Court Opinion

ID: 9905597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 20:03:45.455695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:45.998430
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/29/23

                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

             COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                 D081230

        Plaintiff and Respondent,

        v.                                   (Super. Ct. No. FVI1002669)

 ROBERT FRANK VELASCO,

        Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino,
Christopher S. Pallone, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
       Pauline E. Villanueva, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, and Elizabeth M. Renner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                              INTRODUCTION
       Appellant Robert Frank Velasco, who was serving a sentence for
attempted home invasion robbery, assault with a firearm, and possession of a
firearm by a felon, was identified as eligible for resentencing pursuant to
Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483), which added

what is now Penal Code1 section 1172.75.2 At the September 15, 2022
resentencing hearing, Velasco’s attorney made an oral motion to strike
Velasco’s one year prison prior enhancement, which had been imposed
pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) and did not involve a sexually
violent offense. Velasco was not present at the hearing and, although the
minute order reflects that his presence was waived, the record does not
contain a written waiver. The trial court granted the request, struck the one-
year enhancement, and resentenced Velasco to a total term of 26 years and
four months. Neither counsel nor the court addressed whether other new
sentencing laws might impact Velasco’s sentence or whether postconviction
factors should influence the new sentence. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2) [“The
court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2     Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats 2019, ch. 590, § 1) (Senate Bill 136) limited prior prison term
enhancements to those terms served for specified sexually violent offenses.
(People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681.) In 2021, the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill 483 which sought to make the changes implemented by
Senate Bill 136 retroactive. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1 [“it is the intent of the
Legislature to retroactively apply . . . Senate Bill 136 of the 2019-20 Regular
Session to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or
prison for these repealed sentence enhancements”].) Senate Bill 483 added
former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, to the Penal Code. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12, eff. June 30, 2022.)
We refer to the new provision as most recently renumbered.

      Section 1172.75 declares that “Any sentence enhancement that was
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for
a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)

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other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion
so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing”] & (3) [“The court may consider postconviction factors”].)
      Velasco argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by
not conducting a full resentencing hearing as is required by section 1172.75.
He further contends the trial court violated his federal and state
constitutional rights by holding a resentencing hearing in his absence
without a valid waiver.
      The People assert that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct this
resentencing hearing at all because Velasco’s case was already on appeal
before this court in case No. D080603. However, should we determine that
the trial court had jurisdiction, the People concede that remand is warranted
because Velasco did not waive his presence at the resentencing hearing.
      We conclude the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Velasco
pursuant to section 1172.75 but reverse and remand for a new hearing on the
grounds that Velasco was not present at the sentencing hearing and did not
validly waive his presence.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On June 11, 2013, a San Bernardino County jury found Velasco guilty
of attempted home invasion robbery (§§ 211, 664; count 1), assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 4), possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 5), and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a);
count 6). As to count 1, the jury returned a true finding that Velasco
personally used a firearm, within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivision (b). As to counts 1 and 4, the jury returned a true finding that
Velasco personally used a firearm, within the meaning of section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). Velasco also admitted he had suffered a prior serious felony

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conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and served a
prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
      The trial court sentenced Velasco to 28 years and eight months in
prison, including five years for the prior conviction and one year for the prior
prison term. In October 2015, the trial court dismissed count 6 and vacated
the corresponding sentence, resulting in a total sentence of 27 years and four
months.
      On August 2, 2022, Velasco filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the superior court requesting relief under Senate Bill 483.3 The trial court
denied the petition on the grounds that section 1172.75, subdivision (b) sets
forth a specific timeline for granting relief to eligible inmates. However, the
trial court then scheduled a resentencing hearing pursuant to Senate

3      The People request that we take judicial notice of the record in
Velasco’s related appeal, case No. D080603, as well as his petition for writ of
habeas corpus, and the superior court’s denial of the same, in the underlying
case. We deferred ruling on this request. Having considered the briefing, we
grant the request pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d)
because the court records demonstrate the existence of the related appeal
that forms the basis for the People’s jurisdictional argument. (See Evid.
Code, § 459, subd. (a) [“The reviewing court may take judicial notice of any
matter specified in Section 452”].) Additionally, the record in this case
reflects that the trial court considered and denied the habeas corpus petition,
so we judicially notice those documents for the limited purpose of clarifying
the procedural history of the case.
                                       4
Bill 483.4 As noted above, the trial court subsequently struck Velasco’s one-
year prison prior enhancement and resentenced him to 26 years and four
months.
                                   DISCUSSION
                                          I.
     The Trial Court Retained Jurisdiction to Resentence Velasco Pursuant to
                                Section 1172.75

