Court Opinion

ID: 9601458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:44:26.878317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:57.662383
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I agree with much of the majority’s opinion. However, I disagree with its conclusion that a communication between a debt collector and a debtor’s attorney is not actionable as a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA” or “Act”). 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. I also disagree with its conclusion that the letter sent by the debt collector in this case, RJM Acquisitions LLC (“RJM”), to the debtor’s attorney was not an attempt to collect a debt. See id. § 1692g(b). The majority’s conclusions are inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, with appellate case law interpreting that language, and with the policy of the statute.
I. Factual Background
The factual background of this case is recounted in some detail in the majority opinion. For purposes of this dissent, only the following need be stated.
On May 20, 2002, RJM sent two nearly identical letters to Kenneth Guerrero, at two separate addresses in Hawaii, attempting to collect an asserted debt of $1,291.86. Guerrero then contacted an attorney, who wrote a letter to RJM on June
10, 2002. The attorney’s letter requested payment of $3,000 to Guerrero, threatened litigation if that amount were not paid within ten days, and requested verification of the debt. The letter requested that RJM send the verification and other communications to the attorney rather than to Guerrero.
RJM responded in a letter to Guerrero’s attorney on June 14, 2002. In its entirety, the body of RJM’s letter stated:
RJM Acquisitions LLC is in receipt of a recent fax you sent dated June 10, 2002, concerning the above referenced account. Please be advised that RJM Acquisitions LLC has purchased this account from Citibank (SD), N.A.
In response to your fax, please be guided by the following. A Shell Oil *942account was opened August 12, 1993, in the name of Kenneth J. Guerrero, social security # XXX-XX-XXXX. The last payment was posted October 2, 1998.
We are in the process of complying with your request to verify the above referenced account. Same will be sent to you upon receipt.
RJM Acquisitions LLC respectfully maintains that it has violated no laws. RJM Acquisitions LLC is not a collection agency and therefore, not subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The only attempted contact we had with your client is by our letter dated May 18, 2002[sic].
Additionally, enclosed please find relevant information in response to your fax.
The current balance is $1,291.86. Please contact this office to discuss this matter.
We have enclosed a postage paid return envelope for your convenience.
(Emphasis in original.) At the bottom of its letter, below the signature line and in the same typeface as the body of the letter itself, RJM wrote, “This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose.”
No other communications are at issue.
II. My Disagreements with the Majority
Congress passed the FDCPA in 1978 to respond to the “widespread and serious national problem” of “debt collection abuse.” S.Rep. No. 95-382, at 2, 4 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696, 1698. Congress intended that the FDCPA serve as a “remedial statute aimed at curbing what Congress considered to be an industry-wide pattern of and propensity towards abusing debtors.” Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.2006).
According to the majority, whenever a debtor is represented by an attorney none of the protections of the FDCPA protect the debtor against false, misleading, or abusive communications by the debt collector, so long as the communications are directed to the attorney. The majority’s conclusion is inconsistent with the purpose of the FDCPA. More to the point, its conclusion is inconsistent with the plain statutory text.
The FDCPA is a multi-part statute, with a number of provisions regulating what a debt collector may do. Two provisions specifically mention attorneys for debtors, specifying that if a debtor retains an attorney a debt collector must communicate with the attorney rather than the debtor except in narrowly defined circumstances. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(6), 1692e(a)(2). Other provisions prohibit harassment or abuse, § 1692d; prohibit “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation,” § 1692e; prohibit “unfair or unconscionable means” of collecting debts, § 1692f; require that the debt collector “cease collection of [a disputed] debt” during a requested verification of the debt, § 1692g(b); require that any suit be brought in specified venues, § 1692i; and prohibit the use of deceptive forms, § 1692j.
