Court Opinion

ID: 9577766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:37:53.546242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:14.342964
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice,
dissenting with whom THOMAS, Chief Justice, joins.
I dissent for the reasons stated in the prior opinion of this court in Burton v. Fisher Controls Company, Wyo., 713 P.2d 1137 (1986). And, by way of additional comment, I note that the court cites Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Wyo., 718 P.2d 890 (1986) as support for the trial court’s holding that the facts of the case as related to Deans, “did not encompass any possibility of gross negligence,” but “might accommodate ordinary-negligence questions.” Jones v. Chevron involved the independent-contractor issue and was decided upon summary judgment. In the instant case, before the judge ruled that as a matter of law the jury could not find gross negligence, the facts were fully developed by testimony of witnesses in a trial to a jury. That is quite a different circumstance from the summary judgment in Jones v. Chevron.
The majority then finds comfort in the fact that the jury not only did not find Deans grossly negligent, but declined to find that he was even negligent, and then states: “The curative effect of a directed verdict by confirmatory jury verdict cannot realistically be ignored.” This scenario and statement brings into focus the precise complaint of appellant, i.e., that he was denied a fair trial by the court’s ruling. The jury's verdict is confirmatory of nothing. When the court held, as a matter of law, that Deans was not grossly negligent, appellant could not, under any circumstance, recover from him. Thus it became necessary for him to argue that not only *1224was Deans not grossly negligent but that he was not negligent at all, for a finding of negligence against Deans would have meant that appellant had lost his case. Thus in his opening statement, appellant argued that Deans was grossly negligent, but when the case finally went to the jury he had to argue exactly the opposite, such argument being set forth verbatim on page 1218 of the majority opinion. As appellant’s counsel stated in argument to this court, the jury must have thought he was crazy. His second objection was that although he was not seeking to recover from parties with whom he had settled, they nevertheless were shown on the verdict form as defendants in the lawsuit, and he was forced to attempt to explain to the jury that although they were shown as defendants, he was not seeking to recover against them. Again, this was an extremely confusing situation which placed him at a considerable disadvantage and must have affected his credibility in attempting to present his claim to the jury. I am convinced this court was right in its first decision in this case; and, therefore, I must dissent from the opinion of the court following rehearing.