Court Opinion

ID: 9897411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:13.725519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:52.793577
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          May 04 2023, 9:38 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Neal F. Eggeson, Jr.                                       A. Richard M. Blaiklock
Eggeson Privacy Law                                        Wade D. Fulford
Fishers, Indiana                                           Lewis Wagner, LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kristyn R. Plummer and Angela                              May 4, 2023
M. Stillabower,                                            Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Claimants,                                      22A-CT-2559
                                                           Appeal from the Marion Superior
        v.                                                 Court
                                                           The Honorable Cynthia Ayers,
Amy L. Beard, Commissioner of                              Judge
the Indiana Department of                                  Trial Court Cause No.
Insurance,                                                 49D04-2104-CT-011760
Appellee-Respondent

                                  Opinion by Judge May
                           Judges Crone and Weissmann concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023                               Page 1 of 24
[1]   Kristyn R. Plummer and Angela M. Stillabower (collectively, “Appellants”)

      appeal the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Amy L.

      Beard, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of

      Insurance, which administers the Indiana Patient Compensation Fund

      (collectively, “the Fund”). 1 Appellants raise several issues, which we

      consolidate, revise, and restate as:

               1.     Whether Appellants’ claim against Columbus Regional
               Hospital (“CRH”) falls under Community Hospital v. McKenzie,
               185 N.E.3d 368 (Ind. 2022), such that it sounds in ordinary
               negligence rather than medical malpractice;

               2.     Whether, if McKenzie controls, it should be applied
               retroactively to Appellants’ claim; and

               3.    Whether, if McKenzie controls, the Fund has statutory
               authority to challenge Appellants’ right to access the Fund after
               Appellants reached a settlement with CRH.

      We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History

      1
       During the timeframe relevant herein, our legislature had limited the amount a patient could recover for an
      act of malpractice to $1,250,000. Ind. Code § 34-18-14-3(a)(3). The liability of a qualified health care
      provider was limited to the first $250,000 in damages. Ind. Code § 34-18-14-3(b). If a plaintiff settled with a
      qualified health care provider for an amount greater than $250,000, the plaintiff could petition to receive the
      excess damages from the Fund. Ind. Code § 34-18-15-3.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023                                    Page 2 of 24
[2]   Each of the Appellants lives in Columbus, Indiana. Plummer’s husband is

      Michael Cool, and Cool’s ex-wife is Lindsay R. Johnson-Heck. Johnson-Heck

      is currently married to Stephen Heck, and Heck shares a son from a prior

      relationship with Stillabower.

[3]   From 1993 until 2006, Johnson-Heck worked as a registered nurse at CRH. In

      April 2012, Johnson-Heck returned to CRH as an employee of Emergency

      Physicians, Inc. of Columbus (“EPIC”), the exclusive provider of emergency

      department services at CRH. In 2014 Johnson-Heck began working for

      Southern Indiana ENT (“SIENT”). During all relevant times, CRH gave

      Johnson-Heck clinical privileges. Between January 2014 and June 2015,

      Johnson-Heck allegedly used her CRH-granted privileges to access medical

      records of twenty-three individuals who were not her patients. She accessed

      Plummer’s records on May 2, 2014, and Stillabower’s records on June 3, 2014;

      July 16, 2014; August 5, 2014; and June 20, 2015.

[4]   Stillabower and Heck (Johnson-Heck’s then current husband) were embroiled

      in a custody/visitation disagreement when Johnson-Heck and Heck via text

      message and emails revealed to Stillabower that they knew some of

      Stillabower’s personal medical information. Stillabower contacted CRH to

      voice her suspicion that someone had accessed her protected health

      information. CRH’s investigation revealed Johnson-Heck’s access to

      Stillabower’s records as early as June 29, 2016, but CRH did not notify

      Stillabower of the nature and extent of the breach until early October 2016. In

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023           Page 3 of 24
      early October 2016, Plummer received a letter from CRH notifying her about

      Johnson-Heck’s unauthorized access into her medical records. 2

[5]   On April 25, 2017, Appellants filed a Proposed Complaint with the Indiana

      Department of Insurance against CRH and Johnson-Heck alleging they

      “breached their statutory and common law duties of confidentiality and

      privacy” and Appellants had suffered damages as a result. (App. Vol. III at 11.)

      The matter was submitted to a medical review panel, which issued its opinion

      on September 11, 2019:

                 The panel is of the unanimous opinion that the evidence does not
                 support the conclusion that defendant [CRH] failed to meet the
                 applicable standard of care, and therefore, its conduct
                 complained of was not a factor of any resultant damages.

                 The panel is of unanimous opinion that the evidence supports the
                 conclusion that defendant [Johnson-Heck] failed to comply with
                 the appropriate standard of care, but the panel is unable to
                 determine from the evidence whether her conduct was or was not
                 a factor of the resultant damages.

      (App. Vol. II at 220.) Appellants then filed an amended complaint that alleged

      CRH was vicariously liable for Johnson-Heck’s breach of their privacy, CRH

      was liable for negligent training and supervision of Johnson-Heck, CRH was

      liable for its own inadequate protection of confidential patient information,

      Johnson-Heck was liable for “negligence, breach of professional duty, invasion

      2
          Johnson-Heck allegedly shared Plummer’s personal medical information with Cool in 2015.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023                               Page 4 of 24
      of privacy by intrusion, invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts,

      intentional infliction of emotional distress, [and] negligent infliction of

      emotional distress[.]” (App. Vol. III at 19) (capitalization removed).

[6]   On April 5, 2021, CRH and Appellants entered into a Mediation Agreement

      and Settlement Agreement. The Mediation Agreement stated that it was “not

      contingent on [Fund] access or further recovery,” (id. at 28), such that Plummer

      and Stillabower acknowledged the potential they might not recover any

      payment from the Fund. As part of the Settlement Agreement, CRH (and/or

      its insurers) agreed to pay (1) $107,001.00 to counsel; (2) $71,499.50 to

      Stillabower, and (3) $71,499.50 to Plummer. Neither individual received a total

      of $250,000, but the total payout from CRH was $250,000.

[7]   On April 7, 2021, Appellants filed their Petition for Payment of Damages from

      the Fund in the Marion Superior Court, alleging they were “separate,

      independent, non-derivative victims of a single act of malpractice[.]” (App. Vol.

      II at 26.) On April 18, 2022, Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment

      that argued the facts of this case fall within the Medical Malpractice Act

      (“MMA”). The Fund responded to Appellants’ motion to dispute the claim fell

      under the MMA and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment contending

      Appellants failed to recover the statutorily-required amounts to obtain monies

      from the Fund.

[8]   After a hearing, the trial court determined, in reliance on Community Health

      Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368 (Ind. 2022), “that unauthorized

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023               Page 5 of 24
      access to confidential medical records by a person, not directly related to

      medical care and treatment of the complainant, is not covered by the MMA and

      that setting policy for medical records access is an internal non-medical

      treatment provider’s business decision.” (App. Vol. II at 20.) The trial court

      also noted the MMA “allows for one recovery for each distinct act of

      malpractice that results in a distinct injury, even if multiple acts of malpractice

      occur in the same procedure.” (Id. at 21) (quoting Walen v. Hossler, 130 N.E.3d

      138, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)). Because the evidence revealed Johnson-Heck

      did not access Appellants’ records on the same date, the trial court concluded in

      the alternative that Johnson-Heck committed separate acts of malpractice for

      which an individual recovery of $250,000.00 must be made prior to money

      from the Fund becoming available. (Id. at 22.) The trial court denied

      Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the Fund’s Motion for

      Summary Judgment.

      Discussion and Decision
[9]   “‘When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment we

      stand in the shoes of the trial court.’” Supervised Estate of Kent, 99 N.E.3d 634,

      637 (Ind. 2018) (quoting City of Lawrence Utils. Serv. Bd. v. Curry, 68 N.E.3d 581,

      585 (Ind. 2017)). Summary judgment should be granted “if the designated

      evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

      and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind.

      Trial Rule 56(C).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023            Page 6 of 24
               The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
               making a prima facie showing that there is no issue of material
               fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
               burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence
               of a genuine issue.

       Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020). “A fact is ‘material’ if its

       resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a

       trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if

       the undisputed facts support conflicting reasonable inferences[.]” Williams v.

       Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (citations omitted). Any doubts about

       the facts, or the inferences to be drawn from the facts, are resolved in favor of

       the non-moving party. Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 851. Where the challenge to

       summary judgment raises questions of law, we review them de novo. Rogers v.

       Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 320 (Ind. 2016).

[10]   Findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court aid our review,

       but they do not bind us. Supervised Estate of Kent, 99 N.E.3d at 637. Nor is our

       standard of review or analysis altered by the parties’ filing of cross-motions for

       summary judgment – we simply “‘consider each motion separately to determine

       whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Erie

       Indemnity Co. v. Estate of Harris, 99 N.E.3d 625, 629 (Ind. 2018) (quoting SCI

       Propane, LLC v. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d 675, 677 (Ind. 2015)). The party appealing

       the trial court’s decision has the burden to convince us the trial court erred, but

       we scrutinize the trial court’s decision carefully to make sure a party was not

       improperly denied its day in court. Ryan v. TCI Architects, 72 N.E.3d 908, 913

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023               Page 7 of 24
       (Ind. 2017). Indiana “consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases

       proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious

       claims.” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 2014).

[11]   Not all claims by patients against healthcare providers fit within the MMA, nor

       is the MMA intended to encompass cases of ordinary negligence. Doe v. Ind.

       Dept. of Insurance, 194 N.E.3d 1197, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Instead, the

       MMA covers only “curative or salutary conduct of a health care provider acting

       within his or her professional capacity” and “not conduct unrelated to the

       promotion of a patient’s health or the provider’s exercise of professional

       expertise, skill, or judgment.” Id. (quoting Howard Reg’l Health Sys. v. Gordon,

       952 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ind. 2011)).

               The fact that the alleged misconduct occurred in a healthcare
               facility, or that the injured party was a patient at the facility, is
               not dispositive of whether the MMA applies. Instead we must
               look to the substance of the claim and determine whether it is
               based on the provider’s behavior or practices while acting in his
               or her professional capacity as a provider of medical services.
               We have explained:

                        A case sounds in ordinary negligence where the factual
                        issues are capable of resolution by a jury without
                        application of the standard of care prevalent in the local
                        medical community. By contrast, a claim falls under the
                        MMA where there is a causal connection between the
                        conduct complained of and the nature of the patient-health
                        care provider relationship.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023                 Page 8 of 24
               Thus, “acts or omissions of a health care provider unrelated or
               outside the provider’s role as a health care professional” are
               outside the reach of the MMA.

               “In sum, the appropriate analysis involves first, the nature of the
               conduct alleged in the complaint – whether or not the alleged
               negligence involves provision of medical services – and, second,
               whether the rendering of medical services is to the plaintiff for the
               plaintiff’s benefit.”

       Id. (internal citations and footnote omitted). Whether a case is ordinary

       negligence or medical malpractice that falls under the MMA is a “question for

       the court,” Rossner v. Take Care Health Sys., LLC, 172 N.E.3d 1248, 1255 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied, and as such it is “particularly suited for

       determination on summary judgment.” Doe, 194 N.E.3d at 1199.

       1. Does Appellants’ claim against CRH fall under McKenzie?
[12]   We begin our analysis with discussion of our Indiana Supreme Court’s decision

       in Community Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368 (Ind. 2022), on

       which the trial court relied when granting summary judgment to the Fund. In

       McKenzie, Katrina Gray, who worked for an orthopedic practice in the

       Community Health Network (“Community”), had been given access to

       Community’s confidential medical records system so that she could schedule

       appointments and release records for patients of the orthopedic practice. Id. at

       374. Gray also used that access to improperly browse the medical records of

       160 people who were not patients of the orthopedic practice. Id. Amongst

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023             Page 9 of 24
       those 160 people were seven members of the family of Heather McKenzie, with

       whom Gray had a “long-running family feud.” Id. at 373.

[13]   The McKenzie family members (collectively “the McKenzies”) filed a lawsuit

       against Community and Gray in Marion Superior Court. Id. at 374. Against

       Community, the McKenzies asserted claims of respondeat superior and

       negligent training, supervision, and retention, and against Gray, the McKenzies

       asserted claims of negligence and invasion of privacy. Community filed a

       motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in which Community

       asserted the McKenzies could not proceed in the trial court without first

       satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of Indiana’s MMA. 3 Id. The trial

       court denied Community’s motion to dismiss after finding the McKenzies did

       not need to satisfy the jurisdiction requirements of the MMA because the

       McKenzies “‘were not patients of the practice at which Gray worked’ and

       Gray’s alleged misconduct ‘did not involve providing medical treatment to

       them.’” Id. at 375 (quoting trial court order). The Court of Appeals affirmed

       the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss after concluding the McKenzies’

       claims did not fall under the MMA, and Community petitioned for transfer. Id.

       3
         Community also filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court denied that motion based on
       what it found to be genuine issues of material fact. Our Indiana Supreme Court held Community was
       entitled to summary judgment on all of the McKenzies’ claims for reasons not relevant to the issues before us
       in this appeal. See McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at 379 (negligence-based claims fail because damages for emotional
       injury are unavailable without physical injury satisfying modified impact rule or bystander rule) & 383
       (public disclosure of private facts claim fails because there was no evidence disclosure as to public or large
       number of people). As those issues are not relevant to the issues herein, we will not discuss the facts and
       analysis of those issues in any detail herein.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023                                  Page 10 of 24
[14]   Our Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to

       dismiss because “[t]he misconduct alleged does not constitute ‘malpractice[.]’”

       Id.

               Malpractice is a ‘tort or breach of contract based on health care
               or professional services that were provided or that should have
               been provided, by a healthcare provider, to a patient.’ I.C. § 34-
               18-2-18. This definition imposes four requirements, two of which
               are not challenged here — [the McKenzies] allege a ‘tort…by a
               health care provider,’ and [the McKenzies] are all ‘patient[s]’ of
               Community. See id. The contested issues are whether the
               tortious conduct was (1) based on ‘health care’ or ‘professional
               services’ (2) that were, or should have been, provided ‘to a
               patient.’ Id. Because neither requirement is met, we hold the
               MMA does not apply.

               To determine whether the conduct was based on ‘health care’ or
               ‘professional services,’ we look first to the definitions provided in
               the MMA. ‘Health care’ is ‘an act or treatment performed or
               furnished, or that should have been performed or furnished, by a
               health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the
               patient’s medical care, treatment, or confinement.’ Id. § -13
               (emphasis added). The statute’s focus on timing—requiring that
               the alleged tortious conduct (whether by omission or
               commission) occur ‘during’ a patient’s care, treatment, or
               confinement—imposes a temporal requirement that tethers the
               misconduct to patient care. See id. But here, neither [the
               McKenzies] nor Community have alleged or shown any such
               connection. And without this requisite temporal tie, the
               underlying actions are not ‘health care’ under the MMA.

               The remaining question is whether the unauthorized access of
               [the McKenzies’] medical records qualifies as a ‘professional
               service’ under the MMA. Unlike ‘health care,’ ‘professional

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023            Page 11 of 24
        service’ is not defined in the MMA. Community contends that
        its ‘maintenance of medical records, as well as its determination
        and utilization of the appropriate mechanisms, training
        protocols, and procedures for logging, auditing, monitoring,
        detecting, or otherwise securing access to patient records, are
        professional services.’ To be sure, Community uses professional
        judgment when it establishes protocols for creating, maintaining,
        and accessing patient information. But even if we assume that
        the mere exercise of professional judgment makes doing so a
        ‘professional service,’ Community’s relevant protocols and
        procedures could support a malpractice claim only if they were
        provided ‘to a patient.’ Id. § -18.

        Although this case presents a close call, on this record we
        conclude that Community’s internal business decisions and
        access protocols for medical records are not professional services
        provided to a patient. Community acts largely on its own behalf
        in developing and implementing its policies for safeguarding
        confidential patient health information. And those policies -
        which are directed inward to Community employees, not
        outward to its patients - are used to execute Community’s
        regulatory obligations and balance its business risks. Simply put,
        Community’s applicable protocols and procedures are neither
        conduct related ‘to the promotion of a patient’s health’ nor do
        they require ‘the provider’s exercise of professional expertise,
        skill, or judgment.’ Gordon, 952 N.E.2d at 185. Additionally
        relevant here, [the McKenzies] were not patients of any of the
        orthopedic providers for whom Gray was responsible for
        scheduling appointments and releasing medical records. Thus,
        Gray’s unauthorized access of [the McKenzies’] medical records
        was unrelated to any professional service executed on their behalf
        as Community’s patients.

        To summarize, the alleged misconduct does not fall under the
        MMA. It lacks a temporal connection to any care provided by
        Community to the Plaintiffs as patients. And it was also

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023         Page 12 of 24
               unrelated to either the promotion of a patient’s health or the
               provider’s exercise of professional expertise, skill, or judgment.

       McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at 376-77.

