Court Opinion

ID: 9949911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 19:18:12.458105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:17.754464
License: Public Domain

J-A22037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  QUINCY FUQUA                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1419 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 25, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0009484-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                              FILED: March 12, 2024

       Appellant, Quincy Fuqua, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury

trial conviction for first degree murder.1 We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with first degree murder in connection

with the killing of his paramour, Makebia Morgan (“Victim”). On September

18, 2017, the court appointed the Office of Conflict Counsel to represent

Appellant.    Attorney Richard Narvin entered his appearance on Appellant’s

behalf on January 17, 2018. On March 21, 2018, the court granted Appellant’s

request for an independent psychiatric evaluation and permitted counsel to

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
J-A22037-23

retain Dr. Stephen Zerby for this purpose.

      On July 26, 2019, Appellant filed a notice of mental infirmity, notifying

the Commonwealth that the defense intended to call Dr. Zerby to testify that

Appellant was suffering from a psychotic episode at the time of the murder.

On October 29, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a motion seeking an order for

Appellant to be evaluated by the Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. Bruce Wright,

and the court granted the motion on the same day. On September 2, 2019,

Appellant filed a motion to appoint a new expert witness.             Appellant

represented that Dr. Zerby, for reasons unrelated to the case, withdrew from

further participation in the case. Appellant asked the court to appoint Dr. Alan

Pass as an expert, and the court granted this motion on September 3, 2020.

On January 4, 2021, Attorney Narvin retired from the Office of Conflict Counsel

and Appellant’s case was transitioned to Attorney Matthew Capan, who

entered his appearance on February 24, 2021. Nevertheless, Attorney Narvin

continued to assist with Appellant’s case on a pro bono basis.

      On February 25, 2021, Appellant filed another motion to appoint an

expert witness. Appellant represented in his motion that Dr. Pass declined to

continue to work on Appellant’s case because he believed that an expert with

a specialty in substance abuse assessment and treatment should be utilized.

Dr. Pass further recommended that the Commonwealth’s expert should

conduct an independent evaluation of Appellant prior to the disclosure of the

defense expert report. Appellant requested that the court appoint Dr. James

                                     -2-
J-A22037-23

Lim, who had the requisite qualification and was willing to perform an

evaluation of Appellant.        Appellant further asked the court to require the

Commonwealth’s expert to complete an independent evaluation of Appellant

prior   to   disclosing   the    defense    expert’s   report,   as   per   Dr.   Pass’

recommendation. Appellant averred that such a process would ensure the

reliability of the evaluations by preventing the Commonwealth’s expert from

merely editorializing the defense expert’s report.           Appellant alleged that

several experts, including Dr. Pass, had expressed that they would require

assurance of an independent Commonwealth evaluation prior to accepting the

case.

        The Commonwealth filed a response, opposing the portion of the motion

that requested the court to order the Commonwealth to conduct an

independent evaluation ahead of the defense report.                   Specifically, the

Commonwealth averred that it needed to review the defense expert report in

consultation with potential Commonwealth experts to properly evaluate

whether to retain its own expert for trial. On March 8, 2021, the court granted

Appellant’s motion to retain Dr. Lim as a defense expert but denied the request

to order the Commonwealth to complete an independent evaluation.

        On August 10, 2021, Attorney Narvin filed a motion seeking

appointment as co-counsel. In his petition, Attorney Narvin averred that: he

had been assisting Appellant on a pro bono basis since he retired from the

Office of Conflict Counsel in January of 2021; Appellant and Attorney Capan

                                           -3-
J-A22037-23

wanted Attorney Narvin to continue his involvement in the case; and

Appellant’s case had required more time than Attorney Narvin originally

anticipated.   Based on the foregoing, Attorney Narvin asked the court to

appoint him as co-counsel for Appellant with counsel fees to be paid by

Allegheny County. On August 26, 2021, the court denied Attorney Narvin’s

motion. On September 3, 2021, Attorney Narvin filed a motion seeking to be

appointed as an expert consultant “for matters such as expert witness

consultation, counseling the defendant and his family, legal consulting, and

preparing the defense’s case for court.” (Motion for Appointment of Expert

Consultant, filed 9/3/21, at 3) (unpaginated). The court denied the motion

on September 13, 2021.

