Court Opinion

ID: 9523199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:37:04.290093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:41.797932
License: Public Domain

BROOK, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
The majority correctly observes that being HIV-positive is not a crime. Under Indiana Code Sections 85-42-1-9 and 16-41-7-1, neither is it a crime for a person to infect another person with HIV. In my view, to convict Johnson of a erime under these statutes, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) was a carrier of HIV, (2) actually knew of his status as a carrier of HIV, and (3a) knowingly failed to warn or cause to be warned by a third party (4) a person at risk (8b) of his disease status and the need to seek health care such as counseling and testing.1 See Ind.Code §§ 35-42-1-9, 16-41-7-1. Assuming, arguendo, that the *1145State established that K.J. and LW. were persons at risk, it failed to establish with competent evidence that Johnson was a carrier of HIV and that he actually knew of his HIV carrier status.
At most, the testimony of C.B., Y.V., T.D., and KJ. regarding their positive HIV test results is cireumstantial evidence that Johnson was a carrier of HIV,2 and T.D.'s testimony that she accused Johnson of infecting her with HIV is evidence that Johnson reasonably should have known that he was a carrier of HIV. It is important to note, however, that Indiana Code Section 16-41-7-1 does not impose a duty to warn on persons who "reasonably should know" that they are carriers of a dangerous communicable disease. As we explained in Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied,
[It is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say. A court may not read into a statute that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature. Criminal statutes cannot be enlarged by construction, implication, or intendment beyond the fair meaning of the language used. Moreover, criminal statutes are strictly construed against the State. Even though an act may fall within the spirit of the statute, it will not constitute a crime unless it is also within the words of the statute.
Id. at 1010 (citations omitted). I believe that Indiana Code Section 16-41-7-1 plainly requires the State to establish that a defendant actually knew that he is a carrier of a dangerous communicable disease.
*1146Unless the State could establish with competent evidence that Johnson was a carrier of HIV and actually knew of his carrier status, it could not establish that he committed the charged crimes. The only evidence in this regard consists of the letter from the Social Security Administration, which was admitted solely for another purpose, and his admissions to C.B. and K.J. that he was "HIV-positive." The majority concludes that these admissions do not run afoul of the corpus delicti requirement and that they were properly admitted at trial. I respectfully disagree.
With respect to the corpus delicti requirement, this court has stated that
[tlhe reason for requiring evidence of a crime independent of a defendant's extrajudicial confession is to avoid the risk of convicting a defendant for a crime to which he confessed, but which never in fact occurred.
. A confession must include all essential elements of the crime, whereas an admission merely admits some fact which tends to connect the defendant with the alleged offense.... However, the distinction is immaterial to issues of corpus delicti since our case law applies the corpus delicti requirement to the introduction of admissions as well as confessions.
Indiana case law has consistently held that a defendant's out-of-court admission or confession is not properly admitted unless there is independent proof of the corpus delicti, in that, the evidence aside from the admission or confession establishes that the specific crime charged was committed by someone.
Parsons v. State, 166 Ind.App. 152, 155-56, 333 N.E.2d 871, 873 (1975) (citations omitted). Aside from Johnson's admissions, there is no evidence that he actually knew of his HIV carrier status and therefore no independent proof that the specific crimes charged were committed. Accordingly, I must conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting C.B.'s and K.J.'s testimony regarding Johnson's admissions and that his convictions therefore cannot stand. Johnson's actions might be considered extremely callous and contemptible, but absent competent evidence that he was a carrier of HIV and actually knew of his carrier status, they cannot be considered criminal under the applicable statutes as they are currently written.3 Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. I respecifully disagree in several respects with the majority's formulation of the essential elemenis of the crime at issue. For instance, the majority would require the State to establish that Johnson is and knew that he is "HIV-positive[.]" Slip op. at 12. Indiana Code Section 16-41-7-1, however, specifically refers to "carriers" of dangerous communicable diseases and knowledge of one's carrier "status." For purposes of this statute, a "carrier" is defined as "a person who has: (1) tuberculosis in a communicable stage; or (2) another dangerous communicable disease." Ind.Code § 16-18-2-49. The majority would also require the State to establish that Johnson "knowingly or intentionally ... engaged with a partner in sexual contact that has been. demonstrated epidemiologically to transmit HIV[.]" Slip op. at 12. Under Indiana Code Sections 35-42-1-9 and 16-41-7-1, Johnson's intent with respect to engaging in sexual contact is irrelevant; the question is whether he knowingly or intentionally failed to warn "persons at risk" (ie., past, present, and future "high risk activity" sexual partners) of his HIV carrier status and the need to seek health care.
My disagreement with the majority regarding the essential elements of the crime perhaps reflects the unwieldiness of employing Indiana Code Section 16-41-7-1 as a criminal statute, as opposed to its original intended use as a public health statute. The record suggests that the State was understandably flummoxed by the awkward combination of the applicable statutes in prosecuting Johnson. See, e.g., Appellant's App. at 3 (charging Johnson as follows: "during 1999 at or near 125 W. Markland in Howard County, Siate of Indiana, Larry E. Johnson did knowingly or intentionally violate or fail to comply with the *1145requirements of 1.C. 16-41-7-1, to-wit: failure to warn a person at risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided"); Tr. at 102 (explaining in opening statement, "[The State basically has to prove these things: that in 1999 Mr. Johnson had the HIV virus; second, that he had unprotected sex with [KJ.] and [LW.]; and third, that he didn't tell them. Those are the three elements of this crime.").

. The testimony of Y.V., TD., and C.B. is less than compelling in this regard, as they did not state that they engaged in unprotected sex with Johnson. It is also worth noting that although T.D. testified that she had sex with Johnson once in 1995 and tested positive for HIV in 1996, there is no competent evidence that her other sexual partners did not have HIV. See Tr. at 160-65. Additionally, C.B. testified that she had sex with Johnson six to ten times starting in 1993, that she tested positive for HIV in 1996, and that none of her other sexual partners between 1993 and the date of her HIV test told her that they were HIV-positive. See id. at 169-72, 333 N.E.2d 871. As Johnson's counsel remarked in closing argument, "I find that very odd that we would put witnesses on to say well the other person I've been with or the other persons I've been with have never said they had [HIV], is that proof that they don't?" Id. at 199, 333 N.E.2d 871.
In any event, I believe that circumstantial evidence of a defendant's carrier status (such as the applicable testimony of Johnson's sexual partners in the instant case) is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible in a prosecution for failure to warn persons at risk under Indiana Code Section 35-42-1-9. See Ind. Evidence Rule 401 (defining "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable than it would be without the evidence") (emphasis added); Ind. Evidence Rule 402 (providing in relevant part, "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."). Like a person's blood alcohol level, a person's carrier status is a medical fact that cannot be established with circumstantial evidence. Nothing would prohibit a prosecutor, however, from using circumstantial evidence of a defendant's carrier status as a basis for procuring a search warrant for a blood sample or a subpoena duces tecum for medical test results. Of course, a defendant may simply admit to his carrier status, but such an admission might run afoul of the corpus de-licti requirement and therefore be inadmissible at trial.

. In other cases, the State might be able to prove a defendant's carrier status and actual knowledge of his status by other means. See, eg., Ind.Code § 16-41-7-3(e) (waiving staiu-tory physician-patient privilege for a patient with a dangerous communicable disease regarding "information provided about a patient's noncompliant behavior in an investigation or action under this chapter").