Court Opinion

ID: 9583045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:22.086726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:06.957403
License: Public Domain

*702Deen, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
An analysis of the cases sought to be overruled is in order. In the first of them, Herrin v. Graham, 87 Ga. App. 291 (73 SE2d 572) (1952) it was stated (p. 293) that “it is clear that the child’s domicile was changed from Tennessee to Georgia” prior to the adoption proceeding. In Altree v. Head, 90 Ga. App. 601 (83 SE2d 683) (1954), the child, although English by birth, was “legally in the custody of the applicant whose domicile was shown to be in” the county of domicile of the adoptive parents, being the county where the petition for adoption was filed. The third case, Carpenter v. Forshee, 103 Ga. App. 758 (120 SE2d 786) (1961), the natural father, a nonresident, had appeared and defended the case and was found to have abandoned the child, who was domiciled in the county of the adopting parent, and that case specifically stated that it was not necessary to pass on the contention that there was a conflict of law between the present statute and the jurisdictional statement that the child must be a resident of or domiciled in the state also. In the fourth case, Huff v. Moore, 144 Ga. App. 668 (242 SE2d 329) (1978), the child was neither domiciled nor a resident in Georgia when the petition was filed, and this court properly held that the Superior Court of Richmond County had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit. An adoption changes status. It is a proceeding in rem, and the child is the res. Walter v. August, 186 Cal. App. 2d 395, 83 ALR2d 941; 2 AmJur2d, Adoption, § 48, pp. 898, 899 et cit. That this is a salutary rule, see an extended discussion of the authorities in A. v. M., 180 A2d 541 (1962). To overrule the language in the above cases to the effect that “for a superior court of Georgia to have jurisdiction of an adoption proceeding, the child to be adopted must be domiciled in or be a resident of this State” is therefore unnecessary in the first three cases cited, and would result in an unconstitutional construction of the statute in Huff, the fourth case sought to be overruled.
The majority opinion omits to state that there is obviously a sizeable estate presumptively belonging to this infant in Tennessee, the admitted domicile of the child and her parents at the time of their deaths. The Chancery Court of Hamilton County, Tennessee, domicile of the parties, took jurisdiction prior to any action in this state and appointed a guardian ad litem for the infant. The latter became aware of the facts that actions for custody and guardianship were filed during the pendency of the Tennessee proceedings by both maternal grandparents, aunt and uncle in Bartow County, and by both paternal grandparents, aunt and uncle in Richmond County. The Bartow County proceedings were dismissed because the child (the res) was not within the jurisdiction of that court. The Richmond County proceedings, subject of this appeal, followed a contrary *703course, in spite of the fact that a proceeding for guardianship of the person of the child is pending in the Tennessee proceedings and a temporary restraining order was issued by the Tennessee court on October 4,1979, prohibiting both appellants and appellees here from pursuing adoption proceedings outside the state of Tennessee. It should be added that the appellants state their willingness to abide the judgment of the Tennessee Court, which they admit has jurisdiction of the proceedings.
Georgia law is clear that the domicile of a minor is that of her father, and so continues at the time of his death. Bedgood & Royal v. McLain, 94 Ga. 283 (21 SE 529) (1894); Sailors v. Spainhour, 98 Ga. App. 475 (106 SE2d 82) (1958); Code § 79-404. That this is the general rule throughout the country see 3 Redfearn, Wills, Ga., § 399, p. 1268 (4th Ed., 1979).
For all of the above reasons it is clear that the Superior Court of Richmond County had no jurisdiction at the time this order of adoption was filed. It is also clear to me that the cases sought to be overruled are correct in each instance and that it would do more harm than good to attempt to overrule them. As to whether the courts of Tennessee have jurisdiction so as to exclude a proper action in Georgia, I have not had the time to research this difficult question. It does appear, however, that in a proper case we have a Georgia precedent which would, if followed, allow the case to continue in this state. I reason as follows:
A ward may acquire a domicile in any place where the guardian causes him to live within the state in which the guardian was appointed. See American Law Institute Restatement of the Law 2d Conflict of Laws, § 22(h), p. 91. The domicile and residence of a minor is that of the person in whom the right of custody and control are vested. Ingle v. Rubenstein, 112 Ga. App. 767 (146 SE2d 367) (1965). “Under the general, inherent powers of a court of equity, the judge of the superior court, presiding as chancellor, is specially vested with the authority and power to superintend and care for... the person... of a minor. Where a petition is filed relative to an infant’s estate or person, which seeks relief against several persons, one of whom is a resident of the county where the petition is filed, the superior court acquires jurisdiction, and the infant immediately becomes a ward in chancery.” Chase v. Bartlett, 176 Ga. 40 (2) (166 SE 832) (1932). In that case the child’s parents died simultaneously by drowning accident. A jurisdictional dispute arose between parties in various counties of Georgia, and it was held that where the child was in the county where the equitable petition was filed the court had jurisdiction over it as a ward of the court to appoint a guardian. As has been seen above, the domicile of the orphan is then that of its *704guardian, and the adoption may proceed within the requirements of the statute. I would assume that if there is a permanent guardian in Tennessee, the courts of that state would have jurisdiction; otherwise, a guardian appointed in Georgia would settle the domicile issue. But the present situation points up the grave danger of having the courts of various states disregard the question of domicile and seek to establish custody regardless of the legal situs of the res.
I must respectfully dissent.