Court Opinion

ID: 9900312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:10:49.262128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.190639
License: Public Domain

162                 November 15, 2023              No. 593

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

              In the Matter of the Marriage of
                       JABIN NOOR,
                   Petitioner-Respondent,
                             and
               IMAM MAHI CHOWDHURY,
                   Respondent-Appellant.
                 Lane County Circuit Court
                    20DR20517; A177261

  Stephen W. Morgan, Judge.
  Argued and submitted April 12, 2023.
  George W. Kelly argued the cause and filed the brief for
appellant.
   Kayla Steindorf argued the cause for respondent. Also on
the brief was The Reynolds Law Firm, PC.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  PAGÁN, J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 329 Or App 162 (2023)                               163

         PAGÁN, J.
         In this marital dissolution case, husband appeals
from orders and a judgment striking his pleadings regard-
ing finances and entering a default against him regarding
those issues. The trial court sanctioned husband pursuant
to ORCP 46 B(2)(c) because he violated discovery obligations
and failed to comply with an order compelling production of
documents. In a single assignment of error, husband claims
that the trial court abused its discretion. We conclude that
the evidence provided a factual basis for the decision, and
that husband did not preserve his procedural challenge to
the trial court’s failure, if any, to make specific findings as
to why lesser sanctions were not appropriate. Considering
husband’s flagrant violation of discovery obligations, and
his failure to make basic disclosures as required by ORS
107.089, we further conclude that there was no abuse of dis-
cretion in the trial court’s choice of sanction. We affirm.
                            FACTS
         We review a trial court’s decision to impose sanc-
tions under ORCP 46 B(2) for an abuse of discretion. See
Pamplin v. Victoria, 319 Or 429, 436, 877 P2d 1196 (1994)
(emphasizing “the need for flexibility and discretion on the
part of the trial judge”). We consider the facts in light of that
standard.
         In December 2020, wife filed a petition for dissolu-
tion of marriage. Husband and wife were married in 1998.
They have two children, who were eight and four years old
at the time of the petition.
          Although the precise nature of their assets and lia-
bilities is not clear, due in part to husband’s failure to make
required disclosures, the record indicates that the couple
had relatively complex finances. Husband and wife owned
a duplex residential property, vehicles, and they had mul-
tiple bank accounts. Both had college degrees, both worked
at various times during their marriage, and they operated
various businesses, including a grocery store business that
closed in 2020 and a transportation or touring business.
They also had debts associated with their businesses and a
loan from the Small Business Association.
164                                               Noor and Chowdhury

         Wife did not seek spousal support from husband.
In his response to the petition, husband claimed to have no
income, and he stated that he was living in his van. Husband
sought spousal support from wife. He filed a motion for tem-
porary support of $500 per month because wife rented out
the second unit in their duplex. Wife responded that, despite
the rental income, she had no permanent employment and
significant expenses, that husband was not providing any
funds for the care of their two children who resided with
wife, and that husband received loans and a cash gift from
his family. The trial court denied husband’s request for tem-
porary spousal support.
        The parties stipulated to a trial date of July 22,
2021. In late January or early February 2021, wife sought
discovery, including 38 requests for production of documents
(RFPs). For the most part, the RFPs were standard requests
for documents that parties in a marital dissolution case are
required to provide pursuant to ORS 107.089.1 The RFPs
focused on financial documents, including tax returns,
income records, bank statements, insurance policies, and
vehicle titles or registrations. In March 2021, husband
responded by email attaching tax returns for 2015, 2016,
and 2017.2 In his email, husband stated that wife
   “has control of all my documents, financials, tax, payments,
   earnings therefore she was able to cancel bank accounts,
   credit card accounts, memberships along with Apple Pay
   and anything related to finance. After dismissal of the
   restraining order, I was not allowed back into the house.
   Therefore, I cannot get you much of the information you
   requested. I believe [wife] will provide you with all the nec-
   essary documents, which I have no access to.”

