Court Opinion

ID: 9617450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:55:27.095124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:09.458360
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority that the trial court’s refusal to give appellant’s requested charge on assumption of the risk was erroneous, I would not reach that issue, as I cannot agree with the majority that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to withstand appellant’s motions for a directed verdict as to the issues of nuisance and joint venture.
(a) Appellees asserted at trial that appellant was liable for their son’s death under the theory of nuisance because appellant had failed to correct a hazardous condition in the pool it maintained. Conflicting testimony exists in the record regarding the condition of the pool, specifically the appearance of the water in the pool. Both the pool manager, Robert Woods, and one lifeguard testified that it had been “cloudy” in appearance off and on since the pool opened, and a second lifeguard agreed with them that it was cloudy on the day in issue. However, none of the pool personnel thought the condition of the water posed any danger, or that the pool should be closed. The lifeguards testified that after the pool closed on that particular day, they both swam and could see the bottom clearly. Judy Franklin testified that she and her five-year-old daughter were frequent users of the pool, and she never thought the pool had a murky or cloudy appearance. Franklin testified that on that particular day, her daughter had been allowed by Coach Woods to swim while the pool personnel were cleaning the pool after the pool closed, and that during that time, she was watching her daughter dive. She was certain she could see the bottom.
Unlike the majority, I find substantial material evidentiary differences in the record before this court at the prior appearance of this case and at present. The record in the prior case contained depositions, including that of Woods. However, Woods testified at trial, and since his deposition was not introduced at trial it did not become part *693of the trial record. Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga. App. 151,153-154 (1) (193 SE2d 19) (1972). Of course, the record in the summary judgment appeal did not contain trial testimony. I have examined the depositions in the prior record and find that at his deposition, Woods testified that the city’s employee in charge of the water system “had showed me how to, well, clean out the dirty water, but that machine was broken and on many occasions I came by here to let him know that. You know, he came when he was here and when he wasn’t here, he didn’t come.” This court obviously relied on that testimony in finding that the city had “repeated notice” of a problem with the water in the pool. Such testimony, however, was not given by Woods in his testimony at trial, nor were the depositions introduced at trial. They are thus not a part of the instant record. Maloy, supra. Consequently, the record on this appeal does not contain the same indication that appellant had actual notice. (This discrepancy between the record on summary judgment and at trial did not escape the notice of the trial court, for when appellees opposed appellant’s motion for directed verdict on the issue of nuisance, counsel for appellees stated to the trial court that “[t]he facts as they went up to the Court of Appeals [in the appeal from grant of summary judgment to the city] are the identical facts that have been proved here today,” to which the trial court responded, “I don’t believe that’s true.”)
It is well established law that a municipality is not liable for negligence in the exercise of governmental functions. Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips, 224 Ga. 834, 838 (165 SE2d 141) (1968). The operation of recreational facilities is a governmental, rather than a ministerial, function. Brannan v. City of Brunswick, 49 Ga. App. 62, 68 (174 SE 186) (1934). However, “[a] municipal corporation, like any other individual or private corporation, may be liable for damages it causes to a third party from the operation or maintenance of a nuisance, irrespective of whether it is exercising a governmental or municipal function. [Cits.]” Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga. 419, 426 (3) (g) (249 SE2d 224) (1978).
