Court Opinion

ID: 9784065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:36:49.38581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:48.089815
License: Public Domain

Judge WESTON,
dissents.
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the Court for two reasons:
*43I believe that the strict application of the holding in State v. Schumacher 131 Idaho 484, 959 P.2d 465 (Ct.App.1998) to the facts of a case in which the defendant received a withheld judgment and has successfully completed probation is erroneous. In Shumacher, the defendant was convicted of two counts of delivery of a controlled substance. This conviction resulted in the loss of the defendant’s civil rights because of the operation of Article VI, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution.1 A defendant who has been convicted must seek the expungement of his conviction under I.C. § 19-2604. Schumacher notes that this is “an extraordinary remedy” which is denied to probationers who have been adjudicated to be in violation of the terms of their probation. It seems clear that under I.C. § 19-2604 a defendant who seeks to have his conviction expunged from the record carries the burden of producing evidence and also the burden of persuading the court that the expungement of the felony conviction is in the best interest of society.
However, the case takes a different posture when the trial court has withheld the imposition of judgment and placed the defendant on probation for a stated period of time. The defendant has not lost his rights of citizenship under Article VI, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution because the defendant has not been convicted of a felony. The civil rights of a defendant who has been granted a withheld judgment and placed on probation are merely suspended during the period of probation by operation of I.C. § 18-310. However, I.C. § 18-310(2) is clear that upon completion of probation the suspension of the defendant’s civil rights is lifted and the defendant is automatically “restored to the full rights of citizenship” upon satisfactory completion of probation.2 Under I.C. § 18-310(2) the defendant need not establish that he “at all times has complied with the terms of probation” as required by the language of I.C. § 19-2604(1). In order to have his plea of guilty withdrawn and the case dismissed, the defendant is necessarily proceeding under I.C. § 19-2604(1) which requires the exercise of discretion by the Court. I agree with the majority opinion that the trial court was in error in its opinion that the Court did not have discretion; a decision under I.C. § 19-2604(1) always calls for the exercise of discretion. However, in the case of a defendant who has never been convicted of a felony, and who has been released from probation, the quantum of proof should not be as strict as a defendant who has been convicted of a felony.
My second ground for dissenting from the majority opinion is based upon the posture of the case as it was presented to the trial court and to this court. I believe that any error on the part of the trial court was harmless. The probation officer who was handling the defendant’s case filed a Request and Order of Discharge on October 2, 2000, reciting that the defendant “has satisfactorily complied with the terms and conditions of the probation and cannot be further aided by probation supervision ____” and requesting that the defendant be discharged from probation. The prosecuting attorney approved and joined in the motion by signing the Request for Order of Discharge. The defendant was discharged from probation on October 30, 2000, and restored to his full rights of citizenship by operation of I.C. § 18-310(2). On January 16, 2001, the defendant then moved to set aside his plea of guilty and dismiss the case. The prosecuting attorney filed a response to that motion which pointed out that during the term of the defendant’s probation *44there had been two reports of violation filed against the defendant which were later withdrawn. The prosecuting attorney then submitted “this matter to the court for decision without hearing or argument.” The trial court properly held that unadjudicated and withdrawn ■ allegations of violation were, standing alone, of no consequence.3 In my opinion, the trial court and the defendant were both entitled to rely upon the record which contained the motion of the probation officer (which was approved by the prosecuting attorney) that the defendant had satisfactorily complied with the terms of probation. I would affirm the action of the trial court.

. § 3. Disqualification of certain persons. — No person is permitted to vote, serve as a juror, or hold any civil office who is under guardianship, or who, has, at any place, been convicted of a felony, and who has not been restored to the rights of citizenship....

. 18-310. Imprisonment — Effect on civil rights and offices. — (1) A sentence of custody to the Idaho state board of correction suspends all of the civil rights of the person so sentenced including the right to refuse treatment authorized by the sentencing court, and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts, authority or power during such imprisonment ..., and provided further that any such person may lawfully exercise all civil rights that are not political during any period of parole or probation____
(2) Upon final discharge of a person convicted of any Idaho felony ... a person shall be restored the full rights of citizenship. As used in this subsection "final discharge” means satisfactory completion of imprisonment, probation and parole as the case may be.

. Technically, the Reports of Violation fail to allege a violation. They merely recite that the defendant is behind in is payments and fail to allege that the arrearage is "willful” as required by State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 870 P.2d 1337 (Ct.App.1994).