Court Opinion

ID: 9961216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 14:04:15.96212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:28.265638
License: Public Domain

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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                 Nos. 22-AA-0449, 22-AA-0450 & 22-AA-0469

       OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE’S COUNSEL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
                       PETITIONER/CROSS-RESPONDENT,

                                       v.

             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY,
                       RESPONDENT/CROSS-PETITIONER.

   Petition for Review from the District of Columbia Water & Sewer Authority
                       (Nos. 2021-424908 & 2022-78202)

                    (Janet W. Blassingame, Hearing Officer)

(Argued January 11, 2024                                 Decided April 18, 2024)

    Scott H. Strauss, with whom Sandra Mattavous-Frye, Elizabeth Beltran, and
Amanda C. Drennen were on the brief, for petitioner/cross-respondent.

        Emil Hirsch, with whom Barbara K. Mitchell and Emily Green were on the
brief, for respondent/cross-petitioner.

      Before DEAHL, HOWARD, and SHANKER, Associate Judges.

      SHANKER, Associate Judge: In 2021, District of Columbia residents Matthew

Roberts and Timothy Melham brought separate challenges to their water bills from

the D.C. Water & Sewer Authority (“D.C. Water”), suspecting that they were being

overcharged due to equipment malfunctions. A Hearing Officer denied both of their
                                           2

requests for adjustments to their bills. The Office of the People’s Counsel for the

District of Columbia (“OPC”) appealed the Hearing Officer’s decisions to this court.

We hold that because OPC was not a party to the proceedings before the Hearing

Officer, it cannot appeal the Hearing Officer’s decisions. That power remains with

the consumers, Messrs. Roberts and Melham. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals

for lack of standing.

                                 I.      Background

      Messrs. Roberts and Melham disputed their water bills at different times and

in different proceedings. When they appealed D.C. Water’s denial of their claims to

a Hearing Officer, OPC served as counsel for both of them in two separate

administrative hearings before the same Hearing Officer and in the same month. The

Hearing Officer affirmed D.C. Water’s denial of the claims in both cases. OPC,

acting in its own name, petitioned this court for review of both cases. We ordered

the cases consolidated.

                            A.        Mr. Roberts’s Case

      Mr. Roberts noticed an uptick in his water bill tracing back to his July 2020

bill, which covered the month of June 2020. In April 2021, after he ruled out

potential innocuous causes, such as his new sprinkler system, he contacted D.C.
                                           3

Water to ask about his situation. He wrote in his email to the agency: “something is

off with my water bill and need some help. My bills have drastically increased since

last June[,] and we are not doing anything different. Thoughts?” On D.C. Water’s

recommendation, Mr. Roberts hired a plumber to inspect his property. The plumber

found a broken toilet flapper, which they fixed. Yet the heightened water bills

persisted. Mr. Roberts asked the plumber to return and check for leaks, but the

plumber found nothing.

      Having failed to resolve the issue, Mr. Roberts disputed his May 2021 bill and

stated that “[t]he origins of this [billing issue] started in June of 2020, so if we had

the option to, we would dispute the charges all the way to that point.” D.C. Water

denied his claim for the May bill and informed him that his dispute of all prior bills

was untimely. Mr. Roberts requested an administrative hearing to appeal D.C.

Water’s decision. While awaiting the administrative hearing, Mr. Roberts continued

to dispute his new bills.

      In August 2021, D.C. Water tested Mr. Roberts’s water meter and concluded

that it was performing outside the acceptable range, registering at 101.77% (0.27%

above the maximum acceptable reading). D.C. Water then adjusted Mr. Roberts’s

bills for the months that he had timely disputed them (the months after April 2021),

totaling $386.56 in adjustments. D.C. Water did not adjust his remaining bills.
                                           4

      At the administrative hearing, where Mr. Roberts was represented by OPC,

the Hearing Officer affirmed D.C. Water’s denial of Mr. Roberts’s request for relief.

They explained that, in their view, multiple other factors could have “caused or

contributed to” the increase in Mr. Roberts’s bills. OPC petitioned this court for

review of the Hearing Officer’s determination. D.C. Water cross-petitioned for

review of Mr. Roberts’s case, arguing that the Hearing Office should have dismissed

Mr. Roberts’s claims for failure to timely dispute his bills.

