Court Opinion

ID: 9950744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 18:03:19.151637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:37.629945
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24 P. v. Jones CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097084

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 21FE002500)

           v.

 VINCENT JONES et al.,

                    Defendants and Appellants.

         Defendants Vincent Jones and Marcus Grey appeal their convictions for
premeditated attempted murder, shooting at an inhabited dwelling, assault with a firearm,
and various firearm possession offenses. They contend their attempted murder
convictions lack sufficient evidence and that they were prejudiced by both the trial
court’s erroneous denial of Jones’s motion to sever and the admission of one of Jones’s
social media conversations. Jones separately contends his conviction for possessing an
assault weapon violated the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, while

                                                             1
Grey separately contends (1) he was improperly sentenced to a consecutive sentence and
(2) his abstract of judgment must be corrected.
       As for the issues raised by Jones, we disagree and affirm. We agree with Grey
that his sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm must by stayed pursuant to
Penal Code1 section 654 and his abstract of judgment must be corrected. We affirm
Grey’s judgment as modified.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Jamal P. slept on the couch of his brother’s home near Mack Road and La Mancha
Way where several other adults and children lived. By October 2020, Grey had also
started living in the house. People staying at the house would often smoke cannabis and
congregate on the back patio. The patio was surrounded by a six-foot fence and on the
other side of the fence were several parking spaces, a street, and a large cement wall that
separated the street from a freeway. Jamal testified that, while he did not own a firearm
himself, firearms were present in the house and he could easily get a firearm if he ever
needed one.
       One morning, Grey wanted to smoke some of the cannabis that Jamal was
smoking on the back patio. Jamal refused to share, causing Grey to become angry and
threaten to fight Jamal. Jamal lost his temper and demanded Grey leave the house.
Jamal’s brother was awakened by the commotion and came downstairs to see Grey and
Jamal arguing; Jamal’s brother then fought Grey. At trial, the testimony was conflicted
about whether another person joined the fight against Grey.
       Grey sustained a swollen and cut lip and a swollen eye. Jamal’s brother’s
girlfriend told Grey he needed to leave the house. As Grey left the house, Jamal heard
him say “ ‘I got something for this house.’ ” Jamal’s brother’s girlfriend heard Grey

1      Section references are to the Penal Code unless indicated otherwise.

                                             2
make a call to Jones and say that Jamal and his brother had “jumped” Grey and that Grey
“got [sic] something for [them].” Grey went to the hospital and texted a picture of his
swollen face to several people, including Jones, claiming that he was jumped by Jamal
and his brother. Grey also sent a message to another person saying he needed to buy a
gun and would be willing to pay $300 for it.
       After midnight, Grey’s friend Big Trap, who was in possession of a firearm,
stopped by the house with two of his friends. Big Trap asked Jamal and his brother to
explain what had happened to Grey. After the explanation, Big Trap indicated he did not
believe the men. Big Trap also threatened to “put a hot one” on Jamal and threatened
Jamal against visiting with Big Trap’s child’s mother. To Jamal, this was a threat to
shoot him.
       After 6:00 p.m. on October 23, 2020, Jamal was sitting on the back patio with his
young niece and some friends, talking with his daughter on the phone. He heard a laugh
that sounded like Jones’s laugh coming from the other side of the fence surrounding the
patio. A short time after the laugh, gunshots rang out in rapid succession. Jamal realized
he had been shot and threw his niece into the house. Jamal ran upstairs and fell to the
ground. He was taken to the hospital and survived. He was hit with a bullet in the arm
and in the chest, the latter of which punctured his lung.
       The Sacramento Police Department responded to a call of a shooting at the house.
Twenty-four shell casings were found on the outside of the fence surrounding the back
patio. Four bullet holes appeared in the fence and 10 bullet holes appeared in the house,
with most of them hitting above the sliding glass door into the house. A bullet also hit
the sliding glass door, and three bullet strikes were found inside the house. Officers
contacted Jamal’s brother and another person who was present at the house during the
shooting. Both men had fired gunshots from the house following the shooting. The men
were on probation and detained by officers.

