Court Opinion

ID: 9765155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:53:54.540635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:05.889228
License: Public Domain

FOWLER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of my colleagues. In my opinion, this ease presents two issues. The first issue is whether an employee of one independent contractor owes a “duty of ordinary care” to the employee of another independent contractor to prevent injury to the other through negligence.1 The answer to this question is yes. The second issue is whether the negligence of the one independent contractor’s employee proximately caused the injuries of the second independent contractor’s employee. The answer to this question also is yes.
This case was tried to a jury which found for the plaintiff, Manriquez, on all issues, even though it found him contributorily neg*49ligent. The jury awarded, in fact, almost three times the damages he pled.
Manriquez, along with Chaney, worked at the Regency Parking Garage. Their employers were the two independent contractors responsible for the daily operation of the garage. Manriquez’s employer was responsible for the maintenance of the premises while Chaney’s employer, Pinkerton, was responsible for safety and for staffing the cashier booths. On the morning of the accident, Manriquez and Chaney were at the garage by themselves when Chaney received a call from a customer that his car was stalled on the thirteenth floor. Chaney could not leave the cashier booth because customers were leaving the garage at the time, so he called out to Manriquez and told him “to assist a driver” on thirteen.2 When Manriquez got to the thirteenth floor, he found the car stalled on the ramp pointing upward between the twelfth and thirteenth floors. Manriquez did not know that Chaney’s employer, Pinkerton, had a tow truck specifically for dealing with cars stalled on ramps and required its employees to call headquarters in such an event. Pinkerton took these special precautions because it recognized the probability of injury if someone attempted to move a car stalled on a ramp. Not knowing this fact, Manri-quez did what he was asked to do and so he and the owner of the car decided to move the car themselves. The owner concluded the conversation thinking they would move the car down the ramp; Manriquez, whose English was not always good, thought they were going to push the car up the ramp. When the owner put the car in neutral he was unable to keep the car from slamming Manri-quez’s fingers into a wall behind the car.