                             B.     Mr. Melham’s Case

      Mr. Melham lives with his brother, Mark Melham, in a single-family

residence. Between February 11, 2021, and February 18, 2021, the water usage at

their residence spiked dramatically, reaching 37,000 gallons of water, roughly ten

times the normal usage. Before and after February 2021, the Melhams’ water bills

ranged from approximately $100 to $120. For the month of February, however, their

bill rose to around $780. Water usage receded to normal levels after February 18.

D.C. Water issued high-water-usage alerts on February 13 and 19 to inform the

Melhams of the heightened usage. The customers hired a plumber to inspect the

property, and the plumber found no leaks, running toilets, or other problems that

would cause such a spike. D.C. Water investigated the meter and found that it was

functioning within accepted parameters. Mr. Melham contested his February bill,
                                           5

and D.C. Water declined to adjust it. Mr. Melham, represented by OPC, appealed

that decision to the Hearing Officer.

      The Hearing Officer affirmed D.C. Water’s denial of Mr. Melham’s claim.

They explained that “the weight of the evidence was that the water usage occurred

and nothing was wrong with [D.C. Water’s] equipment.” Although Mr. Melham

had presented testimony from a mechanical engineer suggesting that only a digital

error could explain the increased water usage, the Hearing Officer concluded that

the “testimony was based upon speculation of a system error having occurred, and

[D.C. Water] refuted [the] testimony by testimony and evidence of no error notations

on the meter read log, testing of the water meter, and verification of the meter read

when the meter was pulled for testing.” OPC petitioned this court for review of the

Hearing Officer’s decision.

                              C.    Procedural History

      Both of OPC’s petitions were captioned “Office of the People’s Counsel For

the District of Columbia v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer.” The first

sentence of both petitions reads: “The Office of the People’s Counsel for the District

of Columbia . . . , the statutory representative of District of Columbia Ratepayers

and consumers with respect to water utility matters[ ], respectfully seeks review by

the District of Columbia Court of Appeals . . . .” The petitions refer to the respective
                                           6

case number both in the heading and in the body of the petitions, and they identify

the cases as “In re: Matthew Roberts” and “In re: Timothy Melham,” respectively,

which is how the administrative hearings before the Hearing Officer were captioned.

      After this court consolidated all three petitions (OPC’s two petitions and D.C.

Water’s cross-petition) into a single case, D.C. Water moved to dismiss. It argued

that OPC lacked standing to petition for review in both cases. In response, OPC

argued that it possessed standing and, in the alternative, requested leave to amend

its petitions to name Messrs. Roberts and Melham as the petitioners. A motions

panel of this court deferred the issue to the merits panel.

      Subsequently, OPC moved to dismiss D.C. Water’s cross-petition. It argued

that D.C. Water could not cross-petition for review of the Hearing Officer’s decision

because the Hearing Officer constituted a part of D.C. Water, which meant that D.C.

Water was not aggrieved by the decision. D.C. Water responded, arguing that it was

aggrieved by the Hearing Officer’s decision because it was contrary to the law. The

motions panel referred this issue as well to the merits panel.

                                  II.    Discussion

      OPC primarily argues on appeal that the Hearing Officer’s decisions in both

Messrs. Roberts’s and Melham’s cases were not supported by substantial evidence.
                                          7

Before we can reach this issue, however, or any other issues raised by the parties,

we must determine whether OPC has standing to petition this court for review in the

first place. See Deloatch v. Sessoms-Deloatch, 229 A.3d 486, 488 (D.C. 2020) (“We

first determine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain these appeals.”). Because

we conclude that it does not and we dismiss the case for lack of standing, we do not

reach any of the other arguments raised by the parties.

      With respect to standing, OPC advances three arguments. First, OPC argues

that D.C. Code § 34-2202.05a confers statutory standing upon it to litigate these

claims in its own name. Second, OPC submits that it has parens patriae standing.

Third, OPC argues that, in the event that this court concludes it lacks standing, the

petitions can be read as appeals by the consumers and, in the alternative, renews its

request to amend the petitions to substitute in Messrs. Roberts and Melham as

petitioners. We address each argument in turn. We hold that OPC lacks standing to

petition for review of Messrs. Roberts’s and Melham’s cases. We also conclude that

the petitions cannot fairly be interpreted as appeals by the consumers, and we decline

OPC’s request to amend the petitions.

                               A.    Legal Standard

      Our analysis in this case proceeds de novo. OPC was not a party in the prior

proceedings, so its standing was not in question there. Accordingly, there is no
                                           8

“standard or review” for the standing issue because this court is deciding the issue

in the first instance. In any event, this court reviews legal questions of standing and

statutory interpretation de novo. District of Columbia v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 172

A.3d 412, 418 (D.C. 2017); Eaglin v. District of Columbia, 123 A.3d 953, 955 (D.C.

2015).

      Although the question in this case is one of standing, the case does not turn

on the typical constitutional standing requirements: injury, traceability, and

redressability. See Kalorama Citizens Ass’n v. SunTrust Bank Co., 286 A.3d 525,

532 (D.C. 2022) (reciting the “requirements for constitutional standing”). Instead,

the case centers on whether OPC has litigation authority to bring this appeal.

Because OPC is an entity within the D.C. government, it requires a grant of litigation

authority before it may sue another party. See Kane v. District of Columbia, 180

A.3d 1073, 1078 (D.C. 2018); Braxton v. Nat’l Cap. Hous. Auth., 396 A.2d 215, 216

(D.C. 1978). If OPC lacks litigation authority to bring this appeal, it lacks standing,

and we will dismiss the appeal. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Pol. Victory

Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 99 (1994) (dismissing an appeal “for want of jurisdiction”

because the agency lacked adequate litigation authority to file a petition for certiorari

in the Supreme Court).
                                          9

                             B.     Statutory Standing

      The relevant statutory provision provides OPC three distinct grants of

litigation authority in cases involving D.C. Water. See D.C. Code § 34-2202.05a(a).

First, OPC may “[r]epresent District of Columbia ratepayers at administrative

hearings when these hearings involve the interests of users of the products of or

services furnished by [D.C. Water].” Id. § 34-2202.05a(a)(1). Second, OPC may

“[r]epresent the interests of and advocate for District of Columbia ratepayers at

public hearings held by [D.C. Water] . . . to establish and adjust water and sewer

rates.” Id. § 34-2202.05a(a)(2). Finally, OPC may “[r]epresent and advocate for

District of Columbia ratepayers at proceedings before local and federal regulatory

agencies and courts when those proceedings involve the interests of users of the

products of or services furnished by [D.C. Water].” Id. § 34-2202.05a(a)(3).

      OPC argues that this final grant of litigation authority, codified at

Section 34-2202.05a(a)(3), empowers it to appeal in its own name the denial of a

consumer’s claim in a proceeding to which it was not a party. In its view, because

the statute confers authority to “represent and advocate” in front of “courts” in cases

“involv[ing] the interests of” D.C. Water consumers, id. § 34-2202.05a(a)(3), it may

litigate this case in its own name rather than on behalf of Messrs. Roberts and

Melham.
                                           10

      Reading the statutory provision as a whole, we reach a contrary conclusion:

Section 34-2202.05a(a) does not empower OPC to appear as a party in this appeal.

It does not grant OPC general litigation authority in cases involving D.C. Water. Cf.

D.C. Code § 1-301.81 (granting general litigation authority to the Attorney General

with the words “[t]he Attorney General shall have the power to control litigation and

appeals, as well as the power to intervene in legal proceedings on behalf of [the]

public interest”). Nor does it make OPC a party to proceedings involving D.C.

Water, as the Council has done with OPC in other contexts. Cf. id. § 34-804 (“[OPC]

shall be a party, as of right, in any . . . proceeding of any nature by the Public Service

Commission . . . .”).   Instead, Section 34-2202.05a(a) confers on OPC limited

litigation authority in the context of water cases. It may “represent” consumers in

administrative hearings concerning D.C. Water, id. § 34-2202.05a(a)(1); it may

“[r]epresent the interests of and advocate for” consumers in public hearings held by

D.C. Water, id. § 34-2202.05a(a)(2); and it may “[r]epresent and advocate for”

consumers before other regulatory agencies and courts, id. § 34-2202.05a(a)(3). In

the context of this case, that boils down to a single, discrete grant of litigation

authority: to “[r]epresent and advocate for” consumers. Id.

