Court Opinion

ID: 9955284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 23:00:37.981596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:25.432937
License: Public Domain

PRECEDENTIAL

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

                 No. 23-3166

  PENNSYLVANIA STATE CONFERENCE OF NAACP
    BRANCHES; LEAGUE OF WOMAN VOTERS OF
PENNSYLVANIA; PHILADELPHIANS ORGANIZED TO
    WITNESS EMPOWER AND REBUILD; COMMON
     CAUSE PENNSYLVANIA; BLACK POLITICAL
    EMPOWERMENT PROJECT; MAKE THE ROAD
 PENNSYLVANIA; BARRY M. SEASTEAD; MARLENE
    G. GUTIERREZ; AYNNE MARGARET PLEBAN
   POLINSKI; JOEL BENCAN; LAURENCE M. SMITH

                     v.

SECRETARY COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA;
     ADAMS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
   ALLEGHENY COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
  ARMSTRONG COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
BEAVER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BEDFORD
 COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BERKS COUNTY
 BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BLAIR COUNTY BOARD OF
   ELECTIONS; BRADFORD COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; BUCKS COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; BUTLER COUNTY BOARD OF
    ELECTIONS; CAMBRIA COUNTY BOARD OF
    ELECTIONS; CAMERON COUNTY BOARD OF
      ELECTIONS; CARBON COUNTY BOARD OF
      ELECTIONS; CENTRE COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; CHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; CLARION COUNTY BOARD OF
   ELECTIONS; CLEARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; CLINTON COUNTY BOARD OF
    ELECTIONS; COLUMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF
   ELECTIONS; CRAWFORD COUNTY BOARD OF
  ELECTIONS; CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; DAUPHIN COUNTY BOARD OF
   ELECTIONS; DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF
 ELECTIONS; ELK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
  ERIE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FAYETTE
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FOREST COUNTY
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD
    OF ELECTIONS; FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF
      ELECTIONS; GREENE COUNTY BOARD OF
  ELECTIONS; HUNTINGDON COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; INDIANA COUNTY BOARD OF
    ELECTIONS; JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; JUNIATA COUNTY BOARD OF
  ELECTIONS; LACKAWANNA COUNTY BOARD OF
   ELECTIONS; LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF
   ELECTIONS; LAWRENCE COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; LEBANON COUNTY BOARD OF
      ELECTIONS; LEHIGH COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; LUZERNE COUNTY BOARD OF
    ELECTIONS; LYCOMING COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; MCKEAN COUNTY BOARD OF
      ELECTIONS; MERCER COUNTY BOARD OF
      ELECTIONS; MIFFLIN COUNTY BOARD OF
     ELECTIONS; MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF
  ELECTIONS; MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF

                    2
    ELECTIONS; MONTOUR COUNTY BOARD OF
 ELECTIONS; NORTHAMPTON COUNTY BOARD OF
 ELECTIONS; NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD
     OF ELECTIONS; PERRY COUNTY BOARD OF
  ELECTIONS; PHILADELPHIA COUNTY BOARD OF
 ELECTIONS; PIKE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
      POTTER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
   SCHUYLKILL COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
      SNYDER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
    SOMERSET COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
     SULLIVAN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
  SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS;
   TIOGA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; UNION
     COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; VENANGO
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WARREN COUNTY
   BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WASHINGTON COUNTY
BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; WESTMORELAND COUNTY BOARD OF
    ELECTIONS; WYOMING COUNTY BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; YORK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE; NATIONAL
  REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE;
 THE REPUBLICAN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA,

                                      Appellants

              (Intervenors in D.C.)

                       3
     On Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Western District of Pennsylvania
            (District Court No. 1-22-cv-00339)
     District Judge: Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter

               Argued February 20, 2024

Before: SHWARTZ, CHUNG, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

             (Opinion filed March 27, 2024)

John M. Gore [ARGUED]
E. Stewart Crosland
Ryan M. Proctor
Louis J. Capozzi, III
Jones Day
51 Louisiana Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20001

     Counsel for Appellants Republican National
     Committee, National Republican Congressional
     Committee and The Republican Party of Pennsylvania
     and Intervenor Appellant Richard Marino

                           4
Steve Marshall
Edmund G. Lacour Jr.
Soren Geiger
Office of Attorney General of Alabama
501 Washington Avenue
P.O. Box 300152
Montgomery, AL 36104

        Counsel for Amicus Appellant State of Alabama

Zachary M. Wallen
Chalmers Adams Backer & Kaufman
301 S Hills Village Drive
Suite LL200-420
Pittsburgh, PA 15241

         Counsel for Amicus Appellants Brian Cutler, Kim
         Ward and Joe Pittman

Gilbert Dickey
Conor D. Woodfin
Consovoy McCarthy
1600 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 700
Arlington, VA 22209

      Counsel for Amicus Appellant Restoring Integrity and
      Trust in Elections Inc

                            5
Brittany C. Armour
David Newmann
Hogan Lovells US
1735 Market Street
23rd Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux
Sophia Lin Lakin
Ari J. Savitzky [ARGUED]
American Civil Liberties Union
125 Borad Street
18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Stephen A. Loney, Jr.
Marian K. Schneider
Kate Steiker-Ginzberg
American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania Legal
P.O. Box 60173
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Witwold J. Walczak
American Civil Liberties Union
P.O. Box 23058
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

       Counsel for Plaintiff Appellees

                             6
Richard E. Santee
Northampton County office of the Solicitor
669 Washington Street
Easton, PA 18042

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Northampton County
      Board of Elections

Jacob B. Boyer [ARGUED]
Michael J. Fischer
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Office of General Counsel
333 Market Street
17th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17108

Sean A. Kirkpatrick
Lisa Eisenberg
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1600 Arch Street
Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Robert A. Wiygul
Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller
One Logan Square
18th & Cherry Streets
27th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Secretary
      Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

                             7
Molly R. Mudd
Adams County Office of Solicitor
117 Baltimore Street
Gettysburg, PA 17325

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Adams County
      Board of Elections

Lisa G. Michel
Allegheny County Law Department
300 Fort Pitt Commons
445 For Pitt Boulevard
Suite LL 500
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Allegheny County
      Board of Elections

Casey A. Coyle
Babst Calland
409 N 2nd Street
Suite 201
Harrisburg, PA 17101

                            8
Elizabeth A. Dupuis
Babst Calland
330 Innovation Boulevard
Suite 302
State College, PA 16803

      Counsel for Defendant Appellees Bedford County
      Board of Elections, Carbon County Board of Elections,
      Centre County Board of Elections Columbia County
      Board of Elections, Dauphin County Board of
      Elections Huntingdon County Board of Elections,
      Indiana County Board of Elections, Jefferson County
      Board of Elections, Lawrence County Board of
      Elections, Lebanon County Board of Elections,
      Monroe County Board of Elections, Montour County
      Board of Elections, Northumberland County Board of
      Elections, Snyder County Board of Elections, Venango
      County Board of Elections, and York County
      Board of Elections

Tyler B. Burns
Bucks County Law Department
55 E Court Street
5th Floor
Doylestown, PA 18901

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Bucks County Board
      of Elections

                            9
Timothy J. Ford
Christian M. Velez-Vargas
Dilworth Paxson
1500 Market Street
Suite 3500E
Philadelphia, PA 19102

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Chester County
      Board of Elections

James M. Parks
Duane Morris
30 S. 17th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Delaware County
      Board of Elections

Robert E. Grimm
Grimm Layers
P.O. Box 430
Smithfield, PA 15478

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Greene County Board
      of Elections

                            10
John Marlatt
Philip W. Newcomer
Montgomery County Office of Solicitor
One Montgomery Plaza, Suite 800
P.O. Box 311
Norristown, PA 19404

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Montgomery County
      Board of Elections

Thomas A. Burkhart
McNerney Page Vanderlin & Hall
433 Market Street
P.O. Box 7
Williamsport, PA 17701

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Union County Board
      of Elections

Melissa A. Guiddy
Suite 103
2 N Main Street
Greensburg, PA 15601

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Westmoreland
      County Board of Elections

Brian H. Benjet
Ilana H. Eisenstein
DLA Piper
1650 Market Street
One Liberty Place, Suite 5000
Philadelphia, PA 19103

                            11
Alison L. Stohr
City of Philadelphia
Law Department
15th Floor
1515 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102

      Counsel for Defendant Appellee Philadelphia County
      Board of Election

Jason Lee [ARGUED]
Tovah R. Calderon
United States Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section
P.O. Box 14403
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

      Counsel for Amicus Appellee United States of
      America

Alexander D. Bernstein
Aaron H. Crowell
David C. Kimball-Stanley
Clarick Gueron Reisbaum
220 5th Avenue
14th Floor
New York, NY 100001

      Counsel for Amicus Appellee The Protect Democracy
      Project

                             12
Omeed Alerasool
Justin Baxenberg
Daniel J. Cohen
Uzoma N. Nkwonta
Elias Law Group
250 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 200001

      Counsel for Intervenor Appellees Democratic
      Senatorial Campaign Committee and Democratic
      Congressional Campaign Committee

Seth P. Waxman
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20037

      Counsel for Intervenor Appellee Democratic National
      Committee

                           13
                  OPINION OF THE COURT

AMBRO, Circuit Judge,

        Pennsylvania, like all other States, has devised a web of
rules that qualified voters must follow to cast a ballot that will
be counted. Mail-in and absentee voters, for their part, must
sign and date the declaration printed on the return envelope
containing their mail ballot. The date requirement, it turns out,
serves little apparent purpose. It is not used to confirm timely
receipt of the ballot or to determine when the voter completed
it. But the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that dating
the envelope is mandatory, and undated or misdated ballots are
invalid under its state law and must be set aside.

        We must decide whether federal law nonetheless
requires those non-compliant ballots be counted. Section
10101(a)(2)(B) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, called the
Materiality Provision, prohibits denial of the right to vote
because of an “error or omission” on paperwork “related to any
application, registration, or other act requisite to voting,” if the
mistake is “not material in determining whether [an] individual
is qualified” to vote. Because the date requirement is irrelevant
to whether a vote is received timely, the blink response is to
believe a voter’s failure to date a return envelope should not
cause his ballot to be disqualified. But our role restricts to
interpreting a statute, and there we hold that the Materiality
Provision only applies when the State is determining who may
vote. In other words, its role stops at the door of the voting
place. The Provision does not apply to rules, like the date

                                14
requirement, that govern how a qualified voter must cast his
ballot for it to be counted. We reach this conclusion because a
contrary approach cannot be reconciled with the text and
historic backdrop of the statute, nor cabined to the date
requirement while leaving intact other vote-casting rules that
serve valid state interests. Accordingly, we reverse the District
Court’s decision and remand for further consideration of the
pending equal protection claim.

                         I. Background
                                A
       The federal law at the heart of this case—the Materiality
Provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—today reads as
follows:

    No person acting under color of law shall . . . deny the
    right of any individual to vote in any election because
    of an error or omission on any record or paper relating
    to any application, registration, or other act requisite
    to voting, if such error or omission is not material in
    determining whether such individual is qualified under
    State law to vote in such election.

52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). It was part of Congress’ effort to
“outlaw[] some of the tactics” used by States “to disqualify
[African Americans] from voting in federal elections.” South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966). Despite
the promises of the Fifteenth Amendment that “[t]he right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude,” U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1, discriminatory laws
like poll taxes, literacy tests, property qualifications, and “good

                                15
morals” requirements abounded after its ratification,
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313. African American voter
registration in many Southern States thus languished at
“appallingly low” levels for decades. Brnovich v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 594 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (2021).

       One of the many techniques used to keep Black voters
from the polls was to reject would-be registrants for
insignificant, hyper-technical errors in filling out application
forms. Report of U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights (“CRC
Report”) 1963, at 22. For instance, registrars rejected
applicants for failing “to calculate [their] age to the day,”
misspelling “Louisiana,” underlining “Mr.” when it should
have been circled, or the Catch 22 of identifying their skin
color as “Negro” instead of “brown,” or “brown” instead of
“Negro.”1 Voter registration thus was the principal means to
suppress Black voter participation.

       Congress, in 1957 and 1960, passed two civil rights acts
to rein in some of these practices, but “[e]fforts to deny the
right to vote” continued to “take many forms,” most often
through “arbitrary registration procedures” individuals had to
follow to qualify to vote. CRC Report of 1961, at 133, 137. A
few years later, Congress again took aim at these entrenched

1
  CRC Report of 1961, at 137; Hearings on S. 1731 and S. 1750
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 101 (1963)
(statement of Robert F. Kennedy, U.S. Att'y Gen.); see also 110
Cong. Rec. 6715-16 (1964) (statement of Sen. Kenneth B.
Keating) (recounting similar rejections); 110 Cong. Rec. 6733
(1964) (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart); id. at 6530 (statement
of Sen. Hubert Humphrey); id. at 1693-94 (statement of Rep.
Emanuel Celler).

                               16
problems. In Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it
prohibited the arbitrary application of voter qualification
standards and procedures and barred literacy tests as a
qualification for voting in federal elections. Pub. L. No. 88-
352, § 101(a)(2)(A), (C). Surrounded by these provisions, the
Materiality Provision of the 1964 Act applied only to federal
elections, id. § 101(a)(2)(B), but the Voting Rights Act of 1965
expanded its reach to state elections as well. Pub. L. 89-11,
§ 15(a), 79 Stat. 437, 444 (1965).

