Court Opinion

ID: 9774128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:09:29.640956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:02.566724
License: Public Domain

CHAPA, Justice,
concurring.
I respectfully concur.
In this case, the record reflects that on January 2, 1990, appellant’s counsel filed a motion for psychiatric examination of the appellant, based on the fact that the appellant “ha[d] a long history of mental illness, ha[d] been a patient in a psychiatric facility as recently as August, 1988, and ha[d] previously been diagnosed as suffering from Mixed Organic Brain Syndrome and Undifferentiated Subchronic Schizophrenia.” As a direct result, the court ordered the office of the county examiner to examine appellant to determine if appellant “ha[d] sufficient present ability to consult with defense counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether the Defendant ha[d] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him,” “[wjhether the Defendant [was] mentally ill,” and “[w]hether the Defendant [was] a mentally retarded person.” On the 8th of March, 1990, Dr. Michael Arambula, *230a psychiatrist, submitted an evaluation to the effect that the appellant “[was] not mentally competent to stand trial” but “[would] attain competency in the foreseeable future”; that the appellant “[was] mentally ill”; and, that the appellant “[was] not mentally retarded.” In his detailed report, which is also part of the record, Dr. Aram-bula reveals that the medical records at the Detention Center indicate that the appellant attempted to hang himself after being caught stealing from the commissary; that the appellant broke his right metacarpal by hitting a door after complaining of weeping and hearing voices; that appellant again attempted to hang himself after breaking his hand; that the appellant masturbated while a mental health worker evaluated him; that the appellant took showers with his clothes on and hit two different inmates; that appellant complained that Michael Jackson was telling him what to do and would not leave him alone; and, that the appellant was taking 200 mg. of Tegre-tol twice a day, 10 mg. of Stelazine twice a day and 15 mg. of Stelazine at bedtime. Dr. Arambula concluded with a diagnosis of Schizophreniform Disorder. On April 9, 1990, appellant’s counsel filed a motion for a competency hearing to stand trial based on the allegations that the appellant “appear[s] not to have a rational or factual understanding of the proceedings against him,” the appellant “has had a prolonged personal history of mental inadequacy,” and appellant’s “incompetency to stand trial has been substantiated by the findings resulting from an examination by MICHAEL ARAMBULA, M.D.” On April 10, 1990, Dr. John C. Sparks, the county medical psychiatrist, submitted his findings to the effect that the appellant was “mentally competent to stand trial,” that the appellant was “mentally ill,” and that the appellant was “not mentally retarded.” In his detailed report, Dr. Sparks states that the appellant “appears to be mentally ill,” that the appellant “has very little affect,” that the appellant “has a history of auditory hallucinations,” and that the appellant was diagnosed as suffering from “schizophrenia, chronic, undifferentiated type.”
The record further reflects that a competency hearing was held before a jury wherein the court charged the jury on the law of competency. On October 30, 1990, the jury returned a verdict that the appellant was “competent to stand trial,” and that the appellant was “mentally ill and meeting the criteria for court ordered mental health services.”
After trial on the merits, the jury found the appellant guilty as charged, and the statement of facts disclosed the following exchange immediately prior to sentencing:
THE COURT: Do you have anything further?
PROSECUTOR: No, Your Honor. With that we will rest. We will just reoffer all of the evidence in the Case in Chief. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, having—
THE COURT: I’m sorry?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: — having you been in here and heard the competency examination and everything, we do not have any evidence to offer.
THE COURT: All right. Does either side wish to argue?
PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, we will waive our right to open and reserve our right to close.
THE COURT: Mr. Valicek [defense counsel]?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, there is no question that this young man needs help. The only issue is on how best to not only help him but society where these sorts of things don’t happen anymore, in other words proper treatment. I don’t believe that the State Department of Criminal Justice, otherwise, before known as TDC, has the kind of programs that John Garrett needs and that he needs the support of his family, the State Hospital, and therapy.
Clearly, counsel for appellant was attempting to make a plea to the court prior to the court’s sentencing of the appellant. Thus, instead of waiving the provisions of art. 42.12 § 9(i), appellant’s counsel not only suggested to the court that the appellant had a mental impairment, but also made a plea to the court for help by asking *231the court to consider appellant’s mental condition in the process of sentencing him. Considering the obvious purpose of art. 42.12 § 9(i), and the fact that the appellant received a sentence of 99 years, it seems clear that the implementation of the provisions of art. 42.12 § 9(i) could have only served to help the appellant; therefore, the failure to follow the mandatory statute was not harmless. TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b)(2).