Court Opinion

ID: 9897566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:13.17156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:52.543206
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2599-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ISRAEL HIRALDO, a/k/a
YSAEL HIRALDO,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Argued October 25, 2023 – Decided November 14, 2023

                   Before Judges Mayer, Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Indictment No. 19-02-0102.

                   Kevin S. Finckenauer argued the cause for appellant
                   (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Kevin
                   S. Finckenauer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of
                   counsel and on the briefs).

                   William P. Cooper-Daub argued the cause for
                   respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General,
                   attorney; William P. Cooper-Daub, Deputy Attorney
                   General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant appeals from an April 25, 2022 judgment of conviction for

robbery and weapons offenses. He also appeals from the sentence imposed. We

affirm.

      We recite the facts from the testimony presented during the three-day jury

trial. On November 27, 2018, defendant and three other men approached an

individual who was walking toward the Elizabeth train station. The victim

noticed the four men and grew suspicious. He slowed his pace to let the group

pass, and "made a mental note of their faces."

      Two of the men crossed to the other side of the street while the other two

men remained on the same side of the street as the victim. One of the men on

the same side of the street as the victim turned and chambered a round in a

handgun.

      That man, subsequently identified by the victim as defendant, ordered the

victim to turn around and raise his hands. The victim complied. Defendant

pressed the gun into the victim's back while another man took the victim's wallet.

The four men then fled.

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                                        2
      The victim immediately called 9-1-1 and gave the operator a description

of the four men. Because the victim placed the 9-1-1 call as he watched the men

flee, the victim provided contemporaneous information as to their location.

      Officer Timothy Goldate of the Elizabeth Police Department responded to

the scene. While seated in his patrol car, the officer saw four men not far from

the train station. Two of the men fit the description given by the victim to the

9-1-1 operator.

      Because some of the men matched the victim's descriptions, all four men

were detained by the police. The responding officers gathered the four men in

a nearby parking lot and conducted a show-up identification. The officers

presented the four men, one at a time, for the victim to identify. The victim

identified all four men as involved in the robbery and, specifically, identified

defendant as the man holding the gun.1

      The police also recovered a .38-caliber handgun near the scene. The gun

contained at least one hollow nose bullet and one regular bullet. At trial, the

State's forensic expert discussed the results of DNA and fingerprint testing on

the recovered handgun. The handgun tested negative for fingerprints. However,

1
  At trial, the victim could not make a definitive identification of defendant,
explaining it had "been too long" since the incident.
                                                                          A-2599-21
                                         3
the State's forensic expert testified the mixture of DNA found on the gun

revealed a statistically probable match for three of the four men, including

defendant.

       On February 19, 2019, defendant was charged in Indictment No. 19-02-

0102 with first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2) (Count One),

second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (Count

Two), second-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-4(a)(1) (Count Three), fourth-degree possession of hollow nose bullets,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)(1) (Count Four), and second-degree conspiracy to commit

robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (Count Five).

       Defendant's trial began on February 7, 2022. Defendant elected to testify

at trial. On February 9, 2022, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts.

       On April 22, 2022, defendant appeared for sentencing. On Count One,

the judge sentenced defendant to a fifteen-year prison term with an eighty-five

percent period of parole ineligibility, subject to the No Early Release Act

(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.2 On Count Two, the judge sentenced defendant

to a concurrent five-year sentence with a forty-two-month period of parole

ineligibility.   Additionally, the judge sentenced defendant to a concurrent

2
    The judge merged the convictions on Counts Three and Five into Count One.
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                                       4
eighteen-month sentence on Count Four. The judge entered a judgment of

conviction on April 25, 2022.

     On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

     POINT I

           THE   LACK    OF   ANY      ON-THE-RECORD
           COLLOQUY WITH [DEFENDANT] ABOUT HIS
           DECISION TO WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO NOT
           TESTIFY    FAILED      TO      ADEQUATELY
           SAFEGUARD         HIS           SIGNIFICANT
           CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT.
           ADDITIONALLY,      THE        SURROUNDING
           CIRCUMSTANCES         INDICATE         THAT
           [DEFENDANT] DID NOT MAKE THE DECISION
           TO WAIVE HIS RIGHT KNOWINGLY AND
           INTELLIGENTLY. (Not Raised Below).

