Court Opinion

ID: 9907408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 15:05:22.749423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:30.729081
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-687

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                             MIGUEL C. FLETCHER.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a jury-waived trial, the defendant was convicted

 of negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 1           After filing a

 notice of appeal, the defendant moved for expert funds, for

 reconsideration of the denial of that motion, and, accompanied

 by a renewed motion for expert funds, for a new trial.               He filed

 a second notice of appeal from the denials of those motions, and

 his appeal from those orders was consolidated with his direct

 appeal.    In the consolidated appeals, the defendant argues that

 the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that

 the prosecutor asserted facts not in evidence in her closing

 argument, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,

 1 The defendant was also found responsible for a civil infraction
 of speeding at a rate exceeding the posted limit. He was
 acquitted of operating under the influence.
and that he is entitled to expert funds and a new trial.     We

affirm.

     Background.   We summarize the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth.   See Commonwealth v. Latimore,

378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).   In November 2017 Bridgewater

Police Officer Christopher Paze was working a paid detail at a

restaurant when he saw a car in the parking lot that had "just

been struck."   Parked adjacent to the damaged car was an

eighteen-wheeler bobtail tractor without the trailer attached,

"tilting back and forth."   Paze approached the tractor and asked

the driver, later identified as the defendant, to get out.     The

defendant did not respond and instead "took off at a high rate

of speed."   Paze then radioed in the tractor's registration

plate information and direction of travel.

     In response to the call, Bridgewater Police Sergeant Carl

MacDermott 2 drove to nearby Central Square to intercept the

defendant.   Central Square is a thickly settled business

district with crosswalks, a traffic light, angular parking, and

a rotary with a speed limit of thirty miles per hour.   As

MacDermott approached the area with his blue lights on, he saw

the defendant entering "the rotary at a high rate of speed."

The defendant navigated the rotary successfully before turning

2 MacDermott was a lieutenant by the time of trial.   We refer to
him by his rank at the time of the offense.

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onto a street with a speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour.

After MacDermott made the same turn, the defendant's "vehicle

. . . shot off."    MacDermott had to drive between sixty and

sixty-five miles per hour for seven-tenths of a mile to catch up

with the defendant.

     MacDermott activated his siren, and the tractor pulled over

without incident.    Because the height of the tractor put

approximately ten feet between the defendant and MacDermott,

making it difficult for them to communicate, MacDermott asked

the defendant to get out.    Once the defendant did so, MacDermott

noticed that he seemed "very agitated" and spoke with "thick-

tongued, slurred speech."    Without being asked, the defendant

stated that he had consumed three beers and a mixed drink.

     Bridgewater Police Officer Ryan O'Connell arrived at the

scene to assist.    He observed that the defendant had red

bloodshot eyes and slurred speech and smelled moderately of

alcohol.   O'Connell administered various field sobriety tests,

which the defendant did not successfully complete.    The

defendant could neither recite the alphabet nor count backwards

in the manner requested.    While receiving instructions for the

nine-step walk-and-turn test, the defendant was unable to

maintain his balance, and he never properly completed the walk.

He also did not properly perform the one-leg stand test.

                                  3
Believing that the defendant was intoxicated, the officers

arrested him.

      Discussion.   1.   Sufficiency of the evidence.   We review

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to

determine "whether a rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"

(quotation and citation omitted).      Commonwealth v. Quinones, 95

Mass. App. Ct. 156, 162 (2019).     Inferences supporting a

conviction "need only be reasonable and possible" and "need not

be necessary or inescapable" (quotation and citation omitted).

Id.

      Negligent operation requires proof that the defendant

"(1) operated a motor vehicle (2) upon a public way

(3) negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might

be endangered."     Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377,

379 (2017).   The defendant challenges only the third element,

arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he operated

his vehicle in a negligent manner.     We disagree.

      To satisfy the third element, the Commonwealth must present

proof that the defendant's conduct "might have endangered the

safety of the public, not that it in fact did."       Commonwealth v.

Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 35 (2007).     Here, the evidence

showed that the defendant drove a bobtail tractor through a

thickly settled business district at a high rate of speed.      The

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evidence also permitted the inference that the defendant had

been drinking before doing so; he failed to successfully perform

any of the field sobriety tests, displayed several physical

signs that he had recently been drinking, and admitted that he

had consumed multiple beers and a mixed drink earlier that

night.   See Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380 ("The fact that the

jury ultimately did not convict the defendant of OUI does not

preclude their consideration of the evidence of intoxication in

considering the negligent operation charge").   Considering the

defendant's speeding and that he had been drinking, coupled with

the size of the tractor and the thickly settled nature of the

area, the judge had an adequate basis to find the defendant

guilty of negligent operation.   See id. at 380-381 (affirming

conviction of negligent operation based on evidence of

intoxication and excessive speeding at night on residential

road); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 921-923

(2004) (affirming conviction of negligent operation based on

evidence of excessive speeding through thickly settled

neighborhood on holiday afternoon).

     We are unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that the

absence of a measurement or numerical estimate of his speed

necessitates vacating his conviction.   Officers observed the

defendant's tractor moving at a high rate of speed on three

separate occasions, including in areas where the speed limit was

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no higher than thirty-five miles per hour.     Sergeant MacDermott

also testified that he had to drive between sixty and sixty-five

miles per hour for seven-tenths of a mile to catch up with the

defendant.   It was a "reasonable and possible" inference from

this evidence that the defendant was driving in excess of the

speed limit. 3   Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 162.

     2.   Closing argument.    The defendant asserts that the

prosecutor improperly stated facts not in evidence when she

argued that the defendant was "traveling essentially over 60

miles per hour with an officer pursuing him in what appears to

be at least a 30-mile-per-hour zone."     As the defendant did not

object at trial, we review to determine whether any error

created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.     See

Commonwealth v. Cuffee, 492 Mass. 25, 32 (2023).

