Court Opinion

ID: 9477461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:24:13.70082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:53.491277
License: Public Domain

SEITZ, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges SLOVITER and MANSMANN join, dissenting.
Accepting the correctness of the new rule of law adopted today that a federal statute of limitations controls here, I dissent because I believe the majority commits egregious error in not addressing and resolving plaintiffs’ argument that if a new limitations rule is adopted, it should not be applied to this case.
Initially, there is a special irony in the majority’s implied criticism of the dissent for reaching the retroactivity issue when it was not a certified question. The majority itself, in establishing a federal statute of limitations rule, is not answering the formal language of any certified question. The parties have not even documented any basis that would justify the conclusion that a federal limitations rule was proposed to the district court.
Another curious feature of the majority opinion is that it rules on a “decision” of the district court rather than on the order being appealed, even while recognizing that it is the order that forms the jurisdictional basis for our power of review. Miller v. Bolger, 802 F.2d 660, 666 (3d Cir.1986) (“our review is of orders and not of isolated legal questions”). As we indicated in Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, 95 S.Ct. 148, 42 L.Ed.2d 122 (1974), section 1292(b) specifically involves an appeal from an order and we must act on the order. As this court said in Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 550 F.2d 860, 863 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 2641, 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977), “orders must be in a posture capable of affirmance or reversal” to be appeal-able under section 1292(b).
Once it is realized that we are obligated to rule on the district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss the third amended complaint on statute of limitations grounds, it necessarily follows that we must determine its correctness. This is so even though our court has now adopted a new rule of law in reviewing the order. As Judge Gibbons stated:
An appeal pursuant to § 1292(b), like any other, is taken from the order of the district court, not from its opinion, and the court is “called upon not to answer the question certified but to decide an appeal.” Johnson v. Alldredge, supra, 488 F.2d at 823. When an order or judgment is before a reviewing court, “[t]he prevailing party may ... assert in the reviewing court any ground in support of his judgment, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the trial court.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n. 6 [90 S.Ct. 1153, 1156 n. 6, 25 L.Ed.2d 491] ... (1970); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 n. 4 [90 S.Ct. 616, 620 n. 4, 24 L.Ed.2d 593] ... (1970); see Note, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure — Review of Errors at the Instance of a Non-Appealing Party, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 1058, 1059-60 (1938).
Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass’n, 602 F.2d 494, 502 (3d Cir.1979), vacated and remanded for further consideration, 448 U.S. 902, 100 S.Ct. 3040, 65 L.Ed.2d 1131 (1980).1
*1552Thus, in passing on the correctness of the district court’s order we must consider any ground now asserted in support of the order “whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the trial court.” Id. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1156 n. 6, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)).2 Whether to reverse or affirm the district court’s order therefore requires a decision whether the controlling rule of law will be applied here. Moreover, not to determine now whether the new rule adopted by the majority is to be applicable to the order in this case is to make a mockery of the very objective of section 1292(b) “that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Indeed, it is commonplace for courts formulating a new or different rule of law to rule on its retroactivity at the same time. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982); cf. Mineo v. Port Authority, 779 F.2d 939 (3d Cir.1985) (holding that Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) should not be applied retroactively), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1005, 106 S.Ct. 3297, 92 L.Ed.2d 712 (1986).
I am therefore convinced that the re-troactivity issue must be addressed in determining whether the new rule of law should be applied to the district court’s order in this case.
I commence my analysis from the established legal principle that this court has the power to apply a rule of law prospectively only. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858; Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 784 F.2d 460 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 248 (1986). The Supreme Court has set forth a three-part test for determining when a court should not apply a newly announced rule of law retroactively. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). The Chevron Court stated:
First, the decision to be applied nonretro-actively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, see, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., [392 U.S. 481, 496, 88 S.Ct. 2224, 2233, 20 L.Ed.2d 1231 (1968) ], or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, see, e.g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, [393 U.S. 544, 572, 89 S.Ct. 817, 835, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969)]. Second, it has been stressed that “we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Linkletter v. Walker, [381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)]. Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” Cipriano v. City of Houma, [395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969) ].
Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355-56; see Cohn, 784 F.2d 460.
Although the Chevron Court was determining whether the holding of a previous case should have been applied retroactively, there is no doubt that the Chevron principles are equally applicable where a new principle of law is announced in the case sub judice. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858 (applying Chevron retroactivity test in case announc*1553ing new principle of law); Cohn, 784 F.2d 460; Ettinger v. Central Penn Nat’l Bank, 634 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.1980).
The first question to be answered here under Chevron is whether the rule of law announced by the majority is a clear break with past precedent on which litigants may have relied. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 2025-26, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (approving Third Circuit’s nonretroactive application of its holding overruling “clearly established circuit precedent on which the complaining party was entitled to rely”). This question is answered by examining the precedent in this circuit at the time the third amended complaint was filed against the appealing defendants.3 At that time, the law of the circuit was: 1) that a court was to determine the appropriate statute of limitations in securities fraud cases by looking to the state statute of limitations that best comported with the federal policies underlying Rule 10b-5, and that process began by applying the state’s blue sky law, which was regarded as the most logical state law candidate; and 2) that if, however, there was no civil damage remedy under the blue sky law for the claim in question, a court was to apply the state statute of limitations for fraud. See Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir.1980); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir.1979) (applying New Jersey law). In light of the precedent in this court applying state statutes of limitations to federal securities claims, see Biggans, 638 F.2d 605; Roberts, 611 F.2d 450, and in view of the fact that none of the Supreme Court cases cited by the majority4 even considered, much less clearly overruled, Third Circuit precedent dealing with securities fraud, today’s action of our court in overruling those cases and adopting a federal statute of limitations clearly overturns past circuit precedent on which these plaintiffs may have relied.
The second Chevron question is whether applying the federal statute of limitations to this action would further or retard its operation. Applying this portion of the test, the Chevron Court noted that retroactive application of the statute of limitations rule under consideration in. that case would have deprived the plaintiff of “any remedy whatsoever on the basis of superseding legal doctrine that was quite unforeseeable.” Chevron, 404 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. at 356. That reasoning is equally applicable here. Additionally, applying the new rule prospectively only would not significantly further or retard the policies underlying its general applicability.
The third part of the Chevron test requires an examination of the equities of the instant case to determine whether the federal statute of limitations should be applied to this action. As the Chevron Court noted, “[i]t would ... produce the most ‘substantial inequitable results’ ... to hold that [plaintiff] ‘slept on his rights’ at a time when he could not have known the time limitation that the law imposed upon him.... [Nonretroactive application here simply preserves his right to a day in court.” Chevron, 404 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. at 356; see also Cohn, 784 F.2d at 465. The same is true here. The district court’s order borrowing the six-year period of limitations will preserve the plaintiffs’ opportunity to have a day in court; application of the majority’s newly announced rule will foreclose that opportunity.
The foregoing analysis, in my view, mandates that the rule announced today not be applied to this case. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to ascertain the applicable New Jersey statute of limitations. The inquiry under prior precedent is whether the operative allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint stated a cognizable claim *1554under the blue sky law. The New Jersey blue sky law provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who
(1) Offers or sells a security in violation of sections 8(b), 9(a) or 13 of this act, or
(2) Offers or sells a security by means of [specified conduct] is liable to the person buying the security from him
(b) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under paragraph (a), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller who materially aids in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller, unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist....
(h) The rights and remedies provided by this act are in addition to any other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity, but this law does not create any cause of action not specified in this section or section 10, paragraph (e).
N.J.Stat.Ann. § 49:3-71 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
The third amended complaint alleged that the appealing defendants, an accountant and his firm and an attorney and his firm, had violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by actively participating in, and aiding and abetting, a conspiracy to defraud plaintiffs. Essentially for the reasons cited by the district court, i.e., the appealing defendants did not sell securities to the plaintiffs and the defendants were outside the scope of liability imposed by the plain language of the blue sky law, I conclude that plaintiffs’ complaint did not state a claim under the blue sky law. I believe the New Jersey Supreme Court would construe the statute similarly. It follows, then, that the district court properly applied the New Jersey six-year statute of limitations for fraud. Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the district court denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

. The district court’s obligation to identify a "controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion," pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), see also Third Circuit Rule 23, is to be contrasted with state laws which permit "certification” by federal courts to the state's supreme court of questions under state law. See generally 1A J. Moore, W. Taggart, A. Vestal & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.203[5] (1985).

. The quotation in the majority opinion from Miller v. Bolger, 802 F.2d 660 (3d Cir.1986) is inapposite here. In view of the district court’s ruling, it had no reason to address retroactivity. Unlike Miller, in which this court declined to rule on an issue that required "determinations that should be left to the district court in the first instance,” the majority does not identify any issue of material fact here with respect to the retroactivity issue, and I am convinced that there is no such issue. Accordingly, I see no reason to forgo our obligation to resolve the retroactivity question.

. I do not intend to imply that the date the complaint is filed would necessarily be the critical date in all cases applying the Chevron principles.

. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (decided after appealing defendants were joined in the instant action); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983).