Court Opinion

ID: 9918441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 22:06:36.220731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:14.399677
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Stephens v. Stephens, 2024-Ohio-106.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   OTTAWA COUNTY

Perry Stephens                                          Court of Appeals No. OT-23-013

       Appellee                                         Trial Court No. 22 DV 115

v.

Joanne Stephens                                         DECISION AND JUDGMENT

       Appellant                                        Decided: January 12, 2024

                                                *****

       James S. Gentile and Rhys Cartwright-Jones, for appellant.

                                                *****

       ZMUDA, J.

                                         I.      Introduction

       {¶ 1} This matter is on appeal from the judgment of the Ottawa County Court of

Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, approving the magistrate’s decision and

entering a final decree of divorce, consistent with the parties’ settlement agreement. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm.
                                   II.    Background

      {¶ 2} Appellant, Joanne Stephens (wife) and appellee, Perry Stephens (husband)

were married in 2014. On September 29, 2022, husband filed a complaint for divorce,

alleging incompatibility. The couple had no minor children.

      {¶ 3} On March 9, 2022, the parties appeared for trial before a magistrate and

informed the court they had resolved the case. Counsel for husband recited the

settlement agreement into the record, as follows:

             The parties are proceeding today on the grounds of incompatibility.

             The marital real estate located at 555 South Streeter Road in Port

      Clinton shall be awarded to the [Wife]. She’ll have six months to refinance

      the debt on the property to remove the [Wife’s] – or the [Husband’s] name

      from that debt obligation. And pay the [Wife] the sum of $17, 593.

             If [Wife] is unable to refinance in the six-month period, the property

      be sold and the net sale proceeds split equally. However, the [Wife] – the

      [Husband] would be awarded no less than $17,593.

             If there’s insufficient sale proceeds to award [Husband] $17,593, the

      [Wife] would owe the difference to [Husband].

             If the [Wife] is unable to refinance within six months, the [Husband]

      would have the option to be awarded the property, refinance that property,

      and pay – take possession and pay the [Wife] $11,593.

2.
            [Counsel for Wife]: Fourteen, right?

            Well, we adjust for the 3,000.

            [Counsel for Wife]: Right. So 17, 17 minus 14 makes.

            Fourteen minus three.

            [Counsel for Wife]: Oh, Yeah, yeah, yeah. I got ya.

            11,000

            [Counsel for Wife]: Yup.

            $11,593.

            The [Husband’s] pension through Biro Manufacturing would be

     divided between, for the QDRO. The dates would be June 25th, 2014 to

     March 9, 2023. The parties will equally split the cost of the preparation and

     filing of the QDRO.

            Personal property at the, at the marital residence to be divided, the

     equity between the parties. If the parties are unable to agree, the Court

     reserve jurisdiction over that issue.

            Each party will keep whatever vehicles that are titled in their name.

            The [Husband] will have 60 days to vacate the property.

            There will be no spousal support paid by either party, and that the

     Court will not reserve jurisdiction over spousal support.

3.
              The parties will equally divide all household bills until the

       [Husband] vacates the premises, then [Wife] shall be solely responsible for

       all household bills and debts.

              Since we have this obligation to refinance in six months, the Court

       will set a compliance Hearing on September 21st at 9:00 a.m.

              THE COURT: All right. Attorney [for Wife], any changes,

       additions, corrections to that agreement or (inaudible)?

              [Counsel for Wife]: I’m sure he said it, I just want to make sure it

       was on the record that the [Husband] will vacate within 60 days.

              THE COURT: Yes, he did.

              [Counsel for Wife]: Okay. That, that sounds like the agreement then.

The parties agreed, on the record, that counsel for husband would prepare the written

entry, and the trial court placed husband and wife under oath before addressing each

regarding the settlement agreement. Both husband and wife confirmed they participated

in settlement and agreed with the recited terms.

       {¶ 4} At the conclusion of hearing, the court asked the parties if they wished to

have party and counsel signatures on the entry to be prepared by husband’s attorney, and

the parties indicated all would sign, with wife’s attorney requesting seven days to

complete his portion. The trial court granted three weeks from the date of hearing for

execution of the judgment entry and adjourned.

4.
       {¶ 5} On March 9, 2023, the trial court entered a magistrate’s order, indicating

settlement on all pending issues, as recited into the record, with counsel for husband to

submit a judgment entry reflecting the parties’ agreement “no later than March 31, 2023.”

Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the magistrate scheduled a compliance review

concerning the real estate on September 21, 2023. The entry contained the following

language in bold type:

       This order is effective without further judicial approval. The parties

       have 10 days to file a “Motion to Set Aside Magistrate’s Order.”

       {¶ 6} On April 4, 2023, the trial court filed the judgment entry, signed by husband

and his counsel, but not signed by wife and her counsel. Instead, on the signature lines,

the notation reads, “Submitted 3-9-23 and not returned.” The signatures of husband and

his counsel are undated, but the document contains a date imprint, along the top of each

page, of March 27, 2023 4:14 PM.” The appearance docket indicates a proposed entry

was submitted on March 27, 2023.

       {¶ 7} On May 1, 2023, wife filed her notice of appeal.

       {¶ 8} On June 23, 2023, we remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of a

final judgment, noting the magistrate and judge both signed the proposed entry, with no

indication that the judge adopted the magistrate’s decision. On June 29, 2023, the trial

court issued a final judgment, reciting review of the magistrate’s decision, the fact no

objections were filed, and adopting the decision without modification.

5.
       {¶ 9} On August 4, 2023, wife filed a motion for limited remand for ruling on her

June 30, 2023 motion to set aside the order of the magistrate, which the trial court had not

addressed. On September 15, 2023, we denied the motion for remand, noting the failure

to file any challenge to the magistrate’s decision within the time permitted for objections.

                               III.    Assignment of Error

       {¶ 10} Wife filed an appellate brief on June 20, 2023, asserting a single

assignment of error:

       THE COURT ERRED IN APPROVING A JUDGMENT ENTRY FINAL

       DECREE OF DIVORCE WHEN THE COURT REQUJIRED ALL

       PARTIES AND COUNSEL TO SIGN AND WIFE AND WIFE’S

       ATTORNEY DID NOT SIGN AND THE ENTRY WAS NOT

       SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 18

       {¶ 11} Husband has not appeared or filed a brief in this appeal.

                                      IV.    Analysis

       {¶ 12} In support of her assignment of error, wife acknowledges a court may

incorporate the terms of a settlement, memorialized on the record, as part of its journal

entry, but argues that a court may not “force an agreement upon the parties.” She argues

a court abuses its discretion when it adopts a settlement agreement without conducting a

hearing to adjudicate disputes. Because she never signed the proposed entry, she argues

this is evidence of an existing dispute that prevented adoption by the trial court.

6.
Additionally, wife argues that the trial court signed the entry four days late, on April 4,

2023, after ordering the entry to be presented no later than March 31, 2023.

       {¶ 13} “As the Ohio Supreme Court recognized almost a century ago, when ‘a

consent decree has been entered by the court, such a decree is not even subject to direct

attack, except for irregularity or fraud in its procurement.’” Salpietro v. Salpietro, 2023-

Ohio-169, 205 N.E.3d 1203, ¶ 13, (6th Dist.), quoting Sponseller v. Sponseller, 110 Ohio

St. 395, 399, 144 N.E. 48 (1924), citing Harding v. Harding, 198 U.S. 317, 335, 25 S.Ct.

679, 49 L.Ed. 1066 (1905) (additional citation omitted.). Because a divorce decree based

on settlement is essentially a consent decree, wife’s consent to the settlement agreement

waives her right to appeal its terms absent issues related to formation of the agreement

itself. (Citations omitted) Salpietro at ¶ 13.

       {¶ 14} On appeal, wife does not challenge the formation of the agreement, but

instead challenges procedural issues related to the trial court’s incorporation of the

agreement in its final decree, arguing husband’s attorney submitted it after the March 31,

2023 deadline, and arguing the absence of her signature signals a dispute, despite the fact

she failed to file a motion to set aside the magistrate’s order. Neither of wife’s arguments

address the requirements for or effect of a consent decree, and her procedural challenges

do not negate the settlement.

       {¶ 15} First, wife’s claim of a missed deadline is refuted by the record. Simply

put, the appearance docket plainly indicates the proposed entry was submitted and

7.
received by the trial court on March 27, prior to the alleged March 31, 2023 deadline.

Thus, the docket belies wife’s claim that husband’s attorney failed to submit the proposed

entry before a deadline, even if such a deadline were dispositive. As to the timeliness of

husband’s submission, therefore, the record refutes wife’s argument.

       {¶ 16} Second, wife argues her lack of signature is the equivalent of affirmatively

filing a motion to set aside the magistrate’s order. The authority she recites in support

provides no support for this contention. See, e.g., Schrock v. Schrock, 12th Dist. Madison

No. CA2005-04-015, 2006-Ohio-748 (settlement agreement is an enforceable contract

and failure to affirmatively challenge terms in the trial court waives issue on appeal);

Kilroy v. Kilroy, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2002-G-2470, 2003-Ohio-5214 (dispute existed

based on wife’s filed objections to husband’s proposed entry); Phillips v. Phillips, 5th

Dist. Stark Nos. 2004CA00105, 2004CA00005, 2005-Ohio-231 (no settlement where in-

court record did not reflect a meeting of the minds).

       {¶ 17} In this case, the record demonstrated agreement with the settlement terms,

and the written entry accurately records those terms. While the proposed entry did not

note the manner of presentment, the in-court settlement is a binding contract, and the trial

court was “free to adopt a proposed entry that accurately reflects the terms of the

settlement, unless the record reflects some objection by the non-drafting party.”

