Court Opinion

ID: 9726725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:05:19.442457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:30.084845
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RIZZI, specially concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority. As to the trial court’s summary judgment on count IV of the complaint, however, I believe the focus should be on (1) whether the placement of a ladder may give rise to a cause of action under the Structural Work Act and (2) whether the placement of the ladder in this case may have been a proximate cause of the decedent’s death. Since the answer to both questions is in the affirmative, it is plain the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the defendant on count IV of the complaint. As to the first question, I believe that the placement of a ladder may give rise to a cause of action under the Act if the placement is a proximate cause of a worker’s injury or death. The Act provides: “All scaffolds, *** ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this State for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any *** structure, shall be erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and constructed, placed and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of any material that may be used or deposited thereon.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 60(1).) The legislative intention of the Act must be ascertained from the language used by the legislature and from the evil to be remedied and the object to be obtained by the Act. (Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry. Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 305, 317, 175 N.E.2d 785, 791.) Plainly, the language used by the legislature mandates that all ladders shall be placed as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any person engaged thereon. The evil to be remedied and the object to be obtained by the Act is to prevent injuries to persons employed in dangerous and extrahazardous occupations so that negligence on their part in the manner of doing their work might not prove fatal. (Smith v. Georgia Pacific Corp. (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 570, 573, 408 N.E.2d 117, 119.) Surely, the placement of a ladder can cause persons employed in dangerous and extrahazardous occupations to be injured or killed, especially if they are negligent in the manner of doing their work. It follows that the legislative intention is that the placement of a ladder may give rise to a cause of action under the Act if the placement is a proximate cause of a worker’s injury or death. The fact that an electric power line was involved in the occurrence makes no difference. The key question in each case is whether the placement of the ladder was a proximate cause of the worker’s injury or death. The remaining question here, therefore, is whether the placement of the ladder may have been a proximate cause of the decedent’s death. Usually, whether a certain act was a proximate cause of a decedent’s death is a factual question to be determined by all attending facts or circumstances. It is fundamental, however, that there may be more than one proximate cause. Liability will attach under the Act if a defendant’s violation contributed in whole or in part to the death so long as it was one of the proximate causes. Ewert v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc. (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 1008,1014, 405 N.E.2d 1283,1287. Bearing the above-stated principles in mind, I believe that in this case although the decedent may have been negligent and a proximate cause of his own electrocution, the placement of the ladder may also have been a proximate cause of contact being made between the decedent and the energized electric power line or electrical current arcing to the decedent. The ladder may have been negligently placed too close to the energized power line to allow the decedent to safely do his work while engaged on the ladder, or the ladder may have been placed too close to the energized power line so as not to give proper and adequate protection to the decedent if he was negligent in the manner in which he was doing his work while engaged thereon. Thus, to me, the placement of the ladder may give rise to a cause of action under the Act albeit an electric power line was involved in the occurrence. Also, in reaching my conclusion, I reject any contention that the Act should be interpreted to mean that the only basis for imposing liability with respect to the placement of a ladder is that the ladder was not secure or not properly supported. (Compare Carrillo v. Pepper Construction Co. (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 647, and Overbeck v. Jon Construction, Inc. (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 918, 923-25, 540 N.E.2d 969.) Such a contention is contrary and does violence to the legislative intention of the Act, and is contrary and does violence to long-established principles of proximate cause. Under the circumstances, I believe that there is a factual issue in this case as to whether the cause of action alleged in count IV of the complaint may be maintained. The factual issue is whether the placement of the ladder was a proximate cause of the decedent’s death. Accordingly, although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I would reverse the summary judgment on count IV of the complaint for the reasons that I have stated.