Court Opinion

ID: 9352080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 20:06:53.185295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:52.362775
License: Public Domain

J-S41024-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TYYA M. BARNES                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 326 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 9, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
                 Criminal Division at CP-22-CR-0002483-2013

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                      FILED: JANUARY 4, 2023

        Tyya M. Barnes (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing his

second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

        In June 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of second-degree murder,

robbery, conspiracy, and carrying a firearm without a license. On June 12,

2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison. Appellant filed a

direct appeal, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on September

8, 2017.     Commonwealth v. Barnes, 178 A.3d 146 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(unpublished memorandum).             Appellant did not petition the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court for allowance of appeal.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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      Appellant subsequently filed a timely first PCRA petition. The PCRA court

denied relief on January 16, 2020, and Appellant appealed.             This Court

affirmed the denial of relief on January 5, 2021. Commonwealth v. Barnes,

248 A.3d 460 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum).

      Appellant filed the underlying pro se PCRA petition, his second, on May

17, 2021. Appellant claimed

      after-discovered evidence that had a jury had notice of[,] would
      have at the time of [Appellant’s] trial[,] questioned not only an
      unnatural relationship between a prosecutor and an unreliable
      witness[,] but also left reasonable doubt concerning the credibility
      of a witness who falsely testifies for favorable treatment.

PCRA Petition, 5/17/21, at 8.

      On July 20, 2021, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to dismiss

Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.          See

Order, 7/20/21 (PCRA court stating it was “satisfied from its review of the

record in this case that [Appellant] is not entitled to post-conviction collateral

relief as this [c]ourt is without jurisdiction to hear the instant PCRA petition”).

The PCRA court dismissed the petition on September 9, 2021. Appellant filed

this pro se appeal. The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement.

                             Timeliness of Appeal

      On March 16, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause directing

Appellant to address the timeliness of his appeal.        Order, 3/16/22, citing

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of

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the order being appealed). Appellant responded that he did not timely receive

the September 9, 2021, order, but filed his appeal “immediately after” he

learned about it, “dating [the notice of appeal] October 13, 2021, to show due

diligence.” Response, 3/28/22, at 2. On April 11, 2022, this Court discharged

the rule and deferred the issue to this merits panel.

      The PCRA court addressed the late filing as follows:

      The date stamp on the instant Notice or Appeal received by this
      [c]ourt indicates that the Notice of Appeal was received and filed
      in the Dauphin County Clerk of Court’s Office on February 16,
      2022. However, the Notice of Appeal was dated October 13, 2021.
      It is unclear to this [c]ourt why the Clerk of Court’s Office did not
      receive the Notice of Appeal until February 16, 2021. Appellant
      claims that he did not receive the Final PCRA Dismissal Order until
      October 13, 2021, and according to Appellant this is why the date
      on his Notice of Appeal is more than 30 days past the issuance of
      the September 9, 2021, Order he is appealing.

Statement in Lieu of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 2/28/22, at 1 n.1.

      Our review reveals a notation at the bottom of the September 9, 2021,

order indicating that a copy was mailed to Appellant in prison. However, the

trial court docket does not show that the order was served on Appellant as

required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(B)(1) (“A copy of any order or court notice

promptly shall be served on each party’s attorney, or the party if

unrepresented.”). Rule 114(C) requires criminal docket entries to contain,

inter alia, “the date of service of the order or court notice.”     Pa.R.Crim.P.

114(C)(2)(c). Rule 907(4) provides that when the PCRA court dismisses a

petition, the order “shall be filed and served as provided in Rule 114.”

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4); see also Commonwealth v. Hess, 810 A.2d 1249,

1253 (Pa. 2002) (stating “the language of [Pa.R.Crim.P. 114] leaves no

question that the clerk’s obligations are not discretionary”); In re L.M., 923

A.2d 505, 509 (when “there is no indication on the docket” of notice, “then

the appeal period has not started to run”).    Accordingly, we consider this

appeal to be timely.

                                   Issues

      Appellant presents the following issues for review:

      1.)   WHETHER THE PCRA COURT ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION
            AND/OR ERROR OF LAW DENYING APPELLANT’S RIGHTS TO
            FEDERAL AND STATE DUE PROCESS BY DISMISSING HIS
            PCRA PETITION AS UNTIMELY WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY
            HEARING.

      2.)   WHETHER THE PCRA COURT ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION
            AND/OR ERROR OF LAW DISMISSING APPELLANT’S PCRA
            PETITION AS BEING “PRESENTED ... WITHOUT MERIT”
            WHERE A CLEAR BRADY VIOLATION TOOK PLACE AT
            APPELLANT’S TRIAL, VIOLATING HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR
            TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS WHICH IS GUARANTEED BY THE
            PENNSYLVANIA AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

      3.)   WHETHER APPELLANT MEETS AN             AFTER-DISCOVERED
            EVIDENCE CLAIM.

