Court Opinion

ID: 9896970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:53.321977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:56.552340
License: Public Domain

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                     IN RE ELAINE M. COLE
                           (SC 20746)
                  Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,
                    Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

                                   Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 55-3), ‘‘[n]o provision of the general statutes, not
   previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any
   new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have
   a retrospective effect.’’

In November, 2021, the debtor, C, filed a bankruptcy petition under chapter
    7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy
    Court for the District of Connecticut, claiming, inter alia, a statutory
    (§ 52-352b (21)) homestead exemption in the amount of $250,000. The
    public act (P.A. 93-301) that created the homestead exemption allowed
    a debtor to protect up to $75,000 of the value of his or her primary
    residence from attachment in postjudgment or bankruptcy proceedings.
    Public Act 93-301, however, included a carve-out whereby the homestead
    exemption could not be claimed for debts accrued prior to the act’s
    effective date of October 1, 1993. The legislature subsequently passed
    an amendment (P.A. 21-161), effective October 1, 2021, that repealed
    the previous version of § 52-352b and replaced it with a new version,
    which increased the homestead exemption from $75,000 to $250,000 but
    did not include any carve-out for preexisting debts. The trustee of the
    bankruptcy estate objected to C’s claimed homestead exemption of
    $250,000, arguing that, although her bankruptcy proceeding was com-
    menced after October 1, 2021, all of her debts were incurred prior to
    that date. Relying on the principle embodied in § 55-3, the parties focused
    their arguments before the Bankruptcy Court on the issue of whether
    P.A. 21-161 enacted a procedural amendment, which presumptively
    applies retroactively, or a substantive amendment, which presumptively
    applies only prospectively. The Bankruptcy Court overruled the trustee’s
    objection, concluding that the amendment was intended to apply retroac-
    tively to preexisting debts and, accordingly, that C was entitled to the
    $250,000 homestead exemption. The trustee appealed from the decision
    of the Bankruptcy Court to the United States District Court for the
    District of Connecticut, which certified to this court a question concern-
    ing whether P.A. 21-161 applied retroactively or only prospectively to
    debts incurred by a debtor before that act took effect. Held:

1. This court concluded, as a threshold matter, that the answer to the certified
    question was a matter of state, rather than federal, law for choice of
    law purposes:

   Under the federal statute (11 U.S.C. § 522 (b) (3) (A)) specifying what
   property can be exempted from a debtor’s chapter 7 bankruptcy estate,
   a debtor may protect ‘‘any property that is exempt under . . . State or
   local law that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition,’’ and,
   accordingly, this court clarified that the question presented by this appeal
   was whether the expanded homestead exemption contained in P.A. 21-
   161 was applicable to C’s case, given that the expanded exemption
   was in effect when her bankruptcy petition was filed but not when her
   underlying debts were incurred.

   Moreover, in determining whether the applicability of a state exemption
   statute, as recognized under 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b) (3) (A), is a matter of
   federal bankruptcy law or state law, this court recognized that there is
   a split of federal authority on this choice of law question but assumed
   that the Bankruptcy Court would adhere to the rule adopted by the
   United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, pursuant to which
   state law governs.

2. The expanded, $250,000 homestead exemption set forth in P.A. 21-161
    applies in bankruptcy proceedings filed on or after October 1, 2021, the
    effective date of the act, regardless of when the underlying debts
accrued:

a. The trustee could not prevail on his claim that the expanded homestead
exemption does not apply to debts incurred prior to the effective date
of P.A. 21-161:

P.A. 21-161 was silent as to the accrual date of the debts that are the
subject of the postjudgment or bankruptcy proceeding governed by the
amended homestead exemption, nothing in the language of the act indi-
cated that the legislature had intended to carve out preexisting debts
from the reach of that exemption, and § 52-352b, as part of the statutory
scheme that regulates postjudgment procedures, simply defines what
property is exempt, that is, what property is not subject to any court
order for purposes of debt collection.

b. This court rejected the trustee’s claim that it should find in P.A. 21-
161 an implicit carve-out for debts accrued prior to the act’s October 1,
2021 effective date insofar as the legislature had included such a carve-
out in P.A. 93-301:

The trustee’s argument that the legislature, having been aware of the
carve-out language in P.A. 93-301, would have clearly indicated if it had
intended not to include a similar carve-out for preexisting debts in P.A.
21-161 was unavailing because it was inconsistent with basic rules of
statutory interpretation, pursuant to which the fact that the legislature
included a special carve-out for preexisting debts in the original home-
stead exemption but did not include one in P.A. 21-161 indicated an
intent not to exclude preexisting debts from the scope of the expanded
homestead exemption set forth in P.A. 21-161.

c. There was no merit to the trustee’s claim that this court should find
in P.A. 21-161 an implicit carve-out for debts accrued prior to the act’s
October 1, 2021 effective date because a failure to do so would improperly
give the act retroactive effect without the express authorization of the
legislature:

Although the parties’ arguments centered primarily around the issue of
whether P.A. 21-161 was a procedural or substantive amendment for
purposes of § 55-3, which applies only if the amendment has a ‘‘retrospec-
tive effect,’’ this court concluded that § 55-3 did not apply to the present
case because the increased homestead exemption set forth in P.A. 21-161
did not constitute retroactive legislation when C’s bankruptcy proceeding
was initiated after the effective date of the act.

Moreover, because it is not always apparent whether a new law has a
‘‘retrospective effect,’’ especially when the statutory changes solely alter
the future, rather than the past, legal consequences of previous transac-
tions or occurrences, this court looked to the approaches taken by the
United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products (511
U.S. 244), in which the majority concluded that a new statute has a
retroactive effect if it impairs established rights of the parties, imposes
new duties or obligations that they could not reasonably have anticipated,
or disturbs other reasonable, settled expectations, and in which the
concurrence concluded that the focus of the retroactivity inquiry should
not be on whether the amendment affects vested rights but, rather, on
the relevant activity that the amendment regulates, and clarified that
both approaches were part of a proper retroactivity analysis under Con-
necticut law.

The application of P.A. 21-161 to preexisting debts would not constitute
a retroactive application under either of the Landgraf approaches.

