Court Opinion

ID: 9690427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:12:34.366809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:56:21.924522
License: Public Domain

*196PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 32. 0dissenting). The majority opinion clarifies that the test to be met by a defendant in a challenge to a sentence that was allegedly based on inaccurate information is whether the circuit court actually relied on inaccurate information in its sentencing decision. Majority op., ¶ 2. I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion. However, the majority opinion then accepts the parties' stipulation that the sentencing court did actually rely on inaccurate information. Majority op., ¶ 4. The majority opinion goes on to relate that because "[i]t seems clear that the parties also agree that the issue of harmless error was not developed to the degree necessary to assist this court in resolving that issue" and because the parties agree the matter should be remanded for re-sentencing, it is appropriate to reverse a published court of appeals decision, with no further analysis of the issues that are presented. Majority op., ¶ 4.
¶ 33. When we overturn a published decision of the court of appeals, we must do so based on an error of law that actually requires reversal, not based on a stipulation between the parties. To do as the majority opinion does here is to place the stipulation of parties to litigation above a decision rendered by constitutional officers, the elected judges of the circuit court and the court of appeals. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has no power to overturn a judicial decision based on an agreement between the parties to litigation. See Wis. Stat. § 809.18 (2003-04).1
¶ 34. Instead of proceeding as set out in the majority opinion, I would apply the test of actual reliance to the facts of the case, as provided by the *197record before us. My application of that test to the record and to the arguments provided in the parties' briefs leads me to conclude that Tiepelman has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually relied on inaccurate information. Furthermore, even if I were to assume, arguendo, that the circuit court did so rely, I conclude that such an error was proved to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would affirm the court of appeals, and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 35. The majority concludes that "the record makes it clear that the sentencing court specifically considered the inaccurate information in its decision." Majority op., ¶ 29. It bases this statement on the sentencing transcript, which reveals that the circuit court stated during the sentencing that Tiepelman had more than twenty prior convictions. Majority op., ¶ 29. It then concludes that, based on the court's reference to an incorrect number of convictions and the stipulation of the parties, Tiepelman has met his burden to establish actual reliance on inaccurate information. Majority op., ¶ 30.
¶ 36. The record contains a thorough exposition of the circuit court's reasoning for its sentencing decision, wherein the court cited its considerations. At sentencing, the circuit court said:
In looking at those factors in Mr. Tiepelman's case, first the seriousness of the offense, it is a substantial theft. The original check written by Mr. Tiepelman on his employer's account was — it's all documented in the PSI and in the record here — was over some $24,000. The amount which the Community First Bank, who *198took the loss, is currently out has been established by earlier proceedings at $9,341.46.
As I recall, Mr. Tiepelman took a substantial portion of the proceeds and bought snowmobiles with it at Viteznik's. It is not a theft which by anybody's account can be considered a minor offense. It was premeditated, it was somewhat sophisticated, and it was obviously an out and out theft of significant proportions.
I believe that it is the highest category of theft that was in the criminal code at the time, that is, exceeding $2,500, so the only thing you can say about it is that this category of theft was intended to reach any amount of felony theft, no matter how large, above $2,500. And it's certainly possible, theoretically possible, to steal an awful lot more than twenty-four- or twelve- or $9,000, but by, I think, anybody's account, to do somebody out of over $9,000 is a substantial theft.
Turning to the character of the offender, I have to agree with... all of the various people who were interviewed for the purposes of the pre-sentence investigation who reported numerous small and large thefts, dishonesties, false identifications, in dealing with Mr. Tiepelman. Mr. Tiepelman, at the time of the commission of this offense, had a long pattern of similar offenses — or at least offenses of dishonesty, theft, false pretenses, et cetera. I counted something over twenty prior convictions at the time of the commission of this offense back in 1995. They include numerous issuance of worthless checks, they include other forgeries, thefts by false representation, several — more than one forgery, looks like a couple of forgeries, couple of thefts by false representation, theft in a business setting, again, worthless checks. A well-established pattern of criminal behavior dealing with theft and false representation, issuance of worthless checks, prior to the commission of this offense.
*199There also is a record of assaultive offenses. Although I agree ... that that is not the primary characteristic of Mr. Tiepelman, but nor can it be ignored. He has a conviction for battery, apparently to his now ex-wife. He has a conviction for violating the no contact provision. He has various bail and bond violation convictions, again dealing with the violation of the restrictions against having contact with his wife. So he is properly characterized as assaultive and a domestic abuser, at least to that extent.
Mr. Tiepelman, having accumulated this record, has absolutely no credibility with this Court. ... Mr. Tiepelman takes the tack today in explaining his record —which is a pretty standard approach to take, but given Mr. Tiepelman's record it is all the more breathtaking in its sillyness [sic], and that is that it's someone else's fault that I've committed all these offenses. I haven't gotten the help that I've needed. It's the Department of Corrections' fault because they didn't prohibit me from having a checking account. It's someone else's fault in my past for not getting me the help I needed.
I believe that Mr. Tiepelman can stop himself any time he wants to, and he chooses not to be honest, chooses not to be law abiding. He is a criminal thinker from way hack. Now, it's true that counseling might help, but this is not a mental disease or defect. Has not been asserted as such anywhere during the course of these proceedings. It's a character defect.
Mr. Tiepelman has no moral compass that I could discern. ... Mr. Tiepelman is conning when he gets up in the morning, he's conning as he goes through the day, he's conning before he falls asleep at night if he thinks there's any advantage he can gain from it, if there's any benefit he can accrue to himself. ... I believe that Mr. Tiepelman is a significant risk to the public. ... So the offense is serious; Mr. Tiepelman has very little positive *200going for him with respect to character, and he presents an ongoing risk to the public.
There is an issue in Mr. Tiepelman's sentencing scenario which calls for punishment, as well as sending a message of deterrence to others, but to me the most significant factor is Mr. Tiepelman's character and the ongoing danger he presents to the public, as well as the seriousness of the offense. ... I am sentencing him in light of his conduct since the offense. I'm also primarily sentencing him for the flat out theft that got him convicted.
¶ 37. The circuit court identified Tiepelman's overall pattern of behavior, the seriousness of the immediate offenses, and his conduct since the conviction of the immediate crimes as the factors that most influenced its decision. Although the circuit court referred to an incorrect number of convictions, the correct number of convictions, as well as other criminal conduct that did not result in convictions, were accurately represented in the presentence investigation report (PSI). The court used the PSI in sentencing Tiepelman. The PSI reveals the following: (1) the offenses for which he was sentenced began with a series of transactions in 1995 to buy two snowmobiles with bad checks; (2) Tiepelman blamed the crime on his emotional state that resulted from his divorce and the death of his father and on his desire to have nice things; (3) the First Community Bank's representative stated that the bank wished to recover the funds paid out for those bad checks, but that Tiepelman had not followed through on his restitution obligation while on probation.
¶ 38. The PSI shows that Tiepelman has an extensive adult record, both before and after the convictions that were the subject of the sentencing, includ*201ing: (1) a 1988 charge of issuing a worthless check for which a bench warrant was issued because Tiepelman did not appear; (2) a 1990 charge of issuing a worthless check, which was subsequently dismissed; (3) a 1990 charge of issuing a worthless check, for which Tiepel-man was convicted; (4) a 1990 charge of issuing a worthless check, for which charges were dismissed; (5) 1991 charges of battery, disorderly conduct, bail jumping, bond violation and violating a no contact provision that were dismissed for a plea to a charge of issuing a worthless check; (6) a 1991 issuing a worthless check charge, for which the disposition remained unknown; (7) 1991 convictions of forgery, felony theft and false representation; (8) a 1992 conviction of disorderly conduct and dismissal of a count of battery and consolidation of a bond violation charge; (9) a 1995 conviction of issuing worthless checks; (10) a 1995 conviction of theft in a business setting; (11) a 1995 conviction of theft and false representation with an habitual criminality enhancer; (12) 2001 convictions of disorderly conduct with an habitual criminality enhancer; (13) a 2002 no contest plea to speeding; and (14) two pending counts of issuing worthless checks with habitual criminality enhancers. The PSI also relayed information about Tiepelman's periods of incarceration for the above listed convictions, problems that he had with his correctional programming and family and social issues that pertained to his criminality.
