Court Opinion

ID: 9831407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:04:59.935129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:34.538192
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[23] Appellants in their motion for rehearing complain of several findings of fact made by us. Before going over said objections, we wish to say that, the jury having passed upon the credibility of the witnesses and found in plaintiff’s favor, necessarily we have adopted his version where a dispute existed. Appellants say we erred in stating that plaintiff “did not know it was a violation of such an ordinance to leave them at this place” (meaning plaintiff’s team). We quote from his testimony as follows: “I did not think it necessary to leave any one in charge of them while I went into the baggageroom. I know that it was against the city ordinance on the streets. I did not know that it was a violation of the law there. I knew there was a city ordinance on the street.” It was admitted that the place where plaintiff left his team was on property of the International & Great Northern, and not on any street. Appellants also complain because we do not find that the place where the team was left untied was in the city of San Antonio, and* call our attention to the fact that plaintiff’s petition, upon which the case was tried, contains the following statement: “That said receiver, on the date hereinafter mentioned, maintained in the city of San Antonio a freight and passenger depot, which was a public place, to which the public in general was invited, and especially upon business connected with receiving or shipping of freight or baggage; that at said depot, and as a part thereof, the defendant T. J. Freeman, receiver, operated and maintained a large baggageroom for the receipt and delivery of baggage, and on the east side of said baggageroom, where there was a platform for the handling of trunks and baggage, the said defendant had and maintained three large iron or metal doors.”
Appellant also complains of the portion of our opinion stating that the baggagemaster knew the drivers of vehicles coming after baggage left their teams untied. We have again examined the record, and, while we find no express statement to that effect by the baggagemaster, yet we find evidence which we think amply sustains our conclusion. Appellant offered in evidence certain photographs of the baggage platform and its vicinity. One of these shows a team standing by the platform, and the driver standing on the platform. It shows the iron posts around the little park, and, taken with the evidence, shows conclusively that said posts are too far away for any team to be tied to same while standing by the platform or backed up to it. The undisputed evidence shows there was no other place to tie teams. The baggagemaster testified: “When transfer wagons come there with baggage, they generally back up, back up against that place” —meaning the platform. He also testified he had seen horses driven alongside like in the photograph. That they usually stand a little further up than where the wagon is shown to be by the photograph. That any place between the two doors is where the wagons come up to do business with the International & Great Northern Railway. That he knew plaintiff was in the habit of coming with the wagon to get trunks. This evidence clearly shows that the baggage-master was familiar with the customs of those coming there for baggage with reference to where they left their teams. The witness Banks testified that everybody left their teams there that got a trunk.
[24] Appellants contend earnestly that we should hold that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence by leaving his team untied in a public place in violation of the city ordinance, and that such negligence proximately contributed to the injuries suffered by plaintiff. In our findings of fact, we stated that the city ordinance with reference to leaving teams untied and unattended was in force. We notice appellee contends in his brief that the evidence does not show the same to have been in force at the time of plaintiff’s injury. The trial began on November 8, 1911. Plaintiff was injured on January 27, 1909. The evidence does not show when the ordinance was adopted. The plaintiff testified to a knowledge of an ordinance relating to leaving teams on the street, but there is nothing to show that the ordinance he referred to was the one introduced in evidence which related to plazas, streets, avenues, lanes, alleys, and other public places.
We have gone over this matter carefully and find: (1) That the issue was submitted to the jury upon a special charge asked by appellants, and the jury found against such contention. (2) We do not find, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence by leaving his team as he did, especially as the evidence fails to show the ordinance relied upon to have been in *438force at the time the injury to plaintiff occurred. (S) Were we to concede that plaintiff was guilty of negligence, as a matter of law, in so leaving his team, it would still be a matter for the jury to determine whether such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury,' or whether same was proximately caused by the supervening negligence of the baggagemaster.
We adhere to our former holding that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding against appellants on such issue.
The motion is overruled.