Court Opinion

ID: 9906422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-02 01:00:26.775584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:22.149489
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50632     Document: 00516986695         Page: 1     Date Filed: 12/01/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                   FILED
                                                                       December 1, 2023
                                  No. 23-50632                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                   Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Greg Abbott, in his capacity as Governor of the State of Texas; State
   of Texas,

                                          Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                          USDC No. 1:23-CV-853
                  ______________________________

   Before King, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
          In July 2023, Texas, at the direction of Governor Greg Abbott,
   installed a floating barrier in the Rio Grande near Eagle Pass, Texas. The
   United States filed a civil enforcement action against Texas, alleging that
   installment of the barrier violated the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act
   of 1899 (“RHA”). The United States moved for a preliminary injunction,
   which the district court granted, ordering the defendants to cease work on
   the barrier and to move it to the Texas riverbank. Texas timely appealed.
   This court entered an administrative stay. Finding that the district court did
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   not abuse its discretion, we DISSOLVE the administrative stay and
   AFFIRM.
                                I. BACKGROUND
          In early June 2023, Governor Abbott announced Texas’s intent to
   deploy “marine floating barriers” to “mak[e] it more difficult to cross the
   Rio Grande and reach the Texas side of the southern border.” 1 On July 10,
   2023, without authorization from the federal government, Texas began
   installing the floating barrier.
          The floating barrier was deployed near Eagle Pass, Texas, with
   additional plans by Texas to deploy similar barriers at three different
   locations in the area. The floating barrier is roughly 1,000 feet long, made up
   of large four-foot orange buoys fastened together with heavy metal cables and
   anchored in place with concrete blocks placed systematically on the floor of
   the Rio Grande. The buoys are surrounded by 68 anchors weighing about
   3,000 pounds each and 75 anchors weighing about 1,000 pounds each.
   Attached to about 500 feet of the floating barrier is a stainless-steel mesh
   “anti-dive net” extending two feet into the water.                   The following
   photographs are illustrative:

          _____________________
          1
            Press Release, Office of the Texas Governor, Governor Abbott Signs Sweeping
   Package of Border Security Legislation (June 8, 2023), https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/
   governor-abbott-signs-sweeping-package-of-border-security-legislation.

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          On July 24, 2023, the United States brought a civil enforcement action
   under Sections 12 and 17 of the RHA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 406, 413, seeking to enjoin
   the building of structures in navigable waters that obstruct the navigable
   capacity of those waters and to require Governor Abbott to remove all
   structures and obstructions in the Rio Grande. Specifically, the United
   States alleged that Texas violated Section 10 of the RHA, 33 U.S.C. § 403,
   by erecting a structure in the Rio Grande without authorization from the
   United States Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) and creating an

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   obstruction to the navigable capacity of that waterway without affirmative
   Congressional authorization.
          On September 6, 2023, after holding a hearing on the motion for a
   preliminary injunction filed by the United States, the district court concluded
   that the United States showed a likelihood of success on the merits and that
   the equities favored the granting of a preliminary injunction. It ordered
   Texas to cease any work on the floating barrier and to reposition it on the
   Texas side of the riverbank by September 15, 2023.                   This court
   administratively stayed the district court’s order pending consideration by
   this panel. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) from an order
   granting a preliminary injunction.
                       II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          “The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is
   discretionary with the district court.” Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas
   Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, we review a
   district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion,
   reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
   Harrison v. Young, 48 F.4th 331, 339 (5th Cir. 2022). “A finding of fact is
   clearly erroneous ‘when although there is evidence to support it, the
   reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
   conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Clark v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
   693 F.2d 500, 501-02 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum
   Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
                               III. DISCUSSION
          A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that “he is
   likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in
   the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor,
   and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

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   Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A “preliminary injunction is an
   extraordinary remedy which should not be granted unless the party seeking
   it has ‘clearly carried the burden of persuasion.’” Harrison, 48 F.4th at 342
   (quoting PCI Transp., Inc. v. Fort Worth & W.R.R., 418 F.3d 535, 545 (5th Cir.
   2005)). The district court determined that the United States had carried its
   burden of persuasion as to all four requirements.
               A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
          Section 10 of the RHA provides in pertinent part:
          The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by
          Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the
          United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build
          or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom,
          weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any
          . . . navigable river . . . of the United States. . . except on plans
          recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
          Secretary of the Army. . ..
   33 U.S.C. § 403.       The first clause prohibits the construction of any
   obstruction in navigable waters without the consent of Congress. 33 U.S.C.
   § 403, cl. 1. The second clause prohibits the construction of specified and
   other structures in those navigable waters absent permission from the Corps.
   33 U.S.C. § 403, cl. 2.
          The district court concluded that the United States showed a
   likelihood of success on the merits as to both clauses. For the United States
   to succeed on the first clause, the district court considered whether the
   segment of the Rio Grande at issue is a “navigable” waterway and whether
   the floating barrier is an “obstruction” to the navigable capacity of that
   waterway. For the United States to succeed on the second clause, the district
   court further considered whether the floating barrier is an “other structure”
   requiring a permit from the Corps before construction. We address each in

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   turn. We then address the district court’s findings on Texas’s self-defense
   argument.
                                   i. Navigability
          To succeed under either clause of Section 10, the waterway must be
   navigable. Navigability is a factual question reviewed for clear error. United
   States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405 (1940).
          The Code of Federal Regulations defines navigable waters as:
          [T]hose waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide
          and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past, or may
          be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign
          commerce. A determination of navigability, once made,
          applies laterally over the entire surface of the waterbody, and is
          not extinguished by later actions or events which impede or
          destroy navigable capacity.
   33 C.F.R. § 329.4. Prior to the passage of the RHA, the Supreme Court
   defined navigable waters as those “used, or are susceptible of being used, in
   their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and
   travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
   water.” The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871).
          Following the passage of the RHA, the Supreme Court broadened its
   definition of navigability. In Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256
   U.S. 113 (1921), it expanded the definition to include waters formerly used in
   interstate commerce but no longer capable of such use. Id. at 123-24. And in
   Appalachian Electric, it expanded the definition to include waters not
   presently used, but capable of future use with reasonable improvement. 311
   U.S. at 408-09.
          Thus, the elements to find navigability, as stated succinctly by the
   Sixth Circuit, require that the waterway “must (1) be or have been (2) used

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   or susceptible of use (3) in the customary modes of trade and travel on water
   (4) as a highway for interstate commerce.” Mia. Valley Conservancy Dist. v.
   Alexander, 692 F.2d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 1982). Texas focuses much of its
   argument on the current state of the at-issue segment of the Rio Grande. But
   the current condition of the Rio Grande is not dispositive, as the tests for
   navigability set forth by the Supreme Court permit a review of whether the
   Rio Grande was historically navigable—that is, whether it was historically
   used in or susceptible of use in commerce—or whether it may be navigable
   in the future with reasonable improvements. See United States v. Utah, 283
   U.S. 64, 82 (1931) (stating that “[t]he extent of existing commerce is not the
   test” for navigability); see also Econ. Light, 256 U.S. at 117 (finding the
   Desplaines River navigable despite “no evidence of actual navigation within
   the memory of living men”).
          The district court made two alternative, independent findings that the
   at-issue segment of the Rio Grande is navigable: first, that it had been used or
   was susceptible of use in commerce in the past and second, that it was
   susceptible of future use in commerce with reasonable improvements. We
   begin with historical navigability. The district court concluded that the
   United States presented sufficient evidence to carry its burden at this stage.
   We agree.
          In its complaint, the United States attached several exhibits discussing
   the navigability of the at-issue segment of the Rio Grande. Included among
   those is a document issued on December 20, 2011, by the Corps titled
   “Navigable Waters of the United States in the Fort Worth, Albuquerque,
   and Tulsa Districts Within the State of Texas.” It includes the Rio Grande
   from “the Zapata-Webb county line upstream to the point of intersection of

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   the Texas-New Mexico state line and Mexico” as “navigable waters of the
   United States” falling within the Corps’ jurisdiction. 2
           The United States also attached an authenticated document titled
   “Navigability Determination, Rio Grande River, TX,” published in 1984, in
   which the United States Coast Guard indicated that the Rio Grande River
   “was listed among the navigable waters of the United States pursuant to
   treaties with Mexico and for Coast Guard regulatory purposes.” The Coast
   Guard published these determinations yearly from 1947 to 1976, when the
   practice of publishing lists of navigable waters ceased. The document further
   stated that “the designated stretch of the Rio Grande River remains a
   navigable waterway of the United States.” 3 In his declaration authenticating
   the document, Captain Brandy Parker of the U.S. Coast Guard indicated that
   “the 1984 navigability determination is still in effect.”
           The United States also relied on an extensive study performed by the
   Corps that concluded: “The Rio Grande River between River Mile 275.5 and
   610.0, on the United States side from the centerline of the normal channel, is
   a navigable water of the United States.” This determination of navigability
   by the Corps is based on a report titled “Navigability Study, Rio Grande,
   Tributaries, and Lakes, Rio Grande Basin, River Mile 275.5 to 610.0 date

           _____________________
           2
            U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Fort Worth Dist., Navigable
   Waters of the United States in the Fort Worth, Albuquerque, and
   Tulsa Dist. Within the State of Texas 1 (2011), www.swf.usace.army.mil/
   Portals/47/docs/regulatory/NavList2011.pdf.
           3
             Courts afford substantial weight to an agency’s determinations of navigability.
   Huron Mountain Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 2:12-CV-197, 2012 WL 3060146,
   at *9 (W.D. Mich. July 25, 2012), aff’d, 545 F. App’x 390 (6th Cir. 2013); Wash. Water
   Power Co. v. FERC, 775 F.2d 305, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[The Corps’] official reports thus
   carry particular weight.”); 33 C.F.R. § 329.14(a) (“Although conclusive determinations of
   navigability can be made only by federal [c]ourts, those made by federal agencies are
   nevertheless accorded substantial weight by the courts.”).

