Court Opinion

ID: 9533979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:36:01.140194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:15.364339
License: Public Domain

*791CLARK, J.
I concur in reversing the order granting the writ of habeas corpus and in remanding the case to the Solano County Superior Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views 'carefully expressed in the majority opinion, but I dissent from modifying petitioner’s sentence.
To now reduce petitioner’s sentence to life imprisonment with possibility of parole, the majority must encroach upon the Governor’s exclusive power of commutation. “The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.” (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.) Commutation of a sentence—on conditions deemed proper—is an executive power vested solely in the Governor. (See Cal. Const., art. V, § 8 (formerly art. VII, § 1); People v. Danielly (1949) 33 Cal.2d 362, 383 [202 P.2d 18]; People v. Tuthill (1948) 32 Cal.2d 819, 827 [198 P.2d 505]; In re Lindley (1947) 29 Cal.2d 709, 729 [177 P.2d 918]; see also People v. Odle (1951) 37 Cal.2d 52, 58 [230 P.2d 345].)
Having concluded that the death penalty was both cruel and unusual punishment in People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628 [100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880], this court modified Anderson’s sentence to life imprisonment with possibility of parole because that was the only other penalty provided by the Legislature for first degree murder. (See Pen. Code, § 190.) However, it was a proper exercise of his power of commutation for the Governor to reduce petitioner’s sentence to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. (See Green v. Gordon (1952) 39 Cal.2d 230, 232-233 [246 P.2d 38].)
Because neither Anderson nor any other case proscribes such punishment, to now further reduce petitioner’s sentence is to invade the Governor’s prerogative.
McComb, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied March 20, 1974. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.