Court Opinion

ID: 9602792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:00:00.080076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:06.635344
License: Public Domain

Baker, Chief Justice
(dissenting in part).
I regret the necessity of writing a dissenting opinion on the issue of the refusal of the trial Judge to grant appellant’s motion for a direction of verdict, and failing in that, to grant its motion for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, but viewing the case as I do, feel it my duty.
For the purpose of context and to set out a little more in accuracy and detail some of the facts in this case, I find it necessary to duplicate to an extent some of the facts appearing in the prevailing opinion; and will follow in the main the prevailing opinion heretofore filed in this case, but which has now been ordered withdrawn.
There are at the location of the accident three tracks of the appellant. Approaching from the east, the first track is the main line from Sumter to Darlington, the next a side track adjoining the main line, and 30 or 40 feet west (according to plat offered in evidence by appellant) a curving track, which connects the tracks of appellant with those of Seaboard Air Line Railway, on which track appellant’s engine was slowly moving northwardly when struck by the automobile.
Calhoun Street is paved, 40 feet in width between curb lines. On the south side of Calhoun Street, east of the main and side tracks, there is a building (Early & Daniel Company), the average distance of which is 32 feet from the *378sidewalk. Between the side track and the Seaboard connection, there are two buildings (referred to on plat as metal covered warehouses), one about 90 feet and the other about 98 feet south of the sidewalk. From a point about 540 feet east of the connecting track, the driver of a car approaching same on Calhoun Street from the east would have an unobstructed view of the connecting track to a point 55 feet south of the street and from that point to the track the point of vision on the connecting track would increase. All of the testimony shows that the engine did not go as far as 55 feet south of Calhoun Street on the connecting track before backing northward over Calhoun Street immediately prior to the collision, so it cannot be contended that there was any obstruction to vision of the engine at any pertinent time. There were no distractions of any nature to excuse approaching drivers of automobiles of their duty to be on the lookout for approaching trains or engines.
The diesel engine of switching type was equipped with headlight on both the front and rear of the engine. There is no contradiction of tire testimony that both were lighted. Prior to the collision, the engine backing with two box cars attached to the front, crossed Calhoun Street going north, and cleared the switch of the connecting track with the Seaboard a short distance north of the crossing. The engine pushing the box cars then proceeded southward across Calhoun Street on the connecting track, clearing the sidewalk only a few feet — estimated by the witness, Henry Strange, Jr., as 5 or 6 feet. Upon signals from another member of the crew, the engine, moving at a very slow rate of speed, then backed north into Calhoun Street. When the engine was covering about three-quarters of the street, the automobile struck the engine at the rear trucks about under the fireman’s seat. The engine was brought to a stop within 5 or 6 feet.
The testimony of the witness for the respondent, Jessie Nelson, is very material. He was walking east on the north side of Calhoun Street approaching the crossing. He testi*379fled when he was crossing Chandler Street just east of Bethel Church, which is on the north side of Calhoun Street about 350 feet east of the crossing, he saw the train going south across Calhoun Street; that the Rock car passed him about that time, and while he was passing Bethel Church, the train came back moving north and the automobile collided with the engine on the crossing; that the collision occurred about the time he saw the rear lights on the automobile blinking, which he assumed was when brakes on the car were applied.
The speed of the Rock car is variously estimated by respondent and her witnesses as from 20 to 30 miles per hour at and immediately prior to the collision and there is no testimony to the effect that the brakes were applied to reduce the speed of the car until the moment of the collision. The driver testified that he hit the train and the brakes at the same time.
We shall first consider the question as to whether the trial Judge committed error in refusing to direct a verdict or to order judgment non obstante veredicto for the appellant on the ground that respondent’s injury was due, caused and occasioned by the contributory negligence, recklessness and wilfulness of the driver of the automobile in which respondent was riding, as a proximate cause thereof.
While the principles which govern cases of this kind have many times been stated with clarity, the difficulty lies in applying the principles to the facts of each case, and this is particularly true in this instance. It must likewise be borne in mind that if the facts are susceptible of different conclusions in the minds of reasonably minded men, the question is one for the jury. It is also to be borne in mind that, upon appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, this Court must view the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, and where the question is one of gross contributory negligence upon the part of a person who has obtained a verdict, the testimony must point to such with clearness and singleness of *380inference, in order to justify the Court in taking the case from the jury.
We assume for the purposes of this decision that the bell was not rung nor the whistle blown, and that the crossing was not flagged. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the driver of the automobile approached a railroad crossing, with which he was entirely familiar, at a rate of speed of 20 to 30 miles per hour without slowing down until about the instant of impact and struck the side of a locomotive, which had just proceeded onto the crossing, with headlight burning, at a very slow rate of speed; that the vision of the approaching locomotive was unobstructed for the whole distance it moved on the movement which brought it onto the crossing; that it was observed by a disinterested pedestrian witness about 350 feet away who had no occasion to be on the alert for same; and that, before striking the locomotive, the driver passed over two railroad tracks and an intervening space of approximately 30 feet before reaching the track on which the engine was then slowly moving. While the driver claimed he looked and did not see the approaching engine, the conclusion is inescapable that if he had exercised even slight care, he could not have failed to see the engine. There were no circumstances or conditions prevailing, no evidence of hustle and hurry of traffic, no noises, smoke, or fog or anything that distracted the attention of the driver or might have excused him from observing the approaching engine.
In oral argument, some point was made of the fact that the fireman testified that some people were standing on the south side of the street near the track as the engine backed towards the crossing, that it was “kind of dark out there” and that he “just could see” them, from which it might be inferred that the headlight on the engine was insufficient or not bright enough. It is to be borne in mind that the engine had proceeded only a short distance south of the street, and that the headlight was shining down the track, that they were very near the track on the sidewalk on the *381south side and probably not within the area where the light was focused, or where its beams shone on them. It is a matter of common knowledge that a headlight on an engine throws beams of light ahead and not immediately in the area of the engine. The light was nevertheless sufficient for both engineer and fireman to see these people and warn them, according to their testimony, by blasts of the whistle. The headlight was observed by the witness Nelson from a long distance down Calhoun Street. It is not alleged in the complaint that the headlight was insufficient or that it was not burning brightly. Furthermore, at the angle the switch engine was coming out into the street on the track which it was occupying at the time of the collision, one approaching the crossing from the direction in which the automobile was approaching same, paying the slightest attention and looking in the direction which he was travelling, was bound to have seen the headlight on the switch engine, and the switch engine itself, unless he was driving an automobile without headlights burning thereon. We cannot see any merit in this contention.
Under the foregoing circumstances, and the undisputed facts, we are of the opinion that the driver was guilty as a matter of law of gross contributory negligence and reckless indifference to his safety and the safety of those who were riding with him. Robison v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 179 S. C. 493, 184 S. E. 96; Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 192 S. C. 406, 7 S. E. (2d) 4; Smith v. Southern Railway Co., 193 S. C. 44, 7 S. E. (2d) 630; Taylor v. Powell, 195 S. C. 486, 12 S. E. (2d) 27; Arnold v. Charleston & Western Carolina Railroad Co., 213 S. C. 413, 49 S. E. (2d) 725. Also, Funderburk v. Powell, 181 S. C. 412, 187 S. E. 742; Mozingo v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 220 S. C. 323, 67 S. E. (2d) 516.
We are not prepared to hold as a matter of law that the respondent was herself guilty of gross contributory negligence, but the acts of the driver are imputable to her for the reasons hereafter appearing.
*382As to the alleged failure to give statutory signals, of which there was testimony on the part of the respondent, the gross contributory negligence or wilfulness of the driver of the automobile is imputable to the respondent. Sec. 8377, 1942 Code of Laws of South Carolina; Wright v. Southern Railway Co., 210 S. C. 432, 43 S. E. (2d) 139; Neely, Admr. v. Carolina & N. W. Railway Co., 123 S. C. 449, 117 S. E. 55; Smith v. Southern Railway Co., 193 S. C. 44, 7 S. E. (2d) 630. But let it be assumed that there was also testimony as to the other acts of negligence on the part of appellant. The ownership of the automobile by respondent's husband and the driver jointly appears in the prevailing opinion. Respondent testified that it was used as a family car and if she wanted to go uptown, her son, Harmon Rock, would drive her, and that on this occasion they were going to town to do Christmas shopping. Harmon Rock testified that the members of the family were going shopping, that he was driving the car, that when he was driving the car, he would go wherever they wanted him to go, and when they wanted him to stop, he would stop. Ella Rock, wife of Harmon, testified generally to the same effect, and that if respondent wanted Harmon to go a certain place, she would tell him and he would go. Under all of the circumstances, the respondent is shown to have such control, or right of control, of the operation of the automobile as renders the trip a joint enterprise and makes the acts of the driver of the automobile imputable to her. The facts as to this phase of the case were not in dispute. The trial Judge submitted the issue to the jury for determination, but we think he should have held as a matter of law that a joint enterprise was established.
Section 8377 of the Code cited above, reads as follows:
“If a person is injured in his person or property by collision with the engines or any car or cars of a railroad cor-, poration at a crossing, and it appears that the corporation neglected to give the signals required by this chapter, and that such neglect contributed to the injury, the corporation *383shall be liable for all damages caused by the collision, or to a fine recoverable by indictment, as provided in the preceding section, unless it is shown that in addition to a mere want of ordinary care the person injured, or the person having charge of his person or property, was at the time of the collision guilty of gross or wilful negligence, or was acting in violation of the law, and that such gross wilful negligence or unlawful act contributed to the injury.”
The facts in the case of Wright v. Southern Railway Co., supra [210 S. C. 432, 43 S. E. (2d) 140], are set out in the opinion, and are as follows:
“A review of the testimony shows that the plaintiff at the time of her injury was riding in an automobile driven by a Mr. Powell; that the two had originally planned to go to a tent show, but because of the cold and dampness of the night decided to return to her home; that on the way she suggested they go to an ice cream parlor first. They proceeded down Granard Street until reaching Birnie and along Birnie to the place where it crossed the tracks of the defendant railway company, there being two main line tracks (one for northbound traffic and one for southbound traffic) and a third track being used as a sidetrack. Mr. Powell, the driver of the car, testified that he was familiar with the track crossing; that the night was damp and foggy, the windows of the car were up and that they and the windshield were blurred; that as he approached the crossing, he slowed down but did not stop; that he was looking in the direction in which he was driving; that although he looked both ways and there was no obstruction to prevent his seeing the oncoming train, he neither saw nor heard it before it was within a few feet of the car. Pie admitted proceeding around an automobile which had stopped immediately in front of him, and that had he stopped before entering upon the right-of-way of defendant, the accident would not have happened. He testified that trains passed quite often, and he knew this to be a dangerous crossing.
*384“The plaintiff testified substantially to the same effect, stating that she was riding on the right side; that she heard no whistle and that the train was within 9 or 10 feet of them when she first became aware of it. She testified that she visited Gaffney frequently and knew of the crossing, and knew it was dangerous to cross there with mist blurring the windshield and windows as on this occasion. She also testified that she saw the car stopped there, and that they drove around it thinking it was backing up. She further testified that there was misty rain and fog and one could hardly see ; that it was difficult to drive but they could see the lights of other cars and the street lights .which were on at the time and running parallel to the tracks; that it was too cold to have the windows down, but had they been, the occupants of the car could have seen and heard much better; that the car slowed down but never stopped before entering the right-of-way of defendant.
“The view both ways along defendant’s right-of-way here is admittedly clear of obstructions and nothing to prevent the plaintiff from seeing the oncoming train except the weather conditions and the fog and mist on the windows and windshield of the car.”
Under the facts as above related, it is readily seen that the facts of that case are not nearly so strong on the issue of gross contributory negligence and wilfulness of the driver, and joint enterprise as are the facts of the case under discussion; and there this Court held that the trial Judge correctly nonsuited the plaintiff on the ground of the gross contributory negligence and wilfulness of the driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding, and joint enterprise.
For the reasons stated, I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of defendant, and not merely for a new trial as the prevailing opinion holds.
Taylor, J., concurs.