Given these provisions, it is impossible to conclude that all otherwise prohibited conduct is permitted merely because it is directed at a debtor’s attorney. For example, § 1692d(l) prohibits “[t]he use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person.” Further, § 1692i(a) requires that a legal action to enforce a debt be brought in the district in which the consumer resides or signed the contract sued upon or, in the case of a secured interest in real property, in the district in which the property is located. It simply cannot be the case that such things as threats of violence communicated through a debtor’s attorney and suits in *943inconvenient forums are no longer forbidden by the FDCPA as soon as the debtor retains an attorney.
There are two provisions of the FDCPA at issue in this case— § 1692e, which forbids “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation,” and § 1692g(b), which requires cessation of “collection of the debt” during verification of a disputed debt. Even though the majority rejects Guerrero’s claims under both sections, its analysis is based almost exclusively on § 1692g(b) and on one district court case interpreting that section. In my view, the majority errs in concluding that § 1692e provides no protection against false, deceptive, or misleading representations to a debtor’s attorney. Indeed, I think the majority would almost certainly abandon its conclusion that § 1692e provides no such protection if it were to analyze § 1692e on that section’s own terms. In my view, the majority also errs in concluding that indirect collection efforts aimed at a debtor’s attorney are not covered by the prohibition against collection efforts pending verification of the disputed debt under § 1692g(b). I discuss §§ 1692e and 1692g(b) in turn.
A. “False, Deceptive, or Misleading” Statements under § 1692e
1. Coverage of § 1692e
For three reasons, I conclude that communications between a debt collector and an attorney representing a debtor are covered by § 1692e.
First, the text of the FDCPA clearly requires that conclusion. Section 1692e provides, “A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” For purposes of the FDCPA, a “debt collector” is “any person who ... regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added). A “representation” may be made by means of a “communication.” See, e.g., id. § 1692e(8) (prohibiting “[cjommunicat-ing or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known ... to be false”); id. § 1692e(9) (prohibiting “use or distribution of any written communication which simulates or is falsely represented to be [an official] document”); id. § 1692e(ll) (prohibiting “failure to disclose in the initial ... communication with the consumer ... that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt”). A “communication” is defined as the “conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” Id. § 1692a(2) (emphasis added).
These provisions make clear that the prohibition contained in § 1692e against “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation ... in connection with the collection of any debt” is not limited to representations made directly to debtors. By its plain terms, § 1692e bars “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation,” whether it is made to the consumer or to a third party, so long as the representation is made “in connection with the collection of a debt.” The majority’s assertion that “communications directed only to a debt- or’s attorney ... are not actionable under the Act,” Maj. Op. at 936, is impossible to square with the Act’s prohibition on such representations when made “directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.”
There is nothing in the text of the FDCPA to indicate that attorneys representing debtors are excluded from the class of third parties to whom a debt collector may not make a false, deceptive, or misleading representation. To the contrary, § 1692c(a) specifically provides that, where a debtor is represented by an attorney, the debt collector shall direct all *944“communication” to the attorney, absent permission to communicate directly with the debtor. A proper reading of the text therefore dictates that § 1692e, which regulates categorically the contents of communications by the debt collector, covers the “communication” to the debtor’s attorney described in § 1692c(a)(2). See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (“[T]he normal rule of statutory construction [is] that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Second, the United States Supreme Court and two courts of appeals have read § 1692e as applying to communications to attorneys representing debtors. In Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995), the debtor, Darlene Jenkins, borrowed money from a bank and then defaulted on the loan. The bank sued Jenkins in state court to recover the debt. As part of an effort to settle the suit, an attorney for the bank wrote a letter to Jenkins’s attorney. Jenkins then brought suit against the bank’s attorney and his law firm, alleging that the letter to her attorney was a “ ‘false representation of ... the ... amount ... of any debt’ ” in violation of § 1692e(2)(A). Heintz, 514 U.S. at 293, 115 S.Ct. 1489 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A)) (alterations in original). The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil ‘Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, on the ground that the FDCPA did not apply to a lawyer who attempts to collect a debt through litigation. Id. at 294, 115 S.Ct. 1489. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s reversal of the district court order granting the motion to dismiss, holding that “[t]he Act does apply to lawyers engaged in litigation.” Id. In so doing, the Court assumed, quite correctly in my view, that a false representation sent to a debtor’s attorney by a debt collector violates § 1692e(2)(A).
