Court Opinion

ID: 9739543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:17:19.7748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.885039
License: Public Domain

R.S. Smith, J. (dissenting).
Since the enactment of CPLR 1411 in 1975, it has been the general rule that plaintiffs own culpability will not bar his claim, but will only be grounds for apportioning fault. In several cases, however, we have recognized that a plaintiffs fault may be so egregious in comparison to the defendant’s that it “supersede^] defendants’ conduct” (Egan v A.J. Constr. Corp., 94 NY2d 839, 841 [1999]) and becomes the “sole legal cause” (Olsen v Town of Richfield, 81 NY2d 1024, 1026 [1993]) or “sole proximate cause” (Howard v Poseidon Pools, 72 NY2d 972, 975 [1988]) of the plaintiff’s injuries. I believe the facts of this case bring it within the superseding cause doctrine.
Plaintiff here was reckless twice. It was, of course, very foolish for him and his companions to choose a narrow catwalk next to the subway tracks for pedestrian travel. But plaintiff would have escaped unharmed if he and the others, when they heard a train coming, had done what minimal common sense would require—stand still, as far as they could get from the tracks, and let the train pass by. Instead, they chose to race the train to the next station. On these facts, I think it is fair to say that plaintiffs injuries were entirely his own fault, even if a nonnegligent motorman might have been able to stop the train in time to avoid the accident.
While no two cases are identical, precedents support the view that this plaintiffs recklessness was serious enough to be a “superseding cause.” In Merino v New York City Tr. Auth. (89 NY2d 824, 825 [1996]) we refused recovery to a plaintiff who had fallen onto the subway tracks as a result of his own intoxication, holding, as an alternative ground for dismissal, that *495plaintiff “failed to show that the defendant’s alleged negligence was a substantial factor in causing his injury.” Several Appellate Division cases also deny recovery on superseding cause grounds to plaintiffs who put themselves in the paths of trains (e.g., Wadhwa v Long Is. R.R., 13 AD3d 615 [2d Dept 2004]; Lassalle v New York City Tr. Auth., 11 AD3d 661 [2d Dept 2004]; Snyder v New York City Tr. Auth., 2 AD3d 162 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 707 [2004]; Gao Yi Feng v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 285 AD2d 447 [2d Dept 2001]). Gao Yi Feng is perhaps the closest to this case on its facts: the plaintiff there was struck while standing “directly adjacent to the train tracks with his back to oncoming trains” (285 AD2d at 447).
Cases denying recovery, even under a comparative negligence regime, to highly reckless plaintiffs speak of causation in defending their results, but in each case it is clear that the extraordinary degree of the plaintiffs fault—not just the foreseeability of the plaintiffs conduct—has been decisive. A pure foreseeability analysis does not explain the cases. For example, I would not hesitate to uphold an award if this plaintiff had been pushed by someone else into the path of the train, rather than recklessly placing himself there, though there is not much difference in the foreseeability of the two events.
The principle we have applied in previous cases, and should apply here, is that people whose failure to take care of themselves is extreme may not shift any of the consequences to others. Anyone of normal human compassion will sympathize with plaintiff; he is not the only 18 year old who ever acted recklessly, and he has paid a much higher price for it than most. But I do not think it consistent with law or wise policy to hold, as the majority does, that the New York City Transit Authority must compensate him in part for his loss. The Transit Authority moved, before the case was submitted to the jury, for a directed verdict, asserting that plaintiffs reckless conduct was the sole legal cause of the accident. I think that motion should have been granted.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges G.B. Smith and Read concur with Judge Ciparick; Judge R.S. Smith dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Judges Rosenblatt and Graffeo concur.
Order affirmed, with costs.