        Fast forward to today. Voter registration now is a
streamlined process often requiring little more than a few
clicks on a website or a trip to a driver’s license center. In
Pennsylvania, an individual is qualified to vote if that person
(1) is at least eighteen years old on the day of the election, (2)
has been a U.S. citizen for at least one month before that day,
(3) has resided in Pennsylvania and the election district for at
least thirty days, and (4) has not been imprisoned for a felony
conviction within the last five years. Pa. Const. art. VII, § 1;
25 P.S. § 2811, 25 Pa.C.S. § 1301(a). Each county board of
elections assesses compliance with these requirements when
the individual seeks to register to vote. 25 Pa.C.S. § 1328.
Approved applicants receive a unique identification number in
the Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors (“SURE”)
system—Pennsylvania’s database of all registered voters—and
an identification card. Id. §§ 1328.1, 1222.

        In 2019, Pennsylvania also made voting more
convenient by adopting universal mail-in voting. Act of Oct.
31, 2019, P.L. 552, No. 77, § 8; see 25 P.S. § 3150.11(a).
Registered voters now can cast their vote by submitting a mail-
in ballot without having to show cause why they cannot make
it to the polls on Election Day. To do so, a registered voter

                               17
must apply to his county election board and provide, among
other things, his name, address, date of birth, proof of
identification, and length of residency in the voting district. Id.
§ 3150.12. The county board reviews the application, verifies
the proof of identification, and compares the information with
that on the applicant’s registration card housed in county-
specific voter rolls within the SURE system. Id. § 3150.12b(a).
Once approved, the voter receives a package containing the
ballot, a secrecy envelope, and a pre-addressed return
envelope. Id. § 3150.14; App. 57. The return envelope is
specific to each voter and features a declaration as well as a
unique barcode that allows the county board to track each
ballot. 25 P.S. § 3150.14; see also App. 58, 80. After
completing the ballot, the voter places it into the secrecy
envelope, and places that envelope into the return envelope. 25
P.S. § 3150.16(a).

       Among the rules a mail-in voter must follow for his mail
ballot to be valid—central to the dispute here—is
Pennsylvania’s requirement to “fill out, date and sign the
declaration printed on [the] envelope” before returning the
completed ballot. Id. § 3150.16(a). But, it may surprise, the
date on the declaration plays no role in determining a ballot’s
timeliness. That is established both by a receipt stamp placed
on the envelope by the county board and separately through
scanning of the unique barcode on the envelope. App. 58, 80;
see 25 P.S. §§ 3150.17(b)(5), 3146.9(b)(5).

                                B

        Until recently, the Materiality Provision received little
attention from federal appellate courts. When it did, the
challenged state law prescribed rules governing voter

                                18
registration. See Schwier v. Cox, 439 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th
Cir. 2006) (affirming District Court determination that Georgia
statute requiring applicants to disclose Social Security Number
on registration form violated Materiality Provision); Fla. State
Conf. of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1173 (11th
Cir. 2008) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction and
holding Florida voter registration statute imposing a new
verification process as a precondition of registration for first-
time registrants did not violate Materiality Provision);
Vote.Org v. Callanen, 89 F.4th 459, 485-91 (5th Cir. 2023)
(holding Texas law requiring an original signature on a voter
registration form did not violate Materiality Provision).

       But in the November 2020 and November 2022
elections, thousands of Pennsylvania mail-in voters did not
comply with the date requirement. Some voters omitted the
date altogether, others put shortened or obviously incorrect
dates. As county boards took different approaches to enforcing
the date requirement, litigation began, and the Materiality
Provision took center stage. A panel of this Court ruled this
federal law does apply outside the voter registration context
and was violated by the date requirement now (again) before
us. See Migliori v. Cohen, 36 F.4th 153, 157 (3d Cir. 2022).
But that decision has since been vacated as moot by the
Supreme Court. Ritter v. Migliori, 143 S. Ct. 297 (2022).

       The validity of enforcing the date requirement thus
remained uncertain as a matter of federal law. But the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania soon settled the issue for state law
purposes. See Ball v. Chapman, 289 A.3d 1, 20-23 (Pa. 2023).
It unanimously agreed the command in Pennsylvania’s
Election Code that mail-in voters “shall . . . date” the
declaration was “unambiguous and mandatory” as a matter of

                               19
statutory interpretation; so omitting the date, or incorrectly
dating the return envelope, “render[s] a ballot invalid” under
Pennsylvania law. Id. at 20-22. The Court also rejected the
argument that a declaration with an incorrect date was
“sufficient,” reasoning that “[i]mplicit in the Election Code’s
textual command . . . is the understanding that ‘date’ refers to
the day upon which an elector signs the declaration.” Id. at 22.
So, under Pennsylvania law, non-compliant ballots are invalid.
The Court evenly divided, however, on whether failing to
count non-compliant ballots violated the Materiality Provision.
Id. at 9. That question thus was bound to return to us.

        Shortly after the Ball order, five individuals whose
ballots were not counted during the November 2022 election,
along with the Pennsylvania State Conference of the NAACP
(“NAACP”) and other voting organizations,2 brought this suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all 67 Pennsylvania county
boards of elections and the Secretary of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (“Secretary”), claiming enforcement of the date
requirement violated the Materiality Provision and the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Republican National Committee and other entities affiliated
with it (“RNC”) intervened as Defendants.

2
 The NAACP joined efforts with the League of Women Voters
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphians Organized to Witness,
Empower and Rebuild, Common Cause Pennsylvania, Black
Political Empowerment Project, and Make the Road
Pennsylvania. For convenience, they are collectively referred
to as “NAACP,” and with the individual plaintiffs as
“Plaintiffs.”

                              20
        On cross-motions for summary judgment,3 the District
Court determined the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their
equal protection claim against all county boards of election and
their Materiality Provision claim against 55 of them. It thus
dismissed those counties on standing grounds. But the Court
ruled the Plaintiffs had standing to sue the remaining 12 county
boards and the Secretary, and granted summary judgment for
the Plaintiffs on their Materiality Provision claim. It declared
that rejecting timely received mail ballots because of missing
or incorrect dates violated the Materiality Provision and
permanently enjoined the Secretary from directing counties to
exclude ballots on that basis. The Court also dismissed the
equal protection claim against the Secretary on constitutional
avoidance grounds, explaining “there [wa]s no need to reach”
that issue given the Court’s resolution of the statutory question.
App. 7, 88. (The NAACP did not appeal the District Court’s
rulings on that claim or on standing.).

       The District Court framed the Materiality Provision
issue as “whether Pennsylvania’s Date Requirement is material
to the act of voting”: “[I]f the error is not material to voting,
the requirement of placing a date on the Return Envelope
violates the Materiality Provision.” App. 74. The date
requirement, it reasoned, is immaterial by any measure. No
party disputed that election officials “did not use the
handwritten date . . . for any purpose related to determining” a
voter’s qualification under Pennsylvania law. App. 74-75, 81.
Moreover, it is “irrelevant in determining when the voter

3
  The Secretary did not move for summary judgment, instead
filing a brief stating he did not oppose the Plaintiffs’ motion as
to the Materiality Provision but opposed it as to the equal
protection claim.

                               21
signed their declaration” or filled out the ballot. App. 79. Nor
is it used to determine the ballot’s timeliness because a ballot
is timely if received before 8:00 p.m. on Election Day, and
counties’ timestamping and scanning procedures serve to
verify that. Indeed, not one county board used the date on the
return envelope to determine whether a ballot was timely
received in the November 2022 election.

       The District Court also disagreed with the RNC’s
argument that enforcement of the date requirement “does not
impinge on the right to vote” because the Materiality Provision
“only prohibits immaterial requirements affecting the
qualification and registration of a voter,” not additional
requirements for casting a ballot. App. 76. That interpretation,
in the Court’s view, was incompatible with the statute’s
expansive definition of “vote” to include “casting a ballot and
having [it] counted.” App. 77.

       The RNC timely appealed. Richard Marino, who lost
his 2023 bid for reelection to the Towamencin Township Board
of Supervisors after the District Court ordered the counting of
non-compliant ballots, intervened.4 The RNC and Marino

4
   Appellees argue Mr. Marino’s challenge regarding the
application of the District Court’s order to his 2023 race is
moot because the results have been certified and his opponent
sworn into office. E.g., DNC Br. 50-53. Thus, they say, we
cannot “grant any effectual relief” if he prevailed here. Id. at
50 (citing Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)). Under
Pennsylvania law, however, the results of an election may be
changed even after certification based on a “timely filed
election contest petition.” In re Contest of 2003 Gen. Election
for the Off. of Prothonotary, 849 A.2d 230, 235 (Pa. 2004);

                              22
obtained a stay of that order, and we expedited the appeal. The
Democratic National Committee and other entities affiliated
with it (“DNC”) intervened in support of the Plaintiffs-
Appellees. The Secretary, though a Defendant below, joins
Plaintiffs and the DNC in defending the District Court’s
decision on the Materiality Provision claim (“Appellees”).

          With that important background in mind, we turn to the
merits.

RNC Br. 66. Mr. Marino filed such a petition, but the Court of
Common Pleas rejected his challenge as untimely (and thus
moot) and noted the ballots were counted consistent with the
District Court’s order. In re: Contest of Nov. 7, 2023 Election
of Towamencin Twp., No. 1482 C.D. 2023, slip op. at *8-9 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Dec. 29, 2023). Mr. Marino appealed, and the
Commonwealth Court scheduled a hearing on both mootness
and the merits of his certification challenge for April 3, 2024.
See ECF No. 219. It thus is not “impossible” that he could
prevail, Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172, so his claim before us is not
moot.

                                23
                        II. Discussion5

        States have separate bodies of rules for separate stages
of the voting process. One stage, voter qualification, deals with
who votes. To register and thus be authorized to vote,
applicants must follow prescribed steps and meet certain
requirements. It’s like obtaining a license to drive. Another
stage deals with how ballots are cast by those previously
authorized to vote, which is governed by a different set of rules.
To cast a ballot that is valid and will be counted, all qualified
voters must abide by certain requirements, just like those
authorized to drive must obey the State’s traffic laws like
everyone else.

      The Materiality Provision is an important federal overlay
on state election requirements during the “who” stage: voter
qualification. It prohibits States from denying an applicant the
right to vote based on an error or omission in paperwork
involving his application if that mistake is immaterial in
determining whether he is qualified to vote. That is, it is
triggered when conduct or laws restrict who may vote. But it
leaves it to the States to decide how qualified voters must cast

5
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 gives us appellate jurisdiction. We review
the District Court’s order granting summary judgment and
questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Ingram v.
Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 83 F.4th 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2023).
       While Appellants provide several grounds for reversal,
we need consider only one: that Pennsylvania’s date
requirement does not violate the Materiality Provision. We
assume private plaintiffs can sue to enforce that federal law.
Migliori, 36 F.4th at 159-62; Vote.Org, 89 F.4th at 475-478.

                               24
a valid ballot. Pennsylvania has made one such rule—the date
requirement—mandatory. The federal Materiality Provision,
in our view, does not interfere.

      It has five elements: (1) the proscribed conduct must be
engaged in by a person “acting under color of law”; (2) it must
have the effect of “deny[ing]” an individual “the right . . . to
vote”; (3) that denial must be attributable to “an error or
omission on [a] record or paper”; (4) the “record or paper”
must be “related to an[] application, registration, or other act
requisite to voting”; and (5) the error or omission must not be
“material in determining whether such individual is qualified
under State law to vote.” 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B); see also
Ritter v. Migliori, 142 S. Ct. 1824, 1825 (2022) (Alito, J.,
dissenting from denial of application for stay).

      The first and third elements are not disputed here.
Pennsylvania’s county boards of elections are state actors, and
neither party argues that a missing or incorrectly dated mail-in
envelope is not an “error or omission on [a] record or paper.”6

6
  Judge Chung notes the possibility that the phrase “because of
an error or omission” does more work than the parties
argue. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). For instance, facially non-
compliant mistakes that render a ballot defective under state
law might be “defects.” Accordingly, one might say these
facially non-compliant ballots are not counted “because of” a
defect rather than “because of an error or omission.” Undated
envelopes may fall into this category since the statute imposes
a duty on the voter to date the declaration, 25 P.S. § 3146.6(a),
and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has concluded the
requirement is mandatory, Ball, 289 A.3d at 20-21. In
comparison, improperly dated envelopes might be considered

                               25
But does the declaration on the envelope in which the ballot
travels “relat[e] to an[] application, registration, or other act
requisite to voting”? And what of the requirement that “such
error or omission” must not be “material in determining
whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote”?
Also, is a voter “den[ied] the right . . . to vote” if his ballot is
not counted for failing to abide by state ballot-casting rules?

