Court Opinion

ID: 9573530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:56:29.246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:32.786001
License: Public Domain

*98NEELY, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
In my dissent in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, 161 W.Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978), I expressed concern that the majority’s approach to procedure threatened to undermine the entire workers’ compensation system. I have the same concern now. Mandolidis involved three different cases in which workers claimed to fall within the “deliberate intent” exception to employer liability. In all three cases, the lower courts had granted summary judgment to the employer. On appeal, the majority reversed the granting of summary judgment, and held that all three cases should have gone to a jury. They did so because they believed that in each case the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to be allowed an opportunity to develop facts.
However, of the three claimants, only Mr. Mandolidis alleged facts that demonstrated to me that there was “deliberate intention” on the part of the employer. Mr. Mandolidis was the victim of an accident resulting from a level of willful, wanton, and reckless disregard for human safety that amounted to “deliberate intention”, while the other two claimants suffered from accidents resulting simply from some degree of negligence.
The problem with allowing weak “deliberate intention” cases to get to the jury is that juries have sympathy for injured workers and no sympathy for big employers and insurance companies. If you allow 100 “deliberate intention” cases involving big employers like Shoney’s, Inc., to get to juries, you will get some substantial number of groundless verdicts for the plaintiffs.1 More important, however, than the cases that are tried are the cases that are settled. Mandolidis was an economic disaster for this state not because employers feared judgments, but because employers feared run away lawyers’ bills and routine nuisance suit settlements and hefty new insurance premiums in addition to workers’ compensation to protect against possible loss of compensation immunity.
I like wealth re-distribution as much as the next man, but the simple fact is that the statute applied in this case was not intended to provide for wealth redistribution, but rather to prevent excessive wealth redistribution. Indeed, the statute was passed in response to the majority’s opinion in Mandolidis and the statute attempted to instantiate the notions I had articulated in my Mandolidis dissent. If juries make mining operators or manufacturers pay huge awards, the manufacturers will move out of West Virginia, or go out of business completely, while new mine operators will be reluctant to come here. At any rate, jobs will flee the State. Indeed, this was what was happening under Mandolidis, which is why the legislature amended the statute in 1983 with the willing and eager support of the West Virginia AFL-CIO.
In my Mandolidis dissent I complained that the majority appeared to be waiting for an opportunity to create a new legal fiction of “constructive intent to injure”. Today’s majority has found that fiction codified in the five-part test of amended W. Va. Code 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) [1983]. By their reading, the jury makes the determination of whether the employer loses immunity, *991.e., whether the case can go to a jury.2 The statute does contain a technical flaw, in that at one isolated point (if one is innocent of this statute’s tumultuous history) it appears to place the decision as to whether the employer is subject to suit under the five-part test of W.Va. Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) in the hands of the trier of fact, whether that be judge or jury.
However, exactly because the drafters of the new law, W.Va.Code 23-4-2 [1983], feared that the Court would deliberately misinterpret their amendment to reinstate the “constructive deliberate intent to injure” cause of action that had worked such economic destruction in this state for five years, the legislature made their intentions clear in W.Va.Code 23-4-2(c)(l) [1983]:
It is declared that enactment of this chapter and the establishment of the workmen’s [workers’] compensation system in this chapter was and is intended to remove from the common law tort system all disputes between or among employers and employees regarding the compensation to be received for injury or death to an employee except as herein expressly provided, and to establish a system which compensates even though the injury or death of an employee may be caused by his own fault or the fault of a co-employee; that the immunity established in sections six and six-a [§§ 23-2-6 and 23-2-6a], article two of this chapter, is an essential aspect of this workmen’s [workers’] compensation system; that the intent of the legislature in providing immunity from common law suit was and is to protect those so immunized from litigation outside the workmen’s [workers’] compensation system except as herein expressly provided; that, in enacting the immunity provisions of this chapter, the legislature intended to create a legislative standard for loss of that immunity of more narrow application and containing more specific mandatory elements than the common law tort system concept and standard of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct; and that it was and is the legislative intent to promote prompt judicial resolution of the question of whether a suit prosecuted under the asserted authority of this section is or is not prohibited by the immunity granted under this chapter.
The legislative intent as clearly expressed above should inform any reading of W.Va.Code 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii) [1983]. Thus, any reading of the latter provision that would broaden the definition of “deliberate intention” is patently wrong. First, “prompt judicial resolution”, in light of the overall legislative history of the amendment, can only be a determination made by a judge. Second, the practical effect of letting the jury decide what cases are “deliberate intention” cases certainly is to broaden substantially the “deliberate intention” exception. Even the majority admits:
Ironically, this is not the sort of case wherein, under all the facts and circumstances, the appellee could probably have prevailed under the extremely narrow concept of deliberate intent enunciated in Mandolidis. See 161 W.Va. at 698, 246 S.E.2d at 907. The reason the appellee *100would likely have been unsuccessful under Mandolidis is because we do not perceive this as the type of injury “re-sultpng] from wilful, wanton or reckless misconduct [where] such ... injury [wa]s no longer accidental in any meaningful sense of the word, and [therefore] must be taken as having been inflicted with deliberate intention_” Id. 161 W.Va. at 705, 246 S.E.2d at 914.
Mayles v. Shoney’s, 185 W.Va. 88, 405 S.E.2d 15 (1990) (Workman, J.). The majority then goes on to make a curious pronouncement:
However, the legislature, in an apparent effort to narrow the parameters of civil liability for employers, has indeed broadened the concept by enactment of the five-part test of W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii).” 3
Id. 185 W.Va. at 96, 405 S.E.2d at 23-24.
Thus, like the malevolent genie, who, after telling the finder of the lamp to make three wishes, then seizes on any ambiguity in the finder’s expression of his wishes to play ironic practical jokes, the majority knows exactly what the legislature meant to do with the amendment, and interprets the language so as to defeat the legislature’s express purpose.
For the statute to operate as the legislature intended, there must be a threshold determination by the trial court that the accident resulted from either “deliberate intention”, or, alternatively, that all of the elements of the five-part test are met.
In affirming the jury verdict in this case, the Court found that Shoney’s had a “subjective realization” of the “high degree of risk” and “strong probability of serious injury or death.” I strongly disagree, and would hold that, as a matter of law, subsection (B) of the five part test was not met. I would also hold that, as a matter of law, Shoney’s management’s conduct did not amount to “intentional exposure”, under subsection (D).
Subsection (B) requires “subjective realization”, and not merely “objective realization.” Even if the “reasonable man" would have realized the existence of a dangerous condition in the workplace and the high degree of risk associated with that condition, the specific real life defendant in this case did not meet subsection (B), and thus retains immunity from civil action. For the employer to lose immunity, he must have demonstrated that he knew of the dangerous condition and appreciated the high degree of risk. Thus, our compensation law is particularly (and rightfully) protective of the stupid; only the malicious employer loses his immunity. The claimant has not shown that Shoney’s management knew of the dangerous condition and realized how dangerous it was.
“Deliberate exposure” is, likewise, a difficult test to meet. “Deliberate” means that the decision to expose employees to the dangerous condition was something that management thought about for at least a moment or two. (Like malice in murder, the thought must have been around for at least the twinkling of an eye.) Thus “deliberate exposure” requires a conscious decision on the part of management. The record does not disclose a conscious decision on the part of management to expose employees to the particular dangerous condition of carrying hot grease down a grassy slope. Indeed, the record conclusively demonstrates that workers were provided a perfectly safe, paved passage that completely avoided the grassy slope.
Perhaps the chain of communication should have been better so that Mr. Hunt would have been aware of potentially dangerous practices in the workplace. Perhaps Mr. Hunt should have watched the employees constantly to make sure that they always did things the correct and safe way. However, any misconduct on the part of management constituted negligence, at worst. Indeed, to reiterate, stupidity is a quality expected of both employers and employees under the workers’ com*101pensation statutes and both are protected from being penalized for it: The worker recovers even if the accident was entirely his fault, and the employer is still immune from common law suit even if he walks around all day wearing a dunce cap!
Mr. Mandolidis’ plant foreman, on the other hand, knew that running a table saw without a guard was extremely dangerous to the saw’s operator, and insisted that it be run without the guard. Further, the plant foreman and the plant manager affirmatively demonstrated that they did not care if a saw operator was injured from an unguarded saw. In response to numerous complaints about the dangerous condition, the plant foreman and plant manager “heehawed”, apparently taking sadistic pleasure in the uneasy position of the saw operators. Furthermore, after a plant inspector shut down a guardless saw and placed on it an “out of order” sign, the foreman took the sign off and placed the saw back in operation. Such conduct shows both “subjective realization” of the dangerous condition, and a reckless disregard for human life that rises to the level of “malice”. And, indeed, that is what needs to be shown for there to be a “deliberate intention” case.
Mr. Hunt’s conduct in this case is to the conduct óf Mr. Mandolidis’ plant manager and foreman as night is to day. Not only does it appear that Mr. Hunt lacked a subjective realization of the dangerous condition and the degree of risk; Mr. Hunt certainly did not intentionally expose plaintiff to the danger. Where Mr. Mando-lidis was expressly threatened with firing if he did not go ahead and operate the highly dangerous unguarded saw, Mr. Hunt never said to plaintiff, “You take that oil out while it’s hot, and you better take it down the grassy slope, or you’re fired.” The “Get it done now” attitude alleged in this case does not rise to the level of “deliberate exposure.” Indeed, the slothful law clerk who drafted this opinion has heard the same admonition three times today! The record shows that the employer provided a perfectly safe way to dispose of the oil. It could have been carried out after it was cooled, and it could have been carried to the fifty-five gallon drum by a much safer path than the grassy slope, and such a path was provided by the employer.
Examining the amended statute and the facts of this case, one can conclude only that the management, although perhaps negligent in some respects, did not engage in the level of “willful, wanton and reckless misconduct” that the drafters of the amended statute envisaged as triggering loss of employer immunity from suit.
I am authorized to say that Justice BROTHERTON joins me in this dissent.

