Court Opinion

ID: 9882628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:17:40.565995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:37.769245
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Howard, Adm. of the Estate of Sean David Howard, Sr. v. Szozda, et al., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1297,
2023-Ohio-, 2023-Ohio-3407.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LUCAS COUNTY

Linda L. Howard, Administrator of the                       Court of Appeals No. L-22-1297
Estate of Sean David Howard, Sr., et al.
                                                            Trial Court No. CI0202003524
        Appellants

v.

Michelle Szozda, et al.                                     DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellees                                           Decided: September 22, 2023

                                                  *****

        Edwin A. Coy, for appellants.

        Paul R. Morway, for appellee Kevin Vasquez.

                                                  *****

        MAYLE, J.

        {¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Linda L. Howard, Administrator of the Estate of Sean

David Howard, Sr., and Steven Howard, Legal Custodian, appeal the November 21, 2022

judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in
favor of defendants-appellees, Kevin Vasquez and Kellsie Cousino. Vasquez has filed a

brief on appeal; Cousino has not. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court

judgment.

                                    I.     Background

       {¶ 2} On October 6, 2019, a group of women attended a bridal shower for a co-

worker. At some point, the shower transitioned into a party, and male co-workers

arrived. Michelle Szozda, Kevin Vasquez, Kellsie Cousino, and Kirk Mills, were among

those present. Seven attendees, including Szozda, Vasquez, Cousino, and Mills,

consumed alcohol and cocaine, but ran out of cocaine and decided to obtain more. They

pooled their money—$20 each—and after deeming that Szozda was the least impaired

among them, designated her to drive Mills to make the purchase. Szozda and Mills

additional cocaine, but on the way back to the party, Szozda caused a two-car motor

vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Sean Howard, Sr., the driver of the other

vehicle, and injuries to his passenger, his two-year-old daughter.

       {¶ 3} Szozda was charged criminally. The administrator of Howard’s estate and

his daughter’s legal guardian then sued Szozda and multiple others civilly for wrongful

death, negligence, and punitive damages. Although they recognized that Szozda owned

and was operating the vehicle, the Howards sought to hold liable all seven people who

consumed and contributed to the purchase of the cocaine. Their theory was that by

pooling their money and designating Szozda to drive and Mills to purchase the drugs, the

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seven party-goers formed a joint venture, pursuant to which Szozda’s negligence could

be imputed to all venturers. Vasquez and Cousino, neither of whom were in the vehicle

when the collision occurred, moved for summary judgment on the Howards’ claims.

       {¶ 4} Vasquez and Cousino argued that a joint venture requires (1) a joint contract,

(2) intention, (3) community of interest and joint control, and (4) profit and loss. They

claimed that all elements were missing here. They further argued that even if a joint

venture was formed, they could not be liable for Szozda’s negligence because they had

no joint operation or control of the movements of the vehicle.

       {¶ 5} The trial court agreed that the element of “joint control” was lacking, and

deeming it unnecessary to consider the other three elements, it granted summary

judgment in favor of Vasquez and Cousino. It reasoned that “[n]ot only were Defendants

herein not driving the vehicle at the time of the crash which killed/injured Plaintiffs,

Defendants were not passengers in the vehicle; they were at a different location entirely

from that of the crash.” Moreover, the court found, even if all the elements of a joint

venture were satisfied, “any input Defendants had into the operation of the vehicle was

too far removed to find they had joint control at the time of the crash.”

       {¶ 6} The Howards appealed. They assign the following error for our review:

              The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Appellees

       Vasquez and Cousino by ruling there is no genuine issue of material fact

       with respect to the community of interest and joint control element of the

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      joint venture Appellants Howard allege existed among Appellees Vasquez

      and Cousino and the other defendants below at the time of the crash.

                         II.    Summary Judgment Standard

      {¶ 7} Appellate review of a summary judgment is de novo, Grafton v. Ohio

Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996), employing the same

standard as trial courts. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts., 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129,

572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist.1989). The motion may be granted only when it is

demonstrated:

             (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the

      moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that

      reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is

      adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is

      made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his

      favor. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 67, 375

      N.E.2d 46 (1978), Civ.R. 56(C).

      {¶ 8} When seeking summary judgment, a party must specifically delineate the

basis upon which the motion is brought, Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 526

N.E.2d 798 (1988), syllabus, and identify those portions of the record that demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293,

662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). When a properly supported motion for summary judgment is

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made, an adverse party may not rest on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but

must respond with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact.

