Court Opinion

ID: 9488695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:53:08.19111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:15.947693
License: Public Domain

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The United States Supreme Court returned federalism to constitutional doctrine in recently deciding, in United States v. Lopez, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause when it banned the possession of firearms near a school. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A) (1988 ed., Supp II). This ease poses remarkably similar constitutional questions arising from 15 U.S.C. § 922(o), a companion provision to Section 922(q). Appellant Kirk contends that the Court’s reasoning in Lopez also renders unconstitutional Congress’s attempt, in Section 922(o), to ban1 possession of any “machine gun”2 that was not “lawfully” possessed before the provision passed in 1986. Acknowledging that Lopez does not control this case, I nevertheless see no meaningful distinction between Section 922(q) and Section 922(o) as the latter applies to possession, not transfer, of machine guns. I also believe that Section 922(o) cannot be upheld as a more direct exercise of Congressional commerce power. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The majority have accurately described Lopez's recapitulation of the jurisprudence of the Commerce Clause. Thus, it is settled that the Congressional power over interstate commerce extends to (1) regulating the use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) regulating and protecting the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat *799may come only from intrastate activities; and (3) regulating intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30.
But while Lopez evaluated the ban of firearms near a school under the “affecting commerce” strand of jurisprudence, the majority here have concluded that the ban on possession of machine guns constitutes either a regulation of the “channels of interstate commerce or of things moving in interstate commerce.” This analysis, in my view, misinterprets those two broad categories of Commerce Clause power and ultimately conflates them with the third. Moreover, the affecting commerce category, relied upon by the federal government’s brief to this court, cannot sustain Section 922(o) under the logic of Lopez.
The fundamental mistake by the majority lies in their misconstruction of the plain language of the statute. Although the majority deem the ban on possession of “machine guns” to regulate the channels of interstate commerce or things in interstate commerce, neither Section 922(o) nor its legislative history supports that position. The statute is not limited to possession in or even affecting interstate commerce or to possession of a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce. Rather, it criminalizes the mere private possession of a machine gun.
The majority infer from the fact that Section 922(o) prohibits “transfer” as well as “possession” that channels or things in interstate commerce were intended to be regulated. This inference seems unwarranted for two reasons. First, transfer as well as possession of a thing can be of a wholly intrastate character. Second, when the government criminalizes conduct in the disjunctive, it may prosecute separately each type of conduct disjunctively named. Thus, as in this case, possession alone is criminalized independent of any transfer of a machine gun. We need not and ought not consider here the constitutionality of the Section 922(o) restriction on transfers of machine guns.
The majority also seek advantage from the nature of the weapons banned and the statute’s prospective scope, citing a passage from this court’s decision in Lopez:
Section 922(o) is restricted to a narrow class of highly destructive, sophisticated weapons that have been either manufactured or imported after enactment of the Firearms Owners Protection Act, which is more suggestive of a nexus to or effect on interstate or foreign commerce than possession of any firearms whatever, no matter when or where originated, within 1,000 feet of the grounds of any school.
2 F.3d at 1556 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). Neither of these features of the law, however, renders it more closely or more necessarily connected to the regulation of interstate commerce. Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce does not depend on the value or dangerousness of the item regulated, but upon its connection with interstate commerce. Obviously, eggs as well as toxic chemicals can be regulated if they have the appropriate nexus to interstate commerce. Further, the grandfather clause of the ban, making it effective only after 1986, fails to enhance its relation to interstate commerce.3 After 1986, both interstate and wholly intrastate private possessions are banned, and there are no Congressional findings that this most drastic impact upon intrastate activity, otherwise subject to local police power, was required by the ineffectiveness of prior federal machine gun regulation. Section 922(o), in sum, does not expressly or by necessary implication appertain to the channels of interstate commerce or to regulation of things in interstate commerce.
