Court Opinion

ID: 9366736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 19:03:29.752368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.778838
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 210994-U

                                                                               SIXTH DIVISION
                                                                               January 27, 2023

                                             No. 1-21-0994

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                            IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                        FIRST DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                            )   Appeal from the
                                                                 )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   )   Cook County.
                                                                 )
     v.                                                          )   No. 19 MC3 000110
                                                                 )
 THOMASA DE LA ROSA,                                             )   The Honorable
                                                                 )   Ketki Shroff Steffen,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                  )   Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices C.A. Walker and Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1        Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for battery over her contention that the trial court
                plainly erred by providing inadequate admonishments prior to accepting her jury
                waiver, and we reject her argument that she was denied effective assistance of trial
                counsel.

¶2        Following a bench trial, defendant Thomasa De La Rosa was found guilty of two counts

of battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3 (West 2018)) and sentenced to 14 days in the Cook County

Department of Corrections and one year of conditional discharge. On appeal, De La Rosa contends

that the trial court accepted her jury waiver without providing adequate admonishments and

ensuring that her waiver was knowing and voluntary. She also contends that she was denied
No. 1-21-0994

effective assistance by defense counsel’s use of body camera footage that supported the State’s

case. We affirm.

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4     De La Rosa was charged by complaint with two counts of battery following an October 15,

2018, incident involving complainant A.P.1.

¶5     On June 28, 2019, De La Rosa was in court with her attorney when the trial court stated

that the case was continued, and a bench trial was indicated. On December 16, 2019, De La Rosa

was present when an assistant public defender appeared for defense counsel and asked to set the

case for a bench trial, in response to which the trial court scheduled a bench trial on March 5, 2020.

On September 25, 2020, De La Rosa was present with counsel when the trial court stated that the

case was “up today for a bench trial,” but the case was continued. At the next court date, De La

Rosa was present with her attorney when the trial court stated that the case was set for a bench

trial, but the case was then continued again.

¶6     On May 25, 2021, the trial court asked for De La Rosa’s jury waiver. The trial court then

explained the charges and possible penalties and asked whether De La Rosa understood.

De La Rosa stated that she did. The trial court then asked De La Rosa if her signature appeared on

the jury wavier and De La Rosa answered in the affirmative. The trial court explained that a jury

consists of 12 people selected by defendant, defense counsel, and the State, and that all 12 would

have to find De La Rosa guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court then asked whether

De La Rosa “understood the nature of the charges” and De La Rosa answered affirmatively. The

record contains De La Rosa’s signed jury waiver dated May 25, 2021. The document states that

       1
           Because the complainant was a minor, we elect to refer to her by her initials.

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No. 1-21-0994

“the undersigned [(De La Rosa)], do hereby waive jury trial and submit the above entitled cause

to the Court for hearing.”

¶7       A.P. testified that on October 15, 2018, she attended Larkin High School in Elgin and

played in a “powder puff,” inter-grade football game. After the game, as A.P. was looking for her

coach, De La Rosa—whom A.P. identified in court—came onto the field, put her hand in A.P.’s

face, and would not let A.P. “get past.” A.P. had not spoken or gestured toward De La Rosa.

De La Rosa’s hand was six inches from A.P.’s face. De La Rosa told A.P. not to say anything to

De La Rosa’s daughter, called her a “b***,” and hit her. A.P. hit De La Rosa back, and De La Rosa

pulled A.P.’s hair. De La Rosa’s daughter, Ni. G., then “ran up” and punched A.P.2 A.P. believed

that one of De La Rosa’s other daughters was also involved. The incident lasted a few minutes,

during which De La Rosa and her daughters punched A.P. in the face. After school administrators

stopped the fight, A.P. was involved in a second fight. She was later taken to a hospital and

diagnosed with a concussion. A.P. identified photographs of her injuries, stating that De La Rosa

scratched her cheek and caused bruising underneath her eye. Additionally, A.P.’s nails were

“broken off.”

