Court Opinion

ID: 9958949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 14:11:57.598592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:08.094576
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania Liquor Control                   :
Board,                                        :
                 Petitioner                   :
                                              :
                 v.                           :      No. 147 C.D. 2023
                                              :      Submitted: February 6, 2024
Amato Berardi (Workers’                       :
Compensation Appeal Board),                   :
                 Respondent                   :

BEFORE:          HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                 HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
                 HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT                                     FILED: April 10, 2024

                 The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (Employer) petitions for
review of an adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that
granted the claim petition filed by Amato Berardi (Claimant). In doing so, the Board
affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) that Claimant’s
injuries occurred in the course and scope of his employment and, thus, were
compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).1 On appeal, Employer
argues that the Board erred because Claimant fell in a public parking lot during a
lunch break, and Claimant’s medical evidence did not establish causation.
Discerning no merit to these contentions, we affirm the Board.
                                          Background
                 Claimant worked as a clerk in a state liquor store in Warminster,
Pennsylvania. His duties included stocking shelves, unloading trucks, and cashing

1
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.1, 2501-2710.
out customers. On June 29, 2019, while on his lunch break, Claimant fell while
walking back to the store with his take-out meal.
             On August 1, 2019, Claimant filed a claim petition under the Act
alleging that he sustained injuries to his “[r]ight [k]nee” while “walking from his
vehicle in[]to the store.” Reproduced Record at 5a (R.R. __). Employer denied all
allegations, asserting that the “incident happened in a parking lot which was not
owned, operated or controlled by [Employer].” R.R. 8a. Hearings were held before
the WCJ.
             Claimant testified that he began working for Employer on October 4,
2018. He explained that he has arthritis in his right knee, for which he has received
yearly cortisone shots since 2014 to treat the pain. He further explained that he used
the parking lot that serves the shopping center where the liquor store is located. The
only entrance to the store is through the front doors adjacent to the parking lot. On
the day in question, Claimant drove to a pizza shop to pick up lunch. He returned to
work and, while walking to the front door of the liquor store, tripped on a concrete
barrier and fell, hitting his right knee and elbow. Claimant did not immediately seek
medical attention, figuring he “would just see how it goes.” Claimant Dep. at 13;
R.R. 24a. However, he left early to ice his knee at home because of the swelling.
             Claimant testified that, on or about July 5, 2019, he informed Employer
that he needed medical attention for his right knee. Employer sent him to the
Rothman Institute, where he was seen by Christopher Aland, M.D., on July 11, 2019,
who placed him on modified duty while waiting for the results of a magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) test. Claimant continued working until July 20, 2019,
when he left work because of knee pain. Because Employer issued a Notice of

                                          2
Compensation Denial, Claimant was not able to return to the Rothman Institute or
get the MRI.
               On or about August 7, 2019, Claimant was seen by Ronald Lieberman,
M.D., who ordered an MRI, took Claimant out of work, and referred Claimant to
Scott Katzman, M.D. Dr. Katzman diagnosed Claimant with a torn medial meniscus
that required surgery, which took place on October 10, 2019. On October 25, 2019,
Dr. Katzman released Claimant to return to work, part-time, to modified duties.
Claimant is not permitted to do extensive standing, bending, or climbing, and cannot
lift more than 10 pounds. However, effective August 25, 2020, Employer eliminated
the modified-duty position. Claimant remains under work restrictions from Dr.
Katzman, whom he last saw in February 2020.
               On cross-examination, Claimant acknowledged that he was not directed
by Employer to park his vehicle in any particular place. It was his choice. He also
acknowledged that he fell while still on his lunch break.
               Dr. Katzman is an orthopedic surgeon and Claimant’s treating
physician. He testified that on September 20, 2019, Claimant presented with “right
knee pain, swelling, catching and clicking,” as a result of his fall. Katzman Dep. at
12; R.R. 118a. Dr. Katzman understood that Claimant had previously treated for his
arthritis.   Based on the MRI, Dr. Katzman diagnosed a “meniscal tear” and
“moderate degenerative changes to his patella and tibial joint space medially with a
small effusion,” for which he did surgery on October 10, 2019. Katzman Dep. at 13;
R.R. 119a. In December 2019, Claimant returned, at which visit Dr. Katzman
diagnosed Claimant with chondral damage, which had been observed in the surgery.
Dr. Katzman testified that Claimant has not fully recovered from his work injury and
cannot return to work full-time.

