Court Opinion

ID: 9366205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 09:10:38.75781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:50.682413
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                                   08-21-00208-CV
                        08-21-00208-CV                                 EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                  EL PASO, TEXAS
                                                                                 1/23/2023 9:47 PM
                                                                            ELIZABETH G. FLORES
                                                                                            CLERK

                          No. 08-21-00208-CV

                                                                 FILED IN
                                                          8th COURT OF APPEALS
      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH              DISTRICT
                                                              EL PASO, TEXAS
                       EL PASO, TEXAS                     1/23/2023 9:47:52 PM
                                                          ELIZABETH G. FLORES
                                                                  Clerk
                         ATI JET SALES, LLC

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

CITY OF EL PASO, TEXAS AND MARIA O. PASILLAS, TAX ASSESSOR-
                COLLECTOR, CITY OF EL PASO

                                Appellees.

    Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6 of El Paso County, Texas
                        Cause No. 2021DCV1168
                  The Honorable M. Sue Kurita Presiding

        REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT ATI JET SALES, LLC

                                         Kory Ryan
                                         Texas Bar No. 24068065
                                         Brittany E. Dumas
                                         Texas Bar No. 24101713
                                         RYAN LAW FIRM, PLLC
                                         13155 Noel Road, Suite 1850
                                         Dallas, Texas 75240
                                         Tel: (972) 250-6363
                                         Fax: (972) 250-3599

                                         Counsel for ATI Jet Sales, LLC

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED.                 September 6, 2022
                                      TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ...............................................................................1

        I.       GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT SHIELD THE
                 TAXING AUTHORITIES IN THIS CASE AS JET SALES
                 PLED A VIABLE TAKINGS CLAIM. ................................................1

                 A.      Texas law requires that the jurisdictional issue be resolved
                         liberally in favor of the plaintiff without a review on the
                         merits of the cause of action. ......................................................2

                 B.      Jet Sales affirmatively demonstrated a viable takings
                         claim; thus, dismissal was in error. .............................................3

                 C.      The Taxing Authorities’ seizure of the aircraft was not
                         lawful as they improperly used their taxing power. ...................5

                 D.      Jet Sales properly demonstrated that the seizure was for
                         public use. ...................................................................................7

                 E.      Jet Sales had no adequate remedies in which to recover the
                         aircraft. ........................................................................................8
        II.      GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT SHIELD THE
                 TAXING AUTHORITIES IN THIS CASE FROM ANY
                 ULTRA VIRES ACTS. .......................................................................11

                 A.      The Taxing Authorities’ argument that the declaratory
                         judgment action is moot was not properly raised at the trial
                         court. In addition, Exhibit A to the Taxing Authorities’
                         Response Brief is evidence not contained within the record
                         and should not be admitted into this proceeding. .....................11

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .............................................................................13

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................15

                                                          ii
                                         INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) ....................................3

Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1981)...........................3

City of Dallas v. Heard, 252 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet.
  denied) ........................................................................................................... 11, 12

City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2004) ..........................................8

City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2011) ........................................9
City of Keller v. Hall, 433 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet.
  denied) ........................................................................................................... 2, 4, 5
City of Robinson v. Leuscher, 636 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. App.—Waco 2021, pet.
  filed) .......................................................................................................................8

City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2009) ...................................8
City of Webster v. Hunnicutt, 650 S.W.3d 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
  Dist.] 2022, no pet. h.) .................................................................................. 2, 3, 5
County of Burleson v. General Electric Capital Corp., 831 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.
  App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) ................................................6, 7
Harris County v. Luna-Prudencio, 294 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—Houston
 [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) .........................................................................................3

Harris Cty Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2016) .....................1
Paramount Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1988).............3

Rylander v. Palais Royal, Inc., 81 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002,
  pet. denied))............................................................................................................6

Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. 1997) ..................................2

State v. Brownlow, 319 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. 2010) ......................................................1

Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe &
  Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. 2013)........................................................2, 4
                                                               iii
Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) .............3

Texas Workforce Corp’n v. Midfirst Bank, 40 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—
  Austin 2001, pet. denied) .......................................................................................6

Villareal v. Harris Co., 226 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
  2006, no pet.)..........................................................................................................6

Other Authorities
TEX. TAX CODE § 33.24 .......................................................................................9, 10

TEX. TAX CODE § 41.411 .........................................................................................10
TEX. TAX CODE § 41.4115 ...................................................................................10
TEX. TAX CODE § 41.44 .......................................................................................10

Rules
TEX. R. CIV. P. 45 .......................................................................................................8

TEX. R. CIV. P. 47 .......................................................................................................8

                                                            iv
                         APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

      In response to the Taxing Authorities’ arguments relating to Jet Sales’ takings

cause of action and declaratory judgment action presented in their appellate brief,

Jet Sales will address each argument in turn. For the reasons explained below, Jet

Sales respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial court’s judgment, and

remand to the trial court for adjudication on Jet Sales’ claims on the merits.

