Court Opinion

ID: 9743058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:24:48.0173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:38.888562
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: I would reverse and remand because of the trial court’s rulings, (1) that Mason’s testimony concerning the acts of a third person was hearsay and, (2) the refusal to make Mason a court’s witness because there was no showing of hostility on the part of the latter. Upon the first issue I cannot agree that substantial rights were not affected. The issue of knowing possession was a contested issue and its determination depends upon the inferences drawn by the trier of fact from the position of the package, described as dime-sized, found on the driver’s seat. At least two inferences were argued to the jury and the fair administration of justice requires that the defendant should be permitted to introduce admissible evidence in his defense under Supreme Court Rule 615(a). Errors affecting substantial rights may be noted. Mason cannot claim privilege against self-incrimination in behalf of the other person and the State’s argument that the evidence could not be produced because of Mason’s claim of privilege is not persuasive. The record shows Mason’s answer in part: “I know how and why the packet was there, but I take the Fifth on answering whether I put it in there or not.” Such statement does not necessarily support an inference that Mason’s claim of privilege for his own acts would make unavailable testimony as to the acts of the third party. The foundation for designating a witness as a court’s witness as stated in People v. Robinson (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 713, 361 N.E.2d 138, and its cited cases should not be intermingled and confused with the foundation in proceeding as with a hostile witness. While in People v. Bridgeforth (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 52, 281 N.E.2d 617, the term “court’s witness” was used, the foundation in the evidence was entirely directed to the showing of bias and hostility of the witness toward the defendant. Here, it was represented to the court and the record shows that Mason had been convicted upon 11 counts of perjury, as well as other felonies, and that the defendant could not vouch for the witness’ veracity. It was also represented to the court that defendant was an eyewitness to the transaction at the automobile and that his testimony was essential to preventing a miscarriage of justice. It is not apparent how hostility is a necessary part of the foundation under such circumstances. It is too speculative for this court to conclude at this time that examination of Mason as upon cross-examination would have been fruitless.