Court Opinion

ID: 9662268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:04:21.226915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:38.191881
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I find that I must respectfully dissent from the majority in this case, in that I do not believe that the allegations contained in Williams’ second motion for post conviction relief are sufficient to require the trial court to grant him an evidentiary hearing.
Part of the difficulty we encounter here may be as a result of our earlier decision in State v. Myers, 205 Neb. 867, 290 N.W.2d 660 (1980). In Myers I wrote separately because I did not then, nor do I now, believe that a nonexpert can testify as to whether one is insane as that term is used under our criminal law. To suggest that a nonexpert may testify as to whether an individual, at the time of the commission of a crime, had the ability to distinguish between right and wrong and knew the nature and quality of his or her act, as required under the rule in this jurisdiction, is to permit a nonexpert to testify about a matter on which the nonexpert could not possibly have an opinion. See Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 202 Neb. 300, 275 N.W.2d 77 (1979).
Beyond that, however, I do not believe that the allegations contained in the motion filed by Williams are sufficient to raise a factual dispute sufficient to entitle Williams to an evidentiary hearing. As the majority notes, a court may properly deny an evidentiary hearing upon a determination after an examination of the files and records of the case that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Further, as the majority notes, the pleading of mere conclusions of fact or of law is not sufficient to require the court to grant an evidentiary hearing. See, State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 231 N.W.2d 345 (1975); State v. Robinson, 215 Neb. 449, 339 N.W.2d 76 (1983).
Recently, in State v. Rayes, ante p. 588, 357 N.W.2d 222 (1984), we held that the defendant must at least make some plausible showing of how the testimony of the absent witness would have been both material and favorable to the defense before the defendant is entitled to relief. And earlier, in State v. Holtan, 205 Neb. 314, 287 N.W.2d 671 (1980), we held that *624Holtan’s conclusory claim that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because counsel did not subpoena witnesses from the State of Washington was without merit. In doing so, we said at 321, 287 N.W.2d at 676:
The record, however, fails to disclose what, if anything, the witnesses would have testified to had they been called. What they might have testified to at best was the defendant’s hope and wish. In the absence of evidence to disclose what the witnesses would have testified to, we are unable to establish any prejudice and therefore unable to establish any error.
In the instant case the motion filed by Williams makes no allegations of fact entitling Williams to any evidentiary hearing or further relief. The allegations are simply that as a result of his trial attorneys’ having a conflict of interest, they failed to call Williams’ former wife, Merrilee Williams. The allegations, however, contain no matters of fact and are wholly conclusory in nature. Specifically, the allegations read: “That defendant’s trial attorneys discovered that Merrilee Williams was a critical witness for the defense in their presentation of an insanity defense for defendant, due to her knowledge of defendant’s mental state at the time of the crimes alleged.” The allegations of paragraph 6(e) of Williams’ motion contain no allegations of fact requiring the holding of an evidentiary hearing. At a minimum, Williams was required to allege what it is that Merrilee Williams would have testified about had she been called. To suggest that she was a critical witness due to her. knowledge of his mental state, without alleging whether she would have testified and of what that testimony would have consisted, is insufficient in my view to entitle Williams to an evidentiary hearing.
While it may be true, as suggested by the majority opinion, that Merrilee Williams “could have” testified that Williams was insane, the problem is that the motion contains no such allegation. For all we can tell from the allegations, Merrilee Williams may testify that Williams was sane. We need not hold a hearing to receive that evidence. That is why a party seeking relief under the Post Conviction Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3001 et seq. (Reissue 1979), must allege “facts” and not *625mere conclusions to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing. I would have affirmed the action of the trial court in denying to Williams an evidentiary hearing.