Court Opinion

ID: 2964336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:09.949084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:36.524847
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2360

                                    DAVID ELWELL,

                                Petitioner-Appellant,

                                          v.

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                 Respondent-Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Joseph K. Kenyon with whom Stephen Weymouth was on brief for
            ________________           ________________
        appellant.
            George W. Vien, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Donald K. Stern,
            ______________                               _______________
        United States Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, was on brief for
        appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  September 9, 1996
                                 ____________________

         
                      CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.  David Elwell
                                ____________________

            appeals from the denial by the district court of his motion

            under 28 U.S.C.   2255 to vacate, set aside or correct the

            sentence it imposed following his conviction for drug-related

            offenses.  Elwell contends, inter alia, that the court made

            errors in determining the amount of cocaine to attribute to

            him for sentencing purposes.  

                          I.  Procedural and Factual History
                          I.  Procedural and Factual History

                      After a jury trial in the district court, Elwell

            was convicted on February 15, 1991, of one count of

            conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.  

            846; two substantive counts of possession of cocaine with

            intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.   841(a)(1);

            and one count of willfully subscribing to a false income tax

            return, in violation of 21 U.S.C.   7206(1).  He was

            sentenced to 78 months imprisonment concurrently on each of

            the drug counts, and 36 months on the tax count, to be served

            concurrently.  Elwell took a direct appeal to this court,

            which affirmed the judgment of the district court.  United
                                                                ______

            States v. Elwell, 984 F.2d 1289 (1st Cir. 1993), cert denied,
            ______    ______                                 ___________

            113 S. Ct. 2429 (1993).  He then brought the present motion

            under 28 U.S.C.   2255.  This was denied in a comprehensive

            opinion by the same judge who had sentenced him.  Elwell now

            appeals.  

                      The primary witness against Elwell at his criminal

            trial was Mark Polito, a cocaine addict turned government

            informant.  Polito testified to having purchased "an ounce--

            two ounces" from Richard Moretto every other week or so over

            a period of four to five months in the spring of 1988.  When

            Moretto had to report to prison in or around April 1988, he

            introduced Polito to his distributor, Hobart Willis.  Willis,

            in turn, put Polito in touch with Elwell, who managed Willis'

            "northern territory."  Elwell supplied Polito's cocaine needs

            throughout the summer of 1988.  Polito eventually fell into

            debt to Elwell because of his cocaine habit and, under

            pressure for payment, began to cooperate with law enforcement

            authorities.  While cooperating, Polito made two more cocaine

            purchases from Elwell, on November 17, 1988, and December 19,

            1988.  In a tape recorded statement, Elwell stated that

            Polito owed him "twenty-four somethin'."

                      Elwell's conviction was for the final two

            purchases, which amounted to a total of three ounces of

            cocaine.  At sentencing, the district court found that Elwell

            had also distributed an additional 20 ounces of cocaine to

            Polito during the course of the previous summer of 1988.  The

            court, therefore, attributed sales of over 500 grams to him

                                         -3-

            for purposes of determining the Base Offense Level.1  Polito

            testified at trial that he had purchased "18, maybe 20"

            ounces of cocaine from Elwell during the summer.  At

            sentencing, the judge stated, among other remarks,

                           What that [the rule allowing the
                      court to consider relevant information
                      without regard to its admissibility under
                      the rules of evidence] means to me is
                      that I can review all of the material I
                      have.  I can assess the credibility of
                      Mr. Polito, the evidence which tended to
                      corroborate Mr. Polito or contradict him,
                      the testimony of other participants, such
                      as Mr. Willis--not of the testimony, but
                      of the evidence that pertained to Mr.
                      Willis and Mr. Willis's connection with
                      Mr. Elwell, and make a decision as to the
                      disputed findings of fact.  I heard that
                      evidence.
                           Mr. Polito testified, in summary,
                      that he bought one or two ounces, one or
                      two ounces every week or every two weeks
                      from Mr. Moretto over a period of four to
                      five months.  I calculated that had to be
                      about 14 purchases, not every week but
                      for a period of 14 weeks, not 20 weeks
                      but 14 weeks of one to two ounces.  I
                      took the one to two ounces to be one and
                      a half ounces, and I added 14 purchases
                      to one and and [sic] a half ounces to 20
                      ounces.  That's a conclusion, a factual
                      conclusion I made.

                                
            ____________________

            1.  United States Sentencing Guidelines   1B1.3(a)(2)
            provides that in determining the Base Offense Level, the
            court shall include acts and omissions committed by the
            defendant as part of the same course of conduct or common
            scheme or plan as the offense of conviction when, inter alia,
            the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the
            total quantity of a substance involved.  See U.S.S.G.   
                                                     ___
            3D1.2(d).  U.S.S.G.   2D1.1(c)(7) provides for a Base Offense
            Level of 26 for unlawfully selling between 500 grams and two
            kilograms of cocaine in a continuing criminal enterprise.

