Court Opinion

ID: 9353849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 22:00:48.50845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:12:06.705761
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 19-13390    Document: 39-1        Date Filed: 01/12/2023    Page: 1 of 40

                                                                [PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 19-13390
                           ____________________

        FCOA LLC,
                                                         Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        FOREMOST        TITLE     &     ESCROW          SERVICES        LLC,

                                                       Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-23971-KMW
                           ____________________
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                    19-13390

        Before BRANCH, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
                 In this trademark infringement case, we must decide
        whether the parties’ FOREMOST trademarks at issue could con-
        fuse consumers into thinking that a relationship exists between the
        parties. Here, the District Court found at summary judgment that
        there was no likelihood of confusion (and thus no trademark in-
        fringement) between the FOREMOST marks of Foremost Insur-
        ance Company (“FIC”), a multi-billion dollar insurance company
        which for 70 years has sold many different lines of insurance, and
        Foremost Title and Escrow (“FT&E”), a shell company set up to
        sell title insurance for a law firm. After reviewing the record and
        with the benefit of oral argument, we disagree with the District
        Court’s likelihood of confusion analysis and thus reverse the
        Court’s grant of summary judgment on FIC’s trademark infringe-
        ment claim. 1
                                             I.
              In 1952, FIC was founded and started using FOREMOST-
        branded marks to market and sell its insurance products. After FIC
        operated independently for several decades, Farmers Insurance
        Group acquired FIC in 2000. Now a subsidiary of Farmers, FIC

        1 FT&E also appealed the District Court’s denial of attorney’s fees and non-
        taxable costs to FT&E in a separate cross-appeal that is not before us.
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        19-13390                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

        continues to sell insurance in the United States and Florida under
        its FOREMOST-branded marks. 2
               In total, FIC owns 21 registered trademarks with the word
        “Foremost.” On its website, FIC displays a FOREMOST mark in
        the following way:

        FIC also uses its FOREMOST marks on its online advertisements,
        social media, emails, magazines, and brochures. From 2011 to
        2017, FIC spent an average of $6,765,627 per year to advertise and
        promote its FOREMOST marks. Moreover, the American Associ-
        ation of Retired Persons (“AARP”) endorsed FIC in 1989. Thus,
        FIC also advertises to AARP members using its FOREMOST marks
        through AARP’s website, email and mailing lists, and the AARP
        magazine. AARP has 2.7 million Florida members; of these, FIC
        sent FOREMOST-branded emails or mail solicitations to over
        120,000 AARP members in 2016 and 2017. Additionally, FIC’s

        2 One of FIC’s wholly owned subsidiaries, FCOA, owns legal title to FIC’s
        FOREMOST trademarks. Although FCOA filed this lawsuit, the real party in
        interest is FIC and we refer to these entities collectively as FIC throughout this
        opinion.
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                        19-13390

        independent insurance agents often use the FOREMOST marks in
        their own marketing.
               FIC has issued over 3 million FOREMOST-branded insur-
        ance policies nationwide, including homeowners’ insurance, prop-
        erty insurance, fire insurance, business building insurance, landlord
        insurance, and mobile home insurance. In Florida alone, FIC has
        over 95,000 customers. FIC primarily sells its insurance policies
        through its over 33,000 independent agents at 77,000 locations.
        FIC generated over $2 billion in insurance premiums nationwide
        in 2017, of which $80 million came from Florida policies. How-
        ever, one thing FIC does not offer is title insurance. Under Florida
        law, entities that issue title insurance are prohibited from selling
        any other type of insurance, and vice versa. Fla. Stat. § 627.786. 3
               Enter FT&E. In 2015, two partners of the law firm Stok Folk
        + Kon, Robert Stok and Joshua Kon, set up FT&E as a Florida-
        based limited liability company. Stok and Kon created FT&E to do
        one thing: take over the real estate closings and title insurance4
        sales that Stok Folk + Kon previously performed. FT&E shares

        3We need not reach the issue of whether FIC could have created a subsidiary
        to sell title insurance under a FOREMOST mark if it had so desired.
        4 Titleinsurance protects home purchasers and lenders from the risks associ-
        ated with defects in title, such as issues not discoverable in a title search and
        mistakes made in a title search. Fla. Stat. § 624.608 (defining title insurance as
        “[i]nsurance of owners of real property or others having an interest in real
        property . . . against loss by encumbrance, or defective titles, or invalidity, or
        adverse claim to title”).
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        19-13390               Opinion of the Court                         5

        with Stok Folk + Kon both a physical address in Aventura, Florida
        (a suburb of Miami), and a phone number.
                In preparing to open FT&E, Stok and Kon conducted a
        search for potential business names. As part of this process, they
        brainstormed the term “foremost,” searched the term on the Flor-
        ida Secretary of State’s online business list, and found no other ac-
        tive title insurance businesses with “foremost” in their name. So,
        Stok and Kon settled on the name “Foremost Title & Escrow.”
              FT&E adopted the following mark, which it displays on its
        website:

        FT&E derives its clients from the Stok Folk + Kon law firm and
        realtor referrals. Still, FT&E markets its title insurance and closing
        services through online advertisements, social media, a locally dis-
        tributed magazine, trade shows, public events, and emails to home-
        owners.
              FT&E received its license to operate as a title insurance
        agency in Florida on October 13, 2015, from the Florida
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                      19-13390

        Department of Financial Services (“DFS”).5 In May 2016, FT&E
        began conducting closings within the Tri-County area of South
        Florida (Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties) and
        marketing to real estate agents, bankers, mortgage brokers, and de-
        velopers. FT&E had completed seven closings by October 2017
        (when FIC filed this lawsuit) and at least 20 closings by November
        2018 (when the parties moved for summary judgment). Obtaining
        title insurance is an integral part of FT&E’s closing services. How-
        ever, FT&E does not underwrite title insurance itself. Instead,
        FT&E conducts a title search as a title insurance agent for Fidelity
        National Title Insurance Company and Old Republic Title Insur-
        ance Company based on agency agreements executed in May 2016.
        Fidelity National and Old Republic then decide whether to issue a
        policy insuring the purchaser’s title to real estate at closing. FT&E

        5 Under Florida law, title insurance may only be sold by a “licensed and ap-
        pointed title insurance agent employed by a licensed and appointed title insur-
        ance agency.” Fla. Stat. § 626.8412(1)(a). A title insurance agency is different
        than a title insurer, who underwrites and issues a policy insuring title. The
        agent acts on the insurer’s behalf in selling the policy and running a “reasona-
        ble title search.” Id. §§ 627.7845, 627.796. Typically, title insurance agents
        must either be attorneys licensed by the state of Florida or pass a licensing
        exam. Id. §§ 626.8417(4) (noting that attorneys are exempt from the licensing
        and appointment requirements of title insurance agents), 626.241(7). Like-
        wise, title insurance agencies (which employ title insurance agents) must be
        licensed by the state and appointed as an agent by a title insurer. Id.
        §§ 626.8418, 626.8417(6) (providing that a title insurance agency owned by
        lawyers and not engaged in the practice of law must still comply with licensing
        and appointment requirements).
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        19-13390              Opinion of the Court                       7

        earns revenue by charging a fee for closing services and collecting
        a portion of the insurance premium for the policies it procures.
               Seven months after FT&E started conducting closings and
        obtaining title insurance, FIC sent FT&E a cease-and-desist letter
        claiming that FT&E’s use of the term “foremost” infringed on
        FIC’s FOREMOST marks. FT&E insists that this letter was the first
        time it learned of FIC and its numerous lines of insurance in Flor-
        ida. FT&E responded to FIC’s letter by disputing the allegations of
        trademark infringement in both a phone call and a letter to FIC.
               On October 4, 2017, FIC filed a five-count complaint against
        FT&E. FIC alleged trademark infringement under the Lanham
        Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1116 (Count I); false designation of
        origin, a form of unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15
        U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count II); dilution under the Lanham Act, 15
        U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Count III); unfair competition under Florida com-
        mon law (Count IV); and antidilution under Fla. Stat. § 495.151
        (Count V). Following discovery, both parties moved for summary
        judgment on November 2, 2018.
               In August 2019, the District Court issued its order denying
        FIC’s motion for summary judgment and granting FT&E’s motion
        for summary judgment. FCOA, LLC v. Foremost Title & Escrow
        Servs., LLC, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1381, 1395 (S.D. Fla. 2019). Because
        the District Court believed that each count of FIC’s complaint re-
        quired a showing of likelihood of confusion between FT&E’s and
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        8                           Opinion of the Court                        19-13390

        FIC’s marks,6 it began (and ended) its analysis there. Id. at 1387–
        88. The District Court held that the two marks did not create a
        likelihood of confusion by consumers that a relationship exists be-
        tween the parties as a matter of law. Id. at 1394. Accordingly, the
        Court ruled that FIC had no cognizable claim and granted FT&E’s
        motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1394–95. FIC then timely
        appealed the Court’s final judgment as to Count I, its trademark
        infringement claim.7

        6 This belief was only partially correct. The District Court correctly recog-
        nized that FIC’s trademark infringement and unfair competition claims
        (Counts I, II, and IV) do all require a showing of likelihood of confusion.
        FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1388 & n.4; Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Fla. Nat’l
        Univ., Inc. (“FIU ”), 830 F.3d 1242, 1265 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Suntree Techs.,
        Inc. v. Ecosense Int’l, Inc., 693 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2012)); Custom Mfg.
        & Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 652–53 (11th Cir. 2007)
        (holding that Florida unfair competition and trademark infringement use the
        same likelihood of confusion analysis as the federal Lanham Act test). How-
        ever, dilution under federal and Florida law (Counts III and V) do not. Mose-
        ley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2003);
        15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); Great S. Bank v. First S. Bank, 625 So. 2d 463, 470 (Fla.
        1993). As far as we can tell, the District Court never mentioned FIC’s dilution
        claims in its order at all despite purporting to decide FIC’s “five claims.” See
        FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1386. Since FIC only appealed its trademark in-
        fringement claim, we need not address this matter further.
        7FIC failed to mention the unfair competition and dilution claims (Counts II
        through V) in its initial appellate brief beyond noting that its complaint alleged
        these claims in the facts section of FIC’s brief. Appellant Br. at 3. By failing to
        provide any argument or citation that the District Court erred in deciding
        these claims in its initial appellate brief, FIC forfeited them. United States v.
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        19-13390                     Opinion of the Court                                   9

                                                 II.
                On summary judgment, we review district court decisions
        de novo using the same standard as the district courts. Tana v.
        Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010). We view all the
        evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
        moving party. Id. A grant of summary judgment is proper where
        there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
        is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 8
             We have recognized that district courts deciding summary
        judgment motions may occasionally draw inferences against the

        Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (holding that the “failure
        to raise an issue in an initial brief on direct appeal” results in forfeiture).
        8 FT&E urges us to treat the proceedings below as a bench trial because the
        District Court implicitly (and wrongly) decided questions of fact as a matter of
        law. In other words, FT&E seeks to shift our standard of review from the
        more exacting summary judgment standard—whether any issues of material
        fact remain—to the more deferential standard for factual determinations in a
        bench trial—whether the District Court’s determinations were clearly errone-
        ous. We refuse to do so. Cross-motions for summary judgment may be
        treated on appeal as a bench trial only in rare “limited circumstances,” consid-
        ering whether (1) there was a hearing on the merits of the motions where the
        facts were fully developed; (2) the parties “expressly stipulated to an agreed set
        of facts”; and (3) the record shows that the parties “in effect submitted the case
        to the court for trial on an agreed statement of facts embodied in a limited
        written record, which would have enabled the [district] court to decide all is-
        sues and resolve all factual disputes.” FIU, 830 F.3d at 1252–53 (alterations in
        original); see also Ga. State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
        775 F.3d 1336, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 2015). None of these circumstances are pre-
        sent here.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      19-13390

        non-movant when “there are no genuine issues of material fact,”
        “no issues of witness credibility,” and the district court must decide
        the motion based on a cold record consisting of “affidavits, deposi-
        tions, and stipulations.” Useden v. Acker, 947 F.2d 1563, 1572 (11th
        Cir. 1991) (quoting Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123–
        24 (5th Cir. 1978)). However, our standard of review on appeal is
        “unaffected by any inferential conclusions reached below” under
        the Nunez standard of review. Id. at 1573 & n.14.
                                             III.
               Trademark infringement under the Lanham Act occurs
        when a defendant, without consent, uses “in commerce any repro-
        duction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
        mark” that “is likely to cause confusion” that a relationship exists
        between the parties. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). 9 For a trademark in-
        fringement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that it owns a
        valid mark with priority, and (2) that the defendant’s mark is likely
        to cause consumer confusion with the plaintiff’s mark. See
        Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Int’l Select Grp., Inc., 192 F.3d 1330, 1335
        (11th Cir. 1999). The parties agree that at least some of FIC’s

        9That relationship can take two forms. First, a consumer could be confused
        about the source of the marks, thinking that the goods or services associated
        with a second mark are produced by the original mark holder. Second, a con-
        sumer may be confused as to the existence of an affiliation, connection, or
        sponsorship between the parties. Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d
        1535, 1546–47 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Bos. Pro. Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap &
        Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012–13 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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        19-13390                   Opinion of the Court                               11

        FOREMOST marks have priority over FT&E’s. So, because the
        District Court granted summary judgment to FT&E, the sole is-
        sue 10 before us is whether a reasonable jury could find that FT&E’s
        FOREMOST mark is likely to cause confusion with FIC’s marks.11
               The likelihood of confusion analysis involves two steps. At
        step one, the court considers several factors which can provide cir-
        cumstantial evidence of likelihood of confusion. See Fla. Int’l Univ.
        Bd. of Trs. v. Fla. Nat’l Univ., Inc. (“FIU ”), 830 F.3d 1242, 1255
        (11th Cir. 2016). Or, to put it another way, the court conducts sev-
        eral separate inquiries on the factors which yield “circumstantial
        facts” that shed light on the likelihood of confusion as a whole.12