I.    GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT SHIELD THE TAXING
      AUTHORITIES IN THIS CASE AS JET SALES PLED A VIABLE
      TAKINGS CLAIM.
      Governmental immunity, in this case, does not shield the Taxing Authorities

 for their actions made in contravention of the Takings Clause. Texas case law is

 clear that “[s]overeign and governmental immunity do not shield the government

 from liability for compensation under the takings clause. Harris Cty Flood Control

 Dist. v. Kerr, 499 S.W.3d 793, 99 (Tex. 2016); State v. Brownlow, 319 S.W.3d 649,

 52 (Tex. 2010). As stated in Jet Sales’ Appellate Brief, immunity does not bestow

 carte blanch, blanket authority to a governmental agency or employee. See APT

 Brief at 41. Although the Taxing Authorities were permitted to raise immunity as a

 defense via a plea to the jurisdiction, that does not guarantee that immunity be found

 in all instances. Rather, to defeat an immunity claim for purposes of jurisdiction, a

 plaintiff must demonstrate that there is viable takings claim. See Tex. Dep't of

                                           1
Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 66 (Tex. 2013) (emphasis

added).

      When determining whether a claim of immunity successfully defeats

jurisdiction, the court should determine whether a viable takings claim exists, not

whether the Plaintiff established by a preponderance of the evidence that a takings

did in fact occurred. See, e.g., City of Keller v. Hall, 433 S.W.3d 708, 728 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied). Only in those instances where it is undisputed

that there is not a viable takings claim should the plea be granted. See City of

Webster v. Hunnicutt, 650 S.W.3d 792, 797-98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2022, no pet. h.). If the governmental defendant produces evidence to demonstrate

as a matter of law that there is not a viable claim, then the court should grant the plea

to the jurisdiction. Ibid.; see also A.P.I. Pipe, 397 S.W.3d at 166.

      A.     Texas law requires that the jurisdictional issue be resolved liberally
             in favor of the plaintiff without a review on the merits of the cause
             of action.

      Texas case law makes clear that when determining a jurisdictional issue, the

court should take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and “indulg[e] every

reasonable inference and resolv[e] any doubts in [the plaintiff’s] favor” for purposes

of the jurisdictional question. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911

(Tex. 1997). That is, the court should resolve the issue liberally in favor of conferring

                                           2
jurisdiction. Harris County v. Luna-Prudencio, 294 S.W.3d 690, 696 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

      Not only should the pleading be read favorably in favor of Plaintiff, but Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure 45 and 47 require that the original pleading give a short

statement of the cause of action sufficient to give the opposing party fair notice of

the claim involved. TEX. R. CIV. P. 45, 47; Paramount Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. v.

Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. 1988); Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617

S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1981). Rule 45 does not require that the plaintiff lay out its

evidence that it will rely upon to establish the asserted cause of action. Muhr, 749

S.W.2d at 494-95. Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,

230 (Tex. 2004). When considering the jurisdictional question, a court should only

consider the pleadings and evidence pertinent to make a determination on the

jurisdictional inquiry and not the merits of the cause of action. See City of Webster v.

Hunnicutt, 650 S.W.3d 792, 797-98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.

h.) (citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000)).

      B.     Jet Sales affirmatively demonstrated a viable takings claim; thus,
             dismissal was in error.

      As stated in Jet Sales’ Appellate Brief, Jet Sales pled each element necessary

to demonstrate that a takings occurred in this instance. See APT Brief at 43-44. The

Taxing Authorities allege that (1) there was not a taking as the seizure was lawful;

(2) the seizure was not for “public use”; and (3) that Jet Sales failed to avail itself of

                                            3
remedies to recover the aircraft. See AEE Brief at 16-30. As further demonstrated

below, the Taxing Authorities cannot show as a matter of law that Jet Sales had no

viable takings claim.

      In response to Jet Sales’ argument that it did in fact allege a viable takings

claim, the Taxing Authorities misconstrue what is required for jurisdictional

purposes. Whether or not Jet Sales would succeed on its takings argument is a

question for the trier of fact See City of Keller v. Hall, 433 S.W.3d 708, 728 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied). What is required at this jurisdiction juncture,

is merely that Jet Sales demonstrated that there was a viable takings claim as

discussed supra. See ibid.