                                         -4-

                      Appellant relies on the second paragraph of the

            judge's above statement to argue (1) that the judge

            improperly included cocaine sold by a co-conspirator before

            Elwell joined the conspiracy to arrive at the 23-ounce

            figure; and (2) that the judge improperly used averages to

            calculate the amount of cocaine sold by Elwell in purported

            violation of new case law, entitling Elwell to reopen this

            court's previous affirmance on direct appeal of his sentence. 

            Appellant further contends that the district court should

            have scrutinized more closely Polito's drug quantity

            estimates because of Polito's status as an addict-informant,

            and that appellant should receive reductions in his sentence

            for being a "minor participant" in the criminal activity in

            which he was involved and for "acceptance of responsibility"

            under U.S.S.G.    3B1.2(b) and 3E1.1.2

                                         II.
                                         II.

            A.   Inclusion of Cocaine Sold by a Co-conspirator
                 _____________________________________________

                      In arguing that the judge improperly enlarged

            Elwell's offense level by counting cocaine sold earlier by a

            co-conspirator, appellant relies upon a November 1, 1994

                                
            ____________________

            2.  The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide for a
            two-level decrease in the defendant's Base Offense Level if
            he or she was a minor participant in the criminal activity. 
            The Guidelines also provide for a two-level decrease if the
            defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
            for his or her offense.

                                         -5-

            amendment to the Application Notes of U.S.S.G.   1B1.3 which

            states, "A defendant's relevant conduct does not include the

            conduct of members of a conspiracy prior to the defendant

            joining the conspiracy, even if the defendant knows of that

            conduct. . . "  U.S.S.G.   1B1.3, comment. (n.2).     

                      The government correctly points out, however, that

            the total amount of cocaine counted by the district court as

            relevant conduct for sentencing purposes did not include

            amounts sold earlier to Polito by Moretto.  Rather the court

            arrived at its finding that Elwell had sold 20 ounces in

            addition to the three ounces underlying his conviction from

            Polito's sworn testimony of having purchased "18, maybe 20"

            ounces of cocaine from Elwell in the summer of 1988.3  Hence

            there is no occasion to consider the law relative to a co-

            conspirator's drug sales.  

                      It is true, as earlier mentioned, that the court

            also referred to Polito's testimony about cocaine purchases

            from Moretto earlier that spring, over a four to five month

            period.  But the judge's language in doing so suggests that

            the court was discussing the prior transactions simply as

            part of its assessment of the overall credibility of Polito's

                                
            ____________________

            3.  As this court pointed out on direct appeal, since even
            the low-end figure of 18 ounces is 504 grams, exceeding the
            Guidelines' 500 gram minimum for the sentence in issue, the
            court's finding of 20 ounces rather than 18 is of no
            consequence.  Elwell, 984 F.2d at 1297.  Elwell makes no
                          ______
            argument based on the two-ounce difference.

                                         -6-

            testimony, comparing the amounts earlier purchased from

            Moretto with the "18, maybe 20" ounces Polito claimed to have

            bought from Elwell within a comparable time frame.  This

            interpretation dove-tails with the district court's finding

            at sentencing, "I conclude that Mr. Elwell distributed at
                                            __________

            least 20 ounces of cocaine to the witness . . . during the
                                                            __________

            summer of 1988 . . . "  (Emphasis supplied).  Had the court
            ______________

            meant that some or all of the 20 ounces came from Moretto, it

            would not have said that "Mr. Elwell distributed at least 20
                                      __________

            ounces . . .", nor would it have referred to sales in the

            summer, rather than the spring, of 1988.  

                      That this was what the court meant was confirmed by

            the trial judge himself in his opinion disposing of Elwell's

            motion under   2255.  The judge flatly stated, "I was

            referring to the twenty ounces which Elwell sold directly to

            Polito."  This court earlier reached the same conclusion when

            deciding Elwell's direct appeal, i.e. we stated that the

            district court's findings were based upon cocaine Elwell sold
                                                              ______

            during the summer of 1988.  Elwell, 984 F.2d at 1297-98.  
            _________________________   ______

                      As the district court rested its finding of 23

            ounces on amounts sold by Elwell in the summer and fall, not

            amounts sold earlier to Polito by another supplier, we see no

            merit in appellant's contention that the district court

            violated the November 1, 1994 amendment to the Application

            Notes of U.S.S.G.   1B1.3.

