Court Opinion

ID: 9738296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:49:29.926224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.312624
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 38. (dissenting). The majority chooses not to resolve this case by a determination of the intent of the parties from the text of the document. This approach is puzzling, to say the least.1
*632¶ 39. Instead, the majority resolves this case using Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3). In doing so, the majority construes the 1977 document to an end that effectively disregards the otherwise apparent intent of the parties as evinced by the written text.
¶ 40. Because I conclude that the easement, here a deed and referred to hereafter as the document, created a nontransferable right to sand removal, personal to Nemitz as the original holder, and because I reach this conclusion regardless of whether I apply traditional rules for interpreting an easement instrument or apply a correct interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3), I dissent.
I
¶ 41. I begin by interpreting the document and acknowledging the rules of interpretation. When the text of a document is plain and unambiguous, the document must be interpreted to effectuate the parties' intent.2 Case law also establishes that the primary source of the intent of the parties is "what is written *633within the four corners of the deed . . . ."3 Furthermore, as the majority notes, "we generally interpret the use of different language in similar or related sections as intending a different meaning."4
¶ 42. I therefore begin with the text of the document. Applying the rules of interpretation identified above, I conclude that the 1977 document granted rights relating to the water flowage different from those relating to sand removal. Whereas the former (water flowage) is transferable by each grantee, the latter (sand removal) is personal to the original grantee and thus is not transferable by the original grantee.
¶ 43. Regarding the water flowage rights, I conclude that the following aspects of the text support the conclusion that the 1977 document conveyed an easement for flowage rights and that the easement for flowage rights was transferable: (1) the title is "Easement for Flowage Rights," phrased in the singular (an "easement") and specifically referring to flowage rights; (2) the phrase "easement. .. with full right and privilege" is used; (3) the grant of flowage rights is to "Carl Nemitz, his heirs, and assigns," the latter words ordinarily used to indicate transferability; (4) the easement is "perpetual providing that the flowage rights hereby granted are being used for the purpose of cranberry culture." The only reasonable interpretation of this text is that the water flowage provision is a grant of a transferable right. Majority op., ¶¶ 29-30.
¶ 44. In contrast, the grant of sand removal rights presents a different text, on its face supporting a *634different conclusion. The sand removal provision must be interpreted according to its text and in comparison with the language used to create the transferable water flowage easement. Thus the language that is used in the grant of sand removal, as well as language that is used in the grant of water flowage but conspicuously omitted from the grant of sand removal, are both significant. Analyzed in this way, the text of the sand removal provision contains numerous indicia that the parties intended the two rights to be different and discrete from one another.
¶ 45. The document is structured in a way that makes the sand removal rights both structurally and linguistically separate from the water flowage rights.
¶ 46. With regard to structure, the provisions relating to the water flowage rights are listed first and constitute the bulk of the document. The document further enumerates that the conveyance is supported by consideration, witnessed by the parties, and perpetual. In contrast, the sand removal rights are addressed last, constituting a separate almost ancillary paragraph, of one single sentence.
¶ 47. With regard to language, the text of the sand removal provision, both in the words used as well as those omitted, distinguishes the grant of sand removal rights from the immediately preceding grant of water flowage rights. The sand removal provision does not use the word "easement;" instead, it uses only the words "right and privilege." The words "heirs and assigns," used in the grant of water flowage, are omitted from the sand removal provision; sand removal is granted only to "the Grantee [Carl Nemitz]." While the statement that the sand removal right is limited to the use for the purpose of cranberry cultivation, the word "perpetual" is not used. Finally, the document's title is an "Ease*635ment for Flowage Rights." The title makes no mention of sand removal and the grant related to sand removal, which is instead set forth as a "further right and privilege."5
¶ 48. Thus, the explicit and repeated terms of the document's sand removal provision distinguish it from the transferable water flowage rights. The sand removal provision is a separate ("further") grant, and it is a grant made personally to Nemitz.
¶ 49. I agree with the County that the cumulative effect of these structural and linguistic distinctions is to communicate the parties' intent that the grant of the right of sand removal be personal to Nemitz and not transferable.6 If this intent is not flatly unambiguous, it is certainly the most reasonable interpretation of the intent of the parties, based on the primary source for determining that intent — what is written within the "four corners" of the document itself.