                                          3
             On cross-examination, Dr. Katzman acknowledged that Claimant had
received injections for right knee problems and observed that the injections appeared
to have been effective. Dr. Katzman also acknowledged that the MRI report
suggested degeneration that preexisted the June 29, 2019, fall. However, the MRI
also showed edema, which supported “an acute finding consistent with acute
trauma.” Katzman Dep. at 30; R.R. 136a. Dr. Katzman further noted that the
degeneration described in the radiology report did not mention osteophytes, which
are expected when degeneration develops over time.
             Eugene Elia, M.D., who is board certified in orthopedic surgery,
testified on behalf of Employer. On December 18, 2019, he did an independent
medical examination of Claimant and reviewed his medical records, which
confirmed a torn meniscus. They also showed arthritis and psoriasis. Claimant
stated that he was able to do the modified position as a cashier. Dr. Elia observed
that Claimant did not limp, and he was able to ascend and descend the examination
table without difficulty. With respect to Claimant’s right knee, Dr. Elia observed
some “synovitis which is mild swelling with no effusion, which is commonly known
as water on the knee.” Elia Dep. at 17; R.R. 189a. There was evidence of psoriasis
on both of his knees and mild tenderness along the medial joint line. Dr. Elia testified
that Claimant’s exam was almost normal.
             Dr. Elia opined that Claimant suffered a right knee contusion, sprain,
and torn meniscus as a result of the fall on June 29, 2019. Dr. Elia testified that
Claimant’s improvement after surgery “shows me that the arthritis that he had
experienced was not aggravated or accelerated by [the work injury] and any
complaints that he continued to have would be his baseline complaints.” Elia Dep.
at 27; R.R. 199a. Dr. Elia opined that, as of December 18, 2019, Claimant had fully

                                           4
recovered from the June 29, 2019, work injury and was able to resume his previous
position without restrictions.
                        WCJ Decision and Board Adjudication
              The WCJ found the testimony of Claimant credible. The WCJ found
the testimony of Drs. Katzman and Elia credible to the extent their opinions were
consistent, but where they differed, the WCJ found Dr. Katzman more credible and
persuasive than Dr. Elia. Because Dr. Katzman was Claimant’s treating provider and
did the knee surgery, he had the opportunity to observe the inside of Claimant’s knee.
Dr. Katzman examined Claimant both before and after surgery, whereas Dr. Elia only
examined Claimant after surgery.
              The WCJ found that Claimant sustained a meniscal tear and
chondromalacia of the condyle of the right knee that was either caused or aggravated
by the fall. The WCJ found that Claimant’s injury occurred in the course and scope
of his employment. Although he was on his lunch break, Claimant was walking in
an area integral to Employer’s store when he fell and injured himself. Thus,
Claimant proved that his injury occurred in the course of his employment.
              Employer appealed to the Board, arguing generally that the WCJ erred
in granting Claimant’s claim petition. The Board remanded the matter to the WCJ
for a decision on Claimant’s contingency fee agreement.2 On the merits of the WCJ’s
decision, the Board affirmed.
                                           Appeal

2
  The remanded portion involved the approval of the contingency fee agreement. The Board
remanded this matter for the WCJ to make specific findings regarding the terms and intent of the
contingency fee agreement to be approved. The WCJ awarded attorney’s fees to Claimant’s
counsel of 20% of the total amount of the repriced medical bills paid. See Employer Brief at 21
n.3. On January 18, 2023, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision. It is this final order which
Claimant appealed.
                                               5
               On appeal,3 Employer raises one issue. It argues that the Board erred
in affirming the WCJ’s decision granting Claimant’s claim petition.4
                                             Analysis
               To be eligible for compensation, an injured employee must establish
that his injury occurred in the course of employment. Section 301(c)(1) of the Act
states, in pertinent part, as follows:
               The terms “injury” and “personal injury,” as used in this act, shall
               be construed to mean an injury to an employe, regardless of his
               previous physical condition, except as provided under subsection
               (f), arising in the course of his employment and related thereto
               . . . . The term “injury arising in the course of his employment,”
               as used in this article . . . shall include all [ ] injuries sustained
               while the employe is actually engaged in the furtherance of the
               business or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer’s
               premises or elsewhere, and shall include all injuries caused by
               the condition of the premises or by the operation of the
               employer’s business or affairs thereon, sustained by the employe,
               who, though not so engaged, is injured upon the premises
               occupied by or under the control of the employer, or upon which
               the employer’s business or affairs are being carried on, the
               employe’s presence thereon being required by the nature of his
               employment.

