Court Opinion

ID: 9700790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:49:20.502285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:14.599867
License: Public Domain

J. T. Hammond, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
The facts are accurately stated in the lead opinion. The lead opinion states, "A judge should not declare a mistrial sua sponte without first making explicit findings, after a hearing on the record, that no reasonable alternative exists.” Ante at 200.1 agree.
The lead opinion also states: "Under the circumstances it was not necessary for Judge Curtis to recuse herself from this case. Although the assistant prosecutor brought the potential conflict to the judge’s attention, he did not ask the judge to recuse herself, nor did he move for a mistrial. Furthermore, counsel for defendant adamantly opposed the judge’s recusal. Because Judge Curtis stated that it was unlikely that her objectivity would be affected, it appears that her decision to recuse herself was essentially based on the potential for bias and the appearance of impropriety. We find under these facts that such grounds did not constitute 'manifest necessity’ requiring a mistrial.” Ante at 202. Again, I agree.
I believe that the correct analysis of this case *205requires that we look at precisely what did happen. Judge Curtis did not grant a mistrial. She did not dismiss the case.
If Judge Curtis had dropped dead during the course of the trial, there would be no question but that some successor judge would be forced to declare a mistrial. Under those circumstances, Judge Curtis would not be able to proceed further (being then before a much higher court), and there would thus be manifest necessity requiring a mistrial. See Christopher v Nelson, 50 Mich App 710; 213 NW2d 867 (1973).
In this case, Judge Curtis fortunately did not die, but simply refused to participate further in the proceedings. Her reason was that continuing to preside over the case after the prosecutor had revealed her connection with defendant’s brother might have resulted in the appearance of impropriety if she acquitted the defendant or convicted him and imposed a lenient sentence. I suggest that Judge Curtis’ reason was not insignificant or frivolous.
The point, however, is not why she refused to participate. Her personal motivation, for purposes of this proceeding, does not matter. She simply refused to proceed further. In light of that refusal to proceed further, Judge Boyle had absolutely no choice but to declare a mistrial. He tried in every way possible to avoid it, but the defendant, as was his right, declined the several alternatives presented, leaving Judge Boyle with no choice but to do that- which the chief judge (or acting chief judge, in the absence of the chief judge), ought to have done: declare the mistrial. Again, the manifest necessity for the mistrial was the fact that the trial judge, in the middle of a bench trial of a felony case, simply refused to participate further.
It was this, and not the appearance of impro*206priety, that constitutes the manifest necessity with which Judge Boyle was faced.
We had here, I suggest, a "breakdown in judicial machinery.” Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Gori v United States, 367 US 364, 372; 81 S Ct 1523; 6 L Ed 2d 901 (1961), said:
Once a trial starts jeopardy attaches. The prosecution must stand or fall on its performance at the trial. I do not see how a mistrial directed because the prosecutor has no witness is different from a mistrial directed because the prosecutor abuses his office and is guilty of misconduct. In neither is there a breakdown in judicial machinery such as happens when the judge is stricken, or a juror has been discovered to be disqualiñed to sit, or when it is impossible or impractical to hold a trial at the time and place set. [Emphasis added.]
In this case, Judge Curtis was the judge of the facts as well as the law and might therefore be analogized to a juror. If a juror in a criminal prosecution becomes ill during the trial, the jury may be discharged and the accused may be tried again for the same offense without contravening the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment. United States v Potash, 118 F2d 54 (CA 2, 1941).
Similarly, if, during a federal criminal trial, the trial judge discovers facts that indicate that one or more of the jurors is "disqualified or biased against the government” or the defendant, the judge may discharge the jury and direct a retrial and in such event the subsequent trial does not violate the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment. Wade v Hunter, 336 US 684; 69 S Ct 834; 93 L Ed 974 (1949); Thompson v United States, 155 US 271; 15 S Ct 73; 39 L Ed 146 (1894); Simmons v United States, 142 US 148; 12 S Ct 171; 35 L Ed 968 (1891).
*207In United States v McCunn, 36 F2d 52 (SD NY, 1929), after the jury was sworn, it was discovered that one of the defendants was a "brother of the husband of the juror’s aunt,” and it was held that the discharge of the jury was within the discretion of the trial court and that the defendants could be retried without subjecting them to double jeopardy.
The propriety of the reasons for a judge’s own recusal in the middle of a trial may well be a proper subject of inquiry for the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission, but those considerations are not determinative or dispositive in this case.
In United States v Perez, 22 US (9 Wheat) 579, 580; 6 L Ed 165 (1824), the manifest necessity rule was stated, holding that the discharge of the jury did not always bar a future trial for the same offense:
We think that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. . . . [S]uch a discharge constitutes no bar to further proceedings and gives no right of exemption to the prisoner from being again put upon trial. [Emphasis added.]
Judges often have to make rulings that, at first glance, appear to many in the general public to be irrational, unreasonable, unfair, or even stupid. There is simply no way that all of us can make all of our decisions palatable to everyone. We can, however, explain the reasons for our actions. For the sake of engendering support for the rule of law, we have an obligation to do so. This is not merely an obligation to satisfy the appellate *208courts, but also an obligation to explain our actions so that the public can, and will, understand why we have been forced to do that which they would rather we not do.
For just a moment, then, let us look at this case through the jaundiced eyes of a general public that may not trust public officials, nor care particularly for some of the technical details that are so central to our judicial system. Let us look at a worst case example, from a public relations standpoint.
This case runs the danger of looking to the public as follows: The judge has a close relationship with a brother of the defendant. She says nothing about that, perhaps hoping that no one will find out. The prosecutor reminds her of this relationship, therefore telling her that the cat is out of the bag. It now is apparent that there will be problems because of the known relationship between the judge and the defendant’s family. The prosecution does not move for a mistrial, to disqualify the judge, or for anything else. The judge refuses to participate further and, if the double jeopardy claim is upheld the defendant gets off absolutely free from a life offense (and from a charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony) because the trial judge, by some legal mumbo jumbo, made it forever impossible for the prosecution to continue the case against the defendant to judgment and sentence. If that doesn’t evoke the "appearance of impropriety,” I do not know what does.
While I do not suggest or believe that any of this is, or even might be, true, or that Judge Curtis was involved in any such conspiracy or impropriety of any sort (beyond recusing herself at a time when she should not have done so), there are likely to be those who might think that she did *209conspire to obstruct justice in this case. Only Judge Curtis is in a position to deny it. There may be those who, on the basis of these facts, will not believe her. Had she recused herself before the first witness was sworn and began to testify, there would have been no problem. What really matters in this case is that the whole situation casts a grave shadow on the perception of the integrity of the judiciary in this state.
Judge Boyle, as the fourth Recorder’s Court judge to have this case before him, declared a mistrial because of manifest necessity, and in doing so committed no error. This matter can and should proceed to trial.