Court Opinion

ID: 9917254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 19:02:12.515556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:59.434314
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/11/24 In re Alberto C. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

In re Alberto C. et al., Persons                              B326669
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
                                                               (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. 17CCJP00799C-D)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

              Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

LORI C. et al.,

         Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tiana J. Murillo, Judge. Conditionally affirmed and
remanded with directions.
      Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Lori C.
      Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Saul C.
      Dawyn Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ________________________

                         INTRODUCTION

       Lori C., the mother of Alberto C. (born March 2008) and
Isaiah C. (born August 2013), appeals from the juvenile court’s
orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388
petition for modification as to both children and terminating her
parental rights as to Isaiah under section 366.26. Lori contends
the court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 request
because she established a change in circumstances supporting
continued reunification services with both children, and there is
substantial evidence she established the beneficial parental
relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights
as to Isaiah. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
       Saul C., the father of Alberto and Isaiah, appeals from the
juvenile court’s orders denying his section 388 request as to
Isaiah, terminating his parental rights as to Isaiah, and granting
legal guardianship of Alberto to his paternal aunt with monitored

1       Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

                                  2
visits for Saul. However, the only claim of error Saul advances in
his opening brief is that remand is necessary to comply with the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).2 (25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.) Lori joins in Saul’s ICWA arguments. In Saul’s previous
appeal of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition findings,
this court affirmed those findings and orders in a nonpublished
order, but remanded for the sole purpose of ensuring compliance
with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA. (Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services v. Saul C.
(Aug. 12, 2022, B313369) [nonpub. order].)
       The parties agree the record reflects no investigation of
Indian ancestry in compliance with ICWA and this court’s order
and agree remand for an ICWA inquiry is appropriate. We reject

2      Saul otherwise purports to join in Lori’s brief. Lori’s brief
does not make any particularized argument regarding Saul’s
legal rights as they relate to Isaiah or Alberto. Under these
circumstances, we deem Saul to have joined in Lori’s arguments
relating to Lori’s legal rights, and only address Saul’s ICWA
argument. (See In re Michael V. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 229,
fn. 3 [solely addressing ICWA argument where mother’s notice of
appeal identified order terminating parental rights and the order
denying her section 388 petition, but her opening brief challenged
the ICWA ruling only as it relates to the termination order];
Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052,
1066 [“[o]n appeal we need address only the points adequately
raised by plaintiff in his opening brief on appeal”].) We deem
Saul’s unbriefed issues as forfeited. (See Tellez, at p. 1066
[“When an appellant asserts a point but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point
as forfeited.”]; Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellate brief
must support each point by argument and citation of authority].)

                                 3
Lori’s arguments in all other respects. Accordingly, we
conditionally affirm the orders and remand the matter to allow
the Department of Children and Family Services (Department)
and the juvenile court to conduct a meaningful ICWA inquiry in
accordance with the inquiry and notice requirements of federal
and California law consistent with our prior order.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     Dependency Proceedings Involving Alberto and Isaiah
       The Department filed the underlying section 300 petition in
this case in March 2021. The petition alleged Isaiah and Alberto
were at risk of serious physical harm or illness due to: Lori’s and
Saul’s substance abuse and each parent’s failure to protect; Saul’s
mental health diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, his failure to
take medication, and Lori’s failure to protect from Saul; Isaiah
being in Saul’s home with a paternal uncle involved in ongoing
criminal activity and substance abuse; and the parents’ failure to
ensure treatment for the children’s mental health and
developmental issues (including autism for Isaiah, and
depression, PTSD, and ADHD for Alberto). (§ 300, subds. (b), (c)
& (j).)3 The children were detained from both parents and placed
with their paternal aunt Carolina, with separate monitored
visits.4

3      In 2022 the Legislature amended section 300 (Stats. 2022,
ch. 832, § 1), effective January 1, 2023, but the changes do not
affect our analysis.
4    A prior section 300 petition was sustained in January 2018
based on Lori’s physical abuse of Alberto, Lori’s boyfriend’s

