Court Opinion

ID: 9791367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:09:52.353643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:35.518629
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Justice
(dissenting) :
I cannot concur in the views of the Majority for the following reasons :
When the defendant’s meter reader left the gate open, the dogs were not in the yard. Thus his negligence merely created a condition which was not the proximate cause of the loss of plaintiffs’ Llewellin setter. Plaintiffs’ own failure to check the gate before letting the dogs out of their “confinement” into their yard was the cause of their escape and the Llewellin setter’s injury. See Cheatham v. Van Dalsem [Okl.1960], 350 P.2d 593:
“1. In a suit for damages for personal injuries, although the defendants may be shown to have been negligent in some manner, yet, unless the negligence so shown was the proximate cause of the injury, it is the duty of the trial court to sustain the demurrer and enter judgment for the defendants.
*131“2. The proximate cause of any injury must be the efficient cause which sets in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury; if the negligence complained of merely furnishes a condition by which the injury was possible and a subsequent act caused the injury, the existence of such condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.
“3. Where the admitted facts fail to show a causal connection between the act of negligence and the injury alleged to have resulted therefrom, the existence of proximate cause is a question of law for the court.”
The following from the body of the opinion again announces the well-settled rule of law in this State, to-wit:
“Conclusions
“[1, 2] In considering the issue involved, we must be cognizant of certain salient principles of law heretofore established, which are: That regardless of any negligence on part of a defendant and regardless of the extent of such negligence, no liability attaches unless the injuries complained of resulted directly and proximately from such negligence; that the proximate cause of any injury must be the efficient cause which sets in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury and if the negligence merely furnishes a condition by which the injury was possible and a subsequent act caused the injury, the existence of such condition is not the proximate cause of the injury; that if the facts do not disclose a causal connection between the act of negligence and the injury alleged to have resulted therefrom, the existence of proximate cause is a question of law for the court. See Billy v. Texas, O. & E. R. Co., Okl., 263 P.2d 187; Sturdevant v. Kent, Okl., 322 P.2d 408; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Robertson, 207 Okl. 80, 247 P.2d 501; Larkey v. Church, 79 Okl. 202, 192 P. 569; Lynn v. Gessel Drilling Co., 172 Okl. 16, 43 P.2d 1019; Booth v. Warehouse Market, Okl., 286 P.2d 721; and Munroe v. Schoenfeld & Hunter Drilling Co., 178 Okl.. 149, 61 P.2d 1045.”
Even assuming that the question of proximate cause was for the jury, the question of exemplary damages is not sub-missible under the allegations of plaintiffs’ petition. The petition alleged that the meter readers were requested to advise them of their presence so that they could secure their dogs to prevent the dogs from attacking the meter readers. Since, in the present case, the dogs were already confined or secured, the need for this notice was not required or necessary. Plaintiffs further alleged that defendant’s meter readers were instructed to latch and secure the gate on leaving the premises and that on this occasion they failed to latch and secure the gate. Alleging negligence in failing to latch and secure a gate hardly satisfies the requirement under 23 O.S. 1971, § 9, which provides that exemplary damages may be awarded where the defendant is “guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, actual or presumed.” Notice also the cases cited in the annotation at 1 A.L.R.3d 997, 1008ff.
I therefore respectfully dissent to the majority opinion.