Court Opinion

ID: 9390340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 16:02:45.585419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.683466
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
               ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                     STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

                                        v.

                  RASHAD MARTEZ TURNER, Petitioner.

                         No. 1 CA-CR 22-0564 PRPC
                              FILED 4-27-2023

    Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                         No. CR2011-007880-001
            The Honorable Kathleen H. Mead, Judge (retired)
            The Honorable John R. Ditsworth, Judge (retired)

                  REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

                                   COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Robert A. Walsh
Counsel for Respondent

Attorneys for Freedom Law Firm, Chandler
By Marc J. Victor
Counsel for Petitioner
                            STATE v. TURNER
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1            Rashad Martez Turner petitions this court to review the
dismissal of his post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition filed under Arizona
Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 33.1. We grant review but deny relief.

            FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            In March 2011, around 5:00 a.m., Turner was involved in a car
accident. Turner, driving westbound on a two-lane street, collided with a
trailer attached to a vehicle (“Car 2”) traveling eastbound. Turner then
collided with another car (“Car 3”) driving eastbound, and Car 3’s driver
died because of the accident.

¶3            Two eyewitnesses reported they saw a vehicle traveling
westbound swerve into the eastbound lane and collide with the trailer. One
of the witnesses, Sullivan, was “a ways back” and could not identify the
vehicle because of bad lighting. But he confirmed the westbound vehicle
swerved into the eastbound lane and crashed. Car 2’s driver was the other
witness. He reported that while driving, a vehicle driving toward him
crossed the center line and struck his trailer.

¶4            The police diagrammed the accident scene and documented
and photographed the damage to each vehicle, areas of impact, each
vehicle’s location post-crash, skid marks, gouges in the road, and the area’s
applicable speed limit (40 miles per hour).2 In addition, the police found
several empty prescription bottles in Turner’s car, and blood samples
drawn from Turner revealed that he had taken multiple prescription drugs.

1    We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
judgment. State v. Mendoza, 248 Ariz. 6, 11, ¶ 1, n.1 (App. 2019).

2     The crash-scene photographs are no longer available, and the officer
who took the photographs passed away in 2020.

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                             STATE v. TURNER
                            Decision of the Court

¶5            Officers downloaded the crash data from the vehicles and
reconstructed the accident. The crash data revealed Turner’s car had a
“steering angle of -16 degrees five seconds prior to the deployment events.”
The police concluded Turner’s steering wheel “would have been turning
towards the left” when approaching Car 2. The data also revealed that
during the five seconds before the crash, Turner had neither slowed nor
applied the brakes, and his car maintained a speed of 60 miles per hour. The
police concluded that Turner, driving westbound, “drove left of center and
collided with the trailer” and “then continued westbound and collided with
[Car 3].”

¶6           A grand jury indicted Turner on counts of manslaughter, a
Class 2 dangerous felony, and endangerment, a Class 6 dangerous felony.
The State amended the indictment to allege that Turner had a prior
non-dangerous felony conviction (conspiracy to possess marijuana for sale),
he committed the current offenses while on probation, and there were
aggravating circumstances other than the prior conviction. The aggravating
circumstances included that Turner’s driving privileges were suspended
because of a prior DUI conviction. And the State submitted the DUI
conviction as evidence of Turner’s “extreme indifference to the probable
consequences of his actions.”

¶7             Turner pled guilty to manslaughter, and in return, the State
dismissed the endangerment charge and the allegations that Turner had a
prior felony conviction and committed the current offense while on
probation. Under the plea agreement, Turner faced between 7 and 21 years
in prison. If convicted at trial, he faced a minimum sentence of 10.5 years
flat on the manslaughter charge and a consecutive minimum of three years
on his conspiracy prior conviction.3 At the change-of-plea hearing, Turner
admitted that at the time of the accident, he was impaired by “codeine,
oxycodone and alprazolam” while driving. Because the prescription drugs
impaired him, Turner drove “into oncoming traffic,” hitting the victim
head-on and causing his death. In December 2012, the court sentenced

3     If convicted for a dangerous offense while on release, a defendant
must serve no “less than the presumptive sentence . . . and is not eligible for
suspension or commutation or release on any basis until the sentence
imposed is served.” A.R.S. § 13-708(A). The conviction also serves as a
revocation of the defendant’s release status and requires a consecutive
sentence to be imposed. A.R.S. § 13-708(E); see also A.R.S. §§ 13-704(A)
(dangerous offense) and -702(D) (non-dangerous offense).

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                             STATE v. TURNER
                            Decision of the Court

Turner to an aggravated term of 18 years and reinstated probation for his
prior conviction.

¶8            Turner filed a PCR notice in February 2013. Turner’s
appointed counsel reviewed the record and found no arguable issues. As a
result, the court granted leave to Turner to file a pro se petition. Turner
requested his case file and received it around November 2013. The court
ultimately dismissed the case when Turner failed to petition or secure
additional extensions.

