Court Opinion

ID: 9695522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:21:38.717191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:13.795585
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
dissenting. I do not believe that today’s decision can be squared with the plain wording of the Code of Professional Conduct. The decision is not only erroneous, but, in my view, it sends a very wrong message, both to the bar and to the public whose interests the Code is supposed to protect. To the members of the bar, it says, you will not be held to the ethical standards of the Code, as long as you are fortunate enough that your misconduct does not happen to cause serious harm. To the public, the decision can only add to its concerns as to whether the profession is capable of policing its own members. I respectfully dissent.
DR 1-102(A) provides that “A lawyer shall not: ... (4) Engage in conduct involving . . . deceit or misrepresentation.” (Internal punctuation omitted.) Signing a legally significant document with someone else’s name knowing that the other has not given authorization to do so is (a) a misrepresentation of the genuineness of the signature and/or of one’s authority to execute the document and is, therefore (b) a deceitful act against anyone relying on the genuineness/authority of the signature.
While it is easy to imagine much more serious cases of deceit and misrepresentation than this, there can hardly be a plainer one. Thus, unless the appellee is to be excused because he merely procured the act through giving advice to his client, as opposed to forging the signature himself, he unquestionably violated the Code. The majority does not excuse his conduct on this ground, and a moment’s reflection on the concepts of agency, causation and conspiracy will confirm why it has not.
It is true that the appellee’s conduct resulted in his client achieving a result to which she was apparently entitled. That is a consideration that should go to the severity of the sanction, however, not to the conclusion as to whether a violation occurred in the first place. I think the hearing panel was well within its discretion in deciding that, under the circumstances, the minimum sanction was warranted. I cannot agree with the Board, however, which adopted the hearing panel’s findings of fact in their entirety, that no violation occurred. See In re Morrissette, 161 Vt. 576, 579, 636 A.2d 329, 332 (1993) (mem.) *326(attorney violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by altering release of right of first refusal after clients had signed it); In re Conti, 380 A.2d 691, 692 (N.J. 1977) (attorney violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by signing clients’ names to deeds and acknowledging signatures despite permission to do so); see also State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v. Kelly, 374 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Neb. 1985) (forging client’s endorsement on bond receipt violates DR 1-102(A)(4) despite attorney’s belief that conduct was “ministerial in nature and done as a service to his client”).
The concurrence characterizes this issue as a question of standard of review. It is not. Where the Board ought to be entitled deference, akin to a jury, is in its fact finding role. The issue before us, however, is whether appellee’s conduct, as determined by the Board, amounts to a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). This issue is most plainly a question of law; the Board’s legal conclusions must be ‘“clearly and reasonably supported by the evidence.’” In re Rosenfeld, 157 Vt. 537, 543, 601 A.2d 972, 975 (1991) (quoting In re Wright, 131 Vt. 473, 490, 310 A.2d 1, 10 (1973)). Indeed, under these facts, the Board’s conclusion that no violation occurred was clearly erroneous. The Board has the opportunity to temper “violations of the Code with a collective view of fairness” when it recommends sanctions. It may not impose its view of fairness in deciding whether a violation occurred at all.
I would reverse the decision of the Board and issue a public reprimand. I am authorized to state that Justice Dooley joins in this dissent.