Court Opinion

ID: 9703050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:38:10.506648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:44.380148
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the majority that appellée-bank has not exhibited bad faith in asserting its rival claim to appellant’s property and therefore has not abused its conditional privilege to disparage appellant’s title to the property in question. However, I disagree with the majority’s application of the law on slander of title to the facts of the present case. Inasmuch as my analysis of the facts in this appeal differs from that of the majority, I respectfully concur.
An action for slander of title safeguards an owner’s marketable interest in property against another person’s *564false and malicious representation of the owner’s title to the property. Triester v. 191 Tenants Association, 272 Pa.Super. 271, 415 A.2d 698 (1979); Young v. Geiske, 209 Pa. 515, 58 A. 887 (1904); Comment /to Section 647 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1976). “[M]alice — that is, absence of good faith — ... is of the gist of the action.” Hygienic Underwear Co. v. Way, 35 Pa.Super. 229, 233 (1908); Comment d to Section 647 of the Restatement.
A person is conditionally privileged to assert in property a legally protected interest inconsistent with the alleged property owner’s interest if the rival claim is asserted in good faith, i.e., with an honest belief in the claim’s substantial possibility of being sustained. Comment d to Section 647 of the Restatement; Comment b to Section 650A of the Restatement. “It is not necessary that the person asserting the claim should believe in its certain or even probable validity.” Comment d to Section 647 of the Restatement. The conditional privilege “is not abused when the publication [of the rival claim] is made without reasonable grounds for belief in its truth, but is abused only when the claimant does not believe honestly or in good faith that there is a substantial chance of his claim being sustained.” Comment b to Section 650A of the Restatement.
In the present case, the appellee-bank’s legally protected, rival interest in appellant’s property derived from promissory notes memorializing bank loans to appellant and her husband. On March 14, 1975, an attempt was made to consolidate the notes into a single note in the amount of forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000) which constituted the aggregate of the preceding notes.
To protect its right to repayment of the $45,000 debt, the appellee-bank asserted a rival claim to appellant’s property by having a judgment on the March 14 consolidation note entered against appellant and recorded as a lien against appellant’s property. Subsequently, the trial court found as a fact that appellant’s signature on the March 14 note was *565forged but that appellant’s signatures on the underlying, prior notes were valid.
The issue in this appeal is whether the appellee-bank lost its conditional privilege to assert a rival claim to appellant’s property by acting in bad faith when it had a judgment for $45,000 entered against appellant.
The majority states that the appellee-bank “could reasonably have inferred that the judgment was valid because appellant failed to promptly contest its validity.” At 688 (footnote deleted). Contrary to the majority, I would not confer hindsight justification upon the actions of one who asserts a rival property claim. The question is whether the appellee-bank believed in good faith, both when it initially asserted a rival property claim and when it thereafter continued to maintain the claim, that there was a substantial chance of having its claim upheld. In other words, if the appellee-bank asserted a rival interest in appellant’s property without honestly believing that it had a legitimate interest therein, the appellee-bank would be liable for slandering appellant’s title to property regardless of appellant’s subsequent action or inaction. Comment d to Section 647 of the Restatement; Comment b to Section 650A of the Restatement.
In the present case the appellee-bank was entitled to repayment of $45,000 in indebtedness represented by notes properly endorsed by appellant and her husband. By having a judgment for $45,000 against appellant entered along with a corresponding lien against appellant’s property, the appellee-bank was not acting maliciously to deprive appellant of an opportunity to sell her property but rather was acting to safeguard its right to repayment of the $45,000 debt. Therefore, I conclude that inasmuch as the appellee-bank had a valid claim against appellant in the amount of $45,000, the appellee-bank did not exhibit bad faith by having a judgment for $45,000 entered against appellant together with a correlative lien against appellant’s property.