Court Opinion

ID: 9803921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 16:10:52.484194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:03:38.075802
License: Public Domain

J-S17024-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1228 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 5, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0015155-2010

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                           FILED: August 31, 2023

       Appellant, Christopher Freeman, appeals from the October 5, 2022

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County that

dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.1 We affirm.

       This Court previously summarized the factual history as follows:

       During the late evening on July 6, 2010, [Appellant] went [] to the
       house of a friend[] to hang out on the porch, play video games,
       and smoke marijuana. [The friend’s house] is located [in the
       Sheraden neighborhood of the City of] Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania[.]
       The victim [was a neighbor of Appellant’s friend.] On that
____________________________________________

1 Although the PCRA court docket identifies the October 5, 2022 order as an

order dismissing a second motion and a third motion to amend Appellant’s
PCRA petition, a review of the October 5, 2022 order demonstrates that, in
said order, the PCRA court, in fact, dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition, as
more fully discussed herein. PCRA Court Order, 10/5/22, at 2 (stating, the
PCRA court “hereby dismisses the second amended PCRA petition and the third
amended PCRA petition” (extraneous capitalization omitted)).
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     evening, the victim] apparently approached [Appellant and the
     friend], mumbled something, and [Appellant] asked the victim to
     repeat what he [] said. [The friend] heard the victim say “you”
     and [a derogatory remark. Appellant] became visibly upset[,] and
     the victim retreated to his house. [Appellant] then left [the
     friend’s house.]

     Several hours later, [the friend] was in his dining room, at his
     computer, when he noticed motion-sensor lights go on at the
     victim's house. He heard three loud bangs and looked out the
     window. [The friend] observed three men in dark clothing,
     including [Appellant], standing outside the victim's home.
     [Appellant], who had a shirt covering the lower half of his face,[FN3]
     told [the friend], “You didn't see anything.” He then pulled a gun
     from his waistband, and pointed it at [the friend. The friend]
     closed his [window] blinds and went back into his dining room.
     [The friend] then heard the sound of both of the victim's vehicles,
     a red Chevy pickup truck and a blue Pontiac Sunbird, drive off.[FN4]

        [Footnote 3: The friend] testified [that] he recognized
        [Appellant] based on his hair, height, eyes, voice, and
        because he had on the same clothes as earlier in the
        evening.

        [Footnote 4:] Two other witnesses[] testified that they lived
        on the same street as the victim and [the friend], and they
        saw both of the victim's [vehicles] driving [] down the
        street. [One of the witnesses] also stated that she saw two
        people in the Pontiac and one person in the truck.

     The next morning [(July 7, 2010), the friend] went to the victim's
     home and saw that the front door had been damaged[,] and the
     air conditioning unit was hanging [from] the window. He opened
     the door slightly and observed the victim on the [floor]. He called
     out the victim's name, heard no response, and went back to his
     house to call 911 [emergency services].

     Detective Christine Williams of the City of Pittsburgh Police
     Department [(“Detective Williams”)] responded to the scene and
     found the victim dead, as a result of two gunshot wounds to the
     shoulder and [the] chest. The victim also suffered from blunt
     force trauma to his scalp, at the top and back of his head.
     Detective Williams indicated [that] the interior of the residence
     looked like it had been ransacked, with furniture overturned, the
     doorjamb pulled away from the frame of the door, and a large
     sliding window hanging [from] the window frame. Detective

                                     -2-
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     Williams also found three live bullet casings, and two spent bullet
     casings in the same room. Police officers issued a “be on the
     lookout” report for the victim's two vehicles.

     That same day, Detective John Lewis [(“Detective Lewis”)] was
     taking part in an unrelated narcotics investigation near the
     entrance to Sheraden Park when he observed two men standing
     [next] to a red pickup truck talking to a third man, who was behind
     the wheel of a blue Pontiac. Detective Lewis identified [Appellant
     and a second man] as the two men standing outside the truck and
     the driver of the Pontiac as Marshineak Manning [(“Manning”).
     Detective Lewis] saw Manning stop the [Pontiac] and talk to
     [Appellant and the other man] for a couple of minutes before
     driving off. [Appellant] was taken into custody as part of that
     unrelated [narcotics] investigation. He was searched incident to
     arrest[,] and a set of keys was seized. The [Pontiac] and the truck
     were found and subsequently determined to be the victim's
     missing vehicles. The keys found on [Appellant’s person] fit in the
     lock and ignition for the red truck.

     When the [police] officers investigating the victim's murder
     learned that [Appellant] had been arrested near the victim's truck,
     they asked to speak with him on July 8, 2010. He agreed to speak
     without a lawyer and signed a police interrogation warning form.
     During the interrogation, [Appellant] maintained he did not know
     the victim, nor was he familiar with the street where the victim
     lived. When asked about the truck, [Appellant] said he was never
     with a red truck and did not know anything about a red truck. He
     denied talking to anyone inside a blue Pontiac or ever being in
     Sheraden Park.      The investigating detective, James McGee
     [(“Detective McGee”)], then asked [Appellant, “]Well, if you didn't
     have anything to do with the red pickup truck, why did you have
     the keys that belonged to the red pickup truck?[” Appellant] said
     he [] found [the] keys in Sheraden Park. When confronted with
     the fact that he [] just said that he had never been in the park,
     [Appellant] responded, “Well, I mean over by the high school.”
     After questioning, [Appellant] was not arrested for the [victim’s]
     murder.

     Also during this time, [the friend] did not tell the police about the
     events that transpired the night [of July 6, 2010,] because he was
     “scared.” Shortly after the incident, [the friend] said that a man
     approached him and threatened him not to tell police what he
     knew about the murder. The man also told [the friend] that he
     had to send money to post [Appellant’s] bond for his arrest on the

                                     -3-
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       other charges and to put money in [Appellant’s] “book.” [The
       friend] paid the bond, but the threats and demands for money
       continued.     In mid-October 2010, tired of the threats and
       demand[s] for [money, the friend] went to the police, telling them
       what he knew about [Appellant] and the night in question. [The
       friend] also identified Manning as the individual that threatened
       him and forced him to send money to [Appellant].

       Based on this evidence, [Appellant] was arrested for [the victim’s]
       murder on October 15, 2010.

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 195 A.3d 1041, 2018 WL 4102788, at *1-*2

(Pa. Super. filed Aug. 29, 2018) (unpublished memorandum) (extraneous

capitalization omitted).

       On October 25, 2012, a jury convicted Appellant of second-degree

murder, robbery of motor vehicle, burglary, and conspiracy to commit

burglary.2 On January 9, 2013, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence

of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.3 On January 14, 2013,

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court subsequently

denied on April 24, 2013.

       This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 30, 2015.

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 125 A.3d 466, 2015 WL 6132355 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

2  18 Pa.C.S.A.       §§ 2502(b),      3702(a),   3502(a),   and   903   (3502(a)),
respectively.

3 Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

for his second-degree murder conviction. The trial court sentenced Appellant
to 5 years’ incarceration for the robbery of motor vehicle conviction and 2
years’ incarceration for the burglary conviction. Both sentences were set to
run concurrent to Appellant’s life sentence. No further penalty was imposed
for Appellant’s conspiracy conviction.

                                           -4-
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filed Jul. 30, 2015) (unpublished memorandum).        Appellant did not seek

discretionary review by our Supreme Court and, as such, his judgment of

sentence became final on Monday, August 31, 2015.           See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(3) (stating, “[a] judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct

review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United

States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time

for seeking the review”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (requiring a petition for

allowance of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of an order of this

Court sought to be reviewed); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (stating that, whenever the

last day of any period of time referred to in a statute “shall fall on Saturday

or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of this

Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the

computation”).

       On December 4, 2015, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first.