                                         -7-

                      Appellant also seems to argue that the events which

            occurred before he personally sold drugs to Polito may not be

            considered even for background corroborative and credibility

            purposes.  We disagree.  United States Sentencing Guidelines

              6A1.3(a) provides, in part, "In resolving any reasonable

            dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing

            determination, the court may consider relevant information

            without regard to its admissibility under the rules of

            evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information

            has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable

            accuracy."  While the Moretto sales, standing alone, would be

            inadequate to establish the amounts Elwell later sold, they

            have some general relevance to Polito's testimony of the

            specific amounts he purchased from Elwell, since they help

            show the pattern of Polito's purchases during the year.

                      It is commonplace that a conspiracy's past

            activities may be considered at sentencing for various

            purposes, e.g., to determine the volume of drugs a late-

            joining co-conspirator reasonably foresaw would be sold by

            the conspiracy in the future.  United States v. O'Campo, 973
                                           _____________    _______

            F.2d 1015, 1025-26 & 1024-25 n.9 (1st Cir. 1992).  See also
                                                               ________

            United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1236 (5th Cir. 1994);
            _____________    _______

            United States v. Madkins, 14 F.3d 277, 279 n.10 (5th Cir.
            _____________    _______

            1994); United States v. Patriarca, 912 F. Supp. 596, 606, 610
                   _____________    _________

            (D. Mass. 1995).  Here, the frequency and quantity of drugs

                                         -8-

            previously purchased by Polito, before Elwell began to supply

            him, helped verify the amounts later said to have been

            furnished by Elwell, since it might be thought that Polito's

            requirements and habits would remain somewhat consistent over

            time.

            B.   The Use of Averages to Calculate Amounts
                 ________________________________________

                      Elwell complains that the district court wrongly

            used "averaging" in holding him responsible for the sale of

            23 ounces. He bases this argument on the district court's

            quoted review of the sales by Moretto to Polito in which the

            judge indicated that the amounts sold each time averaged out

            to one and one-half ounces.  Elwell also finds fault with the

            court's estimates of the frequency of Moretto's sales.  

                      As already pointed out, however, the district

            court's finding of 23 ounces does not rest upon Moretto's

            previous sales to Polito but rather is based on Polito's

            testimony that he had purchased "18, maybe 20" ounces of

            cocaine from Elwell in the summer of 1988 (and, in addition,

            on evidence of the three ounces sold by Elwell to Polito in

            November and December of that year).  This evidence of summer

            sales was not the product of averaging nor did it call for

            averaging.  It is true that the court also made certain

            inferences about the earlier transactions with Moretto, 

            including the average quantities purchased, but as we have

            indicated, the court did so merely to assist in its overall

                                         -9-

            evaluation of Polito's testimony concerning Elwell's own

            sales to him, upon which the finding of 23 ounces was based.

                      Elwell argues also that the deductions the court

            drew from the Moretto evidence were flawed, leading it to

            attribute too much cocaine to this earlier period, and to err

            in believing that these previous sales corroborated the

            quantities attributed to Elwell in the latter period.  The

            short answer to this argument is that Elwell is not entitled

            on collateral review to relitigate issues raised on direct

            appeal, absent an intervening change in the law.  Davis v.
                                                              _____

            United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342 (1974) (holding that a  
            _____________

            2255 hearing is permitted on an issue previously addressed on

            direct appeal when there has been an intervening change in

            the law).  Cf. Singleton v. United States, 26 F.3d 233, 240
                       ___ _________    _____________

            (1st Cir. 1993) ("'[I]ssues disposed of in a prior appeal

            will not be reviewed again by way of a 28 U.S.C.   2255

            motion.'" (quoting Dirring v. United States, 370 F.2d 862,
                               _______    _____________

            864 (1st Cir. 1967))), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 517 (1994);
                                   ____________

            United States v. Michaud, 901 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1990) ("We
            _____________    _______

            note that certain other claims raised in the   2255 motion

            were decided on direct appeal and may not be relitigated

            under a different label on collateral review.").  Likewise,

            Elwell is not entitled to relitigate issues that could have

            been raised on direct appeal, but were not, absent a showing

            of cause excusing the default and actual prejudice resulting

                                         -10-

            from the error of which he complains.  See United States v.
                                                   ___ _____________

            Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982); Suveges v. United States,
            _____                               _______    _____________

            7 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a party must show

            cause and prejudice to raise an objection not argued on

            direct appeal in a   2255 motion (citing Frady)).  Elwell
                                                     _____

            vigorously argued on direct appeal that the 20 ounces

            attributed to him was unsupported and too high; this court

            considered those arguments expressly, and to the extent he

            now seeks to repeat and embellish these contentions, he has

            failed to show cause for being allowed to do so.

