Court Opinion

ID: 9408150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 18:01:22.049629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.996226
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50285     Document: 00516816130       Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/11/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                              _____________                               FILED
                                                                      July 11, 2023
                               No. 22-50285                          Lyle W. Cayce
                           consolidated with                              Clerk
                               No. 22-50286
                             _____________

   United States of America,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                     versus

   Roberto Buendia,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                 Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                         USDC Nos. 2:20-CR-1354-1,
                               2:20-CR-1435-1
                 ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
         Roberto Buendia pled guilty to conspiring to transport and
   transporting undocumented immigrants resulting in serious bodily injury and
   death. He appeals a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.
   § 2L1.1(b)(8)(A) for involuntarily detaining a migrant through threat or
   coercion. Finding no plain error in the application of the enhancement, we
   AFFIRM.
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                                      22-50285
                                  c/w No. 22-50286

                               I. Background
          We recite the following facts from Buendia’s presentence report
   (“PSR”) and the factual basis discussed at his plea hearing. On May 16,
   2020, Buendia drove his Buick LaCrosse to an area north of Laredo, Texas
   to pick up two migrants who had illegally crossed the border. A border patrol
   agent was notified that a gold Buick LaCrosse had been seen picking up two
   suspected illegal immigrants in that area. The agent spotted Buendia’s
   vehicle and started following him on U.S. Highway 83. After the agent
   activated his emergency lights to conduct an immigration inspection,
   Buendia accelerated and continued traveling north on the highway. The
   agent requested aerial assistance and continued to pursue Buendia for some
   time. When they reached a red light at the intersection of FM 190 and U.S.
   Highway 83 in Asherton, Texas, Buendia was traveling at a high rate of speed.
   Buendia ran the light and broadsided a car that was crossing the intersection.
   Buendia’s car then struck a utility pole, ripped in two, and Buendia and both
   passengers were ejected from the vehicle. One passenger, A.M.A., died at the
   scene from his injuries. The other passenger, L.G.G.G., sustained serious
   injuries and had to be placed in a medically induced coma after he was
   airlifted to a hospital. Buendia also sustained serious injuries and had to be
   placed in a medically induced coma.
          About a month later, Homeland Security Investigators interviewed
   L.G.G.G. at the hospital. L.G.G.G. said he paid a man named Gordo $2,500
   to be smuggled into the United States. After crossing the border on foot with
   five others, the group separated when they were chased by border patrol
   agents. L.G.G.G. stayed with A.M.A., and they were picked up by Buendia.
   Once they got in his car, Buendia told them to get in the back cargo area and
   keep their heads down. Buendia also instructed them to get out of the car and
   run if they got pulled over by law enforcement. Once Buendia was being

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                                             22-50285
                                         c/w No. 22-50286

   chased by the border patrol agent, L.G.G.G. told Buendia to stop, but
   Buendia told him to shut up and stay quiet.
           Buendia was charged with conspiring to transport and transporting
   undocumented immigrants resulting in death and conspiring to transport and
   transporting undocumented immigrants resulting in serious bodily injury.
   After Buendia pled guilty, the probation officer prepared his PSR and
   calculated his offense level at 27. His offense level included enhancements
   for intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious
   bodily injury and for the death of A.M.A. It also included a two-level
   enhancement for involuntarily detaining a migrant through threat or
   coercion. This enhancement was supported by the following facts: “As
   reflected in the offense conduct, [L.G.G.G.] stated that he told Buendia to
   stop the vehicle. However, Buendia told him to shut up and stay quiet.”
   Buendia did not object to the enhancement or its factual basis. The district
   court adopted the PSR without change. At sentencing, the district court
   found the advisory Guidelines range of 87-108 months inadequate and varied
   upward to a 144-month sentence. Buendia timely appealed the application of
   the two-level enhancement. 1
                              II. Standard of Review
           We ordinarily review the district court’s interpretation or application
   of the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States
   v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). However, as Buendia
   concedes, we review for plain error since he did not object to the sentencing

           _____________________
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             Buendia also appealed the revocation of his supervised release in Case No. 22-
   50286. We granted his motion to consolidate the appeals, but he has abandoned any
   challenge to the revocation by failing to raise it in his brief. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338,
   1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“An appellant abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial
   brief on appeal.” (citation omitted)).

