Court Opinion

ID: 9836982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:50.514882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.654961
License: Public Domain

EFFRON, Judge
(dissenting):
At the time of his trial, appellant was a Technical Sergeant in the Air Force with over 19 years of service. The offenses of which appellant was convicted alleged various forms of child abuse involving K, who was 11 years old at the time of trial, and J, who was 9 years old at the time of trial. K, who first made the allegations of the abuse, did not do so until nearly 2 years after she had last seen appellant. Appellant testified on his own behalf and denied the allegations. The heart of the defense case pitted appellant’s credibility against the testimony of K and J.
As noted in the majority opinion, the first granted issue involves the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which provides that an accused “shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The Supreme Court, as noted by the majority, has described this as a “fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s constitutional goal,” Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), providing “a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), the primary case relied upon by the majority, the Supreme Court recognized a very limited exception:
[I]f the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse ease is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.
Id. at 855, 110 S.Ct. 3157.
Craig provided that “[t]he requisite finding of necessity must of course be a ease-specific one.” According to the Supreme Court, an alternative procedure must be the product of evidence that supports a finding: (1) that the alternative procedure “is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child witness who seeks to testify”; (2) that the child witness would be traumatized, “not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant”; and (3) that “the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more than ‘mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify.’ ” Id. at 855-56, 110 S.Ct. 3157.
The Court emphasized that “courtroom trauma,” by itself, does not provide a sufficient basis to justify denial of face-to-face confrontation. There must be a showing that “it is the presence of the defendant that causes the trauma.” Id. at 856, 110 S.Ct. 3157.
Craig sets a rigorous standard, which requires rigorously fair procedures. In the *156present case, the military judge failed to apply the procedural safeguards necessary to ensure fair consideration of appellant’s constitutional rights.
This is not a case in which the victim was so traumatized by the events that she could not communicate in an adversarial proceeding. Prior to trial, K testified at the Article 321 hearing in the presence of appellant. There is no indication in the record of the Article 32 proceeding that the presence of appellant produced the type of trauma discussed in Craig. On the contrary, K testified at length and provided detailed testimony about the alleged offenses.
Prior to trial, the prosecution filed a written “Motion for Alternative Forms of Child Testimony,” in which it asked for an Article 39(a)2 hearing “to determine whether [J] and [K] are able to testify in front of the accused at trial.” The Government indicated that it would offer expert testimony at the hearing that would be based on psychological interviews of the children that ha 1 been scheduled but not yet conducted.
The Government represented that it expected the expert to state that if the children were required to testify in the physical presence of appellant, each “would undergo serious emotional distress, such that the child would be unable to communicate;” and that such stress “would be more than de mini-mus, and would result, primarily, from the physical presence of the accused in the courtroom.” The prosecution moved that, if such conclusions were reached by the expert, both J and K be permitted to testify by closed-circuit television or “in such a manner as to avoid eye contact with the accused.”
Defense counsel filed a written response to this motion. The defense objected to an ex parte examination by an expert of the prosecution’s selection and argued that the better approach was to have the examination done by a court-appointed military child psychologist. As an alternative, the defense asked that its own expert be permitted to attend any examinations done by the Government’s expert. The defense also requested that any such interviews be videotaped. Finally, counsel asked that the military judge, after hearing the expert testimony, undertake an in camera interview of the girls to assess their emotional state and to ascertain the understanding of the girls as to the purpose of the examinations.
The military judge denied the defense motions. Thereafter, the prosecution’s psychologist conducted ex parte interviews of K and J. At a subsequent Article 39(a) session, the psychologist described her interviews of the children. On the basis of those interviews, the psychologist recommended that J be allowed to testify via closed-circuit television. The psychologist also concluded that K could testify in court without any special procedures.
Subsequently, trial counsel moved that a screen be installed in the courtroom during the testimony of K and J to block their view of appellant. She also moved that appellant not be allowed in the courtroom until after the witness was seated in each instance, and that appellant be required to leave the courtroom before each witness departed.
Defense counsel objected to these procedures. He noted that K had testified at length at the Article 32 hearing with appellant in the same room and argued that, while she might have some anxiety, she would be able to testify. “[Sjhe’s done it before, she can do it again.”
Without conceding the need for any alternative format with respect to J, he contended that the preferred method under Supreme Court caselaw was to use closed-circuit television, with the witness and counsel in another room and hooked up by audio and video to the courtroom, rather than a screen.
The military judge ruled that J could testify with a screen but that K would testify facing the members and facing away from appellant without a screen unless the screen “appears to become necessary.” He ruled that a closed-circuit television camera would project to a monitor “which will be positioned *157for the military judge, Defense Counsel, the Accused and Court Reporter to see.”
When K was called as a witness, she walked into the courtroom and sat at the witness stand in front of the members, the spectators, and the participants in the court-martial. After she reached the stand, however, her testimony did not begin. Instead, the military judge provided detailed instructions to the members about the television monitor and cameras, ensured that the equipment was working, ruled on whether a government expert could sit at the prosecution table, and further instructed the members as to the purpose of the victim-witness advocate who was seated beside K.
After facing the courtroom while all this activity was undertaken, K spoke privately to trial counsel, and trial counsel requested a recess. When the proceedings reconvened in an Article 39(a) session without K on the stand, trial counsel revealed that K had asked that appellant be excluded from the courtroom when she entered. The military judge asked whether a screen was needed, and trial counsel responded that that was an option. Trial counsel continued:
I think at this point it would make it easier if she had the screen. However, if the court dictates otherwise, we’ll at least try to get her to talk the way the courtroom is set up at this point.
The military judge, without examining the witness or obtaining any further testimony from the psychologist, not only granted the prosecution’s request, but also — on his own motion — expanded his original ruling to permit K to testify from behind a screen.
The military judge’s ruling did not reflect the teaching of Craig that confrontation may not be denied absent a finding that the child witness would be traumatized, “not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant,” and that the distress suffered by the child is “more than ‘mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify.’ ” Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56, 110 S.Ct. 3157. The military judge simply noted:
However, having observed her walk into the courtroom, face the members, the Accused and all of the spectators, I make a finding of fact that she was unable to even approach the witness stand and had to leave the courtroom saying, under her breath, “I can’t do this,” or words to that affect.
This ruling provides an insufficient basis to justify denying appellant his constitutional right of confrontation where the prosecution’s expert witness did not recommend that this witness testify behind a screen, where the judge’s initial ruling did not order such a measure, and where there was no examination of the witness by the court or an expert to resolve the ambiguity as to the cause of her reluctance to testify.
The end result was that K testified in a courtroom environment modified in a manner that identified appellant before the members of the court-martial as a person to be feared, a person whose impact on the witness was so traumatizing that extraordinary measures were warranted in the courtroom. When such measures are taken without an adequate showing of necessity, they are unconstitutional. United States v. Craig, supra.
In recent years, those responsible for the criminal justice system in general and the military justice system in particular have become increasingly aware of the adverse impact on individuals and society that flows from an insensitivity to the rights and needs of victims and witnesses. See, e.g., Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12; Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4820; Department of Defense Directive 1030.1. Sensitivity to such concerns, however, does not require disregard of the basic constitutional rights of accused servicemembers.
The prospect of testifying in court, particularly as a victim who must face the accused, is not something that most people would relish. Under Craig, it is appropriate for a court to be particularly sensitive to the impact on a victim of tender years. The obligation to face the accused, however, *158is enshrined in our Constitution and may be limited only under the narrowly defined circumstances set forth in Craig. Failure to follow those procedures in this case created an environment in the courtroom prejudicial to the substantial rights of appellant.

. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 832.

. UCMJ, 10 USC § 839(a).