Court Opinion

ID: 9499607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:52:38.223461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:36.575785
License: Public Domain

LEAVY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from Part II.B of the majority opinion which concludes that Martinek has no right to a jury trial of the issue of just compensation for the property interest taken by the United States through filing of the Declaration of Taking. In this case, there were two takings: one by inverse condemnation through government regulation which began on the date stipulated by the parties and ended when the government filed its Declaration of Taking; and the other by direct condemnation which occurred when the government filed its Declaration of Taking. When Martinek filed his inverse condemnation action in the district court he owned no interest in the mining claims. They had already been taken by the filing of government’s Declaration of Taking. Mar-tinek had a right to a jury trial of just compensation for the property interest taken when the United States filed its complaint and Declaration of Taking. He did not forfeit that right by bringing an inverse condemnation action asserting that, in addition to the taking which occurred when the government filed its Declaration of Taking, the government had also previously taken his mining claims through regulation.
The following additional background facts are important to resolution of this issue. After the National Park Service (NPS) had completed and submitted to Congress its plan for acquisition of the mining claims in Denali Park, it was by no means clear when the claims would be acquired or whether, in the meantime, mining operations would be permitted in the park. In a 1990 communication with mining claim owners, NPS stated:
Our expectation is that given adequate Congressional funding the acquisition of all mining claims will be accomplished over the next 10-15 years.... Pending acquisition, the National Park Service will receive and process [mining] plans of operations. Plans of operations that fully meet the requirements of the National Park Service Mining in Parks regulations (36 CFR 9A) and would have no significant adverse impacts on park resources could be approved.
Thus, in 1991, Martinek brought an inverse condemnation action against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims asserting that the NPS regulations had effected a taking of his mining claims. Martinek subsequently agreed to dismissal of his action so long as the government *1139brought a direct condemnation action in district court. On March 10, 1998, the United States brought this condemnation action in the district court pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 8113 (formerly codified at 40 U.S.C. § 257), with the filing of a Declaration of Taking of Martinek’s mining claims and a deposit of funds pursuant to the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3114-15 (formerly 40 U.S.C. §§ 258a-e). Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed Martinek’s inverse condemnation action.
When Martinek filed his second inverse condemnation action against the United States in the district court, alleging that the mining claims had been the subject of a regulatory taking before the United States filed its Declaration of Taking, the district court only had jurisdiction over Martinek’s action under a provision of the Mining in the Parks Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1910, which provides that holders of mining claims in National Parks may bring actions in the United States district court to recover just compensation for the federal government’s taking of their claims. Before the enactment of § 1910, an inverse condemnation action for any amount over $10,000 could be brought only in the Court of Federal Claims, pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346,1491.
Thus, uniquely at issue in this appeal is the interplay between a direct condemnation action initiated by the United States to acquire mining claims and an inverse condemnation action brought by the claim holder in the same court concerning an earlier and temporary regulatory taking of the same property interest. Martinek asserts that, because the United States initiated a direct condemnation action, he is entitled to a jury determination of just compensation. With respect to the property right that vested in the United States upon the filing of the Declaration of Taking, he is correct.
The United States generally has available two statutory methods of acquiring private land for public use. Kirby Forest Inds., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 4, 104 S.Ct. 2187, 81 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984).1 The first condemnation method is prescribed in 40 U.S.C. § 3113, and does not give the government immediate title to the property, but
give[s] the Government an option to buy the property at the adjudicated price. If the Government wishes to exercises that option, it tenders payment to the private owner, whereupon title and right to possession vest in the United States. If the Government decides not to exercise the option, it can move for dismissal of the condemnation action.
Id. (citations omitted).
A second method, the one used by the NPS to acquire Martinek’s mining claims, is the “more expeditious procedure” prescribed by 40 U.S.C. § 3114. Under this statute, title and right to possession vest immediately in the United States upon the government’s filing of a “Declaration of Taking” and depositing an amount of money equal to the estimated value of the land. Id. at 4-5, 104 S.Ct. 2187. The exact value of the land is determined through subsequent judicial proceedings.
The statute governing a direct condemnation action, 40 U.S.C. § 3114(b), provides:
Vesting of title. — On filing the declaration of taking and depositing in the court, to the use of the persons entitled *1140to the compensation, the amount of the estimated compensation stated in the declaration—
(1) title to the estate or interest specified in the declaration vests in the Government;
(2) the land is condemned and taken for the use of the Government; and
(3) the right to just compensation for the land vests in the persons entitled to the compensation.
40 U.S.C. § 3114(b).
The form of proceedings in the statutory direct condemnation action is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 71A. Of particular relevance here is Rule 71A(h) which provides: “[i]f the action involves the exercise of the power of eminent domain under the law of the United States ... any party may have a trial by jury of the issue of just compensation by filing a demand therefor within the time allowed for answer.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 71A(h).
