Court Opinion

ID: 9497281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:47:30.087185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:06.050968
License: Public Domain

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:
Sisay Mengistu (Mengistu) and his wife, Almaz Sayoum Abebe (Abebe), citizens of Ethiopia, petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of their applications for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a.1 Because Mengistu has not shown that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to find that he suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution, we DENY his petition for review.

I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mengistu entered the United States in 1990, and Abebe entered in 1993. Mengis-tu applied for asylum in July, 1993. Abebe’s asylum claim is derivative of Men-gistu’s.
Mengistu’s father and stepmother were involved with the then controlling government in Ethiopia, the DERG, a Marxist Leninist dictatorship ruled by Mengistu Haile Mariam (no relation to Petitioner). Petitioner Mengistu’s father and stepmother were imprisoned and stripped of their civil rights by the succeeding government, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Mengistu was, but no longer is, a member of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), an organization critical of the DERG regime. In 1981, Mengistu was imprisoned for a few days because of his membership in EPRP, and underwent indoctrination after his release. In 1991, the DERG regime was overthrown by the EPRDF, and the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) assumed control.
Mengistu and Abebe married in 1988. In 1990, at a time when DERG was still in power, Mengistu came to the United States to study at Oregon State University. Abebe did not join Mengistu in the United States until 1993, because they did not want the government to suspect that Mengistu was not returning to Ethiopia. After bribing a clerk with the equivalent of *757$125, Abebe obtained a visa to travel to the United States.
Mengistu does not support the TGE. In 1993, he joined Medhin, a multi-ethnic organization that opposed the TGE and sought a democratic government. Medh-in’s focus is on creating change through politics. However, some members endorse violence as a method to effect change. As a member, Mengistu received materials from Medhin and attended a Medhin conference in 1996 in Washington, D.C. Men-gistu is concerned that the Ethiopian embassy may acquire the attendance list of that meeting and identify him as a Medhin member.
Mengistu fears imprisonment if he returns to Ethiopia because of his opposition to the controlling government. He testified that his fears are substantiated by articles he has read in the magazine Ethiopian Observer, detailing extrajudicial killings of opposition members. Mengistu also bases his fear upon general stories he has heard from other Medhin members relating the imprisonment of Medhin supporters who returned to Ethiopia. Men-gistu, however, offered no specific facts, such as names or dates, to support his general statements.
Mengistu also expressed his fear that he would not find work because of his affiliation with Medhin. Mengistu suspects that his opinions regarding the current government are known in Ethiopia because his former roommate has returned to Ethiopia to publish a magazine. Mengistu’s friend, Badege Bishaw, testified that if Mengistu returns to Ethiopia, he is in danger if the Ethiopian officials know of his affiliation with Medhin.
In addition to his fear that he may be discriminated against for his political views, Mengistu also fears that his daughter would be subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM) if they return to Ethiopia. Mengistu testified that the family controls whether a girl is subjected to FGM and that he could likely stop the procedure from occurring as long as he was not imprisoned. Abebe was a victim of FGM when she was a baby, and she testified that she would not allow her daughter to undergo FGM, even though she would be ostracized by her family.
The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that Mengistu and Abebe did not establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution should they return to Ethiopia. The IJ placed substantial weight upon the fact that Mengistu joined Medhin in late 1993, after applying for asylum on July 13, 1993. The IJ stated:
With regard to the respondent’s membership in the Medhin, the Court was struck at first by the fact that it appeared to be an act of “bootstrapping;” that is to say that the respondent joined an organization which is opposed to the present government of Ethiopia at a time when his own status in this country and his own right to stay in this country was at issue. It would seem to the Court very reddess to join an opposition party and then flaunt it when he faces possible deportation to that country unless it is a ploy to insure [sic] that he would face persecution so that the asylum claim would have to be granted.
However, the IJ did not specifically decide whether Mengistu’s membership in Medh-in was a ploy, because the IJ found that Mengistu had not established a well-founded fear of persecution were he and his family to return to Ethiopia.
The IJ relied upon the State Department Country Report on Ethiopia. The IJ found that, based on the 1994 Country Report, individuals who renounce violence were not likely to face persecution in Ethiopia, because the government was most *758concerned with organizations that advocate the violent overthrow of the government. The IJ reasoned that because Mengistu was willing to renounce violence, it was unlikely he would suffer persecution. The IJ also noted that Mengistu’s participation in Medhin was minimal, as he only attended a conference.
The IJ ruled that there was not much of a threat of FGM being enforced upon Mengistu’s daughter. The IJ explained that because FGM is a decision made by the family, and as Mengistu and Abebe have decided not to allow their daughter to undergo FGM, the daughter faces no real threat of subjection to FGM.
Petitioners appealed to the BIA. The BIA issued a summary ruling adopting the Id’s decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When the BIA issues a summary decision adopting the decision of the IJ, we review the IJ’s decision as the final agency decision. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir.2003). “Within broad limits the law entrusts the agency to make the basic asylum eligibility decision .... ” Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). The agency’s final decision is reviewed to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Specifically, we may overturn the BIA’s denial of asylum only if the applicant shows “that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Id. (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

