Court Opinion

ID: 9653319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:43:42.231648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:57.764072
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
■ The appellant has filed a motion for a rehearing or in the alternative to transfer this case to the Supreme Court stating that the original opinion does not clearly decide whether the, policy of insurance itself was ambiguous because of conflict between the provision's in the paragraph designated as coverage A and section III of the insuring agreements and paragraph (e) of the exclusions.
Coverage A in question provides: “Bodily Injury Liability. To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury * * , * caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.”
Section III of the Insuring agreements is “Definition of Insured. With respect to the insurance for bodily injury liability, for property damage liability and for medical payments for the unqualified word ‘insured’ includes the named insured and also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission.” (Then follows certain inapplicable material.)
Exclusion (e) is: “This policy does not apply under coverage A to any obligation for which the' insured or any company as his insurer may be held liable under any *611workmen’s compensation law; or to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing- in the same household as the insured.”
Appellants argues that coverage A does not except any claim made by the named insured against an additional insured. That it makes no distinction as to who may be the claimant but covers the claims of any person regardless ,of who he is. That under construction the exclusionary paragraph reads: “This policy does not apply:, under coverage A; or to the insured.” That under the proper grammatical construction of that paragraph, the paragraph means that the policy does not apply under coverage A to the insured. If this language is interpreted as written then by this exclusion the company has taken completely away from the insured the protection which the policy gives under coverage A. That the phrase “or to the insured” refers back to the phrase “under coverage A”. That it cannot be said to refer back to anything in the preceding clause which is separated, by the semicolon. Paragraph (e) therefore, when considered with paragraph designated coverage A creates an ambiguity. On the question of punctuation appellant cites the case of Orlosky v. Haskell, 304 Pa. 57, 155 A. 112, 114, where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in construing a statute of that state said: “A qualifying phrase which appears in a paragraph before a semicolon does not leap over or bridge the, semicolon and qualify what 'follows the semicolon. Provisos ordinarily qualify what precedes not what follows them.”
In this case the policy in suit marked appellant’s Exhibit “A” is before the court and shows that at the top of page three it is stated in black-faced italics “This policy does not apply:” and then down the left side "of the half page directly below such statement appear seven separate paragraphs of material including paragraph (e). On the right-hand side of the page appear eight separate paragraphs. All paragraphs are lettered. Below this, which covers about' one-third of the upper page, appear the conditions of the policy below that word, located in the center of the page. ' - ■■
It seems to us, laying aside technical objections, the policy at this point simply states that this policy does not apply to the instired. The fact that there is a semicolon after the first clause of the paragraph and the word “or” before the words “to the insured” we feel cannot destroy the plain meaning of the paragraph under consideration. The fact that it is ungrammatical or mispünctuated, if it is, as urged by appellant cannot avail if the meaning is plain.
In the case of Morris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 88 Ga.App. 844, 78 S.E.2d 354, 357, where the plaintiff in error complained about the presence of a semicolon before the clause “ ‘or to the insured’ ” the court said: “The plaintiffs in error argue that the punctuation in the exception is important. We do not consider the semicolon before the last clause beginning with ‘or to the insured, etc.’ makes any difference whatever. We do not think, the meaning would be in any way different if the semicolon ivas omitted or replaced by a colon or a comma.”
In the case of Pearson v. Johnson, 215 Minn. 480, 10 N.W.2d 357, loc; cit. 358, a clause identical -with the- one in this case was quoted, except that a-comma only appears where here there is a semicolon. In that case the court without hesitation approved the exclusion clause and from a study of the context of the policy there set out and considered we feel no other course was possible.
We have considered other cases cited by appellant concerning policy provisions held to be ambiguous under their particular facts but we do not find that they rule this case. On 'the other hand in the considerable litigation we have reviewed concerning this matter we find no substantial supporting authority for a different conclusion than we have reached. It follows that the motion for a rehearing or in The alternative to transfer the case to the Supreme Court should be and the same is hereby ordered overruled.