Court Opinion

ID: 9732649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:29:50.949579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:27.368548
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: February 28,1984 Notice of predecision memorandum on review. March 12,1984 Petition for Certiorari filed. April 3, 1984 Industrial Commission decision issued. The employee concedes that she filed the writ of certiorari prematurely, before the entry of the order affirming the arbitrator. The supreme court has consistently held that the requirement that a petitioner in a worker’s compensation proceeding file for writ of certiorari within 20 days of receipt of the notice of decision of the Commission is a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court to review that decision and may be satisfied only by literal compliance with the statute. Boalbey v. Industrial Com. (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 217, 362 N.E.2d 286; International Harvester v. Industrial Com. (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 180, 374 N.E.2d 182. On February 28,1984, the Industrial Commission issued: “NOTICE OF PREDECISION MEMORANDUM ON REVIEW AND NOTICE OF CONSTRUCTIVE WAIVER OF CERTAIN RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 19(e) OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT.” The notice stated: “The Commission will issue a decision in this case as set forth below. At the written request of any party hereto within 20 days from the date of this notice, with proof of service on all parties, the Commission will issue a decision setting forth in writing the reasons for the decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. Failure of all parties to request such a decision within the specified time shall be deemed a waiver of the requirement for such a decision pursuant to Section 19(e) of the Workers’ Compensation Act acceptance of a summary decision (omitting specific findings of fact and conclusions of law) order as the decision of the Commission. Such a decision in this case will thereafter be signed by the Commission, dated and filed, and copies will be sent to the parties as provided by law. The time for filing a Writ of Certiorari or Petition Under Section 19(h) shall commence upon receipt of the decision of the Commission and not from receipt of the Notice of Predecision Memorandum.” To allow the petitioner’s premature filing to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court is not only contrary to our supreme court’s rulings but would affect the orderly process by which decisions of the Commission are filed. The problems that will follow if we find the petition was properly filed and timely filed are numerous. Petitioner in her application for the writ made the false representation that the Commission had determined that the probable cost was $175 and tendered a check in that amount. The order of the Commission affirming the decision of the arbitrator which was subsequently entered stated that the probable cost of the record was $35. While, in this case, the petitioner overestimated the amount, there is no guarantee that a subsequent appellant would not underestimate the cost and thereby run afoul of the rule that states that there is no subject matter jurisdiction if the probable cost of the record has not been paid. Miller v. Industrial Com. (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 291, 464 N.E.2d 718. The majority ignores the provision of section 19(e) which provides in part: “Any party may, within 20 days after receipt of notice of the Commission’s decision, or within such further time, not exceeding 30 days, as the Commission may grant, file with the Commission either an agreed statement of the facts appearing upon the hearing, or, if such party shall so elect, a correct transcript of evidence of the additional proceedings presented before the Commission.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 172.54. The above subsection requires the Commission to give 20 days’ notice of the decision, which they did do in this case. The notice gives the party certain rights to attack the decision to be entered. Included is the Commission’s prerogative to grant an additional 30 days, within which to file an agreed statement of facts or a correct transcript. The majority decision ignores this statutory provision. The timetable, according to sections 19(e) and 19(f), with certain exceptions not applicable here, would be: 1. Twenty-day notice of decision — Commission could grant further time not exceeding 30 days. 2. Decision entered. 3. Twenty days to appeal. It would be inconsistent to say that the predecision order sent out by the Commission is the final order when it grants 20 days and a possible 30-day extension of time to take further action. Under the facts of this case the majority sets the time period for filing a writ at 55 days (February 29,1984, to April 23,1984). The majority’s decision is simply contrary to precedent and will create havoc at the Commission level. The judgment of the circuit court should be vacated; the writ was improperly issued and the circuit court was without jurisdiction to review the decision of the Industrial Commission.