Court Opinion

ID: 9894478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 19:14:37.636796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:52.171391
License: Public Domain

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                 2023 Fall Term                              FILED
                            _____________________                  November 1, 2023
                                                                         released at 3:00 p.m.

                                No. 22-ICA-83                        EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                   INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
                            _____________________                        OF WEST VIRGINIA

                     SWN PRODUCTION COMPANY, LLC,
                          Plaintiff Below, Petitioner,

                                        v.

                          CITY OF WEIRTON and
              CITY OF WEIRTON BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS,
                       Defendants Below, Respondents.

       ___________________________________________________________

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court of Brooke County
                        Honorable Jason A. Cuomo, Judge
                   Nos. CC-05-2021-P-35 & CC-05-2021-C-71

                               REVERSED
        _________________________________________________________

                         Submitted: September 19, 2023
                            Filed: November 1, 2023

Shawn N. Gallagher, Esq.                       Ryan P. Simonton, Esq.
Kathleen Jones Goldman, Esq.                   Margaret E. Lewis
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC                 Kay Casto & Chaney, PLLC
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania                       Morgantown, West Virginia
Counsel for Petitioner
                                               Vincent S. Gurrera, Esq.
                                               Gurrera Law Offices, PLLC
                                               Weirton, West Virginia
                                              Daniel J. Guida, Esq.
                                              Guida Law Office
                                              Weirton, West Virginia
                                              Counsel for Respondent City of
                                              Weirton

JUDGE SCARR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SCARR, JUDGE:

              Petitioner, SWN Production Company, LLC (“SWN”), appeals the August

23, 2022, “Order Regarding Pre-Emption” entered by the Circuit Court of Brooke County.

In that order, the circuit court concluded that Respondent City of Weirton’s (“City”)

municipal zoning ordinances were not preempted by either the West Virginia Oil and Gas

Act or the Natural Gas Horizontal Well Control Act (“Horizontal Well Act”). 1 On appeal,

SWN argues that the circuit court erred by failing to recognize that the Horizontal Well

Act delegates “sole and exclusive authority” over all aspects of the permitting and location

of oil and gas exploration and production activities to the Secretary of the West Virginia

Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”).

              For the reasons discussed below, this Court reverses the August 23, 2022,

“Order Regarding Pre-Emption,” entered by the Circuit Court of Brooke County.

                          I. Facts and Procedural Background

              SWN Production Company, LLC is a Texas-based natural gas exploration

and production company. The City of Weirton is a Class II city 2 located in the northern

panhandle.

       The Oil and Gas Act is codified within West Virginia Code § 22-6-1 et seq. The
       1

Horizontal Well Act is codified within West Virginia Code § 22-6A-1 et seq.
       2
        West Virginia Code § 8-1-3 (1969) classifies cities with a population between
10,000 and 50,000 as Class II.
                                             1
              On June 11, 2021, SWN submitted its application for a conditional use permit

to the City in order to obtain local zoning approval under the City’s then existing Unified

Development Ordinance (“UDO”) for drilling at a well site located on a parcel within the

City known as the Brownlee Site. Under the UDO, the setback requirement for drilling

sites was 200 feet from any residential, church, or school use.

              On July 7, 2021, the City enacted a new Unified Development Ordinance

(“NUDO”) which increased the setback requirement to 2,500 feet from any residential,

church, or school use and removed oil and gas extraction as a permitted conditional use

anywhere in the City except for industrial-zoned districts. The Brownlee Site is not within

an industrial zone.

              On August 3, 2021, and September 7, 2021, the City of Weirton Board of

Zoning Appeals (“Board”) conducted hearings on SWN’s application for a conditional use

permit. On October 1, 2021, the Board issued its written decision denying SWN’s

application. The Board reasoned that “SWN has failed to prove that the proposed

conditional use is compatible with the goals of the [City’s] Comprehensive Plan, including

objective 2.3, which provides[,] in part[,] that future development in the Three Springs

Drive area should be managed ‘to avoid worsening traffic congestion and additional stress

on other existing infrastructure.’”

