Court Opinion

ID: 9384534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 12:04:55.536354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.058358
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                       No. COA21-639

                                     Filed 04 April 2023

Forsyth County, No. 19 CVS 3758

ALVIN MITCHELL, Petitioner,

               v.

THE UNIVERSITY             OF    NORTH       CAROLINA         BOARD       OF    GOVERNORS,
Respondent.

        Appeal by Petitioner from Order entered 26 July 2021 by Judge Martin B.

McGee in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May

2022.

        Allison Tomberlin for petitioner-appellant.

        Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Zach Padget,
        for respondent-appellee.

        HAMPSON, Judge.1

                         Factual and Procedural Background

        Alvin Mitchell (Petitioner) appeals from the trial court’s Order affirming a

decision of The University of North Carolina Board of Governors (BOG) which, in

turn, upheld Petitioner’s discharge from employment as a tenured professor at

1 Judge Murphy contributed substantial authorship of those portions of the Opinion of the Court on
which we are unanimous. This specifically includes the Factual and Procedural Background and our
discussion of the alleged procedural errors asserted by Petitioner.
                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                  Opinion of the Court

Winston-Salem State University (WSSU). The Record before us tends to reflect the

following:

      Petitioner was hired by WSSU in July 2006 as an Associate Professor of Justice

Studies in the Department of Social Sciences and was granted tenure in December

2008. In July 2015, Dr. Cynthia Villagomez and Dr. Denise Nation became co-chairs

of the Department of Social Sciences and, thus, Petitioner’s direct supervisors. This

appeal arises out of Petitioner’s discharge from employment based on three alleged

acts of misconduct by Petitioner taking place between the Fall of 2015 and the Fall of

2017 while he was under the supervision of Dr. Villagomez and Dr. Nation.

      First, during Petitioner’s Introduction to Corrections course in the Fall 2015

semester, a student submitted a paper that Petitioner did not feel met the necessary

requirements. Petitioner provided the student an opportunity to resubmit the paper,

which led to the student receiving a grade of “incomplete” in the class. Throughout

2016, the student and his academic success counselor attempted to reach out to

Petitioner without success.    Pursuant to WSSU policy, in December 2016, the

student’s grade of “incomplete” converted to an F.       Dr. Nation and Petitioner’s

supervising Dean, Dr. Doria K. Stitts, both attempted to resolve the grade issue with

him over email, but he did not respond. Dr. Nation and Dr. Villagomez approached

Petitioner to discuss the issue as Petitioner was teaching a class, leading to a verbal

altercation in which Dr. Villagomez called the police.

      Second, sometime during the 2016-2017 academic year, two students in

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                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                  Opinion of the Court

Petitioner’s Research Methods class conducted research to draft a paper.          The

students learned about a conference in New Orleans—the Race, Gender & Class

Conference—where they could present their findings. They approached Dr. Nation

to obtain funding to attend the conference, but she did not approve the funding,

instead recommending a different conference by the American Society of Criminology

(ASC). One of the students believed that Dr. Nation may have encouraged the

students to look into the ASC conference because it was primarily Caucasian. When

Petitioner learned of the conversation, he wrote a letter to Dr. Nation in response:

             Hi Denise, it was brought to my attention that you told a
             student that the conference I and two of my students are
             presenting at has no substance or standards, meaning that
             it is useless and unaccredited, and anyone can present. In
             addition, you told the student she should try to present at
             the ASC held in November because it is a better conference
             and has a lot of substance. You are entitled to your opinion.
             However, you should not be telling the student things like
             that, especially with no proof. The Race, Gender & Class
             conference is locally, regionally, and internationally known
             and ha[s] scholars from around the world presenting. In
             addition, the conference has been in existence for over 20
             years. Thirdly, this conference does not take anyone. You
             have to be accepted through their process. It is amazing
             how you always try to debunk what I do. Yet you complain
             that I tell students negative things about you. It would
             have been better to tell the student that you did not want
             to help fund her instead of telling her falsehoods about the
             RGC conference and asking her to present on scholarship
             day. That is not appropriate behavior as a chair.

             After all these years, it is amazing that you still think that
             anything white is better. I looked up the ASC and nothing
             but a bunch of white men (some white women) are running
             it. Keep promoting and praising those white folks who are

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                  MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                  Opinion of the Court

              associated with the ASC. As I told you before, you can
              graduate from and praise their schools, come up with a
              great theory, hangout with them, praise Latessa and other
              European professors (you need to ask them about their civil
              rights record), wear their European style weaves, walk
              with their bounce, hire them, present at their conferences,
              and even publish in their journals. In their eyes you will
              never be equal to them. They still look at you as a wanna
              be white, an international nigger, an international coon,
              and an international sambo (lol) because you display that
              kind of behavior. You will never get it. Wake up.

Dr. Nation believed the letter created a hostile workplace, and, while she ultimately

decided to not file a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, she did report the incident to the Dean and Provost and sent them a

copy of the letter.

       Third, Petitioner’s Summer 2017 semester Constitutional Law class was

involuntarily reassigned by Dr. Nation to another professor because of concerns

regarding the rigor of the course and his failure to provide a syllabus in a previous

semester. Less than one week before the Fall 2017 semester, Petitioner informed Dr.

