Court Opinion

ID: 9647188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:26:04.627652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:46.389029
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellants complain that we failed to address a contention raised in their first point of error, which stated that the “trial court erred in dismissing the cause of action against appellee Crow for misrepresentation of fact and failing to submit issues to the jury with regard to such action.” We found no ruling in the record indicating that the trial court dismissed appellants’ action for fraud, and therefore interpreted the point as complaining of the failure to submit special issues on that ground of recovery. Appellants insist on rehearing that this point complained of the dismissal of their fraud action.
Assuming that the trial court so ruled, it would not have erred in dismissing the fraud cause of action. As a matter of law, Crow owed appellants no affirmative duty to disclose its intention to insist upon the lease provision requiring Tempo to obtain its written approval before erecting its sign. A failure to disclose information is not fraudulent unless one has an affirmative duty to disclose, such as where a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between the parties, Richman Trusts v. Kutner, 504 S.W.2d 539, 543-44 (Tex. Civ.App.—Dallas 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.), or where a party later learns that previous affirmative representations are in fact false. Susanoil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 519 S.W.2d 230, 236 (Tex.Civ.App.— San Antonio 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Appellants, through their attorney, admitted in the hearing on Crow’s special exceptions that Crow never made any representation regarding whether it would object to Tempo’s use of the sign. Further, the mere contractual relationship between a lessor and lessee does not impose upon the lessor an affirmative duty to disclose. In American Marine Upholstery v. Minsky, 433 S.W.2d 717, 719-20 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court held that there was no liability for fraud when the lessor does not disclose information concerning the property. Therefore, we hold that Crow was not liable to appellants for fraud as a matter of law. We expressly do not reach questions of waiver and estoppel as they have not been presented for appellate review. The motion for rehearing is overrruled.