Court Opinion

ID: 9749934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:06:29.015591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:00.269311
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,
concurring.
Truth and Consequences
Was there “truth” in this sentencing? How about accurate information?
There were five persons directly involved — the defendant Eric Webb, his attorney, the probation officer who prepared the sentencing assessment report (SAR), the experienced trial judge and the prosecutor.1 What might each of these five *132persons have known about the “truth” of this sentencing?
• Webb — he says his attorney told him he would have to serve 40 percent of his sentence in prison before becoming eligible for parole. The truth is that the statute governing his crime requires him to serve 85 percent of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.
• Webb’s attorney — the attorney has not yet testified during post-conviction review about what information was given to Webb. If the information the attorney gave Webb was not true, the attorney did not check the statute or the sentencing information available on the sentencing advisory commission’s website.
• The probation officer who prepared the SAR — we now know that the report does not say that Webb is ineligible for parole until he has served 85 percent of his sentence in prison.2
• The prosecutor may or may not have known about the 85-percent provision, but the prosecutor surely would say that it is not the prosecutor’s job to inform the defendant of the effects of his plea. But if the prosecutor knows, it might be well to say so, if only to avoid post-conviction proceedings like this one.
• The circuit court rejected the 10-year plea agreement after reviewing the SAR. Did the court know that Webb would be required to serve 85 percent of his sentence? In other words, if he had known of this requirement, would he have rejected the 10-year sentence and imposed a 12-year sentence — with Webb required to serve at least 10.2 years of that sentence?
The Missouri criminal code recently was called “a Christmas tree of oddball crimes and penalties.”3 The truth of that observation is obvious in this case, which involved a driver whose negligent and alcohol-impaired conduct resulted in the death of Terry Parker, the driver of the vehicle with which Webb collided. Section 565.024,4 provides that the first-degree involuntary manslaughter charge in this case can be filed either as a class C felony (maximum prison term of seven years) or a class B felony (maximum prison term of 15 years),5 or the wrongful act can be charged as any number of lesser felonies or misdemeanors. To charge this crime as a class B felony, the state must allege that the *133defendant, driving while intoxicated, acted with criminal negligence and killed a driver or a passenger in another car. Section 565.024.l(3)(a). If the victim had been a passenger in Webb’s car, the highest level of felony that could be charged is a class C felony.6 State v. Seeler, 316 S.W.3d 920 (Mo. banc 2010).
When a defendant pleads guilty to involuntary manslaughter as set forth in section 565.024.1(3)(a), his prison term is subject to the 85-percent limitation on parole eligibility. Section 565.024.2. Many of the 85-percent limitations in our sentencing laws were enacted, apparently with no irony intended, as “truth in sentencing” provisions.
Given the several crimes with which Webb could have been charged for his driving that caused the death of Terry Parker,'there truly was a menu of options available to the local prosecutor. This may lead to the conclusion that our Christmas tree of a criminal code creates not one criminal justice system, but 115 — one for each local jurisdiction.
Because these systems have negotiated pleas in the overwhelming number of cases, they can be considered a market, perhaps best understood with an analogy: Think of 115 used-car dealers, whose deals cause many of the buyers (the criminal defendants) to believe they paid too much and — where the crimes have specific victims — ensure that many of the victims or their survivors will believe they were paid too little.7
*134Surely in the United States of America it is fitting to have a market where deals are made, but there can be no respect for a market in which accurate information is not freely available to all participants in the deals, including the public. In the current vogue economic term, our plea-bargain marketplace is not “transparent,” and, because of this, the market regularly will fail. This may be tolerable when the commodity being traded is used cars, but when the commodity is justice, the systems’ failures should not be tolerated.
To fill this information void in the guilty-plea marketplaces, the United States Supreme Court recently decided Padilla v. Kentucky, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), which, if its reasoning is followed faithfully, will require that defense attorneys have a professional obligation to inform their clients of the truly clear consequences of their guilty pleas.
Padilla puts courts on notice that reciting the usual no-threats-no-promises litany at sentencing does not necessarily ensure that the plea is voluntary. The litany, as referred to in the per curiam opinion in this case, is more or less as follows: In response to questions, Webb responded that no one had threatened him or promised him anything to get him to plead guilty; he understood he was waiving all of his rights at trial; he understood the range of punishment available; his attorneys had not made him plead guilty against his free will; his attorneys could not have done anything differently in handling his case; and he was satisfied with their legal services.
