Court Opinion

ID: 9926919
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Date Created: 2024-01-25 21:10:37.204707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:02.312155
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01/25/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                               November 7, 2023 Session

       KENNATH ARTEZ HENDERSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Fayette County
                      No. 4465     J. Weber McCraw, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                          No. W2023-00515-CCA-R3-ECN
                       ___________________________________

The Petitioner, Kennath Artez Henderson, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s
summary denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, challenging the sentence of
death that the trial court imposed after his guilty plea to the first degree premeditated
murder of a law enforcement officer. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that newly
discovered evidence of severe brain damage and serious mental illness at the time of the
offense may have resulted in a different judgment if presented at trial, that he was without
fault in failing to present the evidence at the proper time because trial counsel were
ineffective for failing to discover and present the evidence at sentencing, and that due
process requires tolling the statute of limitations. Based on our review of the oral
arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis
court.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.
MCMULLEN, P.J., and JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., joined.

Kelley J. Henry, Chief, and Amy D. Harwell, Assistant Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal
Public Defender, and Katherine M. Dix, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Nashville,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Kennath Artez Henderson.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor
General; James Gaylord, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Mark E. Davidson, District
Attorney General; and Falen M. Chandler, Assistant District Attorney General, for the
appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION
                                           FACTS

        On May 13, 1997, the Fayette County Grand Jury returned a ten-count indictment,
charging the Petitioner with one count of first degree premeditated murder, three counts of
first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnaping, and one count
each of attempted especially aggravated kidnaping, aggravated robbery, aggravated
assault, and felony escape. On July 6, 1998, the day trial was scheduled to begin, the
Petitioner pled guilty to all of the charges except the charges for the three counts of first
degree felony murder. Our supreme court summarized the facts in its opinion from the
Petitioner’s direct appeal of his convictions as follows:

               At the time of the events giving rise to this case, the [Petitioner] was
       incarcerated at the Fayette County Jail serving consecutive sentences for
       felony escape and aggravated burglary. On April 26, 1997, as the [Petitioner]
       was planning an escape from jail, he had a .380 semi-automatic pistol
       smuggled into the jail through his girlfriend. A couple of days later, the
       [Petitioner] requested dental work on a tooth that needed to be pulled, and an
       appointment was made for May 2 with Dr. John Cima, a dentist practicing in
       Somerville. Dr. Cima had practiced dentistry in Somerville for more than
       thirty years, and he had often seen inmate patients. In fact, this was not the
       [Petitioner’s] first visit to see Dr. Cima.

               On May 2, 1997, Deputy Tommy Bishop, who was serving in his
       official capacity as a transport officer for the Fayette County Sheriff's office,
       took the [Petitioner] and another inmate, Ms. Deloice Guy, to Dr. Cima’s
       Office in a marked police car. Upon their arrival at the dentist’s office, Dr.
       Cima placed the [Petitioner] and Ms. Guy in separate treatment rooms, and
       each patient was numbed for tooth extraction. Deputy Bishop remained in
       the reception area and talked with the receptionist during this time.

               When Dr. Cima and his assistant returned to the [Petitioner’s] treating
       room to begin the tooth extraction, the [Petitioner] pulled out his .380 pistol.
       Dr. Cima immediately reached for the pistol, and he and the [Petitioner]
       struggled over the weapon. During this brief struggle, Dr. Cima called out
       for Deputy Bishop, and the deputy hurried back to the treatment room. Just
       as the deputy arrived at the door, the [Petitioner] regained control of the pistol
       and fired a shot at Deputy Bishop, which grazed him on the neck. Although
       not fatal, this shot caused the deputy to fall backwards, hit his head against
       the doorframe or the wall, and then fall to the floor face down, presumably
       unconscious.

                                             -2-
               The [Petitioner] then left the treating room and came back with the
       receptionist in his custody. The [Petitioner] reached down and took Deputy
       Bishop’s pistol, and he took money, credit cards, and truck keys from Dr.
       Cima. The [Petitioner] then ordered Dr. Cima and the receptionist to
       accompany him out of the building, but just before he turned to leave the
       building, the [Petitioner] went back to the treatment room, leaned over
       Deputy Bishop, and shot him through the back of the head at point-blank
       range. The deputy had not moved since first being shot in the neck moments
       earlier and was still lying face-down on the floor by the door to the treatment
       room when the [Petitioner] fatally shot him.

               Once outside of the office, the [Petitioner] was startled by another
       patient, and Dr. Cima and his receptionist were able to escape back into the
       office. Once inside, Dr. Cima locked the door and called the police. The
       [Petitioner], in the meantime, stole Dr. Cima’s truck and drove away at a
       slow speed so as not to attract any attention to himself. When police officers
       began to follow him, the [Petitioner] sped away, and eventually drove off the
       road and into a ditch. The officers took the [Petitioner] into custody, and
       upon searching the truck, they found the murder weapon, Deputy Bishop’s
       gun, and personal items taken from Dr. Cima’s office.

