Court Opinion

ID: 2964563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:27:30.86601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:24.583954
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 96-1948

                                    DAVID W. HANN,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                              MICRON SEPARATIONS, INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                              __________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                              __________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge, 
                                       _____________

                              Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                   ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                              _________________________

               William T. Murphy on brief for appellant.
               _________________
               Edward  J.  Goddard and  Day, Berry  &  Howard on  brief for
               ___________________      _____________________
          appellee.

                              _________________________

                                  February 12, 1997
                              _________________________

                    Per Curiam.   In the suit  that underlies this  appeal,
                    Per Curiam.
                    __________

          plaintiff-appellant  David  W.  Hann  alleges  that  his  quondam

          employer, Micron Separations,  Inc. (Micron),  a manufacturer  of

          industrial   filtration  systems,  disregarded  a  severance  pay

          obligation  when it  terminated  him as  its marketing  director.

          Micron  moved for  summary  judgment on  the  ground that  Hann's

          written employment contract provided  for such remuneration  only

          in  the  event of  another  company's  acquisition  of Micron  (a

          circumstance that  had not occurred).   A magistrate  judge heard

          arguments and wrote a carefully reasoned report recommending that

          the district  court grant  brevis disposition in  Micron's favor.
                                     ______

          The magistrate concluded, after examining the relevant  evidence,

          that the proof,  taken in  the aspect most  flattering to  Hann's

          case, proves neither a  modification of the terms of  his written

          employment  contract nor  a breach  of those terms.   On  de novo

          review,  the  district  court  accepted  the  recommendation  and

          entered  summary  judgment  for  the defendant.    Hann  appeals.

          Having  determined  that  oral  argument would  not  advance  the

          decisional process, we summarily affirm.

                    On  whole-record review,  we   believe that  this is  a

          suitable  case in  which to  act upon  our long-held  belief that

          "when  a  lower  court produces  a  comprehensive,  well-reasoned

          decision,  an  appellate court  should  refrain  from writing  at

          length to  no other  end than  to hear  its own words  resonate."

          Lawton v.  State Mut. Life Assur.  Co. of Am., 101  F.3d 218, 220
          ______     __________________________________

          (1st  Cir. 1996); accord In  re San Juan  Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
                            ______ ________________________________________

                                          2

          Litig., 989  F.2d 36, 38 (1st  Cir. 1993).  Hence,  we affirm the
          ______

          judgment for substantially  the reasons set forth  in the opinion

          below.  We add only a small coda.

                    In his brief, Hann rehashes the evidence and invites us

          to take  a more expansive view of the facts than did the district

          court.   We decline the invitation.   When summary judgment is at

          stake,  we, like the trial  court, must scrutinize  the record in

          the light most  favorable to the nonmoving party,  "indulging all

          reasonable  inferences in  that party's  favor,"   Griggs-Ryan v.
          __________                                         ___________

          Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasis supplied), but
          _____

          disregarding  unsupported  allegations, unreasonable  inferences,

          and conclusory speculation.   See Smith  v. F.W.  Morse & Co., 76
                                        ___ ______    _________________

          F.3d  413, 428  (1st Cir.  1996); Medina-Munoz  v.  R.J. Reynolds
                                            ____________      _____________

          Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d  5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).  If no genuine issue
          ___________

          of  material fact  percolates  through the  record, then  summary

          judgment  is proper.  So viewed, the essential purpose of summary

          judgment  is "to  pierce the  boilerplate  of the  pleadings" and

          appraise the proof to determine whether a trial is needed.  Wynne
                                                                      _____

          v.  Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976  F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992),
              ________________________

          cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993).  Here, a trial would serve no
          _____ ______

          useful purpose.

                    We  will not tarry.  Despite the generosity of the Rule

          56 standard  vis- -vis the party opposing  summary judgment, that

          party  is not entitled to the benefit  of every inference that he

          can conjure  up;  he is  only entitled  to the  benefit of  every

          reasonable inference.   See National Amusements, Inc. v.  Town of
          __________              ___ _________________________     _______

                                          3

          Dedham,  43 F.3d 731,  735 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 115  S. Ct.
          ______                                  _____ ______

          2247 (1995).  In this instance, we cannot draw the inference that

          the  appellant hawks.  To the contrary, the statement of Micron's

          president,  Dr. John Greenwood, which  the appellant cites as the

          basis for his claim of an oral modification, simply will not bear

          the weight that the appellant piles upon it.

                    The  appellant's promissory  estoppel  claim  fares  no

          better  than his breach  of contract claim.   Under Massachusetts

          law, a  promisee's reliance  on  a promise  may give  rise to  an

          enforceable contract,  but only  if such reliance  is reasonable.

          See  Rhode Island Hosp. Trust  Nat'l Bank v.  Varadian, 419 Mass.
          ___  ____________________________________     ________

          841,  849-50,  647  N.E.2d  1174,  1178-79  (1995); Cambridgeport
                                                              _____________

          Savings Bank v. Boersner, 413 Mass. 432, 442-43, 597 N.E.2d 1017,
          ____________    ________

          1023-24 (1992); Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 376
                          ______________________    __________________

          Mass.  757, 760-61, 384 N.E.2d  176, 179 (1978);  Hall v. Horizon
                                                            ____    _______

          House  Microwave, Inc., 24 Mass.  App. Ct. 84,  93-94, 506 N.E.2d
          ______________________

          178, 184  (1987); see also  Coll v. PB Diagnostic  Sys., Inc., 50
                            ___ ____  ____    _________________________

          F.3d 1115, 1124-25 (1st  Cir. 1995) (refusing under Massachusetts

          law to honor a  promissory estoppel claim for an  orally modified

          employment  contract  when  reliance  was  unreasonable).    Even

          assuming  for argument's  sake  that Dr.  Greenwood had  apparent

          authority  to  bind  Micron  to  a  change  in  Hann's  severance

          arrangement   an  assumption that the record tends  to belie   no

          factfinder  rationally   could  conclude  that   the  appellant's

          professed reliance  on  Dr. Greenwood's  remark  was  reasonable.

          Even  on  the  appellant's  version,  Dr.  Greenwood's  statement

                                          4

          amounted  to  no  more than  a  passing  comment.   Only  wishful

          thinking could have  led Hann  to believe that  his contract  had

          been improved by this  passing comment   and wishful  thinking is

          not enough to support a cognizable claim of detrimental reliance.

          Thus, the magistrate judge and district court  acted within their

          proper office  in rejecting  the unreasonable inference  on which

          the appellant's case rests.  See Smith, 76 F.3d at 428.
                                       ___ _____

                    We need  go no further.   Finding,  as we do,  that the

          district   court  appropriately   granted  Micron's   motion  for

          judgment, we summarily affirm.  See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.
                                          ___

                    Affirmed.
                    Affirmed.
                    ________

                                          5