Court Opinion

ID: 9393002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 21:02:17.893345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:50.332663
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/8/23 P. v. Ramirez CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F083185
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. F21900047)
                    v.

 JERONIMO ISMAEL TOMAS RAMIREZ,                                                           OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Gary R.
Orozco, Judge.
         Patricia J. Ulibarri, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kari Ricci Mueller and
Darren K. Indermill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                     INTRODUCTION
       In 2019, defendant Jeronimo Ismael Tomas Ramirez was arrested in connection
with a residential burglary and sexual assault of the 89-year-old homeowner and a
separate residential burglary committed shortly thereafter several miles away. Defendant
was charged by information with one count of forcible sexual penetration (Pen. Code,
§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 1),1 one count of assault with intent to commit rape during
the commission of first degree burglary (§ 220, subd. (b); count 2), two counts of first
degree burglary (§§ 459/460, subd. (a); counts 3 & 6), one count of assault with intent to
commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a)(1); count 4), and one count of elder abuse (§ 368,
subd. (b)(1); count 5). As to count 1, the information alleged the offense was committed
during the commission of burglary, for the purpose of One Strike law sentencing.
(§ 667.61, subd. (e)(2).) As to count 3, the information alleged the offense was
committed when another person other than an accomplice was present in the residence.
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21).)
       In 2021, the jury convicted defendant on all six counts and found the allegations
attached to counts 1 and 3 true. The trial court imposed terms of 25 years to life on
count 1 under section 667.61, subdivision (a), of the One Strike law, and life in prison
with the possibility of parole on count 2, to run consecutively pursuant to section 667.6,
subdivision (c). On count 6, the court imposed the middle term of four years and,
pursuant to section 654, the court imposed and stayed the middle term of four years on
count 3 and count 4, and the middle term of three years on count 5.

1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Section 289, subdivision (a)(1)(A), proscribes sexual penetration “by means of force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury .…” This case involves
penetration by force, and we shall refer to the offense accordingly.

                                               2.
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. With respect to the burglary special
circumstance allegation attached to count 1,2 defendant claims the trial court erred when
it instructed the jury, in relevant part, that the prosecutor must prove he entered the
victim’s house with the intent to either commit theft or commit sexual penetration by
force, and that the error is prejudicial, including because it resulted in the imposition of a
sentence of 25 years to life under section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (d)(4). If we find
his instructional error claim forfeited for failure to object, he claims ineffective assistance
of counsel.
       Defendant also claims that his convictions for burglary in count 3 and for assault
with the intent to commit rape in count 4 must be reversed because they are lesser
included offenses of count 2, assault with the intent to commit rape during the
commission of burglary. Finally, he claims the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing consecutive sentences on counts 1 and 2 under section 667.6,
subdivision (d)(1), because the court’s finding that there was an opportunity to reflect
between the commission of acts, sufficient to support a finding of separate occasions, is
not supported by substantial evidence.
       The People dispute defendant’s characterization of his first claim as one of
instructional error and instead argue that it is a sentencing error, subject to correction to
reflect a sentence of 15 years to life under section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e)(2),
rather than a sentence of 25 years to life under section 667.61, subdivisions (a) and (d)(4).
The People concede defendant’s entitlement to relief on his second claim because
counts 3 and 4 are lesser included offenses of count 2. Finally, they dispute any
entitlement to relief on the third claim on the ground that a more reasonable reading of

2       On appeal, defendant refers to the allegation under section 667.61 as an enhancement, as
did the prosecutor and the trial court. As discussed post, however, section 667.61 is an
alternative sentencing scheme that applies to certain enumerated sex crimes committed under one
or more enumerated special circumstances. (People v. Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 534
(Carbajal).)

