Court Opinion

ID: 9397122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 16:00:39.764452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.613314
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 24 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DARREN GABRIEL LACHANCE,                        No.    21-16694

                Petitioner-Appellee,            D.C. No.
                                                3:17-cv-00689-MMD-WGC
 v.

JAMES DZURENDA; et al.,                         MEMORANDUM *

                Respondents-Appellants.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Nevada
                  Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted May 12, 2023
                            San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,** District
Judge.
Concurrence by Judge FRIEDLAND.

      A Nevada jury convicted Darren LaChance of various offenses, including as

relevant here, domestic battery by strangulation and domestic battery causing

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
              The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for
the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
substantial bodily harm. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 33.018, 200.481, 200.485.1 After

unsuccessful state postconviction proceedings, LaChance filed a federal habeas

petition subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

The district court granted conditional relief on one ineffective assistance of counsel

(“IAC”) claim: counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on misdemeanor

domestic battery as a lesser included offense of domestic battery by strangulation.

The district court denied all remaining claims and declined to issue a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) as to any of those claims. The State of Nevada appeals

from the district court’s order granting in part LaChance’s habeas petition.

LaChance requests a COA on two denied claims.2 We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 2253, and we reverse the grant of relief on the IAC claim and decline to

issue a COA.

      1.     We review de novo a district court’s grant of habeas relief. Dickinson

v. Shinn, 2 F.4th 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2021). As a threshold issue, the district court

1
 All references to the Nevada Revised Statutes refer to the version in effect in
2012 when LaChance committed the offenses.
2
  Although a motions panel previously denied LaChance’s request for a COA, we
have the power to revisit that decision. See Phelps v. Alameda, 366 F.3d 722, 727
(9th Cir. 2004) (“[A merits panel has] the power to expand the scope of a COA to
include additional issues, even if they previously had been deemed inappropriate
for review.”); id. at 728 n.6 (explaining that the law of the case doctrine does not
preclude a merits panel from reviewing the issuance of a COA, as it is a
jurisdictional issue).

                                          2
determined that, under Crace v. Herzog, 798 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2015), the Nevada

Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), when it concluded that the IAC claim failed for lack of prejudice. Thus,

the district court declined to afford AEDPA deference to the Nevada Court of

Appeals’s lack-of-prejudice determination and reviewed the IAC claim de novo.3

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

        In Crace, the state court had concluded that there was no Strickland

prejudice based on counsel’s failure to request a lesser included offense

instruction. 798 F.3d at 846. In reaching that conclusion, the state court first

presumed that the jury must have found each of the elements of the offense proved

beyond a reasonable doubt, and then determined that, because the evidence was

“sufficient” to support the jury’s verdict, the lesser included offense instruction

would have made no difference. Id. at 847. We held that the state court’s

methodology was an unreasonable application of Strickland because it improperly

“converted Strickland’s prejudice inquiry into a sufficiency-of-the-evidence

question.” Id. at 849.

        Here, unlike in Crace, the Nevada Court of Appeals did not find that the

evidence supporting the greater offense was merely sufficient. Instead, in denying

the IAC claim, it relied on Crace and found that there was “substantial evidence to

3
    The Nevada Court of Appeals did not reach Strickland’s performance prong.

                                           3
support” the jury’s verdict. (emphasis added). That said, we need not decide

whether the Nevada Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Strickland under

Crace because, as discussed below, the IAC claim fails even under de novo

review. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010).

      To establish Strickland prejudice, LaChance must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, had the lesser included offense instruction been given,

the “jury would have convicted only on the lesser included offense.” Crace, 798

F.3d at 849. “The likelihood of [that] result must be substantial, not just

conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).

      The evidence supporting the strangulation element 4 of the greater offense—

the only difference between the greater and lesser offense—was strong. The

victim, Starleen Lane, testified that LaChance viciously assaulted her for hours.

She was “[c]rying, screaming,” and begging him to stop. LaChance, while

continually telling Lane he was going to “f***ing kill [her],” put his hand on “the

lower part of [her] neck,” impeding her breathing and almost causing her to pass

out. LaChance was also hitting her with a flashlight and punching her

“[e]verywhere” with his fists. The jury credited Lane’s testimony as to the assault,

4
  To prove strangulation the prosecution had to prove that LaChance “intentionally
imped[ed] the normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying pressure on
the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of another person in a manner
that create[d] a risk of death or substantial bodily harm.” Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 200.481(1)(h).

                                          4
which was supported by overwhelming evidence. A witness testified that Lane,

who was being chased by LaChance, was “screaming for her life” and that when

LaChance caught up to her, he hit her with “extremely forceful” blows. An officer,

who arrived at the scene shortly after the attack, testified that he saw bruises and

marks on Lane’s body that were consistent with Lane’s version of what happened,

and that Lane told him that LaChance’s hand was “around her throat” and that he

“had cut her airway off causing her to almost pass out.” Photos of Lane’s injuries

and her medical records also corroborated her testimony. Because the evidence

supporting the strangulation element was strong, and because the evidence

corroborating Lane’s testimony was overwhelming, there is no substantial

likelihood that the jury would have convicted LaChance on only the lesser

included offense—misdemeanor domestic battery.

      LaChance’s counterarguments are weak. Lane’s medical records and the

photographs of her injuries did not directly contradict her testimony. Additionally,

Lane’s testimony that LaChance’s hand was on her collarbones did not necessarily

undermine her testimony that his hand was on her lower neck. Given the

proximity between the collarbones and lower neck, the jury could have easily

inferred that LaChance’s hand extended to both Lane’s collarbones and lower

neck, especially given the size difference between LaChance, who is 6’1”, and

                                          5
Lane, who is 5’4”. Finally, LaChance’s argument that the jury may have

discounted the officer’s testimony is speculative.

      Because LaChance fails to show Strickland prejudice, his IAC claim fails,

and we need not address the district court’s determination that counsel’s failure to

request the lesser included offense instruction was deficient. See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697. We reverse the district court’s grant of relief on the IAC claim based

on counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on misdemeanor domestic battery

as a lesser included offense of domestic battery by strangulation.

      2.      LaChance requests a COA on two IAC claims that the district court

rejected: counsel was ineffective by (a) failing to request a jury instruction on

misdemeanor domestic battery as a lesser included offense of domestic battery

causing substantial bodily harm, and (b) failing to investigate and present at trial

Lane’s Facebook messages. “[T]he showing required to satisfy [28 U.S.C.]

§ 2253(c) [for a COA] is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

      As to the first claim, the district court reviewed it de novo5 and determined

that there was no Strickland prejudice because the evidence supporting the

5
 Again, we assume without deciding that de novo review applies because it does
not affect the outcome. See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 390.

                                          6
substantial bodily harm element6—the only difference between domestic battery

causing substantial bodily harm and the lesser offense of misdemeanor domestic

battery—was so overwhelming that there was no reasonable probability that the

jury would have convicted LaChance on only the lesser offense. No reasonable

jurist would debate that conclusion given the overwhelming evidence that Lane

experienced some physical suffering or injury that lasted longer than the pain

immediately resulting from the attack.

      As to the second claim, the Nevada Court of Appeals denied it based on lack

of Strickland prejudice. That determination was neither contrary to nor based on

an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), as a reasonable jurist could conclude that the Facebook messages

were consistent with Lane’s testimony, and thus there was no reasonable

probability that their admission at trial would have changed the outcome, see

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 269–70 (2015).

LaChance also fails to show that the Nevada Court of Appeals’s decision was

based on an unreasonable factual determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Thus, the district court correctly determined that LaChance failed to overcome

6
 The jury was instructed that “substantial bodily harm” means “[p]rolonged
physical pain,” and “prolonged physical pain” means “some physical
suffering or injury that lasts longer than the pain immediately resulting from the
wrongful act.” LaChance has not challenged these instructions.

                                          7
AEDPA deference on the IAC claim related to the Facebook messages, and

reasonable jurists would not debate that determination.

      REVERSED.

                                         8
                                                                       FILED
                                                                       MAY 24 2023
LaChance v. Dzurenda, No. 21-16694
FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge, concurring:                              MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                     U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

      I join this disposition except as to the discussion comparing the Nevada

Court of Appeals decision here to the state court decision reviewed in Crace v.

Herzog, 798 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2015). I do not think we need to reach—or hint

about—whether the Nevada Court of Appeals decision here comports with Crace

and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), given that we are holding that

the ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails even under de novo review.