Court Opinion

ID: 9966425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 22:14:54.745172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:11.090296
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                   No. 86176-0-I

                   Respondent,                         DIVISION ONE

            v.                                         UNPUBLISHED OPINION

QUINCY VALENTINO HAWKINS,

                   Appellant.

       FELDMAN, J. — Hawkins appeals from his resentencing conducted pursuant

to State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021), which struck down

Washington’s statute prohibiting simple drug possession. He argues that we

should remand for another resentencing because (a) the resentencing court

mistakenly believed it could not take his post-conviction rehabilitation into account

in determining his new sentence and (b) his attorney provided ineffective

assistance at and before the resentencing hearing. Hawkins also contends that

the trial court erred by imposing discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) as

part of his sentence. We remand for the trial court to determine whether to impose

restitution interest under RCW 10.82.090(2) and expressly strike from Hawkins’

judgment and sentence several LFOs (as detailed below) that may not be imposed

on indigent defendants. In all other respects, we affirm.
No. 86176-0-I

                                           I

         Following a jury trial in 2008, Hawkins was convicted of second degree

murder, second degree assault, and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm.

The sentencing court imposed a sentence on the high end of the standard range,

totaling 391 months. Because Hawkins’ offender score included an offense for

possession of a controlled substance, Hawkins filed a motion under CrR 7.8(b) to

correct his judgment and sentence following our Supreme Court’s decision in

Blake.

         Hawkins’ resentencing memorandum included evidence of his post-

conviction rehabilitation. Hawkins also argued that the court should impose an

exceptional sentence below the standard range based on his youthfulness at the

time he committed the crimes at issue. Lastly, Hawkins requested a mitigated

sentence under RCW 9.94A.535(1)(a) based on his assertion that the “victim was

an initiator, willing participant, aggressor, or provoker of the incident.”

         The trial court scheduled a resentencing hearing and, at the conclusion of

the hearing, declined to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard

range. Instead, after considering all of the evidence presented and excising the

prior convictions subject to Blake, the court imposed a sentence in the middle of

the standard range, totaling 336 months. Hawkins appeals.

                                           II

A.       Resentencing Error

         Hawkins argues that the resentencing court abused its discretion because

it sentenced him under the “mistaken belief it could not take his rehabilitation into

account in determining the sentence.” We disagree.
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No. 86176-0-I

       Hawkins’ argument misconstrues controlling precedent. In State v. Ramos,

187 Wn.2d 420, 449, 387 P.3d 650 (2017), our Supreme Court held that trial courts

are not required to consider evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation ”as a basis

for an exceptional sentence downward.”             Instead, where evidence of post-

conviction rehabilitation exists, such evidence is relevant, if at all, to the trial court’s

decision regarding the length of a sentence within the standard range. See State

v. Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d 238, 241, 532 P.3d 652 (2023) (acknowledging that

Dunbar may seek a sentence at the low end of the standard range based on

evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation).

       The trial court here appropriately considered evidence of Hawkins’ post-

conviction rehabilitation in determining Hawkins’ sentence within the standard

range. At the outset of its ruling, the court stated, “I . . . hope that everyone sees

that I have reviewed everything that’s been supplied to me.” (Emphasis added.)

When it explained its ruling, the court again confirmed that it had reviewed all of

the submitted evidence:

               When I reviewed this case and -- again, what I don’t see a lot
       of direct evidence of is -- while Mr. Hawkins had a difficult upbringing,
       I didn’t see a lot of direct evidence of the impact on this particular
       event. And I say that because I am declining to give a below
       standard-range sentence.

              I don’t think under the facts of this case, after considering all
       of the submissions that have been given, that that’s appropriate.
       However, that does not mean that the Court does not consider some
       of the mitigating factors of youth as to where within the standard
       range to fall.

             The prior [sentencing] court judge, back when this trial
       happened, gave Mr. Hawkins a high end of the standard-range
       sentence on all counts and, for me -- again, taking into account the
       evidence that’s been presented, I don’t think a high end of the
       standard range is appropriate either.
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No. 86176-0-I

(Emphasis added.) As can be seen, the court did not state or even suggest that it

had restricted its review of the evidence; instead, it considered everything that the

parties had submitted, as required by precedent. See Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d at

241 (“unless the reviewing court restricts resentencing to narrow issues, any

resentencing should be de novo”).

       The record is equally clear that the trial court’s reference to “everything

that’s been supplied to me” included evidence regarding Hawkins’ post-conviction

rehabilitation.   Hawkins’ resentencing memorandum expressly addressed and

attached evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation.       Additionally, to support

Hawkins’ request for a sentence at or below the low end of the standard range,

Hawkins’ family members provided statements describing his post-conviction

rehabilitation. For example, Hawkins’ sister stated:

              He has taken the necessary steps to better himself. In doing
       so, he has completed courses of substance abuse and domestic
       violence; he has also furthered his education so he can be an
       addition to society in a productive manner. He has made the
       necessary changes within to be a better mentor and example for our
       youth.

Hawkins’ fiancé similarly stated:

               He wrote a course called "Am I My Worst Enemy" that I helped
       him copyright. He also started a nonprofit organization called Locate
       the Nation to focus on adolescence within the community in which
       he grew up . . . to let them know that they are not forgotten and give
       the support and knowledge that inspires to never give into false
       realities of the street or peer pressure from other’s choices.

Thus, in determining Hawkins’ sentence within the standard range, the record

shows that the trial court considered everything that the parties had submitted,

which includes evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation, and exercised its

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No. 86176-0-I

discretion accordingly. Whereas the sentencing court imposed a sentence on the

high end of the standard range in 2008, the resentencing court imposed a sentence

in the middle of the standard range in 2023.

      On this record, Hawkins’ reliance on Dunbar is misplaced. The defendant

there sought relief under Blake to correct his offender score because it included

two convictions for possession of a controlled substance. Dunbar, Wn. App. 2d at

239-40. At resentencing, similar to Hawkins here, Dunbar submitted evidence of

post-conviction rehabilitation. Id. at 241. The resentencing court responded to

that evidence as follows:

      Mr. Dunbar has provided the Court with information about what he
      has done since being incarcerated, and the problem is . . . that it is
      basically a look back, and by that, I have regular resentencings that
      I do where the state’s position is . . . that the Court cannot take that
      into consideration and shouldn’t take that into consideration.

Id. at 242 (emphasis added). The court then imposed the same high-end sentence

that the original sentencing court imposed. Id. at 242.

      Dunbar appealed, and this court remanded for a new resentencing. The

court noted that issuing “the same sentence does not necessarily correlate with

the second court considering itself precluded from exercising discretion.” Id. at

243. It nevertheless remanded for a new resentencing because “the resentencing

court’s comments could be taken as adopting the sentencing court’s judgment

without reviewing the relevant facts and considerations anew.” Id. at 243. And in

doing so, we instructed the trial court to “consider new evidence and arguments of

the parties, including evidence of Daniel Dunbar’s rehabilitation.” Id. at 250. But

while our holding in Dunbar strongly supports Hawkins’ argument that the

resentencing court here may consider evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation,
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No. 86176-0-I

the record shows that the court did so—resulting in a shorter sentence at the

middle rather than the high end of the standard range. Consequently, Dunbar is

distinguishable and does not require remand for another resentencing.

       In short, because the record shows that the resentencing court

appropriately considered Hawkins’ evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation in

determining the length of his sentence within the standard range, there was no

abuse of discretion.

B.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Hawkins next argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his lawyer

provided ineffective assistance. We disagree.

       “Both the United States and Washington Constitutions guarantee a criminal

defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Vazquez, 198

Wn.2d 239, 247, 494 P.3d 424 (2021). “To demonstrate ineffective assistance of

counsel, a defendant must make two showings.” Id. at 247. First, the defendant

must show that “defense counsel’s representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the

circumstances.”    Id. at 247-48.   And second, the defendant must show that

“defense counsel’s deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is

a reasonable probability that, except for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 248. “Failure to establish

either prong of the test is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim.”      State v.

Arumugam, __ Wn. App. 2d __, 545 P.3d 363, 374 (2024).

       First, Hawkins argues that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by

allegedly “conceding rehabilitation was not a legitimate factor for consideration” in
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No. 86176-0-I

resentencing.     This argument fails because defense counsel made no such

concession. At the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked “whether or not

the Court is going to consider post-conviction rehabilitation” because “that does

change some of the nature of the State’s argument.” Defense counsel responded

that while post-conviction rehabilitation is not the basis for Hawkins’ request for “an

exceptional sentence based on youthfulness,” one of Hawkins’ arguments for a

lesser sentence (but not his only argument), “we think that the post-conviction

rehabilitation is something that’s still germane for the Court to consider.” Contrary

to Hawkins’ argument, his lawyer clearly stated that evidence of post-conviction

rehabilitation was and remained relevant in resentencing.

        Nor did Hawkins’ lawyer retreat from that view, as Hawkins also claims.

Hawkins points to the following colloquy:

        [MS. NORTH (prosecutor)]: Just to make it clear, the State is not only
        just asking that post-conviction rehabilitation doesn’t come in but it’s
        not germane to the O’Dell[1] analysis that occurs.

               This is a youthful offender case where we’re looking at -- for
        looking at the defendant’s ability to be rehabilitated.

               The State doesn’t believe that’s part of the SRA analysis of
        youthful mitigation; it’s more of whether or not the instant crime
        reflected youthful characteristics enough to mitigate -- to impose a
        mitigated sentence.

                THE COURT: And perhaps we’re splitting hairs. I’m not sure
        that I heard Mr. Downs necessarily disagreeing with that --

                MS. NORTH: Yeah.