                                              3.
the record is that the court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms on counts 1 and 2
under section 667.6, subdivision (c), which does not require a finding of separate
occasions.
       We agree with the parties that defendant is entitled to reversal of counts 3 and 4
because they are lesser included offenses of count 2. (People v. Dyser (2012) 202
Cal.App.4th 1015, 1021.) However, we reject defendant’s claim that he is entitled to
reversal of the burglary special circumstance finding attached to count 1. As explained
post, the trial court erred in including a factually inadequate theory in its instruction to the
jury, but the error does not require reversal because a valid ground for the verdict
remains. (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 7 (Aledamat).) We agree that
defendant’s sentence of 25 years to life on count 1 under section 667.61, subdivisions (a)
and (d)(4), is unauthorized, and we shall modify the judgment to reflect a sentence of
15 years to life under section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e)(2). (§ 1260.)
       Finally, we reject defendant’s claim of sentencing error under section 667.6,
subdivision (d)(1). The record expressly reflects that the trial court exercised its
sentencing discretion and imposed consecutives terms on counts 1 and 2 under
subdivision (c) of section 667.6, which applies to certain sex crimes committed against
“the same victim on the same occasion.” Accordingly, we reverse counts 3 and 4 as
lesser included offenses of count 2, and we reduce defendant’s sentence on count 1 to
15 years to life under section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e)(2). Except as modified, the
judgment is affirmed.
                                 FACTUAL SUMMARY
I.     Facts Underlying Crimes
       In December 2019, 89-year-old Bessie H. was living alone in her long-time home
on Mt. Whitney Avenue, located in an agricultural area in Laton. Bessie wore a Medical
Guardian alert around her neck and in the later morning hours of December 25, a
company representative contacted Bessie after receiving an alert and asked if she needed

                                              4.
help. In the recorded call, which was played for the jury, Bessie was yelling and
screaming, and she responded, “Yes, I do. He’s in my house.” She also screamed, “Oh
my god—get help,” and “He[’s] trying to rape me.… Help. No. No. No!”
       Medical Guardian alerted Bessie’s son, Stan, who lived about 30 minutes away,
and one of her daughters, Sharon, who lived closer. Stan called Bessie’s next-door
neighbor, Sue, and asked her to check on Bessie because an intruder was robbing her.
Sue’s roommate, Dennis, grabbed a pipe from their yard and walked over while Sue
drove her car. They saw Bessie walking outside as if heading toward their house. Sue
assisted Bessie into her car and drove back home. Dennis checked around the perimeter,
but did not find anyone. While Sue was on the phone with 911, she saw a white truck or
SUV speeding down a dirt access road on a neighboring dairy, which stood out to her.
       Deputies with the Fresno County Sheriff’s Office were dispatched to the
Mt. Whitney address for a possible burglary and rape or attempted rape. As deputies
were responding, a second call for service came in regarding a residential burglary on
Cornelia Avenue, approximately seven and one-half miles away from Bessie’s house.
The Cornelia Avenue house was located on a dairy and the dairy owner, Gerrit D., had
encountered a man earlier, subsequently identified as defendant, at the back door of the
office. Defendant asked for a friend or an employee by a name that Gerrit did not
recognize. Gerrit told him to come back the next day because the office was closed for
Christmas and, as he watched, defendant drove away in a white SUV.
       In his rearview mirror, Gerrit saw the SUV stop at the home of one of his sons,
Rimmert. Rimmert and his family were not home at the time, so Gerrit dropped his wife
off at the nearby house of his other son, Nathan, and he and Nathan drove to Rimmert’s
house to investigate. Nathan entered the home through the back door and found
defendant in the bedroom of Rimmert and his wife. Defendant appeared inebriated and
somewhat confused to Nathan, but he went outside with Nathan without any resistance.
Gerrit called 911, and the three waited for deputies to arrive.

