Court Opinion

ID: 7819531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:48:57.994697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:42.096604
License: Public Domain

Carleton Harris, Chief Justice, dissenting. I dissent because, in my opinion, the instrument in question was just exactly what it was titled, “Retail Buyers Order”. It was accepted by both Mrs. King and Rebsamen Ford, Inc., and the carrying out of its provisions was subject only to the approval of a finance company. The transaction occurring on Saturday afternoon, no contact could be made with the Ford Motor Credit Company since it had closed for the day. The testimony reflects that the credit company was contacted on Monday, although the exact time is not established; it thus is not clear whether Mrs. King advised Rebsamen that she was not going to purchase the car before or after the credit company was called. However, that particular point is immaterial to me since, in my view, Rebsamen was entitled to a reasonable time in which to obtain the approval of a responsible finance company, and since the Rebsamen company representative took action on the very first business day following the execution of the agreement, I feel that the contract was binding upon appellee. In the case of Gentry v. Hanover Insurance Company, 284 F. Supp. 626, the United States District Court for the Western Division of Arkansas, Hot Springs Division, through Judge John E. Miller, Senior District Judge, quoted 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 43, p. 686, as follows: “Where an agreement is made subject to the consent of a third party, it must be looked on as a conditional agreement, dependent on such consent being given within a reasonable time, in default of which the agreement must be taken not to have become effective ...” The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Green River Steel Corp. v. Globe Erection Company, 294 S.W.2d 507, stated the same view, as follows: “The general rule is that where an agreement is made, subject to the consent or approval of a third person, it must be looked on as a conditional agreement, dependent on such consent being given within a reasonable time, in default of which the agreement must be taken not to have become effective. [Citing cases.]” My basic disagreement with the majority is simply that, under my interpretation, the contract was not an “offer”, but was an “order”, subject only to approval by the credit company. Since appellant, which, in my opinion, was the only party having the right to raise the question of credit approval, is satisfied, I would hold the contract binding and reverse the judgment. I also suggest that, under this decision by the majority, automobile dealers had best re-examine their customer order agreements. Holt, J. joins in this dissent.