Court Opinion

ID: 9640429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:05:56.386474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:38.473135
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/22/23 P. v. Zena CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080795

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCE384235)

 KIIAIYONA C. ZENA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
         Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Laura
Baggett and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

                                               INTRODUCTION
         Kiiaiyona C. Zena challenges her convictions for felony assault and
felony battery based on instructional error. She contends the trial court’s use
of the mutual combat instruction, CALCRIM No. 3471, was not supported by
the evidence and prejudicially reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof on
the self-defense element.
      We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s giving
of the mutual combat instruction, and that the instruction did not lower the
prosecution’s burden in proving Zena did not act in self-defense. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The People’s Case

      Zena and K.J. are sisters. In 2016, Zena, her boyfriend, and her two
children briefly stayed with K.J. After about two weeks, K.J. said she noticed
her utility bill was high and asked Zena over the telephone to contribute $50.
Zena became upset, and the call ended without a resolution. About
10 minutes later, K.J. claimed Zena and her family “came busting through
[her] door.” She said Zena was very angry and pushed her. K.J. grabbed a
pair of needle-nose jewelry pliers to defend herself, but then Zena knocked
her down. K.J. was face down with Zena on her back. When she realized she
could not breathe, K.J. swung her right hand over her shoulder with the
jewelry pliers and stabbed Zena in the face and back. Zena then got up, and
K.J. felt blood trickle on her.
      The family left, and K.J. learned about a month later that Zena had
obtained a restraining order against her. The sisters did not have any
contact after that until 2018.
      In September 2018, K.J. accompanied her boyfriend, A.F., to the
laundromat. She walked to another sister’s house nearby to retrieve a pot
and then returned to the laundromat. When she arrived, A.F. was waiting
for her in front of the building and told her, “your sister’s here.” K.J. knew he

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meant Zena. She retrieved her keys from A.F. and went to put the pot in her
car, at which point she saw Zena and her family.
      Zena said, “You don’t remember you cut my face?” She then repeatedly
reminded K.J. that she had a restraining order. K.J. said at that point she
wanted to leave, so she walked toward the laundromat entrance intending to
tell A.F. she was leaving and give him her keys. She had to walk by Zena,
who then approached her and hit her in the face with a closed fist. K.J. said

she was dazed for a minute, and then Zena’s daughters1 and boyfriend
started hitting her as well. She hunched forward to protect her face. At some
point during the same time frame, Mikqueen said, “Mom, she has [her] keys.
She’s going to cut you” and then, at Zena’s direction, pulled the keys from
K.J.’s hand. The group continued hitting and kicking K.J. and pulled out
some of her hair. She said she did not fight back.
      K.J. called for help, and her boyfriend came out of the laundromat.
A.F. and Zena’s boyfriend then got into an altercation. Afterwards, K.J.
called 911.
      An ambulance transported K.J. to the hospital where she was
diagnosed with a “blowout fracture” of the orbital floor, meaning the bone
that supported her eye had been pushed down. She underwent plastic
surgery to have the bone moved back into place and remained hospitalized for
three days. K.J. continues to suffer vision problems in her left eye.

1     Zena’s older daughter, Mikqueen Hopper, was her codefendant in the
case but is not a party to the instant appeal. Because the younger daughter’s
surname is also Hopper, we refer to Mikqueen by her first name solely for
purposes of clarity.
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B.       The Defense Case

         Zena testified on her own behalf. She explained that after she refused
to pay the utility bill, she arranged to retrieve her things at the apartment.
When she arrived, she said K.J. slammed open the screen door, which ran
over her foot and cut it open. She claimed K.J. then stabbed her in the face
with needle-nose pliers, and they started fighting. During the fight, K.J. also
stabbed her in the back. After Zena left, she did not call the police or go to
the hospital. According to Zena, she obtained a restraining order because
K.J. subsequently harassed her and her children over the telephone.
         On the day of the laundromat incident, Zena was there with her
daughters and boyfriend. She said K.J. was about 10 to 12 feet away when
she first saw her. Zena claimed K.J. came toward her with her keys
protruding from her fingers “like wolverine claws.” Mikqueen said, “Mom,
she’s going to stab you in your face again.” Zena explained that she had just
enough time to take off her shoes and glasses before the fight started. K.J.
then scratched the side of Zena’s nose with her keys at which point Zena said
she “just lost it” and they started fighting. Zena acknowledged that she
punched K.J. while holding her by the hair, but said that K.J. then punched
her back. She also admitted she punched K.J. in the face and estimated the
sisters each hit each other five or six times. Zena claimed the only reason she
punched K.J. was to defend herself.
         According to Zena, her younger daughter was not involved in the fight,
and Mikqueen did not strike K.J.; she only took the keys away from her.
Zena said the fight ended when A.F. and Zena’s boyfriend almost got into a
fight.
         On cross-examination, Zena acknowledged that even after Mikqueen
took K.J.’s keys away, she “beat up” her sister, pulled her hair, and punched

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her. She said she has “always been scared of [K.J.]” since K.J. stabbed her in
the face and back. As a result, she feared K.J. would have stabbed her in the
back with the keys had she turned to leave. Zena confirmed that, in speaking
to a police officer about what happened, she had said, “my first instinct was
to fight her.”

C.    The Mutual Combat Instruction, Verdict, and Sentencing

      During a jury instruction conference, the prosecutor asked the trial
court to deliver CALCRIM No. 3471, the mutual combat instruction, because
he believed there was a “version of the facts” under which the jury could find
that the “assault began as mutual combat.” Counsel for both defendants
objected, and the court initially indicated it did not see how the instruction
was applicable to the parties. The prosecutor then explained that, if the
jurors believed the assault began as mutual combat, they would “be
wondering what the rules are if two people agreed to fight.” He reasoned that
they would “need instruction on how to resolve the legal question of what
happened after mutual combat had ended.”
      The court agreed to give the instruction, at which point Zena’s counsel
argued there was no evidence that anyone agreed to fight. The prosecutor
pointed out that “[K.J.] testified that the defendant attacked her, but she
didn’t want to fight. The defendant testified that [K.J.] attacked her, and
that the defendant didn’t want to fight.” Over the defense’s objection, the
court confirmed it would give the instruction.
      After closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury with, among
other instructions, CALCRIM No. 3471, as follows:
             “A person who engages in mutual combat or starts a fight
      has a right to self-defense only if, one, she actually, and in good
      faith, tried to stop fighting.

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            “Two, she indicated by word or conduct to an opponent in a
      way that a reasonable person would understand that she wanted
      to stop fighting, and that she had stopped fighting.

            “And, three, she gave her opponent a chance to stop
      fighting.

            “If a defendant meets these requirements, then she had a
      right of self-defense if the opponent continued the fight.

            “A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by
      mutual consent or agreement. That agreement may be expressly
      stated or implied, and must occur before the claim of self-
      defense.”

      In closing, the prosecution argued that, “even if you were to find that
Defendant Zena and [K.J.] started fighting mutually at the beginning, even if
you were to find that [K.J.] did throw the first punch, which is not what
happened, but even if you concluded that, Defendant Zena is still guilty of
battery causing serious bodily injury and assault likely to cause [great bodily
injury]. [¶] Because based on Defendant Zena’s description of what
happened, she starts fighting with [K.J.]. Defendant [Mikqueen] starts
trying to take [K.J.’s] keys away. And according to Defendant Zena’s
testimony, those keys were the thing that concerned her. According to her
testimony, she was fixated on those keys. And according to her testimony,
according to Defendant Zena’s testimony, Defendant [Mikqueen] did
successfully, eventually successfully, get those keys away from [K.J.]. And
after the [sic] [Mikqueen] removed the keys from [K.J.], according to
Defendant Zena’s testimony, Defendant Zena beat up her sister. [¶] . . . [¶]
So under no version of events did the defendants act in self-defense.”

