Court Opinion

ID: 9579562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:13.242051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:35.433929
License: Public Domain

McGRAW, Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s substitution of its view of what constitutes sufficient resistance and serious bodily injury for that of the jurors who had the benefit of observing the demeanor of the parties involved. The victim, who was fifteen years old, plied with alcohol and marijuana, in an unfamiliar, and perhaps hostile, environment, was suddenly sodomized in the middle of the night by the appellant, who was more than twice the victim’s age. Although the victim’s protests thwarted an initial attack, unfortunately, the appellant persisted until his efforts succeeded. The majority, in my view, fails to take into account the psychological setting in which these events took place. First, the age difference between the victim and both the appellant and his hosts placed the victim at a psychological disadvantage. Second, provision and consumption of alcohol and marijuana both diminished the victim’s volition and could have created a sense of false trust between the parties concerned. Third, the attack occurred in the middle of the night, when the victim’s weariness, exacerbated perhaps by the alcohol and marijuana, would have diminished his capacity to resist. Finally, the victim could well have perceived his hosts’ condonation of the appellant’s activities given their proximity and their apparently friendly relationship with the appellant, and could have *279believed that they would come to the appellant’s aid if he had protested too vociferously. Presumably, the jury weighed these factors in determining that the “forcible compulsion” element of first degree sexual assault had been met. Although the majority states that it “understands that the victim of a sodomy assault may be so petrified by his attacker that he is struck dumb with terror during a sexual assault and therefore meekly submits,” maj.op. at 277, it penalizes the unfortunate victim for failing to “plead with the appellant” or “try to escape from the appellant,” id. Furthermore, to find that severe constipation, chronic back pain, protruding vertebra, diminished intellectual performance, and loss of appetite does not constitute “serious bodily injury” as defined under West Virginia Code 61-8B-1(9) (1984 Replacement Vol.) is ludicrous. For example, in State v. McKee, 312 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Iowa 1981), the Iowa Supreme Court held that a sexual abuse victim’s “menstrual cramping and irregularity [which] had persisted for approximately five months” was alone sufficient to constitute “serious bodily injury” for purposes of a first degree sexual abuse conviction.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to say that Justice McHUGH joins me in this dissent.