Court Opinion

ID: 9759507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:18:43.190284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.457981
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring.
This Court granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review in order that it might consider and review appellant’s contention that the court of appeals, see Calloway v. State, 707 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.App.1986), erred in overruling his eighteenth ground of error, to-wit: “The trial court committed reversible error by denying appellant’s motion to suppress for lack of standing to complain for the reason that the trial court did not apply the proper legal test to determine appellant’s standing to complain [about the search warrant that issued that resulted in appellant being arrested and charged with committing the offense of possession of cocaine].”
Given the state of the appellate record, my vote is to place this Court’s “Refused with a disclaimer” stamp on appellant’s petition for discretionary review. The majority, however, prefers to overrule appellant’s contention with an opinion. Because I am unable to agree with many legal statements that are contained within the majority opinion, I can only concur in the decision to affirm the decision of the court of appeals. By this statement, however, I do not mean to imply that I agree with all of what the court of appeals stated in its opinion.
The majority opinion correctly sets out what occurred in the trial court when the trial judge called up appellant’s motion to suppress for consideration; therefore, I will not repeat the colloquy that occurred between the trial judge and appellant’s counsel.
In finding that appellant did not have “standing” to challenge the validity of the search warrant affidavit and search war-*653the place searched, the correct legal standard in deciding whether he has “standing” to contest the search is whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where the search occurred. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1984); State v. Curbello-Rodriquez, 351 N.W.2d 758 (1984); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, modified, 664 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.1981); and Chapa v. State, 729 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). This decision is based upon, but not limited to, the factors that are set out in several of these cases.
A careful reading of the court of appeals’ opinion makes it clear to me that that court correctly overruled appellant’s ground of error, although apparently for the wrong reasons. In overruling appellant’s ground of error, the court of appeals, either expressly or implicitly, held that the statements of appellant’s counsel were not evidence. However, this Court has held that unsworn statements by trial counsel, as well as the trial judge, are sufficient to place the event in the record. See, for example, Canada v. State, 660 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Hicks v. State, 525 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); and Harris v. State, 738 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
It is now obvious to me that the record makes it clear that appellant’s counsel, in stating to the trial judge why appellant had “standing” to contest the search, failed to sufficiently articulate why appellant, as a “guest” in the residence where he was arrested, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area of the residence where he'was arrested.
Appellant’s counsel merely represented to the trial judge that appellant was a “guest” in the residence where his arrest and the search took place. His statement, without more, for Fourth Amendment purposes, was insufficient to establish that appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area where he was arrested. Although a “guest”, temporary, overnight, or even permanent, in another individual’s residence has historically been deemed to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence, see, for example, United States v. Haydel, supra, and State v. Curbello-Rodriguez, supra, the mere fact that an individual who was arrested in another individual’s residence was a “guest” in that residence does not necessarily mean that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area of the residence where he was arrested. In sum, as occurred here, for Fourth Amendment purposes, merely stating that a defendant was a “guest” in another individual’s residence where the defendant’s arrest or the complained about search occurred does not automatically afford that person protection under the Fourth Amendment, nor does it automatically strip that person of protection under the Fourth Amendment. Because all “guests” do not have the same rights in another individual’s residence, the issue whether a “guest” has standing to contest the validity of a search must therefore be determined on an ad hoc basis, which decision is based upon, but not limited to the factors that are set out in several of the above cited cases.
Contrary to the majority opinion, I find without any reservation or qualification that appellant received an adverse ruling from the trial judge on his motion to suppress when the trial judge ruled that because appellant did not have “standing”, according to the trial judge’s erroneous legal standard, that before appellant could have “standing” to contest the search he had to first establish that he had a proprietary or possessory interest in the residence where he was arrested, the evidence that was seized pursuant to the execution of the search warrant would not be suppressed and would be admitted into evidence during appellant’s trial. Having obtained an adverse ruling on the motion to suppress, it was unnecessary for appellant to later object when the evidence that was seized was offered and admitted into evidence. See, for example, Roberts v. State, 545 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Also see former Art. 40.09, 6(d)(3), V.A.C.C.P.; Rule *654rant, the execution of which led to appellant’s arrest, because he did not have either a proprietary or possessory interest in the residence where he was arrested, the trial judge clearly used the wrong legal standard. When a defendant challenges a search, and there is no dispute that there was a legitimate expectation of privacy in 52(b), Rules of Appellate Procedure; and Rule 103(a)(1), Rules of Evidence.
Notwithstanding that I have found that appellant received an adverse ruling from the trial judge on his motion to suppress, I am compelled to also find that because appellant’s counsel, during his colloquy with the trial judge, failed to perfect his error, there is nothing presented for review. Counsel should have, but did not make an offer of proof that would have reflected that appellant, as a “guest” in the residence, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area of the residence where he was arrested. Had counsel made a sufficient offer of proof, concerning why appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy as a “guest”, in the area of the residence where he was arrested, then I would not hesitate to hold that the trial judge erred by applying the wrong legal standard and not conducting a formal hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress. In that instance, the State would have had the burden to produce the search warrant affidavit and search warrant, after which appellant would have had the burden to establish the invalidity of the search warrant affidavit. See Miller v. State, 736 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).
For the above and foregoing reasons, I only concur.