                                               3
       Sacramento Police officers reviewed video footage from surrounding properties
taken during the time of the shooting. In the footage, they saw a car parked near the patio
surrounding the home where Jamal was staying. The driver and passenger got out of the
car, and the person who was in the passenger seat then got into the driver’s seat. He left
the car running, while the person who had gotten out of the driver’s seat walked toward
the fence surrounding the back patio, returned, then walked back to the patio. Several
seconds later, the person who walked to the fence is seen running back to the car and
getting into the passenger seat before the driver pulls the car from the curb and drives
away. In another camera angle, the person walking toward the back patio is seen walking
to the fence before a glitch causes the video to freeze. The location of the frozen person
walking to the fence is the location of the 24 bullet casings.
       Jones was known to drive a car matching the car depicted in the video footage. A
photograph taken of Jones and Grey 20 minutes after the shooting depicted them wearing
clothes matching the clothes worn by the two men in the video footage, with Grey
wearing clothes matching the clothes worn by the shooter. Also, both Jones’s and Grey’s
cell phones were detected using cell phone towers near the scene of the shooting around
the time of the shooting. After the shooting, their cell phones were detected using towers
away from the scene of the shooting, but near to each other.
       Jones and Grey were arrested in February 2021. During a search of the apartment
Jones was staying at, officers discovered three firearms in an attic crawl space. One of
the weapons was an assault weapon. None of the firearms were consistent with firearms
that could fire the bullets or the casings discovered at the scene of the shooting. Jones,
however, was known to possess a Glock-style nine-millimeter handgun with an extended
magazine that was never recovered. The bullets and casings found at the scene of the
shooting were consistent with having been fired from a Glock-style nine-millimeter
handgun. Some of the bullets recovered at the scene of the shooting were also hollow

                                              4
point bullets, which Jones was known to possess and which he messaged a friend about
obtaining five days before the shooting.
       Following their arrest, Jones and Grey were placed in an interview room together.
They spoke in whispers about how they were each arrested and what each other said or
should say to officers when interviewed. They often said they did not believe police
officers had sufficient evidence against them because officers did not have the gun or
access to their phones or social media accounts. Grey twice asked Jones whether officers
found the gun used in the shooting and Jones said no. They also discussed trial strategy,
such as whether they would assert their right to a speedy trial or whether any of the
people living at the house would testify. Also during the conversation, Jones admitted to
owning the assault weapon and two handguns found at the apartment where he was
staying before his arrest.
       During a search of Jones’s cell phone, officers discovered a social media
conversation between Jones and his girlfriend occurring two days after the shooting. In
the conversation, the two were in an obvious quarrel, with Jones’s girlfriend saying,
“Keep doing what you doing[.] God don’t like ugly[.] I told the police about that shit on
Mack and lamancha to[o], and I got yo money,” (sic) followed by, “See you in court.”
Jones immediately responded, “So you not gone give my money back[?]” (sic) and she
responded, “No.” The conversation continued, with Jones’s girlfriend messaging in
succession, “You shouldn’t have hit me,” “It’s okay[;] you [are] [go]nna go down for
murder,” and “Bye, [V]innie[, I’]m cool off you.”
       Jones responded, “I ain’t hit you[,] but it’s good[.] [K]eep them cards[,] imma call
and get the shit turned off and I’m not going down for nothing[,] cus I ain’t do nun.”
Jones’s girlfriend insisted Jones had done something, he denied it, and then she called
him a liar. During another conversation on February 6, 2021, Jones told his girlfriend to
delete her conversations with him because she had talked about murder.

