Court Opinion

ID: 9940551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 19:00:38.15353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:00.065151
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30242   Document: 00517063845     Page: 1   Date Filed: 02/14/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                           ____________                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                            No. 22-30242                           FILED
                           ____________                     February 14, 2024
                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                       Clerk

                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                versus

   Marty Johnson,

                                                 Defendant—Appellant,

                        consolidated with

                          _____________

                            No. 22-30249

                          _____________

   United States of America,

                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                versus

   Keesha Dinkins,

                                                 Defendant—Appellant.
Case: 22-30242     Document: 00517063845          Page: 2    Date Filed: 02/14/2024

                  ______________________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Louisiana
                           USDC Nos. 5:19-CR-259-1,
                                 5:19-CR-259-2
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
          Defendant Marty Johnson, the owner of a mental health rehabilitation
   clinic, and Defendant Keesha Dinkins, an employee of the clinic, fraudulently
   billed Medicaid for illegitimate services from sometime in 2014 to January
   2018. On the day their jury trial was scheduled to begin, Johnson pled guilty
   to conspiracy to commit healthcare and wire fraud, and Dinkins pled guilty
   to misprision of a felony. In each of their plea agreements, Defendants stipu-
   lated to a loss of $3.5 million and recommended that the judge order $3.5
   million in restitution to the Government.
          The district court, accepting the Defendants’ recommendations and
   the factual basis in the Presentence Investigation Report, ordered each to pay
   $3.5 million in restitution. After receiving the benefit of their plea bargain,
   both Defendants now argue the $3.5 million order was erroneous, with
   Dinkins additionally contending that under the sentencing guidelines, the en-
   tire loss should not have been attributed to her. We hold Defendants to the
   plea bargain they made and AFFIRM.
                                         I.
                                         A.
          Johnson owned and operated Positive Change Counseling Agency,
   L.L.C., a mental health rehabilitation clinic in Shreveport, Louisiana.
   Dinkins was a manager and supervisor at Positive Change. From sometime
   in 2014 to January 2018, Johnson and Dinkins submitted Medicaid claims for

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                                      c/w No. 22-30249

   services that were not rendered or performed and created false client files to
   conceal their efforts. Johnson knowingly caused Positive Change to use
   Medicaid recipients’ names and identifying information without their
   knowledge or consent, directed witnesses to give false statements to law
   enforcement, and provided them with false dates, times, and services.
           On August 28, 2019, Johnson and Dinkins were charged in a 53-count
   indictment, which included one count of criminal conspiracy, 47 counts of
   healthcare fraud, four counts of wire fraud, and one count charging Johnson
   with taking illegal kickbacks. On the day their jury trial was scheduled to
   begin, both parties pled guilty to bills of information with the agreement that
   the indictment would be dismissed: Johnson to criminal conspiracy to
   commit healthcare fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1357, and wire
   fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and Dinkins to misprision of a felony
   in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4. All parties—Johnson, Dinkins, and the
   Government—recommended that the district court order $3.5 million in
   restitution.
           The district court accepted Johnson’s and Dinkins’s guilty pleas and,
   on the Government’s motion, dismissed their indictment. 1 During the
   colloquy, both defendants answered affirmatively when asked whether they
   agreed to recommend $3.5 million in restitution:
           THE COURT: Mr. Johnson . . . . You’ve agreed to a certain
           amount of restitution. You’re agreeing that they should
           recommend—that the recommended restitution be three and a
           half million dollars. . . . And that’s what you understood, Mr.
           Johnson?
           DEFENDANT JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor.
           _____________________
           1
             The district court confirmed that the plea agreements before the court were the
   final versions and that “[a]ll previous negotiations were refused.”

