Court Opinion

ID: 9429403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:26:39.882504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:19.423983
License: Public Domain

Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Masrshall joins,
dissenting.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is m all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the *113Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), I would grant the application and stay the execution of applicant Sullivan.
r-H HM
Even if I accepted the prevailing view that the death penalty may constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant the application because Sullivan has raised a substantial claim concerning the constitutionality of his death sentence. In particular, Sullivan alleges that application of the Florida death penalty statute violates the Equal Protection Clause because it discriminates against capital defendants solely on the basis of their race and the race of their victims. For support, Sullivan has proffered numerous scholarly studies, several of which are yet to be published, that provide statistical evidence to substantiate his claim. Although the Court has avoided ruling on similar claims in the past, and continues to avoid the issue by its decision tonight, the claim is clearly deserving of further consideration. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has recognized in a similar case, “the merits of this allegation cannot be assessed without a more detailed consideration of the evidence proffered” and therefore the applicant “is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the claim as a matter of law.” Spencer v. Zant, 715 F. 2d 1562, 1582-1583 (1983). See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963).
I see no reason to depart from that sensible approach in this case. In fact, the Court has had only 24 hours to examine the voluminous stay application and exhibits that have been filed on Sullivan’s behalf. The haste with which the Court has proceeded in this case means not only that Sullivan’s claim has not received the thoughtful consideration to which it is entitled, but also that the Court has once again rushed to judgment, apparently eager to reach a fatal conclusion.
I dissent.