      Read as a whole and in context, the text tells us the
Materiality Provision targets laws that restrict who may vote.
It does not preempt state requirements on how qualified voters
may cast a valid ballot, regardless what (if any) purpose those
rules serve.

imperfectly compliant ballots where electors have facially met
statutory requirements but have done so imperfectly, either by
error (e.g., using the previous year) or by omission (e.g.,
providing no year). Although the Court found that these
misdated envelopes were not “sufficient,” it analyzed the effect
of these mistakes separately from its consideration of undated
envelopes and pursuant to a different statute, 25 P.S.
§ 3146.8(g)(3) (providing election officials discretion to
determine sufficiency). See Ball, 289 A.3d at 20-23, Section
III(B)(1) (undated envelopes) and III(B)(2) (incorrectly dated
envelopes). Thus, not counting imperfectly compliant ballots
might be considered “because of an error or omission” rather
than a defect. This interpretation would not affect the
discounting of undated ballots, but it might result in requiring
incorrectly dated ballots to be counted if the dissent’s view of
paperwork were adopted. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B).

                                26
                                A

        To make sense of the Materiality Provision, we begin
with the part we think drives the interpretation of the rest of the
statute. For the statute to apply, the “error or omission” must
not be “material in determining whether such individual is
qualified under State law to vote . . . .” 52 U.S.C.
§ 10101(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). At first glance, one might
think the date requirement fits neatly because the date on the
declaration bears no relation—it is immaterial—to whether a
voter is qualified under Pennsylvania law to vote, i.e., age,
citizenship, duration of residence, and so forth. And that is
what Appellees argue to us. See NAACP Br. 28-29; DNC Br.
24; Sec’y Br. 25-26.

      But the text does not say the error must be immaterial
“to” whether an individual is qualified to vote. It uses the
words “in determining,” and that choice must mean something.
See Polselli v. IRS, 598 U.S. 432, 441 (2023) (“We ordinarily
aim to ‘give effect to every clause and word of a statute.’”
(quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i L.P., 564 U.S. 91, 106 (2011)).
Read naturally, we believe they describe a process—namely,
determining whether an individual is qualified to vote. So the
information containing an error or omission, material or not,
must itself relate to ascertaining a person’s qualification to vote
(like paperwork submitted during voter registration), and it is
only in that context that “officials are prohibited from using” a
mistake to deny ballot access unless it is “material ‘in
determining’ whether” the applicant indeed is qualified to vote.
See Ball, 289 A.3d at 38 (Brobson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).

                                27
         Words also take color from context. Other provisions
in subsection 10101(a)(2) that sandwich the Materiality
Provision give it meaning. The first—(a)(2)(A)—targets the
application of discriminatory standards, practices, or
procedures “in determining whether any individual is qualified
. . . to vote.” The second—(a)(2)(C)—bars literacy tests “as a
qualification for voting,” subject to some exceptions not
relevant here. The thrust of subsection (a)(2) in which the
Materiality Provision lives thus appears clear: it governs voter
qualification determinations.

      And once that much is settled, we can readily make sense
of the phrase “record or paper relating to any application,
registration, or other act requisite to voting.” 52 U.S.C.
§ 10101(a)(2)(B). Everyone agrees dating the return envelope
does not relate to applying or registering to vote. Indeed, it is
far afield. But is it an “act requisite to voting”?

        If those words take meaning from the words that
precede it—application or registration—the answer is no. But
Appellees claim the statutory definition of “vote” supplies an
unequivocal answer to the contrary. See NAACP Br. 35; DNC
Br. 19; Sec’y Br. 35. It includes “all action necessary to make
a vote effective[,] including, but not limited to, registration or
other action required by State law prerequisite to voting,
casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted and included
in the appropriate totals of votes cast[.]” 52 U.S.C. § 10101(e).
So, the argument goes, because “requisite” means “necessary,”
and the statutory definition of “vote” includes “having [a]
ballot counted,” the Materiality Provision unambiguously
applies here: dating the declaration on the return envelope is
“necessary” to having one’s ballot counted, and the envelope
is a paper related to that act.

                               28
       But the words of a statute are not read in isolation;
statutory construction is a “holistic endeavor.” United Sav.
Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484
U.S. 365, 371 (1988). The phrase “act requisite to voting” also
draws its import from the context in which it appears. Because
the “in determining” phrase, as explained, makes clear the
Materiality Provision applies to determinations that affect a
voter’s eligibility to cast a ballot, its application necessarily is
limited to “record[s] or paper[s]” used in that process. And
Congress further signaled its focus on qualification
determinations by referring to acts like “application” and
“registration.” Those specific words limit the scope of the
relevant paperwork in a way that coheres with the statute’s
voter qualification focus. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001) (“Where general words
follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general
words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature
to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

      Although we need not rely on legislative history, it too
supports confining the statute’s scope to paperwork used for
voter qualification determinations. Title I of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as we have detailed above, was one in a series of
federal efforts seeking to put an end to Southern States’ diverse
techniques “used to disqualify” African Americans from
voting. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 811; see also Browning, 522
F.3d at 1173 (describing enactment as a means to “sweep away
such tactics as disqualifying an applicant” by “inducing voter
generated errors that could be used to justify rejecting
applicants” (emphases added)).

                                29
      Several statements in the Report issued by the House
Judiciary Committee that considered the legislation buttress
the Materiality Provision’s focus on “address[ing] the practice
of requiring unnecessary information for voter registration
with the intent that such requirements would increase the
number of errors or omissions on the application forms, thus
providing an excuse to disqualify potential voters.” Schwier,
340 F.3d 1284, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphases added); see
Robert A. Katzmann, JUDGING STATUTES 75 (2014)
(“Committee reports are among ‘the most authoritative and
reliable materials of legislative history.’” (citation omitted));
Anita S. Kirshnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 Duke L.J. 909,
991-92 (2016). In the Report, the Committee declares that
“discriminatory use of literacy tests and other devices by
registration officials is dealt with … by the prohibition against
their disqualifying an applicant for immaterial errors or
omissions in papers requisite to voting in Federal elections.”
H.R. Rep. 88-914, title I (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2394 (emphases added).

      And references to “registration” and its many
permutations abound. See id. (“[Section 10101(a) is designed
to [e]nsure nondiscriminatory practices in the registration of
voters …. (emphasis added)); id. at 2445-46 (noting Title I
would “provide for Federal determinations as to whether errors
or omissions in an application to register are material”
(emphasis added)); id. at 2490 (reporting the
“disproportionately low [African American] registration in
some counties” (emphasis added)). Supporters praised Section
10101(a) for countering “the intricate methods employed by
some … officials to defeat [African American] registration,”
like the “dilatory handling of [their] applications and failure to
notify applicants of results,” and “applying more rigid

                               30
standards of accuracy to [them] than white[s], thereby rejecting
[African Americans’] applications for minor errors or
omissions.” Id. at 2491 (emphases added). They noted
“registrars will overlook minor misspelling errors or mistakes
… by white applicants, while rejecting an [African
American’s] application for the same,” and explained the
amendment would require “registration officials,” among
other things, to “disregard minor errors or omissions if they are
not material in determining whether an individual is qualified
to vote.” Id. (emphases added). And testimony at the House
and Senate Judiciary Committee hearings detailed the myriad
discriminatory techniques local registrars used to reject
applications like, as noted, misspelling “Louisiana.” See n.1,
supra.

      The legislative history shows the enacting Congress was
concerned with discriminatory practices during voter
registration, thus in line with what the text reflects. So, in our
view, the phrase “record or paper relating to application,
registration, or other act requisite to voting” is best read to refer
to paperwork used in the voter qualification process. It does
not cover records or papers provided during the vote-casting
stage.

      Yet a separate reason leads us to conclude that a vote-
casting rule cannot violate the Materiality Provision: a voter
who fails to abide by state rules prescribing how to make a vote
effective is not “den[ied] the right . . . to vote” when his ballot
is not counted. “Casting a vote, whether by following the
directions for using a voting machine or completing a paper
ballot, requires compliance with certain rules.” Brnovich, 141
S. Ct. at 2338. States have legitimate interests in regulating the
voting process and in imposing restrictions on voters to

                                 31
preserve “the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.”
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-90
(2008). If state law provides that ballots completed in different
colored inks, or secrecy envelopes containing improper
markings, or envelopes missing a date, must be discounted,
that is a legislative choice that federal courts might review if
there is unequal application, but they have no power to review
under the Materiality Provision. And we know no authority
that the “right to vote” encompasses the right to have a ballot
counted that is defective under state law.

      One may argue, as Appellees do, that the statutory
definition of “vote” as “having [a] ballot counted” means that
not counting a timely received mail ballot denies “the right to
vote.” Sec’y Br. 47; NAACP Br. 43. But the definition does
not get us far. Is that right “denied” when a ballot is not
counted because the voter failed to follow the rules, neutrally
applied, for casting a valid ballot? We doubt it is.

      Consider that the enacting Congress in 1964 merely
cross-referenced the definition of “vote” from Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1960, where Congress sought to protect
minorities’ access to the polls in States with “a pattern or
practice” of denying the right to vote on racial grounds. See
Pub. L. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86, 91-92, Title VI, § 601(a), codified
at 52 U.S.C. § 10101(e). It “authorized courts to register voters
in areas of systematic discrimination,” Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
at 313 (emphasis added), upon proof they were “denied” that
“opportunity,” 52 U.S.C. § 10101(e). That focus on denying
(and remedying denials of) the opportunity to register
strengthens our view that the phrase “deny the right . . . to vote”
in the Materiality Provision must be understood as denying an
individual the opportunity to access the ballot in the first

                                32
instance—not as denying the right to cast a defective ballot.
See Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1294 (“[The Materiality Provision]
forbids the practice of disqualifying potential voters for their
failure to provide information irrelevant to determining their
eligibility to vote.” (emphasis added)).

      Returning to the 1960s, we think, illustrates that is what
Congress had in mind. It targeted States’ systematic
campaigns to subvert minorities’ access to the polls. Rejecting
applications to register for irrelevant mistakes was one of many
devices, like poll taxes or literacy tests, that resulted in outright
vote denial—many Black citizens never had a chance to cast
their ballot. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 547
(2013). In enacting the Materiality Provision and other
prohibitions, Congress put an end to that. No longer could
States block ballot box access to an applicant who misspelled
a State’s name or failed to calculate correctly his birthday to
the day. But the Materiality Provision’s prohibitions end there.
States must still control the mechanics of the vote-casting
process. Once inside the voting place (where, in the 1960s,
nearly all voting took place), all voters must follow the same
rules for casting a valid ballot.

      In our view, it makes no sense to read the Materiality
Provision to prohibit enforcement of vote-casting rules that are
divorced from the process of ascertaining whether an
individual is qualified to vote. “Indeed, they were not intended
for that purpose,” Ball, 289 A.3d at 38 (Brobson, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part), and “[t]here is no reason why the
requirements that must be met in order to register (and thus be
‘qualified’) to vote should be the same as the requirements that
must be met in order to cast a ballot that will be counted,”
Ritter, 142 S. Ct. at 1825 (Alito, J.). Unless we cabin the

                                 33
Materiality Provision’s reach to rules governing voter
qualification, we tie state legislatures’ hands in setting voting
rules unrelated to voter eligibility.

        A few examples illustrate the point. Pennsylvania’s
Election Code requires that secrecy envelopes containing “any
text, mark or symbol which reveals the identity” of the voter
“be set aside and declared void.” 25 P.S. § 3146.8. An
improper mark on that envelope is a paperwork “error.” But
the error is not relevant (i.e., material) when a State ascertains
whether the voter is qualified to vote. On Appellees’ account,
the error thus must be disregarded, and the ballot counted.
Pennsylvania’s Election Code also requires that voters mark
their ballot using “the same pen or pencil,” or else it will be
voided and not counted. Id. § 3063(a). Filling out the ballot
with two different pens would likewise be a paperwork “error,”
and one that is not relevant to a voter’s eligibility. Under
Appellees’ approach, that rule too would be unenforceable.
The same goes for the rule against overvoting, which requires
excluding a ballot from the vote tally if a voter casts more votes
than permissible, id., the rule that a ballot must not be counted
if it is “impossible to determine [a voter’s] choice,” id., or the
requirement that mail-in voters “fill out” and “sign the
declaration” printed on the return envelope, id. § 3150.16.

      There is no need to belabor this point further. The upshot
of Appellees’ theory is that the Materiality Provision would
preempt many such ballot-casting rules because none are
related to a voter’s qualification to vote. We thus think the
correct conclusion is that the Materiality Provision is
concerned only with the process of determining a voter’s
eligibility to cast a ballot.

                               34
      It follows that individuals are not “denied” the “right to
vote” if non-compliant ballots are not counted. Suppose a
county board of elections excludes a voter’s ballot from the
vote tally because he cast more than the permissible number of
votes. Or it sets aside a ballot because the voter revealed his
identity by improperly marking the secrecy envelope
containing the ballot. Is that person denied the right to vote?
In both instances, the voter failed to follow a rule—like the
date requirement—that renders his ballot defective under state
law. We find it implausible that federal law bars a State from
enforcing vote-casting rules that it has deemed necessary to
administer its elections. See Ritter, 142 S. Ct. at 1824 (Alito,
J.) (“Even the most permissive voting rules must contain some
requirements, and the failure to follow those rules constitutes
the forfeiture of the right to vote, not the denial of that right.”).

                                 B

      The Materiality Provision’s textually apparent focus on
voter qualification determinations is Appellees’ Achilles’ heel.
Why? Because vote-casting rules like the date requirement
have nothing to do with determining who may vote. A voter
whose ballot is set aside because of a missing or incorrect date
on the return envelope, we know, “ha[s] previously been
determined to be eligible and qualified to vote in the election.”
App. 81.

