Court Opinion

ID: 9928871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 08:12:54.551168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:26.744542
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                    EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                         EL PASO, TEXAS

    RAYMOND DIEGO REYES,                                 §                 No. 08-23-00125-CR

                                   Appellant,            §                    Appeal from the

    v.                                                   §             218th Judicial District Court

    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                  §              of Atascosa County, Texas

                                   Appellee.             §                (TC#21-02-0083-CRA)

                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

         Appellant Raymond Diego Reyes pled guilty to intoxication manslaughter and intoxication

assault and was sentenced to concurrent 16 and 10-year prison terms. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.

§§49.07(c); 49.08(b). He appeals his conviction, arguing that his plea was involuntary because his

attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 1 For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         On the night of August 13, 2020, Philip Smith rear-ended a tractor trailer that was pulling

into a gas station off Highway 16 in Atascosa County. The accident disabled Smith’s vehicle, and

1
 This case was transferred pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Fourth Court of Appeals to the extent they might conflict with our
own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
it remained in the road. Danielle Gonzalez, a nurse who happened to be driving by, stopped to help

Smith. Moments later, Appellant collided with Smith’s vehicle. The impact threw Smith into the

median, causing fatal injuries, and severely injured Gonzalez. Law enforcement arrived on the

scene and while investigating, asked Appellant to complete a field sobriety test, which he refused,

saying that he is blind in one eye. At the hospital later that night, Appellant’ blood work showed a

blood alcohol level of .074 as well as the presence of cocaine and opiates.

        Appellant was indicted and charged with intoxication manslaughter and intoxication

assault. The indictment further alleges that “the defendant used a deadly weapon, to wit: a motor

vehicle, during the commission of the offense.”

        Appellant entered an open plea. He pled guilty to both counts with no agreement with the

State for punishment. Appellant judicially confessed to committing both offenses “exactly as

charged within the indictment” and pled “true” to enhancement and special issues in the

indictment. Appellant, his attorney, and the State signed “Agreed Punishment Recommendations”

which state, “The parties agree to ask the court to asses[s] punishment anywhere within the full

range of punishment, and in consideration for this agreement, the parties agree to waive their right

to a jury trial and the right to appeal any judgment by the court.” At the plea hearing, the trial court

admonished Appellant that the intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault charges were

each punishable by up to 10 years in prison. 2 The trial court accepted Appellant’ plea but did not

make a deadly weapon finding and reset the case for a sentencing hearing so that a presentence

investigation could be conducted.

2
 This statement is incorrect. Intoxication manslaughter is a second-degree felony, punishable by up to 20 years in
prison. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§12.33, 49.08(b). The written admonitions about the ranges of punishment, however,
were correct, and Appellant has not raised the discrepancy as error in this appeal.

                                                        2
       Although there was no plea agreement or punishment recommendation, the trial court

signed an order stating:

       After having agreed to assess punishment consistent with the plea agreement, the
       Court hereby finds that the Defendant understands the consequences of waiving the
       right to a motion for new trial, motion in arrest of judgment or file a notice of appeal
       . . . . The Defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived such right.
       Said waiver is accepted by the Court.
That same day, the trial court also signed a certification of Appellant’ right of appeal which stated

that Appellant’ case was not a plea-bargain case and that he has the right to appeal the sentence.

       In February 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Along with testimony from the

probation department about the presentence investigation, the court also heard testimony about

how the accident impacted the lives or families’ lives of Philip Smith and Danielle Gonzalez.

Kayla Jordan-Tschirhart, Philip Smith’s widow, was 31 years old when Smith was killed. She and

Smith had children and Smith also had three older children from a prior relationship. Tschirart

testified about how her life has changed and the difficulties her children have now, and will

continue to have, coping with the loss of their father. Philip Smith was the sole-provider for the

family and Kayla described her financial struggles following Smith’s death.

       Danielle Gonzalez was 27 years old at the time of the accident and has two children. Before

the accident, Gonzalez was independent and physically active, but now must rely on others for

many basic life functions. Her injuries impaired her vision and she cannot use the right side of her

body. She lost the ability to walk. She struggles with memory and depression. Before the accident

she was employed as nurse, but can no longer perform gainful employment.

       Appellant also testified at the sentencing hearing. He claims that it was dark at the time of

the accident and he did not see Smith’s vehicle until he hit it. He also admitted, however, that about

an hour before the collision he drank two or three beers and ingested cocaine and marijuana. He

                                                  3
was questioned about his criminal history, which included two prior terms of probation–in 1993

for assault and in 2004 for possession of marijuana. Both probations led to revocations. In closing,

Appellant’ counsel requested that the court give him community service.

        After the hearing, the trial court made a finding that Appellant used a deadly weapon in

commission of the crimes and sentenced him to 16 years for intoxication manslaughter and 10

years for intoxication assault, with the terms to run concurrently.

        In his one issue on appeal, Appellant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance of counsel and his guilty plea was therefore involuntary. Specifically, Appellant

contends that his attorney requested that the court order community service, but because of the

deadly weapon finding, community service “could never have been granted.”

                                                 ANALYSIS

        A. Waiver of right to appeal

        The State argues that Appellant waived his right to appeal. Because a valid waiver of the

right to appeal deprives us of subject-matter jurisdiction, we address this issue first. Thomas v.

State, 615 S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.).

        Texas law grants criminal defendants the right to appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

44.02; TEX. R. APP. PROC. 25.2. That right can be waived, but the waiver must be made

“voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14; Ex parte

Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794, 796-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When a defendant waives his right to

appeal as part of a plea bargain that includes a sentencing recommendation, the waiver is made

with the knowledge of what the consequences will be and is therefore valid. 3 Id. at 799; Blanco v.

3
 A trial court is not obligated to follow the State’s sentencing recommendation. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
26.13. But if it does not, the defendant can withdraw his agreement to the plea bargain. Id.

                                                       4
State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc). But in open plea cases like this

one, when a criminal defendant pleads guilty without an agreement about sentencing, “the validity

of a pretrial waiver of appeal is in question because the waiver cannot be knowing and intelligent

when potential errors cannot be anticipated and the consequences of the waiver are unknown.”

Delaney, 207 S.W.3d at 798. For these kinds of appeal waivers to be valid, the State must provide

consideration for the waiver. Compare Jones v. State, 488 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016) (defendant’s waiver of appeal was valid because the State provided consideration by

abandoning one of its enhancement paragraphs), with Washington v. State, 363 S.W.3d 589, 590

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (per curiam) (defendant’s waiver of appeal was not valid because the

record did not reflect that the State gave any consideration).

        The State argues that by waiving its right to a trial by jury, or consenting to Appellant’

waiver of a jury trial, it provided consideration. But, Carson v. State, cited by the State for this

proposition actually holds that “[c]onsent to proceed to a bench trial, thus waiving the right to a

jury trial, by itself is not sufficient to qualify as consideration for defendant’s waiver of his right to

appeal.” Carson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 489, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (emphasis added). The

record must reflect that the State’s waiver of a jury trial was given “in exchange for” the

defendant’s appeal waiver. Id.

        For example, in Ex Parte Broadway, the defendant pled guilty but did not want a jury to

determine his sentence because only a court could place him on community supervision with drug

treatment. Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (en banc). But the

record showed that the State wanted sentencing by a jury and would only consent to the defendant’s

waiver of a jury trial if the defendant also waived his right to appeal. Id. at 698. The court held that

because his appeal waiver resulted from a bargain, it was valid. Id. at 697–98. Similarly, in Carson

                                                    5
v. State, the defendant did not want a jury trial because he believed that he could receive a more

favorable sentence from the trial court. Carson, 559 S.W.3d at 495. And the State’s position was,

“if we’re going to have to do an appeal and everything then we might as well go to a jury trial.”

Id. Therefore, for the defendant to get sentencing by the trial court, he agreed to waive his right to

appeal. Id. The court held that the defendant “negotiated a bargain” and his “waiver was made in

exchange for consideration given by the State and, thus was voluntary, knowing and intelligent.”

Id. at 496.

         Unlike Broadway and Carson, the record here does not show that the State wanted a jury

trial and that it would only agree to forgo one if Appellant agreed to waive an appeal. At the plea

hearing, Appellant agreed that he waived the right to appeal, but there was no testimony or other

evidence that he did so because of the State’s waiver of the right to a jury trial. The only mention

of the waiver of a jury trial at the plea hearing is Appellant’ acknowledgment that he (not the State)

waived the right to a jury. Nor does the waiver of the right to appeal reflect any bargained for

consideration. The agreed punishment recommendations recite, “The parties agree to ask the court

to assess punishment anywhere within the full range of punishment, and in consideration for this

agreement, the parties agree to waive their right to a jury trial and the right to appeal any judgment

by the court.” 4 By its terms, the waiver of the right to a jury was not consideration for Appellant’s

appeal waiver. Rather, both Appellant and the State waived the right to a jury trial, and they did

so along with waiving the right to appeal, not in exchange for Appellant’ waiver of the right to

4
  The “Waivers, Stipulation, Confession, and Agreement” signed by Appellant also contains waivers of the right to
appeal as follows: “[Having] been informed of the limited right to . . . file a notice of appeal with the court of appeals,
in a plea bargain case, and after having consulted with my attorney, I hereby waive those rights . . .” and “I agree to
plead guilty (or nolo contender) to the above specified offenses), true to enhancement and special issues, if any, in the
indictment or information, judicially confess, and waive any right to a motion for new trial and appeal . . . .” Neither
statement of waiver recite consideration given by the state.

                                                            6
appeal. On this record, there is no evidence that the State’s waiver of a jury trial was a bargained-

for benefit to Appellant for which gave up a right of appeal. 5 Thomas, 615 S.W.3d at 564 (the

record did not show consideration because it reflected “that appellant and the State negotiated for

both parties to give up their right to a jury trial in exchange for appellant's guilty plea—not for her

waiver of her right to appeal”).

        B. Ineffective assistance of counsel

        On the merits, Appellant sole issue claims that his attorney incorrectly believed that he was

eligible for community service and that he therefore provided ineffective assistance of counsel,

rendering his plea involuntary.

        “A defendant’s decision to plead guilty when based upon erroneous advice of counsel is

not done voluntarily and knowingly.” Ex Parte Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d 684, 688–89

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on an

attorney’s advice of the consequences of his guilty plea, courts apply the two-prong standard

announced in Strickland v. Washington. Ex Parte Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d at 690–91; Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, (1984). The defendant must show both that (1) his attorney’s

performance was deficient and that (2) “but for the erroneous advice of counsel, [he] would not

have plead guilty.” Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d at 690–91.

        To make a successful ineffective assistance of claim, “the record must affirmatively

demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim.

5
  Unlike Ex parte Broadway, in which sentencing by the court allowed for the possibility of community supervision,
there was no apparent benefit to Appellant from the State’s waiver of a jury. Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694,
696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (en banc). A jury is not prevented from recommending community supervision even if it
finds that a deadly weapon was used in commission of a crime. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.054(b),
42A.056. A judge cannot. Id. Therefore, community service was just as much, if not more, of an option for Appellant
if the jury determined sentencing.

                                                        7
App. 1996) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1998) (en banc). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present challenges on direct appeal

because the record about trial counsel’s errors is usually undeveloped. Thompson v. State, 9

S.W.3d 808, 813–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). More often, these claims are raised in a motion for

new trial or petition for writ of habeas corpus, where the defendant and trial counsel can present

the relevant facts on the record. Id. at 814; Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997) (en banc).

         Appellant points to his trial counsel’s repeated requests for community supervision at the

sentencing hearing as evidence that his trial counsel believed that he was eligible for community

supervision. The record lacks evidence about what advice Appellant was given and whether he

relied on it. But we focus on the initial premise of Appellant’ argument–that his attorney

incorrectly believed he was eligible for community supervision. 6

         The Code of Criminal Procedure grants a trial court the authority, subject to important

limitations, for at least two non-prison alternatives for punishment following a finding of guilt. A

trial court might place a defendant on deferred adjudication community service under TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.102. But excluded from that option are offenses under Section 49.07

(intoxication assault) and 49.08 (intoxication manslaughter) of the Penal Code. TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 42A.102(b)(1)(A); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.07, § 49.08. Another non-prison

alternative is judge ordered community supervision under Article 42A.053. TEX. CODE CRIM.

6
  In Tabora v. State, the 14th Court of Appeals held that trial counsel’s repeated requests for “deferred” constituted
sufficient evidence that he incorrectly believed his client was eligible for deferred adjudication, meeting the first prong
of the Strickland test. 14 S.W.3d 332, 336-37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). But those requests
were not sufficient to show that the attorney advised the defendant that he was eligible for deferred adjudication or
that the defendant relied on that advice. Id.

                                                            8
PROC. ANN. art. 42A.053. But it has two limitations relevant here. First, a trial court is prohibited

from ordering community service if a defendant is sentenced to more than ten years. Id. art.

42A.053(c). Second, a trial court is prohibited from placing a defendant on community service

when there is a finding that “a deadly weapon . . . was used or exhibited during the commission of

a felony offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.054(b)(1)(A). Whether or not to make

that finding, however, is completely discretionary. Guthrie-Nail v. State, 506 S.W.3d 1, 6

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“[A] trial judge has the discretion to decline to make a deadly-weapon

finding even after finding the defendant guilty of an offense in which use of a deadly weapon was

a charged or necessary element.”); see also Shute v. State, 945 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d) (“[A] trial court, in a trial to the bench, has complete discretion

to refuse to make an affirmative deadly weapon finding, even though the State has met its burden

of proof on the deadly weapon issue.”); Campos v. State, 927 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Tex. App.—Waco

1996, no pet.) (“Although [defendant] was indicted for use of a deadly weapon and pled nolo

contendere the accusations, we believe the making of an affirmative [deadly weapon] finding was

within the court’s discretion.”).

        Despite Appellant’s plea, the trial court retained the discretion to make, or not make, a

deadly weapon finding. Rodriguez v. State is almost factually and procedurally identical to this

case. Rodriguez v. State, 933 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, pet. ref’d). In that case,

the defendant, Rodriguez, was driving while intoxicated and caused a collision which resulted in

the death of the passenger of the other vehicle. Id. at 704. He pled guilty to intoxication

manslaughter, but there was no agreement regarding his sentence. Id. At a subsequent sentencing

hearing, the trial court sentenced Rodriguez to 17 years. Id. Rodriguez then appealed, claiming

that the trial court failed to admonish him about his ineligibility for community supervision and,

                                                   9
like this case, his trial counsel did not correctly advise him about the possibility of community

service. Id. at 704, 706. 7 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment because at the time of

Rodriguez’s plea, he was eligible for community supervision. The court reasoned:

        The trial court’s finding of Rodriguez’ guilt at the plea hearing also did not
        automatically signify that the judge had found, or was going to find, that a deadly
        weapon was used in the commission of the crime. Neither did a finding of guilt
        signify that the trial court was going to sentence Rodriguez to serve more than ten
        years in prison. As noted, either one or both of those occurrences would have made
        Rodriguez ineligible for community supervision, but at the time of the plea it was
        an open question as to what the judge was going to do. The judge did not make the
        affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon until after he sentenced Rodriguez
        to seventeen years imprisonment. Thus, at the time Rodriguez entered his plea, the
        admonishments were accurate and did not misstate Rodriguez’ eligibility for
        community supervision.

Id. at 705 (internal citations omitted); see also Graves v. State, 803 S.W.2d 342, 347 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d) (holding that because probation was possible until the court

sentenced the defendant, his trial counsel did not misinform him about his eligibility for probation

or provide ineffective assistance of counsel); Ballard v. State, No. 04-14-00603-CR, 2015 WL

6736767, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 4, 2015, no pet.) (not designated for publication)

(holding no ineffective assistance of counsel because “until the trial court entered the [deadly

weapon] affirmative finding, the trial court could still suspend Ballard’s sentence and place him

on community supervision”).

        At the time of Appellant’s guilty plea, the trial court had not made a deadly-weapon

finding. Therefore, Appellant’s trial counsel could have been correct–Appellant was eligible for

7
 The limitations on court-ordered community supervision in effect at the time of the Rodriguez case were found in
Article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure which has been repealed and recodified as Article 42A.054.
See Act of June 17, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 770, § 1.01, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 2321, 2321–65.

                                                       10
community service. It was not until the trial court announced its ruling after the sentencing hearing

and made that deadly-weapon finding that Appellant became ineligible for community service. 8

          Because Appellant has not met the first prong of the Strickland standard by showing that

his attorney’s performance was deficient, we need not determine whether the record affirmatively

shows that Appellant’s attorney advised him about community service and that he relied on that

advice.

                                                 CONCLUSION

          Appellant’s appeal is authorized because the State did not provide consideration in

exchange for his waiver of the right to appeal. That said, Appellant’s guilty plea is valid because

his attorney’s belief that he was eligible for community service was correct and Appellant has not

shown that he provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment below.

                                                      JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice

January 25, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

8
 For that matter, Appellant does not address how the trial court’s discretionary decision to assess a 16-year sentence
for the intoxication manslaughter charge would have also made him ineligible for community service on that charge.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.053(c) (community service not available when the prison term exceeds ten
years). Appellant does not argue that his trial counsel misunderstood this prohibition.

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