Court Opinion

ID: 9909525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 17:09:06.766728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:37.344301
License: Public Domain

J-S41033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  RUTH ANN GRANT, AS EXECUTRIX                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  OF THE ESATE OF RUTH M. GRANT,               :        PENNSYLVANIA
  SUCCESSOR IN THE INTEREST TO                 :
  RUTH M. GRANT                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :   No. 380 WDA 2023
                                               :
                                               :
  LOUIS A. GRANT, JR.                          :

             Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 20, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at
                       No(s): Case No. 1172 of 2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                     FILED: December 13, 2023

       Ruth Ann Grant (“the executrix”), the executrix of the estate of Ruth M.

Grant (“the decedent”), appeals from the judgment entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, which held the decedent’s partition

action abated upon her death, and quieted title in favor of the joint tenant,

Louis A. Grant, Jr. (“Appellee”). After a careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On February

27, 2020, the decedent filed a complaint for partition of real property.

Therein, the decedent alleged that she and Appellee, who is the decedent’s

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S41033-23

son, held title as joint tenants with the right of survivorship to real property

located in Murrysville, Pennsylvania (“the property”). She noted there were

no mortgages, judgments, or liens encumbering the property, and the

residential property did not generate rents, profits, or revenues. The decedent

averred that holding joint tenancy with Appellee was no longer tenable, and,

therefore, she requested the trial court partition the property.

      On June 1, 2020, Appellee filed an answer with new matter and

counterclaims. Therein, Appellee averred the decedent acquired her interest

in the property by way of fraud, accident, or mistake, and, therefore, she was

not a valid and lawful title holder to the property in any respect. Appellee

presented three counterclaims: count 1-constructive trust, count 2-unjust

enrichment, and count 3-declaratory judgment for adverse possession.

      On June 18, 2020, the decedent filed a reply to Appellee’s answer with

new matter. Also, on this same date, the decedent filed preliminary objections

to Appellee’s counterclaims. Specifically, the decedent averred Appellee failed

to plead his counterclaims with sufficient specificity.

      On August 21, 2020, Appellee filed an amended counterclaim petition

wherein he continued to raise three counterclaims: count 1-constructive trust,

count 2-unjust enrichment, and count 3-declaratory judgment for adverse

possession. In support of his amended counterclaims, Appellee averred that,

during Appellee’s entire lifetime, until January of 2020, the decedent had

handled Appellee’s bookkeeping and administrative matters, and the decedent

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had placed herself in a confidential relationship, thus owing a fiduciary duty

to Appellee. He indicated he had placed an unfettered trust in the decedent

until January 10, 2020, at which time he discovered the decedent had engaged

in wasteful, deceptive practices concerning Appellee’s financial resources,

which was a breach of the decedent’s fiduciary duty to Appellee.

       Appellee averred he purchased the property pursuant to an agreement

of sale between him, as the buyer, and Laos Kaldi and Clara Kaldi, 1 as the

sellers. The decedent was not a party to the agreement of sale; however, on

behalf of Appellee, she handled the transaction regarding the property.

Appellee averred that, prior to the decedent filing her complaint for partition,

he was unaware that a deed dated December 19, 1996, and recorded on

December 24, 1996, initially conveyed the property from Laos Kaldi and Clara

Kaldi to solely the decedent. Thereafter, by deed dated December 19, 1996,

and recorded on January 3, 1997, for reasons unknown to Appellee, the

decedent conveyed the property from herself (grantor) to herself and Appellee

as joint tenants with the right of survivorship (grantees).

       Appellee indicated that, prior to his acquisition of the property, he had

been involved in a divorce proceeding. He alleged the decedent, “using her

motherly powers of persuasion and taking advantage of [Appellee’s]

trust…fraudulently or accidentally or mistakenly convinced [Appellee] that it

____________________________________________

1 Laos Kaldi and Clara Kaldi were husband and wife.

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would be best for [Appellee] and [the decedent] to own the property together

to avoid any problems with future girlfriends or spouses of [Appellee].”

Appellee’s amended counterclaim, 8/21/20, at ¶ 52. Appellee averred the

decedent never personally paid for any loans, mortgages, taxes, maintenance,

utility bills, or improvements to the property. Further, Appellee averred the

decedent never resided or stayed overnight at the property.