Civ.R. 56(E); Riley v. Montgomery, 11 Ohio St.3d 75, 79, 463 N.E.2d 1246 (1984). A

“material” fact is one which would affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable

substantive law. Russell v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 135 Ohio App.3d 301, 304, 733

N.E.2d 1186 (6th Dist.1999); Needham v. Provident Bank, 110 Ohio App.3d 817, 826,

675 N.E.2d 514 (8th Dist.1996), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 201 (1986).

                                 III.   Law and Analysis

       {¶ 9} In Ohio, the negligence of one person will not be imputed to another unless

an exception applies. Bloom v. Leech, 120 Ohio St. 239, 166 N.E. 137 (1929). Joint

enterprise—or “joint venture”—is one such exception. Id. See Vonderheide v.

Comerford, 113 Ohio App. 284, 286, 177 N.E.2d 793 (1st Dist.1961) (Ohio courts use

the terms “joint venture,” “joint enterprise,” and “joint adventure” interchangeably);

Cassity v. Oren Fab & Supply, Inc., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 13185, 1993 WL 112536,

*2 (Apr. 12, 1993) (“[J]oint venture [is] also referred to as joint adventure or joint

enterprise[.]”).1 In their sole assignment of error, the Howards claim that genuine issues

of material fact exist as to whether the seven named defendants formed a joint venture,

1
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “joint enterprise,” inter alia, as a “joint venture for
noncommercial purposes.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed.2019).

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pursuant to which liability may be imputed to Vasquez and Cousino for Szozda’s

negligence. They insist that these issues of fact precluded the trial court from granting

summary judgment in favor of Vasquez and Cousino.

       {¶ 10} Formation of a joint venture requires four elements: (1) a joint contract,

either express or implied, to engage in a specific business enterprise; (2) an intention to

associate as joint venturers; (3) a community of interest and joint control; and (4) an

agreement to share jointly and severally in profits and losses. Ford v. McCue, 163 Ohio

St. 498, 502-03, 127 N.E.2d 209 (1955). The parties must intend to associate themselves

as joint venturers, as determined using the ordinary rules for interpreting and construing

contracts. Id. They will not be found to have formed a joint venture for purposes of

imputing negligence unless there is “a community of interest in the purpose of the

undertaking, and equal authority or right to direct and govern the movements and conduct

of each other in connection therewith.” Id. Ohio courts recognize that “the person

alleging joint enterprise for the purpose of imputing negligence has a heavy burden of

proof since the courts do not favor the doctrine.” Weinstein v. Anselmo’s Landscape &

Design, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 70643, 1996 WL 674004, *3 (Nov. 21, 1996), citing

O'Donnell v. Korosec, Geauga App. No. 91-G-1659, 1992 WL 361434 (Nov. 27, 1992),

citing, Lester v. John R. Jurgensen Co., 400 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir.1968).

6.
       {¶ 11} Szozda was deposed in this matter. The Howards claim that Szozda’s

deposition testimony—where she testified to the facts summarized above—provided

evidence of each element required for formation of a joint venture.

       {¶ 12} As to the first element, a joint contract, the Howards claim that a joint

venture requires an agreement to undertake a specific enterprise or purpose. They insist

that here, the seven named defendants agreed they wanted to buy cocaine, they each

contributed $20 to fund the purchase, each participated in the decision to designate

Szozda the driver and Mills the buyer, and each agreed that Szozda and Mills would

return to distribute the cocaine to be consumed by all. They maintain that there was a

meeting of the minds as to the purpose of the venture, shared financial contribution, and

agreed planning for carrying out and sharing the purchase.

       {¶ 13} As to the second element, intention, the Howards claim that the seven

named defendants were the only people at the party consuming cocaine, all seven snorted

the initial supply until it was gone, and all seven wanted more, so they combined funds,

selected the least impaired driver, and appointed a buyer who had a connection. The

Howards insist that these facts evidence an intention to associate themselves with one

another.

       {¶ 14} As to the third element, community of interest and joint control, the

Howards argue that members of a joint venture may delegate joint control and need not

participate equally in every aspect of the venture. They emphasize that the group

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specifically considered—and with cause and reason—appointed Szozda the driver and

Mills the buyer because they were deemed the best suited to accomplish the venture; they

specifically selected Szozda because she was the least impaired. Although the Howards

acknowledge that Vasquez and Cousino did not ride along to supervise Szozda’s driving,

the Howards insist they were jointly and severally responsible for setting the venture in

motion. They claim that Vasquez and Cousino knew the venture would be more perilous

if anyone other than Szozda drove, and they made the collective decision to entrust her

with this task. The Howards maintain that they did not need to be in the car “hovering

over the steering wheel” to satisfy the element of joint control, and they characterize

Vasquez and Cousino’s participation as “active and continuing.”

       {¶ 15} On this point, the Howards rely on Kahle v. Turner, 66 Ohio App.2d 49,

420 N.E.2d 127 (12th Dist.1979), where the court determined that the sponsor of a

carnival was engaged in a joint venture with the owner/operator of a Ferris wheel from

which two patrons fell, killing one and injuring the other. The court concluded that the

sponsor, who furnished the site, promoted and advertised the event, sold tickets, and

provided electricity for the rides, could be liable for wrongful death and personal injuries

as a joint venturer even though it did not maintain or operate the Ferris wheel. The

Howards insist that it is a question of fact whether joint venturers share community of

interest and joint control, and where there is substantial evidence tending to prove that the

parties intended to join their property and efforts in furtherance of some enterprise for

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their joint profit, the question should be determined by the jury. They insist that

substantial evidence exists here.

       {¶ 16} Finally, as to the fourth element, an agreement to share in profits and

losses, the Howards claim that “profit” is not limited to an expression of financial

measure or the attainment of money. They argue that the “profit” here was the

anticipated acquisition of cocaine and whatever benefit snorting cocaine presumably

provided.

       {¶ 17} Vasquez responds that all elements of a joint venture are missing here.

       {¶ 18} As to the first element, a joint contract, Vasquez argues that because the

performance of the alleged agreement required a violation of law, there was necessarily

no lawful contract here.

       {¶ 19} As to the second element, intent, Vasquez insists that without a valid

contract, there cannot be an intent to associate as joint venturers. He also maintains that a

joint venture requires a “business” enterprise, which did not exist here.

       {¶ 20} As to the third element, community of interest and joint control, Vasquez

emphasizes that the instrument that caused harm to the Howards was Szozda’s vehicle,

thus the focus of inquiry should be on who had the right to control that motor vehicle

when it caused injury—i.e., Szozda. He stresses that he was not in the car, he lacked

“authority or right” to govern the movements of Szozda’s vehicle leading to the crash,

and there was no evidence that he even knew the identity or location of the dealer from

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whom Mills would purchase cocaine. Vasquez contends that Ohio courts often refuse to

find liability on the part of passengers in a vehicle, let alone someone who was not in the

vehicle at all and who provided no input as to routes or actual operation of the vehicle.

Vasquez distinguishes Kahle on the basis that it did not involve the operation of a

vehicle, but instead involved specifically-delineated terms of a joint venture. He insists

that Allen v. Benefiel, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP-90, 1999 WL 770942 (Sept. 30,

1999), decided 20 years after Kahle and involving the negligent operation of a motor

vehicle, describes the appropriate test to be employed and requires joint operation or

control of movements. He maintains that a simple contribution of money is insufficient

to establish community of interest and joint control.

       {¶ 21} Finally, as to the fourth element, an agreement to share in profit and losses,

Vasquez maintains that there was no profit derived from the purchase and no agreement

to jointly distribute losses. Vasquez claims, therefore, that the Howards cannot establish

this element.

       {¶ 22} The trial court concluded that the failure to establish the third element—

community of interest and joint control—prevented the formation of a joint venture and

was dispositive here. It deemed it unnecessary to address the remaining elements

required to form a joint venture. We agree with the trial court.

       {¶ 23} The seminal Ohio Supreme Court case on this issue is Bloom, 120 Ohio St.

at 243-44, 166 N.E. 137. In Bloom, the driver intended to purchase livestock from the

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passenger, and they drove to the bank of the passenger’s surety to verify the surety’s

financial status. After this stop, the passenger told the driver where the surety lived and

they began driving to his home. As the vehicle approached an intersection, the driver

asked the passenger to look to see if the intersection was free of streetcars. The

passenger said it was clear, but it was not. The car was struck by the streetcar. The court

considered the issue of whether the driver’s negligence could be imputed to the passenger

under a joint enterprise theory.

       {¶ 24} The court recognized that the driver and passenger shared a common

purpose and the trip “was beneficial to both.” But, it explained, “[p]arties cannot be said

to be engaged in a joint enterprise, within the meaning of the law of negligence, unless

there be a community of interests in the objects or purposes of the undertaking, and an

equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other with respect

thereto.” (Internal quotations and citation omitted.) Id. at 244. The court emphasized

that where a “crossing accident” is involved, “the test in determining the question is

whether the parties were jointly operating or controlling the movements of the vehicle in

which they were riding”—i.e., “there must be a right of mutual control.” (Emphasis in

original.) Id. at 243-244. “Where the guest has no voice in directing and governing the

movements of the automobile, he cannot be said to be engaged in a joint adventure with

the driver, within the meaning of the law of negligence.” Id.

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          {¶ 25} The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that no joint enterprise existed

between the driver and the passenger. It reasoned that even though the passenger told the

driver the route and destination, and even though the driver asked the passenger to check

to see if the intersection was clear, the evidence failed to show that the passenger “had

any power or control over the vehicle in which they were riding, or that he had any such

authority as would show that he had joint control with * * * the owner and driver of the

car.” Id. at 245. See also Burris v. Zurich, 2019-Ohio-5255, 138 N.E.3d 1185, ¶ 32 (4th

Dist.).

          {¶ 26} Since Bloom, Ohio courts continue to recognize that in the context of a

motor vehicle accident, the mere fact that two people had a common business interest is

not enough to support joint enterprise liability—the lack of control by a person over the

vehicle or the driver’s driving renders the doctrine inapplicable. Torres v. Erie

Lackawanna Ry. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 38485, 1979 WL 210009, *10 (May 31,

1979). See also Bailey v. Parker, 34 Ohio App. 207, 211-12, 170 N.E. 607 (5th

Dist.1930) (recognizing that even where “all the occupants of the car [are] mutually

interested in the object and purpose of their trip * * *, this alone cannot create joint

enterprise, as understood in law”). “[T]he key to finding the existence of a joint

enterprise in the context of the use of a motor vehicle is the passenger’s control over or

right to control the actual operation and movement of the motor vehicle.” Allen, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 99AP-90, 1999 WL 770942, at * 3. See also Bailey at id. (observing

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that before negligence will be imputed to someone other than the driver, “it must first be

shown that the parties are engaged in a joint enterprise, and it must be proved that the

parties are jointly operating or controlling the movements of the car in which they are

riding”). Summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate where the facts

construed most strongly in favor of the plaintiff show that the defendant “had neither

actual control over nor the right to control the operation of” the vehicle responsible for

the collision. Allen at * 3.

       {¶ 27} In Allen, relied on by Vasquez, the driver and passenger had been out

drinking with co-workers. Later, the driver was driving the passenger home, when she

veered left of center and collided with another vehicle. The plaintiff argued that the

driver and passenger had been engaged in a joint enterprise such that the driver’s

negligence could be imputed to the passenger.

       {¶ 28} In Allen, the evidence showed that the passenger persuaded the driver to

drink despite her reluctance, paid for her drinks, asked her to stop at a second bar, gave

her directions, and benefited from getting a ride home from her. There was also evidence

that other of their co-workers told the driver that the passenger needed a ride home and

the driver agreed to take him home because she thought it would be unsafe for him to

drive. But the court concluded that these activities were not sufficient to make it a joint

enterprise because the passenger did not have control over the actual operation of the

vehicle. See also Tittle v. Maurer, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-95-5, 1995 WL 641273, *3

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(Oct. 23, 1995) (finding that the record contained no evidence which would allow a

rational trier of fact to conclude that passenger had any actual or constructive control over

the operation of the vehicle); Collopy By & Through McCarthy v. Gardiner, 12th Dist.

Clermont No. CA85-08-057, 1986 WL 4234, *3 (Apr. 7, 1986) (finding no liability

where defendant did not own the car, was not driving, and had no legal right or power to

direct the manner in which the car was operated or its route).

       {¶ 29} This court has had occasion to consider claims of joint venture liability

concerning the operation of a vehicle. In Elfers v. Bright, 108 Ohio App. 495, 162

N.E.2d 535 (6th Dist.1958), for instance, four people drove to Florida together. All four

shared gas expenses equally. The owner of the vehicle delegated driving responsibility to

another occupant of the vehicle. The driver was involved in an accident and the plaintiff,

another passenger, was injured. The injured passenger sued both the driver and the

owner of the vehicle. The driver argued that because they were engaged in a joint

venture, her negligence was imputed to the injured passenger and plaintiff could not

recover against her. We disagreed. We concluded that “[t]he occupants of an automobile

on a trip to Florida who have agreed with the owner thereof to share the expense of the

trip but who do not participate in controlling the actual operation of the vehicle are not

engaged in such a joint enterprise as would impute the negligence of the driver thereof to

the other occupants.” Id. at 497. We reasoned that “[a]lthough the four women were

engaged in a common objective, they were not engaged in such a joint enterprise as

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would impute the negligence of the defendant to the plaintiff” because the element of

control over the operation of the vehicle was lacking.2 Id. at 497-498.

