Court Opinion

ID: 9903943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:11:20.73755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:52.175862
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                     NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                     FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                     DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

SHARIN KAYE JOHNSON,

             Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.                                    Case No. 5D21-621
                                      LT Case No. 2019-DR-160

ERIC PAUL JOHNSON,

          Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
________________________________/

Opinion filed November 4, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Flagler County,
Christopher A. France, Judge.

Jessie L. Harrell, of The Harrell Firm,
Jacksonville, for Appellant/Cross-
Appellee.

William S. Graessle, of William S.
Graessle, P.A., Jacksonville, for
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

PER CURIAM.

      Sharin Johnson (“Former Wife”) appeals the trial court’s final judgment

of dissolution of marriage, dissolving her marriage with Eric Johnson

(“Former Husband”). Former Husband cross-appeals from that judgment.
        Former Wife raises six issues. She argues the trial court erred by failing

to: (1) award retroactive child support; (2) enter an income deduction order

requiring Former Husband to make his support payments through the State

Disbursement Unit; (3) allow Former Wife to claim the dependency tax

exemption every year; (4) remove a $1,686.94 credit from Former Husband’s

equitable distribution column where Former Husband did not incur that

expense; (5) order Former Husband to maintain life insurance to secure his

support obligation; and (6) address Former Wife’s request for attorney’s fees

based on Former Husband’s bad faith conduct.

        On cross-appeal, Former Husband challenges the trial court’s

equitable distribution scheme, including its rulings on (a) tax liabilities; (b)

business account balances; (c) medical bill balances; (d) forensic accounting

and social investigation costs; (e) valuation of property Former Husband

claims was either “stolen or kept” by Former Wife; and (f) post-separation

debt.

        The parties had two children during the course of their nearly twenty-

one-year marriage, one of whom was still a minor at the time of dissolution.

Former Wife did not work for the majority of the marriage, staying home

raising the children. Former Husband operated two IT consulting businesses,

which were jointly owned by the parties. Former Husband filed his petition

                                         2
for dissolution in February 2019, and Former Wife filed her counter-petition

thereafter.

        Following an initial mediation, the parties agreed to entry of a consent

temporary order, which provided, inter alia: (a) completion of a social

investigation, for which Former Husband would pay the initial $4,000

retainer; the trial court reserved jurisdiction to apportion the remaining cost

after a final hearing; (b) Former Husband has the right to inspect the contents

of the marital home; no party shall remove items from the home; (c)

performance of a forensic accounting to determine Former Husband’s

income, for which he would pay the initial $2,000 retainer; the trial court

reserved jurisdiction to apportion the cost after a final hearing; (d) sale of the

marital home, with Former Wife to have exclusive use and occupancy until

sold.

        In July 2020, an evidentiary hearing was held for temporary relief, at

which the social investigator, forensic accountant, and Former Wife testified.

The accountant found, contrary to Former Husband’s earlier-filed financial

affidavits, that Former Husband’s monthly gross income for 2019 was

$8,284, and approximately $11,000 for 2020. 1 The accountant also found

       Former Husband had claimed a 2019 gross monthly income of $6,748
        1

and a 2020 gross monthly income of $8,024.

                                        3
that historically, Former Husband’s net monthly income averaged $10,800.

Having exhausted the allotted hearing time, the trial court elected to set the

case for trial later that same month, rather than issuing a ruling or setting

additional time on temporary matters. The trial court proposed utilizing the

testimony from the temporary relief hearing as part of the trial. Neither party

objected, and trial was set to take place over two days, one in July and the

other in August.

