Court Opinion

ID: 9409694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 07:00:20.731181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:52.752748
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     YAW S. OBENG,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DC-0752-20-0124-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,                         DATE: July 18, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Charles W. Day, Jr., Esquire, Rockville, Maryland, for the appellant.

           Ashley Geisendorfer, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross
     petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained the charge of failure to
     follow safety procedures but mitigated the demotion penalty to a 30 -day
     suspension. Generally, we grant petitions such as these only in the following

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner ’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party has
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross
     petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the cross
     petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board ’s
     final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was previously employed as ZP-V Research Scientist with the
     agency. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 87. By a letter dated November 14,
     2018, the agency proposed to demote the appellant (with a resulting loss in pay)
     from the ZP-V pay band to a ZP-IV Research Chemist position, based on the
     charge of failure to follow safety procedures with a single specification.        Id.
     at 146-53. In the narrative description under the charge, the agency alleged that
     the appellant accessed a laboratory at his place of employment, the National
     Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), without authorization, and
     completed a procedure cleaning a silicon wafer with hydrofluoric acid (HF)
     without obtaining necessary permission or approval, and without u sing proper
     required personal protective equipment (PPE).       Id. at 149-50.    The appellant
     provided a written reply and an oral response to the proposal, as well as a
     supplemental written reply.    Id. at 98, 100-38, 140-44.     After considering the
                                                                                          3

     appellant’s replies, the deciding official issued a decision letter sustaining the
     charge and the demotion penalty. Id. at 89-96.
¶3         The appellant subsequently filed a formal equal employment opportunity
     (EEO) complaint alleging that the agency discriminated against him on the basis
     of race (Black), national origin (Ghana), and age (61 years of age) when it
     demoted him. Id. at 33-38. The agency issued a final agency decision (FAD)
     finding no discrimination and provided the appellant with Board appeal rights for
     his mixed-case complaint. 2 Id. at 40-85. The appellant timely filed the instant
     Board appeal challenging his demotion and reduction in pay, arguing that the
     charge was unsupported, and that the penalty was unreasonable and the deciding
     official failed to properly apply the Douglas 3 factors in making his penalty
     determination. IAF, Tab 1 at 1-5. The appellant also raised affirmative defenses
     of discrimination based on his race, national origin, and age.        Id. at 5. After
     holding the appellant’s requested hearing, see IAF, Tab 21, Hearing Compact
     Disc (HCD), the administrative judge issued an initial decision that sustained the
     charge of failure to follow safety procedures and found nexus between the charge
     and the efficiency of the service, but mitigated the demotion penalty to a 30-day
     suspension as the maximum reasonable penalty, IAF, Tab 22, Initial Decision
     (ID) at 9-19. The administrative judge also concluded that the appellant failed to
     establish any of his affirmative defenses. ID at 20 -26.

     2
       A “mixed-case” complaint is a complaint of employment discrimination filed with a
     Federal agency relating to or stemming from an action that can be appealed to the
     Board. Moore v. Department of Justice, 112 M.S.P.R. 382, ¶ 4 n.4 (2009); 29 C.F.R.
     § 1614.302(a)(1). The appellant’s case was a mixed-case because, at the time the
     agency issued the FAD, he had been issued a letter of decision on the demotion and loss
     of pay that was appealable to the Board.
     3
       In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board
     articulated a nonexhaustive list of 12 relevant factors to be considered in determining
     the appropriateness of an imposed penalty.
                                                                                             4

¶4         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, arguing
     that the administrative judge misapplied the law to the facts , made erroneous
     credibility determinations, and abused her discretion by mitigating the agency’s
     chosen penalty. 4 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The appellant has filed a
     response to the petition for review and a cross petition for review. 5 PFR File,
     Tab 3. The agency has filed a reply to the response and the cross petition for
     review. PFR File, Tab 6.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5         On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred by failing
     to identify all of the material issues of fact and by failing to resolve necessary
     credibility disputes. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-22. The agency also argues that the

     4
       With its petition for review, the agency submitted a certification of its complianc e
     with the interim relief order and provided evidence demonstrating that it has complied
     with the administrative judge’s interim relief order, which the appellant does not
     challenge on review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 34 -39; see 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.116(a).
     5
       The appellant was required to file a response to the petition for review and a cross
     petition for review by Sunday, July 19, 2020. PFR File, Tab 2 at 1. Where, as here, the
     deadline falls on a weekend, the filing deadline is extended to the next business day.
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.23. Thus, the appellant’s submission was due on Monday, July 20,
     2020. The appellant’s first response/cross petition for review was electronically filed at
     11:56 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) on July 20, 2020, and a substantially similar
     second response with a number of formatting and spelling error corrections was
     electronically filed at 12:48 a.m. EST on July 21, 2020. See PFR File, Tabs 3-4. The
     appellant asserted that the first filing was erroneously submitted due to a
     “synchronization conflict on Microsoft SharePoint,” and requests that the second filing
     be accepted into the record. PFR File, Tab 4 at 3. The agency argues that the changes
     made in the latter filing were “extensive” and went “beyond c orrecting mere
     formatting” issues, and requests that the latter submission be rejected as untimely filed
     without good cause shown for the delay. PFR File, Tab 6 at 5. We have reviewed both
     filings, and aside from the nominal number of misspelling correct ions, word
     substitutions, and general formatting changes the agency identified, the two filings were
     otherwise functionally the same in terms of both structure and content. Nevertheless,
     we have not considered the appellant’s second filing, and our decisi on here is based
     exclusively on the first, timely filed response in opposition to the petition for review
     and cross petition for review.
                                                                                     5

     administrative judge abused her discretion when she mitigated the agency ’s
     chosen penalty, by reweighing the Douglas factors and by substituting her
     judgment for that of the deciding official. Id. at 23-32.

