Court Opinion

ID: 9961388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 16:14:03.373209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:41.353014
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Crenshaw v. Mooningham, 2024-Ohio-1470.]

                            COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                           EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

MARIAH CRENSHAW,                                    :

               Plaintiff-Appellant,                 :
                                                         No. 112835
               v.                                   :

CHELSEY MOONINGHAM,                                 :

               Defendant-Appellee.                  :

                             JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

               JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
               RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 18, 2024

           Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                               Case No. CV-21-956163

                                         Appearances:

               Mariah Crenshaw, pro se.

               Edwin V. Hargate III, for appellee.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

               Appellant Mariah Crenshaw (“Crenshaw”) challenges the judgment of

the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor

of appellee Chelsea Mooningham (“Mooningham”) on Crenshaw’s claims for

defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, telephone harassment, and
spoliation of evidence. After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                      I. Factual and Procedural History

             This matter arises from statements made by Mooningham in social

media posts that Crenshaw alleges were defamatory to her, intentionally caused her

emotional distress, and constituted telephone harassment. Crenshaw filed suit

against Mooningham, and the parties engaged in discovery. Crenshaw later moved

the court to amend her complaint to include a claim for spoliation of evidence, which

was granted by the trial court, and Mooningham answered.

             Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court denied

Crenshaw’s motion and granted Mooningham’s, finding that no genuine issues of

material fact remained and that Mooningham was entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.

             Crenshaw then filed the instant appeal, raising one assignment of error

for our review:

      The trial court erred and abused its discretion in granting a motion for
      summary judgment in violation of discovery civil rules, Civ.R. 56
      requirements and evidentiary rules without having the ability to review
      all social media posts.

                              II. Law and Analysis

            In her sole assignment of error, Crenshaw contends that she properly

identified the “multiple issues and violations” in her complaint and brief opposing

the motion for summary judgment that the trial court failed to consider. She
maintains that she presented to the trial court social media posts along with her

affidavit under Civ.R. 56. She further asserts that an evidentiary conflict exists

between Mooningham’s discovery responses and her summary judgment motion,

which raises a genuine issue of material fact.

             We review an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo

standard of review. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d

241 (1996); Zemcik v. LaPine Truck Sales & Equip. Co., 124 Ohio App.3d 581, 585,

706 N.E.2d 860 (8th Dist.1998). In Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 82 Ohio St.3d

367, 369-370, 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998), the Supreme Court of Ohio set forth the

appropriate test as follows:

      Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1)
      there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is
      entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can
      come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the
      nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have the evidence
      construed most strongly in his favor. Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp.,
      73 Ohio St.3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196 [(1995)], paragraph three of the
      syllabus. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
      showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is
      entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d
      280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 [(1996)].

             Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party “may

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s

response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Civ.R. 56(E); Mootispaw v.

Eckstein, 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 667 N.E.2d 1197 (1996). Doubts must be resolved
in favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-

359, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992).

             Crenshaw alleged in her amended complaint that Mooningham

“posted numerous slanderous, libelous, and defaming statements on social media

multiple times a day with intent to harass, annoy, and embarass [sic] the Plaintiff in

violation of R[.]C[.] 2739.01.”      Crenshaw stated that Mooningham posted

Crenshaw’s court cases, home address, and financial information on social media to

harass, bully, and humiliate Crenshaw and has posted case information and court

dates, and called an unidentified member of Crenshaw’s family a “murderer.”

Crenshaw claimed that Mooningham’s actions have caused her extreme emotional

and psychological damages, affected her earning capacity and reputation, and

caused her to seek mental health counseling. Crenshaw sought damages in excess

of $400,000 plus “all court costs and fees associated with this action.”

             Mooningham’s motion for summary judgment asserted that no

genuine issues of material fact remained for trial because (1) Crenshaw failed to

identify any libelous or slanderous statements; (2) Crenshaw cited the incorrect

legal elements for a telephone harassment claim; and (3) Crenshaw had no material

facts to support her claim for spoliation.

              In response to Mooningham’s motion for summary judgment,

Crenshaw presented arguments relating to the admissibility of Mooningham’s

exhibits and noted that Mooningham did not deny that she was the author of the

posts or refuted the content. She further raised assertions relative to Mooningham’s
counsel and the truthfulness of statements made in court filings and during phone

conferences with the court.

                                   A. Defamation

              Defamation, which includes both slander and libel, is the “publication

[of] a false statement ‘made with some degree of fault, reflecting injuriously on a

person’s reputation, or exposing a person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule,

shame or disgrace, or affecting a person adversely in his or her trade, business or

profession.’” Jackson v. Columbus, 117 Ohio St.3d 328, 2008-Ohio-1041, 883

N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 9, quoting A & B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg.

