Court Opinion

ID: 9777389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:09:12.334939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:53.488710
License: Public Domain

OSBORNE, Judge
(dissenting).
As I feel the majority opinion does not adequately set forth the facts of this case nor the circumstances surrounding the witness Loudin’s testimony, I take the liberty of stating the facts concerning both the collision and this witness’ participation in the case.
This litigation arose out of a truck-automobile collision which occurred on U.S. Highway 25W just south of Williamsburg, Kentucky, in which Floyd Taylor, Jr., was killed. The collision occurred during the daylight hours on the afternoon of December 19, 1963. The weather was clear. The road was dry. Both vehicles were traveling on a blacktop surface with no obstructions to visibility between them. At the point of impact the road runs generally north and south and makes a long sweeping curve to the left as one travels from the north to the south. The point of impact was 202 feet north of the southside of Don’s drive-in restaurant, which is located on the west side of the highway approximately 50 feet off the pavement. The testimony is conclusive that decedent entered the driveway to the restaurant from the north, that he circled the restaurant traveling on the blacktop parking surface and reentered the highway on the southside of the drive-in and headed back in a northerly direction. A truck owned by Webb Transfer Lines, Incorporated, loaded with 22,000 pounds of tobacco in cloth bags and driven by appellant James Herman Allen was proceeding from the north to the south, The car and the truck hit head-on on the east side of the road; traveled 80 feet before stopping just off of the east edge of the paved portion of the roadway. Before the collision the truck skidded forty feet leaving tire marks on the surface of the road. At the place where the collision occurred visibility is good for a distance of from Vio to 1/2 mile. There are two other roads that intersect with High*97way 25W in the vicinity of the spot where the collision took place. Highway 25 comes in from the west and intersects 477 feet north of the north side of Don’s drive-in. The road to Savoy turns off of 25W approximately 400 feet south of the south side of Don’s drive-in.
I believe the most serious contention and the one which should be dispositive of all the issues herein is the contention that the verdict is not supported by the evidence and the trial court erred in not directing a verdict for the appellants. Determination of this issue will require a detailed examination of the evidence. There were five eye witnesses to the collision including the driver of the truck. Four of these witnesses are in almost complete agreement as to how the collision occurred. The truck driver, James Herman Allen, testified that as he approached Dons’ drive-in at a rate of speed not over 45 miles per hour he saw a green Plymouth car at the south corner of the drive-in coming out slowly in the direction of the highway. He stated that the car looked like it was waiting for him to come by but when he got within 75 to 100 feet of the highway all at once, “he came out of there just a flying and the first glimpse I got of him he was looking back over his right shoulder.” The driver further testified that “the next instant the front of his car went down as if he put on the brakes when he done that I cut to the left the only way I had to miss him.”
The driver’s testimony is to the effect that the tractor trailer truck struck the left front wheel of the car as the car came on across the road proceeding at an angle from the east lane to the west lane; that the vehicles struck while the left front wheel of the car was in the center line. The truck driver’s testimony is corroborated by the testimony of Cobey Hoskins, Henrietta Teague and Lee Edward Brown, who were all sitting in the front seat of a car together on the south side of Don’s drive-in. Their testimony is to the effect they saw the accident happen. The Plymouth driven by the decedent came from the highway into the drive-in from the north, circled around behind the drive-in and passed behind the car in which they were sitting. When the driver came by them, he threw up his hand at them in the form of a greeting and they reciprocated. After circling the drive-in, he reentered the highway at an angle without stopping and was immediately struck head-on by the truck somewhere near the center line of the highway. The foregoing testimony shows conclusively the appellants were without fault and if it were the only testimony in the record there would be no doubt but that a verdict should have been directed for them. However, there was one other witness who saw the collision, Robert L. Loudin. Loudin first testified that he was 28 years of age, lived in Dayton, Ohio, and worked for the city of Dayton in the sanitation department, and that on the date of the collision in Emlyn, Kentucky, he and his wife were driving north on highway 25W and were about to the point where the Savoy road turns off 400 feet south of Don’s drive-in when he first saw the car stopped in front of Don’s drive-in. At that time he did not see any other vehicle but when the car got out on the road and had gotten on its side of the road and had driven about 100 feet or so the truck came over in the north-bound lane. He is positive that the car had traveled about 100 or 125 feet when it was struck by the truck. When asked, “how far from the center line in the northbound lane,?” his response was, “I couldn’t say that, but he was in the north-bound lane.” At another point on direct examination he was asked, “How much of the truck was over in the north-bound lane at the time of the collision?” His answer, “I couldn’t say exactly about that but I know that his left front wheel was.” On cross-examination he was asked, “Now when the car pulled out on the highway did it go straight across on the highway or did it go at an angle on the highway?” His answer was, “He kindly curved around.” He further testified on cross-examination that when he first saw the car it was ten feet from the edge of the pavement and, “looked to me like it was stopped there.” And, again *98he was asked relative to the position of the automobile at the time it was struck, “Was it completely in the north-bound lane or was it partly in the north-bound lane?” Here he answered, “Completely.”