     The administrative judge made reasoned findings of fact and credibility-based
     determinations.
¶6         Regarding its argument that the administrative judge failed to identify all
     material issues of fact, the agency points to a footnote in the initial decision
     stating that, based on the appellant’s admission that he entered the HF lab and
     cleaned silicon wafers without authorization and without using required PPE, the
     administrative judge found that to be “a sufficient basis for finding that [the
     appellant] engaged in the charged misconduct,” and so she found it unnecessary
     to further discuss the specific evidence supporting the charge. PFR File, Tab 1
     at 19; see ID at 10 n.1. The agency argues that in concluding that the charge was
     proven based on the appellant’s admission, the administrative judge failed to
     resolve the significant discrepancies between the testimony from the appellant
     and the agency witnesses concerning how far the students accompanying the
     appellant in the lab stood from the appellant, how the fume hood sash was
     arranged, whether the appellant had received permission to use the HF lab,
     whether he had regularly worked in the HF lab on previous occasions, and
     whether his use of safety equipment was superior to that mandated by the lab ’s
     standard operating procedures (SOPs), among other things.        PFR File, Tab 1
     at 19-21. The agency also argues that the administrative judge failed to make
     explicit credibility findings pursuant to the Board’s decision in Hillen v.
     Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), and improperly credited
     the appellant’s version of events with respect to some of these factual disputes.
     Id. at 21-22; PFR File, Tab 6 at 9-10, 15-17. The agency asserts that the failure
     to resolve these disputed issues constituted reversible error , citing the Board’s
     decision in George v. Department of the Air Force, 24 M.S.P.R. 269, 270-71
     (1984), for support. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19, 22, Tab 6 at 6-7, 15-17.
                                                                                        6

¶7        In response, the appellant argues that the administrative judge correctly
     considered all material facts and made reasoned credibility determinations
     necessary to resolve the appeal. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5-10. The appellant argues
     that the agency overstates the importance of the cited footnote, observing that the
     administrative judge merely concluded that based on the appellant’s admission,
     no further evidentiary determinations were necessary concerning the issue of
     whether the narrative charge had been proven, but that the administrative judge
     made clear that she reviewed “all relevant evidence to include testimony and
     admitted exhibits” in reaching her determination. Id. at 6-7; see ID at 10 n.1.
     The appellant asserts that the administrative judge properly made credibility
     findings in resolving the relevant disputed testimony, but that contrary to the
     agency’s assertion otherwise, it was not necessary for the administrative judge to
     resolve “the details of every instance of disputed testimony” in order to determine
     that the agency proved the charge. PFR File, Tab 3 at 7-9. He also disputes the
     agency’s assertion that the administrative judge improperly credited the
     appellant’s testimony over that of agency officials on disputed issues. Id. at 9-10.
¶8        We agree with the appellant that the administrative judge properly
     considered the relevant evidence in making her determinations. As the appellant
     correctly notes, it was not necessary for the administrative judge to resolve the
     dispute concerning issues such as the position of the fume hood, the relative
     distance of the students observing the appellant, and the other factors identified
     by the agency in order to determine whether the misconduct as described in the
     proposal occurred as charged. When an agency relies upon a generic charge of
     misconduct and an accompanying narrative specification supporting its cha rge,
     the agency is required to prove only the essence of the charge, not every single
     fact alleged, in order to sustain the charge.    See Hicks v. Department of the
     Treasury, 62 M.S.P.R. 71, 74 (1994), aff’d, 48 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
     (Table). As described in the proposal, the agency charged the appellant with the
     following: (1) accessing a NIST laboratory without authorization; (2) engaging
                                                                                          7

      in the activity of cleaning a silicon wafer using HF; (3) without obtaining
      necessary authorization and approval; and (4) without using the proper PPE
      required by the SOP. IAF, Tab 5 at 149-50. The administrative judge concluded
      that the agency proved each of these aspects of the charge based on the
      appellant’s admission to each of these facts at his oral response to the proposal, in
      his supplemental written response, and at the hearing. IAF, Tab 5 at 98, 100-38;
      HCD (testimony of appellant); see ID at 9-10.
¶9          The administrative judge then turned to a detailed penalty analysis
      discussion to address the remaining disputed issues regarding the seriousness and
      severity of the appellant’s misconduct, whether he was on notice that he was
      engaging in misconduct, and other mitigating or aggravating factors related to the
      appellant’s misconduct that would bear on the appropriate penalty. ID at 12-19.
      However, for the purpose of determining whether the agency proved the charge as
      described in the proposal, the administrative judge properly considered and
      summarized the relevant evidence in the record and made approp riate findings.
      As the appellant correctly notes, the fact that the administrative judge did not
      painstakingly recount all of the material facts and all of the evidence in the record
      supporting the agency’s charge in reaching her determination that the agency
      proved the misconduct as alleged does not mean that she did not consider it in
      reaching her decision. Marques v. Department of Health and Human Services,
      22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table); see
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 6-7.
¶10         With respect to the Board’s decision in George cited by the agency, that
      decision is inapposite and distinguishable.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 19, 22, Tab 6
      at 6-7, 15-17. In concluding that the agency failed to show that the proposed
      discipline would promote the efficiency of the service in George, the
      administrative judge in that case failed to analyze whether the charged conduct
      had, in fact, even occurred. George, 24 M.S.P.R. at 270. Here, by contrast, the
      administrative judge specifically determined that the misconduct occurred based
                                                                                              8