      Appellee averred that, on January 10, 2020, he was summoned to the

decedent’s house for a meeting concerning the decedent’s handling of the

Grant family’s financial affairs (“the January meeting”). Upon his arrival, he

was met by the decedent, her attorney, and her accountant.           During the

January meeting, Appellee discovered the decedent had squandered and

misappropriated Appellee’s financial resources, as well as the family fortune,

over which the decedent had control.

      Accordingly, in count 1 of his amended counterclaim, Appellee requested

the trial court place the property in a constructive trust solely for the benefit

of Appellee and to prevent the unjust enrichment of the decedent. In count 2

of his amended counterclaim, Appellee indicated that, from September of

2008 to August of 2010, he made improvements to the property totaling

$1,155,282.33, and from January of 2010 to October of 2010, he made

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improvements to the property totaling $486,185.69.2 He noted the decedent

did not pay for any of these improvements with her own funds. Thus, Appellee

averred that, in the event the trial court ordered partition of the property, he

must be given credit, and the decedent must account for all sums expended

by Appellee, so that the decedent would not be unjustly enriched. In count 3

of his counterclaim, Appellee requested a declaratory judgment that, to the

extent the decedent had any interest in the property, Appellee had acquired

sole ownership via adverse possession due to his open, exclusive, and

continuous possession for over 21 years.3

       On September 9, 2020, the decedent filed preliminary objections to

Appellee’s amended counterclaims, and on February 18, 2021, the trial court,

noting that Appellee pled his counterclaims with sufficient specificity,

overruled the decedent’s preliminary objections. On November 16, 2021, the

decedent filed an amended answer to the amended counterclaims.

       On May 14, 2022, the decedent died,4 and on June 24, 2022, the

executrix filed a notice of substitution as the plaintiff in the partition action.

____________________________________________

2 Appellee attached to his amended counterclaims two documents entitled
“Billing Recap,” which set forth dates, amounts, and checks for payment
related to improvements made to the property.

3 Appellee averred the real property contains his residence.

4 In her January 10, 2020, Will, the decedent specifically indicated she
knowingly and purposefully left no part of her estate to her son, Appellee.

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      On July 19, 2022, the trial court gave Appellee permission to amend his

answer and new matter with counterclaims. Accordingly, on July 21, 2022,

Appellee filed a first amended new matter and second amended counterclaim.

Therein, in addition to the defenses raised in the initial new matter, Appellee

raised the defense of abatement. Specifically, Appellee alleged any claims the

decedent had as a joint tenant seeking severance by partition are barred due

to the decedent’s death before entry of the judgment in the partition action.

He alleged that, since the property immediately passed to him upon the

decedent’s death, the executrix had no standing and could not substitute

herself as a party in the partition action.

      Moreover, in amending his counterclaims, in addition to the averments

supra, Appellee indicated that, prior to the decedent’s death, on November 1,

2021, the decedent executed a Quitclaim Deed purporting to transfer the

property from herself (as grantor) to herself (as grantee). Appellee contended

the Quitclaim Deed “did not sever the joint tenancy, as [the decedent’s]

conveyance from herself to herself does not clearly and unequivocally signify

an intent to sever the joint tenancy, and, during her lifetime, she remained

able to retreat from her position of creating a severance of the joint tenancy.”

Appellee’s first amended new matter and second amended counterclaim,

7/21/22, at ¶ 70. Appellee contended that any interest the decedent had in

the property was as a joint tenant with the right of survivorship, and thus,

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when she died, any interest the decedent had passed to Appellee as the

survivor. Id. at ¶ 71.

      Appellee averred the Quitclaim Deed had no legal effect on the joint

tenancy; however, he averred it was a “cloud on the title.” Thus, he added a

fourth counterclaim: a declaratory judgment to quiet title.

       The executrix filed an amended answer to the amended new matter

and second amended counterclaims. On August 10, 2022, the executrix filed

preliminary objections to the second amended counterclaims. The executrix

averred that, as it pertained to the partition complaint, Appellee failed to join

the estate as an indispensable party, and as it pertained to Appellee’s

counterclaims, Appellee did not state the counterclaims with sufficient

specificity.

      By order entered on October 14, 2022, the trial court overruled the

executrix’s preliminary objections. As it related to the partition action, relying

on Sheridan v. Lucey, 395 Pa. 306, 149 A2d 444, 446 (1959), the trial court

noted that “the mere pendency of an action in partition, without more, is

insufficient to work a severance of the joint tenancy, whereupon an abatement

occurs upon the death of the joint tenant.” Trial Court Order, filed 10/14/22

(citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the decedent’s

death on May 14, 2022, during the pendency of the partition action, “invoked

a divestiture of [her] interest in favor of the survivor, [Appellee].”        Id.