[15]   Appellants claim we should reach a different result herein because three factual

       differences make their circumstances distinguishable from McKenzie. We

       disagree, but we address each of Appellants’ assertions to further explain our

       reasoning.

[16]   First, Appellants assert that, in McKenzie, the tortfeasor worked for an

       orthopedic practice where none of the victims were patients, while herein

       Johnson-Heck worked for CRH where both Plummer and Stillabower were

       patients. However, while Johnson-Heck worked at CRH during the years in

       question and had clinical privileges at CRH, both Johnson-Heck and CRH

       indicated Johnson-Heck did not work for CRH during months when she

       accessed the medical records of Plummer and Stillabower. Instead, Johnson-

       Heck was employed by EPIC and SIENT. (See Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 54,

       60 (“At the time of each inappropriate access to Plaintiffs’ electronic health

       record, Johnson-Heck was an employee of either EPIC or SIENT[.]”); & 110

       n.1 (indicating Johnson-Heck was employed by EPIC and SIENT, which had

       relationships with CRH but were “separate entities from CRH”).) Accordingly,

       Johnson-Heck’s employment for a third-party provider who had been given

       access to the hospital’s records places her in precisely the same position as the

       tortfeasor in McKenzie.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023              Page 13 of 24
[17]   Moreover, Johnson-Heck’s legal submission to the Medical Review Panel

       admitted she “never provided care to either Plummer or Stillabower, nor did

       she ever have a practitioner-patient relationship with either of them.” (Id. at

       114.) Accordingly, her accessing of Appellants’ medical records “lacks a

       temporal connection to any care provided” by CRH to Appellants as patients.

       McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at 377. As such, her alleged misconduct cannot be

       construed as “‘health care’ under the MMA.” Id. at 376 (“without this requisite

       temporal tie, the underlying actions are not ‘health care’ under the MMA”).

[18]   Second, Appellants assert that, unlike in McKenzie, they “were being provided a

       service of ‘professional expertise, skill, or judgment’ when [Johnson-Heck]

       accessed their records[.]” (Appellants’ Br. at 24.) In support of this assertion,

       Appellants quote Johnson-Heck’s submission to the Medical Review Panel:

               Johnson-Heck denies that her access to the records of Plummer
               and Stillabower constituted misconduct. Nor was the access
               improper. HIPAA does allow for physicians, medical
               professionals, and hospitals to access patient information to
               ensure adequate and appropriate care is being provided and to
               evaluate the quality of care being provided.

       (Id. at 23 (citing App. Vol. II at 111).) However, if, as Appellants now assert,

       Johnson-Heck was providing them with a professional service permitted by

       HIPAA, then arguably CRH could not be liable for Johnson-Heck’s accessing

       of Appellants’ medical records. Not only would Appellants avoid application

       of McKenzie, but they ought also dismiss this action altogether. Moreover,

       while HIPAA might permit medical professionals and hospitals to access

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023          Page 14 of 24
       patient information to evaluate quality of care, there is nothing in the record

       before us to suggest Johnson-Heck had been given authorization to evaluate the

       quality of care provided to people who had never been her patients (and also

       happened to be married to Johnson-Heck’s ex-husband or to be the mother of a

       child with Johnson-Heck’s current husband). We decline to hold Appellants’

       case is distinguishable from McKenzie on this basis. See McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at

       376 (“Gray’s unauthorized access of Plaintiffs’ medical records was unrelated

       to any professional service executed on their behalf as Community’s patients.”).

[19]   Finally, Appellants note there was no medical review panel decision in

       McKenzie, while a unanimous medical review panel reached a determination

       regarding whether Johnson-Heck or CRH breached the appropriate standard of

       care. Appellants assert this “factor is of particular significance given that ‘[the

       Medical Review Panel is] empowered to determine whether its opinion is called

       for since the Act provides for no other body to make that determination.’”