¶8       The parties stipulated to the foundation of several photographs and that they accurately

depicted A.P.’s injuries. These photographs were entered into evidence and are included in the

record on appeal. They depict a young African-American woman with a scratch to her left cheek

that runs from her eye to the edge of her nostril. Another photo shows a hand with painted acrylic

nails and blood on the middle, ring, and pinky fingers. The final photograph depicts a bloody pinky

nail missing a painted fingernail, and the other fingers’ acrylic nails broken at the fingertips.

         2
             For clarity, we will refer to De La Rosa’s daughters, who were minors at the time, as Ni. G. and
Na. G.

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No. 1-21-0994

¶9     During cross-examination, A.P. denied participating in “trash talk” before the game.

Although her team lost, she was not upset or yelling. She denied that she and her teammates

surrounded Ni. G., and that De La Rosa separated them. A.P. hit De La Rosa after De La Rosa hit

her. She did not remember telling a police officer that she punched De La Rosa more than twice

but less than five times. Three fights took place after the game.

¶ 10   De La Rosa testified that in 2018, her daughters Ni. G. and Na. G. attended Larkin High

School. Ni. G. was a senior and Na. G. was a sophomore, and both girls played on their class

powder puff football teams. The final game on October 15, 2018, was the sophomores versus the

juniors. The sophomores were the underdogs but won the game. De La Rosa, along with other

adults, went to the field to congratulate the team and take pictures.

¶ 11   Once on the field, De La Rosa saw a group of 20 juniors “having words” with Ni. G.

De La Rosa approached, told them to stop, and instructed Ni. G. to join her friends elsewhere.

When De La Rosa turned around, she was hit twice in the face and “buckled” at the knees. She

remembered who hit her but did not know the girl’s name at that time. De La Rosa was later told

A.P.’s name. Ni. G. returned and began fighting with A.P.; a larger fight then began.

¶ 12   De La Rosa approached a police officer and stated that a girl struck her on the field. The

officer told De La Rosa to leave until the fight was under control. As De La Rosa left, she

encountered the school’s dean and told him that she was struck by a child. The officer approached

De La Rosa and stated that he told her to leave the field. De La Rosa identified the person who

struck her to the dean and was told to leave the field while things “de-escalated.” De La Rosa did

not put her hands in anyone’s face, touch anyone, or pull anyone’s hair.

¶ 13   During cross-examination, De La Rosa acknowledged telling a police officer that Ni. G.

and A.P. fought. She denied stating that the “African-American” girl “ ‘swung’ ” at her, and they

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No. 1-21-0994

“ ‘both got up to fighting with each other.’ ” She was not angry when she saw A.P. having words

with Ni. G.; rather, she was concerned for their safety. Although De La Rosa approached A.P., she

remained six feet away.

¶ 14   During redirect, De La Rosa agreed that she told the officer that “ ‘The African-American

girl then swung on [Ni. G.][3], and they both got to fighting with each other.’ ”

¶ 15   Ni. G. testified that she went to the field to cheer for her sister. After the sophomores won

their game, members of the other team, including A.P., were “aggressive.” The first time Ni. G.

saw A.P., A.P. was hitting De La Rosa. A.P. “cocked her hand back” and struck De La Rosa with

a “full fist,” causing De La Rosa to fall. De La Rosa did not touch anyone prior to falling. Rather,

she stood between the groups. After De La Rosa fell, there was no other physical contact between

De La Rosa and A.P. Ni. G. approached A.P. and asked if A.P. hit De La Rosa. A.P. stated she did

and then punched Ni. G. in the face. Ni. G. hit back. After teachers separated the girls, A.P. “came

at” Ni. G. a second time.

¶ 16   During cross-examination, Ni. G. denied that De La Rosa hit A.P. Ni. G. did not recall how

many times she hit A.P. De La Rosa was initially in the stands and then went to the field.

¶ 17   The defense entered body camera footage from a police officer that defense counsel argued

supported De La Rosa’s and Ni. G.’s testimony. The footage was admitted, published, and is

included in the record on appeal.

¶ 18   This court has reviewed the footage, which is approximately 13 minutes and 29 seconds

long. The first 30 seconds lack audio and visual components. The audio component begins at 31

       3
         Although not clear from the transcript, based on De La Rosa’s testimony, we infer that she was
referring to Ni. G.

