Court Opinion

ID: 9912870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-25 08:09:06.966602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:44.867488
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued December 21, 2023

                                        In The

                                Court of Appeals
                                       For The

                           First District of Texas
                              ————————————
                                NO. 01-20-00287-CV
                             ———————————
CITY OF PASADENA, JEFF WAGNER, AND ROBIN GREEN, Appellants
                                          V.
                 APTVV, LLC AND APTPCY, LLC, Appellees

                    On Appeal from the 334th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2018-25740

                MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REHEARING

      Two Pasadena apartment-complex owners sued the City of Pasadena, its

mayor, and its director of public works, alleging that money paid to the City through

utility and trash-collection billing is an unconstitutional tax or fee. The City and its

officials moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting
governmental immunity from suit. The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction.

In five issues, the City and its officials contend that the trial court erred in denying

the plea to the jurisdiction.

      On August 11, 2022, we issued a memorandum opinion and judgment

affirming the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. The City

moved for panel rehearing and en banc reconsideration, asserting that the

memorandum opinion required additional jurisdictional analysis.1 See TEX. R. APP.

P. 49.1, 49.5. The apartment owners responded. See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.2. We grant

panel rehearing, withdraw our opinion of August 11, 2022, vacate our judgment of

the same date, and substitute this opinion and judgment in their stead.2 Our

disposition, however, remains the same. We affirm the trial court’s order denying

the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.

1
      Based on the arguments in the parties’ briefs, our original memorandum opinion
      affirmed the denial of the City’s plea to the jurisdiction on the sufficiency of the
      apartment owners’ pleadings. On rehearing, the City contends for the first time in
      this Court that the undisputed evidence negates essential jurisdictional facts.
      Because such jurisdictional challenges may be made at any time in the proceeding,
      see Rusk State Hospital v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Tex. 2012), we consider this
      argument now.
2
      The City’s motion for en banc reconsideration of the prior panel opinion is moot.
      See In re Wagner, 560 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig.
      proceeding); Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469,
      472 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); Brookshire Bros., Inc. v.
      Smith, 176 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
                                           2
                                   Background

      APTVV, LLC owns the Victoria Village Apartments, a 612-unit apartment

complex in the City of Pasadena. APTPCY, LLC owns the Courtyard Apartments,

a 195-unit apartment complex also in the City of Pasadena. The two entities will be

referred to collectively as the Apartment Owners.

      The Apartment Owners have sued the City of Pasadena and two city officials

in a declaratory judgment action seeking the return of money paid to the City through

utility and trash-collection billing, plus attorney’s fees. They allege that the City

implemented a waste-removal scheme (1) granting an exclusive contract to Waste

Management to provide trash-removal services to all non-residential customers in

the City and (2) requiring all non-residential trash-removal customers to use Waste

Management and to pay whatever amount the City dictated.

      Through a 2018 City ordinance, the City specified a base rate for Waste

Management’s services. The base rate set the maximum that Waste Management

could charge non-residential customers for trash removal. The rate varied depending

on the quantity and frequency of trash-removal services.

      Through the same 2018 City ordinance, the City imposed a 25% City Fee on

trash-removal bills, meaning that 25% of the money Waste Management received

for trash-removal services for non-residential customers would be forwarded to the

                                         3
City in exchange for the exclusive right to collect trash within the city limits.3 The

City’s fee schedule stated that the 25% City Fee was included in the base rate amount

set by the City.

      One of the bills in dispute charged for the removal of trash from

front-end-load, eight-yards containers four times per week. The City’s fee schedule

listed a base rate for that monthly service of $507.58, which included the 25% City

Fee. The record contains bills sent from before and after the 2018 ordinance and fee

schedule took effect. The pre-2018-ordinance bill includes a single line item for trash

service without specifically noting the 10% City Fee and then other line items for

city taxes. According to the record evidence, the then-applicable 10% City Fee was

included in the base rate figure. The post-2018-ordinance bills are structured

differently. There is a line item for the base rate, a second line item for the 25% City

Fee, and other line items for city taxes. The bills in the record generally increased

about 16% after the 2018 ordinance and its 25% City Fee were applied.

      The Apartment Owners sued, alleging that the City Fee is an impermissible

tax by the City on commercial customers, who are forced to accept trash-removal

services from Waste Management under the City-created monopoly and forced to

pay an excessive 25% tax on the mandated services. The Apartment Owners

characterize the 25% City Fee as a “kickback.” According to the Apartment Owners,

3
      Before 2018, the City Fee had been 10%.
                                           4
if they were to refuse to accept trash-removal services under the monopoly or to pay

the 25% kickback to the City, the City could suspend waste collection at their

properties and pursue both civil remedies for uncollected solid waste constituting a

nuisance and criminal sanctions for non-compliance.