77 P.S. §411(1) (emphasis added).

3
  The Court’s standard of review is to determine whether necessary findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence, whether an error of law has been committed, or whether constitutional
rights have been violated. Piedmont Airlines, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(Watson), 194 A.3d 737, 740 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
4
  Employer’s statement of the questions presented does not conform to Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 2116(a), PA. R.A.P. 2116(a). It reduces all its issues to one: Did the Board
err? In its brief, however, Employer essentially raises three issues. First, Claimant was not in the
course of his employment when he was injured on June 29, 2019. Second, Claimant did not
establish a causal connection between his fall and his disability. Third, Claimant’s disability ended
on December 27, 2019, following a normal physical examination. Accordingly, we will address
these issues seriately.
                                                 6
             Section 301(c)(1) has been construed to mean that an injury arises in
the course of employment in two distinct situations. First, an injury is compensable
if it occurs while the claimant is furthering the business or affairs of his employer,
without regard to where the injury occurs. Second, the claimant may be entitled to
compensation if the injury occurs on the employer’s premises.            Specifically,
compensation may be awarded if the employee
             (a) is on the premises occupied or under the control of the
             employer, or upon which the employer’s business or affairs are
             being carried on; (b) is required by the nature of his employment
             to be present on his employer’s premises; and (c) sustains injuries
             caused by the condition of the premises or by operation of the
             employer’s business or affairs thereon.

Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Slaugenhaupt) v. United States Steel
Corporation, 376 A.2d 271, 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977). Whether an employee is
injured in the course of employment is a question of law to be determined on the
basis of the WCJ’s findings of fact. Markle v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal
Board (Bucknell University), 785 A.2d 151, 153 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001).
             With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of Employer’s
appeal.
                             I. Course of Employment
             In its first issue, Employer argues that Claimant was not in the course
of his employment when he tripped and fell because Employer does not own,
maintain, or control the parking lot. Even if the parking lot were considered an
“integral part” of Employer’s premises, Claimant was walking back to the store to
eat his lunch, not to resume his job duties. A claimant who is off duty and sustains
an injury on the employer’s premises is not acting in furtherance of the employer’s

                                          7
business. Employer Brief at 26 (citing Camiolo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal
Board (American Bank Notes), 722 A.2d 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)).
             Employer further argues that Claimant’s presence in the parking lot was
not required by the nature of his employment. It directs the Court to Giebel v.
Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Sears), 399 A.2d 152 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979),
where benefits were denied to a claimant injured while shopping in a retail store
adjoining her place of employment. We reasoned that the claimant was not in a
place where her presence was required when injured. Employer argues that as in
Giebel, Claimant was not in a place where his presence was required by work but,
rather, “enjoying” his lunch break. Employer Brief at 29. Additionally, Employer
contends that ICT Group v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Churchray-
Woytunick), 995 A.2d 927 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), is distinguishable. In that case, the
claimant slipped on ice in the parking lot while leaving for lunch. By contrast, here,
Claimant was already on his lunch break when he fell, and Employer did not require
Claimant to eat his lunch in the storeroom.
             In any case, Employer argues that Claimant’s injury was not caused by
the condition of the premises or by the operation of Employer’s business or affairs
thereon. See Slaugenhaupt, 376 A.2d at 273. Claimant testified that his left foot hit
a concrete barrier, but Claimant did not establish that the concrete barrier was in an
incorrect place, or installed higher or lower than it should have been.
             Claimant responds that Employer’s “premises” includes parking lots,
public streets, and common areas if they are integral to Employer’s workspace or
constitute a reasonable means of ingress or egress from the workplace. Claimant
Brief at 16 (citing US Airways, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board