                                             5
       Defendants were charged with premeditated attempted murder, discharging a
firearm at an inhabited dwelling, and assault with a firearm. While several firearm
allegations were alleged as to each defendant, Grey was alleged to have personally used
the firearm and caused great bodily injury, while Jones was alleged to have been armed
with a firearm during the offenses. Grey was separately charged with being a felon in
possession of the firearm used in the crime, while Jones was separately charged with
possessing an assault weapon and three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
relating to the firearms discovered at the apartment he was living at the time of his arrest.
Finally, Grey was alleged to have been previously convicted of a strike offense and
serious felony conviction.
       The jury convicted defendants as charged. The trial court found Grey had
previously been convicted of a strike offense that also qualified as a serious felony
conviction. The trial court also found aggravating factors in defendants’ prior
convictions and worsening criminal conduct. In total, the trial court sentenced Grey to 14
years to life, plus 14 years in prison, comprising of 14 years to life for the attempted
murder conviction, plus 10 years for the attached firearm enhancement, and four years for
the felon in possession of a firearm conviction. The trial court then imposed a concurrent
10 years for the shooting at an inhabited dwelling conviction and struck the attached
firearm enhancement. The court struck or stayed the remaining sentences and
enhancements.
       Grey’s abstract does not indicate by a checked box under the concurrent heading
that the sentence for shooting at an inhabited dwelling was imposed concurrently to the
attempted murder sentence. The abstract also lacks an entry for the total sentence
imposed.
       The trial court sentenced Jones to a total of seven years to life, plus four years four
months, comprising of seven years to life for the attempted murder conviction, plus one
year for the attached firearm enhancement, two years for one felon in possession

                                              6
conviction, and eight months each for the remaining two felon in possession convictions.
The trial court then imposed a concurrent five years for the shooting at an inhabited
dwelling conviction, plus one year for the firearm enhancement attached to that count.
The trial court stayed the sentences for Jones’s remaining convictions and enhancements.
       Defendants appeal.
                                      DISCUSSION
                                             I
     Substantial Evidence Supports Defendants’ Convictions For Attempted Murder
       Defendants contend their convictions for attempted murder lack sufficient
evidence. We disagree.
       “In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is to
review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) “ ‘An appellate court
must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have drawn from the evidence
even if the court would have concluded otherwise.’ ” (People v. Halvorsen (2007)
42 Cal.4th 379, 419.) Before a verdict may be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence,
a party must demonstrate “ ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th
297, 331.) Reviewing courts must consider all the evidence admitted at trial, even if
erroneously admitted, to establish whether there was substantial evidence. (Lockhart v.
Nelson (1988) 488 U.S. 33, 39-42.)
       The elements of attempted murder are the specific intent to kill and “ ‘a direct but
ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ” (People v. Houston (2012)
54 Cal.4th 1186, 1217.) Additionally, section 664 applies a sentencing enhancement
when the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (§ 664, subd. (a).)

                                             7
       “ ‘There is rarely direct evidence of a defendant’s intent. Such intent must usually
be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the defendant’s actions.’ ”
(People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.) Intent to kill may “be inferred from the
defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime.” (Ibid.) Substantial evidence that a
defendant’s intent to kill was premeditated may be demonstrated by “planning activity,
preexisting motive, and manner of killing.” (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056,
1069.) There is no requirement that all three factors be established or that any factor
must be shown by direct evidence. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124-1125.)
                                              A
        Grey’s Attempted Murder Conviction Is Supported By Sufficient Evidence
       Grey contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
premeditated attempted murder because there was no evidence demonstrating he intended
to kill Jamal in particular, as opposed to the other individuals involved in the altercation.
Grey argues the evidence more strongly supports an inference that he intended to kill
Jamal’s brother or the other person involved in the fight, or that he merely intended to
scare the residents of the house.
       We do not see how Grey’s intent to kill Jamal’s brother, if present, would negate
an intent to kill Jamal. Grey’s preexisting motive toward Jamal and his brother was the
same—both brothers were involved in the altercation that resulted in Grey’s eviction
from the house and facial injuries. Grey targeted Jamal and his brother in his statements
of retribution and Grey’s friend Big Trap confronted both Jamal and his brother. Grey’s
planning activity was also substantial. Upon leaving the house, Grey implied he would
come back because he had “something for this house” and particularly Jamal and his
brother. Grey then sent a text message looking for a gun and appears to have secured one
from Jones for the exact purpose of shooting at the house he was evicted from.
       Finally, the manner in which the shooting took place demonstrated more than just
an intent to scare the residents of the house. The evidence demonstrated Grey

                                              8
approached the fence surrounding the outside patio while Jamal was on the phone with
his daughter and socializing with a group of people. It is reasonable to infer Grey
overheard the conversation and identified Jamal as a person who was on the other side of
the fence. Grey then fired 24 shots in Jamal’s general direction. Given that Grey could
reasonably identify Jamal on the back patio, and the number of bullets fired in his
direction, it was reasonable for the jury to find that Grey intended to specifically kill
Jamal. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports Grey’s conviction for premeditated
attempted murder.
                                              B
        Jones’s Attempted Murder Conviction Is Supported By Sufficient Evidence
       Jones also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding
he intended to kill Jamal. The jury found Jones guilty as an aider and abettor. “ ‘A
“person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she[ or they], acting with
(1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of
committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or
advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.” ’
[Citation.] ‘[T]o be guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor, a person must
give aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and
with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of the intended
killing—which means that the person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor
must intend to kill.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054.)
       Jones contends the evidence demonstrates he intended to aid Grey in shooting at
the house and not in killing Jamal. But Jones did not drive with Grey to the front of the
house to shoot at it. Instead, he drove with Grey to the back patio and waited as Grey
walked to the wooden fence surrounding the area where the people living in the house
were known to congregate. Shooting at a fence with people on the other side in an
enclosed area is arguably much more likely to be lethal than shooting at the walls of a

                                              9
multi-roomed house. Further, Grey told Jones about the altercation with Jamal and his
brother. The evidence supported the inference that Jones then supplied Grey with a gun
with an extended magazine and hollow point bullets. Given Jones’s knowledge of Grey’s
animus towards Jamal, his furnishing of a firearm and large capacity magazine, and the
circumstances of the shooting, a jury could reasonably infer Jones knew of Grey’s intent
to kill and intended to facilitate the killing. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports
Jones’s conviction for premeditated attempted murder.
                                             II
            The Trial Court Did Not Err By Denying Jones’s Motion To Sever
       Jones moved to sever his firearm possession offenses from the offenses he was
charged in common with Grey. Jones argued the possession charges were a different
class of crime than the charges occurring on the date of the attempted murder and that he
would be prejudiced by trying all the charges together. Grey submitted on the motion,
adding nothing to Jones’s argument. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the
firearm possession evidence was cross-admissible to evidence related to the attempted
murder, the charges were not unduly inflammatory, and the evidence tending to
demonstrate guilt of the attempted murder related charges was not weak. Defendants
contend this was error.2 We disagree.
       “ ‘The law favors the joinder of counts because such a course of action promotes
efficiency.’ ” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 395.) Section 954 governs the
joinder of criminal counts and states: “An accusatory pleading may charge two or more

2      Grey impliedly concedes he did not object to Jones’s firearm charges being heard
with defendants’ common charges. Because Jones preserved and raised the severance
issue on appeal and we will be addressing it, we will exercise our discretion to address
Grey’s appellate claim as well. (See FCM Investments, LLC v. Grove Pham, LLC (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 545, 554 [a court may decline to apply forfeiture to advance the due
administration of justice].)

                                             10
different offenses connected together in their commission, . . . or two or more different
offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, . . . provided, that
the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown,
may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory
pleading be tried separately.”
        To prove error, defendants must show the statutory requirements for joinder were
not met. (People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 622.) In the absence of such a
showing, the party seeking severance must show a clear potential of prejudice exists,
requiring that the charges be separately tried. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622,
666.)
        Defendants do not argue the statutory requirements for joinder were not met, and
thus their reliance on Walker v. Superior Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 938 is misplaced.
There, the defendant was charged with participating in an armed robbery and with
possessing a firearm as a felon approximately three months after the robbery. (Id. at
pp. 940-941.) No evidence was presented showing the same gun was involved in both
offenses. (Id. at p. 940.) The court in Walker concluded that the two incidents lacked the
requisite “ ‘common element,’ ” and were thus not of the same class for joinder under
section 954. (Walker, at p. 941.) To the contrary, here, possession of a firearm by a felon
was not only charged against Jones, but also against Grey, making the joined charges of
the same class of crimes as required by section 954. Thus, Walker is inapposite, and
defendants must predicate their claims of error on a showing of prejudice.
        We review the court’s ruling denying severance based on the lack of prejudice for
an abuse of discretion. (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 666.) “ ‘Refusal to
sever may be an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried
would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually
likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a “weak” case has been joined with a
“strong” case, or with another “weak” case, so that the “spillover” effect of aggregate

                                             11
evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges;
and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns into a
capital case.’ ” (People v. Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 395-396.) “If the evidence
underlying the charges in question would be cross-admissible, that factor alone is
normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court’s
refusal to sever properly joined charges. [Citation.] Moreover, even if the evidence
underlying these charges would not be cross-admissible in hypothetical separate trials,
that determination would not itself establish prejudice or an abuse of discretion by the
trial court in declining to sever properly joined charges.” (People v. Soper (2009)
45 Cal.4th 759, 774-775, italics omitted.)
       We agree with defendants that the evidence of Jones’s firearm possession at the
time of his arrest was not cross-admissible as character evidence or strongly related to the
attempted murder. Defendants’ conversation in the police station after their arrest,
however, was evidence demonstrating both that Jones possessed the three firearms and
that defendants participated in the shooting. While the recording of the conversation
could have conceivably been edited to remove Jones’s statements regarding the firearms
in his apartment, the evidence was still cross-admissible in some capacity.
       Further, Jones’s possession-related charges were not likely to inflame the jury
because those charges were unrelated to any offense in which the firearms were used.
While the charges introduced to the jury the fact that Jones was a felon, that evidence was
not as inflammatory as Jones contends. The jury was not told the felony Jones had been
previously convicted of and evidence of Jones’s conviction was told to the jury as a brief
stipulation in an otherwise lengthy trial. Further, many individuals involved in the
shooting-related offenses, including victims, had records or were on probation. Indeed,
firearm possession pervaded this case. Jamal testified that guns were a part of daily life
and present in the household and among many of his acquaintances. Consequently,

                                             12
Jones’s status as a felon and his possession of firearms did not make him stand out as an
especially bad actor in the context of the case.
       Finally, both cases were strong. The evidence against Jones for the possession
crimes was substantial—Jones admitted ownership of the guns and the guns were found
in an apartment at which he was staying. The evidence supporting defendants’
participation in the shooting was also substantial—video footage captured individuals,
dressed in the same clothing as defendants and driving Jones’s car, commit the shooting;
cell phone location evidence placed defendants together near the location of the shooting
at the time of the shooting; and defendants made admissions of their joint participation in
a shooting. On balance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jones’s
motion to sever his possession-related offenses from the shooting-related offenses.
                                             III
                       The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
                     By Admitting Jones’s Social Media Conversation
       The trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of Jones’s social
media conversation with his girlfriend. As discussed at the time of the ruling, Jones’s
girlfriend messaged him that she told police about the shooting and that she was in
possession of Jones’s money. Jones responded by asking whether she was going to give
his money back. The prosecutor indicated there was also a statement in the conversation
by Jones’s girlfriend that Jones committed acts of domestic violence against her;
however, the prosecutor was willing to redact that statement. While the trial court
believed the prosecutor demonstrated Jones had viewed the message before responding,
the trial court left open the possibility for Jones to present further argument regarding the
admission of the social media conversation. At trial, neither Jones nor Grey objected to
the admission of the entire social media conversation, which included statements from
Jones’s girlfriend that Jones had hit her and a statement from Jones that he was “not
going down for nothing[,] cus [he] ain’t do nun.”

                                             13
       Based on the foregoing, defendants contend the trial court erred by admitting the
social media conversation without proof of the requisite foundational fact that Jones had
read his girlfriend’s allegation before responding to her message.3 We disagree.
       We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717.) “We will not reverse a court’s ruling on
such matters unless it is shown ‘ “the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” ’ ” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 74, quoting People v. Brown
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 534.)
       Evidence of a statement by someone other than a witness testifying at the hearing
and “offered to prove the truth of the matter stated” is generally inadmissible hearsay.
(Evid. Code, § 1200, subds. (a), (b).) However, “[e]vidence of a statement offered
against a party is not inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the
party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested
his[, her, or their] adoption or his[, her, or their] belief in its truth.” (Evid. Code, § 1221;
see People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 717.)
       “ ‘In determining whether a statement is admissible as an adoptive admission, a
trial court must first decide whether there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that:
(a) the defendant heard and understood the statement under circumstances that normally
would call for a response; and (b) by words or conduct, the defendant adopted the
statement as true.’ ” (People v. Charles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 308, 322-323.) “ ‘ “To
warrant admissibility, it is sufficient that the evidence supports a reasonable inference

3      Grey concedes his attorney did not object on these grounds in the trial court and
argues his counsel was ineffective. Because Jones preserved and raised this evidentiary
issue on appeal and we will be addressing it, we will exercise our discretion to address
Grey’s appellate evidentiary claim as well. (See FCM Investments, LLC v. Grove Pham,
LLC, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 554.)

                                               14
that an accusatory statement was made under circumstances affording a fair opportunity
to deny the accusation; whether [the] defendant’s conduct actually constituted an
adoptive admission becomes a question for the [trier of fact] to decide.” ’ ” (People v.
Zavala (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 772, 779.)
       Here, there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that Jones read the portion of
the message accusing him of participating in the shooting. Contrary to Jones’s assertions,
the evidence demonstrates that his girlfriend accused him of participating in the shooting
in the same message where she told him she was in possession of his money. Jones’s
response pertained to the money and did not respond to the allegation that he was
involved in the shooting. Because Jones responded to the last part of the message, it is
reasonable to infer he read the entire message, including the first part of the message.
       For this reason, defendants’ reliance on McDaniel is misplaced. There, the
prosecution admitted a text message exchange between the defendant and his mother.
(People v. McDaniel (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 986, 996-997.) During the contentious
exchange, the defendant’s mother accused the defendant of committing a robbery and the
defendant did not respond. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded: “[I]n light of the
distinctive nature of text messaging, the receipt of a text message does not automatically
signify prompt knowledge of its contents by the recipient, and furthermore, the lack of a
text response by the recipient does not preclude the possibility that the recipient
responded by other means, such as a phone call.” (Id. at p. 999, italics omitted.) The
McDaniel court also noted that (1) the text exchange at issue “was not instantaneous but
rather unfolded over a 20-minute period,” (2) there “was no evidence as to whether and
when [the defendant] read the text message in which his mother suggested he had robbed
multiple local stores,” and (3) the defendant “emphatically texted his mother, ‘Stop
telling lies!!!’ ” (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, the McDaniel court concluded,
“[T]here was not an adequate showing that [the defendant] had in fact failed to respond to
or deny his mother’s indirect accusation[,] . . . a response or denial was not necessarily

                                             15
warranted under the circumstances[, and] there was no other evidence of [the
defendant’s] reaction to his mother’s statement that showed adoption of it on his part.”
(Id. at p. 1000.)
       Here, by contrast, Jones responded instantaneously, and Jones responded to other
matters contained in the message, not responding to only the allegation that he
participated in the shooting. While Jones later denied being involved in the shooting,
defendants did not argue exclusion of the evidence on this basis in the trial court and
challenged only the foundation supporting Jones’s adoptive admission. Defendants’
failure to object constitutes forfeiture of the argument on appeal. (People v. Dykes (2009)
46 Cal.4th 731, 756.) Further, an objection would not have been futile as Jones argues.
The trial court explicitly invited Jones to make further argument at a later date if he
wished.
       In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Jones’s initial
failure to deny his participation in the shooting an adoptive admission. In the context of
that social media conversation, reasonable people would have denied participating in a
shooting instead of merely asking whether they were going to get their money back. The
later denials appear equivocal and made after repeated accusations and increased tempers.
Thus, admitting the conversation was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.
(People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 74, quoting People v. Brown, supra,
31 Cal.4th at p. 534.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting Jones’s social media conversation with his girlfriend.
                                              IV
                    Section 30605 Does Not Violate The Second Amendment
       Jones contends his conviction for possessing an assault weapon should be reversed
because section 30605 violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
on its face. We disagree.

