Court Opinion

ID: 9538215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:32:31.38661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:38.937136
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
(dissenting.
I concede that the words “reconstructing and renovating the state capitol building” as used in chapter 278, Laws 1955, mean the rebuilding, remodeling and repair of the building already constructed or erected as held in the majority opinion. I do not agree however that the income from the land grant may not be used for those purposes.
The Enabling Act, like our codes, must be liberally construed with the view of accomplishing the object sought to be attained. R.C.M. 1947, section 12-202. And the intention of the lawmakers in enacting the Enabling Act must be pursued if possible. R.C.M. 1947, sections 93-401-16, 43-511.
Sections 12 and 17 of the Enabling Act were for the purpose of erecting buildings to be used for executive, legislative and judicial purposes. I think there is implied authority to use the income from the land grant to repair a building already erected. In other words there is implied authority to keep the building erected or constructed. Our attention has not been called to any case involving a grant of lands for the purpose of erecting buildings for governmental purposes that holds it may not be used to repair a building already constructed. All the cases relied on in support of the majority opinion are eases in which the proposed bonds were payable by tax levies.
In those cases there was involved the principle that bonds may not be issued payable from tax levies unless the authority to issue the bonds is expressly conferred. The authority will *525not be drawn by implication. In such cases statutes conferring authority are strictly construed and no authority or power will be implied.
But even in such cases there is a division of authorities on the subject and some courts hold that the authority to erect a building, even under the strict construction rule, will permit the issuance of bonds for the purpose of repairing a building already constructed.
Thus in Brown v. Graham, 58 Tex. 254, the court in speaking of this said:
“Should the commissioners’ court come to the conclusion that a larger court house is needed to meet the demands of the public business of their county, and they agree upon its plan and dimensions, and find that they can secure a building conforming to them in every respect, either by erecting a new structure, or altering, repairing and enlarging the old one, and the latter mode will be less expensive by half than the former, is there any reason in holding- that they can levy the tax for the more expensive mode of attaining their object, when they could not by the other, though the structure which is the result is precisely the same in every particular?
“The object of the foregoing provisions of our constitution and statutes was to enable the diferent counties to provide suitable public edifices, leaving it to the judgment of the proper authorities whether this would be done better by building new edifices or by repairing and adding to old ones, when they could thus be rendered suitable to the purposes of the country. The word ‘erect’, contained in all the foregoing provisions, was the most comprehensive term that could be used to embrace all such improvements.
‘ ‘ To hold that a county whose court house, with proper repairs and additions, could be rendered commodious and useful in every respect, must pull it down and build an entirely new one, would be to charge our law-givers with an intent to encourage an unnecessary expenditure of the public money. Such a consideration would not, in itself, authorize us to infer a power *526when not expressly given or necessarily implied. Yet when the language used is capable of including authority to do an act not mentioned in terms, such construction of it is greatly aided by considerations of public advantage which it would certainly produce.”
In Cotter v. Joint School Dist., 164 Wis. 13, 158 N.W. 80, it was held that authority to borrow money for the purpose of aiding in the erection or purchase of a schoolhouse was sufficiently broad to authorize the borrowing of money for the purpose of remodeling an existing schoolhouse and building an addition thereto.
In Harrell v. Board of Commissioners of Wilson County, 206 N.C. 225, 173 S.E. 614, it was held that the authority to levy taxes for the erection and purchase of school-houses included the power to repair and make additions.
The words “erect” and “construct” are synonymous. State ex rel. Davis v. Barber, 139 Fla. 706, 190 So. 809; State ex rel. City of Chillicothe v. Gordon, 233 Mo. 383, 135 S.W. 929; Butz v. Murch Bros. Const. Co., 199 Mo. 279, 97 S.W. 895. I think the authority to “erect” or “construct” a building for executive, legislative and judicial purposes by necessary implication carries with it the authority to keep the buildings in a proper state of repair so as to serve the purpose intended. Analogous cases treating of subjects other than buildings hold that the authority to construct confers implied authority to keep in repair.
In re Fowler, 53 N.Y. 60, in discussing the meaning of the word “construct” as used in an act authorizing the construction of a sewer, the court said:
“Nor do we think that the phrases ‘to construct’ and ‘be constructed’ are, in the purview of this act, to be confined to the bare act of building the sewer. Doubtless, to construct is, primarily, to form, to build together; and a power to construct may, in many cases, end when the work of building is done. But here the power to construct is the power to keep together as well as the power to put together, the power to maintain, pro*527tect and preserve, as well as the power to erect. The purpose or object of sewerage, upon a general plan for a city, is not temporary, and such a plan is for a long continued use and benefit. The works constructed for it must be afterward maintained, else the purpose fails.”
In First Nat’l Bank of Eutaw v. Smith, 217 Ala. 482, 117 So. 38, 40, the court had before it the question whether an act setting aside the “gasoline fund” to the “construction, repair, and maintenance” of a designated highway conflicted with the title of the act which authorized the use for “construction” only. The court held it did not, saying:
“* * * the maintenance of the roads and bridges, after their construction, is clearly germane to the purpose of the act, which is to supply the people with highways which are capable of continuous service. And, indeed, the authorities hold that, when authority or duty is imposed by law upon a governmental body to ‘construct’ any public work or utility, that term includes also the duty of maintenance and protection — of keeping it constructed by means of necessary repairs.”
To the same effect is Town of Pelham v. The B. F. Woolsey, 16 F. 418, 421, where the court said:
“In the present case, it may be said, it is true that, strictly, the maintenance of this dock, or the power ‘ to keep and maintain the same in good repair at the expense of the town,’ is not identically the same as ‘constructing the dock’ spoken of in the title. No one, however, could imagine that the dock was to be abandoned by the town the moment its original construction was completed. Subsequent repair is necessary in the nature of the case; and authority to construct the dock would, therefore, in a general sense, seem to imply and include the power to keep it constructed by means of necessary repairs. ’ ’
In Bell County v. Lightfoot, 104 Tex. 346, 138 S.W. 381, 382, the law authorized a bond issue for “purchasing or constructing bridges for public purposes. ’ ’ A bond issue was proposed for “repairing bridges”. The issue was sustained, the court saying:
*528“The Attorney General objects that the statute under which the right to issue the bonds is claimed does not empower the county to issue bonds for the purpose of repairing bridges. We think it well settled that the authority to construct bridges for public purposes embraces the repair and maintenance of such structures.”
In Board of County Com’rs of Bernalillo County v. McCulloh, 52 N.M. 210, 195 Pac. (2d) 1005, 1009, it was held that the authority to “erect” a building carries the implied power to purchase a site and to equip the building so that it can be used for the purpose for which it was built. A long list of cases are therein cited in support of the rule that the power to erect a building implies the power to purchase the necessary land on which to erect it. I think the implied power to repair a building already erected is not as far-fetched as the implied power to purchase a site on which to erect the building for, strictly speaking, the purchase of land is not the erection of a building.
When we construe the Enabling Act liberally with the view of giving effect to the purpose of providing a building .for executive, legislative and judicial purposes, I have no difficulty in concluding that the authority to repair an existing building exists by implication.
I see no difference in principle between this ease and one where money is placed in trust by A for the purpose of erecting a building for use by A’s son and family as a home. Certainly as long as there was money in the trust it could be used to keep the building in a reasonable state of repair so that it served the purpose intended by the grantor.
As to the roll call voting machine, I think it is authorized as a part of the equipment of the building. In Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County v. McCulloh, supra, the court said: ‘ ‘ The courts are, with one exception, unanimous in holding that there is implied power to equip public buildings where power is given to erect them. ’ ’ Many cases are there cited to support the statement.
*529The court then pointed out in that case that there is a difference of opinion among the courts as to the character of equipment contemplated. Some authorities limit the equipment to such as becomes a part of the building while others hold that the power to erect a public building includes the implied power to furnish and equip it so that it can be used for the purpose for which it is erected.
A common sense view of this question was taken by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Hudgins v. Mooresville Consolidated School Dist., 312 Mo. 1, 278 S.W. 769, 771. There the Constitution authorized taxation for the purpose of erecting school buildings, without making any reference to furniture or equipment. It was contended by appellants that there was no authority to equip the building under the constitutional provision. The court, in holding that the contention was without merit, said:
“It has often been held here and elsewhere, not only in the construction of statutes, but Constitutions, that they should be so construed as to aid and effectuate the purpose of their adoption. This beneficient and wholesome rule would cease to be applicable if the section be construed as contended by appellants. It would authorize the erection of a building, but leave it empty as the House of Usher, and thus defeat the purpose of its erection. Goode, J., in an illuminating opinion in State ex rel. Wahl v. Speer, 284 Mo. 45, 223 S.W. 655, held, in effect, that the language of the Constitution (Section 11, Art. 10), which authorizes an increase in the indebtedness of a county for the erection of a courthouse, means, not only that the money so voted can be used to construct the courthouse, but also to acquire a site for it; the rule of interpretation being that a power granted carries with it, incidentally or by implication, powers not expressed, but necessary to render effective the one expressed, and that a courthouse cannot be erected without a site. By parity of reasoning, while a school building may be erected without equipment, the latter is vitally necessary to its use, and without the same its erection would be futile and the purpose of its erection a useless formality.”
*530This language was quoted with apparent approval by the Wyoming Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Blume in Hendricks v. School Dist. No. 1, 44 Wyo. 204, 10 Pac. (2d) 970.
It is unnecessary in this case to determine whether we would go so far as to hold that the power extends to furnishing the building. Here the equipment becomes a part of the building as much so as desks in a schoolroom which are fastened to the floor. The equipment here is much the same as the electric wiring which goes into a modern building, taking the place of the kerosene lamp. Likewise I believe equipment may be added to a building already constructed to meet the needs of a progressive society. Arps v. State Highway Comm., 90 Mont. 152, 300 Pac. 549.
I have considered other questions raised by these proceedings but find nothing upon which to reverse the action of the trial court. It should be noted that the grantor — the United States • — is not complaining of the use made of income from the land grant.
I think the judgment should be affirmed.