Court Opinion

ID: 9681093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:43:59.431827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.299604
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion On Motion for Rehearing
PARKER, Justice.
The real estate license was the one and only license appellant was required to have under the facts in this case. Neither the trial court nor this court held that Texas law required plaintiff to have two licenses, one under The Securities Act and the other under the Real Estate License Act, in order to recover a commission for services rendered as a broker. Not having held that two licenses were so required, this court pretermits discussion of the constitutional question that the plaintiff urges only in the event this court should construe the statutes as requiring plaintiff to have licenses under both acts in order to recover against defendant.
This court recognizes that: “[A] business relationship not meeting the legal standards of a partnership or joint venture or any other legal relationship giving it a technical fiducial character may yet be such a confidential relationship as to impose fiducial duties and obligations upon the parties to it.” Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247 (S.Ct.1962); MacDonald v. Follett, 142 Tex. 616, 180 S.W.2d 334; Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 150 Tex. 39, 237 S.W.2d 256 (S.Ct.1951) and authorities cited in such opinions. Plaintiff had no pleadings of fact bringing plaintiff under the principles of constructive trust under any theory.
Taking the allegations of fact contained in plaintiff’s petition as true, he failed to plead facts raising the issue of construe-*760tive trust. In appellant’s motion for rehearing, it is stated:
“In plaintiff’s amended petition it was alleged that in October, 1957, H. Curtis Plumly, Jr. and the defendant, W. H. Sorenson, were in partnership and that the partnership, acting through H. Curtis Plumly, Jr., agreed in writing with the plaintiff that they would assign to plaintiff a l/64th overriding royalty for his assistance in obtaining an oil, gas and mineral lease for the partnership. Plaintiff alleged that he had done everything required of him and that a commitment was obtained and leases were actually prepared whereby the lands were to be leased ‘to H. Curtis Plumly, Trustee.’ It was then alleged that after such commitment had been obtained and the leases so prepared in the name of H. Curtis Plumly, Trustee, that the defendant, W. H. Sorenson, ‘in an attempt to defeat plaintiff’s rights’ and to deprive him of his l/64th overriding royalty, had the leases changed by substituting the name of W. H. Sorenson, Trustee, for that of H. Curtis Plumly, Jr., although he, the said Sorenson, had not participated or assisted in any way in obtaining the commitment for the leases or in the preparation thereof. It was further alleged that Sorenson, after taking the leases in his name as Trustee, then ‘reserved unto himself a l/64th overriding royalty, which was the l/64th overriding royalty which plaintiff was entitled to receive for his services.’ Based upon such facts, plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to have a trust impressed upon said leases and the l/64th overriding interest which Sorenson had reserved for himself, after having obtained the leases initially In his name as Trustee by the substitution of mames as above set forth.” (emphasis added)
The agreement in writing is the letter of October 23, 1957, set forth in the original opinion. This letter plainly makes plaintiff a real estate broker, nothing else. From the letter and such pleadings, it appears that plaintiff sues for the payment of a real estate dealer’s commission without a license, for which reason plaintiff cannot recover. Plaintiff has neither claimed nor pleaded any facts bringing him under the provisions of the Supreme Court cases on constructive trust above mentioned and/or as set forth in plaintiff’s motion for rehearing. Otherwise, plaintiff’s motion for rehearing calls for no further clarification.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is denied and overruled.