      In our view, the Materiality Provision does not reach
something as distinct from “registration” as the casting of a
mail ballot at the end of the voting process. The text does not
allow it. Even the statute’s definition of “vote” distinguishes
“casting a ballot” from what precedes it in time: “registration
or other action required by State law prerequisite to voting.”

                                 35
52 U.S.C. § 10101(e). The date requirement is embedded in
the act of casting a ballot. Indeed, the provisions of
Pennsylvania’s Election Code where the date requirement
appears are captioned “Voting by mail-in electors” and
“Voting by absentee electors,” 25 P.S. §§ 3150.16, 3146.6, and
“set forth . . . requirements for how a qualified elector may cast
a valid absentee or mail-in ballot,” In re Canvass of Absentee
and Mail-in Ballots of Nov. 3, 2020 Gen. Elec., 241 A.3d 1058
(Pa. 2020) (emphasis added). “It is therefore awkward to
describe the act of voting as ‘requisite to the act of voting.’”
Ritter, 142 S. Ct. at 1826 n.2 (Alito, J.). And so an outer ballot
envelope falls outside the Materiality Provision’s scope.

      The Pennsylvania General Assembly has decided that
mail-in voters must date the declaration on the return envelope
of their ballot to make their vote effective. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania unanimously held this ballot-casting rule is
mandatory; thus, failure to comply renders a ballot invalid
under Pennsylvania law. Ball, 289 A.3d at 20-23. We do not
read the Materiality Provision as overriding that
pronouncement by requiring that non-compliant ballots
nonetheless be counted.

                  III. The Dissent’s Position

       Our colleague takes a different approach. Her dissent
reads each of the elements in isolation—consulting more than
half a dozen dictionary definitions—and then reassembles
them to conclude the Materiality Provision “covers mistakes
on any paperwork necessary for one’s ballot to count” and
requires those mistakes be ignored whenever they are “not
relevant to the State’s ability to ascertain whether he is
qualified under state law to vote.” Dissent Op. 19, 30-31, 34.

                               36
We part from that theory because what results is a statutory
provision Congress did not write with implications it did not
intend.

                                A

        The dissent’s approach separates the Materiality
Provision into two and treats these parts as though one does not
inform the other. The phrase “if such error or omission is not
material in determining whether such voter is qualified under
State law to vote,” it says, identifies what types of errors cannot
be used to deny a voter the right to vote: any mistakes that are
not “relevant to the State’s ability to ascertain whether [an
individual] is qualified” to vote. Dissent Op. 15-16, 34. So
far, we’re onboard. But the dissent then divorces that phrase
from everything that comes before it. It does not read the “in
determining” phrase as necessarily referring to the process of
voter qualification, so it believes the types of “record[s] or
paper[s]” covered by the Materiality Provision extend far
beyond the paperwork submitted during voter registration.
Thus, an “error or omission” can occur on any “paperwork
necessary for one’s ballot to count” (echoing Appellees’
theory), and whether that mistake must be ignored depends on
whether it is relevant to ascertaining whether the voter is
qualified to vote.

       But the “in determining” phrase that makes explicit the
Materiality Provision’s voter qualification focus is the tail that
wags the dog. It must confine the scope of “record[s] or
paper[s]” to those used at the qualification stage because the
dissent’s approach runs into the issue that our reading avoids:
“judg[ing] the validity of vot[e-casting] rules based on whether

                                37
they are material to eligibility.” Ritter, 142 S. Ct. at 1825
(Alito, J.). Think back to our driver’s license example. Could
you dispute a ticket for running a red light in Pennsylvania on
the ground that you have a valid driver’s license, and observing
this traffic law is not relevant to whether you are a resident of
the State, passed all licensing exams, are over eighteen years
old, and so forth? If that sounds confusing, that’s because it is.

        Likewise, when a registered voter submits his mail-in
ballot, all that is left for election officials to do is to verify
whether it is valid, i.e., whether it complies with the State’s
vote-casting rules. Put differently, the dissent’s reading
ignores that vote-casting rules, as we have explained, serve
entirely different purposes than voter-qualification rules. It
makes little sense to block enforcement of laws meant to
protect the integrity of the voting process due to their
inescapable irrelevance in determining whether an individual
meets registration requirements.

        The dissent appears to believe its approach would not
result in stymying enforcement of important vote-casting rules.
We have already provided a list of examples to illustrate the
practical consequences of adopting the dissent’s view, see
supra Part II.A, and its attempt to distinguish the date
requirement from those rules does not persuade us.

       Our colleague tackles low-hanging fruit like state laws
about voting deadlines, polling locations, and the use of
secrecy envelopes, see Dissent Op. 21-22 n.17, explaining
none are covered by its reading of the Materiality Provision
because they do not involve “record[s] or paper[s].” We don’t
disagree. What troubles us is the dissent’s treatment of rules
about the ballot. Consider that Appellees, recognizing the

                               38
potentially sweeping implications of their position in this case,
have argued that the ballot is not a paper “requisite to voting,”
and so does not come within the Materiality Provision’s sweep.
See NAACP Br. 46; Sec’y Br. 55-56. But by elsewhere urging
that Congress was “concerned with protecting voters’ rights at
every step of the voting process,” and that the Materiality
Provision covers an outer ballot envelope because it is
“paperwork necessary for one’s ballot to count,” Dissent Op.
19, 30 (emphasis added), the dissent would have difficulty
explaining why that same logic does not apply to the ballot
itself. Of all the “paperwork required to vote,” the ballot seems
to us to be the most necessary to have one’s vote counted.
Moreover, excluding the ballot from the Materiality
Provision’s reach while including the envelope in which the
completed ballot travels—on the ground that one is “requisite
to voting” and one is not—counters commonsense. The
dissent thus concedes, as it must, that “good reason” exists to
conclude its interpretation brings into play state rules
concerning the ballot itself. Dissent Op. 36 n.27. But there is
nothing wrong with that, says our colleague, for no matter
Pennsylvania’s interest in its election laws, it simply was
“Congress’s goal” in 1964 “to restrain a State’s ability to
discard ballots cast by qualified voters.” Id. Legislative
history does not support that. To assert otherwise without any
indication from a Committee Report is judicially to rewrite
Congress’ stated intent.

       To downplay the implications of its position, the dissent
briefly mentions the rule against overvoting, claiming it still
would be enforceable under its reading because “the State
could not determine the candidate for whom the voter intended
to vote.” Op. 36 n.27. In other words, there is a legitimate
reason for prohibiting overvotes. The dissent also claims its

                               39
interpretation would not “give license to bad actors who
attempt to exploit certain State election laws for improper
purposes,” such as “by having voters make errant marks on
ballots to signal the vote where such marks are prohibited by
State law.” Id. Why that is so it does not say. Presumably, the
dissent again believes these rules serve a legitimate purpose
while the date requirement does not. But the Materiality
Provision simply does not care whether a rule furthers
important state interests.       It targets rules that require
unnecessary information during voter qualification processes
and prohibits disqualifying individuals making immaterial
errors or omissions in paperwork related to registration. It does
not prevent enforcement of neutral state requirements on how
voters may cast a valid ballot, no matter the purpose those rules
may serve.

      Perhaps the dissent recognizes as much, as it argues the
declaration on the return envelope does in fact “play[] a role in
helping the State to determine that all mail-in voters [are]
qualified to vote,” and the signature “provides the name of the
voter” and thus a means “to determine whether the name is
associated with a qualified voter”—i.e., to ascertain his
identity. Dissent Op. 34-35 n.26, 38 & n.30. We do not see it
that way. Even if verifying a voter’s identity, in theory, is a
necessary step in determining an individual’s qualification to
vote, Pennsylvania does not, in practice, use the signature on
the declaration to do that. See In re Nov. 3, 2020 Gen. Election,
662 Pa. 718, 741-43 (Pa. 2020). Moreover, the declaration is
printed on an envelope a voter uses to submit—i.e., cast—his
mail ballot. It (the declaration) is not even remotely a form
used in Pennsylvania’s voter qualification process. The voter
who submits his mail-in package has already been deemed
qualified to vote—first, when his application to register is

                               40
approved and again when his application for a mail ballot is
accepted.      See App. 81; NAACP Br. 30; 25 P.S.
§§ 3150.12b(a), 2811; 25 Pa.C.S. § 1301(a). Moreover, in
signing and dating the declaration, the voter merely attests that
he is “qualified to vote in this election,” “ha[s] not already
voted,” “marked [his] ballot in secret,” and “understand[s] [he
is] no longer eligible to vote at [his] polling place after”
returning the voted ballot. App. 58. That signed and dated
attestation is used to determine whether the ballot is validly
cast, not whether the individual is qualified under state law to
vote.

                               B

        Our dissenting colleague grounds her rationale for
reading the Materiality Provision to extend to all “paperwork
required to vote”—and thus to ensnare a ballot return
envelope—in Congress’ use of “act requisite to voting” and the
statute’s broad definition of “vote.” We address a few points
here.

       To be sure, there is an argument that limiting the phrase
“record or paper relating to any application, registration, or
other act requisite to voting” to paperwork submitted during
registration or similar processes renders “other act requisite to
voting” superfluous. Dissent Op. 21. Sometimes, “no matter
how” we read a statute, “there will be redundancies.” Bobb v.
Att’y Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 223 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
And reading the Materiality Provision as the dissent does—i.e.,
it simply refers to “paperwork required to vote”—would also
render language superfluous; namely, the deliberate references
to “registration” and “application.” Why did Congress list
these specific procedures when it just as easily could have said

                               41
the Materiality Provision applies to “any record or paper
relating to an act requisite to voting”? The dissent’s reading
ignores not just the limiting effect of “application” and
“registration” but also the import of the voter qualification
focus in the “in determining” phrase that follows.

        The dissent claims support in legislative history for
interpreting the phrase to cover “more than registration-related
papers.” Dissent Op. 21, 23-27 & n.19. It accepts that the
enacting Congress was concerned with “the threshold
problem” of “discriminatory practices in voter registration.”
Id. at 25 n.19, 27. But rather than limiting the statute’s reach
accordingly, the dissent believes it can expand it because
“Congress’s concerns about voter discrimination did not
vanish after registration.” Id. at 27. No doubt those concerns
existed after Congress passed the Civil Right Act of 1964.
They led the following year to enactment of the landmark
Voting Rights Act of 1965. But before us today is the statutory
interpretation of the Materiality Provision.          Even our
colleague’s own account of that law’s historic record consists
of nothing but instances of discriminatory and arbitrary
practices during registration. See id. at 24-26 n.19. That is
what Congress meant to address and what the text reflects.

        We close this segment by commenting on the dissent’s
conclusion that a voter whose ballot is not counted for omitting
or incorrectly dating the return envelope is “denied the right
. . . to vote.” Citing the statute’s definition of “vote” as
including “having [a] ballot counted,” the dissent believes
setting aside non-compliant ballots deprives affected voters of
their right to vote. Dissent Op. 16-17, 37-38. We have already
explained why, in our view, the definition does not help much,
as voters must still follow certain rules to make their vote

                              42
effective. See supra Part II.A. The dissent’s response is
circular. It acknowledges that “States have the authority to set
neutral requirements for voting.” Id. at 17 n.13. But, it claims,
if “a state requirement denies an individual the right to vote in
an election due to an inconsequential paperwork error or
omission of the type captured by the Materiality Provision,
then the state rule cannot be used to disqualify a vote.” Id.
That just begs the question at the heart of this case: Does the
Materiality Provision (a federal override for determining voter
qualification) cover the date requirement (a Pennsylvania vote-
casting rule)?

                           *****

      Confining the role of the Materiality Provision to
qualification determinations places its parts into a whole that
can be squared with the statute’s text, context, and historic
backdrop. It prohibits turning away otherwise eligible
individuals based on errors or omissions in supplying
information that is not material in determining whether they
are qualified to vote. This removes unnecessary barriers
blocking access to the voting place. But it lets States decide
the rules that must be followed to cast a valid ballot.
Pennsylvania’s date requirement, regardless what we may
think of it, does not cross over to a determination of who is
qualified to vote, and the Materiality Provision likewise does
not cross over to how a State regulates its vote-casting process.

     Because we hold the date requirement for casting a mail-
in ballot is not covered by, and thus does not violate, the
Materiality Provision, we reverse the District Court’s order and
remand for it to consider the merits of the Plaintiffs’ equal
protection challenge.

                               43
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge dissenting.

        In the 1950s and 1960s, Congress set out to guarantee
all eligible Americans the right to vote. It investigated,
legislated, and, when its efforts fell short, enacted “sterner and
more elaborate measures” to eliminate barriers to voting.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). One
such measure was to ensure that States’ immaterial voting
requirements did not prevent otherwise qualified voters from
registering to vote, casting ballots, and having their votes
counted. Congress did so, in part, through the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 as amended by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, in which
it enacted what is now codified as 52 U.S.C. §10101(a)(2)(B)
(the “Materiality Provision”). This law forbids State actors
from denying voters the right to vote in any election due to
errors or omissions on required paperwork when such mistakes
do not affect the State’s ability to determine the voters’
qualifications to vote.1

       More than one million Pennsylvania voters mailed in
their ballots in the November 2022 election. Of them, 10,000
timely-received ballots were not counted because they did not
comply with the State law requirement that the voters’
declarations (‘the declarations”) on the mailing envelopes
include a date below the voter’s signature,2 Ball v. Chapman,

       1
         The words “paperwork” and “document” refer to any
record or paper covered by the Materiality Provision. The
word “mistake” refers to the errors and omissions covered by
the Materiality Provision.
       2
          These voters either omitted the date, wrote an
incomplete date, or recorded an incorrect date below their
signatures. Examples of erroneous dates include dates that
284 A.3d 1189, 1192 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam), even though the
date on the envelope is not used to (1) evaluate a voter’s
statutory qualifications to vote, (2) determine the ballot’s
timeliness, or (3) confirm that the voter did not die before
Election Day or to otherwise detect fraud.

       Some of those voters, and organizations representing
similar interests (“Plaintiffs”), sued the Secretary of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and county boards of
elections to have their ballots counted, contending that the
exclusion of those ballots denied those voters their right to vote

only had the month and day but no year, or with a month and
year but no day, dates that listed a year in the past or in the
future, dates that were likely the voter’s birth date, and dates
written using the European style of day/month/year.

                                2
under federal law.3, 4 The District Court agreed, granted
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,5 and ordered that

       3
         Plaintiffs are correct that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides
them a private right of action to enforce the Materiality
Provision. Vote.Org v. Callanen, 89 F.4th 459, 478 (5th Cir.
2003) (holding that “a remedy for [§] 10101 violations [may
be sought] by way of [§] 1983”); Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d
1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that § 10101 “may be
enforced by a private right of action under § 1983”); but see
Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 837 F.3d 612, 630
(6th Cir. 2016) (stating that § 10101 could not be enforced
under § 1983 based on cases relying on a district court opinion
that had no allegation of state action and did not discuss §
1983).
        Applying the test announced in Gonzaga University v.
Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), despite having some doubt that it
applies to civil rights claims, see id. at 279-83 (justifying the
test based on “confusion” stemming from noncivil rights
cases), Plaintiffs may use § 1983 seek relief. Under Gonzaga,
a plaintiff must show that the law he claims has been violated
creates a personal right. Three Rivers Ctr. for Indep. Living v.
Hous. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 382 F.3d 412, 421-22 (3d Cir.
2004). To determine whether a statute gives rise to a personal
right, we consider whether: (1) Congress intended that the
statute benefit the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff has shown that the
right is “not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement
would strain judicial competence”; and (3) the statute imposes
a binding obligation on the State, which may be shown by its
couching of the right “in mandatory, rather than precatory,
terms.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Once the
plaintiff establishes such a right, then there is a rebuttable

                                3
presumption that the plaintiff may enforce that right via § 1983.
Id. at 341; see also Health and Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v.
Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 186 (2023) (same). Plaintiffs have
established there is a personal right in § 10101, and the
presumption has not been rebutted.
        First, § 10101 embodies a right, which the parties do not
dispute, as the first subsection of the statute provides that all
qualified citizens “shall be entitled and allowed to vote.” 52
U.S.C. 10101(a)(1). This subsection, and the Materiality
Provision itself, benefit a voter. Moreover, the right embodied
in the statute is not “vague and amorphous,” and the statute “is
couched in mandatory terms,” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340, in that
it provides that no State actor “shall . . . deny the right of any
individual to vote[.]” 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B); cf.
Wisniewski v. Rodale, Inc., 510 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“[A]n explicit reference to a right and a focus on the individual
protected . . . suffices to demonstrate Congress’s intent to
create a personal right.”). Therefore, § 10101 creates a
personal right.
        Second, Appellants have not rebutted the presumption
that the right is enforceable and that a remedy can be secured
via § 1983 because Congress did not (1) expressly foreclose
the use of § 1983, or (2) create a comprehensive enforcement
scheme incompatible with individual enforcement. Gonzaga,
536 U.S. at 284 n.4. Here, Appellants argue that § 10101(c)
contains an “elaborate enforcement scheme,” as it permits
private individuals to seek a declaration that they are entitled
to vote only after the Attorney General prevails in a lawsuit
showing that a State actor engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(c), (e). This, however, is
not the only remedy available to private plaintiffs. Congress
specifically provided federal courts with jurisdiction over §

                                4
10101 claims and gave the “party aggrieved,” i.e., the
aggrieved voter, the right to bring suit without exhausting other
remedies. See 52 U.S.C. § 10101(d). This means that an
individual need not await any action by the Attorney General,
or a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination, before
seeking to enforce his rights under the statute. As a result, the
statute does not embody a comprehensive scheme for relief
incompatible with individual enforcement.
        Furthermore, the 1957 Civil Rights Act specifically
added the aggrieved person/no exhaustion provision at the
same time it gave the Attorney General civil enforcement
authority. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131,
71 Stat. 634, 637 (1957). It would be inconsistent to read the
statute to remove one roadblock to private suits (exhaustion
requirements) and simultaneously erect another by allowing
private persons to obtain relief only when the Attorney General
chooses to bring (and wins) a pattern and practice suit. See
Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1295-96; see also Morse v. Republican
Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186, 213, 230-34 (1996) (holding
the Voting Rights Act “only authorizes enforcement
proceedings brought by the Attorney General and does not
expressly mention private actions,” but nevertheless “Congress
must have intended [] to provide private remedies”); United
States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 137 (1965)
(acknowledging “private persons might file suits under §
[10101]”). Thus, because § 10101 does not provide a
comprehensive enforcement scheme that is inconsistent with a
plaintiff’s ability to seek relief under § 1983, Plaintiffs have a
private of right action and can sue under § 1983.
        Although Plaintiffs asserted in their complaint that §
10101 contains an implied right of action, they did not do so
before us. Nonetheless, there is textual support for concluding

                                5
such an implied right of action exists. To determine whether
an implied right of action exists, courts consider whether (1)
plaintiff was the beneficiary of the statute, (2) the text indicates
that the statute created a remedy, (3) implying the remedy is
consistent with the legislative scheme, and (4) the implied
cause of action is in an area not traditionally relegated to state
law such that it would be inappropriate to infer a federal cause
of action. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of
Env’t Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 777 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting West
Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18 n.1 (3d
Cir. 1989) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975))). Each
of these considerations support concluding that § 10101
contains an implied private right of action. First, because the
statute directs State actors not to deny an individual the right
to vote, the beneficiary of the statute is the voter. The statute
also instructs federal district courts to accept suits from a “party
aggrieved” regardless of whether that party has exhausted
administrative remedies. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(d). This conveys
that Congress intended that voters whose rights were denied be
permitted to immediately come to court. Second, following a
finding that a wrongdoer engaged in a pattern or practice of
voter discrimination, the statute provides an avenue for a voter
to obtain declaratory relief. Although Congress identified this
declaratory relief in a particular circumstance, the text’s
reference to allowing courts to consider suits by aggrieved
persons without satisfying administrative or other prerequisites
shows that the statute does not limit aggrieved parties to
seeking only such relief. Third, allowing a voter to bring suit
for violations of the statute is consistent with the text and
legislative scheme. Fourth, although the statute covers election
activity, including State elections subject to state law, it serves
the purpose of ensuring that State actors do not misuse state

                                 6
law to deny a voter the right to have their vote counted, a right
Congress explicitly extended to voters in State elections in the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Therefore, there are reasons to
conclude that § 10101 has an implied right of action.
        4
          Amicus curiae Alabama and sixteen other States (the
“Seventeen States”) contend that § 1983 cannot apply here. No
party made such an argument and amici are generally not
permitted to inject new issues into an appeal, “at least in cases
where the parties are competently represented by counsel.”
New Jersey Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669
F.3d 374, 382 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted)). Nevertheless, I will address it. The
Seventeen States argue that Plaintiffs may not rely on § 1983
to enforce § 10101 because Gonzaga requires that § 1983 can
only be used to enforce new rights that Congress creates and
that statutes promulgated under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment can only
create remedies. This is incorrect for at least three reasons.
        First, the Gonzaga Court itself approvingly noted that
the Supreme Court had previously “recognized, for example,
that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” (which prohibits
discrimination in federally assisted programs, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (1964)) “creat[ed] individual rights.”
536 U.S. at 284 (citation omitted). Thus, it cannot be that the
Court was ruling that legislation enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot satisfy the Gonzaga test as the
Court used the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was
promulgated in part based on the Fourteenth Amendment, as
an example of a statute that can create rights.

                               7
        Second, the implications of the Seventeen States’s
position illustrate why it is wrong. Under their theory, (1) all
§ 1983 actions for statutory violations require the underlying
statute to confer a new right, (2) statutes enacted pursuant to
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments cannot establish
new rights, and (3) together this means that no federal civil
rights law enacted pursuant to those Constitutional
Amendments are enforceable by private action unless the
statute includes an express cause of action. Adopting the
Seventeen States’s theory would: (1) eliminate almost all
avenues to enforce the civil rights laws promulgated pursuant
to the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments; (2) ignore that Congress enacted many civil
rights laws without including an express private right of action
“against a backdrop of decisions in which implied causes of
action were regularly found[,]” Morse, 517 U.S. at 213, 231
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); and (3) be
inconsistent with the purpose of § 1983, which Congress
enacted to enforce the civil rights laws against State actors, see,
e.g., Talevski, 599 U.S. at 176-77; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934 (1982) (noting Congress viewed § 1983
as a mechanism for private plaintiffs to enforce the rights
embodied in the Reconstruction Amendments); Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545 (1972) (“The broad
concept of civil rights embodied . . . in the Fourteenth
Amendment is unmistakably evident in the legislative history
of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, the direct
lineal ancestor of §[] 1983[.]”).
        Third, Gonzaga developed the rights-creation test to
clarify “confusion” that the Court thought had resulted from
several of its earlier ruling. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 279-83.
However, the cases it cited as giving rise to “confusion” all

                                8
such ballots be counted in the twelve counties over which the
Court had Article III jurisdiction.6 Pennsylvania State Conf. of

arose outside of the civil rights context. See id. Therefore, it
follows that Gonzaga’s test was crafted to examine cases where
plaintiffs seek to use § 1983 to enforce a right arising outside
of the civil rights context.
        5
          The Purcell doctrine, which disfavors courts providing
election-related relief in the weeks before an election, does not
counsel against deciding this dispute. First, the doctrine is
often invoked to ensure that courts avoid deciding matters that
could result in “voter confusion” and cause voters to “remain
away from the polls.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5
(2006) (per curiam); see also Republican Nat’l Comm. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (per
curiam) (“[W]hen a lower court intervenes and alters the
election rules so close to the election date, our precedents
indicate that this Court, as appropriate, should correct that
error.”). Here, the District Court’s ruling occurred after the
polls closed. Second, the District Court’s ruling occurred well
before any upcoming election, providing ample time for voters
to plan how they would like to vote. Third, the District Court’s
order affected election officials, not voters, and provided clear
guidance about whether to count certain mail-in ballots. Thus,
ruling in this case did not present any risk voter confusion.
        6
          The District Court’s remedy, which was limited to
twelve counties based on its Article III jurisdiction,
Pennsylvania State Conf. of NAACP v. Schmidt, No. 1:22-cv-
00399, 2023 WL 8091601, at *35-36 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21,
2023), did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Two
Supreme Court cases tell us why. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,
the Supreme Court held that a federal law that required the
States to grant voting rights to non-English speakers who

                               9
attended schools in Puerto Rico that taught predominantly in a
non-English language, but not to non-English speakers who
attended schools beyond the territorial limits of the United
States, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 384 U.S.
641, 654-58 (1966). The Court upheld the law because it “d[id]
not restrict or deny the franchise but in effect extend[ed] the
franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it by state
law.” Id. at 657. Likewise, in McDonald v. Board of Election
Commissioners, the Court considered an Illinois law that
allowed for absentee voting in certain circumstances, including
where a voter would be absent from his resident county on
Election Day. 394 U.S. 802, 803 (1969). Plaintiffs, who were
pre-trial detainees in their county of residence, alleged that the
law violated the Equal Protection Clause because it permitted
pre-trial inmates at jails located outside of their counties of
residence to vote absentee, while the plaintiffs were excluded
from doing so. Id. at 803, 806. The Court concluded that the
“different treatment” afforded to similarly situated voters in
different counties did not give rise to an Equal Protection
Clause violation, in part because expanding voting to people
who otherwise would not be entitled to it “should not render
void [the] remedial legislation, which need not . . . ‘strike at all
evils at the same time.’” Id. at 810-11 (quoting Semler v.
Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935)). Thus, under
Morgan and McDonald, remedies that fall short of extending
voting rights to all similarly situated individuals do not violate
the Equal Protection Clause, as making voting more accessible
often comes in stages and need not be an all-or-nothing
proposition.
        Appellants’ reliance on Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000), to support their view that the District Court’s order
violated the Equal Protection Clause is misplaced. First, Bush

                                10
NAACP v. Schmidt, No. 1:22-cv-00399, 2023 WL 8091601,
at *28-34 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2023).