¶ 39. In his postconviction motion, Tiepelman challenged the sentence because of the circuit court's reference to an inaccurate number of Tiepelman's convictions. Tiepelman alleged that:
Nothing in the record, including the presentence report (PSI), supports the court's statement that Mr. Tiepelman had "something over twenty prior convic*202tions at the time of the commission of this offense back in 1995." Although the PSI lists some twenty prior charges, it shows only nine of the charges resulted in criminal convictions. . ..
The court sentenced Mr. Tiepelman with the belief that his prior record consisted of twice as many convictions than is correct. Moreover, the court's belief that he had been convicted of battery and various bond violations can only be characterized as aggravating, not mitigating, factors. The state cannot prove the error was harmless.
¶ 40. Because of Tiepelman's postconviction motion, the circuit court had the opportunity to review its sentencing decision, including its misstatements and the information the court relied on for the sentence it chose. The circuit court's statements are instructive:
In addressing the sentencing decision, in exercising the sentencing decision, in performing the sentencing function at that time, the Court addressed the three primary factors or characteristics in sentencing: the character, seriousness of the offense, the character of the offender, and the need for the protection of the public, and those points are separately addressed in the transcript.
In the analysis of the character of the offender, the Court did note 20 prior convictions which is concededly in error in that it's nine or ten, depending on how you want to count the read-in, and I don't really recall and I'm not suggesting in the record that that was misspeaking on my part referring to the 20 entries or whether or not I was actually mistaken as to the number of convictions at that point. I will note that neither M[r]. Tiepelman [n]or Ms. Oliveto spoke up and said that's not correct. So how that was understood at the time that's not clear either, but it is clear, first of all, that the sentence was, sentencing determination was *203based on factors that went considerably beyond whether there was ten or twenty convictions and addressed the other matters which are appropriate to being addressed in sentencing, and the transcript of course sets forth exactly what was discussed at that point.
The behavior both before and since the original probation disposition was addressed particularly ... in the arguments and... in my sentencing comments I say, "... I am sentencing him in light of his conduct since the offense. I'm also primarily sentencing him for the flat out theft that got him convicted."
So I believe that the defense in its argument in support of its motion wants to focus upon the ten versus twenty convictions and not consider the other factors that are appropriate to a sentencing determination, which were specifically addressed and weighed as well... [tjhese [other charges] apparently were dismissed for whatever reason but the record reflects that many of them were dismissed as part of a disposition which occurred on a couple of different occasions, but the conduct itself was conceded both at the time of the original sentencing and again today, and all of that conduct, even if the defendant was not specifically convicted for those offenses, is certainly appropriately considered by the Court. So the defense, as I say, in its argument focuses in and accentuates the 10 versus 20, or nine and a read-in versus 20, without regard to the other issues.
I believe, frankly, there is an issue as to whether or not this information was inaccurate in any substantial sense. ... I simply do not believe that the, whether it's ten or twenty, when the conduct is conceded and in light of the other — well, whether it's 10 or 20, when the conduct's conceded amounts to inaccuracy in any material sense and, secondly, in light of the other factors which the court analyzed in length in its sentencing *204decision, I do not believe that the defense has established by clear and convincing evidence either the inaccuracy or that it was relied on in imposing the sentence so the motion to vacate the sentence and resentence Mr. Tiepelman is denied.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 41. Sentencing is a decision within the discretion of the circuit court and appellate review will set aside a sentence only when there has been an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Patino, 177 Wis. 2d 348, 384, 502 N.W.2d 601 (Ct. App. 1993). In reviewing whether a circuit court has misused its sentencing discretion, we presume that the circuit court acted reasonably. State v. J.E.B., 161 Wis. 2d 655, 661, 469 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1991). A sentencing court misuses its discretion, as a matter of law, when it sentences in contravention of a defendant's due process rights. See State v. Coolidge, 173 Wis. 2d 783, 788-89, 496 N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1993). We review this constitutional issue independently. Id.
B. Sentencing
¶ 42. When sentencing a defendant, the circuit court considers three main factors: (1) the seriousness of the offense of conviction, (2) the character of the defendant and (3) the public's need for protection from the defendant. State v. Larsen, 141 Wis. 2d 412, 427, 415 N.W.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1987). It is permissible for the sentencing court to consider criminal conduct that has not resulted in a conviction, in evaluating a defendant's character. State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 126, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990). However, a sentence may not be *205based on the violation of a constitutional right. J.E.B., 161 Wis. 2d at 663. A convicted defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948).
