Court Opinion

ID: 9616383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:46:25.489591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:58.027657
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the juvenile court’s termination of appellant’s parental rights. Based on testimony of a child psychologist that the mother is a “non-entity” in the child’s life; that there is an absence of a mother-son relationship between the two; and that the child should be permanently placed so that he can develop stability, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the continued deprivation of the child will cause or is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child. I cannot agree that this testimony establishes by clear and convincing evidence the requisite harm under OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A) (iv) inasmuch as there is no evidence in the record of any action on the part of appellant which has caused, or is likely to cause, harm to the child. Compare In re G. M. N., 183 Ga. App. 458, 460 (359 SE2d 217) (1987) (evidence that the natural mother “drank heavily” and was “in and out of jail”); In the Interest of J. M. K., 189 Ga. App. 140, 141 (375 SE2d 131) (1988) (evidence that the natural father left the children outside at 5:30 a.m. in the pouring rain); In the Interest of A. T., 187 Ga. App. 299 (1) (370 SE2d 48) (1988) (evidence that the natural mother physically abused the child and withheld medical care). The danger which is inherent in the juvenile court’s order is that the “harm” requirement under OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A) (iv) can be met by merely establishing that the child is in an indefinite foster-care situation, without any showing that the parent whose rights are sought to be terminated forever has done anything, or is likely to do anything, to cause physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child.
“Georgia law has consistently favored the preservation of the relationship between biological parents and their children” (Murphy v. Suddeth, 189 Ga. App. 212 (1) (375 SE2d 253) (1988)), and “[t]his *750court has long recognized that termination of parental rights is a severe measure. [Cit.]” In re N. F. R., 179 Ga. App. 346, 348 (346 SE2d 121) (1986). The court is authorized to consider, “as an element in continued deprivation under [OCGA] § 15-11-81 (a) (4), and as a matter of the child’s best interest in its ‘need for a stable and secure home’ under § 15-11-81 (a), the severe detrimental effects of prolonged stay in foster care undér the ephemeral hope of change but without the real prospect of parental improvement that would justify such a prolonged stay in foster care. . . ” In re G. M. N., 183 Ga. App. 458 (1) (359 SE2d 217) (1987). However, “[a] court is not allowed to terminate a parent’s natural right because it has determined that the child might have better financial, educational, or even moral advantages elsewhere.” In re L. L. B., 178 Ga. App. 235, 238 (342 SE2d 715) (1986).
Decided November 30, 1989.
Conrad & Abernathy, Steven M. Campbell, for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Carol A. Cosgrove, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Kipling L. McVay, for appellee.
While giving due deference to the juvenile court as the trier of fact, I do not find that the requirement of OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (4) (A) (iv) was met by clear and convincing evidence; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Presiding Judge McMurray, and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.