Court Opinion

ID: 9948803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 22:03:05.928402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:52.960684
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/7/24 P. v. Neuhart CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G062412

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 16WF2412)

 RICHARD MICHAEL NEUHART,                                              OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Derek
Guy Johnson, Judge. Reversed and remanded as directed.
                   Richard A. Levy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kristen A. Ramirez and Steve
Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                             *               *               *
               The relevant charging document alleged defendant Richard Michael
Neuhart had committed residential burglary and had two prior convictions for burglary.
Neuhart was eventually convicted of residential burglary, and he waived his right to a
jury trial on the alleged prior convictions. Nothing in the record shows Neuhart admitted
the prior convictions, nor did the trial court make findings on them. However, the court
factored the prior convictions into Neuhart’s sentence by imposing two five-year
                                                       1
recidivist enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)) and a prior strike (§§ 667, subds.
(d), (e), 1170.12).
               Neuhart’s sentence was later recalled under section 1172.1. During
resentencing, the court again imposed a prior strike and a recidivist enhancement based
on Neuhart’s alleged prior convictions. On appeal, Neuhart argues the court erred by
considering the prior convictions. We agree. Neuhart’s sentence was unauthorized
because he never admitted the prior convictions, nor did the court (or jury) make any
finding on them. We reverse and remand the case and order the court to hold a trial on
the alleged prior convictions unless Neuhart admits them. Neuhart must then be
resentenced accordingly.
                                              I
                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               In 2016, Neuhart entered a home in a disguise during a real estate open
house. He was detained by a real estate agent, and was later arrested by the police, after
he attempted to break into what appeared to be a jewelry box located in a bedroom
        2
closet. (People v. Neuhart (Cal. Ct.App., Jan. 25, 2019, No. G055217) 2019 WL
322775 (Neuhart I).)

1
    All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
    The box contained the ashes of the owner’s dog.

                                              2
              The prosecution filed an amended information in November 2016 charging
Neuhart with one count of first degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), while
a nonaccomplice was present (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). For sentencing purposes, the
amended information also alleged Neuhart had two prior serious and violent felony
convictions for residential burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)):
    • May 26, 2006: An alleged conviction for residential burglary for purposes of
       (1) the five-year recidivist enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), (2) the “Three Strikes”
       law (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e), 1170.12), and (3) a prison prior enhancement
       (§ 667.5, subd. (a)).
    • May 15, 2012: An alleged conviction for four residential burglaries, tried
       together, for purposes of (1) a single five-year recidivist enhancement, (2) four
                                                                                  3
       strikes under the Three Strikes law, and (3) a prison prior enhancement.
              The court granted Neuhart’s motion to bifurcate the trial as to the prior
convictions. At the guilt phase of trial, prior to the receiving the verdict, Neuhart waived
his right to a jury trial on the prior convictions. The jury found him guilty of first degree
burglary and found true that a nonaccomplice was present. After the jury’s verdict was
read, the parties and the court discussed the alleged prior convictions. Neuhart’s counsel
indicated Neuhart was ready to admit to the prior convictions. But the parties were
unsure of the required procedure, so, everyone agreed the issue would be handled at the
sentencing hearing.
              The sentencing hearing was held in June 2017. Neuhart did not admit the
prior convictions at the sentencing hearing, nor did the court expressly find the prior
conviction allegations to be true. Nor does anything in the record show Neuhart admitted
the prior convictions before the sentencing hearing. Regardless, the court proceeded as if
they had been admitted or found to be true and sentenced Neuhart to 22 years in prison.
3
  The record indicates all the alleged prior burglaries were purportedly committed in the
same manner, with Neuhart attempting to steal items at open houses.

                                              3
Specifically, the court struck the alleged 2006 strike and three of the four alleged 2012
strikes, making the current case Neuhart’s second strike. The court selected the upper
term of six years for residential burglary, which was doubled to 12 years as a second
strike. It added two consecutive five-year recidivist enhancements for the two prior
convictions but struck both prison prior enhancements.
              This Court affirmed the judgment. (Neuhart I, supra, 2019 WL 322775 at
p. *5.) But based on new law, we remanded the case to allow the trial court an
opportunity to exercise discretion to strike one or both of the five-year recidivist
enhancements. (Ibid.) The trial court declined to strike either on remand.
              In December 2022, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation recommended that Neuhart’s sentence be recalled and that he be
resentenced under section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). Neuhart filed a brief requesting a
sentence of four to six years. After a hearing, the court recalled the Neuhart’s sentence
and reduced it from 22 to 13 years by (1) selecting the middle term of four years for the
burglary conviction and doubling it to eight years as a second strike, and (2) adding a
five-year recidivist enhancement for the 2006 conviction but staying punishment on the
same enhancement for the 2012 conviction.
              Neuhart appeals his 13-year sentence. He argues he never admitted the
prior convictions nor did the court find them to be true, therefore, the court erred by
considering them in his sentence. We agree and remand this case for further proceedings
on the prior convictions. Due to this finding, Neuhart’s other contentions are moot.

