Court Opinion

ID: 9953353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 21:00:45.780772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:46:01.409740
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-1178

        JAMES LEE KEITH,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        VOLVO GROUP NORTH AMERICA, LLC, d/b/a Volvo Trucks North America,

                            Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Roanoke. Elizabeth Kay Dillon, District Judge. (7:20-cv-00521-EKD-RSB)

        Submitted: February 22, 2024                                      Decided: March 20, 2024

        Before GREGORY and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Thomas E. Strelka, L. Leigh Rhoads, Brittany M. Haddox, Monica L. Mroz,
        STRELKA EMPLOYMENT LAW, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Ellison F. McCoy,
        D. Randle Moody, II, JACKSON LEWIS PC, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               James Lee Keith appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to

        his employer, Volvo Group North America, LLC (“Volvo”), on his claims under the

        Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213. Finding no

        reversible error, we affirm the district court’s order.

               We review a district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo, “applying the same

        legal standards as the district court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the

        light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Ballengee v. CBS Broad., Inc., 968 F.3d

        344, 349 (4th Cir. 2020). “Summary judgment is warranted ‘if the movant shows that there

        is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

        matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A genuine question of material fact

        exists where, after reviewing the record as a whole, a court finds that a reasonable jury

        could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”          J.D. ex rel. Doherty v. Colonial

        Williamsburg Found., 925 F.3d 663, 669 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). In conducting this inquiry, courts may not “weigh conflicting evidence or make

        credibility determinations.” Id. But “the nonmoving party must rely on more than

        conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or

        the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v.

        Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        And we may affirm “on any ground apparent on the record.” Moore v. Frazier, 941 F.3d

        717, 725 (4th Cir. 2019).

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               We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Keith was not a

        qualified individual under the ADA. * To establish a cognizable ADA claim—whether

        based on a failure to accommodate or other unlawful discrimination—a plaintiff must

        establish that they were a “qualified employee with a disability.” See Laird v. Fairfax

        Cnty., 978 F.3d 887, 892 (4th Cir. 2020). A “qualified individual” is one who “can perform

        the essential functions of the employment position they hold or desire, either with or

        without reasonable accommodation.” Wirtes v. City of Newport News, 996 F.3d 234, 238

        (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). To determine whether a plaintiff satisfies this requirement,

        courts must consider: “(1) whether [they] could perform the essential functions of the job,

        i.e., functions that bear more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue, and (2) if not,

        whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable [them] to perform

        those functions.” Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). “A job function is essential when ‘the reason the

        position exists is to perform that function,’ when there aren’t enough employees available

        to perform the function, or when the function is so specialized that someone is hired

        specifically because of his or her expertise in performing that function.” Jacobs v. N.C.

        Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 579 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 29 C.F.R.

        § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)).

               *
                 For purposes of this analysis, we assume without deciding that the district court
        erred in concluding that Keith was judicially estopped from asserting that he was a
        qualified individual based on his representations in applying for long-term disability
        (“LTD”) benefits. See EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373, 379 (4th Cir. 2000);
        Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-07 (1999).

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               “[T]he decision about a position’s essential functions belongs, in the first instance,

        to the employer; it accordingly merits considerable deference from the courts.” Elledge v.

        Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004, 1009 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). “While the ADA identifies a position’s written job description as relevant to the

        employer’s judgment on this question, it does not posit that description as dispositive.” Id.

        (citation omitted). Thus, courts “must consult the full range of evidence bearing on the

        employer’s judgment, including the testimony of senior officials and those familiar with

        the daily requirements of the job.” Id.

