Court Opinion

ID: 9397565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 16:10:27.168885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:25.934043
License: Public Domain

J-S13045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JULIO CEASAR SEGURA JR.                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2902 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 24, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                       at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000314-2021

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                            FILED MAY 25, 2023

       Appellant Julio Ceasar Segura, Jr.1 appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County after

he was convicted of recklessly endangering another person (REAP), fleeing or

attempting to elude a police officer, persons not to possess a firearm, firearms

not to be carried without a license, and vehicle code violations. Appellant

claims the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion which was based

on his challenge to the legality of the stop of his vehicle. We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the factual background of the case as

follows:

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Appellant’s name may be misspelled in the trial court’s caption. However, as
it does not appear that Appellant filed any motion to correct the caption, we
utilize the caption reported by the trial court.
J-S13045-23

            On November 23, 2020, at approximately 1:17 a.m.,
      Pennsylvania State Troopers Jason Henley and Seth Heffner were
      on patrol in the area of East High Street in Pottstown, PA when
      they observed a silver Cadillac sedan (the “Cadillac”) which did
      not have a functioning registration lamp. The troopers also
      observed the Cadillac weaving within its lane of travel. The
      Cadillac subsequently approached a signalized intersection at
      Sunnybrook Road. Despite the traffic light’s display of a steady
      green light, the Cadillac almost came to a complete stop at the
      intersection.

            Trooper Henley activated his emergency siren and lights and
      attempted to effectuate a traffic stop. The Cadillac began to pull
      over to the side of the roadway but subsequently reentered the
      travel lanes on High Street and drove away at a high rate of speed.
      The Cadillac proceeded to drive in the center of the roadway and
      drove through a steady red light at the South Pleasantview Road
      intersection. The Cadillac nearly drove into oncoming traffic lanes,
      and traveled at speeds exceeding 115 miles per hour. The Cadillac
      also drove through a steady red light at the Rupert Road
      intersection as two (2) vehicles were stopped at the light.

             Eventually, the Cadillac traveled onto West Ridge Pike,
      where it spun out and crashed into a guard rail. Trooper Henley
      proceeded to execute a “PIT” maneuver which caused the Cadillac
      to come to a stop in the roadway’s grassy median. The troopers
      subsequently approached the Cadillac and the driver, later
      identified as [Appellant], who stated “I can’t stop it, it won’t stop,
      I’ve got a gun on me.” [Appellant] also informed the troopers that
      the gun was “under the hoodie” located inside the vehicle. While
      placing [Appellant] into custody, authorities uncovered a loaded
      firearm from the vehicle which was wrapped inside a hooded
      sweatshirt.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 1/11/23, at 1-2.

      After Appellant was charged in this case, Appellant filed a motion to

suppress the firearm seized from the Cadillac. The trial court denied the

suppression motion following a hearing.

      On July 7, 2022, the trial court conducted a bifurcated trial at which the

jury convicted Appellant of REAP, fleeing or attempting to elude an officer,

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and firearms not to be carried without a license. Appellant stipulated that if

the jury found he was in possession of a firearm, he was also guilty of persons

not to possess a firearm based on his prior burglary conviction.

      On October 24, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of seven to fourteen years’ imprisonment. Appellant filed a

timely appeal and complied with the trial court’s direction to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

      Appellant raises one issue for our review on appeal:

      Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to
      suppress where he was seized without probable cause that he
      committed a Vehicle Code violation nor reasonable suspicion that
      he was driving under the influence because the dash camera video
      shows that Appellant’s license plate was clearly illuminated and
      that he merely slowed while approaching an intersection?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

      Appellant’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying

his suppression motion. Appellant alleges that the arresting officer’s dash

camera recording does not support the finding that there was probable cause

to stop his vehicle. We review a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion

under the following standard:

      [o]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of
      a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the
      suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record
      and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
      correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
      suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
      Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
      remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
      a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are

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      supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may
      reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where
      ... the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns
      on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal
      conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it
      is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
      to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are
      subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 146 A.3d 1271, 1273 (Pa.Super. 2016)

(citation omitted).

      With respect to vehicle stops based on suspected violations of the motor

vehicle code, Section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code provides:

      (b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police officer is
      engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers
      or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring
      or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal,
      for the purpose of checking the vehicle's registration, proof of
      financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
      number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information
      as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce
      the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).

      In Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285 (Pa.Super. 2010), this

Court further explained the state of the law with respect to vehicle stops:

      Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion[,] either of criminal
      activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the
      authority of Section 6308(b)[,] must serve a stated investigatory
      purpose. [Commonwealth v.] Chase, 960 A.2d [108,] 116 [(Pa.
      2008)].

      Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the
      driver's detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant
      to the suspected violation. In such an instance, “it is encumbent
      [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him,
      at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable
      cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of

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      some provision of the Code.” [Commonwealth v.] Gleason, 785
      A.2d [983,] 989 [(Pa. 2001)].

Id. at 1291.

      This Court has further explained how to determine the quantum of

suspicion required to stop a vehicle:

      when considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause
      is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the nature of
      the violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary to stop
      the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code has
      occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the
      vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a stop is necessary to
      further investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer
      need only possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
      Illustrative of these two standards are stops for speeding and DUI.
      If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must possess
      probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because when a
      vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be determined as to the
      speed of the vehicle when it was observed while traveling upon a
      highway. On the other hand, if an officer possesses sufficient
      knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer
      may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code
      violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed
      opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under
      the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.

Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa.Super. 2015).

      Section 4303 of the Motor Vehicle Code, which sets forth general lighting

requirements, provides in relevant part that “[e]very vehicle operated on a

highway shall be equipped with a rear lighting system including, but not

limited to, rear lamps, rear reflectors, stop lamps and license plate light, in

accordance with regulations of the department.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b). This

Court has observed that “[d]epartment regulations at 67 Pa.Code §§

175.80(a)(9)(i) and 175.66(k) provide a vehicle is not in compliance with the

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Vehicle Code if ‘[a]n exterior bulb or sealed beam, if originally equipped or

installed, fails to light properly,” and “the registration plate lamp shall emit

white light and make the registration plate visible from [a] distance of 50 feet

to the rear of the vehicle.’” Salter, 121 A.3d 993.

      In this case, Trooper Henley and Trooper Heffner testified that one of

the reasons that caused them to initiate the traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle

was their observation that Appellant’s license plate lamp was not illuminated.

In response, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in crediting the

troopers’ testimony, which Appellant claims was undermined by the dashcam

recording from the troopers’ patrol car. From Appellant’s point of view,

Appellant argues that the video shows that his license plate was clearly visible.

      In addition, Appellant asserts that Trooper Henley should have turned

the headlights of his vehicle off to confirm that Appellant’s license plate lights

were not working. Appellant further contends that Trooper Henley failed to

corroborate his suspicion that the license plate light was not working after he

had pulled over Appellant’s vehicle. Thus, Appellant argues that the troopers

did not demonstrate that they had probable cause that Appellant had violated

Section 4303 when they activated their overhead lights to initiate the stop.

      In upholding the vehicle stop, the trial court specifically found that the

troopers gave credible and “unequivocal” testimony that the license plate lamp

was not illuminated on the Cadillac. Trooper Henley specifically testified that

“you can clearly see that [the registration lamp was] out” even though the

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patrol car’s headlights were illuminated. Notes of Testimony (N.T.),

Suppression Hr’g, 6/30/22, at 13-14.

       While Trooper Henley admitted that he did not turn off the lights of the

patrol car to confirm that Appellant’s license plate lamp was inoperable, the

trial court found that this action was not required as Trooper Henley

“steadfastly testified that he was still able to determine the lamp was not

illuminated and turning off the headlights on the patrol vehicle would have

created a safety issue.” T.C.O. at 7.

       The record supports the factual findings of the trial judge, who did

review the dashcam footage and determined that the troopers’ testimony was

credible. On two occasions in the video, Trooper Henley narrated that he

intended to pull Appellant over for having “no reg[istration] lamps.”2 Dashcam

video at 00:00:49-00:00:55; 00:01:26-00:01:27. At the beginning of the

video, the Cadillac’s license plate is not illuminated and only becomes visible

when Appellant’s brake lights are activated and the troopers’ vehicle is close

enough to provide light upon the license plate from its headlights.

       As Trooper Henley determined that Appellant’s vehicle had no

registration lamp and Appellant’s license plate was not illuminated, Appellant’s

license plate would not have been visible from a distance of 50 feet at 1:17
____________________________________________

2  Trooper Henley also indicates that he intended to stop Appellant for
“swerving all over the place … [and] coming to almost like a stop at a green
light.” Dashcam video at 00:00:49-00:00:55. We need not determine whether
these other observations gave the troopers’ the requisite suspicion to stop
Appellant’s vehicle, as their observation of his inoperable registration lamp
was sufficient itself to justify the stop.

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a.m. Because Trooper Henley did not need to investigate further to determine

whether Appellant’s license plate lamp was out, he had probable cause to

initiate a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle for a violation of Section 4303.3

Salter, 121 A.3d at 994 (quoting Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d

1271, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quotation omitted) (clarifying that “[p]robable

cause does not require certainty, but rather exists when criminality is one

reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most likely inference”).

____________________________________________

3 While we uphold the trial court’s finding in this case that Trooper Henley
possessed probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle after observing Appellant
did not have a working registration lamp, we acknowledge that the requisite
suspicion to justify a vehicle stop for a violation of Section 4303 varies based
on the factual circumstances of the case.

       It is possible, given the nature of this violation and the conditions
       under which plate illumination may be observed, that an officer
       may have to stop a vehicle to investigate further if a violation
       exists. Reasonable suspicion requires only that the officer have
       sufficient knowledge to believe a traffic violation has occurred in
       order to conduct a brief investigative stop. See Feczko, 10 A.3d
       at 1291 (noting an officer may, consistent with § 6308(b), perform
       a traffic stop “to secure such other information as the officer may
       reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of
       [the Vehicle Code]”). For instance, fog, rain, time of day, or
       obstructions impeding or blocking view of the plate illumination
       might prevent a clear determination if a lighting violation exists.
       If reasonable suspicion exists that such a violation is present, but
       a stop is required to confirm the violation, then probable cause is
       not needed and reasonable suspicion may be sufficient.

Salter, 121 A.3d at 994. However, if an officer observes a vehicle’s license is
not illuminated and the officer does not need to investigate further to
determine whether the registration lamps were out, the officer possesses
probable cause to justify the stop. Id.

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     Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying

Appellant’s suppression motion.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/25/2023

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