Court Opinion

ID: 9625794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:51:20.471878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:15.445370
License: Public Domain

Judge Baley
dissenting.
I agree with the court below that this default judgment for $100,200.00 should be vacated and the case heard on its merits.
The entry of a default judgment is a harsh and drastic action. Courts generally favor giving every litigant a fair opportunity to present his side of a disputed controversy. “Where' there is a genuine dispute concerning material facts, the philosophy of the . . . rules of procedure favor trial on the merits in contra-distinction to judgments by default.” Newberry v. Cohen, 374 F. 2d 320, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Therefore, “on a motion for relief from the entry of a default or a default judgment, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief.” 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2693, at 313'; accord, Whaley v. Rhodes, 10 N.C. App. 109, 111, 177 S.E. 2d 735, 737. “There is much more reason for liberality in reopening a judgment when the merits of the case never have been considered than there is when the judgment comes, after a full trial on the merits.” 11 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2857, at 160.
*535Rule 60 (b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:
* * *
(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”
Rule 60(b)(6) has been described as “a grand reservior of equitable power to do justice in a particular case.” 7 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 60.27 [2], at 375. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that its “broad language . . . ‘gives the court ample power to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.’ ” Brady v. Town of Chapel Hill, 277 N.C. 720, 723, 178 S.E. 2d 446, 448.
“Under our Rules of Civil Procedure, the determination of whether an adequate basis exists for setting aside the entry of default and the judgment by default rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Whaley v. Rhodes, 10 N.C. App. 109, 177 S.E. 2d 735 (1970).” Acceptance Corp. v. Samuels, 11 N.C. App. 504, 510, 181 S.E. 2d 794, 798.
In this case the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, has vacated this judgment as “grossly excessive.” The court has found that “the interests of justice will best be served” by setting it aside. In my view there is sufficient evidence when considered in its most favorable light to support this decision.
The affidavit of James R. Price, an insurance adjuster for Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company, which provided liability insurance for the defendant, recounted in detail extensive negotiations with plaintiff’s attorney seeking a settlement prior to the institution of the action. Price’s affidavit which was uncontradicted in any material part set out the maximum demand of plaintiff’s attorney at $15,000.00, the medical expenses incurred at $285.50, and the car repair at $99.20. At the hearing plaintiff’s attorney admitted receipt of a $1,000.00 offer from the insurance company made in a letter dated 18 May 1970 which read as follows:
“This will supplement our telephone conversation of May 15, 1970, wherein I extended an offer of $1,000 in settlement of the claim of Charles Franklin Highfill.
*536“We await your reply.”
Even though such letter specifically requested a reply, there was no rejection or acceptance of this offer and suit was instituted and default judgment obtained without notice to the representative of defendant with whom negotiations were in progress and who would be responsible for the payment of the judgment. These factors were available for the trial judge as well as the record and argument of counsel. His decision should be upheld unless there is a clear abuse of discretion which does not here appear.
Rule 60(b)(6) was designed to give the trial court authority to prevent injustice where procedural exactitudes would otherwise require violation of the basic rules of fair play. Judge McConnell has used it for that purpose. My vote is to affirm his judgment.