Court Opinion

ID: 9652525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:25:17.34249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:25.919568
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
Once upon a time, long, long ago, the King of Epirus defeated his Roman adversaries in a battle at Asculum. Unfortunately for him and his cause, however, a large part of his army was destroyed. “Another such victory over the Romans,” his majesty exclaimed, “and we are utterly undone.” PLUTARCH, Lives, Pyrrhus, § 21.1 The king’s name was Pyrrhus, and the kind of triumph which brought the winner such travail has come to be known as a Pyrrhic victory.
I am very much afraid that what Tommie Melton has won through litigation may be as counter-productive in the long run as the famous monarch’s flawed win at Asculum. Indeed, I am constrained to wonder how many of the homeless persons who live wretched and squalid lives on grates and benches and pavements in our nation’s capital are there because they have “won,” through litigation or the threat thereof, or as a result of premature deinstitutionalization, the “liberty” not to be required to take medication essential to their mental health.2
I
Although my colleagues do not focus on it, the central issue in this case is whether Tommie Melton, a frequently hospitalized paranoid schizophrenic, needed monitoring to ensure that he regularly took prolixin, an anti-psychotic medication. When he adhered to his regimen, he had a reasonable insight into his illness and was therefore able to function in the community. When he neglected to do so, however, often as a result of alcohol abuse, his conduct was self-destructive and, according to the evidence presented, probably dangerous to others too. It was because Mr. Melton could not be relied on to take the medication that St. Elizabeths Hospital requested and obtained an order committing him to the hospital as an out-patient, so that his compliance could be appropriately monitored while he remained in the community.
I think any reasonable person reading this record would agree,‘irrespective of the merits of the various legal contentions, *650that the need for Mr. Melton to take his medicine was compelling. Four years ago, when this case arose, he was in dire straits. Dishevelled and dirty, he had apparently not taken a bath in weeks, and had been urinating in his bedroom. He was also suffering from glaucoma, which could threaten his eyesight, and from diabetes, which could imperil life and limb. He had many bruises on his skin. His diabetes pills were found in the same bottle with his psychotropic medication. According to Dr. Byrd, Mr. Melton had once jumped out of a moving car on the way to the hospital and had threatened on another occasion to set himself on fire.
It appears that Mr. Melton was not the only person whose interests were implicated by his failure to take his medication. His mother had reported to doctors from the hospital that, on the previous day, Mr. Melton had punched her on the nose. On another occasion, according to hospital records described by Dr. Byrd, Mr. Melton had threatened his sister with a screwdriver. Dr. Cornet, who responded to the home of Mr. Melton’s mother after the alleged punch, described him as belligerent and unruly before he was brought to the hospital.
As the majority correctly points out, much of the evidence presented by the government to establish these facts was based on what the medical witnesses were told by others, or what they gleaned from hospital records not in evidence. Indeed, it may be that this appeal could have been avoided if the government had presented more substantiation for the facts presented, all of which stood uncontradicted in the record.3 Nevertheless, the “hearsay,” if that is what it was,4 appears to me to have been largely reliable because the facts related by out-of-court declarants were mutually corroborative. As the doctors suggest; ed, at least implicitly, the illness and, in particular, Mr. Melton’s failure to take medication, tended to corroborate the self-destructive behavior; the irrational acts tended to corroborate each other and the failure to medicate as well. Under these circumstances, Mr. Melton was and may still be in danger of paying a high price indeed for his “liberty” not to take much-needed medication and not to be monitored by the hospital for his own well-being.
It is unfortunate that the adversary system, which in some cases serves as a protection for basic liberty interests, see, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975), turns doctors whose medical function it is to help patients into their legal adversaries in courtroom combat. As a layman, I wonder whether the relationship between psychiatrist and patient was not compromised when Mr. Melton watched his lawyer conduct a vigorous adversarial cross-examination of Dr. Cornet, whom Mr. Melton nevertheless wanted to have as his psychiatrist if he won the case.5
Be that as it may, this appeal is from an order in contested adversarial litigation. However Pyrrhic the victory for which Mr. Melton is striving may seem to be, he is entitled to it if there was prejudicial error in the trial court. I therefore turn to the merits.
II
According to the majority opinion, reversal is required because “not all psychiatrists are necessarily qualified to provide expert testimony on a person’s dangerousness.” I must respectfully disagree with this assertion, especially as applied to the facts of this case.
As Judge (later Chief Justice) Burger wrote for the court in Baerman v. Reising*651er, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 180, 181, 363 F.2d 309, 310 (1966),
It is settled law that “[a] physician is not incompetent to testify as an expert merely because he is not a specialist in the particular field of which he speaks.” Sher v. De Haven, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 257, 262, 199 F.2d 777, 782, 36 A.L.R.2d 937 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 936, 73 S.Ct. 797, 97 L.Ed. 1363 (1953). The training and specialization of the witness goes to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence, generally speaking.
Ordinarly, a specialist in a particular branch within a profession is not required. McCoRmick on Evidence § 13, at 34 & authorities cited at n. 11 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). Even an ordinary medical practitioner is, and should be, permitted to testify as to a patient’s sanity. 2 J. WigmoRE, Evidence § 569, at 785-86 & n. 2 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979); see Jenkins v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 306-07, 307 F.2d 637, 643-44 (1962) (en banc). The issue whether an expert is sufficiently qualified “is recognized as a matter for the trial judge’s discretion, reviewable only for abuse. Reversals for abuse are rare.” McCormick, supra, § 13, at 34.6
Both Dr. Byrd and Dr. Cornet are practicing psychiatrists. Each stated that he was eligible for board certification. Each had previously testified as an expert before the Mental Health Commission, and Dr. Byrd had done so in court as well. Mr. Melton’s counsel expressly stated that he had no objection to the court’s finding Dr. Cornet to be qualified as an expert.7 If it is ever permissible for a psychiatrist to be permitted to testify as to a patient’s dangerousness, I do not see how it can plausibly be contended that the judge abused his discretion in allowing Dr. Byrd and Dr. Cornet to do so.
I turn, then, to the question whether psychiatrists may testify as to dangerousness. With all due deference, I do not believe that this question can seriously be said to be in doubt. As the Supreme Court stated in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1811, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979):
There may be factual issues in a commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of the inquiry. Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.
(Emphasis added to last nine words).
In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983), a capital sentencing case, the defendant argued, in conformity with the views of the American Psychiatric Association (APA),8 that psychiatric testimony as to dangerousness was inherently unreliable and ought not to be admitted where a defendant’s life was on the line. The issue was cast in constitutional terms, but the Supreme Court’s response was sufficiently broad and emphatic to dispel any doubt, at least in my mind, as to how that court would rule in this case:
The suggestion that no psychiatrist’s testimony may be presented with respect to a defendant’s future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel. In the first place, it is contrary to our cases.
Id. at 896, 103 S.Ct. at 3396.
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In the second place, the rules of evidence generally extant at the federal and *652state levels anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the factfinder, who would have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party. Psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may be countered not only as erroneous in a particular case but also as generally so unreliable that it should be ignored. If the jury may make up its mind about future dangerousness unaided by psychiatric testimony, jurors should not be barred from hearing the views of the State’s psychiatrists along with opposing views of the defendant’s doctors.
Id. at 898-99, 103 S.Ct. at 3397-98 (emphasis added).
Mr. Melton seeks to distinguish Barefoot on the grounds that that case involved a constitutional contention, and that psychiatric testimony as to dangerousness should be excluded as a matter of the substantive District of Columbia law of evidence. Aside from the breadth of the Court’s language in Barefoot and its allusion to applicable rules of evidence, however, the statutory law of this jurisdiction explicitly contemplates that such determinations will be made by psychiatrists. The administrator of a public hospital may detain a person for emergency observation if the psychiatrist on duty certifies that the person
