Court Opinion

ID: 9904523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:39:14.171764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:44.704133
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                     NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                     FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                     DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

RICHARD LEMON AND
LEANNE LEMON,

             Appellants,
                                           Case No. 5D21-2771
 v.                                        LT Case No. 2018-CA-057724-X

PEOPLE'S TRUST INSURANCE
COMPANY,

          Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed June 3, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Brevard County,
Curt Jacobus, Judge.

Matthew G. Struble and
Christine M. Deis, of Struble,
P.A., Indialantic, for Appellants.

Robert Alden Swift, of
Swift Legal Group, P.A.,
Orlando, for Appellee.

WOZNIAK, J.

       Richard and Leanne Lemon appeal the final judgment rendered in

favor of their homeowners insurance carrier, People’s Trust Insurance
Company (“PTI”), after a jury trial. The Lemons’ home sustained damage

caused by Hurricane Matthew, and after cashing PTI’s check covering the

cost to repair the roof, fence, and master bedroom ceiling, the Lemons

subsequently discovered additional damage to their home and sought to

supplement their damage claim with PTI. PTI refused additional payment

because, it asserted, the Lemons’ act of cashing the check constituted full

settlement of all claims, and thus their supplemental claim was barred by

accord and satisfaction. The jury agreed with PTI, determining that while the

Lemons had a supplemental claim against PTI, that claim was barred by

accord and satisfaction. On appeal, the Lemons argue that they were not

precluded from submitting a supplemental claim because neither common

law nor statutory accord and satisfaction applies. We agree and reverse the

final judgment. 1

      The Lemons’ home was damaged by Hurricane Matthew on October

6, 2016. They reported their damage claim to PTI, and the property was

inspected on December 8, 2016. Eleven days later, on December 19, 2016,

PTI sent the Lemons two letters. One letter advised the Lemons that there

was coverage for the loss and that PTI had elected to use its preferred

      1
        Because of our holding that PTI’s accord and satisfaction defense is
inapplicable in its entirety, we do not address the Lemons’ other arguments
raised on appeal.

                                     2
contractor, Rapid Response Team, LLC (“RRT”) to repair their property. The

letter further advised:

             Sometimes this scope changes as repairs move
             forward and new conditions are discovered. If that
             happens, you have the right to supplement your
             claim to include newly discovered damages so long
             as they are damages which are covered under your
             policy.

(Emphasis added). The letter instructed the Lemons how to proceed if they

did not agree with the scope of repairs attached to the letter, but if there was

no disagreement, the assigned adjuster or RRT would be contacting the

Lemons to request execution of a written work authorization granting

permission for RRT to commence repair work.

        The scope of repairs document attached to the letter stated in pertinent

part:

             Please refer to the enclosed itemized estimate. This
             estimate contains our scope and valuation of the
             damages for the reported loss and was prepared
             using reasonable and customary prices for your
             geographic region. If any hidden, or additional
             damage and/or damaged items are discovered,
             please contact me immediately. Coverage for hidden
             or additional damages and/or damaged items, would
             need to be determined, and may require an
             inspection/re-inspection for further consideration.
             Please do not destroy, or discard any of the hidden
             or additional damages and/or damaged items, until
             we have had an opportunity to review and inspect the
             hidden or additional damages and/or damaged
             items.

                                        3
(Emphasis added).

          The other letter sent the same day, titled “Claim Settlement Letter,”

contained statements inconsistent with those in the previously described

letter.     It stated that PTI had been unable to obtain an executed work

authorization from the Lemons and, as a consequence, PTI was foregoing

its right to repair covered damages using RRT and instead was issuing them

a check for $15,286.40.         The Claim Settlement Letter specified, “This

agreement is based upon our mutual agreement as to the scope and amount

of your loss.” It continued:

               Your endorsement of this check memorializes your
               acceptance of the scope and amount of damages we
               previously reviewed and as reflected in the attached
               estimate, it is offered solely to bring about a complete
               and final resolution of your claim. If, for one reason
               or another, you choose not to endorse the enclosed
               check, or you no longer agree with scope and/or
               amount of loss we previously agreed upon, please
               notify the undersigned at your earliest convenience
               and PTI will proceed with repairs in accordance with
               the E023 Preferred Contractor Endorsement, and
               any scope disputes will be resolved in accordance
               with the scope dispute mechanism in your policy.

(Emphasis added).

