Court Opinion

ID: 9915558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 18:11:25.691807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:55.433795
License: Public Domain

01/05/2024

        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                        Assigned on Briefs December 12, 2023

        PEDRO IGNACIO HERNANDEZ v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
                     No. 2011-A-525    Monte Watkins, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                            No. M2023-00796-CCA-R3-PC
                        ___________________________________

The petitioner, Pedro Ignacio Hernandez, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition,
arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of
counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of
the petition.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR.,
and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

Manuel B. Russ, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Pedro Ignacio Hernandez.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Roger D. Moore,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                         OPINION

                              Facts and Procedural History

       On direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts surrounding the petitioner’s
convictions for three counts of rape of a child, one count of attempted rape of a child, and
five counts of aggravated sexual battery, as follows:

              [T]he 12-year-old victim testified that she was born on January 11,
       2001, and that she lived with her parents, her sister, her brother, and a friend
of her father, Hector Hernandez, and Mr. Hernandez’s family. She said that
in addition to those mentioned, the [petitioner] had also lived with her family
when they lived [on] Canyon Ridge in Nashville. The victim recalled that
when she was nine and a half years old, she reported to her school counselor
that the [petitioner] had been “touching” her inappropriately. She said that
the [petitioner] touched her in “the front where [her] private part; and like the
back; and, [her] neck.” Utilizing a drawing of a “[l]ittle girl who is naked,”
the victim circled the parts of her body that the [petitioner] had touched.

        The victim recalled that on the day that she reported the touching to
her school counselor, her little sister saw the [petitioner] pull the victim into
his room, and the victim became “scared that he was going to do something
to her too.” She said that after pulling her into his room on that day, the
[petitioner] tried to touch her “[f]ront part” and tried to pull her pants down,
but she “kept on moving around.” She said that there was “[a] little bit” of
contact between the [petitioner’s] hand and the “[o]utside” of her “[f]ront
part.” She indicated this location for the jury but did not mark it on the
drawing.

        The victim testified that on another occasion, the [petitioner] forced
her onto the bed, and she then fell onto the floor because he had pulled her
pants down, and she “couldn’t get up.” She said that he pushed her down
and held her wrists. She said that she saw the [petitioner’s] penis but that it
did not touch her on that day. The [petitioner] did, however, touch the
“outside” of her “private” with his hand. She recalled that “white stuff” came
“out of his private and it got on [her] hand.” She said that she thought the
[petitioner] used a towel to “wipe it off” and that she “ran into the restroom”
to wash her hands. She said that before the white stuff came out of the
[petitioner’s] “private,” the [petitioner] “was trying to put [his penis] on [her]
face,” but she “elbowed him and then [she] ran.” She also recalled that before
the white stuff came out, the [petitioner] had been trying to put his penis into
her vagina. She said that while she was in the floor, the [petitioner] pulled
her pants down and “sticked it in there, but, like, only . . . on the . . . outside.”
She said that the [petitioner’s] penis went “inside, but not like . . . deep
inside.” She said that the [petitioner] was “[m]oving back and forth.”

       The victim recalled another occasion when the [petitioner] placed his
penis between her “butt cheeks” and moved it back and forth. She could not
recall whether the [petitioner] ejaculated on that occasion.

                                        -2-
       The victim testified that on another occasion the [petitioner] kissed
her “[i]nside that line” on the drawing of the girl. Again, she indicated the
location for the jury but did not mark it on the drawing.

       The victim also recalled an occasion when the [petitioner] “grabbed
[her] and pushed [her] in his room” and then “threw [her] down on the bed,
and then he just - - like, his hand was touching down in [her] private part.”
She indicated the location on the drawing as “[o]utside of the line.”

       The victim recalled another incident when the [petitioner] “just started
touching [her] right in the front part.”

        She recalled that on another occasion the [petitioner] “barely”
penetrated her “private part” with his penis before going to the closet to wipe
“white stuff” on a red towel. She tried to differentiate yet another incident
by demonstrating the relative positions of their bodies when the [petitioner]
penetrated her vagina with his penis. On that occasion, she said, nothing
came out of the [petitioner’s] penis. She clarified that she only saw the
[petitioner] wipe the “white stuff” with the red towel one time.

        The victim testified that on another occasion, the unclothed
[petitioner] climbed on top of her while she was clothed and began “moving
back and forth.” She said, “I kept moving my hand and then, like, the next
thing I know when I saw my hand it had that white stuff on it.”

