Court Opinion

ID: 9476975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:10:27.445338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:48.539855
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed August 3, 2023

                                                In The

            Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                            __________

                                     No. 11-21-00190-CV
                                         __________

                                 JACY GATES, Appellant
                                                   V.
       DENISE MCDONALD AND DIANA DOBBINS, Appellees

                         On Appeal from the 42nd District Court
                               Coleman County, Texas
                            Trial Court Cause CV20-01034

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
        This appeal arises from the first phase of partition proceedings. 1 Appellees
Diana Dobbins and Denise McDonald filed a petition for partition in kind of a 52.04-
acre parcel of land in Coleman County (the Property) owned by Appellees and Jacy
Gates (Gates). Gates generally denied Appellees’ claims and requested that, should

        1
         Appellant has also filed an appeal focusing on the second phase of the partition proceedings. That
appeal, which is currently pending in this court, is Cause No. 11-22-00054-CV. The opinion in Cause
No. 11-22-00054-CV is being issued on the same date as the issuance of the opinion in this appeal.
the trial court find that the Property was partitionable in kind, the trial court deny
Appellees’ request for equitable adjustments based upon their respective ownership
of adjoining properties.
      After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the Property was susceptible
to partition in kind, entered a Decree of Partition, and appointed commissioners to
partition the land in a manner consistent with the Decree of Partition’s instructions.
Gates challenges the trial court’s Decree of Partition in four issues. We affirm.
                                   Background Facts
        The Property was originally part of a larger plot of land belonging to John
William Walthall and Nellie Ruth Walthall. The Walthalls divided the larger plot
into three 52.04-acre tracts and created a trust for the benefit of their three daughters:
Diana Dobbins, Denise McDonald, and Deborah Gates. The trust was designed to
distribute one 52.04-acre tract to each daughter. Dobbins received the easternmost
tract, and McDonald received the northernmost tract. Because Deborah predeceased
her parents, her tract was distributed to her four children in 2014, with each child
receiving a 25% interest in the Property.
      In 2019, Gates’s three siblings sold their respective 25% interests in the
Property to Appellees. Gates retained his 25% interest. Thus, Appellees each owned
a 37.5% interest in the Property when they filed their petition for partition in kind.
        The Property is largely undeveloped. The only improvements that have been
made are a stock tank/pond with a pump house that Dobbins maintains. As such,
Appellees requested that the trial court award the southeastern portion of the
Property, where the stock tank/pond is located, to Dobbins. Further, Appellees
requested that McDonald be awarded the northern portion of the Property, so that
both Appellees’ awarded portions would be contiguous to their adjacent land.
Gates’s position was that “[Appellees’] ownership of additional real property . . . is
not an equity to be adjusted amongst these parties.”
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      A bench trial was held in 2021 to complete the first phase of partition
proceedings. At the bench trial, Dobbins testified that she owns an easement to use
the water from the stock tank/pond located on the southeastern portion of the
Property and that she has paid for all required maintenance on the pump house.
Dobbins stated that she had “safety concerns” with Gates being close to her home.
Dobbins explained that she was concerned about Gates hunting near her adjacent
land. Dobbins also testified that she did not “want [Gates] as a neighbor that can see
through [her] kitchen window if he was to be at the tank.”
      McDonald testified that she had installed fencing along the shared border
between her land and the northern portion of the Property. McDonald stated that she
used her land to raise cattle and that she wanted to expand her cattle operation onto
the northern portion of the Property. McDonald explained that she had “concerns”
with Gates being awarded a tract that was “sandwiched between two tracts that
[McDonald] might own” because it would interfere with her plans to fence in the
northern portion of the Property and to expand her cattle operation.
      Appellees also called Samuel Paul Walker, a generally certified real estate
appraiser, to testify about the appraisal report he prepared at Appellees’ request.
Walker testified about the process of preparing the appraisal report and stated that,
in his opinion, (1) the Property’s best use was for agriculture and recreation; (2) the
Property’s value was $125,000 total ($2,400 per acre); and (3) the proposed partition
contained in the appraisal report divided the Property “equal[ly] in utility” and would
increase the total value of the Property to $144,000. The appraisal report was
admitted into evidence in its entirety over Gates’s objection.
       After the bench trial, the trial court entered its Decree of Partition. The decree
ordered that each party should be granted a portion of land consistent with their
ownership interests. It also instructed that, in balancing the equities, Dobbins should
receive an eastern portion of the Property that included the stock tank/pond, and
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McDonald should receive a northern portion of the Property. The parties did not
request, nor does the record contain, findings of fact or conclusions of law.
                                        Analysis
      A partition case consists of two decrees that are both final and appealable.
Griffin v. Wolfe, 610 S.W.2d 466, 466 (Tex. 1980); Bowman v. Stephens, 569
S.W.3d 210, 221 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Ellis v. First City
Nat’l Bank, 864 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, no writ). In the first
decree, the trial court determines the following: the share or interest of each owner
in the property that the owners seek to divide, all questions of law or equity that may
affect title, and whether the property in dispute is subject to partition or sale. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 760, 761, 770; Ellis, 864 S.W.2d at 557. Further, the trial court is required
to appoint three or more disinterested persons as commissioners who shall partition
the property in dispute pursuant to the trial court’s decree; the trial court may also
provide directions to the commissioners as may be necessary and appropriate. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 760, 761.
      With respect to the second decree, the commissioners “shall proceed to
partition the real estate described in the decree of the court, in accordance with the
directions contained in such decree and with the provisions of law and these rules.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 766. After the partition is completed, the commissioners must
submit, under oath, a written report to the trial court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 769. Within
thirty days after the commissioners file the report, any party to the partition suit may
file objections with the trial court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 771. The party who objects to
the report bears the burden of proving that the report is materially erroneous or that
the partition is unequal and unjust. Bowman, 569 S.W.3d at 222; Ellis, 864 S.W.2d
at 557. However, the trial court must reject the report and appoint a new panel of
commissioners if it finds that the report is (1) materially erroneous in any respect or

