Court Opinion

ID: 9522894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:33:28.596099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:13.414733
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
¶ 41. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). I agree with the majority's conclusions on the substantive issues. But I disagree with its conclusion concerning Hellenbrand's alleged failure to comply with the trial court's summary judgment procedure order. That order directed the parties to submit "[a] Statement of Proposed Findings of Fact or a stipulation of fact between or among the parties or a combination of both." The order was inconsistent with summary judgment methodology, and Hellenbrand should not be faulted for failing to comply with it. Findings of fact are unknown to summary judgment methodology. In Bong v. Cerny, 158 Wis. 2d 474, 478 n.3, 463 N.W.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1990), we faced a similar situation. We said:
The trial court made findings of fact when deciding the motion for summary judgment. Findings of fact are not made under summary judgment methodology. The trial court decides only whether "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [whether] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
*767Id. (citations omitted).
¶ 42. If findings of fact are needed when a motion for summary judgment is being considered, it is a sure sign that the motion must be denied. Hellenbrand should not be faulted for failing to suggest findings of fact when to do so would contradict summary judgment methodology.
¶ 43. The majority translates the trial court's order into an order requiring "proposed undisputed facts." While that solves the problem for the majority, the trial court made no determination that Hellenbrand also made this translation. Were I writing for the majority, I would conclude that Hellenbrand was not required to file proposed findings of fact on a motion for summary judgment. Ultimately, however, the majority reaches the same result I do because it concludes that in any event, American Family is not entitled to summary judgment.
¶ 44. Nor do I agree that we should remand on the issue of whether Hellenbrand incurred compensable damages. We review summary judgment motions de novo. Cole v. Hubanks, 2004 WI 74, ¶ 5, 272 Wis. 2d 539, 681 N.W.2d 147. In reviewing the material submitted by the parties, we should decide whether Hellenbrand incurred compensable damages during the time his damaged vehicle was out of use. We have the trial court's record, the same record the trial court will have on remand. By declining to decide this question of law, all we have done is to invite another appeal.
¶ 45. While the amount of damages is subject to differing views, I have no difficulty in concluding that Hellenbrand was damaged during the time his vehicle was being repaired. Hellenbrand might have walked, used another of his automobiles, taken a bus or taxi, borrowed an automobile from a friend, or bought a *768temporary replacement vehicle, new or used. In each case his damages might be different, but in each case he would nonetheless be damaged. Juries should settle factual disputes. American Family is free to submit evidence showing little or no damage. Hellenbrand is free to submit evidence showing significant damages. I would not remand to ask the trial court to determine whether Hellenbrand incurred compensable damages, which is a question of law. I would conclude that he could have, and that a jury could separate reality from nonsense in arriving at a dollar figure for those damages.
¶ 46. For these reasons I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.