& Constr. Trades Council, 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 651 N.E.2d 1283 (1995).

              To prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a false

statement of fact, (2) about the plaintiff, (3) was published to a third party, (4) with

the requisite degree of fault on the part of the defendant, and (5) the statement was

either defamatory per se or was defamatory per quod, causing special harm to the

plaintiff. See, e.g., Geletka v. Radcliff, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110988, 2022-Ohio-

2497, ¶ 31; Lograsso v. Frey, 2014-Ohio-2054, 10 N.E.3d 1176, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.);

Garofolo v. Fairview Park, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 92283 and 93021, 2009-Ohio-

6456, ¶ 17.

              In Mooningham’s motion for summary judgment, she argued that

Crenshaw “has failed to identify in her complaints or other pleadings what these

libelous or slanderous statements are.” As noted by Mooningham, some of the

statements cited do not even pertain to Crenshaw.
              Crenshaw did not specifically identify the alleged defamatory

statements in her amended complaint, nor did she present any evidence regarding

the statements with her brief in opposition to Mooningham’s motion for summary

judgment. Crenshaw asserts in her brief that she attached the defamatory social

media posts to her own motion for summary judgment, along with her affidavit.

              Crenshaw does not set forth any specifics about each statement,

particularly how they were defamatory. Simply attaching the posts and stating in an

affidavit that they were slanderous and libelous is insufficient.         An affidavit

submitted on summary judgment must contain more than general, conclusory

assertions to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial:

      “‘Generally, a party’s unsupported and self-serving assertions, offered
      by way of affidavit, standing alone and without corroborating materials
      under Civ.R. 56, will not be sufficient to demonstrate material issues of
      fact. Otherwise, a party could avoid summary judgment under all
      circumstances solely by simply submitting such a self-serving affidavit
      containing nothing more than bare contradictions of the evidence
      offered by the moving party.’”

Jochum v. Listati, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106957, 2019-Ohio-166, ¶ 19, quoting

Davis v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83665, 2004-Ohio-6621, ¶ 23, quoting

Bell v. Beightler, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-569, 2003-Ohio-88, ¶ 33. Crenshaw

presented no evidence to demonstrate how the claimed statements were defamatory

or, in some cases, that they even pertained to her, and it is not the duty of this court

to root out Crenshaw’s claims and find evidence in support thereof.
               Crenshaw has failed to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact

relating to her defamation claim; thus, the trial court properly granted summary

judgment on this claim.

                B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

              To establish an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the

plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff

serious emotional distress; (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and

outrageous; and (3) the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of plaintiff's

serious emotional distress. Phung v. Waste Mgt., Inc., 71 Ohio St.3d 408, 410, 644

N.E.2d 286 (1994). Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct that goes beyond

all possible bounds of decency and is so atrocious that it is “utterly intolerable in a

civilized community.” Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 375, 453 N.E.2d

666 (1983). “Mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or

other trivialities” are insufficient to sustain a claim for relief.” Id.

               Even if we were to find that Crenshaw’s allegations created a genuine

issue of material fact regarding Mooningham’s conduct, we note that a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress also requires proof “that the mental

anguish suffered by plaintiff is serious and of a nature that no reasonable person

could be expected to endure it.” Burks v. Torbert, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91059,

2009-Ohio-486, ¶ 19. A plaintiff may prove severe and debilitating emotional injury

through the testimony of an expert or lay witnesses acquainted with the plaintiff who

have observed significant changes in the emotional or habitual makeup of the
plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 20. A self-serving affidavit, however, is insufficient to overcome

summary judgment as to this element of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Id. at ¶ 20, citing Jacob v. Fadel, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86920, 2006-Ohio-5003,

¶ 13. The record reveals that Crenshaw’s infliction of emotional distress claim fails

due to this deficiency.

              We find no error in the trial court’s decision to grant summary

judgment on Crenshaw’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

                           C. Telephone Harassment

              R.C. 2917.21 is a criminal statute, which states, “No person shall make

or cause to be made a telecommunication, or permit a telecommunication to be

made from a telecommunications device under the person’s control, with purpose

to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.”

