Court Opinion

ID: 9582137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:22:57.71815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:28.649277
License: Public Domain

CRIPPEN, Judge
(concurring specially)
I concur in the opinion of Judge Randall but with these additional statements on the case.
1. Governing law
The majority agrees on the proposition at the root of this decision, that State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540 (Minn.1996) must not be unreasonably read and applied.
At least in those cases where the defendant has been found guilty of a criminal *291act,2 the trial court has lawful authority to stay the ultimate adjudication of guilt in special circumstances demonstrating that this action is in the “furtherance of justice.” State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn.1996).
Krotzer recognized the special circumstances confronted in that case and found it significant that the trial court strongly disagreed with the prosecution’s view on the disposition of the case. Id. at 254. The court said little more to suggest the appropriate level of deference the reviewing court should give to the trial court’s determination on the justice of the case. Foss ratifies the notion, evident in Krotzer, that the reviewing court will upset a judgment reflecting “mere disagreement” of the trial court and the prosecutor. Foss, 556 N.W.2d at 541. The stay of adjudication should not be a routine practice but a remedy employed “sparingly.” Id.
To these general but meaningful concepts, Foss suggested another: the stay of adjudication should be employed only for injustices resulting from the prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion “in the exercise of the charging function.” Id. In the aftermath of Foss, this statement has been read persistently as a reference to prosecutorial discretion in assessing whether the state had sufficient evidence to prove that an offense had occurred. But the weight of evidence supporting a charge is largely beside the point when considering the cause for staying an adjudication, as it no doubt was in Krotzer and the subsequent cases that address the same issue. ' What was at issue in those cases was whether the trial court had cause to strongly question whether the prosecution erred in its insistence that a conviction be recorded, perhaps when it brought the charges — as might be the case when a compelling, existing alternative was disregarded — but more commonly when the case advanced to the point where an adjudication and disposition might occur.
The authority of Krotzer, never subsequently corrected, extends to cases where the prosecutor abuses its executive discretion by rigidly objecting to a disposition without adjudication of the offense, where the trial court is empowered to act differently if the .special circumstances of the case permit the court’s strong conviction that this is in the furtherance of justice. We should not employ a distorted reading of Foss to create instead an unbridled discretion of prosecutors. I concur with the conclusion of Judge Randall that an executive veto power seriously infringes on the judicial role of pursuing justice under the rule of law.
2. Standard of review
Neither Krotzer nor Foss, nor their progeny, make evident the appropriate standard of review for the appellate courts: the deference that should extend to the trial court in cases of this kind. The majority agrees that these are sentencing decisions, a classification that bears on the standard of review and on jurisdictional topics that have been addressed in earlier minority opinions. Perhaps this suggests, as Judge Randall concludes, a “limited” standard of review. Perhaps, when applied alongside the search for circumstances that are special that permit the trial court’s strong disagreement with the prosecutor and on practices that are not just routine, a more probing appellate review should be employed. An explicit identification of the standard of review is not necessary for purposes of this case, as it was not in Krotzer. The circumstances of this matter are unique and support the trial court’s strong conviction that an adjudication should not occur if respondent abides by stated conditions. The trial court has given what the law does not *292always guarantee, a just solution to a tragic problem. We would do otherwise if we did not affirm the trial court’s decision.

. A "stay of adjudication" may occur before the determination of guilt, at least in circumstances where Lhe defendant waives the right to an early adjudication of the case. The matter is conditionally laid on the table for a later dismissal in the interests of justice. The peculiar characteristics of this form of stay, to my knowledge, have not been addressed by Krotzer and its progeny.