Court Opinion

ID: 9751643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:41:39.721363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:53.177038
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
BELL, C.J.,
which HARRELL, and GREENE, JJ., join.
The issue this case presents is whether the District of Columbia police officers who pursued Robert Bost, the petitioner, into Maryland pursuant to Maryland’s Fresh Pursuit Act, Maryland Code (2001, 2006 Cum.Supp.), §§ 2-304—2-309 of the Criminal Procedure Article, as justification, had a reasonable suspicion to believe that Bost was committing or had committed a felony in the District of Columbia. The facts found by the motions judge in this case lead me to conclude *361that they did not have the necessary level of suspicion — it must be both a reasonable one and relate to a felony — to pursue Bost.
I. Facts
On November 29, 2005, at approximately 6 P.M., Officer Phillip, a District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Officer, was patrolling the 800 block of Southern Avenue, SE, in Washington, D.C., along with sixteen other D.C. police officers. They were in several unmarked vehicles. Officer Phillip, the State’s central witness at the suppression hearing, described his encounter with the petitioner, as follows:
“[Q]: Describe for the judge what the defendant did as you approached?
“[Phillip]: As I stated, as we exited the vehicle we observed the 12 male subjects standing on the sidewalk drinking and congregating, at which time Mr. Bost immediately observed us and immediately started walking away in a briskful manner clutching his right waistband with his right elbow.
“[Q]: Describe in more detail what you observed?
“[Phillip]: As he is walking away he is clutching his right waistband area with his elbow.
“[Q]: What did he have on?
“[Phillip]: To my recollection, blue jeans, black North Face Parka Jacket.
“[Q]: The area he is clutching for the record you were indicating that it is outside I guess of his jacket, his right side?
“[Phillip]: Yes.
“[Q]: You observed it as he is walking away?
“[Phillip]: Yes. He is clutching the right waistband area with his elbow as he is walking away.
“[Q]: What are you and the other officers doing?
“[Phillip]: It immediately draws our attention to him.
“[Q]: Why is that?
*362“[Phillip]: He is the only one from the 12 male subjects walking away. They all stood there when we exited our vehicles.
“[Q]: Did you tell them to stand still?
“[Phillip]: No.
“[Q]: The defendant was walking away. What happened next?
“[Phillip]: At which time he continued clutching his right side with his elbow, started walking away in a briskfully [sic] manner, started picking up his pace. At which time he immediately took flight on foot crossing the street onto the Prince George's county side. At that given time with my training and my experience gave me reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that Mr. Bost was trying to conceal a weapon.”
The Maryland Fresh Pursuit Act permits out-of-state law enforcement officers to enter Maryland and make an arrest so long as they are in “fresh pursuit” of a felon or one who is “reasonably suspected” of being a felon, i.e., of having committed a felony. See Md.Code (2001, 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 2-305 of the Criminal Procedure Article.1
*363II. Analysis
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court considers only the facts and information contained in the record of the suppression hearing. Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498, 924 A.2d 1129, 1135 (2007); State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 581, 861 A.2d 62, 67 (2004); Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 533, 842 A.2d 773, 779 (2004); Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 93, 821 A.2d 372, 376 (2003) (quoting State v. Collins, 367 Md. 700, 706-07, 790 A.2d 660, 663-64 (2002)); Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569, 774 A.2d 420, 429 (2001). Deferring to the motions judge’s determination and weighing of first-level factual findings, disturbing neither the determinations, or the weight given to them, unless either or both is shown to be clearly erroneous, Longshore, 399 Md. 486, 498, 924 A.2d 1129, 1135 (2007); Nieves, 383 Md. at 581-82, 861 A.2d at 67; Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34, 842 A.2d at 779-80; Dashiell, 374 Md. at 93-94, 821 A.2d at 378; State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207, 821 A.2d 439, 444 (2003); Riddick, 319 Md. at 183, 571 A.2d at 1240; Perkins v. State, 83 Md.App. 341, 346, 574 A.2d 356, 358 (1990). See Rule 8-131,2 we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing on the motion, in this case, the State. Longshore, 399 Md. 486, 498, 924 A.2d 1129, 1135 (2007); Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 458, 682 A.2d 248, 253 (1996). On the other hand, however, the trial court’s determination as to *364whether, or not, the facts found rise to the level of reasonable suspicion is reviewed de novo. Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 414, 765 A.2d 612, 615 (2001). See also In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 529, 789 A.2d 607, 610 (2002) (explaining that de novo review given to the trial court’s determination as to whether, under the facts found, there was reasonable suspicion to make a warrantless search); Stokes, 362 Md. at 413-14, 765 A.2d at 615; Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999). Stated differently, we make our “own independent constitutional appraisal [of the ultimate constitutional question], by reviewing the law and applying it to the peculiar facts of the particular case.” Jones, 343 Md. at 457, 682 A.2d at 253.
With regard to this latter point, this Court has recognized that, determining whether certain facts give rise to “reasonable suspicion,” of criminal conduct is not an exact science. Longshore v. State, 399 Md. at 507, 924 A.2d at 1141. We have made clear, however, that, in order for there to be “reasonable suspicion,” there must be “a particularized and objective basis” for suspecting that the person stopped has engaged in, or committed, criminal activity. Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 507, 924 A.2d 1129, 1141 (2007) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981)). A similar, if not the identical, definitional conundrum is presented by our fresh pursuit statute’s requirement that the trigger for pursuit be that the person pursued be “reasonably suspected of having committed a felony” or that “there is reasonable ground for believing that a felony has been committed.” The Longshore formulation addresses that issue and applies as well to this case. Thus, applying the Longshore test, in order to pursue Bost into Maryland, the D.C. police officers had to have a “particularized and objective” basis to believe that Bost had committed a felony, not just simply that he was engaged in unspecified, generalized criminal conduct. A mere “hunch” by D.C. police officers that the conduct they actually observed was felonious *365would not be sufficient under the Act. Longshore, 399 Md. at 508, 924 A.2d at 1141.
The only conduct that Officer Phillip and his fellow law enforcement officers observed was Bost clutching his side as he walked away from a group of approximately twelve men, whom they observed were drinking alcohol in open containers in a “high crime area.” Officer Phillip never saw a gun; he never saw anything resembling a weapon in Bost’s possession when he made his way toward the group; and he never saw drugs, either being used or exchanged. There are many reasonable inferences that could be drawn from Bost’s conduct, not least of which is that he wanted to avoid getting in trouble for drinking beer from an open container in public. That surely is not a felony. See D.C.Code § 25-1001 (2005) (punishing consumption of alcohol in public places in D.C. as a misdemeanor). Perhaps Bost, as he was certainly permitted to do, notwithstanding his presence in a “high crime area,” simply decided that he did not want to talk to the police and was clutching his newspaper, or some other innocent object, one that he may not have wanted the police to see, under his arm as he walked away. The possibilities of what Bost might have been clutching are endless. To be sure, those possibilities may have included objects that were illegal to possess, i.e. drugs or weapons; but to concede that is merely to concede what the police believed, that Bost was engaged in criminal conduct, the nature of which was not and could not be known in any particularized or objective manner until, as done in this case, he was stopped and searched. The point is this: there was nothing about Bost’s behavior that could possibly lead one reasonably to believe that Bost had committed a felony. True, his conduct might have been suspicious to the police and it may well have justified the belief that he was engaged in “some” criminal conduct. That conduct was not such as to justify a belief that a felony had been or was being committed. The Fresh Pursuit Act required of Officer Phillip more than just suspicion; he had to reasonably suspect Bost of having committed a felony and there must have been reasonable ground for believing that that was so.
*366The majority’s decision today allows a law enforcement officer’s invocation of “buzzwords” — “high crime area,” “my training and my experience,” “reasonable, articulable suspicion” — to substitute for the judicial function. The trial court’s ruling at the suppression hearing makes, and emphasizes, the point:
“[The Court]: The facts are fairly clear, the defendant is in a drug trafficking area known to the police department in the District of Columbia. A group of people that number between 12 and 15 I believe. When the police arrive the defendant took flight[3] clutching at his waistband. Certainly the police officers involved in this instance based on their training, experience, had cause to believe that crime was afoot here. In chasing the defendant, after ordering him to stop several times, he continued to clutch at his side as if he had a weapon or something else illegal.”
It is significant that the motions judge acknowledged the lack of particularization and objectivity with regard to what, if any, criminal conduct was observed or was afoot, noting only that the officers’ experience led them to believe crime was afoot and conceding that the defendant was acting “as if he had a *367weapon or something else illegal.” The trial court, in this case, failed to heed the admonition given by Judge Wilner:
“The command that we generally respect the inferences and conclusions drawn by experienced police officers does not require that we abandon our responsibility to make the ultimate determination of whether the police have acted in a lawful manner or that we ‘rubber stamp’ conduct simply because the officer believed he had a right to engage in it.”
Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 110-11, 816 A.2d 901, 908 (2003).
Not once does the motions judge’s ruling mention the word “felony” or even engage in an analysis of whether the objective facts of Officer Phillip’s “contact” with Bost rose to the level sufficient to give an officer reasonable suspicion to believe that Bost had committed a felony. The closest the trial court comes to mentioning any sort of felony at all is hypothecating that Bost could have had a “weapon.” But this mere mentioning of a weapon by the trial court does not negate the fact that the majority of the trial court’s ruling seemed to be determining merely whether there was reasonable suspicion to believe that some crime had taken place. In fact, the part of the trial court’s ruling that states that the officers “had cause to believe that crime was afoot here” is telling, because that it not the standard that must be met under the Fresh Pursuit Act. Instead, the trial court had to determine whether there was reasonable suspicion to believe that a “felony” was afoot here. This standard clearly was not properly applied by the trial court.
Judge Wilner’s admonition is not limited to trial courts; it applies as well to appellate courts, and perhaps it is more important that it be heeded by such courts. The majority did not engage in the proper analysis nor apply the proper standard and, thus, “ ‘rubber stamp[ed]’ conduct simply because the officer believed he had a right to engage in it.” Ransome v. State, 373 Md. at 110-11, 816 A.2d at 908. In so doing, the majority, in effect, “abandon[s][its] responsibility to make the ultimate determination of whether the police have *368acted in a lawful manner.”4
I dissent.
HARRELL, J. and GREENE, J. have authorized me to state that they join in this dissent.

. Md.Code (2001, 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 2-304(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article provides:
" 'Fresh pursuit' includes:
“(1) fresh pursuit as defined by the common law; and
"(2) pursuit without unreasonable delay, but not necessarily instant pursuit, of a person who:
"(i) has committed or is reasonably suspected of having committed a felony, or
"(ii) is suspected of having committed a felony, although a felony has not been committed, if there is reasonable ground for believing that a felony has been committed.”
Subsection (b)(2) prescribes two scenarios justifying fresh pursuit of a suspected person into Maryland: subsection (b)(2)(i), when the suspect has committed a felony, and subsection (b)(2)(ii), when the suspect is only suspected of committing a felony, but did not. These two subsections do not state that different standards apply when a felony has or has not been committed. Instead, the use of "reasonable ground” in (b)(2)(h) merely restates the standard of "reasonably suspected" in (b)(2)(i). These two formulations are, in essence, synonymous with each other; there simply is not any substantive difference between *363"reasonably suspected” and “reasonable ground for believing” when determining if an out-of-state law enforcement officer was indeed in "fresh pursuit” under the Act.

. Maryland Rule 8-131 provides, as relevant:
"(a) Generally. The issues of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and, unless waived under Rule 2-322, over a person may be raised in and decided by the appellate court whether or not raised in and decided by the trial court. Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.”

. In Watkins v. State, 288 Md. 597, 420 A.2d 270 (1980), this Court upheld the defendant’s conviction, after ruling that the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop where that officer, approaching a group of 30 to 50 people standing on the corner while responding to a call for assistance from another police officer involved in a foot pursuit in a high-crime area, heard someone yell "run, police” and immediately thereafter observed the defendant running. Watkins, 288 Md. at 599, 420 A.2d at 271. Although the defendant in Watkins was not one of the people originally being pursued, he still was arrested and subsequently convicted of serious drug charges. Watkins, 288 Md. at 598-99, 420 A.2d at 271. Judge Cole’s comments about the majority’s decision in Watkins are instructive and warrant repeating here:
"The Court’s decision today has the potential for becoming a true chimera, especially in the economically depressed areas of the State where police-community relations are, to say the least, strained. The Court gives license to the police to stop any individual who runs when the police happen upon the scene.”
Watkins v. State, 288 Md. 597, 617, 420 A.2d 270, 281 (1980) (Cole, J., dissenting).

. In Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 816 A.2d 901 (2003), Judge Raker, author of the majority opinion in this case, wrote a concurring opinion in which she rejected the State’s contention that sufficient grounds existed for police officers to conduct a-Terry stop. In Ransome, the defendant was either standing or walking on the sidewalk with an acquaintance in a high-crime neighborhood in Baltimore City when the police began to observe the defendant from an unmarked car. Ransome, 373 Md. at 101, 816 A.2d at 902. As the police brought their cruiser near the defendant, the defendant turned to look at the cruiser. Id. One of the police officers regarded this as suspicious and noted that the defendant had a bulge in his pants pocket, which the officer thought could have been a gun. Subsequently, the police approached the defendant and, eventually, conducted a Terry stop which revealed large quantities of drugs. Ransome, 373 Md. at 101-02, 816 A.2d at 902. In her concurring opinion, Judge Raker made a point that has particular relevance to the circumstances presented in this case: "[i]f Ransome’s actions were sufficient to warrant a Terry stop, then anyone standing on a corner, talking with a friend in the late evening, in a high-crime area, with an unidentified ‘bulge’ in a pocket, may be stopped." Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 114, 816 A.2d 901, 910 (2003) (Raker, J., concurring). The only fact that is different in this case is that Bost ran. The principle, however, is the same: the courts must not succumb to the temptation of allowing law enforcement officers to invoke the "buzz words” found in the statute to justify their actions. Unless the courts, both on the trial and appellate levels, take these standards seriously, there will be no protection against illegal stops and intrusions by overzealous law enforcement officers.