        We begin with the threshold issue of whether the trial court retained
jurisdiction to resentence Velasco pursuant to section 1172.75 after Velasco
filed a valid notice of appeal in case No. D080603. “When the evidence is not
in dispute, subject matter jurisdiction is a legal issue, which we review de
novo.” (A.F. v. Jeffrey F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 671, 681.)
A.      Legal Principles
        As a general rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence
a criminal defendant once it relinquishes custody of the defendant and
execution of the sentence has commenced. (People v. Karaman (1992)

4      Although the trial court’s September 1, 2022 minute order does not
specify the court’s reason for setting a resentencing hearing after denying the
habeas corpus petition, we presume that because Velasco appears eligible for
relief under section 1172.75 and because the July 1, 2022 deadline for the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to
designate individuals eligible for resentencing under the provision (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b)(2)) had passed, the CDCR notified the trial court at some point
before September 1, 2022 that Velasco was eligible under section 1172.75.
This would accord with proper application of the statute’s procedure. (See
People v. Escobedo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 440, 447, 448 [“section 1172.75 does
not authorize appellants to file a petition or a motion to strike the
unauthorized enhancements”; rather, “any review and verification by the
[trial] court in advance of resentencing is only triggered by receipt of the
necessary information from the CDCR Secretary or a county correctional
administrator, not by any individual defendant”].)
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4 Cal.4th 335, 344; People v. Scarbrough (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 916, 923.)
The defendant’s filing of a valid notice of appeal also typically divests the
trial court of jurisdiction over any matter affecting the judgment. (People v.
Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1064 (Flores); People v. Lockridge (1993) 12
Cal.App.4th 1752, 1757 (Lockridge).) “ ‘The purpose of the rule depriving the
trial court of jurisdiction in a case during a pending appeal is to protect the
appellate court’s jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is
decided. The rule prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by
altering the appealed judgment . . . by conducting other proceedings that may
affect it.’ ” (Townsel v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1084, 1089;
Scarbrough, at p. 923.) However, jurisdiction survives where provided by
statute. (Flores, at p. 1064.) “In such cases, the jurisdictional period
generally is not tolled during the pendency of an appeal.” (Ibid.)
      As Velasco points out, former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), now
section 1172.1, provides an exception to the general rule. In Dix v. Superior
Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, the Supreme Court recognized that “[s]ection
1170(d) is an exception to the common law rule that the court loses
resentencing jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun.” (Id. at
p. 455; see also People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863.) This
section allows the sentencing court “to recall its sentence ‘within 120 days of
the date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the
recommendation of the Director of Corrections or the Board of Prison
Terms. . . .’ ” (Dix, at p. 455.) After recalling the sentence, the court can
“ ‘resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he or she had not
previously been sentenced,’ provided any new sentence does not exceed the
original sentence, grants credit for time served, and ‘appl[ies] the sentencing
rules of the Judicial Council so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to

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promote uniformity of sentencing. . . .’ ” (Ibid.) The Dix court concluded that
a sentencing court lost its “ ‘own-motion’ jurisdiction” only if it failed to recall
the sentence within 120 days of the original commitment. (Id. at p. 464.)
      This court subsequently extended the Dix holding in concluding that
“a trial court is not divested of its limited jurisdiction under section 1170,
subdivision (d) to recall a sentence for modification within 120 days of the
defendant’s commitment by the filing of an appeal notice.” (Portillo v.
Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1829, 1836 (Portillo); Lockridge, supra,
12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1755 [“although the trial court loses jurisdiction for most
purposes upon the filing of an appeal, it is not deprived of its power to recall
its sentence and impose a new sentence under section 1170, subdivision (d)”].)
In Portillo, we reasoned that “[t]o hold the general rule, that a trial court
loses jurisdiction to proceed in a matter after the filing of an appeal,
supersedes or negates the specific rule for granting limited jurisdiction to the
trial court to recall a sentence, enacted by the Legislature in light of existing
law concerning a trial court’s sentencing jurisdiction, would render
meaningless the long-established rules of statutory interpretation against
surplusage and favoring a specific statute regarding a subject matter over
one that is more general. Moreover, such interpretation ‘would infringe on
the power of the Legislature to establish a determinate sentencing system
providing statutorily fixed terms for given crimes to be imposed by courts
with limited discretion to vary those terms.’ ” (Id. at p. 1835.) The Third
Appellate District subsequently agreed with us. (People v. Nelms (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 1465, 1472.)

