Court Opinion

ID: 9910198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 05:04:33.598789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:29.741923
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                             STATE OF MICHIGAN

                              COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                       UNPUBLISHED
In re RH, Minor.                                                       December 14, 2023

                                                                       No. 365428
                                                                       Ingham Circuit Court
                                                                       Family Division
                                                                       LC No. 21-000960-NA

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent1 appeals by right the termination of her parental rights to her minor child, RH,
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist),
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)
(reasonable likelihood the child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home). On appeal,
respondent argues the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights to RH because petitioner,
the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), failed to provide adequate
reunification efforts,2 statutory grounds for termination did not exist, and termination was not in
RH’s best interests because of the close bond they shared. We affirm.

1
    RH’s father voluntarily surrendered his parental rights to RH and is not a party to this appeal.
2
  We note the first issue, while addressed by respondent’s brief on appeal, was not present in the
actual language in respondent’s statement of questions presented, and was treated as somewhat of
an extension of the issue regarding statutory grounds. Therefore, this issue is, arguably,
unpreserved. See Ypsilanti Fire Marshal v Kircher, 273 Mich App 496, 543; 730 NW2d 481
(2007); MCR 7.212(C)(5). However, while the language does not match verbatim, we choose to
address this issue because it is necessary for a proper determination of this case, and failure to
consider the issue could result in manifest injustice. Gen Motors Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 290
Mich App 355, 387; 803 NW2d 698 (2010). We also note that respondent did not raise any direct
objections on the issue of reunification efforts, but, because respondent did express her belief
services were inadequate during the case, and, again, given the importance of the issue, we choose
to address it. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 336-338; 990 NW2d 685 (2022).

                                                   -1-
                     I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       RH was born in Texas, but shortly thereafter respondent and RH moved to Michigan, where
respondent’s family resides. Respondent initially lived with her sister, but moved in with her
boyfriend in February 2021, despite his substantial history with Children’s Protective Services
(CPS).

         In October 2021 respondent began experiencing paranoid delusions. Specifically,
respondent began to believe she was being “hacked.” According to respondent, the hackers took
control over, among other things, her computer, phone, washing machine, drier, radios, televisions,
and coffee machine. She believed that the hackers also accessed her files, told her that the DEA
was coming to her home, told her that her boyfriend was cheating on her, expressed concerns about
or threatened RH’s safety, and varied between being helpful and hurtful. Eventually, respondent
was involuntarily hospitalized, and she placed RH with her sister for the time being. Respondent’s
sister found RH to be filthy, smelling of urine and feces, in an inappropriately-sized car seat, and
with ill-fitting clothes. She believed RH displayed food insecurity, and RH would later be found
to be below-average weight for his size.

        After being discharged from her involuntary hospitalization, respondent disappeared with
RH for a few days, ostensibly to escape the hackers she described. This brought her to the attention
of CPS. Respondent was somewhat compliant with CPS at first, and voluntarily submitted to drug
tests, which were positive for methamphetamines. Respondent initially agreed to “a very open
ended [sic] safety plan” for RH, but later determined she no longer wished to participate in the
plan, and DHHS initiated the instant case.

        During the proceedings, respondent was repeatedly instructed to stop using
methamphetamines and stop living with her boyfriend. Respondent failed to comply with either
instruction. It was never in doubt that respondent loved RH and shared a bond with him. Indeed,
her participation in parenting time was generally regarded as appropriate. However, respondent
suffered from a lack of stable housing, a lack of transportation, and a persistent inability to gain
insight into her mental health problems. Respondent’s caseworker was in frequent contact with
her, though respondent frequently failed to respond. The caseworker repeatedly provided
respondent with lists of services, sometimes even arranging appointments or participating in three-
way calls with respondent. Respondent’s therapists were often unable to provide therapeutic
services for respondent’s mental health and substance abuse issues because they had to focus on
the more basic instabilities in respondent’s life. Respondent was repeatedly given suggestions for
shelters that would give her priority placement for housing, how to obtain employment, and,
sometimes, her caseworker or therapists would personally provide respondent with transportation.
However, respondent frequently refused outright, failed to appear at follow-up appointments, and
eventually unilaterally decided to discontinue participating in parenting time.

