Court Opinion

ID: 9927959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 16:17:05.76408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:32:30.078212
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges O’Brien, Fulton and Callins
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Richmond, Virginia

            JOHN B. RUSSELL, JR.
                                                                                 OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 0822-22-2                                   JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS
                                                                               JANUARY 30, 2024
            COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LANCASTER COUNTY
                                      Harold W. Burgess, Jr., Judge Designate1

                           John B. Russell, Jr., pro se.

                           Jason D. Reed, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                           Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                   John B. Russell, Jr. pled nolo contendere to practicing law without a license. On appeal, he

            argues the trial court erred by accepting his plea and by denying his motion to withdraw the plea.

            He also argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to admit certain testimony on his

            motion to withdraw his plea. We conclude that, under Rule 1:1(a), the trial court did not have

            jurisdiction to render the judgment that Russell challenges on appeal.

                                                      BACKGROUND

                   The trial court found Russell guilty of the unauthorized practice of law, in violation of Code

            § 54.1-3904, following Russell’s plea of nolo contendere. On September 24, 2021, the court

            entered an order convicting Russell and imposing a 6-month jail sentence and a $2,500 fine.

            Russell subsequently filed a motion asking the trial court both to vacate his conviction and to allow

                   1
                     Judge Roy Michael McKenney accepted Russell’s plea, imposed the sentence, and
            entered the September 24, 2021 order. After Judge McKenney was recused, Judge Designate
            Burgess entered the March 31, 2022 and May 5, 2022 orders.
him to withdraw his plea. A few days later, on October 1, 2021, the trial court entered an order

“stay[ing] execution of [the] Sentence to December 17, 2021.” The order also acknowledged the

withdrawal of Russell’s trial counsel and ordered the production of hearing transcripts “if the above

Motion is [d]enied by the Court.” The order did not address substantively Russell’s underlying

plea, nor did it otherwise implicate the September 24 order.

       On December 17, 2021, the trial court entered an order continuing Russell’s motion to

vacate and to withdraw his plea. On March 31, 2022, following a hearing on the matter, the trial

court entered an order denying Russell’s motion and requiring him to report to jail on April 18.

Russell subsequently moved the court to reconsider “den[ial of] a stay of execution”2 and of his

withdrawal of his plea; Russell also moved for a new sentencing hearing. The same day Russell

filed his motions, April 8, the trial court stayed the March 31 order and suspended it until April 15,

2022. The trial court later extended the stay and suspension to May 13. On May 5, 2022, the trial

court entered an order denying Russell’s motions for reconsideration and for a new sentencing

hearing. Russell appeals to this Court.

                                             ANALYSIS

       We are empowered to raise the question of jurisdiction sua sponte at any time, including for

the first time on appeal. Holden v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 403, 407 (1998); see also Parrish

v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 292 Va. 44, 49 (2016). This inquiry is one we must address prior to

considering the merits of an appeal. Minor v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 728, 737 (2016). In

accordance with Code § 17.1-406(A), this Court has jurisdiction over “any final conviction in a

circuit court of . . . a crime.” And although the General Assembly recently expanded the

jurisdiction of this Court, the powers of the Court continue to be prescribed by statute. See Minor,

       2
        The March 31, 2022 order did not deny a stay of execution. The order denied Russell’s
motion “to vacate judgment of [the September 24, 2021 order and] to allow withdraw [sic] of
plea.”
                                             -2-
66 Va. App. at 738. Thus, we have “jurisdiction to consider [t]his appeal only if the trial court had

jurisdiction to entertain the underlying motion.” Id. Whether a trial court properly retained

jurisdiction to entertain a motion is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 738-39. Here,

although the trial court retained jurisdiction over Russell’s motion to modify his sentence, it lost

jurisdiction to entertain his motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere.

        “All final judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of court, remain under the

control of the trial court and may be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days after the

date of entry, and no longer.” Rule 1:1(a) (emphasis added). Rule 1:1’s provisions are intended “to

assure the certainty and stability that the finality of judgment[] brings.” N. Va. Real Est., Inc. v.

Martins, 283 Va. 86, 104 (2012). Rule 1:1 further supports “the firmly established law of this

Commonwealth that a trial court speaks only through its written orders.” Kosko v. Ramser, 299 Va.

684, 689 (2021) (quoting Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148 (1996)).

        The 21-day period “commences with the entry of the final order and ‘may be interrupted

only by the entry, within the 21-day period after final judgment, of an order [modifying,]

suspending or vacating the final order.’” Minor, 66 Va. App. at 739 (quoting James v. James, 263

Va. 474, 482 (2002)). Pendency of a post-judgment motion more than 21 days after the final

judgment does not act to toll the 21-day period prescribed by Rule 1:1. Id. (quoting Sch. Bd. of City

of Lynchburg v. Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc., 237 Va. 550, 556 (1989)).

