Court Opinion

ID: 9517466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:17:52.802354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:54.339731
License: Public Domain

(dissenting). The only liability issue in this case was whether the defendant was negligent. It was stipulated that the plaintiff-driver was not negligent. Since the jury found the defendant non-negligent, the accident must be categorized as an unavoidable accident or an “act of God or nature” case. Black’s Law Dictionary in defining “accident” refers the reader to “act of God” when negligence is not involved. Given the facts in this case, I sincerely doubt this court wants to apply the theory that such incidents on icy roads can occur without anyone’s fault.
Consider the scenario of this case as testified to by the defendant:
(1) The defendant knew it was sleeting while traveling and that the roads were slippery and stated: “On icy conditions, you shouldn’t be on the road at all. You should be at home, not on the road.”
(2) The defendant answered affirmatively that he recognized the need to control his car’s speed on slippery roads.
(3) The plaintiffs’ car which was in front of the defendant’s car was stopped before and on impact.
(4) The defendant saw the brake lights of the plaintiffs’ car come on before impact.
*460(5) When asked how close he was to the plaintiffs’ car when he saw the brake lights come on, defendant answered: “I don’t know exactly how far, but it wasn’t too far. I wouldn’t know how far it was, that’s for sure. We were all driving, as you say, bumper to bumper.”
(6) The defendant claimed he was not going “much more than ten miles an hour” when he “slammed” on his brakes. Later he testified, “I don’t know how many miles [an hour] I went. I know I wasn’t going fast . . . .” When asked if he was going too fast when he applied his brakes, the defendant responded: “Well, if it had been a dry road, it would have been no problem.”
(7) When the defendant applied his brakes, his car slid and his front bumper went under the plaintiffs’ car’s rear bumper.
(8) Damage to the defendant’s car consisted of a cracked grille and a punctured radiator rendering the car inoperable.
The majority reasons: “The jury could, from the evidence, conclude that [the defendant] had acted reasonably as an intelligent and prudent person . . . .” P. 454. I disagree with that analysis. By the defendant’s own statement, he knew of the slippery conditions on the road and admitted that if it had been a dry road, there would have been no problem. That in itself was the problem — it was not a dry road; it was a slippery road. By driving with an inappropriate distance between cars at too high a speed, the defendant was forced to slam on his brakes. All of these factors indicate that the defendant was not operating his vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver should under similar circumstances. His actions before sliding and the accident were negligent as a matter of law. Since the plaintiff-driver, by stipulation, was not negligent, the defendant was 100 percent causally negligent. Therefore, the plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict should have been granted. The jury *461verdict was inconsistent with the uncontroverted facts of defendant’s negligence as stated by the defendant.
If, as the trial court, court of appeals and this court concluded, this incident could occur as the jury found without fault, then it must be viewed as an unavoidable accident. However, we know from the evidence, including the defendant’s testimony, that all other drivers in the line operating cars under the same slippery conditions were able to control and stop their vehicles without striking any other vehicle. Therefore, it was an avoidable accident. All that was required of the defendant was reasonable, non-negligent operation of his vehicle. However, by his own testimony, the defendant was not operating his vehicle as were the other reasonable drivers under the same conditions.
In the majority’s attempt to minimize the negligent actions of the defendant, it is even willing to take judicial notice that “damage to a stationary vehicle when struck by another vehicle even at a low speed barely in excess of five miles an hour may be substantial.” P. 454. As an initial matter, the defendant was going ten miles per hour. In addition, “substantial” is a vague term and it is not clear to me whether the term refers to actual physical damage or the economic cost of repair in inflationary times. In all, I do not believe the majority’s assertion to be a matter of common knowledge. Defendant’s car sustained a cracked grille and a punctured radiator. The damage to the plaintiffs’ car was also considerable. The jury awarded $500 property damage for plaintiffs’ car. However, that was the total value of the car before impact. The damage done to plaintiffs’ car was estimated to be between $710 and $790 with the front and rear bumpers needing to be replaced and the frame to be straightened. In effect, the plaintiffs’ car was a total loss. That fact gives the most accurate estimate of the physical impact sustained.
*462I recognize that we said in Abbott v. Truck Ins. Exchange Co., 33 Wis. 2d 671, 148 N.W.2d 116 (1967) :
“While this may be a novel case or the rare case where a jury finds there is no negligence on the part of either the plaintiff or the defendant, the jury’s verdict cannot be upset because of its novelty or rarity or upon a distribution-of-the-risk theory that someone must be found guilty of negligence in every accident.” Id. at 678.
