Court Opinion

ID: 9827387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:29:04.277043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:30.038096
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We again call attention to the fact that the receiver had been placed in possession of the débris from the storm and that he alone had the right, if any existed, of suing for the possession of the property in the hands of appellee. He did not seek to intervene in the suit and was never granted the authority to intervene. His name in some unaccountable way got into the supplemental petition filed by appellants and in some undisclosed manner was dropped from the suit, and no mention is made of him in the judgment. Intervention is the admission, by leave of the court, of a person not an original party, into pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes 'a party thereto for the protection of some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings. There was no allegation in the pleadings of appellants that Gibson had ever been appointed receiver, although that omission was graciously supplied by appellee, who alleged that he had been appointed receiver and had duly qualified as such. The general and special exceptions of appellee were sustained as to the original petition, which, of course, did not mention a receiver who when it was filed was not in existence. The supplemental petition nor the receiver is mentioned in the judgment except in so far as it is stated that the receiver gave notice of appeal.
However, appellee in his cross-action fully recognizes the right of the receiver to appear in the suit, and prays for judgment against him as to the title to the property held by him and as to damages. The cross-action was in effect an original suit to try the rights of property in the débris on the lots of ap-pellees, which property they allege the receiver was about to seize and appropriate. While adhering to our original opinion, we think the cause should be reversed as to the cross-action alone and the right to the property be tried as between appellees and the receiver,, and it is accordingly so ordered. The appelT lants Oatman, and Helscher have no standing-in this case, and the judgment of affirmance as to them and all the appellees except Bullard will be adhered to; but-the judgment as between the receiver and appellee Bullard will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a trial between the receiver and Bullard as to. the ownership of the property held by Bul-lard. The costs will be assessed against, appellants.