     POINT II

           THE TRIAL COURT REVERSIBLY ERRED BY
           IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON
           JOINT AND CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION WHEN
           THE STATE'S THEORY OF THE CASE AND ITS
           EVIDENCE    PRESENTED       TO  THE JURY
           DEMONSTRATED ONLY ACTUAL AND SOLE
           POSSESSION. (Not Raised Below).

     POINT III

           THE    TRIAL    COURT    ERRONEOUSLY
           INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT THE STATE DID
           NOT HAVE TO PROVE THAT [DEFENDANT]
           KNEW THE HOLLOW NOSED BULLET WAS IN
           FACT HOLLOW NOSED IN ORDER TO FIND HIM

                                                                 A-2599-21
                                     5
             GUILTY OF KNOWINGLY POSSESSING                       A
             PROHIBITED WEAPON. (Not Raised Below).

      POINT IV

             THE HANDGUN PERMIT APPLICATION PROCESS
             AT THE TIME OF [DEFENDANT]'S ALLEGED
             POSSESSION OF THE HANDGUN CONTAINED A
             REQUIREMENT THAT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
             PRECLUDED HIM FROM BEING ELIGIBLE TO
             RECEIVE SAID PERMIT. ACCORDINGLY, HIS
             CONVICTION FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH A
             FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL PERMITTING
             PROCESS CANNOT STAND. (Not Raised Below).

      POINT V

             THE TRIAL COURT EXPLICITLY IMPOSED A
             TRIAL PENALTY ON [DEFENDANT] BY SAYING
             HE SHOULD RECEIVE A HEAVIER SENTENCE
             FOR FAILING TO PLEAD GUILTY AND WASTING
             THE COURT'S TIME AND RESOURCES, IN
             ADDITION TO MAKING SEVERAL ERRORS IN
             ITS ANALYSIS OF THE AGGRAVATING AND
             MITIGATING FACTORS.       THESE ERRORS
             COMPOUNDED TO RESULT IN AN EXCESSIVE
             SENTENCE FOR A YOUTHFUL DEFENDANT
             WITH NO CRIMINAL HISTORY.

      We review the arguments not raised before the trial court for plain error.

R. 2:10-2.   We generally "will decline to consider questions or issues not

properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation

is available." State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 419 (2015) (citing State v. Robinson,

200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234

                                                                           A-2599-21
                                       6
(1973))). Under the plain error standard, reversal is warranted only if an error

was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.

      While not raised to the trial court, defendant contends the judge erred in

failing to conduct an on the record discussion regarding defendant's decision to

testify. We disagree.

      A defendant's right to testify on his own behalf "is essential to our state -

based concept of due process of law, which guarantees a 'fair and impartial trial

in which there is a legitimate and decorous recognition of the substantive rights

of the defendant.'" State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 628 (1990) (quoting State v.

Morriggi, 15 N.J. Super. 479, 481 (App. Div. 1951)). However, a defendant's

decision whether to testify is "an important strategic or tactical decision" to be

made between a defendant and defendant's attorney. State v. Bogus, 223 N.J.

Super. 409, 423 (App. Div. 1988). "It is the responsibility of a defenda nt's

counsel, not the trial court, to advise defendant on whether or not to testify and

to explain the tactical advantages and disadvantages of doing so or of not doing

so." Ibid.

      Further, a "trial judge should not discuss the issue directly with a

represented defendant, since that 'may inappropriately involve the trial court in

the unique attorney-client relationship . . . .'" State v. Coon, 314 N.J. Super.

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                                        7
426, 435 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting Bogus, 223 N.J. Super. at 423-24). "'[T]he

better practice [is] for a trial court to inquire of counsel whether [counsel] has

advised a defendant . . . of [their] right to testify.'" State v. Ball, 381 N.J. Super.

545, 556 (App. Div. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Savage, 120 N.J. at

631). The trial court "need not engage in a voir dire on the record to establish

[a] defendant's waiver." Ibid. As long as a defendant is represented by counsel,

a judge commits no legal error by failing to address defendant's decision to

testify. State v. Cusumano, 369 N.J. Super. 305, 314 (App. Div. 2004).

      Because New Jersey case law does not support his argument on this point,

defendant urges this court to adopt the Hawaii Supreme Court's reasoning in

State v. Torres, 439 P.3d 234 (Haw. 2019). In that case, the Hawaiian court held

"trial courts are required to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with a defendant

when the defendant chooses to testify to ensure that a waiver of the right not to

testify is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Id. at 246-47.

      We decline to follow the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision.                  As a

preliminary matter, published opinions from other jurisdictions are not binding

on New Jersey courts. Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 436 (2006). Additionally,

Hawaii requires on-the-record colloquies with a defendant waiving the right to

testify, and deems such a right to be of "equal constitutional stature" to the right

                                                                                A-2599-21
                                          8
to testify. Torres, 439 P.3d at 236-37, 244-46. However, New Jersey courts do

not require on-the-record discussion related to a defendant's decision to testify

when a defendant is represented by counsel. See Bogus, 223 N.J. Super. at 423.

      Here, prior to the start of the trial, the judge asked whether defense

counsel informed defendant of the right to testify. Defense counsel responded

defendant was "likely going to testify," and stated, "we've been contemplating

[the decision] for quite some time." The judge further explained on the record

that defendant had the right to decide if he would testify.

      On the second day of trial, defense counsel asked the judge for a ten-

minute recess to speak with defendant regarding defendant's decision to testify.

The judge granted a fifteen-minute recess for counsel to confer with defendant.

The judge stated:

            THE COURT: You're going to advise me.                   If
            [defendant] wants to testify, he can go immediately;
            okay? If he elects not to testify, I will question him on
            that to make sure that it is a knowing, voluntary,
            intelligent waiver of his rights; okay? Does that sound
            fair to you?

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That does.

      Defense counsel and defendant then took a twenty-three-minute recess.

Upon returning to the courtroom, the judge confirmed with counsel that

                                                                           A-2599-21
                                        9
defendant had adequate time to discuss his decision to testify. Specifically, the

judge asked:

             THE COURT: Have you had enough time to discuss
             this matter in private and with an interpreter with
             [defendant]?

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge, and I confirmed
             that [defendant] had enough time with me, as well.

             THE COURT: You did?

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, in the presence of both
             interpreters.

      Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the judge did not need to

engage in any further colloquy regarding defendant's decision to testify. On this

record, it is clear defendant had ample opportunity to discuss his decision with

defense counsel through the use of Spanish interpreters. Any further inquiry by

the judge may have impermissibly impinged on the attorney-client relationship.

Under the given circumstances, the judge's decision not to engage in a colloquy

with a represented defendant about the decision to testify did not constitute

error, let alone plain error.

      Despite not raising the issue to the trial judge, defendant next argues the

judge improperly instructed the jury on joint and constructive possession of a

                                                                           A-2599-21
                                      10
weapon because the State's evidence was limited to actual possession of the gun

during the robbery. We disagree.

      Defendant did not object to the charge during the charge conference.

Further, defendant never raised any objection to the jury charge prior to the jury

commencing deliberations. See State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016)

(noting Rule 1:7-2 provides that the appropriate time to object to a jury charge

is "before the jury retires to consider its verdict"). "If the defendant does not

object to the charge at the time it is given, there is a presumption that the charge

was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case." State v.

Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012).

      Here, the judge reviewed the proposed jury charges with counsel several

times. Defense counsel told the judge that he reviewed the entire charge with

defendant through a Spanish interpreter, and defendant "indicated he had no

additional questions" regarding the charges. After instructing the jury, the judge

asked defense counsel if there were any objections. Defense counsel responded,

"[n]o objection. No additional requests."

      When a jury has been instructed as to multiple theories of possession and

is not asked to return separate verdicts, a defendant's conviction must be

reversed "unless the State presented sufficient evidence to support a guilty

                                                                              A-2599-21
                                        11
verdict under both theories." State v. Roldan, 314 N.J. Super. 173, 186-87 (App.

Div. 1998). Under the Model Jury Charges, "actual possession" exists when a

person knows what an object is, has knowledge of its character, and knowingly

"has it on his/her person at a given time" or "has direct physical control over a

thing . . . ." Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Robbery in the First Degree

(N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1)" (rev. Sept. 10, 2012). In contrast, "constructive possession"

exists where a person "does not physically have the property, but though not

physically on one's person, he/she is aware of the presence of the property and

is able to and has the intention to exercise control over it." Ibid. Further, where

"one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is

sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing,

possession is joint . . . ." Ibid.

      Although the State argued defendant actually possessed the gun used to

commit the robbery, the judge's instruction on joint and constructive possession

was amply supported by the evidence. The State's theory of the case did not

foreclose evidence supporting alternate theories for the jury's consideration,

provided the evidence supported such alternate theories.

      The evidence elicited by defense counsel could have supported an

alternative theory that defendant was not the actual robber and the victim

                                                                             A-2599-21
                                       12
confused defendant's identity with one or more of the other men involved in the

robbery. Based on the trial evidence, defense counsel argued the following to

the jury: (i) the victim's descriptions of the robbers' clothes were inconsistent;

(ii) the victim never gave the 9-1-1 operator a description of the gunman's facial

features; (iii) two of the men involved in the robbery, not including defendant,

were seen near where the handgun was recovered; and (iv) Officer Goldate

observed the four men walking together, but did not see them exchange any

objects.

      Additionally, defense counsel emphasized the State's DNA expert testified

the mixture of DNA found on the gun produced stronger matches for two of the

men involved in the robbery than defendant's DNA.                While defendant

acknowledged handling the gun the night of the robbery, he claimed he never

used the gun in connection with the robbery.

      Based on this evidence, the jury could have rationally agreed with the

defense's theory and found defendant guilty of constructive possession as

defined by the judge in his charging instructions, even if defendant was not the

gunman. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the judge's decision to

include charges for actual, joint, and constructive possession were supported by

the evidence and did not rise to the level of error, let alone plain error.

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                                        13
      We next consider defendant's argument the judge erred in charging the

jury regarding possession of hollow nose bullets because the charge was

misleading and contradicted the language in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f). Defendant

contends the "knowing" requirement under the statute applied to all elements of

a charged offense, meaning the possession of the gun and that the gun was

loaded with hollow nose bullets. Again, we disagree.

      The judge, tracking the Model Jury charge, instructed the jury that it may

find defendant knowingly possessed hollow nose bullets without proving that

defendant actually knew the exact nature of bullets in the handgun. The judge

told the jury that "defendant must know or be aware that he possessed the item.

Here the item's alleged to be ammunition. The State is not required to prove

that at the time he knowingly possessed the ammunition, defendant also knew

that it was hollow nose or dum-dum bullets."

      Defendant concedes the judge's instruction tracked the Model Jury charge.

"When a jury instruction follows the model jury charge, although not

determinative, 'it is a persuasive argument in favor of the charge as delivered.'"

State v. Whitaker, 402 N.J. Super. 495, 513-14 (App. Div. 2008), aff'd, 200 N.J.

444 (2009) (quoting State v. Angoy, 329 N.J. Super. 79, 84 (App. Div. 2000)).

As our Supreme Court stated, "[i]t is difficult to find that a charge that follows

                                                                            A-2599-21
                                       14
the Model Charge so closely constitutes plain error." Mogull v. CB Com. Real

Est. Grp., 162 N.J. 449, 466 (2000).

      Defendant correctly notes the Model Jury Charge for possession of hollow

nose bullets cites to State v. Smith, 197 N.J. 325, 338 (2009).      However,

defendant misapplies the holding in that case. In Smith, our Supreme Court

construed a "knowing" requirement in a similar firearms offense: N.J.S.A.

2C:39-3(d), which creates an offense when a person "knowingly has in his

possession any firearm which has been defaced."       Smith, 197 N.J. at 331

(quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d)). In that case, the Court noted the "knowing"

requirement in other weapons-possession offenses has been interpreted as

requiring general knowledge of the item possessed, but not knowledge of any

illegal characteristic.   Ibid.   The Court further explained, "alternative

phraseology [possession of a defaced firearm] would not have compelled a

different conclusion, particularly in light of the similar phrasing of other

subsections of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3." Id. at 333.

      Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the judge's instruction that

the "knowing" requirement applied only to possession of the handgun and not

to the possession of hollow nose bullets did not constitute error. The judge

                                                                         A-2599-21
                                       15
instructed the jury using the Model Jury charge without objection from counsel.

The charge as given in this case was not error, much less plain error.

       We next consider defendant's argument that the United States Supreme

Court decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597

U.S.     , 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) rendered New Jersey's handgun permit statute

unconstitutional. We reject this argument.

       We recently stated Bruen did not render New Jersey's gun permitting

scheme facially invalid. State v. Wade,        N.J. Super.     (App. Div. 2023)

(slip op. at 27). In Wade, we addressed the same issue raised by defendant in

this appeal, and determined New Jersey's gun permitting scheme was

constitutional and defendant lacked standing to challenge the permit

requirement because he never applied for a permit. Ibid.

       The issue in Wade was whether Bruen wholly invalidated New Jersey's

gun permit scheme. Id., (slip op. at 3-4). Because sections of New Jersey's gun

permit statutes, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 and -4, were not dependent on a justifiable

need requirement, which was declared unconstitutional in Bruen, we held the

justifiable need requirement was severable and the remaining portions of the

statute were valid. Wade, ____ N.J. Super. ____ (slip op. at 24-26); see also

N.J.S.A. 1:1-10 (noting the constitutionality of New Jersey's permitting scheme

                                                                         A-2599-21
                                      16
depends on whether the justifiable-need requirement is severable); Inganamort

v. Borough of Fort Lee, 72 N.J. 412, 423 (1997) (providing a statutory provision

may be severed "where the invalid portion is independent and the remaining

portion forms a complete act within itself"). Because Wade concluded the

provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4, with the exception of requiring a "justifiable

need" to carry a handgun, remained valid, we reach the same result in this

matter.3

      Additionally, we are satisfied the facts in this case are distinguishable

from Bruen. Here, defendant admittedly never applied for a handgun permit.

Notwithstanding that he never applied for a gun permit, defendant argues that if

he applied, a permit would have been issued but for the unconstitutional

justifiable need provision.

3
   The day after the Bruen decision, New Jersey's Attorney General issued a
directive advising the justifiable need requirement for obtaining a handgun
permit was no longer constitutional. Attorney General Law Enforcement
Directive No. 2022-07, "Directive Clarifying Requirements For Carrying Of
Firearms In Public" (June 24, 2022). However, that same directive made clear
that Bruen did "not eliminate our overall permitting requirements" nor "change
any other aspect of New Jersey's public carry laws." Ibid. New Jersey's
Legislature also passed a law eliminating the "justifiable need" requirement in
revising the gun permitting scheme. L. 2022 c. 131 (Dec. 2022).

                                                                          A-2599-21
                                      17
      This argument was raised and rejected in Wade. In Wade, we stated

"[g]enerally, to establish standing to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional

permit statute, the challenger must have applied for a permit or license under the

statute." Wade, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at 19) (citation omitted).

      Moreover, defendant's argument ignores that he had not attained the age

of twenty-one years at the time of the robbery. Because he was not twenty-one

years old, defendant could not have obtained a gun permit if he applied,

regardless of the justifiable need provision. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c). Nor did

defendant demonstrate his ability to satisfy the other requirements under

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) to obtain a gun permit. See Wade, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip

op. at 20–21) (noting the defendant did not submit certifications establishing he

would have satisfied other criteria under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(b) and -(c) to qualify

for a gun-carry permit).

      Nor do we deem defendant's arguments under the First and Second

Amendments persuasive. The cases relied upon by defendant in support of this

argument involved challenges to gun permitting laws deemed unconstitutional

in their entirety. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151

(1969); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319, 325 (1958); Lovell v. City

of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452–53 (1938).

                                                                            A-2599-21
                                       18
      In Wade, we rejected the same argument resting upon the same cases as

made by defendant here. In that case, we reasoned that other courts had declined

to wholesale incorporate the application of First Amendment law to a Second

Amendment analysis. Wade, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at 22-23). As we

explained in Wade, "law-abiding citizens are not free to ignore a statute and

presume that they would have been granted a permit but for one potentially

invalid provision of a permit statute." ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at 21)

(citation omitted).

      For these reasons, we reject defendant's argument that New Jersey's gun

permit scheme was unconstitutional and provided a defense to the State's case

against him.

      We next address defendant's claim the judge erred in applying the

aggravating and mitigating factors in imposing the sentence.       Specifically,

defendant contends the sentence was excessive because he was "a youthful

defendant with no criminal history." He also argues the judge "essentially

impos[ed] a penalty" because defendant invoked his constitutional right to

proceed to trial. We reject these arguments.

      We review a sentence imposed by a trial court for abuse of discretion.

State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15, 28 (2019). A sentence must be affirmed "unless:

                                                                          A-2599-21
                                      19
(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and

mitigating factors were not 'based upon competent credible evidence in the

record;' or (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s]

the judicial conscience.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (alteration

in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).

      A decision not to plead guilty must "not be considered in withholding or

imposing a sentence of imprisonment." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(c)(1). The prohibition

of imposing a "trial-penalty" has been recognized by the United States Supreme

Court and New Jersey courts. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363

(1978); State v. Jimenez, 266 N.J. Super. 560, 570 (App. Div. 1993).

      Here, while the judge mentioned co-defendants during the sentencing

hearing, he did not treat defendant differently as a result of defendant exercising

his constitutional right to proceed to trial. In his sentencing decision, the judge

stated:

             I'm going to sentence you significantly more severely
             than your colleagues. And that's because your conduct
             in this case was qualitatively more serious than the
             others. And thus, the sentence should be significantly
             longer. The other three individuals pled guilty. They
             took responsibility. They negotiated a plea agreement
             with the State. They saved the State time and resources.
             And the uncertainty of a jury trial. They saved the
             victim the difficulty of flying out of the country to come
             back here. But most important to the [c]ourt, they

                                                                                A-2599-21
                                         20
accepted responsibility and owned, to some degree, the
horror that they inflicted on this family and on our
community.

You were the princip[al]. You are the individual who
cocked the gun. You loaded the chamber with hollow-
point bullets. With depravity, it was you who turned
and pointed that handgun at a completely innocent
stranger minding his business, just trying to get to work
at an hour when most of the rest of us are happy and
sleeping. You then . . . stuck [the victim] . . . in the
back with that loaded handgun, while another
ransacked him.

At that moment, [defendant], [the victim] did not know
how this terror would end. Would he - which happens
often - tragically end up dead, and for nothing. If you
had panicked, or decided killing the victim would
reduce the likelihood that . . . you might be caught and
identified, you may very well have pulled the trigger in
a moment of haste, or inadvertently. After all, you
cocked that gun to load it seconds before. You loaded
that gun for a reason.

There's no comparison in terms of culpability of you
versus the other three defendants. You were the only
one with a loaded handgun. You were the only one who
pointed that handgun. You were the only one who
placed that handgun in the individual's back. And
you're the only one who made demands verbally of the
[victim]. Without question, as compared to your . . .
co-defendants, you are the most culpable and caused
the most terror. Since none of the others had weapons,
none of the others could have inflicted the threat of
death, as you did. Two of the others were across the
street as lookouts. Certainly, they played an integral
role in this conspiracy, but nothing in terms of the terror
that you inflicted. The other individual was also

                                                              A-2599-21
                           21
            integral, but unarmed. And so, as a result, you have
            earned, sadly, a much more severe sentence than your
            co-defendants.