       Medical professionals agreed respondent displayed little insight into her psychological
problems and remedying those problems would require full commitment to treatment, in which
respondent was not interested. Although respondent frequently stayed in other locations, she never
separated from or moved away from her boyfriend, and she continued using methamphetamines.
Later in the case, respondent was hospitalized a second time, again related to her paranoid
delusions. Meanwhile, RH was happy, healthy, and strongly bonded to his foster placement.

                                                -2-
        The trial court ultimately terminated respondent’s parental rights, noting that, while it was
“abundantly clear [respondent] loves her son,” she failed to adequately address her mental health,
and while respondent did argue there could have been additional accommodations made because
of her mental illness, respondent never requested such accommodations. The trial court found
DHHS provided adequate services on the basis of respondent’s mental health evaluation, but
respondent “did not avail herself of those services consistently except for visitation.” The trial
court concluded respondent had not meaningfully participated in and benefited from the plans
crafted to help her, so she had not demonstrated that she could properly parent RH, or that RH
would be safe in her care, and there was no reasonable likelihood she could do so in a reasonable
time. While the trial court recognized respondent’s bond with RH, it also recognized the bond had
diminished over the duration of the case because respondent unilaterally stopped attending
parenting times. Furthermore, the fact that the parenting times respondent did attend were
appropriate was not enough to justify returning RH to her care. Respondent now appeals.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

                                A. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

       Respondent argues DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. We
disagree.3

        In the absence of aggravating circumstances, DHHS must make reasonable efforts to
reunify a child with the family in all cases. In re Simonetta, 340 Mich App 700, 707; 987 NW2d
919 (2022). While DHHS “has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services
to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to
participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569
(2012). A respondent’s choice to refuse recommendations cannot be attributed to DHHS. See In
re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 267; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).

        Respondent consistently failed to make any meaningful efforts to refrain from using
methamphetamines, despite being repeatedly told she needed to desist. Furthermore, one expert
involved in respondent’s care believed respondent’s psychosis might dissipate if she discontinued
using methamphetamines, which was respondent’s other primary barrier to reunification. As the
trial court noted, respondent only provided excuses: she made a doubtful claim that she was told
she needed an active drug problem to be accepted into a substance abuse program, or claimed she
needed methamphetamines to self-medicate. The experts involved in this case believed respondent
had no insight into her problems and was only participating in treatment because she believed it
was a condition to get RH back, rather than because she understood that she needed treatment.
Despite the overwhelming efforts of her providers and caseworker to help her, including personally
offering to transport respondent and make appointments for her, respondent not only failed to keep

3
  The question of whether DHHS made reasonable efforts at reunification is generally reviewed
for clear error. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). “The trial court’s
factual findings are clearly erroneous if the evidence supports them, but we are definitely and
firmly convinced that it made a mistake.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701; 709-710; 846 NW2d
61 (2014).

                                                -3-
appointments, she failed to communicate with both her caseworker and her counsel. None of the
testimony suggested DHHS was unwilling to offer respondent additional services. Instead, the
record indicates that respondent’s challenges were so fundamental that her providers were unable
to provide meaningful therapy—either because respondent’s life needed to be stabilized first, or
because respondent simply refused to show up. Respondent even unilaterally decided to stop
appearing for parenting time visits.

        The only specific services respondent identifies on appeal as lacking concerned testing or
treatment for ADHD. However, her primary care provider testified he was treating respondent’s
ADHD, and another provider recognized that, while respondent had an ADHD diagnosis, it would
not substantially affect her parenting, and recommended against amphetamine-based treatment.
Furthermore, the psychiatrist respondent saw after her second hospitalization was willing to
continue her treatment with a drug that was also used to treat ADHD symptoms, but respondent
refused the psychiatrist’s services because the psychiatrist refused to continue all of the
medications provided by the hospital. This psychiatrist also opined ADHD was not respondent’s
primary concern. Therefore, respondent’s ADHD was at least being partially treated and was not
a significant problem for respondent in the scope of her other issues. Respondent chose to forgo
not only treatment for her ADHD, but also all treatment, because of her unwillingness to work
with the new psychiatrist. Respondent’s failure to identify any other services DHHS should or
could have provided, or how any such services would help her, is insufficient to support her claim
of error. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 267.

                                    B. STATUTORY GROUNDS

       Respondent provides no argument on appeal specifically relevant to any statutory ground for
termination, which may constitute abandonment of the issue. In re JS and SM, 231 Mich App 92, 98;
585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). Regardless, to the extent respondent generally argues that there was no evidence
she neglected or endangered RH, we disagree.4

       RH was filthy and potentially malnourished when respondent was first hospitalized, and the
evidence showed that respondent never gained any insight into her actual problems. Given
respondent’s situation and mental health, her failure to participate consistently in services and to benefit
from those services constitutes direct evidence that RH would be harmed if returned to her care. In re
Kaczkowski, 325 Mich App 69, 77; 924 NW2d 1 (2018). Furthermore, respondent consistently chose
methamphetamines and her boyfriend over RH despite repeated admonitions and opportunities to
engage in treatment, and refused to pursue alternative housing or employment. A respondent’s choice
to maintain a relationship with someone known to be inappropriate for the child calls “into question
respondent’s ability to provide proper care and custody.” In re Smith-Taylor, 339 Mich App 189, 204;

4
  “This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and ultimate determinations
on the statutory grounds for termination.” White, 303 Mich App at 709 (footnote and citations
omitted); MCR 3.977(K). “The trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous if the evidence
supports them, but we are definitely and firmly convinced that it made a mistake.” White, 303
Mich App at 709-710. “The interpretation and application of statutes and court rules are []
reviewed de novo.” In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 404; 852 NW2d 524 (2014).

                                                    -4-
981 NW2d 511 (2021), rev’d on other grounds 509 Mich 935 (2022). To the limited extent respondent
challenges the trial court’s findings regarding statutory grounds for termination, the evidence in the
record amply supports those findings. We decline to undertake any further analysis of the trial court’s
specific findings regarding statutory grounds, because plaintiff has failed to raise any specific
challenges on appeal. JS and SM, 231 Mich App at 98.

                                       C. BEST INTERESTS

      Respondent lastly argues that termination was not in RH’s best interests because she had a
bond with RH. We disagree.5

        “Once a statutory basis for termination has been shown by clear and convincing evidence,
the court must determine whether termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re LaFrance
Minors, 306 Mich App 713, 732-733; 858 NW2d 143 (2014); MCL 712A.19b(5). “[T]he focus at
the best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the parent.”                     In re
Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson Minors, 311 Mich App 49, 63; 874 NW2d 205 (2015) (quotation marks
and citation omitted, alteration in original). “Best interests are determined on the basis of the
preponderance of the evidence.” LaFrance, 306 Mich App at 733. Considerations of the best
interests of the child include:

       [T]he child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
       permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the
       parent’s home. The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic
       violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s
       visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the
       possibility of adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App 701; 713-714; 846 NW2d 61
       (2014) (quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted).]

“The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the child[]’s best interests.”
Id. at 713.

         The fact that respondent loved and had a bond with RH was never in any real doubt,
although respondent was responsible for diminishing that bond by choosing to forgo further
parenting time visits. As noted above, however, the child’s bond with the parent is but one factor
the trial court may consider when determining the best interests of the child. Id. at 713-714. While
this bond may weigh against termination, the other factors for the trial court to consider in this
case overwhelmingly support termination.               Again, respondent consistently chose
methamphetamines and her boyfriend over RH, and she never seriously engaged in any services
other than the parenting coach program. Respondent also elected to unilaterally discontinue her
parenting time visits. Finally, the evidence indicates RH was happy, strongly bonded, and well-

5
  This Court reviews a trial court’s determination regarding best interests for clear error. White,
303 Mich App at 713. “The trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous if the evidence
supports them, but we are definitely and firmly convinced that it made a mistake.” Id. at 709-710.

                                                 -5-
cared for in his foster placement. We discern no clear error in the trial court’s finding that
termination was in RH’s best interests.

                                     III. CONCLUSION

        Because there is no evidence the trial court erred by terminating respondent’s parental
rights, we affirm.

                                                          /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                          /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
                                                          /s/ Christopher P. Yates

                                              -6-