Court Opinion

ID: 9775060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:42:19.366622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:19.568460
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent for two reasons, both directed at the impermissible use of the out-of-court statement of the nontesti-fying co-defendant, George Wade:
1) As to that portion of Wade’s statement inculpating Taylor as the murderer, no impartial observer can accept as fact that Wade intended to make a declaration against penal interest, as necessary to be admissible under FRE 804(b)(3);
2) Admitting this evidence violated the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Sec. 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Before an out-of-court statement of a witness is admissible as a declaration against interest, FRE 804(b)(3) states first it must be “at the time of its making so far contrary to” the declarant’s penal interest “that a reasonable person in [his] position would not have made the statement unless he believ[ed] it to be true.” The Majority has addressed this problem as a purely technical matter: Wade’s depiction of how *78Taylor murdered the victims exposed Wade to criminal liability for murder based on complicity (KRS 502.020). True, but the test for whether a statement is an exception to the hearsay rule under PRE 804(b)(3) is much less complicated: how would “a reasonable person in his position” view it at the time he made the statement; was Wade then seeking to inculpate himself in these murders or to exonerate himself? We have held in Fisher v. Duckworth, Ky., 738 S.W.2d 810, 815 (1987) that “the burden is on the party seeking to use this exception ... to first establish a basis” by proof the declarant had knowledge at the time he made the statement that it was against his interest. As stated in Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 725 (6th Cir.1985):
“Hearsay under the declaration against interest exception is unreliable unless the declarant is aware at the time of making the statement that it is against his interest.”
And, as explained in the Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 4th ed., Saltzburg and Redden, p. 940 (discussing “Declarations against interest”):
“Whenever a statement against interest is offered, it is the job of the Trial Judge to determine whether the declarant was under the impression that the statement was against his interest at the time he made it." [Emphasis added.]
An objective view of Wade’s statement compels the conclusion that in the critical portion pertaining to the murders Wade did not intend to inculpate himself but, on the contrary, in general to disassociate himself from responsibility for the murders, and in particular to avoid the death penalty, the more serious consequence likely to flow from being directly involved. It is simply not credible for our Court to qualify statements obviously made to avoid the death penalty as admissible under a hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. To quote the critical portions of Wade’s statement:
Wade And after we searched the car and everything you know, we was get-tin’ ready to go ridin’ and then, all of sudden you know....
Duff Well, wait a minute now, You and Vic were getting ready to go riding?
Wade Yeah. And then, Vic said uh, hey, you know they done seen us, like that. I said_and I said man, that’s, you know, that ain’t nothin, like that. He said, but you know they done seen us. And uh_
Duff What did he mean by that?
Wade He said, they done seen us, you know.
Duff Right.
Wade They done seen our face.
Duff Okay.
Wade But I told him it wasn’t nothin’, you know.
Duff What do you think he meant by that?
Wade I couldn’t tell you. I don’t know. I don’t know nothin’. He. .man, he’s wild man. And uh,_
Duff You mean Vic’s wild?
Wade Yeah.
Duff Vic Taylor, is that who you’re talking about?
Wade Yeah.
Duff Okay. Go on.
[[Image here]]
Duff Okay. Were they still alive at this point?
Wade Ah, yeah.
Duff Okay.
Wade They were still alive. So uh, like we walkin’ away and uh, he said man, you know they done seen us man, people done seen us. I said man, it don’t make no difference. Then, he told me to hold up for a minute. ‘Cause we walkin’ like uh, at the end of where, where they at. Where the car’s parked at right there on the side of the building. We walkin’ back down toward you know, goin’ towards Preston Street.
[[Image here]]
Wade He said, hold up for a minute. And I, you know I hold up. I was waitin’ right around uh, right on the end of the building. Right around the *79corner where I was waitin’ for him. He said, hold up. I asked him what he was gonna do. He just told me to hold up for a minute. And then, that’s uh ... I heard, I heard that shot. I, I left. I didn’t hear nothin’ else. I just heard that shot. And I was gone. And....
Duff Did you take off running?
Wade Yeah. ‘Cause I, you know, I didn’t know what he was gonna do. And I heard another shot when I got to the end of the alley. I heard another shot.
Moody This is uh, Sgt. Moody speaking. George, where were you standing exactly when you heard the first shot? Where were you standing when you heard the first shot fired?
Wade Right around uh, right around the little ... it’s a little building right there on the comer of the alley. Right there on the left hand ... yeah, on your left hand side from where they was. A little building. I was standin’ right around the comer.
Moody Okay. And where_ you stated that you ran. Which way did you run!
Wade Out towards Preston. I, you know ... nah. No, I didn’t. I ran out towards uh, ran out towards uh, what’s, what’s that? Caldwell. ‘Cause it’s Caldwell and Caldwell runs into Preston, you dig.
Moody Okay. So, you’re running towards Preston and Caldwell Street when, when you heard the first shot? You started running in that direction when you heard the first shot?
Wade Yeah.
Moody Okay. So, and then, as you were running, what happened or what took place then?