¶9             Eventually, Turner retained counsel, and in August 2019, he
hired an accident reconstruction expert. The reconstructionist visited where
the crash occurred in 2011, reviewed the police reports and crash data, and
interviewed Sullivan. Sullivan allegedly told the reconstructionist that Car
2’s trailer bounced or swung to the left and struck the front left of Turner’s
car, which “forced [Turner’s] car into the path of oncoming eastbound
traffic.” But Sullivan never provided a sworn statement to Turner’s
attorney. The reconstructionist completed an accident reconstruction report
in May 2021.

¶10          The reconstructionist doubted the police’s determination of
the accident’s point of impact. Turner’s reconstructionist reported that
Turner’s vehicle’s negative steering wheel angle meant his wheel was
turned right, contrary to the police’s conclusion that it was turned left.
Turner’s reconstructionist noted that the crash data report read:

       Steering Wheel Angle data is displayed as a positive value
       when the steering wheel is turned to the right and a negative
       value when the steering wheel is turned to the left, except for
       Cadillac STS model vehicles with StabiliTrak 3.0 systems
       (RPO JL7). For Cadillac STS model vehicles with StabiliTrak
       3.0 systems (RPO JL7), when the steering wheel is turned to
       the right, a negative value will be displayed and when the
       steering wheel is turned to the left, a positive value will be
       displayed. The Steering Wheel Angle data is reported in 16
       degree increments.

Based on this data, the reconstructionist concluded that Turner, who drove
a Cadillac, could not have swerved to the left. Instead, according to the
reconstructionist, Car 2’s trailer caused the accident by swinging over the
center line of the street and striking Turner’s car. The reconstructionist also
asserted that the collision damaged Turner’s left front wheel and forced
Turner’s car into the eastbound lane.

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                            STATE v. TURNER
                           Decision of the Court

¶11            In June 2021, Turner petitioned for PCR. Turner claimed:
1) under Rule 33.1(e), the new interview with Sullivan, the discovery that
the police overlooked information about the steering wheel angle, and the
2021 accident reconstructionist’s report were newly discovered material
facts that probably would have changed the outcome; 2) under Rule 33.1(h),
the 2021 accident reconstruction report established by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would find him guilty of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt; and 3) under Rule 33.1(a), Turner’s trial counsel
was ineffective by failing to reconstruct the accident, interview the
eyewitnesses, and discover the crash data inconsistencies in the police
reports, thus rendering his guilty plea involuntary.

¶12           In response, the State conceded the police had overlooked the
steering angle directions for Cadillac STS models with StabiliTrak. But the
State explained other evidence showed that Turner caused the accident by
traveling left of center, including the skid marks, gouges, and Turner’s
point of impact with Car 2’s trailer in the eastbound lane. The State asserted
there was also no evidence Turner tried to avoid the trailer, as he had not
applied the brakes in the five seconds before the crash.

¶13           In the State’s supplemental report, a police officer from the
crash scene responded to the reconstructionist’s findings. The report
explained it was unlikely that Turner was traveling 16 degrees to the right
because, at his speed, he would have “crossed over the westbound lane’s
right shoulder” and avoided the two vehicles altogether. The supplemental
report highlighted the possibility that the steering wheel was not correctly
calibrated or was inoperative. The report also noted it was unclear whether
the StabiliTrak system was active during the crash event. The report
concluded that the evidence at the scene and the witness statements fully
proved that Turner caused the accident.

¶14           After Turner replied, the superior court dismissed the
petition. The court found that Turner’s claims were precluded as untimely
because Turner did not file his second PCR petition until eight and a half
years after his sentencing and did not explain why the delay was
reasonable. The superior court alternatively dismissed each claim on its
merits.

¶15          Turner petitioned this court for review. We have jurisdiction
under A.R.S. § 13-4239(C) and Rule 33.16.

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                             STATE v. TURNER
                            Decision of the Court

                                DISCUSSION

¶16            We review the superior court’s ruling on a PCR petition for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238, ¶ 6 (App. 2021). We
review legal conclusions and interpretations of the Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure de novo. Id.; State v. Macias, 249 Ariz. 335, 339, ¶ 8 (App.
2020). Post-conviction relief “is applied quite restrictively to overturn guilty
pleas,” mainly because a defendant waives all non-jurisdictional defenses
by pleading guilty. State v. Fritz, 157 Ariz. 139, 140 (App. 1988). To be
eligible for post-conviction relief, a defendant must strictly comply with the
post-conviction rules. Canion v. Cole, 210 Ariz. 598, 600, ¶ 11 (2005).

A.     The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding that
Turner’s Claims of Trial and PCR Counsel Ineffectiveness Under Rule
33.1(a) Were Precluded as Untimely.

