Court Opinion

ID: 9785871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:44:41.992733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:10.399836
License: Public Domain

*1089WERDEGAR, J., Dissenting.
One of the hallmarks of the liberty guaranteed to persons in this country is that agents of the government cannot arrest, seize or detain them without a good reason. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend. [“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13 [same].) As this constitutional guarantee has been interpreted, a full-fledged arrest must be supported by a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate or by probable cause to believe the person arrested has committed a crime. (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 386-387 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 850, 949 P.2d 947].) Short of outright arrest, police may temporarily detain a person on a lesser showing of cause, but the detention— essentially a temporary seizure of the person—must be supported by reasonable cause to believe the person is guilty of some wrongdoing. (Ibid.) These rules apply to traffic stops: “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].” (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809-810 [135 L.Ed.2d 89, 116 S.Ct. 1769].) “[P]ersons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers.” (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 663 [59 L.Ed.2d 660, 99 S.Ct. 1391].) When police stop a car traveling on the highway due to an alleged traffic violation—that is, when police activate their lights and siren and force the driver of the car to stop—police effect a detention that must be supported by reasonable cause.
We address in this case the effect of an anonymous tip, received by police, that a certain type of vehicle, driving in a certain direction, was driving illegally. The majority today concludes a tip of this nature provides reasonable cause to detain the driver of such a vehicle, even though police fail to confirm any alleged illegality. Because this conclusion is contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s admonition in Florida v. J. L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266 [146 L.Ed.2d 254, 120 S.Ct. 1375], that confirmation of the innocent details of an anonymous tip is insufficient to provide police with reasonable cause to detain, I dissent.
I
Officer Irigoyen, a traffic officer for the California Highway Patrol, testified he received a broadcast of “a possible DUI driver, weaving all over the roadway.” (As most people by now know, “DUI” stands for driving under the influence.) The broadcast described the vehicle as a 1980’s-era blue van driving northbound on State Route 99 at Airport Drive, near Bakersfield. No information was broadcast, and no evidence was presented at either the *1090preliminary hearing or the suppression hearing, indicating from where or whom this information came. Being three or four miles from the van’s last reported location, Officer Mgoyen waited for the van. About three minutes later, a 1980’s blue van went by. The van was not weaving and was traveling within the speed limit and otherwise obeying all traffic laws. Officer Irigoyen effected a traffic stop and determined the driver, defendant Susan Wells, was under the influence of drugs.
II
As the majority recognizes, Florida v. J. L., supra, 529 U.S. 266 (J. L.), posed a similar situation. In that case, police received an anonymous tip that “a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.” (Id. at p. 268.) The identity of the tipster was unknown: “So far as the record reveals, there is no audio recording of the tip, and nothing is known about the informant.” (Ibid.) Police went to the bus stop, recognized the person from the description, but observed no illegality. “The officers [in J. L.] did not see a firearm, and [the defendant] made no threatening or otherwise unusual movements.” (Ibid.) Thus, in both the instant case and in J. L., police responded to an anonymous tip of a crime, confirmed the innocent aspects of the tip, but did not confirm the tip’s report of illegal activity.
The J. L. court unanimously reversed the defendant’s conviction. At the threshold, the high court distinguished anonymous tips from those of known informants. “Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated [citation], ‘an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.’ ” (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 270, quoting Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 329 [110 L.Ed.2d 301, 110 S.Ct. 2412].)
Next, the court dismissed the state’s argument that confirmation of the innocent aspects of an anonymous tip supplied the necessary reasonable cause. “An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.’'’ (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 272, italics added.)
Applying the rule of J. L. to the facts of this case (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 232, 3 P.3d 878] [federal *1091constitutional law governs state exclusionary rule for search and seizure violations]) would entitle defendant to relief. Officer Irigoyen stopped defendant’s car after confirming the innocent details of an anonymous tip (a 1980’s-era blue van, driving northbound on State Route 99), but did not confirm the tip’s report of any illegality (“weaving all over the roadway”). Officer Irigoyen testified the van was not weaving, was complying with the speed limit and was otherwise following all traffic laws. According to J. L., then, the officer did not have reasonable cause to stop defendant.
