Court Opinion

ID: 9716753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:50:10.538169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:48.099479
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: I respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill. App. 3d 799. As in Loyola, the majority in the instant cause ostensibly recognizes the plaintiff’s right to amend following summary judgment pursuant to section 2—1005(g) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2—1005(g)), but then eviscerates this right by imposing unprecedented and needlessly restrictive limitations on the circumstances in which the plaintiff’s right to amend will be permitted. The majority creates a broad rule that “motions to amend the pleadings which the movant could have anticipated should be made before the court reaches the summary judgment stage.” (198 Ill. App. 3d at 858.) (Emphasis added.) On this basis, the majority determines that the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s request to amend following summary judgment because the “plaintiff could have anticipated [her] amendments far earlier in the course of the litigation” and has “offered no justification for [not] proposing] her alternative theories at a more appropriate stage of the proceedings.” 198 Ill. App. 3d at 858-59. The majority’s ruling is contrary to Illinois precedent regarding requests to amend following summary judgment. (See Siebert v. Continental Oil Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 891, 515 N.E.2d 728; Ruff v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 811, 513 N.E.2d 7, relying upon Kupianen v. Graham (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 373, 377, 437 N.E.2d 774; see also Wingate v. Camelot Swim Club, Inc. (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 963.) As I stated in more detail in my dissent in Loyola, the decisions of Siebert v. Continental Oil Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 891, 515 N.E.2d 728, Ruff v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 811, 513 N.E.2d 7, and Kupianen v. Graham (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 373, 437 N.E.2d 774, are controlling authority that recognize the trial court’s power to permit amendments, following a final order of summary judgment, to add new causes of action or legal theories to those alleged in the plaintiff’s original pleading. Contrary to the arguments made by defendant on appeal, the courts of review in Siebert and Ruff did not limit the plaintiffs to amendments that conformed the pleadings to the proofs. The courts in Siebert and Ruff held that the plaintiffs should be permitted to allege new causes of action or legal theories on remand. Also, neither Seibert, Ruff, nor the plain language of section 2—1005(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure limits the opportunity to amend to instances where the court has entered only partial summary judgment. Consequently, I find defendant’s contentions on appeal insufficient ground to affirm the trial court’s ruling. According to Siebert, Ruff, and Kupianen, the trial court’s exercise of its discretion to allow amendment following summary judgment should be reviewed according to the following factors: “ ‘whether the proposed' amendment would cure the defective pleading [citation]; whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment [citations]; the timeliness of the proposed amendment [citation]; and whether previous opportunities to amend the pleadings could be identified. [Citation.]’ ” (Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 895, quoting Kupianen, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 377.) Application of this established standard to the case at bar reveals that the trial court should have allowed plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The facts of the instant case indicate that, upon consideration of these factors, the trial court should have allowed plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. Plaintiff’s suit against defendant sought recovery under the Animal Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 8, par. 366 et seq.) for personal injuries allegedly suffered by plaintiff when she was attacked by defendant’s horse. The trial court allowed defendant’s summary judgment motion because an Illinois Supreme Court decision filed after plaintiff’s suit was instituted necessitated the conclusion that plaintiff, as defendant’s employee, could not recover under the Animal Control Act. (See Harris v. Walker (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 542, 510 N.E.2d 917.) Plaintiff requested leave to file an amended complaint at the court’s hearing on defendant’s summary judgment motion, but the trial court denied plaintiff’s oral motion. Plaintiff thereafter filed a timely motion to vacate the summary judgment, supported by a motion for leave to file a proposed amended complaint in which plaintiff sought recovery based on common law negligence and fraud. The trial court denied these motions, and plaintiff appeals. The first element, i.e., whether the plaintiff’s amendments overcame the deficiency of her original pleading, favors the allowance of plaintiff’s motion to vacate summary judgment and permit the filing of her amended complaint. Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint cures the defects in plaintiff’s original pleading under the Animal Control Act, which was deficient because plaintiff, as defendant’s employee, could not recover under that act. The proposed amended complaint is sufficient to state a claim for common law negligence and fraud notwithstanding plaintiff’s status as defendant’s employee. See, e.g., HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 145, 165, 545 N.E.2d 672 (elements of fraud); Forsyth v. Dugger (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 362, 367, 523 N.E.2d 704 (elements of common law negligence action based upon injury caused by animal). The remaining factors also favor allowance of plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The record shows that plaintiff promptly sought leave to amend at the court’s summary judgment hearing. The record also indicates that plaintiff had not previously sought leave to amend her complaint. Permitting the motion to amend would not be unfairly prejudicial to defendant, who was actively involved in the litigation since its inception. The court in Siebert reasoned that “ ‘[n]o prejudice or surprise could have resulted to the other parties since the case was still at the pleading stage. The proposed amendment was presented to the trial court at the time the motion to vacate was heard.’ ” (Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 896, quoting Kupianen, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 377.) The case at bar was also at the pleading stage, and, as in Siebert, “[n]o prejudice or surprise could have resulted to the other parties.” (161 Ill. App. 3d at 896.) Also, in the case at bar, as in Siebert and Kupianen, “[djespite the plaintiff’s having had previous opportunities in the case sub judice to amend the complaint, the only just and reasonable approach now is to allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint.” (Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 896.) Based upon Siebert, Ruff, and Kupianen, and in order to do substantial justice between the parties, the trial court should have allowed plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. The majority fails to apply the Kupianen factors to the case at bar. In place of the Kupianen factors, the majority creates a new, broad rule that “motions to amend the pleadings which the movant could have anticipated should be made before the court reaches the summary judgment stage.” (198 Ill. App. 3d at 858.) On this basis, the majority determines that the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s request to amend following summary judgment because the “plaintiff could have anticipated these amendments far earlier in the course of the litigation” and has “offered no justification for [not] proposing] her alternative theories at a more appropriate stage of the proceedings.” (198 Ill. App. 3d at 858-59.) Thus, the majority relies exclusively upon the factor which the court in Siebert, Ruff, and Kupianen found least significant and readily excused, i.e., whether the plaintiff had prior opportunities to amend the complaint. As I stated in greater detail in my dissent in Loyola, I find neither logic nor wisdom in the majority’s ruling. Also, as noted above, the parties in the case at bar were still at the pleading stage when plaintiff presented her request to file an amended complaint alleging, not new facts, but different legal theories. The parties have acknowledged that little, if any, additional discovery would be required if plaintiff’s motion to amend were allowed. The prejudice to plaintiff is apparent in the court’s refusal to allow plaintiff to file her first amended complaint, but I fail to see how defendant would be prejudiced by the allowance of the motion to file plaintiff’s first amended complaint, particularly since the parties were still before the court with arguments relating to the pleadings. For these reasons, and those stated in my dissent in Loyola, I disagree with the majority’s refusal to apply the factors set forth in Kupianen, and the majority’s determination that the trial court properly denied plaintiff leave to amend its complaint following summary judgment.