Court Opinion

ID: 9964426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 22:15:45.160152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:27.155305
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                            No. 84873-9-I

                            Respondent,          DIVISION ONE
                 v.

 TYE LANE GROSHONG,                              UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                            Appellant.

          SMITH, C.J. — Following an altercation with his step-daughter, a jury

convicted Tye Groshong of assault in the fourth degree against a family member.

On appeal, Groshong contends that remote voir dire proceedings violated his

constitutional right to in-person jury selection and interfered with his right to a fair

and impartial jury. Because no right to in-person jury selection exists and

because no violation to Groshong’s right to a fair and impartial jury occurred, we

affirm.

                                         FACTS

          In August 2021, Tye Groshong’s step-daughter, Shanna Backman-

Groshong, received a call from a neighbor that Groshong’s dog was loose

outside. The neighbor asked Backman-Groshong to pick up the dog and return it

to her step-father’s house. Groshong was not at home when Backman-

Groshong went to return the dog, so she took the dog home with her for the

night.
No. 84873-9-I/2

        The next day, as Backman-Groshong was in her car at home, preparing to

take the dog back to her step-father’s house, Groshong appeared outside her car

window. Groshong appeared angry. At one point, Groshong opened the car

door. He then proceeded to kick Backman-Groshong in the chest and stomach,

put his arm around her neck, and hit her in the face while she sat in her car.

When Backman-Groshong attempted to call 911, Groshong hit her again in the

face.

        Groshong was later charged with assault in the second degree with a

domestic violence aggravator and with interfering with domestic violence

reporting.

        During pretrial motions, Groshong objected to the use of technology to

conduct voir dire remotely. Groshong acknowledged that “[t]he Court has a lot of

leniency in conducting voir dire how they choose,” but asserted that remote voir

dire and wearing masks impeded his ability to communicate effectively with his

counsel. The trial court denied Groshong’s motion for in-person voir dire. As to

Groshong’s ability to communicate with his counsel, the court noted: “And I find

that the fact that you and your client are wearing masks doesn’t impede your

communication. You’re sitting right next to each other. You’re welcome to sit as

close as you want to talk.”

        The jury acquitted Groshong of assault in the second degree and of

interfering with domestic violence reporting but convicted him of assault in the

fourth degree against a family member.

        Groshong appeals.

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No. 84873-9-I/3

                                      ANALYSIS

                                  Voir Dire Procedures

       Groshong asserts that remote voir dire violated his right to in-person jury

selection under article 1, section 21 of the Washington State Constitution and his

right to a fair jury trial. We disagree.

       1. Article I, Section 21

       We recently addressed whether article I, section 21 applied to jury

selection in State v. Booth, 24 Wn. App. 2d 586, 521 P.3d 196 (2022), review

denied, 1 Wn.3d 1006 (2023), and concluded that it did not.

       In Booth, this court engaged in a Gunwall1 analysis to address whether

article I, sections 21 and 22 of our state constitution protect the use of

peremptory challenges in criminal jury selection proceedings. 24 Wn. App. 2d at

601-02. We explained that article I, section 21 governs a defendant’s right to a

jury trial while article I, section 22 governs jury selection and that the two sections

serve complementary roles. Booth, 23 Wn. App. 2d at 604. We reasoned that

article I, section 21 had “not been applied to regulate the process of jury

selection” and “to incorporate article I, section 22’s protections into article I,

section 21 would be to interpret the former as mere surplus to the latter.” Booth,

23 Wn. App. 2d at 604-05. Because article I, section 22 clearly governs jury

selection, we concluded that the text and structure of our state constitution

strongly opposed finding that article I, section 21 created additional rights in jury

selection. Booth, 23 Wn. App. 2d at 604.

       1   State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).

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No. 84873-9-I/4

       Because article I, section 21 does not apply to jury selection, we disagree

with Groshong that it creates a right to in-person jury selection.

       2. Ability to Select a Fair and Impartial Jury

       Groshong also contends that remote jury selection violated his ability to

select a fair and impartial jury. We disagree.

       Our federal and state constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right

to an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22. This

guarantee includes “the right to have a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the

community.” State v. Meza, 22 Wn. App. 2d 514, 533, 512 P.3d 608, review

denied, 200 Wn.2d 1021 (2022).

       Trial courts have wide discretion in conducting voir dire. State v. Wade,

28 Wn. App. 2d 100, 111, 534 P.3d 1221 (2023), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1018

(2024). The trial court’s broad discretion in conducting voir dire is limited “only by

the need to assure a fair trial by an impartial jury.” State v. Brady, 116 Wn. App.

143, 147, 64 P.3d 1258 (2003). Absent an abuse of discretion and a showing of

prejudice, a trial court’s ruling on the scope and content of voir dire will not be

disturbed on appeal. Wade, 28 Wn. App. 2d at 111. The court abuses its

discretion if it “adopts a view that no reasonable person would take.” State v.

Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 623, 290 P.3d 942 (2012).

       When Groshong proceeded to trial, Washington was still in the throes of

the COVID-192 pandemic. In response to the pandemic, our state supreme court

       2 COVID-19 is the World Health Organization’s official name for
“coronavirus disease 2019,” a severe, highly contagious respiratory illness that
quickly spread throughout the world after being discovered in December 2019.

                                           4
No. 84873-9-I/5

issued a series of orders requiring courts to “conduct all [jury trial] proceedings

consistent with the most protective applicable public health guidance in their

jurisdiction.” Ord. re: Modification of Jury Trial Proc., In re Statewide Response

by Washington State Courts to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, at 3

(Wash. June 18, 2020).3 It also noted that “[t]he use of remote technology in jury

selection, including use of video for voir dire in criminal and civil trials, is

encouraged to reduce the risk of coronavirus exposure.” Ord. re: Modification of

Jury Trial Proc. at 3.

       Here, the trial court adopted reasonable voir dire procedures in light of the

ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, Groshong offers no examples of how

remote voir dire impacted his ability to select a fair and impartial jury. Absent any

evidence of prejudice, we disagree that his right to select a fair and impartial jury

was violated.

                      Victim Penalty Assessment and DNA Fee

       Groshong also argues that because he is indigent, the victim penalty

assessment and DNA collection fee must be stricken. The State does not

oppose remand to strike the victim penalty assessment. Therefore, we remand

for the fee to be stricken. We note, however, that the judgment and sentence did

not impose a DNA collection fee on Groshong and therefore, the court does not

need to address the DNA collection fee on remand.

       3https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%
20Orders/Jury%20Resumption%20Order%20061820.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5YJ-
BWPR].

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No. 84873-9-I/6

      Affirmed and remanded to strike victim penalty assessment fee.

WE CONCUR:

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