Court Opinion

ID: 9918980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 01:00:34.338145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.000879
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-11210      Document: 00517033741         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/16/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                  FILED
                                                                         January 16, 2024
                                   No. 22-11210                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                  Clerk

   Shandra Hodge,
   Individually and as the surviving mother of Schaston Hodge
   and as the administrator of the Estate of Schaston Hodge,

                                                            PlaintiffAppellant,

                                       versus

   Joshua Engleman; Robert Litvin,

                                           DefendantsAppellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 3:21-CV-1916
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:
          Officers Engleman and Litvin shot and killed Schaston Hodge after he
   refused to pull over his vehicle, led the officers on a brief chase back to his
   home, and exited his car with a gun in his hands. After reviewing the officers
   bodycam footage, the district court granted their motion to dismiss on the
   ground of qualified immunity (QI) even though Hodge did not include
   that footage in the pleadings. Treating the dismissal as an implicit conversion
   to summary judgment, we affirm.
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                                           No. 22-11210

                                         I.
          Driving home, Schaston Hodge stopped at a stop sign and turned left
   without signaling. Litvin and Engleman attempted to pull Hodge over.
   Despite the officers lights and sirens, Hodge continued driving for several
   minutes until he reached his house. As Hodge parked in his driveway,
   Engleman jumped out of the police car and sprinted toward Hodges car with
   his gun drawn, ordering Hodge to show his hands and step out of the car.
   Hodge exited the car with a gun in his hands and pointed it at Engleman.
   Engleman fired, shooting Hodge, and dropped to the ground.1 Approaching
   behind Engleman and seeing him fall to the ground, Litvin also discharged
   his weapon. All told, Engleman fired eleven times and Litvin eight, hitting
   Hodge sixteen times.
           Hodges mother, individually and as the administrator of his estate,
   sued Engleman and Litvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and the
   Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS) and the City of Dallas for
   failure to train and supervise.2 TDPS moved to dismiss, asserting Eleventh
   Amendment immunity. The City also moved to dismiss, averring the com-
   plaint lacked any factual basis for a claim of municipal liability. Finally,
   Engleman and Litvin moved to dismiss, claiming QI. The district court
   granted TDPSs and the Citys motions but delayed ruling on Engleman and
   Litvins motion.3

           _____________________
           1
             Engleman seems to have dropped to the ground in an attempt to avoid being shot,
   not because he was shot. It is unclear from the footage whether Hodge ever actually fired
   his gun, and no party has made any claims either way. Because we resolve all genuine
   disputes in favor of the nonmoving party at this stage, see infra, we assume that Hodge did
   not fire.
           2
               Throughout this opinion, we refer to Schaston Hodge as the plaintiff.
           3
            The court gave Hodge leave to refile the complaint after granting TDPSs and the
   citys motions, mooting Engleman and Litvins first motion. After Hodge refiled, Engle-

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                                         No. 22-11210

           In each of their three motions to dismiss, Engleman and Litvin
   attached body-camera footage. The district court relied on that video to dis-
   miss because of QI. The court explicitly found that the blatantly contra-
   dict[ory] video meant Hodges complaint failed to meet the low bar neces-
   sary to survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion.
   636 F. Supp. 3d 727, 733 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (quoting Harmon v. City of Arling-
   ton, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021)).

                                            II.
           We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th
   736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023). Rule 12(b)(6) motions are viewed with disfavor
   and rarely granted. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496,
   498 (5th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). To survive a motion to dismiss, a com-
   plaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
   claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
   678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
   Although we accept all well-pled facts as true, construing all reasonable
   inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plain-
   tiff, conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclu-
   sions are not accepted as true. Allen, 65 F.4th at 743 (cleaned up).
          If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), matters outside the pleadings
   are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated
   as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)
   (cleaned up). Even if a district court does not explicitly inform the parties
   that it was converting the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment

           _____________________
   man and Litvin filed a second motion to dismiss that the court denied without prejudice on
   evidentiary grounds. Defendants then filed a third, which the court granted and is at issue
   here.

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   motion, appellate courts may take the district courts consideration of mat-
   ters outside the pleadings to trigger an implicit conversion. Trinity Marine
   Prods., Inc. v. United States, 812 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2016) (quotation
   marks and citation omitted). On review, this error is reversible only if [the
   plaintiff] had no notice or opportunity to refute [the] allegations in the motion
   to dismiss. Bolen v. Dengel, 340 F.3d 300, 31213 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation
   omitted). Parties must have at least ten days notice before the courts ruling
   that the court could convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a summary
   judgment. Holguin v. U.S. Dept of Army, 98 F.3d 1337, 1996 WL 556767, at
   *2 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (table) (unpublished) (citing Washington v.
   Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir. 1990)).4
          We review a . . . summary judgment de novo, viewing all facts and
   drawing all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
   Harville v. City of Houston, 945 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omit-
   ted). Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is
   no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judg-
   ment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of
   material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
   return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Abdallah v. Mesa Air Grp., Inc.,
   83 F.4th 1006, 1012 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
           To overcome QI, a plaintiff must make two allegations, which we may
   address in either order: first, that an officer acted under color of state law and
   violated a constitutional right. That is a threshold inquiry. If no constitu-
   tional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there

           _____________________
           4
            See also Clark v. Tarrant Cnty., 798 F.2d 736, 74546 (5th Cir. 1986) ([A]bout a
   year and a half of notice that the court might treat Tarrant Countys Rule 12(b)(6)
   motion as a motion for summary judgment since the court accepted evidence outside the
   pleadings is more than sufficient.).

