Court Opinion

ID: 9375034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 18:01:01.310251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:55.218196
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-2061     Document: 010110817515      Date Filed: 02/24/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       February 24, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                        No. 22-2061
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:21-CR-00280-JB-1)
  ROBERT ORTIZ,                                               (D.N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MORITZ, SEYMOUR, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Robert Ortiz challenges his 57-month sentence for carjacking on three

 grounds. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                     Background

       In November 2020, Ortiz—unemployed, unhoused, and suffering from drug

 addiction, posttraumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression—was inside a

 laundromat trying to obtain quarters from the washing machines. As he was doing so,

 Ortiz noticed a BMW parked outside. He approached the vehicle, opened the

 driver’s-side door, and demanded the keys from the passenger (who was the only

       *
         This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its
 persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 22-2061    Document: 010110817515        Date Filed: 02/24/2023      Page: 2

 person in the vehicle at that time). When the passenger resisted, Ortiz pulled out a

 BB gun, pointed it at him, and again demanded the keys.1 The passenger told Ortiz

 that he did not have the keys. Ortiz then returned to the laundromat, located the

 driver, and demanded the keys while pointing the BB gun at the driver’s chin. The

 driver gave Ortiz the keys and told the passenger to exit the vehicle. Ortiz then drove

 away in the BMW. Although neither victim was injured, both believed Ortiz intended

 to shoot them.

       Four days later, officers saw Ortiz run a red light while driving the BMW.

 Ortiz attempted to flee but was arrested after a short chase. The government indicted

 Ortiz for carjacking. He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement.

       Before sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a presentence

 investigation report (PSR). As relevant here, the PSR recommended adding four

 levels to Ortiz’s base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines

 (the Guidelines or U.S.S.G.) because he “otherwise us[ed]” a dangerous weapon

 during the offense. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D). The PSR set Ortiz’s total offense

 level at 23, which, when combined with a criminal history category of III, produced

 an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 57 to 71 months.

       Ortiz objected to the four-level enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous

 weapon under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), arguing that his conduct warranted only a three-

 level enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) for brandishing a dangerous weapon. He

       1
         Ortiz told officers that it was a BB gun, but the victims believed it was a real
 firearm; the actual weapon was never located.
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 accordingly advocated for a total offense level of 22 and a resulting Guidelines range

 of 51 to 63 months.

       Before the sentencing hearing, the district court issued an order overruling

 Ortiz’s objection. After surveying caselaw from the Tenth Circuit and virtually every

 other circuit, the district court explained that for the otherwise-used enhancement to

 apply, the threat posed to the victim must be specific rather than general. The district

 court then determined that Ortiz used the BB gun to create a specific threat by

 pointing the BB gun at the victims and demanding the keys to the BMW. Although

 the district court agreed with Ortiz that the cases affirming otherwise-used

 enhancements typically involved more egregious conduct, it rejected his argument

 that the Guidelines impose a “proportionality requirement” for sentencing. R. vol. 1,

 45. The district court therefore concluded that Ortiz’s conduct amounted to otherwise

 using the BB gun, meriting the four-level enhancement.

       At his sentencing hearing, Ortiz argued for a sentence of 41 months, below his

 Guidelines range. In support, he cited negative experiences in his upbringing, his

 extensive substance-abuse history, and his need for treatment and education. He also

 reiterated that his conduct was less egregious than that typically captured by the

 otherwise-using enhancement in § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), warranting a lower sentence. The

 district court ultimately imposed a sentence within, but at the bottom of, the

 Guidelines range—57 months in prison plus three years of supervised release—and

 later issued a written order memorializing and further explaining its sentencing

 decision.

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       Ortiz appeals, raising three issues.

                                        Analysis

 I.    Otherwise Using a Dangerous Weapon

       Ortiz first argues that the district court erred in applying the four-level

 enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) for “otherwise us[ing]” a dangerous weapon

 during the offense. In his view, he should have only received a three-level

 enhancement for “brandish[ing]” under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). “We review the factual

 findings underlying a district court’s sentencing determination for clear error and

 review the underlying legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Marrufo, 661 F.3d

 1204, 1206 (10th Cir. 2011) (italics omitted) (quoting United States v. Hooks, 551

 F.3d 1205, 1216 (10th Cir. 2009)).

