Court Opinion

ID: 9394764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 14:07:02.247502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.662140
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13361

     ROBERT HERRMANN & others1 vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL & another2
                     (and a consolidated case3).

            Suffolk.     February 6, 2023. - May 16, 2023.

 Present:     Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                             & Georges, JJ.

Initiative. Constitutional Law, Initiative petition, Political
     contributions. Elections, Political contributions.
     Political Committee. Moot Question. Attorney General.

     Civil actions commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for
the county of Suffolk on October 24, 2022.

      After consolidation, the cases were reported by Wendlandt,
J.

     Lawrence Lessig (Thomas O. Bean also present) for David C.
Baxter & others.
     Ronald A. Fein (Courtney M. Hostetler & John C. Bonifaz
also present) for Robert Herrmann & others.
     Anne Sterman, Assistant Attorney General (Adam Hornstine,
Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the Attorney
General & another.

      1   Lars Mikkelsen, Joshua Redstone, and Graeme Sephton.

      2   Secretary of the Commonwealth.

      3   David C. Baxter & others   vs.   Attorney General & another.
                                                                  2

     Thaddeus A. Heuer, for Fiscal Alliance Foundation, amicus
curiae, submitted a brief.

     KAFKER, J.   The plaintiffs seek review of the Attorney

General's decision not to certify their initiative petition.4

The plaintiffs' proposed law would have instituted limits on

contributions to independent expenditure political action

committees, more commonly known as "Super PACs."   The Attorney

General determined that the proposed law conflicted with the

right of free speech protected by the Massachusetts Declaration

of Rights and that it therefore addressed an excluded subject

under art. 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts

Constitution, which sets out the procedures for the popular

initiative.   See art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 2.    In so

ruling, the Attorney General determined that United States

Supreme Court precedent precludes this type of limitation on

campaign contributions under the First Amendment to the United

States Constitution and that the State constitutional right of

free speech must extend at least as far as the cognate right

under the Federal Constitution.   See 1A Auto, Inc. v. Director

     4 The single justice consolidated two complaints from two
separate groups of plaintiffs. Each plaintiff was one of the
ten initial sponsors of the initiative petition. As explained
infra, the two plaintiff groups seek identical relief but under
different theories for why the proposed law is constitutional.
                                                                    3

of the Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 480 Mass. 423, 440

(2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2613 (2019).

    After the plaintiffs brought these appeals challenging the

denial, the Attorney General offered to agree to a stipulated

order with the initiative proponents that would have allowed

them to gather the initial round of voter signatures required by

art. 48 during their appeals, despite the Attorney General's

conclusion that the initiative addressed an excluded subject.

See Abdow v. Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 485 (2014).      The

proponents, however, refused to agree to such an order.     The

Attorney General now contends that the appeals are moot, as the

proponents did not gather the first round of signatures by the

deadline required by art. 48.

    We conclude that the cases are moot.    When the petition was

filed in June 2022, the proponents initiated a streamlined

governmental process involving numerous State actors, including

the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and the

General Court.   The petitioners' filing with the Attorney

General was timely, as it was submitted "not later" than August

2022, as required by art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as

amended by art. 74 of the Amendments.   By filing at that

particular time, they established the particular assembling of

the General Court, and thus the legislative session, into which

they would have needed to introduce the petition:   the 2023
                                                                    4

session.   It was not then within the control of the petitioners

to stop and restart the process, as they contend.    They were

required to meet the subsequent deadlines.    They did not,

however, meet the December 2022 deadline to file additional

signatures with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.      Thus, the

cases are now moot.