          On December 20, 2016, the day after PTI sent the letters to the

Lemons, PTI issued a check to the Lemons in the amount of $15,286.40,

which it reissued on December 28 because the first check was made out to

                                          4
an incorrect mortgagee. The check stub bore the notation: “REASON:

FULL AND FINAL PAYMENT - Full & final settlement in accord w/ claim

settlement.”

     Approximately a month after cashing the check, the Lemons

discovered more moisture damage in their home’s ceilings, garage, and

home office and advised PTI, through a public adjuster, of their supplemental

claim. Ultimately, the Lemons submitted a Sworn Proof of Loss claim to PTI

for $35,155.53. When PTI did not respond to their claim, the Lemons filed

the underlying breach of contract action. PTI answered and raised, pertinent

to this appeal, accord and satisfaction as an affirmative defense:

           As its First Affirmative Defense, without waiver of any
           defense as to coverage based the terms and
           conditions of the policy, Defendant asserts that the
           Plaintiffs’ claim and lawsuit are barred by Accord and
           Satisfaction. Plaintiffs and Defendant reached a
           mutually agreed settlement of Plaintiffs’ entire claim
           and Defendant issued the mutually agreed payment
           to Plaintiffs in performance of the settlement
           agreement.

The affirmative defense made no distinction between common law and

statutory accord and satisfaction.

     At trial, the Lemons testified that prior to PTI’s issuance of the check,

they never had any conversations with PTI that quantified the amount of

damage to their home. Rather, PTI unilaterally determined the amount of

                                      5
loss it was going to pay based on an agreed-upon scope of work; the Lemons

did not dispute the amount of the check as payment for the unilaterally

determined amount of loss because they understood they could file a

supplemental claim later if needed. Such supplemental claim was necessary

because the Lemons discovered additional damage to their home after

depositing PTI’s check.

     After the Lemons rested their case, PTI sought a directed verdict,

arguing that once it tendered the check and the Lemons accepted it, there

was an accord and satisfaction that barred any further recovery. The trial

court denied the motion, and PTI presented its witnesses. None of PTI’s

witnesses testified to the existence of any dispute with the Lemons prior to

the Lemons’ supplemental claim.

     After PTI’s final witness, the Lemons moved for a directed verdict on

PTI’s accord and satisfaction affirmative defense, arguing that it was

undisputed that at the time the Lemons accepted and cashed the check, the

parties agreed that the Lemons could submit supplemental claims should

they uncover further damage. The Lemons asserted that there was no

evidence of a superseding agreement or a mutual intent to settle a dispute,

and accordingly, PTI had not met its burden to establish the requisite

elements of common law accord and satisfaction. The court denied their

                                     6
motion and submitted the case to the jury. The jury determined that while

the Lemons had a supplemental claim for damage discovered after their

acceptance of PTI’s check, the supplemental claim was barred by accord

and satisfaction. The Lemons filed a Motion for Judgment in Accordance

with Prior Motion for Directed Verdict or Motion for New Trial, which the court

denied.

      In reviewing the trial court’s rulings, we are mindful of the applicable

standard of review:

            A trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict
            is reviewed de novo. 21st Century Centennial Ins.
            Co. v. Thynge, 234 So. 3d 824, 826 (Fla. 5th DCA
            2017). A motion for directed verdict shall be granted
            “only if no view of the evidence could support a
            verdict for the nonmoving party and the trial court
            therefore determines that no reasonable jury could
            render a verdict for that party.” Scott v. TPI Rests.,
            Inc., 798 So. 2d 907, 908 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (citing
            Blake v. Hi-Lu Corp., 781 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 3d
            DCA 2001)).

Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Motie, 335 So. 3d 205, 206 (Fla. 5th DCA

2022). A trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict is also reviewed de novo. Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Jones, 232 So. 3d

1127, 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). “When deciding the appropriateness of a

directed verdict or JNOV, Florida trial and appellate courts use the test of

whether the verdict is, for JNOVs, or would be, for directed verdicts,

                                      7
supported by competent, substantial evidence.”      Lindon v. Dalton Hotel

Corp., 49 So. 3d 299, 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing Speedway

SuperAmerica, LLC v. Dupont, 933 So. 2d 75, 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)).

     Turning now to the Lemons’ argument on appeal, the Lemons assert

that their supplemental claim 2 could not have been the subject of accord and

     2
        As noted above, the jury specifically found that the Lemons had
proved they had a supplemental claim for damages caused by Hurricane
Matthew. Pursuant to the homeowners policy at issue, supplemental claims
could be filed for hurricane-caused damages for up to three years after the
date of the hurricane:

           4. Notice of Hurricane or Windstorm Claims - If
           Windstorm coverage is provided in this policy a
           claim, “supplemental claim" or “reopened claim" for
           loss or damage caused by hurricane or other
           windstorm must be given to us in accordance with the
           terms of this policy and within three years after the
           hurricane first made landfall or a Windstorm caused
           the damage.