State v. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d 307, 310-11 (Tenn. 2000) (footnotes omitted).

      One week after the Petitioner’s guilty pleas, he waived his right to have a jury
empaneled to determine his sentence, and the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Id. at
311. Four witnesses, including the Petitioner, testified in mitigation at the hearing.
Henderson v. State, No. W2003-01545-CCA-R3-PD, 2005 WL 1541855, at *41 (Tenn.
Crim. App. June 28, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2005).

        A brief review of the relevant testimony is in order. The Petitioner testified that he
was twenty-four years old at the time of the crimes. Henderson, 24 S.W.3d at 311. He
was heavily involved in extracurricular activities and sports in high school but had “some
‘problems’” that were never addressed. Id. While the Petitioner was in jail in 1996, he
requested counseling because he thought he “‘needed help psychologically.’” Id. The
Petitioner’s mother testified that she did not think the Petitioner needed any help or
intervention in his high school years and that she did not pursue obtaining help for him in
jail because he “‘seemed to be doing fine when [she] talked to him.’” Id. at 311-12. Dr.
Lynne Zager, a forensic psychologist who evaluated the Petitioner for the sentencing
hearing, testified about her findings and conclusions, which were based on two interviews
with him, a personality test she administered, and information supplied by the defense. Id.
at 312. She concluded that the Petitioner was suffering from dissociative disorder at the
                                            -3-
time of the crimes and that he “possessed an unspecified personality disorder which
exhibited some narcissistic and anti-social traits.” Id. She thought his dissociative state
began after he fired the first shot and lasted at least twenty-four hours. Id. She opined that
he was “‘[acting] under duress, and that his judgment was not adequate’” at the time of the
crimes but that his “condition at the time of the murder would not support a legal finding
of insanity.” Id.

      At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that all four
aggravating circumstances argued by the State had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:

       (1) that the defendant created a great risk of death to two or more persons
       during the act of murder; (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose
       of avoiding an arrest; (3) that the murder was committed during the
       defendant’s escape from lawful custody; and (4) that the murder was
       committed against a law enforcement officer, who was engaged in the
       performance of official duties.

Id. at 312 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(3), (6), (7), (9)). The trial court imposed
a sentence of death for Deputy Bishop’s murder and a consecutive effective sentence of
twenty-three years for the remaining convictions. Id. fn.4.

       On direct appeal of his convictions to this court, the Petitioner argued only that his
death sentence was disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. State v.
Henderson, No. 02C01-9808-CC-00243, 1999 WL 410421, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June
15, 1999). This court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Id. at *5. On automatic
direct appeal to our supreme court, that court held that the Petitioner’s sentence of death
was not disproportionate or arbitrarily applied, that the evidence supported each of the four
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
Henderson, 24 S.W.3d at 319.

       The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief on February 12, 2001,
and an amended petition on November 30, 2001, claiming, in pertinent part, that trial
counsel were ineffective for failing to consult with him, which prevented them from
monitoring his mental health, and for failing to develop and introduce mitigation evidence.
Henderson, 2005 WL 1541855, at *1, *40. Regarding the latter argument, the Petitioner
claimed “significant” mitigation evidence of his mental health existed, specifically, that his
extended family members had a history of mental illness and that he suffered from Bipolar
Type 2 disorder at the time of Deputy Bishop’s death, none of which trial counsel
investigated or presented at sentencing. Id. at *40.

                                            -4-
       At the 2003 post-conviction evidentiary hearing, second-chair trial counsel testified
that he was appointed to represent the Petitioner in June 1997, that he met with the
Petitioner’s family members three or four times, and that he met with the Petitioner
“numerous” times before trial. Id. at *5. He described the Petitioner as “‘calm,’”
“‘respectful,’” and “‘pleasant’” and said that the Petitioner’s mother never indicated he had
any mental health issues or was mentally deficient. Id. at *7. Second-chair counsel “was
not able to discern any obvious indicators that the [P]etitioner was unable to assist in his
representation or suffered from any mental illness,” and “[a]ny information related to
possible mental illnesses or deficiencies were solely limited to the opinions of Dr. Zager.”
Id. Evidence of the Petitioner’s guilt was overwhelming, but evidence of mental illness in
the Petitioner’s family would have been relevant to the defense and the trial court. Id.