In the body of his email, husband responded to each of
the RFPs. For most of them, husband responded that wife
“should have the other documents.” Husband provided more
    1
      As an attachment to wife’s petition for dissolution, wife served husband
with an ORS 107.089 discovery notice, listing financial documents that are
required to be exchanged under that statute. Wife propounded her RFPs after
the deadline for husband’s response to the discovery notice.
    2
      Notably, wife’s RFPs had expressly requested production of tax returns for
2018, 2019, and 2020, and had not requested tax documents for 2015, 2016, and
2017.
Cite as 329 Or App 162 (2023)                              165

specific information regarding debts, but no documents to ver-
ify the debt amounts. For some of the RFPs, husband stated,
“I choose not to invest my time in digging these garbage [sic].”
         In May 2021, wife sent husband a letter explain-
ing that the responses were deficient, that wife did not have
access to some bank accounts, and she requested records
to substantiate husband’s claims regarding debts. The let-
ter also explained, for example, that husband could order a
copy of his Social Security statement online. Wife explained
that if responsive documents were not produced within two
weeks, then she would consider filing a motion to compel
production of documents.
        In early June 2021, wife sent husband a second let-
ter pointing out that meaningful settlement negotiations
could not occur without the requested financial documents
and indicating that wife planned to file a motion to compel.
A few days later, husband sent an email indicating that he
would obtain copies of bank statements associated with the
grocery store business, that there were documents in the
basement of the duplex that he could not access, and that
wife had access to all his financial accounts.
           In June 2021, wife filed her motion to compel
production of documents. Husband did not respond to the
motion. On July 1, 2021, wife sent husband another letter
regarding missing discovery, and, the following day, on
July 2, she moved to postpose the July 22 trial date. The
motion explained that wife “does not have enough informa-
tion regarding the assets and debts in [husband’s] name to
proceed to trial. In order to provide the Court with the most
basic schedule of assets and liabilities, [wife] needs [husband]
to provide documentation. It will be next to impossible to
arrive at a just and proper division of marital assets and lia-
bilities without a full disclosure by [husband].” Husband did
not respond to the motion to postpone the trial. On July 11,
husband produced some responsive discovery including
bank account statements for December 2020 and estimates
regarding debts and the value of vehicles.
       On July 12, 2021, the trial court granted wife’s motion
to compel. Husband was required to produce documents by
166                                     Noor and Chowdhury

July 19, including documents regarding monies received,
charitable assistance, bank and credit union accounts,
debts, pension and retirement benefits, reimbursements,
correspondence from government agencies, husband’s credit
report, and his Social Security earnings. The order stated
that husband’s failure to comply could result in sanctions
including “the Court granting Petitioner all relief sought
in their pending action.” The following day, on July 13,
the trial court denied wife’s motion to postpone the trial.
         On July 19, husband responded to the order by
email. His response was substantially the same as earlier.
Husband reiterated that he could not enter the house and
that his wife had access to his financial documents. Once
again, husband attached tax documents from 2015, 2016,
and 2017. His written responses to the RFPs were substan-
tially the same as earlier, including by claiming that his
wife had access to the documents. For some of the RFPs,
husband continued to state, “I choose not to invest my time
in digging these garbage [sic].”
         In her trial brief, and although she acknowledged
that she had earned a higher income in the past, wife claimed
an income of $3,479 per month based on rental income, unem-
ployment benefits, and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program benefits for her two children. Wife claimed that
husband was operating a food cart business and a touring
business. As a result of husband’s failure to produce docu-
mentation regarding income, despite an order requiring him
to do so, wife requested the court to impute to husband an
income of $6,000 per month. Based on those income figures,
wife sought $998 per month from husband in child support.
She did not seek spousal support.
        On the day of trial, on July 22, wife’s counsel made
an oral motion for sanctions pursuant to ORCP 46 based
on husband’s failure to comply with the order compelling
production of documents. Wife’s counsel explained that hus-
band failed to produce “the most basic discovery documents
relevant to the distribution of assets and liabilities * * * and
his income.” She continued,
      “There are bank account[s], business, income tax, and
   other records, and relevant documents that [husband] has
Cite as 329 Or App 162 (2023)                                  167

