Court Opinion

ID: 9402091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 08:09:46.063018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:57.327474
License: Public Domain

In The
                              Court of Appeals
                     Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                    No. 07-22-00235-CV

                TIM BARKLEY AND TERESA BARKLEY, APPELLANTS

                                             V.

                JAMES CONNELLY AND KIKI CONNELLY, APPELLEES

                             On Appeal from the County Court
                                 Hansford County, Texas
              Trial Court No. CV00893, Honorable Benny D. Wilson, Presiding

                                      June 13, 2023
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

       Appellants Tim and Teresa Barkley appeal from a judgment for possession entered

against them in a forcible detainer action brought by appellees James and Kiki Connelly.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
                                             BACKGROUND

         This case arises from the sale of the Barkleys’ Hansford County farm to the

Connellys. The Barkleys completed the transfer of their interest in the property to the

Connellys in November of 2018 but did not vacate the property. The Barkleys desired to

repurchase a portion of the 960-acre farm, but the Connellys did not wish to sell.

Eventually, the Barkleys filed suit against the Connellys claiming they were entitled to title

of the property. After the trial court issued a final judgment in favor of the Connellys in

that lawsuit,1 the Connellys brought a forcible detainer action in justice court against the

Barkleys, seeking to evict them from the property. After a judgment was entered in favor

of the Connellys, the Barkleys appealed to the county court, which also found in favor of

the Connellys.         The Barkleys then appealed to this Court seeking to set aside the

judgment.

                                      FORCIBLE DETAINER ACTION

         In three issues, the Barkleys challenge the sufficiency of notice, the validity of the

citation, and the trial court’s jurisdiction.

Notice

         By their first issue, the Barkleys contend that the Connellys failed to introduce

evidence of a notice served on them which complied with the Texas Property Code.

Proper notice is an element of a forcible detainer action. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§§ 24.002, 24.005. A party seeking possession in a forcible detainer cause of action must

         1   That judgment was affirmed by this Court in Cause Number 07-22-00144-CV.

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strictly comply with the statutory requirements. Kennedy v. Andover Place Apts., 203

S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

       However, the Barkleys have not directed this Court to any written pleading, motion,

or objection raising this point in the trial court, and our own review of the record reveals

no argument related to notice. In order for a party to present a complaint for appellate

review, the record must show that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely

request, objection, or motion. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); see also T.O. Stanley Boot Co.,

Inc. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. 1992) (listing ways to preserve no-

evidence point). If a party fails to do so, the issue is not preserved and may not be made

on appeal.    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).     Because the Barkleys’ first issue was not

preserved, we may not consider it on appeal. See Bell v. Mortgage Elec. Registration

Sys., Inc., No. 05-06-00427-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2374, at *10–12 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Mar. 28, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (in forcible detainer suit, complaints not

presented to trial court, including complaint regarding purported deficiency in eviction

notice, waived on appeal). Accordingly, we overrule this issue.

Citation

       The Barkleys assert in their second issue that the Connellys failed to serve them

with a proper citation and that citation should have been quashed. The Connellys contend

that the Barkleys waived their complaints regarding citation by their appearance in both

the justice court and the county court.

       Ordinarily, when a party makes a general appearance, the party is considered to

have consented to the personal jurisdiction of the trial court and to have effectively waived

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any complaint as to service. N.J. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 613 S.W.3d

317, 321 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.).          Here, the Barkleys made a general

appearance by appearing and participating in the justice court proceedings and the de

novo trial in the county court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120, 121. Even if we disregard the

Barkleys’ participation in the justice court, we conclude that their appearance in the trial

de novo in county court waived any complaint as to service of process because, upon the

perfection of their appeal from justice court to county court, the Barkleys filed a plea to

the jurisdiction, motion to quash citation, and subject thereto, original answer. See In re

A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d 60, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“Filing an

answer constitutes a general appearance, thereby dispensing with the need for the

issuance of service of citation and waiving any complaints about service.”); In re D.M.B.,

467 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied) (“In general, a party’s

personal appearance before a trial court indicates a submission to the court’s jurisdiction,

constituting a general appearance and therefore, waiving any complaint as to service.”).

       The Barkleys did not file a special appearance challenging personal jurisdiction.

Moreover, the motion to quash does not function as a special appearance.              GFTA

Trendanalysen B.G.A. Herrdum GMBH & Co., K.G. v. Varme, 991 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex.

1999) (per curiam). If no special appearance has been properly urged, an attack on

defective service constitutes a general appearance. Id.; see also Roberts v. Mariner Vill.

Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 14-16-00021-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 118, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 10, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating “by filing a motion to quash

citation, a defendant appears in the case”). Because the Barkleys did not challenge the

trial court’s jurisdiction over them before filing their motion to quash and answer, they

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made a general appearance and the trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over them.

Therefore, we overrule the Barkleys’ second issue.

Jurisdiction

       By their final issue, the Barkleys argue that the trial court did not have jurisdiction

over this matter while an appeal of the title issue was pending. They contend that the trial

court should have abated this case pending appellate resolution of the title dispute.

       The only issue in an action for forcible detainer is the right to actual possession of

the premises. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006).

“To prevail in a forcible detainer action, a plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only

required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to

immediate possession.” Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001,

no pet.). The jurisdiction of a forcible detainer action is expressly given to the justice court

of the precinct where the property is located and, on appeal, to county courts for a trial de

novo. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c).

       Forcible detainer actions are cumulative of any other legal remedy a party may

have, and the displaced party is entitled to bring a separate suit in the district court to

determine questions of title. Salaymeh v. Plaza Centro, LLC, 264 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). If it becomes apparent that a genuine issue of

title exists in a forcible detainer action, a justice court or county court does not have

jurisdiction over the matter. Mitchell v. Armstrong Capital Corp., 911 S.W.2d 169, 171

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). On the other hand, if the issues of

title and possession are not so intertwined, “a forcible-detainer suit in justice court may

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run concurrently with another action in another court—even if the other action adjudicates

matters that could result in a different determination of possession from that rendered in

the forcible-detainer suit.” Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 437 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Matters relating to possession may overlap in

the two proceedings without affecting the county court’s jurisdiction to determine

immediate possession because “a judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is

a determination only of the right to immediate possession and does not determine the

ultimate rights of the parties to any other issue in controversy relating to the realty in

question.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Lopez v. Sulak, 76 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi—Edinburg 2002, no pet.)).

          We conclude that the issues of title and possession in this case are not so

interconnected to preclude the county court from determining the right to immediate

possession. After conveying all their interest in the property to the Connellys by warranty

deeds, the Barkleys filed suit in district court alleging various theories and claims to the

property. Following the district court’s entry of judgment in the Connellys’ favor, the

Connellys initiated this forcible detainer action in justice court to evict the Barkleys. The

Connellys filed deeds showing their ownership of the property with their forcible detainer

action.

          On this record, the deeds the Connellys filed are prima facie evidence of their title

to the disputed property. See Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex.

2007) (per curiam) (“Deeds obtained by fraud are voidable rather than void, and remain

effective until set aside.”). The mere existence of a title dispute in district court did not

divest the county court of jurisdiction to determine who had the right to immediate
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possession of the property. See Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d at 437; see also Cook v. Mufaddal

Real Estate Fund, No. 14-15-00651-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 2876, at *8–9 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 4, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (challenges to validity of

foreclosure sale do not deprive justice or county court of jurisdiction in forcible detainer

action because plaintiffs in such actions need only present sufficient evidence of

ownership to demonstrate superior right to immediate possession to prevail). The county

court properly retained the forcible detainer action. Therefore, we overrule the Barkleys’

third issue.

                                       CONCLUSION

       Having overruled the Barkleys’ three issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

                                                        Judy C. Parker
                                                           Justice

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