Court Opinion

ID: 9889762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 15:04:56.150715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:29.436335
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                                State of Florida

                        Opinion filed October 11, 2023.
        Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                             ________________

                              No. 3D22-1400
                         Lower Tribunal No. 13-6518
                            ________________

                               Dena Spector,
                                   Appellant,

                                      vs.

                               Seth Spector,
                                   Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David Young,
Judge.

     Wasson & Associates, Chartered, and Roy D. Wasson, for appellant.

      Buckner, Shifrin, Etter, Dugan & Bradfute, P.A., and Emily M. Bradfute,
for appellee.

Before SCALES, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ.

     HENDON, J.

     The former wife, Dena Spector (“Former Wife”), appeals from the trial
court’s Amended Final Judgment Granting Former Husband’s Verified

Supplemental Petition for Termination of Alimony or, in the Alternative,

Downward Modification of Alimony and Other Relief. In this order, the trial

court terminated Seth Spector’s (“Former Husband”) obligation to pay the

Former Wife monthly durational alimony pursuant to their Mediated

Settlement Agreement (“MSA”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm, in

part, reverse, in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

    I.     Facts

         The parties married in 1995. In May 2013, the parties entered into a

Mediated Settlement Agreement (“MSA”), which was incorporated into their

final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Pursuant to the MSA, the Former

Husband was required to pay the Former Wife specified amounts of

durational alimony until June 1, 2023. Paragraph 12(d) of the MSA provides

that the Former Husband’s alimony obligation to the Former Wife may be

modified or terminated if the Former Wife is in a “supportive relationship” as

defined by Florida Statutes, or cohabitates.1

1
  We have considered the Former Wife’s argument relating to the trial court’s
interpretation of paragraph 12(d) of the MSA. Based on our de novo review,
we find no error. Helinski v. Helinski, 305 So. 3d 703, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA
2020) (holding appellate court reviews de novo trial court’s interpretation of
a settlement agreement).

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     In April 2021, the Former Husband filed a “Verified Supplemental

Petition for Termination of Alimony or, in the Alternative, Downward

Modification of Alimony and for Other Relief” (“Supplemental Petition”),

relying on paragraph 12(d) of the MSA. The Former Husband asserted the

Former Wife was (1) in a supportive relationship with Seth Selesnow (“Mr.

Selesnow”), citing to section 61.14, Florida Statutes, which provides for the

termination or reduction of alimony when the obligee enters into a supportive

relationship subsequent to the granting of the divorce, and (2) cohabitating

with Mr. Selesnow, either of which would warrant a termination or

modification of alimony pursuant to paragraph 12(d) of the MSA.

     The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the Supplemental

Petition, during which Mr. Selesnow, the Former Wife, and the Former

Husband testified. The trial court entered an amended order granting the

Former Husband’s Supplemental Petition.        In doing so, the trial court

addressed the “circumstances” that the trial court “shall” consider “in

determining the relationship of an obligee to another person,” set forth in

section 61.14(1)(b)(2)(a)-(k).   Thereafter, the trial court ordered and

adjudged as follows:

     2. Former Wife cohabitated with Mr. Selesnow and alimony shall
     be terminated, retroactive to the date of the Supplemental
     Petition;

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      3. Former Wife was in a supportive relationship with Mr.
      Selesnow and alimony shall be terminated, retroactive to the
      date of the Supplemental Petition[.]

Moreover, the trial court ordered the Former Wife to repay all alimony paid

to her as of the date the Former Husband filed the Supplemental Petition.

The Former Wife did not file a motion for rehearing. This appeal follows.

   II. Standards of Review

      The trial court’s interpretation of the MSA is reviewed de novo. Helinski

v. Helinski, 305 So. 3d 703, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). Further,

      a review of a trial court's decision under section 61.14(1)(b) is a
      mixed question of law and fact that requires a mixed standard of
      review. The trial court must first make factual findings based on
      the evidence presented and then determine whether the facts
      establish the existence of a “supportive relationship,” which
      requires an interpretation of the statute and an application of the
      law to the facts. If the trial court concludes that a “supportive
      relationship” exists, it has the discretion to reduce or terminate
      the alimony obligation. Thus, we review the trial court's factual
      findings to determine whether they are supported by competent
      substantial evidence; the trial court's interpretation and
      application of the law should be reviewed de novo; and the
      exercise of the trial court's discretion should be reviewed for an
      abuse of discretion.

Murphy v. Murphy, 201 So. 3d 18, 21-22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (internal

citations omitted). See also Klokow v. Klokow, 323 So. 3d 817, 821 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2021) (holding that factual findings are reviewed to determine if they

are supported by competent, substantial evidence, and a trial court’s legal

conclusion that a supportive relationship exists is reviewed de novo). Finally,

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if a trial court finds the existence of a “supportive relationship” under section

61.14(1)(b), a trial court’s decision to reduce or terminate alimony is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. See Gregory v. Gregory, 128 So. 3d 926, 927

(Fla. 5th DCA 2013); Buxton v. Buxton, 963 So. 2d 950, 953 (Fla. 2d DCA

2007) (“If the trial court determines that a ‘supportive relationship’ exists, we

review the trial court’s decision to reduce or terminate alimony for abuse of

discretion.”).

