Court Opinion

ID: 9483023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:08:06.358118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:21.895387
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I have no alternative but to dissent. The majority reverses on a ground (harmless error) the State has never raised in this court or in any court below. This is completely contrary to settled appellate procedure. Even if the question of harmless error were properly before us, I would still affirm the district court’s decision to grant the writ because the confrontation clause violation was not harmless error.
I.
The State has had ample opportunity to raise the claim that any confrontation clause violation was harmless error.1 Although Lufkins has presented his confrontation clause claim to the South Dakota Supreme Court, the federal district court, and our court, the State has chosen not to raise the issue of harmless error before any of these courts. The majority’s decision to reverse the district court on an issue not presented below or on appeal is contrary to well established precedents governing appellate procedure.
A. Harmless error not raised below
The general rule is that federal appellate courts do not consider issues not passed upon below. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Jenkins v. Missouri, 962 F.2d 762, 766 (8th Cir.1992) (issue was not raised below, “and we do not consider such issues”); United States v. Garrett, 961 F.2d 743, 748 (8th Cir.1992) (double jeopardy claim not raised below “is not properly before us”). The purpose of the rule is to avoid injustice and surprise by giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues they believe relevant, Singleton, 428 U.S. at 120-21, 96 S.Ct. at 2877-78, and we have vigorously applied the rule in habeas *1485cases. Our court has frequently insisted that habeas petitioners raise claims in district court or find themselves barred from raising the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Warden v. Wyrick, 770 F.2d 112, 114 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1035, 106 S.Ct. 600, 88 L.Ed.2d 579 (1985) (this court precluded from reviewing issue not raised by petitioner in district court); Davis v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 1209, 89 L.Ed.2d 322 (1986) (same).
Oddly enough, the majority now decides to ignore this well established rule even though fairness would require us to apply it to both habeas petitioners and habeas respondents. Perhaps Judge Silberman of the District of Columbia Circuit has suggested the reason the majority today has eschewed an even-handed approach to the question of waiver:
Should we be willing to overlook counsel’s failure to raise a clearly winning argument — even in civil cases — if by doing so we can save the expense of a new trial (or other societal costs)? Or is this a rule for criminal cases only? And if it is the latter, is that because the courts have some unstated responsibility to help the government in its prosecution of defendants? I think not — we have only the duty to apply the law neutrally in both civil and criminal cases.
United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1355 (D.C.Cir.1991) (Silberman, J., dissenting). Like Judge Silberman, I do not believe we have the responsibility to help prosecute criminal defendants. And like Judge Silberman and Chief Judge Ervin of the Fourth Circuit, I believe that our treatment of waiver must be even-handed and “run a two-way street:”
[Fjinality, and its companion, waiver, must run a two-way street. Finality certainly means that a petitioner cannot raise new claims on appeal not yet raised. It also must mean that the state cannot raise new defenses on appeal not raised below.
Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, 458-59 (4th Cir.1992). I will be interested to see if after this decision any members of this court will be willing to reverse a district court’s denial of the writ by relying on an issue not presented below or on appeal by a habeas petitioner, or whether our court will require only the petitioners and not the states to cut straight corners.
Although there are circumstances in which we may resolve an issue not passed upon below, such as where “the proper resolution is beyond any doubt ... or where injustice might otherwise result,” see id. 428 U.S. at 121, 96 S.Ct. at 2877, those narrow circumstances are not present here. As I demonstrate below in section II of this dissent, the resolution of the harmless error issue is not beyond doubt. Moreover, no injustice would result from declining to hear this issue because the State will still have an opportunity to retry Lufkins with constitutionally admissible evidence.
B. Harmless error not raised on appeal
The State not only failed to claim harmless error below, but it never raised the issue on appeal. An appellate court will ordinarily give no consideration to questions not raised, briefed, or argued on appeal. Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736, 740-41 (8th Cir.1985). We consistently follow this rule. See, e.g., Rang v. Hartford Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir.1990); Jacobsen v. Harris, 869 F.2d 1172, 1173-74 (8th Cir.1989) (court refused to consider arguments not raised below or not raised in appellate brief). Moreover, the State did not even raise the harmless error issue at oral argument; it simply responded to a panel member’s question about the issue. In any case, we ordinarily do not consider points raised only at oral argument. Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486 (8th Cir.1990) (refusing to consider point urged at oral argument but not in briefs). As the Supreme Court put it, “[w]e do not reach for constitutional questions not raised by the parties. The fact that the issue was mentioned in argument does not bring the question properly before us.” Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 240 n. 6, *148697 S.Ct. 2339, 2344 n. 6, 53 L.Ed.2d 306 (1977) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206 n. 5, 74 S.Ct. 460, 464 n. 5, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954)).
Many of our cases state that we may affirm a district court on any ground supported by the record even if not relied upon below. See, e.g., Lane v. Peterson, 899 F.2d 737, 742 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 74, 112 L.Ed.2d 48 (1990). These cases are entirely consistent with fair appellate procedure. It is the appellant who bears the burden of demonstrating the error in the lower court, and in most cases the appellee will urge an alternative ground such as harmless error to justify affirmance. It is another matter to reverse the district court on grounds not urged below and not urged on appeal, and the majority cites to no cases supporting such a position.
Instead, the majority, faced with contrary authority in our circuit, canvasses other circuits to find support for its decision to reverse the district court. These cases, however, provide no support. Most of the eight cases cited involve direct appeals, not habeas. None of them involve the situation here: reversing a district court’s grant of habeas relief on an issue not raised below or on appeal. In fact, the majority fails to mention that in several of the cases it cites that the appellate court refused to excuse the government’s failure to raise harmless error on direct appeal. United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 542 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Giovannetti, 928 F.2d 225, 227 (7th Cir.1991). In yet another direct appeal case cited by the majority, the government at least raised the waiver issue at oral argument, and the parties then briefed the issue. United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (5th Cir.1992). That certainly did not happen in the case before us. In two other direct appeal cases, the appellate court simply affirmed the district court by holding any error that occurred was harmless. United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 228-29 n. 5 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1348 (D.C.Cir.1991). Although Judge Silberman’s dissent in Pryce demonstrates why sua sponte consideration of harmless error is undesirable, the panel in that case (and in Jewel) at least followed the general rule permitting an appellate court to affirm a district court on any ground supported by the record even if not relied upon below.
The two Supreme Court cases cited by the majority also offer little support for its decision to reverse the district court’s grant of habeas. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that it will not grant certiorari when “the question presented was not pressed or passed upon below.” See United States v. Williams, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1738-1739, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992), and cases cited therein. Moreover, in Karo, a direct appeal case, the government raised the sufficiency of the search warrant in the court below, something the State failed to do here. See United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (10th Cir.1983). Finally, the only habeas case cited by the majority, Yates v. Evatt, presents a situation the exact opposite of the present case. In Yates, the harmless error issue had not only been considered by the lower court, but harmless error was the main issue before the Supreme Court. Here, of course, the harmless issue error was not raised below and it was not raised on appeal.
Under these circumstances we must affirm the district court.2 As the First Circuit noted in Rodriguez Cortes, “the government’s failure to brief and argue *1487harmless error is itself an indication it recognized how harmful the [erroneously admitted] evidence was.” Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d at 543. If the State decides to retry the defendant it could, of course, decide to rest its case solely on the petitioner’s inculpatory statement and the medical evidence, or it could re-call the three witnesses to testify.3 In either event, if the jury convicted Lufkins, the state trial court and the South Dakota Supreme Court then would have the opportunity to decide whether that evidence was sufficient.
II.
Even if the harmless error issue were properly before us, I would uphold the district court’s grant of the writ. The Supreme Court established a “harmless-constitutional-error” rule in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The Court held that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828 (emphasis added). The Court has returned to the harmless error rule several times since it decided Chapman, each time reaffirming its original holding. In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), the Court determined that the admission of two codefendants’ confessions was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of “overwhelming evidence” against the defendant, the Court concluded that even without the confessions, a reasonable jury would still have voted to convict. Id. at 254, 89 S.Ct. at 1728. The Court refined the Chapman rule in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972), stating that the improper use of evidence will be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if (1) “the properly admitted evidence of guilt is ... overwhelming,” and (2) the prejudicial effect of the erroneously admitted evidence is “insignificant by comparison.” The Court elaborated on the second element of the Schneble test in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), listing the following factors to consider in evaluating the prejudicial effect of erroneously admitted evidence: (1) the importance of the erroneously admitted testimony to the prosecution’s case, (2) whether the testimony was cumulative, (3) whether other evidence properly admitted corroborated or contradicted the testimony on material points, and (4) “the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted.”
