Court Opinion

ID: 9696496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:49:23.630272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:22.900134
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ZAZZALI,
dissenting.
This Court has a duty to reconcile outdated formulations of the common law with the complexities of contemporary society. See Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 21-22, 76 A.2d 877 (1950). The common law must “stand ready to adapt as appropriate, to shape, redress, and remedy so as to answer measure for measure the particular *441evil it pursues.” Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F.Supp.2d 259, 318 (S.D.N.Y.2001), rev’d on other grounds, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir.2004).
Accordingly, I would not allow those responsible for polluting this State’s residential environment to avoid liability simply because past applications of the public nuisance doctrine do not mirror the circumstances of this appeal. Because I find that the public nuisance doctrine is an appropriate and efficient means for vindicating the public’s right to be free from the harmful effects of lead paint, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Lead paint is a deadly toxin that permeates the structural environment of this State. The effects of lead poisoning are well-documented:
Lead is highly toxic and affects virtually every system of the body. At high exposure levels, lead poisoning can cause coma, convulsions, and death. While adults can suffer from excessive lead exposures, the groups most at risk are fetuses, infants, and children under age six. At low levels, the neurotoxic effects of lead have the greatest impact on children’s developing brains and nervous systems, causing reductions in IQ and attention span, reading and learning disabilities, hyperactivity, and behavioral problems. These effects have been identified in many carefully controlled research studies. However, the vast majority of childhood lead-poisoning cases go undiagnosed and untreated, since most poisoned children have no obvious symptoms.
[Office of Lead-Based Paint Abatement and Poisoning Prevention, 61 Fed-Reg. 29170-71 (June 7,1996) (citations omitted).]
Children need not ingest lead paint directly to be at risk. Because lead does not “dissipate, biodegrade, or decay,” all lead paint not properly extracted remains in the State’s environment, and children are not safe from exposure simply because their residence has been decontaminated. Comment, Karla A. Francken, Lead Based Paint Poisoning Liability: Wisconsin Realtors, Residential Property Sellers, and Landlords Beware, 77 Marq. L.Rev. 550, 559 (1994). Paint chips and particles pollute dust and soil, which children subsequently inhale or ingest. See Thomas F. Zimmerman, The Regulation of Lead-Based Paint in Air Force Housing, 44 A.F.L.Rev. 169, 172 (1998). The usual wear and tear *442associated with the use of walls, windows, and doors introduces the toxin into our environment. Ibid. The federal Department of Housing and Urban Development, therefore, has identified lead poisoning as “the most common environmental disease of young children, eclipsing all other environmental health hazards found in the residential environment.” Office of Lead-Based Paint Abatement and Poisoning Prevention, supra, 61 Fed.Reg. at 29170 (emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
That contamination harms thousands of New Jersey’s children. The most recent survey of blood-lead levels in New Jersey revealed that 3.12% of children tested were suffering from lead poisoning.1 New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, Childhood Lead Poisoning in New Jersey, Annual Report Fiscal Year 2003 11 (2004) [hereinafter Childhood Lead Poisoning ]. As amicus Public Advocate of New Jersey observes, if that percentage is extrapolated across the relevant population, there are approximately 18,176 New Jersey children suffering from elevated blood levels. Compare Judy Peet, The Danger Lurking Within, Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 4,2001, at 21 (reporting number of poisoned children at 30,000). Children from underprivileged communities are most at risk because of the prevalence of older, dilapidated buildings within their communities. American Civil Liberties Union, Preventing Childhood Lead Poisoning in New Jersey: Advocate and State Government Working Together to Increase the Lead Screening of Children 2 (2005). Statistically, low-income children are eight times more likely to be poisoned than children from other income brackets, and an estimated sixty percent of all poisoned children are on Medicaid. Ibid.
*443Adding to the crisis are the logistical difficulties associated with abating lead paint contamination. Residential homes are widely recognized as the principal source of poisonous lead. See, e.g., New Jersey Department of Health and Family Services, Lead Poisoning Elimination Plan 6 (2005). Prior to 1950, residential lead paint contained extremely high levels of lead pigment. Childhood Lead Poisoning, supra, at 50 (noting that some paints manufactured before 1950 contained fifty percent lead pigment). However, in 1978, the federal government banned the use of lead paint in residential homes. Ban of Lead-Containing Paint, 16 C.F.B. § 1303.1. Nevertheless, in 2003, the Legislature noted that “because of the age of New Jersey’s housing stock, our State is among the states with the most serious risk of exposure from previous residential use of lead-based paint.” N.J.S.A. 52:27D-437.2(d) (estimating that there are two million homes in New Jersey built before 1978, one million of which were built before 1950).