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          ...
          THE COURT: And, Ms. Dinkins . . . . you understand you do
          your best on restitution, also in the amount of three and a half
          million. Is that pretty much it—
          DEFENDANT DINKINS: Yes, Your Honor.
          In sum, Johnson and Dinkins each agreed to pay $3.5 million in
   restitution, and the Government agreed to dismiss their remaining charges.
   Specifically, both agreements contained two relevant provisions: (1) “The
   government and [Defendant] recommend that [Defendant] be assessed loss
   of $3,500,000.00 under the United States Sentencing Guidelines,” and (2)
   “The government and [Defendant] recommend that [Defendant] be
   assessed restitution of $3,500,000.00 to be made payable immediately to the
   victim, the United States Government.” The agreements also acknowledged
   that the agreed restitution did not bind the district court and that the court
   would determine the amount of restitution owed after its own evaluation of
   the evidence. 2 Neither plea agreement specified whether the recommended
   restitution and loss assessment were to be issued pursuant to the Mandatory

          _____________________
          2
              The agreements stated:
          In addition to the penalties set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the Court
          shall order restitution in this case, and the defendant agrees that
          notwithstanding any recommendations by the parties in this plea
          agreement, restitution in this case may not be limited to the amounts or
          victims referred to in the specific charge(s) to which the defendant has
          pled guilty and will be determined by the Court after a complete review of
          the evidence developed in the investigation of this case by the government
          and further investigation by the United States Probation Office as
          contained in the presentence report;
          ...
          The government and [Defendant] acknowledge that the loss and
          restitution recommendations from the parties are not binding on the Court
          and that loss and restitution shall be determined by the Court.

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                                   c/w No. 22-30249

   Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, or the Victim and
   Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a).
                                          B.
          The Presentence Investigation Reports for both Johnson and Dinkins
   were prepared after the district court accepted their plea agreements and
   explained:
          Investigative material provided by the Government revealed
          that from 2015 to 2017, Positive Change billed Medicaid
          $176,462.43 for transportation services for which Medicaid
          paid $165,803.68. From 2014 to 2018, Positive Change billed
          Medicaid $11,892,091.48 for Mental Health Rehabilitation
          Services for which Medicaid paid $7,981,266.09. Medicaid
          paid a total of $8,147,069.77. After interviews with both clients
          and employees of Positive Change, as well as an extrapolation of the
          afore-mentioned figures, the agent with the Office of Inspector
          General (OIG) determined the actual loss amount for guideline
          purposes to be $3,500,000.
          After receiving the PSRs and before the sentencing hearing, both
   Defendants submitted objections to the restitution calculation on separate
   grounds. Dinkins objected to allocating the entire $3.5 million loss to her.
   She argued that she was unaware of the purpose of creating fraudulent files,
   so “any loss attributed directly to Dinkins would be far less than the $3.5
   million total loss amount calculated by the OIG.” She “acknowledge[d] that
   in Section E. of her plea agreement she recommends that the loss attributable
   to Positive Change’s activities was $3.5 million for sentencing guidelines and
   restitution purposes,” but she noted that “the plea agreement makes it clear
   that the recommendation is not binding on the Court, and it can make its own
   determination of the amount of loss.” Notably, Dinkins did not object to the

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   $3.5 million calculation itself, 3 and neither defendant disputes that
   restitution is applicable and warranted. By contrast, Johnson filed objections
   to the PSR and a supplemental pre-sentencing memorandum challenging the
   loss and restitution calculation. In response, the Government provided more
   details about the $3.5 million figure in its Sentencing Memorandum:
           Because of the pervasive fraudulent billing practices of PCCA
           [Positive Change] which yielded volumes of documentation
           and data, investigators assessed the loss by extrapolating
           representative samples of fraudulent documents during the
           time period between 2014 and 2018. From the extrapolation,
           investigators estimated loss to Medicaid. Because some
           services were in fact provided, investigators took a
           conservative approach to assessing loss. This is a common
           approach that Medicaid officials use to assess loss when it is
           not feasible to examine every bill submitted because of the
           substantial volume of documentation and data. Furthermore,
           the $3,500,000 loss figure is consistent with the interviews
           with former clients and employees and documents seized at
           PCCA during the execution of the federal search warrant.
                                               C.
           At the sentencing hearing held on April 19, 2022, the Government
   entered into evidence an itemized spreadsheet to support its restitution

           _____________________
           3
             In fact, during the sentencing hearing, Dinkins’s counsel specifically denied
   challenging the factual basis and the restitution calculation and narrowed his objection to
   the court’s attribution of the entire $3.5 million loss to Dinkins:
           THE COURT: She’s . . . not trying to tell me that the factual basis . . . is
           in error.
           MR. McMICHAEL: I’m not trying to tell you that.
           ...
           MR. McMICHAEL: My argument was directed at the use of the entire
           amount that the government claims was lost against her sentencing
           guidelines.