    Because the cases are moot and raise constitutional

questions, including Federal constitutional questions, we

decline to consider the merits.    Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390

Mass. 780, 782 (1984).    As a general matter, we avoid resolving

moot questions, unless they are important, likely to recur, and

otherwise avoid review.   See Lynn v. Murrell, 489 Mass. 579, 583

(2022); Lockhart, supra at 783-784.    Whether this issue is

likely to recur is a matter of speculation.   At this point, only

the ten initial proponents have indicated their support for the

initiative.   They gathered no additional signatures.    Thus, it

is far from clear whether the proponents would, in a future

year, collect sufficient signatures to make the question a live

issue.   The question, albeit important, is also one of

constitutional law.   We are particularly reluctant to decide

constitutional questions in moot cases.   See Murrell, supra at

584, quoting Lockhart, supra at 784.    Finally, the issue

presented raises Federal as well as State constitutional issues,

requiring us to review and decide Federal constitutional
                                                                     5

questions best left to the Federal judiciary.   For all these

reasons, we decline to address the merits in these moot cases.5

     Background.    According to campaign finance law, political

action committees (PACs) that make expenditures that are

uncoordinated with political candidates are known as

"independent expenditure PACs" or "Super PACs."    See G. L.

c. 55, § 18A (d).   In June 2022, proponents of a law that would

limit individual contributions to independent expenditure PACs

submitted an initiative petition to the Attorney General.      The

Attorney General declined to certify the petition in September

2022, as she determined that it was inconsistent with the right

of free speech protected by the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights and thus addressed an excluded subject under art. 48.

She relied on Federal cases concluding that the First Amendment

precluded such limitations.   In October 2022, the ten

proponents, split between two groups of plaintiffs, filed

complaints in the county court challenging the Attorney

General's decision not to certify the petition.   The two groups

seek identical relief but have different theories for why the

proposed law is constitutional.

     The Attorney General indicated to the plaintiffs that they

would need to submit additional signatures by December 2022, or

     5 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Fiscal
Alliance Foundation.
                                                                    6

their appeals would become moot.    To that end, she offered to

move for an order allowing the proponents to collect signatures

in advance of a judicial ruling on her denial, but the

proponents declined.6    Thus, they have not yet demonstrated

support from voters beyond the ten initial signers of the

petition.   They contend that, because they intend to have their

petition considered by the Legislature in January 2024, not

January 2023, they have until December 2023 to collect

additional signatures.

     The plaintiffs seek judgments under G. L. c. 231A, § 1,

declaring that they are not required to submit additional

signatures until December 2023 and that the Attorney General

erred in declining to certify the petition because the proposed

initiative does not violate the First Amendment or art. 16 of

the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.    In November 2022, the

defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that because the plaintiffs

admitted that they would not gather the required signatures

before December, their claims were (or would soon become) moot.

A single justice granted the parties' joint motion to

consolidate the cases and reserved and reported the cases to the

     6 Such orders are consistent with the long-standing practice
of the Attorney General and this court. See, e.g., Abdow, 468
Mass. at 485; Paisner v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 593, 595-596
(1983).
                                                                       7

full court.   In the meantime, the proponents did not submit the

required signatures by December 2022.

    Discussion.     1.   Article 48 time frame.   The first issue to

be decided is the time frame for compliance with the initiative

petition process.     Article 48 contains a series of interrelated

and tightly defined time periods for different governmental

actors to perform their respective functions regarding the

proposed law, while simultaneously imposing on proponents

requirements to gather an increasing number of signatures if

they want these governmental actors -- and ultimately the voters

-- to consider the initiative.      See Bogertman v. Attorney Gen.,

474 Mass. 607, 610-611 (2016) (describing process).

    At issue are three specific deadlines.        First, ten

qualified voters may submit an initiative petition "to the

[Attorney General] not later than the first Wednesday of the

August before the assembling of the [G]eneral [C]ourt into which

it is to be introduced."     Art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as

amended by art. 74.      This deadline provides the Attorney General

time to determine whether the initiative petition is valid,

including whether it contains excluded matters, before the

signature gathering process commences.      Second, "[a]ll

initiative petitions . . . shall be filed with the [S]ecretary

of the [C]ommonwealth not earlier than the first Wednesday of

the September before the assembling of the [G]eneral [C]ourt
                                                                     8

into which they are to be introduced."    Id.   After this filing,

the proponents may begin gathering signatures from supporters.

