Court Opinion

ID: 9497750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:59:10.563969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:23.802681
License: Public Domain

BOGGS, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur in all other parts of the court’s opinion, I do not believe that Barnett has shown that any error in sentencing was prejudicial. I therefore respectfully dissent in part.
I agree with the court’s conclusion that the district court’s use of the pre-Booker sentencing rubric was plainly erroneous in light of present law, but I do not believe Barnett has shown the error prejudiced his sentencing. First, as a factual matter, I believe the record indicates the district court felt the sentence was fair and would therefore give the same sentence post-Booker. Second, as a matter of law, I believe the court errs by concluding that we should reverse when the record is silent as to prejudice.
I
In United States v. Booker, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Supreme Court found the Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional because they permitted judicial fact-finding to increase a sentence beyond that authorized by the jury conviction, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Booker produced two majority opinions, both by a 5-4 vote, with only Justice Ginsberg joining both opinions. The first, by Justice Stevens, found the Guidelines unconstitutional. Id. at 745-56. The second, by Justice Breyer, provides the remedy. Id. at 756-70. The Court’s solution was to strike 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which is the provision making the Guidelines mandatory. Id. at 756-57. The Court left intact the remainder of the Guidelines in an advisory role, instructing that they must be consulted by a sentencing court but are no longer binding. Ibid. The Supreme Court has instructed us to apply Booker to cases on direct review using “ordinary prudential doctrines” and applying the “plain-error test.” United States v. Booker, — U.S.-,-, 125 S.Ct. 738, 769, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). *535The Court also stated that not “every appeal will lead to a new sentencing hearing.” Ibid.
Plain error is a highly deferential standard of review: “[t]he Supreme Court and numerous federal courts have repeatedly stated that the plain error doctrine is to be used sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, and solely to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 F.3d 472, 483 (6th Cir.1999) (quotations omitted). Before we can consider reversing for plain error, the defendant must show that error was prejudicial: that it affected his “substantial rights,” or, in other words, that it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). The defendant bears the burden of showing that the error was prejudicial and altered the outcome. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).
There is ample evidence in the record that the district court believed Barnett’s sentence of 265 months in prison to be proper in light of traditional sentencing considerations. Based on offense level and history, the Guidelines dictated a sentencing range of 235 to 292 months, and the district court imposed a sentence of 265 months. Thus, the district court eschewed the use of discretion that it clearly possessed, pre-Booker, to reduce the sentence by as much as 30 months. In this case, all that Booker added was some, though not unfettered, discretion to reduce the sentence yet further, though with significant restraints. Booker, — U.S. at -, 125 S.Ct. at 764-65 (stating that the Sentencing Guidelines still impose a number of requirements on judges, such as the requirement to consider the Guideline sentencing range, the need to avoid sentencing disparities, reasonableness of the sentence, and other statutory factors). Within the Guideline range, district judges have always exercised their discretion in light of traditional factors, such as the nature of the offense, the character of the defendant, the deterrent effect,- and the future dangerousness of the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (when the Guideline range exceeds 24 months, the district court must state in open court the reason for choosing a point in that range); United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 923-24 (2nd Cir.1993) (remanding- for resentencing when the district court failed to articulate any reason at all for why a particular sentence was selected). When the district court selected a sentence in the middle of the permissible range, it presumably did so because it felt that this would be the just sentence in light of the articulated traditional factors. Had it believed that Barnett warranted a more lenient sentence for any reason, the court was free to reduce his term of imprisonment. The fact that it did not’is a strong indication that the district court did not think a lighter sentence was warranted.1 On this record, I conclude that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines at the time Barnett *536was sentenced did not affect the sentencing outcome, and certainly that he has not demonstrated such an effect.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the record is silent as to prejudice, we should still affirm. The court states that it “refuse[s] to speculate as to the district court’s intentions in the pre-Booker world.” Op. at 528-29. This abrogates the long-held rule that plain error review requires us to determine whether the outcome would be different had the law been correctly applied. This is the heart of the “affects substantial rights” inquiry. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 394-95, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (“Where the effect of an alleged error is so uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his burden of showing that the error actually affected his substantial rights.”); Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632, 122 S.Ct. 1781 (for plain error to have affected substantial rights, it “must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings”) (quotations omitted). What the court dismisses as speculation is precisely the exercise that we must undertake in plain error review. The court does not identify even a sliver of evidence suggesting Barnett would have received a different sentence had the district court applied the post-Booker law. Indeed, it cannot do so, because no such evidence exists. Instead, the court grasps onto only the “distinct possibility that the district court would have imposed a lower sentence under the new post-Booker framework.” Op. at 528-30. A different sentence cannot be conclusively ruled out, but to reverse we must find more than the mere metaphysical possibility that the outcome might have been different. There must be some affirmative evidence to suggest that the error likely altered the outcome before we can consider reversing. Because there is no such evidence, Barnett cannot show that his substantial rights were affected.