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                                       c/w No. 22-30249

   calculation. This spreadsheet, and its seeming inconsistencies, is the main
   basis for the Defendants’ argument that the restitution calculation was
   erroneous. The spreadsheet appears to list fraudulently billed services and
   corresponding payments that Positive Change received from Medicaid from
   2015 to 2017, totaling $710,120.18. In addition, the spreadsheet notes that
   Medicaid paid a total of $725,250.73 for unreasonable services between 2015
   and 2017. The Government then (1) calculated the sum of the discrepant
   figures ($1,435,370.41) and represented to the court that the sum reflected
   fraud perpetuated between “2015-2017,” and (2) multiplied the sum by
   three years to reach a total of $4,306,111.23 in fraudulent payments. 4
           The district court first addressed Johnson’s objection regarding the
   method to calculate restitution and said that “the government’s correct that
   I need to make a reasonable estimate of the loss.” Then, the district court
   “adopt[ed] the factual findings of the probation office contained in
   [Johnson’s] presentence report and its addendum.” The district judge issued
   a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment and ordered Johnson to pay $3.5
   million in restitution, jointly and severally with Dinkins. The court declined
   to order that Johnson pay a fine “based on the amount of restitution.”
           Next, the district court overruled Dinkins’s objection that the entire
   agreed-upon loss of $3.5 million should not be attributed to her, stating:
   “She’s not trying to withdraw her guilty plea, she’s not trying to tell me that
   she didn’t really do what she pled guilty to, and she’s not trying to tell me
   that the factual basis . . . is in error.” The district court further rejected
   Dinkins’s argument that joint and several liability was inappropriate given
   her claim that she played only a limited role in the fraud. Finally, Dinkins
           _____________________
           4
            The offense level calculation is notable. Pursuant to § 2B1.1, if the loss was more
   than $1.5 million but no more than $3.5 million, the defendant receives 16 points.
   U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Here, Johnson and Dinkins received 16 points.

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   argued that she “only signed the factual basis because it was written that [the
   district judge] would decide the amount of loss” and that she “would never
   have agreed to $3.5 million if it would send [her] to jail” because she did not
   own Positive Change and claims that she did not receive money from the
   company beyond her salary. The district court rejected these arguments,
   finding that “[her role] was not a limited role,” and sentenced Dinkins to 24
   months’ imprisonment along with $3.5 million in restitution. 5 The judge
   declined to order a fine due to her “financial condition.” The court did not
   specify the statutory basis for either of its restitution orders.
                                                 D.
          After sentencing, both defendants filed timely notices of appeal. They
   also filed nearly identical motions with the district court to stay the
   restitution order pending appeal. Defendants argued that there was a
   “substantial question of law . . . namely, whether the Government
   established the restitution amount . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.”
   The district court denied both motions to stay the restitution orders after
   finding that “neither Defendant has made a showing of likelihood of success
   on the merits. There is little chance that either Defendant can prevail on any
   claim against the restitution order given that each Defendant expressly
   agreed in the plea agreement to the precise amount of restitution.”
                                                 II.
          This Court reviews the legality of a restitution order de novo and
   factual findings, including the amount of loss incurred, for clear error. 6
   “[P]reserved error as to the quantum of a restitution award” is reviewed for

          _____________________
          5
              As a result of her plea, Dinkins faced a three-year statutory maximum.
          6
              United States v. Read, 710 F.3d 219, 231 (5th Cir. 2012).