In finding J. L. inapplicable, the majority unpersuasively attempts to fit this case into a possible exception mentioned by the J. L. court. As a possible exception to its rule, the high court observed that a threat to public safety might be “so great” that an anonymous tip of such a catastrophic threat would supply reasonable cause to detain even in the absence of any confirmation of the illegality. (J. L, supra, 529 U.S. at pp. 273-274.) The high court suggested “a report of a person carrying a bomb” might qualify for this exception. (Ibid.) The majority opines that an anonymous tip of a drunk driver similarly qualifies as a threat to public safety so catastrophic that compliance with J. L.’s rule requiring confirmation of the illegality is excused. Thus, the majority asserts that “a report of a possibly intoxicated highway driver, ‘weaving all over the roadway,’ poses a far more grave and immediate risk to the public than a report of mere passive gun possession [as in J. L .].” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1087.)
The majority misreads J. L. That the high court in J. L. left open the possibility that a catastrophic threat might justify a somewhat relaxed standard of reasonable cause to detain does not suggest we are now to rank all crimes along a sliding scale, permitting investigatory detentions on lesser showings when the detainees are suspected of more serious crimes. Certainly merely by mentioning the possibility of a threat “so great” that some lesser degree of suspicion could justify a detention, the high court did not suggest such a regime. Moreover, while I do not dispute the seriousness of drunk drivers on our roadways (see In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 260-261 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645, 95 P.3d 906] [“No citation to authority is necessary to establish that automobile accidents by underage drinkers lead to the injuries and deaths of thousands of people in this country every year”]), I am not convinced this fairly common crime poses the type of threat contemplated by the high court, the type of threat “so great” that an exception to the general rule is warranted. In particular, I am not convinced the danger posed by drunk drivers is so much greater than the danger posed by young men carrying concealed firearms (as in J. L.) that a different standard should apply under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the fact Officer Irigoyen failed to verify that the blue van was weaving, and his testimony that no other cars were on the road at that time of night (1:43 a.m.), diminish significantly the potential danger posed by this alleged drunk driver.
*1092The majority relies heavily on U.S. v. Wheat (8th Cir. 2001) 278 F.3d 722, a lower federal court case. Of course, such cases are not binding on this court. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 190 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710].) Nevertheless, that the majority places such reliance on Wheat is telling, for that case explained that “integral to a determination of whether an anonymous tip of erratic driving may justify an investigatory stop” (Wheat, at p. 731) is that “[t]he tip . . . contain a sufficient quantity of information to support an inference that the tipster has witnessed an actual traffic violation that compels an immediate stop” (id. at p. 732). The majority recognizes this point (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1086) and thereafter asserts the tipster in this case “was presumably an eyewitness to illegal activity” (ibid., italics added), later suggesting that defendant’s alleged reckless driving was “presumably viewed by the caller” (id. at p. 1087, italics added).
That the majority relies so heavily on its assumption the tip came from another driver with personal knowledge defendant was “weaving all over the roadway” substantially undercuts its analysis, for the record contains no such evidence. That the tip was from another driver or any other eyewitness is no more than conjecture; nothing is known of the identity of the tipster or the basis of the tipster’s knowledge. The information may have come from a vindictive ex-boyfriend sitting in his home or teenagers making a prank call. Although the majority attempts to gloss over this analytical lacuna by concluding we should “reasonably infer that the tip came from a passing motorist” (for “[w]here else would it have come from?”) (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1088), it is significant that this alleged motorist neither gave his or her name, nor reported the circumstances in which he or she came to see defendant allegedly “weaving all over the roadway,” nor left a cell phone number, nor provided any other information allowing assessment of the tipster’s veracity. Had police obtained the name and telephone number of the tipster, this would be a different case.
The high court in J. L. could similarly have inferred that the tip the defendant in that case had a gun concealed on his person came from someone with personal knowledge (for “where else would it have come from?”). But it is just this type of logical fallacy the high court rejected. According to J. L, because the tip was an anonymous one, the tipster’s reputation for veracity could not be assessed and he or she could not be held accountable if the tip was fabricated. (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 270.) Accordingly, J. L. teaches that police must confirm more than merely the innocent details of an anonymous tip before effecting a seizure of the person.
The majority’s subsidiary arguments fare no better. That some leeway is permitted in Fourth Amendment cases when cars are involved, due to their mobile nature and the state’s heavy regulation of automobiles, is true. (Maj. *1093opn., ante, at pp. 1087-1088.) Once a car is legally stopped on the highway, for example, the driver’s failure to produce his or her car registration will permit police to search the car for evidence of such registration. (In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, 38 P.3d 433].) And an arrest of the driver permits police to search the entire car. (New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 [69 L.Ed.2d 768, 101 S.Ct. 2860].) But neither of the concerns expressed (mobility of cars and pervasive state regulation of cars) means police need less cause to effect a traffic stop than required to make other detentions.
