Court Opinion

ID: 9838332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 00:00:29.10458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:27.608138
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30540         Document: 00516883666             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/05/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                 September 5, 2023
                                       No. 22-30540                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Geronimo Flores,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:21-CR-189-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Jones, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Geronimo Flores appeals the final judgment entered against him in
   accordance with a jury’s guilty verdict on two federal criminal charges. A jury
   found Flores guilty of interstate domestic violence and interstate domestic
   violence by strangulation or suffocation of his girlfriend while on a cruise
   ship. Flores now argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
   permitted the jury to hear testimony that he had committed similar abuse

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30540      Document: 00516883666          Page: 2    Date Filed: 09/05/2023

                                    No. 22-30540

   against a previous girlfriend. This testimony, he argues, constituted improper
   character evidence. The district court determined the testimony was proper
   for the discrete purpose of proving the intent elements of the charges against
   Flores. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
                                         I.
          Sara Jordan accused Flores of striking her on the head and choking her
   while the couple was aboard a cruise ship headed to Panama. Jordan testified
   at trial that Flores became jealous on the cruise, accusing her of checking out
   other men. One evening at dinner, Jordan began arguing with Flores because
   he talked about wanting to have sex with women other than her on the ship.
   As the argument escalated, they brought their dinner and the argument up to
   their room. Eventually, Flores decided to leave the room, but Jordan stopped
   him because she wanted to finish the conversation. Jordan told the jury that
   Flores then threw food at her and the two started yelling. Jordan testified that
   Flores proceeded to strike her twice in the face with a closed fist. She threw
   a glass of lemonade in his face. At this point, as Jordan turned to walk out of
   the room, Flores grabbed her from behind and put her in a chokehold.
          Flores eventually let Jordan free, and she ran from the room,
   approaching cruise ship security officers. Three officers testified at trial,
   corroborating that Jordan immediately reported that her boyfriend choked
   her. The officers photographed redness on Jordan’s face and neck. The
   following day, Jordan visited the cruise ship’s doctor due to soreness in her
   neck and a headache. The doctor observed a lump on Jordan’s head, as well
   as bruising on her shoulder, upper arm, and neck. Jordan’s description of her
   injuries, according to the doctor, was consistent with a concussion.
          The Government charged Flores with one count of assault by
   strangulation or suffocation, 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(8), and one count of
   interstate domestic violence, id. § 2261, both offenses committed in the

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   maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The defense’s
   theory at trial was that Jordan misrepresented the course of events leading up
   to her injuries and exaggerated her injuries. Defense counsel suggested that
   Jordan’s injuries were instead caused by alcohol and various prescription
   drugs. In addition to cruise employees and Jordan, the Government called
   Cortney Criss to testify. Criss had been in a romantic relationship with Flores
   two years before this incident. Like Jordan, Criss described arguments she
   had with Flores stemming from his jealousy and controlling nature. Criss
   testified that during these arguments Flores physically attacked her twice.
   One time, she said, Flores grabbed her by the throat and pinned her against a
   vehicle.
          Flores had lodged a pre-trial objection to Criss’s testimony, arguing it
   was improper character evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and
   404(b). The district court overruled Flores’s objection because, rather than
   merely show Flores’s bad character, evidence of Flores’s prior domestic
   violence was relevant under Rule 404(b)(2) to prove intent, motive, or
   pattern. Additionally, the district court found that the prejudice caused by
   Criss’s testimony was not unfair and did not substantially outweigh the
   evidence’s probative value.
          After Criss’s testimony at trial, the district court gave the jury a
   limiting instruction. The jury was told it could not consider evidence of
   similar acts done by Flores against Criss “in deciding if the defendant
   committed the acts charged in th[is] indictment.” Rather, the jury could
   consider such evidence only after it determined “beyond a reasonable doubt
   from other evidence in this case that the defendant did commit the acts
   charged in the indictment.” Only then, according to the court’s instruction,
   could the jury look to Criss’s testimony for the “very limited purpose” of
   determining whether Flores “had the state of mind or intent necessary to
   commit the crime,” whether he “had a motive or the opportunity,” whether

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   he “acted according to a plan [or] pattern of conduct,” or whether he
   committed the acts “by accident or mistake.” The court reiterated this
   limitation in its final jury instructions.
          The jury was charged with the elements of assault within maritime and
   territorial jurisdiction by strangulation or suffocation, 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(8),
   and interstate domestic violence, id. § 2261, which both included requisite
   intent to commit the crime. The jury unanimously found Flores guilty of both
   charges.
          Flores now appeals.
                                           II.
          We review the “district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
   discretion, subject to harmless-error analysis.” United States v. Perry, 35
   F.4th 293, 325 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted).
   We review a “district court’s admission of extrinsic offense evidence over a
   404(b) objection under a ‘heightened’ abuse of discretion standard.” United
   States v. Jones, 930 F.3d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.
   Jackson, 339 F.3d 349, 354 (5th Cir. 2003)). The Government bears the
   burden to show that evidence of similar bad acts “is relevant and admissible
   under 404(b).” Ibid. (citation omitted).
                                           III.
          Flores argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
   permitted Criss’s testimony of similar bad acts by Flores. We disagree.
          Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of a defendant’s
   past bad act “is not admissible to prove a person’s character” but “may be
   admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
   preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
   accident.” Jones, 930 F.3d at 373 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). Such

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   evidence is admissible if “(1) it is relevant to an issue other than the
   defendant’s character, and (2) it ‘possess[es] probative value that is not
   substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice’ under Federal Rule of
   Evidence 403.” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Smith, 804 F.3d 724, 735 (5th
   Cir. 2015)). We consider the following factors in determining whether undue
   prejudice substantially outweighs probative value: “(1) the government’s
   need for the extrinsic evidence, (2) the similarity between the extrinsic and
   charged offenses, (3) the amount of time separating the two offenses, and
   (4) the court’s limiting instructions.” United States v. Kinchen, 729 F.3d 466,
   473 (5th Cir. 2013). Finally, we must also “consider the overall prejudicial
   effect of the extrinsic evidence.” United States v. Juarez, 866 F.3d 622, 627
   (5th Cir. 2017).
          The district court decided first that evidence of Flores’s past domestic
   violence was relevant and necessary to prove intent. Second, the court found
   that the prejudice caused by the evidence was not unfair and did not
   substantially outweigh its probative value. Accordingly, the court admitted
   the evidence under Rules 403 and 404(b).
          Flores argues that the Government did not need Criss’s testimony to
   prove intent or pattern because Flores did not contest his intent or identity.
   Specifically, Flores’s counsel stated that he “wouldn’t be served by
   contesting intent . . . So[,] the defense [wasn’t going to] argue that at trial.
   The defense [wa]s he did not commit the act.” Accordingly, Flores contends
   the only possible reason for Criss’s testimony was “to show that on a
   particular occasion [he] acted in accordance with the character,” which is
   forbidden by Rule 404(b). Additionally, with no valid reason for the evidence,
   the prejudice was unfair and impermissible under Rule 403.
          We disagree. As to the first prong of Rule 404(b) analysis, the district
   court properly found evidence of Flores’s similar bad acts was relevant to

