Court Opinion

ID: 9891124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 16:10:12.109505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:09.779163
License: Public Domain

J-A19038-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  BAXTER MCLINDON HAYES, III AND               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  JARROD TYSON HAYES                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  BAXTER MCLINDON HAYES, JR. AND               :
  UTILIPATH HOLDINGS, INC.                     :   No. 1798 EDA 2022
                                               :
                       Appellants              :

              Appeal from the Judgment Entered July 12, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                 No(s): September Term, 2017, No. 001253

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                        FILED OCTOBER 17, 2023

       Baxter McLindon Hayes, Jr. (Hayes Jr.) and Utilipath Holdings, Inc.

(collectively, Appellants) appeal from the judgment entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) in the amount of

$97,536.86 in favor of Hayes Jr.’s sons, Baxter McLindon Hayes, III

(McLindon) and Jarrod Tyson Hayes (Jarrod) (collectively, Appellees) following

a bench trial in this breach of contract case.           Because we agree with

Appellants’ contention that Appellees failed to establish the element of

damages, we reverse the trial court’s verdict and vacate the July 12, 2022

judgment.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A19038-23

                                               I.

                                               A.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. In

2003, the Appellees and their father Hayes Jr. formed Utilipath, LLC, a

company that offered utility locating services to telecommunication companies

such as AT&T and commercial wiring services for offices. In 2013, the three

men decided to sell Utilipath to non-party NewSpring Mezzanine Capital II,

L.P. (NewSpring) for approximately $13 million dollars.1 Within months of the

sale, NewSpring sued the parties for misrepresentation and related claims in

the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and in the

Chancery Court of the State of Delaware.

       On March 29, 2014, the parties executed an Amended and Restated

Joint Defense and Common Interest Agreement (the Agreement) to prepare

for the NewSpring litigation. Their stated goal was to work cooperatively to

advance their common interests in formulating strategy and to share the costs

of developing mutually beneficial materials.        At that time, Appellees were

____________________________________________

1 Appellant Utilipath Holdings, Inc. was formed when Utilipath LLC was sold to

NewSpring in order to operate independently in the commercial wiring field
and this entity was not a component of the sale. The trial court found that
Hayes Jr. had a larger ownership stake in Utilipath Holdings than his two sons,
but that the actual ownership composition of the entity has no relevance to its
decision because the joint defense agreement was entered by the men in their
individual capacities and not as officers or agents of Utilipath Holdings. (See
Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/22, at n.1, 5).

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represented by Kutak Rock, LLP and Appellants were represented by Kang

Haggerty & Fetbroyt, LLC.      The Agreement provided in pertinent part as

follows:

      3. Common Interest Materials. The Parties and their counsel
      agree that it is in their individual and mutual best interest in the
      defense of the Litigation (and any anticipated potential litigation)
      and prosecution of legal claims they may assert related to the
      subjects of their common interest, to share information
      (“Common Interest Materials”).         Common Interest Materials
      include, but is not limited to: (i) communications (in writing and
      orally) by or among any of the Parties and/or their counsel, (ii) all
      information and communications with or relating to prospective
      witnesses, as well as consulting experts, testifying experts or
      litigation support service providers who may be engaged by the
      Parties or their counsel to assist in defense of the Litigation, (iii)
      disclosure of documents, factual and legal analyses, summaries,
      memoranda, mental impressions, opinions, legal strategies,
      interview reports and reports of experts, consultants or
      investigators, and (iv) joint meetings between counsel, the
      Parties, their representatives, employees and agents and any
      meetings with prospective witnesses or consulting experts or
      litigation support service providers in connection with the
      Litigation or other subjects of Common Interest in person, by
      telephone or in any other form, including all records, notes or
      reports of such communications all of which are included within
      the term “Common Interest Materials.”

