Court Opinion

ID: 9844516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:04:00.688075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:36.615276
License: Public Domain

Donworth, J.
(dissenting)—The majority, in my opinion, has speculated as to what it believes the legislature was “trying to say” (but did not say) in Rem. Supp. 1945, § 11201, instead of applying to the words actually used therein the meaning which the context indicates that the legislature intended.
The majority also says that it finds no ambiguity in § 11201. It seems to me that the discussion accorded by the majority to the meaning of the words “which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritance of this or any other state” is an implicit recognition of an ambiguity therein. The position of the majority in holding that, there is no ambiguity in § 11201, and that there is therefore no need to interpret the statute strictly, seems to be achieved by ignoring or reading out of the statute the words “of this or any other state.”
In interpreting this section, two cardinal principles of statutory interpretation relating to taxing acts must be kept in mind:
First, as stated in In re Knight’s Estate, 31 Wn. (2d) 813, 199 P. (2d) 89:
“An inheritance tax, like any other tax, is a legal imposition exclusively of statutory origin, and, consequently, any liability for payment thereof must be found in the statute, or else it does not exist.” (Italics mine.)
Second, in Pacific First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Pierce County, 27 Wn. (2d) 347, 178 P. (2d) 351, we said:
“It is the law of this state that, in case of doubt, taxing statutes are construed in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing power. Union Trust Co. v. Spokane County, 145 *692Wash. 193, 259 Pac. 9; Denny v. Wooster, 175 Wash. 272, 27 P. (2d) 328; and State ex rel. Tacoma School Dist. v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P. (2d) 638.”
With these rules as guides, I turn to a consideration of the wording of § 11201, supra:
“All property within the jurisdiction of this state, and any interest therein, whether belonging to the inhabitants of this state or not, and whether tangible or intangible, which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritance of this or any other state . . . shall, for the use of the state, be subject to a tax. ...”
The majority holds that this language indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to tax all property passing by will “whether belonging to the inhabitants of this state or not.” It is also held that, since title to the “Fan-tome” passed by a will, the words “or by the statutes of inheritance of this or any other state” may be disregarded.
The majority cites in support of its interpretation the decision of the United States supreme court in Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 46 L. Ed. 697, 22 S. Ct. 515, where similar language in a Federal inheritance tax act was interpreted as applying both to property passing by will and property passing by intestacy statutes. As .1 read that decision, it supports the opposite conclusion.
The precise language of the statute then before the court was:
“Any person or persons having' in charge or trust, as administrators, executors or trustees, any legacies or distributive shares arising from personal property . . . passing . . . from any person possessed of such property, either by will or by the intestate laws of any State or Territory, shall be, and hereby are, made subject to a duty or tax,
In holding that the Federal statute was applicable whether the decedent left a will or died intestate, the court said:
“The question involved in this case, however, arose under the act of June 30, 1864, before Mr. Justice Gray of this court, while holding the Circuit Court for Massachusetts, in *693United States v. Hunnewell, 13 Fed. Rep. 617. Section 124 of that act imposed a duty on legacies or distributive shares arising from personal property passing from any person possessed of such property, either by will, or by the intestate laws of any State or Territory. The action was brought to recover the tax upon American securities bequeathed by a French citizen domiciled in France to a son, who was also domiciled there. The will was executed in conformity with the French law and was duly proved there, though a local executor was appointed by the probate court in Boston to transfer to the legatee the securities in question. It was held that section 124 did not make the duty payable when the person possessed of such property died testate if it would not be payable if such person died intestate; and as if the deceased had .died intestate her son would not have taken a distributive share by the intestate laws of -any State or Territory, his rights were the same if he took by will. In other words, that the words ‘either by will or by the intestate laws of any State or Territory’ must be construed together, and would apply only to wills executed within any State or Territory of the United States. The case is precisely in point.”