       (Appellants’ Br. at 24.) 4 However, as noted above, whether facts state a claim

       for ordinary negligence or medical malpractice under the MMA is a “question

       for the court.” Rossner, 172 N.E.3d at 1255. Accordingly, we do not find

       4
         In support of this assertion, Appellants claimed to be quoting a concurring opinion from Judge Garrard in
       Guinn v. Light, 536 N.E.2d 546, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), reh’g denied, trans. granted. We remind counsel for
       Appellants that the granting of a petition to transfer by our Indiana Supreme Court vacates any opinion from
       the Court of Appeals unless the Supreme Court invokes one of the two exceptions provided in Appellate Rule
       58. As our Supreme Court did not invoke an exception in Guinn, see Guinn v. Light, 558 N.E.2d 821, 824 (Ind
       1990) (“We vacate the opinions of the Court of Appeals….”), there remained no Court of Appeals opinion
       for Appellants to cite in support of any legal assertion. See Appellate Rule 58 (“Upon the grant of transfer,
       the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the appeal and all issues as if originally filed in the Supreme
       Court.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023                                 Page 15 of 24
       compelling Appellants’ assertion that the existence of a medical review panel

       decision distinguishes this case from McKenzie.

[20]   For all these reasons, we reject Appellants’ attempts to avoid the application of

       McKenzie to the facts of their case. Johnson-Heck’s use of her CRH privileges to

       access medical records of Appellants, who were not her patients, “was

       unrelated to any professional service executed on their behalf as [CRH]

       patients.” See McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at 376. Moreover, to the extent CRH was

       exercising professional judgment when designing “protocols for creating,

       maintaining, and accessing patient information[,]” id., those professional

       services were not provided “to a patient.” See id. (holding Community’s

       professional judgments about policies around patient information systems were

       “directed inward to Community employees, not outward to its patients”).

       Appellants’ claim sounds in ordinary negligence rather than medical

       malpractice.

[21]   Nevertheless, Appellants urge us to allow them to avoid the application of

       McKenzie based on the timing of the McKenzie decision and the timing of the

       Fund’s challenge to their claim for excess damages. We address each of these

       additional arguments in turn.

       2.      Should McKenzie apply retroactively?
[22]   Appellants argue McKenzie should not be applied retroactively because

       “McKenzie charted a new course away from clear past precedent” on which the

       parties relied. (Appellant’s Br. at 20.) In Arrendale v. American Imaging & MRI,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023         Page 16 of 24
our Indiana Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the apparent agency

principles outlined in Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 152-53 (Ind.

1999), should be expanded to non-hospital medical facilities. One of the parties

therein – Marion Open MRI – asked that any expansion be made prospective

only. The Court said:

        We have observed that “[p]rospective application is an
        extraordinary measure[,]’ Lowe v. N. Ind. Comm. Transportation
        Dist., 177 N.E.3d 796, 800 (Ind. 2021), and “[a]ppellate court
        decisions routinely apply to the parties involved, and everyone
        else, even when addressing an unresolved point of law.” Ray-
        Hayes v. Heinamann, 768 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. 2002).
        Accordingly, we decline to apply today’s rule prospectively only,
        and apply it to Marion Open MRI.

Arrendale, 183 N.E.3d at 1073 n.4 (alterations in Arrendale). We see no reason a

different result should occur herein. See also Eakin v. Kumiega, 567 N.E.2d 150,

153, 153 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (hereinafter “Kumiega”) (noting Court of

Appeals could not exempt the Eakin family from the “harshness” of the

required legal ruling because an exception for the Eakin family “would create

the potential for an anamolous result in subsequent cases”), trans. denied,

abrogated as to the unavailability of emotional distress damages without physical impact

by Shaumber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991) (adopting modified

impact rule).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023               Page 17 of 24
       3.      Can the Fund challenge Appellants’ claim?
[23]   Appellants next argue we should not apply McKenzie to their claim because the

       Fund has no authority to challenge Appellants’ claim for funds in excess of

       CRH’s payment. In support thereof, Appellants cite Indiana Code section 34-

       18-15-3, which provides the procedure to be followed to make a claim against

       the Fund. Accordingly, addressing Appellants’ argument requires us to

       interpret and implement the controlling statute, which is a question of law that

       we review de novo. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at 375 (“The interpretation of the

       MMA presents a question of law subject to de novo review.”).

[24]   Indiana Code section 34-18-15-3 provides, in relevant part:

               If a health care provider or its insurer has agreed to settle its
               liability on a claim by payment of its policy limits established in
               IC 34-18-14-3(b) and IC 34-18-14-3(d), and the claimant is
               demanding an amount in excess of that amount, the following
               procedure must be followed:

                        (1) A petition shall be filed by the claimant . . . .

                                                          *****

                        (3) The commissioner . . . may agree to a settlement with
                        the claimant from the patient’s compensation fund, or the
                        commissioner . . . may file written objections to the
                        payment of the amount demanded. . . . .