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                                    No. 22-11210

   is no necessity for further inquiries concerning [QI]. Saucier v. Katz,
   533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), limited by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
   Second, that the right was clearly established. The relevant, dispositive in-
   quiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would
   be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
   he confronted. Id. at 202 (citation omitted).

                                        III.
         We first address whether the district court properly granted the
   motion to dismiss.
           In its introduction, the court explained that it had reviewed the
   Motion, Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Third Motion to Dismiss, and
   the appended video evidence. 636 F. Supp. 3d at 731 (cleaned up). When
   reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, though, a court usually may rely on
   only the complaint and its proper attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities,
   Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). And the court must
   accept all well-pleaded facts as true. Allen, 65 F.4th at 743. Although the
   court may rely on documents that the pleadings incorporate by reference,
   Hodge did not attach the video evidence to the pleadings, nor did the plead-
   ings refer to the videos sufficiently to incorporate them. See Dorsey, 540 F.3d
   at 338; Harmon, 16 F.4th at 116264. Therefore, by reviewing the appended
   video evidence, the district court moved beyond the pleadings and to the
   summary judgment stagethus implicitly converting the motion to dismiss
   into a motion for summary judgment per Rule 12(d). See Trinity Marine,
   812 F.3d at 487. By doing so, though, the court did not commit reversible
   error.
          A court need not advise either party of its intention to convert the
   motion. Holguin, 1996 WL 556767, at *2 (citation omitted). The only
   requirement is that the non-moving party have at least ten days in which to

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                                            No. 22-11210

   submit its own evidence. Id. That ten-day period begins running when
   the non-movant is first put on notice that, based on its acceptance of evidence
   outside the pleadings, the court could convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into
   a summary judgment. Id.
          Defendants filed Englemans bodycam footage on January 7, 2022.
   Hodge filed a motion to strike that footage on January 24, claiming, in part,
   that the lack of Litvins bodycam footage made Englemans suspect. Defen-
   dants responded with Litvins bodycam footage on January 26. And, on Feb-
   ruary 9, the court entered a scheduling order permitting limited . . .
   discovery of facts necessary for this Court to rule on the assertion of [QI] by
   defendants. That same day, Hodge filed a reply brief in support of the
   motion to strike the videos, and everything else in this litigation happened
   afterwardsincluding (1) Hodges first amended complaint on April 4;
   (2) defendants second motion to dismiss on April 18; (3) Hodges response
   on May 9; (4) defendants third motion to dismiss on October 6; (5) Hodges
   response on October 10; and (6) the order granting dismissal on October 21.
         When the court entered that scheduling order, it implicitly placed
   Hodge on notice that the court had accepted evidence outside the pleadings.5
   Thus, the ten-day period required by Holguin began running on February 9,
   2022. Hodge had well more than ten days, though. He had eight months
   worth of time, notice, and opportunity to consider the video, to take steps to
   cast doubt on it, and to submit contrary evidence. That is more than
   sufficient.6

           _____________________
           5
            See also In re Deepwater Horizon, 761 F. Appx 311, 31314 (5th Cir. 2019) (per
   curiam) (unpublished) (The courts request to submit the releases and BPs compliance
   with that request, therefore, put the plaintiffs on notice that the court was considering
   matters outside the pleadings and could treat the motion as one for summary judgment.).
           6
               Even if Hodge could plausibly claim there was insufficient notice, error in notice

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                                     IV.
           We turn to whether summary judgment was proper.
           In Scott v. Harris, the Court clarified the process for reviewing evi-
   dence on a summary judgment motion. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). Recognizing
   that it was bound to resolve all genuine disputes in favor of the non-moving
   party, the Court explained that [w]hen opposing parties tell two different
   stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
   reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the
   facts . . . . Id. at 380. And, it held, where a video in the record brooks no
   dispute, the court may view the facts in the light depicted by the
   videotape. Id. at 381.
          Our court has applied that standard many times. In Craig v. Martin,
   we reversed a denial of QI, reasoning that where there is video evidence that
   blatantly contradict[s] the plaintiffs allegations, the court should not adopt
   the plaintiffs version of the facts; instead, the court should view those facts
   in the light depicted by the videotape. 49 F.4th 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 38081). In Harmon, we similarly relied on a video
   when we affirmed a dismissal of a § 1983 claim. 16 F.4th at 116265. And we
   followed a parallel approach to Harmon and Craig in Livingston v. Texas,
   No. 22-40719, 2023 WL 4931923 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023) (per curiam)
   (unpublished). There, we affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of a
   false arrest and excessive force claim by relying on police dashcam footage