Padilla held that it is ineffective assistance of counsel for a defense attorney not to advise a defendant about the “truly clear” immigration consequences of his or her plea. Id. at 1483. Padilla may require us to inquire: If the defendant is not informed of the other inevitable consequences of his plea, how can the plea be considered voluntary? Or, to put it in terms of the sentencing litany, how can Webb be satisfied with his attorney’s legal services if he did not know that his attorney misinformed or failed to inform him that he would be required to spend at least 85 percent of his sentence behind bars?
The defendant in Padilla, a longtime lawful permanent résident of the United States, pleaded guilty to transportation of a large amount of marijuana. As a result, he was subject to deportation. He alleged that his attorney had not only failed to advise him that he would be deported as a result of his plea, but he also was told “that he ‘did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.’ ” Id. at 1478.
The United States Supreme Court noted that the Supreme Court of Kentucky had rejected the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim by holding that potential deportation is a “collateral” consequence. The United States Supreme Court, however, stated that it was not necessary to decide whether the direct-collateral consequences distinction was appropriate because “of the unique nature of deportation.” Id. at 1481. The Supreme Court noted that because of changes in immigration policy by Congress, if a non-citizen commits a removable offense, “his removal is practically inevitable.... ” Id. at 1480 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court also noted that “deportation is an integral part — indeed, sometimes the most important part — of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizens who plead guilty to specified crimes.” Id. The Supreme Court further reasoned that deportation is a‘“particularly severe penalty” and is “intimately related to the criminal process.” Id. at 1481.
*135In light of the “practically inevitable” consequence, the Supreme Court considered whether the defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective. To find ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, the court is required to “first determine whether counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). If it falls below this standard, the court then asks “whether ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
The Supreme Court stated that counsel’s representation is unreasonable if it does not meet “the practice and expectations of the legal community” as outlined by “prevailing professional norms.” Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. Failing to advise a client regarding the risk of deportation is unreasonable if that risk is clear from the relevant statutes. Id. In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that numerous authorities, including the National Legal Aid and Defender Association’s (NLADA) Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, require defense attorneys to advise their non-citizen clients as to the risk of deportation. Id.
The “prevailing professional norms” of practice language comes from Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, where the Supreme Court held that such norms should be “guides for determining what was reasonable, but they are only guides.” The Supreme Court in Strickland emphasized that no particular set of rules for counsel’s conduct fully can take into account the decisions that counsel often has to make in representing a criminal defendant. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Padilla, however, departs from this reasoning by finding that it is unreasonable for plea counsel not to advise his or her client of “practically inevitable” consequences of the client’s guilty plea. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1480.
Although a departure from Strickland, the Padilla analysis follows logically; it is never a reasonable strategy for counsel to depart from prevailing professional norms and fail to advise or misadvise a client of the “practically inevitable” consequences that may result from a guilty plea.
The Supreme Court in Padilla further noted that the terms of the relevant immigration statute in the case were “succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for [the defendant’s] conviction.” Id. at 1483. As a result, the defendant’s counsel had a responsibility to advise the defendant as to the “truly clear” deportation consequence of his guilty plea. Id. The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of that case the failure to advise the defendant or misadvising him as to his potential deportation was unreasonable. Id. at 1483-84.
The Supreme Court declined to limit its analysis to “affirmative misadvice,” because such a limit would “invite two absurd results. First, it would give counsel an incentive to remain silent on matters of great importance, even when answers are readily available. Second, it would deny a class of clients least able to represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily available.” Id. at 1484. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the state court to determine whether the defendant had suffered prejudice. Id.
*136Does Padilla Apply Only to Deportation Consequences?