Nation and Dr. Villagomez via email that he did not feel comfortable teaching

Research Methods II—a course given to him in lieu of Constitutional Law—despite

having already approved the course on his schedule and having taught it for at least

six years. Dr. Nation did not allow him to change courses. On 22 August 2017, one

day after the semester began, Dr. Nation informed Petitioner that he had failed to

open an online course he was teaching. Petitioner responded by stating “I do not

know my schedule anymore . . . .” However, Dr. Villagomez reiterated that his

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                  MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                     Opinion of the Court

schedule had not changed.

      On 31 August 2017, WSSU Interim Provost Carolynn Berry provided

Petitioner with notice of WSSU’s intent to discharge him pursuant to Section 603 of

The Code of the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina (UNC Code)

for neglect of duty and misconduct. According to the UNC Code, “neglect of duty[]

includ[es] sustained failure to meet assigned classes or to perform other significant

faculty professional obligations[,]” and “misconduct . . . includ[es] violations of

professional ethics, mistreatment of students or other employees, research

misconduct, financial fraud, criminal, or other illegal, inappropriate or unethical

conduct.” However, “[t]o justify serious disciplinary action, such misconduct should

be either (i) sufficiently related to a faculty member’s academic responsibilities as to

disqualify the individual from effective performance of university duties, or (ii)

sufficiently   serious   as   to   adversely    reflect     on   the   individual’s   honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness to be a faculty member.”

      On 10 January 2018, a hearing was held before the Faculty Hearing

Committee (FHC). Following the presentation of WSSU’s case, the FHC determined

that WSSU had not made a prima facie case and recommended the Chancellor

overturn the sanctions. Despite this recommendation, in accordance with the UNC

Code’s procedure, the Chancellor issued a letter on 30 January 2018 disagreeing with

the FHC’s determination and sent the matter back to the FHC to conclude the

hearing. After the Chancellor’s determination, Petitioner informed the FHC he did

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                                   Opinion of the Court

not wish to present any further evidence. The FHC once again found WSSU had not

proven its case. However, after reviewing the transcript, the FHC’s recommendation,

and all of the evidence received by the FHC, the Chancellor issued his decision on 7

March 2018 and upheld the Provost’s decision to discharge Petitioner.                The

Chancellor determined Petitioner violated the UNC Code via neglect of duty because

he failed to provide his student with a final grade and failed to open the online course.

The Chancellor also further determined Petitioner violated the UNC Code via

misconduct when he sent the letter to Dr. Nation.

      Following the Chancellor’s determination, Petitioner appealed to the WSSU

Board of Trustees (BOT). The Appeals Committee of the BOT concluded WSSU had

produced sufficient evidence to uphold Petitioner’s dismissal for neglect of duty and

misconduct. Petitioner then sought review of the BOT’s decision to the BOG, which

upheld the BOT’s decision on 23 May 2019. The BOG concluded as follows:

             Substantively, based upon a careful consideration of the
             record as a whole, statements submitted by the parties,
             and consideration of all controlling laws and policies, there
             is sufficient evidence in the record to support a
             determination that [Petitioner] failed to adequately resolve
             a grading issue, resulting in the student receiving a failing
             grade for the class and endangering the student’s eligibility
             to receive financial aid, which failure constitutes neglect of
             duty under Section 603(1) of [the UNC Code]. In addition,
             there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the
             determination that [Petitioner] failed to timely open [a]n
             online class that he knew he was scheduled to teach, and
             that he continued to fail to open the class at least six days
             after being directed to do so by his department chairs and
             his [D]ean, which failure constitutes neglect of duty under

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                   MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                   Opinion of the Court

             Section 603(1) of [the UNC Code]. Finally, there is
             sufficient evidence in the record to support the
             determination that [Petitioner] wrote and delivered to his
             direct supervisor [a] personally and professionally
             insulting, racially inflammatory note in which he referred
             to her as a “nigger,” a “coon,” and a “sambo,” which
             constitutes misconduct under Section 603(1) of [the UNC
             Code].

The BOG also found that “[Petitioner] erroneously characterize[d] his letter to Dr.

Nation as [a] letter written by him in his capacity as a private citizen, on a matter of

public concern.”

      Petitioner sought judicial review in Superior Court. After a whole record

review, the trial court affirmed the decision of the BOG. The trial court concluded:

             the decision to terminate the Petitioner for (1) his neglect
             of duty for failing to open the online course, (2) his neglect
             of duty for failing to issue a final grade, and (3) misconduct
             for the derogatory and racially charged letter to [Dr.
             Nation] . . . is supported by substantial evidence in the
             record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
             discretion[.]

             ....

             the decision to discharge the Petitioner . . . was not in
             violation of any constitutional provisions, in excess of
             statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, made
             upon unlawful procedure or affected by other error of law.
             The Petitioner’s discharge related to his letter of March
             2017 was not in violation of his First Amendment rights
             and proper procedures were followed.

The trial court also ruled the process afforded Petitioner at the agency level was

adequate. Petitioner timely appealed to this Court.

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                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                   Opinion of the Court

                                        Issues

      On appeal to this Court, Petitioner raises two primary issues: (I) whether the

BOG’s decision upholding Petitioner’s discharge from employment was affected by

unlawful procedures during the proceedings before WSSU’s FHR and Chancellor; and

(II) whether Petitioner’s discharge from employment was in violation of his First

Amendment right of free speech where the discharge was based, in part, on the letter

he sent to Dr. Nation.

                                       Analysis

      “Appellate review of a superior court order concerning an agency decision

requires an examination of the trial court’s order for any errors of law.” Emp. Sec.