      Neither representing nor advocating for a group in the context of a judicial

proceeding necessarily implies appearing as a party in that proceeding. The parties

agree that represent, at least in this context, refers to appearing as counsel for water
                                          11

consumers rather than as a party. Similarly, one can advocate in judicial proceedings

without appearing as a party by, for example, appearing as amicus curiae. See

Apartment & Off. Bldg. Ass’n of Metro. Wash. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 203 A.3d 772,

784 (D.C. 2019) (observing that amicus curiae appearing in an appeal from an order

by the Public Service Commission was not a party to the case). Although parties to

judicial proceedings may advocate for various interests or groups, advocacy does

not require party status. Accordingly, the power to advocate in a judicial proceeding

does not imply the power to be a party to that proceeding.

      Interpreting Section 34-2202.05a(a)(3) to permit OPC to appear as a party in

its own name requires reading the single word “advocate” to confer freewheeling

litigation authority upon a government agency. We see little reason to give the word

such capacious reach where its plain meaning suggests otherwise.

      OPC supports its contrary view with three arguments. It argues that (1) the

rule against surplusage suggests a more expansive interpretation of the word

“advocate,” (2) OPC’s litigation authority in other statutory contexts points toward

its ability to appeal as a party in D.C. Water cases, and (3) the purpose animating the

statute favors a liberal construction of OPC’s litigation authority. We are not

persuaded.
                                          12

      First, invoking the rule against surplusage, OPC argues that “represent” and

“advocate” must carry independent meanings. It interprets “represent” to refer to

serving as the consumers’ lawyer—as it did in the proceedings before the Hearing

Officer—and “advocate” to refer to appearing as a party to the proceeding. As we

have already explained, however, “advocate for” may bear independent meaning

relative to “represent” without stretching to encompass a grant of authority to appeal

the Hearing Officer’s decisions as a party. It could refer to appearing as amicus

curiae or other forms of advocacy that do not require party status. Our interpretation,

then, creates no surplusage.

      Next, OPC urges us to interpret Section 34-2202.05a(a)(3) analogously with

its grant of litigation authority in appeals from proceedings involving the Public

Service Commission.      See D.C. Code § 34-804.         In our view, however, the

comparison to Section 34-804 supports the opposite result. When the District of

Columbia Council authorized OPC to appeal in proceedings involving the Public

Service Commission, it made OPC “a party, as of right, in any . . . proceeding of any

nature by the Public Service Commission.” Id. § 34-804(a). Conversely, the

Council did not make OPC a party to administrative proceedings involving D.C.

Water, which suggests that OPC possesses less litigation authority in D.C. Water

cases than in those involving the Public Service Commission.
                                         13

      Of course, as OPC points out, parties are not the only ones who may appeal

agency decisions. See York Apartments Tenants Ass’n v. D.C. Zoning Comm’n, 856

A.2d 1079, 1082 n.2 (D.C. 2004). Therefore, the mere fact that OPC was not a party

to the prior administrative hearings does not prove that it cannot appeal the Hearing

Officer’s decisions. Nevertheless, the D.C. Council’s decision not to make OPC a

party in D.C. Water proceedings still suggests that OPC possesses more limited

litigation authority with respect to D.C. Water than it does before the Public Service

Commission, where it enjoys full party status. Moreover, where the D.C. Council

has given OPC litigation authority to appeal, it has said so explicitly. D.C. Code

§ 34-804(d)(1) (OPC “[s]hall represent and appeal for the people of the District of

Columbia at hearings of the Commission and in judicial proceedings in the District

of Columbia courts.” (emphasis added)). Section 34-2202.05a(a)(3), in contrast,

contains no such language. Because the D.C. Council chose not to make OPC a

party as of right to proceedings involving D.C. Water and because it offered no other

indication that OPC could appeal adverse administrative hearings litigated by

consumers, we decline to read such litigation authority into the statute.

      Finally, OPC argues that we should read Section 34-2202.05a(a)(3) in light of

the statute’s overall purpose, which, it submits, is to enhance consumer protection.

Even assuming that OPC has ascertained the statute’s overriding purpose correctly,

this argument merely begs the question of how far the D.C. Council wanted to go in
                                          14

enhancing consumer protection in water cases. Our interpretation of the statute

already significantly expands OPC’s ability to protect consumers in water cases

relative to the situation before the statute’s enactment. OPC may now serve as

consumers’ counsel, offering them free, experienced legal representation in water

cases. The question before us is whether the Council intended to take the further

step of permitting OPC to litigate against D.C. Water in its own name. In some

situations, this authority would allow OPC to appeal against the wishes of the

consumer, pitting OPC’s perception of the broader consumer interest against the

consumer’s own wishes. In our view, neither the statute’s text nor its purpose

mandates this result.

