Court Opinion

ID: 9670989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:29:10.78651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.592838
License: Public Domain

PEEPLES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that pro se litigants — in contrast to those with counsel — do not waive a jury by acquiescing in a nonjury trial without objection. The majority has held that a litigant, who admittedly requested a jury and paid the fee, can participate in a nonjury trial on the merits without objecting to the lack of a jury, and then obtain reversal of the adverse judgment on the ground that she was denied a jury trial. The litigant, says the court, must “assent” to the nonjury trial. I would hold that litigants assent to nonjury trial and thereby waive their jury demand when they acquiesce by allowing the nonjury trial to begin without protesting that they want a jury.
It is true that the majority attempts to limit its holding to the somewhat extreme facts of this case — plaintiffs counsel withdrew thirteen days before trial, and the newly pro se plaintiff respectfully but firmly asked the court for more time to retain a new lawyer, though she said nothing about a jury.
But we are bound to apply the same procedural rules to pro se litigants and litigants with counsel. “There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves. Litigants who represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules.... ” Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex.1978).1
*411When counsel has recently withdrawn through no fault of the litigant, the trial court should give the newly pro se litigant time to seek other counsel. See Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex.1986). See generally Tex.R.Civ.P. 10. But the majority does not rest its decision on the trial court’s denial of the pro se plaintiffs motion for continuance.
Instead, the majority holds that, at least on these facts, there must be “assent” to the nonjury trial. Apparently this means there must be an express waiver of the right to a jury. None of the cases cited by the majority require assent in the sense of an express waiver of a jury; waiver by acquiescing in a nonjury trial without objection should be enough. Rule 220 was amended after Green v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Company, 422 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.1968). Nothing in the supreme court's opinion in Citizens State Bank v. Caney Investments, 746 S.W.2d 477 (Tex.1988), supports the majority’s holding. Whatever might be the facts shown in the intermediate court’s opinion in Caney, the supreme court itself did not suggest there must be an express waiver of a jury. On the contrary, rule 220 seems to require an objection.2
If this pro se plaintiff was indeed without fault in the discharge of her attorney, existing law might entitle her to reversal under Villegas because the court denied her oral motion for continuance to hire new counsel. We should confront that issue head-on. Otherwise, under Cohn she must be held to the same procedural rules as other litigants.
The real issue in this case is the denial of the continuance. Because the majority has muddled the rules concerning pro se litigants and waiver of jury trial, I dissent.

. I think the Cohn rule serves the valid purpose of judicial neutrality and that it would change our system radically to excuse pro se litigants from complying with Tex.R.App.P. 52 (appellate review extends only to errors that appellant preserved in trial court). If pro se litigants were excused from the usual rules of procedure and evidence, trial courts would have to decide throughout the trial whether to advise them on procedural and evidence questions to avoid waiving their rights; a trial court who advised the pro se litigant to file motions and make objections might be perceived as somewhat of an advocate for the pro se litigant. The other litigant would, understandably, wonder whether the judge was truly an umpire. Thus, to bend the procedural rules for pro se litigants would exact a high price *411in judicial neutrality, and the perception of neutrality.

. Rule 220 provides in part: "When any party has paid the fee for a jury trial, he shall not be permitted to withdraw the cause from the jury docket over the objection of the parties adversely interested.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 220.