                                              16
       Initially, we note that defendant Jones did not argue in the trial court that section
30605 was unconstitutional. We will, however, excuse Jones’s forfeiture because he
raises only a facial challenge to the constitutionality of section 30605. (In re Sheena K.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887 [challenge based on facial constitutional defect “capable of
correction without reference to the particular [trial court] record” can “be said to present a
pure question of law” excusing forfeiture].)
       “ ‘A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute or ordinance
considers only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular
circumstances of an individual.’ [Citation.] A facial challenge seeks to void the statute
as a whole by showing that ‘ “no set of circumstances exists under which the [provision]
would be valid,” i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all its applications.’ ” (In re D.L.
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 157.) “We join the California courts that have applied this
standard when evaluating facial challenges to gun regulations . . . . (People v. Alexander
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 480 . . . [§§ 29800 subd. (a)(1), 30305, subd. (a)(1)
prohibiting felons from possessing firearms and ammunition, are facially valid because
the challenged conduct is not covered by the Second Amend.]; Regina v. State of
California (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 386, 401, 403-404 [rejecting facial constitutional
challenge to § 28220, subd. (f)(4) because Department of Justice notification to dealer for
firearms transfer does not implicate the right to bear arms].)” (In re D.L., at p. 157.)
       Jones acknowledges we have decided this issue against him in People v.
Bocanegra (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1236. Indeed, in Bocanegra, we applied the test
announced in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 to conclude section
30605’s prohibition on the possession of assault weapons did not violate the Second
Amendment. (Bocanegra, at p. 1255.) We reasoned the firearms prohibited by that
provision were dangerous and unusual weapons not “ ‘typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes’ ”; rather, they were “ ‘only slightly removed from M-16-

                                               17
type weapons that Heller likewise appeared to conclude were outside the scope of the
Second Amendment’s guarantee.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1250-1251.)
       Jones argues our conclusion in Bocanegra was wrong because it left unanswered
“whether, in light of Bruen, one state, i.e., California, can lawfully prohibit possession of
a firearm that is considered ‘in common use’ throughout the United States as a whole.”
(Citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1.) Relying on
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Caetano v. Massachusetts (2016) 577 U.S. 411, Jones
argues that because assault weapons are not prohibited in a majority of states, they cannot
be prohibited here.
       First, contrary to Jones’s assertion, in Bocanegra we did consider the fact that
assault weapons were not prohibited in other jurisdictions. Specifically, we reasoned,
“[T]he scope of our concern is limited to California and the constitutionality of section
30605. And, in this regard, we note section 30605 and its predecessor have been upheld
repeatedly over more than 30 years. We further note that, while it is but one jurisdiction,
it is difficult to conceive of California as an ‘outlier’ . . . given California’s outsized
population, economy, cultural influence, and, most importantly, its 30-year history and
tradition of assault weapon regulation. Moreover, since the passage of the [Roberti-Roos
Assault Weapon Control Act] in 1989, several states have followed California’s lead and
passed laws banning assault weapons in at least some form, most recently in 2023.
[Citations.] The United States Congress did the same, enacting an assault weapons ban in
1994, although it had a 10-year sunset provision.” (People v. Bocanegra, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1253.)
       Second, Jones’s reliance on Caetano is misplaced because he relies on Justice
Alito’s concurrence, which is not binding authority. (Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn.
(2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 630, 644, fn. 9.) The opinion in Caetano was a per curiam
opinion remanding the case to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to reconsider
its holding in light of the standard announced in Heller. (Caetano v. Massachusetts,

                                               18
supra, 577 U.S. at pp. 411-412.) We do not read Heller’s limitation of the right to bear
arms to weapons “ ‘in common use’ ” (District of Columbia v. Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at
p. 627) to require a granular and comprehensive review of gun ownership statistics to
discern the line dividing permissible from impermissible regulation. Indeed, Heller did
not address the number of “M-16 rifles and the like” in circulation when it suggested
such weapons may be “banned.” (Ibid.) Moreover, mere statistics on the relative
scarcity or ubiquity of a weapon may well be due to factors that are not relevant to
Heller’s analytical approach. Instead, the analysis of whether a weapon is dangerous and
unusual is focused on historical analogy (id. at pp. 592-595, 627 [compiling 17th and
18th century sources in support of “the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of
‘dangerous and unusual weapons’ ”]) and courts must consider “how and why the
regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense” (New York State
Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 29). We engaged in this
analysis in People v. Bocanegra, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pages 1250-1251, and Jones’s
unsupported assertions that assault weapons are in common usage do not convince us to
alter our conclusion.
                                             V
    Section 654 Required The Trial Court To Stay The Sentence For Grey’s Firearm
         Possession Conviction And His Abstract Of Judgment Contains Errors
       Grey contends the trial court erred under section 654 because it failed to stay the
sentence imposed for his felon in possession of a firearm conviction. The People
contend, “[T]he trial court could draw the reasonable inferences that Grey intended to
unlawfully possess a firearm before he used it in the attempted murder, and he possessed
a firearm following the crime.” We agree with Grey.
       Grey argues section 654 precludes multiple punishments in his case because the
evidence demonstrates he harbored the same intent and objective when possessing the
firearm as he did when shooting it at a group of people and attempting to kill Jamal.

