Court Opinion

ID: 9760005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:38:06.955289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:09.369601
License: Public Domain

*153
Davidson, J.,

dissenting:

I agree with the majority that the trial court’s instruction concerning the State’s burden of proof with respect to each link in a chain of circumstantial evidence was erroneous. I further agree that in determining whether that erroneous instruction requires reversal, it must be viewed in the context of the instructions as a whole. However, I do not agree with the majority that viewed in the context of the instructions as a whole, the trial court’s erroneous instruction left "no room for misunderstanding.”
I recognize, as stated by the majority, that in its instructions, the trial court "stated repeatedly that in order to convict it was necessary for the jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of Pressley’s guilt.” However, the trial court’s erroneous instruction that the jury was " 'not required to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in a chain of circumstances necessary to establish defendant’s guilt,’ ” affirmatively contradicted the repeated general instructions concerning the State’s burden of proof. Under these circumstances, misunderstanding was inevitable. Accordingly, in my view, the trial court’s erroneous instruction, even when viewed in context, was confusing and misleading, and, therefore, requires reversal. Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 685, 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (1980); State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178, 185-86, 345 A.2d 436, 440 (1975).
The majority’s conclusion that "|t]here was no room for misunderstanding” not only defies logic and common sense, but also is contrary to a long line of this Court’s decisions. For over 125 years, this Court has consistently recognized that when a trial court gives a jury both a correct and an incorrect instruction upon the same issue, reversal is required. Grady, 276 Md. at 185-86, 345 A.2d at 440; Wintrobe v. Hart, 178 Md. 289, 299-300, 13 A.2d 365, 370 (1940); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277, 285-86 (1867); Adams v. Capron, 21 Md. 186, 206 (1864); Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194, 215-16 (1856).
As long ago as 1856, in Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194 (1856), this Court said:
*154"The defendant’s counsel insists, that even if this objection to the prayer is a valid one, when considered without reference to the instruction given in lieu of the first prayer, yet, as that instruction gave the law correctly to the jury, upon the same subject, there can be no reversal on account of the supposed error in the prayer. But as it appears the instruction and the prayer were both given, if one is correct, and the other is erroneous, how is it to be ascertained by which the jury were governed? This is not like the case where several prayers have been offered, some or all of which have been refused, and an instruction given by the court which covers the whole ground. There, although some of the prayers refused should be correct, still the rejection of them will not cause the judgment to be reversed, because the party whose prayers are refused has sustained no injury. But this court cannot refuse to reverse, on account of no injury having been done, by a prayer either erroneously granted or rejected, unless the record clearly shows the absence of injury. How can that be shown when, on the same subject, a correct and incorrect instruction have been given? there being no means of knowing which had an influence on the decision of the jury.” Haney, 9 Md. at 215-16 (emphasis added).
More recently, in State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178, 345 A.2d 436 (1975), a case similar to the instant case, this Court considered the question whether a trial court’s contradictory instructions on the burden of proof required reversal. There, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
" 'Now, there is evidence in this case, or been offered in this case, or introduced, the defendant was not present at the time and the place where the offenses allegedly were committed. This may be referred to as a defense of alibi. The Court tells you that a defense of alibi is a legitimate, legal and proper defense. The defendant may not be convicted *155of the offense with which he is charged unless the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present at the time when, and at the place where, the offenses were committed.
" 'If, after a full and fair consideration of all the facts and circumstances in evidence, you find that the government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present at the time when, and the place where, the offense charged was allegedly committed, you must find the defendant not guilty.
" 'With reference to alibi, a defendant may be entitled to acquittal if you believe the alibi testimony as his not being present at a time and place of the alleged offense, by taking into consideration this testimony with all the other evidence raising a reasonable doubt of guilt, but in order to prove an alibi conclusively, the testimony must cover the whole time in which the crime by any possibility might have been committed, and it should be subjected to rigid scrutiny.’ ” Grady, 276 Md. at 180-81, 345 A.2d at 437-38 (emphasis deleted) (additional emphasis added).
This Court, recognizing that the trial court had both correctly instructed the jury that the State had the burden of proof, and incorrectly instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden of proof, said:
"Turning to the jury instructions in this case, we make the threshold observation that they must be viewed as a whole and that portions should not be read out of their proper context. Reading this instruction in that light, we conclude that it was improper to explain alibi testimony as did the trial judge since, at the very least, one rational interpretation of the words used would place an impermissible burden of proof upon the respondent. The Achilles’heel of the instruction is that it could be understood as meaning that, while the State *156must prove its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant has the responsibility of establishing his alibi, and apparently must even do so conclusively. Though, from the trial judge’s words, the jury may have properly construed the respondent’s obligation, we must assume that the improper inference was drawn because the latter portion of the instruction, quoted earlier in this opinion, is misleading, ambiguous and confusing. Since the defendant-respondent, as a matter of law, assumed no burden of persuasion with respect to his alibi evidence, the inference to the contrary in the instruction constitutes reversible error.” Grady, 276 Md. at 185-86, 345 A.2d at 440 (citations omitted) (additional emphasis added).
Thus, this Court recently acknowledged that when a trial court gives a jury a correct and an incorrect instruction upon the same issue reversal is required.
I can find no justification for departing from this well-established Maryland principle. In my view, the cases relied upon by the majority to support its contrary conclusion do not provide an adequate rationale. Indeed, the cases relied upon by the majority involve broad, general principles of law, which are taken out of context without any consideration of their applicability to the facts of the instant case. In none of the cases relied upon by the majority did the trial court give the jury an erroneous instruction that affirmatively contradicted other of its instructions.1 Accordingly, the cases relied upon by the majority are inapposite.
Given my view that the majority’s conclusion is unsupported and indeed is contradicted by precedent, logic, and common sense, I respectfully dissent. When all is said and done, in this criminal case, the trial court gave the jury an erroneous instruction concerning the State’s burden *157of proof that affirmatively contradicted other of its general instructions on that issue. Thus, when viewed in context, the trial court’s erroneous instruction was confusing and misleading, and requires reversal. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674-75, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 1912-13 (1975); State v. Garland, 278 Md. 212, 219-20, 362 A.2d 638, 642 (1976); State v. Poster, 263 Md. 388, 395-97, 283 A.2d 411, 414-15 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 908, 92 S.Ct. 1616 (1972).