Court Opinion

ID: 9663405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:37:54.775811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:49.304311
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because, in my view, a proper application of this jurisdiction’s prior decisions to the facts of this case required the trial court to dismiss plaintiff’s action at the close of all the evidence, as requested by the defendant.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,185 (Reissue 1985) bars a plaintiff from recovery if, upon a comparison of the plaintiff’s negligence with that of the defendant, the defendant was guilty of less than gross negligence and the plaintiff was guilty of more than slight negligence. I recognize the statute also provides that all questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury. This court has held, however, that where the evidence shows that plaintiff’s negligence is more than slight as a matter of law, plaintiff’s action should be dismissed or a verdict directed in favor of the defendant. Lyon v. Paulsen Building & Supply, Inc., 183 Neb. 365, 160 N.W.2d 191 (1968); Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404, 100 N.W.2d 65 (1959).
In deciding whether a plaintiff was negligent in walking on dark, exterior premises, it is proper to consider all the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the premises, any necessity for walking on the premises, the availability of alternative routes, the plaintiff’s familiarity or lack of familiarity with the premises, the extent to which others had used and were using the premises when the injury occurred, any warnings of danger, the plaintiff’s ability to obtain means of lighting the way, the nature and degree of darkness, and the precautions taken by the plaintiff. Annot., Premises Liability: Proceeding in the Dark Across Exterior Premises as Contributory Negligence, 23 A.L.R.3d 441 (1969).
This court has considered those factors in a variety of contexts. In Gardner v. Metropolitan Utilities District, 134 Neb. 163, 278 N.W. 137 (1938), a plaintiff carrying groceries into her pantry fell through a trapdoor and into the cellar. This court found that “ [h]er negligence in stepping into the darkened room, where she well knew that the floor was a trapdoor regularly opened upon the cellar steps, was more than slight negligence and defeated her recovery.” Id. at 165-66, 278 N.W. at 138.
*895In Wentink v. Traphagen, 138 Neb. 41, 291 N.W. 884 (1940), the plaintiff had never been in the dark basement before and thus struck two matches to light his way. The matches went out, and plaintiff, instead of returning for more matches or another light source, continued walking in the basement. He fell into a pit and was seriously injured. In affirming the trial court, which had dismissed plaintiff’s case at the close of all the evidence, this court found significant the facts that plaintiff had never been in the basement before and that there was no emergency, peril, or need for speed requiring the plaintiff to go forward.
In Lepley v. Von Dorn, 139 Neb. 410, 297 N.W. 642 (1941), this court relied upon Wentink v. Traphagen and affirmed the trial court’s determination that a plaintiff was sufficiently contributorily negligent to bar her recovery as a matter of law when she injured herself by falling from a step of a dark and unfamiliar bathroom. The court set out the facts and the inescapable conclusion:
This situation is presented. A woman, her eyes adjusted to the bright light of the bathroom, turned out that light and opened the door into the hall where the light was less brilliant than it had been in the bathroom. Knowing that the step was there, but forgetting about it, she stepped from the dark bathroom into the hall and fell, to her injury. Whether she slipped on the sill, lost her balance as a result of the lower elevation of the hall floor, or just what happened is left to speculation and conjecture. Obviously Mrs. Johnson, at the moment before she stepped into the hallway, had three courses open to her, — she could wait until her eyes became adjusted to the light before proceeding; she could have turned on the bathroom light, which, when the door was open, clearly lighted the hall, and determined the nature of the hallway; and she could proceed, forgetful of the step, into what the plaintiff contends was a dark hall and a dangerous situation. She apparently took the last course. The conclusion is inescapable that Mrs. Johnson’s own act was the proximate cause of the accident.
Id. at 412-13, 297 N.W. at 643.
*896In Kelley v. Luke, 140 Neb. 283, 299 N.W. 593 (1941), a woman entered a dimly lit coffeeshop in which she had never been before. She failed to watch where she was walking and was injured when she fell off a step. This court again cited Wentink v. Traphagen and pronounced the conclusion to be “inescapable that the accident was caused by the failure of plaintiff to exercise due care for her own safety.” Id. at 289, 299 N.W. at 596.
In Weitz v. United States Trust Co., 143 Neb. 703, 10 N.W.2d 623 (1943), plaintiff knew he was entering a semidark room in which there was an elevator shaft. He also knew where the light switches were located but chose not to turn on the lights and fell into the pit. This court concluded plaintiff was “the author of his own injury” and thus affirmed the trial court’s finding that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in a degree sufficient to bar his recovery as a matter of law. Id. at 710, 10 N.W.2d at 627.
In Johnson v. Goodier, 182 Neb. 172, 153 N.W.2d 445 (1967), a guest in an unfamiliar home sought to go to the bathroom; entered a dark and unlighted room; opened the basement door, thinking it was the bathroom door; stepped forward; and fell down the basement stairs. This court, again citing Wentink v. Traphagen, concluded that the plaintiff, in walking in darkness in an unfamiliar place, was guilty of negligence sufficient to bar recovery as a matter of law.
In Leary v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc., 191 Neb. 575, 216 N.W.2d 750 (1974), a woman left her house during the darkness and walked over a tarpaulin to get her mail. She tripped over a trowel underneath the tarpaulin and was injured. This court held:
[T]he plaintiff was capable of understanding and discretion, had knowledge of the dangers she was about to encounter, and failed to exercise ordinary care and prudence to avoid the very defects and dangers of which she knew or should have known, and was therefore guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Id. at 578, 216 N.W.2d at 752.
Similar results have been reached by other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Maher v. Voss, 48 Del. 45, 98 A.2d 499 (1953); Yoder v. Greenwald, 246 So. 2d 148 (Fla. App. 1971); Conroy v.
*897Kleinman Realty Co., 288 Minn. 61, 179 N.W.2d 162 (1970); Mourning v. Interlachen Country Club, 280 Minn. 94, 158 N.W.2d 244 (1968); Posin v. Hotel, 45 Ohio St. 2d 271, 344 N.E.2d 334 (1976).
The majority opinion not only absolves plaintiff of any responsibility for her own conduct but rewards her indifference to her own safety. I do not know that our society can long survive such a rule of law. I would therefore have applied the rule developed in our earlier cases: that one who, absent especial circumstances requiring him or her to act, proceeds into the dark is guilty of contributory negligence more than slight as a matter of law and thus barred from recovery.
In the case before us, rather than forgo placing a nonemergency phone call scheduled for the dark hours or bear the trauma attendant to an unnecessary climb of stairs, plaintiff elected to risk life and limb by stepping into and traversing an area she knew to be dark and uneven. She was therefore negligent in a degree more than slight as a matter of law and should bear the consequences of her own folly.
Boslaugh and Hastings, JJ., join in this dissent.