Court Opinion

ID: 9397791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 14:05:44.366933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.616483
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                             Court of Appeals

                                 NO. 2022-CA-0069-MR

AFRICA TILFORD                                                               APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 21-CI-003464

LOUISVILLE REGIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY; DANN MANN;1 AND
JESSICA SIMS                                                                  APPELLEES

                            OPINION
      AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

                                      ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; JONES AND KAREM, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: The Appellant, Africa Tilford, seeks review of the Jefferson

Circuit Court’s December 9, 2021 opinion and order dismissing her complaint

against the Louisville Regional Airport Authority and two of its employees,

Executive Director Dan Mann and Maintenance Administration Manager Jessica

1
 Appellee Mann’s name appears to be misspelled in the notice of appeal. We use the spelling
appearing in the record on appeal throughout this Opinion.
Sims. On appeal, Tilford asserts that the trial court erred when it dismissed her

individual capacity claims against Director Mann and Manager Sims for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to CR2 12.02(f).3 For the

reasons explained below, we affirm in part as related to Tilford’s claims against the

Airport, including her official capacity claims against Director Mann and Manager

Sims, reverse in part as related to Tilford’s individual capacity claims against

Director Mann and Manager Sims, and remand for further proceedings.

                                         I. BACKGROUND

                On or about June 16, 2021, Tilford filed a negligence complaint in

Jefferson Circuit Court alleging that she was injured on October 23, 2020, when

she slipped on a clear liquid substance (believed to be hand sanitizer) and fell to

the ground while at the Muhammad Ali International Airport. (Record (“R.”) at 1-

4.) Tilford named the Louisville Regional Airport Authority (“Airport”),

Executive Director Dan Mann, and Maintenance Administration Manager Jessica

Sims as defendants. Tilford’s complaint indicated she was suing Director Mann

and Manager Sims in their individual and official capacities.

                Pertinent to this appeal, Tilford’s complaint alleged as follows:

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
3
 In her Appellant’s brief, Tilford concedes the trial court properly dismissed her complaint
against the Airport.

                                               -2-
               7. At all times relevant hereto, the [Appellees], by and
               through their agents, ostensible agents, servants,
               employees and/or representatives, had a duty to maintain
               and keep the Premises [the Louisville Muhammad Ali
               International Airport located at 600 Terminal Drive,
               Louisville, Kentucky 40209] safe for the use of [Tilford],
               along with warning its invitees of all known dangerous
               conditions; [Appellees] had a duty to maintain the
               Premises in a safe and reasonable manner.

               8. [Tilford] was a business invitee.

               9. On or about October 23, 2020, [Tilford] slipped and
               fell in a foreign substance believed to be clear liquid
               hand sanitizer on the floor of the Premises.

               10. [Tilford] fell several feet, causing personal injury.

               11. As a direct and proximate result of the negligent acts
               and/or omissions of the [Appellees] and their agents,
               [Tilford] was caused to incur medical expenses both past
               and future, physical and mental pain and suffering both
               past and future, increased risk of harm, mental anguish
               and lost enjoyment of life.

               12. [Tilford’s] damages are in excess of the minimum
               dollar amount necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of this
               Court.

(R. at 2-3.)

               After having been served with Tilford’s complaint, Appellees filed a

joint motion to dismiss the complaint. The Airport asserted that it was entitled to

governmental immunity which also shielded Director Mann and Manager Sims

from suit in their official capacities. Director Mann and Manager Sims further

argued that Tilford’s individual capacity claims against them should be dismissed

                                           -3-
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because Tilford’s

complaint was “too vague to be actionable.” (R. at 20.)

                Following a hearing, the trial court entered a final and appealable

opinion and order granting Appellees’ motion and dismissing Tilford’s complaint

in its entirety. Therein, the trial court concluded that the Airport, which was

established by the Legislature pursuant to KRS4 183.133 and controlled by

Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government, performs the vital government

function of providing a transportation infrastructure to the people of this

Commonwealth making the Airport and its employees, when sued in their official

capacities, immune from suit. With respect to Tilford’s individual capacity claims,

the trial court reasoned that dismissal was appropriate because Tilford’s complaint

“failed to make any allegations of wrongful conduct against [Director] Mann and

[Manager] Sims in their personal capacities.” (R. at 103-04.) It elaborated as

follows:

                In paragraphs 5 and 6 of her Complaint, [Tilford] claims
                that [Director Mann and Manager Sims] acted in both
                their individual and official capacities. However, she
                fails to set forth any factual predicate for such assertions,
                merely stating in paragraph 7 that they “had a duty to
                maintain and keep the Premises safe for the use of
                Plaintiff, along with warning its invitees of all known
                dangerous conditions. Defendants had a duty to maintain
                the Premises in a safe and reasonable manner.” These

4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                             -4-
               conclusory allegations without factual support are
               insufficient to survive a properly pled motion to dismiss.

(R. at 104.)

               This appeal followed.

                           II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

               The issue of whether a defendant is entitled to the defense of

sovereign or governmental immunity is a question of law. See Rowan County v.

Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky. 2006) (citing Jefferson County Fiscal Court v.

Peerce, 132 S.W.3d 824, 825 (Ky. 2004)). This means “we owe no deference to

the legal conclusions of the court[] below.” Howard v. Big Sandy Area

Development District, Inc., 626 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Ky. 2020).

