Court Opinion

ID: 9716170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:29:35.059139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:42.536284
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE EASSERMAN, specially concurring: I concur with the conclusion of the majority that the trial court, in considering the determinative factors in awarding custody, abused its discretion in relying on: (1) the professed preference of the parties’ son for custodianship and (2) the parties’ religious practices. I also agree that the instant cause must be remanded to the trial court for a new determination as to custody. Although I agree with this aspect of the decision of the majority, I would also reverse and remand the case at bar on the basis that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of In re Custody of Harne (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 414, 396 N.E.2d 499. Section 610(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 610(b)), requires a finding by the trial court that a change of circumstances has occurred. The majority recognizes that under the decision in Harne, an express finding that a change in circumstances has occurred is an “indispensable requirement.” The majority further recognizes that this court applied the dictates of Harne in Vollmer v. Mattox (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 1, 484 N.E.2d 311, and reversed the trial court for its failure to make sufficiently specific findings concerning the requisite change in circumstances. In spite of this precedent, the majority chooses to follow an earlier decision of the Appellate Court for the First District in In re Custody of Blonsky (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 810, 405 N.E.2d 1112, which attempted to distinguish Harne. I see no reason for this court in the instant appeal to depart from the rationale of Harne and the prior decision of this court in Vollmer v. Mattox. Furthermore, as stated by the majority, Public Act 84 — 795 has been amended to provide that the court shall state in its decision “specific findings of fact” in support of its modification or termination of joint custody if either parent opposes the modification or termination. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 610(b).) In this regard, Illinois courts have recognized that it is proper to consider a subsequent amendment as an expression of legislative intent as to the original statute. In re Marriage of Semmler (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 130, 137, 481 N.E.2d 716, 719; People v. Williams (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 266, 273, 491 N.E.2d 941, 945. Based on the foregoing, I would also reverse the decision of the circuit court of Marion County for its failure to make the specific findings required by section 610(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and would remand the instant cause to the trial court for the purpose of making such findings.