The scope of the Padilla holding on counsel’s failure to advise a defendant of the consequences of his plea is not entirely clear. But what is clear is that this Court’s prior cases may need to be expanded to take into account the analysis in Padilla when considering whether counsel rendered deficient performance. Many state courts and lower federal courts have already considered how Padilla applies to consequences beyond deportation, such as parole eligibility.8
Deportation and the minimum prison term a defendant is required to serve before becoming eligible for parole have similar characteristics. Deportation is “practically inevitable” for a noncitizen who commits a removable offense. Similarly, if a defendant pleads guilty to certain offenses, such as the class B felony of involuntary manslaughter, he or she is required to serve at least 85 percent of his or her sentence. Although a defendant is not guaranteed to receive parole, restrictions on parole eligibility play an integral part in a defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea and impact the plea negotiations. See Pridham, 2010 WL 4668961 at *3. There is a substantial difference between becoming eligible for parole in 4.8 years and not becoming eligible for parole until after serving at least 10.2 years, Webb’s actual eligibility time under the 85-percent standard.
Parole eligibility and deportation also are similarly consequential in that both are severe results that are intimately related to the criminal process. While perhaps not always as severe as deportation, a defendant’s parole eligibility date is the date that he or she first has the possibility of being released from prison under supervision. The defendant’s prospect of deportation in Padilla was “practically inevit*137able,” but Webb’s prospect of serving at least 85 percent of his sentence in prison is a certainty. The Supreme Court in Padilla has imposed a requirement on counsel for a serious consequence that is not entirely certain. It is appropriate for this Court to apply the same analysis where a serious consequence — -the statutory requirement that means more than twice as long in prison — is certain.
The parole eligibility information in this case is not of the same kind as the information a defendant’s attorney may convey to a client about the parole board’s discretionary guidelines and practices, as set forth in the SARs and available on the website of the Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission. It may be helpful to counsel and to the defendant to know the parole board’s guidelines and practices with regard to particular offenses and categories of offenders. But the decision the parole board makes in such cases — in the absence of a statutory minimum — is discretionary and not subject to post-conviction relief if the board makes a decision that differs from its guidelines or differs from the time that a defendant’s attorney may have estimated based upon experience or reviewing the parole board’s guidelines.
The question in this case is whether it was unreasonable for Webb’s trial counsel to misadvise him about how much time he would be required to spend in prison before becoming eligible for parole. In Padilla, the Supreme Court examined “the practice and expectations of the legal community” as outlined by “prevailing professional norms.” Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. The Supreme Court, as noted, cited several sources, including the National Legal Aid and Defender Association’s (NLADA) Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. Id,. These same sources show that prevailing professional norms require counsel to inform the client about the client’s parole eligibility date. The NLADA compendium states that “pri- or to the entry of the plea, counsel should ... make certain that the client fully and completely understands ... the consequences the accused will be exposed to by entering a plea.” 2 Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems, Standards for Attorney Performance (2000), available at http://www.mynlada.org/ defender/DOJ/standardsv2/v2h.htm. The NLADA compendium specifically notes that it is important for counsel and client to know of all “parole consequences” while engaged in plea negotiations. Id. The NLADA compendium further notes that several states have specific guidelines their defenders are encouraged to follow.9
The Missouri state public defender system also has adopted “Guidelines for Representation” that its defenders are required to follow. These guidelines specifically require that “before the Public Defender allows the client to plead guilty, the Public Defender must be satisfied ... [t]hat the client understands the consequences of conviction, including the maximum possible sentence, any mandatory minimum faced by the client, [and] the client’s probation and parole eligibility.” Missouri State Public Defender, Guidelines for Representation, Guilty Pleas, Prerequisites for Guilty Pleas (November 9, 2001).
*138While not as definitive, the ABA standards state that “[t]o the extent possible, defense counsel should determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated plea.” American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section Standards, Standard 14-3.2(f), available at http://www.abanet.org/ crimjust/standards/guiltypleas_blk.html.
The NLADA compendium, the ABA standards and Missouri’s own guidelines show that the “prevailing professional norm” in the criminal defense community is for a defendant’s counsel to advise the defendant at least as to the statutory minimum sentence before parole eligibility.