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No. 1-21-0994

seconds and the visual component begins at 2 minutes and 43 seconds. The sound cuts in and out,

with constant screaming, yelling, and multiple voices in the background.

¶ 19   Initially, in the portion of the video that only contains an audio component, a male voice

yells “stop” several times, “get off the field,” and “knock it off.” Another voice says, “jumped

her.” The male voice says, “get off the field” and “wait over there for me please.” A female voice

says, “where’s [Ni. G.],” and another female voice says, “I don’t know where my sister is.” The

male voice says, “wait over there” and “we will handle it.” A female voice replies, “not handled

when she just got [inaudible] by 10 different people.” A voice says, “the mom hit first.” Then a

male voice says, “hey, you need to go now” and “stop.” Another voice says, “that’s a parent and

she cold cocked her three times in the face [inaudible] that student.” The male voice says, “calm

down.” A voice says, “she over there.” Then someone screams, “Mom” repeatedly. A voice says,

“here they go again.” There is additional screaming and a male voice yells, “stop.”

¶ 20   When the visual component of the video begins, a football field and track are depicted, and

people are milling around. A woman says, “my daughter is upset.” A.P. says, “someone pulled my

hair.” A.P. is held by a woman, as A.P. screams “no” repeatedly. As an older woman and others

try to comfort A.P. and say “relax,” A.P. yells, speaks incoherently, stumbles, and cries. Although

A.P. says she is fine, an ambulance is called. At one point a voice says, “that parent jumped on

four kids.”

¶ 21   In closing argument, the State argued that it was incredible that De La Rosa never struck

A.P., noting that in the video A.P. was crying in her mother’s arms. Moreover, De La Rosa

admitted to leaving the stands and being in an altercation with high school students. The defense

responded that De La Rosa denied any physical contact with A.P. and that De La Rosa’s and

Ni. G.’s version of events was credible and unimpeached.

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No. 1-21-0994

¶ 22   The trial court then asked whether the video depicted one of De La Rosa’s daughters

beating A.P., and defense counsel answered in the negative. The trial court then noted that on the

video, A.P.’s mother indicated that her daughter had been hit “ ‘again’ ” by someone else. Defense

counsel replied that was the “point,” namely, that multiple people were involved in multiple fights.

Defense counsel asserted that A.P. was the “initial instigator,” and that the video did not depict

De La Rosa or her daughters instigating the fight. The trial court clarified that the video did not

begin until after the alleged contact between A.P. and De La Rosa ended, and asked whether

De La Rosa was arrested for “no reason.” Defense counsel replied that “it happens all the time.”

After the trial court stated there was “no doubt” that multiple people hit A.P., defense counsel

argued that none of the others were arrested or identified, and their actions should not be

“impute[d]” to De La Rosa.

¶ 23   In rebuttal, the State argued that it did not make “any sense” for A.P. to fabricate that De

La Rosa hit her. Ni. G. admitted to hitting A.P. multiple times, and De La Rosa’s explanation that

she went to the field to take photographs was incredible.

¶ 24   In finding De La Rosa guilty, the trial court noted the “animosity” after the sophomores

won the game and found it incredible that this animosity became hostile a “split second” after

De La Rosa went to the field. The trial court did not find De La Rosa or Ni. G. credible, noting

that when De La Rosa told an administrator she was struck, he told her to leave, but De La Rosa

did not comply. The trial court had “no doubt” that De La Rosa battered A.P., as De La Rosa’s

testimony did not “jibe.” The trial court did not believe that De La Rosa went to the field to “just

to take a picture,” and, even if she did, the situation soon turned hostile. Although the trial court

believed that A.P. was “egging” people on, she did not deserve to be beaten. De La Rosa filed a

motion for a new trial and a motion to reconsider, which were denied.

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No. 1-21-0994

¶ 25    At sentencing, the State argued in aggravation that De La Rosa had a 2000 felony

conviction for theft by deception and five misdemeanor convictions. In mitigation, defense counsel

argued, in relevant part, that De La Rosa’s criminal background was “at least 20 years old,” except

for one traffic offense.

¶ 26    The trial court imposed a sentence of 14 days in the Cook County Department of

Corrections and 1 year of conditional discharge. De La Rosa did not file a motion to reconsider

sentence.