“Based on the holdings in Town of Ft. Oglethorpe v. Phillips, Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Palmerio, . . . and many other cases . . . the following guidelines appear [for deciding when a nuisance is established]: (1) The defect or degree of misfeasance must be to such a degree as would exceed the concept of mere negligence. (A single isolated act of negligence is not sufficient to show such a negligent trespass as would constitute a nuisance, [cit.]) (2) The act must be of some duration (two weeks in Ft. Oglethorpe, four hours held insufficient in [City of Atlanta v. Roberts, 133 Ga. App. 585 (211 SE2d 615) (1974)]) and the maintenance of the act or defect must be continuous or regularly repetitious (Palmerio and Roberts, supra). (3) Failure of the municipality to act within a reasonable time after knowledge of *694the defect or dangerous condition. (Ft. Oglethorpe, supra.)” (Emphasis supplied.) City of Bowman v. Gunnells, 243 Ga. 809, 811 (256 SE2d 782) (1979). Applying these guidelines to the facts of the case at bar, even assuming the first two requirements are present, I am unable to find in the record any evidence that appellant had actual knowledge or notice of a dangerous condition. Conceding that the county may be held to have had notice of the alleged cloudy water through its employees, the pool manager and lifeguards, no evidence at trial established that the existence of this condition was actually communicated by the county to anyone employed by or representing appellant city.
Woods, the pool manager, was asked at trial: “[d]o you have a recollection of how many times you attempted to contact or attempted to get Mr. [Edwin] Hodges [appellant’s employee in charge of the city water system] over to the pool before Roger’s death?” (Emphasis supplied.) To this question, he responded “[o]ff the top of my head I would have to say about five times.” However, other than before the pool opened, there is no indication in the record that Hodges was ever at the pool working on the equipment, that he was ever actually reached by Woods, or that he was called about a problem regarding water cloudiness. The lifeguard who is quoted by the majority as testifying that Hodges was there “[t]rying to clear the condition,” had admitted only moments before that she did not “know exactly what he was working on.” Hodges testified that he did not recall there being any problems with the system, and although he did recall Woods calling him back once, he testified that it was because the coach was out of the chemical reagents used for testing the pool. Hodges testified that he never failed to respond to any messages left by Woods, and that Woods never contacted him about the water being too cloudy or any other condition characterized as dangerous.
Since I find that the evidence of record does not support actual notice to appellant and notice or knowledge of the defect is one of the elements necessary to establishing the maintenance of a nuisance, see City of Bowman, supra, in my view a directed verdict in favor of appellant would have been proper on this issue unless the required knowledge by appellant was established constructively, through proof that appellant was engaged in a joint venture with the county, which clearly had notice. If it was, then notice to the county, its co-joint venturer, and its employees would also constitute notice to appellant under agency principles. See generally Boatman v. Geo. Hyman Constr. Co., 157 Ga. App. 120, 122-124 (276 SE2d 272) (1981). I turn, therefore, to the question of whether appellant’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of the existence of a joint venture was properly denied.
(b) The record reveals that a group of citizens approached James *695P. Marshall, appellant’s mayor, in 1981 and requested that the public pool, which was owned by appellant but had been closed for some time, be reopened. Marshall testified at trial that he told the citizens’ group appellant was not in a financial position to operate the pool, but that as a result of their request a committee was appointed to approach the Putnam County commissioners about the matter. The committee subsequently reported that they had reached an agreement with the county, the exact terms of which were the subject of conflicting testimony at trial, particularly as to the division of responsibility between the county and appellant for maintenance of the pool. However, the minutes of the county commission for June 22, 1981 were introduced into evidence, and show, in pertinent part, the following: “We have an estimate of $1,500.00 to put the swimming pool in operating order. We respectfully request that the County assume this cost and the operation of the pool for the benefit of the people of the entire county who wish to pay the usage fee. The second proposal was that the City [appellant] will put the pool in operating Condition and asks that the County operate [it] thereafter. The City to maintain the grounds outside of the swimming pool area. The City to furnish water and chemicals to operate the pool. A1 Reaves, Director of [the County] Recreation Dept., was called in for discussion on the matter. A1 stated that to operate the pool at least three certified people would be needed — two at the pool and one in the bath house area. He also suggested that advertisement for the jobs should be placed in [the] paper. Employees for these jobs will be paid $4.00 per hour [by the county].” Although the minutes do not so reflect, it is uncontroverted that appellant’s offer to ready the pool was accepted and the plan went forward. The county commissioner’s minutes for June 23, 1982, which were also admitted into evidence, indicate (and Mayor Marshall so testified) that the plan was again adopted in the following year: “[t]he Board [of Commissioners] was advised that the swimming pool is being readied and will be operated by the [CountyJ Recreation Department. Director A1 Reaves was advised to obtain life guards for the operation of the pool.” (Emphasis supplied.) A small fee was charged to the users of the pool, and all such revenue was retained by Putnam County.