In this case, Webb alleged in his post-conviction motion that his plea counsel had told him that as a result of his guilty plea he would not be subject to any “85 [percent] non-parole eligibility rule,” but that he would be required to serve 40 percent of his sentence without parole eligibility. Webb alleged that but for his attorney’s misrepresentation, he would have rejected pleading guilty and, instead, would have insisted on proceeding to trial. As the per curiam opinion discusses, Webb is entitled to relief under Reynolds v. State, 994 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Mo. banc 1999), and its progeny.
But under Padilla, a criminal defendant also may be entitled to relief even if counsel did not make any definite representation as to parole eligibility where the consequence is “truly clear.” Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1488. Padilla says that a holding limited to misadvice only would lead to counsel having an incentive to remain silent as to a serious consequence, even though, as in cases such as this, the attorney can find the correct information easily — by reading the applicable statute. Id. at 1484. If a defendant is required to serve a minimum amount of prison time by a statute, it would seem to be the attorney’s responsibility to inform the client as to this minimum. Padilla should be read as limiting the applicability of this Court’s holding in Reynolds, 994 S.W.2d 944, which held that because parole eligibility is a “collateral” consequence, failure to inform is not ineffective assistance of counsel: When the consequence of the plea is “truly clear,” counsel has a duty to inform — not just a duty to avoid misleading the client.
What Consequences Does Padilla Include?
While prevailing professional norms may help discern what a defense attorney should disclose to a client who is to plead guilty to an offense, the consequences can be broad-ranging and scattered throughout the statutes of the state and federal government’s. Felony convictions — and in some cases misdemeanor convictions — may disqualify a person from being licensed for various occupations and may be used to deny governmental benefits, access to housing, health care, student loans, and other amenities or necessities those without criminal records may take for granted. “In a real sense, convicted persons are regulated,” according to a comment published by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.10 “While some disabilities may be well known, such as disenfranchisement and the firearms prohibition, in most jurisdictions, no judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, legislator or agency staffer could identify all of the statutes that would be *139triggered by conviction of the various offenses in the criminal code.” Id.
What the courts have done, prior to Padilla, is to label all consequences, other than the sentence itself, as “collateral” as a way to remove them from the constitutional protection of the Sixth Amendment right to competent representation. Gabriel J. Chin and Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 67 Cornell L.Rev. 697, 700-701 (2002).
Padilla may well limit the courts’ ability to disregard some consequences as “collateral” if a particular consequence can be considered “truly clear” and an integral part of the punishment.11 The question of how a sentencing court ought to inform a defendant of likely consequences of a guilty plea may be appropriate for consideration by this Court’s Committee on Procedure in Criminal Cases. Until there is further specific guidance, counsel and the courts should be as vigilant as possible to explain that the guilty plea to which a defendant agrees may carry serious consequences beyond the immediate punishment.
In this case, as in Padilla, the defendant who pleaded guilty must show prejudice, that is, that he would not have entered the plea if he had been informed accurately of its consequences. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. And the nature of the relief may be subject to further case law developments.12
*140Conclusion
Decisions requiring that the defendant be informed of the direct consequences of the guilty plea come at an interesting time in the developmental history of our criminal law. There is a duty imposed on defense counsel who might be helped by the report of a probation officer. But these officers — like many public defenders — are overburdened by large caseloads of offenders to be managed on probation and parole and the need to prepare reports to be used at sentencing. While prosecutors have some control in the charging decisions, they too may be overburdened.
Consequences of various kinds may affect as many as one-third of the American public, because about one-third of Americans have criminal records.13 The public, whose appetite for punishment seems to have increased greatly in recent decades, eventually may realize it is not well served by a criminal justice system whose criminal code is complicated, whose commands reach well beyond the crimes that the common law considered malum in se (offenses that are wrong by their very nature— generally those that may be covered by a fair reading of the Ten Commandments) and whose truly clear consequences go well beyond probation, prison and parole. These observations raise questions that properly are for the General Assembly.
In the meantime, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers and the department of corrections will soldier on, trying to patch together a system that is worthy of the word “justice.”
That said, I concur in the per curiam opinion.