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(2) unequal and unjust. TEX. R. CIV. P. 771; see Bowman, 569 S.W.3d at 222; Ellis,
864 S.W.2d at 557.
      Consideration of Appellees’ Adjacent Land
      In Gates’s first issue, he contends that the trial court erred by considering
Appellees’ adjacent land when providing Appellees with an equitable adjustment in
its Decree of Partition. In this regard, the trial court’s Decree of Partition provides
as follows:
      5.      In balancing the equities, the Court ORDERS that Diana Dobbins
              should be awarded a tract in equal value to her 37.5 % interest,
              on the east side of the Property which shall include the tank/pond,
              and Denise McDonald should be awarded a tract in equal value
              to her 37.5% interest that is located on the Northern most portion
              of the Property.
In advancing this issue, Gates is asserting a legal question as to the equitable
considerations that the trial court may weigh in the first phase of a partition
proceeding.
      “The rules of equity govern the trial court’s partition of property.” Bowman,
569 S.W.3d at 223 (citing Williams v. Mai, No. 01-11-00611-CV, 2012 WL
6644704, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
“A trial court exercises broad discretion in balancing the equities involved in a case
seeking equitable relief.” Id. (citing Stracener v. Stracener, No. 12-10-00270-CV,
2011 WL 2766802, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 13, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.)).
“An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on a claim seeking equitable
relief unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without regard to guiding legal
principles.” Id. (citing Williams, 2012 WL 6644704, at *4); see Wagner & Brown.,
Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 429 (Tex. 2008).
      Gates cites Thompson v. Whitfield for the proposition that, as a general
principle of law, “an adjustment of equities should be confined to the land directly

                                           5
involved.” 203 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1947, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Gates’s reliance on Thompson is misplaced. The context of Gates’s quoted passage
from Thompson reads as follows:
               Another cogent reason why the theory of equitable partition is
        not applicable in this case is that if the non-conveying tenants in
        common were to be forced to take their share of land in other tracts
        under a different source of title in lieu of their share in the tract sold,
        they would run the risk of being relegated to a defective title. . . . We
        do not think that the doctrine of equitable partition should be extended
        so as to involve a tract or tracts separate and apart and coming under
        different sources of title to the one concerned in a sale by a tenant in
        common, but an adjustment of equities should be confined to the land
        directly involved.
Id. Therefore, the court in Thompson did not limit the consideration of equities in
cases where equitable partition is proper. Rather, the Thompson court merely
reconfirmed that equitable partition is only applicable in situations where each
common owner has partial title to every aspect of the property at issue. See id. at
270–71. There is no dispute as to the fact that Gates and Appellees are co-owners
of undivided interests in the tract at issue. Therefore, the Thompson court’s holding
does not impact the trial court’s ability to consider Appellees’ adjacent land in this
case.
        Gates further asserts that Yturria v. Kimbro, 921 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1996, no pet.), held that improvements to the land are the
“fundamental” equitable considerations that trial courts may assess.             Gates’s
contention is misguided. The specific language in Yturria reads: “[P]roof is made
to the factfinder at trial of the existence and value of improvements to the property
at the time of partition and of other equitable considerations which may warrant
awarding a particular portion of the property to one of the parties.” 921 S.W.2d at
342 (emphasis added). While Yturria does not elaborate on what other equitable
considerations are proper for a trial court to consider, it specifically permits equitable
                                            6
considerations other than improvements to the property to be balanced and does not
assign weight to any particular equitable consideration. See id. at 344.
      Nevertheless, Gates’s position that “there is not a single case that supports
[Appellees’] ownership of adjacent real property to be a matter of equity” is not
entirely misplaced. While there is ample case law using the language “and other
equitable considerations,” there is scant case law defining what “other” equitable
considerations may be considered. See, e.g., Bowman, 569 S.W.3d at 221; Carter v.
Harvey, 525 S.W.3d 420, 425 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.); Snow v.
Donelson, 242 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.).
      In George v. Taylor, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals stated that the trial court
“had the authority to adjust and enforce between the cotenants every conceivable
equity relating to the parties and the property.” 296 S.W.2d 620, 624 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1956, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Smith v. Cooper,
the Texarkana Court of Appeals referenced Missouri and Oregon case law to support
its proposition that equitable considerations should be related to the property in
question. The court noted the following:
      In the Missouri case, the court said:
             “The circuit court may exercise a wide latitude in the
             adjustment of equities among the parties to a partition
             suit. . . . The equities to be adjusted, however, must be
             necessity [sic] be those which have arisen from or are in
             some way connected with the real estate to be partitioned;
             they must be claims relating to the common property.”
      The Oregon Supreme Court said:
             “We think that in the interest of orderly procedure a suit
             for partition of property should be limited to an adjustment
             of the interests of the parties as co-tenants. . . .”