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                                       22-50285
                                   c/w No. 22-50286

   enhancement below. “To establish plain error, [the defendant] is required to
   show that (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error affected
   his substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness,
   integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Redd,
   562 F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted).
                                  III. Discussion
                     a. The § 2L1.1(b)(8)(A) Enhancement
          The pertinent two-level sentencing enhancement applies “[i]f an alien
   was involuntarily detained through coercion or threat, or in connection with
   a demand for payment, (i) after the alien was smuggled into the United
   States; or (ii) while the alien was transported or harbored in the United
   States.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(8)(A).
          To begin, the PSR recounts that Buendia continued to drive after
   L.G.G.G. told him to stop the car, and Buendia did not contest that factual
   finding before the district court and does not contest it on appeal. Buendia
   conceded at oral argument that L.G.G.G. was involuntarily detained, so the
   only question is whether he was detained through coercion or threat. Id.
          The Guidelines do not define coercion or threat as they are used in
   this enhancement. When terms in Guidelines are not defined, “we must give
   them their ordinary meaning.” United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 238
   (5th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Herrera, 647 F.3d 172, 178-79 & n.5
   (5th Cir. 2011) (defining “coerce” in the comments to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 by
   looking to definitions in dictionaries, case law, and state statutes); United
   States v. Andres, 666 F. App’x 621, 623–24 (9th Cir. 2016) (unpublished
   memorandum op.) (adopting dictionary definitions for “coercion” and
   “threat” in § 2L1.1(b)(8)(A)). Accordingly, we recite the following relevant
   definitions for these terms:

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                                  c/w No. 22-50286

   Coercion
      • “Compulsion of a free agent by physical, moral, or economic force or
         threat of physical force.” Coercion, Black’s Law Dictionary
         (11th ed. 2019).
      • “Constraint, restraint, compulsion; the application of force to control
         the action of a voluntary agent.” Coercion, The Oxford English
         Dictionary (online ed. 2023).

   Threat
      • “A communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on an-
         other’s property, esp. one that might diminish a person’s freedom to
         act voluntarily or with lawful consent; a declaration, express or im-
         plied, of an intent to inflict loss or pain on another.” Threat, Black’s
         Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
      • “A denunciation to a person of ill to befall him; esp. a declaration of
         hostile determination or of loss, pain, punishment, or damage to be
         inflicted in retribution for or conditionally upon some course.”
         Threat, The Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2023).
          Consistent with these definitions, the enhancement clearly applies
   when violence or threats of violence are conditioned on a migrant’s attempt
   to leave. See, e.g., United States v. Rocha-Guajardo, 772 F. App’x 229, 230 (5th
   Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (per curiam) (affirming § 2L1.1(b)(8)(A)
   enhancement where defendant brandished a firearm in the stash house, pistol
   whipped a migrant, and kicked and punched two migrants who attempted to
   escape). Outside of physical violence or threatened physical violence, we
   have also affirmed the application of the enhancement where a smuggler
   boarded up and padlocked the exits of a stash house “from the outside to
   prevent [the migrants] inside from escaping.” United States v. DeLeon, 484
   F. App’x 920, 934 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (per curiam).
          Relying on the above-listed definitions, Buendia claims his conduct
   did not amount to a threat because he did not express, explicitly or implicitly,
   an intention to inflict injury or loss upon L.G.G.G. The Government

