Court Opinion

ID: 9687690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:42:28.928528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:30.063572
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.,
(dissenting). By placing unqualified lifeguards on a public beach, the City of Kenosha (City) created a trap for the unwary. The presence of the lifeguards created the perception of a safe condition that was not justified. I do not agree with the majority that the recreational use statute exempts owners of recreational property from liability when the actions of the owner create a perception of safety that does not in reality exist. The legislature could not have intended such an absurd result.
The City placed a lifeguard on a public beach who had no training or experience. She had no training in first aid, CPR, or life-saving. She had not even been tested for her ability to swim. The majority concludes that as a matter of law the City's conduct was exempt from liability. The majority errs.
*486Section 895.52(4)(b), Stats., provides that an owner of recreational property is not exempt from liability for malicious acts or malicious failures to warn against an unsafe condition. I conclude that the term "malicious," as used in this statute, includes acts which are made with reckless disregard for the safety of others. This definition would maintain the policy behind the recreational use statute while still protecting the public from traps such as these. The City created a trap for unwary swimmers and for parents who justifiably assumed that the lifeguards were trained. The City's actions were undeniably deceptive, and, arguably, made with reckless disregard for the safety of others. A jury should be allowed to determine that issue. Accordingly, I dissent.
The facts in this case deserve further discussion. The deposition of the female lifeguard, who was nearest to the boys and observed them fall off the dropoff, demonstrates how poorly equipped she was to deal with this emergency. She had never worked at a pool or beach in any capacity before being hired by the City. She was hired after responding to a newspaper ad and was never tested for her ability to swim or save lives. She had never been trained in CPR. Her only relevant experience was a three credit swim class at the University of Wisconsin. The City of Kenosha provided her with a sheet that indicated the rules of the beach, but gave her no oral or written instructions as to how to protect the lives of swimmers in an emergency.
In addition, the affidavit of the plaintiffs investigator, Thomas Weiss, states that he had heard the head lifeguard explain that the female lifeguard had a phobia that fish or other living organisms would be following her in the water and that she did not like to be in any kind of water where she could not see where she was going or see the bottom of the water.
*487One of the other two lifeguards manning the beach at the time this incident occurred also had no lifesaving experience. Like the female lifeguard, he had been hired without a formal interview and without any skills testing. He was not trained in CPR. Furthermore, the City did not provide him with any oral or written instructions as to how to protect the lives of swimmers in an emergency.
The City hired the female lifeguard without any basis for believing that she was qualified as a lifeguard. She was not qualified. When Clarence Ervin and Brian Wells waded towards the dropoff, she acted as an unqualified lifeguard would — by doing nothing. She saw the boys go under the water and still did not act immediately. The deposition of a witness, Mirtha Dulzaides, states that this lifeguard watched the boys going up and down in the water for a period of time before Dulzaides and two other bystanders finally went into the water to attempt to save the boys. Dulzaides estimated that the female lifeguard did not enter the water until the boys had been under water for two minutes.
By placing unqualified lifeguards on a public beach, the city created a trap for the unwary. The presence of the lifeguards created the perception of a safe condition that was not justified. In addition, the lifeguards' presence may well have inhibited other swimmers from immediately responding to the emergency because they too expected the lifeguards to have been trained and knowledgeable in lifesaving procedure. In essence, the lifeguards were decoys that lured unwary swimmers and their parents into a false sense of security. Providing an unqualified lifeguard was as dangerous as providing boaters with a life jacket that does not float or installing smoke alarms that do not work.
*488I disagree with the majority's conclusion that in order to prove that the City's conduct was "malicious" the plaintiffs must be able to show that the acts of the City "were the result of hatred, ill-will, a desire for revenge or inflicted under circumstances where insult or injury was intended." Majority op. at 485.
Neither this court nor the legislature has previously defined malicious within the context of the recreational use statute. "Malicious," and its counterparts, "malice" and "maliciously" have been construed in numerous different ways depending on the context in which they are used. The term is used in many types of actions including those for libel, punitive damages, malicious prosecution, bankruptcy, malicious mischief, murder, and alienation of affection. A scan of Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990), West's Words and Phrases, and Am. Jur. 2d's sections on malice attests to the obscure nature of the term. In view of the difficult task of providing a concrete definition for the word, it is not surprising that Prosser and Keeton characterized the term "malicious" as an "unfortunate word." Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts 882 (5th ed. 1984).
The majority correctly notes that in punitive damages actions "malicious" conduct is often characterized by hatred, ill will, a desire for revenge, or an intentional infliction of insult or injury. See Wis. JI — Civil 1707 (1990). In other contexts, however, "malice" has been defined more broadly and the term may include actions made with "reckless disregard” for the rights of others. In Manz v. Klippel, 158 Wis. 557, 562 (1914), this court stated that malice in malicious prosecution cases could be established by "showing that the wrongful act complained of was done wantonly or recklessly . . .." In Meyer v. Ewald, 66 Wis. 2d 168, 175, 224 N.W.2d 419 (1974), we stated that for plaintiffs to prove "malice" as *489that term is applied in malicious prosecution cases, it must be shown that:
'the defendants acted with a wanton or willful disregard for the facts or law in any manner whatsoever that would evince any ill will or vindictiveness toward the plaintiff or in any manner from which ill will or vindictiveness could be inferred.' (quoting Yolk v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis. 2d 271, 276, 151 N.W.2d 4 (1967)).