Specifically, under the majority’s approach in Landgraf, there was no
claim that P.A. 21-161 imposed any new duties or obligations on the
parties, and applying the increased homestead exemption to preexisting
debts would not be fundamentally unfair, insofar as it allegedly would
frustrate the settled expectations of unsecured lenders who extended
credit to C while the lower, $75,000 exemption was in place, because
there was no evidence in the record that C’s unsecured creditors ever
considered the equity in C’s home or relied on the size of the homestead
exemption when they decided to extend C credit, and the creditors were
presumed to have been aware that the legislature could increase the
size of the homestead exemption at any time and that their rights might
otherwise be adversely impacted by changes in federal or state law.
  Furthermore, under the concurrence’s approach in Landgraf, applying
  P.A. 21-161 to preexisting debts would not qualify as a retroactive applica-
  tion of the law because the accrual of those debts was not the primary
  or principal activity that the act sought to regulate, insofar as § 52-352b
  is part of a chapter of the General Statutes that deals with postjudgment
  procedures, neither the original 1993 homestead exemption nor the 2021
  amendment made any reference to the source or nature of the underlying
  debts involved, instead focusing entirely on the enforcement process,
  and, accordingly, it was clear that the purpose of the 2021 amendment
  was to specify the exemptions that were presently available to the debtor.
     Argued December 12, 2022—officially released July 18, 2023

                           Procedural History

   Petition for bankruptcy relief, brought to the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut,
where the court, Tancredi, J., overruled the trustee’s
objection to the debtor’s claim for a homestead exemp-
tion, and the trustee appealed to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Connecticut, where the
court, Bolden, J., certified a question of law to this
court concerning whether No. 21-161, § 1, of the 2021
Public Acts applied retroactively to debts incurred by
the debtor before the act took effect.
  Jeffrey Hellman, for the appellant (trustee).
  Jenna N. Sternberg, for the appellee (debtor).
                          Opinion