      on the appellant’s admission that it did, and that alone was sufficient to support
      the administrative judge’s finding that the charge was proven.
¶11         Regarding the agency’s argument that the administrative judge “apparently
      credited” the appellant’s testimony on disputed issues, such as his claim that he
      was trying to improve the SOP or that the fume hood was configured in the
      manner he described and similar such issues, and failed to credit contrary
      testimony by agency witnesses concerning these points, there is also no merit to
      this assertion. PFR File, Tab 1 at 21-22. Because the administrative judge held a
      hearing, her credibility determinations were implici tly based on witness
      demeanor.      The Board must give deference to an administrative judge ’s
      credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the
      observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may
      overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for
      doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
      see Mithen v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 489, ¶ 13 (2015)
      (noting that an administrative judge’s credibility determinations are “virtually
      unreviewable”), aff’d, 652 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In the initial decision,
      the administrative judge made clear that she relied on the factors identified by the
      Board in Hillen for resolving credibility-based disputes, to the extent they existed
      and were relevant to her determinations. 6 See ID at 23 (citing Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R.
      at 458).

      6
         Indeed, the administrative judge explicitly noted that she credited the deciding
      official’s testimony in analyzing the appellant’s discrimination affirmative defense
      claims, citing the appropriate Hillen factors, but noted that her decision to mitigate the
      demotion penalty was not based on the deciding official’s lack of credibility. See ID
      at 23 (citing the Hillen factors related to the deciding official’s demeanor, prior
      consistent statements, and lack of bias in crediting his testimony). Additionally, she
      explicitly declined to credit the appellant’s testimony that he believed he was
      “grandfathered” into using the HF lab and therefore lacked notice of his misconduct.
      See ID at 16 (rejecting the appellant’s arguments regarding lack of notice).
                                                                                        9

¶12         With respect to the agency’s specific objections, the administrative judge
      identified the appellant’s statement that he deviated from the SOP in order to
      make the safety requirements “more rigorous,” first, in analyzing whether he had
      notice that his actions were contrary to the agency’s established rules and
      guidance, and second, in identifying his testimony at the hearing that he later
      came to understand that he could not deviate from the established SOP.        ID
      at 15-16, 19.   In neither instance did the administrative judge credit these
      statements as true or as confirming that the appellant had, in fact, improved the
      established safety protocols, but she instead cited them to show that there was a
      shift in the appellant’s demeanor before and after the oral response to the
      proposed demotion, after he reviewed his lab authorizations and contemplated his
      conduct and began to fully understand the seriousness of his misconduct. See ID
      at 5, 18-19.
¶13         Regarding the agency’s claim that the administrative judge apparently
      credited the appellant’s testimony that he had the fume hood positioned in the
      manner he described, there is also no support for this assertion. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 21.   The administrative judge did not make any findings at all about the
      positioning of the fume hood in the initial decision because, as discussed above,
      such a finding was not necessary to her determination that the charged
      misconduct occurred, and the agency fails to identify where in the decision the
      administrative judge purportedly made any such finding.        Accordingly, we
      conclude that the administrative judge properly considered the relevant evidence
      in making her findings of fact and made reasoned credibility determinations, and
      we see no reason to disturb those findings on review. See Clay v. Department of
      the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 9 (2016) (finding no reason to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings where the administrative judge consider ed the
      evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned
      conclusions); Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (same).
                                                                                       10

      The administrative judge did not abuse her discretion by mitigating the demotion
      penalty to a 30-day suspension.
¶14        On review, the agency argues that given the administrative judge’s finding
      that the deciding official provided a “thorough Douglas factor analysis,” she
      abused her discretion by failing to give deference to the agency’s penalty
      determination when she reweighed the Douglas factors and substituted her own
      judgement for that of the agency. PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-32; Tab 6 at 13-15; see
      Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305-06.      Specifically, with respect to the appellant’s
      potential for rehabilitation, the agency argues that the administrative judge
      erroneously rejected the deciding official’s conclusion that the appellant’s
      “continued rationalizations” and his failure to fully apologize for his misconduct
      and acknowledge wrongdoing indicated that he had little potential for
      rehabilitation. PFR File, Tab 1 at 23-28; Tab 6 at 10. To support its position, the
      agency cites a number of Board decisions it argues demonstrate that the Board
      will reverse an administrative judge’s penalty mitigation determination where she
      rejected the deciding official’s Douglas factor analysis and instead independently
      reweighed the mitigating and aggravating factors. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 26-28;
      Tab 6 at 12-14.
¶15        The agency also disputes the administrative judge’s finding that the
      appellant showed contrition and acknowledged his misconduct during the course
      of the disciplinary process, and argues that this finding was in tension with the
      deciding official’s testimony at the hearing that he was not satisfied with the
      appellant’s apology or convinced that the appellant understood the severity of his
      misconduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 27-31; see ID at 14. To that end, the agency
      highlights the fact that the appellant failed to specifically note that two students
      were present while he was improperly using HF in his post-oral reply
      supplemental statement, and that during his deposition and at the hearing, he
      continued to take the position that he could deviate from the SOP and that his
      procedure for handling HF was sufficiently safe. PFR File, Tab 1 at 27-31; Tab 6
                                                                                         11

