Court Opinion

ID: 9901299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 17:02:07.170154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.497070
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

                                        UNITED STATES

                                                 v.

                                    Dylan C. JAMES
                     Gunner’s Mate Third Class (E-4), U.S. Coast Guard

                                          CGCMG 0390
                                         Docket No. 1485

                                        15 November 2023

General court-martial sentenced adjudged on 01 March 2022.

       Military Judge:                           CDR Paul R. Casey, USCG (motions and
                                                  arraignment)
                                                 CAPT Ted R. Fowles, USCG
       Appellate Defense Counsel:                LCDR Kristen R. Bradley, USCG
                                                 LT Schuyler B. Millham, USCG
       Appellate Government Counsel:             LCDR Daniel P. Halsig, USCG
                                                 LT Elizabeth M. Ulan, USCG

                                       BEFORE
                          MCCLELLAND, BRUBAKER & PARKER
                                Appellate Military Judges

BRUBAKER, Judge:

       A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted Appellant, consistent with
his pleas entered in accordance with a plea agreement, of three specifications of possession of
child pornography and one specification of distribution of child pornography in violation of
Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Appellant was sentenced to confinement
for six years, reduction to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable
discharge. Judgment was entered accordingly.

       Appellant asserts that: (1) he suffered illegal pretrial punishment; (2) his counsel were
ineffective for failing to address or request credit for pretrial confinement conditions; and (3) he
              United States v. Dylan C. JAMES, No. 1485 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

is entitled to relief for unreasonable post-trial delay. We conclude there was no prejudicial error
and affirm.

                                       Illegal Pretrial Punishment
           For the first time on appeal, Appellant asserts he is entitled to additional confinement
credit for illegal pretrial punishment in violation of the Fifth Amendment1 and Article 13, UCMJ.
The Government counters that Appellant waived this claim, both by operation of law and
affirmatively. We conclude that although Appellant did not waive this claim by operation of law,
he did do so affirmatively.

           The Government asserts that the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF) in United States v. Inong, 58 M.J. 460, 465 (C.A.A.F. 2003), established a bright line
rule that failure to raise claims of illegal pretrial punishment at trial results in waiver by
operation of law. We disagree. Inong is an example of what CAAF would later call “the failure
of military courts to consistently distinguish between the terms ‘waiver’ and ‘forfeiture.’ ”
United States v. Gladue, 67 M.J. 311, 313 (C.A.A.F. 2009). As Gladue clarified:
           Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the
           timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or
           abandonment of a known right. The distinction between the terms is important. If
           an appellant has forfeited a right by failing to raise it at trial, we review for plain
           error. When, on the other hand, an appellant intentionally waives a known right at
           trial, it is extinguished and may not be raised on appeal.

Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); United States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154,
156 (C.A.A.F. 2008)) (cleaned up).

           The holding of Inong is that “failure at trial to seek sentence relief for violations of
Article 13 waives that issue on appeal absent plain error.” Inong, 58 M.J. at 465 (emphasis
added). Because a court only reviews for plain error if an issue is forfeited, not waived, Inong is
clearly one of those pre-Gladue cases that used the word “waiver” but actually meant
“forfeiture.” See Gladue, 67 M.J. at 313; United States v. Ahern, 76 M.J. 194, 197 (C.A.A.F.
2017) (noting instances where rules use the word “waiver,” but actually mean “forfeiture”
because they also mention plain error review).

1
    U.S. Const. amend. V.

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           United States v. Dylan C. JAMES, No. 1485 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

       Additionally, since Inong, the rule underpinning that decision, R.C.M. 905, has been
amended. Whereas it previously used the word “waive,” and thus was considered a “raise or
waive” rule, Inong, 58 M.J. at 464 (citing R.C.M. 905(e), MCM (2002 ed.)) (emphasis added), it
now expressly provides for forfeiture, not waiver. R.C.M. 905(e), MCM (2019 ed.); United
States v. Shafran, __ M.J. __, No. 1480, 2023 WL 6534065, at *3 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 6,
2023). Accordingly, neither case law nor rule provides that an unraised claim of illegal pretrial
punishment is waived by operation of law.

