Court Opinion

ID: 9487014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:05:58.269014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:03.194764
License: Public Domain

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result.
While I agree in principle with much of the majority’s analysis, I believe that this panel is bound by prior Sixth Circuit decisions recognizing the existence of an “outrageous government conduct” defense, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to criminal prosecution. I concur in the result, nevertheless, because the government’s conduct in the present case was not outrageous.
As the majority correctly observes, this Circuit has decided more than two dozen cases involving an “outrageous government conduct” defense, rejecting it in each instance on the facts. In United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 363-64 (6th Cir.1991), we reiterated four factors that must be weighed in determining whether governmental conduct is outrageous:
(1) the need for the police conduct as shown by the type of criminal activity involved, (2) the impetus for the scheme or whether the criminal enterprise preexisted the police involvement, (3) the control the government exerted over the criminal enterprise, and (4) the impact of the police activity on the commission of the crime.
In Barger and United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d 1228, 1231-33 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 306, 121 L.Ed.2d 229, and cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 811, 121 L.Ed.2d 684 (1992), our most recent published opinions involving this defense, we engaged in a lengthy analysis of each factor under the circumstances of the particular case. This analysis was undertaken, in both instances, in a separate section of the opinion devoted solely to the briefed and argued issue of outrageous government conduct, and not simply in a passing statement or eursory, superfluous commentary. Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority’s characterization of this repeated treatment as dicta.1 It seems clear to me that this *1430Circuit has recognized outrageous government conduct as a valid due process defense, and, as the majority concedes, the Supreme Court has not clearly held otherwise. My disagreement with the majority opinion on this point notwithstanding, I concur in the remand for trial on the entrapment issue because I believe that the government’s conduct in the present case was not outrageous.

. Black's Law Dictionary defines dictum as follows:
The word is generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum, "a remark by the way;” that is, an observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of law, or the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the case or essential to its determination; any statement of the law enunciated by the court merely by way of illustration, argument. analogy, or suggestion. Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. Dicta are opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point, are not the professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself.
*1430Black's Law Dictionary 409 (5th ed.1979) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).