II
Perhaps recognizing that the evidence in this case does not support a finding of prejudice, the court argues that prejudice should be presumed. The court believes that we should presume prejudice when the “inherent nature of the error made it exceptionally difficult for the defendant to demonstrate that the outcome of the lower court proceeding could have been different had the error not occurred.” Op. at 526-27. This inverts the burden in plain error review. It is well settled that the defendant must show prejudice before a reviewing court may reverse. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. I do not believe this inversion is warranted. Moreover, even if there were such a presumption, it is rebutted by affirmative evidence that the district court believed its sentence to be appropriate in light of traditional factors.
Contrary to the court’s suggestion, the Supreme Court has never put its imprimatur on the idea that we may presume prejudice in plain error review. The passage upon which the court relies is a single sentence in a Supreme Court opinion refusing to consider the issue. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (“Nor need we address those errors that should be presumed prejudicial if the defendant cannot make a specific showing of prejudice.”). Indeed, if the Supreme Court believes that we should presume prejudice when it would be difficult for the defendant to establish it, it is hard to explain why the Court has passed up so many opportunities to articulate such a doctrine.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly applied standard plain error review even in circumstances where it would be “exceptionally difficult” for the defendant to show prejudice. ' In the capital case of Jones, 527 U.S. at 373, 119 S.Ct. 2090, the Court considered possible prejudice from jury in*537structions that the defendant alleged may have misled the jury into believing the judge would impose a lesser sentence if the jury could not unanimously decide on either a life sentence or the. death penalty. It would obviously be exceptionally difficult to show that this alleged error affected the sentence, since jury deliberations are secret. The Court nonetheless applied standard plain error review for prejudice:
Moreover, even assuming that the jurors were confused over the consequences of deadlock, petitioner cannot show the confusion necessarily worked to his detriment. It is just as likely that the jurors, loath to recommend a lesser sentence, would have compromised on a sentence of life imprisonment as on a death sentence. Where the effect of an alleged error is so uncertain, a defendant cannot meet his burden of shoiving that the error actually affected his substantial rights. In Romano, we considered a similar argument, namely, that jurors had disregarded a trial judge’s instructions and given undue weight to certain evidence. In rejecting that argument, we noted that, even assuming that the jury disregarded the trial judge’s instructions, “[i]t seems equally plausible that the evidence could have made the jurors more inclined to impose a death sentence, or it could have made them less inclined to do so.” Any speculation on the effect of a lesser sentence recommendation, like the evidence in Romano, would have had such an indeterminate effect on the outcome of the proceeding that we cannot conclude that any alleged error in the District Court’s instructions affected petitioner’s substantial rights.
Id. at 394-95, 119 S.Ct. 2090. The Eleventh Circuit has determined that Jones is controlling in plain error review of pre-Booker sentences. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1306, 2005 WL 272952 (11th Cir. Feb. 4, 2005) (“where the effect of an error ... is uncertain or indeterminate — where we would have to speculate— the appellant has not met his burden of showing a reasonable probability the result would be different but for the error; he has not met his burden of showing prejudice”). I agree.
The fact that there is no evidence supporting Barnett’s claim of prejudice does not mean it is categorically “extraordinarily difficult” for defendant’s to establish prejudice in pre-Booker sentencing. In fact, we often have had evidence on the record when district courts are dissatisfied with the sentence the Guidelines required them to give. Sentencing courts are required by law to give reasons in open court for the sentence they select whenever the range is greater than 24 months. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). And even when this rule does not apply, district courts typically explain their chosen sentence. We may also infer possible prejudice when a district court sentences at the bottom of the range. See supra n. 1. It is no more difficult to establish prejudice here than in the vast run of cases involving plain error review.
Nor did Booker expand the factors a district court could consider when selecting a sentence. The court suggests that now counsel could present aggravating and mitigating circumstances that were “not available for consideration under the mandatory Guidelines regime,” Op. at 527-28 (quotations removed), but the court does not indicate what those additional circumstances might be. This argument ignores a fundamental feature of the Guidelines: they present a sentencing court with a range, from which it must select a sentence. In this case the range was nearly five years — 57 months. Counsel already had every reason and every opportunity to present any mitigating circumstance that *538might possibly have saved Barnett from an additional five years in prison. Any arguments that might be raised post -Booker about culpability, future dangerousness, offsetting good works, family obligations, or any other mitigating circumstance were also fair game pr e-Booker, and these arguments for mitigation have been regularly invoked by defense counsels in pr e-Booker sentencing proceedings. United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 627-28 (6th Cir.1996) (finding reversible error when the defendant was not offered the opportunity to give mitigating evidence at sentencing). The Guidelines never placed any limits on the ability of the district court to consider these factors, so there is no reason to remand so the district court may consider additional circumstances.2
Most importantly, the presumption is irrelevant because here we have concrete evidence in the record that the district court had no desire to give Barnett a lower sentence. The district court, in light of traditional factors, could have given Barnett 30 months less in prison if it had believed such a sentence warranted. We need ■ not speculate- as to what the district court would have done if it had the discretion to give a more lenient sentence, because it already had such discretion. Assuming, arguendo, a presumption of prejudice, it is rebutted by the record.
