Court Opinion

ID: 9927729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 21:00:48.299975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:29.368788
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10231    Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/29/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10231
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        DAVID JACOB MITCHELL,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cr-00168-MSS-SPF-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10231

        Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               David Mitchell appeals his below-guidelines 600-month total
        imprisonment sentence for production of child pornography,
        distribution of child pornography, transfer of obscene material to a
        minor, and possession of child pornography. He argues that his
        sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court
        imposed too severe a penalty considering his mitigating personal
        history, resulting in an unwarranted sentencing disparity between
        him and defendants convicted of similar crimes. After review, we
        affirm.
                                 I.     Background
               In June 2022, Mitchell was charged by superseding
        indictment with production (Count 1), distribution (Count 2), and
        possession (Count 4) of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 2251(a) and (e), § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B), and (b)(1)–(2). He was also
        charged with transfer of obscene material to a minor (Count 3), in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470. Mitchell pleaded guilty to all counts
        without the benefit of a plea agreement.
              In preparation for sentencing, a presentence investigation
        report (“PSI”) was prepared. The PSI described the offense
        conduct as follows. On October 18, 2021, an undercover detective
        (“UC”), purporting to be a 13-year-old female, received a message
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        23-10231                 Opinion of the Court                             3

        from Mitchell’s Kik1 account. During Mitchell’s communications
        with the UC, Mitchell sent around 15 videos of children (many
        between the ages of 5 and 11) being sexually abused, as well as
        several videos of himself masturbating. Mitchell also sent the UC
        a video of child pornography that he stated he created with a 15-
        year-old female. Mitchell expressed interest in coming to visit the
        UC and making videos of sexual acts with the UC. Mitchell
        admitted that he thought the UC was a minor.
               On April 21, 2022, law enforcement executed a search
        warrant at Mitchell’s residence. Federal agents seized and
        forensically reviewed multiple electronic devices recovered from
        his residence. Agents discovered the following. Between
        September and October 2017, Mitchell “enticed, induced, and
        coerced Victim 1,” who was 15 years old at the time, “to send
        images and videos of herself engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”
        Mitchell also tried to set a time to meet with Victim 1 in-person.
        Mitchell’s devices also contained images and videos of minors
        engaged in sexual acts, including toddlers and children under the
        age of 12. Mitchell also conducted searches of underaged girls on
        his iPhone. In total, law enforcement discovered 78 images and 30
        videos of child pornography across his devices. Mitchell’s advisory
        guidelines range was the statutory maximum of 960 months’

        1 Per the PSI, “Kik is a web-based instant messaging mobile application that

        allows users to transmit and receive messages, photos, and videos. Users can
        communicate privately with other users or in groups.”
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                       23-10231

        imprisonment. 2 He faced a statutory-minimum term of 180
        months’ imprisonment.
               Mitchell argued for a downward variance from 960 months
        to the statutory minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment in light of
        his personal background. Mitchell stated that his mother was
        verbally abusive and suffered from alcoholism, which led to liver
        disease and her death at a young age. Despite the turmoil his
        mother’s alcoholism caused him, Mitchell stated that his
        relationship with his mother “was not horrible” and that he “did
        not cope well” with her passing in 2003. Mitchell suffered from
        anxiety, depression, pedophilic disorder, and post-traumatic stress
        disorder, and had twice attempted suicide. He also submitted a
        psychosexual evaluation and mitigation analysis, which expanded
        on the effect his mother’s alcoholism had on him, as well as his
        mental illness and his own struggles with substance abuse and
        addiction.
              In his allocution at sentencing, Mitchell accepted
        responsibility and apologized to the court. Mitchell’s counsel
        noted that Mitchell had changed for the better since his arrest
        because he had stopped using drugs and was no longer
        experiencing withdrawals. His counsel maintained that the

