Court Opinion

ID: 9580070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:01:33.698523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:00.644267
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting on denial of petition for rehearing:
I
In its opinion denying the petition for rehearing, the majority asserts that its initial opinion in this case does nothing to change the standards established in Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986), and Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979). The majority’s opinion on denial of rehearing assures petitioners that the Dinneen standard for ruling on a motion for new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) is still “whether the trial court concludes that the award of the jury was the product of passion or prejudice.” Ante 112 Idaho at 631,733 P.2d at 1256. The majority now asserts, in its opinion denying the petition for rehearing, that the “shock the conscience” or “unconscionable” language in its initial opinion does not establish “any new standard or test.” Ante at 631, 733 P.2d at 1256. I agree, of course, that Quick v. Crane, supra, did nothing to supplant or modify this Court’s decision in Dinneen v. Finch, supra. As noted in my dissent to the Court’s initial opinion, Quick does not establish a “shock the conscience” or an “unconscionable” test for determining whether a motion for new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) should be granted. The majority, in its opinion on denial of petition for rehearing, now recognizes and accepts the position taken in the dissent on this issue. The majority opinion on denial of petition for rehearing corrects the Court’s initial opinion by holding that the standards established in Dinneen v. Finch, supra, are the standards for determining when a 59(a)(5) motion for new trial should be granted.
However, what remains unanswered in the present case, then, is why or on what basis the majority reverses the trial court’s determination that a new trial should be granted in the absence of plaintiff’s acceptance of a remittitur of a portion of the damages awarded. In Dinneen v. Finch, supra, we expressly held that the standard of review on appeal of a trial court’s decision granting or denying a motion for new trial under 59(a)(5) is whether the trial court has abused its discretion. We recently reaffirmed that in Black v. Reynolds, 109 Idaho 277, 707 P.2d 388 (1985). Both the majority’s initial opinion and opinion on denial of petition for rehearing are completely devoid of any explanation, or, indeed, assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in the present case in granting defendant's 59(a)(5) motion for new trial. In its initial opinion, the majority remanded to the trial court “so that it may enter findings of fact as to whether he was, in fact, shocked by the jury award or found such award unconscionable so as to have the appearance that it was given under the influence of passion or prejudice.” (Ante at 616, 733 P.2d at 1241). If the majority has not established a “shock the conscience” or “unconscionable” test, as it now asserts in its opinion on denial of petition for rehearing, why has it not withdrawn the language in the original opinion remanding for findings on “whether he was, in fact, shocked by the jury award or found such award unconscionable”? If the majority has not adopted a new “shock the conscience” standard, as it now disclaims in the opinion on denial of rehearing, what *633remains for the trial court to do in this case upon remand? Absent any other indication of how it abused its discretion, the trial court will surely wonder on remand what is left for it to do in order to comply with the standards of Dinneen. The only logical answer to such a question is, nothing. The trial court in its considered decision has already conscientiously applied the Dinneen standard. Nothing in the majority’s initial opinion or opinion on denial of petition for rehearing demonstrates otherwise. Apart from the “shock the conscience” and “unconscionable” language found in the majority’s initial opinion, which it now denies is part of a new standard, the only other claim for the majority’s assertion that the trial court erred in the present case (without specifically finding that it abused its discretion) was that the trial court granted the new trial-remitittur even though the trial court acknowledged that the jury’s award was supported by substantial competent evidence. However, as we said in Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187, 1196 (1986), quoting from Dinneen v. Finch, supra:
“ ‘The rule that a verdict will not be set aside when supported by substantial but conflicting evidence has no application to a trial court ruling upon a motion for a new trial.’ ”
To the extent that the majority’s original opinion, as grounds for reversing the trial court, relied upon the trial court’s acknowledgement that there was substantial competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict, the majority has relied upon a matter which both Quick and Dinneen held “has no application to a ... ruling upon a motion for a new trial.” Any issue of whether the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial competent evidence is germane only to motions for j.n.o.v., as clearly set forth in Justice Donaldson’s opinion in Quick v. Crane, supra. The issue of supporting evidence has no bearing and is entirely irrelevant to the determination of whether a new trial or remittitur should be granted under 59(a)(5). Quick v. Crane, supra; Dinneen v. Finch, supra.
Finally, the majority’s assertion that the trial court must first find fault with the jury itself before granting a motion for new trial under 59(a)(5) is a proposition entirely unsupported by any authority. Indeed, allegations of jury fault or misconduct are properly addressed under motions for new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1) and (a)(2). Like the issue of substantial evidence to support the jury verdict, any issues regarding fault of the jury itself are entirely irrelevant to the motion for new trial premised on 59(a)(5). Quick v. Crane, supra.
