Court Opinion

ID: 9459539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:23:37.360421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:12.660081
License: Public Domain

*444GEWIN, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
In my view the majority has correctly decided that there is no merit in the specifications of error having to do with damages, and therefore, I concur in that portion of the opinion. With full respect for the views expressed by my Brothers of the majority I am in complete disagreement with the conclusion that there should be a new trial as to the issue of liability. In my considered judgment the majority has applied an incorrect standard of review and has abridged the seventh amendment right to trial by jury to which the plaintiff-appellee (Adams) is entitled under the facts of this case.
Against the stubborn and aggressive contentions of MFB Mutual Insurance Company (MFB) two juries have decided that Mr. Adams was not guilty of arson and that he did nothing to increase the hazard or chance of loss by fire. The evidence was developed in a lengthy trial by skillful and effective trial counsel for both parties. There were numerous witnesses and a large volume of exhibits. The evidence was in total conflict and presents a typical situation which requires a factual resolution of claims based on conflicting evidence.
The appropriate standard of review has recently been set forth clearly and unequivocally by this court in Griffin v. Matherne, 471 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1973) and reaffirmed in Colvin v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 477 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1973). We quote from the opinion in Griffin v. Matherne:
The Seventh Amendment requires that if there is a view of the case which makes the jury’s answers consistent, the court must adopt that view and enter judgment accordingly. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798, 806-807 (1962). This court has stated that the test to be applied in reconciling apparent conflicts between the jury’s answers is whether the answers may fairly be said to represent a logical and probable decision on the relevant issues as submitted, even though the form of the issue or alternative selective answers prescribed by the judge may have been the likely cause of the difficulty and largely produced the apparent conflict. R. B. Company v. Aetna Insurance Company, 299 F.2d 753, 760 (5th Cir. 1962). If on review of the district court’s judgment we find that there is no view of the case which makes the jury’s answers consistent and that the inconsistency is such that the special verdict will support neither the judgment entered below nor any other judgment, then the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for trial anew. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Salazar, 254 F.2d 847, 849 (5th Cir. 1958); Wright v. Kroeger Corporation, 422 F.2d 176, 178-179 (5th Cir. 1970).
471 F.2d at 915.
The interrogatory quoted in the opinion was the first one submitted to the jury. The necessity for that interrogatory arose from the defense vigorously asserted by MFB that Mr. Adams had increased the hazard or chance of loss by fire. It was asserted that he did so by deliberately cutting off the automatic sprinkler system. That issue occupied much of the trial time and evidence relating to it extended over numerous pages of the record. Moreover, the trial judge, thoroughly understood the issue and fully explained it with remarkable clarity in his instructions to the jury. Indeed, in my view, his instructions were very favorable to the defense asserted by MFB. We quote from the court’s instructions with reference to the interrogatory in question:
Now, the word ‘means,’ as used in this provision of the policy refers to a situation or a condition which increases the hazard or chance of loss by fire, here claimed to be the fact that the post indicator valve was closed or shut, preventing water from flowing into the sprinkler system.
*445Now, if you should determine that the sprinkler system was cut off at the time of the fire, then the Court instructs you that such condition would be a means which would increase the hazard or chance of loss by fire. However, the question is not just whether the valve was on or off, but it must be shown whether if off, such means were within the control or knowledge of the insured.
As used in this policy, the words ‘control or knowledge’ means the same thing as control ‘and’ knowledge. The idea of control assumes the existence of knowledge and the power to do something about it. Thus, a person cannot control a situation or condition if he has no knowledge of it, and as used here, the word ‘knowledge’ means actual knowledge brought directly to a person’s senses.
Thus, it is not enough for it to be shown that the valve was located on the plaintiff's property and subject to the plaintiff’s regulation and closed at the time of the fire or even to show, in addition, that the plaintiff should have known whether it was closed or not. You must find by the evidence that the valve was closed and that the plaintiff actually knew it was closed.
Now, knowledge may not ordinarily be proven directly, that is by direct evidence, because it is seldom possible to have direct evidence of the operation or what is in somebody’s mind. But, you may infer the presence or absence of knowledge from the circumstances surrounding a particular event or transaction. Thus, you may consider any acts done or omitted and any statement made or omitted and all other facts and circumstances which indicate a person’s state of mind at a certain time.
Now, if you find from a consideration of all the evidence that you have heard in this case that Mr. Kenneth A. Adams or someone acting under the direction or with the knowledge of Mr. or Mrs. Kenneth Adams turned off the automatic sprinkler system so that it was off at the time of the fire, then you should answer number one, yes.
Now, you should examine all the facts and circumstances as revealed to you by the evidence and if you believe by a preponderance of the evidence that the valve was closed at the time of the fire and that such condition was one within the control and knowledge of the plaintiffs as explained to you, then you should answer number one, yes. Otherwise, your answer should be no, and you should then proceed to the next question.
Following the standard set forth in Griffin v. Matherne, it is obvious to me that “there is a view of the case which makes the jury’s answers consistent” and in obedience to that standard this court should “adopt that view and enter judgment accordingly.” Simply stated the jury has unequivocally found that at the time of the fire the automatic sprinkler system was not cut off by a means within the control or knowledge of the insured.
The majority insists that the jury’s negative response to interrogatory number one is ambiguous. I would be inclined to agree if the interrogatory was to be analyzed in the abstract. But that is not the proper approach. A reviewing court must pass on questions such as this one in a far broader context and when that is done here the possibility of any ambiguity in the jury’s answer to this interrogatory is extremely remote. At the trial, neither side contested the fact that the sprinkler system was turned off by someone prior to the fire. The evidence presented was directed mainly toward establishing responsibility for that act. In charging the jury, the trial judge placed great emphasis upon this point. In light of these factors, I have no difficulty in assessing the jury’s answer to interrogatory number one. To suggest that it could mean that the sprinkler system was found to be inoperative at the time of the fire is simply to ignore what went on at the *446trial. There may be some logical consistency in the majority’s opinion but unfortunately there is too little common sense.
In addition it is of some importance to mention the fact that much of the confusion on this issue was created by the testimony of Mr. Wilde, a defense witness presented by MFB. His testimony was confusing, contradictory and rather bizarre. Evidently the jury rejected it, and to my mind, the reasons are obvious. Again I must say, that the insured was not to blame according to the jury’s answer, even if the system was turned off. Adams’ recovery is not dependent upon that fact. Rather the right of recovery is dependent upon whether, if the system was cut off, it was cut off “by a means within the control or knowledge of the insured.”
It is a serious matter to overturn a jury verdict after two different juries have decided a specific and vital issue in favor of a plaintiff and thereby deprive the plaintiff of a judgment in excess of one million dollars.
I would affirm the judgment.