Court Opinion

ID: 9409116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-15 00:00:43.369169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.943730
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30488     Document: 00516821239       Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/14/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit
                               ____________                                 FILED
                                                                        July 14, 2023
                                No. 22-30488
                               ____________                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                            Clerk
   Lester Johnson,

                                                         Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                     versus

   Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Incorporated,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 3:20-CV-749
                  ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Stewart and Douglas, Circuit
   Judges.
   Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
         Plaintiff Lester Johnson (“Johnson”), an injured maritime worker,
   appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgement to defendant
   Cooper T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc. (“Cooper”) on his claims of
   Jones Act negligence, failure to pay maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness,
   and, alternatively, vessel negligence. The district court granted summary
   judgment after concluding that Johnson had not put forth evidence showing
   a genuine dispute of material fact concerning his seaman status or vessel
   negligence. We AFFIRM.
Case: 22-30488      Document: 00516821239          Page: 2    Date Filed: 07/14/2023

                                    No. 22-30488

                                          I.
          Cooper has a facility for midstream cargo operations near Darrow,
   Louisiana. At the Darrow facility, cargo operations occur while vessels are
   located midstream in the Mississippi River.          In connection with its
   operations, Cooper owns and operates a weigh station vessel, the
   AMERICA, which is used to transfer bulk cargo from barges to oceangoing
   vessels.
          Cooper’s Darrow facility hires longshoremen on a per-day basis
   through the local union hall to load and unload vessels. Johnson worked
   sporadically as a longshoreman for Cooper as early as 1998 and worked
   regularly for Cooper from 2008 through the date of his injury on June 22,
   2018, never going more than a week and a half without working.              his
   employment with Cooper, Johnson performed various jobs including
   operating a front-end loader and track hoe, flagging cranes, and loading
   barges.
          According to Cooper, longshoremen like Johnson are not “assigned”
   to the AMERICA, are not its crewmembers, and “do not operate it, maintain
   it, clean it, fuel it, or perform any other functions similar to her crew,” but
   instead are “instruct[ed]” to report to particular vessels “to identify the mid-
   stream location of the cargo barges and oceangoing vessels on which they will
   be working.” In other words, Cooper gives longshoremen like Johnson
   assignments to cargo barges and oceangoing vessels that are limited to
   performance of “discrete tasks,” after which their connections to the vessels
   end. Cooper also has full-time employees, which include crewmembers
   assigned to the AMERICA.
          On the evening of June 22, 2018, Johnson was injured when he fell to
   the deck of the AMERICA from the deck of an adjacent cargo barge, the SCF
   24122. On the night of the injury, Johnson reported to Cooper’s Darrow

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                                    No. 22-30488

   office and was transported from the landing dock to the AMERICA via crew
   boat. Johnson’s job during that night’s operations was inside the hold of the
   SCF 24112, operating a front-end loader to move cargo, soybean mill, into
   the AMERICA’s “bucket,” which would then move the cargo to the hold of
   an oceangoing vessel, the M/V XENIA. Cooper did not own or operate the
   SCF 24112 or the M/V XENIA.
          After the cargo in the hold of the SCF 24112 had been unloaded,
   Johnson positioned the front-end loader to be removed from the cargo
   barge’s hold by the AMERICA’s winch and then climbed an aluminum
   ladder to exit the hold himself. The ladder was owned by Cooper and
   permanently stored on the AMERICA. On the deck of the barge, Johnson
   and another longshoreman, Joe Thomas, pulled the ladder out of the hold of
   the barge and attempted to place it in its storage “slot” on the AMERICA.
   Doing so was a routine task for Johnson and other longshoremen working for
   Cooper.
          This time, however, Johnson slipped, fell, and landed headfirst on a
   catwalk on the AMERICA’s deck, 13 feet below. Johnson testified that he
   and Thomas did not have any problem with the ladder, but that he slipped on
   “cargo”—meaning pieces of grain and grain dust—on the deck of the barge.
   He testified that cargo dust “gets all over the place” whenever vessels are
   being loaded or unloaded and that he saw cargo all over the barge when he
   got out of the hold the night of the accident.
          Johnson suffered numerous personal injuries and was hospitalized
   because of his fall. Over the next year and half, he underwent multiple
   medical procedures (including two surgeries) and physical therapy. In
   connection with his injuries, Johnson collected workers’ compensation
   benefits from Cooper pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
   Compensation Act (“LHWCA”).

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                                     No. 22-30488

          Johnson filed suit against Cooper in federal district court in November
   2020, alleging that he was a seaman and a member of the crew of the
   AMERICA, and bringing claims of Jones Act negligence, failure to pay
   maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness (collectively, “seaman
   claims”). In the alternative, Johnson alleged that if he was not a seaman and
   was covered by the LHWCA, then Cooper as vessel owner had been
   negligent pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) and general maritime law. After
   discovery, Cooper moved for summary judgment, asserting that (1) Johnson
   was not a “seaman”; (2) there were no facts to support a vessel negligence
   claim under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b); and (3) Johnson’s general maritime law
   negligence claim was barred by § 905(a)’s exclusivity provision. The district
   court granted the motion and dismissed Johnson’s claims with prejudice.
   According to the district court, Johnson failed to cite to evidence that showed
   a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was a seaman and,
   alternatively, as to vessel negligence.
                                             II.
          “This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary
   judgment, applying the same standard as the district court.” Austin v. Kroger
   Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Summary
   judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine [dispute] of material
   fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
   verdict for the non-moving party.”              Austin, 864 F.3d at 328 (citation
   omitted).   “All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
   nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences are drawn in that party’s
   favor.” Id. at 328–29 (citation omitted).

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                                          No. 22-30488

           “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must
   support the assertion” by “citing to particular parts of materials in the
   record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
   presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party opposing
   summary judgment “must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific
   facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
   37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). “[C]onclusory allegations” and
   “unsubstantiated assertions” will not suffice. Id. (citations omitted).
                                               III.
           On appeal, Johnson challenges the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment to Cooper on his seaman claims and his vessel negligence claim.1
   As explained below, after reviewing the record, we agree with the district
   court that Johnson failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to his
   claims. Cooper was therefore entitled to summary judgment.
                                               A.
           “The Jones Act grants ‘a seaman’ a cause of action against his
   employer in negligence.” Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex., L.L.C., 997

           _____________________
           1
             Cooper also asserts that Johnson’s general maritime law negligence claim is
   barred by the exclusivity provision of 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) because Cooper was his employer
   and secured payment of LHWCA compensation for his injury. “The liability of an
   employer” for LHWCA compensation “shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
   of such employer to the employee . . . except . . . if an employer fails to secure payment of
   compensation as required by” the LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a). The district court ruled
   that Johnson conceded this issue by failing to brief it and dismissed his general maritime
   law negligence claim as barred by § 905(a). Johnson’s appellate brief likewise does not
   address Cooper’s § 905(a) argument, and he has thus waived or abandoned the issue. See
   Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 260 n.9 (5th Cir. 1995); McDowell
   v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 126 F. App’x 168, 170 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Where a claim is not
   briefed on appeal, it is abandoned.”)

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                                      No. 22-30488

   F.3d 564, 568–69 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30104).2 “As the
   courts have often lamented, the term ‘seaman’ is not defined in the Jones
   Act.” In re Endeavor Marine Inc., 234 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus,
   it has largely fallen to the courts “to establish workable tests to define the
   word ‘seaman.’” Sanchez, 997 F.3d at 569.
          To qualify as a “seaman,” a maritime worker must satisfy a two-part
   test: he or she (1) “must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the
   accomplishment of its mission,” and (2) “must have a connection to a vessel
   in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in
   terms of both its duration and its nature.” Endeavor Marine, 234 F.3d at 290
   (citing Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368)). Johnson claims that he is a seaman based
   on his connection to the AMERICA.
          The first part of this test, the “threshold requirement” of whether a
   worker “does the ship’s work,” is “very broad.” Id. (cleaned up). “‘All
   who work at sea in the service of a ship’ are eligible for seaman status.”
   Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (quoting McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S.
   337, 354 (1991)) (emphasis in original). The parties and the district court all
   agree that Johnson meets the first part of the test, and so do we. Johnson’s
   work loading and unloading cargo contributed to the mission of the
   AMERICA, as well as the various cargo barges and oceangoing vessels.
          The second part of the test—whether the worker has a substantial
   connection to a vessel—has two elements: the worker’s connection must be
   “substantial in terms of both [1] its duration and [2] its nature.” Sanchez,
   997 F.3d at 571 (quoting Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368). For the duration

          _____________________
          2
            In addition to damages for negligence under the Jones Act, seamen may also
   recover maintenance and cure and damages for unseaworthiness under the general
   maritime law. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995).

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                                    No. 22-30488

   element, the “rule of thumb for the ordinary case” is that “[a] worker who
   spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in
   navigation should not qualify as a seaman.” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371.
   Recently, in Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators, the en banc court refined this
   Circuit’s test for the nature element. 997 F.3d at 573–74. Post-Sanchez, we
   consider four factors when deciding whether a worker’s connection to a
   vessel is substantial in nature: (1) the worker’s exposure to “perils of the
   sea,” meaning the hazards of a maritime working environment; (2) whether
   “the worker owe[s] his [or her] allegiance to the vessel, rather than simply to
   a shoreside employer”; (3) if his or her work is “sea-based or involve[s]
   seagoing activity”; and (4) whether “the worker’s assignment to a vessel [is]
   limited to performance of a discrete task after which the worker’s connection
   to the vessel end[s],” or whether he or she stays with the vessel. Id. at 574.
          Johnson’s claim to seaman status founders on the duration element of
   the substantial-connection test. In opposing Cooper’s motion for summary
   judgment in the district court, Johnson relied on two citations to his
   deposition testimony to establish that he was a seaman: (1) that he worked for
   Cooper for more than 20 years, and (2) that he took a crew boat provided by
   Cooper from the Darrow landing dock to the AMERICA on the night he was
   injured. The district court found this deposition testimony insufficient to
   create a genuine dispute of material fact as to the duration element. We
   agree. The fact that Johnson performed longshoring work for Cooper for 20
   years does not, without more, create a genuine dispute of material fact as to
   whether he had a connection to the AMERICA that was substantial in
   duration. Likewise, the fact that Johnson was transported by crew boat to the
   AMERICA on the night he was injured and was injured when he fell from an
   adjacent vessel on to the AMERICA is not enough to qualify him as a seaman.
   See Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363 (rejecting a “snapshot” test). A “more
   enduring relationship” with the AMERICA is required. Id.

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                                         No. 22-30488

           On appeal, Johnson attempts to bolster his claim to seaman status by
   citing to the declaration of Cooper’s Director of Maintenance, James
   Gauthreaux, which describes Cooper’s midstream operations. Relying on
   the declaration, Johnson’s argument seems to be that because his longshore
   work for Cooper took place midstream in the Mississippi River and because
   the AMERICA is part of Cooper’s midstream operations, we should infer
   that he had a connection to the AMERICA that was substantial in duration.
   Unfortunately for Johnson, however, nothing in Gauthreaux’s declaration
   allows us to draw that inference.3
           Assuming that this argument is not forfeited for failure to raise it in
   district court, see Rollins v. Home Depot, USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397–98 (5th Cir.
   2021), the Gauthreaux declaration does not create a genuine dispute of
   material fact as to Johnson’s status.            The declaration establishes that
   longshoremen like Johnson performed their work for Cooper on vessels
   midstream and that Cooper used the AMERICA in connection with its
   midstream operations. But critically, the declaration is silent as to the
   duration of the connection that longshoremen like Johnson had with the
   AMERICA. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Johnson, we
   simply do not know and cannot infer based on this record how often he
   reported to or worked on, around, in service of, or in connection with the
   AMERICA; there is a gap in the summary-judgment evidence that dooms his
   claim to seaman status.          See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (explaining that
   “unsubstantiated assertions” do not satisfy nonmovant’s summary

           _____________________
           3
              We also note that the section of Johnson’s appellant brief that most forcefully
   argues that he had a connection to the AMERICA that was substantial in duration is
   tellingly short on record citations to support its factual assertions. See Fed. R. App. P.
   28(a)(8) (requiring argument contain “citations to . . . parts of the record on which the
   appellant relies”); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (explaining that “unsubstantiated
   assertions” do not satisfy nonmovant’s summary judgment burden).

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                                    No. 22-30488

   judgment burden); cf. Endeavor Marine, 234 F.3d at 291 (holding that crane
   operator who worked on a derrick barge had a connection to the vessel that
   was substantial in duration because he spent almost all his time working on
   the vessel in the 18 months prior to his accident).
          Because Johnson did not show a genuine dispute of material fact as to
   whether he had a connection to the AMERICA that was substantial in
   duration, the district court was correct to grant summary judgment in
   Cooper’s favor on Johnson’s seaman claims, and we need not proceed to
   consider the nature prong of the substantial-connection test.
                                         B.
          In the alternative to his seaman claims, Johnson brought a claim
   against Cooper as owner of the AMERICA pursuant to the LHWCA, 33
   U.S.C. § 905(b). The district court granted summary judgment to Cooper
   on this claim because Johnson failed to show a genuine dispute of material
   fact as to vessel negligence. We agree.
          Section 905(b) provides a cause of action to a person injured by
   “negligence of a vessel,” with the caveat that “[i]f such person was
   employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall
   be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in
   providing stevedoring services to the vessel.” 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). In Scindia
   Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981), the Supreme
   Court “outlined the three general duties shipowners owe to longshoremen.”
   Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 512 U.S. 92, 98 (1994) (citing Scindia,
   451 U.S. at 167). Johnson contends that Cooper breached two of the Scindia
   duties: (1) the “turnover duty,” which “relates to the condition of the ship
   upon the commencement of stevedoring operations”; and (2) the “active
   control” duty, which “provides that a shipowner must exercise reasonable
   care to prevent injuries to longshoremen in areas that remain under the

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                                    No. 22-30488

   ‘active control of the vessel’” during stevedoring operations. Id. (citing
   Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167–68).
          Johnson failed to cite to any record evidence showing that Cooper
   breached either duty. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (explaining that a party
   must support assertion that there is a genuine dispute of material fact by
   “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the
   materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
   dispute”); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (explaining that “conclusory allegations”
   and “unsubstantiated assertions” do not satisfy nonmovant’s summary
   judgment burden). Nor could he, as an independent review of the record
   shows no evidence of vessel negligence. The district court was correct to
   grant summary judgment to Cooper on Johnson’s § 905(b) claim.
                                         IV.
          As the district court stated in its ruling, summary judgment is about
   evidence. “We resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party,
   but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have
   submitted evidence of contradictory facts. We do not, however, in the absence
   of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary
   facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S.
   871, 888 (1990)) (emphasis in original). Because Johnson did not—and could
   not, based on his failure to put forth evidence—show a genuine dispute of
   material fact as to his claims, the district court’s grant of summary judgment
   to Cooper is AFFIRMED.

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