Court Opinion

ID: 9607580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:00:06.30536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:39.315304
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in Division 1 of the majority opinion but point out that this case, like some of those cited as well as others which the appellate courts have decided, falls in the category of those which must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Full-time police officers, on the other hand, are automatically disqualified if challenged for principal cause. Hutcheson v. State, 246 Ga. 13, 14 (1) (268 SE2d 643) (1980), so held, stating that the reason is that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of police duties and the closeness with which such officers are identified with criminal procedures that questions regarding possible bias, fairness, prejudice or impermissible influence upon jury deliberations inevitably arise” despite subjective, sincere declarations of impartiality by the prospective juror. Impartiality is the key qualification for factfinders, and it must be assured. Like the two city police officers in Hutcheson, the state patrolman in Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 464 (2) (339 SE2d 712) (1986), was also subject to automatic excusal when challenged for principal cause.
Moving from this general category, the Supreme Court more recently considered a secretary in the appellate section of the district attorney’s office, in Beam v. State, 260 Ga. 784, 785 (2) (400 SE2d 327) (1991). The majority held that she was disqualified because of her employment, for principal cause.
In comparing the employee in this case and the secretary, both worked full-time for governmental criminal justice agencies which investigate or prosecute crime, neither appeared as witnesses in criminal cases, and both declared an unbiased attitude towards the case and the jury’s task. The difference is that the secretary was an employee of the same district attorney who prosecuted Beam.
Although a GBI forensic chemist who worked in the state crime laboratory testified in this case, the connection between the laboratory and the crime information center is more remote and of a different type than that between the secretary and her employer. In addition, no connection was shown between the introduction of defendant’s prior offense and the work of the crime information center. And the relationship between this case and the crime information center employee who went out and taught how to use the sys*59tem and criminal histories is more remote than the relationship between the prosecution of Beam and the secretary whose employer was conducting the prosecution. The distinctions foreclose the disqualification of the GCIC employee for principal cause. See Beam, supra at 786, fn. 4.
Decided November 27, 1996
Reconsideration denied December 17, 1996
Derek H. Jones, for appellant.
Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Debra H. Bernes, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The GCIC employee fits more appropriately in the category exemplified by the cases cited by the majority as well as Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 338 (6) (276 SE2d 224) (1981) (former police officers working for a state correctional facility); and Todd v. State, 261 Ga. 766, 771 (5) (410 SE2d 725) (1991) (Department of Public Safety driver’s license examiner). Like these other criminal justice system personnel, the GCIC employee could only be challenged for favor, and none was shown.
I concur fully in the remainder of the opinion.