Court Opinion

ID: 9683178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:23:51.056925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:45.902444
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
SIMON, Justice.
When this matter was originally before us we annulled and set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused and remanded the case for a new trial, being of the opinion that the lower court had committed prejudicial error in admitting, over defendant’s objection, certain evidence showing i that on the day following the arrest of defendant, namely, October 7, 1953, gleanings of marijuana were found in his clothes at his residence.
The matter is now under reconsideration by us on rehearing.
The accused, Ben Johnson, was convicted of the crime of unlawful possession of marijuana and sentenced therefor to a term of 10 years in the state penitentiary. His original appeal was based on two bills of exception formally perfected and filed with us, which we shall dispose of in their order.
Bill of Exception No. 1
This bill was taken and perfected to the ruling of the trial judge permitting the State to amend the Bill of Information by changing the date of the alleged offense as charged from that of “on or about October 7th, 1953” to “on or about October 6, 1953”.
In our original opinion we cited and approvingly quoted the provisions of LSA-R.S. 15:253 and the cases of State v. Anderson, 125 La. 779, 51 So. 846; State v. Roshto, 169 La. 251, 125 So. 67, and held that the amendment of the Bill of Information was properly allowed, time *329not being of the essence of the crime charged and an alibi not having been pleaded. The ruling of the court below was not prejudicial to or violative of the rights of the accused. We reinstate and affirm our original holding in that respect.
Bill of Exception No. 2
The record discloses that on October 6, 1953, the defendant was arrested, taken into custody, and, at which time, gleanings of marijuana were allegedly found on his person and in his automobile. As a result thereof, he was incarcerated, and on November 10, 1953, was formally charged in a Bill of Information, as subsequently amended, with having on or about October 6, 1953, violated LSA-R.S. 40:962, our State Narcotic Act. On the day following his arrest, namely, October 7, 1953, defendant voluntarily accompanied the arresting officers to his residence where he identified certain clothing as belonging to him and which, upon examination, allegedly contained gleanings of marijuana.
It appears that on October 18, 1954, defendant filed a motion for a Bill of Particulars requesting the following specifications, to-wit: the kind and quantity of the narcotic drugs the defendant was charged with possessing; the nature of the possession, whether on defendant’s person, in his automobile or other vehicle, or in a house, building, or premises over which the accused had control and supervision, and in the latter instance, the name of the owner, occupant or occupants or other persons having control thereof. In written response thereto, the district attorney stated that the narcotic drug was “marijuana” and that the possession as charged was “on his person and in his automobile”.
On trial of this cause, proof of the findings of these gleanings at defendant’s residence was offered in evidence by the State. Defendant objected thereto on the ground that such evidence was irrelevant to the issue and contrary to and beyond the State’s restricted answer to the Bill of Particulars.
In his per curiam the trial judge states that the district attorney informed the court, in the presence of the jury, that “this evidence was not offered in support of the charge of possession on October 6th, 1953, but was offered merely to show another and similar offense on October 7th, 1953, * * * The objection was overruled and the evidence admitted under Articles 445 and 446 of the Code of Criminal Law and Procedure, LSA-R.S. 15:445 and 15:446.
Defendant contends that evidence of a similar and separate offense allegedly committed by him tendered for the declared purpose of proving system, intent or guilty knowledge in connection with proof of the crime charged is prejudicial and violative of his rights; that its admission for that purpose constitutes reversible error. In this connection he argues that, the crime charged being a statutory crime wherein possession vel non constitutes the crime, the element of intent forms no part of the crime; and *331that' evidence to establish intent, system or guiity knowledge is irrelevant, immaterial and inadmissible.
Therefore, as correctly stated in our original opinion, the question to be resolved is: -Whether intent, system or guilty knowledge, under the facts and the law, is a necessary ingredient of the crime charged, which would authorize proof of the commission by the defendant of a similar and separate offense.
The charge leveled against defendant is •brought under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 40:962, which reads:
“It is unlawful for any- person to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell, give, deliver, transport, prescribe, administer, dispense, or compound any narcotic drug, * *
Article 445 of the Code of Criminal Law and Procedure provides:
“In order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar acts, independent of the act charged as a crime in the indictment, for though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.”
Article 446 of the Code of Criminal Law and Procedure provides:
“When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct or declarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent and .where -the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offense charged.”
