Court Opinion

ID: 9537540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:19:43.173465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:46.087562
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part):
Although I concur with the majority on all other issues in this case, I dissent from its decision on the following remark made by the prosecutor during his rebuttal closing argument:
“Mr. Duber [defense counsel] has asked you to find Mr. Marvin guilty of voluntary manslaughter. If you find Mr. Marvin guilty of voluntary manslaughter you might as well sentence to death anybody who ever touched Mrs. Marvin, [Gerry Marvin, appellant’s ex-wife] as well as sentence to death Gerry Marvin.’’
This language directs the jurors’ attention away from the real issue in the case by appealing to their fears and emotions. It seeks to influence the jurors to find defendant guilty of first degree murder rather than voluntary manslaughter by implying that voluntary manslaughter has a minimal sentence. The jurors are invited to prevent future crimes by the defendant by finding him guilty of first degree murder, with its impliedly heavier sentence, even though the evidence of guilt as to this crime may not be beyond a reasonable doubt.
This type of argument injects into the minds of jurors matters with which they should not be concerned in deciding guilt. As this Court stated in State v. Makal, 104 Ariz. 476, 477-78, 455 P.2d 450, 451-52 (1969) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 838, 92 S.Ct. *560128, 30 L.Ed.2d 71 (1971), quoting Farris v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 305, 163 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1968):
“ ‘When evidence introduced is not of a subsequent act but of a possible future act, it does not shed any material light on an accused’s mental state at the time of the offense charged. It can only have relation to the possibility or even probability that an accused will in the future commit a criminal act or will be a danger to society, and such evidence tends to destroy by fear the recognized defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.’ ”
In my dissent in State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 259-260, 585 P.2d 563, 567-568 (1978), I stated, and I now reiterate, that the prejudicial effect is the same regardless of whether the prosecutor urges the jury to disregard the state’s burden of proof or the defendant’s insanity defense.
The majority finds the statement proper as a reasonable inference from defendant’s testimony that he had threatened to kill his wife and anyone he found with her, citing State v. Jaramillo, 110 Ariz. 481, 520 P.2d 1105 (1974) and State v. Gonzales, 105 Ariz. 434, 466 P.2d 388 (1970). I believe that the reasonable inferences from the evidence, which are permissible in closing argument, must relate to the crime charged, not as in this case to potential future crimes. The cases cited do not hold otherwise.
The statement of the prosecutor went beyond the pale of legitimate argument and into the realm of prejudicial error that denied defendant the fair trial to which he was entitled. This Court should not countenance and thus encourage this example of overzealous prosecutorial activity. Rather, it should strongly disapprove of all such conduct, both to preserve defendants’ right to a fair trial, and to put prosecutors on notice that such actions will not be tolerated. For these reasons, I would reverse.