Court Opinion

ID: 9466223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:08:30.106091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:36.410852
License: Public Domain

VANCE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
If the stop in this case had occurred at some other place and under other conditions, I might well agree with the conclusion of the majority. The facts before us, however, lead me to a different result. Agent Garza was carrying out his duty on Highway 180, well known as the principal conduit used in transportation of illegal aliens from Mexico to Colorado. From January to September 1978, when this stop was made, 216 vehicles carrying 1,175 illegal aliens had been stopped along this conduit. Approximately one-half were destined for Colorado, many in cars bearing Colorado license plates. The location is in a remote, mountainous, ranching area. As Garza waited to turn onto Highway 180 and saw the automobile in question, factors of subtle yet important significance were apparent. The car bore Colorado license plates but did not look like a typical Colorado tourist vehicle. It was old and had flashy ornamentation. It did not have the more cluttered appearance of a tourist car but appeared to be heavily loaded. Five people were in the car and as the car went by it appeared to Garza that they were sliding down in the *551seat. As a trained officer familiar with the area, he suspected that which was true.
To my mind the test of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), was clearly met. Several of the specific factors recognized in Brignoni-Ponce, numbered 1, 4, 5 and 8 by the majority in the instant case, are present here. Agent Garza developed a reasonable suspicion, sufficient to justify a stop, on the basis of “the characteristics of the area in which [he] encountered] a vehicle,” “previous experience with alien traffic” on the route over which a steady stream of illegal aliens flowed, “[a]spects of the vehicle itself [that] justify suspicion,” observation of “persons trying to hide,” all assessed “in light of [the agent’s] experience in detecting illegal entry and smuggling.” Id. at 884-85, 95 S.Ct. at 2582. The trained officer did not merely see passengers of Mexican extraction, as in Brignoni-Ponce, or see a carload of atypical tourists; he noted several articulable circumstances and drew several logical inferences that gave him a suspicion that was reasonable on these facts. The district court found that his suspicions were reasonable and concluded that they justified a brief investigatory stop.
It seems to me important that we keep in mind the nature of the inquiry. We are not dealing with probable cause. The Brignoni-Ponce court took from Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the following that serves as a backdrop for the present case:
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest . . . simply [to] shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)] recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. . A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.
Id. at 145-46, 92 S.Ct. at 1923.
The Brignoni-Ponce court then held:
[W]e hold that when an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.
Id. at 881, 95 S.Ct. at 2580.
I believe that Brignoni-Ponce dictates that the judgment of the district court upholding the stop should be affirmed.