Court Opinion

ID: 9675806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:06:18.859952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:39.559129
License: Public Domain

*456ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 47. (dissenting). Despite the conflicting interpretations of the court of appeals and without addressing the petitioner's interpretation of the statute, the majority declares Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)l. (2005-06) unambiguous and its meaning "plain." No matter that the interpretation that the majority finds obvious renders statutory language superfluous, and no matter that it conflicts with this court's prior interpretation of the statute.
¶ 48. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)l. unambiguously permits insurers to reduce UIM limits by payments made from non-UIM tortfeasors. Because the majority's interpretation renders statutory language superfluous, and because it fails to follow this court's prior decisions interpreting the statute, I respectfully dissent.
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¶ 49. It is surprising that the majority so readily claims that the meaning of § 632.32(5)(i) is unambiguous. The court of appeals has reached diametrically opposed conclusions as to whether that section allows insurers to reduce UIM limits by payments made to the insured by non-UIM tortfeasors. See majority op., ¶ 12 n.5.
¶ 50. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, the court of appeals concluded that § 632.32(5) (i)l. does not allow reduction of UIM limits by payments made by non-UIM tortfeasors. No. 2003AP2482, unpublished slip op., ¶ 1 (Wis. Ct. App. December 1, 2005). Three weeks after Bailey was decided, the court of appeals reversed course and concluded that the section does allow such reductions. Marotz v. Hallman, No. 2005AP1579, unpublished slip op., ¶ 16 (Wis. Ct. App. December 22, 2005).
*457¶ 51. We have previously determined that when courts reach contradictory interpretations of a statute, it "is indicative of ambiguity." Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶ 19, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (citing Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Public Instruction Sch. Dist. Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 222, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996)). The majority's determination that § 632.32(5)(i)l. is unambiguous cannot be squared with the fact that two well-reasoned court of appeals opinions have interpreted that section in two different and incompatible ways.
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¶ 52. In addition to disregarding the opposing interpretations of the court of appeals, the majority's interpretation of § 632.32(5)(i)l. is problematic because it renders part of the statute superfluous. Section 632.32(5)(i) provides as follows:
(i) A policy may provide that the limits under the policy for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage for bodily injury or death resulting from any one accident shall be reduced by any of the following that apply:
1. Amounts paid by or on behalf of any person or organization that may be legally responsible for the bodily injury or death for which the payment is made.
2. Amounts paid or payable under any worker's compensation law.
3. Amounts paid or payable under any disability benefits laws.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 53. The petitioner contends that the phrase "for which the payment is made" refers to payments made by an insurer under the applicable UM or UIM cover*458age. Without addressing the petitioner's interpretation, the majority asserts that the statute is unambiguous. Majority op., ¶ 22. It implicitly adopts the view that "for which the payment is made" refers to "[a]mounts paid by or on behalf of any person or organization that may be legally responsible for the bodily injury or death." What it fails to explain is why the words "for which the payment is made" are in the statute in the first instance.
¶ 54. The majority asserts that subsection 1. contains the words "for the bodily injury or death for which the payment is made" to "resolve [] a potential ambiguity." Id., ¶ 26. Specifically, it precludes insurers from reducing UIM limits "by amounts paid by a person who may be legally responsible in the accident, but whose payment is not made for a bodily injury arising from the accident." Id. No one else advances this interpretation —and for good reason.
¶ 55. The examples given to support the majority's novel interpretation are peculiar. First, the majority conjures a scenario in which "an accident occurs between persons who had previously entered into an unrelated purchase agreement, and where the subsequent payment from the buyer to the seller is attributable to that purchase agreement and not [attributable] to injuries arising from the accident." Id., ¶ 26 n. 6 (emphasis added).
¶ 56. Second, the majority maintains that the phrase prevents payments made to the insured by a tortfeasor in an entirely separate accident. It imagines a situation in which "Tortfeasor 1 settles a prior claim with an injured insured by paying current hospital costs for injuries arising from an accident involving Tortfea-sor 2 and which costs would be properly attributable to Tortfeasor 2." Id.
*459¶ 57. These scenarios are not only peculiar, but they are precluded by other language in the statute. Section 632.32(5)(i) is explicit that reductions of UM and UIM limits pertain to coverage "resulting from any one accident." There is therefore no "potential ambiguity" that UM or UIM limits could be reduced by payments resulting from an "unrelated purchase agreement" or arising out of another, unrelated accident as the majority maintains.
¶ 58. The majority's view that § 632.32(5)(i)l. includes the phrase "for the bodily injury or death for which the payment is made" to prevent reductions for payments made pursuant to other accidents and to events unrelated to any accident therefore renders that phrase superfluous. In doing so the majority violates a fundamental principle of statutory construction: "When construing statutes, meaning should be given to every word, clause and sentence in the statute, and a construction which would make part of the statute superfluous should be avoided wherever possible." Hutson v. State Pers. Comm'n, 2003 WI 97, ¶ 49, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212 (quoting Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 563, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981)).