      Various Texas courts have examined takings claim cases wherein a defendant

alleged that governmental immunity precluded jurisdiction. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of

Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Sup., LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2013). For instance,

in A.P.I. Pipe, the Supreme Court of Texas found that a takings claim was not viable

and therefore the Court found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Ibid. In that

case, however, the Court found that the Plaintiff did not demonstrate an ownership

interest in the property taken. Ibid. As ownership of the property taken is a

fundamental tenant for a takings claim to exist, the Court found that there could not

be a viable takings claim. Ibid.

                                         4
      In Hunnicutt, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff did not

plead a viable takings claim as well. See City of Webster v. Hunnicutt, 650 S.W.3d

792, 797-98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet. h.). In that case, the

plaintiff pled a tort claim against the City. Ibid. at 798-800. As a takings claim must

be based on intentional actions by the City, the Court found that there was not a

viable takings claim. Ibid.

      In contrast, courts have found that if there is a fact issue surrounding one of

the elements of the takings claim, that dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds

is inappropriate. See City of Keller v. Hall, 433 S.W.3d 708, 728 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2014, pet. denied). In Hall, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial

court’s decision wherein it denied the city’s plea to the jurisdiction. Ibid. In that case,

the City argued that there was no subject matter jurisdiction for an inverse

condemnation claim as the evidence admitted showed that the City did not know that

the actions it took would result in damage to the property—i.e., that the act was not

intentional (a requirement of the claim). See ibid. at 717. The court ultimately found

that there was a factual question concerning the City’s knowledge about whether

damage would result, which precluded the plea to the jurisdiction. Ibid. at 728.

      C.     The Taxing Authorities’ seizure of the aircraft was not lawful as
             they improperly used their taxing power.

      The Taxing Authorities allege that because the seizure of the aircraft was

lawful, there can be no taking. See AEE Brief at 16. In support for this position, the

                                            5
Taxing Authorities cite to Villareal for the proposition that when a governmental

agency uses its taxing power to take property to collect taxes, that seizure “does not

amount to a ‘taking’ as contemplated by Article I, Section 17 of the Texas

Constitution.” See AEE Brief at 20 (citing to Villareal v. Harris Co., 226 S.W.3d

537, 544 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Rylander v. Palais Royal,

Inc., 81 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied)).

      The Taxing Authorities’ argument, however, fails as they misconstrue

Villareal. As Villareal and other Texas cases make clear, a governmental agency

using its taxing power to seize property may not be considered a taking.

See Rylander v. Palais Royal, Inc., 81 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002,

pet. denied) (emphasis added). But, as in this case, if the government improperly

uses its taxing power to take property for public use, a taking can occur. See, e.g.,

Villarreal v. Harris Cnty., 226 S.W.3d 537, 544 (Tex. App.—2006) (emphasis

added).   Various Texas courts have recognized that takings action could be

warranted when a taxing authority improperly uses its taxing powers. See, e.g., Texas

Workforce Corp’n v. Midfirst Bank, 40 S.W.3d 690, 697 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001,

pet. denied); County of Burleson v. General Electric Capital Corp., 831 S.W.2d 54

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). The reason for this distinction

is that an improper use of its taxing power is not actually a use of taxing power at

all, but rather a taking. See Midfirst Bank, 40 S.W.3d at 697.

                                          6
      In General Electric, the court recognized a takings action when a taxing

authority illegally sold a mobile home in which a company had a security

interest. See Burleson v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 831 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). In that case, a local taxing authority

foreclosed on a debtor's mobile home to collect the deficient tax owed on the

property. Ibid. at 57-58. In foreclosing on the mobile home, the taxing authority

“acted contrary to the required procedures” for the foreclosure of the lien when it

failed to provide notice to the holder of a perfected security interest. Ibid. The court

expressly rejected the taxing authority’s claim that this could not amount to a taking

and held that the taxing authority's “actions have damaged [the company] and

deprived   it     of   a valuable   property   interest without due process or

compensation.” Ibid. at 59.

      In this case, the Taxing Authorities seized property of one taxpayer—Jet Sales

(Appellant, here) in satisfaction of delinquent taxes owed by another taxpayer—

Sales West. The delinquent tax statement listed Sales West as the owner. See 3RR

185-86. Seizing property of one taxpayer to satisfy another’s debt is an improper use

of taxing powers.

