Court Opinion

ID: 9893481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 14:07:16.413914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:16.084101
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 20, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0778-MR

RACHEL PETRIE (NOW GIBNEY)                                          APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE JOE W. HENDRICKS, JR., JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 20-CI-00027

ROBERT PETRIE                                                         APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Rachel Petrie (now Gibney) appeals the final decree of the Todd

Circuit Court designating her former husband, Robert Petrie, as the primary

residential parent of their two minor children and granting Rachel timesharing

every other weekend. Rachel also appeals the trial court’s order denying her

motion to recuse Circuit Court Judge Joe W. Hendricks, Jr., from presiding over
the underlying dispute. Following review of the record and all applicable law, we

affirm.

                                I.    BACKGROUND

             Rachel and Robert were married in 2016. They have two children in

common: E.R.P., born in 2014, and I.E.P., born in 2017. The parties separated on

June 16, 2018. On March 6, 2020, they entered into a Separation Agreement.

Paragraph 1 states:

             The parties shall share joint legal custody of the minor
             children, [E.R.P. and I.E.P.] to allow for 50/50 parent
             time as deemed appropriate by the Court. Should the
             parties disagree on visitation then visitation will be
             consistent with the Kentucky Model Visitation/Time
             Sharing Guidelines. No child support is required at this
             time. The parties shall be equally responsible for
             incurred expenses related to the maintenance of [the
             children]. The parties shall claim one child each for tax
             purposes.

(Record (R.) at 9.) On March 10, 2020, Rachel filed a verified petition for

dissolution of the parties’ marriage in Todd Circuit Court. On the same day, she

also filed her deposition upon interrogatories and the parties’ Separation

Agreement with the court. On March 13, 2020, the trial court entered findings of

fact, conclusions of law, and a decree dissolving the marriage. The parties’

Separation Agreement, including its provision for joint custody and equal

timesharing, was incorporated by reference into the trial court’s final decree.

                                         -2-
             In reality, Rachel and Robert did not adhere to the timesharing portion

of their Separation Agreement. Instead, without court intervention, the parties

worked out a new schedule wherein the children resided primarily with Rachel

during the week and had timesharing with Robert on weekends. This informal

schedule appeared, at least initially, to satisfy everyone involved; although Rachel

contends that Robert was not as involved in the children’s lives as he should have

been and that their timesharing with him was almost always initiated by his parents

with whom he resided.

             Sometime after the parties’ divorce, Rachel married Ryan Gibney.

Around April 2021, Rachel, Mr. Gibney, and the two children moved from Todd

County to Bowling Green, Kentucky. Rachel asserts that the purpose of the move,

in part, was so that the children could attend a better-rated school the following

year. She further asserts that she spoke to Robert before the move and that he did

not object to her relocating to Bowling Green with the children. According to

Rachel, after the move, Robert continued to exercise timesharing with the children

every other weekend. Either Rachel would drive the children to Todd County, or

she would meet Robert’s parents somewhere in between to exchange the children.

             Complications arose in September/October 2021, when one of the

children allegedly told Rachel that she had been touched inappropriately by one of

                                         -3-
her paternal cousins while at Robert’s parents’ home.1 Rachel did not report the

allegations to either law enforcement or the Cabinet for Health and Family

Services (“Cabinet”). Instead, Rachel enrolled the child in therapy and reached out

to Robert’s father, Sherwood, for assistance. Sherwood did not respond to

Rachel’s satisfaction prompting her to stop allowing the children to have

timesharing with Robert in Todd County. For a short time, Rachel allowed

timesharing to take place in Bowling Green. However, in October 2021, after

picking the children up in Bowling Green, Robert’s parents took them back to

Todd County for the afternoon. Shortly thereafter, Rachel refused to permit Robert

and his family to have timesharing with the children.

              Acting with the assistance of his counsel, Ami Brooks, on February

25, 2022, Robert filed a motion seeking to have Rachel held in contempt for

violating the timesharing provisions of the parties’ dissolution decree and seeking

to be made the children’s primary residential parent. Rachel filed a written

response objecting to Robert being designated as the primary residential parent.

She also filed a motion to set child support, a motion for supervised visitation, and

requested the trial court judge, Hon. Joe W. Hendricks, to recuse on the basis that

1
  Roberts’ parents have nine grandchildren. Robert’s mother babysat many of the grandchildren
in her home. Since Robert lived with his parents, I.E.P. and E.R.P. were around the other
children when they had their timesharing with Robert.