               Tilford rightly concedes that the Airport is entitled to governmental

immunity. Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Corp., 295

S.W.3d 91 (Ky. 2009). The Airport’s governmental immunity “extends to its

officers and employees who are sued in their official capacity.” Caneyville

Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 810

(Ky. 2009). Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Tilford’s claims against the

Airport as well as her official capacity claims against Director Mann and Manager

Sims.

                                           -5-
                        III. INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY CLAIMS

             Director Mann and Manager Sims also moved the trial court to

dismiss Tilford’s individual capacity claims against them for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Since a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a pure question of law, a

reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an

appellate court reviews the issue de novo. Gregory v. Hardgrove, 562 S.W.3d 911,

913 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted).

             In ruling on a motion for failure to state a claim, the trial court should

take all the allegations in the complaint as true and not dismiss “unless the

pleading party appears not to be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could

be proven in support of his claim.” Marshall v. Montaplast of N. Am., Inc., 575

S.W.3d 650, 651 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky.

App. 2009)). “[T]he question is purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the

court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the

plaintiff be entitled to relief?” Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010)

(citation omitted).

             Tilford argues that the trial court’s dismissal of her individual capacity

claims runs afoul of Kentucky’s long-held adherence to notice pleading. She

explains that the trial court’s requirement for her to allege more detailed facts

                                          -6-
linked to the essential elements of her claim exceeds our time-honored barebones

approach to pleading.

              “Kentucky is a notice pleading jurisdiction, where the central purpose

of pleadings remains notice of claims and defenses.” Watson v. Landmark

Urology, P.S.C., 642 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Ky. 2022) (quoting Russell v. Johnson &

Johnson, Inc., 610 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Ky. 2020)). CR 8.01(1) states simply that a

pleading “shall contain (a) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief and (b) a demand for judgment for the relief to

which he deems himself entitled.” “It is not necessary to state a claim with

technical precision under this rule, as long as a complaint gives a defendant fair

notice and identifies the claim.” Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v.

Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ky. 2005) (citing Cincinnati, Newport &

Covington Transp. Co. v. Fischer, 357 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1962)).

             The trial court noted that Tilford had only alleged that Director Mann

and Manager Sims had a general duty to maintain and keep the Airport safe and to

warn invitees of all known dangerous conditions. (R. at 104.) According to the

trial court, such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a properly pleaded

cause of action upon which relief can be granted unless the complaint also alleges

specific facts that link to the plaintiff’s cause of action. However, our Supreme

Court has explicitly “refuse[d] to mandate a heightened pleading standard” that

                                          -7-
would require anything more than a complaint “couched in general and conclusory

terms[.]” Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Stars Interactive Holdings (IOM) Ltd.,

617 S.W.3d 792, 809 (Ky. 2020). In fact, oftentimes, “[f]ormal discovery is

necessary before a plaintiff can fairly be expected to provide a detailed statement

of the specific bases for her claim.” Russell, 610 S.W.3d at 242 (emphasis

omitted). “Before [such] discovery, plaintiffs simply don’t know what they don’t

know.” Id.

             This case involves an issue of pleadings, not proof. “We are not

concerned with the appellee[s’] ultimate liability: whether after discovery the

claimant can withstand a Motion for Summary Judgment, or whether the evidence

at trial will be sufficient to withstand a Motion for a Directed Verdict.” Smith v.

Isaacs, 777 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Ky. 1989). Even though devoid of additional facts,

the complaint is sufficient to apprise Director Mann and Manager Sims that they

are being sued in their individual capacities for negligence in connection with an

incident that occurred on October 23, 2020, when Tilford slipped on a clear

substance on the Airport floor, and that Tilford believes that they breached their

duties to maintain the Airport in a safe condition for its patrons. Here, Tilford

alleged the elements necessary to establish a negligence claim: duty, breach,

causation, and damages. While Tilford is aware that a substance was on the floor

that caused her to slip and suffer injury, at this juncture, prior to discovery, she

                                           -8-
may simply not know enough facts to draw a more specific link than that alleged in

her complaint.

               Under Kentucky’s liberal notice pleading standards, Director Mann

and Manager Sims’s motion to dismiss Tilford’s individual capacity claims against

them should have been denied.5 McCollum v. Garrett, 880 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Ky.

1994). While it is possible that Director Mann and Manager Sims may be entitled

to summary judgment later, Tilford is entitled to make use of the discovery process

prior to having to marshal specific facts to support her negligence claim against

them.

                                      III. CONCLUSION

               For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

dismissal of Africa Tilford’s negligence claim against the Louisville Regional

Airport Authority and Executive Director Dan Mann and Maintenance

Administration Manager Jessica Sims in their official capacities; we reverse the

dismissal of her negligence claims against Director Mann and Manager Sims in

5
  We note that in denying Tilford’s CR 59.05 motion, the trial court cited Craig & Landreth
Cars, Inc. v. Protective Life Corporation, No. 2020-CA-0119-MR, 2021 WL 1431870 (Ky. App.
Apr. 16, 2021), discretionary review denied (Jan. 11, 2022), to support its conclusion that Tilford
was required to link essential facts to each cause of action or face dismissal. Id. at *3. In
addition to being unpublished, the opinion dealt with fraud-based claims. CR 9.02 imposes a
heightened standard on averments of fraud or mistake requiring that the “circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” In contrast, Tilford alleged a
common, garden variety negligence claim. There is no heightened standard that applies to such
claims.

                                               -9-
their individual capacities, and remand the individual capacities claims for further

proceedings.

               ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

John S. Friend                             Douglas B. Bates
Louisville, Kentucky                       Bethany A. Breetz
                                           Chelsea R. Stanley
                                           Louisville, Kentucky

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