Court Opinion

ID: 9897885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:26:40.930732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:36.937931
License: Public Domain

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             FILE
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                                                                                     THIS OPINION WAS FILED
                                                                 FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
                                                                                           AUGUST 3, 2023
        IN CLERK’S OFFICE
 SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
         AUGUST 3, 2023                                                                  ERIN L. LENNON
                                                                                     SUPREME COURT CLERK

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

          STATE OF WASHINGTON,                               No. 100922-4

                                      Respondent,            EN BANC

                         v.                                  Filed: August 3, 2023

          PAUL RIVERS,

                                      Petitioner.

                STEPHENS, J.—The state and federal constitutions guarantee the right to trial

         by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Jury diversity

         is central to a fair and democratic system of justice, as diverse juries bring broader

         perspectives that foster rich deliberations and lead to better informed decisions. Paul

         Rivers, a Black man, was convicted on two criminal charges in King County by a

         jury drawn from a panel that lacked any Black potential jurors. Rivers argues this

         venire, as well as certain aspects of the King County jury selection system that

         produced this venire, violated his state and federal fair cross section rights.

                Though Rivers argues his convictions must be reversed under existing United

         States Supreme Court precedent, he urges that article I, sections 21 and 22 of the

         Washington Constitution provide greater protection of the fair cross section guaranty
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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       than does the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution. Rivers, supported by

       amici, 1 proposes a new test under state law in which a defendant establishes a per se

       constitutional violation by showing a comparative disparity level of 20 percent or

       more in a single jury venire.2 Alternatively, if the court continues to evaluate

       disparities across all jury venires rather than by considering only the defendant’s

       jury panel, Rivers proposes to eliminate the requirement of showing a systematic

       cause for the disparity. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S. Ct. 664, 58

       L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979) (violation of Sixth Amendment’s fair cross section guaranty

       requires showing that underrepresentation of a distinctive group “is due to

       systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process”).

              No one in this case disputes that jury diversity is lacking in Washington and

       that more can and must be done to promote juror diversity statewide. This court and

       others have an administrative responsibility to address the policy question of how to

       facilitate juror participation and achieve greater jury diversity across Washington.

       However, the case before us invokes our appellate jurisdiction, not our

       1
         The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, the American Civil Liberties Union
       of Washington, the King County Department of Public Defense, and the Public Defender
       Association filed a joint amici curiae brief in support of Rivers. The Washington
       Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers also filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
       Rivers.
       2
         Comparative disparity is one of numerous statistical methods, discussed in greater detail
       infra, that courts employ to measure jury representativeness when assessing fair cross
       section claims.

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       administrative function, and the legal question presented is whether Rivers has

       established a violation of his fair cross section rights under either the federal or state

       constitution. Because Rivers has not shown that the Washington Constitution

       requires the heightened test he proposes for assessing fair cross section claims, we

       analyze his claim using the existing Sixth Amendment framework, which this court

       has applied in prior cases. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364; see also In re Pers. Restraint

       of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 20, 296 P.3d 872 (2013). Applying that framework, we

       conclude that Rivers’s venire and King County’s jury selection system satisfy

       constitutional minimums.

             Because Rivers is not entitled to a new trial based on his fair cross section

       claim, we address his additional challenge to the trial court’s admission of expert

       testimony regarding the correlation between strangulation and memory loss as well

       as the trial court’s decision not to answer a written question from the jury regarding

       the mens rea of assault by suffocation. We affirm on each claim because the trial

       court acted within its discretion in both instances. We remand for resentencing,

       however, because Rivers is entitled to the benefit of RCW 9.94A.647, which no

       longer allows a persistent offender life sentence based on prior second-degree

       robbery convictions.

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

           BACKGROUND ON KING COUNTY JURY SELECTION AND RACE
                            DEMOGRAPHICS

             As Rivers’s principal challenge is to the composition of his jury venire, some

       background is necessary regarding the jury summons process in King County and,

       more generally, race demographic data for the county.

          A. Jury Summons Procedures in King County

             Across Washington, courts randomly select prospective jurors from master

       jury lists. RCW 2.36.010(12). Master jury lists are compiled from jury source lists,

       which contain names and addresses of registered voters, licensed drivers, and

       identicard holders who reside in a particular county. RCW 2.36.010(10); see also

       RCW 2.36.054; GR 18(c). The court clerk notifies individuals randomly selected

       for jury service by issuing a summons. RCW 2.36.095. Low juror response rates

       are typical in many counties, including King County. See, e.g., PETER A. COLLINS

       & BROOKE MILLER GIALOPSOS, AN EXPLORATION OF BARRIERS TO RESPONDING TO

       JURY SUMMONS: TECHNICAL REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

       OFFICE       OF       THE       COURTS        8-9       (June      24,       2021),

       https://www.courts.wa.gov/subsite/mjc/docs/2021_Jury_Study_Final_Report.pdf

       (over a four-month period in 2021, King County reached only a 10 percent response

       rate to jury summonses). Those who do respond to a jury summons can request

       excusal on the basis of undue hardship, for example, due to work obligations or a

       medical condition. See RCW 2.36.100(1). Otherwise, summoned jurors generally

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       complete a questionnaire before appearing in court, which helps the court determine

       eligibility and fitness to serve. See, e.g., How a Jury Is Chosen, SEATTLE MUN. CT.

       https://www.seattle.gov/courts/jury/reporting-for-jury-duty/how-a-jury-is-chosen.

       Eligible jurors who appear for service form the venire panel, at which point the

       attorneys conduct voir dire and select veniremembers to serve on the petit jury and

       to decide the case. See, e.g., id.

          B. Seattle and Kent Jury Assignment Areas

             King County has two full-service superior courthouses: the King County

       Courthouse in Seattle and the Norm Maleng Regional Justice Center in Kent. State

       v. Lanciloti, 165 Wn.2d 661, 664, 201 P.3d 323 (2009). Until 2007, King County

       summoned prospective jurors to either courthouse randomly regardless of proximity.

       Id. Superior Court judges began to observe that jurors were more likely to appear

       for jury service when summoned to the courthouse closest to their home. Id. One

       judge compiled detailed demographic data that tended to show “distance to the

       courthouse had a disproportionate impact on poor and minority jurors, making juries

       overall less representative of King County.” Id.

             In response to requests from King County Superior Court judges, the

       legislature amended the jury summons statutes to permit counties with two or more

       courthouses to create multiple jury districts within the county. Id.; see also LAWS

       OF 2005, ch. 199, codified as RCW 2.36.055. The express purpose of this legislative

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       amendment was to “lessen the burdens borne by jurors fulfilling their civic duties by

       providing a mechanism that narrows the geographic area from which the jurors are

       drawn while maintaining a random and proportionate jury pool.” LAWS OF 2005,

       ch. 199, § 1. In 2007, the King County Superior Court promulgated Local General

       Rule (LGR) 18, which creates separate geographic jury assignment areas for Seattle

       and Kent. LGR 18 divides the jury source list so that prospective jurors are

       summoned to the courthouse closest to their residence, based on zip code. LGR

       18(1). The “Seattle Case Assignment Area” includes roughly all of the city of Seattle

       and north of Interstate 90; the “Kent Case Assignment Area” encompasses

       everything else sprawling south of Seattle. Lanciloti, 165 Wn.2d at 665; see also

       Local Civil Rule (LCR) 82(e)(3).

          C. King County’s Racially Disparate Neighborhood Demographics

             The United States has a shameful history of segregating neighborhoods

       through the use of racially restrictive covenants. See In re That Portion of Lots 1 &

       2, 199 Wn.2d 389, 395-96, 506 P.3d 1230 (2022) (tracing the history of racial

       covenants across the country). Seattle is no exception.

             Seattle’s first known racially restrictive covenant was written in 1924.

       Catherine Silva, Racial Restrictive Covenants History: Enforcing Neighborhood

       Segregation in Seattle, SEATTLE CIV. RTS. & LABOR HIST. PROJECT,

       https://depts.washington.edu/civilr/covenants_report.htm [https://perma.cc/NY93-

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       3G34]. Similar covenants quickly proliferated throughout the city, spurred in large

       part by land developers and real estate companies. Id. Many neighborhoods used

       racially restrictive covenants and deeds to exclude non-White and Jewish families.

       Id. These restrictions “played a major role in dictating municipal demographics”

       throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Id. As a result, Black residents

       had few housing options and were heavily concentrated in Seattle’s Central District

       and International District. Id.

             Redlining also contributed to racial segregation in Seattle. “Redlining” is

       “[c]redit discrimination . . . by an institution that refuses to provide loans or

       insurance on properties in areas that are considered to be poor financial risks or to

       the people who live in those areas.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1531 (11th ed.

       2019).    Lenders relied on maps drawn to indicate the “best” Seattle area

       neighborhoods in which banks should invest; banks generally refused to lend money

       for properties in “declining” and “hazardous” neighborhoods. See HOME OWNERS’

       LOAN CORPORATION SECURITY MAP AND AREA DESCRIPTIONS (January 10, 1936),

       https://cdm16118.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16118coll2/id/379

       [https://perma.cc/CTP4-PRL6]; see also Bruce Mitchell & Juan Franco, HOLC

       “Redlining” Maps: The Persistent Structure of Segregation and Economic

       Inequality,   NAT’L     CMTY.     REINVESTMENT      COAL.     (Mar.    20,    2018),

       https://ncrc.org/holc/ [https://perma.cc/JWQ7-MZL5].

