Court Opinion

ID: 9897462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:15.911149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:48.826736
License: Public Domain

Li
                                                             139 Nev., Advance Opinion

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                   PARVIZ EIVAZI,                                       No. 84427-COA
                   Appellant,
                   vs.
                   FATEMEH EIVAZI,
                                                                             FL
                   Respondent.                                               OCT 05 2023

                                                                        BY
                                                                             C EF DEPUTY CLERK

                               Appeal from a district court decree of divorce. Eighth Judicial
                   District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Nancy Saitta, Sr. Judge.'
                               Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

                   Hofland & Tomsheck and Bradley J. Hofland, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Radford J. Smith, Chartered, and Garima Jain and Radford J. Smith,
                   Henderson,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
                   WESTBROOK, JJ.

                                                   OPINION

                   By the Court, WESTBROOK, J.:
                               In this opinion, we take the opportunity to caution both
                   practitioners and district courts of the dangers inherent in the practice of

                         'District Court Judge Nadin Cutter is now assigned to the case.
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                    adopting wholesale a litigant's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
                    law. In this case, following lengthy divorce proceedings, the district court
                    summarily adopted respondent Fatemeh Eivazi's proposed 61-page findings
                    of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce as drafted, without making
                    any modifications. Appellant Parviz Eivazi contends that it was reversible
                    error for the district court to do so. We conclude that utilizing a party's
                    proposed order does not in and of itself constitute an abuse of discretion, as
                    the practice of requesting and adopting proposed orders from the parties is
                    both well established and often necessary to the administration of justice.
                    Nevertheless, we strongly urge both litigants and judges to exercise care
                    when preparing and adopting such orders.
                                Practitioners should ensure that proposed orders are both

                    factually accurate and legally adequate, and courts should diligently
                    exercise their discretion and thoroughly review litigant-drafted orders
                    before adopting them. In this case, while portions of the decree are legally
                    and factually supportable, other parts contain numerous legal and factual
                    deficiencies. With respect to the latter, we conclude that the district court
                    abused its discretion when it granted financial awards for alimony, attorney
                    fees, and expert fees and when it unequally distributed the parties'
                    community property and debt. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in
                    part, and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings
                    consistent with this opinion.
                                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTOR Y
                                Although previously married in Iran, Parviz and Fatemeh
                    moved to the United States and were married in Las Vegas in 2001.

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                   Faterneh filed for divorce in June 2016.2 From the inception of the case, the
                   divorce proceedings were drawn out and highly contested. In the first year
                   alone, both parties filed multiple motions and countermotions, requesting
                   attorney fees and costs in connection with those filings. The district court
                   entered numerous orders granting and denying the parties' various
                   requests for attorney fees and costs, and Fatemeh did not move to
                   reconsider any of these orders.
                                   In April 2017, Parviz filed a motion for summary judgment
                   related to the parties' marriage in Iran and again requested attorney fees
                   and costs. Fatemeh opposed the motion and also sought attorney fees and
                   costs in connection with that motion under EDCR 7.60(b) and NRS
                   18.010(2)(b), on grounds that Parviz had multiplied the proceedings in a
                   manner that increased costs unreasonably and vexatiously and because his
                   motion was maintained without reasonable grounds or to harass. Because
                   there were genuine disputes of material fact, the district court denied
                   Parviz's motion for surnmary judgment but scheduled an evidentiary
                   hearing to resolve three discrete issues. The court deferred the parties'
                   pending motions for attorney fees and costs until that time.
                                   The pretrial evidentiary hearing was held over a three-day

                   period in October 2017, May 2018, and June 2018. Following this hearing,
                   the district court entered a minute order in November 2018, ruling in favor
                   of Fatemeh on all three issues, providing that the parties "would bear their
                   own fees and costs," and directing Fatemeh to prepare the order. A year

                               the initiation of divorce proceedings, Parviz filed for Chapter
                         2 After

                   13 bankruptcy. Prior to the entry of the divorce decree, Parviz's debt was
                   reduced from approximately $187,000 to $65,000, and Parviz was making
                   monthly payments towards the principal amount.
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                   later, Fatemeh still had not prepared the order. So, in November 2019,
                   Parviz prepared an order that was filed by the district court. After Parviz
                   served Fatemeh with a copy of the order, Fatemeh filed a notice of entry of
                   order in December 2019. On the same day, she moved for reconsideration
                   of that order.
                               In her motion for reconsideration, Fatemeh argued she was
                   entitled to all attorney fees from the inception of the case through the
                   evidentiary hearing—not just the fees that related to the summary
                   judgment motion and evidentiary hearing that the district court had denied
                   in its December 2019 order.      In the motion, Fatemeh also requested
                   reconsideration as to expert fees, but she did not seek reconsideration as to
                   costs. The district court granted Fatemeh's motion for reconsideration and
                   set the case for tria1.3
                                A divorce trial was held over three days in June, July, and
                   August 2020 to address the parties' remaining contested issues. During the
                   trial, Faterneh alleged that Parviz had wasted a substantial amount of
                   community funds and presented an expert forensic accountant who
                   identified potential waste. Analyzing financial transactions from 2011 to
                   2017, Fatemeh's expert determined that a variety of "unknown or
                   unsupported transactions" constituted potential marital waste in the
                   aggregate amount of $208,294. Fatemeh posited that these transactions
                   were waste because she had no knowledge of them and did not consent to
                   the depletion of the community funds. When asked about the expenditures
                   at trial, Parviz testified that the funds were used for marital expenses

                         Although the district court granted Fatemeh's motion for
                         3
                   reconsideration, it did not enter an order formally awarding Fatemeh her
                   requested fees until the entry of the divorce decree.
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                   including education, travel, jewelry for Fatemeh, fertility treatments, home
                   improvements, a down payment on a new home, and cash given directly to
                   Faterneh.
                               Fatemeh and Parviz each also testified about their respective

                   employment status.    Fatemeh was previously employed full time as an

                   ultrasound technician, but she suffered injuries during a car accident in
                   2018. Following her accident, Fatemeh initially worked part time, but in
                   2019 she ceased employment completely due to her physical limitations.

                   Parviz was employed full time as a scientist with the Las Vegas Valley
                   Water District.   During the trial, however, Parviz testified that he had

                   several health problems and that he was currently using his accrued sick
                   days pending his request for FMLA leave.
                               At the conclusion of the trial, the district court asked both
                   parties to submit proposed orders. They complied, and in February 2021,
                   the district court entered Faterneh's 61-page proposed findings of fact,
                   conclusions of law, and decree of divorce in its entirety, without
                   modification. Although the decree noted that neither party had significant
                   assets, the decree awarded Fatemeh $5,000 per month in alimony for ten
                   years, $176,976.99 in attorney fees and costs from the inception of the case
                   through the pretrial evidentiary hearing, and $19,565 in expert fees. The
                   decree ordered Parviz to reimburse Fatemeh $59,000 for monies she used
                   "to fund the litigation." The decree also made an unequal distribution of
                   community property and debt, requiring Parviz to reimburse Fatemeh for
                   half of the wasted community assets in the amount of $100,357.50 and
                   ordering Parviz to pay half of Fatemeh's credit card debt while Parviz
                   remained solely responsible for his bankruptcy debt. In total, the decree
                   required Parviz to pay Fatemeh more than $400,000.         In addition, the

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                        decree ordered Parviz to sell the marital home. Lastly, the decree provided
                        that any unpaid balance would be reduced to judgment and accrue interest.
                                    After entry of the decree, both Fatemeh and Parviz filed
                        motions to amend the decree. The district court denied Parviz's motion but
                        granted Fatemeh's motion in part and ordered that Fatemeh would also
                        receive nearly the entire value of Parviz's retirement account, which the
                        decree had previously split evenly between them, to satisfy the financial
                        obligations that remained after the sale of the marital home.4 Parviz timely
                        appealed.
                                                        ANALYSIS
                                    In this appeal, we address the following issues: (1) whether the
                        district court abused its discretion when it adopted Fatemeh's proposed
                        decree verbatim in its entirety; (2) whether the district court abused its
                        discretion when it found marital waste because Parviz was unable to
                        account for unknown transactions by clear and convincing evidence;
                        (3)whether the district court adequately considered the alimony factors in
                        NRS 125.150(9), including Fatemeh's need for alimony and Parviz's ability
                        to pay, when it awarded Fatemeh alimony of $5,000 per month for ten years;
                        (4) whether the district court abused its discretion when it awarded
                        Fatemeh attorney fees from the inception of litigation through the
                        evidentiary hearing, $59,000 to reimburse her for money she borrowed to
                        fund the litigation, and expert fees; and (5) whether the district court
                        abused its discretion in connection with other miscellaneous financial
                        awards and allocations in the divorce decree.

