Court Opinion

ID: 9661900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:54:18.240123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:34.963995
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
Seaback, Plantation and Deoux Chene assert that the admissions in their third-party complaint were not invoked on the trial by City and were therefore waived. We overrule this contention. All the parties announced ready on the trial and stated to the court their positions and contentions under their respective pleadings. City then proceeded to prove the amount of its charges and St. Paul’s indemnity bonds. The admissions in the third-party actions stand uncontradicted in the record. None of City’s proof was inconsistent with the admissions. The judgment recites that the court considered the evidence and “the pleadings on file” in reaching its conclusion that there was no evidence supporting certain essential elements of City’s case. For the reasons set forth in our original opinion, we remain convinced that the court erred in its conclusion.
St. Paul asserts the pleading denominated “Third Party Action” which it adopted was in fact an alternative plea for indemnity against Cousins in the event City succeeded in its suit, and accordingly that the admissions contained in it could not be *779considered in proof of City’s case. We disagree. The third-party complaint against Cousins is grounded on pleadings of conversion of certain funds, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and fraud. City’s suit against the complainants is not even mentioned in it; and, as we have already noticed, the prayer sought directly, and not contingently, the recovery of the sum sued for. Our view that the third-party action was not intended merely as a plea for indemnity is further supported by the fact that the original complainants in the third-party suit — Seaback, Plantation, and Deoux Chene — included in their answer to City’s suit a count for indemnity against Cousins in the event City succeeded against them, and adopted their pleadings in the third-party complaint as grounds therefor, as follows:
“The defendants say that the Third Party Defendant in the Third Party Action to be filed herein is liable to this Defendant for any amount, if any, that the Plaintiff herein recovers from these defendants and that they should have judgment over and against the Third Party Defendant as alleged therein. And all provisions of the Third Party Action are adopted and made a part hereof.”
It is clear under the pleadings in the third-party action that the complainants were asserting that Cousins had come into possession of funds collected during the bankruptcy proceeding which belonged to the complainants, in an amount based upon and equal to certain water and electric utility bills incurred by the apartments during the bankruptcy proceeding, and that complainants were entitled to recovery of funds, without regard to the recovery or not by City on its suit, because the funds represented “operating costs” of the apartments during the bankruptcy proceeding.
Other contentions by Seaback, Plantation, Deoux Chene and St. Paul for rehearing are also overruled.
Seaback, Plantation, Deoux Chene, and St. Paul did not appeal from the take-nothing judgment against them in favor of Cousins on the third-party action; and they seek no relief here, alternatively or otherwise, from that judgment. City, not being interested in the third-party action, appealed only from the judgment against it in favor of Seaback, Plantation, Deoux Chene, and St. Paul. Although Cousins filed a brief and orally argued on this appeal in support of the take-nothing judgment against City, it consistently maintained in its brief and oral argument that the third-party actions against it were independent actions. Cousins contends that under those circumstances we erred in reversing the take-nothing judgment in its favor on the third-party actions and in assessing costs of this appeal against it. We sustain those contentions.
It is the general rule that where one party appeals from a judgment, a reversal as to him will not justify a reversal against the other non-appealing parties. However, this rule does not apply in cases where the respective rights of the appealing and non-appealing parties “are so interwoven or dependent on each other as to require a reversal of the whole judgment where a part thereof is reversed.” Lockhart v. A. W. Snyder & Co., 139 Tex. 411, 163 S.W.2d 385, 392 (1942).
We have demonstrated that the third-party actions against Cousins are independent and distinct suits not at all grounded upon nor interwoven with City’s suit against the third-party complainants. Of course, this is not so as to the count for indemnity set up in the answer of Seaback, Plantation and Deoux Chene.
Cousins’s motion for rehearing is granted. Our prior judgment is set aside and judgment is here rendered as follows: The take-nothing judgment against City is reversed, and that cause is remanded for trial. The take-nothing judgment against Cousins on the third-party actions is affirmed. The costs of this appeal are assessed against Seaback, Plantation, Deoux Chene, and St. Paul.