*636¶ 50. Surprisingly then, the majority ultimately concludes that this reasonable interpretation of the document cannot be controlling because an equally reasonable interpretation is gleaned from the majority's (erroneous) application of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).
II
¶ 51. I turn to Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3), which the majority concludes is determinative, although the statute plays a relatively minor role in the parties' briefs.
¶ 52. I began by interpreting the text of the document, and I shall now proceed to the text of the statute. The majority places the statutory history before statutory text. The majority begins its discussion not with the text of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) but with a recitation of statutory history and authority from other jurisdictions. See majority op., ¶¶ 15-20. I follow the more usual method, beginning with the statutory text and then addressing the statutory history and other sources of legislative intent.
A
¶ 53. Wisconsin Stat. § 706.10(3) has two clauses, each complete by itself and each capable of standing as a separate sentence. The text of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3), when properly parsed, reads as follows:
[1] In conveyances of lands words of inheritance shall not be necessary to create or convey a fee, and
[2] every conveyance shall pass all the estate or interest of the grantor unless a different intent shall appear expressly or by necessary implication in the terms of such conveyance (formatting and emphasis added.)
*637¶ 54. I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) does not help us in interpreting the intent of the parties expressed in the document. However, were I to apply the statute to the present facts, I would nonetheless conclude that the County prevails.
¶ 55. As written, the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) provides that in conveyances of lands, words of inheritance (that is, words like "heirs" and "assigns") are not necessary to create or convey a fee.
¶ 56. The second clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) provides that every conveyance shall pass all of the estate or interest of the grantor unless a different implication appears expressly or by necessary implication in the terms of such conveyance.
¶ 57. The first clause governs "conveyances of lands." It does not apply to the document at issue in the present case because in Wisconsin an easement is not a conveyance of land, and the present case does not involve creation or conveyance of a fee.
¶ 58. At least in Wisconsin, an easement is only an interest in land, not the land itself. Accordingly, a conveyance of a right-of-way, for example, is not a conveyance of the strip of land itself.7 This court has repeatedly affirmed that an easement "does not create an estate in land," but rather "a right to use the land of another for a special purpose not inconsistent with the general property in the owner."8 Thus it is abundantly *638clear that the granting of an easement does not convey title to the land to an easement holder but only a right or privilege.9
¶ 59. Therefore, as an easement, the 1997 document (titled "Easement for Flowage Rights") is not a conveyance of land. By the statute's own terms, this document is therefore not affected by the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).
¶ 60. Based on the text of the statute, I therefore conclude that the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) applies only to a subset of conveyances, "conveyances of lands" that "create or convey a fee." The conveyance of the easement for water flowage and the conveyance of sand removal rights in the instant case are not conveyances of land creating a fee within the scope of the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).
¶ 61. Furthermore, the phrase "unless a different intent shall appear expressly or by necessary implication," contained within the second clause of § 706.10(3), does not modify or affect the first clause of the sentence, which applies to conveyances of lands and creation of fee interests.
¶ 62. A final important point. The fact that the words of inheritance are not necessary in a conveyance of land creating a fee to convey a transferable estate or interest does not mean that words of inheritance are meaningless if they are used. A drafter may use words like "heirs" and "assigns" to manifest the intent of the parties, even if their use is not required to convey a transferable interest in land. Indeed the statutory form warranty deeds set forth in the 1874 Laws,10 in the *6391878 Statutes11 and in the 1967 statutes12 provide for conveyance to the "grantee, his heirs and assigns," even when the statutes provide that words of inheritance are not necessary.
¶ 63. I turn now to the second clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3). It covers "conveyances." The use of the word "conveyances" can he interpreted as referencing, and thus as controlled by, the first clause to address only a conveyance of land that creates or conveys a fee. If so, the second clause of the statute is not applicable here for the same reasons that the first clause of the statute is not applicable.