To be eligible for asylum protection, the Petitioner must show that he is a refugee, defined as one “who is unable or unwilling to return to [Ethiopia] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir.2003) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The petitioner’s fear of persecution must be “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted).
The subjective component may be satisfied by credible testimony that Petitioner genuinely fears persecution. Id. “To satisfy the objective component, [Petitioner] must show that [Petitioner] has suffered from past persecution (which then gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution) or that [Petitioner] has a good reason to fear future persecution by adducing credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record of facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Persecution, as defined by the Ninth Circuit, is “the infliction of suffering of harm upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive.” Id. (citation omitted). “Persecution, however, is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Mengistu has not shown that he objectively and subjectively fears persecution. Mengistu’s detention in 1981 does not rise to the level of past persecution. See Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a five to six-day detention, without abuse, does not amount to persecution). Mengistu does not have a well-founded fear of persecution based upon his involvement with Medhin, because no threats have been made to *759Mengistu for his involvement in Medhin. See Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that we are unlikely to find persecution where there is no significant physical violence or specific threats of. serious harm).
Moreover, Mengistu’s fear that he may not be able to find work if he returns to Ethiopia does not compel a finding of a well-founded fear of persecution. Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1016 (holding that employment discrimination “is not the type of economic deprivation that rises to the level of persecution”).
Finally, although a closer case, Mengistu’s concern that his daughter would be subjected to FGM does not rise to the level of a well-founded fear of persecution under the facts of this case. Both Mengistu and Abebe testified that they would not allow their daughter to undergo FGM, even though they might be ostracized by their families. See Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that ostracism is not persecution). Specifically, Mengistu testified that “I will try to do whatever I can to stop [the FGM procedure,]” and Abebe testified that she was not willing to allow her daughter to be subjected to FGM and that she faced rejection from her family for this decision.
Likewise, the record reflects that in Ethiopia “women are able to prevent their daughters from being subjected to [FGM] by relatives.” See United States Department of State, Ethiopia—Profile of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions 5 (Dec. 1994).
The facts are dissimilar in the Second Circuit case predicating a finding of persecution on a fear of subjection to FGM. The most important distinction is that in Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 24 (2nd Cir.1999), the asylum applicant herself faced FGM, and in Ghana, not Ethiopia. Additionally, the applicant had no control over her tribe’s decision to inflict FGM as a punishment for engaging in premarital sex in violation of a tribal taboo. It was inevitable that the tribe would discover that the alien had engaged in premarital sex during the “enstooling” of the alien as the tribe’s Queen Mother. Id. at 20, 24. In contrast to the applicant in Abankivah, Mengistu and Abebe have not established that the subjection of their daughter to FGM is inevitable or even probable.
We are aware that the Sixth Circuit recently remanded a FGM-based asylum case involving a mother and daughter from Ethiopia for further development of the record. However, we are not persuaded that the same result is warranted in this case. As an initial matter, we note that the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir.2004) found potential social ostracism sufficient to support a claim of persecution, a finding not consistent with our precedent. Compare Abay, 368 F.3d at 640, with Kazlauskas, 46 F.3d at 907.
Additionally, the facts in Abay are dissimilar to the facts in this case. In Abay, the mother testified that “she would not be able to prevent a future husband or his relatives from demanding that [FGM] be done.” Abay, 368 F.3d at 640. In contrast, Mengistu and Abebe indicated in their testimony that they would be able to protect their daughter from forced FGM, even though they might face ostracism. Also unlike this case, in Abay the daughter had filed an individual application for asylum and testified about her fear of FGM.
Finally, we are constrained by the deferential standard of review we must apply. Gonzalez-Hernandez, 336 F.3d at 998. Although a reasonable factfinder could have found a fear of persecution on this record, a finding of persecution is not com-*760petted by the facts of this case. See Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1018.
Because Abebe and Mengistu failed to satisfy the lesser standard required for asylum, they necessarily fail to satisfy the standard for withholding of removal. See Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir.2000).

IV. CONCLUSION

The IJ’s finding that Abebe and Mengis-tu do not have a well-founded fear of persecution was supported by substantial evidence.
PETITION DENIED.

. "Because removal proceedings against [Mengistu] were pending before April 1997, and the BIA issued its final decision after October 1996, we apply the transitional rules of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ('IIRIRA'), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. We therefore have jurisdiction over the asylum claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a.” Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted).