Court Opinion

ID: 9865132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:24:53.515705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:32.954515
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting.
Firm in the belief that the rule followed in the majority. opinion does not apply to the will here involved, I dissent.
It is most likely, and dangerously so, that the effect of the ruling as announced in the opinion would take too many of the decisions made by executors out of the control of the probate court. In all the cases cited in the majority opinion, in support of the ruling, the will involved gave the executor undeniable and complete discretion as I will later demonstrate.
Before us is paragraph 21 of Hirshorn’s will in the following words:
“21. As to my one-half interest in the Algerian Club, which is represented by a co-partnership agreement between one Jack Kanner and myself, I direct that my interests in said Club be disposed of in the following manner:
“I direct my said executor, hereinafter named, to as*305certain all bona fide employees of the said Algerian Club (excluding Jack Kanner), who have worked there regularly for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately prior to my death, and to all employees who have been determined by my said executor to be bona fide employees of the Algerian Club for more than one (1) year prior to my death, I give and bequeath all my said right, title and interest in and to the Algerian Club, share and share alike, subject to the restriction that no such employee may sell, pledge or otherwise dispose of his or her interest in said Club prior to the expiration of two (2) years after my death. However, if any employee violates this direction not to sell or pledge his or her share, then such share shall be divided among the other employees who take under the terms of this will. The employees who become beneficiaries of this Will are further directed by me to immediately select one of their number to act as spokesman for them and as co-manager of the Algerian Club.”
This lays bare an unequivocal direction and not discretion. The executor was directed to ascertain, that is, make certain by examination, all bona fide employees who have worked there regularly for a period of not less than one year. To ascertain who were such employees depended upon the facts that existed, and not on the judgment or discretion of the executor, and no place in the will did the testator say, “use his judgment,” or that his judgment would be “final, controlling or conclusive,” as is to be found in wills in the cases cited in the majority opinion as supporting the rule followed, as I will later set out.
This wording of the will before us contemplates that each and every one who had regular employment for at least a year before the death of the testator, would share in his beneficence. Whenever any employee could establish such employment, his right to share could not be denied, whether erroneously, arbitrarily or capriciously.
The claimant here is not an interloper, but is brought *306into the controversy by reason of recognized and admitted employment, and more forcibly so by the recorded actions of the executor himself, when he included her as a beneficial employee in the petition for probate of the will, again when he caused citation to attend probate to be served upon her, and also when he included her in the publication, of notice. Without notice, he unceremoniously changed his mind and excluded her.
After so being made a party, if she found herself injured or denied her rights by the executor by excluding her from the benefits under the will, whether capriciously or otherwise, she certainly was entitled to have the question of fact about her employment determined by the court. The facts upon which the executor was bound by the will to act, were determined in her favor by two courts of unquestioned ability and integrity. The executor was a party to both proceedings and he, as well as this court, is bound by the findings of fact on competent evidence. If he was wrong, claimant was entitled to have the court tell him so. If, as the findings of the county court and the district court disclose, claimant was and is entitled to share in the estate under the above provision of the will, then the denial of her right to so share by the executor had to be held erroneous or arbitrary, and the finding of the two courts sustained the allegation of the petition that the executor acted arbitrarily and capriciously, without expressly so stating in the findings, which was not necessary under the facts before both courts. As before stated, the findings, in effect, show that the executor was either arbitrary or capricious or was mistaken in his construction of the facts.
The executor appeared at both hearings and participated through counsel in the proceedings to determine whether claimant came within the provisions of the will or not, and never raised the question, or suggested to the court, that the will gave him complete discretion in *307determining who were such employees, and he offered no resistance to claimant on that ground. Claimant assumed, and carried the burden, of showing that his actions were arbitrary or capricious when she clearly established her right to participate under the will.
Credit of sincerity is due the executor for asking the county court, in his petition filed therein, to construe the will and the testator’s language concerning bona fide employees of the Algerian Club, stating in his petition, “That in his opinion, the language, with reference to the determination by the executor of all bona fide employees of the Algerian Club is not clear and this executor is in doubt as to his duty with relation thereto.” He then prays, “That the Court construe the will and the testator’s language concerning bona fide employees * * * and make a determination thereof.”
If the will gave the executor such carte blanche power and discretion as the majority opinion says he has, it would have to be in such clear and unmistakable language as to leave no doubt in the mind of the executor that he had such discretion and there would have been no occasion for him to file such a petition.
Contrary to the statement in the majority opinion that “The important thing which the court seems to have overlooked is that Hirshorn did not bequeath his interest to the bona fide employees who had worked in the club regularly for a period of not less than one year,” in my opinion, he did, and he directed the executor to find out who they were. On this question, the executor was in doubt and participated in a hearing before two courts on that question. However, the court in the majority opinion says that the judgment of the executor, and not the judgment of the court, prevailed. Where does the will even mention judgment of the executor?
On page six of the majority opinion, it is stated “The rule above enunciated seems to have been universally *308followed, as we have found no authority to the contrary.” In the case of Talladega College v. Callanan, 197 Ia. 556, 197 N. W. 635, cited in the opinion, it is stated: “That decisive question is whether the decision of the executors is final and binding upon the plaintiff of the dispute presented by it. This provision of the will is one which has been universally sustained by the courts in the comparatively few cases wherein the question has been raised.”
I am not in accord with paragraph numbered 3 on page seven of the opinion wherein it is stated: “* * * in order for petitioner to prevail, the evidence must with such certainty contradict the determination of the executor as to convince the court that there was .not merely a mistake of judgment on his part, but arbitrary action without basis of reason.” This is tantamount to saying that if the executor made a mistake in judgment, thereby giving claimant the right to participate under the will, and such mistake is sufficiently established by the evidence to base a finding such as two courts did in this case, then the claimant would still not be permitted to take under the will, but would have to go beyond that and show arbitrary action. I do not believe that such can be the law because of the clear direction that claimant would benefit if she qualified as an employee.
I will now set out pertinent parts of the wills in all cases cited in the opinion commencing with American Board of Com’s of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15 Fed. 696, in which paragraph twelve of the will there involved was as follows: “Be it distinctly understood by all concerned that every word and sentence herein is strictly my own; and I hereby determine and direct, furthermore, that in case any doubt or uncertainty arise touching any matter or thing contained or supposed to be contained in the foregoing, he, the existing male executor, shall act as umpire, and his determination and *309decision over his signature attached to this will, shall, in all respects, be accepted as final.” Unlike the will before us, in this case, the testator made clear that in case of any doubt, the determination of the executor would be final. There is no such wording in the Hirshorn will.
In Wait, et al., Executors v. Huntington, 40 Conn. 1, “Should any informality appear or questions arise as to the meaning or legal construction of this instrument, I hereby direct that the distribution of my estate shall be made to such persons and associations as my executors shall determine to be my intended legatees and devisees, and their construction of my will shall be binding upon all parties interested.” Quite different to the Hirshorn will.
In Talladega College v. Callanan, supra, also cited as supporting the rule, in paragraph 49 of the will in that case, is the following language: “ * * *and if any question of construction or meaning shall arise under this will, or any question of right or of dispute shall arise as to how much anyone is entitled to, I direct that the decision of a majority of my said executors on any such point shall be final.” No power of final decision is given the executor in the will before us.
In another case cited, Buchar’s Estate, 225 Pa. 427, 74 Atl. 237, the following is to be found in the will: “* * * unto my son, Charles E. Buchar, at such time and when my executors, or survivors of them shall decide that in their judgment, he is competent morally to have control' of the same.” The Hirshorn will does not permit the use of the executor’s judgment as final as in the case last quoted.
In another case relied upon to support the opinion, In re DeBancourt’s Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272 N. W. 891, is found the following: “I hereby give, devise and bequeath to the Salvation Army located in the City and County of Jackson, Michigan, the sum of Ten Thousand Dol*310lars to be used by them in the erection of their new building, said money to be paid by my executor hereinafter named when he is satisfied that the building will be completed and that the said Salvation Army will be able to finance the same.” This is quite different authority to that given by Hirshorn in the case before us.
The last case cited in the opinion in support of the rule is National Metropolitan Bank v. Joseph Gawler’s Sons, Inc., 168 F. (2d) 571, and the case turns on the following provision in the will, the executors were directed “to pay decedent’s just debts and the expenses of his last illness, ‘funeral and burial’ in such sums as they may deem proper.”
The writer of the court opinion cites the text in 21 American Jurisprudence, page 492, section 213, wherein it is said, “The reason for this hesitancy on the part of the court to interfere is that the testator has a right to dispose of his property as he pleases, and he may subject all, or any part, of it to the discretion of his executor or trustee. This discretion, properly exercised, will not be interfered with by the courts. Where the power given to an executor to do, or not to do, a particular thing is wholly discretionary, the court has no jurisdiction to lay a command or prohibition upon him as to the exercise of that power, provided his conduct is bona fide.” This text undoubtedly states the rule in the few reported cases where it is disclosed by the wills involved that discretion was specifically intended to be given by the testator to the executor and was so given by the varied expressions in the different wills. I have no quarrel with such a rule under the circumstances of these cases, but I do believe that it cannot be logically contended that any such discretion is given the executor in the case before us.
Let us hope that the majority opinion herein will not be freely accepted as authority for executors to feel that their judgment must prevail over that of the pro*311bate court in cases where the will gives no clearer right to such discretionary power than that in the will before us.
For these reasons, I think the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard concurs in this opinion.