Most significant, however, is the staggering cost of decontamination. In 2001, the chairman of the State’s Inter-Agency Task Force for Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention estimated that it would cost New Jersey $50 billion to abate lead paint contamination. Peet, supra, at 21. The cost to private property owners is also prohibitive, with the decontamination of a single apartment costing as much as $12,000. Ibid.
In sum, New Jersey’s residential environment is infected with a deadly toxin that affects our most vulnerable and cherished citizens: our children.
II.
Nevertheless, in its comprehensive opinion the majority concludes that the Legislature foreclosed plaintiffs’ claims by enacting the Lead Paint Act and the Products Liability Act. The majority finds that plaintiffs’ claims are “directly contrary to legislative pronouncements governing both lead paint abatement programs and products liability claims.” Ante at 409, 924 A.2d at 487.
*444As a creature of the common law, the public nuisance tort exists independent of any legislative pronouncement. Although a “statute may take away a common law right, ... there is a presumption that the Legislature had no such intention,” De Fazio v. Haven Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 22 N.J. 511, 519, 126 A.2d 639 (1956) (quoting 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 6201 (3d ed.1943)); accord Velazquez v. Jiminez, 172 N.J. 240, 256, 798 A.2d 51 (2002). A statute should be interpreted to subsume preexisting common law remedies only if that intention is “clearly and plainly expressed.” Velazquez, supra, 172 N.J. at 257, 798 A.2d 51.
The Lead Paint Act, N.J.S.A. 24:14A-1 to-12, demonstrates no intention to foreclose alternative tort remedies. In fact, the Act does not even concern tort liability. Rather, it is an enabling statute authorizing local health boards to enforce lead paint regulations. See N.J.S.A. 24:14A-9 (vesting municipalities with jurisdiction to enforce Lead Paint Act). The Act’s purpose is to ensure appropriate governmental regulation of lead paint removal and detection. See N.J.S.A 24:14A-11 (authorizing commissioner to promulgate lead paint regulations “necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act”). Nowhere does the Lead Paint Act express an intention to foreclose pre-existing common law remedies that would supplement the eradication of lead paint. See L. 1971, c. 366 (describing Lead Paint Act as “[a]n act prohibiting the use of lead paint in certain circumstances, providing remedies and penalties for violation thereof’).
I am in substantial agreement with the Appellate Division’s conclusion that “to allow plaintiffs’ claim to proceed would not subvert the goals of the Lead Paint Act, and, in fact such action would foster those goals.” The Lead Paint Act and the public nuisance doctrine are complementary mechanisms aimed at the same evil. The Lead Paint Act permits local governments to enforce lead paint regulations, N.J.S.A 24:14A-9A, and a public nuisance claim enables municipalities to recoup the cost of abatement from those responsible for creating the nuisance in the first *445place. Thus, this Court should not infer that the Legislature intended to derogate the common law by enacting the Lead Paint Act.2
Regarding the Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 to-11, the majority concludes that the Products Liability Act precludes plaintiffs’ claims because lead paint is not an environmental crisis. The Legislature intended the Products Liability Act to govern all product liability claims, with one express exemption for “environmental tort action[s].” N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-6. The Act defines an environmental tort action as “a civil action seeking damages for harm where the cause of the harm is exposure to toxic chemicals or substances, but does not mean actions involving drugs or products intended for personal consumption or use.” N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-l(b)(4).
Plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants intentionally polluted residential bmldings is a fitting example of an environmental tort. Defendants manufactured toxic lead pigment for application to New Jersey’s buildings. Plaintiffs allege that defendants were aware of lead’s toxicity and knowingly introduced it into the structural environment of this State. Consequently, lead paint permeates many of our residences. I see no significant distinction between the scenario presented in this appeal and traditional environmental torts where pollutants are introduced into some other aspect of the physical environment, such as the air or water. See Statement to Senate Bill No. 2805, 7-8 (Nov. 17,1986) (stating that “environmental tort exception” was “intended to encompass actions involving pollution of the ambient air and of streams and *446other bodies of water, ‘dumping’ of toxic wastes, and similar activities”).
In my view, Stevenson v. Keene Corp., 131 N.J. 393, 395, 620 A.2d 1047 (1993) is controlling in this appeal. There, we held that the environmental tort exception applied to a negligence claim against asbestos manufacturers. We affirmed the Appellate Division’s conclusion that “there can be no question but that the product itself and the risks it poses to people when introduced into the environment are both toxic and hazardous.” Stevenson v. Keene Corp., 254 N.J.Super. 310, 320, 603 A.2d 521 (App.Div.1992). There is no meaningful difference between the manufacturing of asbestos and the production of toxic lead pigment.
Further, the lead paint dilemma is not analogous to injuries sustained from products that are “intended for personal consumption or use.” N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-l(b)(4). In James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279, 295-96, 714 A.2d 898 (1998), we held that the environmental tort exception applied because, although the defendants manufactured petroleum products for personal consumption, the plaintiff, who was not a consumer but a worker who cleaned drums containing the products, was harmed by prolonged exposure to pollutants emanating from the defendants’ products.
Here, the injured parties are also not consumers, but unsuspecting children who are exposed to ambient lead pollutants decades after the paint was originally purchased by consumers. What remains is an environmental disaster that poisons innocent children. The environmental tort exception to the Products Liability Act was intended to apply in such circumstances.
Accordingly, I do not believe that the Legislature foreclosed plaintiffs’ claim by enacting either the Lead Paint Act or the Products Liability Act. Absent the Legislature’s express declaration to the contrary, this Court should not infer the intent to eradicate a common law right of recovery. Velazquez, supra, 172 N.J. at 256, 798 A.2d 51. Because neither statute expressly *447abrogates the common law right at issue in this appeal, I would permit plaintiffs to assert their public nuisance claims.
III.
Broadly defined, a public nuisance is “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1979). The majority holds that plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim must fail because it exceeds the “well-recognized parameters of that tort.” Ante at 409, 924 A.2d at 487. The majority relies on the “time-honored” principle that “a public entity ... may only seek to abate at the expense of the one in control of the nuisance.” Id. at 429, 924 A.2d at 499. According to the majority, the common law doctrine of public nuisance is not applicable in this appeal because plaintiffs, by virtue of their public status and the general injuries they allege, may seek only abatement as a remedy, id. at 428, 485, 924 A.2d at 498, 502 and because defendants do not retain control of the property hosting the nuisance, id. at 429, 924 A.2d at 499. However, that application of the public nuisance doctrine conflicts with sound policies underlying public nuisance principles and, more important, permits those allegedly responsible for contaminating New Jersey to avoid responsibility for curing the infection.
The control element, on which the majority rests its decision, is grounded on the assumption that only injunctive relief is appropriate in public nuisance cases brought by public entities. Consequently, pursuant to that assumption, the only appropriate defendants are those who retain control of the nuisance at the time of abatement. See, e.g., Roseville Plaza Ltd. P’ship v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 811 F.Supp. 1200, 1210 (E.D.Mich.1992) (holding that once defendant lost legal right to abate, public nuisance claim was moot). Thus, in jurisdictions where the control element has been adopted, the public nuisance doctrine does not serve a punitive or preventive function. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. Cin. L.Rev. 741, 819-21 (2003) (collecting cases). Rather, the public nuisance tort is *448exclusively a corrective instrument that enables municipalities to stop a continuing noxious use. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F.Supp.2d 882, 911 (E.D.Pa.2000).
Historically, however, a public nuisance action served both a punitive or preventive function and a corrective purpose. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal.4th 1090, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277, 929 P.2d 596, 602-03 (1997) (providing historical account of public nuisance doctrine); see also W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 90 (5th ed.1984) (discussing origins of public nuisance remedies). The public nuisance doctrine originated as a crime against the crown under English law and did not require an element of control by the offender. Acuna, supra, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277, 929 P.2d at 603. It was essentially penal in nature, imposing sanctions on anyone who polluted public spaces. Ibid. Culpability hinged on whether the offender was responsible for creating the nuisance. Ibid.
And so, consistent with the punitive and corrective functions of the public nuisance doctrine, various courts have rejected the majority’s application of the control element. See, e.g., N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. & Energy v. Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., 821 F.Supp. 999, 1012 (D.N.J.1993) (“It is enough for a nuisance claim to stand that the [defendants] allegedly contributed to the creation of a situation which, it is alleged, unreasonably interfered with a right common to the general public.”); Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F.Supp. 623, 633 (D.R.I.1990) (“This court has discovered no [state] precedent that bars recovery of nuisance damages simply because the defendants no longer control the instrumentality.”); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F.Supp. 1219, 1222 (D.Mass.1986) (holding defendants liable even though they did not control nuisance); County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 137 Cal.App.4th. 292, 306, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 (2006) (“[Liability for nuisance does not hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses or controls the property”). Those courts have held that defendants are liable for abatement costs if they contributed to the creation of the nuisance, even if the defendant no longer has *449control over the property where the nuisance exists. County of Santa Clara, supra, 137 Cal.App. 4th at 306, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 (“[Liability for nuisance does not hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses or controls the property, nor on whether he is in a position to abate the nuisance; the critical question is whether the defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.”); See North Carolina ex rel. Howes v. W.R. Peele, Sr. Trust, 876 F.Supp. 733, 741 (E.D.N.C.1995) (“The person who creates the nuisance is liable and that liability continues as long as the nuisance exists.”).
