Court Opinion

ID: 9845190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:16:25.924464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:54.002112
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
The affidavit and search warrant “particularized” the wrong address of a house. I would not reverse on this singular basis. Additionally, the search warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with particularity in that it failed to designate which apartment was to be searched. There were two separate abodes within the apartment house (Hinek family upstairs and appellant with roommate downstairs) and the officers kicked in the door on the basement apartment. Shades of the American Revolution.
If authorities may legally “particularize” an entire apartment house with one address (i.e., employing a correct address, which was not the case here), can authorities systematically kick in doors until the stolen goods are ultimately found? I would think not. You see, the first door might not be the correct door. I am opposed to this type of constitutional justice.
The inquiring legal mind conjures a host of domestic intranquilities arising from the decision of this Court: door desecrations in a long hallway in an apartment house, furor over doors being kicked in, startled people, screams in the night, bedlam. We begin with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article VI, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution providing “no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched_” (Emphasis supplied.) And recognizing that the premises searched must be described with reasonable certainty, we end up here with documents which do not describe the apartment to be searched. The search warrant expresses: “YOU ARE THEREFORE commanded to search the residence at 401 Dorothy Street *510.... ” There were two residences, not one, at 407 -Dorothy Street. It also provided: “You may serve this warrant on Sunday.” An individual’s constitutional rights should not be dependent upon the size of his community. True, Martin is a rural community. I envision an application of this decision to apartment houses in larger cities in this state and I foresee trouble in its application, if not tumult. For cases supporting my viewpoint, see People v. Royse, 173 Colo. 254, 256, 477 P.2d 380, 381 (1970); State v. Lee, 247 La. 553, 172 So.2d 678 (1965); United States v. Diange, 32 F.Supp. 994 (W.D.Pa.1940); Bryson v. State, 59 Okl.Cr. 130, 56 P.2d 1198 (1936); Thompson v. State, 198 Ind. 496, 154 N.E. 278 (1926).
In essence, illegally seized evidence contrary to the Federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal trial in a state court regardless of the relevancy and trustworthiness of the seized evidence as an item of proof, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961); the exclusionary rule was fashioned as a sanction to redress and to deter overreaching government conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, i.e., kicking down the doors in an apartment house. Under the reasoning of the majority opinion, if the officers had the right to kick in the door of the basement apartment, they had the right to kick in the upstairs door.
The majority’s reliance on United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), is misplaced. Ross, 456 U.S. at 800, 102 S.Ct. at 2159-60, dealt with the search of an automobile trunk. This case deals with the search of an apartment house. The law applicable to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures which extends to searches of automobiles, cannot carte blanche, be en-grafted upon the home of a citizen.
I fail to perceive how the Kaseman case, cited by the majority, is authority for the majority’s ultimate holding. Kaseman buttresses my position that search warrants must describe with particularity that which is to be searched. In Kaseman, the search warrant gave the exact location of defendant’s automobile.
The Wellner cite in the majority opinion is inapposite. Wellner addressed a concern of reviewing affidavits upon which search warrants are based. We stated the reviewing court “should read each affidavit as a whole and interpret each in a common sense and realistic manner.” Wellner, 318 N.W.2d at 327. This statement does not negate the constitutional mandate to particularly describe the place to be searched in a warrant. State v. Ellis, 263 S.C. 12, 207 S.E.2d 408 (1974), cited by the majority is distinguishable; factually, there was a residence at 88 Columbus Street, City of Charleston, State of South Carolina; here, there are two separate residences at 407 Dorothy Street, Martin, South Dakota. In this case, the house may very well have structurally enjoyed a common entryway leading to both apartments but each apartment had a separate door shielding it with privacy. My tenet is that a man’s castle, in an apartment house, begins at his apartment door. This South Dakota house was a duplex and the tenants therein should be accorded the same constitutional rights as a “multiple-residence” structure. There can be no realistic distinction, in law, between a one-family dwelling, a duplex, a multiple-residence structure, or a large apartment house with many apartments. Indeed, each apartment dweller has a legitimate expectation of privacy. His apartment is his home. The general rule in the United States, as I understand it, is that a general search warrant for an entire building or floor of a building occupied by different families or different tenants is void. See W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(b) at 78 (1978). W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 5.5(b) at 5-17 (1983), provides: “A search warrant for an apartment building or other multiple occupancy dwelling will be struck down unless the warrant particularizes the apartment or subunit of the dwelling to be searched.” The majority opinion would carve out an exception (duplex) under the facts here presented. I would not.
*511Federal courts have consistently held that the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a specific “place” be described when applied to dwellings refers to a single living unit (the residence of one person or family). Thus, a warrant which describes an entire building when cause is shown for searching only one apartment is void. United States v. Barkouskas, D.C. [Pa.], 38 F.2d 837; United States v. Diange, D.C. [Pa.], 32 F.Supp. 994; United States v. Chin On, D.C., [Mass.], 297 F. 531; United States v. Innelli, D.C. [Pa.], 286 F. 731; United States v. Mitchell, D.C. [Cal.], 274 F. 128. The basic requirement is that the officers who are commanded to search be able from the “particular” description of the search warrant to identify the specific place for which there is probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed. This requirement may be satisfied by giving the address of the building and naming the person whose apartment is to be searched. Kenney v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 157 F.2d 442; Shore v. United States, 60 App.D.C. 137, 49 F.2d 519.
United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir.1955). In Hinton, the address named in the search warrant was an entire apartment building, the basement, and each of the three upper floors thereof which constituted separate residences. The Hinton Court held the warrant invalid for want of particularity and expressed that searching two or more apartments in the same building was no different than searching two or more completely separate houses. Probable cause, stated Hinton, must be shown for searching each house or each apartment. Where the majority leaves the body of American Constitutional Law is here: The footprints led to the single entrance way and the officers obviously could not ascertain what person or persons went into the duplex and then into one of the two apartments; the affidavit could not, and did not, identify the apartment where the fruits of the crime were cached. For as the Hinton Court stated: “A single warrant may cover several different places or residences in a single building. But probable cause must be shown for searching each residence unless it be shown that, although appearing to be a building of several apartments, the entire building is actually being used as a single unit.” Hinton, 219 F.2d at 326. Accord: United States v. Higgins, 428 F.2d 232 (7th Cir.1970), striking down a general warrant commanding a search of a basement apartment building where there was a three-story building with four apartments on each floor and three in the basement.
To search for evidence in a home demands the greatest of care and caution upon law enforcement; for, indeed, the intrusion of privacy into a home was the heart — the central focus — of the Fourth Amendment. Our forefathers feared the British violating the sanctity of their home. Hence, greater restraint is demanded in a home-setting which would include a family dwelling or building containing apartments. They feared officials pounding on their doors and breaking the door down to search and seize persons and property within their homes. They wanted to be secure from excesses of government. At the beginning, our forefathers declared that all men were born equally free and independent and had certain inalienable rights, among those being life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Throughout modern history, people have fled to these shores because of the liberty that this Republic affords. They do not flee to the Communist bloc. This Republic is considered the leader of the free world among all nations. To us, they look for guidance and protection. The American Republic has made an indelible impact on this planet. It continues to be a beacon of liberty. Our forefathers, through the Bill of Rights, made it so. Therefore, each day, throughout the land, we must imbue that Bill of Rights with vitality. I cannot vote for an opinion which deprives a citizen of one of his most basic rights. Conceptually, to vote for an opinion which tolerates a search of an apartment house, albeit a little house on the prairie, without designating the spe*512cific apartment to be searched is to lay waste to the very protection which is sought by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article VI, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution.*
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. Walking the solitary road of dissent again, I am comforted by these words: “The curious man — the dissenter — the innovator — the one who taunts and teases or makes a caricature of our prejudices, is often our salvation. Yet, throughout history he has been burned or booed, hanged or exiled, imprisoned or tortured, for pricking the bubble of contemporary dogma.” Justice William 0. Douglas. 59 Neb.L.Rev. 229, 230 (1980). Dissenters to British colonial rule wrote the Constitution; these dissenters, our Founding Fathers, feared a pernicious warrant, yes, such as we witness here.

 Article VI, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated., and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. (Emphasis supplied.)