      Prior to the effective continuation of the trial, the parties entered into a

“Joint Stipulation of Final Resolution of Certain Issues” (hereinafter, “the

stipulated agreement”). Pertinent to the issues on appeal, the stipulated

agreement provided: (a) the parties shall split equally the cost of the child’s

extra-curricular activities; (b) the child would reside the majority of the time

with Former Wife, specifically providing that “[t]his majority designation is

SOLELY for purposes of all other state and federal laws which require such

a designation”; (c) Former Husband shall pay Former Wife $800 per month

in child support, commencing August 1, 2020, and terminating September

30, 2022; (d) Former Wife would maintain health insurance for the child; (e)

Former Husband would provide Former Wife with moving expenses upon the

sale of the marital home, and Former Wife would refile the parties’ 2018 and

2019 tax returns as “married filing jointly”; (f) Former Husband shall return to

                                        4
the marital home upon Former Wife’s vacating it to retrieve items included

on an attached exhibit list, excluding the items Former Wife sold for

temporary financial relief; 2 and (g) Former Husband shall pay Former Wife

$3,000 per month in permanent periodic alimony, commencing August 1,

2020. No agreement was reached on the issues of attorney’s fees and

equitable distribution. Attached to the stipulated agreement was a child

support guidelines worksheet and a list of items contained in the marital

home for Former Husband to retrieve. The child support guidelines included

the parties’ stipulated net monthly incomes: $4,744 for Former Husband and

$3,990 for Former Wife, which included the alimony payment.

      The trial court entered an order approving the parties’ stipulated

agreement. Following trial, the trial court entered an “Order on Trial,”

explaining the state of the evidence and the proceedings and noting that it

was prepared to make final rulings on some issues but reserve on others.3

Specifically, the court noted that it had received substantial evidence on time-

sharing, the valuation of Former Husband’s businesses, and the value of the

      2
        At the hearing on temporary relief, Former Wife testified that she was
forced to sell some items in the marital home in order to support herself and
the child, as Former Husband’s temporary support—an apparent agreement
to pay her $335 per week for both her and the child—was inadequate.
      3
          Of the two trial hearings set, only one took place.

                                         5
parties’ stock, and as such, was prepared to make a final ruling on those

issues. The remaining issues included equitable distribution, post-filing debts

of the Former Wife, retroactive alimony and child support, marital debt, and

marital assets. The trial court suggested that written arguments, including

summaries of the parties’ exhibits, could be filed to resolve the outstanding

issues if the parties desired to complete the litigation in an efficient and timely

manner.

      Soon thereafter, Former Wife filed two motions for contempt, alleging

that Former Husband had been late paying his child support and alimony

payments based upon the stipulated agreement. She also alleged that he

was not paying his half of the child’s extra-curricular expenses. Former Wife

specifically requested the trial court require Former Husband’s future support

payments be made through the State Disbursement Unit via an income

deduction order.

      In response to the trial court’s “Order on Trial,” the parties agreed to

file trial memorandums in lieu of a second hearing. After the parties’

submitted their written memoranda, the trial court entered an order titled

“Final Rulings on Reserved Issues and Order for Final Judgment.” The trial

court addressed the parties’ finances during the course of the marriage and

separation, noting that Former Wife’s role was to raise their children and

                                        6
Former Husband’s to provide financially for the family. It found that while

Former Wife had claimed a lack of sufficient support post-separation for both

herself and the child, the evidence also showed that Former Wife had spent

her money on “things that [were] not necessities.” Still, the court found that

Former Husband had left Former Wife with “no support” for certain periods

of time.

      As to Former Husband’s income, the court adopted the findings in the

forensic accounting report, namely, that he had “shut down” the two jointly

owned businesses on the “eve of the divorce filing” only to reopen two new

(but identical in nature) businesses thereafter. The trial court also provided

a chart of Former Husband’s monthly business income based on the forensic

accounting.

      The trial court adopted and ratified both the consent temporary order

and the stipulated agreement. It found that after monthly child support and

alimony, Former Husband’s net monthly income was $3,944 and Former

Wife’s was $4,790; it also noted that Former Wife had begun generating her

own income by way of her recent property management position.