Further, in Dikeman v. National Educators, Inc., 81 F.3d 949 (10th Cir.1996), an employee of a debt collector communicated with an attorney representing two debtors in an attempt to collect overdue rent and other charges. Id. at 950. The debtors sued the debt collector and several of its employees under the FDCPA, claiming that the communication was a “ ‘false or misleading misrepresentation’ ” in violation of § 1692e(ll). Id. at 951. The Tenth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, but not on the ground that a communication to a debtor’s attorney is not covered by § 1692e. Rather, the court affirmed on the ground that the communication was not false or misleading because the attorney, as a sophisticated professional, would not have misunderstood it. Id. at 953-54.
Finally, in Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226 (4th Cir.2007), the law firm of Wolpoff & Abramson (“W & A”) sued Farid Sayyed in state court to collect a debt. Id. at 228. Sayyed, in turn, sued W & A for violation of the FDCPA, alleging, inter alia, that W & A violated § 1692e(2)(A) by falsely stating the amount of the debt. Id. at 229. W & A argued that § 1692e does not apply to communications to a debtor’s attorney. Id. at 232. The Fourth Circuit squarely rejected that argument. Noting that the FDCPA both contemplates communications with debtors’ attorneys and defines “communication” expansively, the court concluded that a false statement to a debt- or’s attorney “plainly qualifies as an indirect communication to the debtor.” Id. at 232-33. It then wrote, “If the statute left any room for doubt about this issue, Heintz resolved it. Heintz itself involved a communication from a debt collection attorney to debtor Darlene Jenkins’ coun*945sel, not to Jenkins herself.... Thus, plainly, the FDCPA covers communications to a debtor’s attorney.” Id. at 233.
The majority brushes these cases aside, relying instead on dictum from one court of appeals case and on several district court cases. The appellate case is Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118 (2d Cir.2002), in which the Second Circuit declined to entertain an FDCPA claim based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court noted in dictum, without citation to either Heintz or Dikeman, “Where an attorney is interposed as an intermediary between a debt collector and a consumer, we assume the attorney, rather than the FDCPA, will protect the consumer from a debt collector’s fraudulent or harassing behavior. However, this is not an issue on which we need to rule today.” Id. at 128.
The only district court opinion discussed (as opposed to string-cited) by the majority is Zaborac v. Phillips & Cohen Assocs., Ltd., 330 F.Supp.2d 962 (N.D.Ill.2004). But the issue in Zaborac was not whether communications from a debt collector to a debtor’s attorney were covered by the “false, deceptive, and misleading representation” provision of § 1692e. Rather, the issue was whether settlement negotiations between the attorneys for the two sides while a debt was being verified constituted “collection of the debt” within the meaning of § 1692g(b). Id. at 966. The district court in Zaborac held that the settlement negotiations in that case did not constitute “collection” under § 1692g(b) and were thus permitted while verification of the debt was still pending. Id. at 966-67. But Zaborac’s holding on the meaning, of “collection” under § 1692g(b) does not resolve the question whether a debt collector is forbidden by § 1692e to make a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” to a debtor’s attorney.
Third, if notwithstanding § 1692e debt collectors are free to make false, deceptive, or misleading representations to debtors’ attorneys, debtors are left vulnerable to the very abuses that the FDCPA was intended to redress. For example, assume that a debt collector sends to a debtor’s attorney false documents purporting to verify a debt. In such a ease, the attorney might discover the truth and protect the debtor, but she might not. Even if the attorney does discover the truth, she will likely have spent time and money doing so. If § 1692e does not forbid sending false documents to the debtor’s attorney, the debtor will have to pay the attorney’s fees and expenses out of his or her own pocket. On the other hand, if § 1692e forbids such communications with the debtor’s attorney, the debtor will be able to recover damages and attorney’s fees. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(l), (3).