      at 11-12.    The agency argues that as a result of these erroneous findings, the
      administrative judge improperly concluded that the appellant’s misconduct
      constituted a “technical violation,” and not an intentional one, and thus warranted
      a reduced penalty. PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-25, 28-31 (citing Oddo v. Department of
      the Treasury, 13 M.S.P.R. 483 (1982)).        Finally, the agency argues that the
      penalty of removal was within the bounds of reasonableness and so the penalty
      should have been upheld. PFR File, Tab 1 at 25-29, Tab 6 at 6-7, 13-15.
¶16         When the Board sustains all of the charges, it will review an
      agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all of the
      relevant factors and exercised management discre tion within tolerable limits of
      reasonableness.     Stuhlmacher v. U.S. Postal Service, 89 M.S.P.R. 272, ¶ 20
      (2001).     In determining whether the selected penalty is reasonable, the Board
      gives due deference to the agency’s discretion in exercising its managerial
      function of maintaining employee discipline and efficiency, recognizing that its
      function is not to displace management’s responsibility or to decide what penalty
      it would impose, but to ensure that management judgment has been properly
      exercised and that the penalty selected does not exceed the maximum limits of
      reasonableness. Id. Thus, the Board will modify a penalty only when it finds that
      the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or that the penalty the agency
      imposed clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.          Id.   The Board will
      correct the agency’s penalty when all of the charges are sustained only to the
      extent necessary to bring it to the maximum penalty or the outermost boundary of
      the range of reasonable penalties. Id.
¶17         Nevertheless, the ultimate burden is on the agency to persuade the Board of
      the appropriateness of the penalty imposed.          Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 307.
      Although management officials are afforded significant deference in their penalty
      determinations, “[t]he deference to which the agency’s managerial discretion may
      entitle its choice of penalty cannot have the effect of shifting to the appel lant the
                                                                                         12

      burden of proving that the penalty is unlawful, when it is the agency’s obligation
      to present all evidence necessary to support each element of its decision .” Id.
¶18         In mitigating the agency’s chosen penalty, the administrative judge
      reviewed the deciding official’s Douglas factor analysis and concluded that he
      failed to properly consider all of the evidence relevant to a number of those
      factors.   ID at 12-19.    Although the agency argues that this constituted an
      unwarranted reweighing of the Douglas factors, the administrative judge instead
      identified specific relevant information that the deciding official either failed to
      consider or inappropriately discounted in conducting his Douglas factor analysis.
¶19         For example, regarding the first Douglas factor, which concerns the nature
      and seriousness of the offense and its relation to the employee’s duties, position,
      and responsibilities, including whether the offense was intentional or technical or
      inadvertent, was committed maliciously or for gain, or was frequently repeated,
      the administrative judge agreed with the deciding official’s conclusion that the
      appellant’s violation was serious, but rejected his implicit conclusion that the
      appellant’s misconduct was intentional, finding instead that it was a mere
      oversight or error in judgment that was unlikely to be repeated in the future. ID
      at 12-13, 15; see IAF, Tab 5 at 91. On review, the agency doubles down on its
      assertion, arguing that the appellant’s misconduct was “intentional” or “willful,”
      in contrast to that of the employee in the Board case cited by the appellant where
      the penalty was mitigated. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 21, 28-31, Tab 6 at 14-15.
¶20         Despite the agency’s assertion otherwise, the record            supports the
      administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s safety violation was
      attributable to his mistaken belief that he could access the HF lab and that his
      choice of PPE equipment was appropriate, and the deciding official failed to
      adequately consider these facts and instead misconstrued the appellant’s
      explanation for why he held his mistaken belief as post-hoc rationalizations for
      his action.   See ID at 14-15.     Specifically, in his oral reply, the appellant
      acknowledged that at the time he accessed the HF lab, he believed tha t he had
                                                                                       13