¶ 27                                         II. ANALYSIS

¶ 28    On appeal, De La Rosa first contends that the trial court violated her constitutional rights

to a jury trial and to due process of law when it accepted her jury waiver without providing

adequate admonishments. She argues that the trial court’s “fleeting” and “perfunctory”

admonishments fail to establish that she knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her right

to a jury trial. Although she acknowledges her signed jury waiver, she asserts that this document

does not compensate for inadequate admonishments. De La Rosa acknowledges that she did not

preserve this issue for review and asks this court to review it under the second prong of the plain

error rule.

¶ 29    The State responds that no error occurred, and moreover, the record establishes that

De La Rosa’s waiver was knowing and voluntary when the parties repeatedly discussed the case

proceeding to a bench trial in De La Rosa’s presence without any objection from De La Rosa. The

State also argues De La Rosa signed a jury waiver, which she confirmed in open court, the trial

court gave her sufficient admonishments, and De La Rosa’s criminal background demonstrated

her familiarity with her right to a jury trial.

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No. 1-21-0994

¶ 30   Under the plain error doctrine, we may review unpreserved error when an error occurred

and either (1) “the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales

of justice against the defendant,” or (2) “that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the

defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010). “Whether a defendant’s fundamental

right to a jury trial has been violated is a matter that may be considered under the plain error rule.”

People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 270 (2004). A defendant bears the burden of persuasion under

both prongs. People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2009). Because there can be no plain error without

error, we must first determine whether error occurred. People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121, ¶ 19.

¶ 31   The right to a jury trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the federal and state

constitutions. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13; see also People v.

Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 65 (2008). Although the right to a jury trial is fundamental, a defendant

may waive that right. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 269. To be valid, however, a defendant’s waiver “must

be knowingly and understandingly made.” Id.; 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 2018) (“[e]very person

accused of an offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless *** understandingly waived by

defendant in open court”).

¶ 32   There is no formulaic admonishment that a trial court must provide before accepting a jury

waiver; the validity of a waiver depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Bannister,

232 Ill. 2d at 66. A written jury waiver, as required by section 115-1 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-1 (West 2018)), “is one means by which a defendant’s intent”

to waive the right to a jury trial “may be established”; however, it is not “always” dispositive of a

valid waiver. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 269-70. Moreover, a reviewing court may consider a

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No. 1-21-0994

defendant’s silence when defense counsel requests a bench trial, and the defendant’s “prior

interactions with the justice system.” People v. Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498, ¶ 7.

¶ 33    The critical determination is whether a defendant waived the right to a jury trial with the

understanding that “the facts of the case will be determined by a judge and not a jury.” Bannister,

232 Ill. 2d at 69. A defendant has the burden to establish that his or her jury waiver was invalid.

Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498, ¶ 7. We review whether a defendant knowingly waived the right

to a jury trial de novo. Id.

¶ 34    In the case at bar, the particular facts and circumstances support the finding that

De La Rosa’s waiver of her right to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary. Initially, the record

reveals that defense counsel stated that De La Rosa wished to proceed by way of bench trial

multiple times in De La Rosa ’s presence and De La Rosa never objected or asked questions. See

id. (“a present defendant’s silence while his or her attorney requests a bench trial provides evidence

that the waiver is valid”). Additionally, De La Rosa submitted a jury waiver indicating she did not

wish to have a jury trial. See People v. Gatlin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143644, ¶ 14 (“Although not

dispositive of a valid waiver, a written waiver may provide evidence that the defendant knowingly

relinquished his right to a jury trial.”). The trial court first explained the charges and possible

penalties, and De La Rosa confirmed that she understood them. The trial court then asked De La

Rosa if her signature was on the jury waiver; she stated it was. The trial court next stated that a

jury consists of 12 people selected by De La Rosa, defense counsel, and the State, and that all 12

would have to find De La Rosa guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. De La Rosa stated she

understood.

¶ 35    De La Rosa is correct that the trial court did not explain that in a bench trial the facts of the

case are determined by the judge and did not ask whether the waiver resulted from threats or

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No. 1-21-0994

promises. However, the trial court did explain that in a jury trial, De La Rosa, along with her

attorney and the State, would pick a 12-person jury that would have to “unanimously” find her

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. A commonsense understanding of the trial court’s statement

would be that if De La Rosa did not choose a jury, a jury would not determine her guilt.

Additionally, the jury waiver signed by De La Rosa stated that she “waive[d] jury trial and

submit[ed] the *** cause to the [c]ourt for hearing.” In other words, the case was to be heard by

the trial court rather than a jury.

¶ 36    Ultimately, however, the trial court is not required to recite specific admonishments before

allowing a defendant to waive the right to a jury trial (Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66), and the

dispositive question is whether De La Rosa understood that her trial would be decided by the trial

court rather than a jury (Reed, 2016 IL App (1st) 140498, ¶ 7). The record establishes that the trial

court ensured that De La Rosa knew that her case would be decided by the court rather than a jury,

fulfilling the trial court’s duty to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver.

¶ 37    Moreover, De La Rosa’s prior interactions with the justice system, including one felony

conviction and multiple misdemeanor convictions, further supports the conclusion that her jury

waiver was knowing and voluntary. De La Rosa has therefore failed to establish that her jury

waiver was invalid. Id. As the trial court did not err, there can be no plain error (Eppinger, 2013

IL 114121, ¶ 19), and De La Rosa’s argument fails.

¶ 38    De La Rosa next contends that she was denied effective assistance when defense counsel

used the body camera footage. She argues that the video contained inadmissible hearsay statements

and other-crimes evidence that “bolstered” the State’s case “when the evidence of guilt was closely

balanced.”

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No. 1-21-0994

¶ 39   Ineffective assistance claims are evaluated under the standard set forth in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) defense

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s

deficient performance. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90. A reasonable probability is a

“probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

¶ 40   Defense counsel has wide latitude in making tactical decisions, and there is a presumption

that counsel’s conduct reflected sound trial strategy. People v. Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 433 (2010).

This court is highly deferential of defense counsel’s performance. People v. McGath, 2017 IL App

(4th) 150608, ¶ 38. We use this deferential standard because “[t]here are countless ways to provide

effective assistance in any given case.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The failure to satisfy either

Strickland prong is fatal to a defendant’s claim. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 90.

¶ 41   Here, De La Rosa alleges that she was denied effective assistance by defense counsel’s

decision to use the body camera footage, as it contained inadmissible hearsay statements—

including a statement that De La Rosa hit other students and the declarant—that bolstered the

State’s case. She further argues that the Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (Act)

(50 ILCS 706/10-1 et seq. (West 2018)) does not override the rules of evidence governing hearsay.

See People v. Andrade, 2021 IL App (2d) 190797-U, ¶ 23 (“nothing in this section manifests an

intent to override the normal rules of evidence regarding relevancy and hearsay”); see also Ill. S.

Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021) (nonprecedential Appellate Court orders entered on or after

January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes).

¶ 42   The Act is intended to “provide impartial evidence and documentation to settle disputes

and allegations of officer misconduct.” 50 ILCS 706/10-5 (West 2018). With limited exceptions,

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No. 1-21-0994

the Act requires officers to activate their cameras when “engaged in any law enforcement-related

encounter or activity, that occurs while the officer is on duty.” Id. § 10-20(a)(3). “ ‘Law

enforcement-related encounters or activities’ include, but are not limited to, traffic

stops, *** arrests, searches, interrogations, investigations, *** or any other instance in which the

officer is enforcing the laws of the municipality, county, or State.” Id. § 10-10. Pertinent to the

dispute before us, section 10-30 states that “recordings may be used as evidence in any

administrative, judicial, legislative, or disciplinary proceeding.” Id. § 10-30.

¶ 43   Hearsay denotes a statement made by an out-of-court declarant that is offered to prove the

truth of the matter asserted. Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). Hearsay evidence is generally

inadmissible, subject to certain exceptions. In re Jovan A., 2014 IL App (1st) 103835, ¶ 23; see

also Ill. R. Evid. 802 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). However, “testimony about an out-of-court statement

which is used for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement is

not “hearsay.’ ” People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 313 (1998) (quoting People v. Simms, 143 Ill.

2d 154, 173 (1991)).

