Court Opinion

ID: 9832632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:04:29.768662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:49.795403
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[8] We cannot assent to the appellants’ insistence that it is our duty to render judgment here on the verdict of the jury rather than to remand the cause. While, as we have held, the literal meaning of the issue submitted was not confined to the requirement of a finding as to the value of the seven-sixteenths interest in the lease, and the court was not warranted in placing such construction on the verdict and rendering the judgment accordingly, yet the record and manner of the submission of the issue is such that it is not clear that the jury understood just what was submitted to them. The issue submitted, “What was the reasonable market value of the lease and the wells, etc.?” conceding that there was no intention to limit the finding to the seven-sixteenths interest, is ambiguous. The value of the oil lease would not be the same as the value of the wells, taking the language literally. The value of the lease would be diminished by the one-eighth royalty charge due the lessor, while the value of the wells would include both the lessor’s and lessee’s interest. The evidence, as we have suggested, tends to show that the interest sold to plaintiffs, being an “operating” interest, might not be of the same value as an “overriding” seven-sixteenths interest owned by the Burk-Brunson & Calloway Company. It was the duty of the court to submit only issues made by the pleading and on the answer to which judgment might be rendered. The jury, composed of reasonable men, probably knew that the court was submitting issues of fact made by the pleading, and that their answers would be the basis of the judgment. They were likely to have been confused as to the meaning of this issue, and may have concluded that the court was submitting the issue made by the pleading, and which he should have submitted; that is, the value of the interest in the lease sold to the plaintiffs. The trial court knew how he understood the question and was in position to know what meaning was given to it in the argument of the case before the'jury, and we must assume was impressed with the belief that the jury attached the same meaning to the issue as did the trial court. If we should render the judgment here, we would deprive the appellees of the opportunity of showing thS facts as to the argument of the case, etc., as might lead to the conclusion that it would be unjust to render judgment on a construction of the issue which was not adopted in the argument of the case to the jury. There are a number of authorities which sustain us in principle in the conclusion that we ought not, under such circumstances, render judgment here. Howeth v. Anderson, 25 Tex. 557, 573, 78 Am. Dec. 538; H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. State, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 117, 56 S. W. 231, concluding sentence of opinion; Gose v. Coryell, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 504, 126 S. W. 1168. In Howeth v. Anderson, the Supreme Court said:
“The view we have taken of the case would lead to the rendition of judgment for the de*417fendants upon the verdict, but, as that might deprive the plaintiff of having the case revised upon the evidence, as he might have done had the judgment been adverse to him in the court below, and he might'suffer an injustice by the ease taking a direction which he was not bound to anticipate, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.”
So in this case, if the trial court had finally adopted the construction of the verdict insisted upon by appellants, appellees would have had an opportunity of presenting in a motion for new trial, all the facts which would make it inequitable for the court to render a judgment upon such construction and a rendition of the judgment here would deprive them of this opportunity. In the case of Moore v. Moore, 67 Tex. 293, 3 S. W. 285, where there was a controversy as to the construction of the verdict, it was said:
“It may be that the court correctly interpreted the language of the jury, or it may be that they agreed only that defendant was entitled to one half the land, and failed to agree upon the issues involving the question of title to the other half. As to the true construction of such a verdict, neither the lower court nor this court is permitted to speculate. The verdict must find all the issues made by the pleadings in language which does not admit of mistake. It .should be the end, and not the continuation, of the controversy.”
We adhere to our former judgment, and the motion for rehearing will be overruled.