. Also involved, obviously, are the family of the victim and the public, who should have accurate, information to determine whether justice is being served. Did the members of the victim’s family leave the courtroom believ*132ing that Webb would serve at least 40 percent of his 12-year term in prison or 85 percent? If the case is reported in the media, what was the public told?

.The SAR, which does not refer to the 85-percent requirement, contains the parole board’s discretionary release guidelines, which call for parole release at 80 percent if the risk-assessment level determined by prison-based factors is the same as the risk level presented at sentencing, and the parole board’s data that show that the percentage of time served in fiscal 2007 was 70 percent. Neither figure reflects the nondiscretionary nature of the 85-percent requirement, which was added in 2005. See section 565.024, RSMo Supp.2006. The release information may reflect those sentenced before and after the 85-percent restriction was enacted.

. J. Miles Sweeney, special master, Report of the Special Master: State ex rel. MSPD v. Hon. Jon Waters and Hon. Mark Orr, SC91150, Feb. 9, 2011. See also Allison Retka, Missouri public defender special master: To solve the caseload, Missouri Lawyers Media, Feb. 9, 2011, available at http://fmdarticles. com/p/articles/mi_7992/is_20110209/ai_n 56888194/.

. All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2007 unless otherwise specified.

. See section 558.011 for the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment for each of the felonies. Other sections of chapter 558 provide for certain offenders, such as persistent offenders, to receive enhanced sentences.

. Section 565.024 in its entirety reads:
1.A person commits the crime of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree if he or she:
(1) Recklessly causes the death of another person; or
(2) While in an intoxicated condition operates a motor vehicle in this state and, when so operating, acts with criminal negligence to cause the death of any person; or
(3) While in an intoxicated condition operates a motor vehicle in .this state, and, when so operating, acts with criminal negligence to:
(a) Cause the death of any person not a passenger in the vehicle operated by the defendant, including the death of an individual that results from the defendant’s vehicle leaving a highway, as defined by section 301.010, RSMo, or the highway’s right-of-way; or
(b) Cause the death of two or more persons; or
(c) Cause the death of any person while he or she has a blood alcohol content of at least eighteen-hundredths of one percent by weight of alcohol in such person’s blood; or
(4) Operates a motor vehicle in violation of subsection 2 of section 304.022, RSMo, and when so operating, acts with criminal negligence to cause the death of any person authorized to operate an emergency vehi-ele, as defined in section 304.022, RSMo, while such person is in the performance of official duties.
2. Involuntary manslaughter in the first degree under subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection 1 of this section is a class C felony. Involuntary manslaughter in the first degree under subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of this section is a class B felony. A second or subsequent violation of subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of this section is a class A felony. For any violation of subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of this section, the minimum prison term which the defendant must serve shall be eighty-five percent of his or her sentence. Any violation of subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section is a class B felony.
3. A person commits the crime of involuntary manslaughter in the second degree if he acts with criminal negligence to cause the death of any person.
4. Involuntary manslaughter in the second degree is a class D felony.

. The truth of this analogy is quite apparent in the victim impact statement made by the wife of the victim at Webb's sentencing: She said that she wished that Webb's sentence would run consecutively with the sentence he already was serving because she wanted him to know that he was in prison for her husband’s death.