¶ 44   This court has previously held that the plain language of the Act permits the trial court to

exclude body-worn camera recordings “where appropriate” and does not include an express

exception to the Rules of Evidence. See People v. Collins, 2020 IL App (1st) 181746, ¶¶ 24, 27,

appeal dismissed, 2022 IL 127584 (finding that the General Assembly “did not intend limitless

admission of body-worn camera video”).

¶ 45   As an initial matter, the parties dispute the admissibility of the body camera footage and

whether the statements therein are hearsay. However, these arguments were not made before the

trial court. Further, these arguments overlook several key points. First, as discussed, the audio is

poor and there is constant screaming and background noise. This court reviewed the footage

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No. 1-21-0994

several times and did not hear several of the complained-of statements recited in De La Rosa’s

brief. Second, defense counsel did not offer the video for the truth of the matters asserted in the

statements that were audible in the footage. Rather, defense counsel offered the video to establish

the chaotic nature of the incident and that A.P.’s demeanor rendered A.P.’s identification of De La

Rosa as the person who struck her incredible. In other words, trial counsel sought to cast A.P. as

an unreliable narrator of the night’s events.

¶ 46   Ultimately, De La Rosa’s argument, as detailed in her reply brief, is that she was denied

effective assistance by defense counsel’s failure to redact “the objectionable statements from the

video.” She asserts that absent the admission of the unredacted footage, a reasonable likelihood

exists that the trial court would have found her not guilty.

¶ 47   Decisions concerning what evidence to present at trial are considered matters of trial

strategy that are generally immune from ineffective assistance claims. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d

418, 432 (1999). Here, defense counsel used the body camera footage to emphasize the chaotic

nature of that night and attack A.P.’s identification of De La Rosa as the person who struck her.

Indeed, defense counsel argued during closing argument that the actions of others were imputed

to De La Rosa, who was arrested in error. The mere fact that defense counsel’s strategy was

unsuccessful does not mean that defense counsel was deficient. A strategy must be more than

unsuccessful to support a Strickland claim, and “must appear irrational and unreasonable in light

of the circumstances that defense counsel confronted at the time.” People v. Faulkner, 292 Ill.

App. 3d 391, 394 (1997).

¶ 48   Here, it was not irrational for defense counsel to attempt to show the chaotic nature of

events and attack A.P.’s credibility. Even if this strategy appears in retrospect to be erroneous, this

would not render counsel’s representation constitutionally deficient. People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d

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No. 1-21-0994

465, 479-80 (1994) (an error in “judgment or trial strategy” does not establish incompetence, and

trial performance should not be “judged by a hindsight perspective”). Defense counsel could

reasonably have decided that the body camera footage, which depicts numerous people screaming

and an incoherent A.P., would have helped the defense theory that De La Rosa did not strike her.

¶ 49    Even if we were to agree with De La Rosa that defense counsel was deficient, she still fails

to establish prejudice. The trial court expressly found De La Rosa and her daughter to be incredible

witnesses. Contrary to De La Rosa’s argument on appeal that the trial court found her incredible

because the footage showed that De La Rosa was present after being told to leave, the footage

corroborated De La Rosa’s own testimony that she did not leave. Additionally, as the trial court

noted, the footage did not depict the alleged interaction between A.P. and De La Rosa, only the

aftermath.

¶ 50    In finding De La Rosa guilty, the trial court specifically rejected De La Rosa’s explanation

for her presence on the field and her assertion that she was struck first, and found the testimony of

De La Rosa and her daughter incredible. “[W]hen a trial court is the trier of fact a reviewing court

presumes that the trial court considered only admissible evidence and disregarded inadmissible

evidence in reaching its conclusion.” People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 603 (2008). Thus, even if,

as De La Rosa claims, the body camera footage contained hearsay statements, we presume the trial

court did not consider them. See, e.g., People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 32 (1997) (the court is

presumed to know the law and apply it correctly). Because De La Rosa has failed to establish a

reasonable likelihood that, without the body camera footage, the trial court would have found her

not guilty, her ineffective assistance claim fails.

¶ 51                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 52    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

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No. 1-21-0994

¶ 53   Affirmed.

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