Comm’n of N.C. v. Peace, 128 N.C. App. 1, 6, 493 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1997), aff’d in part,

rev. dismissed in part, 349 N.C. 315, 507 S.E.2d 272 (1998). Our standard of review

is defined by statute:

             A party to a review proceeding in a superior court may
             appeal to the appellate division from the final judgment of
             the superior court as provided in G.S. 7A-27. The scope of
             review to be applied by the appellate court under this
             section is the same as it is for other civil cases. In cases
             reviewed under G.S. 150B-51(c), the court’s findings of fact
             shall be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-52 (2021). Here, Petitioner “challenges the trial court’s law-

based inquiries, including whether the [BOT’s] decision violated constitutional

provisions, was made upon unlawful procedure, was in excess of statutory authority,

or was affected by other error of law[.]” The trial court reviewed these asserted errors

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                   MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                   Opinion of the Court

under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-51(c) and “the [trial] court’s findings of fact shall be

upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” Id.

         When conducting our review, the agency is entitled to a presumption of good

faith.

               The agency’s decision is presumed to be made in good faith
               and in accordance with governing law. Therefore, the
               burden is on the party asserting otherwise to overcome
               such presumptions by competent evidence to the contrary
               when making a claim that the decision was affected by
               error of law or procedure.

Richardson v. N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction Licensure Section, 199 N.C. App. 219,

223-24, 681 S.E.2d 479, 483, disc. rev. denied, 363 N.C. 745, 688 S.E.2d 694 (2009)

(citation omitted). “It is well established that an agency’s construction of its own

regulations is entitled to substantial deference.” Morrell v. Flaherty, 338 N.C. 230,

237, 449 S.E.2d 175, 179-80 (1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We must

also generally defer to the agency’s interpretation of its regulations “unless it is

plainly erroneous.” Id. at 238, 449 S.E.2d at 180.

         I.    WSSU Hearing Procedures

         “To assert a due process claim, [Petitioner] must show that [he was] deprived

of a protected property interest in employment.           If tenured, an employee has a

protected property right because tenure constitutes a promise of continued

employment.” Pressman v. Univ. of N.C. at Charlotte, 78 N.C. App. 296, 302, 337

S.E.2d 644, 648 (1985) (citations omitted). Here, Petitioner was a tenured professor

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                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                  Opinion of the Court

who held a protected property interest in his employment. “Section 603 specifies the

due process protections to which a tenured faculty member is entitled and contains a

detailed schedule of steps involving notice and hearings which the university must

take prior to discharging a tenured faculty member.” Bernold v. Bd. of Governors of

Univ. of N.C., 200 N.C. App. 295, 299, 683 S.E.2d 428, 431 (2009). Even if the UNC

Code satisfies the requirements of due process, WSSU must then comply with its own

procedures. McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 225 N.C. App. 50, 68-69, 736

S.E.2d 811, 824 (2013) (“A state actor violates due process when it fails to follow its

own rules and procedures.” (citations omitted)).         Petitioner puts forward three

instances in which he believes his due process rights were violated by WSSU’s failure

to comply with its own procedures: the Chancellor ignoring the prima facie

determinations made by the FHC; Petitioners own waiver of a full hearing; and the

trial court’s reliance on what were purportedly the Chancellor’s findings of fact

instead of the FHC’s.

              A. Chancellor Declining to Accept the FHC’s Recommendation

      First, Petitioner asserts that the Chancellor could not move forward with his

dismissal when the FHC determined twice that WSSU had failed to make out a prima

facie case.   We disagree.     While the Chancellor is required to consider the

recommendations of the FHC, the decision to discharge ultimately remains with the

Chancellor under the UNC Code. The FHC’s decision at the end of the hearing is

transmitted to the Chancellor as a written recommendation. The Chancellor is

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                                     Opinion of the Court

expressly allowed to “decline[] to accept a [FHC] recommendation that is favorable to

the faculty member[.]”       According to Petitioner, this renders the due process

protections outlined in the Faculty Handbook meaningless.2 However, the Faculty

Handbook contemplates that a record will be made at the FHC hearing which can be

used on the multiple levels of appeal available to WSSU and faculty members: “[T]he

purpose of the hearing is to create a record of testimony and documentary evidence

for review by the parties, the [BOT] and/or [BOG], should the Faculty Member seek

further review of the discharge or imposition of other serious sanctions.” For a better

record, “[i]f the Chancellor disagrees with the [FHC’s] determination [of whether a

prima facie case has been presented], he/she will send it back for a full hearing.”

       Indeed, in this case, the Chancellor expressly sent the matter back to the FHC

for the FHC to conclude the hearing and provide Petitioner an opportunity to present

evidence.     Petitioner declined.        Furthermore, WSSU submits a different

interpretation of the UNC Code. WSSU, as a government agency, interprets its

procedure to mean that the Chancellor has the final say if the Chancellor and the

FHC disagree.      “It is well established that an agency’s construction of its own

regulations is entitled to substantial deference.” Morrell, 338 N.C. at 237, 449 S.E.2d

at 179-80 (citation and quotation marks omitted). We must also generally defer to

the agency’s interpretation of its regulations “unless it is plainly erroneous.” Id. at

2 Mitchell does not argue that the Chancellor did not provide a meaningful review of the FHC’s
recommendations.

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                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                  Opinion of the Court

238, 449 S.E.2d at 180. The agency’s interpretation of the ultimate decision maker

is not plainly erroneous. The text of the UNC Code aligns with the interpretation

followed by WSSU: “The [C]hancellor shall issue a final written opinion within 30

[d]ays after receiving the hearing documents including the transcript of the hearing.

