Court Opinion

ID: 9593685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:23:59.221378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:31.733222
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice, specially concurring,
with whom GOLDEN, J., joins.
I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion in this case. I am satisfied that the convictions of the appellants were final and, consequently, no relief is indicated because of the potential petition for certiorari.
I am concerned about the apparent limitation of a requirement which has been adopted as an aspect of the strict scrutiny standard. The strict scrutiny standard itself is designed to protect the right of familial association which we have concluded is a fundamental liberty. DS & RS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo.1980). We have held that it arises from the conflict between the fundamental liberty of familial association and the compelling interest of the State in protecting the welfare of children. Matter of MLM, 682 P.2d 982 (Wyo.1984); Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo.1984); Matter of SKJ, 673 P.2d 640 (Wyo.1983).
*558The second aspect of the fourth ground for termination of parent/child legal relationships found in § 14-2-309, W.S.1977:
“(iv) The parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent is unfit to have the custody and control of the child.” (emphasis added)
is very similar to the second element found in subsection (iii) of that statute. I am not persuaded that our prior cases have limited the less intrusive means standard to the second element of the third ground for termination of parent/child relationships, and I believe that it is an appropriate standard to apply whenever the parent/child legal relationship is to be dissolved. In TR v. Washakie County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 736 P.2d 712 (Wyo.1987), we actually described that standard in the alternative, i.e., “a less intrusive or restrictive method of protecting the child has been attempted or is impractical.” Washakie County DPASS, 736 P.2d at 718. The trial court did not address either of these alternatives, but I am satisfied that this is an instance in which a less intrusive or restrictive method of protecting the child is impractical and, for that reason, I do join in the disposition of this case.
I would prefer that there be found in a record an articulation of those reasons which persuade a trial court that a less intrusive or restrictive method of protecting the child has been attempted and been unsuccessful, or is impractical under the circumstances. That approach would be of significant assistance to this court in considering claims that appropriate alternatives have not been pursued in the context of the standard of strict scrutiny. I also add that, given the circumstances of this case, the resolution is obvious.
Considering the potential for alternative custodial techniques which are becoming more present in our society because of the inability of governments to maintain penal institutions adequate to house all those who deserve commitment, institutional incarceration due to conviction of a felony might not automatically be imposed in every instance in the future. A parent could be convicted of a crime which did not involve the child and then be incarcerated but, instead of jail, be placed under electronically monitored custody confining the parent to the home, the block, or the neighborhood. In such a circumstance, it indeed would be appropriate to require a finding that less intrusive or restrictive methods of protecting the child have been attempted and found unsuccessful or, for some reason, were impractical. In many such instances, the child might well successfully live at home just as he or she had prior to the conviction of the parent.
I would affirm this case because of the obvious impracticality of less intrusive alternatives, but I would require that, in those instances in which the termination of parental rights is sought relying upon the fourth ground set forth in § M-2-309, W.S.1977, there be a showing in connection with the element of unfitness that a less intrusive or restrictive method of protecting the child has been considered and abandoned as unsuccessful or found, for articu-lable reasons, to be impractical.1

. I note the effort to nominate the paternal grandparents as surrogate parents here, but that arrangement is not a less intrusive means designed to preserve the familial relationship that the standard protects. It is really no different than permitting a parent whose rights are in jeopardy to nominate a foster parent, and that is not what the phrase ‘less intrusive or restrictive methods” connotes.