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   March 1975” (the “Navigability Study”). The Navigability Study, relied
   upon by the district court, reflects in detail on past commerce in the region. 4
           The first practical navigation in the region occurred during the
   Mexican American War.                “General Zachary Taylor importuned the
   quartermaster for light steamboats for patrol and military transportation
   purposes. The Corvette, Whitesville, Major Brown, and Colonel Cross arrived
   from Pittsburg in June, 1846. Other steamboats plying the Rio Grande at the
   time were the J. E. Roberts and the Brownsville.” In an extract from People
   and Plots on the Rio Grande by V. N. Lott and V. M. Fenwick (1957), the
   authors indicate the importance of steamboats in the transportation of
   supplies for Taylor’s army: “These played a most important role in the
   history of the conflict and for many years thereafter river navigation was vital
   to the life of the area between Ringgold and Brownsville, and to some extent
   as far up to Laredo.”
           Navigation was then extended further upstream: “In October, 1846, a
   successful attempt was made to ascend the Rio Grande in the United States
   steamer Major Brown, by order of General Patterson . . ..” Another account
   discusses navigating to the Big Bend reach, the farthest upstream area of
   which any account was found:
           The head of steam navigation in the 1850’s . . . was Roma.
           Goods were trans-shipped upriver to the forts by pack and
           wagon from there . . .. First of all, until steamboats were

           _____________________
           4
              Relying on treaties between the United States and Mexico and the Supreme
   Court’s decision in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899),
   discussed infra, the Corps concluded it was “unnecessary to determine whether sufficient
   past use occurred in the study area,” as its navigable capacity was reaffirmed in treaties and
   by the Supreme Court. Regardless, the Navigability Study included numerous excerpts
   and other historical evidence demonstrating past use and susceptibility of use in commerce
   in the area that are relevant to our decision today.

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          released from wartime troop duty, he supplied the river
          garrisons by keelboat. And then in 1850 he sent an expedition
          up the river with orders to navigate to the farthest possible
          place. He hoped to discover that shipping could utilize far
          more of the river’s length than it had so far done. A keelboat
          and a skiff, manned by sixteen men, ascended the river by
          channel to a point a thousand miles above the head of steam
          travel or about thirteen hundred miles above the mouth. It was
          an astonishing penetration for a river with so little water, and
          the expeditioneers came back, all safe, to report optimistically
          that if the channel were improved in certain passages, steam
          navigation would be entirely feasible all the way “up to
          Babbitt’s Falls.”
          Also included in the Navigability Study is an extract from the 1949
   book Rio Grande, River of Destiny by Laura Gilpin that states:
          In 1861 the Rio Grande was navigable for two hundred miles,
          and Texas-grown cotton was brought to the mouth of the river
          by small boats for the transfer to ocean-going vessels in the Gulf
          of Mexico. Down the coast in small boats and across the land
          by wagon came cotton to be sold to Europe. Up the coast and
          back across the land went supplies for the Confederate Army,
          as these were imported from England, France, and Mexico.
          In an extract from Southwestern Historical Quarterly (1914) edited by
   Ephraim Douglass Adams, a letter titled “British Correspondence
   Concerning Texas” sent in 1843 states:
          All the rivers however, discharging themselves into the Gulf,
          vary greatly in their navigable facilities, according to the
          season, and I dare say, that in the winter and spring Months,
          the Rio Grande would be navigable for a great distance in light
          iron boats, such as are used in the upper Ganges and Indus.
          . . . Matamoros, Tampico, Alvarado, Tabasco are all accessible
          to Vessels of the draught I have indicated.

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          The district court, as well as the Corps’ Navigability Study, also
   considered Article VII of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo between the
   United States and Mexico, in which the countries agreed that navigation on
   the Rio Grande “divided in the middle between the two Republics. . . shall
   be free and common to the vessels and citizens of both countries; and neither
   shall, without the consent of the other, construct any work that may impede
   or interrupt, in whole or in part, the exercise of this right.” 9 Stat. 928 (1848)
   (free navigability reinforced by the Gadsden Treaty, art. IV, 10 Stat. 1034
   (1853)).
          Contemporaneous court cases, cited by the district court, also support
   a finding of historical navigability. These cases discuss ferry companies
   operating between Eagle Pass and Piedras Negras, transporting goods in
   commerce, such as cotton. United States v. Weil, 35 Ct. Cl. 42, 77 (1900)
   (“At Eagle Pass there were ferryboats in which cotton was crossed over. .
   ..”); Tugwell v. Eagle Pass Ferry Co., 9 S.W. 120 (Tex. 1888) (resolving
   dispute between ferry companies operating between Eagle Pass and Piedras
   Negras). Contrary to the dissent’s position, ferry usage is an appropriate
   consideration when evaluating historical navigability. See Appalachian Elec.,
   311 U.S. at 413 n.46 (considering ferry usage). Moreover, the dissent points
   to a Georgia district court decision—United States v. Crow, Pope & Land
   Enters., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 25, 35 (N.D. Ga. 1972)—to support its contention
   that ferry usage does not demonstrate commerce in the region. But Crow
   considered intrastate bank-to-bank ferry traffic occurring entirely within
   Georgia on the Chattahoochee River, not commerce across an international
   boundary. See id. at 29-30. The ferry cases cited by the United States
   specifically involve the transportation of goods in commerce, such as cotton,
   between the United States and Mexico—a feature that certainly makes the

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   Rio Grande unique and undermines any contention that navigation must be
   along the river. 5
           In addition to the agency determinations, historical evidence, treaties
   between the United States and Mexico, and court cases, the district court
   noted several acts of Congress, attached to the United States’ complaint, that
   emphasize the importance of navigability in the region. In one act to
   authorize the construction of a bridge over the Rio Grande between the cities
   of Eagle Pass, Texas, and Piedras Negras, Mexico, Congress states:
           [S]aid bridge shall not interfere with the free navigation of said
           river, and in case of any litigation arising from an obstruction
           or an alleged obstruction to the free navigation thereof, caused
           or alleged to be caused by said bridge, the case may be tried
           before the circuit or district court of the United States for the
           State of Texas having jurisdiction thereof.
   23 Stat. 29 (1884). It further states:
           Congress reserves the right to withdraw the authority and
           power conferred by this act, in case the free navigation of said
           river shall at any time be substantially or materially obstructed
           by said bridge, or for any other reason, and to direct the
           removal or necessary modifications thereof at the cost and
           expense of the owners of said bridge. . ..
   Id. 6

           _____________________
           5
             Moreover, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo explicitly contemplates cross-river
   navigation between the United States and Mexico, as it recognizes that either country’s
   vessels or citizens could land upon the other country’s shores. See 9 Stat. 922, art. VII
   (1848).
           6
             Another act granting consent of Congress to the Eagle Pass and Piedras Negras
   Bridge Company for construction of a bridge across the Rio Grande between Eagle Pass,
   Texas, and Piedras Negras, Mexico states in relevant part that the consent of Congress is
   given to the construction of a bridge between Eagle Pass and Piedras Negras “at a point
   suitable to the interests of navigation across the Rio Grande.” 42 Stat. 1482 (1923).