   McDONALD, J. In 1993, the legislature, for the first
time, enacted a so-called ‘‘homestead act,’’ whereby a
debtor could protect up to $75,000 of the value of a
primary residence from attachment in postjudgment
proceedings or bankruptcy. See Public Acts 1993, No.
93-301, § 2 (P.A. 93-301). Although P.A. 93-301 had an
effective date of October 1, 1993, and thus applied to
any proceedings initiated on or after that date, the act
included a special carve-out: the homestead exemption
could not be claimed for debts accrued prior to the
effective date.1 See P.A. 93-301, § 3. In 2021, the legisla-
ture amended the homestead act and replaced it with
a new version that included several changes from the
prior version of the act. For purposes of this appeal,
the relevant change made by the legislature was to
increase the exemption from $75,000 to $250,000,2 but
this time the legislature did not include any carve-out
for preexisting debts. See Public Acts 2021, No. 21-161,
§ 1 (P.A. 21-161). The primary question presented by
this appeal, which reaches us in the form of a certified
question in a bankruptcy appeal from the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, is whether
we should nevertheless read a carve-out into the 2021
public act. We decline to do so.
                             I
   On November 22, 2021, the debtor, Elaine M. Cole,
filed a petition for bankruptcy relief under chapter 7
of the United States Bankruptcy Code; 11 U.S.C. § 701
et seq. (2018); in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Connecticut. In re Cole, 642 B.R. 208,
211 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). At that time, the debtor
owned a home in Mystic that she valued at $589,000,
with equity of more than $350,000, and that was under
contract for sale. See id., 211, 213. Pursuant to General
Statutes § 52-352b (21), she claimed a homestead exemp-
tion in her home in the amount of $250,000. See id., 211,
214.
  The trustee of the bankruptcy estate, Anthony S.
Novak, objected to the claimed homestead exemption.
Id., 211. The trustee argued, among other things, that the
debtor could not use the increased homestead amount
because, although the bankruptcy proceeding was com-
menced after the October 1, 2021 effective date of P.A.
21-161, § 1, all of the debtor’s debts were incurred prior
to that date. See id., 211–12.
  Relying on the principle, embodied in General Stat-
utes § 55-3,3 that procedural amendments to a statute
presumptively apply retroactively, whereas substantive
amendments presumptively apply only prospectively;
see, e.g., State v. Nathaniel S., 323 Conn. 290, 295, 146
A.3d 988 (2016); the arguments of the parties before
the Bankruptcy Court centered around the question
of whether P.A. 21-161, § 1, enacted a procedural or
substantive amendment to the homestead act. See In
re Cole, supra, 642 B.R. 212, 218. The Bankruptcy Court,
focusing less on the procedural/substantive distinction
and more on various canons of statutory construction,
concluded that the amendment was intended to apply
‘‘retroactively’’ to preexisting debts. Id., 220–24. Accord-
ingly, the court overruled the trustee’s objection and
concluded that the debtor was entitled to the $250,000
homestead exemption. Id., 224.
   The trustee appealed from the decision of the Bank-
ruptcy Court to the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut. The District Court indicated
that it was inclined to agree with the conclusion of
the Bankruptcy Court that P.A. 21-161, § 1, applies to
preexisting debts in any bankruptcy proceeding brought
on or after the effective date. Nevertheless, the District
Court determined that the absence of an authoritative
state court decision, the importance of the issue, and
the capacity of certification to resolve the litigation all
counseled for certification of the question to this court.
The District Court therefore certified to this court the
question of ‘‘[w]hether [P.A.] 21-161 applies retroac-
tively to debts incurred by the debtor before [P.A.] 21-
161 took effect or prospectively.’’ We accepted certifica-
tion but, pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (k),
and for the reasons discussed in part II B 3 of this
opinion, we will answer a slightly modified version of
the certified question: does the expanded homestead
exemption contained in P.A. 21-161, § 1, apply in bank-
ruptcy proceedings filed on or after the effective date
of the act to debts that accrued prior to that date? We
answer that question in the affirmative.
                             II
                             A
   Because the certified question involves the intersec-
tion of federal bankruptcy law and Connecticut law
governing postjudgment proceedings, we first must
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the answer
is dictated by federal or state law. As we explain more
fully hereinafter, although there is a split of federal
authority on this question, we assume that the Bank-
ruptcy Court will adhere to the choice of law rule that
has been adopted by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, pursuant to which state substan-
tive law governs. See, e.g., CFCU Community Credit
Union v. Hayward, 552 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2009).
   The federal statute at issue is 11 U.S.C. § 522, which
specifies what property can be exempted from a debt-
or’s chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.4 The statute provides
that, by default, debtors can choose to avail themselves
of either the limited exemptions that are afforded under
federal bankruptcy law or, if more generous, the exemp-
tions afforded under state, local, or other federal law.5
That provision, now codified at 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b),
was enacted in 1978, prior to the original Connecticut
homestead act.
   Section 522 provides in relevant part that a debtor
who opts for the alternative exemption can protect ‘‘any
property that is exempt under Federal [nonbankruptcy]
law . . . or State or local law that is applicable on the
date of the filing of the petition to the place in which
the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 730 days
immediately preceding the date of the filing of the peti-
tion . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) 11 U.S.C. § 522 (b) (3)
(A) (2018). So, the question presented by this appeal
is whether Connecticut’s homestead exemption, as
increased under P.A. 21-161, § 1, is applicable to the
debtor’s case, given that the amended, $250,000 home-
stead exemption was in effect when her bankruptcy
petition was filed on November 22, 2021, but not when
the underlying debts accrued.
   The threshold question is whether the applicability
of a state exemption statute, as recognized under 11
U.S.C. § 522, is determined by federal bankruptcy law,
which would preempt any contrary state law under the
supremacy clause of the United States constitution; see
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; or is a matter of state law
because the intent of Congress was to incorporate state
exemption law fully into the Bankruptcy Code. The
federal courts of appeals and other federal courts are
divided on this question. See, e.g., J. Lockhart, Annot.,
‘‘What Constitutes State or Local Law That Is Applicable
on Date of Filing of Bankruptcy Petition for Purposes
of Applying 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (b) (3) (A) or Its Predeces-
sor in Opt-Out States,’’ 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 333, 405–12,
§§ 27–28 (2013).
   Some courts have held that, under 11 U.S.C. § 522,
the Bankruptcy Code preempts any contrary state law,
and, therefore, any state exemption statutes in effect
at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed apply, regard-
less of whether the state legislature intended a particu-
lar exemption statute to apply only prospectively, retro-
actively, or only under certain circumstances. See, e.g.,
In re Morinia, Docket No. 11-07-12803 SA, 2008 WL
5157501, *3 (Bankr. D.N.M. August 13, 2008); In re
Skjetne, 213 B.R. 274, 275, 278 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1997). As
the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the
First Circuit explained, ‘‘we must discern the outer lim-
its of a state law’s ability to control an exemption’s
operative characteristics in the bankruptcy universe.’’
