Court Opinion

ID: 9947672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 15:14:22.283156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:39.638128
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Appeal of Ralph and Nina          :
Sposato,                                 :
                  Appellants             :
                                         :
               v.                        :
                                         :
City of Philadelphia Board of            :   No. 135 C.D. 2020
Revision of Taxes                        :   Submitted: February 6, 2024

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                          FILED: March 5, 2024

               Ralph and Nina Sposato (collectively, Appellants) appeal from the
Philadelphia County (County) Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) December 10,
2019 order affirming the City of Philadelphia (City) Board of Revision of Taxes’
(BRT) September 6, 2019 order that denied their Petition for Allowance of Appeal
Nunc Pro Tunc. Appellants present two issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether
the 2019 Market Value Assessment of 121 R Port Royal Avenue, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (Property) was the product of a breakdown in the administrative
process by government officers or negligence on the part of administrative officials;
and (2) whether the Property’s 2019 Market Value Assessment was automatically
included in the scope of the 2017 appeal pursuant to Section 8854 of the
Consolidated County Assessment Law (CCAL),1 53 Pa.C.S. § 8854. After review,
this Court reverses.

      1
          53 Pa.C.S. §§ 8801-8868.
              Appellants are trustees of the Ralph and Nina Sposato Irrevocable
Trust, which purchased the Property at a public tax sale for $75,000.00. In 2016,
Appellants timely appealed from the Property’s 2017 Market Value Assessment,
which was $569,200.00. On September 12, 2017, the BRT held a hearing. On
September 25, 2017, the BRT determined that the market value of the Property was
$400,000.00. On October 24, 2017, Appellants timely filed an appeal to the trial
court from the BRT’s determination. On March 14, 2018, the City’s appraiser One
Atlantic Ventures, LLC, valued the Property at $85,000.00. On July 25, 2018, all
parties stipulated to the Property’s value of $85,000.00 for the 2017 and 2018 tax
years. On August 28, 2018, the Honorable Paula A. Patrick issued an order adopting
the stipulation.
              On December 14, 2018, Appellants received their 2019 Real Estate Tax
Bill (2019 Tax Bill) for the Property, which indicated that the Property’s market
value was $400,000.00.         Appellants appealed from the 2019 Market Value
Assessment to the BRT, which denied the appeal as untimely.2                    Thereafter,
Appellants filed a Petition Seeking Permission to Appeal Market Value Late (Nunc
Pro Tunc) (Nunc Pro Tunc Petition), alleging therein that they never received the
2019 Market Value Assessment, and their first notice of the Property’s 2019 Market
Value Assessment was their 2019 Tax Bill. On August 26, 2019, the BRT held a
hearing at which it denied Appellants’ Nunc Pro Tunc Petition. On September 6,
2019, Appellants received notice of the BRT’s decision.
              On October 5, 2019, Appellants appealed from the BRT’s decision to
the trial court. The trial court held a hearing on December 10, 2019, whereupon it

       2
         Pursuant to Section 14(a) of what is commonly referred to as the First Class County
Assessment Law, Act of June 27, 1939, P.L. 1199, as amended, 72 P.S. § 5341.14(a), the appeal
had to be filed “on or before the first Monday of October[,]” i.e., October 1, 2018. Id.

                                             2
affirmed the BRT’s decision, thereby denying Appellants’ nunc pro tunc appeal.3
Appellants appealed to this Court.4 On January 9, 2020, the trial court directed
Appellants to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant
to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule) 1925(b) (Rule 1925(b)
Statement). On January 23, 2020, Appellants filed their Rule 1925(b) Statement.
On September 1, 2020, the trial court filed its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a).
                  Initially,

                  [o]ur Supreme Court discussed the proper basis for
                  granting an appeal nunc pro tunc in Union Electric Corp.
                  v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals [&] Review of
                  Allegheny County, . . . 746 A.2d 581 ([Pa.] 2000), stating
                  that: “[a]llowing an appeal nunc pro tunc is a recognized
                  exception to the general rule prohibiting the extension of
                  an appeal deadline. This Court has emphasized that the
                  principle emerges that an appeal nunc pro tunc is intended
                  as a remedy to vindicate the right to an appeal where that
                  right has been lost due to certain extraordinary
                  circumstances.” Id. at 584 (internal citations omitted); see
                  also Radhames v. Tax Rev[.] [Bd.], 994 A.2d 1170, 1175
                  (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Hanoverian, Inc. v. Lehigh [Cnty.]
                  [Bd.] of Assessment, 701 A.2d 288, 289 (Pa. Cmwlth.
                  1997).

Croft v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Rev., 134 A.3d 1129, 1130 n.3 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2016).
                  Appellants first argue that the Property’s 2019 Market Value
Assessment was the product of a breakdown in the administrative process by
government officers or negligence on the part of administrative officials.

        3
            Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied on January 9,
2020.
        4
          “This Court reviews a trial court’s decision in a property tax assessment appeal to
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings
of fact not supported by substantial evidence.” Downingtown Area Sch. Dis. v. Chester Cnty. Bd.
of Assessment Appeals, 303 A.3d 1104, 1110 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).

                                                   3
Specifically, Appellants contend that they did not receive notice of the 2019 Market
Value Assessment.
             Section 10(a) of what is commonly referred to as the First Class County
Assessment Law provides:

             At least ten days prior to the first Monday in October of
             each year, the [BRT] shall give printed or written notice
             to the registered owners of all real property situated
             within the county, the assessment, valuation[,] and ratio
             upon which has been increased or decreased, specifying
             the change made from the last preceding assessment,
             valuation[,] and ratio, and setting forth that an appeal may
             be filed from such assessment on or before the first
             Monday of October, and stating as definitely as possible
             the time or times at which appeals will be heard by the
             [BRT]. Every such notice shall be given either by mailing
             or delivering the same to the address of the owner as
             shown upon the records of the [BRT], or by posting upon
             the assessed property.

72 P.S. § 5341.10(a) (emphasis added).
             This Court acknowledges that, generally, a claim that one did not
receive notice alone is insufficient for a court to allow a nunc pro tunc appeal. See
Connor v. Westmoreland Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeal, 598 A.2d 610, 612 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1991) (“[M]ere allegations of a failure to receive notice are insufficient
cause for allowing an appeal nunc pro tunc[.]” (italics added)). However, here,
Appellants were still litigating the appeal of their 2017 Market Value Assessment at
the time their Property was reassessed, which added another factor to be considered.
Moreover, in cases where the allegation of not receiving notice was found
insufficient to grant nunc pro tunc relief, the taxing authority produced evidence that
it sent the notice to the address as shown in the BRT’s records. See Horn v. Bd. of
Prop. Assessment, 641 A.2d 15, 15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (“[T]he [b]oard of [p]roperty
[a]ssessment [] mailed a tax assessment notice to the Horns at the U.S. Mortgage

                                          4
address.”); Collier v. Phila., Bd. of Revision of Taxes (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 649 C.D.
2016, filed Mar. 6, 2017) (the City’s Office of Property Assessment (OPA) sent the
notice of Collier’s assessment to her Conshohocken Avenue address).5
               Here, BRT’s Counsel (Counsel) did not assert that the OPA sent any
notice to Appellants.6 Rather, at the trial court hearing, Counsel stated:

               Your Honor, the [C]ity asks that the court take judicial
               notice that the 2019 assessment was certified, pursuant to
               law, March 31, 2018. The [C]ity further asks the court [to]
               take judicial notice [of] the court’s finding in Duffield
               House Associates, L.P. v. City of Philadelphia, 260 A.3d
               329 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), appeal denied, 279 A.3d 1185
               (Pa. 2022)].[7] The county-wide reassessment was
               effectuated for 2019. And the date of that reassessment
               was March 31, 2018. Those are the only two facts that I
               need, Your Honor.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 19 (emphasis added).8
               The trial court denied the nunc pro tunc appeal based on the following
reasoning:

       5
          This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited “for [their] persuasive
value, but not as a binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal
Operating Procedures, 210 Pa.Code § 69.414(a).
        6
          Counsel argues in his brief to this Court that notice was not required because there was
no increase or decrease as the Property’s last Market Value Assessment was for $400,000.00.
However, the 2017 Market Value Assessment was for $569,200,00. The 2018 $400,000.00 Market
Value Assessment was the result of Appellants’ appeal to the BRT, for which Appellants’ appeal
was pending in the trial court at the time of the 2018 reassessment.
        7
          In Duffield House, this Court determined that the taxpayers established that the City’s
selective reassessment in tax year 2018 of only commercial properties violated the Pennsylvania
Constitution’s Uniformity Clause, PA. CONST. art. 8, § 1. Counsel argued that the result of the
finding in Duffield House was a County-wide reassessment in 2018 for tax year 2019.
        8
          Rule 2173 specifies: “[T]he pages of . . . the reproduced record . . . shall be numbered
separately in Arabic figures . . . thus 1, 2, 3, etc., followed in the reproduced record by a small a,
thus 1a, 2a, 3a, etc.” Pa.R.A.P. 2173. Because Appellants’ Reproduced Record page numbers
were not followed by a small a, for ease of reference, this Court will refer to the Reproduced
Record pages as Appellants numbered them.
                                                  5
               Appellants were aware that their Property’s market value
               was only negotiated for 2017 and 2018, after which the
               market value would revert to the reassessment of
               $400,000[.00]. Appellants had notice that their Property’s
               market value would not be $85,000[.00] for the year 2019
               as early as August 28, 2018. There was not an
               administrative breakdown, fraud, deception, or other way
               that would allow for a nunc pro tunc to be warranted, and
               the right to appeal was not lost due to extraordinary
               circumstances. Union Elec. Corp.; Kelly [v. Cnty. of
               Allegheny, 546 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1988)]; [Bass v.
               Commonwealth of Pa., 401 A.2d 1133 (Pa. 1979)]; Stock
               [v. Stock, 679 A.2d 760 (Pa. 1996)]; Hanoverian.
               Consequently, th[e trial] court properly affirmed the
               BRT’s decision to deny Appellant[s’] nunc pro tunc
               petition.