                                4
       In June 2021 the juvenile court dismissed the
subdivision (c) (emotional abuse) allegations and sustained a
substantially similar amended petition, removed the children
from the care and custody of their parents, ordered them placed
under the supervision of the Department, and directed the
Department to provide family reunification services to Lori and
Saul. Saul appealed, and we conditionally affirmed the
jurisdiction findings and disposition order in a nonpublished
stipulated order, with remand for the sole purpose of conducting
an ICWA inquiry. (Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services v. Saul C., supra, B313369 [nonpub. order].)
       At the six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)) in
December 2021, the Department reported the children were
comfortable and bonded with Carolina and were receiving
therapy and appropriate services. The children reported they felt
safe in Carolina’s home. The Department further reported Lori
failed to report for three drug tests in August 2021 and refused to
enroll in drug treatment even after ordered by the court in
September 2021. Lori also did not enroll in any services and
canceled four visits with the children. Visit monitors reported
Lori had “fair” interactions with the children and became more
engaged with them over time, and that Saul interacted well with

physical abuse of Alberto and Lori’s failure to protect, and Lori
and Saul’s substance abuse. In conjunction with that case, both
children were detained from the parents in September 2017 and
placed with Carolina. The children were returned to Lori’s care
in January 2019 with family maintenance and family
preservation services. The juvenile court granted Lori sole
physical custody, joint legal custody, and monitored visits for
Saul in February 2020.

                                 5
the children. The juvenile court ruled that Saul was in partial
compliance with his case plan and that Lori had not made any
substantial progress. It continued reunification services for an
additional six months.
      At the 12-month review hearing in June 2022, the
Department reported Lori had canceled several home visits. Lori
had also canceled more than six visits with the children, and of
those she attended she regularly ended her visits early. Lori had
10 negative drug tests and failed to report to 13 drug tests. Lori
enrolled in services in March 2022 but as of May 17 had not
attended. Monitors reported Lori favored Alberto during visits.
Lori and the children reported visits were positive, and Carolina
reported Isaiah cried when Lori canceled visits. The juvenile
court also reviewed Saul’s section 730 psychological evaluation
report and stated “even if I were not concerned by the 730
evaluation, and I am. . . . Alberto in particular has noted he does
not feel safe. And it is something that I cannot overlook. . . . I
hear dad’s response to be that he doesn’t agree. And he wants his
kids back, which I cannot do today. But, in the alternative, he
wants more time to comply with mental health services that by
his counsel’s own statement he has no intent of complying with.”
      Based on this information, the juvenile court found an
overall substantial lack of progress with the court-ordered case
plan. The court terminated the parents’ reunification services as
to both children and set a section 366.26 hearing for October 11,
2022, which was continued to January 30, 2023 and then to
February 15, 2023.
      On September 2022 Saul filed a writ petition in pro per
challenging the juvenile court’s June 2022 orders as to the
children, which this court dismissed pursuant to Cresse S. v.

                                6
Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 947, and Rules of Court,
rule 8.452(a) and (b). (Ex rel. Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services v. Saul C. (Oct. 4, 2022, B321515)
[docket].)
      In December 2022 the juvenile court held a permanency
planning hearing. Alberto had previously stated he did not want
to be adopted. At the hearing, the court identified legal
guardianship with Carolina as Alberto’s permanent plan, and
adoption with Carolina as Isaiah’s permanent plan, over both
parents’ objection.

