Court Opinion

ID: 9722772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:49:49.693443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:39.934882
License: Public Domain

T. M. Kavanagh, J.
(dissenting). For the reasons given by Justice Souris in People v. Parshay (1967), 379 Mich 7, I dissent. The protection of fundamental rights is not a mere matter of semantics. As a practical matter, the slight burden imposed by the procedural requirement that the trial court make a specific inquiry rather than merely inform the defendant of his right to jury trial and counsel is far outweighed by the danger of being caught up in the swift procedure of pleadings.
In short, advising a defendant of a right, without giving him the opportunity to assert that right, is indeed a hollow gesture which contradicts the clear intendment of the rule. This judicial attitude can only breed contempt for the courts and legally constituted authority.
The only reasonable interpretation of GrCB 1963, 785.3(1) militates against such a dichotomy in procedural due process. As stated by Justice Souris in Par shay, supra, page 16 :
*149“It is clear beyond dispute that the quoted rule [GCR 1963, 785.3(1)] means something more than that certain advice be given regarding some rather fundamental rights of an accused, but that he need not be given an opportunity to invoke those rights.”
For the above reasons and the reasons given by Justice Souris in Parshay, supra, I would reverse and remand for a trial.