      Having reviewed the sentencing transcript, we are satisfied the judge did

not impose a trial penalty on defendant for invoking his constitutional right to

assert his innocence by proceeding to trial.

      Further, we note the judge properly balanced the sentencing requests.

Defendant requested a ten-year sentence, the minimum for a first-degree

conviction. The State recommended an eighteen-year sentence with an eighty-

five percent parole-ineligibility period under NERA. The judge considered

defendant's "lack of criminal history and his youthful status" and sentenced

defendant to fifteen years subject to NERA, merging the conspiracy charge and

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose charge into a single count.

Further, the judge sentenced the defendant to forty-two months of parole

ineligibility on the unlawful possession of a handgun charge, exercising his

discretion to have it run concurrently, although he could have ordered the

sentence to run consecutively. Similarly, the judge did not abuse his discretion

in sentencing defendant to eighteen months on the hollow nose bullet charge,

and running the sentence concurrent to the fifteen-year sentence on the first-

degree conviction.

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      Based on this record, the judge did not violate the sentencing guidelines

when he sentenced defendant differently from his co-defendants. "[A] sentence

of one defendant not otherwise excessive is not erroneous merely because a co -

defendant's sentence is lighter." State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 232 (1996)

(quoting State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391 (1969)).

      Nor do we agree with defendant's argument that the judge misapplied the

aggravating and mitigating factors in his sentencing decision. Defendant claims

the judge erred in finding aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9)

(specific and general deterrence), substantially outweighed the applicable

mitigating factors, factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) (no criminal history)

and factor fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) (youth).         Defendant further

contends the judge erred in assigning "very little weight" to mitigating factor

fourteen, despite defendant having turned eighteen at the time of the offenses.

      "An appellate court's review of a sentencing court's imposition of sentence

is guided by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318

(2018). We "must not substitute [our] judgment for that of the sentencing court."

State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014) (citing State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210,

215 (1989)). In reviewing a sentencing decision, we will affirm unless (1) the

sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors

                                                                            A-2599-21
                                       23
were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; and (3) "the

sentence was nevertheless 'clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial

conscience.'"   State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 371 (2019) (quoting State v.

McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 158 (App. Div. 2011)). The sentencing court must

"state reasons for imposing [the] sentence including . . . the factual basis

supporting a finding of particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting

[the] sentence."   R. 3:21-4(g); State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014).         A

sentencing court must then "balance the relevant factors, and explain how it

arrive[d] at the appropriate sentence." O'Donnell, 117 N.J. at 215.

      Here, the judge applied aggravating factor nine for "it's specific

deterrence." Despite the lack of a criminal record, the judge reviewed the nature

of the offenses, including defendant's "calculated indifference to another human

being" by placing a loaded a gun on a stranger's back. Based on the specifics of

the offenses committed by defendant in this case, the judge explained he gave

"extraordinary weight to specific deterrence." As to general deterrence, the

judge explained, "people need to know that there will be an accounting" for gun-

related crimes and the potential for imposing lengthy sentences.

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                                      24
      During the sentencing hearing, the judge reviewed defense counsel's

requested mitigating factors. The judge expressly took "into consideration

[defendant]'s lack of criminal history and his youthful status."

      In imposing the sentence, the judge found, "qualitatively . . . aggravating

factor [nine] substantially outweigh[ed] mitigating factors [seven] and

[fourteen]." Despite the "horrific" crime, the judge did not "believe the sentence

at the higher end of the range of [eighteen] years . . . [was] warranted."

However, the judge also stated that the minimum sentence requested by defense

counsel in "a case of this severity" was not appropriate. The judge reviewed the

facts with care and precision, and stressed defendant and his co-defendants

"sought to terrorize, to take what they wanted, no matter the regard, or lack of

regard, for another human being."

      After reviewing the judge's sentencing decision, we are satisfied the

sentence imposed was grounded on competent and credible evidence in the

record, the judge properly weighed and applied the aggravating and mitigating

factors, and the sentence does not shock the judicial conscience.

      To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining

arguments, we deem those arguments to lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

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                                       25
Affirmed.

                 A-2599-21
            26