Court Opinion

ID: 9374238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 17:07:49.413756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:45.879437
License: Public Domain

J-S39042-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    COREY D. PALSON                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 173 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 28, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-21-CR-0003256-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                          FILED: FEBRUARY 22, 2023

        Appellant Corey D. Palson appeals from the order denying his timely

first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant contends that the

Commonwealth failed to disclose a plea agreement offered to one of its key

witnesses and claims that trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm.

        A previous panel of this Court set forth the underlying facts of this

matter as follows:

        [Appellant] was charged in connection with three separate deaths.
        Lorraine Avery died from a drug overdose that was reported to
        the Middlesex Township Police on May 2, 2015. Michael Sullivan
        died from a drug overdose that was reported to the Hampden
        Township Police on May 14, 2015. At the scene of both incidents,
        police found empty glassine bags stamped “M*O*B.” At trial,
        Avery’s sister testified that the evening before Avery was found
        dead, “Avery had obtained a ride from a friend . . . whom she
        asked to drive her to meet a person who was going to lend her

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1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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       money, and that first they would be dropping this person off
       somewhere along the way as part of the shared ride.” Trial Court
       Opinion, 4/17/18, at 5. The person Avery met with was Jesse
       Blais, [Appellant’s] codefendant charged with the deaths of Avery
       and Sullivan. At trial, Blais testified that he bought the “M*O*B
       product” from [Appellant] and that [Appellant] was his only source
       of the “M*O*B product.” On June 6, 2016, [Nicole] Tubbs died in
       a car crash in Silver Spring Township. At the scene of the
       accident, the police found a pedicure kit in the vehicle. Inside the
       pedicure kit was a blue glassine bag and a “bundle” of what the
       officer believed to be heroin, stamped “M*O*B.”

Commonwealth v. Palson, 2018 WL 6258905 at *1 (Pa. Super. filed Nov.

30, 2018) (unpublished mem.).

       Following trial, the jury convicted Appellant of three counts of drug

delivery resulting in death, three counts of possession with intent to deliver

heroin, and one count of conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to deliver.2

The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of thirty-one and one-half

years to sixty-three years’ incarceration.

       Appellant filed post-sentence motions3 in which he raised multiple claims

concerning the validity of the drug delivery resulting in death statute, the

weight and sufficiency of the evidence, and the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.

Appellant subsequently filed a direct appeal in which he challenged the validity

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2506, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 903,
respectively.

3 Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions on December 21, 2016.
However, the record further reflects that on April 4, 2017, the trial court
granted Appellant permission to file a supplemental post-sentence motion,
which Appellant filed on May 31, 2017.

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of the drug delivery resulting in death statute and the discretionary aspects of

his sentence.      Ultimately, this Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, but

vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded the case for re-sentencing

because it was unclear from the record whether the trial court used the correct

prior record score. See id. at *4. On remand, the trial court clarified the

correct prior record score and subsequently imposed an identical sentence on

May 28, 2019. See Sentencing Order, 5/28/19. Appellant did not file post-

sentence motions or a direct appeal.

        Appellant subsequently retained PCRA counsel, who filed a timely first

PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf.           See PCRA Pet., 6/26/20.    Therein,

Appellant claimed that the Commonwealth violated Brady4 by withholding

information pertaining to a key trial witness’s plea agreement and that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to file suppression motions and mounting a

“legally invalid defense” that was predicated on jury nullification. See id. at

26, 39.

        On March 17, 2021, the PCRA court issued an order dismissing

Appellant’s Brady claim without a hearing. Therein, the PCRA court explained

that Appellant’s claim was meritless, as “the trial transcript clearly reflects

that at the time of [Appellant’s] trial[,] the testimony of Jesse Blais established

that he was testifying in exchange for consideration from the Commonwealth.”

____________________________________________

4   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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See PCRA Ct. Order, 3/17/21, at 1. Further, the PCRA court concluded that

this issue was waived as “the plea deal with Mr. Blais was formalized on the

record on April 25, 2017, which makes [Appellant’s] Brady argument patently

untimely as raised in his June 26, 2020 PCRA petition.” Id. at 2. However,

the PCRA court stated that it would hold a hearing on Appellant’s remaining

PCRA claims. Id.