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   prove intent. While Flores stated he would not contest intent at trial, that did
   not take intent off the table. See United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 384
   (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[n]ormally, if intent is not at issue, then
   extrinsic evidence is not admissible. But, the defendant must affirmatively
   remove the issue of intent, not just promise not actively to contest the issue”
   (citation omitted)). The Government still bore the burden of proving beyond
   a reasonable doubt each element of the crimes charged, including intent.
          We faced a similar question in Jones. There, the defendant charged
   with being a felon in possession of a firearm did not stipulate that he was a
   felon. Jones, 930 F.3d at 373. When the government produced evidence of a
   prior conviction, the defendant—like Flores here—argued that the
   government “impermissibly” used that evidence to prove his bad character.
   Ibid. The district court instructed the jury to consider the extrinsic evidence
   only “if it found beyond a reasonable doubt from other evidence that [the
   defendant] committed the acts charged in the indictment.” Id. at 372. Only
   then could the jury consider the evidence to determine “intent, motive,
   opportunity, plan, or absence of mistake”—and not whether the defendant
   acted in accordance with bad character. Ibid. We held both prongs of the
   Rule 404(b) analysis were satisfied. Specifically, the prior conviction was
   highly probative, relevant to prove an element, and necessary for a purpose
   other than proving the defendant’s character. Id. at 374. Additionally, we
   held the Government’s need, the similarity of the offenses, the amount of
   time, and the limiting instruction satisfied Rule 403 balancing. Ibid.
          As in Jones, the elements of Flores’s charged offenses remained live
   issues at trial. That did not change merely because Flores announced
   beforehand that he would not contest intent and would instead argue that he
   did not commit the underlying acts. As we have before explained, extrinsic
   evidence is admissible to prove intent under Rule 404(b) when a “defendant
   pleads not guilty” to a non-conspiracy case “and makes the government meet

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   its burden.” United States v. Martinez, 2022 WL 2315877, at *1 (5th Cir. June
   28, 2022) (unpublished) (citing United States v. McCall, 553 F.3d 821, 827–
   28 (5th Cir. 2008)). “To prevent the government from invoking ‘intent’ as
   a basis for extrinsic act evidence,” the defendant must “affirmatively remove
   the issue of intent, not just promise not actively to contest the issue.” Ibid.
   (quoting Grimes, 244 F.3d at 384). Flores did the latter, not the former.
   Therefore, evidence of intent was still “relevant” as “an issue other than
   [Flores’s] character.” Jones, 930 F.3d at 373.
          We are also satisfied that the district court properly weighed the
   Rule 403 factors at the second prong of Rule 404(b) analysis. First, as
   discussed above, the Government expressed a need for this evidence to prove
   intent. Second, the abuse charges against Flores in this case were similar to
   his past acts described by Criss. See Kinchen, 729 F.3d at 473. The evidence
   showed that Flores struck and choked both women in a jealous rage. So, the
   district court properly “assess[ed] the similarity of the offenses and
   weigh[ed] enhanced probative value against the prejudice that almost
   certainly results when evidence of prior misconduct is admitted.” Juarez,
   866 F.3d at 628. Third, as we have previously held, the two-year separation
   between the two offenses “was not too remote in time to be probative.”
   Jones, 930 F.3d at 374. Finally, and critically, “the district court gave the jury
   an appropriate limiting instruction.” Ibid. (noting that “[t]he government did
   not urge the jury to disregard its instructions or consider the evidence for an
   improper purpose”). The district court’s limiting instruction here was
   virtually identical to the one approved in Jones. See id. at 373.
          Finally, the district court’s ruling survives a “commonsense
   assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense.”
   Juarez, 866 F.3d at 629 (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914
   (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)). Evidence of Flores’s prior domestic abuse “was
   admissible to prove an element of [the] charged offenses”—intent. Jones,

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   930 F.3d at 374. Any “prejudicial effect of permitting the jury to consider”
   evidence of Flores’s prior abuse “to help determine his intent was therefore
   diminished.” Id. at 374–75. Moreover, the prior abuse was nearly identical to
   the present charges and therefore was not “greater in magnitude than the
   crimes for which [Flores] was on trial, nor did [it] occupy more of the jury’s
   time than the evidence of the charged offenses.” Id. at 375 (quoting United
   States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir. 1998)). The
   probative value of Flores’s similar bad acts under these circumstances,
   therefore, was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See ibid.
                                        IV.
          The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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