Under the majority’s reading of § 1692e, a debtor is protected against false, deceptive, or misleading representations only so long as she does not retain an attorney. As soon as an attorney for the debtor enters the picture, the debt collector is free to send false, deceptive, and misleading communications to the debtor’s attorney without fear of any damage judgment or award of attorney’s fees. That is, as soon as the attorney enters the picture, the debtor rather than the debt collector will have to bear the burden imposed by any such false, deceptive, or misleading communications from the debt collector. Such a result is manifestly contrary both to common sense and to the policy underlying the FDCPA.
2. Application of § 1692e to Letter from RJM
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that RJM’s June 14 letter to Guerrero’s attorney is covered by § 1692e. However, I would not apply the least sophisticated debtor standard to determine whether *946RJM’s representations to Guerrero’s attorney were false, deceptive, or misleading. Rather, following the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Dikeman, I would hold that the standard of what constitutes a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” has a different application depending on whether the communication is directed to the attorney or the consumer.
In Dikeman, a debt collector attempting to collect a debt contacted the attorney representing two debtors. When the debt collector provided verification of the debt to the debtors’ attorney, it did not state that it was attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. The debtors sued the debt collector, alleging that the omission of such a statement violated § 1692e(ll) which (as it then read) required that a debt collector “disclose clearly in all communications made to collect a debt ... that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose.” Dikeman, 81 F.3d at 951 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)[1995]).
The Tenth Circuit held that the failure to provide such a statement, in a communication to an attorney, did not violate § 1692e. In the court’s view, “the fact of the debt verification and its content, viewed in context, was adequate to disclose to an attorney hired to represent the debt- or that the debt collector was attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose.” Id. at 954. The court explained:
The legal implications of communicating with a debt collector would be especially within the professional competence of a lawyer hired to represent a client’s interests in the collection process, and the fact that a communication is made to collect a debt is something that the lawyer’s professional expertise would allow him or her to discern easily on facts such as these.
Id. at 953.
I agree with the approach taken in Dike-man. It makes sense to read the statute in a practical way, asking not whether the communication is false, deceptive, or misleading in the abstract, but whether it is so to the person to whom it is addressed. A communication that is false, deceptive, or misleading to a consumer may not be so to an attorney. Such an approach both protects debtors and remains true to the statutory text.
The passage in RJM’s June 14 letter to which Guerrero objects is the sentence stating that RJM “is not a collection agency and therefore, not subject to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.” RJM’s statement that it is not a “collection agency” is, in one sense, true. As the district court found, RJM is “neither licensed nor registered as a collection agency in the State of Hawaii.” But RJM’s legal conclusion that it was “therefore” not a debt collector covered by the FDCPA hardly follows.
If RJM’s statement had been made to Guerrero, I would have no hesitation in concluding that it was “false, deceptive, or misleading” within the meaning of § 1692e. But the statement was made to Guerrero’s attorney rather than to him. Given that RJM’s statement was made to a debtor’s attorney,- specifically hired because of his professional expertise in debt collection matters, I would hold that the statement — as made to the attorney — was not “false, deceptive, or misleading.” It was not a statement that might have taken the attorney time and money to evaluate and contest. Rather, it was a legal contention that the attorney was able to evaluate and reject quickly and easily. I would therefore hold that while RJM’s communication to Guerrero’s attorney was covered *947under § 1692e, it did not violate that section.
B. Obligation to Verify Debt under § 1692g
Section 1692g(a)(4) provides that “[w]ithin five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall” give the consumer “written notice containing”
a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector[.]