        10 The number of FIC’s marks that have priority over FT&E’s mark is insignif-
        icant to our analysis because only one mark needs priority to reverse the grant
        of summary judgment.
        11 FT&E also provided our panel with its application to register its mark,
        FOREMOST TITLE & ESCROW, with the Patent and Trademark Office
        (“PTO”), and with the record of the PTO’s subsequent actions. However, the
        PTO’s ex parte decision is not entitled to even persuasive weight in the likeli-
        hood of confusion analysis, so it is irrelevant to our decision. PlayNation Play
        Sys., Inc. v. Velex Corp., 924 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir. 2019).
        12This Court has usually discussed the likelihood of confusion test in terms of
        evaluating factors, not as separate inquiries yielding “circumstantial facts.”
        See, e.g., FIU, 830 F.3d at 1255; Tana, 611 F.3d at 774–75; Frehling, 192 F.3d at
        1335. In this opinion, we discuss the multifactor likelihood of confusion test
        in these terms to reinforce the idea that each of these factors is analytically a
        separate factual inquiry relevant to, but ultimately independent of, likelihood
        of confusion. Therefore, our use of the terms separate inquiries and “circum-
        stantial facts” throughout this opinion is meant as a stylistic choice only and
        does not substantively change our caselaw.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 19-13390

        Of course, on a motion for summary judgment, these separate in-
        quiries must view all the evidence and draw all reasonable infer-
        ences in favor of the non-moving party. This Court has recognized
        seven factors as relevant:
              (1) the strength of the allegedly infringed mark; (2)
              the similarity of the infringed and infringing marks;
              (3) the similarity of the goods and services the marks
              represent; (4) the similarity of the parties’ trade chan-
              nels and customers; (5) the similarity of advertising
              media used by the parties; (6) the intent of the alleged
              infringer to misappropriate the proprietor’s good
              will; and (7) the existence and extent of actual confu-
              sion in the consuming public.

        Id. Additionally, this Court has also analyzed consumer sophistica-
        tion as a separate factor or circumstantial fact relevant to determin-
        ing likelihood of confusion, see id. at 1256, and we analyze it as
        such infra Part III.A.viii.
               At step two, the court weighs each of the relevant circum-
        stantial facts—independently and then together—to determine
        whether the ultimate fact, likelihood of confusion, can reasonably
        be inferred. See Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1335. This inference is also a
        factual inquiry. Id. In drawing the ultimate inference about likeli-
        hood of confusion, the two most important circumstantial facts are
        respectively actual confusion and the strength of the mark. FIU,
        830 F.3d at 1255.
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        19-13390               Opinion of the Court                       13

                This two-step analysis is the same whether the court is de-
        ciding likelihood of confusion at a bench trial or entertaining a mo-
        tion for summary judgment. See Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1335; Tana,
        611 F.3d at 774–82. On summary judgment, the court conducts the
        step one separate inquiries with all the relevant evidence and rea-
        sonable inferences cast in the light most favorable to the non-mo-
        vant. See J-B Weld Co., LLC v. Gorilla Glue Co., 978 F.3d 778, 789
        (11th Cir. 2020). At step two, the court weighs the relative im-
        portance of the circumstantial facts and determines whether these
        facts, taken in the light most favorable to the non-movant, would
        permit a reasonable fact finder to infer likelihood of confusion. Id.
        Courts may grant summary judgment on likelihood of confusion
        even if some circumstantial facts favor the non-movant because the
        two-step analysis “presupposes that [the] various [circumstantial
        facts may] point in opposing directions.” Tana, 611 F.3d at 775 n.7.
                Before it decided the parties’ motions for summary judg-
        ment in this case, the District Court conducted the step one inquir-
        ies and found the following circumstantial facts as a matter of law:
        (1) FIC’s marks were “relatively weak;” (2) FIC’s marks were not
        sufficiently similar to FT&E’s mark; (3) both FIC and FT&E’s
        marks represented similar goods or services; (4) both FIC and
        FT&E “advertise their services using online advertising, websites
        and social media;” (5) FT&E did not intend to cause consumer con-
        fusion by infringing on FIC’s marks; (6) no evidence existed of ac-
        tual consumer confusion about FIC and FT&E’s marks; and (7)
        FT&E’s client base was “sophisticated and unlikely to be
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                 19-13390

        confused.” FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1388–95. For factor four,
        similarity of trade channels and customers, the Court found evi-
        dence that favored both parties and, instead of viewing the evi-
        dence in FIC’s favor, concluded the factor was “neutral.” Id. at
        1392. In fact, throughout its opinion the Court consistently drew
        inferences against FIC by misapplying the Nunez standard, a mat-
        ter we discuss more infra Part IV. Id. at 1387 (citing Nunez, 572
        F.2d at 1123–24). At step two, the District Court mechanically
        added up these findings and held, without any further analysis, that
        FT&E’s mark did not create a likelihood of confusion with FIC’s
        marks as a matter of law. Id. at 1394–95.
              On appeal, FIC argues that the District Court incorrectly
        conducted the inquiries as to the first, second, fourth, and fifth cir-
        cumstantial facts. FIC also argues that the District Court improp-
        erly weighed the circumstantial facts at step two. Accordingly, we
        proceed to review the Court’s determinations de novo.
                                          A.
                             i. Strength of FIC’s Marks
               In trademark law, the strength of a mark is the second most
        important circumstantial fact and determines the scope of the
        mark’s protection. Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1335. Strength or “distinc-
        tiveness” describes a mark’s ability to allow consumers to identify
        the source of a good or service. Id.; John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke
        Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 973–74 (11th Cir. 1983). So, strength or
        distinctiveness is just another way of talking about consumer
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        19-13390                Opinion of the Court                          15

        recognition. When Joe Consumer goes to his local grocer and buys
        Coca-Cola branded products, he can rest assured that he has
        bought something with Coca-Cola’s quality standards. As a result,
        the stronger Coca-Cola’s mark, the easier it is for consumers to rec-
        ognize the product and its source, and thus the more likely it is that
        consumers will associate a similar mark with the same source as
        Coca-Cola-branded products. 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy
        on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (“McCarthy”) § 24:49,
        Westlaw (5th ed. database updated Dec. 2022). The stronger the
        mark, then, the greater the likelihood of confusion and the greater
        the protection given to the mark. Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman,
        509 F.3d 1351, 1361 (11th Cir. 2007).
              We have described two steps in assessing the strength of a
        mark: conceptual strength and commercial strength.
               The first step in assessing strength is to determine the “con-
        ceptual strength” of the mark. FIU, 830 F.3d at 1258; 2 McCarthy
        § 11:80. Conceptual strength describes the potential of a mark to
        aid consumer recognition, which we evaluate through an abstract
        linguistic analysis. Courts determine this potential by placing a
        mark on the sliding scale of trademark strength, from weakest to
        strongest: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) fanciful
        or arbitrary. Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1335; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
        Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768, 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2757 (1992). As we
        have previously explained,
               [Generic marks] refer to a class of which an individual
               service is a member (e.g., “liquor store” used in
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                19-13390

              connection with the sale of liquor). Descriptive
              marks describe a characteristic or quality of an article
              or service (e.g., “vision center” denoting a place
              where glasses are sold). “Suggestive terms suggest
              characteristics of the goods and services and require
              an effort of the imagination by the consumer in order
              to be understood as descriptive.” For instance, “pen-
              guin” would be suggestive of refrigerators. An arbi-
              trary mark is a word or phrase that bears no relation-
              ship to the product (e.g., “Sun Bank” is arbitrary when
              applied to banking services).

        Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1335 (citations omitted). Arbitrary, fanciful,
        and suggestive marks are generally strong. Freedom Sav. & Loan
        Ass’n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1182 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1985). Generic
        and descriptive marks are so weak that they are not valid trade-
        marks. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115(b)(4), 1065(4). However, if a descriptive
        mark, like FOREMOST, acquires “secondary meaning,” then the
        descriptive mark is strong enough to be valid under the Lanham
        Act. Royal Palm Props., LLC v. Pink Palm Props., LLC, 950 F.3d
        776, 782–83 (11th Cir. 2020). Descriptive marks could (in the ab-
        stract) refer to many entities. So, a mark has secondary meaning
        when consumers view the mark as synonymous with the mark
        holder’s goods or services. For example, American Airlines could
        theoretically refer to any airline based in North or South America.
        See id. at 783. But with the mark holder’s time and effort, Ameri-
        can Airlines now calls to mind a specific airline through its second-
        ary meaning. See id. Incontestable descriptive marks, like the
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        19-13390                   Opinion of the Court                               17

        FOREMOST marks, are statutorily presumed to be valid and thus
        must have some degree of secondary meaning. Dieter v. B & H
        Indus. of Sw. Fla., Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 328 (11th Cir. 1989). Other-
        wise, they would not be valid marks at all. Id.
               Incontestable descriptive marks are also presumed, in our
        circuit, to be “relatively strong mark[s].” Id. at 329; see also Sover-
        eign Mil. Hospitaller Ord. of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes &
        of Malta v. Fla. Priory of the Knights Hospitallers of the Sovereign
        Ord. of Saint John of Jerusalem, Knights of Malta, the Ecumenical
        Ord. (“Sovereign Mil.”), 809 F.3d 1171, 1183 (11th Cir. 2015). 13 This
        Dieter presumption can be rebutted by looking to the second step:
        commercial strength. FIU, 830 F.3d at 1256–60.
              Commercial strength refers to the real-world consumer
        recognition of a mark, most often created by the efforts and work

        13Marks that are registered start off as contestable. Marks become incontest-
        able once they have been registered on the Principal Register with the PTO
        for at least five years, among other statutory formalities. Frehling, 192 F.3d at
        1336; 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (listing the requirements for incontestability).
                FT&E argues that this Court is “an outlier” insofar as we recognize a
        connection between incontestable status and mark strength. We have openly
        admitted as much. Sovereign Mil., 809 F.3d at 1183 (indicating that Dieter is
        arguably incorrect because whether a mark is registered says nothing about
        consumer perceptions). Although Dieter may rest on faulty ground, a deci-
        sion being wrong does not mean that it lacks legal force. See id. at 1184. In
        our circuit, prior precedent (even if erroneous) continues to bind us until over-
        turned en banc or by an opinion of the Supreme Court. Id. We are still bound
        to follow Dieter.
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  19-13390

        of the mark holder. See id. at 1258 (“It is surely true that focusing
        solely on conceptual strength is an ‘incomplete’ method of analysis
        . . . .”); John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 974 n.13. We have held
        that “[d]etermining the strength of any mark requires weighing ei-
        ther or both circumstantial evidence of advertising and promotion
        and direct evidence of consumer recognition, such as by a survey.”
        FIU, 830 F.3d at 1259 (quoting 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy
        on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:83 (4th ed. 2016)).
        Commonly used evidence of commercial strength includes third
        party use; advertising and promotion; sales and number and types
        of customers; recognition by trade, media, and customers; and sur-
        vey of likely customers. 2 McCarthy § 11:81.
                As relevant here, the Dieter presumption can be rebutted by
        a strong showing of third-party use of the mark that significantly
        impacts consumer recognition of the original mark. See FIU, 830
        F.3d at 1257; Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535,
        1545 n.27 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that third-party use matters in
        determining “whether the unauthorized third-party uses signifi-
        cantly diminish the public’s perception that the mark identifies
        items connected with the owner of the mark”). In assessing the
        third-party use, we consider: (1) the frequency of third-party use,
        (2) the full names that the third-party uses, and (3) “the kind of busi-
        ness in which the user[s] [are] engaged.” FIU, 830 F.3d at 1257.
        Though the number of third-party uses is important, “there is no
        hard-and-fast rule establishing a single number that suffices to
        weaken a mark.” Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, Inc. v.
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        19-13390                  Opinion of the Court                              19

        Sportswear, Inc., 983 F.3d 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting FIU,
        830 F.3d at 1257). Moreover, third-party uses in the same market
        diminish a mark’s strength more than uses in other markets.14 See
        Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 259–60 (5th
        Cir. 1980); Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
        651 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. July 1981). 15 And, because the consum-
        ing public is unlikely to be aware of mere federal registrations of
        third-party marks, such evidence is not probative of the diminished

        14We have not been entirely clear about whether third-party uses in other
        markets diminishes a mark’s strength. At times we have appeared to say they
        don’t. See PlayNation, 924 F.3d at 1166 (“[S]imilar marks used by third parties
        in unrelated businesses or markets do not diminish the strength of a mark in a
        particular market.”); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, Inc., 675
        F.2d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 1982). At other times we have said they do. See
        Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 259–60 (5th Cir. 1980)
        (“We do not believe that such extensive third-party use and registration of
        ‘Domino’ can be so readily dismissed. The impact of such evidence is not
        dispelled merely because ‘Domino’ cigarettes and matches are not leading
        brands, or because some uses of the mark ‘Domino’ by third parties have not
        been related to food products.”); Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v. Sun Fed. Sav. &
        Loan Ass’n, 651 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. July 1981). The best way to synthesize
        the caselaw is to say that other-market uses can diminish a mark’s strength,
        but not always to a significant extent—certainly not always to the point of
        making a mark weak.
        15 Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
        (all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down before October 1, 1981, are binding
        precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
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        20                          Opinion of the Court                        19-13390

        distinctiveness of the original mark.16 Turner v. HMH Publ’g Co.,
        380 F.2d 224, 228 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1967).
               Here, “Foremost” is a descriptive mark, a self-laudatory
        term meaning the best. Platinum Home Mortg. Corp. v. Platinum
        Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing self-
        laudatory marks as descriptive). Because it is incontestable, this
        mark is presumed to be a relatively strong mark. Dieter, 880 F.2d
        at 329. The District Court held that the existence of 62 registered
        trademarks and 541 registered business names in various states us-
        ing the term “foremost” provided evidence of third-party use

        16 To be fair, we have been unclear on this point as well. We have stated that
        “mere registrations” of similar marks will not weaken a mark. Turner v. HMH
        Publ’g Co., 380 F.2d 224, 228 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1967). At other times, however,
        we’ve seemingly relied on mark registrations and business lists as a proxy for
        distinctiveness without demanding any evidence that they have affected pub-
        lic perception in any way. See AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1539
        (11th Cir. 1986); Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d
        3, 13 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated by B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
        575 U.S. 138, 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
                However, our oldest case in this arena directly addressing this ques-
        tion, Turner, controls. The District Court below used an even older case as
        support for the proposition that registrations are evidence of third-party use.
        See El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1954). In El
        Chico, the Former Fifth Circuit considered trademark registrations alongside
        other evidence of third-party use to determine that a mark was weak. Id. Still,
        El Chico did not directly address this issue, and so it did not foreclose the hold-
        ing in Turner. Thus, Turner controls. See Scott v. United States, 890 F.3d
        1239, 1257 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The prior-panel-precedent rule requires subse-
        quent panels of the court to follow the precedent of the first panel to address
        the relevant issue . . . . ”).
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        19-13390                Opinion of the Court                        21

