Court Opinion

ID: 9675783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:05:45.953623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:39.141032
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 100. {dissenting). The world will not end if Andrae Howell is given an eviden-tiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. But the administration of justice in Wisconsin courts will suffer because, in awarding Howell a Bangert1 hearing, the majority adds a new responsibility for judges in a plea colloquy, fudges the distinction between Bangert motions and non -Bangert motions for plea withdrawal, unfairly shifts the burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing to the State, and gives credibility to Howell's wholly unsubstantiated allegations that another person, not Howell, shot and injured Marcus Pearson. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
*395I
¶ 101. On July 12, 2004, Andrae D. Howell entered a plea of guilty to the charge of first-degree reckless injury, as a party to the crime. He was sentenced on August 31, 2004.
¶ 102. On March 2, 2005, more than six months after sentence, Howell moved to withdraw his plea. His motion was denied by the circuit court without an evidentiary hearing. This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals in a scholarly opinion on August 31, 2006.
¶ 103. The court of appeals decision is now reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court "for an evidentiary hearing under Bangert to determine whether Howell is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea." Majority op., ¶ 89. "The burden is on the State at the evidentiary hearing... to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Howell's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Id., ¶ 9.
¶ 104. In making this decision, the court second-guesses the work of several judges and does so on extremely flimsy grounds.
¶ 105. Let us go back to the beginning.
¶ 106. On Sunday, February 8, 2004, Marcus Pearson, then 23, was sitting in his car on the street near 3124 West Oriole Drive in Milwaukee. It was about noon. Suddenly, a man approached Pearson with a rifle, pointed the rifle, and shot him, fracturing his right middle finger and right lower leg. Pearson succeeded in driving off, past the shooter, and immediately headed to a hospital.
¶ 107. On February 12, 2004, the State filed a criminal complaint against Howell, then 30, alleging that he was the shooter in the February 8 incident.
*396¶ 108. On February 20, 2004, Milwaukee County Court Commissioner Audrey Y. Brooks presided at a preliminary examination at which. Pearson was the only witness. Pearson testified that while he was sitting in the driver's seat of his car, Howell appeared on the sidewalk near a discarded couch, about 30 to 35 feet away. Pearson said he had known Howell — "Dray"—for about four years, and that "Dray" shot him with a rifle. "The first shot came right through the windshield. ... I mean the windshield cracked," he said. A second shot went through the car door as Pearson drove away. On cross-examination Pearson was asked if he was certain that Howell was the person who shot him. "Positive," he answered. "Looked dead at him. He looked dead at me."
¶ 109. After Howell was bound over for trial, the State gave defense attorney Michael Backes the Information, an "offer" letter, and, to use Backes's words, "sizeable amounts of discovery."
¶ 110. On March 2, 2004, Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Richard J. Sankovitz held a scheduling conference. He set a final pretrial conference for May 17 and a jury trial for June 9. This scheduling conference was off the record. The defendant was not present.
¶ 111. A year earlier, on March 19, 2003, Andrae Howell was convicted of a felony. On April 15, 2003, he was sentenced to one year of confinement in the Wisconsin State Prison, but this sentence was stayed and he was placed on probation for three years. Thus, on February 8, 2004, Howell was on probation. On or about April 27, 2004, Howell's probation was revoked in response to the Pearson shooting, and he was sentenced to prison. Howell's status is repeatedly alluded to in the record of this case, but there is no transcript or written decision from the probation revocation proceedings in the record.
*397¶ 112. Attorney Backes represented Howell at the February 20 preliminary hearing and the July 12 plea. He represented Howell at two hearings between these dates. Thus, he may have represented Howell during probation revocation. The record does not tell us. In any event, however, Backes would have been familiar with the fact that Howell's probation had been revoked. Howell had to be brought from the Dodge Correctional Institution for the May 17 hearing and for the June 9 hearing. At the June 9 hearing, there was talk of getting Howell appropriate clothes for the trial.
¶ 113. On May 17, there was a final pretrial conference off the record. Then the court went back on the record. The court said in part, in the presence of Howell:
The parties know who their witnesses are .... The defense indicated there may be a witness or two that needs to be interviewed between now and the trial date .... The defense in this case is that Mr. Howell was present at the scene, but was not the shooter. The State indicated off the record that it had advised Mr. Howell at the outset of the proceedings that if the case can be resolved on the charge that was issued in the Information, that... it would be, but if the case went to trial, the State would be filing additional charges. .. [namely] one count of attempted first degree intentional homicide while armed and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
(Emphasis added.) Attorney Backes replied that he had "reviewed that issue with Mr. Howell this morning again and he understands."
¶ 114. On June 9, the scheduled date of trial, the court indicated that there had been conversations with counsel off the record. On the record, the court said: "[A] witness that Mr. Backes has not previously had *398contact with seems to have surfaced here today and has information that Mr. Backes needs to explore." Attorney Backes then responded:
MR. BACKES: I've been informed that the State is going to amend charges not only upward but also to expand the limits of liability to my client by including party to a crime.
My defense of the case has been the allegation that he's the shooter. My whole theory that I've come — that I'm prepared to try including providing clothes to show that he was not the shooter, all my efforts in preparation for trial are somewhat meaningless at this point. There's a whole new theory.
Of course, in addition, the party we've been trying to find is now here and I did talk to him and he's prepared to testify and that is certainly a factor...
THE COURT: Would the party to a crime wrinkle also mean that there's a possibility that the case won't even be tried?
MR. BACKES: That is a possibility especially as I review what Mr. [Sharp] will be testifying to.
(Emphasis added.) Assistant District Attorney Kenneth Berg then interjected:
MR. BERG: The statement by Mr. [Sharp]... who is the witness who's here[,] was also freely given to Mr. Backes in the statement he gave to the police. I understand that apparently this case will be adjourned, but I want the Court to know that we are fully prepared to try the case.
*399MR. BACKES: Well... if they don't want to amend charges to include party to a crime, I'd now be more than happy to reconsider my position.
THE COURT: Party to a crime is not much of a surprise. It might be enough of a surprise to warrant an adjournment, but I don't think Mr. Howell, when he looks at the ultimate resolution of the case, should be so surprised by how it gets resolved if it goes down as a party to a crime.
There are a bunch of witnesses here who came to see the State put on its case today and I know that they're disappointed by virtue of the fact that the case isn't being tried, but given this development where the State has a different theory for holding you liable on evidence that doesn't seem to be accounted for by your defense in the case, it's quite possible that there won't even be a trial in this case and I think that it's better to let you and Mr. Backes digest this change in the charges in the case and decide whether you really are intent upon a trial.
Rather than scheduling the trial at this point what I'm going to do is set a status date so that you and Mr. Backes can talk about the case and you can decide whether you want a trial or whether you want to try to resolve the case in a different way.
(Emphasis added.)
*400¶ 115. On July 12, the parties appeared for a plea. The first question the court asked was: "Have there been negotiations?" Assistant District Attorney Berg responded that there had been negotiations. The State was amending the charge to add party to a crime. However, it was not pursuing other charges. Berg said he understood that the defendant would be entering "a plea of other than not guilty. Both sides will be free to argue at sentencing." Defense attorney Backes agreed to the State's summary of negotiations.
II
¶ 116. The above stated facts constitute the record of this case at the start of the plea colloquy. The record does not include any police report, the statements of any witnesses, the statement of the defendant, or a transcript or any documentation from the revocation of Howell's probation. However, all these documents would have been available to the defendant and his attorney. The record makes clear that the defendant had multiple opportunities over several months to confer with his attorney, to digest developments, and to plot strategy.
¶ 117. Attorney Backes referred to "Joseph" as early as February 20 in the preliminary hearing, but the record tells us nothing about Joseph Sharp (except that he was a cousin of the defendant) or what he might say as a witness. The clerk noted on May 17 that the State intended to call ten witnesses, the defense, five. We do not know whether Joseph Sharp was a State witness, a defense witness, or was not listed as a witness. We do know that the parties were in continual negotiation.
¶ 118. A fair reading of the record is that Howell planned to defend against the specific charge that he was the shooter. This defense was substantially undermined, however, when the State broadened the charge by adding party to a crime, for party to a crime would *401have ensnared Howell, even if he were not the shooter, if he conspired to plan the crime or if he knowingly assisted another shooter. The "whole new theory" that Attorney Backes referred to was party to a crime, not an allegation that Joseph Sharp was the shooter. There is no evidence in the record at this point suggesting that Howell did not know anything in advance about the confrontation with Pearson or that he was surprised by the shooting.
HH HH H-4
¶ 119. The following selected passages appear in the plea colloquy:
THE COURT: Is there any objection to the amendment to the information?
MR. BACKES: No.
THE COURT: Would it be fair to state that the amendment to the information comprises the prospect that at trial the evidence might show that Mr. Howell didn't pull the trigger, but that he assisted people in putting the victim in a place where he could he shot by somebody else?
MR. BACKES: That's a correct statement.
THE COURT: Mr. Howell, do you agree with that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So, there is no objection to the amendment?
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
*402THE COURT: Mr. Howell, I'm going to grant the State's motion to amend the information in this case. You're now charged with being a party to the crime of first degree reckless injury. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 120. When the court used language "that [Howell] assisted people in putting the victim in a place where he could be shot by somebody else," the court was likely responding to something the parties had said to the court off the record about the offense. The language implies that Howell helped "set up" the victim. Howell's attorney and Howell himself agreed that the court's statement was correct.
¶ 121. The notion that the Pearson shooting was a "set up" was strongly implied at the subsequent sentencing hearing by Assistant District Attorney Berg:
Mr. Pearson always wondered.... This is one of these cases where determining exactly all of the levels of responsibility is difficult because there were clearly people including a girlfriend of his who wanted him to go to that location [on Oriole Drive].
He very accurately has indicated he goes to a very specific location to meet a young lady who he's had a relationship with. And at that location, the location that this Court can see from the Complaint, he's nearly killed. His car was shot at numerous times. He is hit twice.
¶ 122. If this rendition of the facts was shared with the court at some point before the plea hearing, it would have made perfect sense for the court to suggest that Howell "assisted people in putting the victim in a place where he could be shot by somebody else."
*403¶ 123. Later in the colloquy, the court explained the offense with the extra element of party to a crime.
THE COURT: Do you understand that before you can be found guilty the State would be required to prove that on February 8th of this year someone caused great bodily harm to Marcus, M-A-R-C-U-S, Pearson, P-E-A-R-S-O-N. The State would have to prove that whoever did this did it by criminally reckless conduct. That means that they were engaged in conduct that the person knew at the time to create a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to Mr. Pearson, and was aware that they were creating such a risk. The State would have to prove that the person who shot him, shot him in circumstances which showed utter disregard for human life. And then the State would have to prove either that you were the person who did all those things or that you intentionally assisted someone else who was doing those things, knowing what they were doing.
Do you understand what the State would have to prove?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
(Emphasis added.) These alternative explanations by the court of party to a crime, including that "you intentionally assisted someone else who was doing those things *404[reckless injury], knowing what they were doing," are a close analogue to Wis JI — Criminal 400. See majority op., ¶ 46.
¶ 124. Then the court went into the facts:
THE COURT: May I accept as true the facts stated in the complaint?
MR. BACKES: We would stipulate to the factual basis for the plea in the complaint with the understanding as party to a crime.
THE COURT: So, if the case came to trial what are the two possibilities that the State could prove as far as Mr. Howell's involvement in the shooting?
MR. BERG: The two possibilities would be, Judge, that, one, he is the actual shooter, which would have been the victim's actual testimony; the other is what defense counsel and I have discussed. His position and his argument to the court will be that his cousin was the shooter and he was there with him, observed him with the gun as they got out of the car and would have approached the victim in this situation.
THE COURT: Are those facts — or may I accept those facts as true?
MR. BACKES: We would stipulate to that factual basis and those are the facts upon which Mr. Howell has indicated his guilt to me as well. Is that correct?
*405THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: So, Mr. Howell, you're not necessarily agreeing that you shot Mr. Pearson; that you are agreeing that you and your cousin went there and that you approached Mr. Pearson and by doing so you assisted your cousin in shooting him?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
(Emphasis added.) In this part of the colloquy, defense counsel twice stipulates to the facts, and the defendant agrees with him. The Assistant District Attorney set out Howell's own theory that he knew his cousin had a gun as they got out of the car, as an alternative to the theory that Howell was the shooter. Howell confirmed this theory in his personal allocution at sentencing.2
¶ 125. Howell pled "guilty" to the offense. He said he was making his decision to plead guilty voluntarily. His attorney said he was satisfied that Howell was entering his plea freely and intelligently.
IV
¶ 126. The majority concludes that Howell has made a successful Bangert motion to withdraw his plea. Under Bangert, a defendant may move to withdraw his plea when the procedures outlined in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 are not undertaken or other court-mandated duties at the plea hearing are not followed. State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, ¶ 46, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14. The burden rests upon the defendant to *406make a pointed showing that the plea was accepted without the court's conformity with the statute or other mandatory procedures. State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). When the defendant's motion shows a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) or (b) or other mandatory duties and alleges that he in fact did not know or understand the information that should have been provided at the plea hearing, the burden shifts to the State to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶ 46.
¶ 127. A pointed showing means pointing to errors or omissions in the record to show a defect. "To obtain an evidentiary hearing based upon defects in the plea colloquy, the defendant will rely on the plea hearing record." Id., ¶ 47. The defendant must point to a specific defect in the plea hearing transcript that constitutes an error by the court. Id., ¶ 57.
¶ 128. There are elements of the plea colloquy that always must be present, such as the waiver of enumerated constitutional rights. There are other elements that are employed as necessary. Id., ¶ 49. The omission of an explanation or inquiry from the colloquy is not a defect unless that explanation or inquiry was mandatory because of the facts.
¶ 129. Howell filed a motion to withdraw his plea on March 2, 2005. His motion consisted of 17 numbered paragraphs accompanied by an affidavit from his attorney. Only two of the paragraphs, ¶ 5 and ¶ 6, deal with alleged defects in the plea colloquy. Nothing in the accompanying affidavit identifies a defect in the plea colloquy. Paragraphs 5 and 6 read as follows:
5. The plea colloquy in this case was brief. The Court allowed the state to amend the information to *407add the "party to a crime" modifier. See Transcript of 7/12/04 at 2. The Court noted that the amendment was occurring because the state might be able to show that Mr. Howell "assisted people in putting the victim in a place where he could be shot by somebody else." Id. The Court ascertained that Mr. Howell understood that the information was being added and that he did not object. Id. at 3. The Court also informed Mr. Howell of the elements of reckless injury and that "the State would have to prove either that [he was] the person who did all those things or that [he] intentionally assisted someone else who was doing those things, knowing what they were doing." Id. at 5-6. None of these statements indicated whether simply failing to act to prevent the crime was sufficient assistance to be guilty as party to a crime.
6. Mr. Howell in fact did not understand the parameters of party-to-a-crime liability. He believed that he was guilty as party-to-a-crime simply for failure to stop the crime from occurring. See Affidavit at 2-3 ¶¶ 3g-3h. Moreover, the state at the plea hearing took the position that the two possibilities of Mr. Howell's involvement were either that he was the shooter or that, as was Mr. Howell's position, "his cousin was the shooter and he was there with him, observed him with the gun as they got out of the car and would have approached the victim in this situation." Transcript of 7/12/05 at 7. The state's statement reinforced Mr. Howell's belief that mere presence was sufficient.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 130. The critical passage in paragraph 5 is that "[n]one of these statements indicated whether simply failing to act to prevent the crime was sufficient assistance to be guilty as party to a crime." In effect, Howell claims that the court's failure to explain that being at the scene of a crime does not make a person a party to *408the crime, is a defect in the plea colloquy, a defect that was solely the judge's fault.
¶ 131. There is, in the jury instructions a statement that a court may use in certain cases: "[A] person does not aid or abet if (he) ... is only a bystander or spectator and does nothing to assist the commission of a crime." Wis JI — Criminal 400 EXAMPLE. The instructions make plain, however, that this sentence is to be read "if supported by the evidence." Id. (emphasis added). In this case, Judge Sankovitz had no reason to believe that Howell was claiming mere presence at the scene with no prior knowledge of what was going to happen to Pearson. Howell acknowledged as correct "putting the victim in a place where he could be shot." He acknowledged seeing a gun as he got out of a car. This evidence did not impose on Judge Sankovitz a duty to make inquiry or give explanation that would rule out purely innocent conduct.
¶ 132. One might argue that evidence outside the plea colloquy and after the plea colloquy created the basis for a claim of misunderstanding, but that would make Howell's motion a non -Bangert motion. See Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶ 61. Nothing in the record of the plea colloquy or the record before the plea colloquy compels or even suggests that the circuit court was required to make the inquiry the majority now demands. To hold that the failure to make such an inquiry was a Bangert violation is not justified by the facts and, as precedent, opens many otherwise sufficient plea colloquies to new attack.
¶ 133. The circuit court's discussion of the eviden-tiary basis for the offense is also not defective. First, there is a longstanding rule that when there is á negotiated plea, as in this case, the circuit court need not go to the same length to determine whether the *409facts would sustain the charge as it would when there is no negotiated plea. See State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶ 43 n.2, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 27, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996); Broadie v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 420, 423-24, 228 N.W.2d 687 (1975); Wilson v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 508, 513, 204 N.W.2d 508 (1973).
¶ 134. This case involved extensive negotiations and, despite unwavering testimony from the victim, the State allowed the defendant to enter a plea while disavowing that he was the shooter.
¶ 135. Second, the defendant could have pled "no contest" or entered an Alford plea, agreeing to accept a conviction while simultaneously maintaining his innocence. See Wis. Stat. § 971.06; North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). When he pled "guilty" with the full concurrence of his attorney, Howell admitted that all the factual elements necessary to sustain a judgment of guilt were true. See State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶ 30, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886. A defendant is not precluded from attacking the voluntary and intelligent character of his plea. However, when the basis of the attack is the abbreviated discussion of the facts during the colloquy, a reviewing court must allow reasonable inferences. "Where the trial court has concluded that the evidence did provide a sufficient factual basis to support the plea, this court will not upset these factual findings unless they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence." Broadie, 68 Wis. 2d at 423. When the court evaluates the transcript of the Howell plea colloquy to show that it lacks a factual basis for the plea, it is depending on allegations outside the record. A factual basis for acceptance of a plea exists if an inculpatory inference can reasonably be drawn from the facts, even if an exculpatory inference *410could also be drawn and the defendant asserts that the latter inference is the correct inference. State v. Spears, 147 Wis. 2d 429, 435, 433 N.W.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1988).
V
¶ 136. Howell's motion should be evaluated as a non-Bangert or Bentley-type motion (State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996)). When the court determines that Howell's motion is a successful Bangert motion, it produces serious short term and long term consequences.
¶ 137. In the short term, it shifts the burden of proof to the State. In the long term, it adds a new responsibility for circuit judges in plea colloquies; that is, it directs judges to anticipate and foreclose a defendant's theoretical defenses by asking questions that will rule out those defenses. This will require circuit judges to elicit more facts and more admissions from defendants which, in turn, will take additional time. Some defendants, especially defendants entering no contest pleas, may now be asked questions that they are unwilling to answer forthrightly, in public, on the record.
¶ 138. Bentley-type motions for plea withdrawal carry more stringent pleading requirements than Bangert-type motions. There are several reasons for this difference. First, Bentley-type motions usually depend on facts outside the record. To ask a circuit court to examine facts outside the record in an evidentiary hearing requires a particularized motion with sufficient supporting facts to warrant the undertaking. Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶ 61.
¶ 139. Second, Bentley-type motions do not shift the burden of proof. The defendant retains the burden of showing a manifest injustice by clear and convincing *411evidence. Id., ¶¶ 60, 63. Thus, the defendant is required to put his cards on the table by pleading specific details of what he will prove at the hearing and explaining how the proof will add up to manifest injustice. The pleading mirrors the defendant's ultimate burden of proof at the hearing.
¶ 140. Third, a Bentley-type motion has the capacity to cover a wide variety of reasons for claiming that the defendant's plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A Bentley-type motion may well claim that the judge made some error but not the type of error that the judge could have avoided by following the plea colloquy's established outline or script. The latter type of error is Bangert-type error. A judge who follows the plea colloquy script does not automatically have the means to "virtually eliminate" Bentley-type error. Id., ¶ 65.
