Court Opinion

ID: 9777958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:28:58.224245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.775735
License: Public Domain

DROWOTA, Justice,
dissenting.
After considering the authorities and statutes involved in this difficult case, I have concluded that it should not be dismissed, and I, therefore, respectfully dissent. Under the law of pre-emption, by the terms of these Federal and State Statutes, and pursuant to the reserved power of the State of Tennessee under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this State has jurisdiction over a private interstate party with sufficient contacts with the forum and over waters running through its territorial boundaries. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1251(g), 1365(e), 1365(h), 1370; T.C.A. § 69-3-103(28) (Supp.1985); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 27 S.Ct. 655, 51 L.Ed. 956 (1907).
In this case, the residents, wildlife, and other resources of Tennessee, and not those of North Carolina, are primarily damaged by the contamination of the Pigeon River. This case is wholly unlike a case involving a national waterway such as the Mississippi or Ohio Rivers or the Great Lakes, where sources of pollution are many and indeterminable. Cf. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 26 S.Ct. 268, 50 L.Ed. 572 (1906). The Pigeon River is clean above Champion’s manufacturing facility, but it is fouled below it; no other source of pollution lies along its banks between Champion and the flow of the river into Tennessee. Champion is a privately held corporation; it does business in Tennessee and owns land in this State; it would for most other purposes be subject to the jurisdiction of Tennessee Courts. How does Champion differ from any other out-of-state tortfeasor subject to the longarm jurisdiction of a state? Exercising jurisdiction over Champion is neither unfair nor unforeseeable. Many interstate corporations must comply with the diverse laws and regulations of numerous states. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S.Ct. 633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981). Tennessee must bear the costs of dealing with the pollution of the Pigeon River, which costs could be somewhat off-set by an award of damages or even wholly alleviated by an injunction.
In effect, the Majority is permitting the State of North Carolina to dictate the policy of this State. As the United States Supreme Court has noted in regard to the sovereign powers of the States under the Tenth Amendment:
*577“[No] state can legislate for, or impose its own policy upon the other.... One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each other, is that of equality of right. Each state stands on the same level with all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its views to none.”
Kansas v. Colorado, supra, 206 U.S. at 95-97, 27 S.Ct. at 666-667. By refusing to exercise jurisdiction in this case, the Majority permits the law and policy of North Carolina to remain unfrustrated, but that of Tennessee will be frustrated; whereas, if jurisdiction were exercised, the law and policy of both States would be enforced.
In this regard, I think that it is significant that the State is not suing the State of North Carolina or its political subdivisions but is seeking redress against a private party, Champion, who is subject to the dual jurisdiction of Federal and State Governments (including that of Tennessee as well as that of North Carolina). Cf. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 286, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2365, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). The exercise of State jurisdiction in this case is consistent with Constitutional principles of due process, full faith and credit, and federalism. Moreover, Congress has contemplated such a possibility in the Federal statutory scheme itself. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1251(g), 1370. Cf. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1365(f).
Lending support to this result, a recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court analyzes the interaction of the States and Congress, noting that “the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action — the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1020, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq., allows State authority to be substituted for that of the Federal Government, apparently demonstrating the very interaction of State and Federal Governments of which Justice Blackmun conceived in Garcia, supra. Cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 341, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1805, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981) (Milwaukee II) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Because the [FWPCA] contemplates a shared authority between the Federal Government and the individual States ... it is entirely understandable that Congress thought it neither imperative nor desirable to insist upon an exclusive approach to the improvement of water quality.”). Thus, the FWPCA specifically provides that “[nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e). See also Milwaukee II, supra, 451 U.S. at 328, 101 S.Ct. at 1798 (this section of the FWPCA means exactly what it says). Significantly, the definition of “person” in the FWPCA includes a State. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5).
Nothing I have found in the FWPCA reveals a Congressional intent to establish uniform standards, providing only for minimum standards and encouraging States to go further to achieve the goal of clean water as soon as possible. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that uniformity may not be the required result in every case of this nature, having stated that “[t]he enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through their elected representatives in Congress.” Milwaukee II, supra, 451 U.S. at 313, 101 S.Ct. at 1790. Cf. Garcia, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 1017-1019. Congress has clearly incorporated the exercise of State jurisdiction into the FWPCA:
“It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to *578prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use ... of land and water resources.... ”
38 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (emphasis added). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1370. In my opinion, the entire Federal statutory scheme demonstrates the Congress’s intent that the States continue and even expand the exercise of jurisdiction in these cases to achieve the goal of unpolluted water. Being held to the standards of the State of North Carolina, when it is the State of Tennessee whose interests are most directly affected, defeats the purposes of the Tennessee Water Quality Control Act, T.C.A. § 69-3-101, et seq., as well as undermines the structure of the FWPCA. In practice, relegating a State with more stringent standards to the lower standards of a bordering' State for the sake of uniformity transforms the minimum Federal standards into the maximum standards for many interstate streams. I think that this result is contrary to the FWPCA and effectively prevents many States from enforcing their higher standards, which are clearly within their authority to enact, on any but their intrastate tributaries.
Furthermore, how any Commerce Clause purposes would be impaired by imposing Tennessee law on Champion is not clear. Champion will have to comply with one and only one standard, since compliance with Tennessee’s standard will also comply with that of North Carolina; thus, the policies and laws of both States will be enforced. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972) {Milwaukee I), foresaw that “a State with high water-quality standards may well ask that its strict standards be honored and that it not be compelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a neighbor.” 406 U.S. at 107-108, 92 S.Ct. at 1395. Cf. Milwaukee II, supra, 451 U.S. at 341, 101 S.Ct. at 1805 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder the statutory scheme, any permit issued by the EPA or a qualifying state agency does not insulate a discharger from liability under other federal or state law.”).1 In this case, unwavering conformity to purposeless uniformity does not serve the interests of federalism or of the Commerce Clause. Every case carries with it its own equities, requiring in some circumstances at least that the State interest be considered as compelling as that of the Federal Government in uniformity.
“The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else ... deems state involvement to be.”
Garcia, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 1015. Garcia then goes on to elaborate on this concept of federalism:
“[The] Constitution of the United States ... preserves the autonomy and independence of the States — independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments. [Federal] [supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States.”
101 S.Ct. at 1017 (citation omitted). Since Milwaukee II has abrogated the federal common law in this area, in light of the comprehensive scheme of the FWPCA, and because the FWPCA itself purposefully preserves State common law and statutory remedies, then State jurisdiction over a private interstate party is not pre-empted. I emphasize the facts that in this case the source of pollution is certain, that Tennessee must bear the financial and physical burdens of the pollution, that this State has substantial contacts with Champion, and considering the insubstantial effect on commerce, pre-emption is neither required nor reasonable. Cf. Hodel, supra, 452 U.S. at 310, 101 S.Ct. at 2391 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasizing that these cases involve questions of degree and that the ef-*579feet on commerce must be substantial to justify federal pre-emption). Cf. also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 1062, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983) (recognizing that considerations of degree are appropriate in some Tenth Amendment cases).
Additionally, Tennessee’s case law establishes its own criteria for pre-emption in State v. Scott, 678 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn.1984), which follows the United States Supreme Court’s cases in this area. Tennessee jurisdiction over the waters that flow within its borders is a matter within the police powers of the State, and as Justice Rehnquist noted in Milwaukee II, supra:
“[T]he appropriate analysis in determining if federal statutory law governs a question previously the subject of federal common law is not the same as that employed in deciding if federal law preempts state law. In considering the latter question, ‘ “we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” ’ Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977).”
451 U.S. at 316, 101 S.Ct. at 1792. Cf. Milwaukee II, supra, 451 U.S. at 335, 101 S.Ct. at 1802 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Long before the 1972 decision in [Milwaukee /], federal common law enunciated by this Court assured each State the right to be free from unreasonable interference with its natural environment and resources when the interference stems from another State or its citizens.”) (citations omitted). Consistently with these principles, Scott, supra, found that these
“police powers ... are not to be preempted by federal legislation unless that was Congress’ clear and manifest purpose. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 9 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). Pre-emption is compelled only if it is expressly stated in the statute or is implicit in the statute’s structure and purpose. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1892).”
678 S.W.2d at 51. Pre-emption is not clearly or manifestly intended and is not compelled by the structure and purpose of the Federal Statute — on the contrary, the FWPCA contains several provisions that preserve, incorporate, and encourage State jurisdiction.
Applying the criteria in Scott, supra, at 51, for deciding whether pre-emption has occurred in this case, I have concluded that no peculiarly pervasive Federal regulatory program is involved under the terms of the Federal Act itself and that the Federal interest is no more compelling than that of Tennessee’s, especially considering that it is this State’s water resource that is at stake. The exercise of Tennessee jurisdiction is wholly consistent with the objectives and obligations of the FWPCA. Requiring Champion to comply with the Federal and State regulations is not physically impossible, since compliance with Tennessee’s standards fulfills those of North Carolina as well as those of the Federal Government under the provisions of the FWPCA. Champion will have to comply with only one non-conflicting standard, albeit the higher one. Any need for a uniform standard cannot be disserved by this requirement.
To find that State jurisdiction has been pre-empted in this case reduces the State to an administrative arm of the Federal Government. “The Tenth Amendment was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its ‘power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.” Garcia, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 1029 (Powell, J., dissenting). Tennessee is not interfering with the objectives or interests of the State of North Carolina; this State is acting against a private party, and, if it is successful, its action will not only incidentally benefit North Carolina, but it also more fully serves the purposes of the FWPCA to eliminate pollution. Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Consti*580tution, North Carolina would be obligated to enforce a Tennessee judgment rendered against a private tortfeasor under its long-arm jurisdiction. Moreover, the effect of Tennessee’s action is not substantial upon interstate commerce. See Hodel, supra, 452 U.S. at 310-311, 101 S.Ct. at 2391 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The FWPCA cannot “require the State to abandon [its] goals, or to abandon the public policy decisions underlying them.” Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Wyoming, supra, 460 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. at 1062. No lack of comity to the State of North Carolina is implied, and I find it incongruous that North Carolina would ever defend as its public policy a right to pollute on the part of Champion.
This State has jurisdiction over the private party and over the subject matter in this case. No Federal interest is impaired or otherwise frustrated; rather, the interests of all — Tennessee, North Carolina, and the United States — are furthered. The State is acting within its legislative authority to achieve its public policy. Substantial State interests are involved in protecting the quality of water within its boundaries, which is a matter of uniquely compelling concern to the people who must use it. In view of the structure of the FWPCA and in the absence of any Federal common law, the exercise of Tennessee jurisdiction is protected by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. “This [Amendment] is not to be shorn of its meaning by any narrow or technical construction, but is to be considered fairly and liberally so as to give effect to its scope and meaning.” Kansas v. Colorado, supra, 206 U.S. at 90-91, 27 S.Ct. at 664. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.

. Justice Blackmun also reiterated that, as foreseen in Milwaukee I, the effect of Milwaukee II would be to allow States to resort to their own courts to enforce their more stringent standards on out-of-state polluting parties. 451 U.S. at 353, 101 S.Ct. at 1811.