Court Opinion

ID: 9905016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 17:05:13.309313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:13.115623
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Nov 28 2023, 9:30 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Michael A. Sarafin                                        Douglas D. Church
Michael J. Bolde                                          Alexander P. Pinegar
Johnson & Bell, P.C.                                      Steven H. David
Crown Point, Indiana                                      Sloan R. Schafer
                                                          Church Church Hittle + Antrim
                                                          Noblesville, Indiana
                                                          Daniel B. Vinovich
                                                          Hilbrich Cunningham Dobosz
                                                          Vinovich & Sandoval, LLP
                                                          Highland Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Anonymous Provider 2,                                     November 28, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-CT-992
        v.                                                Appeal from the Lake Superior
                                                          Court
Estate of Ryan K. Askew, by                               The Honorable John M. Sedia,
Fonetta Askew, Personal                                   Judge
Representative,                                           Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Respondent.                                      45D01-2211-CT-1196

                                 Opinion by Judge Brown
                             Judges Vaidik and Bradford concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-992 | November 28, 2023                           Page 1 of 9
      Brown, Judge.

[1]   Anonymous Provider 2 (“AP2”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to

      dismiss under Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(1). The Estate of Ryan Askew (“the

      Estate”) filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. We dismiss the appeal and

      remand.

      Facts and Procedural History

[2]   In December 2021, the Estate filed a proposed complaint against AP2 and two

      other parties with the Indiana Department of Insurance alleging that Ryan

      Askew, a security guard at Community Hospital, died after being shot during

      an encounter with a mentally ill and dangerous patient and that the defendants

      committed medical malpractice in part by failing to timely and properly

      evaluate the patient and transfer the patient to an appropriate unit or facility for

      hospitalization and treatment.

[3]   On November 23, 2022, AP2 filed a “Petition for Preliminary Determination of

      Law and 12(B)(1) Motion to Dismiss.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 18.

      The petition stated that AP2 “move[d] the Court to dismiss [the Estate’s]

      medical malpractice case against [AP2] because [the Estate], despite already

      exhausting its sold [sic] and exclusive remedy under the Worker’s

      Compensation Act (‘WCA’) for a work injury involving [Askew] who was a

      fellow employee in the same employ as [AP2], now seeks to circumvent its sole

      remedy under the WCA and pursue additional compensation pursuant to the

      Indiana Medical Malpractice Act . . . (‘MMA’).” Id. The Estate filed a

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-992 | November 28, 2023        Page 2 of 9
      response arguing that AP2 was “not a fellow employee under the WCA” and,

      “even if he were, Indiana Courts have long allowed medical malpractice claims

      to proceed against fellow employee-physicians as an exception to the WCA.”

      Id. at 51. On April 3, 2023, the court held a hearing.

[4]   On April 6, 2023, the trial court issued an “Order on Petition for Preliminary

      Determination Denying Motion to Dismiss.” Id. at 10. The court found that

      Askew was employed by Munster Hospital, AP2 was employed by Community

      Care Network, Inc., and Askew had “the right to pursue his remedy for medical

      malpractice against [AP2] as the two were not coworkers as defined by IC 22-3-

      2-13(a).” 1 Id. at 11-12. The court further indicated AP2’s position was that the

      subsidiary arrangement of AP2 and Askew’s employers made AP2 and Askew

      fellow employees, and the court found that, “[b]ecause Munster Hospital,

      which employed [Askew], owned only a third of the shares of and could not ‘ . .

      . control[s] the activities . . .,’ IC 22-3-6-1(a), 2 of Community Care, which

      1
          Ind. Code § 22-3-2-13(a) provides in part:

                 Whenever an injury or death, for which compensation is payable under chapters 2 through 6 of
                 this article shall have been sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than
                 the employer and not in the same employ a legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the
                 injured employee, or the injured employee’s dependents, in case of death, may commence legal
                 proceedings against the other person to recover damages notwithstanding the employer’s or the
                 employer’s compensation insurance carrier’s payment of or liability to pay compensation
                 under chapters 2 through 6 of this article.
      2
          Ind. Code § 22-3-6-1(a) provides in part:

                 A corporation, limited liability company, or limited liability partnership that controls the
                 activities of another corporation, limited liability company, or limited liability partnership, or a
                 corporation and a limited liability company or a corporation and a limited liability partnership
                 that are commonly owned entities, or the controlled corporation, limited liability company,
                 limited liability partnership, or commonly owned entities, and a parent corporation and its
                 subsidiaries shall each be considered joint employers of the corporation’s, the controlled

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-992 | November 28, 2023                                     Page 3 of 9
      employed [AP2], [AP2] fits the definition of ‘. . . some other person than the

      employer and not in the same employ . . . ,’ IC 22-3-2-13(a), as [Askew].” Id. at

      16-17. The court denied AP2’s motion to dismiss under Ind. Trial Rule

      12(B)(1). 3 The court’s order cited Ind. Trial Rule 54(B) and stated, “[t]here

      being no just reason for delay, a final and appealable judgment is entered in

      favor of [the Estate] and against [AP2].” Id. at 17. On May 3, 2023, AP2 filed

      a notice of appeal.

