Court Opinion

ID: 9775611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:04:54.07106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:29.417663
License: Public Domain

ODOM, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
At the outset I wish to state that I concur in the opinion of the majority that the death penalty is not unconstitutional. This Court has held and today continues to hold that the death penalty is a constitutionally permissible punishment. Tezeno v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 484 S.W.2d 374, 377; Williams v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 427 S.W.2d 868. The only point upon which I take issue with the majority is their interpretation of Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P. The point at which I must part company with the majority is not on the constitutionality of the death penalty, but on the effect and meaning of the statute before us.
The majority interpret Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., as limiting the jury’s “discretion on the range of punishment to life imprisonment or death,” saying that the “two or three questions” asked by Art. 37.071 “direct and guide their [the jury’s] deliberation,” channeling “the jury’s consideration on punishment.” Article 37.071 prescribes a very distinct and rigid method for determining whether the punishment shall be death or life imprisonment.
“Art. 37.071. Procedure in Capital Case
*944“(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. .
“(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:

“(c) . . . the jury shall return a special verdict of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on each issue submitted.

“(e) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on each issue submitted under this article, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the jury returns a negative finding on any issue submitted under this article, the court shall sentence the defendant to confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for life.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Where is the “discretion” referred to in the majority opinion? Each pertinent portion of Art. 37.071 uses “shall”, the command form, rather than the permissive “may.” The jury is required to answer special issues. These questions each require a factual determination by the jury. If the fact questions are answered in the affirmative, pronouncement of a sentence calling for the ultimate penalty is absolutely mandated by Art. 37.071. The word “shall” in Art. 37.071 inflexibly requires certain procedures to be followed, allowing no discretion in determining the punishment to be received by a defendant who is guilty of capital murder.
Before a person may serve as a juror, he must state under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact. Art. 1257(d), V.A.P.C. In order to grant “mercy” 1 in a particular case, the jurors must ignore their oaths and return a deliberately falsified answer to one of the fact issues in Art. 37.071(b). Unless this Court is to presume that jurors will ignore their oaths and return perjured answers to one or more of the issues, a complete prevarication, solely to arrive at the result they may feel is proper in a given case, we must hold this statute is mandatory, leaving no discretion to the jury in the matter of assessing punishment.
The death penalty is mandatory upon affirmative answers to fact questions, which must be decided free from any consideration of the resulting penalty. The statute is mandatory, not discretionary, as asserted by the majority.
In discussing the contention that Article 37.071(b) is too vague, the majority assert that “the factors which determine whether the sentence of death is an appropriate penalty in a particular case are too complex to he compressed within the limits of a simple formula.” (Emphasis supplied.) Do not the majority, by this statement, recognize the inherent vagueness of Art. 37.-071(b)? Somehow the majority seem to equate vagueness with discretion. The majority admit that Art. 37.071(b) does not contain an exhaustive and precise list of factors, but appear to reason that since all factors which determine whether the death sentence is appropriate in a particular case are too complex to be listed, a vague statute becomes “discretionary”, and that some discretion is “inherent and desirable.” The fact that discretion is “inherent and desirable” does not render a vague statute any less vague. The majority have erred in mistaking the vagueness of this mandatory statute for discretion.
Having mistaken vagueness for discretion, the majority naturally have failed to recognize the vagueness inherent in Art. 37.071(b) (2). The word “probability” is not examined by the majority. This concept is at the core of the issue submitted *945under this subsection, yet the majority seek neither to define it nor to discuss its meaning. The essential indefiniteness of the word “probability” is ignored.
One of the necessary conditions upon which assessment of death under Article 37.071, supra, must rest is a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that “there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Art. 37.071(b) (2), supra.
This provision basing the imposition of capital punishment upon the probability of future events appears to be unique to this State. A survey of the capital punishment statutes of other states fails to reveal any provision similar to the “probability” issue of Article 37.071. In all the statutes reviewed, the aggravating circumstances, upon which imposition of the death penalty rests, concern either prior acts of criminal conduct or the means or circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense for which the accused is on trial.2
What did the Legislature mean when it provided that a man’s life or death shall rest upon whether there exists a “probability” that he will perform certain acts in the future? Did it mean, as the words read, is there a probability, some probability, any probability? We may say there is a twenty percent probability that it will rain tomorrow, or a ten or five percent probability. Though this be a small probability, yet it is some probability, a probability, and no one would say it is no probability or not a probability. It has been written: “It is probable that many things will happen contrary to probability,” 3 and “A thousand probabilities do not make one fact.”4 The statute does not require a particular degree of probability but only directs that some probability need be found. The absence of a specification as to what degree of probability5 is required is itself a vagueness inherent in the term as used in this issue. Our common sense understanding of the term leaves the statute too vague to pass constitutional muster.
In a recent text on statistics,6 probability is defined as follows:
“The probability of an event may be defined as the number of favorable events divided by the number of possible events. Suppose we roll one die, which has six sides, along the floor and observe which face ends up on top. If the die is perfectly balanced, all faces (1 to 6) have an equal chance of appearing. Thus the total possible events would equal 6. If we were interested in a specific face, say 2 (and only 2), then the number of favorable events would be 1. Thus the probability of rolling a 2 would be equal to 1 divided by 6 or ⅜ or 16.67 percent or .17. If there were ten possible events and three favorable events, the probability would be ¾0 or .30. If all possible events are ‘favorable’, as they would be if you asked the chances of rolling some number from 1 to 6 with a die, the probability would then be 1.00. On the other hand, if there would be no favorable events, as there would be if you asked the chances of rolling a 22 with a single roll of the die, then the probability would equal .00. It should be obvious that the probability of an event *946cannot be more than 1.00 (where all possible events are favorable) nor less than .00 (where no event is favorable.).”
Certainly this clear, yet technical, definition of probability, though without vagueness in the meaning of the term itself, leaves much vagueness in the issue submitted under Article 37.071(b)(2), because with this clear definition the question would by its terms be answered in the affirmative for all men, no matter how saintly, and no such intent can reasonably be attributed to the Legislature. We must recognize, then, that this least vague of definitions leaves the greatest vagueness in the statute.
Having rejected the common sense understanding and the technical definition as inadequate, let us examine the legal definition of “probability” to determine if it has a meaning sufficiently free of vagueness to give the notice required. In 72 C.J.S. Probability p. 968 we find the following definition:
“The word ‘probability’ implies consideration of probative facts, and in ordinary language it also implies doubt.

