Court Opinion

ID: 9415021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 18:01:01.01508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:06.885606
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        AUG 2 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEOPOLDO COVARRUBIAS-                          No. 21-1341
DELGADO,                                       Agency No.
                                               A044-127-304
              Petitioner,

  v.                                           MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted July 20, 2023 **
                               Pasadena, California

Before: NGUYEN and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT, *** District
Judge.

       Leopoldo Covarrubias-Delgado (Covarrubias) petitions for review of a

       *    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **   The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
       ***   The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for
the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to

reopen. We have appellate jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We grant the

petition in part, dismiss the petition in part, and remand to the BIA.

      1.      Covarrubias first argues that the BIA should have reopened his case

pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(v), which excuses untimeliness where the

noncitizen can show due diligence and “[a] material change in fact or law

underlying a removability ground . . . that vitiates all grounds of removability

applicable to the [noncitizen].”1 The BIA did not err in refusing to rely on that

provision to reopen Covarrubias’s case. The final rule implementing the regulation

was preliminarily enjoined, and thus inapplicable, when the BIA ruled on

Covarrubias’s motion to reopen. See Rubalcaba v. Garland, 998 F.3d 1031, 1036

n.5 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Perez-Camacho v. Garland, 54 F.4th 597, 603 n.5 (9th

Cir. 2022).

      2.      Covarrubias next argues that the BIA erred in refusing to equitably

toll the statutory deadline for his motion to reopen. To qualify for equitable

tolling, Covarrubias must establish that he pursued his rights diligently and that

some extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. Hernandez-Ortiz v.

Garland, 32 F.4th 794, 801 (9th Cir. 2022).

1 Covarrubias cites to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(v), which relates to reopening

before the immigration court. The relevant regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(v),
outlines an identical exception for motions to reopen filed before the BIA.

                                       2                                 21-1341
      The BIA erred in finding that Covarrubias failed to exercise due diligence in

pursuing relief. Covarrubias sought post-conviction relief in state court three days

after the BIA dismissed his initial appeal. After the government deported

Covarrubias, he diligently pursued reopening of his immigration case from abroad.

And he filed his motion to reopen within a reasonable time after the decision

vacating his conviction became final and he received the relevant records from the

state. Thus Covarrubias was reasonably diligent in pursuing relief given the

circumstances. See Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011).

      We agree with the BIA that the purported change in law under Rubalcaba v.

Garland, 998 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2021), does not present an exceptional

circumstance that warrants reopening. But the BIA failed to consider whether

vacatur of a conviction underlying a removal order on constitutional grounds

qualifies as an exceptional circumstance for the purpose of equitable tolling.

Accordingly, we remand to the BIA to determine whether vacatur of Covarrubias’s

criminal conviction is an extraordinary circumstance that explains the delay in

filing his motion to reopen. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–18 (2002).

      3.     Finally, Covarrubias argues that the BIA erred in denying his motion

to reopen sua sponte. Because the BIA’s decision denying sua sponte reopening

did not rely on an erroneous constitutional or legal premise, we lack jurisdiction to

review this claim. Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016); see also

                                        3                                  21-1341
Menendez-Gonzalez v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1113, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding no

legal or constitutional error in denying sua sponte reopening when a petitioner’s

underlying conviction has been vacated).

      PETITION GRANTED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART;

REMANDED.

                                      4                                 21-1341