Court Opinion

ID: 9568753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:07:10.402637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:05:26.774973
License: Public Domain

DENECKE, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the decision that the judgment for the defendant must be reversed; however, I cannot concur in the reasoning of the majority.
The first ground for reversal is that the defendant’s answer setting up a release is insufficient be*258cause it failed to allege that the claim was unliquidated or otherwise in dispute. The majority refers to this release as an accord and satisfaction, whereas the instrument is in terms of a release. There is a theoretical difference between a release and an accord-satisfaction ; however, both are forms-of contract, and probably it is immaterial whether the agreement is an accord and satisfaction or a release.
I can see nothing to be served by requiring the pleader setting up an accord and satisfaction or a release to further allege that the claim released or satisfied was an unliquidated or disputed claim. The only materiality of such an allegation is that a release or agreement of accord and satisfaction of a liquidated and undisputed claim for an amount less than the full amount of the claim is not binding. It is not binding because there is no consideration. This court has adopted the accepted rule of pleading that the defense of want of consideration is new matter which must be pleaded. Tuthill v. Stoehr, 163 Or 461, 469, 98 P2d 8 (1940). Observance of this rule requires the other party to allege that the claim was liquidated and not disputed and, therefore, there was a want of consideration, and the release is not binding.- This is what the plaintiff did in this case in his réply. I can see no reason to require the defendant to allege that the claim was unliquidated and disputed.
I concur that the demurrer to plaintiff’s affirmative reply of no consideration was improperly sustained, and the judgment on the pleadings was, therefore, in error. In my opinion the reply alleges a liquidated and undisputed claim of $.157,000 and the defense of want of consideration is adequately pleaded.
I disagree with that part of the majority holding *259that the plaintiff’s affirmative reply of duress states a cause for rescission:
I interpret the plaintiff’s reply as alleging as follows: Plaintiff was in such economic distress that he was in danger of losing his home and other personal property unless funds owed him by the defendant were immediately paid; plaintiff informed defendant of his condition; defendant acknowledged to plaintiff that it owed him $157,000 but advised plaintiff that unless he signed a complete release in consideration of receiving $5,000 the defendant would pay him nothing; and defendant further informed the plaintiff that defendant’s lawyers were so brilliant that they could prevent plaintiff from getting a judgment against defendant.
I view the basic ingredients of the allegations to be. that plaintiff is in serious economic distress, which is known to defendant, and because of this defendant offers .and plaintiff accepts less than the defendant legally owes plaintiff.
This seems to be as strong a case for the operation of the doctrine of economic duress as can be made. Nevertheless, I believe it would be judicially unwise to hold .that these allegations constitute economic duress and that proof of such allegations would enable the plaintiff to rescind the release.
I .am of this opinion because I believe that a substantial number of business transactions today have these same basic ingredients. I am also of the opinion that' a majority of businessmen, while not approving such conduct, do not believe that such conduct should enable one to avoid an otherwise binding legal obligation. This belief is probably partially grounded upon the knowledge that the facts will seldom be as unambiguous as they are.here alleged and the party assert*260ing this defense will usually be an unfortunate and unsuccessful party opposing a fortunate and successful party. This could cause the trier of fact to find the facts to fit the result. The attitude of the business community is a consideration, although not a compelling one. In addition, I believe that other kinds of sanctions and grounds for relief are available and more desirable.① The well recognized doctrine that an agreement to release a debtor in consideration for a payment of a sum less than the acknowledged amount owing is not enforceable because of a lack of consideration affords relief in situations such as plaintiff has alleged.
I agree with the majority that the decisions of other jurisdictions are in conflict on this issue. I am of the opinion that the doctrine of economic duress is more supported by dicta in the opinions than in the decisions themselves. For example, see Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Corporation, 372 F2d 753 (2d Cir 1967).
An example of a decision which refused to apply the doctrine of economic duress is Weinman Pump Manufacturing Co. v. Cline, 116 Ohio App 4, 183 NE2d 465 (1961), noted in 12 DePaul L Rev 351 (1963). In that case the plaintiff’s manufacturing plant was being appropriated for a freeway and it was imperative that he quickly relocate. Plaintiff owned some other property upon which he wished to relocate. Defend*261ant owned a parcel contiguous to plaintiff’s property and it was desirable for plaintiff to acquire this parcel to make the relocation feasible. The parties entered into a contract for the sale of the parcel for $8,000. The defendant could not give clear title, plaintiff commenced a specific performance suit, defendant then disclosed that he was married and he would not get a release of his wife’s dower interest unless plaintiff paid him an additional $7,000. Plaintiff paid the additional sum because he urgently needed the land and then commenced a suit to recover the $7,000. The court held for the defendant on the ground that the evidence of business duress did not prove a cause for relief.②

 For example, some years ago in Oregon it was believed that some insurance carriers were not paying small claims admittedly owing because they knew it would be almost as costly for the claimant to enforce their claims in court as it would be to personally absorb the claim. The legislature attempted to remedy this and provided that in certain claims less than $1,000, the claimant could make a demand, if the demand was refused and the claimant filed an action and prevailed, he would be awarded attorney’s fees against the defendant. OES 20.080.

 Unfortunately, the opinion does not contain any persuasive reasons for the result.