Court Opinion

ID: 9859805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:42:01.384804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:06:57.511443
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN, dissenting: The charging instrument in this case did not apprise defendant properly of the charges sought to be proved against him. A defendant has a fundamental right, under both the Federal Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VI) and the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8), to be informed of the "nature and cause” of criminal accusations made against him. People v. DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d 318, 321, 662 N.E.2d 412 (1996). The charging instrument must contain sufficient particularity to enable the accused to prepare a defense. People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 54, 630 N.E.2d 811 (1994). The stalking statute states in pertinent part that one places a person "under surveillance” by "remaining present outside the person’s *** place of employment.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/12—7.3(d) (West 1994). Nothing in the charging instrument informed defendant that he could be convicted for placing Barbara under surveillance inside the currency exchange. The majority mistakenly concludes that case law gave him sufficient notice that the statutory language "remaining present outside” includes actions inside a building. Indeed, defendant could not have been apprised of such a questionable construction of the plain language of the statute when the cases cited by the majority were decided after his trial. See People v. Holt, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 649 N.E.2d 571 (1995); People v. Sowewimo, 276 Ill. App. 3d 330, 657 N.E.2d 1047 (1995). The State, itself, recognizing the unfairness of the situation, indicated at oral argument that the charging instrument did not encompass his conduct inside the building. Yet, the majority, taking its own prosecutorial stance, improperly holds him accountable for conduct not articulated within the four corners of the charging instrument. The variance between the crime charged and the crime proved was material and fatal to defendant in this case. Particularly is this so since defendant’s own attorney elicited critical evidence against him during the cross-examination of Barbara, in which she stated that defendant was present inside the currency exchange threatening her for a period of time up to 15 minutes. Had the charging instrument properly apprised defendant that his actions inside the currency exchange could lead to his conviction, defense counsel would have been open to a charge of incompetency in pursuing this line of questioning. The word "surveillance” is commonly defined and understood, in part, to mean "close watch kept over one” or "close and continuous observation.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2302 (1971). Without defendant’s conduct inside the currency exchange, there is no basis for finding him guilty of this statutory second requisite instance of aggravated stalking. There was no evidence that defendant "closely watched” or "continuously observed” Barbara after leaving the currency exchange. To find that defendant’s actions outside of Barbara’s place of employment constitute stalking under these facts, as the majority does here, places any person who walks by a building in danger of being charged with stalking. The result brought about by the majority strains not only the constitution, but common sense as well. There is no doubt that defendant might well have been charged and found guilty of several crimes; aggravating stalking was not one of them. I would reverse the judgment in this case.