     The PCRA court held evidentiary hearings on Appellant’s remaining

claims on May 27, 2021 and July 8, 2021. During the hearings, the PCRA

court heard testimony from the Commonwealth, Appellant’s trial counsel, and

Appellant. On December 28, 2021, the PCRA court entered an order denying

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

     Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the PCRA

court complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

     Appellant sets forth the following issues for our review:

     1. Whether the Commonwealth violated the Brady rule and
        [Appellant’s] state and federal constitutional rights to due
        process of law by failing to disclose, actively concealing and
        misleading the jury as to the prosecution’s “deal” with its chief
        witness against [Appellant] who at trial was facing two first
        degree felony counts of drug delivery resulting in death and
        adamantly denied any “deal” with the prosecution in exchange
        for his cooperation and testimony against [Appellant] and yet,
        months later, the most serious charges were dismissed and he
        pled nolo contendere to a delivery count for approximately time
        served in a plea agreement?

     2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file any
        suppression motions on behalf of [Appellant], especially a
        motion to suppress incriminating statements to police?

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      3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for pursuing a defense
         strategy lacking any legal validity and contrary to statutory and
         case law when he could have based a defense on
         Commonwealth v. Parker, 327 A.2d 128 (Pa. 1974)?

Appellant’s Brief at 1-2 (some formatting altered).

                                 Brady Claim

      In his first issue, Appellant contends that the PCRA court erred in

dismissing his Brady claim on the basis that Appellant “should have known of

the deal given to Jesse Blais because it was a public record as far back as April

25, 2017.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. In support, Appellant argues that “the

prosecution has an absolute obligation to reveal all Brady[] material whether

in the public record or not.” Id. Therefore, Appellant asserts that “[t]he fact

that the plea agreement was in the public record does not excuse the

prosecution from fail[ing] to disclose the agreement to the defense in time for

it to be used.” Id. at 11 (citing Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267

(Pa. 2020)).

      With respect to the underlying Brady claim, Appellant argues that Mr.

Blais’ “undisclosed plea agreement was excessively generous” and that “a

reasonable jury would regard it as an incentive to testify falsely.” Id. at 11.

Additionally, Appellant emphasizes that Blais’ testimony was “crucial” to the

Commonwealth’s case. Id. Therefore, Appellant concludes that “there was a

‘reasonable probability’ of a different outcome if the benefits of the plea

agreement had been disclosed to defense counsel[] and the jury.” Id. at 12.

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      The Commonwealth responds that the information about Mr. Blais’ plea

agreement “was publicly available prior to the filing of [Appellant’s] second

post-sentence motion and could have been obtained by [Appellant] or counsel

by exercising reasonable diligence, the issue is permanently waived.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 21. Therefore, the Commonwealth argues that the

PCRA court “correctly dismissed [Appellant’s] claim that the Commonwealth

committed a Brady violation as meritless and untimely.”           Id. at 21-22.

Further, the PCRA court notes that Blais testified at trial that he was testifying

against Appellant in the hope of receiving leniency from the Commonwealth,

such that there was no concealment of information by prosecutors concerning

a deal for cooperation which would mislead the jury. Id. at 9, 10.

      Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “The

PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are

binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the

PCRA court’s legal conclusions.”     Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d

1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

      To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim has not been

previously litigated or waived. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). Pursuant to Section

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9544(b), “an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to

do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state

postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b).

      In the context of a Brady claim, our Supreme Court has explained:

      To succeed on a Brady claim, the defendant must show: (1)
      evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; (2) the evidence,
      whether exculpatory or impeaching, was favorable to the
      defendant; and (3) prejudice resulted.        Commonwealth v.
      Daniels, 104 A.3d 267, 284 (Pa. 2014) [(citation omitted)]. A
      Brady violation exists only where the suppressed evidence is
      material to guilt or punishment, i.e., where there is a reasonable
      probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the
      proceeding would have been different. Id. In determining
      whether a reasonable probability of a different outcome has been
      demonstrated, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would
      more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
      evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
      understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”
      Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). A “reasonable
      probability” of a different result is shown when the government’s
      suppression of evidence “undermines confidence in the outcome
      of the trial.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985).

