Court Opinion

ID: 9745799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:32:24.982598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.711078
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring: As a matter of judicial economy, if parties can file their claims in a single action they should be forced to do so, unless the claims are diverse and it would be inconvenient to try them as a unit. Only those claims which are part of the same cause of action must be joined. How "cause of action” is defined is therefore a major factor in determining what claims must be made a part of the original lawsuit. Illinois courts have employed two tests for determining whether causes of action are the same, (1) the "same evidence” test, and (2) the "transactional approach,” which is concerned not with theories or relief sought but with whether a "single group of operative facts give[s] rise to the assertion of relief.” (Rodgers v. St. Mary’s Hospital (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 302, 312, 597 N.E.2d 616, 621.) A number of decisions have mistakenly indicated the two tests are the same: "Causes of action are identical where the evidence necessary to sustain a second verdict would sustain the first, i.e., where the causes of action are based upon a common core of operative facts.” Redfern, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 376, 444 N.E.2d at 208, citing Morris, 96 Ill. App. 3d 148, 421 N.E.2d 278 (same evidence test mentioned as an alternative test); see also In re Energy Cooperative, Inc. (7th Cir. 1987), 814 F.2d 1226, 1230-31 (refusing to apply the same evidence test). The confusion may stem from the fact that the Restatement (Second) of Judgments employed the same evidence test until 1982, when it adopted the transactional test. (4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice § 41.5, at 315 (1989) (Civil Procedure Before Trial).) The Restatement (Second) of Judgments abandoned the same evidence test because it was inadequate. Where a single group of operative facts gives rise to different theories, the evidence presented in support of those theories will necessarily be somewhat different, but that is no justification for separate actions. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, Comment a (1982). Although Torcasso cites Redfern and the same evidence test, it is clear that Torcasso intended to prevent successive litigation based on different theories of recovery or requests for relief where a single group of operative facts is involved. (Torcasso, 157 Ill. 2d at 491, 626 N.E.2d at 228.) It may be that courts are often able to reach the same result under both the transactional and same evidence tests. (Rodgers, 149 Ill. 2d at 312, 597 N.E.2d at 621; see 4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice § 41.5, at 312-15 (1989) (Civil Procedure Before Trial).) Nevertheless, it is not accurate to equate the two tests, and use of the same evidence test to determine whether separate causes of action exist results in confusion. We should make it clear that the test for determining whether separate causes of action are involved is the single group of operative facts test; and that the same evidence test is a separate test, no longer to be applied.