       She said that on another occasion when the [petitioner] had a “Dora
blanket” on his bed, the [petitioner] got on top of her and “started kissing
[her] neck.” She said that the blanket was on the [petitioner’s] bed all the
time. She said that she knew some of the “white stuff” got onto the blanket
because it left a “sticky” “white mark.”

       She said that in addition to the offenses about which she had testified,
the [petitioner] had touched her inappropriately “[p]robably two more
times.” She said she could not remember specifically what had happened on
those occasions.

       The victim testified that all of the incidents happened when her
parents were not home. She recalled one occasion when her sister might have
seen the [petitioner] assaulting her. On that occasion the [petitioner] rubbed
his penis against her body while she was clothed.

                                     -3-
       The victim said that she sometimes went into the [petitioner’s] room
to watch television before the touching began but that she did not go into that
room after the assaults began. On one occasion when she was in his room
watching television, the [petitioner] came into the room and began touching
her waist and hip and kissing her neck.

       The victim testified that on one occasion, the [petitioner] showed her
a photograph of his genitalia on his cellular telephone. She could not recall
when he had shown her the picture, where she was when she saw it, or what
she was doing when she saw it.

       The victim testified that she did not report the abuse because she “got
scared that he was going to do something to” her. She admitted that she had
no reason to believe that the [petitioner] would hurt her, saying, “I just
thought he would do something.” The victim testified that she did not share
any of the details of the abuse with her mother because “it’s embarrassing”
and because she was “just scared.”

        Hollye Gallion, a pediatric nurse practitioner and the clinical director
of the Our Kids Center in Nashville, testified as an expert in pediatric nursing
and forensic examinations. She examined the victim on December 1, 2010.
The victim told her, “This man who lives in my house, Pedro. He took me
in his room and he locked the door, and he put his thing in my thing. And I
kicked him in his stomach. And I pulled my pants up and ran away. It
happened Monday afternoon.” The victim reported that the [petitioner] had
placed his hand on the inside of her “private” and that the abuse had occurred
once a week for the six weeks prior to December 1, 2010. The victim’s
mother reported that in September 2010, the victim “had had an episode of
genital bleeding and a rash” and had been “treated for a urinary trac[t]
infection.” The victim’s mother also reported to Ms. Gallion that the victim
had recently begun to complain “of pain with urination, again, and . . . a rash
in her genital area.” Ms. Gallion opined that there was no direct correlation
between sexual activity and a urinary tract infection.

       An anogenital examination of the victim revealed “a little superficial
crack, or tear, in the skin on the inside of the left labia,” “some areas of
redness” adjacent to the victim’s hymen, and “a little area of purplish color
around the urethra.” Ms. Gallion said that there was no injury or signs of
trauma to the victim’s hymen. Ms. Gallion noted that redness in the genital
area was not uncommon in children due to their poor hygiene habits. She
said that the injury to the victim’s labia could be consistent with an injury
                                     -4-
due to friction but that the discolored area around her urethra was a normal
part of the victim’s anatomy rather than a sign of trauma. Ms. Gallion said
that it was not her job to opine whether the victim was or was not sexually
abused.

        Metropolitan Police Department (“Metro”) Detective Eric Fitzgerald
testified that he began investigating this case when contacted by the victim’s
school counselor. In that initial referral, Detective Fitzgerald learned “[t]hat
a family friend had been doing things to [the victim], sexual things to her.”
After conducting a brief interview of the victim and her mother to ascertain
“the basics” of the victim’s claim, Detective Fitzgerald sent the victim for a
forensic interview at the Child Advocacy Center. During the brief initial
interview, Detective Fitzgerald suggested that someone in the victim’s
family wear “a body wire” to try to extract a confession from the [petitioner].
He recalled that the victim’s mother was “indifferent” to the suggestion of a
body wire and indicated a preference for accompanying the victim to the
medical examination.

       Detective Fitzgerald said that he and Officer Gilbert Ramirez, who
spoke Spanish, contacted the victim’s father and asked him to wear the body
wire, and he agreed. Detective Fitzgerald explained that neither of the
victim’s parents spoke English and that Officer Ramirez worked as a
translator. Detective Fitzgerald said that the victim’s father, while fitted with
audio recording equipment, tried to elicit a confession from the [petitioner]
but was unsuccessful. Detective Fitzgerald testified that he had previously
instructed the victim’s father to ask the [petitioner] to leave if he did not
confess to the abuse. He said that he and Officer Ramirez waited outside to
intercept the [petitioner] after the victim’s father ordered him out of the
house. At that point, they asked the [petitioner] if he would come to the
police department for an interview, and he agreed. Officer Ramirez
transported the [petitioner] to the police station in a patrol car.

        Detective Fitzgerald interviewed the [petitioner], with Officer
Ramirez acting as an interpreter. A video recording of the interview, in
which the [petitioner] spoke exclusively in Spanish and Officer Ramirez
spoke primarily in Spanish, was played for the jury. The jury was also
provided with a transcript that the parties had agreed was an accurate
translation of the video. The transcript itself, which was prepared by a court
certified interpreter, was made an exhibit. During the interview, the
[petitioner] acknowledged having had sex with the victim, claiming that she
had come into his room naked and demanded that he have sex with her. He
                                      -5-
said that the victim threatened to tell her father if he did not comply and that
he felt as though she was in a position of power because she could speak
English and he could not. Detective Fitzgerald acknowledged that during the
interview, he attempted to “minimize what the offense is and, kind of, present
it in a light that it’s not nearly as serious as someone would think it might
be” in order to make the [petitioner] “feel a little more comfortable . . . and .
. . open up a little bit.”

       Detective Fitzgerald said that he collected the rape kit from the Our
Kids Center. From the [petitioner’s] bedroom, he collected a Dora blanket,
a blue towel, and a red towel. He took the items to the Metro property room
and filled out a request that the items be sent to the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation (“TBI”) for testing. He also submitted the buccal swabs that
he obtained from the [petitioner] and the victim for deoxyribonucleic acid
(“DNA”) testing.

       During cross-examination, Detective Fitzgerald acknowledged that he
did not interview the other adults who lived in the house with the [petitioner]
and the victim and that he did not collect the victim’s clothing from her
hamper. Detective Fitzgerald conceded that although the [petitioner’s] DNA
was located on the towels and blanket taken from the [petitioner’s] room, the
victim’s DNA was not. He acknowledged that he collected the [petitioner’s]
cellular telephone but did not find a photograph of the [petitioner’s] genitalia
on the telephone.

        TBI Special Agent and Forensic Scientist Doctor Laura Boos testified
that testing performed on the Dora blanket confirmed the presence of semen
and sperm and that DNA analysis confirmed that the [petitioner] was the
contributor. The blue towel was negative for the presence of semen, but
testing confirmed the presence of the [petitioner’s] semen and sperm on the
red towel. Doctor Boos testified that she did not find the victim’s DNA on
either of the towels or on the blanket.

       During cross-examination, Doctor Boos acknowledged that the labial
swab taken from the victim was negative for the presence of semen or sperm.

       Officer Gilbert Ramirez testified that he utilized his experience in
working with members of the Hispanic community when acting as an
interpreter during the [petitioner’s] interrogation. He said that he tried to
ensure that the [petitioner] understood what he was talking about before
moving on to the next question. He stated that on “several” occasions, the
                                      -6-
       [petitioner] appeared “a little puzzled,” so Officer Ramirez took extra time
       to make sure that the [petitioner] understood. He said that he felt confident
       in his interaction with the [petitioner].

       ....

              Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury returned verdicts
       of guilty as charged of rape of a child in counts one, four, and five and of
       aggravated sexual battery in counts eleven, twelve, thirteen, and fifteen. The
       jury convicted the [petitioner] of the lesser included offenses of attempted
       rape of a child in count two and aggravated sexual battery in count three. The
       jury found the [petitioner] not guilty in counts six, seven, and fourteen. The
       jury was unable to reach a verdict in count eight, and the trial court declared
       a mistrial as to that count.

              Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of
       28 years for each of the [petitioner’s] convictions of rape of a child and
       ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. The trial court imposed
       a sentence of 10 years each for the [petitioner’s] convictions of aggravated
       sexual battery and a sentence of 10 years for his conviction of attempted rape
       of a child. The court ordered that the 10-year sentences for attempted rape
       of a child and aggravated sexual battery be served concurrently with each
       other and concurrently with the sentences imposed for the convictions of rape
       of a child. The total effective sentence is, therefore, 84 years.