                                          8
(Bockelman), 221 A.3d 171 (Pa. 2019)). The parking lot was where Claimant and
other employees parked and was the only way to enter and exit Employer’s store.
             We have explained that an employer’s premises under Section
301(c)(1) of the Act, 77 P.S. §411(1), is not limited to the property that the employer
owns or controls. “‘Parking lots, public streets, and common areas in multi-unit
office buildings, for instance, may be considered part of the employer’s premises if
they are integral to the employer’s workplace or constitute a reasonable means of
ingress to or egress from the workplace.’” Stewart v. Workers’ Compensation
Appeal Board (Bravo Group Services, Inc.), 258 A.3d 584, 589-90 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021) (quoting US Airways, 221 A.3d at 176).
             Here, Claimant’s fall occurred in the parking lot that serves the
shopping center where Employer is located, and it provides the only entrance to the
store. Because the parking lot constituted a reasonable means of ingress to the work
site, Claimant’s injuries were incurred on Employer’s premises.
             As to whether the nature of Claimant’s employment required him to be
on Employer’s premises where he was injured, we have explained:
             Once an employee is on the employer’s premises, “actually
             getting to or leaving the employee’s workstation is a necessary
             part of employment, which is definitively furthering the
             employer’s interests.” Allegheny Ludlum Corp. [v. Workers’
             Compensation Appeal Board (Hines)], 913 A.2d [345,] 349 [(Pa.
             Cmwlth. 2006)]. Moreover, any injury sustained by an employee
             up until the time she leaves the employer’s premises is
             compensable, provided it is reasonably proximate to her work
             hours. Epler v. N[orth] Am[erican] Rockwell Corp., 393 A.2d
             1163, 1165 (Pa. 1978).

                                          9
Lombardi v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (UPMC Health Plan, Inc.) (Pa.
Cmwlth., No. 208 C.D. 2020, filed October 27, 2021) (unreported),5 slip op. at 6.
“Reasonable proximity” covers leaving for lunch. Accordingly, the claimant who
fell on ice while leaving for her lunch break was on her employer’s premises when
injured. ICT Group, 995 A.2d 927. We concluded that “her presence on [the
e]mployer’s premises remained so connected to the employment relationship that it
was required by the nature of her employment.” Id. at 932.
               Here, similar to ICT Group, Claimant parked in a parking lot that
provided a customary means of ingress and egress to Employer’s premises.
Although Claimant was still on his lunch break, he was returning to Employer’s
premises, not just to eat lunch but to resume his work duties. His presence in the
parking lot “was required by the nature of his employment.”6 ICT Group, 995 A.2d
at 932.
               Finally, Employer argues that Claimant did not establish that the
injuries he sustained were caused by the condition of the premises. A claimant is
not required to demonstrate that his injuries were the result of a defect in the
premises, or negligent operation of the business. Thomas Jefferson University
Hospital v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Cattalo), 601 A.2d 476, 479
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). It is enough that Claimant fell in the parking lot while walking
to Employer’s store; this satisfies the requirement that his injuries were caused by
the condition of the premises.

5
  An unreported panel decision of this Court, “issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited “for its
persuasive value[.]” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures,
210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).
6
  Employer’s reliance on Giebel, 399 A.2d 152, is misplaced. Its analysis cannot be reconciled
with later developments in this area of the law.
                                                10
             In sum, the WCJ did not err in finding that Claimant was injured in the
course of his employment.
                               II. Causal Connection
             Employer next argues that Claimant did not establish a causal
connection between his fall and his disability. It contends that Dr. Katzman’s
opinion was incompetent because he lacked knowledge of Claimant’s prior physical
condition and did not review his medical records before 2019. Dr. Katzman’s
opinion was also equivocal because he opined that Claimant’s chondromalacia was
either caused or aggravated by the fall, which is medically impossible.
             Claimant responds that the WCJ credited his testimony and Dr.
Katzman’s unequivocal, medical testimony that he sustained a work-related injury;
has not fully recovered; and cannot return to work. This constitutes substantial,
competent evidence to support the WCJ’s findings. The critical inquiry is whether
there is evidence to support the findings made by the WCJ, not whether the record
contains evidence to support facts other than those found by the WCJ.
             Although the WCJ has exclusive province over questions of credibility
and evidentiary weight, “the question of the competency of evidence is one of law
and fully subject to our review.” Namani v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(A. Duie Pyle), 32 A.3d 850, 854 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (quotation omitted).
“Competency, when applied to medical evidence, is merely a question of whether a
witness’s opinion is sufficiently definite and unequivocal to render it admissible.”
Pryor v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Colin Service Systems), 923 A.2d
1197, 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). “Medical evidence is unequivocal as long as the
medical expert, after providing a foundation, testifies that in his professional opinion
he believes or thinks the facts exist.” Merrell v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal

                                          11
Board (Department of Corrections), 158 A.3d 242, 250 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting
Cerro Metal Products Company v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(PLEWA), 855 A.2d 932, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)). The “fact that a medical expert
does not have all of a claimant’s medical records goes to the weight given the
expert’s testimony, not its competency.” Pryor, 923 A.2d at 1203 (quoting Marriott
Corporation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Knechtel), 837 A.2d 623, 631
n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)).
             Here, Employer contends that Dr. Katzman’s testimony was not
competent because he was not fully aware of Claimant’s complete medical history.
Additionally, because Dr. Katzman opined that Claimant’s work activities either
“caused or aggravated” his right knee chondromalacia, his opinion was equivocal.
             While Dr. Katzman did not review all of Claimant’s records, when
“viewed as a whole,” his opinion was not “solely based on inaccurate information.”
Pryor, 923 A.2d at 1203. Dr. Katzman was aware that Claimant was experiencing
similar problems with his right knee before June 29, 2019, for which he had been
treated. Dr. Katzman noted that the injections allowed Claimant to do “a rather
heavy job that requires a lot of lifting” before his fall. Katzman Dep. at 24; R.R.
130a.
             Dr. Katzman testified that “[t]he fall was a contributing factor to the
symptoms that resulted with respect to the chondromalacia[.]” WCJ Decision at 6,
Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 3(n). Further, the MRI “showed edema[,]” “an acute
finding consistent with acute trauma[.]” Katzman Dep. at 30; R.R. 136a. On cross-
examination, Dr. Katzman did not waiver in his opinion that the work injury caused
or aggravated Claimant’s chondromalacia.       Dr. Katzman’s testimony was not
equivocal.

                                        12
             Additionally, “an expert’s opinion will not be deemed incompetent
simply because an expert testifies that a claimant’s work duties either caused an
injury or aggravated a preexisting injury.”            Executive Offices v. Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board (Rothwell) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 546 C.D. 2020, filed
April 21, 2021) (unreported), slip op. at 15. Thus, Dr. Katzman’s opinion that
Claimant’s right knee chondromalacia of the femoral and tibial condyle was “in part
due to the fall and in part possibly preexisting, but aggravated by the fall” is not
equivocal. Katzman Dep. at 19; R.R. 125a. Either way, Claimant sustained a work
injury.
                              III. Continuing Disability
             Finally, Employer argues that the WCJ erred by finding that Claimant
continues to be disabled by his work injury beyond December 27, 2019, when Dr.
Katzman last treated Claimant. Although he found some tenderness, Dr. Katzman’s
physical examination of Claimant’s right knee on that date was otherwise normal.
Employer Brief at 35 (citing R.R. 124a, 142a).             Because a normal physical
examination does not support ongoing disability, Employer contends that the WCJ
erred by finding that Claimant’s disability continued after December 27, 2019.7
             A claimant has the burden of proving a continuing disability throughout
the pendency of the claim petition. American Contracting Enterprises, Inc. v.
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hurley), 789 A.2d 391, 397 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2001). The WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant satisfied his burden of proving an
ongoing disability is supported by several facts. First, although Claimant’s meniscal
tear was repaired, Dr. Katzman testified that Claimant was not fully recovered or
able to work full duty for Employer. Katzman Dep. at 22; R.R. 128a. When Dr.

7
  Claimant does not specifically respond to Employer’s argument that Claimant was no longer
disabled as of December 27, 2019.
                                            13
Katzman saw Claimant on December 27, 2019, he “still had some tenderness to his
knee[.]” Katzman Dep. at 18; R.R. 124a. Second, Claimant testified that he still has
pain and swelling in his knee and difficulty bending and going up stairs. WCJ
Decision at 5, F.F. No. 2(l). The WCJ is free to determine the chronological length
of a claimant’s disability, based not only upon the testimony of the claimant’s expert,
but also upon the testimony of the claimant as well.          American Contracting
Enterprises, Inc., 789 A.2d at 398. The credited testimony of Dr. Katzman and
Claimant constitutes substantial evidence supporting the WCJ’s finding of ongoing
disability.
                                     Conclusion
              Claimant’s injury, from which he is not fully recovered, occurred in the
course and scope of his employment, and Claimant established a causal connection
between his fall and his disability.     Accordingly, the Board’s adjudication is
affirmed.

                            MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

Judge Fizzano Cannon and Judge Dumas did not participate in the decision in this
case.

                                          14
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania Liquor Control       :
Board,                            :
                 Petitioner       :
                                  :
           v.                     :     No. 147 C.D. 2023
                                  :
Amato Berardi (Workers’           :
Compensation Appeal Board),       :
                 Respondent       :

                                ORDER

           AND NOW, this 10th day of April, 2024, the adjudication of the
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, dated January 18, 2023, is AFFIRMED.

                         MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita