Court Opinion

ID: 9892338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 17:05:00.206195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:18.044395
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/23/23 P. v. Whitley CA6

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H049307
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. C1246799)

             v.

 JACOB CRAIG WHITLEY,

             Defendant and Appellant.

         This is defendant Jacob Craig Whitley’s second appeal related to his conviction
for first degree murder. This appeal arises from a trial court proceeding conducted on
remand following an earlier direct appeal.
         In Whitley’s first appeal, a different panel of this court affirmed his conviction for
first degree felony murder with an enhancement for personally and intentionally
discharging a firearm causing death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)1 (hereafter section
12022.53(d); firearm or gun enhancement)). (See People v. Whitley et al. (Nov. 22,
2019, H043651) [nonpub. opn.] [2019 WL 6242496] (Whitley).2) The panel, however,

         1
         Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
         By separate order in this case, we granted the Attorney General’s request that we
         2

take judicial notice of the record and opinion in Whitley’s initial direct appeal (No.
H043651).
reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for the limited purpose of allowing the
trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike the firearm enhancement under a
posttrial legislative change to section 12022.53, subdivision (h). (See Stats. 2017, ch.
682, § 2 [Sen. Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)].)
       On remand, the trial court declined to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement
and reinstated Whitley’s original sentence of 80 years to life in prison. In addition, after
acknowledging that “this may not be included in the remand from the Court of Appeal,”
the trial court declined to strike Whitley’s prior conviction enhancement or to grant his
Romero motion.3 The court also rejected Whitley’s request to be declared eligible for a
youth offender parole hearing due to the alleged unconstitutionality of section 3051,
subdivision (h) (hereafter section 3051(h)), which excludes two and three strikes
recidivists from those eligible for such a hearing.
       In this second appeal, Whitley raises one claim of error. He contends that the trial
court erred under equal protection principles by failing to find him eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing.
       We decide that Whitley’s claim of error is not cognizable on appeal because it
challenges a trial court ruling that under our limited remand is unauthorized and void.
We thus do not consider the merits of Whitley’s claim. Because Whitley has not raised
any other claim challenging the judgment of conviction, we affirm it.
                  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
       In April 2015, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a second amended
information charging Whitley and his codefendant, Louis Sanchez Emanuel, with the
       3
          See People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529–530 (holding
that a trial court’s discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a) includes the power to
dismiss or strike a prior conviction alleged under the Three Strikes law); see also People
v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158.
        4
          We do not recite the facts supporting Whitley’s conviction because they are not
relevant to our decision in this appeal. We nevertheless note that, in his opening brief,

                                                 2
murder of John Cody S. (Cody). (§ 187; count 1). Count 1 included an allegation that
Whitley had personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused
Cody’s death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)). The information further alleged that
Whitley had suffered a prior strike conviction for a violent or serious felony (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a) (hereafter
section 667(a))).5 (Whitley, supra, H043651, at p. 2.)
       A. Trial
       Whitley and Emanuel were tried together in April and May 2015. The jury
convicted Whitley and Emanuel of first degree felony murder and found true Whitley’s
firearm enhancement allegation (§ 12022.53(d)). The trial court subsequently found true
Whitley’s prior strike conviction and prior serious felony conviction allegations.
(Whitley, supra, H043651, at p. 2.)
       In May 2016, the trial court sentenced Whitley to 80 years to life in prison: 25
years to life on count 1, which was doubled pursuant to section 667; plus 25 years to life
for the firearm enhancement on count 1; and a consecutive five-year term for the prior
serious felony conviction enhancement. (Whitley, supra, H043651, at p. 3.) Whitley did
not make any argument to the trial court at sentencing concerning youth offender parole
hearing eligibility under section 3051.
       B. First Direct Appeal
       Whitley appealed the judgment (No. H043651). He did not raise any claim on
appeal regarding section 3051. (See Whitley, supra, H043651, at p. 11.) In November
2019, a different panel of this court affirmed Whitley’s conviction but reversed the
judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court. In the disposition of the opinion, the

Whitley states, “If need be, and solely for purposes of this appeal, appellant accepts the
factual background set forth in this [c]ourt’s November 22, 2019 opinion, 2019 WL
6242496, pp.*2-6.”
       5
         These allegations were based on Whitley’s prior conviction for first degree
(residential) burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)).
                                                 3
panel wrote the following: “The judgment against Whitley is reversed, and the matter is
remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of exercising its discretion under
section 12022.53, subdivision (h), to determine if Whitley’s firearm enhancement should
be stricken in the furtherance of justice. If the trial court strikes Whitley’s firearm
enhancement, it shall resentence Whitley accordingly. If the court declines to strike the
firearm enhancement, the trial court shall reinstate the original sentence. Whitley’s
conviction is otherwise affirmed.” (Id. at pp. 75–76; see also id. at p. 75 [“[W]e conclude
remand for resentencing is necessary for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to
consider whether it should strike Whitley’s firearm enhancement pursuant to section
12022.53, subdivision (h).”].)
       C. Remand Proceeding
       On remand, Whitley, through his defense counsel, filed a sentencing
memorandum. In it, Whitley noted that he was 18 years old at the time of his prior first
degree burglary offense and 20 years old when he murdered Cody. Whitley asked the
trial court “to reconsider striking the strike prior, strike or dismiss the punishment on the
Penal Code [section] 12022.53[] gun enhancement, strike the punishment on the Penal
Code [section] 667(a) enhancement, and[] find [him] eligible for the youthful offender
parole program.”
       The district attorney filed a statement in aggravation, opposing Whitley’s
sentencing memorandum. The district attorney contended: “While [] [Whitley] correctly
states that ‘the trial court is entitled to consider the entire sentencing scheme’ if remanded
for resentencing, [citation] this does not apply when the remand order is limited in scope
[citation]. Essentially, ‘when an appellate court remands a matter with directions
governing the proceedings on remand, those directions are binding on the trial court and
must be followed.’ [Citation.] Deviating from the scope of the remand order is
‘unauthorized and void.’ [Citation.] The remand order was explicit, the only issue

                                                  4
before [the trial court] is the discretion to strike the gun enhancement. If that is denied,
the [c]ourt ‘shall reinstate the original sentence.’ There is no ambiguity about that.”
       The district attorney further argued, inter alia, that consideration of Whitley’s
Romero motion was not authorized under this court’s limited remand order, which did not
“purport to permit a wide ranging do over of the original sentencing beyond the remand.”
In addition, the district attorney “recognize[d] that amendments to section 667(a) now
give trial courts the authority to strike [] prior convictions” and “that because Whitley’s
case is not final on appeal, the ameliorative change may be entitled to retroactive effect.
However, the Court of Appeal did not remand for such discretion and thus, without the
permission of the Court of Appeal, this Court is not authorized to do so. The People
recognize that this [c]ourt is not interested in form over substance, therefore it may be
appropriate for this [c]ourt to indicate whether it would strike the [five] year prior on the
facts. If it would not, then the issue is moot, if it would, then the Court of Appeal can
authorize the relief in the inevitable appeal.” (Italics omitted.) The district attorney also
noted that Whitley “could seek an expansion of the remand order for this limited purpose
as well.” Moreover, the district attorney opposed Whitley’s resentencing requests on
their merits.
       Regarding Whitley’s challenge to section 3051(h)’s youth offender parole hearing
exclusion based on his prior strike for residential burglary, the district attorney contended
that Whitley’s argument was “beyond the scope of the remand” and “flawed on the
merits.”6 The district attorney asserted further that Whitley’s related arguments

       6
         Section 3051(h) provides: “This section shall not apply to cases in which
sentencing occurs pursuant to [s]ection 1170.12, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of
[s]ection 667, or [s]ection 667.61, or to cases in which an individual is sentenced to life
in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that was committed
after the person had attained 18 years of age. This section shall not apply to an individual
to whom this section would otherwise apply, but who, subsequent to attaining 26 years of
age, commits an additional crime for which malice aforethought is a necessary element of
the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to life in prison.”
                                                  5
concerning his prior burglary conviction itself were “not remotely within the remand
order of the [C]ourt of [A]ppeal as it is not a resentencing, but challenging the
constitutional basis for whatever sentence must be imposed. Not only i[s] i[t] [] outside
of the remand order, it is unauthorized as it should have been raised in the original
appeal.”
       At a hearing held on March 8, 2021, the trial court began by stating its tentative
ruling on Whitley’s requests. The court explained: “So the [c]ourt does understand that
the Court of Appeal did remand this case for the limited purpose of striking or dismissing
punishment under [section] 12022.53(d). The [c]ourt[] tentatively would decline to
dismiss or strike the punishment pursuant to [section 12022.53(d)].”
       After providing factual findings supporting its tentative decision not to strike or
dismiss the firearm enhancement, the court continued: “Although the Court of Appeal
did keep its remand narrow, the [c]ourt is mindful of the issue raised by [defense counsel]
to strike the five-year prior, pursuant to Penal Code [s]ection 667(a). . . . [¶] Although
this may not be included in the remand from the Court of Appeal, the [c]ourt does
indicate that if it were part of a remand, then, it would decline to strike the prior
conviction. Similarly, with respect to the Romero motion, I’m not clear that [defense
counsel] gets a second bite at the apple. But the [c]ourt did consider all of the arguments
raised by [defense counsel] with respect to the . . . renewed Romero motion, and the
[c]ourt would decline to grant the Romero motion. The [c]ourt’s position on this issue
remains the same.” (Italics added.)
       Regarding Whitley’s request that the trial court find him to be eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing, the trial court said: “The [c]ourt would decline to find that Penal
Code [s]ection 3051(h) is unconstitutional.”
       After the trial court provided its tentative ruling, defense counsel presented oral
argument and acknowledged the limited nature of the appellate remand saying: “The
reason I brought up all those issues just now, even though it’s probably true what [the
                                                  6
prosecutor] says, that until you decide what you were going to do on the [section
12022.53] issue, there really wasn’t necessarily room to bring those issues in. However,
it was my opinion that the [c]ourt would prefer that I bring up all those issues, and that
the [c]ourt make its decisions instead of waiting for that one decision, and then say, Oh,
I’m sorry, I need to come back. So that was the reason that I put the things in the
paper[s] that I needed to bring up.” The court responded to defense counsel by saying:
“In fairness, [the prosecutor] has also indicated in his papers that . . . this [c]ourt, at
least, is form over substance, is not something that is good for judicial efficiency [sic].
So thank you. I’m quite comfortable ruling on all the issues, and if the Court of Appeal
doesn’t agree, that’s perfectly fine. They can remand, and I’ll follow their instruction.”
       Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, the trial court “adopt[ed] its
tentative ruling, as previously indicated.” The court stated further that Whitley’s
“original sentence is reinstated.”
       Whitley’s defense counsel timely filed a notice of appeal.7
                                      II. DISCUSSION
       Whitley raises a single claim of error: He contends that the exclusion of an
offender from eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051(h) based

       7
          In the notice of appeal form, defense counsel endorsed a preprinted statement
intended for an appeal “after entry of a plea of guilty or no contest or an admission of a
probation violation.” (Italics omitted.) That statement reads: “This appeal is based on
the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the
plea. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).)” No other statement regarding the nature of
Whitley’s appeal (beyond the seemingly erroneous one quoted here) appears in the notice
of appeal.
        In this court, regarding appealability, Whitley states in his opening brief that his
notice of appeal was filed “from an order made after judgment affecting the defendant’s
substantial rights. (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (b).)” Subsequently, in his answer to the
district attorney’s amicus brief, Whitley admits having erred in his statement of
appealability and says, instead, that this “appeal was from the final judgment.” Given
Whitley’s ultimate statement on appealability, we proceed with the understanding that
Whitley is appealing from a final judgment of conviction entered on March 8, 2021,
when the trial court reinstated his original sentence. (§ 1237, subd. (a).)
                                                   7
on his or her sentencing as a second-strike offender under the Three Strikes law (see
§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) is unconstitutional under equal protection
principles. Whitley acknowledges that three published Court of Appeal opinions on the
issue have rejected his argument: People v. Wilkes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1159 (Wilkes);
People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856 (Moore); and People v. Delgado (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 95 (Delgado). Nonetheless, he asserts that for the purpose of section 3051,
two-strikes offenders are similarly situated to youth offender parole-eligible offenders
who do not have any prior strikes and, under either the strict scrutiny/compelling state
interest standard or the rational basis standard, the statute’s classification of offenders
fails to pass constitutional muster. Whitley further asserts that “the judgment should be
affirmed, except as to the ruling of constitutionality which should be reversed, such that
[he] is declared eligible for parole consideration without regard to the [“ ‘strikes’ ”]
exception in section 3051, subdivision (h).”
       The Attorney General counters that this court should reject Whitley’s facial
constitutional challenge to section 3051(h) and affirm the judgment because “multiple-
strike offenders are not similarly situated to non-recidivist youthful offenders” and “the
Legislature had a rational basis for distinguishing between the two groups based on the
greater likelihood of recidivism among prior-strike offenders.”
       With this court’s permission, the district attorney filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of the People asserting that Whitley’s equal protection claim should be denied.
As to the merits of Whitley’s claim, the district attorney argues that “the Legislature’s
exclusion of persons sentenced under the Three Strikes Law has a rational basis because
the Legislature did not have the statutory authority to include them.” That is, Whitley’s
“minimum parole eligibility term in excess of section 3051’s requirements was mandated
by voter-enacted provisions that could not be amended, at least not with the less-than 2/3
votes obtained in the passage of section 3051.”

                                                  8
       In addition, the district attorney raises “questions as to whether the equal
protection issue is even properly before this [c]ourt.” The district attorney asserts that
this court’s remand order was limited and “did not contemplate a constitutional attack on
the previously imposed judgment, especially a challenge that could have been brought in
the original appeal of [Whitley]’s judgment.” The district attorney further asserts that
Whitley’s claim of error is not ripe because “he has not been denied a youth offender
parole hearing, and won’t be eligible for one for another decade, at least.”
       In his answer to the amicus brief, Whitley urges this court to disregard the district
attorney’s “various claims that Mr. Whitley’s facial unconstitutionality argument is
forfeited and unripe” because “[i]t is well recognized that nonparties are not permitted to
raise new issues that the parties have not argued.” Alternatively, Whitley argues that his
proposed remedy is a valid one in response to the unconstitutionality of section 3051’s
two/three strikes exclusion. Whitley further asserts, inter alia, that “the scope of the
remittitur makes no difference to [his] unconstitutionality argument in this court. Even if
the scope of the remittitur had been relevant here, it would have only affected the
litigation in the trial court. The scope of a prior remittitur from this [c]ourt doesn’t affect
litigation in this [c]ourt.”8
       We first consider whether Whitley’s equal protection claim is properly before us.9

       8
          At oral argument, Whitley withdrew his additional assertion that the district
attorney forfeited his current argument about the trial court’s lack of authority to consider
the challenge to section 3051(h). That withdrawal is well taken. As noted ante (pt. I.C.),
the district attorney asserted in his statement in aggravation filed in the trial court that
“Whitley’s constitutional arguments” challenging section 3051 were “beyond the scope
of the remand.”
        9
          We reject Whitley’s argument that we should not address the scope of the
remittitur because it was raised in this court in an amicus curiae brief. As we explain, the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to address the youth offender parole issue based on the
scope of our remittitur and the timing of the relevant statutory enactments. As the issue
goes to the scope of this court’s prior order, this court would have addressed it even if it
was not raised by a party or other entity.
                                                  9
       A. Whitley’s Claim of Trial Court Error is Not Properly Before This Court
       We begin with legal principles governing remand orders and subsequent appellate
review. “Ordinarily, an appellate court has, among others, the power to remand a cause
to the trial court ‘for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.’ ”
(People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1065.) “It is well-established that ‘[t]he order
of the reviewing court is contained in its remittitur, which defines the scope of the
jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned.’ [Citations.] In short, when an
appellate court remands a matter with directions governing the proceedings on remand,
‘ “those directions are binding on the trial court and must be followed. Any material
variance from the directions is unauthorized and void.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 55, 64, italics omitted (Ramirez); see also People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th
214, 228 [“On remand, the lower court may act only within the[] express jurisdictional
limits [of the remittitur].”].) “[T]he dispositional language of the opinion . . . constitutes
the remittitur directions.” (Frankel v. Four Star International, Inc. (1980) 104
Cal.App.3d 897, 902.)
       “If the appellate court’s order upon remand grants the trial court discretion
whether to resentence and the court elects not to do so and leaves the prior sentence
intact, there is no resentencing at all—and hence no need to address other possible errors
in the sentence.” (People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 204.) “In an appeal
following a limited remand, the scope of the issues before the [appellate] court is
determined by the remand order.” (People v. Murphy (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 392, 396–
397 (Murphy), citing People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 713; People v. Webb (1986)
186 Cal.App.3d 401, 410.) We review de novo whether the trial court correctly followed
remand directions. (See Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
258, 264; Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 851, 859 (Ayyad).)
       In the disposition in Whitley, a panel of this court reversed the judgment and
remanded the matter “for the limited purpose of [the trial court] exercising its discretion
                                                  10
under section 12022.53, subdivision (h), to determine if Whitley’s firearm enhancement
should be stricken in the furtherance of justice.” (Whitley, supra, H043651, at pp. 75–
76.) The panel also ordered that if the trial court declined to strike the firearm
enhancement, it “shall reinstate the original sentence.” (Id. at p. 76.)
       Consistent with the remand order in Whitley, the trial court declined to strike or
dismiss the firearm enhancement and reinstated Whitley’s original sentence. Given the
clarity and limited scope of the remand order, the trial court’s further statement that it
“would decline to find that Penal Code [s]ection 3051(h) is unconstitutional” was a
hypothetical ruling. That is, the trial court’s statement indicated how it would rule had
this court’s remand order in fact allowed for consideration of Whitley’s claim. (See
People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [“As a general rule, we do not issue
advisory opinions indicating ‘ “what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.” ’ ”].) In addition, the trial court’s ruling on the constitutionality of section 3051(h)
is void and unauthorized because it varied materially from the remand order in Whitley.
(See Ramirez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 64; see also Rice v. Schmid (1944) 25 Cal.2d
259, 263 “[T]he trial court is bound by the directions given [in the remittitur] and has no
authority to retry any other issue or to make any other findings. Its authority is limited
wholly and solely to following the directions of the reviewing court.”]; Hanna v. City of
Los Angeles (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 363, 376 [where the appellate court did not direct the
trial court on remand to determine whether statutory violations had occurred, any such
determination would be in excess of jurisdiction on remand].)
       Because the trial court’s jurisdiction on remand was clearly limited to exercising
its discretion on the firearm enhancement and reinstating Whitley’s sentence if it declined
to strike the firearm enhancement, the trial court did not have the authority to consider
Whitley’s equal protection claim and thus could not have entered a valid ruling on the
constitutionality of section 3051. (See Ayyad, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.)

                                                  11
       In turn, because Whitley’s equal protection challenge to section 3051 was not
properly before the trial court for decision on remand, we conclude that his corresponding
appellate claim is not cognizable and thus should not be addressed in this appeal. (See
Murphy, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 396–397.)
       We have considered and are not persuaded by Whitley’s various arguments that
the remand order should not constrain our review of this appeal. Although we will not
address each of Whitley’s arguments in detail here, Whitley’s reliance on People v.
Hargis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 199, 208 (Hargis) to assert that the “scope of a prior
remittitur from this [c]ourt doesn’t affect litigation in this [c]ourt” is misplaced.10
       In Hargis, the Court of Appeal addressed an argument concerning the limited
nature of its remand order in the defendant’s prior appeal. (See Hargis, supra, 33
Cal.App.5th at p. 204.) In the earlier appeal, the court affirmed the judgment but
remanded the case for the trial court to conduct a proceeding under People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. (Hargis, at p. 202.) Thereafter, but before the remittitur issued
and the judgment became final, the electorate enacted Proposition 57. (Id. at pp. 202–
203, 204–205.) On remand, the trial court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the
defendant’s motion to have his case sent to the juvenile court pursuant to Proposition 57.

       10
           Whitley’s other arguments include: his facial constitutional challenge to section
3051 is “not subject to the usual rules of forfeiture” and “may therefore be raised for the
first time in an appellate court,” “courts have inherent constitutional authority, which
exists independent of any statute, to decline to enforce a judgment that would be facially
void because the statute on which it is based is void,” “[p]arole eligibility is part and
parcel of any criminal judgment [citations] so a judgment that incorporates an
unconstitutional time to parole ineligibility that it is based on a facially unconstitutional
statute is void, and a court has inherent jurisdiction to decline to enforce it,” “a court has
no jurisdiction to issue a judgment that incorporates a facially unconstitutional refusal of
parole ineligibility,” “accepting the [d]istrict [a]ttorney’s argument would make this
[c]ourt’s prior remittitur itself unconstitutional, as an order that enforced a facially
unconstitutional law,” and “an argument of facial unconstitutionality that affects criminal
punishment is properly considered on appeal, given that ‘the constitutionality of
legislation is always open to challenge on habeas corpus.’ ”
                                                  12
(Id. at p. 203.) The defendant appealed. Subsequently, “the California Supreme Court
held that ‘Proposition 57 applies to all juveniles charged directly in adult court whose
judgment was not final at the time it was enacted.’ ” (Ibid.) Regarding Proposition 57,
the Court of Appeal observed, “it is indisputable that defendant, who was 16 years old at
the time of the offenses of which he was convicted, is entitled to a juvenile
fitness/transfer hearing pursuant to Proposition 57, as he was charged directly in adult
court and his judgment was not final at the time the new law was enacted.” (Id. at
pp. 204–205.)
       The Hargis court, “[u]nder the unique circumstances of th[e] case,” concluded that
“the trial court should have entertained and granted defendant’s motion for a juvenile
fitness/transfer hearing.” (Hargis, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 207.) The court stated that
“[e]ntertaining the motion would not have required the trial court to disobey the
remittitur.” (Id. at p. 208.) The court explained that its limited remand was not a
“straightjacket for the trial court” because the Proposition 57 issue “could not have been
raised on defendant’s prior appeal, and [it] concerned a change in the law that altered the
court’s authority to adjudicate defendant’s case in criminal (adult) court in the first
instance.” (Id. at p. 207.) The court stated further that “even if the trial court properly
concluded it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion, the Proposition 57 issue has now
been brought before us. The scope of our prior remand is no longer relevant to our
analysis, as the law entitles defendant to a juvenile fitness/transfer hearing. [Citation.]
We are bound by the law to afford him that hearing, and so will conditionally reverse his
convictions and sentence.” (Id. at p. 208.)
       Hargis is materially distinguishable. By the time of Whitley’s initial sentencing in
May 2016, section 3051 had been amended to apply to offenders who (like Whitley) were
under age 24 at the time of their offenses, and the two/three strikes exclusion in section

