Court Opinion

ID: 9640288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:02:26.487459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:26.892582
License: Public Domain

Jim Hannah, Justice, concurring. I concur with the majority’s holding that the appellant’s convictions should be affirmed, but I write to address the trial court’s admission of testimony and photographs depicting the appellant’s home. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony and photographs because they were irrelevant. This was not reversible error. The basic question of the admissibility of evidence is relevancy. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Ark. R. Evid. 401. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Ark. R. Evid. 402. The majority states that “[t]he challenged evidence was relevant to establish that appellant had a complete disregard for the well-being of his children.” The appellant was not charged with having a complete disregard for the well-being of his children; rather, the appellant was charged with rape and accomplice to rape. The majority further states that the reasoning outlined in Lindsey v. State, 319 Ark. 132, 890 S.W.2d 584 (1994), applies to the present case. I must point out that Lindsey was a plurality opinion; thus, it has no precedential value. The record indicates that the appellant objected to the admission of the photographs, identified as State’s exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, arguing that they were not relevant, and that they were highly prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objection, stating: The Court: . . . The Court’s under the opinion that they are relevant to the issue that’s involved in this case, and they show the conditions of the trailer in which the children resided, and for that purpose alone, are relevant. The issues involved in this case were whether the appellant had committed the crimes of rape and accomplice to rape. Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, depicted the outside of the appellant’s trailer; these exhibits are not relevant evidence. Nothing depicted in exhibits 2, 3, and 4, make it more or less probable that the appellant committed the crimes for which he was charged. Exhibits 5 and 9, depicted the conditions inside the trailer. While the testimony and photographs illustrated the deplorable conditions in which the children lived, they do not show that it was more or less probable that the appellant committed the crimes for which he was charged. The testimony and photographs clearly evinced parental neglect, but the appellant was not on trial for neglect. Rather, the appellant was on trial for rape, based upon his own conduct, and for rape, based upon his accomplice liability. At the time the appellant committed the crime, a person committed rape if he engaged in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person who was less than fourteen years old. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(4) (Repl. 1997) (superseded). At that time, “deviate sexual activity” was defined as “any act of sexual gratification involving” either “[t]he penetration, however slight, of the anus or mouth of one person by the penis of another person; or [t]he penetration, however slight, of the labia majora or anus of one person by any body member or foreign instrument manipulated by another person.” Ark. Code Ann. 5-14-101 (A)(B) (Repl. 1997) (superseded). The photographs and testimony describing the interior and exterior of the appellant’s trailer were not relevant evidence to prove any of the elements of rape. A person is an accomplice of another person if, “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, he [s]olicits, advises, encourages, or coerces the other person to commit it; or [a]ids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it. ...” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403(a)(l)-(2) (Repl. 1997). The photographs and testimony describing the appellant’s trailer were not relevant evidence to prove that the appellant was an accomplice to rape. The appellant requested that exhibits 6 and 7, the photographs of posters depicting nude women, and exhibit 8, the photograph of the poster depicting a partially nude woman, be “readapted.” He renewed his objection that exhibits 6, 7, and 8, were irrelevant, and that the admission of those photographs would be highly prejudicial. The trial court again overruled the objection, stating: The Court: ... I think that the photographs — if you had to prove motive, and it might go to — to show the conditions, the circumstances, and' — -and at the very least, might indicate a motive, on the part of the Defendant, to commit the crime of rape of the children. The appellant questioned how the photographs of posters depicting nude women would prove motive, and the court replied: The Court: Well, it’s just some evidence of the conditions, the environment, and I think it’s appropriate, for that purpose. * * * LeAnn Varnaman testified that exhibits 6 and 7 depicted posters of nude women, and she testified that exhibit 8 depicted a woman sitting on a motorcycle and wearing short shorts and an open jacket. Varnaman further testified that the posters depicted in exhibits 6, 7, and 8, were hanging on walls in the appellant’s trailer. Varnaman agreed with the State’s characterization of exhibit 8 as being “somewhat inappropriate.” The photographs depicting nude women and a partially nude woman, and the testimony explaining that the posters were located in a residence which was a home to young children, illustrate the appellant’s inappropriate behavior and poor taste. However, the testimony and photographs do not show that it is more or less probable that the appellant committed the crimes for which he was charged, nor does it, by any stretch, prove motive. The testimony and photographs were not used to prove that the appellant committed the crimes for which he was charged, but to inflame the minds of the jurors. Photographs which serve no valid purpose and are used only to inflame the jury’s passions should be excluded. Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986). In addition to being irrelevant, the testimony and photographs had no probative value and were prejudicial to the appellant; therefore, they should have been excluded. I also write to address the appellant’s failure to include the photographs in the Addendum to his brief. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that an examination of the photographs was not necessary for our consideration of the issue regarding the admission of the photographs. Rule 4-3 (g) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court addresses an appellant’s duty to abstract the record. Rule 4-3(g) states: In all felony cases it is the duty of the appellant, whether represented by retained counsel, appointed counsel or a public defender, or acting pro se, to abstract such parts of the transcript and to include in the Addendum such parts of the record, but only such parts, as are material to the points to be argued in the appellant’s brief. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(g) (2002) (emphasis added). Clearly, when a point on appeal involves the admission of photographs, the photographs are material and should be included in the Addendum. While I believe that the appellant had a duty to include the photographs in the Addendum, I do not believe that the Addendum is so deficient that it requires the appellant to cure the deficiency, pursuant to Rule 4-2 (b)(3) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court. Although the photographs are not included in the appellant’s Addendum, they are included in the record. This court will not examine the record to reverse a trial court, but we may examine the record to affirm. See McGehee v. State, 344 Ark. 602, 43 S.W.3d 125 (2001). I believe that it is appropriate to go to the record to affirm the present case. Finally, I must point out that the quoted portion of the appellant’s brief, which the majority included in a footnote, contains an incorrect characterization of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court, as well as an incorrect citation. In his brief, the appellant stated: The Rules of Appellate Procedure require, unless waived by the court upon motion, that the Appellant reproduce a photograph and attach it to the abstract whenever that photograph must be examined for a clear understanding of the testimony. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4 — 2(a)(6); Bunn v. State, 320 Ark. 516, 898 S.W.2d 450 (1995). It is the Appellant’s contention that this is unnecessary in the case at bar as the photographs were throughly described in the transcript and depicted none of the elements related to the charge, but were solely put into evidence to prove that the Appellant was a poor housekeeper and had unconventional tastes in decor by having a framed picture of a nude woman in a home where children lived. The appellant refers to a rule of “Appellate Procedure,” when he cites to a Rule of the Arkansas Supreme Court. Also, the appellant cites to Rule 4-2(a)(6), indicating that the rule is applicable to including photographs in the abstract. The appellant is mistaken. Rule 4-2(a)(6) explains the requirements for the statement of the case section of appellate briefs. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(6) (2002). Nothing in Rule 4-2(a)(6) pertains to photographs. I point out the error contained in the appellant’s brief because the majority, after citing this portion of the appellant’s brief, concludes that the “[ajppellant’s contention is well-taken.” I raise this issue in the event the majority’s statement that the “ [appellant's contention is well-taken” might be construed as the majority’s agreement with the appellant’s assertion that Rule 4-2(a)(6) is the applicable law. 4-2(a)(6), the rule regarding the statement of the case, is immaterial to the points argued in the present case. While I believe there was trial error in admitting the testimony and photographs, I do not believe there is reversible error. The evidence of guilt in this case was overwhelming. Testimony from the children and their mother, as well as testimony from the doctor who examined M.C., was more than enough evidence to support a guilty verdict on all charges. This court has stated in the past that when the .evidence of guilt is overwhelming, slight errors in the introduction of evidence do not constitute reversible error. Bledsoe v. State, 344 Ark. 86, 39 S.W.3d 760 (2001); Kidd v. State, 330 Ark. 479, 955 S.W.2d 505 (1997). In this case, I believe the error to be harmless and, accordingly, I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm.