Court Opinion

ID: 9901771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 16:01:28.473995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:38.954220
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1308     Document: 010110957265          Date Filed: 11/22/2023      Page: 1
                                                                   FILED
                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         November 22, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
  ANDREW BRYAN SOUSER,

        Petitioner - Appellant,
                                                                 No. 23-1308
  v.                                                    (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-01718-RM)
                                                                  (D. Colo.)
  LITTLE, Warden; THE ATTORNEY
  GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
  COLORADO,

        Respondents - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        Andrew Bryant Souser, a Colorado state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a

 certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his

 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)

 (requiring a COA to appeal “the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the

 detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court”). He also seeks

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1308     Document: 010110957265         Date Filed: 11/22/2023      Page: 2

 leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“ifp”). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

 §§ 1291 and 2253(a), we deny both requests and dismiss this matter.1

                                    I. BACKGROUND
                                A. State Court Proceedings
        A jury convicted Mr. Souser of sexual assault, unlawful sexual contact, attempted

 unlawful sexual contact, two counts of harassment, attempt to influence a public servant,

 and additional lesser offenses. The Colorado Court of Appeals (“CCA”) described the

 facts and the trial proceedings as follows:

               Defendant, Andrew Bryant Souser, followed the victim into
               an underpass, pinned her against a wall, and grabbed her
               breast. Souser then digitally penetrated her. After a
               bystander walked by, Souser ran away.

               Souser then went to a bus stop where he sat next to another
               female student and moved his hand up her inner thigh. She
               escaped by running away.

               Both the victim and the other female student described Souser
               and, after the police found an individual matching their
               description, identified him. Police found a feminine article of
               clothing and accessories, including a bra, when they arrested
               Souser. At trial, other women identified him as someone who
               had approached them in a similarly sexually predatory
               manner near that time, often near the underpass.

               The prosecutor charged Souser with harassment, sexual
               assault, and unlawful sexual contact for following, touching,
               and assaulting the victim in the underpass. The prosecutor
               also charged Souser with attempted unlawful sexual contact
               and harassment for his attempt against the second female
               student and with attempt to influence a public servant.

        1
          Because Mr. Souser appears pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we will
 not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).

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               A jury convicted Souser as charged and of additional lesser
               offenses that he requested. The court sentenced him for both
               sexual assault and unlawful sexual contact, reasoning that the
               touching of the victim’s breasts was sufficiently distinct from
               the later digital penetration to constitute two separate
               offenses.

 ROA, Vol. I at 145-46.

        On direct appeal, the CCA affirmed Mr. Souser’s convictions and sentence. As

 relevant here, the CCA rejected Mr. Souser’s argument “that his convictions for sexual

 assault and unlawful sexual contact must merge.” Id. at 162, see id. at 39-43. The CCA,

 applying Colorado case law to the evidence, concluded that he had committed two

 separate offenses. Id. at 165-66. It explained that “the evidence here concerned an act of

 unlawful sexual contact followed by an additional act of unlawful sexual contact that

 involved penetration.” Id.

        The Colorado Supreme Court denied Mr. Souser’s petition for a writ of certiorari.

 Id. at 168.

                               B. Federal Court Proceedings
        Mr. Souser’s § 2254 application alleged three claims, each titled “Double

 Jeopardy,” as follows:

               CLAIM ONE: Mr. Souser was convicted of both a 2nd
               degree sexual assault and a criminal sexual contact with force
               against the same victim, [victim #1]. These were alleged to
               have happened at the same time and in the same location.
               They both carry the same sentence of 4-12 years
               indeterminate. Mr. Souser was sentenced on both to a
               maximum sentence of 12 years on each. Since both offenses
               are practically the same this constitutes a violation of Mr.
               Souser’s protection under the [C]onstitution against being

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               charged with multiple offenses for the same offense, or a
               Double Jeopardy. The contention by the prosecutor is that
               to[u]ching of breasts and touching of the vagina cause
               separate offenses. This is simply not the case.

               CLAIM TWO: The offenses for 2nd degree sexual assault
               and criminal sexual contact with force are a double jeopardy
               to the charge of harassment which was also committed
               against [victim #1] at the same time and in the same place.

               CLAIM THREE: The offense for harassment of touching
               committed against [victim #2] is a double jeopardy to the
               charged of attempted criminal sexual contact committed
               against [victim #2] in the same place and at the same time.

 Id. at 7-8.

        The district court dismissed the second and third claims as unexhausted and

 procedurally barred. Id. at 169-75, 199. Mr. Souser does not seek a COA on those

 claims, so we do not discuss them further here.

        On Mr. Souser’s first claim, the district court noted the CCA had concluded “that

 Mr. Souser was not subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense.” Id. at 205.

 It quoted at length the CCA’s analysis determining that Mr. Souser had committed

 separate offenses under Colorado law. The court said Mr. Souser had not shown that the

 CCA’s rejection of his claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

 established Supreme Court law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or was based on an

 unreasonable determination of fact under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Id. at 208-10. It

 further recognized that federal courts “should defer to a state court’s interpretation of

 state law in determining whether an incident constitutes one or more than one offense for

 double jeopardy purposes.” Id. at 209 (quotations omitted).

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        The district court denied habeas relief. Id. at 210. It also denied a COA.

 Id. at 211.

                                     II. DISCUSSION
                                   A. Legal Background

    COA and AEDPA Standards
        Mr. Souser must obtain a COA for this court to review the district court’s denial of

 his § 2254 application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To do so, he must make

 “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). He

 “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the

 constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

        Our consideration of Mr. Souser’s request for a COA must account for the

 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which requires “deferential

 treatment of state court decisions.” Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004).

 Under AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated the merits of a claim, a federal district

 court cannot grant habeas relief on that claim unless the state court’s decision “was

 contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

 as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or

 “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

 presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, when the district court

 has denied § 2254 habeas relief on the merits, we must determine as part of our COA

 analysis whether reasonable jurists would debate the court’s decision in light of AEDPA

 deference to the state court. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

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    State Law and AEDPA Review
         “In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a

 conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v.

 McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to

 reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Id. at 67-68. Thus, the

 Supreme Court has “repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state law,

 including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal

 court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per

 curiam). “To the extent [the petitioner] argues the state court erroneously interpreted and

 applied state law, that does not warrant habeas relief[.]” Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904,

 916 (10th Cir. 1999); see Hawes v. Pacheco, 7 F.4th 1252, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 2021).

                                          B. Analysis

         In his brief to this court, Mr. Souser seeks a COA on two issues.

         First, he raises a claim of “illegal plea deal reprisal.” Aplt. Br. at 4. He did not

 raise this claim in his § 2254 application, so it is waived. See Goode v. Carpenter,

 922 F.3d 1136, 1149 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e do not consider an issue that was not

 adequately raised in the federal district court.”). Also, he did not raise it on direct appeal

 to the CCA, so it is also unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Fairchild v.

 Workman, 579 F.3d 1134, 1151 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Exhaustion requires that the claim be

 fairly presented to the state court.” (quotations omitted)). We thus to do not consider it

 here.

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          Second, he claims the state trial court “failed to merge . . . the 2nd degree sexual

 assault and criminal sexual contact with force” offenses. Aplt. Br. at 3. But he has not

 shown how reasonable jurists would disagree with the district court’s rejection of this

 claim.

          The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall “be subject for the

 same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.” U.S. Const. amend. V (emphasis added). The

 CCA determined, based on application of state law to the evidence, that the sexual assault

 and unlawful sexual contact offenses were separate. As previously noted, “it is not the

 province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

 questions.” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (per curiam) (quotations omitted);

 accord Hawes, 7 F.4th at 1264. “In a habeas corpus proceeding under section 2254, a

 federal court should defer to a state court's interpretation of state law in determining

 whether an incident constitutes one or more than one offense for double jeopardy

 purposes.” Mansfield v. Champion, 992 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1993).

          As in the district court, Mr. Souser has not shown here that the CCA decision “was

 contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

 as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or

 “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

 presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).

          We conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate that the district court

 correctly denied habeas relief to Mr. Souser.

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                                 III. CONCLUSION
        We deny a COA to Mr. Souser and deny his request to proceed ifp. We dismiss

 this matter.

                                           Entered for the Court

                                           Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
                                           Circuit Judge

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