Court Opinion

ID: 9532542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:22:16.485036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:46.843102
License: Public Domain

LA PRADE, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority disposition of this case, nor do I agree with the reasoning involved in attaining such a result.
This case presents one issue only: was the finding of the Commission, to the effect that the injury of petitioner had not affected his earning capacity, sustained or justified by the evidence?
The Commission found that the applicant has a general physical functional disability not greater than 10%' resulting from the accident, general in its nature, and not affecting applicant’s earning capacity, and
“That applicant’s wages earned since his injury are truly indicative of applicant’s ability to earn, and are reasonably indicative of applicant’s future ability to earn.”
The applicant has not challenged the finding that his general physical functional disability does not exceed 10%'.
By provisions of section 23-1044, A.R.S. 1956, relating to compensation for partial disability, it is provided in subsection C, relating to so-called non-scheduled injuries, that
“ * * * where the injury causes permanent partial disability for work, the employee shall receive during such disability compensation equal to fifty-five per cent of the difference between his average monthly wages before the accident and the amount which represents his reduced monthly earning capacity resulting from the disability, * *
It is provided in subsection D that
“In determining the amount which represents the reduced monthly earning *127capacity for the purposes of subsection C of this section, consideration shall be given, among other things, to any previous disability, the occupational history of the injured employee, the nature and extent of the physical disability, the type of work the injured employee is able to perform subsequent to the injury, any wages received for work performed subsequent to the injury and the age of the employee at the time of injury.”
The findings of the Commission demonstrate that the Commission did take into consideration (a) the occupational history of the employee, (b) the nature and extent of the physical disability, (c) the type of work the employee is able to perform subsequent to the injury, (d) any wages received for work performed subsequent to the injury, and (e) the age of the employee at the time of the injury.
What was the record before the Commission? At the time the petitioner was injured, in October 1954, he was employed by the Douglas Maintenance Company, as an electrician-lineman, with average monthly earnings of $213.52 (not disputed). Within a month after being released to “work status” petitioner went to work for the Utah Construction Company. He was there employed two days less than one month and drew $504 in wages, at a rate double his average monthly wage prior to the accident. The next month and one-half he was out of work. He then secured employment with a different employer, H. A. Foley, electrical contractor, where he drew $1,005 for the two months’ employment, which was at a rate of more than double his average monthly earnings prior to the accident. Without losing any time he was again employed for two months by the Utah Construction Company, where he drew $972.81, which is again double his average monthly earnings prior to the accident. He was off work for less than one month and in October secured employment and worked until some time in December — earnings for this period were not disclosed. He was then out of work, reason not disclosed, until March 26, 1956, when he worked two months for CorbinDykes, electrical contractors, for which he received as a groundman $332.51 and as a lineman $637.50, making a total of $970, which again is at a rate double his average monthly earnings prior to the accident.
It must be remembered that the Industrial Commission is the fact-finding board. With this record before it I think it was entirely justified in finding that there had been no loss of earning capacity, which is the only question that was before it. The majority constitute themselves the fact-finding body, and find that the testimony of the witness, Allen, foreman for the Utah Construction Company, is binding on the Commission because it convinces the majority. With reference *128to Mr. Allen’s testimony to the effect that they “made” the job for petitioner, the court says :
“This evidence was no where disputed and there is nothing intrinsic in the evidence or extrinsic in the circumstances which casts suspicion upon his veracity.”
I think there is something intrinsic in this evidence which casts suspicion upon it. I do not believe that the Commission was bound to believe this witness when he testified, in effect, that he cheated his own employer and caused to be paid to the petitioner out of his employer’s funds the sum of $1,476.81 for three months’ work at a time when, in his opinion, the petitioner had impaired capacity to produce. A like observation can be made to the testimony of Mr. West, the union business manager, who testified, in effect, that he connived with Mr. Allen to “cover up” for petitioner, with the undisclosed purpose of bleeding the employer. The majority labelled the testimony of Mr. West and Mr. Allen as uncontradicted, and, that the fact-finders should have believed these witnesses.
Petitioner has not challenged the finding that his average monthly wage, prior to the accident, was'$213.52. During the eleven months that he worked after the accident he earned $3,400. For non-scheduled injuries the injured employee does not receive any compensation for his injuries, regardless of how painful or serious, unless they result in a reduced monthly earning capacity measurable in dollars and cents. If the injured employee earns more after the injury than prior to the injury this fact presents to the fact-finders some tangible evidence that they can appraise, and goes directly to the only inquiry before them — reduced monthly earning capacity. In quest of the correct answer the statute specifically directs “among other things” to consider “any wages received for work performed subsequent to the injury * * (Emphasis supplied.) Of course the majority find that the Commission should have found that he did not perform any work for which he should have received substantial wages, though he did receive $3,400.
The petitioner is not without remedy if at some time in the future he suffers a loss of earning capacity due to a subsequent change in his physical condition resulting from the original injury. Section 23-1044, subd. F, supra. Until the happening of such an event he has no standing before the Commission or this court.
The case has now been remanded back to the Commission, presumably for the purpose of compelling it to enter the award that should have been entered, and find that the petitioner has a reduced earning capacity, measurable in dollars and cents, which will equal 55%' of the difference be*129tween his average monthly wages ($213.52) before the accident and the amount which represents his “reduced monthly earning capacity” resulting from the disability, section 23-1044, subd. C, supra, which, at the time of the award, was twice as great as his average monthly wages before the accident. Query ?
The award should be affirmed.