Court Opinion

ID: 9939660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 10:11:05.354348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:43.038558
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00004-CR
     ___________________________

   DAVID SHAUN GATES, Appellant

                      V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 43rd District Court
         Parker County, Texas
      Trial Court No. CR21-0341

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                    I. Introduction

      A jury found Appellant David Shaun Gates guilty of one count of continuous

sexual abuse of a young child and one count of indecency with a child by contact and

assessed his punishment at 38 years’ confinement for the first count and 10 years’

confinement for the second. The jury included a $1,000 fine with the indecency

sentence.

      The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts, set the sentences to be served

concurrently, assessed court costs in the first count’s judgment and the fine in the

other, and entered an order to withdraw the costs and fine from Gates’s inmate trust

account. In two issues, Gates challenges the fine and court costs based on his

indigence.1 We affirm.

                                    II. Discussion

      Gates complains that the trial court erred by imposing $1,350 (the fine; court

costs; and miscellaneous, non-legal reimbursement) based on “conflicting

pronouncements by the Trial Court and [his] indigency . . . at the time of sentencing.”

He asks this court to strike the $1,350 because of his indigence and because of the

trial court’s failure “to conduct an ability-to-pay inquiry on the record despite finding

[him] indigent contemporaneous to sentencing.”

      1
       Because Gates does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his convictions, we will not discuss their underlying facts.

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A. Applicable law

       When a defendant is fined, “the judgment shall be that the defendant pay the

amount of the fine and all costs to the state.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

42.15(a); Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“The Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a judgment order a defendant to pay court

costs.”). If the punishment is other than a fine, the judgment shall specify it and order

it enforced by the proper process; “[i]t shall also adjudge the costs against the

defendant[] and order the collection thereof as in other cases.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 42.16.

       “Court costs are pre-determined, legislatively[]mandated obligations resulting

from a conviction.” Houston v. State, 410 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2013, no pet.); see Salinas v. State, 523 S.W.3d 103, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (stating,

as to costs, that “there is nothing inherently inappropriate about making the

defendant pay a fee as a result of being convicted or otherwise suffering an adverse

outcome in criminal proceedings”). Court costs are compensatory in nature and

represent “a nonpunitive recoupment of the costs of judicial resources expended in

connection with the trial of the case.” Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).

On the other hand, fines, which are punitive, are intended to be part of the convicted

defendant’s sentence. Id.; see Anastassov v. State, 664 S.W.3d 815, 823 (Tex. Crim. App.

2022) (“A fine is not a court cost or fee; it is part of the punishment.”).

                                             3
        Article 42.15(a-1) is one of the statutes that governs imposing a fine and costs

on a criminal defendant.2 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.15(a-1). It requires

the court to ask—on the record—whether the defendant can afford to immediately

pay all or part of the assessments, stating,

        Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, during or
        immediately after imposing a sentence in a case in which the defendant
        entered a plea in open court . . . a court shall inquire on the record
        whether the defendant has sufficient resources or income to immediately
        pay all or part of the fine and costs. If the court determines that the
        defendant does not have sufficient resources or income to immediately
        pay all or part of the fine and costs, the court shall determine whether
        the fine and costs should be:

        (1) . . . required to be paid at some later date or in a specified portion at
        designated intervals;

        (2) discharged by performing community service . . . ;

        (3) waived in full or in part under Article 43.091 . . . ; or

        (4) satisfied through any combination of methods under Subdivisions
        (1)–(3).

Id. 3

       The Legislature’s 2017 addition to Article 42.15 applies “to a sentencing
        2

proceeding that commences before, on, or after” the September 1, 2017 effective
date. Act of May 24, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 977, §§ 4, 33, 38, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws
3966, 3967, 3981 (amended 2019, 2021, and 2023) (current version at Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann art. 42.15).

