Court Opinion

ID: 9405356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 00:03:44.782859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:21.498130
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/27/23 U.S. Bank v. Elstead CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 U.S. BANK et al.,
           Plaintiffs and Respondents,
                                                                        A166583
 v.
 JOHN CLIFTON ELSTEAD,                                                  (Alameda County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. RG07346492)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         John C. Elstead, the defendant in a judicial foreclosure action, appeals
an October 7, 2022 order directing the clerk’s office of the Alameda County
Superior Court to issue a writ of sale to effectuate a judgment entered on
May 2, 2022, ordering the sale of his home.
         We affirm the order.
                                                  BACKGROUND
         On May 2, 2022, the trial court entered a judgment of judicial
foreclosure in favor of respondent U.S. Bank (the Bank), ordering the sale of
Elstead’s home in Oakland, California. The judgment was entered after
summary judgment was granted in favor of the Bank on its foreclosure
complaint, and against Elstead on a cross-complaint he filed against the
Bank and related entities. As described by Elstead, his cross-claims
concerned an alleged conspiracy to withhold the release of insurance proceeds

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to fund repairs to his home necessitated by damage from falling trees and
rain.
        Elstead then appealed the judgment, and that appeal is presently
pending in this court (No. A165202).
        Following the entry of judgment, the Bank asked staff members of the
Alameda County Clerk’s Office to issue a writ of sale but was advised that,
because Elstead had filed a notice of appeal, court approval was needed.
        After initially trying to secure court approval for the writ of sale on an
ex parte basis, the Bank ultimately filed a noticed motion asking the trial
court to (1) clarify that no automatic stay was in effect, and (2) direct the
clerk to issue the writ of sale. Elstead opposed the motion on various grounds
and, after a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. It confirmed that
Elstead’s appeal did not automatically stay the judgment and directed the
Alameda County Clerk’s Office to issue writ(s) of sale without further delay.
That ruling is the subject of this appeal.
                                   DISCUSSION
        On appeal, the judgment is presumed correct and it is an appellant’s
burden to affirmatively demonstrate the existence of an error that is
prejudicial. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Adams v.
MHC Colony Park, L.P. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 601, 615.) An appellant’s
burden to demonstrate prejudicial error “remains the same whether or not
the respondent files a brief or provides argument or authority on an issue.”
(Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 655.) Elstead has not met his
burden to show the trial court erred.
        Elstead argues, first, that the writ of sale was not authorized under
Code of Civil Procedure section 712.010,1 the statute cited by the trial court.

        1   All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                           2
Based on the statutory text, he argues that statute is limited to unlawful
detainer actions (which this is not). But “we review the trial court’s ruling,
not its reasoning,” and therefore “ ‘ “[t]o justify a reversal, it is incumbent
upon the appellant to show an erroneous ruling, and not merely bad
reasoning or mistaken views of the law.” ’ ” (Doe v. McLaughlin, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 654.) Elstead makes no attempt to show the court erred
in directing the issuance of a writ of sale at all (i.e., that it was not
authorized to do so).
      Furthermore, Elstead is wrong. The language of the statute plainly
indicates it applies “[a]fter entry of a judgment for possession or sale of
property.” (§ 712.010.)2 Elstead’s reliance on language in the statute
concerning “the daily rental value of the property as of the date the complaint
for unlawful detainer was filed” indicates that one of two applications of the
statute is to unlawful detainer judgments, i.e., “a judgment for possession.”
Further, as the Bank points out, another statute, section 716.010, which
governs the enforcement of judgments directing the sale of property,
expressly incorporates section 712.010. It states: “A judgment for sale of
real . . . property may be enforced by a writ of sale issued pursuant to
Section 712.010.” (§ 716.010, subd. (a), italics added.) Elstead’s briefing

      2 The statute provides, “After entry of a judgment for possession or sale
of property, a writ of possession or sale shall be issued by the clerk of the
court upon application of the judgment creditor and shall be directed to the
levying officer in the county where the judgment is to be enforced. The
application shall include a declaration under penalty of perjury stating the
daily rental value of the property as of the date the complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed. A separate writ shall be issued for each county where the
judgment is to be enforced. Writs may be issued successively until the
judgment is satisfied, except that a new writ may not be issued for a county
until the expiration of 180 days after the issuance of a prior writ for that
county unless the prior writ is first returned.” (§ 712.010.)

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ignores the reference to “judgment for . . . sale” in section 712.010 and ignores
section 716.010 altogether. In short, the court directed the clerk to issue the
very enforcement device the law requires to effectuate a judgment for the sale
of property.
      Next, Elstead argues the court should have issued a discretionary stay
of enforcement under section 918.5, based upon the fact that he has appealed
the adverse judgment entered against him on his cross-claims. That statute
authorizes the trial court “in its discretion” to issue a stay “if the judgment
debtor has another action pending on a disputed claim against the judgment
creditor” (§ 918.5, subd. (a)) and specifies mandatory factors the court must
(“shall”) consider when exercising its discretion (id., subd. (b)). The factors
include “all of the following: [¶] (1) The likelihood of the judgment debtor
prevailing in the other action. [¶] (2) The amount of the judgment of the
judgment creditor as compared to the amount of the probable recovery of the
judgment debtor in the action on the disputed claim. [¶] (3) The financial
ability of the judgment creditor to satisfy the judgment if a judgment is
rendered against the judgment creditor in the action on the disputed claim.”
(§ 918.5, subd. (b).) Here, the trial court in substance ruled that section 918.5
is inapplicable because there is no other pending action, and went no
further.3 In other words, it ruled that the statutory precondition to issuing a
discretionary stay under section 918.5 was not met.

      3  It stated: “The Court rejects Elstead’s argument this Court has
discretion to stay enforcement of the . . . judgment . . . pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure § 918.5 based on Elstead’s purposed two other actions
pending against U.S. Bank. One of those purported actions is the Fifth
Amended Cross-Complaint that Elstead filed in this very same case against
JPMorgan Chase Bank NA and Wachovia Bank NA (US Bank’s predecessor
in interest with respect to Elstead’s deed of trust secured by the subject real
property.) Assuming arguendo that a cross-complaint in this same action

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      On appeal, Elstead’s arguments are directed principally to the legal
question whether “another action pending” encompasses cross-claims filed in
the same case that are pending on appeal. But it is unnecessary to decide
that question because even if we agreed, Elstead has not demonstrated
prejudice. As one of the cases Elstead cites in his brief makes clear, “ ‘The
burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion, and
unless a clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has been a miscarriage
of justice a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest
the trial court of its discretionary power.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566.)
      Here, Elstead has addressed none of the factors that govern
discretionary stays under section 918.5 and none of the evidence (if any) that
would support their application in this case. Other than vaguely adverting to
the substance of his cross-claims, he has not addressed his likelihood of
getting those claims reinstated on appeal, much less of ultimately prevailing
on them in a subsequent final judgment. (See § 918.5, subd. (b)(1) [likelihood
of judgment debtor prevailing in the other action].) He has not even
attempted to quantify the amount by which a final judgment in his favor on
his cross-claim(s) would operate as a set-off to the default that resulted in the
judicial foreclosure judgment. (See § 918.5, subd. (b)(2) [amount of judgment

could be considered ‘another action pending’ . . . that cross-complaint is no
longer pending because the Court entered judgment in favor of Wachovia
Bank NA against Elstead on May 2, 2022. For that same reason, the Court
finds that Elstead has not established a likelihood of prevailing on his claims
against Wachovia Bank NA, and he has no probable recovery against
Wachovia Bank NA. [¶] Elstead’s second purported other action against U.S.
Bank is a proposed Cross-Complaint that Elstead had sought leave to file
against U.S. Bank in this case. The Court denied Elstead’s motion for leave
to file that Cross-Complaint on March 16, 2022. Therefore, no such action
against U.S. Bank is pending.”

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in favor of judgment creditor as compared with amount of probable recovery
of judgment debtor on disputed claim].) And he has not addressed the Bank’s
ability to pay an adverse judgment on the cross-claims (see § 918.5,
subd. (b)(3) [financial ability of judgment creditor to satisfy any judgment
rendered against it on disputed claim]); on the contrary, the Bank states
without contradiction that Elstead acknowledges it is solvent. In short, he
has not affirmatively demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the court’s
error, if any, in not addressing the merits of his request for a discretionary
stay under section 918.5.
      Finally, Elstead makes a constitutional claim. Below at the hearing, he
offered to post a bond in the amount of $5,000 to stay enforcement of the
foreclosure judgment pursuant to section 917.4, which requires an
undertaking in an amount determined by the trial court in order to stay
enforcement of a judgment directing the sale of real property.4 The court
rejected his offer and ruled that $5,000 would not be sufficient to protect the
Bank pending appeal against damage from waste to the property and for the

      4  It states: “The perfecting of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of
the judgment or order in the trial court if the judgment or order appealed
from directs the sale, conveyance or delivery of possession of real property
which is in the possession or control of the appellant or the party ordered to
sell, convey or deliver possession of the property, unless an undertaking in a
sum fixed by the trial court is given that the appellant or party ordered to
sell, convey or deliver possession of the property will not commit or suffer to
be committed any waste thereon and that if the judgment or order appealed
from is affirmed, or the appeal is withdrawn or dismissed, the appellant shall
pay the damage suffered by the waste and the value of the use and occupancy
of the property, or the part of it as to which the judgment or order is affirmed,
from the time of the taking of the appeal until the delivery of the possession
of the property. If the judgment or order directs the sale of mortgaged real
property and the payment of any deficiency, the undertaking shall also
provide for the payment of any deficiency.” (§ 917.4.)

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loss of its use and occupancy of the property. On appeal, Elstead now argues
that section 917.4 is unconstitutional. He asserts it violates due process
because it lacks procedural safeguards including a hearing on the necessity
for and amount of a bond, and the merits of a judgment debtor’s appeal.
      This claim is forfeited. We have reviewed the papers Elstead filed in
the trial court and the arguments he made at the hearing. He did not assert
a constitutional challenge to section 917.4 in the trial court, nor request any
of the procedural protections that he now says were constitutionally required.
“ ‘[I]ssues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.’ ” (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603), including
constitutional ones. (See Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 264
[“ ‘ “ ‘ “No procedural principle is more familiar . . . than that a constitutional
right” . . . “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to
make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine it.” . . .’ ” ’ ”]; see also, e.g., Ramirez v. Superior Court (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 1313, 1335-1336 [constitutional challenge to administrative
hearing procedure raised for first time on appeal held forfeited].) We decline
to exercise our discretion to consider the constitutionality of a statute that is
part of a comprehensive legislative scheme governing appellate stays that
dates back nearly two centuries (see Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of
Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1038-1039) and the validity of which, to
our knowledge, not one appellate court has ever questioned.
      Further, even if the issue were not forfeited we would reject it without
reaching the merits because, here again, Elstead has not demonstrated any
prejudice from the asserted constitutional error. That is, even if the trial
court was constitutionally required to consider the merits of Elstead’s appeal
before deciding whether to permit execution of the foreclosure judgment, we

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could not reverse the order unless the court’s error resulted in a miscarriage
of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), which means that “a different result
would have been probable had the error not occurred.” (Major v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1202.) “[T]he appellant
bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a
miscarriage of justice” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th
68, 106 (Paterno)), and that entails doing more than just asserting the error
was harmful. (DiRaffael v. California Army National Guard (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 692, 718 [“conclusory assertions of prejudice are
insufficient”].) The appellant must demonstrate prejudice—by means of a
cogent legal and factual argument showing how he would have fared better in
the absence of the asserted error. When the appellant does not do this, we
will not reverse a ruling even if it is wrong. (See, e.g., Paterno, at p. 106
[prejudice argument that failed to articulate the legal elements of
erroneously dismissed count and explain how the evidence supported that
theory held “undeveloped” and insufficient to support reversal]; DiRaffael, at
p. 718 [failure to explain how various procedural errors affected outcome held
insufficient to demonstrate prejudice].)
      Elstead has not done this. His discussion of the merits of his appeal
from the foreclosure judgment is conclusory and “undeveloped” (Paterno,
supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 106). He merely identifies various issues he
intends to raise but offers no cogent legal analysis of any of them. He does
not even summarize (much less analyze) any of the evidence before the court
when it ruled against him on summary judgment. He thus has not
demonstrated that his showing in the trial court would have been sufficient
for the trial court to conclude that his appeal from the judgment has even
minimal merit. And for that reason, he has not demonstrated he was

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prejudiced by any constitutional infirmity in the manner by which the trial
court evaluated his request for a stay of that judgment.
      We have considered Elstead’s remaining contentions and find them
devoid of merit.
                               DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs.

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                                      STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MILLER, J.

U.S. Bank v. Elstead (A166583)

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