      been “grandfathered” into using the lab, but that after he reviewed the Hazard
      Review materials for the lab, he understood that he was not authorized to perform
      certain activities in certain labs. IAF, Tab 5 at 111-13. The appellant later made
      clear that he understood that this prior belief was mistaken, noting that he “fully
      admit[ted]” that he made a mistake, that he was “not trying to justify the
      mistake,” and that he was embarrassed by his oversight because he prided himself
      as “mister safety.” Id. at 122. To further drive the point home, the appellant later
      repeated that he was “willing—again repeat I’m willing to admit the mistakes that
      I’ve made,” restated that he was not attempting to justify his mistakes, that he
      “made mistakes . . . I made a mistake, period,” and that “[m]istakes were made
      based on me making assumptions.” Id. at 124-25.
¶21        Seemingly recognizing the appellant’s acknowledgment that his actions
      were the result of a mistake, the deciding official offered the appellant the
      opportunity to supplement his oral response with a “very short concise statement
      accepting responsibility for what happened,” and stated that he would consider
      reducing the penalty to a 30-day suspension. Id. at 119-20, 128-29, 132-33. The
      appellant agreed to do so and later produced the requested brief statement, in
      which he once again stated that he entered the HF lab without authorization, that
      he deviated from the lab’s required SOP, and that those actions “were mistakes”
      and he “took responsibility for them.” Id. at 98. Accordingly, we agree with the
      administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s misconduct was not an
      intentional violation of the agency’s safety rules, but instead was an oversight
      based on his admittedly mistaken belief about the propriety of his actions, and
      that the deciding official failed to adequately account for this fact in considering
      the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, particularly with respect to whether
      the appellant’s misconduct was intentional or technical or inadvertent. See ID
      at 13; Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 332.
¶22        Similarly, the agency challenges the administrative judge’s conclusion that
      the appellant demonstrated clear potential for rehabilitation and that the deciding
                                                                                        14

      official erred by determining otherwise.       PFR File, Tab 1 at 26-29; Tab 6
      at 13-14; see ID at 17-19. The agency points to the deciding official’s finding
      that the appellant’s acknowledgment that “mistakes were made” in his oral reply
      understated the severity of his actions and were evidence that he had limited
      potential for rehabilitation, and the agency argues that the administrative judge
      erred in concluding otherwise. PFR File, Tab 1 at 26-29, Tab 6 at 13-14; see IAF,
      Tab 5 at 93. The agency argues that the deciding official appropriately concluded
      that the appellant’s insistence on explaining his rationale for why he accessed the
      HF lab and performed the cleaning activity without the proper PPE was evidence
      that he did not truly understand the severity of his misconduct and so he had
      limited rehabilitative potential.   PFR File, Tab 1 at 28 -31, Tab 6 at 10.      The
      agency also cites a number of Board cases it argues support its position that the
      Board will reverse an administrative judge’s mitigation determination where she
      disregards the agency’s finding that the appellant has little rehabilitative
      potential.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 26-28 (citing Saiz v. Department of the Navy,
      122 M.S.P.R. 521 (2015); Balouris v. U.S. Postal Service, 107 M.S.P.R. 574
      (2008) aff’d, No. 2008-3147, 2009 WL 405827 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2009); Batten
      v. U.S. Postal Service, 101 M.S.P.R. 222 (2006), aff’d, 208 F. App’x 868 (Fed.
      Cir. 2006)).
¶23         We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant
      exhibited clear potential for rehabilitation, and that the deciding official erred by
      disregarding that fact in his penalty analysis. See ID at 18; IAF, Tab 5 at 93. As
      the administrative judge correctly observed, the deciding official’s assertion in
      the decision letter and in testimony at the hearing that there was no evidence of
      the appellant’s potential for rehabilitation was directly at odds with his posture
      during the appellant’s oral reply. See ID at 19. Specifically, in addition to the
      appellant’s statements identified above acknowledging that he impermissibly
      deviated from the SOP when he accessed the lab without using proper PPE, the
      appellant also made clear that he accepted that he was wrong to deviate from the
                                                                                 15

SOP, but offered that he was only attempting to improve the procedures to make
them more rigorous. IAF, Tab 5 at 117. When pressed by the deciding official
regarding whether the appellant fully understood that deviating from a lab’s SOP
was impermissible even if the intention was to improve the SOP, the appellant
reaffirmed that he understood that, and stated that if he had ideas for how to
improve an SOP, he should have spoken with the lab overseer about his ideas as
opposed to “implementing it on the fly,” and stated that he was “profoundly
sorry” for not doing so. Id. at 118-19. Based on the appellant’s responses, the
deciding official asked him to prepare the supplemental statement acknowledging
that the facts set forth in the proposal letter were met and stated that he would
then consider reducing the penalty, mentioning a 30-day unpaid suspension as the
potential reduced penalty. Id. at 119-20. The deciding official acknowledged
that “mistakes are going to happen,” but that based on the appellant’s first written
response to the proposal, he had concerns that the appellant did not appear
“contrite” and did not “recognize, acknowledge mistakes that were made.” Id.
at 121, 123-24. To assuage any remaining concerns about his apparent lack of
contrition, the appellant once again stated that he was “willing to admit the
mistakes [he] made,” and clarified that he was not trying to justify his actions.
Id. at 124. He also expressed surprise about the fact that after he met with the
proposing official for the first time to discuss the incident, the language in the
resulting proposal suggested that the appellant was “insisting that [he] was right,”
which was not what the appellant intended to convey, so he acknowledged that he
may have “failed to communicate with [the proposing official] properly. ”        Id.
at 124-25. The appellant then again stated that he was “profoundly sorry,” and
agreed to supplement his oral testimony with the requested written statement. Id.
at 126, 128.     After the appellant sought clarification on what form the
supplemental response should take, the deciding official stated that he wanted a
“very short concise statement accepting responsibility for what happened” by
email, and the appellant agreed to do so. Id. at 132-33.
                                                                                            16