                      In particular, there is nothing to Elwell's

            argument that two cases decided by this court, United States
                                                           _____________

            v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
               _________                                ____________

            S. Ct. 2714 (1994) and United States v. Welch, 15 F.3d 1202
                                   _____________    _____

            (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1161 and 114 S. Ct.
                             ____________

            1863, have so changed the law since Elwell's direct appeal as

            to warrant the reopening of our earlier affirmance of

            Elwell's sentence on direct appeal.    

                      This court did not rule in Sepulveda and Welch that
                                                 _________     _____

            averaging was no longer permissible.  We merely held in the

            circumstances of those cases that the particular calculations

            used, based on very broadly based averages, were

            insufficiently precise to determine the amount of drugs used. 

            In later cases, where averages were taken from ranges with

            tighter margins, we accepted their use.  See, e.g., United
                                                     ___  ____  ______

                                         -11-

            States v. Webster, 54 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1995).  In the
            ______    _______

            present case, unlike Sepulveda and Welch, the main evidence
                                 _________     _____

            upon which the court relied    Polito's testimony as to the

            amounts Elwell sold him in the summer of 1988    did not

            involve averaging at all.  The averaging employed related

            merely to Moretto's earlier sales, discussed for purposes of

            analogy only.  The one and a half ounce average, moreover,

            fell arguably within tight margins, although we need not get

            into this in order to conclude that Sepulveda and Welch did
                                                _________     _____

            not alter the law applicable on direct appeal.  This being

            so, Elwell may not relitigate collaterally his challenge to

            the sufficiency of the evidence on which his Base Offense

            Level rests.  See Singleton, 26 F.3d at 240.  
                          ___ _________

            C.   Reliance on Addict-Informant Witnesses
                 ______________________________________

                      In his third claim of error, Elwell contends that

            the district court should have more carefully scrutinized

            Polito's testimony because of his status as an addict-

            informant.

                      This argument was litigated and rejected in

            Polito's direct appeal.  Elwell, 984 F.2d at 1297-98.  As
                                     ______

            explained in Part B, above, relitigation of the issue is thus

            barred unless there has been an intervening change in the

            law.  See Singleton, 26 F.3d at 240.
                  ___ _________

                      In support of his contention that there has been

            such a change, Elwell points to several recent decisions in

                                         -12-

            other circuits which have imposed a "heightened standard of

            scrutiny" on testimony by drug addicts who are cooperating

            with the government.  See United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d
                                  ___ _____________    _____

            1428, 1435 (7th Cir. 1994); Miele, 989 F.2d at 666-68; United
                                        _____                      ______

            States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 776 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.
            ______    _______                                     _____

            denied, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992); United States v. Robison, 904
            ______                        _____________    _______

            F.2d 365, 371-72 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 946
                                              ____________

            (1990).  See also United States v. Richards, 27 F.3d 465, 469
                     ________ _____________    ________

            n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting this line of cases but

            expressing neither agreement nor disagreement).  But see
                                                             _______

            United States v. Browning, 61 F.3d 752, 755 n.2 (10th Cir.
            _____________    ________

            1995) (distinguishing the Simmons line of cases on their
                                      _______

            facts as dealing only with addict-informants whose testimony

            contradicted itself and/or who admitted to hazy memories).  

                      Whether or not the law can be said to have changed

            in other circuits, this circuit has not adopted such a rule

            of heightened scrutiny, nor are we aware of any recent

            congressional enactments or pronouncements by the Supreme

            Court making an alteration in the law in such instances.  In

            Webster, we allowed the district court to base its sentence
            _______

            on the testimony of a witness who was "an admitted perjurer,

            a drug user, and a turncoat who received a substantially

            reduced sentence for implicating others."  Webster, 54 F.3d
                                                       _______

                                         -13-

            at 5.  We concluded that the trial judge was able to make the

            requisite credibility assessments concerning that witness.4  

            D.   Minor Participant and Acceptance of Responsibility
                 __________________________________________________
                 Reductions
                 __________

                      In appellant's fourth point of error, he argues

            that, should he prevail on any of his previous three points

            of error, he should receive a reduction in his sentence for

            being a minor participant in the conspiracy and for accepting

            responsibility for the amount of cocaine he distributed.  We

            find little merit in these arguments on their face, but since

            we reject Elwell's first three points of error, they are in

            any case moot.

                      Affirmed.
                      ________

             

                                
            ____________________

            4.   We add that the mere movement of one or more other
            circuits towards heightened scrutiny in certain cases would
            not amount to intervening new law which would allow Elwell to
            relitigate an issue already decided by this court on direct
            appeal.  Both Simmons and Robison, upon which Elwell in part
                          _______     _______
            relies, were, moreover, decided before the direct appeal in
            this case was argued.

                                         -14-