                          C.     Parens Patriae Standing

      Next, OPC argues that, independent of its statutory standing, it possesses

parens patriae standing to litigate this appeal. For similar reasons to those that lead

us to reject OPC’s statutory standing argument, we hold that OPC cannot bring this

case in its own name via parens patriae standing.

      Parens patriae standing, the Latin portion translating to “parent of the

country,” is a doctrine that permits a state to sue based on a sovereign injury. Alfred

L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1982).

This court has identified two classes of interests that may satisfy parens patriae
                                         15

standing: a sovereign interest and a quasi-sovereign interest. See ExxonMobil Oil

Corp., 172 A.3d at 421. A sovereign interest pertains to enforcing the sovereign’s

legal code.   Id.   A quasi-sovereign interest refers to an injury that affects a

“substantial segment of [the sovereign’s] population” and that the sovereign “would

likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” Alfred L. Snapp

& Son, 458 U.S. at 607. OPC asserts that it, on behalf of the District, has suffered

both kinds of injuries.

      Before it can sue in parens patriae, however, OPC must have legislative

authority to take such an action. OPC is not a private citizen with implied legal

rights such as the ability to sue. Rather, it is a part of the D.C. government. To use

the legal terminology, OPC is not sui juris. See Kane v. District of Columbia, 180

A.3d 1073, 1078 (D.C. 2018) (“[N]on sui juris entities . . . cannot sue or be sued in

their own name . . . .”); Braxton v. Nat’l Cap. Hous. Auth., 396 A.2d 215, 216 (D.C.

1978) (“A noncorporate department or other body within a municipal corporation is

not [s]ui juris.” (emphasis added)); Director, Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs,

Dep’t of Lab. v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 132

(1995) (“Agencies do not automatically have standing to sue for actions that frustrate

the purposes of their statutes.”); see also Kundrat v. District of Columbia, 106 F.

Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2000) (listing D.C. government agencies held to be sui juris).

Rather, OPC, like other government entities, depends on legislative authorization to
                                         16

sue another party. See Francis v. Recycling Sols., Inc., 695 A.2d 63, 71 (D.C. 1997)

(suggesting that because a government entity was not sui juris, it would require

“statutory authority” to sue); cf. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514

U.S. at 129 (“[T]he United States Code displays throughout that when an agency in

its governmental capacity is meant to have standing, Congress says so.”).

      We hold that OPC lacks statutory authorization to sue in parens patriae. OPC

does not possess general litigation authority. Instead, the D.C. Council delineated

its authority to litigate through the statutes discussed above. This limited authority

contrasts with the D.C. Attorney General’s plenary authority to litigate. See D.C.

Code § 1-301.81(a)(1). It thus generally falls to the Attorney General to bring

parens patriae suits. See, e.g., ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 172 A.3d at 423 (reversing

the trial court, which had dismissed a suit by the D.C. Attorney General for lack of

parens patriae standing). True, general litigation authority is not a prerequisite to

parens patriae standing. The D.C. Council could grant OPC authority to litigate

cases in parens patriae without granting it general litigation authority if it wished.

Cf. Md. People’s Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318, 321-22 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia,

J.) (holding that Congress may confer parens patriae standing upon state entities

like OPC, at least under certain circumstances). But, as illustrated by the foregoing
                                             17

analysis, there is no evidence it did so here. OPC cannot claim parens patriae

standing in this case. 1

                  D.       Construing or Amending OPC’s Petition

       Finally, OPC presents an argument in the alternative. If we are inclined to

hold that OPC lacks standing to appeal in this case—as we are—OPC argues that

we should treat this case as one in which Messrs. Roberts and Melham themselves

appealed. We should do this, says OPC, on either of two grounds. First, in OPC’s

view, the petitions for review, fairly construed, were appeals by Messrs. Roberts and

Melham even if they were not mentioned in the captions.                   Second, even if

Messrs. Roberts and Melham cannot fairly be said to have sought review, OPC asks

us to grant its request to amend the petitions and convert this case into an appeal by

the consumers. In our view, the petitions for review cannot be construed as appeals

by Messrs. Roberts and Melham, and we decline OPC’s request to rewrite the

petitions at this belated hour.

