Court Opinion

ID: 9962083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 17:01:00.068396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:49.243872
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 22 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 23-438
                                                D.C. No.
             Plaintiff - Appellee,              2:14-cr-00357-APG-VCF-1
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, c/o
ASO CG Technology Holdings
LLC; BRIAN WRIGHT,

             Interested Parties - Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Nevada
                   Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted April 17, 2024**

Before: McKEOWN, W. FLETCHER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

      This appeal arises out of extended litigation surrounding the seizure of

$40,000 in cash from under Brian Wright’s mattress in 2017. After an evidentiary

hearing on a prior Rule 41(g) motion brought by Wright for return of the money, the

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Silverton Casino was

the proper owner of the money, and we affirmed. See United States v. Wright, 49

F.4th 1221, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 823 (2023). On

remand, Federal Insurance Company (“Federal”), Silverton’s subrogee, brought its

own Rule 41(g) motion for return of the $40,000. The district court granted that

motion, and Wright again appealed. Because Federal is a proper movant under

Rule 41(g) and the district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising equitable

jurisdiction over Federal’s motion, we affirm.

      Under Rule 41(g), “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of

property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return.” Fed.

R. Crim. P. 41(g). Wright argues that Federal, being an entity and not a natural

person, is not a “person aggrieved” under the Rule. We review de novo this legal

issue. Wright, 49 F.4th at 1225.

      When we interpret the word “person” in the statutory context, we generally

conclude that the word’s plain meaning includes entities unless the context of the

specific statute or rule indicates otherwise. See, e.g., Confederated Tribes and Bands

of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau, 843 F.3d

810, 813 (9th Cir. 2016) (“‘When a word is not defined by statute, we normally

construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.’ . . . Accordingly, relying

on the ordinary meaning of the word, the term ‘person’ in [the Internal Revenue

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Code] covers entities . . . .” (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228

(1993))); see also 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[U]nless the context indicates otherwise . . . the

words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms,

partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”). Thus,

we reject Wright’s argument that the “plain meaning” of “person” encompasses only

natural persons.

      We next turn to the context of Rule 41(g) to determine if “person aggrieved”

is intended to include entities like Federal as well as individuals. Rule 41(g) “is

concerned with those whose property or privacy interests are impaired by the

seizure” of their property for law enforcement purposes.          United States v.

Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

(per curiam), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized by Demaree v.

Pederson, 887 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam); see also United States v.

Gladding, 775 F.3d 1149, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he spirit of Rule 41(g) is

one of compromise that recognizes that reasonable accommodations might protect

both the law enforcement interests of the United States and the property rights of

property owners.” (cleaned up)). We have previously held that an entity—even one

without an ownership interest in the property at issue—can be “aggrieved” by its

deprivation and seek its return through Rule 41(g). See Comprehensive Drug

Testing, 621 F.3d at 1173–74 (holding that the MLB Players Association was

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entitled to bring a Rule 41(g) motion for return of the urine samples of its member

players).   Because property-owning entities like Federal can be injured by

government seizure—just like property-owning individuals—Wright’s reading of

Rule 41(g) is incompatible with its context and purpose. Accordingly, Federal was

entitled to bring a Rule 41(g) motion for return of its property.

      Finally, Wright contends that the district court abused its discretion by

exercising equitable jurisdiction over Federal’s motion. The district court held that,

because the evidentiary hearing concluded that the $40,000 recovered from Wright

belonged to Federal, Federal “clearly has an interest in and need for the stolen

money.”     And the district court reasoned that while the government had not

disregarded Federal’s constitutional rights, it does not intend to conduct a forfeiture

proceeding to determine who gets the money—thus, Federal has no remedy at law

for return of its stolen property except for a motion under Rule 41(g).

      In Ramsden v. United States, we set out four factors that govern whether it is

appropriate for a court to exercise its civil equitable jurisdiction when a Rule 41(g)

motion is raised in the absence of pending criminal proceedings. See Ramsden v.

United States, 2 F.3d 322, 324–25 (9th Cir. 1993). They are:

      1) [W]hether the Government displayed a callous disregard for the
      constitutional rights of the movant; 2) whether the movant has an
      individual interest in and need for the property he wants returned; 3)
      whether the movant would be irreparably injured by denying return of

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      the property; and 4) whether the movant has an adequate remedy at law
      for the redress of his grievance.

Id. at 325.

      The district court need only “balance” the Ramsden factors, not determine that

all factors point toward the movant. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1173.

The district court found that the government did not show callous disregard for

Federal’s constitutional rights.    And while an economic injury like Federal’s

generally “does not support a finding of irreparable harm,” that is because, typically,

such an injury can be remedied by other means, such as a damage award. Rent-A-

Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir.

1991). Here, the only other adequate remedy at law available to Federal is a

forfeiture proceeding, and the government has indicated it will not—indeed, it

believes it cannot—initiate such a proceeding. Accordingly, Federal had no other

adequate remedy at law for return of its property, and the district court did not abuse

its discretion when it exercised equitable jurisdiction over Federal’s motion.

AFFIRMED.

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