Counsel was appointed to represent Appellant.      Counsel filed an amended

PCRA petition on May 3, 2016, and a second amended PCRA petition on July

8, 2016. On January 18, 2017, after first conducting a Grazier hearing,4 the

PCRA court granted Appellant’s request for self-representation and directed

Appellant to file an amended PCRA petition, if necessary.5 Appellant filed pro

____________________________________________

4 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

5 The PCRA court directed that PCRA counsel would remain as stand-by
counsel. PCRA Court Order, 1/18/17.

                                           -5-
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se amended PCRA petitions on March 21, 2017, April 10, 2017, and June 15,

2017. On July 11, 2017, the PCRA court notified Appellant of its intent to

dismiss his PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

Criminal Procedure 907. Appellant did not file a response to the Rule 907

notice. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on October 18, 2017. This

Court affirmed the order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition on August 29,

2018. Freeman, 195 A.3d 1041, 2018 WL 4102788, at *1.

        While Appellant’s appeal of the October 18, 2017 order denying his PCRA

petition was pending before this Court, Appellant filed pro se a new PCRA

petition on March 7, 2018.      On March 26, 2018, the PCRA court informed

Appellant that no further action on the PCRA petition would be taken at that

time.    This Court affirmed the denial of Appellant’s first PCRA petition on

August 29, 2018. Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with our

Supreme Court, which was denied on June 10, 2019.

        On July 3, 2019, Appellant filed pro se a petition “to reopen” his March

2018 PCRA petition. On July 23, 2019, Appellant filed pro se an amended

PCRA petition. On July 24, 2019, the PCRA court notified Appellant that he

may proceed with his March 2018 PCRA petition.          The PCRA court, upon

Appellant’s request, appointed PCRA counsel on September 13, 2019 to

represent Appellant.     On September 30, 2019, the PCRA court provided

Appellant notice of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition pursuant to Rule 907.

        On December 6, 2019, the PCRA court vacated its September 30, 2019

Rule 907 notice to permit PCRA counsel an opportunity to file an amended

                                      -6-
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petition, if necessary.      PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on

December 13, 2020, and a second amended PCRA petition on November 11,

2021.6 On March 21, 2022, the PCRA court provided Appellant notice of its

intent to dismiss his November 2021 amended PCRA petition without a hearing

pursuant to Rule 907. Appellant filed objections to the PCRA court’s Rule 907

notice on April 4, 2022. On May 30, 2022, counsel filed a third amended PCRA

petition.7 On October 5, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA

petition.8 This appeal followed.9
____________________________________________

6 Meanwhile, Appellant filed pro se another PCRA petition on February 23,
2022. On March 28, 2022, the PCRA court directed PCRA counsel to confer
with Appellant and ascertain whether Appellant wished to continue with
counsel or proceed pro se. On April 4, 2022, PCRA counsel notified the PCRA
court that, upon conference, Appellant wished to remain represented by
counsel and proceed with the current (November 2021) amended PCRA
petition.

7 The third amended PCRA petition incorporated all of the claims set forth in

the second amended PCRA petition, and raised a new claim for ineffective
assistance of original PCRA counsel, based upon our Supreme Court’s recent
holding in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), which
permits a petitioner to raise claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel
at the first opportunity, even if on appeal. Bradley, 261 A.3d at 405.

8 On October 27, 2022, PCRA counsel filed with this Court a petition to
withdraw as counsel for Appellant. In a November 10, 2022 per curiam order,
this Court remanded the case so the PCRA court could conduct a Grazier
hearing to determine whether Appellant wished to proceed pro se or continue
counsel’s representation on appeal. On December 7, 2022, the PCRA court
provided notification that Appellant wanted to remain with PCRA counsel.

9 The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
1925(b). On November 3, 2022, the PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion,
relying on its October 5, 2022 order dismissing Appellant PCRA petition.

                                           -7-
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      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

      [1.   Whether] the PCRA court erred in dismissing the petition as
            untimely because [Appellant] established that his case falls
            within an exception to the timeliness provisions of the
            [PCRA], and the PCRA court did have jurisdiction to review
            the merits of his petition[?]