      With respect to retroactive alimony and child support, the trial court

ruled, “The Court finds for the Husband as stated in the Husband’s trial

memorandum and will not order retroactive alimony and support in light of

                                      7
the other rulings within this order.” As to attorney’s fees, the court ruled, “The

Court finds for the Husband and adopts the argument and rational[e] found

in . . . Husband’s trial memorandum.” And on the parties’ tax liabilities, it

likewise found for Former Husband “as stated in [his] pre-trial memorandum

for each year.” The court ordered that the costs of the social investigation

and forensic accounting be equally divided between the parties. The trial

court requested Former Husband to file a proposed final judgment

incorporating the rulings made therein, and if the parties could not agree on

equitable distribution, each party could file their own proposed worksheet.

      Prior to entry of a final judgment, Former Wife filed a motion for

rehearing and an objection to Former Husband’s proposed final judgment. 4

The motion for rehearing was denied and a final judgment entered, which

incorporated the trial court’s earlier rulings, ordered the parties to alternate

the dependency tax exemption, and included an equitable distribution

worksheet.

      After entry of the final judgment, Former Husband moved for rehearing,

wherein he addressed the following aspects of the trial court’s rulings: (1)

apportionment of the parties’ tax liabilities and payments; (2) credits for

      4
       Former Wife requested the court to reopen the evidence and hold a
hearing to resolve the parties’ conflicting equitable distribution worksheets.

                                        8
payments toward Former Wife’s medical bills and the child’s medical bill; (3)

credit for an unauthorized charge of his credit card; (4) credit for payment

toward the forensic accounting cost; and (5) the determination that his

businesses were marital property. In response, Former Wife filed an

amended motion for rehearing, which requested the following: (1) remove

the 2019 tax liability from equitable distribution, as such liability was non-

marital; (2) require Former Husband to secure life insurance for his support

obligations; (3) deny Former Husband’s request relating to an unauthorized

charge of his credit card; (4) revisit the ruling on the dependency tax

exemption; and (5) require Former Husband’s support payments be made

through the State Disbursement Unit via income deduction order. The trial

court ordered Former Wife to file a response addressing Former Husband’s

motion for rehearing.

      In her response, Former Wife addressed the tax liabilities, explaining

that the final judgment adopting Former Husband’s calculations were

incorrect because he used the parties’ “married filing separately” tax returns,

despite the agreement to refile as “married filing jointly.” She again sought

removal of the 2019 tax liability, arguing that it was non-marital. Former Wife

included what she asserted were the proper calculations when considering

the parties’ “married filing jointly” returns; attached to her response was a

                                      9
spreadsheet completed by the parties’ accountant, who had always

completed their taxes. She also attached an updated equitable distribution

worksheet reflecting the proper tax liabilities and removal of the 2019 taxes.

      The trial court entered an order adopting Former Wife’s arguments

relating to the tax liabilities but denied all other relief. No amended final

judgment or equitable distribution worksheet was entered. Former Wife

timely appealed, and Former Husband cross-appealed.

      For purposes of simplicity, we begin with Former Wife’s argument

regarding removal of the $1,686.94 credit awarded to Former Husband in the

equitable distribution worksheet, which represented auto insurance

payments on behalf of Former Wife. On appeal, as she did below, Former

Wife asserts that her auto insurance was paid for by Former Husband’s

business credit card for the majority of the proceedings, but he stopped

paying and disputed the charges on that card. As a result she was forced to

pay for her auto insurance and the charges to his credit card were reversed.

Thus, Former Wife contends that assigning an insurance payment of

$1,686.94 to her in equitable distribution resulted in her having to pay that

expense twice. Former Husband concedes that the trial court erred in

awarding him credit for that amount. As such, we remand to the trial court

                                     10
with instructions to remove that credit from equitable distribution and

recalculate accordingly.

      Next, we turn to Former Wife’s argument that the trial court erred by

failing to address her request for Former Husband to maintain life insurance

to secure his support obligations. A trial court’s decision on whether to

require a party to maintain life insurance to secure support obligations is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Jimenez v. Jimenez, 211 So. 3d 76,

79 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (citation omitted). Section 61.08 provides:

            To the extent necessary to protect an award of
            alimony, the court may order any party who is
            ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life
            insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure
            such alimony award with any other assets which may
            be suitable for that purpose.

