Court Opinion

ID: 9839095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 18:00:25.312205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:57.778499
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     TAMARA WILLIAMS,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-1221-16-0475-W-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: September 8, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Michelle F. Bercovici, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           David R. Scruggs, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction . For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the petition for review , VACATE the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Washington Regional Office for
     further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was a GS-14 Contract Specialist for the agency who resigned
     effective December 31, 2015. Williams v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB
     Docket No. DC-1221-16-0475-W-2, Appeal File (W-2 AF), Tab 10 at 8.                  On
     April 6, 2016, the appellant filed an IRA appeal and requested a hearing.
     Williams v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-16-
     0475-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2, 6-11. The administrative judge
     ordered the appellant to list the protected disclosures and personnel actions that
     she was claiming and identify the specific places in her Office of Special Counsel
     (OSC) complaint in which she raised these issues.         W-2 AF, Tabs 35-36. He
     instructed her to produce the lists in a particular format, specified the information
     that she was to include, and emphasized the need for brevity. W-2 AF, Tab 35.
     The appellant responded with a seven-page document setting forth 12 disclosures
     and 17 personnel actions. 2 W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5-11. She included nearly 900
     pages of exhibits. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 12-327, Tabs 42-46.
¶3         The case was subsequently reassigned to a different administrative judge,
     who issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
     because the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she made a
     protected disclosure. W-2 AF, Tab 50, Tab 51, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 10.
     The administrative judge did not address the list of personnel actions that the
     appellant submitted in response to the jurisdictional order. Instead, he addressed
     the appellant’s original OSC complaint in which she raised several alleged
     disclosures of improprieties in the agency’s handling of contracts. ID at 5-6. The

     2
      The appellant raised some of these alleged personnel actions as part of a hostile work
     environment claim, rather than as individual personnel actions in their own right.
     W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 10-11.
                                                                                        3

     administrative judge analyzed these claims and concluded that the appellant failed
     to raise a nonfrivolous allegation that she made an y protected disclosures. ID
     at 6-10.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review stating that the initial decision
     was in error and requesting that the Board hold the processing of her petition in
     abeyance pending the outcome of her equal employment opportunity complaints.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1at 4-7. She requests, alternatively, a 30-day
     extension to file a brief in support of her petition. Id. at 6. The agency has filed
     a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

                                         ANALYSIS
     The appellant’s request to hold the processing of her claim in abeyance is denied .
¶5         In her petition for review, the appellant requests that the Board refrain from
     ruling on her petition until the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
     (EEOC) has issued a final decision in a related case. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. She
     asserts that the resolution of her claims before the EEOC may render moot or
     resolve the issues in the instant appeal.       Id.   We disagree.     Although the
     appellant’s equal employment opportunity complaint may pertain to the same
     personnel actions at issue in her IRA appeal, the EEOC lacks ju risdiction over
     whistleblower claims, Ron W. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal
     No. 0120161855, 2016 WL 6156255, *3 (Oct. 11, 2016), and so the issues to be
     decided by the Board and the EEOC are necessarily distinct. Considering the
     Board’s statutory mandate to expedite the proceedings before it, 5 U.S.C.
     § 7701(i)(4), we find insufficient basis to grant the appellant’s request.
     Accordingly, her request is denied. The appellant’s request for an extension to
     file a supplemental briefing is also denied.          See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(b)
     (explaining that a petition for review must state a party’s objection to the initial
     decision, including all of the party’s factual and legal arguments).
                                                                                        4

     The appellant has established jurisdiction over her appeal.
¶6        The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant exhausts her
     administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegation s that:
     (1) she engaged in activity protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or (b)(9)(A)(i),
     (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the activity was a contributing factor in the agency ’s
     decision to take, fail to take, or threaten to take a personnel action as defined by
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).    Linder v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 6
     (2014). Once an appellant has established Board jurisdiction over her appeal, she
     is entitled to a hearing on the merits in which she will have the opportunity to
     prove her claim by preponderant evidence. Iyer v. Department of the Treasury,
     95 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 6 (2003), aff’d, 104 F. App’x 159 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
¶7        A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure is an allegation of facts
     that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a matter that a reasonable
     person in her position would believe evidenced one of the categories of
     wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).      Salerno v. Department of the
     Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 6 (2016).        To satisfy the contributing factor
     criterion at the jurisdictional stage, an appellant only need raise a nonfrivolous
     allegation that the fact of, or content of, the protected disclosure or activity was
     one factor that tended to affect the personnel action in any way. Id., ¶ 13. Under
     the knowledge/timing test, an appellant may nonfrivolously allege that the
     disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in a personnel action through
     circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official who took the personnel
     action knew of the disclosure or activity and that the personnel action occurred
     within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the
     disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action.       See
     5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 13.         In addition to the
     knowledge/timing test, there are other possible ways for an appellant to satisfy
     the contributing factor criterion.    See Dorney v. Department of the Army,
     117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶¶ 14-15 (2012) (explaining that other evidence relevant to the
                                                                                        5

