Court Opinion

ID: 9739809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:21:10.728527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.014233
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion.
Pfaff, J.
This case (see 196 N. E. 2d 290) again comes before us on a petition for rehearing.
A general conference of the court sitting in banc by a majority vote denied appellees’ petition for rehearing with opinion. I again cannot agree with this action taken by the court and hereby voice my dissént for the following reasons:
Judicial review of a Public Service Commission order by the Appellate Court is a statutory action. §54-443 et seq;, Burns’ 1968 Supp. The statute provides that appeals shall be taken from final orders within SO days. The statute also provides that the *31330-day time limit may be extended if the appellant files a petition for rehearing with the Commission, §54-444, Burns’ 1963 Supp., pursuant to Commission rules, §54-446, Burns’ 1963 Supp.
In the case before us a complaint was filed with the Commission asking for an investigation of the operations of Citizens Gas and Coke Utility, a municipal utility of the City of Indianapolis, and its foreign subsidiary, Citizens By-Products Coal Company, within Greene County. The complaint alleges that Citizens Gas and Coke Utility is limited by §48-7103, Burns’ 1963 Replacement, to operating and furnishing gas within the. City of Indianapolis, and within 5 miles beyond in' Marion County; that Citizens By-Products Coal Company, as a West Virginia corporation, is prohibited by §54-603, Burns’ 1951 Replacement, from operating anywhere in Indiana as a public utility; that both said corporations are engaged in the storage óf gas and the furnishing of gas service within Greene County, which is 65 miles outside Marion County and three counties away.
The Commission statute gives the Commission jurisdiction over municipal utilities and only exempts them from its jurisdiction if their operations are confined to the particular municipality and within 6 miles beyond. §54-105, Burns’ 1963 Supp.; §§54-602, 54-607, 54-707, Burns’ 1951 Replacement; 54-609, Burns’ 1963 Supp. The Citizens Gas and Coke Utility statute of creation limits its operations to the City of Indianapolis and 5 miles beyond, and makes its rules and rates subject to the approval of the Commission. §48-7103, Burns’ 1963 Replacement. The Underground Storage of Gas acts declare such storage to be a public use. §3-1729 et seq., Burns’ 1963 Supp.
*314In the case before us the only thing which has so far occurred is that appellant filed a motion to dismiss, on which oral argument was heard, after which the Commission denied the motion to dismiss, holding:
“. . . said Acts do state certain areas in which the Commission would have jurisdiction over Citizens Gas and Coke Utility;... .
“. . . the Motion to Dismiss ... is in the nature of a demurrer to the complaint; and, therefore, the Commission must accept the allegations set forth in the Complaint ... as true; that among said allegations, we find on Page 6 of the Complaint, Rhetorical Paragraph ‘7. (†) Furnished gas service to inhabitants of Greene County’; that this allegation alone, if proven, would give this Commission authority to . . . undertake an investigation; ....
“. . . the Motion to Dismiss ... is hereby denied; that this cause be set down for hearing by the Commission.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is a factual question whether or not Citizens Gas and Coke Utility has committed acts which exceed its statutory authority and whether or not those acts exceed the exemption portions of the Public Service Commission Act. Those facts can only be determined by the Commission upon hearing held and evidence heard. §54-112, Burns’ 1351 Replacement.
No hearing has been held and no evidence has been heard. Since there has been no hearing, there could be no petition for rehearing and appellant could not extend its appeal time by filing one. The order denying the motion to dismiss was entered on July 20, 1962, but appellant did not perfect its appeal until October 26, 1962, which is 98 days later and 68 days too late.