However, in this case, as stipulated, the plaintiff-driver was not negligent and the defendant by his own statements was 100 percent negligent.
We also said in Lembke v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 243 Wis. 531, 535, 11 N.W.2d 169, 12 N.W.2d 18 (1943) : “It is the duty of an automobile operator to exercise ordinary care with respect to his speed and control, but the law does not impose upon him the absolute duty not to injure or endanger any person or his property.”
However, the law in Wisconsin as reflected in Wis. J.I. —Civil, Part 1,1005 states:
“A person is negligent when he fails to exercise ordinary care. Ordinary care is the degree of care which the great mass of mankind ordinarily exercises under the same or similar circumstances. A person fails to exercise ordinary care when, without intending to do any wrong, he does an act or omits a precaution under circumstances in which a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to foresee that such act or omission will subject him or his property, or the person or property of another to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage.”
This defendant did not exercise ordinary care which the great mass of mankind ordinarily exercises while driving on slippery, sleet-covered streets. Since the defendant was aware of the icy road conditions, he was “required to exercise a degree of care commensurate with such conditions.” Wis. J.I. — Civil, Part I, 1280. The defendant failed to exercise that proper degree of care.
*463Since the plaintiff-driver was admittedly not negligent in this case, the comparative negligence instruction was not given. That was unfortunate, though correct. Wis. J.I. — Civil, Part II, 1580 speaks of the “fault” of each party. Perhaps if the jury had been specifically advised that the issue was whose fault caused the impact, the jury verdict would have been a more reasonable one.
Due to icy road conditions, the trial court was asked to give Wis. J.I. — Civil, Part I, 1285, “Speed: Reasonable and Prudent; Reduced Speed.”1 The trial court refused to give this instruction ruling that Wis. J.I. — Civil, Part I, 1112, which was given, was sufficient. That was an incorrect ruling. Wis. J.I. — Part I, 1112, refers to the operation of an automobile following another.2 The con*464dition of the highway is only one factor that the jury is told to consider in determining whether a car is following another one too closely. That instruction is not specific enough to be sufficient for the facts of this case.
Civil instruction No. 1285 refers to “under the conditions and having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing.” Later in the next paragraph of No. 1285, the instruction states :
“The statute also provides that the driver shall, consistent with the requirements I have j ust stated, drive at an appropriate reduced speed . . . when special hazards exist with regard to other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.”
Instruction No. 1285 should have been given in addition to No. 1112, since No. 1112 does not deal with weather conditions and reduced speed related to such conditions.
In Zillmer v. Miglautsch, 35 Wis. 2d 691, 698-99, 151 N.W.2d 741 (1967), we set out the tests to be used by a trial court when determining whether to grant a motion for a directed verdict.
“A case should be taken from the jury and a verdict directed against a party:
“ ‘ . only when the evidence gives rise to no dispute as to the material issues or only when the evidence is so clear and convincing as reasonably to permit unbiased and impartial minds to come to but one conclusion.” ’ Anderson v. Joint School Dist. (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 580, 583, 129 N.W.2d 545, 130 N.W.2d 105, citing Smith v. Pabst (1940), 233 Wis. 489, 288 N.W. 780, and Rusch Sentinel-News Co. (1933), 212 Wis. 530, 533, 250 N.W. 405.
*465“Also:
“ ‘A verdict ought to be directed if, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances as they appear in evidence, there is but one inference or conclusion that can be reached by a reasonable man.’ ” Milwaukee v. Bichel, ante, p. 66, 150 N.W.2d 419.
“In determining whether or not the trial court was in error in failing to direct the verdict, this court must take that view of the evidence which is most favorable to the party (the plaintiff in this case) against whom the verdict was sought to be directed. Schumacher v. Klabunde (1963), 19 Wis. 2d 83, 87, 119 N.W.2d 457; Mueller v. O’Leary (1935), 216 Wis. 585, 587, 257 N.W. 161. If there is any evidence to sustain a defense or a cause of action, the case must be submitted to the jury. Kielich v. Whittaker (1924), 183 Wis. 470, 198 N.W. 270. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence is for the jury (Jolitz v. Fintch (1938), 229 Wis. 256, 261, 282 N.W. 87), as is the weight to be given to the witness’ positive or negative testimony. Conrardy v. Sheboygan County (1956), 273 Wis. 78, 82, 76 N.W.2d 560. Furthermore, it is basic that the credibility of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are matters for the jury. Braatz v. Continental Casualty Co. (1956), 272 Wis. 479, 487, 76 N.W.2d 303. If there is any evidence other than mere conjecture or incredible evidence to support a contrary verdict, the case must go to the jury. Larson v. Splett (1954), 267 Wis. 473, 66 N.W.2d 181. Incredible evidence is evidence in conflict with the uniform course of nature or with fully established or conceded facts. Davis v. Skille (1961), 12 Wis. 2d 482, 107 N.W.2d 458; Czerniakowski v. National Ice & Coal Co. (1948), 252 Wis. 112, 31 N.W.2d 156.