                                              5.
       Defendant was wearing what one deputy described as a gold or dark yellow
sweatshirt with “U.S.A.” on the front, and he had a jewelry box with earrings in it, some
gold coins, and a watch in his possession, all of which belonged to Rimmert’s family.
Bessie had described her assailant as a Hispanic man in his 20’s or 30’s with short hair
wearing a brownish or tannish jacket, so a deputy drove defendant over to Mt. Whitney
for an in-field showup.3 Bessie had vision problems due to macular degeneration and
was unable to identify defendant as her assailant because she could not see his face
clearly, but she said “the jacket looks to be the same color and the hair is the same.”
       Bessie refused to be transported to the hospital by ambulance, so Sharon took her
that afternoon. After Bessie was treated for high blood pressure, she was given a Sexual
Assault Forensic Evidence (SAFE) examination by Mikaela Soto, a registered nurse.
Bessie had some scrapes and bruising on her lip, the back of her hand, her elbow, and her
hip area, and she reported that her assailant held her down. Soto testified that Bessie was
not 100 percent certain she had been, “by the word, ‘sexually assaulted.’” Bessie
responded to Soto that her assailant did not penetrate her vagina with his penis and when
Soto asked if he penetrated her vagina with a finger, Bessie stated that “‘[h]e put his
hands down [her] pants.’” Based on that response, Soto checked the “‘[y]es’” box on her
report for penetration by finger rather than “‘attempted’” or “‘unsure.’” Soto swabbed
Bessie’s hands and fingernails, but Bessie declined a pelvic exam because she did not
feel it was necessary.
II.    Forensic Evidence
       Analysis of the data extracted from defendant’s cell phone placed the device in the
area of both crime scenes during the time of the offenses. Additionally, Bessie’s DNA
was found in samples taken from defendant’s hands and fingernail scrapings, and

3      Defendant was 36 years old at the time of the offenses.

                                              6.
defendant was identified as a possible minor contributor of DNA samples taken from
Bessie’s right hand and fingernails.
III.   Bessie’s Conditional Examination Testimony
       Bessie died in early September 2020, prior to the preliminary hearing. A
videorecording of her conditional examination, conducted in late August 2020, was
played for the jury. Bessie testified she had been in and out of her house that morning.
After she went into her bedroom and then returned to the kitchen, she saw a man had
entered through the sliding door and was standing there. She told him to get out and she
opened the back door into the garage, intending to open the garage door and escape. She
was within an inch or so of reaching the garage door opener when the man grabbed her
arm and they fell to the cement floor in the garage with the man on top of her. Bessie’s
medical alert necklace was activated, either by her or by her fall.
       Someone from Medical Guardian contacted Bessie and she reported that the man
was putting his hands in her pants. She did not recall if she told the person that “he went
ahead and went far enough down he got into [her] vagina,” but “[t]hat is what was
happening.” Bessie testified that the man unbuttoned her pants and tried to pull them off,
but ended up just sticking his hands down her pants. She testified that he put one or two
fingers all the way inside of her vagina. During the assault, he kept saying, “‘Money,
money, money,’” and she told him she did not have any money. She struggled to get
away and kept telling the man the police were coming. Because she lived near a road,
there was a lot of noise, and the man finally got up and left after she said she thought she
heard the police outside. Bessie was then able to get up, open the garage door, and walk
outside, where she saw her neighbor and her son.
       Bessie went with her neighbor to her neighbor’s house for a while. Sharon took
her to the hospital later that day, where she was examined. She thought she told the nurse
and the police what the man did to her, but she did not remember for sure. She said, “I’m
sure that I did tell [the nurse] that. It is hard to remember everything after all those things

                                              7.
going on. I would have been very stupid not to remember to do that.” She was unable to
identify the man they brought by her house, however, and explained, “No, I wouldn’t
take the chance to try and identify somebody that I couldn’t see that well.”
                                        DISCUSSION
I.     Instructional and Sentencing Error Under One Strike Law
       A.      Background
       Section 667.61, known as the One Strike law, is an alternative sentencing scheme
that applies to certain enumerated felony sex offenses. (Carbajal, supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 534.) Depending on the offense committed and the special circumstance allegations
found true, the statute mandates terms of 15 years to life, 25 years to life, or life without
the possibility of parole. (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (b), (j), (l), (m); Carbajal, supra, at
p. 534; People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 102.)4
       Defendant was convicted in count 1 of forcible sexual penetration, in violation of
section 289, subdivision (a)(1)(A), which is a qualifying offense under the One Strike
law. (§ 667.61, subd. (c)(5).) The special circumstances relevant in this case are
subdivisions (d)(4) and (e)(2) of section 667.61. Subdivision (d)(4) applies if “[t]he
defendant committed the present offense during the commission of a burglary of the first
degree, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 460, with intent to commit an offense
specified in subdivision (c).” (Ibid., italics added.) Subdivision (e)(2) of section 667.61
applies, “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (4) of subdivision (d), [if] the defendant
committed the present offense during the commission of a burglary in violation of
Section 459.” (Ibid.)
       Under the One Strike law, subdivision (a) of section 667.61 mandates a sentence
of 25 years to life if either one of the circumstances under subdivision (d) or two or more

