Court Opinion

ID: 9370440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 17:08:14.448739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.643085
License: Public Domain

J-S41016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    LAVERY LAW, P.C.                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MICHAEL F. FAHERTY                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 884 MDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered May 25, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
                       Civil Division at 2017-CV-01435-CV

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2023

        Michael F. Flaherty (Appellant) appeals from the order sustaining the

preliminary objections filed by plaintiff and counterclaim defendant, Lavery

Law, P.C. (the Law Firm).1 We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

        This is a dispute between the Law Firm and Appellant, a former

shareholder and attorney with the firm. In 2000, Frank Lavery, Jr. (Lavery or

Attorney Lavery), formed the predecessor to the Law Firm when he offered

Appellant and two other attorneys shares in his legal practice. At that time,

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court’s order indicated that immediate appeal would facilitate
resolution of the entire case. Trial Court Order, 5/25/22; see Pa.R.A.P.
341(c). The trial court further explained that because of the significant
relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims, immediate
appeal would enhance the prospects of settlement. Trial Court Order,
5/25/22.
J-S41016-22

Appellant, Lavery, and the other two attorneys entered into a Restricted Stock

Agreement. In addition, Appellant executed a separate Executive Attorney

Employment Agreement (Employment Agreement) with Lavery and the Law

Firm. After a fifth partner was added in December 2012, the shareholders

executed a new Restricted Stock Agreement.

      Relevantly, Appellant’s Employment Agreement provided:

      4. COMPENSATION

      (b) INCENTIVE BONUS. To provide annual incentive to the
      Attorney and to reward his and the Corporation’s performance,
      the Board of Directors of the Corporation shall provide from time
      to time for payment of bonuses to the Attorney (the “Incentive
      Compensation Bonus”) based upon the Attorney’s and the
      Corporation’s ability to meet the agreed upon objectives set forth
      on Exhibit “A” attached hereto and made a part hereof. The
      amount of the Incentive Compensation Bonus and the
      Attorney’s and Corporation’s ability to meet the agreed
      upon objectives shall be determined by the Corporation’s
      Board of Directors and/or its President and/or its
      Managing Shareholder in its, his or their sole discretion[.]

Complaint, Exhibit G (emphasis added). The “List of Corporate and Individual

Attorney Goals for Bonus,” prescribed only “Billable hours of 1,500 each year.”

Id.

      In 2014, the Law Firm had no board of directors. Lavery served as the

Law Firm’s president and managing shareholder. The trial court explained:

            [Appellant] alleges that upon becoming a shareholder in
      2000, bonus amounts were determined by a Compensation
      Committee comprised of Attorneys Lavery and [Appellant],
      followed by full agreement and formal ratification by Attorney
      Lavery as Managing Shareholder. [Appellant] claims that between
      2001 to 2013, the bonus was paid via application of a Performance
      Appraisal System, with certain adjustments providing extra points

                                     -2-
J-S41016-22

     for high performance, which always resulted in a consensus of
     Lavery and [Appellant] on bonus payments and then ratification
     by Lavery as Managing Shareholder.

           In 2014, [Appellant] claimed to have achieved an extremely
     high performance rating (98 out of 100) based upon generating
     $2,618,481 of income to the law firm, a figure far exceeding any
     prior amount generated by any attorney in the firm’s history.
     [Appellant] asserted that the entire fund available as bonus
     compensation for 2014 was $2,108,063. [Appellant] alleges that
     had the Law Firm applied the same parameters under the
     Performance Appraisal System as it had done in the past, he would
     have been entitled to the entire bonus distribution.

           At a November 20, 2014 shareholder meeting, the
     shareholders approved of Lavery’s motion to have the
     Compensation Committee present annual bonus amounts to the
     shareholders before the individual bonuses were determined.
     [Appellant] confronted Lavery the next day, concerned he was
     advocating for a “cash grab” of the bonus money by other
     shareholders, contrary to the firm’s past practice. Lavery told him
     he planned to allow a shareholders’ vote on bonus distribution and
     [Appellant] responded that such a redistribution vote would
     compel him to leave the firm.

