Court Opinion

ID: 3621219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-06 00:02:56.976701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:07:36.189170
License: Public Domain

[EDITORS' NOTE:  THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 480 
The General Term granted a new trial, upon the ground that the judge, at the circuit, should have submitted to the jury the question, whether the rail was broken before it was reached by the train going west carrying the plaintiff; and it held, if it was thus broken, that the defendant was liable, irrespective of any question of negligence, within the principle of the case ofAlden v. The N.Y.C.R.R. Co. (26 N.Y., 102), upon the ground that it was bound to furnish a road adapted to the safe passage of trains, or in other words "a vehicle-worthy road."
I am obliged to differ with the General Term, for two reasons; 1st. If the rail was broken before it was reached by the train going west, it must have been broken by the train going east shortly before, and there is no evidence whatever that it was broken by that train. All the evidence tends to show that it was broken by the train going west. Such is the evidence of the conductors and engineers of both trains. There is no presumption that the rail was broken before this train reached it. It is unquestioned that the accident was *Page 481 
caused by the broken rail, and if the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was liable, because the rail was broken before the train upon which he was riding reached it, it was incumbent upon him to prove it. This he failed to do; and if the jury upon the evidence had found it, it would have been the duty of the court to set the verdict aside as against the evidence.
But there is another reason. It does not appear that plaintiff's counsel, upon the trial, claimed that he had shown any negligence against the defendant, and he did not claim to go to the jury upon any such question, and the General Term did not grant a new trial upon the ground that there was any question of negligence in the case, which ought to have been submitted to the jury, but upon the ground above stated.
In the case of Alden v. The New York Central RailroadCompany, the accident, by which the plaintiff was injured, was caused by the breaking of an axle of the car in which the plaintiff was riding, and it was held that a common carrier is bound absolutely, and irrespective of negligence, to provide road-worthy vehicles, and that the defendant was liable for the plaintiff's injuries caused by a crack in the axle, although the defect could not have been discovered by any practicable mode of examination. That case was a departure from every prior decision and authority to be found in the books of this country or England, and, so far as I can learn, has never been followed anywhere out of this State. It was in conflict with the previous case, in the same court, of Hegeman v. The Western RailroadCorporation (3 Kern., 9). The only authority cited to sustain the decision was the English case of Sharp v. Grey (9 Bing., 457), and yet the decision has been distinctly repudiated in England, in the well considered case of Readhead v. MidlandRailway Co., first decided in the Queen's Bench (Law Reports, 2 Q.B., 412), and then on appeal in the Exchequer Chamber (Law Reports, 4 Q.B., 379), where it was unanimously affirmed in 1869; and the court held that the contract, made by a common carrier of passengers for hire, with a passenger, is to take due care *Page 482 
(including in that term the use of skill and foresight) to carry the passenger safely, and that it does not contain or imply a warranty that the carriage in which he travels shall be in all respects perfect for its purpose and road-worthy. In the Exchequer Chamber, Mr. Justice SMITH, writing the opinion of the court, alludes to the case of Alden v. The New York CentralRailroad Company, and dissents from it, and comments upon the case of Sharp v. Grey, relied upon in that case, and he shows clearly that it was no authority for the broad doctrine laid down in that case. He says: "We have referred somewhat fully to this case (Sharp v. Grey), because it was put forward as the strongest authority in support of the plaintiff's claim, which can be found in the English courts, and because it was relied on by the judges of the Court of Appeals, in New York, in a decision which will be afterward referred to. But the case, when examined, furnishes no sufficient authority for the unlimited warranty now contended for. The facts do not raise the point for decision." Hence the case of Alden v. The New York Central RailroadCompany has no foundation of authority whatever to rest on, and the only reason given for the decision is that the new rule adopted would be plainer and easier of application than the one that had been recognized and acted upon for hundreds of years. It was always supposed that there was a difference, founded upon substantial reasons, between the liability of the common carrier of goods and the common carrier of passengers. The former was held to warrant the safe carriage of the goods, except against loss or damage from the act of God or the public enemy; but the latter was held to contract only for due and proper care in the carriage of passengers.
I have thus commented upon and alluded to the case of Alden
v. The New York Central Railroad Company, with no design to repudiate it as authority, but for the purpose of claiming that it is a decision which should not be extended. I am unwilling to apply it to every case that apparently comes within its principle; nor would I limit it to the car in which the passenger was riding. The whole train must be regarded *Page 483 
as the vehicle; and the engine and all the cars attached together must be free from defect and roadworthy, irrespective of negligence. So far, and no farther, am I willing to regard that case as authority. Shall it be applied to steamboats and vessels, common carriers of passengers upon the ocean and our inland waters? Shall it apply to innkeepers, proprietors of theaters and other places of public resort, who invite the public into their buildings, for a compensation? And shall all such persons be held to an implied warranty that their buildings, with the appurtenances, are suitable and proper, and free from all defects which no foresight could guard against or skill detect? Shall it be applied to the roadbed of a railroad? If so applied, where shall it stop? It must also extend to the bridges, masonry, signals, and, in fact, to all the different parts of the system employed and used in the transport of passengers by railroad. And, as railroad companies are responsible for the skill and care of all their human agents, such an extension of that decision would make them substantial insurers of the safety of all their passengers, and thus practically abolish the distinction between the liability of the carriers of passengers and the carriers of goods. While such a rule would "be plain and easy of application," I am not satisfied that it would be either wise or just. Railroads are great public improvements, beneficial to the owners, and highly useful to the public. There is a certain amount of risk incident to railroad travel, which the traveler knowingly assumes; and public policy is fully satisfied, when railroad companies are held to the most rigid responsibility for the utmost care and vigilance for the safety of travelers.
If, therefore, the jury had found that the rail was broken by the eastward bound train, it would still have been a case of mere accident, caused without any want of proper care and vigilance on the part of the defendant, and the defendant would not have been liable.
I am, therefore, in favor of reversing the order of the General Term, and ordering judgment upon the nonsuit for the defendant, with costs. *Page 484