      Brady claims, nevertheless, may be subject to waiver. See
      Roney, 79 A.3d at 609-12 (several Brady claims deemed waived
      on PCRA appeal for failure to raise them at trial or on direct
      appeal) [(citation omitted)]; Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121
      A.3d 435, 460-61 (Pa. 2015) (Brady claim waived because it
      could have been raised in an earlier proceeding) [(citation
      omitted)]. See also Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179,
      1190-91 (Pa. 2014) (Brady claim waived where appellant did not
      show evidence was not available at trial or counsel could not have
      uncovered it with reasonable diligence).

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 301-02 (Pa. 2017) (footnotes and

some citations omitted, some formatting altered).

      Finally, it is well settled that

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       there is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA
       petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the record that
       no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not
       necessary. To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to
       dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that
       he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,
       would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
       abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations

omitted and formatting altered).

       Here, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s Brady claim without a

hearing after concluding that it was both “meritless” and waived as untimely.

See PCRA Ct. Order, 3/17/21, at 1-2. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA

court addressed the merits of Appellant’s Brady claim, but ultimately

concluded that he was not entitled to relief. See PCRA Ct. Op., 3/22/22, at

8-9.

       Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the PCRA court in dismissing Appellant’s Brady claim without an evidentiary

hearing. See Maddrey, 205 A.3d at 328. First, although it is undisputed that

Mr. Blais entered his guilty plea on April 27, 2017, Appellant did not include a

Brady claim in either his December 21, 2016 post-sentence motions, nor his

May 31, 2017 supplemental post-sentence motion, nor did he raise the issue

on direct appeal.   See Palson, 2018 WL 6258905. Therefore, Appellant’s

claim is waived. See Cousar, 154 A.3d at 301-02; 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9543(a)(3),

9544(b).

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        Further, to the extent Appellant claims that he first learned of Mr. Blais’

plea agreement “in December of 2019,” see PCRA Pet., 6/26/20, at 26, ¶ 49,

Appellant has provided no explanation as to why this information could not

have been obtained earlier with the exercise of reasonable diligence. See

Bomar, 104 A.3d at 1190 (reiterating that “[t]here is no Brady violation when

the appellant knew, or with reasonable diligence, could have uncovered the

evidence in question” (citation omitted)).        Accordingly, Appellant is not

entitled to relief.5 See id; Cousar, 154 A.3d at 301-02.

                                Suppression Motions

        In his next claim, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to file motions to suppress the statements that he made to police and

the evidence that was obtained from his hotel room and vehicle. Appellant’s

Brief at 8. First, Appellant contends that trial counsel should have moved to

suppress his statements to police “on the grounds that the statements were

not knowing, voluntary and intelligent.” Id. In support, Appellant argues that

police failed to inform him of the charges he was facing or issue Miranda6

warnings. Id. at 23. Additionally, he claims that at the time of his interview

with police, “he was upset because he was at his girlfriend’s funeral” earlier

that day and was also “high on drugs.” Id. at 22, 23.

____________________________________________

5While our rationale differs from the PCRA court, it is well settled that we may
affirm the PCRA court’s ruling on any basis. See Commonwealth v.
Clouser, 998 A.2d 656, 661 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2010).

6   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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       With respect to the searches, Appellant contends that the search

warrant for his vehicle was illegal because police failed to establish probable

cause. Id. at 9, 23. He also argues that although police obtained a search

warrant for his hotel room, police did not have probable cause to search the

safe located inside the room. Id. at 9. Appellant asserts that the evidence

obtained from these “unlawful searches would have been suppressed had [trial

counsel] had the initiative to file suppression motions.” Id. at 9.

       Appellant concludes that trial counsel was ineffective because he

“assumed the suppression issues had no merit,” and counsel’s failure left

Appellant “with no way to make the argument that the searches were illegal,

and the statements were involuntary.” Id. at 22-23.

       [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
       defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
       ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
       the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process
       that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
       place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the
       following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit;
       (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her
       action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of
       counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
       proceedings would have been different.[7]

       We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the
       factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.
____________________________________________

7 Pennsylvania’s three-part standard for assessing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, adopted in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973
(Pa. 1987), is “materially identical” to the two-part test set forth in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).                  See Commonwealth v.
Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 n.8 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).

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      Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal
      determination.

      The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for
      his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have
      chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen,
      offered a significantly greater potential chance of success.
      Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they
      effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight
      analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he
      may have taken.

      Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that,
      but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have
      been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
      to undermine confidence in the outcome.

      Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis
      and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to
      prove that counsel was ineffective. Moreover, a failure to satisfy
      any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the
      claim of ineffectiveness.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

It is well settled that “[c]ounsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to

raise a meritless claim.” Washington, 927 A.2d at 603 (citations omitted).

      Here, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s suppression claims as

follows:

      Appellant next contends that trial counsel was ineffective for
      failing to file a motion to suppress Appellant’s statements to the
      police on the basis that Appellant was high at the time he made
      them. Where the challenge is to a failure to move for suppression
      of evidence, the defendant must establish that there was no
      reasonable basis for not pursuing the suppression claim and that
      if the evidence had been suppressed, there is a reasonable
      probability that the verdict would have been more favorable. See
      Commonwealth v. Melson, 556 A.2d 836, 839 (Pa. Super.
      1989); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153,
      1160 (Pa. Super. 2018). A prejudice analysis is unnecessary so

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     long as there was a reasonable strategic basis for failing to file the
     motion. Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1160. A reasonable probability is
     a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
     Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 596 (Pa. Super. 2021),
     citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (Pa.
     2002).

     . . . [T]he test for whether suppression of statements purportedly
     made under the influence may be found in Commonwealth v.
     Culberson, 358 A.2d 416, 417-18 (Pa. 1976). Our Supreme
     Court stated as follows:

        Specifically, appellant maintains that his use of marijuana
        prior to the time of his arrest and questioning negated his
        ability to voluntarily and intelligently waive his Miranda
        rights before making an inculpatory statement. In an
        analogous situation, this Court has stated “intoxication is a
        factor to be considered, but it is not sufficient, in and of itself
        to render the confession involuntary.” Commonwealth v.
        Jones, 322 A.2d 119, 125 (Pa. 1974). The test is whether
        there was sufficient mental capacity for the defendant to
        know what he was saying and to have voluntarily intended
        to say it. Commonwealth v. Smith, 291 A.2d 103, 105
        (Pa. 1972). We believe this standard is equally applicable
        to those instances where an accused was allegedly under
        the influence of drugs or narcotics at the time of his
        interrogation by police officials. See United States ex rel.
        Sadler v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 1377, 1378-79
        (E.D. Pa. 1970), see also Commonwealth v. Eden, 317
        A.2d 255 (Pa. 1974). The burden to prove a valid waiver by
        a preponderance of the evidence is upon the
        Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. [Fogan], 296 A.2d
        755 (Pa. 1972).

     Here, during his police interviews Appellant aptly demonstrated
     sufficient mental capacity to know what he was saying and have
     voluntarily intended to say it. This is demonstrated by Appellant’s
     detailed recollection of his statements years after the fact.
     Additionally, Appellant failed to demonstrate that the outcome of
     the proceeding would have been different if suppression had been
     granted, as the crucial evidence at trial tying Appellant to these
     crimes did not come from Appellant’s statements. Therefore,
     Appellant failed to meet his burden to prove that trial counsel was

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     ineffective for failing to suppress Appellant’s statements to the
     police, and this court should properly be affirmed on appeal.

