Court Opinion

ID: 9954090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:03:04.540025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:50.354114
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 P. v. Wolpert CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    A166450
 v.
 DAVID ALEXANDER WOLPERT,                                               (San Mateo County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 20SF012801A)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         David Alexander Wolpert was charged with making criminal threats
while personally using a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 422, subd. (a), 12022,
subd. (b)(1); undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Before trial,
he requested mental health diversion in lieu of prosecution. (§ 1001.36.)
Although he was diagnosed with delusional disorder, he later withdrew his
request due to counsel’s advice that a pending charge in another county
presented a logistical hurdle for treatment. A jury later found him guilty,
and the trial court imposed a sentence of three years. On appeal, he argues
his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising him to withdraw his
diversion request. We agree and conditionally reverse the judgment and
remand for the court to consider his eligibility for diversion.
                                                  BACKGROUND
         In November 2020, Wolpert drove to the headquarters of Facebook,
upset it suspended his account. Upon arriving at a parking lot, he
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approached a security guard. He said if the guards did not get their “shit
together,” he was going to kill them. He encouraged the guard to “report it,”
brandished a pocket knife with the blade open, started fidgeting with the
knife, and said he was serious. After emphasizing he was not joking, he
warned “If there’s a third time,” “ ‘[s]ecurity guards are going to die.’ ” Before
driving away, he said “ ‘security needs to fix it within a month’ ” or else he
would come back to kill them. In his report to police, the guard said Wolpert
appeared to be experiencing mental problems at the time.
      The San Mateo County District Attorney charged Wolpert with felony
criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), alleging that he personally used a deadly
weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and committed the offense while on bail for
another offense in Sacramento County (§ 12022.1). Based on concerns
defense counsel expressed regarding competency to stand trial, the trial court
issued an order of commitment in March 2021. A correctional facility
ultimately determined Wolpert was not competent — his statements did not
relate to reality, he had poor insight and judgment, tenuous impulse control,
and was overtly psychotic — and it retained him for additional treatment.
Proceedings resumed after Wolpert was found competent to stand trial in
June 2021.
      In March 2022, Wolpert applied for mental health diversion.
(§ 1001.36.) A psychiatrist diagnosed him with a delusional disorder,
emphasizing antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and
clinically indicated. A social worker report noted Wolpert was experiencing
paranoia and delusions at the time of his offense, but he was not taking any
antipsychotic medications at that time. A clinician also noted that, since
“adhering to prescribed medications, Mr. Wolpert has demonstrated an
increasingly goal directed thought process leading to a decrease in

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circumstantial speech.” Wolpert waived his right to a speedy trial, consented
to the diversion program, and expressed a desire to adhere to his psychotropic
medication plan and continue receiving services at a mental health center in
Sacramento — a place where he previously received treatment.
      In opposition, the prosecutor argued Wolpert would be unable to
comply with treatment due to pending charges in Sacramento County for
attempted possession of a weapon of mass destruction (§ 11418, subd. (a))
that required his appearance. (Allegations related to that offense included
him talking about government conspiracies that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation would not investigate, distilling ammonia, and possessing
several bottles of bleach, radiator fluid, ammonia, and surgical tubing.)
Wolpert’s counsel agreed and advised Wolpert he could not comply with
diversion because he had an open case in Sacramento County. Wolpert
subsequently withdrew his application and proceeded to a jury trial.
      In a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted Wolpert of criminal threats and
found true the deadly weapon allegation. The trial court found true
allegations that he committed the offense while on bail — a finding that was
subsequently stricken. The court denied probation, sentencing him to three
years — the middle term of two years, plus an additional year for the
personal use enhancement. He did not serve any time in prison because he
was given 1,392 days of presentence custody credit — 696 days for time
served and 696 conduct days.
                                DISCUSSION
      Wolpert urges us to conditionally reverse his conviction and remand to
allow an evaluation of his eligibility for mental health diversion. He contends
he was a suitable candidate for diversion due to a mental health disorder that
played a significant role in the commission of his offense. He argues his

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request to withdraw his application for pretrial diversion was the result of
ineffective assistance. We agree.
      “Pretrial diversion” is “the postponement of prosecution,” “at any point
in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until
adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1).) Postponement may be temporary or permanent.
(Ibid.) A defendant charged with a felony — as is the case here — may be
diverted for a maximum period of two years. (Id., subd. (f)(1)(C)(i).) At the
end of the diversion period, the court shall dismiss the charges that were the
subject of the criminal proceedings if the defendant’s performance in
diversion is satisfactory. (Id., subd. (h).)
      Courts must find a defendant is both eligible and suitable for diversion.
(§ 1001.36, subds. (b)–(c).)1 A defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if
diagnosed with a mental disorder that was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense. (§ 1001.36, subds. (b)(1)–(2).) Under

      1 At the time Wolpert first filed his mental health diversion application,

the statute authorized a trial court to grant pretrial diversion if a defendant
met all the following criteria: (A) defendant suffers from a mental disorder
identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM), as evidenced by the diagnosis from a qualified
mental health expert; (B) the court is satisfied that the defendant’s mental
disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense; (C) the
qualified mental health expert opined defendant’s symptoms of the mental
disorder motivated the criminal behavior and would respond to treatment;
(D) the defendant consents to diversion and waives the right to a speedy trial;
(E) defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition to diversion;
and (F) the court is satisfied that the defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.
(Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A)–(F); Stats. 2019, ch. 497, § 203, eff. Jan. 1,
2020.) After Wolpert filed his appeal, the Legislature simplified the
procedural process for obtaining pretrial diversion in Senate Bill No. 1223
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1.)
                                         4
recent amendments to the statute, there is a “presumption that the
defendant’s diagnosed mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged crime.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891 (Sarmiento).) For defendants satisfying these
requirements, the court must consider suitability for diversion: whether the
symptoms would respond to treatment, whether the defendant agrees to
comply with treatment, and whether the defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to the public safety if treated in the community.
(§ 1001.36, subds. (c)(1), (3)–(4).) The court must be satisfied “that the
recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment
will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); Sarmiento, at p. 892.)
      Even if the defendant makes a prima facie showing regarding the
eligibility requirements, a trial court may nonetheless deny pretrial diversion
if it finds the defendant or offense are not suitable for diversion. (People v.
Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888.) Any exercise of this residual
discretion must be consistent with the principles and purpose of the diversion
statute — “a strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health
disorders.” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 892–893.) Indeed, the
“Legislature intended the mental health diversion program to apply as
broadly as possible.” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149
(Whitmill).) We review the parties’ arguments against the backdrop of this
statutory framework.
                                         I.
      The Attorney General contends Wolpert’s appeal is moot because he
has served his sentence and, in any event, cannot qualify for pretrial
diversion after judgment has been entered. Not so.

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      True, an appeal cannot be maintained if the issues have become moot
by subsequent acts or events, or where reversal has no practical effect.
(People v. DeLong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486.) But in cases in which
defendants have satisfied their sentences by serving prison time and cannot
obtain relief from imprisonment, determining whether an issue is
moot includes “consideration of whether prejudicial consequences or
disadvantageous collateral consequences can be ameliorated by a successful
appeal.” (Id. at p. 487.) In those circumstances, appeals are not necessarily
moot. Defendants are entitled to appeal the judgment to clear their names
and “ ‘rid [themselves] of “the stigma of criminality.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 487–489,
italics omitted.)
      That principle applies here. Wolpert cannot obtain relief from
imprisonment because the trial court awarded him custody credits exceeding
his three-year term of imprisonment. But the collateral consequences of
having a serious felony conviction on his record could be ameliorated if he
was granted pretrial mental health diversion. (People v. DeLong, supra,
101 Cal.App.4th at p. 487.) Indeed, successful completion of pretrial
diversion results in the dismissal of his criminal charges, and the arrest upon
which diversion was based is deemed to never have occurred. (People v.
Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 630–631 (Frahs); § 1001.36, subd. (h).) Thus, the
appeal is not moot. None of the Attorney General’s cited authorities
persuade us otherwise.
      We similarly reject the Attorney General’s assertion in reliance on
Frahs that Wolpert is procedurally barred from obtaining pretrial diversion
because his case has already been adjudicated. The circumstances in that
case are distinguishable. Frahs addressed whether section 1101.36 applied
retroactively to a defendant convicted of an offense before the statute went