     We discern no error.     The prosecutor's statement that the

defendant was "traveling essentially over 60 miles per hour" was

3 Arguing otherwise, the defendant characterizes Sergeant
MacDermott's testimony as establishing that his seven-tenths of
a mile pursuit of the defendant included a stretch where he
stopped for a red light. But viewed most favorably to the
Commonwealth, MacDermott's testimony was that he stopped at the
red light before pursuing the defendant for seven-tenths of a
mile. In any event, even accepting the defendant's
characterization of MacDermott's testimony, the judge still
could have inferred that the defendant was speeding based on the
evidence that the defendant was driving at a high rate of speed
and "shot off" after exiting the rotary and that MacDermott had
to travel up to sixty-five miles per hour, in a thirty-five mile
per hour zone, to catch up with the defendant.

                                   6
a fair inference from Sergeant MacDermott's testimony that he

was driving between sixty and sixty-five miles per hour while

pursuing the defendant.    See Cuffee, 492 Mass. at 32 ("A

prosecutor is entitled to marshal the facts in evidence, and any

fair inferences drawn from those facts").    Likewise, the

prosecutor's comment that the speeding occurred in "at least a

30-mile-per-hour zone" was a fair inference from MacDermott's

testimony that the speed limit was between thirty and thirty-

five miles per hour in the areas that the defendant was driving.

     We also discern no substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice.    Closing argument is "not evidence."   Commonwealth v.

Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 517 (1987).     And we presume that the judge

based his finding on his own memory of the evidence rather than

the prosecutor's summation of it.     See Commonwealth v. Colon, 33

Mass. App. Ct. 304, 308 (1992) ("it is presumed that the judge

as trier of fact applies correct legal principles").

     3.    Ineffective assistance of counsel.   The defendant next

asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he conceded

during closing argument that "[a]ll you have, in terms of

operation, is really speeding . . . [with] no indicia of

anything other than speeding."    This claim, raised on direct

appeal, is at its "weakest form" because it "is bereft of any

explanation by trial counsel for his actions" (citation

omitted).    Commonwealth v. Diaz, 448 Mass. 286, 289 (2007).    A

                                  7
court may only resolve an ineffective assistance claim on direct

appeal in exceptional circumstances where the basis for the

claim "appears indisputably on the trial record."        Id., quoting

Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 811 (2006).

     That is not the case here.     Trial counsel made an

"obviously strategic decision" to concede that the defendant was

speeding in light of the testimony of two officers that they

observed the defendant traveling at a high rate of speed, and to

argue instead that speeding alone did not rise to the level of

negligent operation.   Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 223

(2019).   There is nothing in the trial record to suggest that

this strategy was manifestly unreasonable.        See Commonwealth v.

Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 442 (2006).

     4.   Postconviction motions.       After trial the defendant

moved for funds to retain an accident reconstructionist, seeking

to develop his theory that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to retain an expert on the issue of whether the

defendant was speeding.   In support of the motion, the defendant

filed an affidavit from appellate counsel, which stated that

"[b]ased on his preliminary review . . ., the [proposed expert]

believes that it may have been physically impossible for the 18-

wheel bobtail tractor the defendant was driving to navigate the

roundabout without swerving or leaving its marked lane at 60 or

50 miles per hour," but the expert needed to do further testing

                                    8
"before he [could] reach an opinion on the matter."     The motion

judge, who was not the trial judge, initially denied the motion

as "premature as [a] motion for new trial has not been

litigated."   After the defendant moved to reconsider, the motion

judge denied relief on the ground that there was "no affidavit

from the proposed expert supporting the assertions of defense

counsel."

     The defendant then filed a "preliminary" motion for a new

trial, together with a renewed motion for funds, asking that no

action be taken on his claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel until he was able to retain and consult with the

proposed expert.   In support of these motions, the defendant

filed two affidavits from appellate counsel, which again stated

that the expert believed that "it may not have been physically

possible" for the defendant to have navigated the rotary while

driving at fifty or sixty miles per hour, but he needed to do

more tests to reach a definitive conclusion.     The trial judge

summarily denied the motion for a new trial. 4

     It is within a judge's discretion to grant funds associated

with the preparation of a new trial motion.      See Commonwealth v.

Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 204 (2003).    To be entitled to such funds,

a defendant "must make a sufficient showing that the discovery

4 No separate action was taken on the renewed motion for funds,
but, as the defendant acknowledges, it was implicitly denied.

                                 9
is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might warrant

granting a new trial."   Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392,

407 (2005).   See Evans, supra at 204-205.   The defendant's

request must be accompanied by "specific, not speculative or

conclusory, allegations that the newly discovered evidence would

have materially aided the defense" (quotation and citation

omitted).   Daniels, supra.

     We discern no abuse of discretion in the denials of the

defendant's motions here, given their speculative nature.      The

affidavits submitted with the motions established only the

expert's "belie[f]" that it "may have been" impossible for the

defendant to have been speeding to the degree described in the

trial testimony.   This was insufficient to demonstrate with the

requisite specificity that further testing would have produced

results that would warrant a new trial.   See Commonwealth v.

                                10
Morgan, 453 Mass. 54, 62-63 (2009); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 102

Mass. App. Ct. 299, 307 (2023).

                                       Judgment affirmed.

                                       Orders denying motion for
                                         expert funds and for
                                         reconsideration affirmed.

                                       Order denying motion for a
                                         new trial and renewed
                                         motion for expert funds
                                         affirmed.

                                       By the Court (Shin, Brennan &
                                         Hodgens, JJ. 5),

                                       Clerk

Entered: December 6, 2023.

5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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