. In addition, juries likely would be overly generous to injured employees of large employers. In Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that where Congress waives the Government’s immunity from suit, the plaintiff has a right to a jury trial only where Congress has affirmatively and unambiguously granted that right by statute. In regard to excessive jury verdicts, the Court said:
It is not difficult to appreciate Congress’ reluctance to provide for jury trials against the United States. When fashioning a narrow exception to permit jury trials in tax refund cases ... Congress expressed its concern that juries “might tend to be overly generous because of the virtually unlimited ability of the Government to pay the verdict.”
Id. at 161 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. at 2702 n. 8. The Court then noted that the narrow exception allowing jury trials in tax refund cases was passed only after much delay and debate, and after the reluctant House conferees became convinced that there would be no danger of excessive jury verdicts because recoveries would be limited to the amount of taxes illegally or erroneously collected. Id.

. The problem with having the determination of employer immunity from suit done at the tail end of the litigation is obvious. Without a threshold determination by the trial court, nuisance suits will plague employers with high litigation costs.
In F. Haas, On Reintegrating Workers' Compensation and Employers’ Liability, 21 Ga.L.Rev. 843 (1987), Professor Haas discusses the problem of nuisance suits by injured workers. An injured worker who has had his expenses taken care of by workers' compensations is in a good position to bring a nuisance suit, and wait around for a high settlement. The author, in his proposal for a dual system of tort liability and workers’ compensation for work-related accidents, makes it clear that some kind of threshold determination is necessary to prevent nuisance suits. Id., 891-893.
While Professor Haas seems mainly concerned with problem of small nuisance suits, I do not think that a mechanical threshold test, like an amount in controversy requirement, would solve the problem of large, but ultimately groundless, claims. First, the employer will have to defend those even more vigorously than the small ones. Second, American juries are known throughout the world for their generosity, so that without a threshold determination by a judge, juries often are going to make large awards in cases that never should have reached them.

. If the Court admits that this claimant would be able to avail himself of the "deliberate intention" exception, under the Mandolidis court’s view, but believes that under the amended statute, which was intended to narrow the exception, the claimant prevails, the majority has reached the wrong result.