Court Opinion

ID: 9459747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:30:49.046733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:19.271210
License: Public Domain

COFFIN, Chief Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the judgment of affirmance, but not without grave reservations. Were it not for the absence of a showing of any substantial prejudice from delay, I would strongly urge that the co-existence of (1) deliberate and extensive resort to civil investigatory powers with the prospect of ultimate criminal prosecution clearly in mind, (2) the absence of any notice to appellant that criminal prosecution was contemplated, and (3) a four-year delay between the alleged fraudulent transactions and indictment had risen to the level of a violation of due process.
While the government did not initiate the § 21(a) bankruptcy investigation and had a non-criminally motivated interest in trying to recoup SB A losses, thus not bringing “a civil action solely to obtain evidence for its criminal prosecution”, United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 11-12, 90 S.Ct. 763, 769, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970), it is hard to say that the delay in the criminal proceedings was not at least partly “an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324, 92 S.Ct. 455, 465, 30 L. Ed.2d 468 (1971), or “purposive”, even though not in bad faith. United States v. Parrott, 248 F.Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965). Here, the government made a deliberate choice to hold the criminal prosecution in abeyance during which time the fruits of the civil proceedings, regularly sent to the U. S. Attorney, were, in the words of SBA’s chief litigation counsel, “of tremendous significance” to the criminal case. Moreover, it is clear that the government “failed to advise the defendant in its civil proceeding that it contemplates his criminal prosecution.” Kordel, supra, at 11 of 397 U.S., at 769 of 90 S.Ct.
In the past we have not adopted the approach of some other courts in shifting the burden of proof as to prejudice from delay, see, e. g., United States v. Rucker, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 464 F.2d 823 (1972). I hesitate to recommend an arbitrary time limit which would trigger a shifting from a defendant to the government. But it seems to me that where the government is responsible for the deliberate tactical delay in the formal institution of criminal proceedings for almost the entire limitations period, without notice to the accused, we would well be justified in imposing on the government the burden of proving the absence of prejudice, difficult though that burden may be to sustain.