Court Opinion

ID: 9960755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 21:19:42.739201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:50.604939
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                       Washington State
                                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Division Two

                                                                                        April 16, 2024

      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                        DIVISION II
    PHYLLIS RAINWATER,                                             No. 58308-9-II

                               Appellant,

          v.

    RAINSHADOW         STORAGE,       LLC,   a              UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    Washington Limited Liability Company; JOHN
    R. DICKINSON and LORI R. DICKINSON,
    dba WE DIG IT,

                               Respondent.

         VELJACIC, A,C,J. — Phyllis Rainwater appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her adverse

possession claim filed against her neighbor to the east, Rainshadow Storage, LLC. Phyllis 1

contends that there is substantial evidence in the record to show that she established adverse

possession over the disputed property. We affirm and award attorney fees to Rainshadow.

                                             FACTS

I.       BACKGROUND FACTS2

         Roger and Helen Clark purchased property on Strawberry Lane in Sequim in 1988. At

some point, trees were planted near the eastern border of their property. Donna Gast, a neighbor,

testified that she remembered the trees were there when she purchased her home in 1988. The

1
 To avoid confusion, this opinion refers to Phyllis Rainwater and her late husband, Gene
Rainwater, by their first names. No offense is intended.
2
 Our background facts rely in part on the trial court’s findings of fact, which are unchallenged
except for findings of fact 17 and 26. Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. Seven
Hills, LLC v. Chelan County, 198 Wn.2d 371, 384, 495 P.3d 778 (2021).
58308-9-II

trees were described as ornamental with limbs that grew long and touched the ground. The land

surrounding the trees was thick with vegetation, such as brambles, thistles, and berry bushes. The

area was so thick that it was impossible to see through the trees and shrubbery. Phyllis and Gene

purchased the property from the Clarks in June 2003.

       In the late fall of 2003 or early 2004, Phyllis’s neighbors, Gast and her husband, approached

Phyllis about using her pasture to hold their miniature horses. The pasture area was located directly

adjacent to the disputed area. The Gasts trimmed the lower branches of the trees and affixed a

wire livestock fence to the trunk of the trees to enclose the pasture area for their miniature horses.

The fence was fastened to the west side of the tree trunks facing Phyllis’s property out of

convenience. The tree trunks themselves were on the neighbor’s side of the property. While the

fence remained in place, the fence was never maintained after it was installed and it became

overgrown and hidden.

       Next to Phyllis’s property was property previously owned by Dale and Troye Jarmuth. The

wire fence did not fully enclose Phyllis’s property nor prevent the Jarmuths from accessing the

trees. Furthermore, the fence could not be discovered because the vegetation on the Jarmuth side

was so dense. Jarmuth intentionally maintained a thick, vegetative buffer to act as a protective

barrier for wildlife, but the trees did not ever exclude the Jarmuths from accessing their property.

The Jarmuths did not discuss the boundary line with Phyllis, nor were they aware that the Gasts

had installed wire fencing along the trees.

       Rainshadow purchased the Jarmuths’ property in early 2017 as a site for a storage facility.

In searching out the boundary lines, Rainshadow learned that the trees between the two properties

were located approximately five-to-six feet onto Rainshadow’s property.

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58308-9-II

Ex. 16. As part of the permitting process for its storage units, Rainshadow was required to move

an irrigation pipe that was located under the trees. The trees needed to be removed to relocate the

pipe. Rainshadow did not know, or have reason to believe, that Phyllis was claiming ownership

of the trees. The area was overgrown and uncared for. In February 2017, the trees were cut down

and We Dig It was hired to remove the trees stumps.

II.    PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       In June 2017, Phyllis filed a complaint against Rainshadow, We Dig It, and We Dig It’s

owners, John and Lori Dickinson, for quiet title, ejectment, and damages to property regarding the

trees’ removal.3 Phyllis alleged that she acquired title to the property near the trees by adverse

possession. The trial court granted Rainshadow’s summary judgment motion, concluding that

3
 Phyllis also sued the Dickinsons’ insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, but the
parties later agreed to dismiss Liberty Mutual as a party.

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Phyllis failed to establish the elements of adverse possession. We reversed the trial court’s

summary judgment order and remanded. Rainwater v. Rainshadow Storage, No. 52757-0-II, slip

op.       at     2      (Wash.      Ct.      App.       Apr.      21,      2020)       (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2052757-0-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf.

We concluded that Phyllis demonstrated genuine issues of material fact on all the elements of

adverse possession. Id. at 10.

         During a bench trial on remand,4 Phyllis testified that a realtor told her the trees were on

her property.     She also testified that she and Gene loved Shakespeare and gave the trees

Shakespearean names. And the two would sit under the trees. Phyllis testified that they would

refer to the property on their side of the trees as “the pasture.” 2 Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 473. She

also testified that there was an irrigation system in the pasture that could reach the trees.

         Phyllis presented several aerial photographs of the property. The images showed that

Phyllis’s side of the trees appeared mowed up to the tree areas. Terry Curtis, a certified

photogrammetrist, reviewed the aerial photographs and testified that the trees were about five feet

to the east of Phyllis’s property line. And that there was “some activity” on Phyllis’s side of the

property from 1997 through 2016. 2 RP at 373-74. But Curtis could not determine for certain the

activity under the trees based on the photographs. He could only testify to the edge of the foliage

of the trees.

         Rainshadow alleged that Phyllis and Gene moved to Arizona in May 2013. It submitted a

declaration from a moving business that helped her relocate. Nevertheless, Phyllis and Gene

continued to own the property. They visited the property in 2015 or 2016, before Gene’s death.

While it was left vacant for a while, Phyllis now uses it as a rental.

4
    The matter went before a different judge on remand.

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58308-9-II

III.   TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

       After the bench trial, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. In

finding of fact 17, the court found:

       It is less clear what the property looks like on the Rainwater side of the line of trees,
       but after reviewing a number of photographs, the Rainwater[s’] photogrammetry
       expert could not provide an opinion as to what activity, if any, had occurred on the
       land beneath the trees during the historical review of the aerial/satellite
       photographs.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 53. And in finding of fact 26, the court found:

       [A]ctivity under the trees can only be characterized as minimal. This is rural land.
       Even if the Jarmuths were aware that the Rainwaters sat under the trees and mowed
       around the tree trunks, they most likely would not have found either of those
       activities objectionable.

CP at 55.

       The trial court concluded that Phyllis failed to show possession of the tree area was open

and notorious, actual and uninterrupted, exclusive, and hostile for a 10-year period. The court

awarded Rainshadow $87,193.18 in attorney fees and costs. Phyllis appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

       Phyllis contends that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s findings of fact

that it was unclear what the property looked like on her side of the property prior to the trees being

cut down and that her and her husband’s activity under the trees can only be characterized as

minimal and not objectionable to the Jarmuths. Phyllis further contends that the findings of fact

do not support the court’s conclusions of law that she failed to establish the adverse possession

elements. We disagree.

I.     LEGAL PRINCIPLES

       One may acquire legal title to another’s land through adverse possession by possessing the

property in a manner that is (1) exclusive, (2) actual and uninterrupted, (3) open and notorious,

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58308-9-II

and (4) hostile. Gorman v. City of Woodinville, 175 Wn.2d 68, 71, 283 P.3d 1082 (2012). All of

these elements must be proven and that they existed concurrently for at least ten years. Id.; RCW

4.16.020(1).

       We presume the holder of legal title maintains possession of their property. ITT Rayonier,

Inc. v. Bell, 112 Wn.2d 754, 757, 774 P.2d 6 (1989). Therefore, the party claiming adverse

possession bears the burden of establishing the existence of each element by a preponderance of

evidence. Id. A preponderance of the evidence means that a fact finder must be persuaded that

the facts are “more likely than not.” Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 172 Wn.2d 593, 608,

260 P.3d 857 (2011).

       Adverse possession presents a mixed question of law and fact. Herrin v. O’Hern, 168 Wn.

App. 305, 311, 275 P.3d 1231 (2012). When reviewing a trial court’s decision following a bench

trial, we review whether substantial evidence supports the court’s findings of fact and whether the

findings support the court’s conclusions of law. Viking Bank v. Firgrove Commons 3, LLC, 183

Wn. App. 706, 712, 334 P.3d 116 (2014). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade

a rational, fair-minded person that the premise is true. Id. We view the evidence and all reasonable

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we do not review the

trial court’s credibility determinations. Columbia State Bank v. Invicta Law Grp. PLLC, 199 Wn.

App. 306, 319, 402 P.3d 330 (2017). We determine de novo whether the underlying facts support

the trial court’s conclusion that the adverse possession claimant fulfilled the elements. Viking

Bank, 183 Wn. App. at 712.

II.    DISPUTED FINDINGS OF FACT

       Phyllis first challenges finding of fact 17, where the court found, “It is less clear what the

property looks like on the Rainwater side of the line of trees.” CP at 53.

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58308-9-II

       Phyllis presented several aerial photographs of the property. The images showed that

Phyllis’s side of the trees appeared mowed up to the tree areas. Curtis testified that there was

“some activity” on Phyllis’s side of the property from 1997 through 2016. 2 RP at 373-74. But

Curtis could not determine for certain the activity under the trees based on the photographs.