       The Republican National Committee intervenors appeal
but, notably, the county boards of election and the Secretary do
not. My colleagues agree with the intervenors’ view that the
Materiality Provision applies only to paperwork used to
register to vote and not to the declarations on the envelopes
used to mail ballots. For the reasons set forth below, the

expressly stated that its “consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election
processes generally presents many complexities.” Id. at 109.
Second, the present case does not involve a lack of a uniform
standards for determining whether a ballot expressed the
voter’s choice. Finally, reported cases involving Equal
Protection challenges to a remedy citing Bush, see, e.g., Ne.
Ohio Coal. For the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 583-84
(6th Cir. 2012); Democratic Party of Georgia, Inc. v.
Crittenden, 347 F. Supp. 1324, 1339-41 (N.D. Ga. 2018);
Friedman v. Snipes, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1381-82 (S.D. Fla.
2004), are factually distinguishable and ignore Bush’s
statement about the limits of its ruling. 531 U.S. at 109.
Furthermore, Bush itself did not cite Morgan, and only Justice
Ginsburg cited McDonald in her dissent. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). Likewise, Husted, Crittenden, and Friedman do
not cite Morgan, and the singular references to McDonald in
Crittenden and Friedman were for unrelated purposes.
Accordingly, these cases do not show that the District Court’s
remedy violated Equal Protection.

                               11
Materiality Provision, in my view, is not limited to that narrow
group of documents and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.7

                                     I

        I begin with a review of the relevant Pennsylvania law.
To be qualified to register and to vote in Pennsylvania, an
individual must (1) be at least eighteen years old on the date of
the election, (2) be a citizen of the United States for at least one
month before the election, (3) reside in the election district for
at least thirty days before the election, and (4) not have been
confined for a felony in the preceding five years. 25 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 1301; 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 2811.

       Qualified voters can vote in person, absentee, or by
mail-in ballot. See 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. §§ 3146.6(a),
3150.16(a). To vote by mail-in ballot,8 the voter must
complete an application that contains the voter’s date of birth,
length of residency in the district, and proof of identification.
25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 3150.12. If the voter’s county
board of elections verifies the voter’s identity and
qualifications, then it sends him a mail-ballot package, which

       7
         A prior panel reached the same conclusion when it
held that the Materiality Provision required that officials count
ballots contained in envelopes where the declaration lacked a
date, and I agree with their conclusion. Migliori v. Cohen¸ 36
F.4th 153 (3d Cir. 2022), vacated as moot sub nom., Ritter v.
Migliori, 143 S. Ct. 297, 298 (2022).
       8
         I focus on only documents that mail-in voters submit
because that is the group of voters at issue in this case. See
United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113, 114 (3d Cir. 1973)
(“[W]e will limit our review to the pertinent facts.”).

                                12
contains a ballot, a secrecy envelope, and a pre-addressed
return envelope, on which a voter declaration is printed. 25 Pa.
Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 3150.12-.15.9 The law instructs the
voter to mark the ballot in secret, place the ballot in the secrecy
envelope, place the secrecy envelope in the return envelope,
and “fill out, date and sign the declaration.” 25 Pa Stat. and
Cons. Stat. §§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a) (the “date requirement”).
Although the formatting of the declaration varies by county,
each declaration contains the following language above the
signature and date lines:

       I hereby declare that I am qualified to vote in this
       election; that I have not already voted in this
       election; and I further declare that I marked my
       ballot in secret. I am qualified to vote the
       enclosed ballot. I understand I am no longer
       eligible to vote at my polling place after I return
       my voted ballot. However, if my ballot is not
       received by the county, I understand I may only
       vote by provisional ballot at my polling place,
       unless I surrender my balloting materials, to be
       voided, to the judge of elections at my polling
       place.

Pa. Supp. App. at 284; see also 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons.
Stat. § 3146.6(b)(3) (setting forth required language for
mail-in and absentee declarations). Of import here, the
first line of the declaration requires the voter to declare
that he is qualified to vote.

       9
        In the November 2022 election, the boards of elections
did not begin sending the relevant mail-in ballot materials to
voters until August 2022.

                                13
        After the voter completes these steps, he is required to
mail or deliver the packet to the designated county location so
it is received by 8:00 P.M. on Election Day. 25 Pa. Stat. and
Cons. Stat. §§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a). When the county board
of elections receives the packet, it scans the bar code on the
return envelope. The bar code corresponds to the voter who
requested the ballot and records when election officials receive
the ballot package.

        As stated previously, more than 10,000 eligible voters
had their timely-ballots disqualified because the dates that
appeared below their signatures had no date, an incomplete
date, or an incorrect date and thus did not satisfy the State law’s
date requirement.

                                II

                                A

       The question in this case is whether the disqualification
of those votes violates the Materiality Provision. To answer
this question, I consider the full text of the Materiality
Provision and the entire statutory section of which it is a part.

        “As in any statutory construction case,” courts must
begin “with the statutory text and proceed from the
understanding        that       [u]nless     otherwise defined,
statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with
their ordinary meaning.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376
(2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(alterations in the original); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 697 n.10

                                14
(1995) (observing that Congress’s choice to “explicitly
define[]” a statutory term “obviat[es] the need for us to probe
its meaning as we must probe the meaning of [] undefined []
term[s]”). When a statutory term is undefined, we may
consider dictionary definitions to ascertain the term’s ordinary
meaning. Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Hum. Servs., 647 F.3d 506, 511 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). “[W]hen the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain,
our job is at an end[,]” as “[t]he people are entitled to rely on
the law as written, without fearing that courts might disregard
its   plain     terms     based     on     some      extratextual
consideration.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 673-
74 (2020) (citations omitted).

       The Materiality Provision provides that:

       [n]o person acting under the color of law shall[]
       . . . deny the right of any individual to vote in any
       election because of an error or omission on any
       record or paper relating to any application,
       registration, or other act requisite to voting, if
       such error or omission is not material in
       determining whether such individual is qualified
       under State law to vote in such election.

52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). This is a conditional statement
consisting of two parts. I will refer to the part the Materiality
Provision that precedes “if such error or omission” as the first
clause, and the language that follows this phrase as the second
clause. As explained herein, the first clause identifies the types
of papers covered by the Materiality Provision, and the second
clause informs the first clause by identifying the types of errors

                                15
or omissions that cannot be used to deny a voter the right to
vote.

                                1

        The first clause begins with “[n]o person acting under
color of law shall[] . . . deny the right of any individual to vote
in any election.” 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). To understand
the meaning of the phrase “deny the right of any individual to
vote,” it is necessary to consider the meaning of “right.”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “right” as “a capacity residing
in one man of controlling, with the assent and assistance of the
state, the actions of others,” or “that which a man is entitled to
have, or to do, or to receive from others within the limits
prescribed by law.” Right, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.
1951) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).10 To
“deny” means, as relevant here, to “refuse to grant,” Deny,
Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).11 Finally, the statute’s
definition of “vote” provides that

       the word “vote” includes all action necessary to
       make a vote effective including, but not limited
       to, registration or other action required by State
       law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and
       having such ballot counted and included in the
       appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to

       10
           See also Right, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968)
(same); accord Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015)
(describing “rights” as “interests of the person so fundamental
that the State must accord them its respect”) (citation omitted).
        11
           See also Deny, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary
of the English Language Unabr. (1963) (“to refuse to grant”).

                                16
       candidates for public office and propositions for
       which votes are received in an election[.]

52 U.S.C. § 10101(e); see also id. § 10101(a)(3)(A) (providing
that “the term ‘vote’ shall have the same meaning as in
subsection (e) of this section”); see Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697
n.10 (deferring to a statute’s definition of a term). This
definition demonstrates that the Materiality Provision applies
to a variety of actions connected with the voting process.
Accordingly, this part of the first clause unambiguously
provides that the State may not refuse to grant voters their
entitlement to have their ballots counted so long as the
remaining conditions of the Materiality Provision are
satisfied.12, 13

       12
           Appellants’ contention that we should interpret the
phrase “right . . . to vote” as the common law understood it in
1964, i.e., to not encompass mail-in voting fails because
Congress provided the strongest possible indication that the
common law definition was not applicable: its own definition.
United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994) (citations
omitted). Its definition governs. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697 n.10.
Mail-in voting falls squarely within that definition, as the
definition does not limit the act of voting to casting ballots in
person.
        13
           States have the authority to set neutral requirements
for voting. If, however, a state requirement denies an
individual the right to vote in an election due to an
inconsequential paperwork error or omission of the type
captured by the Materiality Provision, then the state rule cannot
be used to disqualify a vote because the Materiality Provision
supersedes state law. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr.,
Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324 (2015) (explaining that under the

                               17
       The next portion of the first clause provides “because of
an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any
application, registration, or other act requisite to voting.” 52

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, see U.S. Const. art. VI,
cl. 2, “[c]ourts . . . must not give effect to state laws that conflict
with federal laws” (citation omitted)). The Majority chooses
to adopt a narrow interpretation of the Materiality Provision
due, at least in part, to a concern that a plain reading may
prevent States from enforcing election laws that, albeit
reasonable, have nothing to do with determining whether
someone is qualified to vote. It is not a judge’s job to curtail
the scope of a constitutional law, see infra at 28-30, even if the
judge thinks its application could go too far. See Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 612 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“The contours of public policy should be
determined by Congress, not by judges[.]”). The text makes
clear the types of mistakes Congress sought to regulate (i.e.,
those on mandatory paperwork other than registration forms).
The history shows that Congress extended the Materiality
Provision to the States and broadly defined the term “vote” to
combat the evil of voter disenfranchisement. Accordingly,
Congress’s choice to judge States’ voting laws against the
benchmark of whether a mistake is material to determining a
voter’s qualifications is not “confusing.” Majority Op. at 38.
Rather, the Materiality Provision’s plain text and history
demonstrate that Congress endeavored to legislate
expansively, and it determined that the interest in preventing
neutral-looking laws from disenfranchising qualified voters
outweighed the potential consequence of voiding a limited
number of state voting laws. Congress has the authority to do
so, and we are required to apply the law as written.

                                  18
U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). The Majority holds that this portion
of the Materiality Provision shows that it applies to only
registration paperwork. I part company with them, as I view
the language as written: to capture errors or omissions on any
records or papers that relate to any application, registration, or
“other act requisite to voting.” Id.

        To determine what constitutes any “other act requisite
to voting,” I am guided by the statute’s definition of “vote,”
see Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697 n.10, as well as the ordinary
meaning of “requisite” and “other.” As previously noted, the
statute defines “vote” to include “all action necessary to make
a vote effective including, but not limited to, action required
by State law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having
such ballot counted[.]” 52 U.S.C. § 10101(e). “Requisite”
ordinarily means “required,” Requisite, Webster’s Third New
Int’l Dictionary of the English Language Unabr. (1963)
(“required by the nature of things or by circumstances or by the
end in view: essential, indispensable, necessary”),14 and
“other” means “[d]ifferent or distinct from that already
mentioned,” Other, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951), or
“not being the one (as of two or more) first mentioned,” Other,
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary of the English Language
Unabr. (1963). Therefore, by its terms, the first clause of the
Materiality Provision covers mistakes on paperwork necessary
for one’s ballot to count, including on papers distinct from
application or registration forms. To conclude that the
Materiality Provision limits “other act[s] requisite to voting” to

       14
          See also Requisite, Webster’s New Twentieth
Century Dictionary (2d ed. 1969) (“required by the nature of
things or by circumstances; necessary for some purpose; so
needful that it cannot be dispensed with”).

                               19
only registration-related conduct would place limits on the text
that simply are not there.15 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). Had
Congress wished to limit “any . . . other act requisite to voting,”

       15
           Because the phrase “requisite to voting” is not
ambiguous, the ejusdem generis canon of statutory
interpretation does not apply. See Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
446 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1980). However, applying that canon
would not lead to a different outcome in this case. This canon
instructs that “where general words follow an enumeration of
specific items, [they] are read as applying only to other items
akin to those specifically enumerated.” Id. at 588; see also Ali
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 224-25, 227-28 (2008)
(declining to apply the rule to the phrase “‘any officer of
customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer’” so as
to limit “‘any other law enforcement officer’” because
Congress “easily could have written ‘any other law
enforcement officer acting in a customs or excise capacity’”
but instead “used [an] unmodified, all-encompassing phrase”
(emphasis omitted)). If we applied the canon, as well as the
canon noscitur a sociis, a related canon that provides that “a
word is known by the company it keeps,” Jarecki v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961), “it would not
significantly narrow the ambit of” “requisite to voting” to
preclude inclusion of the declaration, Harrison, 466 U.S. at
588; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
114-15 (2001) (noting that a catch-all phrase can be construed
“to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects
enumerated by the preceding specific words”). The declaration
is of the same species as a voter application or registration
form, as all three types of documents exist to enable someone
to exercise the right to vote and provide information
concerning the voter’s qualifications to vote.

                                20
id., to registration-related conduct alone, it could have written
“any . . . other act requisite to registering to vote,” or defined
“vote” more narrowly, but it did not.

        Interpreting the first clause to cover more than
registration-related papers makes sense for additional reasons.
First, doing so ensures that no words in the statute are rendered
superfluous. “It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that
significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every
word.” Washington Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115
(1879). Limiting the Materiality Provision to papers relating
to the initial registration would render the phrase “or other act
requisite to voting” meaningless, see United States v. EME
Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 293 (3d Cir. 2013)
(cautioning that “general phrases cannot be so narrowly
construed that they become meaningless”),16 because the
Materiality Provision already applies to “any record or paper
relating to any . . . registration,”17 52 U.S.C. 10101(a)(2)(B).

