Court Opinion

ID: 9662435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:08:39.438107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:39.390854
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20092        Document: 00516869594             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/23/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                      August 23, 2023
                                      No. 23-20092                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                    Summary Calendar                                        Clerk
                                    ____________

   Roosevelt L. Lincoln, also known as Roosevelt L. Linicomn,
   Jr.,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Harris County Sheriff’s Office/Health Systems;
   Precinct 4 Constable Riley; Constable Precinct 4
   Officer 1; Constable Precinct 4 Officer 2; Harris
   County Constable’s Office for Precinct 4, Complaint
   Tracking System; Gaston Casillas,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:20-CV-4207
                     ______________________________

   Before Jones, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-20092      Document: 00516869594           Page: 2     Date Filed: 08/23/2023

            Roosevelt L. Lincoln moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
   (IFP) on appeal. The district court dismissed his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983
   complaint without prejudice for failure to timely serve the named defendants
   in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), and it subsequently
   denied his series of motions seeking relief under Federal Rules of Civil
   Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). We liberally construe Lincoln’s pro se notice of
   appeal, which does not specify the judgment or order from which the appeal
   is taken, to designate the judgment of dismissal and the denials of all
   postjudgment motions. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B); Haines v. Kerner,
   404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Williams v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610, 616 (5th Cir.
   2010).
            We must examine the basis of our jurisdiction, sua sponte, if
   necessary. Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). “[T]he timely
   filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”
   Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). Once the district court denied
   Lincoln’s Rule 59(e) motion on November 30, 2022, the 30-day period for
   filing his notice of appeal from the judgment of dismissal and the Rule 59(e)
   denial commenced. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) and (4)(A)(iv). The
   filings of his subsequent Rule 60(b) motions, which raised arguments
   substantially identical to those raised in his Rule 59(e) motion, did not toll the
   Rule 4 appellate deadline. Charles L.M. v. Northeast Independent School Dist.,
   884 F.2d 869, 870-71 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that, once district court denied
   appellant’s first Rule 59(e) motion, Rule 4 appeal period began running and
   was not interrupted by filing of second motion to reconsider raising same
   arguments). Thus, the March 8, 2023 notice of appeal is untimely as to the
   judgment of dismissal, the denial of Rule 59(e) relief, and the December 8,
   2022 denial of Rule 60(b) relief. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) and
   (4)(A)(iv). We therefore have jurisdiction to consider only Lincoln’s timely
   appeal from the February 14, 2023 dismissal of his December 19, 2022, and
Case: 23-20092      Document: 00516869594          Page: 3      Date Filed: 08/23/2023

   January 23, 2023 Rule 60(b) motions, which motions contended that he had
   been prevented from timely serving the defendants by his wrongful
   incarceration. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214;
   Williams v. Chater, 87 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that denial of
   Rule 60(b) motion is separately appealable, but such appeal does not bring up
   underlying judgment for review).
           Lincoln’s IFP motion challenges the district court’s determination
   that the appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197,
   202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into whether the appeal is taken in good faith
   “is limited to whether the appeal involves ‘legal points arguable on their
   merits (and therefore not frivolous).’” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220
   (5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
          Lincoln does not address the court’s dismissal of his December 2022
   and January 2023 Rule 60(b) motions for lack of jurisdiction and as moot; he
   has therefore abandoned any challenge to the dismissal on those grounds.
   See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that pro se
   appellant must brief arguments to preserve them); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty.
   Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987) (observing that failure
   to identify any error in district court’s analysis is same as if appellant had not
   appealed). Further, although Lincoln contends that he was prevented from
   serving the defendants because he was wrongly incarcerated for
   approximately four months between April and August 2022, the district
   court reasoned that he had been afforded ample time and opportunity when
   he was not incarcerated to serve the defendants (his suit had been pending
   for over one year and 10 months when the court dismissed it), and he does
   not substantively address this rationale. See Brinkmann, 813 F.2d at 748. He
   thus raises no nonfrivolous argument that the district court abused its
   discretion by dismissing his December 2022 and January 2023 Rule 60(b)
Case: 23-20092     Document: 00516869594       Page: 4    Date Filed: 08/23/2023

   motions. See Bailey v. Cain, 609 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 2010); Howard, 707
   F.2d at 220.
         Lincoln’s motion to proceed IFP is DENIED, and his appeal is
   DISMISSED in part for lack of jurisdiction and in remaining part as
   frivolous. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214; Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5th
   Cir. R. 42.2.