Court Opinion

ID: 9629231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:39:30.430757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:17.099812
License: Public Domain

Manoukian, J.,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority’s holding and its treatment of the jury misconduct issue. NRS 50.065(2); NRS 48.0125; Barker v. State, 95 Nev. 309, 594 P.2d 719 (1979). However, 1 respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion which labels as harmless error the trial court’s refusal to allow the full cross-examination of Sloan, an admitted participant in the robbery, who became a crucial witness for the state. I believe that my brethren have failed to afford to appellant the extent of justice to which he is entitled.
As part of the state’s case in chief, Sloan testified that he and Bushnell conspired to commit the robbery. Conversely, appellant emphatically denied complicity in the offense. The sole contested issue at trial was appellant’s state of mind at the time Sloan walked into and robbed the beauty shop. Only appellant and Sloan gave direct testimony on the issue of Bushnell’s mens rea, and since the circumstantial evidence of Bushnell’s intent was rather ambiguous, Sloan’s trustworthiness was critical.
On appellant’s cross-examination of Sloan, it was revealed that Sloan had previously been convicted of robbery in Texas, that he had served eight years of the sentence, during which confinement he was allegedly “mistreated,” and that he was subsequently paroled from that sentence. Thereupon, the prosecution objected to any further questioning on the subject. Appellant then made an offer of proof to the effect that in view of the past physical abuse inflicted by Texas correctional authorities, Sloan entertained significant fear of being returned to the Texas parole hold, that indeed, Sloan was hopeful that in return for his testimony, the Texas hold might be dropped, and that he was likewise hopeful of leniency in Nevada. This, appellant argued, evidenced Sloan’s motive to color his testimony against him. Nevertheless, the lower court sustained the state’s objection to the relevancy of the examination.
Defense counsel was not attempting simply to challenge *576Sloan’s general credibility, Johnson v. State, 82 Nev. 338, 418 P.2d 495 (1966), but specifically sought to demonstrate the existence of bias. The examiner should have been permitted to pursue his elicitation of the claimed discrediting testimony. Azbill v. State, 88 Nev. 240, 495 P.2d 1064 (1972). Although Bushnell himself testified peripherally to some of these matters, it is obvious that his testimony did not substitute for a probing inquiry of the witness Sloan.
In Franklin v. State, 94 Nev. 220, 557 P.2d 860 (1978), we recognized the dangers inherent in accomplice testimony. NRS 175.291(1) requires corroboration of such testimony. I view this as a legislative recognition of the suspect nature of accomplice testimony. See State v. Barnett, 437 P.2d 821 (Ore. 1968); State v. Azzone, 135 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1965). Surely an accomplice has a compelling motive for gaining favor with prosecuting authorities.
My colleagues state that the witness’s hopes for lenient treatment are relevant and that it is immaterial whether actual promises were made. In the context of the instant case, I agree. Furthermore, my brethren acknowledge the settled rule that the widest latitude must be given an accused to examine an accomplice as to his motives for testifying. See United States v. Bagsby, 489 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Padgent, 432 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1970).
The primary object of the confrontation clause embodied within the Sixth Amendment is to assure an accused the right to a meaningful cross-examination of the witnesses against him. Brown v. State, 94 Nev. 393, 580 P.2d 947 (1978); see also Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); and Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), holding the exposure of a witness’s motivation for testifying a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.
The evidence appellant attempted to elicit through Sloan was neither confusing, misleading nor unduly time consuming, NRS 48.035, and the prohibited examination was an otherwise proper inquiry into matters relevant and material to the witness’s credibility and possible bias. See Cosley v. State, 93 Nev. 352, 566 P.2d 83 (1977). Thus, although I agree that it was error to restrict appellant’s cross-examination of Sloan, I disagree with that part of the majority opinion which dismisses the error as harmless.
The error was not harmless. The evidence was admittedly close. The case was reduced to the single issue of determining appellant’s mens rea. During their deliberations, the jury asked a question concerning witness Sloan’s credibility. Eight hours *577were required to reach a verdict, compare, State v. Bailey 300 P.2d 975 (Ore. 1956), and Sloan later apparently sought to recant his testimony. The harm likely resulting from the exclusion of what I consider rather crucial cross-examination relating to the believability of the alleged accomplice cannot meaningfully be evaluated by this Court on appeal. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). On this record, the probability that prejudice resulted is great. Compare Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
In my opinion, the unwarranted limitation of appellant’s examination of the state’s key witness deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.