       Section 2B3.1 incorporates the definitions for the terms otherwise used and

 brandished from U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1’s application notes. See § 2B3.1 cmt. n.1. Those

 application notes define otherwise used as “conduct [that] did not amount to the

 discharge of a [dangerous weapon] but was more than brandishing, displaying, or

 possessing a . . . dangerous weapon.” § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(J). And brandished “means

 that all or part of the weapon was displayed, or the presence of the weapon was

 otherwise made known to another person, in order to intimidate that person,

 regardless of whether the weapon was directly visible to that person.” § 1B1.1 cmt.

 n.1(C).

       We distinguish between otherwise using a dangerous weapon and brandishing

 a dangerous weapon by looking at specificity of the threat—we will affirm the

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 otherwise-used enhancement when the defendant pointed a weapon at a victim to

 create a specific rather than general threat of harm. See, e.g., United States v. Gilkey,

 118 F.3d 702, 705 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rucker, 178 F.3d 1369 (10th

 Cir. 1999).2 For instance, in Gilkey, the defendant robbed a diner and pointed his

 weapon directly at various victims while making various demands:

       [H]e (1) pointed [the weapon] at the victims, (2) used it to threaten
       them, (3) pointed it at one victim’s head while grabbing and lifting her
       neck and demanding money, and (4) grabbed another victim, forced him
       to an office area while pointing the gun at him, and demanded that he
       open the safe and provide money.

 118 F.3d at 705 (emphases added). We held that the defendant’s use of the gun to

 threaten the victims specifically and directly and to force them to move according to

 his instructions constituted conduct more culpable than brandishing, even though it

 was unclear whether physical contact between the gun and the victims occurred or

 whether the defendant verbalized a threat to kill. Id. In so doing, we explained that

 the “specific rather than general pointing of the gun” elevated the gun’s use from

 mere brandishing to otherwise using. Id. at 706; see also United States v. Roberts,

 898 F.2d 1465, 1469–70 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that defendant otherwise used

 knife by placing it against victim’s throat from behind while demanding money at

       2
         The parties agree that these cases remain good law even though the definition
 of brandished was amended in 2000. The amendment did not impact our specific-
 versus-general framework, which we used both before and after the amendment. Cf.
 United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 89 & n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that
 although some circuits previously used implicit-versus-explicit framework prior to
 amendment, majority of those have switched to specific-versus-general framework
 after amendment).
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 ATM). Two years later, we relied on Gilkey to similarly hold that a defendant had

 otherwise used a dangerous weapon when he “pointed a gun . . . at the [victims]

 while ordering them to comply with his demands.” Rucker, 178 F.3d at 1371

 (emphasis added).

        Other circuits likewise “distinguish[] between the general pointing or waving

 about of a weapon, which amounts to ‘brandishing,’ and the pointing of a weapon at

 a specific victim or group of victims to force them to comply with the robber’s

 demands.” United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 1999); see also id.

 (collecting cases, including Gilkey, from five circuits).3 In fact, “[v]irtually all of the

 circuits to address the question have held that where a dangerous weapon is pointed

 at a person and some further verbal threat or order accompanies the pointing of the

 weapon to facilitate commission of the underlying crime,” the otherwise-used

 enhancement should apply. United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir.

 1999) (collecting cases, including Gilkey, from seven circuits). And as in this circuit,

 the rationale underlying this “majority view suggests that the key consideration is

 whether a gun (or other weapon) was pointed at a specific person in an effort to

 create fear so as to facilitate compliance with a demand, and ultimately to facilitate

 the commission of the crime.” Id.

        Notwithstanding this consensus, Ortiz contends that pointing a weapon at a

        3
         Like our own pre-2000 caselaw, the cases cited in this paragraph remain
 good law after the 2000 amendment to the definition of brandish because they follow
 the specific-versus-general framework. See, e.g., Villar, 586 F.3d at 90.
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 victim, even coercively, constitutes only brandishing, not otherwise using. But

 Ortiz’s only authority for this point is a dissent from the Ninth Circuit. See United

 States v. Albritton, 622 F.3d 1104, 1108–12 (9th Cir. 2010) (Berzon, J., dissenting).

 And Ortiz acknowledges our precedent and the weight of authority from other

 circuits holding that pointing a weapon to convey a specific threat can constitute

 otherwise using that weapon. We therefore reject Ortiz’s argument that pointing a

 gun at a victim can never constitute otherwise using it.

       Shifting gears, Ortiz concedes that pointing a weapon may sometimes

 constitute otherwise using that weapon, but he stresses that a defendant must do more

 than merely point a dangerous weapon for pointing to cross the line from brandishing

 into otherwise using. And in Ortiz’s view, mere pointing is all he did here. But Ortiz

 did not merely point the BB gun. Instead, as the district court found and as the

 government emphasizes, he pointed the BB gun directly at the victims to force them

 to comply with his demands for the keys to the car. In particular, recall that when the

 passenger first resisted Ortiz’s demands for the car keys, Ortiz pulled out the BB gun,

 pointed it at him, and demanded the keys a second time. And after learning that the

 keys were not in the car, Ortiz then located the driver, pointed the BB gun at his chin,

 and demanded the keys from him. In so doing, Ortiz conveyed implicit but specific

 threats that he would shoot them if they did not cooperate with his orders. See United

 States v. Bolden, 479 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “by pointing a

 firearm at an individual and making a demand of that individual, a defendant

 communicates the implicit threat that if the individual does not comply with the

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 defendant’s demands, the defendant will shoot the individual”). This is precisely the

 type of conduct that shifts a defendant’s conduct from brandishing to otherwise

 using. See Gilkey, 118 F.3d at 705–06; Rucker, 178 F.3d at 1371; Roberts, 898 F.2d

 at 1470.4

       To be sure, unlike some defendants in these authorities, Ortiz did not (1) make

 physical contact with the victims, (2) force the victims to physically move anywhere,

 (3) place his finger on the trigger of the BB gun, (4) swing it at them in a threatening

 manner, or (5) say anything explicitly threatening. But the otherwise-used

 enhancement does not turn on any of these particular facts. The relevant inquiry is

 whether Ortiz pointed the BB gun at the victims to create a specific threat of harm.

 And that he did. The district court therefore properly enhanced his sentence by four

 levels under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).

 II.   Overall Reasonableness of Sentence

       Next, Ortiz challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. When reviewing a

 sentence, we “first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural

 error.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). And “[i]f the district court’s

       4
          Other circuits have reached similar conclusions on similar facts. See, e.g.,
 United States v. Orr, 312 F.3d 141, 144–45 (3d Cir. 2002) (pointing gun at victim
 while demanding money constituted otherwise using the weapon); Bolden, 479 F.3d
 at 461 (pointing gun at individual while making demand amounts to “more than
 merely displaying a firearm with an intent to intimidate (i.e., brandishing)”); United
 States v. Taylor, 135 F.3d 478, 482–83 (7th Cir. 1998) (poking gun into bank
 employee’s back while directing her to hand over money constituted otherwise using
 the weapon); Albritton, 622 F.3d at 1107 (pointing pistol at bank teller and ordering
 her to get down constituted otherwise using weapon).
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 decision is ‘procedurally sound,’ we ‘then consider the substantive reasonableness of

 the sentence imposed.’” United States v. Lucero, 747 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir.

 2014) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).

        A.     Procedural Reasonableness

        Ortiz contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable. We would

 typically review such an argument for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ortiz-

 Lazaro, 884 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2018). But as Ortiz acknowledges, because

 he did not raise any procedural challenge below, he must satisfy our plain-error

 standard on appeal. Id. We will reverse based on plain error only if “(1) an error

 occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affected . . . substantial rights; and

 (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of a

 judicial proceeding.” United States v. Farley, 36 F.4th 1245, 1250 (omission in

 original) (quoting United States v. Wolfname, 835 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2016)).

