Court Opinion

ID: 9645803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:35:56.209557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:31.769935
License: Public Domain

*273WALKER, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I respectfully concur with the result reached by the majority. I feel, however, that Chapter 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure1 need not be resorted to as case law has explicitly spoken to the issue raised by appellant in his first point of error.
The decision to order restitution as a condition of probation lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cartwright v. State, 605 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Tex.Code CRIm.PROC.Ann. art. 42.12, sec. 11(a)(8) (Vernon Supp.1992). Due process requires some factual basis to support a defendant’s criminal responsibility for an injury. Cartwright, supra at 289; Thompson v. State, 557 S.W.2d 521, 525-526 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). In the instant case, appellant concedes in his brief that a variety of documents were admitted into evidence as proof by the State of the expenses incurred to repair Mr. O’Neil’s nose. Appellant does not complain that he is not responsible for the injury sustained by Mr. O’Neil. Indeed, appellant’s objection at trial was that “the Court exceeds its jurisdiction based on Rules of Criminal Procedure, 42.12, Section 11, ... as of the 1987 and 1989 amendments it limits the Court in assessing restitution to the victim only, and we would say that the insurance carrier is not the victim....”
I find the case of Martin v. State, 806 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref’d) completely on point and dispositive of the issue. In Martin, the defendant presented the Austin Court with the identical issue. The Austin Court, relying on two other cases,2 fully examined the question raised by the 1987 and 1989 amendments to art. 42.12. The Martin court concluded by holding that a trial court’s authority to order restitution payments as a condition of probation is not limited by art. 42.12, sec. 11(b) to victims named in the indictment or information. Id. at 242. There is no mention in Martin of Chapter 56, nor do I feel the need to include any portion of Chapter 56 in a substantive analysis of appellant’s first point of error. I would, therefore, overrule appellant’s first point of error based on the precedential value of Martin and the discussion contained therein.
With regard to appellant’s second point of error, the record reflects that on each tender by the State of State’s Exhibits 1 through 6, appellant lodged no objection. Under Tex.R.App.P. 52(a), appellant has failed to preserve any complaint with regard to State’s Exhibits 1 through 6 for review by this Court.
Having made the above observations, I reiterate my concurrence with the majority’s affirmance of the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

. Chapter 56 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is entitled, "Rights Of Crime Victims." Contrary to the slant appellant places on it, this writer views the import of Chapter 56 as a recognition and expansion of rights and privileges the State of Texas affords to individuals who suffer physical or mental injuries as a result of “the criminal conduct of another."

. Garcia v. State, 773 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no pet.); and Harrison v. State, 713 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd).