Court Opinion

ID: 9560402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:48:38.158999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:53.437706
License: Public Domain

PANELLI, J., Dissenting.
I concur in Justice Mosk’s dissenting opinion. I write separately to express my view that the result reached by the majority is *867also prohibited by Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (d) (hereafter section 1538.5(d)).1
Section 1538.5 provides the exclusive procedure in this state for a criminal defendant to seek suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution or article I, section 13 of the state Constitution. (See, e.g., In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 896 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].)2 Since Proposition 8 added article I, section 28, subdivision (d) to our state charter, however, a court may only exclude evidence from a state criminal proceeding if exclusion is mandated by the federal exclusionary rule applicable to evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 896.) The trial court found that the evidence excluded from the prosecutor’s case-in-chief at the defendant’s criminal trial in this case met this standard.
Section 1538.5(d) sets forth the effect of a ruling in defendant’s favor on a section 1538.5 motion to suppress. This statutory provision states: “If a search or seizure motion is granted pursuant to the proceedings authorized by this section, the property or evidence shall not be admissible against the movant at any trial or other hearing unless further proceedings authorized by this section, Section 871.5, Section 1238, or Section 1466 are utilized by the people.” (Italics added.) It is undisputed in this case that the defendant’s section 1538.5 suppression motion was granted and that the People did not pursue any of the remedies set forth in section 1538.5(d). By its plain terms, the statute would appear to govern.
The majority, however, conclude that the Legislature could not have intended section 1538.5 to apply as broadly as the language of that section reads. With this basic premise, I agree. By using a reasoning process that I find insupportable, however, the majority then deduce that section 1538.5(d) is limited in its application solely to criminal cases. Therefore, the majority reason that this section does not apply to an administrative proceeding *868including the type at issue in this case, i.e., where punitive measures can be imposed.3
In my view, the majority’s unsupported and restrictive reading of section 1538.5(d) fails to give adequate weight to the policy underlying the adoption of that section. As we have previously recognized, the Legislature enacted section 1538.5(d) to promote judicial economy in the determination and resolution of search and seizure questions. (See, e.g., Schlick v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 310, 316 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 406, 841 P.2d 926].) In order to give full effect to the Legislative intent underlying this statute, I believe that section 1538.5(d) must be applied in any proceeding where the exclusionary rule is applicable. (Cf. People v. Moore (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 877, 885-886 [247 Cal.Rptr. 353] [recognizing that, even in criminal cases, the language of section 1538.5 must be read in light of Prop. 8].)
As we have previously recognized, the exclusionary rule is based upon the principle that the state should not profit from its own wrongdoing by receiving the benefit of using evidence obtained by unconstitutional means. (Emslie v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 210, 226 [113 Cal.Rptr. 175, 520 P.2d 991].) In deciding whether the exclusionary rule should apply in a given proceeding, this court has considered: (1) whether the proceeding bears a close identity to the aims and objectives of criminal law enforcement so as to be deemed “quasi-criminal” in nature; (2) whether application of the rule in the proceeding in question will serve as a deterrent to misconduct by law enforcement officers; (3)' the social cost resulting from applying the exclusionary rule in the proceeding; and (4) the effect of applying the exclusionary rule on the integrity of the judicial process. (In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 892 [does not automatically apply in civil proceedings]; In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 567, fn. 17 [221 Cal.Rptr. 118, 709 P.2d 1287] [applies in juvenile court proceeding based upon search by school official]; Emslie v. State Bar, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 229 [does not apply in State Bar disciplinary proceedings]; In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 650-651 [83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734] [applies in parole revocation *869proceedings]; People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal.2d 674, 681-682 [72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800] [applies in civil commitment proceedings]; People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe (1964) 62 Cal.2d 92, 96-97 [41 Cal.Rptr. 290, 396 P.2d 706] [applies in civil forfeiture proceedings]; see also United States v. Janis (1976) 428 U.S. 433, 446 [49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 1056, 96 S.Ct. 3021].)
Interpreting section 1538.5(d) to apply whenever the exclusionary rule applies is fully consistent with the legislative intent and does not implicate any of the pitfalls relied upon by the majority in support of their unduly restrictive reading of the statutory language of section 1538.5(d). For example, the exclusionary rule will apply rarely, if ever, in a civil suit. (Cf. In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 892-893; United States v. Janis, supra, 428 U.S. at pp. 453-458 [49 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1060-1063].) The majority merely set up and knock down a straw man by suggesting that, unless section 1538.5(d) is interpreted to apply only to criminal cases, that section would bar the use in civil wrongful death actions of evidence suppressed in a section 1538 motion. The exclusionary rule would not be applied in such a context. The policy reasons for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence simply are not implicated in a civil suit between private citizens. The state itself does not benefit from the use of the evidence in a civil suit. Moreover, the exclusionary rule serves no deterrent function: the state’s criminal investigators have no interest in the outcome of such an action.
Therefore, instead of approaching the question at hand with the broad brush employed by the majority, the first step in the analysis should be to determine whether the exclusionary rule applies to the type of administrative proceeding at issue. In my view, there is little room for doubt that the exclusionary rule applies in this case.
First, the statutes governing the Department of Motor Vehicles administrative proceeding implicitly incorporate the exclusionary rule. The Legislature has seen fit to provide for administrative suspension of a driver’s license only when the underlying arrest of a driver is proven lawful. (Veh. Code, § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(A).) The parties do not urge otherwise. The purpose of such a rule is clear: in the absence of a lawful arrest any evidence seized is considered to be illegally obtained. The majority simply debate whether an administrative hearing officer is entitled to redetermine the legality of the arrest and the search and seizure questions that flow therefrom notwithstanding the fact that a judge in the underlying criminal prosecution also made such a determination.
Second, the policy reasons underlying the exclusionary rule (see, ante, this page) support the conclusion that the rule applies in this case. We have *870explicitly held that the exclusionary rule applies in “quasi-criminal” cases, whether denominated civil or criminal in nature. (E.g., In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 892.) Proceedings are deemed “quasi-criminal” when “it is apparent that there is a close identity to the aims and objectives of criminal law enforcement.” (E.g., ibid., and cases cited therein.)
The administrative proceeding in this case must be judged “quasi-criminal” in nature. One objective of the proceeding is to punish the drunken driver by suspending driving privileges. Another objective is to deter driving while under the influence of alcohol. Both punishment and deterrence are common to criminal, as well as administrative, proceedings arising from drunk driving.
Furthermore, the arresting police officers who enforce the criminal sanctions are intimately involved in the enforcement of the civil sanctions. (E.g., United States v. Janis, supra, 428 U.S. at p. 458 [49 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1062-1063] [recognizing that deterrent effect of exclusionary rule is most potent when the sanction is imposed in a proceeding that falls within the “offending officer’s zone of primary interest”].) The arresting officer makes the car stop and conducts a blood, breath or urine test. (Veh. Code, § 13353.) The arresting officer’s report is generally the central piece of evidence presented in support of administrative suspension of a driver’s license. (See Veh. Code, § 13557, subd. (a).) The arresting officer is fully aware that the evidence he or she gathers will be used to seek sanctions against the driver in both the criminal and administrative arena. Under these circumstances, policy reasons, including the deterrent effect underlying the exclusionary rule, are sufficiently strong to mandate its application.
The exclusionary rule clearly applies to this administrative proceeding.4 The question, thus, becomes whether there is any legitimate reason not to apply section 1538.5(d).5 In this case, I find none.
Since the exclusionary rule is applicable to the administrative proceeding, no policies underlying that rule would be offended by applying the prohibition on admission of the evidence found in the course of a section 1538.5 *871motion to have been illegally obtained. The issue of the admissibility of evidence was fully and fairly adjudicated, by a constitutional judge, under the mechanism provided by section 1538.5. There is no need for an administrative officer to undertake that determination again. Indeed, it is preferable that such a determination be made by a municipal or superior court judge, rather than an administrative official. (Cf. Schlick v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 316; Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 108, 115 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 855].)
Furthermore, the goals of the administrative hearing cannot be impaired by giving conclusive effect to the judicial determination that the arrest was based upon unlawfully obtained evidence under section 1538.5. As previously noted, the Legislature has provided for the administrative suspension of a license only when the underlying arrest of the driver is proven lawful. (Veh. Code, § 13557, subd. (b)(2)(A).) Given the prior judicial determination of that issue on the merits, the provisions of section 1538.5(d) simply preclude relitigation of the same issue in the subsequent administrative proceeding.
On the other hand, the policy underlying the adoption of section 1538.5(d) would be impaired by failure to apply that statutory provision in the present case. Judicial economy is not served by permitting an administrative officer, subject to judicial review, to reconsider the decision of . a municipal or superior court judge regarding the lawfulness of an arrest after that decision has become final. (See, e.g., Schlick v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 316.)
Furthermore, permitting such administrative reconsideration of search and seizure issues undermines the integrity of the criminal court’s ruling and the criminal and administrative processes as a whole. (Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 115; cf. Schlick v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 316.) As the Zapata court accurately summarized: “Public confidence in the integrity of the judicial system is obviously threatened when-a nonjudicial officer, in an informal administrative hearing with no testimony taken, is permitted to relitigate the validity of an arrest that has been previously determined by a municipal court judge, at a contested evidentiary hearing, in the formal setting of a criminal prosecution. If this scenario does not tend to undermine the ‘integrity of the judicial system,’ it is difficult to conceive of what would.” (Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 115.)
In my view, the majority’s interpretation of section 1538.5(d) is unduly restrictive. That statute applies in the present case and prohibits the result *872reached in the majority opinion. For this reason and the reasons stated in Justice Mosk’s dissenting opinion, I also would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

The federal Fourth Amendment restricts the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is inadmissible in state court. (E.g., Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R.2d 933].)

As the majority recognize, no court to date has directly held that section 1538.5(d) is inapplicable to civil trials and administrative hearings. (Compare Buttimer v. Alexis (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 754, 762-763, fn. 4 [194 Cal.Rptr. 603] with People v. Williams (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032 [152 Cal.Rptr. 892] [dictum].) This absence of authority is not surprising given that the statutory language provides no support for such a restrictive reading of the statute. The term “hearing” has been assigned a broad meaning in this state: “A ‘hearing’ is generally understood to be a proceeding where evidence is taken to the end of determining an issue of fact and a decision made on the basis of that evidence.” (People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 521 [58 Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942].) The Department of Motor Vehicles hearing at issue herein meets this description: it is an administrative adjudication governed by Government Code section 11500 et seq. (Veh. Code, §§ 13558, 14112.)

The majority’s reliance upon the relaxed rules of evidence in the administrative proceeding at issue to support its conclusion that section 1538.5(d) is inapplicable to the proceeding is simply unavailing. As we have previously observed: “The mere fact that rules of evidence are relaxed in an administrative proceeding has no bearing on the applicátion of-the exclusionary rules.” (Emslie v. State Bar, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 228.) Of course, section 1538.5(d) also does not differentiate between hearings where the evidentiary rules are relaxed and hearings where they are not.

We have previously recognized that the remedy set forth in section 1538.5, the bringing of a motion to suppress, is not applicable in all administrative proceedings. (Goldin v. Public Utilities Commission (1979) 23 Cal.3d 638 [153 Cal.Rptr. 802, 592 P.2d 289] [discontinuation of telephone service based on alleged criminal usage].) In the present case, we need not consider this issue. The procedure set forth in section 1538.5 was properly invoked in a *871criminal proceeding. We are simply asked to assess the impact under subdivision (d) of the ruling in favor of the defendant to suppress the evidence.