The [C]hancellor’s decision shall be based on the recommendations and evidence

received from the FHC including the Transcript of the hearing.” (emphasis added.)

      We find it analytically relevant that the FHC is tasked with providing

“recommendations,” while the Chancellor issues a “final written opinion” based on

those recommendations. The Chancellor and the FHC clearly have separate roles to

play in the discipline process; therefore, it was not plainly erroneous for WSSU to

interpret the role of the Chancellor as the final decision maker in instances of

disagreement with the FHC.

             B. Petitioner’s Decision Not to Present Further Evidence

      Second, Petitioner argues that he could not have knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waived his right to a full hearing because he erroneously believed the

Chancellor was bound by the FHC’s recommendations. Petitioner was represented

by counsel at the FHC’s hearing and aware of the purposes of the hearing as described

in the notice provided to him. Petitioner made his own decision not to present further

evidence after the prima facie determination was rejected by the Chancellor. He was

also aware of his ability to present evidence at that point in the hearing; the WSSU

Faculty Handbook states that “[t]he Faculty Member shall have the right to counsel,

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                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                  Opinion of the Court

to present the testimony of witnesses and other evidence, to confront and cross-

examine adverse witnesses and to examine all documents and other adverse

demonstrative evidence, and to make argument.” Petitioner’s decision not to present

argument after the prima facie determination was rejected by the Chancellor does

not make the procedure afforded to him defective or violate his due process rights.

             C. Chancellor Acting as a Fact Finder

      Third, Petitioner argues that only the FHC was authorized to function as a fact

finder and not the Chancellor.      Even presuming, without deciding, Petitioner’s

argument is correct, Petitioner has presented no evidence that the Chancellor ignored

the findings of fact reached by the FHC.

             The agency’s decision is presumed to be made in good faith
             and in accordance with governing law. Therefore, the
             burden is on the party asserting otherwise to overcome
             such presumptions by competent evidence to the contrary
             when making a claim that the decision was affected by
             error of law or procedure.

Richardson, 199 N.C. App. at 223-24, 681 S.E.2d at 483 (citation omitted). Without

anything in the Record to support Petitioner’s assertion, he has not overcome the

presumption that the Chancellor acted in good faith and in accordance with governing

law when reviewing the recommendations of the FHC, as the Chancellor could have

reached a different conclusion than the FHC using the same set of facts. Thus,

regardless of whether it would constitute a violation of due process for the Chancellor

to have acted in a fact-finding capacity, Petitioner presented no evidence to support

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                  MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                  Opinion of the Court

that the Chancellor so acted; accordingly, this argument fails.

      For all the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s due process rights were not

violated when the Chancellor rejected the prima facie determination made by the

FHC; when he chose not to present argument after the prima facie determination; or

when the Chancellor reached a different conclusion than the FHC after reviewing the

record and recommendation.         Accordingly, the procedure used to terminate

Petitioner’s employment was not unlawful, defective, or in violation of his due process

rights.

      II.    Discharge based on Petitioner’s Letter to Dr. Nation

      Petitioner further argues the trial court’s decision upholding the BOG’s final

decision upholding Petitioner’s discharge—based in part on Petitioner’s letter to Dr.

Nation—was in error because, Petitioner contends, his letter “touched upon a matter

of public concern.” As such, he argues that, as a public employee, his discharge

implicated his First Amendment right to free speech and violated his protected

interest in freedom of expression. We disagree.

      “Public employment may not be conditioned on criteria that infringes the

employees’ protected interest in freedom of expression.” Pressman, 78 N.C. App. at

300, 337 S.E.2d at 647 (citation omitted). “An employee may not be discharged for

expression of ideas on a matter of public concern.” Id. (citation omitted). “The

expression need not be public but may be made in a private conversation.” Id.

(citation omitted).

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                  MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                                   Opinion of the Court

      “To make out a claim under the First Amendment, the [public] employee must

show that his speech is concerning a matter of public concern.” Id. (citing Connick v.

Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)). “A matter is of public

concern if when fairly considered it relates ‘to any matter of political, social, or other

concern to the community.’ ” Id. at 300-01, 337 S.E.2d at 647 (quoting Connick, 461

U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d at 719). “The context, form, and content of

the employee’s speech as revealed by the whole record are used to determine the

nature of the speech.” Id. at 301, 337 S.E.2d at 647. “Whether speech is a matter of

public concern is a question of law for the courts to decide.” Id. at 301, 337 S.E.2d at

647-48.

      “If the speech is upon a matter of public concern, there must be a ‘balance

between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of

public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the

efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’ ” Id. (quoting

Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, 103 S.Ct. at 1687, 75 L.Ed.2d at 717 (citation and quotation

marks omitted)). “The balancing of interests is a question of law for the courts.” Id.

(citation omitted).

      Here, the BOG determined Petitioner failed to present any evidence that his

letter to Dr. Nation addressed a matter of public concern. The BOG further noted

Petitioner “erroneously characterized” his letter as addressing a matter of public

concern. The trial court affirmed this ruling.

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                                  Opinion of the Court

      Indeed, on appeal, Petitioner again cites no record support for his contention.

