Court Opinion

ID: 9955984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 22:02:27.773224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:28.894643
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                       DIVISION EIGHT

JOSEPH GAZAL,                         B327668

   Plaintiff and Respondent,          Los Angeles County
                                      Super. Ct. No. 22TRCV00429
       v.

CARLOS ECHEVERRY et al.,

   Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Ronald F. Frank, Judge. Affirmed.

     LiMandri & Jonna, Charles S. LiMandri, Paul M. Jonna,
Mark D. Myers and Jeffrey M. Trissell for Defendants and
Appellants.

      Thomas Law Group, Paul William Thomas, Neda Ataie;
Jeff Lewis Law, Jeffrey Lewis and Kyla Dayton for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                 _____________________________
                             SUMMARY
       Plaintiff Joseph Gazal was inspired by a homily, delivered
during church services by defendant Carlos Echeverry, a deacon
at plaintiff’s church, to donate more than $1 million to purchase a
car and a home for a destitute family. Plaintiff brought this
lawsuit about five months later, claiming he was deceived into
believing the car and house would be purchased for and titled to
the family; and he would not have made the donation if he had
known SOFESA, Inc., a nonprofit public benefit corporation
founded and led by the deacon’s wife, Jessica Echeverry, would
buy the car and house for itself, instead of the family.
       Defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint
under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public
participation) statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; further
statutory references are to section 425.16.) Defendants asserted
the homily was protected speech, and so were a conversation
between the deacon and plaintiff that occurred in the church
after the homily, as well as all the private conversations that
ensued over the following 10 days or so.
       The trial court denied the motion, finding the “core injury-
producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised”
did not rest on protected speech, but rather on “conduct and
speech that was private . . . and not directed at a wide public
audience”; and that “the causes of action arose from further
communications” that took place in the weeks after the homily.
       We agree and affirm the trial court’s order. We deny a
motion for sanctions plaintiff filed in this court.
                                FACTS
       Plaintiff, 80 years old and retired, had been a member of
St. Gerard Majella Church for over 15 years. Defendant Carlos
(also known as Charlie) Echeverry was a deacon at the church.
(We refer to him as the deacon.) At a Sunday mass on December

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19, 2021, the deacon delivered a homily on the theme of love.
During the homily, he described a family in need with four
children who had fled from an abusive husband and father. They
had no home and were living in a motel. The deacon read a letter
to Santa written by the eldest child, a 12-year-old boy, saying the
family had lost everything and asking for gifts for his little
brothers.
       After the homily, a line of parishioners including plaintiff
stood waiting to speak to the deacon about helping the family.
The deacon told them that immediate funds were needed to
purchase a home for the family. According to the deacon,
plaintiff “asked to speak with me at more length,” and they “sat
together in a pew in full view of dozens of other people in the
immediate proximity.” Plaintiff told the deacon “that he would
donate a large sum for a house for this destitute family.”
       Within a few days, the deacon introduced plaintiff to his
wife, defendant Jessica Echeverry, the founder and executive
director of SOFESA. SOFESA was incorporated in 2007 with the
name “Sore Feet Saviors” as a charity to provide emergency
assistance to homeless and low income families. Most
communications over the next couple of weeks between plaintiff
and the deacon included both the deacon and his wife.
Defendants told plaintiff the family was in immediate need of a
car because their car had significant body damage making it
unsafe to drive. Plaintiff agreed to donate $40,000 immediately
to purchase a new car for the family.
       On December 24, 2021, plaintiff donated $47,143.91.
Subsequent donations were $100,000 on December 27, 2021;
$100,000 on December 28, 2021, and $800,000 on December 29,
2021, “for a total of $1,047,143.91 to purchase a car and a home
for the family.” Plaintiff “had to withdraw funds from savings
and borrow against his line of credit to be able to donate this