Salpietro at ¶ 19, citing Johnson-Rome v. Rome, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27200, 2017-

Ohio-4099, ¶ 7; Benz v. Benz, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2004-G-2589, 2005-Ohio-5870, ¶

8.
14; Wade v. Wade, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-02-14, 2003-Ohio-686, ¶ 6 (additional citations

omitted.).

       {¶ 18} In her appeal, wife seeks to object to the agreed-upon terms, for the first

time, without otherwise explaining the actual dispute she alleges or explaining her failure

to file a motion to set aside the magistrate’s decision within 10 days, as required.

       {¶ 19} The Local Rules implicated are as follows:

       18.01 Preparation

              After a hearing which disposes of a case, after a mediation which

       results in settlement, or after a case has been reported settled, unless the

       Court otherwise directs or the parties otherwise agree with the Court’s

       consent, counsel for the party in whose favor an order, decree, or judgment

       is rendered, shall within fourteen (14) days thereafter prepare the proper

       journal entry, and submit it to the counsel for the adverse party, who shall

       approve or reject the same within ten (10) days after the receipt thereof. If

       counsel fails to present an entry within thirty (30) days after the order is

       decreed, or judgment rendered, the Judge may cause the proper entry to be

       prepared and filed without submission or notice to counsel, schedule a

       hearing or take such other action as may be appropriate under the

       circumstances.

9.
       18.04. Failure to Return

              If the entry is presented to the adverse party as in section 18.01

       above, and the adverse party fails to sign, return and/or file the entry after

       ten (10) days, the party who prepared the entry shall submit the entry to the

       Court and shall indicate on the signature line when the entry was presented

       to the adverse party and the manner of presentment. The Judge may sign

       the entry if is [sic.] comports with the parties’ agreement.

       {¶ 20} We recently addressed nearly identical argument and rejected it in

Salpietro v. Salpietro, 2023-Ohio-169, 205 N.E.3d 1203 (6th Dist.). In Salpietro, we

considered whether a trial court properly approved a proposed decree submitted by

husband’s attorney and not signed by wife or her attorney. In that case, the wife appealed

the adoption of the judgment entry, arguing the entry contained errors and the trial court

violated its local rules by not providing her 14 days to object to the contents of the

proposed decree. In rejecting wife’s argument, we found the terms of the settlement were

placed on the record in open court, the written entry reflected those terms, and wife failed

to file an objection. Salpietro at ¶ 19. “Thus, it is not error for a trial court to adopt a

proposed entry that one party submits in compliance with the court's local rules when the

other party remains silent or fails to comply with the local rules.” Salpietro at ¶ 19, citing

Johnson-Rome at ¶ 8 (no error when opposing party failed to object to drafting party’s

proposed entry as required by the local rules) (additional citation omitted.).

10.
       {¶ 21} The error claimed in Salpietro was a failure to wait 14 days for wife’s

objection, with the only discrepancy between the settlement agreement and the written

entry a clerical error. Id. at ¶ 22. The terms included in the written entry were the same

as those recited into the record as the settlement agreement. Id. Therefore, any error

resulted in no prejudice to wife, as a “party cannot establish prejudicial error when the

trial court adopts a proposed entry that accurately reflects the parties’ settlement

agreement.” Id., citing Benz, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2004-G-2589, 2005-Ohio-5870, at ¶

20.

       {¶ 22} In this case, wife argues the proposed entry was submitted without a

“manner of presentment” noted on the signature line. She does not, however, argue the

proposed entry was never presented to her or her counsel, or that the terms within the

proposed entry varied from the settlement recited into the record. Moreover, Local Rule

18.01 permitted the trial court to enter its own order, memorializing the settlement terms

already part of the record, if it failed to receive the proper entry within 30 days. Finally,

as in Salpietro, neither wife nor her attorney raised any objection to the settlement terms

and wife does not argue any prejudice arising from the lack of a “manner of presentment”

on an entry she does not deny receiving. Wife also did not attempt to file a motion to

rescind the settlement until after she perfected her appeal.

       {¶ 23} Here, the entry adopted by the trial court matched the terms recited on the

record, in wife’s presence, and wife does not demonstrate that the terms of the settlement

11.
are inaccurate or the product of fraud, duress, or other misconduct. Wife, furthermore,

does not raise any challenge but a technical rule infraction, with no claim of prejudice.

Considering the consent decree and the lack of filed objections, wife’s argument

regarding presentment lacks merit and the trial court properly incorporated the settlement

agreement as part of the final decree.

       {¶ 24} Wife’s sole assignment of error, accordingly, is not well-taken.

                                    V.     Conclusion

       {¶ 25} Finding substantial justice has been done, we affirm the judgment of the

Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. Appellant is

ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                        Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                            ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                                ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, J.                                     JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE

12.
       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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