Court Opinion

ID: 9578745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:48:01.408561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:22.552597
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur specially with Judge Johnson. I agree with the majority that an arraignment and an adjudicatory hearing are not the same and that an arraignment, rather than an adjudicatory hearing, was scheduled by the summons and process in the present case. The dissent fails to acknowledge that the summons and process used herein are form documents that are used to command the appearance of anyone listed to a court appearance of any kind. In the present case, all counsel and the judge referred to the hearing as an arraignment. The judge’s order further reflects that he was continuing the arraignment. As opposed to the summons and process forms, the form order used to continue the arraignment required that the type of hearing be listed in the space provided. Here, the judge designated that an arraignment was being continued. The merits of the case were not scheduled to be heard on March 30, 1993. The evidence in the record indicates that those present at the hearing were all in agreement that it was an arraignment that was scheduled to occur.
OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) provides that “[a]fter the petition has been filed the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the petition. In the event the child is not in detention, the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon which shall be not later than 60 days from the date of the filing of the petition.” The statute really provides no meaningful protection for the child if it merely requires the scheduling of the hearing within ten days. The actual date of the hearing could be several months in the future. It is the limitation on the time that the hearing is held, not when it is scheduled, that provides a safeguard for the subject child. If the statute was intended to relate *271only to the scheduling and not to the conduct of the hearing, why would an additional 50 days be allowed for such an act when the defendant is not in detention, as the detention itself is not a factor in the accomplishment of that task? It is apparent to me that in factual situations such as the one presented herein, the defendant’s civil liberties are at stake and the statute must be strictly construed. Crews v. Brantley County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., 146 Ga. App. 408, 409 (246 SE2d 426) (1978); J. B. H. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199, 203 (228 SE2d 189) (1976). The adjudicatory hearing, once timely scheduled, can be continued in the discretion of the trial court in a proper case.
In several cases, we have incorrectly stated “that OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) requires merely that a hearing date be set within ten days of the filing of the petition and not that the hearing itself be conducted within that period.” In the Interest of L. T. W., 211 Ga. App. 441, 442 (439 SE2d 716) (1993). See also Johnson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 168, 169 (358 SE2d 313) (1987); and P. L. A. v. State, 172 Ga. App. 820, 822 (324 SE2d 781) (1984) (Beasley, J., concurring specially). I would disapprove of that statement in those cases, however, it is not necessary to overrule them because in each of those cases, the date of the hearing was originally set for a date within ten days of the filing of the petition. Id. While the result of the cited cases was correct, the analysis of OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) was not. In Brown v. Fulton County Dept. of Family &c.. Svcs., 136 Ga. App. 308 (1) (220 SE2d 790) (1975) the hearing was originally set for a date not more than ten days after the petition was filed, however, the hearing was continued due to the absence of necessary witnesses. Id. We determined that “the time for the hearing must be set for a time not later than 10 days after the petition [was] filed.” Id. at 309. We held that the grant of the continuance was proper and, as the original hearing date was scheduled for a time within ten days from the filing of the petition, the mandates of OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) had been satisfied. Id. In J. B. v. State of Ga., 171 Ga. App. 373 (2) (319 SE2d 465) (1984), the date for the hearing was originally set for eight days from the date the petition was filed. Id. Thereafter, a continuance was granted, and the hearing was held at a later time. Id. Our opinion in J. B. did not address the issue before us in this case.
In J. B. H. v. State of Ga., supra, we determined that the trial court erred in overruling J. B. H.’s motion to dismiss as the delinquency petition was not filed within 72 hours of the delinquency hearing and the adjudicatory hearing was not set for a date within ten days of the filing of the petition. In Crews, supra, the petition was filed and the scheduling of the hearing occurred on November 23, 1975. The hearing date was set for December 5, 1975, 12 days after the petition was filed. We determined that the trial court erred in *272failing to dismiss the petition as the hearing was untimely held. 146 Ga. App. at 409. In Irvin v. Dept. of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 101, 102 (282 SE2d 664) (1981), the hearing date was set for a date beyond ten days from the filing of the petition and we reversed the trial court’s denial of Irvin’s motion to dismiss. In Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., 237 Ga. 406, 408 (229 SE2d 66) (1976), the Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged that the hearing date must be set for a date within ten days from the filing of the petition, but did not reverse on that issue as Sanchez had failed to preserve his objection at the trial court.
“In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (87 SC 1428, 18 LE2d 527) [(1967)] required that in appropriate situations the same constitutional standards apply to juveniles as to adults. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) [(1972)] the Supreme Court adopted a four-factor test for adjudging whether or not the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. These four factors apply to adult criminal defendants in Georgia. See Sanders v. State, 132 Ga. App. 580, 582 (208 SE2d 597) [(1974)] and cits. We note, however, that in Barker v. Wingo, Mr. Justice Powell observed at page 523 that ‘The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards. . . .’ Our interpretation of these words from the Barker decision is that where a legislative body has defined the right to speedy trial in terms of days, then the time limits must be strictly complied with. . . . Accordingly, we hold that time limits established by the General Assembly in the Juvenile Court Code are jurisdictional and must be strictly adhered to.”
“As Chief Justice Burger observed in Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434 [(93 SC 2260, 37 LE2d 56) (1973)] the only available remedy for one denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial is dismissal. Accordingly, the juvenile court judge here erred in overruling the motion to dismiss.” J. B. H. v. State of Ga., supra at 202-203.
OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) is the equivalent of a statutorily provided speedy trial demand which does not require a specific demand by the child. The trial court does however have discretion to properly grant a continuance of a hearing set for a date within ten days from the filing of the petition, see In re J. B., 183 Ga. App. 229 (2) (358 SE2d 620) (1987), thus protecting both parties from participating in a hearing before they are properly prepared. Finally, if the case is transferred to the superior court within ten days of the petition being filed, the juvenile court rules no longer apply and the ten-day limitation need not be met. Therefore, the statute protects the interests of both the child and the State. Due to properly granted continuances granted by the trial court, the actual hearing did not take place within the prescribed ten days. Id. The present case is distinguishable in that the adjudicatory hearing was not originally set for a date within the ten-day limi*273tation, but only an arraignment was so scheduled.
The occasions on which an adjudicatory hearing can be held outside the ten-day limitation are limited to situations in which a continuation is properly granted by the judge of a timely adjudicatory hearing or where the judge transfers the case to superior court.