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   an abuse of discretion. 7 An abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s “ruling
   is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of
   the evidence.” 8
           Unpreserved objections are reviewed for plain error, which occurs
   when there was error, that was plain, and that “affected the defendant’s
   substantial rights.” 9 Then, the court “will exercise [its] discretion to correct
   the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
   judicial proceedings.” 10
                                                  III.
           First, Johnson and Dinkins argue the district court erred in ordering
   $3.5 million in restitution. Their arguments are unpersuasive. 11
                                                   A.
           Although the district judge did not specify the statutory basis for its
   restitution order, the MVRA applies by its terms, as well as by the terms of
   the VWPA. The MVRA uses the mandatory language “shall” when
   directing district courts to order restitution for specified offenses:
   “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant

           _____________________
           7
               United States v. De Leon, 728 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
           8
                United States v. Crawley, 533 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
           9
                United States v. Lozano, 791 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
           10
                Id.
           11
              Johnson objected to the restitution calculation in the district court, but Dinkins
   did not. Therefore, this Court should review Johnson’s claim regarding the loss calculation
   for clear error, and the restitution amount imposed for an abuse of discretion. It should
   review Dinkins’s claims regarding the loss and restitution calculation for plain error.

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   convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order . . .
   that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.” 12
           The specified offenses are listed in in subsection “c” of the MVRA,
   which states in relevant part: “This section shall apply in all sentencing
   proceedings for conviction of, or plea agreements relating to charges for, any
   offense—(A) that is . . . an offense against property under this title . . .
   including any offense committed by fraud or deceit.” 13 Johnson pled guilty to
   conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347, which is an
   offense clearly covered by subsection “c” of the MVRA.
           Subsection “c” also states that “in the case of a plea agreement that
   does not result in a conviction for an offense described in paragraph (1), this
   section shall apply only if the plea specifically states that an offense listed
   under such paragraph gave rise to the plea agreement.” 14 Dinkins pled guilty
   to misprision of a felony, with 18 U.S.C. § 1347 as the underlying felony.
   Furthermore, the VWPA’s own language confirms that the MVRA applies,
   as the VWPA excludes its application from any “offense described in section
   3663A(c).” 15

           _____________________
           12
                18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1).
           13
                18 U.S.C. § 3663A(C)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
           14
                18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(2).
           15
             18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A); see also United States v. Malone, 747 F.3d 481, 487 (7th
   Cir. 2014) (stating “that any order of restitution was governed by the mandatory restitution
   provisions of the MVRA rather than the VWPA” in a bank fraud case).

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                                          c/w No. 22-30249

                                                  B.
           Under the MVRA, any restitution amount imposed must not exceed
   the victim’s “actual loss.” 16 Specifically, the government must prove the
   amount of loss resulting from the defendant’s conduct by a preponderance
   of the evidence. 17 In healthcare fraud cases, the defendant may have the
   actual loss amount offset by the actual value of bona fide services provided. 18
   Under the MVRA, the defendant has the burden to show the amount of
   legitimate services provided to offset against the actual loss. 19 Moreover, plea
   bargains must also comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which
   imposes an additional requirement that the district court “determine that
   there is a factual basis for the plea.” 20
           The district judge did not err under the MVRA in ordering $3.5
   million in restitution. First, the $3.5 million amount does not exceed the
   Government’s actual loss from the scheme and is based on adequate
   evidence. The district court relied on estimations drawn from the record, the
   PSRs (which considered interviews from clients and employees of Positive
   Change), and both Defendants’ factual stipulations and plea agreements,
   which were accepted in open court with adequate counsel. Both Johnson and
   Dinkins unequivocally agreed that the actual loss was $3.5 million and to
   recommend $3.5 million in restitution. Neither challenged the calculation or
   the loss amount before the court accepted their pleas. Indeed, the $3.5 million
           _____________________
           16
              18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B); United States v. Kim, 988 F.3d 803, 811 (5th Cir.
   2021) (“The MVRA is meant to reimburse the victim’s actual loss and should not be used
   to penalize defendants.”).
           17
                Kim, 988 F.3d at 811 (citations omitted).
           18
                United States v. Ricard, 922 F.3d 639, 658 (5th Cir. 2019).
           19
                18 U.S.C. § 3664(e); Ricard, 933 F.3d at 659.
           20
                Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).