The majority in interpreting the portion of Rem. Supp. 1945, § 11201, above quoted, holds that it should be read as though there were a comma after the word “will.” I am, however, persuaded by the logic of the Eidman case, supra, that the phrase in the statute “which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritance of this or any other state” does not permit of such interpretation, and that no distinction can be made between cases where property passes by will and where it passes by the statutes of intestacy.
To interpret the phrase otherwise would result in an inconsistency. In view of my conclusion as to the meaning of the words “of this or any other state” (hereinafter expressed), if the majority’s interpretation of the preceding language be correct, the result is that tangible personal property of a foreign decedent located within this state would be subject to liability for inheritance tax if it passed by will, but there would be no such liability if it passed by statutes of inheritance. It is not reasonable to presume that the legislature intended such an arbitrary and in*694equitable distinction. The words “of this or any other state” must therefore relate to and modify both “will” and “statutes of inheritance.”
I next consider the meaning of the words “of this or any other state” as used in Rem. Supp. 1945, § 11201. The majority holds that the words “any other state” include not only other states of the United States, but also foreign nations. This conclusion is reached by emphasizing certain words in the statute and ignoring others of equal importance. Referring to the “crucial phrase,” to wit, “which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritance,” and without any consideration given to the meaning of the words “of this or any other state,” the majority says:
“It is consistent with the general meaning of the statute that the crucial phrase means that, upon the, death of the owner thereof, all property, located within the jurisdiction of this state, passing by will or by the laws of inheritance of any sovereignty, shall be subject to Washington state inheritance tax.” (Italics by the court.)
Thus is achieved, as a fait accompli, without due consideration having been given to the context, an interpretation of the words “of this or any other state.” In my opinion, the quoted language begs the question as to the meaning of the entire phrase “which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritance of this or any other state.”
Callahan v. Woodbridge, 171 Mass. 595, 51 N. E. 176 (relied upon by the majority), arose out of an ancillary probate proceeding had in Massachusetts upon the estate of a deceased resident of New York. The Massachusetts statute, under which the ancillary administration was instituted, provided:
“When administration is taken in this commonwealth on the estate of a person who was an inhabitant of any other state or country, his estate found here shall, after payment of his debts, be disposed of according to his last will, if he left any duly executed according to law; otherwise his real estate shall descend according to the laws of this commonwealth, and his personal estate shall be distributed and disposed of according to the laws of the state or country of *695which he was an inhabitant.” Pub. Stats., c. 138, § 1. (Italics mine.)
The jurisdiction of the courts of this state has not been invoked by respondents in an ancillary administration proceeding here upon the only asset of the Guinness estate located in this state.
The Massachusetts taxing act was upon “property . . . which shall pass by will or by the laws of the Commonwealth regulating intestate succession.” The Massachusetts court held that this language was broad enough to authorize a tax upon the transfer of local assets owned by a deceased resident of New York whose estate was being ancillarily administered in Massachusetts.
We have in this state no act comparable to the above-quoted Massachusetts statute regulating the descent or distribution of property of nonresidents, nor is the wording of the Massachusetts taxing act sufficiently similar to the inheritance tax act now before the court to warrant acceptance of the Callahan case as authority for the majority decision that the transfer of title to the “Fantome” is subject to the Washington inheritance tax act.
The majority refers to appellant’s argument to the effect that Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 11202-lp [P.P.C. § 974-117], evidences an intention by the legislature to tax, in § 11201, supra, the estates of nonresidents of the United States.
Section 11202-lp, supra, reads as follows:
“It is further provided, that there shall be no exemption allowed where the decedent was not a resident of a territory or state of the United States, and the property of such decedent shall be taxable whether same is tangible or intangible property, including certificates of stock, bonds, bill, notes, bank deposits, and other written evidences of intangible property which are physically situated within the State of Washington, or where the domicile of the debtor is in the State of Washington.” (Italics mine.)
This provision is part of a long section, the introductory part of which reads:
“An inheritance tax shall be imposed on all estates sub*696ject to this act and other inheritance tax acts of the State of Washington, at the following rates: ...”
