Court Opinion

ID: 9764859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:42:11.968787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:01.913898
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring.
Here two Missouri residents made a sortie into Illinois, intending to return quickly to Missouri. They were involved in an accident in Illinois, and the passenger sued the driver for damages.
In Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. banc 1969), which is factually indistinguishable, we concluded that the state in which the accident occurred (Indiana) had little interest in applying its tort law, and that Missouri had a substantial interest. We therefore refused to apply the Indiana guest statute, which required an enhanced showing of negligence. In so holding we rejected the traditional lex locus delicti approach and purported to adopt the “most significant contacts” approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1969).
In Trzecki v. Gruenewald, 532 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. banc 1976) a similar fact situation was presented. We held that the adult plaintiff’s claim was barred by reason of our “borrowing statute,” now § 516.190, RSMo 1986, because the cause of action “originated” at the place of the accident. We found an express statutory command *874which precluded the application of policy considerations, and rejected the suggestion that the action should be held to have originated in the state which provided the governing substantive law.
The soundness of such a decision has been questioned. Tuchler, Other States’ Guest Statutes — A Hesitant Step Forward, 15 St. Louis Bar Journal 17 (Spring 1969). Kennedy v. Dixon, supra, should be given the broadest possible effect, and Trzecki should not be extended1 when the governing statutes are capable of a construction which better accords with policy considerations.
The present plaintiff was a minor at the time of the accident, under both Missouri’s and Illinois’ law. A state has a primary interest in protecting its minor citizens in their access to its courts. Strahler v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. banc 1986). Section 516.170, RSMo 1986, states expressly that a person who was a minor at the time his or her cause of action accrued “shall be at liberty” to bring an action after the disability of minority is removed. This express permission controls. It is of no significance that our law allows a person of age 18 or over to sue without a next friend.2 (Section 507.115, RSMo 1986). The tolling provisions of § 516.170 continue until age 21. The borrowed limitation period of § 516.190 is expressly tolled by § 516.170 for a plaintiff who is under the age of 21.
It makes no difference that Missouri would borrow the Illinois limitation period subject to Illinois tolling provisions. An action is not “fully barred” under Illinois law if the statute of limitations is tolled by that law. Such a holding is not inconsistent with the application of § 516.170 for the protection of a Missouri minor, in accordance with its express terms.
The result of the principal opinion is supported by reason, policy, and authority as well as by the proper construction of § 516.170. I concur.

. As a matter of fact I would be only too glad to reconsider the holding if an appropriate case were presented.

. I do not see the pertinence of Judge Robertson’s observation that the plaintiff could sue in his own name in Illinois as soon as he reached 18. It is manifest from Kennedy v. Dixon, supra, that Missouri is the most appropriate forum for a suit by this plaintiff against this defendant.