               We agree that Keith was not a qualified individual because he failed to create a

        genuine dispute of material fact that lifting 50 pounds or bending were not essential

        functions of the Engineering Technician position he sought. In his deposition, Keith agreed

        that lifting 50 pounds was one of the essential functions. A Volvo nurse also explained

        that she personally observed work in the BIW department and concluded that Keith could

        not perform the job functions because of his significant bending restrictions. And although

        the written job description was created after this litigation began, it provided a specific

        lifting requirement (just under 40 pounds) that was well above Keith’s 20-pound

        restriction. See Stephenson v. Pfizer, Inc., 641 F. App’x 214, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-

        2079) (argued but unpublished) (recognizing “a written job description prepared after

        advertising or interviewing applicants for the job could be relevant evidence of whether a

        particular function is essential”). While Keith tried to counter this evidence with his

        coworker’s deposition testimony that Keith could perform the essential functions of the

        position, his coworker relied on Keith’s assertions contradicting the limitations provided

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        by Keith’s doctor—limitations Keith agreed were necessary. A plaintiff cannot create a

        genuine dispute of material fact by contradicting his own statements. See Erwin v. United

        States, 591 F.3d 313, 325 n.7 (4th Cir. 2010). The district court thus correctly found that

        Keith was not a qualified individual under the ADA.

               Most aspects of Keith’s failure-to-accommodate claim fail because Keith could not

        perform the essential functions of the Engineering Technician position. But Keith also

        contends that Volvo’s offer to place him in his old position shows that it did not engage in

        a meaningful interactive process. To prove a failure-to-accommodate claim under the

        ADA, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that he was an individual who had a disability within

        the meaning of the statute; (2) that the employer had notice of his disability; (3) that with

        reasonable accommodation he could perform the essential functions of the position; and

        (4) that the employer refused to make such accommodations.” Wilson v. Dollar Gen.

        Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).           The applicable collective

        bargaining agreement required Volvo to return Keith to his prior position if possible.

        Reassignment is also “an accommodation of last resort.” Elledge, 979 F.3d at 1014

        (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Volvo’s offer to return Keith to his prior position

        when he claimed he had no work restrictions was not made in bad faith.

               While employers have “a good-faith duty to engage with their employees in an

        interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation,” Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 581

        (cleaned up), “[a]n employer may reasonably accommodate an employee without

        providing the exact accommodation that the employee requested” and “may provide an

        alternative reasonable accommodation,” Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 789 F.3d 407,

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        415 (4th Cir. 2015). In other words, “the employer has the ultimate discretion to choose

        between effective accommodations.” Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327, 337 (4th Cir.

        2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a failure to engage in the interactive

        process, without more, cannot support an independent ADA claim. Jacobs, 780 F.3d 581;

        see also Wilson, 717 F.3d at 347.

               When Keith first expressed interest in returning to work, Volvo began the interactive

        process. But it was clear from the beginning that Keith wanted only one thing—the

        Engineering Technician position. All of his actions, including having his doctor fill out

        multiple medical forms with shifting restrictions, was to shoehorn his way into the position.

        Volvo considered Keith’s limitations and determined it had no positions for him. And it

        continued to allow him to accrue LTD benefits after considering his return. Thus, we

        discern no cognizable breakdown in the interactive process.

               Finally, we agree that Keith failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his

        interference claim. A plaintiff must exhaust their administrative remedies before filing a

        lawsuit raising an ADA claim. Syndor v. Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012).

        A plaintiff does so by first filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or equivalent

        state agency. See id.

               The ADA’s exhaustion requirements are identical to those applied to Title VII

        claims. See id. Accordingly, an EEOC charge must be “sufficiently precise to identify the

        parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.” Chacko v.

        Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 508 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

        other words, “[o]nly those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those

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        reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable

        investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent . . . lawsuit.”

        Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996).

               Although the EEOC form did not have a box labeled “interference,” the narrative

        portion of Keith’s charge solely relates to his failure-to-accommodate claim. The charge

        said nothing about Volvo threatening to terminate his employment. See Miles v. Dell, Inc.,

        429 F.3d 480, 492 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding plaintiff failed to exhaust retaliation claim

        where the charge did “not remotely allege that [a manager] retaliated against [the plaintiff]

        because she had complained of his discriminatory conduct to his supervisor, and it d[id]

        not otherwise allege facts that would have put [the employer] or the EEOC on notice that

        she was charging [the employer] with retaliation”). And Keith’s pro se status cannot

        excuse his failure to allege any facts suggesting an interference claim. See Rodriguez v.

        Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d

        678, 685 (8th Cir. 1996).

               Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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