Court Opinion

ID: 9928835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 23:02:38.824888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:36.584054
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2024-0071
                  _____________________________

DANIEL JULIO DOMINGUEZ,

    Petitioner,

    v.

MAJOR JEFF CLOUTIER, Director,
Alachua County Department of
the Jail,

    Respondent.
                  _____________________________

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—Original Jurisdiction.

                        January 31, 2024

     ON EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

PER CURIAM.

     Having reviewed Respondent’s return, it is the judgment of
the Court that Petitioner shall be released on Monday, February
5, 2024, at noon, unless the trial court enters an order setting
reasonable conditions of pretrial release or conducts further
proceedings and enters an order under section 907.041(5)(c),
Florida Statutes. No costs or charges are awarded to either party.

LEWIS and LONG, JJ., concur; RAY, J., concurs with opinion.
                   _____________________________

    No Motions for Rehearing will be permitted.

                   _____________________________

RAY, J., concurs with opinion.

     The Florida Constitution guarantees that a presumptively
innocent individual will be released prior to trial on reasonable
conditions. Art. I, § 14, Fla. Const. Because the petitioner is not
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life in
prison, the only exception to this guarantee is if a court finds that
no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably protect the
community, ensure the presence of the accused, or ensure the
integrity of the judicial process. See id. That has not occurred. Yet,
the petitioner has been detained indefinitely based on nothing
more than an arrest on probable cause. I therefore concur with the
decision to order the petitioner’s release unless the trial court
enters an order setting reasonable conditions of pretrial release or
conducts further proceedings and enters an order containing
findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting pretrial
detention.

     The Florida Legislature has implemented the constitutional
right to pretrial release by statute, and the Florida Supreme Court
has adopted procedural rules for pretrial release determinations.
See §§ 907.041, 903.046, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.131, 3.132.
For non-dangerous crimes, there is a presumption of release on
nonmonetary conditions. § 907.041(3)(a), Fla. Stat. For dangerous
crimes, a monetary condition is required at first appearance upon
the finding of probable cause. § 907.041(5)(b), Fla. Stat. In both
situations, the court must consider a variety of factors to
determine whether nonmonetary conditions, monetary conditions,
or a combination of both will protect the community against
unreasonable danger from the defendant, ensure the return of the
defendant, and ensure the integrity of the judicial process. See
§ 907.041(3)(a), Fla. Stat.; § 903.046(2)(a)–(m), Fla. Stat. (listing
factors); § 903.047(1)(a)–(c), Fla. Stat. (listing conditions of pretrial
release). If the court determines that no conditions of release will
accomplish these objectives and the statutory criteria for pretrial

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detention are otherwise satisfied, the court must enter an order of
detention supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law. See
§ 907.041(5)(k), Fla. Stat.

     More to the point here, without an order of detention, the
court must set reasonable conditions that will put the accused out
on bail (read: release pending trial). There is a legislative
expectation, consistent with the constitutional guarantee of
pretrial release, that a person will not be imprisoned prior to trial
without a determination by a court that there are no conditions of
release that could reasonably protect the community, ensure the
presence of the accused, or ensure the integrity of the judicial
process.

     Here, the State did not seek pretrial detention and there is no
order of detention. Instead, the trial court granted the petitioner
pretrial release with conditions including restrictions on travel, a
prohibition on the possession of weapons or firearms, GPS
monitoring, and a $500,000 bond. As to the financial condition, the
undisputed evidence showed that the petitioner cannot afford that
amount. The petitioner testified that he was not working prior to
being arrested and does not have any income or real property. He
said that he does have a “small amount of savings, about $15,000,”
and a small scooter, worth $1,500 at most, if sold. His parents
testified that unless they sold their house, all they could contribute
was $10,000. The State chose not to cross-examine the petitioner
or offer contradictory evidence about his financial condition. Thus,
the most we know is that the petitioner and his family can only
come up with $25,000 or a $250,000 bond. 1

     While this court has previously stated that monetary bail is
not per se excessive or unreasonable simply because the accused is
unable to pay it, Dyson v. Campbell, 921 So. 2d 692, 693 (Fla. 1st

    1 Lest there be any concern that defendants have no incentive

to fully disclose their financial condition in bail determination
proceedings, there are consequences for a lack of candor. See
§ 903.035(3), Fla. Stat. (making it a crime to intentionally provide
false or misleading material information or intentionally omit
material information in connection with an application for bail or
for modification of bail).

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DCA 2006), there is nothing in this record to explain how the trial
court reached the $500,000 amount. By ordering pretrial release,
but then conditioning that release on an amount that is not even
remotely close to what the petitioner can afford, the court has
converted a condition of release into a jail term without the State
or the court meeting their respective obligations under the pretrial
detention scheme. See Mendenhall v. Sweat, 158 So. 280, 281–82
(Fla. 1934) (“Where a petitioner . . . is entitled to bail he is entitled
to be released on bail in a reasonable amount, and in such case the
amount of bail should not be fixed in so excessive an amount as to
preclude the probability of an ordinary citizen in like
circumstances and conditions as those of the accused being able to
furnish, after taking into consideration the gravity of the charge.”);
cf. Rogers v. State, 966 So. 2d 490, 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
(denying habeas petition alleging unaffordable bail because the
defendant failed to present evidence to the trial court that the
amount of bail was beyond his ability to meet).

     In defense of the monetary bail amount, the State argues that
a defendant’s financial resources are only one of the factors a trial
court must consider when determining what conditions of release
will ensure the defendant’s appearance in court and protect the
public from risk of harm. See § 903.046, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.131(b)(3). I do not disagree. The statute and procedural rule set
forth a comprehensive list of factors for the court to consider, and
it appears that the court carefully considered those factors. Given
the seriousness of the charge against the petitioner and other
considerations, the court was justifiably concerned about placing
the community at risk of harm through the petitioner’s release.
But while the court has wide discretion in fashioning appropriate
conditions of release—after it makes the threshold determination
to release the accused—it must stop short of imposing a
requirement that simply cannot be met. 2

     2 It is worth noting that monetary bail, by itself, does not
protect the community from risk of harm because funds posted to
satisfy such a condition will not be forfeited in the event the
accused commits a new crime following release. See § 903.26(2)(a),
Fla. Stat. (governing when and how bonds are forfeited).

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     The concern of trial judges about the possibility of releasing
someone who is dangerous or likely to flee is understandable. It
therefore bears repeating that “[i]f no conditions of release can
reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to
persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the
integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained.” Art.
I, § 14, Fla. Const. The process for achieving pretrial detention is
clear and specific. But the pretrial detention statute cannot be
circumvented through the imposition of an unachievable condition
of release.

     For these reasons, the petitioner is being illegally detained. I
agree with the decision to order his release unless the trial court
enters an order setting reasonable conditions of pretrial release or
conducts further proceedings and enters an order pursuant to
section 907.041(5) of the Florida Statutes.

                  _____________________________

Stacy A. Scott, Public Defender, and Alexis J. Giannasoli,
Assistant Public Defender, Gainesville, for Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Zachary Lawton, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee; Brian Stuart Kramer, State
Attorney, Gainesville, for Respondent.

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