¶ 64. The majority interprets the word "conveyance" in the second clause of the statute more broadly to include a conveyance of any interest of land, thus including the conveyance in the instant case. This interpretation is supported by Wis. Stat. § 706.01(4), which states that for purposes of chapter 706, the word "conveyance" means "a written instrument evidencing a transaction governed by this chapter, that satisfies the requirements of s. 706.02, subject to s. 706.25."
¶ 65. Applying this interpretation of "conveyance," a conveyance of an interest in land, that is, a conveyance of an easement or right or privilege, shall, under the second clause, pass all the estate or interest of the grantor to the grantee unless a different intent shall appear expressly or by necessary implication.
¶ 66. The words "estate" and "interest" are not defined in this second clause. The court has already declared that an easement does not create an estate;13 a *640right or privilege is not an estate. The grantor of an easement is not passing an estate.
¶ 67. The grantor of an easement may convey his or her "interest" in the easement, however. Thus if an easement holder conveys the easement, the entire interest the grantor holds in the easement is transferred, unless there is a different expressed intent or necessary implication. If, however, the holder of the easement owns less than a full interest — let us say she owns a one-half interest in the dominant estate and thus a one-half interest in the easement — she then conveys all of her one-half interest unless a different intent shall appear expressly or by necessary implication.
¶ 68. The majority bypasses the precise language and structure of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) and breezily paraphrases the two clauses, claiming that the statute "provides that every transfer of an interest in land conveys full title to that interest... unless the conveyance evinces a different intent 'expressly or by necessary implication.'" Majority op., ¶ 23. This improper expansion of the statutory language results in an erroneous application of the statute to the present case.
¶ 69. The majority substitutes "full title" for the words "estate" and "interest." The majority does not explain why the words "estate" and "interest" can be transformed into the words "full title" and does not explain the significance of the words "full title."
¶ 70. Stated another way, the majority mixes and matches words from the two clauses of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) to conclude (1) that words of inheritance shall not be necessary in any conveyance of lands, of an estate, or of an interest in land; (2) that every conveyance of an interest in land automatically implies words of inheritance (that is, that every conveyance of an interest in land includes the right of the grantee to *641transfer the same interest in the future); and (3) that a different intent, such as the intent that the conveyed interest in land be nontransferable, must appear expressly or by necessary implication in the terms of the conveyance.
¶ 71. This interpretation contravenes the plain text of the statute. Grammatically, the text is severable so that each clause may stand alone. Neither clause of the statute refers to the other, and each clause covers different circumstances. Yet the majority uses words from each clause to modify the other. The majority's construction seems to use the words of the first clause addressing words of inheritance to modify the second clause. At the same time the majority takes the words "unless a different intent shall appear," which appear only in the second clause, and construes them to modify the first clause.
¶ 72. In addition to these textual problems, the majority fails to give effect to the legislature's explicit instruction on how to interpret chapter 706. If a statute within chapter 706 of the statutes ("Conveyances of Real Property; Recording; Titles") is viewed as ambiguous or there is a conflict, the legislature has provided a rule of interpretation: interpret chapter 706 liberally so as to effectuate the intentions of the parties who have acted in good faith. Wisconsin Stat. § 706.001(1) and (3) provide in relevant part as follows:
(1) [T]his chapter shall govern every transaction by which any interest in land is created, aliened, mortgaged, assigned or may be otherwise affected in law or in equity....
*642(3) This chapter shall be liberally construed, in cases of conflict or ambiguity, so as to effectuate the intentions of parties who have acted in good faith.
¶ 73. In my view, the majority's application of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) violates this specific rule of construction by defeating the intent of the parties as manifest in the terms of the document itself.
B
¶ 74. Contrary to the majority's brief treatment, my review of the statutory history confirms that the two clauses of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) should be read independently, each given an effect of its own. As the majority explains at ¶ 17, Wisconsin enacted its first form of today's § 706.10(3) in 1874. Section 1, Chapter 316 of the Laws of Wisconsin 1874 read as follows:
In all conveyances of land hereafter made in this state, words of inheritance shall not be necessary in order to create or convey a fee.
This is the near-verbatim equivalent of the first clause of the present § 706.10(3).