      On January 12, 2022, Attorney Capan filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel. On January 15, 2022, Attorney Narvin filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel. Attorney Capan’s motion relayed that in December 2021, Attorney

Narvin and Attorney Capan met with Appellant on Microsoft Teams to discuss

his case. During this meeting, Appellant expressed dissatisfaction with their

representation and asked that they file motions to withdraw as counsel. Both

attorneys attempted to discuss and resolve Appellant’s issues, but Appellant

ended the meeting and stated that he would no longer speak to either

attorney. Attorney Narvin’s motion further stated that after the court denied

his request to be appointed as co-counsel or as an expert consultant, he

continued to work on Appellant’s case on a pro bono basis. However, due to

                                    -4-
J-A22037-23

Appellant’s subsequent dissatisfaction with Attorney Narvin’s assistance,

Attorney Narvin filed the motion to withdraw his appearance. Before the court

ruled on the motions to withdraw, Attorney Joseph Hudak entered his

appearance on Appellant’s behalf on February 27, 2022.      On February 28,

2022, Attorney Capan filed an amended motion to withdraw, noting that

Appellant had retained private counsel. On March 15, 2022, the court granted

Attorney Narvin and Attorney Capan’s motions to withdraw.

     On June 14, 2022, prior to trial, Attorney Hudak indicated that he would

be pursuing a self-defense theory at trial instead of a defense involving

Appellant’s mental health. The following exchange took place:

        The court:     Do you suffer from any mental illness or
                       infirmity which would in any way limit your
                       ability to participate in these proceedings?

        [Appellant]:   No, your honor.

        The court:     We have had over the course of time some
                       Behavior Assessment Unit evaluations and in
                       the most recent of those, you were deemed
                       to be competent. So I’m going to ask you
                       now: you are presently taking medications,
                       correct?

        [Appellant]:   Yes, your honor.

        The court:     And while taking those medications, are you
                       able to make decisions in your own best
                       interest?

        [Appellant]:   Yes, your honor.

        The court:     Are you able to carry on conversations with
                       others and understand what others are
                       talking to you about?

                                    -5-
J-A22037-23

       [Appellant]:   Yes, your honor.

       The court:     And specifically, what I’m most concerned
                      about here is you’ve been able to speak with
                      your attorney Mr. Hudak and you have been
                      able to ask him questions and talk to him
                      about your case and he has been able to
                      explain to you or answer your questions in
                      ways you understand, correct?

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

       The court:     Mr. Hudak, you have been representing
                      [Appellant] now for a few months?

       Mr. Hudak:     Yes.

       The court:     You’ve had a chance to meet with him on a
                      number of occasions?

       Mr. Hudak:     Yes.

       The court:     During that time you’ve had a chance to
                      respond to any questions he might ask of you
                      and to ask him questions, as well, correct?

       Mr. Hudak:     Yes.

       The court:     Do you believe today with the medications
                      he’s taking and whatever his mental health
                      diagnosis may be, that he is competent to
                      proceed?

       Mr. Hudak:     Yes, your honor.

       The court:     And that he is able to make decisions in his
                      own best interest?

       Mr. Hudak:     Yes, your honor.

       The court:     [Appellant], just to finish this line of
                      questioning. It is my line of understanding
                      that you do have some mental health

                                  -6-
J-A22037-23

                      diagnosis, correct?

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

       The court:     And that you are taking some medication for
                      that diagnosis to treat you?

       [Appellant]:   Yes, ma’am.

       The court:     And you’re taking that medication as it is
                      prescribed for you?

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

       The court:     While taking that medication, you are
                      competent ― that is you are able to make
                      decisions in your own best interests?

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

                                *    *      *

       The court:     You understand there may be defenses to
                      you?

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

       The court:     You talked to Mr. Hudak about that?

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

       The court:     You talked to him about his trial strategy?

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

       The court:     You understand that it is his job as your
                      lawyer to decide on that trial strategy, not
                      yours?

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

       The court:     But you also understand you have the right
                      to have input, that is discuss your entire case
                      with him?

                                    -7-
J-A22037-23

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

       The court:     You’ve had the chance to talk to him about
                      that trial strategy?

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

                               *     *    *

       The court:     I think I understand where you’re going here.
                      So the example I used when I talked to you
                      about defenses ― the example I used was
                      with regard to the possibility you heard us
                      talking about here of your raising a defense
                      in this case of self-defense and you talked to
                      Mr. Hudak about that?

       [Appellant]:   Yes, ma’am.

       The court:     You understand that there are other potential
                      defenses you could raise and one of them
                      would be specific to your mental health at the
                      time?

       [Appellant]:   Yes, ma’am.

       The court:     And you have talked with Mr. Hudak about
                      that. I’m not asking what you talked about
                      or what advice he’s given you. You talked to
                      him about that?

       [Appellant]:   Yes.

       The court:     And you understand what that defense would
                      involve?

       [Appellant]:   Yes, ma’am.

       The court:     And you had the chance to discuss that
                      defense not just with Mr. Hudak, but prior to
                      Mr. Hudak, you were represented by some
                      other attorneys. Have you had the chance to
                      talk to those attorneys, as well?

                                    -8-
J-A22037-23

         [Appellant]:   Yes, ma’am.

         The court:     And you more recently talked to Mr. Hudak
                        about the possibility of raising some defense
                        with regard to your mental health?

         [Appellant]:   Yes.

         The court:     And again, you had the chance to ask him
                        questions about that and you had the chance
                        to consider that defense versus other
                        potential defenses and you’re satisfied with
                        the information that he’s provided to you
                        regarding the defense that he’s choosing in
                        this case which was self-defense.

         [Appellant]:   Yes, ma’am.

         The court:     So it is my understanding that you and Mr.
                        Hudak have talked about other potential
                        defenses and specifically the potential
                        defense of what is called diminished capacity
                        and you and Mr. Hudak have considered that
                        and weighed it against other potential
                        defenses. And it’s also my understanding
                        that at this time you are satisfied with Mr.
                        Hudak and the defense strategy that he has
                        decided upon in your case, is that correct?

         [Appellant]:   Yes, ma’am.

         The court:     So you understand that at this point in time,
                        Mr. Hudak has not indicated any intention to
                        raise any type of mental health defense?

         [Appellant]:   Yes, ma’am.

         The court:     You’re satisfied with his services?

         [Appellant]:   Yes.

(N.T. Pretrial Hearing, 6/14/22, at 30-46).

                                      -9-
J-A22037-23

      A jury trial commenced shortly thereafter, during which Attorney Hudak

argued that Appellant acted in self-defense during the incident that resulted

in Victim’s death. Evidence of Appellant’s mental health history was largely

not introduced at trial except to give context to why the police responded to

Appellant’s residence.   When a witness began speaking about Appellant’s

mental health history, the Commonwealth objected.         At sidebar, when the

court questioned Attorney Hudak regarding the relevance of the evidence to

his defense, Attorney Hudak responded, “I agree.           I don’t think it has

relevance.” (N.T. Trial, 6/16/22, at 149). When the witness again responded

to a question by mentioning Appellant’s mental health, the Commonwealth

moved to strike the witness’ testimony. Attorney Hudak did not argue against

the Commonwealth’s objection but offered to lead the witness to prevent

further mention of Appellant’s mental health. Following this discussion, the

court made the following statement to the jury:

         The court:      So, ladies and gentleman, the witness’ last
                         answer, I am going to strike from the record.
                         It was not responsive to the question. The
                         defendant’s history of mental illness is really
                         not relevant to the defense in this case. The
                         defense in this case is self-defense.

(N.T. Trial, 6/16/22, at 152). Attorney Hudak did not object to the court’s

instruction.

      The jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder on June 21, 2022.

On July 25, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on the same day, which the court

                                     - 10 -
J-A22037-23

denied on November 8, 2022. On November 29, 2022, Appellant timely filed

a notice of appeal. On December 1, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and

Appellant timely complied on December 8, 2022.

     Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

        Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion,
        when it denied [Appellant’s] motion requesting the
        Commonwealth conduct an independent evaluation process
        after the Commonwealth had initially filed a motion to
        permit an evaluation. The Commonwealth changed course,
        [and] thereby prejudiced the defense in creating a hardship
        with securing experts who refused to participate under those
        conditions.

        Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion or
        erred as a matter of law in violation of [Appellant’s] 6th
        Amendment rights, when it denied [Appellant’s] motion to
        continue the appointment of [Attorney] Narvin without
        explanation, when the request was based on a defendant
        who was known, to the court, to have mental health
        challenges. The motion had referenced that counsel had
        remained on the case pro bono after retiring as Chief
        Counsel of the Allegheny County Office of Conflict Counsel.
        [Attorney] Narvin had provided notice of a mental health
        defense and had just lost his expert after the report was
        turned over; the court’s refusal to continue the appointment
        essentially hamstrung the mental health defense and
        spurred the breakdown of the relationship with [Attorney]
        Capan, causing the withdraw by the Conflict Counsel Office
        and created the ensuing issue with the subsequent change
        of defense.

        Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion
        when it allowed private counsel to enter his appearance and
        change the defense, after having notice of mental infirmity
        and/or expert evidence of a mental condition; this was
        relevant considering its own decision which spurred
        [Attorney] Narvin’s exit.     New counsel came on with
        insufficient time to digest the information and abandoned

                                   - 11 -
J-A22037-23

         the original strategy in favor of a baseless assertion of self-
         defense.

         Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion,
         or erred as a matter of law when it asked during
         [Appellant’s] colloquy, if [Appellant] had considered a
         mental health defense verses other potential defenses, this
         inartful phrased question seemingly pitted one defense
         against the other and bolstered that the two defenses were
         mutually exclusive and validated the impression that the
         options were limited to either-or defenses but not both.

         Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion or
         erred as a matter of law when it stated to [Appellant], “You
         understand that it is his job as your lawyer to decide on that
         trial strategy, not yours.” This statement worked to negate
         [Appellant’s] autonomy, chilled necessary questions and did
         bolster [Appellant’s] impression that counsel solely had the
         power to make the decision and that counsel was correct
         and working to his advantage.

         Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a
         matter of law when it said, “So, ladies and gentlemen, the
         witness’s last answer I’m going to strike from the record. It
         was not responsive to the question. The defendant’s history
         of mental illness is really not relevant to the defense in this
         case. The defense in this case is self-defense.”

         Whether [Appellant] is entitled to relief from his conviction
         because of the cumulative effect of these errors.

(Appellant’s Brief at 3-6).

      At the outset, we observe that “decisions involving discovery in criminal

cases lie within the discretion of the trial court. We will not reverse a trial

court’s order absent an abuse of that discretion.” Commonwealth v. Alston,

233 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court

has repeatedly emphasized that “[i]t is well established in this Commonwealth

that the purpose of the discovery rules is to permit the parties in a criminal

                                     - 12 -
J-A22037-23

matter to be prepared for trial. Trial by ambush is contrary to the spirit and

letter of those rules and cannot be condoned.” Commonwealth v. Shelton,

536 Pa. 559, 564-65, 640 A.2d 892, 895 (1994) (citation omitted).

      Additionally, the decision of whether to appoint new counsel lies within

the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal,

absent an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Cook, 597 Pa. 572,

610, 952 A.2d 594, 617 (2008). “While an indigent is entitled to free counsel,

he is not entitled to free counsel of his own choosing.” Id. (citation omitted).

A request to change counsel “by a defendant to whom counsel has been

assigned, shall not be granted except for substantial reasons. To satisfy this

standard, a defendant must demonstrate that he has an irreconcilable

difference with counsel that precludes counsel from representing him.”

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 562 Pa. 498, 518, 756 A.2d 1139, 1150 (2000),

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 932, 121 S.Ct. 1381, 149 L.Ed.2d 307 (2001).

Nevertheless, “a defendant has a constitutional right to choose any lawyer he

may desire, at his own cost and expense.” Commonwealth v. Rucker, 563

Pa. 347, 349–50, 761 A.2d 541, 542 (2000).

      After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Jill E. Rangos,

we conclude that Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion

comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented.

Specifically, regarding Appellant’s first issue, the court stated that it did not

                                     - 13 -
J-A22037-23

abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s request to delay the disclosure

of the defense expert report until after the Commonwealth completed an

evaluation. The court noted that pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 573, the court had

discretion to order Appellant to disclose the defense expert report so that the

Commonwealth could adequately prepare for trial.        See Shelton, supra;

Alston, supra. Additionally, Appellant failed to establish that he suffered any

prejudice as a result of the court’s ruling.2 (See Trial Court Opinion, filed

6/21/22, at 3-4).