The general rule is that evidence of the commission of an offense other than the one with which a defendant is charged is not admissible. However, there are recognized exceptions as provided by Articles 445 and 446 of the Code of Criminal Law and Procedure, LSA-R.S. 15:445 and 15:446, supra, such as where the evidence is introduced for the purpose of rebutting the inference that the crime charged was not committed by accident or mistake but with a guilty knowledge or evil motive, and where the evidence shows a system of wrongdoing.
In State of Louisiana v. Wilde, 214 La. 453, 38 So.2d 72, 75, wherein the State was permitted to introduce evidence tending to show the commission of other and unrelated crimes by the accused for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, we announced the following:
“The general rule that evidence tending to show the accused, who is being prosecuted for a particular crime, has committed another crime wholly independent of and unconnected with that for which he is on trial is-, irrelevant ' and inadmissible ‘ even though it is a crime of the same sort, is subject to a • number of exceptions. Such-an except *333tion is ‘When knowledge or intent form an essential part of the inquiry.’ In such case ‘testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct or declarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but no't to prove the offense charged.’ Article 446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”
See State v. Gardner, 198 La. 861, 5 So.2d 132, and authorities therein cited.
It is further well recognized that these exceptions to the general rule apply not only to prior criminal offenses committed by the defendant, but also to offenses committed subsequent to the offense charged. In neither event is the admissibility of the evidence under these exceptions affected. In State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So.2d 411, we recognized and applied this principle and approvingly cited the following cases in support thereof: State v. Jackson, 163 La. 34, 111 So. 486; State v. Keife, 165 La. 47, 115 So. 363; State v. Colombo, 171 La. 475, 131 So. 464; State v. Jacobs, 195 La. 281, 196 So. 347; State v. Guillory, 201 La. 52, 9 So.2d 450; State v. Wilde, 214 La. 453, 38 So.2d 72.
The word “possession” means simply thfe owning or having in one’s power; to have and to hold as property; ownership, whether rightfully or wrongfully; actual personal control and care; the right of exercising acts of dominion. 33 Words and Phrases, Possession, p. 69.
Unlawful possession, where one is invested with some right of dominion, can be dej fined as a possession which in the ordinary course of human experience necessarily inr volves knowledge of the fact that one is possessing either rightfully or unlawfully as well as knowledge of the criminal consequences which one should reasonably-anticipate to result therefrom. For, no crime can exist without the combination of k criminal act and a criminal intent, or an evil motive, or with a guilty knowledge ‘ of its consequences. State v. Howard, 162 La. 719, 111 So. 72.1
Therefore, guilty knowledge is ap essential ingredient of the crime of possession of narcotic drugs. The crime of unlawful possession of narcotic drugs as denounced by law cannot exist without proof of guilty knowledge; for, such possession would not be a possession contemplated by the statute.2
Hence evidence of the commission of similar and separate crimes by the "accused relative to and connected with the *335crime charged is admissible to establish guilty knowledge as provided under LSA-R.S. 15:445 and 15:446, supra.
Manifestly, the correctness of the ruling of the trial judge in admitting the evidence objected to by the defendant is further sustained and supported in that said evidence was corroborative of the guilty knowledge of the defendant that he was then unlawfully and intentionally possessing narcotic drugs in violation of the statute. See State v. Gaines, 223 La. 711, 66 So.2d 618; State v. Washington, 225 La. 1021, 74 So.2d 200.
Moreover, the crime charged clearly falls within the terms and provisions of Article 27 of our Criminal Code, LSA-R.S. 14:27, wherein an attempt to commit a crime is made a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime; and a verdict finding the defendant guilty of attempted unlawful possession of narcotic drugs would be responsive to the charge in the Bill of Information. This principle was recognized and applied in the case of State v. Broadnax, 216 La. 1003, 45 So.2d 604.
The pertinent part of Article 27 of our Criminal Code reads:
“Whoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished as follows * * *. In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; but such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.”
Manifestly, the attempt to unlawfully possess narcotics being a responsive verdict imposes upon the trial judge the duty to charge the jury with a full definition of the legal nature of an attempted crime, its component parts and essential ingredients, which necessarily include the element of specific intent. The specific intent of the accused to commit such a crime, being the vital and essential ingredient thereof, the State must necessarily make full proof of this fact so as to legally authorize the finding of a verdict of guilty by the jury. Therefore, evidence showing the commission of collateral offenses either anteriorly or posteriorly is admissible in proof of the specific intent of the defendant and clearly falls within the exception to the general rule hereinabove referred to.
We observe that the question of a responsive verdict was not urged before us either in written- brief or in oral argument at the time of the original hearing, having been raised for the first time on rehearing.
We conclude that Bill of Exception No. 2 is without merit.
For the reasons assigned, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the conviction and sentence be, and the same is affirmed.
HAWTHORNE, J., concurs in the decree.
MOISE, J., dissents.

. LSA-R.S. 14:10: “General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the. ordina^ ry course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.”

. LSA-R.S. 40:982.