                                   *    *    *

      8. Coordinating Counsel and Shared Expenses. The Parties
      and their counsel agree that Kutak Rock, LLP shall serve as
      coordinating counsel for the Parties in connection with the defense
      of the Litigation with primary responsibility for (i) the collection
      and management of shared Common Interest Materials, including
      all documents which may be subject to discovery in the Litigation
      pursuant to written protocols (the “Protocols”) approved by
      counsel to the Parties, (ii) management and administration of
      all hard costs incurred for the benefit of the Parties in the
      Litigation, including without limitation, litigation support
      services, experts and local counsel (“Shared Expenses”) all
      of which the Parties agree shall be shared 2/3 by the

                                       -3-
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     Parties which are clients of Kutak Rock, LLP and 1/3 by the
     Parties that are clients of Kang Haggerty & Fetbroyt, LLC,
     and (iii) formulating recommendations as to legal strategies for
     the defense of the Litigation and assertion of legal rights on behalf
     of the Parties.

(Agreement, 3/29/14, at 2) (emphasis added).

     The parties incurred substantial litigation costs through use of various

professional services, including those of Asterion, Inc., a large national

forensic accounting firm (Asterion), which developed expert evidence

important to the parties’ defense against NewSpring. The Asterion costs and

other expenses were billed to the parties through their respective law firms,

with 2/3 invoiced to Appellees and 1/3 to Appellants in accordance with the

Agreement. Kang Haggerty billed Appellants directly for their costs.

     Disagreement as to the handling of the litigation arose between the

parties based on what Hayes Jr. viewed as Asterion’s high costs, his sons’

employment of marketing consultants and the legal fees charged by Kang

Haggerty. On March 20, 2015, he retained current counsel Clifford E. Haines,

Esq., who entered his appearance in the underlying NewSpring litigation.

Appellees continued to be represented by Kutak Rock and they reached a

settlement with NewSpring in March of 2016 with a payment of approximately

$650,000.     (See N.T. Trial, 7/23/21, at 58).        Conversely, Hayes Jr.

successfully litigated a trial against NewSpring, with no sum owed.

     Eventually Asterion filed two lawsuits, one against McLindon and Jarrod

and one against Hayes Jr. only, which were captioned Asterion, Inc. v. Baxter

                                     -4-
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McLindon Hayes, III and Jarrod Tyson Hayes, No. 1709004 (Pa. C.P., Phila.

Co.) and Asterion, Inc. v. Baxter McLindon Hayes, Jr., No. 171003958 (Pa.

C.P., Phila. Co.).

                                       B.

      Appellees filed a complaint against Appellants in October of 2018

alleging failure to pay 1/3 of all litigation costs as required by the Agreement.

Appellees maintained they paid for the majority of the work, costs and legal

fees associated with the NewSpring litigation, including the taking of

numerous depositions and preparation of court filings.

      The trial court held a two-day bench trial during which Appellees

provided documents and testimony showing that they had paid approximately

$261,313 towards the litigation costs concerning the NewSpring litigation.

(See N.T. Trial, 7/22/21, at 154-165). Regarding the Asterion costs, Jarrod

testified that he and his brother disputed the total amount Asterion charged

as excessive, and when Asterion sued for unpaid fees, they settled the lawsuit

for $80,000, with half of the settlement amount paid by each brother. (See

N.T. Trial, 7/23/21, at 37-38). However, it was admitted that Asterion did not

seek to hold them accountable for any unpaid amounts attributable to Hayes

Jr. but were being separately sued by Asterion only for their 2/3 share of

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Asterion’s unpaid balance, not for Hayes Jr.’s 1/3 share.         (R. 1669a, R.

1670a).2

       On February 23, 2022, the trial court entered its verdict of $81,395.65

against Hayes Jr. representing the remaining balance of his proportionate

share of the forensic accounting work performed by Asterion because he had

benefitted from that work, which gave substance to the merits of his defense.

It also awarded Appellees $15,591.86 representing hard costs for postage,

process service, subpoenas, JT Acceleration’s consulting fees, parking, “Abstar

CD4 Tife” , Xerox Hosting, data copying of Utilipath’s devices, courier services

and Eli Levin consulting services that were billed to McLindon because

Appellants used the products of these hard costs in its successful defense.3

       Hayes. Jr. filed post-trial motions on March 7, 2022, which the trial court

denied on June 13, 2022.4 Judgment was entered on the trial court’s verdict

____________________________________________

2 No evidence was offered by Hayes Jr. regarding the status of the Asterion

lawsuit against him.

3 The trial court attached to its opinion two tables separating the Asterion
charges (Table 1) from the additional hard costs (Table 2) charged to Hayes
Jr., the amounts he paid towards these expenses, and the amounts it found
are due by him. The Tables show that Hayes Jr. stopped making payments
towards the end of 2014/beginning of 2015, approximately nine months after
the Agreement was executed. The trial court found that Hayes Jr. paid
$14,214.00 towards the Asterion costs, with a balance owed to his sons of
$81,395.65 for these charges. (See Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5).

4 Appellees and the trial court maintain that this appeal should be quashed as

untimely because Appellants’ post-trial motion was not timely filed. However,
we agree with Appellants that the post-trial motion was timely, as the ten-day
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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on July 12, 2022.       Appellants timely appealed and the trial court filed an

opinion on December 13, 2022. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

                                               II.

       Appellants’ core contention is that Appellees failed to establish the

damages element of their breach of contract claim because they presented no

evidence demonstrating they sustained any loss or harm flowing from any

purported breach of the Agreement.                   Appellants contest the trial court’s

interpretation of Section 8(ii) of the Agreement governing payment of shared

expenses and maintain that, at most, Appellees demonstrated harm to third

party vendors of litigation services but not to themselves, and should not be

awarded damages. (See Appellants’ Brief, at 24-42).5

____________________________________________

deadline expired on Saturday, March 5, and weekend dates are omitted from
time computation for timeliness purposes. See Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c)(1), 106(b).

5 When reviewing a judgment entered following a bench trial, we limit our
review to:

       a determination of whether the findings of the trial court are
       supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court
       committed error in the application of law. Findings of the trial
       judge in a non-jury case must be given the same weight and effect
       on appeal as a verdict of a jury and will not be disturbed on appeal
       absent error of law or abuse of discretion. When this Court
       reviews the findings of the trial judge, the evidence is viewed in
       the light most favorable to the victorious party below and all
       evidence and proper inferences favorable to that party must be
       taken as true and all unfavorable inferences rejected.

Discover Bank v. Booker, 259 A.3d 493, 495 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation
omitted).

                                           -7-
J-A19038-23

                                               A.

       “It is well-established that three elements are necessary to plead a

cause of action for breach of contract:             (1) the existence of a contract,

including its essential terms; (2) a breach of the contract; and (3) resultant

damages.” Kelly v. Carman Corp., 229 A.3d 634, 653 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citation omitted). Where one party to a contract breaches it without legal

justification, the other party is entitled to recover the damages sustained,

provided: “(1) they were such as would naturally and ordinarily result from

the breach, or (2) they were reasonably foreseeable and within the

contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract, and (3) they

can be proved with reasonable certainty.” Helpin v. Trustees of Univ. of

Pennsylvania, 10 A.3d 267, 270 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted). The purpose

of a damage award is to place the non-breaching party “as nearly as possible

in the same position it would have occupied had there been no breach.” Id.

(citation omitted).6

____________________________________________

6 Because our review involves interpretation of the parties’ Agreement, we are

mindful that “where an agreement contains definitions for the words contained
therein, the court will apply those definitions in interpreting the agreement.”
Toth v. Toth, 2023 WL 4875220, at *11 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 1, 2023).
Additionally, we are guided by the following cannons of contract
interpretation:

       First, the entire contract should be read as a whole to give effect
       to its true purpose. Second, a contract must be interpreted to
       give effect to all of provisions. . . . Third, a word used by the
       parties in one sense is to be interpreted as employed in the same
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
J-A19038-23

                                               B.

