Court Opinion

ID: 9916465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 01:07:14.800248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:29.301347
License: Public Domain

Ahmed v Essex Terrace, Inc.
               2024 NY Slip Op 30037(U)
                     January 5, 2024
             Supreme Court, Kings County
        Docket Number: Index No. 517368/2017
                   Judge: Debra Silber
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
 Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
 State and local government sources, including the New
  York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.
 This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
                       publication.
  FILED: KINGS COUNTY CLERK 01/05/2024 04:49 PM                                                           INDEX NO. 517368/2017
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 201                                                                              RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/05/2024

                                                                                  At an IAS Term, Part 9 of the Supreme Court
                                                                                  of the State of New York, held in and for the
                                                                                  County of Kings, at the Courthouse, at 360
                                                                                  Adams Street, Brooklyn, New York, on the
                                                                                  5th day of January, 2024.

            P R E S E N T:

            HON. DEBRA SILBER,
                                                Justice.
            -----------------------------------------------------------------------X

            SALEH AHMED,                                                                   DECISION / ORDER
                                               Plaintiff,
                             -against-                                                     Index No.: 517368/2017
                                                                                           Mot. Seq. # 8, 9 & 10

            ESSEX TERRACE, INC. and PRISMA
            CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
                                                Defendants.
            -----------------------------------------------------------------------X
            PRISMA CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

                                               Third-Party Plaintiff,

                             -against-

            TUR CONTRACTING INC.,

                                                Third-Party Defendant.
            -----------------------------------------------------------------------X

            The following e-filed papers read herein:                                  NYSCEF Doc Nos.:

            Notice of Motion and Affidavits (Affirmations)
            Annexed                                                                    121-122, 135, 137, 160-161
            Opposing Affidavits (Affirmations)                                         182, 185, 187, 189, 198
            Affirmations in Reply                                                      190, 192, 194, 196, 197

                    Upon the foregoing papers, plaintiff Saleh Ahmed moves for an order, pursuant to

            CPLR 3212, granting him partial summary judgment with respect to liability on his Labor

            Law § 240 (1) cause of action as against defendants (motion sequence number 8).

            Defendant Essex Terrace, Inc. (Essex) moves for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212,

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            granting it summary judgment: (1) on its cross claims for contribution, contractual

            indemnification, and common-law indemnification against defendant/third-party plaintiff

            Prisma Construction, Inc. (Prisma); (2) on its cross claim for contractual indemnification

            against third-party defendant Tur Contracting Inc. (Tur); and (3) dismissing Prisma’s cross

            claims against Essex (motion sequence number 9). Prisma moves for an order, pursuant to

            CPLR 3212, granting it summary judgment: (1) dismissing plaintiff’s common-law

            negligence and Labor Law §§ 200 and 241 (6) causes of action as against it; (2) dismissing

            Essex’s cross claims against it; (3) in its favor on its third-party claims for contractual

            indemnification and breach of contract as against third-party defendant Tur; and in its favor

            on its contribution and common-law indemnification cross claims against Essex (motion

            sequence number 10).

                   For the reasons which follow, plaintiff’s motion (motion sequence number 8) is

            granted. Essex’s motion (motion sequence number 9) is granted to the extent that: (1)

            summary judgment on its cross claim for contractual indemnification against Prisma is

            granted, conditioned upon a finding of a negligent act or omission of a subcontractor of

            Prisma, anyone directly or indirectly employed by such contractor or anyone for whose

            acts they may be liable; (2) summary judgment on its cross claim for contractual

            indemnification against Tur is granted; and (3) Prisma’s cross-claims against Essex are all

            dismissed. Essex’s motion is otherwise denied.

                   Prisma’s motion (motion sequence number 10) is granted to the extent that: (1)

            plaintiff’s common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 causes of action are dismissed

            against it, and plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action is dismissed to the extent

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            that it is predicated on Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) §§ 23-1.5 (a), (b), (c) (1), (c) (2); 23-

            1.7; 23-1.8; 23-1.16; and 23-1.17; but not as premised on § 23-1.5 (c) (3); (2) summary

            judgment on its third-party contractual indemnification and breach of contract claims

            against Tur are granted; and (3) Essex’s claims for contribution and common-law

            indemnification from Prisma are dismissed. Prisma’s motion is otherwise denied.

                                                 BACKGROUND

                   In this action premised on common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§

            200, 240 (1) and 241 (6), plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries on July 15, 2016, while

            disassembling a pipe scaffold, when, after he removed a hook holding a scaffold crossbar

            in place, the crossbar swung down and hit him in the face, and he then fell 26 feet to the

            ground. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was performing façade renovation work at an

            apartment complex that was owned by Essex. Essex hired Prisma as the general contractor

            for the project, which involved interior and exterior renovation work. Prisma, in turn, hired

            Tur to perform the exterior brick repair work. Plaintiff was employed by Tur as a helper.

