Court Opinion

ID: 9547503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:48:10.03152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:49.073413
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion, but believe that a few things must be said with reference to that contained in the dissenting opinion.
I.
In the dissenting opinion, and in much that has been said and written otherwise about this case, great concern is evidenced about the abuse and beatings administered by the appellant’s father to her and to her brother all of which engendered a mental and emotional condition in them, which, in turn, resulted in a climax of hate, fear and desperation, which, again in turn, caused the homicide. The legal problem with using this as a ground for a finding of not guilty or for a reversal on appeal is that it was not put forth as a defense. If appellant or her brother had pled not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, temporary or otherwise, the jury may well have acquitted them. Appellant and her brother did not do so, but opted to rely on self-defense. A court cannot properly find self-defense when the homicide is committed from ambush. All of the recital of past bad acts by the victim-father may evoke sympathy and compassion for appellant and it may evoke condemnation of the victim-father, but it was not represented to the court as having “snapped the mind” of the appellant or having resulted in temporary insanity. The plea was otherwise. The request to the jury for a finding of not guilty was founded on the theory of self-defense. The jury could not find self-defense on the part of one attacking from ambush.
II.
The dissenting opinion refers to an objection to testimony of one of the interrogat*931ing officers concerning a statement made by appellant on the grounds that the statement itself was the best evidence and because it was hearsay, and the dissenting opinion contends that the objection was valid and it should have been sustained. The dissenting opinion would seem to imply that an oral admission or confession is not admissible evidence and that only that part of a confession or admission which is reduced to writing, or recorded, is admissible. The general rule is that:
“ * ⅜ * [Confessions are competent evidence, possessing considerable probative value, and are not in and of themselves inadmissible. The securing of voluntary confessions from guilty persons is desirable and should be allowed in the interests of public welfare and safety. * ⅜ * ” 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 817(1), p. 158 (1961).
“ * * * [I]t [a confession] may be oral or written in whole or in part; and there is no requirement that an oral confession be reduced to writing or that the oral statement, after transcription by another, be signed by accused. * * * ” 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 816(a), p. 154 (1961).
That confessions and admissions are not within the hearsay rule is recognized in Rule 801(d), W.R.E., which provides that:
“(d) * * * A statement is not hearsay if: * * !⅜ ⅜ ⅜ *
“(2) * ⅜ * The statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, * *
And in Rule 801(a), W.R.E., which provides:
“(a) * * * A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or written assertion * * (Emphasis added.)1
The dissenting opinion would infer that the court refused to allow the tape of the interview of appellant into evidence. It was never offered. Appellant could have offered the tape if she believed it to be the best evidence of her confession. She did not do so. The testimony of the witness was not for the purpose of proving the content of a writing or recording. It was simply to recite a confession.
III.
The majority opinion sufficiently refutes the other contentions in the minority opinion.

. Of course, there are a number of other reasons for excluding a confession or admission, such as being a product of illegal arrest, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); not voluntary, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); not warned of right to counsel and to remain silent, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).