        A defendant may waive the requirement for the Subsection (a-1) inquiry to be
        3

on the record. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.15(a-2). The record does not reflect
that the trial court explicitly conducted the Article 42.15(a-1) inquiry on the record or
that Gates objected to its failure to do so, but Gates argues that he was not required
to object to preserve his complaint about the fine’s imposition or the lack of an
explicit ability-to-pay inquiry. Based on our resolution below, we need not reach these

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      When imposing a fine and costs, subject to Article 43.091, the court may direct

the defendant: (1) to pay the entire fine and costs when sentence is pronounced; (2) to

pay the entire fine and costs at some later date; or (3) to pay a specified portion of the

fine and costs at designated intervals. Id. art. 42.15(b). As referenced in Article 42.15,

Article 43.091 states that a court may waive payment of all or part of a fine imposed

on the defendant if it determines that (1) the defendant is indigent or does not have

sufficient resources or income to pay all or part of the fine and (2) each alternative

method of discharging the fine under Article 43.094 or 42.15 would impose an undue

hardship on the defendant. Id. art. 43.091.

arguments. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume,
without deciding, that preservation is not required. See Cruz v. State, No. 14-21-00454-
CR, 2023 WL 3236888, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 4, 2023, pet.
granted) (identifying right to an ability-to-pay inquiry under Article 42.15(a-1) as a
“category-two Marin right” that an appellant is not required to preserve for appeal
through objection); see also Sloan v. State, 676 S.W.3d 240, 242 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2023,
no pet.) (noting trial court’s failure to strictly comply with Article 42.15(a-1) did not
prevent the appellant from raising and developing his no-inquiry-on-the-record claim
on appeal). Gates did not need to object to preserve his complaint about the
imposition of court costs. See Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 388.
      4
         Article 43.09 provides for a defendant confined in a jail after conviction of a
felony for which a fine is imposed to discharge the fine by working “in the county jail
industries program, in the workhouse, or on the county farm, or public improvements
and maintenance projects of the county or a political subdivision located in whole or
in part in the county” or through confinement in jail “for a sufficient length of time to
discharge the full amount of the fine and costs . . . at $100 for each day.” Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.09(a). Such an arrangement is at the trial court’s discretion.
Id. art. 43.09(b).

                                              5
B. The record

      The record shows that Gates retained counsel, who represented him during the

pretrial and trial proceedings, and then, at the punishment phase’s conclusion, when

Gates’s retained counsel indicated that he would file a motion to withdraw, the trial

court noted, “It’s my understanding that [Gates] has or is about to fill out an

application for court-appointed counsel.” The trial court then stated to Gates, “If the

Court finds you to be indigent, the Court will appoint appellate counsel for you.”

      In the judgments signed that day, under “Punishment Options,” the trial court

ordered, “Upon release from confinement, the Court ORDERS Defendant to proceed

without unnecessary delay to the District Clerk’s office, or any other office designated

by the Court or the Court’s designee, to pay or to make arrangements to pay any fines,

court costs, reimbursement fees, and restitution due.” [Emphasis added.] The trial

court included $290 in court costs and $60 in “reimbursement fees (misc)” in the

continuous-sexual-abuse judgment.5 The indecency judgment included the $1,000 fine

      5
        Based on the record’s bill of cost, the $60 reimbursement covers the $10 bond
fee under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 102.011(a)(5) and the
$50 “Capias/Warrant Fee” under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 102.011(a)(2).
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.011(a)(2), (5); Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at
388 (noting that most court costs are mandated by statute). The remaining
$290 includes $185 in state consolidated court costs under Local Government Code
Section 133.102(a)(1) and $105 in local consolidated court costs under Local
Government Code Section 134.101. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 133.102(a)(1),
134.101. Gates does not address whether these fees were properly assessed other than
to argue that his indigence made them inapplicable; accordingly, we will address only
his indigence-related issue. See Houston, 410 S.W.3d at 479 (“We decline to undertake a
review of the correctness of each cost charged in the bill of costs when [the appellant]

                                           6
assessed by the jury but no court costs. See id. art. 102.073(a) (“In a single criminal

action in which a defendant is convicted of two or more offenses or of multiple

counts of the same offense, the court may assess each court cost or fee only once

against the defendant.”).

      The clerk prepared the bill of cost that day for $1,350. The bill of cost shows

the same $1,350 amount reflected in the judgments and order to withdraw. Although

the bill of cost warns that a time-payment fee “will be applied if the fine and court

costs are not paid in full prior to the 31st day after the date of Judgment,” the bill of

cost itself does not reflect a time-payment-fee assessment. See Dulin v. State,

620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (stating that an appeal’s pendency stops

the clock for purposes of the time-payment fee).