Instead, Petitioner contends, without citation, his letter was “an impassioned plea”

and a “strongly worded condemnation of racism within academia and Nation’s

perceived participation in that racist culture.” There is no evidence in this Record,

however, that Dr. Nation’s decision to deny funding to Petitioner’s students for

Petitioner’s chosen conference was racially motivated or a product of racial bias in

academia. There is, further, also no evidence that Petitioner intended his letter to be

an effort to combat racism in academia or to advocate on the part of his students for

funding to attend his preferred conference on that basis.

      To the contrary, the context, form, and content of Petitioner’s speech—as

revealed by the whole Record—reflects Petitioner’s speech was nothing more than an

expression of his personal grievance towards Dr. Nation and his displeasure with her

administrative decision not to provide funding for Petitioner’s preferred conference.

That Petitioner did so by invoking his own racist epithets does not convert his letter

into one addressing a matter of public concern. In fact, in Pressman, this Court

addressed a professor’s statements during a meeting concerning a Dean’s lack of

administrative competence, including a lack of opportunity for personal growth

because of a heavy workload, lack of guidance for grading, and the failure to develop

a master’s program and a recruiting program. Pressman, 78 N.C. App. at 301, 337

S.E.2d at 648. This Court found the “criticism not based on public-spirited concern

but more narrowly focused on [the professor’s] own personal work and his personal

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                                  Opinion of the Court

displeasure with internal policies.” Id. at 301-02, 337 S.E.2d at 648. Thus, the Court

concluded the professor failed to show his speech was addressing a matter of public

concern and, thus, did not implicate the professor’s First Amendment protections as

a public employee. Here, even ignoring Petitioner’s racial invectives directed towards

Dr. Nation, the letter, taken in context, is nothing more than criticism focused on

Petitioner’s own work, broader disagreements with Dr. Nation and her criticism of

him, and his displeasure with her decision not to provide funding.

      Thus, Petitioner’s letter to Dr. Nation, in this case, did not implicate a matter

of public concern. Therefore, the BOG did not commit any error of law by upholding

Petitioner’s discharge from employment based, in part, on his letter to Dr. Nation.

Consequently, the trial court did not err in affirming the BOG.

                                    Conclusion

      Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s 26 July 2021

Order.

      AFFIRMED.

      Judge ZACHARY concurs.

      Judge MURPHY concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion.

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No. COA21-639 – Mitchell v. The Univ. of N.C. Bd. Of Governors

      MURPHY, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

      While I agree with the Majority’s analysis as to whether Petitioner was

afforded adequate process during termination proceedings, I dissent in part from the

Majority on the basis that Petitioner’s remarks implicated a matter of public concern,

therefore requiring the trial court to conduct a First Amendment balancing test.

      “It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis

that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of

speech.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987). This is true “despite the

fact that the statements are directed at their [] superiors.” Pickering v. Board of

Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).      “The threshold question . . . is whether

[Petitioner’s] speech may be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter

of public concern.” Id. “The determination of whether speech is protected under the

First Amendment is a question of law.” Holland v. Harrison, 254 N.C. App. 636, 643

(2017).

      Controversial speech by a public employee is not a novel issue. In Pressman v.

University of North Carolina at Charlotte, a nontenured professor was denied

reappointment after he “attended a faculty meeting where the faculty discussed [the

university dean’s] lack of administrative competence.” Pressman v. University of

North Carolina at Charlotte, 78 N.C. App. 296, 298 (1985). The professor expressed

his concern over a variety of workplace topics at the meeting. Id. Establishing North

Carolina’s two-pronged test regarding free speech by government employees, we said
                  MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                    MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

the following:

             To make out a claim under the First Amendment, the
             employee must show that his speech is concerning a matter
             of public concern. A matter is of public concern if when
             fairly considered it relates “to any matter of political,
             social, or other concern to the community.” The context,
             form, and content of the employee’s speech as revealed by
             the whole record are used to determine the nature of the
             speech. Whether speech is a matter of public concern is a
             question of law for the courts. If the speech is upon a
             matter of public concern, there must be a “balance between
             the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting
             upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
             State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
             public services it performs through its employees.” The
             balancing of interests is a question of law for the courts.

Id. at 300-01 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)). We held that the

professor’s “speech was not upon a matter of public concern.” Id. at 301. Instead,

“[h]is speech can be more accurately described as an employee grievance concerning

internal policy.” Id. His “criticism [was] not based on public-spirited concern but

more narrowly focused on his own personal work and his personal displeasure with

internal policies.” Id. at 301-02.

      Here, Petitioner’s letter to Dr. Nation reads, in whole, as follows:

             Hi Denise, it was brought to my attention that you told a
             student that the conference I and two of my students are
             presenting at has no substance or standards, meaning that
             it is useless and unaccredited, and anyone can present. In
             addition, you told the student she should try to present at
             the ASC held in November because it is a better conference
             and has a lot of substance. You are entitled to your opinion.
             However, you should not be telling the student things like
             that, especially with no proof. The Race, Gender & Class

                                             2
                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                   MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

             conference is locally, regionally, and internationally known
             and ha[s] scholars from around the world presenting. In
             addition, the conference has been in existence for over 20
             years. Thirdly, this conference does not take anyone. You
             have to be accepted through their process. It is amazing
             how you always try to debunk what I do. Yet you complain
             that I tell students negative things about you. It would
             have been better to tell the student that you did not want
             to help fund her instead of telling her falsehoods about the
             RGC conference and asking her to present on scholarship
             day. That is not appropriate behavior as a chair.

