Court Opinion

ID: 9439153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:23:33.364629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:11.613513
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring: I write separately to clarify two points.
First, notwithstanding the broad language in the court’s opinion, see Opinion at 291-92, 293, the court is not foreclosing the government from showing that it would not be “practicable” to disclose information to all members of a committee established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Cf. Food Chem. News v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 980 F.2d 1468, 1469 (D.C.Cir.1992). Although the court concludes that members of a FACA committee are entitled to “fully participate” in committee deliberations, see Opinion at 293, the court has not considered, and expresses no view about, whether “full” participation necessarily entails an equal opportunity to participate at all times. For example, a FACA committee might plausibly claim that it may consider classified information even if such information cannot be made available to all of its members for want of a security clearance or “need to know.” Exec. Order 12,958, § 4.2(a)(3), 60 Fed.Reg. 19,825 (1995). However, whether denial of access to classified or sensitive information would constitute an actionable denial of “full” participatory rights is not before the court (but may arise on remand) because the government has not identified any reason to treat Cummock on less-than-equal footing with other committee members. She asserts that she had the necessary security clearance and the government does not contest that assertion. See Appellee’s Brief at 20 n.8. To the extent the government maintains there is still a “need to know” threshold requirement before classified informa*294tion can be disclosed, see id. (citing Exec. Order 12,958), the court’s holding that Cummock has a right to participate fully in the committee’s deliberations, which includes a cause of action to obtain the same information provided other members, appears to satisfy the need-to-know requirement, although the issue could be explored as necessary by the district court on remand.
Second, following from the court’s holding that there is a cause of action under FACA for a committee member to obtain information considered during committee deliberations is the question of what a member may do with that information, i.e., whether FACA allows additional equitable remedies entitling Cummock to amend her dissent or delete the editor’s note. Broad remedies may be available. Cf. California Forestry Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 102 F.3d 609 (D.C.Cir.1996); see also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), and its progeny, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). Neither party has fully briefed the question of remedies, the district court did not address it, nor has this court previously considered the scope of remedies available to committee members who, after a committee has disbanded and released its final report, challenge the manner in which the committee deliberated. Still, in view of the publication of Cummock’s dissent, her right to participate fully would be seriously diminished were she unable to correct her dissent in light of information previously wrongfully withheld from her and to have it published in corrected form. See Opinion at 293. Given congressional intent to avoid the wasteful expenditure of public money and biased proposals, see Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989), in part by requiring committee membership to be “fairly balanced” and the advice to be the result of the committee’s “independent judgment,” see 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2), (3), the court reasonably concludes that such a remedy reflects congressional intent. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 25, 100 S.Ct. 242. Contrary to the government’s suggestion, see Appellee’s Brief at 15-17, such relief does not represent judicial intrusion in intra-committee disputes; the committee has already decided to publish Cummock’s dissent. But, in view of the posture of the case on appeal, the district court retains leeway to consider the scope of its remedial authority in light of arguments that the parties may advance on remand. See, e.g., Opinion at 293.