Court Opinion

ID: 9392668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 20:00:43.394586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:47.812092
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 23a0216n.06

                                      Case No. 22-1776

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                                              FILED
JOSHUA ZARZA, substituted party on                 )                    May 05, 2023
behalf of Karen Zarza, deceased,                   )                DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                   )
       Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                   )    ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
                                                   )    STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
       v.
                                                   )    THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
                                                   )    MICHIGAN
BOARD OF REGENTS OF                    THE
                                                   )
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
                                                   )                                OPINION
       Defendant-Appellee.                         )

Before: COOK, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

       COOK, Circuit Judge. The University of Michigan fired Karen Zarza. The University

says it responded to complaints from Zarza’s subordinates. Zarza says it retaliated against her

after she advocated for a disabled employee. Because a jury could reasonably believe either

account, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the University.

                                              I.

       Karen Zarza worked for the University of Michigan from 2003 to 2017. She maintained a

clean record with her superiors. For much of her tenure, she held a custodial supervisor role,

managing between 15 and 20 janitors and custodians.
Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

       Robert Taylor was one such custodian. From 2013 to 2015, Taylor suffered a series of

work-related injuries that he says left him disabled. Claiming that he provided inadequate

documents to support his accommodation requests, the University fired Taylor in 2015.

       Taylor filed two lawsuits against the University in 2017. He told Zarza that he would need

her as a witness. Concerned about testifying against her employer, Zarza scheduled a meeting for

May 11, 2017, with John Lawter, one of her supervisors. She also invited two other custodial

supervisors.

       At the meeting, Zarza staked out a clear position. As she saw things, the University

unlawfully refused to accommodate Taylor. Much of the blame, she thought, belonged to Colette

Donner, a manager, who held “a grudge against [Taylor].” R.44-5 at 2–3. Despite her views that

Donner “was vindictive” and would fire her if she spoke up, Zarza revealed that Taylor had called

her as a witness and that she planned to testify on his behalf. R.44-11 at 6.

       After hearing this, Lawter’s “face turned beet red.” R.44-12 at 3. As Zarza recalls it, he

warned her about colluding with Taylor, adding that the University would tell her what to say so

long as she remained an employee. Lawter’s response struck Zarza and her fellow supervisors as

defensive, angry, or threatening. Lawter, for his part, recalls telling Zarza that she could testify if

she chose to do so.

       Five days later, Zarza’s comments to Lawter prompted an email exchange between Sabrina

Garrett-Owens, a human resources director, and Kristin Brancheau, a manager with the custodial

department.    Brancheau described Zarza’s intent to testify that the University failed to

accommodate Taylor’s disability and Zarza’s concern that Donner was “out to get her.” R.48-15

at 2. “When the evidence shows that [Zarza] is not accurate,” Brancheau asked, “can we finally

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Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

discipline her for this?” Id. Garrett-Owens responded that Lawter “c[ould] do more than fire her”

if the evidence showed that Zarza was wrong. Id.

       That’s what Lawter concluded. He called Zarza on May 25 to say that her concerns about

Donner lacked evidence. Zarza heard the same message on June 28, when she met with Brancheau

and Leti Rastigue, a human resources director. Zarza again asserted that Donner did not adequately

handle Taylor’s case and Zarza repeated her concern about testifying for Taylor. Brancheau and

Rastigue disregarded that concern, reasoning that Zarza’s testimony would be irrelevant or

inadmissible.

       The status quo held for two months. One of Zarza’s fellow custodial supervisors called

Donner on September 5. The supervisor told Donner that Zarza berated him, that she bullied her

subordinates and yelled at them, and that she gave her favorites special privileges.

       Donner acted quickly. Within hours, she forwarded the supervisor’s comments to Lawter

and Brancheau. Lawter met with the supervisor the next day. Alongside complaints against Zarza,

the supervisor mentioned Robert Taylor. Lawter observed that “Taylor’s name seems to just swirl

around wherever [Zarza] is.” R.48-12 at 22.

       The pace did not slow. On September 11—before investigating further or hearing Zarza’s

side of the story—Lawter placed Zarza on administrative leave. The following day, Brancheau

conducted interviews. She talked to fourteen custodians and to Donner. In a twelve-page report,

she concluded that Zarza was “mean, unprofessional, [and] unpleasant”; that she treated temporary

employees poorly; and that she gave special privileges to some employees. R.48-19 at 2–4, 13.

Among these criticisms, Brancheau noted in her report that Zarza “told [a custodian] about Robert

Taylor suing the [University],” and that she “hope[s] he wins as he was done wrong.” Id. at 6.

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Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

       Rastigue received the report on September 13, and she interviewed Zarza about the

allegations the same day. Zarza denied any wrongdoing. Even so, Rastigue told Zarza that she

remained on administrative leave.       Shortly after, Rastigue interviewed Donner about the

complaints against Zarza.