Consequently, the trial court reasoned that, since the decedent’s death legally

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vested title in the property to the sole survivor (Appellee), the executrix was

not entitled to be substituted as the plaintiff in the partition action. See id.

      Furthermore, while the trial court recognized there was evidence that

the decedent executed a Quitclaim Deed on November 1, 2021, prior to her

death and during the pendency of the partition action, the trial court deemed

the Quitclaim Deed inapplicable to the partition action. In this vein, the trial

court noted that “the Quitclaim Deed was not brought to issue in the partition

action until after [the decedent’s] death and the Suggestion of Death was filed

on May 25, 2022, which is after the partition action should have abated.” Id.

However, the trial court determined the Quitclaim Deed was relevant to

Appellee’s counterclaim to quiet title, and thus, the trial “court’s ruling that

the Partition Action abates does not prevent either party from obtaining relief”

in a quiet title action. Id.

      On October 20, 2022, the executrix filed a motion for clarification and/or

reconsideration of the trial court’s October 14, 2022, order, and on October

21, 2022, Appellee filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration of the

trial court’s October 14, 2022, order. By order filed on October 21, 2022, the

trial court denied the executrix’s motion for reconsideration.

      However, [since] both sides raised clarification issues and
      requested a phone conference with [the trial] court, [a phone
      conference] was held. At that time, the parties agreed that the
      partition action was abated without prejudice and that [Appellee’s]
      counterclaim to quiet title would survive and proceed. An Order
      reflecting that agreement was entered on November 4, 2022.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/17/23, at 3.

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      As a result of the trial court’s November 4, 2022, order, upon agreement

of the parties, Appellee’s counterclaim to quiet title remained pending.

Accordingly, on November 23, 2022, the executrix filed an answer with new

matter to Appellee’s fourth counterclaim (the action to quiet title). Therein,

the executrix averred the Quitclaim Deed was valid and conveyed the

decedent’s interest in the property to herself while she was alive, and the

purpose of the Quitclaim Deed was to sever the joint tenancy of the decedent

and Appellee while creating a tenancy in common between the two parties.

      On November 30, 2022, Appellee filed a reply to the executrix’s new

matter. On December 22, 2022, Appellee filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings. Therein, Appellee reiterated that, prior to the decedent filing her

complaint for partition, he was unaware that a deed from Laos and Clara Kaldi

as sellers conveyed the property solely to the decedent.      Thereafter, the

decedent recorded a deed for the property, which named herself as the

grantor, and named herself and Appellee as joint tenants with the right of

survivorship as grantees.

      On November 1, 2021, the decedent executed a Quitclaim Deed

conveying her interest in the property to herself.   Appellee contended the

Quitclaim Deed did not sever the joint tenancy since the decedent’s

conveyance of her interest in the property from herself to herself did not

clearly and unequivocally signify an intent to sever the joint tenancy since,

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during her lifetime, she remained able to retreat from her position of creating

a severance of the joint tenancy.

      Thus, Appellee averred that, at most, the decedent retained her interest

in the property as a joint tenant with the right of survivorship and, upon her

death, the entire interest in the property passed to Appellee; however, the

Quitclaim Deed leaves “a cloud” on the title. Accordingly, Appellee requested

the trial court grant his motion and enter judgment on the pleadings in his

favor on his remaining counterclaim, which was an action to quiet title.

      By order entered on March 6, 2023, the trial court concluded there were

no disputed issues of material fact in that all parties agreed that the title to

the property “began as a joint tenancy with right of survivorship between [the

decedent] and [Appellee],…[and] a Quitclaim Deed was executed by [the

decedent] on November 1, 2021, in which she conveyed her interest in the

property to herself[.]” Trial Court Order, filed 3/6/23, at 1. The trial court

noted that it was tasked with determining, as a matter of law, whether the

November 1, 2021, Quitclaim Deed was sufficient to sever the joint tenancy

with the right of survivorship.

      In this regard, the trial court concluded the Quitclaim Deed did not divest

the decedent’s interest, and she retained her one-half interest as a joint tenant

with the right of survivorship. Id. at 2. The trial court held “the Quitclaim

Deed conveying [the decedent’s] interest in the property to herself did not

destroy the four unities, as she retained her interest in the property, and

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retreat from said action was possible.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court granted

Appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to his counterclaim to

quiet title.