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            A few years later, Congress authorized the Texas-Mexican Electric
   Light and Power Company to erect wires across the Rio Grande at Eagle Pass,
   Texas:
            Provided, That said wires shall not interfere with the free
            navigation of said river, and in case of any litigation arising from
            an obstruction or alleged obstruction to the free navigation
            thereof, caused or alleged to be caused by said wires, the case
            may be tried before the district court of the United States for
            the western district of Texas: And provided also, That Congress
            reserves the right to withdraw the power and authority
            conferred by this act in case the free navigation of the river shall
            at any time be substantially or materially obstructed by said
            wires, or for any other reason, and to direct the removal of said
            wires, or necessary modifications thereof, at the cost and
            expense of the owners of said wires . . . ..
   26 Stat. 495 (1890). 7
            Perhaps if all the United States identified at this stage were these acts
   of Congress, we might find clear error based on Oklahoma v. Texas, in which
   the Supreme Court, evaluating similar acts, determined that these provisions
   were “only precautionary” and “not intended as an affirmation of navigable
   capacity in that locality.” 8 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922). But the district court
   relied on additional evidence, outlined supra, of the same sort relied upon by
   the Supreme Court in Appalachian Electric:

            _____________________
            7
             The same language was utilized in another act the same year to authorize the
   Eagle Pass Water Supply Company and the Compania Proveedora de Aguas de Cuidad
   Porforio Diaz to connect their water works communications across the Rio Grande at Eagle
   Pass, Texas. 26 Stat. 502 (1890).
            8
            We note, however, that the acts of Congress through statutes and treaties, at least
   shows that Congress considered this stretch of the river historically “susceptible” to use
   in commerce and sought to preserve its authority over the river, which is sufficient under
   Appalachian Power.

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          Use of a stream long abandoned by water commerce is difficult
          to prove by abundant evidence. Fourteen authenticated instances
          of use in a century and a half by explorers and trappers, coupled
          with general historical references to the river as a water route for the
          early fur traders and their supplies in pirogues and Durham or
          flat-bottomed craft similar to the keelboats of the New [River],
          sufficed upon that phase in the case of the DesPlaines.
   311 U.S. at 416 (emphasis added). Likewise, here, there are numerous
   historical references regarding use in commerce throughout the 1800s.
   Additionally, the Supreme Court in Appalachian Electric stressed the
   broadness in which it finds navigability: “Nor is it necessary for navigability
   that the use should be continuous. The character of the region, its products
   and the difficulties or dangers of the navigation influence the regularity and
   extent of use. Small traffic compared to the available commerce of the region is
   sufficient.” Id. at 409 (emphasis added). “Even absence of use over long
   periods of years, because of changed conditions, the coming of the railroad or
   improved highways does not affect the navigability of rivers in the
   constitutional sense.” Id. at 409-10. “Nor is lack of commercial traffic a bar
   to a conclusion of navigability where personal or private use by boats
   demonstrates the availability of the stream for the simpler types of commercial
   navigation.” Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
          Finally, the district court’s finding of historical navigability on the at-
   issue portion of the Rio Grande is supported by the Supreme Court’s holding
   in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899),
   relied upon by the district court and the Corps’ Navigability Study. There,
   the Supreme Court held that the Rio Grande River is “not navigable within
   the territory of New Mexico.” Id. at 695. However, in discussing the
   propriety of taking judicial notice of navigability within the territory of Texas,
   the Supreme Court expressly stated: “That the Rio Grande, speaking
   generally, is a navigable river, is clearly shown by the affidavits. It is also a

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   matter of common knowledge, and therefore the courts may properly take
   judicial notice of that fact.” Id. at 698. 9
           Accordingly, we find no clear error in the district court’s historical
   navigability finding. The dissent would demand a higher showing than what
   is required. To succeed under the RHA, the United States need not prove
   that the Rio Grande was, in fact, historically used for commerce. It need only
   show that it was historically susceptible of use for commerce. The evidence
   put forth by the United States overwhelmingly supports, at least, the
   conclusion that the at-issue segment of the Rio Grande was historically
   susceptible of use for commerce. On these facts, we are not left with a
   “definite and firm conviction” that the district court erred. Clark, 693 F.2d
   at 501-02 (quoting U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395). Moreover, we expect
   the evidence to develop as this case proceeds to the merits. We reiterate the
   posture of the case before us. We are not reviewing a permanent, but a
   preliminary, injunction.        The “extraordinary” nature of a preliminary
   injunction does not heighten Winter’s “likely” standard. See Winter, 555
   U.S. at 22. For now, this showing is sufficient. 10
                                         ii. Obstruction
           Section 10’s first clause bars the “creation of any obstruction not
   affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the

           _____________________
           9
             The Supreme Court’s consideration of the Rio Grande up to New Mexico as
   “navigable” should be afforded great, if not dispositive, weight. The precise definition of
   “navigable waters” and “navigability” are dependent on judicial determination, not the
   findings of administrative agencies. 33 C.F.R. § 329.3. Although the determinations made
   by the Corps and the Coast Guard certainly bolster a consensus in the evidence of historical
   navigability.
           10
              Because we find sufficient evidence to affirm the district court’s finding of past
   navigability, we do not reach its alternative holding that the Rio Grande was susceptible to
   future use in commerce with reasonable improvements.

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   waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 403. After finding navigability,
   the district court found obstruction, concluding that “the floating barrier
   interferes with or diminishes the navigable capacity of the Rio Grande and
   creates a hazard.” Whether there is an obstruction is a question of fact
   reviewed for clear error. Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 709.
             Texas argues that to be an obstruction, an object must tend to destroy
   the navigable capacity of a waterway. To the contrary, the Supreme Court
   has defined an obstruction as tending to “interfere with or diminish[] the
   navigable capacity of a stream.” Id. It has also emphasized that its own cases
   define “obstruction” as used in Section 10 as “broad enough to include
   diminution of the navigable capacity” of the waterway at issue. United States
   v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 489 (1960). 11                    Under this broad
   construction, the Supreme Court has previously found matter described as
   “fine particles” from an iron mill to be an obstruction under Section 10. Id.
   at 483.
             The Fifth Circuit has likewise acknowledged the Supreme Court’s
   broad interpretation of obstruction. Vieux Carre Prop. Owners, Residents &
   Assocs., Inc. v. Brown, 875 F.2d 453, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The Supreme
   Court has encouraged a broad interpretation of a section 10 ‘obstruction’. .
             _____________________
             11
             The broadness of Section 10’s reading of obstruction is noted no less than five
   times. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. at 487 (“[T]he Court. . . gave the concept of
   ‘obstruction’ as used in § 10, broad sweep . . ..”); id. at 488 (“[I]n Sanitary District Co. of
   Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 429 [(1925)]. . . the Court citing United States v.
   Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., supra, with approval and saying that § 10 of the 1899
   Act was ‘a broad expression of policy in unmistakable terms, advancing upon’ § 10 of the
   1890 Act.”)); id. at 489 (“That broad construction of § 10 was reaffirmed in State of
   Wisconsin v. State of Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 [(1929)] . . ..”); id. at 491 (“We read the 1899 Act
   charitably in light of the purpose to be served. The philosophy of the statement of Mr.
   Justice Holmes . . . that ‘A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure,’ forbids a narrow,
   cramped reading of either § 13 or of § 10.” (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336,
   342 (1931)).

                                                  16
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                                        No. 23-50632

   ..”). And it has construed the term flexibly, as the district court noted,
   without a size or positional limit. See United States v. Raven, 500 F.2d 728,
   731 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding a sunken schooner to be an obstruction “[i]f
   floating particles can be an obstruction”); United Tex. Transmission Co. v.
   U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 7 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding a pair of
   gas pipelines running under the bed of a bayou an obstruction).
           Here, the district court began its analysis by noting that Texas
   designed and deployed the floating barrier to literally obstruct lateral
   movement across the river. 12 It then looked to the credible testimony and
   evidence before it.
           The declaration of Mario Gomez, Acting Area Operations Manager
   for the Amistad Dam Field Office of the United States Section of the
   International Boundary and Water Commission (“IBWC”), 13 indicated that
   “[n]ormally, the Mexico or U.S. Section of the Commission can go into any
   location of the Rio Grande independently and do surveying and other
   engineering work that the Commission Sections carry out” but that the
   floating barrier is “an impediment to the Sections crossing independently in
   this part of the river,” including a planned survey by the Mexican Section of
   the Commission that was unable to proceed because of the obstruction.
          Likewise, the Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol (“USBP”), Jason D.
   Owens, declared that border patrol agents rescue individuals in distress in the
          _____________________
          12
              See Press Release, Office of the Texas Governor, Operation Lone Star Boosts
   Border      Response     with      New      Marine     Barriers    (July   14,    2023),
   https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/operation-lone-star-boosts-border-response-with-new-
   marine-barriers (the floating barrier will “prevent people from even crossing the middle
   part of the Rio Grande River and coming into the state of Texas”).
          13
             The IBWC was established to implement treaties between the United States and
   Mexico. Each country has a section, and the “two sections work in concert to implement
   treaty requirements and resolve differences that arise during implementation.”

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                                          No. 23-50632

   Rio Grande, utilizing “small watercraft to quickly respond as the incidents
   unfold.” He noted that “[a]ny obstructions in the water could naturally
   impair the freedom of movement and potentially delay response times.”
   “From the beginning of fiscal year 2018 through July 23, 2023 there were 249
   water-related rescues and 89 water-related deaths of individuals whose
   rescue or death occurred in or around the Rio Grande throughout the Eagle
   Pass Station AOR.” 14
           Further, in the declaration of Joseph L. Shelnutt, the Regulatory
   Project Manager in the Compliance and Enforcement Branch for the Corps,
   he indicates that the “placement and tandem configuration of the buoys,
   which allows them to move somewhat independently even though they are
   connected, present a structural barrier to cross-river navigation and would
   force a vessel to maneuver around the structure to avoid collision or
   entanglement at this location.”
           The district court also noted that the floating barrier is not simply a
   string of buoys but is made even larger by the anchors placed four to six feet
   on either side of the barrier: “Photographs show these grey concrete anchors
   standing from the bed of the river, with no markings to identify them as
   hazards. These concrete obstacles present a serious risk to watercraft of any
           _____________________
           14
              The declarations from employees of the IBWC and USBP show that the floating
   barrier is an obstruction to the work of federal officials in this segment. And the United
   States’ use of its waterways for more than traditional navigation is an appropriate
   consideration. Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. at 426 (“In our view, it cannot properly be said
   that the constitutional power of the United States over its waters is limited to control for
   navigation. . .. Flood protection, watershed development, recovery of the cost of
   improvements through utilization of power are likewise parts of commerce control. .
   .. That authority is as broad as the needs of commerce.”). “The point is that navigable
   waters are subject to national planning and control in the broad regulation of commerce
   granted the Federal government.” Id. at 426-27. Accordingly, these declarations are
   evidence that the floating barrier interferes with the federal government’s activities on the
   waterway.

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   kind.”     This is because the anchors are not easily seen by oncoming
   watercraft but are at a level that would cause damage to a vessel of any size
   that came upon them.
            Texas’s own declarants state that the portion of the Rio Grande at
   issue has many hazards, including “sand bars, shallow water, water with
   inconsistent depths, small islands, large rocks, man-made debris, natural
   debris such as logs and stumps, and sandy shoals” and that it is “very difficult
   and dangerous” even for airboats to operate. As the district court found,
   these conditions “make it even more imperative for anyone piloting down the
   river to have free reign [sic] of the entire width and a clear view of all
   obstacles.”
            This evidence, coupled with the Supreme Court’s command to
   interpret “obstruction” within Section 10 broadly, supports the district
   court’s finding that the floating barrier is an obstruction to the navigable
   capacity of the Rio Grande, and we find no clear error. Having made the
   requisite showing that Texas is likely in violation of the first clause of Section
   10 because its obstruction was not “affirmatively authorized by Congress,”
   33 U.S.C. § 403, the United States has shown that it is likely to succeed on
   the merits of its first claim.
                                    iii. Other Structure
            Section 10’s second clause prohibits “build[ing] or commenc[ing] the
   building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty,
   or   other    structures    in any. . . navigable river. . . except   on    plans
   recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of
   the Army.” 33 U.S.C. § 403. The Corps defines “structure” expansively
   including, “without limitation, any pier, boat dock, boat ramp, wharf,
   dolphin, weir, boom, breakwater, bulkhead, revetment, riprap, jetty, artificial
   island, artificial reef, permanent mooring structure, power transmission line,

                                            19
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                                    No. 23-50632

   permanently moored floating vessel, piling, aid to navigation, or any other
   obstacle or obstruction.” 33 C.F.R. § 322.2.
          The district court found that the floating barrier was a “boom” or
   “other structure,” requiring a permit prior to construction, and thus that the
   United States was likely to prevail on its Section 10, clause 2 claim. We agree
   that it is an “other structure,” and do not consider whether it is a “boom.”
          As the United States argues, all the structures listed in Section 10 are
   built in water and tend to be obstacles or obstructions to navigation. In other
   words, these structures are all tangible objects that “interfere with or
   diminish” navigation by requiring vessels to move around them. See Rio
   Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 709 (defining “obstruct”). The barrier fits within
   this broad definition because vessels must navigate around the barrier, and
   some may even be completely thwarted by its presence.
          Texas’s argument that to constitute an “other structure,” the floating
   barrier must be permanent is unconvincing. Even if the other enumerated
   structures were permanent, Texas has not shown that the floating barrier is
   not. The barrier has a “tamper resistant” design and “heavy concrete blocks
   placed systematically on the bed of the Rio Grande River to prevent
   movement.” And the barrier “is meant to withstand at least a 100-year
   flood” and “rise and fall with the elevation of the water while maintaining
   the same position on top of the river.” As the district court noted, “Texas’s
   own declarants attest that it would take ‘several weeks,’ heavy equipment,
   and $300,000 to remove the barrier.” Moreover, Texas has no intention of
   removing the barrier after a short time, as is made clear by the current
   litigation.
          Having also made the requisite showing that Texas is likely in
   violation of the second clause of Section 10 because the floating barrier is an
   “other structure” built without seeking Corps approval, the district court

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   correctly determined that the United States has shown it is likely to succeed
   on the merits of both its RHA claims.
                                      iv. Invasion
          Texas argues that the Constitution gives it a right to defend itself from
   “invasion,” so it should be exempt from any RHA violations. U.S. Const.
   art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No state shall, without the Consent of Congress,
   . . . engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as
   will not admit of delay.”). We note that a “preliminary injunction may issue
   . . . despite the existence of a plausible defense, as long as the movant
   demonstrates a substantial likelihood of success.” Dall. Cowboys
   Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir.
   1979). We have already affirmed the district court’s determination that the
   United States showed a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
          However, “the district court must at least make clear that it has
   considered plausible defenses which are fully briefed and argued by [the]
   defendants.” Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. CDL Mrkt., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 815
   (5th Cir. 1989). “While a preliminary injunction may be appropriate even in
   the face of potentially significant defenses, it is frequently desirable in such
   cases to expedite the trial on the merits.” Id. (citing 11 Charles Alan
   Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
   Procedure § 2950, at 484 (1973 & Supp. 1988)); see also Charles A.
   Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal
   Practice & Procedure § 3291.1 (2d ed. 2011) (“Ordinarily the scope
   of appellate review under § 1292(a)(1) is confined to the issues necessary to
   determine the propriety of the interlocutory order itself. The curtailed
   nature of most preliminary injunction proceedings means that the broad
   issues of the action are not apt to be ripe for review. . ..”).

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          Here, Texas’s self-defense argument does not preclude the issuance
   of a preliminary injunction. First, the district court adequately considered
   Texas’s arguments. Further, the district court, mindful of the sensitive
   nature of the parties’ interests in this case, sought to expeditiously seek a
   determination on the merits. Finally, the gravity of Texas’s argument—
   particularly the constitutional implications of a single state’s ability to declare
   it is invaded and select its own means of waging war—suggests it would be
   best considered on a fully developed record.
          “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent irreparable
   injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on
   the merits.” Miss. Power & Light, 760 F.2d at 627 (citing Canal Auth. of State
   of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1974)). The evidence before
   the district court did not show that the floating barrier had any meaningful
   impact on deterring any perceived “invasion,” so its removal is unlikely to
   cause Texas irreparable injury. 15 Accordingly, the preliminary injunction
   appropriately maintains the status quo while the district court expeditiously
   considers the case on its merits.
                            B. Balance of Equities
          Since its issuance, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
   555 U.S. 7 (2008), has been the guidepost for determining whether a plaintiff
   has made an adequate showing to warrant entry of a preliminary injunction.
   The United States has shown a likelihood of success on the merits, so we turn
   to whether it has shown a likelihood of irreparable harm absent preliminary
   relief, that the balance of equities tips in its favor, and that an injunction is in
   the public interest. Id. at 20.

          _____________________
          15
              As discussed below, however, its continued presence will likely result in
   irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief.

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           The district court, in the alternative to its holding that it need not
   consider these additional factors where the United States enforces a public-
   interest statute, expressly addressed each one. 16 Its balancing was not an
   abuse of discretion.
           First, the district court considered whether the United States had
   demonstrated “that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an
   injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. It pointed to the “tremendous strain”
   on the U.S.-Mexico relationship. It further found that the floating barrier
   “threatens the IBWC’s ability to implement the core provisions of the 1944
   Treaty between the United States and Mexico, which is crucial to allocation
   of waters in the Rio Grande,” and that one meeting concerning water releases
   was already cancelled by the Mexican Section of the IBWC due to the
   presence of the floating barrier. The district court also found that the floating
   barrier posed a risk to human life, which is supported by Texas’s own
   statements noting the treachery of venturing across the Rio Grande. 17 The
   weight of the evidence before the district court supports its conclusion.