   failed to produce to which [wife] does not have independent
   access * * *.
       “[Husband’s] responses to discovery requests, including
   stating, ‘I choose not [to] invest my time in digging these
   garbage,’ indicate that [husband] acted willfully and in bad
   faith in not complying with these discovery requests.”
         Regarding sanctions, wife’s counsel pointed out
that, pursuant to ORCP 46 B, the trial court had a number
of options, including striking husband’s pleadings in whole
or in part and entering a judgment of default against him
on all or some issues, or precluding husband from entering
testimonial or documentary evidence regarding matters for
which he failed to provide discovery. Wife requested that the
trial court strike husband’s pleadings and enter a judgment
of default on all issues.
       In response, husband continued to claim that the
documents were in a location that he could not access. As
husband explained it,
      “All my documents are in my house. I’m not allowed
   in the house. My bank accounts ha[ve] been shut down. I
   cannot get in it. I have documents for that, and that’s my
   response.
      “The part I said these are garbage, I don’t want to dig
   into, is like the Facebook, text message, social media. I
   don’t have time to dig into that.
      “So, any financial, tax documents, * * * title of my Land
   Rover, title of my motorcycle, they are all in my house * * *
   [and] I’m not allowed to get in there.”
Wife’s counsel pointed out that even if husband “did not
have access to the documents that he says are in the house,
he could have requested these documents from his financial
institutions and the government institutions that hold cop-
ies of these records. He’s just failed to do so.” Wife’s counsel
claimed that wife searched for documents in the house, and
that she was unable to find them there.
        The court took a recess to review husband’s response
to the motion to compel. When the trial court returned, it
swore in husband and asked him to explain again why he
did not have access to any financial records. He stated that
168                                      Noor and Chowdhury

when the grocery store went out of business, files and records
were moved to the basement. Wife obtained a restraining
order against him, so he had to leave the building, and he
no longer had access. According to husband, he also had no
access to any online financial records.
         In ruling on wife’s motion for sanctions, the trial
court took judicial notice of the court file, as well as wife’s
trial exhibit 18, which included correspondence between the
parties regarding discovery. The trial court made findings
regarding the discovery that wife requested and husband’s
responses, noting that husband’s email in response to the
order compelling production of documents was substantially
identical to his earlier, deficient responses. The trial court
found that husband had notice that his failure to comply
with the order could result in wife receiving all the relief
she sought. The trial court determined that simply stating
that documents were available in their residence, and that
wife should have the documents, did not satisfy husband’s
discovery obligations.
        As noted by the trial court, husband
   “does answer, provide some financial numbers when it suits
   him, which is to make sure that the debt information is out
   there and provided. However, it does not appear that he
   provides any records supporting the number of the debt,
   which he does have the ability to access and get through
   financial records.”
Focusing on husband’s responses about choosing not to dig
through garbage, the trial court found that husband dis-
played “a cavalierness of attitude * * * towards the process
of getting to a conclusion of this matter. It shows, frankly, a
bit of gamesmanship that is not appropriate * * * and does
not allow the other party a fair access to this trial process.”
The trial court found that husband’s testimony about his
inability to access documents was not credible, “and I ques-
tion whether any of his further statements during the trial
process would [be] credible.”
         The trial court observed that, under ORCP 46 B(2)(c),
it could sanction husband in a number of different ways,
including by striking “out pleadings or parts thereof, staying
Cite as 329 Or App 162 (2023)                                     169