      Appellee filed a praecipe for the entry of judgment in his favor, and on

March 20, 2023, judgment was entered in favor of Appellee. On April 5, 2023,

the executrix filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. All Pa.R.A.P. 1925

requirements have been met.

      On appeal, the executrix sets forth the following issues in her

“Statement of the Questions Involved”:

      I.       Whether the trial court erred in its determination that the
               Quitclaim Deed dated November 1, 2021, executed by [the
               decedent] in connection with real property and
               improvements….in Murrysville, PA…did not sever the joint
               tenancy between [the decedent] and [Appellee] prior to [the
               decedent’s] death?
      II.      Whether the trial court committed error in its determination
               that [Appellee’s] effort to ignore the Quitclaim Deed did not
               violate the presumption against joint tenancies with the
               right of survivorship and was not tantamount to an
               impermissible restraint on alienation with respect to the
               property at issue.
      III.     Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that, at the
               time of [the decedent’s] death, the subject property was
               owned by [the decedent] and [Appellee] as tenants in
               common, and therefore, a one-half interest in said property
               is currently held subject to the terms and conditions of [the
               decedent’s] Will and administration of her estate?

Executrix’s Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted).

      Initially, we note that the executrix’s issues challenge the trial court’s

granting of Appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as it relates to

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his counterclaim for a declaratory judgment to quiet title. Since declaratory

relief was entered pursuant to a motion for judgment on the pleadings, our

scope and standard of review is as follows:

           Our scope of review on an appeal from the grant of
     judgment on the pleadings is plenary. Entry of judgment on the
     pleadings is permitted under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
     1034, which provides that “after the pleadings are closed, but
     within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may
     move for judgment on the pleadings.” Pa.R.C.P. 1034(a). A
     motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer. It
     may be entered when there are no disputed issues of fact and the
     moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In
     determining if there is a dispute as to facts, the court must confine
     its consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents. On
     appeal, we accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the
     complaint.
           On appeal, our task is to determine whether the trial court’s
     ruling was based on a clear error of law or whether there were
     facts disclosed by the pleadings which should properly be tried
     before a jury or by a judge sitting without a jury.
            Neither party can be deemed to have admitted either
     conclusions of law or unjustified inferences. Moreover, in
     conducting its inquiry, the court should confine itself to the
     pleadings themselves and any documents or exhibits properly
     attached to them. It may not consider inadmissible evidence in
     determining a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Only when
     the moving party’s case is clear and free from doubt such that a
     trial would prove fruitless will an appellate court affirm a motion
     for judgment on the pleadings.

Rubin v. CBS Broad. Inc., 170 A.3d 560, 564-65 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation

omitted). See Consolidation Coal Co. v. White, 875 A.2d 318 (Pa.Super.

2005) (setting forth standard and scope of review where declaratory relief was

entered pursuant to a motion for judgment on the pleadings).

     Moreover,

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             [We] observe that the hallmark distinguishing the joint
      tenancy from the tenancy in common is the right of survivorship,
      (“jus accrescendi”). Thus, on the death of a joint tenant, the entire
      estate goes to the survivor or survivors free from the claims of the
      heirs or creditors of the deceased co-tenant. In a tenancy in
      common, on the other hand, when one co-tenant dies, [her]
      interest descends or passes by will to [her] heirs or devisees; the
      remaining co-tenants acquire no additional interest in such an
      estate.
                                   ***
            Since the passage of the Act of 1812, the question of
      survivorship has become a matter of intent; and in order to
      engraft the right of survivorship on a co-tenancy which might
      otherwise be a tenancy in common, the intent to do so must be
      expressed with sufficient clarity to overcome the statutory
      presumption that survivorship is not intended. But it is also true
      that no particular form of words is required to manifest such an
      intention.

Edel v. Edel, 424 A.2d 946, 947-48 (Pa.Super. 1981) (citations omitted).

      In the case sub judice, at this juncture, the parties do not dispute the

validity of the deed dated December 19, 1996, and recorded on January 3,

1997, which conveyed the property from the decedent (grantor) to the

decedent and Appellee as joint tenants with the right of survivorship

(grantees). Thus, when the decedent filed her complaint for partition of the

property on February 27, 2020, the decedent and Appellee held the property

as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.

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       The issues presented by the executrix, which are intertwined, question

whether, in the context of Appellee’s counterclaim to quiet title,5 the Quitclaim

Deed,6 which the decedent executed on November 1, 2021, severed the joint

tenancy with right of survivorship, thus creating a tenancy in common by

which the decedent’s heirs are entitled to the decedent’s share of the property.