           _____________________
   is harmless if the nonmoving party admits that he has no additional evidence anyway or if
   . . . the appellate court evaluates all of the nonmoving partys additional evidence and finds
   no genuine issue of material fact. Bolen, 340 F.3d at 313 (omission in the original) (quoting
   Powell v. United States, 849 F.2d 1576, 1582 (5th Cir. 1988)); see also Anderson v. Liberty
   Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As discussed infra, any
   error would be harmless because Hodge has presented no evidence refuting or casting
   doubt on the videos, and we see no indication of such evidence on our independent review.

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                                        No. 22-11210

   that captured the entire incident. Id. at *2. The video contradicted the plain-
   tiffs claim of a genuine dispute that his constitutional rights had been vio-
   lated, entitling the defendants to QI. Id.
          In sum, a court may rely on video evidence to resolve any claimed gen-
   uine disputes of material fact and rule on summary judgment. Englemans
   and Litvins bodycam footage is sufficiently clear and whole that there are no
   genuine disputes of material fact. The videos cover the entire event, from
   Englemans and Litvins pursuing Hodge after he made an illegal turn to
   their administering first aid after shooting him. Further, they show Hodge
   raising a gun and pointing it at Engleman, as well as the gun lying on the
   ground next to his hand after the officers had shot him. Thus, the videos
   blatantly contradict the allegations of the complaint that Hodge at-
   tempted to comply with Litvins [sic] command to show his hands[,] that
   Hodge turned towards the officer to comply[,] and that Hodge posed no
   threat of harm to Litvin and Engleman.7

                                        V.
          Finally, having determined that no material facts are in dispute, we
   turn to whether the undisputed facts support defendants claim of QI.
          To overcome a defense of QI, the plaintiff must show that the defen-
   dant violated a constitutional right and that the constitutional right was
   clearly established. See Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724,
   740 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017)). We
   may begin with either prong of that analysis. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 236.
          Because Engleman and Litvin acted reasonably, they did not violate
          _____________________
          7
           As the motion to dismiss points out, the complaint switched up the officers, and
   the amended complaint does not fix that issue. Engleman was the one who first interacted
   with Hodge.

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                                            No. 22-11210

   Hodges Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, we address only that first prong.
          Hodge claims that the use of deadly force was excessive and therefore
   a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. [T]here can be no question
   that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reason-
   ableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Tennessee v. Garner,
   471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). To establish an excessive force claim under the Fourth
   Amendment, Hodge must allege (1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and
   only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness
   of which was clearly unreasonable. Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 761
   (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir.
   2005)). There is no real dispute that the officers injured Hodge. So, the
   question is whether their use of force was clearly excessive and clearly
   unreasonable. Id.
          We evaluate reasonableness with a calculus that allows for the
   fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgmentsin
   circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving . . . . Harmon,
   16 F.4th at 1163 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 39697 (1989)).
   The variables include the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
   poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others, and whether he
   is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id.
   (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The solution this court has reached
   repeatedly is that an officer who reasonably believes that the suspect poses
   a threat of serious harm to the officer may use deadly force. Id. (quoting
   Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2009)).8

           _____________________
           8
              We evaluate these variables in the moment of the threat that resulted in the
   officers use of deadly force. So, the focus of the inquiry is on the act that led the officer to
   discharge his weapon. Amador v. Vasquez, 961 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up);
   see also Shepherd v. City of Shreveport, 920 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Harris v.

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          Introducing the video footage to the equation, we solve for the answer
   that Engleman and Litvin used a reasonable amount of force. Despite his
   very minor traffic infraction, Hodge did not pull over when the officers first
   flashed their lights or when they sounded their siren; he continued driving to
   his house. Then, Hodge did not pull into a short driveway and slowly exit his
   car; he drove deep into a driveway and jumped out of his car.
          When Engleman approached him and shouted for Hodge to show
   Engleman his hands, Hodge pointed a gun at Engleman. When Engleman
   saw the gun and Litvin saw Engleman drop to the ground and fire, they each
   reasonably believed Hodge pose[d] a threat of serious harm to them and
   made split-second judgments in that moment to use deadly force against
   Hodge. Id. Whether we apply the standard of a reasonable officer on the
   scene or that of a math Ph.D.s thesis advisor, Engleman and Litvin acted
   reasonably. Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396); see also Saucier, 533 U.S.
   at 20405.
         Because Englemans and Litvins use of deadly force was reasonable,
   Hodges claim of a Fourth Amendment violation fails. Without a Fourth
   Amendment violation, Hodge cannot overcome QI. Therefore, the summary
   judgment is AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
   Serpas, 745 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir. 2014)).

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