The “estates subject to this act” are described in § 11201. The function of § 11202-lp is to establish the rates of taxation for estates to which the inheritance tax act applies. The latter section does not purport to amend the former; they were both included in chapter 180, Laws of 1935.
Subsequent to the enactment of this section (§ 11202-lp) in 1935, the legislature has re-enacted § 11201 twice without any change in the wording with which we are here concerned. In fact, the same language “of this or any other state” appeared in the original inheritance tax act in 1901 and § 11201 (in which it is found) has been re-enacted six times without any change so far as concerns the quoted phrase. See chapter 217, p. 499, Laws of 1907; chapter 146, p. 593, Laws of 1917; chapter 180, p. 706, Laws of 1935; chapter 106, p. 420, Laws of 1937; chapter 184, p. 534, Laws of 1945; and chapter 218, p. 710, Laws of 1949 (which became effective subsequent to the testator’s death).
If, as appellant contends, § 11202-lp was intended to change the meaning of § 11201, the legislature would not have re-enacted it threé times since 1935 without changing the language now under consideration. The tax was levied by §11201 (not by § 11202-lp), and the language with which we are here concerned has not been changed by the legislature in fifty, years since its original enactment.
Where the same word or phrase is used more than once in the same statute relating to the same subject matter, it is ordinarily presumed that the legislature intended that it be given the same meaning throughout unless the context requires that it be given a different meaning in different parts of the statute.
This rule was recently applied by the supreme court of Ohio in construing the workmen’s compensation act. In State ex rel. Bohan v. Industrial Commission, 146 Ohio St. 618, 67 N. E. (2d) 536, it was said:
“It is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that where the same word or phrase is used more than once *697in a statute, in relation to the same subject and the same purpose, if it is clear in one connection and doubtful or obscure in another, it will have the same construction in the latter as in the former, unless a different construction is plainly called for. Rhodes v. Weldy, 46 Ohio St., 234, 20 N. E. 461; Chilcote, Gdn., v. Hoffman, 97 Ohio St., 98, 119 N. E. 364.”
See, also, State ex rel. Gary Taxpayers’ Ass’n v. Lake Superior Court, 225 Ind. 478, 76 N. E. (2d) 254.
In Rem. Supp. 1945, § 11201, the legislature used the words “this state” twice before using the phrase “of this or any other state.” In each instance “this state” obviously refers to the state of Washington. I find nothing in the context to support the holding that the words “of this or any other state” were intended to refer to any sovereignty except the state of Washington or a similar state, to wit, one of the United States.
The well-recognized ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction is that where general words follow the designation of particular things, or classes of persons or subjects, the general words will usually be construed to include only those persons or things of the same class or general nature as those specifically enumerated. Crawford, Statutory Construction (1940 ed.), 326, § 191. Courts have frequently applied this rule where the word “other” has been preceded not by a list of several things, but by a single word, and where the context of the statute called for application of the principle embodied in the rule. Lorenz v. Campbell, 110 Vt. 200, 3 A. (2d) 548; Crystal Spring Distillery Co. v. Cox, 49 Fed. 555; State Sav. Loan & Trust Co. v. Swimmer, 208 Mo. App. 503, 236 S. W. 1057; Ex parte Van Winkle, 3 N. J. 348, 70 A. (2d) 167; State ex rel. Churchill v. Hay, 45 Neb. 321, 63 N. W. 821.
In my opinion, the context of § 11201 clearly calls for application of the rule of ejusdem generis, and the words “of this or any other state” bear the logical interpretation “of this state of Washington or any similar state.” Only states of the United States can be fairly held to be similar to the state of Washington.
*698If the legislature, in enacting the statute before us, had intended to include within its scope a foreign nation (such as Great Britain, for example), it could have easily employed language which would have plainly included a class of states different from the state of Washington. The wording used in the original and six later enactments of § 11201 must be held to include only a state similar to the state of Washington.
