Court Opinion

ID: 9450170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:37:42.849637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:11.098188
License: Public Domain

CONNALLY, District Judge
(concurring specially):
I concur fully in the opinion of Judge Gewin wherein it deals with the question of the tolling of the statute of limitations by fraudulent concealment.
With regard to the question of the effect to be afforded a guilty plea under 15 U.S.C.A. § 16(a), were the question one of first impression I should be constrained to dissent. But in the light of the action of the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits cited in the majority opinion (Commonwealth Edison Company v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412, and City of Burbank v. General Electric Co., 329 F.2d 825) I concur in the result, though I consider this question wrongly decided.
To the abundant treatment this issue has already received, I add only the following brief comments.
The argument that a plea of guilty is not a “consent judgment” in my judgment is completely and conclusively answered by the dissent of Judge Knoch in Commonwealth Edison, supra (at page 417 of 323 F.2d). This, in short, is that a defendant by pleading guilty concedes unqualifiedly that judgment go against him in all particulars. No greater consent could be asked. The Government is hardly in position to deny that it consents when the defendant has conceded its case.
A careful examination of the opinions in Commonwealth Edison and City of Burbank leaves me with the impression that underlying each is the sentiment that a defendant who pleads guilty should not avoid having that fact received in evidence against him in a civil proceeding; he should be punished additionally by civil damages. But that is not the question before us. A guilty plea, or any other admission, well may be admissible under ordinary rules of evidence. The question with which we are concerned is whether a special statutory effect should be given to such a plea. I am unable to see any basis for drawing such a distinction — and with such great consequences — between a plea of guilty and a plea of nolo contendere (which I consider to be little more than a plea of guilty by one with his fingers crossed).
The decision of a trial judge, on arraignment in a criminal case, whether to accept a plea of nolo contendere thus will have the greatest effect upon a civil action, probably as yet unfiled and, of *488course, without the plaintiffs therein having an opportunity to be heard. Further, if the trial judge declines to accept the nolo plea, what is the advantage to a defendant in pleading guilty? By doing so he subjects himself to the same disadvantage in the anticipated civil litigation as though he fought the Government tooth and nail. A defendant, his nolo plea denied, will, I suggest, be inclined to take his chances with the jury and try for an acquittal, a not infrequent result, irrespective of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The purpose of the statute was to encourage a defendant who in fact was guilty to capitulate to the Government, and thus to avoid the delay and expense of the protracted proceeding. To those who did so by a “consent judgment”, and before the taking of testimony, a special bonus was offered. Now this is made available only to those who may persuade the trial judge to accept a nolo plea, and thus make a half-hearted capitulation only. It is denied to those defendants who go all the way. I think this was not what the statute intended.