              R.C. 2307.60 creates a civil cause of action for damages resulting from

any criminal act, unless otherwise prohibited by law. Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio

St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, 75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 6, 10, 12-13; R.C. 2307.60(A)(1)

(“Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, and may recover full

damages in, a civil action unless specifically excepted by law, may recover the costs

of maintaining the civil action and attorney’s fees if authorized by any provision of

the Rules of Civil Procedure or another section of the Revised Code or under the

common law of this state, and may recover punitive or exemplary damages if

authorized by section 2315.21 or another section of the Revised Code.”).
              As used in R.C. 2917.21, “[t]elecommunication” is “the origination,

emission, dissemination, transmission, or reception of data, images, signals,

sounds, or other intelligence or equivalence of intelligence of any nature over any

communications system by any method, including, but not limited to, a fiber optic,

electronic, magnetic, optical, digital, or analog method.”           R.C. 2913.01(X);

2917.21(G)(3).

              A “telecommunications device” is “any instrument, equipment,

machine, or other device that facilitates telecommunication, including, but not

limited to, a computer, computer network, computer chip, computer circuit,

scanner, telephone, cellular telephone, pager, personal communications device,

transponder, receiver, radio, modem, or device that enables the use of a modem.”

R.C. 2913.01(Y); 2917.21(G)(3). R.C. 2917.21 does not define “abuse,” “threaten” or

“harass.” But see In re C.W., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-180677 and C-180690, 2019-

Ohio-5262, ¶ 16 (noting that “[h]arassment” has been generally defined as “‘[w]ords,

conduct, or action ([usually] repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific

person, annoys, alarms, or causes substantial emotional distress in the person and

serves no legitimate purpose’”), quoting State v. Ellison, 178 Ohio App.3d 734,

2008-Ohio-5282, 900 N.E.2d 228, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), citing Black’s Law Dictionary,

733 (8th Ed.Rev.2004).

              Crenshaw alleged in her amended complaint that (1) Mooningham

has posted and circulated on social media Crenshaw’s court cases, home address,

and financial information in a campaign designed to harass, bully, and humiliate
Crenshaw without due cause or provocation; (2) Crenshaw has blocked

Mooningham but she has found a way to stalk Crenshaw’s social media page and

continues to post defaming content on her social media page about Crenshaw and

her family; and (3) Mooningham’s conduct has been nonstop harassment, bullying

and intimidation and in violation of Ohio Revised Code 2917.21(B)(1).

              Crenshaw seemingly did not present any arguments regarding her

telecommunications harassment claim in her brief in opposition to Mooningham’s

motion for summary judgment. In support of her brief, she submitted discovery

responses from Mooningham along with Crenshaw’s affidavit — neither of which

provide any further support for the telecommunications harassment claim. We

cannot find that Crenshaw has demonstrated that any genuine issues of material fact

remain with regard to this claim, and summary judgment was properly granted.

                            D. Spoliation of Evidence

              In her amended complaint, Crenshaw states that she “seeks spoliation

damages for the intentional and willful removal and deletion of [Mooningham]’s

social media posts [that were] removed, deleted, and[/]or destroyed * * * .”

              To establish a claim for spoliation of evidence, a plaintiff must prove

the following: (1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff, (2) that the

defendant knew that litigation exists or is probable, (3) willful destruction of

evidence by the defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s case, (4) actual

disruption of the plaintiff’s case, and (5) damages proximately caused by the

defendant’s actions. Elliott-Thomas v. Smith, 154 Ohio St.3d 11, 2018-Ohio-1783,
¶ 10, citing Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 67 Ohio St.3d 28, 29, 615 N.E.2d 1037

(1993).

                In her brief in opposition to Mooningham’s motion for summary

judgment, Crenshaw appeared to argue that Mooningham had deleted social media

posts based upon the fact that Mooningham conveyed to the trial court that the posts

were no longer in her custody, control, or possession. At oral argument, Crenshaw

admitted that she had not subpoenaed Facebook to obtain the posts in order to

demonstrate any such deletion.

                Further, Crenshaw notes that she has “duplicated/captured the posts

by screen shooting [sic] them * * * .”1 Consequently, it would appear that Crenshaw

is still in possession of the evidence she claims has been spoliated.

                Crenshaw seems to assert that Mooningham cannot argue any

asserted defenses to the claims without being able to produce the original social

media posts.      This argument is without merit, though, because the fact that

Mooningham could have difficulty maintaining a defense does not equate to a

disruption of Crenshaw’s case.

                Crenshaw has not presented any evidence that Mooningham willfully

destroyed any evidence. Crenshaw herself still has evidence of the posts in question,

and her case has not been disrupted. Consequently, Crenshaw cannot demonstrate

       1 At oral argument, Crenshaw maintained that she had screenshotted some, but

not all, of the posts.
a claim for spoliation of evidence, and the trial court properly granted summary

judgment on this claim.