State v. Hernandez, No. M2013-01321-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3740028, at *1-7 (Tenn.
Crim. App. July 29, 2014), perm. app. denied, designated not for citation (Tenn. Dec. 19,
2014).

        On direct appeal, this Court modified the sentences for the petitioner’s rape of a
child convictions to twenty-five years each and otherwise affirmed the trial court’s
judgments. Id. at *39-40. On April 24, 2019, the petitioner filed an untimely pro se petition
for post-conviction relief, requesting that the statute of limitations be tolled based on his
first post-conviction counsel’s failure to timely file a petition for post-conviction relief.1
Hernandez v. State, No. M2019-01305-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 3412134, at *1 (Tenn.
Crim. App. June 22, 2020), no perm. app. filed. The post-conviction court entered an order
summarily denying and dismissing the petition, finding it was filed outside of the one-year
statute of limitations. Id. The petitioner appealed, and this Court remanded for the
appointment of counsel and a hearing to determine whether the petitioner was entitled to

       1
           The petitioner’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief is not included in the record.
                                                      -7-
due process tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. at *2. On remand, the post-conviction
court granted the petitioner’s motion to toll the statute of limitations. Following the
appointment of counsel, the petitioner filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief,
arguing, in part, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the petitioner as a witness
during the suppression and competency hearings, failing to argue the correct legal basis for
the exclusion of the victim’s statement to medical personnel, and failing to require the trial
court to make a ruling on the record related to certain 404(b) issues.2 An evidentiary
hearing was held on August 12, 2022, during which the petitioner and trial counsel testified.

        The petitioner, through an interpreter, testified that he moved to the United States
from Honduras in 2007. His highest level of education was the sixth grade, and he was
unable to speak any English. Although trial counsel spoke Spanish, the petitioner was only
able to understand “fifty percent” of what she said. However, trial counsel brought an
interpreter with her “when there was like more work or stuff.” Regarding discovery, the
petitioner stated that trial counsel explained the material, but the petitioner did not fully
understand it. However, the petitioner stated that trial counsel did not review with him
either the petitioner’s or the victim’s statements to police. When asked if he understood
what the victim’s accusations were, the petitioner stated that it was the victim’s school, and
not the victim, who had accused him of misconduct. He testified that he did not know what
he was convicted of or what the accusations against him were regarding. However, he later
stated that trial counsel “told me that I was being accused of having harmed [the victim],
but I told her I never did anything like that.” The petitioner did not recall giving a statement
to police following his arrest and stated that he met with two doctors prior to trial. Although
the petitioner testified that he attended hearings prior to his trial, he did not know what they
were regarding, and trial counsel did not speak to him about testifying at either of the
hearings. According to the petitioner, the State presented an offer of “twenty years at thirty
percent.” However, the petitioner did not understand what “thirty percent” meant, and trial
counsel did not explain it to him because she was “rushing to go home or something.”
Therefore, the petitioner decided to go to trial.

       Trial counsel testified that she was appointed to the petitioner’s case while working
as a public defender.3 Although she was fluent in Spanish, she sometimes utilized the
services of an interpreter if she believed there was a misunderstanding between herself and
the petitioner. Trial counsel reviewed discovery with the petitioner, but she did not leave
a copy with him because she had concerns about both his ability to understand the materials
and his safety at the jail if other inmates assisted the petitioner in reading the discovery.
Although trial counsel recalled the State’s extending the petitioner an offer in this case, she

        2
          The amended petition did not incorporate by reference the claims contained in the pro se petition.
        3
          Trial counsel testified via Zoom because she moved to California nine years prior to the
evidentiary hearing.
                                                   -8-
could not recall the specifics of the offer. However, she would have conveyed any offers
to the petitioner and agreed that the decision of whether to accept or decline an offer was
ultimately the petitioner’s to make.

        Regarding the petitioner’s mental capacity, trial counsel stated the petitioner was
“probably the most impaired client [she] ever had. And so, it was like speaking with an
eight to ten-year-old.” Trial counsel hired a mental health expert who examined the
petitioner and found him to be incompetent. However, she could not recall whether she
thought about having the petitioner testify at the competency hearing. Trial counsel also
stated that she filed a motion to suppress the petitioner’s statement to police which the trial
court denied, and although the denial was determined to be erroneous on direct appeal, it
was also determined to be harmless. She could not recall whether she ever thought about
having the petitioner testify at the motion to suppress, but she stated that “[i]t might have
been” advantageous.

        Regarding the victim’s statement to medical personnel, trial counsel testified that
she could not recall whether she considered raising an objection to the statement. However,
she stated that there was not a strategic reason for her failure to object and agreed the
statement was corroborative of the victim’s in-court testimony. Trial counsel also could
not recall a photograph of the petitioner’s genitals from trial or whether she considered
raising an objection to it under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). However, she stated
that “if [she] missed an appropriate legal objection, there was no strategic reason for doing
that.”

       After its review of the evidence presented, the post-conviction court denied relief,
and this timely appeal followed.

                                          Analysis

        On appeal, the petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call him
to testify at the suppression and competency hearings, failing to request the exclusion of a
photograph of the petitioner’s genitals under 404(b), and failing to seek the exclusion of
the victim’s statement to medical personnel. The State contends the post-conviction court
properly denied relief.

       The petitioner bears the burden of proving his post-conviction factual allegations by
clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). The findings of fact
established at a post-conviction evidentiary hearing are conclusive on appeal unless the
evidence preponderates against them. Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tenn. 1996).
This Court will not reweigh or reevaluate evidence of purely factual issues. Henley v.
                                             -9-
State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997). However, appellate review of a trial court’s
application of the law to the facts is de novo, with no presumption of correctness. See Ruff
v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tenn. 1998). The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
presents mixed questions of fact and law. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).
Thus, this Court reviews the petitioner’s post-conviction allegations de novo, affording a
presumption of correctness only to the post-conviction court’s findings of fact. Id.; Burns
v. State, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).

       To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show
both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984); State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (noting that the
standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel applied in federal cases is also
applied in Tennessee). The Strickland standard is a two-prong test:

               First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
       deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
       counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
       the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
       performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s
       errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
       result is reliable.

466 U.S. at 687. In order for a post-conviction petitioner to succeed, both prongs of the
Strickland test must be satisfied. Id. Thus, courts are not required to even “address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id.; see
also Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996) (stating that “a failure to prove
either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective
assistance claim”).

        A petitioner proves a deficiency by showing “counsel’s acts or omissions were so
serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.” Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Baxter
v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). The prejudice prong of the Strickland test is
satisfied when the petitioner shows there is a reasonable probability, or “a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that “but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694. However, “[b]ecause of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption

                                            - 10 -
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial
strategy.’” Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

I.    Failure to Call the Petitioner to Testify at Suppression and Competency
Hearings

       The petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call him to testify
as a witness at the suppression and competency hearings. Specifically, he contends, had
trial counsel elected to have him testify, “his mental deficiencies would have been
transparent and this would have helped to carry his burden in proving the Miranda4
violation to the trial court as well as demonstrating that the petitioner’s expert as to
competency should have been accredited.” The petitioner also argues that if the trial court
had excluded his statement, the petitioner could have negotiated a more favorable offer
from the State. The State contends the post-conviction court properly found trial counsel
was not ineffective for failing to call the petitioner to testify at the suppression and
competency hearings.

        According to the petitioner, he attended hearings prior to trial but did not know what
they were regarding. He did not recall trial counsel’s speaking with him about testifying
at either hearing. The petitioner testified that he received an offer of twenty years at thirty
percent from the State. However, because trial counsel would not explain what “thirty
percent” meant, the petitioner did not accept the offer. Trial counsel testified that she filed
a motion to suppress the petitioner’s statement to police and had a mental health
professional evaluate the petitioner for competency. However, she could not recall whether
she thought about having the petitioner testify at the suppression or competency hearings.
Trial counsel stated that, although she could recall plea negotiations taking place with the
State, she could not recall the specific offer that they extended. She testified that she would
have conveyed any offers to the petitioner and that the decision to accept or decline an offer
was the petitioner’s to make.

       In its order denying relief, the post-conviction did not accredit the petitioner’s
testimony, and nothing in the record preponderates against the post-conviction court’s
factual findings. See Tidwell, 922 S.W.2d at 500. Furthermore, although the petitioner
argues trial counsel should have called him as a witness at the suppression and competency
hearings, the petitioner failed to state what his testimony at the hearings would have been
and, therefore, cannot establish prejudice. See State v. Anglin, No. M2019-00083-CCA-
R3-PC, 2019 WL 6954185, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2019) (“Without knowing
how the Petitioner might have testified, the post-conviction court had no basis from which
it might conclude that he suffered prejudice from following his attorneys’ advice not to

       4
           See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
                                                 - 11 -
testify.”), no perm. app. filed; Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757-58 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1990). The petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

II.    Failure to Request the Exclusion of Photograph Under 404(b)

       The petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request the
exclusion of a photograph of the petitioner’s genitals under Tennessee Rule of Evidence
404(b). The petitioner argues that, although trial counsel objected to the photograph on the
basis of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, Rule 404(b) provided a more favorable standard
of review. The State contends this issue was waived for failing to include it in his petition
for post-conviction relief.