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

               Redlining “essentially divided cities according to their racial demographics in

       order to determine the economic desirability of certain neighborhoods.” Silva,

       supra. A 1976 Seattle task force reported that banks assigned “higher risks to

       neighborhoods whose residents differ in race,” which “penalize[d] neighborhoods

       because of the diversity of their residents or because of concentrations of racial and

       ethnic minorities.” DRAFT REPORT OF THE MAYOR’S REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE 14

       (Jan.             1,             1976),             http://archives.seattle.gov/digital-

       collections/media/collectiveaccess/images/1/9/3/8/3616_ca_object_representations

       _media_193823_original.pdf       [https://perma.cc/MFS8-EJC9].         This    practice

       prevented Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC) from purchasing homes

       because they could not obtain mortgages in the only neighborhoods where they were

       legally permitted to live. Silva, supra. As a result, Black residents faced significant

       barriers to accumulating generational wealth and, over time, they continued to

       spread south into areas that were historically redlined and underinvested compared

       to the largely white neighborhoods north of Seattle. James Gregory, Seattle’s Race

       and Segregation Story in Maps 1920-2020, SEATTLE CIV. RTS. & LABOR HIST.

       PROJECT,                   https://depts.washington.edu/civilr/segregation_maps.htm

       [https://perma.cc/NXM4-5U6B].

               The consequences of this history remain. Racially restrictive covenants and

       redlining “have had a profound and lingering impact on the Seattle area, reflected

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       even today in the distribution of minorities through the city and its suburbs.” Silva,

       supra. Today, the majority of Black residents in King County continue to live “in

       the Central District and sprawling southward through Rainier Valley and into the

       southern suburbs.” Id.; see also Gregory, supra (mapping the distribution of Black

       residents in the Seattle area by percentage of population over time).

             The Seattle-Kent jury district divide tracks these racial disparities because it

       separates King County into two distinct northern and southern jury assignment areas.

       The record in this case contains data indicating that while King County’s overall

       population in 2015 was 5.60 percent Black, the Seattle assignment area population

       was only 4.14 percent Black while the Kent area’s was 8.11 percent Black. In other

       words, the Kent jury assignment area had nearly twice as many Black residents as

       the Seattle jury assignment area.

                        CASE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

          A. Background Facts of Paul Rivers’s Case

             Paul Rivers met Summer Power in 2017 and they began a sporadic dating

       relationship. At approximately 2:00 a.m. on February 11, 2018, Seattle police

       responded to a 911 call in which the caller reported a female assaulting a male in the

       street. When officers arrived, both parties admitted to having a verbal argument but

       denied physical contact. The officers decided to separate the parties; one officer

       drove Rivers home while another drove Power to the precinct to call her own ride

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       home. Both Rivers and Power had been drinking that night. Power does not recall

       this 2:00 a.m. incident, nor the police response, nor being driven to the precinct.

             Later that morning around 4:00 a.m., Power went to Rivers’s home, and the

       two resumed arguing. The first thing Power remembers from the night is the

       altercation that ensued. Power alleges that when she tried to leave Rivers’s house,

       Rivers pushed her onto the bed and got on top of her. He lifted her shirt and

       forcefully bit her breast. Rivers then placed his hand on Power’s throat and began

       “choking” her. 2 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 914. Rivers also covered her

       nose and mouth, blocking her breathing. When Rivers stood up, Power ran out of

       the house and attempted to call the police using her cell phone. Rivers followed and

       grabbed Power’s phone. Power ran to a neighbor’s house and began screaming for

       help while banging on the front door. A resident called 911.

             Officers soon arrived and observed that Power appeared “very flustered,”

       “was crying,” and “seemed out of breath.” 2 VRP at 568. Power told police Rivers

       had choked her.      One officer noticed “her neck was visibly red” and had

       “marks . . . where she stated she was choked.” 2 VRP at 572, 574-75. When Rivers

       spoke to officers at the scene, he denied choking Power but stated that the two had

       been drinking and that Power was his girlfriend. He admitted to grabbing Power’s

       phone but claimed he had done so playfully like “a game.” 2 VRP at 625-26. Police

       arrested Rivers for domestic violence. The State charged Rivers with one count of

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       second degree assault by strangulation and suffocation and one count of interfering

       with domestic violence reporting.

          B. Pretrial Motion for a Jury Venire Drawn from a Fair Cross Section

             Before trial, Rivers filed a motion seeking a jury venire drawn from a fair

       cross section of the community, raising arguments under both the federal and state

       constitutions. In support of his motion, Rivers provided statistical data from a report

       by University of Washington Professor Katherine Beckett titled “The Under-

       Representation of Blacks in the King County Jury Pool.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at

       106. Beckett’s report analyzes demographic data collected from jurors summoned

       in King County over a period of 20 consecutive court days in 2015. From this data,

       Beckett found a general trend of underrepresentation of Black jurors in King County.

       For example, although the county’s overall population was 5.60 percent Black, only

       3.61 percent of King County jurors were Black.              Black jurors were also

       underrepresented in the individual jury pools of both Kent (5.33 percent) and Seattle

       (2.29 percent) when compared to the overall Black population of King County.

             Rivers argued in his motion that the underrepresentation of Black jurors in

       Seattle was the result of systematic exclusion because King County’s summons

       procedures combined with low juror response rates produce an “oversampling” of

       predominantly white zip codes and an “undersampling” of more racially diverse zip

       codes. He further argued that King County’s choice to divide itself into two separate

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       jury districts along racially disparate demographic lines amounted to systematic

       exclusion of Black residents from Seattle juries. The trial court denied Rivers’s

       motion, ruling he failed to demonstrate systematic exclusion as required by Duren.

       The court declined to consider Rivers’s arguments under the Washington

       Constitution. The court later noted for the record that Rivers’s particular jury panel

       had no potential jurors who appeared to be Black, though “it’s always hard to tell

       with appearances.” 1 VRP at 275-76.

          C. Facts Relating to Rivers’s Evidentiary Challenge to the Admission of Expert
             Witness Testimony

             At trial, Power testified for the State. She admitted to having no memory of

       most events from the evening in question but described her experience being pushed

       onto the bed, bitten, choked, and smothered. The State offered expert testimony

       from Theresa Stewart, a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE). Rivers objected to

       Stewart’s testimony regarding the connection between strangulation and memory

       loss, arguing she was not an expert on the subject. The court conducted voir dire on

       Stewart’s qualifications outside the presence of the jury. Stewart had worked at

       Harborview Medical Center for 17 years treating sexual assault and domestic

       violence patients, including those who suffered strangulation. She participated in

       and conducted trainings on the topic of sexual assault strangulation. Stewart had

       previously been qualified as an expert and testified in court on the topic of

       strangulation approximately 20 times.

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

             Based on her professional experience and training, the court permitted

       Stewart’s expert testimony. Stewart described to the jury signs and symptoms of

       strangulation. She also testified in general terms regarding the correlation between

       strangulation and memory loss. 2 VRP at 778-79 (“As part of our sexual assault

       training and part of the work that we do, we learn and [are] trained around . . . what

       happens to people who experience trauma, which would include both sexual assault,

       strangulation, domestic violence. . . . [I]n a traumatic event, people have difficulty

       recording the memories . . . there may be things that they don’t remember, and they

       definitely—certainly in my experience with sexual assault patients, really struggle

       to give a history that is a nice clean linear history that goes from A to Z.”).

          D. Facts Relating to the Trial Court’s Response to the Jury’s Question

             During jury deliberations, the jury sent out a question about the criminal intent

       required if someone were killed by suffocation: “Regarding instruction 14: If

       someone accidentally killed someone by impairing their ability to breathe without

       the intent of obstructing airflow, would the defend[a]nt be found guilty of

       suffocation?” CP at 62. Instruction 14 defined “suffocation”: “‘Suffocation’ means

       to block or impair a person’s intake of air at the nose and mouth, whether by

       smothering or other means, with the intent to obstruct the person’s ability to

       breathe.” CP at 50. The court was concerned about the hypothetical nature of the

       jury’s question, given that no homicide charge was at issue, and it invited proposed

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       responses from both sides. The prosecution preferred to refer the jury to the

       instructions already given. The defense proposed two possible responses: tell the

       jury a person who blocks another’s air intake without intending to obstruct the

       person’s ability to breathe does not commit suffocation or, alternatively, that

       suffocation requires the intent to obstruct another’s ability to breathe.

                 The court decided not to give the jury further instructions in response to the

       hypothetical question and told the jury to refer to the instructions already given. The

       given instructions included a standard pattern instruction defining “intent”: “A

       person acts with intent or intentionally when acting with the objective or purpose to

       accomplish a result that constitutes a crime.” CP at 48; 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE:

       WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 10.01 (5th ed. 2021). It is

       undisputed that the jury instructions concerning the mens rea for assault reflected an

       accurate statement of the law, requiring the jury to find the defendant acted with

       intent.

          E. Facts Relating to Rivers’s Sentencing and Appeal

                 The jury convicted Rivers on both charges. At sentencing, the trial court

       found Rivers to be a persistent offender based on his convictions for three “most

       serious offense[s],” including two prior convictions for second degree robbery. CP

       at 194, 200. The Court sentenced Rivers to life imprisonment without parole on

       count one based on the persistent offender statute, RCW 9.94A.570, and to a

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       concurrent sentence of 364 days’ confinement and 36 months’ community custody

       on count two.