¶24         As the administrative judge correctly observed, the appellant did exactly as
      he was asked to do in the supplemental statement. See ID at 18. The resulting
      supplemental statement succinctly memorialized the issues discussed above, with
      the appellant acknowledging the following:          (1) that he entered the HF lab
      without explicit authorization and training; (2) he deviated from the lab ’s SOP
      without authorization from the Principal Investigator (PI) as specified by the
      Hazard Review protocols; (3) that these were mistakes and he took responsibility
      for them; and (4) that he apologized for the problems he caused the lab and its
      management. 7 Id. at 98. Although the decision letter acknowledges the fact that
      the appellant provided a supplemental response, the penalty determination section
      includes no mention of the supplemental statement, instead selectively drawing
      language from the appellant’s initial written response and oral reply. See IAF,
      Tab 5 at 91-93.
¶25         Further, there is also no merit to the agency’s argument that the appellant
      continued to rationalize his misconduct during his testimony at the hearing,

      7
         On review, the agency also makes much of the appellant’s statement in his
      supplemental written reply acknowledging that he could not deviate from the HF SOP
      “without authorization,” arguing that because changes to the SOP at issue must be
      approved by the Director of the Physical Measurement Laboratory, the appellant’s
      added qualifier further demonstrated his lack of rehabilit ation and that he did not know
      the correct procedures. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 22 n.10; Tab 6 at 16. The agency’s
      argument is unconvincing. As an initial matter, the agency omits additional qualifying
      language the appellant included in his supplemental r esponse, stating that he deviated
      from the SOP “without prior authorization from the PI as specified by the Hazard
      Review protocols.” See IAF, Tab 5 at 98. Further, in discussing the Hazard Review
      process and requirements with the appellant during the oral reply, the deciding official
      noted that the appellant “did not have the freedom” to deviate from the established
      SOP, but that he could “bring the issue back up to the PI, and the PI can decide that
      under the right set of circumstances alternatives may be acceptable,” and that the
      Hazard Review policies are set up to “ensure that people do not deviate from agreed
      training unless agreed upon by line management.” IAF, Tab 5 at 117-18; see IAF,
      Tab 14 at 9-10. Consequently, the language the appellant used in his supplemental
      response stating that deviations from the SOP must be sought in the manner “specified
      by the Hazard Review protocols” is consistent with the language used by the deciding
      official and with the requirements identified in the agency’s Hazard Review policies.
                                                                                        17

      providing additional evidence of his limited rehabilitative potential.     See PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 27-28, 32, Tab 6 at 10.      As was the case with the appellant’s
      statements during his oral reply, in his hearing testimony the appellant made clear
      that his intent in explaining his actions was to identify his motivations at the time
      he accessed the HF lab and used improper PPE, and was not an effort to defend
      his actions after the fact. See HCD (testimony of the appellant) (stating that he
      took “full responsibility” for his actions as he understood them at the time in his
      response to the proposal and that he later “apologized profusely” for his
      misunderstanding, and answering “zero,” and “I’m not going to do that again” in
      response to a question concerning the likelihood that there would be “any
      repetition of any conduct” identified in the charge).
¶26         On review, the agency also restates its argument that the appellant’s failure
      to address the fact that students were present demonstrated that he was unwilling
      to take full responsibility for his misconduct, and points to testimony from the
      deciding official stating that the students’ presence was “extremely problematic”
      and presumably weighed heavily in his decision finding a lack of rehabilitation.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 28-29, Tab 6 at 6-7. However, as the administrative judge
      correctly noted, while the presence of the students was briefly discussed during
      the oral reply, see IAF, Tab 5 at 129-30, the deciding official did not give any
      indication that he expected the appellant to specifically mention that fact in his
      supplemental written apology, and so it was unreasonable for the deciding official
      to have considered the absence of that acknowledgment as eviden ce of a lack of
      rehabilitation, see ID at 17-18. As previously noted, if a deciding official failed
      to appropriately consider the relevant Douglas factors in making his penalty
      determination, the Board need not defer to the agency’s penalty determination.
      Von Muller v. Department of Energy, 101 M.S.P.R. 91, ¶ 19 (2005), aff’d, 204 F.
      App’x 17 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Additionally, the Board may abandon its deference to
      an agency’s penalty determination where the deciding official misjudged the
      appellant’s rehabilitative potential. See id., ¶ 21; Watkins v. Department of the
                                                                                        18

