Court Opinion

ID: 9660258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:08:56.005033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:29.092113
License: Public Domain

John F. Stroud, Justice, concurring. I am compelled to concur in the reversal of the conviction in this case because the affidavit in support of the search warrant was defective. This court has held many times that an affidavit of a police officer setting forth information gained from a confidential informant must not only show the information was obtained from a reliable source, but must also set forth some of the facts or circumstances upon which the informant’s information was based. State v. Lechner, 262 Ark. 401, 557 S.W. 2d 195 (1977); Lunsford v. State, 262 Ark. 1, 552, S.W. 2d 646 (1977). Here the affidavit contained sufficient facts to show the reliability of the confidential informant, but was completely devoid of any underlying circumstances or facts supporting the informant’s conclusion that the stolen items were hidden in the residence of appellant’s mother. I favor a more lenient requirement for the issuance of a search warrant to permit the search of a residence for specific stolen property after the accused has been charged and arrested for burglary or robbery, because a person’s residence is the usual and normal place where such booty is hidden. To require that a confidential informant see the stolen goods there, be told by the accused that they are there, or otherwise have facts indicating that they are secreted in the residence is in most cases a denial of the right to search. I concur only because my view is inundated by the prior decisions of this court and the United States Supreme Court. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1965). However, I disagree with the majority opinion in also basing their reversal on the failure of the trial court to dismiss juror Richard Bolton for cause. Although I agree that it would have been expedient for the trial judge to have dismissed juror Bolton for cause, and I would urge all circuit judges to do so in similar circumstances, I do not think the failure to do so constituted reversible error. The majority acknowledge that a literal reading of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-1920 (Repl. 1977) does not require a dismissal of juror Bolton for cause, but they nevertheless apply the statute here on the premise of liberal construction. The portion of the statute relied on provides that a challenge for implied bias may be taken where the juror is related by consanguinity to the person on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted. There is no question about the relationship here, but the only possible person upon whose complaint the prosecution could have been instituted was the victim. I do not think that language can be expanded so liberally as to include a police officer who participated in the investigation, nor do I think the legislature could possibly have intended that meaning. It wás, therefore, not error to refuse to excuse juror Bolton for implied bias under § 43-1920. The majority opinion also indicated that the juror should have been excused for actual bias when it said, “Neither can we say that Richard Bolton’s answers on voir dire were sufficient to eliminate him as one who was prevented by a relationship or by circumstances from acting impartially ...” Although a lengthy voir dire of the entire panel was conducted by the trial judge, the questioning of Mr. Bolton by the defense attorney after he had been called as a juror continued as follows: Q. Mr. Bolton, should it develop from the evidence in this case, that your brother, who I believe is currently employed himself in law-enforcement work, should be a witness in this case or should have worked in connection with the investigation of this case, would that cause you to lean more heavily in favor of the State than toward the defendant? A. No, sir. Q. You heard, of course, the question to Mr. Walker about knowing a witness in the case. If you feel that you are chosen on this jury, and in your deliberations arriving at a verdict of not guilty, that it would be embarrassing to you to discuss this case with your friends being on the Sheriffs Department and Police Department? A. No, sir. Q. You don’t think it would bother you at all? A. No, sir. ■ Q. You wouldn’t let that relationship influence your judgment of the evidence in this case? A. No, sir. Q. You wouldn’t try to persuade any of the other jurors that those things should be considered against their judgment? A. No, sir. Following the questioning by counsel, the trial court received an affirmative response from Bolton to an additional question, “Do you feel that you can, without any embarrassment, serve and let the verdict speak the truth?” It obviously would have been impossible for Mr. Bolton to have given more perfect responses reflecting a total lack of actual bias. The judge had the right to accept Mr. Bolton’s responses as being truthful. The determination of actual bias is a matter lying within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge. Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W. 2d 474 (1976). The majority rely on Arkansas State Highway Comm’n v. Young, 241 Ark. 765, 410 S.W. 2d 120 (1967), to support their decision that it was reversible error not to excuse juror Bolton for cause due to his brother’s participation as a police officer in the investigation of the case. That case did find it was error not to excuse the wife of a witness for cause, but in this case Officer Bolton was not a witness. In Jones v. State, 230 Ark. 18, 320 S.W. 2d 645 (1959), where a juror was the sister of a police officer who testified in the case, this court held, “The relationship of a juror to a witness in the trial does not per se disqualify the juror.” The majority opinion in this case is tantamount to a holding that Mr. Bolton is disqualified as a juror per se even though his brother was not a witness in the case. The appellant is entitled to a fair trial, but neither he nor any other accused is entitled to a perfect trial.