Court Opinion

ID: 9740898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:44:19.693104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.936957
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Bobbitt, J.
I cannot agree with either the reasoning or the result reached in the majority opinion for the following reasons:
First: As stated in the majority opinion, the only question raised pertains to the correctness of the ruling on the demurrer. In my opinion this presents the question as to whether appellant has proceeded under the proper statute. If so, the demurrer should have been overruled. However, if appellant’s procedure was controlled by ch. 169 of the Acts of 1929, being §54-429 to 54-438, Burns’ 1951 Replacement, then the demurrer should have been sustained.
*282This action was commenced before the Public Service Commission of Indiana under ch. 49 of the Acts of 1915, §§55-2016 to 55-2019, inclusive, Bums’ 1951 Replacement.
Section 1 of said ch. 49 authorizes the public service commission of Indiana to require persons, firms or corporations owning or operating any railroad or interurban within the state under certain conditions to equip public crossings with a flagman or an automatic gong or bell. Section 2 of the Act provides for petition and hearing before the commission. Section 3 provides that if the commission decides that the obstruction complained of should be removed, it shall order such removal or the establishment and maintenance of a flagman or an automatic gong or bell. The act makes no provision for review of any order of the commission made thereunder.
Appellant asserts that because said ch. 49 pertains to railroads, any petition for review of an order of the commission granted pursuant to the act must be filed and pursued under the provisions of §6 of the Railroad Commission Act. Acts 1905, ch. 53, §6, as amended, being §55-112, Burns’ 1951 Replacement. This section was last amended in 1913.
The legislature in 1929, ch. 169, Acts 1929, enacted a comprehensive procedure act concerning the review of decisions, rules, orders, determinations, requirements or directions of the public service commission and repealing all laws, or parts of laws, in conflict therewith.
Section 1 of said ch. 169, swpra, provides:
“That any person, firm, association, corporation, city, town or public utility adversely affected by any decision, ruling, order, determination, requirement or direction of the public service commission may commence an action in the circuit or superior court of any county in which that portion of the *283utility which is the subject matter of the procedure before the public service commission operates or seeks to operate, against the commission to vacate or set aside or enjoin the enforcement of any such decision, ruling, order, determination, requirement or direction, on the ground that the same is insufficient, unreasonable, unlawful, or procured by fraud or other unlawful methods.”
Section 2 of said ch. 169 defines the word “order” as “any final order,. decision, ruling, determination, requirement or direction made by the public service commission upon any matter within its jurisdiction.” (My italics).
The proceeding before the Tippecanoe Circuit Court was concerned wholly with the review of an order of the public service commission.
In a recent opinion, Public Service Commission of Indiana, et al. v. Fort Wayne Union Railway Co. (1953), 232 Ind. 82, 111 N. E. 2d 719, 722, which involved the review by the Allen Superior Court of an order of the public service commission pertaining to the establishment of a highway crossing at grade over appellants’ railroad, this court said:
“By Acts of 1929, ch. 169, (Burns’ Stat., 1933, §§54-429 to 54-438) the procedure for review of the decisions, orders, determinations, requirements or directions of the Public Service Commission is prescribed, and all laws or parts of laws in conflict therewith are repealed. The word “order” as therein used is made to include any final order, decision, ruling, determination, requirement or direction made by the Public Service Commission upon any matter within its jurisdiction. Since the railroad commission had been abolished and all of its powers and duties had been transferred to the Public Service Commission in 1913, and since the Act of 1929 is expressly made to reach any decision, ruling, order, determination, requirement and direction of the Commission which adversely affects *284any person, _ firm, association, corporation, city, town or public utility, without regard to the law the Commission is administering, it seems to us that the procedural requirements outlined in §6 of the Railroad Commission Act no longer control, and that the provisions of the 1929 Act apply.”
The reasoning in the Fort Wayne Union Railway Co. case, swpra,, applies with equal force to the situation in the case at bar.
Appellant here asserts that because §1 of ch. 169 of the Acts of 1929, supra, provides that the action shall be brought in the county “in which that portion of the utility which is the subject-matter of the procedure before the public service commission operates or seeks to operate,” that the legislature intended the procedure prescribed by this act to apply only to matters involving public utilities as defined in the Public Utility Act.1 (My italics).
The rejection of that contention is implicit in our decision in the Fort Wayne Union Railway case, supra. The word “utility” as used in that section is obviously a generic term which was intended to and does embrace all persons, firms, associations, corporations, etc. who sell their services to the general public at prices which are governmentally fixed, such as transportation, communication, power, water and the like. The word as used was not intended to limit jurisdiction to any particular class of utilities, else the legislature would have said so. It was used for the purpose of defining, prescribing and limiting the forum in which actions to review the orders of the public service commission may be brought.
Second: The sole ground upon which appellee’s demurrer is based is “that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action.”
*285While circuit courts are, generally speaking, courts of general original jurisdiction, they are.by statute deprived of jurisdiction of all causes, matters and proceedings where exclusive jurisdiction thereof is by law conferred upon some other court. Burns’ 1946 Repl., §4-303. Such is the case here.
This court has recently held that a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties must also have jurisdiction of the particular case. Gilmour v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 454, 457, 104 N. E. 2d 127; Ballman v. Duffecy (1952), 230 Ind. 220, 229, 102 N. E. 2d 646; State ex rel. Ferger v. Circuit Ct. (1949), 227 Ind. 212, 215, 84 N. E. 2d 585.
The jurisdiction of actions for review of decisions, rules, orders, determinations, requirements or directions of the public service commission is fixed by statute (§54-429, supra), and such actions are special statutory proceedings, Gavit, Ind. Pl. & Pr., Vol. 2, §207, p. 1442 ; and unless the petition alleges facts sufficient to bring the action within the terms of the statute, jurisdiction is not conferred. State ex rel. Ayer v. Ewing (1952), 231 Ind. 1, 106 N. E. 2d 441, 446.
The petition in the case at bar not only fails to allege such facts, but on the contrary it appears on the face of the petition that the Tippecanoe Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction of the particular case now before us.
Third: The complaint alleges that the particular crossing in question is located in Wabash County, Indiana. It thus appears on the face of the complaint that the Tippecanoe Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction of the particular case, and that under the provisions of the 1929 act it did not have the right, authority and power to hear and determine appellant’s *286petition. State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Com. v. Marion C. Ct. (1951), 230 Ind. 277, 284, 100 N. E. 2d 888.
Fourth: In my opinion the jurisdiction of the particular case was properly raised by appellee’s memorandum filed with the demurrer. By paragraph 1 of such memorandum appellee asserts that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action because the action should have been commenced in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the railroad crossing (the subject-matter of the procedure before the public service commission) is located. By paragraph 3 it is pointed out that the subject-matter involved is located in Wabash County, Indiana. By paragraph 4 it is further asserted that since that part of the railroad which operates in Wabash County constitutes the subject-matter of the action the Wabash Circuit Court, and not the Tippecanoe Circuit Court, has jurisdiction to set aside the action of the public service commission herein.
Acts 1911, ch. 157, §2, being §2-1007, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, does not specify as cause for demurrer the bringing of the action in the wrong county. However, the legislature by the enactment of Acts 1911, ch. 157, §3, being §2-1011, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, as set out in the majority opinion, recognizes this as a ground for demurrer. Unless the proviso of said §2-1011 is to be considered meaningless, it must be assumed that the question as to the action being brought in the wrong county, which in this case is identical with the lack of jurisdiction of the particular case, may be properly raised under clause 1 of §2-1007, supra. As indicated in State ex rel. Allman v. Grant Superior Court (1939), 215 Ind. 249, 19 N. E. 2d 467, a lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter may arise put of the fact that the action is brought in the wrong county. Since appellee’s *287memorandum filed with its demurrer is devoted exclusively, with one exception, to the proposition that the action was brought in the wrong county, it is clear that the question was properly raised and before the trial court.
Appellant should have proceeded under ch. 169 of the acts of 1929, supra. Public Service Commission of Indiana, et al. v. Fort Wayne Union Railway Co. (1958), 232 Ind. 82, 111 N. E. 2d 719, supra.
Where, as here, a right is given and the procedure for its enforcement is provided by a special statute, the procedure so provided excludes resort to another or different procedure. State v. Redmon (1933), 205 Ind. 335, 338, 186 N. E. 328.
The question of jurisdiction of the particular case here at bar was properly raised by appellee’s demurrer and its memorandum filed therewith; it appears on the face of the complaint that the Tippecanoe Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction of the particular case as presented by appellant’s petition, and that said petition was filed in the wrong county. The demurrer was properly sustained, and the judgment should be affirmed.
Draper, J. concurs.
Note. — Reported in 112 N. E. 2d 292.

. Acts 1913, ch. 76, as amended.