Court Opinion

ID: 9884808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:15:29.927287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:40.886962
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the judgments of the circuit and appellate court. The majority states that “once there was a reference to the conversation even a stipulation that Slajchert did not shoot Westbrook would not cure the error.” What error? The opinion does not state what the error was, and the record shows that the State did not object to the cross-examination. It cannot be seriously contended that it was error to show that the police officer spoke with Westbrook and then went to the table and spoke with Slaj chert. The fact that the jury might draw an unfavorable inference from these facts is one of the hazards of our adversary system of the trial of cases. There are countless decisions of this and the appellate courts holding that evidence admissible for one purpose is not rendered inadmissible because the jury might improperly consider it in some other capacity for which it could not properly be admitted. A party aggrieved by its admission can and should offer an instruction limiting the inferences which may be drawn therefrom. I will concede that having succeeded in suppressing the deceased’s oral statement, defense counsel, in the exercise of fairness and complete candor should have called some other witness to show what the police officer did, but the conduct is not so reprehensible as to require the result achieved by the majority’s opinion. This record reflects that the State’s “star” witnesses Gardner and Slajchert had been discredited, perhaps beyond rehabilitation. The allowance of the motion for mistrial, based on cross-examination to which no objection was made, literally “aborted” the proceeding (see United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 91 S.Ct. 547) and improperly deprived the defendant of “his valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal ***.” Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 93 L.Ed. 974, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837. I disagree that defense counsel was in a position to “speculate on a favorable verdict ***” and I fail to perceive the basis for the “strong possibility” that admission of the evidence to which he offered to stipulate would result in a new trial. I am not aware of any opinion of this court which granted a new trial because of evidence admitted in accordance with the stipulation of able experienced trial counsel, obvisously entered into as a matter of trial strategy. I further point out that an examination of this record would quickly allay any question of the adequacy of the defendant’s representation. In my opinion the effect of our decision is to deprive this defendant of a valued fifth amendment right.