       1
         For similar reasons, OPC cannot rely on D.C. Code § 2-510(a) as an
independent avenue to standing. See D.C. Code § 2-510(a) (“Any person suffering
a legal wrong, or adversely affected or aggrieved, by an order or decision of the
Mayor or an agency in a contested case, is entitled to a judicial review . . . .
(emphasis added)). Even assuming OPC satisfies Section 2-510(a)’s strictures in
this case, as a non sui juris entity, OPC still requires a statutory basis for its litigation
authority.
                                           18

      OPC contends that the petitions for review were petitions initiated by the

individual consumers in addition to OPC.           The petitions, it notes, name the

consumers in the body of the petition, consistent with the D.C. Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See D.C. App. R. 15(a)(3)(A) (“The petition must . . . name each party

seeking review either in the caption or the body of the petition . . . .”).

      We read the petitions for review differently. Both petitions name only OPC

in the caption. As OPC points out, the bodies of the petitions identify the individual

consumers by name. The petitions, however, never refer to the consumers as the

parties seeking review. Instead, both petitions state that “[t]he Office of the People’s

Counsel . . . respectfully seeks review” of the orders, and they remain silent with

respect to Messrs. Roberts and Melham. The petitions mention the consumers only

to identify which orders the petitions seek review of or to discuss the prior

proceedings. These references to the consumers, then, speak only to whether the

petitions satisfy D.C. App. R. 15(a)(3)(C), which requires that petitions “specify the

order or decision or part thereof to be reviewed.” To comply with Rule 15(a)(3)(C),

the petitions would have needed to reference the orders in Messrs. Roberts’s and

Melham’s cases irrespective of who was seeking review. The brief allusions to the

consumers thus offer little evidence that the consumers intended to petition for

review. Put differently, OPC drafted the petitions in this case precisely as it would

have if it intended to appeal only in its own name and not on behalf of the consumers.
                                          19

      Nevertheless, OPC suggests that we should not dismiss the petitions because

D.C. App. R. 3(c)(7) instructs that “[a]n appeal may not be dismissed for informality

of form or title of the notice of appeal” or “for failure to name a party whose intent

to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice.” Even assuming that Rule 3(c)(7)—

which is found in the rule governing notices of appeal from Superior Court—has

force here, in a case involving a petition for review from an agency decision under

Rule 15, we would still reach the same conclusion. For the reasons given above, it

is not “clear” to us “from the [petition]” that Messrs. Roberts and Melham

“inten[ded] to appeal.” D.C. App. R. 3(c)(7) (emphasis added). The petitions never

mention that the consumers seek review of the decision, never mention them in the

caption, and never refer to them in a way that suggests that they are active parties in

the petition. Rather, the petitions bear the hallmarks of appeals by OPC and not the

consumers.

      Second, in a separate argument, OPC asks that we allow it to amend the

petitions and effectively transform this case into Matthew Roberts and Mark Melham

v. D.C. Water and Sewer Authority. We decline because OPC has not, as a threshold

matter, demonstrated that we have jurisdiction to entertain its request for this

equitable relief.
                                          20

      Although the parties dispute whether the failure to name Messrs. Roberts and

Melham as petitioners carries jurisdictional weight, neither party analyzes the issue

under the appropriate framework.         D.C. Water contends that the defect is

jurisdictional under our decision in Patterson v. District of Columbia. 995 A.2d 167,

170 (D.C. 2010) (holding that the “cardinal rule of appellate procedure”—that “[a]

notice of appeal ‘must specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each

one in the caption or body of the notice’”—“is jurisdictional.” (quoting D.C. App.

R. 3(c)(1)(A))); accord Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318 (1988)

(recognizing the federal counterpart as a “jurisdictional prerequisite lead[ing] to

[the] harsh result” of dismissal). As OPC observes, however, we have since departed

from the approach exhibited in Patterson and recognized “that stringent

requirements must be satisfied for a rule to have the effect of automatically stripping

a court of ‘jurisdiction.’” Mathis v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 124 A.3d 1089, 1101 (D.C.

