Court Opinion

ID: 9841675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 20:01:22.208474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:13.454586
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McLEAN
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal in chancery, from the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.
The case involves the construction of the will of Frederick Kohne. He first settled in Charleston, South Carolina, where he engaged in active business, and accumulated a large fortune. For many years before his death, his residence was divided between Charleston and Philadelphia. At the latter place, he added much to his wealth, in the acquisition of real and personal property. He had furnished houses in both cities, and a country house in the neighborhood of Philadelphia. Until his health became infirm, he resided a part of the year in the South, and the other part in the North. In May, 1829, he died in Philadelphia, where his will was made and published, in the month of April preceding his death. In his will, he declared himself to be of the city of Philadelphia.
After giving sevéral annuities to his wife and others, and legacies to his friends in this country and in foreign countries, to charitable objects, and providing for the payment of them, he declares: “ Forasmuch as there will be a surplus income of my estate, beyond what will be necessary to pay my said wife’s annuity and the, other annuities, I do therefore direct my said executors to - invest the said surplus income, and all accumulation of interest arising from that source yearly, for and during all the term of the natural life of my said wife, in the purchase of such stocks or securities of the United States, or the State of Pennsylvania, or of any other State or States of the United States, or of the city of Philadelphia, bearing an interest, as they, in their discretion, may see fit; and from and immediately after the decease of my said wife, then all the rest, residue, ancl remainder of all my estate, including the fund which shall have arisen from the said surplus income aforesaid, after payment of the legacies hereinbefore directed to be paid, after the decease of my said wife, arid providing, for the payment of the annuities hereinbefore giveri, of those annuitants who may then be -till living, I authorize and empower my executors or the sur*383vivor of them, after the decease of my said wife, to dispose of the same for the use .of such charitable institutions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina, as they or he may deem most beneficial to mankind, and so that part of the colored population in each' of the said States of Pennsylvania and South Carolina shall partake of the benefits thereof.” His wife, Eliza Kohne, John Bohlen, and Robert Vaux, of the city of Philadelphia, and Robert Maxwell, of the city of Charleston, were appointed executors.
Mrs. Kohne survived her co-executors some years, and then died, having made her last will and testament, and appointed James L. Petigru and William -Ravenel, the defendant, executors, the latter of whom obtained letters testamentary in the county of Philadelphia. And on the 15th of October, 1852, William Fontain, the complainant, obtained letters of administration de bonis non, on the estate of Frederick Kohne, deceased, he being the nearest of kin to the deceased, and one of his heirs at law.
The bill is filed in the name of the complainant, by certain charitable societies of Pennsylvania and South ^Carolina, under the directions of the will, to recover from the defendant, as executor of Mrs. Kohne, so much of the property as came to her hands as the executrix of her husband’s will, and which she distributed, as undisposed-of property, after the death .of her co-executors. And the question in the case is, whether the residuary bequest in the will, whiph authorized his executors, or the survivor of them, after the death of his wife, to dispose of the surplus “ for the use of such charitable institutions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina, as they might deem most beneficial to mankind,” has lapsed, no such appointment having been made, or attempted to be made, during the lifetime of the executors. This part of the property is understood to have amounted to a large sum.
The domicile of the testator, at the time of his death, seems not to be a controverted question. He had so lived in the two States of Pennsylvania and South Carolina, and amassed-property in.both, that his domicile might be claimed in either. There is no evidence in which, if in either, he exercised the right of suffrage. For two years previous to his death, he resided in Pennsylvania.
The bequest under consideration was intended to be a charity. The donor, having entire confidence in his executors, substituted their judgment for his own. They, or the survivor of them, was to designate such objects of his charity in the two States, “ as would be most beneficial to mankind.’5 It was to be placed on the broadest foundations of human sympathy, not *384excluding the colored race. It is no charity to give to a friend. In the books, it is said the thing given becomes a charity where the uncertainty of the recipients begins. This is beautifully illustrated in the Jewish law, which required the sheaf to be left in the field, for the needy and passing stranger.
