Court Opinion

ID: 9352525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:18.366514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:40.426669
License: Public Domain

J-A19020-22

                                   2023 PA Super 2

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    V.L.-P.                                    :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    S.R.D.                                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :     No. 477 MDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Domestic Relations at
                              No(s): 2020-5-0545

BEFORE:       BOWES, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

CONCURRING OPINION BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED: JANUARY 6, 2023

        I join my esteemed colleagues’ decision to vacate the order denying

Appellant’s petition for genetic testing.          I write separately to highlight my

viewpoint that where, as here, there is no intact marriage to preserve through

the presumption of paternity and a father seeks to rescind his formal

acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5103(g)(2), based

upon an allegation of fraud, duress, or the mistake of material fact, the

threshold question should be whether a genetic relationship exists. Indeed,

insofar as genetic testing is dispositive of parentage, any allegation of

fraudulent inducement is relevant only if a genetic relationship is absent.

Thus, I believe the better practice is for trial courts to permit a party to

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*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A19020-22

scientifically refute the genetic relationship at the outset, and after that

preliminary matter is resolved, determine whether paternity by estoppel

applies under the particular facts and circumstances of that case.

      Appellant sought to rescind his written acknowledgment of paternity

under § 5103(g)(2), which is outlined in the portion of the Domestic Relations

code relating to children and minors.        The interrelationship between a

§ 5103(g)(2) rescission and the common law doctrine of paternity by estoppel

is best illustrated by the fact that the two principles require identical

considerations in determining the effect of fraud in the formation of the

parental relationship.   For example, just as proof of fraud will defeat the

application of paternity by estoppel, the same facts would provide a basis to

rescind an acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to § 5103. Compare

R.W.E. v. A.B.K., 961 A.2d 161 (Pa.Super. 2008) (applying five-prong

approach to determine fraud in the context of rescinding acknowledgment of

paternity under § 5103(g) and Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1283-84

(Pa.Super. 2003) (outlining identical “test for fraud” to determine whether to

apply paternity by estoppel).

      Recognizing that the two concepts are coextensive, I also acknowledge

that the legal fiction embodied in paternity by estoppel is traditionally applied

regardless of science.   See e.g. Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721 (Pa.Super

1999) (noting estoppel is legal determination that precludes parent from

denying parentage regardless of true biological parentage); DeRosa v.

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Gordon, __ A.3d__, 2022 PA Super 198, *5 (filed November 22, 2022), 2022

WL 17099037 (quoting Fish, supra approvingly in sustaining trial court’s

determination that the doctrine did not bar paternity claim of likely biological

father who had been involved with child since birth). This perspective is also

reflected in our procedural rules governing paternity disputes in child support

cases, which permits a trial court to stay genetic testing until the applicability

of estoppel has been determined. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.15(c) (“If either party

or the court raises the issue of estoppel or the issue of whether the

presumption of paternity is applicable, the court shall dispose promptly of the

issue and may stay the order for genetic testing until the issue is resolved.”).

      Nevertheless, this reality does not mean that trial courts are constrained

to ignore biological truths in order to apply a legal fiction. Indeed, in upholding

the continuing efficacy of paternity by estoppel, our Supreme Court

recognized, “[a]bsent any overriding equities in favor of the putative father,

such as fraud, the law cannot permit a party to renounce even an assumed

duty of parentage when by doing so, the innocent child would be victimized.”

K.E.M., supra at 807 (emphasis added). It continued,

             The legal fictions perpetuated through the years (including
      the proposition that genetic testing is irrelevant in certain
      paternity-related matters) retain their greatest force where there
      is truly an intact family attempting to defend itself against third-
      party intervention. In cases involving separation and divorce, we
      direct that the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity
      is now to be applied on its terms insofar as it authorizes testing.
      At the very least, the identification of [the] biological father is a
      relevant fact for purposes of determining who should pay for the

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      services of a guardian ad litem to vindicate [the child’s] best
      interests.9 A biological father can do at least this much.

      _________________________________
      9 While at this time we do not hold that a guardian ad litem is

      necessarily required in all cases, at this juncture in the present
      case, we believe an appointment is advisable.

Id. at 809–10 (internal citation and footnotes omitted).

      Thus, the K.E.M. Court understood that the application of a legal fiction

to limit the relevancy of genetic testing retained its “greatest force where there

is truly an intact family attempting to defend itself against third-party

intervention.” Id. at 810 n.8. As it relates to invoking estoppel to circumvent

allegations of fraud, the K.E.M. Court reserved its decision, noting that since

the putative father did not assert that he was deluded into believing that he

was the birthfather, “the strongest case for ‘overriding equities’ [,such as

fraud,] is not present[.]” Id. at 808 n.7. Hence, while the K.E.M. Court’s

holding did not confront this precise issue, its rationale plainly supports the

notion that where, as here, there is neither a marriage to protect nor a third-

party intervenor, scientific advancements and the evolving perception of

family militate against the mechanical application of paternity by estoppel to

defeat a colorable allegation of fraud.

      From my perspective, mindful of the accessibility, affordability, and

reliability of DNA tests, I believe that the flaws associated with permitting rote

assertions of estoppel to bar testing are particularly evident in the case at bar,

where there is neither a marriage or intervenor and Appellant made a genuine

claim that his acknowledgment of paternity was the result of Mother’s

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duplicity, dishonesty, and deceit.        Even ignoring the results of the genetic

testing conducted by Ancestory.com, Appellant adduced sufficient evidence to

support his claim of fraud. He presented evidence that Mother engaged in

fraud by failing to notify him that he may not be the biological father or that

she had contracted chlamydia, a sexually transmitted disease, prior to the

child’s birth.   Moreover, as succinctly summarized in the majority opinion,

Mother failed to disclose that she was previously engaged to the probable

biological father around the time of A.D.’s conception and had motive to deny

her relationship with that person due to his status as a convicted sexual

offender. See Majority Opinion at 31-32. As my learned colleagues accurately

observe, “In the absence of genetic testing or an admission by Mother to

engaging in sexual relations with someone else around the time of [A.D.’s]

conception, . . . Appellant will be unable to prove his fraud claim.” Id. at 32.

Insofar as genetic testing is unquestionably the preeminent means of

determining a child’s parentage, giving genetic testing sequential primacy

over the resolution of an estoppel claim will prevent this inequitable dichotomy

in future cases.

       Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, I believe that the General

Assembly or our Supreme Court1 should revisit the legal fiction created by

paternity by estoppel in light of the advancements in testing and our

____________________________________________

1 For example, the Supreme Court may elect to revise Pa.R.C.P. 1910.15(c)
so it no longer authorizes a trial court to stay genetic testing pending the
resolution of an estoppel claim in child support litigation.

                                           -5-
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contemporary perspective of family and fashion a flexible approach that

affords trial courts both the ability to order genetic testing at the outset of

these cases and the discretion to weigh scientific evidence of paternity in line

with § 5104(c) and (g) of the Uniform Act on Blood Test to Determine

Paternity, which the High Court found to authorize genetic testing in paternity

cases “involving separation and divorce,” i.e., in the absence of an intact

marriage. Id. at 809-810.

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