Court Opinion

ID: 9661380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:37:31.931021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:28.038470
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(concurring). While agreeing with my Brothers Kelly and Dethmers that the search and seizure here involved were reasonable within Federal and State constitutional meaning, I am not sure I understand the basis upon which Justice' Kelly reaches that conclusion nor am I in agreement with Justice Dethmers’ statement that the search and seizure were reasonable because “based upon probable cause on the part of the officers to believe' *327that there was in the automobile, or might be,-evidence that a crime had been or was being committed” (italics added).-
Just last November, in People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich 419, at 426 and 427, this Court unanimously held (Justice O’Hara not participating) that a search could be made by police officers without a warrant when a crime, either a felony or a misdemeanor, was being committed by defendants in their presence or upon probable cause to believe that defendants had committed a felony. Considering what we held in Kuntze, and what we said,* Justice Dethmers’ language, “that a crime had been or was being committed”, is much too broad for the reason that it would permit a search in circumstances legally insufficient to justify an arrest under our law — upon probable cause to believe a misdemeanor had been committed.
The record before us in Winkle, including petitioner’s own statement of facts from which Justice Kelly has quoted at length, amply supports our finding that the search and seizure of Winkle’s car were constitutionally justified within the Court’s holdings in Kuntze and the authorities therein relied upon. At the time the-search commenced, from their interrogation of defendant and his companion the troopers had probable cause to believe (whether they actually did so believe is beside the point in determining the reasonableness of the search and seizure) that the automobile had been stolen. They then knew that the automobile was not owned by either -occupant; that, although defendant claimed to be a resident of Indiana, he carried a Florida driver’s *328license; and that, because of the conflicting stories the occupants of the car told the troopers, either or both occupants had lied about their- residences and their destinations. Considering also the fact that the troopers’ encounter with defendant and his companion occurred at 2 o’clock in the morning and that their interest was aroused initially by the defendant’s haste in making a turn in violation of a traffic control signal, I cannot conceive, any more than can Justice Kelly, what justification there could have been had the troopers failed to make a search such as they did make.
Having concluded that the search and seizure were reasonable and that the objects seized were, therefore, admissible in evidence during trial, defendant’s conviction is not subject to the collateral attack he makes. I agree with Justice Dethmers that, under such circumstances, we need not, and we should not, decide the issues considered in parts 2 and 3 of Justice Kelly’s opinion.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Smith, J., concurred with Souris, J.
Adams, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 “It should not be implied from what has been said that search and seizure without a warrant may be made merely on probable cause to believe a misdemeanor is being committed. In this case Trooper itighter had aetual knowledge, not just probable cause to believe, that .-a misdemeanor was in fact being committed in his presence.” 371 ■Mich at 427.