                   At his deposition, plaintiff testified that just before the accident he was standing on

            a single platform plank approximately 26 feet above the ground and attempting to remove

            a scaffold crossbar, and that, after he removed the hook for the crossbar, the crossbar swung

            down and struck him on his head, and he fell to the ground. Plaintiff asserted that he was

            removing the crossbar in the manner his supervisor and coworkers had shown him and that,

            although his supervisor was not standing on the plank with plaintiff at the time of the

            accident, his supervisor was present and assisting with the disassembly process.

            Photographs of the scaffold show that it did not have side rails or safety rails and plaintiff

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            testified that Tur did not provide him or its other workers with safety harnesses or safety

            lines, and that he did not have a harness; nor was he attached to a safety line at the time of

            the accident.

                   Vasilios Douvas, a part owner of Prisma and its onsite supervisor, testified at his

            deposition that he was at the Essex complex on the date of the accident. Although he was

            not in the vicinity of the building where plaintiff was working at the time of the accident,

            after being informed of the accident by a Prisma employee, he went over to the accident

            site and observed someone he later learned was plaintiff laying on the ground next to the

            scaffold. Later that day, Douvas asserted that he viewed Essex’s security camera video

            footage taken in the area of the building being worked on, and in this video footage he

            observed plaintiff, who was on the scaffold approximately 6 feet off of the ground, kicking

            at a cross brace and planking and then plaintiff appeared to jump off of the scaffold (Douvas

            Deposition at 41, lines16-18). Later in his testimony, however, Douvas stated that he

            observed “someone just jumping, falling off that scaffold” (Douvas Deposition at 65, lines

            17-19) and again, after observing this person kicking something, “I just saw the man drop.

            That’s all I saw” (Douvas Deposition at 66, lines 2-5). While he was viewing Essex’s

            security camera footage, Douvas used his cellphone to film a copy of the video of the

            footage.

                   In his deposition testimony, Mahfujur Rahmen, Tur’s owner, concedes that he

            signed the contract with Prisma, and that Tur was hired to perform exterior façade

            brickwork pursuant to the contract. Rahmen, however, also states that plaintiff was not

            employed by Tur, that Tur did not have scaffolds and did not perform work from scaffolds

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            and that, up to the time of the accident, Tur had not performed any work on the façade that

            could not be performed from the ground.

                   Despite Rahmen’s assertion that plaintiff was not employed by Tur, the court notes

            that the Workers’ Compensation Board identifies Tur as plaintiff’s employer in its decision,

            filed on November 14, 2016, in which it awarded plaintiff payments based on a temporary

            total disability.

                   Plaintiff commenced this action against Tur and Essex on September 8, 2017. Essex

            failed to answer or appear in the action, and plaintiff thereafter moved for leave to enter a

            default judgment against it, which motion was granted in an order (Borrok, J.) dated May

            10, 2018. Essex thereafter obtained an order (Jimenez-Salta, J.), dated August 5, 2020,

            vacating the default, and granting Essex leave to serve a late answer. Essex thereafter

            answered and asserted cross claims against Prisma and Tur. Plaintiff, however, appealed

            the August 5, 2020 order that granted Essex’s motion to vacate the default and gave it leave

            to serve a late answer. In a decision dated June 22, 2022, the Appellate Division reversed

            the order and denied Essex’s motion to vacate the default order (see Ahmed v Essex

            Terrace, Inc., 206 AD3d 866, 867 [2d Dept 2022]). Accordingly, in view of the Appellate

            Division’s reversal, plaintiff’s claims against Essex, with regard to its liability, have been

            determined by the default judgment order dated May 10, 2018.

                   Although Prisma had asserted cross claims against Essex in its answer, it did not

            demand that Essex answer its cross claims (CPLR 3011), nor did Prisma move for leave to

            enter a default judgment against Essex based on Essex’s failure to appear in the action.

            Prisma, in addition, was not a party to the appeal, and the Appellate Division order did not

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            specifically address the validity of Prisma’s cross claim against Essex or Essex’s cross

            claim against Prisma. Aside from its cross claims against Essex, Prisma commenced a

            third-party action against Tur alleging claims for contribution, common-law

            indemnification, contractual indemnification, and breach of contract for failure to obtain

            insurance covering Prisma as an additional insured.