¶ 75. In 1878, the legislature then amended the statute. It added additional language that would become the forerunner of the second clause of the present version of § 706.10(3).14 The legislative history thus *643confirms that § 706.10(3) is composed of two distinct clauses with distinct origins and independent operation.
¶ 76. The majority's statutory history and its use of authority from other states do not contravene that the statute has two distinct clauses or provide a persuasive reason why words from each should be read into the other.
¶ 77. The majority notes that the 1878 amendment added the second clause from a New York statute. The majority cites the New York statute, 1 Rev. St. 748 § 1 (quoted in Whitney v. Richardson, 13 N.Y.S. 861, 862 (N.Y. 1891). The Whitney case does not interpret the statute.
¶ 78. The majority argues that New York case law from the same period applied the New York statute to easements. I agree that the second clause can he applied to easements.
¶ 79. Nellis v. Munson, 108 N.Y. 453, 457 (1888), on which the majority relies, does not, however, interpret the New York statute, 1 Rev. St. 748 § 1, the provision relied on by the Wisconsin legislature. Rather, Nellis interprets a different provision, New York 3 Rev. St. 137, dealing with execution and delivery of documents relating to easements.15
*644¶ 80. Nothing in the majority opinion suggests, much less conclusively establishes, that the New York statute (which Wisconsin adopted as the second clause) should not be read as providing two separate standards affecting separate subject matters within conveyances at large. The cumulative effect is that the majority's reliance on the New York statute, 1 Rev. St. 748 § 1, provides no basis for importing the substance and effect of the first clause of § 706.10(3) into the context of the second clause or importing the substance and effect of the second clause into the context of the first clause.
C
¶ 81. Were I to apply a proper interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3), assuming the statute should be applied at all, the County prevails.
¶ 82. The County was transferring not land but an interest in land, so the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) does not apply. This is the only clause of the statute that addresses words of inheritance. In any event, as I stated previously, the fact that the words of inheritance are not necessary to convey a transferable estate or interest does not mean that words of inheritance are meaningless when they are used, especially when they are used selectively. A drafter may use such words to manifest the intent of the parties, even if their use is not required to convey a transferable interest in *645land. In my view, the drafter of the document at issue deliberately used different words to express different intents.
¶ 83. The second clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3) applies. The second clause is silent about the effect of words of inheritance on conveyances of an estate or an interest less than a conveyance of the land itself. The second clause simply indicates that whatever estate or interest is held by the grantor, "all the estate or interest" shall be passed by the conveyance. From the words of the document, I conclude that the right to sand removal was nontransferable and passed only to the grantee.
¶ 84. The "right and privilege to remove sand" was subject to two limitations that are apparent from the language of the document. First, it is conditioned on its use "for the purpose of cranberry culture upon the Grantee's adjacent lands." Second, the transfer is made to the "Grantee," without words of inheritance. In juxtaposition with the Easement for Water Flowage, the necessary implication is that the sand removal right is only to the "Grantee" and not to the Grantee's "heirs and assigns." The fact that words of inheritance are not necessary to convey a fee interest in a conveyance of land (covered by the first clause of Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3)), does not make them irrelevant when the parties specifically and selectively choose to use or omit such words in a conveyance of an interest in land.
¶ 85. In summary, I conclude that the conveyance of the sand removal to Nemitz was a conveyance of a personal, non-transferable right or privilege. I do not see the bearing of the statute upon which the majority relies, and I would resolve the matter following the usual rule of seeking the intent of the parties by interpreting the language contained in the instrument *646itself. Even if I were to apply Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3), I cannot agree with the majority's interpretation and application of that statute. Following what I believe to be the proper interpretation of the statute, I would conclude that the County prevails under Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3).
¶ 86. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 87. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 See, e.g., Konneker v. Romano, 2010 WI 65, ¶ 26, 326 Wis. 2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432 ("Because the easement in question is created by deed, the court must look to that instrument in *632construing the relative rights of the landowners. Deeds are construed as are other instruments; accordingly, the purpose of the court is to ascertain the intention of the parties. The primary source of the parties' intent is what is written within the four corners of the deed." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