     Finally, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for
     failing to file a motion to suppress evidence secured from searches
     of Appellant’s hotel room, safe, car and cell phone . . . . Here,
     Appellant’s primary focus is on challenging the search of his hotel
     room safe, which was conducted pursuant to a valid search
     warrant, supported by probable cause. “Where a search warrant
     adequately describes the place to be searched and the items to be
     seized the scope of the search ‘extends to the entire area in which
     the object of the search may be found and properly includes the
     opening and inspection of containers and other receptacles where
     the object may be secreted.’” Commonwealth v. Irvin, 134
     A.3d 67, 75 (Pa. Super. 2016), (citing to Commonwealth v.
     Waltson, 555 Pa. 223, 724 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. 1998)). The fair
     scope of a search warrant authorizing a search for drugs, funds
     relating to their sale and documents relating to their sale, properly
     includes the search of a safe as a container in which money or
     contraband may be secreted. Irvin, 134 A.3d at 75. Here, the
     search warrant issued for Appellant’s hotel room specifically
     authorized the search of the hotel room, as well as the safe in
     question, for drugs, cash, drug paraphernalia and cell phones,
     placing this case squarely in line with Irvin. The warrant for
     Appellant’s hotel room and safe was supported by four pages of
     facts demonstrating the existence of probable cause, which amply
     justified the issuance of the warrant. Likewise, the search warrant
     for Appellant’s automobile was issued for the recovery of drugs,
     cash and cell phones, and similarly supported by probable cause.

     While some evidence from the searches of Appellant’s hotel room
     and house were admitted at trial, trial counsel had a reasonable
     basis to not seek suppression. Specifically, the searches in
     question occurred pursuant to valid search warrants which were
     well-supported by probable cause. Further, Appellant failed to
     demonstrate that suppression of the evidence secured pursuant
     to the warrants would have led to a more favorable verdict.
     Independent of the warrants, the Commonwealth had sufficient
     evidence to prove that Appellant was the sole regional supplier for
     M*O*B stamped heroin, and that M*O*B heroin distributed by
     Appellant caused the three . . . deaths at issue here. As such,
     trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to
     suppress the evidence uncovered by the search warrants at issue,
     and this court should properly be affirmed on appeal.

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PCRA Ct. Op. at 12-16 (some formatting altered).

          Following our review of the record, we find no error in the PCRA court’s

conclusion that Appellant failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to file suppression motions. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-

1044. Therefore, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s analysis of this

issue. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 12-16. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to

relief.

                                Alternative Defense

          In his final issue, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective

“for pursuing a strategy with no legal validity when he should have argued the

convictions were contrary to Commonwealth v. Parker, 327 A.2d 128 (Pa.

1974) which discharged the defendant from a murder conviction on the theory

that a person is not guilty of murder for injecting a person with heroin.”

Appellant’s Brief at 23.

          Initially, we note that an appellate brief must substantially comply with

the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119 (explaining the specific requirements

for each section of an appellate brief).

          Further, this Court has explained:

          When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is
          an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently
          developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with
          pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with
          citations to legal authorities. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b), (c).

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      Citations to authorities must articulate the principles for which
      they are cited. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b). This Court will not act as
      counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.
      Moreover, when defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct
      meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely
      or find certain issues to be waived. Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (some

citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915,

924 (Pa. 2009) (reiterating that the failure “to provide any discussion of a

claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any

other meaningful fashion capable of review,” results in waiver of that issue on

appeal (citations omitted)).

      Here, Appellant does not discuss the three-pronged test for an

ineffectiveness claim, nor does he develop any argument beyond his bald

assertion that trial counsel should have pursued an alternative defense. See

Appellant’s Brief at 23. Therefore, because Appellant has failed to properly

develop this claim for review, it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Fears,

86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa. Super. 2014) (reiterating that where a petitioner “fails

to meaningfully discuss each of the three ineffectiveness prongs, he is not

entitled to relief, and we are constrained to find such claims waived for lack

of development” (citations and quotation marks omitted)); see also Hardy,

918 A.2d at 771 (stating that “[t]his Court will not act as counsel and will not

develop arguments on behalf of an appellant” (citation omitted)). Accordingly,

we affirm.

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     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/22/2023

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