§ 61.08(3), Fla. Stat. (2020).

      Former Wife had requested such relief in her counter-petition, trial

memorandum, and motion for rehearing. She highlighted Former Husband’s

testimony that he already had a $1,000,000 life insurance policy, and she

requested only a $500,000 policy. While Former Husband maintained that

he had already been struggling to afford his current policy, the trial court

failed to rule on Former Wife’s request. Therefore, we remand this issue for

resolution. See Barrett v. Barrett, 313 So. 3d 224, 229–30 (Fla. 5th DCA

2021); Duffey v. Duffey, 972 So. 2d 290, 291–92 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

                                     11
      We next address Former Wife’s contention that the trial court erred by

failing to require Former Husband to make his support payments through the

State Disbursement Unit via an income deduction order. Initially, it should be

noted that the parties’ stipulated agreement specifically provided that both

alimony and child support would be paid directly to Former Wife rather than

through the State Disbursement Unit. However, the record reveals that

Former Wife filed two motions for contempt alleging that Former Husband’s

support payments were late and deficient; in those motions, she requested

that Former Husband’s future support payments “be paid through the State

Disbursement Unit by way of [an] Income Deduction Order.”5 Although she

never obtained a ruling on those motions, she again requested such relief in

her trial memorandum and raised the issue once more in her motion for

rehearing. The final judgment is silent on the issue.

      Section 61.1301 governs income deduction orders and provides, in

relevant part:

            (1) Issuance in conjunction with an order
            establishing, enforcing, or modifying an obligation for
            alimony or child support.--

            (a) Upon the entry of an order establishing,
            enforcing, or modifying an obligation for alimony, for

      5
        Former Wife also alleged that Former Husband had failed to
reimburse her for his half of the child’s extra-curricular activities, which was
also agreed upon in the stipulated agreement.

                                      12
            child support, or for alimony and child support, other
            than a temporary order, the court shall enter a
            separate order for income deduction if one has not
            been entered.

§ 61.1301(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020).

      While the “statute is mandatory,” Seith v. Seith, 337 So. 3d 21, 26 (Fla.

4th DCA 2022), the parties were free to contract otherwise. See Lester v.

Lester, 736 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (observing that, while

parents may not “contract away” their child’s right to support, they are not

precluded from “making contracts or agreements concerning their child’s

support so long as the best interests of the child are served” (citations

omitted)). However, with allegations of Former Husband’s failure to strictly

comply with the terms of the stipulated agreement, the trial court should have

addressed the issue in the final judgment. Accordingly, we remand for further

consideration of Former Wife’s request for an income deduction order.

      We now turn to Former Wife’s argument that the trial court erred in

failing to consider her specific request for an award of attorney’s fees

incurred as a result of Former Husband’s bad faith conduct. She argues that

the trial court’s ruling focused only on the parties’ needs and ability to pay.

Former Wife contends that the following circumstances amount to bad faith

conduct, causing her to incur additional attorney’s fees: Former Husband

misrepresented his income, filed incorrect financial affidavits, falsely claimed

                                      13
he had been paying taxes, requiring the retention of a forensic accountant to

determine his actual income; he closed jointly owned bank accounts on the

“eve of litigation”; he failed to fully support her and the child based on his

misrepresented income; he sought 50/50 timesharing despite the social

investigation’s findings that he did not have a close relationship with the child;

and he showed a “lack of candor” in describing the disposition of the parties’

silver and gold in his trial memorandum.

