Court Opinion

ID: 9540384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:15:30.30662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:31.373578
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
¶ 25 (dissenting). The majority dresses up its adoption of the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection Act (AWCPA) in discretionary jurisprudence, not recognizing that this effectively creates a rule preventing defense attorneys from obtaining some of the very material the State will use in attempting to convict their clients.7 This is an unusual step, as courts usually defer to legislatures when it comes to laws adopting or failing to adopt policy the state deems wise or unwise. The Wisconsin legislature has not adopted anything like the AWCPA, though it has had ample opportunity to do so.
¶ 26. "The court of appeals is an error-correcting court." DeFever v. City of Waukesha, 2007 WI App 266, ¶ 16, 306 Wis. 2d 766, 743 N.W.2d 848. We have no rule making authority. See Wis. Stat. § 751.12 (2007-08)8 and Wis. Stat. ch. 752; Mucek v. Nationwide Commc'ns, Inc., 2002 WI App 60, ¶ 69,252 Wis. 2d 426, 643 N.W.2d 98 (Dykman, J., dissenting).
¶ 27. This is a review of a discretionary decision. We have reviewed many discretionary decisions, and the methodology is well known. "[T]he exercise of discretion is not the equivalent of unfettered decision-malting." Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 *236N.W.2d 16 (1981). As the supreme court noted in Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 77-78, 318 N.W.2d 391 (1982), the important part of a discretionary decision is more than the articulation of the decision. It extends to the explanation of the decision. Id. A discretionary decision must reach a decision by a process of logical reasoning. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d at 66.
¶ 28. If any reason for a discretionary decision were acceptable, we would affirm all discretionary decisions for which some reason is given. Of course, that is not the test. For instance, had the majority explained that it was affirming the trial court's discretionary decision adopting the AWCPA because most of those convicted of sexual assault have blue eyes, it would be easy to see the problem. It is more difficult to see the problem with the majority's conclusion that if Bowser's attorneys and expert witness are given unfettered access to Bowser's computer, there will be an additional risk of dissemination of the prohibited material because that conclusion is correct, but unhelpful. Being correct does not mean that the majority has identified a reasoned or reasonable basis for the trial court's decision.
¶ 29. First, I question the majority's conclusion that there is a risk that Bowser's attorneys or expert would disseminate the child pornography. The attorneys and expert know that disseminating child pornography is a felony. They would be put out of business by a felony conviction. I believe that the increased risk is so small as to be insignificant.9 But the majority's reasoning is also incorrect because the risk of more *237people obtaining the pornography from the attorneys and expert is overwhelmed by the fact that there are 1,596,270,108 internet users in the world, an amount that has grown by 342.2% in the past eight years.10 Each of them, as the majority recognizes, can obtain the forbidden material with a few clicks of a computer mouse. Majority, ¶ 12. The majority is mathematically correct that adding three or four people to one-and-one-half billion people poses an additional risk. But it is equally true that pouring a gallon of water into Lake Mendota will raise that lake's level, and increase the risk of flooding by the amount of rise. This may be judicial reasoning, but in the real world of logic and reality, increases such as those feared by the majority are ignored, or dismissed as foolish. Limiting Bowser's attorneys' and expert's access to the prohibited material will not make any difference to the possibility that someone will obtain the pornography and disseminate it to someone else.
¶ 30. The majority has another reason. It reasons that though restricting the defense team's access to the material creates additional hurdles to the defense, those hurdles don't amount to much. But reasoning that the problem isn't a big one begs the question. Why restrict access in the first place? The burden to allow the prosecution to limit access to evidence is, after all, on the prosecution, not the defense. The majority's second reason is not a reason at all, but depends on its other reasons. I have explained the fallacy of "three or four more is too dangerous."
*238¶ 31. It is not reasonable that adding three or four to one-and-one-half billion makes any difference to anything. So, were I writing for the majority, I would reverse and remand to permit Bowser to have the discovery he has requested, but requiring that those given access agree to use the material only for Bowser's defense. But I am not writing for the majority, so I am limited to respectfully dissenting.

 The majority's claim that all this case is is only an affirmance of a discretionary determination fails to recognize the real world of criminal litigation. This is a stereotypical case. The facts are those of almost all child pornography cases. Why would future trial courts risk retrials when this case approves the method and rationale we will affirm?

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.

 If the attorney and expert witness want to obtain the pornography and disseminate it, they could use the internet to do so even without receiving Bowser's hard drive.

 World Internet Usage Statistics, http://www.internet world stats.com/stats.htm (last visited July 28, 2009).