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                                      22-50285
                                  c/w No. 22-50286

   responds that “it is the words and the undisputed facts that Buendia was
   driving in a dangerous and erratic manner and refused to slow down that
   created a threat to the lives of his alien passengers.” It argues that focusing
   only on Buendia’s words and not his conduct is “like focusing on the wording
   of ‘sit down and shut up’ when a hypothetical defendant is pointing a gun; it
   is not merely the words that carry the threat.” But there is a clear distinction
   between Buendia’s erratic driving and pointing a gun at someone. Pointing a
   gun at someone while commanding them to do something communicates an
   intent to cause harm if the person does not comply with the command. Here,
   Buendia was not threatening to hurt L.G.G.G. by driving erratically if he did
   not comply with his command to “shut up”—he was already driving
   erratically because he was attempting to evade the border patrol agent.
   Buendia did not communicate any intent to inflict harm if L.G.G.G. failed to
   heed his command, so his conduct did not amount to a threat.
          Buendia also argues his conduct did not amount to coercion. At first
   glance, Buendia’s continued driving appears similar to the smuggler’s
   actions in DeLeon because it had the effect of keeping L.G.G.G. in the car.
   484 F. App’x at 934. However, in DeLeon, the smuggler locked the exits from
   the outside in order to prevent the migrants inside from escaping. Id. Thus,
   the enhancement was properly applied there because the smuggler acted “to
   control the action of a voluntary agent.” Coercion, The Oxford English
   Dictionary (online ed. 2023) (emphasis added). Here, Buendia did not
   continue to drive in order to prevent L.G.G.G. from escaping—he continued
   to drive in order to avoid apprehension. That Buendia’s continued driving
   was not for the purpose of detaining L.G.G.G. is buttressed by his prior
   instruction to L.G.G.G. and A.M.A. to exit the vehicle and run should they
   be pulled over by law enforcement.

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                                   c/w No. 22-50286

          L.G.G.G. was involuntarily detained, but he was not involuntarily
   detained through threat or coercion. The district court erred by applying this
   enhancement to Buendia’s conduct.
                                    b. Plain Error
          We have found error, but Buendia must also show the error was plain
   since he did not object. Redd, 562 F.3d at 313. In his brief, Buendia did not
   point to any case law showing why the enhancement should not apply to him,
   and a “lack of binding authority is often dispositive in the plain-error
   context.” United States v. Gonzalez, 792 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2015).
   However, at oral argument, Buendia’s counsel directed us to United States v.
   Torres where we found plain error based on “an uncomplicated resort to the
   language of the guidelines.” 856 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 2017). In that case,
   the defendant was convicted of drug trafficking and money laundering. Id. at
   1097. He later moved to reduce his sentence based on lowered ranges for drug
   quantity that were put in place after his sentencing. Id. The district court
   denied his motion because it concluded that the change would affect his drug
   trafficking range but not his money laundering range. Id. The defendant did
   not object to this conclusion. Id. However, this court disagreed because the
   defendant’s money laundering range was tied to “[t]he offense level for the
   underlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived [the drug
   trafficking offense].” Id. at 1098-99 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1)). Since
   this court found error through a straightforward application of the language
   in § 2S1.1(a)(1), it found the error was also plain. Id. at 1099.
          We find error here based on the ordinary meanings of the terms in the
   enhancement, but our conclusion involved the additional step of explaining
   how this case differed from the circumstances in DeLeon. 484 F. App’x at
   934. Again, the smuggler’s blocking of the exits in DeLeon could be
   analogized to Buendia’s continued driving because both resulted in migrants

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                                   c/w No. 22-50286

   being held against their will. It was only after identifying the purpose of the
   application of force in each case that we were able to distinguish them. While
   non-precedential, DeLeon is relevant because “[t]here is no plain error if the
   legal landscape at the time showed the issue was disputed, even if, as here,
   the district court turns out to have been wrong.” United States v. Rodriguez-
   Parra, 581 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 2009). In Rodriguez-Parra, we explained
   that the error was not plain because it required “a careful parsing of all the
   relevant authorities, including the sentencing guidelines and applicable
   decisions.” Id. at 231. We reach a similar conclusion here: since we had to
   survey the relevant definitions and distinguish prior non-precedential case
   law, the error was not plain.
                               IV. Conclusion
          Buendia’s claim of plain error fails at the second prong, so we need
   not examine the remaining prongs. The judgment is AFFIRMED.

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