Then upon cross-examination to whether the car stopped before entering- the highway, he was asked, “Then after it started there and came to the edge of the highway it didn’t stop any more. Is that right?” His answer was, “From the time it started, it didn’t stop.” It developed later that this witness had signed a written statement concerning the collision which reads as follows:
“Dayton, Ohio. May 4, 1964. Statement of Robert L. Loudin, age 27, married, now living at 646 Meredith, Dayton, Ohio. I am employed in the trash collection for the City of Dayton.”
“On December 19, 1963, around two p. m., I witnessed an accident about one mile south of Williamsburg, on Route 25 in front of Don’s Drive-In. As I recall it was clear and the pavement was dry. I was driving north on Route 25 about 25 or 30 miles per hour. I had as passenger my wife, Lola. When I was about 100 feet south of the drive-way of the Drive-In I saw a car pull out of the driveway of Don’s Drive-In to the south of the Drive-In building. From my vision of this car same did not stop before pulling on to Route 25. This car then cut across the pavement, headed north in a diagonal direction. I then saw a tractor trailer coming from the north, headed south. At the time the car started to pull out I would judge the front of the tractor was just to the north of where old Route 25 comes into Route 25. I cannot estimate the speed of the tractor, however the driver seemed to be moving pretty fast. I started to slow down when I saw the car and truck, and then stopped at the south end off of the road in parking lot at Adkins Motel. I saw the car which was a Plymouth, still going in a diagonal direction across the highway and when the right of the Plymouth was just across the center line the driver of the tractor evidently attempted to cut to the left and right front of tractor struck the left side of the Plymouth. When the outfit stopped, they were side by side in front of the motel. They were both headed south with tractor and trailer off of the pavement and the car was partially on the pavement. There was only the driver in the car, and this boy was taken into Williamsburg, I do not know the speed of the Plymouth, but he seemed to be pulling out pretty fast. I did not know either driver, but I learned the boy’s name was Taylor, and that he later died of injuries. The boy’s father came to me several weeks after the accident at my home in Emlyn, Kentucky. I do not know if there were any other eye witnesses. The above is a true version of the accident as seen by me.”
Photographs of the vehicles placed in evidence show conclusively that the Plymouth automobile was struck about the left front wheel at what appears to be a 45° angle of the automobile. Photographs taken at the scene of the collision show that when the car and truck collided they moved together, the car swinging around to the right side of the truck to a point just off the paved portion of the highway to where they stopped.
The majority opinion holds Loudin’s testimony to be sufficient to take the case to the jury. I disagree. When the inconsistent and inconclusive statements are disregarded, his testimony, instead of contradicting the other witnesses, corroborates them. He said in one place the driver stopped before entering the highway, in another place he says he did not stop. If we are to give weight to his testimony to which statement do we give the weight? Reason and logic dictate that we must accept the statement that agrees with all other testimony. This being true then we should only give weight to his statement that the driver did not stop. The same holds true as to his statements concerning the angle the auto entered the road and its position when struck. Is a statement of a witness which is inconsistent *99with his other statements and inconsistent with all other testimony in the case sufficient to support a verdict? Apparently the majority thinks so, in this case anyway. I do not. We have many times held otherwise. See Robert Beedle & Sons, Inc. v. Stone, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 121 (March 7, 1969); Mix v. Smith, Ky., 387 S.W.2d 1; Bell & Koch, Inc. v. Stanley, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 696; Lee v. Tucker, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 849.
I believe the facts show the decedent was negligent as a matter of law in entering upon the highway from a private road or driveway without yielding, KRS 189.330(7). This statute reads:
“The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the highway.”
This court in the case of Brumbach v. Day, Ky., 260 S.W.2d 939, reversed a jury verdict for a plaintiff with directions to enter judgment for the defendant in an analogous situation. Day drove a motor scooter from near the parking area of a filling station onto the highway closely in front of Brumbach’s truck, which was using the highway, and was injured in the collision. The court in that opinion said:
“It was clearly the duty of Mr. Day, before re-entering the highway, to look to the east for approaching vehicles and not to proceed into the highway if he saw one coming, unless he could re-enter the highway in safety. KRS 189.330(6). (Now KRS 189.330(7).) Of course, Mr. Day was not required to exercise an infallible judgment, but was required to use such care as a reasonably cautious and prudent person would exercise under the circumstances.
“However, Mr. Day does not claim that he saw the approach of Brumbach’s car from the west, nor that he believed that he had time to safely re-enter the highway, but claims he looked and saw no vehicle approaching on the highway. Either Mr. Day did not look for approaching vehicles on the highway or failed to see Brumbach’s car, which must have been very close and in plain sight. In either event Day was negligent.