       Lead trial counsel testified that he met with the Petitioner before the Petitioner’s
transfer to Riverbend Maximum Security Institution and that he met with the Petitioner
three or four times at Riverbend. Id. at *8. Lead counsel hired experts and investigators,
and he provided everything in the Petitioner’s file to Dr. Zager. Id. at *9. Lead counsel
saw nothing to indicate that insanity would be a viable offense, and the Petitioner was not
lacking in mental capacity. Id. Lead counsel described the Petitioner as “cooperative,”
“well-mannered,” and “polite.” Id. The Petitioner’s mother refused to believe that the
Petitioner could commit any criminal offenses, and lead counsel was unaware of an
incident in which the Petitioner allegedly had kidnapped and raped his girlfriend’s mother.
Id.

        Dr. Frank Einstein, a self-employed sentencing consultant and mitigation expert,
testified about his normal procedure in completing a mitigation investigation and said that
compiling an accurate social history for a defendant would take one to two or three years.
Id. at *10. The Petitioner’s mitigation consultant did almost all of the work in the
Petitioner’s case just two weeks before he pled guilty. Id. In Dr. Einstein’s opinion, the
mitigation consultant did not spend enough time investigating the Petitioner’s case, which
resulted in the Petitioner’s trial team’s failing to discover mitigation evidence about the
Petitioner and his extended family. Id. That information consisted of the Petitioner’s
behavior in his high school years; radical changes in his behavior two years before the
murder, including kidnapping and raping his girlfriend’s mother; and mental illness in at
least nine of his extended family members. Id. Dr. Einstein thought a psychiatrist should
have examined the Petitioner for sentencing. Id. He acknowledged that the Petitioner’s
trial team had evidence of physical trauma experienced by the Petitioner. Id. at *11.

       Dr. Zager testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that trial counsel
retained her to evaluate the Petitioner and that she spent three hours with him for the
evaluation in November 1997. Id. at *15. In January 1998, Dr. Zager reviewed the
Petitioner’s medical records from Le Bonheur Children’s Hospital. Id. The records
                                            -5-
showed that the Petitioner had been hit by a car while riding his bicycle when he was twelve
years old and that he was rendered unconscious. Id. Nevertheless, Dr. Zager gave her
opinion to trial counsel that the Petitioner was competent to stand trial and that the evidence
was insufficient to support an insanity defense. Id. After the Petitioner’s guilty pleas, Dr.
Zager administered the MMPI and determined that the Petitioner suffered from a
personality disorder with narcissistic and antisocial traits.1 Id. at *15-16. However, that
diagnosis did not constitute a major mental illness and was not very valuable in asserting a
defense. Id. at *16. After initiation of the post-conviction proceedings, Dr. Zager received
additional information that she was not aware of at the time of her initial diagnosis. Id.
The additional information included details about more crimes committed by the Petitioner,
which Dr. Zager could have used to refine her diagnosis. Id. She said that Bipolar Type 2
was a mood disorder, not a psychosis, and that a Bipolar Type 2 diagnosis for the Petitioner
was not inconsistent with the MMPI she administered to him. Id.

        Dr. Pamela Auble, a clinical psychologist, testified that she was involved in the
Petitioner’s post-conviction case. Id. at *17. She explained that the MMPI was a
personality test and that the MMPI was not a sufficient tool for providing a “full picture”
of a person’s psychology. Id. at *16. Dr. Auble interviewed the Petitioner, administered
a litany of tests, and reviewed records about his history, including the medical records from
Le Bonheur. Id. Dr. Auble concluded that the Petitioner did not have “‘global or general
deficits’” but that he did have “‘some specific problems in his mental abilities.’” Id. She
conceded that the personality style identified by Dr. Zager was similar to the personality
style she observed in her own evaluation of the Petitioner, and she agreed with Dr. Zager’s
diagnosis of narcissistic traits and antisocial personality. Id. at *18. Dr. Auble was unable
to diagnosis the Petitioner with an Axis I major mental disorder. Id.

       Dr. William Kenner, a psychiatrist hired by post-conviction counsel, testified that
he reviewed “quite a stack of material” in this case, including interviews with the
Petitioner’s family members. Id. Dr. Kenner noted that the Petitioner was a successful
athlete in high school and “showed great promise.” Id. at *19. However, his behavior
changed in early adulthood. Id. He began committing serious crimes, including abducting
and raping the mother of his girlfriend on two separate occasions and abducting the
younger sister of an ex-girlfriend. Id. The Petitioner also had a family history “heavily
loaded for bipolar disorder” and was experiencing a period of difficulty sleeping at the time
of Deputy Bishop’s murder. Id. Dr. Kenner concluded that the Petitioner was suffering
from Bipolar Type 2 disorder at the time of the killing and that he “was suffering from a
major medical illness that affected his abilities to control his behavior in this case.” Id. at
*18, *20.

       1
        “MMPI” is the acronym for the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory. See State v. Flake,
114 S.W.3d 487, 498 (Tenn. 2003).
                                                 -6-
       Additional witnesses testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing about the
Petitioner’s behavior during and after high school, and family members testified about his
family’s mental health issues. Id. at *11-14. Furthermore, post-conviction counsel tried
to show a history of mental illness on both sides of the Petitioner’s family by introducing
mental health records for some of the Petitioner’s maternal cousins, aunts, and uncles and
his paternal grandmother. Henderson v. Mays, No. 12-5028, 2023 WL 3347496, at *7 (6th
Cir. May 10, 2023).

        Relevant to this evidence, the post-conviction court, which also presided over the
Petitioner’s guilty plea and sentencing hearings, stated in its order denying post-conviction
relief:

               “[T]he Court finds that Petitioner was not denied effective assistance
       of counsel. Counsel filed all the appropriate motions. Counsel was provided
       with expert services. Counsel allowed the investigative and mitigation expert
       to conduct their investigation and report to counsel their findings. It is true
       that trial counsel was not aware of all the history of mental illness in the
       Petitioner’s family. Also true was that counsel was not completely aware of
       some of the violent events that the Petitioner engaged in shortly before this
       incident. It is true that counsel was aware from the expert clinical
       psychologist that Petitioner was diagnosed with a personality disorder, not
       otherwise specified, with narcissistic traits. However, their expert did not
       see any bipolar tendency, and counsel, under the circumstances, acted in a
       competent manner in presenting this psychological proof to the Court. It is
       true that counsel’s mitigation expert did not make as an extensive mitigation
       investigation as Post-conviction mitigation expert opined was necessary.
       However, two points need to be addressed. One, there was a mitigation
       investigation and a review of the trial transcript revealed that various
       witnesses testified on Petitioner’s behalf in an effort to produce mitigation.
       Secondly, the Court places little weight on the testimony of Petitioner’s
       mitigation expert, especially when he opined that it would take two to three
       years to do a proper mitigation investigation. Lastly, as trial counsel stated,
       this was a case where finding mitigation was difficult, and as explained
       hereinafter, also a double-edged sword. Therefore, the Court concludes that
       counsel was not ineffective.

       ....

              The Court can now look to the additional mitigation proof offered at
       this hearing in assessing whether the result would have been different. . . .
       The Petitioner was a normal student in grammar and high school. He was a
                                            -7-
      talented basketball player and had a talent for art. About two years prior to
      this event, his behavior changed. He became violent. He viciously assaulted
      one girlfriend. He was convicted of some lesser felonies. Thereafter, he
      abducted the mother of his girlfriend on several occasions while masked. He
      also raped the mother. Petitioner’s clinical psychologist opined that he had
      a personality disorder, but did not . . . disagree with trial counsel’s clinical
      psychologist, other than she administered more tests. Finally, Dr. Kenner
      diagnosed the Petitioner as bipolar. . . . Dr. Kenner opined that in order to
      fully explain the nature of Petitioner’s bipolar diagnosis, the trier of fact
      would have to hear all the details of Petitioner’s various assaults, abductions
      and rapes.
             ....

             [T]he statutory aggravating circumstances . . . by the State were
      simply overwhelming. The Court considered the mitigating testimony,
      especially the testimony regarding this personality disorder. This proffered
      new mitigating testimony regarding Dr. Kenner’s bipolar diagnosis, only
      reinforces the Court’s opinion that the aggravating circumstances
      outweighed, in fact overwhelmed, any mitigating evidence. . . . The Court is
      assuming . . . that Dr. Kenner’s diagnosis is correct. Had this testimony been
      offered at the trial, the State, of course, would have had the opportunity to
      rebut same. . . . Secondly, the evidence presented regarding the [Petitioner’s]
      abduction of his girlfriend’s mother, the rapes, the assaults, lead the Court to
      the conclusion that the Petitioner’s acts were calculated, cold and deliberate.
      These are the same calculated and deliberate actions that led to the death of
      Tommy Bishop. Whether or not they were the result of a bipolar condition
      would not have changed the Court’s decision to impose a sentence of death.”

Henderson, 2005 WL 1541855, at *21.

      In affirming the post-conviction court’s denial of relief, this court stated:

              It appears that the crux of the [P]etitioner’s complaint is the failure to
      introduce evidence regarding the alleged existence of a bipolar type 2 mental
      illness. The existence of such a mental illness would have been apparent,
      suggests the [P]etitioner, had trial counsel discovered a family history of
      mental illness and evidence of the [P]etitioner’s erratic criminal behavior.
      Dr. Zager failed to diagnosis the [P]etitioner with anything more severe than
      a personality disorder. The [P]etitioner blames this diagnosis on trial
      counsel’s failure to gather sufficient information. The [P]etitioner ignores
      the fact that Dr. Zager’s diagnosis remained the same even after reviewing
                                            -8-
       the additional information. Moreover, the [P]etitioner’s own post-conviction
       witness, Dr. Auble, arrived at essentially the same diagnosis as Dr. Zager.
       While Dr. Kenner eventually diagnosed the [P]etitioner as Bipolar Type 2,
       his diagnosis would have necessitated the introduction of evidence regarding
       the [P]etitioner’s escalating history of violent crime, which is a tactic with
       considerable risk. The [P]etitioner’s claim, at best, amounts to an assertion
       that counsel should have obtained an expert who would have diagnosed the
       petitioner as Bipolar Type 2. The Constitution does not require attorneys to
       “shop around” for more favorable expert testimony. Poyner v. Murray, 964
       F.2d 1404, 1419 (4th Cir. 1992). Additionally, the necessary introduction of
       the [P]etitioner’s violent criminal behavior could have undermined this
       mitigating factor and outweighed any beneficial mitigating impact of the
       mental illness evidence. This “undiscovered” mitigation evidence raised by
       the [P]etitioner was correctly characterized by the post-conviction court as
       being a “double-edged sword.”

               Given the strength of the proof of the aggravating circumstances
       relied upon by the State, the mitigation evidence that was presented at
       sentencing[,] and the possible negative impact of the “undiscovered”
       mitigation evidence, we conclude that had this information been presented to
       the court there is little reason to believe the trial judge would impose a
       sentence other than death. The [P]etitioner is not entitled to relief on this
       basis. Indeed, in this case, unlike the situation where a jury imposes a death
       sentence, we are not left to speculate to some degree as to the effect this
       evidence might have had on the sentencer. The sentencer in this case, the
       trial judge himself, found this evidence would not have altered the result of
       the sentencing hearing.

Id. at *42-43.

       The record reflects that on January 24, 2006, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee,
raising numerous claims for relief. Henderson, 2023 WL 3347496, at *10. In summary,
the Petitioner asserted that he was incompetent to enter a guilty plea and waive jury
sentencing, that trial counsel were ineffective for advising him to plead guilty and waive
jury sentencing, and that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to discover and present
evidence at sentencing that he suffered from brain damage. Id. In support of his arguments,
the Petitioner later filed a response brief and attached a 2008 report prepared by Dr. Ruben
C. Gur, a professor of neuropsychology at the University of Pennsylvania, who reviewed
scans of the Petitioner’s brain that were performed in 2002. Id. Dr. Gur determined that
the Petitioner had an abnormal brain morphology and suffered from brain damage that
                                             -9-
probably resulted from his bicycle accident as a child. Id. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit later summarized Dr. Gur’s findings as follows:

               Dr. Gur concluded that [the Petitioner’s “cranial volume is more than
       2 standard deviations . . . below normal, a condition that occurs in less tha[n]
       2.5% of the population,” and that [the Petitioner] had “abnormally low brain
       volume” overall, a “sign of neurodevelopmental abnormalities.” Dr. Gur
       noted that [the Petitioner’s] cranial volume reduction was more significant in
       the left-top area of his head—the same spot where, as a child, he complained
       of soreness after his bicycle accident—and noted that the scans showed
       reductions consistent with “atrophy . . . often seen following head injury.”
       Based on a clinical interview and computerized testing—conducted in
       conjunction with a review of the brain scans—Dr. Gur concluded “to a
       reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that [the Petitioner] “suffers from
       brain dysfunction” and “abnormalities in brain function in regions relevant
       to behavior, especially related to executive functions (frontal), attention and
       comprehension of complex information (parietal), and the integration of self
       (right parietal).” He concluded that these abnormalities were “most likely
       related to anoxia or traumatic brain injury,” and indicate that [the Petitioner]
       “suffers from brain dysfunction that impairs his ability to modulate his
       behavior in accordance with context and may specifically lead to dissociative
       states, such as the state he was in when he committed the offenses.”

Id.

       The Petitioner also attached a 2008 report prepared by Dr. George Woods, a
psychiatrist who performed a neuropsychiatric evaluation on the thirty-four-year-old
Petitioner in 2007. Dr. Woods reviewed various information, including the transcripts of
the sentencing and post-conviction evidentiary hearings, the medical records from the
bicycle accident, the Petitioner’s school and criminal records, and investigative interviews
that were conducted with the Petitioner’s family members in 2002. Dr. Woods diagnosed
the Petitioner with genetically-derived Bipolar Type 1, rapid-cycling disorder. Dr. Woods
concluded that, based on the structural damage to the Petitioner’s brain found by Dr. Gur
and the “genetically-derived mood disorder” diagnosed by Dr. Woods, the Petitioner was
unable to conform his behavior to the law and was unable to make a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent waiver of his rights to a jury trial and to be sentenced by a jury. Id.

       The district court denied the habeas corpus petition in October 2011. Id. The
Petitioner appealed, and the Sixth Circuit remanded the case in July 2012 for
reconsideration in light of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). Id. at *12. On remand,
the district court again denied the petition, and the Petitioner again appealed to the Sixth
                                            - 10 -
Circuit. Id. On May 23, 2022, while the federal appeal was pending, the United States
Supreme Court released its opinion in Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 382 (2022), which
held that that “a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise
consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on ineffective assistance of state
postconviction counsel.”

         On September 9, 2022, while the federal habeas corpus case was still pending in the
Sixth Circuit and more than twenty-four years after the Petitioner’s guilty pleas and
sentence of death, counsel for the Petitioner filed the petition for a writ of error coram nobis
that is the subject of this appeal. In the petition, the Petitioner alleged that newly discovered
evidence of his mental health at the time of the crimes was developed during his federal
habeas corpus case and that the evidence may have changed the outcome of his state case.
Specifically, the new evidence consisted of the 2002 brain scans that showed a congenital
brain anomaly and brain damage resulting from the bicycle accident. In support of this
alleged new evidence, the Petitioner described and attached Dr. Gur’s report, in which Dr.
Gur explained the Petitioner’s congenital brain morphology and brain damage, and Dr.
Woods’ report, in which Dr. Woods diagnosed the Petitioner with genetically-transmitted
Bipolar Type 1, rapid-cycling disorder, a more disabling condition than either Bipolar Type
1 or Bipolar Type 2. The Petitioner asserted that he was without fault for not discovering
and presenting the evidence earlier because trial counsel were ineffective for failing to
investigate and present the mitigation evidence and that due process and equitable
principles required tolling the statute of limitations. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed an
amended petition for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that post-conviction counsel had
a conflict of interest that resulted in counsel’s inability to locate the newly discovered
evidence earlier and that due process required tolling the statute of limitations, particularly
in light of Shinn v. Ramirez.

        On March 8, 2023, the coram nobis court entered an order summarily denying the
petition. First, the coram nobis court, noting that the Petitioner pled guilty in 1998,
concluded that the petition was “clearly” untimely. The court then concluded that the
Petitioner was not entitled to tolling the statute of limitations because he failed to explain
why the evidence, which was available at the time of post-conviction, was not presented
earlier. Finally, the coram nobis court concluded that even if the Petitioner had timely filed
the coram nobis petition, the Petitioner’s challenge to the effective assistance of trial and
post-conviction counsel was not an appropriate ground for coram nobis relief. The
Petitioner appealed the coram nobis court’s summary denial of the petition to this court.

       On May 10, 2023, the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in the Petitioner’s federal
habeas corpus case. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Petitioner already had argued in
state court that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate mitigation
investigation that would have revealed “red-flag behavior,” a family history of mental
                                             - 11 -
illness, and a bipolar diagnosis and that he was not entitled to relief because the issue was
adjudicated by the post-conviction court on the merits. Henderson, 2023 WL 3347496 at
*16-18. The Sixth Circuit examined the Petitioner’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to discover his brain damage. However, that claim was never presented to a
state court and was based entirely on the reports by Dr. Gur and Dr. Woods. See id. at *18.
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit determined that it was prevented by Shinn v. Ramirez from
considering any evidence of the Petitioner’s brain damage that was developed outside the
state-court record. Id. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit concluded that it was “bound” to
deny habeas corpus relief. Id. at *19.

                                       ANALYSIS

        The Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily denying his
petition for a writ of error coram nobis because he presented newly discovered evidence in
the form of brain scans that show he has brain damage and expert reports that show he has
a severe mental illness, i.e., Bipolar Type 1, rapid-cycling bipolar disorder. He maintains
that he was without fault in failing to present the evidence at sentencing and on post-
conviction because trial and post-conviction counsel were ineffective and that he is entitled
to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in light of Shinn v. Ramirez because that
ruling left him without a remedy in federal court. The State argues that the trial court
properly denied the untimely petition because the delay in filing the petition was
unreasonable as a matter of law, because ineffective assistance of counsel is not grounds
for relief in a coram nobis petition, because the Petitioner is not raising a claim of actual
innocence, and because a guilty plea may not be collaterally attacked with a coram nobis
petition. For the reasons stated below, we conclude the coram nobis court properly denied
the petition without a hearing.

      A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy by which the court may
provide relief from a judgment under only narrow and limited circumstances. State v.
Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tenn. 1999). The writ of error coram nobis is codified in
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105, which provides in pertinent part:

        The relief obtainable by this proceeding shall be confined to errors dehors
       the record and to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on
       the trial of the case, on a motion for new trial, on appeal in the nature of a
       writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Upon a
       showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to
       present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will
       lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which
       were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have
       resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.
                                           - 12 -
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105(b). Generally, a decision whether to grant a petition for a
writ of error coram nobis rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Hart,
911 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).

       “In order to qualify as newly discovered evidence, ‘the proffered evidence must be
(a) evidence of facts existing, but not yet ascertained, at the time of the original trial, (b)
admissible, and (c) credible.”’ Nunley v. State, 552 S.W.3d 800, 816 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting
Payne v. State, 493, S.W. 3d 478, 484-85 (Tenn. 2016)). To be considered “without fault,”
the petitioner must show that “the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have led to a
timely discovery of the new information.” State v Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 527 (Tenn.
2007). “[C]oram nobis petitions with inadequate allegations are susceptible to summary
dismissal on the face of the petition, without discovery or an evidentiary hearing.” Nunley,
552 S.W.3d at 831.

        A petition for a writ of error coram nobis must be filed within one year after the
judgment becomes final. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103. For the purposes of coram nobis
relief, a judgment becomes final thirty days after the entry of the judgment in the trial court
if no post-trial motion is filed, or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely filed post-
trial motion. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 670. The one-year statute of limitations may, however,
be tolled on due process grounds. Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828-29 (citation omitted).

               If a petition for a writ of error coram nobis fails to show on its face
       either that it has been timely filed in accordance with Tennessee Code section
       27-7-103 or specific facts showing why the petitioner is entitled to equitable
       tolling of the statute of limitations, the trial court is within its discretion to
       summarily dismiss it.

 Id. at 829. Although the decision to grant or deny coram nobis relief rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court, see Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 527-28, “[w]hether due process
considerations require tolling of a statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact,
which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at
830 (citation omitted).

        As explained in Workman v. State, in determining whether to toll the statute of
limitations, a court must weigh the petitioner’s interest in obtaining a hearing to present a
later-arising ground for relief against the State’s interest in preventing stale and groundless
claims. 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001). For example, newly discovered evidence that
may establish actual innocence in a capital case “far outweighs any governmental interest
in preventing the litigation [of] stale claims.” Id. Courts should use the following three-
step process to balance these interests:
                                             - 13 -
             (1) determine when the limitations period would normally have
       begun to run;

               (2) determine whether the grounds for relief actually arose after the
       limitations period would normally have commenced; and

              (3) if the grounds are “later-arising,” determine if, under the facts of
       the case, a strict application of the limitations period would effectively deny
       the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present the claim.

Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d
297, 301 (Tenn. 1995) (both overruled on other grounds)).

       First, we will address the State’s claim that the Petitioner’s guilty plea precludes
him from seeking coram nobis relief. In Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246, 253 (Tenn.
2016), our supreme court held that “the coram nobis statute is not available as a procedural
mechanism for collaterally attacking a guilty plea” because a guilty plea is not a “trial.”
However, after the Frazier ruling, a panel of this court concluded that coram nobis relief
is available to a petitioner seeking a new sentencing hearing in a capital case based on
newly discovered evidence. As this court explained,

               In Frazier, our supreme court “emphasiz[ed] that the coram nobis
       statute makes repeated references to words such as ‘evidence,’ ‘litigated,’
       and ‘trial.’” 495 S.W.3d at [248]. So too does the section of our Code that
       governs sentencing in a capital case. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (“jury,”
       “opening statement,” “closing argument,” “evidence,” “instructions,”
       “deliberations,” “verdict,” “reasonable doubt,” “new trial.”). . . . As the
       supreme court emphasized, “The plain and ordinary meaning of the term
       ‘litigated on [or at] the trial’ in the context of criminal prosecutions refers to
       a contested proceeding involving the submission of evidence to a fact-finder
       who then must assess and weigh the proof in light of the applicable law and
       arrive at a verdict of guilt or acquittal.” 495 S.W.3d at 250. The sentencing
       phase of a capital trial is just such a contested proceeding. Tenn. Code Ann.
       § 39-13-204; see [State v. Harris, 919 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tenn. 1996)]
       (commenting on “acquittal” of death penalty based on jury’s decision to
       impose life sentence…).

       Finally, the remedy for a successful coram nobis petition is a new trial. Tenn.
       Code Ann. § 40-26-105(c) (“and if the decision be in favor of the petitioner,
       the judgment complained of shall be set aside and the defendant shall be
       granted a new trial in that cause”). That is the same remedy the statute
                                             - 14 -
       governing sentencing in a capital case provides. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
       204(k) (“if the court finds error alone in the trial determining punishment, a
       new trial on the issue of punishment alone shall be held”).

Davidson v. State, No. E2019-00541-CCA-R3-PD, 2021 WL 3672797, at *62 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Aug. 19, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2021), cert. denied S. Ct. 2720
(2022). Although the petitioner in Davidson did not plead guilty, applying this court’s
reasoning in Davidson, a petitioner who pleads guilty in a capital case may attack a
contested sentence based on a claim of newly discovered evidence. Therefore, we turn to
the three-step analysis for weighing the Petitioner’s interest in obtaining a hearing to
present later-arising grounds for relief against the State’s interest in preventing stale and
groundless claims.

        The Petitioner was sentenced on July 13, 1998. Accordingly, the statute of
limitations began to run thirty days later on August 12, 1998, and expired one year later on
August 13, 1999. The Petitioner did not file his petition for a writ of error coram nobis
until September 9, 2022, more than twenty-three years after the statute of limitations
expired.

        Next, we must determine whether the ground for relief arose after the statute of
limitations normally would have commenced. Part of the Petitioner’s ground for relief is
based on the brain trauma that resulted from the bicycle accident that occurred when he
was twelve years old. Obviously, the Petitioner and his mother were aware of the bicycle
accident when the Petitioner pled guilty. Additionally, the Petitioner’s medical records
from Le Bonheur were in trial counsel’s possession and were provided to Dr. Zager in
preparation for her testimony at sentencing. Dr. Zager testified at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing that she reviewed the records for sentencing and that she was aware of
the accident. However, Dr. Zager concluded that the Petitioner suffered from a personality
disorder with narcissistic and antisocial traits, and trial counsel relied on her diagnosis
alone at sentencing. The long-term ramifications of the bicycle accident on the Petitioner’s
brain and his congenital brain anomaly were not revealed until the brain scans were
performed in 2002 and Dr. Gur released his report in 2008. Likewise, the Petitioner’s
genetically-derived rapid-cycling disorder was not discovered until Dr. Woods evaluated
the Petitioner and released his report in 2008. We note that the State does not argue that
the Petitioner’s ground for relief is not “later arising.” Therefore, we move on to the third
step in the analysis, whether the Petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity to present
his claims.

      At oral arguments, counsel for the Petitioner claimed that the newly discovered
evidence was not available until 2011, when it was developed by federal habeas corpus
counsel. However, that claim is generous to the Petitioner because the brain scans were
                                           - 15 -
performed in 2002 and Dr. Gur and Dr. Woods completed their reports in 2008. Thus, the
evidence was available and Petitioner could have asserted a coram nobis claim in 2008, at
the latest. Instead, he filed his petition for a writ of error coram nobis in 2022, a delay of
approximately fourteen years. Even assuming arguendo that both trial and post-conviction
counsel were ineffective in failing to discover the evidence earlier, their ineffectiveness
does not explain the Petitioner’s fourteen-year delay in filing his petition.

        The Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to equitable tolling in light of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Shinn v. Ramirez because that case “changed the legal landscape” by
prohibiting federal courts from considering evidence offered for the first time in a habeas
corpus proceeding, thereby denying him a remedy in federal court. The Petitioner points
out that he filed his coram nobis petition only three months after the Shinn opinion was
released. Again, we reject this argument. Nothing prevented the Petitioner from filing a
petition for a writ of error coram nobis while his federal habeas corpus case was pending.
See Irick v. State, No. E2010-02385-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 1991671, at *18 (Tenn. Crim.
App. May 23, 2011) (stating, “That the petitioner was litigating related claims in either
federal or state court did not preclude him from asserting these claims in a coram nobis
petition as early as 1999 when the affidavits were first obtained.”). In Irick, another capital
case in which the petitioner alleged newly discovered evidence about his mental health,
this court concluded that the eleven-year delay in filing the coram nobis petition was
unreasonable and that, as a matter of law, he was not entitled to due process tolling. Id.
As this court has stated, “A petitioner may not delay presenting a claim seeking coram
nobis relief until “‘every other avenue of relief ha[s] been exhausted.’” Dellinger v. State,
No. E2013-02094-CCA-R3-ECN, 2015 WL 4931576, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18,
2015) (quoting Irick, 2011 WL 1991671, at *18). The delay in this case was even more
excessive than the delay in Irick. Therefore, we conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled
to due process tolling.

        Finally, the State also claims that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he
does not raise a claim of actual innocence. See Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828-29 (stating, “To
accommodate due process concerns, the one-year statute of limitations may be tolled if a
petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeks relief based upon new evidence of actual
innocence discovered after expiration of the limitations period.”). We note, as does the
State in its brief, that the issue of whether a coram nobis petition must raise a claim of
actual innocence for tolling the statute of limitations is currently pending before our
supreme court. Clardy v. State, No. M2021-00566-SC-R11-ECN (Tenn. heard on oral
arguments June 1, 2023). However, regardless of our supreme court’s ruling in that case,
the Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition because the delay in
filing the petition is unreasonable as a matter of law.

                                            - 16 -
                                  CONCLUSION

     Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the
judgment of the coram nobis court.

                                                 _________________________________
                                                 JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JUDGE

                                        - 17 -