Court Opinion

ID: 9381889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 05:04:49.040818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:35.283958
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                      UNPUBLISHED
In re R. MINJEUR, Minor.                                              March 23, 2023

                                                                      No. 361990
                                                                      Macomb Circuit Court
                                                                      Family Division
                                                                      LC No. 2019-000400-NA

Before: PATEL, P.J., and SWARTZLE and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent1 appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
minor child, RM, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication continue
to exist) and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). Because we find that
termination is in the best interests of the child, we affirm.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        Respondent has a history of substance abuse and admitted to drug use during her
pregnancy. RM tested positive for several drugs at birth and experienced withdrawal symptoms.
Three weeks after RM’s birth, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a
petition requesting that the trial court take jurisdiction over RM under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2).
In addition to the substance abuse issues, the petition alleged incidents of domestic violence
between respondent and the child’s father. Respondent pleaded no contest to the factual
allegations in the petition and the court determined that there were statutory grounds to exercise
jurisdiction over RM. A court-structured plan was adopted, which included participating and
benefitting from parenting classes, undergoing a psychological evaluation, participating in mental
health treatment, undergoing substance abuse evaluations and treatment, random drug screens,
maintaining employment, obtaining suitable housing, maintaining a bond with RM, and
maintaining contact with a parenting coach.

1
  The father’s rights were also terminated, but he is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we
simply refer to respondent-mother as “respondent” and respondent-father as “the father.”

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        Despite ample time and opportunity, respondent failed to adhere to the requirements of the
court-ordered service plan. Respondent continued to test positive for illegal substances, missed
numerous drug screens, missed numerous supervised visits with RM, failed to maintain suitable
housing, failed to complete parenting classes, was inconsistent with substance abuse therapy, and
was terminated by her parent partner/coach As a result, DHHS filed a supplemental petition
seeking termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (ii). DHHS
subsequently moved to amend the petition to include the additional grounds of MCL
712A.19b(a)(ii), (g), and (j), which the court granted. Following a trial, the referee determined
that clear and convincing evidence established a statutory basis to terminate respondent’s parental
rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), and (j). Following a hearing, the referee found by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in RM’s best
interests. The trial court adopted the referee’s findings and terminated respondent’s parental rights.
This appeal followed.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

        Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s determination that statutory grounds existed
for terminating her parental rights. Rather, she argues that the court clearly erred by finding that
termination of her parental rights was in RM’s best interests. We disagree.

       We review a trial court’s decision that termination is in a child’s best interests for clear
error. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408; 890 NW2d 676 (2016). A finding is clearly
erroneous when this Court is “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” Id. (cleaned up). “To be clearly erroneous, a decision must be more than maybe or
probably wrong.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).

        Whether termination is in the children’s best interests must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The
focus of the best-interest determination is on the child, not the parent. In re Schadler, 315 Mich
App at 411. Factors to be considered for purposes of the best-interest analysis include “the child’s
bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and
finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors,
297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted). Other relevant factors
include “the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history
with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re
White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In addition, the trial court may consider a
parent’s substance abuse problems. In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 89; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). If a
child is in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing, the trial court must also
explicitly address that factor. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010).

                                                 -2-
         In this case, the referee determined that it was in RM’s best interests to terminate
respondent’s parental rights because respondent was inconsistent with her parenting time,2 showed
a lack of engagement with RM during her visitations, had not taken steps to distance herself from
domestic violence, failed to complete the majority of the court-ordered service plan, lacked
compliance and consistency with substance abuse treatment, continued to test positive for illegal
drugs,3 and had ongoing criminal issues. While respondent was, at times, engaged during the
supervised visitations with RM that she actually attended, at other times she was preoccupied by
her cellphone, was preoccupied reading tarot cards, had trouble focusing on RM, disregarded RM
despite his repeated attempts to get her attention, had trouble engaging with RM, and struggled to
participate in activities with RM. There was also evidence that respondent passed out during two
visitations with RM, which was attributed to her use of illegal substances. Conversely, there was
evidence of a strong bond between RM and the foster parents. The referee considered the fact that
RM was in the care of relatives, concluding that RM was young and termination was in RM’s best
interests because it provided RM with “stability, freedom from substance abuse, freedom from
domestic violence, and an overall healthy environment in which to grow.” RM’s needs for
permanence, stability, and long-term safety outweigh any bond with respondent that may exist.

        The referee’s findings, which the trial court adopted, were supported by a preponderance
of the evidence. We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not clearly err in finding that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in RM’s best interests.

                                       III. CONCLUSION

       For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating
respondent’s parental rights.

                                                             /s/ Sima G. Patel
                                                             /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                             /s/ Noah P. Hood

2
  The evidence established that respondent had been offered 171 visits, but only attended 93 visits,
and missed 78 visits. There was a period of four and one-half months that respondent did not have
any visits with RM.
3
 The evidence established that respondent was positive for more than 95% of her drug screens:
out of 142 drug screens, respondent missed 115 drug screens, tested positive for 21, and was
negative for six. Per the DHHS policy, a missed drug screen is considered a positive drug screen.

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