Court Opinion

ID: 9900490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:23:54.409237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.830651
License: Public Domain

E-FILED
                                                           CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                           E-filed: Sep 29 2023 05:19PM
                                                           Clerk Review: Sep 29 2023 05:19PM
                                                           Filing ID: 70985183
                                                           Case No.: 2022-SCC-0004-CRM
                                                           NoraV Borja

                           IN THE
                    Supreme Court
                           OF THE

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

   COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,

                              v.

          SHABGUA ZHANG (AKA SHAN GUO ZHANG),
                   Defendant-Appellant.

          Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0004-CRM

                       SLIP OPINION

                     Cite as: 2023 MP 9

                 Decided September 29, 2023

             CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
            ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
              ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERRY B. INOS

  Superior Court Criminal Action Nos. 21-0115-CR & 20-0197-CR
           Associate Judge Joseph N. Camacho, Presiding
                          Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

CASTRO, CJ.:
¶1      Defendant-Appellant Shabgua Zhang (“Zhang”) appeals his conviction for
 vandalism in Criminal Case No. 21-0115 and probation revocation in Criminal
 Case No. 20-0197. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM Zhang’s conviction
 and sentence for vandalism. We DISMISS the appeal of his probation revocation
 for lack of jurisdiction.
                    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2     This appeal involves two independent criminal cases. In March 2021,
 Zhang pleaded guilty to tampering with a vehicle, in violation of 9 CMC § 7103.
 He received a suspended sentence of six months and was placed on probation for
 the same duration.
¶3     Three months later, Zhang attempted to retrieve personal belongings he
 believed were being held in the Ports Police Office at the Saipan International
 Airport. Zhang’s primary language is Chinese and he does not speak English.
 English-speaking Ports Police Officer Jason Cruz (“Officer Cruz”) approached
 Zhang and tried to communicate and demonstrate to him that he must wear a
 mask to enter the office.1 After the two talked back and forth in their respective
 languages, Zhang put on a mask. He then picked up a rock and hit the office
 window, damaging the plexiglass.
¶4      Zhang was arrested, and the Commonwealth charged him with one count
 of vandalism under 6 CMC § 1805(a) and one count of disturbing the peace under
 6 CMC § 3101(a). Because he was serving a probation sentence in Criminal Case
 No. 20-0197 at the time, the Commonwealth moved to revoke probation for
 violating a condition of his probation—specifically, to obey all CNMI laws. The
 bench trial for the vandalism charge also served as the revocation hearing. The
 same court-qualified Chinese-English interpreter provided simultaneous oral
 interpretation during the trial and at sentencing, and orally translated court
 documents. During the bench trial, Zhang admitted to breaking the window and
 conceded to the court that he had committed vandalism.
¶5       The court found Zhang guilty of vandalism but acquitted him of disturbing
 the peace. Based on the vandalism conviction, the court also found he violated a
 condition of his probation. On October 20, 2021, the court issued its Judgment
 of Conviction and Finding of Probation Violation/Imposition of Sentence
 (“JCO”) for both Criminal Case Nos. 21-0115 and 20-0197. In the JCO, the court
 revoked probation and immediately imposed the suspended sentence. On
 February 2, 2022, the court sentenced Zhang on the vandalism conviction. Zhang
 filed a notice of appeal for the vandalism conviction and the probation revocation
 on March 2, 2022.

1
    Officer Cruz testified during the bench trial that all persons on airport premises were
    required to wear a face mask.
                             Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

