Court Opinion

ID: 9608099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:06:13.993599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:03.210767
License: Public Domain

EAGLES, Judge.
Mr. Johnson appeals the trial court s order compelling him to submit to blood-grouping and DNA testing pursuant to G.S. 8-50.1(b). After careful review, we affirm.
I.
We note initially that “[a] court order requiring parties and their minor child to submit to bloodgrouping testing does not affect a substantial right and is, therefore, interlocutory and not [immediately] appealable.” State Ex Rel. Hill v. Manning, 110 N.C. App. 770, 772, 431 S.E.2d 207, 208 (1993). However, this Court may issue a writ of certiorari to review a trial court’s order “ ‘when no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists.’ ” Stone v. Martin, 69 N.C. App. 650, 652, 318 S.E.2d 108, 110 (1984), quoting N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1). We choose to treat Mr. Johnson’s interlocutory appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari and address the merits.
II.
Mr. Johnson first contends that Mr. Meehan has no standing to move for blood-grouping tests under G.S. 8-50.1(b). We disagree. Mr. Johnson cites the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), as authority for the proposition that a third-party, such as Mr. Meehan, has no standing to compel the husband of the biological mother to submit to a *9blood test to establish or disprove the paternity of a child bom during the marriage. We find Michael H. inapposite. Michael H. involved the constitutionality of a California statute which prohibited a third party from seeking parental rights of a child bom during the marriage of the biological mother to another man. The California statute at issue in Michael H. provided that “ ‘the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.’ ” Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115, 105 L.Ed.2d at 101, quoting Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). The statute further provided explicitly that only the husband or wife could move for blood tests to determine paternity and then only within two years of the child’s birth. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115, 105 L.Ed.2d at 101, citing Cal. Evid. Code Ann. §§ 621 (c) & (d). The Supreme Court held that the California statute did not deny third parties any substantive due process right to establish a parental relationship with the child. The Court did not hold that a putative father never has standing to challenge the marital presumption of legitimacy. Rather, the Court there held that states could place limits on such challenges.
The California statute at issue in Michael H. is far more restrictive than the North Carolina statute at issue here, G.S. 8-50.1(b). It provides in pertinent part:
(b) In the trial of any civil action in which the question of parentage arises, the court before whom the matter may be brought, upon motion of the plaintiff, alleged-parent defendant, or other interested party, shall order that the alleged-parent defendant, the known natural parent, and the child submit to any blood tests and comparisons which have been developed and adapted for purposes of establishing or disproving parentage.
Here, Mr. Meehan is an “interested party” under the statute. Mrs. Meehan filed a separate action against Mr. Meehan to compel Mr. Meehan to submit to blood-grouping tests pursuant to G.S. 8-50.1(b) to establish or disprove parentage. Mrs. Meehan’s action against Mr. Meehan was consolidated with Mr. Johnson’s original action against Mrs. Meehan for temporary custody of the minor child. Mrs. Meehan and Mr. Meehan have both filed acknowledgments of paternity. Under these facts, Mr. Meehan is clearly an “interested party” within the meaning of the statute and as such may move the trial court to order blood-grouping tests.
*10III.
Mr. Johnson further argues that the minor child was born during his marriage to Mrs. Meehan and is presumed to be legitimate. Mr. Johnson further argues that Mr. Meehan has no standing to rebut the marital presumption and that G.S. 8-50.1 should not be construed to confer standing to Mr. Meehan to challenge this presumption. We disagree. In Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968), our Supreme Court stated:
When a child is born in wedlock, the law presumes it to be legitimate, and this presumption can be rebutted only by facts and circumstances which show that the husband could not have been the father, as that he was impotent or could not have had access to his wife.
Id. at 197, 159 S.E.2d at 568. The presumption that a child born during the marriage is legitimate is a rebuttable presumption. Eubanks, 273 N.C. at 189, 159 S.E.2d at 562. It may be rebutted “only by facts and circumstances which show that the husband could not have been the father, as that he was impotent or could not have had access to his wife.” Id. (emphasis added). As our Supreme Court further explained in Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972), “[i]mpotency and nonaccess are set out therein [in Eubanks] as examples of types of evidence that would ‘show that the husband could not have been the father.’ ” Id. at 171, 188 S.E.2d at 325.
In Wright, supra, plaintiff-wife instituted an action against defendant-husband for alimony pendente lite, custody of and support for her minor child. Wright, 281 N.C. at 160, 188 S.E.2d at 318. Defendant-husband answered and admitted that the minor child was “entitled to support from him, regardless of the court’s decision relative to custody of the said child.” Plaintiff-wife, however, objected to thirty interrogatories submitted to her by Mr. Wright which called for her to answer detailed questions concerning whether plaintiff-wife was having an adulterous affair at the time of the minor child’s conception. Id. at 161, 188 S.E.2d at 319. The trial court then allowed defendant-husband’s motion that plaintiff-wife, defendant-husband and the minor child submit to blood-grouping tests pursuant to G.S. 8-50.1. Id. This Court reversed the trial court’s order requiring the parties to submit to blood-grouping tests. Id. at 163, 188 S.E.2d at 320.
Our Supreme Court reversed and held that defendant-husband was entitled to have the order for blood-grouping tests. Id. at 173, 188 *11S.E.2d at 326. At the time of the Court’s decision in Wright, G.S. 8-50.1 provided:
Competency of evidence of blood tests. — In the trial of any criminal action or proceedings in any court in which the question of paternity arises, regardless of any presumptions with respect to paternity, the court before whom the matter may be brought, upon motion of the defendant, shall direct and order that the defendant, the mother and the child shall submit to a blood grouping test.... Such evidence shall be competent to rebut any presumptions of paternity.
In the trial of any civil action, the court before whom the matter may be brought, upon motion of either party, shall direct and order that the defendant, the plaintiff, the mother and the child shall submit to a blood grouping test; provided, that the court, in its discretion, may require the person requesting the blood grouping test to pay the cost thereof. The results of such blood grouping tests shall be admitted in evidence when offered by a duly licensed practicing physician or other duly qualified person.
Wright, 281 N.C. at 168-69, 188 S.E.2d at 323-24. Although the first paragraph of G.S. 8-50.1 authorizing the trial court to order blood-grouping tests “regardless of any presumptions with respect to paternity” arguably could have been read to apply only in criminal actions in which the question of paternity arose, the Supreme Court stated:
[W]e are of opinion and hold that in both criminal and civil actions in which the question of paternity arises, the results of such blood-grouping tests must be admitted in evidence when offered by a duly licensed practicing physician or other qualified person, “regardless of any presumptions with respect to paternity,” and that “[s]uch evidence shall be competent to rebut any presumptions of paternity.”
Id. at 170, 188 S.E.2d at 324. The Court further concluded that, “[assuming the blood-grouping tests are made and offered in evidence by qualified persons, the results thereof, if they tend to exclude defendant as the father of the child, may be offered in evidence to rebut the common-law presumption of legitimacy.” Id. at 172, 188 S.E.2d at 326.
Here, Mr. Meehan has presented “other facts and circumstances” sufficient to question the presumption that the child, though bom during the marriage, is legitimate. Mr. Meehan and Mrs. Meehan have *12both filed acknowledgments of paternity of the minor child. In the trial court’s 19 January 1994 Order compelling the parties to submit to blood-grouping tests, the trial court found that while Mr. Johnson was absent in Saudi Arabia for a six month period ending 15 March 1991, Mrs. Meehan had sexual intercourse with Mr. Meehan on numerous occasions. Mrs. Meehan did not have sexual intercourse with anyone else during that period. When Mr. Johnson returned 15 March 1991, Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Meehan had sexual intercourse on at least one occasion. Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Meehan had been trying unsuccessfully to conceive a child for at least one year prior to Mr. Johnson leaving for Saudi Arabia. Mrs. Meehan learned that she was pregnant in early April 1991.
Mr. Johnson did not assign error to any of these findings of fact and there is competent evidence in the record to support each of them. The factual findings are sufficient “other facts and circumstances” to challenge the presumption of legitimacy. Based on our Supreme Court’s holding in Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. at 170, 188 S.E.2d at 324, we conclude that when the question of paternity arises, G.S. 8-50.1 allows the results of blood-grouping tests to be used to rebut any presumptions of paternity in both criminal and civil actions.
