Court Opinion

ID: 9689617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:41:31.046591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:50.217192
License: Public Domain

SAND, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the opinion authored by Chief Justice Erickstad. Nevertheless I deem it appropriate to make additional observations and comments. The legal concept that a person is liable for any damages he has caused is not new.
The Code Napoleon (1804), § 1383, provided as follows:
*579“Chacun est responsable du damage qu’il a cause non seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa negligence ou par son imprudence.” [Every person is responsible for the damage that he has caused not only by his act, but also by his negligence or by his imprudence.]
The Louisiana Civil Code contains substantially the same concept:
“Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill.”
The Field draft Code of New York (§ 853, 1865) contained a very similar provision. North Dakota, in many instances adopted the Field Code as reflected in § 32-03-01, North Dakota Century Code, which provides as follows:
“Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money, which is called damages.”
These basic concepts have been and are recognized and applied to various situations and circumstances, but rarely, if at all, to include attorney fees, even if they meet and come within the usual standards of damages.
Attorney fees are treated differently in most situations even though they have many similarities with damages and indemnity. By way of illustration, indemnity under the ordinary definition includes damages but not attorney fees. In some areas by specific statutory law attorney fees are considered part of damages.
In North Dakota the Legislature generally, with few exceptions, has recognized and followed the old common law concept that attorney fees in civil or criminal actions must be left to the agreement, express or implied, between the parties. Costs, however, are allowed to the prevailing party. Section 28-26-01 (prior to 1977 amendment), NDCC. This section has now been amended by Chapter 283, 1977 Session Laws, to provide as follows:
“1. Except as provided in subsection 2, the amount of fees of attorneys in civil actions must be left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.
“2. In civil actions the court may, in its discretion, upon a finding that the pleading was frivolous, award reasonable actual or statutory costs, or both, including reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.”
The concept that attorney fees is a matter between the client and his attorney is embedded and recognized as the law in this State even to the extent that attorney fees are not recoverable in an action unless expressly authorized by law. Kilby v. Movius Land & Loan Co., 55 N.D. 830, 215 N.W. 284 (1927).
Along the same line, the North Dakota Court has stated that costs (which under some provisions include attorney fees) are purely the creature of the statute and can be awarded only when expressly authorized by statute. Wallace v. Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 70 N.D. 193, 293 N.W. 192 (1940).
The North Dakota Legislature has enacted laws providing for and authorizing the payment of attorney fees in certain cases such as eminent domain (§ 32-15-32, NDCC), prevailing claimant in workmen’s compensation cases (§ 65-10-03, NDCC), and reasonable attorney fees in certain criminal cases (§ 29-07-01.1, NDCC). The United States Congress has authorized attorney fees in antitrust actions under 15 U.S.C. § 15; also, in civil rights cases and class actions under the antitrust statutes. There are only a few instances in which the North Dakota Legislature or the Congress has provided for attorney fees in proceedings or actions in law.
Generally, either as a result of statutory law or case law, attorney fees are not allowed to a party who has successfully defended against an action unless the action was frivolous. See § 28-26-01, NDCC, as amended.
The law, as illustrated by the instant case, leaves the retailer in a products liabili*580ty ease in a “Catch-22” situation — a choice between Scylla and Charibdis, which is neither fair nor just.
If the manufacturer’s product has a defect and the retailer calls it to the attention of the manufacturer, the retailer in so doing places himself in a risky position of being charged with knowledge of the product’s fault, and then if the retailer does not affirmatively act in warning the purchaser of this defect the retailer can be charged with negligence. If the retailer attempts to correct a defect or hazard and subsequently something occurs resulting in an injury to the purchaser or user the retailer can be blamed and the manufacturer can take the position that it was all the fault of the retailer for having made some alteration. Similarly, if there is a defect or hazard which the retailer did not spot or notice as such he can be charged with negligence for not noticing it and not doing something about it.
In addition, and in some products liability cases, the retailer is made a defendant only to maintain a chain of possession, to keep the chain of transaction intact, to avoid or correct some jurisdictional problem, or simply because it is deemed advantageous for whatever reason. Thus the retailer has the choice of either getting out of the business or suffering the consequences — such a Hob-son’s choice in my judgment is not fair or just — unless it can be assumed that the profit is sufficiently adequate to compensate for the risk.
In my view it does not require any legal ingenuity to draft a complaint charging someone with negligence. If the allegations of a complaint were to constitute the basis for determining whether or not a person will be obligated to defend himself without recovering attorney fees there would in fact be no safeguard at all, because it would be a simple process to draft a complaint alleging negligence even though there would be no iota of evidence to support the allegation. Pleadings alone should be resorted to only if there is no other evidence available in the record. Applegren v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Company, 268 N.W.2d 114 (N.D.1978). It can be readily seen that the retailer is in a bind. However, because of the development of case law which we inherited and which to a degree was promoted by statutory law, and because of the existence of the law in this state that attorney fees are not included in damages unless otherwise provided for by statute, the conclusion reached in the opinion by Chief Justice Erickstad is proper under the circumstances.
Even though this court has the authority under § 87 of the North Dakota Constitution to promulgate procedural rules, this matter is more substantive than procedural and legislation would be the more appropriate way of resolving the inequity.
I believe that this is a matter that may and should be corrected by appropriate legislation rather than by court rule or decision.