                                             2
              On October 18, 2021, SWN applied to the West Virginia Department of

Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”) for permits to drill for and develop natural gas at

the Brownlee Site. On February 8, 2022, WVDEP issued SWN Well Work Permit No. 47-

009-00328-00-00 for the Brownlee Site.

              On October 29, 2021, SWN filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the

Circuit Court of Brooke County seeking review of the Board’s denial of SWN’s conditional

use permit. Also on October 29, 2021, SWN filed a Verified Complaint against the City in

the Circuit Court of Brooke County. The Verified Complaint sought to have the circuit

court declare that the West Virginia Oil and Gas Act preempted the UDO and NUDO. The

Verified Complaint also asserted a claim for a taking by the City, as well as a count seeking

injunctive relief to prevent the City from enforcing the UDO or NUDO. On March 14,

2022, the circuit court issued an order consolidating the two matters. In that order, the

circuit court also stayed the issues presented in the Writ of Certiorari until the circuit court

made a final determination on the preemption issues presented by the Verified Complaint.

On March 29, 2022, SWN filed its First Amended Verified Complaint which set forth the

same causes of action as the Verified Complaint but added information about the WVDEP

permit for the Brownlee Site.

              No discovery was conducted on the preemption issue and there was no

hearing. On August 23, 2022, the circuit court issued its “Order Regarding Pre-Emption.”

In that order, the circuit court held that the Legislature did not intend for West Virginia

                                               3
Code § 22-6-1 et seq. or West Virginia Code § 22-6A-1 et seq. to expressly or impliedly

preempt the authority of municipalities to enact reasonable and rational zoning ordinances

under West Virginia Code § 8A-1-1 et seq. The circuit court interpreted those statutes to

mean:

             [T]he operation…and… permitting of [oil and gas] companies
             is…to be “largely, if not completely, regulated by the
             [WVDEP]; and that local municipalities, although not
             permitted to completely ban the lawful operation of oil and gas
             companies within their city limits, are permitted to pass
             reasonable and rational zoning ordinances/regulations to allow
             said companies to operate therein while protecting the health,
             welfare, and safety of its citizens.”

             The circuit court then noted: “If the Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia wants to tell our communities they have lost that ability…then it will have to do

so without having had any express direction from our [L]egislature.” The circuit court

dismissed SWN’s preemption count from its amended complaint, lifted the stay on the

issues presented in the Writ of Certiorari, and permitted the parties to proceed with

discovery on all other remaining issues. It is from this order that SWN appeals to the

Intermediate Court of Appeals.

             On September 15, 2023, four days before oral argument, this Court was

notified by the City’s counsel that the NUDO enacted on June 7, 2021, was repealed by the

City on or about September 11, 2023, re-enacting the previous UDO adopted in 2005. Oral

argument was held before this Court on September 19, 2023, with all parties appearing in

person.

                                            4
                                 II. Standard of Review

              “A circuit court’s entry of a declaratory judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl.

Pt. 3, Cox v. Amick, 195 W. Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995). Our decision in this case

requires an examination of various statutory provisions and resolutions of questions of law.

“Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law involving

an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” City of Morgantown

v. Nuzum Trucking Co., 237 W. Va. 226, 230, 786 S.E.2d 486, 490 (2016) (quoting Syl.

Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995)).

                                      III. Discussion

              As a preliminary matter, this Court notes that the City’s recent repeal of the

NUDO, raises the issue of mootness. The repealed ordinance appears to have eliminated

the primary setback requirement at issue in this case; however, during oral argument, the

parties indicated that there were and are still additional steps and regulatory requirements

under the re-enacted UDO from 2005 before SWN may proceed with drilling, even after

the WVDEP had issued them a permit to begin doing so. 3 Thus, this Court finds that this

       3
         Additionally, SWN argues that both the UDO and NUDO are facially preempted.
Further, this Court is not aware of the additional requirements that SWN must complete
before the City will issue them a permit to begin drilling.
                                             5
matter is not moot, and even if it were, it would fall into one of the exceptions to the

mootness doctrine. 4

               SWN argues that the circuit court erred by determining that municipal zoning

regulations are neither expressly or impliedly preempted by the West Virginia Oil and Gas

Act, West Virginia Code § 22-6-1 et seq., as amended to address horizontal drilling by

West Virginia Code § 22-6A-1 et seq., where the Horizontal Well Act delegates “sole and

exclusive authority” over all aspects of the permitting and location of oil and gas

exploration and production activities to the Secretary of the West Virginia Department of

Environmental Protection.

      4
          The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated:

               “Three factors to be considered in deciding whether to address
               technically moot issues are as follows: first, the court will
               determine whether sufficient collateral consequences will
               result from determination of the questions presented so as to
               justify relief; second, while technically moot in the immediate
               context, questions of great public interest may nevertheless be
               addressed for future guidance of the bar and of the public; and
               third, issues which may be repeatedly presented to the trial
               court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of their
               fleeting and determinate nature, may appropriately be
               decided.”

        Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. W. Va. Secondary Sch. Activities Comm’n. v. Cuomo, __ W.
Va. __, 880 S.E.2d 46 (2022) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Israel ex rel. v. W. Va. Secondary Sch.
Activities Comm’n., 182 W. Va. 454, 388 S.E.2d 480 (1989)).
                                              6
              The City argues in response that there is no express or implied preemption

of its local zoning laws within West Virginia Code § 22-6-1 et seq., and the City has

specific authority to adopt zoning laws under the Land Use Planning Act, West Virginia

Code § 8A-7-1 et seq.

   A. Legislative Acts

              Because our analysis requires this Court to reconcile the meaning of West

Virginia Code § 22-6-1 et seq., and § 22-6A-6 et seq. with West Virginia Code § 8A-1-1

et seq., we must attempt to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. 5 Smith v. State

Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975) (“The primary object

in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.”) “A

statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative

intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.” City of

Morgantown v. Nuzum Trucking Co., 237 W. Va. 226, 230, 786 S.E.2d 486, 490 (2016)

(quoting Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951)).

       5
        This opinion only addresses preemption in regard to the West Virginia Code § 22-
6A-1 et seq., the horizontal well act. This Court notes that this act was enacted after the
already existing West Virginia Oil and Gas Act, amending it for the sole purpose of
addressing horizontal drilling.
                                              7
             Under Chapter 22 of the West Virginia Code, titled “Environmental

Resources” our Legislature created the West Virginia Department of Environmental

Protection (“DEP”) for the purpose of:

             [C]arry[ing] out the environmental functions of government in
             the most efficient and cost[-]effective manner, to protect
             human health and safety, and to the greatest degree practicable,
             to prevent injury to plant, animal and aquatic life, improve and
             maintain the quality of life of our citizens, and promote
             economic development consistent with environmental goals
             and standards.

W. Va. Code § 22-1-1(a)(5) (2001).

             Further, the Legislature declared that:

             It is the policy of the State of West Virginia, in cooperation
             with other governmental agencies, public and private
             organizations, and the citizens of the state, to use all practicable
             means and measures to prevent or eliminate harm to the
             environment and biosphere, to create and maintain conditions
             under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,
             and fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
             present and future generations. The purpose of this chapter are:

             (1) To strengthen the commitment of this state to restore,
                 maintain and protect the environment;

             (2) To consolidate environmental regulatory programs in a
                 single state agency;…

             (8) To improve the management and effectiveness of state
                 environmental protection programs;

W. Va. Code § 22-1-1(b).

                                              8
              Specifically, the West Virginia Oil and Gas Act provides that the Secretary

of the WVDEP (or their designee) “shall have as his or her duty the supervision of the

execution and enforcement of matters related to oil and gas set out in § 22-6-1 et seq.[]

[and] § 22-6A-1 et seq.… of this code.” W. Va. Code § 22-6-2(a) (2023). Also, “[t]he

[S]ecretary shall have full charge of the oil and gas matter set out in § 22-6-1 et seq.[] [and]

§ 22-6A-1 et seq….of this code.” W. Va. Code § 22-6-2(c). Further, the secretary shall

“[p]erform all duties as the permit issuing authority for the state in all matters pertaining to

the exploration, development, production, storage and recovery of this state’s oil and gas.”

