Court Opinion

ID: 9380983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 18:07:02.02569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.891547
License: Public Domain

J-A09012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
               v.                         :
                                          :
                                          :
 SHANE ERNEST RICHARDSON                  :
                                          :
                     Appellant            :   No. 1555 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 3, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-36-CR-0002693-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                  FILED: MARCH 21, 2023

      Shane Ernest Richardson appeals from the October 3, 2022 judgment

of sentence of four and one-half to seventeen years of incarceration imposed

following his convictions for aggravated indecent assault—person less than

sixteen years of age and related charges. After careful review, we vacate the

sentencing order and remand with instructions.

      Over a four-year period between 2008 and 2011, Appellant repeatedly

sexually assaulted two sisters, H.M. and K.W., in his home in Lancaster

County. On June 21, 2021, Appellant was charged with aggravated indecent

assault of a person less than sixteen years of age, indecent assault of a person

less than sixteen years of age, and two counts of unlawful contact with a

minor.     Following a four-day jury trial at which H.M. and K.W. testified,

Appellant was convicted of all charges but one count of unlawful contact with

a minor.    The trial court deferred sentencing so that the Sexual Offender
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Assessment Board (“SOAB”) could evaluate Appellant and a pre-sentence

report could be prepared. The SOAB found that Appellant did not meet the

criteria of a sexually violent predator.1 See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 10/3/22,

at 21.

         On October 3, 2022, the court imposed an aggregate term of four and

one-half to seventeen years of incarceration.2 Id. at 28. The trial court also

noted that, while it had no control over what conditions the department of

corrections imposed, it recommended that Appellant have no contact with the

victims or their family members.               Id. at 29.   Finally, the court ordered

Appellant to register as a sex offender for life and to pay $2,834.95 in

restitution.    Id. at 16-21, 31.         Although the trial court only offered a

recommendation regarding a no-contact condition at the sentencing hearing,

the sentencing order directed that Appellant have no contact with the victims

and their family members, as follows:

____________________________________________

1 Appellant was subjected to lifetime registration requirements under
Subchapter I of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)
due to his conviction for aggravated indecent assault. See 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9799.55(b)(2)(i)(A).

2 Specifically, Appellant received the following sentence: count 1 aggravated
indecent assault (H.M.), three to ten years of incarceration; count 2 corruption
of minors (H.M.), a concurrent term of one to seven years of incarceration;
count 3 corruption of minors (K.W.), a concurrent term of one to seven years
of incarceration; count 4 unlawful contact with a minor (H.M.), one to five
years of incarceration consecutive to count 1; count 6, indecent assault
(H.M.), six months to two years of incarceration consecutive to count one.
See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 10/3/22, at 28.

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      No Contact: Defendant to have no contact with the victim
      whatsoever.

      No Contact – Victim’s Family: Defendant is to have no contact
      with the victim’s family.

See Sentencing Order, 10/5/22.         Appellant did not file a post-sentence

motion.   Instead, this timely appeal followed.       Both the trial court and

Appellant have complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

      Did the trial court err in ordering, as a condition of [Appellant’s]
      state sentence, that he could have no contact with the victims or
      their families, where the court had no jurisdiction to impose this
      condition, as the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections has
      exclusive authority over state prison conditions, and the
      Pennsylvania Department of Probation and Parole has exclusive
      authority over state parole conditions?

Appellant’s brief at 5.

      Initially, we observe that “[t]he matter of whether the trial court

possesses the authority to impose a particular sentence is a matter of legality

[of the sentence].”       Commonwealth v. Dennis, 164 A.3d 503, 510 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore,

      The scope and standard of review applied to determine the legality
      of a sentence are well established. If no statutory authorization
      exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject
      to correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. In evaluating
      a trial court’s application of a statute, our standard of review is
      plenary and is limited to determining whether the trial court
      committed an error of law.

Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911 A.2d 998, 1001–1002 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(internal citations omitted).

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      Appellant contends that the trial court did not have the authority to

impose a condition that Appellant have no contact with the victims or their

families. See Appellant’s brief at 9-10. We agree.

      This Court has held that where the trial court imposes a maximum

imprisonment sentence of two or more years, the Pennsylvania Board of

Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) has exclusive authority over the terms of the

defendant’s parole. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6132(a); see also Commonwealth v.

Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 141 (Pa.Super. 2011) (recognizing “that ‘the

[PBPP] has exclusive authority to determine parole when the offender is

sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of two or more years’”)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Mears, 972 A.2d 1210, 1211 (Pa.Super. 2009)).

Further, the authority to impose a non-contact provision as a special condition

of a defendant’s state incarceration rests with the Pennsylvania Department

of Corrections (“DOC”). See Commonwealth v. Olivo-Vazquez, 248 A.3d

463 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision at *4) (finding the trial court

lacked statutory authority to impose a non-contact provision as part of an

appellant’s state incarceration sentence). Therefore, a trial court does not

have statutory authority to impose conditions on a sentence of incarceration

that exceeds two years, and “‘any condition the sentencing court purport[s]

to impose on [a defendant’s] state parole is advisory only.’” Coulverson,

supra at 141-42; see also 61 Pa.C.S. § 6134(b)(1), (2).

      Herein, the trial court imposed a sentence of imprisonment greater than

two years, giving the DOC and PBPP exclusive authority over the terms of his

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incarceration and parole. See Coulverson, supra at 141; see also Olivo-

Vazquez, supra at non-precedential decision *4. Therefore, the sentencing

court lacked statutory authority to impose incarceration and parole conditions

upon Appellant. Id. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court acknowledges

the illegality of the sentence it issued, explaining that the conditions

referenced by the court during sentencing were intended to be advisory to the

PBPP and that the sentencing order stating otherwise amounted to an

“unfortunate discrepancy.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/22, at 5-6. Whatever

the reason, no statutory authority exists for the court to impose such a

condition.

        However, the trial court does have the ability to make recommendations

as to the conditions of Appellant’s supervision, and it clearly intended to do so

in this case.   See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6134; Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/22, at 5.

Accordingly, we vacate the October 3, 2022 sentencing order and remand for

the trial court to enter an order stating its recommendation to the DOC and

PBPP.

                                      -5-
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      Sentencing    order    vacated.     Case   remanded   with   instructions.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2023

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