Court Opinion

ID: 9412328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-29 17:10:22.506527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:39.548392
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00113-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

MANUEL MARTINEZ III,                                                        Appellant,

                                           v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                           Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 93rd District Court
                         of Hidalgo County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

      Manuel Martinez III entered an open plea of guilty to the indicted offense of murder,

a first-degree felony, and after a contested punishment hearing, the trial court sentenced

Martinez to forty-five years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.32(a);

19.02(b)(2), (c). By a single issue, Martinez contends that his trial counsel committed
several errors during the sentencing hearing, and these errors, whether individually or

collectively, were so grave that Martinez was effectively denied his constitutional right to

counsel. Martinez asks that we overturn his sentence and remand the case for a new

hearing on punishment. We affirm.

                                   I.     BACKGROUND

       Martinez was indicted for intentionally or knowingly causing the stabbing death of

his uncle Reynaldo Villarreal. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from

several witnesses, including Martinez.

       Martinez testified that he considered his uncle to be his mentor, someone he

looked up to and tried to emulate. Martinez also said, however, that his uncle introduced

him to methamphetamine when Martinez was released from prison in 2012, and that he

worked under his uncle as a member of the Valluco gang. Martinez admitted that he and

his uncle were involved in narcotics distribution, and they would “do drops in Tennessee,”

delivering marihuana and methamphetamine while ingesting methamphetamine along

the way. In fact, Martinez and his uncle had returned from one of these drops just prior to

the incident. Martinez also acknowledged an incident where his uncle sent him to recover

bundles of marijuana from the Rio Grande River.

       Leading up to the incident, Martinez was going through a difficult time: he was

addicted to cocaine, methamphetamine, and alcohol; he and his wife had separated; he

had recently attempted suicide; and he had an outstanding arrest warrant for driving while

intoxicated. Martinez said that, on the night in question, he called his uncle to help him

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turn himself in.

       When his uncle arrived, Martinez was “amped up . . . on methamphetamine” and

“was seeing stuff.” Martinez explained that he had been awake for thirty days doing

methamphetamine and was “being schizo.” His uncle tried to calm him down, but Martinez

could tell that his uncle was “getting mad.” Martinez knew his uncle to be an aggressive

person, saying he had witnessed his uncle assault people in the past. Martinez said he

felt his uncle touch him, and “that’s when [he] reacted,” believing that his uncle was about

to hurt him. According to a report by the Hidalgo County Sheriff’s Office, which was

stipulated to by Martinez during his guilty plea and admitted into evidence during the

punishment hearing, Martinez stabbed his uncle in the “left chest area, right lower leg

(near the calf area), left lower leg (near the calf area), [and] right and left forearms.”

       Martinez acknowledged that he has a prior criminal history. When he was a

juvenile, he was charged with possession of firearms for having fourteen guns. As an

adult, he served a four-year sentence from 2005–2009 for burglary of a habitation and

deadly conduct, and he returned to prison in 2010 on another charge of burglary of a

habitation.

       Martinez expressed remorse about the incident and attributed his behavior to his

drug use, saying he did not mean to kill his uncle. Martinez suggested that twenty-five

years would be an appropriate punishment.

       Six of the decedent’s family members, who were also related to Martinez, testified

for the State. Several of these witnesses testified, without objection, that Martinez had a

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reputation for being combative with family members, recounting specific instances where

Martinez tried to pick fights or exhibited aggressive behavior. The State also elicited,

without objection, a sentencing recommendation from four of these witnesses. Two

witnesses believed that Martinez should receive the “maximum” sentence, and two

witnesses agreed with the State that it should be “a heavy prison sentence.”

      During closing, the State pointed out that, by his own admission, Martinez is “a

habitual offender.” The State argued that Martinez’s criminal history, combined with the

violent nature of the crime, showed that, when free, Martinez posed a threat to the

community. The State asked for a life sentence. Martinez prayed for leniency, suggesting

that his drug addiction, although not an excuse, should be considered a mitigating factor.

Again, he asked for a twenty-five-year sentence.

      The sentencing range for murder is imprisonment “for life or for any term of not

more than 99 years or less than 5 years.” See id. §§ 12.32(a); 19.02(c). The trial court

sentenced Martinez to forty-five years’ imprisonment. No motion for new trial was filed,

and this appeal ensued.

                    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

      We evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel using the two-pronged test

from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See Hernandez v. State, 726

S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (adopting Strickland). An appellant is required to

show both: (1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient”; and (2) “the deficient

performance prejudiced” appellant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “Failure to satisfy either

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prong of the Strickland test is fatal.” Morrison v. State, 575 S.W.3d 1, 24 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2019, no pet.). Accordingly, a court may bypass the first prong, and decide

the issue solely on the prejudice prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“If it is easier to

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we

expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”).

       “In order to satisfy the first prong, appellant must prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms.” Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d

137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Such a showing “must be firmly founded in the record.”

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We indulge “a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Id. “In the face of an undeveloped record, counsel should be found ineffective

only if his conduct was ‘so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged

in it.’” Johnson v. State, 624 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Goodspeed

v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). “Trial counsel should generally

be given an opportunity to explain his actions before being found ineffective.” Prine v.

State, 537 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “Thus, if the record does not contain

affirmative evidence of trial counsel’s reasoning or strategy, we presume counsel’s

performance was not deficient.” Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 586.

       Yet, even if the performance was deficient, such an error does not warrant setting

aside the judgment if there has been no prejudicial effect on the outcome. United States

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v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1981). “Some errors will have had a pervasive effect

on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture,

and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695–96.

“Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to

have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Id. The test for

prejudice requires the defendant to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. In conducting our analysis, we consider the totality of the

evidence before the factfinder. Id. at 695.

                                           III.    ANALYSIS

        Martinez contends that his trial counsel’s failure to object to testimony about

Martinez’s reputation and prior bad acts, as well as the sentencing recommendations by

the decedent’s family, was objectively deficient. The State responds that, based on the

limited record before us, Martinez has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s failure

to object was not part of a valid trial strategy. The State suggests reasons why Martinez’s

trial counsel may have viewed this evidence as advantageous for Martinez. Even if we

assume that the performance of Martinez’s trial counsel was deficient, we conclude that

Martinez has failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been

different if this testimony had been excluded.1 Id. at 697

       1 We note that Martinez spends his brief focusing on his trial counsel’s alleged errors. Other than

making a conclusory statement about the reliability of the outcome, Martinez does not provide a meaningful

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       Looking at the totality of the evidence, the trial court heard extensive testimony

from Martinez himself about his prior criminal record, his character, and his extraneous

offenses and bad acts. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1) (providing

that such evidence is “relevant to sentencing”). Martinez acknowledged that he had

served two prior prison terms for three separate felony offenses. Upon his release in 2012,

instead of reforming his behavior, Martinez admitted that he joined a gang and

participated in international and interstate drug trade. Martinez also testified about his

illicit drug use. Finally, the trial court also received evidence about the violent nature of

the crime. See id. (providing that “the circumstances of the offense” are relevant to

punishment). In light of this evidence, all of which was properly before the trial court, we

fail to see what impression, if any, the complained-of evidence made on the trial court’s

sentencing determination. See Hardaway v. State, 939 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 1997, no pet.) (admitting improper testimony about defendant’s reputation during

punishment phase was harmless error when “[c]onsidered in the light of all the evidence”);

cf. Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (finding improper jury

argument “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt [because] [n]othing in this argument can

be said to have contributed to the jury’s assessment of punishment, as the jury had before

it copious testimony concerning appellant’s prior criminal history, expert testimony as to

his future dangerousness, and the heinous facts of the crime itself”). To the contrary, as

the State points out, Martinez’s forty-five-year sentence is more in line with the sentence

analysis of the second Strickland prong. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Merely showing a deficient
performance is only half the job. See Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

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he requested than the life sentence requested by the decedent’s family. Having failed to

show that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance,

Martinez’s issue is overruled. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

                                   IV.   CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                              GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                                              Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
27th day of July, 2023.

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