Court Opinion

ID: 9588734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:37:36.907929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:00.163321
License: Public Domain

Banke, Judge,
dissenting.
In order for the seizure of an item not named in the search warrant to be valid pursuant to OCGA § 17-5-21 (b) (Code Ann. § 27-303), its discovery must have resulted from a bona fide search for the items named in the warrant. Dugan v. State, 130 Ga. App. 527, 534 (203 SE2d 722) (1974); Bostwick v. State, 124 Ga. App. 113 (3), 116 (182 SE2d 925) (1971). Furthermore, even if the item is lawfully discovered, the officer may not seize it unless he has probable cause to believe that it is either stolen or otherwise subject to seizure under the statute. Campbell v. State, 226 Ga. 883 (3), 888 (178 SE2d 257) (1970); Zimmerman v. State, 131 Ga. App. 793, 794 (207 SE2d 220) (1974).
“Rumor, suspicion, speculation or conjecture is not sufficient to show probable cause... The police may not search and seize and then look for probable cause to justify their action. Probable cause must exist at the time of the search and seizure.” Zimmerman v. State, supra, at 795. The constitution does not permit an officer “to enter a home under a valid search warrant and then to extend his search and seize every item in the house that he thinks might possibly be connected with a crime, where there is no substantiation by circumstance but just suspicion . . .” Dugan v. State, supra, at 533.
The officers in this case testified that they opened the pillowcase full of silverware which they found in the attic not because of any belief that marijuana might be inside it but because of their general curiosity “to see what made it weigh so much.” Thus, by their own *766admission, they were engaged in a general, exploratory search for incriminating evidence, rather than a bona fide search for the item named in the warrant. In addition, I do not believe that the mere discovery of the silverware was sufficient to provide the officers with probable cause to believe it was stolen property. While Officer Clenny initially testified that he recognized some of the silverware as being of the same type as silverware which had been reported stolen somewhere at some time, on cross-examination he was unable to identify the characteristics of any of this silverware or to give any other details regarding these alleged reports. Thus, his testimony on the issue must be discounted. It is certainly true that the manner in which the silverware was stored was suspicious, but this alone could not support its seizure as stolen property. See Zimmerman v. State, supra; Cook v. State, 134 Ga. App. 712 (3, 4), 715 (215 SE2d 728) (1975); Hogan v. State, 140 Ga. App. 716, 718 (231 SE2d 802) (1976).
I recognize that there are serious doubts as to whether enforcement of the exclusionary rule provides even-handed justice, and I personally prefer the result reached by the majority in this case. However, until the exclusionary rule is altered by the United States Supreme Court, I believe it is our duty to continue to enforce it. Accordingly, I believe the defendant’s conviction should be reversed based on the erroneous denial of his motion to suppress.