                                                   DISCUSSION

            Plaintiff’s Causes of Action

                   Turning first to the parties’ contentions relating to plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1)

            cause of action, that section imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors or their

            agents when their failure to protect workers employed on a construction site from the risks

            associated with elevation differentials proximately causes injury to a worker (see Wilinski

            v 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 18 NY3d 1, 3 [2011]; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-

            Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 500 [1993]). Here, there is no dispute that Prisma may be held

            liable under Labor Law section 240 (1) as a general contractor (see McCarthy v Turner

            Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369, 374 [2011]; Ennis v Noble Constr. Group, LLC, 207AD3d

            703, 704 [2d Dept 2022]), that plaintiff’s façade repair work is covered work within the

            meaning of section 240 (1) (see Prats v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 100 NY2d 878, 882

            [2003]), and that the fall itself involved a sufficient elevation differential to implicate the

            protections of section 240 (1) (see Doto v Astoria Energy II, LLC, 129 AD3d 660, 662 [2d

            Dept 2015]; Auriemma v Biltmore Theatre, LLC, 82 AD3d 1, 9 [1st Dept 2011]; Bradley v

            Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 21 AD3d 866, 867-868 [2d Dept 2005], abrogated on other

            grounds Wrighten v ZHN Contr. Corp., 32 AD3d 1019 [2d Dept 2006]). Further, plaintiff

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            has made a prima facie showing of a section 240 (1) violation through his deposition

            testimony that he fell to the ground from a single plank of a scaffold that had no safety

            rails, and without the protection of a safety harness, after being struck in the head by the

            crossbar (see Mena v 5 Beekman Prop. Owner LLC, 212 AD3d 466, 467 [1st Dept 2023];

            Leon-Rodriguez v Roman Catholic Church of Sts. Cyril & Methodius, 192 AD3d 883, 885

            [2d Dept 2021]; Morocho v Boulevard Gardens Owners Corp., 165 AD3d 778, 778 [2d

            Dept 2018]; Kupiec v Morgan Contr. Corp., 137 AD3d 872, 873 [2d Dept 2016]; Poracki

            v St. Mary’s R.C. Church, 82 AD3d 1192, 1194-1195 [2d Dept 2011]; cf. Torres v New

            York City Hous. Auth., 199 AD3d 852, 854 [2d Dept 2021]; Medina-Arana v Henry St.

            Prop. Holdings, LLC, 186 AD3d 1666, 1668 [2d Dept 2020]).

                   Prisma, in opposition, argues that plaintiff’s improper manner of disassembling the

            crossbar constitutes the sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff’s manner of

            disassembling the crossbar, however, cannot be the sole proximate cause since he was

            doing the work in the view of his supervisor in the manner shown to him by his supervisor

            and his coworkers (see Zholangi v 52 Wooster Holdings, LLC, 188 AD3d 1300, 1302 [2d

            Dept 2020]; Rico-Castro v Do & Co N.Y. Catering, Inc., 60 AD3d 749, 750 [2d Dept 2009];

            Pichardo v Aurora Contrs., Inc., 29 AD3d 879, 880-881 [2d Dept 2006]; see also Biaca-

            Neto v Boston Rd. II Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 34 NY3d 1166, 1168 [2020]).

                   Prisma also contends that Douvas’ deposition testimony that the security camera

            video that he viewed after the accident showed plaintiff jumping off of the scaffold

            demonstrates factual issues as to whether plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause

            of his injury (see Montgomery v Federal Express Corp., 4 NY3d 805, 806 [2005]; Jurski v

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            City of New York, 204 AD3d 983, 984 [2d Dept 2022]; D’Antonio v Manhattan Contr.

            Corp., 93 AD3d 443, 444 [1st Dept 2012]). To the extent that the testimony of what

            Douvas viewed on the video may be found admissible (see People v Finch, 160 AD3d

            1212, 1214 [3d Dept 2018] [testimony of observations viewed on a video ruled not

            hearsay]; People v Jones, 77 Misc 3d 5, 9 [App Term, 2d Dept 2022]; see also People v

            Fulton, 210 AD3d 1436, 1437 [4th Dept 2022] [discussing best evidence rule], lv denied

            39 NY3d 1154 [2023]; People v Grant, 170 AD3d 888, 890 [2d Dept 2019] [foundation

            demonstrated], lv denied 33 AD3d 1031 [2019]), Douvas’ testimony, which included a

            statement that plaintiff appeared to have jumped, but also included testimony that plaintiff

            appeared to fall or drop off of the scaffold, is simply too equivocal, when viewed in its

            entirety, to demonstrate the existence of a factual issue regarding the claim that the plaintiff

            was the sole proximate cause of his accident (see Farrell v Hochauser, 65 AD3d 663, 664

            [2d Dept 2009]; Bachurski v Polish & Slavic Fed. Credit Union, 33 AD3d 739, 740 [2d

            Dept 2006]).

                   The court has not considered the video Douvas made of the security camera video.

            In order for the court to watch a video submitted as evidence for a motion in an e-file case,

            counsel must e-file Form EFM-4 “Notice of Hard Copy Filing” to describe the item which

            is not electronically filed and then actually give the video to the court in viewable form

            (see Amezquita v RCPI Landmark Props., LLC, 194 AD3d 475, 475-476 [1st Dept 2021];

            Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme Court and the County Court [22 NYCRR] §§ 202.5-

            b [d] [1], [7]; 202.5-bb [a] [1]). Prisma and Essex did neither (see Amezquita, 194 AD3d

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            at 475-476).1 It is further undisputed that Essex did not preserve the original security

            camera footage.

                    Accordingly, Prisma has failed to demonstrate the existence of a factual issue

            whether Labor Law § 240 (1) was violated, and plaintiff is thus entitled to partial summary

            judgment in his favor with respect to liability on his section 240 (1) cause of action.2

                    With respect to plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action, Prisma has

            demonstrated, prima facie, that Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) §§ 23-1.5 (a), (b), (c) (1), (c)

            (2); 23-1.7; 23-1.8; 23-1.16; 23-1.17 fail to state specific standards or are inapplicable to

            the facts of this case (see generally Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 349-

            350 [1998]; Honeyman v Curiosity Works, Inc., 154 AD3d 820, 821 [2d Dept 2017]). As

            plaintiff has abandoned reliance on those sections by failing to address them in his motion

            and opposition papers, Prisma is entitled to dismissal of the section 241 (6) cause of action

            the extent that it is premised on those sections (see Debennedetto v Chetrit, 190 AD3d 933,

            936 [2d Dept 2021]; Pita v Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., 156 AD3d 833, 835 [2d Dept

            2017]).

                    Prisma, however, has failed to demonstrate its prima facie entitlement to dismissal

            of the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action to the extent it is premised on Industrial Code

            (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.5 (c) (3). Section 23-1.5 (c) (3), which provides that “[a]ll safety

            devices, safeguards and equipment in use shall be kept sound and operable and shall be

            immediately repaired or restored or immediately removed from the job site if damaged,”

            1
              The court notes that, although Essex provides a Dropbox link to the video, this link cannot be accessed
            on court system computers and that, when the court attempted to access the link on a non-court system
            computer, it was not accessible.
            2
              As noted above, plaintiff has established his claims as against Essex by way of the default judgment.

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            states a specific standard (see Perez v 286 Scholes St. Corp., 134 AD3d 1085, 1086 [2d

            Dept 2015]). In its motion, Prisma has not pointed to evidence in the record demonstrating

            the absence of a defect with the scaffold, which is a safety device within the meaning of

            Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.5 (c) (3) (see Surko v 56 Leonard LLC, 2021 NY Slip

            Op 32123[U], *16 [Sup Ct, New York County 2021] [finding issue of fact regarding

            violation of section 23-1.5 (c) (3) where scaffold platform only had a single plank]; see

            also Beesimer v Albany Ave./Rte. 9 Realty, 216 AD2d 853, 854 [3d Dept1995]). Nor has

            Prisma pointed to evidence demonstrating that no one in the chain of authority on the

            project had notice of a defect with the scaffold, (see Cabral v Rockefeller Univ., ___ AD3d

            ___, 2023 NY Slip Op 06436, *1 [1st Dept 2023]; Viruet v Purvis Holdings LLC, 198

            AD3d 587, 588 [1st Dept 2021]; Salerno v Diocese of Buffalo, N.Y., 161 AD3d 1522, 1523-

            1524 [4th Dept 2018]; see also Misicki v Caradonna, 12 NY3d 511, 518-519 [2009];

            Rizzuto, 91 NY2d at 351-352; cf. Nicola v United Veterans Mut. Hous. No. 2, Corp., 178

            AD3d 937, 940 [2d Dept 2019]).3 Prisma has thus failed to demonstrate its prima facie

            entitlement to dismissal of the section 241 (6) cause of action to the extent it is premised

            on section 23-1.5 (c) (3) (Cabral, 2023 NY Slip Op 06436, *1; Viruet, 198 AD3d at 588;

            Palaguachi v Idlewild 228th St., LLC, 197 AD3d 1321, 1323 [2d Dept 2021]).

                    On the other hand, Prisma is entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s common-law

            negligence and Labor Law § 200 causes of action. Plaintiff’s own testimony regarding

            how the accident occurred as he was disassembling the scaffold demonstrates that the

            3
              Misicki (12 NY3d 511), which addressed the similar requirements of Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) §
            23-9.2 (a), makes clear that the owner or general contractor need not have notice of the dangerous or
            unsafe condition, but rather, such notice can be satisfied by notice to plaintiff’s employer.

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            accident did not occur as the result of a dangerous or defective property condition, but

            rather, was the result of Tur’s means and methods of performing the work (see

            Przyborowski v A&M Cook, LLC, 120 AD3d 651, 652-653 [2d Dept 2014]; Ortega v

            Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61-63 [2d Dept 2008]; cf. Seem v Premier Camp Co., LLC, 200 AD3d

            921, 924-925 [2d Dept 2021]; Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 129-130 [2d Dept

            2008]).    Where the plaintiff’s injuries arise from the manner in which the work is

            performed, “there is no liability under the common law or Labor Law § 200 unless the

            owner or general contractor exercised supervision or control over the work performed”

            (Carranza v JCL Homes, Inc., 210 AD3d 858, 860 [2d Dept 2022], quoting Cun-En Lin v

            Holy Family Monuments, 18 AD3d 800, 801 [2d Dept 2005]; see Barreto v Metropolitan

            Transp. Auth., 25 NY3d 426, 435 [2015]; Valencia v Glinski, 219 AD3d 541, 545 [2d Dept

            2023]). Moreover, under a methods and manner of work theory of liability, “no liability

            will attach to the owner [or general contractor] solely because it may have had notice of

            the allegedly unsafe manner in which work was performed” (Dennis v City of New York,

            304 AD2d 611, 612 [2d Dept 2003]; see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82

            NY2d 876, 878 [1993]; Cody v State of New York, 82 AD3d 925, 927 [2d Dept 2011];

            Ortega, 57 AD3d at 61; Ferrero v Best Modular Homes, Inc., 33 AD3d 847, 851 [2d Dept

            2006], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 841 [2007]).

                   Here, the testimony of plaintiff and of Douvas demonstrates that Prisma did not

            provide that scaffold at issue 4 or provide Tur or its employees with instructions relating to

            the performance of the work. This is sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that Prisma did

            4
             Rahman’s deposition testimony that Tur did not own the scaffold or work from a scaffold does not
            suggest that the scaffold belonged to Prisma or that Prisma supervised the work on the scaffold.

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            not supervise or control the work at issue (see Wilson v Bergon Constr. Corp., 219 AD3d

            1380, 1383 [2d Dept 2023]; Kefaloukis v Mayer, 197 AD3d 470, 471 [2d Dept 2021];

            Lopez v Edge 11211, LLC, 150 AD3d 1214, 1215-1216 [2d Dept 2017]; Przyborowski, 120

            AD3d at 652-653; Ortega, 57 AD3d at 61-63; cf. Chowdhury, 57 AD3d at 129-130).

            Contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, Prisma’s general contractual safety responsibilities are

            insufficient to demonstrate supervision and control for purposes of liability under the

            plaintiff’s common law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims (see Murphy v 80 Pine,

            LLC, 208 AD3d 492, 496 [2d Dept 2022]; Abelleira v City of New York, 201 AD3d 679,

            680 [2d Dept 2022]; Goldfien v County of Suffolk, 157 AD3d 937, 938 [2d Dept 2018];

            Messina v City of New York, 147 AD3d 748, 749-750 [2d Dept 2017]; Ortega, 57 AD3d at

            61-63). As plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of an issue of fact with respect

            to Prisma’s supervision and control of the work, Prisma is entitled to dismissal of plaintiff’s

            common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 causes of action.

            Cross Claims and Third-Party Claims

                   Turning to the indemnification and contribution claims involving co-defendants

            Essex and Prisma, Prisma asserts that Essex’s claims against it are barred, based on the

            order granting plaintiff a default judgment against Essex, and that it is entitled to summary

            judgment on its claims against Essex for the same reason.              Contrary to Prisma’s

            contentions, Essex’s default with regard to plaintiff’s claims does not determine Essex’s

            and Prisma’s respective cross claims.

                   In this respect, after Essex failed to answer the complaint, Prisma did not move for

            a default judgment relating to its cross claim against Essex at the time that plaintiff did,

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            and it could not have, in any event, as Prisma did not request that Essex reply to its cross

            claim (see Giglio v NTIMP, Inc., 86 AD3d 301, 310 [2d Dept 2011]; Hernandez v MDL

            Equip. Corp., 2022 NY Slip Op 30425[U], *3 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2022, Silber, J.]).