         While the petitioner challenged other aspects of trial counsel’s performance
regarding evidentiary issues, the petitioner failed to challenge trial counsel’s failure to
request the exclusion of a photograph of the petitioner’s genitals under 404(b) in either his
original or amended petitions for post-conviction relief. At the evidentiary hearing, the
petitioner asked trial counsel if she remembered objecting to the photograph of the
petitioner’s genitals under 403 and whether she considered raising an objection under
404(b). Although trial counsel stated that she could not recall the photograph from the
trial, she testified that “if [she] missed an appropriate legal objection, there was no strategic
reason for doing that.” The post-conviction court made no rulings on the issue.

       Our review of the trial record indicates that the photograph of the petitioner’s
genitals was never introduced into evidence at trial. Therefore, the petitioner was not
prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object under 404(b). Furthermore, trial counsel filed
a pre-trial motion to prohibit testimony regarding “statements in the victim’s forensic
interview with Dawn Harper that [the petitioner] showed her a photo of his genitals” under
Tennessee Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, 404, 608 and 701, arguing such testimony
would “confuse the jurors” and “predispose them to a belief in the defendant’s guilt.” The
fact that a trial strategy or tactic failed or was detrimental to the defense does not, alone,
support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521,
528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Deference is given to sound tactical decisions made after
adequate preparation for the case. Id. The petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III. Failure to Request the Exclusion of the Victim’s Statement to Medical
Personnel

       The petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request the
exclusion of the victim’s statement to medical personnel as it was hearsay without an
exception. The State contends the petitioner has waived this issue for failing to include the

                                             - 12 -
victim’s statement in the appellate record. The State further contends the petitioner has
failed to prove that trial counsel was deficient or that the petitioner was prejudiced.

        Initially, we must address the State’s contention that the petitioner waived the issue
presented on appeal for failing to include the victim’s statement in the appellate record. At
the evidentiary hearing, the State requested that the records from both the trial and the
direct appeal be incorporated into the evidentiary hearing record. Additionally, this Court
can take judicial notice of the records in petitioner’s prior appeals to this Court. See Tenn.
R. App. P. 13(c); State v. Lawson, 291 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Tenn. 2009). Therefore, we will
review the petitioner’s claim on the merits.

        At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that she could not recall whether
she considered raising an objection to the victim’s statement. However, she agreed that
there was not a strategic reason not to object and that the statement was corroborative of
the victim’s in-court testimony. Although in hindsight, trial counsel conceded there was
not a strategic reason for her failure to object, we must evaluate her conduct through her
perspective at the time of trial. See Howell, 185 S.W.3d at 326 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689). Our review of the trial record indicates that, despite trial counsel’s lack of
recollection, she filed a pre-trial motion to exclude portions of the victim’s statement under
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, arguing the petitioner had not received any medical
reports to substantiate the victim’s prior doctor’s appointment in September 2010. The fact
that a trial strategy or tactic failed or was detrimental to the defense does not, alone, support
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Cooper, 847 S.W.2d at 528. Deference is
given to sound tactical decisions made after adequate preparation for the case. Id.
Moreover, despite the petitioner’s assertion to the contrary, the victim’s statement to Ms.
Gallion identifying the petitioner was admissible under Tennessee Rule of Evidence
803(4), the hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis
and treatment. See State v. Howard, 504 S.W.3d 260, 280 (Tenn. 2016) (“We have
repeatedly held that “statements made to a physician identifying a perpetrator who is a
member of the child’s household may be reasonably pertinent to proper diagnosis and
treatment of emotional and psychological injury.”) (citations omitted) (quoting State v.
Stinnett, 958 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Tenn. 1997). The petitioner is not entitled to relief on this
issue.

                                          Conclusion

      Based upon the foregoing authorities and reasoning, the judgment of the post-
conviction court is affirmed.

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   ____________________________________
   J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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