[5]   On July 26, 2023, the Estate filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The Estate

      argued:

                 A trial court may only certify an order as “final and appealable”
                 under T.R. 54(B)[4] when the order disposes of one or more

                 corporation’s, the limited liability company’s, the limited liability partnership’s, the commonly
                 owned entities’, the parent’s, or the subsidiaries’ employees for purposes of IC 22-3-2-6 and IC
                 22-3-3-31.
      3
        Ind. Trial Rule 12(B) provides “the following defenses may be made by motion: (1) Lack of jurisdiction
      over the subject matter . . . .” Ind. Trial Rule 12(D) provides, “[w]hether made in a pleading or by motion,
      the defenses specifically enumerated (1) to (8) in subdivision (B) . . . shall, upon application of any party . . .
      be determined before trial unless substantial justice requires the court to defer hearing until trial.”
      4
          Ind. Trial Rule 54(B) provides:

                 When more than one [1] claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
                 counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the
                 court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
                 claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay
                 and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
                 determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which
                 adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties
                 shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form
                 of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
                 claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. A judgment as to one or more but fewer
                 than all of the claims or parties is final when the court in writing expressly determines that
                 there is no just reason for delay, and in writing expressly directs entry of judgment, and an
                 appeal may be taken upon this or other issues resolved by the judgment; but in other cases a
                 judgment, decision or order as to less than all the claims and parties is not final.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-992 | November 28, 2023                                     Page 4 of 9
              claims or issues against a party. Courts have elaborated that
              judgment “must dispose of at least a single substantive claim.”
              See, e.g., Cardiology Assocs. of NW Ind., P.C. v. Collins, 804 N.E.2d
              151, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Here, the order denied the
              dismissal so the claim against [AP2] was not disposed of and he
              is still in the case at this juncture.

      July 26, 2023 Motion to Dismiss at 2. The Estate argued that, “[b]ecause the

      trial court’s order in this case denied [AP2’s] Motion to Dismiss, the order did

      not render any ‘final judgment’ against anyone because it did not ‘dispose’ of

      one or more claims or issues against a party” and, “[t]herefore, the order cannot

      be a final appealable order, even though the trial court added the T.R. 54(B)

      ‘magic language’ to the end of its order.” Id. It contended that “the appropriate

      avenue of appeal is that of a discretionary interlocutory appeal.” Id. at 2-3. On

      August 2, 2023, AP2 filed a response arguing that, “[u]nlike the summary

      judgment order in [Cardiology Associates], the Appealed Order decided a T.R.

      12(B)(1) defense that the Trial Court had to decide before trial as required by

      T.R. 12(D)” and “[t]he Appealed Order . . . includes all required language that

      renders it final under T.R. 54(B), and App. R. 2(H)(2).” August 2, 2023

      Response to Motion to Dismiss at 6-7.

      Discussion

[6]   The dispositive issue is whether the trial court’s April 6, 2023 order is an

      appealable order. A party may appeal from a final judgment and certain

      interlocutory orders. See Ind. Appellate Rule 5; Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A). Ind.

      Appellate Rule 2(H) provides that a judgment is a final judgment if:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-992 | November 28, 2023            Page 5 of 9
              (1)      it disposes of all claims as to all parties;

              (2)      the trial court in writing expressly determines under Trial
                       Rule 54(B) or Trial Rule 56(C) that there is no just reason
                       for delay and in writing expressly directs the entry of
                       judgment (i) under Trial Rule 54(B) as to fewer than all the
                       claims or parties, or (ii) under Trial Rule 56(C) as to fewer
                       than all the issues, claims or parties;

              (3)      it is deemed final under Trial Rule 60(C);

              (4)      it is a ruling on either a mandatory or permissive Motion
                       to Correct Error which was timely filed under Trial Rule
                       59 or Criminal Rule 16; or

              (5)      it is otherwise deemed final by law.

[7]   AP2’s notice of appeal identifies the order being appealed as the trial court’s

      April 6, 2023 order and indicates the order is a final judgment. AP2 agrees that

      the April 6, 2023 order does not dispose of all claims as to all parties and is not

      a final judgment under Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H)(1). The April 6, 2023 order

      contains the language referenced in Trial Rule 54(B) that there is no just reason

      for delay.