       We agree with the Government, however, that Appellant affirmatively waived this claim.
He voluntarily entered a plea agreement where he “specifically agree[d] to waive all motions
except those that are non-waivable pursuant to R.C.M. 705(c)(1) or otherwise.” App. Ex. XXII at
6. A “waive all waivable motions” term such as this is permissible and constitutes an affirmative
waiver of all issues that, under the law, may be waived. R.C.M. 705(c), 907(b); Gladue, 67 M.J.
at 314; United States v. Spykerman, 81 M.J. 709, 723 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2021). Claims of
illegal pretrial punishment are waivable by plea agreement. R.C.M. 705(c); United States v.
McFadyen, 51 M.J. 289, 289 (C.A.A.F. 1999); Spykerman, 81 M.J. at 723. However, to ensure
that such waivers are “executed with full knowledge of the implications of the waiver,” a
military judge “should inquire into the circumstances of the pretrial confinement and the
voluntariness of the waiver, and ensure that the accused understands the remedy to which he
would be entitled if he made a successful motion.” McFadyen, 51 M.J. at 289.

       Here, the military judge reviewed each term of the plea agreement, including the “waive
all waivable motions” clause, to ensure Appellant understood and agreed freely and voluntarily.
Although it was in the context of a withdrawn motion alleging unlawful pretrial confinement as
opposed to punishment, the military judge specifically advised Appellant that if he accepted his
waiver of the Article 13 issue, he would not order any credit to be applied against his sentence
for illegal pretrial punishment. He nevertheless invited Appellant to bring to the court’s attention
any perceived pretrial punishment during the sentencing phase of the court-martial for
consideration in deciding an appropriate sentence. Finally, the military judge asked trial defense
counsel and Appellant himself whether Appellant had been punished in any way that would

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           United States v. Dylan C. JAMES, No. 1485 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

constitute illegal pretrial punishment. Both attested he had not. The military judge then accepted
Appellant’s unconditional pleas of guilty.

       Appellant offers that at the time he signed the agreement, he was not yet in pretrial
confinement, so the conditions he now wishes to get credit for had not yet occurred. But in a plea
agreement, both parties agree to conditions that may not have yet occurred at the time of signing.
One such condition was that Appellant would “waive all motions except those that are non-
waivable,” App. Ex. XXII at 6 (emphasis added). At the time of his guilty plea, he understood
this term and that he was free to withdraw from it if he desired. He did not, instead choosing to
adhere to it in exchange for favorable terms, including a substantial reduction in the amount of
confinement he faced.

       We find his waiver knowing and voluntary. Recognizing our authority to pierce this
waiver under Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ and United States v. Chin, 75 M.J. 220, 222 (C.A.A.F.
2016), we decline to do so.

                                Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       We review Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. United States
v. Akbar, 74 M.J. 364, 379 (C.A.A.F. 2015). The bar to prevail is high. Id. at 371. An appellant
must show: (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness; and (2) that but for his counsel’s deficient performance, there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).

       To establish the first prong, an appellant must overcome a “strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689. This presumption “is rebutted by a showing of specific errors made by defense
counsel that were unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.” United States v. Davis, 60
M.J. 469, 473 (C.A.A.F.2005) (citation omitted). “An appellant must establish a factual
foundation for a claim of ineffectiveness; second-guessing, sweeping generalizations, and
hindsight will not suffice.” Id. (citations omitted). In assessing counsel’s performance, “we do

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not measure deficiency based on the success of a trial defense counsel’s strategy, but instead
examine whether counsel made an objectively reasonable choice in strategy from the available
alternatives.” Akbar, 74 M.J. at 379 (citing United States v. Dewrell, 55 M.J. 131, 136 (C.A.A.F.
2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. “In
considering whether an investigation was thorough, ‘[w]e address not what is prudent or
appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.’ ” Akbar at 379–80 (quoting Burger v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)).