W. Va. Code § 22-6-2(c)(15). 6 “[T]he Legislature has made it clear…that all environmental

programs in West Virginia are to be regulated by the D[epartment] of Environmental

Protection.” Solid Waste Serv. of W. Va. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 188 W. Va. 117, 122, 422

S.E.2d 839, 844 (1992).

   B. Preemption

              As a general rule, “preemption is disfavored in the absence of convincing

evidence warranting its application.” In re Flood Litigation, 216 W. Va. 534, 547, 607

       6
         The Secretary is also empowered to “[a]dopt rules with respect to the issuance,
denial, retention, suspension or revocation of permits authorizations and requirements of
this chapter, which rules shall assure that the rules, permits, and authorizations issued by
the [S]ecretary are adequate to satisfy the purposes of § 22-6-1 et seq., [] [and] § 22-6A-1
et seq. … of this code….” W. Va. Code § 22-6-2(c)(16).

                                               9
S.E.2d 863, 876 (2004) (quoting Hartley Marine Corp. v. Mierke, 196 W. Va. 669, 673,

474 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1996)). “As a result, there is a strong presumption that [the

Legislature] does not intend to preempt areas of traditional [municipal] regulation.” Id.

(quoting Chevy Chase Bank v. McCamant, 204 W. Va. 195, 300, 512 S.E.2d 217, 222

(1998)). Nevertheless, where supported preemption may either be express or implied. See

id. “To establish a case of express preemption requires proof that Congress, through

specific language, preempted the specific field covered by state law…. To prevail on a

claim of implied preemption, ‘evidence of a congressional intent to pre-empt the specific

filed covered by state law’ must be pinpointed.” Id. (quoting Hartley, 196 W. Va. at 674,

474 S.E.2d at 604).

              “A municipal corporation is a creature of the State[] and can only perform

such functions of government as may have been conferred by the constitution[] or

delegated to it by the law-making authority of the State.” Syl. Pt. 1, Toler v. City of

Huntington, 153 W. Va. 313, 168 S.E.2d 551 (1969) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Brackman’s Inc.

v. City of Huntington, 126 W. Va. 21, 27 S.E.2d 71 (1943)). “A municipal corporation has

only the powers granted to it by the [L]egislature, and any such power it possesses must be

expressly granted or necessarily or fairly implied or essential and indispensable. If any

reasonable doubt exists as to whether a municipal corporation has a power, the power must

be denied.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Charleston v. Hutchinson, 154 W. Va. 585, 176 S.E.2d

691 (1970). “When a provision of a municipal ordinance is inconsistent or in conflict with

a statute enacted by the Legislature the statute prevails and the municipal ordinance is of

                                            10
no force and effect.” Syl. Pt. 1, Davidson v. Shoney’s Big Boy Rest., 181 W. Va. 65, 380

S.E.2d 232 (1989) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Vector Co. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 155 W. Va.

362, 184 S.E.2d 301 (1971)); see also Brackman’s Inc., 126 W. Va. at __, 27 S.E.2d at 78

(any inconsistency between state and local law “must be resolved in favor of the State”).

A municipal ordinance conflicts with a state statute if it espouses a view that is inconsistent

and irreconcilable with that contained in a state statute. See Vector Co, 155 W. Va. at 366-

67, 184 S.E.2d at 304 (1971).

   i.     Express Preemption

              First, SWN argues that the Legislature in enacting West Virginia Code § 22-

6A-6(b) (2011) plainly and expressly stated its intent to preempt the entire field of oil and

gas regulation, even in those areas that are traditionally left to local zoning ordinances,

such as site location. Specifically, West Virginia Code § 22-6A-6(b) provides that:

              Except for the duties and obligations conferred by statute upon
              the shallow gas well review board pursuant to article eight,
              chapter twenty-two-c of this code, the coalbed methane review
              board pursuant to article twenty-one of this chapter, and the oil
              and gas conservation commission pursuant to article nine,
              chapter twenty-two-c of this code, the [WVDEP] has sole and
              exclusive authority to regulate the permitting, location,
              spacing, drilling, fracturing, stimulation, well completion
              activities, operation, any and all other drilling and production
              processes, plugging and reclamation of oil and gas wells and
              production operations within the state.