Section 54-408, Burns’ 1951 Replacement, provides as follows:
*315“Upon a complaint made against any public utility by any mercantile, agricultural or manufacturing society or by any body politic or municipal organization or by ten (10) persons, firms, corporations or associations, or ten (10) complainants of all or any of the aforementioned classes, or by any public utility, that any of the rates, tolls, charges or schedules or any joint rate or rates in which such petitioner is directly interested are in any respect unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory, or that any regulation, measurement, practice or act whatsoever affecting or relating to the service of any public utility, or any service in connection therewith, is in any respect unreasonable, unsafe, insufficient or unjustly discriminatory, or that any service is inadequate or can not be obtained, the commission shall proceed, with or without notice, to make such investigation as it may deem necessary or convenient. But no order affecting said rates, tolls, charges, schedules, regulations, measurements, practice or act, complained of, shall be entered by the commission without a formal public hearing.” (Emphasis supplied)
The only action which the Commission has taken is to deny a motion to dismiss. This is an interlocutory and procedural ruling. There has been no final order entered.
The majority opinion questions whether the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission of Indiana may be challenged in our courts by a party who does not first exhaust his administrative remedies, and in discussing this question cites numerous federal and foreign state authorities. It is my opinion that such authorities cannot be relied upon by this court when the result reached thereby is contrary to a ruling precedent of the Indiana Supreme Court. It is stated in City of E. Chicago v. Sinclair Ref. Co. (1953), 232 Ind. 295, 306, 111 N. E. 2d 459:
*316“Where, as here, an administrative remedy is provided, it must be exhausted before judicial review may be requested. (Cases cited)”
The case before us is simply a case of a premature appeal which does not comply with the statute defining our jurisdiction. The case of Shank v. Federal Power Commission (5th Cir. 1956), 236 F. 2d 830, 834-835, is exactly in point, the pertinent parts of which read as follows:
“. . . petitioner is prematurely seeking a judicial review without having first exhausted its administrative remedy and that by resorting to this Court before the Commission had set the date for hearing and prior to its decision and the issuance of a definitive order in the pending proceedings before it, petitioner is attempting to substitute this Court for the Commission as the tribunal to hear and determine what Congress declared the Commission should hear and determine in the first instance.....

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“. . . we think it plain these orders are . . . mere procedural steps taken at the inception of and not upon the completion of the administrative process. All that the Commission did in the exercise of its regulatory jurisdiction was to enter preliminary, interlocutory orders which do not bear upon the merits of the controverted fundamental issues which must ultimately be adjudicated by the Commission.....
“The petitioner is thus before this Court without a record, without a single established fact or finding, and without evidence, asking us to exercise our power of review when, in fact, there is no ‘order’ to review. This being the situation, it is plain that petitioner is prematurely seeking review of the Commission’s action without having first exhausted the prescribed administrative remedy. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-51, 58 S. Ct. 459, 82 L. Ed. 638. This case thus falls squarely within the well es*317tablished rule which requires that there be no judicial intervention until administrative action has reached its complete development. Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Kirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 767, 67 S. Ct. 1483, 91 L. Ed 1796; Union Oil Company v. Federal Power Commission, 5th Cir. 236 F. 2d 816.
“ . . . the petition must be and the same is hereby dismissed. See also Sun Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission (5th Cir. 1962), 304 F. 2d 290, 292.
In a recent decision of this court it has been specifically held that the Commission has not only the power, but the duty, to investigate and hold a hearing to determine the truth of the matter alleged, regardless of the form and contents of the petition filed. In New York Central R. R. v. Public Serv. Comm. (1962), 133 Ind. App. 680, 183 N. E. 2d 609, the court had before it the question of whether or not the Commission acted properly in failing to hold a hearing on an unauthorized petition which contained allegations as to the possible violation of a Commission rule. In holding against the Commission that a hearing should have been held on such allegations, this court said, on page 691:
“It is to be granted that appellant’s petition was unorthodox and unauthorized. However, the Commission had broad powers of its own as to investigations and hearings. After the filing of the petition, it could have initiated a proceeding according to statute and held a formal hearing on the entire matter regardless of the form and contents of the petition. Sections 54-412, 54-413, Burns’ Ind. Stat., 1951 Replacement.” (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the above statutes and authorities, it is my opinion that appellees’ motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction should be sustained, or *318in any event, the Commission’s preliminary order denying appellants’ motion to dismiss, and setting the cause for hearing, should be affirmed.