      [2.   Whether] the PCRA court erred in dismissing the petition as
            untimely regarding [Appellant’s Commonwealth v.
            Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021)] claims before giving
            notice of intent to dismiss, providing the [PCRA] court's
            reasons [for dismissal], and allowing [Appellant] to respond
            before entry of a final order, pursuant to [] Rule 907[?]

      [3.   Whether] the PCRA court erred in dismissing the petition as
            untimely     where     Manning's     affidavit   contained
            [after-]discovered evidence that warrant[s] a new trial[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

      In addressing Appellant’s issues, we are mindful of our well-settled

standard and scope of review of an order denying a PCRA petition. Proper

appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a petition is limited to an

examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988,

992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court,

and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support

a contrary holding.”      Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s

                                      -8-
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legal conclusions de novo.     Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).

      It is well-established that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is

jurisdictional, and if a PCRA petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over

the claims and cannot grant relief. Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d

1120, 1124 (Pa. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d

118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding, courts do not have jurisdiction over an

untimely PCRA petition). To be timely filed, a PCRA petition, including second

and subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of the date a

petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

“A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking

the review.”   42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).       The PCRA’s jurisdictional time

restriction is constitutionally sound. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287,

292 (Pa. 2004).

      As discussed supra, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on

August 31, 2015. Therefore, Appellant had until September 1, 2016, in which

to file a timely PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (stating, a PCRA

petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one

year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless the petitioner alleges and

proves one of the three enumerated exceptions set forth herein). Appellant

filed pro se his current PCRA petition on July 23, 2019, more than two years

                                      -9-
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and ten months after the deadline for filing a timely PCRA petition.10

Therefore, Appellant’s July 2019 petition is patently untimely.11

         If a PCRA petition is untimely filed, the jurisdictional time-bar can only

be overcome if the petitioner alleges and proves one of the three statutory

exceptions, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Commonwealth v.

Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017). The three narrow statutory exceptions

to the one-year time-bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government

officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly[-]discovered facts; and (3)

an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51

A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

A petition invoking an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar must be filed

within one year of the date that the claim could have been presented. 12 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (effective Dec. 24, 2018). If a petitioner fails to invoke

____________________________________________

10 For the reasons discussed more fully herein, we deem Appellant’s July 2019

petition, as amended thereafter, to be his current PCRA petition.

11 Appellant concedes that his PCRA petition is untimely.    See Appellant’s Brief
at 21.

12 We note that effective December 24, 2018, the time-period in which to file

a petition invoking one of the three exceptions was extended from 60 days to
one year. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). This amendment applies to claims
arising one year prior to the effective date of the amendment, i.e., December
24, 2017, or later. Act. 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 3. Because
Appellant filed his PCRA petition on July 23, 2019, this amendment applies,
and Appellant had one year in which to file a petition that validly invoked any
of the exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar.

                                          - 10 -
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a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar, courts are without jurisdiction to

review the petition and provide relief. Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676.

      It is well-established that, to invoke the newly-discovered facts

exception, the petitioner must plead and prove facts that were “unknown” to

him or her, and that he or she could not uncover such facts with the exercise

of “due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1274 (Pa.

2007); see also Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 2020)

(stating that, the newly-discovered facts exception “renders a petition timely

when the petitioner establishes that the facts upon which the claim is

predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”). Our Supreme Court recently

reiterated the well-established principle that a judicial decision does not

constitute a “fact” for purposes of the newly-discovered facts exception.

Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1147 (Pa. 2020).

      Here, Appellant asserts the newly-discovered facts exception to the

jurisdictional time-bar based on an affidavit he obtained from Manning.

Appellant’s Brief at 22; see also Pro Se PCRA Petition, 7/23/19, at Exhibit 1;

Amended PCRA Petition, 12/13/20, at 9; Second Amended PCRA Petition,

11/1/21, at 9.   Appellant contends that the information contained in the

affidavit “contradicts the [Commonwealth’s] sole witness[, the friend, as] to

the events that led to the death of [the] victim[.]”   Pro Se PCRA Petition,

7/23/19, at Motion for PCRA Relief ¶5.