(Emphasis Added).

                                              11
              In response the City argues that there is no provision in the Land Use

Planning Act that exempts oil and gas development from zoning laws. Further, the City

asserts that the Legislature did address zoning applications to oil and gas development

specifically within the Land Use Planning Act and chose not to prohibit zoning. West

Virginia Code § 8A-7-10(3) (2004) provides that:

              Nothing in this chapter authorizes an ordinance, rule or
              regulation preventing or limiting, outside of municipalities or
              urban areas, the complete use (i) of natural resources by the
              owner; or (ii) of a tract of contiguous tracts of land of any size
              for a farm or agricultural operation as defined in § 19-19-2 by
              the owner.

              The Legislature is well aware of how to preempt zoning laws when it intends

to do so. In the Land Use Planning Act, it made express preemptions for other uses: group

residential facilities must be permitted in all residential districts pursuant to West Virginia

Code § 8A-11-1; essential utilities and equipment are a permitted use in any zoning district,

West Virginia Code § 8A-7-3(e). This shows that the Legislature is presumed to know the

effect of its actions, and it will speak clearly when it intends to preempt another law.

              To establish a case of express preemption requires proof that the legislature,

through specific and plain language in the statute, preempted the specific field covered by

local law. See Morgan v. Ford Motor Co., 224 W. Va. 62, 69-70, 680 S.E.2d 77, 84-85

(2009). However, this Court finds it unnecessary to engage in a more exhaustive express

preemption analysis because, in this case, West Virginia Code § 22-6-1 et seq., and § 22-

                                              12
6A-6 et seq. clearly preempt the City’s NUDO (which has been repealed) and UDO under

implied conflict preemption. 7

   ii.       Implied Preemption

               Where a law does not expressly preempt other laws, it may still operate to

preempt them if it is intended to occupy the entire regulatory field or if there exists a

conflict between the laws such that compliance with both is impossible. See Morgan, 224

W. Va. 62, 680 S.E.2d 77, 85 (2009) at fn. 8. There are two types of implied preemption,

which are field preemption and conflict preemption. See In re Flood Litigation, 216 W.

Va. 534, 547, 607 S.E.2d 863, 876 (2004). 8

                      [F]ield pre-emption[] [occurs] where the scheme of
               federal regulation is “ ‘ so pervasive as to make reasonable the
               inference that Congress left no room for the States to
               supplement it,’” and conflict pre-emption[] [occurs] where
               “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a

         In reaching our decision, we take no position on the policy issues raised by these
         7

preemption arguments before us in regard to express preemption, leaving that up to the
Legislature. Preemption clearly raises issues of line drawing between different state
statutes enacted by the Legislature, and although there are certainly opposing arguments
that can and have been made in regard to express preemption, we find that there is sufficient
direction by the Legislature to conclude the City’s ordinance is preempted under implied
conflict preemption.

        The parties also dispute whether West Virginia Code § 22-6A-1 et seq., impliedly
         8

preempts the City under implied field preemption. However, because this Court finds that
implied conflict preemption resolves that matter before us, we will not engage in an
analysis of implied field preemption.
                                             13
              physical impossibility,” or where state law “stands as an
              obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
              purposes and objectives of Congress[.]”

Id. (citation omitted).

              On appeal, SWN argues that the Horizontal Well Act directly conflicts with

the specific requirements of the City’s ordinances. For example, the Horizontal Well Act

provides that “the center of well pads may not be located within six hundred twenty-five

feet of an occupied dwelling structure.” See W. Va. Code § 22-6A-12 (2011). In contrast,

the NUDO, which only permits oil and gas extraction in the City’s industrial districts,

provides that “[n]o well may be located closer than two thousand five hundred (2,500) feet

of any residential, church or school use.” See NUDO § 9.6.20(a). Further, SWN asserts that

even under the now re-enacted UDO, the Horizontal Well Act and the local zoning

ordinance have fundamental conflicts, because the UDO purports to vest final approval of

well locations in a body other than WVDEP. The City’s approval scheme is in direct

conflict with the Horizontal Well Act’s express language, which vests WVDEP with “sole

and exclusive” authority to regulate the “permitting” and “location” of horizontal gas wells.