     contributing factor criterion includes the strength or weakness of the agency’s
     reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the whistle blowing was
     personally directed at the proposing or deciding officials, and whether those
     officials had a desire or motive to retaliate).
¶8         On review, the appellant asserts, without explanation, that the initial
     decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law and contains erroneous
     findings of material fact. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-6. The appellant’s bare assertion
     fails to meet the Board’s requirements for the content of a petition for review.
     See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(b).      It constitutes mere disagreement with the initial
     decision and therefore provides no basis for us to disturb it.      See Weaver v.
     Department of the Navy, 2 M.S.P.R. 129, 133-34 (1980), review denied per
     curiam, 669 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1982).              Nevertheless, under     5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115(e), notwithstanding the sufficiency of a petition for review, the Board
     reserves the authority to consider any issue in an appeal before it. Based on our
     review of the record in this case, we find that the appellant has, in fact,
     established jurisdiction over her appeal and that a remand is warranted.        See
     Stoglin v. Department of the Air Force, 123 M.S.P.R. 163, ¶ 7 (2015) (finding
     that the issue of jurisdiction is always before the Board and may be raised at any
     time), aff’d, 640 F. App’x 864 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
¶9         In his initial decision, the administrative judge remarked on the appellant’s
     voluminous jurisdictional filings and stated that the Board is not obliged to pore
     through them to make sense of her claims, and that one whose submissions lack
     clarity runs the risk of being found not to have met her burden. ID at 5 & n.2.
     Although we agree with the administrative judge’s remarks in principle, he
     appears to have overlooked the listing of disclosures and personnel actions that
     the appellant filed in response to the jurisdictional order.     W-2 AF, Tab 41
     at 5-11. We find that the appellant prepared these lists in accordance with the
     administrative judge’s instructions and that they clearly set forth all the elements
                                                                                              6

      of her claims as necessary for us to make a jurisdictional determination. 3
      W-2 AF, Tabs 35-36, Tab 41 at 5-11.

            Disclosure 1
¶10         The appellant alleges that she made a protected disclosure several times
      between March 22 and May 9, 2013, concerning work on expired construction
      contracts. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5, Tab 44 at 6-7. Specifically, she claims she
      disclosed that the agency “improperly ordered to open 20 expired contracts, make
      modifications to the original scope of work, and extend the period of performance
      dates.” W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5. According to the appellant, the agency’s actions
      violated, among other things, the “bona fide needs rule” of 31 U.S.C. § 1502,
      which provides that “[t]he balance of an appropriation or fund limited for
      obligation to a definite period is available only for payment of expenses properly
      incurred during the period of availability . . . .” Id. at 5 & n.2. In other words,
      “[f]iscal year appropriations may properly be obligated only for bona fide needs
      actually existing within the fiscal year sought to be charged.” 33 Comp. Gen. 90
      (Aug. 20, 1953). The appellant explains that, if the agency uses expired funds to
      pay for additional work not required in the original contracts, it may violate the

      3
        Although our review of this case is at the jurisdictional stage, we note that certain of
      the appellant’s disclosures appear to reflect her belief that, if she had followed some of
      the agency’s instructions, she would have had to violate a law, rule, or regulation. At
      the time that the appellant filed this appeal, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D) made it a
      prohibited personnel practice to take an action against an employee for “refusing to
      obey an order that would require the individual to violate a law.” The U.S. Court of
      Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered this provision and held that “law” only
      included statutes, and not rules and regulations. See Rainey v. Merit Systems Protection
      Board, 824 F.3d 1359, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2016). However, on June 14, 2017, the
      President signed the Follow the Rules Act into law. Pub. L. No. 115 -40, 131 Stat. 861
      (2017). The Act amends section 2302(b)(9)(D) to provide whistleblower protection for
      individuals who refuse to obey an order that would require the violation of a law, rule ,
      or regulation. Nevertheless, the Board has determined that this expansion does not
      apply retroactively to cases pending at the time the Act was enacted, and so it does not
      change the analysis in this case. Fisher v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 11,
      ¶¶ 12-19.
                                                                                            7

      bona fide needs rule. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5 n.2. We find that the appellant has
      made a nonfrivolous allegation that she reasonably believed that she disclosed a
      violation of law. 4

