Court Opinion

ID: 9953537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:19:12.906532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.840919
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 15, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0165-MR

JOHN T. BOSTON                                                      APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE BRIAN C. EDWARDS, JUDGE
               ACTION NOS. 01-CR-000939 AND 01-CR-002488

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: John Boston appeals from an Order Denying Motion to

Vacate entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court on January 12, 2023, denying relief

pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. We affirm.

            This is Boston’s second post-conviction appeal of his underlying

felony convictions. In 2004, Boston previously appealed an order of the Jefferson

Circuit Court denying relief pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 11.42. This Court summarized the factual and procedural background of

Boston’s underlying felony convictions as follows:

                   On April 18, 2001, Appellant, John Boston
            (Boston), was indicted in Jefferson County, Kentucky, on
            two counts of robbery in the first degree, one count of
            burglary in the first degree, one count of fleeing or
            evading the police in the first degree, and one count of
            cruelty to animals in the second degree in case number
            01-CR-939. Also named in this indictment was Carl
            Roderick Bruce (Bruce).

                    The indictment stemmed from an incident on April
            9, 2001, in which Anthony and Frieda Polio were robbed
            in their home at gunpoint by two men wearing ski masks.
            The Polios’ dog was also killed by the assailants during
            the incident. The Polios were bound with duct tape in
            their bedroom then robbed by the two armed men. When
            finished, the two men left the home. However, the two
            men quickly returned to the parties’ bedroom because
            they were unable to open the Polios’ garage door. The
            two men released Mr. Polio (Polio) to open the garage
            door for them. After Polio opened the door, the two men
            left in his car. Polio returned to his bedroom to free his
            wife so she could call the police. Polio then began a car
            chase with the two men. During the chase, the two men
            changed cars and Polio continued to follow the other car.
            Shortly thereafter, the local police joined Polio in the
            chase. At one point, the car slowed down enough so that
            Bruce could jump out. Bruce dropped a pillow case
            containing evidence from the robbery of the Polios while
            jumping from the automobile. Bruce was quickly
            apprehended by the police. The driver continued to flee,
            later abandoning the car and evading the police that
            evening.

                   While in police custody, Bruce implicated Boston
            as his accomplice in the criminal acts against the Polios.
            Also, the police gathered Boston’s driver’s license and

                                        -2-
              work photo identification card attached to the keys in the
              ignition from the automobile used by the two men.
              Boston eluded the police until May 2002.

                     On October 25, 2001, Boston, was indicted in
              Jefferson County, Kentucky on a charge of persistent
              felony offender in the first degree in case number 01-CR-
              2488 due to prior felony convictions in the following
              Jefferson County cases 95-CR-1943 (receiving stolen
              property); 96-CR-1089 (three counts of burglary in the
              third degree); 82-CR-797 (three counts of robbery in the
              first degree, one count of burglary in the first degree, and
              two counts of burglary in the third degree); and 82-CR-
              509 (burglary in the first degree). Case numbers 01-CR-
              2488 and 01-CR-939 were consolidated.

                     Boston accepted the Commonwealth’s offer to the
              consolidated cases and entered a guilty plea on all
              charges on June 23, 2003. A Judgment and Conviction
              of Sentence was entered on June 25, 2003, resulting in
              Boston receiving twenty years for each count of robbery
              in the first degree; twenty years for burglary in the first
              degree; five years for fleeing or evading police in the first
              degree; and twelve months for cruelty to animals in the
              second degree. Each sentence was to be served
              concurrently for a total of twenty years in the
              penitentiary. The twenty-year sentence was enhanced by
              the persistent felony offender in the first degree charge to
              forty years in the penitentiary. . . .

Boston v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-000669-MR, 2005 WL 2806977, at *1

(Ky. App. Oct. 28, 2005) (footnote omitted).1 This Court affirmed the circuit

court’s order denying relief to Boston pursuant to RCr 11.42.

1
  John T. Boston’s prior Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 appeal also involved
a third, subsequent underlying felony conviction, Jefferson County Case No. 02-CR-002543.
That case is not currently on appeal.

                                             -3-
                 Boston now seeks to set aside his conviction, asserting he is entitled to

relief pursuant to CR 60.02(e) and/or (f)2 because the prior convictions used to

enhance his sentence as a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) were

insufficient because they were uninterrupted terms of imprisonment in violation of

Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 532.080(4). The circuit court denied the motion

to vacate and this appeal follows.

                 Our review of the circuit court’s denial of Boston’s CR 60.02 motion,

looks to whether the circuit court abused its discretion:

                 The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial
                 court’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
                 unsupported by sound legal principles.”

                 ....

                 The decision as to whether to grant or to deny a motion
                 filed pursuant to the provisions of CR 60.02 lies within
                 the sound discretion of the trial court. The rule provides

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 states, in relevant part only, that:

                 On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party
                 or his legal representative from its final judgment, order, or
                 proceeding upon the following grounds . . . (e) the judgment is
                 void, or has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
                 judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
                 vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
                 prospective application; or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary
                 nature justifying relief. The motion shall be made within a
                 reasonable time, and on grounds (a), (b), and (c) not more than one
                 year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
                 A motion under this rule does not affect the finality of a judgment
                 or suspend its operation.

                                                 -4-
              that a court may grant relief from its final judgment or
              order upon various grounds. Moreover, the law favors
              the finality of judgments. Therefore, relief may be
              granted under CR 60.02 only with extreme caution and
              only under the most unusual and compelling
              circumstances.

Age v. Age, 340 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Ky. App. 2011) (citations omitted).

