Court Opinion

ID: 9831541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:10:19.596736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:35.657180
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In' his motion for rehearing the plaintiff in error,. among other things, requests us to correct 'our recital in the original opinion that his contention that the take nothing judgment as entered in the divorce suit disposed of all issues involved in that suit was neither briefed nor discussed. In this we were in error. Such contention was not' •covered in his original brief, but was adverted to and discussed with authorities cited in a supplemental brief, subsequently filed, which escaped our attention. The correction requested is therefore made.
The contention piade, however, is .not sustained. The general rule is well settled that a judgment will be construed to have disposed of all issues made by the pleadings and the proof, as well as all other matters essential to an adjudication of the issues so made, unless the contrary is made to appear. In the instant case, however, there was more involved than merely the marital status of Dorothy Fletcher and Carl Cromwell, and the property rights as between them. The rights of Luella Cromwell, who was a party to the Dallas county ■suit, and the legitimacy of their 14 year old daughter, were matters of paramount concern. It affirmatively appears that these matters constituted the moving consideration for the settlement agreement made. While under a liberal rule of construction .a take nothing judgment might be held to have embodied a finding that no marital status ever existed between Carl Cromwell arid Dorothy Fletcher,' it does not necessarily ' follow that such an implied finding was the basis for such judgment. The agreement, which was the consideration'for the note here involved, was for an express finding in such judgment that no such marital relationship had ever existed. If none such had ever existed, the matter of a divorce and of partition of property as a matter of course were foreclosed. It was incumbent on the plaintiff in that suit to establish a common-law ■ marriage, grounds for a divorce, and a right to partition of community property. No evidence was introduced in that suit. Though, by proper proof, Dorothy Fletcher might have established such common-law marriage, it would not necessarily follow that she was entitled to a divorce and to a partition of the property involved. The divorce could have been refused even though the marriage relationship were shown to have been established. It does not necessarily follow, therefore, that, as a matter of law, the judgment, as entered, constituted a finding that no marriage between them had ever existed. That finding was the matter of paramount concern to Cromwell and to his wife, and the express consideration for the settlement agreement. The judgment entered did not embody it, and consequently such consideration failed.
To the extent of correcting the misre-citals in our original opinion, the motion for rehearing is granted. In all other respects it is overruled.
Granted in part, and in part overruled.