             Disclosure 2
¶11         The appellant alleges that on June 25 and 26, 2013, she disclosed that an
      agency official signed and issued a notice to proceed for contactors to perform
      additional work even though this official lacked delegated contracting authority.
      W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5. She claims that the official’s actions violated 48 C.F.R.
      § 1.602-3(a), defining “unauthorized commitment” as an agreement that i s not
      binding solely because the Government representative who made it lacked the
      authority to do so. Id. However, we find that this subsection is definitional in
      nature and is therefore not capable of being violated. Furthermore, as set forth in
      the following subsection, there is no prohibition against creating unauthorized
      commitments. 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-3(b). Therefore, the appellant has not made a
      nonfrivolous allegation that she reasonably believed the agency committed any
      wrongdoing with respect to an unauthorized commitment.                   Nevertheless,
      construing the appellant’s allegation generously, it appears that she may be
      alleging a violation of 48 C.F.R. § 836.213-70(a), 5 which provides that a notice to
      proceed must be provided by the “contracting officer” for construction
      contractors to begin work. A contracting officer is a person with the authority to
      enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and to make related determinations
      and findings.    48 C.F.R. § 2.101.     The appellant asserts that the official who

      4
         The appellant also alleges that the agency’s actions violated other unspecified
      “principles,” including unspecified Federal Acquisition Regulations (codified in
      relevant part at 48 C.F.R. chapters 1, 8). W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5. This vague, conclusory
      allegation, even read in conjunction with the supporting materials that the appellant
      cites, does not rise to the level of a nonfrivolous allegation. See El v. Department of
      Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6 (2015), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
      5
       See 73 Fed. Reg. 2712-01, 2760 (Jan. 15, 2008). This regulation is no longer in effect.
      See 84 Fed. Reg. 9968-01, 9972 (Mar. 19, 2019).
                                                                                             8

      issued the notice to proceed was not a contracting officer and lacked delegated
      authority to act as one.          W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5.      We therefore find that the
      appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that she disclosed what she reasonably
      believed to be a violation of 48 C.F.R. § 836.213-70(a). See Kalil v. Department
      of Agriculture, 96 M.S.P.R. 77, ¶ 16 (2004) (finding that it is not always
      necessary to identify a specific law, rule, or regulation to make a nonfrivolous
      allegation of a protected disclosure concerning a violation of the same).

               Disclosure 3
¶12           The appellant alleges that on July 31 and August 1, 2013, she filed a hotline
      complaint with the agency’s Office of Inspector General, alleging various acts of
      agency malfeasance.        W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 6. Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C),
      disclosing information to an Inspector General, in accordance with applicable
      provisions of law, constitutes protected activity without regard to the contents of
      the disclosure.       We therefore find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that she engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C).

               Disclosure 4
¶13           The appellant alleges that, on August 6 and 23, 2013, she disclosed that two
      officials were serving in GS-13 contractor positions, and were acting as managers
      or     supervisors,     without    the   required   credentials   (Federal   Acquisition
      Certifications in Contracting).          W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 6.         According to the
      appellant’s complaint to OSC, this violates 41 U.S.C. § 433, 6 which authorizes
      the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) to establish requirements for
      jobs in the 1102 occupational series. Id. at 6, 18. We find that the law that the
      appellant cites merely authorizes the OFPP to establish qualifications for t he
      1102 job series, and could therefore not have been violated as she alleges.
      Furthermore, we have reviewed OFPP’s related materials, but we were not able to

      6
          Section 433 of Title 41 of the United States Code is now at 41 U.S.C. § 1703.
                                                                                         9

      locate a requirement that these GS-13 positions require the certifications in
      question. Office of Management and Budget, OFPP Letter 05-01, ¶ 8(b)(1)-(2)
      (Apr. 15, 2005), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/procurement_policy_
      letter_05-01 (last visited Sept. 7, 2023). We therefore find that the appellant has
      failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she reasonably believed that this
      disclosure evidenced a violation of law or any other categ ory of Government
      wrongdoing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).

            Disclosure 5
¶14        The appellant alleges that on September 24 and October 3, 2013, she
      disclosed that the agency was ordering her to sign a contract for a procurement
      that had not been conducted in accordance with the Federal Acquisition
      Regulations and in accordance with a recent audit from the Office of Inspector
      General.   W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 6. She alleges that this disclosure evidenced a
      violation of 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.602-1(b), 803.104-7(a), 803.602, 7 and Department of
      Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Handbook 1002.02,
      Minor Construction Program. 8      W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 6-7.        According to the
      appellant, the agency attempted to coerce her into signing a contract that was
      missing eight required pieces of information. W-2 AF, Tab 45 at 26. The record
      does not appear to contain adequate information for us to determine whether the
      contract in question actually required these eight pieces of information, or if they
      were in fact missing, as the appellant alleges.     However, the appellant is not
      required to prove her claim at the jurisdictional stag e—only to make a

      7
        Sections 803.104-7(a), 803.602 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations, see
      73 Fed. Reg. 2712-01, 2731 (Jan 15, 2008), are no longer in effect, see 83 Fed. Reg.
      16206-01, 16208 (Apr. 16, 2018).
      8
        The VHA has since rescinded the November 8, 2012 version of the Handbook in effect
      at the time of the appellant’s alleged disclosures. VHA Directive 1002.02, VHA Minor
      Construction Program at 1 (Aug. 23, 2022), https://www.va.gov/vhapublications/ViewP
      ublication.asp?pub_ID=9917 (last visited Sept. 7, 2023).
                                                                                      10

      nonfrivolous allegation thereof. Smart v. Department of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R.
      566, ¶ 9, aff’d, 157 F. App’x 260 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57. We find
      that if the facts that the appellant alleges are true, she could reasonably have
      concluded that the agency was ordering her to violate at least 48 C.F.R.
      §§ 1.602-1(b), which provides that no contract shall be entered into unless the
      contracting officer ensures that all legal requirements and other applicable
      procedures have been met. See Reid v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 508 F.3d
      674, 677 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding that protected disclosures may relate to
      imminent violations of law not yet carried out).

            Disclosure 6
¶15        The appellant alleges that between October 8 and 11, 2013, she disclosed
      that she was issued a performance appraisal for a period of less than 90 days.
      W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 7. She claims that the agency’s actions violated 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(12), the applicable collective bargaining agreement, and provisions of
      VA Directive 5013. Id. It is not clear to us how the appellant’s allegations, even
      if true, could evidence a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(12), which prohibits
      personnel actions that violate laws concerning the merit syst em principles of
      5 U.S.C. § 2301(b). However, we find that the appellant might have reasonably
      believed that the agency’s actions were in violation of VA Directive 5013/8, Pt. I,
      § 7(a), https://www.va.gov/vapubs/viewPublication.asp?Pub_ID=211 (last visited
      Sept. 7, 2023), which provides that “[t]he minimum appraisal period is
      90 calendar days under a performance plan.” The record seems to show that the
      agency issued the appellant two interim performance appraisals for periods of less
      than 90 days. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 294, 297. Although the Directive appears to
      apply the 90-day minimum appraisal period only to final appraisals, we find that
      the appellant, who is presumably not well versed in Federal personnel law, could
      nevertheless have reasonably understood the requirement to apply to interim
                                                                                         11

      appraisals as well. 9 See Mithen v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R.
      489, ¶ 24 (2015) (finding that a disclosure that does not identify any actual
      wrongdoing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) is nevertheless protected if the appellant
      reasonably believed that it did), aff’d, 652 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We
      therefore find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected
      disclosure based on her belief that the agency had violated VA Directive 5013/8,
      Pt. I, § 7(a).

             Disclosure 7
¶16         The appellant alleges that on October 31 and November 1, 2013, she
      disclosed various acts of agency malfeasance to the Office of Inspector General.
      W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 7. We find that the appellant’s disclosure of information to an
      Inspector    General   would    constitute   protected   activity   under    5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C). 10 We therefore find that she has made a nonfrivolous allegation
      that these communications with the Inspector General constituted protected
      activity.

             Disclosure 8
¶17         The appellant alleges that on January 16, 2014, she disclosed to agency
      officials that an agency employee had been acting outside the scope of her
      authority and misrepresenting herself as a contract ing officer before the U.S.
      Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 8. She alleges that, in
      this same disclosure, she reported that her reviewing official had downgraded her

      9
        Our finding is supported by the absence of any clear indication on the performance
      appraisal documents that they constituted interim ratings. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 292-98.
      Furthermore, when the appellant raised her concerns to her superior, the Director of
      Contracting, it appears that he was unable to provide her an answer without assistance
      from Human Resources. W-2 AF, Tab 46 at 490-91.
      10
        The language of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) was expanded by the National Defense
      Authorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1238 (2017). This expansion,
      however, does not affect the analysis here.
                                                                                      12

      performance evaluation based on the improper “unacceptable” rating given by her
      rating official. Id. The appellant explained in her OSC complaint that the rating
      official’s mid-year rating had been retracted, but the reviewing official relied
      upon it despite that fact. Id. at 18.
¶18         Regarding the first of these allegations, we find that, if an agency official
      had misrepresented her position to the U.S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals,
      the appellant could reasonably conclude that some law, rule, or regulation had
      been violated. Kalil, 96 M.S.P.R. 77, ¶ 16. We therefore find that she has made
      a nonfrivolous allegation of the same.
¶19         As to the second allegation, it appears that the gravamen of this claim is
      that the appellant believed that her performance rating was the product of
      whistleblower retaliation. W-2 AF, Tab 46 at 21. In other words, she is alleging
      that she disclosed a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Whether the appellant
      can prove that she had a reasonable belief of this may depend largely on whether
      she can prove by preponderant evidence that she reasonably believed that any of
      the activities or disclosures discussed above were protected. In any event, we
      find that she has alleged sufficient facts at this stage to support a nonfrivolous
      allegation.