further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismiss-
ing the action or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment
by default against the disobedient party.” The trial court
decided to strike part of husband’s pleadings and enter a
default against husband regarding financial issues. As the
trial court explained it, “I do not find that setting this case
over would benefit the parties in any way, * * * as [husband]
has had months to comply with discovery in this matter and
has not, and not only just has not, but has stated that he
makes choices to not comply.” The trial court continued,
      “First, so I don’t find that—that it is worthwhile or pro-
   ductive, or appropriate to set the case over to deal with dis-
   covery matters further. I’ve done that in the past, and I’ve
   done that most of the time, frankly, because frankly there’s
   plenty of reason to believe it will happen. And the Court
   notes that doing anything other than setting it over is a
   pretty severe sanction, however * * * looking at this file, at
   the responses, and in hearing [husband], I don’t find that
   there is any likelihood to have compliance in the future.
      “So therefore, I do strike any of his pleadings that deal
   with finances, and I do grant * * * [wife] default on the
   financial related matters, which specifically deal with the
   asset and liability matters, the child support matter, and
   the spousal support matter. The spousal support matter is
   not at issue once I’ve stricken his request for spousal sup-
   port. So that is not necessarily a default, but [it] is no longer
   an issue.”
         The court noted that wife’s exhibits included a pro-
posed limited judgment that allocated assets and liabilities,
and a child support worksheet, and the trial court observed
that if wife testified regarding those exhibits, then that tes-
timony would satisfy her obligation to make a prima facie
case. In addition, the trial court made findings regard-
ing the prejudice caused by husband’s deficient discovery
responses. The trial court entered a limited judgment of
default, which, among other things, requires husband to pay
$998 per month in child support. Husband appeals.
                            ANALYSIS
        We begin our analysis by reviewing some key stat-
utes and legal principles. ORCP 46 B(2) provides, in part:
170                                        Noor and Chowdhury

   “If a party * * * fails to obey an order to provide or permit
   discovery, * * * the court in which the action is pending may
   make any order in regard to the failure as is just including,
   but not limited to, the following:
      “B(2)(a) Establishment of facts. An order that the
   matters that caused the motion for the sanction or any
   other designated facts shall be taken to be established for
   the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of
   the party obtaining the order.
       “B(2)(b) Designated matters. An order refusing to
   allow the disobedient party to support or oppose desig-
   nated claims or defenses, or prohibiting the disobedient
   party from introducing designated matters in evidence.
      “B(2)(c) Strike, stay, or dismissal. An order strik-
   ing out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
   ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action
   or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
   against the disobedient party.
      “B(2)(d) Contempt of court. In lieu of or in addition
   to any of the orders listed in paragraph B(2)(a), B(2)(b), or
   B(2)(c) of this rule, an order treating as a contempt of court
   the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a
   physical or mental examination.”
(Boldface in original.) In Pamplin, 319 Or at 436-37, the
Supreme Court explained that the sanction of dismissal
   “is appropriate only when it is ‘just’ and only when there is
   willfulness, bad faith, or other fault of like magnitude by
   the disobedient party. To assess the propriety of imposing
   that sanction, an appellate court needs to know (1) the his-
   torical facts on which the trial court based its decision to
   impose it and (2) the analytical process by which the trial
   court concluded that dismissal is ‘just’ in view of those facts
   and in view of the other sanctions that are available.”
         Here, husband contends that the trial court erred
by striking his pleadings and holding him in default. In sup-
port of that assignment of error, husband makes four argu-
ments. First, husband argues that the trial court’s findings
and its ruling were “unsupported by the evidence.” Second,
he argues that the trial court failed to explain why the
sanction was just or why a less severe sanction was inappro-
priate. Third, husband claims that the trial court failed to
Cite as 329 Or App 162 (2023)                               171

consider “whether and to what extent wife was prejudiced
by husband’s actions.” And fourth, husband argues that the
trial court’s decision “does not explain why it is that wife’s
equal access to much of the requested discovery does not
excuse husband’s noncompliance.” We address each of those
arguments in turn.
         In his first argument, husband points out that
“counsel’s arguments are not evidence.” Jewett v. Sterling
Furniture Co., 277 Or App 608, 613, 371 P3d 1290 (2016). He
suggests that there was insufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s decision to sanction him. That argument lacks
merit.
         The record shows that husband was ordered to pro-
duce documents by July 19, 2021. Three days later, on the
day of trial, wife made an oral motion for sanctions because
husband failed to comply with the order. Wife’s trial exhib-
its included exhibit 18, which consisted of wife’s RFPs, hus-
band’s responses, the parties’ correspondence regarding
discovery obligations, and the trial court’s order compelling
production of documents. Before ruling on the motion for
sanctions, the trial court received that exhibit into evidence.
The trial court file also contained husband’s July 19 email
response to the order compelling production of documents,
which, as explained by the trial court, was substantially the
same as his earlier deficient responses. In addition, the trial
court provided husband an opportunity to provide testimony
explaining why he was unable to access his financial doc-
uments, and the trial court found that his testimony was
not credible. Based on that record, the evidence was more
than sufficient to support the trial court’s decision to impose
sanctions. See Udhe and Udhe, 260 Or App 284, 287, 317
P3d 337 (2013), rev den, 329 P3d 771 (2014) (evidentiary
record contradicted party’s assertion “that there was no fac-
tual basis for the trial court to find that she failed to provide
discovery”).
         Second, husband argues that the trial court failed
to explain why the sanction it chose was just or why it chose
not to impose a lesser sanction under ORCP 46 B(2). That
argument challenges both the trial court’s findings as well
as the substance of the trial court’s discretionary ruling. The
172                                                Noor and Chowdhury