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

      In reviewing the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition, we

examine “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record

and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (citation omitted).    “The PCRA court’s findings will not be

disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified

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record.”    Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citations omitted). In addition:

        The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without
        a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine
        issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
        to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
        would be served by further proceedings. To obtain a reversal of
        a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an
        appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of material
        fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to
        relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying
        a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted).

              Timeliness of Appellant’s Second PCRA Petition

        We consider the timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition because it

implicates jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa.

Super. 2014). All PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions,

must be filed within one year of when the petitioner’s judgment of sentence

becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes final

at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”            42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(3). Because the PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional, a

court      may   not    address    the    merits   of   issues   if   the petition

was not timely filed. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa.

2017).

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      Appellant pro se filed the underlying PCRA petition on May 17, 2021.

This Court had affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on September 8,

2017, and he did not seek allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113 (petition for allowance of appeal shall be filed with

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court within 30 days of the entry of the Superior

Court order). Thus, Appellant had until October 8, 2018, to file a timely PCRA

petition. As his petition filed May 17, 2021, was untimely, Appellant had to

plead and prove an exception enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

      The PCRA time bar may “only be overcome by satisfaction of one of the

three statutory exceptions codified at Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).” Spotz,

171 A.3d at 678.     The exceptions are: “(1) interference by governmental

officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly-discovered facts; and (3)

an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51

A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012). A petitioner invoking an exception must

do so within one year of when the claim could have been presented. 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

      The PCRA court explained:

            [Appellant] does not expressly name a statutory provision
      that should apply to his case. Assuming [Appellant] wants
      Subsection (ii) to apply to his case, we ask when it is that he could
      have presented the claim. The newly discovered evidence that
      [Appellant] bases his claim on is the case Commonwealth v.
      Larry Trent Roberts, 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3781. In
      that decision, filed October 10, 2018, the Pennsylvania Superior
      Court affirmed an order in which the Criminal Division of the Court
      of Common Pleas of Dauphin County granted Larry Trent Roberts
      a new trial pursuant to his PCRA petition. That decision revealed

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       that a witness in that case … had, after the trial, recanted his
       testimony. This witness, Layton Potter, was also a witness at
       [Appellant’s] trial. If an exception could be made based on this
       decision which was filed October 10, 2018, the one-year time bar
       would begin to run on that date, and [Appellant] would need to
       have filed [his petition] by October 10, 2019. At the time the
       Roberts decision was filed, [Appellant] had recently submitted his
       first PCRA petition (filed September 12, 2018). That initial PCRA
       petition was not dismissed until January 16, 2020. [Appellant]
       could have amended his PCRA petition to include the discovery of
       this previously unknown fact (Layton Potter’s recantation).
       [Appellant] did not do this and therefore his petition is untimely.

PCRA Court Memorandum Order, 7/20/21, at 4.

       Appellant has failed to overcome the PCRA’s time bar.1 To be eligible

for relief on a claim of after-discovered evidence, a petitioner must plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence “[t]he unavailability at the time of

trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become available and

would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced.” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). In addition,

       [an] appellant must demonstrate that the evidence: (1) could not
       have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the
       exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative
       or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility
       of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a
       new trial were granted.

____________________________________________

1 We further agree that the Roberts case is distinguishable, where the
defendant received a new trial based on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing
to call a witness to support the defendant’s alibi defense. Commonwealth
v. Roberts, supra, at *9; see also PCRA Court Memorandum Order,
7/20/21, at 5.

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Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532, 537 (Pa. Super. 2012),

citing Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (Pa. 2008), cert.

denied, 555 U.S. 1198 (2009).

       In his brief, Appellant

       asserts the knowledge of [Layton] Potter’s willingness to testify
       for favorable treatment and even recreational purposes was at all
       times in the sole possession and control of [the prosecutor] and
       was not otherwise available to Appellant and trial counsel. Once
       again, the undisclosed evidence is that [] in 2013 (before
       Appellant’s trial)[,] the [C]ommonwealth witness (who was
       testifying against Appellant) had just in another defendant’s case
       recanted[,] alleging the prosecutor (the same one trying
       Appellant) coerced him into testifying to motive in 2007, in
       exchange for favorable treatment.

Appellant’s Brief at 15-16.

       Appellant has failed to plead and prove that Layton Potter’s role in

Roberts constituted “exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become

available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been

introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi).2

____________________________________________

2 Further, the PCRA court observed “there was other evidence besides Layton
Potter’s testimony upon which the jury could base its verdict.” PCRA Court
Memorandum Order, 7/20/21, at 5, citing Commonwealth v. Barnes, 178
A.3d 146 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum at *1-3) (describing
fired shell casings recovered by police, telephone records and video footage
connecting Appellant and the victim, and testimony from other witnesses
(besides Layton Potter)).

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     For the above reasons, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/4/2023

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