Court Opinion

ID: 9850582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:59:36.74573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:39.773310
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. “The question of what constitutes 'regular use’ within the meaning of such an exclusionary clause has arisen in a number of situations and the resolution of the question usually depends on the particular fact situation, no absolute definition of the term being possible.” 7 AmJur2d 415, 416, Automobile Insurance, § 106. Apparently, the only two Georgia cases interpreting such a clause, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates, 107 Ga. App. 449 (130 SE2d 514) and National-Ben Franklin Ins. Co. v. Prather, 109 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) (136 SE2d 499), involve factual situations different from that of the instant case; however they are helpful insofar as they establish general guidelines for this type of case. Many of the pertinent foreign decisions are apparently conflicting, resulting in part, perhaps, from the variation of factual situations to which the exclusion clause has been applied.
The cases are not in harmony on the question whether or not such a clause is ambiguous, requiring a construction strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. See cases annotated in 86 ALR2d 937, 942-944, § 3. In my opinion, however, it is not necessary to so construe the present policy, since the purpose of the exclusion is ascertainable and the circumstances of this case govern the question of liability. “The purpose of the ‘drive other cars’ provision in an automobile liability policy is to cover occasional or incidental use of other cars without the payment of an additional premium, but to exclude the habitual use of other cars, which would increase the risk on the insurance company without a corresponding increase in the premium.” (Emphasis supplied.) 86 ALR2d 937, 940 (II, § 2) and cases annotated thereunder. The covered use is also variously described as “casual” (Vern v. Merchants Mut. Casualty Co., 118 NYS2d 672 (21 Misc.2d 51) (1952)) and “infrequent” (Wyatt v. Cimarron Ins. Co., 235 F2d 243 (CA Okla.) (1956)), while the term “regular use” has been held to suggest a principal (though not necessarily exclusive) use as *816distinguished from a casual or incidental use. 7 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 4455, p. 496, n. 80; 36A Words & Phrases 301 (Perm. Ed.); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates, 107 Ga. App. 449, 451, supra; Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 56 Cal. App. 2d 597 (132 P2d 846) (1943); 86 ALR2d 937, 952. Thus the key to the insurer’s intention in the use of such clause is its obvious intention to cover only those uses, whether described as occasional, incidental, casual, infrequent or by other similar adjectives, which will not materially increase the insurer’s risk without a corresponding and compensating increase in the premium.
In the Prather case, 109 Ga. App. 459, 461, supra, it is noted that this court, in the Bates case, supra, cited Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 56 Cal. App. 2d 597, “as authority for the proposition that the word 'furnished for’ must be read in connection with 'regular use’ and that both are operative parts of the exclusion,” then further observed that this is emphasized in the special concurrence in the Bates case, from which is quoted the statement: “The provision should be interpreted to mean that to exclude coverage there must have been the furnishing for regular use and also regular use.” (Emphasis supplied.) This requirement of actual, regular use in addition to mere availability for regular use was also recognized in Harrill v. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co., 122 FSupp 389 (DC Iowa) (1954) and Sumrall v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co. (La. App.) 124 S2d 168 (1960). See 86 ALR2d 937, 953, 955.
“Whether a vehicle is covered, or whether it is excluded under a provision denying coverage where such vehicle is furnished . for the insurer’s regular use, normally becomes a jury question.” 7 Appleman § 4455, supra, pp. 496, 497; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bates, supra; National-Ben Franklin Ins. Co. v. Prather, supra. “Such a provision is usually construed in favor of the insured. And this is particularly true where there is any ambiguity.” 7 Appleman § 4455, supra, p. 497. There was ample evidence in the instant case to authorize the finding that, regardless of the use for which the automobile was furnished, its actual use was not a principal use, but rather an occasional, incidental, casual, infrequent, etc., use, which was *817not sufficient to materially increase the insurer’s risk. To set aside the jury’s verdict, which was authorized by the evidence, has the effect of denying coverage for irregular use, whereas the policy’s exclusion is for “regular” use. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court overruling the defendant’s motion for a judgment n.o.v.
Debn, Judge, dissenting. “After the verdict, the testimony is construed in its most favorable light to the prevailing party. . . . For every presumption and inference is in favor of the verdict.” Young Men’s Christian Assn. v. Bailey, 112 Ga. App. 684, 690 (146 SE2d 324). Although the testimony was in conflict, it indubitably authorized the jury to find that the automobile being operated by the insured at the time of the collision out of which the present action arose was not furnished for his regular use, and further was not regularly used.
In my opinion there was sufficient evidence to authorize the finding that the prime purpose for which the automobile was furnished or turned over to the insured was to sell it for his step-son. There was further testimony that would authorize a finding that the insured used this particular automobile on only two occasions. The jury has resolved these issues; therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court overruling the defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.