Court Opinion

ID: 9672222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:51:12.741402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:14.979040
License: Public Domain

*251Thompson, J.
(dissenting). — This case is a companion case to Sioux Associates, Inc. v. Iowa Liquor Control Commission, 257 Iowa 308, 132 N.W.2d 421, and this dissent is a companion dissent to the one filed therein. What was said in the dissenting opinion there is applicable here; all of what is said here is likewise pertinent to the dissent in Sioux Associates.
I. For the sake of brevity I shall refer to the Sioux Associates ease as Sioux, and to the instant case as Carey. The question of strict construction of the exception provided in the statute, relieving from its operation “occasional private social gatherings of friends or relatives in a private home or place” is discussed in the dissent in Sioux, and need not be repeated here. Reference is made, however, to the authorities there cited: Wood Brothers Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 562, 563, 1 N.W.2d 655, 661; Hawkeye Portland Cement Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 198 Iowa 1250, 1255, 201 N.W. 16, 19.
II. In the Sioux dissent, however, the question of the meaning of “a private home or place” as used in the statute was not extensively considered. But I think a proper construction of these terms rules both cases and denies the right of the plaintiffs to the relief asked, in each.
The question of the application of the rule of ejusdem ge-neris is only sketchily dealt with in the Sioux case, and the holding there is adopted by the majority opinion here without further consideration. Both cases, therefore, rely upon the somewhat meager analysis of the question in Sioux, and both reach an unsupportable conclusion. It is achieved by writing the word “home” out of the statute, and discussing only the adjective “private”. So, instead of considering the entire term “private home”, the majority in Sioux, followed without further analysis in Carey, gives the governing part of the term no real consideration. This achieves the result sought, but entirely overlooks the real issue.
Lord Tenterden’s Rule, known to our law as the principle of ejusdem generis, is thoroughly established and understood, and has been applied in many cases, both in Iowa and in other jurisdictions. The words “ejusdem generis” mean literally “of the *252same kind or species.” 28 C. J. S., Ejnsdem, page 1049. The rale is that “where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some mo-re general wo-rd or phrase, such general word or phrase is to be held to refer to things of the same'kind * * 28 C. J. S., Ejnsdem, pages 1049, 1050; Hewitt v. Whattoff, 251 Iowa 171, 175, 100 N.W.2d 24, 26. The majority says in Sioux, that there is no “clean-up” or general word in the statute under consideration. It is not necessary that there be a “clean-up” word, in the terms of “or otherwise” or similar terms. In State v. Wignall, 150 Iowa 650, 128 N.W. 935, 34 L. R. A., N. S., 507, the leading case in Iowa on this point, the target phrase was “or person”; and we held this meant a person who was engaged in the same kind of activities as delineated in the preceding specific terms. There the general term was “or person”; here it is “or place”. It is not possible to say one is a general term while the other is not. So it is not possible to agree with the trial court, and the majority, that there is no general term involved here. The specific words in the statute are “a private home”; and the general words following are “or place”. It is of course not required that the specific words be several, or more than one; a single specific term preceding a general term calls for an application of the rule. Certainly a “home” is specific; and equally certain, a “place” is general. It begs the question to say that the only important word in the specific term is “private”; it is merely an adjective describing and making the specific word “home” more specific. The genus word is “home”.
Applying the rule to the actual wording of the statute, we have the specific words “a private home” and the following words “or place”. In Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 98, 123 N.W. 231, 234, 27 L. R. A., N. S., 407, Ann. Cas. 1912B 852, we said “the purport of which [ejusdem generis] is that, where specific words of the same nature are used in a statute followed by the use of general ones, these general terms take their meaning from the specific ones and are restricted to the same genus; in other words, comprehend only those things of the same kind as the specific ones.” We quoted and followed this in- State v. Cusick, 248 Iowa 1168, 1171, 84 N.W.2d 554, 556. In this case (page 1172) we quoted with approval this statement: “It has *253been said that the rule has been universally applied with some degree of strictness, so as not to enlarge the provisions of a statute, unless it was manifest from a reading of the whole statute, or relative statutes, that it was intended to broaden powers delegated.” 28 C. J. S., Ejusdem, page 1050.
In Hewitt v. Whattoff, supra, we said that the general term must be applied only to “something of the same genus, of the same kind, as the things specifically named.” Loc. cit. 251 Iowa 176, 100 N.W.2d 27. “Genus” is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary as meaning “a class, kind, or group marked by common characteristics or by one common characteristic”.
So we have here the specific term “private home” followed by the general term “or place”. It seems to me inescapable— although the majority escapes it — that the rule of ejusdem ge-neris applies here in full force; and that the general word “place” must mean a place of the same kind or class, and having common characteristics as a “home”. Such might be a hotel or motel, or boardinghouse room; but not a commercially operated ballroom, restaurant or nightclub, or place devoted to the serving of meals and rental of banquet rooms, for profit. A home, says Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, is “the house and grounds with their appurtenances habitually occupied by a family; one’s principal place of residence; domicile; a private dwelling.” I doubt anyone will contend a commercial ballroom, as in Sioux, or the operation conducted by the plaintiffs, as in Carey, comes within either the dictionary definition of a home or the popular understanding of the word.
The majority, in Sioux, adopted in Carey, says if “place” were intended to mean the same thing as “home”, there would be no occasion to use it at all. What the majority is really saying here is that the rule of ejusdem generis is either meaningless, or should be abrogated. For the same argument could be made in each ease where the rule applies; if the general term must mean only the same thing, or things, as the specific words which it follows, why is it written into the statute in the first place ? The answer, as applied to the case at bar, is that apparently the legislature wished to except not only private homes, but things of a *254similar nature, such as the hotel and motel and boardinghouse rooms previously referred to. These have the general characteristics of a home; temporary, in many cases, but still used as a dwelling place for longer or shorter periods. Another answer is that the rule is thoroughly established as one of statutory construction ; is universally accepted and followed, and we ourselves have applied it in many cases.
Indeed, the argument at this point operates in reverse to the reasoning of the majority. If any private place is within the exception to the statute, as the majority holds, why is the word “home” included at all? A private place would necessarily include a home. But the hard fact is that the word “home” is there. We must assume the legislature put it there for a definite purpose and to have a definite meaning. It is a specific term preceding the general term “place”. The place, therefore, must be of the same genus as a home. In this a dance hall or cafe surely fails for want of the chief characteristic of a home; for neither is a dwelling place, or residence, or domicile.
The majority selects one characteristic of a home — -“private” —and ignores all others. The primary characteristic of a home is that it is a dwelling place; indeed, the adjective “private”, which is all the majority considers, is a redundancy. All homes are private, but all private places are not homes. But, by ignoring the other attributes of a “home” the majority succeeds in defeating the rule. I suggest that the rule means here clearly, that the “place” which follows “private home” in the statute means a place with the same characteristics; of the same kind. And the most marked characteristic of a home is that it is a dwelling place; a domicile; the building where one resides. Certainly a public dance hall or a building devoted to use as a supper club or restaurant is not of the same kind and does not have the same characteristics as a home. The answer to both Sioux and Carey is found at this point. The rule of ejusdem generis applies equally and fully in both eases.
III. Leaving the question of ejusdem generis, which seems to me clearly to rule both Sioux and Carey, there is the question whether the plaintiffs’ operation in Carey is in fact a “private place” within the meaning of the statute. This is generally a fact *255question, to be determined from the evidence as applied to the wording of the statute. The plaintiffs plead that their business has been established and operating for a long period of time, and is well known “throughout Iowa City, Johnson County, and the State of Iowa.” Few private places are SO' well known. The plaintiff Fred P. Carey, testifying in his own behalf, said: “Who gets to come to the parties is up to the person who has leased the premises, and they tell me in advance how many people are going to be there. When I said there was a minimum number that I insisted upon, I meant that in relationship to the serving of food. If we do not have a certain amount of dinners, then we make them pay a rental charge in addition.” Further, he testified: “Any corporation or partnership or association or legitimate organization can rent a room.”
While Mr. Carey said repeatedly that he does not serve the public, this is true if at all only in a most technical sense. Anyone can rent a room; the only qualification being that if he does not purchase a sufficient number of dinners he will be required to pay some rental for the room, or rooms, nsed. Apparently any orderly individual could secure service, even if he were alone, if he wished to pay whatever extra would be charged him in the way of rental. There is no other restriction on the size of the groups, except of course that they be orderly. The plaintiffs are in the position of the man who said he dealt only with his friends, but that he “hadn’t an enemy in the world.”
I cannot believe the legislative enactment, strictly construed against the exception, is shown to exempt such operations as the plaintiffs are conducting here. However, I am convinced the rule of ejusdem generis so clearly covers the situation that I shall not further stress the factual point discussed briefly in this division.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
Garfield, C. J., joins in this dissent.