       16
          Conversely, this interpretation of “requisite to voting”
does not render “application or registration” superfluous, as
“Congress may have simply intended to remove any doubt
that” applying and registering to vote count as acts requisite to
voting. Fort Stewart Schs. v. FLRA, 495 U.S. 641, 646 (1990)
(noting that Congress may insert “technically unnecessary”
examples “out of an abundance of caution—a drafting
imprecision venerable enough to have left its mark on legal
Latin (ex abundanti cautela)” (italics omitted)).
       17
          This interpretation of “any . . . other act requisite to
voting” also does not violate the canon against federalism.
Concluding that the phrase covers paperwork other than
registration forms does not infringe upon a State’s right to
enact neutral and uniform legislation to regulate elections,

                               21
       Second, this interpretation gives effect to the
Materiality Provision’s repeated use of the word “any.” See 52
U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has
an expansive meaning, that is, one or some indiscriminately of
whatever kind.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5
(1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, this construction aligns with Congress’s use of
“any” to emphasize the variety of papers the Materiality
Provision covers.18

subject to the Materiality Provision, which itself is limited to
mistakes on paperwork requisite to voting that are irrelevant to
determining a voter’s qualifications. State laws that set voting
deadlines, identify polling locations, permit mail-in voting, and
require the use of a secrecy envelope for mail-in ballots, for
example, all lie outside the sphere of the Materiality Provision,
as such requirements cannot result in errors on papers requisite
to voting. See, e.g., Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm. v.
Kosinski, 614 F. Supp. 3d 20, 55 (S.D.N.Y.
2022) (distinguishing between errors regarding a voter’s
assigned polling place and errors “on any record or
paper”); Friedman, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1372-73 (declining to
issue an injunction under the Materiality Provision that would
require counting absentee ballots received after a deadline, as
this was not an error or omission “on any record or paper”); see
also Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775,
841 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (failure to present identification “is by
definition not an error or omission on any record or paper”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), aff’d sub nom.
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir.
2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
        18
           The Majority relies on the fact that the statutory
subsections neighboring the Materiality Provision may more

                               22
      Third, this interpretation is consistent with the historical
context in which the Materiality Provision was enacted.19 As

obviously apply to only registration and voter qualifications to
support the view that the Materiality Provision only applies to
initial registration paperwork.             See 52 U.S.C. §
10101(a)(2)(A), (C) (prohibiting State actors from using (1)
non-uniform practices to “determin[e] whether any individual
is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any election,”
and (2) “literacy test[s] as a qualification for voting . . . unless”
certain requirements are met). These neighboring provisions,
however, do not alter the scope of the Materiality Provision.
First, they are not phrased as conditional statements and thus
are not structured in the same way as the Materiality Provision.
Secon, the Materiality Provision reaches errors or omissions
any paperwork “requisite to voting.” Neither § 10101(a)(2)(A)
nor (C) contain such “requisite to voting” language. Therefore,
the subsections differ, and with “differing language” comes
differing meanings. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983) (observing that when “Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same [a]ct, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
        19
           Between 1957 and 1965, Congress engaged in an
eight-year effort to research and combat discrimination in
elections. In 1957, Congress, “disturbed by allegations that
some American citizens were being denied the right to vote . .
. because of their race, color, creed, or national origin[,]” U.S.
Comm’n on Civil Rights, Report of the U.S. Comm’n on Civil
Rights 1959, at ix (1959) (“1959 CCR Report”), passed the
Civil Rights Act of 1957, which, among other things, outlawed

                                 23
intentional acts of voter intimidation in federal elections and
established the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (“CCR”) to
“investigate” discrimination in voting, see 71 Stat. at 634-36
(§§ 101-06).
        The CCR’s initial report detailed the history of
persistent, “ingenious and sometimes violent methods” State
actors employed to disenfranchise Black voters since the end
of the Civil War. 1959 CCR Report at 30. This report advised
Congress that the “[t]he history of voting in the United States
shows . . . that where there is will and opportunity to
discriminate against certain potential voters, ways to
discriminate will be found.” Id. at 133. Congress responded
by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449,
74 Stat. 86 (1960). Relevant in that legislation, Congress
defined the term “vote” using the identical, broad definition
now codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10101(e). See 74 Stat. at 91-92.
        By 1963, the CCR advised Congress that: (1) voter
discrimination endured, (2) “present legal remedies . . . [were]
inadequate[,]” and (3) “the promise of the 14th and the 15th
amendments to the Constitution remain[ed] unfulfilled.” U.S.
Comm’n on Civil Rights, Civil Rights ‘63, at 13, 26 (1963)
(“1963 CCR Report”). The report further catalogued that the
“techniques of discrimination” used to “subvert the
Constitution of the United States” remained “diverse.” Id. at
15, 22. Among the most “common” included the “use of
plainly arbitrary procedures” by certain officials, such as (1)
the “requirement of vouchers or some other unduly technical
method of identification,” (2) the “rejection for insignificant
errors in filling out forms,” (3) the “failure to notify applicants
of rejection,” (4) the “imposition of delaying tactics,” and (5)
the “discrimination in giving assistance to applicants.” Id. at
22; see also U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, 1961 U.S. Comm’n

                                24
on Civil Rights Report: Voting, at 137 (1961) (“1961 CCR
Report”) (describing the arbitrary requirement “to calculate
[one’s] age to the day” as a “common technique of
discriminating against would-be voters on racial grounds”). As
a result of this report, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to remedy “problems encountered in the operation and
enforcement of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960[.]”
H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, title I (1963), as reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2394 (“1963 House Report”); see also id.
at 2448 (explaining further that Congress sought rectify the
failure of prior legislation “to end wholesale voter
discrimination in many areas”).
        The 1964 legislation included an initial version of the
Materiality Provision that applied only to federal elections,
which the House Report described as “prohibiting the
disqualification of an individual because of immaterial errors
or omissions in papers or acts relating to [] voting.” Id. at 2394.
The House Report reflects that Congress largely envisioned the
Materiality Provision to address discriminatory practices in
voter registration. Id. at 2391, 2491 (Congressmen expressing
their views that the Materiality Provision required registration
officials to disregard minor errors or omissions if they are not
material in determining whether an individual is qualified to
vote). However, in framing the problem, Congress understood
from the CCR’s initial report that “where there is will and
opportunity to discriminate against certain potential voters,
ways to discriminate will be found.” 1959 CCR Report at 133.
Accordingly, the initial focus on registration merely reflects
that, at the time the legislation was enacted, registration was
the threshold problem that needed to be addressed, but it was
not the only problem that Congress did, in fact, address.
Indeed, the definition of vote that is in § 10101 demonstrates

                                25
that it is illogical to conclude that Congress, who was seeking
to ensure that Black Americans could vote, intended to enact
legislation that only allowed Black Americans to register to
vote but gave no regard to whether those same individuals
could actually have their votes counted once registered. See,
e.g., 1963 House Report at 2393 (explaining “H.R. 7152, as
amended, . . . would reduce discriminatory obstacles to the
exercise of the right to vote[,]” not just the right to register to
vote).
         Ultimately, “the provisions of the 1957, 1960, and 1964
Civil Rights Acts to eliminate discriminatory voting practices
[proved] to be clearly inadequate,” 111 Cong. Rec. 15,645
(1965) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler), and “[p]rogress”
remained “painfully slow,” H.R. Rep. No. 89-439 (1965), as
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2441. The CCR
expressed concerns that Congress’s prior efforts had “failed to
produce any significant increase in [Black] registration and
voting.” U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Voting in Mississippi,
at 49 (1965). Even the Supreme Court observed that when
Congress banned specific discriminatory practices, “some of
the States affected . . . merely switched to discriminatory
devices not covered by the federal decrees,” “enacted difficult
new tests,” “defied and evaded court orders,” or “simply closed
their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls.”
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314. Consequently, Congress passed
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which expanded the Materiality
Provision to cover all elections, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
437, 445 (1965), thereby ensuring that, even in State and local
elections, voters were not denied the right to cast a ballot based
on inconsequential paperwork mistakes that had no impact on
determining whether the voter was qualified to vote. A
fulsome consideration of the legislative history surrounding the

                                26
explained in more detail in note 19, history shows that
Congress investigated the problem of voter discrimination and
learned that it was pervasive, adaptable, and destructive.
Although Congress sought to address what, at the time, was the
threshold problem for Black Americans trying to vote,
Congress’s concerns about voter discrimination did not vanish
after registration.    Congress’s underlying concern was
wrongful disenfranchisement. In light of the important
problem Congress sought to address, and its adoption of broad
statutory language, it follows that the Materiality Provision
applies to mistakes on paperwork including, but not limited to,
voter registration forms. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309
(describing ‘voluminous legislative history’ addressing
‘unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution’”).20

Voting Rights Act demonstrates that Congress clearly
understood that it was acting in an area normally reserved to
the States and did so because of the extraordinary need to
protect the franchise. Congress regarded the Voting Rights of
Act of 1965 as “essential to prevent any last minute
nullification of the enfranchisement of qualified citizens.” 111
Cong. Rec. 10958, 11021-22 (May 19, 1965) (statement of
Sen. Fong).
        20
           The Materiality Provision does not require proof that
the State law under review was motivated by discriminatory
animus as the plain language of the Materiality Provision
contains no such requirement. See Bostock, 590 U.S. at 674
(identifying no constitutional problem when legislation
“reaches beyond the principal evil legislators may have
intended or expected to address,” as “it is ultimately the
provisions of . . . legislative commands rather than the principal
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)).            Additionally,

                               27
        Reading the statute to cover paperwork that is created
after a voter is registered also does not render the Materiality
Provision unconstitutional. First, with respect to federal
elections, the Elections Clause provides that “[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding” federal elections “shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Elections

Congress’s choice for the Materiality Provision to cover
facially neutral, but nonetheless immaterial, post-registration
requirements is an appropriate and necessary approach to
remedy voter discrimination, particularly because States used
what appeared to be facially neutral voting requirements to
disenfranchise certain voters. See Condon v. Reno, 913 F.
Supp. 946, 950 (D.S.C. 1995) (describing the requirement for
a voter to calculate his age in exact months, which disparately
affected Black voters in the Jim Crow South, and which
Congress sought to eradicate by way of the Materiality
Provision); cf. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 721-22 (2003) (observing in the analogous Fourteenth
Amendment context that “Congress may enact so-called
prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional
conduct in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional
conduct”). In any event, an amicus has cited a report finding
that the types of errors and omissions that occurred in this case
disproportionately disenfranchised minority voters.           See
SeniorLAW Center Amicus Br. at 11-12 (citing Carter Walker
& Laura Benshoff, Philadelphia’s Communities of Color
Disproportionately Affected When Mail Ballots Are Rejected
Over Small Errors, SpotlightPA (June 27, 2023),
https://www.spotlightpa.org/news/2023/06/pa-philadelphia-
mail-ballot-rejection-black-latino/).

                               28
Clause on its own thus supplies authority for Congress to
prohibit the disenfranchisement of voters for immaterial
paperwork mistakes in elections where federal candidates are
on the ballot.

       Second, both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
empowered Congress to promulgate legislation such as the
Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. U.S. Const. amends. XIV, § 5, XV, §
2. Although the Supreme Court has stated that such legislation
need only be reviewed for a rational basis, Katzenbach, 383
U.S. at 324, it also has indicated that legislation enacted under
the Fourteenth Amendment must be congruent and
proportional to the injury Congress sought to prevent, City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). See Vote.Org v.
Callanen, 89 F.4th 459, 486 n.11 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The
Supreme Court has not decided whether legislation enacted
under the Fifteenth Amendment on voting rights must be
congruent and proportional or simply a rational means of
executing a constitutional prohibition” (internal quotation
marks, citations, and alterations omitted)).

        The interpretation of the Materiality Provision set forth
herein survives constitutional muster under either standard.
See id. (“The Materiality Provision satisfies either test.”). As
already noted, the historical record shows that Congress sought
to eliminate a variety of evils plaguing the voting process when
it passed the Civil Rights Acts and the Voting Rights Act. See
supra n.19; accord Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534
(2013) (noting that “Congress determined [that the Voting
Rights Act of 1965] was needed to address entrenched racial
discrimination in voting,” not merely in registering to vote); id.
at 545 (quoting favorably Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308, for the

                               29
proposition that in 1966 “‘[t]he ‘blight of racial discrimination
in voting’ had ‘infected the electoral process in parts of our
country for nearly a century’”); id. at 548 (observing that the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 “has proved immensely successful
at redressing racial discrimination and integrating the voting
process”—not registration, alone). This history demonstrates
that Congress was concerned with protecting voters’ rights at
every step of the voting process, not just during registration.
“[P]rohibit[ing] those acting under color of law from using
immaterial omissions, which were historically used to prevent
racial minorities from voting, [and] from blocking any
individual’s ability to vote[,]” is a rational, congruent, and
proportional remedy to address a State actor’s effort to
interfere with the franchise. Vote.Org, 89 F.4th at 487; see
Florida State Conf. of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153,
1173 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e recognize that Congress in
combating specific evils might choose a broader remedy.”);
accord La Unión del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, No. 5:21-cv-
0844, 2023 WL 8263348, at *21 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2023)
(“Congress’s enactment of a broader rule is entirely rational:
after identifying a record of a problem at the registration stage,
Congress was not limited to crafting a solution with an obvious
loophole allowing officials to use forms at later stages in the
same way, and for the same purpose.”).

