Court Opinion

ID: 9524324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:51:48.10266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:33.065246
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, also dissenting: The one-year suspension imposed by the majority in this case is too severe when compared with the punishments imposed on attorneys who have engaged in conduct similar to that of the respondent. In choosing the appropriate sanctions to impose on attorneys in disciplinary proceedings we should carefully consider the recommendations of the boards, but “the final responsibility for imposing discipline rests with this court.” (In re Schuyler (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 6, 18.) In determining the appropriate sanction in a particular case, we are to consider any relevant mitigating or aggravating factors that are unique to the case. (In re O’Hallaren (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 426, 433.) In several cases, however, we have also emphasized that “ ‘[predictability and fairness require that there be a degree of consistency in the sanctions imposed for similar types of conduct ***.’ (In re Hopper (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 318, 324.) Sanctions should be imposed consistent with those imposed in cases with factual situations substantially similar to the case under consideration.” In re Freel (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 263, 270; see also In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7,11; In re Clayter (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 276, 283. The majority’s imposition of a one-year suspension is not accompanied by a careful examination of the cases in which other attorneys have been found guilty of neglecting their client’s matters. Instead, the majority simply observes that suspension is a proper punishment in cases in which a corrupt motive and moral turpitude are not shown. In many cases of professional neglect suspension is a proper remedy, but in many other cases of this type censure has also been considered a proper remedy. (See In re Kink (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 293; In re Ahem (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 69.) Only by reviewing the punishments imposed in similar cases of professional neglect can we establish a fair and proper punishment for this respondent as well as one consistent with the sanctions imposed on others. A review of these cases illustrates that suspension has been limited to cases of outrageous neglect and irresponsibility. For example, in In re Taylor (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 567, and In re Simpson (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 562, the attorney-respondents were each suspended for one year because they completely neglected matters entrusted to them by clients after money had been paid in advance for fees and costs. In Simpson the court emphasized the outrageous character of the attorney’s conduct: “His unprofessional conduct was not merely failing to do the work he should have done *** but *** failing even to commence the divorce action, destroying the file, and remaining incommunicado from his client for over two years, while retaining the fee paid to obtain the divorce ***.” (47 Ill. 2d 562, 566.) Moreover, in Simpson the attorney had apparently converted to his own use money that had been entrusted to him by a client for the purchase of a surety bond. Other disciplinary cases in which this court has imposed suspension involve similar circumstances of complete neglect and outrageous conduct. See, e.g., In re Levin (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 205 (clients’ action dismissed because attorney failed to provide answers to interrogatories, to produce clients for depositions, and to obtain documentation of alleged settlement agreement); In re Chapman (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 494 (two clients denied appeals because of attorney’s neglect; attorney misrepresented to clients the status of their cases). The respondent’s conduct, although reprehensible, is not as outrageous as that of the attorneys in Taylor and Chapman. The principal basis for the charge of neglect in the estate matter involves the respondent’s failure to file the final account despite numerous inquiries from his client. The principal basis for the charge of neglect in the divorce matter is the respondent’s failure to prepare and submit to the court the final decree of divorce. In both matters the respondent performed considerable legal work, but through oversight and mistaken judgment, and probably also through inattention to responsibility, he failed to complete the entrusted matters. The respondent’s conduct appears to be no worse than the conduct of the attorney-respondents in In re Kink (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 293, and In re Ahern (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 69, cases where the attorney received a censure. In Ahern an attorney was censured for failing to complete properly matters that had been entrusted to him by clients and for which he had already received a fee. In one matter he had been asked to obtain a marriage annulment. He had filed a complaint but had failed to obtain the appropriate decree. In another matter the attorney represented the executor of an estate. He procured the admission of the will but was thereafter unable to proceed because of an alleged dispute with the executor. In finding that censure was the most appropriate penalty this court observed that the attorney’s “misconduct, altho[ugh] it involves an error in judgment, is not shown to have resulted from corrupt motives.” 23 Ill. 2d 69, 74. In Kink an attorney was also censured for failing to complete properly three estate matters entrusted to him. This court found that he had failed to close two estates, had misrepresented the status of the matters to his clients, and had been evasive in failing to respond to his client’s inquiries. In deciding that the attorney in Kink should be censured this court distinguished Taylor and Chapman, in which suspensions had been imposed. In doing so the court observed that “[although respondent was negligent and dilatory in representing his clients’ interest, he did render some services on their behalf.” I believe that the majority’s decision to suspend Amim Johnson for one year is inconsistent with Kink and Ahem. The respondent’s shortcomings are substantially equivalent to the shortcomings of the attorneys in those cases, and fairness requires that he receive a comparable penalty. I would therefore censure him instead of imposing a one-year suspension.