Court Opinion

ID: 9949298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 12:02:06.705492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:51.013730
License: Public Domain

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           WILLIAM THOMAS CLARK ET AL. v.
              QUANTITATIVE STRATEGIES
                 GROUP, LLC, ET AL.
                     (AC 45956)
                      Suarez, Clark and Prescott, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The defendant judgment debtor, B, appealed to this court from the judgment
   of the trial court denying his claim that certain bank accounts were
   exempt from execution pursuant to statute ((Supp. 2022) § 52-367b)
   because the plaintiff judgment creditors executed on accounts that did
   not belong to him but, rather, belonged to his mother, J. The plaintiffs
   had obtained an arbitration award against B arising from a default on
   a loan, and the award was confirmed by the United States District Court
   for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs then domesticated
   the judgment in the Superior Court. After the trial court granted an
   application for a bank execution to satisfy the domesticated judgment,
   the plaintiffs served the execution on T Co., a bank, which identified
   two bank accounts on which B was listed as an account owner along
   with J and his sister. In his claim of exemption, B did not identify any
   of the statutory bases for an exemption set forth in § 52-367b or on the
   form prescribed by the Judicial Branch pursuant to § 52-367b (k).
   Instead, B indicated on his claim of exemption form that the basis of
   his claim was ‘‘[o]ther’’ and included a handwritten notation stating
   ‘‘[f]unds in these accounts are not my property.’’ Following a hearing,
   the court denied B’s claim of exemption. Held that the trial court did
   not improperly find that the accounts at issue were joint accounts and
   were not exempt from execution under § 52-367b, the court having
   correctly concluded that B’s asserted exemption was not recognized or
   enumerated under § 52-367b: although B purported to claim an exemp-
   tion under § 52-367b, specifically, that the funds in the accounts were
   not his but, instead, belonged solely to J, both the plain language of
   § 52-367b and case law make clear that the only cognizable exemptions
   are those provided for by that statute or any other laws or regulations of
   this state or the United States which exempt such debts from execution;
   moreover, although B noted in a supplemental brief to this court that
   he had filed a claim in the trial court for determination of interests
   pursuant to statute (§ 52-356c), that claim was neither pursued by B
   nor adjudicated by the trial court, and, because only a judgment creditor
   or a third person may make a claim for determination of interests
   pursuant to § 52-356c, not a judgment debtor, unless acting in a represen-
   tative capacity for an appropriate third party with an alleged interest
   in the subject property, and B lacked any legal capacity to act on J’s
   behalf, he was not authorized by statute to challenge T Co.’s determina-
   tion that he was a co-owner of the accounts by pursuing a claim for
   determination of interests.
       Argued October 16, 2023—officially released March 12, 2024

                            Procedural History

  Action to enforce a domesticated judgment, and for
other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Hartford, where the court, Baio, J., denied
the motion for exemption from execution filed by the
defendant John A. Brunjes et al., and the defendant
John A. Brunjes et al. appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Paul R. Fenaroli, with whom, on the brief, were
Joseph M. Pastore III, and Melissa Rose McClammy,
for the appellant (defendant John A. Brunjes et al.).
   Linda Clifford Hadley, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
                         Opinion

   CLARK, J. In this appeal from postjudgment proceed-
ings to obtain satisfaction of a domesticated judgment
arising from an arbitration award, the defendant judg-
ment debtor John A. Brunjes1 appeals from the judg-
ment of the trial court denying his claim of exemption
filed pursuant to General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-
367b2 claiming that the plaintiff judgment creditors, Wil-
liam Thomas Clark and TDA Construction, Inc., exe-
cuted on bank accounts that did not belong to him but,
rather, belonged to his mother, Josephine M. Brunjes.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improp-
erly found that he was a co-owner of the bank accounts
at issue and that they were not exempt from execution
under § 52-367b. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
  The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. On November 5,
2019, the plaintiffs obtained an arbitration award
against the defendant arising from a default on a loan.
On December 2, 2020, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York confirmed the
award (SDNY judgment). See Clark v. QMG Global
Holdings, LLC, United States District Court, Docket
No. 7:17-cv-07233 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. December 2, 2020).
On November 2, 2021, the plaintiffs domesticated the
SDNY judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-605.3
Thereafter, on January 10, 2022, the plaintiffs applied
for a bank execution to satisfy the domesticated judg-
ment against the defendant. The court granted the appli-
cation and issued an execution on February 17, 2022.
After the court granted the application, the plaintiffs
served the execution on TD Bank. TD Bank identified
two bank accounts (accounts) on which the defendant
was listed as an account owner along with his mother
and his sister. Having identified those two accounts,
which held a combined total of $214,501.46, TD Bank
subsequently ‘‘froze’’ the accounts and gave notice to
the defendant pursuant to § 52-367b (d).4
   On June 30, 2022, the defendant filed a claim of
exemption pursuant to § 52-367b (e).5 In his claim of
exemption, however, the defendant did not identify any
of the statutory bases for an exemption set forth in
§ 52-367b (a)6 or on the form prescribed by the Judicial
Branch pursuant to § 52-367b (k).7 Instead, the defen-
dant indicated on his claim of exemption form that
the basis of his claim was ‘‘[o]ther’’ and included a
handwritten notation stating ‘‘[f]unds in these accounts
are not my property.’’
  Thereafter, on October 13, 2022, the court held an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to § 52-367b (f) (1)8 to
consider the defendant’s claim of exemption. At that
hearing, the defendant claimed that the accounts
belonged to his mother, that he had no ownership inter-
est in them, and that he had no intent to become an
owner of the accounts. Following the hearing and the
submission of posttrial briefs, the court, Baio, J., issued
a memorandum of decision dated October 26, 2022,
denying the defendant’s claim of exemption. The court
found that (1) the accounts were joint bank accounts,
(2) the defendant was a co-owner on those accounts,
and (3) the funds within those accounts were not
exempt from execution. The court further concluded
that the defendant had not identified an exemption pro-
vided for by statute.
   In the court’s memorandum of decision, it stated:
‘‘The defendant does not dispute that the law permits
the execution on joint accounts. He argues, rather, that
this account is not a joint account. He submits that he
is not an ‘owner’ of the account, the funds belong to
his mother, and he has neither contributed to the funds
nor exercised dominion or control over the funds.
Hence, the issue is whether the account at issue is a
joint account. The defendant maintains that it was never
his intention to claim ownership of this account.
  ‘‘The problem for the defendant is that despite his
intentions or desires, that does not change the nature
of the account at issue. It also bears noting that the
defendant is not an unsophisticated consumer who
might be challenged in reading the bank forms. By his
own testimony . . . he is a college and law school grad-
uate . . . .
   ‘‘Through the evidence submitted by the defendant,
all three named individuals, the defendant, his sister,
and their mother, are named as owners on the account.
Each has the authority to make transactions on the
account. . . . Even though the defendant testified that
he had made no withdrawals, it is undisputed that he
could have done so if he so chose.
   ‘‘The bank form adding the defendant to the account
expressly lists the defendant as an account owner. . . .
The plaintiff correctly points out the express language
on the form under the caption ‘important information,’
which provides that by signing the form, the defendant
acknowledges that he is an account owner. The evi-
dence establishes that the account at issue is a joint
account, and there has been no evidence presented that
the account funds are exempt from execution under
the statute. To hold otherwise would be to improperly
create an exemption not otherwise provided by statute.
Cf. Pac v. Altham, 49 Conn. App. 503, 508–509, 714
A.2d 716 (1998). The defendant’s claim of exemption
is denied.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) This
appeal followed.
   On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly found that the accounts at issue were joint
accounts and, therefore, were not exempt from execu-
tion under § 52-367b. Specifically, the defendant argues
that the funds held in the accounts are exempt from
execution because they belong solely to his mother. He
also claims that the court erred in determining that the
burden of proof to establish the basis for the claimed
exemption under § 52-367b did not shift to the plaintiffs
once he filed his claim of exemption because such filing
constituted prima facie evidence that the funds are
exempt from execution. We disagree because, as the
trial court correctly concluded, the defendant’s asserted
exemption is not a claim of exemption that he is entitled
to assert under § 52-367b.
   We begin with our standard of review and an over-
view of the pertinent statutory provisions. Because the
defendant’s claim on appeal rests on the meaning and
application of § 52-367b, our review is plenary. See
Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 309 Conn. 608, 614, 72
A.3d 394 (2013) (‘‘[i]ssues of statutory construction
raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary
review’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). ‘‘When
construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the
legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine,
in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory
language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including
the question of whether the language actually does
apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, Gen-
eral Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text
of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.
If, after examining such text and considering such rela-
tionship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambig-
uous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,
extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall
not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
TLOA of CT, LLC v. Taipe, 220 Conn. App. 667, 673–74,
300 A.3d 647, cert. granted, 348 Conn. 923, 304 A.3d 443
(2023). Accordingly, we begin by examining § 52-367b.
   Pursuant to General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b
(a), ‘‘[e]xecution may be granted . . . against any debts
due from any financial institution to a judgment debtor
who is a natural person, except to the extent such debts
are protected from execution by sections 52-352a, 52-
352b, 52-352c of the general statutes, revision of 1958,
revised to 1983, 52-354 of the general statutes, revision
of 1958, revised to 1983, 52-361 of the general statutes,
revision of 1958, revised to 1983 and section 52-361a,
as well as by any other laws or regulations of this state
or of the United States which exempt such debts from
execution.’’ Section 52-367b (c) (1) provides in relevant
part: ‘‘[I]f any such financial institution upon which
such execution is served and upon which such demand
is made is indebted to the judgment debtor, the financial
institution shall remove from the judgment debtor’s
account the amount of such indebtedness not exceeding
the amount due on such execution . . . .’’ General Stat-
utes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b (c) (1). If a financial institu-
tion removes funds from a judgment debtor’s account,
it must provide proper notice to the judgment debtor
and any secured party. General Statutes (Supp. 2022)
§ 52-367b (d).
   A judgment debtor, upon belief that debts are exempt
from execution, may file a claim of exemption pursuant
to § 52-367b (e) by filing form JD-CV-24A, titled ‘‘Exemp-
tion Claim Form Financial Institution Execution.’’9 Sec-
tion 4 of this form, titled ‘‘Affidavit of Claim of Exemp-
tion Established by Law,’’ states: ‘‘I, the judgment debtor
named above, claim and certify under the penalty of
false statement that the money in the above account is
exempt by law from execution as follows . . . .’’ The
form then provides a checklist of the most common
statutory exemptions and includes an ‘‘[o]ther’’ option
with space to explain the legal basis for the claim of
exemption.
   Once a judgment debtor claims an exemption from
execution pursuant to § 52-367b (e), the court must
schedule a hearing on the exemption claim. The exemp-
tion claim filed by the debtor is considered prima facie
evidence that the claimed exemption exists. See Gen-
eral Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b (f). The court, after
conducting this hearing, must decide whether the
exemption claim is meritorious; see General Statutes
(Supp. 2022) § 52-367b (i); and, if so, whether all or
only part of the money deposited in the subject account
is exempt. See General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b
(j); see also Pac v. Altham, supra, 49 Conn. App. 507.
   In the present case, the defendant purported to claim
an exemption not recognized or enumerated under § 52-
367b—specifically, that the funds in the accounts were
not his but, instead, belonged solely to his mother. Both
the plain language of § 52-367b and our case law, how-
ever, make clear that the only cognizable exemptions
are those provided for by that statute. Section 52-367b
(a) plainly and unambiguously states that the judgment
debtor is only permitted to assert exemptions set forth
by statute or ‘‘any other laws or regulations of this
state or of the United States which exempt such debts
from execution.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes
(Supp. 2022) § 52-367b (a).
   Indeed, this court previously has held that a judgment
debtor may assert only those exemptions set forth in
§ 52-367b (a). See Pac v. Altham, supra, 49 Conn. App.
508. In Pac, the plaintiff, after obtaining a judgment
against the defendant, applied for and received a bank
execution, which, at a later hearing on the defendant’s
claim of exemption, was found to be untimely served
and therefore, void. Id., 504–505. In the interim, the
plaintiff had applied for and received a second bank
execution to levy the defendant’s funds, and the defen-
dant filed another exemption claim form, this time
asserting that the funds were exempt from execution
because they had been improperly removed from the
account by virtue of the first untimely served execution.
Id., 505. Following a hearing on the second execution,
the court ruled that the funds were exempt from execu-
tion because, but for the fact that the funds had been
removed improperly under the first execution, the funds
would have been available to the defendant to withdraw
and would not have been available for execution at the
time the second execution was served. Id.
   On appeal to this court, the plaintiff argued that the
trial court improperly recognized and applied an exemp-
tion not provided for by statute. Id., 504. This court
agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the judgment of
the trial court, explaining that ‘‘the trial court improp-
erly created an exemption not otherwise provided by
statute. . . . Specifically, the trial court found that the
entire account was exempt from execution because
of the proceedings related to the service of the first
execution, which was untimely and therefore improper.
This exemption is not provided for in the General Stat-
utes. To the contrary, General Statutes § 52-352b sets
forth the list of statutory exemptions. We conclude that
the trial court’s exemption is not provided for by statute,
and, accordingly, the judgment should be reversed.’’
(Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 508–509.
   Here, as in Pac, the defendant’s claimed exemption is
not among the exemptions recognized and enumerated
under § 52-367b (a). As a result, the trial court properly
concluded that the defendant’s claim of exemption
failed because ‘‘[t]o hold otherwise would be to improp-
erly create an exemption not otherwise provided by
statute.’’
   Nevertheless, in his supplemental brief to this court,10
the defendant notes for the first time that he also filed
in the trial court a claim for determination of interests
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-356c. That statute
provides in relevant part that: ‘‘Where a dispute exists
between the judgment debtor or judgment creditor and
a third person concerning an interest in personal prop-
erty sought to be levied on, or where a third person
claims that the execution will prejudice his superior
interest therein, the judgment creditor or third person
may, within twenty days of service of the execution or
upon application by the judgment creditor for a turn-
over order, make a claim for determination of interests
pursuant to this section. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Gen-
eral Statutes § 52-356c (a).
   Section 52-356c (b), in turn, provides that such claim
‘‘shall be filed with the Superior Court, on a prescribed
form as a supplemental proceeding to the original
action. . . .’’ Section 52-356c (c) further provides that,
‘‘[o]n filing of the claim, the clerk of the court shall
assign the matter for hearing . . . and order that notice
of the hearing be served by the claimant on all persons
known to claim an interest in the disputed property.’’
  Although the record in the trial court reveals that the
defendant filed a claim for determination of interests
in this case, that claim was neither pursued by the
defendant nor adjudicated by the court. Instead, the
defendant’s sole claim before the court was that the
funds were exempt from execution pursuant to § 52-
367b (a). Indeed, that is the only claim the defendant
has raised in this appeal.
  More fundamentally, only a judgment creditor or a
third person may make a claim for determination of
interests pursuant to § 52-356c (a). Judgment debtors,
unless acting in a representative capacity for an appro-
priate third party with an alleged interest in the subject
property, may not file a claim for determination of inter-
ests under § 52-356c. See Simko v. LaMorte, 222 Conn.
793, 798, 610 A.2d 663 (1992) (‘‘although generally the
judgment debtor is not a party to the hearing [pursuant
to § 52-356c] . . . in the present case, the defendant,
as trustee for third parties with deposits in the account,
may request a hearing pursuant to § 52-356c, on behalf
of those third parties’’ (citation omitted)). Conse-
quently, and because the defendant in this case lacked
any legal capacity to act on his mother’s behalf, he
was not authorized by statute to challenge TD Bank’s
determination that he was a co-owner of the accounts
by pursuing a claim for determination of interests pursu-
ant to § 52-356c.11
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     The plaintiffs, William Thomas Clark and TDA Construction, Inc., brought
the underlying action in federal court against QMG Global Holdings, LLC,
Quantitative Strategies Group, LLC, QMG Founders I, LLC, QMG Investors,
L.P., John A. Brunjes, individually and in his capacity as trustee of the John
W. Brunjes Estate Trust, and Josephine M. Brunjes as defendants. See Clark
v. QMG Global Holdings, LLC, United States District Court, Docket No.