       For these reasons, the first clause of the Materiality
Provision covers mistakes on paperwork submitted both in

                               30
connection with a voter’s initial registration to vote and those
required to ensure that the voter’s vote is counted.21, 22

       21
          Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See,
e.g., La Unión del Pueblo Entero, 2023 WL 8263348, at *19
(concluding that the Materiality Provision applies because the
“preparation of a carrier envelope is an ‘act requisite to voting’
for individuals who cast a mail ballot”); League of Women
Voters of Arkansas v. Thurston, No. 5:20-cv-05174, 2023 WL
6446015, at *16 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 29, 2023) (applying the
Materiality Provision to absentee ballot applications); In re
Georgia Senate Bill 202, No. 1:21-mi-55555, 2023 WL
5334582, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2023), appeal docketed,
No. 23-13245 (11th Cir.) (holding that returning an absentee
ballot and completing the outer envelope is an act requisite to
voting); Common Cause v. Thomsen, 574 F. Supp. 3d 634, 636
(W.D. Wis. 2021) (observing that the Materiality Provision
“isn’t limited to . . . voter registration”); Ford v. Tenn. Senate,
No. 06-2031, 2006 WL 8435145, at *7, 10-11 (W.D. Tenn.
Feb. 1, 2006) (holding that under the Materiality Provision,
State officials could not set aside in-person voters’ ballots
because they had not met the requirement to separately sign
both a ballot application form and a poll book).
        Appellants have identified only one district court that
has ruled differently. In Friedman, the court declined to enjoin
the counting of absentee ballots received after a deadline,
principally because this was not an error or omission on a
record or paper. 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1373. Thus, that case
differs from this case, which involves paperwork. Relatedly,
although the Friedman court viewed the Materiality Provision
as being “designed to eliminate practices that could encumber
an individual’s ability to register to vote[,]” id. at 1370-71
(emphasis and citation omitted), and stated that it found no

                                31
                                2

       The Materiality Provision’s second clause limits the
Provision to cover errors or omissions only “if such error or
omission is not material in determining whether such
individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election.”

authority to hold that the Materiality Provision was intended to
apply after a voter was deemed qualified, id. at 1371, it made
these observations in a case where the alleged errors were (1)
not on paperwork, and (2) did not affect state officials’ ability
to determine voter qualifications. Thus, these comments are
dicta from an out-of-circuit district court.
        22
           The Majority speaks of a category of state election
laws it calls “ballot-casting” or “vote-casting” measures, which
it views as distinct from registration rules. This categorization
is not grounded in the text of the statute, which draws no such
distinction. In fact, its definition of “vote” demonstrates that
the statute covers actions beyond registration. Cf. United
States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915) (stating “the right
to have one’s vote counted is as open to protection by Congress
as the right to put a ballot in a box”). Moreover, this distinction
does not account for situations where same-day voter
registration is permitted. See, e.g., Va. Code § 24.2-420.1.
More specifically, in a same-day registration jurisdiction, a
voter could make a paperwork mistake on the registration form
that the Materiality Provision would forgive. If, however,
moments later the voter made the identical mistake on another
document requisite to voting, then, under the Majority’s view,
the Materiality Provision would not apply and the ballot could
be discarded. Such an outcome would be inconsistent with the
plain meaning of the Materiality Provision and Congress’s
goals in enacting it.

                                32
52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). Thus, mistakes on paperwork
related to any act requisite to voting cannot provide a basis to
discard someone’s vote “if” the voter’s mistake is immaterial
“in determining whether” the voter is “qualified under State
law to vote in such election.” Id.

       The statute defines the phrase “qualified under State
law” to “mean qualified according to the laws, customs, or
usages of the State[.]” Id. at § 10101(e).23 “Material” means
“having influence” or is “relevant.” See Material, Black’s Law
Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) (“having influence or effect; going
to the merits”); Material, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary
of the English Language Unabr. (1963) (“of, relating to, or
consisting of matter,” “relevant, pertinent”).24 “Determine”

       23
           As is the case in Pennsylvania, see 25 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 1301(b), States generally define voter qualifications to
consist of substantive personal attributes. See, e.g., La Unión
del Pueblo Entero, 2023 WL 8263348, at *22 (citing Lassiter
v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51
(1959) (residence, age, criminal record)). Such qualifying
attributes are “distinct from rules governing the conduct of
elections, including the manner of determining
qualifications.” Id. at *22 (citing Arizona v. Inter Tribal
Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 13-17 (2013); Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666
(1966) (distinguishing qualifications and compliance with poll
tax)).
        24
           See also Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385, 392 (2016)
(explaining that in the context of the Brady rule, “[e]vidence
qualifies as material when there is any reasonable likelihood it
could have affected the judgment of the jury”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)); Anderson v. Liberty

                               33
means “to reach a decision about after thought and
investigation,” “decide upon,” “find out exactly,” “ascertain,”
or “resolve.” Determine, Webster’s New World Dictionary,
College Ed. (1960). In this context, “in” means “used as a
function word to indicate means or instrumentality.” In,
Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (7th ed. 1963);
see also In, Webster’s New World Dictionary, College Ed.
(1960) (“during the course of”).25 Thus, the phrase “in
determining” within the Materiality Provision addresses
whether the error or omission is used to ascertain or decide the
voter’s qualifications.

       Therefore, read together, the Materiality Provision
means that State actors cannot deprive a voter of the right to
vote due to an error or omission he makes on papers that he
must complete to have his ballot counted, including on papers
distinct from application or registration forms, if the mistake is
not relevant to the State’s ability to ascertain whether he is
qualified under state law to vote in the election.26 Inversely, if

Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (describing materiality in the
context of summary judgment as “facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law”).
        25
           See also Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary of the
English Language Unabr. (1963) (“to settle a question or
controversy about”; “to come to a decision concerning as the
result of investigation or reasoning”).
        26
           Contrary to the Majority’s suggestion, determining
whether an individual is qualified to vote does not end after the
individual registers. On Election Day, States continue to verify
voter qualifications up until the time they count voters’ ballots,
such as by requiring voters to sign-in or present identification
immediately prior to voting at a polling location or by ensuring

                               34
that the voter had not died, moved from the district or the
Commonwealth, or been incarcerated for a felony. Cf.
Vote.Org, 89 F.4th at 489 (observing, as a broad principle, that
States’ “interest in voter integrity is substantial,” and “that
interest relates to the qualifications to vote”).
         It is worthwhile to note that the declaration here played
a role in helping the State to determine that all mail-in voters
were qualified to vote. As noted, the declaration contained the
language “I hereby declare that I am qualified to vote in this
election” above the date and signature line. See, e.g., Pa. Supp.
App. 284. Thus, the declaration provides additional assurance
to election officials that the mail-in voter is qualified to
vote. See 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 3146.8(g)(3) (“When
the county board meets to pre-canvass or canvass . . . mail-in
ballots . . . the board shall examine the declaration on the
envelope of each ballot not set aside under subsection (d)[,]”
which addresses deceased voters, 25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. §
3146.8(d),“and shall compare the information thereon with that
contained in the . . . Mail-in Voters File . . . . If the county
board has verified the proof of identification as required under
this act and is satisfied that the declaration is sufficient and the
information contained in the . . . Mail-in Voters File . . .
verifies his right to vote . . ., the county board shall provide a
list of the names of electors whose . . . mail-in ballots are to be
pre-canvassed or canvassed.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
         Accordingly, even assuming the Materiality Provision
only covers documents States use to determine voter
qualifications, the declaration and signature themselves—but
not the date—fit the bill. They aid election officials in
verifying the name of the voter and that he was qualified to
vote on the date of the election. Therefore, the signed

                                35
someone makes an error or omission on paperwork required to
vote and that mistake is relevant to the State actor in
ascertaining whether the voter is qualified to vote, then the
State actor can deny him the right to vote for making that
mistake.27

declaration was material to determining voter qualifications
but, as explained herein, the date was not.
        27
           As explained herein, Congress wrote broadly when it
enacted the Materiality Provision to include a host of
paperwork beginning with “registration” through “having a
ballot counted.” 52 U.S. C. § 10101(e). Although it is
unnecessary to decide here, there is good reason to conclude
the Materiality Provision covers ballots. This, however, does
not mean that State officials are, for example, required to count
a ballot that contains votes for multiple candidates for a single
position. This is because it would be impossible to “have such
ballot counted and included in the appropriate totals of votes
cast,” 52 U.S.C. § 10101(e), because the State could not
determine the candidate for whom the voter chose to vote.
        Conversely, where a voter’s choice is discernable, the
Materiality Provision may require States to count those votes,
say where the ballot is marked in black ink despite a state law
requiring the ballots to be marked in blue ink. This is
consistent with Congress’s goal to restrain a State’s ability to
discard ballots cast by qualified voters.
        Furthermore, as stated previously, see supra n.17, the
interpretation herein also does not invalidate the broad array of
State election laws that do not relate to paperwork required to
vote or give license to bad actors who may attempt to exploit
certain State election laws for improper purposes, such as those
individuals who might implement a pay-to-vote scheme by
having voters make errant marks on ballots to signal their vote,

                               36
                             3

       Applying this interpretation of the Materiality
Provision, the declaration here is squarely covered by the
Provision’s first clause. First, the declaration appears on the
mailing envelope and thus is a paper. Second, although the
declaration is not itself a registration or application, it is
another paper required for a voter to have his vote counted. See
25 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. §§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a). Third,
qualified voters who failed to date their declarations or who
wrote an incorrect or incomplete date had their ballots
discarded for noncompliance with the date requirement.28 As

where such marks are prohibited by State law. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 597; 52 U.S.C. § 20511.
       Contrary to the Majority’s characterization, these
observations are not based upon whether there are legitimate
interests being furthered, but rather are based upon what the
law says. Moreover, they are consistent with Congress’s goal
of safeguarding the right of all qualified voters to participate in
the democratic process—an interest shared by federal and state
actors alike.
       28
          One member of the Majority asserts that even if the
view espoused herein governed, an argument could be made
that declarations that contain no date or incomplete dates
should not be counted, but declarations that have an erroneous
date, such as the wrong year, should be counted. No party has
advocated such view. To the contrary, the parties agreed at
oral argument that, for the purposes of the date requirement,
there is no difference between a declaration that omits a date
and a declaration that has an erroneous date. This is consistent
with the conclusion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which
held that both “undated or incorrectly dated” return envelops

                                 37
a result of the disqualification of those ballots, affected voters
were deprived of their right to have their votes counted.29

        The components of the second clause are also satisfied.
The record shows that the date errors and omissions were not
relevant to a voting official’s determination that the voter was
qualified to vote. Although the declaration embodies the
voter’s representation that he was qualified to vote, and the
signature provides the name of the voter,30 the evidence shows
that election officials did not use the date or absence thereof to
determine a voter’s qualifications (i.e., a voter’s age,
citizenship, county and duration of residence, or incarceration
status). See 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1301(b).31

could not be counted because they failed to comply with State
law. Ball v. Chapman, 289 A.3d 1, 22-23 (Pa. 2023). The Ball
court split as to whether such ballots should nonetheless be
counted under the Materiality Provision.
       29
          Elections officials confirmed that all rejected ballots
were signed and timely received and came from voters who
were otherwise registered and qualified to vote.
       30
          The signature is being used for the sole purpose of
providing a name and the name is needed to determine whether
the name is associated with a qualified voter. Pennsylvania
specifically prohibits election officials “from rejecting
absentee or mail-in ballots based on signature comparison[.]”
In re: Nov. 3, 2020 General Election, 240 A.3d 591, 611 (Pa.
2020).
       31
          Election officials did not use the handwritten date to
establish whether the ballot was timely received, and a voter
whose mail-in ballot was timely received could have only
signed the declaration at some point between the time that he
received the mail-ballot from election officials and the time

                               38
       Election officials denied qualified voters the right to
vote by declining to count timely-received ballots contained in
return envelopes with signed declarations that were missing or
had incorrect dates, even though such errors or omissions were
immaterial to ascertaining whether those individuals were
qualified to vote. Accordingly, enforcement of the State’s date
requirement violates the Materiality Provision. Thus, timely
received ballots cast by qualified voters that were contained in
envelopes with signed declarations that have omitted or
mistaken dates should have been (and should be) counted.

       My colleagues disagree with this conclusion. They hold
the majority, and their view prevails. From a practical
perspective, this means that the State may toss a ballot cast by
a qualified voter based upon mistakes on required paperwork
immaterial to determining voter qualifications.

        Today’s ruling is a clear reminder that all voters must
carefully review and comply with every instruction and
requirement imposed upon them. If they do not, they risk
having their otherwise valid votes discounted based on even
the most inconsequential mistake. One can only hope that
election officials do not capitalize on the Majority’s narrow
interpretation of the Materiality Provision by enacting unduly
technical and immaterial post-registration paperwork
requirements that could silence the voices of qualified voters.

election officials received it back. Election officials discarded
ballots received after the Election Day deadline and did not
count the ballots of voters who died before Election Day. In
addition, no county board of elections identified any fraud
concern due to a declaration missing or having an incorrect
date.

                               39
I respectfully dissent.

                          40