Court Opinion

ID: 9457440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:22:10.263919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:21.158377
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur with the result reached by Judge McLaughlin.
The basic issue in this case — whether a court should enjoin Haggerty’s induction into the Armed Services — is governed by the same principles the Supreme Court found controlling in Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256, 89 S.Ct. 424, 21 L.Ed. 2d 418 (1968). Here, Haggerty alleged that the procedure utilized in determining his physical acceptability for service in the Army constituted a violation of procedural due process of law. However, in § 10(b) (3) Congress has deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to review prior to induction “the classification or processing of any registrant”, except as a defense to a criminal prosecution. Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. VI 1970). And the Supreme Court has held Section 10(b) (3) to be constitutional, although not applicable where a local board acts in a “blatantly lawless manner”. Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board, 393 U.S. 223, 238, 89 S.Ct. 414, 21 L.Ed.2d 402 (1968). See Breen v. Selective Service Board, 396 U.S. 460, 90 S.Ct. 661, 24 L.Ed.2d 653 (1970); Steiner v. Officer in Command, 436 F.2d 687, 688-690 (5th Cir. 1970).
Haggerty, however, is asking that we review prior to induction his classification — the very matter precluded by § 10(b) (3). In order to succeed, then, Haggerty must demonstrate that what transpired was not a part of his pre-induction classification or processing or that his local board clearly departed from its statutory mandate in a “blatantly lawless manner”. In this task, appellant has failed.
The heart of Haggerty’s objection is that after his re-examination for induction,1 at which the examining physician informed him of a physically disqualifying condition, his records were forwarded to the Surgeon General, who reversed the determination of the examining physician. These events were crucial stages in the determination whether Hag-gerty would be inducted, and therefore, come within the scope of that provision of § 10(b) (3) which refers to “processing”.
*800In addition, the records were transmitted in accordance with an order of the Secretary of the Army affecting nationally prominent registrants.2 Because of the broad grant of authority which Congress has given the Department of Defense and Secretary of the Army, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 3010, 3012 (1964); 50 U.S.C. § 454(a) (Supp. VI, 1970) , the procedure followed in this case was not “blatantly lawless”. Therefore, in this proceeding, we are interdicted from determining the ultimate validity of the order affecting nationally prominent registrants.3 But cf., Hunt v. Local Board No. 197, 438 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1971) .
Further, Haggerty advances the argument that Army Regulation 40-501, If 2-43, which pertains to waivers of physical defects where the registrant has demonstrated in his civilian occupation that he is likely to be able to perform his armed services duties, is invalid because it is not statutorily authorized.4 However, in view of the statutes cited supra, the promulgation of this regulation may hardly be characterized as “blatantly lawless”.
Appellant also contends he was denied a hearing before the Surgeon General, and thus deprived of due process of law. However, a hearing is essential only if a registrant’s classification is reopened, and reopening of a classification is required only if the registrant makes non-frivolous allegations of fact not previously considered and not conclusively refuted by other reliable information in the registrant’s file. Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Ed.2d 362 (1970). When the examining physician informed appellant that he was not physically qualified and recorded this conclusion on the medical form, he was merely reporting his findings for the use of the local board. The examining physician did not reclassify the appellant. Therefore, despite the examining physician’s actions, Haggerty retained his I-A classification. Since appellant was never classified other than I-A, the action by the Surgeon General, reversing the medical findings of the examining physician, was similarly not a reclassification. It follows, therefore, that appellant was not entitled to a personal appearance before the Surgeon General.
Whether the procedures followed by the Selective Service System or whether the Surgeon General’s medical findings conclusively refuted the appellant’s allegations and the findings of the examining physician may be determined only during a habeas corpus proceeding after induction, or if appellant decides not to report for induction, during a criminal prosecution.

. Appellant was found fit for service at the first examination, conducted in Detroit. The re-examination was occasioned by appellant’s request to transfer the completion of his induction to the Pittsburgh board.

. Tlie order, contained in a letter from the Adjutant General to various commanding generals, required that the records of nationally prominent registrants who were excused from induction for medical reasons be forwarded to the Surgeon General for final evaluation. Department of Army letter, AGAM-P(M) (4 Apr. 66) EPPAW, dated April 28, 1966).

. Similarly, we are statutorily prohibited from deciding the fact questions of appellant’s national prominence or physical acceptability.

. There was testimony that the Surgeon General relied in part on this regulation in finding Haggerty fit for duty.