These issues involve a question of law, and, thus, we exercise plenary review

over the trial court’s decision. In re Estate of Quick, 588 Pa. 485, 905 A.2d

471 (2006).

       Relevantly, this Court has held:

       The essence of a joint tenancy created in this Commonwealth is
       the four unities: interest, title, time, and possession.
       Furthermore, specific intent of survivorship is required to create a
       joint tenancy, otherwise the interest is presumed to be a tenancy
       in common. Each joint tenant holds an undivided share of the
       whole estate….During h[er] lifetime, however, a joint tenant may
       convey h[er] interest to a third party, or [s]he may have the joint

____________________________________________

5 We note an action to quiet title is designed to resolve a dispute over the title

to real estate of which the plaintiff is in possession. Woodhouse Hunting
Club, Inc. v. Hoyt, 183 A.3d 453 (Pa.Super. 2018).

6 Our Supreme Court has held that:

      Quit-claim deeds, long known to the law, are used when a party
      wishes to sell or otherwise convey an interest [she] may think
      [she] has in land but does not wish to warrant [her] title. It does
      not purport to convey anything more than the interest of the
      grantor at the time of its execution. The distinguishing
      characteristic of a quitclaim deed is that it is a conveyance of the
      interest or title of the grantor in and to the property described,
      rather than of the property itself.
Greek Catholic Congregation of Borough of Olyphant v. Plummer, 338
Pa. 373, 12 A.2d 435, 437 (1940) (citation omitted).

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       tenancy property partitioned, or h[er] interest may be seized and
       sold by h[er] creditors in execution.

General Credit Co. v. Cleck, 609 A.2d 553, 556 (Pa.Super. 1992) (citations

omitted).

       Thus,

       [a] joint tenancy…is severable by the act, voluntary or
       involuntary, of either of the parties. When this occurs, the
       tenancy becomes one in common. Although the joint tenancy may
       be severed by a joint tenant’s act which destroys one of the four
       unities, that act must be of sufficient manifestation that the actor
       is unable to retreat from the position of creating a severance of
       the joint tenancy.

Allison v. Powell, 481 A.2d 1215, 1216-17 (Pa.Super. 1984) (citation

omitted). See Sheridan, supra.

       Here, the trial court determined the November 1, 2021, Quitclaim Deed

did not sever the decedent’s joint tenancy with Appellee. Specifically, the trial

court explained as follows:

             [The trial] court ruled, in reliance on Sheridan, [supra],
       that the partition action abated upon [the decedent’s] death on
       May 14, 2022. Based on that abatement, her joint interest in the
       property terminated upon her death and by operation of law
       reverted to [Appellee] as the joint tenant holding the right of
       survivorship[7]….[The trial] court did not err or abuse its discretion

____________________________________________

7 We note that it is well-settled that the commencement of a partition action

is alone insufficient to sever a joint tenancy because the plaintiff-joint tenant
can always retreat from her demand for partition so long as a final judgment
has not been entered. Sheridan, supra. Thus, it follows that in the event a
joint tenant dies during the pendency of the action to partition, title to the
jointly owned real estate generally passes by right of survivorship to the
surviving joint tenant. Allison, supra.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       in finding that the November 1, 2021, Quitclaim Deed did not
       sever the joint tenancy between [the decedent] and [Appellee].
       The [trial] court applied the standard set forth in Sheridan,
       [supra]: “Although a voluntary act on the part of one of the joint
       tenants is adequate to work a severance, that act must be of
       sufficient manifestation that the actor is unable to retreat from her
       position of creating a severance of the joint tenancy.” Id. at 446.
       [The trial] court found the application of this principle by the
       Superior Court in Wolf v. Nearing, 272 A.3d 493, [438 WDA
       2021]     (Pa.Super.     2021)    [(unpublished      memorandum)]
       persuasive. As in the Wolf case, the quitclaim deed at issue here
       did not divest [the decedent’s] interest in the property and she
       retained her undivided one-half interest in the property. “A joint
       tenancy is severed when one or more of the four unities [interest,
       title, time, and possession] is destroyed.” The Quitclaim Deed
       conveying [the decedent’s] interest in the property to herself did
       not destroy any of the four unities, as she retained her interest in
       the property, and retreat from said action was possible. The
       application of his law supports the finding that the joint tenancy
       remained intact at the time of [the decedent’s] death, [the
       decedent and Appellee] did not hold the property as tenants in
       common, and, therefore, title passed fully to [Appellee] and not
       to [Appellee] and [the decedent’s] estate in equal shares.
              The [trial] court [concludes] this [holding does not] violate
       the presumption against joint tenancies with the right of
       survivorship and is [not] tantamount to a [nonpermissive]
       restraint on alienation with respect to property. A joint tenancy
       with the right of survivorship already existed prior to the [trial]
       court’s ruling pursuant to the terms of the December 19, 1996,
       deed, and there is no statute that prevents “the creation of the
       right of survivorship by the express words of a will or deed….”
       Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355, 356 (1978). The
       only decision the [trial] court made was whether, once created,
       the joint tenancy was properly severed. The case law cited above
       is clear on how the court is to analyze acts purported to sever a

____________________________________________

       In the case sub judice, the executrix does not dispute this aspect of the
law or claim the decedent’s commencement of the partition action severed the
joint tenancy. Rather, the executrix contends the decedent’s execution of the
Quitclaim Deed during the pendency of the partition action, and before the
decedent’s death, resulted in a severance of the joint tenancy.

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       joint tenancy, and the [trial] court applied the law to the facts of
       this case in reaching its decision.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/17/23, at 4-5 (footnote added).

       Initially, we agree with the trial court that this Court’s decision in Wolf

is persuasive.8     In Wolf, supra, on January 2, 2001, parents conveyed

property to their two daughters, Wolf and Coy, as joint tenants with the right

of survivorship. Thereafter, Wolf married Charles, and on May 22, 2020, Wolf

executed a deed conveying her one-half interest in the property to herself and

Charles as tenants in common.

       On July 13, 2020, Wolf and Charles filed a complaint for partition

claiming that the May 22, 2020, deed severed the joint tenancy of Wolf and

Coy, thus resulting in Coy, Wolf, and Charles holding title as tenants in

common.      Coy countered that Wolf conveyed the property to herself and

Charles because Wolf was diagnosed with a terminal illness. The trial court

found the May 22, 2020, deed did not sever the joint tenancy created by the

January 2, 2001, deed. A panel of this Court affirmed holding:

              As the trial court explained, Wolf did not convey her interest
       just to a third party, but rather conveyed that interest to herself
       and her husband. Thus, [t]he retention of an interest in the

____________________________________________

8 We note the executrix argues the trial court erred in relying on Wolf since it

is an unpublished memorandum and is not consistent with the holdings of
other states. However, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished non-
precedential decision of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be
cited for their persuasive value. Similar to the trial court, we find Wolf to be
persuasive.

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       subject property by [] Wolf militates against severance of the
       survivorship tenancy. We agree.
             Our review confirms the conveyance effected by the May 22,
       2020, deed was not “of sufficient manifestation that the actor is
       unable to retreat from [her] position of creating a severance of
       the joint tenancy.” Sheridan, [supra], 149 A.2d at 446.
       Specifically, the May 22, 2020, deed resulted in no divestiture of
       Wolf’s interest in the…property. Under the May 22, 2020, deed,
       Wolf retained her undivided one-half interest in the…property,
       although purportedly as a tenant in common with Charles.
       Consequently, the May 22, 2020, deed failed to extinguish Wolf
       and Coy’s joint tenancy.

Wolf, 272 A.3d 493, 438 WDA 2021, at *3.

       Similar to Wolf, the Quitclaim Deed in the instant matter, whereby the

decedent purported to convey the property from herself to herself, militates

against severance of the joint tenancy.            Simply put, the decedent did not

convey her interest to a third party. General Credit Co., supra.

       We agree with the trial court that the decedent’s Quitclaim Deed of self-

conveyance, from herself to herself, is not sufficient to sever the four unities

of joint tenancy. As in Wolf, the act was not of sufficient manifestation that

the actor was unable to retreat from the position of creating a severance of

the joint tenancy.9 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in quieting title in

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9 In developing her argument, we note the executrix points to language the

decedent included in the Quitclaim Deed indicating she intended to sever the
joint tenancy. However, as the trial court held, despite this language, the
decedent, through her self-conveyance, was able to retreat from her position
of creating a severance of the joint tenancy. See Allison, supra.

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J-S41033-23

Appellee’s favor based on the pleadings.     See Consolidation Coal Co.,

supra.

     For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

     Affirmed.

DATE: 12/13/2023

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