B.     The Section 388 Modification Requests as to Both Children
       In October 2022 Lori filed a modification request pursuant
to section 388 seeking Alberto and Isaiah’s return to her or,
alternatively, additional family reunification services. She
declared she completed her case plan, including two drug
treatment programs, 22 parent education classes, and 20
individual counseling sessions. She further reported having
consistently tested negative for drugs, that she saw her
psychiatrist regularly, and was taking prescribed medication.
But a letter from her substance abuse education program stated
Lori had not completed the program. Lori argued a change of
order would be in the children’s best interest because she was
committed to resolving the underlying issues that led to their
removal and sought to be involved as their mother.
       On January 30, 2023 the juvenile court heard Lori’s
section 388 request. The Department and counsel for the
children jointly recommended Lori’s request be denied. Lori’s
counsel argued her issues with compliance and canceled visits
were due to a medical condition (endometriosis), for which she

                                7
was treated in October 2022. The court denied the request,
finding no changed circumstances. The court observed that Lori
had made efforts towards completing her case plan, but her
compliance was incomplete and her circumstances were not yet
sufficiently changed. The court stated it did not need to reach the
best interest of the child prong, but even if it did, it was not
inclined to find change was in the children’s best interest given
Lori’s past visitation record with her children.
       On January 27, 2023 Saul filed section 388 modification
requests seeking return of Isaiah to his care or alternatively
shared custody with Carolina, reinstatement of family
reunification services, and liberalized, unmonitored visitation
with both children.5 On February 15, 2023 the juvenile court
heard argument on and denied Saul’s section 388 requests.

5     The record reflects Saul filed two additional section 388
modification requests, which are not the subject of this appeal.
On February 14, 2023 Saul filed an amended section 388
modification request seeking reinstatement of family
reunification or liberalized unmonitored visits as to both boys,
and alleging he completed a drug abuse treatment program,
individual and family counseling and parenting classes, and had
been sober for six months. On March 1, 2023 Saul filed
additional section 388 modification requests seeking the boys’
return or six months of family reunification services. Saul
alleged “massive improvement to be on everyone’s level socially to
collaboration with any other individual at institutional level. The
mental health issue is a [sic] constructed by DCFS to prevent me
and kids.” As noted above, in this case Saul filed a notice of
appeal from the juvenile court’s February 15, 2023 order denying
his January 27 section 388 petition, but advances no legal
argument in support.

                                8
C.     The Section 366.26 Hearing Terminating Parental Rights
       As to Isaiah, and Placing Alberto in Legal Guardianship
       The section 366.26 hearing commenced February 15, 2023,
with testimony from Lori and Saul. The court directed the
parties to submit their closing arguments in writing. Each
parent argued the parental benefit exception to termination of
parental rights applied.
       On March 3 the juvenile court found Isaiah was adoptable,
and that Lori had not visited him regularly. As to the first prong
of the parental benefit exception, regular visitation and contact,
the court noted that while Carolina had cancelled some visits,
Lori had cancelled more visits (11 visits) and had not availed
herself of virtual visits when medical issues made travel difficult.
Lori had canceled visits the day of or asked for visits to end early,
including as recently as December 22. As to the second prong of
the exception, positive emotional attachment, the court found
Isaiah and Lori had friendly engagement during certain visits
but no engagement during others when Lori spent more time
with Alberto. The court stated it could not find that Isaiah had a
substantial positive emotional attachment to Lori, noting Lori’s
testimony lacked specificity about his emotional response to her
visits. As to the third prong, detriment to the child even when
balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home, the court
found that the parents had not provided evidence of detriment to
Isaiah if parental rights were terminated. Accordingly, the court
terminated Lori’s and Saul’s parental rights as to Isaiah.
       As to Alberto, the court found legal guardianship was an
appropriate plan. The court found Alberto was adoptable and
that removal from Carolina would be detrimental to his
emotional wellbeing, and terminated jurisdiction as to Alberto.

                                  9
Carolina agreed to provide permanency for Alberto and Isaiah
under their respective plans. The court ordered each parent’s
visitation to remain monitored and occur three times per week for
three hours per visit.
       Lori appealed from the juvenile court’s January 30, 2023
order denying her section 388 petition and March 3, 2023 order
terminating her parental rights as to Isaiah. She did not appeal
from the order granting legal guardianship of Alberto to
Carolina. Saul appealed from the juvenile court’s February 15,
2023 order denying his section 388 petition and March 3, 2023
orders terminating his parental rights to Isaiah and granting
Carolina legal guardianship of Alberto with monitored visits for
him.

                          DISCUSSION

A.    Governing Law and Standard of Review
      1.    Section 388 modification of juvenile court orders
      “Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court
orders when the moving party (1) presents new evidence or a
change of circumstance and (2) demonstrates modification of the
previous order is in the child’s best interest.” (In re Matthew M.
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1194, citing In re Jasmon O. (1994)
8 Cal.4th 398, 415; accord, In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 317; In re Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1122; see
Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e); see also In re Zacharia D. (1993)
6 Cal.4th 435, 455 [“‘[s]ection 388 provides the “escape
mechanism” that . . . must be built into the process to allow the
court to consider new information’”].) “‘The petitioner has the
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that

                                10
there is new evidence or a change of circumstances and (2) that
the proposed modification would be in the best interests of the
child.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he change in circumstances must be
substantial.’” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845; accord,
In re Malick T., at p. 1122.)
       “If the juvenile court has ruled the moving party failed to
carry his or her initial burden to demonstrate new evidence or
change of circumstance, the first step of the analysis, the
question for the reviewing court is whether that finding is
erroneous as a matter of law.” (In re Matthew M., supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1194; see Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners
Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 [where the issue
on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, “the question for the
reviewing court [becomes] “‘whether the evidence compels a
finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law’””]; In re
Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1156 [same]; see also
In re R.V. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 181, 201 [where a party fails to carry
its burden on an issue in the juvenile court, “the inquiry on
appeal is whether the weight and character of the evidence . . .
was such that the juvenile court could not reasonably reject it”].)
       “We review the court’s best interest determination, the
second step, for abuse of discretion and may disturb the exercise
of that discretion only in the rare case when the court has made
an arbitrary or irrational determination.” (In re Matthew M.,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1194-1195; see In re Stephanie M.,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318; In re I.B. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 133.)
“We do not inquire whether substantial evidence would have
supported a different order, nor do we reweigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. [Citation.]

                                 11
We ask only whether the juvenile court abused its discretion with
respect to the order it made.” (In re Matthew M., at p. 1195.)

       2.     Section 366.26 Selection and Implementation Hearing
       The express purpose of a section 366.26 selection and
implementation hearing is “to provide stable, permanent homes”
for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) “If the court has
decided to end parent-child reunification services, the legislative
preference is for adoption.” (In re Elizabeth M. (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 768, 780; accord, In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529,
532 [“[i]f adoption is likely, the court is required to terminate
parental rights, unless specified circumstances compel a finding
that termination would be detrimental to the child”]; In re
Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“if the child is adoptable . . .
adoption is the norm”]; see In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295,
307 [state has a “compelling” interest in “providing stable,
permanent homes for children who have been removed from
parental custody” and reunification efforts have been
unsuccessful].)
       “When the court finds by clear and convincing evidence the
child is likely to be adopted, the statute mandates judicial
termination of parental rights unless the parent opposing
termination can demonstrate one of six enumerated exceptions
applies.” (In re Elizabeth M., supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 780-
781; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); see In re Celine R., supra,
31 Cal.4th at p. 53 [“court must order adoption and its necessary
consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the
specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding
that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the
child”]; In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 392 [decision to

                                12
terminate parental rights at § 366.26 hearing “‘“will be relatively
automatic if the minor is going to be adopted”’”].)
       The beneficial parental relationship exception to
termination permits the court to order a permanent plan other
than adoption if “[t]he parents have maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
As our Supreme Court explained in In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, the exception requires the parent to establish, by
a preponderance of the evidence, (1) the parent has maintained
regular visitation and contact with the child, “taking into account
the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent such that the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship; and
(3) terminating the relationship “would be detrimental to the
child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a
new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 636; see id. at p. 630 [“the
exception applies in situations where a child cannot be in a
parent’s custody but where severing the child’s relationship with
the parent, even when balanced against the benefits of a new
adoptive home, would be harmful for the child”].) “‘If severing
the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a
substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’ even
considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination
would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the court should not terminate parental
rights.” (Id. at p. 633.)
       We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the
parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the
child and the existence of a beneficial parental relationship for
substantial evidence. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at

                                 13
pp. 639-640; cf. In re R.V., supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 200-201
[“[t]here is, however, no single formulation of the substantial
evidence test for all its applications;” where a party fails to meet
its burden on an issue in the juvenile court, “the inquiry on
appeal is whether the weight and character of the evidence . . .
was such that the juvenile court could not reasonably reject it”].)
We review the third step—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship
with his or her parent—for abuse of discretion. (In re Caden C.,
at p. 640.)

