Court Opinion

ID: 9770190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:54:05.019619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:15.705056
License: Public Domain

DRAUGHN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur that sanctions were warranted in this case, but write separately to state my views about the scope of Rule 215. I cannot accept the dissent’s restrictive conclusion that Rule 215 allows sanctions against an attorney for discovery abuses only when there is direct evidence that he specifically advised his client to violate some discovery order or process. Tex.R. *766Civ.P. 215. I view the wording of the rule to be more descriptive of the attorney’s responsibility for and relationship to his disobedient client rather than as an unduly limiting evidentiary requirement. I believe the rule permits the trial court to examine the attorney’s conduct to determine accountability for discovery abuses. The conduct to be examined can constitute action or inaction. The inquiry should not be whether the attorney specifically advised the client to thwart discovery. Rather, a court should inquire whether the attorney, by his conduct, permitted or aided the client in thwarting discovery. If the standard were otherwise, an attorney would seldom be sanctioned because, absent open antagonism between the attorney and client, who could testify that the attorney “advised” the client to violate discovery orders? Surely, not the attorney who could always plead privilege and assert: “I’m just the lawyer; I’m not responsible.”
I view the lawyer’s role under the rule as being more dynamic. His or her conduct must be such that it does not foster or encourage the client to engage in dilatory tactics. The attorney must take the initiative in assuring legitimate discovery processes are promptly completed and must insist that the client do likewise. The attorney must not, by action or inaction, inordinately delay or obstruct legitimate discovery efforts. Such conduct is reviewable by the trial court to determine whether sanctions are appropriate. On appeal, we must evaluate the trial court’s actions by a clear abuse of discretion standard. Brant-ley v. Etter, 677 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1984). Based on my review of the record in this case, I find the court did not abuse his discretion in determining that sanctions against the attorney were warranted.
Nonetheless, I have serious reservations about the amount of the attorneys fees assessed against appellant which are in excess of the amount prayed for in the pleadings. But given the purpose of such sanctions, to punish and to deter, and the clear abuse of discretion standard by which we must be guided, I cannot find from the record before us that the trial court abused his discretion in the amount he assessed.