Court Opinion

ID: 9412016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:11:17.397108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:23.859816
License: Public Domain

J-S23028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 WALTER SMITH                            :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 2841 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 21, 2022,
           in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0909821-1982.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                         FILED JULY 28, 2023

      Walter Smith appeals pro se from the order denying his untimely filed

petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9541-46. We affirm.

      This Court previously summarized the pertinent facts and procedural

history that began forty years ago as follows:

             On the night of July 31, 1982, [Smith] and his neighbor,
      Alfred Young, the victim, engaged in an argument relating to a
      fistfight between their daughters earlier that evening. [Smith]
      proceeded to stab the victim approximately seventeen times with
      a knife. The victim was pronounced dead later that evening at
      Temple University Hospital. [Smith] was arrested that same
      evening at Temple University Hospital, where he was receiving
      care for injuries suffered during the altercation.

            On January 24, 1983, following a nonjury trial, [Smith] was
      found guilty of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and
      possession of an instrument of crime. On December 16, 1983,
      the trial court arrested judgment on the verdict of first-degree
      murder and substituted a verdict of guilt on the charge of third-
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     degree murder. The trial court sentenced [Smith] to concurrent
     terms of imprisonment of ten to twenty years for murder, five to
     ten years for conspiracy, and two and one-half to five years for
     possession of an instrument of crime.      The Commonwealth
     appealed, and on November 3, 1986, this Court vacated the
     judgment of sentence and reinstated the verdict of murder in the
     first degree. We then remanded the case for disposition of
     [Smith’s] remaining post-verdict motions and for resentencing.

            On July 22, 1987, the trial court granted [Smith’s] motion
     for arrest [of] judgment on the charge of criminal conspiracy and
     denied [Smith’s] motion for a new trial. The trial court sentenced
     [Smith] to a term of life in prison for first-degree murder, and
     reinstated the previously imposed sentence of two and one-half to
     five years of imprisonment for possession of an instrument of
     crime. On July 30, 1987, the trial court denied [Smith’s] motion
     for reconsideration of sentence.

            [Smith] appealed to this Court on August 21, 1987, and we
     affirmed the judgment of sentence on July 15, 1988.
     Commonwealth v. Smith, 548 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. 1988)
     (unpublished memorandum). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
     denied [Smith’s] petition for allowance of appeal on January 30,
     1989. Commonwealth v. Smith, 521 Pa. 612, 557 A.2d 343
     (1989). [Smith] did not seek review by the United States
     Supreme Court. Thus, his judgment of sentence became final on
     April 30, 1989.

           Smith filed his first PCRA petition on June 13, 1989. The
     [PCRA] court denied the petition on April 6, 1994. This Court
     affirmed the [PCRA] court’s denial of post[-]conviction relief on
     August 3, 1995. Commonwealth v. Smith, 668 A.2d 1198 (Pa.
     Super. 1995) (unpublished memorandum).

Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 915 EDA 2001 (Pa. Super. 2002),

unpublished memorandum at 1-3.

     Smith filed a second PCRA petition on March 26, 2001. On June 18,

2001, the PCRA court denied the petition as untimely filed. Smith appealed

to this Court. On February 20, 2002, we rejected Smith’s claims that he could

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meet an exception to the PCRA’s time bar and affirmed the denial of post-

conviction relief. Smith, supra.

       On August 22, 2012, Smith filed his third PCRA petition in which he

claimed that his life sentence was illegal in light of the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).         For reasons

unclear from the record, no action was taken on this petition for ten years. 1

On August 18, 2022, the PCRA court issue a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its

intent to dismiss Smith’s petition because it was untimely filed, and because

Smith failed to establish a time-bar exception. Smith filed a response. By

order entered October 21, 2022, the PCRA court denied the petition. This

timely appeal followed.        The PCRA court did not require Pa.R.A.P. 1925

compliance.

       Smith raises the following six issues on appeal:

       I.     Has [Smith] been denied due process and equal protection
              of the law guaranteed by both the state and federal
              constitutions?

       II.    Is [Smith] currently sentenced via a selective application of
              the law, while being similarly situated to those given this
              selective application, without any statutory authority to
              make such a distinction under Pennsylvania law?

       III.   Is [Smith] serving a mandatory minimum life sentence as a
              result of the application of a statute that has been voided
              by the Pa. Supreme Court’s use of [its] severance power[?]

____________________________________________

1 On February 13, 2015, Smith filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which

the court treated as a supplement to Smith’s PCRA petition.

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      IV.   Has [Smith] been deprived of due process and equal
            protection of the law, due to the defective and
            unconstitutional nature of the [PCRA]?

      V.    Has [Smith’s] writ of habeas corpus been unconstitutionally
            converted into a [PCRA petition], since [its] very enactment
            is violative of the suspension clause of the state and federal
            constitutions?

      VI.   Has the Commonwealth’s failure to give adequate notice of
            the charges against [Smith], and the ambiguity as it relates
            to the [permissible] range of sentences he would face if
            convicted, deprived [Smith] of his right to adequate notice
            in violation of both the state and federal constitutions?

Smith’s Brief, at 1-2 (unnumbered) (excess capitalization omitted).

      Smith challenges the denial of his most recent attempt to obtain post-

conviction relief. Using the applicable standard of review, we must determine

whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and is free of

legal error. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 749-50 (Pa. 2014)

(citations omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions. Id.

      Before addressing the six issues Smith has raised, we must first

determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that Smith’s third

petition was untimely filed, and that Smith failed to establish an exception to

the time bar.

      The   timeliness   of   a   post-conviction   petition   is   jurisdictional.

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment

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becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an

exception to the time bar is met.

      The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time

on appeal.        Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of date the

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

      Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction

over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority    to    address   the   substantive   claims.”   Commonwealth      v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

      Here, as this Court previously noted, Smith’s judgment of sentence

became final on April 30, 1989, ninety days after our Supreme Court denied

his petition for allowance of appeal, and the time for filing a petition for writ

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of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court expired. § 9545(b)(3).2

Because Smith filed the serial petition at issue in 2012, it is patently untimely

unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the

enumerated exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

       Smith cannot establish a time-bar exception. As noted by the PCRA

court, in his 2012 petition, Smith attempted to satisfy the newly-recognized

right exception based on Miller, supra.

       The new constitutional right exception to the deadline for filing a PCRA

petition has two requirements: first, it provides that the right asserted is a

constitutional right that was recognized by the federal Supreme Court or the

state Supreme Court after the time provided in the PCRA; and second, it

provides that the right has been held by that Court to apply retroactively; thus

a petitioner must prove that there is a “new” constitutional right and that that

right “has been held” by that Court to apply retroactively. Commonwealth

v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 994 (Pa. Super. 2014).

       Here, the PCRA court explained why, even though Smith filed his third

petition shortly after the Miller decision, he “did not present a claim falling

within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s decision” in Miller:

             Although the United States Supreme Court in Montgomery
       v. Louisiana, [136 S.Ct. 718 (2016, as revised (Jan. 27, 2016))]
       ruled that Miller has retroactive effect in cases on state collateral
____________________________________________

2 Because April 30, 1989, fell on a Sunday, Smith actually had until May    1,
1989, to file his writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See
generally, U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 30.1.

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      review, the Miller holding specifically limited itself to juveniles
      under the age of eighteen years at the time of the offense who
      were sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without
      parole. See Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460. Instantly, [Smith’s] date
      of birth is 3/3/1962 and the murder occurred on 7/31/82, making
      him twenty-years-old on the date of the offense.               See
      Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2019) [(en
      banc)] (holding “that age is the sole factor in determining whether
      Miller applies to overcome the PCRA time-bar an . . . declin[ing]
      to extend its categorical holding”). Therefore, [Smith] has failed
      to invoke the timeliness exception codified under subsection
      9545(b)1)(iii).

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/1/22, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).

      Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion.

Therefore, this Court, like the PCRA court, is without jurisdiction to consider

the merits of this appeal.   Derrickson, supra.      We thus affirm the PCRA

court’s order denying Smith’s third PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/28/2023

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