                                    - 11 -
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      The PCRA court found that the affidavit constituted a fact for purposes

of satisfying the newly-discovered fact exception to the jurisdictional time-bar.

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/21/22, at 8. The PCRA court further found, however,

that Appellant, in July 2017, was aware of Manning and his version of the

events surrounding the murder, as later set forth in an affidavit, based upon

a letter Appellant wrote to his mother. Id. at 9. The PCRA court held that

Appellant, upon learning of the factual basis underlying the affidavit, failed to

exercise due diligence in obtaining the affidavit from Manning and presenting

the same to the PCRA court within the required timeframe. Id. at 9.

      The record demonstrates that, in a letter dated July 11, 2017, and

addressed to his mother, Appellant detailed “some revelations” that he

recently learned from a fellow inmate about a conversation the inmate had

with Manning, while the inmate and Manning were incarcerated at the same

state correctional institution.   Pro Se PCRA Petition, 7/23/19, at Exhibit 2

(Letter).   The information Appellant learned from the inmate is essentially

re-stated in Manning’s affidavit, as discussed infra.       Id.   In the letter,

Appellant asked his mother to contact Manning and request that he provide

an affidavit regarding his version of the events surrounding the victim’s

murder. Id.

      Thereafter, on October 16, 2017, Appellant wrote a letter to Manning

requesting that Manning provide a sworn affidavit explaining his version of the

events pertaining to the victim’s murder. Pro Se PCRA Petition, 7/23/19, at

Exhibit 6 (Letter).   Appellant avers that he received Manning’s affidavit on

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February 6, 2018. The essence of the affidavit was that Manning had been

contacted by the friend, that the friend asked him to “beat up [the victim]”

and “get [the victim] out of the picture,” and, when Manning went to the

friend’s house, the friend asked Manning to get rid of a Pontiac vehicle for

him. Pro Se PCRA Petition, 7/23/19, at Exhibit 1 (Affidavit).

      Upon review, we concur with the PCRA court, and the record supports,

that the affidavit constitutes a “fact” for purpose of the newly-discovered facts

exception because the affidavit contains newly-discovered information that

offers a different version of the events surrounding the victim’s murder. See

Second Amended PCRA Petition, 11/1/21, at 10 (stating, the affidavit contains

information that is exculpatory in nature, was unavailable to Appellant at the

time of trial, and if presented at trial, could have resulted in a different

outcome). Appellant did not learn of Manning’s version of events until July

2017. The PCRA court erred, however, in determining that Appellant failed to

exercise due diligence in obtaining the affidavit. Upon learning of Manning’s

version of events surrounding the murder, Appellant wrote his mother asking

that she contact Manning to obtain his sworn statement of events. In the

meantime, Appellant initiated the formal process requesting that he be

permitted too directly correspond with another inmate (Manning) who was

housed at a different state correctional institution. Upon receiving permission

to communicate directly with Manning, Appellant wrote a letter to Manning

asking him to provide a sworn statement detailing his recollection of events.

Manning provided the affidavit to Appellant on February 6, 2018. Based upon

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the circumstances of the case sub judice, Appellant’s efforts constituted due

diligence in obtaining the affidavit.

      Nonetheless, upon receipt of the affidavit, Appellant had one year in

which to file a PCRA petition setting forth the newly-discovered fact (the

affidavit) as the basis for an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “[a]ny petition invoking an exception [to the

jurisdictional time-bar] shall be filed within one year of the date the claim

could have been presented”). Here, Appellant filed a PCRA petition setting

forth the affidavit as a newly-discovered fact on March 7, 2018. This PCRA

petition, however, was filed during the pendency of the appeal involving his

first PCRA petition.