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amount,” and he did so with the understanding he was helping a
destitute family. He told defendants that funds not used to
purchase a car and a home had to be returned to him.
      On January 18, 2022, defendants told plaintiff a house was
purchased for the family, but they did not mention the purchase
price. Defendants asked plaintiff to complete a W-9 form; they
stated SOFESA would be required to issue plaintiff a 1099 form
for the funds being returned. Plaintiff complied because he was
in dire need of the money.
      Plaintiff then demanded an accounting of his donation,
including the escrow closing statement and information on the
amount of money received when defendants sold the family’s old
car. “Defendants continued to ignore Plaintiff’s request” until
February 9, 2022, when plaintiff’s counsel sent a demand letter.
(Plaintiff sent e-mails on January 26, 2022, and February 2,
2022, explaining his precarious financial situation, and again
asking for the escrow closing statement.) Plaintiff consulted with
two priests at the St. Gerard Majella Church, and was told
defendants’ “solicitation of the large sum of money was contrary
to church practices and there should have been a discussion with
the church.”
      The February 9, 2022 letter to defendants from plaintiff’s
counsel demanded an accounting, including the escrow closing
statement and other documents, and demanded return of
plaintiff’s entire donation, asserting the solicitation was unlawful
and a violation of church rules. That same day, the deacon’s wife
responded to plaintiff’s February 2 e-mail, attaching a redacted
closing statement and a one-page ledger sheet showing how
plaintiff’s donation was spent. The closing statement showed
SOFESA, not the family, as the buyer. The ledger sheet included
items “never discussed or agreed upon which is why only
$195,000 was returned to the Plaintiff.”

                                 4
       Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 1, 2022, alleging
causes of action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
three fraud-related causes of action, elder financial abuse,
unlawful solicitation, unfair business practices, and an
accounting. The named defendants were the deacon, his wife,
and SOFESA. Seven causes of action were expressly based on
the claim that defendants used plaintiff’s donation to purchase
the house and the car for SOFESA and in SOFESA’s name rather
than for the family, “contrary to what the parties agreed,” and
that his donation was also used for other items “never agreed
upon.” The complaint alleged that SOFESA “has the ability to
evict [the family] at any time, charge rent and take away their
only mode of transportation . . . . Defendants misrepresented
material facts and Plaintiff would not have withdrawn from his
savings or borrowed money to make this substantial donation for
this family had he known the car and house would be purchased
in Defendant Sofesa’s name.”
       Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for “unlawful solicitation”
alleged that on December 19, 2021, the deacon “solicited
donations for an alleged family in need of a home at the
St. Gerard Majella Church”; that “[t]he discussions continued and
further solicitation for a new car was made”; that SOFESA’s
registration with the Attorney General’s Registry of Charitable
Trusts was delinquent “at the time the solicitation was made”;
and that a delinquent organization “is not in good standing and
prohibited from engaging in conduct for which registration is
required including solicitation or disbursing charitable funds.”
       In addition to alleging that the deacon’s reading of the
letter to Santa “was intended and did capture the sympathy and
heart of the parishioners, including Plaintiff,” plaintiff alleged
that during the homily, the deacon “cloaked charitable
solicitation in faith-based rhetoric” and “called on several biblical

                                  5
analogies” to “further induce charitable contributions” for
SOFESA’s benefit.
       As recounted at the outset, defendants filed an anti-SLAPP
motion, and the trial court denied it on the ground plaintiff’s
claims did not arise from protected activity. Because the court
found defendants did not carry their threshold burden, the court
did not consider whether plaintiff had demonstrated his claims
had at least minimal merit.
       Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal.
                             DISCUSSION
1.     The Law
       A defendant may bring a special motion to strike any cause
of action “arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue . . . .” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) When ruling on an
anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court employs a two-step process.
The moving defendant bears the initial burden of establishing
that the allegations or claims “ ‘ “aris[e] from” protected activity
in which the defendant has engaged. [Citations.] If the
defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate
its claims have at least “minimal merit.” ’ [Citation.] If the
plaintiff fails to meet that burden, the court will strike the
claim.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871,
884.)
       Our review is de novo. (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1238, 1250.)
       As relevant here, defendants must establish the conduct
alleged in the complaint was protected under either of two
provisions: either the claims arise from a “written or oral
statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a

                                 6
public forum in connection with an issue of public interest”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3)), or they arise from “any . . . conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right . . . of free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4), the catchall provision).
2.     This Case
       Defendants contend plaintiff’s complaint arises “from
protected religious preaching.” According to defendants, both the
homily and the conversation between the deacon and plaintiff in
the church after the homily were protected under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3), as statements “made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest.” (Ibid.) As for the subsequent private discussions,
defendants argue those conversations “cannot form a distinct
claim for relief and thus are incidental.” Defendants say the
private discussions were protected under the catchall provision
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)) that covers “any other conduct” in
furtherance of First Amendment rights “in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Ibid.)
       None of these arguments has any merit except, partially,
the first: We will assume that the deacon’s homily at a public
church service on issues of homelessness and Christian charity
was protected First Amendment activity. (The trial court pointed
out that the public forum requirement of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3) was satisfied by the broadly inclusive church
service with the homily having been uploaded to the internet for
an even broader segment of the public.) But the moving party
“must establish both (1) that its act constituted protected activity
and (2) the opposing party’s cause of action arose from that

                                  7
protected activity.” (Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Assn. of
Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 119, 130.)
       Here, the problem for defendants is that plaintiff’s claims
do not arise from the homily. His claims arise from the alleged
misconduct that occurred after delivery of the homily. Conduct
does not become protected activity simply because it follows
protected activity. (See City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29
Cal.4th 69, 78 (City of Cotati) [“That a cause of action arguably
may have been triggered by protected activity does not entail that
it is one arising from such.”]; see also id. at p. 77 [“California
courts rightly have rejected the notion ‘that a lawsuit is
adequately shown to be one “arising from” an act in furtherance
of the rights of petition or free speech as long as suit was brought
after the defendant engaged in such an act, whether or not the
purported basis for the suit is that act itself.’ ”].)
       As City of Cotati and other cases tell us, “the statutory
phrase ‘cause of action . . . arising from’ means simply that the
defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action
must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition
or free speech.” (City of Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 78; see
also Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 (Park) [the determinative issue is
whether “the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong
complained of”].) “Phrased another way, does the ‘ “core injury-
producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised” ’
arise out of protected activity?” (Starr v. Ashbrook (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 999, 1020.)
       As the trial court observed, the homily “set in motion a
series of events that resulted in the claimed misconduct.”
Certainly the homily inspired plaintiff to offer to buy a car and a

                                 8
house for the destitute family described in the homily. But that
is as far as it goes. Plaintiff would have no claims were it not for
the conduct he alleged in seven of his causes of action:
defendants’ conduct of buying the house in SOFESA’s name
rather than in the name of the family, and using the donation for
items never discussed or agreed upon. 1 The homily does not
supply an element of any of those claims. (See Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1063 [“in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts
should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what
actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently
form the basis for liability”].)
       Defendants’ other contentions do not change this result.
       Defendants contend the conversation between plaintiff and
the deacon immediately after the homily, in which plaintiff
offered to buy a home for the family, was protected activity
because it “took place in the church while it was still open to the
public, and while other members of the parish were nearby.” The
deacon’s declaration states that plaintiff “asked to speak with me
at more length, . . . so we sat together in a pew in full view of
dozens of other people in the immediate proximity,” and plaintiff
“then spontaneously . . . offered to donate money to provide
housing for the family.” Being in a public place within sight of
others does not change a private conversation into a public one.

1      The only cause of action not expressly based on that
conduct was plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for “unlawful
solicitation,” alleging SOFESA’s registration was delinquent and
therefore it was prohibited from soliciting for charitable purposes
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.9.4) at the time. The complaint
alleges the deacon solicited donations both on December 19, 2021
(the date of the homily and the conversation between the deacon
and plaintiff in the church) and subsequently for the new car.

                                 9
In any event, that conversation, like the homily, is not the
“ ‘ “core injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim
is premised.” ’ ” (Starr v. Ashbrook, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1020.)
        Next, defendants contend all the subsequent
communications between plaintiff and defendants were also
protected activity under the catchall provision of the anti-SLAPP
statute. That provision protects “any other conduct” in
furtherance of the exercise of free speech rights “in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(4).) According to defendants, the subsequent private
communications “flowed from the homily” and because the homily
is protected activity, “surrounding conduct in furtherance of it is
necessarily also protected.” The case defendants cite does not
support that principle, and as we have already observed, conduct
is not necessarily protected simply because it follows protected
activity.
        The relevant analysis appears in FilmOn.com Inc. v.
DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn), which provides
direction on how a court should analyze whether communications
qualify for anti-SLAPP protection under the catchall provision.
We are required to consider the context as well as the content of a
statement. (FilmOn, at p. 149.) We first look to the content of
the speech by asking what public issue or issue of public interest
is implicated by the speech in question. (Ibid.) And then we ask
“what functional relationship exists between the speech and the
public conversation about some matter of public interest.” (Id. at
pp. 149-150.) “[W]e examine whether a defendant—through
public or private speech or conduct—participated in, or furthered,
the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.” (Id. at

                                10
p. 151.) “[A] statement is made ‘in connection with’ a public issue
when it contributes to—that is, ‘participat[es]’ in or furthers—
some public conversation on the issue.” (Ibid.)
       The private discussions that ensued after the homily and
after plaintiff’s offer to donate funds for a house for the destitute
family do not satisfy the FilmOn standard. The issue of public
interest discussed between the parties was housing for a
homeless family. But there is no functional relationship between
those private discussions “and the public conversation about
some matter of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 150.) The private discussions were not “in connection with” a
public issue because they did not “contribute[] to—that is,
‘participat[e]’ in or further[]—some public conversation on the
issue.” (Id. at p. 151; see also id. at p. 150 [“ ‘it is not enough that
the statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the
statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public
debate’ ”].)
       As the trial court observed, the complaint did not allege “a
broader discussion or public debate over homelessness, its causes
or solutions; rather, the Complaint alleges a narrowly focused
effort to help a single family of five who were experiencing
homelessness after an episode of domestic violence.” In short, as
in FilmOn, the parties’ private communications “are too
tenuously tethered to the issues of public interest they implicate,
and too remotely connected to the public conversation about those
issues, to merit protection under the catchall provision.”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 140.)
3.     Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
       After filing his respondent’s brief, plaintiff filed a motion in
this court asking us to award monetary sanctions of $106,730

                                  11
against defendants for filing a frivolous appeal. According to
plaintiff, the appeal was devoid of merit because “most lawyers
would recognize that the private conduct here is not subject to
California’s anti-SLAPP laws,” and even if defendants had good
cause to file the motion, “once they received and reviewed the
opposition by [plaintiff] containing overwhelming evidence in
support of his claims, most lawyers would recognize that no
credible Prong Two theory could be advanced.”
       We have not requested a response to plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions, 2 and we deny the motion.
       Plaintiff does not correctly articulate the standard for a
frivolous appeal. An appeal is frivolous “ ‘when it is prosecuted
for an improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the
effect of an adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no
merit—when any reasonable attorney would agree that the
appeal is totally and completely without merit.’ ” (Workman v.
Colichman (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1039, 1062.) Nor has plaintiff
demonstrated that this case satisfies that standard.
       Plaintiff merely states it is “absurd” to apply anti-SLAPP
law to this dispute, because “most lawyers would recognize” that
false statements made in private conversations after the homily
were not protected speech. But FilmOn tells us that “private
speech or conduct” may be protected if it furthers “the discourse
that makes an issue one of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 151.) Moreover, the trial court did not view the
case as frivolous; indeed, before the hearing, the court articulated

2     See California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a) and (c) (a Court
of Appeal may impose sanctions for taking a frivolous appeal, and
the court “must give notice in writing if it is considering imposing
sanctions”).

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five issues on which it solicited the parties’ views, “[t]o help focus
argument,” and in its ruling referred to the “lengthy interactive
oral argument at the motion hearing.” All this belies the notion
that “any reasonable attorney” would agree the motion (or the
appeal) was totally devoid of merit.
                          DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendants’ special motion to strike is
affirmed. Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is denied. Plaintiff to
recover costs on appeal.

                                GRIMES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                         STRATTON, P. J.

                         VIRAMONTES, J.

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