Court Opinion

ID: 9467261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:43:14.232109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:15.348744
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge,
concurring.*
Although I agree with the result announced in the majority opinion, I disagree with the implication in footnote 4 that plaintiff must prove that defendant Finley’s actions were intentional or reckless. The majority states that mere negligence will not support a § 1983 action against Finley, Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1976). While this standard applies in many factual situations, the majority fails to note that some official duties are mandatory. McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 5 (4th Cir. 1972).
In McCray, plaintiff alleged that the court' clerk impeded the filing of certain papers. The court held that where an official fails to follow a court order or acts in violation of his statutory duties, “no immunity [is] recognized and the officer [is] held liable under section 1983 if his actions abridged an individual’s federally protected rights.” 456 F.2d at 5.1
I believe that if plaintiff shows at trial that Finley had a mandatory duty to execute the court’s order to recall the arrest warrant, then she does not have to prove that his failure to do so was intentional or reckless. Further, if it is shown that Finley’s duty to execute warrant recalls is ministerial rather than discretionary, he would not be entitled to immunity.2 McCray v. *368Maryland, supra, 456 F.2d at 4; Norwood v. Soloman, 431 F.Supp. 380 (E.D.Mo.1977).

 An amended opinion was issued on March 11, 1981 reflecting certain changes in footnote 4 appearing on page 367. This concurring opinion was filed in response to those changes.
Chief Judge Fairchild and Judge Cudahy voted to deny rehearing en banc. Their votes are predicated upon the view expressed in Judge Swygert’s concurring opinion.

. The court went on to note that when an official acts in violation of duties imposed upon him by law, he is “entitled to no more protection than any other state ministerial functionary who fails to discharge a mandatory duty.” 456 F.2d at 5 (citing Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901, 90 S.Ct. 210, 24 L.Ed.2d 177 (1969)).

. The Fourth Circuit explained the rationale for distinguishing between ministerial and discretionary duties in considering whether immunity is applicable:
The immunity of “quasi-judicial” officers . . . derives, not from their formal association with the judicial process, but from the fact that they exercise a discretion similar to that exercised by judges. Like judges, they re*368quire the insulation of absolute immunity to assure the courageous exercise of their discretionary duties. Where an official is not called upon to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial discretion, courts have properly refused to extend him the protection of absolute judicial immunity ....
456 F.2d at 4.