¶17            Turner argues he would not have pled guilty if not for his trial
counsel’s ineffective assistance. He also asserts that the superior court
should have excused his untimely post-conviction petition based on the
ineffective assistance of his first PCR counsel. We note Turner’s claims of
ineffective assistance are separate claims relating to trial and PCR counsel.
Both, however, are precluded.

¶18             A defendant must file a notice for a PCR claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel under Rule 33.1(a) within 90 days after
sentencing. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.4(b)(3)(A); see State v. Lopez, 234 Ariz. 513,
515, ¶ 8 (App. 2014) (The time required to bring a claim “is not based on
waiver, but instead on the defendant’s timeliness in seeking relief.”); State
v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 4 (2002) (When “ineffective assistance of counsel
claims . . . could have been raised[] in a [prior] Rule 32 post-conviction relief
proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed
waived and precluded.”).

¶19            A pleading defendant must file a claim of ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel “no later than 30 days after the trial
court’s final order in the first post-conviction proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P.
33.4(b)(3)(C). “The court must excuse an untimely notice . . . filed under
subpart 3(A) or 3(C) if the defendant adequately explains why the failure to
timely file a notice was not the defendant’s fault.” Ariz. R. Crim. P.
33.4(b)(3)(D).

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                             STATE v. TURNER
                            Decision of the Court

¶20            Turner petitioned for PCR in June 2021,4 eight years after
sentencing and seven years after the superior court dismissed his first PCR
petition. For the court to reach the merits of the Rule 33.1(a) claims
(ineffective assistance of trial and PCR counsel), Turner needed to explain
adequately why the delay was not his fault. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
33.4(b)(3)(A), (C), (D).

¶21             A defendant is “without fault” for an untimely PCR
proceeding if the defendant was unaware of his right to seek
post-conviction relief or if he intended to file a post-conviction petition
timely, but his attorney or someone else interfered with this opportunity.
See State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 539, ¶ 6 (App. 2011). Turner does not
argue, and the record does not show that either circumstance exists. At
sentencing, the court informed Turner of his right to seek post-conviction
relief. Shortly after, Turner filed a notice and received an extension from the
court to file a petition. But he did not petition for PCR. Turner had a chance
to seek PCR timely but failed to do so.

¶22           Turner asks this court to excuse his untimeliness because his
prior counsel (trial and PCR) failed to “carry[] out sufficient investigation,”
and his new attorney needed time to “pick up the pieces and start over in
2019-2021.” Turner does not allege that anyone interfered with his ability to
seek post-conviction relief in 2013. This court will not excuse an untimely
PCR petition just because the defendant claims “that, based on information
that later came to light, he regretted having failed to challenge his
conviction.” Poblete, 227 Ariz. at 539–40, ¶ 7. Because Turner failed to
explain adequately why he was not at fault for his untimely PCR petition,
the superior court did not err by dismissing the ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.

B.    The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding
Turner’s Rule 33.1(e) and Rule 33.1(h) Claims Were Precluded as
Untimely.

¶23            Unlike the 90-day requirement for raising an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim under Rule 33.1(a), a defendant may file a claim
of newly discovered material facts under Rule 33.1(e) or actual innocence
under Rule 33.1(h) “within a reasonable time after discovering the basis for
the claim.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.4(b)(3)(B). “[T]he passage of time alone
cannot preclude relief.” Reed, 252 Ariz. at 239, ¶ 14. To consider whether a

4      Turner filed an unnecessary “notice” in August 2021.

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                             STATE v. TURNER
                            Decision of the Court

delay is reasonable, the court applies equitable principles. Id. It considers,
“inter alia, the consequences of a failure to address the merits of the claim
and the prejudice to the State or victim.” Id. But the court should dismiss
the notice if the notice does not sufficiently explain why the defendant did
not timely file. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.2(b)(1).

¶24           As noted above, Turner filed this post-conviction petition
eight years after his sentencing raising newly discovered material facts and
actual innocence claims. During this eight-year delay, one of the
investigating officers died. The remaining police officers could not locate
the accident scene photographs, and witnesses could not remember events
from the accident and its aftermath. When determining whether the delay
was reasonable, the superior court considered the passage of time and the
prejudice to the parties resulting from the diminished evidence based on
the delay in raising the claims. The court found that the consequences of
failing to address the petition’s merits were minimal because Turner failed
to present colorable claims, and the prejudice to the State and victims was
substantial, given the diminished evidence. The court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to find Turner filed within a reasonable time. Reed,
252 Ariz. at 238, ¶ 6.

