Court Opinion

ID: 9548602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:05:59.294378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:11.491566
License: Public Domain

Collins, C. J.,
dissenting:
It appears to me there is a theory upon which the evidence found by the police officer in the third search may be admissible and not in violation of appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. Id. 351. Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the court, said, “. . . once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people — and not simply “areas”— against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of the Fourth Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of physical intrusion into any given enclosure.” Id. 353. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan explained the meaning of Katz in a slightly different way. He said, “My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” Id. 361. I am of the opinion that Katz controls the admissibility of evidence in this case rather than Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), and Heffley v. Hocker, 420 F.2d 881 (1969).
*151The gun and money found in the console compartment of the automobile by the third officer whose search was not incident to appellant’s arrest nor pursuant to a search warrant, was properly admitted for two reasons: first, the expectation of privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects had already been thwarted by the prior search warrant, and nothing was left to be protected by the issuance of another warrant. Katz v. United States, supra. Second, since the third search did not exceed the scope of the second search which was predicated upon a valid search warrant, no end is served by excluding otherwise admissible and relevant evidence. Hence, it was not unreasonable.
As indicated in Katz, the Fourth Amendment now protects an individual’s expectation of privacy, not a particular area. Appellant’s expectations of privacy as to anything secretly hidden in the automobile were effectively thwarted by the second search under a warrant. There was no justifiable reliance by appellant on privacy of the contents of the automobile following the second search. See From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 968 (1968). The automobile was constantly in custody of the police from the time of the second search until the third search. Appellant therefore had no opportunity to re-establish any justifiable reliance on privacy in the contents of the automobile. Had the automobile been restored to appellant’s custody, then his Fourth Amendment rights can be said to have been revitalized. But to preclude a third search under the circumstances present here would be to exalt form over substance and add nothing to the protection of appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
I would sustain both convictions.