C. Actual Reliance
¶ 43. I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that a defendant who claims that inaccurate information was used in his sentencing must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the information was inaccurate and (2) the circuit court actually relied on inaccurate information. Majority op., ¶ 26. Once a defendant does so, the burden shifts to the State to show that the error was harmless. State v. Marsh, 177 Wis. 2d 643, 653, 502 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1993). A convicted defendant is not required to prove that the circuit court prejudicially relied on inaccurate information. Majority op., ¶ 27.
¶ 44. Here, the circuit court's commentary about Tiepelman's overall pattern of behavior, the nature of the crime, Tiepelman's conduct since the commission of the crimes for which he was being sentenced and his credibility before the court were not erroneous factual statements, but rather, they were taken from the PSI and are not challenged in this review. Furthermore, at the hearing on Tiepelman's postconviction motion, the circuit court was very direct in explaining that it did not rely on Tiepelman having twenty convictions when it made its sentencing decision. The circuit court said:
In the analysis of the character of the offender, the Court did note 20 prior convictions which is concededly in error in that it's nine or ten, depending on how you want to count the read-in ....
The behavior both before and since the original *206probation disposition was addressed particularly ... in the arguments and ... in my sentencing comments I say, "... I am sentencing him in light of his conduct since the offense. I'm also primarily sentencing him for the flat out theft that got him convicted."
[ I]n light of the other factors which the court analyzed in length in its sentencing decision, I do not believe that the defense has established by clear and convincing evidence either the inaccuracy or that it was relied on in imposing the sentence so the motion to vacate the sentence and resentence Mr. Tiepelman is denied.
¶ 45. In so explaining, the circuit court said it did not actually rely on Tiepelman having twenty convictions, but rather, the court was concerned with his character as evidenced by his continuing criminal conduct. The circuit court was in the best position to evaluate its sentencing decision and what it actually relied upon. Based on my review of the information in the record, unlike the majority, I am satisfied that Tiepelman has not met his burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the circuit court actually relied on inaccurate information in reaching its sentencing decision.
D. Harmless Error
¶ 46. However, even if I were to assume actual reliance on inaccurate information, arguendo, I would continue to dissent from the majority opinion's assumption that the error was not harmless, which conclusion is based on the stipulation of the parties rather than on an application of the law to the record before us.
¶ 47. We have explained that for an error to affect the substantial rights of a party and warrant reversal, it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the result *207of the proceeding would not have been the same absent the error. State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189. This is a test that we have concluded is based on Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶ 44-46. It is also asserted that the test was established in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 51 (Crooks, J., concurring). We have earlier articulated the test for harmless error as "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed" to the outcome. State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). We explained that a "reasonable possibility" under Wisconsin law is the equivalent of "reasonable probability" in United States Supreme Court parlance. Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 41. The specific wording of the test has been a matter of dispute on this court for some time. Id., ¶ 52 n.1, (Crooks, J., concurring).
¶ 48. I note that the doctrine of harmless error applies to sentencing decisions. Marsh, 177 Wis. 2d at 653-55. Wisconsin courts have applied harmless error in a sentencing context, basing their analyses on whether the alleged errors affected the ultimate sentence that was imposed.2 State v. Anderson, 222 Wis. 2d 403, 410-411, 588 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that the circuit court relied on errors in the PSI that the State had not proved there was "no reasonable probability that the error contributed to the outcome"); Marsh, 177 Wis. 2d at 653-55 (concluding that the circuit court's forceful assertion that the inaccurate *208information did not affect its sentencing decision was dispositive in determining that the claimed error was harmless).
¶ 49. Although reliance on inaccurate information in sentencing can constitute a due process violation, the presence of inaccurate information at sentencing does not fall within the limited class of errors that are "so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal... without regard to their effect on the outcome." See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 37 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 7). In other words, sentencing where inaccurate information has been presented is not a "structural error," one that automatically warrants reversal without regard to the influence of the error on the process.3
¶ 50. However, based on my review of the statements of the circuit court presented by the record of Tiepelman's sentencing and the hearing on his postcon-viction motion, I conclude it does not matter which test for harmless error is used, the result is the same: it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the circuit court would have given Tiepelman the same sentence if the erroneous reference to twenty convictions had not been a part of the court's narration at sentencing. Therefore, Tiepelman suffered no prejudice because his substantial right to be sentenced based on correct information *209was not affected. When an error is committed that is not structural error and the defendant suffers no prejudice, the error is harmless. Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 51, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201.