“The stringency of these tests is such that this court has cautioned trial courts against granting motions for directed verdicts in close cases and recommends as the better practice the reservation of a ruling on the motion until after the jury has returned its verdict. Davis v. Skille, supra, page 490; Rasmussen v. Garthus (1961), 12 Wis. 2d 203, 209, 107 N.W.2d 264; Koczka v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1966), 29 Wis. 2d 395, 399, 138 N.W.2d 737.”
*466When applying- our review of the trial court’s failure to direct the verdict for the plaintiff, even after the jury returned its verdict in favor of the defendant, it becomes apparent that the trial court was in error. We held in Bishop v. Johnson, 36 Wis. 2d 64, 152 N.W.2d 887 (1967) :
“There is no question the trial court has the power to direct a verdict when the evidence is so clear and convincing as reasonably to permit unbiased and impartial minds to come to but one conclusion. Sailing v. Wallestad (1966), 32 Wis. 2d 435, 145 N.W.2d 725. When the evidence is of such a nature, only a question of. law is presented and if the evidence is presented to the jury and it does not reach the ‘one conclusion,’ the court has the power to set aside such verdict. McCauley v. International Trading Co. (1954), 268 Wis. 62, 66 N.W.2d 663.” Id. at 68.
Also, Wappler v. Schneck, 178 Wis. 632, 641-42, 190 N.W. 555 (1922) stated:
“It is only when proof is so clear and decisive, and the facts and circumstances are unambiguous and there is no room for fair and honest difference of opinion, that the court may take the case from the jury or pronounce upon the question of negligence as a matter of law. This rule is so familiar and has been so often declared by this court that it is unnecessary to cite the authorities.”
In the instant case, the evidence in the form of the defendant’s own testimony was so clear and decisive that the trial court had the duty to direct the verdict as to liability in the plaintiffs’ favor notwithstanding the jury verdict. There was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could draw the inference that the defendant was not negligent.
Alternatively, I believe the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant the plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial in the interests of justice. A new trial may be granted in the interest of justice if the verdict is *467against the great weight of the evidence, even though there is sufficient credible evidence to support the jury’s finding. Bartell v. Luedtke, 52 Wis. 2d 372, 377, 190 N.W.2d 145 (1971) ; Landrey v. United Services Auto. Asso., 49 Wis. 2d 150, 181 N.W.2d 407 (1970). The test on review is whether the trial court abused its discretion on ruling on the motion, and I would find in this case there was such abuse.
I would reverse the court of appeals.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICES ROLAND B. DAY and WILLIAM G. CALLOW join this dissenting opinion.

 Wis. J.I.-Civil, Part I, 1285 provides:
“A safety statute regulating speed of motor vehicles provides that no person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing, and that the driver shall exercise ordinary care to so regulate his rate of speed as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any object, person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and using due care.
“The statute also provides that the driver shall, consistent with the requirements I have just stated, drive at an appropriate reduced speed . . . (when special hazards exist with regard to other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions).
“Appropriate reduced speed as used in this instruction is a relative term and means less than the otherwise lawful speed. An appropriate reduced speed is that speed at which a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would drive under the same or similar circumstances.”

 Wis. J.I. — Civil, Part 1, 1112 provides:
“1112 OPERATION OP AUTOMOBILE FOLLOWING ANOTHER
“The statutes provide that the operator of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
“In determining whether or not the driver of the rear car was following the preceding vehicle more closely than was reasonable *464and prudent, you should consider the speed of both vehicles, the amount of traffic, condition of the highway and the condition of visibility then existing.
“It is the duty of the driver of the following car to exercise ordinary care to have his car under such control or to maintain such a distance behind the preceding vehicle as will enable him to stop his car and avoid a collision.”