       In this case, the parties entered the Agreement for the express purpose

of coordinating and sharing the litigation costs involved in defending against

NewSpring in two forums. Section 8 of the Agreement obligated Appellants

to pay 1/3 and Appellees to pay 2/3 of the hard costs accrued in connection

with the NewSpring litigation. (See Agreement at 3-4, Section 8(ii)). These

hard costs include, “without limitation”, litigation support services and expert

materials. Similar language is included in Section 3, which defines common

interest materials to “include, but is not limited to . . . all information and

communications with or relating to prospective witnesses, as well as

consulting experts, testifying experts or litigation support service providers

who may be engaged by the Parties or their counsel to assist in defense of the

Litigation” as well as expert reports. (Agreement, at 2 Section 3(ii)-(iii)).

       While this Agreement provides that Appellants are to pay 1/3 and

Appellees are to pay 2/3 of the litigation costs, it does not provide that each

party shall be liable for the other party’s share. In fact, Asterion billed and

sued Appellants and Appellees for its services separately based on their

____________________________________________

       sense throughout the writing in the absence of countervailing
       reasons, such as thwarting the intent of the agreement. And,
       finally, a party’s performance under the terms of a contract is
       evidence of the meaning of those terms.

Id. (citation omitted).

                                           -9-
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proportionate share.        Moreover, Asterion’s action against Appellees was

settled for the remaining amount based on their 2/3 share. It did not purport

to settle Asterion’s claim against Appellants for their remaining 1/3 share.

       Furthermore, while the trial court found that Appellants benefitted from

the expert reports produced by Asterion and other expenses incurred in

defending against the NewSpring litigation, just because Appellants received

some benefit from Asterion’s work does not mean that Hayes Jr. is obligated

to pay Appellees for costs that they incurred. That is a quantum meruit claim

which was not pled.7 Even if it had been, a quantum meruit claim cannot be

used to vary or supplement the terms of an agreement to make the parties

responsible for payments made by the other party for which separately they

are responsible to pay. See Ruby v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 50 A.3d 128

(Pa. Super. 2012).

____________________________________________

7 A claim for damages in quantum meruit is fundamentally an equitable claim

of unjust enrichment in which the party seeking recovery must demonstrate:

       (1) [the] benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff; (2)
       appreciation of such benefits by defendant; and (3) acceptance
       and retention of such benefits under such circumstances that it
       would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without
       payment of value. The application of the doctrine depends on the
       particular factual circumstances of the case at issue.         In
       determining if the doctrine applies, our focus is not on the
       intention of the parties, but rather on whether the defendant has
       been unjustly enriched.

Shafer Elec. & Const. v. Mantia, 96 A.3d 989, 993 (Pa. 2014) (citations
omitted).

                                          - 10 -
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       Similarly, the $15,591.86 the trial court also awarded to Appellees due

to Appellants’ failure to pay expenses invoiced by Kang Haggerty were also

billed separately to Appellants, making them liable for those costs. Moreover,

Appellees did not claim that they were individually responsible for those bills

or that they made payments to Kang Haggerty for any of those litigation costs.

Moreover, to the extent that third party litigation vendors were harmed, those

entities are neither parties to the Agreement nor to this litigation. Therefore,

any purported harm flowing to them can have no bearing on our disposition,

which involves only an analysis of damages or lack thereof to Appellees.

       Accordingly, because Appellees have failed to establish that they have

sustained any such damages from any breach of the Agreement, we reverse

the trial court’s verdict and vacate the July 12, 2022 judgment against

Appellants.8

       Verdict reversed. Judgment vacated. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/17/2023
____________________________________________

8 As resolution of this issue is dispositive, we need not address Appellants’
remaining claims on appeal.

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