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   sum is less than half of the total amount Medicaid paid to Positive Change
   (approximately $8.1 million), and neither Defendant offered rebuttal
   evidence to offset the loss amount, as required in healthcare fraud cases
   under the MVRA. Defendants’ complaints about the spreadsheet also have
   no sway: any difference between it and the OIG’s $3.5 million amount may
   be explained by the fact that the OIG reached $3.5 million after considering
   evidence, including interviews with clinic employees and clients, for which the
   spreadsheet did not appear to account. That is, the spreadsheet represents only
   one of many pieces of evidence in this case; it is not determinative. 21 There
   was sufficient evidence for the district judge to find that the actual loss from
   the scheme was $3.5 million.
           Second, it makes no difference that the pleas acknowledged the
   district court’s power to decide the amount of restitution after reviewing the
   evidence—it ultimately did so. And, again, the district court did not exceed
   the amount to which Defendants admitted under oath and in their plea
   agreements—it matched the amount—exactly.
           In sum, the district court was well within its power to impose $3.5
   million in restitution. The amount fell below the estimated amount in the
   Government’s proffered spreadsheet (which is inherently an estimate);
   matched the Defendants’ factual stipulations, plea agreements, and in-court
   admissions; matched the amount recommended in the PSRs; and totaled less
   than half of the payments Medicaid sent to Positive Change over the relevant
   time period—approximately $8.1 million. Moreover, that Defendants agreed

           _____________________
           21
              As Defendants note, the district judge stated that he needed to make a
   “reasonable estimate of the loss,” while the MVRA requires that the amount of restitution
   not exceed the victim’s “actual loss.” Ultimately, the district judge adopted the factual
   findings of the PSR, which stated unequivocally that the “actual loss amount” was $3.5
   million.

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   to recommend $3.5 million on the day of their scheduled trial, after all
   preparation and document review had presumably occurred, lends additional
   credibility to their admissions.
           The criminal justice system in this country relies on plea agreements
   to provide efficient resolutions to criminal cases. Indeed, over 95 percent of
   federal criminal cases are resolved without trial. 22 It would undermine the
   principle that plea bargains are contracts to hold that a party can agree to a
   specific amount of restitution, supported by record evidence, and then in the
   next breath, challenge an order imposing that exact amount of restitution. 23
                                               IV.
           Second, we reject Dinkins’s argument that the district court erred by
   using $3.5 million in restitution to calculate her sentencing range under
   U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Relevant here, Section 2B1.1 requires the district court to
   impose a 16-level increase if the offense involved between $1.5 and $3.5
   million in losses. 24 When calculating the loss, the district court may hold the

           _____________________
           22
             Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market:
   From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 1117,
   1118–19, 1119 n.2 (2011) (citations omitted).
           23
              See generally Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 16 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
   (“This Court has yet to address in any comprehensive way the rules of construction
   appropriate for disputes involving plea agreements. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the
   law of commercial contract may in some cases prove useful as an analogy or point of
   departure in construing a plea agreement, or in framing the terms of the debate.”); United
   States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A plea agreement is, in essence, a
   contract between the Government and a criminal defendant.”); Colin Miller, Plea
   Agreements as Constitutional Contracts, 97 N.C. L. REV. 31 (2018) (developing rules of
   construction grounded in contract law for plea agreements).
           24
                U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I).

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   defendant responsible for any “pecuniary harm” that the defendant knew or
   “reasonably should have known, was a potential result of the offense.” 25
          Dinkins argues that the entire loss resulting from Positive Change’s
   healthcare fraud should not be attributed to her because she had a “limited
   role in the offense.” She claims that because “[s]he was not aware of or
   involved in supervising clinical activities, did not prepare or send bills to
   MCOs and did not receive any of the fraudulently obtained funds or profits
   from Positive Change,” it is “unfair to attribute the entire loss amount to her
   for restitution purposes.” She also claims that in her plea agreement, she
   agreed only that “the loss attributable to Positive Change’s [as opposed to
   her own] activities was $3.5 [m]illion for sentencing guideline and restitution
   purposes.”
          These arguments are contradicted by the record. Apart from
   Dinkins’s assertions that she played only a limited role in the fraud, which
   the district court did not find credible, there is no evidentiary basis by which
   to hold that Dinkins was not responsible for the entire $3.5 million loss. First,
   contrary to her attempts to restate the plea agreement, it expressly states that
   Dinkins—not Positive Change—was responsible for the $3.5 million loss. 26
   Dinkins cannot direct the Court to a provision in the plea agreement

          _____________________
          25
               U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A)(iv).
          26
               The plea agreement stated:
          1. The government and KEESHA DINKINS recommend that KEESHA
          DINKINS be assessed a loss of $3,500,000.00 under the United States
          Sentencing Guidelines.
          2. The government and KEESHA DINKINS recommend that KEESHA
          DINKINS be assessed restitution of $3,500,000.00 to be made payable
          immediately to the victim, the United States Government.