                             4 0n appeal, Parviz does not challenge any of the district court's
                        rulings on the parties' post-decree motions, including the court's
                        redistribution of his retirement account.
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                                This court reviews a district court's alimony determinations,

                   attorney fee awards, and disposition of community property, including any
                   underlying marital waste determinations, for an abuse of discretion. Kogod
                   v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 75, 439 P.3d 397, 406 (2019).        This court

                   reviews the district court's factual findings deferentially and will not set
                   them aside unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial
                   evidence. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009).
                   Substantial evidence "is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as
                   adequate to sustain a judgment." Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161
                   P.3d 239, 242 (2007).
                                "Although this court reviews a district court's discretionary
                   determinations deferentially, deference is not owed to legal error" or
                   findings so conclusory that they mask legal error. Davis v. Ewalefo, 131
                   Nev. 445, 450, 352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015). The district court "must have
                   reached its conclusions for the appropriate reasons," Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149,
                   161 P.3d at 241-42, and if there are no facts explaining how the district
                   court reached its conclusions, this court cannot determine whether those
                   conclusions were made for appropriate reasons, see Davis, 131 Nev. at 451-
                   52, 352 P.3d at 1143 (explaining that: because the district court did not tie
                   its factual findings to its conclusion, the appellate court "cannot say with
                   assurance that the ... determination was made for appropriate legal
                   reasons").
                   Adopting Faterneh's proposed decree verbatim was not, by itself, an abuse of
                   discretion
                                Parviz initially contends that the divorce decree must be set
                   aside because the district court accepted Fatemeh's proposed decree in its
                   entirety, without making any modifications. Parviz argues that, by doing
                   so, the district court abdicated its judicial role and, necessarily, abused its
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                   discretion. We disagree that a district court abuses its discretion simply by
                   entering an order proposed by one of t.he litigants without modification;
                   however, we caution courts and practitioners alike that there are risks
                   inherent in this practice, and scrutiny should be given to the contents of any
                   proposed orders before entering them.       See Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v.

                   Westland Liberty Vill., LLC, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 57, 515 P.3d 329, 337 n.6
                   (2022) (urging district courts "to scrutinize [proposed] draft orders, being
                   mindful that they assume responsibility for those findings and attendant
                   rulings upon entry of the order").
                               At the outset, we note that in the Eighth Judicial District
                   Court's Family Division, the court rules expressly contemplate that parties
                   may submit proposed orders for consideration and adoption by the court.
                   See EDCR 5.515 ("Proposed orders may include such findings, conclusions,
                   and orders as the submitting party believes relevant to each point in dispute
                   in the proceedings."). Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court I1ias recognized
                   that a district court may properly adopt a party's proposed order, provided
                   that the opposing party is apprised of the order and given an opportunity to
                   respond. See Byford v. State, 123 Nev. 67, 69, 156 P.3d 691, 692 (2007)
                   (discussing the predecessor to Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC)
                   Cannon 2, Rule 2.6(a), which was substantively identical to the present
                   rule).5

                         5Although   NCJC Cannon 2, Rule 2.6(a) does not include the
                   commentary from the former version of the rule that was discussed in
                   Byford, the decision's rationale remains equally applicable today given that
                   the current rule still requires the district court to "accord to every person
                   who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right
                   to be heard according to the law."
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                                  Parviz does not argue on appeal that he did not have an
                   opportunity to respond to Fatemeh's proposed decree prior to the district
                   court's adoption. In fact, the record reflects that both parties timely emailed
                   their proposed decrees to the court and copied opposing counsel on those
                   emails, at which point either party could have raised objections thereto.
                   Further, after entry of the decree, Parviz had an opportunity, under NRCP
                   52(b), to request amendments to the decree. See NRCP 52(b) ("On a party's
                   motion...the        court   may   amend       its findings—or   make   additional

                   findings—and may amend the judgment accordingly."); cf. Byford, 123 Nev.
                   at 70, 156 P.3d at 693. The availability of this procedure offers an additional
                   level of protection to litigants in the event that they believe the district
                   court's findings and conclusions are improper. In this case, Parviz availed
                   himself of that opportunity by filing a motion to amend the decree.
                                  Nevertheless, Parviz contends that the district court erred by
                   adopting Fatemeh's proposed order verbatim based on several cases that
                   have criticized the practice of district courts adopting litigant-drafted
                   orders.     See, e.g., Anderson u. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985)
                   (stating that "[w]e, too, have criticized courts for their verbatim adoption of
                   findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties" and noting "the potential for
                   overreaching and exaggeration on the part of attorneys preparing findings
                   of fact"); In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 275 (11th Cir. 1987) ("The
                   dangers inherent in litigants ghostwriting opinions are readily apparent");
                   Chudasama u. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1373 n.46 (11th Cir.
                   1997) (explaining that "[w]e have consistently frowned upon the practice of
                   delegating the tasks of drafting important opinions to litigants," as the
                   ,
                       `practice harms the quality of the district court's deliberative process");
                   Harris v. Davis, 88 N.E.3d 1081, 1086 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (stating that

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                   "[w]hen a trial court adopts verbatim a party's proposed findings and
                   conclusions," it "weakens our confidence as an appellate court that the
                   findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court" (internal
                   quotation marks omitted)).
                               Although these cases strongly discourage the practice of
                   adopting litigant-drafted orders verbatim, they do not support Parviz's
                   argument that the practice is itself an independent basis for reversal. For
                   instance, in Anderson, the United States Supreme Court explained that
                   l<even when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings

                   are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous." 470
                   U.S. at 572. The Supreme Court declined to subject the district court's
                   findings to a more stringent appellate review than called for by the
                   applicable rules. Id. at 572-73. Likewise, in In re Colony Square, the United
                   States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained that "[t]he fact
                   that a judge allowed a litigant to draft the court's orders without notice to
                   the opposing party" did not automatically invalidate those orders absent a
                   finding that the opposing party was denied a meaningful opportunity to be
                   heard. 819 F.2d at 276-77. In Saylor v. State, also cited by Parviz, the
                   Indiana    Supreme     Court    concluded    that   "although     we    do   not
                   encourage ... judges to adopt wholesale the findings and conclusions of
                   eit.her party, we decline to find bias solely on that basis. The critical inquiry
                   is whether the findings adopted by the court are clearly erroneous." 765
                   N.E.2d 535, 565 (Ind. 2002), reu'd on reh'g on other grounds, 808 N.E.2d 646
                   (Ind. 2004); .see also Harris, 88 N.E.3d at 1086 n.2 (stating that when a trial
                   court adopts a party's proposed order without modification, "it does not alter
                   our standard of review"); Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1373 n.46 (recognizing
                   "that the district court's adoption of [a party's] draft orders nearly verbatim