            Prisma was also not a party to plaintiff’s appeal of the August 5, 2020 order that vacated

            the plaintiff’s default order, and the Appellate Division order did not specifically address

            the validity of Prisma’s cross claim against Essex or Essex’s cross claim against Prisma

            (see Ahmed, 206 AD3d at 866-867). Under similar circumstances, courts have held that a

            cross claim against a codefendant by a party in default to the plaintiff may still be

            considered (see Cillo v Resjefal Corp., 13 AD3d 292, 294 [1st Dept 2004]; Vierya v Briggs

            & Stratton Corp., 184 AD2d 766, 766-767 [2d Dept 1992]; Guido v New York Tel. Co.,

            145 AD2d 203, 205 [3d Dept 1989]). Indeed, even if Essex’s answer must be considered

            a nullity in view of the Appellate Division order, the cross claim included in that answer

            may be treated by the court as a third-party complaint (see Guido, 145 AD3d at 205). For

            essentially the same reasons, as plaintiff was the only party that obtained a default judgment

            against Essex, only the plaintiff benefits from the facts deemed admitted as a result of the

            default, and Prisma may not rely on those admissions for its benefit (see Mack v Arnold

            Gregory Mem. Hosp., 90 AD2d 969, 969 [4th Dept 1982]; Brown v Godefroy Mfg. Co.,

            278 App Div 242, 243 [1st Dept 1951]; see also Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449,

            456-457 [1985] [a judgment taken on default generally has no collateral estoppel effect];

            Rojas v Romanoff, 186 AD3d 103, 109 [1st Dept 2020]; Chambers v City of New York, 309

            AD2d 81, 85-86 [2d Dept 2003]).

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                    In considering their common-law indemnification and contribution claims on the

            merits, Essex and Prisma have both demonstrated, through the testimony of Douvas and

            plaintiff, that they were not negligent and that they did not supervise or control the injury

            producing work. They are thus both entitled to dismissal of the common-law

            indemnification and contribution claims they have asserted against each other (see Chapa

            v Bayles Props., Inc., ___ AD3d ___, 2023 NY Slip Op 06025, *2 [2d Dept 2023]; Quiroz

            v New York Presbyt./Columbia Univ. Med. Ctr., 202 AD3d 555, 557 [1st Dept 2022];

            Debennedetto, 190 AD3d at 938; Uddin v A.T.A. Constr. Corp., 164 AD3d 1402, 1404 [2d

            Dept 2018]; see also McCarthy, 17 NY3d at 377-378).5

                    Further, Essex has also demonstrated, prima facie, that it is entitled to summary

            judgment dismissing Prisma’s contractual indemnification claim, if one was in fact asserted

            against it,6 because the indemnification provisions of the Essex/Prisma contract are in favor

            of Essex (see Kiss Constr., Inc. v Edison Elec. Contrs., Corp., 152 AD3d 575, 577 [2d Dept

            2017]; Flynn v Toys “R” Us, Inc., 31 AD3d 603, 604 [2d Dept 2006]). Prisma, which has

            not addressed this issue in its opposition papers, has failed to raise a factual issue. Essex

            is thus entitled to dismissal of Prisma’s entire cross-claim as asserted against it.

                    Turning to Essex’s contractual indemnification claim against Prisma, Prisma does

            not deny that it is bound by the contract at issue and that the accident arose from its work

            under the contract. The indemnification provision, however, requires indemnification for

            5
              The court notes that Essex had not answered or appeared in the action at the time Prisma answered and
            asserted cross claims against Essex and, as such, Prisma would have been required to serve Essex in the
            same manner as with a summons and complaint (see Hernandez, 2022 NY Slip Op 30425[U], *2-3;
            CPLR 3012 [a]). This court need not address this issue because Essex has demonstrated that the claims
            must be dismissed on the merits, and, in any event, Essex did not raise any issue regarding the propriety
            of the service of Prisma’s answer with cross claims in its moving or opposition papers.
            6
              Prisma’s cross-claim is so poorly drafted it is unclear if it asserts a claim for contractual indemnification.

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            a claim arising from the work “only to the extent caused by the negligent acts or omissions

            or breach of this Contract by the Contractor, a Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly

            employed by them or anyone for whose acts they may be liable, regardless of whether or

            not such claim, damage, loss or expense is caused in part by a party indemnified hereunder”

            (Essex/Prisma Contract § 3.18.1; Essex/Prisma Contract Rider § 3.18.1). As discussed

            above, Prisma has established that it was not negligent, and plaintiff’s testimony regarding

            the happening of the accident does not demonstrate that there was, prima facie, negligence

            on the part of Tur, plaintiff, or Tur’s other employees, as a matter of law (see Palaguachi,

            197 AD3d at 1323; see also Scavelli v Town of Carmel, 131 AD3d 688, 690 [2d Dept 2015]

            [the mere happening of an accident is insufficient to establish liability in negligence]). A

            determination of the issue will require a trial unless plaintiff elects to proceed solely on his

            Labor Law § 240 (1) claim and discontinues his other claims.

                    Under these circumstances, Essex is entitled to an order granting it conditional

            summary judgment on the contractual indemnification claim against Prisma, pending a

            determination of negligence by a subcontractor of Prisma, or anyone directly or indirectly

            employed by them (see Winter v ESRT Empire State Bldg., LLC, 201 AD3d 844, 845-846

            [2d Dept 2022]; Graziano v Source Builders & Consultants, LLC, 175 AD3d 1253, 1260

            [2d Dept 2019]).

                    Both Essex and Prisma assert that they are entitled to contractual indemnification

            from Tur, based on the indemnification provision contained in Prisma’s contract with Tur.7

            7
              Essex’s claims against Tur, which is not a direct defendant, probably should have been brought by way
            of a third-party action, rather than as cross claims, after the Second Department struck its answer.. Tur,
            however, does not appear to have rejected the pleading and, in failing to raise the issue in opposition to
            Essex’s motion, would appear to have waived any procedural irregularity. In addition, if Essex had

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            In the motion papers, they have submitted the contract, which Mahfujur Rahmen, Tur’s

            owner concedes, in his deposition testimony, that he signed, which specifically identifies

            Essex as the owner, and which contains a broadly worded indemnification provision that

            applies to “all claims . . . costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees . . . related to and/or arising

            directly or indirectly from or out of (i) the Work.” In addition, Essex and Prisma submit

            plaintiff and Douvas’ deposition testimony to support a finding that they were not

            negligent, that Tur was performing the façade brick work pursuant to Prisma’s contract

            with Tur at the time of the accident, and that plaintiff was injured while performing Tur’s

            work. Given that indemnification provisions containing “arising out of the work” language

            are broadly construed (see Brown v Two Exch. Plaza Partners, 76 NY2d 172, 178 [1990];

            O'Connor v Serge El. Co., 58 NY2d 655, 657-658 [1982]; Madkins v 22 Little W. 12th St.,

            LLC, 191 AD3d 434, 436 [1st Dept 2021]; Tkach v City of New York, 278 AD2d 227, 229

            [2d Dept 2000]), Essex and Prisma have both demonstrated their prima facie entitlement

            to summary judgment on their contractual indemnification claims against Tur (see

            Mogrovejo v HG Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 207 AD3d 461, 463 [2d Dept 2022]; De Souza

            v Empire Tr. Mix, Inc., 155 AD3d 605, 605-606 [2d Dept 2017]; Muevecela v 117 Kent

            Ave., LLC, 129 AD3d 797, 798 [2d Dept 2015]; Tobio v Boston Props., Inc., 54 AD3d

            1022, 1024 [2d Dept 2008]).

            appeared and answered in the ordinary course, this would not be an issue. Once a party is joined as a
            third-party defendant, it becomes a party to the entire action and is subject to cross-claims by the co-
            defendants (See CPLR 3019(b); Doyle v Happy Tumbler Wash-O-Mat, Inc., 113 AD3d 818 [2d Dept
            1985]; Patrician Plastic Corp. v Bernadel Realty Corp., 25 NY2d 599 [1970]).

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                   In opposition, Tur initially argues that the indemnification provision of the contract

            should not apply because Rahman’s deposition testimony demonstrates that he was not

            proficient in reading English. A person’s inability to read English, however, is “by itself,

            insufficient to avoid the rule that [a] party who signs a contract without any valid excuse

            for having failed to read it is conclusively bound by its terms” (Kenol v Nelson, 181 AD2d

            863, 866 [2d Dept 1992] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Prete v Tamares Dev. 1,

            LLC, 219 AD3d 1537, 1538 [2d Dept 2023]; Ivasuk v Raglan, 197 AD3d 635, 638 [2d

            Dept 2021]). Absent any evidence in the record indicating that Rahman had a reasonable

            excuse for failing to have the agreement translated, or that Prisma misled Rahman

            regarding the terms of the agreement he was signing, Rahman’s mere inability to

            understand English fails to demonstrate a factual issue regarding the applicability of the

            terms of the agreement (see Ivasuk, 197 AD3d at 638; Neery v Greenpoint Mtge. Funding,

            Inc., 144 AD3d 646, 648 [2d Dept 2016]; cf. Pimpinello v Swift & Co., 253 NY 159, 163

            [1930]).

                   Tur also argues that Prisma’s contract with Tur does not identify the place of Tur’s

            work or identify the building where the accident occurred as being part of the work. This

            argument, however, ignores Rider A to Prisma’s contract with Tur, which indicates that

            Tur’s work included the removal of old brick and the installation of new brick for the

            “Essex Terrace” project, without any limitation on the scope of such work, and ignores

            section 1.1 of the contract that expressly incorporates Essex’s contract with Prisma as part

            of the contract. Exhibit B to the Essex/Prisma contract delineates the exterior masonry

            work to be performed, refers to drawings, identifies the building at issue as one of the

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            locations where such work was to be performed, and in no way suggests that such work

            was limited to work at the ground level. Under these circumstances, Rahmen’s testimony

            that Tur’s work under its contract with Prisma did not include the work at issue creates a

            feigned issue of fact (see Schaeffer v May, 214 AD3d 424, 425 [1st Dept 2023]; Sandor v

            9274 Group, Inc., 114 AD3d 1276, 1277 [4th Dept 2014]; see also Meade v Hampton

            Diaries, Inc., 219 AD3d 1424, 1425 [2d Dept 2023]).