W. Va. Code § 22-6A-8(d) (2011). SWN argues that this language in the Horizontal Well

Act cannot be reconciled with the City’s local ordinance which provides requirements or

vests final approval in a body other than the WVDEP. We agree.

              In response, the City argues that there is a false conflict between the City’s

local ordinance under the Land Use Planning Act and the Horizontal Well Act. The zoning

                                             14
regulations at issue make no attempt to regulate the operation of oil and gas wells governed

by Chapter 22, Article 6. The City relies on Longwell v. Hodge, 171 W. Va. 45, 297 S.E.2d

820 (1982), where the Supreme Court of Appeals found a false conflict, stating:

              What we have here is the perfect example of a “false conflict.”
              The State, by licensing the sale of beer, neither acquires, nor
              seeks to acquire, any positive interest in the operation of
              taverns or restaurants selling beer at particular locations within
              municipalities. Rather, the State’s interest is defensive, to
              assure that beer is not sold by an “unsuitable person” or in an
              “unsuitable place.” See W. Va. Code § 11-16-12 [1972]. Thus,
              to the extent that a municipality is not seeking to encroach on
              the licensing or taxing authority the State holds unto itself, the
              municipality may zone either to allow or not allow beer-selling
              restaurants just as it may zone other land uses.

Longwell, 171 W. Va. at 49, 297 S.E.2d at 824.

              Conflict preemption arises where a state statute and municipal ordinance are

in direct conflict, where a municipal ordinance stands as an added obstacle to an already

enacted legislative statute. See Metro Tristate, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 245

W. Va. 495, 504, 859 S.E.2d 438, 447 (2021) (“Conflict preemption arises from a direct

clash between state and federal law, and ‘conventional conflict pre-emption principles

require pre-emption “where […] state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and

execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”’”) (quoting Boggs v. Boggs,

520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997)). Under conflict preemption, municipal ordinances are preempted

                                             15
where they directly conflict with a statute enacted by the Legislature. See Id. 9 “When a

provision of a municipal ordinance is inconsistent or in conflict with a statute enacted by

the Legislature the statute prevails and the municipal ordinance is of no force and effect.”

Syl. Pt. 2, Am. Tower Corp. v. Common Council of Beckley, 210 W. Va. 345, 557 S.E.2d

752 (2001) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Vector Co., 155 W. Va. at 362, 367, 184 S.E.2d at 301,

304). Further, the West Virginia Constitution provides that “any such law or ordinance so

adopted, shall be invalid and void if inconsistent or in conflict with this Constitution or the

general laws of the State then in effect, or thereafter, from time to time enacted.” W. Va.

Const. art. VI, § 39a.

              Under West Virginia Code § 22-6-1 et seq. as amended by West Virginia

Code § 22-6A-1 et seq., the Legislature explicitly set forth a comprehensive framework for

the application for oil well permits. The applicant is required to specifically set forth the

type of well, the location, the depth, the purpose of the well, and fees associated with the

well, etc. See W. Va. Code §§ 22-6A-7, 9; see also W. Va. Code § 22-6-6(c) (1994). The

Horizontal Well Act provides that the WVDEP may not issue a drilling permit if it

determines that: “(1) The proposed well work will constitute a hazard to the safety of

persons; (2) The plan for soil erosion and sediment control is not adequate or effective; (3)

Damage would occur to publicly owned lands or resources; or (4) The proposed well work

       9
        “Under an implied conflict preemption analysis, federal statutory or policy
language explicitly signaling an intent to preempt state law is not necessary.” Metro, 245
W. Va. at 504, 869 S.E.2d at 447.
                                              16
fails to protect fresh water sources or supplies.” 10 W. Va. Code § 22-6A-8(d). Additionally,

the WVDEP must confirm that all well location restrictions set forth in the Horizontal Well

Act have been satisfied. See W. Va. Code § 22-6A-8(e). Finally, the WVDEP is tasked

with promptly reviewing and considering all comments raised by the public and appeals of

applications. 11 See W. Va. Code §§ 22-6A-8(f), 9. The circuit court held that because the

City is generally empowered by the Land Use Planning Act, West Virginia Code § 8A-7-

1, to enact traditional zoning laws, and that the Land Use Planning Act does not specifically

limit the City’s ability to regulate oil and gas, the City retains the power to enact and

regulate oil and gas through its zoning laws; even when a permit has been approved

authorizing a proposed well in a specific location.

