Court Opinion

ID: 9715520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:07:41.915126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:35.513543
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RATHJE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Given the skeletal set of facts in the appeal at bar, the verdicts rendered were mutually inconsistent. The supreme court’s opinion in People v. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d 396 (1986), is dispositive in this case. See also People v. Mitchell, 238 Ill. App. 3d 1055 (1992). In Spears, the defendant was convicted of attempted murder, armed violence, and reckless conduct against his wife. These charges were based upon two gunshots. In affirming the appellate court’s order of a new trial on all counts, the Spears court held that the jury impermissibly concluded that defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly at the same time. The Spears court stated that "where a claim of inconsistent guilty verdicts involves multiple shots or victims, the question is whether the trier of fact could rationally find separable acts accompanied by mental states to support all of the verdicts as legally consistent.” Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 405. Spears advised courts of review to pay special attention to the charges against the defendant and the evidence adduced in relation to those charges. Moreover, the Spears court wrote in relevant part: "In what appears to be an alternative argument, the State contends that the requisite mental states for reckless conduct and armed violence based on aggravated battery — recklessness and knowledge, respectively — are not mutually inconsistent. This argument, as the State itself concedes, is at odds with our holding in Hoffer that recklessness and knowledge are mutually inconsistent culpable mental states. We find no merit in the State’s argument that Hoffer should be overruled on the ground that the mental state of knowledge 'includes’ the mental state of recklessness. The State clarifies what it means by 'includes’ in its erroneous assertion that 'a defendant who acts recklessly still acts knowingly.’ The fatal flaw in this argument is that it totally blurs the distinction between the mental state of knowledge and the less culpable mental state of recklessness by assuming that the two invariably coexist. A defendant acts with a reckless state of mind when he 'consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow.’ [Citation.] The statutory definition of recklessness does not contemplate that a defendant be 'practically certain’ of the result that his conduct will cause or consciously aware of the 'substantial probability’ that a material fact exists as required in the statutory definition of knowledge. [Citation.] Therefore, it does not follow, as the State has urged, that one who acts recklessly also acts knowingly.” (Emphasis added.) Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 407-08. In the instant appeal, the relevant count of the indictment stated in pertinent part: "[Defendant *** committed the offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm, in that [he] knowingly discharged a firearm *** in the direction of [the victim].” As noted above, neither the victim nor defendant testified at trial. Consequently, there was no direct evidence of the shooting which occurred late on November 14. The State’s evidence revealed that the victim was shot once, with the bullet entering near the base of her neck. The victim, who tested positive for cocaine and amphetamines and had a blood-alcohol level of 0.17, told paramedics that she had been shot twice. The police found a hole in the wall behind the bed on which the victim was found. Expert opinion indicated that the hole could have been caused by a .22-caliber bullet passing through it, although no bullet was found. Two spent .22-caliber cartridges and a .22-caliber pistol were found in the subject bedroom. The State’s closing argument reflected its theory that defendant had knowingly committed the alleged acts. The prosecution argued that, in order to shoot a gun, one must deliberately pull the trigger, and "[i]t is not an accident when a gun is fired two times.” Later, arguing intentional conduct on defendant’s part, the prosecutor stated: "What [defendant] intended to do is what happened. [Defendant] intended to shoot at her; and basically what the facts show in this case is after the first shot, [the victim] ducked, and [defendant] moved up and he shot her.” Also, the State extensively argued a theory that the two shots occurred in rapid succession and that the .22-caliber pistol was then thrown aside. Based upon this record, the jury could not have rationally found two separable acts accompanied by separate mental states. From the evidence given at trial, there is no way to determine whether the two gunshots were fired in rapid succession or whether they occurred at sufficient intervals to support guilty verdicts on separable acts based on differing mental states. Moreover, to allow the State to construct, with the benefit of hindsight, a theory of the case that it never charged or attempted to prove would be manifestly unfair. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 405. When the jury returned the inconsistent verdicts, it was incumbent upon the trial court to send the jury back for "further deliberations consistent with new instructions to resolve the inconsistency.” Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 410. The trial court failed to do so, and this cause should be remanded for a new trial on the aggravated discharge of a firearm and reckless conduct charges.