Court Opinion

ID: 994001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:16:22.676752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:38.326734
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 97-4158

BERNARD CALVIN COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge.
(CR-96-178-S)

Submitted: January 6, 1998

Decided: January 22, 1998

Before HALL, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

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Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Charles Jerome Ware, Columbia, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A.
Battaglia, United States Attorney, James G. Warwick, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Bernard Calvin Coleman pled guilty to conspiring to possess with
intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine in vio-
lation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West Supp. 1997), and to carrying a fire-
arm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation
of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West Supp. 1997). The court sentenced
Coleman to ninety-seven months imprisonment on the conspiracy
count and a consecutive sixty-month term on the§ 924(c) count, to
be followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Coleman
appeals his sentence, contending that the district court violated his
due process rights by failing to consider alternatives to incarceration
and by failing to grant a greater downward departure from the guide-
line range given his rehabilitation potential and cooperation with the
government. Because we lack jurisdiction to review the extent of the
district court's downward departure, we dismiss Coleman's appeal.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court established a base
offense level of thirty-six, see USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1),1 on the conspir-
acy count and reduced it by three levels because Coleman accepted
responsibility for his crime, see USSG § 3E1.1(a), (b)(2). The govern-
ment then moved for a downward departure under USSG§ 5K1.1,
p.s., based on Coleman's substantial assistance, and the district court
elected to depart downward by three levels. The final offense level of
thirty and criminal history category of I produced a guideline range
of 97 to 121 months. The district court sentenced Coleman to the
ninety-seven-month minimum.

Coleman claims on appeal that the district court should have
departed further given his substantial assistance and potential for
rehabilitation. While a defendant may appeal an upward departure
under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a)(3) (West Supp. 1997), the statute does
not authorize a defendant to challenge the extent of a departure in his
favor. See United States v. Hill, 70 F.3d 321, 323-24 (4th Cir. 1995)
(holding that dissatisfaction with extent of downward departure does
_________________________________________________________________

1 U.S. SENTENCING G UIDELINES MANUAL (1995).

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not provide basis for appeal unless sentence imposed in violation of
law or as result of misapplication of sentencing guidelines). To the
extent that Coleman attempts to evade the jurisdictional limitations of
§ 3742 by claiming that his sentence violates due process, we reject
his claim. Coleman relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (1994), and 28
U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994), as support for his contention that the district
court impermissibly imposed incarceration to effectuate rehabilita-
tion. Our reading of the sentencing transcript, however, does not sug-
gest that the district court imposed a prison term to rehabilitate
Coleman.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argu-
ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-
sional process.

DISMISSED

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