Court Opinion

ID: 9572838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:45:03.908658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:28.187480
License: Public Domain

BROUSSARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority opinion except for its discussion of the special circumstance of intentional murder for financial gain. In People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731 [209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994], we observed that this special circumstance, if read broadly, would overlap other special circumstances such as murder in the course of robbery or burglary. We noted that courts of three other states had adopted restrictive constructions of “murder for pecuniary gain” in order to avoid duplicative aggravating factors. We then concluded that “the court should construe special circumstance provisions to minimize those cases in which multiple circumstances will apply to the same conduct, thereby reducing the risk that multiple findings on special circumstances will prejudice the defendant. Such a limiting construction will not prejudice the prosecution, since there will remain at least one special circumstance— either financial gain or felony murder—applicable in virtually all cases in which the defendant killed to obtain money or other property. We adopt a *447limiting construction under which the financial gain special circumstance applies only when the victim’s death is the consideration for, or an essential prerequisite to, the financial gain sought by the defendant.” (Id. at p. 751.)
The majority opinion limits Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731, in a rather unusual and undesirable fashion. It states that “Bigelow’s formulation should be viewed strictly when it is important to serve the purposes underlying that decision, but that it is not intended to restrict construction of ‘for financial gain’ when overlap is not a concern.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 410.) Thus Howard gives a dual meaning to the phrase “for financial gain.” When the prosecutor charges both felony murder and murder for financial gain, the phrase would mean a murder in which the victim’s death is essential to the gain, but whenever he charges only murder for financial gain, the same words would mean something different, broader, and wholly undefined. While one can argue about what the people intended when they enacted a special circumstance of murder for financial gain, it is quite unlikely that they intended two different things depending on whether the prosecutor chose to join a charge of felony murder.
We do not need to reexamine Bigelow’s definition of murder for financial gain in this case, since any error in failing to give a Bigelow instruction here was clearly harmless. The prosecutor claimed that defendant killed Berkey to obtain payment pursuant to a contract with Lemock, which if true would mean that the victim’s death was the consideration for financial gain under Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 731. Defense counsel argued that defendant killed as a favor to Lemock, not for financial gain. There was no evidence or argument that defendant killed for some kind of financial gain that does not come within the Bigelow definition. Thus the case went to the jury on the question whether defendant killed pursuant to contract, or for nonfinancial reasons. The jury’s verdict determined that defendant was a hired killer, which makes him guilty of murder for financial gain within the Bigelow construction.
In sum, I see no reason for this court to consider adopting a construction of the financial-gain special circumstance under which its meaning varies from case to case depending on the charges filed. Defendant’s contention was that the court erred in not instructing in accord with our decision in Bigelow. The error, if any, was not prejudicial. That should be sufficient to decide the issue.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied April 21, 1988, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.