        sufficient to rebut the Dieter presumption. FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d
        at 1390 (citing El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 725 (5th
        Cir. 1954) and AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1539 (11th
        Cir. 1986)). The Court did so without analyzing the industries or
        names of the marks or businesses presented. Id. On appeal, FIC
        first argues that the District Court erred by relying solely on trade-
        mark registrations and business lists to rebut the Dieter presump-
        tion. FIC argues in addition that the District Court erred when it
        failed to analyze the additional “commercial strength” evidence
        FIC proffered of its marketing and promotional efforts.
               Conducting the analysis de novo, we conclude that the Di-
        eter presumption remains unrebutted. As explained above, the
        mere fact that a mark has been registered or that a business is
        named in a registry is not evidence of third-party use. Turner, 380
        F.2d at 228. FT&E simply provided a list of businesses printed from
        Secretary of States’ webpages and trademark registrations. In re-
        sponse, FIC has shown that none of the “active” entities on the
        business lists (other than FIC) contain the word “insurance” in their
        name, the business lists do not show which industries the compa-
        nies operate in, and no registered trademarks with the term “Fore-
        most” are registered for use in the insurance industry (other than
        FIC). Our review of the evidence in the light most favorable to FIC
        shows that there is no reliable evidence that these businesses or
        marks are active. Inactive businesses and marks are not relevant to
        our analysis. See id. Given this (lack of) evidence, we hold that the
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        22                          Opinion of the Court                        19-13390

        Dieter presumption remains unrebutted, and FIC’s marks are still
        “relatively strong.” Dieter, 880 F.2d at 329.
               FIC has also provided evidence of consumer recognition
        that bolsters its already presumptively strong mark. While FT&E
        argues FIC only introduced evidence of its $7,000,000-a-year adver-
        tising budget, 17 FIC has also provided evidence about the size and
        scope of its agent class, its over $2.4 billion in annual insurance pre-
        miums, its recognition in independent publications, an AARP en-
        dorsement, and a survey showing that a majority of South Florida
        respondents had heard of FIC. Viewing the evidence in FIC’s favor,
        a reasonable factfinder conducting a separate inquiry on the
        strength of FIC’s marks could find the marks strong based on both

        17 We have previously doubted the probative value of “raw advertising fig-
        ures,” that is, the dollar amount that a company spends to advertise its mark.
        In FIU, we stated that a district court under clear error review was permitted
        to discount evidence of raw advertising figures, standing alone, as it impacts
        the strength of the mark. 830 F.3d at 1259 (“There simply was not sufficient
        evidence of commercial strength in the record to [require] the district court to
        ignore the substantial third-party usage.”). We reasoned that raw advertising
        figures alone tell us little about the efficacy of those efforts in the mind of con-
        sumers. Id. We stated that this evidence was far more probative if there was
        comparative spending evidence with others in the industry or direct evidence
        of consumer recognition. Id. In a later case, we held that it was also not clear
        error for a court to find, with additional evidence beyond raw advertising fig-
        ures, that advertising expenditures contribute to the strength of a mark. Play-
        Nation, 924 F.3d at 1166 n.3. Because it was not clear error to consider that
        evidence in PlayNation, we can consider that same type of evidence on sum-
        mary judgment.
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        19-13390                Opinion of the Court                        23

        the Dieter presumption and the additional evidence of commercial
        strength.
                             ii. Similarity of the Marks
               The second inquiry requires us to examine the similarity be-
        tween the parties’ marks. FIU, 830 F.3d at 1260. “The greater the
        similarity, the greater the likelihood of confusion.” Id. Of course,
        the marks don’t need to be identical to support a finding of similar-
        ity, because the key is to determine if the similarities are sufficient
        to deceive the public. Id. We “consider[] the overall impressions
        that the marks create, including the sound, appearance, and man-
        ner in which they are used,” rather than comparing isolated fea-
        tures. Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1337; Sovereign Mil., 809 F.3d at 1186.
        Because of its malleability, we have described this analysis as a
        “subjective eyeball test.” AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1540.
                The District Court stated that both marks started with
        “Foremost” and looked similar at first glance. FCOA, 416 F. Supp.
        3d at 1390–91. However, the District Court focused on the differ-
        ences in color, fonts, and logos, and the words that followed the
        FOREMOST marks. Id. Specifically, it found that the words “title”
        and “escrow” separated FT&E’s mark from FIC’s FOREMOST
        marks, because it is not obvious to the public that “title” refers to
        title insurance. Id. Thus, the District Court concluded that the
        marks were dissimilar. Id.
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                 19-13390

                FIC argues that the District Court did not fully consider the
        commercial impression of the marks and that its side-by-side anal-
        ysis of the marks was insufficient. Considering similarity anew, we
        believe a reasonable factfinder could find that the parties’ marks are
        similar in sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impres-
        sion:

               Our analysis focuses on the distinctive parts of marks. See
        AmBrit, 812 F.2d at 1541; John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 976.
        “Foremost” is the most distinctive part of both parties’ marks, and
        far more important than generic words like title and escrow. See
        PlayNation Play Sys., Inc. v. Velex Corp., 924 F.3d 1159, 1168 (11th
        Cir. 2019); John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 976. With that frame
        of reference, the marks are similar in sight, sound, and meaning.
        The logos create a similar overall effect and accentuate the marks’
        similarities, because both feature two lines of text, with “Fore-
        most” in bold, sans-serif type above smaller letters detailing the ge-
        neric parts of the marks, to the right of a stylized “F.” See Safeway
        Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1165 (11th
        Cir. 1982) (focusing on overall effect of a mark and ignoring its non-
        distinctive parts); Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Hous., Inc.,
        628 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that two marks were sim-
        ilar when they were both in block letters on an all-white back-
        ground with blue underneath). This conclusion is bolstered by
        considering how the marks are used in the actual world, something
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        19-13390               Opinion of the Court                        25

        the District Court did not do. See Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743
        F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that “Singleton,” the most
        distinct part of the mark at issue, was emphasized on materials in
        the marketplace). FT&E often refers to itself simply as “Foremost”
        on its website, which is precisely FIC’s trademark and the most crit-
        ical part of other marks.
               Admittedly, there are some differences in the marks because
        the parties use different fonts and colors. FT&E relies on a green
        and gold color scheme, whereas FIC relies on black and blue colors.
        We do not find these minor differences to be significant on sum-
        mary judgment, given that “Foremost” is the dominant part of
        both marks and what consumers would focus on. Conagra, 743
        F.2d at 1514; see also Carnival Brand Seafood Co. v. Carnival
        Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1307, 1312 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1999); Safeway,
        675 F.2d at 1165. Those differences are even less important because
        consumers are unlikely to confront them side-by-side in the real-
        world where they could be discerning about those differences. See
        Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Rsch. & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192
        (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) (stating that the likelihood of confusion
        may be increased when consumers are unable “to compare the
        products side by side and observe the precise differences in appear-
        ance”). Drawing all inferences in FIC’s favor, a reasonable fact-
        finder could determine that these two marks are similar.
                           iii. Similarity of the Products
              The third circumstantial fact, the similarity of the products,
        concerns whether the products are of a kind the public could think
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                 19-13390