                   Tur also points to Rahmen’s testimony that plaintiff was not employed by Tur in

            arguing that the accident does not arise out of Tur’s work. Plaintiff, however, attached a

            copy of the Workers’ Compensation Board’s determination identifying Tur as plaintiff’s

            employer as an exhibit to his motion papers, and Tur, which did not dispute that plaintiff

            was employed by Tur before the Board, is bound by that determination (see Velazquez-

            Guadalupe v Ideal Bldrs. & Constr. Servs., Inc., 216 AD3d 63, 71-72 [2d Dept 2023];

            Workers’ Compensation Law § 11 [2]). Although submitted by plaintiff, the Board

            determination may be considered with respect to the claims against Tur since Prisma’s

            motion was argued and submitted at the same time as plaintiff’s motion.

                   Accordingly, Tur has failed to overcome the motion and demonstrate a factual issue

            regarding whether Essex and Prisma are entitled to contractual indemnification from it.

            Thus, Essex and Prisma are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on their contractual

            indemnification claims against Tur.

                   Finally, with respect to Prisma’s breach of contract claim against Tur based on Tur’s

            alleged failure to obtain insurance naming Prisma as an additional insured on a primary

            basis, Prisma has provided the disclaimer letter from Tur’s insurer, Utica First Insurance

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            Company, which indicates that it was disclaiming coverage based on an exclusion that

            applies in the event that the injury occurs during the course of the employment by an

            employee of Tur (see Bassuk Bros., Inc. v Utica First Ins. Co., 1 AD3d 470, 471 [2d Dept

            2003], lv dismissed 3 NY3d 696 [2004]). Courts are generally reluctant to find a breach

            based solely on a disclaimer letter as the disclaimer, in and of itself, may not demonstrate

            that the policy obtained failed to comply with the contractual requirements (see Perez v

            Morse Diesel Intl., Intl., Inc., 10 AD3d 497, 498 [1st Dept 2004]; KMO-361 Realty Assoc.

            v Podbielski, 254 AD2d 43, 44 [1st Dept 1998]; Garcia v Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 231

            AD2d 401, 402 [1st Dept 1996]; see also Dorset v 285 Madison Owner LLC, 214 AD3d

            402, 404 [1st Dept 2023]; Binasco v Break-Away Demolition Corp., 256 AD2d 373, 375

            [2d Dept 1998]).

                   Here, however, the policy exclusion relied upon in the disclaimer letter violates an

            express term of the contract, which provides that the subcontractor’s insurance shall not

            contain any exclusions (Prisma/Tur contract § 6.1 [l]), and thereby rendered the insurance

            ineffective for its intended purpose of providing Prisma with coverage for injuries to Tur’s

            workers which might occur during Tur’s work on the project (see Roldan v New York Univ.,

            81 AD3d 625, 629 [2d Dept 2011]; Bachrow v Turner Constr. Corp., 46 AD3d 388, 388

            [1st Dept 2007]; Clapper v County of Albany, 188 AD2d 774, 775-776 [3d Dept 1992];

            Bssuk Bros., Inc. v Utica First Ins. Co., 2002 WL 31925593[U], *3, 7 [Sup Ct, Kings

            County 2002] [addressing the employee exclusion in a Utica First Ins. Co. policy], affd 1

            AD3d 470 [2d Dept 2003], lv dismissed 3 NY3d 696 [2004]). It is clear to the Court that

            Tur did not obtain the kind of insurance required by the contract.

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                  Under these circumstances, the court finds that Prisma has demonstrated, prima

            facie, that the insurance obtained by Tur breached the terms of the insurance procurement

            requirements of the contract. As Tur, in opposition, has failed to demonstrate a factual

            issue in this respect, Prisma is entitled to summary judgment on this issue (see Calvitti v

            40 Garden, LLC, 155 AD3d 1399, 1402 [3d Dept 2017]). Prisma, however, must still

            demonstrate at the trial of this matter that it has incurred unreimbursed damages as the

            result of the breach (see Inchaustegui v 666 5th Ave. Ltd. Partnership, 96 NY2d 111, 115-

            116 [2001]; Bleich v Metropolitan Mgt., LLC, 132 AD3d 933, 935 [2d Dept 2015]).

                  This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

                                                             ENTER:

                                                             ______________________
                                                             Hon. Debra Silber, J.S.C.

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