Court Opinion

ID: 9687656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:41:11.916376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:13.346581
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
concurring.
I write separately to express two concerns. First, whatever the second order entered by the district court may be, it is not an “order nunc pro tunc.” The office of such an order is to correct clerical errors, not to correct judicial errors or otherwise change judicial determinations, even if unintended. Interstate Printing Co. v. Department of Revenue, ante p. 110, 459 N.W.2d 519 (1990); IAFF Local 831 v. City of No. Platte, 215 Neb. 89, 337 N.W.2d 716 (1983); Continental Oil Co. v. Harris, 214 Neb. 422, 333 N.W.2d 921 (1983). It is obvious the second order did not correct a clerical error; it merely reflected a change in the district court’s mind. While the district court has the right, under such circumstances, to modify or vacate its interlocutory rulings in a pending action, it may not properly do so through the guise of a purported order nunc pro tunc. Interstate Printing Co. v. Department of Revenue, supra; IAFF Local 831 v. City of No. Platte, supra; Continental Oil Co. v. Harris, supra.
That having been written, I turn to my other, and perhaps more important, concern. Whatever the second order may be, First Westside Bank had to deal with it. While I agree with the determination that the order is not appealable, I certainly understand that Westside would resolve any doubt it may have had in that regard in favor of making this particular trip, for although a litigant suffers no legal harm by arriving at this tribunal early, it forever forfeits its right to appellate review if it arrives late. See, In re Interest of K.D.B., 233 Neb. 371, 445 N.W.2d 620 (1989); Sederstrom v. Wrehe, 215 Neb. 429, 339 N.W.2d 74 (1983).
Thus, I wonder what happened to the time-honored practice of permitting a motion for new trial relating to orders of questionable appealability to pend until adjudication of all remaining aspects of the case, at which point all questions were appealed? Such a practice not only saved judicial time, it spared the litigant’s purse.
I am not unmindful that in an effort to prod the few dilatory members of our profession, on either side of the bench, to *886timely action, this court adopted case progression standards and requires judges to report and explain matters under submission for more than 90 days. See Canon 3 and Appendix A of the Code of Judicial Conduct (1987). This circumstance does not, however, provide me with an understanding of how delaying a questionable appeal with respect to a limited aspect of a case delays resolution of the entire case. Indeed, the opposite is true. The notice of appeal removing jurisdiction over this litigation to this court was filed on December 12,1988. During the 2 years intervening between that filing and the filing of the majority’s opinion, the world, so far as this litigation is concerned, stood still. What an expensive waste!
A legitimate variation from a standard can be explained and, thus, the progression rules applied thoughtfully in a manner which will achieve, rather than frustrate, their purposes. I suggest we revisit our old practice.