Court Opinion

ID: 9696889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:01:04.985184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:27.476649
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
While I concur with the result reached and generally speaking, with the fine analysis of Judge Beck with respect *367to the various issues presented, I am very troubled by the factual scenario of this case and feel compelled to write separately to express my concern.
I find it revolting and a mockery to justice and fairness the District Attorney’s usage of Pedulla and DeLuca as key witnesses in this case, who are alleged perjurers, although not convicted as such, to sustain the Commonwealth’s position in this case.
It is a true commentary that the District Attorney cannot choose the witnesses to criminal activity. Consequently, the choice of witnesses for trial is often very limited. However, it is also true that our system of criminal justice is founded upon notions of fundamental fairness and justice. Such fundamental concepts have led us to structure our criminal system so as to presume an accused innocent until proven guilty; and not just proven guilty but proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
In this context, two police officers with years of service have been found guilty of bribery and conspiracy based, in large part, on the testimony of two convicted “hit men” who have admittedly lied about this matter under oath in grand jury proceedings, who have evidenced a total disdain for the oath and who have also evidenced a likelihood to say whatever will best advance their own interests.
To further complicate this scenario, the testimony was elicited by virtue of a bargain with the District Attorney’s office whereby these two key witnesses were to receive favorable treatment as to the potential perjury charges as well as other pending charges. Under this factual scenario, the integrity of our courts as a vehicle in the pursuit of truthfulness has been strained to a point nearing intolerable limits.
It further concerns me that in situations like these, the District Attorney is put in a discretionary position as to keeping the key witnesses competent to testify. As aptly illustrated in the majority opinion, Pedulla and DeLuca would not be statutorily incompetent unless convicted and sentenced for perjury. Yet the District Attorney is charged *368with making the decision to prosecute the individuals for perjury or whether to forego such prosecution. Hence, the District Attorney is capable of keeping the admitted or suspected perjurer competent to testify and any disqualifying function of the statute is avoided.
I question the wisdom of requiring a conviction and sentencing for perjury to render the individual incompetent under circumstances such as these. Is anything really gained in requiring the Commonwealth to prove formally what is freely admitted by the perjuring witness? If there is something patently unreliable in the testimony of a convicted perjurer, so much so that our law will not allow him to take the witness stand, I see no greater indicia of reliability of the witnesses in this case under the factual situation presented.
The integrity of our courts in promoting truth and justice is compromised by cases such as these. I caution the District Attorneys of this Commonwealth against knowingly avoiding the purpose of the incompetency statute by selectively avoiding prosecutions for perjury against individuals like Pedulla and DeLuca. Unfortunately, I agree that under the current law of this Commonwealth, the witnesses were competent to testify and as there was some corroborating evidence of guilt, I do not believe we would be justified in taking the case from the jury.