Court Opinion

ID: 9893290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 16:11:40.098407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:28.782837
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Vega, 2023-Ohio-3885.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                            No. 112613
                 v.                              :

RICARDO VEGA, III,                               :

                 Defendant-Appellant.            :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 26, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-20-649286-A

                                           Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Jasmine Jackson, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Friedman, Gilbert & Gerhardstein and Marcus Sidoti, for
                 appellant.

PER CURIAM:

                Defendant-appellant, Ricardo Vega, III (“Vega”), appeals his 17-month

prison sentence and claims the following error:
      Appellant’s sentence is contrary to law because the record does not
      support the imposition of the near maximum sentence for a fourth-
      degree felony.

            We vacate Vega’s sentence and remand the case to the trial court for a

new sentencing hearing consistent with his opinion.

                       I. Facts and Procedural History

            Vega pleaded guilty to one count of improper handling of a firearm in a

motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), a fourth-degree felony. The trial court

sentenced him to 17 months in prison, a $250 fine, and ordered forfeiture of the gun

to Cleveland police. Defense counsel objected to the sentence and argued that Vega

had no prior criminal record except for a minor misdemeanor from 2016, was

gainfully employed, and had a carrying-a-concealed-weapon permit. The court,

unpersuaded by defense counsel’s remarks, noted the offense was serious enough to

warrant a prison sentence because, at the time of his arrest, Vega had a Glock 27 in

one pocket and a magazine with eight live rounds in the other pocket. (Tr. 6.) The

court also noted that Vega was in possession of drug paraphernalia at the time of the

offense, and he had previously been charged as a juvenile with committing an act

that would constitute burglary if committed by an adult. Vega now appeals his

sentence.

                              II. Law and Analysis

             In the sole assignment of error, Vega argues his sentence is contrary to

law because the record does not support the imposition of the near maximum

sentence.
             We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d

1231. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that an appellate court may increase, reduce,

modify, or vacate and remand a felony sentence if the court clearly and convincingly

finds either that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings, or the

sentence is otherwise “contrary to law.”

             “A sentence is contrary to law if it falls outside the statutory range for

the offense or if the sentencing court fails to consider the purposes and principles of

sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.”

State v. Angel, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110456, 2022-Ohio-72, ¶ 8, citing State v.

Pawlak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103444, 2016-Ohio-5926, ¶ 58.

            Although the trial court must consider the sentencing factors in R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an appellate court to

modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by

the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250,

2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 22. However, an appellate court may reverse a

trial court’s judgment if the court considered evidence outside the factors contained

in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when imposing a sentence. Id., citing State v. Jones,

163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 31, 39; see also State v.

Munoz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112006, 2023-Ohio-1895, ¶ 19.

             Vega contends the trial court was biased against him because he was

charged but acquitted of other serious offenses in another case. He implies the trial
court had already decided to impose a prison term before considering the statutory

factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 as a result of his acquittal in the

separate case. Indeed, Vega filed an affidavit of disqualification with the Ohio

Supreme Court detailing the facts he believed support his bias claim.

             An appellate court generally has “‘no authority to determine a claim

that a trial judge is biased or prejudiced against a defendant and no authority to void

a trial court’s judgment based on a claim that the trial judge is biased or prejudiced.’”

State v. Frazier, 2017-Ohio-8307, 98 N.E.3d 1291, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), quoting State v.

Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104294, 2016-Ohio-7053, ¶ 27. However,

because proceedings before a biased judge are fundamentally unfair, they deny a

defendant due process of law. State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110467,

2022-Ohio-1311, ¶ 88, citing State v. Dean, 127 Ohio St.3d 140, 2010-Ohio-5070,

937 N.E.2d 97, ¶ 48; Munoz at ¶ 24. “As a result, a trial court’s judgment may be

reversed due to judicial bias if the bias or prejudice violated the defendant’s right to

due process and deprived the defendant of a fair proceeding.” Robinson at ¶ 88,

citing Dean at ¶ 48.

              In determining whether alleged judicial bias resulted in the imposition

of an unlawful sentence, an appellate court presumes the trial court was unbiased

when it imposed the sentence, and the bias or prejudice must be compelling in order

to overcome the presumption. Id., citing State v. Eaddie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

106019, 2018-Ohio-961, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Filous, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
104287, 2016-Ohio-8312, ¶ 14. To overcome the presumption, an offender must link

the court’s inappropriate comments to the court’s decisions. Munoz at ¶ 24.

              At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel recounted on the record

how the trial court had stated that “Lady Justice was raped today” when Vega was

acquitted. (Tr. 8.) Although the trial court indicated that it “accepts all verdicts,” it

did not deny having made the egregious comment. Vega also asserted that the court

sentenced him to the near-maximum sentence even though he had virtually no

criminal record and despite the presumption of community control set forth in R.C.

2929.13(B)(1) for his fourth-degree felony. Therefore, Vega sufficiently linked the

alleged bias to the court’s decision to impose the near-maximum prison term on an

offense that is normally punished through community control.              We make no

comment regarding the propriety of Vega’s sentence; only that the trial court was

biased against Vega and that the sentencing proceeding was fundamentally unfair.

Fortunately, the trial court granted Vega bond pending this appeal and, in an

abundance of caution, we sustain the sole assignment of error.

              Judgment vacated and case remanded to the trial court, with

instructions that the administrative judge assign the case to a different judge.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE