Court Opinion

ID: 9679497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:54:19.312031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:14.133691
License: Public Domain

HAMITER, Justice
(dissenting).
The basis of *the decisions in State v. Jones and State v. Sims (cited and relied on by the majority as controlling herein and, incidentally, in both of which I dissented), to the effect that Act No. 164 of 1950 denouncing criminal neglect of family had no application to the prosecutions there involved, was that our substantive law at that time imposed no obligation or duty Upon a parent to support his illegitimate child, unless such child had been acknowledged by the parent in the manner required by the LSA-Civil Code or had been de*894dared, as such by judgment rendered in an appropriate civil proceeding.
However, subsequent' to those decisions, and obviously as a result thereof, the Legislature adopted Act No. 368 of 1952 which remedied the claimed deficiency by specifically establishing and imposing, for the purpose of prosecutions for criminal neglect of family, a duty or obligation on the. part of a parent to support his illegitimate child, even though the parentage be not acknowledged or judicially decreed. Thus, such statute (also known as LSA-R.S. 14:74), insofar as pertinent, recites:
“Criminal neglect of family is the desertion or intentional non-support: ******
“(2) By either parent of his minor child, whether legitimate or illcgitimate, who is in destitute or necessitous circumstances, there being a duty established by this article for either parent to support his child. The parent shall have this duty without regard to his reasons and irrespective of the causes of his living separate from the other parent. The duty established by this article shall apply retrospectively to all children, legitimate or illegitimate, born prior to the effective date of this article.” (Italics mine.)
With respect to the application for remedial writs in State v. Henry Holmes, No. 41,076 of the docket of this court and referred to in the majority opinion, I have only to say that I did not subscribe to the ruling and endorsement: “Writ refused.. The accused was properly discharged.” Rather, having entertained at the time a view consistent with that above expressed, I suggested that the writs should be granted..
For these reasons I respectfully dissent.