7:17-cv-07233 (KMK). The plaintiffs named Quantitative Strategies Group,
LLC, QMG Founders I, LLC, QMG Investors, L.P., and John A. Brunjes,
individually and in his capacity as trustee of the John W. Brunjes Estate
Trust in this state court proceeding. The only defendant participating in the
present appeal is John A. Brunjes, individually and in his capacity as trustee
of the John W. Brunjes Estate Trust. Accordingly, all references to the
defendant in this opinion are to John A. Brunjes only.
   2
     All references herein to § 52-367b are to the version of the statute in the
2022 Supplement to the General Statutes.
   3
     General Statutes § 52-605 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A judgment
creditor shall file, with a certified copy of a foreign judgment, in the court
in which enforcement of such judgment is sought, a certification that the
judgment was not obtained by default in appearance or by confession of
judgment, that it is unsatisfied in whole or in part, the amount remaining
unpaid and that the enforcement of such judgment has not been stayed and
setting forth the name and last-known address of the judgment debtor.
   ‘‘(b) Such foreign judgment shall be treated in the same manner as a
judgment of a court of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and
is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening,
vacating or staying as a judgment of a court of this state and may be enforced
or satisfied in like manner. . . .’’
   4
     General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b (d) provides: ‘‘Notice to judg-
ment debtor and secured party. If any funds are removed from the judg-
ment debtor’s account pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, upon
receipt of the execution and exemption claim form from the serving officer,
the financial institution shall (1) forthwith mail copies thereof, postage
prepaid, to the judgment debtor and to any secured party that is party to
a control agreement between the financial institution and such secured
party under article 9 of title 42a at the last-known address of the judgment
debtor and of any such secured party with respect to the affected accounts
on the records of the financial institution, and (2) mail notice to the judgment
debtor as required by 31 CFR 212.6 and 212.7. The financial institution shall
hold the amount removed from the judgment debtor’s account pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section for fifteen days from the date of the mailing
to the judgment debtor and any such secured party, and during such period
shall not pay the serving officer.’’
   5
     General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b (e) provides: ‘‘Claim of exemp-
tion and claim of prior perfected security interest. To prevent the
financial institution from paying the serving officer, as provided in subsection
(h) of this section, the judgment debtor shall give notice of a claim of
exemption by delivering to the financial institution, by mail or other means,
the exemption claim form or other written notice that an exemption is being
claimed and any such secured party shall give notice of its claim of a prior
perfected security interest in such deposit account by delivering to the
financial institution, by mail or other means, written notice thereof. The
financial institution may designate an address to which the notice of a claim
of exemption, or a secured party claim notice, shall be delivered. Upon
receipt of such notice, the financial institution shall, within two business
days, send a copy of such notice to the clerk of the court which issued the
execution.’’
   6
     General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b (a) provides: ‘‘Exempt debts.
Execution may be granted pursuant to this section against any debts due
from any financial institution to a judgment debtor who is a natural person,
except to the extent such debts are protected from execution by sections
52-352a, 52-352b, 52-352c of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised
to 1983, 52-354 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1983, 52-
361 of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to 1983 and section 52-
361a, as well as by any other laws or regulations of this state or of the
United States which exempt such debts from execution.’’
   7
     General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b (k) provides: ‘‘Forms. The exe-
cution, exemption claim form and clerk’s notice regarding the filing of a
claim of exemption shall be in such form as prescribed by the judges of
the Superior Court or their designee. The exemption claim form shall be
dated and include a checklist and description of the most common exemp-
tions, instructions on the manner of claiming the exemptions and a space
for the judgment debtor to certify those exemptions claimed under penalty
of false statement.’’
   8
     General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b (f) (1), titled ‘‘Hearing,’’ pro-
vides: ‘‘Upon receipt of an exemption claim form or a secured party claim
notice, the clerk of the court shall enter the appearance of the judgment
debtor or such secured party with the address set forth in the exemption
claim form or secured party claim notice. The clerk shall forthwith send
file-stamped copies of the exemption claim form or secured party claim
notice to the judgment creditor and judgment debtor with a notice stating
that the disputed funds are being held for forty-five days from the date the
exemption claim form or secured party claim notice was received by the
financial institution or until a court order is entered regarding the disposition
of the funds, whichever occurs earlier, and the clerk shall promptly schedule
the matter for a hearing. The claim of exemption filed by such judgment
debtor shall be prima facie evidence at such hearing of the existence of the
exemption.’’
   9
     General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 52-367b (e) provides in relevant part:
‘‘To prevent the financial institution from paying the serving officer, as
provided in subsection (h) of this section, the judgment debtor shall give
notice of a claim of exemption by delivering to the financial institution, by
mail or other means, the exemption claim form or other written notice that
an exemption is being claimed and any such secured party shall give notice
of its claim of a prior perfected security interest in such deposit account
by delivering to the financial institution, by mail or other means, written
notice thereof. . . . Upon receipt of such notice, the financial institution
shall, within two business days, send a copy of such notice to the clerk of
the court which issued the execution.’’
   Form JD-CV-24A can be found on the Judicial Branch website. See Official
Court Webforms, Form JD-CV-24A, available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/webforms/
forms/CV024A.pdf (last visited March 4, 2024).
   10
      At oral argument before this court, both parties were questioned as to
whether the defendant had standing to argue that the money in the accounts
belongs solely to his mother even though he is not her legal representative.
On November 16, 2023, following oral argument, we ordered the parties to
file simultaneous supplemental briefs on that issue. The plaintiffs and the
defendant complied with the court’s order by filing briefs on December 21
and 22, 2023, respectively.
   11
      Although we need not reach the issue in light of our conclusion that
the defendant failed to assert a valid exemption, we also conclude that the
trial court’s finding that the defendant was a co-owner on the accounts was
not clearly erroneous, irrespective of whether the court applied the correct
burden of proof. See Maye v. Canady, 214 Conn. App. 455, 460, 280 A.3d
1270 (‘‘It is well established that [o]ur review of questions of fact is limited
to the determination of whether the findings were clearly erroneous. . . .
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record
to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is the trial
court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give
great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do
not examine the record to determine whether the [court] could have reached
a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every
reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 919,
284 A.3d 627 (2022).
   In his brief to this court, the defendant argues that he had no intention
of becoming a joint owner on his mother’s account. However, despite the
defendant’s claimed intention, the evidence presented clearly demonstrated
that the defendant signed a form indicating that he was to be added as a
co-owner of the accounts. Indeed, the trial court found ‘‘[t]he bank form
adding the defendant to the account expressly lists the defendant as an
account owner. . . . The plaintiff correctly points out the express language
on the form under the caption ‘important information,’ which provides that
by signing the form, the defendant acknowledges that he is an account
owner. The evidence establishes that the account at issue is a joint account
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Moreover, our case law is clear
that joint accounts can be executed upon in their entirety even when only one
co-owner is the judgment debtor. Fleet Bank Connecticut, N.A. v. Carillo,
240 Conn. 343, 352, 691 A.2d 1068 (1997) (holding that in cases of joint bank
accounts, ‘‘each coholder of a joint account . . . has a sufficient property
interest [in the account] to permit a judgment creditor to exercise a bank
execution, pursuant to § 52-367b, against the entire account’’ (emphasis
omitted)); see also Masotti v. Bristol Savings Bank, 232 Conn. 172, 173–75,
653 A.2d 179 (1995) (adopting holding of trial court that coholders of joint
account have sufficient ownership interests in account so that creditor of
any one coholder may exercise setoff rights against account in its entirety).