        Moving to the second prong, even when there is deficient performance, it must be so
prejudicial “as to indicate a denial of a fair trial or a trial whose result is unreliable.” Davis, 60
M.J. at 473 (citation omitted). The appellant must show that but for the deficient performance,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694.

        Here, Appellant asserts that even if he waived the issue of illegal pretrial punishment, his
counsel were ineffective for failing to address or request additional confinement credit for his
conditions in pretrial confinement. In an affidavit, Appellant details his allegedly arduous
conditions, including denial of needed medical supplies, mental health care, and medication. He
alleges he informed his counsel of at least some of these complaints.

        Responsive to our order, Appellant’s trial defense counsel provided affidavits. Lieutenant
Commander (LCDR) LR, who represented Appellant throughout the proceedings and was joined
later by LCDR AM, states that at several junctures, he discussed Appellant’s health and well-
being with him, specifically his medical treatment, and advised that if he was not being treated
well, he could receive additional confinement credit. Later, he, LCDR AM, and Appellant

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              United States v. Dylan C. JAMES, No. 1485 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

discussed the pros and cons of filing a motion for additional confinement credit and the risk that
this would—considering Appellant’s agreement to waive all waivable motions in return for
desirable terms in the plea agreement—cause the Government to withdraw from the agreement.
After reviewing case law and discussing the matter with supervisory counsel, LCDR LR and
LCDR AM spoke again to Appellant about the pros and cons of filing the motion and risk of
losing the protections of the plea agreement. They offered, instead, the alternative of eliciting
confinement conditions through his unsworn statement and arguing it as mitigation. Appellant,
too, was concerned about losing the benefit of his plea agreement and chose to use the evidence
as mitigation rather than seeking additional confinement credit through a motion.

       In her affidavit, LCDR AM states that upon joining the trial defense team, it was
immediately apparent, and she understood, that Appellant had significant mental and physical
healthcare needs. She and LCDR LR investigated Appellant’s conditions in pretrial confinement
and sought relief for it, including meeting with brig personnel and obtaining a rehearing before
the initial review officer to argue Appellant should be released to provide better access to
medical facilities and treatment. But after discussing the matter with colleagues and conducting
legal research, the defense team, including Appellant, decided the best course of action was to
raise pretrial confinement conditions as mitigation evidence rather than a separate motion that
could be deemed a breach of the agreement to waive all waivable motions. LCDR AM went on
to explain:
       It was absolutely a considered decision of the trial defense team to present these
       matters in sentencing rather than as a motion for relief due to unlawful pretrial
       punishment because the Appellant made a decision [subsequent to his placement
       in pretrial confinement] that he wanted to persist as a party to the plea agreement
       he had negotiated under the previously negotiated terms, to include the motions
       waiver provision.

LCDR AM’s Aff. at 3.

       Even if we assume Appellant’s assertions on appeal are true, he fails to establish either
deficient performance by his counsel or prejudice. See United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 248
(C.A.A.F. 1997). Appellant entered into an agreement that in return for favorable terms, he
would waive all waivable motions. His counsel assisted him in deciding what to do, but both

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           United States v. Dylan C. JAMES, No. 1485 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

they and the military judge ensured that Appellant personally understood the agreement and still
wished to be bound by it before accepting his pleas. Appellant made his choice.

       It was likely a wise one. In advising on whether to file a motion for additional
confinement credit despite the agreement to waive all such motions, trial defense counsel acted
well within professional norms. Their concern that filing such a motion would be deemed a
breach and prompt the Government to withdraw from the agreement was well-considered and
legitimate. Appellant was charged with possession and distribution of numerous images and
videos of child pornography. Without getting into unnecessary details, many of these images and
videos were horrific—on the high end of the scale in terms of aggravation. Without an
agreement, he faced up to 50 years of confinement. His agreement provided for a maximum of
six. Under these circumstances, it was a reasonable strategic decision to advise Appellant to
continue to abide by the terms of his plea agreement, waive any motion for additional
confinement credit, and instead raise the alleged conditions of his confinement during his
unsworn statement for the military judge’s consideration as mitigation.

       Appellant also fails to meet Strickland’s second prong: that but for his counsel’s deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different. He does not even allege that but for his counsel’s errors, he would have elected to
withdraw from the agreement and plead not guilty or plead guilty without the benefit of an
agreement. See United States v. Bradley, 71 M.J. 13, 16 (C.A.A.F. 2012). And the risk was real
that if he filed a motion for additional confinement credit without renegotiating his agreement to
waive all such motions, the Government would withdraw. It is entirely speculative that any
additional confinement credit he might have gotten through filing a motion would have exceeded
additional confinement he might have been adjudged absent an agreement limiting it.

       Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s claim that his counsel were ineffective.

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           United States v. Dylan C. JAMES, No. 1485 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

                                         Post-Trial Delay
       Servicemembers “have a due process right to timely review and appeal of courts-martial
convictions.” United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 135 (C.A.A.F. 2006). We review whether
Appellant was denied this right de novo, applying a three-tiered analysis. Id.

       First, we must determine whether the post-trial delay is facially unreasonable. Id. at 136.
Post-trial delay is presumed to be unreasonable when: (1) the record of trial is not docketed with
this Court within 150 days of the completion of trial; or (2) we do not render a decision within 18
months of docketing. United States v. Tucker, 82 M.J. 553, 570 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2022).

       Second, facially or presumptively unreasonable delay triggers a full analysis of whether a
due process violation occurred by weighing the four Barker factors: (1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the appellant’s assertion of the right to timely review and
appeal; and (4) prejudice. Moreno, 63 M.J. at 135 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972)). “No single factor is required for finding a due process violation and the absence of a
given factor will not prevent such a finding.” Id. at 136.

       Third, and finally, if we conclude there was a due process violation, we must grant relief
unless we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless. United States v.
Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 363 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

       The record shows the following sequence of post-trial events:

       Date            Event                                          Days elapsed
       1 Mar 22        Sentence adjudged                                      0
       11 Mar 22       Transcript certified                                  10
       13 Apr 22       Convening authority signed                            43
       14 Apr 22       Judgment entered                                      44
       2 May 22        Military judge verified ROT                           63
       1 Jun 22        Court reporter certified ROT                          93
                       2-volume ROT shipped to CGCCA
                       Digital copies of ROT made available
       10 Jun 22       Memorandum signed transmitting ROT                    102
                        to CGCCA

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             United States v. Dylan C. JAMES, No. 1485 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

                        Clerk notified records custodian that only 1
                         of 2 volumes received
          27 Sep 22     Reconstructed missing volume shipped               210
          12 Oct 22     Clerk noted discrepancies                          225
          27 Oct 22     Appellant asserted speedy trial right              240
          28 Nov 22     Appellant again asserted speedy trial right        272
          30 Nov 22     Docketed at CGCCA                                  274

          As can be seen, the time from completion of trial to docketing exceeded the Tucker
standard, triggering a full due process analysis. We consider each Barker factor in turn.

          1. Length of the Delay
          The length of the delay was 274 days—124 days beyond the Tucker standard. Although
this is not as substantial as the delay in cases where our higher court has found due process
violations, see United States v. Anderson, 82 M.J. 82, 86 (C.A.A.F. 2022), the additional delay is
nonetheless significant and favors Appellant. See, e.g., United States v. Grijalva, 83 M.J. 669,
676 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023) (granting relief for 53-day additional delay); United States v.
Tardif, 58 M.J. 714, 714 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (granting relief for 115-day additional
delay).

          2. Reasons for the Delay
          The Government initially shipped both volumes of the record of trial well within
established timelines. Through no discernable lack of due care or diligence on their part, one of
the two volumes was separated and lost in transit. Once this was discovered, it took the
Government 108 days to reconstruct the volume. The Government explains it had to not only
reproduce the volume, but obtain affidavits for all documents requiring original signatures
pursuant to this Court’s direction. There was particular delay in obtaining an affidavit from the
convening authority, who had retired from the Coast Guard and was difficult to reach and get his
signature. The Government provided a detailed chronology of its efforts to reconstruct the
volume consistent with the Court’s standards. Given all the circumstances, we conclude that the
Government has offered sufficient justification for the 108 days it took to reconstruct the
volume. The additional 64 days it took to correct discrepancies noted by the Clerk of the Court

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           United States v. Dylan C. JAMES, No. 1485 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

was less justified, but on the whole, we conclude that the Government acted with diligence and a
sense of urgency. This weighs in the Government’s favor.

       3. Assertion of Right to Timely Review and Appeal
       Appellant asserted his right to timely review and appeal on 27 October 2022 and again on
28 November 2022. This weighs in his favor.

       4. Prejudice
       “Prejudice due to post-trial delay is assessed in light of the potential impact on the
appellate process.” Anderson, 82 M.J. at 87. In assessing prejudice, we consider three interests:
“(1) prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) anxiety and concern; and
(3) limiting the possibility that a convicted person’s grounds for appeal and defenses, in case of
retrial, might be impaired.” Id.

       Appellant cites only the second interest, asserting he experienced anxiety and concern
because (1) he was unable to submit a package for a clemency board held in October 2022; and
(2) he is “forced to wonder” where the missing volume is and what happened to the sensitive
information about him. Appellant’s Br. at 43–44. Appellant, however, has the burden of showing
“constitutionally cognizable anxiety that arises from excessive delay and we require an appellant
to show particularized anxiety or concern that is distinguishable from the normal anxiety
experienced by prisoners awaiting an appellate decision.” Anderson, 82 M.J. at 87 (quoting
Toohey, 63 M.J. at 361).

       We conclude Appellant has failed to do so. First, appellate defense counsel had access to
a digital copy of the complete record of trial in June 2022. Appellant does not explain why a
package could not be compiled for a clemency board using this copy—he would not have had
originals even if this Court did at that point anyway—or why the case not yet being docketed
with this Court had anything to do with his eligibility for early release. Second, as CAAF stated
in Anderson, “the likelihood of receiving parole or clemency is highly speculative and there is no
indication Appellant would have been granted either at the earliest possible date.” 82 M.J. at 87.
Third, although appellate defense counsel argues about the impact of misplacing sensitive data,

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             United States v. Dylan C. JAMES, No. 1485 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

Appellant makes no mention of this in his affidavit. We are thus left with no competent evidence
of any anxiety he may feel about that. Finally, even if there were competent evidence, that
anxiety would be the result of the loss of part of the package, not of the delay in post-trial
processing. There was thus no cognizable prejudice, which weighs in the Government’s favor.

       Balancing the factors together, and noting that the delay was not “so egregious that
tolerating it would adversely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the
military justice system,” Toohey, 63 M.J. at 362, we conclude there was no due process
violation.

       We turn now to whether we should grant relief under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ, and United
States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002). Even in the absence of a due process violation,
this Court may grant appropriate relief if an appellant demonstrates “excessive delay in the
processing of the court-martial after the judgment was entered into the record . . . .” Art.
66(d)(2), UCMJ. We decline to do so. Unlike other cases where we noted the potential for
cognizable prejudice but an appellant’s difficulty substantiating it, see, e.g., United States v.
Guzman, 79 M.J. 856, 868 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2020), here, we believe there was no cognizable
prejudice. Furthermore, unlike other cases where we found that unexplained delay “indicat[es] a
lack of institutional diligence,” Grijalva, 83 M.J. at 677, we see no such indications in this case.

                                              Decision
       We determine that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and, on the basis
of the entire record, should be approved. Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the sentence, as
approved below, are affirmed.

Chief Judge McCLELLAND and Judge PARKER concur.

                                                                For the Court,
                                                         VALDES.SARAH Digitally signed by
                                                                       VALDES.SARAH.P.1503854704

                                                         .P.1503854704 Date: 2023.11.15 10:51:36
                                                                       -05'00'

                                                                Sarah P. Valdes
                                                                Clerk of the Court

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