                                             -4-
the judge had been law partners with Robert’s attorney, Ms. Brooks, immediately

prior to his taking the bench. The pending motions were set to be heard by the trial

court on March 29, 2022.

              The first matter the court addressed at the hearing was Rachel’s

motion to recuse.

              THE COURT: [A]nd then we also have a motion to
              disqualify. Ms. Dahl do you have anything else to add to
              your motion to disqualify?

              RACHEL’S COUNSEL: No, Sir. I think I covered
              everything, and I’ve never met the Court, so nice to meet
              you, Your Honor. But – but no, I don’t – I don’t think
              that the Court is necessarily, you know, required to
              automatically recuse itself from these cases, but my client
              did raise this as a concern to me, so I did want to bring it
              to the Court’s attention and request the Court to consider
              it.

              THE COURT: All right. The motion doesn’t
              sufficiently state the basis for disqualification. And
              under Kentucky’s rules, if I’m not – If I’m not required
              to disqualify, I’m required to sit. So the motion to
              disqualify is denied.2

              The Court then turned to the substantive issues before it. The truth of

Rachel’s allegations regarding the alleged sexual abuse as well as her failure to

timely notify the Cabinet about the alleged abuse became major issues at the

hearing.

2
 The trial court entered a signed handwritten order that same day which simply states
“m/disqualify is DENIED.”
                                              -5-
              Robert was the first witness called to testify. According to him, the

parties had a good co-parenting relationship prior to Rachel’s move to Bowling

Green. Before the move, the children stayed with Rachel during the week and had

timesharing with Robert on the weekends. Robert testified that Rachel did not tell

him she was contemplating moving to Bowling Green with the children; instead,

she waited until she and Mr. Gibney had already purchased a home to inform him

that the family would be moving, leaving him little choice in the matter. Robert

also testified that Rachel stopped communicating with him in October 2021 but did

not tell him why. Specifically, Robert testified that Rachel never told him about

the alleged sexual abuse or expressed any concern to him about how the children

were cared for when they were with him at his parents’ house.

              Robert explained that he had been residing with his parents in Todd

County since the divorce and that was where the children stayed when they were

with him. Robert testified that he had a separate bedroom at his parents’ house as

did the children. He denied that he slept in the same bed as the children when they

were with him. In any event, he said that he was currently in the process of

building his own home and it would have three bedrooms when it was finished in a

few months.

              Robert’s mother, Karen, also testified at the hearing. Her description

of the living arrangements differed somewhat from Robert’s testimony. She said

                                          -6-
that while Robert had his own bedroom in the home, the children did not.3 Karen

testified that Robert was a good father but admitted that she was the primary point

of contact with Rachel as related to the children. Karen explained the family came

to an impasse around November 1, 2021, after she and Sherwood picked up the

children in Bowling Green and took them back to Todd County. Karen denied that

Rachel told them they could not take the children to Todd County.

               Sherwood testified next. He said that the house where he and Karen

resided was Robert’s house meaning they lived with Robert and not the other way

around.4 Sherwood denied that Rachel had ever expressed any concerns about the

children’s care to him or that she had ever asked him and Karen not to take the

children to Todd County.

               Rachel’s testimony differed markedly. Rachel testified Robert had

never exercised his right to equal parenting time and that he had never been very

involved in the children’s lives. Rather, any timesharing Robert had was because

of Karen. Rachel expressed concerns that the children did not have a separate

bedroom at Robert’s current home, and she believed that it was not proper for the

children to co-sleep with Robert as a matter of course. Rachel then explained that

3
 Karen described Robert’s “bedroom” as actually being a utility room that had been converted to
a bedroom. She stated that when the children stayed in the home, Robert slept with his son on a
bed in the converted utility room and his daughter slept on a sofa in the living room.
4
  Sherwood’s rationale for this statement was that after he and Karen died, Robert would inherit
the house.
                                               -7-
the family’s problems arose after one of the children told her that a cousin had

inappropriately touched her while she was at Robert’s house.5 Rachel said she

responded by putting the child in therapy and telling Sherwood about it sometime

in late October. According to Rachel, Sherwood did not take the matter seriously

simply stating that he could not control what occurred in another family’s home.

                 Rachel believed the allegations were true explaining that the child had

been “sexually acting out.” She described this behavior as the child smacking and

sticking her bottom out, smacking Rachel’s bottom, and offering to tickle Rachel’s

back. Rachel testified that after the child stopped having timesharing at Robert’s

home, these behaviors greatly improved.

                 At this juncture, the trial court interrupted the hearing to question

Rachel regarding whether she had reported the allegations to the Cabinet and

whether she was aware that she had a duty to do so.6 Rachel stated that she was

5
    The female cousin at issue was close in age to Rachel’s daughter, the alleged victim.
6
  Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 620.030 provides that “[a]ny person who knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that a child is dependent, neglected, or abused shall immediately
cause an oral or written report to be made to a local law enforcement agency or to the
Department of Kentucky State Police, the cabinet or its designated representative, the
Commonwealth’s attorney, or the county attorney by telephone or otherwise.” Pursuant to KRS
600.020(1)(a) an abused or neglected child includes “a child whose health or welfare is harmed
or threatened with harm when . . . [h]is or her parent, guardian, person in a position of authority
or special trust, as defined in KRS 532.045, or other person exercising custodial control or
supervision of the child . . . 5. [c]ommits or allows to be committed an act of sexual abuse,
sexual exploitation, or prostitution upon the child; [or] 6. [c]reates or allows to be created a risk
that an act of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or prostitution will be committed upon the
child[.]”

                                                 -8-
unsure whether she had been required to report the child’s allegations but that she

had not done so. The trial court then expressed grave concerns that no one had

made a report to the Cabinet and that Rachel had never discussed the matter with

Robert. The trial court halted the hearing so that it could make a report to the

Cabinet.7 The trial court expressed concern that Rachel “was playing games” but

rescheduled the hearing pending further investigation by the Cabinet.

              It was ultimately revealed that Rachel was the only person the child

had allegedly talked to about the inappropriate contact. The child never told her

therapist that she had been touched inappropriately and denied in an interview she

had been “bad touched.” No further actions were taken by either the Cabinet or

law enforcement. However, Rachel continued with therapy for the child who by

that time had been diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder.

              Rachel concluded her testimony in May by updating the court on the

children. Rachel explained that Mr. Gibney’s mother watched the children while

Rachel and Mr. Gibney were at work, and Rachel planned for them to attend

school in Bowling Green after the summer break. Rachel testified that she wanted

to remain the children’s primary residential parent. She explained that she had

always overseen the children’s day-to-day lives and that Robert had never taken an

7
 A family court has a duty to report suspected child dependency, neglect, or abuse pursuant to
KRS 620.030(1). Fugate v. Fugate, 896 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Ky. App. 1995).

                                              -9-
interest in their educations or been as involved with them as a father should be with

his children. She further testified that the school they would attend in Bowling

Green was rated better than their prior school in Todd County. If she were to

remain the primary residential parent, the children could attend school in Bowling

Green and Robert could exercise his timesharing on the weekends and during

school breaks as he had always done in the past.

             Ultimately, the trial court did not find Rachel to be credible. It

appeared most concerned that Rachel had manufactured the sexual abuse

allegations to gain an advantage over Robert and keep the children with her in

Bowling Green. After weighing the best interest factors, the court granted

Robert’s motion such that he was designated the primary residential parent with

Rachel to have timesharing every other weekend. The parties retained joint legal

custody and Rachel was ordered to pay Robert child support.

             This appeal followed.

                                  II.    ANALYSIS

             Rachel’s first argument is that the trial court erroneously denied her

motion to recuse requiring us to vacate all subsequent orders and remand for

further proceedings, including assignment of a new judge.

             Both the legislature and the Supreme Court of Kentucky have

“expressed policy that mandates recusal in any proceeding in which a judge’s

                                         -10-
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Abbott, Inc. v. Guirguis, 626

S.W.3d 475, 482 (Ky. 2021); KRS 26A.015(2)(e) (“Any . . . judge of the Court of

Justice . . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding . . . [w]here he has

knowledge of any other circumstances in which his impartiality might reasonably

be questioned.”); SCR8 4.300 Canon 2.11(A) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or

herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned[.]”). “[T]he standard for measuring whether a judge’s impartiality

might reasonably be questioned is an objective one, made from the perspective of a

reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and

circumstances.” Abbott, Inc., 626 S.W.3d at 483 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

                “Because any judge, however candid, will naturally be loathe to

acknowledge the judge’s own partiality or bias, compounded by the judge’s

general duty to hear and decide matters assigned to the judge, a reviewing court

gives a motion to recuse fresh eyes, owing no deference to a refusal to recuse.”

Phillips v. Rosquist, 628 S.W.3d 41, 54 (Ky. 2021). “Because an objective

standard is appropriate for measuring whether a judge’s impartiality might

reasonably be questioned from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is

informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances, we hold, appropriately,

8
    Rules of the Supreme Court.
                                          -11-
that this determination is to be reviewed on appeal on a de novo basis.” Abbott,

Inc., 626 S.W.3d at 484.

             At the outset, we observe that the issue is not whether Judge

Hendricks was in fact impartial; the issue is whether under the circumstance a

reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts and circumstances might

reasonably question his impartiality. Those facts and circumstances, as alleged by

Rachel, are that Judge Hendricks and Robert’s counsel were law partners

immediately prior to Judge Hendricks taking the bench in 2019.

             Rachel contends that the bias became more apparent as the case

progressed as demonstrated by Judge Hendricks’s comments concerning Rachel’s

actions and motives. None of the alleged comments, however, are beyond the pale

or indicative of an extrajudicial bias. Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787,

794-95 (Ky. 2001) (explaining that even some expressions of frustration with a

litigant by judge not enough to merit recusal so long as judge does not violate the

litigant’s rights and conducts a basically fair if imperfect trial). They appear

consistent with the duty of a judge to weigh the credibility of witnesses, and in the

case of a family court matter, to make sure that allegations concerning sexual

abuse were reported to the Cabinet for appropriate investigation.

             Thus, we must determine whether recusal was required simply based

on Judge Hendricks’s being law partners with Robert’s counsel prior to taking the

                                         -12-
bench in late November 2019.9 The general rule is that to require recusal a litigant

must allege some additional circumstance beyond the former relationship between

the judge and the adverse party’s counsel. These facts and circumstances must be

alleged in a sworn affidavit. Abbott, Inc., 626 S.W.3d at 484. “The mere belief

that the judge will not afford a fair and impartial trial is not sufficient grounds for

recusal.” Bissell v. Baumgardner, 236 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Ky. App. 2007) (quoting

Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 794-95).

               Rachel did not include an affidavit with her motion to recuse as

Abbott, rendered a year before Rachel filed her motion, requires. Additionally, she

did not cite anything to support her motion to recuse other than the former business

relationship of Robert’s counsel, Ami Brooks, and Judge Hendricks. Specifically,

she did not allege that while in private practice, Judge Hendricks served as a

lawyer in the matter in controversy or that Robert’s counsel represented him while

Judge Hendricks was a partner at the law firm.

               As noted, Judge Hendricks took the bench on or about November 25,

2019. Robert’s counsel first entered an appearance in this matter on February 25,

2022, over two years later. The American Bar Association Committee on Ethics

and Professional Responsibility, in Informal Opinion 87-1524 (December 14,

9
 We take judicial notice that Judge Hendricks was sworn in as a circuit court judge for 7th
Judicial Circuit on or about November 25, 2019, after winning a special election.
                                              -13-
1987), has expressed its opinion that “[a] judge is not disqualified from presiding

at a trial solely because of a former association in private practice more than two

years previously with counsel for a party.” ABA Informal Op. 87-1524.10

Accordingly, we hold that Judge Hendricks was not required to recuse himself

from presiding over this matter based solely on the fact the judge was law partners

with Robert’s counsel over two years before counsel entered an appearance in the

present dispute.

               In these circumstances, given the length of time that elapsed between

Judge Hendricks taking the bench and Attorney Brooks entering an appearance in

this matter and Rachel’s failure to include an affidavit, we do not believe that

Judge Hendricks erred by failing to include a more detailed explanation to support

his denial of Rachel’s motion to recuse. However, even so, as Abbott makes clear,

the better practice would have been for the judge to specifically set forth in writing

the countervailing facts or considerations deemed pertinent to his denial to permit

more meaningful appellate review. Abbott, Inc., 626 S.W.3d at 484.

               We now turn our attention to Rachel’s second assignment of error that

the trial court erred when it granted Robert’s motion and designated him as the

10
  “Ethics opinions and American Bar Association standards are guides to determining what is
reasonable and may be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective
representation[.]” U.S., ex rel. U.S. Attorneys ex rel. Eastern, Western Districts of Kentucky v.
Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 149 (Ky. 2014).

                                               -14-
children’s primary residential parent. Generally, in family court matters our

review is governed by the clearly erroneous standard. CR11 52.01. Under this

standard, the family court’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless there

exists no substantial evidence in the record to support them. See M.P.S. v. Cabinet

for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Ky. App. 1998) (citing V.S. v.

Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Ky. App.

1986)).

                 Clear and convincing proof does not necessarily mean uncontradicted

proof, but rather requires proof of a probative and substantial nature that is

sufficient to convince ordinarily prudent minded people. Id. at 117. However,

whether the family court correctly applied the law to the facts is a question of law

that we review de novo. E.K. v. T.A., 572 S.W.3d 80, 82 (Ky. App. 2019).

                 Before we consider the trial court’s findings of fact, we must first

determine the appropriate legal standard. Throughout these proceedings, the

parties’ and the trial court used the terms custody, timesharing, and visitation

interchangeably. As explained by the Kentucky Supreme Court, however, these

terms have distinct definitions and are governed by different legal standards.

Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759, 765 (Ky. 2008). Pursuant to KRS

403.340, a motion to modify custody shall not be filed within two years of the

11
     Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
                                            -15-
initial custody decree unless the petitioner asserts by affidavit that the child is in

danger of serious harm, or the child has been placed with a de facto custodian. In

contrast, pursuant to KRS 403.320, a motion to modify timesharing may be filed at

any time as it is evaluated according to the best interest standard set forth in KRS

403.270.

             Confusingly, without citing any of the relevant statutes, Robert styled

his initial filing as a motion for modification of custody but in the body of the

motion he requested only to be designated as the primary residential parent.

Reviewing the entire record, it is apparent that both the trial court and the parties

treated Robert’s motion as a motion to modify timesharing only. Humphrey v.

Humphrey, 326 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Ky. App. 2010). Notably, during the second

part of the hearing on May 10, 2022, the trial court noted that it was applying the

best interest standard set forth in KRS 403.270, which governs motions to modify

timesharing. The parties did not object or seek to correct the trial court’s

characterization of Robert’s motion as seeking only to modify timesharing.

Additionally, the trial court stated in its final order that it was granting Robert’s

motion and designating him as the primary residential parent, but that custody

would remain joint.

             Modification of timesharing is determined pursuant to KRS

403.320(3). Pennington, 266 S.W.3d at 765. The statute provides: “The court

                                          -16-
may modify an order granting or denying visitation [or timesharing] rights

whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child; but the court

shall not restrict a parent’s visitation [or timesharing] rights unless it finds that the

visitation [or timesharing] would endanger seriously the child’s physical, mental,

moral, or emotional health.” KRS 403.320(3).

             In this case, the trial court first determined that Robert and Rachel

currently reside too far apart for them to practically exercise equal timesharing

with the children. Then, applying the best interest factors, the trial court

determined that on the balance, the children would be best served by living with

Robert. Specifically, the trial court considered the children had spent most of their

lives in Todd County, and that Robert’s parents were available to assist with

childcare in Todd County, instead of the children being watched by step-relatives.

It also considered Rachel’s past reluctance to allow the children to visit Robert in

Todd County, and the likelihood she would repeat this behavior. It also found

Robert to be more credible and sincere in his motivations than Rachel. Credibility

determinations are exclusively within the province of the lower courts, and we

cannot second-guess them. Truman v. Lillard, 404 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Ky. App.

2012).

             In sum, while we might have decided this matter differently, we

cannot discern any error of law or abuse of discretion on the trial court’s part.

                                           -17-
While Rachel may disagree with the trial court’s decision to modify timesharing,

she has failed to point us to any actionable error.

                                 III.   CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the Todd Circuit

Court.

             CETRULO, JUDGE, CONCURS.

             TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND DOES NOT FILE SEPARATE
OPINION.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Taylor R. Dahl                             Ami L. Brooks
 Clarksville, Tennessee                     Russellville, Kentucky

                                         -18-