            Disclosure 9
¶20         The appellant alleges that between May 21 and 28, 2014, she disclosed that
      the Director of Contracting assigned her to take over the responsibilities of two
      positions—supervisor of the Washington, D.C. Commodities Team and supervisor
      of the Martinsburg, West Virginia Commodities Team. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 8.
      She claims that this action was improper because the Director failed to provide
      her with “adequate resources or compensation” and failed to document the action
      officially via a Standard Form 50 or 52. Id. She also asserts that the Director’s
      actions were contrary to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) requirements
      and were in retaliation for protected whistleblowing. Id. The appellant has not
      cited to any law, rule, regulation, or practice that would prohibit the agency from
                                                                                       13

      assigning her additional employees to supervise without additional compensat ion.
      Nor has she explained what OPM “requirements” were violated or why she
      believes that the agency’s action required additional documentation.            The
      appellant has given us no reason to doubt that assigning her this additional work
      was, in itself, within the agency’s sound discretion and lawful authority.
      Nevertheless, to the extent that the appellant reasonably believed that the
      assignment of additional duties was retaliatory under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), and
      she actually disclosed this belief, her disclosure may have been protected. We
      therefore find that she has raised a nonfrivolous allegation in connection with this
      disclosure.

            Disclosure 10
¶21         The appellant alleges that on June 16, 2014, she disclosed that the Director
      would be violating the agency’s whistleblower protection policy by issuing a
      letter of counseling to a Junior Contract Specialist because she believed the letter
      to be retaliatory or otherwise improper. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 8. The Director had
      ordered the appellant to prepare the letter based on that Contract Specialist’s
      alleged failure to follow instructions.    W-2 AF, Tab 46 at 56.     The appellant
      prepared the letter and returned it to the Director for his signature , but the
      Director replied that the appellant would be the one signing the letter. Id.
      at 53-55. The appellant refused to sign the letter, stating that she had no direct
      involvement in the matter, she was unsure that the Contract Specialist actually
      had committed any wrongdoing, and issuing the letter would violate the
      Whistleblower Protection Act. Id. at 53.
¶22         Having reviewed the information that the appellant had at the time the
      Director ordered her to execute the letter of counseling, we find that she has
      failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she reasonably believed that the
      agency was committing any type of wrongdoing covered under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8)(A). Specifically, the Contract Specialist in que stion approached a
      contractor at the Washington, D.C. VA Medical Center and questioned the
                                                                                        14

      contractor’s presence in the facility, demanding to see the contract that authorized
      him to be there. Id. at 62-63. Word of this encounter reached the Director, wh o
      emailed the Contract Specialist and told him that they needed to speak about it.
      The Contract Specialist replied, with copies to several Senior Executive Service
      (SES) officials and others, explaining his side of the story. Id. at 61-62. The
      Director responded, assuring the Contract Specialist that there was a contract
      authorizing the contractor to perform his duties at the Medical Center. Id. at 60.
      He instructed the Contract Specialist to utilize his chain of command and asserted
      that there was no need to include the SES officials in his previous email. Id. The
      Director stated that the Contract Specialist had been repeatedly warned about this
      issue and that any future infractions would be met with an official counseling. Id.
      The Contract Specialist nevertheless replied to the Director, with copies to the
      SES officials, complaining about the way the Director was handling the matter
      and attempting to justify his own actions. Id. at 59. It was then that the Director
      ordered the appellant to issue the letter of counseling.     Id. at 58-59.   Having
      reviewed all this evidence, we find nothing in the Contract Specialist’s last
      email—the one for which he was to be counseled—that could reasonably be
      construed as a protected disclosure. Id. at 59. Furthermore, it is clear that the
      Contract Specialist ignored the Director’s stern warning and blatantly violated his
      explicit order not an hour after he had received it. Id. at 59-60. We therefore
      find no reasonable basis to conclude that issuing the Contract Specialist a letter of
      counseling would be, in any way, improper. The appellant has failed to make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that Disclosure 10 was protected.

            Disclosure 11
¶23         The appellant alleges that on several dates between June and October, 2014,
      she disclosed to agency officials and entities that she was being retaliated against
      for whistleblowing activities. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 9. She claims that she reported
      retaliation in the form of a reprimand, a proposed suspension, designation of
      certain absences as absence without leave (AWOL), and various other actions.
                                                                                          15

      Id. Again, the appellant’s ability to prove by preponderant evidence that this
      disclosure was protected may depend on her ability to prove that the disclosures
      and activities above were protected. However, at the jurisdictional stage, we find
      that she has met her burden of making a nonfrivolous allegation that she
      reasonably believed she was disclosing retaliation for her prior whistleblowing .

