Court Opinion

ID: 9785278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:13:51.891823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:14.525009
License: Public Domain

Pigott, J. (dissenting in part).
Although the majority has set forth the proper standard of review to be applied in this case, I nevertheless respectfully dissent because I believe both the trial court and the Appellate Division correctly applied that standard and reached the correct decision.
In my view, the majority’s analysis is clouded by the fact that defendant was charged with the two purse-snatching misdemeanors in addition to felony possession of a forged instrument. The majority seems to conclude that because defendant was up to a different larcenous escapade at the time of his arrest, the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the forgery is weakened or lacking. I disagree. Indeed, had the People elected not to pursue the two attempted purse-snatching charges, the intent element of the possession of a forged instrument charge becomes clear.
The People were required to prove that defendant knowingly possessed the counterfeit bills with the “intent to defraud, deceive or injure another” (Penal Law § 170.30). As the majority notes, the defendant’s intent must be specific to the crime (see majority op at 72), but the specific intent required for possession of a forged instrument is a state of mind that may be inferred from defendant’s actions and the surrounding circumstances (see e.g. People v Barnes, 50 NY2d 375, 381 [1980]). The intent to defraud or deceive need not be targeted to any specific person; a general intent to defraud suffices (see People v Dallas, 46 AD3d 489, 491 [1st Dept 2007]). Nor does the statute require the People to prove that defendant attempted to use the counterfeit bills. They need only show that defendant possessed the counterfeit bills with the requisite mental state.
Here, the relevant evidence shows that defendant was going from one fast food restaurant to another in a busy shopping district. He was carrying the counterfeit bills in his pants pocket—where one would ordinarily carry spending money. All *74the while, he was engaging in larcenous behavior. Upon his arrest, he admitted “[y]ou got me for the counterfeit money,” and then stated “but I didn’t have my hand near the purse.” The majority, as well as the defendant, concede that this statement proves that defendant knew the bills were counterfeit. But it does more—it shows that defendant had a guilty mind with respect to his possession of the bills. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that there was no other logical explanation for defendant’s possession of the bills, except to pass them when the opportunity arose.
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, I believe the evidence was legally sufficient to permit the charge to be submitted to the jury and I would therefore affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo and Read concur with Judge Jones; Judge Pigott dissents in part and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judge Smith concurs.
Order modified, etc.