Then, third, "the remainder of the required signatures shall be

filed not later than the first Wednesday of the following

December."    Id.   By this point, the petition must have voter

signatures totaling at least "three per cent of the entire vote

cast for [G]overnor at the preceding biennial [S]tate election."

Art. 48, The Initiative, V, § 1, as amended by art. 81 of the

Amendments.

    After these three initial steps, the initiative is

transmitted to the Legislature in the following year.     Art. 48,

The Initiative, II, § 4.    The Legislature then has until May to

take action itself:

    "If the [G]eneral [C]ourt fails to enact such law before
    the first Wednesday of May, and if such petition is
    completed by filing with the [S]ecretary of the
    [C]ommonwealth, not earlier than the first Wednesday of the
    following June nor later than the first Wednesday of the
    following July, a number of signatures of qualified voters
    equal in number to not less than one half of one per cent
    of the entire vote cast for [G]overnor at the preceding
    biennial [S]tate election, in addition to those signing
    such initiative petition, which signatures must have been
    obtained after the first Wednesday of May aforesaid, then
    the [S]ecretary of the [C]ommonwealth shall submit such
    proposed law to the people at the next [S]tate election."

Art. 48, The Initiative, V, § 1, as amended by art. 81.     The

Legislature may also pass a "legislative substitute" to appear

on the ballot at the same time as the initiative, but may do so
                                                                     9

after the May deadline.   See Opinion of the Justices, 370 Mass.

869, 877 (1976).

    The Attorney General interprets these provisions to create

a continuous process of filing and signature gathering during a

concentrated time period.   As the petition in these cases was

filed with the Attorney General in June 2022, it must be filed

no earlier than September 2022 with the Secretary of the

Commonwealth.   Then, the signatures necessary for legislative

action must be filed no later than December 2022, with follow-up

signatures for placement on the ballot by July 2023, even though

the election would not take place until November 2024.

    By contrast, the proponents argue that the two-year

election cycle provides them more choice and flexibility.   They

contend that because they filed with the Attorney General by

August 2022, either they can follow the process outlined above,

or they can start the process and then choose to delay a year,

either for strategic reasons or, as in these cases, to pursue an

appeal from the Attorney General's denial of certification.     In

this alternate timeline, if we dispose of these appeals in their

favor, they would file with the Secretary of the Commonwealth by

September 2023, gather the necessary signatures for legislative

action by December 2023, and finally (if the Legislature does

not pass the law by May 2024) gather follow-up signatures by

July 2024 for the November election.   The proponents contend
                                                                    10

that this more relaxed calendar would allow buffer time for

judicial review of the Attorney General's certification

decision, so that they would not have to collect signatures

under a cloud of legal uncertainty.7

     "In interpreting any statutory or constitutional provision,

including [art. 48], the starting point of our analysis is its

plain language . . . ."    Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass.

189, 191 (2006).   With regard to the mandatory deadlines in art.

48, we have also said:    "It is not possible to treat these words

of the amendment as precatory or merely directory.     They are an

explicit command from the people."     Opinion of the Justices, 237

Mass. 589, 590-591 (1921).    The key dispute between the parties

is how to interpret the event to which the three interconnected

deadlines are keyed:     the "assembling of the [G]eneral [C]ourt

into which [the petition] is to be introduced," that is, the

annual session in which the Legislature will consider the

initiative.8   Art. 48, The Initiative, II, § 3, as amended by

art. 74.   Under the Attorney General's interpretation, this

     7 This rationale -- that "a contest over the validity of a
proposed initiative has an adverse effect on efforts to obtain
the necessary signatures" -- was not found persuasive in
Lockhart, 390 Mass. at 782.

     8 See art. 64, § 2, of the Amendments, as amended by art. 82
of the Amendments ("The general court shall assemble every year
on the first Wednesday in January"). Thus, the "assembling of
the [G]eneral [C]ourt" refers to an annual legislative session.
                                                                    11

session must be the one immediately following the date that she

receives the filing.   The proponents contend instead that they

can choose the assembling in which they intend the Legislature

to consider their petition after they file with the Attorney

General, as long as they meet the August deadline in an even-

numbered year (thus allowing two possible opportunities for

legislative consideration before the next election).