It may be admitted that this bequest would be executed in England. A charity rarely, if ever, fails in that country. The only question there is, whether it shall be administered by the chancellor, in the exercise of his ordinary jurisdiction, or under the sign-manual of the crown. Thus furnished with the judicial and prerogative powers, the intent of the testator, however vaguely and remotely expressed, if it be construed into a charity, effect is generally given to it. It is true, this is not always done in the spirit of the donor; for sectarian prejudices, or the arbitrary will of the king’s instruments, sometimes pay little or no regard to the expressed will of the testator.
The appellants endeavor to sustain this charity under the laws of Pennsylvania. This is according to the course of the court. The case of The Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart’s Executors, 4 Wheat. 1, was decided under the laws of Virginia, which had repealed the statute of 43 Elizabeth. In Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566, the pious use of a burial-ground was sustained under the bill of rights of Maryland. The case of Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. 55, was ruled under the laws of Virginia. And in the case of Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, the laws of Pennsylvania governed.
In Wheeler v. Smith, this court said, when this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power still-remains with them, except so far as they have delegated a portion of it to the federal government. The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment. The State, as a sovereign, is the parens patries.
There can be no doubt that decisions have been made in this country, on the subject of charities, under the influence of English decrees, without carefully discriminating whether they resulted from the ordinary exercise of chancery powers, or the prerogatives of the crown.
The courts of the United States cannot exercise any equity powers, except those conferred 'by acts of congress, and those judicial powers which the high court of chancery in England, acting under its judicial capacity as a court of equity, possessed and exercised, at the time of the formation of the constitution of the United States. Powers not judicial, exercised by the chancellor merely as the representative of the sovereign, and by virtue of the king’s prerogative as parens patriae, are not possessed by the circuit courts.
*385In 2 Story’s Eq. § 1189, it is said: “ But as the court of chancery may also proceed in many, although not in all, cases of charities by original bill, as well as by commission under the statute of Elizabeth, the jurisdiction has become mixed in practice ; that is to say, the jurisdiction of bringing informations in the name of the attorney-general, has been mixed with the jurisdiction given to the chancellor by the statute. So that it is not always easy to ascertain in what cases he acts as a judge, administering the common duties of a court of equity, and in what cases he acts as a mere delegate of the crown, administering its peculiar duties and prerogatives. And again, there Is a distinction between cases of charity, where the chancellor is to act in-the court of chancery, and cases where the charity is to be administered by the king, by Ms sign-manual. But in practice the cases have often been confounded, from similar causes.”
“ It is a principle in England, that the king, as parens patrice, enforces public charities, where no other person is intrusted with the right. Where there is no trustee, the king, by his lord chancellor, administers the trust, as the keeper of the king’s conscienceand it is not important whether the chancellor acts as the special delegate of the crown, or the Icing acts under the sign-manual, his discretion being guided by the chancellor.”
It may be well again to state the precise question before us. “ The executors, or the survivor of them, after the decease of • the testator’s wife, was authorized to dispose of the property, for the use of such charitable institutions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina, as they or he may deem most beneficial to mankind.”
No special trust is vested in the executors, by reason of this power of appointment. It is separable and distinct from their ordinary duties and trust as executors. It was to be exercised after the death of Mrs. Kohne; but the executors died before her decease, and consequently they had no power to make the appointment. The conditions annexed by the testator rendered the appointment impossible. Had the contingency of the death of Mrs. Kohne happened, as the testator from her advanced age contemplated, during the life of the executors or the survivor of them, the appointment might have been made at his or their discretion. But had they or the survivor of them failed to make it, it might have become a question whether he or they could have been coerced to do so by the exercise of' any known chancery power in this country. The will contained no provision for such a contingency, and it could not be brought under the trust of executorship. Chancery will not compel the execution of a' mere naked power. 1 Story’s Eq. § 169. ¡But it will, *386tmder equitable circumstances^ aid a defective execution of a power. A power when coupled with a trust, if not executed before the death of the trustee, at law the power is extinguished, but the trust, in chancery, is held to survive.
The testator was unwilling to give this discretion to select the objects of his bounty, except to his executors. He relied on their discrimination, their judgment, their integrity, and fitness, to carry out so delicate and important a power. He made no provision for a failure, in this respect, by his executors or the survivor of them, nor for the contingency of their deaths before Mrs. Kohne’s decease. They died before they had the power to appoint, and now what remains of this bequest, on which a court of chancery can act ?
There must be some creative energy to give embodiment to an intention which was never perfected. Nothing short of the prerogative power, it would seem, can reach this case. There is not only uncertainty in the beneficiaries of this charity, but behind that is a more formidable objection. There is no expressed will of the testator. He intended to speak through his executors or the survivor of them, but by the acts of Providence this has become impossible. It is then as though he had not spoken. Can any power now speak for him, except the parens patria? Had he declared'that the residue of his estate should be applied to certain charitable purposes, under the statute of 43 Eliz., or on principles similar to those of the statute, effect might have been given to the bequest, as a charity, in the State of Pennsylvania. The words as to the residue of his property were used in reference to the discretion to be exercised by his executors. Without their action, he did not intend to dispose of the residfie of his property.
It is argued, “ that in England the chancellor, in administering charities, acts as the delegate of the' crown, inasmuch as he discharges all his judicial, functions in that capacity.” If, by this, it is intended to assert that the chancellor, in affixing the dgn-manual of the king, or when he acts under the cy pres power, is in the discharge of his ordinary chancery powers, it does not command our assent.
The statute of 43 Eliz., though not technically in force in Pennsylvania, yet, by common usage, and constitutional recognition, the principles of the statute are acted upon in cases involving charities. Witman v. Lex, 17 Serg. and Rawle, 88.
In the argument, the case of Moggridge v. Thaekwell, 7 Ves. 86, was cited, as identical with the case before us. “ The only difference between the case and this one, it is said, is, that in the former the devise was for objects not defined, as they are in this case.” In this the counsel are somewhat mistaken, as the case of Moggridge will show.
*387The devise in the will of Ann Cam was: “ And I give all the rest and residue of my personal estate unto James Vaston, of Clapton, Middlesex, gentleman, his executors and administrators, desiring him to dispose of the same in such charities as he shall think fit, recommending poor clergymen who have large families and good characters; and I appoint the said John Maggridge and Mr. Vaston, before mentioned, executors of this my will.”
In the final decree, “ upon a motion to vary the minutes, Lord Thurlow declared, that the residue of the testatrix’s personal estate passed by her will, and ought to go and be applied to charity,” &c.
Now here was a trust created not only in Vaston, but in his executors and administrators, to whom the residue of the estate was bequeathed for the purposes of the charity. In this view, Lord Thurlow might well say, “the residue of the personal estate passed by the will.’.’ This was true, though Vaston was dead when the will took effect. This being the case, it is difficult to say that that case is identical with the one before us.
The case of Moggridge v. Thackwell was before Lord Eldon on a rehearing. He entered into a general view of the subject of charities, by the citation of authorities which showed the unreasonableness of the doctrine maintained by the courts, the inconsistencies in the decisions in such cases,'and the gross perversions of charities by the exercise of the prerogative power; but at last he says : “ Therefore I rather think the decree is right. I have conversed with many upon.it. I have great difficulty in my own mind, and have found great difficulty in the mind of every person I have consulted; but the general principle thought most reconcilable to the cases is, that where there is a general indefinite purpose, not fixing itself upon any object, as this in a degree does, the disposition is in the king by sign-manual; but where the execution is to be by a trustee, with general or some objects pointed out, there the court will take the administration of the trust. ■ But,” he observes, “ it must be recollected that I am called upon to reverse the decree of a predecessor, and of a predecessor who, all the reports inform us, had great occasion to consider this subject. I should hesitate with reference to that circumstance; but where authority meets authority, and precedent clashes with precedent, I doubt whether I could make a decree more satisfactory to my own ihind than that which has been made.”