                                                 13
3051(h) existed.11 (See Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1.) Thus, Whitley could have challenged
the constitutionality of section 3051(h) prior to the remand proceeding in this case.
       Moreover, Whitley does not point us to any change in law that would require us to
approve his claim and declare the recidivist exclusion in section 3051(h) unconstitutional.
In fact, decisions issued by other Courts of Appeal uniformly hold that the recidivist
exclusion does not violate equal protection principles. (See Delgado, supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at pp. 102–103 [concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a youth
offender parole hearing as a matter of equal protection]; Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
p. 864 [concluding that “the differential treatment of youth offenders sentenced under the
Three Strikes law for purposes of early parole consideration for youth offenders is
rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of addressing recidivism and
does not violate equal protection”]; Wilkes, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1167 [holding
that “the differential treatment of youth offenders sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes
law for purposes of youth offender parole hearings does not violate equal protection”].12)

       11
           “Youth offender parole hearings under section 3051 were established by the
Legislature in 2013, following a series of United States and California Supreme Court
cases addressing the constitutionality of lengthy prison sentences for juvenile offenders.”
(In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 431.) Before Whitley’s May 2016
sentencing, “[e]ffective January 1, 2016, section 3051’s provisions were extended to
offenders who were under age 24 at the time of their offenses. [Citation.] Two years
later, they were further extended to include offenders who were under age 26 when they
committed their crimes.” (Id. at p. 432; see also People v. Montelongo (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1016, 1037–1039 (conc. opn. of Segal, J.) [discussing the history of section
3051(h)]; Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4 [adding § 3051]; Stats. 2015, ch. 471, § 1 [eff. Jan. 1,
2016]; Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1 [eff. Jan. 1, 2018]; Stats. 2017, ch. 684, § 1.5 [eff. Jan. 1,
2018]; Stats. 2019, ch. 577, § 2 [eff. Jan. 1, 2020].)
        12
           The California Supreme Court denied review in Moore (Dec. 1, 2021, S271344)
and Wilkes (July 15, 2020, S262431). By contrast, our Supreme Court has granted
review in cases involving other exclusions set forth in section 3051(h). (See People v.
Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, 285–291, review granted Jan. 11, 2023, S277487
[holding that denying a youthful offender sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole a youth offender parole hearing violates equal protection]; People v. Williams

                                                  14
       Considering the differences between the circumstances in Hargis and the present
case, and even assuming arguendo that Whitley’s claim is excepted from usual forfeiture
rules because it asserts a facial challenge to a purportedly unconstitutional sentence, we
decide that the trial court’s ruling on remand was unauthorized and void. Whitley’s
current appellate claim is not cognizable. We express no opinion on the merits of
Whitley’s equal protection claim or the propriety of any future reassertion of the claim.
       Because Whitley raises no cognizable claim of trial court error in this appeal, we
affirm the judgment of conviction.
                                   III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 475, 493, review granted July 22, 2020, S262229 [rejecting an
equal protection challenge to section 3051(h)’s differential treatment of violent felony
sex offenders sentenced under the one strike law].)
                                                15
                           ______________________________________
                                      Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H049307
People v. Whitley