Court Opinion

ID: 9520671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:46:43.095168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:36.647901
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that there are two distinct police pursuits in this case that are separated by both time and distance. Rather, I believe there is only one pursuit and therefore would reverse one of Sanders' convictions for resisting law enforcement.
The offense of resisting law enforcement does not constitute a crime against the person. Armstead v. State, 549 N.E.2d 400, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). Rather, it is an interference with governmental operations that constitutes an offense against public administration. Id. A person who violates Indiana Code § 35-44-3-8 harms the peace and dignity of the State and its law enforcement authority, and the harm caused by one incident is the same regardless of the number of police officers resisted. Id. It is the act of resisting duly constituted authority that the statute prohibits, not resisting individual representatives of that authority. Id. Unless more than one incident occurs, there may be only one charge. Id. at 402. "When a defendant harms a single entity as a result of a single incident, we believe he should be answerable for the greatest harm stemming from that single incident." Id.
In Johnson v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), upon which the majority relies, a Lapel Police Department Officer, Officer Byrne, tried to stop Johnson in Madison County in the early morning hours. Johnson initially stopped but drove off into Hamilton County. Officer Byrne pursued Johnson into Hamilton County but stopped her pursuit at 3:20 a.m. due to foggy conditions. She advised dispatch of the fleeing vehicle, including its license plate number, and requested an all points bulletin. A Noblesville Police Department Officer, Officer Von Housman, heard the dispatch and saw Johnson's car within five minutes of hearing the dispatch and attempted to stop Johnson. However, Johnson refused and continued driving. Eventually, Officer Housman stopped Johnson *796and arrested him. Johnson was charged in both Madison and Hamilton counties with resisting law enforcement. After being convicted in Hamilton County, Johnson moved to dismiss the Madison County charge on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that it constituted "one continuous event." Id. at 1014.
On appeal, we held that Johnson's actions could be divided into two very distinct parts: his resistance to Officer Byrne in Madison County and his subsequent resistance to Officer Von Housman in Hamilton County. We highlighted the fact that at trial, "Johnson testified that he saw Officer Byrne break off her chase. Johnson stated that he drove around for two and a half to three hours before heading home. He testified there were no police cars behind him and that he was not under pursuit at all times." Id. As such, when Officer Von Housman attempted to stop Johnson and Johnson resisted, that conduct constituted a separate offense from his resistance to Officer Byrne. "The trial court properly found that Johnson's actions in resisting Officer Byrne and Officer Von Housman were sufficiently separated by time and distance as to constitute two distinct, separate offenses," and "Johnson will not be subjected to double jeopardy by prosecution of the resisting law enforcement charge in Madison County." Id. at 1015.
This case is readily distinguishable from Johnson. I believe the two to three hour gap in Johnson, during which Johnson was not under pursuit, is a crucial difference. Instead, in this case, Officer Cook pursued Sanders and then lost sight of him when he crossed a ditch and entered a church parking lot. Approximately two minutes and eight blocks later, Officer Somerville, who had heard the dispatch, observed Sanders drive by at an excessive rate of speed. He activated his emergency lights and siren and began following him. After an eleven-mile chase, Sanders was apprehended.
I believe that Sanders' acts of resisting Officers Cook and Somerville arose from a single incident. To me, it does not make any difference that Officer Cook ended his pursuit because Sanders, who had a two-block lead, crossed a ditch and Officer Cook did not want to damage his vehicle. Sanders was engaged in the same act of evading law enforcement when Officer Somerville picked up in the chase of Sanders a minute or two and seven or nine blocks later. See Tr. p. 76. I would therefore reverse one of Sanders' resisting law enforcement convictions. See Miller wv. State, 726 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), summarily aff'd in relevant part, 753 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind.2001), reh'g denied.
ORDER
The Court, on its own motion, FINDS AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1. This Court's opinion handed sown in this cause on September 15, 2009, marked "Memorandum Decision, Not for Publication," in now ORDERED PUBLISHED.