Court Opinion

ID: 2963951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:17:53.589949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:43.480842
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1096

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                     JOSE LEBRON,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                   [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                      Coffin and Rosenn,* Senior Circuit Judges.
                                          _____________________

                                _____________________

               David  A.F.   Lewis,  by  Appointment  of   the  Court,  for
               ___________________
          appellant.
               Jean B.  Weld, Assistant  United States Attorney,  with whom
               _____________
          Paul M.  Gagnon,  United  States   Attorney,  was  on  brief  for
          _______________
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  February 14, 1996
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

                    ROSENN, Circuit Judge.  This appeal from a guilty  plea
                    ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
                            _____________

          and  sentence  requires  that  we  consider  the  process  due  a

          defendant  whose  behavior  may  raise questions  concerning  his

          mental competency.

                                          I.
                                          I.

                    A federal  grand jury for the District of New Hampshire

          indicted  Jos  Lebr n on ten  counts stemming from  his two armed

          robberies  of a pawnshop and a bank in Manchester, New Hampshire.

          His co-defendants,  Paul Hazen  and Frank  Jones, pled  guilty to

          possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.   922(g).

          The  court imposed sentence and neither of them appealed.  Lebr n

          requested  counsel  under the  Criminal  Justice  Act, 18  U.S.C.

            3006A.  However, he  vehemently objected to his court-appointed

          counsel and filed several motions  with the court requesting  new

          counsel.   A magistrate  judge denied  the  motion, finding  that

          Lebr n had  not articulated  sufficient reasons.   The magistrate

          informed  Lebr n  that  he  could  either  retain  his  appointed

          counsel, or proceed pro se.  
                              ___ __

                    At  a hearing  on  Lebr n's  motion  for a  new  court-

          appointed counsel,  the district court  found no valid  reason to

          substitute  counsel.   The  court informed  Lebr n that  he could

          proceed  pro se and that  his court-appointed counsel would stand
                   ___ __

          by, and take over the case if Lebr n did not conform to courtroom

          rules.  Lebr n  lost his  temper, and his  behavior prompted  the

          marshals to handcuff  him before  the hearing ended.   The  court

          denied his  motion  for reconsideration.    Lebr n then  filed  a

                                         -2-

          Renewed Motion for Reappointment of Counsel, in which he asserted

          that there was medication  he could take which could  "affect his

          ability to be aware of exactly what is happening around him."

                    On May 10, 1994, Lebr n represented himself during jury

          selection.  Although he  initially asked for, and was  denied, an

          interpreter,  Lebr n  was  able  to communicate  with  the  jury.

          Several  of his objections to  jury members were  granted.  After

          jury  selection, the court held  an ex parte  session with Lebr n

          and his counsel to  enable them to air the  disagreements between

          them without compromising the attorney-client privilege.  At this

          session, the judge informed Lebr n that he had done a good job in

          jury  selection, but  that  he was  "not  competent to  represent

          himself  in the sense he's  not aware of  fundamental issues that

          ought  to be raised  on his  behalf."   Lebr n concedes  that the

          district  court  meant  this   statement  to  refer  to  Lebr n's

          competence as an attorney, not to Lebr n's mental competence.  At

          the  same ex parte  session, Lebr n's counsel  informed the court

          that  Lebr n  used to  receive  prescriptions  for thorazine  (an

          antipsychotic)  and  trazodone   (an  antidepressant)  from   the

          Veteran's Administration hospital, and that he would like to take

          these drugs during the trial.

                    In  response, the  judge  alerted  the Government  that

          Lebr n had a previous psychiatric history.  He believed that this

          might  be relevant  to the  defendant's ability  to intelligently

          waive his right to counsel.  The court then held  a hearing later

          that day  to  determine the  issue  of Lebr n's  competency,  and

                                         -3-

          whether Lebr n should  be permitted to  take his requested  drugs

          during trial.  The  court took testimony from Dr.  Nathan Sidley,

          the  prison psychiatrist.    Sidley stated  that  he had  briefly

          reviewed Lebr n's Veteran's Administration medical records, which

          revealed  a possible  diagnosis  of schizophrenia  in the  1970s.

          Sidley had attempted to  meet with Lebr n, but Lebr n  terminated

          their meeting within the  first five minutes, upon  learning that

          their  discussion would  not be  confidential.   Sidley concluded

          that, based on  these facts,  Lebr n was not  psychotic, and  was

          competent to stand trial.  He further concluded that any possible

          benefits from the  drugs Lebr n requested were  outweighed by the

          detriments  of  giving  him  massive  quantities  needed  without

          sufficient time for the drugs to build up in his bloodstream.

                    Lebr n  then testified  that  he was  using heroin  and

          Valium, and  that he had  both drugs in  his system at  the time.

          Two  days later, the district  court judge issued  an order which

          continued the trial date, permitted Lebr n's counsel to withdraw,

          and appointed Paul Twomey as new counsel for Lebr n.  

                    The next day, the Government and Twomey jointly filed a

          request  for a  psychiatric evaluation  pursuant to  18 U.S.C.   

          4241,  which  the court  granted.   The  parties agreed  that Dr.

          Albert Druktenis  should perform  the evaluation.   Druktenis met

          with  Lebr n and evaluated him  pursuant to the  court's order to

          determine  both Lebr n's sanity at  the time of  the offense, and

          his  competency  to stand  trial now.   Druktenis  concluded that

          Lebr n was not insane at the time of the offense, and that he was

                                         -4-

          competent to stand trial.  He noted that Lebr n's personality was

          manipulative, but that he  was aware of the charges  against him,

          and  had been able to speak  intelligently, lucidly and logically

          at  court  hearings.   Druktenis  also  addressed  the  issue  of

          Lebr n's  current medications, and  noted   that they  "would not

          cloud  his  thinking in  any substantial  way  and, in  fact, are

          probably helping him by reducing anxiety and agitation."

                    After  the psychiatrist  submitted this  report, Lebr n

          withdrew his  motion to  dismiss based  on incompetency,  and the

          parties reached  a plea agreement.  Under  this agreement, Lebr n

          would plead guilty to two counts of use and carrying of a firearm

          in  violation of  18 U.S.C.    924(c),  and the  Government would

          dismiss the remaining eight counts.

                    The  court  conducted  a  change  of  plea  hearing  on

          October 3,  1994.  Before the judge entered the courtroom for the

          hearing,  Lebr n  threw   a  pitcher   of  water   at  the   case

          investigators, narrowly missing one  agent.  Soon thereafter, the

          hearing  proceeded, with  the  court stating  that it  understood

          there was "no issue at this  point with regard to the defendant's

          competence."   Both  counsel  agreed that  Lebr n was  competent.

          Defense  counsel then added that  he had come  to that conclusion

          himself  independently  after reviewing  the  psychiatric report.

          The  court then asked Lebr n  if the Government's  proffer of the

          evidence to the  charges was  correct.  At  first Lebr n  claimed

          that he  could  not remember  any  of  the events.    On  further

          questioning,  he admitted to  the conduct.   After fully advising

                                         -5-

          Lebr n of the rights he would waive by pleading guilty, the court

          accepted the plea.

                    The  court  sentenced Lebr n  to  imprisonment  for 240

          months  on one  count and 60  months on  the other,  to be served

          consecutively, three years supervised release with a condition of

          treatment for his chemical dependency, $500 in restitution, and a

          $100 special assessment.   Lebr n  appeals, raising  as his  sole

          issue  whether the district court  denied him due  process by not

          holding  a  hearing  under 18  U.S.C.     4241  to determine  his

          competency when he changed his plea.  We affirm.

                                         II.
                                         II.

                    The  conviction of  a  criminal defendant  while he  is

          legally incompetent violates  due process.  Pate v. Robinson, 383
                                                      ____    ________

          U.S.  375, 378  (1965).    The  test  for  a  defendant's  mental

          competency to plead guilty  is the same as that  of a defendant's

          competence to stand  trial.   United States v.  Harlan, 480  F.2d
                                        _____________     ______

          515, 517 (6th Cir. 1973).  That test, as set forth by the Supreme

          Court,  is  whether  the  defendant  understands the  proceedings

          against him and  has sufficient present  ability to consult  with

          his lawyer  with a  reasonable degree of  rational understanding.

          Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
          _____    _____________

                    To  assist courts  in  making this  test, Congress  has

          established  certain procedures.  Section 4241 of Title 18 of the

          United States  Code provides the relevant reference in matters of

          a  criminal  defendant's  competency  to stand  trial.    4241(a)

          provides in pertinent part:

                                         -6-

                      ...[T]he  defendant  or the  attorney for
                      the Government  may file a  motion for  a
                      hearing    to   determine    the   mental
                      competency of the  defendant.  The  court
                      shall  grant the  motion, or  shall order
                      such  a  hearing  on its  own  motion, if
                      there is reasonable cause to believe that
                      the defendant may presently  be suffering
                      from a mental disease or defect rendering
                      him  mentally  incompetent to  the extent
                      that  he  is  unable  to  understand  the
                      nature    and    consequences   of    the
                      proceedings  against  him  or  to  assist
                      properly in his defense.

          In  the  present case,  no such  hearing  was held  or requested.

          Lebr n, however,  asserts that the district  court had reasonable

          cause to believe  that he,  Lebr n, was suffering  from a  mental

          disease  or defect.  Therefore, he claims, the court violated his

          due  process rights by not  ordering a competency  hearing on its

          own motion.

                    By the language of the statute, a district court  judge

          has  a  duty to  order  a  competency hearing  only  if there  is

          "reasonable cause" to doubt the defendant's mental competence.  A

          district  court's findings  about the  competency of  a defendant

          after  holding  such a  hearing will  be  upheld unless  they are

          clearly erroneous.  United  States v. Collins, 949 F.2d  921, 927
                              ______________    _______

          (7th  Cir.  1991).   When  there  has  been  no hearing,  and  no

          examination of  the  defendant whatsoever,  the  appellate  court

          reviews the district court's findings comprehensively.  Id.  This
                                                                  __

          case falls in between these two standards.  

                    Although  the  trial  judge  did  not  order  a  formal

          hearing, he  carefully and painstakingly sought,  commencing with

          the  defendant's  initial  appearance before  him,  to  ascertain

                                         -7-

          whether  there was  any  question  of  mental competency  and  to

          protect  Lebr n's due  process rights.   To  this end,  the judge

          discharged the  jury, continued the  trial and  ordered that  the

          defendant be examined  by a  psychiatrist.  Thus,  the court  had

          before  it  the  psychiatrist's   report,  as  well  as  Lebr n's

          Veteran's Administration medical records and the testimony of the

          prison psychiatrist.   In addition, defendant's  counsel also had

          concluded  that Lebr n was  mentally competent to  enter a guilty

          plea.  Because the judge had substantial facts before him when he

          made findings  as to  defendant's  competency, we  will give  his

          decision not to hold a competency hearing due deference.

                    Dr.  Druktenis, after  conducting a  two-hour interview

          with Lebr n, concluded  that Lebr n was competent to stand trial.

          If a psychiatrist has determined that a defendant is competent, a

          court  is not  required  to hold  a  further evidentiary  hearing

          absent extenuating circumstances.   See United States v. Prewitt,
                                              ___ _____________    _______

          553 F.2d  1082, 1086 (7th  Cir. 1977).   It was  well within  the

          district  court's discretion to  conclude that such circumstances

          were not present here.

                    Lebr n points to his irrational and outrageous behavior

          in the courtroom.    He claims that this  should have alerted the

          district court judge that Lebr n was incompetent to enter a plea.

          Lebr n had been  handcuffed at the April hearing.   Also, at this

          hearing,  he had  pleaded  to  be  removed  from  the  courtroom,

          stating, "I  have too much trouble  on my mind, your  Honor."  At

          the  change of plea hearing, Lebr n threw a pitcher full of water

                                         -8-

          at  case  investigators.    Such behavior  may  be  uncontrolled,

          manipulative, or  even theatrical.   It  is not  determinative of

          competency.   Agitated or violent  courtroom antics alone  do not

          mandate a finding by the trial court of reasonable cause.  United
                                                                     ______

          States  v. Marshall,  458  F.2d  446, 450  (2d  Cir.  1972).   In
          ______     ________

          Marshall, the defendant  behaved belligerently in  the courtroom,
          ________

          shouted obscenities, and threw not only a water pitcher, but also

          a  chair in  the courtroom.    Two psychiatric  reports, however,

          disclosed that the defendant was competent, and predicted that he

          would engage in disruptive  behavior.  The Court of  Appeals held

          that the trial court was within its discretion in failing to hold

          a competency hearing.  Similarly here, two psychiatrists examined

          Lebr n and found him competent.1  

                    Lebr n  further argues  that  his  medical  record  and

          history of taking medications  should have provided the necessary

          reasonable cause.   However, past  treatment or drug  use is  not

          determinative of present competency.  United States v. Pryor, 960
                                                _____________    _____

          F.2d  1  (1st  Cir.  1992).   Lebr n's  Veteran's  Administration

          records were from  the 1970s,  twenty years ago.   Moreover,  Dr.

          Druktenis expressly addressed the issue of the medications Lebr n

                              
          ____________________

          1  Lebr n argues  that Dr. Sidley's opinion should  be discounted
          because their meeting was inadequate.  It is true that Sidley had
          little  contact with  Lebr n,  and that  his  review of  Lebr n's
          medical  records  was  cursory.    We  agree  that  Dr.  Sidley's
          testimony alone would not  have sufficient indicia of reliability
          to obviate the need for further findings.  However, Dr. Druktenis
          conducted an extended face-to-face examination of Lebr n.

                                         -9-

          was  currently taking  and noted  that they  would not  cloud his

          thinking.

                    In  summary,  although   Lebr n  occasionally   behaved

          belligerently  and has  a medical  history showing  past possible

          mental   illness  and  past   drug  use,  these   are  more  than

          counterbalanced  by  Dr. Druktenis'  report  of Lebr n's  present

          competence, his counsel's assertion  that Lebr n was competent to

          enter the  plea,  and the  trial  court's careful  plea  colloquy

          ensuring that Lebr n understood the  charges against him, and the

          consequences  of pleading guilty to  them.  All  of these factors

          pointed  unequivocally  to  the  defendant's  mental  competency.

          There  was no  reasonable cause  for  the trial  court to  hold a

          hearing  when  all the  information  from  the psychiatrist,  the

          defense  counsel, and the judge  himself were in  agreement.  See
                                                                        ___

          id. United States v.  Pryor, 960 F.2d 1, 2  (1st Cir. 1992)(where
          ___ _____________     _____

          district court had an opportunity to observe defendant rationally

          and  vigorously  participating  in  his  defense  at  a  pretrial

          proceeding, and psychiatrist found that defendant was oriented as

          to time and place,  there was no  cause for the  court to hold  a

          further hearing, under  section 4241 despite  defendant's history

          of drug problems and psychiatric treatment).  

                    As this  court noted  in Hern ndez-Hern ndez  v. United
                                             ___________________     ______

          States,  904 F.2d 758  (1st Cir. 1990),  a ruling that  this case
          ______

          provides reasonable  cause for  a hearing  would  "come close  to

          requiring district courts to order competency hearings sua sponte

          in every case where  a defendant has some history  of psychiatric

                                         -10-

          treatment  and, even vaguely, mentions the problem."  Id., at 760
                                                                ___

          (quoting  Figueroa-V zquez v.  United States,  718 F.2d  511, 612
                    ________________     _____________

          (1st Cir. 1983).  We decline to impose such a heavy, unnecessary,

          and costly burden on district courts.

                                         III.
                                         III.

                    We hold  that when a qualified  psychiatrist examines a

          defendant  before he enters a  plea to criminal  charges, and the

          psychiatric report and other pertinent current information reveal

          that  the  defendant  is competent  to  stand  trial,  it is  not

          reversible  error for  a  district court  to  fail or  refuse  to

          conduct  a formal  hearing under  the provisions  of 18  U.S.C.  

          4241(a).  Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence is

          affirmed.
          affirmed
          ________

                                         -11-