       Regarding Appellant’s second claim that the court erred in denying

Attorney Narvin’s motion to be appointed as co-counsel, the court found that

Appellant was not entitled to court-appointed counsel of his choosing and

there was no indication that Appellant’s appointed counsel was not competent

or zealously pursing Appellant’s interests. See Cook, supra; Spotz, supra.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant ultimately decided not to pursue a defense     involving his mental
health at trial. Neither Appellant nor the Commonwealth presented any
experts at trial regarding Appellant’s mental health. Further, the record belies
Appellant’s claim that the court’s ruling resulted in Appellant being unable to
find an expert, which in turn contributed to the breakdown of his attorney-
client relationship with Attorney Narvin and Attorney Capan. Rather, the
record shows that Appellant asked the court to appoint Dr. Lim as a defense
expert. Appellant stated that Dr. Lim had the requisite qualifications to serve
as an expert in Appellant’s case. Appellant did not indicate that Dr. Lim
conditioned his involvement in the case on reviewing an independent
evaluation by the Commonwealth.           Additionally, nothing in the record
indicates that Dr. Lim refused to continue working on Appellant’s case because
the court denied Appellant’s request for an independent evaluation by the
Commonwealth. Likewise, there is no indication in the record that Appellant’s
relationship with Attorney Capan or Attorney Narvin deteriorated as a result
of this ruling.

                                          - 14 -
J-A22037-23

Additionally, Appellant did not suffer any prejudice as a result of this ruling

because Appellant subsequently hired private counsel who represented him at

trial.3 (See Trial Court Opinion at 4-5).

       With respect to Appellant’s third issue that the court erred in permitting

Appellant to retain new counsel and change the defense strategy, the court

noted that Appellant was deemed competent and he had retained Attorney

Hudak four months prior to trial. See Rucker, supra. The court conducted

an extensive colloquy during which Appellant affirmed that he was competent

to make decisions in his own best interests and was fully satisfied with

Attorney Hudak’s representation. The court further explained that beyond this

inquiry, it is not the court’s role to direct Appellant’s defense or trial strategies.

(See Trial Court Opinion at 5).

       In response to Appellant’s fourth and fifth issues combined, the court

explained that it properly asked questions to ascertain whether Appellant was

making informed decisions without unnecessarily intruding into the attorney-

client relationship. The court’s questions did not improperly imply to Appellant

____________________________________________

3 The record does not support Appellant’s contention that the court’s denial of

Attorney Narvin’s motion to be appointed as co-counsel resulted in the
breakdown of Appellant’s relationship with Attorney Narvin and Attorney
Capan. To the contrary, Attorney Narvin indicated in his motion to withdraw
as counsel that he continued to work on Appellant’s case on a pro bono basis
even after the court denied his motion to be appointed as co-counsel.
Attorney Narvin and Attorney Capan both indicated that the basis of their
motions to withdraw was a subsequent meeting with Appellant where
Appellant indicated that he was no longer satisfied with their representation
and refused to engage with them further.

                                          - 15 -
J-A22037-23

that self-defense and mental health defenses were mutually exclusive.

Rather, the court inquired whether Appellant had discussed both defenses with

his attorney and was satisfied with the choices that counsel was pursuing on

his behalf.    The court further ascertained that Appellant was aware that

although it was counsel’s role to determine trial strategy, Appellant had the

right to fully discuss and give his input to counsel regarding the chosen

strategy. Once the court was satisfied that Appellant was aware of his rights

and was making informed decisions, the court properly did not advise or

instruct Appellant any further regarding trial strategies. (See id. at 6-7).

       Regarding Appellant’s sixth claim, the court explained that it properly

excluded evidence of Appellant’s history of mental illness because Appellant

chose not to pursue a defense involving his mental health at trial. Additionally,

Appellant’s counsel conceded that evidence of Appellant’s mental health was

not relevant to his defense.4 (See Trial Court Opinion at 7). In response to

____________________________________________

4 To the extent Appellant is attempting to raise an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, this issue must wait to be addressed on collateral review. See
Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002) (explaining
general rule that petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel until collateral review). Our Supreme Court has recognized
two very limited exceptions to the general rule in Grant regarding when trial
courts may review ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) in
extraordinary circumstances where claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are
apparent from the record and immediate consideration best serves the
interests of justice and/or (2) where there is good cause shown and review of
the claim is preceded by a waiver of the right to seek collateral review.
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 621 Pa. 595, 598-99, 79 A.3d 562, 563-64
(2013). Ineffectiveness claims may be raised on direct appeal only if: (1) the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 16 -
J-A22037-23