      D.        Jet Sales properly demonstrated that the seizure was for public use.

      The Taxing Authorities’ seizure of the aircraft was for public use. The Taxing

Authorities seized the aircraft in satisfaction of delinquent property taxes of another

                                           7
taxpayer in the county. In determining whether an act is for public use, Texas case

law indicates that a governmental action that is accidental or negligent does not

confer a benefit to the public. City of Robinson v. Leuscher, 636 S.W.3d 48, 57-58

(Tex. App.—Waco 2021, pet. filed) (citing City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284

S.W.3d 809, 820 (Tex. 2009)). There must be a showing that the act was intentional.

Ibid. “When damage is merely the accidental result of the government's act, there is

no public benefit and the property cannot be said to be taken or damaged

for public use.” City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. 2004)

(internal quotations and emphasis omitted).

      In this case, the Taxing Authorities’ actions were intentional as demonstrated

by the tax warrant and physical seizure of the property. The Taxing Authorities

intended to seize the property for payment of taxes, which undoubtedly benefit the

public. It is undisputed that property taxes fund many public benefits including

funding schools, roadways, and construction among other things. As such, Jet Sales

pled a viable takings claim and should not have been dismissed on jurisdictional

grounds.

      E.     Jet Sales had no adequate remedies in which to recover the aircraft.

      The Taxing Authorities allege that Jet Sales failed to avail itself of remedies

to recover the aircraft and thus, there can be no taking. See AEE Brief at 20. This

argument fails for two reasons. First, the remedies “available” to Jet Sales were not

                                         8
adequate. Second, this argument was not presented in the Plea to the Jurisdiction or

the accompanying hearing.

       There are instances in which a governmental agency takes property, but

through an adequate process for obtaining compensation and/or return of the

property, there is no governmental taking. City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d

231, 236 (Tex. 2011). The Taxing Authorities cite to VSC as authority to demonstrate

that Jet Sales should have availed itself of one of three remedies so that the property

would have been returned and thus, no takings would have occurred. See AEE Brief

at 20-26. In VSC, the Plaintiff had an adequate, legal avenue it could have pursued

to regain possession of the vehicles. Ibid. at 249. The Court in VSC found that

“[b]ecause VSC could seek possession or compensation through a remedial statutory

scheme, it could not ignore that scheme in favor of initiating a constitutional takings

suit.” Ibid.

       The Taxing Authorities, here, allege that Jet Sales had three avenues in which

to recover the aircraft. See AEE Brief at 20-26. First, Jet Sales could have paid the

taxes due under protest. Ibid. at 23-24. Second, Jet Sales could have delivered a cash

or surety bond to the taxing unit’s tax collector under Section 33.24 of the Texas Tax

Code. Ibid. at 24-25. Third, Jet Sales could have posted a bond of $200,000 with the

trial court until final resolution of the case. Ibid. at 25. Each option, however, is not

an adequate remedy and each fails in turn.

                                           9
      Posting a bond and/or paying cash of $200,000 or higher to recover its seized

property is not an adequate remedy for Jet Sales. In addition, option two under

Section 33.24 of the Texas Tax Code, is not applicable here. Pursuant to Section

33.24, “a person may prevent seizure of property or sale of property seized by

delivering to the collector a cash or surety bond conditioned on payment of the tax

before delinquency.” TEX. TAX CODE § 33.24. The alleged delinquent taxes dated

back to 2017 thereby making the delinquency date years prior to the seizure.

Although the Taxing Authorities state that the delinquency date can be pushed back

under Sections 41.411, and 41.4115, and 41.44, none of those sections allow for the

date to actually be pushed in this case. See AEE Brief at 25. The sections require a

payment of the amount of taxes due on the property that is not in dispute before the

delinquency date. See TEX. TAX CODE §§ 41.411, 41.4115, and 41.44. In this case,

no payment had been made prior to the delinquency date as Jet Sales never received

notice of taxes owed. Thus, Jet Sales had no recourse through these provisions of the

Tax Code. Accordingly, requiring a Plaintiff to pay over $200,000 or more to recover

property that was illegally seized cannot be an adequate remedy in which Plaintiff

was required to avail itself.

                                         10
      In addition, this issue was not raised in the trial court whereby appellate court

review is appropriate. Appellate court jurisdiction is limited to reviewing a plea to

the jurisdiction as filed and heard and does not extend to grounds outside those

actually raised. See City of Dallas v. Heard, 252 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2008, pet. denied). Courts of appeals should not consider whether the trial

court erred in denying a plea to the jurisdiction on a ground that was not argued

before the trial court. Ibid. In addition, this argument was not presented as a basis

for the Plea to the Jurisdiction. For both reasons, the Taxing Authorities’ argument

that Jet Sales did not avail itself of remedies and thus cannot claim a takings fails

in its entirety.