4      Subdivisions (j), (l), and (m) of section 667.61 apply to minor victims and are not
relevant here.

                                               8.
of the circumstances under subdivision (e) are found true; and subdivision (b) mandates a
lesser sentence of 15 years to life if only one of the circumstances under subdivision (e) is
found true. (§ 667.61, subds. (a)–(b), (d)–(e).) The jury here returned a verdict finding
that defendant committed sexual penetration by force during the commission of first
degree burglary, which is the special circumstance finding under subdivision (e)(2) of
section 667.61 and results in a mandatory sentence of 15 years to life under
subdivision (b) of the statute.
        However, relevant to defendant’s claim of error, the trial court instructed the jury
that the prosecution must prove that “[w]hen the defendant entered the house he intended
to commit theft or sexual penetration by force .…” (Italics added.) The trial court
subsequently sentenced defendant to 25 years to life, which would be the statutorily
mandated sentence if defendant committed the forcible sexual penetration during the
commission of first degree burglary with the intent to commit a sexual offense specified
under subdivision (c), which includes sexual penetration and rape. (§ 667.61, subds. (a),
(c), (d)(4).)
        Defendant claims that this instruction was erroneous and that the error was
prejudicial, necessitating reversal of the burglary special circumstance finding. The
People disagree that an instructional error occurred and instead argue that the imposition
of a sentence of 25 years to life under subdivisions (a) and (d)(4) of section 667.61 was
unauthorized, but given the jury’s burglary special circumstances finding, we may
modify the judgment on appeal to reflect a sentence of 15 years to life. As explained
next, we agree with defendant that an instructional error occurred, but it does not require
reversal of the jury’s special circumstance finding. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 1.)
In accordance with section 1260, we shall reduce the punishment on count 1 to reflect a
sentence of 15 years to life under section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e)(2). 5

5     We do not reach defendant’s alternative argument that by failing to object to the special
circumstance instruction on count 1, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance o f counsel.

                                               9.
       B.      Standard of Review
       We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22
Cal.4th 690, 733; People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111.) “In criminal
cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of
law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.” (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 953.)
“[I]nstructions are not considered in isolation. Whether instructions are correct and
adequate is determined by consideration of the entire charge to the jury.” (People v. Holt
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 677; accord, People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 356.)
Jurors are presumed to have understood and followed the trial court’s jury instructions.
(People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 422.)
       C.      Analysis
               1.      Jury Instructed on Factually Inadequate Theory
       With respect to counts 3 and 6, first degree burglary, the trial court instructed the
jury that the People must prove defendant entered a structure intending to commit theft
and defined first degree burglary as burglary of an inhabited house. With respect to
count 2, assault to commit rape during the commission of burglary, the court instructed
the jury that the People must prove that when defendant acted, he was committing a first
degree burglary as defined by another instruction. However, when it came to the special
circumstance finding attached to count 1, the court instructed the jury that in deciding if
defendant committed forcible sexual penetration during the commission of a first degree

Generally, the failure to object in the trial court forfeits a claim on appeal, but there is an
exception “if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (§ 1259; accord,
People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 638.) Given that it was error to instruct the jury that
defendant committed burglary if he entered the house with the intent to commit theft or sexual
penetration by force, we elect to exercise our discretion to reach the claim on its merits without
deciding whether the forfeiture doctrine applies. (People v. Johnson, supra, at p. 639.)

                                                10.
burglary, it must decide if he entered the house intending to commit theft or sexual
penetration by force.
        “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States the power to
deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of the charged offense” (Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265,
citing In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364), and the verdict, including the jury’s
special circumstance finding here, must be supported by substantial evidence (People v.
Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 691; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357). In
instructing the jury, trial courts have a duty to instruct “on every theory that is supported
by substantial evidence, that is, evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to make a
determination in accordance with the theory presented under the proper standard of
proof.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206.) An instruction not supported by
substantial evidence or that might mislead or confuse the jury should not be given.
(People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 768; People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332,
350.)
        Here, there is no evidence in the record that would support the theory that
defendant entered Bessie’s house with the intent to commit a sex offense. The evidence
shows only that Bessie was in and out of her house that morning, and at one point, she
went back to her bedroom and returned to find defendant standing in her kitchen. The
only thing defendant said to Bessie was, “‘Money, money, money.’” When she opened
the back door and reached for the garage door opener to escape, defendant grabbed her
arm, they fell to the floor, and defendant then tried to unbutton her pants before putting
his hand down her pants and digitally penetrating her vagina.
        During the jury instruction conference, the court commented that “some jurors
could have the opinion he broke in there to commit a sex crime, [and] other jurors [that]
he broke in to commit theft and it was after the thought while he was in the commission
of the burglary.” However, there is no credible evidence to support the theory that

                                             11.
defendant entered with the intent to commit a sex offense and while the jury may draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence, “‘[a]n inference is not reasonable if it is based
only on speculation.’” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 365; accord, People v.
Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 167–168.) Therefore, given the absence of evidentiary
support for the theory, it was error to include “or sexual penetration by force” in
instructing the jury on intent at the time of entry. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 7.)
              2.     Error Does Not Require Reversal
       Although neither party cites the California Supreme Court’s decision in Aledamat,
it sets forth the operative analysis with respect to errors of this nature. (Aledamat, supra,
8 Cal.5th 1.) Where the jury is instructed on a factually inadequate theory, “the theory is
incorrect only because the evidence does not support it.” (Id. at p. 7, citing People v.
Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1128 (Guiton).) “‘[I]f the inadequacy of proof is purely
factual, of a kind the jury is fully equipped to detect, reversal is not required whenever a
valid ground for the verdict remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that
the verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground.’” (Aledamat, supra, quoting
Guiton, supra, at p. 1129.)
       In contrast, a legally inadequate, or incorrect, theory is contrary to law.
(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 7, citing Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128.) “An
example of this second category ‘is a case where the inadequate theory “fails to come
within the statutory definition of the crime.”’” (Aledamat, supra, at p. 7, quoting Guiton,
supra, at p. 1128.) “When the theory is legally erroneous—i.e., of a kind the jury is not
equipped to detect—a higher standard must be met for the error to be found harmless.
‘These different tests reflect the view that jurors are “well equipped” to sort factually
valid from invalid theories, but ill equipped to sort legally valid from invalid theories.’”
(Aledamat, supra, at p. 7.)
       In sum, “‘[a] legal error is an incorrect statement of law, whereas a factual error is
an otherwise valid legal theory that is not supported by the facts or evidence in a case.

                                             12.
[Citation.] Between the two, legal error requires a more stringent standard for prejudice,
for jurors are presumed to be less able to identify and ignore an incorrect statement of law
due to their lack of formal legal training. [Citation.] Factual errors, on the other hand,
are less likely to be prejudicial because jurors are generally able to evaluate the facts of a
case and ignore factually inapplicable theories.’” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 8,
quoting People v. Stutelberg (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 318.)
       The error in this case is factual. (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 7.)
Notwithstanding the trial court’s error in instructing on count 1, by virtue of counts 2, 3
and 6, the jury was instructed on the definition of first degree burglary and that defendant
committed burglary if he entered the structure intending to commit theft. In convicting
defendant of burglary in count 3, the jury necessarily found that he entered Bessie’s
house intending to commit theft, a clear and well-supported theory given Bessie’s
testimony that the only thing defendant asked for was money and his subsequent theft of
items from Rimmert’s house. There is no affirmative indication in the record that the
jury’s special circumstance finding rested on the factually inadequate theory that
defendant entered Bessie’s house with the intent to commit sexual penetration by force
rather than the factually adequate theory that he intended to commit theft, and defendant
does not claim otherwise. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the instructional error does not require
reversal of the burglary special circumstance finding. (Ibid.)
       We acknowledge defendant’s argument that the error confused the jury with
respect to the necessary intent. He contends that “the instructions regarding the intent
elements of Counts 1, 2, and 3 were hopelessly misleading if not outright a conflicting
version of the law as applied to these facts,” and “when read in the context of the jury
charges as a whole, ‘there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged
instruction in an impermissible manner’ based on the instructions they were given.”
(Quoting People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220, disapproved on another
ground by People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216.) However, Aledamat controls