It will be perceived that this decision was made reluctantly, and after much balancing of the law and the force of jrrecedentsj and chiefly; as it would seem, in respect to the decree of Lord Thurlow. This decision of Lord Eldon was made in 1802, and it is not known to have been recognized in this country.
*388Neither the doctrines on which this decision is. founded, nor the doubts expressed by the chancellor, are calculated very strongly to recommend it to judicial consideration. The case, however, is different from the one before us, in this : the residuary estate of Mrs. Cam passed to the trustee; that of Mr. Kohne remained as a part of his estate in the hands of the executors, and descended to his heirs at law on the death of Mrs. Kohne. ' The beneficiaries were not more definitely described in the one case than in the other. In Kohne’s case no trust was created, except that which was connected with the executorship.
Where there is nothing more than a power of appointment conferred by the testator, there is nothing on which a trust, on general principles, can be fastened. The power given is a mere agency of the will, which may or may not be exercised at the discretion of the individual. And if there be no act on his part, the property never having passed out of the testator, it necessarily remains as a part of his estate. To meet such cases, and others, the prerogative power of the Ung, in England, has been invoked, and he, through the chancellor, gives effect to the charity.
It would be curious, as well as instructive, on a proper occasion, to consider the principles, if principles they can be called, which were first applied in England to charities. Their most learned chancellors express themselves, in some degree, as ignorant on this subject. Lord Eldon said, in the case of Maggridge, “ in what the doctrine originated, whether, as Lord Thurlow supposed, in the principles of the civil law, as applied to charities, or in the religious notions entertained formerly in this country, I know not; but we all know there was a period when a portion of'the residue of every man’s estate was appropriated to charity, and the ordinary thought himself obliged so to apply it, upon the ground that there was a general principle of piety in the testator.”
In the above case, Lord Eldon again says: In Clifford v. Francis, this doctrine is laid down: that when money is given to charity, without expressing what charity, there the king is the disposer of the charity; and a bill ought to be preferred in the attorney-general’s name. I cite this (he says) to show that it contains a doctrine precisely the same as the Attorney-General v. Syderfin, and the Attorney-General v. Matthews. So those three eases (he say's) seemed to have established, in the year 1679, that the doctrine of this court was, that where the property was not vested in trustees, and the gift was to charity generally, not to be ascertained by the act of individuals referred to, the charity was to be disposed of, not by a scheme before the master, but by the king, the disposer of such charities in his character of parens patriae.
*389Some late decisions in England, involving charities, evince a disposition rather to restrict than to enlarge the powers exercised on this subject. An arbitrary rule in regard to property, whether by a king or chancellor, or both, leads to uncertainty and injustice.
In a late case of Clark v. Taylor, 21 Eng. Law and Eq. 308, a gift, by will, to a particular charitable institution maintained voluntarily by private means, the particular intention having-ceased : held that the gift was not to be disposed of as a charitable gift cy pres, but failed and fell into the residue.”
In'the case of the Baptist Association, Chief Justice Marshall says, there can be no doubt that the power of the crown .to superintend and enforce charities existed in very early times; and there is much “ difficulty in marking the extent of this branch of the royal prerogative before the statute. That it is a branch of prerogative, and not a part of the ordinary powers of the chancellor, is sufficiently certain,” And in the case of the Attorney-General v. Flood, Hayne’s Hep. 630, it is said: The court of chancery has always exercised jurisdiction in matters of charity, derived from the crown as parens patria.”
In the provisions of the act of Pennsylvania defining the powers of a court of chancery, in 1836, it is declared, “ that in every case in which any court, as aforesaid, shall exercise any of the powers of a court of chancery, the same shall be exercised according to the practice in equity, prescribed or adopted by the supreme court of the United States.”
In June, 1840, an act extended the jurisdiction of the supreme court within the city and county of Philadelphia, in chancery, in cases of “ fraud, accident, mistake, or account; ” and since then an act has been passed giving the orphans’ court power where a vacancy exists in a trust to fill it, and also to dismiss trustees, executors, Ac., for abuse of their trusts, Ac. But no statutory provision is found embracing the case before us.
