Court Opinion

ID: 9512642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:19:00.791619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:29.146254
License: Public Domain

Judge LANSING,
specially concurring.
I write separately to disavow any implication, which might otherwise be drawn from the Court’s opinion, that evidence which has been suppressed from use at trial must be excluded in sentencing proceedings if a timely objection is made. That is an issue that we have not decided in this case.
Several jurisdictions addressing the question have held that the purpose of the exclusionary rule — to deter police misconduct — is sufficiently served by excluding the unlawfully acquired evidence at trial and does not justify its exclusion in sentencing proceedings if the evidence was not coerced and is otherwise reliable. For example, in United States v. Nichols, 438 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2006), the court determined that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit consideration at sentencing of statements obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The court said:
[A] balancing of the deterrent effect expected to be achieved by extending the Miranda exclusionary rule against the harm resulting from the exclusion of reliable evidence from the truth-finding process____ [W]e conclude that the policies underlying the Miranda exclusionary rule normally will not justify the exclusion of illegally obtained but reliable evidence from a sentencing proceeding. We believe that in most cases, the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda from the government’s case-in-chief at trial will provide ample deterrence against police misconduct____[T]he additional deterrent effect of excluding illegally obtained evidence from sentencing usually would be minimal.
In addition, absent coercive tactics by police, there is nothing inherently unreliable about otherwise voluntary statements obtained in violation of Miranda____
Nichols, 438 F.3d at 443 (citations omitted). Accord, Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363 (7th Cir.1994); People v. Mancini, 239 A.D.2d 436, 658 N.Y.S.2d 37 (N.Y.App.Div.1997). But see State v. Valera, 74 Haw. 424, 848 P.2d 376 (1993), holding that evidence obtained after inadequate Miranda warnings could not be used at sentencing, based in part upon broader protections of the state constitution.
*301In the present case, we have rejected Person’s challenge to the inclusion of his suppressed statements in the presentence investigation report because he made equivalent new disclosures of the same information to the presentence investigator. By relying upon this mootness point, however, I imply no view as to whether, absent waiver or mootness, previously suppressed evidence must be excluded at a sentencing hearing if objection is made. That issue remains for consideration on another day.