Court Opinion

ID: 9689362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:28:49.494101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:37.988465
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Bailiffs are an integral part of the judicial branch of government. They keep order, provide security for the court officials, and generally attend to the needs of the trial judge and the jury. Their function is vital for no trial judge can supervise every facet of a jury trial. They are the right arm of the judge.
In South Dakota, all bailiffs must be sworn to do their duty as they embark upon their responsibilities in supervising a jury. Their oath is solemn and it is meaningful. Without any doubt, the primary duty of the bailiffs is to insure the integrity of the jury and to thereby preserve the sanctity of jury verdict upon which our entire system of American Jurisprudence is founded. Our state law specifically requires that one or more officers (bailiffs) must be sworn to keep the jury together before the jurors retire for deliberation. The law admonishes these officers to keep the jury in a private place and yet a place that is convenient. Food and drink, as the trial judge determines, shall be provided unto the jury. Should a trial judge determine that the jury separate during the night, again the bailiffs must supervise the overnight adjournment. SDCL 23A-25-5.
And how, pray tell, can these bailiffs supervise the jurors as the jurors go hither and thither about their individual activities? Obviously, they cannot. And how, to protect the integrity of the jury system and the sanctity of the jury verdict, must the bailiffs conduct themselves when the trial judge tells the jury to all go home and report the next morning? Obviously, the bailiffs are helpless to keep the very oath that they were sworn to uphold through His Honor. This decision, by blessing the act of the trial judge, literally permits officers of the trial courts to violate their oath.
One does not have to be a student of human nature to know that husbands and wives talk about the labors of the day and reveal the intimate thoughts of each other. A trial judge can admonish a man or woman to not discuss the case, even with his life mate, but that admonishment has little practical effect once husband and wife are in the privacy of their home. Again, the bailiffs, by state law, are sworn to not permit any person (emphasis mine), including themselves, to communicate with the jurors and again, this decision causes the bailiffs to violate their oath. It is obvious that a separation of the jury overnight, which the statute contemplates, is to discreetly permit the ordinary privacies of women and men serving on a jury to exist and to also permit them rest. SDCL 23A-25-5 does not permit a jury separation such as contemplated by the trial judge in this case or by the highest court of this state. The bailiffs are sworn “to keep them together.” It is further evident that our lawmakers desired the jury not to separate, *894such as is contemplated by this decision, for it was included in the statute in question that food and drink were to be supplied.
I note that one of the male jurors expressed in open court the question his wife indignantly posed when he separated from his fellow jurors and went home: “Where in hell have you been for this late?” Is this the type of setting the statute contemplates, i.e., “private,” “convenient,” and “under supervision of the officer or officers”? One cannot help but ponder as to whether this male juror’s “deliberation” was peaceful and meditative. I further note he was the jury foreman.
An illustration of the danger that separation without supervision, such as we see in this case, spawned by a violation of the statute in question, may be seen in a telephone call by a wife of a defense witness. One Marilyn Nelson telephoned a juror friend, Enid Rogers. These two ladies were involved in the same church circle. The juror prepared a handwritten memo of the conversation and gave it to the bailiff. This phone call took place at 7:50 a. m., approximately two hours before the jury rejoined and thereupon took one hour and thirty-seven minutes to reach a verdict. The memo follows:
Marilyn Nelson: I didn’t know how late you were up so I wanted to wait until the kids were up and around
Enid Rogers: Late
Marilyn: Did you (decide or finish?)?
Enid: No -so I can’t continue — (talking etc)
Marilyn: I understand because I was on. When will you — ?
Enid: I don’t know.
Marilyn: Later today?
Enid: I don’t know—
Marilyn: Ok goodbye—
My point is that an unsupervised jury is reachable and more readily accessible to contamination.