      Navy, 29 M.S.P.R. 146, 148 (1985) (declining to credit a supervisor’s assertion
      that he lost confidence in the appellant, instead concluding that the appellant
      exhibited good potential for rehabilitation). For the foregoing reasons, we agree
      with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant repeatedly took
      responsibility for his misconduct and exhibited clear rehabilitation, and it is clear
      from the record that the agency failed to properly consider the appellant ’s
      rehabilitative potential in making its penalty determination. See Wentz v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 91 M.S.P.R. 176, ¶¶ 24-25 (2002) (mitigating a penalty, based in
      part on disagreement with the deciding official’s conclusion that appellant lacked
      potential for rehabilitation).
¶27         Another of the factors to be considered in determining the propriety of a
      penalty is the consistency of the penalty with the agency’s table of penalties.
      Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305; see Peterson v. Department of Transportation,
      54 M.S.P.R. 178, 184 (1992) (consistency of the penalty imposed with the
      agency’s table of penalties is a relevant factor in determining the reasonableness
      of the penalty). Where the agency has a table of penalties, the Board will adhere
      to the guidelines in the table unless a deviation from the suggested penalty is
      warranted under the circumstances.         Goode v. Defense Logistics Agency,
      45 M.S.P.R. 671, 676 (1990). The Board has long held that the agency’s table of
      penalties should not be applied so inflexibly as to impair consideration of other
      factors relevant to the individual case. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 307. Deviation
      from the table is permissible where the circumstances of the case so justify.
      Zazueta v. Department of Justice, 94 M.S.P.R. 493, ¶ 8 (2003), aff’d, 104 F.
      App’x 166 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
¶28         Nevertheless, if the agency deviates from its guidelines in its table of
      penalties, it must establish that the more severe penalty is within the bounds of
      reasonableness. Basquez v. Department of the Air Force, 48 M.S.P.R. 215, 218
      (1991). If the agency cannot justify the deviation, it has abused its discretion.
      Williams v. Department of the Air Force, 32 M.S.P.R. 347, 349 (1987)
                                                                                       19

      (concluding that where the agency has a table of penalties, it must adhere to the
      guidelines in the table unless it can show that a deviation from the suggested
      penalty is justified by the circumstances of the case); Stead v. Department of the
      Army, 27 M.S.P.R. 630, 634 (1985). Indeed, a penalty grossly exceeding that
      provided by an agency’s standard table of penalties, for that reason alone, may be
      arbitrary and capricious, even where such a table provides only suggested
      guidelines. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 307 n.71; cf. IAF, Tab 5 at 196 (noting that
      the agency’s table of penalties in this case are “guidelines only and are not
      mandatory”).
¶29        The agency’s table of penalties identifies a penalty range of an oral
      admonishment to a 3-day suspension for a first offense of the most closely
      analogous charge to the sustained charge, a “violation of safety regulations,
      instructions, or prescribed safe practices.” See IAF, Tab 5 at 201. Aside from
      generally stating on review that the demotion penalty was the “only reasonable”
      or “lowest possible” penalty available under the circumstances, the agency does
      not offer any specific argument explaining why such a significant departure from
      the penalty range was justified. See PFR File, Tab 1 at 32, Tab 6 at 7.
¶30        Conversely, the Board has sustained decisions mitigating a removal to an
      unpaid suspension for a first offense of a safety-related violation in circumstances
      similar to those in this case, even on occasions where the appellant’s misconduct
      potentially endangered himself or others.     See, e.g., Wentz, 91 M.S.P.R. 176,
      ¶¶ 15-25 (concluding that a 5-day suspension, rather than removal, was the
      maximum reasonable penalty for the sustained sole charge of “unsatisfactory
      performance/failure to perform the duties of your position in a safe manner ”
      based on a motor vehicle accident, where the appellant had several mitigating
      factors including 13 years of discipline-free Federal service, he was under the
      influence of prescription medication that played a part in the misconduct, and
      other employees were treated much less harshly for similar safety violations);
      Williams v. Department of the Navy, 38 M.S.P.R. 387, 390-91 (1988) (mitigating
                                                                                      20

      a removal penalty to a 30-day suspension for a first offense of “failure to observe
      precautions for personal safety, posted rules, signs, written or oral safety
      instructions, or to use protective clothing or equipment,” where the appellant
      violated medical restrictions mandating his use of a cane and endangered his own
      safety, and where the agency’s table of penalties identified a penalty range of a
      reprimand to 2-day suspension for a first offense); Watkins, 29 M.S.P.R.
      at 147-48 (mitigating a removal penalty to a 60-day suspension for a first offense
      of “endangering the safety personnel through car elessness” when the appellant
      exposed himself and a subordinate to X-ray radiation, despite the seriousness of
      the offense, the fact the appellant’s supervisor stated that he had lost confidence
      in that appellant and declined to mitigate the penalty based on that loss of
      confidence, and the fact that the appellant was in charge and therefore was held to
      a higher standard, where the violation was the appellant’s first offense in an
      otherwise spotless 25-year work and safety record, and the appellant ’s potential
      for rehabilitation was good).
¶31        Further, as the administrative judge correctly noted, the agency could have
      charged the appellant with a charge of “conduct demonstrating untrustworthiness
      or unreliability,” for which the demotion penalty would have been more in line
      with the agency’s table of penalties, and it is clear from the record that agency
      officials specifically contemplated doing so but ultimately chose not to. See IAF,
      Tab 5 at 203, Tab 16 at 63-64; HCD (testimony of proposing official); ID at 16.
      The Board is required to review the agency’s decision on an adverse action solely
      on the grounds invoked by the agency, and the Board will not substitute what it
      considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.            Gottlieb v. Veterans
      Administration, 39 M.S.P.R. 606, 609 (1989).       For the foregoing reasons, we
      agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the demotion penalty
      significantly exceeds the 3-day suspension maximum penalty provided by the
      agency’s table of penalties, the agency failed to adequately justify such a
      significant departure from the its table of penalties, and that a 30-day suspension
                                                                                      21

      is the maximum reasonable penalty based on the facts of this case.         See ID
      at 16, 19.

      The administrative judge correctly concluded that the appellant failed to establish
      his affirmative defenses.
¶32         The appellant has also filed a cross petition for review challenging the
      administrative judge’s finding that he failed to establish his affirmative defenses
      of discrimination based on his race, national origin, and age. PFR File, Tab 3
      at 17-18; see ID at 20-26.        Specifically, the appellant argues that the
      administrative judge erred by concluding that his white co-worker was not a valid
      comparator, despite the fact that the deciding official had ultimate supervisory
      authority over both the appellant and the co-worker, and the co-worker’s
      misconduct was more egregious but he did not receive any disciplinary act ion.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 17-18. In response, the agency argues that the administrative
      judge did not err in determining that the co-worker was not a valid comparator,
      highlighting the administrative judge’s finding that the purported comparator was
      in the ZP-IV pay band while the appellant was a ZP-V, the co-worker was already
      subject to additional oversight at the time the agency considered discipline, and
      the comparator immediately took responsibility for his misconduct and self-
      reported his safety violation while the appellant did not.      PFR File , Tab 6
      at 17-18.
¶33         In the initial decision, the administrative judge determined that the
      appellant failed to establish by preponderant evidence that race, national origin,
      or age discrimination was a factor in the agency’s demotion decision. See ID
      at 20-26. In reaching that determination, she thoroughly reviewed the record and
      testimonial evidence and concluded that the appellant did not provide any direct
      or circumstantial evidence of discrimination, any evidence of suspicious timing,
      ambiguous oral or written statements, behavior or comments directed at
      employees in the appellant’s protected groups, or any other evidence that could
      establish an inference of discriminatory intent.    ID at 22 -26.   Regarding the
                                                                                           22

      appellant’s purported comparator employee, as the administrative judge correctly
      noted, the Board has held that for other employees to be deemed similarly
      situated for purposes of a discrimination affirmative defense claim, comparators
      must have reported to the same supervisor, been subjected to the same standards
      governing discipline, and engaged in conduct similar to the appellant ’s without
      differentiating or mitigating circumstances. Gregory v. Department of the Army,
      114 M.S.P.R. 607, ¶ 44 (2010) (citing Adams v. Department of Labor,
      112 M.S.P.R. 288, ¶ 13 (2009); Spahn v. Department of Justice, 93 M.S.P.R. 195,
      ¶ 13 (2003)).
¶34         As the administrative judge correctly concluded, the proposed comparator
      identified by the appellant is not an appropriate comparator because he was in a
      lower pay band than the appellant (and thus had a lower level of independence),
      did not report to the same supervisor, and made an immediate effort to report and
      acknowledge his misconduct. See ID at 25-26. Accordingly, we agree with the
      administrative judge that the identified co-worker was not an appropriate
      comparator, and we also agree with her conclusion that there is no evidence in the
      record showing that the appellant’s race, national origin, or age played any role in
      the demotion decision.       See ID at 22-26.       Accordingly, we find that the
      administrative judge properly found that the appellant failed to prove any of his
      discrimination affirmative defenses. 8 ID at 22-23. For the foregoing reasons, we
      deny the petition for review and cross petition for review an d affirm the initial
      decision, which sustained the charge of failure to follow safety procedures but
      mitigated the demotion penalty to a 30-day suspension.

      8
       Because we discern no error with the administrative judge’s motivating factor anal ysis
      or conclusion regarding these claims, we do not reach the question of whether
      discrimination was a “but for” cause of the removal action. See Pridgen v. Office of
      Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31.
                                                                                        23

                                            ORDER
¶35         We ORDER the agency to CANCEL the appellant’s demotion effective
      March 3, 2019, and substitute in its place a 30-day suspension without pay. See
      Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The
      agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this
      decision.
¶36         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency ’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶37         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶38         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶39         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the Nation al Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
                                                                                     24

necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                 NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                       YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                      ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 9
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

9
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      25

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of rev iew
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                 26

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC    review    of   cases   involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.         See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     27

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 10   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

10
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                28

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
     specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
     until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
     notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
     in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
     Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
     include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
     CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
     or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by the Merit
Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1.       Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
     describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2.       The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
        a.         Employee name and social security number.
        b.         Detailed explanation of request.
        c.         Valid agency accounting.
        d.         Authorized signature (Table 63).
        e.         If interest is to be included.
        f.         Check mailing address.
        g.         Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
        h.         Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be collected
              (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1.        Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
     Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2.        Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3.        Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4.        If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
     return monies.
5.        Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions (if applicable).
6.        If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the type
     of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7.        If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave to
     be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and required
data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum Payment,
Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
         a.      Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
         b.      Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
         c.      Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s Payroll/Personnel
Operations at 504-255-4630.