             After all these years, it is amazing that you still think that
             anything white is better. I looked up the ASC and nothing
             but a bunch of white men (some white women) are running
             it. Keep promoting and praising these white folks who are
             associated with the ASC. As I told you before, you can
             graduate from and praise their schools, come up with a
             great theory, hangout with them, praise Latessa and other
             European professors (you need to ask them about their civil
             rights record), wear their European style weaves, walk
             with their bounce, hire them, present at their conferences,
             and even publish in their journals. In their eyes you will
             never be equal to them. They still look at you as a wanna
             be white, an international nigger, an international coon,
             and an [i]nternational sambo (lol) because you display that
             kind of behavior. You will never get it. Wake up.

Under Pressman, the question this letter raises is twofold and subject to resolution

as a matter of law: (1) whether the speech at issue, holistically and in context,

addresses a matter of public concern and (2) whether the interests of the employee in

expressing the concern outweigh the employer’s interest in the efficient

administration of its services. As the extent of the discussion of this constitutional

issue at trial was a singular statement that Petitioner’s termination “was not in

violation of any constitutional provisions,” I understand the trial court to have ruled,

                                            3
                      MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                        MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

without discussion, that the letter did not address a matter of public concern.

         At the threshold, I make two notes. First, the broader subject of academia’s

relationship with race has long been acknowledged as a subject of public concern and

remains so, now more than ever. Universities in this state and across the country

market themselves to, and communicate with, the public based on demographic

diversity with respect to—among other things—race. See, e.g., Duke University

Office    of   the    Provost,     Duke’s    Commitment       to   Diversity       and   Inclusion,

https://provost.duke.edu/initiatives/commitment-to-diversity-and-inclusion                       (last

accessed 5 January 2023); Wake Forest University, Diversity & Inclusion,

https://admissions.wfu.edu/experience-wake-forest/diversity/               (last      accessed      5

January        2023);          Harvard      University,       Diversity         and      Inclusion,

https://www.harvard.edu/about/diversity-and-inclusion/ (last accessed 5 January

2023); Stanford Graduate School of Business, Diversity, Equity & Inclusion,

https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/experience/diversity-equity-inclusion (last accessed 5

January 2023); see also Campus Ethnic Diversity: National Universities, U.S. News

&    World           Report,      https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-

universities/campus-ethnic-diversity (last accessed 5 January 2023).                      Copious

amounts of ink have been spilled over what the significance of race in academia

should be, what constitutes racism, and how to solve the myriad of problems it poses.

See, e.g., Kevin Laland, Racism in academia, and why the ‘little things’ matter, Nature

                                                 4
                        MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                         MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

(Aug.      25,    2020),     https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02471-6;            John

McWhorter, Words Have Lost Their Common Meaning, The Atlantic (Mar. 31, 2021),

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/nation-divided-

language/618461/; Yuvraj Joshi, Racial Transition, 98 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1181, 1203-

1208 (2021). The U.S. Department of Education has reported on racial diversity in

higher education. United States Department of Education, Advancing Diversity and

Inclusion in Higher Education: Key Data Highlights Focusing on Race and Ethnicity

and                 Promising                  Practices                (Nov.              2016),

https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/research/pubs/advancing-diversity-inclusion.pdf                (last

accessed 5 January 2023). The way race is taught in schools has become one of the

defining political issues of this decade. See Lauren Camera, Congressional Democrats

Target Bans on Teaching About Racism in Schools, U.S. News & World Report (Feb.

2, 2022, 3:06 p.m.), https://www.usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2022-02-

02/congressional-democrats-take-aim-at-efforts-to-ban-critical-race-theory                  (last

accessed 5 January 2023); Stephen Kearse, GOP Lawmakers Intensify Effort to Ban

Critical         Race      Theory       in      Schools,      Pew       (June       14,    2021),

https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/06/14/gop-

lawmakers-intensify-effort-to-ban-critical-race-theory-in-schools.               Few topics could

be more legitimately said to constitute issues of public concern.

        Second, the bulk of authoritative caselaw addressing adverse employment

                                                  5
                MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                  MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

action in response to employee speech has attempted to cleanly differentiate speech

concerning sociopolitical issues from speech concerning strictly personal or

administrative issues. In Connick v. Myers, the U.S. Supreme Court laid out the

then-recent history of developments in First Amendment jurisprudence concerning

adverse employment action:

            For most of this century, the unchallenged dogma was that
            a public employee had no right to object to conditions
            placed upon the terms of employment—including those
            which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights. The
            classic formulation of this position was Justice Holmes,
            who, when sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of
            Massachusetts, observed: “A policeman may have a
            constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
            constitutional right to be a policeman.” For many years,
            Holmes’ epigram expressed this Court’s law.

            The Court cast new light on the matter in a series of cases
            arising from the widespread efforts in the 1950s and early
            1960s to require public employees, particularly teachers, to
            swear oaths of loyalty to the state and reveal the groups
            with which they associated. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
            U.S. 183[] . . . (1952), the Court held that a State could not
            require its employees to establish their loyalty by
            extracting an oath denying past affiliation with
            Communists. In Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
            886[] . . . (1961), the Court recognized that the government
            could not deny employment because of previous
            membership in a particular party. By the time Sherbert v.
            Verner, 374 U.S. 398[] . . . (1963), was decided, it was
            already “too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of
            religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of
            or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.” It was
            therefore no surprise when in Keyishian v. Board of
            Regents, 385 U.S. 589[] . . . (1967), the Court invalidated
            New York statutes barring employment on the basis of

                                           6
    MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

      MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

membership in “subversive” organizations, observing that
the theory that public employment which may be denied
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless
of how unreasonable, had been uniformly rejected.