        Ortiz specifically argues that the district court failed to adequately explain its

 decision to deny his request for a variance. A district court must “state in open court

 the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). But

 when a district court stays within the Guidelines, it “must provide only a general

 statement of its reasons” to satisfy § 3553(c). United States v. Lente, 647 F.3d 1021,

 1034–35 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d

 894, 903 (10th Cir. 2008)). This means that even though the district court must

 consider the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) when determining an appropriate

 sentence, the district court “need not explicitly refer to either the § 3553(a) factors or

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  respond to every argument for leniency that it rejects in arriving at a reasonable

  sentence.” Id. (quoting Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d at 903). Further, “the district

  court may satisfy its obligation to explain its reasons for rejecting the defendant’s

  arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence by” considering the defendant’s

  arguments and indicating in some way that it “‘did not rest on the [G]uidelines

  alone’” but instead “‘considered whether the [G]uideline[s] sentence actually

  conforms, in the circumstances,” to the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Wireman,

  849 F.3d 956, 958–59 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Martinez-Barragan, 545 F.3d at

  903). “Such a ‘functional rejection’ of a defendant’s arguments—as opposed to an

  explicit rejection—is entirely proper.” Id. at 959 (quoting Martinez-Barragan, 545

  F.3d at 903).

        Here, the district court’s oral pronouncement explained the basis for the

  sentence it imposed. To begin, the district court expressly discussed the § 3553(a)

  sentencing factors. It considered the nature and circumstances of the offense,

  observing that Ortiz was “a large guy” who pointed what appeared to be a real gun at

  the victims during the offense. App. vol. 3, 30; see also § 3553(a)(1). The district

  court also discussed Ortiz’s history and characteristics, including his difficult

  childhood, his substance-abuse problems, and his criminal history. See § 3553(a)(1).

  Additionally, the district court acknowledged that the sentence should “promote

  respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence both at [a]

  specific and general level,” noting Ortiz’s youth and the risk of recidivism given his

  criminal history. R. vol. 3, 30; see also § 3553(a)(2)(A). And in the district court’s

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  view, a Guidelines sentence would avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among

  defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. See

  § 3553(a)(6).

         Moreover, the district court considered Ortiz’s arguments for a below-

  Guidelines sentence. It acknowledged his “tough childhood” and agreed with him

  that he needed substance-abuse treatment. R. vol. 3, 29. The district court also noted

  that even though the otherwise-used enhancement applied, Ortiz’s “conduct [wa]s not

  as egregious as some of the others that pick up” such enhancement. Id.

         Nevertheless, Ortiz complains that the district court’s “discussion does little to

  explain its decision not to grant a variance.” Aplt. Br. 24. Yet the district court made

  clear that it had entertained Ortiz’s arguments for a lower sentence, but after

  considering the § 3553(a) factors, it concluded that the mitigating factors were “not

  strong enough to take [the sentence] out of the [G]uideline[s] range.” App. vol. 3, 30.

  This satisfies the district court’s obligation to explain the reasons for rejecting Ortiz’s

  arguments for a downward variance.

         Ortiz also faults the district court for stating at the sentencing hearing that it

  had identified approximately 12 factors that applied “downward pressure” and 21

  factors that put “upward pressure” on the sentence but waiting until its written

  sentencing opinion to list those factors. Aplt. Br. 23 (quoting App. vol. 3, 29). Yet

  the district court is not required to specifically recite every factor it considers in

  arriving at the chosen sentence; again, it only needs to provide a general statement of

  its reasons. See Lente, 647 F.3d at 1034. Ortiz attempts get around this well-

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  established rule by arguing that excluding this list from the oral pronouncement

  denied him the opportunity to object and be present at sentencing, but this argument

  is unavailing. To be sure, when oral and written orders conflict, “[t]he oral

  pronouncement controls because a ‘defendant has the right to be present at

  sentencing.’” United States v. Benvie, 18 F.4th 665, 671 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting

  United States v. Barwig, 568 F.3d 852, 857–58 (10th Cir. 2009)). But Ortiz identifies

  no clash between the oral pronouncement and the written order. Indeed, as the

  government observes, all 21 upward-pressure factors can be found in the district

  court’s oral pronouncement. So can the 12 downward-pressure factors, even though

  the written order included more specific details about Ortiz’s treatment and

  educational needs and his substance-abuse history. In other words, the district court’s

  written order merely memorialized and provided a more detailed explanation of its

  oral pronouncement. We therefore reject Ortiz’s argument that the district court

  failed to give adequate reasons for its sentence by failing to expressly list and number

  the 12 and 21 factors it had identified.5

         Because the district court provided a general statement of its reasons and

  sentenced Ortiz at the bottom of his Guidelines range, Ortiz has failed to establish

  any error, much less a plain error that affects his substantial rights or the integrity of

  judicial proceedings. See Farley, 36 F.4th at 1250.