This decision, in effect, repeals SDCL 23A-25-5. For, indeed, as Justice Morgan points out, the majority relies upon decisions antedating the 1955 statutory amendment. This decision literally legislates and does violence to the great doctrine of separation of powers. As I review this decision and the motivation of the trial judge, could the underlying, unseen, and compelling reason be to avoid the cost of purchasing supper and lodging for juries, and particularly in this case, the cost of lodging? If so, may I remind the Bench and the Bar that the business of the courts is not economy, expediency or efficiency — it is justice. Hypothetically, should the rule be different for eluding a police vehicle (misdemeanor) case than a murder case (felony)? I think not. A right to a fair trial is as fundamental in a misdemeanor case as a felony case. Surely, if a man were on trial for murder, the new instruction (blessed now) of “let’s all go home and go to bed and do not talk about this case to anyone” would be used hesitatingly. A vigilant trial judge would flinch at an instruction the majority blesses for fear of improper communication to a juror. And what is to restrict this blessing to just a late hour in the morning? Fatigue could come upon a jury and judge at five o’clock. My Brothers, this is a dangerous precedent and will come back to haunt trial judges, juries, and this Court. I cannot, and will not, join a decision that permits a creeping encroachment of improper influence by others upon a jury. This decision tampers with the heart and soul of a jury and everything that it stands for: an impartial body to be free of improper influence, free of disturbances and annoyances, free to calmly and collectively deliberate, and to render a just verdict under the evidence presented without the hubbub of the home milieu or elsewhere. A man’s mind often reflects the color of his environment.
Appellant’s motion to stay execution of the sentencing imposed (6 months in the Spink County jail and a $300 fine), was denied by the trial court, the same court which did not discharge the jury after it was informed the jury was deadlocked. The deadlock was at 9:25 p. m.; at 12:35 a. m., there was still no verdict; and thereupon the trial court, without one expression to either the state’s attorney or defense counsel, summarily announced its decision to *895violate the mandatory sequestration rule. Defense counsel vigorously objected to this procedure. During the early morning hours then, after their dismissal, some of the jurors changed their minds and voted for a guilty verdict. For, after reconvening at 10:00 a. m., on the following morning, at 11:37 a. m. the bailiff reported that the jury had reached a verdict. The record shows that the jurors were totally unsupervised for a period of nine hours. This was not a trivial, momentary separation. Steensland, cited in the majority, is inapposite.
“There is no definite rule by which to measure prejudicial error and each case must be decided on its own facts.” State v. Reddington, 80 S.D. 390, 396, 125 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1963). Under the facts of this case, the trial procedure of permitting the jury to go unsupervised for nine hours apparently tipped the scales of justice against the appellant for, when the jury left the courthouse, the jury was deadlocked; on the following morning, the jury convicted appellant. In State v. Pirkey, 24 S.D. 533, 536, 124 N.W. 713, 715 (1910), we said: “Prejudicial error is such error as in all probability must have produced some effect upon the final result of the trial, namely, the verdict of the jury.”
There are many cases cited under Separation of Jury in Criminal Case after Submission of Cause — Modern Cases, 72 A.L.R.3d 248 (1976), pertaining to the general issue discussed in the majority and minority opinions. A fair reading of this exhaustive treatise brings one to the conclusion that the case holdings turn on the wording of the statute in each state. Considering this state’s specific statute which absolutely mandates supervision of the jury by court officers upon the jury’s separation, this dissent is backed by respectable authority in the collection of cases therein contained. But, specifically, it appears that my viewpoint follows the overwhelming majority rule where the jurors are under the direct supervision or custody of the court officers when the jury has been permitted to separate. 72 A.L.R.3d 270, § 12 (1976). That the jurors are required to be kept in custody of an officer or officers at all times when they are out of court, whether as a group or individually, appears to be a given. Id. And there is no way the majority opinion can write around this phrase “under the supervision of the officer or officers.”
The most critical stage of a trial is the deliberation of the jury. It is the American system of justice at work. I would not suffer it to be denigrated. Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the judgment of conviction and grant a new trial.