Court Opinion

ID: 9624725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:15:13.556429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:53.670644
License: Public Domain

On Respondent’s Objections To Cost Bill
ROSSMAN, J.
This cause is again before us, this time upon objections presented by the state to two items in the cost bill filed by the successful appellant. The items are $496 and $222; they represent, respectively, the charges entered by the appellant for the printing of his opening brief and his reply brief. The former was 248 pages in length and the latter 111. The state does not challenge either charge in its entirety, although, if its challenges are completely sustained, each charge will be materially reduced. The state’s objections to the two printing items are the following: (1) The headings, “Legal Propositions,” “Points and Authorities,” “Argument,” and “Reply to Proposition I,” etc., which precede the divisions into which the briefs were cast, were not printed in 12 point type (see Rule 15, Rules of the Supreme Court, which became Rule 26 under the revision of June 1, 1955) but in size 14. (2) The parts of the briefs which submitted the appellant’s propositions and which constituted divisional headings were not spaced four lines to the inch (see the rule just cited) but 3.6 lines to the inch. (3) The appellant’s briefs “used a full-bodied type face which expanded *354the size” of the briefs 30 pages. (4) The appellant’s opening brief did not present merely the assignment of error which we sustained but also 12 others. (5) The appellant’s briefs at places repeated statements. (6) The argument in behalf of the 12th assignment of error employed “redundancies and repetitions.” (7) Some assignments of error could have been consolidated.
The states’ objections to the appellant’s cost bill declare: “While the body of appellant’s opening and reply briefs are printed in 12 point type in accordance with Eule 15 of the Eules of the Supreme Court, appellant adopted and used a full-bodied type face which expanded the size of said briefs.” Thus, the state acknowledges that the parts of the briefs which submitted the appellant’s argument, as distinguished from other parts which consisted of captions or headlines, employed the required size type.
The aforementioned rule of this court says: ‘ ‘ Type used shall be 11 or 12 point spaced four lines to inch; excerpts and citations six lines to inch.” A total of 72 lines of the opening and reply briefs, which constituted chapter and divisional headings, appear in 14 point type. Those 72 lines, therefore, exceeded the size premitted by our rules. The appellant’s briefs were printed 24 lines to the page although an occasional page contains 25 lines. Accordingly, the 72 lines of 14 point type could be deemed the equivalent of three pages. When the challenged briefs were prepared, our rules entitled the successful party to enter in his cost bill a charge of $2.00 for each page of his brief. The state makes no claim that the appellant was not entitled to employ chapter headings. Those devices are often useful and enable the reader to grasp more readily the briefwriter’s meaning. Therefore, the breach of our *355rules did not consist of the use of captions but of printing them in oversize type. We do not know how much extra space was consumed when those 72 lines were set in 14 point instead of 12 point, but are satisfied that it was negligible and unworthy of retaxation of costs.
As we have seen, the state claims that parts of the appellant’s opening brief were not spaced four lines to the inch as required by the rule previously quoted but “are spaced 3.6 lines to the inch.” The objections enumerated, one by one, parts of 21 pages which, it is claimed, infract the rule. Each of the 21 pages submitted a short proposition printed 3.6 lines to the inch. Each proposition was followed immediately by supporting argument which was cast four lines to the inch. The total material upon those 21 pages which was spaced 3.6 lines to the inch aggregates 107 lines. The objections declare that “said lines occupy approximately five pages for the printing of which appellant claims $10 (5 pages at $2.00 per page).” A glance at the specified pages shows that in the printing of the 107 lines the pressman did not feel obliged to confine himself to four lines to the inch. The segregation of briefs into appropriate divisions, each of which is preceded by an apposite proposition which the succeeding argument seeks to maintain, is often a very useful way of presenting an appeal. The appellant’s infraction, if any, of our rules did not consist of including in his brief the propositions upon which he depended, but in giving to each a little more space than the state believes was warranted. Unless a proposition is set apart slightly from the line above it and the one below, it may be engulfed in its surroundings and fail its purpose. Our rule of four lines to the inch was, obviously, intended to govern the printing of the *356argument and not of such aids to ready grasp as headings and short propositions. Court rules cannot prescribe in detail every phase of brief printing without drawing themselves out into cumbersome length and occasionally unduly hampering a capable briefwriter. Whenever wastefulness or prodigal indications appear, this court will act. Nothing of that kind is rendered apparent by this phase of the state’s objections.
We now proceed to the contention of the state that the appellant’s brief “used a full-bodied type face” and thereby expanded its size 30 pages. Full-bodied type face increases slightly the horizontal space between words and thereby makes the page more readable. Very likely the state’s contentions are correct that the length of a brief which employs that kind of material is expanded. However, this court has adopted no rule adverse to the use of full-bodied type face and, since we know of nothing wasteful about the appellant’s briefs in that respect, this contention is rejected.