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                   does not affect our standard of review" and also "does not automatically
                   create an appearance of impropriety that would require the district court
                   judge to recuse" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                               Caselaw from the Nevada Supreme Court also undermines
                   Parviz's argument. In Foley v. Morse & Mowbray, the appellant made a
                   similar argument challenging a district court's adoption of a proposed order
                   "without any changes." 109 Nev. 116, 123, 848 P.2d 519, 524 (1993). The
                   supreme court evaluated the substance of the district court's order for
                   potential error. The court identified errors as to certain findings of fact and
                   conclusions of law because those particular findings were not supported by
                   the record, but the court approved the remainder of the district court's
                   order. Id. at 124, 848 P.2d at 524. Thus, in analyzing the contents of the
                   district court's order, the supreme court implicitly rejected the appellant's
                   claim that adopting the respondent's proposed order "without any changes"
                   was itself error. Icl. at 123-24, 848 P.2d at 524.
                               As noted above, we recognize that numerous authorities have
                   criticized, discouraged, and condemned the practice of courts adopting
                   verbatim orders and findings of fact prepared by prevailing parties. See,
                   e.g.. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 571. We, too, share these concerns. See Fed.
                   Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 515 P.3d at 337 n.6. Nonetheless, we also recognize that
                   asking litigants to submit proposed orders is a customary practice that is
                   often necessary for the timely administration of justice. See, e.g., Prowell v.
                   State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 708-09 (Ind. 2001) (providing that courts may adopt
                   a proposed party's findings because "trial courts of this state are faced with
                   an enormous volume of cases" and "the need to keep the docket moving is
                   properly a high priority of our trial bench"). Further, NRCP 52(b) protects
                   parties by providing the opportunity to object to and amend such findings,

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                   and Parviz did in fact avail himself of that opportunity. See Foley, 109 Nev.
                   at 123-24, 848 P.2d at 524 (citing Foster v. Bank of Am., 77 Nev. 365, 365
                   P.2d 313 (1961)). Therefore, although a district court's verbatim adoption
                   of a litigant's entire proposed order is not recommended as sound judicial
                   practice, we cannot conclude under these circumstances that doing so is, in
                   and of itself, an abuse of discretion. Rather, as in Foley, we will analyze the
                   content and substance of the proposed order that was adopted by the district
                   court and decide whether any particular findings of fact and conclusions of
                   law were unsupported by substantial evidence or legally erroneous. Ogawa,
                   125 Nev. at 668, 672, 221 P.3d at 704, 707.
                               Although the district court did not abuse its discretion by
                   adopting Fatemeh's proposed decree verbatim, when it did so, the court and
                   the practitioners assumed the risk that any legal or factual errors contained
                   in that decree might be reversible. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 515 P.3d at 337
                   n.6. And in this case, Fatemeh's proposed decree contained several legal
                   and factual deficiencies, particularly in relation to the monetary awards and
                   allocations, which we address in turn.
                   The district court abused its discretion in finding marital waste
                                In its decree, the district court made an unequal disposition of
                   community property in favor of Fatemeh in the amount of $100,357.50 to
                   account for marital waste. Parviz challenges this disposition on multiple
                   grounds. He alleges the district court abused its discretion when it failed
                   to distinguish between waste and discretionary expenditures, applied an
                   erroneous legal standard that negligent expenditures of community funds
                   constituted waste, and imposed an improper burden on him to prove that
                   all expenditures made during the marriage without Fatemeh's knowledge
                   were not waste.

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                               A district court must make an equal disposition of community
                   property in a divorce unless there is a "compelling reason" to make an
                   unequal disposition. NRS 125.150(1)(b); see also Kogod, 135 Nev. at 75, 439
                   P.3d at 406.    "Dissipation," also known as "waste," can constitute a

                   compelling reason for an unequal disposition of community property.
                   Kogod, 135 Nev. at 75, 439 P.3d at 406; see also Lofgren v. Lofgren, 112 Nev.
                   1282, 1283, 926 P.2d 296, 297 (1996) ("[I]f community property is lost,
                   expended or destroyed through the intentional misconduct of one spouse,
                   the court may consider such misconduct as a compelling reason for making
                   an unequal disposition of community property and may appropriately
                   augment the other spouse's share of the remaining community property.").
                   "Generally, the dissipation [or waste] which a court may consider refers to
                   one spouse's use of marital property for a selfish purpose unrelated to the
                   marriage in contemplation of divorce or at a time when the marriage is in
                   serious jeopardy or is undergoing an irretrievable breakdown." Kogod, 135
                   Nev. at •75-76, 439 P.3d at 406-07 (quoting 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
                   Separation § 524 (2018)); see also Dissipation, Black's Law Dictionary (11.th
                   ed. 2019) (defining "dissipation" as "[t]he use of an asset for an illegal or
                   inequitable purpose, such as a spouse's use of community property for
                   personal benefit when a divorce is imminent").
                               In Kogod, the supreme court analyzed various types of
                   expenditures to determine if they constituted dissipation or waste. Initially,
                   the court pointed out that when community property is spent on
                   extramarital affairs, those expenditures will almost always constitute
                   waste. Kogod, 135 Nev. at 76, 439 P.3d at 407. Such expenditures are
                   waste, regardless of when they occur, because the act of engaging in an
                   extramarital affair is inherently inimical to the marital relationship. As a

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                   result, Kogod upheld an unequal disposition of community property in the
                   amount that a husband spent on extramarital affairs throughout the
                   marriage Id.
                                ln contrast, when community property is spent on gifts to
                   family members, such expenditures do not necessarily constitute waste
                   because supporting one's family does not inherently undermine the marital
                   relationship. Whether gifts to family members constitute waste ultimately
                   depends on the timing and circumstances of those gifts.       In Kogod, the

                   supreme court explained that "[a]bsent a specific injunction, a gift to a
                   family member is not [waste] if there is an established pattern or history of
                   giving such gifts to family members during the marriage." Id. at 77, 439
                   P.3d at 407. On the other hand, a gift to a family member could constitute
                   waste if there was "no previous history of gift giving or the amount of the
                   gift during the divorce [was] substantially greater than past gifts." Id. at
                   77, 439 P.3d at 408. Accordingly, the supreme court agreed with the district
                   court that a husband's "long-standing and regular" expenditures on his
                   family were not waste because he "routinely gave money to his family
                   throughout the marriage, and often did so without consulting" his wife. Id.
                   In contrast, the supreme court also agreed that the husband's post-
                   separation payments that occurred after a joint preliminary injunction,
                   which were neither regular nor routine, were properly characterized as
                   waste. Id.
                                Kogod also recognized that waste committed after separation or
                   during an irreconcilable breakdown of the marriage is distinguishable from
                   overconsumption during the marriage. Id. at 78-79, 439 P.3d at 408-09; see
                   Putterrnan v. Putterrnan, 113 Nev. 606, 609, 939 P.2d 1047, 1048 (1997) ("It
                   should be kept in mind that the secreting or wasting of community assets

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                   while divorce proceedings are pending is to be distinguished from
                   undercontributing or overconsuming of community assets during the
                   marriage.").     Thus, the court instructed district courts to "differentiate

                   between ordinary consumption for higher-income earners . . . which is not
                   necessarily dissipation, and misappropriation of community assets solely
                   for personal gain." Kogod, 135 Nev. at 78, 439 P.3d at 408.
                                  Unlike the wasted funds spent on the husband's extramarital

                   affairs, which were inherently adverse to the marriage, Kogod concluded

                   that the district court erroneously found waste when the husband could not
                   prove that unexplained expenditures affirmatively served a marital
                   purpose. Id. at 78-79, 439 P.3d at 408-09. After the wife's forensic expert
                   examined the parties' finances and identified millions of dollars in unknown
                   transactions, or "potential community waste," the district court required the
                   husband to account for each of the transactions and demonstrate that those
                   transactions were not waste. Id. at 78, 439 P.3d at 408. When the husband
                   was unable to do so, the district court made an unequal disposition of
                   community property to the wife, in the amount of more than $2 million, to
                   account for the potential community waste. Id. at 78-79, 439 P.3d at 408-
                   09.
                                  The supreme court deemed this to be error and reversed the
                   district court's unequal disposition of community property that related to
                   this purported waste. Id. In doing so, the supreme court noted that the
                   district court did not require the husband "to account for these expenditures
                   because [his wife] raised a reasonable inference that the transactions
                   furthered a purpose inimical to the marriage, that he rnade them to
                   diminish [his wife's] community share, or even that they were unusually
                   large withdrawals from community accounts." Id. at 78, 439 P.3d at 408.

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                   Rather, the district court required the husband to prove that the
                   expenditures were not waste "because they exceeded [the husband's] self-
                   described monthly expenses" and he failed to provide his own forensic
                   accounting after promising to do so. Id. Thus, the supreme court concluded
                   that the husband's inability to account for unknown expenses did not
                   demonstrate a compelling reason for an unequal disposition of community
                   assets. Id. at 409, 439 P.3d at 79.
                               Just like in Kogod, in this case Fatemeh presented an expert

                   forensic accountant at trial who identified potential marital waste in the
                   form of unknown transactions. Although Faterneh did not file for divorce
                   until June 2016, her expert analyzed financial transactions from 2011 to
                   2017 and determined that a variety of "unknown or unsupported
                   transactions" constituted potential waste in the amount of $208,294.6     At

                   trial, Fatemeh testified that she believed Parviz used community funds to
                   purchase a condominium in Iran for his mother, but the district court did
                   not make any findings as to whether he, in fact, did so, or whether any
                   particular transaction reflected such a purchase. Rather, the district court
                   simply listed in the decree four categories of potential waste identified by
                   Fatemeh's expert, including (1) "[u]nknown checks" in the amount of
                   $53,438 between April 2011 and July 2017; (2) "[c]ash" in the amount of
                   $120,865 between October 2013 and July 2016; (3) a transfer to "someone
                   by the name of 'Yousfi" in the amount of $10,000 in December 2013; and
                   (4) "[u]nknown withdrawals" of cash in the amount of $16,412 from 2010
                   through 2014. The district court determined that Faterneh demonstrated a
                   prima facie case for "breach of fiduciary duty in the form of community

                        6The decree identified waste in the amount of $200,715.    The reason
                   for the discrepancy between the expert report and the decree is unclear.
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                     waste," ostensibly because Faterneh did not know how these funds were
                     spent and therefore did not consent to the expenditures. And the court
                     determined that Parviz "failed to meet his burden of proof by the 'clear and
                     convincing' standard to explain the waste identified by Fatemeh and he
                     failed to provide any independent accounting of that waste."
                                  When asked about the expenditures at trial, Parviz testified
                     that the funds were used for various marital expenses. However, the
                     district court found that Parviz's testimony "d[id] not explain" the waste
                     and concluded that, because he failed to account for the missing funds, all
                     of the unknown expenditures constituted marital waste. Ultimately, the
                     court ordered Parviz to reimburse Fatemeh for one half of this "waste" by
                     making an unequal disposition of community property in Faterneh's favor
                     in the amount of $100,357.50. This was an abuse of discretion.
                                 Because    the   district    court's   waste   analysis   included
                     expenditures that were made during the six-year period before Fatemeh
                     filed for divorce, the parties' briefing addresses the theoretical issue of
                     whether waste can occur at any time during a marriage, or whether waste
                     can occur only after a marriage has undergone an irretrievable breakdown.
                     Kogod did not squarely address that question, and we need not resolve it
                     here, because we conclude that regardless of when the alleged waste may
                     have occurred, the district court made the very same error that the supreme
                     court deemed reversible in Kogod—"requiring [Parviz] to explain everyday
                     expenditures over the course of several years, including before this divorce

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            crAR*3
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01 1947H
                   action began, and finding [waste] when he failed in this task." 135 Nev. at
                   78, 439 P.3d at 408.7
                               Like in Kogod, the district court erred by placing an evidentiary

                   burden on Parviz to demonstrate the absence of waste by clear and
                   convincing evidence8 without first requiring Fatemeh to raise a reasonable
                   inference that any transactions were, in fact, waste. The district court
                   appears to have found that Fatemeh established a prima facie showing of
                   waste simply because she was unaware of the expenditures at the time they
                   were made and could not have consented to them, and thus Parviz had a
                   fiduciary duty to account for all of them. To support this conclusion, the
                   district court stated that "the negligent or willful dissipation of community
                   funds by one of the spouses, or the surreptitious and personal use of

                         7 Insofar as Fatemeh argues on appeal that we should reach a decision

                   contrary to Kogod, this court cannot overrule Nevada Supreme Court
                   precedent. See Hubbard u. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 720 (1995)
                   (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that stare decisis "applies a fortiori to
                   enjoin lower courts to follow the decision of a higher court"); People v.
                   Solórzano, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659, 664 (2007) ("The Court of Appeal must
                   follow, and has no authority to overrule, the decisions of the [state supreme
                   court]." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

                         8As we   explained in Monahan v. Hogan, 138 Nev. 58, 69, 507 P.3d
                   588, 597 (Ct. App. 2022), "preponderance of the evidence is still the default
                   evidentiary standard in family law absent clear legislative intent to the
                   contrary." (Citation omitted.) Fatemeh does not cogently argue why the
                   fiduciary relationship between husband and wife required Parviz to account
                   for all "unknown" expenditures by clear and convincing evidence when the
                   court only needed to find waste by a preponderance of the evidence. See
                   Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280,
                   1288 n.38 (2006) (declining to consider issues that are not supported by
                   cogent argument). We note that when Faterneh's counsel raised a virtually
                   identical argument in briefing to the supreme court in Kogod, the court
                   declined to adopt a clear and convincing standard in that case.
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   19479    ADD
                   community property or funds without the other [spouse's] knowledge, is
                   waste." Yet, this definition of waste is much broader than that adopted by
                   the supreme court in Kogod, 135 Nev. at 75-76, 439 P.3d at 406-07
                   (generally defining waste as a "spouse's use of marital property for a selfish
                   purpose unrelated to the marriage in contemplation of divorce or at a time
                   when the marriage is in serious jeopardy or is undergoing an irretrievable
                   breakdown" (quoting 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation§ 524 (2018))).
                               In this case, the district court's overly expansive definition of
                   waste failed to account for Kogod's holding that a husband's "relatively long-
                   standing and regular" expenditures to family members, which were often
                   made without consulting his wife, did not constitute waste. Id. at 77, 439
                   P.3d at 408. Likewise, the district court's overly broad conception of waste
                   failed to account for the distinction between waste and a spouse's
                   overconsumption during a marriage, of which the other spouse might not be
                   aware. Id. at 78-79, 439 P.3d at 408-09; see also Putterrnan, 113 Nev. at
                   609, 939 P.2d at 1048-49 ("Almost all marriages involve some disproportion
                   in contribution or consumption of community property. Such retrospective
                   considerations are not and should not be relevant to community property
                   allocation and do not present 'compelling reasons' for an unequal
                   disposition . . . ."). In addition, the district court failed to recognize that
                   consent to make a gift of community property may also be implied by the
                   circumstances. See NRS 123.230.
                               We note that family-related expenditures, even when not
                   disclosed or agreed to, are not necessarily inimical to a harmonious marital
                   relationship when viewed in the context of the marital estate. See, e.g.,
                   Kogod, 135 Nev. at 77, 439 P.3d at 407-08. Arguably, upon entering into a
                   marriage, rnost couples impliedly consent to provide reasonable support for

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                   one another's immediate family. cf. NRS 123.230 ("Neither spouse may
                   make a gift of community property without the express or implied consent
                   of the other."). Although married couples may disagree about money spent
                   on family members, such gifts standing alone should not be deemed
                   dissipation or waste without examining the context of the expenditures,
                   including consideration of the overall marital estate and implied consent
                   under the facts and circumstances of the case.° The existence of implied
                   consent is a question of fact for the district court and should be considered
                   along with other factors, such as the size of the gift (higher value may draw
                   higher scrutiny), the regularity of the gift (routine or long-standing gifts are
                   generally not waste), the timing of the gift (the closer to separation or
                   irreconcilable breakdown, the greater the scrutiny), the purpose of the gift,
                   and how close the recipient of the gift is to the parties.1°

                           °To the extent that the district court found that Parviz wasted
                   community assets by allowing his brother and his brother's wife to live with
                   him without providing any financial contribution after the entry of the Joint
                   Preliminary Injunction (JPI), we conclude that this finding was. clearly
                   erroneous. The JPI in this case did not prohibit Parviz from allowing family
                   members to stay with him without paying room and board: therefore, he did
                   not violate it. See also EDCR 5.703(a) (explaining that a JPI enjoins the
                   parties from "Nransferring, encumbering, concealing, selling, or otherwise
                   disposing of any of the joint, common, or community property of the
                   parties . . . except in the usual course of conduct or for the necessities of
                   life").
                         ioIn Kogod, the supreme court affirmed the district court's finding of
                   waste when a husband gave his father two "non-routine" gifts of $3,600,
                   along with a $50,000 "political carnpaign contribution," after separating
                   from his wife. 135 Nev. at 77, 439 P.3d at 408. The supreme court
                   considered the size, irregular nature, timing, and purpose of these gifts,
                   along with the identity of the recipient, in assessing waste. Id. In this case,
                   the district court similarly found that Parviz wasted funds spent on his
                   adult son after the JPI was entered, but failed to evaluate the size,
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 C), 1947B
                               Whether a particular expenditure by one spouse constitutes
                   waste does not turn on whether the other spouse had knowledge of the
                   expenditure at the time it was made; rather, waste generally requires a
                   finding by the court that the expenditure in question was for a selfish
                   purpose that is "unrelated to the marriage in contemplation of divorce or at
                   a time when the marriage is in serious jeopardy or is undergoing an
                   irretrievable breakdown." Kogod, 135 Nev. at 75-76, 439 P.3d at 406-07
                   (quoting 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 524 (2018)). Thus, in
                   Kogod, the supreme court suggested that it might be permissible to shift the
                   burden of proving the absence of waste if one spouse could demonstrate that
                   the "transactions furthered a purpose inimical to the marriage, that [the
                   other spouse] made them to diminish [that spouse's] community share, or
                   even that they were unusually large withdrawals from community
                   accounts." Id. at 78, 439 P.3d at 408. But here, the district court made no
                   such finding as to any of the transactions at issue before improperly shifting
                   the burden of proof to Parviz.
                               The decree in this case identified only one specific transaction
                   that allegedly constituted waste," while otherwise finding that large

                   regularity, or purpose of the gifts in its decree. Although gifts given to
                   family after a JPI may be subject to greater scrutiny, under Kogod, the
                   district court should still consider these other factors when determining if
                   those funds were wasted.

                         "Although the court identified a December 23, 2013, transfer of
                   $10,000 to "someone by the name of'Yousfr as waste, the only explanation
                   given by the court as to why this transfer constituted waste was that
                   "Fatemeh did not consent to the transfer and had no knowledge of the
                   transfer" and "Parviz did not know who Yousfi was and what the transfer
                   was for." The purpose of this expenditure was never established and should
                   be reevaluated on remand.
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                   groupings of unknown checks and cash withdrawals over a seven-year
                   period, in the     aggregate, constituted waste      simply because      those

                   expenditures were unexplained. The district court's vague findings in this
                   case stand in stark contrast to the specific findings of waste in Lofgren,
                   where the district court identified discrete expenditures that constituted
                   financial misconduct because of both the timing of those expenditures (e.g.,
                   after the court issued a preliminary injunction in the parties' divorce action)
                   and the purpose of the expenditures (e.g., for a selfish purpose unrelated to
                   the marriage).12   Likewise, the district court's conclusion in this case that
                   groups of transactions, the majority of which occurred before Fatemeh filed
                   for divorce, must be waste simply because Parviz could not explain them is
                   distinguishable from the "specific and meticulous findings of fact" that
                   justified the waste finding in Putterman.' 3 Because the decree in this case
                   failed to indicate how any of the allegedly wasted funds were actually spent,

                         12In Lofgren, the district court found that a husband committed waste

                   when he violated the terms of a preliminary injunction in a divorce action
                   by transferring $100,000 of community funds to his father (although some
                   of the funds were later paid back), transferring $17,000 of community funds
                   for his own personal use, using $11,200 in community funds to improve his
                   personal house, using $10,000 of community funds to furnish his personal
                   house, transferring another $13,000 in community funds to his father, and
                   misappropriating $5,000 of community funds by paying his children
                   without court consent. 112 Nev. at 1284, 926 P.2d at 297-98.

                         'In Putterman, the district court awarded a wife a country club
                   membership and a portion of stock in a closely held corporation after
                   making specific findings that the husband charged several thousand dollars
                   on his wife's credit cards after the parties' separation, in addition to lying
                   about his income, and refusing to account for any finances over which he
                   had control. 113 Nev. at 609-10, 939 P.2d at 1049.
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(th 1917B
                        it could not identify which transactions were made for an improper purpose
                        that would justify a finding of waste.
                                    "[D]eference is not owed to legal error" or findings so conclusory