                            II. JURISDICTION
¶6   The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of the
 Commonwealth Superior Court. NMI CONST. art IV, § 3.
                                 III. DISCUSSION
¶7      Zhang appeals both his probation revocation and conviction. Zhang’s
 probation was revoked in October 2021, and his previous sentence was
 immediately reimposed by the court. The court later sentenced Zhang on the
 vandalism conviction in February 2022. The Commonwealth objects to Zhang’s
 appeal of his probation revocation, since his notice of appeal of the probation
 revocation was filed more than 30 days after his probation was revoked. Resp.
 Br. at 4. When properly invoked, Supreme Court Rule 4(b)(1)(A)—requiring that
 a notice of appeal in a criminal case be filed within 30 days of the judgment or
 order—is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Commonwealth v. Borja, 2015 MP 8
 ¶ 19 (quotation omitted). Because the Commonwealth has properly raised the
 timeliness of the appeal, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the probation
 revocation in Criminal Case No. 20-0197.2
¶8       Zhang raises four issues on appeal, all for the first time: (1) federal law
 preempts the vandalism charge under 6 CMC § 1805(a) that occurred at the
 Saipan International Airport; (2) the crime of vandalism in Section 1805(a) is an
 unconstitutional strict liability crime; (3) he was not afforded a fair trial; and (4)
 the trial court violated his due process rights by not providing written translation
 in the course of trial proceedings. This Court will not consider a new issue unless
 it applies to one of the following narrow exceptions:
          (1) a new theory or issue has arisen due to a change in the law while
              the appeal was pending,
          (2) the issue is only one of law not relying on any factual record; or
          (3) plain error has occurred and an injustice might otherwise result
              if the appellate court does not consider the case.
          Saipan Achugao Resort Members’ Assoc. v. Yoon, 2011 MP 12
          ¶ 78.
    As to each issue, we first examine whether any of these exceptions apply, and if
    so, we will address the issue on its merits in turn.

2
     Even if Zhang had timely appealed the probation revocation, his appeal would have
     been waived for failure to argue the issue. Despite noting the facts of his probation
     revocation in his opening brief, Zhang fails to assert any argument related to the
     revocation. By providing the Court with no legal argument, he does not fully develop
     this matter. “An issue is insufficiently developed when the party’s principal brief fails
     to ‘provide legal authority or public policy, or apply the facts of the case to the asserted
     authority in a non-conclusory manner.’” Commonwealth v. Ogumoro, 2020 MP 8 ¶ 13
     n.5 (citations omitted). We have the discretion to decline review of insufficiently
     developed arguments, and may consider them waived. Kim v. Baik, 2016 MP 5 ¶ 30.
                          Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

              A. 6 CMC § 1805(a) Is Not Preempted by Federal Law
¶9      Zhang alleges that 18 U.S.C. § 37, criminalizing violence at international
 airports, preempts 6 CMC § 1805(a). This is an issue only of law not relying on
 any factual record. Yoon, 2011 MP 12 ¶ 78. We consider the issue and review de
 novo. Id.; Commonwealth v. Minto, 2011 MP 14 ¶ 16.
¶ 10     Preemption, the primacy of federal over state laws, derives from the
  Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Felt
  v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 60 F.3d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995);
  Commonwealth v. Bashar, 2018 MP 11 ¶ 22. Only provisions of the U.S.
  Constitution defined by the Covenant will apply in the Commonwealth.
  Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
  Political Union with the United States of America, 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note.
  Because the Supremacy Clause is not defined as such, it is not applicable on its
  own. Bashar, 2018 MP 11 ¶ 22. However, Section 503 of the Covenant grants
  Congress the authority to pass laws and make them applicable to the
  Commonwealth. Covenant § 503 (48 U.S.C. § 1801 note). Congress exercised
  such authority when it defined the Commonwealth as one of the states to which
  18 U.S.C. § 37 applies. 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(9). Under the provisions of the
  Covenant, Section 37 can preempt Commonwealth law. We must analyze
  whether Section 37 does preempt 6 CMC § 1805.
¶ 11     There is a strong presumption that federal law does not preempt state law
  unless Congress clearly manifests such intention through explicit language
  contained in the statute’s structure and purpose. Stevedoring Servs. v. Eggert, 914
  P.2d 737, 741 (Wash. 1996). “The ultimate purpose in any preemption analysis
  is to determine whether state regulation is inconsistent with a federal law.” Wells
  Fargo v. Apache Tribe, 360 P.3d 1243, 1265 (Okla. Ct. App. 2014). In sum,
  federal law preempts state law if: (1) federal law expressly preempts state law,
  (2) federal law occupies the entire field of regulation, or (3) state law conflicts
  with federal law to the degree that compliance with both is impossible or “state
  law presents an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal purpose.”
  Stevedoring Servs., 914 P.2d at 740–41.
¶ 12     There is no explicit language in 18 U.S.C. §§ 31 or 37 indicating that
  Congress intended violence at international airports to be exclusively under
  federal jurisdiction. Statutory interpretation requires we follow the plain
  language of the statute. Albia v. Duenas, 2022 MP 3 ¶ 7. Subsection (b)(1) of 18
  U.S.C. § 37 states “[t]here is jurisdiction over the prohibited activity in
  subsection (a) if the prohibited activity takes place in the United States.”3 While
  the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 37 grants federal jurisdiction, it is devoid of
  any language that state law is preempted. Preemption language is found in other
  federal statutes, such as 48 U.S.C. § 1806(f) regarding immigration: “[t]he
  provisions of this section . . . shall, on the transition program effective date,