                                             19
“The determination whether [Grey] acted pursuant to a single intent and objective is a
factual one, and we uphold the trial court’s determination where supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Chung (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 462, 469.)
       In People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, our Supreme Court held section 654
prohibited separate punishments for assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer
and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon where the defendant wrested away the
officer’s gun and shot at the officer after the officer stopped the defendant for speeding.
(Bradford, at pp. 13, 22-23.) Our Supreme Court reasoned the defendant’s possession of
the officer’s revolver “was not ‘antecedent and separate’ from his use of the [gun] in
assaulting the officer.” (Id. at p. 22.)
       In Ratcliff, the defendant committed two armed robberies and was arrested later
the same morning, with the loaded handgun in his possession. (People v. Ratcliff (1990)
223 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1404-1405.) On appeal, the defendant challenged the consecutive
term imposed for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, contending that the term
should be stayed under section 654, “because the firearm use and being [a felon] in
possession of a concealable firearm were part of a continuous transaction.” (Ratcliff, at
pp. 1407-1408.) The court rejected his argument, explaining: “[T]he crime is committed
the instant the felon in any way has a firearm within his control. [¶] . . . [¶] In the
instant case, the evidence showed that [the] defendant used a handgun to perpetrate two
robberies separated in time by about an hour and a half. He still had the gun in his
possession when he was arrested half an hour later. Unlike in Bradford . . . , the
defendant already had the handgun in his possession when he arrived at the scene of the
first robbery. A justifiable inference from this evidence is that [the] defendant’s
possession of the weapon was not merely simultaneous with the robberies, but continued
before, during and after those crimes. Section 654 therefore does not prohibit separate
punishments.” (Ratcliff, at pp. 1410-1413, italics omitted.)

                                             20
      The facts of Grey’s case are more analogous to Bradford. The evidence
demonstrated Grey came into possession of the gun from Jones before the shooting and
for the purpose of committing the shooting. Grey’s motivation to obtain a gun
materialized after the altercation with Jamal and his brother and apparently concluded
with Grey receiving a gun from Jones. Importantly, the evidence does not suggest that
Grey came into possession of the firearm an appreciable period before the shooting and
possessed it for independent reasons apart from the shooting. The evidence further
demonstrated that Jones disposed of or concealed the gun after the shooting. The firearm
was never recovered, and Jones indicated during defendants’ conversation at the police
station that he concealed the firearm from officers. No evidence was admitted at trial to
suggest that Grey possessed the firearm used in the shooting outside the circumstances of
the shooting. Thus, Grey held the same intent and objective when possessing the firearm
as he did when attempting to kill Jamal and shooting at the house. Accordingly, Grey’s
sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon must be stayed pursuant to section 654.
      We further agree with Grey that his abstract of judgment contains errors, including
that the box was not checked to indicate the shooting at an inhabited dwelling sentence
was imposed concurrently and Grey’s total prison term was not stated. Because the clerk
must prepare an amended abstract of judgment given our modification of the judgment,
these corrections should be included in the amended abstract.

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                                      DISPOSITION
       Jones’s judgment is affirmed. Grey’s judgment is modified to reflect the four-year
sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 4) is stayed pursuant to
section 654. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court shall prepare an
amended abstract of judgment for Grey, which also indicates the concurrent nature of his
shooting at an inhabited dwelling sentence (count 2) and includes a total sentence
imposed, and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.

                                                 /s/
                                                 ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
DUARTE, J.

/s/
ASHWORTH, J.*

*     Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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