        Our Supreme Court has repeatedly said that to “‘avoid the application of the 21 day time

period’ running from what would otherwise be a final order, the order must include ‘specific

language stating that the court is retaining jurisdiction’ over the case.” Monroe v. Monroe, ___ Va.

___, ___ (July 20, 2023) (quoting Johnson v. Woodard, 281 Va. 403, 409 (2011)). The trial court’s

intent to rule on pending motions is “insufficient to negate the finality of an order rendering a final

judgment.” Carrithers v. Harrah, 60 Va. App. 69, 74-75 (2012) (stating that “even if an order

                                                  -3-
granting a final judgment on the merits of a case contains express language indicating that the trial

court intends to rule . . ., such language does not negate the fact that such an order is in fact a final

judgment”). This is “particularly true” when the trial court’s intention is not expressed in the order.

Id. at 75. Thus, when a trial court enters an order and renders judgment against an accused,

“[u]nless a court vacates or suspends a final order during the twenty-one-day period or some other

exception to the general rule applies, the court loses jurisdiction over the case and any action taken

by the trial court after the twenty-one-day period has run is a nullity.” Minor, 66 Va. App. at 739-

40.

        The trial court entered a final order on September 24, 2021, convicting Russell of a

misdemeanor under Code § 54.1-3904 and imposing a jail sentence of 6 months and a $2,500 fine.

See Dobson v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 524, 528 (2023) (“In a criminal case, the final order is

the sentencing order.” (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 587, 596 (2020))). The

October 1, 2021 order staying the execution of the sentence did not affect the finality of the

conviction. See Preston v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 731, 735 (1992) (holding that an “order

postponing execution of the judgment of conviction . . . does not vacate the judgment or affect

finality of the judgment” (citing Code § 19.2-319)). This is because the imposition of judgment is

distinct from the execution of judgment. See Kosko, 299 Va. at 687 (“A final order is one which

‘disposes of the entire action and leaves nothing to be done except the ministerial superintendence

of execution of the judgment.’” (quoting Super Fresh Food Mkts. of Va., Inc. v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555,

560 (2002))). An order staying execution of a sentence “merely postpones the date when a final

judgment will be executed; it does not alter the substantive provisions of that final judgment.”

Davidson v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 168, 171 (1993). Thus, an execution of judgment is a

“ministerial act” over which a trial court retains jurisdiction even after it no longer has jurisdiction

of the underlying conviction. See id. (holding that an order setting appellant’s execution date was “a

                                                   -4-
ministerial act that served only to ‘fix a day when the judgment already existing should be

executed’” (quoting Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 813, 815 (1895))). The October 1 order

stayed the execution of Russell’s sentence,3 but it did not modify, vacate, or suspend the order of

conviction beyond the 21-day period delineated by Rule 1:1.

        Russell’s contention that the parties “rightfully believe[d]” that the trial court modified and

suspended the September 24, 2021 order is unavailing. Copeland v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App.

529, 531 (2008) (recognizing that this Court has no obligation to accept parties’ concessions of

law). He also argues that Rule 1:1 is not meant to be a trap for litigants, thereby requiring the trial

court to use “magic words.” Rule 1:1 does not require incantation; it requires specificity. Our

Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that, to toll the finality of an order, a trial court must include

“specific language” stating that it is retaining jurisdiction over a case. Johnson, 281 Va. at 409. A

trial court speaks only through its orders. Kosko, 299 Va. at 689 (noting the consistency of this

approach with “firmly established law”). It does not speak through insinuation, innuendo, or the

parties’ agreed understanding. Even the trial court’s good faith intent to rule on Russell’s motions is

“insufficient to negate the finality of an order rendering a final judgment.” Carrithers, 60 Va. App.

at 75.4 Although different words could produce the same effect, an order that uses the exact words

of Rule 1:1 will unquestionably allow a trial court to retain jurisdiction over a case.

        3
         A trial court may suspend or modify a jail sentence for a misdemeanor conviction “at
any time before the sentence has been completely served.” See Code § 19.2-303; accord
Dobson, 76 Va. App. at 529-30. Here, the trial court explicitly stayed execution of Russell’s jail
sentence until its last order of May 5, 2022. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider
Russell’s motion to reconsider its “denying a stay of execution of [Russell’s] sentence.”
        4
         By this we do not imply that the trial court, here, intended to do anything other than
what it did: that is, stay execution of Russell’s jail sentence. But to the extent the trial court
stayed execution of the sentence to retain jurisdiction to consider Russell’s motions for post-
judgment relief, we hold that the stay had no such effect.
                                                  -5-
        The September 24, 2021 order imposed a judgment of conviction against Russell. No

subsequent order of the trial court modified, vacated, or suspended the conviction. Thus, the trial

court lost jurisdiction of the judgment 21 days after the September 24 order and each order entered

after that period is a nullity. Because the trial court had no jurisdiction to rule on Russell’s motion

to withdraw his plea, we have no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the same.

                                           CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

                                                                                             Dismissed.

                                                  -6-