Court Opinion

ID: 9393254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 18:07:32.699693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:52.029406
License: Public Domain

J-S40036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1129 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 5, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004119-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                      FILED MAY 9, 2023

        Appellant, Christopher Johnson, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench

trial conviction for simple assault.1 We affirm.

        The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case as follows:

           On April 28, 2019, at approximately 11:30 P.M.,
           [Appellant], Shenelle Washington, Cynthia Preston, and
           Dewitt King were all present in a house at 210 Parker
           Avenue in Philadelphia. (N.T. Trial, 4/5/22, at 20-21).
           [Appellant] and Ms. Washington were downstairs watching
           television when Mr. King came downstairs, put on his jacket,
           and told [Appellant] that when he gets back [Appellant]
           better not be there. [Appellant] and Mr. King “exchanged
           words” and Mr. King went outside, telling [Appellant] to
           come outside because he “had something” for him.
           [Appellant], standing in the doorway, and Mr. King, standing
           outside the front of the house, began yelling at each other.
           (Id. at 21-23).
____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701.
J-S40036-22

          Ms. Washington yelled upstairs to her sister, and Mr. King’s
          girlfriend, Ms. Preston, to help calm the situation down.
          During this time, Mr. King was outside of the house yelling
          at [Appellant] and swinging a belt above his head. When
          Ms. Preston came downstairs, [Appellant] went into the
          kitchen and grabbed a bread knife. (Id. at 22, 25). Ms.
          Washington told [Appellant] not to go outside and grabbed
          his shirt to physically restrain him.     (Id. at 23, 43).
          [Appellant] pushed past both Ms. Preston and Ms.
          Washington, went outside with the knife, and tackled Mr.
          King. (Id. at 45). [Appellant], a man weighing “over 300”
          pounds and standing “over [six] feet” tall, ended up on top
          of Mr. King, a significantly smaller man. (Id. at 29).

          Ms. Preston began hitting [Appellant] and yelling at him to
          get off. After a struggle lasting a couple of minutes,
          [Appellant] got off Mr. King, who was bleeding from the face
          and hands. Ms. Preston described the cut on Mr. King’s hand
          as a “slice.” (Id. at 57-58). The knife in [Appellant’s]
          possession had blood on it before Ms. Preston washed it.
          (Id. at 47). After the altercation, Mr. King called the police.
          Detective Brian Boos photographed bloodstains at the scene
          and recovered the knife used in the altercation. Detective
          Boos took a statement from Ms. Washington and drafted an
          affidavit of probable cause for an arrest warrant of
          [Appellant]. (Id. at 60-65).

(Trial Court Opinion, 7/1/22, at 1-2).

       Following a bench trial on April 5, 2022, the court found Appellant guilty

of simple assault—mutual combat.2              That same day, the court sentenced

Appellant to six months of probation. Appellant did not file a post-sentence

motion. On April 25, 2022, Appellant pro se filed a timely notice of appeal.

____________________________________________

2 The court found Appellant not guilty of aggravated assault, possession of an
instrument of crime (“PIC”), recklessly endangering another person, and
strangulation.

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J-S40036-22

The court appointed counsel, who filed an amended notice of appeal on May

4, 2022. The court subsequently ordered Appellant to file a concise statement

of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant complied on June 5, 2022.

     Appellant raises three issues on appeal:

        1) The evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict
        for simple assault-mutual combat (M3) as Appellant acted
        in justified self-defense against the aggressor complaining
        witness. The intent element for simple assault was not
        proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as Appellant did not
        mutually enter into a scuffle with the aggressor complaining
        witness, but rather was forced to use reasonable force to
        repel an imminent unlawful attack by the complainant who
        was the initial and ongoing aggressor.

        2) The Commonwealth failed to disprove beyond a
        reasonable doubt Appellant’s claim of self-defense, as the
        aggressor complaining witness (who failed to testify at trial)
        was high on [m]arijuana, intoxicated on alcohol and where
        the following factors were also present:

           A. the complaining witness was repeatedly
           brandishing and swinging a belt and buckle as a
           menacing weapon, as he threatened immediate
           physical violence upon Appellant;

           B. the complaining witness blocked Appellant’s only
           exit from the home—the front door (back door was
           not traversable), denying Appellant any safe retreat
           and forcing Appellant to use necessary force to escape
           the home. While blocking Appellant’s retreat, the
           complaining witness threatened violence upon
           Appellant through words and actions while swinging a
           belt and buckle used as a weapon;

           C. the Trial Court ruled the complaining witness was
           the aggressor and that Appellant did not possess the
           bread knife with the intent to employ it criminally.
           Therefore, Appellant asserts that as the bread knife
           was not possessed with criminal intent (indeed he was
           found not guilty of PIC), then it was possessed for the

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            lawful purpose of justified self-defense, and that the
            limited use by Appellant was reasonable to defend
            against the assault committed by the complainant;

            D. The evidence established that Appellant used only
            that force necessary to repel the imminent and
            unlawful physical threat against him, as he simply
            “tapped” the aggressor complaining witness when the
            men then fell to the ground. Appellant did not point,
            swing or otherwise use the bread knife in any stabbing
            fashion. The limited and reasonable use of justifiable
            force is corroborated by the fact that the complaining
            witness sustained non-serious injuries;

            E. Appellant was lawfully in the home at the time of
            the altercation, and was up to that point a frequent
            overnight guest of his girlfriend, and per his girlfriend
            he was a quasi-resident as Appellant “stayed over
            mostly all the time.” Accordingly, although Appellant
            attempted to safely retreat from the aggressor
            complaining witness, Appellant proffers that there was
            no legal duty to do so.

         3) The Trial Court erred in [finding] Appellant guilty of
         simple assault (M3) where evidence was presented at trial
         of Appellant’s good character in the community for being
         peaceful and law-abiding, which raised a reasonable doubt.

(Appellant’s Brief at 7-8).

      For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s first and second

issues. Therein, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction for simple assault because, he insists, the evidence established that

he used justifiable force in self-defense. Appellant contends that Mr. King was

the aggressor and Appellant’s actions were solely in self-defense. Appellant

maintains that he only grabbed the bread knife because Mr. King was outside

swinging a belt like a weapon. Appellant insists that he “had no realistic or

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reasonable alternative than to go outside to defend himself against the

assailer…[who] was swinging the belt like a weapon.” (Id. at 19). Appellant

observes that the trial court found him not guilty of possessing the bread knife

with the intent to employ it criminally. Appellant asserts that this proves he

must have possessed the knife for a lawful purpose, namely, self-defense.

Further, Appellant suggests that as a “quasi-resident” of the home he had no

duty to retreat. Appellant concludes the Commonwealth failed to disprove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s actions were in self-defense, and

the evidence was insufficient to convict him of simple assault. We disagree.

      Regarding challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard of

review is well settled:

         The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
         evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
         trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
         is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
         element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
         applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
         and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
         we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
         Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
         innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
         be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
         and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
         fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
         Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
         element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
         of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
         above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
         evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
         [trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
         and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
         all, part or none of the evidence.

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Commonwealth v. Jackson, 215 A.3d 972, 980 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal

denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011)).

      An individual is guilty of simple assault if he “attempts to cause or

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.”    18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). Intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence that

reasonably suggests a defendant intended to cause injury. Commonwealth

v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 948 (Pa.Super. 2012).        Bodily injury is the

“impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

A person is guilty of simple assault by mutual consent if the simple assault is

committed while “in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent,” which

reduces the charge to a third-degree misdemeanor.             18 Pa.C.S.A §

2701(b)(1).

      The Crimes Code describes self-defense as follows: “the use of force

upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such

force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against

the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.” 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a). After a defendant presents evidence of self-defense, the

burden is on the Commonwealth to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 219, 224, 766 A.2d 342, 345

(2001) (citations omitted).    To prove that the defendant’s act was not

justifiable self-defense, the Commonwealth must establish: “at least one of

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the following: (1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in danger

of death or serious bodily injury; or (2) the accused provoked or continued

the use of force; or (3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the retreat was

possible with complete safety.” Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d

1223, 1229-30 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted; emphasis added).

Whether the defendant was acting in self-defense is an issue for the factfinder

to decide. Id. at 1230.

       Instantly, the evidence established that after Appellant and Mr. King

verbally exchanged words inside the residence, Mr. King went outside the

residence. During the time that Mr. King was still outside and swinging the

belt around, Appellant walked away from Mr. King, into the kitchen, and

grabbed a bread knife. Appellant brought the knife outside in pursuit of Mr.

King and reengaged in the physical altercation, cutting Mr. King with the bread

knife. Thus, although Appellant may not have initially provoked the use of

force, the record makes clear that he continued such force when he went back

into the residence to retrieve a bread knife and brought the knife outside to

confront Mr. King. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as verdict winner, the Commonwealth sufficiently disproved Appellant’s claim

of self-defense,3 and proved Appellant committed simple assault.       See id.

____________________________________________

3 Based on our disposition that Appellant provoked or continue the use of
force, we need not consider Appellant’s “quasi-resident” and other arguments
relevant to whether Appellant had a duty to retreat. See McClendon, supra.

                                           -7-
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See also Torres, supra; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). Accordingly, Appellant’s

first two issues are meritless.

      In his third issue, Appellant argues the court ignored the evidence of his

good character. Appellant claims Mr. King was the initial aggressor and was

drunk and high at the time of the fight.      Therefore, Appellant insists the

evidence at trial concerning his good character was enough to raise a

reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

      Preliminarily, we note that an argument that the finder of fact should

have credited one witness’ testimony over that of another witness generally

challenges the weight, not the sufficiency of the evidence. Commonwealth

v. W.H.M., Jr., 932 A.2d 155, 160 (Pa.Super. 2007) (explaining claim that

jury erred in crediting victim’s testimony over appellant’s version of events

goes to weight, not sufficiency of evidence). Our Supreme Court has held that

an “appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must fail[,]” where

an appellant phrases an issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,

but the argument that appellant provides goes to the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, 434, 741 A.2d 666, 672 (1999).

See also Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745 (2000)

(explaining distinctions between claim challenging sufficiency of evidence and

claim challenging weight of evidence).

      Here, Appellant does not allege that the Commonwealth failed to

establish any particular element of self-defense. Rather, Appellant maintains

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that the court should have believed the testimony of defense witnesses, who

claimed that Appellant had a reputation for being peaceful and law abiding,

rather than the testimony of the eyewitnesses, who described Appellant’s

actions during the fight.    Notwithstanding the phrasing of this claim as

concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, his claim is more properly

construed as a challenge to the weight of the evidence. See W.H.M., Jr.,

supra. See also Widmer, supra.

      A challenge to the weight of the evidence must be preserved by a motion

for a new trial. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607 provides:

      Rule 607. Challenges to the Weight of the Evidence

         (A) A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
         evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for
         a new trial:

            (1) orally, on the record, at any time before
            sentencing;

            (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing;
            or

            (3) in a post-sentence motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3). “An appellant’s failure to avail himself of any of

the prescribed methods for presenting a weight of the evidence issue to the

trial court constitutes waiver of that claim.” Commonwealth v. Weir, 201

A.3d 163, 167 (Pa.Super. 2018), aff'd, 662 Pa. 402, 239 A.3d 25 (2020). See

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, Comment (stating: “The purpose of this rule is to make

it clear that a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be raised with the

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trial judge or it will be waived”).

      Here, Appellant did not preserve his challenge to the weight of the

evidence either orally at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. Therefore,

this issue is waived. See Weir, supra. Moreover, the record reflects that

the trial court appropriately considered Appellant’s character evidence in

conjunction with the other evidence presented at trial, which demonstrated

that Appellant fought his victim and chose to willingly retrieve a bread knife

and   continue   the   fight   after   the   victim   left   the   residence.   See

Commonwealth v. Price, 616 A.2d 681, 685 (Pa.Super. 1992) (stating: “The

factfinder, after considering character evidence, may weigh it as it sees fit”).

Therefore, even if Appellant had preserved his weight claim, it would not have

entitled him to relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/9/2023

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