Court Opinion

ID: 9746654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:32:02.546539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:52.139879
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
Judicial patience is a virtue. As this Court admonished in Parker v. Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia,
“[tjhat which before trial appears to be demonstrably bad may belie prophecy in actual operation.... But even if a law is found wanting on trial, it is better that its defect should be demonstrated and removed than that the law should be aborted by judicial fiat.”
483 Pa. 106, 121-22, 394 A.2d 932, 940 (1978), quoting American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 553, 69 S.Ct. 258, 265, 93 L.Ed. 222 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In my view, the Health Care Services Malpractice Act and implementing regulations are entitled to far more judicial patience than the majority is willing to exercise. I dissent.
Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that “delay” has impermissibly infringed the constitutional right of mal*400practice plaintiffs to trial by jury. Rather, I share the conclusion of the unanimous Supreme Court of Indiana which rejected a similar challenge to Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act. The Supreme Court of Indiana observed:
“It is quite clear that the Malpractice Act does not take away the right to a jury trial. The right is fully accorded after the delay and expense occasioned by the panel submission requirement... .
Delay in the commencement of a trial and the expense of investigating and marshalling evidence are part and parcel of the preparation of any piece of civil litigation. Delay routinely occurs between the decision to prosecute a claim and the trial. Expenses for investigation and preparation attend the pre-trial preparation of all claims. The panel submission requirement generates evidence admissible at a future trial of the claim. The delay in the trial occasioned by this process and the cost attendant to it are in major part like those to be expected in any case. The participation by the parties in the panel processes will satisfy to a great extent their preparation needs. Such satisfaction will tend to reduce total aggregate time for trial preparation. Thus, the delay complained of will be offset to an appreciable extent. The cost to the party in whose favor the opinion is rendered would be in the range that such party would expect to pay to develop such evidence individually. And the . . . party against whom the opinion is rendered has been subjected to a cost by the process which would be much the same as he expects to pay to discover his opponent’s evidence. The panel submission requirement does impinge upon the right to trial by jury, but in so doing does not alter or change and does not impair the right contrary to constitutional limitation. The delay and expense complained of does not alter or change the substantial elements and incidents of the jury trial right for either party.”
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585, 592 (1980). Indeed, the majority’s contrary conclusion is based on a speculative, arbitrary, and standardless guessing-*401game approach which can lead only to unfair future application. Today’s line-drawing can only “bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and this train only.” Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669, 64 S.Ct. 757, 766, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).*
There can be no denying that Pennsylvania’s Malpractice Act has not enjoyed a trouble-free start. In its early years of administration the Act generated no small delay in the resolution of disputes between the ever-increasing numbers of persons dissatisfied with medical services and providers of health care.
It must be remembered however, that “Courts may not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution.” Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 16, 331 A.2d 198, 205 (1975), quoting Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963). Accord, In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880, 99 S.Ct. 216, 58 L.Ed.2d 192 (1978). There is every reason to believe that relief is now here. In December of last year, our Legislature by Act 1979-128 made several significant adjustments of the Malpractice Act. Arbitration panels have been reduced in size from seven members to three. § 308(b). The “strike list” method of selecting panel members has been eliminated. In its stead the Legislature has established a system of Administrator-appointments. § 308(a). Parties’ peremptory challenges to panelists have been reduced from six to one. § 308(c). And now if a panel is not selected within ninety days after a certificate of readiness is filed, *402the action shall be transferred to a court of common pleas for disposition. § 403.
This last adjustment is most important. Under newly-promulgated 37 Pa.Code § 171.123(a) of the Act’s Administrator, certificates of readiness in both pending and future cases must be filed expeditiously. This regulation provides:

“Mandatory filing of certificates of readiness.

(a) In all actions commenced prior to the effective date of this section [(February 12,1980)], the parties shall file a certificate of readiness within one year after the effective date of this section. In all actions commenced on or after the effective date of this section, the parties shall file a certificate of readiness within one year after the commencement of the action.”
This regulation and the amendment directing transfer together assure litigants that within fifteen months of initiation of an action their case will be heard. I therefore cannot subscribe to the majority’s conclusion that there has been “too little, too late.” Rather, these efforts of not just the Legislature but also the Act’s Administrator are, indeed, positive and affirmative measures. These joint efforts of the Legislative and Executive branches of our Government deserve due deference by this, our Judicial branch.
EAGEN, C. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 Malpractice statutes similar to Pennsylvania’s have been sustained against numerous constitutional attacks, including jury trial guarantees, in the following cases: Attorney General of Maryland v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Comiskey et al. v. Arlen et al., 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Everett v. Goldman, La., 359 So.2d 1256 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hospital, 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); State ex rel. Strykowski et al. v. Wilkie, 81 Wis.2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978); Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital et al., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979).