       Zarza did not take all this quietly. She began with a retaliation complaint through the

University system, asserting “that her administrative suspension [was] the result of her expressing

complaints to John Lawter.” R.48-39 at 2. She also emailed the University’s legal counsel. She

again linked the allegations against her to the Taylor case and to the meeting with Lawter. The

counsel forwarded the email to Garrett-Owens, interpreting the email to allege that Lawter

“threatened [Zarza] regarding potential testimony in the Robert Taylor lawsuit.” R.48-37 at 2.

Garrett-Owens looped in Rastigue and Brancheau.

       Despite Zarza’s attempts to raise the alarm, no one investigated her retaliation claims

against Donner and Lawter. Instead, Donner and Lawter continued to provide input on the

investigation against Zarza.

       Garrett-Owens, Rastigue, and Lawter exchanged “[s]trategy” emails a few days after

Zarza’s email to the University’s counsel. R.48-42 at 2. Garrett-Owens began, saying that she

had been thinking about “the best approach to ending [Zarza’s] employment.” Id. She explained

that Zarza “no longer demonstrates the qualities we need” in a supervisor and that multiple issues

“severely diminished her credibility.” Id. Garrett-Owens proposed “immediately releas[ing

Zarza] from her duties” and giving her 21 days to accept a settlement. Id. If Zarza refused, Garrett-

Owens proposed convening a Disciplinary Review Conference to “seek[] her discharge.” Id.

“Given her years of service and lack of documented discipline,” Garrett-Owens added, settlement

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Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

appeared their “best option.” Id. Lawter thought the plan was “worth a shot,” though he speculated

that Zarza would “claim[] retaliation.” Id. at 3. Rastigue also signed on.

       Rastigue wasted no time. She met with Zarza and presented the settlement offer on

September 21, two days after the strategy emails. When Zarza asked about her options “to refute

the charges,” Rastigue replied that Zarza “should use this time to search for a job.” Id.

       Zarza refused the settlement offer. As promised, the University scheduled a Discipline

Review Conference for November 10. The morning of the conference, a University employee

emailed Brancheau to say that Taylor had subpoenaed Zarza. “If she’s not [employed] at the time

of trial,” the employee observed, “we can’t be required to ‘produce’ her so that could actually be

another benefit to terminating employment.” R.48-43 at 2.

       The Disciplinary Review Conference began a few minutes later, with Garrett-Owens,

Rastigue, and Donner presiding. Garrett-Owens explained that the University charged Zarza with

“unsatisfactory work performance, specifically creating a hostile work environment of fear,

intimidation, and harassment.” R.48-44 at 2. Zarza denied the charge, asserting that she was a

good supervisor and a loyal employee.

       The University fired Zarza five days later. Donner, Garrett-Owens, and Rastigue served

as the primary decisionmakers, though Lawter and Brancheau contributed.

       Zarza sued the University, asserting several retaliatory termination claims.         After

discovery, one claim remained: Zarza alleged that the University fired her in retaliation for her

opposition to its treatment of Robert Taylor, violating the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 701 et

seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the University. Zarza appeals.

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Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

                                                  II.

        “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Allman v. Walmart,

Inc., 967 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2020). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute exists “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We view the evidence “in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving

party, Zarza. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)

(quotation omitted).

                                                  III.

        Zarza argues that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to the University

on her retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act. We analyze that claim under the McDonnell

Douglas framework. Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2001); see McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must present

a prima facie case of retaliation; “if the plaintiff does that, the employer must identify a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action; and if the employer does that, the

plaintiff must prove that the employer’s reason” served as a pretext for retaliation. Sloat v.

Hewlett-Packard Enter., 18 F.4th 204, 209 (6th Cir. 2021).

                                                  A.

        Prima facie case. To state a prima facie case of retaliation, Zarza must show that (1) she

engaged in protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act; (2) the University knew of her

protected acts; (3) she suffered an adverse action; and (4) her protected acts caused the adverse

action. Gribcheck, 245 F.3d at 550.

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Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

       The district court concluded that Zarza stated a prima facie case. On appeal, no one

disputes that Zarza satisfies the first three elements. She engaged in protected activity under the

Rehabilitation Act by “opposing” the University’s allegedly unlawful treatment of a disabled

employee, Robert Taylor. A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 711 F.3d 687, 696–97

(6th Cir. 2013); see Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ., 974 F.3d 652, 661 (6th Cir. 2020). After

learning of her stance, the University suspended Zarza and then fired her. See Burlington N. &

Santa Fe Ry., 548 U.S. 53, 71–73 (2006) (suspension qualified as an adverse action); Kirilenko-

Ison, 974 F.3d at 667 (same).