    We conclude that the Attorney General's interpretation is

correct.   A close reading of the text establishes that art. 48

creates a continuous, time-delimited process that occurs from

the initial filing of the petition no later than the first

Wednesday in August to the filing of the final round of

signatures by no later than the first Wednesday in the following

July.   See Opinion of the Justices, 370 Mass. at 875 ("the

deadline . . . was fixed to permit sufficient time for the

taking of the additional steps to have the initiative measure

appear on the ballot at the next State election").     Fixed time

points in August, September, and December of the same year, and

not different years, are identified, as well as the following

May and July.    The timing provisions are tightly

interconnected, identifying a series of actions involving

different governmental actors that must occur within a

relatively short period of time.   Within that concentrated

period of time, the petition is evaluated for legality,
                                                                    12

sufficient signatures are required to demonstrate significant

support for the initiative to merit further consideration, and

the Legislature is provided with the ability to weigh in with a

substitute proposal.   The process thereby provides for a timely

and efficient governmental review for proposals that demonstrate

sufficient public support.   Stale or outdated interpretations of

law by the Attorney General and unnecessary decisions by this

court are thereby avoided.   A governmental process that

petitioners can stop and start without demonstrating sufficient

public support is inconsistent with this structure.     Cf. Unger

v. Rosenblum, 362 Or. 210, 225 (2017) ("the tightly crafted,

interconnected series of deadlines" in State initiative process

suggests that proponents may not delay for "an indefinite amount

of time").

    Previously, we relied on the interconnected nature of the

art. 48 timeline to determine the deadline for the Governor's

approval or veto of an initiative passed by the Legislature.

Opinion of the Justices, 370 Mass. at 874.     We summarized the

timing requirements, and then explained that

    "in order to give effect to these provisions, which set
    forth a timetable for taking the steps necessary to have a
    proposed law placed on the ballot, we conclude that all
    constitutional steps for passage of a law, including the
    Governor's approbation or legislative action after veto of
    the measure, must occur before the first Wednesday of May."
                                                                     13

Id. at 875.   Article 48 thus creates a strict calendar that must

be adhered to for a proposed law to make it to the ballot.

    Once the initial petition is filed, the clock begins to

tick.   By filing in August of a particular year, initiative

proponents are identifying the particular "assembling of the

[G]eneral [C]ourt into which [the petition] is to be introduced"

as the next one that will occur following the filing.     If the

Attorney General denies their petition, they cannot then delay

by claiming that they now intend to submit a petition into the

"assembling" that will occur a year later.

    We recognize that when art. 48 was originally passed and

the deadlines set out above were established, the Commonwealth

had annual elections, making the deadlines straightforward and

simpler to interpret.    See Opinion of the Justices, 291 Mass.

578, 585 (1935) (art. 48 "was framed, approved and voted to be

submitted to the people by the Constitutional Convention in 1917

at a time when there were annual elections for the choice of

members of the General Court.     Its words doubtless were adapted

to that situation").     Today, this process occurs in the context

of biennial elections.    Although the interpretation of art. 48

is less obvious in this context, the article, read as a whole,

creates a continuous, concentrated governmental process that

commences with the initial filing.     Regardless of which year the

petition is filed, the governmental process continues unabated.
                                                                       14

What results is that proponents who file in an even-numbered

year have a full year to campaign after they submit their final

set of signatures, while proponents who file in an odd-numbered

year (most of them, according to the Attorney General) go

straight to the election.    The petitioners thereby control how

long they have to campaign but not other aspects of the

governmental process.

       2.   Constitutional questions.   Because the proponents did

not submit any signatures to the Secretary of the Commonwealth

by December 2022, these cases are moot.      See Lockhart, 390 Mass.

782.   Although this court may decide important moot questions

that are likely to recur and otherwise avoid review, we are

particularly reluctant to resolve moot questions of

constitutional law, especially ones raising Federal as well as

State constitutional law.    As these moot cases raise such

constitutional questions, we decline to address the merits.

       Despite mootness, "where the proceedings raise an issue

that is of public importance, worthy of decision by an appellate

court, and is capable of repetition yet evading review, a court

may in its discretion choose to decide the case."      Harmon v.

Commissioner of Correction, 487 Mass. 470, 471-472 (2021).       See

Murrell, 489 Mass. at 583.    Here, however, it is far from clear

that this issue is likely to recur.     The proponents have not

demonstrated that they have the requisite support to satisfy the
                                                                  15

different signature gathering obligations set out in art. 48

necessary to make this an issue requiring judicial resolution.

So far, they have only indicated that they themselves support

the petition.    Thus, "it is not clear that the issues will arise

again in the same form or in any form."    Lockhart, 390 Mass. at

784.

       We have also emphasized that we are particularly reluctant

to decide moot constitutional questions.    As this court

explained in Lockhart, another case involving the Attorney

General's declining to certify a petition and the failure of the

petitioners to gather the necessary number of signatures, we

have a "long tradition of not unnecessarily deciding

constitutional questions."    Lockhart, 390 Mass. at 784.   See

also Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. C.R., 484 Mass. 472, 488 (2020)

("We do not . . . decide constitutional questions unnecessarily

or prematurely").    When the case is moot, we exercise "'judicial

restraint,' especially regarding purported constitutional

claims."   Lockhart, supra, quoting Blake v. Massachusetts Parole

Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 707 (1976).

       It is even more important for us to exercise such restraint

when the moot question that we are asked to decide is one based

on Federal constitutional law, as it is here.    See Breese v.

Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 166 (Alaska 1972) ("avoidance of the

federal thicket is the better course"); Portland v. Jacobsky,
                                                                   16

496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985) ("policy of judicial restraint

impels us to forbear from ruling on federal constitutional

questions").   While the question whether a proposed law bears on

an excluded subject under art. 48 is by its terms a question of

State constitutional law, see Associated Indus. of Mass. v.

Attorney Gen., 418 Mass. 279, 284 (1994), in the instant cases,

the question to be decided ultimately revolves around Federal

constitutional law.     This is because we cannot provide less

protection under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights for

political contributions than that provided for such

contributions under the First Amendment, and at least in regard

to political contributions by corporations, we have stated:       "We

see no reason to conclude that art. 16 or 19 gives corporations

greater rights of political participation than they enjoy under

the First Amendment."    1A Auto, Inc., 480 Mass. at 440.

Recognizing the significant protections found so far by the

Federal courts for political contributions, the Attorney General

therefore turned to Federal constitutional law and the Federal

courts for guidance on what was precluded by the Federal

Constitution and thus art. 48 as well.     If we were to decide

this now moot question, we would have to do the same, deciding

unnecessarily a question best left to the Federal judiciary.
                                                                 17

Exercising judicial restraint for the reasons explained supra,

we decline to do so.9

     Conclusion.   Article 48 requires proponents to collect

signatures in the months immediately following the proponents'

filing of an initiative petition with the Attorney General.

Because the plaintiffs in the instant cases did not follow this

timeline, these cases are moot.   We also decline to exercise our

discretion to resolve a moot issue, as this matter has not been

demonstrated to be one of those rare issues that are likely to

recur and yet avoid review.   Harmon, 487 Mass. at 471-472.

Finally and importantly, this court exercises judicial restraint

and does not unnecessarily resolve State and Federal

constitutional questions in a moot case.   For all of the reasons

stated supra, these cases are dismissed.

                                    So ordered.

     9 We also note that if, in the future, we are required to
revisit whether limitations on contributions to independent
expenditure PACs conflict with the Federal right to free speech,
the United States Supreme Court itself may, by that time, have
ruled on the exact issue presented.