           This condition concerning time for submission of
           claim does not affect any limitation for legal action
           against us as provided in this policy under the Suit
           Against Us Condition including any amendment to
           that condition.

This language essentially mirrors that of section 627.70132, Florida Statutes
(2016), which defines “supplemental claim” as

           any additional claim for recovery from the insurer for
           losses from the same hurricane or windstorm which
           the insurer has previously adjusted pursuant to the
           initial claim. This section does not affect any
           applicable limitation on civil actions provided in s.

                                     8
satisfaction—common law or statutory—as a matter of law because they had

the right to submit a supplemental claim for newly discovered damage, and

thus they were entitled to a directed verdict and/or judgment notwithstanding

the verdict on PTI’s affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. We

agree.

     At the time PTI sent the Lemons the check, the only damages of which

the Lemons and PTI were aware were to the roof, the fence, and the ceiling

of one bedroom. As such, those were the only damages adjusted by PTI at

that time. Indeed, the scope of repairs document, Claim Settlement Letter,

check, and check stub referenced neither the ceiling spots nor the water

damage to the home office, which were the subject of the supplemental

claim. PTI’s check stub bore the notation: “REASON: FULL AND FINAL

PAYMENT - Full & final settlement in accord w/ claim settlement”—which

requires reference to the letter titled “Claim Settlement Letter” that further

described the purpose of the check. The Claim Settlement Letter advised

the Lemons that PTI was issuing a check for $15,286.40 and that if they

            95.11 for claims, supplemental claims, or reopened
            claims timely filed under this section.

Although not pertinent here, we note that post-trial, the statute was amended,
effective July 1, 2021, to distinguish a “supplemental claim” from a “reopened
claim.” § 627.70132(1) (a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2022).

                                      9
endorsed the check, the endorsed check “memorializes your acceptance of

the scope and amount of damages we previously reviewed and as reflected

in the attached estimate.” (Emphasis added). The “scope and amount of

damages we previously reviewed” was indisputably a reference to the roof,

fence, and ceiling claim because no other damages had been submitted,

claimed, or reviewed at that time. Thus, the “final resolution of the claim”

was the final resolution of the claim for damages being adjusted at that time.

      PTI’s performance in delivering the check to the Lemons was no more

than what it was contractually obligated to do, having chosen to pay rather

than repair, and there being no challenge to the amount it tendered. In other

words, PTI’s payment of $15,286.40 was not a substitute for a previously

agreed amount or performance. Rather, it was the performance expected

by the Lemons in the first place. Because under no view could the language

on the check evince an intention to settle future, unknown supplemental

claims, the motion for directed verdict on the accord and satisfaction defense

should have been granted as a matter of law. See Luciano v. United Prop.

& Cas. Ins. Co., 156 So. 3d 1108, 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (holding, where

insurer’s 2006 letter indicated check was net settlement only for skylight

replacement, and no check or letter indicated payment in full for, or a

complete settlement of, all Hurricane Wilma claims or indicated that no

                                     10
additional supplemental payments would be made, checks “merely evidence

performance under the insurance policy and United’s alleged breach did not

occur until United denied the claim for roof replacement in 2010”); Rizo v.

State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 133 So. 3d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)

(observing that prior checks tendered by insurer to cover hurricane damages

were not marked “in full and final payment” nor did they “anticipatorily

preclude the possibility of supplemental claims or payments”); see also Roll

v. Spero, 293 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (holding plaintiffs not

precluded from recovering further amounts under contract where they had

cashed a check containing the phrase “Paid in Full to date of abeyance”

where invoice related to check showed check was a progress payment and

no dispute existed between parties at time check was cashed).

     Because the language of the check tendered in satisfaction of the

original damage claim is susceptible of only one interpretation—that it was

offered (and accepted) in settlement of only the damages claimed and

adjusted as of that date—and there was no evidence whatsoever of the

parties’ intent to preclude supplemental claims, it was error to deny the

Lemons’ motion for directed verdict and subsequent motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict on PTI’s affirmative defense of accord and

                                    11
satisfaction. Accordingly, we reverse the Final Judgment and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

     REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

EVANDER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.

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