II.   GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT SHEILD THE TAXING
      AUTHORITIES IN THIS CASE FROM ANY ULTRA VIRES ACTS.
      A.     The Taxing Authorities’ argument that the declaratory judgment
             action is moot was not properly raised at the trial court. In
             addition, Exhibit A to the Taxing Authorities’ Response Brief is
             evidence not contained within the record and should not be
             admitted into this proceeding.

      The Taxing Authorities allege for the first time that the declaratory judgment

action is now moot. See AEE Brief at 25. As an initial matter, this issue was not

brought before the trial court and is wholly outside the record. In addition,

Appellee’s Exhibit A is not included in the record and Jet Sales objects to its

admission in its entirety. This Exhibit has not been authenticated, produced, or

otherwise brought into evidence in any capacity. The purported date on the Exhibit

                                         11
is December 12, 2022, over twelve (12) days after Jet Sales filed its Notice of Appeal

in this case. As such any argument relating to mootness and/or reliance on

Appellee’s Exhibit A is outside the record and was not a consideration when

determining jurisdiction at the trial court level.

      Appellate court jurisdiction is limited to reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction

as filed and heard and does not extend to grounds outside those actually raised. See

City of Dallas v. Heard, 252 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).

Courts of appeals should not consider whether the trial court erred in denying a plea

to the jurisdiction on a ground that was not argued before the trial court. Ibid.

Accordingly any argument as to mootness or Appellee’s Exhibit A is not a

consideration for this Court.

                                           12
                         CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

      For the foregoing reasons, Jet Sales respectfully requests the Court reverse the

trial court’s October 27, 2021 Order granting the Taxing Authorities’ Plea to the

Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss and remand to the trial court for adjudication of

Jet Sales’ claims on the merits.

                                       Respectfully submitted,

                                       RYAN LAW FIRM, PLLC
                                       13155 Noel Road, Suite 1850
                                       Dallas, Texas 75240
                                       Ph: 972.250.6363
                                       Fax: 972.250.3599

                                       /s/ Brittany E. Dumas
                                       Brittany E. Dumas
                                       Texas Bar No. 24101713
                                       Brittany.Dumas@ryanlawyers.com

                                         13
                    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1.   This Brief complies with the type-volume limitation Tex. R. App. 9.4(i)
     because:

     • This brief contains 2,972 words, excluding the parts of the Brief exempted
       by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1) and (2)(B).

2.   This Brief complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e)
     and the type style requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because:

     • This Brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced format using
       Microsoft Word in 14 pt. Times New Roman.

                                  /s/ Brittany E. Dumas
                                  Brittany E. Dumas

                                      14
                        CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      I certify that a true and correct copy of this motion was filed electronically

and was served on counsel for Appellee on January 23, 2023, pursuant to the Texas

Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.5.

                                    /s/ Brittany E. Dumas
                                    Brittany E. Dumas

                                        15
                         Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Mary Bayer on behalf of Brittany Dumas
Bar No. 24101713
mary.bayer@ryanlawyers.com
Envelope ID: 72066890
Status as of 1/24/2023 1:35 PM MST

Associated Case Party: City of El Paso, Texas

Name           BarNumber    Email                     TimestampSubmitted     Status

Jose Padilla 24032811       EP.Litigation@lgbs.com 1/23/2023 9:47:52 PM      SENT

Associated Case Party: Maria O. Pasillas, Tax Collector-Assessor for the City of El
Paso

Name           BarNumber    Email                     TimestampSubmitted     Status

Jose Padilla 24032811       EP.Litigation@lgbs.com 1/23/2023 9:47:52 PM      SENT

Associated Case Party: ATI Jet Sales, LLC

Name                   BarNumber    Email                                 TimestampSubmitted     Status

Brittany Dumas                      brittany.dumas@ryanlawyers.com        1/23/2023 9:47:52 PM   SENT

Dallas OfficeFilings                dallasofficefilings@ryanlawyers.com   1/23/2023 9:47:52 PM   SENT

Evelin Martinez                     evelin.martinez@ryanlawyers.com       1/23/2023 9:47:52 PM   SENT

Jeff Nanson                         jeff.nanson@ryanlawyers.com           1/23/2023 9:47:52 PM   SENT

Mary Bayer                          mary.bayer@ryanlawyers.com            1/23/2023 9:47:52 PM   SENT

Julian Jones                        julian.jones@ryanlawyers.com          1/23/2023 9:47:52 PM   SENT

Alexandra Cuestas                   Alexandra.Cuestas@ryanlawyers.com 1/23/2023 9:47:52 PM       SENT