“In the doctrine of chances, probability is the likelihood of the occurrence of an event, or the quotient obtained by dividing the number of favorable chances by the whole number of chances.
“In legal writings and opinions, ‘assumption,’ ‘inference,’ ‘presumption,’ and ‘probability’ have been said to have substantially the same meanings. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
As can be seen, this explanation leaves as much vagueness in the statute as we have found in either of our earlier considerations of the term.
Article 37.071 is so confusing that even the majority of this Court have been misled. They have not even addressed the vagueness inherent in Article 37.071(b) (2), and have failed to remove from my mind the vagueness of that issue upon which the operation of this mandatory statute pivots. I would hold the statute unconstitutionally vague in violation of Article 1, Section 10, Texas Constitution, and the due process clause of Amendment XIV, United States Constitution.
The invalidity of Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., however, would not invalidate Article 1257, V.A.P.C., nor would it require reversal of this case. If Article 37.071 were held unconstitutional, as it should be, the only remaining punishment available under Article 1257(b) would be life. The proper disposition of this case, in light of the invalidity of the procedure for imposing the death penalty, would be to reform the judgment to provide for life imprisonment. See Haines v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 391 S.W.2d 58, 60 (on motion for rehearing).
I therefore concur in the affirmance of this conviction, but would reform the judgment to life.

. “Mercy” is described by the majority as “one of the fundamental traditions of our system of criminal jurisprudence.”

. See, e.g., the statutes of California, Cal. Penal Code Sec. 190.2; Colorado, CRS 39-11-103(6); Ohio, Ohio Rev.Code, Ann. Sec. 2929.04; Pennsylvania, 18 Pa. S. Sec. 1311 (d). See also the statutes of Indiana, Ind. Ann.Stat. Sec. 10-3401 (b); Louisiana, 14 L.S.A. Sec. 30; Oklahoma, 21 O.S.A. Sec. 701.1.

. See H. L. Menken, ed., A New Dictionary of Quotations, New York, 1972.

.Id.

. Even if a degree of probability were specified, the contradiction inherent with the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would remain, as would the due process problem of punishing for possible future conduct. Cf. Baker v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 478 S.W.2d 445, 448.

. R. K. Young and D. J. Yeldman, Introductory Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, 2nd ed., New York, 1972.