Ill
Finally, it is significant that this case does not involve a Sixth Amendment violation. Unlike Booker itself, and United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374, 380, 2005 WL 147059, at *5 n. 6 (4th Cir. Jan.24, 2005) (stating that it is remanding based only on error due to a Sixth Amendment violation and noting'that “[t]his case does not present the question of whether a defendant suffers prejudice because a sentencing court fails to treat the guidelines as-advisory in determining the sentence”), upon which the court relies, sentencing in this case‘was not based on judicial fact-finding. The only factors that determined Barnett’s. Guideline range were the jury conviction itself and prior felony convictions. Thus, unlike Booker, the determination of the range was not a constitutional violation. As the court correctly stated, it is well settled that the Sixth Amendment does not require that prior convictions be found by a jury. Op. at 524-25 (citing United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 707-09 (8th Cir.2001)); accord Booker, — U.S. at-, 125 S.Ct. at 756 (“Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established' by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (emphasis added). This is highly significant, because only when a sentence is based on judicial fact-finding — as in Booker and Hughes — may the sentence be said to have resulted from Sixth Amendment error.
IV
The efficiency argument made in the concurrence by Judge Gwin, while intriguing, suffers from two defects. First, *539lowering the threshold for showing prejudice based on “efficiency considerations” is novel and has no basis in the Supreme Court’s instructions with respect to remedy. Booker, — U.S. at-, 125 S.Ct. at 769 (cases on direct review should be reviewed using “ordinary prudential doctrines” and applying the “plain-error test,” and “not every appeal will lead to a new sentencing hearing”). Judge Gwin seems to be arguing that judicial economy warrants a blanket remand of all pre-Booker sentences on direct review. If the Court’s directions are to be followed, we cannot simply conclude that the prejudice inquiry is waived in the interests of judicial economy.
Second, a remand in this particular case would not be resource efficient. While the district court is likely to be somewhat familiar with the case already, after more than a year it will be necessary to review the case before resentencing. We must also consider the need for the parties to submit arguments and to participate in the resentencing, however streamlined. Finally, after sentencing there will be the inevitable appeal to this court. Both district and circuit courts must expend non-trivial effort to resolve even the easy cases, where the outcome is never in doubt. And we must not forget the energy the parties must expend to make their arguments before us.
While I would not necessarily dismiss efficiency considerations altogether, I conclude that in this case judicial economy is best served by affirming. However streamlined, a remand proceeding clearly expends some judicial resources (and the resources of the parties). If we are sufficiently certain that the district court would not alter its sentence, than no efficiency purpose is served by remand. Here, I think we can be quite certain the district court would not alter its sentence. Armed with all the facts and having heard the parties fully, the district court chose not to reduce the sentence by up to 30 months. I see not one iota of evidence suggesting that the court would be persuaded to reduce the sentence simply because it had more discretion, when it left unused the discretion it already possessed. These facts can be ascertained quickly and easily by a reviewing court. There may be other cases where judicial economy tips the scales in favor of remand rather than further analysis — such as when the defendant is sentenced at the bottom of the Guideline range — but this is not such a case.
I also note that the efficiency point is in tension with the court’s argument that remand will allow the district court to consider additional mitigating circumstances. Op. at 526-28. If the resentencing is to be highly efficient, permitting only “limited input from the defendant” and relying upon evidence already presented, then there is little or nothing new for the district court to consider. But if there are any additional mitigating circumstances, than the resentencing will be more cumbersome than the lean procedure envisioned in support of Judge Gwin’s efficiency argument. It is difficult to see how resentencing by the district court can be both highly streamlined and give full consideration to additional mitigating circumstances.

. In contrast, when a district court sentences at the bottom of a Guideline range, this would support an inference of possible prejudice. If the district court believed, in light of traditional factors, that a defendant should receive a sentence lower than the Guideline range, it would necessarily, in the pre-Booker world, impose a sentence at the bottom of the range. Thus when there is a sentence at the bottom of the Guideline range there are two possibilities: 1) that the district court thought that the minimum Guideline sentence was appropriate, or 2) that the district court preferred some sentence below the minimum Guideline sentence. Since the set of possible sentences in the second option is always the larger of the two, a sentence at the Guideline minimum suggests the district court might have been more lenient had it felt free to do so.

. This distinguishes the allocution cases upon which the court relies. Op. at 525-26. The court noted that some circuit courts have held that prejudice can be presumed in plain error review when the defendant was not offered the opportunity to present mitigating circumstances. In such cases, it is indeed true that the district court was never presented with potential mitigating circumstances that may have affected the sentence. Here, however, counsel had every reason to present every possible mitigating circumstance and Booker, while it has expanded sentencing discretion, has not expanded the range of possible considerations when determining a sentence.