Court Opinion

ID: 9386489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 18:00:40.390891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.767235
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30236      Document: 00516709255         Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/12/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                  FILED
                                                                           April 12, 2023
                                  No. 22-30236                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                  Clerk

   Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C., doing business as Tofurky
   Company,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Michael G. Strain, in his official capacity as Commissioner of
   Agriculture and Forestry,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 3:20-CV-674
                  ______________________________

   Before Smith, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge:
          A Louisiana statute bars food labeling practices that are misleading.
   The district court found that such a bar infringes on the free speech rights of
   food labelers and enjoined the law. We disagree, and so REVERSE and
   VACATE.
                                          I
          In 2019, Louisiana passed the Truth in Labeling of Food Products Act
   (the “Act”) to “protect consumers from misleading and false labeling of food
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   products that are edible by humans.” La. Rev. Stat. §§ 3:4741–4746.
   The Act bars, among other things, the intentional “misbrand[ing] or
   misrepresent[ing of] any food product as an agricultural product” through
   several different labeling practices. Id. § 3:4744(B). Those practices include
   “[r]epresenting a food product as meat or a meat product when the food
   product is not derived” from various animals. Id. § 3:4744(B)(4).
   Enforcement of the Act is charged to Louisiana’s Commissioner of
   Agriculture and Forestry, a position currently occupied by Michael Strain.
   Despite formulating rules and regulations pertaining to the Act’s
   enforcement, no action has yet been taken. All the same, the statute imposes
   a maximum penalty of $500 per violation per day. La. Rev. Stat.
   § 3:4746(A).
          Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C. (d/b/a Tofurky), is a Washington
   company headquartered in Oregon. Tofurky, “founded on the principle that
   people, animals, and the environment matter more than profit margins,” is
   committed to producing and marketing 100% plant-based food products.
   Those products include plant-based “chick’n,” deli slices, burgers,
   sausages, tempeh, and roasts. Tofurky’s labels say as much:

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   Each label, while employing meat-esque words like “sausage” or “burger,”
   prominently indicates that the product is “plant-based.”
          Tofurky markets and sells its products in Louisiana. But now, thanks
   to the Act, Tofurky believes it operates under a constant threat of
   enforcement. Per its CEO, Tofurky lacks the financial and logistical
   resources to create Louisiana-specific labels and cannot guarantee that any
   Tofurky products meant for sale elsewhere would be excluded from
   Louisiana. Further, changing Tofurky’s marketing nationwide would cost
   almost $1,000,000. Rather than do so, Tofurky has “essentially avoided
   saying anything new out of fear of enforcement and has refrained from using
   certain words and images on marketing materials and labels.” It has also
   “removed content from [its] website and online marketing out of fear of
   enforcement . . . .”
          Tofurky sued Strain, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The
   parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district court
   sided with Tofurky. It held that Tofurky had standing to challenge the Act

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   and that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on Tofurky’s right to
   free speech. The State now appeals both holdings.
                                               II
           We review de novo the district court’s ruling on standing. See Students
   for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 37 F.4th 1078, 1083 (5th
   Cir. 2022). We also review a grant (or denial) of summary judgment de novo.
   Davidson v. Fairchild Controls Corp., 882 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2018). A
   “court should grant summary judgment when ‘there is no genuine dispute as
   to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
   law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
                                               A
           First, we must determine whether Tofurky has standing to challenge
   Louisiana’s Truth in Labeling of Food Products Act. We conclude it does.
           To establish standing, Tofurky must demonstrate (1) an “injury in
   fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent”; (2) is
   fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) is likely to be redressed by
   a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
   The state challenges whether Tofurky has suffered an injury in fact. 1
           Tofurky challenges the statute prior to enforcement. In pre-
   enforcement free speech challenges, “chilled speech or self-censorship is an
   injury sufficient to confer standing.” Barilla v. City of Houston, 13 F.4th 427,
           _____________________
           1
             Though we focus primarily on standing’s injury in fact prong, we must
   nevertheless ensure that all standing components are met. See Cleartrac, LLC v. Lanrick
   Contractors, LLC, 53 F.4th 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2022). And here, the other two components
   are: the Act, threatening millions in civil damages for violations, is clearly the cause of
   Tofurky’s chilled speech, and Tofurky’s sought relief—an injunction forbidding Louisiana
   from enforcing the Act—would redress that harm. Tofurky’s standing, then, turns only on
   whether it has suffered an injury in fact.

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   431 (5th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Tofurky “need not have experienced
   ‘an actual arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action’ to establish
   standing.” Id. (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158
   (2014)). Instead, all Tofurky must show is that: (1) it intends to engage in a
   course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest; (2) that the
   course of action is arguably proscribed by statute; and (3) that there exists a
   credible threat of prosecution under the statute. Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 159.
           Tofurky satisfies all three conditions. 2 First, Tofurky intends to
   engage in conduct arguably affected by a constitutional interest. The First
   Amendment protects commercial speech so long as that speech is not
   misleading and concerns lawful activity. See Am. Acad. of Implant Dentistry v.
   Parker, 860 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
   Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). Tofurky insists
   that it intends to engage in commercial speech through its past and future
   labels. We, like the district court, agree. Tofurky’s labels and marketing—
   which no one contends are misleading or involve illegal activity—are just the
   kind of commercial activity the First Amendment protects.
           Second, Tofurky’s intended actions are arguably proscribed by the
   Act. The Act directs that “[n]o person shall intentionally misbrand or
           _____________________
           2
              The State argues that the Barilla (or Driehaus) standard applies only to the motion
   to dismiss stage, rather than the summary judgment stage. But nothing in either case was
   so limited, and courts have applied the Barilla standard at summary judgment many times.
   See, e.g., N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 38, 49–52 (1st Cir. 2021) (applying
   Driehaus to a motion to dismiss converted to a motion for summary judgment); N.J.
   Bankers Assoc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 49 F.4th 849, 855–56 (3rd Cir. 2022) (applying Driehaus
   to cross appeals of summary judgment motions); Md. Shall Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 971 F.3d
   199, 217–18 (4th Cir. 2020) (similar). What changes is not the standard, but rather the
   evidentiary burden on the party claiming standing. See Barilla, 13 F.4th at 431 (explaining
   that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing “in the same way as any other
   matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of
   evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation” (citation omitted)).

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   misrepresent any food product as an agricultural product through any activity
   including:
           [...]
                  (2) Selling a food product under the name of an
           agricultural product.
           [...]
                   (4) Representing a food product as meat or a meat
           product when the food product is not derived from a harvested
           beef, pork, poultry, alligator, farm-raised deer, turtle, domestic
           rabbit, crawfish, or shrimp carcass.
                   [...]
                 (6) Representing a food product as beef or a beef
           product when the food product is not derived from a
           domesticated bovine.
                 (7) Representing a food product as pork or a pork
           product when the food product is not derived from a
           domesticated swine.
                  (8) Representing a food product as poultry when the
           food product is not derived from domesticated birds.
                  (9) Utilizing a term that is the same as or deceptively
           similar to a term that has been used or defined historically in
           reference to a specific agricultural product.
   La. Rev. Stat. § 3:4744. 3 The statute defines “misbrand” as
   “intentionally identify[ing] or label[ing] a food product in a false or
   misleading way.” Id. § 3:4743(12). To “misrepresent” also requires
   intention. See id. § 3:4743(13). “Meat” is defined as “a portion of a beef,
           _____________________
           3
           The Act defines “person” as “an individual, partnership, limited liability
   company, limited liability partnership, corporation, trust, firm, company, or other entity
   doing business in Louisiana.” La. Rev. Stat. § 3:4743(14). That definition
   encompasses Tofurky.

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   pork, [or] poultry . . . carcass that is edible by humans but does not include a
   . . . [s]ynthetic product derived from a plant, insect, or other source.” Id.
   § 3:4743(10)(a) (emphasis added).
           To the State, the intention requirement begins and ends the game:
   because Tofurky does not intend to mislead with any of its labels and has not
   proven “that it intends to break Louisiana’s labeling law,” nothing Tofurky
   does is proscribed by the statute. That contrasts with Barilla, says the State,
   where the plaintiff alleged he would openly busk where it was illegal to do so.
   Per the State, to have standing, Tofurky needs to “establish[] that it intends
   to label its food products by misbranding them or by misleading its customers
   so as to be in violation . . . .”
           Tofurky insists that the intention to mislead is not required. Instead,
   says Tofurky, the leading clause of § 3:4744(B)—“No person shall
   intentionally misbrand or misrepresent any food product as an agricultural
   product through any activity including:”—expands the definition of
   “intentionally misbrand or misrepresent” to include the twelve subsequent
   actions. Misbranding or misrepresenting then includes “representing a food
   product as meat” when it did not come from a harvested animal or “as pork
   or a pork product” when it did not come from a domesticated swine. So,
   because Tofurky sells products labeled and advertised as plant-based beef,
   pork, or poultry—but that are explicitly exempted from the Act’s definition of
   meat because they are plant-derived—it is by definition misbranding its
   products, and faces liability.
           Tofurky need not establish that it openly intends to violate the Act. As
   the Supreme Court has stressed time and again, “[n]othing in [its] decisions
   requires a plaintiff who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a law to
   confess that he will in fact violate that law.” Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 163; see also
   Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 301 (1979)

