Court Opinion

ID: 9840249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 17:00:46.425187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:11:29.587960
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 15 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE RAMON BRAHMS-GARCIA,                       No. 21-1238
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A200-685-986
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted July 13, 2023**
                               Seattle, Washington

Before: GRABER, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Jose Ramon Brahms-Garcia petitions for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal from an immigration

judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1229b(b). He contends that the BIA and IJ erred in finding that he was ineligible

for nonpermanent resident cancellation of removal on account of having been

“convicted of an offense [described] under” 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i), which sets

forth grounds of inadmissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Brahms-Garcia

argues that the amended information, the judgment, and his guilty plea to criminal

solicitation to commit delivery of methamphetamine under Washington Revised

Code (“RCW”) sections 9A.28.030 and 69.50.401(1), (2)(b), do not show that he

engaged in conduct described in § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i), which prohibits participation

in illicit drug trafficking. He asserts that his criminal offense is not covered by

§ 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) because the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA”)

definition of illicit drug trafficking does not encompass solicitation to deliver

controlled substances.1

      Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), we lack jurisdiction to review “any final

order of removal against [a noncitizen] who is removable by reason of having

committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2),” including illicit

1
  Brahms-Garcia also argues that we should apply the framework from Matter of
Medina-Jimenez, 27 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 2018), to determine whether he is
ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1)(C). We disagree. The
BIA was not required to apply Medina-Jimenez here because that case pertains
only to offenses described under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Id. at 401–03.
Neither the BIA nor this court has required this framework for any of the other
statutory offenses listed in § 1229b(b)(1)(C). See id; Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 931
F.3d 830, 841–45 (9th Cir. 2019).

                                         2                                    21-1238
trafficking. See Lopez-Molina v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1206, 1208–11 (9th Cir.

2004). We retain jurisdiction, however, to determine our own jurisdiction, id., and

may review constitutional claims and questions of law, 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(D).

We deny the petition.

      1.     To determine whether we have jurisdiction to review Brahms-Garcia’s

final order of removal, we must first address whether the agency correctly found

that Brahms-Garcia is “removable by reason of having committed a criminal

offense covered in” § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i). Lopez-Molina, 368 F.3d at 1208–11.

Under § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i), a noncitizen who “the consular officer or the Attorney

General knows or has reason to believe . . . [1] is or has been an illicit trafficker in

any controlled substance . . . or [2] is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister,

conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such controlled .

. . substance . . . or endeavored to do so” is inadmissible. See also Gomez-Granillo

v. Holder, 654 F.3d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 2011) (interpreting “a knowing aider,

abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others” to signify a knowing

“particip[ant]” in the traffic of illicit drugs). In reviewing whether substantial

evidence supports the agency’s determination that a noncitizen is inadmissible

under § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i), we look to whether the decision rests on “reasonable,

substantial, and probative evidence.” Alarcon-Serrano v. INS, 220 F.3d 1116,

1119 (9th Cir. 2000).

                                          3                                     21-1238
      Here, “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” supports the

agency’s determination that there was “reason to believe” that Brahms-Garcia was

involved in the illicit trafficking of controlled substances. Id. Brahms-Garcia’s

voluntary guilty plea of criminal solicitation of delivery of methamphetamine is

“probative evidence” that he “did, in fact, engage” in the solicitation of delivery of

methamphetamine. Chavez-Reyes v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 2014).

Moreover, Brahms-Garcia’s solicitation of delivery of methamphetamine gave the

agency adequate reason to believe that he had participated in illicit drug

trafficking. See Hamid v. INS, 538 F.2d 1389, 1390–91 (9th Cir. 1976) (per

curiam) (concluding that a noncitizen’s conduct in asking an individual to carry

hashish into the United States provided a “sound basis” to believe that he was a

“trafficker” under § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i)).2 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s

determination that Brahms-Garcia is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) and,

thus, removable for having committed a criminal offense covered therein.

      2.     Therefore, our jurisdiction to review Brahms-Garcia’s final order of

removal is limited to questions of law and constitutional matters. 8 U.S.C.

2
  Brahms-Garcia argues that we should follow Cortes-Maldonado v. Barr, 978
F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2020), to conclude that the INA’s definition of illicit drug
trafficking does not encompass solicitation and that Congress’s omission of
solicitation from the list of inchoate crimes in the statute was purposeful. Cortes-
Maldonado, however, has no application here because it applied the categorical
approach to assess whether a particular crime is an aggravated felony under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).

                                         4                                   21-1238
§1252(a)(2)(D). Because Brahms-Garcia does not contest that he was convicted of

criminal solicitation to commit delivery of methamphetamine, but rather

challenges whether his conviction legally satisfies the definition “of an offense

[described] under” § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) for purposes of § 1229b(b)(1)(C), he raises a

legal question. See Orellana v. Barr, 967 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 2020)

(“Questions of law include the application of law to undisputed or established

facts.”).

       Our jurisdiction is also limited under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) because we

may not review agency factual findings when reviewing a claim for discretionary

relief, including applications for cancellation of removal. Patel v. Garland, –––

U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1621–22 (2022). However, as noted above, we have

jurisdiction to review legal and constitutional questions pertaining to cancellation

of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also Ochoa v. Garland, 71 F.4th 717,

721 (9th Cir. 2023) (noting that, if the question regarding discretionary relief does

not pertain to “historical fact,” but “can be answered in a law library,” we have

jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D).). Accordingly, we consider whether Brahms-

Garica met his burden of proving that his conviction does not meet the statutory

definition “of an offense [described] under” § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) and, thus, that the

BIA erred in finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i).

                                         5                                   21-1238
      The agency properly concluded that Brahms-Garcia was ineligible for

nonpermanent resident cancellation of removal. Brahms-Garcia’s conviction for

solicitation to commit delivery of methamphetamine rendered him inadmissible

under § 1182(a)(2), and he was therefore statutorily barred from relief under

§ 1229b(b)(1)(C) because he was “convicted of an offense [described] under”

§ 1182(a)(2). 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).

      PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

                                        6                                  21-1238