   II.      Analysis

         As explained by the Second District Court of Appeal in King v. King, 82

So. 3d 1124, 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), when a trial court addresses a

petition to terminate or reduce alimony under section 61.14(1)(b), the trial

court “must employ an analysis that may involve four steps.” The Second

District describes the analysis as follows:

         First, the circuit court must “elicit the nature and extent of the
         relationship in question.” § 61.14(1)(b)(2). To accomplish this
         task, the circuit court must consider and make findings
         concerning the factors listed in section 61.14(1)(b)(2) and any
         other pertinent circumstances. Buxton v. Buxton, 963 So. 2d
         950, 951-53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). In the second step, based on
         its findings, the circuit court must determine whether the facts
         establish a supportive relationship. Id. If the circuit court
         concludes that a supportive relationship does exist, then it must
         decide whether to reduce or terminate the alimony obligation. Id.
         at 952-53. In the third step, the circuit court must consider the
         relevant economic factors for determining an award of separate
         maintenance or alimony outlined in section 61.08(2). Buxton,
         963 So. 2d at 955-56. In the fourth step, having considered the

                                         5
      relevant economic factors, the circuit court must determine
      “whether to reduce or terminate the Former Wife's alimony and,
      if to reduce it, by how much.” Id. at 956.

King, 82 So. 3d at 1129.

      In the instant case, the trial court followed the first and second steps.

First, the trial court addressed all of the factors listed in section

61.14(1)(b)(2)(a)-(k). Based on a review of the trial transcript and evidence

introduced at the hearing, the trial court’s findings are supported by

competent, substantial evidence. Second, based on these findings, the trial

court concluded that the Former Wife was in a supportive relationship.

Based on our de novo review, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion

that the Former Wife was in a supportive relationship with Mr. Selesnow.2

See Murphy, 201 So. 3d at 24, 26 (affirming the determination that the former

wife and her boyfriend were in a supportive relationship and the reduction of

former wife’s alimony from $4,200 to $3,500 per month where the evidence

showed that the former wife and her boyfriend were in a monogamous,

romantic relationship, and he was living in the former wife’s house; the

boyfriend contributed only $150 per month, which was primarily used for his

and his children’s food; the former wife continued to pay all utilities, taxes,

2
 The trial court’s finding that the Former Wife was cohabitating with Mr.
Selesnow is also supported by competent, substantial evidence.

                                      6
and insurance related to the home; the boyfriend cut the grass, cleaned the

pool, periodically cleaned the former wife’s car, and helped with some

chores; and the former wife provided a separate bedroom in her home for

the boyfriend’s children to use during visitations, purchasing beds for that

room); Klokow, 323 So. 3d at 821-22 (holding trial court correctly determined

the former wife and her live-in boyfriend, Mr. Gutauckis, were in a “supportive

relationship” under section 61.14(1)(b) where Mr. Gutauckis moved into the

former wife’s home and made numerous improvements to her home, and

they have worked together to improve the value of the home; Mr. Gutauckis

contributes $900 of in-kind rent each month by paying certain expenses; and

“[t]hey support each other emotionally and are clearly involved in a serious

relationship”); Buxton, 963 So. 2d at 954 (“The facts presented at the hearing

show that the [f]ormer [w]ife and [her live-in boyfriend] are in a long-term,

committed relationship that provides both economic and social support

equivalent to that of a marriage. Under these circumstances, the evidence

established the existence of a ‘supportive relationship’ as contemplated by

section 61.14(1)(b).”).

      Next, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion by

terminating alimony rather than reducing it. As stated in King, if a trial court

concludes an obligee is in a supportive relationship, steps three and four of

                                       7
the analysis requires the trial court to consider the relevant economic factors

for determining an award of separate maintenance or alimony outlined in

section 61.08(2), and thereafter, determine whether, based on those factors,

the obligee’s alimony should be terminated or reduced. King, 82 So. 3d at

1129.

        In the instant case, the trial court followed step four—terminated

alimony—but prior to doing so, failed to comply with step three—consider the

relevant economic factors outlined in section 61.08. 3 As a result of the trial

court’s failure to address the relevant economic factors, we cannot determine

if the trial court abused its discretion by terminating the Former Wife’s

alimony. 4   Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the order on review

3
  A review of the hearing transcript reflects the trial court did not make any
findings relating to the relevant economic factors, and the order on review
did not address the relevant factors. In determining whether to terminate and
modify alimony based on cohabitating with Mr. Selesnow, economic factors
should also be considered.
4
  The Former Husband argues that, because the Former Wife failed to file a
motion for rehearing bringing to the trial court’s attention its failure to address
the relevant economic factors, the Former Wife cannot raise this argument
on appeal. We disagree. See Broadfoot v. Broadfoot, 791 So. 2d 584, 585
(Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“We do, of course, reserve the right to reverse on
account of an absence of findings [set forth in section 61.08, Florida Statutes]
(whether the point was raised in the trial court or not) if the absence of
statutory findings frustrates this court’s appellate review.”); see also Ortiz v.
Ortiz, 306 So. 3d 1081, 1082 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“The former wife
argues that the former husband waived his opportunity for this Court to
review the issue of the trial court's omission of the statutory factors [pursuant

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terminating the Former Husband’s obligation to pay alimony to the Former

Wife, and remand with instructions for the trial court to make the requisite

findings, and based on those findings, to reconsider whether alimony should

be terminated or reduced, and if the trial court determines that alimony

should be reduced, to determine the reduced amount.5

      Any remaining arguments do not merit discussion.

      Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part, and remanded for further

proceedings.

to section 61.075, Florida Statutes] by failing to specifically raise it in his
motion for rehearing below. This type of error, however, is fundamental and
is reviewable where the error is apparent on the face of the final judgment.").
5
   We take no position as whether the Former Wife’s alimony should be
terminated or reduced.

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