Court Opinion

ID: 9882311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 18:03:54.066249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:59.464063
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/5/23 P. v. Gomez CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E077966

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. BAF1800821)

 JOHNNY MANUEL GOMEZ,                                                    OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John M. Davis, Judge.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part with directions.

         Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Paige Hazard

and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       A jury convicted Johnny Manuel Gomez of carjacking and evading a peace

officer. (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); unlabeled statutory

citations refer to the Penal Code.) Gomez argues that the record does not contain

substantial evidence to support the force or fear element of carjacking. He also argues

that we should remand the matter for the trial court to exercise its discretion under

recently amended sections 654 and 1385. We remand for a new sentencing hearing, but

we otherwise affirm the judgment.

                                     BACKGROUND

I. Evidence at Trial

       On the night of June 22, 2018, two police officers observed Gomez’s truck drive

by them. One of the officers recognized the truck from previous contacts and stops, and

the officer knew that Gomez had an active warrant for his arrest. The officers activated

the lights on their patrol car and attempted to stop Gomez, but he accelerated and sped

away from them. He led the officers on a high-speed chase, running through numerous

red traffic lights and stop signs. Gomez eventually escaped from the officers by turning

off his headlights and driving down a dirt road. The officers lost track of his truck

because of a large dust cloud. Surveillance video later confirmed that Gomez was

driving the truck.

       Six days later, Connie Yanez was driving Gomez to cash his paycheck. Yanez is

Gomez’s former fiancée. She had known Gomez for 25 years. Yanez drove by two

police officers, who observed Gomez in the passenger’s seat. Those officers also knew

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that there was a warrant for Gomez’s arrest. They followed Yanez’s car and activated the

lights on their patrol car. Yanez slowly pulled over and stopped. The officers were

roughly one and one-half car lengths behind Yanez.

       According to the officers, Yanez was screaming, and there was “a lot of

commotion” and movement inside the car, especially from the passenger’s side. Gomez

looked back at the officers a few times, and he reached in the direction of the gear shift.

The car’s reverse lights came on and the car rolled back, and then it shifted back into

park. Gomez was also reaching toward Yanez’s legs and pushing down on her right leg,

as if he were trying to make her step on the gas pedal. He moved toward the center

console and started pushing Yanez. She was facing him with both hands raised when he

reached across her to the driver’s side door. The door flew open, and Yanez tumbled out

of the car back-first. She landed in the middle of the road and rolled. The speed at which

she flew out of the car made it appear as though she had been pushed. Gomez moved to

the driver’s seat and sped away. Throughout the incident, Yanez was yelling things like

“‘No, Johnny’” and “‘Don’t do this.’”

       Officers interviewed Yanez shortly after the incident. She told them that Gomez

said not to pull over and “to run.” She also said that Gomez was trying to push the gas

pedal while she was in the driver’s seat. She told one of the officers that Gomez pushed

her out of the car.

                                              3
       An officer also interviewed Gomez after law enforcement apprehended him.

During that interview, the officer said several times that Gomez pushed Yanez out of the

car. Gomez did not deny that statement.

       According to Yanez’s trial testimony, she saw the officers activate their lights and

told Gomez that she had to pull over. Gomez appeared nervous and panicky. He wanted

her to pull over so that he could get out of the car. She pulled over and told him to get

out and “take care of it.” Gomez nudged her and told her to “hurry up and get out” of the

car. He reached across her and opened the driver’s side door, but he did not push her out

of the car. She never told officers that Gomez pushed her out of the car. She fell out of

the car face-first when her foot got caught in her seatbelt. Yanez acknowledged that she

cared about Gomez and did not want him to get into trouble.

II. Procedural Background

       The People charged Gomez with one count of carjacking and two counts of felony

evading a peace officer. The information also alleged that Gomez had two prior

convictions qualifying as prior strikes and prior serious felony convictions—a 2004

conviction for robbery (§ 211) and a 2007 conviction for infliction of corporal injury on

his child’s mother (§ 273.5, subd. (e)), with an enhancement for personal use of a deadly

or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)).

       The jury convicted Gomez on all counts, and he admitted both prior strike

convictions. He moved to dismiss the prior strikes under People v. Superior Court

(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and section 1385. The People opposed the

                                             4
Romero motion, and the court granted the motion in part by dismissing the 2004 prior

strike for robbery.

       The court sentenced Gomez to 22 years in prison, consisting of the middle term of

five years for carjacking, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law; two years for

evading an officer (count 3); and two five-year terms for the two prior serious felony

convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).1 Pursuant to section 654, the court imposed but stayed

a middle term sentence on the second count for evading an officer (count 2).

                                       DISCUSSION

I. Substantial Evidence Challenge

       Gomez argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the

force or fear element of carjacking. We disagree.

       In resolving a substantial evidence claim, we review “the entire record in the light

most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is

reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100,

1128.) We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and credibility questions in favor of the

verdict. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) We do not reweigh the

1      Although no party has briefed the issue, the sentence on count 3 appears to have
been incorrectly calculated. The court stated that it was imposing one-third the middle
term, “making that two years.” The middle term sentence for felony evading an officer is
two years. (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; § 18, subd. (a).) One-third of two years is eight
months. Doubling that under the Three Strikes law (People v. Nguyen (1999) 21 Cal.4th
197, 203-204), the appropriate sentence on count 3 would appear to be 16 months, not
two years. Because we are remanding the matter for resentencing under sections 654 and
1385, the parties and the court may address the count 3 sentence on remand.

                                              5
evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210,

fn. 5.)

          “A conviction for carjacking requires proof that (1) the defendant took a vehicle

that was not his or hers (2) from the immediate presence of a person who possessed the

vehicle or was a passenger in the vehicle (3) against that person’s will (4) by using force

or fear and (5) with the intent of temporarily or permanently depriving the person of

possession of the vehicle.” (People v. Magallanes (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 529, 534,

citing § 215, subd (a).)

          The record here contains substantial evidence that Gomez used force to take

Yanez’s car. The evidence showed that he struggled to take control of Yanez’s car while

she was still in the driver’s seat. He shifted the car out of park and pushed down on

Yanez’s leg to make her step on the gas pedal. When that did not work, he moved into

the center console area and started pushing her. He then reached across and opened her

door, and she was ejected out of the car back-first. According to one of the officers,

Yanez told him that Gomez pushed her out of the car. And when another officer told

Gomez that he had pushed her, Gomez did not deny it. The jurors could reasonably

conclude from the evidence that Gomez forcibly took Yanez’s car by pushing her out of

it. (See People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1062 [noting that “a completed

carjacking occurs” when the defendant “forcibly removes the victim from the car before

driving off” (italics omitted)].)

                                               6
       Gomez argues that there was not substantial evidence because the evidence of

force came exclusively from the officers’ testimony, which was contradicted by Yanez’s

trial testimony that she fell out of the car but was not pushed. But the jury was entitled to

credit the officers, including their reports of Yanez’s pretrial statements, and disbelieve

what Yanez said at trial. We may not substitute our own judgment about the witnesses’

credibility on appeal.

       For these reasons, substantial evidence supports the finding that Gomez

accomplished the carjacking by force or fear.

II. Section 654

       Gomez argues that we should remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion

under recently amended section 654. Former section 654 provided that an act punishable

by more than one provision of the law “shall be punished under the provision that

provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment,” but the act could not be

punished under more than one provision. (Former § 654, subd. (a), as amended by Stats.

1997, ch. 410, § 1.) Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 518)

removed the requirement that the court impose the longest term of imprisonment for the

act. (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673 (Sek).) Thus, effective January 1,

2022, section 654 permits a defendant whose single act is punishable by multiple

provisions to “be punished under either of such provisions.” (§ 654, subd. (a).)

       The People concede that Assembly Bill 518 applies retroactively to the nonfinal

judgment in this case and that a remand is appropriate, and we agree. (People v. Mani

                                              7
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379.) On remand, Gomez may ask the court to decide

whether to stay his carjacking sentence or his sentence on count 2 for evading an officer.

III. Section 1385

       Gomez also argues that on remand, the court should have the chance to exercise its

discretion under recently amended section 1385. Effective January 1, 2022, the

Legislature amended section 1385 to include subdivision (c). (People v. Mendoza (2023)

88 Cal.App.5th 287, 295.) The new subdivision specifies mitigating circumstances that

the court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements in the furtherance

of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (c); Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 674.) As relevant here, the

court must consider whether multiple enhancements are alleged, whether application of

the enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years, and whether the

enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old. (§ 1385, subd.

(c)(2)(B), (C), (H).) Subdivision (c) of section 1385 applies “to all sentencings occurring

after January 1, 2022.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(7).)

       The People concede that if we are remanding for the court to resentence Gomez

under amended section 654, then any resentencing will occur after January 1, 2022, and

subdivision (c) of section 1385 will apply to Gomez’s case. We agree. (People v.

Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922, 930; Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at

p. 674.) On remand, Gomez may ask the court to dismiss one or both of his

enhancements for prior serious felony convictions under section 1385, subdivision (c).

                                             8
                                      DISPOSITION

       The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing in light of

recently amended sections 654 and 1385. The parties and the court may also address any

error in Gomez’s sentence on count 3. (See fn. 1, ante.) In all other respects, the

judgment is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                               MENETREZ
                                                                                          J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                        P. J.
RAPHAEL
                           J.

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