Court Opinion

ID: 9703035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:37:41.308564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:45.000183
License: Public Domain

*539CASTILLE, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe a defendant’s escape or flight from justice acts as a per se forfeiture of his right of appeal regardless of when he chooses to flee the jurisdiction of the court; therefore, I dissent. The right to appeal should be conditioned upon a convicted defendant’s compliance with the procedures established by this Court and the laws of this Commonwealth. A defendant who deliberately chooses to break the law by fleeing the jurisdiction in an attempt to avoid the imposition of his or her sentence, should be bound by the consequences of Ms or her action and barred from appellate review of the judgment from which he or she sought to unlawfully escape. Commonwealth v. Jones, 530 Pa. 536, 538, 610 A.2d 439, 440 (1992), citing, Commonwealth v. Passaro, 504 Pa. 611, 613, 476 A.2d 346, 347 (1984) (a defendant who deliberately chooses to bypass the orderly procedures afforded for challenging his conviction is bound by the consequences of his decision).
Here, appellant attempted to avoid the courts of this Commonwealth by fleeing to Ohio prior to sentencing. The only reason that no delay occurred so as to permit a forfeiture of his appellate rights under Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S.— , —, 113 S.Ct, 1199, 1206, 122 L.Ed.2d 581, 594-595 (1993); Commonwealth v. Kindler, 536 Pa. 228, 233, 639 A.2d 1, 3 (1994) (plurality decision),1 cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 327, 130 L.Ed.2d 287 (1994), was because the police, by happenstance, were able to ascertain the whereabouts of the appellant and arrest him within a time frame so as not to disrupt the appellate process. Upon being caught by police, he now tries to benefit from the very appellate process which he sought to avoid. A defendant who flees should not be able to have it both ways.
In Commonwealth v. Craddock, 522 Pa. 491, 564 A.2d 151 (1989) (per curiam affirmance), this Court upheld the Superior Court’s reasoning that despite the fact that the defendant is recaptured and within the control of the court at the time of his appeal, his voluntary fugitive status at the time for direct *540appeal acted as a knowing and understanding waiver of his appellate rights. Id., citing, Commonwealth v. Passaro, 504 Pa. 611, 613, 476 A.2d 346, 347 (1984). Similarly, here, appellant’s escape prior to sentencing acted as a knowing and understanding waiver of his appellate rights. Consequently, I would hold that appellant forever forfeited his right to appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Jones 530 Pa. 536, 610 A.2d 439 (1992) (defendant’s voluntary, escape acts as per se forfeiture of his right of appeal). To hold otherwise will only give encouragement to those individuals who may be contemplating flight to avoid punishment. Knowing that there are severe consequences that result when one attempts to disrupt the orderly process of the court, an individual so inclined to flee will be given an incentive to stay and face the process of the court. Therefore, I believe the Superior Court properly held that appellant waived his appellate rights.2
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Superior Court affirming the trial court’s denial of post conviction relief.
MONTEMURO, J., files a concurring opinion which is joined by Mr. Chief Justice NIX.
CASTILLE, J., files a dissenting opinion.

. In Kindler, this Court held that waiver or quash was a proper remedy where fugitive status interfered with the appellate process.

. The majority’s holding reduces the incentive on behalf of the police to promptly capture a fugitive so as not to interfere with the appellate process.