Court Opinion

ID: 9867423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 16:06:51.100463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:27.064914
License: Public Domain

Miller, J.
(dissenting.) — This is an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, in the Second Judicial District, quashing a writ of certiorari, with costs.
On a petition of the Relators, alleging certain errors in the assessment roll made by the said Board for the year 1866, the Supreme Court made an order that a writ of certiorari issue requiring the Board to return its proceedings in that behalf to the said Court.
A return having been made, and the parties heard on the merits, the Court quashed the writ. The Relators were incorporated as a gas company, under the general act passed in 1848.
In June, 1866, they made their annual written statement, under oath, to the Board of Assessors, in which they set forth that their nominal capital was $1,000,000, and that they had paid for their real estate $856,358.26. They returned no surplus or reserved profits, and made no claim to exemption from taxation.
The Assessors, instead of deducting the sum stated to have been paid for real estate from the actual value of the capital, put down the actual value of the capital at $1,000,000, and deducted from it only $214,800 ; putting that sum in the roll as the “ valuation .of the real estate.” It appears by the petition on which, the cer-tiorari was issued, that the sum specified in the annual statement as the price paid for the company’s real estate was made up of two items — one, $505,928.26, being the cost of land, and the buildings and fixtures thereon; the other, $350,430, being the sum paid for iron mains, and for laying them in the streets, &c., *125the mains being regarded as affixed to the land, and of the nature of real estate.
In then- return the Assessors state that they have estimated the capital stock of said company at $1,000,000, its actual value; that they deducted “ the assessed value ” of the real estate — $214,800 —from the estimated value of the capital stock, and assessed it at $785,200 for personal property. Referring to the annual statement, they further say, “ that the secretary included in the amount named as paid for real estate, the amount paid for pipes owned by the said company, and which were laid in the streets of the city of Brooklyn, and not upon any premises of said company, and that the amount named as aforesaid is, therefore, not the amount paid by said company for real estate, or the value of its real estate, but is, excepting the sum of $214,800, composed of items of personal property.”
The return was heard at the General Term in the Second District, in December, 1866, and an order was made quashing the writ of certiorari, with costs.
Judgment was entered, and the Relators appealed to this Court.
The fact that the Assessors have not fully and particularly stated the various items required by the statute (S. L. of 1853, p. 1240), is not important, provided they have substantially complied with the provisions of the Revised Statutes, and the acts amendatory thereto, in reference to the assessment of corporations.
Although the third'section of the act of 1853 requires that the Assessors shall, in the fourth column, enter the amount of the capital stock of the incorporated company paid in, &c., “ after deducting the sums paid out for all the real estate of the company,” I do not understand that this' provision is entirely peremptory and controlling; for, if such were the case, there would be no means of correcting the erroneous and false estimates made by officers of incorporated companies for moneys paid for real estate, and expenditures of this character would rest entirely, or at least to a great extent, in the judgment,' and sometimes in the entire misapprehension, of the parties who made them.
Such clearly was not the intention of the law, as is especially *126manifested by the provision of the third section of chapter 456 of the Laws of 1857, which provides that the capital stock of every company liable to taxation, &c., “ after deducting the assessed value of its real estate,” &c., “ shall be assessed at its actual value, and taxed in the same manner as other personal and real estate.”
The effect of this enactment, I think, is, to qualify the provisions of the act of 1853, and, in connection with the general object and tenor of the statute in question, to leave it for the Assessors to place a valuation upon the real estate, without being entirely confined to the statement of the company. What is the “ assessed value,” unless it be the value put upon the property by the Assessors % It cannot mean the amount which the Assessors are required to put in the first column of the assessment roll— that is, the price paid for the real estate, as is claimed; because that is not assessed, but simply a statement of the company, which is qualified by the provision referred to, and contained in the act of 1857.
Nor does this construction interfere in any way with the assessment of the real estate in the ward where it belongs, where, as in this case, the jurisdiction of the Assessors extends over the whole city. The question is not presented as to its effect in case the land was located in other towns, and it is not, therefore, necessary to look at it in that point of view. The effect of this interpretation would produce no injustice; for if the company were aggrieved, they had a right to apply to the Assessors to change and reduce the valuation in accordance with the provision of the statute (chap. 536, S. L. of 1857, § 6, p. 123).
Assuming that I am correct in this construction of the statute, the question then arises whether the Assessors have assessed a larger amount for personal property than was warranted upon the facts presented to them. The petition of the Kelators shows that they had expended $505,928.26 for land, buildings, and works thereon, and $350,430 for iron mains, and the laying thereof, in the streets of Brooklyn.
The return of the Assessors shows that they estimated the capital stock at its par value, and, after deducting the assessed value *127of the real estate, have assessed tbe company for the balance on personal property; and that the secretary of the company included, in his statement of the amount named as paid for real estate, the amount paid for pipes owned by said company, which are laid down in the streets of Brooklyn, and that the amount thus named is not the amount paid for real estate, or the value of real estate, but, excepting the sum of $214,800, composed of personal property.
The return of the company, I am inclined to think, must be controlling; and we cannot, in a common law certiorari, measure the weight to be attached to conflicting statements, if the petition and return can be regarded in that light.
"We are then to determine whether the mains or pipes laid in the streets were properly assessed as personal property. They were not upon the real estate, but mainly in the streets of Brooklyn, which did not belong to the Relators.
They are liable to be changed or moved at the will and pleasure of the owner, and are not so immediately connected with the real estate as to be attached to the freehold, and so as to make them appurtenances thereto, or a permanent fixture. I think, without examining the numerous cases on the subject of fixtures, that they must be regarded as machinery, so far as. they are attached to the building, and were capable of removal without injury to it (Voorhies v. McGinnis, 46 Barb. 242).
Beyond the portion immediately connected with the real estate of the company, I think they cannot be considered as even attached to it, or as anything but detached personal property. I am also of the opinion that they are not included within the definition of the terms “lands,” “ real estate,” and “ real property,” as defined by the Revised Statutes. The statute regulating the assessment and collection of taxes declares that the term “land,” as used therein, “ shall be construed to include the land itself, all buildings and other articles erected upon or affixed to the same, all trees and underwood growing thereon, and all mines, minerals, quarries, and fossils in and under the same, except mines belonging to the State; and the terms ‘ real estate,’ and ‘ real property,’ *128whenever they occur in this chapter, shall be construed as having the same meaning as the term ‘ land,’ thus defined ” (1B. S. 387, § 2). The statute also declares that “ the terms, ‘personal estate,’ and ‘ personal property,’ whenever they occur in this chapter, shall be construed to include [certain articles specified, and] such portion of the capital stock of incorporated companies, liable to taxation on their capital, as shall not be invested in real estate ” (1 B. S. 388, § 3).
It is very evident, I think, that the pipes or mains of the Be-lators are not, within the meaning of the statute, real estate, and were not properly to be assessed as such.
I have not discussed the question whether the decision of the General Term can be reviewed, as the views expressed render it unnecessary.
It is, perhaps, appropriate to add, that the petition upon which the certiorari was granted does not set forth any objections to, or make any complaint as to, the manner in which the assessment was made up; and even if it is not in accordance with, and upheld by, the provisions of the act of 1857, it may be questionable whether the Belators are entitled to urge these objections upon the hearing of the certiorari.
The Court below rightly quashed the writ and the order made, and the judgment entered thereon should be affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
JOEL TIFFANY,
State Beporter.