3
    “United States” is further defined in 18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(9), in relevant part, as “any
    commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.”
                            Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

    supersede and replace all laws, provisions, or programs of the Commonwealth
    relating to the admission of aliens and the removal of aliens from the
    Commonwealth.” 48 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (emphasis added). 4 Absent express
    language indicating that federal law preempts state law, states retain their
    jurisdiction. Section 37 does not expressly preempt Commonwealth criminal law.
¶ 13     We turn to the second principle of preemption analysis: whether federal
  law occupies the entire field of regulation on violence in international airports. A
  federal law preempts state law when it “occupies a field of regulation so
  comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state legislation.”
  Knox v. Brnovich, 907 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations
  omitted). When a federal statute provides such dense and detailed regulations
  that “any state regulation within the same field” would necessarily interfere,
  Congress intended to preempt state law. Id. (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v.
  United Airlines, Inc., 813 F.3d 718, 734 (9th Cir. 2016)). We need not look
  further than the statute itself to find that Congress did not intend for 18 U.S.C.
  § 37 to be the only control of violent acts in airports. Subsection (c) of Section
  37 bars federal prosecution of conduct involving a labor dispute when that
  conduct is a state felony.5 Only state prosecution remains possible once federal
  prosecution is barred under Subsection (c). Had Congress intended to create field
  preemption for criminal acts in international airports, Subsection (c) would
  negate this aim. Instead, Congress considered that state criminal laws would
  apply to actions that also violate this federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 37, based on the
  content of this subsection, was not intended to occupy the entire field.
¶ 14     Under the third principle of preemption, we examine whether either 18
  U.S.C. § 37 conflicts with 6 CMC § 1805(a) to a degree that compliance with
  both is impossible or the latter presents an obstacle to the federal purpose. Oneok
  v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 377 (2015). “[T]he purpose of Congress is the
  ultimate touchstone” in determining whether state law is preempted by federal.
  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohri, 518
  U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Section 37 makes it a federal offense to unlawfully and
  intentionally perform an act of violence against a person at, or destroy or
  seriously damage the facilities in, an international civilian airport. 18 U.S.C.
  § 37(a). Congress added Section 37 to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994

4
     See also Stevedoring Servs., 914 P.2d at 741–42 (where the Washington Supreme Court
     looked at three other federal acts (the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
     of 1965 and as later amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, the
     Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the Employee Retirement
     Income Security Act of 1974) containing language expressing Congress’s intent to have
     federal law preempt state law).
5
     Subsection (c) specifically states, “It is a bar to Federal prosecution under subsection
     (a) for conduct that occurred within the United States that the conduct involved was
     during or in relation to a labor dispute, and such conduct is prohibited as a felony under
     the law of the State in which it was committed.” 18 U.S.C. § 37(c). The statute further
     describes “State” as including any commonwealth of the United States. Id.
                            Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