has symptoms of a mental illness and, as a result thereof, is likely to injure himself or others unless he is immediately hospitalized.
D.C.Code § 21-522 (1989). The Mental Health Commission, which is made up of psychiatrists and psychologists, is required to determine, inter alia, whether a patient “is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty.” § 21-544. Two physicians, one of whom must be a specialist on nervous or mental disorders, are required to .determine whether an allegedly mentally ill person found on certain federal reservations shall be hospitalized “for his own safety and welfare and for the preservation of the peace and good order.” § 21-902(b)(2). In proceedings to determine whether a person acquitted of an offense by reason of insanity should be released, psychiatric testimony may be submitted on the issue whether such person “has recovered his sanity ... [and] will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others.” § 24-301(e)(1) — (2).
I therefore agree with the government that
to accept appellant’s theory that psychiatrists cannot predict dangerousness, and therefore should not be permitted to testify on this issue, would nullify the entire legislative scheme for treatment of mentally ill persons in the District of Columbia.
The legislature has effectively decided that “ ‘the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge [permits] a reasonable opinion to be asserted ... by an expert,’ ” Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.) (iquoting McCoRmick on Evidence § 13 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)), cert denied, 434 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 529, 54 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977), and we would be impermissibly intruding upon a legislative prerogative if we were to challenge that judgment.
In the present case, as I have noted, Mr. Melton’s dangerousness to himself and others is alleged to stem from his failure to take psychotropic medicine with the requisite regularity. In my opinion, the consequences of such failure are obviously so “ ‘distinctly related to ... a science ... as to be beyond the ken of the average layman,’ ” Dyas, supra, 376 A.2d at 832. It defies common sense to suggest that a lay juror knows as much about this subject as a qualified psychiatrist does. The challenged testimony will surely “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed.R.Evid. 702. Accordingly, Dr. Byrd and Dr. Cornet were properly permitted to testify about Mr. Melton’s dangerousness.9
*653III
My colleagues assert, opinion at 636, that “not all hearsay can be reasonably relied upon as a basis for expert opinion testimony,” and that the trial judge abused his discretion “by failing to conduct any inquiry concerning the reasonableness of Dr. Byrd’s and Dr. Cornet’s virtually exclusive reliance on hearsay data as the basis for their respective opinions.” Id. at 647. I agree that it would have been better to allow counsel to approach the bench and make his argument on the issue,10 but I do not think that the judge’s failure to do so can possibly have changed the result.
The basic issue in this case was whether Mr. Melton was a danger to himself or others. I can discern no basis — and my colleagues offer none — for concluding that a psychiatrist (or any other reasonable person) would fail to seek information from members of a person’s family to determine whether, and under what circumstances, he has done things which are dangerous to himself or to others. When such an inquiry — through direct conversation with the family members, or by reviewing hospital records — reveals information from more than one family member about several incidents, and when these incidents are themselves consistent with what a psychiatrist would expect to happen when a paranoid schizophrenic fails to take his medication, the reliability of the information is obviously enhanced.
This does not mean, of course, that everything which family members have told an expert witness is necessarily true. An expert cannot know whether it is, and the most elementary cross-examination can quickly establish the point that the expert is not speaking from personal knowledge. Indeed, neither Dr. Byrd nor Dr. Cornet purported to guarantee the truth of what Mr. Melton’s mother told them or of what was in the hospital record. The lack of any such guarantee, however, does not warrant *654the exclusion of the testimony on the grounds that the expert ought not to have relied upon it.