                        that they mask legal error. Davis, 131 Nev. at 450, 352 P.3d at 1142. Here,
                        because the decree improperly shifted the burden of proving the absence of
                        waste to Parviz, and because it also failed to identify any specific
                        transactions that constituted waste or make any findings as to the purpose
                        of those transactions, we are left to speculate whether the unequal
                        distribution to account for waste "was made for appropriate legal reasons."
                        Id. at 452, 352 P.3d at 1143. We thus reverse the district court's unequal
                        distribution of community property in the amount of $100,357.50 and
                        remand for a proper evaluation of waste consistent with this opinion.
                        The district court abused its di,scretion by failing to adequately analyze
                        alimony
                                    Parviz next argues that the district court abused its discretion
                        when it awarded Faterneh alimony of $5,000 per month for ten years. He
                        contends that the decree failed to properly consider the factors under NRS
                        125.150(9) because the decree's analysis lacked "a rational nexus" between
                        those factors and the district court's decision and because the decree failed
                        to include adequate facts when addressing each factor.
                                    "Alimony is financial support paid from one spouse to the other
                        whenever justice and equity require it." Rodriguez u. Rodriguez, 116 Nev.
                        993, 999, 13 P.3d 415, 419 (2000); see also NRS 125.150(1)(a) (providing that
                        the alimony award must be "just and equitable"). When determining if
                        alirriony is just and equitable, a district court must consider the 11 factors
                        listed in NRS 125.150(9). See generally Devries v. Gallio, 128 Nev. 706, 712,
                        290 P.3d 260, 264-65 (2012). These factors are:
                                          (a) The financial condition of each spouse;
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101 19471)    .02P;n3
                                             (b) The nature and value of the respective
                                        property of each spouse;
                                              (c) The contribution of each spouse to any
                                        property held by the spouses pursuant to NRS
                                        123.030;
                                               (d) The duration of the marriage;
                                              (e) The income, earning capacity, age and
                                        health of each spouse;
                                             (f) The    standard    of   living   during   the
                                        marriage;
                                             (g) The career before the marriage of the
                                        spouse who would receive the alimony;
                                              (h) The existence of specialized education or
                                        training or the level of marketable skills attained
                                        by each spouse during the marriage;
                                            (i) The contribution of either spouse as
                                        homemaker:
                                              (j) The award of property granted by the
                                        court in the divorce, other than child support and
                                        alimony, to the spouse who would receive the
                                        alimony; and
                                              (k) The physical and mental condition of each
                                        party as it relates to the financial condition, health
                                        and ability to work of that spouse.
                            NRS 125.150(9). Although the district court can consider other relevant
                            factors, it cannot consider "the marital fault or rnisconduct, or lack thereof,
                            of the spouses." Kogod, 135 Nev. at 67, 439 P.3d at 401.
                                        Ahmony may be awarded "based on the receiving spouse's need
                            and the paying spouse's ability to pay." Id. at 68, 439 P.3d at 401. The
                            statutory factors relevant to a needs-based alimony award include NRS
                            125.150(9)(a), (b), (e), (j), and (k). Kogod, 135 Nev. at 69, 439 P.3d at 402.
                            Alternatively, alimony may "be awarded to compensate for economic loss as
                            the result of a marriage and subsequent divorce, particularly one spouse's
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 I Yj IQ4 7        tleSto
                   loss in standard of living or earning capacity." Id. at 70, 439 P.3d at 403.
                   The statutory factors relevant to an award designed to compensate for
                   economic loss include NRS 125.150(9)(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i). Kogod, 135
                   Nev. at 71, 439 P.3d at 404.
                               In this case, the district court awarded Fatemeh alimony in the
                   amount of $5,000 per month for a period of ten years based on Fatemeh's
                   "need[]" and Parviz's "ability to pay." The court determined that Parviz's
                   net income was approximately $13,000 per month, while Fatemeh currently
                   does not have any income. Then, the court determined, "[u]pon a review of
                   Fatemah's FDF . . . she needs $5,000 per month in alimony" and "Parviz has
                   an ability to pay that amount."
                               Although the district court superficially addressed the factors
                   contained in NRS 125.150(9)(a)-(k) before reaching this conclusion, the
                   court's factual findings were incomplete, unsupported by substantial
                   evidence, and internally inconsistent, and they improperly referenced
                   misconduct by Parviz. Further, the court failed to connect its findings with
                   a determination that alimony was "just and equitable" as either a needs-
                   based award or as an award intended to compensate Fatemeh for economic
                   loss after a 20-year marriage due to a change in her standard of living.
                               Where factor (a) required the district court to consider each
                   spouse's financial condition, the court made no findings as to Parviz and
                   noted only that Fatemeh was "presently unemployed" and "actively looking
                   for employment despite being in severe pain from a recent car accident."
                   When evaluating factor (a), the court did not otherwise discuss the parties'
                   respective financial conditions, which would have "help[ed} the court
                   understand the spouses' financial needs and abilities to pay." Kogod, 135
                   Nev. at 69, 439 P.3d at 402.

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                                  Where factor (b) required the district court to consider the
                      nature and value of each spouse's respective property, and factor (j) required
                      the district court to take into consideration the property that Fatemeh
                      would be awarded in the divorce, the court did not assign any monetary
                      values to the parties' property or explain how the court's division of that
                      property would impact either Fatemeh's need for alimony or Parviz's ability
                      to pay that amount.14 See id. at 72, 439 P.3d at 404 (requiring district courts
                      to consider whether the "value of the community property [a spouse]
                      received in the divorce obviated any basis for awarding alimonY").
                                  When considering the income, earning capacity, age, and health
                      of each spouse under factor (e), the district court's findings are likewise
                      incomplete and, in addition, are unsupported by substantial evidence. The
                      court noted that Parviz was a scientist for the Las Vegas Valley Water
                      District whose income was publicly available on the Transparent Nevada
                      website.   However, Parviz objected at trial when Fatemeh sought to
                      introduce a printout of Parviz's income from the Transparent Nevada
                      website, and that evidence was never admitted. Yet, the court erroneously
                      relied exclusively on this unadmitted evidence from Transparent Nevada to

                             "The decree failed to assign a consistent monetary value to the waste
                      finding, which was necessary in order to adequately consider how the
                      determination would impact Fatemeh's need for alimony or Parviz's ability
                      to pay. For example, the decree states. "Even if the Court finds that all of
                      the waste identified by Fatemeh is accurate, then perhaps Fatemeh will
                      receive around $200,000 for the waste issue." However, later in the same
                      decree, the court found waste in the amount of $100,357.50. In addition, we
                      note the decree was internally contradictory in several instances, and it
                      contained both "findings" that were speculative or argumentative in nature
                      as well as "conclusions" that were inconsistent with those findings. These
                      inconsistencies again demonstrate the dangers inherent in the district
                      court's wholesale adoption of litigant-drafted orders.
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t()I 194713    AD.>
                   calculate Parviz's average income as $189,331 per year, or approximately
                   $13,000 per month. This was an abuse of discretion.15 See Burroughs Corp.
                   v. Century Steel, Inc., 99 Nev. 464, 470, 664 P.2d 354, 358 (1983) (holding
                   that a district court determination that was based upon an exhibit not
                   admitted into evidence was clearly erroneous).
                               Relatedly, when evaluating Parviz's ability to pay alimony, the
                   district court determined that Parviz had "grossly exaggerated his
                   expenses" but made no findings as to what his actual expenses were to
                   determine if $5,000 per month was an amount that Parviz could pay. The
                   court indicated that Parviz had "significant resources for the payment of
                   support to Fatemeh" due to the discharge of some of his debt in bankruptcy.
                   But the court also ordered Parviz to sell his home to compensate Fatemeh
                   for awards under the decree because it found that "the only cash available
                   is from the sale of the house." The court's acknowledgment that Parviz was
                   unable to compensate Fatemeh under the decree without selling his home
                   undermines its finding that he had "significant resources" to pay alimony.
                               When considering Parviz's age and health, in connection with
                   factors (e) and (k) as it related to his ability to work, the district court also
                   made insufficient findings.     On the one hand, the court acknowledged
                   Parviz's testimony at trial that "his health is poor, and he has 'stress,
                   anxiety, high blood pressure and suicidal ideation' as a result of this

                          ' 5Parviz does not specifically challenge the district court's reliance
                   upon this evidence; however, the error is apparent on the record, and we
                   may "take cognizance of plain error sua sponte." Crow-Spieker # 23 v.
                   Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co., 103 Nev. 1, 3 n.2, 731 P.2d 348, 350 n.2
                   (1987). In her answering brief, Fatemeh points out that "Parviz's 2015-2019
                   W-2s were admitted at Trial reflecting his historical income." The district
                   court should have looked to the adrnitted evidence when calculating Parviz's
                   income.
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k0) 1947B
                   divorce." Yet, the court inexplicably concluded that Parviz "did not provide
                   any evidence of such allegations of his poor health." See In re DISH Network
                   Derivative Litig., 133 Nev. 438, 445 n.3, 401 P.3d 1081, 1089 n.3 (2017)
                   (noting that "evidence need not be in a particular format to qualify as
                   evidence— testimony is evidence whether it is given in court or a
                   deposition").'6 And while the court noted that Parviz was 59 years old, had
                   already worked at the Las Vegas Valley Water District for 25 years, and
                   was currently working, the court did not address Parviz's ability to continue
                   working for the 10-year period of the alimony award, especially when he
                   was nearing retirement age.
                                For Fatemeh, the district court did not rnake any findings as to
                   her earning capacity, but instead focused on her current lack of income after
                   finding that she was not, at present, "willfully unemployed." In passing,
                   the court noted that Fatemeh was previously employed as an ultrasound
                   technician, that she earned an average of $32,540 annually between 2017
                   and 2019, that she had been in an automobile accident in 2018, and that
                   she was actively looking for work. But the court did not consider Fatemeh's
                   likelihood of obtaining employment in the future, nor did it consider how

