Court Opinion

ID: 9638071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:32:37.227563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:03.490554
License: Public Domain

*515Henderson, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion, in which Sybert, J., concurred.
The majority opinion in this case decides a point, left open in previous opinions, in a manner that I believe to be unwise, and I must respectfully dissent. The most that can be said of the evidence presented by the appellant in support of his plea of insanity at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, is that it showed that one or two of the younger psychiatrists upon the staff at Perkins differed from the senior psychiatrists and other staff members, and felt that the accused was probably insane under the M’Naghten test.
Even this testimony was somewhat shaken by the fact that Dr. Gregory, the only witness called by the appellant, stated his belief that the accused was “unable to distinguish right from wrong and adhere to the right.” (Italics supplied) This suggests “irresistible impulse,” a defense not open under the M’Naghten test, but I find no basis for the statement in the majority opinion that the trial court did not consider his testimony. Indeed, Judge Grady carefully analyzed it, although rejecting it in the end. Dr. Prado, called by the State, testified that the accused was not medically or legally insane. I am unable to- conclude that the judgment of the trial court was clearly erroneous under Rules 886, and 772. Under Rule 742 the trial court may render its verdict without comment, and it does not appear that any question as to the burden of proof was raised or decided in the court below as required by Rule 885.
My chief objection, however, is tO' the holding that upon the presentation of evidence tending to show insanity the burden of proving sanity shifted to the State, to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. To my mind the opinion misreads Lipscomb v. State, 223 Md. 599, 604. In that case Chief Judge Brune, for the Court, stated that a person is presumed sane “until sufficient proof of his insanity is introduced to raise a question in the minds of reasonable men as to whether he is or is not sane.” If the defense does not produce evidence legally sufficient to establish insanity, the issue should be withdrawn from the jury. O’Connor v. State, 234 Md. 459, and cases cited. But it does not follow that wherever sufficient evidence is produced *516to overcome the presumption, the burden shifts to the State. In Lipscomb Chief Judge Brune said that once the presumption of sanity is overcome “a further question then arises, on which there is a division of authority, as to whether the defendant must go forward and prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, or whether the State must then offer proof to establish the defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.” Because the “threshhold” question was not raised, “the problem of determining which party must bear the burden of proof on the insanity issue is not reached * *
If we must here make a choice, I am in favor of the view that requires the accused to establish insanity by a fair preponderance of the evidence. In 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed.), sec. 2501, the learned author states that three different rules have found vogue. He describes the third in the following language: “(3) But another view, based on judicial experience in dealing with the issue of insanity in criminal trials, and adopted by an increasing number of Courts, is that the accused has the burden of proving insanity, in the sense that he has the risk of persuading the jury to that effect, at least by a preponderance of evidence, and also, of course, has the duty of producing evidence.” In support of the third view, the preeminent author quotes from the opinion of Douglas, J. in State v. Quigley, 26 R. I. 263, 58 Atl. 905, which he characterizes as “good”:
“The question was settled in England in 1843 by the answer of the judges to questions propounded by the House of Lords, suggested by the case of Daniel M’Naghten, reported in 10 Cl. & Fin. 200. In that case the law was said to be: ‘That if the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do; and if the act was at the same time contrary to law, he is punishable. In all cases of this kind the jurors ought to be told that every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crime until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the party *517was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or as not to know that what he was doing was wrong.’
“The question has arisen in almost every State of the Union, and in the courts of the United States, and between the decisions of these courts there is a hopeless conflict.
“It would be a fruitless task to review in detail the cases where the question has been considered, for they are divided into two classes which follow substantially the same two divergent lines of reasoning.
“The English rule implies that the question of guilt and the question of insanity raise two distinct issues, and that while both may be involved in the final verdict, the burden of proof upon each issue lies upon different parties. The most complete and forcible statement of the argument in support, of this rule which we have found is contained in the opinion of Judge Danforth in State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574, 581.
“The American rule, so-called, holds that in a criminal case there is but one issue and that the burden throughout is upon the prosecution to prove, not only the criminal act, but the capacity of the accused to commit it beyond a reasonable doubt.
“We think the first of these positions is the more logical. Sanity is not an ingredient of crime. It is a condition precedent of all intelligent action, as well benevolent as nefarious. It is a quality of the actor, not an element of the act. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to show the commission of the act, and from this showing and its circumstances to sustain the inferences of malice and such emotions as the particular crime may include. But sanity is not one of these inferences. It is a pre-existing fact which may be taken for granted as implied by law and general experience. * * *.
*518“It is argued that criminal intent, malice, and premeditation are facts to be proven by the prosecutor; that these can not exist in an insane mind; hence sanity must be proved by the prosecutor. But these are facts of mental condition and action, and they can only be proved by inference from material facts, circumstances, and acts. It is incumbent, therefore, upon the prosecution to prove such material facts, circumstances, and acts as would compel the inference of guilt in a sane person, and this is the limit of his burden.
“In murder the prosecution must establish the act, and either by inference or additional evidence, malice, and premeditation. If these ingredients of the crime can not exist without sanity, sanity is presumed. All the ingredients of the crime must be proved, and as to these we agree the burden never shifts; but as to sanity it never attaches to the prosecutor. The plea of not guilty by itself does not put the sanity of the accused in issue. He must raise the question otherwise, as all agree, if not by special plea, at least by introducing evidence, and this is confession and avoidance.”
We adopted the M’Naghten rule in this State in Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 37, 13 Atl. 809, in an opinion by Alvey, C.J. and have followed it consistently ever since. The expressions “clearly proved” or proved to the “satisfaction” of the jury, used in M'Naghten's case, may import a degree of proof higher that a preponderance, but most courts now state the rule in terms of a preponderance of the evidence. See Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, p. 219 et seq. Perhaps the latest English case on the subject is R. v. Podola, [1959] 3 All E. R. 418, 429 (C. Cr. A.). If we are to continue to follow the M’Naghten rule in its pristine form I see no reason to reject the portion of it that deals with the burden of proof. It has been the practice in some of the trial courts to instruct on the basis of the preponderance of evidence and the burden on the defense. See for example, the charge of Chief Judge Niles in Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, 587, Judge Macgill in Bell v. State, 234 Md. 254, and Judge Grady in O’ Connor v. State, *519supra. In 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (11th ed.), sec. 899, the learned author makes the point that a statutory plea of insanity is nearer to- a plea to the jurisdiction than confession and avoidance. Nevertheless, when offered to show “entire unamenability” he suggests that it should be established by “at least a preponderance of proof,” particularly where it may form the basis for commitment to a mental institution.1
The rule that the burden shifts to the State was laid down for the Federal Courts in Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469, but it was made clear in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, that this was not applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The State courts are almost evenly divided on the point. There seems to be no particular trend, although a late case in Alaska, Chase v. State, 369 P. 2d 997, 1003 (1962), adopted the preponderance rule. Some of the cases that reject the preponderance rule also reject the M’Naghten rule. Statutes control the matter in some states. As stated in the recent article by Roller, on The Insanity Defense, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 733, 741 (March 1964), twenty-three states place the burden of proving insanity on the accused. The author continues: “Allocating the risk of error to the defendant in this situation is not unfair since he is attempting to refute the ordinary presumption of sanity and may therefore have to establish any circumstances entitling him to exculpation.”
It is probably true, as some commentators point out, that the *520presumption of sanity, viewed simply as a rule of evidence, disappears when evidence to the contrary is produced, but placing the onus on the accused, to establish his unaccountability by a preponderance of all the evidence is also a matter of policy, implicit in the M’Naghten rule. In short, the accused should bear the risk of persuasion when all the evidence is in, as in other cases where he asserts an affirmative defense.2 To acquit a defendant simply because a doubt is raised as to his sanity is to relax the fundamental concept of criminal responsibility. I would adhere to the English rule.
Judge Sybert authorizes me to say that he concurs in the views here expressed.

