Court Opinion

ID: 9528139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:37:40.404794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:32.251292
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice,
dissenting in part.
Since I am of the view that there are material questions of fact as to whether or not White and Jones breached the duty of representation owed to Van Horn, and as to the time at which the applicable tort statute of limitations commenced to run on Van Horn’s claims against White and Jones, I would not affirm the superior court’s grant of summary judgment.
White and Jones owed their client Van Horn a duty to take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to its rights when they withdrew from an extremely complex case three days before the consolidated complaint was scheduled to be filed. *645See Alaska Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-110.1 I do not think that the record contains evidence sufficient to support a holding that there was no material question of fact as to whether White and Jones had fulfilled their duty of representation to Van Horn.2 Because the superior court disposed of the case by holding that Van Horn’s action was time-barred under AS 09.10.070,3 it did not consider that issue, Since I would not affirm the summary judgment on the merits, as the majority does, I find it necessary to address the question of the effect of AS 09.10.070 upon Van Horn’s ability to maintain this action, We have not previously determined when *646the statute of limitations begins to run as to a malpractice action against an attorney. Van Horn urges the adoption of a “discovery” rule — namely, that the statute does not begin to run until the aggrieved client discovers the damage caused by the attorney’s negligence. In support of this contention, Van Horn relies upon the California Supreme Court’s adoption of this rule in Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal.3d 176, 98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 844-46, 491 P.2d 421, 428-30 (Cal.1971).4 White and Jones suggests that the statute begins to run either when the damage has been suffered, see Austin v. Fulton Insurance Co., 444 P.2d 536, 539 (Alaska 1968), or when the attorney-client relationship has ended.5
Because of the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, I think the last proposed starting point for the statute (at the termination of the attorney-client relationship) is inappropriate. If we were to adopt a “discovery” standard for the beginning of the statutory period, that standard would require damage to have been suffered before the statute begins to run.6 Thus, regardless of whether we were to adopt the “damage” rule or the “discovery” rule, it would be essential to make a determination as to when Van Horn sustained damage.
In Austin v. Fulton Insurance Co., 444 P.2d at 539, we noted that “[t]he statute of limitation as to torts does not usually begin to run until the tort is complete.” See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, Comment c (1979). On February 11, 1976, the superior court announced it would impose sanctions on Van Horn for its failure to file the consolidated complaint on time, noting that the delay had been caused by the late withdrawal of White and Jones. These “sanctions” were apparently stated in the alternative; and the record does not indicate whether the nature of the sanction ultimately imposed was first determined on February 19, when the superior court issued its written order, or at some time prior to that date. I do not believe that the tort alleged to have been committed by White and Jones can be said to have been complete until the nature of the sanction imposed on Van Horn was established. Since the record on appeal does not contain information sufficient to allow a determination of the time at which that occurred, I would remand for a determination of the date on which Van Horn was initially damaged as a result of the conduct of its attorneys.7 If *647Van Horn was first damaged on or after February 14, 1976, then its malpractice complaint against White and Jones was timely under both the “damage” rule and the “discovery” rule.
I concur in the court’s holding that Van Horn’s claim based on the delay by White and Jones in filing an action for forcible entry and detainer was barred by AS 09.10.-070.

.The Alaska Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-110(A)(2), provides:
In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules.
Further, EC 2-32 provides:
A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the basis of compelling circumstances, and in a matter pending before a tribunal he must comply with the rules of the tribunal regarding withdrawal. A lawyer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavoring to minimize the possible adverse effect on the rights of his client and the possibility of prejudice to his client as a result of his withdrawal. Even when he justifiably withdraws, a lawyer should protect the welfare of his client by giving due notice of his withdrawal, suggesting employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, cooperating with counsel subsequently employed, and otherwise endeavoring to minimize the possibility of harm. Further, he should refund to the client any compensation not earned during the employment.
DR 2-110(C)(1)(f) permits a lawyer to withdraw because his client “ [deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees.” This permission to withdraw does not constitute permission to disregard the obligations imposed by DR 2-110(A)(2) and EC 2-32.
Although the Code of Professional Responsibility disclaims any attempt to “define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct,” Alaska Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement, I agree with those commentators who have argued that the Code is nonetheless significant to a determination of whether a lawyer has behaved with the degree of care, skill, and prudence demanded of him by the profession. See Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L.Rev. 281 (1979); Thode, Canons 6 and 7: The Lawyer — Client Relationship, 48 Tex.L.Rev. 367 (1970). See also Wood-ruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 101 S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 114 (1980).