This conclusion is fully supported by the authorities cited by the majority. As stated in the Advisory Committee’s notes to Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a physician bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources, including statements by patients and relatives, as well as hospital records. The expert is assumed to have the necessary skill to evaluate any second-hand information and give it only such probative force as the circumstances warant. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1223, 1245 (E.D.N.Y.1985), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2898, 101 L.Ed.2d 932 (1988); see also State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1223 (Utah 1986). Accordingly, the court should accord an expert wide latitude in choosing the sources on which to base his or her opinions. See Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 505 (5th Cir.1983). Although it is proper to examine the reliability of these sources, id., a trial judge may not substitute his judgment for the expert’s as to what data are sufficiently reliable. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 277-79 (3d Cir.1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsashita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 514-16 (3d Cir.1981) (error to exclude psychiatric testimony as to criminal defendant’s susceptibility to entrapment). The assumptions which form the basis for the expert’s opinion, as well as the conclusions drawn therefrom, are subject to rigorous cross-examination. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., supra, 723 F.2d at 277. Juries are intelligent enough, in light of the availability of such cross-examination, to ignore what is unreliable or unhelpful. Id. at 279.
As my colleagues recognize, the trial court’s rulings with respect to the admission of expert testimony in general, and expert psychiatric evidence in particular, are reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Majority opinion at 16 and authorities there cited. Testimony very similar to much of that at issue here was held to be admissible in In re Samuels, 507 A.2d 150, 153 (D.C.1986); see also In re Gahan, 531 A.2d 661, 666 n. 7 (D.C.1987) (“[t]he court, as fact-finder, was entitled to learn the factors underlying Dr. Carter’s opinion that Gahan was likely to inflict harm on himself by ceasing to eat”;) Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 676-85, 480 A.2d 807, 812-16 (1984) (psychiatrist permitted to base his conclusion as to attorney’s mental state on facts as to attorney’s behavior related by the attorney’s wife and by his partner).
Even a criminal defendant in a capital case is entitled not to a perfect trial, but to a fair one. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2280, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). Accordingly, I do not think that the trial judge’s summary resolution of the question of the reliability of the expert witnesses’ sources warrants reversal here.
IV
Even if, as I have concluded, the psychiatric witnesses testified on the basis of the kind of data on which experts customarily and reasonably rely, I have some concern for another reason about the admission and use of the evidence. If we look at the substance rather than the form of what occurred, the second-hand testimony about Mr. Melton having punched his mother came to the jurors’ attention in such a way that they might well have considered it for the truth of the out-of-court statement. This may also have occurred with respect to some other incidents.
On October 17, 1985, Dr. Byrd testified that Mr. Melton
became impulsive and lost control of his temper, which is a characteristic of a schizophrenic. And he punched his mother in the nose and became very angry with her.
The judge gave no contemporaneous instruction as to the purpose for which this testimony was received.
Four days later, during his final instructions, the judge told the jurors, with respect to testimony by Dr. Byrd and Dr. *655Cornet as to information given to them by other individuals, that
these statements are admitted only to demonstrate the information relied upon by the doctors in forming their conclusion. They are to be considered by you only for the purpose of evaluating the reasonableness and correctness of the doctors’ conclusions. They are not to be considered by you as actual proof of the incidents described. They are hearsay and as such are not admissible to establish the truth of the matters asserted by them.
This court has recently noted that some students of the law of evidence consider the distinction sought to be articulated in such a “limiting” instruction as “most unlikely to be made by juries.” In re Samuels, supra, 507 A.2d at 153 n. 5. As Judge Salzman aptly remarked for the court in that case,
[conceptual problems are bound to arise when a judge tells a jury that the jury may consider psychiatric diagnoses based on medical records customarily relied on in professional practice, but then tells the jury that it may not consider the “truthfulness” of those records for any other purpose.

Id.

These conceptual problems are even more serious with respect to a discrete dramatic act like punching one’s mother on the nose. To tell the jurors that they are to consider the testimony about the punch as a basis for the expert’s finding of dangerousness, but not with respect to whether Mr. Melton punched his mother, may call for mental gymnastics which only the most pristine theoretician could perform. I have the impression that the reaction of that elusive individual, the reasonable person, would be that you cannot believe that the testimony about the punch tends to show that Mr. Mel tom. is dangerous unless you first believe that he actually punched his mother. Since the expert apparently believed that he punched her — and I agree with the majority, opinion at 646, that an expert’s reliance on hearsay is an implied assertion of belief in its truth — the juror is likely to believe it too. I therefore apprehend that the distinction sought to be made becomes “ephemeral.” Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 421 (D.C.1988).
The problem is a perplexing one, because it is difficult to articulate reasonable or workable limits on any rule which excludes testimony of the kind here at issue. In the present case, however, the parties have primarily addressed the questions decided by the majority and discussed in Parts II and III of this opinion, and have touched on this issue only tangentially. No objection was made to the lack of a contemporaneous instruction, or to the wording of the instruction ultimately given.11 For this reason, and because I am in dissent, I “simply note [my] concern and leave the question for a case in which the issue is squarely presented and fully briefed.” In re Samuels, supra, 507 A.2d at 153 n. 5.
V
Mr. Melton also contends that the judge committed prejudicial error by refusing to grant a directed verdict in his favor at the close of the government’s case. He bases this contention on the proposition that “the hospital presented scant first-hand evidence of Mr. Melton’s behavior.” My colleagues do not reach this question, since they reverse on other grounds. As I do not join them in reversal, I address the contention briefly, and reject it as wholly unpersuasive.
On a motion for a directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is sought. Bauman v. Sragow, 308 A.2d 243, 244 (D.C.1973) (per curiam). “ ‘Where there is substantive evidence in *656support of plaintiffs case, the judge may not direct a verdict against him, even though he may not believe his evidence or may think that the weight of the evidence is on the other side ...Rich v. District of Columbia, 410 A.2d 528, 534 (D.C.1979) (quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 850, 354 (4th Cir.1941). A verdict may be directed only when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court finds, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, that there is only one verdict which reasonable jurors could reach. Harrington v. United States, 504 F.2d 1306, 1311 (1st Cir.1974).
Both Dr. Byrd and Dr. Cornet testified that Mr. Melton was mentally ill and dangerous to himself and others. Reasonable jurors could surely have believed them. Once their testimony to this effect was admitted — and a motion for a directed verdict is surely not a proper vehicle for arguing the admissibility of evidence — there was simply no basis whatever to sustain the motion.12
VI
In his final instructions, Judge Block told the jury that
You need not find that [Mr. Melton] is likely to injure himself and other persons. You need only find one or the other is likely to happen.
The relevant portion of the verdict form stated
We, the Jury, find that the Respondent, Tommie Lee Melton, because of mental illness is X or is not — likely to injure himself or others [13] if allowed to remain at liberty.
There was no objection to the instruction or to the form.
In reversing the judgment, my colleagues have not ordered a new trial, which is probably a wise course of action in light of the staleness in late 1989 of such evidence as an alleged punch in the nose in 1985. Nevertheless, if there is a new trial, I suggest that the instruction and the verdict form both be revised.
The instructions and verdict form utilized by the trial judge would permit Mr. Melton to be committed without a unanimous finding either that he was dangerous to himself or that he was dangerous to others. If six jurors concluded that Mr. Melton was a danger to himself, and six different jurors found him to be dangerous to others, then, consistent with the court’s instruction, the verdict form could be completed unfavorably to him. Upon retrial, the instructions and verdict form should reflect that the jurors must be unanimous as to which kind of danger — to himself or others — they find that Mr. Melton poses. See Scarborough v. United States, 522 A.2d 869 (D.C.1987) (en banc).14
VII
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. Quoted in J. Barlett, Familiar Quotations 92 (15th ed. 1980).

. For a much-publicized case presenting such an issue, see Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1st Dept. 1987), appeal dismissed, 70 N.Y.2d 972, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796, 520 N.E.2d 515 (1988).

. Mr. Melton presented no evidence.

. Ostensibly, the out-of-court statements were not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

. Mr. Melton’s counsel concluded his opening statement as follows:
We ask you to allow Mr. Melton to continue his arrangement, [which] he has now, which is to be with Dr. Comet and to live with his mother, but to let him do it on his own. Thank you.
On appeal, Mr. Melton has argued, and the majority now holds, that Dr. Cornet has not been shown to be competent to determine if Mr. Melton was dangerous to himself or others.

. Dean Wigmore goes even further:
the trial court must be left to determine, absolutely and without review, the fact of possession of the required qualification by a particular witness.
2 Wigmore, supra, § 561, at 756 (emphasis in original).

. Counsel argued that Dr. Byrd had "just finished” his training and that "we will submit [that] to consider him an expert on the basis of what he said so far is so modest that we would ask that he not be considered as an expert at this point.” The judge emphatically disagreed and found Dr. Byrd qualified.

.Mr. Melton’s counsel has presented for our consideration in this case the same views of the APA which were rejected by the Court in Barefoot.

. I do not agree with my colleagues' theory that Judge Block failed to "exercise his discretion” as to whether the witnesses should be allowed to testify as to dangerousness. Once they had been qualified as experts in psychiatry, there was no further discretionary determination as to their expertise for the judge to make.
*653I find the authorities relied upon by the majority for a contrary conclusion altogether inapposite. In Jenkins v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 307 F.2d 637 (1962), the court held that even though psychologists lack medical training, those with specialized knowledge relevant to the diagnosis of insanity should nevertheless be permitted to testify. There is no suggestion in the present case that Drs. Byrd or Cornet lack medical training, and there is nothing in Jenkins or in the other cases cited by the majority involving psychologists which would support the exclusion of the testimony of these two witnesses.
In United States v. Davis, 772 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1036, 106 S.Ct. 603, 88 L.Ed.2d 581 (1985), the only case cited on this point by the majority which involves any restriction on the admissibility of psychiatric testimony, the court sustained as a proper exercise of the trial judge’s broad discretion the exclusion of the proffered testimony of a psychiatrist that the defendant’s compulsive gambling made him unable to refrain from forgery or conversion, and thus rendered him insane. As the court put it,
[the psychiatrist’s] testimony shows her to be unqualified as an expert on the issue that would be before the jury. Her testimony seems illogical, inconsistent and in considerable part, incomprehensible and lacks any basis in fact. Quite clearly, it could not assist a jury to determine the central fact that would be in issue in Davis’s insanity defense.
Id. at 1344. I find no support in Davis for the proposition that Judge Block abused his discretion in allowing the two psychiatric witnesses in the present case to explain to the jury the probable consequences of a paranoid-schizophrenic’s failure to take his medication, especially when the question of dangerousness has been confided to psychiatrists by the statutory law of this jurisdiction.

. In fairness to the trial judge, I think the colloquy between court and counsel quoted in the majority opinion at 6 should be considered in context. Judge Block had long specialized in mental health cases, and Mr. Fulton was the attorney from the Public Defender Service who had handled a great many of them. I think it reasonable to infer that the judge probably ruled immediately because he had decided a similar issue in a similar case in which Mr. Fulton had been counsel. Although it is understandable that the judge did not want to repeat everything, he could have avoided the problem here presented and facilitated appellate review if he had allowed counsel to argue and had explained on the record his reasons for his ruling.
It is evident from Mr. Fulton’s opening statement that he was aware in advance of the issue that would arise. I suggest that in such circumstances a motion in limine should be filed, or that a ruling from the court should be sought before the seating of the jury. It has been my experience that an early request for a ruling avoids interruption and even disruption of the testimony and facilitates the orderly and thoughtful resolution of legal issues.

. If I understood correctly the response of counsel for Mr. Melton to questions asked from the bench at oral argument, he was not pressing the issue which I have discussed in Part IV of this dissent. Since there is some similarity between that issue and the question of the reliability of the experts’ sources, I am not prepared to say that the point was waived. In view of my colleagues’ disposition of the other questions raised, the issue of waiver is presently of no practical consequence.

. Cf. In re Penn, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 248, 251, 443 F.2d 663, 666 (1970), in which the court found it unnecessary to reach the issue whether a person may be committed wholly on the basis of hearsay testimony concerning events which formed the basis for psychiatric opinion because, as in the present case, there was other evidence as well.

. The words "or others" are inserted on the form in handwriting. The jurors checked the space after "is” and crossed out the words "is not.”

. I would, however, find no "plain error” here. See Shivers v. United States, 533 A.2d 258, 261-62 (D.C.1987).