Court Opinion

ID: 9787156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:11:41.487384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:52.850209
License: Public Domain

Order affirmed without costs. Memorandum: In this appeal from an order dismissing the petition in a RPTL article 7 tax certiorari proceeding, petitioner argues that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of proof to overcome the presumption of validity of the assessments. In Matter of Barker’s Stores v Board of Review (74 AD2d 994), this court stated that "[r]eal property assessments are presumed valid and the challenger has the burden of proving that they are erroneous by clear and convincing evidence (Matter of Nezelek Dev. Corp. v City of Binghamton, 61 AD2d 1108).” The Third Department, which wrote the Nezelek decision, has since held that "it is well settled that there is a presumption of validity of an assessment by the taxing authority and the burden is imposed on petitioner to show by substantial evidence that the assessments are excessive” (Matter of Adirondack Mountain Reserve v Board of Assessors, 99 AD2d 600, 601, affd 64 NY2d 727). The overwhelming weight of authority supports the view that a party challenging an assessment must overcome the presumption of validity by substantial evidence, as opposed to the greater standard of clear and convincing evidence (see, for example, Matter of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v Tax Commn., 85 AD2d 525, affd 57 NY2d 964; Matter of Manno v Finance Adm’r of City of N. Y, 92 AD2d 896; Matter of Trinity Place *896Co. v Finance Adm’r of City of N. Y., 72 AD2d 274, 275, affd 51 NY2d 890). We conclude that substantial evidence is the appropriate test to be applied and that our statement in Barker’s Stores (supra) to the contrary should no longer be followed.
We conclude that applying the less exacting standard of substantial evidence to the proof offered in this case the trial court properly held that petitioner failed to meet its burden of overcoming the presumption of validity of the tax assessments.
Contrary to the view expressed by the dissenters, we find that the court did not err in admitting an earlier appraisal report on the subject property prepared by another member of the appraisal firm in which petitioner’s expert witness was employed. This report may be used, at the court’s discretion, to impeach the witness’ credibility as a prior inconsistent statement (Wettlaufer v State of New York, 66 AD2d 991, 993; Sullivan v State of New York, 57 Misc 2d 308, 309).
All concur, except Callahan, J. P., and Balio, J., who dissent and vote to reverse and grant the petition in accordance with the following memorandum.