Court Opinion

ID: 9449050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:53:47.171259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:39.760536
License: Public Domain

J. SHELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The overriding question presented by this appeal is: may an affidavit filed by an indigent defendant in a criminal case as required by Rule 17(b)1 to subpoena *872witnesses at Government expense be used against him at his trial. Rule 17(b) provides that the defendant in his affidavit “shall state the name and address of each witness and the testimony which he is expected by the defendant to give if subpoenaed, and shall show that the evidence of the witness is material to the defense, that the defendant cannot safely go to trial without the witness and that the defendant does not have sufficient means and is actually unable to pay the fees of the witness.”
Rule 17(b) apparently presents an indigent with Hobson’s choice: either make no defense or disclose his whole case to the Government before his trial.2 It is questionable whether in 1962 this choice meets the current standard3 of due process considered in the light of the Fifth Amendment injunction: “No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Be that as it may, the accused here, unlike John Lilburne,4 has already executed the affidavit and we must decide whether it was properly used against him. I believe it was not.
Appellant's 5 Rule 17(b) affidavit, prepared by his counsel but signed by him, recited:
“2. That the testimony which he (or they) is expected to give, if subpoenaed, is:
“To establish that I was not present at the scene of the crime at the time it was allegedly committed.
“3. That the evidence of the witness or witnesses is material to the defense because
“It will establish my ‘Alibi’ ”
Apparently the witnesses subpoenaed would not establish his alibi. In any event, they were not called. But the accused was confronted with his affidavit when he took the stand and testified that he was indeed at the scene of the crime.6 Over objection, the affidavit was admitted into evidence. I would hold this was er*873ror 7 and reverse for a new trial on this ground.
After Coppedge v. United States, supra Note 3, it need hardly be asserted that under our law indigency is not a penalty in a criminal case, that the right to constitutional protection is not a reflection in a net worth statement, and that courts stand to protect the rights of the accused irrespective of his station in life or his alleged crime.8 But this high purpose to provide equal justice under law, to provide an indigent with the means for making his defense as a matter of right, would fail of its goal if he is otherwise limited in making that defense. Securing for indigents the means of defense cannot be achieved by sacrificing his broader rights common to all Americans. If an accused, rich or poor, is entitled to a defense under our law, then a man’s poverty cannot weigh in the scales against him. It cannot give the prosecution a greater advantage in the already unequal struggle.
To obtain witnesses under Rule 17(b), the indigent is compelled to tell the Government, under oath, who they are, where they live, and what they will testify to. In addition, the defendant, in his affidavit, “shall show that the evidence of the witness [es] is material to the defense, that the defendant cannot safely go to trial without” them. Not only must the accused speculate as to what the witnesses will say, but he must explain, under oath, the materiality of the testimony to his defense. And now the Government argues9 that the affidavit compelled under Rule 17(b) may be used against him in a trial for his life.
Almost 100 years ago the Supreme Court had something to say with reference to compelling oaths. It bears repeating now. “And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party’s oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman ; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-632, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532-533, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).
In this same Boyd ease, relying on an Act of Congress rather than, as here, a Rule of Criminal Procedure, the Government sought to make palatable merely a questionable infringement10 of a party’s rights under the Fifth Amendment. *874Alertly, the Court struck it down. "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed.” Id. at 635, at 534 of 6 S.Ct.
Rule 17(b) humanely provides for the defense of indigents. Obviously, criminal rules which failed in this regard would not pass the constitutional test.11 But the indigent’s Sixth Amendment right to “compulsory process for obtaining witnesses” would mean little indeed if he were required to barter away his rights under the Fifth Amendment to exercise it.12 The rights of indigents, so lately won, may not so soon be eroded. Even if it were held that constitutionally a defendant may be compelled to file an affidavit to obtain Rule 17(b) rights, constitutionally that affidavit may not be used against him at his trial.13

. E.R.Cr.P., 18 U.S.C.A. Rule 17(b) is a recognition that the Sixth Amendment *872right “to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor” applies to indigents too.

. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 264, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), in which the Court held that a defendant could not be required under Rule 41(e), E.R.Cr.P., to admit ownership of narcotics in order to exercise his rights under the Fourth Amendment.

. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 78 S.Ct. 974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1958); Griffin v. People of the State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956).

. Lilburne refused to take an oath before the Council of the Star Chamber to answer charges of importing seditious books. He was condemned to be whipped and pilloried for his “boldness in refusing to take a legal oath.” The prosecution of Lil-burne resulted in the establishment of the privilege against self-incrimination as part of the common law. See Griswold, The 5th Amendment Today, p. 3.

. Appellant was convicted on two counts of an indictment charging housebreaking witli intent to assault and rape. D.C. Code § 22-1801 and D.C.Code § 22-2801. Appellant admitted intercourse but testified that it was a consensual professional relationship of some duration costing $25 per episode. He stated that the victim screamed after the act when she learned he had only $17. The medical report on the victim, which was not in evidence, showed intercourse but, unknown to appellant or his counsel, was negative as to other signs of rape. The jury convicted appellant of rape but did not recommend the death penalty as the statute permitted. The maximum penalty otherwise is 30 years. The trial court sentenced appellant to 3 to 10 years on each count, to run concurrently.

. The Government was not surprised by his testimony. Appellant filed a second Rule 17(b) affidavit which stated in part: “They [the witnesses to be subpoenaed] will corroborate the defendant’s testimony as to what he was doing the day in question, and his previous relationship with the complaining witness.” Government trial counsel, before trial, was fully aware that appellant’s defense would be, not alibi, but consent on the part of the victim.

. Whether a prosecution for perjury may be predicated on a false affidavit is not before this court. See Pothier v. Rodman, 261 U.S. 307, 309, 43 S.Ct. 374, 67 L.Ed. 670 (1923).

. In Griffin v. People of the State of Illinois, supra Note 3, at 16-17, at 589 of 76 S.Ct., in upholding the right of the indigent to equal justice, the Court stated:
“Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem. People have never ceased to hope and strive to move closer to that goal. * * * In this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of persons. * * * ”

. The Government relies on Tucker v. United States, 151 U.S. 164, 14 S.Ct. 299, 38 L.Ed. 112 (1894), interpreting Section 860, Revised Statutes, which reads:
“No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this or any foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him or his property or estate, in any court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, or for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture: Provided, that this section shall not exempt any party or witness from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in discovering or testifying as aforesaid.”
While Tucker factually seems to be on all fours with this case, the constitutional point was neither raised nor decided there.

. Boyd was a forfeiture proceeding under the then existing internal revenue (custom) laws, Act of June 22, 1874, § 12, *87418 Stat. 186 et seq., involving 35 eases of plate glass allegedly illegally imported. Under § 5 of the Act Boyd was ordered to produce the invoices for the plate glass or explain his refusal or inability. Under the Act, non-compliance with the court’s order was a confession that the plate glass was contraband. Equating the forfeiture proceedings with a criminal prosecution, the Court held § 5 unconstitutional because, among other things, it compelled Boyd to be a witness against himself.

. Also in Griffin v. People of the State of Illinois, supra Note 3, at 19, at 590 of 76 S.Ct., the Court stated:
“ * * * Such a denial [of equal justice because of indigency] is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. * * * ”

. The court in its opinion cites cases holding that a defendant’s income tax returns may be used in evidence against him. But, while the filing of a return is required, privileged disclosures in the return may not be compelled where there is timely invocation of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 S.Ct. 607, 71 L.Ed. 1037 (1927); Shushan v. United States, 5 Cir., 117 F.2d 110, 117, 133 A.L.R. 1010 (1941). Moreover, all persons with a gross annual income of $600 or over are required to file income tax returns. Under Buie 17(b) only indigent defendants who desire to exercise their Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses are required to file the affidavit.

. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954), does not require a different result. Here, unlike Walder, appellant did not “turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government’s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.” Id. at 65, at 356 of 74 S.Ct. Nor is Tate v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 283 F.2d 377 (1960), controlling since there the prior statement used for impeachment was made voluntarily.