Because Section 922(o) reaches wholly intrastate, non-commercial possession, the provision poses the constitutional question avoided by the Supreme Court when it interpreted a federal statute criminalizing a felon’s possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. *800515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). The government prosecuted appellant Bass without demonstrating any connection between his possession and interstate commerce, because the statute did not clearly require a nexus. Noting the ambiguity of the both the statute and legislative history concerning whether interstate commerce was jurisdictionally invoked, the Court declined to accept broad construction of the statute and “render[ ] traditionally local criminal conduct a matter for federal enforcement and ... [promote] a substantial extension of federal police resources.” 404 U.S. at 351, 92 S.Ct. at 524. By inferring a requirement that the possession be “in commerce or affecting commerce,” the Court avoided a significant intrusion on the traditional federal-state balance. 404 U.S. at 350, 92 S.Ct. at 523. A more far-reaching intrusion on state police power is carried out by Section 922(o), but unlike Bass, no saving construction is available.
The majority do not rely on legislative history concerning Section 922(o), for there is virtually none, and it says nothing about interstate commerce. There appears to be only one recorded statement by its legislative sponsor, Representative Hughes, in the Congressional Record:
I do not know why anyone would object to the banning of machine guns.
132 Cong.Rec. H1750 (April 10, 1986) (statement of Rep. Hughes). Section 922(o) was incorporated as Section 102(9) of the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, 100 Stat. 452-53, but no other reference to it appears in the committee reports or elsewhere in legislative history, with the exception of a brief Senate colloquy concerning the scope of the exemption for government-authorized machine guns.4
Despite the absence of textual or legislative historical support for their interpretation, the majority conclude that Section 922(o) “is an attempt to control the interstate market for machine guns by creating criminal liability for those who would constitute the demand-side of the market ...”. Accordingly, the majority first upholds the possession ban as a regulation of the use of channels of interstate commerce. I respectfully disagree. Even accepting the majority’s cause-and-effect rationale, mere intrastate possession of a machine gun is not a use of the channels of interstate commerce any more than mere intrastate possession of a basketball. Compare Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241, 257, 85 S.Ct. 348, 357-58, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964).
The majority also rely upon a recent Tenth Circuit case that upheld Section 922(o) as a regulation of things in commerce, i.e. interstate traffic in machine guns. U.S. v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir.1995). Decided after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez, Wilks considered the Section 922(o) ban on machine gun possession functionally indistinguishable from previous laws, such as the 1968 Gun Control Act, which had extended federal control over interstate and foreign commerce by regulating all persons engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1521-22. The court used the statements of Congressional findings and purposes in the previous laws to defend Congress’s further step of banning private machine gun possession in Section 922(o) as if it were a part of the seamless web of regulation of the firearms business.5 For several reasons, I must disagree with Wilks. First, none of those laws purported to ban possession of firearms unrelated to interstate commerce. Compare United States v. Bass, supra. As Judge Garwood’s opinion in Lopez painstakingly demonstrates, all previous federal gun control laws have been expressly tied to the conduct of the *801firearms business, a business whose inter- and intra-state activities are not only commingled but clearly “commercial”. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1348-57.
Second, the overall structure and history of the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA), in which Section 922(o) originated, suggests no general Congressional determination that possession of machine guns necessarily implicates interstate commerce. Judge Garwood’s opinion in Lopez explains that the Act focused on regulating transfers of firearms, including express Congressional findings that transfer by non-federal-licensees to “disqualified persons” must be controlled to prevent evasion of license regulations. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1354-55. Other amendments effected by that statute dealt with provisions which already expressed an interstate commerce nexus without diluting those requirements. Id. The preamble of the legislation expressed Congress’s desire not to “place any undue or unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to the ... possession or use of firearms appropriate to ... any lawful activity____” P.L. 99-308 § 100 stat. 449. Section 922(o) stands isolated from the rest of the FOPA because it conspicuously lacks either a nexus to commerce or the support of findings that banning mere intrastate possession of machine guns is essential to effectuate federal regulation.
Third, banning the possession of machine guns represents a logical extreme of federal regulation but also the negation of the preexisting regulatory structure as to those firearms. Wilks, however, imports the same Congressional findings that regulated transfers of firearms in interstate commerce to justify banning mere possession without any link to interstate commerce. The Wilks decision leaps to fill in the logical gap between regulating activity in interstate commerce and banning a wholly local intrastate action. Surely Congress ought to have decided that its earlier attempts at regulation were ineffectual before taking this intrusive step into the police power of the states. It is not for the courts to do so. Compare Bass, supra, where the Court expressed concern that Congress simply did not consider the federalism implications of banning mere intrastate firearm possession.
Although Wilks’s point is debatable, I am persuaded that prior federal firearms statutes and Congressional findings do not speak to the subject matter of Section 922(o) or its relation to interstate commerce. To paraphrase Lopez, by banning the wholly intrastate possession of machine guns, Section 922(o) plows new ground and breaks with the longstanding pattern of federal firearms legislation. — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. at 1632, citing U.S. v. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366.
Eliminating the “channels of commerce” and “things in commerce” bases of Commerce Clause jurisdiction espoused by the majority, Section 922(o) may only be justified as a measure that substantially affects interstate commerce. But the analogy between Lopez and this case is compelling, so much so that the majority here, like the court in Wilks, did not attempt to dispute it.
Like the provision found wanting by the Supreme Court, Section 922(o) is also a “criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise.” Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31. Further, Section 922(o) has no jurisdictional element to ensure that the prohibited firearm possession affects interstate commerce. Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1631.6 Indeed, Section 922(o) seems to suffer the same infirmities as the broad reading of the former Section 1202 rejected by the Court in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). See Lopez, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1631; Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1347 (“Were Section 1202 read to punish mere possession without a commerce nexus, the Court argued, it would intrude upon an area of traditional state authority and would push Congress’ commerce power to its limit, if not beyond.”).
As in Lopez, the possession of a machine gun covered by Section 922(o), without more, *802is no more an economic activity that may substantially affect commerce than was the possession of a firearm in a school zone prohibited by Section 922(q). — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. Section 922(o) would punish a local resident for the mere possession of a machine gun acquired after 1986 “with no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.” Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. Indeed, it would appear that the arguments proffered in defense of Section 922(o) would unalterably convert the commerce power into a reserved “general police power” in direct contravention of the Court’s dictates. Id. at 1632-33; see also Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1638. As Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lopez states: “Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.” — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1638.
Regardless of one’s view of the wisdom or unwisdom of banning the private, intrastate possession of machine guns, the question before this court is whether Congress had the constitutional authority to do so by virtue of its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.7 Lopez reminds us forcefully that Congress’s enumerated power over commerce must have some limits in order to maintain our federal system of government and preserve the states’ traditional exercise of the police power. Section 922(o) is a purely criminal law, without any nexus to commercial activity,8 and its enforcement would intrude the federal police power into every village and remote enclave of this vast and diverse nation. Even after Lopez, Congress need not do much to satisfy the Commerce Clause. Here, however, it did practically nothing. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 922(o).

