Court Opinion

ID: 9662613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:14:07.889193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:11.688283
License: Public Domain

GRAVES, Justice,
Dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent. I believe the proper disposition of this matter is an order of remand to the circuit court for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law as previously requested by the Commonwealth Attorney. On May 19, 1999, the trial court entered a one-line order denying Appellees’ motion to suppress, namely, “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to suppress is DENIED.” The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law.
On September 8, 1999, after entry of Appellees’ conditional guilty pleas, the Commonwealth filed the following motion:
Pursuant to RCr 9.78, the Commonwealth moves that the Court enter the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Motion to Suppress, filed with this motion.
In support of this motion, the Commonwealth states that the Court has denied the defendants’ motion to suppress. The defendants have now pled guilty, under the condition that they be permitted to appeal the Court’s denial of their motion to suppress. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law have not been entered setting forth the Court’s reasons for its decision.
So moved this 8th day of September, 1999.
Criminal Rule 9.78 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
If ... a defendant moves to suppress, ... the fruits of a search, the trial court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing ... and at the conclusion thereof shall enter into the record findings resolving the essential issues of fact raised by the motion ... and necessary to support the ruling. If supported by substantial evidence the factual findings of the trial court shall be conclusive.
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 564 S.W.2d 24, 28 (1978), holds that RCr 9.78 requires the trial court to make findings of fact supporting its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence of a confession or other incriminating statements or evidence of fruits of a search. The trial judge is in the best position to determine the credibility and sufficiency of the evidence and an appellate court is bound by the findings of fact of the trial judge unless there is a clear error or abuse of discretion.
Meaningful appellate review is impeded in this case because the trial court did not enter findings of fact. Without a reasoned explanation, neither the parties nor this Court knows the rationale for the court’s ruling. Consequently, should the trial court find and conclude that exigent circumstances existed, this matter should be affirmed as a matter of law.
I am of the opinion that the frenzied destruction of marijuana cultivation paraphernalia, plainly observed by sheriffs deputies from a public sidewalk, created a exigency of sufficient magnitude to justify the warrantless entry into Appellees’ home. Warrantless entry is justified when police must act “now or never” to preserve evidence of criminal activity. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 93 S.Ct. 2796, 37 L.Ed.2d 757 (1973). Exigent circumstances may occur which ex*180cuse the warrant requirement when the physical destruction of incriminating evidence is imminent. Cormney v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 943 S.W.2d 629 (1996).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that in order to temporarily dispense with the warrant requirement police officers must show “a reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling” as well as an “objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the loss or destruction of evidence is imminent.” United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1512 (6th Cir.1988). Furthermore, in evaluating police claims of exigent circumstances, courts must “consider the totality of the circumstances, as well as the ‘inherent necessities of the situation at the time.’ ” Id. at 1512, quoting United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833, 94 S.Ct. 173, 38 L.Ed.2d 68 (1973).
Police officers, due to their training and experience, may legitimately perceive criminality in objects or conduct that would appear innocent in the perspective of an untrained layman. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). See also Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982). Deputy Sheriff Hayden immediately recognized that the grow light, pots, and trays inside Appellees’ home were likely associated with the cultivation of marijuana. That insight, augmented by the tip as well as by McManus’ apparent destruction of evidence following the “knock and talk,” properly led Deputy Hayden to conclude that exigent circumstances were present necessitating war-rantless entry.
In section IV of Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), Chief Justice Burger pointed out that seizures of premises are less likely to violate the Constitution than are searches, because seizures affect only pos-sessory interests rather than the more highly protected privacy interests. In Section IV of Segura, however, the Chief Justice was joined only by Justice O’Con-nor. In differentiating between searches and seizures, the Chief Justice opined:
[T]he heightened protection we accord privacy interests is simply not implicated where a seizure of the premises, not a search, is at issue. We hold, therefore, that securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents.
Id. at 810, 104 S.Ct. 3380 (emphasis in original).
The absence of a true exigency necessitating warrantless entry does not inexorably lead to the exclusion of evidence obtained in a subsequent search. If information sufficient to support a probable cause determination existed independent of any evidence discovered diming an illegal entry, evidence discovered later pursuant to a judicially sanctioned search warrant is not tainted. Segura, supra, (majority opinion, §§ I — III, V & VI). The tip received by the McCracken County Sheriffs Department, along with the observation of marijuana cultivation paraphernalia inside the McManus home, provided independent grounds upon which to base a search warrant. No evidence discovered in the warrantless entry was required in the probable cause determination, despite the fact that such evidence was included by Deputy Hayden in the warrant application.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits only searches that are unreasonable. Here, the police officers had reasonable belief of a crime being committed based not only on reliable information, but also on personal *181observation that there was indoor cultivation of marijuana. Delaying entry would have created a substantial risk that evidence would have been destroyed. These critical circumstances dictated that a seizure be executed immediately to preserve the status quo without the delay attendant to obtaining a warrant. This was an exigent circumstance because there was an immediate compelling need for official action and insufficient time to secure a warrant.
In United States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541, 545 (6th Cir.1980) cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 808 (1980), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit approved of the lower court’s deferential attitude toward law enforcement officers:
It is also to be noted in this regard that the case law is clear that the agents, in reaching a decision of the nature that they did here, need only have sufficient information to justify the warrantless entry to reasonably conclude that evidence would be destroyed or removed. A hindsight, Monday-morning quarterback position, which might show that in fact that was not about to happen, is not the standard by which their conduct is to be judged, but rather the situation as it appeared to them at the time.
The presence or absence of exigent circumstances involves a finding of fact which is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Richard, 994 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir.1993). In the absence of a full evidentiary hearing and findings of fact by the trial court, it is impossible for any reviewing court to determine the legality of the seizure. The trial court should make the requested findings of fact concerning exigent circumstances.
LAMBERT, C.J., and WINTERSHEIMER, J., join this dissenting opinion.