              In denying relief to Boston without a hearing, the circuit court did not

address the timeliness of Boston’s request for relief (see CR 60.02 stating that

requests for relief brought under CR 60.02 (e) or (f) must be brought “within a

reasonable time”). Nor did the court address whether Boston could have sought

relief for the same issues on direct appeal or in his prior post-conviction motion for

relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.3 Rather, the circuit court addressed the merits of

Boston’s claims, albeit briefly. While the Commonwealth’s arguments that

Boston’s CR 60.02 claim is untimely and failed to satisfy other procedural

3
 In Kentucky, CR 60.02 is not intended to provide a defendant with a second bite of the apple
concerning post-conviction relief. Rather,

              [i]t is for relief that is not available by direct appeal and not
              available under RCr 11.42. The movant must demonstrate why he
              is entitled to this special, extraordinary relief. Before the movant
              is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he must affirmatively allege
              facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege
              special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.

Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).

                                               -5-
requirements are well-taken, we shall nonetheless review the circuit court’s order

addressing the merits.

                 One of several criteria when receiving a first-degree PFO

enhancement is that a defendant must have two (2) or more prior felony

convictions. However, KRS 532.080(4) provides:

                 For the purpose of determining whether a person has two
                 (2) or more previous felony convictions, two (2) or more
                 convictions of crime for which that person served
                 concurrent or uninterrupted consecutive terms of
                 imprisonment shall be deemed to be only one (1)
                 conviction, unless one (1) of the convictions was for an
                 offense committed while that person was imprisoned.

                 At the time Boston entered his guilty plea in the underlying actions, he

had the following prior felony convictions from the Jefferson Circuit Court: 82-

CR-797; 82-CR-509; 95-CR-1943; and 96-CR-1089. He acknowledged these prior

convictions in accepting the Commonwealth’s offer which included a first-degree

PFO enhancement. He now argues he was not eligible for first-degree PFO

enhancement because his prior felony convictions were served concurrently or

consecutively without interruption; therefore, they should count only as one prior

felony conviction, not two. Boston’s arguments are refuted by the record before

us; by Boston’s own timeline for his convictions and various parole dates;4 and

Kentucky caselaw.

4
    See Appellant’s reply brief.

                                             -6-
            Boston received a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment for Jefferson

County Case No. 82-CR-509 to be served consecutively with Case No. 82-CR-797

for a total of twenty years’ imprisonment. In 1996, while on parole for those

convictions, Boston was indicted and convicted in Jefferson County Case Nos. 95-

CR-1943 and 96-CR-1089. His parole was revoked, and he was sentenced to an

additional two years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively with his prior two

convictions for a total of twenty-two years’ imprisonment. Boston was again

granted parole. He was then indicted for the underlying crimes in this action in

2001, his parole was again revoked for his prior convictions, and he was convicted

in 2003. Boston now argues that he had served fourteen and one-half years of a

single uninterrupted twenty-two-year sentence when he was convicted of the

crimes at issue in this appeal. Boston’s argument has no merit.

            The Kentucky Supreme Court has clearly stated that the “concurrent

sentence break” provided for in KRS 532.080(4) “does not apply to individuals

who commit a felonious act, receive a sentence, and then subsequently commit

another felonious act and receive another sentence.” Blades v. Commonwealth,

339 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Ky. 2011). As explained more specifically by the Blades

Court:

                   In Williams [v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 788
            (Ky. App. 1982)], the appellant was released on parole
            after being convicted of and imprisoned for four counts
            of forgery. 639 S.W.2d at 789. While on parole, he was

                                        -7-
convicted of theft by unlawful taking and sentenced to
four years’ imprisonment. Id. The Court of Appeals
aptly rejected his interpretation of KRS 532.080(4) that
would require two or more convictions to be treated as
one even when prison time has been served after the first
conviction and the second crime is committed while on
parole from the first conviction:

             Appellant’s suggested interpretation
      of KRS 532.080(4) would erode the purpose
      of the statute. Without analyzing the entire
      history and purposes of the statute, it is
      enough to say that the statute is designed to
      strengthen the Commonwealth’s attempts at
      rehabilitation of convicted persons. Greater
      penalties are sanctioned for those persons
      who, after serving a prison term for a
      conviction, demonstrate the futility of their
      rehabilitation by committing other crimes
      after their release. The concurrent sentence
      break is provided only to those who may
      have committed more than one crime but
      received their sentences for these crimes
      prior to serving any time in prison.

      ....

             It is clear from the wording of the
      statute and the Commentary thereto that a
      person who, in appellant’s situation, serves
      time in prison for a felony, is released on
      parole, commits another crime and is
      resentenced to prison, that upon his release
      again and third conviction, he has two prior
      felonies for purposes of a persistent felony
      offender charge. That is, the rehabilitative
      efforts on his first conviction failed, the
      rehabilitative efforts on his second
      conviction failed, and he is, under the
      statute, a persistent felony offender in the

                           -8-
                   first degree upon receiving his third
                   conviction.

Blades, 339 S.W.3d at 455 (citation and footnote omitted).

                 This Court is duty bound to follow the Kentucky Supreme

Court’s mandate set out in Blades in this appeal. Due to Boston’s repeated felony

convictions and repeated commission of additional felonies while on parole,

Boston had at least two prior felony convictions available for first-degree PFO

enhancement. KRS 532.080(4) is inapplicable and the circuit court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Boston’s motion.

            Accordingly, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                        BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

John T. Boston, pro se                       Daniel Cameron
Beattyville, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                             Matthew F. Kuhn
                                             Solicitor General

                                             Rachel A. Wright
                                             Assistant Solicitor General
                                             Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        -9-