                         16We   reject Parviz's argument that the district court's income
                   calculation was incorrect since he "lost his employment because of his poor
                   health." Although Parviz claims to have lost his employment, he did not
                   support this claim with any citation to the record. See NRAP 28(e)(1)
                   (requiring every assertion in briefs pertaining to matters in the record to be
                   supported by a cite to the appendix where the matter relied upon is to be
                   found). Moreover, based on our review of the record, it does not appear that
                   Parviz presented the district court with any evidence that he lost his
                   employment prior to entry of the divorce decree; thus, the district court
                   cannot have erred by declining to consider this issue at the time the court
                   entered the decree. Parviz had applied for Family Medical Leave, but it is
                   unclear what effect, if any, this had on his earnings.
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                                                        28
(0) 1947H
                   much she might be able to earn under circumstances where she was actively
                   looking for work.
                               The district court appears to have determined that because
                   Fatemeh was not willfully unemployed, it did not need to consider her
                   earning capacity when calculating alimony but, instead, could look only to
                   her actual income. Fatemeh takes a similar position on appeal, when she
                   asserts that "Mlle district court did not impute income to Fatemeh because
                   it correctly found that Fatemeh was not willfully unemployed."            But
                   regardless of whether Fatemeh was willfully unemployed, the district court
                   was still required to consider her earning capacity when evaluating an
                   award of alimony. See NRS 125.150(9)(e) (requiring consideration of the
                   "earning capacity" of "each spouse"); see also Earning Capacity, Black's Law
                   Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("A person's ability or power to earn money, given
                   the person's talent, skills, training, and experience.").
                               The district court did not consider Fatemeh's ability to earn
                   money in light of her talent, skills, training, and experience. Instead, the
                   court examined Fatemeh's declared monthly expenses, determined that she
                   currently does not have any income, and summarily concluded she had a
                   financial need for ten years of alimony payments of $5,000 per month to
                   cover those expenses. But by failing to consider Fatemeh's own earning
                   capacity, the court could not properly evaluate her ongoing need for alimony
                   in relation to Parviz's ability to pay."

                         "To the extent Fatemeh argues on appeal t.hat a $5,000 per month
                   award of alimony was necessary to compensate her for economic losses
                   caused by the dissolution of their 20-year marriage, we note that the district
                   court improperly considered misconduct by Parviz as evidence of hêr
                   economic losses. Initially, when evaluating the nature and value of
                   Fatemeh's property under factor (b), the court commented that "Fatemeh
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()}   1947H
                                 When "the trial court does not indicate in its judgment or decree
                    that it gave adequate consideration" to the appropriate alimony factors,
                    "this [c]ourt shall remand for reconsideration of the issue." Devries, 128
                    Nev. at 712, 290 P.3d at 264 (alteration in original) (quoting Forrest v.

                    Forrest, 99 Nev. 602, 606, 668 P.2d 275, 278 (1983)).          Even though the

                    district court superficially addressed the 11 factors contained in NRS
                    125.150(9), it was not enough for the court to simply process this case
                    through the list of statutory factors and announce its ruling. The court's
                    factual findings had to be supported by substantial evidence, and the court
                    needed to explain why those findings supported its alimony award in both

                    has significant debt that she had to incur as a result of Parviz's
                    unreasonable positions, all of which were denied, and his filing of the
                    bankruptcy proceedings which further delayed the case." When analyzing
                    Fatemeh's income and employment under factor (e), the court commented
                    that "Fatemeh has borrowed significant funds to meet her basic needs, and
                    to pay counsel to combat the litany of motions and other proceedings
                    brought by Parviz in bad faith. While Parviz seeks to avoid responsibility
                    for his actions through bankruptcy, Fatemeh should not have to do the
                    same." Finally, when analyzing Fatemeh's contributions as a homemaker
                    under factor (i), the court chastised Parviz for "fail[ing] to acknowledge
                    Fatemeh's contributions toward their marriage" and for "vehemently
                    object[ing] to Fatemeh going to Iran in December 2014 and February 2016
                    to visit her father when he was sick and in a coma."

                           Although the court could properly award attorney fees and costs to
                    sanction Parviz for needlessly multiplying the proceedings, it was error for
                    the district court to rely on his alleged misconduct during the divorce as
                    justification for awarding alimony. See Rodriguez, 116 Nev. at 998, 13 P.3d
                    at 418 ("[W]hen considering an award of alimony, the court may not
                    consider either party's misconduct or fault."). On remand, the district court
                    should instead consider the economic loss factors set forth in NRS
                    125.150(9)(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i) when evaluating alirnony, including the
                    length of the marriage, the parties' standard of living, and Fatemeh's
                    contributions as a homemaker.
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                    amount and duration. Because the district court abused its discretion in
                    evaluating alimony in this case, we reverse the district court's alimony
                    award and remand for a proper determination of alimony. See Devries, 128
                    Nev. at 711-12, 290 P.3d at 264.
                    The district court abused its discretion when it awarded Fatemeh all
                    attorney fees and costs from the inception of litigation, an additional $59,000
                    that she borrowed to fund the litigation, and $7,450 for translation services
                                Parviz contends that several of the decree's other financial
                    awards are legally improper or not based on substantial evidence, including
                    an award of $176,976.99 representing all of Fatemeh's attorney fees and
                    costs from the inception of the case in June 2016 through a pretrial
                    evidentiary hearing, an award of $59,000 to reimburse Fatemeh for money
                    she borrowed to pay for her litigation fees, and an award of $19,565 for
                    expert witness and translator fees.
                                Parviz first challenges the district court's award granting
                    Fatemeh all of her attorney fees and costs through the pretrial evidentiary
                    hearing. This award was entered in response to Fatemeh's motion for
                    reconsideration of the district court's December 2019 order that the parties
                    were to bear their own fees and costs in connection with Parviz's failed
                    motion for summary judgment and the subsequent evidentiary hearing.
                    However,   when the district court granted           Fatemeh's motion for
                    reconsideration, it improperly awarded Fatemeh attorney fees and costs
                    that had been the subject of prior motions that had already been resolved
                    on the merits and were never challenged. In addition, the court awarded
                    costs even though Fatemeh's motion for reconsideration only requested
                    attorney fees and expert witness fees. While the court could permissibly
                    reconsider its decision Pot to award attorney fees in connection with the
                    summary judgment motion and evidentiary hearing, any additional fees
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                   were outside the scope of the order for which Fatemeh sought
                   reconsideration. Further, it was improper to award costs when Fatemeh
                   did not address them or request them in her motion for reconsideration. We
                   therefore reverse the district court's award of attorney fees and costs in the
                   amount of $176,976.99 and remand for the district court to consider only
                   those fees incurred in connection with the summary judgment motion and
                   evidentiary hearing. When calculating those fees, the court must ensure
                   that any fees that were already addressed in prior court orders are excluded.
                   The court must also consider any fees that Parviz has already paid toward
                   that amount to ensure the attorney fee award is not duplicative.
                             In addition, the $59,000 award to reimburse Fatemeh for
                   rnonies she borrowed to fund the litigation was an abuse of discretion. The
                   decree contains no findings or analysis about this award but merely states
                   that "Parviz shall be required to reimburse the money to her." It appears
                   that the award of money borrowed to fund the litigation is duplicative of the
                   other attorney fee awards in the decree. Yet, in the absence of factual
                   findings, this court cannot adequately review the district court's award. See
                   Robison, 100 Nev, at 673, 691 P.2d at 455; see also Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev.,
                   Adv. Op. 21, *33-36,        P.3d     ,       (Ct. App. July 27, 2023). We
                   therefore reverse this award and, on remand, direct the court to ensure that
                   Fatemeh does not receive double recovery of her attorney fees.
                               Next, Parviz challenges the award of expert fees. The decree
                   awarded a total of $19,565 in expert fees for three experts, including $7,450
                   for translation services. NRS 18.005(5) provides for the recovery of fees "ih
                   an amount of not more than $1,500 for each witness, unless the court allows
                   a larger fee after determining that the circumstances surrounding the