              Here, the objective terms of the Horizontal Well Act directly conflict with

the additional requirements of the City’s ordinance. On October 1, 2021, the Board issued

its written decision denying SWN’s application. The Board reasoned that “SWN has failed

to prove that the proposed conditional use is compatible with the goals of the

Comprehensive Plan, including objective 2.3, which provides, in part, that future

development in the Three Springs Drive area should be managed ‘to avoid worsening

       10
         The Director is given the sole discretion to authorize or deny the issuance of a
permit on the basis of numerous factors. See W. Va. Code §§ 22-6-6(h), 11.
       11
          Further, pursuant to West Virginia Code §§ 22-6-9, -17, the regulations further
state the specific requirements for notice to property owners, the procedure for filing
comments, the process for setting hearings upon objections to such drilling, as well as the
procedures for an appeal process.
                                             17
traffic congestion and additional stress on other existing infrastructure.’” On October 18,

2021, SWN applied to the WVDEP for permits to drill for and develop natural gas at the

Brownlee Site. On February 8, 2022, WVDEP issued SWN Well Work Permit No. 47-009-

00328-00-00 for the Brownlee Site.

              Clearly, under the now repealed NUDO there was a direct conflict between

the state statute and city ordinance. Under the City’s NUDO the setback requirement was

2,500 feet, while the state only requires a setback requirement of 625 feet. See W. Va. Code

§ 22-6A-12; see also NUDO § 9.6.20(a). These setback requirements cannot be reconciled

and are in direct conflict with each other. Further, to the extent that the City’s re-enacted

UDO has other requirements which conflict with the state statute, it is also preempted under

conflict preemption. 12 Even absent express preemption, the City’s ordinance is in direct

conflict with the state’s Horizontal Well Act, where the Legislature has vested in the

WVDEP sole and exclusive authority to regulate the permitting, location, and any and all

other drilling and productions processes of oil and gas wells and production operations

within the state. See W. Va. Code § 22-6A-6(b). 13

       12
          This Court is not saying that fees or certain paperwork create a direct conflict,
however, to the extent that SWN must go through further hearings or administrative
procedures, and/or there are other regulatory requirements that conflict, a direct conflict
exists between the City’s UDO and the WVDEP’s authority to grant permits.
       13
         See EQT Prod. Co. v. Wender, 870 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2017). There, a county
commission, relying on its general authority to abate public nuisances, issued a blanket ban
on all disposal of wastewater from drilling operations within county lines based on
concerns that wastewater storage locations were leaking wastewater into local waterways.
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              Once the WVDEP issued a permit, the City cannot hinder SWN’s ability to

begin drilling. The City’s approval scheme is in direct conflict with the Horizontal Well

Act which vests WVDEP with “sole and exclusive authority” to regulate the “permitting”

and “location” of horizontal gas wells. See W. Va. Code § 22-6A-8(b). This language

cannot be reconciled with the City’s position that a municipality retains the authority to

require zoning approval for an oil or gas well that has already been approved under the

state’s permitting program.

                                     IV. Conclusion

              For the foregoing reasons, this Court reverses the August 23, 2022, “Order

Regarding Pre-Emption,” entered by the Circuit Court of Brooke County.

                                                                                Reversed.

See Id. The storage and disposal of wastewater is specifically regulated by the WVDEP
who is charged with protecting against water pollution arising from oil and gas production.
See Id. In EQT, the Fourth Circuit held that the county’s ordinance created a conflict with
the WVDEP’s statutory authority and was preempted by state law. See Id. at 332, 336-37.
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