B.     The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Denying Lori’s
       Section 388 Requests Based on Changed Circumstances
       For a change of circumstances to require modification of a
juvenile court’s order under section 388 as a matter of law, “[t]he
change in circumstances . . . must be of such significant nature
that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged
order.” (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) “‘Not every
change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior order’”
under section 388. (In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120; see
In re A.A., at p. 612.) ““‘[T]he change in circumstances must be
substantial.’”” (In re Malick T., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1122;
accord, In re I.B., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 152; see In re J.M.,
supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 845.) “[A] section 388 petition
seeking reinstatement of reunification services or return of the
child will necessarily involve a parent who has made mistakes
sufficient to support termination of services at some point in the
past. The question must be whether the changes the parent
made since then are substantial enough to overshadow that prior

                                14
determination, such that reunification is now in the child’s best
interests.” (In re J.M., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 848.)
       In evaluating whether the petitioner met her initial burden
to show changed circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence, the juvenile court “should consider (1) the seriousness
of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for
any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative
bonds between the dependent children to both parent and
caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily
removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has
been.” (In re A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612; In re
Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532.)
       Here, Lori presented no substantial change of
circumstances to justify modification of the juvenile court’s
orders. In assessing the seriousness of the problem that led to
dependency of the children, the juvenile court expressly found
that Lori had: a history of substance abuse, including
methamphetamine and opiates; failed to protect the children
from Saul, who has a history of mental health and substance
abuse; and had not ensured the children received consistent
mental health treatment. The court further found Lori was
resistant to services and drug treatment for many months, even
under court order, and repeatedly missed drug tests. Lori’s
section 388 petition alleged she completed various services and
programs, but on appeal Lori concedes she “had not fully
ameliorated the issues that brought the children under
dependency court jurisdiction.” Instead Lori argues, she
substantially complied with her case plan, received treatment for
her medical condition that impacted her ability to comply with
the case plan, and she was committed to fulfilling the court’s

                               15
requirements. While this progress is laudable, however, the
record before the juvenile court reflects that Lori had not
completed substance abuse treatment, and only attended the
substance abuse education course in part. This is so despite
longstanding substance abuse issues and averring in her
section 388 petition that she completed two treatment programs.
Indeed, Lori was not participating in any ongoing treatment or
other court-ordered services after October 2022 beyond taking
medication.
      Accordingly, Lori failed to demonstrate materially changed
circumstances which would justify a modification, and the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying her
section 388 request for modification of the disposition order.
      Lori further argues she had a strong bond with Isaiah,
which is relevant to whether it would be in Isaiah’s best interest
to change the court order. We need not assess whether
modification would be in the child’s best interest, however,
because Lori has not demonstrated changed circumstances which
are the predicate to a successful section 388 petition.

C.    The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
      Concluding Lori Failed To Establish the Parental
      Relationship Exception to Adoption with Regard to Isaiah
      As noted above, it was Lori’s burden to establish all three
elements required for the parental relationship exception to
apply in this case. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); In re
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding Lori did not meet her burden.

