Court Opinion

ID: 9679744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:04:35.102292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:19.343371
License: Public Domain

*17BLACKMAR, Senior Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the disposition of the case, but write separately to comment about two important evidentiary points.
1. Declarations Against Penal Interest of Unavailable Witness
The principal opinion states “... the incriminating aspect of Williams’ statement does not exonerate the defendant. That alone is sufficient justification for rejecting Williams’ confession....”
I agree. The rule of Sutter v. Easterly, 189 S.W.2d 284 (Mo.1945), permitting the introduction of declarations against the penal interest of an unavailable witness, is a good one. There is no reason to confine its application to civil cases. A person’s admission of crime carries a built-in indication of trustworthiness. It matters not that there is no 100% guarantee. The law of evidence does not require this. State v. Turner, 623 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. banc 1981), gives only cavalier consideration to an important point, and I would not follow it.
Nor should we receive declarations against interest in criminal cases only grudgingly, under the coercion of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). That case set only minimum standards.
Inasmuch as the only guarantee of trustworthiness is found in the dissenting aspects of the declaration, other parts are not competent evidence. The appellant argues that the whole statement must be received. It may sometimes be necessary to receive portions of the declaration that are not disserving, but these would be subject to a limiting instruction. In this case, which did not involve a single-actor crime, Williams’ guilt or innocence is not a material circumstance, and the court could properly conclude that the admissible portions had no substantial value to the defense.
The trial court also has discretion to reject a proffered declaration that seems to be utterly unreliable. This is the same discretion that applies to any evidence. Inasmuch as the rejection is supported by other adequate reasons, I shall not pursue the point.
I would, finally, overrule State v. Row-lett, 504 S.W.2d 48 (Mo.1973), at the first opportunity. There the Court believed that the use of declarations against interest by the prosecution was encumbered by the confrontation clauses. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States make it clear that confrontation is not a problem where admission is supported by firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions. White v. Illinois, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980).
2. Prior Inconsistent Statements
I agree that the prior statements of witnesses were properly admitted under § 491.074, RSMo 1986, and State v. Bowman, 741 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. banc 1987). I would not quibble about the manner of raising the constitutional issue under the confrontation clauses. The point is implicit in the objections made.
If we are to allow prior statements as substantive evidence, it is idle to argue at length about whether the statements are “inconsistent”. If the prior statements include matter that was not testified to from the stand, they are inconsistent. If they do not add anything, then their reception into evidence is harmless, unless there is a serious problem of bolstering as in State v. Seever, 733 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. banc 1987), which here there is not.
At the same time, I have reservations. Here the statements were on tape, and the record provides substantial corroboration. I would wonder about a ease in which the only evidence of an essential element of the offense is supplied by oral testimony about what a witness said at an earlier time, when the witness denies both the making and the truth of the statement.
With these observations, I concur.