           _____________________
           16
              We leave for another day the argument of whether Winter overrules the line of
   cases in this circuit (and others) that hold that when the United States seeks an injunction
   enforcing a public-interest statute, a court may grant a preliminary injunction “without
   making findings of irreparable harm, inadequacy of legal remedy, or the balance of
   convenience.” United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1358 (5th Cir. 1996);
   see also United States v. FDIC, 881 F.2d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 1989) (“However, if a statutory
   violation is involved and the statute by necessary and inescapable inference requires
   injunctive relief, the movant is not required to prove the injury and public interest
   factors.”). We need not consider this argument now, as the district court, in the
   alternative, performed the Winter balancing of equities.
           17
               Though Texas vigorously disputes whether people have died because of the
   floating barrier, Governor Abbott’s own letter to President Biden acknowledges the harm
   posed in crossing the Rio Grande: “Neither of us wants to see another death in the Rio
   Grande River. Yet your open-border policies encourage migrants to risk their lives by
   crossing illegally through the water, instead of safely and legally at a port of entry. Nobody
   drowns on a bridge.”

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                                    No. 23-50632

          The declaration of Jennifer T. Pena, Chief Legal Counsel for the
   United States Section of the IBWC, discussed the collaboration between the
   United States and Mexico. In a 1944 Treaty between the United States and
   Mexico called the “Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana and of
   the Rio Grande,” the two countries agreed “how to allocate the waters of the
   bi-national rivers in the Treaty title, including the Rio Grande.” In a 1970
   Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio
   Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary, both countries
   agreed “that the international boundary will be the middle of the channel
   occupied by the normal flow of the river.” Because river channels may shift
   over time, the countries agreed to take measures to stabilize and prevent
   shifts, including by “prohibit[ing] the construction of works in its territory
   which . . . may cause deflection or obstruction of the normal flow of the river
   or of its flood flows.”
          The floating barrier “has been the subject of a series of
   correspondence from the Mexican section of the IBWC” and is “interfering
   with the ability of the IBWC to fulfill its mission.” On July 14, 2023,
   Mexico’s Section of the IBWC “objected to the placement of the buoys and
   requested intervention of the United States Section to remove the buoys.”
   It further reported that, “as a result of the floating barriers in Eagle Pass,
   Mexico was cancelling a July 24, 2023, meeting concerning water releases to
   the United States from the Rio Conchos River in Mexico.” In a July 14, 2023,
   meeting between the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and the
   IBWC to discuss delivery by Mexico to the United States of water from the
   Rio Grande, Mexico’s Section of the IBWC indicated that Texas’s unilateral
   actions “could affect cooperation between the two countries going forward.”
          Currently, the United States and Mexico are in the midst of trying to
   reach an agreement by December 2023 on a “new mechanism to improve the
   predictability and reliability of Rio Grande water delivery from Mexico to the

                                         24
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                                     No. 23-50632

   United States” and discussions are “at a sensitive stage.” “By causing
   Mexico to rethink and limit its cooperation with the United States, Texas’s
   floating barrier interferes with IBWC’s ability to implement its core mission
   of implementation of the 1944 Water Treaty for deliveries of water on the Rio
   Grande.” “[I]f the proposed [structure] and appropriation of waters of the
   Rio Grande constitute a breach of treaty obligations or of international duty
   to Mexico, they also constitute an equal injury and wrong to the people of the
   United States.” Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 701.
          On July 24, 2023, Hillary Quam, the U.S.-Mexico Border Coordinator
   at the U.S. Department of State and acting Director of the Office of Mexican
   Affairs, declared that if the barrier “is not removed expeditiously, its
   presence will have an adverse impact on U.S. foreign policy,” and that
   Mexico “[o]n a number of different occasions beginning in late June, 2023”
   has “protested to the United States the deployment of a floating barrier
   within the Rio Grande.” Mexico has protested the installation of the floating
   barrier, “asserting that it causes obstruction and deflection of the river as well
   as possible runoff into Mexican territory” “in contravention of the
   provisions of the 1970 Treaty.”
          In a supplemental declaration on August 15, Ms. Quam indicated as
   follows:
          The Government of Mexico has continued to protest to the
          United States the deployment of the barrier. On August 10, the
          Secretary of State held a meeting in Washington, D.C., with his
          counterpart from Mexico, Foreign Secretary Alicia Bárcena
          . . . The topic of the floating barrier was the first one raised by
          Foreign Secretary Bárcena. The Foreign Secretary indicated
          that Mexico is very concerned about the floating barrier and
          grateful for this lawsuit.
   The President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, in his daily press
   conference, has discussed the matter of the floating barrier at least six times

                                          25
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                                          No. 23-50632

   since July 25, 2023. Crediting this evidence to find a likelihood of irreparable
   harm was not erroneous. 18
            Turning to the balance of equities and the public interest, when the
   United States is a party, the third and fourth elements of the traditional
   preliminary injunction analysis merge. Cf. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435
   (2009). The district court found that “the barrier’s threat to human life, its
   impairment to free and safe navigation, and its contraindication to the
   balance of priorities Congress struck in the RHA outweigh Texas’s interest
   in implementing its buoy barrier in the Rio Grande River.”
           The district court, in finding that the public interest favored the
   United States, emphasized Supreme Court decisions. In Sanitary District of
   Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925), the Supreme Court stated:
   “There is no question that this power [to remove obstructions to interstate
   and foreign commerce] is superior to that of the States to provide for the
   welfare or necessities of their inhabitants.” Id. at 426. More pointedly, in
   Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), the Supreme Court noted that
   while Arizona “may have understandable frustrations with the problems
   caused by illegal immigration,” as Texas has alleged, “the State may not
   pursue policies that undermine federal law.” Id. at 416.

           _____________________
           18
              The dissent faults the scope of the injunctive relief—as the district court only
   required that the barrier be moved to the shoreline, rather than entirely removed—as failing
   to remedy the United States’ diplomatic harms. But this overlooks the fact that the
   President of Mexico spoke positively of the district court’s injunction during his daily press
   conference on September 7, 2023. Further, Mexico’s expressed concerns sprung from the
   treaty obligations between the countries that require the river be free of obstructions.
   Moving the barrier to the riverbank alleviates this concern and allows the district court to
   proceed to the merits without requiring Texas to dismantle the barrier entirely.

                                                26
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                                           No. 23-50632

           Further, the district court emphasized that the “balance of priorities
   Congress struck in the RHA” outweighed Texas’s asserted interests. Courts
   may look at the statute at issue for guidance in determining whether the
   issuance of a preliminary injunction would be in the public interest. See, e.g.,
   Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 544 (1987)
   (finding the public interest promoted by the Alaska National Interest Lands
   Conservation Act was “to protect Alaskan subsistence resources from
   unnecessary destruction,” rather than preventing the actions the plaintiff
   sought to enjoin). Congress has spoken to the public interest through passage
   of the RHA, and the Supreme Court has emphasized the same: “We are
   dealing here with the sovereign powers of the Union, the Nation’s right that
   its waterways be utilized for the interests of the commerce of the whole
   country.” Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. at 405. 19
           The district court relied on all the evidence discussed herein to find
   that the balance of hardships tips in favor of the United States. It considered
   the threat to navigation and federal government operations on the Rio
   Grande, 20 as well as the potential threat to human life the floating barrier

           _____________________
           19
              See also U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 70 (1913) (“But
   every such structure in the water of a navigable river is subordinate to the right of navigation
   . . . and must be removed if Congress, in the assertion of its power over navigation, shall
   determine that their continuance is detrimental to the public interest in the navigation of
   the river.”).
           20
              We also consider the danger to federal government operations, including those
   of the Border Patrol, IBWC, and Coast Guard, to be particularly concerning. At this stage,
   the showing is sufficient, and the United States can hardly be faulted for being unable to
   produce even more evidence of the dangers the floating barrier poses. As noted in Captain
   Justin Peters’s declaration, because Texas did not seek a permit by the Corps, the Coast
   Guard has not been able to consider “the impact of the structure on the safety of navigation
   as well as the traditional and possible uses of the waterway including possible impact on
   future Coast Guard mission tasking,” as well as “the location of the structure in relation to
   the navigable channel, navigational traffic patterns, difficulty of navigation in the vicinity
   of the structure, the nature of maritime activity in the vicinity of the structure, the nature

                                                 27
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                                         No. 23-50632

   created. All of the district court’s findings of fact were well supported by the
   record, and its conclusion that the equities favor issuance of a preliminary
   injunction was not an abuse of discretion.
                                      IV. CONCLUSION
           The district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. Its
   grant of a preliminary injunction was not an abuse of discretion, as the United
   States carried its burden. Accordingly, we DISSOLVE the administrative
   stay and AFFIRM. Texas’s motion to stay the district court’s preliminary
   injunction pending appeal is DENIED AS MOOT.