                                16
       1.    Regular Visitation and Contact
       As the juvenile court observed at the section 366.26
hearing, Lori’s visitation was inconsistent for much of the
dependency proceedings. The court’s evaluation of visitation for
purposes of the parental relationship exception considers the
entire time the children have been removed from parental
custody, not simply the period immediately before the hearing at
which termination of parental rights is at issue. (See In re C.F.
(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 554 [“Sara was more consistent with
visitation as the section 366.26 hearing neared, but we agree
with the Agency’s assessment that overall her visitation was
sporadic. Sporadic visitation is insufficient to satisfy the first
prong of the parent-child relationship exception to adoption.”];
see also In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 531 [considering
lapses in visitation that had occurred prior to the last six weeks
of dependency as supporting the finding there was not regular
visitation and contact].)
       Here, Lori missed 10 or more scheduled visits and often
canceled the day of the visit. She also ended her visits early.
After the children were detained, Lori began monitored visits
once per week for three hours. She canceled four visits between
June and November 2021. During the second six-month review
period, Lori’s visits were for two hours once per week, and she
canceled at least six visits between December 2021 and June
2022. Two other visits were mutually canceled by Lori and
others, and others canceled three visits. The social worker noted
that Lori canceled additional visits that were not recorded, as she
canceled at the last minute or ended visits early. In October
2022, Lori had monitored visits once per week for one or two
hours. In December 2022, the Department assessed her

                                17
visitation as “consistently inconsistent.” The social worker
planned to observe a visit on November 22, 2022 unannounced,
but was unable to do so because Lori ended the visit after only
30 minutes.
       Given the evidence of Lori repeatedly canceling and
shortening her once-weekly visits, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in finding Lori did not establish the regular
visitation prong.

       2.    Beneficial Relationship
       The second prong of the parental relationship exception has
two components: (a) the child has a positive emotional
attachment to the parent, and (b) the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship. (See In re Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Isaiah exhibited some affectionate behavior
toward Lori at visits (hugging, running toward her, holding her
hand) that indicated a positive relationship between them, and
visitation monitoring reports indicated Lori became more
engaged with both children over time. In October 2022 Isaiah
reported visits were going “okay.”
       Even assuming a positive emotional attachment, however,
the record contains insufficient evidence to support a finding
Isaiah would benefit from continuing that relationship. (See
In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [whether “‘the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship’” with his or her
parent is shaped by factors “such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the
“positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs’”]; In re Katherine J. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 317.) Isaiah spent much of his life out of

                                 18
Lori’s custody: he lived with Lori from his birth in August 2013
through September 2017, but then lived with Carolina from
September 2017 through January 2019, and from March 2021
through the hearing. Sometime in 2020 he began residing with
his paternal grandmother during the week, spending only
weekends with Lori. In December 2022 Isaiah stated he wanted
to live with Carolina and felt protected and cared for in her
household. Lori’s counsel offered limited evidence to support a
finding Isaiah benefited from visits with Lori, however pleasant
they may have been, and the record also reflects negative effects
of their interaction. Carolina reported Isaiah cried when Lori
cancelled visits. Visitation monitors observed that Lori favored
Alberto and had difficulties responding to Isaiah’s emotional
needs during their visits. In September and December 2022
Carolina reported Lori continued to give Alberto more attention
and to leave Isaiah by himself. One day when Alberto did not
attend the visit, Isaiah asked to leave after 30 minutes, and Lori
agreed.

       3.    Detriment from Termination
       The final prong is whether the benefits of stability and
permanence to Isaiah from adoption by paternal aunt Carolina
was outweighed by the harm to Isaiah that would be caused by
terminating his parental relationship with Lori. As the Supreme
Court in In re Caden C. cautioned, the legislative preference is
adoption; the parental relationship exception, like the other
exceptions to termination of parental rights, applies only in
“‘exceptional circumstances.” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 631; accord, In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
When the benefits of a stable, adoptive, permanent home