Section 1692g(b) further requires
If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed ... the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment ... and a copy of such verification or judgment ... is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise violate this subchapter [Subchapter V. Debt Collection Practices] may continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) of this section unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed
(Emphasis added.)
After receiving RJM’s two initial letters, Guerrero asked for verification of the asserted debt in his attorney’s June 10 letter, in accordance with § 1692g(b). RJM responded in its June 14 letter to Guerrero’s counsel, “We are in the process of complying with your request to verify the above referenced account. Same will be sent to you upon receipt.” RJM also wrote, “the current balance is $1,291.86. Please contact this office to discuss this matter. We have enclosed a postage paid return envelope for your convenience.” (Emphasis in original.) Finally, at the bottom of the letter, RJM wrote, “This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose.”
Guerrero contends that RJM had not verified the debt when it wrote the June 14 letter, and that RJM was therefore obliged under § 1692g(b) to “cease collection of the debt.” He contends further that the June 14 letter was “collection of the debt” within the meaning of § 1692g(b). The district court agreed with Guerrero, but the majority reverses. According to the majority, a settlement attempt is not “collection of [a] debt” within the meaning of § 1692g(b) if the debtor is represented by an attorney. However, according to the majority, a settlement attempt is “collection of[a] debt” if the debtor is not represented.
I am somewhat sympathetic to the general policy concerns expressed by the majority, and, indeed, am very sympathetic to its concerns as they relate to the facts of this case. As a general matter, there may be some sense in allowing two attorneys— one representing the debt collector and the other representing the debtor — to enter into settlement negotiations while á debt is still being verified. In this particular case, it is hard to like the aggressive stance and tactics of Guerrero’s lawyer and hard to see the harm caused by RJM’s June 14 letter.
But policy concerns are not the same thing as statutory language. The plain *948meaning of § 1692g is that any “collection of the debt,” whether direct or indirect, is prohibited until the debt has been verified. When a debt collector receives a request under § 1692g(a) to verify a debt, it has two choices. It may decide not to verify the debt and to abandon any attempt to collect the debt. See Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assocs., 122 F.3d 480, 483 (7th Cir.1997) (debt collector gave up all attempts to contact debtor and actually returned debt- or’s file to original creditor). Or it may decide to verify the debt in order to pursue collection activities. But if it decides to verify the debt, it must cease collection activity during the verification process and resume collection activity only after the debt has been verified. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
The majority refuses to read the statute as it is written. According to the majority, indirect collection activity aimed at a debt- or’s attorney is permitted under § 1692g(b) while a debt is being verified. Its opinion states that upon receipt of Guerrero’s request for verification, RJM “ceased all direct collection activity from Guerrero.” Maj. Op. at 931 (emphasis added). The statute does not make such a distinction. The majority does not deny that RJM engaged in “collection activity” in sending its June 14 letter to Guerrero’s attorney, but it approves such activity because it is indirect and aimed at the attorney rather than the debtor. But there is nothing in the text of § 1692g(b) that prohibits “direct” collection but permits “indirect” collection. Nor is there anything in the text that permits sending a “collection” letter to a debtor’s attorney, even while forbidding sending an equivalent “collection” letter directly to an unrepresented debtor.
Although I can see policy reasons for writing the statute differently, I would follow the statute as it is written. The fact that the statute is written clearly is reason enough to follow it. In addition, the Supreme Court in Heintz, surveying the legislative history of the statute, observed that Congress had considered and rejected alternative language that would have immunized from FDCPA liability a debt collector’s lawyer’s attempts “ ‘to contact third parties in order to facilitate settlements.’ ” 514 U.S. at 297, 115 S.Ct. 1489 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99-405, at 11 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752, 1760). The Court explained that Congress had declined to draw a line in the FDCPA “between ‘legal’ activities and ‘debt collection’ activities.” Id.