. The cases from other jurisdictions since Padilla include: Bauder v. Dep't of Corr. State of Florida, 619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.2010) (affirming district court finding of deficient performance of counsel and affirmative misad-vice where plea counsel told defendant that he would not be subject to civil commitment, but actually the law was unclear as to whether a possible risk of civil commitment existed); Wilson v. State, 244 P.3d 535 (Alaska Ct.App.2010) (finding ineffective assistance where defendant was misinformed that his no contest plea could not be used against him in the expected civil case against him); Taylor v. State, 304 Ga.App. 878, 698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (2010) (holding that "failure to advise a client that pleading guilty will require him to register as a sex offender is constitutionally deficient performance”); Pridham v. Commonwealth, 2010 WL 4668961 at *3 (Ky.Ct.App. Nov. 19, 2010) (concluding that "gross misad-vice concerning parole eligibility may amount to ineffective assistance of counsel worthy of post-conviction relief"); Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa.Super.Ct.2010), appeal granted in part, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. Nov. 30, 2010) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel where plea counsel failed to advise defendant that he would lose his teacher’s pension as a result of his guilty plea). But see Brown v. Goodwin, slip op., 2010 WL 1930574 (D.N.J. May 11, 2010) (declining to find ineffective assistance of counsel on federal habeas where the state court previously had made the factual finding that the petitioner was adequately informed of the possibility of his civil commitment and also noting, in dictum, that civil commitment was not an automatic consequence like deportation); Maxwell v. Larkins, 2010 WL 2680333 at *9-10 (E.D.Mo. July 1, 2010) (declining to extend Padilla to failure of plea counsel to advise the defendant of the requirement to register as a sex offender, the requirement to complete the Missouri sex offender program (MOSOP) prior to release, and possible commitment under the sexually violent predator (SVP) law, because none of these requirements are mentioned in the NLADA guidelines and sex offender registration is not punitive in that it is only civil and regulatory in nature, the MOSOP program does not resemble deportation, because it is a requirement while in prison to complete parole, and SVP commitment is not an automatic result).

. For example, Oregon requires that an attorney should advise his or her client as to "parole or post-supervision eligibility.” 2 Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems, Standards for Attorney Performance (2000), available at http://www. mynlada.org/defender/DOJ/standardsv2/v2h. htm. Massachusetts also specifically requires that clients should be informed of any consequences of their conviction, which relate to parole eligibility. Id.

. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Comment to Section 4, Amendments to Uniform Collateral Consequences of Convictions Act (2010), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ ucsada/201 Oam_draft.pdf.

. Defense counsel also may have an ethical obligation to advise their clients as to these "truly clear" consequences. Although state ethics codes, including Missouri's, "provide only general guidance for attorney behavior" and "do not explicitly address a duty to inform clients" about these consequences, some of their provisions could be interpreted as requiring such warnings. Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 Iowa L.Rev. 119, 153 (2009). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require lawyers to " 'explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation,’ to stay current on the law, and [require] 'legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' " Id. At least one state court, Oregon, has imposed a one-year suspension from the practice of law on a lawyer who, in addition to other disciplinary violations, misadvised his client that his guilty plea would not result in deportation. Id. (citing In re Black, 21 Disciplinary Bd. Rptr. 6, 6-18 (Or.2007)). Oregon’s disciplinary code, however, explicitly requires defense counsel to warn clients about the deportation consequences of any guilty plea. Id. at 154 n. 146.
The Oregon case appears to be the exception rather than the rule. Roberts at 154 (" 'not one jurisdiction seems actively to use the disciplinary process to protect criminal defendants from incompetent criminal defense representation' ”) (quoting Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. Rev. I, 43 (2002)). This may be intentional. The American Bar Association previously had "urged jurisdictions to assist defenders in carrying out their 'ethical duty’ to advise clients about collateral consequences.' " ABA Policy: Res. 103E Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions, Feb. 12, 2007, at 3 n. 4, http://www.americanbar. orgfcontent/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/ 2007/midyear/docs/journaI/hundredthreee. authcheckdam.doc. In 2007, however, the ABA noted that although failing to advise as to certain consequences, such as "almost certain deportation in the event of a felony conviction,” may be an ethical violation, in many other cases, failure to advise may not be an issue of competency, "particularly where information about those collateral consequences was not readily available." Id.

. The United States Supreme Court may address the question of relief, or the scope of Padilla, when it decides the case of Missouri v. Frye, in which the Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari. Frye v. State, 311 S.W.3d 350 (Mo.App.2010), cert. granted, Missouri v. Frye, -U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 856, 178 L.Ed.2d 622 (2011). Frye involved a defendant who pleaded guilty to a felony after his *140attorney failed to inform him of a misdemean- or plea offer. In the grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court asked the parties to brief this question: "What remedy, if any, should be provided for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargain negotiations if the defendant was later convicted and sentenced pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures?”

. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2008 3 (2009) ("Over 92 million individual offenders were in the criminal history repositories of State criminal history repositories on December 31, 2008,” though individuals may have records in more than one state), available at http://www.ncjrs. gov/pdffilesl/bjs/grants/228661 .pdf.