Court Opinion

ID: 9658905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:21:36.429043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:01.538858
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.,
(concurring). The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Secretary of State (1964), 373 Mich 627, requires that where two candidates have the same or similar surnames they receive-ballot designations which will “identify them adequately when considered from the standpoint of the elector seeking to cast an effective vote for the Sullivan of his choice.”
A designation by street address or by present occupation, attorney at law, would no more accomplish that purpose in this case than it would have in the Sullivan ,Case. Here, as in Sullivan, all the candidates are. attorneys at law. And, as in Sullivan, a designation of “attorney at law” or by street address would not identify the Koscinski/Kosinslri or Murphy of the voter’s choice. Hence, we must, as in Sullivan, grant Arthur J. Koseinski and John R. Murphy designations related to their former positions, i.e., as judges, which designations would identify them. To grant Arthur J. Koseinski a *265designation as former assistant prosecuting attorney, which has been suggested as an alternative solution, and John R. Murphy a designation as former recorder’s court judge would be unfair, by comparison, to Arthur J. Koscinski.
By like token, to grant Arthur J. Koscinski and John R. Mnrphy designations as former recorder’s court judges and to deny a designation of former municipal judge to Robert L. Evans is unfair, by comparison, to Robert L. Evans.. And so it goes. If we grant designations of the potency we here grant, I think we should seek to eliminate so much of their impact beyond mere identification as can be done without depriving Arthur J. Koscinski and John R. Murphy of the identification to which they are entitled.
I would accordingly grant to Arthur J. Koscinski, John R. Murphy and Robert L. Evans designations as former judges. I would also grant the designation of traffic court referee to John C. Carney, that of assistant prosecuting attorney to Gerald W. Groat, Jr., that of common pleas judge, to Henry J. Szymanski, and, for want of a bettel suggestion, that of attorney at law to Ross John Fazio and Walter A. Kurz.
. The approach I. suggest1 is entirely consistent with the spirit and intent of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Sullivan and Elliott v.- Secretary of State (1940), 295 Mich 245. In the Sullivan Case the Supreme Court granted designations not expressly authorized by the statute and which had not been granted by the election commission. ' In the Elliott Case the Court required rotation of names on the ballot even though the statute did not so *266require. Both decisions sought to insure a fair election.2
“It is not consistent with fairness or purity of elections or the avoidance of misuse of elective franchise for election officials to prepare ballots in such a condition as will afford one candidate or nominee an unfair advantage over rival candidates or nominees.” Elliott, supra, pp 249, 250.

 This opinion, as was Judge Gielis’ (see footnote, 1 of his opinion), was filed with our order of July 5, 1968.

For a general discussion, see Kelman, Ballot Designations: Tlieir Nature, Function, and Constitutionality, 12 Wayne L Rev 756, 762 (1965-1966).