In all of these cases, the precedents in which Pickering [v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968),] is rooted, the
invalidated statutes and actions sought to suppress the
rights of public employees to participate in public affairs.
The issue was whether government employees could be
prevented or “chilled” by the fear of discharge from joining
political parties and other associations that certain public
officials might find “subversive.” The explanation for the
Constitution’s special concern with threats to the right of
citizens to participate in political affairs is no mystery. The
First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people. Speech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government. Accordingly, the Court has frequently
reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,
and is entitled to special protection.

Pickering . . . followed from this understanding of the First
Amendment. In Pickering, the Court held impermissible
under the First Amendment the dismissal of a high school
teacher for openly criticizing the Board of Education on its
allocation of school funds between athletics and education
and its methods of informing taxpayers about the need for
additional revenue. Pickering’s subject was a matter of
legitimate public concern upon which free and open debate
is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate.

Our cases following Pickering also involved safeguarding
speech on matters of public concern. The controversy
in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593[] . . . (1972), arose
from the failure to rehire a teacher in the state college
system who had testified before committees of the Texas
legislature and had become involved in public

                               7
                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                   MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

             disagreement over whether the college should be elevated
             to four-year status—a change opposed by the Regents.
             In Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274[] .
             . . (1977), a public school teacher was not rehired because,
             allegedly, he had relayed to a radio station the substance
             of a memorandum relating to teacher dress and
             appearance that the school principal had circulated to
             various teachers. The memorandum was apparently
             prompted by the view of some in the administration that
             there was a relationship between teacher appearance and
             public support for bond issues, and indeed, the radio
             station promptly announced the adoption of the dress code
             as a news item. Most recently, in Givhan v. Western Line
             Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410[] . . . (1979), we
             held that First Amendment protection applies when a
             public employee arranges to communicate privately with
             his employer rather than to express his views publicly.
             Although the subject-matter of Mrs. Givhan’s statements
             were not the issue before the Court, it is clear that her
             statements concerning the school district’s allegedly
             racially discriminatory policies involved a matter of public
             concern.

Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-46 (marks and extratextual citations omitted). Pressman,

which cited Connick in its articulation of the two-pronged test cited above, reached a

different result than the most recent cases Connick cited, holding that a state

employee’s speech was simply “an employee grievance concerning internal policy”

rather than one “based on public-spirited concern” when it concerned a college

administration’s “lack of opportunity for personal development . . . , lack of guidance

for grading, failure to develop a masters program, failure to recruit quality students

and faculty, and inadequate or inappropriate educational direction . . . .” Pressman,

78 N.C. App. at 298, 301-302.

                                            8
                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                    MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

      While the Majority treats the fact pattern in Pressman and the ensuing holding

as directly controlling in this case, Petitioner’s letter fits only with great difficulty

into the framework set out in Connick and Pressman; it reads, simultaneously and

inseparably, as a defense of the academic legitimacy of a conference, an expression of

dissatisfaction on the state of racial diversity in academia, and a statement of

frustration with Dr. Nation, both personally and with any potential unconscious

biases. Admittedly, examining the speech at issue holistically and in context—as we

must, see Pressman, 78 N.C. App. at 300-01—the letter’s status is not immediately

clear on its face. Its first paragraph, while critical of Dr. Nation’s conduct toward a

student, reads not simply as a rebuke, but an attempt to defend the broader academic

legitimacy of the RGC conference by appealing to its level of recognition, longevity,

and internal vetting process. And the second paragraph—the only part of the letter

discussed by the trial court—was not an isolated set of remarks; rather, it was an

elaboration on the first paragraph and an expression of Petitioner’s belief that racial

bias informed the perception that the RGC was less academically legitimate than

other conferences. Petitioner’s personal criticisms of Dr. Nation, while undeniably

present, were predicated on concern for her impact on the perceived social and

academic value of the conference and informed by the social and academic influence

she exerted by virtue of her position.

      Given the blended nature of the letter, we have been tasked with answering

                                             9
                    MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                      MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

whether the personally offensive character of the letter precludes our holding that it

addresses a matter of public concern under Pressman and Connick. And the answer,

as informed by the analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court in Givhan v. W. Consol. Sch.

Dist., 439 U.S. at 411-413, is no. There, as discussed in the above-quoted portion of

Connick, the Court held that an employee’s views on a matter of public concern are

protected even when expressed privately. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414 (“This Court’s

decisions . . . do not support the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his

protection against governmental abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides to

express his views privately rather than publicly.”). The remarks by the plaintiff in

that case were more than just private; they were, according to the defendant school

district, “‘insulting,’ ‘hostile,’ ‘loud,’ and ‘arrogant[,]’” yet they were held to address a

matter of public concern nonetheless. Id. at 412. So too here.3

       To be clear, in concluding that Petitioner’s letter—especially its second

paragraph—addressed a matter of public concern rather than merely being a

statement of racial abuse, I am cognizant of its precise framing and context.

