Court Opinion

ID: 9927766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 22:44:14.097924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:13.942401
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                              No. 85920-0-I
                          Respondent,
                                              DIVISION ONE
               v.
                                              UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 TYLER JAMES AUTRY,

                             Appellant.

       DÍAZ, J. —RCW 9.94A.753(1) requires restitution be set within 180 days of

sentencing unless the court finds “good cause.” Tyler Autry alleges the superior

court lacked “good cause” when it continued his hearing until 184 days after his

sentencing. He also alleges the superior court failed to consider his indigency as

allowed under RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b), which was enacted following his sentencing.

       We hold the court did not abuse its discretion when it continued his

restitution hearing, and remand the case to consider Autry’s ability to pay under

RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b). If the court feels financial obligations are still appropriate,

it must then add a provision to Autry’s judgment that his Social Security benefits

may not be used to satisfy his restitution.

                              I.     BACKGROUND

       On October 21, 2021, Tyler Autry lit a fire in a school bus parked at a
No. 85920-0-I/2

dealership. Autry was homeless and lit the fire for warmth. On January 12, 2022,

Autry pled guilty to one count of reckless burning in the first degree. That same

day, Autry was sentenced to 120 days in jail, with 60 days credit for time served

and the court ordered Autry to pay restitution. The amount of restitution for the fire

damage was “[t]o be set” at a later date.

       On June 29, 2022, 168 days after sentencing, the court held a hearing

(hereinafter “June hearing”) on the State’s request to set the amount of restitution.

The State intended to offer a witness who would appear remotely in support of its

request, but had not made a pre-hearing motion, arguing that remote testimony

“had been standard practice over the last year or two” due to COVID-19. However,

Autry’s counsel objected, both orally and in writing, to the State’s attempt to

present one witness remotely absent a motion. The court agreed with Autry,

finding that in-person testimony was required in “non-routine” criminal cases

absent an agreement by the parties or the court otherwise finding remote testimony

was appropriate.

       The State noted at the beginning of the hearing that the court could, and

subsequently twice asked the court to, find “good cause” to continue the hearing

past the 180 day deadline, if the court wanted all of the State’s witnesses to appear

in person. Rescheduling attempts were thwarted by the court’s already scheduled

vacation the following week. As such, the court made the following good cause

finding:

       So, July 15th at 2:30 . . . [w]ill be the new date. . . . This matter could
       be done within 180 days, except for the fact that the Court is going
       to be on vacation next Tuesday through Friday, making it impossible

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No. 85920-0-I/3

       to conclude before July 11th, excuse me, which would be the 180th
       day.

       On July 15, 2022, 184 days after sentencing, the parties attended the

rescheduled restitution hearing. (Hereinafter “July hearing”). The superior court

heard testimony from the Vancouver Fire Department’s lead deputy fire marshal,

an insurance adjustor, and Autry himself. Ultimately, the court set restitution at

$56,799.51. Autry now appeals.

                                 II.    ANALYSIS

       “[W]hen restitution ‘is authorized by statute, imposition of restitution is

generally within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal

absent an abuse of discretion.’” State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 679, 974 P.2d

828 (1999) (some alterations in original) (quoting State v. Davison, 116 Wn.2d 917,

919, 809 P.2d 1374 (1991)). A court’s decision to grant or deny motions for

continuances are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Downing, 151

Wn.2d 265, 272, 87 P.3d 1169 (2004). “Discretion is abused when the trial court’s

decision is manifestly unreasonable, or is exercised on untenable grounds, or for

untenable reasons.” State v. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d 822, 830, 845 P.2d 1017

(1993).

A.     The Superior Court’s Finding of “Good Cause” for the Continuance

       “When restitution is ordered, the court shall determine the amount of

restitution due at the sentencing hearing or within 180 days . . . The court may

continue the hearing beyond the 180 days for good cause.” RCW 9.94A.753(1).

“Washington courts strictly enforce the one-hundred-eighty-day deadline absent

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good cause or waiver.” State v. Jones, 20 Wn. App. 2d 552, 568, 500 P.3d 968

(2021).

       For restitution, good cause has been defined as an “external impediment

that did not result from a self-created hardship that would prevent a party from

complying with statutory requirements.” State v. Johnson, 96 Wn. App. 813, 817,

981 P.2d 25 (1999). As such, “[i]nadvertence or attorney oversight is not ‘good

cause.’” Id. (quoting State v. Tomal, 133 Wn.2d 985, 989,       948     P.2d      833

(1997)).

       On appeal, Autry makes two arguments. First, Autry argues the “lower court

did not address the State’s failure to make proper motions but instead, opined that

since it was going on vacation, good cause existed to hold the Restitution Hearing

past the 180 days.” In other words, he avers that “[s]ince the State did not make

a good cause motion, it was error for the lower court to find good cause on its own.”

Second, Autry argues that, on the merits, no good cause existed to continue the

hearing as the delay was solely due to the State not seeking prior approval for their

remote witness. Autry avers the “State had five months and 17 days to make the

proper motions” yet failed to do so.