           [Appellant] claims he had a number of meetings with Lavery
     thereafter, between November 21 and December 25, 2014, to
     discuss bonus distribution.    … [I]n the final days of 2014,
     Compensation Committee members Lavery and [Appellant] failed
     to agree on a bonus distribution ….

            On December 30, 2014, Lavery called a meeting of all
     shareholders. [Appellant] claims that just prior to that meeting,
     Lavery met privately with the other three shareholders to discuss
     distribution of 2014 bonuses via shareholder vote, rather than by
     the process utilized in each of the prior thirteen years. At the
     shareholder meeting, by a four to one vote (with [Appellant]
     dissenting), a distribution of the $2,108,063 bonus fund was
     approved wherein [Appellant] was awarded $1,341,993, Lavery
     was awarded $354,365, and the remainder was divided amongst
     the other shareholders. [Appellant] notes that Lavery’s bonus
     significantly increased over his 2013 figure despite his
     performance rating declining significantly between 2013 and
     2014. [Appellant] additionally noted that the bonuses paid to

                                    -3-
J-S41016-22

      Lavery and two other shareholders were the highest ever paid to
      those attorneys[,] while their performance scores were their
      lowest recorded. [Appellant] claimed the bonus awards were in
      conflict with the established bonus system of rewarding strong
      performance and not rewarding poor performance. He further
      alleges that the approval of the distributions, via a shareholder
      vote on December 30, 2014, rather than by the Compensation
      Committee, was an unauthorized change to the bonus system.
      This alleged unauthorized change to the bonus distribution
      practice reduced [Appellant’s] bonus from $2,108,063 to
      $1,341,993, a loss to [Appellant] of $766,070, which he claims
      [the Law Firm] owes him.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 4-5. Appellant subsequently left the Law Firm.

      Following Appellant’s departure, Appellant demanded his unpaid salary

and reimbursement of a $3,000 business expense (Appellant’s annual dues to

an eminent domain professional organization). Id. at 5. Appellant further

disputed the value assigned to his shares of the Law Firm and deductions

charged for Appellant’s failure to provide one year’s notice of his departure,

as required under the parties’ Restricted Stock Agreement. Id. at 2.

      The trial court described what next transpired:

             Following [Appellant’s] departure, [the Law Firm] sent a
      letter to [Appellant], on May 6, 2015, alleging that [Appellant] had
      unilaterally and improperly sent email notifications to firm clients,
      which [the Law Firm] had never seen nor approved, suggesting to
      clients that they select [Appellant] to retain their files and that
      this was a breach of the withdrawal provisions of the Restricted
      Stock Agreement. [The Law Firm] also informed [Appellant] that
      it considered him in breach of his obligations under the
      Employment Agreement for failing to devote all of his efforts “to
      the practice of law and business of the Corporation” wherein he
      abruptly left the [Law Firm] without appropriate notice and
      commenced his own legal practice.

             [The Law Firm] informed [Appellant] in the letter that under
      the   Employment Agreement, [Appellant] was obligated to

                                      -4-
J-S41016-22

      reimburse the firm for the value of all work [Appellant] performed,
      whether unbilled or billed and unpaid, on each eminent domain
      case he took with him, up to the date the file was removed from
      the firm. [The Law Firm] also demanded that [Appellant] conduct
      a prompt accounting on each contingent file, prorate each
      recovery and promptly pay the Law Firm its pre-withdrawal share.
      [The Law Firm] included in the letter a lengthy list identifying
      ninety-one (91) files taken by [Appellant] upon which it sought
      reimbursement of attorney’s fees. [The Law Firm] also demanded
      that [Appellant] reimbursee it for costs advanced on all relevant
      files, as reflected on the list.

              [The Law Firm] alleges that [Appellant] failed to reimburse
      it as required under the Employment Agreement and as demanded
      in its letter, prompting it to file its Complaint. In Count I of the
      Complaint, [the Law Firm] asserts that [Appellant] breached
      numerous sections of the Employment Agreement including
      soliciting and diverting firm clients away from [the Law Firm], by
      failing to cooperate with the Law Firm in the completion of his
      pending work and the orderly transfer of work to other Law Firm
      employees, and most significantly, by failing to compensate the
      Corporation for all outstanding disbursements for all work
      performed on legal matters transferred to [Appellant], pursuant
      to Section 13 of the Employment Agreement. [The Law Firm]
      asserts that the minimum damages it has incurred due to
      [Appellant’s] breach of Section 13 is $730,691.16, which includes
      $20,791.16 for costs, $668,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and
      $41,900.00 for paralegal fees. After the offset of $23,106.22
      allegedly due [Appellant] for his Law Firm shares, [Law Firm]
      seeks minimum damages under Count I of $707,584.94. In Count
      II, [the Law Firm] asserts a claim for Quantum Meruit/Unjust
      Enrichment in the amount of $730,691.16, plus costs of suit.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 2-3.

      Appellant filed an answer, new matter and counterclaims. In his new

matter, Appellant described the Law Firm’s past practice of determining

bonuses.   Appellant asserted counterclaims for: (I) Breach of Contract -

Employment    Agreement,     (II)   Breach   of   Contract   -   Restricted   Stock

                                       -5-
J-S41016-22

Agreement,    (III)   Conversion,   and   (IV)   Intentional   Interference   with

Contractual Relations.

     Under Counterclaim Count I, [Appellant’s] primary assertion is
     that [the Law Firm] breached the Employment Agreement by
     failing to pay the bonus amounts in accordance with the
     Employment Agreement and past practices.            Specifically,
     [Appellant] alleges that Lavery, whom [Appellant] agrees was
     solely delegated with the responsibility to determine bonus
     payments under Employment Agreement Section 4(b), wrongfully
     delegated the bonus determination to a shareholder vote.
     [Appellant] claims a loss $766,070 for bonus payments wrongfully
     withheld.

            [Appellant] also alleges under Count I that he was caused
     unspecified damages when [the Law Firm] delayed him payment
     of his salary due January 25, 2015, until March 10, 2015, in
     violation of the Employment Agreement’s requirement for
     payment of services. Finally, [Appellant] alleges under Count I
     that [the Law Firm] should have paid his $3,000 membership fee
     to a professional organization under Employment Agreement
     Section 5(c), which requires the Law Firm to reimburse him for
     “reasonable business expenses incurred.” [Appellant] claims that
     his new law firm was later forced to pay the fee after he left [the
     Law Firm].

           Under Counterclaim Count II, [Appellant] alleges that the
     Law Firm is in breach of the terms the Restricted Stock Agreement
     whereby it failed, as required under Sections 3 and 4, to fulfill its
     obligation to pay for [Appellant’s] 30.97% ownership interest in
     [the Law Firm] under the time limits set forth thereunder….

            In Counterclaim Count III, [Appellant] asserts a claim for
     conversion. [Appellant] primarily claims that he was entitled to
     receive the entire 2014 bonus monies of $2,108,063 under the
     terms of the Employment Agreement and the established
     Performance Appraisal System. He claims that the Law Firm’s
     failure to follow its past practice, and instead rely upon the
     unauthorized use of shareholder vote to distribute the bonus,
     resulted in conversion of bonus monies due to him of $766,070,
     which was diverted to the other shareholders.

                                     -6-
J-S41016-22

             [Appellant] also alleges under Count III that [the Law Firm]
      owes him $1,828.15 for his portion of a contingency fee related
      to litigation of a workers’ compensation case (Drivas). In the
      underlying case, [Appellant] had initially represented the claimant
      while still working for [the Law Firm]. After his departure, the
      claimant chose to retain [Appellant]. Thereafter, a Workers’
      Compensation decision was issued and later affirmed finding
      [Appellant’s] firm was entitled to all contingency fees due after
      [Appellant] left [the Law Firm].

            Finally, in Counterclaim Count IV, [Appellant] alleges
      intentional interference with contractual relations….

Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 6-7.

      On February 6, 2018, the Law Firm filed preliminary objections

demurring to Counterclaims I (breach of employment agreement), III

(Conversion), and IV (interference with contractual relations). The Law Firm

also objected to Counterclaim Count IV based on lack of specificity. On April

9, 2018, the trial court sustained the Law Firm’s demurrer to Counterclaim

Count I, finding as a matter of law that the Law Firm’s distribution of bonus

funds complied with the Employment Agreement. Trial Court Order, 4/9/18,

at 1. Additionally, the trial court concluded “the timeliness of [the Law Firm’s]

payment for [Appellant’s] services in 2015 and reimbursement for business

expenses was not in violation of its obligation to [Appellant].” Id.

      The trial court further sustained the Law Firm’s preliminary objection to

Counterclaim Count III (conversion) concluding that Lavery, as managing

partner, determined the bonus amount in accordance with Appellant’s

Employment Agreement. Id. at 2. The trial court sustained in part the Law

Firm’s preliminary objection to Counterclaim Count III (conversion), where

                                       -7-
J-S41016-22

Appellant sought a $1,828.15 contingency fee in a worker’s compensation

case. Id. at 2-3.2 Finally, the trial court sustained the Law Firm’s preliminary

objection to Counterclaim Count IV for lack of specificity. Id. at 2.

       On May 10, 2018, after pleadings had closed, Appellant filed a motion

for determination of finality for the trial court’s preliminary objections rulings.

Motion for Determination of Finality, 5/10/18.         The trial court denied the

motion because Appellant failed to file the motion within 30 days of the order

determining preliminary objections, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 341(c)(3). Trial

Court Order, 9/6/19.

       The matter proceeded through discovery. In late 2021, the parties filed

motions for summary judgment, “the disposition of which they believed would

help foster a final settlement.”          Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 8.    On

December 13, 2021, the trial court granted, in part, the Law Firm’s summary

judgment motion:

       [The Law Firm’s] motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby
       GRANTED; this Court finds as a matter of law that [Appellant] is
       subject to the re-executed Restricted Stock Agreement (absent
       the contested one-year termination notice, which shall be
       determined at trial) and that, if proven to the factfinder,
       [Appellant] may be held liable either for breach of the Employment
       Agreement or, in the alternative, under a theory of unjust
       enrichment.

____________________________________________

2 The trial court stated it “will not abrogate the Order of the Worker’s
Compensation Judge” and limited Appellant’s fee consistent with the order.
Id. at 2-3.

                                           -8-
J-S41016-22

Trial Court Order, 12/13/21, at 1 (bold emphasis in original). The trial court

denied Appellant’s motion for summary judgment. Id.

        Following additional unsuccessful settlement negotiations, Appellant,

with the agreement of the Law Firm, filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s

prior preliminary objections order.       Appellant requested the order’s re-

issuance to allow for a determination of finality under Pa.R.A.P. 341(c), and

for inclusion of a statement that immediate appeal would facilitate resolution

of the entire case. Motion To Re-Issue Order, 5/24/22, at 2-3.

        On May 25, 2022, the trial court entered two orders. The first order

vacated the court’s prior preliminary objections order.        The second order

adopted the finality language proposed by Appellant and agreed to by the Law

Firm.    The new order provided:

          1. [The Law Firm’s] Preliminary Objections to [Appellant’s]
          Counterclaim Count I (Breach of Contract/Executive Attorney
          and Employment Agreement) is GRANTED. This determination
          is final. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341 (c), this Court finds that an
          immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of this entire case
          and further finds that there is a significant relationship between
          the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims, there is a possibility
          that such issues may be considered by this Court, and an
          immediate appeal may enhance the prospects of settlement.

          2. [The Law Firm’s] Preliminary Objections to [Appellant’s]
          Counterclaim Count III (Conversion) are GRANTED in part. This
          determination is final. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341 (c), this Court
          finds that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of this
          entire case and further finds that there is a significant
          relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims,
          there is a possibility that such issues may be considered by this
          Court, and an immediate appeal may enhance the prospects of
          settlement.

                                       -9-
J-S41016-22

        3. [The Law Firm’s] Preliminary Objections to [Appellant’s]
        Counterclaim Count IV is GRANTED for lack of specificity
        required by Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a), (b), (f), and (h).

Trial Court Order, 5/25/22. Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the trial

court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant presents the following issues for review:

       1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT
          GRANTED [THE LAW FIRM]’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO
          [APPELLANT’S] COUNTERCLAIM COUNT I (BREACH OF
          CONTRACT/EXECUTIVE      ATTORNEY      EMPLOYMENT
          AGREEMENT)[?]

       2. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT
          GRANTED [THE LAW FIRM]’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO
          [APPELLANT’S]    COUNTERCLAIM        COUNT      III
          (CONVERSION)[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

      Our review of an order determining preliminary objections in the nature

of a demurrer is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Raynor v.

D’Annunzio, 243 A.3d 41, 52 (Pa. 2020).

      We recognize a demurrer is a preliminary objection to the legal
      sufficiency of a pleading and raises questions of law; we must
      therefore accept as true all well-pleaded, material, and relevant
      facts alleged in the complaint and every inference that is fairly
      deducible from those facts. A preliminary objection in the nature
      of a demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and
      without a doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be
      granted.

Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

      Appellant first argues that the trial court improperly granted the Law

Firm’s preliminary objection to Appellant’s Counterclaim Count I, because the

                                    - 10 -
J-S41016-22

facts, as pleaded, alleged a breach of contract cause of action. Appellant’s

Brief at 9.   Appellant claims his breach of contract claim is based on the

following language of the Employment Agreement:

      The amount of the Incentive Compensation Bonus and the
      Attorney’s and corporation’s ability to meet the agreed upon
      objectives shall be determined by the Corporation’s Board of
      Directors and/or its President and/or its Managing Shareholder in
      its, his or their sole discretion.

Id. Appellant asserts Lavery previously breached the Employment Agreement

by not exercising his sole discretion in calculating bonus awards. See id. at

10. Instead, Lavery delegated his decision to a shareholder vote, “taking ‘sole

discretion’ out of the equation.” Id. at 11.

      Appellant specifically challenges the trial court’s characterization of

Appellant’s following averment as an admission: “2014 bonus payments were

determined    by   Lavery   in   full   compliance   with   the   Employment

Agreement[.]” Id. at 11 (emphasis added) (quoting Counterclaim Paragraph

65). Appellant argues the trial court erred by disregarding other “well-pleaded

facts and the inferences therefrom” in Appellant’s Counterclaim I. Id. at 12.

Appellant asserts the trial court failed to

      appreciate that [Appellant’s] Counterclaims allege that there is a
      process to determine incentive bonus distribution under the
      Employment Agreement, but that process was not followed when
      Mr. Lavery involved other parties and delegated the distribution
      decision to a committee….

                                        - 11 -
J-S41016-22

Id.   According to Appellant, the decision of bonus distributions by a

shareholder vote constituted breach of the Employment Agreement. Id. at

13.

      “[T]hree   elements      are   necessary   to   plead   a   cause   of   action

for breach of contract: (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential

terms; (2) a breach of the contract; and[] (3) resultant damages.” Meyer,

Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Law Firm of Malone

Middleman,       P.C.,   137     A.3d    1247,   1258     (Pa.    2016)    (citation

omitted). Contract interpretation is a question of law. Davis v. Borough of

Montrose, 194 A.3d 597, 608 (Pa. Super. 2018). Our standard of review

is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.          Id.   When interpreting a

contract, the goal “is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties

as reasonably manifested by the language of their written agreement.” Id.

(citation omitted).

      In rejecting Appellant’s claim, the trial court stated:

      [T]o the extent [Appellant] was seeking additional payment of his
      2014 bonus, this Court explained its reasoning for the dismissal
      of his claims in the 2018 Order:

        … [Count I, Breach of Contract] The Court finds that the
        Managing Shareholder[, Lavery], in his sole discretion,
        properly determined the method of which [Appellant’s] bonus
        for 2014 would be determined and permissibly determined
        the amount of [Appellant’s] bonus for year 2014 in accord
        with the Executive Attorney Employment Agreement….

        … [Count III, Conversion] The Court again finds that the
        Managing Shareholder properly and permissibly determined

                                        - 12 -
J-S41016-22

       [Appellant’s] bonus in accord with the terms of the Executive
       Attorney Employment Agreement.

     In so holding, this [c]ourt was relying upon the clear and
     unambiguous language in Section 4(b) of the Employment
     Agreement, which explicitly stated that “[t]he amount of the
     [bonus] and the Attorney’s and [Law Firm’s] ability to meet
     the agreed upon objectives shall be determined by the
     [Law Firm’s] Board of Directors and/or its President
     and/or its Managing Shareholder in its, his or their sole
     discretion[.]” (Complaint, Exbt. G) [Appellant] admitted in the
     pleadings that “[t]he terms of the Employment Agreement
     indicate that Lavery, as President or Managing Shareholder, was
     required to determine Bonus payments.” (Answer with New
     Matter, 65) This clear language reflects that, as applied,
     Lavery had complete discretion to decide all facets of bonus
     distribution. There is no other language in the Employment
     Agreement otherwise limiting this discretion, including
     consideration of past discretionary, bonus payment practices. As
     such, it was clearly within Lavery’s sole discretion to delegate the
     decision on the 2014 bonus distribution to a shareholder vote. As
     such, this Court found that [Appellant] failed to state a claim for
     a different bonus distribution than the one made by [the Law Firm]
     in 2014, which was in full conformity with Section 4(b) of the
     Employment Agreement.

     [The trial court] also held in both Orders that Count IV (intentional
     interference with contractual relations) should be dismissed.
     [Appellant] has not sought a determination of finality as to this
     holding and is thus not pursuing review of it on appeal. As such,
     [the court] will not be addressing the merits of [the court’s]
     dismissal of Count IV.

     Finally, [the court] briefly addresses the remaining claims made
     by [Appellant] in Counterclaim Count I, relevant to the current
     issues. In his Count I breach of contract claim, [Appellant], in
     addition to seeking bonus money, also sought unspecified
     damages for [the Law Firm’s] delayed salary payment and
     reimbursement for a $3,000 membership fee. This Court, in its
     2018 Order, dismissed these claims. This Court notes that this
     holding was issued in error[,] inasmuch as [the Law Firm]
     never raised any objections to these claims; [the Law
     Firm’s] sole objection to Count I was limited to
     [Appellant’s] claim for bonus money. As such, this Court

                                    - 13 -
J-S41016-22

      respectfully requests that, to the extent this Court’s May
      25, 2022 Order encompasses a dismissal of these two
      claims (delayed salary payment and professional fee), that
      that decision be reversed and those claims reinstated.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 10-11 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

The record supports the trial court’s determinations, and we discern no error

beyond the trial court’s inadvertent dismissal of Appellant’s claims for the

unreimbursed business expense and delayed salary payment.                  See id.

Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.

      In his second issue, Appellant argues the trial court improperly

sustained Lavery’s preliminary objection to Counterclaim Count I, because the

well-pleaded facts established conversion of his share of the bonus funds.

Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant asserts the “bonus funds were by contract

identified as ‘Incentive Bonus’ corresponding to the reward of good or strong

performance and not weak and significantly deteriorated performance.” Id.

at 15 (emphasis added). Appellant again claims the trial court improperly

relied on Paragraph 120 of Appellant’s Counterclaim. Id. Appellant asserts

“it is not clear that [he] cannot prevail.”      Id.   Appellant offers no further

argument in this regard.

      Under Pennsylvania case law, conversion is “the deprivation of another’s

right of property in, or use or possession of, chattel, or other interference

therewith,    without      the   owner’s       consent    and    without     lawful

justification.” McKeeman v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d 655, 659 n.

3 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting Stevenson v. Economy Bank of Ambridge,

                                      - 14 -
J-S41016-22

197 A.2d 721, 726 (Pa. 1964)). A person may incur liability for conversion

by “[u]nreasonably withholding possession from one who has the right to

it.” Martin v. National Sur. Corp., 262 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. 1970).

      As stated above, the trial court concluded (a) Appellant admitted the

Law Firm had complied with the Employment Agreement; and (b) Lavery’s

delegation of his bonus decision to the shareholders did not breach the

Employment Agreement. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/22, at 10-11. Because

we discern no error in these determinations, Appellant’s second issue does not

merit relief. See id.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the

portions of Counts I and IV claiming breach of contract, conversion and unjust

enrichment based upon the Law Firm’s determination of Appellant’s 2014

bonus.   We reverse the portion of the order dismissing Appellant’s claims

based upon the Law Firm’s failure to reimburse Appellant’s business expense

and timely pay Appellant’s salary, and remand for further proceedings.

                                    - 15 -
J-S41016-22

      Motions denied. Order affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in

part for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

      Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/13/2023

                                  - 16 -