Court Opinion

ID: 9640424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:05:52.842705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:29.736610
License: Public Domain

Mountain, J.
(dissenting). A majority of the Court have now directed that unless full funding of the Public School Education Act of 1975, or other constitutional compliance, is forthcoming by June 30, 1976, any further expenditure of public funds for school purposes will be enjoined until such compliance eventuates. Por the reasons set forth below, I dissent.
I
Underlying the question of school financing — with which the series of Robinson opinions has been chiefly concerned — exists a far more important issue of constitutionalism: to what extent, if at all, should courts affirmatively intrude to *162rectify perceived instances of unconstitutional conduct which under our system of government should be corrected by one or other of the political branches of government — the executive or legislative. This is the issue we face here. This Court decided in Robinson I, 62 N. J. 473 (1973), that the system of financing public education in this state violated Article 8, § 4, ¶ 1 of the New Jersey Constitution which requires the Legislature to “provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.” The Constitution places the obligation directly upon the Legislature. It is not diffused between or among two or more of the branches of government as are many constitutional obligations; it is imposed squarely upon one of the political branches.
It is the view of a majority of this Court that to this date there has not been legislative compliance with the constitutional mandate. The Court therefore faces the serious dilemma as to whether it should take further action to bring about compliance or stay its hand. Resolving the problem is not easy. This whole question as to the affirmative duty — if such it be — of the judiciary to compel compliance by other branches of government with requirements that have been determined by the judiciary to be necessitated by the Constitution, has been described by an eminent authority as “the next great challenge of American constitutionalism.” Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government (1976) 98.
II
Examined abstractly, powerful arguments can be presented to sustain each of the opposing viewpoints. In support of judicial restraint it may be pointed out that judicial activism, of the kind in which the majority has now engaged, generally results in violating accepted notions as to the doctrine of the separation of powers, Robinson IV, 69 *163N. J. 133, 174-184 (1975) (dissenting opinion). This doctrine finds explicit expression in our Constitution. N. J. Const. Art. III, ¶ 1.
Secondly, such judicial activism removes from the legislative body, which has been elected by the people, the opportunity to resolve the problem and gives that power to a small group of persons who have not been popularly elected. In considering this point it should not be overlooked that the same small group of persons will have been responsible for making the initial determination of uneonstitutionality now invoked as the compelling reason for a further assertion of power.
In the third place the intrusion of the judiciary — regardless of alleged provocation — into areas of legislative- or executive competence and concern places in serious jeopardy what has been called the Court’s “power of legitimacy.”" Because Professor Cox has expressed this thought so well, I prefer to quote from his .recent work rather than state the proposition in my own words. Although his remarks are addressed to the role of the Supreme Court of the United States, with only minor modification they apply equally to the highest court of each of the states:
The most important quality of law in a free society is the power to command acceptance and support from the community so as to render force unnecessary, or necessary only upon a small scale against a few recalcitrants. I call this quality the ‘power of legitimacy’ because it appears to attach to those commands of established organs of government ivhich are seen to result from their performance in an authorized fashion of the functions assigned to them. Such commands, and only such, are legitimate.
The Judicial Branch is uniquely dependent upon the power of legitimacy when engaged in constitutional adjudication; and belief in the legitimacy of its constitutional decisions is therefore a matter of prime importance. The rulings thwart powerful interests. The issues arouse the deepest political emotions. Although the courts control neither the purse nor the sword, their decrees often run against the Executive, set aside the will of the Congress, and dictate to a State. Compliance results from the belief that in such cases the courts are legitimately performing the function assigned to them, and that it is important that the function be preserved. It was the power of legitimacy that produced the public outcry *164which in turn compelled obedience when President Nixon announced hs intention to disregard Judge Sirica’s order to produce the Watergate Tapes despite its affirmation by the Court of Appeals. It is to the same power that we must look to induce other branches of government to give support when necessary even to constitutional decisions of which they disapprove. sjc> $ #
The power of the Supreme Court to command acceptance and support not only for its decisions but also for its role in government seems to depend upon a sufficiently widespread conviction that it is acting legitimately, that is, performing the functions assigned to it, and only those functions, in the manner assigned. [Cox, the Role of the Supreme Court in American Government, supra, 103-05; emphasis added.]
Fourthly, the task of enforcement may often be beyond the competence of the Court for lack of supportive resources. The judiciary does not have, and was never intended to have, the staff and other resources needed to superintend and supervise the execution of complex and elaborately detailed decrees that would in effect be taking the place of legislative enactments or executive orders.
Finally, removing a matter from legislative or executive control may often result in most unfortunate side-effects. The Court may often be unable to view the governmental problem in its entirety and as a whole. For instance, in the case before us the obvious effort of the Court is to compel the raising of a very large amount of money and seeing that it is allocated to educational needs. Worthy as is this purpose, it takes no account of any number of other public needs of which the Legislature is acutely aware. Welfare, public health, needed renovation and construction of public facilities including correctional institutions, mass transit and essential increases in the wages and salaries of public employees, to name but a few, are also very worthy purposes. But revenues have some finite limit; there is a .point beyond which taxpayer endurance cannot be expected to continue. If the judiciary seeks satisfactorily to resolve the problem before it, may not competing needs be forced to go unmet? The Legislature can, as it customarily does, take account of all public obligations, and allocate funds accordingly.
*165On the other hand it is pointed out that unless the courts will act, no one will act. This may or may not be true in a particular case, but the argument has much merit. On its •face, at least, there seems no good reason why the citizens of the State should be asked to forego a constitutional right because of governmental inaction. Resort to the ballot box is a last and often ineffectual remedy.
Ill
Consideration of the present case in the light of what has been abstractly stated above, convinces me that the action taken by the majority is most unfortunate. The Court has resorted to the equitable remedy of injunction. I have grave misgivings as to the wisdom of this step. This is no ordinary injunction. Its effect will be and is intended to be coercive. It is hoped that by threatening to close the schools this Court will induce the Legislature to raise and appropriate for educational purposes some very large sum of money. Thus the Court is indirectly commanding that a tax be imposed. But the taxing power is legislative and cannot be exercised by the judiciary. Should it seek to do indirectly what all readily admit it cannot do directly? It seems to be agreed that in all probability the money can only be raised by imposing an income tax throughout the state. Should the Court throw its great weight and influence in the scales, upon an issue so deeply controversial which has thus far met consistent legislative rejection? Of course the Legislature may, for whatever reason, fail to respond in the manner the majority must anticipate it will. What would happen then ? As Professor Cox has said, speaking directly to this issue,
It is no answer to say ‘shot down the schools and the legislature will do its duty.’ [Cow, supra, at 95]
IY
Mindful as I am of the importance of fulfilling the educational promise embodied in our organic law, I yet enter*166tain a strong hope and expectation that it will be brought ■about by our Legislature within a reasonable period of time. I cannot agree that the drastic and threatening action taken by the majority will ultimately prove beneficial to the people of this State or in the fullness of time be found to accord with the sound evolution of constitutional doctrine.