Finally, there are good policy reasons supporting the statute as written. There is nothing particularly onerous about requiring a debt collector to cease debt collection activities — including attempts at settlement with the debtor’s attorney — until the debt is verified. The standard for verification is not very demanding. See, e.g., Clark, 460 F.3d at 1173-74; Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 406 (4th Cir.1999). In most cases, the waiting period will not be long. In those cases where the waiting period is extended because the debt is difficult to verify, that very difficulty is a reason to wait. Requiring all collection efforts, including settlement offers, to cease prior to verification helps to ensure that both parties have accurate information about the claim being settled. See S.Rep. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699 (verification is intended to “eliminate the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid”); Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir.2004) (public interest in settlement does not trump FDCPA provisions).
Section 1692g(b) provides a simple bright-line rule: All “collection of the *949debt” must cease pending verification of the debt. Full stop. There are sound policy reasons for having such a bright-line rule. There is no necessity to distinguish between cases in which the debtor is, or is not, represented by counsel. There is no necessity to distinguish between bona fide settlement negotiations and harassment, hardball tactics, or threats of injury designed to coerce settlement. If verification has been requested, all collection activity must cease pending verification. The rule is easy to understand and easy to follow.
In this case, it is undisputed that Guerrero properly requested verification of the debt under § 1692g(a). In response, RJM sent a letter on June 14 in which it stated that it was in the process of obtaining verification, thus making clear that as of the date of the letter, the obligation to cease collection activities applied. In that same letter, RJM stated that the “current balance” of the account was $1,291.86, the same amount given in its two initial dunning letters to Guerrero; it stated that it was enclosing “a postage paid return envelope for your convenience”; and it stated, “This is an attempt to collect a debt.” RJM’s letter could hardly have been clearer. It was trying to collect the asserted debt. One can characterize the letter as an attempt to settle the debt, even though that is not what the letter says. But that does not matter. Section 1692g(b) makes no exception for attempts at “settlement,” and it forbids “collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof’ pending verification.
I would therefore hold that in sending its June 14 letter to Guerrero, RJM violated § 1692g(b).
III. Attorney’s Fees
Section § 1692k(a) provides that “any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision” shall pay the debtor “any actual damage sustained,” “such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000,” and, “in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” The district court here concluded, “On the basis of the above findings, and particularly the findings with respect to Defendant’s false and misleading representations, ... Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages of $1,000.00 for the FDCPA violations.” No other damages were awarded to Guerrero. Based on Guerrero’s success in winning statutory damages, the district court also awarded him $43,428.00 in attorney’s fees and $1,809.21 in costs.
I concur in that portion of the majority’s opinion holding that the two otherwise identical letters that RJM sent to Guerrero’s home and post office box addresses were not false, deceptive, or misleading simply because the account and file numbers listed on one letter ended with an “a” and those on the other letter with a “b.” In my view, even the least sophisticated debt- or would realize that these letters referred only to a single account due. I also agree with the majority, although based on a different rationale, that RJM’s June 14 communication to Guerrero’s attorney did not violate § 1692e. In contrast to the majority, I would uphold the district court’s ruling that RJM failed to cease collection activity pending verification as required by § 1692g(b).
Because I would hold that Guerrero prevailed on his claim that RJM violated § 1692g(b), I would also hold that he is eligible for statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs under § 1692k(a). However, I would vacate the district court’s existing award of statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs and remand for reconsideration consistent with the degree of success *950Guerrero ultimately achieved. See, e.g., Zagorski v. Midwest Billing Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 1164, 1166-67 (7th Cir.1997) (per curiam); Carroll v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 53 F.3d 626, 630 (4th Cir.1995).
Conclusion
Based upon the plain language of the FDCPA, the case law interpreting the statute, and Congress’s underlying policy, I would hold that communications or collection activities directed at a debtor’s attorney are actionable under §§ 1692e and 1692g. On the facts of this case, I would reverse the district court’s holding that RJM violated § 1692e but affirm its holding that RJM violated § 1692g(b).