In re Leicht, 222 B.R. 670, 677 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998).
‘‘[A]lthough through § 522 (b) Congress provided states
with the opportunity to define the category and content
of exemptions resident debtors may invoke in bank-
ruptcy (going so far as to authorize states to opt out of
the federal exemption scheme), it defined the operative
effect of exemptions in bankruptcy through [§] 522 (c)
and (f). . . . As a consequence, those provisions of the
[state] homestead statute that limit the exemption’s
vitality against certain categories of claims cannot hold
sway against conflicting [Bankruptcy] Code provi-
sions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. On this
view, the answer to the certified question would be
easy: because P.A. 21-161, § 1, took effect prior to the
date the debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed, the new,
higher exemption would apply as a matter of federal
law.
   The Second Circuit, however, has reached a different
conclusion with respect to the choice of law question,
holding that whether and to what extent an exemption
is applicable on the date a petition is filed is a matter
solely of state law. See CFCU Community Credit Union
v. Hayward, supra, 552 F.3d 259 (‘‘[although] federal
law governs the date on which the exemption comes
into play, [state] law governs the nature and scope of
the exemption’’); see also First National Bank of Mobile
v. Norris, 701 F.2d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1983) (rejecting
argument that 11 U.S.C. § 522 preempts state law regard-
ing retroactive application of homestead amendments).
We assume that the Bankruptcy Court will adhere to
Second Circuit law on this point. See, e.g., In re Pratt &
Whitney Co., 140 B.R. 327, 331 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992);
see also, e.g., In re Duda, 182 B.R. 662, 667 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Gernat v. Belford, 192 B.R.
601 (D. Conn. 1996), aff’d sub nom. In re Gernat, 98
F.3d 729 (2d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we must proceed
on the assumption that Hayward controls and that it
falls to this court to determine, as a matter of Connecti-
cut law, whether the new exemption amount contained
in P.A. 21-161, § 1, applied to the debtor’s bankruptcy
petition filed after the effective date of that statute,
regardless of when the underlying debts accrued.
                            B
  We turn our attention, therefore, to the trustee’s argu-
ment that the legislature intended the amended home-
stead exemption to apply to bankruptcy petitions6 filed
on or after October 1, 2021, but did not intend debts
accrued prior to that date to be subject to the higher
exemption amount. We are not persuaded.
                            1
   Because the applicability of the expanded homestead
exemption presents a question of statutory interpreta-
tion, we begin with the text of the act. See General
Statutes § 1-2z; see also Maghfour v. Waterbury, 340
Conn. 41, 46–47, 262 A.3d 692 (2021) (when addressing
issue of retroactivity, we begin by asking whether legis-
lature has expressly prescribed statute’s proper reach).
   Public Act 21-161, § 1, begins by repealing General
Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 52-352b in its entirety. It then
provides, with respect to the homestead exemption:
‘‘The following property of any natural person shall be
exempt . . . (21) The homestead of the exemptioner
to the value of two hundred fifty thousand dollars, pro-
vided value shall be determined as the fair market value
of the real property less the amount of any statutory
or consensual lien which encumbers it, except that, in
the case of a money judgment arising out of a claim of
sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor, sexual assault
or other wilful, wanton, or reckless misconduct commit-
ted by a natural person, to the value of seventy-five
thousand dollars . . . .’’ P.A. 21-161, § 1. Finally, the
act provides that it is ‘‘[e]ffective October 1, 2021
. . . .’’ P.A. 21-161, § 1.
   On its face, P.A. 21-161, § 1, is silent as to the accrual
date of the debts that are the subject of the postjudgment
proceeding or bankruptcy governed by the amended
homestead exemption. Nothing in the language of the
act indicates that the legislature intended to carve out
preexisting (or any other) debts from the reach of the
exemption. Section 52-352b is part of chapter 906 of
the General Statutes, which regulates postjudgment
procedures, and the statute simply defines what prop-
erty is exempt, that is, ‘‘not subject to any form of
process or court order for the purpose of debt collection
. . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-352a (3). Accordingly, on
the face of the statute, there is no reason to think that
the expanded homestead exemption, which undisput-
edly applies in all bankruptcy proceedings brought on
or after the effective date, does not apply to preexisting
debts. See, e.g., Southwick at Milford Condominium
Assn., Inc. v. 523 Wheelers Farm Road, Milford, LLC,
294 Conn. 311, 320, 984 A.2d 676 (2009) (‘‘if the legisla-
ture had intended to create any exception to this rule
. . . we must assume that it would have said so
expressly’’); Earl B. v. Commissioner of Children &
Families, 288 Conn. 163, 175–76, 952 A.2d 32 (2008)
(similar); Board of Education v. Booth, 232 Conn. 216,
221, 654 A.2d 717 (1995) (‘‘there is nothing in the defini-
tion of ‘earnings’ under [General Statutes] § 52-350a
(5) to suggest that the legislature intended to limit the
exemption from prejudgment garnishment only to those
debts payable prior to the termination of the employ-
ment relationship’’).
   We do not understand the trustee to contest that this
is the plain meaning of the statutory text. Rather, he
contends that we should nevertheless find an implicit
carve-out for preexisting debts for two reasons. First,
the public act that created the prior version of the
statute contained such a carve-out. See P.A. 93-301,
§§ 2 and 3. Second, interpreting P.A. 21-161, § 1, not to
include a similar carve-out would be to give the act
retroactive effect without the express authorization of
the legislature. We consider each argument in turn.
                             2
  The trustee first contends that we should read a
carve-out for preexisting debts into P.A. 21-161, § 1,
because the legislature included such a carve-out in
P.A. 93-301, the act that created the initial homestead
exemption. Public Act 93-301, § 3, provides: ‘‘This act
shall take effect October 1, 1993, and shall be applicable
to any lien for any obligation or claim arising on or
after said date.’’ (Emphasis added.) The federal courts
have read the highlighted language to create a carve-
out for preexisting debts in bankruptcy proceedings.
See, e.g., Gernat v. Belford, 192 B.R. 601, 604–605 (D.
Conn.), aff’d sub nom. In re Gernat, 98 F.3d 729 (2d
Cir. 1996). The trustee’s argument appears to be that
the legislature, having been aware of the language and
judicial interpretations of the prior act, would have
clearly indicated had it intended not to include a similar
carve-out in P.A. 21-161, § 1.
   Even if we were to agree with the trustee that it is
appropriate to look to the legislative history of the act,
however; see Cohen v. Rossi, 346 Conn. 642, 665–66,
    A.3d      (2023) (plurality opinion); see also id., 705
n.10 (Ecker, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); we are not persuaded that the trustee’s
interpretation is correct.7 Indeed, the trustee’s argument
runs headlong into a basic rule of statutory interpreta-
tion. ‘‘As we have stated many times, [when] a statute,
with reference to one subject contains a given provi-
sion, the omission of such provision from a similar
statute concerning a related subject . . . is significant
to show that a different intention existed.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Asylum Hill Problem Solv-
ing Revitalization Assn. v. King, 277 Conn. 238, 256,
890 A.2d 522 (2006). This principle applies with equal
force to reenactments of previous statutes. See, e.g.,
Gilmore v. Pawn King, Inc., 313 Conn. 535, 543–48, 98
A.3d 808 (2014).
   The fact that the legislature included a special carve-
out for preexisting debts in the original homestead act
but did not include one in the 2021 act indicates an