                                              II
                                       DISCUSSION
A. The Alleged Prior Convictions
              “Whenever the fact of a previous conviction of another offense is charged
in an accusatory pleading, and the defendant is found guilty of the offense with which he

                                              4
is charged, the jury, or the judge if a jury trial is waived, must unless the answer of the
defendant admits such previous conviction, find whether or not he has suffered such
previous conviction.” (§ 1158.)
              Nothing in the record shows Neuhart ever admitted the prior convictions.
                                                                   4
Nor did the court (or jury) make an express finding on the issue. The Attorney
General’s office concedes this point. But it contends the court made an implied finding
the prior convictions were true by imposing a sentence based upon them. In support, it
cites People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629 (Clair) and People v. Chambers (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 1047 (Chambers). Neither case applies here.
              In Clair, the trial court made no express finding on a prior conviction
allegation. The Supreme Court found the court had made an implied finding by imposing
an enhancement based on the prior conviction. (Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 691, fn. 17.)
Likewise, in Chambers, the trial court failed to make an express finding as to whether a
personal use of firearm allegation was true. (Chambers, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1048-1049.) Relying on Clair, the appellate court concluded the trial court had impliedly
found the allegation to be true by imposing a firearm enhancement. (Id. at pp. 1050-
1051.)
              Unlike here, in Clair and Chambers the trial court was asked to make a
finding as to the enhancement allegations and evidence was introduced on the issue.
(Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 691, fn. 17; Chambers, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1048-
1051.) In Clair, the prosecution introduced evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction,
including “‘certified copies of [the] conviction.’” (Clair, at p. 691, fn. 17.) In Chambers,
evidence was introduced that the defendant had used a personal firearm during the

4
  The minutes from the June 23, 2017 hearing state the two prior convictions were
“found true or admitted.” But the oral pronouncement of judgment controls. (People v.
Pantaleon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 932, 942; see, e.g., People v. Molina (1977) 74
Cal.App.3d 544, 550 [striking true finding from abstract of judgment where court did not
make true finding in its oral pronouncement].)

                                              5
charged robbery. (Chambers, at pp. 1048-1049.) Thus, in both cases, it could be implied
that the trial court considered the evidence presented, found the underlying allegations to
be true, and then imposed the relevant sentencing enhancement. (See Clair, at p. 691,
fn. 17; Chambers, at pp. 1048-1051.)
              That is not the case here. Nothing in the record shows any evidence was
introduced regarding Neuhart’s prior convictions. During the guilt phase of the trial, the
court excluded any references to his prior convictions under Evidence Code section 352.
And no evidence of his prior convictions was introduced at the sentencing hearing. Thus,
we cannot infer the court considered evidence of Neuhart’s prior convictions, found them
to be true, and then imposed the enhancement and prior strike. (See People v. Haney
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 472, 475 [“To establish a prior conviction enhancement
allegation, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the
enhancement”].)
              Unlike Chambers and Clair, the transcript from the resentencing hearing
shows the court erroneously believed Neuhart had admitted the prior convictions and
sentenced him based on this mistaken belief. While the parties were discussing the
alleged prior strikes, the prosecution questioned, “I’m just thinking out loud, did we, in
fact, take admissions to those prior convictions already?” The court responded, “Yes,”
and the parties continued discussing the prior strikes. But, as set forth above, nothing in
the record shows Neuhart made this admission.
              In short, we cannot find the court made an implied finding because the
record in this case unambiguously shows the trial court imposed the enhancement and
prior strike based on a mistaken belief Neuhart had admitted the prior convictions.
Further, there was no evidence introduced from which the court could have made an
implied finding the prior convictions were true.
              Next, the Attorney General’s office contends Neuhart cannot relitigate a
question of guilt that is now final. Not so. “[A]n unauthorized sentence is a void

                                             6
judgment that may be vacated or corrected whenever it is brought to the trial court’s
attention, even after execution of the invalid sentence has begun or the judgment has
                                                                            5
become final . . . .” (People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 993.) Here,
Neuhart’s sentence was unauthorized because the trial court made no findings on the
alleged prior convictions. As such, it could not apply the Three Strikes law or impose a
five-year recidivist enhancement. (§§ 1170.12, subd. (a), 667, subd. (a)(1); see In re G.C.
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130 [“[A]n unauthorized sentence . . . is a sentence that ‘could
not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case’”].)
               Because Neuhart’s sentence was unauthorized, we must remand this case
for further proceedings.

B. Scope of Remand
               The parties disagree on the scope of remand. Because the court made no
findings on his prior convictions, Neuhart asserts its silence equates to an implied
acquittal that cannot be relitigated on remand. Thus, he argues the court must resentence
him without any consideration of the prior convictions. The Attorney General’s office
requests that we remand this case for a trial on the alleged prior convictions. We agree
with the latter.
               We have not been cited any compelling authority preventing the trial court
from trying the prior convictions on remand. Indeed, “where a prior conviction finding is
reversed on appeal for a lack of substantial evidence, the proper procedure is to remand

5
  There is conflict among appellate courts as to whether an unauthorized sentence may
be corrected once the sentence is in execution. One line of cases states an authorized
sentence can be vacated or corrected at any time by bringing a motion. (People v.
Codinha, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.) The other holds a trial court lacks jurisdiction
to resentence a defendant once the sentence is in execution. (People v. King (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 629, 636-637.) We need not address this split in authority. Even King
recognized an unauthorized sentence could be corrected if the sentence is recalled per
statute. (Id. at p. 637; People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 329.)

