Court Opinion

ID: 9587383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:21:30.955038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:42.202778
License: Public Domain

WYNN, Judge,
dissenting in part, concurring in part.
Because the trial judge instructed the jury that it could find Defendant guilty if it found he concealed “one or more knives,” which was not the basis of the offense that Defendant faced at trial under the indictment of carrying a concealed weapon, “to wit: a Metallic set of Knuckles,” I would hold that the trial court committed prejudicial error.
It is well established that the purpose of a bill of indictment is: (1) to give a defendant notice of the charge against him so he may prepare his defense and be in a position to plead prior jeopardy if he is again brought to trial for the same offense; and (2) to enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce in case of conviction. State v. Burton, 243 N.C. 277, 278, 90 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1955). Thus, “[i]t is a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that it is error, generally prejudicial, for the trial judge to permit a jury to convict upon some *248abstract theory not supported by the bill of indictment.” State v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 164, 170, 270 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1980) (citations omitted). The bill of indictment in this case charged that Defendant “unlawfully and willfully did carry a concealed weapon while off his premises, to wit: a Metallic set of Knuckles." (Emphasis added). However, in the jury charge, the trial court instructed that the jury could find Defendant guilty of carrying a concealed weapon upon a finding that he “carried and concealed about his person one or more knives.” (Emphasis added). Indeed, the trial judge made no mention of a metallic set of knuckles in the jury charge. While the “knives” theory of the case might have been supported by the evidence, it was not charged in the indictment.
Because the indictment and jury charge allege two distinctively different theories of carrying a concealed weapon, the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct on the theory charged in the bill of indictment. Therefore, the jury’s verdict was based on jury instructions that fatally varied from the theory of the offense charged under the indictment. See Taylor, 301 N.C. at 171, 270 S.E.2d 414 (“[The trial court’s] failure to instruct on the theory charged in the bill of indictment, in addition to its instructions on theories not charged, constitutes prejudicial error entitling defendant to a new trial on the charge . . . .”).