      The next day, Gates filed a form affidavit of indigence and application for a

court-appointed lawyer. In the form, Gates averred that he had three children who did

not live with him, that he had no job because he was in jail, that his spouse had no

job, that he was not receiving any public assistance, that he had no assets, that he had

no expenses, and that he had not tried to hire a lawyer. His affidavit concluded with

the statement, “If the court finds I am indigent, I request the appointment of a lawyer

to represent me.”

has not done so.”); see also Coronel v. State, 416 S.W.3d 550, 556 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2013, pet. ref’d) (“[W]e note that in his original brief and his two post-submission
objections to the bill of costs, appellant does not challenge the propriety or legality of
the specific costs assessed; therefore, we do not address these issues.”).

                                            7
      The trial court appointed appellate counsel “without reimbursement” but

checked as the reason “it is in the interests of justice” instead of “defendant is

indigent.” However, the check-marked option also states, “Defendant presently has no

financial resources to pay or contribute to the cost of legal services and related

expenses.” [Emphasis added.]

      The trial court’s order to withdraw lists $1,350 and states that funds should be

withdrawn from Gates’s inmate trust account because the court “finds that the

offender is unable to pay the court costs, fees and/or fines on this date.” [Emphasis

added.] See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.014(e) (stating that on notification by a court,

the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) “shall withdraw from an inmate’s

account any amount the inmate is ordered to pay by order of the court under this

subsection”). The order to withdraw provides that funds should be withdrawn from

Gates’s inmate trust account in various percentages “until the total amount of the

court costs, fees and/or fines are paid, or the offender is released from confinement.”

[Emphasis added.] See 58 Tex. Jur. 3d Penal and Correctional Institutions § 63 (2024)

(explaining that TDCJ must take possession of all money the inmate receives during

confinement and must credit that money in an account created for the inmate);

Stephen Raher, The Company Store and the Literally Captive Market: Consumer Law in

Prisons and Jails, 17 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 3, 10–11 (2020) (explaining that most

money spent in prison comes from an incarcerated person’s friends or family who can

transfer money to the incarcerated recipient’s inmate trust account); see also Harrell v.

                                           8
State, 286 S.W.3d 315, 316 (Tex. 2009) (explaining that proceedings under

Government Code Section 501.014(e) to recover court fees and costs assessed against

an inmate are civil in nature and that due process is satisfied if the inmate receives

notice and opportunity to be heard after funds are withdrawn).

C. Analysis

      Although Gates argues that we should reform the judgments to remove the

fine and court costs based on “the conflicting pronouncements by the Trial Court,”

his indigence at the time of sentencing, and the lack of an explicit ability-to-pay

inquiry, based on this record, the trial court’s pronouncements did not conflict with

Gates’s indigence or the trial court’s acknowledgments that Gates was financially

unable to pay everything immediately when it signed the judgments and order to

withdraw.

      To the contrary, under Article 42.15(a-1), upon determining that Gates did not

have sufficient resources or income to immediately pay all or part of his fine and

costs, the trial court decided—as illustrated in the order to withdraw—that the fine

and costs should be paid in a specified portion of designated intervals from Gates’s

inmate trust account until his release, at which point—as illustrated in the

judgments—he would be required to proceed to the district clerk’s office to make

arrangements to pay the remaining fine, court costs, and reimbursement fees. See Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.15(a-1)(1), (b). The same order reflects the trial court’s

implicit determination not to waive the fine despite Gates’s immediate lack of

                                           9
resources—an issue left to the trial court’s discretion. See id. art. 43.091(a)(1) (“A court

may waive payment of all or part of a fine imposed on a defendant if the court

determines that . . . the defendant is indigent or does not have sufficient resources or

income to pay all or part of the fine.” (emphasis added)).

       Gates relies on Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), and Mayer

v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), to support his argument that his fine

and costs should be removed. But in Cates, in which the indigent defendant was

assessed a $5,000 fine and $1,039.75 in court-appointed attorney’s fees, the Court of

Criminal Appeals removed only the $1,039.75 in court-appointed attorney’s fees from

the order assessing court costs, and not the $5,000 fine. 402 S.W.3d at 251–52.

Likewise, in Mayer, the court addressed only the impropriety of requiring an indigent

defendant to pay court-appointed attorney’s fees. 309 S.W.3d at 556 (noting that such

fees under Article 26.05(g) are to be ordered to be paid as court costs). This is because

attorney’s fees are discretionary costs; “[a] mandatory cost is one other than attorney’s fees

that is a predetermined, legislatively mandated obligation imposed upon conviction.”

Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 389 (emphasis added).