                                        6
into effect. (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 624 [permitting defendants whose
cases were not final on appeal and had no opportunity to request diversion to
do so].) Moreover, it expressly rejected as “unconvincing” the same argument
the Attorney General makes here. (Id. at p. 640 [statute’s definition of
pretrial diversion “as the postponement of prosecution at any point of the
judicial process ‘until adjudication’ ” did not prevent retroactive application
of the statute].) Indeed, other courts have reversed judgments with
directions to reconsider a defendant’s motion for pretrial mental health
diversion after entry of a guilty or no contest plea. (See, e.g., People v.
Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1142, 1147; People v. Qualkinbush,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 883.) Accordingly, we reach the merits of
Wolpert’s appeal.
                                        II.
      Wolpert argues his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising
him to withdraw his pretrial diversion application because his pending
Sacramento County case made compliance with diversion impossible.
Wolpert contends his counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, resulting in
prejudice — “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694.) We agree.
      First, when examining whether counsel’s performance was deficient, we
generally defer to reasonable tactical decisions and presume “counsel acted
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) But Wolpert has affirmatively established
otherwise. (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 745–746 [presuming
counsel’s performance falls within range of professional competence unless

                                         7
defendant establishes the contrary].) In response to the request for diversion,
the prosecutor argued Wolpert would not be able to comply with treatment
due to pending charges in another county. The prosecutor cited no statute or
case law, simply asserting “even if [Wolpert] is willing to comply with a
treatment plan, he will be unable to do so because he will be transported to
Sacramento County on his outstanding warrant to face charges there.”
Wolpert’s counsel repeated this assertion during an in-chambers conference
and, as the Attorney General concedes, this is why Wolpert withdrew his
request for diversion. (Compare with People v. Ledesma, at p. 746 [claim of
ineffective assistance must be rejected if the record fails to indicate why
counsel engaged in challenged action or omission].)
      But we can find nothing in the diversion statute or case law — and the
Attorney General cites none — supporting the notion that a pending case in a
different county barred Wolpert’s suitability or eligibility for diversion.
(People v. McCary (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [counsel has a duty to carefully
investigate all defenses of law available, promptly advise defendants of their
rights and take necessary actions to preserve those rights].) Rather, the
statute suggests otherwise. Its purpose is to meet the “unique mental health
treatment and support needs of individuals with mental disorders” and
provide counties “discretion and flexibility” to implement diversion.
(§ 1001.35, subds. (c), (b).) Nor is there conflict in the law governing the
criteria for ordering diversion. (Compare with People v. Foster (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 379, 385 [attorney not responsible for failing to anticipate
resolutions of law when a subject is doubtful or debatable].) Thus, on this
record, Wolpert’s counsel had no rational, tactical purpose for advising his
client to withdraw his application. (People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at
p. 1009.)

                                        8
      We reject the Attorney General’s argument that Wolpert is estopped
from claiming ineffective assistance because the diversion application was
withdrawn at Wolpert’s request. Generally, a defendant is estopped from
claiming ineffective assistance if their counsel acts in conformance with the
defendant’s own request. (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 120.)
Wolpert’s claim, by contrast, is predicated on his counsel’s advice to withdraw
the motion. Nothing in the record indicates Wolpert sought to pursue
this strategy against counsel’s advice. (See, e.g., People v. Majors (1998)
18 Cal.4th 385, 409 [defendant estopped from claiming ineffective assistance
where action taken against counsel’s advice].)
      Second, counsel’s advice prejudiced Wolpert, who withdrew his
request even though he appeared to satisfy eligibility and suitability criteria.
And making the request would not have been futile. He consented to
diversion and waived his right to a speedy trial. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2).)
A psychologist opined he experienced paranoid and grandiose delusions,
indicative of a delusional disorder — a diagnosis included in the most recent
DSM — while he was evaluated for his competency to stand trial. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (b)(1).) Wolpert’s disorder was a significant factor in the commission of
his offense. (Id., subd. (b)(2); Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.)
For example, a police report indicated he was experiencing mental problems
at the time of the offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2) [authorizing consideration
of police reports and witness statements when assessing whether a mental
disorder was a significant factor in the charged offense].)
      Clinicians also noted Wolpert’s mental disorder symptoms would
respond to treatment. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1).) A psychologist stated
antipsychotic mediation was medically appropriate and clinically indicated
for Wolpert, who exhibited moderate thought process disturbance as

