Court Opinion

ID: 9553196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:25:06.171004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:15.181365
License: Public Domain

MR JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the result reached in the foregoing opinion so far as it affirms the order of the court awarding the custody of the children.
I disagree with that portion of the opinion which overrules the majority opinion in McDonald v. McDonald, 124 Mont. 26, 218 Pac. (2d) 929, 15 A. L. R. (2d) 1260. That the McDonald Case is supported by the great weight of authority is shown by the annotations in 15 A. L. R. (2d) 1270, et seq.
As there pointed out a divorce action is still pending after the decree of divorce is entered so that the court may make changes in alimony and the custody of children and that being so, an award of attorney’s fees for the former wife may be made under R. C. M. 1947, sec. 21-137, after the divorce decree has become final. Likewise most courts that have spoken on the subject take the view as did the majority opinion in the McDonald Case that the court has the inherent power to make such an award of attorney’s fees even without reference to any statute. See Note in 15 A. L. R. (2d) 1272.
Hence the majority opinion in the McDonald Case is not only supported by the clear weight of authority but it is also supported by the better reason. After a divorce has been granted it is true that the parties are no longer husband and wife. But where there are children of the marriage the husband and wife are not complete strangers to each other. The action is still pending under our statute, R. C. M. 1947, sec. 21-138, so that the court may, after judgment, make modification affecting the custody, care and education of the children of the marriage, and the court may likewise after judgment modify its orders with respect to allowances for the support of the former wife. R. C. M. 1947, sec. 21-139.
Hence under our statute a divorce action is "pending” within the meaning of R. C. M. 1947, sec. 21-137, so long as the court *524has authority to modify the judgment in any respect. If it isn’t pending in contemplation of law, then by what process of reasoning is it subject to modification?
The narrow construction placed upon the statutes in the dissenting opinion in the McDonald Case and which the majority opinion herein now adopts, makes the mother’s custody of children dependent upon her financial ability to employ an attorney and embark upon litigation. This, I think, should not be the rule, and under our statutes it is not the rule.
I think the majority opinion in the McDonald Case is correct and that the order allowing attorney’s fees on the strength of the holding in that case should be affirmed.
I also disagree with that portion of the opinion of the Chief Justice which holds that witnesses who had been acquainted with plaintiff for considerable periods of time could give their opinions' as to whether she was a fit and proper person to have the custody of her minor children. I agree that on proper subjects opinion evidence may be given by an ordinary observer. 32 C. J. S., Evidence, sec. 455, page 94. But there are limitations on the subject matter with which an ordinary observer may give his conclusion. 32 C. J. S., Evidence, sections 463-471, inclusive, pages 103-126. No useful purpose would be subserved in reviewing the authorities on analogous questions. This court before the turn of the present century has answered the question before us.
In State ex rel. Giroux v. Giroux, 19 Mont. 149, 47 Pac. 798, 802, the court disposed of the point by saying: ‘ ‘ The following-interrogatory was propounded to several witnesses whose depositions were taken, namely: ‘Which do you consider the better qualified to have the care and custody of their said minor child, George L. Giroux, now about seven years of age, — relator or respondent?’ It was objected to as incompetent on the ground that it asked for a conclusion of the witnesses. We think the court was right in sustaining the objection. The question manifestly asked for a conclusion, and was therefore clearly incompetent. The following interrogatory was also propounded: ‘State whether you *525consider respondent a fit and proper person to have the care and custody of the said minor child, George L. Giroux, and give reason for your opinion.’ While this last interrogatory is less objectionable than the former, still the objection to it, that it asked for a conclusion, was properly sustained. ’ ’
I find there was ample evidence in the record to sustain the trial court’s order without the opinion evidence, and for that reason reception of this evidence was harmless error.
I think the order of the trial court should be sustained in its entirety.