        originate from a single source. Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1338. Here,
        both parties sell insurance. FT&E argues that there can be no con-
        fusion because a consumer could not purchase a policy of FIC that
        overlaps with a policy of FT&E, that the policy itself would not
        bear the FOREMOST marks because FT&E is merely an agent of
        larger national title insurance companies, and that FIC cannot con-
        duct closings or issue title insurance under Florida law. While title
        insurance is a monoline industry in Florida, consumers are unlikely
        to know that and, even if they did, could potentially assume that
        FT&E was a subsidiary or affiliate of FIC. Moreover, the logo or
        trademark on the insurance policy does not somehow transform
        insurance into the mere work of an agent separate from the insur-
        ance itself and, even if it did, by the time FT&E’s customers actu-
        ally see FT&E’s policies, they almost certainly have already been
        exposed to FT&E’s “foremost” mark. Accordingly, a reasonable
        factfinder could find that the parties’ products are similar.
                 iv. Similarity of Trade Channels and Customers
               The fourth circumstantial fact, similarity of trade channels
        and customers, focuses on “where, how, and [with] whom” the
        parties transact with their actual and potential customers. Sover-
        eign Mil., 809 F.3d at 1187–88 (“Dissimilarities between the retail
        outlets for and the predominant consumers of plaintiff’s and de-
        fendants’ goods lessen the possibility of confusion . . . .” (quoting
        Amstar Corp., 615 F.2d at 262)); Safeway, 675 F.2d at 1166; see also
        Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 757 F.2d at 1184–85, 1184 n.7 (holding
        for this circumstantial fact that it is enough if a plaintiff “show[s]
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        19-13390               Opinion of the Court                       27

        that the same customers are likely to use both services”). The pri-
        mary focus in this inquiry is on the overlap of the customer bases,
        because the greater the overlap, the greater the likelihood that con-
        sumers will be exposed to both marks and become confused. See
        Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, Inc., 983 F.3d at 1284. Therefore,
        direct competition or identity of sales is not required; we look to
        whether the companies “cater to the same general kinds of individ-
        uals.” Sovereign Mil., 809 F.3d at 1188; PlayNation, 924 F.3d at
        1168. Likewise, the similarity of trade channels analysis focuses on
        whether the medium (e.g., stores, agents, online, mail, etc.) that
        customers frequent would expose them to both marks, not on
        whether the products or services are sold in the same location or
        manner. Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1339; see also Century 21 Real Est.
        Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
              Here, the District Court correctly recognized that FIC pro-
        duced evidence tending to show that FIC and FT&E’s customer
        bases overlapped, i.e., both targeted homeowners seeking home
        insurance-related products. FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1391–93.
        However, the District Court also credited FT&E’s argument that
        FIC and FT&E “differ[ed]” because most of FT&E’s customers
        came from referrals by Stok Folk + Kon, realtors, brokers, and
        other agents. Id. at 1392. Faced with contradictory evidence, the
        Court found this factor to be neutral instead of applying the sum-
        mary judgment standard. Id.
              Conducting the analysis de novo, we agree with the District
        Court that both parties targeted the same type of individuals, i.e.,
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        28                     Opinion of the Court                19-13390

        “real property purchasers” or sellers who need insurance. Accord-
        ingly, FIC has put forth evidence tending to show that its customer
        base overlapped with FT&E’s. However, we disagree with the Dis-
        trict Court and FT&E that FT&E has introduced any evidence
        tending to show that its customer base did not overlap with FIC’s.
        FT&E primarily gets customers from its referral system, yes, but
        the persons buying title insurance are the same type of people
        (home buyers and sellers) who will likely need homeowners’ insur-
        ance and thereby could be exposed to both marks. See Freedom
        Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 757 F.2d at 1184 n.7 (noting that it is sufficient
        for plaintiffs “to show that the same customers are likely to use
        both services”); Safeway, 675 F.2d at 1166 (focusing on the overlap
        of actual or potential customers). Nothing prevents a potential
        home buyer or seller from purchasing homeowner’s insurance
        from FIC, noting the FOREMOST mark, and then being referred
        to FT&E for closing services and title insurance. Indeed, consider-
        ing the evidence FIC has introduced about its presence in Florida,
        this scenario is quite plausible.
               On appeal, FT&E defends the Court’s finding that FT&E’s
        customer base differed from FIC with three additional arguments:
        (1) FT&E only sells through its physical location in Aventura, not
        through other trade channels or in other geographic regions; (2)
        FT&E sells directly to consumers at its office, as opposed to inde-
        pendent agents; and (3) title insurance is a monoline industry in
        Florida. We find all three unpersuasive.
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        19-13390               Opinion of the Court                       29

            As an established multi-billion dollar nationwide insurance
        company, FIC naturally sells insurance through many more medi-
        ums and in many more locations than a small start-up like FT&E.
        The question, however, is not whether one party’s trade channels
        and customer base exceeds the other’s, but whether the parties’
        trade channels and customer bases overlap. FIC’s insurance prod-
        ucts are sold by its independent agents in physical locations
        throughout Florida. In other words, FIC sells insurance in Florida
        in the exact same manner as FT&E. Under our precedent, how-
        ever, FIC would not even need a physical presence in Florida to
        show overlap. In Safeway, we held that even though Safeway the
        grocer had no physical stores in Florida, its in-state food purchases
        provided a presence that allowed consumers to potentially mistake
        Safeway Discount Centers for Safeway the grocer. 675 F.2d at
        1166. Likewise, FIC’s over 95,000 customers in Florida establish its
        presence in Florida. Nor does title insurance being a monoline in-
        dustry in Florida prevent the parties’ customer bases from overlap-
        ping; as explained above, home buyers and sellers are likely to buy
        both homeowner’s insurance and title insurance. Drawing all rea-
        sonable inferences in favor of FIC, as we must, a reasonable fact-
        finder could find that FIC’s actual and potential consumer base
        overlaps with FT&E’s.
                            v. Similarity of Advertising
               The fifth circumstantial fact, similarity of advertising, fo-
        cuses on the audience reached by the advertisements of the parties.
        Sovereign Mil., 809 F.3d at 1187–88. Like with similarity of trade
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        30                      Opinion of the Court                 19-13390

        channels and customer bases, the greater the overlap or similarity
        of the audiences, the greater the likelihood of confusion. Id. Iden-
        tity of advertising methods is not required, but instead we assess
        whether the overlap in readership of the parties’ advertisements is
        “significant enough” that “a possibility of confusion could result”
        in a fashion very similar to the previous factor. PlayNation, 924
        F.3d at 1168–69; Sovereign Mil., 809 F.3d at 1188 (quoting Frehling,
        192 F.3d at 1340).
                As the District Court found, both parties advertise through
        similar mediums, i.e., online advertising, magazines, brochures,
        emails, social media, and their websites. FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d at
        1392. On appeal, FT&E argues that it directs its advertisements to
        a different “universe of consumers” than FIC, namely “real estate
        developers, purchasers, sellers, lenders, and borrowers,” and so
        there is no audience overlap. Appellant Br. at 41–42. But FT&E’s
        argument fails on its face. Even if FT&E focuses its advertisements
        on real estate professionals, it admits it also advertises to “purchas-
        ers, sellers, lenders, and borrowers,” the exact sort of people who
        may be interested in buying FIC’s homeowner’s insurance. For ex-
        ample, FT&E’s website—which bears FT&E’s logo on each of its
        pages—lists “homeowners” as among the customers served by
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        19-13390                  Opinion of the Court                            31

        FT&E. On summary judgment, this is sufficient to show overlap
        in advertisement audience.18
                                 vi. Defendant’s Intent
                With respect to the sixth circumstantial fact, the defendant’s
        intent to confuse consumers, the District Court found that FT&E
        had no intent to “capitalize on . . . [FIC]’s business reputation.”
        FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1393 (quoting FIU, 830 F.3d at 1263). Be-
        cause FIC did not take issue with this finding nor the weight as-
        cribed to it, FIC has forfeited the analysis applicable to this circum-
        stantial fact and we decline to address it further. See United States
        v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (explaining
        that issues not briefed on appeal are forfeited and thus may only be
        addressed in extraordinary circumstances).
                                  vii. Actual Confusion
               Actual confusion asks whether there is evidence in fact of
        confusion. Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1340. Though it is the most im-
        portant circumstantial fact, it is not a requirement for finding a like-
        lihood of confusion. Id. The District Court found no evidence of
        actual confusion. FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1393–95. While FIC
        produced two expert witnesses who used internet surveys as the
        bases of their opinions that there was the potential for actual

        18 We note, however, that as the internet ages and becomes ubiquitous, having

        a website or advertising online informs the court precious little about expo-
        sure and confusion. See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Con-
        cepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011).
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        32                     Opinion of the Court               19-13390

        confusion, the District Court discounted this evidence. Id. at 1394.
        The District Court stated that survey evidence was of slight weight
        and viewed unfavorably in the Eleventh Circuit, and FIC’s surveys
        were even less probative because they did not distinguish between
        confusion caused by a word (that is, “Foremost”) and the whole
        mark. Id. On appeal, FIC does not dispute the lack of evidence of
        actual confusion. Instead, FIC argues that the lack of confusion
        should be given no weight because there was no time for actual
        confusion to develop.
               We agree with FIC. While no hard and fast rules set how
        much evidence is necessary to show actual confusion, we have said
        that courts must take into account the circumstances of each case.
        J-B Weld Co., 978 F.3d at 793 (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Sa-
        loon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 122 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir.
        1997)). Those circumstances include the extent of advertising, the
        length of time for which an infringing product has been advertised,
        and any other factors that might influence the reporting of actual
        confusion. The District Court did not consider these circum-
        stances when assessing the lack of evidence of actual confusion.
               In Hard Candy, LLC v. Anastasia Beverly Hills, Inc., we
        stated that a lack of evidence showing actual confusion can be dis-
        counted when there is not an “adequate period of time” for actual
        confusion to develop among consumers. 921 F.3d 1343, 1362–63
        (11th Cir. 2019). In that case, cosmetic maker Anastasia had sold
        nearly 250,000 makeup kits over a period of eight months, contain-
        ing a mark allegedly similar to Hard Candy’s trademark. Id.
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        19-13390               Opinion of the Court                        33

        Despite that, Hard Candy could not point to a single instance of
        actual confusion. Id. We stated that the district court did not
        clearly err in finding that the lack of evidence of actual confusion
        was probative. Id. However, on summary judgment, we must
        take every inference in FIC’s favor, something the District Court
        did not do here. Even assuming it was correct to reject the survey
        data that FIC provided, we think the lack of evidence of actual con-
        fusion is not particularly probative. A reasonable inference for FIC
        is that actual confusion did not have adequate time to develop,
        given that FT&E started in May 2015, and then conducted at least
        20 closings between May 2016 and November 2018, when motions
        for summary judgment had been filed. This is different from Hard
        Candy, where we held it was not clear error to state that the lack
        of actual confusion was probative where potentially millions of
        consumers were exposed to the infringing mark, hundreds of thou-
        sands of consumers bought the makeup palette, and not a single
        instance of actual confusion arose. See id.; see also Tana, 611 F.3d
        at 779–80 (finding that no reasonable jury could find actual confu-
        sion where there were two instances of actual confusion where a
        company served over a million customers in five years, and affirm-
        ing a grant of summary judgment for the defendant). Thus, a rea-
        sonable factfinder could discount the importance of the evidence
        of actual confusion.
                           viii. Consumer Sophistication
               Typically, we analyze likelihood of confusion using only
        seven factors or, as we put it earlier, seven separate inquiries. See,
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        34                      Opinion of the Court                 19-13390

        e.g., Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 38 F.4th 114, 127 (11th Cir.
        2022) (“In determining the likelihood of confusion, we consider the
        following seven factors . . .”); Sovereign Mil., 809 F.3d at 1181
        (same); Tana, 611 F.3d at 774–75 (same); Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1335
        (same). Indeed, courts in this circuit are required to consider the
        seven factors analyzed above when conducting a likelihood of con-
        fusion analysis. J-B Weld Co., 978 F.3d at 794. However, we have
        recognized that consumer sophistication may also be relevant to
        assessing likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., FIU, 830 F.3d at 1256,
        1265 (analyzing consumer sophistication separately from the seven
        factors); Welding Servs., 509 F.3d at 1361 (“[S]ophisticated consum-
        ers [of complex goods or services] . . . are less likely to be confused
        than casual purchasers of small items.”); Freedom Sav. & Loan
        Ass’n, 757 F.2d at 1185 (“[S]ince most of these customers are mak-
        ing a major investment, they are likely to be especially well-in-
        formed buyers. The sophistication of a buyer certainly bears on
        the possibility that he or she will become confused by similar
        marks.”). After all, consumers that either have special knowledge
        of the industry through education or experience, see Welding
        Servs., 509 F.3d at 1361, or have invested significant time into be-
        coming well-informed due to the nature of the purchase, see Free-
        dom Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 757 F.2d at 1184–85, are more likely to
        distinguish between similar marks and thereby avoid becoming
        confused. As both the parties and the District Court considered
        consumer sophistication, we find it appropriate to do so as well. In
        so doing, we recognize only that consumer sophistication may im-
        pact likelihood of confusion and do not require that the factor be
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        19-13390                   Opinion of the Court                                35

        considered in every, or even most, likelihood of confusion anal-
        yses. Cf. J-B Weld Co., 978 F.3d at 794; see also Star Indus., Inc. v.
        Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 389–90 (2d Cir. 2005) (likewise
        treating consumer sophistication as a separate factor).
               The District Court accepted FT&E’s argument that its “cli-
        ent base is largely comprised of real estate developers, referring
        realtors, sellers, lenders and mortgage brokers who are sophisti-
        cated and unlikely to be confused.” FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1392.
        We agree with FT&E that real estate developers and realtors are
        sophisticated in real estate purchases and that individual home buy-
        ers and sellers are likely to be sophisticated due to the importance
        and size of the transaction. Appellee Br. at 19. However, as FT&E
        points out, “consumers generally have minimal involvement in the
        selection of a title insurance provider and rely entirely on the rec-
        ommendations of their agents or professionals.” Id. at 19–20. Or,
        in other words, individual home buyers and sellers may be well-
        informed when buying or selling a home, but that sophistication
        does not transfer to buying title insurance. This makes sense; title
        insurance is a complex legal matter that, for the consumer, only
        involves a single, relatively small payment. 19 Thus, home buyers

