Court Opinion

ID: 9720090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:15:17.202383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:31.566303
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring). I agree with Justice Dethmers’ reasons for holding that the circuit court’s judgment should be reversed, yet cannot concur with his cavalier dismissal of appellant’s “other claims of error.” Tie says, without further enlightenment: “Inasmuch as the case must be tried again, it may be helpful to note that we perceive no merit in plaintiff’s other claims of error.”
So far, in the foregoing posture of the case, the profession is not advised respecting the nature of *403appellant’s “other claims,” and other members of this Court are so far not informed as to Justice Dethmers’ reasons for rejection thereof. The void should be filled lest the counsel in this case be the only ones who know that we have or have not declared that “slight” contributory negligence bars recovery.
Appellant alleges error in the following instruction:
“If you find that the railroad was not guilty of negligence in this case which was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, you need not deliberate any further, you would then find for the defendant and your verdict would be no cause for action. If you do find the defendant guilty of such negligence, then you must determine whether or not the plaintiff was in any way guilty of any negligence which contributed to or was a proximate cause of her injuries. If she was guilty of such negligence, however slight, she is not entitled to recover and in that instance your verdict would also be no cause for action.”
Appellant asserts, quite correctly, that “slight” negligence does not authorize recovery when—in a case of tort not arising from contractual relations— such negligence is charged against a defendant; also that it does not bar recovery when charged as contributory in such a case. The concluding sentence of the quoted instruction was accordingly erroneous and should not be repeated on retrial in case contributory negligence again becomes an issue for jury consideration. “Slight negligence is never actionable” (People v. Campbell, 237 Mich 424, 429), and negligence which is not actionable at suit of one injured thereby cannot be contributory. For recent consideration of the subject and specification of reasons for outlawing such argumentative instructions, see Busch v. Lilly, 257 Minn 343 (101 NW2d 199). And see recent rejection of the alleged distinction *404between “mere” negligence and actionable negligence. Schattilly v. Yonker, 347 Mich 660, 669.
The right standard to be applied here is simply that of ordinary care in the circumstances of action or omission of action, and that standard is the one by which the law measures the conduct of both plaintiff and defendant in a case like this when the one charges actionable negligence and the other charges contributory negligence.
What was said by Justice Campbell, for the unanimous Court in Michigan Central R. Co. v. Coleman, 28 Mich 440, 449 (4 Am Neg Cas 1), establishes the point:
“While recognizing to some extent the bearing of these principles some of the rulings below departed from them. The jury were told that carriers of passengers are ‘legally bound to exert the utmost care and skill in conveying their passengers, and are responsible for the slightest negligence or want of skillfulness either in themselves or their servants.’ ‘That the law is, that common carriers of passengers are bound to the utmost care and skill in the performance of their duty. That the degree of responsibility to which carriers of passengers are subjected is not ordinary care, which will make them liable for ordinary neglect, but extraordinary care which renders them liable for slight neglect. It is the danger to the public which may proceed even from slight faults, unskillfulness or negligence of passenger carriers or their servants, and the helplessness in which passengers by their conveyances are, which make this duty of extraordinary care a legal one.’
“The language used would fairly permit the jury to find anything to be negligence which could by any possibility be avoided. But negligence is neither more nor less than a failure of duty.”
The presented question may be tested easily by assuming that plaintiff rather than defendant had recovered below, and by assuming further that the *405trial judge had instructed the jury that “slight” negligence on the part of the defendant railroad would, if causal, require a verdict of liability in the absence of contributory negligence. Would not the railroad then be in rightful position to complain of reversible error? The Michigan Central Case above answers directly.
The fact is that the trial judge, by explicit instruction, held the defendant railroad to the ordinary (and proper) measure of duty, but, upon turning to the plaintiff’s duty, held her on penalty of barred recovery to a standard of great or extraordinary care (for definitions, see 45 CJ, Negligence, § 34, p 666; 65 CJS Negligence, § 8-B, p 370).* This was unfair as well as reversibly erroneous.
Appellant’s next’ point is that the question of contributory negligence was not properly in the case at all; that the defendant railroad failed to carry its burden in such regard, and that the question should not have been submitted for jury consideration. There may be merit in the point, since it is not clear that plaintiff owed any duty—self-protective or otherwise—to act other than she did on the occasion. I would not determine the point now, however, since the parties agreed, after the jury had retired for deliberation:
“Whereupon the counsel for each party stipulated that the charge was agreed upon with plaintiff’s ex*406ception as to the contributory negligence charge containing the phrase in ‘the slightest degree’.”
Appellant’s final point is that the jury’s verdict was and is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Here I agree with Justice Dethmers that such allegation is without merit. On this record a properly instructed, jury, well within its prerogative, could have returned a verdict for the defendant railroad as well as for the plaintiff.
Kavanagh, Souris, and Adams, JJ., concurred with Black, J.

 Prosser defines (Prosser on Torts [2d ed], pp 149, 150):
“Slight Negligence. This has been defined as ‘an absence of that degree of care and vigilanee which persons of extraordinary prudence and foresight are aeeustomed to use/ or in other words, a failure to exercise great care. It is said, therefore, not to be the same thing as a slight want of ordinary care, which is merely ordinary negligence. It finds its chief application in eases, such as those of bailments for hire or of carriers injuring passengers, where there is an obligation to use great care, and it results in liability where lack of ordinary care would not. But the term also has been used in a very general comparative sense, as contrasted with gross negligence, where the comparative negligence rule is applied.” ■ •