    after the United Nations agreed “[c]onsidering that unlawful acts of violence
    which endanger . . . the safety of persons at airports serving international civil
    aviation or which jeopardize the safe operation of such airports . . . there is an
    urgent need to provide appropriate measures for punishment of offenders.”
    Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
    International Civil Aviation, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
    Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474
    (“Protocol”). When the U.S. became a party to the Protocol, Congress’ enactment
    of 18 U.S.C. § 37 adopted verbatim the Protocol’s language. Id.; Violent Crime
    Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1796,
    1979–80 (1994). It is obvious that 18 U.S.C. § 37 was intended to deter and
    punish violent acts at international airports.
¶ 15     The Commonwealth’s vandalism statute does not hinder or present an
  obstacle to 18 U.S.C. § 37’s purpose. Rather, criminalizing the act of destroying,
  damaging or defacing public property further carries out the purpose to deter and
  punish violent acts at international airports. 6 CMC §§ 103(x), 1805(a). We find
  that the federal and Commonwealth statutes do not conflict with one another and
  that compliance with both is possible. Because 6 CMC § 1805(a) does not follow
  any of the three preemption principles, 18 U.S.C. § 37 does not preempt 6 CMC
  § 1805(a).
                 B. 6 CMC § 1805(a) Is Not a Strict Liability Crime
¶ 16     Zhang next alleges 6 CMC § 1805(a) lacks a mens rea element, resulting
  in an unconstitutional strict liability crime. Opening Br. at 3. As an issue of law
  not relying on a factual record, we review it de novo under the second Yoon
  exception to new issues raised on appeal. 2011 MP 12 ¶ 78; Commonwealth v.
  Atalig, 2002 MP 20 ¶ 2.
¶ 17     Section 1805(a) states, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person and/or
  persons to vandalize any public or private property.” To “[v]andalize” is defined
  as “the action involving destruction, damage, and/or defacing to public or private
  property.” 6 CMC § 103(x). In the absence of an express mens rea element, we
  infer general intent. Commonwealth v. Inos, 2013 MP 14 ¶ 20; Atalig, 2002 MP
  20 ¶ 67. Additionally, use of the term “unlawful,” as seen in Section 1805(a),
  “routinely triggers a general intent analysis.” Commonwealth v. Palacios, 2004
  MP 23 ¶ 14. As such, Section 1805(a) creates a general intent crime.
¶ 18      Zhang’s reliance on State v. Blake, 481 P.3d 521 (Wash. 2021), and
  Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), to prove Section 1805(a) is a strict
  liability statute is misplaced. In both cases, the courts were concerned with the
  criminalization of “innocent and passive conduct with no criminal intent at all.”
  Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229; Blake, 481 P.3d at 524. 6 We have shared similar

6
     The Supreme Court of Washington, in Blake, declared the illegality of a strict liability
     felony drug possession statute. 481 P.3d at 530. In Lambert, the United States Supreme
     Court held that criminalizing a person’s failure to register with the city of Los Angeles
     within five days of arrival was an unconstitutional use of police power. 355 U.S. at 229.
                           Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

    concerns for other statutes with unclear intent requirements. See Commonwealth
    v. Cabrera Cepeda, 2009 MP 15 ¶ 42; Commonwealth v. Camacho, 2019 MP 2
    ¶ 11. There is no such concern here because Zhang’s actions clearly present his
    intent to hit the window with the rock.
¶ 19      General intent crimes require only a finding that the defendant “intended
  to act, rather than to produce a particular result” through those actions.
  Commonwealth v. Tian, 2019 MP 9 ¶ 19. We can infer his intent from his actions,
  as described both by himself and a witness. Zhang told the court that he was
  angry after being denied entry into the Ports Police office to retrieve his
  belongings and Officer Cruz saw him use the rock to hit the window and damage
  it. Tr. at 17, 38. This is corroborated by the defendant’s concession to the charge
  of vandalism during trial. Tr. at 26. Zhang’s actions outside the Port Police office
  clearly constitute vandalism as defined by Section 1805(a). 6 CMC § 1805(a) is
  constitutional in creating vandalism as a general intent crime, and Zhang was
  correctly convicted for violating the statute.
                         C. Zhang Was Afforded a Fair Trial
¶ 20     Zhang’s third issue is whether his trial was fair because the court allegedly
  did not consider all the facts of his case. Opening Br. at 4. This is an issue raised
  for the first time on appeal and does not meet any of the three discretionary
  exceptions to the rule that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be
  considered. Yoon, 2011 MP 12 ¶ 78. Zhang does not rely on a change in the law
  to support his assertion, nor does he assert that this is an issue of law or an
  instance of plain error.
¶ 21      Zhang only asserts factual allegations and provides no legal authority for
  this issue. As with the appeal of his probation revocation, he “fails to analyze this
  argument and therefore waives it.” Commonwealth v. Ogumoro, 2020 MP 8 ¶ 13
  n.5; see supra ¶ 6, n.3. We consider any argument that Zhang was denied a fair
  trial to be waived.
¶ 22     The Commonwealth responds to this argument by noting that there was
  sufficient evidence presented at trial for the vandalism conviction. Resp. Br. at
  9. We will only disturb the ruling of a lower court upon a “firm and definite
  conviction that a mistake has been made.” Matsunaga v. Matsunaga, 2006 MP
  25 ¶ 32; see also In re Buckingham, 2012 MP 15 ¶ 10. We decline to consider
  whether Zhang was afforded a fair trial.
        D. Due Process Does Not Require Written Translation in This Case
¶ 23    Lastly, Zhang claims that he was denied due process of law when he was
  not provided written translation of the trial proceedings and court documents.
  Opening Br. at 4. He claims simultaneous oral interpretation7 was insufficient.

7
     An “interpreter is normally understood as one who translates orally from one language
     to another.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 569 (2012). The
     translation of documents is not encompassed by the ordinary meaning of interpretation.
     Id.
                        Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

 Id. Because this is an issue he raises for the first time on appeal, we must
 determine whether it fits any of the three narrow exceptions that warrant this
 Court’s review on the merits. Yoon, 2011 MP 12 ¶ 78. First, no change of law
 has occurred since this appeal was filed, and this is not an issue only of law as
 facts are needed to determine what translation, if any, was provided. As for the
 third exception, we must first determine whether plain error has occurred,
 resulting in an injustice to Zhang.
¶ 24     Plain error review requires a three-part analysis to determine (1) whether
  there was error; (2) whether the error was plain; and (3) whether such error
  affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Luan v. PRMC, 2021 MP 8 ¶ 28.
  Reversal of a trial court decision on plain error is then only proper if “necessary
  to safeguard the integrity and reputation of the judicial process or to forestall a
  miscarriage of justice.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Hocog, 2019 MP 5 ¶ 11).
  We must first determine whether there was error with the lack of written
  translation. The right to a written translation stems from the Sixth Amendment
  right in all prosecutions to be “meaningfully present at one’s own trial, to assist
  in one’s own defense, to have effective assistance of counsel and to confront the
  government’s witnesses on cross examination.” United States v. Mosquera, 816
  F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D. NY. 1993). As this is a constitutional issue, we review
  de novo. Commonwealth v. Zhen, 2002 MP 4 ¶ 10; In the Matter of Blankenship,
  3 NMI 209, 212 (1992).
¶ 25     Generally, “Due Process does not require that discovery documents be
  translated into a defendant’s native language.” Mendoza v. United States, 755
  F.3d 821, 831 (7th Cir. 2014). A narrow exception to this general rule may exist
  only in the case of trials that are heavily reliant on discovery documents that do
  not lend themselves easily to interpretation. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. at 175. The
  U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alone has held that
  written translations of court documents are constitutionally required:
        Due process demands that criminal defendants be given the means
        to understand the charges lodged against them as soon and as fully
        as practicable. It is fundamental that a defendant must be told what
        he has been accused of in a language he or she can understand. This
        is the responsibility of the government, which brought the charges,
        not of the defendant. For a non-English speaking defendant to stand
        equal with other before the court requires translation. Non-English
        speaking criminal defendants currently are at a substantial
        disadvantage. A criminal defendant cannot aid in his own defense
        without meaningful access to relevant documents he or she can
        understand.
        Id.
 In Mosquera, the court concluded that the defendants who pleaded guilty were
 entitled to written translation of certain documents: indictments, relevant
 portions of statutes referenced in their indictments, guilty pleas, pre-sentence
 reports, and other documents that may be ordered by the court. Id. at 178.
                          Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