The chancery powers are of comparatively recent establishment in the State' of Pennsylvania, and it does not appear that the cypres power is given, and in the exercise of jurisdiction it seems to be disclaimed.
In King v. Rundle, 15 Barb. 139, “ there being a number of charitable bequests to several charitable bodies, the remainder was bequeathed or devised to the Protestant Episcopal society, for certain purposes, Ac.; the bequests to the. religious bodies were held invalid, and so of the remainder over, as not being statutory tests. In Yates v. Yates, 9 Barb. 324, the court say: “ We come to the conclusion that,' as a court of equity; we possess no original inherent jurisdiction, to enforce the execution of a charitable trust void in law, as contravening the *390statute against perpetuities, as. being authorized. In this case, where the use is a pious one, additional reasons might be urged against the exercise of such jurisdiction, were it important. Unless this trust will stand the statutory test to be applied to it, it must fall.
In the will of Sarah Zane, Mr. Justice Baldwin, sitting in Pennsylvania, and speaking of trustees, says: “ They will be considered as trustees, acting pinder the supervision of this court, as a court of chancery, with the same powers over trusts as courts of equity in England, and the courts of this State profess and exercise.” “ When the fund shall be so ascertained a's to be capable of a final distribution, it will be directed to be applied exclusively to the objects designated in the will, as they existed at the time of her death, and shall continue until a final decree; if any shall then appear to have become extinct, the portion bequeathed to such object must fall into the residuary fund as a lapsed legacy. Its appointment to other purposes or cestuis que trust than those which can, by equitable construction, be brought within the intention of the will of the donor, is an exercise of that branch of the jurisdiction of the chancellor of England which has been conferred on this court by no law, and cannot be exercised, virtute officii, under our forms of government.”
And again, in Wright v. Linn, 9 Barr, 433, Bell, J., says: “ Though the statute of 43 Elizabeth, ch. 4, relating to charitable uses, has not, in terms, been recognized as extending to Pennsylvania, we have adopted, not only the principles that properly emanate from it,,but, with perhaps the single exception of cy pres, those which, by an exceedingly liberal construction, the English courts have engrafted upon it.”
In the Methodist Church v. Remington, 1 Watts, 226, the court says : “ The original trust, though void; was not a superstitious one; nor if it were, would the property, as in England, revert to the State for the purpose of being appropriated in eadem genera, as no court here possesses the specific power necessary to give effect to the principle of cy pres, even were the principle itself not too grossly revolting to the public sense of justice to be tolerated in a country where there is no ecclesiastical establishment.”
In Ray v. Adams, 3 Mylne and Keen’s R. 237, it was held, “ that where a power is by will given to a trustee, which he neglects to execute, the execution of the trust devolves upon the- court; but if, in the events which happen, the intended trustee .dies before the time arrives for the exécution of the trust, and' the trust therefore fails, the testator is to be considered as. having so far died intestate.
*391In the case of Ommanney v. Butcher, 1 Turn. and Russ. R. 260, a testator concluded his will, “ in case there is any money remaining, I should wish it to be given in private charity.” Held, “ if the testator meant to create a trust, and the trust is not effectually created, or fails, the next of kin must take.”
There appears to be no law or usage in South Carolina that can materially affect the question under consideration. It seems to be conceded that if this charity cannot be administered by this court, in the State of Pennsylvania,''•it cannot be made available by the laws of South Carolina.
After the investigation we have been able to give to this important case, embracing the English chancery decisions on charities, as well as our own, and the cases decided in Pennsylvania, we are not satisfied that the fund in question ought to be withdrawn from those who are in possession of it, as the heirs of Frederick Kohne. There does not appear to us to be any safe and established principle, in Pennsylvania, which, under the circumstances, enables a court of chancery to administer the fund. It has not fallen back into the estate of the testator, because it was not separated from it. It remains unaffected by the bequest, because the means through which it was to be given and applied have failed. The decree of the circuit court is,’therefore, affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY and Mr. Justice DANIEL concurred in the judgment of the court, but dissented from the reasoning. Their opinions were as follows.