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   (holding a case justiciable even though the plaintiffs disavowed any intent to
   “propagate untruths”). The State demands too much of Tofurky. While
   everyone agrees that Tofurky does not intentionally misrepresent its
   products as meat and does not intend to start doing so, Tofurky has standing
   if its intended action—continuing with its “plant-based” labels that use
   meat-esque words—is arguably proscribed.
          And here, it is: the Act arguably sweeps broadly enough to capture
   Tofurky’s conduct. Though the State belabors that § 4744, and the Act’s
   definitions for “misbrand” and “misrepresent,” require intentional
   mislabeling, Tofurky’s alternative reading is arguable. As Tofurky notes, the
   demand for intention could be read one of two ways. First, it could mean that
   the actor intended to mislead (e.g., we make a soy product, but we want you
   to think it’s chicken and label it so). This interpretation would not ensnare
   Tofurky’s conduct. But second, it could also mean that the actor
   intentionally used a label that was independently misleading, the actor’s
   intent in using that label notwithstanding (e.g., we make a soy product and
   label it in a way that we think conveys that it’s a soy product, but you’re
   confused and think the product is chicken). This latter interpretation could
   doom Tofurky if a consumer (or future Commissioner) believes its labels to
   be misleading, no matter Tofurky’s intent in using those labels. Further still,
   the Act does not define “represent.” If Tofurky is correct that the § 4744
   subparts expand the definition of “intentionally misbrand or misrepresent,”
   that they employ meat-esque words on their labels could arguably represent
   those products as meat and, therefore, misbrand them. Additionally, there is
   no explicit safe harbor for meat-like, plant-based products as found in similar
   statutes in other states. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 2 § 5-107 (“[P]roduct
   packaging for plant-based items shall not be considered in violation of [this
   statute] so long as the packaging displays that the product is derived from

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   plant-based sources . . . .”). Instead, the Act clarifies that Tofurky’s products
   are not meat and punishes representations that they are.
            While Tofurky’s interpretation may not be the best interpretation, the
   test doesn’t require that. See, e.g., Picard v. Magliano, 42 F.4th 89, 98 (2d Cir.
   2022) (“The Supreme Court’s opinion in [Driehaus] makes clear that courts
   are to consider whether the plaintiff’s intended conduct is ‘arguably
   proscribed’ by the challenged statute, not whether the intended conduct is in
   fact proscribed.”). Because Tofurky’s reading is arguable, it satisfies this
   prong.
            And third, Tofurky faces a substantial (or credible) threat of
   enforcement. When we face a pre-enforcement challenge “to recently
   enacted (or, at least, non-moribund) statutes that facially restrict expressive
   activity by the class to which the plaintiff belongs, [we] will assume a credible
   threat of prosecution in the absence of compelling contrary evidence.” Speech
   First, Inc. v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319, 335 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotations and citation
   omitted). Tofurky plainly belongs to a class that is facially restricted by the
   policy: it is a company that labels, markets, and sells food products in
   Louisiana. So, we assume a credible prosecutorial threat absent compelling
   evidence to the contrary.
            Nothing here compels a different conclusion. The Commissioner
   admits that his office has formulated rules and regulations for the Act’s
   implementation. Once this case ends, he plans to begin enforcement. While
   the State insists that Tofurky’s nine demonstrative labels do not violate the
   Act, it nevertheless declines to make any “representations as to whether any
   other label of Tofurky would be violative of the provisions of the Act.” Even
   the State’s disclaimed intent to penalize the nine labels is not compelling. See
   Speech First, 979 F.3d at 336 (holding as “not compelling” evidence that the
   policymaker “lack[ed] any intention to penalize the intended conduct of [the

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   plaintiff’s] members”). And besides, nothing binds the Commissioner
   here—he (or a future holder of his office) could change his mind and decide
   Tofurky’s labels do violate the statute. Cf. Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman,
   2022 WL 4627711, at *8 (E.D. Ark. 2022) (“There is nothing stopping the
   State from simply changing its mind and deciding to prosecute Tofurky
   during the pendency of this litigation, despite its expressed intention thus far
   to postpone any enforcement until the resolution of Tofurky’s constitutional
   challenge.”). Thus, Tofurky faces a substantial threat of enforcement.
          All told, then, Tofurky satisfies the three prongs needed to
   demonstrate an injury in fact in a pre-enforcement freedom of speech
   challenge. Because the other two prongs of standing are also satisfied,
   Tofurky’s challenge may proceed.
                                          B
          We move on to the merits of Tofurky’s action. As a preliminary
   matter, it is unclear whether Tofurky challenges the Act facially or as applied
   to itself. Therefore, we turn to the language of the lower court’s order to
   evaluate whether it reviewed the case as a facial challenge or as applied to
   Tofurky. See Am. Acad. of Implant Dentistry, 860 F.3d at 306 (“We find that
   answer [to whether the case is a facial or applied challenge] in the district
   court’s own words . . . .”). “The distinction [between a facial and as applied
   challenge] . . . goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the
   Court . . . .” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010)
   (cleaned up). We contrast a facial challenge with “a narrower remedy.” See
   United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477–78 (1995).
   Here, the district court found the Act in its entirety to be unconstitutional
   and invalidated the entire statute. So, we evaluate Tofurky’s constitutional
   challenge as one targeting the Act’s facial validity.

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           “Principles of judicial restraint must be employed before a federal
   court may declare a state law unconstitutional.” Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen,
   732 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 2013). In the commercial speech context, “[t]o
   succeed in a typical facial attack, [Tofurky] would have to establish ‘that no
   set of circumstances exists under which [the Act] would be valid,’ or that the
   statute lacks any ‘plainly legitimate sweep . . . .’” United States v. Stevens, 559
   U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (citation omitted). 4 Also, “[u]nder the constitutional-
   avoidance canon,” we “shun an interpretation that raises serious
   constitutional doubts and instead adopt an alternative that avoids those
   problems.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018). With these
   principles in mind, we review the district court’s facial invalidation of the Act
   and the State’s challenge to that decision.
           In the merits section of its order, the district court evaluated
   Tofurky’s claim that the Act unconstitutionally infringed its commercial free
   speech under the First Amendment. The district court then applied the
   Central Hudson framework to its interpretation of the Act. See Cent. Hudson,
   447 U.S. at 566. The district court accepted the parties’ agreement that
   Tofurky’s commercial speech is not misleading. It then found that the State
   claimed a valid interest in ensuring its citizens are not misled by false or
   misleading labeling and advertising. However, the lower court was skeptical
   whether the statute advanced the State’s proclaimed interest in protecting
   citizens from misleading corporate speech. Regardless, the district court
   concluded that the Act was more extensive than necessary to achieve the
   State’s interest, violating the standard laid out in Central Hudson. Having
   determined that the Act failed one, and possibly two, prongs of the Central

           _____________________
           4
              In the commercial free speech context, the overbreadth doctrine does not apply.
   See Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496–97 (1982).

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   Hudson test, the district court declared the law unconstitutional and enjoined
   the State from enforcing it.
          The State challenges the district court’s order on two grounds. First,
   it argues that the Act applies only to “person[s who] intentionally misbrand
   or misrepresent any food product as an agricultural product [as defined by
   the Act.]” See La. Rev. Stat. § 3:4744(B). Consequently, says the State,
   the Central Hudson analysis simply does not apply to the Act. Second, the
   State argues that if we agree with the district court and find Central Hudson
   controls the outcome of this appeal, we should reverse the trial court because
   it incorrectly applied the test. Specifically, the State contends that the Act’s
   intent to “misbrand or misrepresent” requirement ensures that it directly
   advances the State’s interest and goes no further than necessary to advance
   that interest. Via either path, the State concludes that we should reverse the
   district court’s order.
          Tofurky counters that the plain meaning of the Act’s text extends
   beyond misleading speech to encompass the company’s non-misleading
   labeling. It argues that the district court correctly decided Central Hudson
   controlled and did not err in its application. Additionally, Tofurky makes a
   new argument—that the Act is unconstitutionally vague—which was not
   adjudicated by the lower court.
          The Supreme Court held in Central Hudson that the First
   Amendment’s commercial free speech protections only apply to
   “communication [that] is neither misleading nor related to unlawful
   activity.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. The Court further elaborated,
   “there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial
   messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The
   government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the
   public than to inform it or commercial speech related to illegal activity.” Id.