Because the tree branches were wide and extended to the property, Curtis could only testify to the

edge of the foliage of the trees. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Rainshadow,

this evidence is sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person that it is less clear what it

looked like on Phyllis’s side of the trees prior to their removal. Accordingly, substantial evidence

supports this finding of fact.

       Phyllis next challenges finding of fact 26, where the court found, “[A]ctivity under the

trees can only be characterized as minimal. . . . . Even if the Jarmuths were aware that the

Rainwaters sat under the trees and mowed around the tree trunks, they most likely would not have

found either of those activities objectionable.” CP at 55.

       Phyllis testified that she and Gene gave the trees Shakespearean names. And that the two

would sit under the trees. They also had a sprinkler system on their property and water could reach

the trees. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Rainshadow, this evidence is

sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person that Phyllis and Gene’s use was minimal and

naming the trees, sitting under them, or even watering them would most likely not be objectionable

to the trees’ owners. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports this finding of fact.

III.   ADVERSE POSSESSION

       Phyllis next contends that the trial court’s conclusions of law regarding the adverse

possession elements are not supported by the court’s findings of fact. We need only hold that one

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element of adverse possession is not established and Phyllis’s adverse possession claim fails. See

Gorman, 175 Wn.2d at 72 (all of the elements of adverse possession must be established).

          Use is open and notorious if it is “‘of the character that a true owner would assert in view

of its nature and location.”” Chaplin v. Sanders, 100 Wn.2d 853, 863, 676 P.2d 431 (1984)

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Krona v. Brett, 72 Wn.2d 535, 539, 433 P.2d 858 (1967)). This

element is met if (1) the true owner has actual notice of the adverse use throughout the statutory

period or (2) the claimant uses the land in such a way as would lead any reasonable person to

assume that the claimant is the owner. Kesinger v. Logan, 51 Wn. App. 914, 921, 756 P.2d 752

(1988).

          The trial court found that the area in dispute was thick with vegetation. The wire fence

installed by the Gasts was not visible from the Jarmuths’ side. The Jarmuths intentionally

maintained a thick, vegetative buffer to act as a protective barrier for wildlife, but the trees did not

ever exclude the Jarmuths from accessing their property.

          The trial court correctly applied the standard set forth in Chaplin and Kesinger in

concluding that the findings of fact support the conclusion that not only was there no evidence that

the Jarmuths knew about Phyllis’s minimal use of the disputed area, but that Phyllis failed to

establish on a more likely than not basis that any reasonable person would have known about the

use.

          Because we hold that Phyllis failed to establish at least one of the elements of adverse

possession, we need not address the other elements or whether her actions lasted for 10 consecutive

years. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that Phyllis failed to show she acquired the

property through adverse possession.

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58308-9-II

IV.    ATTORNEY FEES BELOW

       Phyllis contends that we should reverse the award of attorney fees under RCW 7.28.083 to

Rainshadow because she should have been the prevailing party. The trial court may enter an award

for reasonable attorney fees to “[t]he prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property

by adverse possession” RCW 7.28.083(3). In accordance with our conclusion that Phyllis did not

establish that she owned the property in question through adverse possession, the court did not err

in awarding attorney fees to Rainshadow as the prevailing party.

V.     ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

       Both parties request attorney fees on appeal under RAP 18.1 and RCW 7.28.083(3). RAP

18.1 grants us the ability to award attorney fees if applicable law allows. Under RCW 7.28.083(3),

“[t]he prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession may

request the court to award costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees,” and the court may award such

costs if it “determines such an award is equitable and just.” Attorney fees under RCW 7.28.083(3)

are available to parties prevailing on appeal. Workman v. Klinkenberg, 6 Wn. App. 2d 291, 308-

09, 430 P.3d 716 (2018).

       Because the trial court awarded Rainshadow attorney fees below and because it is the

prevailing party on appeal, we determine attorney fees on appeal are equitable and just. Therefore,

we award reasonable attorney fees to Rainshadow as the prevailing party on appeal subject to

compliance with RAP 18.1.

                                          CONCLUSION

       Substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact and the findings of fact

support the trial court’s conclusions of law that Phyllis failed to establish the existence of all the

elements of adverse possession. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing Phyllis’s

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58308-9-II

adverse possession claim. Additionally, the trial court did not err in awarding Rainshadow its

attorney fees under RCW 7.28.083(3).

        We affirm and award attorney fees on appeal to Rainshadow.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                            Veljacic, A.C.J.

We concur:

        Glasgow, J.

        Price, J.

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