             Rivers appealed, raising numerous challenges, including violation of his

       constitutional right to an impartial jury panel drawn from a fair cross section of the

       community. Following oral argument on March 2, 2022, the Court of Appeals

       determined pursuant to RCW 2.06.030 that this case presents a fundamental and

       urgent issue of broad public import requiring prompt and ultimate determination:

                    Whether article I, section 21 and/or section 22 of the Washington
             State Constitution provide greater protection of the right to a jury venire
             drawn from a fair cross section of the community than the Sixth
             Amendment to the United States Constitution.

       Ord. of Certification, State v. Rivers, No. 81216-5-I, at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. May 11,

       2022). The Court of Appeals accordingly certified this case to our court, and we

       accepted the transfer of the appeal for determination on the merits.

                                           ANALYSIS

             We first address Rivers’s fair cross section claim before turning to his

       remaining challenges to his conviction and sentence. Constitutional issues are

       questions of law we review de novo. State v. Jorgenson, 179 Wn.2d 145, 150, 312

       P.3d 960 (2013) (citing State v. Sieyes, 168 Wn.2d 276, 281, 225 P.3d 995 (2010)).

       We generally review a trial court’s decisions admitting testimony and determining

       how to respond to a deliberating jury’s questions for abuse of discretion. State v.

       Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 856, 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (admission of testimony); State

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       v. Sublett, 176 Wn.2d 58, 82, 292 P.3d 715 (2012) (plurality opinion) (questions

       from deliberating jury).

             Rivers has not shown a violation of his fair cross section rights under either

       the state or federal constitution. We decline to adopt his proposed tests under article

       I, sections 21 and 22 of the Washington State Constitution. While Rivers and Amici

       identify serious ongoing concerns about jury diversity in King County and statewide,

       Rivers fails to demonstrate how his proposed tests are constitutionally required to

       address these concerns. We adhere to the test set forth by the United States Supreme

       Court in Duren, which this court has long applied. Because Rivers has not shown a

       constitutional violation under the analysis established in Duren, we decline to order

       a new trial on this basis.

             We also decline to order a new trial based on the trial court’s decision to admit

       expert testimony from a sexual assault nurse and its decision not to further instruct

       the jury in response to its question during deliberations. In both instances, the abuse

       of discretion standard applies and the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion.

       We therefore affirm Rivers’s convictions, though he is entitled to resentencing

       because his life sentence as a persistent offender is no longer authorized by RCW

       9.94A.570.

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

             I.     Rivers Does Not Establish a Violation of His Right to an Impartial Jury

             A criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury, and this

       constitutional right includes the right to have jury panels drawn from a fair cross

       section of the community. Duren, 439 U.S. at 358-59 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana,

       419 U.S. 522, 526-31, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975)); State v. Hilliard, 89

       Wn.2d 430, 440, 573 P.2d 22 (1977) (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528). Rivers argues

       he was deprived of his fair cross section right under both the federal and state

       constitutions when King County’s jury selection system produced his venire

       containing no apparent Black potential jurors. To prove a fair cross section violation

       under the Sixth Amendment, the Duren test requires a defendant to show (1) a

       distinctive group (2) is unreasonably underrepresented in his own venire and in jury

       venires generally, (3) as a result of systematic exclusion in the jury selection process.

       Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 366. Washington has consistently applied this test in past

       cases considering claims of underrepresentation on juries. See, e.g., Yates, 177

       Wn.2d at 18-23; State v. Cienfuegos, 144 Wn.2d 222, 230-32, 25 P.3d 1011 (2001);

       State v. Rupe, 108 Wn.2d 734, 746-48, 743 P.2d 210 (1987).

             In Rivers’s view, the Duren test has failed to adequately guard the fair cross

       section right. He urges us to interpret our state constitution to require a more

       stringent test for assessing fair cross section claims. Rivers, supported by Amici,

       proposes we eliminate Duren’s requirement of showing underrepresentation

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       generally so that a constitutional violation occurs when a person shows

       underrepresentation in the particular venire panel at 20 percent or greater

       comparative disparity. Alternatively, he urges that we eliminate the systematic

       exclusion requirement so that defendants must only show underrepresentation of a

       distinctive group.3 For the reasons below, we find insufficient justification to

       announce a new test and instead analyze Rivers’s fair cross section claim using the

       existing Duren framework. Applying that framework here, we conclude that Rivers

       has not demonstrated a constitutional violation because the evidence does not

       establish systematic exclusion.

           A. Background on the Fair Cross Section Right

              The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the

       states through the Fourteenth Amendment, grants all criminal defendants the right

       to trial “by an impartial jury.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Taylor, the United States

       Supreme Court recognized that “a jury drawn from a venire constituting a fair cross

       section of the community” is an “essential” component of the Sixth Amendment’s

       3
         The Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers offers yet another alternative,
       interim test: “Given that the Duren standard has been so ineffectual in promoting diverse
       jury venires, this Court may be concerned that adopting Mr. Rivers’ proposed test will
       create short-term disruptions to the court system. To the extent the Court views such
       concerns are valid, this Court should not simply leave Duren in place, but instead adopt an
       alternative, interim rule: if underrepresentation in jury venire exceeds 20% comparative
       disparity, it is presumptively unconstitutional unless the state shows that all reasonable
       steps have been taken to overcome the history of systematic exclusion.” Amended Amicus
       Curiae Br. of Crim. Def. Laws. of Wash. at 12-13 (emphasis omitted).

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       impartial jury guaranty. 419 U.S. at 526. The fair cross section right is a means of

       effectuating the constitutional right to an impartial jury, and it must be understood

       in this context. Id. at 525-26; Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480, 110 S. Ct. 803,

       107 L. Ed. 2d 905 (1990) (“The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section

       on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution

       does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).”).

             Shortly after deciding Taylor, in Duren, the United States Supreme Court

       announced a three-part test for assessing fair cross section claims. Under Duren, a

       claimant must show

             (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the
             community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from
             which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the
             number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
             underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
             jury-selection process.

       439 U.S. at 364. Once a claimant makes a prima facie showing of a fair cross section

       violation by satisfying each of Duren’s three requirements, the burden shifts to the

       State to “justify[] this infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to

       be incompatible with a significant state interest.” Id. at 368-69 (State failed to meet

       this burden because “the preclusive domestic responsibilities of some women is

       insufficient justification for their disproportionate exclusion on jury venires”).

             Most litigation centers on Duren’s second and third requirements. Regarding

       the second requirement to date, neither this court nor the United States Supreme

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       Court has endorsed a particular method of measuring underrepresentation. See

       Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 329-30, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 176 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2010)

       (finding “no cause to take sides . . . on the method or methods by which

       underrepresentation is appropriately measured”). Courts are free to use whatever

       they believe is the best model. The two most popular methods of measuring

       underrepresentation are absolute disparity and comparative disparity. Absolute

       disparity is determined by subtracting the percentage of a distinctive group in the

       jury pool from the percentage of that group in the overall jury eligible population.

       Smith, 559 U.S. at 323. For example, if “Group X” comprises 10 percent of the

       population but only 4 percent of the jury pool, there is an absolute disparity of 6

       percent.

             Comparative disparity expresses the absolute disparity as a percentage of the

       group’s overall representation in the community. It purports to state “the diminished

       likelihood that members of an underrepresented group, when compared to the

       population as a whole, will be called for jury service.” Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d

       1215, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 1992). Comparative disparity is measured by dividing the

       absolute disparity figure by the percentage of a distinctive group in the overall jury

       eligible population. For example, if Group X comprises 10 percent of the population

       but only 4 percent of the jury pool, there is a comparative disparity of 60 percent.

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       This signifies that 60 percent of the jurors from Group X are missing from the

       average venire.

             Neither statistical method is perfect. Both have been criticized as poor

       indicators of underrepresentation when the distinctive group comprises a relatively

       small percentage of the overall population. See, e.g., Smith, 559 U.S. at 329 (both

       methods “can be misleading when, as here, ‘members of the distinctive group

       comp[ose] [only] a small percentage of those eligible for jury service’” (alterations

       in original) (quoting People v. Smith, 463 Mich. 199, 203-04, 615 N.W.2d 1

       (2000))). Absolute disparity tends to “understate[] the systematic representative

       deficiencies” of small groups. United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 774, 776-77 (8th

       Cir. 1996). For example,

             if we assume a group makes up 90% of the population, but 80% of the
             jury pool, there would be a 10% absolute disparity. Under those
             circumstances, it is doubtful that any court would consider the group
             underrepresented. However, if a population group constituted 10% of
             the population, but had no representation in a jury pool, that result
             might give rise to fair cross-section concerns. Yet, the absolute
             disparity—10%—would be identical under both scenarios.

       United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). In

       contrast, comparative disparity tends to “overstate the underrepresentation of a

       group that has a small population percentage.” Id. at 1163. For example,

             [l]et’s assume . . . that a group constitutes .1% of the population, with
             no representation in the jury pool. The comparative disparity of that
             group would be 100%. Few would argue that the absence of a group
             representing just 0.1% of the population violates the fair cross-section

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

             requirement, yet comparative disparity analysis would suggest
             otherwise.

