Court Opinion

ID: 9469536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:43:17.560569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:26.541984
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although I concur with Judge Weick’s well-reasoned opinion, I write separately to articulate my views concerning the application of collateral estoppel to the present case.1 In my opinion, the application of the doctrine precludes this Court from addressing the merits of the issue presented. Accordingly, I limit my concurrence to section II of Judge Weick’s opinion.
Application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel involves a consideration of three factors. Under this doctrine, a judgment rendered in a prior law suit between the parties precludes the relitigation of those issues previously raised, considered and determined when a subsequent suit, based upon a different claim or demand, is brought. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948). Thus, a court must initially determine whether the issues presented in the second action are identical to those resolved in the previous action. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155, 99 S.Ct. 970, 974, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the issue resolved by the litigation in Stauffer I is identical to the question raised in this appeal.
However, the finding of an identity of issues in the first and second action does not end the inquiry. This Court has steadfastly refused to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel mechanically or rigidly. Rather, this rule is “qualified or rejected when [its] application would contravene an overriding public policy or result in manifest injustice.” Tipler v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1971). See also Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80, 89 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom., LaFatch v. MM Corp., 435 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 1611, 56 L.Ed.2d 62 (1978); Bronson v. Board of Education, 525 F.2d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1665, 48 L.Ed.2d 175 (1976). The Supreme Court, in Montana v. United States, supra, identified the following two questions, both of which must be resolved favorably to the party asserting collateral estoppel before the doctrine can be applied: (1) “whether controlling facts or legal principles have changed significantly” since the judgment in the pri- or suit; and (2) “whether other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion.” 440 U.S. at 155, 99 S.Ct. at 974.
The first inquiry seeks to prevent the application of collateral estoppel in situations where the legal principles underlying the initial judgment have been altered, thus weakening its conclusive nature. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 599-602, 68 S.Ct. at 720-721. An examination of the record in the present case reveals that there has been no such change in the legal principles underlying the decision in Stauffer I. Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether an exception to the application of the doctrine should be made on equitable grounds.
In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court identified one set of circumstances which counsels against the application of the doctrine. “Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness or fairness of the procedures in prior litigation.” 440 U.S. at 164 n.11, 99 S.Ct. at 979 n.11. More*1191over, this Court has identified a number of other circumstances which have been found to justify an exception to the application of the rule. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 652 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1981) (a broader range of proofs is required in the second action than in the prior action); Shimman v. Frank, supra, (lesser burden of proof required in the subsequent action than imposed in the first); United States v. LaFatch, supra (overriding public policy against bribery of public officials); Tipler v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., supra (differences in the purposes and requirements of the statutory provisions under which the prior and subsequent actions have been prosecuted). See generally Westwood Chemical Co. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1228-32 (6th Cir. 1981). EPA has not asserted, nor does the record reflect, that any of the circumstances identified by the preceding cases are present.
However, I note that, in his concurring opinion, Judge Siler identifies two apparent sources of injustice which would spring from the invocation of the rule. Initially, he states that “injustice would result if EPA were precluded from entering in Stauffer’s plant in Tennessee, but were using private contractors in entering competitors’ plant in the same area.” I am not persuaded. In my opinion, the injustice, if any, is suffered by Stauffer whose plants and trade secrets in one area will be protected, while in another, private individuals will be able to enter and inspect its facilities. To prevent such an anomaly, collateral estoppel should be applied. See Continental Can Co. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1979).2 Further, given the concurrence of two panel members as to the issue of employing private contractors in these inspections, the injustice identified will remain since the EPA will technically retain the power to use private contractors elsewhere in the circuit. But even EPA’s power to use these individuals in its inspections is illusory since the stare decisis impact of the Court’s holding today, if it becomes final, may be expected to eliminate the practice in this jurisdiction. See Allegheny General Hospital v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1979). In short, application of collateral estoppel is only minimally related to the harm identified.
Judge Siler also remarks that application of collateral estoppel is improper where several cases, involving the same legal issue, are being litigated in different areas and result in inconsistent decisions. However, I adhere to the position articulated in Western Oil and Gas v. E. P. A., 633 F.2d 803, 809 (9th Cir. 1980), where the court concluded, “we think the fact of inconsistent decisions is a relevant, but not always dispositive, factor to be considered in the exercise of discretion [in refusing to apply the doctrine].” In the present ease, this factor weighs in favor of applying the doctrine. The Ninth Circuit in articulating this rule relied on dictum appearing in several Supreme Court cases which apparently approve the practice of agency relitigation. See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135 n.26, 97 S.Ct. 965, 978 n.26, 51 L.Ed.2d 204 (1977); Union Electric Co. v. E. P. A., 427 U.S. 246, 254-55, 96 S.Ct. 2518, 2523-24, 49 L.Ed.2d 474 (1976); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 72-75, 95 S.Ct. 1470, 1478-79, 43 L.Ed.2d 731 (1975). However, an examination of these cases reveals that they involved circumstances not present here. In each, the agency’s relitigation of an issue in several courts of appeal was prosecuted by and against different parties as opposed to the same party as in the case at bar. Although not dispositive, this factor weighs on *1192the side of the party urging the application of collateral estoppel because its application will serve the following purpose recently enunciated by the Supreme Court:
To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. at 153-54, 99 S.Ct. at 973-74 (footnote omitted). While I do not favor precluding a federal agency’s ability to test its policy decisions in more than a single circuit, in circumstances where the same defendant is sued in seri-atim without the agency attempting to exhaust its appeals on the previous judgment, the equities favor application of collateral estoppel and not its abdication. Thus, in my opinion, application of the rule is proper.

. As noted by Judge Siler in his concurring opinion, res judicata is inapposite to the present case since this litigation involves a different set of operative facts and hence a different cause of action than Stauffer I.

. Continental Can involved a somewhat analogous situation. There, a can manufacturer sued to enjoin the Department of Labor from prosecuting pending citations issued as a result of alleged violations of OSHA noise regulations. Previously, a proceeding involving several of the manufacturer’s plants in California ■ resulted in a finding that the company had fulfilled its obligation by employing the most economically feasible engineering controls. After noting that the manufacturer’s other eighty plants, located nationwide, were structurally similar and had the identical noise “problem” as that involved in the prior proceeding, the court held that fairness required an application of collateral estoppel in order to dismiss the pending citations concerning these other plants.