       The University challenges only causation. Zarza must present enough evidence to permit

the inference that her superiors fired her due to her protected activity. See Upshaw v. Ford Motor

Co., 576 F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 2009). She needs only “minimal” evidence to create that

inference. Shelby Cnty., 711 F.3d at 701. To establish causality, plaintiffs often point to temporal

proximity and some “other evidence of retaliatory conduct.” Bledsoe v. Tenn. Valley Auth. Bd. of

Dirs., 42 F.4th 568, 588 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516,

525 (6th Cir. 2008)).

       Zarza follows that well-trod path. She begins with temporal proximity. She spoke out

against Taylor’s treatment in May and in June. Lawter suspended Zarza in September. Around a

week later, Zarza’s superiors planned a second adverse action—termination. And before the

calendar flipped to October, Rastigue presented Zarza with an unattractive choice: quit or face a

Disciplinary Review Conference. Leaving little doubt about what the conference would decide,

Rastigue told Zarza to start looking for a job. The University fired Zarza on November 15.

Whether tallied from Zarza’s suspension or her termination, the interval between protected activity

and adverse action is probative (but not determinative) of a “retaliatory motive.” Bledsoe, 42 F.4th

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Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

at 588 (three-month interval is probative); see Upshaw, 576 F.3d at 588–89 (four-month interval);

Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 737 (6th Cir. 2006) (six-month interval).

       Zarza bolsters the timing with other evidence. She points to Lawter’s visible anger at her

stance on the Taylor case. She points to the emails between Garrett-Owens and Brancheau

expressing their desire to fire Zarza for her opposition to Taylor’s treatment. She points to the

“[s]trategy” emails where Garrett-Owens acknowledged Zarza’s spotless record and yet plotted to

fire her. R.48-42 at 2. She points to the University’s failure to investigate her concerns or to

remove Donner and Lawter from the decision process. Combined with the timeline, this evidence

would allow a jury to conclude that Zarza’s comments about Donner’s refusal to accommodate

Taylor rankled her superiors and led to her termination.

       The University disagrees, arguing that the complaints against Zarza acted as an intervening

cause that separate Zarza’s comments from her termination. As the University confesses, it failed

to press this point below. Puskas v. Delaware Cnty., 56 F.4th 1088, 1098 (6th Cir. 2023). The

argument also falters on its own terms. Given Garrett-Owens’ and Brancheau’s desire to terminate

Zarza for her protected activity, a jury could believe that the complaints did not come out of the

blue, but as a welcome “opportunity to terminate” Zarza. Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d

428, 436 (6th Cir. 2009); see Upshaw, 576 F.3d at 590 (“Given [these] statements, a jury could

reasonably conclude that the [reasons] used to justify terminating Upshaw were contrived to mask

what was, in fact, retaliation for her complaint activity.”).

       The University adds that the timeline alone generally cannot establish causation. We agree.

Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc., 965 F.3d 443, 448–49 (6th Cir. 2020). But the timing works in

tandem with Zarza’s “other indicia [of retaliation] to support a causal connection.” Id. at 449.

       Zarza clears the prima facie case’s “low hurdle.” Gribcheck, 245 F.3d at 551.

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Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

                                               B.

       Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. At the second step of McDonnell Douglas, the

University must provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Zarza. The University

offers one: It relied on the custodians’ complaints and Brancheau’s report to fire Zarza for

“[u]nsatisfactory work performance, specifically creating a hostile work environment of fear,

intimidation, and harassment.” R.44-22 at 2. We agree with the district court that this reason

satisfies the University’s burden. Jackson v. Genesee Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 999 F.3d 333, 350 (6th

Cir. 2021).

                                               C.

       Pretext. The burden shifts to Zarza. Though her “burden is not heavy,” she must show

that the University’s proffered reason for firing her served as pretext for retaliation. George v.

Youngstown State Univ., 966 F.3d 446, 462 (6th Cir. 2020). She may do so in various ways,

including through evidence that the University’s asserted reason lacked a factual basis or did not

actually motivate the University.     Jackson, 999 F.3d at 350–51.        Ultimately, we ask a

“commonsense” question: “did the employer fire the employee for the stated reason or not?” Chen

v. Dow. Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009).

       The district court concluded that Zarza identified insufficient signs of pretext. We see

things differently. A jury could find that the University’s proffered reason—Zarza’s alleged

mistreatment of her colleagues—served as a pretext for retaliation.

       Consider the factual basis of the complaints against Zarza. Some employees found Zarza

unpleasant, abrasive, or unfair. But Zarza denies these accounts. She points to evidence that she

did not yell at her coworkers or mistreat them. And she points to evidence that she treated her

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Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

coworkers fairly and respectfully. With some evidence in her corner, Zarza creates a dispute as to

whether the University’s asserted reasons “lack a basis in fact.” Shelby Cnty., 711 F.3d at 702.