       Id.   To account for these problems, courts tend to use a combination of both

       methods, sometimes in combination with other statistical methods. See, e.g., id. at

       1162-64 (discussing standard deviation, the absolute impact test, and the disparity-

       of-risk test); United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 799 (10th Cir. 2006) (using

       combination of absolute and comparative disparity); Mosley v. Dretke, 370 F.3d 467,

       479 n.5 (5th Cir. 2004) (using absolute disparity as primary method and permitting

       comparative disparity in some instances); Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1231 (using

       combination of absolute disparity, comparative disparity, and deviation from

       expected random selection).

             Next, Duren’s third component requires the claimant to show the

       impermissible underrepresentation is caused by systematic exclusion.             This

       requirement implements Taylor’s and Duren’s fundamental premise: that a process

       that systematically excludes distinctive groups from the jury pool is constitutionally

       intolerable because it deprives the defendant of an impartial jury. Taylor, 419 U.S.

       at 538 (“Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, but the

       jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must

       not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to

       be reasonably representative thereof.” (citations omitted)).

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

             “Systematic” means “inherent in the particular jury-selection process

       utilized.” Duren, 439 U.S. at 366. For example, in Taylor, the United States

       Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana statute that required women to file a written

       declaration stating their interest in serving on a jury before becoming eligible for

       jury service. In effect, the statute systematically excluded the vast majority of

       women from jury service. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531. Although women comprised 53

       percent of the population in the defendant’s judicial district, women comprised no

       more than 10 percent of eligible jurors. Id. at 524. This was constitutionally

       intolerable because the jury was not “drawn from a source fairly representative of

       the community.” Id. at 538. The case United States v. Osorio provides another

       example. 801 F. Supp. 966 (D. Conn. 1992). There, two errors—one computer and

       one unexplained—in the Hartford Division of the District of Connecticut’s jury

       selection system mistakenly excluded from the master jury wheel all residents of

       both Hartford and New Britain, which were home to a large concentration of Black

       and Hispanic residents. United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1242-43 (2d Cir.

       1995) (citing Osorio, 801 F. Supp. at 969-71). As a result, “the exclusion of

       approximately two-thirds of [B]lacks and Hispanics in the Division as a source of

       names for jury selection constitute[d] ‘systematic exclusion’ of those groups from

       the jury-selection process.” Osorio, 801 F. Supp. at 979.

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

             Importantly, systematic exclusion is not the same as systemic exclusion. See

       Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations: Why the

       Definition of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section Claims Must Be Expanded,

       59 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 769-79 (2011) (explaining the difference between

       “systematic” and “nonsystematic” factors, which generally include “factors not

       inherent in the jury selection process itself, but rather ‘private sector’ influences

       beyond the control of the court”).        Whereas “systemic” exclusion broadly

       encompasses all forms of institutional racism that collectively produce

       underrepresentation in juries, “systematic” exclusion is much narrower. It requires

       the claimant to identify a specific jury selection practice that causes persistent and

       constitutionally significant exclusion of a particular group from the jury pool. In

       Taylor, for example, the “systematic” apparatus causing unconstitutional disparity

       was the Louisiana statute that operated to exclude most women from jury service.

       In Osorio, it was two errors that mistakenly excluded all residents of Hartford and

       New Britain from the jury pool, which in turn excluded significant numbers of Black

       and Hispanic potential jurors.

             While systemic and systematic mean different things, we note that it remains

       an open question whether systemic factors can nonetheless inform the systematic

       exclusion analysis; the United States Supreme Court has expressly declined to

       address the issue. Smith, 559 U.S. at 333 n.6 (“We have also never ‘clearly’ decided,

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       and have no need to consider here, whether the impact of social and economic factors

       can support a fair-cross-section claim.”). At the same time, however, Duren requires

       a defendant to identify something more discrete about the jury selection system itself

       that produces persistent and traceable exclusion, beyond the myriad of systemic

       factors that likely combine to produce exclusion. See id. at 332 (defendant could not

       establish prima facie case under Duren by “pointing to a host of factors that,

       individually or in combination, might contribute to a group’s underrepresentation”).

       And the defendant must tie the disparity to a particular practice with evidence;

       statistically significant disparities alone are not enough. See id. at 330-31.

             With this background, we now turn to Rivers’s fair cross section claim under

       the Washington Constitution.

          B. We Decline To Adopt Rivers’s Proposed Tests for Assessing Fair Cross
             Section Claims under the Washington Constitution

             As noted, Rivers and amici urge us to interpret article I, sections 21 and 22

       independently from the Sixth Amendment and to adopt a separate state constitutional

       analysis to assess fair cross section claims. This court has a duty, where feasible, to

       resolve constitutional questions first under our own state constitution before relying

       on federal law. In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 198 Wn.2d 342, 353, 496 P.3d 289

       (2021).

             Article I, section 21 provides, in relevant part, “[t]he right of trial by jury shall

       remain inviolate.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21. Article I, section 22 guarantees the

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       right to trial “by an impartial jury” in all criminal prosecutions. WASH. CONST. art.

       I, § 22. We have previously considered whether article I, section 21 supports

       heightened protections in related contexts. See, e.g., City of Pasco v. Mace, 98

       Wn.2d 87, 99, 653 P.2d 618 (1982) (article I, section 21 guarantees the right to trial

       by jury for petty offenses, even though the Sixth Amendment guarantees no such

       right); State v. Hicks, 163 Wn.2d 477, 492, 181 P.3d 831 (2008) (relying on

       “increased protection of jury trials under the Washington Constitution” to uphold

       finding of prima facie case of discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,

       106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986)); State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d 34, 49, 309

       P.3d 326 (2013) (plurality opinion) (“We should also recognize that there is

       constitutional value in having diverse juries . . . . Article I, section 21 of our state

       constitution declares, ‘The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.’”). We have

       at least once interpreted section 22’s impartial jury guaranty coextensively with the

       Sixth Amendment. See State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 598, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)

       (in the context of death qualification procedures, Washington Constitution does not

       afford broader protection of the right to an impartial jury than recognized under the

       Sixth Amendment).

             Not all claims encompassed within a particular constitutional provision are

       the same, so our analysis centers on Rivers’s specific claim: that article I, sections

       21 and 22 require a more stringent assessment of fair cross section claims than the

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       Sixth Amendment’s Duren test. “‘Even where it is already established that the

       Washington Constitution may provide enhanced protections on a general topic,

       parties are still required to explain why enhanced protections are appropriate in

       specific applications.’” Williams, 198 Wn.2d at 354 (quoting State v. Ramos, 187

       Wn.2d 420, 454, 387 P.3d 650 (2017)). To determine whether our state constitution

       extends broader rights than the federal constitution in a particular context, we

       examine the constitutional guaranties in light of the six criteria outlined in State v.

       Gunwall.4 Claimants who propose an alternative, more stringent test to analyze state

       constitutional rights independently from their federal counterparts must explain how

       the Washington Constitution commands the proposed test.                  See, e.g., State v.

       Gocken, 127 Wn.2d 95, 101-07, 896 P.2d 1267 (1995) (adhering to the “same

       elements” test in Blockburger 5 to assess double jeopardy claims and holding the

       Gunwall factors did not support the proposed “same conduct” test in Grady6).

       4
         106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). These factors are (1) the state constitutional text,
       (2) significant differences between the state’s text and the text of any parallel provisions of
       the federal constitution, (3) state constitutional and common law history, (4) preexisting
       state law, (5) structural differences in state and federal constitutions, and (6) whether the
       subject matter is of particular state interest or local concern. Id. at 61-62.
       5
         Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).
       6
         Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 109 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1990), overruled by
       United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1993)
       (plurality opinion).

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             We find insufficient grounds to adopt Rivers’s proposed tests under article I,

       sections 21 and 22 because he fails to explain how these tests are rooted in our state

       constitution. Rivers principally argues that recognition of an “inviolate” jury trial

       right in article I, section 21 necessarily shows that the Washington Constitution

       demands a more stringent test for assessing fair cross-section claims because the

       “federal constitution contains no words sanctifying the jury right to such a degree.”

       Br. of Appellant at 23. Rivers is correct that section 21 has no federal analog, and

       that “‘inviolate’ connotes deserving of the highest protection.” Sofie v. Fibreboard

       Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 656, 771 P.2d 711 (1989). But we fail to see how the term

       “inviolate” commands that we find a per se constitutional violation every time a

       Washington defendant demonstrates a 20 percent or greater comparative disparity in

       the jury venire. We similarly fail to see how the term “inviolate” obviates the

       requirement that defendants show systematic exclusion of a distinctive group.

             Beyond the Gunwall factors, Rivers urges an independent state constitutional

       analysis on the ground that the Duren test fails to adequately protect the fair cross

       section right. Rivers compares Duren to Batson, noting how our “observation that

       ‘Washington appellate courts have never reversed a conviction’ under Batson

       spurred [this court] to adopt a new standard for peremptory challenges.” Supp. Br.

       of Pet’r at 11 (quoting Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d at 45-46). Out of the 20 cases that

       Rivers cites in which Washington appellate courts assessed fair cross section

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       challenges, he is correct that not one resulted in a reversal on fair cross section

       grounds. But Rivers’s analogy to Batson does not help his argument concerning

       how to interpret the Washington Constitution. In seeking to better address racial

       bias during jury selection, we never modified Batson on state constitutional grounds.

       Rather, we enacted GR 37 under our rule-making authority through legitimate rule-

       making procedures. And in Jefferson, we modified Batson using not our state

       constitution but our “authority under federal law to create new procedures within

       existing Fourteenth Amendment frameworks.” State v. Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d 225,

       242, 429 P.3d 467 (2018) (plurality opinion). Our Batson jurisprudence therefore

       does not support modifying Duren in the manner that Rivers proposes.

             This is not to say that Rivers’s concerns about jury diversity in King County

       and across Washington are unfounded or trivial. Rivers identifies a number of

       systemic barriers that contribute to persistent and troubling underrepresentation in

       Washington jury pools and petit juries. These include, among other things, low juror

       pay, work obligations, lack of family care, and lack of transportation. See COLLINS

       & GIALOPSOS, supra, at 31-33. We know these socioeconomic barriers to jury

       service disproportionately impact BIPOC communities and operate to produce less

       diverse and more homogenous juries. See JURY DIVERSITY TASK FORCE, MINORITY

       &      JUST.     COMM’N,        2019      INTERIM      REPORT       2-3      (2019),

       https://www.courts.wa.gov/subsite/mjc/docs/Jury%20Diversity%20Task%20Force

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       %20Interim%20Report.pdf (“lower income and minority populations are

       disproportionally affected by the financial hardships of jury service” and “are

       disproportionately likely to seek economic hardship excusals”). And we know that

       structural racism contributes to juror underrepresentation in other ways, too. For

       example, BIPOC people are incarcerated at disproportionately high rates and for

       longer periods of time than non-BIPOC people. RSCH. WORKING GRP., TASK FORCE

       2.0, RACE AND WASHINGTON’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 2021 REPORT TO THE

       WASHINGTON              SUPREME               COURT           17-21           (2021),

       https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context

       =korematsu_center. This translates to a disproportionately small population of jury-

       eligible BIPOC individuals from which to summon potential jurors.

             A lack of jury diversity results from many systemic contributors and, as a

       result, any effective approach to the problem requires multifaceted solutions.

       Adversarial litigation and appellate review certainly provide one avenue to effect

       change, but within limitations. Our role here, sitting as a court in review, is not to

       decide the best method for optimizing jury diversity or juror participation generally.

       These policy questions are best answered through legislative action or the judiciary’s

       formal rule-making process, as with GR 37 in the Batson context.

             Still, we emphasize the critical importance of jury diversity and the urgent

       need to promote juror participation and representation statewide. It is beyond

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       dispute that “[f]ully representational jury pools and fairly selected juries are required

       . . . to make our trials fair, our judgments legitimate, and our democracy inclusive.”

       Rocha v. King County, 195 Wn.2d 412, 438, 460 P.3d 624 (2020) (González, J.,

       dissenting). Indeed, research shows that diverse juries spend more time deliberating,

       engage in more thorough and detailed deliberations, are more willing to discuss

       racial bias, and make fewer factual errors. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity

       and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on

       Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 597, 606-08 (2006)

       [https://perma.cc/29WP-SL7U]. Conversely, “[w]hen any large and identifiable

       segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove

       from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the

       range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.” Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,

       503, 92 S. Ct. 2163, 33 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1972) (Marshall, J.) (plurality opinion). Our

       holding today does not foreclose the judiciary or the legislature from taking new and

       different steps toward eradicating systemic barriers to jury service in order to

       maximize jury diversity in Washington. We acknowledge the legislature’s efforts

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       on this front to date, 7 but we recognize that more can and must be done. 8 See, e.g.,

       JURY DIVERSITY TASK FORCE, supra, at 3-7 (making formal recommendations for

       improving jury diversity in Washington).

       7
          Most recently, the 2023 legislature enacted Second Substitute Senate Bill (SSSB) 5128,
       which addresses juror participation and representation in several ways. Notably, SSSB
       5128 directs the administrative office of the courts to “provide all courts with a method to
       collect data on a juror’s race, ethnicity, age, sex, employment status, educational
       attainment, and income, as well as any other data approved by order of the chief justice of
       the Washington state supreme court.” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 316, § 1. SSSB 5128 also
       permits courts to issue juror summons electronically by e-mail and directs the
       administrative office of the courts to “establish a work group to make recommendations
       for the creation of a child care assistance program for individuals reporting for jury
       service.” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 316, §§ 2-4.
       8
         One available solution, which we have previously discussed in detail, is higher juror pay.
       See Rocha, 195 Wn.2d at 431 (concluding jurors are not employees entitled to minimum
       wage under the Minimum Wage Act or otherwise but noting that “low juror reimbursement
       is a serious issue that has contributed to poor juror summons response rates”); see also id.
       at 433 (Yu, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“All too often inadequate juror
       compensation is a barrier to jury service that disproportionately impacts low income and
       minority populations. I would hold that the system is exclusory, but the remedy for this
       exclusion lies with the legislature, not with the courts.” (emphasis added)); id. at 440
       (González, J., dissenting) (concluding the court should imply a cause of action for higher
       juror pay because King County’s “low pay and low reimbursement rate amounts to an
       exclusion on the basis of economic status, denying such jurors the opportunity to serve as
       promised in RCW 2.36.080(1)”). RCW 2.36.150 directs Washington counties to
       compensate jurors through expense payments ranging between $10 and $25 per day of
       service, plus mileage reimbursement. King County, like many other counties, has chosen
       to pay jurors the statutory minimum of just $10 per day. Rocha, 195 Wn.2d at 417. King
       County’s present $10 daily rate is no different than it was in 1959—over 60 years ago.
       See LAWS OF 1959, ch. 73, § 1. This token $10 rate plus a modest travel reimbursement
       does not meaningfully compensate jurors for a day of missed work in 2023 and beyond.
       Such low juror pay imposes a significant financial barrier that keeps many low-income and
       BIPOC citizens out of King County jury pools. Accordingly, the Minority and Justice
       Commission Jury Diversity Task Force has offered policy recommendations to increase
       juror pay statewide and to explore the feasibility of tax credits or deductions for jury
       service. See JURY DIVERSITY TASK FORCE, supra, at 4.

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          C. Rivers Does Not Establish a Fair Cross Section Violation under Duren

             Turning to the merits of Rivers’s fair cross section claim, we adhere to our

       precedent and apply the three-part test set forth in Duren. Rivers bears the burden

       of proving that his jury selection system is unconstitutional and warrants a new trial.

       Hilliard, 89 Wn.2d at 440. Under the Duren test, he must show (1) a distinctive

       group (2) is unreasonably underrepresented on venires generally and on his own

       venire, and (3) this underrepresentation is the result of systematic exclusion. Duren,

       439 U.S. at 364, 366. When a defendant makes a prima facie showing of a fair cross

       section violation under Duren, the burden shifts to the State to justify the

       infringement by demonstrating that attainment of a fair cross section is incompatible

       with a significant state interest. Id. at 367-68.

             Rivers easily meets Duren’s first element. Black people form a distinctive

       group for Duren purposes. Yates, 177 Wn.2d at 20. This case, like most, turns on

       Duren’s second and third elements: underrepresentation and systematic exclusion.

             With respect to Duren’s second requirement, we take this opportunity to

       clarify that Washington courts are not confined to any one statistical method of

       measuring underrepresentation. We decline to adopt any particular methodology as

       constitutionally mandated and instead endorse a flexible approach because different

       factual scenarios will require different statistical methods. We hold that Washington

       courts may use one or more statistical models, including but not limited to absolute

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       and comparative disparity, as the circumstances may warrant. Washington courts

       must also consider statistics in light of the real people they purportedly represent.

       For example, the Ninth Circuit embraces both absolute and comparative disparity

       measures while requiring a showing of

             not only statistical significance, but also legal significance. The results
             of any statistical method must be examined in the context of the likely,
             actual, “real life” impact on the jury pool at issue. As we have observed
             in earlier cases, “we look to people not percentages.”

       Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d at 1165 (quoting United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d

       1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1977)). If a statistical analysis shows underrepresentation, but

       the disparity “does not substantially affect the representation of the group in the

       actual jury pool, then the underrepresentation does not have legal significance in the

       fair cross-section context.” Id. This approach strikes the appropriate balance and

       we adopt it here, recognizing that statistics can be helpful but only when understood

       in light of the actual people and groups they measure.

             However, we do not reach the question of underrepresentation in this case

       because Rivers does not meet Duren’s third element, systematic exclusion.

       Systematic exclusion means underrepresentation of the distinctive group is “inherent

       in the particular jury-selection process utilized.” Duren, 439 U.S. at 366. Rivers

       offers two theories of systematic exclusion. First, he argues that low juror response

       rates combined with King County’s summons practices produce an “oversampling”

       of predominantly white zip codes and an “undersampling” of more diverse zip codes.

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       Framing exclusion in this way does not satisfy Duren, as low juror response rates

       may be due to systemic or other nonsystematic factors external to the county’s

       summons procedures.

             Rivers next claims that King County’s summons procedures are exclusionary

       because the county chose to divide itself into two demographically disparate jury

       districts: Seattle and Kent. He argues the Seattle-Kent divide constitutes systematic

       exclusion because, as a result of historically racist housing policies, King County’s

       Black population is more heavily concentrated in the Kent jury assignment area.

       This means fewer Black residents are summoned for jury service in the Seattle jury

       assignment area and, consequently, Seattle juries are less diverse than Kent juries.

       The State responds that the Seattle-Kent divide was created in an effort to promote

       jury participation and diversity by eliminating long travel distances. As noted, the

       legislature enacted RCW 2.36.055 in response to evidence showing that “distance to

       the courthouse had a disproportionate impact on poor and minority jurors, making

       juries overall less representative of King County.” Lanciloti, 165 Wn.2d at 664.

             Rivers’s argument about the geographic subdivision of King County could

       establish a form of systematic exclusion under Duren, but he has failed to prove this

       argument with evidence.      Although racial demographics combined with jury

       districting “might contribute to a group’s underrepresentation,” there must be proof

       of causation. See Smith, 559 U.S. at 330-32 (a Kent County, Michigan jury

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       assignment order allegedly “siphoned” Black jurors from the racially diverse city of

       Grand Rapids to district courts located in less diverse regions of the county and, in

       theory, systematically excluded such jurors from service in Grand Rapids, but

       defendant failed to prove this theory with evidence). Professor Beckett’s data shows

       that during a 20-day period, the prospective Kent jury pool was 5.33 percent Black

       while Seattle’s was 2.29 percent Black. 9 CP at 74, 115. However, this data does not

       reveal “‘how the alleged siphoning of [Black] jurors . . . affected the . . . jury pool.’”

       Smith, 559 U.S. at 325 (quoting Smith, 463 Mich. at 205). In particular, Rivers does

       not offer data predating the geographic divide to establish a baseline for assessing

       how separate jury districts have impacted jury diversity in King County. It is

       possible that eliminating long travel distances by summoning jurors to their nearest

       courthouse actually increased BIPOC participation and representation in the jury

       9
          We note that Professor Beckett’s data does not provide a complete picture of juror
       demographics in King County given that she performed this study over a 20-day period in
       2015, reached only a 73.6 percent response rate, and did not record the race of those who
       declined to take the survey. We also acknowledge the serious lack of available data
       concerning jury diversity in Washington, as well as the substantial barrier that this lack of
       data creates for defendants seeking to prove a fair cross section violation. The Minority
       and Justice Commission Jury Diversity Task Force has “unanimously agreed on the
       importance of collecting jury demographic data and recommends the permanent statewide
       implementation of a system to collect juror demographics.” JURY DIVERSITY TASK
       FORCE, supra, at 6. Commendably, the enactment of SSSB 5128 represents an important
       first step in implementing this recommendation, directing a system for collecting juror
       demographic data. Supra n.5 (quoting LAWS OF 2023, ch. 316, § 1). This centralized data
       collection system will not only aid criminal defendants in the context of fair cross section
       claims but is crucial to “help the state monitor whether and to what extent each [of the Task
       Force’s] proposed [solutions] affect[] minority juror participation.” JURY DIVERSITY
       TASK FORCE, supra, at 6.

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       system, as intended. Without predivide data, it is difficult to know whether the

       divide has produced systematic exclusion rather than inclusion, whether there is an

       offset, or what other consequences flow from the decision to subdivide the areas. A

       showing of statistical disparity over a short period in 2015, on its own, is insufficient

       under Smith, 559 U.S. 314, and does not persuade us that the decision to divide King

       County into Seattle and Kent jury districts has produced systematic exclusion within

       the meaning of Duren.

             Rivers has not substantiated his theory of systematic exclusion with evidence

       as required by Duren, and for this reason we hold Rivers fails to establish a fair cross

       section violation.

             II.    Rivers’s Remaining Claims Do Not Warrant a New Trial, Though He
                    Is Entitled to Resentencing
             Beyond his fair cross section claim, Rivers seeks a new trial due to (1) the trial

       court’s admission of expert testimony from an experienced Harborview nurse

       regarding the correlation between strangulation and memory loss and (2) the trial

       court’s decision not to answer a written question from the jury regarding the mens

       rea of assault by suffocation and to instead refer the jury to its instructions. We hold

       that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on either occasion. However, Rivers

       argues and the State does not dispute that he is entitled to resentencing as a result of

       recent legislative amendments. We agree and remand to the trial court for a new

       sentencing hearing.

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

          A. The Trial Court Acted within Its Discretion in Qualifying a Nurse Witness as
             an Expert on the Relationship between Strangulation and Memory Loss
             Rivers claims the trial court erred in permitting expert testimony by a SANE,

       Theresa Stewart, on the correlation between strangulation and memory loss.

       Specifically, Rivers alleges Stewart lacked training as a psychologist,

       neurobiologist, or neuroscientist; that she had not researched the connection between

       strangulation and memory loss; and that her experience on this subject was limited

       to anecdotal observations and a single training video. According to Rivers, the

       testimony was beyond Stewart’s area of expertise and therefore not helpful to the

       jury’s understanding of the evidence.

             We review the admission of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. State v.

       Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 856, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). Reversal is warranted only where

       “no reasonable person would have decided the matter as the trial court did.” Id. The

       evidence rules permit expert testimony “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized

       knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a

       fact in issue.” ER 702. An expert may be qualified based on “knowledge, skill,

       experience, training, or education.” Id. It is well established that an expert may be

       qualified by experience alone. Johnston-Forbes v. Matsunaga, 181 Wn.2d 346, 355,

       333 P.3d 388 (2014) (quoting In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 38, 283 P.3d

       546 (2012) (no abuse of discretion where trial court permitted expert testimony on

       topic of child abduction by attorney who worked in the field of child abduction for

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       17 years)). “‘The witness need not possess the academic credentials of an expert;

       practical experience may suffice.’” Harris v. Robert C. Groth, MD, Inc., 99 Wn.2d

       438, 449, 663 P.2d 113 (1983) (quoting 5A KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON

       PRACTICE: EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 289 (2d ed. 1982)).

             The trial court sustainably qualified Stewart as an expert on the correlation

       between strangulation and memory loss. Stewart obtained her bachelor of science

       in nursing in 1989. In 2002, she completed a 40-hour didactic SANE training to

       become a forensic nurse. At the time of trial, Stewart had worked as a nurse

       examiner at Harborview Medical Center for 17 years. She has seen over 500 patients

       for sexual assault exams and estimates that approximately 15 percent of all sexual

       assault victims report strangulation.          Stewart has performed strangulation

       examinations on both sexual assault and domestic violence patients in the course of

       her work at Harborview. Stewart occasionally performs forensic examinations

       specifically related to strangulation. When Stewart evaluates patients, the first thing

       she does is obtain a patient history of “as much as they’re able to remember about

       what’s happened to help guide the exam and the care” provided to the patient. 2

       VRP at 735. Stewart also regularly attends trainings and conferences on sexual

       assault strangulation, pattern injuries, neurobiology, and related topics. She has

       trained other nurse examiners, law enforcement, prosecutors, and advocates on the

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       topic of sexual assault strangulation. She has been qualified as an expert and testified

       in court on the topic of strangulation approximately 20 times.

             We cannot say that no reasonable person would have ruled as the trial court

       did here. Based on her experience and training, Stewart was qualified to render her

       expert opinion that memory loss is a symptom of strangulation. That Stewart lacked

       academic credentials on this particular subject goes to the weight of her testimony,

       not admissibility. See State v. Flett, 40 Wn. App. 277, 285, 699 P.2d 774 (1985)

       (“[O]nce basic requisite qualifications are established, any deficiencies in an

       expert’s qualifications go to weight, rather than admissibility of testimony.”). The

       record does indicate, as Rivers points out, that many of the trainings on strangulation

       that Stewart has either attended or planned recycle the same training video created

       by Dr. Rebecca Campbell, a neurobiologist who studies the effects of trauma. This,

       too, goes to the weight of Stewart’s testimony, not admissibility. Moreover, the

       testimony was helpful to the trier of fact because it established that strangulation

       could have contributed to Power’s memory loss from the evening of the alleged

       assault. The trial court acted well within its discretion in permitting Stewart’s expert

       opinion on this topic.

          B. The Trial Court Acted within Its Discretion in Declining To Answer the Jury’s
             Written Question

             Next, Rivers claims he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court declined

       to answer a question from the deliberating jury concerning the mens rea for assault

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       by suffocation. According to Rivers, the trial court was obligated to answer this

       question because it demonstrated the jury’s confusion over the intent required to

       convict him of assault. The court’s refusal to answer, he claims, relieved the

       prosecution of its burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a

       reasonable doubt. We disagree.

             We review a trial court’s decision of how best to respond to a deliberating

       jury’s question for abuse of discretion. State v. Becklin, 163 Wn.2d 519, 529-30,

       182 P.3d 944 (2008). Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instruction. State v.

       Weaver, 198 Wn.2d 459, 467, 496 P.3d 1183 (2021). We presume they read the

       instructions as a whole to discern the relevant legal standard. Id. A single jury

       question “does not create an inference that the entire jury was confused, or that any

       confusion was not clarified before a final verdict was reached.” State v. Ng, 110

       Wn.2d 32, 43, 750 P.2d 632 (1988) (no abuse of discretion where trial court declined

       to answer jury question because instructions already answered that question).

             There was no abuse of discretion here. It is undisputed that the jury’s

       instructions reflected an accurate statement of the law. Instruction No. 14 defined

       suffocation and expressly stated that it requires a person act with intent to block

       another’s ability to breathe. The trial court acted reasonably when it declined to

       answer a question involving hypothetical facts about death by suffocation and

       instead referred the jury to the instructions already given, which contained an answer

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       to the jury’s question. The instructions were legally correct, and we presume the

       jury followed them. Weaver, 198 Wn.2d at 467.