¶ 141. If one applies this analysis to the present case, it becomes obvious that Howell's motion is a Bentley-type motion. The allegations of significance in Howell's motion are consistently based outside the record. For example, Howell's motion states: "3. On June 9, 2004, approximately a month prior to the plea in this case, Mr. Howell's cousin, Joseph Sharp came to court on the jury trial date and indicated that he was the person who shot the victim in this case." Howell points to the June 9, 2004, transcript (which is quoted earlier in this dissent and does not substantiate this allegation) and Attorney Henak's affidavit of what she believes Howell would testify. Howell allegedly told Attorney Henak that "Joseph Sharp came to court and confessed to Attorney Backes that he shot the victim."
¶ 142. The Howell motion continued:
4. After June 9,2004, trial counsel [Backes] and Mr. Howell discussed the case in light of the "party to a *412crime" addition. Based upon these conversations, Mr. Howell believed that he was guilty as party to a crime if he was there and did not prevent it. He believed that his failure to prevent the shooting was sufficient assistance in the case.
¶ 143. These are classic "outside the record" allegations. There is no record, much less the plea colloquy-record, that supports these allegations. They are textbook examples requiring Bentley analysis and Bentley procedure.
¶ 144. Even if one were to believe that these allegations were sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing, one should be reluctant to shift the burden of proof to the State. The State should not be required, on these facts, to straighten out Howell's many allegations to prove that Howell's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
¶ 145. In his motion, Howell is saying, in essence, that: (1) Joseph Sharp, his cousin, is the shooter; (2) his sister, Kimberly, who drove Sharp to the scene, may be a party to the crime; (3) Howell's only involvement was riding along in a car (knowing nothing about an imminent shooting); (4) his attorney led him to believe that failure to stop Sharp once Howell saw a gun made him guilty as party to a crime; (5) his attorney agreed to Howell's plea, even though that attorney had previously received Sharp's confession to the shooting; and (6) his attorney repeatedly misrepresented Howell's involvement in getting a gun for the shooting, in the attorney's argument to the sentencing court. Putting the burden on the State to sort out this soap opera is likely to require testimony from Howell's family members, who may assert constitutional rights against self-incrimination, and Howell's attorney, Michael Backes. Howell has not alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, *413but Howell's motion has overtones of ineffective assistance of counsel. Attorney Backes is in a position to clarify many factual issues raised by Howell's motion. However, in the absence of an explicit ineffective assistance of counsel claim and in view of this court's decision in State v. Meeks, 2003 WI 104, 263 Wis. 2d 794, 666 N.W.2d 859, the scope of Attorney Backes's testimony may be the subject of fierce dispute. If Howell's motion were properly assessed as a Bentley-type motion, Howell would maintain the burden of proof, and he would have to put his attorney and family members in the witness box.
VI
¶ 146. Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Jean W DiMotto denied Howell's motion in a prompt, incisive written opinion without an evidentiary hearing. Her ruling is reversed on grounds that Howell was automatically entitled to a hearing because he established Bangert violations.
¶ 147. In my view, Judge DiMotto's decision is sound and defensible. However, defending Judge DiMotto's decision raises a new set of issues of what a defendant must plead in a non -Bangert, Bentley-type motion to earn an evidentiary hearing, and what latitude a circuit judge has in reviewing the allegations in non-jBangert, Bentley-type motions.
¶ 148. In Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497-98, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972), the court stated:
[I]f a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after judgment and sentence alleges facts which, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing. However, if the defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his motion to raise a question *414of fact, or presents only conclusionary allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the trial court may in the exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion without a hearing. It is incumbent upon the trial court to form its independent judgment after a review of the record and pleadings and to support its decision by written opinion.
¶ 149. In Bentley the court employed all the language in the Nelson formulation, but it created a two-part test which necessitated a mixed standard of appellate review. See Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 309-10. The court said:
If the motion on its face alleges facts which would entitle the defendant to relief, the circuit court has no discretion and must hold an evidentiary hearing. Whether a motion alleges facts which, if true, would entitle a defendant to relief is a question of law that we review de novo.
Id. at 310 (citation omitted). The court also uncoupled the last sentence in the Nelson test ("It is incumbent upon the trial court to form its independent judgment after a review of the record") and appeared to limit the circuit court's review of the record to "the second prong" where it is permitted to exercise discretion. Id. at 310, 318-19.