            Disclosure 12
¶24         The appellant alleges that at some point in 2013 or 2014, agency
      management received a report of an external audit that uncovered serious
      problems with contracts in the Washington, D.C.-area, including a list of 16
      expired purchase orders totaling $38,000,000.      W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 9, Tab 46
      at 65. She states that her superiors knew that she was interviewed in connection
      with this audit and perceived her to be a source of information to the auditor.
      W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 9. Given the nature of what the appellant alleged that the
      audit uncovered, we find that she has made a nonfrivolous allegation that she was
      perceived as a whistleblower. See generally King v. Department of the Army,
      116 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 8 (2011) (explaining the standard for establishing
      jurisdiction as a perceived whistleblower).

      Personnel Actions and Contributing Factor
¶25         The appellant alleges that the agency took multiple personnel actions
      against her in retaliation for her alleged protected activity.    W-2 AF, Tab 41
      at 10-11. Considering the appellant’s allegations as a whole, we find that she
      made a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency subjected her to nine personnel
      actions, and, as discussed below, that one or more of her disclosures and/or her
      protected activity was a contributing factor in those actions.
¶26         The appellant alleges that on July 11, 2013, the Director failed to select her
      for a Supervisory Contract Specialist position in retaliation for Disclosures 1
      and 2. Id. at 10. Because the appellant alleges that she made Disclosures 1 and 2
      within a few months of her nonselection for promotion, and that the Director
                                                                                             16

      knew about these disclosures, we find that she has made a nonfrivolous allegation
      under the knowledge/timing test of 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1) that they were a
      contributing factor in her nonselection, which is a personnel action under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ii).       W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5-6; see Mastrullo v.
      Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 21 (2015) (finding that a period of 1 to
      2 years between a disclosure and a personnel action is sufficient t o satisfy the
      timing component of the knowledge/timing test). 11
¶27         The appellant alleges that on August 7, 2013, the Construction Team
      Manager issued her a mid-point performance evaluation with a rating of
      “unacceptable” in retaliation for Disclosures/protected activity 1, 2, and 3.
      W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5-6, 10. However, we find that this mid-point review does
      not, in itself, constitute a “personnel action” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(1)(A).
      W-2 AF, Tab 42 at 87-89; see King v. Department of Health and Human Services,
      133 F.3d 1450, 1452-53 (Fed. Cir. 1998).          Therefore, we will not consider it
      further except in connection with the appellant’s hostile work environment claim.
      See infra ¶ 35.
¶28         The appellant alleges that on October 16, 2013, the Deputy Director
      charged her retroactively with 91 hours of AWOL, pursuant to the Director’s
      orders, in retaliation for Disclosures/protected activity 1-3 and 5. 12         W-2 AF,
      Tab 3 at 51-52, Tab 5 at 4, Tab 41 at 5-7, 10. The appellant asserts that the
      Director and Deputy Director were aware of these disclosures, including

      11
         All of the personnel actions the appellant alleges were taken, threatened, or not taken
      in retaliation for her disclosures/protected activity occurred less than 2 years after the
      disclosures. Accordingly, we need not discuss the “timing” aspect of the
      knowledge/timing test with regard to each of the actions.
      12
         The appellant also alleges that Disclosure 4 was a contributing factor in her AWOL.
      W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 10. However, because the appellant has failed to make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that Disclosure 4 was protected, we need not consider whether
      it may have been a contributing factor in this or any other alleged personnel action.
      The Director ended up sustaining most, but not all, of the AWOL. IAF, I -2, Tab 5
      at 22.
                                                                                        17

      Disclosure 3, which was made to the Inspector General. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5-7,
      10. The Board has found that a charge of AWOL is a decision concerning pay
      and therefore constitutes a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix).
      Mc Corcle v. Department of Agriculture, 98 M.S.P.R. 363, ¶ 16 (2005). We find
      that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation, under the knowledge/timing
      test, that Disclosures/protected activity 1-3 and 5 were a contributing factor in
      this personnel action.
¶29         The appellant alleges that on October 16, 2013, the Deputy Director issued
      her a proposed letter of reprimand for AWOL in retaliation for Disclosures 1-3
      and 5, and the Director upheld the reprimand on February 3, 2014, 13 in retaliation
      for Disclosures/protected activity 1-8. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 10-11. We find that
      the reprimand constituted a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii)
      because the agency made it a part of the appellant’s official personnel file and
      informed her that it could be considered in any future disciplinary actions and
      that she had the right to grieve it.     Id. at 22-23; see Rice v. Department of
      Agriculture, 97 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 15 (2004). The proposed reprimand was a threat
      to take a personnel action, and it is therefore also a personnel action covered
      under the statute. Finally, we also find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous
      allegation, under the knowledge/timing test, that Disclosures /protected activity
      1-3 and 5 were a contributing factor in the proposed reprimand, and, since the
      appellant alleges that the Director was aware of Disclosures/protected activity 1-3
      and 5-8, that these were a contributing factor in his decision to uphold and effect
      the reprimand. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 5-7, 10.
¶30         The appellant alleges that on October 16, 2013, the Deputy Director
      revoked her telework privileges on orders from the Director, and that this was in
      retaliation for Disclosures/protected activity 1-3 and 5.     W-2 AF, Tab 5 at 7,

      13
        The Director appears to have actually issued the letter of reprimand on January 29,
      2014. W-2 AF, Tab 5 at 22-23.
                                                                                           18

      Tab 41 at 10. The appellant also alleges that on March 24, 2014, the Director
      denied    her   request    to   reinstate      her   telework     in   retaliation   for
      Disclosures/protected activity 1-8. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 11. The Board has found
      that cancellation of a telework agreement can be a personnel action under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii) to the extent that it constitutes a significant change
      in working conditions. Rumsey v. Department of Justice, 120 M.S.P.R. 259, ¶ 23
      (2013). We further find that the Director’s denial of the appellant’s request to
      reinstate her telework privileges was also a personnel action, in that it was a
      failure to approve a significant change in duties. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(8), (b)(9)
      (prohibiting a failure to take a personnel action in retaliation for a protected
      disclosure or protected activity).    The appellant has alleged that the Deputy
      Director and Director were aware of the disclosures/protected activity at issue
      with respect to these actions, and we therefore find that the appellant has made a
      nonfrivolous allegation that Disclosures/protected activity 1-3 and 5 were a
      contributing factor in the revocation of the appellant’s approval to telework and
      that Disclosures/protected activity 1-3 and 5-8 were a contributing factor in the
      denial of the request to reinstate telework.
¶31         The appellant alleges that on December 5, 2013, the Construction Team
      Manager (her rating official) issued her a final rating for fiscal year 2013 of
      “fully successful” with numerous negative comments.             W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 10,
      292-97. She further alleges that on January 16, 2014, the Director (h er reviewing
      official) refused to revise the performance evaluation.         W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 10,
      Tab 46 at 14-26. The appellant claims that these actions were in retaliation for
      Disclosures/protected activity 1-3 and 5-7. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 10. The issuance
      of a final performance evaluation is a personnel action under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(viii).    The appellant has alleged that either the Construction
      Team Manager or the Director, or both, were aware of the disclosures in question,
      id. at 5-8, 10, and we therefore find that she has made a nonfrivolous allegation,
                                                                                             19

      under the knowledge/timing test, that they were a contributing factor in her final
      performance evaluation.
¶32           The appellant contends that on June 1, 2014, the Director ordered her to
      take     on   the     duties   of   two     full-time   positions   in   retaliation   for
      Disclosures/protected activity 1-3 and 5-8. Id. at 11. Specifically, it appears that
      the appellant was previously responsible for supervising one team of six
      contracting officials for the agency’s Washington, D.C. VA Medical Center, and
      on June 1, 2014, she became responsible for the Martinsburg, West Virginia VA
      Medical Center as well, with an additional five contracting officials added to her
      team.     Id. at 76-77, 87.     On its face, this appears to represent a significant
      increase in the appellant’s workload, and we therefore find that she has made a
      nonfrivolous allegation that the agency significantly changed her duties and
      responsibilities—a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).               As
      noted above, the appellant has alleged that the Director was aware of
      Disclosures/protected activity 1-3 and 5-8, and thus, we find that the appellant
      has made a nonfrivolous allegation, under the knowledge/timing test, that these
      disclosures/protected activity were a contributing factor in this alleged personnel
      action. Id. at 5-9.
¶33           The appellant alleges that, on June 24, 2014, the Deputy Director denied her
      request for sick leave and charged her with 1 hour of AWOL in retaliation for
      Disclosures/protected activity 1-3 and 5-9. Id. at 11, 54-55. However, it appears
      that the Deputy Director approved the request retroactively on July 28, 2014. Id.
      at 51. Because the agency completely rescinded this personnel action before the
      appellant filed her OSC complaint, we find that we lack jurisdiction to consider it
      as a separate personnel action.           W-2 AF, Tab 3 at 14, Tab 41 at 12.           Cf.
      Lachenmyer v. Federal Election Commission, 92 M.S.P.R. 80, ¶ 7 (2002).
      Nevertheless, we find that this matter is still relevant for consideration in the
      context of the appellant’s claim of a hostile work environment, discussed below.
                                                                                             20

¶34         The appellant alleges that on September 24, 2014, the Director and Deputy
      Director      proposed   to   suspend    her   for    10   days    in   retaliation   for
      Disclosures/protected activity 1-3, 5-9, and 11. 14 W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 11, 32-43.
      A proposed 10-day suspension is a threatened personnel action under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii), and, since the appellant has alleged that the Director or
      Deputy Director, or both, were aware of the disclosures/protected activity she
      raised with respect to this claim we find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous
      allegation, under the knowledge/timing test, that Disclosures /protected activity
      1-3, 5-9, and 11 were a contributing factor in the proposed suspension. Id. at 5-9.
¶35         The appellant alleges that on December 16, 2014, the Director included a
      negative memorandum and progress report in her fiscal year 2014 performance
      evaluation in retaliation for Disclosures/protected activity 1-3, 5-9, and 11-12. 15
      Id. at 11, 264-76.       This performance evaluation is a personnel action under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(viii), and as the appellant has alleged that the Director
      was aware of the disclosures/protected activity, the appellant has made a
      nonfrivolous allegation of contributing factor under the knowledge/timing test.
      Id. at 5-9.
¶36         Finally, the appellant alleges that the agency created a hostile work
      environment in retaliation for her protected activity. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 10-11.
      The Board has found that the creation of a hostile work environment may
      constitute a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii) to the extent
      that it represents a significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working

      14
          The appellant also alleges that Disclosure 10 was a contributing factor in the
      proposed suspension. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 11. However, because the appellant has
      failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that Disclosure 10 was protected, we need not
      consider whether it may have been a contributing factor in this or any other alleged
      personnel action.
      15
        To the extent that the appellant is claiming the progress report as a separate personnel
      action, we find that it is not. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 11; see King, 133 F.3d at 1452-53.
                                                                                        21

      conditions. Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 23 (2015),
      overruled in part by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB
      31, ¶¶ 23-25. To meet this standard, an agency’s actions must, “individually or
      collectively, have practical and significant effects on the overall nature and
      quality of an employee’s working conditions, duties, or responsibilities .”
      Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16. In determining
      whether a hostile work environment is present, the Board will consider the
      totality of the circumstances, including agency actions that may not individually
      rise to the level of a personnel action. Id., ¶ 18.
¶37         In this case, the appellant claims that a hostile work environment was
      created through the cumulative effect of numerous agency actions, including most
      of the personnel actions discussed above, as well as various other actions ,
      including verbal berating, an investigation into her computer usage, a change in
      office space, exclusion from meetings, and exclusion from the agency’s student
      loan repayment and tuition reimbursement programs. W-2 AF, Tab 41 at 10-11.
      We find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that these
      circumstances comprised a hostile work environment for purposes of a pers onnel
      action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). Moreover, because she alleges that
      the individuals in her chain of command were aware of her disclosures/protected
      activity and took, threatened, or failed to take the actions that created the hostile
      work environment, we find that she also has made a nonfrivolous allegation of
      contributing factor under the knowledge/timing test. Id. at 5-9.

      Exhaustion
¶38         The appellant filed her OSC complaint on July 16, 2014, and supplemented
      it with amendments and additional information several times over the ensuing
      18 months. W-2 AF, Tab 3 at 39-121, Tab 41 at 12-327, Tabs 42-46. We find
      that she raised before OSC all of the disclosures/protected activity and personnel
      actions that she now raises in this IRA appeal, and she provided OSC with a
      sufficient basis to pursue an investigation.     W-2 AF, Tab 3 at 39-121, Tab 41
                                                                                       22

      at 12-327, Tabs 42-46; see Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security,
      2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. The record also contains a copy of OSC’s February 1, 2016
      close-out letter, informing the appellant that it was closing its investigation into
      her complaint and notifying her of her right to file an IRA appeal with the Board.
      W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 5-6.      We therefore find that the appellant has proven by
      preponderant evidence that she exhausted her administrative remedies.

      Conclusion
¶39        For the reasons explained above, we find that the appellant has exhausted
      her administrative remedies and made nonfrivolous allegations that the agency
      subjected her to numerous personnel actions in retaliation for a number of
      protected disclosures and for her communications with the Inspector General,
      which were protected activity. Therefore, she has established jurisdiction over
      her appeal and is entitled to the merits hearing she requested.       See Salerno,
      123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5.
¶40        The issues on remand will include whether the appellant can prove by
      preponderant evidence that Disclosures/protected activity 1-3, 5-9, and 11-12
      were protected under the statute. The appellant also will need to show that she
      did, in fact, suffer the nine personnel actions discussed above, and that her
      disclosures/protected activity were a contributing factor therein. If the appellant
      proves her case, then the agency will have the opportunity to prove by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions
      notwithstanding the protected activity. Id.
                                                                                       23

                                          ORDER
¶41        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.