              THE COURT: It’s not a Houston-Sconiers[2] situation, so we
        don’t have that aspect of it, and, again, just for the parties’

1 State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015).
2 State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017)

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No. 86176-0-I

      awareness, I guess, not only did I go back and read O’Dell, I’ve tried
      to look up basically almost every case that’s cited to O’Dell, since
      there are several. Some are published; some are unpublished, a lot
      of unpublished cases, a lot of Division II unpublished cases that
      basically, as I read them, all state that, under O’Dell, the court can
      consider youthfulness; it’s not required to consider youthfulness. I
      don’t think any of those talked about rehabilitation issues.

             So I’ll ask you, Mr. Downs, is that your understanding of what
      O’Dell and its progeny stand for?

             MR. DOWNS [Defense attorney]: Yes, that’s correct.

The trial court then responded, “All right.   So with that, Mr. North, you may

proceed.”

      The foregoing exchange does not support Hawkins’ argument that his

lawyer wrongly conceded that rehabilitation could not properly be considered in

resentencing. The cases cited by the trial court—O’Dell and Houston-Sconiers—

address consideration of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing. State

v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 23-24, 391 P.3d 359 (2015); O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d

at 688-89.      Thus, when the statements of Hawkins’ attorney are properly

considered in context, the record shows that counsel merely conceded that

evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation was not germane to Hawkins’ separate

and additional argument that the court should impose an exceptional sentence

below the standard range based on Hawkins’ youthfulness at the time he

committed the crimes at issue. Because Hawkins’ lawyer did not concede that

rehabilitation “was not a legitimate factor for consideration” in resentencing, as

Hawkins claims, we reject this argument.

      Second, while Hawkins recognizes that Dunbar (discussed above) was

decided after the resentencing hearing, he argues that the authorities discussed in

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No. 86176-0-I

Dunbar “were not new” and that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by

failing to cite those authorities, “all of which favor consideration of rehabilitation.”

Our Supreme Court has held that “[w]here an attorney unreasonably fails to

research or apply relevant statutes without any tactical purpose, that attorney’s

performance is constitutionally deficient.” In re Pers. Restraint of Yung-Cheng

Tsai, 183 Wn.2d 91, 102, 351 P.3d 138 (2015). But here, Hawkins does not, and

cannot, establish that the result of the proceeding would have been different if his

attorney had cited these additional authorities because, as noted previously, the

record shows that the trial court considered Hawkins’ evidence of post-conviction

rehabilitation as Dunbar and the authorities cited therein require. Accordingly,

Hawkins’ ineffective assistance of counsel argument necessarily fails based on the

absence of prejudice (the second prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel

test).

C.       Imposition of Legal Financial Obligations

         At the conclusion of the resentencing hearing, the trial court decided to

waive all discretionary LFOs. Hawkins argues that the judgment and sentence is

not definite and certain as to which LFOs are discretionary and which are not, as

required by controlling precedent. See, e.g., Grant v. Smith, 24 Wn.2d 839, 840,

167 P.2d 123 (1946) (“It is the rule in this state that a sentence for violation of law

must be definite and certain.”). As a result, Hawkins asks this court to remand for

the trial court to amend the judgment and sentence. The State concedes this point

and states, ”On remand, the superior court should expressly waive the attorney

fees, criminal filing fees, extradition costs, supervision fees, collection costs,

appellate costs, and nonrestitution interest.” We accept the State’s concession
                                         -9-
No. 86176-0-I

and remand to the trial court to amend the judgment and sentence accordingly.

       Hawkins also requests that we remand to the trial court to strike both the

$500 Victim Penalty Assessment (VPA) and the $100 DNA collection fee imposed

at resentencing. Consistent with Hawkins’ argument, RCW 7.68.035 and RCW

43.43.7541 allow a court, upon motion by the defendant, to waive “any VPA” and

“any fee for the collection of the offender’s DNA imposed prior to July 1, 2023.”

The State concedes this point as well. Here too, we accept the State’s concession

and remand for the trial court to strike the DNA collection fee and VPA.

       Finally, Hawkins ask us to remand for the trial court to consider waiving

interest on restitution. Consistent with Hawkins’ argument, a recent amendment

to RCW 10.82.090 provides that the superior court “may elect not to impose

interest on any restitution the court orders” and that this determination shall be

based on factors such as whether the defendant is indigent. LAWS OF 2022, ch.

260, § 12. This new law applies here because this case is on direct appeal. See

State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023). The State does not

object to remand for the trial court to consider waiving interest on restitution

pursuant to RCW 10.82.090. We accept that concession as well, and remand to

the trial court to address whether to waive restitution interest pursuant to the new

statute.

                                         III

       We remand to the trial court to determine whether to impose restitution

interest after consideration of the relevant factors under RCW 10.82.090(2) and

expressly strike from Hawkins’ judgment and sentence the VPA, DNA collection

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No. 86176-0-I

fee, attorney fees, criminal filing fee, extradition costs, appellate costs, supervision

fees, collection costs, and nonrestitution interest. In all other respects, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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