Petitioner’s use of racially-charged rhetoric in the letter was not a statement that

Mitchell regarded Dr. Nation as lesser because of her race; rather, it was a statement

       3  I further note that the remarks at issue in Givhan, much like the remarks here, were most
immediately trained on the policies of the school at which the petitioner in that case was employed
while also implicating broader social issues. Id. at 412-13 (marks omitted) (noting that the
“petitioner had made demands on [] two occasions” but that “all the complaints in question involved
employment policies and practices at the school which petitioner conceived to be racially
discriminatory in purpose or effect”).

                                                10
                     MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                       MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

of Petitioner’s perception that other academics saw Dr. Nation as lesser because of

her race—a perception presumably informed by his own experience as a Black

academic and scholar. Indeed, the Record indicates that the letter may have been

prompted in the first instance by a student’s concerns that Dr. Nation had

recommended the ASC over the RGC on a racially preferential basis. Our courts are

duly attuned to the fact that, in the ordinary case, use of racial slurs and epithets,

especially when employed to insult a member of a different racial group, are

inflammatory, deeply wounding, and sufficient to constitute constitutionally

unprotected “fighting words.”            See In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 414-15 (1997).4

      4   Our Supreme Court’s full reasoning in Spivey was as follows:

                By another assignment of error, [the] respondent Spivey contends that
                his removal from office for his behavior, including the use of the word
                “nigger” and other tasteless language, violates the First Amendment
                to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 14 of the
                Constitution of North Carolina. Spivey argues that he has been
                wrongly removed from office because of the content of his speech. He
                claims that this violated his constitutionally protected right to express
                his viewpoint. We disagree.

                Taken in context, the use of the word “nigger” by Spivey squarely falls
                within the category of unprotected speech defined by the Supreme
                Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568[] . . . (1942). In
                Chaplinsky, the United States Supreme Court wrote

                        [I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is
                        not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.
                        There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
                        classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
                        which have never been thought to raise any
                        Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
                        obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
                        “fighting” words—those which by their very utterance

                                                   11
                    MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                       MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

                       inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
                       the peace.

               Id. at 571-72[] . . . . At the hearing on this matter, there was testimony
               concerning the hurt and anger caused African-Americans when they
               are subjected to racial slurs by white people. We question, however,
               whether such testimony was necessary to the findings of the superior
               court in this case. Rule 201(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
               provides that a trial court may take judicial notice of a fact if it is not
               subject to reasonable dispute in that it is generally known within the
               territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 201(b)
               (1992). No fact is more generally known than that a white man who
               calls a black man a “nigger” within his hearing will hurt and anger the
               black man and often provoke him to confront the white man and
               retaliate. The trial court was free to judicially note this fact.
               Additionally, evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding
               Spivey’s verbal outbursts in the bar tends to show that his use of this
               racial epithet in the present case was intended by him to hurt and
               anger Mr. Jacobs and to provoke a confrontation with him. “‘Resort to
               epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
               information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution.’” Chaplinsky,
               315 U.S. at 572[] . . . (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
               309-10[] . . . (1940)).

               [The] [r]espondent Spivey cites Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116[] . . . (1996),
               for the proposition that governmental restriction on the ability of
               elected officials to express their views, however objectionable, stifles
               public debate and violates the First Amendment. We conclude that
               nothing in that opinion protects the use of racial invective by a public
               official against a member of the public in a bar. Spivey’s use of the
               word “nigger” and his abusive conduct on the night in question did not
               in any way involve an expression of his viewpoint on any local or
               national policy. In fact, Spivey himself has repeatedly asserted since
               the incident in question that the use of the racial epithet “nigger” does
               not in any way reflect his views about race.

               Mr. Spivey’s abusive verbal attack on Mr. Jacobs which gave rise to the
               inquiry removing him from office is not protected speech under the
               First Amendment. Instead, when taken in context, his repeated
               references to Mr. Jacobs as a “nigger” presents a classic case of the use
               of “fighting words” tending to incite an immediate breach of the peace
               which are not protected by either the Constitution of the United States
               or the Constitution of North Carolina. We overrule this assignment of
               error.

In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 414-15 (1997).

                                                  12
                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                   MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

However, this is not the ordinary case; and, while I express no opinion on the

underlying veracity of Petitioner’s remarks, their function was more than simple

derogation.

      I would reverse the trial court’s determination that Petitioner’s speech did not

address a matter of public concern. However, as the trial court’s tacit determination

that Petitioner’s speech did not implicate the First Amendment discontinued its

analysis before it conducted a balancing test under the second prong of Pressman, I

would also remand the case for further proceedings, as that issue has not yet been

“raised and passed upon in the trial court.” State v. Morrow, 200 N.C. App. 123, 127

(2009) (emphasis added) (“Appellate courts will not ordinarily pass upon a

constitutional question unless it affirmatively appears that such question was raised

and passed upon in the trial court.”); see also Pressman, 78 N.C. App. at 300-01

(marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added) (“If the speech is upon a matter of

public concern, there must be a balance between the interests of the employee, as a

citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,

as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through

its employees. The balancing of interests is a question of law for the courts.”). Should

the trial court have then determined that Petitioner’s interests in making the

statements in the letter outweighed any countervailing interests of WSSU in

terminating him, the trial court may have further determined whether any of the

                                            13
                 MITCHELL V. THE UNIV. OF N.C. BD. OF GOVERNORS

                   MURPHY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part

remaining bases offered by WSSU, independently or in combination, supported

Petitioner’s termination.

      I respectfully dissent in part.

                                            14