Court Opinion

ID: 9444044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:39:06.868863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:41.416487
License: Public Domain

WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the result, because I think Julia Holcomb is barred by laches. She waited nearly six years before suing on the contract: that is too long. Hurdle v. American Security & Trust Co., 1929, 59 App.D.C. 58, 32 F.2d 954; see Galliher v. Cadwell, 1892, 145 U.S. 368, 12 S.Ct. 873, 36 L.Ed. 738. The general rule is said to be that laches may not be invoked in a suit between spouses. See Note, 121 A.L.R. 1382 (1939). But the reason for the rule — to preserve domestic tranquillity — has no application here. Where spouses have been separated! throughout the entire span of the delay the better reasoned cases hold that the doctrine of laches may be applied. Dunham v. Adams, 1913, 82 N.J.Eq. 265, 88 A. 696; see Note, 121 A.L.R. at 1399 (1939).
But I think the court errs in saying that Mrs. Holcomb is barred by res judi-cata. She did not, in the body of her 1945 complaint, say anything about the separation agreement, or about any property dispute. She simply asked, in her prayer for relief, “that property rights be adjudicated herein.” That simple prayer certainly does not rise to the dignity of an independent action for ad*800judication of property rights in particular items of realty or personalty. Cf. Reilly v. Reilly, 1950, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 182 F.2d 108. The complaint cannot fairly be read to make it so. And the husband’s answer was, at best, equivocal. He denied cruelty and desertion on his part, and that he had “failed to furnish the plaintiff with means to secure support and maintenance.” His answer, under the heading “New Matter,” then alleged that the parties had voluntarily separated, pursuant to the agreement of March 29, 1945, which was attached as an exhibit; that the wife was in possession of the house on Sheriff Road, pursuant to the agreement; that •she had sold much of the furniture in the house, and that if not restrained she would dispose of the remainder. In conclusion the answer prayed that the wife be required to quit the Sheriff Road premises and to give possession thereof to the husband, and that she be restrained from selling the furniture. Prayer was also made for such other and further relief as to the court might seem just and proper.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of prosecution. The order merely recited that the plaintiff should “go without day.” Certainly this order served to deny a divorce to the plaintiff and, no doubt, under Rule 41 (b) is a decision on the merits insofar as divorce is concerned. But there is no sound reason why it should be considered an adjudication in favor of the husband on the question of property rights generally or the Sheriff Road property in particular. The husband’s answer asked for possession of the property and asked that appellee be restrained from selling the furniture. But when the complaint was dismissed for want of prosecution no order was entered granting the relief that the husband requested in his answer. No order was entered relieving the husband from any of his obligations under the separation agreement. No order was entered disturbing plaintiff’s possession of the premises. In this situation, how can it possibly be said that the District Court had made any adjudication on the question of property rights —much less that it held on the merits that the husband was entitled to possession, that the wife had no claim to the property, and that the separation agreement was not a binding contract? On the contrary, the District Court could reasonably have supposed that the parties had become reconciled, or that they had decided to remain separated without changing the status quo. Either alternative is far more reasonable than to suppose that the District Court intended to grant affirmative relief to the husband, and simply failed to enter an order doing so. For this court to conclude that the District Court did in fact decide a property question in favor of the husband seems startling, to say the least. The opinion in effect holds that where a wife’s complaint for divorce includes a general, prayer for adjudication of property rights, and the action is dismissed for lack of prosecution, the wife is forever precluded from claiming any property to which the husband has asserted ownership in his answer — or perhaps any property at all. Title searchers face a new hazard if they must henceforth search the files for dismissed divorce petitions.
True, it may be that in an ordinary litigation, between persons dealing at arm’s length, pleadings and proceedings comparable to those described above would justify a court in holding a subsequent action barred by res judicata. But this was an action between husband and wife: a divorce action. Important reasons of public policy dictate the application of different criteria here. The courts should, where possible, encourage the dropping of divorce suits. And certainly a wife should not be unnecessarily penalized for so doing. The terrible inequity of allowing the husband all property to which he asserts a claim where a divorce suit is dropped or simply neglected by the wife seems obvious. It is difficult to believe that a judge dismiss*801ing a suit for divorce intends such a result.
When a divorce is denied the hope at least is that the parties will mend their differences. Particularly is this true where — as here — the divorce action was brought soon after the period of separation and estrangement between the spouses had begun. For the court to make a general adjudication of property rights — determining who owns each piece of property — at this crucial moment in the relationship would almost inevitably raise a barrier to reconciliation. No sensible court, it seems to me, would consider doing so in the absence of strong representations from one (or preferably both) of the parties. Nothing of that sort appears in the present case.
The fair inference from a suit for divorce with a prayer for a general property adjudication attached is, I think, that the property is to be divided when, and if, the parties are legally adjudicated to be no longer man and wife. For this reason, and for others given above, courts all over the country have established and followed the rule that after denial of a divorce the court is without jurisdiction to determine the ancillary question of the property rights of the parties.1 The divorce is properly considered the basis of the action, and, when dismissed, the rest of the case must automatically be dismissed also. It is dismissed, not because the court has determined that the plaintiff is entitled to no property, but because the court may not even consider the question.
But even if this principle is to be rejected in the District of Columbia, and jurisdiction found to adjudicate property claims where divorce is denied, surely this jurisdiction is not mandatory. In view of the strong equities and policies described above it cannot be the law that in all cases where a prayer for a general property adjudication is coupled with a suit for divorce the court, where divorce is denied, must adjudicate all the property rights of the parties. If jurisdiction is there it must be discretionary. And the trial court should not be taken to have asserted its jurisdiction unless it gives a clear indication that it has done so. A fortiori this should be true where the suit is simply dismissed for want of prosecution. Here there was no clear indication on the point, or indeed, any indication at all. Surely, in such a situation, it cannot properly be held that the trial court has not only taken jurisdiction but has adjudicated all property claims in favor of the husband.

. E.g., Miller v. Miller, 1923, 200 Ky. 648, 255 S.W. 101; Oswald v. Oswald, 1949, 326 Mich. 238, 40 N.W.2d 135; Gasior v. Gasior, 1940, 67 Ohio App. 84, 35 N. E.2d 1021; Benson v. Benson, 1915, 45 Utah 514, 146 P. 564; see Ollman v. Ollman, 1947, 396 Ill. 176, 71 N.E.2d 50; Schaffer v. Schaffer, .1926, 114 Ohio St. 309, 151 N.E. 186; Gooden v. Gooden, 1947, 180 Or. 309, 176 P.2d 634; Rivard v. Rivard, 1944, 70 RJ. 305, 38 A.2d 771; Harkness v. Harkness, Tex.Civ.App.1927, 1 S.W.2d 399; McPherson v. McPherson, 1939, 200 Wash. 365, 93 P.2d 428. See also Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 14.109 (2d od. 1945) : “ * * * ordinarily a division of the property of the spouses is not allowable where a divorce is denied.”