Court Opinion

ID: 9720732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:40:15.171688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:20.884966
License: Public Domain

DARDEN, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the State's seizure of marijuana pursuant to a search warrant issued upon Detective Scott Southerland's probable cause affidavit. The probable cause affidavit is permeated with hearsay upon hearsay, self-serving conclusory statements lacking in indicia of reliability, and little, if any, information to establish the credibility of the confidential sources. As such, I would reverse the trial court's ruling and find that the good faith exeeption does not apply because the probable cause affidavit is so lacking in indicia of reliability that it strains credulity and renders official belief in its existence unreasonable. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).
Similar to my dissent in State v. Johnson, 669 N.E2d 411 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied, I do not believe that the facts in this case support a finding that Detective Southerland acted in good faith. Indiana Code § 85-83-5-2(b) provides that an affidavit for probable cause may be based on hearsay if it: (1) contains reliable information concerning the credibility of the source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished; or (2) contains information that establishes that the totality of the cireum-stances corroborates the hearsay. Because the provisions of this statute were not satisfied, it cannot be said that Detective Southerland acted in good faith. See Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 382 n. 5 (Ind.1999) (where our supreme court refused to presume that law enforcement officers will break the law, implying a presumption that law enforcement officers will follow the law).
In his affidavit, Detective Southerland stated that 90 days before the probable cause affidavit was filed (approximately August 1, 2000), he spoke with Deputies McGaha and Taggart. It was Deputy McGaha who informed him of confidential source # I's allegations about Frasier possessing and growing marijuana in his garage. At no time did Detective Souther-land speak with confidential source # 1 to determine his/her credibility. In addition, no action was taken and more than three months elapsed before a search warrant was sought. As a result, it would seem that either the officers did not find confidential source #1 to be reliable or that they knew the information provided was insufficient to constitute probable cause. Detective Southerland suggested as much when he implied that a recent argument between Frasier and confidential source # 1 may have been the reason he/she had made the instant allegations.
Next, Detective Southerland stated in the affidavit that he spoke with Deputy Collins on October 81, 2000. Apparently, Deputy Collins told Detective Southerland that two months earlier (approximately August 1, 2000) he had been told by confidential source #2 that he/she had seen a *468bale of marijuana in Frasier's garage. However, confidential source # 2 could not remember the date of the alleged sighting because he/she had waited several months before approaching - Deputy - Collins. Again, Deputy Collins' delay in taking any action strongly suggests that the allegations were either stale, or did not constitute sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant. And again, Detective Southerland never spoke with confidential source #2, and no facts are included in the affidavit to establish credibility or to corroborate the information.
Finally, on October 31, 2000, Detective Southerland stated that he interviewed confidential sources #3 and #4. Confidential source #3 alleged that within the past 72 hours he/she had seen marijuana inside Frasier's home. Then, Detective Southerland, without any supporting facts mentioned in the record, summarily concluded that he found confidential source #8 to be credible. Confidential source # 4 stated that confidential source # 1 had told him/her that Frasier was dealing marijuana, had obscured the windows of his garage, and that he/she thought they saw Frasier involved in a drug transaction because he was standing in his yard talking to an individual. Detective Southerland stated that confidential source # 4 believed these allegations to be true because he/she had seen a lot of traffic in and out of Frasier's residence. Again, no facts are included to establish the credibility of the allegations made by these sources, or to establish what he/she meant by "a lot of traffic."
Unlike the extensive independent investigation conducted by the police in Leon, the only independent investigation conducted by Detective Southerland, outside of the unconstitutional search using a thermal imaging device, was (1) driving by Frasier's residence to confirm that the garage windows had been painted; (2) observing a stack of black plastic planting pots behind Frasier's garage; and (8) a criminal history check. None of these observations alone or together would constitute probable cause supporting the issuance of a search warrant. Moreover, I do not believe that, when combined with the uncorroborated allegations of these confidential sources, there is probable cause to support a search warrant. However, there was ample information to justify an investigation. But, what is most troubling is that the police, who claim to be "trained and experienced," would be allowed to use the uncorroborated allegations of sources as probable cause to obtain a search warrant for a person's home. There is nothing in the probable cause affidavit from which a trial court, let alone Detective Southerland, could reliably determine the " 'veracity'" and " 'basis of knowledge'" of the sources that supplied the hearsay information. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 218, 288, 108: S.Ct. 2817, 2882, 76 LEd.2d 527 (1983).
The good faith exception to the exclusionary Tule is just that, an exception, which should not be routinely used to subvert the requirements for obtaining a proper search warrant based upon res-sonable probable cause. Where the probable cause affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant is so lacking in indicia of reliability and probable cause, as in this case, it calls into question whether the police officer's reliance upon it was unreasonable as well as whether the issuing magistrate or judge was neutral and detached or had wholly abandoned their judicial role.
Johnson, 669 N.E.2d at 415 (Darden, C., dissenting) (citation omitted).
I would reverse the trial court.