Court Opinion

ID: 9728275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:03:38.093198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:47.337524
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Judge,
concurring.
I fully concur in the majority's determination that the sentence imposed upon Io-tha Cunningham is manifestly unreasonable. Even in the absence of such a determination, however, I would remand with instructions to impose concurrent sentences on the basis of clear error and bias on the part of the trial court in sentencing these defendants.
The trial court in imposing upon lotha Cunningham consecutive sentences total-ling sixteen years for the crime of illegally obtaining food stamps has adduced no grounds which may properly be considered in aggravation for this purpose. The court's discretion in determining whether sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively is not without limits. At a minimum, the sentencing court must be able to articulate facts in the case that support a finding of at least one of the statutory aggravating cireumstances, before it may impose consecutive terms. - Taylor v. *10State, (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1087. The sentencing record must contain a particularized statement of aggravating circumstances to show that determination of the sentence was based upon consideration of facts of the specific crime and the relation of the sentence imposed to objectives which will be served by that sentence. Harris v. State, (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 112; Washington v. State, (1981) Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1218.
The trial court in the present case has failed entirely to cite particular facts which would justify the imposition of eight consecutive sentences. The rationale given at the defendants' sentencing hearing, quoted in its entirety by the majority, consists primarily of a sermon on the theme of food stamp fraud as a generalized social evil. This homily indicates the trial court's bias against these defendants and represents clearly inappropriate grounds for imposing consecutive sentences. The court's opinion as to the gravity of the evil threatened by this crime as a general matter can hardly be substituted for the legislative judgment regarding presumptive sentences. - Nor does this statement afford individualized treatment of the defendant and his particular offense, as our decisions have consistently required. Gambill v. State, (1982) Ind., 436 N.E.2d 301; Green v. State, (1981) Ind., 424 N.E.2d 1014; Page v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 424 N.E.2d 1021.
The trial court likewise errs in attempting to justify this sentence by invocation of the aggravating circumstance defined by IND.CODE 35-4.1-4-7(c)(4) [repealed 1983 Acts, P.L. 811; see now IND.CODE 85-88-1-7(b)(4)]: "Imposition of a reduced sentence or suspension of the sentence and imposition of probation would depreciate the seriousness of the crime." By its explicit terms, this factor may be considered in aggravation only for the limited purpose of outweighing mitigating factors when the judge would otherwise reduce or suspend the sentence. While it may be considered as one aggravating circumstance among others, this factor may not stand alone as grounds for enhancement, as our supreme court has indicated in White v. State, (1982) Ind., 433 N.E.2d 761.
In White, the defendant challenged the sentencing record wherein the trial court found two aggravating circumstances: defendant's history of criminal activity, and that a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. The Court discussed the issue in the following terms:
The record of the sentencing hearing discloses that the defendant was seeking a sentence shorter than the fixed ten-year prison term because of claimed mitigating circumstances relating to his family life, and work and school record.
The trial court was acting within the bounds of its discretion in evaluating these circumstances in the particular case as applying only a negligible mitigating force, and in evaluating the aggravating circumstances in the balance as applying an upward force warranting an enhancement of the prison sentence beyond the fixed term.
483 N.E.2d at 768.
This analysis, relying on the defendant's allegation of mitigating circumstances and cast in terms of the countervailing weight of the aggravating factors, comports with the unequivocal language of the statutory criterion. A contrary analysis would allow the judiciary to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature; in the absence of any other aggravating circumstances, it is absurd to argue that the presumptive sentence prescribed by the legislature inherently depreciates the seriousness of the offense. I thus would not read IC 35-4.1-4-T(c)(4) as authorizing the trial judge to impose consecutive sentences solely on this basis.
Moreover, the trial court in citing this aggravating factor has merely recited the statutory language. Our courts have repeatedly held that the trial court's statement of reasons for enhancing a sentence or imposing consecutive terms is inadequate where, as here, the court merely repeats the conclusory language of the statutory criterion and expresses a general *11belief that the sentence appears to be appropriate under the circumstances. Gambill, supra; Green, supra; Page, supra.
I also detect error in the trial judge's refusal to consider mitigating cireumstane-es in this case. IND.CODE 85-4.1-4-7(a) [repealed 1988 Acts, P.L. 311; see now IND.CODE 85-88-1-7(a)] mandates that the court consider the nature and circumstances of the particular crime, as well as the character and condition of the defendant. Enhancement of a sentence or imposition of consecutive terms requires that the trial court identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Our supreme court has recently reiterated this requirement, indicating that failure to find either when clearly supported by the record constitutes error. Jones v. State, (1984) Ind., 467 N.E.2d 681; see also Page, supra. As the majority notes, the record in this case reveals a number of statutorily-defined mitigating circumstances directly pertinent to the sentencing decision and which weigh so heavily in mitigation that the trial court could not properly disregard them.
These statutory grounds alone would, of course, require that we remand this cause. Customarily, we would remand for resen-tencing in conformity with the statutory guidelines. But where as in the present case the trial court has demonstrated bias against the defendants, as witnessed by his statement at the sentencing hearing and by the grossly disproportionate sentence imposed, we may properly remand with instructions to impose the presumptive term or concurrent sentences. See Gambill, supra (trial judge's demonstration of bias in attempting to enhance defendant's sentence for involuntary manslaughter on grounds that the jury should have conviet-ed him of murder necessitated remand for resentencing to presumptive term). On the authority of Gambill, independent of our conclusion that the sentence imposed on lotha Cunningham is manifestly unreasonable, I would remand with the instructions adopted by the majority.