           _____________________
   of the structure, and the potential for the structure to move with tidal or weather
   conditions.” In Shelnutt’s declaration, he indicates that the Corps “were unable to
   determine, among other things, the exact methods of construction and whether the floating
   barrier was sufficiently anchored to ensure it remained in place,” as well as “any overall
   effects from the floating barrier on public safety, use of the Rio Grande in that area, and
   other public interest factors.” Finally, “because no information was submitted for project
   evaluation and potential permitting, it is unknown if the structure meets engineering
   standards to withstand predicted high flows. Should segments of the structure, or the
   entire structure, become unmoored from its location and travel downstream, further risks
   to navigation and safety could reasonably be assumed.” This is particularly troubling
   considering the August 15, 2023, declaration of the United States showing that nearly 80
   percent of the floating barrier had drifted out of alignment and into Mexican waters. The
   ambiguity and concerns surrounding the impact of the floating barrier, which have not been
   properly evaluated by relevant agencies because of Texas’s unilateral action, support the
   grant of a preliminary injunction.

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                                              No. 23-50632

   Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
           In response to millions of illegal border crossings in recent years,
   accompanied by millions of pounds of smuggled drugs, Texas Governor Greg
   Abbott deployed a floating barrier along a 1,000-foot stretch of the Rio
   Grande near Eagle Pass, a popular crossing spot. The bright orange chain of
   tethered buoys—a floating border wall anchored to the riverbed by concrete
   blocks—is Governor Abbott’s latest effort to quell the record influx of illegal
   crossings, something he has declared an “invasion.”
           Today, the majority opinion upholds the district court’s grant of a
   preliminary injunction requiring Texas to cease work on the barrier and shift
   it to the Texas riverbank. I disagree and would vacate the injunction entered
   by the district court, as the United States has failed to carry its burden on any
   of the four preliminary injunction factors.
           With deepest admiration for my colleagues, I respectfully dissent.
                                          *        *         *
           “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy” not to be
   granted freely. 1 The district court should deny relief “unless the party
   seeking it has clearly carried the burden of persuasion” 2 by showing four
   things: (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits, (2) they are likely to suffer
   irreparable harm without an injunction, (3) the balance of the equities tips in
   their favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. 3

           _____________________
           1
               Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 703 F.3d 262, 268 (5th Cir. 2012).
           2
             Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cnty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 692 F.3d
   343, 348 (5th Cir. 2012)).
           3
               Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

                                                  29
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                                          No. 23-50632

           As for factor one—likelihood of success on the merits—the United
   States’ claim under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA) is unlikely to
   prevail. 4 Both the district court and the majority opinion cite inapplicable
   statutes, treaties, cases, and other evidence to argue that this segment of the
   Rio Grande is navigable and thus subject to the RHA. But the district court’s
   erroneous navigability finding—and the majority’s affirmance—cannot be
   squared with a century-plus of precedent.
           The United States also falls short on the three other preliminary
   injunction factors. It is entirely unclear how the preliminary injunction—
   which orders the barrier to be moved, but not removed (as Mexico
   demands)—remedies the United States’ diplomatic harms. And as for the
   balance of the equities and public interest, the United States offers no
   substantiated record evidence that could justify a preliminary injunction.
                                                I
           The United States has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits
   of its claim under the first two clauses of RHA § 10. Under both clauses, the
   United States must show that this 1,000-foot stretch of the Rio Grande is
   navigable—but it cannot. More than a century of precedent points to only
   one conclusion: This 1,000-foot segment is not navigable.
           The majority opinion and the district court overlook this well-settled
   law and distort the test for navigability. Despite the majority’s and district
   court’s many attempts to argue otherwise, the United States has not shown
   that it will likely prevail in demonstrating that these 1,000 feet were
   historically used or susceptible of use in interstate or foreign commerce and

           _____________________
           4
             See id.; see also Mock v. Garland, 75 F.4th 563, 587 n.60 (5th Cir. 2023) (“There
   is authority that the first factor—likelihood of success on the merits—is the most important
   of the preliminary injunction factors.”).

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                                            No. 23-50632

   thus historically navigable. 5 The majority does not reach the district court’s
   alternative holding—that this Rio Grande segment is navigable because
   reasonable improvements could make it susceptible of future commercial
   use. But the district court erred there, too: The United States cannot show
   that it will likely prevail in establishing navigability on this ground because it
   has failed to present evidence that any improvements would be reasonable. 6
                                                  A
           In upholding the district court’s finding of historical navigability, the
   majority opinion repeats many of the district court’s mistakes—and makes
   some new ones of its own.
                                                  1
           Start with the mistakes that the majority opinion and the district court
   share. Both recite statutes, treaties, a 1975 study by the United States Army
   Corps of Engineers (the Corps), and cases that they say show historical

           _____________________
           5
             This is the proper test for historical navigability. See, e.g., Econ. Light & Power Co.
   v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123–24 (1921) (holding that waters are navigable even if they
   are “not at present used for such commerce” or are currently “incapable of such use” so
   long as they previously had “actual navigable capacity in [their] natural state and [were]
   capable of carrying commerce among the states”); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
   Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940) (“A waterway, otherwise suitable for navigation, is not barred
   from that classification merely because artificial aids must make the highway suitable for
   use before commercial navigation may be undertaken.”).
           6
               The district court did not decide whether this 1,000-foot stretch is presently used
   or susceptible of use for interstate or foreign commerce. The United States does not argue
   that it is. Regardless, the record is replete with evidence that it is not. Accordingly, this Rio
   Grande segment cannot be deemed navigable based on present commercial use or
   susceptibility. See The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 439 (1874) (stating that waters are navigable
   “when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, . . . as highways for commerce”).

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   navigability. But this evidence does not show that this 1,000-foot segment of
   the Rio Grande was historically used or susceptible of use in commerce.
           First, the statutes. The district court should not have relied on these
   statutes to find navigability. In Oklahoma v. Texas, the Supreme Court said in
   no uncertain terms that a similar act that “provided in substance that there
   should be no interference with navigation . . . was only precautionary and not
   intended as an affirmation of navigable capacity in that locality.” 7 The
   statutes cited by the district court and the majority, like the statute in
   Oklahoma, do not make the necessary factual findings 8 that the Rio Grande
   was used or susceptible of use in commerce; they only prohibit obstructions
   to navigation. 9 In Oklahoma, the Supreme Court explained that this
   prohibitory language was merely Congress playing it safe by barring
   obstructions in case that segment of the river turned out to be navigable. 10 We
   should not read these statutes as saying more than they do.
           Second, the treaties. Like the district court, the majority points to the
   Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the Gadsden Treaty, which require the
   United States and Mexico to maintain “free and common” “navigation of”
   the Rio Grande below New Mexico. But point is all the majority and district

           _____________________
           7
               258 U.S. 574, 585–86 (1922).
           8
            See Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. at 405 (“The navigability of the [river segment] is,
   of course, a factual question . . . .”).
           9
             See, e.g., Act of Mar. 4, 1923, 67 Cong. Ch. 254, 42 Stat. 1482 (granting consent
   of Congress to Eagle Pass and Piedras Negras Bridge Company for construction of a bridge
   across the Rio Grande); Act of Sept. 27, 1890, 51 Cong. Ch. 1002, 26 Stat. 495 (authorizing
   the Texas-Mexican Electric Light and Power Company to erect wires across the Rio
   Grande at Eagle Pass); Act of May 29, 1884, 48 Cong. Ch. 57, 23 Stat. 29 (authorizing the
   construction of a bridge over the Rio Grande between Eagle Pass and Piedras Negras).
           10
              See Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 586 (“Congress merely took the perfectly safe course
   of qualifying its permission as indicated.”).

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   court do. They give no reason—because there is none—why these treaties
   establish navigability and are not merely precatory.
           Even a cursory review of the case law shows that these treaties do not
   establish navigability. In United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation
   Company, the Supreme Court said that these treaties obligated the United
   States “to preserve . . . the navigability of its navigable waters.” 11 That is,
   whether the river is navigable is a preliminary question that is not answered
   by the treaties themselves. Oklahoma suggests the same. Like the statute in
   Oklahoma, these treaties do not make specific factual findings of navigability
   and provide only that there should be no interference with “free and
   common” navigation. 12 On Oklahoma’s reasoning, then, the treaties are not
   “affirmation[s] of navigable capacity” but rather “precautionary”
   statements that navigability should not be obstructed where it exists. 13 Because
   the treaties cannot establish navigability, the majority opinion also
   improperly relies on the United States Coast Guard’s 1984 navigability
   determination—which itself relies on these treaties.
          Third, the Corps’s 1975 study. The majority opinion and the district
   court cite the Corps’s 1975 study and subsequent determination that the Rio
   Grande is navigable—but the Corps never found navigability based on
   historical or then-current use. 14 The Corps observed that there was “no
   [then-current] commercial activity occurring within” that stretch of the river

          _____________________
          11
               174 U.S. 690, 700–01 (1899) (emphasis added).
          12
               See Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 585–86.
          13
               See id. at 586.
          14
            The majority also cites a 2011 document in which the Corps lists the Rio Grande
   as a navigable water. As the United States acknowledges, this 2011 navigability
   determination was based on the Corps’s 1975 study. Because reliance on the 1975 study is
   improper, so too is reliance on the 2011 list improper.

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   and that there were only “sketchy accounts on [past] use.” The Corps
   instead found navigability based on the treaties and the Supreme Court’s
   decision in Rio Grande Dam, which, as I explain, was improper. The majority
   opinion admits that the Corps’s navigability finding was not based on past
   use—but it inconspicuously relegates that concession to a footnote and
   avoids mentioning that the Corps criticized the historical evidence on which
   it now relies.
          Like the district court, the majority opinion looks under the hood at
   the Corps’s historical findings. But the majority’s and district court’s
   analyses of this historical evidence are flawed. Both overlook a key feature of
   the test for navigability: Use of the river must have been more than
   “sporadic,” “ineffective,” 15 and “exceptional.” 16
          Any evidence of past use in the Corps’s study is too sporadic and
   exceptional to establish historical navigability. The majority opinion and the
   district court both cite an anecdote that, in 1850, “[a] keelboat and a skiff,
   manned by sixteen men, ascended the river by channel to a point a thousand
   miles above the head of steam travel,” which was Roma, Texas. But the
   district court omitted—and the majority opinion overlooks—that this
   historical account also described the expedition as “an astonishing
   penetration for a river with so little water.” And they ignore the Corps’s
   comment that “[t]here is no showing that substantial items of commerce
   were shipped from [Roma]” at the time of the expedition. In context, this
   expedition is at most an “exceptional” use of the river, which does not suffice
   to show navigability. 17

          _____________________
          15
               United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 23 (1935).
          16
               Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 699.
          17
               See id.

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           In addition, the Corps stated that “there apparently has never been
   any ‘practical navigation’ between Roma . . . and El Paso” and that “at
   normal stages the river apparently was not navigable above Rio Grande
   City.” Even “during periods of sufficient flow,” only “fishing boats and
   other shallow draft craft” could navigate the river. As the Supreme Court
   explained, navigability does not extend to “every small creek in which a
   fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at high water.” 18 Rather,
   to be historically navigable, the river must have been suitable “as [a]
   highway[] for commerce, over which trade and travel [was] or [could have
   been] conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.” 19
   There is no evidence of that here. As the Corps said, any accounts of the
   river’s use were “sketchy,” and “actual accounts of commercial travel
   [were] lacking.” And given the “serious ecological objections to any
   channelization” and “doubtful” economic justifications, there were no
   reasonable improvements that could have permitted commercial use of that
   stretch of the river. 20 Because the Corps’s study does not show that the river
   segment was used or susceptible of use in commerce, it does not support the
   district court’s finding of historical navigability.
           Fourth, the cases. The majority opinion and the district court cite
   cases that mention past ferry traffic across the Rio Grande at Eagle Pass. But
   bank-to-bank traffic alone has never established navigability. Because the test
   for historical navigability turns on whether the water was used or susceptible
           _____________________
           18
                Id. at 698–99 (citation omitted).
           19
                The Montello, 87 U.S. at 439.
           20
              See Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. at 408–09 (stating that “[a] waterway, otherwise
   suitable for navigation, is not barred from that classification merely because artificial aids
   must make the highway suitable for use before commercial navigation may be undertaken”
   and that “[t]here must be a balance between cost and need at a time when the improvement
   would be useful”).

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                                               No. 23-50632

   of use as a “highway for commerce,” there must also be evidence of
   commerce or navigation along the river. 21 Consistent with this view, the
   Supreme Court in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Company did
   not rely solely on evidence of ten “small public ferries going from one bank
   to the other” to find navigability. 22 Rather, the Court cited ample evidence
   of boating and commerce along the river, including “[f]ourteen
   authenticated instances of use . . . by explorers and trappers,” “general
   historical references to the river as a water route for the early fur traders,”
   and “evidence of actual use of [one segment] for commerce.” 23 Our circuit
   has taken the same approach. In Puente de Reynosa, S.A. v. City of McAllen,
   we noted that there was ferrying across the river—but we also observed “that
   high-pressure steamboats [previously] made frequent trips up [that segment
   of] the Rio Grande” and that “small boats continue to be navigated on the
   river” before finding that segment navigable. 24

           _____________________
           21
               See Econ. Light & Power Co., 256 U.S. at 121 (quoting The Montello, 87 U.S. at
   439); see also Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. at 413–15 (describing evidence of boating “along”
   the river); Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 699 (noting that “the Fox river, which was
   considered [by the Supreme Court] in [The Montello],” had “a general capacity for
   navigation along its entire length” (emphasis added)). As one court persuasively observed,
   “[T]he existence of ferries is no more an example of commercial use than the presence of
   a bridge or railroad trestle whose primary purpose is to avoid the river rather than to employ
   it as a means for trade and transportation.” United States v. Crow, Pope & Land Enters., Inc.,
   340 F. Supp. 25, 35 (N.D. Ga. 1972). The majority opinion argues that Crow is inapposite
   because here, unlike in Crow, the ferries cross an international boundary. But Crow did not
   distinguish between intrastate and cross-border ferry traffic when making this observation.
   See id. Its general comment about ferry traffic is thus still persuasive.
           22
                See Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. at 413 & n.46.
           23
                Id. at 416; see also id. at 413–15.
           24
             357 F.2d 43, 50–51 (5th Cir. 1966) (determining the Rio Grande’s navigability
   near the Hidalgo-Reynosa Bridge).

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           Accordingly, without sufficient evidence of past use or susceptibility
   to use in commerce along this 1,000-foot Rio Grande segment, there can be
   no finding of historical navigability. As explained, the “sketchy” historical
   accounts of activity along the river are nowhere near as extensive as those in
   Appalachian Electric and do not establish navigability.
           The majority opinion thus repeats the district court’s mistakes. Both
   engage only partially with the case law and record, overlooking signs that this
   stretch of the river was not used or susceptible of use in commerce—and thus
   not historically navigable.
                                               2
           In an attempt to bolster the district court’s erroneous conclusions, the
   majority opinion points to additional historical anecdotes and the Supreme
   Court’s opinion in Rio Grande Dam. But in doing so, it makes two new,
   unforced errors: It would have us ignore Texas geography and give
   dispositive weight to an out-of-context quote from the Supreme Court.
           First, the majority opinion quotes historical anecdotes that refer to
   other parts of the Rio Grande—not this specific 1,000-foot segment near
   Eagle Pass. Whether the Rio Grande was historically navigable along these
   other segments has zero bearing here because we analyze navigability of this
   segment only. 25
           Consider the majority opinion’s quote from the 1949 book Rio Grande,
   River of Destiny by Laura Gilpin. Nothing in that quote suggests that this
           _____________________
           25
              See Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 698–99 (determining whether the segment of
   the Rio Grande within New Mexico is navigable); 33 C.F.R. § 329.11(b) (“The character
   of a river will, at some point along its length, change from navigable to non-navigable.”);
   cf. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 593 (2012) (“To determine title to a
   riverbed under the equal-footing doctrine, this Court considers the river on a segment-by-
   segment basis to assess whether [it] . . . is navigable or not.”).

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   1,000-foot stretch is within the 200 navigable miles that Gilpin describes.
   The quote mentions the 200-mile segment and then says that goods were
   brought to the Rio Grande’s mouth at the Gulf of Mexico, more than two
   hundred miles from inland Eagle Pass. This suggests that Gilpin’s 200-mile
   navigable segment started at the Rio Grande’s mouth and thus stopped short
   of where the barrier is today. The majority’s quote from People and Plots on
   the Rio Grande suffers from a similar geographic flaw. That quote describes
   navigation “between [Fort] Ringgold and Brownsville, and to some extent as
   far up as Laredo.” 26 But our 1,000-foot segment is much further inland than
   Fort Ringgold, Brownsville, and Laredo. These quotes are thus irrelevant.
          Second, the majority opinion omits the context surrounding the
   Supreme Court’s comment in Rio Grande Dam that courts may take judicial
   notice “[t]hat the Rio Grande, speaking generally, is a navigable river.” 27
   After stripping the qualifying language, the majority says we should give this
   quote “great, if not dispositive, weight.”
          The surrounding language in Rio Grande Dam shows that this quote is
   not persuasive, let alone dispositive. The Supreme Court suggested only that
   courts could take judicial notice “[t]hat the Rio Grande, speaking generally, is
   a navigable river” because it is common knowledge. 28 The Court was careful
   to underscore a critical point: “[H]ow far up the stream navigability
   extends . . . should be determined by evidence” if it is not “a matter of
   general knowledge, or one that ought to be generally known.” 29 The Court

          _____________________
          26
            Logically, this quote must refer to “Fort Ringgold.” The modern Ringgold is
   near Texas’s border with Oklahoma.
          27
               See Rio Grande Dam, 174 U.S. at 698.
          28
               Id. (emphasis added).
          29
               Id.