         5
           Ortiz further argues that even if the written order properly elaborated the oral
  pronouncement, “it still does not justify the decision.” Aplt. Br. 25. But because the
  district court’s oral pronouncement adequately explained the basis for the chosen
  sentence, we need not address that argument.
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        B.     Substantive Reasonableness

        Ortiz also argues that his 57-month sentence is substantively unreasonable.

  Substantive reasonableness asks “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable

  given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in [§ 3553(a)].”

  United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting

  United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2007)).

        We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a sentence for

  substantive reasonableness, “a standard requiring ‘substantial deference to district

  courts.’” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting

  United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008)). A district court abuses

  its discretion only if it imposes a sentence that is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or

  manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Sample, 901 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir.

  2018) (quoting United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir. 2009)). Put

  differently, a sentencing decision is substantively unreasonable if it “‘exceed[s] the

  bounds of permissible choice,’ given the facts and the applicable law.” United States

  v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Ortiz,

  804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986)). And because Ortiz’s sentence falls within

  his Guidelines range, we presume his sentence is substantively reasonable. See

  Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d at 1215.

        Ortiz “may rebut this presumption by showing that his sentence is

  unreasonable in light of” the § 3553(a) factors. Id. Attempting to do so, Ortiz first

  argues that the district court erred by considering the seriousness of the offense, its

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  nature and circumstances, and his criminal history when analyzing the § 3553(a)

  factors because these factors were already accounted for by his Guidelines range.

  This is essentially an allegation of impermissible double-counting, but it lacks merit.

  As the government highlights, district courts must “begin all sentencing proceedings

  by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range” and then “consider all of

  the § 3553(a) factors.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (emphasis added). District courts are not

  required to ignore § 3553(a) factors that have some overlap with the Guidelines. On

  the contrary, “the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the

  Commission as carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail,

  the other at wholesale.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348 (2007). Thus, as we

  recently explained in rejecting a challenge to a district court’s decision to impose an

  upward variance, “district courts have broad discretion to consider particular facts in

  fashioning a sentence under [§ 3553(a)], even when those facts are already accounted

  for in the advisory guidelines range.” United States v. Gross, 44 F.4th 1298, 1304

  (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2018)).

        Here, the district court properly calculated Ortiz’s Guidelines range and then

  considered the § 3553(a) factors in determining that a low-end Guidelines sentence

  was appropriate. That some of the factors relevant to determining the Guidelines

  range also played a role in the district court’s overall § 3553(a) analysis does not

  create an abuse of discretion. And as the government observes, Ortiz identifies

  nothing unreasonable about the district court’s finding that the seriousness and

  circumstances of his offense and his criminal history weighed in favor of a

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  Guidelines sentence.

           Ortiz also contends the district court ignored the unwarranted sentencing

  disparity created by imposing a sentence within the Guidelines, taking issue with the

  district court’s refusal to vary downward despite acknowledging that Ortiz’s conduct

  was “not as egregious” as that of other defendants who receive the otherwise-using

  enhancement. Aplt. Br. 29 (quoting R. vol. 3, 29). According to Ortiz, the district

  court effectively failed to consider his disparity argument because, as he sees it, the

  district court gave this factor no weight. But as the government highlights, the district

  court did consider—and agree—that Ortiz’s conduct was less egregious than that of

  some defendants who received an otherwise-used enhancement. Nevertheless, after

  considering the § 3553(a) factors, the district court determined that a Guidelines

  sentence was appropriate.

           When, as here, “the balance struck by the district court among the factors set

  out in § 3553(a) is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly unreasonable, we must

  defer to that decision even if we would not have struck the same balance in the first

  instance.” Sells, 541 F.3d at 1239. We therefore see no abuse of discretion in the

  district court’s decision to impose a sentence at the bottom of Ortiz’s Guidelines

  range.

                                         Conclusion

           Because Ortiz pointed a BB gun directly at two victims to force them to

  comply with his demands for the car keys, the district court did not err in applying

  the four-level enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) for otherwise using a dangerous

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  weapon. It also adequately explained its reasons for imposing the 57-month sentence,

  and Ortiz fails to rebut the presumption that his Guidelines sentence is substantively

  reasonable. We accordingly affirm.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Nancy L. Moritz
                                             Circuit Judge

                                            16