Court Opinion

ID: 9712922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:03:04.412917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:15.305395
License: Public Domain

ON CRIMINAL PETITION TO TRANSFER
GIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. After correctly citing the history of the rule barring the admission into evidence of confessions by third parties to the crime at issue, the majority states that the Supreme Court of the United States reversed its position in Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297. I would submit that the decision in Chambers was not a total reversal of the evidentiary rule nor do I agree with the statement in the majority opinion that Chambers is factually similar to the case at bar.
In Chambers, police officers, in attempting to effect an arrest, had met with severe opposition from a large group of people, and during the melee, shots were fired from the crowd which struck and killed one *228of the officers. Chambers was one of the persons in the crowd and was struck by fire returned by the wounded officer. However, no one, including several officers present, was able to state that Chambers was the one who fired the fatal shot or that he in fact fired any shot.
Sometime after the shooting, a man named McDonald, after first consulting with a minister who was a personal friend, went to Chambers' attorney and gave a sworn statement that he shot the officer. He told -the attorney that on three prior occasions he had informed friends that he had committed the shooting. However, after his arrest, McDonald repudiated his statements and eventually was released.
Justice Powell, writing for the United States Supreme Court, observed that:
"In large measure, he was thwarted in his attempt to present this portion of his defense by the strict application of certain Mississippi rules of evidence.... that the application of these evidentiary rules rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him of due process of law."
Id. 410 U.S. at 290-91, 93 S.Ct. at 1043, 35 L.Ed.2d at 305.
After observing that the specific facts of the case required the implementation of an exception to the hearsay rule, Justice Powell stated:
"In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this ease the rulings of the trial court deprive Chambers of a fair trial." Id. 410 U.S. at 303-04, 93 S.Ct. at 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d at 313.
In Taggart v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 667, 382 N.E.2d 916, cited by the majority, the rule and its exceptions were recognized including a quotation from Chambers. There this Court correctly held that the admissibility of such a statement depends in a large part upon the trustworthiness of the person making the statement. In Tag-gart, the person making the statement had offered it for sale to Taggart for $5,000.
In the case at bar, there was no confusion such as that which existed in Chambers where authorities were unable to pinpoint who fired a shot from a large crowd. The only issue in this case was that either Eric Nelson or appellant perpetrated the robbery. Although Nelson had at one time been identified in a photographic array, which did not include appellant, when appellant was placed in a lineup in which Nelson was not included, the bank tellers identified him as the holdup man. The issue turns upon the great similarity of the appearance of Nelson and appellant. Also, unlike the facts in Chambers, very little reliability could be placed upon Nelson's braggadocio statements to other inmates in the jail where he was held on other charges. These statements were never made to persons in authority or to any one other than inmates of the jail. The ruling in Chambers is undoubtedly correct in stating that a given set of facts can justify a departure from the general rule. However, I see nothing in the factual situation in the case at bar which can justify such a departure.
I therefore would hold that in the case at bar the rule was applied properly. I would affirm the trial court.