Court Opinion

ID: 9379193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 22:02:58.206422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:51.085794
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 220017-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                        NOTICE
 Decision filed 03/14/23. The
                                                                             This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0017
                                                                             Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                        limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                   under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     St. Clair County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 99-CF-825
                                                )
DeALANDUS BEST,                                 )     Honorable
                                                )     Julie K. Katz,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and Moore concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: Where defendant’s section 2-1401 petition was substantively identical to the one
               previously dismissed, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the subsequent
               pleading based on the doctrine of res judicata; where defendant failed to satisfy the
               “prejudice” prong of the cause-and-prejudice test, the circuit court’s denial of
               defendant’s motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition is affirmed.

¶2       Defendant, DeAlandus Best, appeals the circuit court’s orders denying his petition for

postjudgment relief pursuant to section 2-1401(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-

1401(f) (West 2018)) and denying him leave to file a successive postconviction petition.

Defendant’s appointed appellate counsel, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD),

concludes that no reasonably meritorious argument exists that the court’s rulings were erroneous

and filed a motion to withdraw as counsel together with a supporting memorandum (see

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987)). Counsel notified defendant of its motion and this

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court provided him with an opportunity to file a response, which he has done. After considering

OSAD’s motion and supporting memorandum, defendant’s response, and the record on appeal, we

agree this appeal presents no reasonably meritorious issues. Accordingly, we grant OSAD leave

to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s orders.

¶3                                    BACKGROUND

¶4       In 2001, following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree

murder. Evidence at trial revealed that defendant and four codefendants—three of whom testified

against defendant—planned to rob a local drug dealer, Gerald Little. One of the co-conspirators,

Gary James, called Little to lure him to James’s house. Little arrived in a truck driven by

Christopher Price. However, the planned robbery soon went awry and ended with defendant

shooting Little and another conspirator, James Bean, shooting Price. People v. Best, No. 5-01-0665

(2003), slip order at 2 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Best I). Because

defendant was convicted of killing more than one person, he was subject to a mandatory sentence

of natural-life imprisonment, which the court imposed. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West

2002).

¶5       On direct appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court erred by failing to conduct a

hearing based on a series of letters defendant sent to the circuit clerk complaining about defense

counsel’s representation. See People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). We rejected this claim,

finding defendant never presented his grievances in open court despite numerous opportunities to

do so and, in subsequent arguments to the court, appeared to endorse counsel’s conduct. Best I,

slip order at 5-9.

¶6       In 2003, defendant filed a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS

5/122-1 et seq. (West 2002)). The circuit court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition,

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raising numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and trial errors. The court

conducted a third-stage hearing but ultimately denied relief. This court affirmed. People v. Best,

No. 5-04-0035 (2005), slip order at 7 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Best II).

¶7      In 2018, defendant filed a section 2-1401 petition, raising numerous claims of the denial

of due process and the ineffective or unreasonable assistance of trial, appellate, and postconviction

counsels. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the filing was untimely, that none of

the claims were appropriate for a section 2-1401 petition, and the claims lacked substantive merit.

Following a hearing, the court granted the motion and dismissed the petition. The court found the

pleading was untimely, no valid basis existed to excuse the delay, no exception to the two-year

limitations period existed, and none of the claims was cognizable in a section 2-1401 petition.

¶8      Defendant filed a notice of appeal and moved for the circuit court to waive the $364.50

transcript preparation fee. The circuit court refused, noting that waiver was unavailable for a civil

appeal. This court ultimately dismissed defendant’s appeal for want of prosecution on July 15,

2021.

¶9      On August 5, 2021, defendant sought to withdraw his 2018 petition and filed a second one

that was substantively identical to the earlier one. The State moved to dismiss the new petition

primarily on the ground of res judicata.

¶ 10    At about the same time, defendant filed a “Post-Conviction Petition for Re-Sentencing.” In

a November 3, 2021, order, the court noted that pages were missing from defendant’s most recent

filing and granted him leave to file an amended petition. That same day, the court granted the

State’s motion to dismiss the (second) section 2-1401 petition.

¶ 11    On December 16, 2021, defendant filed two motions which the circuit court reasonably

interpreted as a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition and a successive

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postconviction petition. Substantively, defendant argued that his natural-life sentence for a crime

he committed at age 19 violated the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11).

¶ 12    The circuit court denied leave to file a successive petition, finding defendant failed to allege

either cause or prejudice. Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 13                                         ANALYSIS

¶ 14    The circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s second 2-1401 petition and denial of

defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition raising a proportionate-

penalties argument are before us. OSAD first addresses the section 2-1401 petition, concluding

that it can make no good-faith argument regarding the circuit court’s dismissal on res judicata

grounds was erroneous. We agree.

¶ 15    Section 2-1401 provides a method allowing relief from final judgments or orders that are

older than 30 days. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2020). The purpose is “to bring before the

court facts not appearing in the record that, if known at the time of the entry of the judgment,

would have prevented its rendition.” In re Marriage of Brubaker, 2022 IL App (2d) 200160, ¶ 19.

Such a proceeding “is not ‘intended to give a litigant a new opportunity to do that which should

have been done in an earlier proceeding.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Travlos, 218 Ill. App.

3d 1030, 1035 (1991)).