                                             13.
the analysis for instructional errors of this type and reversal of the burglary special
circumstance finding is not required under the facts of this case. (Aledamat, supra, 8
Cal.5th at p. 8.) We are unpersuaded that there is any reasonable likelihood the erroneous
instruction on the burglary special circumstance allegation attached to count 1 otherwise
confused or misled the jury with respect to its findings on count 2 or count 3. (People v.
Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1199.)
       We agree with defendant that given the absence of a special circumstance finding
under subdivision (d)(4) of section 667.61, imposition of a sentence of 25 years to life
under section 667.61, subdivision (a), was unauthorized, but the remedy does not require
reversal of the special circumstance finding. Rather, the jury’s finding that defendant
committed sexual penetration by force during the commission of a burglary, within the
meaning of subdivision (e)(2) of section 667.61, results in a sentence of 15 years to life
under section 667.61, subdivision (b), and we may correct the error on review by
modifying the judgment accordingly. (§ 1260.)
II.    Counts 3 and 4 Are Lesser Included Offenses of Count 2
       Next, it is well settled that “[a] defendant may be convicted of more than one
offense based on the same act or a single course of conduct. [Citations.] However, a
defendant may not be convicted of two such offenses if one is a necessarily included
lesser offense of the other.” (People v. Robinson (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 69, 73, citing
§ 954 & People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227; accord, People v. Delgado (2017)
2 Cal.5th 544, 570.) “[I]f the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of the
statutory elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater offense cannot be committed
without also committing the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the
former.” (People v. Robinson, supra, at p. 74, citing People v. Reed, supra, at p. 1230 &
People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 240.)
       The parties agree that defendant’s convictions for first degree burglary (count 3)
and assault with intent to commit rape (count 4) are lesser included offenses of assault

                                             14.
with intent to commit rape during the commission of first degree burglary (count 2).
(People v. Dyser, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1021.) We concur. (Ibid.) The greater
conviction is controlling and, therefore, we shall reverse defendant’s convictions on
count 3 and count 4. (People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 736.)
III.   Imposition of Consecutive Sentences Under Section 667.6
       A.     Background
       Finally, defendant claims that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive
sentences on count 1 and count 2 under section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1), which provides
that “[a] full, separate, and consecutive term shall be imposed for each violation of an
offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the
same victim on separate occasions.” (Italics added.) The People take the position that a
more reasonable construction of the record is that the court sentenced defendant to
consecutive terms under subdivision (c) of section 667.6, which provides that “a full,
separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of an offense specified
in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve the same victim on the same occasion.” (Italics
added.) In the alternative, the People argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing defendant to mandatory consecutive terms under section 667.6,
subdivision (d)(1), because substantial evidence supports a finding that defendant
committed forcible sexual penetration and assault with intent to commit rape on separate
occasions.
       The jury convicted defendant of both forcible sexual penetration and assault with
intent to commit rape. Because the crimes involved the same victim on the same
occasion, the trial court had the discretion to sentence defendant to consecutive terms
under subdivision (c) of section 667.6. As discussed next, we agree with the People that
the record reflects the trial court exercised discretion in selecting consecutive sentences
under subdivision (c) of section 667.6. Therefore, we do not reach defendant’s argument

                                             15.
that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the crimes were committed on
separate occasions within the meaning of section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1).
       B.     Analysis
       We presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct (People v.
Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666), and the moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating error on appeal (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 378; People v.
White Eagle (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1523; People v. Clifton (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d
860, 862). As the party challenging the sentence, defendant bears the burden of
“‘“clearly show[ing] that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.]
In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”’” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 376–377, quoting People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968,
977–978; accord, People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.)
       Defendant’s claim of error, based on insufficient evidence that he committed his
crimes against Bessie “on separate occasions,” is premised on our agreement that the trial
court imposed mandatory consecutive terms under subdivision (d)(1) of section 667.6.
He does not otherwise challenge the sentence as an abuse of discretion (see People v.
Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [“‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing
decisions made in the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court.’”]),
although he cites People v. Reeder in his reply for the proposition that “‘[a] decision to
sentence under section 667.6, subdivision (c) is an additional sentence choice which
requires a statement of reasons separate from those justifying the decision merely to
sentence consecutively’” (People v. Reeder (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 900, 912, quoting
People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 347). Defendant observes that “[t]he trial
court did not state or adopt the probation officer’s recommendations on the record,” and
did not follow the recommendations in their entirety.