 Mosquera was a complex case that involved 18 defendants, some 10,000
 documents, more than 550 tape recordings and transcripts, and during one
 proceeding, only one translator. Id. at 170. Importantly, the court held the
 complexity of the charges and lack of available interpreters to be dispositive in
 asserting a due process right to written translation of court documents. Id.
¶ 26     In United States v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Mosquera
  by reading the case narrowly to hold only that “a court may decide to provide
  written translations in difficult and complicated cases.” 339 F.3d 725, 729 (8th
  Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Numerous courts have followed or agreed with
  Gonzales’ interpretation of Mosquera. See United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818,
  841 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Canizales-Satisbal v. United States, 73 F.3d 364 n.2 (7th
  Cir. 1995); Sanders v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 2d 447, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
  State ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Dep’t v. William M., 161 P.3d 262,
  271 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007). Indeed, even Mosquera itself acknowledges that the
  trial court decides “the extent and nature of translation services needed by the
  defendant.” 816 F. Supp. at 174 (citing United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470
  (9th Cir. 1986)).
¶ 27     Zhang’s case at the trial level was not document-heavy or factually
  complex enough to demand written translation of documents, as required in
  Mosquera. The evidence brought against Zhang at trial was the sort for which
  written translation was neither necessary nor practical. Zhang was convicted
  upon the in-court testimony of one eye witness and two photographs of physical
  evidence: the broken window and the rock used to break it. Tr. at 4, 7, 9, 41.
¶ 28     We find persuasive the jurisdictions that hold a defendant is entitled to oral
  interpretation, and not written translation, absent a clear indication that the
  defendant’s other constitutional rights were denied. “[A] criminal defendant
  lacking a basic understanding of the English language has a due process right to
  an interpreter to enable him to understand what is said at trial and to communicate
  with counsel.” Mendoza, 755 F.3d at 828 (citing United States v. Johnson, 248
  F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2001)). Any constitutional right to written interpretation
  exists on the basis that the defendant cannot be truly present for their trial or assist
  in their case without such translation. Zhang had consistent and reliable access
  to a court-qualified interpreter. Indeed, he benefitted from the same interpreter
  being present for both the bench trial and sentencing. It is clear from the record
  that he was an active participant and understood the proceedings. Zhang’s due
  process rights were not violated for lack of written translation. We find no error
  in the trial court’s provision of competent, contemporaneous interpretation
  services to the defendant.
                         Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

¶ 29     Zhang argues that he should have been provided with a written translation
  of the court proceedings. Opening Br. at 4. To support this argument, he relies
  on United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970),
  and Ling v. State, 702 S.E.2d 881, 884 (Ga. 2010). In Negron, the Second Circuit
  granted an application for a writ of habeas corpus from a Puerto Rican man
  convicted of murder in New York, who had no English ability and his trial lawyer
  had no Spanish ability. Negron, 434 F.2d at 387, 388. No interpreter was
  consistently assigned, making the defendant largely unable to understand the
  proceedings. Id. at 388. The government admitted that it would have provided a
  translator had the defendant asked, but the defendant did not know he had such a
  right. Id. at 389–91. The court found the failure to provide consistent
  interpretation violated the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
  rights. Negron concluded that when a court is aware of a defendant’s language
  difficulties, it must inform them of the right to a translator. Id. at 390–91.
¶ 30     Negron does not clearly stand for the proposition that written translations
  are mandatory; the court said nothing about written translations and focused on
  the defendant’s inability to comprehend what was happening at trial. Id. at 388.
  Zhang’s claim that he was entitled to a written translation of trial proceedings
  and court documents is wholesale distinct from the claim at issue in Negron,
  where lack of consistency in oral interpretation formed the basis for the
  defendant’s habeas petition. As such, we find no support in Negron for Zhang’s
  appeal.
¶ 31    Ling similarly fails to support Zhang’s argument that he should have been
  offered written translation. Ling held that a criminal defendant who does not
  speak English is rendered effectively absent at trial if no interpreter is provided.
  702 S.E.2d at 882. Since Zhang was provided an interpreter at trial, Ling is
  inapplicable.
¶ 32      In fact, one year later, the Georgia Supreme Court distinguished the facts
  of Ling from cases in which defendants are provided interpreters. In Pineda v.
  State, 706 S.E.2d 407 (Ga. 2011), the court found that the defendant’s due
  process rights were not violated when his attorney “recognized the need for
  interpreters and secured them.” Id. at 411. Several interpreters translated for
  Pineda at different times throughout his trial, and “[a]t each change of interpreter,
  Pineda told the court that he was satisfied with the procedure; at no time did he
  tell the court, or his attorneys, that he did not, or could not, understand what had
  transpired.” Id.
¶ 33     The facts of Pineda are analogous to the case before us today. The same
  interpreter was used throughout trial and sentencing, and the interpreter was court
  qualified and sworn in at the beginning of each proceeding. Zhang himself,
  through the interpreter, addressed the court. The record is devoid of any evidence
  that he did not understand what had transpired during his trial and sentencing, he
  was unable to communicate with his counsel, or had requested a written
  translation and was denied the service. Zhang did not allege during his trial,
                          Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

 revocation hearing, or sentencing that he was dissatisfied with the oral
 interpretation.
¶ 34     Moreover, Zhang failed to claim that his substantive rights were injured
  by the lack of a written translation. In his appeal, he states only that he “might
  [have made] statements that were not adequately deliberated on,” not that he
  actually made such statements. Opening Br. at 4.
¶ 35     We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling absent a showing by the
  defendant that he was prejudiced by the lack of written translation. See Luan,
  2021 MP 8 ¶ 28. Without an argument from Zhang that his substantial rights were
  explicitly violated and without evidence that a miscarriage of justice would result
  from a finding of no error, we have no cause to find error in the trial court’s
  proceeding. See Hocog, 2019 MP 5 ¶ 11. The oral translation provided to Zhang
  sufficiently afforded him the protection of his Sixth Amendment rights.
                                    IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 36     We find that the trial court had proper jurisdiction because federal law
  does not preempt 6 CMC § 1805(a). Zhang was properly convicted for vandalism
  as a general intent crime. To the extent that Zhang did not raise concerns about
  the fairness of his trial with the court below, his arguments are waived. The oral
  interpretation provided for Zhang at trial did not violate his due process rights.
  For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the conviction and sentence.
         SO ORDERED this 29th day of September, 2023.

/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Chief Justice

 /s/
JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
Associate Justice

/s/
PERRY B. INOS
Associate Justice

                                        COUNSEL

Shabgua Zhang, Pro Se Appellant.

Cong Nie, Saipan, MP, Standby Counsel for Appellant.

J. Robert Glass, Jr., Saipan, MP, for Appellee.
                           Commonwealth v. Zhang, 2023 MP 9

                                           NOTICE

This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In any
event of discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication,
the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236–9715,
fax (670) 236–9702, e–mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov.
                                                                             E-FILED
                                                                             CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                                             E-filed: Sep 29 2023 04:57PM
                                                                             Clerk Review: Sep 29 2023 04:58PM
                                                                             Filing ID: 70985179
                                                                             Case No.: 2022-SCC-0004-CRM
                                                                             NoraV Borja

                                            IN THE

                                    Supreme Court
                                           OF THE

           Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

                COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS,
                              Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                             v.

                        SHABGUA ZHANG (AKA SHAN GUO ZHANG),
                                 Defendant-Appellant.

                        Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0004-CRM
                       Superior Court Nos. 21-0115-CR & 20-0197-CR

                                        JUDGMENT

         Defendant-Appellant Shabgua Zhang (“Zhang”) appeals his conviction for vandalism and
sentence in Criminal Case No. 21-0115 and probation revocation in Criminal Case No. 20-0197.
For the reasons discussed in the accompanying opinion, the Court AFFIRMS Zhang’s conviction and
sentence for vandalism, and DISMISSES the appeal of his probation revocation for lack of
jurisdiction.

       ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2023.

 /s/
JUDY T. ALDAN
Clerk of the Supreme Court