Court Opinion

ID: 9838269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 20:12:20.595433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:45:25.799548
License: Public Domain

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                                                             FILED
WORKFORCE WEST VIRGINIA,                                                September 5, 2023
Respondent Below, Petitioner                                             EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                       INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

vs.) No. 22-ICA-110         (Cir. Ct. Kanawha Cnty., No. 21-AA-63)           OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHRISTINA GADDY,
Petitioner Below, Respondent

                             MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner Workforce West Virginia (“Workforce”) appeals the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County’s August 19, 2022, “Final Order Reversing the Decision of the
Workforce West Virginia Board of Review and Granting Unemployment Compensation
Benefits.” Respondent Christina Gaddy timely filed her response. 1 Workforce did not file
a reply. The issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in reversing the Workforce
Board of Review (“Board”) and in finding that Ms. Gaddy was eligible for unemployment
benefits based on the application of equitable tolling to the statutory period in which Ms.
Gaddy was required to submit a physician’s certification for a valid “medical quit” pursuant
to West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(1) (2020).

       This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2022). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds that there is error in the circuit court’s decision but no
substantial question of law. This case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of
Rule 21(d) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for reversal in a memorandum decision.
For the reasons set forth below, the circuit court’s decision is reversed, and this case is
remanded to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County for further proceedings consistent with
this decision.

       Ms. Gaddy was formerly employed at American Public University as a Senior
Financial Aid Advisor from September 16, 2013, to March 22, 2021. Ms. Gaddy’s primary
job duty was to answer calls from students and parents regarding financial aid. In early
2020, Ms. Gaddy’s position became remote due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Throughout
2020, Ms. Gaddy sought treatment for anxiety. Rauf Cheema, M.D., diagnosed Ms. Gaddy
with anxiety, and opined that her anxiety was a “chronic, serious health condition.” After
Dr. Cheema’s diagnosis, Ms. Gaddy depleted her accrued sick leave and then her FMLA

       1
        Workforce West Virginia is represented by Kimberly A. Levy, Esq. Ms. Gaddy is
represented by Matthew Austin Jividen, Esq.

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leave to deal with her anxiety and to care for her family. On April 21, 2020, Ms. Gaddy
requested eighty hours of emergency paid sick leave from her employer, which was
granted. Ms. Gaddy exhausted that leave by July 13, 2020. From July 13, 2020, to August
14, 2020, Ms. Gaddy used personal leave due to childcare needs. Ms. Gaddy returned to
work on August 17, 2020. In December 2020, Ms. Gaddy was approved to use FMLA
leave on an intermittent basis through November 2021. In February 2021, Ms. Gaddy and
her children contracted Covid-19. Although Ms. Gaddy was still employed at American
Public University, she was granted unemployment benefits for the week of February 26,
2021, continuing until she and her children were no longer Covid-19 positive. Ms. Gaddy
received unemployment benefits for the weeks ending March 6, 2021, March 13, 2021, and
March 20, 2021.

       Ms. Gaddy was scheduled to return to work on March 22, 2021, but instead she
resigned from her position on that date, citing lack of childcare and depletion of her FMLA
leave. Shortly after leaving her position, Ms. Gaddy applied for unemployment benefits. A
hold was then placed on Ms. Gaddy’s claim following her resignation so that her case could
be investigated and referred to a Workforce deputy for a decision.

        On April 30, 2021, the Board issued its deputy’s decision, which found that Ms.
Gaddy left her position due to childcare issues and no longer having paid leave remaining.
The deputy’s decision stated that Ms. Gaddy was disqualified by statute from receiving
unemployment benefits beginning March 21, 2021, until she had returned to covered
employment and worked for at least thirty days. See W. Va. Code § 21A-6-3(1). Ms. Gaddy
had not received this decision on May 5, 2021, when she spoke to an employee in
Workforce’s central office. This employee alerted her of the requirement that she produce
a physician’s note to Workforce for a valid medical quit. Ms. Gaddy alleged that she was
not previously aware of this requirement. The following day, Ms. Gaddy got a physician’s
certification from Dr. Cheema. Dr. Cheema’s certification dated May 6, 2021, stated “Ms.
Christina Gaddy was under my care for her illness. She was stressed at work which
contributed to her anxiety and panic attacks. Due to her severe anxiety, she left her
position.” Workforce asserted that it was unclear when this certification was received by
its office. Ms. Gaddy stated that she sent the certification by email on May 7, 2021.

        Ms. Gaddy then appealed the April 30, 2021, deputy’s decision to the Board’s
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). On June 25, 2021, a hearing was held before the ALJ.
Ms. Gaddy testified that she had worked at American Public University for seven years,
and that her anxiety worsened after the pandemic began. Further, Ms. Gaddy stated that
she was unable to continue with several job responsibilities due to her anxiety, and that she
was unaware of the requirement that a physician’s certification must be submitted within
thirty days of leaving employment for a valid medical quit.

      By decision dated and mailed June 30, 2021, the ALJ found that Ms. Gaddy left
work voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of the employer, and that

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she was thus disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. The ALJ found that
although Ms. Gaddy provided a medical certification that her job had worsened her medical
condition, she did not meet the thirty-day statutory deadline for submitting a physician’s
certification set forth in West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(1). Further, the ALJ noted that lack
of childcare is not a basis that would constitute fault on the part of the employer. Based on
these findings, the ALJ affirmed the deputy’s decision. On July 13, 2021, Ms. Gaddy
appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision in its
entirety by order dated and mailed September 10, 2021.

        Ms. Gaddy appealed the Board’s decision to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.
On appeal, Ms. Gaddy asked the circuit court to apply an equitable remedy to toll the
deadline for producing a physician’s certification. By order entered August 19, 2022, the
circuit court reversed the decisions of the ALJ and the Board. The circuit court stated that
the only limitations explicitly placed on equitable tolling relate to filing deadlines which
are jurisdictional in nature. 2 The circuit court found that statutes that are remedial in nature
and statutes that concern public good or welfare should be construed liberally and
according to their equity. The circuit court further found that Ms. Gaddy was unaware of
the requirement that a physician’s certification be produced to Workforce, that she
diligently pursued her claim beyond that of a reasonable claimant, and that Workforce was
in possession of the physician’s note for seven weeks prior to the ALJ hearing on June 25,
2021. Based on these findings, the circuit court reversed the Board, holding that Ms.
Gaddy’s production of the physician’s certification was timely as a matter of law under the
doctrine of equitable tolling. Thus, the circuit court held that Ms. Gaddy was eligible for
unemployment benefits. It is from this order that Workforce now appeals. Our standard of
review is as follows:

              The findings of fact of the Board of Review of [Workforce West
       Virginia] are entitled to substantial deference unless a reviewing court
       believes the findings are clearly wrong. If the question on review is one
       purely of law, no deference is given and the standard of judicial review by
       the court is de novo.

Syl. Pt. 3, Adkins v. Gatson, 192 W. Va. 561, 563, 453 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1994).

        On appeal, Workforce advances four primary arguments. First, Workforce argues
that the circuit court erred in applying the doctrine of equitable tolling to permit Ms. Gaddy
to receive unemployment benefits despite her late submission of the physician’s
certification. Next, Workforce argues that Ms. Gaddy failed to meet the statutory
requirements for submitting a physician’s certification within thirty days of leaving her
employment as required by West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(1), and that the note she

       The circuit court cites to Indep. Fire Co. No. 1 v. W. Va. Human Rts. Comm’n, 180
       2

W. Va. 406, 408, 376 S.E.2d 612 (1988) in support of its position.

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ultimately submitted was insufficient under the statute. Workforce further argues that the
circuit court failed to give substantial deference to the findings of fact of the Board. Finally,
Workforce argues that the circuit court erred in failing to find that Ms. Gaddy’s voluntary
resignation from employment disqualified her from receipt of unemployment benefits.

        Turning to the issue of equitable tolling, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia (“Supreme Court”) has held that equitable remedies may be applied to decisions
of administrative boards in certain cases. See Hudkins v. State of W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret.
Bd., 220 W. Va. 275, 647 S.E.2d 711 (2007) (applying equitable estoppel where petitioner
retired after employer promised petitioner that accumulated sick leave would convert to
service credit); see also W. Va. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Jones, 233 W. Va. 681, 760 S.E.2d 495
(2014) (discussing whether it was appropriate to apply equitable estoppel to Retirement
Board case). Administrative boards are quasi-judicial and have the ability to apply
equitable remedies in certain cases. However, this Court notes there is a high standard for
equitable remedies. See Hudkins, 220 W. Va. at 281, 647 S.E.2d at 717. Further, the
Supreme Court has stated that “statutes of limitations are favored in the law and cannot be
avoided unless the party seeking to do so brings himself strictly within some exception.”
Adkins v. Clark, 247 W. Va. 128, 875 S.E.2d 266 (2022). Additionally, “[d]isqualifying
provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law are to be narrowly construed.”
Summers v. Gatson, 205 W. Va. 198, 202, 517 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1999) (citing Syl. Pt. 1,
Peery v. Rutlege, 177 W. Va. 548, 355 S.E.2d 41 (1987)).

       The controlling statute for physician certifications in unemployment cases, West
Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(1), provides in, part:

       For the purpose of this subdivision, an individual has not left his or her most
       recent work voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of the
       employer, if the individual was compelled to leave his or her work for his or
       her own health related reasons and notifies the employer prior to leaving the
       job or within two business days after leaving the job or as soon as practicable
       and presents written certification from a licensed physician within 30 days
       of leaving the job that his or her work aggravated, worsened, or will worsen
       the individual’s health problem.

        Regarding the issue of deference, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
has held that “[a]n appellate court, be it the circuit court . . . may not substitute its judgment
for that of the administrative law judge.” See Keatley v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 200 W.
Va. 487, 490, 490 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1997). Further, “a reviewing court is obligated to give
deference to factual findings rendered by an administrative law judge, a circuit court is not
permitted to substitute its judgment for the hearing examiner with regard to factual
determinations.” See Syl. Pt. 1 Cahill v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 208 W. Va. 177, 539
S.E.2d 437 (2000). The ALJ’s credibility determinations are binding unless patently

                                                4
without basis in the record. Martin v. Randolph Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 195 W. Va. 297, 304,
465 S.E.2d 399, 406 (1999). Further:

       [I]n applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a [lower
       tribunal] sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind
       that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo. Indeed, if the lower
       tribunal’s conclusion is plausible when viewing the evidence in its entirety,
       the appellate court may not reverse even if it would have weighed the
       evidence differently if it had been the trier of fact.

 Bd. of Educ. of Cnty. Of Mercer v. Wirt, 192 W. Va. 568, 579, 453 S.E.2d 402, 413 (1994)
(citations omitted).

        The record demonstrates that Ms. Gaddy left work voluntarily without fault on the
part of her employer, and that Ms. Gaddy cited childcare needs as the initial reason for her
separation from work. Further, Ms. Gaddy did not provide a physician’s certification within
thirty days as required by West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(1). Ms. Gaddy left her position
on March 22, 2021, and did not submit her physician’s certification until at the earliest,
May 7, 2021. It also appears from the record that, as submitted, the certification did not
specifically address whether Ms. Gaddy’s position aggravated or worsened her anxiety as
required by West Virginia Code § 21A-6-3(1). Ms. Gaddy did not demonstrate that she fell
within an exception to the deadline set forth in the statute. In the present case, equitable
tolling was not an appropriate remedy, as the statute clearly sets forth the time frame in
which a physician’s certification must be submitted for a valid medical quit. 3 For these
reasons, we find that the circuit court was clearly wrong in determining that Ms. Gaddy
was eligible for unemployment benefits based on the application of the doctrine of
equitable tolling. Further, the circuit court was required by law to give deference to the
findings of fact of the Board and the ALJ.

       Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s August 19, 2022, order and remand the
matter to circuit court for the entry of an order reinstating the decision of the Board of
Review consistent with this decision.

                                                                    Reversed and Remanded.

ISSUED: September 5, 2023

       3
         The Supreme Court of Appeals has previously held that good cause was not shown
for the late filing of a claim for unemployment benefits where the Petitioners were unable
to establish with specificity that they were prevented from timely filing the claims. See
Patton v. Gatson, 207 W. Va. 168, 171, 530 S.E.2d 167, 170 (1999) .

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CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge Thomas E. Scarr
Judge Charles O. Lorensen

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