¶ 59. The conclusion that the majority's interpretation renders the phrase "for the bodily injury or death for which the payment is made" superfluous is supported by the fact that the phrase is appended only to subsection 1. Subsections 2. and 3. permit reductions of UIM limits for worker's compensation and disability payments. However, those subsections do not explicitly limit reductions for worker's compensation and disability payments "for the bodily injury or death for which the payment is made." Such language is unnecessary precisely because § 632.32(5)(i) is restricted to payments "from any one accident."
*460¶ 60. In contrast, the interpretation of the statute proffered by the petitioner avoids rendering part of § 632.32(5)(i) superfluous. According to the petitioner's interpretation the first part of § 632.32(5)(i)l., "[a]mounts paid by or on behalf of any person or organization that may be legally responsible for the bodily injury or death. . allows that UIM coverage may be reduced by payments made by or on behalf of tortfeasors. If subsection 1. ended there, it would be sufficient to support the majority's interpretation.
¶ 61. Under the petitioner's interpretation, the addition of "for which the payment is made" refers to payments made by an insurer under the applicable UM or UIM coverage. It therefore serves to limit which payments by or on behalf of tortfeasors may reduce UM or UIM coverage. Specifically, it provides that policies may reduce coverage limits only for payments made by or on behalf of tortfeasors whose actions require the insurer to make payments under § 632.32(5)(i) — UIM and UM motorists.
¶ 62. Thus, the petitioner's interpretation also explains why § 632.32(5)(i) contains the phrase "from any one accident" while at the same time § 632.32(5)(i)l. contains the phrase "for which the payment is made." Further, it explains why subsections 2. and 3. do not contain the phrase "for which the payment is made." The phrase is contained in subsection 1. as a way to restrict its application to payments made by or on behalf of UM or UIM tortfeasors. However, no such limitation is required with respect to worker's compensation and disability payments.
¶ 63. The majority has provided no explanation as to why the petitioner's interpretation is unreasonable, despite the advantage it holds over the majority's view insofar as it does not render part of the statute super*461fluous. In light of this failure to explain an alternative interpretation, and in light of the contradictory court of appeals decisions, I simply cannot see why the majority maintains that § 632.32(5)(i) is "plain" and unambiguous where its interpretation of the section violates a fundamental principle of statutory construction.
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¶ 64. The majority's view also conflicts with this court's established interpretation of § 632.32(5)(i). In Dowhower v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 WI 73, ¶ 18, 236 Wis. 2d 113, 613 N.W.2d 557, we concluded that "the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage is solely to put the insured in the same position he (or she) would have occupied had the tortfeasor's liability limits been the same as the underinsured motorist limits purchased by the insured." Two years later in Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, ¶ 18, 255 Wis. 2d 61, 647 N.W.2d 223, we quoted this passage from Dowhower and again embraced the same interpretation of the legislative purpose of UIM coverage.
¶ 65. More recently in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Langridge, 2004 WI 113, 275 Wis. 2d 35, 683 N.W.2d 75 (citations omitted), we reiterated our determination that "UIM coverage is designed to put the insured in the same position as he or she would have occupied had the tortfeasor's liability limits been the same as the underinsured motorist limits purchased by the insured." Id., ¶ 17 (internal quotations and brackets omitted)(citations omitted). The Langridge court explained that an insured "ought reasonably to expect that the insurer promises only to insure for the difference between the insured's higher UIM limit and the tortfeasor's lower liability limit." Id., ¶ 21.
*462¶ 66. The consistent interpretation of Dowhower, Badger Mutual, and Langridge would entitle Marotz to coverage that pays the difference between the insured's higher UIM limit and the underinsured's lower liability limit. Under the Dowhower, Badger Mutual, and Langridge interpretation of UIM coverage, Marotz would be entitled to $75,000 of coverage under the Rural policy (that is, the $100,000 UIM limit minus the $25,000 he received from Hallman's insurer). Under the majority's new interpretation of UIM coverage, Marotz does not receive even a penny under the Rural policy. Clearly, this does not put him in the same position he would have occupied had Hallman's liability limits been the same as Marotz's UIM limits.
¶ 67. Without overruling or withdrawing any language from our prior cases, the majority simply ignores the precedent. It instead adopts a new interpretation. It now contends that "the statutes establish that contributions from all legally responsible sources are to be considered in reaching the insured's UIM coverage limit" and that this includes payments by non-UIM tortfeasors. Majority op. ¶ 29.1 The majority's contention, however, rests on a mistake.
*463¶ 68. UIM coverage limits may be reduced by only those sources recognized under § 632.32(5)(i).2 Thus, whether Rural may reduce the amount of the petitioner's UIM coverage limits by payments from a non-UIM tortfeasor depends upon whether such payments are included under § 632.32(5)(i)l. That, however, is the very issue before the court. To support the conclusion that the amount of UIM coverage may be reduced by payments from non-UIM tortfeasors with the proposition that UIM coverage is arrived at by combining payments from all sources (i.e., all sources recognized under the statute) merely begs the question.
¶ 69. For the reasons stated above, I conclude that the language of the statute is ambiguous. Questions of ambiguity aside, we should follow our precedent in interpreting it. Doing so requires following the principle that UIM coverage serves "to put the insured in the same position as he [or she], would have occupied had the tortfeasor's liability limits been the same as the underinsured motorist limits purchased by the insured." Langridge, 275 Wis. 2d 35, ¶ 17. Under this principle, § 632.32(5)(i) does not permit an insurer to reduce the limit of UIM coverage by amounts paid to an insured by or on behalf of a non-UIM tortfeasor.
¶ 70. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 71. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this dissent.

 For example, a policy could not reduce UIM coverage limits by amounts donated by others to aid one's recovery or given gratuitously by a benefactor. Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5) (i).