Court Opinion

ID: 9552256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:07:25.318294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:58.695505
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Judge
(specially concurring).
I concur in the results of this opinion for the reason that the narcotics found in the car were part of the armed robbery offense. The alleged “possession” is an integral part of the armed robbery. I am not offended by that part of the decision in Neal v. State, 55 Cal.2d 11, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839 (1960), wherein the California Supreme Court construed the California statute as prohibiting the charge of arson after the attempted murder conviction. The arson was the means — or the weapon —by which the murder was attempted, the same as if the murder had been attempted by shooting the victim with a pistol.
However, I do not construe 21 O.S. Supp.1970 § 11 to allude to a “course of conduct”. That section speaks in the singular; and, I believe where more than one independent act — punishable under separate statutes — is committed, those independent acts are not necessarily covered by the statute under consideration.
This case is also distinguishable from Ryan v. State, Okl.Cr., 473 P.2d 322 (1970), in that in the instant case, arrest occurred at the conclusion of the pursuit; and, the narcotics found in the car were clearly the fruits of the armed robbery; however, in the Ryan case, supra, the narcotics were found in defendant’s apartment several hours after the robbery was committed. Another recent case distinguishable from the instant one is Tucker v. State, Okl.Cr., 481 P.2d 167 (1971); wherein he was convicted for kidnapping. Tucker committed armed robbery of a drug store,1 after which he also committed the separate and independent act act of kidnapping. The kidnapping was committed at the completion of the armed robbery, when Tucker ordered the pharmacist to accompany him in his flight from the scene of the robbery. Both convictions were affirmed by this Court as being separate and independent crimes. This view is consistent with the California view expressed in the matter styled, In Re Chapman, 43 Cal.2d 385, 273 P.2d 817; which was cited in Neal v. State, supra, at page 612 in 9 Cal.Rptr., at page 844 in 357 P.2d. In Chapman, supra, the defendant committed armed robbery and assault. The Neal decision stated with reference to Chapman:
“[W]e held that when the assault is not a means of perpetrating the robbery but is an act that follows after the robbery is completed the defendant is guilty of two punishable acts.”
I accept that construction, but I do not construe the Oklahoma Statute to include any reference to a “course of conduct”, as the California Court seems to construe its statute. I believe the intent of the statute is: If two criminal acts are committed— which are separate and independent acts— punishment for the second act is not proscribed by 21 O.S.Supp.1970 § 11; however, each separate act can be charged under only one statute, whether there is a conviction or acquittal, even though it may violate several statutes. To add to the *167statute the “course of conduct” places a premium on the commission of numerous crimes, i. e., “many crimes at the price of one”. Finally, each case will stand or fall on its own merits; therefore, I concur in the results of this decision, for the reason stated.

. Armed Robbery Affirmed; See 473 P.2d 332 (1970).