Court Opinion

ID: 9587574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:23:51.246362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:55.193724
License: Public Domain

Felton, C. J.,
dissenting. 1. Under no theory was the jury authorized to find in favor of the plaintiff in this case and the court therefore erred in denying the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the jury believed all of the testimony of Eddie James Shannon, the driver of the partnership's trailer truck, and the only eyewitness, the evidence conclusively showed that the only negligence with which the defendants could be charged was that the truck was being driven without brakes on the trailer and this cannot be reasonably said to have been a contributing proximate cause of the collision.
2. If the jury believed all of Eddie James Shannon’s testimony except that contradicted by other witnesses and circumstances, the items of negligence against the defendants would have been that he did not apply his brakes, drove without brakes on the trailer and operated his truck at seventy miles per hour. The jury could have also found that he drove his truck completely off the pavement 162 feet from the point of collision but that went to the matter of impeachment and did not show negligence. In this view the negligence of the defendants could not reasonably be said to have been a contributing proximate cause of the collision. Without a knowledge of the intersection and without any warning of a left turn, the defendants owed the driver of the Smith truck no duty whatsoever which he did not perform because Eddie James Shannon could not have anticipated a sudden left turn in front of him under the circumstances.
3. If it can be said that the impeachment of Eddie James Shannon was successful and that the jury disregarded all of his testimony, we are left with the physical facts and circumstances from which no intelligent and logical conclusion could be reached. It is too well known to require citation that where circumstantial evidence points with equal consistency to two opposing theories, one showing liability and one lack of liability, the party having the burden of proof cannot prevail. The two most plausible theories to be deduced from the circumstances alone are (1) that the defendants.’ truck struck the Smith truck while the *139latter was standing still in the dirt road intersection, and (2) that the Smith truck toned into the intersection to the right or left and was struck by the defendants’ -truck. In-the first theory, the conclusion of the defendants’ negligence would, be authorized; in the second it would not because the fact of collision is not aided by presumption of law or permissible inference under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The fact that the defendants were guilty of negligence in lack of brakes on the trailer and illegal speed would not authorize the inference that one or both were contributing proximate causes of the collision. The plaintiff is not required to prove lack of negligence in the first instance, but to make out a prima facie case she must prove facts to show not only that the defendants were negligent but that such negligence was the proximate or one of the proximate causes of the injuries sued for. There are no circumstances here which authorize a rational conclusion that under the second theory the negligence of the defendants contributed proximately to the collision. The effect of any other ruling would apply a presumption of proximate cause from proof of negligence or apply the rule of res ipsa loquitur to permit a finding of proximate cause from the mere fact of negligence.
In my opinion a verdict was demanded for the defendants, and the court erred in denying the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.