       Contrary to Autry’s first argument, the State did move for good cause. The

State twice expressly “ask[ed] the Court to make a finding -- a good cause finding,”

both before and after the court raised its scheduling challenges. 1 As such, the

1 There appears to be a clerical error in the lower court’s Verbatim Report of

Proceedings. The request for “good cause” is mislabeled as having been stated
by the court. However, this appears to have been actually said by the State. First,
it is unlikely the court would refer to itself as “Your Honor[.]” Second, this portion
of the record was part of a broader conversation between the State and the court
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No. 85920-0-I/5

court did not act “sua sponte” 2 as Autry claims. Moreover, none of the authority

Autry offers holds that a court may not move sua sponte to continue a restitution

hearing. Where a party fails to provide citation to support a legal argument, we

assume counsel, like the court, has found none. State v. Loos, 14 Wn. App. 2d

748, 758, 473 P.3d 1229 (2020) (citing State v. Arredondo, 188 Wn.2d 244, 262,

394 P.3d 348 (2017)). And the plain language of RCW 9.94A.753 contains no

such procedural limitation, stating only that a “court may continue the hearing

beyond the 180 days for good cause.”

       Autry’s second argument on the merits fails also when analyzed under the

four factors articulated in State v. Tetreault, 99 Wn. App. 435, 998 P.2d 330 (2000).

When examining a continuance past the 180 day limit, courts can consider “the

State’s diligence in procuring the necessary evidence” as well as “(1) the length of

the delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right

to speedy sentencing, and (4) the extent of prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 438.

       First, the length of the delay was minimal. The June and July hearings were

16 days apart. Further, the July hearing was held just four days after Autry’s

original 180 day deadline had passed. This factor favors a continuance.

       Second, the reason for the delay.       The lower court did not abuse its

discretion by continuing the restitution hearing.        Our Supreme Court has

determined “scheduling conflicts may be valid reasons for continuances beyond

regarding evidence and rescheduling. As such, the context clearly indicates it was
the State, not the court or Autry’s counsel, that made the request for “good cause.”
2 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1722 (11th ed. 2019) (defines sua sponte as “of one’s

own accord; voluntarily . . . Without prompting or suggestion”).
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No. 85920-0-I/6

the time for trial period” when considering a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

State v. Flinn, 154 Wn.2d 193, 200, 110 P.3d 748 (2005). As such, the court did

not abuse its discretion for basing its continuance on a scheduling conflict created

by a previously scheduled court vacation.

      The delay was also not due to the State’s lack of “diligence in procuring the

necessary evidence.” Tetreault, 99 Wn. App. at 438. As explained above and by

the court, it was the State’s request for remote testimony, coupled with Autry’s

motion in opposition filed earlier that same day and the court’s preference for in-

person testimony, that created the need to reschedule. 3    And again, the court’s

previously scheduled vacation made rescheduling prior to the 180-day deadline

impossible. Contrary to Autry’s assertions, the State violated no identified rule,

appeared ready to conduct the June hearing, was prepared to proceed prior to the

deadline expiring, and – most importantly – did not request good cause due to a

need or desire to gather more evidence. 4 As such, this factor also favors a

continuance.

3 In its oral ruling, the court appears to have been referencing CR 3.4, which

provides that certain proceedings “may be conducted by video conference only by
agreement of the parties, either in writing or on the record, and upon approval of
the trial court judge pursuant to local court rule.” CrR 3.4(e)(2); see also CLARK
COUNTY SUPER. CT. LOCAL GENERAL R. 19(b)(2) (“Trials or evidentiary hearings may
be conducted by remote appearance only upon the approval of the judicial officer”).
However, we are not aware of, nor do the parties provide, any authority which
requires restitution hearings to be conducted in person or requires a motion for
remote testimony before the hearing. Further, Autry’s written motions and
objections do not explain why a pre-hearing motion was necessary. Regardless,
the parties do not brief and we do not reach whether a restitution hearing where
testimony is taken is required to be in person, or whether a motion must be made
in advance.
4 As shown by the State’s discussion with the court at the June hearing, the State

had amassed ample evidence for the hearing. However, the court did “want the
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No. 85920-0-I/7

       Third, Autry asserted his right to speedy sentencing both at the hearing and

in a written motion. As such, this factor does not favor a continuance.

       Finally, Autry was not prejudiced by the continuance. As discussed, the

delay was minimal. Autry does not assert that he suffered any prejudice. State v.

Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990) (“This court will not consider claims

insufficiently argued by the parties.”). Further, there is no indication the State

presented new evidence in July, i.e., evidence it had not previously planned to

present in June. More substantively, Autry does not claim, nor was he denied, the

opportunity to present evidence, rebut the State’s evidence, or argue his own

theory of the case. In short, it is exceedingly unlikely the continuance altered the

outcome of Autry’s restitution hearing or otherwise hampered his ability to argue

his case. As such, Autry’s argument fails under the Tetreault factors.

       Autry also argues that his case is similar to Jones, 20 Wn. App. 2d at 552.

Specifically, he frames Jones as having “remanded for dismissal of all restitution

claim[s] finding that the appellants did not contribute to the delay and that the State

failed to make a motion for good cause to extend[.]”

       Jones, however, is clearly distinguishable as it involved a superior court

finding good cause after the 180 day period had elapsed. Jones, 20 Wn. App. 2d

at 575. Specifically, Jones addressed confusion on when the 180 day period

begins following a remand. Id. at 568-70. Ultimately, it was determined the 180

record to be supplemented with photographs” while discussing good cause.
However, this doesn’t appear to indicate the State had failed to compile evidence.
Rather, this is referencing the State’s earlier statement that “I was forwarded some
photographic evidence of the damages” and that they planned to admit them
during the June hearing.
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No. 85920-0-I/8

day clock starts “on the issuance of the Court of Appeals' mandate.” Id. at 555.

As such, this meant the superior court had “lacked any authority . . . to find good

cause because the limitation period had already lapsed.” Id. at 575 (emphasis

added). In Autry’s case, it is undisputed that the superior court made its good

cause finding within the 180-day period.

       As a final note, Autry also argues the superior court should have issued

written findings and conclusions. He admits that “there is no authority mandating

that a court make findings and conclusions after a restitution hearing” but “it would

have been helpful here.” This court has previously invalidated restitution orders

based upon findings of good cause that were not expressly made on the record.

State v. Grantham, 174 Wn. App. 399, 406, 299 P.3d 21 (2013). However, as

conceded by Autry, no authority required the superior court’s good cause finding

be in writing. Loos, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 758 (“when a party provides no citation to

support an argument, this court will assume that counsel, after diligent search, has

found none.”).

B.     Applicability of RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b) and Autry’s Indigency

       In 2022, our legislature amended RCW 9.94A.753 to add section (3)(b).

LAWS OF 2022, ch. 260, § 3. In sum, section (3)(b) allows a sentencing court to

use its discretion to assess an indigent defendant’s ability to pay restitution. RCW

9.94A.753(3)(b). 5 This amendment became effective on January 1, 2023. LAWS

5 In full, section (3)(b) states the following.

       At any time, including at sentencing, the court may determine that the
       offender is not required to pay, or may relieve the offender of the
       requirement to pay, full or partial restitution and accrued interest on
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No. 85920-0-I/9

OF 2022, ch. 260, § 26. Autry’s restitution hearing was held months earlier on July

15, 2022. At the hearing, Autry testified that his only income was $1,264.00 in

monthly Social Security benefits. Additionally, the superior court had previously

found him indigent.

       The State concedes that this remand would allow the superior court to

“reconsider the propriety of assessing the full $56,799.51 restitution upon Autry in

light of his acknowledged difficulties and indigence.” This is because the newly

enacted RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b) allows the sentencing court to relieve a defendant

“[a]t any time[.]” As such, we accept this concession as well.

       Even without the State’s concessions, a remand would be warranted under

State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023). Ellis involved another

restitution dispute grappling with a newly enacted statutory amendment. Id. at 16.

There, this court determined that “[a]lthough this amendment did not take effect

until after Ellis’s resentencing, it applies to Ellis because this case is on direct

appeal.” Id. (emphasis added). As such, Ellis remanded the case for the trial court

to reexamine the defendant’s restitution under the new amendment. Id.

       In sum, even though RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b) became effective after Autry’s

restitution was set, it still applies here as his case is on direct appeal. As such, we

       restitution where the entity to whom restitution is owed is an insurer or state
       agency, except for restitution owed to the department of labor and industries
       under chapter 7.68 RCW, if the court finds that the offender does not have
       the current or likely future ability to pay. A person does not have the current
       ability to pay if the person is indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3). For
       the purposes of this subsection, the terms "insurer" and "state agency" have
       the same meanings as provided in RCW 9.94A.750(3).

RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b) (emphasis added).
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No. 85920-0-I/10

remand the case so the superior court can reexamine Autry’s restitution under

RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b) in light of his indigency.

       On appeal, the State also concedes that this case should be remanded so

Autry’s judgment can be amended to “indicat[e] that the legal financial obligations

‘may not be satisfied out of any funds subject to the Social Security Act’s

antiattachment statute.’” State v. Duran 16 Wn. App. 2d 583, 590, 481 P.3d 623

(2021) (quoting State v. Catling, 193 Wn.2d 252, 266, 438 P.3d 1174 (2019)). This

claim is referencing the fact that Autry’s judgment and sentence and restitution

order did not explicitly indicate that Social Security benefits are exempt from

satisfying restitution. We accept the State’s concession and remand accordingly.

                               III.   CONCLUSION

       For the reasons above, we remand the case to consider Autry’s ability to

pay under RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b). If the court finds financial obligations are still

appropriate, it must then add a provision to Autry’s judgment that his Social

Security benefits may not be used to satisfy his restitution.

WE CONCUR:

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