IV.
Mr. Johnson next contends that he cannot be compelled to submit to blood-grouping tests because under G.S. 8-50.1(b) only “the alleged-parent defendant, the known natural parent, and the child” can be ordered to submit to blood-grouping tests. Mr. Johnson argues that as the “presumed father-husband,” he cannot be the “alleged-parent defendant.” We disagree. From the pleadings, it is clear that Mr. Johnson is the named defendant in Mrs. Meehan’s counterclaim and in Mr. Meehan’s crossclaim. Mr. Johnson has alleged in his own complaint that he is the parent of the child. Accordingly, Mr. Johnson is an “alleged-parent defendant” as determined by the trial court in its conclusions of law and is subject to being required to submit to blood-grouping tests. The trial court concluded that “good cause” had been shown for the granting of Mr. Meehan’s motion for blood-grouping tests and therefore ordered all the parties to submit to DNA and blood-grouping testing that would provide to the court the most dependable evidence available to determine paternity.
In Ban v. Quigley, 812 P.2d 1014 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners’ argument that the word *13“father” in a statute allowing the mother, father or guardian of the child to bring paternity actions was meant to include only the presumptive father-husband as opposed to the putative father. The Court held that the term “father” was “intended to mean the putative father, presumed or otherwise.” Quigley, 812 P.2d at 1017. We likewise conclude that the term “alleged-parent defendant” may apply to a presumed father-husband as well as a third party putative father.
V.
Finally, Mr. Johnson contends that allowing Mr. Meehan to rebut the marital presumption of legitimacy by compelling Mr. Johnson to submit to blood-grouping tests pursuant to G.S. 8-50.1(b) would violate public policy and would not be in the child’s best interest. The trial court’s order compelling Mr. Johnson to submit to DNA and blood-grouping tests to determine paternity arose in the context of deciding whether Mr. Johnson or Mrs. Meehan should have temporary custody of the minor child pending the parties’ divorce proceeding. An order awarding custody of a minor child should award custody to the person that “will best promote the interest and welfare of the child.” G.S. 50-13.2. “ ‘[T]he welfare of the child is the paramount consideration to which all other factors, including common law preferential rights of the parents, must be deferred or subordinated.’ ” Surles v. Surles, 113 N.C. App. 32, 37, 437 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1993) (quoting Plemmons v. Stiles, 65 N.C. App. 341, 345, 309 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1983)). Evidence of paternity may be considered in determining what is in the child’s best interest. Surles, 113 N.C. App. at 36, 437 S.E.2d at 663. We also note that in those jurisdictions that allow a putative father to bring a paternity action to establish the paternity of á child born during the marriage of the biological mother to another man, the trial courts are required to consider whether allowing the putative father to assert paternity and seek blood-grouping tests in an attempt to prove or disprove his paternity would be in the child’s best interest. In Ban v. Quigley, 812 P.2d 1014 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), the Court of Appeals of Arizona held:
Arizona has a strong public policy of preserving the family unit when neither the mother nor the mother’s husband disavows the latter’s paternity of the child. Because of that policy, we conclude that the trial court must specifically consider whether it would be in the best interests of the child for the case to proceed before a putative father may be permitted to seek blood tests in an attempt to rebut the presumption of the husband’s paternity.
*14Id. at 1017. Washington, Massachusetts, Maryland and Kansas all have similar requirements that the trial court first consider whether ordering the blood tests and the potential impact of the results will be in the child’s best interest. See McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987); C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365 (Mass., 1990); Turner v. Whisted, 607 A.2d 935 (Md. 1992); In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331 (Kan. 1990). For these reasons, we conclude that in the context of a proceeding to award custody of a minor child, an order compelling the parties to submit to blood-grouping and DNA testing to determine paternity “will best promote the interest and welfare of the child.” G.S. 50-13.2. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order compelling Mr. Johnson to submit to blood-grouping and DNA testing pursuant to G.S. 8-50.1(b).
Affirmed.
Judge McGEE concurs.
Judge WALKER dissents.