                                            16.
       In People v. Belmontes, the California Supreme Court explained that “[a] decision
to sentence under section 667.6, subdivision (c) is an additional sentence choice which
requires a statement of reasons separate from those justifying the decision merely to
sentence consecutively. [¶] This does not mean that the reasons justifying full term
consecutive sentencing under section 667.6, subdivision (c) must necessarily be different
than those used to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences under section 1170.1.”
(People v. Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 347–348.) “What is required [in this
regard] is an identification of the criteria which justify use of the drastically harsher
provisions of section 667.6, subdivision (c). The crucial factor, in our view, is that the
record reflect recognition on the part of the trial court that it is making a separate and
additional choice in sentencing under section 667.6, subdivision (c).” (Id. at p. 348,
fn. omitted, italics added.) Here, the trial court took great pains to make a record of its
reasons for selecting consecutive terms under section 667.6, subdivision (c).
       The probation report recommended the trial court exercise its discretion to impose
consecutive terms under section 667.6, subdivision (c), and the trial court stated, “And so
as to the consecutive terms as to Counts 1 and 2, the code section that controls that is in
reference to 667.6[, subdivision ](c) in determining violent sex offenses you can full-term
consec them to each other.” As defendant points out, the court discussed, in part,
whether there were two separate acts because there was time for reflection. Although this
language mirrors subdivision (d)(1) of section 667.6, the discussion occurred in the
context of determining whether to impose consecutive sentences and the court more
broadly discussed all of the facts underlying the crimes, including Bessie’s age and
vulnerability; her chilling screams in the Medical Guardian recording that defendant was
trying to rape her; the violence of the crimes; the sophistication in targeting residences on
Christmas Day, when many people were not at home; and the effect on victims of sex

                                              17.
crimes that extends beyond the physical act.6 Critically, rather than indicating the court
believed it was required to impose consecutive sentences, as it would under
subdivision (d)(1) of section 667.6, the record expressly reflects the court exercised
discretion in selecting consecutive terms, concluding, “So that is the evidence that’s
supportive of two consecutive terms—of the two terms being run consecutive.”
       We disagree that the record is, at best, “arguably ambiguous” concerning whether
defendant was sentenced under subdivision (c) or subdivision (d) of section 667.6,
necessitating remand for resentencing. The trial court set forth a statement of its reasons
for imposing consecutive terms, and this statement affirmatively reflects the court was
exercising discretion to impose consecutive terms under subdivision (c) of section 667.6.
Therefore, we reject defendant’s claim of sentencing error under subdivision (d)(1) of
section 667.6.
                                        DISPOSITION
       On count 1, sexual penetration by force, defendant’s sentence is modified to
reflect an indeterminate term of 15 years to life under section 667.61, subdivision (b), of
the One Strike law. In addition, defendant’s convictions for burglary in count 3 and
assault with intent to commit rape in count 4 are reversed as lesser included offenses of
count 2, assault with intent to commit rape during a burglary. The trial court is directed

6      California Rules of Court, rule 4.426(b) provides, “A decision to impose a fully
consecutive sentence under section 667.6[, subdivision ](c) is an additional sentence choice that
requires a statement of reasons separate from those given for consecutive sentences, but which
may repeat the same reasons. The sentencing judge is to be guided by the criteria listed in rule
4.425, which incorporates rules 4.421 and 4.423, as well as any other reasonably related criteria
as provided in rule 4.408.”

                                               18.
to issue an amended abstract of judgment to the appropriate authorities reflecting these
modifications. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

                                                                             MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

PEÑA, J.

                                            19.