                                19
outweigh the harm the child would experience from the loss of a
continued parent-child relationship, the court should order
adoption. (In re Caden C., at p. 634.)
      Here, the juvenile court concluded there was no evidence in
the record that Isaiah’s relationship with Lori outweighed the
benefits of consistency and stability in the adoptive home of his
paternal aunt. At the time of termination of parental rights for
Isaiah in March 2023, both siblings had been living with Carolina
since March 2021; they had also been living with her between
September 2017 and January 2019 when they were previously
placed with Carolina in conjunction with a previous dependency
proceeding. Isaiah and Alberto bonded with Carolina and
reported they felt safe with her. The children had special
behavioral and developmental needs, and Carolina worked as a
pre-kindergarten teacher for children with special needs,
supporting the juvenile court’s conclusion she was well equipped
to manage Isaiah’s autism diagnosis, among other issues. Lori
also could continue to visit with Alberto up to three times a week
for three hours per visit, with Carolina having discretion to
permit her to have continued contact with Isaiah.
      Lori challenges the juvenile court’s determination and
argues a legal guardianship with regard to Isaiah would better
serve his interests rather than adoption and termination of
parental rights. Lori has not, however, demonstrated the court’s
finding was arbitrary or irrational. In light of the limited
evidence before the juvenile court supporting application of the
parental relationship exception, the court’s decision was not an
abuse of discretion.

                               20
D.    Further Remand Is Appropriate To Ensure Compliance
      with ICWA
      On August 12, 2022 in Saul’s previous appeal of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition findings, this court
conditionally affirmed the findings and orders at issue in that
appeal but remanded for the sole purpose of ensuring compliance
with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA (25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.). (Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services v. Saul C., supra, B313369 [nonpub. order].)
      The matter was remanded with directions for the
Department to make all reasonable efforts to interview the
children’s paternal grandparents, aunts, and uncles; to identify
and thereafter to interview all extended family members and
others who have an interest in the children, including the
maternal grandparents, regarding the children’s possible Indian
ancestry; and to submit a report of its interviews or efforts to
conduct the interviews to the juvenile court. (Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services v. Saul C., supra,
B313369 [nonpub. order].) As set forth in our prior order, if this
inquiry gave the Department reason to believe Indian children
may be involved, but the Department does not yet have sufficient
information to determine if notice must be provided to a tribe or
tribes, the Department must conduct a further inquiry, including
contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the California
Department of Social Services, and any tribe that may potentially
be interested in the proceeding to ascertain whether the children
may be members or eligible for membership with a tribe. (Ibid.)
At a noticed hearing, the juvenile court was to ensure that
adequate inquiry and any necessary notice had been made, and
then the court was directed to make ICWA findings regarding the

                               21
children. (Ibid.) If notice is required pursuant to ICWA and a
tribe determines Alberto and Isaiah are Indian children, the
juvenile court was to proceed in accordance with ICWA. (Ibid.;
see generally 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a); Welf. &
Inst. Code, §§ 224.1, 224.2; Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)
[describing inquiry and notice requirements when investigating
and determining whether a dependent is an Indian child].)
       The parties all agree the record does not reflect the
Department or juvenile court took any action to comply with this
order, and further remand for ICWA inquiry is appropriate. We
also agree and remand to the juvenile court to direct the
Department to conduct the ICWA inquiry as specified in our
August 12, 2022 order in Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services v. Saul C., supra, B313369
[nonpub. opn.].

                        DISPOSITION

       The juvenile court’s section 388 orders of January 30, 2023
and February 15, 2023 are affirmed. The section 366.26 orders of
March 3, 2023 are conditionally affirmed. We remand the matter
for the juvenile court to direct the Department to conduct a
meaningful ICWA inquiry and ensure compliance with ICWA and
related California law notice requirements, in accordance with
this court’s August 12, 2022 order in Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services v. Saul C., supra,
B313369 [nonpub. order], and for the Department to ensure
compliance.
       The juvenile court shall then determine whether the ICWA
inquiry and notice requirements have been satisfied and whether

                               22
Isaiah and Alberto are Indian children. If the court finds they
are Indian children, it shall conduct a new section 366.26
hearing, as well as all further proceedings, in compliance with
ICWA and related California law. If not, the court’s original
section 366.26 order remains in effect.

                                     MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

      SEGAL, Acting P. J.

      FEUER, J.

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