Court Opinion

ID: 9941027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 18:12:04.050356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:08.432239
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2024-Ohio-583.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 112843
                 v.                                :

MARQUISE D. JACKSON,                               :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 15, 2024

      Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-17-619749-A, CR-22-666534-A, CR-22-666977-A, CR-22-671433-A,
                   CR-23-677633-A, and CR-23-678698-A

                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Brian Callahan, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 The Goldberg Law Firm LLC and Adam Parker, for
                 appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                   Marquise Jackson appeals the imposition of consecutive service in

three cases in which he was found to have violated previously imposed community

control sanctions: Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-619749, CR-666534, and CR-666977
(collectively “violation cases”). For the following reasons, we reverse the imposition

of consecutive service and remand for a new hearing to solely resolve the

consecutive-sentencing question.

              In the violation cases, Jackson was serving a term of community

control sanctions for menacing by stalking, criminal damaging, telecommunications

harassment, failure to comply, and burglary convictions. After several violations

and continuation of the community control sanctions, Jackson committed several

additional crimes leading to Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-671433, CR-677633, and

CR-678698 (collectively “new-offense cases”): vandalism, tampering with records,

violating a protection order, and two counts of menacing by stalking.             The

community control sanctions imposed in CR-619749 expired, which included the

failure-to-comply conviction, but the trial court found Jackson to have violated the

sanctions imposed on the remaining violation cases. The 15-month aggregate of the

sentences imposed in the violation cases were imposed consecutively to the

24-month aggregate of the sentences imposed in the new-offense cases. The trial

court imposed consecutive service of those sentences as a matter of law: the

sentences imposed in the violation cases “will run concurrent with each other, but,

by law, consecutive to” the sentences imposed in the new-offense cases. (Emphasis

added.) Tr. 196:9-15. Neither the transcript nor any of the journal entries contain

consecutive-sentence findings, and there is no discussion as to the mandatory

consecutive nature of the imposed sentences.

              The parties have not addressed this aspect of the procedural history.
Instead, both Jackson and the state presume that the trial court was required to

make consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and attempted to do

so. Both parties argue that the trial court partially complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

by referencing the trial court’s recitation of the principles of felony sentencing under

R.C. 2929.11 at the onset of the sentencing hearing. The trial court’s statement —

“the two primary things that a Court does in sentencing is to protect the public and

punish the offender” — is an overriding statement reflecting Ohio sentencing

principles and cannot be considered an attempt to comply with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

               In that context, it is not clear that the trial court was considering the

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) factors rather than reciting, nearly verbatim, the principles of

sentencing under R.C. 2929.11: “The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to

protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, to punish the

offender * * *.” R.C. 2929.11 does not apply to consecutive sentencing. See, e.g.,

State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761, 141 N.E.3d 169, ¶ 17 (“R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12 both clearly apply only to individual sentences.”). As the trial

court further explained, Jackson’s inability to conform and adhere to the laws of

Ohio endangered the public and required the court to “issu[e] a punishment,” but

there was no discussion regarding whether that punishment entailed consecutive

service of prison sentences. Further, upon reciting the language of R.C. 2929.11, the

trial court immediately transitioned into imposing individual sentences on each

offense. Although the R.C. 2929.11 principles of sentencing overlap to some degree

with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the record in this case does not demonstrate that the trial
court was attempting to exercise its discretion in considering consecutive service of

the punishments imposed.

               Jackson’s appellate argument focuses on his belief that the trial court

did not make all the findings, failing to find that consecutive service was not

disproportionate to Jackson’s conduct. Despite the fact that Jackson has inartfully

framed the dispositive issue, his argument that the trial court failed to make all the

required findings is vacuously true — the trial court did not make any findings based

on its stated position that consecutive service was required as a matter of law.

               The state argues that the findings can be discerned from the record

under State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 29

(“[A]s long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the

correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the

findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.”). Thus, the state appears to

concede that consecutive service of the prison sentences imposed for the violations

of community control sanctions are discretionary and that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

findings were required. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 162 Ohio St.3d 314, 2020-Ohio-

3195, 165 N.E.3d 1088, ¶ 27 (concluding that when an offender violates the terms of

community control, the trial court may impose a prison term to be served

consecutively to any other sentence through compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)).

Although appellate courts may discern the findings are made from the record, that

divination must be limited to the record as it pertains to the trial court’s exercise of

its discretionary authority to impose consecutive sentences under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4). We cannot assume that the court would make the findings when it

believed the findings to be unnecessary.

              Coupling the above observation with the parties’ presumption that

compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) was required before the imposition of

consecutive sentences, it must be concluded that the trial court erred by imposing

the sentences consecutively without complying with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v.

Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 541, 2008-Ohio-69, 880 N.E.2d 896, ¶ 19. In general, when

consecutive sentences are discretionary and subject to the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

requirements, a trial court is considered to have committed reversible error when

imposing consecutive service based on a belief that the consecutive service is

required by law. Id. In those situations, the trial court has not exercised any

discretion under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and a new hearing on the consecutive-sentence

determination is required. Id.

              After imposing individual sentences on each offense, the trial court

considered the consecutive-service question but concluded that it was required by

law. Even under Bonnell’s standard of review, an appellate court cannot infer a

discretionary decision when consecutive service was believed to be mandated by

law. Johnson at ¶ 19. The trial court’s stated rationale for imposing the sentences

to be served consecutively cannot be overlooked. As a result, Jackson’s request for

a remand and new sentencing hearing to address the consecutive-service issue is

sustained.
              The imposition of consecutive service of the underlying sentences is

reversed, and the matter remanded for the sole purpose of conducting a new

sentencing hearing to address the consecutive-service question with respect to all

the individual sentences imposed.     Although the trial court may consider the

consecutive-sentencing issue anew, the individual sentences imposed on each

offense are now final and cannot be revisited on remand. The sole question is

whether the individual terms are to be served concurrently with or consecutively to

each other. If necessary, and not otherwise mandated by law, the findings under

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) must be included in the record and in the final entry of

conviction.

              Reversed and remanded.

      This cause is reversed and remanded to the lower court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed. The court

finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR