Court Opinion

ID: 9838702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 16:09:15.142917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:42.816202
License: Public Domain

J-S24024-23

                                   2023 PA Super 162

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KELVIN MCLEAN                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 176 MDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 16, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-22-CR-0006639-2018

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.:                            FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2023

       Kelvin McLean appeals nunc pro tunc from his judgment of sentence,

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, after a jury

convicted him of one count each of statutory sexual assault,1 corruption of

minors,2 and unlawful contact with a minor.3           We conclude the trial court

properly denied McLean’s motion to suppress DNA evidence taken pursuant to

court order, and, therefore, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

       The trial court sets forth the facts of this case as follows:

       In March of 2018, Dauphin County Children and Youth Services
       [DCCYS] received a child abuse referral alleging that B.F. (DOB:
       8/[]/01) who was sixteen (16) years old at the time, had given
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1.

2 Id. at § 6301.

3 Id. at § 6318.
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     birth to a child. [I]t was alleged [by DCCYS] that B.F. was fifteen
     (15) years old at the time of conception and that [McLean, B.F.’s
     mother’s paramour at the time of conception,] was the biological
     father of the child. . . . DCCYS had information from the hospital
     that B.F. wanted to put [McLean’s] name as the biological father
     on the child’s birth certificate.

     B.F. had told hospital staff that she viewed [McLean] as a father,
     that she was planning on being adopted by him, and wanted her
     child to have the same last name as she. DCCYS interviewed B.F.,
     who denied that [McLean] was the biological father.

     Initially[,] the allegation was deemed unfounded upon the
     information DCCYS had at the time. Despite this, DCCYS was
     familiar with B.F. [due to two prior dependency proceedings in
     2012 and 2015,] and had concerns with B.F.’s ability to care for
     her child.

                                 *    *    *

     During the summer of 2018, DCCYS provided housing assistance
     for B.F., her child, [B.F.’s mother (Mother), Mother’s child with
     McLean, and McLean.] After a caseworker went to check on the
     family at the hotel [in which they were being housed], [] DCCYS
     began to have concerns that the relationship between B.F., [now]
     sixteen (16), and [McLean] was [not a familial relationship but
     rather a romantic relationship.] Thereafter, DCCYS pursued
     dependency of B.F. and her child.

     On August 22, 2018, DCCYS obtained a court order[, issued by
     the Honorable John F. Cherry,] to place B.F. and her child in the
     care and custody of DCCYS, as well [as] an order for paternity
     testing of [McLean. It was subsequently determined that McLean
     failed to attend his scheduled appointment for paternity testing.
     As a result,] DCCYS requested an order for contempt of court for
     [McLean’s] lack of compliance with the August 22, 2018 order. It
     was stipulated at the trial that the buccal swab of [McLean] was
     performed by [a “Miss Johnson”] on behalf of the court. After
     collecting DNA from the child, both samples were sent out for
     testing.

                                 *    *    *

     On November 8, 2018[, as a result of testimony stating there is a
     99.99% probability that McLean is the biological father of B.F.’s

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       child, based on the results of the DNA test] the Honorable Royce
       Morris issued an order [legally establishing McLean’s paternity.]

       B.F. testified at trial and admitted that [McLean] is the biological
       father of her child. She further admitted that she and [McLean]
       engaged in sexual intercourse beginning when she was fifteen
       (15) years old, and adamantly stated that she consented. She
       also identified [McLean] in court and stated they were not married.

       In addition to DCCYS’ child abuse investigation, the Steelton
       Borough Police Department had also opened an investigation in
       March of 2018 and re-opened it in August of 2018. Officer Dory
       Thompson [] of Steelton Borough Police Department testified that
       they received a Childline referral in March of 2018 stating that B.F.
       had given birth to a child, that she was fifteen (15) years of age
       at the time of conception, and that [McLean’s] name was on the
       child’s birth certificate. Officer Thompson interviewed B.F., who
       denied the allegations, and because there was no other evidence
       that [McLean] was the father at that time, the case was closed.

       After DCCYS took custody of B.F., she was placed in a foster home,
       then Pinkney’s Vineyard,[4] and finally a youth shelter. Cell
       phones are prohibited at the youth shelter [and] DCCYS maintains
       possession of the youth’s belongings if they are unable to give
       them to a parent. In this case, DCCYS took possession of B.F.’s
       phone. [This occurred sometime between late August and early
       September of 2018.]       While [B.F.’s phone was in DCCYS’]
       possession, Mother provided the passcode to DCCYS and they
       were able to look at B.F.’s phone[, in which they found
       photographs and videos that prompted them to notify law
       enforcement.]

       Based on the information provided by DCCYS, Officer Thompson
       [obtained a search warrant to obtain B.F’s cell phone and
       download the contents of that cell phone, which revealed photos
       and videos of sexual acts performed by B.F. that had been

____________________________________________

4  Pinkney’s Vineyard was founded in 2003 to help disadvantaged teen
mothers. See PINKNEY’S VINEYARD OF FAITH MINISTRIES, http://pvfm.org/ (last
visited Aug. 3, 2023).

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       forwarded to a number associated with McLean.5] Thereafter,
       Officer Thompson was notified that [McLean] was found to be the
       biological father of B.F.’s child through paternity testing. [As a
       result of learning of McLean’s paternity results, and other
       information gathered throughout the Steelton Borough Police
       Department’s investigation, criminal charges were filed against
       McLean shortly thereafter. Officer Thompson then applied for and
       obtained an arrest warrant for McLean.]

       On or about November 25, 2018, McLean was charged with the
       above-mentioned offenses. McLean filed an omnibus pretrial
       motion to suppress the DNA evidence. After a hearing on
       February 20, 2020, before the Honorable William T. Tully, the
       suppression court denied McLean’s motion[, concluding that] the
       dependency action August 22, 2018 order was lawfully filed, and
       that McLean’s defense counsel conceded his argument upon
       learning that this order arose from a separate proceeding. A jury
       trial was held [with the same jurist presiding], beginning on
       October 6, 2020, wherein McLean was found guilty on all counts.

       McLean was sentenced on December 16, 2020, to an aggregate
       sentence of six (6) to twelve (12) years of incarceration and five
       (5) years of consecutive state probation. McLean was notified he
       was a Tier 3 sexual offender [under the Sex Offenders Registration
       and Notification Act (SORNA)] and all standard sexual offender
       conditions were imposed. McLean filed a timely post-sentence
       motion on December 28, 2020, which was subsequently denied
       on January 7, 2021. On February 3, 2021, McLean filed a timely
       notice of appeal, which was dismissed on May 26, 2021, for failure
       to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 3517.

       On July 28, 2022, McLean filed a petition [under the Post
       Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546].
       Christopher Wilson, Esquire (Attorney Wilson) was appointed as
       PCRA counsel. Based upon the agreement of the parties, on
       November 10, 2022, Defendant’s PCRA petition was granted, and
       his appeal rights were reinstated, nunc pro tunc. On January 31,
       2023, McLean filed a timely notice of appeal, nunc pro tunc. The
____________________________________________

5 The information obtained from B.F.’s cell phone was not used in Officer
Thompson’s affidavit of probable cause leading to the approval of a warrant
for McLean’s arrest in the underlying matter. See Affidavit of Probable Cause,
11/19/18, at 1-3. The affidavit was based solely on the events that led to the
dependency court’s order establishing McLean’s paternity. See id. at 2-3.

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      trial court directed McLean to file a concise statement of errors
      complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).]

Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/23, at 2-7 (unpaginated, citations omitted).

      On appeal, McLean raises the following issue for our consideration:

         Whether the [s]uppression [c]ourt erred in denying the
         motion to suppress the DNA sample obtained from [McLean]
         while he was in prison, and whether the [s]uppression
         [c]ourt’s decision was erroneous, and the findings were not
         supported by the record?

Appellant’s Brief, at 3.

      Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of

a suppression motion is limited to determining

      whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
      the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
      facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
      the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
      Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
      remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
      a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
      supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may
      reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where
      . . . the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns
      on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal
      conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it
      is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
      to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the court[] below are
      subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010).

      The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

§ 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution protects a private citizen from

unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Wilmer, 194 A.3d

564, 565 (Pa. 2018). In order to either search a constitutionally protected

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area for evidence or seize a criminal defendant, law enforcement is generally

required to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause, with limited

exceptions.   See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 899 (Pa.

1991).

      It is well settled that “[a] criminal defendant with standing to pursue a

motion to suppress in this Commonwealth has a right to compel the

prosecution to prove its evidence was not obtained in violation of his

constitutional rights.” Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695, 703 (Pa.

2014); see Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). The Commonwealth has the initial burden

to “present evidence that the defendant’s constitutional rights were not

infringed.” See Enimpah, 106 A.3d at 701.       If the Commonwealth presents

evidence that shows the defendant “lacked a privacy interest, the burden

shifts to the defendant to demonstrate he had a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the area searched.”      Id.   Thereafter, it is incumbent on the

suppression court to consider all of the evidence to determine whether the

Commonwealth met its burden of production, and, if so, whether the

defendant met his burden of persuasion that he possessed a reasonable

expectation of privacy. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823

A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“It is within the suppression court’s sole

province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to

be given to their testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some

or none of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”).

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      Instantly, McLean contends that because the contempt order in the

dependency action resulted in his incarceration, and the record is devoid of

any testimony from the individual who performed the buccal DNA swab test

for his paternity, McLean was coerced by law enforcement to consent to an

unlawful search and seizure. See Appellant’s Brief, at 10. McLean argues

that the evidence obtained as a result of this alleged unlawful search and

seizure, which resulted in the dependency court entering an order establishing

McLean’s paternity, could not be used in the officer’s probable cause affidavit

supporting his arrest for the subject offenses. Id. at 11. In support of its

denial of McLean’s suppression motion, the trial court opined that “[a]fter

hearing testimony and reviewing the August 22, 2018, [o]rder, [] the

dependency action was filed in good faith[, and t]here was no evidence of any

police participation [or misconduct that] would otherwise justify suppression

of any evidence.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/23, at 9.

      We agree with the trial court that the dependency action was a separate

and lawful proceeding. The record of the suppression hearing supports the

court’s determination that the order establishing McLean’s paternity would

have provided the necessary probable cause to support a warrant for his arrest

in this criminal matter, regardless of whether the court established paternity

by default or by genetic testing. See Eadie v. Bohatch, 601 A.2d 361 (Pa.

Super. 1992) (holding defendant’s failure to comply with trial court’s order to

submit blood testing gave trial court authority to resolve paternity issue).

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Additionally, we emphasize that the use of buccal swabs is a minimal intrusion

into a defendant’s privacy interest following his lawful arrest and does not

require a demonstration of consent.     See Commonwealth v. Smith, 164

A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[W]hen the prospective DNA sample is

being used for identification purposes [upon arrest], the donor of that sample

has no more privacy interest in it than in his fingerprints.”). Therefore, we

find the Commonwealth sustained its burden of demonstrating McLean’s

constitutional rights were not infringed upon. See Enimpah, supra.

      Next, McLean contends that the suppression court’s decision not to

exclude the DNA test was not supported by the record, and, thus, constitutes

reversible error.   In response, the Commonwealth argues that because

McLean was incarcerated as a result of the dependency court finding him in

contempt for failure to submit to genetic testing, no warrant was needed to

obtain his DNA. See Appellee’s Brief, at 7. In fact, the trial court noted that,

at the suppression hearing, McLean’s defense attorney conceded that McLean

was not coerced after he realized that the order was from the dependency

court, and not “at the request of law enforcement.” N.T. Suppression Hearing,

2/20/20, at 33. See also id. at 8 (defense counsel stating based on receipt

of dependency court order and discussions with prosecution, “I don’t think

necessarily all aspects of that [suppression] motion are appropriate at this

point.”); id. at 17-19 (defense counsel acknowledging order was not initiated

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by law enforcement; trial court stating “tenor of the case changes dramatically

with the appearance of that court order” from dependency action).

       In civil proceedings pertaining to domestic relations, dependency, or

custody actions, the plaintiff has the right to request and obtain court-ordered

genetic testing. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4343(c)(1).6 In the event that an order

is granted requiring the defendant to submit to paternity testing, “[t]he order

must advise the defendant that his failure to appear for the testing will result

in entry of an order finding that he is the father of the child.”       Pa.R.C.P

1910.15(b)(1). Failure to appear for genetic testing by the defendant allows

the requesting party to seek, and obtain, from the court, a contempt order

punishable by a period of imprisonment, fines, and/or probation.         See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 4344.7

____________________________________________

6 “Upon the request of any party to an action to establish paternity, supported

by a sworn statement from the party, the court or domestic relations section
shall require the child and the parties to submit to genetic tests.” 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 4343(c)(1).

7 Pursuant to section 4344:

       A person who willfully fails or refuses to appear in response to a
       duly served order or other process under this chapter may, as
       prescribed by general rule, be adjudged in contempt. Contempt
       shall be punishable by any one or more of the following:

          (1) Imprisonment for a period not to exceed six months.

          (2) A fine not to exceed $ 500.

          (3) Probation for a period not to exceed six months.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4344.

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      Here, it was established at the suppression hearing that the dependency

court had the authority to issue its August 22, 2018 order requiring McLean

submit to court-ordered DNA testing following DCCYS’ initiation of its action.

See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 2/20/20, at 4. As a result of McLean’s failure

to comply with the dependency court’s order, he was lawfully found in

contempt. See id. at 13-14. All of this information was relayed to Officer

Thompson of the Steelton Borough Police Department and was included in

Officer Thompson’s testimony at the suppression hearing. See id.; see also

Elmobdy, supra.

      “[W]ith respect to the breathalyzer test, buccal, swab, and fingernail

scrape, the United States Supreme Court has characterized the scope of the

intrusions as . . . an ‘almost negligible’ physical intrusion; and[] a ‘very limited

intrusion.’” Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 800 (Pa. Super.

2016) (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 462 (2016);

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013); and Cupp v. Murphy, 412

U.S. 291, 296 (1973)). In Simonson, this Court held that a gun residue test

on a defendant’s hands could not be considered an unlawful intrusion and was

a search incident to a lawful arrest supported by a legitimate governmental

interest. See id. at 800. We found that this test was far less intrusive than

the buccal swab at issue in Maryland v. King, supra. See Simonson, supra

at 801.   However, we also emphasized that a defendant’s privacy interest

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protecting him or her from a buccal swab is substantially diminished once in

police custody. See id. at 800.

      Additionally, “DNA collection occurs only after it has been determined

that there is probable cause to believe that the arrestee committed a crime.

In light of this probable cause finding, arrestees possess a diminished

expectation of privacy in their own identity, which has traditionally justified

taking their fingerprints and photographs.” Smith, supra at 1260 (quoting

United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 411-12 (3d. Cir. 2011)). While

McLean avers that reliance on Smith is misplaced as its factual basis arises

out of a buccal swab pursuant to a warrant, see Appellant’s Reply Brief, at 1,

the discussion it provides on the degree of a defendant’s expectation of privacy

is instructive on the suppression issue at bar. See Smith, supra at 1259-60.

      Here, the dependency court’s finding that McLean was in contempt as a

result of his failure to appear for paternity testing was, conclusively, an order

mandating his arrest. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 2/20/20, at 13-14. As

a result of this arrest, Officer Thompson obtained information that McLean was

in custody of law enforcement at Dauphin County Prison. See id. at 14. Under

these circumstances, it is abundantly clear that McLean’s arrest was supported

by probable cause.     See Smith, supra at 1260.        With McLean in police

custody, the need to obtain his consent was substantially diminished, as was

his reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the DNA test.              See

Simonson, supra at 800.

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      As noted above, a court presiding over domestic relations matters may

enter a contempt order in response to a defendant’s failure to follow a court

order, but it is not the sole remedy. See Smith v. Beard, 473 A.2d 625, 629

(Pa. Super. 1984) (establishing dependency court may resolve question of

paternity on its own accord following defendant’s inability to comply with

paternity blood testing). A dependency court has the discretion to determine

the applicable penalty regardless of a defendant’s inability or refusal to comply

with a court order, or refusal to submit to paternity testing for other reasons.

See Eadie, supra at 310-11; see also supra n.7.

      Here, assuming, arguendo, that McLean’s buccal swab DNA test had

occurred as a result of an unlawful arrest and thus violated his protected

privacy interest, the    dependency court could have          made    a default

determination that McLean was the father of B.F.’s child solely based upon

his failure to appear for the testing. See Eadie, supra at 309. Even if

the order establishing paternity by the dependency court was lacking any

reasonable degree of biological certainty, but was only the result of McLean’s

own default, the order would still provide the necessary probable cause for

Officer Thompson to obtain a warrant for McLean’s arrest. See In re Petition

to Compel with Child Abuse Investigation, 875 A.2d 365, 379 (Pa. Super.

2005) (holding plaintiff Child and Youth Services need not obtain warrant

when performing investigation subject to domestic relations court order, but

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separate criminal matters require solicitation of warrant supported by

probable cause).

       McLean was lawfully arrested and incarcerated due to a finding of

contempt by the dependency court, and since that finding was predicated on

his failure to submit to a buccal DNA swab, which is also a routine booking

procedure incident to that arrest, we do not require any further inquiry into

the conduct of law enforcement at that time.       See Smith, supra at 1259-

60.8

       We hold that a buccal mouth swab test conducted incident to a

defendant’s incarceration for contempt of an order entered in a separate

dependency matter, which test was used to establish paternity in the

dependency matter, does not violate a defendant’s privacy rights when that

determination of paternity is used to obtain an arrest warrant in a subsequent

criminal matter. Accordingly, the suppression court did not err in denying

McLean’s motion to suppress. Jones, supra.

____________________________________________

8 While the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently emphasized that an

absence of evidence suggesting any exigent circumstance does not permit
officers to order a warrantless, non-consensual blood draw, reliance on this
decision is misguided in the context of McLean’s DNA sample. See
Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 279 A.3d 508 (Pa. 2022). The
comparison of a blood test without a warrant to a buccal swab subject to a
lawful arrest implicates two distinct expectations of privacy. Law enforcement
does not have the ability to obtain warrantless blood draws due to the higher
degree of bodily intrusion into a defendant’s person. See Simonson, supra
at 797. However, a buccal swab has long been considered a negligible
intrusion for the limited scope of what it can establish. See id. at 799.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/7/2023

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