Court Opinion

ID: 9795172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:21:34.390066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:27:30.369398
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
specially concurring.
While I too believe the trial court's order should be reversed before jeopardy attaches and preempts any effective remedy for the erroneous suppression of an extrajudicial confession in this case, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the prosecution lacks a right of interlocutory appeal under these circumstances. I do not agree with the majority's suggestion, see maj. op. at 855 n. 2, that separate statutory authorization for an interlocutory appeal should not be considered by us in the absence of express argument by the prosecution, or for that matter, that the prosecution failed to expressly invoke the authority of the statute in this case. I understand the majority's approach, however, to reserve for another day the question whether the General Assembly's 1986 adoption of section 16-12-102(2), 6 C.R.S. (2002), and its subsequent amendments to that statute, have broadened the right to an interlocutory appeal beyond that originally described in C.A.R. 4.1. I also note that in light of the decision to exercise this court's original jurisdiction and reverse the trial court's ruling anyway, the majority's jurisdictional analysis is wholly unnecessary to the resolution of the case before us.
I therefore concur in all but Section II of the majority opinion.