Court Opinion

ID: 9529079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:47:15.647315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:39.088497
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. My colleagues approach this appeal in terms of the scope of review of the trial judge’s decision not to recharacterize defendant’s petition for relief from judgment. While I agree with Justice Spomer more generally on this point, the core issue of this appeal is the Whitfield issue and the failure to follow People v. Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d 846, 876 N.E.2d 1055 (2007). As to recharacterization, I disagree with Justice Spomer’s position that if a judge declines to review the terms of possible recharacterization, “that choice is nonreviewable.” 391 Ill. App. 3d at 251 (Spomer, J., specially concurring). My reading of People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45, 833 N.E.2d 863 (2005), is that it is reviewable. The real issue, however, is a Whitfield issue. By the majority’s approach, the Whitfield issue is not reached. Defendant was not properly admonished under the standard established in People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 189, 840 N.E.2d 658, 666 (2005). According to Whitfield, a defendant must be sufficiently admonished of any period of mandatory supervised release before entering into a fully negotiated plea. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 189, 840 N.E.2d at 666. The failure to afford a defendant that protection violates due process. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 189, 840 N.E.2d at 666. This case presents two issues under Whitfield. The first issue is whether Whitfield applies to this plea agreement. The second issue is whether the admonishment substantially complied with the standards of Whitfield. The initial question is whether defendant entered into a plea agreement that entitled him to be admonished that he would have to serve a period of mandatory supervised release. The State contends that the plea agreement in this case lacks the absolute language of Whitfield. The State points out that the prosecutor began his address to the court by stating, “Subject to approval by the [c]ourt, we have a joint recommendation to the [c]ourt that the defendant be sentenced to six years to Illinois Department of Corrections ***.” The State further contends that the use of the phrase “joint recommendation” indicates that Whitfield does not apply, pointing to People v. Holt, 372 Ill. App. 3d 650, 867 N.E.2d 1192 (2007). In Holt, the prosecutor stated, “ ‘[T]he State has agreed to recommend a commitment to the Illinois Department of Corrections for a period of 13 years, with the [d]efendant receiving credit for 247 days.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Holt, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 651, 867 N.E.2d at 1193-94. The court found that, despite the State’s failure to restate the mandatory-supervised-release requirement during its recitation, the court had substantially complied with the notice requirement by informing the defendant that he would be subject to mandatory supervised release with any prison sentence. Holt, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 653, 867 N.E.2d at 1195. The court continued: “We note that Whitfield may also be distinguishable on another ground. Whitfield specifically distinguished itself from situations where, as here, the State agrees to recommend a certain sentence. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at 667, citing People v. McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d 398, 403, 385 N.E.2d 696, 699 (1979). Where the State only promises to recommend a sentence and the total sentence imposed, including subsequent parole periods, is substantially less than the maximum sentence authorized by law, the court’s failure to admonish defendant of the subsequent parole period is not of a ‘constitutional dimension.’ Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at 667. Also, where the State only promises to recommend a certain sentence, the defendant does receive the benefit of the bargain he made with the State. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at 667. Here, though defendant categorized his plea agreement as ‘fully negotiated’ and ratified by the trial court, we note that the State categorized Holt’s plea as ‘open.’ Indeed, the State did only agree to ‘recommend’ a sentence of 13 years’ imprisonment. Moreover, applying the McCoy factors, Holt’s 13-year sentence plus 3-year [mandatory-supervised-release] term was substantially less than the 30-year maximum sentence authorized by law, and, unlike both McCoy and Whitfield, the trial court did in fact admonish Holt as to the [mandatory supervised release].” (Emphasis in original.) Holt, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 653-54, 867 N.E.2d at 1195-96. Aside from any semantic difference between the use of the term “recommendation” in Holt and the phrase “joint recommendation,” Whitfield calls for an admonition of defendant in the present case. The State correctly asserts that Whitfield distinguishes fully negotiated pleas from different forms of pleas. The distinction, however, does not apply to the case at hand. Whitfield found that the defendant had not received the benefit of his bargain. In order to fulfill the benefit of the bargain, a defendant is entitled to receive what he was promised. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 185, 840 N.E.2d at 664; Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 432, 92 S. Ct. 495, 498 (1971). The failure to provide the benefit of the bargain violates due process. In Whitfield, the defendant had entered into a negotiated plea agreement for a specific sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at 667. The court found that the imposition of the period of mandatory supervised release exceeded the specific sentence bargained for by the defendant. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at 667. Whitfield analyzed the concept of benefit of the bargain through the precedent of McCoy. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at 667; McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d at 403, 385 N.E.2d at 699. In McCoy, the defendant had not been admonished of a mandatory parole term when entering his plea. As explained in Whitfield, McCoy found that the defendant was not prejudiced for the following reason: “ ‘[T]he quid pro quo for the plea of guilty was the [prosecutor’s] recommendation that there be concurrent sentences of 1 to 3 years[,] [and] defendant knew that the court was not bound to accept the recommendation and could sentence defendant to a term of not less than 1 nor more than 20 years.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at 667, quoting McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d at 403, 385 N.E.2d at 699. Whitfield then noted that McCoy distinguished itself from cases where a defendant had entered a plea in exchange for a promise of a specific sentence. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at 667; McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d at 403, 385 N.E.2d at 699; United States ex rel. Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel. Ferris v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1977). Whitfield reported that the distinction found in McCoy had been applied in subsequent cases. The court stated: “Generally, our appellate court has drawn a distinction, as suggested in McCoy, between ‘open’ guilty pleas and negotiated pleas for a specific sentence. In situations where a defendant has entered an open plea and the trial court has admonished the defendant regarding the maximum sentence to which he would be exposed by his plea, the failure to admonish a defendant concerning the [mandatory supervised release] is not a constitutional violation, as long as the sentence plus the term of [mandatory supervised release] is less than the maximum sentence which defendant was told he could receive.” Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 193-94, 840 N.E.2d at 668-69 (citing People v. Fish, 316 Ill. App. 3d 795, 737 N.E.2d 694 (2000), People v. Brown, 296 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 695 N.E.2d 1374 (1998), and People v. Coultas, 75 Ill. App. 3d 137, 394 N.E.2d 26 (1979)). Whitfield then stated that if a defendant enters a plea in contemplation of a specific sentence, the imposition of an additional period of mandatory supervised release is a violation of due process. Reversible error had been found when the defendant did not receive the benefit of the bargain of the specified sentence. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 194, 840 N.E.2d at 669 (citing People v. Smith, 285 Ill. App. 3d 666, 670, 676 N.E.2d 224, 227-28 (1996), People v. Moore, 214 Ill. App. 3d 938, 944, 574 N.E.2d 37, 41 (1991), People v. O’Toole, 174 Ill. App. 3d 800, 801, 529 N.E.2d 54, 55 (1988), and People v. Kull, 171 Ill. App. 3d 496, 500, 525 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (1988)). Upon a review of these cases, the court concluded that due process requires that the defendant be advised of the mandatory supervised release whenever the plea is for a specific sentence: “[T]here is no substantial compliance with Rule 402 and due process is violated when a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence and the trial court fails to advise the defendant, prior to accepting his plea, that a mandatory[-]supervised[-]release term will be added to that sentence. In these circumstances, addition of the [mandatory-supervised-release] term to the agreed-upon sentence violates due process because the sentence imposed is more onerous than the one defendant agreed to at the time of the plea hearing. Under these circumstances, the addition of the [mandatory supervised release] constitutes an unfair breach of the plea agreement.” Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 195, 840 N.E.2d at 669. The mere use of the phrase “joint recommendation” does not place this case within the exception outlined in Whitfield. The discussion of the term “recommendation” in Holt derived from the analysis of the benefit of the bargain in Whitfield. Although the term suggested an open plea in Holt, in this case, defendant explicitly entered a plea of guilty in return for a specific sentence. See People v. Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d 473, 481, 898 N.E.2d 119, 128 (2008) (distinguishing Holt as limited to open pleas). Defendant did not enter into an open plea where the State recommended a range of sentences under the statutory maximum. See People v. Adams, 373 Ill. App. 3d 991, 996, 869 N.E.2d 856, 860 (2007) ('Whitfield did not apply because the defendant had entered an open plea). Defendant did not receive the benefit of the bargain as called for by Whitfield. As in Whitfield, defendant bargained for a specific sentence. The case at hand falls in line with the precedents cited by Whitfield in which a defendant entered into a fully negotiated plea for a specific sentence. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 194, 840 N.E.2d at 669 (citing Smith, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 670, 676 N.E.2d at 227-28, Moore, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 944, 574 N.E.2d at 41, O’Toole, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 801, 529 N.E.2d at 55, and Hull, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 500, 525 N.E.2d at 1225). Due process required that defendant be admonished that he would be subject to a period of mandatory supervised release with his plea. The State contends that even if Whitfield applies, the admonishment was sufficient. Defendant was advised by the trial court that he would have been subject to a period of incarceration for each count, with a total possible of 31 years, followed by a period of mandatory supervised release for a conviction on any of the three counts “[i]f you had been convicted at trial.” In Company, this court established that the mention of mandatory supervised release by a trial court when advising a defendant of the possible results of a trial does not provide due process to a defendant entering a fully negotiated plea. People v. Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d 846, 850, 876 N.E.2d 1055, 1058 (2007). Indeed, this court suggested that such a limited admonition was a clearer violation of due process. Company found: “While Whitfield involved no [mandatory-supervised-release] admonishment, in this case the trial court did mention mandatory supervised release. Arguably, however, the defendant in this case has a stronger argument than the defendant in Whitfield. Here, the trial court admonished the defendant that he would be subject to a term of [mandatory supervised release] if convicted at a trial but that, under the plea agreement, instead of the possible sentences available upon conviction, he would receive the agreed sentence of 15 years, with no mention of [mandatory supervised release].” (Emphasis in original.) Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 850, 876 N.E.2d at 1058. The admonishment did not achieve substantial compliance under Whitfield. Cf. People v. Borst, 372 Ill. App. 3d 331, 332, 867 N.E.2d 1181, 1182 (2007) (inartful admonishments of maximum possible sentences not limited to the result at a trial substantially complied with Whitfield). Defendant was not advised that he would be subject to mandatory supervised release upon entering a plea. In accordance with Whitfield, the appropriate disposition of this appeal would be to modify defendant’s sentence to a term of imprisonment followed by the mandatory term of supervised release or to remand with directions to modify the sentence, either resulting in four years’ imprisonment followed by two years’ mandatory supervised release. The majority’s disposition does neither. Accordingly, I dissent.