¶ 150. Two years ago in State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶¶ 68-73, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62 (Prosser, J., dissenting), I tried to explain the internal inconsistency I perceived in the Bentley decision. The inconsistency is that the circuit court appears to be powerless to deny a requested evidentiary hearing when there is a properly pleaded motion, even though the circuit court has compelling evidence from the record that key allegations in the motion are not true.
*415¶ 151. To illustrate, suppose that a defendant enters a plea of guilty to shooting his brother in Milwaukee. The defendant's post-sentencing Bentley-type motion to withdraw this plea alleges in rich detail that Osama bin Laden shot his brother, and that bin Laden threatened to kill the defendant's mother if the defendant did not plead guilty to his brother's shooting. If this pleading contains "the five 'w's' and one 'h;' that is, who, what, where, when, why, and how," see State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶ 23, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433, the circuit court appears to have no discretion to rule: "Yes, Mr. Defendant, if your allegations were true, you would be entitled to a hearing, but based on the record I find that your allegations are not true."3
¶ 152. To its credit, the majority opinion corrects this festering problem. See majority op., ¶ 77 ("A well-pled complaint may be denied without an evidentiary hearing if the record as a whole conclusively demonstrates that relief is not warranted."). The third paragraph of footnote 51 of the majority opinion reads:
The Bentley court interpreted Nelson as follows: "If the motion on its face alleges facts which would entitle the defendant to relief, the circuit court has no discretion and must hold an evidentiary hearing." Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 310, citing Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 497 (empha*416sis added). In phrasing the Nelson test this way, Bentley might be interpreted to make an evidentiary hearing mandatory whenever the motion contains sufficient, nonconclusory facts, even if the record as a whole would demonstrate that the defendant's plea was constitutionally sound. Such an interpretation of Nelson snABentley, however, is not correct. The correct interpretation of Nelson/Bentley is that an evidentiary hearing is not mandatory if the record as a whole conclusively demonstrates that defendant is not entitled to relief, even if the motion alleges sufficient nonconclusory facts.
Majority op., ¶ 77 n. 51.
¶ 153. The majority's clarification of the Bentley opinion restores to the circuit court the ability "to form its independent judgment [on a Bentley plea withdrawal motion] after a review of the [entire] record and pleadings." Nelson, 54 Wis. 2d at 498. The problem here is that if the circuit court, once again, has the ability to review the entire record in evaluating a Bentley-type motion to withdraw a plea, there is ample evidence in this record to sustain Judge DiMotto's well written opinion.
VI
¶ 154. The majority opinion summarizes the facts:
On February 8, 2004, Marcus Pearson was shot twice while seated in his vehicle. The defendant, Andrae D. Howell, along with his sister Kimberly and his cousin Joseph Sharp, had allegedly driven to the scene to find another sister, April, who was dating Pearson. Pearson alleged that Howell exited his vehicle, brandished a rifle, and shot him.
The State charged Howell with first degree reckless injury .... On the date originally set for trial, Sharp *417allegedly admitted to Howell's trial counsel that Sharp, not Howell, shot the victim. Howell's trial counsel requested an adjournment allegedly in light of this information.
Majority op. ¶¶ 12-13. The underlined statements are supported by sworn testimony or documents from the record. The other statements are simply Howell’s version of the "facts." I believe it is a mistake to give credence to Joseph Sharp as the shooter of Marcus Pearson without any sworn evidence to support Howell's accusation.
¶ 155. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 156. I am authorized to state that Justices JON E.WILCOX and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this dissent.

 State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).

 Howell stated: "I did not get out of there knowing that he had a gun." (Emphasis added.)

 Howell's allegations that Joseph Sharp is the shooter, that Sharp confessed to Howell's attorney, and that Sharp was prepared to testify favorably at Howell's trial, carry the same indicia of reliability as the bin Laden hypothetical. There are no personal affidavits from Howell, or Sharp, or Kimberly, or Backes. There is no assertion that the State takes this stuff seriously and has prosecuted Sharp. There is no evidence that these allegations should be believed in the face of the defendant's statements at the plea colloquy and other material in the record.