      The Apartment Owners’ declaratory judgment action against the City seeks

(1) a determination that the 25% City Fee is an excessive and thus unconstitutional

tax applied to local businesses through a trash-collection scheme, (2) return of past

payments of the City Fee, and (3) attorney’s fees. They assert that they have paid the

illegal fee under duress because, otherwise, they would have faced civil and criminal

penalties.

      In the same declaratory judgment action, APTVV challenges a “customer

service inspection certification charge” that appeared on its August 2016 utility bill

in the amount of $12,240. APTVV alleges it paid the fee to the City under the same

duress and has demanded its refund. The City allegedly responded that the fee

represented a $20-per-unit inspection charge for the 612-unit apartment complex.

APTVV disputes that any City official inspected all 612 units at its complex and

argues that, aside from the charge having no factual basis, it is unconstitutionally

excessive. APTVV includes in its declaratory judgment action a claim for the return

of the $12,240 inspection certification charge it paid to the City under duress.

                                          5
      Along with the declaratory judgment action against the City, the Apartment

Owners suit includes a breach-of-contract claim against Waste Management seeking

monetary damages.

      The City and its officials moved to dismiss the claims against them on the

ground that the City enjoys governmental immunity from suit and all claims against

the officials are claims against the City.

      The Apartment Owners responded. They emphasized that their burden in

defeating a plea to the jurisdiction is only to allege facts that, if taken as true,

establish jurisdiction, not to prove their allegations at this preliminary stage of the

litigation. And they argued that the City does not have immunity against suits

seeking declaratory relief and the return of money had and received, relying on

Federal Sign v. Texas Southern University, 951 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. 1997), and

Nivens v. City of League City, 245 S.W.3d 470, 475 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2007, pet. denied).

      The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, and the City and its

officials appealed.4 They raise five issues, which we quote:

      1. [The Apartment Owners’] claim for money had and received is
      barred by governmental immunity because there is no statutory waiver
      of immunity for this or any other quasi-contractual claims.
      2. [The Apartment Owners’] claim against the City for declaratory
      relief, which merely couches their claim for monetary damages as a

4
      Although it is a defendant below, Waste Management is not a party on appeal.
                                             6
      request for declaratory relief, is barred by the City’s governmental
      immunity because the Declaratory Judgment Act is merely a procedural
      device for claims over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction.

      3. Because [the Apartment Owners] are neither a party nor third-party
      beneficiary to the City’s contract with Waste Management, [they] lack
      standing to challenge the City’s exclusive waste contract with Waste
      Management.
      4. The City’s exclusive franchise contract with Waste Management for
      commercial solid waste disposal within the city is permissible under [a]
      Texas statute and constitutional.

      5. [The Apartment Owners] fail to and cannot assert a valid ultra vires
      claim against Mayor Jeff Wagner, and Robin Green, the City’s Public
      Works Director, because Mayor Wagner and Green did not enter into
      the Contract with Waste Management and, as a result, neither Wagner
      nor Green could be a responsible government actor for [the Apartment
      Owners’] ultra vires claim.
                                        Analysis

      The City contends that the Apartment Owners did not overcome the

presumption of governmental immunity and that there is no statutory waiver of

immunity for the Apartment Owners’ claims arising from the 25% City Fee and

APTVV’s claim for the overpayment of inspection fees. As a result, the City argues,

the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction.

A.    Standards of review of a plea to the jurisdiction

      A party may challenge a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction by filing a

plea to the jurisdiction. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554

(Tex. 2000). We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo.

Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

                                            7
      Ordinarily a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the plaintiff’s pleadings,

asserting that the alleged facts do not affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s

subject matter jurisdiction. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372

S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012). To defeat a plea to the jurisdiction based on

governmental immunity, “[a] plaintiff suing the [government] must plead facts that,

if true, affirmatively demonstrate that [governmental] immunity either does not

apply or has been waived.” Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex. 2021)

(quotation omitted). “This is because the government retains immunity from suit

unless the [plaintiff] has pleaded a viable claim.” Id. at 389 (quotation omitted). We

“construe the plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, taking all factual assertions as true, and

look to the plaintiff’s intent.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150

(Tex. 2012).

      A plea to the jurisdiction may also challenge the existence of jurisdictional

facts, and when it does, the parties may present evidence. Mission Consol. Indep.

Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d at 635. “In those situations, a trial court’s review of a plea to

the jurisdiction mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment motion.” Id. The

movant must present summary judgment proof showing that the court lacks

jurisdiction. Id. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show that there is a

material question of disputed fact on the jurisdictional issue. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P.

166a(c) (to prevail on traditional summary judgment motion, movant must show that

                                           8
no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as matter

of law).

B.    Governmental immunity

      Sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine that protects the state from suit

or liability. Hillman v. Nueces Cnty., 579 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex. 2019).

“Governmental immunity operates like sovereign immunity to afford similar

protection to subdivisions of the State, including counties, cities, and school

districts.” Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004); see Garcia v.

City of Willis, 593 S.W.3d 201, 208 (Tex. 2019) (“Political subdivisions of the state,

including cities, share in Texas’ inherent sovereign immunity.”). The Legislature

may waive sovereign immunity, but because it is a common law doctrine, it is “the

judiciary’s responsibility” “to determine under what circumstances sovereign

immunity exists in the first instance.” Garcia, 593 S.W.3d at 208–09 (quoting Reata

Constr. Corp. v. City of Dall., 197 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Tex. 2006)).

      Keeping with this responsibility, the Texas Supreme Court recognizes “a

narrow exception to immunity when a plaintiff seeks reimbursement of an allegedly

unlawful tax, fee, or penalty that was paid involuntarily and under duress.” Id. at

209; see Saturn Cap. Corp. v. City of Hous., 246 S.W.3d 242, 245 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“[S]overeign immunity does not prevent a

party who paid illegal government taxes and fees under duress from filing a lawsuit

                                          9
to seek their repayment.”); Nivens, 245 S.W.3d at 474 (recognizing same). This is

because money collected from an illegal tax, fee, or penalty should not be treated as

the municipality’s property and subject to immunity; instead, the illegally collected

tax, fee, or penalty should be refunded if paid because of fraud, mutual mistake of

fact, or duress, without respect to waiver of sovereign immunity. Nivens, 245 S.W.3d

at 474. “No legislative consent to sue is needed under these circumstances.” Id.

      In Nivens, taxpayers asserted claims for money had and received but did not

seek declaratory or injunctive relief and did not allege that their payments resulted

from fraud, mutual mistake of fact, or duress. Id. Thus, this Court held that their

claims were barred by governmental immunity. Id.; see Tara Ptrs., Ltd. v. City of S.

Hous., 282 S.W.3d 564, 577 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)

(holding that claims were barred by governmental immunity because ratepayers did

not plead that they paid under duress).

      Later, in Anheuser-Busch, L.L.C. v. Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector, a

taxpayer was assessed over $600,000 in penalties and interest on its delinquent tax

payment. 516 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). The

taxpayer paid the penalty to avoid additional penalties and interest and then sued for

its return. Id. at 5. The tax assessor-collector argued that it had governmental

immunity and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Relying on

Nivens, we held that no legislative consent to sue was required because the taxpayer

                                          10
sought a declaratory judgment and alleged it paid the improper penalties and interest

under duress. Id. Immunity did not protect the tax assessor-collector from suit;

consent to sue was not required. Id.

      Although the City acknowledges these authorities, it contends the Apartment

Owners still cannot overcome the presumption of governmental immunity because

no statutory waiver of immunity applies. But as these authorities show, a statutory

waiver of immunity is not required here. Like the Anheuser-Busch taxpayer, the

Apartment Owners brought a declaratory judgment action, asserting a claim for

money had and received and requesting return of allegedly illegal tax payments and

inspection fees made under duress. These allegations fit within our precedent and

compel the conclusion that immunity from suit does not exist and therefore no

legislative consent to sue is required.5 Nivens, 245 S.W.3d at 474; Anheuser-Busch,

516 S.W.3d at 6.

      The City’s other arguments are unavailing. The City asserts that it retains

immunity for the claims arising from the 25% City Fee because undisputed evidence

shows that Waste Management pays the fee, not the Apartment Owners. The City

points to (1) the terms of its contract with Waste Management requiring Waste

5
      The City’s reliance on Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006), is
      misplaced in that it is a breach-of-contract case involving a claim for consequential
      damages.

                                           11
Management to “pay monthly . . . to [the] City twenty-five percent (25%) of the

compensation for services that [it] received from Customers,” and (2) affidavit

testimony from a Waste Management representative asserting generally that Waste

Management “pays the City . . . a fee of 25% of the revenues” under the agreement.

But the invoices paid by the Apartment Owners and containing a line item for the

25% City Fee raise a fact issue on whether, as the Apartment Owners allege, “Waste

Management merely acted as a middleman charged with collecting the City Fee from

its customers and forwarding the collected fees on to the City.” Other testimony from

the same Waste Management representative explained that typically a line item on

an invoice distinguishes Waste Management’s service rates from other fees or taxes

charged to the customer.

       The City also contends that it retains governmental immunity because the

25% City Fee is lawful. The City’s lawfulness contention rests on its statutory

authority to grant Waste Management an exclusive franchise for waste collection

and the validity of the ordinance adopting the City’s contract with Waste

Management. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 364.034(a). But the Apartment

Owners do not contest the City’s authority to require them to use and pay for

specified garbage collection services. Rather, the gist of their complaint is that the

amount charged is excessive, has no reasonable relationship to any costs the City

incurred, and is thus a general means of raising revenue and an unconstitutional tax.

                                         12
Neither the City’s arguments on appeal nor its plea filed in the trial court address

this complaint.

      Turning to APTVV’s claim for a refund of overpaid inspection fees, the City

argues that it retains governmental immunity because it can conduct inspections and

levy a charge to offset the costs of those inspections. But again, the City’s general

authority to inspect and charge a fee is not in dispute. APTVV complains that the

City failed to make a full inspection of all 612 units but charged APTVV as if it had

made a full inspection. The City has pointed to no evidence in the record challenging

this claim.

      In short, the City’s proof does not negate issues of fact and therefore does not

show that the trial court lacks jurisdiction. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,

372 S.W.3d at 635. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying

the plea to the jurisdiction, and we overrule the City’s first, second, and fourth issues.

C.    Standing to claim breach of contract

      Next, the City argues that the Apartment Owners lack standing to bring a

breach-of-contract claim because the Apartment Owners are neither signatories nor

third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the City and Waste Management.

Thus, the City argues, they cannot “challenge or enforce” the contract.

      The Apartment Owners do not assert a breach-of-contract claim against the

City. Their breach-of-contract claim is against Waste Management only. Waste

                                           13
Management is not a party to this appeal and is not pursuing a standing challenge on

the sole breach-of-contract claim in this suit.

      The City may not seek to limit the Apartment Owners’ claims against or

recovery from nonappealing codefendants in its appeal of an adverse ruling. See

Jackson v. Fontaine’s Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1973) (when appealing

defendant challenged plaintiffs’ right to recover from nonappealing codefendant,

Court held that appealing defendant “may not complain of errors which do not

injuriously affect him or which merely affect the rights of others”). Moreover, the

Apartment Owners’ declaratory judgment action against the City does not seek to

“challenge or enforce” the contract between the City and Waste Management, as the

City contends, but, rather, to obtain the return of allegedly unconstitutional taxes

imposed under a city ordinance.

      We overrule the City’s third issue.6

6
      To the extent the City’s standing complaint is that the Apartment Owners have no
      particularized injury given that others similarly pay the fee, the Texas Supreme
      Court’s decision in Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2022), forecloses it. A
      plaintiff has standing to seek reimbursement of a fee because the plaintiff is out-of-
      pocket the money paid for the fee. Id. at 201. The fee does not have to be declared
      invalid to grant the plaintiff standing. Id. at 201–02 (noting that the Court’s standing
      analysis focuses on the nature of the injury, not the merits of the claim). A small fee
      paid is a particularized injury to establish standing, regardless of whether the merits
      of the legal challenge to the fee ultimately are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. See
      id.
                                             14
D.    Ultra Vires argument does not support reversal of plea ruling

      In the fifth and final issue, the City and its officials argue that no part of the

Apartment Owners’ suit survives the assertion of governmental immunity because

the claims against the officials are not true ultra vires claims.

      This appeal challenges a single ruling by the trial court—that the City lacks

governmental immunity from suit and that its plea to the jurisdiction is therefore

denied. We have already concluded that governmental immunity is unavailable to

force the dismissal of the Apartment Owners’ claims against the City. Whether the

city officials were acting within their authority or ultra vires cannot provide another

means for reversing the ruling being challenged. Thus, this is not an issue that is

before us.

      Had the City prevailed on appeal in establishing governmental immunity, then

the viability of the continued claims against the city officials as a suit for ultra vires

acts could be before us. But with our holding that the trial court did not err in

rejecting the claim of governmental immunity or in denying the plea to the

jurisdiction on that ground, the viability of claims against the city officials

individually is outside the issue being appealed, which is jurisdictional.

      We overrule the fifth issue.

                                           15
                                   Conclusion

      We affirm.

                                             Sarah Beth Landau
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Hightower.

                                        16