The Question of Duty

The majority has held that no special relationship existed between Manriquez and Chaney. I agree with this conclusion. But, the majority also concludes that no duty existed between the two men. I disagree. At the risk of oversimplifying, in my opinion, the issue of duty in this appeal falls under a line of cases holding that employees of two independent contractors on a work site owe a duty of ordinary care to prevent injury to the other through neghgence. For example, in Hernandez,3 a Texas Supreme Court case, Hernandez, an employee of the owner of land was walking on an asphalt road being constructed on the land by a construction company, Heldenfels Brothers, when he was struck by one of Heldenfels’s trucks loaded with asphalt. The court held that Heldenfels owed a duty not to injure Hernandez through its own neghgence.4 A second case probably more instructive is Christian5 issued out of this court. Dishongh, an employee of one independent contractor on a work site, was injured while helping the employee of another independent contractor, Christian, rig pole trailers. Dishongh’s superintendent had told Dishongh to help Christian’s employee rig the trailers so they could be moved to allow other trailers to enter the property as quickly as possible.6 In holding that Christian was hable for Dishongh’s injuries even though Dishongh was not Christian’s employee, the court held that (1) the two companies had the same objective “to unload ... pilings from the trucks and remove the trucks so that another truck might be brought in and be unloaded,” and, more importantly, (2) Christian owed Dishongh a duty to prevent injury to him through its neghgence.7
Admittedly, there is some distinction between the facts of Christian and Hernandez and this case in that the plaintiffs in those cases were directly and immediately injured by the neghgent act of a co-independent contractor while in this appeal Manriquez was injured by Chaney’s neghgence in a more indirect way. But, the general proposition *50that an employee of one independent contractor owes a duty to prevent injury to the employee of another independent contractor through negligence remains intact despite the majority’s contention that this court has retreated from the proposition in the recent ease, Rendleman v. Clark.8 On the contrary, the plaintiff in Rendleman, an employee of one subcontractor, recovered from another subcontractor based on its negligence. This court upheld the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff, holding that the defendant/independent contractor’s duty arose “from the duty of ordinary care at common law, based on its knowledge of the danger and the probability of injury.”9
The duty of ordinary care at common law also was discussed in Bennett v. Span Industries, Inc.,10 another case mentioned by the majority for the proposition that no special relationship existed between Chaney and Manriquez.
There was no special legal relationship between Span and Bennett which would in itself bring him within the scope of Span’s duty, but the duty of ordinary care at common law may arise not only as a matter of legal relation, but it may also arise from a knowledge of the danger, which in turn depends upon the probability of injury. Prosser on Torts §§ 53 and 54, pp. 324 seq. (4th ed. 1971); 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 36, pp. 382, 383 (1971). Whether or not there is a pre-existing privity in legal relationship between the actor and the person injured, if the circumstances are such that a person of ordinary common sense would recognize that if he did not exercise reasonable care in his conduct with regard to those circumstances, his acts would place another person in danger, the duty to use ordinary care to avoid such danger arises. 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 37, pp. 384, 385; § 57, p. 407 (1971), and cases cited. As Dean Prosser noted, the concept of duty has expanded to the point that in many cases, the mere knowledge of serious danger threatening physical harm to another, which one may avoid with little inconvenience, creates a sufficient relation, recognized by every moral and social standard, to impose a duty of care. Prosser on Torts § 56, p. 343 (4th ed.1971). Thus, the duty of care arises from the probability of injury to one who may reasonably be foreseen as likely to be subject to such injury. See Carlisle v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 137 Tex. 220, 152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941); Mohan v. Safeway Stores, 237 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1951, no writ). “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed; it is the risk, reasonably within the range of apprehension, of injury to another person, that is taken into account in determining the existence of the duty.” United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828, 81 S.Ct. 67, 5 L.Ed.2d 56 (1960); 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 58, p. 409 (1971).11
The same reasoning applies here. Chaney knew a car was stalled and therefore knew it was a potentially dangerous situation. In fact, if the car was stalled on a ramp it would be considered an “emergency situation,” to use Chaney’s own words. Even knowing this fact, and knowing that the company required its employees not to touch cars stalled on a ramp and to call for the tow truck — Chaney nonetheless sent Manriquez to the thirteenth floor into a dangerous situation to help the motorist without giving Manriquez sufficient information or equipment to properly or safely handle the problem.12 He thus failed to *51use ordinary care to prevent an injury to Manriquez when the probability of injury was great.13
We reach the same result if we ignore the line of cases stating a duty exists and apply the test set out in Otis Engineering v. Clark14 and Bird v. W.C.W.,15 to determine if a duty exists. Under this test, we weigh the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury against the social utility of the actor’s conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of placing the burden on the employer.16 The risk and likelihood of injury are great in a situation such as this one. As a matter of fact, no one disputed whether a car stalled on a ramp posed a serious threat of injury to anyone who attempted to move it. I also believe the foreseeability requirement has been met. Contrary to Pinkerton’s claims, I think it quite foreseeable that a young man, who had been employed only a short while, and who had only a ninth grade education, would do what he could to help the stalled motorist — including moving a car stalled on an incline. In fact, I think most young men in their early twenties would think nothing of attempting to move a car on a ramp. That it might not have been the most ‘prudent thing to do is an issue for contributory negligence,17 not a reason to say that it was totally unforeseeable, as Pinkerton claims.18 It also was foreseeable because it was in the best interests of Manriquez’s employers for Manriquez to help Chaney when Chaney had no other help. In this regard, one wonders how Regency Garage or Manriquez’s own employer would have viewed Manriquez if he had refused to help.
Regarding foreseeability, Pinkerton’s suggests that it had no duty to foresee that Manriquez or anyone else would act negligently and try to move a stalled car up a ramp. However, it seems to me that Pinkerton did foresee that its employees might try to move a stalled car on a ramp because it took great pains to forewarn its employees not to try to move a ear stalled on a ramp and instead to call headquarters for a tow truck. If it was totally unforeseeable that anyone would try to move a car without special equipment, why the need to ensure that the employees knew they must call headquarters for a tow truck when a ear was stalled on a ramp?
The other side of the equation does not meet these concerns. There was no overriding social utility in Chaney’s actions other than to help a motorist. In addition, the burden on Pinkerton of guarding against the injury is minimal. Chaney could easily have said, “Go and see where the car is stalled. If it’s on the ramp, don’t touch the car, but call me and HI get a tow truck sent over.” Or, using Pinkerton’s theory that Manriquez was under no obligation to help, Chaney could have left the stalled car there, told the motorist to wait, and called his headquarters to let them know that he could not take care of the problem immediately. Either solution places a minute burden on Pinkerton with either no or minimal consequences.
In summary then, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that no duty was owed. Chaney owed Manriquez a duty to prevent injury to Manriquez by Chaney’s own negligence. By sending Manriquez into an admittedly dangerous situation without sufficient information or equipment, Chaney acted negligently and Manriquez was injured.
Before leaving the issue of duty, I feel compelled to discuss one aspect of the majority opinion and of Pinkerton’s argument that troubles me. Whether intended or not, the opinion seems to imply, and Pinkerton seems to argue, that Pinkerton owed no duty because Manriquez’s decision to place himself behind the car was utterly unimaginable and stupid. It seems to me that this position *52comes close to the “no duty doctrine” rejected by the Texas Supreme Court in Parker v. Highland Park, Inc.19 and to voluntary assumption of the risk also abandoned in Farley v. MM Cattle Co.20 The Parker court had this statement to make about the no duty doctrine.
No duty, as thus explained, was said to defeat a plaintiffs action because a plaintiffs knowledge and appreciation of a danger cut off his action before reaching the issue about a defendant’s negligence. As has been noticed before, the plaintiffs knowledge and appreciation are two elements which duplicate, overlap, and are segments of the voluntary assumption of risk doctrines which we abandoned in Farley v. MM Cattle Company, 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.1975). Adam Dante Corporation v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 457-58 (Tex.1972).
We now expressly abolish the so-called no-duty concept in this case and, as expressed in Farley, “henceforth in the trial of all actions based on negligence ...” The reasonableness of an actor’s conduct under the circumstances will be determined under principles of contributory negligence. While this case arose prior to the adoption of the comparative negligence statute, in the trial of cases under that statute, one who is contributorily negligent is still entitled to have his negligence compared with that of the other participants in the event.21
Regarding voluntary assumption of the risk, the Farley court said the following:
We therefore hold that for this trial, and henceforth in the trial of all actions based on negligence, volenti non fit injuria — he who consents cannot receive an injury — or, as generally known, voluntary assumption of risk, will no longer be treated as an issue. Rather, the reasonableness of an actor’s conduct in confronting a risk will be determined under principles of contributory negligence.22
Thus, whether Manriquez was solely responsible for his injuries because he chose to push the car was properly an issue for the jury in this case. And the jury did not find Manriquez solely responsible, it found him only 35% responsible for his injuries. This court cannot substitute its own opinion on this issue for the jury’s.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

Cause in Fact
Having concluded that Pinkerton owed Manriquez a duty, the next question is whether Pinkerton and/or Chaney proximately caused Manriquez’s injuries. As noted by the majority, proximate cause consists of two elements: cause in fact and foreseeability. The majority concludes that Manriquez met neither element, but I disagree.
Regarding cause in fact, Chaney’s actions were a substantial factor in bringing about Manriquez’s injury because he asked Manri-quez to assist the stranded motorist and failed to equip Manriquez with sufficient information to properly or safely assess and handle the situation. As discussed earlier, a car stalled on a ramp was considered an emergency requiring Chaney to contact his headquarters so a tow truck could be called. Instead of leaving Manriquez with the impression that he should not help the motorist if the car was stalled on a ramp, Chaney left Manriquez with the impression that he should help the motorist. There was no exception attached to the request. Thus, the connection between Chaney’s actions and Manriquez’s injuries are not too attenuated to constitute legal cause.23 Chaney did more than provide a condition which made the injury possible. Chaney sent Manriquez into a dangerous situation without giving him sufficient information to protect himself.
This situation is not an attenuated connection like in Lear Siegler. In that case, the *53driver of a Texas Highway Department truck was killed while stopped to fix a malfunctioning flashing arrow he was pulling behind his truck when a driver of a van fell asleep and hit him. When the employee’s family sued the manufacturer of the malfunctioning sign, the court said the company’s product did no more than furnish the condition that made the plaintiff’s injury possible.24 The court also concluded that the “happenstance of place and time was too attenuated from the defendant’s conduct for liability to be imposed.” 25 In our case, we have no happenstance of time and place. Manriquez was sent to fix a problem that was dangerous, set about doing his task as asked, and was injured as a result.
In another case relied on by the majority and Pinkerton, Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton,26 the plaintiff’s injuries and the defendant’s negligence were less connected than in the present case.27 In Union Pump, the plaintiff, an employee of a chemical plant, assisted in putting out a fire started by an allegedly defective pump.28 After the fire was under control, the employee fell and was injured while taking a short cut back to headquarters. Although a quicker way to get back to headquarters, the short cut also was more dangerous because it required the employee to walk on top of pipes in her fire gear. The employee sued the manufacturer of the pump alleging that the defective pump proximately caused her injuries.29 The court held that even if the pump were in some sense a “but for” cause of the employee’s injuries, it did nothing more than create a condition in which her injuries could occur. The fire had dissipated, there was no longer an emergency and so the employee did not need to use the short cut to leave the fire.30 In our case, in contrast, the dangerous situation had not dissipated, Manriquez was sent to deal with it, and did so. That he may have been negligent in the way he handled the situation does not override the fact that Chaney’s order to assist the motorist without further information was a substantial factor in bringing about Manriquez’s injuries.
Pinkerton also argues that no proximate cause exists because Manriquez was a volunteer and did not have to help. I disagree with this argument in two respects. First, I do not see a connection between being a volunteer and proximate cause. That a person may have volunteered to do something has no bearing on whether the defendant’s negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. Thus, it does not really matter if Manriquez could have refused to do what Chaney told him to do. That fact does not absolve Chaney from having negligently placed Manriquez in a dangerous situation without the tools to deal with it. For example, the plaintiff in Dis-hongh did not have to help an employee of another subcontractor (Christian Brothers), but he did because it was in the best interests of his employer. And the court held Christian Brothers hable because Christian Brothers’ employee failed to use reasonable care to prevent injury to Dishough.31 Second, the record clearly shows that Manriquez did not feel that he could refuse. Helping a fellow worker advanced the garage owner’s goal of having an efficiently run garage and thus theoretically was in the best interests of his employer. Additionally, since no one else was there who could help, he clearly was afraid that if he refused to help, it would jeopardize his job, which he had held only a few months. So, it is inaccurate not only to say that he was a volunteer, but also to argue that a volunteer can never be owed a duty even when the requester’s negligence caused the injuries.

