Court Opinion

ID: 9830090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:51:49.382269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:59.036786
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Both appellant and appellee have filed motions for rehearing, which will be discussed in the order named.
Appellant strenuously insists that this court erred in its holding that because, “in this- ease the creditors represented by the commissioner were not parties to any acts of fraud, deceit, or illegal acts entered into by the officials of the bank in issuing said stock, if any such acts existed, * * * therefore under the facts in this case such defenses as pleaded by appellant are not and could not be good as against them.” This question was fully discussed in our original opinion, and we now hold that the exception is not well taken. We also overrule exceptions 3 and 4 in appellant’s motion for new trial.
Appellant’s fifth assignment of error reads as follows:
“The Court of Civil Appeals erred in its holding that because it is revealed by the appellant’s own testimony that, after the commissioner had refused to place $150,000 to the credit of the bank, he (appellant) wired one Kirby for assistance, and that Kirby’ did wire $30,000 or $35,000 to be placed to the credit of the bank, and, if it had not been for the efforts of appellant, the bank would have closed its doors a day or two earlier, hence it.must have been upon the faith of his credit that the money was received from Kirby, and the bank continued to do business for a few days longer, hence his stock must be held to be good for the purpose of an assessment for the benefit of creditors.”
This question was fully discussed in oiir original opinion. However, we will now state that the undisputed testimony of appellant himself was to the effect that he, as a stockholder and director, went to Austin, Tex., for the purpose of discussing the condition of the bank with the banking commissioner and trying to secure from the banking commissioner a deposit of $150,000 to be used for assisting the bank in its embarrassed condition. But, after having conversation with the banking commissioner wherein the commissioner refused to furnish the $150,000 or any other sum, the appellant then upon his own motion wired one John H. Kirby, advising him of the failing condition of the bank, and asking a credit of from $30,000 to $35,-000, which credit was furnished by the said Kirby at the special request of the appellant. Under the above facts sworn to by appellant we are unable to see how there can be any controversy over the fact that the bank did receive credit of the said Kirby on account of the appellant applying to said Kirby for credit; he (the appellant) being at the time not only a stockholder, but a director in charge of the affairs of the bank. Hence we conclude that there is no merit in his exception No. 5.
Exceptions 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 present matters that were fully discussed in our original opinion.
Appellant having presented no new authorities in his motion for rehearing, and all facts being fully discussed in our original opinion, and the laws cited in support of our conclusions therein, the motion for rehearing of appellant is in all things refused.
Appellee has filed a motion for rehearing, based on the action of the court in not passing upon appellee’s cross-assignment of error. Said cross-assignment of error is as follows;
“The court erred in overruling plaintiffs exception to paragraph 7 of defendant’s origi*479nal answer and in admitting the evidence of the witness H. B. Purr in support of the allegation contained in said paragraph 7 and in instructing a verdict against plaintiff on that part of his cause of action resting upon the stock ownership of 20 shares in the name of H. B. Purr, trustee, for the reason that the court thereby permitted defendant to prove an undisclosed trusteeship as a defense to the assessment made against him, and then by the instructed. verdict enforced such defense, all of which fully appears from plaintiff’s bill of exception No. 1.”
Appellant testified upon the trial of the case that he was indebted to his minor son in the sum of $4,000, and, in order to reimburse his said son, he purchased $2,000 worth of stock, and held same in his own name as trustee for the use and benefit of his minor son.
No one will seriously contend but what each share of stock in the defunct bank was subject to assessment by the banking commissioner, and that some one was liable for the payment of said assessment; hence it would .appear that the only question'now for this court to decide is who is liable for the assessment on the $2,000 worth of stock held by appellant as trustee, and it necessarily follows that either appellant or his four year old son is liable for said' assessment.
There is nothing in the record even indicating that appellant had ever been appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction as guardian of said minor; hence the appellant himself could not legally have purchased said stock for said minor in repayment of money owing to said minor.
No one will seriously contend that a four year old boy could agree or could in any manner make a binding contract by which he would be bound as the purchaser of said stock to pay an assessment thereon, and, if he could not have agreed to the purchase of said' stock, he certainly could not be liable; hence there is only one conclusion for this court to arrive at, which is to hold that appellant is personally liable for the assessment made by the commissioner of banking, not only upon the $6,100 of stock held in his own name, but upon the $2,000 worth of stock held in his name as trustee, although he claimed it was for the benefit of his minor son.
Authorities: Article 556, Revised Civil Statutes, 1911; Connally v. Lyons et al, 82 Tex. 664, 18 S. W. 799, 27 Am. St. Rep. 935; Head v. Porter et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 240 S. W. 685; Hubbell v. Houghton (C. C.) 86 P. 547; Chapman v. Pettus (Tex. Civ. App.) 269 S. W. 270.
In the 'case of Kerr v. Urie, 86 Md. 72, 37 A. 789, 38 L. R, A. 119, 63 Am. St. Rep. 493, the Supreme Court of Maryland was considering the effect of the national bank act, which is substantially identical with our article 556, Revised Statutes 1911. A father had purchased 10 shares of stock in a national bank for the benefit of his infant daughter, who was four years old, and had transferred them to his wife, who likewise held them in trust for the daughter, and the court said:
“The appellant, however, contended that admitting that Mrs. Urie was authorized to hold the stock beneficially she did not so hold it, but in fact held it as attorney, agent, trustee or in some representative capacity. But it is clear from the evidence that she either holds as self-appointed attorney or trustee for an infant of tender years; for an undisclosed principal, as appears by the certificate, or personally and beneficially, as appears by the stub of the stock book of the bank. In neither event do we think she can evade the personal liability of a stockholder. If persons were allowed to subscribe for stock in a national bank or in any other corporation where a personal liability attaches either as attorney for an unnamed principal, as self-appointed trustee for some unnamed cestui que trust or as attorney for an unnamed infant of .tender years, and when called upon to pay the debts of the bank to the extent of the stock so subscribed, could escape by simply declaring that they represented in some capacity those who are legally or otherwise incapacitated, the law would be a dead letter, and the creditors of these associations-which are found in great numbers in every state would be deprived of the only certain means provided by law for the payment of their claims.”
Therefore we conclude that we erred in-our original opinion in so far as we failed to pass upon the cross-assignment of error filed by appellee, and we now refuse motion fojt rehearing as to appellant, and grant said motion as to appellee, and affirm the judgment of the district court in so far as it gives judgment against the appellant for $6,100, and reverse said judgment as to the $2,000 worth of stock held by appellant as-trustee, and here render judgment against the appellant for said $2,000, or to the full value of the 81 shares of stock upon which the commissioner levied said assessment.