Court Opinion

ID: 9465748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:54:29.549338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:20.790981
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, District Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority.
I am, however, unable to join in Part II. C. of the majority opinion dealing with the issue of vindictive sentencing. The court holds that it will not consider the issue on appeal because appellant relies on an affidavit first presented here asserting facts not included in the record, instead of having complied with Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.*
Rule 10(c) provides a method for including in the appellate record proceedings which were not reported and thus are not included in the transcript, such as those which allegedly occurred in chambers below. I am entirely in agreement that in the normal case, an appellant should not be entitled to raise an issue on appeal based on matters outside the record without compliance with Rule 10(c). See, Murphy v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 314 F.2d 30 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906, 84 S.Ct. 197, 11 L.Ed.2d 146 (1963) (decided under the predecessor rule, Fed.R.Civ.P. 75(n)); 9 Moore’s Federal Practice, 1210.06.
It makes little sense to me, however, to elevate Rule 10(c) into a jurisdictional requirement, as the majority appears to do when it states that “consideration . cannot be given to these affidavits, because they are not a part of the record on appeal.” P. 698. When the error asserted is of constitutional dimensions, as is the case here, a refusal to entertain the issue merely defers it to post-conviction review under Section 2255, a result which promotes neither judicial economy nor the defendant’s right to speedy justice.
For that reason it appears to have been the practice of this and other courts of appeals, at least until now, to retain the option of entertaining substantial issues but remanding for compliance with Rule 10(c) where that procedure appeared necessary to insure a record adequate for review. United States v. Piascik, 559 F.2d 545, 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062, 98 S.Ct. 1235, 55 L.Ed.2d 762 (1978); cf. United States v. Knox, 456 F.2d 1024 (8th Cir. 1972); but see, United States v. Dunham Concrete Products, Inc., 475 F.2d 1241, 1251 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832, 94 S.Ct. 65, 38 L.Ed.2d 66 (1973) (reaching a contrary result).**
*702Inasmuch as I would not treat compliance with Rule 10(c) as being in effect jurisdictional, I would reach the merits of the claim. Viewing it in the light most favorable to appellant, based on the facts stated in the affidavit of Vargas’ counsel, I would conclude that the claim is without merit and that no remand is necessary.
The exercise of a trial judge’s broad discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory limits is reviewable where the facts raise an inference that the defendant was punished for electing to stand trial. In United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948, 93 S.Ct. 1924, 36 L.Ed.2d 409 (1973), the judge offered defendant a three-year sentence if he were to plead guilty but said that he would receive from five to seven years if he went to trial and were convicted. In United States v. Capriola, 537 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1976), a substantial disparity existed in the sentences imposed on defendants for the same criminal activity, depending on whether they pleaded guilty or stood trial. In both cases, this court remanded for re-sentencing upon a record which would show that the defendant’s sentence was not punishment for having refused to plead guilty.
Unlike the facts in those cases, the facts submitted by Vargas raise no inference that the sentence was intended to punish him for having refused to plead guilty. The affidavit of Vargas’ counsel merely states that at a conference in the trial judge’s chambers, the possible length of incarceration of Vargas in the event of a guilty plea was discussed by the judge and counsel for the defendant and the government. Defense counsel requested a six-year sentence, the United States attorney objected, and the judge “stated that perhaps seven (7) to eight (8) years would be appropriate.” Vargas makes no claim that an offer was ever made or that the judge stated what sentence he would impose if a plea bargain were reached. In these circumstances, the trial judge’s exercise of his sentencing discretion is not reviewable. See United States v. Stevenson, 573 F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th Cir. 1978).

Rule 10(c) provides:
(c) Statement of the Evidence or Proceedings When no Report Was Made or When the Transcript is Unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including his recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments thereto within 10 days after service. Thereupon the statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted
to the district court for settlement and approval and as settled and approved shall be included by the clerk of the district court in the record on appeal.

 The majority distinguishes Brown and Piascik on the stated ground that the error in those cases — failure to report all proceedings as required by 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) — was “fully apparent on the face of the record on appeal.” The court made it quite clear in both cases, however, that the failure to report was not reversible error, but that it was the possibility that the record, if made, would disclose such *702error that warranted remand to comply with Rule 10(c). Brown, supra, 314 F.2d at 295, note 1; Piascik, supra, 559 F.2d at 548. Moreover, reviewability of an allegedly serious error should not be allowed to turn on the fortuitous circumstance that it is apparent on the face of the record.