[8]   In Legg v. O’Connor, the defendants in a medical malpractice action moved for

      summary judgment. 557 N.E.2d 675, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). The trial court

      granted “judgment as a matter of law on all issues except the issue of informed

      consent” and “certified the case for appeal, reciting that there [was] not just

      reason for delay, and reserving for trial the issue of informed consent.” Id. On

      appeal, this Court held that, to be certifiable under Trial Rule 54(B), “a

      judgment must possess the requisite degree of finality, and must dispose of at

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-992 | November 28, 2023         Page 6 of 9
      least a single substantive claim.” Id. We held that Trial Rule 54(B) “does not

      apply to a single claim action,” “[a] claim asserts only one legal right growing

      out of a single transaction or series of related transactions,” and “[a] single

      claim resting on multiple theories or a single claim with an alternative request

      for relief [is] not [a] final judgment[] which a trial court may certify [under Trial

      Rule 54(B)] for appeal.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court found the plaintiff’s

      claim arose from a single transaction, “[t]his single negligence claim cannot be

      certified under T.R. 54(B),” and “[t]he trial court’s order was interlocutory

      despite the [Trial Rule 54(B)] certification,” and the Court dismissed the appeal.

      Id. at 677.

[9]   In Cardiology Assocs., the defendants appealed the denial of their motion for

      summary judgment. 804 N.E.2d at 153. This Court observed that, “to be a

      final judgment under T.R. 54(B) and T.R. 56(C), a judgment must possess the

      requisite degree of finality and must dispose of at least a single substantive

      claim,” id. at 154 (citing Legg, 557 N.E.2d at 676), and noted an order denying a

      motion for summary judgment “is not a final appealable order, as no rights

      have been thereby foreclosed” and “[t]he denial merely places the parties’ rights

      in abeyance pending ultimate determination by the trier of fact.” Id. at 154-155

      (citations omitted). We concluded the trial court’s ruling was interlocutory in

      nature despite the trial court’s use of the magic language in Trial Rule 54(B) and

      the parties did not follow the proper procedure for bringing an interlocutory

      appeal, and we dismissed the appeal and remanded for further proceedings. Id.

      at 155 (citations omitted). See also Anonymous Dr. A v. Sherrard, 783 N.E.2d 296,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-992 | November 28, 2023        Page 7 of 9
       299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s

       summary judgment motion arguing the statute of limitations in a medical

       malpractice action had expired was not a final appealable judgment despite the

       trial court’s use of the magic language in Trial Rule 54(B) and dismissing the

       appeal), reh’g denied.

[10]   Here, the only substantive claim is the Estate’s medical malpractice claim. The

       trial court’s order denying AP2’s motion to dismiss did not dispose of the

       Estate’s single claim. The court’s order did not possess the requisite degree of

       finality to be certifiable under Trial Rule 54(B) and did not constitute an

       appealable order under Appellate Rule 2(H)(2). See Cardiology Assocs., 804

       N.E.2d at 153-155; Anonymous Dr. A, 783 N.E.2d at 299; and Legg, 557 N.E.2d

       at 677. See also Boley v Knowles, 905 SW2d 86, 87-90 (Mo. 1995) (holding the

       trial court’s denial of a motion to amend complaint to add a claim for expenses

       did not dispose of plaintiff’s single medical malpractice claim and, despite the

       court’s use of the language that there was no just reason for delay, the court’s

       ruling was not appealable and dismissing the appeal); Sisemore v Farmers Ins. Co.,

       779 P.2d 1303, 1305-1306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (dismissing the plaintiffs’

       appeal of the trial court’s denial of their request for punitive damages because

       the ruling did not dispose of either their contract claim or their bad faith claim

       and holding the order was not appealable despite the court’s finding there was

       no just reason for delay under Arizona Trial Rule 54(B); and dismissing the

       defendant’s cross-appeal of the denial of its motion to dismiss certain parties

       because the ruling did not dispose of any claims and, despite the court’s use of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-992 | November 28, 2023       Page 8 of 9
       the language in Arizona Trial Rule 54(B), was not an appealable order), review

       denied; Glacier Gen. Assur. Co. v Hisaw, 651 P.2d 539, 542 (Idaho 1982) (holding

       that the trial court erred in certifying its partial summary judgment as

       appealable under Idaho Trial Rule 54(B) where the ruling did not dispose of the

       single claim under an insurance policy and that Rule 54(B) “operates only when

       there are in the action multiple claims of which at least one has been

       adjudicated”). We cannot say the order falls into any of the remaining

       categories of Appellate Rule 2(H). Accordingly, the appealed order is not a

       final judgment under Appellate Rule 2. AP2 is therefore appealing from an

       interlocutory order. AP2 does not assert the right to appeal from the

       interlocutory order under Appellate Rule 14(A), there is no indication AP2

       sought certification from the trial court or permission from this Court to file a

       discretionary interlocutory appeal, and AP2 has not stated a statutory right to

       appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand for further

       proceedings. See Legg, 557 N.E.2d at 677.

[11]   Dismissed and remanded.

       Vaidik, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-992 | November 28, 2023       Page 9 of 9