Court Opinion

ID: 9714763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:45:04.658985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:28.381271
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: Because I believe the majority opinion incorrectly analyzed whether the trial court should have appointed new counsel to argue defendant’s pro se, post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion, in concluding that new counsel should not have been appointed to argue defendant’s pro se, post-trial motion distinguished this court’s decision in People v. Krankel (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 181. Specifically, the majority opinion focused on the type of counsel defendant had at trial (a private attorney), and whether defense counsel requested that new counsel argue defendant’s pro se, post trial motion. In Krankel, this court found that the failure to appoint new counsel to argue the defendant’s pro se, post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel was error and remanded the cause for a new hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue. The defendant’s trial counsel had failed to present an alibi defense, or to contact an alibi witness suggested by the defendant. Both the State and defendant agreed that new counsel should have been appointed to argue the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Subsequently, our appellate court, in interpreting Krankel, held that there is no per se rule mandating that new counsel should be appointed whenever a defendant presents a pro se, post-trial motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (See People v. Bell (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 613; People v. Washington (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 703; People v. Generally (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 668; People v. Jackson (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 128.) Rather, to determine whether new counsel should be appointed, “the trial court should examine the factual matters underlying the defendant’s claim[.] *** [I]f the claim lacks merit or pertains to matters of trial strategy, then no new counsel need be appointed[, but] if the allegations show possible neglect of the case *** new counsel [should] be appointed.” Washington, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 711. Recently, in People v. Nitz (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 82, this court adopted our appellate court’s interpretation of Krankel, and set forth the parameters for when new counsel should be appointed to argue a defendant’s pro se, post-trial motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In Nitz, this court stated: “If the trial court conducts a preliminary investigation of the defendant’s allegations and determines them to be spurious or pertaining only to trial tactics, no new counsel should be appointed to represent the defendant. If, however, defendant’s allegations of incompetence indicate that trial counsel neglected the defendant’s case, the court should appoint new counsel to argue defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 134-35. Presently, the majority distinguished Krankel by stating that the defendant in Krankel was represented by an appointed public defender (144 Ill. 2d at 15), whereas the defendant in this case was represented by a private attorney. Thus, according to the majority opinion, the trial court did not have the authority to “advise or exercise any influence or control over the selection of counsel by defendant, who was able to, and did, choose counsel on his own accord.” 144 Ill. 2d at 15. This is irrelevant. As noted in Nitz, if the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel show possible neglect of the case, then new counsel should be appointed to argue the defendant’s allegations. Otherwise, there would be a conflict of interest to have defense counsel argue his own incompetence at the hearing. It is as equally inappropriate for private counsel to argue his incompetence at a post-trial hearing as it is for an appointed public defender. Further, the majority states that defendant’s trial counsel never requested that new counsel be appointed to argue defendant’s pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, as defense counsel did in Krankel. However, the majority acknowledges that defendant did request to be co-counsel with respect to his post-trial motion, but the trial court told defendant that he could either proceed pro se or through his attorney. Again, it is irrelevant that defendant’s trial counsel failed to request that new counsel be appointed to argue the trial counsel’s own incompetence. Because the majority opinion incorrectly distinguished Krankel and incorrectly analyzed whether new counsel should be appointed to argue defendant’s pro se, post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, I respectfully dissent.