        2 Mitchell’s base offense level of 43 and his criminal history category of I

        resulted in a guidelines range of life. However, where, as here, “the statutorily
        authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable
        guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the
        guideline sentence.” U.S.S.G. §§ 5G1.1(a), 5G1.2(b) cmt. (n.3(B)).
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        23-10231                Opinion of the Court                           5

        statutory-minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment was
        appropriate. 3
               The government argued for 960 months’ imprisonment. It
        asserted that Mitchell’s behavior was predatory and that he was a
        danger to the community. The government noted that Mitchell
        had continuously engaged in this conduct for several years and his
        contact with the UC was “calculated and premeditated.” It
        maintained that Mitchell’s mitigating personal circumstances were
        outweighed by the serious nature of the offense and that he was at
        a high risk of reoffending. Thus, the government argued that a
        guideline sentence was necessary to recognize the harm suffered
        by the young victims, promote respect for federal law and societal
        norms, provide just punishment and deterrence, and protect the
        public.
               The district court sentenced Mitchell to a downward
        variance of 600 months’ imprisonment—360 months for Count 1
        followed by a consecutive term of 240 months on Counts 2, and
        concurrent terms of 120 months as to Counts 3 and 4—to be
        followed by 160 months’ supervised release. The court said that it
        “t[ook] no pleasure in imposing” this sentence “but the
        consequences of [Mitchell’s] behavior . . . called for it[.]” With
        regard to Mitchell’s mitigation arguments, the district court noted
        that it could not “identify mitigating factors that would take

        3 The U.S. Probation Office recommended a downward variance of 480

        months’ imprisonment based on Mitchell’s decision to plead guilty and his
        personal history of mental health issues and substance abuse.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10231

        [Mitchell] out of what [was] intended to be the heartland of cases
        and defendants in these types of offenses.” The court explained
        that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and advisory
        guidelines, and that the sentence complied with the statutory
        purposes of sentencing.
              Mitchell objected to the substantive reasonableness of the
        sentence, and this appeal followed.
                                 II.    Discussion
               On appeal, Mitchell argues that his below-guidelines 600-
        month sentence is substantively unreasonable because it was
        greater than necessary to protect the public and promote the goals
        of sentencing. In light of his mitigating factors, Mitchell argues for
        a sentence between the statutory minimum (180 months) and what
        probation recommended (480 months). He also maintains that his
        sentence “create[d] an unwarranted sentencing disparity.”
               We review the reasonableness of sentencing decisions under
        the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
        552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A district court abuses its discretion at
        sentencing if it “(1) fails to aﬀord consideration to relevant factors
        that were due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight to an
        improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
        judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey,
        612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotations omitted).
        The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing
        that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record, the
        sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and “the substantial
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        23-10231               Opinion of the Court                          7

        deference aﬀorded sentencing courts.”             United States v.
        Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
               “A district court has considerable discretion in deciding
        whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance and the extent of
        one that is appropriate.” United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262,
        1266 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted). Thus, we may aﬃrm a
        sentence even though we might have imposed a diﬀerent sentence
        had we been in the district court’s position. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.
        We will vacate a district court’s sentence “only if we are left with
        the ‘deﬁnite and ﬁrm’ conviction that the district court committed
        a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by
        arriving at a sentence that is outside the range of reasonable
        sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v.
        Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Irey, 612 F.3d
        at 1190). “[W]e do not presume that a sentence outside the
        guidelines range is unreasonable and . . . must give due deference
        to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors support its
        chosen sentence.” Id. at 1267. And “[a] sentence imposed well
        below the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of a
        reasonable sentence.” United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 656
        (11th Cir. 2014).
               The “overarching” instruction to sentencing courts in 18
        U.S.C. § 3553 is that any sentence, whether within the guideline
        range or through a variance, must be suﬃcient but not greater than
        necessary to comply with the goals of sentencing listed in
        § 3553(a)(2). Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007); see
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10231