When it filed its Declaration of Taking and deposited the funds into the court registry, the United States immediately became the owner of the mining claims and Martinek had only a vested right to just compensation. 40 U.S.C. § 3114(b)(1) & (3). At that moment, Martinek had a right to a jury trial of just compensation for the property interest taken. Fed. R.Civ.P. 71A(h). In addition, after the United States filed its Declaration of Taking, the action could not be dismissed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 71A(I)(3); Kirby, 467 U.S. at 12, 104 S.Ct. 2187 n. 18.
A property owner cannot file a counterclaim in a direct condemnation action. United States v. 40.60 Acres, 483 F.2d 927 n. 1 (9th Cir.1973). Thus Martinek’s only remedy for the earlier regulatory taking of his mining claims was through an inverse condemnation action, discussed below.
Where the United States does not acquire privately owned land through one of the statutory methods, but instead appropriates private land by physically entering onto possession or regulation which restrict its use, the owner has a right to bring an “inverse condemnation” action to recover the value of the land. Id. As noted by the Court in Kirby, “[sjuch a suit is ‘inverse’ because it is brought by the affected owner, not by the condemnor. The owner’s right to bring such a suit derives from the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to condemnation.” Id. at n. 6 (citations and quotations omitted).
A regulatory taking may be temporary in nature and still trigger the Just Compensation Clause, imposing a duty on the government to make payment for the temporary taking. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California, 482 U.S. 304, 317-18, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987). “The Court has recognized in more than one case that the government may elect to abandon its intrusion or discontinue regulations.” Id. at 317, 107 S.Ct. 2378. Abandonment “results in an alteration in the property interest taken-— from full ownership to one of temporary use and occupation. In such cases compensation would be measured by the principles normally governing the taking of a right to use property temporarily,” United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26, 78 S.Ct. 1039, 2 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1958).
This express consent by the United States to a jury trial in a direct condemnation action does not extend to inverse condemnation actions brought under the MPA. KLK, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 35 F.3d 454, 457 (9th Cir.1994). Thus, Martinek has a right to a jury trial in the government’s direct condemnation action but not in his inverse condemnation action.
Martinek asserts that he did not lose his right to a jury trial by stipulating that the government took his property through regulation at a date prior to its filing of the *1141Declaration of Taking. The district court determined that the effect of the parties’ stipulation was to convert the consolidated actions into a single, inverse condemnation action where Martinek had no right to a jury trial. However, while the parties may stipulate to facts, and we should give the stipulation its intended effect, “our ultimate decision concerning the legal effect of those admitted facts is not and could not be controlled by the parties’ stipulation.” Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir.2000).
The parties’ stipulation could not backdate the taking that occurred when the United States filed its complaint and Declaration of Taking. The legal effect of the filing of the Declaration of Taking was to vest immediate title in the United States as of March 10, 1998. Under the unique direct condemnation procedure, “[tjhe nature and extent of the property interest to be acquired is discretionary with those authorized officials within the executive branch and may not be increased or decreased by the courts.” United States v. 40.60 Acres of Land, 483 F.2d 927 (9th Cir.1973). We cannot alter the property interest acquired. The parties certainly are without power to do so by stipulation. Therefore, the legal effect of the stipulation was to establish a second, temporary, taking through inverse condemnation beginning on the stipulated dates and ending on March 10,1998.
Where, as in this case, the landowner asserts that an additional property interest has been taken, the proper course is to recognize that “two separate takings are involved.” United States v. 45.50 Acres of Land, 634 F.2d 405, 407 (8th Cir.1980) (landowner claimed that additional land had also been taken by the government). In one taking, the direct condemnation by the government, Martinek has a right to a jury trial. In the other, his inverse condemnation action, he does not. Absent the jurisdictional grant in § 1910 to the district court to hear Martinek’s inverse condemnation case, this is precisely what would have occurred. Martinek would have had a jury trial of just compensation in the direct condemnation action in the district court and the Court of Federal Claims would have determined just compensation for the loss of the use of the claims because of the earlier regulatory taking without a jury in the inverse condemnation case.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 101.88 Acres of Land, 616 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.1980) provides additional support for this bifurcated approach. When considering an analogous situation where the landowner sought damages in a condemnation proceeding for the Government’s use of lands contiguous to those condemned, the Fifth Circuit held that the landowner had to seek compensation “in a separate proceeding.” Id. at 770. When ruling, the Fifth Circuit was aware that its determination affected the landowner’s “right to a jury trial concerning compensation” for the contiguous lands. Id. at 766; see also United States v. 21.54 Acres of Land, 491 F.2d 301, 304 (4th Cir.1973) (“if, ultimately, it is determined that the government has taken more than it has formally condemned and paid for, the landowner may recover under the Tucker Act for the additional take.”).
Martinek has a right to a jury trial of just compensation for the property interest taken when the United States filed its Declaration of Taking. He neither lost nor expanded that right to a jury trial by seeking compensation for the government’s temporary taking of the same property through regulation in his inverse condemnation action.

. A third method is when, "Congress occasionally ... enacts a statute appropriating the property immediately by a 'legislative taking’ and setting up a special procedure for ascer-taming, after the appropriation, the compensation due to the owners.” Id. at 5, 104 S.Ct. 2187.