Court Opinion

ID: 9716659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:47:25.539938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.717608
License: Public Domain

ROBINSON, J.,
dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the Superior Court’s declaration that the Glocester Town Council was entirely without authority to remove Gregory Laramie from the Foster-Glocester Regional School Building Committee. In my view, the Glocester Town Charter grants the town council the authority to remove (albeit only for due cause and after notice and a hearing) the three members of the building committee whom the town council has appointed.
While I recognize that it is a close question and while the majority has articulated its position in an (almost) convincing manner, at the end of the day I conclude that I must disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the following particular provision within Article XIV, § C 14-2 of the Gloees-ter Town Charter:
“Any appointed Officer of a Board or Commission may be removed from the office by the Town Council for due cause following a public hearing.”
In contrast to the majority’s restrictive reading of that provision, it is my view that each member of the building committee whom the town council has appointed does fall within the category of an “appointed Officer of a Board or Commission” as that term is used in the town charter.
I consider highly significant the fact that it is elected officials of the towns of Foster and Glocester to whom the General Assembly has given the responsibility “for the appointment or election of the necessary representatives.” See P.L.1958, ch. 109, § 4. Given the fact that three members of the building committee were appointed by the Glocester Town Council, I consider the status of those members to be quite comparable to the status of the appointed members of any other board or commission within the Town of Glocester.6 See generally Town of Johnston v. Santilli, 892 A.2d 123, 131 (R.I.2006). It is therefore my considered judgment that the Glocester Town Charter vests the town council with the authority to remove for due cause members of the building committee whom it has appointed.7
*1130That being said, I wish to recall the pertinent insight of Justice Louis D. Bran-déis, who once made the following observation to Justice Robert H. Jackson with respect to how he (ie., Justice Brandéis) viewed his own decision-making as a member of the United States Supreme Court:
“[T]he difficulty with this place is that if you’re only fifty-five percent convinced of a proposition, you have to act and vote as if you were one hundred percent convinced. * * * You’ve got to decide the case one way or the other. Therefore the result oftentimes doesn’t reflect the residue of doubt that remains in the minds of the men [and women] who’ve decided it.” Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandéis: A Life 836 n.474 (2009).
In accordance with that especially perceptive observation about the nature of the judicial decisional process, I readily recognize that this is an extremely close case, and I genuinely respect the reasonableness of the majority’s position. However, reasonable minds can differ; and, after much reflection, I simply disagree with the majority’s affirmance of the Superior Court’s declaration that the Glocester Town Council had no authority to remove Mr. Laramie from the Foster-Glocester Regional School Building Committee. In my judgment, the town charter vests the town council with such authority, albeit subject to certain significant provisos, as discussed supra.
For these reasons, I very respectfully dissent.

. I employ the expression “quite comparable” so as to candidly express my awareness that the Glocester Town Charter does not explicitly refer to appointees to a committee, whether regional or purely local. There is wisdom in the ancient maxim that "all comparisons are imperfect,” but I nevertheless believe that the members of the building committee who were appointed by the town council are entitled to no less (and no more) claim on their office than are the town council’s other appointees.

. The language of the charter is laudably consistent with due process principles — since it expressly provides that appointed officers of boards or commissions may be removed from office only "for due cause following a public hearing.” Glocester Town Charter Article XIV, § C 14-2; see Riccio v. Town Council of Bristol, 109 R.I. 431, 439, 286 A.2d 881, 886 (1972) ("[T]here are numerous Rhode Island cases which hold that such officer is entitled to the procedural due process of written specifications of charges, an opportunity to be heard thereon, and to offer evidence in his behalf.”); see also Mellor v. Leidman, 100 R.I. 80, 85, 211 A.2d 633, 637 (1965); Davis v. Cousineau, 97 R.I. 85, 90, 196 A.2d 153, 156 (1963); Narragansett Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Kiernan, 59 R.I. 79, 82-83, 194 A. 49, 51 (1937); Hanna v. Board of Aldermen of Pawtucket, 54 R.I. 392, 395-97, 173 A. 358, 358-60 (1934); Garvin v. McCarthy, 39 R.I. 365, 371-72, 97 A. 881, 882-83 (1916); McCarthy v. Board of Aldermen of Central Falls, 38 R.I. 385, 390, 95 A. 921, 923 (1915); see generally *1130Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1267, 1280-81 (1975).