Foreseeability

Having decided that Chaney was the cause in fact of Manriquez’s injuries, the question again arises if it was foreseeable that Manri-*54quez, when confronted with a car stalled on a ramp would choose to try to move it up or down and thereby injure himself. As discussed earlier in more detail, considering Manriquez’s age, social status, and short employment history with his employer, I think it quite foreseeable that Manriquez would try to move the car unless given sufficient instruction that he not do that. Thus, in my opinion Manriquez also established that Pinkerton’s employee proximately caused his injuries.

Summary

The crux of Pinkerton’s duty/proximate cause argument on appeal seems to be threefold. First, Manriquez acted of his own volition to help Chaney and the motorist — it was not something he had to do. Second, Chaney only provided a condition and was not the cause in fact. Third, it is unimaginable that a reasonable person finding a car stalled on a ramp would try to move it. All three of these arguments fail. The cause in fact was Chaney’s order: Manriquez was given a task without sufficient warning and he completed the task. That Manriquez may have completed the task in a different way than Chaney would have liked does not defeat the cause in fact, it impacts contributory negligence. Likewise, the other two arguments fail because they focus solely on Manriquez’s actions and ignore Chaney’s negligent conduct that sent Manriquez into a dangerous situation and partly caused Manriquez’s injuries. The jury was responsible for deciding if Manriquez should get 100% of the blame for his injuries because he decided to push the car. And, contrary to Pinkerton’s position, the jury apparently did not find it wholly unimaginable that Manriquez would try to push the car, because it assesséd only 35% of the responsibility to him.
In short, I dissent because I (1) do not believe the trial court erred in determining that a duty was owed and proximate cause established, and (2) believe the verdict of the jury for Manriquez is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.

. See Hernandez v. Heldenfels, 374 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tex.1963); Harding v. Sinclair Pipeline Co., 480 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Christian v. Dishongh, 449 S.W.2d 823, 825-26 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ).

. Chaney disputes this version of the facts, claiming instead that he asked Manriquez to check out the situation and report back to him.

. See Hernandez, 374 S.W.2d at 196.

. See id. at 199.

. See Christian, 449 S.W.2d at 823.

. See id.

. See id.

. 909 S.W.2d 56 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism’d as moot).

. Id. at 60.

. 628 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

. id. at 473-74.

. As I noted earlier, a fact issue exists on this issue because Chaney claimed he told Manriquez to check out the situation and report back to him. Since the trial court found a duty existed, he must have resolved this issue in favor of Manriquez, and certainly the jury resolved this issue in favor of Manriquez. Whether we apply a legal or factual sufficiency review to this implied finding of the judge — we have no guidance as to which of these we are to apply, see e.g. Central Power & Light Co. v. Romero, 948 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, n.w.h.)—sufficient evidence exists to support it. Consequently, I have used Manriquez’s version of the facts on this question.

. See id.

. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.1983).

. 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex.1994).

. See Otis Engineering, 668 S.W.2d at 309; Bird, 868 S.W.2d at 769.

. See Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.001 et seq., in effect in 1991 when this injury occurred.

. See Bennett, 628 S.W.2d at 474 (holding that even if the plaintiff is contributorily negligent, he is entitled to have his negligence compared with that of the defendants).

. 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.1978).

. 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.1975).

. Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 517.

. Parley, 529 S.W.2d at 758.

. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.1991); Henry v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 934 S.W.2d 748, 751-52 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).

. See Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 472.

. See id.

. 898 S.W.2d 773 (Tex.1995).

. See id. at 776.

. See id. at 774.

. See id.

. See id. at 776.

. See Dishongh, 449 S.W.2d at 825.