first part of that argument is a procedural challenge, which
must be preserved to be considered on appeal. See Peeples
v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 223-25, 191 P3d 637 (2008) (distin-
guishing between a procedural and a substantive challenge
to the failure to make special findings and stating that “the
usual rules of preservation apply” to the procedural failure
“to make express special findings required by Pamplin.”).
         Here, husband did not request special findings
explaining why lesser sanctions were not appropriate despite
a number of opportunities to do so. On appeal, husband’s coun-
sel points out that husband was not represented by counsel
below. That argument is unavailing because “pro se litigants
are bound by the same preservation rules that bind all other
parties.” State v. Morrow, 192 Or App 441, 444, 86 P3d 70,
rev den, 337 Or 282 (2004). At oral argument, husband’s coun-
sel conceded that his procedural challenge was not preserved,
and we accept that concession as well-taken. See Budden v.
Dykstra, 181 Or App 523, 528, 47 P3d 49 (2002) (The court
“cannot be faulted for failing to make such findings if no one
requested them.”); see also SAIF v. Harris, 161 Or App 1, 10,
983 P2d 1066, rev den, 329 Or 527 (1999) (defendant failed
to preserve argument that the trial court’s sanction order
did not include necessary findings). We decline to engage in
plain-error review of that procedural error, if any.
         We turn, then, to husband’s substantive challenge
to the merits of the trial court’s decision to strike his plead-
ings regarding finances and to enter an order of default
against husband regarding financial issues.3 We review that
decision for an abuse of discretion. Boline v. Whitehead, 119
Or App 230, 234, 850 P2d 1128, rev den, 317 Or 271 (1993).
“If the trial court’s decision was within the range of legally
correct discretionary choices and produced a permissible,
legally correct outcome, then the trial court did not abuse
its discretion.” State v. Romero, 236 Or App 640, 643, 237
P3d 894 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
        First, we note that, despite husband’s failure to com-
ply with discovery obligations, the trial court did not choose
    3
      Husband does not argue that the trial court’s findings are insufficient to
permit meaningful appellate review of its choice of sanction, nor could he, given
the trial court’s detailed findings.
Cite as 329 Or App 162 (2023)                               173

the most severe sanctions available. For example, although
husband failed to comply with the order compelling produc-
tion of documents, the trial court did not find husband to
be in contempt of court, ORCP 46 B(2)(d), nor did it enter
a default against husband on all issues, ORCP 46 B(2)(c).
Instead, the trial court imposed the lesser sanction of strik-
ing his pleadings regarding finances and entering a default
against husband regarding financial issues only.
          Nevertheless, husband suggests that the trial court’s
sanction was too harsh and that the trial court could have
imposed a less severe sanction. He argues, for example, that
if the trial court had barred him from entering testimonial
or documentary evidence regarding the party’s assets and
liabilities, then he could have cross-examined wife regard-
ing her claim that he had an earning capacity of $6,000
per month. However, that substantive challenge to the trial
court’s decision misses the point because “discretion” refers
to “the authority of a trial court to choose among several
legally correct outcomes.” State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 312, 4
P3d 1261 (2000). What is missing from husband’s argument
is an explanation of why the sanction that the trial court
choose was legally incorrect or legally impermissible.
          What the record shows is that the trial court found
that husband’s testimony regarding his inability to access
financial documents was not credible, that his responses to
discovery were cavalier and displayed gamesmanship, and
that husband chose not to comply with his discovery obliga-
tions. In addition, and as explained more fully below, the trial
court found that husband’s conduct caused prejudice. Those
findings support the trial court’s choice of sanction. Indeed,
the order compelling production of documents put husband
on notice that his failure to comply could result in “the Court
granting Petitioner all relief sought in their pending action.”
Thus, the trial court’s decision to strike husband’s pleadings
regarding finances, and to enter a default against him on
financial matters, was legally permissible. In other words,
the trial court’s decision to impose that sanction for hus-
band’s conduct did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
       Next, relying on Markstrom v. Guard Publishing Co.,
294 Or App 338, 344, 431 P3d 443 (2018), rev den, 364 Or
174                                                 Noor and Chowdhury

849 (2019), husband argues that the trial court failed to con-
sider the effect of his conduct and whether it prejudiced wife.
The record does not support that claim. Before proceeding to
wife’s prima facie case, the trial court expressly made find-
ings about the prejudice caused by husband’s failure to com-
ply with his discovery obligations. The trial court found that
    “the lack of discovery and gamesmanship * * * by [husband]
    creates a scenario in which a trial of these matters today
    would be unfair for [wife] because * * * there is a fair amount
    of finances, whether it’s asset[s] or debt[s] to deal with and
    it cannot be dealt with fairly from a petitioner’s side if they
    don’t get fair discovery. A Court cannot rule fairly if * * *
    discovery isn’t done and then gets full vetting through the
    trial process, it[’s] * * * impossible to have a fair and com-
    plete trial if both sides don’t have a fair playing field, and so
    that is the other issue for the Court in this case.”
Thus, the trial court did consider the prejudice caused to
wife by husband’s failure to disclose financial documents.
Indeed, it appears the court relied in part on its prejudice
analysis to determine which sanction to impose. Husband’s
third argument lacks merit.4
        Under ORS 107.089, husband was required to
produce copies of documents including tax returns for the
preceding three years, documents showing income earned
or received, financial statements, certificates of title or
registrations for vehicles, and documents showing debts.
Husband was aware of those requirements because he was
served with a copy of ORS 107.089.
        “The disclosure requirements of ORS 107.089 also imple-
    ment ORS 107.105(1)(f), which provides that ‘[t]he court
    shall require full disclosure of all assets by the parties in
    arriving at a just property division.’ That statute shows a
    legislative intent to require ‘full and frank disclosure of all
    circumstances materially bearing’ on the dissolution judg-
    ment, including ‘a full disclosure of marital assets.’ ”
    4
      Relatedly, in Pamplin, 319 Or at 436-37, the Supreme Court held that when
a trial court imposes the sanction of dismissal under ORCP 46 B(2)(c), then a
finding of willfulness, bath faith, or fault of a similar degree on the part of the
disobedient party is required, but a finding of prejudice to the party seeking
discovery is not. Nevertheless here, in this marital dissolution case, it is worth
emphasizing the prejudice to wife that occurred as a result of husband’s discov-
ery conduct.
Cite as 329 Or App 162 (2023)                              175

Conrad and Conrad, 191 Or App 283, 292, 81 P3d 749 (2003)
(quoting Eltzroth and Eltzroth, 67 Or App 520, 526, 679 P2d
1369 (1984)). Here, husband’s failure to produce basic finan-
cial documents undermined wife’s ability to prepare for trial
and the trial court’s ability to effectuate a just division of
assets and liabilities.
         Finally, husband faults the trial court for failing to
explain why “wife’s equal access to much of the requested
discovery does not excuse husband’s noncompliance.” Under
ORS 107.089(1), husband was required to provide copies of
documents in his possession or under his control. Assuming
without deciding that husband could not physically access
financial documents stored in the duplex, we agree with the
trial court that those documents were nonetheless under his
control because he could have requested new copies from
third parties. Husband’s sweeping claim of “equal access”
ignores that many of the requested documents were not
within wife’s control, including husband’s credit report and
his Social Security statement, both of which were critical for
an accurate analysis of husband’s earnings and liabilities.
We reject husband’s suggestion that his noncompliance with
basic discovery obligations was excusable.
        Affirmed.