¶25           Turner justifies his delay by asserting he did not have “the
scientific facts and legal analysis” supporting his claims “strongly
grounded” until his accident reconstructionist completed the report in 2021.
He claims his prior counsels’ failure to investigate the case prevented him
from discovering new information about the car accident. As the superior
court explained, “[t]he fact that [Turner] has now retained an accident
reconstruction expert almost a decade after [he] pled guilty, on its own, is
not a sufficient explanation for the delay.” The court did not abuse its
discretion by finding that Turner did not sufficiently explain his delay. Reed,
252 Ariz. at 238, ¶ 6.

¶26           Because the “reasonable time” standard instructs us to
balance equitable principles, we will review the merits of Turner’s Rule
33.1(e) and 33.1(h) claims to confirm that time-preclusion does not unduly
prejudice him. See Reed, 252 Ariz. at 239, ¶ 14. As explained below, the
superior court did not err by finding that Turner failed to present colorable
claims of newly discovered material facts and actual innocence. Thus,
Turner was not prejudiced by the court’s finding that he failed to file these
claims within a reasonable time.

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                             STATE v. TURNER
                            Decision of the Court

C.    The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding
Turner Failed to State a Colorable Claim for Relief Under Rule 33.1(e).

¶27            Turner disputes the superior court’s conclusion that he was
not entitled to relief under Rule 33.1(e). A defendant can petition for PCR if
“newly discovered material facts” exist and “probably would have changed
the judgment or sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.1(e). The defendant must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the evidence was
discovered after trial although it existed before trial; that it could not have
been discovered and produced at trial through reasonable diligence; that it
is neither cumulative nor impeaching; that it is material; and that it
probably would have changed” the outcome. State v. Saenz, 197 Ariz. 487,
489, ¶ 7 (App. 2000).

¶28            Turner argues that “the re-analyzed [crash data] combined
with a full-on accident reconstruction report constitute new and/or
newly-discovered evidence.” The superior court rejected this argument
because the crash data could have been discovered and produced at trial.
And while Turner’s accident reconstruction report did not exist at the time
of the plea, the scientific data was available with reasonable diligence. The
court also found the report was not material because it relied on Sullivan’s
unsworn statements from his interview with the reconstruction expert,
inconsistent with his post-accident statements to the police.

¶29            The superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
the information in Turner’s report could have been discovered with
reasonable diligence. Saenz, 197 Ariz. at 489, ¶ 7. Both parties recognized
that in certain Cadillac models, a negative steering value means the wheel
was turned right. This information was available at the time of the plea, but
its potential importance was not brought to light until the accident
reconstruction report. But this court has advised not to confuse a conflicting
expert opinion with newly discovered material facts. See State v. King, 250
Ariz. 433, 442, ¶¶ 38–39 (App. 2021). Turner is not entitled to relief just
because he has retained an expert who reached a different conclusion from
the police report. See id.

¶30          The superior court also considered Sullivan’s interview with
the reconstruction expert, the crash data, and the new accident
reconstruction report. The court found the recent interview with Sullivan
was unreliable, and the court also doubted the materiality of the
reconstruction report, given its reliance on unsworn testimony. Given these
weaknesses, along with the other eyewitness testimony and crash evidence
supporting the police report’s theory that Turner caused the accident, the

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                            STATE v. TURNER
                           Decision of the Court

court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the alleged newly
discovered material facts would probably not have changed the outcome.
See Saenz, 197 Ariz. at 489, ¶ 7.

¶31           The superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
Turner failed to establish a colorable claim under Rule 33.1(e).

D.    The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding
Turner Failed to State a Colorable Claim for Relief Under Rule 33.1(h).

¶32           Turner disputes the superior court’s conclusion that he was
not entitled to relief under Rule 33.1(h). A defendant has a right to PCR if
he shows by clear and convincing evidence that, based on the facts of the
case, no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.1(h).

¶33             Turner argues that the new reconstruction report proves he
did not cause the accident. Although the reconstruction report concluded
that Car 2’s trailer caused the accident, other record evidence supports that
Turner caused the accident—a fact admitted to by Turner at the
change-of-plea hearing. Moreover, while the report may have raised a
triable issue, it is far from dispositive given that two eyewitnesses saw the
westbound vehicle swerve into the eastbound lane, and Turner did not
apply brakes or slow down before the crash. Based on the statements and
the skid marks in the eastbound lane, the police determined that the point
of impact between Turner’s vehicle and the trailer occurred in the
eastbound lane, which supports the police’s conclusion that Turner
swerved. Because the record contained evidence of Turner’s guilt, the
superior court was within its discretion to find that a juror could still
reasonably find Turner guilty. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.1(h). Thus, the
superior court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Turner’s claim for
relief.

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                            STATE v. TURNER
                           Decision of the Court

                              CONCLUSION

¶34           The superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
Turner untimely petitioned for post-conviction relief, did not present
colorable claims, and thus was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Thus,
we deny relief.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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