        18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (stating that whether a
        sentence falls inside or outside the guideline range, the district
        court must consider the § 3553(a) factors). The relevant factors
        under § 3553(a) include the nature and circumstances of the
        oﬀense, the personal history and characteristics of the defendant,
        the seriousness of the crime, and the need for the sentence to
        promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, and aﬀord
        adequate deterrence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2). The court must
        also consider the applicable guideline range, any pertinent policy
        statements from the Sentencing Commission, and the need to
        avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly
        situated defendants and provide restitution to any of the
        defendant’s victims. Id. § 3553(a)(3)–(7).
               The district court does not have to give all the factors equal
        weight and is given discretion to attach great weight to one factor
        over another. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. The “district court
        need not account for every § 3553(a) factor, nor must it discuss each
        factor and the role that it played in sentencing.” United States v.
        McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007). The failure to discuss
        mitigating evidence does not indicate “that the court erroneously
        ignored or failed to consider this evidence.” United States v. Amedeo,
        487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted).
              The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
        Mitchell to 600 months’ imprisonment. Mitchell’s sentence is well
        below both the guideline range and the statutory maximum of 960
        months’ imprisonment, which is an indicator of reasonableness.
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        23-10231                    Opinion of the Court                                  9

        Stanley, 739 F.3d at 656 (“A sentence imposed well below the
        statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable
        sentence.”). And the district court reached this sentence after
        considering the parties’ arguments, Mitchell’s background and
        history, the PSI, and the § 3553(a) factors. The district court noted
        that it “t[ook] no pleasure” in imposing the sentence, but that it
        could not “identify mitigating factors that would take [Mitchell]
        out of what is intended to be the heartland of cases and defendants
        in these types of oﬀenses.” It then concluded that the “sentence
        [was] suﬃcient but not greater than necessary to comply with the
        statutory purposes of sentencing.” Given the seriousness of the
        oﬀense and the high risk of reoﬀending, it was reasonable for the
        district court to determine that the mandatory-minimum sentence
        was unwarranted and that a longer sentence was necessary to
        accomplish the sentencing goals of § 3553(a). 4
              Furthermore, we have expressed that “the more serious the
        criminal conduct is the greater the need for retribution and the
        longer the sentence should be.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1206 (en banc). And
        as we have repeatedly emphasized, “[c]hild sex crimes are among
        the most egregious and despicable of societal and criminal

        4 Mitchell also argues, in passing, that the district court imposed a 600-month

        sentence simply because “the guideline suggest[ed] that it [was] appropriate.”
        But there is no evidence that the district court treated the guidelines as
        mandatory. The guidelines suggested a harsher sentence than 600 months,
        and the district court explicitly considered other factors in its decision than just
        the guidelines, including the § 3553(a) factors, the parties’ arguments,
        Mitchell’s background and history, and the PSI.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                       23-10231

        oﬀenses.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sarras,
        575 F.3d 1191, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009)). As a result, we have
        frequently upheld lengthy sentences in cases involving child
        pornography and sex crimes. See United States v. Johnson 451 F.3d
        1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding as reasonable a 140-year
        sentence for producing and distributing child pornography
        involving three boys between the ages of 8 and 16); United States v.
        Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1221 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding as reasonable
        a 1,200-month sentence for three counts of knowingly persuading
        a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct and one count of
        knowingly possessing child pornography).5
              Accordingly, we conclude Mitchell’s sentence                            is
        substantively reasonable, and we aﬃrm the district court.
                AFFIRMED.

        5 Mitchell mentions in passing that the district court’s sentence created an

        unwarranted sentencing disparity with other defendants. We disagree. First,
        he fails to identify another defendant who is similarly situated to him. See
        United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that
        “[w]hen we consider disparity in sentencing, we first ask whether the
        defendant is similarly situated to the defendants to whom he compares
        himself”). Second, the district court explicitly varied downward from the
        guideline range of 960 months’ imprisonment in order to “avoid unwarranted
        sentencing disparities among defendants.”