. Although the majority holds that White and Jones were not negligent as a matter of law, the following considerations persuade me that there is a question of fact as to White and Jones’ compliance with the standard imposed by DR 2-110:
a. Van "Horn formally consented to the withdrawal on January 20 (Tuesday) and was advised of White and Jones’ desire to withdraw well in advance of that date. However, the consolidated complaint was due on January 23 (Friday) and the trial judge in the original action recognized the fact that it was impractical to expect substitute counsel to meet this deadline. Furthermore, 1 find nothing to indicate that either Van Horn or co-counsel Mr. Keever expected to be responsible for filing the consolidated complaint without the benefit of the services of White and Jones. It seems to me that to take “reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of [their] client,” White and Jones should have either filed the complaint or informed Van Horn or Mr. Keever sooner of their intention not to file the consolidated complaint.
b. I fail to see how the accumulated unpaid fees and costs would justify the untimely withdrawal of White and Jones.
c. While it is true that Van Horn was also represented by co-counsel, Mr. Keever, Van Horn alleges that Keever had not planned to take an active role as co-counsel and that there was a possibility that he would be a material witness at trial.
d. It is irrelevant that the trial court did not require White and Jones to continue with the case. The trial court consented to the withdrawal after the harm from the untimely withdrawal had already occurred, and requiring White and Jones to continue with the case at that time would have served no purpose.

. AS 09.10.070 provides in relevant part:
No person may bring an action (1) for libel, slander, assault, battery, seduction, false imprisonment, or for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising on contract and not specifically provided otherwise .. . unless commenced within two years.

. The “discovery” rule for accrual of legal malpractice actions has recently been adopted by statute in California, Cal. Code of Civ.Pro. § 340.6 (West Supp. 1979); the statute does, however, impose an absolute limit of four years from the date of the wrongful act in addition to the one-year-from-diseovery rule.

. White and Jones rely on Gilbert Properties, Inc. v. Millstein, 33 N.Y.2d 857, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198, 307 N.E.2d 257 (1973), and Keaton Co. v. Kolby, 27 Ohio St.2d 234, 271 N.E.2d 772 (1971), for this approach.
Millstein held that an attorney malpractice action accrues, at the latest, when the attorney-client relationship ends. It relied upon Borgia v. City of New York, 187 N.E.2d 777, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962), a medical malpractice action in which the Court of Appeals considered the deadline for filing an action against the city. The claim had been filed against Kings County Hospital, which had negligently allowed Borgia’s infant son to suffer severe brain damage due to lack of oxygen. Faced with a 90-day limitation on filing claims against the city, the court held that the statute had begun to run at the end of the continuous course of treatment rather than on the date of the negligent acts.
Keaton was decided by analogy to earlier Ohio cases holding that Ohio’s special malpractice statute begins to run in a medical malpractice case no later than the day that the physician-patient relationship ends. The concurring opinion of Corrigan, J., 271 N.E.2d at 775, notes that the discovery rule was not argued to the Ohio court in that case.

. See generally, Note, Legal Malpractice — Is the Discovery Rule the Final Solution?, 24 Hastings L.J. 795 (1973): “Under the newly adopted rule, the cause of action accrues at the time the client discovers or should have discovered the attorney’s negligence and is damaged thereby.”

. In Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal.3d 195, 98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 852-53, 491 P.2d 433, 436-37 (1971), the California Supreme Court held that the date upon which damage accrues is a question of fact. That court also held that its adoption of the discovery rule in attorney malpractice cases incorporated the damage rule, so that the statute begins to run upon the occurrence of the later of the two events.