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   indicating that the $3.5 million amount would be assessed only to Positive
   Change, not to her. That is because such a provision does not exist.
          Similarly, Dinkins’s unequivocal statements and admissions at the
   plea colloquy reflect her understanding that she would be held responsible for
   the $3.5 million loss:
          THE COURT: And, Ms. Dinkins . . . you understand you do
          your best on restitution, also in the amount of three and a half
          million. Is that pretty much it—
          DEFENDANT DINKINS: Yes, Your Honor.
          Finally, there was sufficient record evidence on which the district
   court could rely when attributing the $3.5 million loss amount to Dinkins.
   During the plea hearing, she affirmed her stipulated factual basis under oath
   and admitted that she knew Johnson was submitting false claims to Medicaid
   for services never rendered. She also admitted that she supervised the “cut
   and paste” sessions when she and the staff created fake patient files.
          The district court did not err in taking Dinkins’s admissions in the
   plea agreement and at the plea colloquy as evidence that Dinkins caused, or
   reasonably knew that her actions could cause, a loss totaling $3.5 million.
   While Dinkins raised this objection at sentencing, nowhere in the plea
   agreement or in the plea colloquy did Dinkins express her understanding that
   the $3.5 million would be assessed to Positive Change, not to her. Any such
   claimed “understanding” is directly contradicted by Dinkins’s stipulations
   and in-court admissions. In sum, the district court did not err in attributing
   the entire $3.5 million loss to Dinkins for sentencing guideline purposes.
                                        V.
          Represented by competent counsel, Johnson and Dinkins took plea
   bargains to minimize losses from their multi-year, multimillion-dollar
   fraudulent scheme. Now they wish to keep part of the bargains and challenge

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   the amount of restitution—despite their express agreement to the precise
   amount imposed—by attempting to fault the Government for not making a
   more robust presentation of that agreed-upon amount. This will not do.
          The district court’s restitution order is valid under the MVRA. There
   was an adequate factual basis to support the pleas, the restitution amount did
   not exceed the actual loss, and the district court appropriately used the total
   loss amount when calculating Dinkins’s sentence. Johnson and Dinkins
   received the benefit of their agreements when the Government dismissed
   their 50-plus count indictment; they must now make good on their end of the
   bargains. We AFFIRM.

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Case: 22-30242        Document: 00517063845                Page: 17       Date Filed: 02/14/2024

                                          No. 22-30242
                                        c/w No. 22-30249

   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge, concurring:
           I concur in the majority opinion because Johnson and Dinkins failed
   to press their claim by providing evidence against the PSR’s findings. 27 I
   write separately to highlight some concerns with the restitution calculation.
           The MVRA is unambiguous in its requirements and consistently uses
   the mandatory language “shall.” “Notwithstanding any other provision of
   law,” when sentencing a defendant convicted under the MVRA, “the court
   shall order . . . restitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (emphasis added).
   “The order of restitution shall require that such defendant . . . pay an amount
   equal to” the value of the loss caused less the value of any returned property.
   Id. at § 3663A(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). “This section shall apply in all
   sentencing proceedings for convictions of, or plea agreements relating to” of-
   fenses under this section. Id. at § 3663A(c)(1) (emphasis added).
           Thus, district court judges, in cases of fraud where the MVRA applies,
   are required to calculate the loss caused by the fraudulent scheme and order
   restitution in that amount, regardless of whether the defendant went to trial
   or entered a plea agreement. Our caselaw is likewise consistent in its inter-
   pretation of the MVRA. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 988 F.3d 80, 811 (5th
   Cir. 2021) (“The MVRA is meant to reimburse the victim’s actual loss and
   should not be used to penalize defendants.” (citations omitted)).
           The district court relied on two pieces of evidence provided by the
   government in determining an actual loss amount of $3,500,000. First, the
   PSR found an actual loss of $3,500,000 based on an investigation by the Of-
   fice of Inspector General.

           _____________________
           27
              I agree with the majority opinion that the district court did not err in attributing
   the entire $3,500,000 loss to Dinkins and I do not address that issue here.

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                                     No. 22-30242
                                   c/w No. 22-30249

          Second, after the conclusion of sentencing, the government submitted an
   itemized spreadsheet demonstrating losses above $3,500,000. The spread-
   sheet was not seen by defense counsel until an hour before the sentencing
   hearing and not entered into evidence until after the sentencing hearing. This
   means Johnson and Dinkins were sentenced to the $3,500,000 restitution or-
   der without all the evidence in the record and without an opportunity to re-
   spond to the new evidence submitted into the record after sentencing.
          Further, that spreadsheet contains a two-year figure of $1,435,370.41.
   That number was multiplied by three to reach a total of $4,306,111.23. This
   suggests that the fraudulent scheme lasted a total of six years (two years mul-
   tiplied by three). However, the PSR states that the scheme only lasted four
   years. That would suggest that the two-year figure should only have been
   multiplied by two. This results in a loss of $2,870,740.82, less than the
   $3,500,000 restitution order.
          When calculating restitution under the MVRA, we generally apply a
   burden shifting framework. The government bears the burden of demon-
   strating “the amount of the loss sustained by a victim.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).
   The defendant then “has a burden to show entitlement to an offset against
   the amount of actual loss.” United States v. Ricard, 922 F.3d 639, 659 (5th
   Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Mathew, 916 F.3d 510, 521 (5th Cir. 2019)).
          We have consistently held that where there is insufficient record
   evidence to support a restitution order as reflecting the actual loss of the
   victim, that order is unlawful and must be vacated and remanded to the
   district court. See United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 117, 121 (5th Cir.
   2006) (vacating and remanding a restitution order because “the MVRA does
   not permit awards ‘in excess of the amount of the [victim’s] loss’” (citation
   omitted) (alteration in original)); United States v. Sharma, 703 F.3d 318, 327
   (5th Cir. 2012) (vacating the restitution order and remanding to the district

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                                    No. 22-30242
                                  c/w No. 22-30249

   court for specific findings in the record of the actual loss); United States v.
   Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 899, 901 (5th Cir. 2008) (declining to adopt harmless
   error analysis, and vacating and remanding the restitution award because less
   than 1% of the total was unsupported by record evidence); United States v. De
   Leon, 728 F.3d 500, 508–09 (5th Cir. 2013) (vacating and remanding the
   restitution order because the district court plainly erred by relying on an
   overinclusive PSR figure); United States v. Majors, No. 2040405, 2022 WL
   301545 at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 1, 2022) (unpublished) (vacating and remanding
   for a recalculation of the restitution order because the PSR lacked an
   “‘adequate evidentiary basis’” (quoting United States v. Cantu-Ramirez, 669
   F.3d 619, 629 (5th Cir. 2012)).
          Johnson and Dinkins could have attempted to satisfy their burden by
   demonstrating that: (1) “proffer[ing] evidence that the services that [Positive
   Change] rendered to patients were legitimate;” and (2) “that [Medicaid]
   would have paid for those services but for his fraud.” United States v.
   Mahmood, 820 F.3d 177, 194 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Johnson and
   Dinkins, however, did not submit any evidence either contesting the PSR’s
   determination or demonstrating that they were entitled to a greater offset for
   bona fide services. Even at oral argument, counsel for the defendants did not
   even have a number in mind for the amount of the actual loss suffered by the
   victims.
                                     *   *       *
          The MVRA does not permit us to cut corners in making restitution
   calculations simply because there is a plea agreement.             18 U.S.C.
   § 3663A(c)(1). The statutory terms mandate calculation of the actual loss
   caused by the defendant, whether that defendant went to trial or pleaded
   guilty. But here, Johnson and Dinkins failed to counter the information in
   the PSR report or suggest that they deserved a greater offset for bona fide

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                                   No. 22-30242
                                 c/w No. 22-30249

   services. Accordingly, I concur.

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