      Pennsylvania law makes clear the [PCRA] court has no jurisdiction
      to consider a subsequent PCRA petition while an appeal from the
      denial of the petitioner's prior PCRA petition in the same case
      [remains] pending[.] A petitioner must choose either to appeal
      from the order denying his prior PCRA petition or to file a new
      PCRA petition; the petitioner cannot do both, i.e., file an appeal
      and also file a PCRA petition, because prevailing law requires that
      the subsequent petition must give way to a pending appeal from
      the order denying a prior petition. In other words, a petitioner
      who files an appeal from an order denying his prior PCRA petition
      must withdraw the appeal before he[, or she,] can pursue a
      subsequent PCRA petition. If the petitioner pursues the pending
      appeal, then the PCRA court is required [] to dismiss any
      subsequent PCRA petitions filed while that appeal is pending.
      Pennsylvania law also states unequivocally that no court has
      jurisdiction to place serial petitions in repose pending the outcome
      of an appeal in the same case.

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Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations,

quotation marks, and emphasis omitted; paragraph formatting modified),

appeal denied, 218 A.3d 850 (Pa. 2019).

       Upon receipt of the affidavit, Appellant was left with the choice of

discontinuing the appeal of his first PCRA petition and filing a subsequent PCRA

petition setting forth the affidavit as a newly-discovered fact, or continue with

the appeal of his first PCRA petition. Appellant chose to continue with the

appeal of his first PCRA petition.         Therefore, the PCRA court was without

jurisdiction to address the March 7, 2018 PCRA petition and was required to

dismiss the PCRA petition.           Although the PCRA court did not dismiss

Appellant’s PCRA petition but, rather, informed Appellant that “[n]o action

would be taken on this petition at the moment,” the timeliness of a PCRA

petition is a jurisdictional prerequisite and we cannot overlook the PCRA

court’s failure to dismiss Appellant’s petition in order to find the PCRA court

had jurisdiction to address Appellant’s March 2018 petition.13

____________________________________________

13 Case law is clear that a PCRA court does not have jurisdiction to address a

subsequent PCRA petition filed during the pendency of an appeal of a prior
PCRA petition where the petitioner chooses to pursue the appeal. Beatty,
207 A.3d at 961. A PCRA court is unable to “manufacture” jurisdiction over
the subsequent PCRA petition by holding the petition in abeyance. Id.
(stating, “holding serial petitions in abeyance pending [an] appeal [of a prior
petition] in [the] same case perverts [the] PCRA [jurisdictional] timeliness
requirements”). While notification that a petition is being held in abeyance is
erroneous and misleading to a petitioner, and in particular to a pro se
petitioner, we cannot overlook this error by a PCRA court and “find”
jurisdiction.

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       The appeal of Appellant’s first PCRA petition concluded on June 10,

2019, when our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of

appeal. On July 23, 2019, Appellant filed a subsequent PCRA petition, setting

forth the affidavit in support of the newly-discovered facts exception to the

jurisdiction time-bar. The one year period in which to file such a petition,

however, expired on February 7, 2019, one year after Appellant received the

affidavit. Therefore, the PCRA court was without jurisdiction to address the

underlying claims raised by Appellant, including the Bradley ineffectiveness

claim raised in Appellant’s counseled May 2022 amended PCRA petition, which

related back to the July 23, 2019 petition.        Consequently, the PCRA court

properly dismissed the petition under review, and we are without jurisdiction

to address Appellant’s claims on appeal.14

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

14 To the extent that Appellant, in his May 2022 amended PCRA petition,
asserts that our Supreme Court’s decision in Bradley, supra, constitutes a
fact for purposes of the newly-discovered facts exception, we find this
assertion to be without merit. See Third Amended PCRA Petition, 5/30/22, at
9; see also Reid, 235 A.3d at 1147 (reiterating the well-established principal
that a judicial decision does not constitute a “fact” for purposes of the
newly-discovered facts exception). Moreover, the decision in Bradley does
not create a new and retroactive constitutional right. See Commonwealth
v. Mead, 284 A.3d 955, 2022 WL 3755382, at *3 (Pa. Super. 2022 filed Aug.
30, 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (stating, “Bradley does not create [an
after]-recognized constitutional right and[,] thus, does not involve the PCRA’s
time[-]bar”).

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J-S17024-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/31/2023

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