intent not to exclude preexisting debts from the scope
of the expanded homestead exemption. Indeed, it makes
perfect sense that, when the legislature increased the
homestead exemption in 2021 to keep pace with infla-
tion, it would have opted to avoid the practical problems
that could have arisen from carving out preexisting
debts at that time.8
                            3
   Finally, we turn our attention to the issue at the core
of the certified question, as originally framed by the
District Court. The trustee’s primary argument is that
interpreting P.A. 21-161, § 1, not to include a carve-out
for preexisting debts would give the act retroactive
effect without the express authorization of the legisla-
ture. Specifically, the trustee contends that P.A. 21-161,
§ 1, effected a substantive change in the law and that,
under § 55-3, substantive amendments presumptively
apply on a solely prospective basis. The debtor counters
that the amendment was procedural rather than sub-
stantive in nature and, therefore, can be applied retroac-
tively. In the alternative, the debtor argues that, regard-
less of whether we characterize the amendment as
substantive or procedural, in the present case, it is
being applied on a solely prospective basis, insofar as
it applies to a bankruptcy proceeding that was initiated
after the effective date of the act. Because we agree with
the debtor that the enactment of the higher homestead
exemption does not constitute retroactive legislation
when applied to postenactment petitions, we need not
resolve the question of whether the amendment was
procedural or substantive in nature. In short, there is
no retroactivity problem here.
   ‘‘It is well established that § 55-3 is a rule of presumed
legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive
rights shall apply prospectively only. . . . The rule is
rooted in the notion that it would be unfair to impose
a substantive amendment that changes the grounds [on]
which an action may be maintained on parties who
have already transacted or who are already committed
to litigation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shan-
non v. Commissioner of Housing, 322 Conn. 191, 202,
140 A.3d 903 (2016). This rule is easier stated than
applied. See, e.g., id., 204. It is not always clear, for
example, whether a particular change in the General
Statutes qualifies as substantive or procedural. See, e.g.,
Coley v. Camden Associates, Inc., 243 Conn. 311, 317–
18, 702 A.2d 1180 (1997); see also, e.g., Casiano v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 80, 110, 115 A.3d
1031 (2015) (majority and dissenting justices disagreed
over whether Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.
Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), announced watershed
rule of criminal procedure for purposes of retroactiv-
ity), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, 577 U.S.
1202, 136 S. Ct. 1364, 194 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2016). Most of the
briefing in the present case is addressed to that issue.
   But dispositive considerations can arise well before
we reach the substantive/procedural junction. Section
55-3 comes into play—that is, we only need to determine
if a new provision of the General Statutes is substantive
or procedural—only if the amendment would have a
‘‘retrospective effect.’’ Section 55-3 does not define the
term ‘‘retrospective effect,’’ however, and whether a
new law would have such an effect in a given case is
not always apparent. See, e.g., Shannon v. Commis-
sioner of Housing, supra, 322 Conn. 204 (‘‘deciding
when a statute operates retroactively is not always a
simple or mechanical task’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). As United States Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia explained in Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S.
343, 119 S. Ct. 1998, 144 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1999), asking
whether a change in the law is intended to operate
retroactively ‘‘leaves open the key question: retroactive
in reference to what?’’ Id., 362 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
   Many retroactivity cases, and most of the easy ones,
involve ‘‘what modern scholarship calls primary retro-
activity—altering the past legal consequences of past
actions. [This includes] legislative creation of criminal
or civil liability for completed acts, significantly less-
ening or adding onto the burdens of past contracts
(particularly debt contracts), legislative termination of
accrued claims for relief [regardless of whether they
are] the subject of a pending action, and legislative
undoing of final judgments no longer subject to appeal.’’
(Emphasis added; footnotes omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) A. Woolhandler, ‘‘Public Rights, Private
Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity,’’ 94 Geo. L.J. 1015,
1022–23 (2006). These situations tend to be governed
by well established rules, such as that ‘‘[a] criminal
statute is said to have [primary] retroactive application
if it applies to crimes allegedly committed prior to its
date of enactment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Bischoff, 337 Conn. 739, 746, 258 A.3d 14 (2021);
see also General Statutes § 1-1 (u) (passage or repeal
of act presumptively does not affect pending actions).
   More troublesome is so-called secondary retroactiv-
ity, which refers to statutory changes that solely alter
the future legal consequences of past transactions or
occurrences. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univer-
sity Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 219, 109 S. Ct. 468, 102 L.
Ed. 2d 493 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing
distinction between primary and secondary retroactiv-
ity); J. Laitos, ‘‘Legislative Retroactivity,’’ 52 Wash. U.
J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 81, 84–85 (1997) (same). Many
changes in the law could be characterized as retroactive
in some respect. That is to say, they attach some new,
future legal consequences to actions that were taken
or decisions that were made prior to their enactment.
See, e.g., A. Woolhandler, supra, 94 Geo. L.J. 1022 (‘‘[s]ome
modern judges and even more modern scholars see the
retroactivity-prospectivity line in the civil context as
logically illusory, because all legal change may defeat
expectations, creating winners and losers’’). That alone
is not enough to render a statute retroactive. See, e.g.,
D. Bassett, ‘‘In the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Decons-
tructing Legislative Retroactivity Analysis,’’ 69 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 453, 467 (2001) (‘‘[e]ven when laws expressly
state that they are to be applied prospectively, it is
virtually certain that they will affect expectations and
prior transactions’’). Indeed, we frequently have recog-
nized that ‘‘a statute does not operate [retroactively]
merely because it is applied in a case arising from con-
duct antedating the statute’s enactment . . . or upsets
expectations based in prior law.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Maghfour v. Waterbury, supra, 340
Conn. 49–50.
  Take alimony, for example. The legislature might
amend the alimony laws to make them less favorable
to either the payer or the payee. Such a law would
almost certainly qualify as retroactive if applied to
divorces and alimony awards that were finalized prior
to its passage, and we would require a clear statement
of legislative intent before applying it to them.9 But,
surely, applying the new law in a future divorce action
to a couple who married in 1990 would not be character-
ized as a retroactive application, even though the sub-
stantive legal rules and duties that govern the couple
will now differ from those that were in place when they
made the choice to marry. In that case, the opposite
presumption applies; we would assume that the new
rules do apply to existing marriages, unless the legisla-
ture provides otherwise. The fact that the change in
the law is substantive is of little moment. The reason
for the different outcome is that the relevant reference
point for purposes of retroactivity is the divorce, which
happens after the change in the law, and not the mar-
riage, which happened before.
   The relevant reference point is not always so intu-
itively clear. Hadix was a particularly thorny case. The
attorney’s fee statute at issue in that case arguably could
have been retroactively applicable to five different cate-
gories of events.10 Before the United States Supreme
Court could assess whether the ordinary presumption
against retroactivity applied, the court first had to iden-
tify the relevant reference point or points. See Martin
v. Hadix, supra, 527 U.S. 357–58.
  In the present case, as in the alimony hypothetical,
there really are just two possibilities. The trustee con-
tends that the accrual of the debts qualifies as one
relevant reference point. If we permit the debtor to
claim the expanded homestead exemption with respect
to debts that accrued prior to the passage of P.A. 21-
161, § 1, then its application will be retroactive as to
those debts and should be permitted only if the legisla-
ture demonstrated an intent for the amendment to apply
retroactively.
   The debtor disagrees. She contends that the only
relevant consideration is when her bankruptcy proceed-
ing was commenced, as the relevant reference point is
the initiation of the bankruptcy proceeding, not the
debts to which the homestead exemption would apply.
If the expanded homestead exemption were applied to
a previously commenced bankruptcy proceeding, then
a retroactivity issue would arise. But, she contends,
merely to apply the expanded exemption in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding that was commenced after the effec-
tive date of P.A. 21-161, § 1, does not raise any retroac-
tivity concerns, regardless of when the debts accrued,
and, so, § 55-3 simply does not apply here.
   For secondary retroactivity claims of this sort, courts,
including this court, have struggled to identify the
proper reference point or points and to define exactly
when a new law so alters the future legal consequences
of prior conduct that it can be said to operate retroac-
tively with respect to that conduct. The seminal case
in which the United States Supreme Court attempted
to resolve these issues was Landgraf v. USI Film Prod-
ucts, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229
(1994). In Landgraf, a five justice majority recognized
that the high court had used various formulations to
articulate when a substantive change in the law is being
applied retroactively, including that a statute or law is
retroactive if it ‘‘changes the legal consequences of acts
completed before its effective date’’; (internal quotation
marks omitted) id., 269 n.23; ‘‘gives a quality or effect
to acts or conduct [that] they did not have or did not
contemplate when they were performed’’; (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) id.; or ‘‘takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates
a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations
already past . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 269. Ultimately, the Landgraf majority settled
on the following formulation: ‘‘[T]he court must ask
whether the new provision attaches new legal conse-
quences to events completed before its enactment. The
conclusion that a particular rule operates retroactively
comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning
the nature and extent of the change in the law and the
degree of connection between the operation of the new
rule and a relevant past event.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 269–70. Put differently, ‘‘[a] new
statute would have retroactive effect . . . [if] it would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase
a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties
with respect to transactions already completed.’’ Id.,
280; see also Martin v. Hadix, supra, 527 U.S. 358 (retro-
activity assessment ‘‘should be informed and guided
by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable
reliance, and settled expectations’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
  The Landgraf majority’s formulation certainly covers
the full ambit of primary retroactivity. With respect to
secondary retroactivity, however, the guidance is less
instructive. As we discussed, virtually every substantive
change in the law has the potential to upset someone’s
expectations or impose new consequences on some
prior actions and decisions. Under the majority
approach in Landgraf, the more settled and reasonable
those expectations, the more likely we are to deem the
change retroactive. But the majority readily admits that
this analysis is a subjective one, recognizing that its
formulation ‘‘will leave room for disagreement in hard
cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety
of legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity.’’
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 270.
  In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by two
other members of the court, proposed a different
approach to retroactivity questions. See Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 290, 114 S. Ct. 1522,
128 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgments). The concurrence argued that ‘‘[t]he critical
issue . . . is not whether the rule affects vested rights
. . . but rather what is the relevant activity that the
rule regulates. [In the absence of a] clear statement
otherwise, only such relevant activity [that] occurs after
the effective date of the statute is covered. Most statutes
are meant to regulate primary conduct, and hence will
not be applied in trials involving conduct that occurred
before their effective date. But other statutes have a
different purpose and therefore a different relevant ret-
roactivity event.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 291 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgments). By way of example, the concurrence
explained, ‘‘[a] new ban on gambling applies to existing
casinos and casinos under construction . . . even though
it attaches a new disability to those past investments.
The relevant retroactivity event is the primary activity
of gambling, not the primary activity of constructing
casinos.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 293–94 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgments).
   Although the majority’s approach in Landgraf is, of
course, the law of the land, at least as far as federal
law is concerned, the United States Supreme Court has,
at times, also relied on the Landgraf concurrence. See,
e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.
Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 947, 117 S. Ct. 1871, 138 L. Ed.
2d 135 (1997) (majority approach in Landgraf is not
‘‘the exclusive definition of presumptively impermissi-
ble retroactive legislation’’); id., 951 (citing concur-
rence’s approach); see also, e.g., Vartelas v. Holder, 566
U.S. 257, 269–70, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 182 L. Ed. 2d 473
(2012) (part of what court considers in assessing
whether application of statute would be retroactive is
what primary activity Congress sought to regulate).
Accordingly, the lower federal courts have found both
approaches instructive when faced with thorny ques-
tions regarding secondary retroactivity. See, e.g., Cov-
ino v. Reopel, 89 F.3d 105, 106–108 (2d Cir. 1996). Insofar
as our prior retroactivity cases have not provided ade-
quate guidance in this respect, we take this opportunity
to clarify that both approaches are part of a proper
retroactivity analysis under Connecticut law.
  In this case, both the majority’s and the concurrence’s
approaches in Landgraf point to the same result: appli-
cation of P.A. 21-161, § 1, to preexisting debts would not
constitute a retroactive application. Under the majority’s
approach, we look to factors such as whether allowing
the debtor to avail herself of the higher homestead
exemption would impair established rights of the credi-
tors or the trustee, impose new duties or obligations
that they could not reasonably have anticipated, or dis-
turb other reasonable, settled expectations. See Land-
graf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 270, 280.
There is no claim here that P.A. 21-161, § 1, imposed
any new duties or obligations on the parties.
   With respect to the rights and expectations of the
parties regarding the unsecured debts at issue in this
case, we are persuaded by the following analysis: ‘‘The