 Atkinson v. Mentzel, 211 Wis. 2d 628, 638, 566 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Construction of the deed to determine the grant's terms and purposes is a question of law unless there is an ambiguity requiring resort to extrinsic evidence. Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law ...."); Hemmis v. Consol. Water Power & Paper Co., 173 Wis. 518, 521, 181 N.W. 743 (1921) ("... in construing deeds every word and clause is to be taken into consideration").

 Rikkers v. Ryan, 76 Wis. 2d 185, 188, 251 N.W.2d 25 (1977). The interpretation of the document is ordinarily a question of law without resort to extrinsic evidence.

 Majority op., ¶ 29.

 Contrary to the majority's assertion, reading the document as creating an easement only in water flowage rights does not disrupt the document's syntax. The sand removal rights may be reasonably read as a license rather than as an easement. It is well-established that licenses and easements may involve the same type or quantity of use. Furthermore, licenses may also be conveyed in written documents between the original parties and using language such as "grant." When coupled with a writing conveying an interest in land, such as the easement for flowage rights here, a written license may become an irrevocable license. This reasonably accounts for the parties' inclusion of the license in the 1977 document that also grants the easement in flowage rights. Thus, only a single easement is created — one easement, one license — which explains the title's reference to a singular "Easement for Flowage Rights."

 Schwartz v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc'y of Wis., 46 Wis. 2d 432, 438, 175 N.W.2d 225 (1970).

 Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 344, 254 N.W.2d 282 (1977).
"An easement is a permanent interest in another's land, with a right to enjoy it fully and without obstruction." Id. at 343 (quoted source omitted).

 Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 344, 254 N.W.2d 282 (1977).

 Polebitski v. John Week Lumber Co., 157 Wis. 377, 381, 147 N.W. 703 (1914).

 Laws of 1874, ch. 316, § 1.

 Wis. Stat. 1878, § 2208.

 1967 Wis. Stat. § 235.06.

 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.

 Wisconsin Statutes Annotated of 1878 provides:
Section 2206. In conveyances of lands, words of inheritance shall not be necessary to create or convey a fee and every grant of lands or any interest therein shall pass all the estate or interest of the grantor, unless the intent to pass a less estate or interest shall appear by express terms or be necessarily implied in the terms of such grant.

 The majority's reference to case law from other jurisdictions is inapposite. The statutes are not the same as Wis. Stat. § 706.10(3). The cases revolve around the words "heirs" or "assigns." The cases stand for the proposition that these words need not be used and that the intent of the parties controls. See, e.g., Karmuller v. Krotz, 18 Iowa 352 (1865) (holding that the use of the term "heirs" is not essential to make the right of way transferable; examine intent of parties); Brown v. Redfern, 541 S.W.2d 725 (Mo. 1976) (words "heirs" or "assigns" not required; examine intent of the parties as controlling to determine that *644an express easement was created where the deed required that the easement be appurtenant); Presbyterian Church of Osceola, Clarke County v. Harken, 158 N.W. 692 (Iowa 1916) (citing Karmuller v. Krotz to show that intent of the parties determines transferability of an interest in land; holding that the reservation at issue was an easement appurtenant where intended to benefit the remaining land, not the grantor personally).