Traditionally, in speaking of the earmarks of a joint venture, it is said that “ ‘there is a joint enterprise or adventure when two or more combine their property or labor, or both, in a joint undertaking for profit, with rights of mutual control, provided the arrangement does not establish a partnership.’ [Cit.]” Bowman v. Fuller, 84 Ga. App. 421, 425 (1) (66 SE2d 249) (1951). Although there is no question that a municipal corporation such as appellant has the authority to enter into an arrangement with a county to provide recreational amenities for the citizens of both, OCGA § 36-34-3, it is problematic to me *696whether such an arrangement, in which the intangible benefit of the citizenry is substituted for the traditional profit motive, could be termed a “joint venture.” See generally City of Brunswick v. Taylor, 87 Ga. App. 751, 754 (75 SE2d 203) (1953). This is particularly true here, where all revenue from the undertaking was retained by the county. However, even assuming that such a joint venture by a governmental body is possible, it does not resolve the question of whether such a joint venture existed here, as the record before us does not establish the crucial element of “rights of mutual control.” “There must be not only a joint interest in the objects and purposes of the undertaking, but also a right, express or implied of each member of the joint venture to direct and control the conduct of the other. [Cits.]” Security Dev. &c. Co. v. Williamson, 112 Ga. App. 524, 525 (1) (145 SE2d 581) (1965). See also Time Fin. Svcs. v. Hewitt, 139 Ga. App. 270, 272 (2) (228 SE2d 176) (1976). In my opinion, Seckinger & Co. v. Foreman, 252 Ga. 540, 541 (1) (314 SE2d 891) (1984), relied on by the majority, is persuasive as authority for the proposition that a joint enterprise may be found despite the absence of a profit motive and mutual control, only in the most limited of circumstances such as were there found. In Seckinger, the Supreme Court (using the “any evidence” standard because Seckinger was a workers’ compensation case) found that a statement in the agreement itself providing that it was a joint venture agreement and should be deemed and construed as such, was sufficient to authorize a finding there of joint venture. Those narrow circumstances are not present here.
The question of whether or not the facts proved show a joint venture between the parties is generally a jury question. Bowman, supra at 426. However, a court may decide as a matter of law that no joint venture exists. See, e.g., Castleberry v. Gold Agency, 124 Ga. App. 694, 696 (1) (185 SE2d 557) (1971); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 147 Ga. App. 292 (248 SE2d 554) (1978). In the case at bar, the minutes of the county commission clearly indicate that the pool would be “operated by” the county, thereby establishing the day-to-day operation and control of the pool as a county responsibility, rather than a joint one. The record is devoid of any indication that this control was mutual or joint. In my view there is, thus, no conflict in the evidence on the material issue of the terms of the agreement, regardless of any testimony from individuals purporting to give their “understanding” of the agreement. It follows that since the material element of right of joint control was missing, there was no joint enterprise, and I believe the trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion for a directed verdict as to this issue. See generally Citicorp Indus. Credit v. Rountree, 185 Ga. App. 417, 422 (1) (364 SE2d 65) (1987).
(c) Having determined that no joint venture existed, the crucial *697element of knowledge of a dangerous condition, necessary to showing appellant’s maintenance of a nuisance, may not be supplied constructively. Accordingly, I also conclude that the trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion for a directed verdict in its favor as to the issue of nuisance. See id.
Decided December 5, 1988 —
Rehearing denied December 20, 1988
Burnside, Wall & Daniel, James W. Ellison, for appellant.
Andrew M. Scherffius III, John P. Batson, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Birdsong and Presiding Judge Banke join in this dissent.