2015); accord Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011)

(“We have urged that a rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it

governs a court’s adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal

jurisdiction.”). Rules falling short of such requirements are instead mandatory

claims-processing rules, which do not contain jurisdictional implications. See

Deloatch v. Sessoms-Deloatch, 229 A.3d 486, 487 (D.C. 2020).
                                         21

      Despite identifying this issue, neither party analyzes whether the failure to

name the proper petitioners creates a jurisdictional defect under the modern

framework. The modern framework requires two analytical steps: (1) determining

whether the necessity of a petition for review derives from a legislature’s

establishment of a jurisdictional requirement and (2) ascertaining whether

identification of the parties to a case is an essential component of a petition for

review. See Neill v. D.C. Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd., 93 A.3d 229, 238-39 (D.C. 2014).

The parties address neither step. In our view, the answer is not obvious. See D.C.

Code § 2-510 (“Upon the filing of a petition for review, the Court shall have

jurisdiction of the proceeding . . . .”); Mathis, 124 A.3d at 1102-03 (classifying the

portions of D.C. Code § 2-510 requiring a petition for review as “jurisdictional

provisions”); Neill, 93 A.3d at 239 (parsing which parts of a request for review are

“essential” such that they carry jurisdictional weight and concluding that failure to

include the proper respondent in the caption is not always a jurisdictional defect);

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 147-48 (2012) (suggesting that the failure to name

a party may be jurisdictional because courts and respondents are left “unable to

determine with certitude whether [the unnamed party] should be bound by an

adverse judgment or held liable for costs or sanctions” (internal quotation omitted)).

      Because OPC has not established that we may, as a jurisdictional matter,

consider its proposed amendment, we decline its request to amend the petitions. As
                                          22

the party seeking an equitable remedy, OPC bears the burden of demonstrating its

entitlement to that relief. See Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958,

971-72 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (collecting cases and explaining that the party

seeking equitable relief bears the burden of proof even in the context of procedural

requirements such as equitable tolling). OPC failed to meet its burden here because

it did not explain why we would have authority to grant the relief it requested after

D.C. Water challenged our authority to do so.

      To be sure, OPC argues that we can and should toll D.C. App. R. 15(a)(2)’s

thirty-day deadline and allow its amendment. But whether we should exercise our

discretion to grant OPC’s requested amendment presupposes that we have

jurisdiction to entertain such amendments.             And OPC’s argument that

Rule 15(a)(2)’s time limit is nonjurisdictional and may be equitably tolled does not

answer whether the rule’s requirement for a valid petition for review under

Rule 15(a)(3) may be similarly relaxed. If the failure to name the proper petitioners

amounts to a jurisdictional defect, we may be unable to grant leave to amend the

defect. See Patterson, 995 A.2d at 173 (“‘“[H]armless error” analysis’ does not

apply to ‘defects in a notice of appeal’ because the very ‘nature of a jurisdictional

requirement’ is that ‘a litigant’s failure to clear a jurisdictional hurdle can never be

“harmless” or waived by a court.’” (quoting Torres, 487 U.S. at 317 n.3)). But see

Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev.
                                         23

Comm’n, 671 F.2d 643, 653 & n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (granting leave to

amend a petition to cure the failure to name the proper respondent but not discussing

whether the requirement was jurisdictional). Rather than answering, without the aid

of sufficient advocacy from the parties, whether the failure to name the proper

petitioners creates a jurisdictional defect under the modern framework or whether

we could grant leave to amend such a defect if it is jurisdictional, we conclude that

OPC has failed to show we have jurisdiction to afford it equitable relief. 2

Accordingly, we deny its request to amend.

      Because we do not reach the merits of OPC’s request for equitable relief, our

decision does not preclude future petitions by Messrs. Roberts and Melham in their

      2
        Although defects in subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, arguments
in favor of jurisdiction can be. See Battle v. District of Columbia, 80 A.3d 1036,
1037 n.2 (D.C. 2013) (declining to “generate” a new theory in favor of jurisdiction
“sua sponte”); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[D]efects in
subject-matter jurisdiction require correction regardless of whether the error was
raised in the district court.”); Colorado Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 823 F.3d
537, 545 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[O]ur obligation to consider unargued obstacles to
subject matter jurisdiction does not affect our discretion to decline to consider
waived arguments that might have supported such jurisdiction[.]” (internal quotation
omitted)). The burden of proving subject-matter jurisdiction still falls on the party
invoking our jurisdiction—in this case, OPC. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside
[of federal courts’] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary
rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).
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own names that argue that the Rule 15 time limits for filing a petition should be

equitably tolled under the circumstances.

                                III.   Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss OPC’s petitions for lack of standing.

                                                    So ordered.