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541 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ) (quoting Richardson v.
Kuhlmyer, 250 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Mo. 1952); then quoting Palmer v. Protrka, 476
P.2d 185, 189 (Or. 1970)).
      Therefore, contrary to Gates’s contention that Texas courts limit an
adjustment of the equities to the property directly at issue, Texas courts have only
gone so far as to limit proper equitable considerations to those related to the property
at issue. As a result, Appellees’ adjacent land was a proper equity for the trial court
to consider because their adjacent land is directly tied to the Appellees’ plans for the
Property. Accordingly, we overrule Gates’s first issue.
      Sufficiency of the Evidence
      In Gates’s third and fourth issues, he challenges the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s Decree of Partition. He
asserts that there was “no evidence (legal insufficiency) regarding various elements
of the Decree” and seeks a rendition of the judgment. In the alternative, Gates seeks
a new trial because “there is insufficient evidence (factual insufficiency) as well.”
Gates directs his evidentiary challenges toward the “balancing the equities”
provision of the Decree of Partition that we cited above.
      When findings of fact or conclusions of law were not requested or filed, we
assume the trial court “made all the findings necessary to support its judgment.”
Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). If some evidence supports
the judgment, it must stand. Ware v. Ware, 809 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1991, no writ) (citing Lemons v. EMW Mfg., 747 S.W.2d 372, 373 (Tex.
1988)); see Grimes v. Collie, 733 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1987, no
writ) (“Appellate courts may imply fact findings by the trial court to sustain the
judgment, including issues as to title of property.”). In determining whether there is
“some” evidence to imply findings of fact that support the judgment, “it is proper to
consider only that evidence most favorable to the issue and to disregard entirely that
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which is opposed to it or contradictory in its nature.” Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109
(quoting Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1950)).
        The trial court’s findings in a partition suit, as in the trial of all other cases,
may be attacked on appeal for legal and factual sufficiency. Carson v. Hagaman,
884 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1994, no writ). When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s express or implied findings,
we apply the same standards of review that apply to a jury’s verdict. See MBM Fin.
Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 660, 663 n.3 (Tex. 2009) (citing
Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994)).
        When the appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting an adverse finding on which he did not have the burden of proof at trial,
he must demonstrate that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. 2 See
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); Croucher v. Croucher,
660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983). Under a legal sufficiency review, we consider all
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, make every
reasonable inference in that party’s favor, and disregard contrary evidence unless a
reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807, 822, 827. We
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder if the evidence falls within
this zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 822.
            The evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding only if (1) the record
discloses a complete absence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or
evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the
only evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the
evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 810. “Anything
more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding.”