       Other realities undermine the University’s claimed rationale. Look at Zarza’s record. She

worked for the University for 14 years without “documented discipline,” as Garrett-Owens noted.

R.48-42 at 2. Zarza received a positive review from Donner in 2012, the only evaluation in the

record. And just a year before Zarza’s termination, Donner offered to recommend Zarza for a

promotion. Despite all this, Zarza’s superiors—including Garrett-Owens and Donner—fired her

just a month after complaints surfaced. A jury could find their haste suspicious, especially when

compared to their relaxed response to Zarza’s complaints of retaliation. See Kirilenko-Ison, 974

F.3d at 668.

       Couple Zarza’s abrupt suspension and termination with the proximity of her opposition to

the University’s treatment of Taylor. Recall the timing. Four months separated Zarza’s initial

complaint to Lawter from his decision to suspend her. In September, Zarza’s superiors strategized

about “the best approach to” firing her and told her to “search for a job.” R.48-42 at 2, 4. In two

months more, the University fired Zarza. During that time, Zarza repeated her support for Taylor,

as well as her belief that her superiors were retaliating against her. And on the morning of the

Disciplinary Review Conference, Brancheau heard that Taylor issued a subpoena for Zarza’s

testimony and that “another benefit [of] terminating” Zarza would be that the University would

not “be required to ‘produce’ her.” R.48-43 at 2. Altogether, a reasonable jury could find that the

University’s stated reasons “were not its true reasons.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012).

       The responses that Zarza received to her views on Taylor also suggest that retaliation

motivated Zarza’s superiors. Think of Lawter’s face turning “beet red” when Zarza claimed that

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Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

Donner illegally refused to accommodate Taylor’s disability. R.44-12 at 3; see Sloat, 18 F.4th at

213 (visible anger supported pretext). Think of her claim that Lawter “threatened” her not to

testify for Taylor. Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 668 (threat supported pretext). And think of

Brancheau and Garrett-Owens agreeing that they could “more than fire” Zarza for her stance on

Taylor’s treatment. R.48-15 at 2; see Brooker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d

1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989) (explaining that protected activity includes mistaken complaints).

       The University disagrees with this conclusion.

       Acknowledging Zarza’s position that the complaints against her lacked a basis in fact, the

University counters that it honestly believed the complaints. See Shelby Cnty., 711 F.3d at 705.

But the University failed to develop this point below (or any point on pretext), United States v.

Montgomery, 998 F.3d 693, 697–99 (6th Cir. 2021); Bard v. Brown Cnty., 970 F.3d 738, 750–51

(6th Cir. 2020), and it matters little here anyway. Whatever the University’s belief, a jury could

conclude that Zarza’s protected activity motivated the University, not the complaints from her

subordinates. Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 668.

       As with causation, the University posits that the custodians’ complaints and Brancheau’s

report had nothing to do with Zarza’s support for Taylor. A jury could find otherwise. Mingled

with other complaints about Zarza, one custodian told Lawter about Zarza’s views on Taylor. And

in one of Brancheau’s interviews, a custodian said that Zarza “told him about Robert Taylor suing

the U,” and of her “hope [that] he wins as he was done wrong.” R.44-8 at 7. Brancheau’s report

included that comment, as well as Zarza’s remark that “the University didn’t treat [Taylor] well

and she hopes he wins his lawsuit against us.” Id. at 8. That Brancheau included these statements

in her report—the same report the Disciplinary Review Conference relied on—allows a jury to

infer that opposition to Zarza’s protected acts played a role. Shelby Cnty., 711 F.3d at 704–05

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Case No. 22-1776, Zarza v. Bd. of Regents

(emphasizing emails that “consistently reflected a concern with the [protected activity]”); Jackson,

999 F.3d at 352; Briggs v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 11 F.4th 498, 515–18 (6th Cir. 2021). And a

reasonable juror could find that Brancheau was biased from the outset given her May 16 email to

Garrett-Owens asking if the University could “finally discipline” Zarza for continuing to assert

that the University failed to accommodate Taylor. R.48-15 at 2.

       The University also points to statements from Zarza’s superiors where they deny retaliating

against Zarza. A jury could find these assertions trustworthy and disregard Zarza’s contrary

evidence, but we may not. Briggs, 11 F.4th at 507. A jury must decide whether the University

acted with legitimate or retaliatory motives.

                                                IV.

       Zarza independently claims that the district court erred in addressing the pretext prong at

all, arguing that the University did not move for summary judgment on that ground. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(f); Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ., 708 F.3d 821, 829 (6th Cir. 2013). Because we identify

a material dispute of fact on pretext, we do not consider this alternative argument.

                                                V.

       We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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