reality of modern commercial transactions is that a
lender who reasonably expects specific property to be
available to satisfy an obligation . . . takes a secured
position in the property. A lender’s expectation of later
realization of payment from unsecured property in exis-
tence at the time of contract is, [in the absence of]
unusual circumstances, an expectation founded on pure
speculation. Realization of payment from such property
is necessarily dependent [on] circumstances and rights
that do not exist at the time of [the] unsecured contract
and that are not created by it. It is dependent [on]
continued retention of ownership and equity in the
property by a debtor as well as the subsequent creation
of a lien by judgment and/or levy.
   ‘‘A creditor’s right to enforcement of the contract
through remedy of judgment and levy against specific
unsecured property of a debtor is an implied contract
right. But the contractual relationship of parties is not
substantially impaired by later legislation compromis-
ing or eliminating that right unless the right otherwise
has substantial value to the contractual relationship at
the time of the legislation complained of. [When] an
unsecured claim has not been reduced to judgment
prior to such legislation, the abstract right of potential
enforcement out of specific unsecured property, stand-
ing alone, ordinarily has no substantial value to the
contractual relationship in light of modern commercial
transactions. This is particularly so [when] the legisla-
tion compromising or eliminating the right is in an area
of established, long-standing legislative control and reg-
ulation, such as homestead exemption laws. The abstract
right is simply one without reasonable expectation of
fulfillment.’’ (Footnote omitted.) In re Johnson, 69 B.R.
988, 993 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); see also Central Bank
v. Hickey, 238 Conn. 778, 784, 680 A.2d 298 (1996) (‘‘the
very nature of an unsecured debt is that the creditor
has no current legal interest in the assets of its debtor’’);
Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 147, 3 A.2d 839 (1939)
(established rights that are presumptively secure from
retroactive civil legislation ‘‘must be something more
than such a mere expectation as may be based [on] an
anticipated continuance of the present general laws’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
   For this reason, we reject the trustee’s argument that
applying the increased homestead exemption to preex-
isting debts would be fundamentally unfair because it
would frustrate the settled expectations of unsecured
lenders who extended credit while the lower, $75,000
exemption was in place. There is no evidence in the
record that the debtor’s creditors ever considered the
equity in her house, much less that they relied to their
detriment on the size of the Connecticut homestead
exemption when they decided to extend her credit.
Rather, the unsecured creditors are presumed to have
been aware that the legislature could increase the size
of the homestead exemption at any time and that their
rights might otherwise be adversely impacted by
changes in federal or state law. See, e.g., CFCU Commu-
nity Credit Union v. Hayward, supra, 552 F.3d 268;
see also, e.g., In re Van Hove, 78 B.R. 917, 920 (N.D.
Iowa 1987) (lenders’ reasonable contract expectations
were not impaired by application of increased exemp-
tion, in light of state’s ‘‘clearly established . . . rule
that the extent of the debtor’s exemption rights [is]
determined by reference to the exemption statutes in
effect on the date the bankruptcy petition was filed,
regardless of when the debts arose’’ (emphasis in origi-
nal)). Indeed, the debtor could have simply shielded
additional assets by selling her Connecticut home and
relocating to one of the many states with larger (in some
cases, unlimited) homestead exemptions. See, e.g., T.
Tarvin, ‘‘Bankruptcy, Relocation, and the Debtor’s Dilem-
ma: Preserving Your Homestead Exemption Versus
Accepting the New Job Out of State,’’ 43 Loy. U. Chi.
L.J. 141, 145 (2011). Any expectation that the debtor
would be perpetually limited to a $75,000 exemption
was, in short, unreasonable.
   The result is the same under the concurrence’s
approach in Landgraf. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prod-
ucts, supra, 511 U.S. 291 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgments). Applying P.A. 21-161, § 1, to preexisting
debts would not qualify as a retroactive application of
the law because the accrual of those debts is not the
principal activity that the law seeks to regulate. See id.
As we discussed; see footnote 6 of this opinion; § 52-
352b is part of chapter 906, which deals with postjudg-
ment procedures, and the title of P.A. 21-161 is ‘‘An Act
Concerning Property That Is Exempt from a Judgment
Creditor.’’ Neither the original homestead act nor the
2021 amendment makes any reference whatsoever to
the source or nature of the underlying debts involved.
The focus, rather, is entirely on the enforcement pro-
cess—what exemptions are available to the debtor dur-
ing the bankruptcy or postjudgment proceeding.11 Public
Act 21-161, § 1, provides that the homestead exemption
‘‘shall be determined as the fair market value of the real
property less the amount of any statutory or consensual
lien which encumbers it’’ at the time of the proceeding,
not when the debt or debts accrued. It is clear that the
purpose of the act is to specify the exemptions that are
presently available to a debtor. Indeed, counsel for the
trustee conceded at oral argument before this court that
the primary purpose of the statute is to allow debtors
to shield from creditors a portion of the equity in their
home. For this reason, applying the expanded home-
stead exemption to a bankruptcy proceeding that was
initiated on or after the effective date of the act does
not constitute a retroactive application, any more than
a new law governing divorces would be retroactive
with respect to already married couples. That result is
consistent with this court’s prior secondary retroactiv-
ity cases.12
   We thus conclude that P.A. 21-161, § 1, is not retroac-
tive as applied to the debtor’s bankruptcy petition.
Accordingly, § 55-3 is not applicable, and we need not
resolve the dispute between the parties as to whether
the 2021 amendment effected a substantive or proce-
dural change in the law. See State v. Faraday, 268 Conn.
174, 197 and n.11, 842 A.2d 567 (2004). Because the
legislature did not direct otherwise, the expanded
homestead exemption contained in P.A. 21-161, § 1,
applies in all bankruptcy and postjudgment proceedings
initiated on or after the effective date of the act, regard-
less of when the underlying debts accrued.
   The answer to the certified question, as reformulated,
that is, does the expanded homestead exemption con-
tained in P.A. 21-161, § 1, apply in bankruptcy proceed-
ings filed on or after the effective date of the act to
debts that accrued prior to that date, is ‘‘yes.’’
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     The relevant statutory language is set forth in part II B 2 of this opinion.
  2
     The act maintained the $75,000 exemption for money judgments arising
out of certain tort claims that are not relevant to the present case. Public
Acts 2021, No. 21-161, § 1; see also part II B 1 of this opinion.
   3
     General Statutes § 55-3 provides: ‘‘No provision of the general statutes,
not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any
new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a
retrospective effect.’’
   We will use the terms ‘‘retrospective’’ and ‘‘retroactive’’ interchangeably.
   4
     ‘‘Under the [federal Bankruptcy] Code, all property of the debtor, includ-
ing exempt property, initially becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. The
debtor is thereafter permitted to assert exemptions by filing a list of property
that he or she claims as exempt. . . . [T]he exemptions augment the debt-
or’s ‘fresh start’ by allowing the debtor to take back certain assets from the
bankruptcy estate.’’ (Citations omitted.) Gernat v. Belford, 192 B.R. 601, 603
(D. Conn.), aff’d sub nom. In re Gernat, 98 F.3d 729 (2d Cir. 1996).
   5
     Under the Bankruptcy Code, states can choose to opt out of the federal
bankruptcy exemptions, so that only those afforded by state law are available
in a federal bankruptcy proceeding conducted in that state. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 522 (b) (2) (2018). Approximately one third of the states, including Connect-
icut, have not opted out. See, e.g., G. Sullivan, ‘‘A Fresh Start to Bankruptcy
Exemptions,’’ 2018 BYU L. Rev. 335, 339 (2018); J. Salisbury, Note, ‘‘Are
They or Aren’t They ‘Retirement Funds’? The Case for Including Funds from
an Inherited IRA in a Debtor’s Bankruptcy Estate,’’ 80 Mo. L. Rev. 871, 884
n.142 (2015).
   6
     The amended homestead exemption is codified at § 52-352b (21). By its
terms, § 52-352b makes no mention of bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed, on
its face, all of chapter 906 of the General Statutes is dedicated only to
postjudgment proceedings. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the legisla-
ture intended the homestead exemption, like all of the exemptions contained
in § 52-352b, to be available in federal bankruptcy proceedings under 11
U.S.C. § 522 (b), as well.
   Section 52-352b begins with the statement that ‘‘[t]he following property
of any natural person shall be exempt . . . .’’ General Statutes § 52-352a
(3), in turn, defines ‘‘exempt’’ expansively as ‘‘not subject to any form of
process or court order for the purpose of debt collection . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) To the extent that the statutory language is ambiguous in this
respect, the legislative history confirms that the homestead exemption was
intended to be used primarily in federal bankruptcy proceedings. This point
is made repeatedly in the legislative histories of both the original version
of the homestead act and the 2021 amendment. See, e.g., 36 H.R. Proc., Pt.
30, 1993 Sess., p. 10,828, remarks of Representative Dale W. Radcliffe (‘‘[t]he
amendment merely adds to several of those exemptions in the event of
bankruptcy’’); id., pp. 10,849–50, remarks of Representative Lee A. Samowitz
(discussing application of homestead exemption in foreclosure and bank-
ruptcy); id., p. 10,857, remarks of Representative Radcliffe (‘‘[o]nly two
states . . . provide no protection [whatsoever] for a . . . resident in the
event of bankruptcy and that is really what this does’’); see also, e.g., 64 H.R.
Proc., Pt. 6, 2021 Sess., p. 4170, remarks of Representative Craig Fishbein
(discussing exemptions in bankruptcy context); Conn. Joint Standing Com-
mittee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 3, 2021 Sess., pp. 1454–58, remarks of Attorney
Susan M. Williams (discussing exemption in bankruptcy context); id., p.
1456, remarks of Attorney Williams (‘‘three decades is much too long to
wait to amend the home bankruptcy exemptions’’).
    7
      Likewise, we have reviewed the legislative history of P.A. 21-161, § 1,
and, to the extent that it is relevant, we find therein no support for the
trustee’s contention that the legislature intended to create a new carve-out
for preexisting debts.
    8
      As the Bankruptcy Court observed, if P.A. 21-161, § 1, repealed the prior
homestead exemption, but the expanded one was applicable only to those
debts accrued on or after October 1, 2021, then the practical effect could
have been to create a ‘‘donut hole’’ in which the exemption was temporarily
abolished in its entirety. See In re Cole, supra, 642 B.R. 221. That was
certainly not the intent of the legislature. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy
Court explained, even if the original homestead exemption did continue to
follow debts accrued while it was in effect, the trustee’s interpretation would
significantly and unnecessarily complicate bankruptcy proceedings, as dif-
ferent exemption amounts could apply to portions of different debts that
were accrued before and after the effective date. See id. (‘‘asserting two
applicable state homestead exemptions would be incongruous and would
irreconcilably complicate the administration of a bankruptcy estate’’); see
also In re Skjetne, supra, 213 B.R. 278 (with respect to revolving credit
accounts, cautioning about ‘‘the tremendous cost . . . and the impossible
task of knowing what debt is incurred prior to . . . and what debt is incurred
after the effective date of the homestead amendment’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
    9
      This assumes that such application satisfied all relevant constitutional
restraints. The question of whether application of a new or amended statute
qualifies as retroactive—a matter largely of statutory interpretation—is dis-
tinct from the question of whether it violates the contract clause of the
federal constitution or the ex post facto, takings, or due process provisions
of the federal or state constitutions.
    10
        Hadix addressed a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-72 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (d) (3)), that placed new limits ‘‘on the
fees that may be awarded to attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits.’’
Martin v. Hadix, supra, 527 U.S. 347. In that case, the limits arguably could
have applied ‘‘retroactively’’ with respect to five different points in time or
categories of events: ‘‘(1) the alleged violation [on] which the fee-imposing
suit is based (applying the new fee rule to any case involving an alleged
violation that occurred before the PLRA became effective would be giving
it retroactive application); (2) the lawyer’s undertaking to prosecute the
suit for which attorney’s fees were provided (applying the new fee rule to
any case in which the lawyer was retained before the PLRA became effective
would be giving it retroactive application); (3) the filing of the suit in which
the fees are imposed (applying the new fee rule to any suit brought before
the PLRA became effective would be giving it retroactive application); (4)
the doing of the legal work for which the fees are payable (applying the
new fee rule to any work done before the PLRA became effective would
be giving it retroactive application); and (5) the actual award of fees in a
prisoner case (applying the new fee rule to an award rendered before the
PLRA became effective would be giving it retroactive application).’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 362–63 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
    11
       Although the 2021 amendment maintained the $75,000 cap on the home-
stead exemption for debts arising from certain categories of legal claims,
it did so only with respect to money judgments arising out of those claims.
See General Statutes § 52-352b (21) (maintaining prior homestead exemption
‘‘in the case of a money judgment arising out of a claim of sexual abuse
or exploitation of a minor, sexual assault or other wilful, wanton, or reckless
misconduct committed by a natural person’’ (emphasis added)).
   12
      See, e.g., Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Com-
mission, 307 Conn. 53, 69–70, 52 A.3d 636 (2012) (application of nondisclo-
sure rule to previously detained individuals would not be retroactive); Con-
tractor’s Supply of Waterbury, LLC v. Commissioner of Environmental
Protection, 283 Conn. 86, 88–89, 109–10, 925 A.2d 1071 (2007) (law barring
location of asphalt plants in proximity to watercourses was not retroactive
as applied to prior permit application); Schieffelin & Co. v. Dept. of Liquor
Control, 194 Conn. 165, 172–76, 479 A.2d 1191 (1984) (statute that prohibited
termination of wholesale liquor distributorships except for cause applied
prospectively to all terminations regardless of whether distributorships pre-
dated or postdated statute); Nagle v. Wood, 178 Conn. 180, 187, 423 A.2d
875 (1979) (statute expanding inheritance rights of ‘‘illegitimate children’’
operated prospectively as to future deaths but, apparently, encompassed
children born before enactment); Hartford v. Suffield, 137 Conn. 341, 343–45,
77 A.2d 760 (1950) (in action to recover cost of supporting ‘‘paupers,’’ statute
providing that ‘‘ ‘[a]ny person, having a settlement in any town in this state,
who shall have resided outside of said town for a period of four consecutive
years, shall be deemed to have lost his settlement therein’ ’’ was prospective
in effect because it governed actions brought after its operative date, even
though it altered legal status of persons who relocated prior to that date).