R.R. at 106.
               Curiously, when Counsel made a similar argument during the trial court
hearing, the trial court took a different stance:

               [Counsel:] So, at the very least, he was aware on August
               28, 2018[,] that his 2019 [Market Value A]ssessment was
               not $85,000[.00]. Because the assessment[s] are always
               set, by law, March 31st of the year prior.
               And, so, on March 31st of the year prior even -- whether
               that number is a new number, or was the number that he
               had already for 2017 and 2018, by signing this stipulation
               and receiving this order, that’s a stipulation that makes it
               clear that 2019 is not part. And the $85,000[.00] will not
               be the value.
               He was on notice, as of that moment.
               THE COURT: Well, it might have been. But it might not
               have been. It had no effect.

R.R. at 16 (emphasis added).
               Notwithstanding, Appellants should not be penalized because their
appeal was still pending at the time of the reassessment. Because the County

                                            6
reassessed the Property in 2018, the County was required to send notice to
Appellants because the $400,000.00 Market Valuation Assessment was either an
“increase[]” from the 2017 and 2018 agreed upon Market Valuation Assessment of
$85,000.00, or a “decrease[]” from the County’s Market Valuation Assessment of
$569,000.00. 72 P.S. § 5341.10(a). Based on the record evidence, the County did
not send Appellants notice.9 The law is well settled that “[a] failure to properly send
a notice may amount to a breakdown in operations which is the equivalent of
negligence on the part of administrative officials.” Connor, 598 A.2d at 612.
               This Court cannot, on this record, conclude that because Appellants
appealed from their 2017 Market Value Assessment, which resulted in a court-
approved stipulation on August 28, 2018, for tax years 2017 and 2018, that they had
notice on March 31, 2018, that their Property was reassessed at $400,000.00, for tax
year 2019. Indeed, the opposite is more reasonable.10 The delay here was caused
       9
          While it may appear illogical to require the BRT to know that the agreed-upon Market
Valuation Assessment would be less than $400,000.00, thereby requiring notice be sent to
Appellants, before the amount was agreed thereto and reduced to an order, that is exactly the logic
the trial court relies upon in suggesting that Appellants should have appealed the 2019 Market
Valuation Assessment at the time their 2017 appeal was settled.
        10
           The opposite is more reasonable given that Section 8854(a)(5) of the CCAL provides:
               If a taxpayer . . . has filed an appeal from an assessment, so long as
               the appeal is pending before the [BRT] or before a court on appeal
               from the determination of the [BRT], as provided by statute, the
               appeal will also be taken as an appeal by the appellant on the subject
               property for any valuation for any assessment subsequent to the
               filing of an appeal with the [BRT] and prior to the determination of
               the appeal by the [BRT] or the court. This provision shall be
               applicable to all pending appeals as well as future appeals.
53 Pa.C.S. § 8854(a)(5). Here, while the 2017 assessment appeal was pending before the trial
court, but months before the parties settled, the OPA set the Property’s Market Value Assessment
for tax year 2019 at $400,000.00. Under the trial court’s reasoning, Appellants were to assume
that the BRT would ignore its own appraiser’s valuation and assess their Property at $400,000.00;
thus, requiring Appellants to file an appeal on the day the trial court adopted BRT and Appellants’
stipulation. That is far from reasonable. See Chartiers Valley Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Prop.

                                                 7
by the BRT failing to comply with its statutory requirement to notify Appellants of
their Property’s reassessment. Under these circumstances, the BRT was negligent
in not mailing Appellants notice of their Property’s reassessment. Appellants filed
an appeal with BRT as soon as they received their 2019 Tax Bill, which was the first
time they received notice that their Property had been reassessed. Accordingly,
Appellants are entitled to nunc pro tunc relief.11
               For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is reversed, and this
matter is remanded to the trial court with direction to remand to the BRT to permit
Appellants to pursue a nunc pro tunc appeal.

                                              _________________________________
                                              ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

Assessment, Appeals and Rev., 622 A.2d 420, 426-27 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (“[T]he automatic appeal
provisions are intended to prevent duplicative appeals and consolidate these matters for trial . . .
not deprive the parties of an opportunity to be heard.”) (emphasis added).
       11
           Appellants also argue that the Property’s 2019 Market Value Assessment was
automatically included in the scope of the 2017 appeal pursuant to Section 8854 of the CCAL.
However, because Appellants did not raise that issue before the trial court, it is waived. See Rule
302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).).

                                                 8
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Appeal of Ralph and Nina             :
Sposato,                                    :
                  Appellants                :
                                            :
            v.                              :
                                            :
City of Philadelphia Board of               :   No. 135 C.D. 2020
Revision of Taxes                           :

                                    ORDER

            AND NOW, this 5th day of March, 2024, the Philadelphia County
Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) December 10, 2019 order is REVERSED, and
the matter is REMANDED to the trial court to remand to the City of Philadelphia
Board of Revision of Taxes to permit Ralph and Nina Sposato to pursue a nunc pro
tunc appeal consistent with this Opinion.
            Jurisdiction is relinquished.

                                       _________________________________
                                       ANNE E. COVEY, Judge