Court Opinion

ID: 9607462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:59:00.731752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:38.496814
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, C. J.
(dissenting) — In the recent case of In re Sherman, 66 Wn.2d 718, 404 P.2d 978 (1965), we said that if misconduct of an attorney was the result or consequence of mental incompetency, from which he has not recovered but from which recovery is possible, he should be suspended, rather than disbarred, until such time as he can show that the probability of a recurrence is remote.
The existence of that case is not recognized in the majority opinion. I registered a dissent in the Sherman case, accepting the validity of the defense of mental incompetency, but contending that the attorney in that case should not be allowed to continue to practice because he had not even attempted to obtain a cure. Although the case had been pending for a considerable length of time, he had not yet sought psychiatric help and still displayed the symptoms of paranoia. Nevertheless, the majority of this court was willing to give him the benefit of the doubt and allow him to continue to practice law.
In my opinion, if this court is going to recognize a defense of mental or emotional illness, the defense should be available to all on an equal basis. As the law now stands, the availability of the defense depends upon the nature of the lawyer’s offense. If his violations of the code of ethics are falsification of his application for admission and contemptuous remarks addressed to a court of a sister state, the defense is available; on the other hand, if ‘his offenses consist of neglect of duty to clients and misappropriation of funds, the defense is not available. The question of whether the attorney has recognized his disability and is seeking *814a cure is irrelevant. In my opinion, the latter consideration should be determinative of the choice between suspension and disbarment, and, in any event, the attorney should not be permitted to practice law until he can show with reasonable certainty that a cure has been effected.
The prognosis of the psychiatrists in this case tends to support a conclusion that Mr. Moody’s emotional condition may improve to the extent that the probability of a recurrence is remote. Such a conclusion is also supported by the fact that Mr. Moody’s conduct after the commencement of these proceedings demonstrated an awareness (belated though it was) of the nature of his problem. He immediately ceased to practice law and has not practiced since; he sought psychiatric help and was committed to institutions for psychiatric care. Drinking has been a serious symptom of his illness and he stopped drinking. He has obtained employment which does not involve the handling of funds of others; and which, according to his doctor, is calculated to improve his mental and emotional health. He has done well in this work and won the respect of his fellows. His conduct has evidenced a recognition that he has problems and a sincere desire to correct them. Fellow lawyers, as well as judges, have spoken in his behalf.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that disbarment is not necessary at this time. An indefinite suspension should serve the purpose of protecting the public and maintaining proper discipline among members of the bar; and at the same time would not unduly penalize him for conduct which, according to the evidence before us, he was not able to control.
The defense of mental irresponsibility has only recently been recognized in this court, and, consequently, we do not have in our records another case in which this court has suspended an attorney until such time as he could show that he had become rehabilitated. However, a recent Illinois case is very much in point. It is In re Bourgeois, 25 Ill. 2d 47, 182 N.E.2d 651 (1962) (annotated in 96 A.L.R.2d 735). The attorney in that case was charged with the wrongful conversion of clients’ funds, and it appeared at the hearing *815that he had been suffering from mental and emotional strain, brought on by domestic and business difficulties of such severity that he had been taking psychiatric treatments for a year prior to the conversion. This the court considered a mitigating factor. In addition, the court said, at 52:
Amicus Curiae, in his usual fair manner, concedes that there are additional mitigating factors presented by the record. They are: 'his age (31 years), his previous good record and his subsequent unblemished conduct, the lack of other charges, the making of full restitution with relative promptness, and the fact that a number of character witnesses, including practicing lawyers and other reputable citizens, testified to his good character and reputation. Furthermore, respondent’s repentance, and recognition of 'his problem by seeking psychiatric help, are entitled to be placed on the scales as mitigating factors.
While not all of those factors are present here, it seems to me that there is a sufficient showing that Mr. Moody is making a genuine endeavor to rehabilitate himself to justify our imposing the lighter penalty of a suspension until such time as he can demonstrate that he is capable of practicing law and abiding by the canons of ethics of the bar.
I would not disbar the respondent but would order a suspension.
March 30,1967. Petition for rehearing denied.