             Rivers cites three primary cases in support of his argument, but each is readily

       distinguishable. In State v. Sanjurjo-Bloom, the trial court erred by admitting

       character evidence without a limiting instruction. 16 Wn. App. 2d 120, 127-28, 479

       P.3d 1195 (2021). When the jury asked a question indicating it was considering this

       evidence for improper propensity purposes, the court “compounded” the existing

       error by failing to correct the jury’s misunderstanding. Id. The Court of Appeals

       reversed not because the lower court declined to answer a jury question, but because

       the court permitted the jury to consider improper propensity evidence. Id. at 129-

       30. In Rivers’s case, however, there was no existing evidentiary error the court was

       obligated to correct.

             In State v. Campbell, one of the jury’s instructions did not accurately inform

       the jury of the law. 163 Wn. App. 394, 401, 260 P.3d 235 (2011). When read as a

       whole, the instructions did not cure the deficiency. Id. “This error was compounded

       when, in response to the jury’s question, the trial court referred the jurors back to the

       instructions already given rather than clarifying the applicable law.” Id. at 401-02.

       Unlike Campbell, the jury instructions here correctly stated the law on assault,

       including the element of intent, and the trial court did not compound an existing error

       by declining to answer the jury’s question.

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

             In State v. Backemeyer, the jury asked multiple questions indicating it did not

       understand the law of self-defense. 5 Wn. App. 2d 841, 849, 428 P.3d 366 (2018).

       The issue on appeal was not whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining

       to answer the jury’s questions, but whether defense counsel performed deficiently in

       repeatedly agreeing to tell the jury to simply refer to its instructions. Id. (holding

       defense counsel performed deficiently because he “had no legitimate strategy” in

       answering the jury’s questions). Courts are particularly sedulous in ensuring that

       the standard for self-defense be manifestly clear to the jury, so the court

       appropriately found deficient performance by counsel in Backemeyer in light of the

       jury’s obvious confusion. But that case does not compel the result that Rivers seeks

       here because he has not shown juror confusion on the elements of assault and he

       makes no claim that trial counsel performed deficiently.

             In sum, the trial court acted well within its discretion when it responded to the

       jury’s question by referring the jury to its instructions, which reflected an accurate

       statement of the law.

          C. Rivers Is Entitled to Resentencing

             Although Rivers’s other claims fail, he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.

       Under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act, persistent offenders are sentenced

       to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.        RCW 9.94A.570.        A

       “persistent offender” is one who has been convicted of three or more felonies

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       constituting “most serious offense[s].” RCW 9.94A.030(37)(a). In 2019, the

       legislature amended the categories of crimes constituting most serious offenses.

       After Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5288, second degree robbery no longer

       qualifies as a most serious offense. LAWS OF 2019, ch. 187, § 1 (amending RCW

       9.94A.030(33)). In 2021, the legislature passed Engrossed Senate Bill 5164, which

       provides that defendants “must have a resentencing hearing if a current or past

       conviction for robbery in the second degree was used as a basis for the finding that

       the offender was a persistent offender.” LAWS OF 2021, ch. 141, § 1 (effective July

       25, 2021), codified as RCW 9.94A.647.

             Rivers is entitled to resentencing under the amended statutes.        He was

       sentenced in 2020 to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under the

       Persistent Offender Accountability Act. This sentence was based in part on his two

       prior convictions for second degree robbery. Rivers therefore must receive a

       resentencing hearing because his “past conviction[s] for robbery in the second

       degree” served as the basis for his sentence as a persistent offender.         RCW

       9.94A.647.

                                         CONCLUSION

             We affirm Rivers’s convictions and remand for a resentencing hearing. We

       decline to adopt Rivers’s proposed state constitutional tests and instead analyze his

       fair cross section claim under the existing Duren test. Applying that test here, we

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        State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4

       conclude Rivers fails to establish systematic exclusion and therefore has not carried

       his burden of demonstrating a constitutional violation. In addition, we hold that the

       trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in permitting Ms. Stewart’s expert

       testimony on the correlation between strangulation and memory loss and in

       answering the jury’s question regarding assault by suffocation by referring the jury

       to its instructions. While Rivers is not entitled to a new trial, we vacate his sentence

       and remand for resentencing because RCW 9.94A.647 no longer allows a persistent

       offender life sentence based on prior second degree robbery convictions.

                                                         ____________________________

       WE CONCUR:

       ___________________________                       ____________________________

       ____________________________                      ____________________________

       ____________________________                      ____________________________

       ____________________________                      ____________________________

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                                           No. 100922-4

             GONZÁLEZ, C.J. (concurring) — Those charged with a crime have a right to

       be tried before a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Taylor v.

       Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975). A fair cross

       section of the community on venires, panels, or lists from which juries are drawn

       “is essential to the fulfillment of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial

       jury trial in criminal prosecutions.” Id. at 526; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It also

       “preserv[es] ‘public confidence in the fairness of [our] criminal justice system.’”

       Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137

       (1986) (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31).

              Long-standing precedent puts the burden on the defendant to show that the

       pool of potential jurors does not represent a fair cross section of the community.

       While this accords with the regular course of judicial review, the truth is that the

       defendant does not have access to the information that would allow them to meet

       that burden. Whether the jury pool in fact represents a fair cross section of the

       community is a matter courts have all too often taken on faith, often in the face of

       considerable reasons to think otherwise. When a defendant cannot meaningfully
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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

       challenge the cross section from which their jury panel is drawn it undermines both

       the fairness of the process and public confidence.

              As the majority properly acknowledges, jury pools have historically not been

       drawn from that fair cross section. Justice demands more than we have done.

       Under the impossible burden established by Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.

       Ct. 664, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979), the controlling federal precedent, Paul Rivers has

       not established that he is entitled to relief. Nor has he done the work to establish a

       right to a different result under our state constitution. Accordingly, I reluctantly

       concur with the majority.

              I write separately to express my deep concern with the unworkable legal

       framework set forth in Duren and the inadequate steps we have taken to make our

       jury pools represent a fair cross section of our communities. Duren has failed and

       we have failed. We—judges, court clerks, and the legislature—must do more.

              I.     APPLICATION OF DUREN STANDARD

              Duren articulated a three-pronged test for fair cross section challenges.

       When a defendant raises a fair cross section challenge, they must make a prima

       facie showing:

              (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the
              community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from
              which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the
              number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
              underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
              jury-selection process.
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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

       Id. at 364. The defendant is not required to show intentional or purposeful

       discrimination. As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissenting opinion in Duren,

       “under equal protection analysis prima facie challenges are rebuttable by proof of

       absence of intent to discriminate, while under Sixth Amendment analysis intent is

       irrelevant.” Id. at 371. Once the defendant has made this prima facie showing, the

       burden shifts to the State to justify the infringement “by showing attainment of a

       fair cross section to be incompatible with a significant state interest.” Id. at 368

       (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 533-35).

              Duren had challenged a state law that exempted women from jury service

       upon their request. Id. at 360. Near the time of Duren’s trial, women represented

       approximately 54 percent of the population eligible for jury service but only 26.7

       percent of those summoned and 14.5 percent of those on venires. Id. at 362-63,

       367.

              The Court rejected the State’s argument that Duren failed to show the

       exemption of women on request had “‘any effect’ on or was responsible for the

       underrepresentation of women on venires.” Id. at 368. The Court held Duren had

       made a “prima facie showing of an infringement” of his fair cross section right. Id.

       at 368. In essence, the Duren Court did not require a stringent showing of

       causation to meet the systematic exclusion prong. See Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong

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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

       About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-Section Guarantee by

       Confusing It with Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 163 (2012).

              The Court arguably required a more particularized showing of the cause of

       the disparity in Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 176 L. Ed. 2d

       249 (2010). There, Smith challenged Kent County’s jury assignment order that

       assigned jurors first to district courts then to circuit courts. The city of Grand

       Rapids made up 37 percent of Kent County, and Black residents made up 85

       percent of Grand Rapids. Id. at 322. Smith alleged that the order siphoned Black

       jurors from the circuit court to the district court, resulting in an underrepresentation

       of Black jurors in the circuit court where his trial was held. He provided evidence

       showing a drop in the comparative underrepresentation of Black jurors from 18.0

       percent to 15.1 percent after the order was discontinued, but the court concluded

       that Smith failed to show that the order caused the underrepresentation. Id. at 331.

       In my view, the constitutional guaranty to a fair cross section should not be so

       constrained.

              Nevertheless, our court has followed federal courts and repeatedly applied

       this strict reading of Duren in consistently rejecting fair cross section claims. See

       In re Pers. Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 20-23, 296 P.3d 872 (2013); State v.

       Cienfuegos, 144 Wn.2d 222, 232, 25 P.3d 1011 (2001); In re Pers Restraint of

       Lord, 123 Wn.2d 296, 312, 868 P.2d 835 (1994); State v. Rupe, 108 Wn.2d 734,

                                                      4
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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

       747-48, 743 P.2d 210 (1987); see also David M. Coriell, An (Un)fair Cross

       Section: How the Application of Duren Undermines the Jury, 100 CORNELL L.

       REV. 463, 465 (2015) (concluding that a strict reading of Duren places “a high bar

       [on the defendant] that often renders the fair cross section guarantee illusory”)

       Today, we add Rivers to this unpleasant legacy of fair cross section claims.

