Court Opinion

ID: 9634511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:15:35.972951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:04.421468
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that appellant’s inculpatory statement was not the product of unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment, and was knowingly and voluntarily given in compliance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). I dissent on both grounds.
This Court has consistently held that, other than time required for administrative processing of the accused, all delay between arrest and arraignment is unnecessary. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Eaddy, 472 Pa. 409, 372 A.2d 759 (1977); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974). Nonetheless, the majority today concludes that because appellant was in a very emotional condition and did not respond to the initial police questioning in a coherent fashion, the first seven and one half hours of delay between arrest and arraignment was necessary. The majority prem*598ises this condition upon an unwarranted assumption that there is no purpose in providing an accused with a speedy preliminary arraignment when his emotional condition renders him according to the majority “incapable of benefitting from the protections the preliminary arraignment was designed to afford.” At 1260.
The very purpose of a preliminary arraignment is to insure that the rights of an accused are protected. At the arraignment the accused is informed by a neutral judicial officer of the nature of the charges lodged against him and also advised of his rights to counsel, bail and a preliminary hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 140. Additionally, where, as here, the accused has not been arrested pursuant to a warrant, the preliminary arraignment serves as the forum where an independent review of the facts alleged to provide probable cause is made by a detached and neutral magistrate. Commonwealth v. Eaddy, supra. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).
The record clearly reveals that from 7:30 a. m. until 3:00 p. m., police did not provide for appellant’s arraignment. Appellant’s right to a prompt preliminary arraignment cannot be compromised as it was here merely because police were unable to interrogate him or obtain a confession. Indeed, the more distraught an accused may be, the more a prompt preliminary arraignment is necessary to insure that the accused’s rights are protected. It must therefore be concluded that the first seven and one half hours of delay were unnecessary.
The Commonwealth has failed to justify any portion of the entire eleven and one half hour delay between appellant’s arrest and the obtaining of his inculpatory statement. During the interrogation that began at 3:00 p. m., seven and one half hours after his warrantless arrest and after police had determined appellant had “calmed down” and become “more coherent,” appellant told police he would tell them about the alleged homicides when he was ready. This was *599in no sense a waiver of his right to a prompt arraignment. Nevertheless, police kept appellant in the same interview room for an additional four hours until 7:00 p. m. when, in response to police inquiries, appellant “said he was ready” and began his inculpatory statement.
It is obvious that there was no purpose for the entire eleven and one half hour delay other than to obtain a confession. Moreover, it is beyond doubt that the incriminating statement that police eventually obtained resulted from the eleven and one half hour delay. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 459 Pa. 171, 327 A.2d 618 (1974). Appellant’s statement was therefore inadmissible into evidence. This ground alone mandates reversal and a remand for a new trial.
The majority also concludes that appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda, even though shortly before police informed appellant of his rights, they had, without medical supervision, administered appellant “nerve pills,” at appellant’s request. “[T]he defendant’s physical and psychological state” is a factor which must be considered in assessing a waiver of rights under Miranda. Commonwealth v. Walker, 470 Pa. 534, 538, 368 A.2d 1284, 1287 (1977), quoting Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 184-85, 335 A.2d 698, 701 (1975). See generally, Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interrogation? When Does it Matter?, 67 Geo.LJ. 1, 70 (1978). On this record, where appellant’s purported waiver of Miranda rights followed his ingestion of “nerve pills” in the presence and under the direction of police officers, and the record does not reveal the effect of the pills upon appellant’s ability to intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily relinquish his rights under Miranda, I would suppress appellant’s statement.
I dissent.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.