Court Opinion

ID: 9681941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:01:50.537756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:36.699875
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER,
Justice, dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because there is nothing in the briefs or oral argument presented to this Court which indicates that the conviction and sentence of Barnett was improper. In my view the majority has improperly substituted its view of how the case should be practiced for that of Barnett’s trial and appellate counsel.
Barnett’s appellate counsel frames his sole argument on appeal to the effect that the application of the rape shield law in this case denied appellant his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. The majority opinion states that the issue properly expressed is whether the appellant was denied a right to present a defense and consequently, a *364fair trial, when the trial court excluded evidence of prior sexual contact between the complaining witness and her brother without conducting a hearing to determine the relevance of such evidence. The majority further states that it appears from the record that appellant’s counsel erroneously conceded that the rape shield statute excluded such evidence. In order to reach the result of reversing, the majority seeks to apply manifest injustice pursuant to RCr 10.26.
Initially, we must observe that Barnett had submitted this issue on appeal with an incomplete record of the videotaped proceedings. Eleven minutes of the proceedings where the issue was argued before the court by counsel were not recorded on the videotape. Clearly the proper procedure would have been to notify the court and request leave to include a narrative statement agreed upon by the parties. CR 75.-13.
Consequently, the court is placed in the position of accepting Barnett’s version of the issue on appeal without much choice. Such action is totally inappropriate. Cf. Young v. Newsome, Ky., 462 S.W.2d 908 (1971); CR 76.12(4)(c)(iv). K.R.S. 510.-145(3) indicates the specific statutory procedure to be followed in the event the defendant believes there is relevant evidence to offer. In the absence of an appropriate record or an agreed narrative statement, it cannot be known whether Barnett followed proper procedures or even preserved the issue he presents for review. Cf. Ford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 261 (1971). That is actually of little consequence because the majority of this Court ignores the procedural lapse and substitutes its version of the trial for that of either the appellant or the appellee.
The claimed exculpatory evidence relating to the complaining witness’ alleged admission of sexual contact with her brother was introduced by means of avowal at the close of the defendant’s evidence. Clearly the introduction of such avowal evidence again puts the court in the position of accepting the statements on behalf of Barnett without any means of testing the credibility of the testimony. The statement in question was allegedly made by the complaining witness to her mother who in turn allegedly informed the social worker. Thus the statement was little more than double hearsay without any recognized exception available.
The remaining claimed exculpatory evidence, handwritten notes between the complaining witness and her brother, was properly disallowed by the trial judge because the step-mother of the victim indicated that she did not know exactly when the notes had been written before their discovery in late 1987 or early 1988. The offense charged was alleged to have occurred between March and May of 1986. It is impossible to glean whether the ambiguous notes pertained to the act on which the prosecution was based. Therefore the trial judge correctly prohibited the notes from being introduced pursuant to the rape shield statute, K.R.S. 510.145(3).
I would affirm the conviction in all respects.
SPAIN, J., joins in this dissent.