. We recently held in Rowe v. State, 334 Md. 395, that the same test of criminal responsibility was applicable in the case of a plea of insanity at the time of trial (insane now), as in the case of a plea of insanity at the time of the commission of the alleged offense (insane then). We further held that a verdict of insane now nullified the trial, so far as the guilty verdict was concerned, and required that the accused be committed to a mental hospital until capable of standing trial again, I submit that a verdict of insane then or insane now, under the holding in the instant case, could not support a commitment to a mental institution, for it would not amount to a finding of insanity, but only a finding that the State had failed to established sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. It would seem to follow that under either verdict (insane then or insane now) the accused would be entitled to immediate release.

. The decision in the instant case is inconsistent with our holding that the burden does not shift in a defense of self-defense, but that the burden is upon the proponent to establish his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The majority opinion recognizes that this is the Maryland rule in self-defense, Gunther v. State, 228 Md. 404, but attempts to distinguish it on the ground that the insanity plea raises an issue of mens rea or criminal intent, while self-defense does not. The distinction is untenable. There is a split of authority as to the burden of proof in self-defense, just as there is in insanity cases. See Comment, The Burden of Proving Self-Defense in Homicide Cases, 39 J. Crim. L. & Crimin. 183. But the cases holding that the burden shifts to the State do so, expressly or impliedly, on the theory that any evidence of self-defense negates the criminal intent, although there is no presumption to overcome, and thus shifts the burden. See casenote, 24 Md. L. Rev. 78, 81-83. Both defenses relate to the state of mind, and the result in Gunther should compel a similar result in the case at bar.