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B.    Analysis
      Velasco contends that, like section 1172.1, section 1172.75 presents an
exception to the general rule and vests the trial court with jurisdiction to
conduct a resentencing hearing while an appeal is pending. We agree.
      “Pursuant to established principles, our first task in construing a
statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the
purpose of the law. In determining such intent, a court must look first to the
words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary
import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and
sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. A construction making
some words surplusage is to be avoided. The words of the statute must be
construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose . . . .” (Dyna-
Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386–
1387 (Dyna-Med).) Additionally, “ ‘ “statutes must be construed so as to give
a reasonable and common-sense construction consistent with the apparent
purpose and intention of the lawmakers—a construction that is practical
rather than technical, and will lead to wise policy rather than mischief or
absurdity. [Citation.] In approaching this task, the courts may consider the
consequences which might flow from a particular interpretation and must
construe the statute with a view to promoting rather than defeating its
general purpose and the policy behind it.” ’ ” (Oakland Police Officers’
Assn. v. City of Oakland (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 503, 518–519.)
      If anything, our reasoning in construing the statute in Portillo applies
with greater force to section 1172.75. In section 1172.1, the legislature
granted the trial court discretion to assert jurisdiction and recall a sentence
within 120 days (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1)), whereas in section 1172.75 it
mandated recall of the relevant sentence enhancements and resentencing.

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(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Moreover, it set specific deadlines for doing so. (Id.,
subd. (c)(1) & (2) [requiring the court to recall and resentence defendants by
October 1, 2022, for those who have served their base term and any other
enhancement and currently are serving a sentence based on the invalid
enhancement, or by December 31, 2023, for all others].) This suggests a clear
legislative intent to promptly rectify specific, perceived inequities in the

sentencing system.5 Additionally, having found the trial court retained
jurisdiction under section 1172.1 where the legislature sought to inject more
transparency into resentencing procedures and create a presumption favoring
recall and resentencing of certain individuals, we conclude there is even more
reason to do so under section 1172.75 where the legislature has expressly
declared the sentencing enhancements legally invalid.
      The time limits imposed by section 1172.75 also support our conclusion
that the legislature intended for the trial court to retain jurisdiction. For
instance, the statute required the CDCR to identify all other eligible
individuals, aside from those already identified, by July 1, 2022. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b)(2).) It then instructed the trial court to recall their sentences and
resentence these individuals by December 31, 2023. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(2).)
A person in this category may well have already had an appeal pending when
they were identified by the CDCR, which would divest the trial court of

5      Indeed, according to the author of Senate Bill 483, “SB 483 will
retroactively apply the elimination of those enhancements to people currently
held in prisons and jails, ensuring that no one is serving time based on
outdated rules. [¶] A robust body of research finds that long prison and jail
sentences have no positive impact on public safety, yet are documentably
injurious to families and communities—particularly Black, Latino, and
Native Americans in the United States and in California.” (Sen. Rules Com.,
Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Sept. 1, 2021, p. 4.)
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jurisdiction. Or, given that defendants generally have only 60 days from the
judgment or order being appealed to file a notice of appeal (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.308(a)), they likely would file an appeal during this time frame.
Given the time allotted for appellate briefing and decision, the trial court’s
statutorily mandated time limit for recalling the sentence and resentencing

the individual no doubt would lapse during the pendency of the appeal.6
Thus, to read section 1172.75, subdivision (c) as not providing for trial court
jurisdiction would render these time limitations surplusage, which is a result
we strive to avoid. (See Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387; Portillo,
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1835.)
      A similar situation arose in People v. Turner (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th
1690, 1695 (Turner) where the reviewing court considered whether
section 987.8, which permits the trial court to hold an additional hearing
within six months of judgment on the defendant’s ability to pay the costs of
his court-appointed counsel, provided a statutory exception to the general
rule that an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction. In concluding that
it did, the Turner court explained that the statute provided for a county
officer to make inquiries regarding the defendant’s ability to pay and “
‘presumably report back to the court.’ ” (Id. at 1696.) It further reasoned
that, “[s]ince, from a practical standpoint, such reports could not always be
prepared and filed on the day of judgment, it must be concluded that the
Legislature intended the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the matter of
attorney fees for a reasonable period of time—that is, a six-month period—
following the pronouncement of judgment.” (Ibid.) But, because a notice of