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   at 563–64 (citation omitted). So, the First Amendment does not protect
   commercial statements that are actually misleading, meaning they deceive or
   are inherently likely to deceive. See Express Oil Change, L.L.C. v. Miss. Bd. of
   Licensure for Pro. Eng’rs & Surveyors, 916 F.3d 483, 488 (5th Cir. 2019). But
   statements that are only potentially misleading are safeguarded by the First
   Amendment and restrictions on such speech must survive intermediate
   scrutiny. Id. The State argues that the Act applies only to actually misleading
   speech, so it falls outside the First Amendment’s protection of commercial
   free speech. We agree.
             In a facial challenge, Tofurky bears the heavy burden of showing that
   either “‘no set of circumstances exists under which [the Act] would be
   valid,’ or the statute lacks any ‘plainly legitimate sweep . . . .’” Stevens, 559
   U.S. at 472 (citation omitted). “In determining whether a law is facially
   invalid, we must be careful not to go beyond the statute’s facial requirements
   and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.” Wash. State
   Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449–50 (2008). The
   Supreme Court has also empowered us to “shun an interpretation that raises
   serious constitutional doubts and instead . . . adopt an alternative that avoids
   those problems.” Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 836; see also Wash. State Grange, 552
   U.S. at 450–51 (explaining the myriad reasons the Court disfavors facial
   challenges). So, courts are required “to accept a narrowing construction of a
   state law in order to preserve its constitutionality.” Voting for Am., 732 F.3d
   at 396.
             The Act states, in the relevant part, “[n]o person shall intentionally
   misbrand or misrepresent any food product as an agricultural product . . . .”
   La. Rev. Stat. § 3:4744(B) (emphasis added). The definitions section of
   the Act defines “[a]gricultural product” as “any beef, pork, poultry,
   crawfish, shrimp, meat, sugar, or rice product that is edible by humans.” Id.
   § 3:4743(1). As the State construes the Act, it only prohibits a company from

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   intentionally misleading a consumer by claiming a product is made from beef,
   pork, poultry, crawfish, shrimp, meat, sugar, or rice when it is not. Thus, by
   the State’s construction, the Act only applies to actually misleading
   representations that fall outside the First Amendment’s protection for
   commercial free speech as defined by Central Hudson.
          The district court did not lend any weight to the State’s interpretation
   of the statute and instead chose to apply Central Hudson’s analysis to its own
   interpretation of the Act. In doing so, the district court concluded that the
   Act covered more speech than was necessary to support the State’s interest
   and found the law unconstitutional. But by failing to accept the State’s
   narrower construction of the Act’s text, the district court erred. See Voting
   for Am., Inc., 732 F.3d at 398 (“[W]e must accept the state’s narrowing
   construction of the [Act.]”).
          Tofurky would like us to agree with the district court and disregard
   the State’s reading of the Act. It asserts that the statute is appropriately
   construed as barring its truthful conduct when it sells products labeled
   “veggie burgers” or “vegan sausage.” Appellee takes issue with the
   “laundry list of speech” that it argues the Act defines as “‘intentionally
   misbrand[ing] or misrepresent[ing].’” As an illustration of its point, Tofurky
   examines paragraph (9) of the Act, which states that intentionally
   misbranding or misrepresenting includes “[u]tilizing a term that is the same
   as or deceptively similar to a term that has been used or defined historically
   in   reference    to   a   specific   agricultural   product.”    La.     Rev.
   Stat. § 3:4744(B)(9); Tofurky reads this language as encompassing its
   conduct in advertising, labeling, and selling “plant-based sausage” or “ham-
   style roast.” Tofurky worries that it could be held liable for making a plant-
   based product and labeling it in a way that it thinks conveys that the item is a
   plant-based product. This could happen, according to Tofurky, because its
   labeling unintentionally confuses a consumer into thinking its product is an

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   agricultural product as defined by the Act. Tofurky concludes by arguing that
   Central Hudson’s First Amendment protections should apply to its conduct
   so it can be protected from enforcement actions in the event of this outcome.
   See Express Oil Change, 916 F.3d at 488.
          Although this is a way to read the Act, it is far from the only way to
   read the Act. Nothing in the statute’s language requires the State to enforce
   its punitive provisions on a company that sells its products in a way that just
   so happens to confuse a consumer. See id. at 488. The State’s construction
   limits the Act’s scope to representations by companies that actually intend
   consumers to be misled about whether a product is an “agricultural product”
   when it is not. This interpretation is not contradictory to the Act, and we thus
   accept it for the present purposes of evaluating Tofurky’s facial challenge.
   See Voting for Am., Inc., 732 F.3d at 398 (“[A] narrowing interpretation is not
   contradictory to the statute, and the court was thus required to accept it for
   present purposes [of a facial challenge].”); see also Express Oil Change, 916
   F.3d at 488.
          The district court erred in ignoring the State’s limiting construction
   and in implementing its own interpretation of the Act. That narrower
   interpretation regulates content that falls outside the purview of Central
   Hudson. Consequently, we conclude that the Act, when narrowly construed,
   does not violate the First Amendment’s protection of commercial free
   speech.
                                         III
          The district court’s judgment is REVERSED, and its injunction is
   VACATED.

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