              Rivers contends that King County Superior Court’s procedure of dividing its

       jury source list into two assignment areas systematically excludes Black panel

       members from the “Seattle Jury Assignment Area.” His contention is supported by

       a report by Professor Katherine Beckett, albeit a report that was limited by

       considerable constraints. Dr. Beckett analyzed (1) juror summons information for

       each zip code in King County and the separate assignment areas for the year of

       2015, aggregated with the latest United States census data, and (2) juror survey

       responses conducted in both the Seattle and Kent courthouses from January to

       April 2015. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 111-13. This data showed that only 4 percent

       of eligible jurors in the Seattle Jury Assignment Area were Black, whereas more

       than 8 percent of the “Kent Jury Assignment Area” were Black. CP at 113. The

       numbers are even more concerning when we consider that only 2 percent of jurors

       who showed up for jury duty in the Seattle Jury Assignment Area were Black. Id.

       But without equally powerful analysis comparing the disproportionality of the jury

       pools that would exist without the assignment areas, I am constrained to agree with

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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

       the majority that under Duren, this is insufficient to demonstrate systematic

       exclusion. See majority at 36. However, it strongly suggests we need to do better.

              II.    BURDEN UNDER DUREN

              The majority suggests that Rivers could have made a prima facie showing by

       providing juror data predating the adoption of King County Superior Court’s Local

       General Rule (LGR) 18 to test if the rule had operated as intended and, if not,

       whether it systematically excluded Black jurors. Id. LGR 18 was adopted after

       King County judges observed that the general inverse relationship between the

       distance from the courthouse and the likelihood of appearing in response to a juror

       summons was more pronounced when the juror was lower income or a person of

       color. State v. Lanciloti, 165 Wn.2d 661, 664, 201 P.3d 323 (2009). Whether

       LGR 18 has worked as intended is absolutely something that should be tested. The

       majority suggests this data might have shown “whether the divide has produced

       systematic exclusion rather than inclusion . . . or what other consequences flow

       from the decision to subdivide the areas.” Majority at 36. But it is unrealistic to

       think that this is a showing an individual defendant should be able to make in the

       heat of trial. It illustrates the difficulty defendants face when trying to enforce

       their Sixth Amendment fair cross section right.

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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

                     a. DEFENDANT’S BURDEN AND LACK OF JUROR INFORMATION

              Such an approach to establishing the prima facie case demonstrates the

       nearly impossible burden under Duren today. Defendants depend largely on our

       courts for access to jury information. This information is not complete and cannot

       be easily analyzed. In addition, some courts do not consistently track juror

       demographic information.1 Under our court rules, such information is presumed to

       be private, and, in most cases, requests for this information will be granted by the

       court only upon a showing of good cause and after the conclusion of the trial. GR

       31(j). The record in this case shows that King County does not regularly collect

       data regarding the race of its jurors. CP at 159. However, to mount a successful

       fair cross section challenge, defendants “need the government’s data about the race

       of potential jurors . . . [and] access to the operation of the system to understand the

       source of the disparity.” Nina W. Chernoff, No Records, No Right: Discovery &

       the Fair Cross-Section Guarantee, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1719, 1734-35 (2016). An

       inability to access such information can be fatal to Sixth Amendment fair cross

       section claims.

       1
         See JURY DIVERSITY TASK FORCE, MINORITY & JUST. COMM’N, 2019 INTERIM REPORT 6 n.7
       (2019), https://www.courts.wa.gov/subsite/mjc/docs/Jury%20Diversity%20Task%20Force%20
       Interim%20Report.pdf (citing N.Y. JUD. LAW § 528) (concluding that New York is the only state
       collecting juror demographics and recommending that juror demographic data be collected on a
       permanent statewide basis in Washington State).

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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

              This was illustrated in Cienfuegos, 144 Wn.2d 222, and State v. Lopez-

       Ramirez, No. 75546-3-I (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2018) (unpublished),

       https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/755463.PDF. On appeal, Cienfuegos

       argued that he was prevented from making a prima facie showing of a fair cross

       section violation because he did not have access to racial demographics about the

       potential jurors—either by the trial court’s refusal to provide him the jury list so he

       could contact the jurors to determine their race for purposes of his appeal or by the

       compilation of the jury list itself because it does not collect information about the

       juror’s race. Cienfuegos, 144 Wn.2d at 232. There, the court concluded that his

       bare allegations that the jury list was not representative of the community was not

       sufficient enough to bring the issue into play. We held that Cienfuegos did not

       meet the requisite prima facie showing. Id.

              In Lopez-Ramirez, the defendant moved for a jury drawn from a fair cross

       section of the community before trial, arguing that Black residents in King County

       were underrepresented in jury venires. He requested access to demographic

       information on potential jurors in the jury assembly room, but the trial judge

       declined to provide such information. Lopez-Ramirez, No. 75546-3-I, slip op. at 8-

       9. Similar to Rivers, Lopez-Ramirez relied on the same report from Professor

       Beckett. The Court of Appeals held that Lopez-Ramirez failed to meet his burden

       under Duren. Id. at 13.

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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

              The “cross-section requirement [is] without meaning if a defendant [is]

       denied all means of discovery in an effort to assert that right.” State ex. rel.

       Garrett v. Saitz, 594 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Mo. 1980). The Iowa Supreme Court

       recognized this in State v. Plain, where it held that the defendant could not make

       his prima facie case because he was denied access to historical data regarding jury

       information to which he was entitled. 898 N.W.2d 801, 828, 836-37 (Waterman, J.,

       concurring specially) (Iowa 2017). 2 The New Jersey courts have taken great

       strides toward making the promise of a fair cross section meaningful in the wake of

       State v. Andujar, 247 N.J. 275, 254 A.3d 606 (2021). See N.J. CTS., JURY

       SELECTION UPDATES: (1) STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS BIAS; (2) AMENDMENTS TO

       COURT RULES; AND (3) NEW RULE 1:8-3A (Aug. 2022),

       https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/attorneys/jury-

       reforms/statewidejuryreforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9ZZ-9E6A]. I applaud the

       legislature for taking a substantial step toward making the promise of a fair cross

       section meaningful. See, e.g., LAWS OF 2023, ch. 316. But more is required.

                      b. STATE’S BURDEN TO JUSTIFY INFRINGEMENT

              Even under the existing inadequate Duren test, I am concerned that putting

       the burden on the defendant to show a difference before and after adoption of LGR

       2
         Plain also discusses several jurisdictions that have established that the Constitution requires
       that defendants have access to juror information in order to enforce their Sixth Amendment fair
       cross section right. 898 N.W.2d at 828.
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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

       18 makes rebutting the State’s justification part of the prima facie case. It also

       confuses the State’s burden in a fair cross section challenge under the Sixth

       Amendment—to show that attaining a fair cross section is incompatible with some

       significant state interest—with its burden in an equal protection challenge. Once a

       defendant makes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under the equal

       protection clause, the State bears the burden of showing there is no intentional

       discrimination. No such showing of intent is required under the Sixth Amendment.

       Duren, 439 U.S. at 368. Once the defendant shows systematic exclusion exists, the

       only remaining question is whether the infringement on defendant’s right is

       justified. See id. at 368 n.26.

              The State seems to suggest that since its intentions are good and the rule

       rational, the Sixth Amendment has not been violated. Br. of Resp’t at 38. That is

       not sufficient as “‘[t]he right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely

       rational grounds.’” Duren, 439 U.S. at 367 (alteration in original) (quoting Taylor,

       419 U.S. at 534). The State must provide proof. See also Smith, 559 U.S. at 332-

       33 (explaining that when the State argued that the exemption complained of did not

       cause the systematic exclusion, the State must demonstrate how the other

       exemptions, that would justify failure to achieve a fair cross section, are the cause

       of the systematic exclusion).

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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

              III.   ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO A FAIR CROSS SECTION

              Our state has made considerable efforts over the years to make our juries

       more reflective of the community. I commend the ongoing work of stakeholders to

       find and fund ways to track and increase juror participation. However, the lack of

       diverse juries in our criminal justice system still persists. Therefore, it is important

       that a defendant be able to enforce their Sixth Amendment cross section right with

       access to appropriate juror demographic information essential to making a prima

       facie case of systematic exclusion. See Letter from Wash. State Sup. Ct. to

       Members of Judiciary & Legal Cmty. 1 (June 4, 2020),

       https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/Ju

       diciary%20Legal%20Community%20SIGNED%20060420.pdf

       [https://perma.cc/QNT4-H5P7] (“[W]e must recognize the harms that are caused

       when meritorious claims go unaddressed due to systemic inequities.”)

              We should hold ourselves accountable and scrutinize our own court rules

       and procedures that govern the jury selection process and access to juror records to

       amend or craft such rules to reflect what we have learned about the shortcomings

       of Duren. See GR 31(j) (allowing defendants access to limited juror information

       upon a showing of good cause and only after the conclusion of the trial); GR 18(b)

       (requiring that jury source lists include only the juror’s name, date of birth, gender,

       mailing and residential address).

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       State v. Rivers, No. 100922-4 (González, C.J., concurring)

              Our state legislature should also consider how Congress has responded to the

       challenge that defendants face in obtaining information to support such claims in

       the federal courts. See Garrett, 594 S.W.2d at 608. Federal law commands that

       courts preserve all jury records and papers for “public inspection for the purpose of

       determining the validity of the selection of any jury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1868; see also

       28 U.S.C. § 1867 (allowing defendants to present such records as evidence in

       challenging the jury selection process).

              I concur with the majority that under existing law and based on the factual

       showing made, Rivers is not entitled to relief. But his case starkly points out how

       jury pools in this state do not resemble the people of this state. Now that we know

       better, we must do better.

              With these observations, I concur with the majority.

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