       {¶ 30} In Pfund v. Ciesielczyk, 84 Ohio App.3d 159, 168, 616 N.E.2d 560 (6th

Dist.1992), the driver, a teen who had only his temporary permit, picked up two friends,

one of whom was a licensed driver, intending to travel to Wauseon with “a common

purpose to engage in a pickup basketball game and to return a video to a video rental

store.” The driver caused an accident. The plaintiff argued that the licensed passenger

could be held liable for the accident under the joint venture theory because he was

accompanying the permit driver as a licensed driver, and, therefore, had an equal right of

control to the vehicle. We concluded otherwise. We found that although “a duty does

exist for a licensed driver knowingly accompanying a permit driver to advise, instruct and

supervise the permit driver, we are not prepared to extend the duty to include a general

requirement that the licensed driver be prepared to control the vehicle.” Id. We

determined that “no genuine factual dispute remain[ed] on the issue that he had no mutual

right to control the vehicle,” thus, “as a matter of law, no joint enterprise existed” and

summary judgment was properly granted to the licensed passenger.

2
 See also Carey v. Seeley’s Ceramic Serv., Inc., 2d Dist. Miami No. 93-CA-30, 1994 WL
124849, *3 (Apr. 13, 1994) (“The liabilities of joint venturers are predicated on a theory
of mutual agency, and evidence of mere joint contribution falls short of the requisite
proof of mutuality of control.”) (Internal quotations and citations omitted.).

15.
       {¶ 31} Finally, in Simensky v. Zwyer, 40 Ohio App. 275, 281, 178 N.E. 422 (6th

Dist.1931), the plaintiff’s decedent was a passenger in a truck driven by an intoxicated

driver. He was killed when the driver was involved in a collision with another vehicle.

At trial, the court gave a number of jury instructions that the plaintiff claimed were given

in error. One such instruction was that if the plaintiff’s decedent and the other two

occupants of the vehicle were on a pleasure trip, were all intoxicated, were all parties to

the drinking, and all participated in the intoxication of the driver, “each would be as

much responsible for the car being driven by a drunken person as the driver would be.”

Id. at 280. The instruction further provided that “[i]n such a case it is not very material

who drove the car, for, if the injury resulted from the intoxication of the driver, it is the

common act of all, and prevents any one of the intoxicated persons, or his personal

representative, from recovery.” Id. at 280-281. We agreed with the plaintiff that the trial

court erred in giving this instruction. We found that the principle of joint enterprise was

not applicable to the case because the occupants of the truck “were not engaged in a joint

enterprise as to the operation of the automobile.” Id. at 281. We reasoned that there was

“no evidence tending to show that the right to control or responsibility for the operation

was in any one other than the driver himself,” and “joint enterprise with reference to the

driving of an automobile requires not only common possession of the automobile by the

joint adventurers, but also that they must have joint control and responsibility for its

operation.” Id., citing Bloom, 120 Ohio St. at 246, 166 N.E. 137.

16.
       {¶ 32} Here, construing the facts most strongly in favor of the Howards, we

conclude that while Vasquez and Cousino may have shared a common objective with

Szozda to obtain more cocaine, funded equally by members of the group, Szozda’s

negligence cannot be imputed to them. The Howards’ injury was the direct result of

Szozda’s control of the operation and movement of her vehicle. Where a plaintiff has

sustained injuries caused by a driver alleged to have been engaged in a joint venture, and

the plaintiff seeks to impute negligence to the alleged non-driving co-venturers, Ohio

courts focus very specifically on whether the alleged, non-driving co-venturers had

control of the operation and movement of the vehicle. While Vasquez and Cousino may

have been involved in designating Szozda the task of driving to obtain cocaine to be

shared by the group, Szozda retained sole control of the operation and movement of the

vehicle. Vasquez and Cousino not only lacked control of the operation and movement of

the vehicle—they were not even in the vehicle. Because Vasquez and Cousino in no way

operated or physically controlled the movement of the vehicle, they lacked the “joint

control” necessary to impute Szozda’s negligence to them under a theory of joint venture

liability. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to

Vasquez and Cousino.

       {¶ 33} We find the Howards’ assignment of error not well-taken.

17.
                                    IV.    Conclusion

       {¶ 34} We find the Howards’ sole assignment of error not well-taken. Szozda’s

negligence in causing the automobile accident here could not be imputed to Vasquez and

Cousino under a theory of joint venture liability because the element of “joint control”

could not be established. Vasquez and Cousino were not passengers in the vehicle, and

there was no evidence that they jointly operated or controlled the movements of the

vehicle. We affirm the November 21, 2022 judgment of the Lucas County Court of

Common Pleas. The Howards are ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R.

24.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                               ____________________________
Gene A. Zmuda, J.                                      JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE

18.
       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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