Wade I heard another shot, you know. I knew what it was. I told him (inaudible). I said man, don’t do that. ‘Cause he uh, asked me. I said, don’t do that man. Yeah. I said, nah, that ain’t you know, it wasn’t worth that. Plus they didn’t have nothin’.
Moody Okay.
Wade They didn’t have nothin’ for real, for as you know, for it to be like that.
Moody Okay. So, after you started running and heard the first.... second shot, then continue on. What happened?
Wade We uh, after I heard the second shot, I see Vic come runnin’ up behind me. I said, what did you do. I said.... he said man, you know what I done. He said, I, I shot them. Like that. He just come back laughin’, you know and stuff like that. He was lau-ghin’ like, you know, he was crazy or somethin’.
In two recent Kentucky cases, Dodson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 753 S.W.2d 548 (1988) and Barnes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 794 S.W.2d 165 (1990), our Court reversed because of the use of out-of-court statements against the accused in circumstances much less oppressive than the present ones. The fact situation in Dodson was almost identical to what we have here, erroneous use of an out-of-court statement from a robbery confederate who “was called as a witness and refused to testify.” In Bames the fact situation was erroneous use against the accused of the victim’s prior statement controverting the defense of accidental homicide. The statement was an affidavit from a divorce case filed by his wife two and a half years previously stating Bames had “on numerous occasions physically thrown [the victim] out of [her] home, ... hit her and threatened] to shoot [her] with his rifle or handgun.” The circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness for the affidavit in Bames were much greater than in the present case. In Bames we rejected a claim that the evidence qualified “under the present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule,” stating the evidence does not “fit[ ] within a recognized exception” to the hearsay rule. 794 S.W.2d at 167. The claim in the present case that Wade’s statement, quoted above, qualifies as a declaration against penal interest likewise does not “fit within a recognized exception” to the hearsay rule. Wade did not make the statement implicating the appellant until he had spent
*80more than ten hours in police custody, and had made numerous denials of any knowledge or participation in the crimes. He confessed only after he had been informed that he had failed a polygraph examination and had been identified by a witness.
It is difficult to understand how the same judges who authored and concurred in Majority Opinions in Dodson and Barnes can reconcile having done so with joining the present Majority Opinion which is authored by and follows closely the views expressed in the Dissents in those cases. The views taken here are in sharp conflict with the Dodson and Barnes opinions. We have expanded the “declaration against interest” exception to the hearsay rule all out of reason.
Next, this result is in conflict with the Confrontation Clauses found in both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, which are, at the same time, both separate from, yet integral to, the hearsay exceptions. The landmark case holding the use of an out-of-court statement from a confederate is a violation of the Confrontation Clause is Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). Douglas v. Alabama was reversed because, as in the present case, the written statement purporting to be the confession of an accomplice was read to the jury after the accomplice who was called as a witness invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. Twenty years later Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), reaches the same conclusion. In Lee v. Illinois the trial court relied upon a co-defendant’s confession as substantive evidence against Lee in violation of the accused’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. In Douglas v. Alabama, the circumstances were substantially identical to the present case and in Lee v. Illinois, the circumstances were no different except that both defendants were tried in the same trial. This is a distinction without a difference insofar as the use of one defendant’s statement against the other.
There is an exception made in a joint trial which has its genesis in language of the opinion in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), applied more recently in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) and Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987), reh. denied 483 U.S. 1044, 108 S.Ct. 19, 97 L.Ed.2d 807 (1987). This exception permits the statement of a defendant to be used in a joint trial, but only against himself and not against his co-defendant. Any mention of the noncon-fessing co-defendant must be carefully redacted to eliminate prejudice to the noncon-fessing co-defendant from the unauthorized use of hearsay. The fact that the statement of a co-defendant, so carefully redacted that no prejudice inures to the noncon-fessing co-defendant, is admissible in a joint trial adds nothing from which to infer that a nonredacted, accusatory out-of-court statement of a co-defendant is admissible as substantive evidence of guilt. Indeed, the opposite should be inferred from the Bruton rule.
It is apparent from the language in the Opinion that the Majority of our Court has misunderstood Lee v. Illinois, supra, as permitting use of a hearsay statement as “probative when corroborated with other evidence.” Majority Opinion p. 76. The Majority opines the court can make an exception for out-of-court statements it believes “trustworthy” because corroborated by other evidence in the case, in this case statements Taylor purportedly made about the killings to other witnesses. We are not free by expanding exceptions to the hearsay rule to create exceptions to the Confrontation Clause. The teaching of Lee v. Illinois is to the contrary, that interpretation of hearsay exceptions can inform the reach of the Confrontation Clause, but cannot control it.
Before we assume that our Court can avoid the Confrontation Clause by expanding the definition of what qualifies as a declaration against penal interest, we should take heed of this footnote in Lee v. Illinois:
*81“We reject respondent’s categorization of the hearsay involved in this case as a simple ‘declaration against penal interest.’ That concept defines too large a class for a meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis. We decide this case as involving a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant.” 476 U.S. at 544,106 S.Ct. at 2064, 90°L.Ed.2d at 528.
If some in the Majority doubt the limitations generated by the Confrontation Clause on our ability to expand hearsay exceptions against the criminally accused, such doubt should be dispelled by the most recent United States Supreme Court pronouncement on this subject in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), brought to our attention in the Petition for Rehearing. In Idaho v. Wright the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction based on a hearsay statement qualifying under Idaho’s “residual hearsay exception.”1 Just as we do in this case, in Wright the Idaho Supreme Court cited and then misapplied a caveat from Lee v. Illinois stating that, although hearsay, a statement may withstand Confrontation Clause challenge “if it is supported by a ‘showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ ” [476 U.S. at 543,106 S.Ct. at 2063, 90 L.Ed.2d at 528]. In Idaho v. Wright, the U.S. Supreme Court states:
“We agree that ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ must be shown from the totality of the circumstances, but we think the relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief” 497 U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 3148, 111 L.Ed.2d at 655. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, while the Confrontation Clause does not foreclose use of traditional, firmly rooted and well-defined hearsay exceptions, it forecloses using new and expanded definitions of admissible evidence to impair Sixth Amendment rights.
While it would be proper to take into consideration the circumstances at the time Wade made his statement in deciding whether it was a declaration against penal interest, unfortunately these circumstances bear none of the indicia of reliability and trustworthiness required for making hearsay exceptions. He was then seeking to mitigate his criminal liability, not to expand it. Our Court finds some circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness only by considering corroborating evidence from other persons, admissions made by Taylor on other occasions, matters entirely separate from the making of Wade’s statement. This is not the theme of the so-called “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” articulated in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) and then quoted as stated above in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986).
It should be abundantly clear that hearsay is permissible as an exception to the Confrontation Clause only in limited circumstances where it comports to a traditional, well-recognized and clearly defined hearsay exception. Unwisely, our Court in this Opinion has greatly expanded what qualifies as a declaration against interest. A state court may be free to expound and expand its own hearsay doctrine, even when it is unwise, but it is not free by doing so to restrict the reach of the Confrontation Clause. We have no power to impair the rights of the criminally accused guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment. Indeed, we lack authority to override the constitutional limits of Section Eleven of our own Constitution by finding the evidence “trustworthy” because there is other evidence of guilt. No light flashes on inside our head to tell us this statement is trustworthy; no bell rings to tell us it is not. If we judges decide to admit such statements on an ad hoc basis whenever we deem them sufficiently trustworthy because of other evidence, the system will soon fall apart.
*82The constitutional rule is the circumstances surrounding the taking of Wade’s statement are the only evidence to be considered in determining its admissibility; these “particularized circumstances,” standing alone, provide no indicia of reliability to render his accusations of Taylor admissible. The holding in Wright is “the use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement’s particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” is constitutionally impermissible. Yet that is exactly what our Court does in the Majority Opinion. Wright states:
“Thus, unless an affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement was made, provides a basis for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not worthy of reliance at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires exclusion of the out-of-court statement.” 497 U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 3150, 111 L.Ed.2d at 656. [Emphasis added.]
The Majority Opinion mistakenly relies upon Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987), as authority for a “philosophy” accommodating a balancing test between “societal interests” and the reach of the Confrontation Clause. This is a clouded view of the constitutional guarantee and a complete misunderstanding of the Bourjaily opinion. Bourjaily involved the crime of conspiracy and the traditional, well-established and deeply rooted hearsay exception codified in FRE 801(d)(2)(E) for a statement by a co-conspirator. Such a statement is not hearsay if made “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Statements taken from Bourjaily have been misapplied in our Majority Opinion. Bourjaily conforms to the limitations in Douglas v. Alabama and its progeny, including Lee v. Illinois and Idaho v. Wright. Bourjaily does not afford us a different view to choose from; it has no application to the facts at hand.
Although Wade’s out-of-court statement was certainly not the only evidence to prove Taylor guilty of these killings, the Commonwealth has conceded it was a powerful conclusion to its case. If believed, it provided important incriminating details not brought out in any other evidence. Being objective, there is no way to qualify the error in this case as harmless using the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement for constitutional error mandated by Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
I share the public’s horror and outrage at these monstrous crimes. But we are not jurors free to decide based on what we think Taylor deserves. This brings to mind the warning of Justice Louis D. Brandéis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 573, 72 L.Ed. 944, 957 (1928):
“The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding.”
We are judges charged with the duty to reverse and remand when confronted with prejudicial error. Recognizing my responsibility under the law, I dissent.
COMBS, J., joins this Dissent.

. Unlike Idaho, in Kentucky we do not accept the "residual hearsay exception" (See Wager v. Commonwealth, Ky., 751 S.W.2d 28 (1988)), so the evidence could not limp in on this crutch even if in Idaho v. Wright the U.S. Supreme Court had reached a different result.