Court Opinion

ID: 9533312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:30:25.853049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:00.317639
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice.
Appeal from a summary judgment for plaintiffs in a quiet title action. Reversed with instructions to dismiss the complaint and enter judgment on the counterclaim. Costs to defendants.
Plaintiffs purchased defendants’ property at the so-called “May Sale” 1 conducted to sell property to satisfy delinquent taxes. The county auditor must conduct *209the sale under our statute.2 Plaintiffs then sued defendants to quiet title thereto, and defendants counterclaimed, urging that the sale was conducted by one Hibler, not the auditor, and an unqualified person. Plaintiffs conceded that he was not qualified de jure, but claimed he was a de facto deputy auditor and as such capable of conducting the sale and effectively passing title.
Mr. Hibler was a tax accountant, taking care of tax work and the preparation of tax rolls for submission to the county treasurer. He was strictly an employee of the auditor and never attained the status, de facto or otherwise, of deputy auditor or anything else.
Under the statute, it was possible that Hibler could have become a true deputy auditor,3 and could have legally conducted the sale, but he never qualified as such.
Under our statute, to have become a deputy auditor, three facts were absolutely necessary:
1. His appointment must have been made in writing, which admittedly was not done;
2. Such written appointment must have been filed in the office of the county clerk, which obviously was not done;
3. He was required to take the oath, which was not done.
The statute then, in the same paragraph in crystal clear language says:
Until such appointment is so made and filed and until such deputy shall have taken the oath of office, no one shall he or act as such deputy,4 [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiffs strongly urge that inasmuch as Hibler had been accustomed to performing some duties that the auditor was charged to do, he was a de facto officer. They cite considerable respectable authority for their position, but we are constrained not to subscribe to the employment of a couple of Latin words to circumvent the clear intent of the legislature. When a person’s real property is at stake, and its title hinges on statutory construction in tax sales procedures, we are committed to two other Latin words: “strictissimi juris,” which we believe, hold, and have held, to apply to a case like this.5
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.

. Title 59-10-64, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

. Title 59-10-64 (4), Utah Code Annotated 1953.

. Title 17-16-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

. Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Bd. of Com’rs, 71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783 (1928).

. Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 93 Utah 561, 74 P.2d 1184 (1938).