“In Vaughn v. Jones, Ky., 1953, 257 S.W.2d 583, it was said:
“ ‘Thus, it appears that Jones moved out into the’ highway after looking in the direction from which Vaughn was coming when it was “approaching so closely on the highway as to constitute an hazard.” KRS 189.330(4). It was not sufficient that he should have stopped, but have yielded the right-of-way by not proceeding into the highway. KRS 189.-330(4) Vaughn could assume, under the circumstances, that Jones would conform to the law and remain where he was until the way was reasonably clear and could act upon that assumption in determining his own manner of using the road. Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707, 134 S.W.2d 594. The only excuse Jones offers is that he did not see the Vaughn car. We have said that testimony that one looked and did not see a train that was right on him was entitled to no reasonable credence; that “he will not be heard to say that he looked but did not see” it. Nashville, C. & S.L. Ry. Co. v. Stagner, 305 Ky. 717, 205 S.W.2d 493; McCarter v. L. & N.R. Co., 314 Ky. 697, 236 S.W.2d 933. Sometimes maybe failure to see is because one’s mind was not registering what his eyes beheld. “Mental abstraction, not due to any surrounding circumstances, does not palíate inattention to a known danger.” 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Sec. 187. If, under the circumstances, Jones ought to have seen the approaching car, he is guilty of negligence even though he testified he did not see it.’ (Citing authorities.)”
Those cases were followed in a similar situation in the case of Couch v. Hensley, *100Ky., 305 S.W.2d 765 and Manning v. Claxon’s Executrix, Ky., 283 S.W.2d 704.
In the case of Riggs v. Miller, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 69 (1965), this court held that a motorist traveling on a secondary road and who drove his truck from that road onto an arterial highway and had traveled from 80 to 85 feet on the main highway when struck in the rear by an approaching vehicle was negligent as a matter of law and was solely responsible for the accident, despite the fact that the vehicle traveling on the main highway left skid marks of at least 231 feet in length before the impact.
In the recent case of Chambliss v. Lewis, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 207 (1964), the evidence was that Chambliss was traveling on the main highway when Lewis drove onto the main highway from a secondary side road when the two vehicles collided. Lewis testified that he came to a stop at the intersection and looked in both directions. He further testified that he observed a car approaching from 400 to 1000 feet to his left, but that he assumed that he had time to enter and cross. There was testimony that the Chambliss car was traveling at a speed óf 70 to 75 miles per hour. In reversing a judgment in favor of Lewis and his passenger against Chambliss, this court stated:
“KRS 189.330(4) requires a motorist entering a main highway from a secondary road to stop and not proceed if an approaching car is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Couch v. Hensley, Ky., 305 S.W.2d 765.
“Under the circumstances Chambliss could assume that Lewis would conform to the law and remain where he was until the way was reasonably clear and could act upon the assumption in determining his own manner of using the road. Vaughn v. Jones, Ky., 257 S.W.2d 583.
“In the case at bar, Lewis saw the approaching automobile and moved onto the highway in view of the known danger. It appears that Lewis assumed the risk in trying to cross the highway knowing that a collision could result. With the car so near, whether Lewis stopped or didn’t stop, he should have yielded the right-of-way by not proceeding onto the highway in the face of the known approaching automobile. Couch v. Hensley, supra, and Vaughn v. Jones, supra. Lewis testified that he clearly saw the Cham-bliss car but thought that he had time to cross the road. This assumption, coupled with the fact that a collision did result, is conclusive that Lewis was negligent.
“It is our opinion that under circumstances such as in this case, where the approaching car on the arterial highway was in view for an unlimited distance, the speed of the approaching car cannot be considered to be a causative factor. From the standpoint of physics, the cause is simply that the two vehicles are attempting to occupy the intersection at the same moment. However, from the standpoint of law, the reason (excessive speed or otherwise) why the car on the arterial highway happens to be in the intersection at that moment is immaterial, if the fact that it would be there at that moment was reasonably observable to the driver of the car on the inferior highway, because then the latter driver has the duty not to be in the intersection at that moment. The negligence of Lewis in the instant case was the sole cause of the accident. Therefore the court should have directed a verdict for Chambliss as against both Charles Lewis and Mae Lewis.”
I simply cannot believe that reasonable minds can differ but that the sole cause of the collision in this case was the negligence of the decedent in not stopping and yielding the right-of-way before he entered the superior highway in the immediate presence of the truck. The majority opinion attempts to evade this cold, harsh reality by intimating that the truck had no adequate explanation for being on the wrong side of the road. To nie this is ridiculous. It is perfectly obvious that the truck driver did *101nothing more than try to avoid a head-on collision. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that the truck driver had any earthly reason for swerving to the left except in a desperate last-minute attempt to miss the car. The majority in its opinion states:
“If the explanation is so clear and convincing and all the circumstances and fair inferences that could be drawn from them show that the reason for being on the wrong side of the road was completely unrelated to any negligence of the defendant, then the defendant is entitled to win by directed verdict, but if the reasons, circumstances or the inferences are not that clear then the jury must determine the question.”
Certainly under this rule no fair-minded person can argue but what the appellant was entitled to a directed verdict. This case disturbs me because I feel we have done a grave injustice to the parties involved. It disturbs me even more because it destroys the concept of “right-of-way” for all people using the highways of this Commonwealth.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
MONTGOMERY, C. J., joins in this dissent.