Court Opinion

ID: 9740744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:41:11.443011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.088971
License: Public Domain

KIRSCH, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority's resolution of issues I and II. As to the resolution of issues III and IV, however, I respectfully dissent.
Issues III and IV turn upon whether Jupe's Coupes had actual knowledge that Owens did not have a driver's license at the time it entrusted the automobile and plates to him and whether there is a sufficient nexus between such entrustment and the accident to constitute proximate cause. Both questions are material questions of fact which render the entry of summary judgment inappropriate.
The question of whether Jupe's had actual notice that Owens did not have a driver's license was not raised by Jupe's Coupes in its motion for summary judgment, nor asserted by Jupe's on appeal. Indeed, Jupe's states that the issue "is not whether Jupe's had actual knowledge that Owens did not possess a driver's license; the inquiry is whether Jupe's had actual knowledge that Owens was incompetent to drive...." (Appellee's Brief at p. 25). At the oral argument before this court, Jupe's acknowledged that, at this stage of the proceedings, the Record supports the inference that Jupe's knew Owens did not have a driver's license.
Here, there is conflicting evidence regarding what information Jupe's requested and what information Owens produced. Jupe's states that it asked for Owens' license; Owens states that it did not. Jupe's states that Owens produced what appeared to be a valid driver's license; Owens states that he did not. The majority states that the Record does not permit an inference that Jupe's requested Owens' license and Owens did not produce one. I disagree. The statements by Jupe's that it asked for and received a valid driver's license are separate and independent statements. Similarly, Owens' statements are also separate and independent. The truth of one is neither determinative of, nor dependent upon, the truth of the other. Neither logic, nor experience, requires that we accept either statement as completely true. A trier of fact could reasonably believe (1) that Jupe's asked for a driver's license and (2) that Owens produced something other than a valid driver's license. What Jupe's requested and what it received are material questions of fact which render summary judgment inappropriate.
The issue of proximate cause is also a question of fact which renders summary judgment inappropriate. Proximate cause requires that there be a reasonable connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries. In Shaw v. Hart (1964), 186 Ind.App. 567, 202 N.E.2d 587, this court said:
"... Indiana has always recognized the rule that negligence cannot be predicated upon the mere lack of an operator's license. Negligence must be determined from the facts surrounding the accident. The lack of a license is immaterial unless a causal connection between the injuries and the failure to have a license is shown." Id. at 588.
Here, resolving the question of Jupe's actual knowledge that Owens did not have a driver's license in favor of the plaintiffs, the non-moving parties, the record discloses the following: Jupe's entrusted the car and temporary plates to Owens with actual knowledge that he did not have a driver's license. Owens did not have a driver's license because the States of Indiana and Ohio had suspended his licenses for multiple offenses of driving while intoxicated. Owens proceeds, within eight days of the entrustment, to operate the vehicle while intoxicated. In the course of such operation, he causes injury to the plaintiffs. The required nexus between the defendant's negligence and plaintiffs' injuries *1025lies in Owens' operation of the vehicle while intoxicated. Such operation was the reason for Owens' license suspension and the cause of injuries to the plaintiffs.
In Smith v. Thomas (1955), 126 Ind.App. 59, 130 N.E.2d 85, this court held that one who negligently entrusts an automobile and license plates to one too young to obtain a license is liable for the injuries caused as a result of the negligent operation of the automobile by the minor. Id., 130 N.E.2d at 89. One who negligently entrusts an automobile and license plates to one whose license has been suspended in two states for multiple offenses of driving while intoxicated could reasonably foresee that such individual may operate such vehicle while intoxicated, and should be held liable for injuries resulting from such operation.
A jury could reasonably find the requisite causal connection between the alleged negligent entrustment and the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs and could allocate a portion of the total fault resulting in this accident to Jupe's; a jury could reasonably find to the contrary. In either event, the issue of proximate cause is a question of fact for the jury to determine. See State Street Duffy's, Inc. v. Loyd (1993), Ind.App., 623 N.E.2d 1099, 1101.