Appellant’s seventh claim that he suffered cumulative prejudice, the court

found that Appellant failed to establish that his claims of error had merit and

as such, they cannot form the basis for a claim of cumulative prejudice. (See

id. at 8). We agree with the trial court that all of Appellant’s issues on appeal

are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence on the

basis of the trial court’s opinion.5

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 03/12/2024

____________________________________________

appellant raised his claim(s) in a post-sentence motion; (2) an evidentiary
hearing was held on the claim(s); and (3) a record devoted to the claim(s)
has been developed. Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911 A.2d 998, 1004
(Pa.Super. 2006). Here, Appellant failed to satisfy the requirements of
Holmes and Leverette. Therefore, this appeal is not the proper time to raise
or address any ineffectiveness of counsel claim.

5 We direct the parties to attach a copy of the trial court’s opinion to any future

filings involving this appeal.

                                          - 17 -
                                                                                    Circulated 02/21/2024 04:51 PM

             IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY,
                                PENNSYLVANIA

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                             CRIMINAL DIVISION

        v.                                                CP-02-CR-09484-2017

 QUINCY FUQUA

                                              OPINION

RANGOS, J.                                                                       March 3, 2023

        On June 21, 2022, a jury convicted Appellant, Quincy Fuqua, of one count of Murder of the

First Degree.' This Court sentenced Appellant on July 25, 2022, to life imprisonment. This Court

denied Appellant's Amended Post-Sentence Motion on November 7, 2022. Appellant filed a Notice

of Appeal on November 27, 2022, and his Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal on

December 3, 2022.

                          MATTERS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL

       Appellant alleges nine issues on appeal. Appellant alleges that this Court erred in denying a

Motion requesting the Commonwealth's witness conduct an independent evaluation before reviewing

the defense expert's report. Next, Appellant alleges that this Court erred in failing to appoint attorney

Richard Narvin as co-counsel upon his retirement from Office of Conflict Counsel. Appellant further

alleges this court erred in failing to appoint Narvin as an "expert consultant." Appellant alleges that

this Court erred in permitting private counsel to change the defense strategy. Additionally, Appellant

alleges that this Court erred in its colloquy of Appellant by suggesting that self-defense and mental

 18 Pa.C.S.   2502 (a).

                                                   2
health defenses were mutually exclusive. Appellant alleges that this Court's statement, that Appellant's

attorney, and not Appellant himself, determines trial strategy, negated Appellant's autonomy over his

case. Appellant asserts that this Court's colloquy was incomplete because it did not clearly explain to

Appellant the options available to him regarding trial strategy. Appellant alleges that this Court erred

in striking a witness' response and stating to the jury that Appellant's mental health history is irrelevant

because the defense strategy in this case was self-defense. Lastly, Appellant alleges that he is entitled

to relief as a result of the cumulative effect of these errors. (Statement of Errors to be Raised on

Appeal, pp. 2-6).

                                             DISCUSSION

        Appellant alleges that the Court erred in denying a Motion requesting the Commonwealth's

witness conduct an independent evaluation before reviewing the defense expert's report. This request

is governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573, which states, in relevant part:

        If an expert whom the defendant intends to call in any proceeding has not prepared a
        report of examination or tests, the court, upon motion, may order that the expert
        prepare and the defendant disclose a report stating the subject matter on which the
        expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts to which the expert is expected
        to testify; and a summary of the expert's opinions and the grounds for each opinion.

Pa. R. Crim. P. 573. Appellant was required to share the defense evaluation by its expert so that the

Commonwealth could adequately prepare for trial.              Once the report was received by the

Commonwealth, it could choose whether to provide it to its own expert, if one was retained. The

Commonwealth's decision to retain its own expert would be based, at least in part, on what was

contained in the defense expert report. Appellant's claim that the Commonwealth's subsequent expert

report is flawed as a result of failing to conduct an examination without reviewing defense expert's

report is an argument that goes to the weight and not to the admissibility of the Commonwealth's

                                                    3
report. Appellant's argument that he had difficulty obtaining an expert as a result of this Court's

decision has no basis in the record and is moot because Appellant clearly found an expert.

        Next, Appellant alleges that this Court erred in failing to appoint attorney Richard Narvin as

co-counsel upon his retirement from Office of Conflict Counsel. Appellant further alleges this court

erred in failing to appoint Mr. Narvin as an "expert consultant." Appellant alleges he wished to

continue to be represented by Narvin following Narvin's retirement from the Office of Conflict

Counsel and this Court's failure to permit him to act in that capacity ultimately led to a breakdown in

the relationship between Appellant and the Office of Conflict Counsel.

        "[A]lthough the right to counsel is absolute, there is no absolute right to a particular counsel."

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 805 (Pa. 1968). Upon the retirement of Attorney Narvin, Appellant's

case was transitioned to another lawyer within the Office of Conflict Counsel. Seven months after

his retirement from the Office of Conflict Counsel, Narvin filed a motion indicating that he had

continued to work on the case pro bono and would like to be appointed as co-counsel. This Court

notes that the Office of Conflict Counsel did not file or assent to this motion. After Narvin retired,

Appellant remained represented by other counsel within the Office of Conflict Counsel, who

continued to zealously advocate on behalf of Appellant. Since Appellant is not entitled to court-

appointed counsel of his choosing, and Appellant did not suffer a lack of zealous representation, this

Court did not err in denying the motion to appoint Narvin as co-counsel.

       Likewise, Appellant's attempt to backdoor Narvin's appointment by calling him an expert

consultant must fail. The purported expertise Narvin suggested was the relationship he had developed

with Appellant.    Once again, since Appellant did not suffer a lack of competent, zealous

representation, this Court did not err in denying the motion to appoint Narvin as co-counsel disguised

as expert consultant.   Furthermore, the issue of whether to appoint Attorney Narvin, after his

retirement, as co-counsel with another attorney from the Office of Conflict Counsel became moot

                                                   4
once Appellant retained private counsel, a decision Appellant may have made even if Attorney Narvin

had been appointed.

        Appellant alleges that this Court erred in permitting private counsel to change the defense

strategy. On February 27, 2022, attorney Joseph Hudak entered his appearance as privately retained

counsel for Appellant, four months prior to the trial.2 Appellant implies that this Court should have

bound Attorney Hudak to the trial strategy of his predecessor.' It is not the role of a trial court to tell

a privately retained attorney how to present his case. To the contrary, it is the ethical duty of an

attorney to "reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to

be accomplished." PA ST RPC Rule 1.4. Prior to trial, this Court conducted a colloquy with Appellant

regarding his satisfaction with his new attorney and with his trial strategy. Appellant indicated that he

discussed both self-defense and diminished capacity with Attorney Hudak, that Appellant agreed with

the decision to pursue the trial strategy of self-defense and not diminished capacity, and that he was

satisfied with Attorney Hudak's representation. (Trial transcript, volume I, June 14, 2022, hereinafter

"1"11" at 43-46). Appellant has promulgated no evidence that Attorney Hudak breached his ethical

duty, and no adequate reason for this Court to interfere with the attorney-client relationship.

       Appellant appears to be attempting to backdoor an ineffective assistance of counsel argument

by alleging that this Court permitted him to hire private counsel. Attorney Hudak, an experienced

criminal defense attorney, chose to pursue a defense theory of self-defense, which was a reasonable,

although ultimately unsuccessful, trial strategy. Counsel's strategic decision to argue self-defense

rather than pursue a diminished capacity defense does not constitute ineffective assistance so long as

2 Appellate counsel refers to this period as "at the last moment" in Appellant's concise statement.

 Although prior counsel had spent time consulting with experts, it would be pure speculation on
this Court's part to conclude that counsel had chosen to pursue diminished capacity as a defense.

                                                    5
he had a reasonable basis for the strategy chosen. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (Pa.

2006). Therefore, this Court did not err in "permitting" counsel to argue self-defense.

        Additionally, Appellant alleges that this Court erred in its colloquy of Appellant by suggesting

that self-defense and mental health defenses were mutually exclusive. As stated above, Appellant

discussed both self-defense and diminished capacity with Attorney Hudak, and Appellant agreed with

the decision to pursue the trial strategy of self-defense and not diminished capacity. Appellant alleges

that this Court erred by not emphasizing that Appellant could pursue both a self-defense and

diminished capacity. Once it was clear that Appellant and Attorney Hudak had discussed trial strategy

and that Appellant was satisfied with Attorney Hudak's efforts on his behalf, this Court did not engage

Appellant further out of respect for the integrity of the attorney-client privilege.

        Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Moore, 805 A.2d 1212 (Pa. 2002) in support of his claim.

However, in Moore, counsel was deemed ineffective for failing to inquire into defendant's mental health

issues, which could have led to a diminished capacity defense concurrently presented with a self-

defense case. In the matter sub judice, counsel was aware of Appellant's mental health and chose not

to pursue diminished capacity. Appellant indicated in the colloquy that he knew that he could pursue

a self-defense argument and was choosing not to do so. Appellant has failed to establish that this

Court had a duty to ensure Appellant understood that he could pursue self-defense and diminished

capacity simultaneously. As such, this claim has no merit.

       Appellant alleges that this Court's statement, that Appellant's attorney, and not Appellant

himself, determines trial strategy, negated Appellant's autonomy over his case. Appellant further

asserts that this Court's colloquy was incomplete because it did not clearly explain to Appellant the

options available to him regarding trial strategy. These claims may be combined for judicial economy.

       [A] defendant who makes a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision concerning
       trial strategy will not later be heard to complain that trial counsel was ineffective on
       the basis of that decision. See Commonwealth v. Abu—Jamal, 553 Pa. 485, 515, 720 A.2d

                                                   6
        79, 93 (1998). To hold otherwise would allow a defendant to build into his case a
        ready-made ineffectiveness claim to be raised in the event of an adverse verdict.

Commonwealth a Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 316 (Pa. 2002).

        This Court conducted an extensive colloquy with Appellant to ensure that he fully understood

his rights and the trial strategy that would be undertaken. Appellant stated that he had spoken with

Attorney Hudak about the possible defenses he could pursue. (TT1 37). Appellant stated that he

understood that he had the right to have input with his trial counsel, but that counsel would ultimately

decide upon the trial strategy. Id. Appellant further stated that he understood that he had the right

to choose whether to testify, regardless of the trial strategy adopted by Attorney Hudak. (111 39).

Appellant stated that he had discussed all matters pertaining to the case with Attorney Hudak and that

he was pleased with the services provided by Attorney Hudak. (TT1 39-40). Appellant specifically

stated that he discussed with Attorney Hudak both self-defense and a defense related to his mental

health. (TT1 43-44). Appellant stated that he had the opportunity to discuss these potential defenses

and was satisfied with the defense strategy of self-defense chosen by Attorney Hudak. (TT1 45).

Appellant is bound by his statements and this court did not err in its colloquy.

        Penultimately, Appellant alleges that this Court erred in striking a witness' response and stating

to the jury that Appellant's mental health history is irrelevant because the defense in this case was self-

defense. Appellant chose not to pursue a defense based on his mental health. Counsel further

indicated a desire to keep out as much as possible Appellant's mental health. (TT4 16). However,

trial counsel asked Appellant a question regarding Appellant's history of mental illness. (TT4 15).

Since this testimony was not relevant to Appellant's self-defense strategy, this Court correctly

sustained the objection and struck the answer from the record. ("Relevant evidence then, is evidence

that in some degree advances the inquiry, and thus has probative value, and is prima facie admissible."

McCormick, Evidence 185 at 437-38 (2nd Ed. 1972).

                                                    7
          Lastly, Appellant alleges that he is entitled to relief as a result of the cumulative effect of these

errors. No number of failed claims may collectively warrant relief. Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d

35, 75 (Pa. 2012). When the failure of individual claims is based upon a lack of prejudice, however,

then the cumulative prejudice from those individual claims may properly be assessed. Id Appellant's

claims are without merit. As such, Appellant cannot aggregate the cumulative effect of the alleged

errors.

                                              CONCLUSION

          For the above reasons, no reversible error occurred, and the findings and rulings of this Court

should be AFFIRMED.

                                                   BY THE COURT:

                                                   JILL ElIRAN G 0 S
                                                        1/

                                                       8
                                  CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of this OPINION was mailed

to the following individuals by first class mail, postage prepaid on March 3, 2023.

                                       Carmen Robinson
                                       84 Roberts Street
                                       Pittsburgh, PA 15219

                                       Michael Streily
                                       Office of the District Attorney
                                       401 Allegheny County Courthouse
                                       436 Grant Street
                                       Pittsburgh, PA 15219

                                               James J. Robertson, Law clerk for Jill E. Rangos

                                                  9