Until today, this court has faithfully followed the Van Arsdall and Schneble rules. See, e.g., Wealot v. Armontrout, 948 F.2d 497, 500-501 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Copley, 938 F.2d 107, 111 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Roberts, 844 F.2d 537, 547 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S.Ct. 172, 102 L.Ed.2d 141, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S.Ct. 534, 102 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). Today, however, the majority ignores two very important aspects of the Supreme Court’s harmless error analysis: the properly admitted evidence must be not only sufficient, but overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the erroneously admitted evidence must be insignificant when viewed in light of the other evidence admitted. Schneble, 405 U.S. at 430, 92 S.Ct. at 1058.
A proper analysis under Schneble and Van Arsdall leads to the conclusion that the error in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If a jury were to convict Lufkins based on the properly admitted evidence alone (Lufkins’ admission, the medical evidence, and other marginally significant circumstantial evidence), the conviction might well be sustained under a “sufficiency of the evidence” analysis. The properly admitted evidence, however, does not constitute the overwhelming *1488evidence necessary to show harmless error. See Schneble, 405 U.S. at 430, 92 S.Ct. at 1058. Moreover, the erroneously admitted testimony of Hayes, Hedine, and Blue Dog was far from insignificant. Id. Rather, it was an integral part of the prosecution’s case against Lufkins.
A careful reading of the record convinces me that there would have been significant gaps in the prosecutor’s case if he had relied solely on the properly admitted evidence. First, that evidence showed only that Lufkins struck Sylvester Johnson with an axe handle; that Johnson died of a subdural hematoma, which could have been caused by a single blow to the head; and that persons receiving such an injury could live as long as six to eight hours. The possibility remained that one of the other eyewitnesses to the incident also struck Johnson.4 The prosecutor closed this door when he called three of the four eyewitnesses to testify. Hayes testified that he never hit Johnson, that no one else hit Johnson, and that Johnson did not fall and hit his own head. Hedine testified that because he has no right hand and has only three fingers and a thumb on his left hand, he could not have lifted the axe to strike Johnson; he also testified that no one other than Lufkins hit Johnson that night. Blue Dog testified that he only weighed 115 pounds, had a bad heart, and suffered from lupus. Johnson, on the other hand, was 6'1" tall and weighed 240 pounds. All of this testimony supported the prosecutor’s contention that Lufkins was alone in attacking Johnson.
Second, the properly admitted evidence left open the possibility that Johnson did not die as a direct result of Lufkins' attack. Something might have happened to cause Johnson’s death after the incident with Lufkins. Anticipating this problem, the prosecutor offered the testimony from Hayes to the effect that immediately after the incident, Johnson got into Hayes’ car and Hayes began to drive him to the hospital. En route, according to Hayes, Johnson’s skin began to turn dark, and Hayes believed that he had died. Hayes stated that he then stopped the car and dragged Johnson’s body onto the lawn of a church, where it was found the next morning. Combined with the other testimony of Hayes, Hedine, and Blue Dog, this evidence closed the gaps in the prosecution’s case against Lufkins. Their testimony, if the jury believed it, directly established what the properly admitted testimony could not: that Lufkins’ blow to Johnson, and that blow alone, was fatal. The testimony of Hayes, Hedine, and Blue Dog was not cumulative of the properly admitted evidence, nor did the other evidence corroborate or contradict it. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438.
In sum, the error of admitting the Hayes, Hedine, and Blue Dog testimony was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Without this evidence, questions still remained about what happened after Lufkins hit Johnson. Given the importance of the three witnesses’ testimony, we cannot say with any confidence that the jury would have convicted Lufkins on the basis of the properly admitted testimony alone.

. Like the majority, I assume for purposes of this opinion that Lufkins’ right to confrontation was violated during his 1984 trial.

. Because the State did not raise the issue of harmless error, I would not remand this case to the District Court or the South Dakota Supreme Court.to determine whether the confrontation clause violation was harmless error. Compare Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 677, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1434, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (case remanded to Delaware Supreme Court where State had raised harmless error issue in that court and in the United States Supreme Court).

. The State claims that the three witnesses were not available at the second trial. It appears from the record, however, that they were available for an evidentiary hearing before the district court, perhaps due to changed circumstances. The probability is that they will be available for a third trial.

. Moreover, the police never took fingerprints from the axe handle, making it impossible to determine whether Hayes, Hedine, or Blue Dog had also used the axe to attack Johnson.