¶ 51. In addition, there is no basis for accepting the assistant attorney general's assertion that harmless error has not been adequately briefed. Majority op., ¶ 30. The State argued below that if there were error, it was harmless, and it briefed the harmless error issue for this court. See State's brief, pp. 17-22. Tiepelman anticipated the State's harmless error argument in his brief in chief, pp. 24-29, and he responded to the State's argument in his brief in reply, Tiepelman's brief in reply, pp. 3-6. A harmless error analysis can be done on the record before us and the briefing of the parties.
¶ 52. The State's brief relied heavily on the sentencing transcript and the court's explanation of the sentence at the hearing on Tiepelman's postconviction motion, as quoted at length above. I agree with the State's brief that "the transcript all but... speaks for itself' as to the harmlessness of the court's misstatement of fact. I have examined the sentencing and conclude that if the court actually relied on its statement that Tiepelman had twenty convictions, it did not do so to Tiepelman's prejudice and therefore any error was harmless. I come to this conclusion because of the direct and clear statements from the circuit court at the sentencing:
[ T]o me the most significant factor is Mr. Tiepelman's character and the ongoing danger he presents to the public, as well as the seriousness of the offense. I am sentencing him in light of his conduct since the offense. .. . I'm also primarily sentencing him for the flat out theft that got him convicted.
*210¶ 53. Furthermore, the legislature has directed the appellate courts of Wisconsin not to overturn earlier court decisions if the claimed of error is harmless. Wis. Stat. § 805.18(1). Section 805.18(1) provides:
The court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party.4
Section 805.18(1) is made applicable to criminal cases by Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1). While I agree with the majority opinion that a convicted defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information, majority op., ¶ 10, we are not free to ignore Wisconsin statutes for the convenience of the parties. See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 39. Accordingly, unless the alleged error was prejudicial to Tiepelman, the sentencing cannot be set aside.
¶ 54. And finally, the decision of the majority also contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of Wis. Stat. § 809.18. Section 809.18 provides:
The dismissal of an appeal by the appellant or by agreement of the parties or their counsel does not affect the status of a lower court decision ....
¶ 55. The stipulation that the majority opinion accepts does not result in a complete dismissal of the proceedings before us because we clarify that the prejudicial reliance test the court of appeals applied is not *211the correct test. Majority op., ¶ 2. However, it does result in a partial dismissal of the review because the majority opinion overturns the sentence of the circuit court, which was affirmed by the court of appeals. The majority opinion does so based solely on the stipulation of the parties, which requested this court to assume both actual reliance on inaccurate information by the circuit court and that such error was not harmless. When the majority opinion permits two private parties to overturn the decisions of two constitutionally established courts, it operates outside of its statutory and constitutional authority.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 56. In sum, while I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that actual reliance is the test to be met by a defendant in a challenge to a sentence that was allegedly based on inaccurate information, I disagree with the majority opinion's sweeping acceptance of the parties' stipulations that result in reversal of the sentencing decision of the circuit court, which decision was affirmed by the court of appeals. My application of the test of actual reliance to the record and to the arguments provided in the parties' briefs leads me to conclude that Tiepelman has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually relied on inaccurate information. Furthermore, even if I were to assume, arguendo, that the circuit court did so rely, I conclude that such an error was proved to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would affirm the court of appeals.
¶ 57. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

 All further references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.

 Federal courts have also applied harmless error analysis to sentencing decisions. See United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 417 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Paulus, 419 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 298 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Smith, 218 F.3d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 2000).

 Structural errors are "defect[s] affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 37, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (citation omitted). As we noted in Harvey, if the defendant had counsel and an impartial adjudicator, "there is a strong presumption that any other constitutional errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis." Id. (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986)). We identified errors in this limited class in Harvey. Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 37.

 We note that the federal harmless error rule, Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, contains substantially similar language, and that federal harmless error review also addresses the protection of "substantial rights." See Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶ 36 (discussing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)).