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                                       No. 23-50632

   added, “[I]t is not so clear that it can fairly be said . . . [that it is] a matter of
   common knowledge at what particular place between its mouth and its source
   navigability ceases.” 30
          In Rio Grande Dam, the Supreme Court tellingly did not take judicial
   notice that the Rio Grande was navigable within New Mexico—instead, it
   examined “affidavits and other evidence.” 31 And, the real kicker, it
   concluded that the segment was not navigable. 32 Judicial notice of the Rio
   Grande’s general capacity for navigation clearly does not displace or even
   supplement our standard fact-driven, segment-by-segment navigability test.
   As today’s dispute shows, the navigability of this 1,000-foot Rio Grande
   segment is far from common knowledge. The Supreme Court’s comment
   about judicial notice thus has no role here.
          In sum, there is not sufficient evidence to find that the United States
   is likely to prevail in showing that this specific 1,000-foot stretch of the Rio
   Grande was historically used or susceptible of use in commerce. The district
   court clearly erred in finding navigability on this ground.
                                             B
          Because the majority opinion affirms the district court’s finding that
   this 1,000-foot segment was historically navigable, it does not reach the
   district court’s alternative holding: that this part of the river is navigable

          _____________________
          30
               Id.
          31
               Id.
          32
               Id. at 698–99.

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                                              No. 23-50632

   because it could be used for commerce with reasonable improvements. 33 I
   would reject this alternative holding, too.
           Navigable waters include those that are not presently used as
   highways for commerce but could be after reasonable improvements. 34 Key
   is the word “reasonable.” 35 That is, “[t]here must be a balance between cost
   and need at a time when the improvement would be useful.” 36
           The district court said only that future improvements are
   “possible”—it did not attempt to assess costs and benefits. But how could
   it? The United States has presented no evidence of costs or commercial
   benefits. 37 The record thus does not support the district court’s holding that
   the Rio Grande segment is navigable because reasonable improvements could
   make it suitable for commerce.
                                          *       *     *
           Because the United States cannot show that this segment is navigable,
   based on historical evidence or on future reasonable improvements, its RHA
   claim cannot succeed. 38 The United States thus fails to show a likelihood of
           _____________________
           33
                See Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. at 408–09.
           34
                Id.
           35
                Id. at 408.
           36
             Id. at 407–08; see also Lykes Bros. Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 821 F. Supp.
   1457, 1464 (M.D. Fla. 1993), aff’d, 64 F.3d 630 (11th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that “the costs
   of improvement [must] be justified by the benefits to commercial transit in th[e] area”);
   Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. FERC, 681 F.2d 1134, 1139 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1982) (weighing costs
   and benefits).
           37
             See Appalachian Elec., 311 U.S. at 407–08; Lykes Bros. Inc., 821 F. Supp. at 1464
   (“The Corps failed to present any evidence of the cost of such improvements or evidence
   of any commerce which would rely on the creek should such improvements be made.”).
           38
             As mentioned before, this Rio Grande segment also cannot be deemed navigable
   based on present commercial use or susceptibility. See supra note 6.

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                                             No. 23-50632

   success on the merits—“the most important of the preliminary injunction
   factors.” 39
                                                 II
          The United States fares no better on the last three preliminary
   injunctions factors: It has not shown that it “is likely to suffer irreparable
   harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in
   [its] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 40
          The district court erred in concluding that the United States was likely
   to suffer irreparable harm without the preliminary injunction. Critically, it is
   entirely unclear how the injunction alleviates the United States’ diplomatic
   harms. The record indicates that the alleged harms arise from the
   “construction and presence” of the barrier and that Mexico has demanded
   the barrier’s “prompt removal.” The preliminary injunction, however,
   requires Texas to shift the barrier to the Texas bank, not remove it from the
   river. If the district court credited the United States’ allegations of harm,
   then it should have ordered the barrier to be not just moved but removed. Only
   complete removal would eliminate the “construction and presence” of the
   barrier and meet Mexico’s demands. The district court’s justification is
   unsatisfying: It suggested only that ordering removal would not be a
   “measured” response suitable for the preliminary injunction stage, wholly
   ignoring the mismatch between the United States’ alleged harms and the
   remedy it prescribed. That the district court entered a preliminary injunction

          _____________________
          39
               See Mock, 75 F.4th at 587 n.60.
          40
               See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

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   that is nonresponsive to the United States’ alleged diplomatic harms suggests
   that those harms are merely speculative. 41
          The United States also fails to show that the balance of the equities
   and the public interest favor granting the injunction. The district court
   erroneously identified three reasons that it said favor the United States: the
   barrier threatens human life and safety, impairs navigation, and violates the
   RHA.
          First, Texas and the district court disagree about the barrier’s safety
   and usefulness for deterring drug trafficking. Texas argues that the barrier
   “was designed . . . to save lives and direct migrants to appropriate . . . points
   of entry while deterring unlawful, dangerous crossings; drug smuggling;
   human trafficking; and terrorist infiltration” at “one of the most active drug-
   trafficking and human-trafficking hotspots on the river.” At this stage,
   however, Texas has not offered concrete evidence that the barrier has saved
   lives or reduced illegal crossings and drug trafficking.
          On the other side, the United States—which bears the burden on the
   preliminary injunction factors 42—has offered no credible evidence of harm.
   Curiously, the district court tried to spin the river’s naturally treacherous
   conditions as evidence that the barrier is dangerous. The majority opinion
   also makes that logical leap, but I cannot. To support the district court’s
   assessment, the majority opinion cites a quote by Governor Abbott that
   migrants “risk their lives by crossing illegally through the [Rio Grande].”
   The majority opinion holds this out as evidence that “the floating barrier

          _____________________
          41
             See Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 601 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The party seeking a
   preliminary injunction must also show that the threatened harm is more than mere
   speculation.”).
          42
               See Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 2009).

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                                          No. 23-50632

   pose[s] a risk to human life.” But Governor Abbott was talking about the
   danger posed by the river, not the barrier. The majority opinion cannot
   misread Governor Abbott’s comment to save the United States on these
   preliminary injunction factors.
           The district court also erred in taking judicial notice of news articles
   that reported that two dead bodies were found near the barrier. 43 Although
   “courts reviewing preliminary injunctions can take judicial notice of
   subsequent factual developments,” 44 those facts must still be proper material
   for judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 45 Under that rule, a
   district court “may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable
   dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial
   jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources
   whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 46 The news articles
   satisfy neither prong: It was not established that the facts were “generally
   known within the” district court’s jurisdiction, and Texas reasonably
   questioned the articles’ accuracy. 47 The district court should not have found
   on the evidence before it that the barrier is a “threat to human life.”
           Second, the district court should not have found that the barrier is an
   “impairment to free and safe navigation” and a “contraindication to the
           _____________________
           43
              See Petrobras Am., Inc. v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 9 F.4th 247, 255 (5th
   Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“We review a district court’s decision whether to take judicial
   notice for abuse of discretion.”).
           44
              Valentine v. Collier, 960 F.3d 707, 708 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020) (Davis, J., concurring)
   (collecting cases).
           45
             Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260, 1277 n.33 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting
   that Federal Rule of Evidence 201 applied in a preliminary injunction hearing).
           46
                Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)–(2).
           47
            See Petrobras Am., Inc., 9 F.4th at 255 (“The newspaper articles in this case were
   not proper material for judicial notice.”).

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                                           No. 23-50632

   balance of priorities Congress struck in the RHA.” Because this Rio Grande
   segment is not navigable and the United States is likely to fail on its RHA
   claim, neither of these factors carries weight.
          In sum, the district court’s analysis of these equitable factors was
   unpersuasive, unsubstantiated, and incorrect—and the majority opinion
   repeats the error. The United States has not carried its burden.
                                                III
          A preliminary injunction is an exceptional remedy that requires the
   moving party to clearly satisfy all four requirements. In this case, the United
   States cannot satisfy one, much less all four.
          The law and the record are clear: The United States cannot succeed
   on its RHA claim because it has not shown that this 1,000-foot segment of
   the Rio Grande is navigable. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority
   opinion and the district court resort to evidence that is foreclosed to us by a
   century-plus of case law. Nor can the United States satisfy the three other
   preliminary injunction factors.
          As the United States has not “clearly carried the burden of
   persuasion” 48 on even one requirement to obtain the “extraordinary
   remedy” 49 of a preliminary injunction, I respectfully dissent.

          _____________________
          48
               Dennis Melancon, Inc., 703 F.3d at 268 (citation omitted).
          49
               Id.

                                                 44