        19 In Florida, Office of Insurance Regulation sets title insurance premiums.Fla.
        Stat. § 627.7711; Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 69O-186.003(1). Currently, the rates
        are $5.75 of premium per $1,000 of the purchase price for the first $100,000 of
        liability written and $5.00 per $1,000 of liability written from $100,000 to $1
        million. Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 69O-186.003(1). So, for a policy that insures
        the new owner for $500,000, the title insurance premium would be at most a
        one-time payment of $2,575.
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        36                     Opinion of the Court                 19-13390

        and sellers are likely to be unsophisticated when buying title insur-
        ance.
               FT&E argues that the unsophistication of these consumers
        weighs in its favor because their unsophistication makes them
        more likely to rely on sophisticated agents and professionals who
        would be more likely to be able to distinguish between similar
        marks. Appellant Br. at 18–19. FT&E may well be able to establish
        this tendency at trial. But on summary judgment, we must draw
        inferences in the non-movant’s favor, and we see an alternative in-
        ference that may be drawn from consumers’ unsophistication
        about title insurance. While unsophisticated consumers might rely
        on the advice of sophisticated professionals, they might also rely on
        their earlier research into home purchases and insurance. If they
        came across and trusted FIC’s FOREMOST brand, then they may
        decide to trust another “foremost”-branded insurance company
        due to its possible affiliation with FIC. In fact, this possibility is
        precisely what companies seek to avoid when they file trademark
        infringement lawsuits. So, without sufficient evidence in the rec-
        ord to definitively decide this issue one way or the other and being
        on summary judgment, we make this inference and hold that a rea-
        sonable factfinder could find FT&E’s customer base to be unso-
        phisticated and thus more likely to be confused by the similarity
        between the parties’ marks.
                                         B.
               To recap, our separate inquiries on the evidence have
        yielded the following circumstantial facts under the summary
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        19-13390                    Opinion of the Court                          37

        judgment standard: (1) FIC’s mark is strong; (2) FIC and FT&E’s
        marks are similar; (3) FIC and FT&E sell similar products; (4) FIC
        and FT&E’s trade channels and customers overlap; (5) FIC and
        FT&E’s advertising audiences overlap; (6) FT&E did not intend to
        cause consumer confusion about the existence of a relationship be-
        tween the parties; (7) there is no evidence that consumers have ac-
        tually confused FT&E with FIC; and (8) title insurance purchasers
        are unsophisticated and thus may be confused by similar marks.
        Now, at the second step, we must weigh these circumstantial facts
        in the light most favorable to FIC to determine whether a reasona-
        ble factfinder could infer the ultimate fact, likelihood of confusion.
        Here, similar unsophisticated consumers would see similar marks,
        displayed in similar advertising media directed at similar audiences,
        selling similar insurance products through similar mediums in the
        state of Florida. While there is no evidence of actual confusion
        amongst consumers about the parties’ relationship, this lack of ev-
        idence has relatively little weight under these facts because there
        simply was not enough time for actual confusion to develop. See
        Hard Candy, 921 F.3d at 1362–63. Similarly, while evidence of an
        intent to cause consumer confusion weighs heavily in favor of find-
        ing a likelihood of confusion amongst consumers, 20 absence of that
        evidence in no way prevents consumers from likely becoming con-
        fused. Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1340. Consequently, a reasonable

        20   See Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 757 F.2d at 1185 (“If a person intends to
        induce confusion among customers, he or she is likely to succeed”).
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        38                     Opinion of the Court                 19-13390

        factfinder could find a likelihood that consumers would be con-
        fused by the marks.
                                          IV.
              In closing, two thoughts.
                First, on cross-motions for summary judgment and espe-
        cially when applying the Nunez framework, courts should be very
        careful in their analysis to ensure that the proper party receives the
        benefit of the summary judgment standard. When parties jointly
        move for summary judgment, the court has three options: granting
        summary judgment for the plaintiff under the defendant’s best
        case, granting summary judgment for the defendant under the
        plaintiff’s best case, or denying both motions for summary judg-
        ment and proceeding to trial. Before granting summary judgment
        for a party, the court must consider the evidence in the light most
        favorable to the non-movant and, unless “there are no genuine is-
        sues of material fact,” i.e., all material facts have “been incontro-
        vertibly proved,” and the trial judge is the finder of fact, the court
        must also draw all inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Nunez,
        572 F.2d at 1123–24. Only once this is done may a court determine
        if a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; should any ma-
        terial questions of fact remain that may cause a reasonable fact-
        finder to rule in the non-movant’s favor, summary judgment must
        be denied.
               Our review of the decision in this case revealed that the Dis-
        trict Court never discussed the summary judgment standard in its
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        19-13390                Opinion of the Court                        39

        analysis after citing Nunez in the “Legal Standard” section for its
        decision. See generally FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1387–95. The
        closest the Court came to applying the summary judgment stand-
        ard was quoting a footnote from Tana stating that “[a]lthough like-
        lihood of confusion is a question of fact, it may be decided as a mat-
        ter of law.” Id. at 1388 (quoting Tana, 611 F.3d at 775 n.7). True—
        but only after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
        the non-movant. While the Court implicitly decided this case un-
        der the Nunez framework, it never actually decided whether all the
        material facts had been “incontrovertibly proved.” Nunez, 572
        F.2d at 1124; see generally FCOA, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 1387–95. A
        district court may not ignore the traditional summary judgment
        standard merely by invoking the specter of Nunez.
               Nunez itself acknowledged that summary judgment can be
        “a ‘lethal weapon’ capable of ‘overkill’” and that situations where
        the Nunez standard is appropriate “may be rare.” 572 F.2d at 1223–
        24 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 612 (5th
        Cir. 1967)). Indeed, the Nunez standard can easily become a trap
        for unwary district courts and litigants; wise lawyers and judges
        would do well to remember that this Court’s de novo standard of
        review is “unaffected by any inferential conclusions reached be-
        low.” Useden, 947 F.2d at 1573 n.14. Accordingly, the Nunez
        standard should be reserved for those rare cases where it is justified.
              Second, cross-motions for summary judgment in non-jury
        cases are a very inefficient method by which to decide a case.
        When parties move for summary judgment, they tell the court that
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        40                       Opinion of the Court                    19-13390

        they are ready for a determination on the merits and that no mate-
        rial fact issues remain for a factfinder to decide. If both parties
        move for summary judgment after conducting extensive discov-
        ery, then the parties effectively agree that no fact issues exist. But
        when the court grants summary judgment in these situations, the
        loser will invariably take an appeal and argue that there was a fact
        dispute or credibility issue that prevented the court from deciding
        the case, despite arguing the opposite below. The winner will ar-
        gue that no fact issues remain. If a fact issue does remain, the case
        must be reversed and remanded to hold a bench trial, which should
        have occurred in the first place. And, of course, the loser of the
        bench trial will then appeal.
              In this case, for efficiency’s sake, the parties should have es-
        chewed moving for summary judgment, informed the court that
        discovery was complete and that the case was ready for trial, and
        then held a bench trial. 21
               Because we hold that a reasonable factfinder could deter-
        mine that a likelihood of confusion exists, we reverse the District
        Court’s grant of summary judgment as to Count I of FIC’s com-
        plaint and remand the case for trial on the merits.
               REVERSED AND REMANDED.

        21The case’s docket sheet indicates that on May 16, 2019, the case had been
        scheduled for a bench trial on September 3, 2019. The order granting FT&E
        summary judgment was entered on August 1, 2019.