      Although the trial court technically ruled on Former Wife’s request for

attorney’s fees, it did so by simply “adopt[ing] the argument and rational[e]”

advanced in Former Husband’s trial memorandum. However, Former

Husband’s trial memorandum focused exclusively on the parties’ financial

resources, need and ability to pay, and the notion that both parties will be on

equal footing after equitable distribution and support awards. While it is true

that an award of attorney’s fees is generally inappropriate when the

requesting spouse has the ability to pay in light of equitable distribution and

alimony, that does not necessarily preclude the trial court from exercising its

discretion to order a spouse to pay a portion of fees based on bad faith

conduct. See Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla. 1997) (noting that,

while parties’ financial resources are primary factor to consider in

determining fee award, other relevant circumstances may be considered,

                                       14
including bad faith conduct); see also Kelly v. Kelly, 925 So. 2d 364, 368

(Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (remanding dissolution judgment for trial court to award

former wife larger fee award based on former husband’s numerous bad faith

litigation tactics even where former wife had ability to pay her own fees after

dissolution).

      Because the trial court failed to address Former Wife’s basis for an

award of attorney’s fees, we remand for further consideration. See Sumlar v.

Sumlar, 827 So. 2d 1079, 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“Appellant argued that

Appellee’s own conduct in allegedly hiding or squandering assets and

refusing to disclose certain requested information during discovery

prolonged the litigation and caused her to incur additional attorney’s fees.

The trial court made no findings regarding Appellee’s acts or omissions in

this regard.”).

      Former Wife also argues that the trial court erred in failing to award

retroactive child support. “A trial court’s denial of retroactive child support is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Johnson v. Johnson, 297 So. 3d 700,

704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citing § 61.30(17), Fla. Stat.). “Although we review

a trial court’s award of child support for an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s

decisions concerning support must be supported by competent substantial

evidence and factual findings sufficient to enable this Court to determine how

                                       15
the trial court made the decisions it did.” Lennon v. Lennon, 264 So. 3d 1084,

1085 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (citations omitted).

      Section 61.30 provides in relevant part:

            (17) In an initial determination of child support,
            whether in a paternity action, dissolution of marriage
            action, or petition for support during the marriage, the
            court has discretion to award child support
            retroactive to the date when the parents did not
            reside together in the same household with the child,
            not to exceed a period of 24 months preceding the
            filing of the petition, regardless of whether that date
            precedes the filing of the petition. In determining the
            retroactive award in such cases, the court shall
            consider the following:

            (a) The court shall apply the guidelines schedule in
            effect at the time of the hearing subject to the
            obligor’s demonstration of his or her actual income,
            as defined by subsection (2), during the retroactive
            period. Failure of the obligor to so demonstrate shall
            result in the court using the obligor’s income at the
            time of the hearing in computing child support for the
            retroactive period.

            (b) All actual payments made by a parent to the other
            parent or the child or third parties for the benefit of
            the child throughout the proposed retroactive period.

            (c) The court should consider an installment payment
            plan for the payment of retroactive child support.

§ 61.30(17)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2020).

      Former Wife argues that the trial court should have awarded $9,658.68

in retroactive child support based on her calculations of what Former

                                         16
Husband had paid throughout the proceedings. Specifically, she contends

that Former Husband “swore under oath” that he was making $335 weekly

payments for both her and the child, and she relied on those numbers to

calculate the retroactive support figure. In his argument against an award of

retroactive child support, Former Husband claimed that he had already

overpaid his support obligations during the retroactive period because he

had been paying the full $335 per week solely for the child, amounting to

$25,125. Former Wife asserts that Former Husband should be precluded

from recharacterizing the $335 payment as only for the child to avoid paying

retroactive support.

      In ruling on retroactive child support, the trial court once again merely

adopted the argument articulated in Former Husband’s trial memorandum.

However, the trial memorandum inadequately described the state of the

retroactive payments made and provided no insight, calculations, or analysis

as to how he arrived at the figures articulated. As a result, we find the trial

court’s adoption of Former Husband’s argument resulted in a lack of specific

factual findings in the final judgment on this issue. See Lennon, 264 So. 3d

at 1085. Moreover, Former Husband acknowledged throughout the

proceedings that the $335 weekly support payments were to be split between

Former Wife and the minor child. It was disingenuous for Former Husband

                                      17
to characterize his $25,125 in support payments as being solely for child

support. Thus, on remand, the trial court should revisit its ruling on retroactive

child support and render appropriate findings of fact. See Davies v. Turner,

802 So. 2d 1195, 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (reversing dissolution judgment

and remanding for trial court to “explain how it reached its [retroactive child

support award] or to conduct further proceedings on this matter”); see also

Miller v. Miller, 826 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (finding that trial

court’s rationale for declining to order retroactive child support lacked

sufficient findings and failed to explain its decision).

      Finally, we address Former Wife’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling

that the parties alternate the dependency tax exemption for their minor child.

We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See Vick v.

Vick, 675 So. 2d 714, 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); see also Salazar v. Salazar,

976 So. 2d 1155, 1158 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). While the custodial parent is

presumptively entitled to the dependency tax exemption, the trial court has

discretion to transfer the exemption to the noncustodial parent. Vick, 675 So.

2d at 719; Abramovic v. Abramovic, 188 So. 3d 61, 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

      Former Wife contends that the parties’ stipulated agreement, which

provided that their minor child would reside with her the majority of the time,

rendering her the primary custodian, had the effect of assigning her the

                                       18
dependency tax exemption. She further argues that child support was

calculated based on her having the exemption, and the trial court’s decision

to require the parties to alternate was not only contrary to the parties’

agreement, but also had the effect of modifying the amount of support

available to her. While Former Wife’s argument is well taken, our review of

the record indicates that her pre-trial statement, filed after entry of the

stipulated agreement, explicitly noted that the dependency tax exemption

was an issue of fact for the trial court’s determination. As such, any error in

the trial court’s ruling on this issue was self-inflicted.

      In summary, as to the Former Wife’s appeal, we reverse and remand

the final judgment of dissolution with instructions for the trial court to (1)

remove the $1,686.94 car insurance credit from Former Husband’s column

in the equitable distribution worksheet and recalculate equitable distribution;

(2) rule on Former Wife’s request for Former Husband to maintain a life

insurance policy to secure his alimony payments; (3) address the potential

need for entry of an income deduction order requiring Former Husband’s

future support payments be made through the State Disbursement Unit; (4)

rule on Former Wife’s request for attorney’s fees based upon Former

Husband’s alleged bad faith conduct; and (5) revisit its ruling on retroactive

                                        19
child support. 6 We affirm the trial court’s ruling on the dependency tax

exemption.

      Turning to Former Husband’s cross-appeal, he argues that the trial

court committed several errors in its equitable distribution scheme. A trial

court’s equitable distribution scheme is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,

and the “distribution of marital assets, whether equal or unequal, must be

supported by factual findings based on substantial competent evidence.”

Moses v. Moses, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D2065, D2066 (Fla. 5th DCA Sept. 17,

2021).

      First, Former Husband contends that the trial court erred by unequally

apportioning the parties’ tax liabilities in its initial equitable distribution

worksheet and further erred when it amended its ruling by adopting Former

Wife’s proposed tax distribution articulated in her response to his motion for

rehearing. Specifically, Former Husband argues that Former Wife’s

spreadsheet attached to her response is hearsay and insufficient evidence

to support the trial court’s ruling with respect to the 2017 and 2018 tax

      6
         We express no opinion on the merits of Former Wife’s requests for
life insurance, an income deduction order, an attorney’s fees award based
on bad faith conduct, and retroactive child support. Our reversal is based
solely upon the failure to either address or make sufficient factual findings on
these issues.

                                      20
liabilities. Additionally, he contends it was error to remove the 2019 tax

liability as non-marital.

      Former Wife’s response to Former Husband’s motion for rehearing

provided the trial court with a spreadsheet prepared by the parties’

accountant, which outlined the parties’ payments and liabilities for 2017 and

2018 when filed as “married filed jointly.” We find that the parties’

acquiescence to the procedures utilized in this case precludes reversal.

During the second phase of this trial, the rules of evidence were, for all

intents and purposes, an afterthought. That is not necessarily good or bad.

It can be a cost-effective manner for both sides, but when the parties choose

to take that path, they cannot later complain where it leads. In this case, the

parties stipulated to filing their respective memoranda in lieu of holding a

second final hearing, and the trial court was permitted to consider their filings

as additional evidence on the various outstanding issues. Both sides, without

objection, presented evidence and related arguments in their memoranda

and again in their motions filed after the trial court’s initial order on “reversed

issues.” Former Wife’s tax spreadsheet was consistent with how the

                                        21
presentation of evidence occurred in this case. As a result, we decline to

reverse the trial court’s treatment of the parties’ 2017 and 2018 tax liabilities. 7

      As to the 2019 tax liability, the trial court agreed with Former Wife that

such liability was non-marital, as it was incurred after the date of filing—

February 2019. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

removing the 2019 tax debt from the equitable distribution worksheet. See §

61.075(7), Fla. Stat. (2020) (providing that “cut-off” date for determining

whether liabilities are marital is “the date of the filing of a petition for

dissolution of marriage”). Thus, we also affirm that aspect of the trial court’s

equitable distribution. 8

      Next, Former Husband argues that the trial court erred in equitably

distributing the balances in the Wells Fargo and Vystar business accounts,

as the funds in those accounts were used to pay down credit card debt, which

was accumulated by paying the mortgage, insurance, utilities, and other

      7
         Notably, under Former Wife’s updated equitable distribution
worksheet adopting the tax spreadsheet figures, Former Husband’s
equalizing payment was reduced by approximately $8,000.
      8
        In light of our disposition, we need not address Former Husband’s
argument relating to the trial court’s initial ruling on the parties’ tax liabilities,
which was based upon “married filing separately” returns. The trial court’s
decision to use “married filing jointly” returns was consistent with the parties’
stipulated agreement.

                                         22
expenses for the benefit of Former Wife. On this issue, we agree with Former

Wife that Former Husband’s appellate argument—that the business account

balances should not have been equitably distributed because it would result

in him paying Former Wife twice—was not the argument made below. See

Sciame v. Sciame, 215 So. 3d 190, 191–92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (rejecting

former husband’s appellate argument regarding supposed error in equitable

distribution where former husband “changed his position and argue[d] for the

first time” an argument not presented below). In any event, Former

Husband’s argument on appeal is insufficient to demonstrate that the trial

court abused its discretion in equitably distributing the business accounts.

      Former Husband next argues that the medical bills included in

equitable distribution—$4,608.81 (Former Wife’s bill) and $2,225.20 (the

child’s bill)—were paid in full by him, such that “the balances were both at

zero prior to the entry of the [final judgment].” On appeal, Former Wife

concedes that Former Husband had made payments toward the child’s

medical bill, requiring adjustment of the equitable distribution worksheet. As

she did below, Former Wife acknowledges that her column should reflect a

debt of only $2,064, and Former Husband’s column should reflect a debt of

$1,508. On remand, the trial court should recalculate the equitable

distribution accordingly.

                                     23
      However, as to Former Wife’s medical bill—$4,608.81—not only does

Former Husband provide no record support for his assertion that he had paid

this debt down to zero, but his trial memorandum never alleged that such

debt had been fully paid off. Instead, his trial memorandum simply requested

the trial court to equitably divide Former Wife’s medical bill. Accordingly, we

leave undisturbed the trial court’s ruling on Former Wife’s medical bill.