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      The jury convicted Zena of assault by means likely to produce great

bodily injury (Pen. Code,2 § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1) and found true the
allegations that she personally inflicted great bodily injury upon K.J.
(§§ 12022.7, subd. (a) & 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). It further found Zena guilty of
battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 2) and found true
the allegation that she personally inflicted great bodily injury upon K.J.
(§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)
      In July 2022, the trial court sentenced Zena to three years of formal
probation with 180 days in custody.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Zena contends the trial court violated her right to due process by
delivering the mutual combat instruction over her objection. In particular,
she argues the instruction was unsupported by the evidence and effectively
reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof on the self-defense element. We
disagree.
      We review assertions of instructional error de novo. (People v. Mitchell
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579; People v. Marquez (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1212,
1218.) “When considering a claim of instructional error, we view the
challenged instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole and the
trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.” (People v. Houston
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1229 (Houston).) We also presume jurors understand
and follow the court’s instructions. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834,
852 (Sanchez).)
      Even if an instruction correctly states a principle of law, if it has no
application to the facts of the case, it is an error to offer it. (People v. Guiton

2     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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(1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129.) Thus, “instructions not supported by
substantial evidence should not be given.” (People v. Ross (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 1033, 1050 (Ross).) Substantial evidence is “evidence that would
allow a reasonable jury to make a determination in accordance with the
theory presented under the proper standard of proof.” (People v. Cole (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206 (Cole).) “Stated differently, we must determine
whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant committed [the offense based on the proffered theory].”
(Ibid.)
      In this case, Zena maintains Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th 1033 is
dispositive of this issue. In Ross, the defendant had been arguing with a
woman when she slapped him, whereupon the defendant punched her,
breaking her cheekbone. (Id. at p. 1036.) The defendant was convicted of
aggravated assault and battery after the trial court, over defense counsel’s
objection, instructed the jury that a person engaged in “mutual combat”
cannot claim self-defense unless he has first undertaken to withdraw from
the conflict and inform his opponent he has stopped fighting. (Id. at p. 1042
and fns. 8 & 9.) The trial court refused the deliberating jurors’ request for a
legal definition of “mutual combat,” telling them there was no legal definition

and instead to rely on the common, everyday meaning of these words.3
(Ross, at p. 1043.)
      The Ross court held this was error. It found the phrase “mutual
combat” was “too broad to convey the correct legal principle.” (Ross, supra,
155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1044.) The jury therefore was “left . . . free to suppose

3     When Ross was decided, former CALCRIM No. 3471 did not include a
definition of “mutual combat,” unlike the current version given by the trial
court in this case.
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that any exchange of blows disqualifies both participants from claiming a
right of self-defense. In fact the doctrine applies only to a violent
confrontation conducted pursuant to prearrangement, mutual consent, or an
express or implied agreement to fight.” (Id. at p. 1036.)
      The court further concluded the phrase “ ‘mutual combat’ is not only
ambiguous but a misnomer. The mutuality triggering the doctrine inheres
not in the combat but in the preexisting intent to engage in it.” (Ross, supra,
155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045.) It thus found that, for a mutual combat
instruction to be appropriately given, “there must be evidence from which the
jury could reasonably find that both combatants actually consented or
intended to fight before the claimed occasion for self-defense arose.” (Id. at
p. 1047.) Because the evidence before the court was insufficient to establish
such an arrangement or agreement, and the reviewing court concluded there
was a substantial basis for the jury to find that the defendant acted in self-
defense, the court found it reasonably probable that a properly instructed
jury would have returned a more favorable verdict to defendant. (Id. at
p. 1036.)
      By contrast, the record in the instant case contains substantial
evidence from which reasonable jurors could infer the existence of an implied
agreement to fight. (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) Both women
acknowledged having a contentious history. They had not seen each other
since the conflict in 2016, which Zena immediately brought up, saying “[y]ou
don’t remember you cut my face?” She then repeatedly reminded K.J. that
she had a restraining order.
      K.J. acknowledged that, although she knew she was supposed to stay
one hundred yards away from Zena, she walked towards Zena’s group and
tried to go around them instead of leaving the area. In so doing, she said she