                        (4) The judge of the court in which the petition is filed
                        shall set the petition for approval or, if objections have
                        been filed, for hearing, as soon as practicable. . . . .
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023               Page 18 of 24
                        (5) At the hearing, the commissioner, the claimant, the
                        health care provider, and the insurer of the health care
                        provider may introduce relevant evidence to enable the
                        court to determine whether or not the petition should be
                        approved if the evidence is submitted on agreement
                        without objections. If the commissioner, the health care
                        provider, the insurer of the health care provider, and the
                        claimant cannot agree on the amount, if any, to be paid
                        out of the patient’s compensation fund, the court shall,
                        after hearing any relevant evidence on the issue of
                        claimant’s damage submitted by any of the parties
                        described in this section, determine the amount of
                        claimant’s damages, if any, in excess of the health care
                        provider’s policy limits established in IC 34-18-14-3(b) and
                        IC 34-18-14-3(d) already paid by the insurer or the health
                        care provider. The court shall determine the amount for
                        which the fund is liable and make a finding and judgment
                        accordingly. In approving a settlement or determining the
                        amount, if any, to be paid from the patient’s compensation fund,
                        the court shall consider the liability of the health care provider as
                        admitted and established.

       Ind. Code § 34-18-15-3 (emphasis added).

[25]   Appellants acknowledge Subsection (3) of that statute permits the Fund to

       object to the payment of the amount demanded by a claimant, but they assert

       Subsection (5) precludes the objection filed by the Fund herein, which

       Appellants argue is a challenge to “the liability of the health care provider as

       admitted and established” in violation of Subsection 5. Appellants claim the

       only Indiana authority regarding “whether the Fund may challenge MMA-

       applicability post-settlement” is a concurrence by Judge Shields in 1993 that

       demonstrates Appellants’ position is correct. (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 11

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023                     Page 19 of 24
       (citing Dillon v. Callaway, 609 N.E.2d 424 (1993) (hereinafter “Callaway” 5), trans.

       denied.) Appellants are simply wrong.

[26]   In 1991, the Commissioner of the Department of Insurance, Eakin, appealed a

       trial court ruling that allowed medical malpractice claimants, the Kumiegas, to

       access excess damages from the Patient’s Compensation Fund for emotional

       distress that resulted from witnessing the death of their daughter. Kumiega, 567

       N.E.2d 150. Eakin argued that allowing the Kumiegas to access the Fund was

       improper because the emotional distress damages sought were prohibited by

       Indiana’s adherence to the impact rule, and our court agreed. We held “the

       impact rule bars the Kumiegas’ claim for emotional distress damages. From

       this it follows that such noncompensable injuries are not subject to payment from the

       Fund.” 567 N.E.2d at 153 (emphasis added). In the process of reaching that

       holding, the court also specifically held:

               The Kumiegas also argue that the Commissioner’s argument
               must fail because Ind. Code 16-9.5-4-3(5) [a prior version of the
               statute at issue herein with the same language in Subsection 5]
               requires the trial court to consider the health care provider’s
               liability as “admitted and established.” While we agree that the
               statute requires such admitted liability, we do not agree that the
               existence of a health care provider’s liability obligates the Fund to
               compensate claimants for noncompensable injuries.

       5
        Dillon was the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Insurance, which administers the Patient’s
       Compensation Fund, and his name is also on other opinions to be discussed herein. Accordingly, for clarity,
       we will refer to this case and others involving the Fund by the name of the Plaintiff/Appellee.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023                               Page 20 of 24
       Id. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added). Thus, under Kumeiga, after a plaintiff and

       health care provider reach a settlement, the Fund may challenge the availability

       of excess damages under the Fund if the Fund believes the requested damages

       are for injuries that are “noncompensable” under the MMA. See id.

[27]   Then, the next year, our court decided Dillon v. Glover, 597 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1992), trans. denied, in which the new Commissioner of the Indiana

       Department of Insurance, Dillon, challenged the availability of excess damages

       from the Fund based on the lack of evidence that the doctor’s mistake had

       proximately caused Glover’s damages. Id. at 792. As in Kumiega, the petition

       for excess damages from the Fund was filed after Glover settled with the doctor

       (or doctor’s insurer) for the amount necessary to access the Fund. The Glover

       panel noted Kumiega “concluded that the admission of liability did not obligate

       the Fund to compensate claimants for noncompensable injuries[,]” id. at 793,

       but then distinguished Kumiega based on the fact that, in Glover, the Fund’s

       challenge to proximate cause was prohibited by the health care provider’s

       admission of liability. See id. (“once liability is established, the issue of

       proximate cause is decided”) (emphasis in original).

[28]   This is the context in which arose the Callaway opinion, 609 N.E.2d 424, and

       Judge Shields’s concurring opinion, to which Appellants cite. Judge Shields’s

       concurrence insisted the Fund’s attempt to avoid payment of the excess

       damages was “foreclosed by the settlement made by [the doctor] and his

       insurer”:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023                 Page 21 of 24
               In my opinion, the Fund’s arguments that the Act does not apply
               to Dr. Chambers’s sexual relationship with Callaway and that
               Callaway’s injuries were not the proximate result of health care
               services provided by Dr. Chambers raise an issue of liability
               rather than an issue of whether particular damages asserted by
               Callaway are compensable within the Act. Therefore, because “a
               health care provider or its insurer [Dr. Chambers and his insurer]
               has agreed to settle its liability on a claim by payment of its
               policy limits,” IC 16-9.5-4-3 (1988), this court’s decisions in
               Dillon v. Glover (1992), Ind. App., 597 N.E.2d 971, and Eakin v.
               Kumiega (1991), Ind. App., 567 N.E.2d 150, compel the
               determination that the issues the Fund attempts to present are
               precluded.

       Id. at 429.

[29]   Appellants point to Judge Shields’s language and assert “with liability

       conclusively established,” the Fund cannot contest the applicability of the

       MMA. (Appellants’ Br. at 18.) But this is an inaccurate reading of Judge

       Shields’s concurrence. Judge Shields would have held the Fund’s challenge

       precluded, but only because she believed the Fund to be raising “an issue of

       liability rather than an issue of whether particular damages . . . are compensable

       under the Act.” Callaway, 609 N.E.2d at 429 (Judge Shields, concurring in

       result).

[30]   Thus, the language in Subsection (5) of Indiana Code section 34-18-15-3

       prohibits post-settlement challenges to liability, see Glover, 597 N.E.2d at 973-74

       (citing subsection 5 of prior version of the statute, then codified as Ind. Code §

       16-9.5-4-3, which contained the same language), but does not prohibit post-

       settlement challenges to the non-compensability of damages under the MMA,
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023           Page 22 of 24
       see Kumeiga, 567 N.E.2d at 152 n.4 (health care provider’s admitted liability

       does not obligate the Fund to compensate claimants for noncompensable

       injuries under Subsection 5 of Ind. Code § 16-9.5-4-3, which is now found at

       Ind. Code § 34-18-15-3). This is why the majority opinion in Callaway

       explicitly stated: “the compensable nature of Callaway’s injuries was not

       decided by her settlement of liability with [the doctor] and his insurer, and is

       properly before us.” 609 N.E.2d at 426. Based on this precedent, we hold the

       Fund can challenge the compensable nature of the Appellants’ damages under

       the MMA even after Appellants reached a settlement with providers that

       admitted liability. 6 See also J.L. v. Mortell, 633 N.E.2d 300, 303-304 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1994) (holding trial court’s inquiry into the compensable nature of the

       plaintiff’s damages was proper based on Callaway and Kumeiga), trans. denied.

       Conclusion
[31]   Appellants’ claims cannot be distinguished from those asserted in McKenzie and,

       thus, do not state a claim for medical malpractice that is compensable from the

       Fund. McKenzie applies retroactively to Appellants’ claim. Finally, as thirty

       years of precedent demonstrates, Indiana Code section 34-18-15-3(5) permits

       the Fund to challenge whether Appellants’ claimed injuries are non-

       6
        Because of this clear precedent, we decline Appellants’ invitations to hold estoppel or waiver should
       preclude the Fund from raising its statutorily-permitted challenge to the compensability of Appellants’ claims
       under the Fund. Moreover, because McKenzie applies and precludes recovering damages from the Fund, we
       need not determine whether Appellants’ settlement with CRH was for the amount statutorily required to
       access the Fund.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023                                  Page 23 of 24
       compensable under the MMA. Because Appellants have not demonstrated any

       genuine issue of material fact about the application of McKenzie and the Fund is

       entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the trial court’s grant of

       summary judgment to the Fund.

[32]   Affirmed.

       Crone, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2559 | May 4, 2023          Page 24 of 24