      We agree with Former Husband’s next argument—that the trial court

erred by failing to credit him with a $2,000 payment he made toward the

forensic accounting cost. Relevant to this issue is the trial court’s consent

temporary order, which provided that Former Husband would pay the initial

$2,000 retainer fee, and the trial court would later equally apportion the cost

of the forensic accountant’s evaluation. A review of the equitable distribution

worksheet appears to show that Former Husband did not receive a credit for

his initial $2,000 payment toward the later-determined total cost of

$11,155.50. As such, on remand, the equitable distribution worksheet should

be recalculated to reflect that credit.9

      Former Husband argues that the trial court erred in its distribution of

the value of several items of personal property that were located in the

      9
        We reject Former Husband’s challenge to the treatment of the social
investigation cost as unpreserved.

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martial home, which, according to him, were “looted” by Former Wife. Former

Husband asserts that the final judgment and equitable distribution worksheet

“provided nothing in terms of the value of the items [Former Wife] took,

secreted, and kept or sold.” We reject Former Husband’s claim for many

reasons. First, the issue was not raised in his motion for rehearing. See

Moody v. Newton, 264 So. 3d 292, 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (finding former

wife’s challenge to trial court’s valuation of marital property unpreserved for

appeal where former wife’s motion for rehearing “failed to raise any issue

with these particular assets” (citing Hentze v. Denys, 88 So. 3d 307, 311

(Fla. 1st DCA 2012))). Additionally, the record demonstrates that the parties

had stipulated to the distribution of their marital assets within the home, and

Former Husband’s trial testimony failed to demonstrate which items he was

otherwise entitled to but did not receive. Moreover, he never provided the

trial court with any valuation of the personal property for the trial court to rely

upon. See Simmons v. Simmons, 979 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)

(“The judge could not have made findings of value based on anything other

than the evidence presented by the parties, and the parties did not present

evidence of value for many of the major assets included in the equitable

distribution.”).

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      Finally, Former Husband argues that the trial court erred by failing to

provide him a credit in equitable distribution for his post-separation debt of

$33,922.10, incurred to keep current with his support obligations, even

though Former Wife’s post-separation debt of $16,660 was included.

However, after the trial court entered its equitable distribution worksheet,

Former Husband’s motion for rehearing wholly failed to address any error

with respect to the trial court’s factual findings on the parties’ post-separation

debt. Once again, his argument is unpreserved.

      Still, the trial court’s findings were sufficient to justify the inclusion of

only Former Wife’s post-separation debt in equitable distribution. See §

61.075(1), Fla. Stat. (providing a list of factors for trial court to consider as

justification for unequal distribution, including, but not limited to, economic

circumstances of parties; duration of marriage; contribution of each spouse

to incurring liabilities; and “any other factors necessary to do equity and

justice between the parties”). Here, the trial court’s decision to include

Former Wife’s post-separation debt was based upon the following findings:

            This is a credit card the Former Wife used to pay
            living expenses during the dissolution. Former Wife
            was a stay-at-home mother and did not have the
            funds necessary to support herself and the minor
            child. Former Husband’s support was inadequate
            and inconsistent. He had a continuing duty to support
            his Former Wife, his child, and the marital estate. The
            court has noted the substantial support payments

                                       26
            from the Former Husband to the Former Wife and
            has noted that support was inadequate for certain
            periods of time. This obligation is being included in
            the Former Wife’s column for equitable distribution in
            the amount of $16,660.

      Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion by including Former Wife’s post-separation debt

into the equitable distribution worksheet, as she had been a stay-at-home

mother for the entirety of the marriage and had little financial stability post-

separation. See Knecht v. Palmer, 252 So. 3d 842, 846 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)

(noting that, while best practice is for trial court to address all applicable

factors, unequal distribution may be affirmed where court’s findings

demonstrate that doing so was required to do equity in case).

      Accordingly, as to the Former Husband’s cross-appeal, on remand, the

trial court shall recalculate equitable distribution with attention given to the

credits and debts relating to the child’s medical bill and Former Husband’s

credit toward the forensic accounting cost. Otherwise, we affirm on all other

issues raised by Former Husband.

      AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

EVANDER, COHEN and WALLIS, JJ., concur.

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