My conclusion is supported by the decision of the United States supreme court in Eidman v. Martinez, supra, wherein that court, in referring to certain state statutes which contained similar wording but did include a specific reference to the property of deceased nonresident aliens, said:
“If, as in several of the States, the words ‘passing by will or by the intestate laws of this State,’ or similar words, are connected with words declaring that the tax was intended to be imposed upon the estates of persons domiciled abroad, the latter provision is held to apply, and the words ‘passing by will or the intestate laws of this State’ are held to include the estates of persons domiciled abroad. Such is the case in Illinois: Billings v. People of Illinois, 189 Ill. 472; Massachusetts: Callahan v. Woodbridge, 171 Mass. 595; Greves v. Shaw, 173 Mass. 205; Maine: State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495; Ohio: Laws of 1894, p. 166; Connecticut: Laws of 1889, p. 106; Tennessee: State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674. But it is hardly necessary to say that the construction given to these statutes would have no application to cases where words expressly providing for the estates of non-residents are omitted.” (Italics mine.)
The Eidman case disposes of another basis for the majority opinion, namely, that by applying the law of Great Britain for the purpose of determining who are the legatees of the testator the state of Washington has, for the purposes of the present case, adopted the British law as part of our statutes of inheritance. Hence, it is said that the “Fantome” passed to respondents by the laws of this state within the purview of Rem. Supp. 1945, § 11201.
A similar contention was rejected by the United States supreme court in the Eidman case in the following language:
*699“To say that we recognize by comity the law of a foreign domicil as controlling the transmission or succession of personal property because it thereby becomes our law, (and the property therefore taxable) as is indicated in some cases, notable in Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones Eq. 51, is misleading and little more than a play upon words. When we speak of our laws we mean to be understood as referring to our own statutory laws or the common law we inherited from the mother country, and when we apply the laws of a foreign domicil we do so, not because they are our laws, but because upon principles of comity we recognize those laws as applicable to the particular case. But to speak of such foreign laws as thereby becoming ‘the intestate laws of any State or Territory,’ wherein they are enforced, is practically to confound the whole distinction between the law of the situs and the law of the domicil. We do not enforce the law of Spain in this case because it is our law, but because the practice of all civilized nations is to recognize the law of the domicil as governing the transmission and inheritance of personal property, and to prevent the confusion that would follow, if estates, situated possibly in half a dozen countries, were administered and distributed according to the laws of each country in which any portion of such estate happened to be located. We decline to hold the tax involved in this case applicable to this estate because the words of the statute do not require it, and because the thing taxed, that is, the transmission of the property to the legatees or next of kin, takes place in a foreign country.”
Whatever effect is given by this state to the laws of Great Britain, in determining who are the legatees of the testator, arises by virtue of principles of comity and not by reason of our statutes of inheritance.
The majority states that there is no ambiguity in § 11201, supra. But the fact that the members of the court entertain such divergent opinions as to its meaning would strongly indicate that this is not correct. Since there appear to be two possible interpretations, the court is bound to adopt the one favorable to the taxpayer and against the taxing power. Pacific First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Pierce County, supra. The majority does not apply the rule to this case.
*700However desirable the collection of an inheritance tax 'may be under the circumstances of this case, we are bound by the language actually used by the legislature in § 11201, supra, and should interpret its ambiguous wording most favorably to the taxpayer. The majority opinion, as I view it, substitutes words in this section which the legislature did not use and has persisted in not using for more than fifty years.
For the reasons stated herein, I am of the opinion that the legislature, in enacting Rem. Supp. 1945, § 11201, did not manifest an intention to levy an inheritance tax upon the transfer by will of tangible personal property located in this state and owned by a nonresident of the United States whose will was executed and probated in a foreign country.
Since, as I view it, the legislature in enacting § 11201, supra, has not attempted to tax a transfer of title such as we now have before us, it is not necessary to determine in this case whether the state has the power to tax such a transfer.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Schwellenbach, C. J., Grady, and Hill, JJ., concur with Donworth, J.
September 6, 1952. Petition for rehearing ordered withdrawn upon stipulation.