¶ 16    Defendant’s 2021 petition was virtually identical to, and involved the same parties as,

defendant’s 2018 petition that was dismissed for want of prosecution by this court in 2021. “ ‘The

doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of

competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on the

same cause of action.’ ” Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (2008) (quoting Rein v.

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David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (1996)). This doctrine “applies to all matters that were

actually decided in the original action, as well as to matters that could have been decided.” Cooney

v. Rossiter, 2012 IL 113227, ¶ 18.

¶ 17   The trial court found the 2018 section 2-1401(f) petition (1) was untimely filed,

(2) contained no valid basis to excuse the delay in filing the petition, (3) failed to include any

exception to the two-year statute of limitations period that would apply, and (4) even if it was

timely filed, contained arguments that were not properly raised in the section 2-1401(f) petition.

While our 2021 dismissal was based on procedural grounds, defendant’s failure to timely file a

petition for rehearing rendered our dismissal a final decision. Woodson v. Chicago Board of

Education, 154 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1993); People v. Lyles, 217 Ill. 2d 210, 216 (2005). Our dismissal

did not diminish the effect of the trial court’s original, final decision on the merits.

¶ 18   Defendant’s section 2-1401(f) petition filed in 2021 either asserted the same claims decided

by the trial court in 2020 or could have been presented in the 2020 appeal. Thus, the circuit court

properly dismissed defendant’s 2021 section 2-1401(f) petition on the ground of res judicata.

¶ 19   OSAD also concludes it can raise no meritorious argument that the circuit court erred by

denying leave to file a successive postconviction petition. In the successive petition, defendant

sought to raise a claim that the mandatory sentence of natural-life imprisonment violated the eighth

amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). Defendant cited Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460

(2012), in support of his claim. OSAD concludes that because Miller was decided after defendant’s

direct appeal and first postconviction petition were decided, “cause” for failing to raise the issue

in those proceedings was established; however, defendant cannot establish prejudice.

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¶ 20   The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) provides

a statutory mechanism by which criminal defendants may assert that their conviction resulted from

a substantial denial of their constitutional rights. Id. § 122-1(a); People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247,

253 (2008). The Act contemplates the filing of a single petition in any particular case, and a

defendant must obtain leave of court to file a successive petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West

2020); People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27. The circuit court will grant such leave only if the

defendant shows both cause and prejudice. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). “To establish

‘cause,’ the defendant must show some objective factor external to the defense that impeded his

ability to raise the claim in the initial postconviction proceeding.” People v. Holman, 2017 IL

120655, ¶ 26. “To establish ‘prejudice,’ the defendant must show the claimed constitutional error

so infected his trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.” Id. “[B]oth *** prongs of

the cause-and-prejudice test must be satisfied in order for the defendant to prevail.” People v.

Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15. Further, “the cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition

involves a higher standard than the first-stage frivolous or patently without merit standard that is

set forth in section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act.” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. “To meet the

cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition requires the defendant to ‘submit enough in the

way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make that determination.’ ” Id. (quoting People

v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010)).

¶ 21   Here, defendant failed to allege sufficient facts to establish prejudice. In Miller, the United

States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits mandatory life sentences for

juveniles who commit murder. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. While defendant is not formally precluded

from relying on Miller, the Miller rule does not directly apply to defendants who attained legal

adulthood when they committed their crimes. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45. When

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defendants are 18 or older, the record must be sufficiently developed to determine whether the

Miller factors apply and whether evidence submitted is sufficient to support the claim. Id. ¶¶ 45-

46 (citing Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 30). Here, defendant argued that he was only the lookout;

however, this argument is inconsistent with the State’s theory that defendant fired the fatal shots.

Defendant also argued that he evidenced rehabilitation by providing a copy of his high school

equivalency certificate. Although admirable, this is insufficient to demonstrate that he would have

received a lesser sentence.

¶ 22   In People v. White, 2020 IL App (5th) 170345, the defendant sought to file a successive

postconviction petition to raise a quasi-Miller claim. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of leave,

stating Harris

       “made no mention of exactly what is necessary to overcome the high bar for leave to file a

       successive postconviction petition, and we find that a flat allegation as to evolving science

       on juvenile maturity and brain development is simply insufficient. See People v. Tidwell,

       236 Ill. 2d 150, 161 (2010) (a defendant seeking leave to institute a successive

       postconviction ‘must submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court

       to’ determine whether leave should be granted).” Id. ¶ 24.

¶ 23   A similar result was seen in People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (4th) 190528. In Moore,

defendant asserted that a 19-year-old’s brain was more like a 17-year-old adolescent brain in terms

of development. Id. ¶ 40. The court found this assertion “insufficient to survive the more exacting

standard that would warrant the filing of a successive postconviction petition.” Id.

¶ 24   Defendant’s petition in the case at bar offered nothing more specific than what was seen in

White and Moore and, consistent with those cases, the circuit court did not err in dismissing the

motion for leave to file a successive petition. In his response, defendant addresses this issue only

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briefly. Other than the patently false factual assertions that he was a juvenile when he committed

the crimes and that he was convicted solely of being a lookout, he offers no further support for the

assertion that application of the mandatory-natural-life provision to him was unfair, which is

insufficient for the reasons set forth above.

¶ 25                                       CONCLUSION

¶ 26   As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and

affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 27   Motion granted; judgment affirmed.

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