Court Opinion

ID: 9584459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:48:34.058032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:54.283766
License: Public Domain

*127HUNTER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting defendant’s statement to Officer Mashni that he had some crack in his coat pocket because the officer failed to advise defendant of his Miranda warnings prior to the custodial interrogation. However, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the trial court’s erroneous admission of defendant’s incriminating statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b) (2001). In addition, I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the cocaine, which was found as a result of the Miranda violation, was properly admitted since defendant’s statement was not the product of coercion. However, I disagree with the majority’s determination that “even assuming defendant’s statement was coerced, the cocaine would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine . . . .” Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would vacate defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
A violation of a defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the State demonstrates that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b). In order for an Appellate Court to conclude that the State has met its burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court must be convinced “that ‘there is no reasonable possibility’ that the erroneous admission of evidence ‘might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” State v. Hooper, 318 N.C. 680, 682, 351 S.E.2d 286, 288 (1987) (quoting State v. Castor, 285 N.C. 286, 292, 204 S.E.2d 848, 853 (1974)). The presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt may render a constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Autry, 321 N.C. 392, 400, 364 S.E.2d 341, 346 (1988).
In the instant case, the admission of defendant’s statement to Officer Mashni that he had some crack in his coat pocket was highly inflammatory on the issue of whether defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine. The State’s evidence as to whether defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine, excluding defendant’s statement, is hardly overwhelming. In fact, the only evidence against defendant is that cocaine, discovered as a result of a Miranda violation, was found inside the coat defendant was wearing. Thus, without the admission of defendant’s incriminating statement, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have had reasonable doubt as to whether defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine and returned a different *128verdict. Therefore, I conclude the State has not met its burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, by showing that there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneous admission of the statement might have contributed to the conviction. Accordingly, I would vacate defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that defendant’s statement was not the product of coercion and therefore, the cocaine found as a result of the Miranda violation was properly admitted. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that “even assuming defendant’s statement was coerced, the cocaine would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine .. . .” Pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine,
evidence which would otherwise be excluded because it was illegally seized may be admitted into evidence if the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered by the law enforcement officers if it had not been found as a result of the illegal action.
State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 106, 114, 423 S.E.2d 740, 744 (1992) (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984)).
In the case sub judice, during the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the State did not present evidence material to, nor did the trial court address, the inevitable discovery doctrine. Our Supreme Court has previously stated: “Whether this exception [to the exclusionary rule] is applicable is initially a question to be addressed by the trial court....” State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 116, 117, 423 S.E.2d 746, 746 (1992). Since the inevitable discovery doctrine was never raised in defendant’s motion hearing not its applicability considered by the trial court, it is improper for this Court to determine that “even assuming defendant’s statement was coerced, the cocaine would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine ....” In addition, during the suppression hearing, the State failed to present any evidence that the cocaine would have been inevitably discovered. Thus, the State did not meet the necessary burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the cocaine would have been inevitably discovered by the law enforcement officers if it had not been found as a result of the Miranda violation. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that even if the statement had been coerced, the evidence would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery exception.