Court Opinion

ID: 9483107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:11:22.388404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:25.767920
License: Public Domain

RYMER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
While the majority’s approach is tempting, I am constrained to dissent because of the analysis of a parallel clause we adopted in United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083, 110 S.Ct. 1143, 107 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1990).
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) states that a person will be subject to criminal penalties if he “knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste ... to a facility which does not have a permit.”
In Hoflin, we addressed the scienter requirement in § 6928(d)(2)(A)-(B), which imposes criminal liability on any person who
knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter—
(A) without a permit under this subchap-ter ...; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit. ...
We held that knowledge of a lack of a permit is not an element of the offense under § 6928(d)(2)(A). See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038-39. In reaching this result, we relied on the plain language of the statute itself, see id. at 1037-38, concluding that it is clear on its face that knowledge is not a requisite element under subsection (A), but that it is a requisite element under subsection (B). We declined to write a knowledge requirement into subsection (A) when Congress chose not to do so. Id.
We also rejected the argument that a knowledge requirement must be read into the statute so as to avoid criminalizing innocent conduct. See id. at 1037-38 (declining to follow United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208, 105 S.Ct. 1171, 84 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985), which read a knowledge requirement into § 6928(d)(2)(A)). Yet that is the rationale of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Hayes International Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503-05 (11th Cir.1986), upon which the majority relies for support in holding that § 6928(d)(1) requires proof that the defendant knew the facility lacked a permit. Supra at 796-97. Instead, reading the statute literally here, as in Hoflin, is consistent with the RCRA’s purpose of protecting people and the environment from hazardous waste. See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038-39.
The word “knowingly” is used in the same way in § 6928(d)(1) as in § 6928(d)(2)(A). “Knowingly” in § 6928(d)(2)(A) modifies “treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste,” but does not modify “without a permit.” The language of § 6928(d)(1) is parallel to that of § 6928(d)(2)(A), and the word “knowingly” in § 6928(d)(1) only modifies “transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste.”
Because we are bound in this case to follow our own precedent in Hoflin, I would affirm.