Court Opinion

ID: 9644457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:56:58.079734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:13.827091
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Associate Justice
(dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority that under the statutes which govern condemnation proceedings brought in the District of Columbia for the use of the United States an appeal is not barred by the omission of the losing parties below to move to set aside the verdict and to move for a new trial. I agree also that there was no reversible error in rulings upon the admissibility of evidence, except one. Concerning that my views are as follows:
The trial court, upon the issue of market value of the appellants’ property, ex-*444eluded evidence offered by the appellants as to the amount paid by the United States for property similar to that which was the subject of the present action. Upon the question whether in a condemnation proceeding evidence may be introduced as to the price paid by a condemnor for property similar to that in suit, there is a division of authority. The weight of authority outside this jurisdiction is that such evidence is inadmissible. But in Washington Home for Incurables v. Hazen, 1934, 63 App.D.C. 185, 70 F.2d 847, we adopted the minority rule and held the admission of such evidence proper. We based our ruling upon O’Malley v. Commonwealth, 1902, 182 Mass. 196, 65 N.E. 30, in which the opinion for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was written by Holmes, then Chief Justice of that tribunal. See, also, supporting the minority rule the following cases: Eames v. Southern New Hampshire Hydro-Electric Corp., 1932, 85 N.H.379, 159 A. 128; Shaw v. Monongahela R. Co., 1931, 110 W.Va. 155, 157 S.E. 170; Texas P. M. P. T. R. R. v. Elliott, 1928, 166 La. 347, 117 So. 275; Curley v. Jersey City, 1912, 83 N.J.L. 760, 85 A. 197, 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 985; cf. Hanson Co. v. United States, 1923, 261 U. S. 581, 43 S.Ct. 442, 67 L.Ed. 809. The theory of admissibility is that although evidence of’ a purchase by the condemnor of property similar to that involved in a condemnation proceeding is less persuasive on the issue of market value than evidence of a purchase by a stranger, there is no reason in principle why such evidence should not be admitted provided the purchase by the condemnor was made without compulsion; in short, it is held that objection to this type of evidence goes to its weight, not to its competency.
But the condition upon admissibility that the purchase must have been without compulsion must be fulfilled, and it is therefore the duty of the trial judge to determine as a preliminary fact bearing upon the admissibility of proffered evidence of this type whether or not the purchase by the condemnor was without compulsion. The burden of establishing this fact is upon the party offering the evidence. City of Mt. Olive v. Braje, 1937, 366 Ill. 132, 7 N.E.2d 851; Wright v. Commonwealth, 1934, 286 Mass. 371, 190 N.E. 593; Eames v. Southern New Hampshire Hydro-Electric Corp., supra; Kankakee Park Dist. v. Heidenreich, 1927, 328 Ill. 198, 159 N.E. 289; see State Highway Commission v. Buchanan, 1936, 175 Miss. 157, 165 So. 795, 166 So. 537, 538.1 This is in accord with the usual rule that a proponent of evidence must accept the burden of establishing preliminary facts essential to its admissibility. See 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 18, p. 347.
In the instant case the record shows that the trial judge took no evidence upon the question whether the purchase by the United States sought to be proved was without compulsion. I think therefore that the case should be reversed and that at a retrial, if the appellants again offer this evidence, they should be given the opportunity of showing that the purchase was without compulsion, and that if they make this showing to the satisfaction of the trial judge, the evidence must be admitted. I think it cannot be said that the exclusion of the evidence was not prejudicial.
I think it not warranted to dispose of the case as the majority does — by holding that the appellants did not establish as a preliminary fact that the purchase by the Government was without compulsion and were therefore 'not entitled to introduce the evidence — for the reason that Washington Home for Incurables v. Hazen left the law in doubt in this jurisdiction in re*445spect of the question whether the proponent of the evidence should qualify it or the objector disqualify it. The record in the instant case shows several pages of confused colloquy between counsel and the trial judge in respect of the admissibility of the evidence in question. The judge ruled twice that it was admissible and then once that it was not. I think the confusion was in part due to the fact that Washington Home for Incurables v. Hazen did not determine the question of the burden of qualifying or disqualifying the evidence. Since the law with respect to the duty of qualifying proffered evidence of purchases of other similar property by the condemnor is for the first time made certain in this jurisdiction in the instant de-cisión it seems to me harsh to deny to the appellants the opportunity of introducing the evidence proffered if they can qualify it. That they can qualify it would seem hardly doubtful because the circumstances under which a condemnor would be under compulsion must be most unusual— since if a condemnor cannot purchase at a reasonable price he is at liberty to take the property by condemnation proceedings.

 In a note entitled “Evidence of Sales in Condemnation Proceedings,” 32 Col.L. Rev. (1932) 1053, the author states at page 1055: “Although generally it is incumbent upon the proponent [of evidence of prior sales] to lay a foundation for the admissibility of the evidence by showing substantial similarity, there is a presumption that sales are voluntary and the burden here is thrown on the attacker.” In support of the statement contained in the last clause of the sentence quoted, which it will be noted is contrary to the statav&nt made in that part of the text to which this footnote is appended, the author cites an Illinois case: South Park Com’rs v. Livingston, 1931, 344 Ill. 368, 176 N.E. 546. This case, which stands squarely for the proposition for which it is cited, is contrary to the two Illinois cases cited in the text. Of the two cases cited in the text, one (Kankakee Park Dist. v. Heidenreich, 1927, 328 Ill. 198, 159 N.E. 289) was decided prior to the Livingston case, the other (City of Mt. Olive v. Braje, 1937, 366 Ill. 132, 7 N.E.2d 851) thereafter. The Illinois court has not, so far as I can ascertain, commented upon this divergence in its decisions.