        2
         We assume for the purpose of our analysis that Appellees had the burden of proof on their request
for an equitable consideration concerning their neighboring properties.
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Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d
41, 48 (Tex. 1998). “More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence
would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach different conclusions.”
Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 259 (Tex. 2014). “However, if the evidence
is so weak that it only creates a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, it is
regarded as no evidence.” Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill,
Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 156 (Tex. 2014).
      If a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue in
which the other party had the burden of proof, the attacking party must demonstrate
that there is insufficient evidence to support the adverse finding. Croucher, 660
S.W.2d at 58. In a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider and weigh all of the
evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. See Mar. Overseas Corp. v.
Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406–07 (Tex. 1998). We may set aside the finding only if
the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Dow Chem. Co. v.
Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). We may not substitute our own judgment
for that of the factfinder or pass upon the credibility of witnesses. Mar. Overseas
Corp., 971 S.W.2d at 407.
      Gates contends that the evidence was legally insufficient because the trial
court had no evidence to support Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Partition. Gates
further contends that the evidence is factually insufficient because there was no
permissible evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s balancing of the
equities, other than his legal contention that the trial was not permitted to consider
Appellees’ adjacent land. However, by overruling his first issue, we have rejected
Gates’s legal argument.
      As we previously noted, both Appellees testified that they planned to use their
proposed portions of the Property in a manner consistent with the activities they
                                         10
already conducted on their adjacent land. Additionally, Dobbins testified that
Appellees had a “strained” relationship with Gates. Dobbins expressed concern with
Gates hunting so close to her land. Further, Dobbins already had an easement to use
the stock tank/pond, and she had been the only one maintaining the attached pump
house.
      McDonald had already installed border fencing between her adjacent land and
the Property. McDonald testified that she wanted to expand her cattle operation and
run cattle on the Property. McDonald also testified about being concerned if Gates
were to be awarded a tract “sandwiched in” between her tracts.
      Thus, in addition to the evidence that Appellees owned neighboring tracts of
property, there were other items of evidence that supported the trial court’s decision
for neighboring tracts of the Property to be awarded to Appellees. Under the
applicable standards of review, the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient
to support the trial court’s Decree of Partition. We overrule Gates’s third and fourth
issues.
      Admission of Appraisal Report
      In Gates’s second issue, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting and
relying upon an appraisal report prepared at the request of Appellees. Gates asserts
that the appraisal report includes discussions of the value of the property, which is a
matter solely entrusted to the commissioners. Appellees assert that Gates failed to
preserve this issue and that, even if he properly preserved the issue, there is no
evidence that the trial court relied on the report because “there was additional
unchallenged evidence admitted at trial that was cumulative of the Report, thus
rendering the admission of the Report harmless error.”
      “As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record
must show” that a complaint was made to the trial court by an objection that “stated
the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with
                                          11
sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint.” TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). The trial court must have “(A) ruled on the request, objection,
or motion, either expressly or implicitly; or (B) refused to rule on the request,
objection or motion, and the complaining party objected to the refusal.”             Id.
R. 33.1(a)(2). “A general objection to a unit of evidence as a whole, . . . which does
not point out specifically the portion objected to, is properly overruled if any part of
it is admissible.” Speier v. Webster College, 616 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. 1981)
(quoting Brown & Root, Inc. v. Haddad, 180 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1944)).
      Gates first made the following objection to the appraisal report: “I would
generally object to just en mass submitting the entire appraisal report as an exhibit.
If she wants to ask him questions about it, I understand that. But I don’t know that
it’s appropriate just to generally admit the entire appraisal report as an exhibit.” The
trial court overruled this objection and admitted the appraisal report into evidence.
Gates later made a relevance objection when Appellees sought to introduce a portion
of the appraisal report. Gates’s second objection was as follows: “[O]bviously it’s
in the report, Your Honor, but I would object to its relevance. This Court doesn’t
determine value, the commissioners do.” See Yturria, 921 S.W.2d at 343 (“Matters
of valuation concerning the property itself and objective considerations concerning
the best manner of dividing the property in accordance with the instructions given
while retaining the highest value for the partitioned tracts, are entrusted to the
commissioners and not the judge or jury.”). Gates’s objection was overruled, and
the offered portion of the appraisal report was admitted into evidence.
      Assuming, without deciding, that Gates preserved his objection and that the
trial court erred by admitting the appraisal report, we conclude that the error did not
cause the rendition of an improper judgment. “In a bench trial, we presume that the
trial court, in its role as factfinder, disregarded any improperly admitted evidence.”
Richard Nugent & CAO, Inc. v. Estate of Ellickson, 543 S.W.3d 243, 260 (Tex.
                                          12
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (citing Kenny v. Portfolio Recovery
Assocs., 464 S.W.3d 29, 32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.)); see also
Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 450 (Tex. 1982). Thus, we presume that the
trial court disregarded any improperly admitted evidence concerning the appraiser’s
valuation of the Property. Additionally, nothing in the Decree of Partition states that
the trial court relied on the appraiser’s valuations in making its decision.
Accordingly, the record does not show that Gates suffered any harm from the
admission of the values in the appraisal report. We overrule Gates’s second issue.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                JOHN M. BAILEY
                                                CHIEF JUSTICE

August 3, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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