I find questionable the majority’s attempt to distinguish J. L., supra, 529 U.S. 266, on the ground the “level of intrusion” of a traffic stop is “considerably less” than the stop-and-frisk at issue in J. L. (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1087). The defendant in J. L. was frisked in view of other people at the bus stop, whereas defendant here, a woman alone in her car, was stopped by police on a deserted highway at nearly 2:00 o’clock in the morning. That the “level of intrusion” in this case was “considerably less” than in J. L. does not seem evident to me. In any event, irrespective of one’s view of the comparative intrusiveness of the two encounters, the high court has held unequivocally that an automobile stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment that must be justified by “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law.” (Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at p. 663, italics added.)
The majority’s reliance on Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz (1990) 496 U.S. 444 [110 L.Ed.2d 412, 110 S.Ct. 2481] is misguided. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1087.) In that case, the high court rejected a constitutional challenge to a state’s sobriety checkpoint program, at one point noting the low “ level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy caused by the checkpoints,’ ” as balanced against the state’s strong interest in apprehending drunk drivers. (Sitz, at p. 449.) A significant factor in permitting such checkpoints was that they snare everyone for minor detentions. The high court explained that it was addressing only the checkpoint situation in which all motorists must stop for a few seconds and that “[detention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard.” (Id. at p. 451, italics added.) In other words, if police were to focus on one particular person, then individualized suspicion—that is, reasonable cause—would be required to detain that person, irrespective of the “level of intrusion.” Sitz, then, involved a variation of the special needs cases such as those concerning border searches (United States v. Ramsey (1977) 431 U.S. 606 [52 L.Ed.2d 617, 97 S.Ct. 1972]) and school searches (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325 [83 L.Ed.2d 720, 105 S.Ct. 733]), where, for reasons other than normal enforcement of the criminal laws, police may dispense with individualized suspicion before effecting a detention or *1094search. (See also People v. Hyde (1974) 12 Cal.3d 158 [115 Cal.Rptr. 358, 524 P.2d 830] [warrantless airport searches justified as administrative regulatory search].) Nothing in Sitz suggests that when police focus on a single driver due to suspicions of drunk driving and are not conducting a sobriety checkpoint stopping all drivers, police can detain that driver on less than reasonable cause.
Finally, the majority attempts to justify its holding by claiming that “[pjolice officers undoubtedly would be severely criticized for failing to stop and investigate a reported drunk driver if an accident subsequently occurred.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1087.) This irrelevant though emotional concern misleadingly suggests that an invasion of personal privacy is justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if such invasion might unmask a criminal or prevent a crime. This view ignores the balance the Fourth Amendment strikes between a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy and “the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” (Johnson v. United States (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 14 [92 L.Ed. 436, 68 S.Ct. 367].) No doubt the police in J. L. would also have been criticized if that defendant subsequently shot someone with the gun he was secreting at the bus stop, but the possibility of such criticism did not convince the high court in that case to dispense with requiring confirmation of the illegal aspects of the anonymous tip.
Ill
It is said that the police have a difficult job, and I do not disagree. In this case, however, the burden on the investigating officer was slight: he need only have followed defendant’s blue van a short distance to determine whether she was weaving or otherwise violating the traffic laws. The observation of even a small deviation, such as weaving slightly within a lane, may, when coupled with the anonymous tip, have been sufficient to justify a traffic stop. Instead, without confirming any illegal or even suspicious conduct at all, the officer simply pulled her over. I am not persuaded by the majority that this case reasonably can be distinguished from J. L., supra, 529 U.S. 266, where the high court held that, when faced with an anonymous tip, police must confirm not only its innocent details but also some aspect of the illegality before detaining a person. The requirement is small, but important. As the high court explained in a different context long ago: “It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It *1095is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.” (Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U.S. 616, 635 [29 L.Ed. 746, 6 S.Ct. 524].)
Because police failed to sufficiently confirm the anonymous tip before effecting an investigatory detention, I conclude defendant is correct that her detention and the subsequent discovery of evidence of her intoxication violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because the majority concludes otherwise, I dissent.
Kennard, J., and Moreno, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 13, 2006. Baxter, J., did not participate therein. Kennard, J., Werdegar, J., and Moreno, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.