                              E. Vexatious Litigator

               R.C. 2323.52(A)(3), Ohio’s vexatious litigator statute, defines a

vexatious litigator as

      any person who has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable
      grounds engaged in vexatious conduct in a civil action or actions,
      whether in the court of claims or in a court of appeals, court of common
      pleas, municipal court, or county court, whether the person or another
      person instituted the civil action or actions, and whether the vexatious
      conduct was against the same party or against different parties in the
      civil action or actions. * * *

               R.C. 2323.52(A)(2) defines “vexatious conduct” as conduct of a party

in a civil action that constitutes any of the following:

      (a) The conduct obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure
      another party to the civil action.

      (b) The conduct is not warranted under existing law and cannot be
      supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
      reversal of existing law.

      (c) The conduct is imposed solely for delay.

               In accordance with the statute, this court has adopted Loc.App.R. 23.

Under division (A) of this rule, this court may determine that “an appeal, original

action, or motion is frivolous or is prosecuted for delay, harassment, or any other

improper purpose” and impose appropriate sanctions.

              Loc.App.R. 23(B) further provides that a party that “habitually,

persistently, and without reasonable cause engages in frivolous conduct under
division (A) of this rule,” may be found by this court, sua sponte, to be a vexatious

litigator.

              A review of this court’s docketing system reveals that Crenshaw has

filed 16 appeals and five original actions in this court since 2013, with the majority

of filings occurring since 2022.     Crenshaw has appealed seven of this court’s

decisions to the Supreme Court of Ohio, all of which have been dismissed or

jurisdiction declined.

              The constitutional right of access to courts guaranteed under

Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is not unfettered. It “does not include

the right to impede the normal functioning of judicial processes.”          (Citation

omitted.) State ex rel. Richard v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 100 Ohio App.3d

592, 598, 654 N.E.2d 443 (8th Dist.1995). As of the date of this opinion, eight of

this court’s judges have had to recuse themselves from actions where Crenshaw is a

party, leaving only four judges to handle her numerous filings. By repeatedly filing

meritless actions and appeals, Crenshaw has continually taxed the limited and

precious resources of this court and the clerk of courts. Exercising our inherent

power under Loc.App.R. 23, we, sua sponte, declare Crenshaw a vexatious litigator

to prevent any further abuse by her of the judicial process. See State v. Henderson,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100374, 2014-Ohio-2274; State ex rel. McGrath v.

McClelland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97209, 2012-Ohio-157.

              Accordingly, Crenshaw is prohibited from instituting any appeals or

original actions, continuing any appeals or original actions, or filing any motions in
any pending appeals or original actions, pro se, in the Eighth District Court of

Appeals, without first obtaining leave of this court. She is further prohibited from

filing any appeal or original actions, pro se, in the Eighth District Court of Appeals

without the filing fee and security for costs required by Loc.App.R. 3(A). See

McGrath. Any request to file an appeal or original action shall be submitted to the

clerk of this court for the court’s review.

                                   III. Conclusion

               The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on

Crenshaw’s claims. Crenshaw’s sole assignment of error is overruled, and the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. It is further ordered that Mariah Crenshaw

be declared a vexatious litigator pursuant to Loc.App.R. 23.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS IN PARTS AND DISSENTS IN PART
(WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:

              I fully concur with the majority decision to affirm the judgment of the

trial court. However, I would not sua sponte declare Crenshaw a vexatious litigator.

Although Crenshaw has filed numerous appeals and original actions, she has had

limited success in some instances and this court has found reasonable grounds in

others. Nonetheless, Crenshaw’s filings have been excessive, and in this case, she

lacks adequate support for her claims. As the majority recognizes, Crenshaw has

continuously taxed the limited resources of this court and others. At this juncture,

I would issue a warning that the continued filing of appeals or original actions that

are not reasonably grounded in fact or warranted by law shall result in her being

declared a vexatious litigator pursuant to Loc.App.R. 23, and in such event filing

restrictions or other sanctions may be imposed as provided in the rule. See, e.g.,

Blue v. McGuire, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108891, 2020-Ohio-4292, ¶ 13-14 (similar

warning issued); State v. Perry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107596, 2019-Ohio-547,

¶ 12 (giving forewarning of being declared a vexatious litigator pursuant to

Loc.App.R. 23); State v. Keith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 102106, 102107, and

102108, 2015-Ohio-2401, ¶ 2 (providing fair warning of this court’s inherent power

to prevent abuse of the appellate process).