The fourth contention above stated is based upon the fact that the appellant’s brief presented, not only the assignment of error which we sustained, but also twelve others. It is not essential to the taxation of costs for the printing of a brief that the appellant should divine the contentions which we later embrace and print nothing else. So far as we know, the appellant submitted all of his assignments of error in good faith and had confidence in the arguments which he tendered in their support.
The fifth contention directs attention to the fact that the appellant’s opening brief in 17 places contains repetitious material. The state claims that an award to the appellant for printing should allow nothing for duplicate statements. The state computes the repetí*357tious material as “a minimum of nine pages for which appellant claims $18.00 costs (9 pages at $2.00 per page).”
The contention which we just mentioned presents a difficult problem. Repetition is recognized as a legitimate tool of advocacy and in the hands of a capable writer is sometimes an effective means of advancing a cause. We have no right to deny a briefwriter any means of persuasion which advocacy places at his avail. Accordingly, we cannot rule that when a brief-writer has once made a statement he must never repeat it.
The appellant’s opening brief, as the state’s objections point out, contains 17 repetitions. We will now analyze them. In each of two instances repetition occurred when a quotation from an authority was later printed again in support of an analogous contention. In another place the opening brief quoted from a source this ejaculation, “You can’t do that. If you enter an order which gives a defendant his liberty, you can’t take it away again.” Later, by way of reinforcing the argument, the ejaculation was again printed. In still another instance repetition occurred in this manner: In complying with Rule 13 (3a) now Rule 16, the appellant followed his assignment of error with a quotation of the instruction given to the jury over his objections which was the subject matter of the assignment of error. Shortly, in arguing in behalf of his exception, a part of the instruction was repeated. We think that repetition in all of those four instances represented legitimate, useful argumentation. In the fourth instance, the repetition occurred through an effort to comply with our rules.
Each of the 13 remaining cases of repetition arose when the appellant, under the heading of Points and *358Authorities, set forth propositions followed immediately with supporting citations and, next, under the heading of Argument, repeated verbatim the propositions and citations. In most places the points and authorities reoccurred under the heading of argument in exactly the same manner in which they had appeared under points and authorities without even being separated from one another by anything in the nature of argument. In other words, pure duplication occurred. When we analyzed the case prior to writing our decision we found that the repetition just described cast no light and did not promote convenience. Instead of serving a useful purpose it impeded our progress. We went back over the material at that time under an apprehension that the printer had inadvertently omitted something. The total of the duplicate material just described aggregates 116 lines, or approximately 4.8 pages. We do not believe that any allowance should be made for printing that material more than once.
Next, the state claims that the appellant’s brief employed “redundancies and repetitions” in presenting the argument in support of the 12th assignment of error, which was based upon the denial of a motion for a directed verdict. The appellant’s brief devoted 56 pages to that assignment of error. The state’s brief dwelled at corresponding length upon the same contention. We do not believe that the state’s contention should be sustained.
The final attack upon the cost bill contends that the appellant, in violation of Rule 13 (3 a) now Rule 16, failed to consolidate assignments of error which presented the same legal question. Especially in criminal cases much discretion must be left to appellant’s counsel in phrasing, aiming and marshaling his claims of error. Two challenged rulings may be gov*359erned by the same principle of law, bnt the exceptions, saved by counsel, may be sufficiently different to warrant separate treatment of the rulings. We know of no reason for believing that the appellant, in presenting his assignments of error, acted in bad faith, and the.situation affords no basis for a belief that if the assignments of error had been consolidated into a fewer number printing would have been materially lessened in volume. We disallow this objection to the cost bill.
The goal which the rules under consideration seek to attain is the preparation of effective briefs which present in an enlightening manner the contentions of the parties. We think that the briefs which were filed in this case, both by the appellant and the state, were among the best that have come to our hands in recent years in criminal cases. The state’s brief was apparently printed by a pressman who was intimately familiar with our rules, yet when it is examined with critical care an occasional violation of our rules, which added a little to length, can be found. The situation indicates that getting a brief through the printshop is a very practical matter and that our rules should not be viewed as mandates but rather as guides. We must at times be prepared to accept something less than perfection, for, if we demand meticulous compliance with the rules, every case in which costs are taxed will result in a painstaking examination by losing counsel of the winning brief and then of the filing of exhaustive objections. Thus, every case will yield a satellite case. That is a result which must be avoided.
The objections are sustained to the extent of $9.60 (4.8 x $2). The clerk will retax the costs.