In my view, that precedent represents the proper application of the public nuisance doctrine because it prevents the exploitation of the public and shifts the cost of abatement to those responsible for creating the nuisance. Compared to the communities suffering from the nuisance’s harmful effects, the parties that created the problem are better suited to finance the abatement because they profited from the pollution of the community. Here, plaintiffs allege that defendants are partially responsible for creating New Jersey’s lead paint crisis because they knowingly distributed toxic lead pigment. If those allegations are proven true, it is entirely proper to require defendants to bear the cost of abatement.
Therefore, a claim for public nuisance should exist if the defendant is responsible for creating the nuisance and, by virtue of the unjust benefit derived from the nuisance, can fairly be required to fund abatement. That application of the public nuisance tort remains true to the doctrine’s corrective purpose because it enables municipalities with limited resources to finance abatement. Monetary damages apportioned by fault also serve a preventive function because they provide disincentives for parties to knowingly exploit the public.
IV.
I add only this. The majority correctly notes that the
conduct that has given rise to the public health crisis is, in point of fact, poor maintenance of premises where lead paint may be found by the owners of those *450premises. That conduct creates the flaking, peeling, and dust that give rise to the ingestion hazard and thus creates the public nuisance.
[Ante at 433, 924 A.2d at 501.]
However, that perspective sidesteps the harsh reality of the lead paint crisis. Decades ago, lead paint was applied to buildings throughout this State. As the harmful effects of lead paint became public, those who could afford its removal or proper maintenance did so. The dangerous lead paint that remains in our physical environment exists primarily in underprivileged, residential communities where home owners and municipalities cannot afford the exorbitant costs of decontamination. See American Civil Liberties Union, supra, at 2. Those citizens and communities should not be portrayed as the cause of a public health crisis; they are the victims. More important, defendants should not be shielded from liability by recasting the reality of the lead paint problem. If plaintiffs’ allegations are proven true, defendants should bear the burden of remediation.
V.
In an ordered society, one purpose of the law, particularly the common law of torts, is to provide a corrective mechanism for injustice. See Keeton et. al., supra, at 15. Common law claims must keep step with the schemes of those who would unfairly profit at the expense of others. It is our responsibility to ensure that formalistic distinctions and outdated definitions do not thwart justice. Rather, we must mold the common law to the unanticipated injustices that inevitably arise as our society advances through time. Our duty is “[t]o sustain, to repair, to beautify this noble pile” that is the common law. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England 436 (1765-69).
The tragedy of the lead paint crisis is that it was and is entirely preventable. The only impediment to purging New Jersey of lead paint is the financial cost. The majority’s holding unfairly places the cost of abatement on taxpayers and private property owners, while sheltering those responsible for creating the problem. Because the common law doctrine of public nuisance is an appropri*451ate means of shifting the cost of abatement to those who unfairly profited at the expense of the general public, I respectfully dissent.
Justice LONG joins in this opinion.
For reversal and remandment — Justices LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS — 4.
For affirmance — Chief Justice ZAZZALI and Justice LONG— 2.
Not Participating — Justice ALBIN.

 That percentage represents children who have blood-lead levels exceeding 10 ug/dl. Scientists have established that children with blood-lead levels greater than 10 ug/dl require treatment to avoid harmful effects, Zimmerman, supra, 44 A.F. L.Rev. at 169-70, and the federal Centers for Disease Control has adopted that number as the threshold for intervention, Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children, A Statement by the Centers for Disease Control 2 (2005).

 The majority also makes extensive reference to the Lead Paint Act in its analysis of the common law elements of the public nuisance tort. Ante at 431-34, 924 A.2d at 500-02. Because the public nuisance tort emanates from the common law, the Lead Paint Act is of limited or no relevance to a discussion of a common law claim. See 58 AmJur.2d Nuisances § 59 (2002) ("Statutes defining nuisances generally do not change the common-law definition of the term---Such statutes do not modify or abrogate the common law.”). Rather, the Lead Paint Act is an enabling statute that sheds no light on the appropriate scope of the public nuisance tort.