Court Opinion

ID: 9886478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 16:10:58.639844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:28.915482
License: Public Domain

J-S28036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID L. BAYNES                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 761 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 7, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0002773-2014

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID L. BAYNES                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 762 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 7, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0000244-2014

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                      FILED: OCTOBER 6, 2023

       In these consolidated appeals,1 David L. Baynes appeals pro se from

the October 7, 2021 order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant’s appeals at Nos. 761 WDA 2022 and 762 WDA 2022 were          sua
sponte consolidated by this Court on September 22, 2022.
J-S28036-23

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.         After careful

review, we affirm.

      The underlying facts of this case are not relevant to our disposition and

need not be reiterated here.       The PCRA court summarized the procedural

history of this case as follows:

            On November 5, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of:
            rape; involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”);
            sexual assault; indecent assault; indecent exposure;
            and simple assault. The presiding trial judge, the
            Honorable Donna Jo McDaniel, sentenced Appellant on
            February 3, 2015 to an aggregate sentence of 25-50
            years of incarceration. As a result of an appeal, the
            convictions were affirmed but the case was remanded
            to the [trial] court for resentencing, after it was
            determined there were errors in the application of the
            merger doctrine and a failure to impose the second-
            strike provision. [See Commonwealth v. Baynes,
            156 A.3d 332 (Pa.Super. 2016) (unpublished
            memorandum), appeal denied, 165 A.3d 875 (Pa.
            2017).]

            On June 8, 2017, Appellant was resentenced by Judge
            McDaniel to an aggregate sentence of 23½ to 47 years
            of incarceration and was classified as a sexually
            violent predator (SVP).       This sentence was also
            appealed, resulting in this Court again vacating
            Appellant’s sentence and remanding for a new
            sentencing hearing. It was determined the sentence
            imposed at the conviction for indecent assault was
            illegal. Additionally, the [trial] court again failed to
            apply the Section 9718.2 second-strike mandatory
            minimum sentence of 25 years at the convictions for
            rape or IDSI as instructed. [See Commonwealth v.
            Baynes, 209 A.3d 531 (Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished
            memorandum).]

            [This Court subsequently vacated Appellant’s SVP
            designation as it was no longer permitted under
            current law. Id.] Upon remand, Appellant’s cases

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            were reassigned to Judge Mark Tranquilli and a
            resentencing hearing was conducted on July 12, 2019.
            Consistent with the opinion and directive of the
            Superior Court, the trial court imposed a mandatory
            minimum sentence of 25 to 50 years of incarceration
            at both Count 1 and 2; Rape and IDSI respectively.
            These terms were run concurrently, followed by 4
            years of probation imposed at Count 5 and 6; indecent
            exposure and simple assault.

            In response to a petition filed with the Court on
            September 3, 2019, counsel was appointed to
            represent Appellant for the purpose of a [PCRA]
            petition. On August 26, 2020 counsel filed a no merit
            letter. On September 17, 2020, this Court issued a
            [Pa.R.Crim.P. 907] notice of intent to dismiss and
            Appellant filed an objection on October 6, 2020.
            [PCRA counsel was granted permission to withdraw on
            September 17, 2020].

PCRA court opinion, 11/14/22 at 2-4 (citations, footnotes and extraneous

capitalization omitted).

      On October 7, 2021, the PCRA court entered an order denying

Appellant’s PCRA petition. Thereafter, on February 1, 2022, Appellant filed a

second PCRA petition, alleging he never received timely notice of the dismissal

of his first PCRA petition due to a mailing issue at SCI Benner-Township.

Accordingly, Appellant requested reinstatement of his appellate rights;

permission to file a new petition; an evidentiary hearing; and the appointment

of counsel. On June 6, 2022, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s petition in

part by reinstating his appellate rights relative to the October 7, 2021 order,

but denying all other relief.

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       On June 29, 2022, Appellant filed two separate pro se appeals docketed

at Nos. 761 WDA 2022 and 762 WDA 2022.2 On July 9, 2022, the PCRA court

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b)

statement on July 21, 2022, and the PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion

on November 14, 2022.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

              1.     Did the PCRA Court err when it dismissed
                     Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition without a
                     hearing when [Appellant] set forth facts, both of
                     record and off record which, if proven would
                     have entitled him to relief? More specifically:

                     A.     [Whether Appellant] was abandoned by
                            both direct appeal counsel and first PCRA
                            counsel      when      [Appellant]      was
                            constructively denied counsel at a critical
                            stage when direct review counsel failed to
                            file post-sentencing motions and a
                            requested direct appeal, and first PCRA
                            counsel failed to identify the claim[?]

                     B.     Was      [Appellant]     unlawfully      and
                            prejudicially deprived of his established
                            6th amendment right to effective
                            assistance of counsel in filing post-
                            sentence motions and direct appeal when
                            it was by counsel’s specific per se errors
                            which caused the loss and this was
                            [Appellant’s] first opportunity to raise and
                            preserve the claim?
____________________________________________

2 Appellant also filed an appeal from the June 6, 2022 order that reinstated

his appellate rights; this appeal was docketed at No. 763 WDA 2022 and was
quashed on October 7, 2022.

                                           -4-
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            2.    [Whether] Appellant is actively serving an illegal
                  sentence as the Court improperly construed a
                  prior conviction as a second strike when such
                  did not qualify and/or the Commonwealth
                  violated the terms of the contract when in fact,
                  Appellant originally pled guilty to a second
                  degree misdemeanor of voluntary deviate
                  sexual     intercourse   ultimately    upgraded
                  unlawfully to a second degree felony of sexual
                  assault[?]

            3.    Was direct appeal counsel and first PCRA
                  counsel ineffective in failing to raise these
                  claims[?]

Appellant’s brief at 3 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

      Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller,

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the

certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the

PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record

could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d

136, 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

      This court has continually recognized that there is no absolute right to

an evidentiary hearing.     Commonwealth v. Hart, 911 A.2d 939, 941

(Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted). When the PCRA court denies a petition

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without an evidentiary hearing, as is the case here, we “examine each issue

raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record certified before it in order to

determine if the PCRA court erred in its determination that there were no

genuine issues of material fact in controversy and in denying relief without

conducting an evidentiary hearing.” Commonwealth v. Khalifah, 852 A.2d

1238, 1240 (Pa.Super. 2004).          “It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to

decline to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has

no support either in the record or other evidence.” Commonwealth v. Wah,

42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citations omitted).

      The crux of Appellant’s first claim is that an evidentiary hearing was

warranted in this matter because his direct appeal counsel, Suzanne Swan,

Esq. (“Attorney Swan”) was ineffective for failing to file post-sentence motions

and direct appeal challenging his July 12, 2019 judgment of sentence.

Appellant’s brief at 10, 12. Appellant further contends that his PCRA counsel

was ineffective in failing to raise this issue on collateral review. Id. at 30. We

disagree.

      To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the PCRA,

a petitioner must establish the following three factors: “first[,] the underlying

claim has arguable merit; second, that counsel had no reasonable basis for

his   action   or   inaction;   and   third,   that   Appellant   was   prejudiced.”

Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1020 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 523 (Pa. 2014). “In order to

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meet the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness standard, a defendant must

show that there is a reasonable           probability that but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Commonwealth v. Reed, 42 A.3d 314, 319 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citations

omitted), appeal denied, 114 A.3d 416 (Pa. 2015).

            [A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he
            proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his
            conviction or sentence resulted from the [i]neffective
            assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
            the    particular   case,     so    undermined        the
            truth-determining     process     that     no    reliable
            adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
            place.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation

marks    omitted;    some    brackets    in   original),   citing   42   Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9543(a)(2)(ii).

      “[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of demonstrating

ineffectiveness rests on appellant.”     Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d

1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 30 A.3d 487

(Pa. 2011). “If a petitioner fails to prove any of these prongs, his claim fails.”

Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (Pa. 2013).

      Upon review, we find that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim fails because

he failed to satisfy the first and third prongs of the aforementioned test;

namely, that his claim had arguable merit and that he suffered prejudice as a

result of Attorney Swan’s purported inaction.

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       As recognized by the PCRA court, Attorney Swan represented Appellant

during both of his prior direct appeals, and these appeals were successful and

resulted in a remand for resentencing. See Baynes, 156 A.3d 332 (Pa.Super.

2016); Baynes, 209 A.3d 531 (Pa.Super. 2019).

       The record reflects that at the July 12, 2019 hearing, the trial court

properly resentenced Appellant in accordance with this Court’s instructions set

forth in its January 25, 2019 memorandum.            In doing so, the trial court

specifically corrected the error in Appellant’s prior sentence.      The Baynes

Court explained as follows:

              Here, prior to Baynes’ original sentencing hearing, the
              Commonwealth filed a notice of its intention to invoke
              the mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years’
              imprisonment      set   forth     in  [42    Pa.C.S.A.
              § 9718.2(a)(1)],[ ] based upon Baynes’ prior
                                3

____________________________________________

3 Section 9718.2, Sentences for sexual offenders, provides in relevant
part, as follows:

       (a)    Mandatory sentence.--

       (1)    Any person who is convicted in any court of this
              Commonwealth of an offense set forth in section 9799.14
              (relating to sexual offenses and tier system) shall, if at the
              time of the commission of the current offense the person
              had previously been convicted of an offense set forth in
              section 9799.14 or an equivalent crime under the laws of
              this Commonwealth in effect at the time of the commission
              of that offense or an equivalent crime in another jurisdiction,
              be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least 25 years of
              total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of
              this title or other statute to the contrary. Upon such
              conviction, the court shall give the person oral and written
              notice of the penalties under paragraph (2) for a third
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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              conviction of sexual assault. Although the court
              imposed an aggregate minimum term of 25 years’
              imprisonment, it did not impose the requisite
              mandatory minimum sentence. See Baynes, supra,
              156 A.3d 332 (unpublished memorandum at *5).
              Consequently, the panel that considered Baynes’
              direct appeal vacated the judgment of sentence and
              remanded the case to the trial court to, inter alia,
              “properly apply ... the second-strike provision of
              Section 9718.2(a)(1), which [was] not satisfied by the
              aggregate     sentence[.]”      Id.     (unpublished
              memorandum at *6). Nevertheless, upon remand,
              the trial court declined to impose the mandatory
              minimum term set forth in Section 9718.2(a)(1),
              instead choosing to impose consecutive sentences on
              several distinct convictions.  Accordingly, we are
              compelled to vacate Baynes’ judgment of sentence on
              this basis as well, and remand to the trial court to
              apply the second-strike provision of Section
              9718.2(a)(1).

See Baynes, 209 A.3d 531 (unpublished memorandum at *4) (footnote

omitted); see also notes of testimony, 7/12/19 at 14-15.

       Instantly, Appellant has failed to establish that a meritorious sentencing

issue existed to support an appeal.            Accordingly, we find that there is no

arguable merit to Appellant’s claim that Attorney Swan was ineffective for

failing to lodge a direct appeal on this basis, nor can Appellant demonstrate

any prejudice as a result of Attorney Swan’s decision.                   See e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 173, 179 (Pa.Super. 2017) (stating,

____________________________________________

              conviction. Failure to provide such notice shall not render
              the offender ineligible to be sentenced under paragraph (2).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2(a)(1).

                                           -9-
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“[t]he prejudice inquiry is satisfied if Appellant demonstrates a nonfrivolous

issue for appeal”), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 340 (Pa. 2018). Likewise, PCRA

counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to raise this meritless issue on

collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 815 A.2d 563, 590 (Pa.

2002) (stating, “[c]ounsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a

claim that has no merit.” (citation omitted)).

      Appellant next argues that Attorney Swan effectively abandoned him by

failing to consult with him about his direct appeal. Appellant’s brief at 12.

This claim is belied by the record.

      At the July 12, 2019 resentencing hearing, the court explicitly

questioned Appellant as to whether he had discussed his post-sentence and

appellate rights with Attorney Swan, and Appellant responded in the

affirmative:

               THE COURT: [S]ir, you have the full benefit of all your
               appellate rights. You have 30 days where you could
               take an appeal to what happened here today. Have
               you discussed your post-sentencing and appeal rights
               with [Attorney] Swan?

               [Appellant]: Briefly.

               THE COURT: Do you have a present understanding
               that you have a right to appeal to the Superior Court
               but that the clock begins to tick today?

               [Appellant]: Oh, yes, I do understand that part.

Notes of testimony, 7/12/19 at 15-16.

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      Based on the foregoing, we find that Appellant’s second claim is also

devoid of arguable merit. See Charleston, 94 A.3d at 1020.

      In his final claim, Appellant contends that the 25 to 50 year sentence he

is currently serving is illegal because the trial court improperly construed his

prior conviction for voluntary deviate sexual intercourse, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124,

as a second strike for purposes of sentencing under Section 9718.2(a)(1) and

the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9799.10-9799.42. Appellant’s brief at 19. For the following reasons, we

disagree.

      Generally, “[i]ssues concerning the legality of sentence are cognizable

under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Beck, 848 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa.Super.

2004) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating, “[t]his

subchapter provides for an action by which … persons serving illegal sentences

may obtain collateral relief.”).   A challenge to the legality of a sentence

“presents pure question of law. Our standard of review is de novo and our

scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Succi, 173 A.3d 269, 284

(Pa.Super. 2017) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 188 A.3d 1121 (Pa.

2018).

      Here, the record reflects that on March 2, 1998, Appellant entered a

plea of nolo contendere to three counts of what the docket sheet at CP-02-

CR-0006123-1997 designated as “voluntary deviate sexual intercourse,” 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 3124, for offenses that occurred on May 6, 1996. See Appellant’s

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brief at Exhibit C. However, as Appellant plainly acknowledges in his brief,

see id. at 19., at the time Appellant committed these offenses in May 1996,

the General Assembly had already repealed Section 3124 on March 31, 1995

and replaced it with Section 3124.1, renamed “sexual assault.” See 1995,

March 31, P.L. 985, No. 10 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 7. Moreover, Section 3124.1

was the section that was in effect at the time Appellant entered his nolo

contendere pleas in March 1998.

      As it is evident that the charges on the docket sheet appear to have

been erroneously labeled as Section 3124 instead of Section 3124.1, the

section in effect at the time, Appellant’s conviction qualifies as a Tier III sexual

offense to warrant the imposition of a second strike sentence.             See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d)(5). Accordingly, Appellant’s final claim must fail.

      For all the foregoing reasons, we discern no error on the part of the

PCRA court in dismissing Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing

and affirm its October 7, 2021 order.

      Order affirmed.

      P.J. Panella joins.

      Judge Olson concurs in the result.

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DATE: 10/6/2023

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