The only other intimation remaining in the majority’s initial opinion in this case regarding trial court error is the majority’s pronouncement that neither Dinneen nor Quick countenance a trial judge substituting his opinion for that of the jury. However, that is precisely what Quick v. Crane, supra, and Dinneen v. Finch, supra, expressly require the trial court to do:
“ ‘The trial court must weigh the evidence and then compare the jury’s award to what he would have given had there been no jury. If the disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not to stand. It need not be proven that there was in fact passion or prejudice nor is it necessary to point to such in the record. The appearance of such is sufficient. A trial court is not restricted to ruling a verdict inadequate or excessive ‘as a matter of law.’ ” Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187, 1196 (1986), quoting from Dinneen v. Finch, supra.
Quick and Dinneen expressly provide that the trial judge’s assessment of damages takes precedent over that of the jury if the two awards are so disparate as to suggest to the trial court the influence of passion or prejudice. “It need not be proven that there was in fact passion or prejudice nor is it necessary to point to such in the record. The appearance of such is sufficient.” Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187, 1196 (1986). The majority’s argument regarding substitution of the court’s *634opinion for that of the jury is entirely erroneous and circuitous. The Dinneen process was originally designed to ensure that due deference would be given to the jury’s decision by the trial court. Once the trial judge goes through the Dinneen process and determines that a sufficient disparity exists such as to suggest the influence of passion or prejudice, he may properly substitute his opinion for that of the jury by either awarding a new trial outright or conditioning his award of new trial upon acceptance of a remitittur or additur.
There can be no suggestion in the present case that the trial judge did not give adequate consideration to the jury’s determination. Indeed, he was very reluctant to have to disagree with the jury, but nevertheless stated that he could not “in good conscience” come within $400,000 of the jury’s verdict. Based upon that disparity, the trial court expressly found, in open court, that the disparity was sufficient to meet the Dinneen standard of “appearance of passion or prejudice.” In explaining that conclusion the trial court said, “I don’t see any way around it under the Dinneen decision.” He observed that “the Dinneen case gave no guidance as to what significant disparity means to the point of suggesting passion or prejudice,” but he nevertheless concluded that “over 29% would probably be — I thought would certainly be considered sufficient.” (Emphasis supplied). The majority’s initial opinion and the opinion on denial of petition for rehearing entirely ignore this explicit finding by the trial court of the appearance of passion or prejudice in the jury’s verdict in the present case. If the Court’s two opinions in this case have indeed not established “any new standard or test,” ante at 631, 733 P.2d at 1256, then unquestionably the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.
II
The opinion on denial of petition for rehearing also seriously errs in its holding that the issue of Sanchez’s alienage status “would undoubtedly be moot in the event of a new trial since the passage into law on November 5, 1986, of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Public Law 99-603.” Ante at 631, 733 P.2d at 1256. At a minimum, any question of mootness regarding the alienage issue involves questions of fact upon which the defendant was entitled to a jury trial. The majority’s assertion that the alienage status issue has been rendered moot is at best mere speculation. The 1986 Immigration Reform & Control Act merely “provide[s] a controlled legalization program for certain undocumented aliens who have entered this country prior to 1982.” There is nothing in this record to show that Sanchez would qualify and, even if he did, there is no guarantee in that legislation that any alien who meets the qualifications will necessarily be permitted to remain in this country.
The legalization program referred to in the 1986 act only provides for temporary resident status and then only if the illegal alien meets certain qualifications. The record in the present case is obviously devoid of any information as to whether Sanchez meets any of the requirements of the act because the trial court’s action granting the motion in limine regarding the alien-age issue prevented the defendants from developing an adequate record regarding the issue. The requirements which Sanchez must demonstrate that he meets in order to obtain temporary resident status under the act include the following:
(1) that he has resided continuously in the United States from the date of illegal entry and from the date of application; 1986 Act, § 245A(a)(2)(A);
(2) that he is otherwise admissible immigrant (which calls into play most all of the immigration laws, including the numerical limitations on immigrants 1); Id., § 245A(a)(4)(A);
*635(3) that he has not been convicted of any felony or three misdemeanors; Id. § 245A(a)(4)(B); and
(4) that he is registered under the Military Selective Service Act, if so required under that act.
As number (1) above indicates, the first requirement that must be met is, obviously, the timely filing of an application for adjustment of status. This requirement alone is sufficient to defeat any assertion of mootness. Nothing before this Court indicates that such an application has been filed by Sanchez or even that such an application will be filed. The record is entirely lacking in any assertion by Sanchez that he desires or intends to become a United States citizen or even a permanent resident in this country. Without any evidence in the record regarding Sanchez’s conduct while in the United States, it is impossible to determine whether or not he would qualify under the 1986 act. Any determination of mootness would require this Court to engage in the very type of speculation which the majority so strongly urges the Court to eschew under its analysis of the issue. Ante at 631, 733 P.2d at 1256.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.

. The 1986 act expressly provides that the numerical limitations contained in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, do not apply to adjustment of status to permanent resident status, 1986 Act, § 245A(d)(1). However, nowhere does the act contain such an express exclusion regarding adjustment to temporary resident status. State v. Michael, 111 Idaho 930, 729 P.2d 405 (1986) *635(“the specific mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius”).