6     We acknowledge that the number of individuals to whom this scenario
will apply likely will be minimal, as they would have to have a sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, but still have a case
on appeal in 2023. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a)–(c).)
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appeal must be filed within 60 days of judgment, the Turner court concluded
that if it “were to apply the general rule divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction upon the filing of a notice of appeal, that provision of the statute
providing for an additional hearing within six months of judgment would be
effectively defeated in every case where an appeal was filed. Such a result
would frustrate the intent of the Legislature and render the provision

surplusage.”7 (Turner, at p. 1696.) The same holds true here. If we were to
apply the general rule divesting the trial court of jurisdiction, a significant
percentage of the individuals to whom this statute is expressly directed
would be unable to timely benefit from this ameliorative statute. We cannot
conclude that an interpretation which frustrates the intent of the legislature
and renders certain provisions surplusage is the correct one.
      Accordingly, we conclude the trial court here retained jurisdiction to
resentence Velasco pursuant to section 1172.75 after Velasco filed a valid
notice of appeal.
                                        II.
  The Trial Court Erred by Conducting a Resentencing Hearing in Velasco’s
              Absence Without a Valid Waiver of His Presence

      Despite concluding the trial court had jurisdiction to hold a
section 1172.75 resentencing hearing, we nonetheless must reverse the order
and remand for a new hearing because there is no evidence in the record that
Velasco waived his presence at the hearing.

7     Flores disapproved Turner to the extent the Turner court went on to
conclude that section 987.8’s six-month limitation for holding an ability-to-
pay hearing was jurisdictional and, thus, limited the appellate court’s
authority to remand a case after six months for a hearing. (Flores, supra, 30
Cal.4th at p. 1068.) In the instant case, we find nothing in section 1172.75
that would limit our authority to order a full resentencing hearing upon
remand.
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         “A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is
guaranteed under the federal Constitution by the confrontation clause of the
Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is also required by section 15 of article I of the California Constitution and
by sections 977 and 1043.” (People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 81
(Concepcion).) This right extends to all “ ‘critical stages of the criminal
prosecution’ ” and includes sentencing and resentencing. (See People v.
Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 347–348 (Cutting).)
         The right to be present may be waived. (Concepcion, supra, 45 Cal.4th
at p. 82.) However, pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b)(1)-(2), in all cases
in which a felony is charged, the defendant is required to be personally
present at the time of the imposition of sentence unless he executed a written
waiver of his right to be present or the waiver was properly entered orally on
the record. The right to be present at the imposition of sentence includes the
right to be present at a resentencing hearing, as the trial court has discretion
to reconsider the entire sentence on remand for resentencing. (See Cutting,
supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.)
         Here, although the minute order in this case indicates that Velasco
waived his presence at the September 15, 2022 resentencing hearing, there is
no corresponding writing in the record and his counsel stated only that he
was “not present before the Court.” There also is no evidence that he or his
attorney previously entered a valid waiver on the record. (§ 977,
subd. (b)(2)(A) & (B).) As a result, and as the People concede, the record does
not adequately demonstrate that Velasco waived his presence at this critical
stage.
         When errors involving a defendant’s federal constitutional rights are
implicated, the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967)

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386 U.S. 18 applies and the error is prejudicial and requires reversal unless
we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not affect the outcome
of the proceeding. (See id. at p. 24; Cutting, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 348.)
In this case, had Velasco been present at the hearing, he may have “offered
mitigation factors that arose after his original sentencing; he may have
expressed remorse; [or] he may have made a plea for leniency.” (Cutting, at
p. 350.) Indeed, section 1172.75 expressly allows the trial court to consider
postconviction factors such as “the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects
whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that
continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3).) Velasco was not able to present evidence of any of these factors.
Accordingly, as the People concede, we cannot conclude that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We, therefore, must reverse and

remand the matter for resentencing.8

8    Because Velasco will be entitled to a full resentencing hearing on
remand, we need not address his related claim for relief on appeal.
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                                DISPOSITION
      The September 15, 2022 resentencing order is reversed and the matter
is remanded to the trial court with directions to conduct a full resentencing
hearing consistent with all provisions of section 1172.75 and the views
expressed in this opinion.

                                                      HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

KELETY, J.

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