Black's Law Dictionary 956 (6th ed. 1990) provides many definitions of "malice," including that it is "[a] condition of the mind showing a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief." Black's also states that n[m]alice in law is not necessarily personal hate or ill will, but it is that state of mind which is reckless of law and of the legal rights of the citizen." Id. at 956-57. "Maliciously" is defined as "[i]mports a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another, or an intent to do a wrongful act, and may consist in direct intention to injure, or in reckless disregard of another's rights." Id. at 958. One of the stated definitions of "malicious" is "wrongful and done intentionally without just cause or excuse or as a result of ill will." Id. at 958. See also Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485-86 (1904) (quoting Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & Cres. 247) (" 'Malice, in common acceptation, means ill will against a person, but in its legal sense it means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse . . ..It equally works an injury, whether . . . meant to produce an injury or not.' ")
Many other courts have also defined malice, etc. in ways that would raise a jury question in this case. " 'Malicious' means in conscious disregard of one's duties or without just cause or excuse; it does not require ill-will or specific intent to do harm." Wheeler v. *490Laudani, 783 F.2d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 1986). "[T]rial court's finding of 'reckless, willful and wanton conduct' was a finding of 'willful and malicious' conduct on the part of the defendant." Breeds v. McKinney, 171 Ohio St. 336, 170 N.E.2d 850, 853 (1960). "Malice, however, may consist of a state of mind determined to perform an act with reckless or wanton disregard of or indifference to the rights of others." United States v. Vollweiler, 229 F. Supp. 558, 561 (N.D. Cal. 1964). "[M]alicious connotes something more than mere negligence. It has been variously defined as: the intentional commission of a tortious act; the willful and reckless disregard of another's rights; and the wanton and deliberate commission of a wrongful act." Tcherepnin v. Franz, 393 F. Supp. 1197, 1208-09 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
In the context of a conditional privilege of immunity granted to public officials in the performance of their duty except when their conduct is "malicious," the First Circuit has stated that, "malice in this sense means something broader than personal ill will; it means an 'abuse' of the privilege, (cite omitted). . .. Or . . . [that] the privilege is lost upon proof of . . . 'reckless indifference to the rights of the individual citizen.' " (cite omitted). Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1965). In this same context it has been said that, "malice which would remove the protection of privilege is not limited to hate, vindictiveness or animosity but may be found in reckless disregard of the right of another or such conscious indifference to results as could be regarded as willfully wrong." Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 497 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
The above discussion clearly illustrates the ambiguities of the term "malicious." If the language of a statute is ambiguous, we examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and object of the statute to discern legis*491lative intent. State v. Pham, 137 Wis. 2d 31, 34, 403 N.W.2d 35 (1987). Furthermore, we must interpret a statute in such a way as to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result. Id.
The language of the recreational use statute's predecessor statute, sec. 29.68, Stats., indicates that "malicious" as defined in the recreational use statute should be construed as including conduct that is not necessarily "wilful" conduct. Section 29.68(3)(a) immunized owners from liability except when there was a "wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity." If, as the majority asserts, "malicious" requires ill-will, vindictiveness, hatred, or the intentional infliction of injury, then the term "malicious" in the predecessor statute was entirely superfluous because each meaning of "malicious" was encompassed under the exception for "wilful" conduct. The established rule of this court, however, is that we avoid a construction of a statute which makes a word in a statute superfluous. See, e.g., Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 110 Wis. 2d 530, 534, 329 N.W.2d 178 (1983). There is no reason to believe that "malicious" is now defined any differently within the recreational use statute than it was before the legislature excluded "wilful" from the scope of the exception. Therefore, "malicious," as used in the recreational use statute, should be read to encompass conduct in addition to wilful conduct, such as conduct in reckless disregard for the rights of others.
Defining "malicious" to include acts done with reckless disregard for the safety of others would do no harm to the purpose of the recreational use statute. As the majority emphasizes, the legislature's purpose in creating the recreational use statute was "to limit the liability of property owners toward others who use their property *492for recreational activities . . 1983 Wis. Act 418, sec. 1. Under any definition of malicious the statute provides extraordinary protection to the owners of recreational property. In exchange for the recreational use of their property, the legislature has granted owners immunity from liability for even serious acts of negligence. The City has virtually no obligation under the statute to ensure the public's safety. No public policy, however, supports allowing owners to actively deceive the public. It is unreasonable to believe the legislature intended to grant owners a license to misrepresent the safety of their property or facilities to the public by engaging in conduct that is the equivalent of setting a trap.
The term "malicious," as used in the recreational use statute, should be defined by this court to include conduct done in reckless disregard of the public's safety. It should also encompass conduct which suggests ill-will or from which ill-will could be inferred, without regard to the defendant's actual state of mind. Both of these definitions of "malicious” are consistent with the purpose of the statute. By giving the term "malicious" this broader definition we would also protect the public's safety from unjustifiable activity of recreational property owners and their employees.
The City of Kenosha and the amicus curiae supporting the City's position argue that to allow the potential for liability when lifeguards are gratuitously provided as a "safety measure" would deter owners from providing safety measures or additional facilities for recreational property users. "Safety measures," such as the lifeguards provided at Pennoyer Beach, which so egregiously betray the expectations of the public, are about as welcome as a Trojan horse. Thanks, but no thanks. If an owner of recreational property cannot provide lifeguards that are trained in lifesaving, then such "safety measure" should *493not be provided at all. To lull parents into believing that their children are protected by trained lifeguards is worse than not providing lifeguards at all. If there were no lifeguards present, then people using the beach, including parents who allow their children to use the beach, would at least be alert to the actual condition of the beach: it was a beach without lifeguards.
I conclude that the actions of the City of Kenosha could well be "malicious" and present a question that should be decided by the jury. I dissent.