Court Opinion

ID: 9430009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:28:36.808762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:22.393465
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
dissenting.
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979), we held that instructing the jury that “the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts” violates due process. We invalidated this instruction because a reasonable juror could interpret it either as “an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption” or “as a direction to find intent upon proof of the defendant’s voluntary actions . . . unless the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may well have been considerably greater than 'some’ evidence — thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent.” Id., at 517 (original emphasis). Either interpretation, we held, would have relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., at 521; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 698-701 (1975).
Unlike the charge in Sandstrom, the charge in the present case is not susceptible of either interpretation. It creates no “irrebuttable direction,” and a reasonable juror could not conclude that it relieves the State of its burden of persuasion. The Court, however, believes that two sentences make the charge infirm:
“The acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person’s will, but the presumption may be rebutted. A person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts but the presumption may be rebutted.” App. 8a-9a.
I agree with the Court that “[s]landing alone,” the challenged language could be viewed as “an unconstitutional burden-shifting presumption with respect to the element of *328intent.” Ante, at 318 (emphasis added). The fact is, however, that this language did not stand alone. It is but a small part of a lengthy charge, other parts of which clarify its meaning. Although the Court states that it considered the effect the rest of the charge would have had on a reasonable juror, its analysis overlooks or misinterprets several critical instructions. These instructions, I believe, would have prevented a reasonable juror from imposing on the defendant the burden of persuasion on intent. When viewed as a whole, see Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 146-147 (1973), the jury charge satisfies the requirements of due process.
The trial court repeatedly impressed upon the jury both that the defendant should be presumed innocent until proved guilty and that the State bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It stated:
“[T]he burden is upon the State of proving the defendant’s guilt as charged in such count beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“. . . If, upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of this case, your mind is wavering, unsettled, not satisfied, then that is the reasonable doubt under the law and if such a doubt rests upon your mind, it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and acquit him.
“Now, the defendant enters upon his trial with the presumption of innocence in his favor and this presumption . . . remains with him throughout the trial, unless and until it is overcome by evidence sufficiently strong to satisfy you of his guilt to a reasonable and moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt.
“Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, the burden is upon the State to prove to a reasonable and moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt every material allegation in each count of this indictment and I charge you further, *329that there is no burden on the defendant to prove anything. The burden is on the State.
“Members of the Jury, if, from a consideration of the evidence or from a lack of evidence, you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and to a reasonable and moral certainty that the State has established the guilt of the defendant. . . then it would be your duty to acquit him . . . .” App. 4a-12a.
We noted in Sandstrom, supra, at 518, n. 7, that general instructions may be insufficient by themselves to make clear that the burden of persuasion remains with the State. In this case, however, the trial court went well beyond the typical generality of such instructions. It repeatedly reiterated the presumption of innocence and the heavy burden imposed upon the State. In addition, the jury was told that the “presumption of innocence . . . remains with [the defendant] throughout the trial,” App. 5a, and that “there is no burden on the defendant to prove anything. The burden is on the State,” id., at 8a.
More important is the immediate context of the two suspect sentences. They appeared in a paragraph that stated:
“A crime is a violation of a statute of this State in which there shall be a union of joint operation of act or omission to act, and intention or criminal negligence. A person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking or intention or criminal negligence. The acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person’s will, but the presumption may be rebutted. A person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts but the presumption may be rebutted. A person will not be presumed to act with criminal intention *330but the trier of facts, that is, the Jury, may find criminal intention wpon a consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.” Id., at 8a-9a (emphasis added).
The final sentence clearly tells the jury that it cannot place on the defendant the burden of persuasion on intent. The Court, however, holds that in context it could not have had this effect. It believes that the term “criminal intention” refers not to intent at all, but to “absence of provocation or justification,” ante, at 320, a separate element of malice murder. Despite the fact that provocation and justification are largely unrelated to intent, the Court believes that “the jury could certainly have understood [the term] this way.” Ibid. Such a strained interpretation is neither logical nor justified.*
The instructions on circumstantial evidence further ensured that no reasonable juror would have switched the burden of proof on intent. Three times the trial court told the jury that it could not base a finding of any element of the offense on circumstantial evidence unless the evidence “exclude[d] every other reasonable hypothesis, save that of the [accused’s] guilt. . . .” App. 6a. Under these instructions, a reasonable juror could not have found intent unless the State’s evidence excluded any reasonable hypothesis that the defendant had acted unintentionally. This requirement *331placed a burden of excluding the possibility of lack of intent on the State and would have made it impossible to impose on the defendant the burden of persuasion on intent itself.
Together, I believe that the instructions on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence, the instruction that “criminal intention” cannot be presumed, and the instructions governing the interpretation of circumstantial evidence removed any danger that a reasonable juror could have believed that the two suspect sentences placed on the defendant the burden of persuasion on intent. When viewed as a whole, the jury instructions did not violate due process. I accordingly dissent.

The term’s context also precludes such an interpretation. The term “criminal intention” appears in a paragraph describing the general requirements of all crimes without discussing the specific requirements of any particular one. The Court offers no reason why a reasonable juror might have believed that this paragraph referred to only one of the crimes charged — malice murder — especially when a different crime — kidnaping— was described in the immediately following paragraphs. It is much more reasonable to interpret the term “criminal intention” as shorthand for “intention or criminal negligence,” the traditional mens rea requirement. In this view, the final sentence informs the jury that whatever else a rebut-table presumption might establish it cannot by itself establish mens rea.