                                        9
evidenced by his illogical, tangential, circumstantial, and irrational
statements. After taking antipsychotic medications, he demonstrated more
goal-directed thought processes, leading to a decrease in circumstantial
speech. He tolerated challenging conversations with less frustration. The
Attorney General’s assertion that insufficient evidence demonstrates his
delusional disorder would respond to treatment is unsupported by the record.
      Moreover, Wolpert agreed to comply with treatment — he wanted to
continue his current psychotropic medication plan and return to a mental
health program in Sacramento County where he had previously received
treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3).) As previously discussed, nothing
supports the Attorney General’s assertion that compliance with diversion was
not possible given the Sacramento County charges. And on this record,
nothing indicates the recommended treatment plan was insufficient to
address his specialized needs. (Id., subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).) The plan included
continuing psychotropic medication and exploring any necessary changes to
that regimen with a treating psychiatrist, mental health services at a
treatment facility that already noted it would readmit Wolpert upon his
release, exploring higher levels of treatment, abstaining from marijuana, and
connecting with appropriate medical services to address several physical
health issues.
      Finally, there is prima facie evidence Wolpert does not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety — that is, an unreasonable risk
he would commit a new violent felony under section 667. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4) [incorporating § 1170.18’s definition of “unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety”].) Those violent felonies are “super strikes,”
including murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault
with a machine gun on a police officer, serious or violent felonies punishable

                                       10
by death or life imprisonment, and possession of a weapon of mass
destruction. (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449.) He has no
prior convictions, violent offense convictions, or prior prison commitments.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [court may consider defendant’s violence and criminal
history]; Moine, at p. 451 [dangerousness is generally present where
defendants have long criminal histories involving violent felonies].) His
criminal threat charge did not support an inference he was likely to commit a
super strike offense in the future. (Moine, at pp. 450–451.) Wolpert also
noted mental health treatment, including his prescribed medications, was
helpful, and he expressed a willingness to participate in treatment.
(Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1152 [defendant’s statements
regarding willingness to participate in treatment demonstrated, in part, lack
of substantial evidence defendant would commit a super strike offense].)
      To the extent the Attorney General suggests Wolpert’s section 11418,
subdivision (a) charge in Sacramento County for attempted possession of a
weapon of mass destruction establishes his dangerousness, we disagree.
That offense does not statutorily preclude placement into diversion.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (d)(8) [defendants whose current charged offenses are
violations of § 11418, subds. (b) or (c) may not be placed in diversion].)
Moreover, nothing in the record indicates how the charge was resolved, and
Wolpert was released on bail for that offense. (People v. Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 451 [releasing defendant on bail indicated “the court
necessarily found that [the defendant] was not likely to cause ‘great bodily
harm to others’ if released” and it is “logically inconsistent to deny mental
health diversion on the ground that [the defendant] was likely to commit a
super strike offense”].) Under these circumstances, he has demonstrated a
reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel not advised him to

                                       11
withdraw his pretrial diversion application. (Strickland v. Washington,
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome”].)
      In sum, Wolpert has established both deficient performance and
resulting prejudice. Accordingly, we conclude a conditional reversal and
remand is warranted.2 (People v. Burns (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 776, 789–790
[“Conditional reversal thus restores the case to its procedural posture before
the jury verdict for purposes of evaluating [a defendant’s] eligibility for
pretrial mental health diversion”].)
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the
trial court with directions to hold a diversion eligibility hearing under section
1001.36. If the court finds Wolpert eligible under the statute, it may grant
diversion. If Wolpert satisfactorily performs in diversion, the court shall
dismiss the charges. (Id., subd. (h).) If the court does not grant diversion, or
if the court grants diversion but Wolpert does not complete it satisfactorily,
the court shall reinstate Wolpert’s conviction.

      2 In a separate order filed this same date, we dismiss Wolpert’s

companion petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the same grounds as
moot. (In re David Alexander Wolpert, on habeas corpus, A168798.)
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                                 _________________________
                                 RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.

_________________________
PETROU, J.

A166450

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