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                   expert's testimony were of such necessity as to require the larger fee."18 "A
                   district court's decision to award more than $1,500 in expert witness fees is
                   reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Frazier v. Drake, 131 Nev. 632, 644,
                   357 P.3d 365, 373 (Ct. App. 2015). A district court abuses it discretion when
                   it fails to provide "an express, careful, and preferably written explanation
                   of   the   court's   analysis   of   factors   pertinent   to   determining   the

                   reasonableness of the requested fees and whether the circumstances
                   surrounding the expert's testimony were of such necessity as to require the
                   larger fee." Id. at 650, 357 P.3d at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                   The decree made specific findings to justify the fees for the first two experts
                   but failed to further address the translation fee. Because the decree failed
                   to justify the translation services award," granting Fatemeh this expert fee
                   for translation services was an abuse of discretion.2°

                         "Following the entry of the divorce decree, the Nevada Legislature
                   amended NRS 18.005(5) to authorize awards up to $15,000, rather than
                   $1,500, for each expert witness, which amendment became effective on
                   July 1, 2023. 2023 Nev. Stat., ch. 70, § 1, at (enacting A.B. 76, 82d Leg.
                   (Nev. 2023)). For clarity, we cite to the pre-amendment version of NRS
                   18.005(5), which was the version in effect when the divorce decree was
                   entered.

                         'Although it is arguable whether the expenses of the translation
                   services qualify as expert fees, in this case the decree explicitly included the
                   translation fee as an expert fee award, and neither party challenged the
                   expert designation on appeal, only the amount of the fee awarded.

                         20 Parviz  argues on appeal that the expert fee award in the decree
                   failed to account for a preliminary $5,000 expert fee awarded to Fatemeh
                   more than three years before the parties' divorce trial. On remand, similar
                   to the attorney fee award, the district court should review any amounts that
                   Parviz has already paid to ensure the expert fee award is not duplicative.
                   If the court finds that Parviz had already paid toward the expert fee prior
                   to trial, the decree should reduce the expert fee award correspondingly.
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                   Miscellaneous financial awards and allocations
                               Lastly, Parviz challenges a number of miscellaneous financial

                   awards and allocations to Fatemeh and argues they were not supported by
                   factual findings or substantial evidence.    Specifically, he challenges an

                   award for interim spousal support arrears, the division of insurance
                   proceeds from Fatemeh's car accident, the unequal allocation of the parties'
                   debt. and the sale of Parviz's residence.
                               The interim spousal support arrears were supported by
                   substantial evidence, as Fatemeh filed a schedule of arrearages shortly
                   before trial. See Ogawa, 125 Nev. at 668, 221 P.3d at 704. The division of
                   insurance proceeds from Fatemeh's car accident was also supported by
                   substantial evidence because Fatemeh testified that Parviz received the full
                   insurance payout. Therefore, we affirm these two awards.
                               However, the decree does not contain adequate findings to
                   support the unequal distribution of debt, where Parviz was ordered to pay
                   half of Fatemeh's community credit card debt but was deemed solely
                   responsible for his bankruptcy debt. Because the district court failed to
                   state its reasoning for why it made an unequal distribution of the parties'
                   community debt, the court abused its discretion.          NRS 125.150(1)(b)

                   (providing that the court must make an equal disposition of community
                   property, unless the court sets forth in writing the reasons for making an
                   unequal disposition); Lofgren, 112 Nev. at 1283, 926 P.2d at 297.         We

                   reverse these allocations as well and remand for further findings.
                               The final issue is the sale of Parviz's home. Parviz contends on
                   appeal that the district court violated his due process rights by ordering the
                   forced sale of the home, despite the parties' stipulation to the contrary,
                   without affording him the opportunity to be heard. We disagree.

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                                Initially, the parties stipulated that Parviz would be permitted

                   to keep the marital home and buy out Fatemeh's interest so long as he paid
                   for an appraisal, which Parviz agreed to do. However, in his closing brief
                   after trial, Parviz requested that the district court order the sale of the
                   marital home and split the net proceeds between the parties. Similarly, in
                   her closing brief, Fatemeh also requested the district court order the sale of
                   the home to satisfy Parviz's financial obligations under the decree. Finally,
                   in his rebuttal brief, Parviz repeated his request for the district court to
                   order the sale of the marital home, though he disputed which party should
                   be financially responsible for home maintenance and costs pending the sale.
                                "The doctrine of 'invited error' embodies the principle that a
                   party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself has
                   introduced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit. It has
                   been held that for the doctrine of invited error to apply it is sufficient that
                   the party who on appeal complains of the error has contributed to it."
                   Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994) (citing 5
                   Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962)).
                                In this case, Parviz twice requested that the district court order
                   the sale of the marital home, but he then contends on appeal that the
                   district court denied his due process rights when it did, in fact, order the
                   sale of the home. Because Parviz introduced the very error he challenges
                   on appeal, he invited the error and is not entitled to relief. Pearson, 11.0
                   Nev. at 297, 871 P.2d at 346 (stating that the appellant "may not be heard
                   to complain of the decision which resulted from her own attorney's
                   request").
                                                  CONCLUSION
                                This case illustrates the importance of both practitioners and
                   courts exercising diligence when submitting and adopting proposed orders;
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                   practitioners should ensure that proposed orders are factually accurate and
                   legally adequate, and courts should exercise due diligence and judgment
                   when reviewing litigant-drafted orders prior to adoption. Although we
                   strongly caution courts against adopting litigant-drafted orders without
                   first engaging in thorough and diligent review, we cannot conclude under
                   these circumstances that adopting a proposed order without modification is
                   itself an abuse of discretion. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is to examine
                   the district court's substantive findings, and in this case, we conclude that
                   the court abused its discretion when making several of the financial awards
                   and orders.
                                 In conclusion, we affirm the financial award for interim spousal
                   support arrears and the distribution of the insurance proceeds from
                   Fatemeh's car accident, which were supported by substantial evidence in
                   the record. We also affirm the decree's order to sell the marital home.
                   However, we reverse and remand the financial awards for alimony, attorney
                   fees, and translation services fees. We also reverse and remand the decree's
                   $59,000 award to reimburse Fatemeh for monies she borrowed to fund the
                   litigation and the unequal distribution of the parties' community property
                   and debts. Insofar as the parties have raised any other arguments that are
                   not specifically addressed in this opinion, we have considered the same and
                   conclude that they either do not present a basis for relief or need not be
                   reached given the disposition of this appeal.21

                         21We note that Parviz made several arguments that did not include
                   appropriate citations to the record, and therefore, we decline to consider
                   them. See Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon, 109 Nev. 990, 997, 860 P.2d 720, 725
                   (1993) ("This court need not consider the contentions of an appellant where
                   the appellant's opening brief fails to cite to the record on appeal."). We
                   remind counsel that every assertion in briefs regarding matters in the
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                                   On remand, the court must reevaluate the financial awards for
                    alimony, attorney fees, and expert fees under the appropriate legal
                    standards as set forth in this opinion.22 The court must also reevaluate the
                    issue of waste and make particularized findings to identify any compelling
                    reasons to justify the unequal distribution of the parties' community
                    property and debt in accordance with NRS 125.150(1)(b).

                                                                                        J.

                    We concur:

                                                  , J.
                    Bulla

                    record shall be supported by a reference to the appendix where the matter
                    relied on is to be found. NRAP 28(e)(1).

                            22Asnoted earlier, Parviz does not challenge the district court's
                    redistribution of his retirement account. Nevertheless, in light of our
                    disposition, the district court should reevaluate the necessity of using
                    Parviz's share of his retirement account to satisfy his financial obligation to
                    Fatemeh in light of any financial awards the court orders in accordance with
                    this opinion.
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