. One commentator, writing shortly after Section 922(o) was passed as part of the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986), declined to characterize this Section as a "ban” on machine gun possession, noting that possession of machine guns was still permitted "under the authority” of the United States or any lesser political subdivision or as a result of the grandfather clause for weapons "lawfully” possessed before 1986. Hardy, David T., The Firearms Owners' Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 Cumberland L.Rev. 585, 668-670 (1987). Hardy, however, advocated a narrower construction of the statute than has been utilized by the government here; the government construes Section 922(o) to ban private possession of machine guns produced or unlawfully transferred after 1986.

. The term "machine gun” is defined for federal regulatory purposes in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). As this court’s en banc opinion found, however, not all machine guns so defined are Uzis or AK-47’s. They include conventional firearms that have been modified or altered by wear and tear to commence "firing when the trigger is depressed and continue[] firing until it is released, or the weapon’s supply of ammunition is exhausted.” United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1249, n. 3 (5th Cir.1989).

. The effect of the grandfather clause does, paradoxically, assure a nexus between interstate commerce and criminal possession of pre-1986 unlawfully possessed machine guns, because, as this court’s Lopez opinion noted, pre-1986 regulatory laws expressly embodied a jurisdictional nexus to commerce. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1356, n. 29.

. See discussion of legislative history in Hardy, supra n. 1, at 671-74 and n. 461, 462, 463.

. Willcs abandoned, as it had to, the erroneous references to legislative history on which pre-Lopez opinions of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits relied in upholding Section 922(o). See United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997, 113 S.Ct. 1614, 123 L.Ed.2d 174 (1993); United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir.1991). These cases drew a connection between Section 922(o) and interstate commerce based upon legislative history from earlier, unpassed legislation. This court criticized such reliance in United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1356-57; the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez undermined other aspects of those courts’ reasoning; and Wilks appropriately discards the discredited reasoning.

. The government's brief relies on the legislative history of other firearms statutes that was rejected as a guide to interpreting Section 922(q) in Lopez. Lopez, - U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1632. Based on the Fifth Circuit's reading of the legislative history behind firearms regulation and Section 922(o), in accordance with the discussion above, I would reject the use of legislative history of prior firearms legislation in this case.

. In footnote 7 of their opinion, the majority conjure up the “horribles” that they believe will ensue if § 922(o) is found constitutionally infirm in the wake of Lopez. Four statutes they cite as vulnerable are 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), prohibiting simple possession of controlled substances; 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(5), prohibiting possession of equipment designed to label counterfeit drugs; 18 U.S.C. § 2342(a), prohibiting possession of counterfeit cigarettes; and 18 U.S.C. § 842(j), prohibiting storage of explosive materials not conforming to federal regulations.
Footnote 7 is both mischievous and wrong. It is mischievous because in pure dictum, it virtually invites constitutional challenges to legislation not even remotely before the court in this case. It is also mischievous in ignoring the reasoning of Lopez, which requires a careful review of any individual statute's background and purpose before a constitutional challenge will be upheld.
The footnote is seriously wrong to cast doubt on the constitutionality of the two listed federal drug control laws. In Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367, n. 51, this court rejected the government's proffered analogy between the constitutionality of proscribing § 922(q) firearm possession hear a school and outlawing simple drug possession. As Judge Garwood pointed out, an earlier Lopez case, 459 F.2d 949, 952-53 and n. 3 (5th Cir.1972), cited voluminous Congressional findings, set forth at 21 U.S.C. § 801, to sustain the criminality of simple controlled substance possession as a necessary ingredient of regulating foreign and interstate drug trafficking. This reasoning would also govern the prohibition on possessing equipment to label counterfeit drugs, because Congress expressly recognized that controlled substances, being fungible, cannot effectively be regulated without federal control of local aspects of the business.
The majority’s alleged fears with regard to the federal crimes for improper storage of explosives and possession of contraband cigarettes appear to be unwarranted. A cursory review of the legislative history indicates that when Congress decided to regulate explosives, it did so out of concern to protect the channels of interstate commerce and with an express acknowledgement that regulation of intrastate activity was essential to the regulatory scheme. See, e.g., 1970-1 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1109 (discussing Title XI of P.L. 91-452); and 1970-2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4044 (section-by-section analysis of legislation). Similarly, Congress’s expressed objective in regulating large-scale traffic in contraband cigarettes was to thwart illicit bootlegging of cigarettes, often conducted by organized crime, from low-tax to high-tax states. 1978-5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5518 et seq. (Sen. report on P.L. 95-575).

. This case is obviously different from Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942), in which the farmer’s use of his privately grown wheat was found to affect the market and "commerce” in that community.