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put two fingers through the loop of her key ring and held her three “sharp”
keys in her hand. If the jury believed Zena’s testimony, K.J. was holding the
ring with the keys protruding between her fingers “[l]ike wolverine claws.”
Additionally, both sisters agreed Mikqueen issued a warning regarding the
keys to the effect of: “Mom, she’s going to stab you in your face again.” K.J.
also confirmed that her mindset at the time was that she was not going to let
go of her keys. A jury could reasonably construe K.J.’s actions as
demonstrating an intent to fight. (Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047.)
      The same is true of Zena’s actions. Zena testified that she only just had
time to take her shoes and glasses off before the fight started. Although she
argues these acts are not evidence of a prearranged agreement to fight, the
jury was instructed that the definition of mutual combat included an implied
agreement and a jury could view these actions as showing her “implied
agreement to fight.” (Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036.) Further,
according to Zena’s version of events, even though K.J. initiated the fight by
scratching the side of Zena’s nose with her keys, Zena then “just lost it.” She
told police officers that when she saw her sister, “[her] first instinct was to
fight her.” Moreover, under both versions of events, the fight started almost
immediately. Viewing this evidence collectively, a reasonable jury could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that both sisters demonstrated an “inten[t]
to fight before the claimed occasion for self-defense arose.” (Id. at p. 1047,
italics omitted.) As a result, we conclude the mutual combat instruction was
supported by substantial evidence (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1206) and the
trial court, therefore, did not err by providing this instruction. (Ross, at
p. 1050.)
      We also disagree that the mutual combat instruction had the effect of
lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof on the self-defense element. If the

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jury believed Zena and K.J. were engaged in mutual combat or that Zena
started the fight, CALCRIM No. 3471 provided the actions Zena was required
to take before being entitled to assert her right to self-defense. If the jury
believed K.J. started the fight, the trial court’s recitation of CALCRIM
No. 3470 (Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide)),
CALCRIM No. 3472 (Right to Self-Defense: May Not be Contrived), and
CALCRIM No. 3474 (Danger No Longer Exists or Attacker Disabled)
provided the standards applicable. In reciting CALCRIM No. 3470, the court
specifically reiterated that “[t]he People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that a defendant did not act in lawful self-defense or
defense of another.” We may presume the jurors understood and followed the
court’s instructions. (Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 852.)
      Additionally, contrary to Zena’s contention on appeal, the prosecution’s
argument would not have led a reasonable jury to misinterpret the self-
defense standard. The prosecution argued that even if the jury believed that
K.J. started the fight, Zena did not act in self-defense under CALCRIM

No. 34744 because she continued to beat up K.J. after the dangerous keys she
was concerned about had been taken from K.J. This scenario only applied if
the jury rejected the mutual combat theory and, thus, ignored CALCRIM

4      CALCRIM No. 3474 instructs: “The right to use force in (self-defense/
[or] defense of another) continues only as long as the danger exists or
reasonably appears to exist. [When the attacker (withdraws/ [or] no longer
appears capable of inflicting any injury), then the right to use force ends.]”

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No. 3471, which the trial court expressly instructed them they could do.5
Likewise, if the jury thought the prosecution was arguing that CALCRIM
No. 3474 applied to a mutual combat scenario, that misunderstanding would
work in Zena’s favor because it would suggest that she retained a right to
self-defense during mutual combat even if she had not attempted to withdraw
as required by CALCRIM No. 3471. Accordingly, viewing the challenged
instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole, we conclude there is
no reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible
manner. (Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1229.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                       HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

CASTILLO, J.

5     Pursuant to CALCRIM No. 200 (Duties of Judge and Jury), the trial
court informed the jury that “[s]ome of these instructions may not apply,
depending on your findings about the facts of the case. . . . After you have
decided what the facts are, follow the instructions that do apply to the facts
as you find them.”
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