                                             7
the case to the trial court for a retrial of the prior conviction allegation.” (People v. Franz
(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1455; People v. Strike (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 143, 154.)
We see no reason why a similar principle would not apply here, where the court failed to
make a finding on the prior conviction allegations due to its mistaken belief that Neuhart
had admitted them.
              None of the cases cited by Neuhart are sufficiently analogous. In People v.
Gutierrez (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1425 and People v. Farias (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 619,
the parties did not intend to admit the prior convictions. Rather, they asked the court to
determine the truth of prior conviction allegations based on the evidence submitted.
(Gutierrez, at pp. 1439-1440; Farias, at pp. 629-630.) The trial courts in both cases
failed to make any findings on the prior convictions. Thus, Gutierrez and Farias inferred
the trial court’s silence on the issue was equivalent to a not true finding. (Gutierrez, at
pp. 1439-1440; Farias, at pp. 633-635.)
              Here, unlike Gutierrez and Farias, the court was not asked to review
evidence and make a finding on Neuhart’s prior convictions. Indeed, no evidence was
submitted on issue. Rather, the parties and court erroneously believed Neuhart had
admitted the prior convictions, and the court sentenced Neuhart based on this error.
Given this context, we cannot infer the court’s failure to make findings on the alleged
prior convictions amounts to an implied acquittal. Rather, the lack of findings was a
mistake that can be corrected on remand.
              Neuhart also cites In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702 and People v.
Huffman (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 260. Candelario held: “Reference to the prior
conviction must be included in the pronouncement of judgment for if the record is silent
in that regard, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it may be inferred that the
omission was an act of leniency by the trial court. In such circumstances the silence
operates as a finding that the prior conviction was not true.” (Candelario, at p. 706.)
Likewise, Huffman explained: “The recognized expertise of the trial judge compels us to

                                              8
the conclusion that he knew the result of not ruling upon the count containing the charged
prior felony. Since no finding was made by the court as to the alleged prior conviction as
required under Penal Code section 1158, the court’s silence operates as an acquittal of the
charge of the prior conviction.” (Huffman, at p. 261.)
              These cases are based on an inference that a trial judge’s failure to rule on a
prior conviction was an intentional act of leniency. We cannot make that inference here.
As discussed above, the court’s silence was based on a mistake. It cannot be inferred the
court’s silence was an intentional act. Further, the court’s imposition of a prior strike and
a five-year recidivist enhancement dispels the argument that its failure to make findings
on the prior convictions was an act of leniency.
              Neither side cited People v. Meals (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 215 (Meals),
which we find to be more analogous than the cases Neuhart cites. In Meals, the
prosecution alleged the defendant had five prior felony convictions, which the defendant
denied. (Id. at pp. 218-219.) At the sentencing hearing, the court struck two of the prior
convictions but did not mention the remaining three. (Id. at pp. 225-226.) However, the
minute order and formal judgment stated, “the court found the third, fourth and fifth prior
convictions ‘true as heretofore admitted by defendant.’” (Id. at p. 226.) The appellate
court explained: “It appears from the record that the court, the clerk of the court, defense
counsel, and the deputy district attorney operated under the erroneous assumption that
defendant had previously admitted the prior felonies. Since the court struck two of the
priors, its failure to make an express finding as to the third, fourth and fifth alleged priors
clearly was not intended as an act of leniency and cannot reasonably be construed as a
finding in favor of defendant on the priors.” (Ibid.) Because of the ambiguity in the
record, the appellate court remanded the case for a limited trial on the prior convictions.
(Ibid.)

                                               9
              Like Meals, we cannot interpret the court’s silence on the prior convictions
as a finding in favor of Neuhart. It was an oversight. Thus, the most reasonable remedy
is to remand this case for a trial on the prior conviction allegations.
              Because Neuhart must be resentenced after his prior convictions are tried,
we do not address his remaining contentions that the court abused its discretion by
(1) selecting the middle term rather than the lower term for the burglary conviction, and
(2) failing to dismiss the remaining five-year recidivist enhancement or the remaining
strike. At the resentencing hearing on remand, the court may “‘reconsider all of its
sentencing choices, subject only to the limitation that defendant not be sentenced to a
greater aggregate term than the first sentence.’” (People v. Kelly (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th
842, 845.)

                                              III
                                       DISPOSITION
              The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded as directed for further
proceedings. On remand, the court shall hold a trial on Neuhart’s alleged prior
convictions unless he admits to them. Neuhart shall then be resentenced accordingly.

                                                    MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

GOETHALS, J.

                                              10