       Neither Cates nor Mayer is on point because no attorney’s fees—which are

discretionary and governed by Code of Criminal Procedure articles separate from the

ones before us, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 1.051, 26.04–.05—have been

assessed against Gates. See Scroggin v. State, No. 02-19-00096-CR, 2020 WL 479284, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

                                             10
publication) (explaining that Mayer’s language, in context, does not apply to other

costs); see also Slaven v. State, Nos. 02-11-00297-CV to -305-CV, 2012 WL 5535603, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting in civil appeal

challenging withdrawal-of-funds order that “a convicted defendant’s indigency is not

relevant to the amount of court costs assessed when those court costs do not include

an obligation to pay court-appointed attorney’s fees under code of criminal procedure

article 26.05(g)”).

       Our sister courts agree that indigence does not prevent the imposition of

statutorily mandated court costs. See Osuna v. State, No. 03-18-00239-CR,

2018 WL 3233733, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Austin July 3, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (concluding that the trial court had not erred by

assessing court costs against the appellant despite his indigence based on the costs’

legislative mandate and counting cases that agreed with that resolution from Corpus

Christi–Edinburg, Beaumont, Texarkana, and Amarillo); see also Stanberry v. State,

No. 07-23-00194-CR, 2023 WL 8470636, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 6, 2023,

no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Because the court costs are

properly collectable, regardless of Appellant’s ability to pay now or in the future, we

find no error in the assessment of costs.”); Amparan v. State, No. 11-21-00162-CR,

2022 WL 17684377, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 15, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (“[I]ndigent criminal defendants, such as Appellant,

are not excused from paying mandatory court costs.”); Ketchum v. State, No. 08-22-

                                          11
00114-CR, 2022 WL 16758491, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 8, 2022, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Our research has uncovered no authority

precluding the imposition of court costs on indigent defendants. Rather, appellate

courts have upheld imposing court costs on indigent defendants.”); Welch v. State,

668 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, order) (“A trial court is required to order

appellant to pay mandatory court costs, which are those that are predetermined and

legislatively mandated.”). But see Dority v. State, 631 S.W.3d 779, 793–94 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2021, no pet.) (noting that while the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a

convicted defendant to pay court costs that are predetermined and legislatively

mandated, when a trial court clerk erroneously includes record-preparation fees as

court costs, the court “should modify the bill of costs to remove the improperly

assessed fees”).

      Further, Gates has failed to show that he was harmed by the trial court’s lack of

an express inquiry. See Sloan, 676 S.W.3d at 242. In Sloan, the court noted that under

Rule 44.4(a), remanding for an Article 42.15(a-1) inquiry on the record would be

appropriate only “if the trial court’s erroneous action, failure, or refusal to act

prevents the proper presentation of the case” to the appellate court, such as when a

trial court erroneously withholds information necessary to evaluate a defendant’s

claim on appeal (like failing to file required fact findings) or erroneously prevents the

appellant from submitting information necessary to evaluate his claim (like by refusing

to permit an offer of proof), id. at 241, none of which has happened here. The Sloan

                                           12
court concluded from the judgment’s language about payment “upon release from

confinement” that the trial court had implicitly determined that the appellant did not

have sufficient resources to immediately pay all or part of his fine and court costs. Id.

at 242.6

       Because the record here reflects that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by imposing the fine and court costs on Gates and that Gates was not harmed by the

trial court’s failure to hold an express ability-to-pay inquiry, see id., we overrule both of

his issues.

                                     III. Conclusion

       Having overruled both of Gates’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

       6
        The Sloan court also noted that if, upon his release, the appellant was unable to
pay the fine and court costs, he could then seek relief from the trial court at that time
under Article 43.035(a) and (c). 676 S.W.3d at 242 n.2. Article 43.035 allows the trial
court to revisit whether the judgment’s fine and costs impose an undue hardship and
whether they should be satisfied through “one or more methods listed under Article
42.15(a-1)” if the defendant notifies the court of his difficulty paying the fine and
costs. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.035(a), (c). This option is available to Gates
upon his release. See id.; see also Act of May 21, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, §§ 3.03,
3.16, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 3981, 4015–16, 4019 (current version at Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 43.035) (adding Article 43.035 and providing that it applies “to a
[defendant’s] notification received by a court on or after the effective date of this Act,
regardless of whether the judgment of conviction was entered before, on, or after the
effective date of this Act”).

                                             13
                                   /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                   Elizabeth Kerr
                                   Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 8, 2024

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