Court Opinion

ID: 9467463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:49:24.33202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:21.534153
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion which holds that there was probable cause for issuance of the search warrant without inclusion of any information obtained during the sweep of the premises at the time of defendant’s arrest. However, because I would hold that the entry into Mr. Kinney’s residence was not unlawful and that a cursory sweep of his premises for the protection of the arresting officers was justified under the circumstances, I cannot join in the remainder of the majority’s opinion.
The FBI agents had an arrest warrant for Kinney. They did not know his exact address but did locate his automobile behind a residence at 1775 Fay, East Cleveland. Agent Hamilton testified that he observed a man leave the residence and enter the automobile. He and another agent followed the car. Hamilton testified, “Once we observed that this (the driver of the car) was not Timothy Kinney, we asked Mr. Westbrook where Timothy Kinney was.” Westbrook told them that Kinney had loaned him the car. Westbrook also told them he had been convicted of armed rob-
638 F.2d — 22 *946bery. The agents then returned to Fay Street.
There five FBI agents, assisted by three uniformed city police officers with shotguns, made the arrest. Two agents were placed at the rear of the home, one at a side exit, and two in front. The uniformed officers were placed one at the rear, one at the side, and one in front. Agent Hamilton pounded on the front door and announced his presence. There was some delay before the door was opened by defendant. On seeing Agent Hamilton, who had spoken to him the day before, defendant tried to shut the door. Hamilton pulled defendant out the door onto the front porch of the two-story, two-family residence, where he was handcuffed. Kinney was not fully dressed. A crowd was gathering. Hamilton, therefore, took Kinney back into the residence, where he was read his constitutional rights and the arrest completed. Agents made a cursory search or sweep through the premises to look for other individuals. The district court found that the agents checked closets but did not open drawers and cabinets. The facts are sparse because the suppression hearing was largely concerned with whether the officers thoroughly searched the house at that time or later, after they secured the search warrant. A gun was found on the bed in the bedroom where the television was playing. No one was found in the house, although agents heard noises in the rear of the house and observed movement at a window.
The arrest warrant authorized the agents to enter Kinney’s residence to effect his arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Because the agents had pulled Kinney through the doorway onto the porch when he started to shut the door, the majority would prohibit the officers from entering the premises without first securing Kinney’s permission. It is doubtful that anyone would consider it necessary to ask Kinney whether he wished to reenter the house when he had been pulled through the doorway, not fully clothed, on March 2, in East Cleveland, Ohio.
The officers testified that they reentered the residence for the additional reason that the sight of police with shotguns caused a crowd to gather. The majority holds that this was an insufficient reason to reenter unless the crowd was menacing. A prudent police officer should not wait to determine whether the crowd is friendly or unfriendly where any problem could be avoided by simply stepping inside the door. The conduct of the officers in permitting defendant to complete dressing and completing the arrest inside with an advice of rights is as reasonable as, if not preferable to, the procedure suggested by the majority of whisking the defendant away.
Further, I would hold that a sweep of defendant’s flat was justified under the circumstances of this case.
I recognize that in most of the cases approving of a sweep the threat to the police was greater than their apprehension here. But see United States v. Briddle, 436 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1970). As stated by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1980):
When officers have arrested a person inside his residence, the exigent circumstances exception permits a protective search of part or all of the residence when the officer reasonably believe that there might be other persons on the premises who could pose some danger to them.
The officers’ apprehension for their safety here was justified. It was reasonable for them to conclude that there was another individual in the residence, in view of the observations of officers at the back of the premises. What they heard may well have been the television, which was on in the bedroom, but they would have no way of knowing that before conducting the sweep. The officers knew that Kinney had a record of serious offenses. He was being arrested for armed bank robbery. He had advised Agent Hamilton that he was on probation for shooting his brother-in-law. Kinney had previously been observed in the company of some other young men, one of whom, Mr. Westbrook, who had just left the resi*947dence, was on parole for armed robbery. The officers also knew another of his associates was Kenneth Workman, the other bank robber. Workman was in jail, of course, but he nonetheless provides a clue to Kinney’s likely associates. The prudent officers ought to know the whereabouts of other persons in the residence including family members who might undertake to release Kinney under some misguided notion of helping him.
There is nothing in this case to indicate that either the entry or the sweep were pretextual. The officers gave uncontradicted testimony as to the reason for the sweep and the manner in which it was conducted. The occupation of a police officer is perilous enough even when officers are permitted to take reasonable precautions for their safety. The additional intrusion into Kinney’s privacy interest was slight. The Supreme Court has endorsed such slight intrusions for the purpose of protecting the police. For instance, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), permits a protective search for weapons in the case of a stop. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), permits the opening of drawers in the vicinity of an arrested defendant for the protection of the arresting officers. Since the officers’ apprehension was reasonable and the precautions they took were reasonable, I would hold the sweep lawful.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the district court for these additional reasons.