Court Opinion

ID: 9403454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 13:04:36.785354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:07.192436
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
 Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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 official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                  Decided: June 21, 2023

                     S23A0338. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.

       PINSON, Justice.

       Reginald Demarcus Johnson was convicted of felony murder

and first-degree cruelty to children in connection with the death of

his six-month-old daughter, Jordan. 1 On appeal, Johnson contends

       1The crimes occurred in April 2016. Johnson was indicted by a DeKalb
County grand jury in May 2016 on one count each of malice murder, felony
murder, and cruelty to children in the first degree. After a jury trial held in
August 2016, Johnson was acquitted of the malice-murder charge but found
guilty of felony murder and first-degree child cruelty. Johnson was sentenced
to serve life in prison for felony murder; the child-cruelty count was merged
into the felony murder count for sentencing purposes. Prior to his sentencing,
Johnson filed a premature motion for new trial on October 3, 2016, which
ripened upon the entry of the final disposition on October 5, 2016. See Southall
v. State, 300 Ga. 462, 464-467 (1) (796 SE2d 261) (2017). Johnson amended his
motion for new trial through new counsel in August and December of 2020 and
January of 2021. The trial court held a hearing on the motion for new trial in
September 2021. Johnson filed a premature notice of appeal on November 29,
2021, which he withdrew on January 4, 2022. The trial court denied the motion
for new trial on August 15, 2022, and Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal
on August 30, 2022. The appeal was docketed to the term of this Court
beginning in December 2022 and was thereafter submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2)

the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence and strongly

against the weight of the evidence; (3) the trial court erred by

admitting certain photographs taken before and during the autopsy;

(4) the trial court erred by limiting the defense’s cross-examination

of Jordan’s mother; (5) the trial court erred by allowing certain

testimony by the medical examiner; (6) the trial court erred by

excluding testimony about the defense’s unsuccessful effort to

procure a witness; and (7) the trial court committed plain error by

failing to give a jury instruction on accident.

     Each of these claims fails. When viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdicts, the evidence at trial showed that Jordan

died from blunt force trauma to the head that was intentionally

inflicted within the twelve-hour period when she was in Johnson’s

sole care and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the

convictions as a matter of constitutional due process. And the jury

was authorized to find that the evidence, although circumstantial,

excluded every reasonable hypothesis other than that of Johnson’s

                                   2
guilt, so the evidence was also sufficient as a matter of Georgia

statutory law. The trial court’s refusal to grant a new trial on the

“general grounds” is not subject to this Court’s review, so that claim

fails. The autopsy photographs, used by the medical examiner to

help explain his conclusions about Jordan’s injuries, were probative

as to both the timing and the manner of injury, and the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the danger of unfair

prejudice from their admission did not substantially outweigh their

probative value. And even if the single “pre-autopsy” photograph

should not have been admitted, it is highly probable that this

photograph—which was far less graphic than the properly admitted

autopsy photographs—did not contribute to the verdicts. Finally,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the defense

from cross-examining Jordan’s mother on a topic not relevant to

Johnson’s guilt or innocence; did not plainly err in allowing certain

testimony by the medical examiner on a subject which his

experience qualified him to speak on; did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to allow testimony about the defense’s effort to procure a

                                  3
witness, when it had failed to avail itself of the statutory material

witness subpoena procedure; and did not plainly err in failing to give

a jury instruction on accident because this theory was at odds with

not only Johnson’s primary defense but also the overwhelming

weight of the evidence. We therefore affirm Johnson’s convictions

and sentence.

      1. The evidence at trial showed as follows.2

      (a) At 6:40 a.m. on April 4, 2016, emergency responders were

dispatched to a DeKalb County home after Johnson made a 911 call

to   report    that   his    six-month-old     daughter,     Jordan,     was

unresponsive. One of the paramedics who responded testified that

she could tell Jordan had suffered a brain injury, based on her

unequally dilated pupils and the swelling and bruising on her right

temple. She said that Johnson at the time seemed a little nervous

      2Our resolution of two of Johnson’s claims requires an assessment of the
harm of presumed or actual trial errors. To undertake that assessment, we
must “review the record de novo, and we weigh the evidence as we would expect
reasonable jurors to have done.” Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 264 (1) n.2 (882
SE2d 227) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). In light of that standard
of review, we recount the evidence here through that lens rather than
recounting it in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.
                                      4
but not distraught. She also said that Johnson told her that Jordan’s

twin brother sometimes “head-butted” her, but she did not believe

Jordan’s injuries could have happened that way.

     Another of the emergency responders testified that Johnson’s

demeanor “wasn’t like a frantic parent would be.” That witness

testified that Johnson told her that he woke up in the night and saw

Jordan’s twin “laying on top of her suffocating her.” When she told

Johnson his story was “not adding up” and that Jordan could not

have sustained her injuries that way, Johnson suggested that

“maybe it was when [she] rolled off the bed.” He denied dropping her

by accident or hitting her, then “got quiet” and suggested that

“maybe the other child did it.”

     The pediatric emergency physician who treated Jordan at the

hospital testified that Jordan’s CT scan showed fractures on both

sides of her skull and bleeding in the brain. Those injuries, he

opined, could not have been caused by another six-month-old in the

ways Johnson suggested and would have had to have resulted from

“major trauma” such as a car accident without seatbelts, getting hit

                                  5
or kicked with great force, or falling from a “great height.” In

addition, the effects of the head trauma would have been noticeable

within minutes to an hour of the trauma, such that Jordan would

not have engaged in normal movement or made normal noises.

     A hospital social worker who spoke with Johnson testified that

Jordan’s injuries were “completely inconsistent” with Johnson’s

story and that, based on the severity of the injury and the absence

of any obvious explanation for it, she suspected child abuse and

determined that law enforcement needed to be contacted.

     (b) Jordan’s mother, Ciara Cole, testified about the chronology

of events on April 3 and 4. At the time, she and the twins were living

at her mother’s home, and Johnson, who had lived with them at one

time, was living with his aunt, Sallie White. On April 3, Cole and

the twins were at her mother’s home until about 2:30 p.m., when she

left for a short time to pick Johnson up from work. When they

returned, they were arguing. While she took a shower, Johnson took

the twins, left the house, and walked to a nearby restaurant. She

tracked them down and drove there, and they all left together to go

                                  6
to Johnson’s grandmother’s house. Johnson’s father, who was at the

house, took Jordan in the house for about five minutes; at that time,

Jordan seemed “normal.” After a short time, Cole took Johnson and

the twins to White’s home, where they were to stay that night. She

dropped them off, went back to her mother’s home, and later went

out with friends. Throughout the night and into the morning, Cole

exchanged texts with Johnson, checking on the twins. Johnson never

indicated there was anything unusual, until he called early on the

morning of April 4 to tell her Jordan was unresponsive. Ultimately,

on April 7, once the extent of Jordan’s injuries was known, the

decision was made to take her off life support.

     Cole testified that she had suffered from depression after the

twins were born. She also admitted that, after Jordan died, she

began using cocaine and had been arrested for cocaine possession

and theft by shoplifting, and that such charges were still pending at

the time of trial. Cole said she had been offered no deal in exchange

for her testimony here. In addition, Cole admitted that her other

children “live with other people right now,” although she visits with

                                  7
them.

     Cole’s mother, Robbie Johnson, testified that on April 3, Cole

and the twins were at her home until the mid-afternoon; that she

had awakened around lunchtime that day and nothing was unusual;

that Cole and Johnson were arguing after Cole picked him up from

work; and that Jordan was fine. She also testified that after Jordan’s

death, Cole had a “nervous breakdown” and started using cocaine.

     (c) Dr. Stephen Messner, the chair of the hospital’s child abuse

pediatrics department, and Peggy Woodard, a social worker with the

Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS) who was called

in to assess Jordan’s case, both testified about the hospital’s

investigation. Woodard, together with a hospital fellow working

under Dr. Messner’s supervision, interviewed Johnson at the

hospital. Johnson told Woodard he did not know what had caused

Jordan’s injury, but guessed that her twin brother had kicked her.

He said that Jordan had been acting normally on April 3 but that

she had not taken much of her bottle. He said he was alone with the

twins from around 6:30 until around 9:30 that evening, when his

                                  8
aunt got home. His aunt saw the twins and all was fine. Johnson

said that the twins slept with him in a queen-sized bed and that they

went to sleep around 10:00 p.m. A few hours later, Jordan awoke,

crying, and he noticed her brother was kicking her. He shifted his

son and calmed Jordan, and they went back to sleep. Johnson woke

up again around 5:00 a.m. and noticed that his son was situated with

his “torso laying on [Jordan].” He moved his son and picked up

Jordan, who he realized was unresponsive. So he “shook her lightly”

and tried to rouse her with some water; when that didn’t work, he

went to his aunt, who told him to call 911. Woodard described

Johnson’s demeanor as “calm,” “cooperative,” and “relaxed,” in

contrast to Cole, who was “visibly upset.” Johnson said that April 3

was the second time he had had the twins with him overnight by

himself. Although Johnson would later claim he accidentally hit

Jordan’s head against the bed’s headboard before they all went to

sleep that night, Johnson made no mention of this in his interview

with Woodard.

     Dr. Messner, who was qualified as an expert in child abuse

                                 9
pediatrics, testified that Jordan’s CT scans showed fractures on the

back and both sides of her skull. Based on their length, and the fact

that they were “depressed” and exhibited “branching,” Dr. Messner

opined that they must have been caused by “significant force.”

Subdural hemorrhages were indicative of trauma characterized by

rapid twisting or rotating. These injuries, he opined, could not have

been caused by a fall. And nothing that was reported in Jordan’s

history—getting kicked or rolled on by her brother, light shaking, or

a minor bump against a headboard—could have caused the injuries.

He opined that Jordan would have shown signs of distress

immediately or within moments of sustaining her injuries. In his

opinion, her injuries were consistent with physical abuse.

     (d) In an interview at the hospital with a DeKalb County police

detective, Johnson maintained that he did not know what had

happened and that Jordan had been fine the night before, other than

refusing to take her bottle. And again he mentioned that Jordan’s

brother was lying on his sister’s head at one point and suggested

that perhaps he had kicked or head-butted her during the night. He

                                 10
did not mention anything about accidentally hitting Jordan’s head

against the headboard.

     The lead detective in the case, Gregory Moore, testified that,

after Jordan’s death, he tried to contact Johnson on April 7 and 8

but could not reach him, and Johnson failed to return the calls. After

another unsuccessful try on April 9, Detective Moore obtained an

arrest warrant. Johnson was ultimately arrested on April 10 when

he appeared in court in an unrelated DFCS proceeding—at which he

appeared only after initially failing to show up and being called in

by a DFCS case-worker.

     Following Johnson’s arrest, Detective Moore interviewed

Johnson, an audio recording of which was played for the jury.

Johnson continued to insist that he had done nothing to hurt Jordan,

that he “wasn’t rough with” the twins, that Jordan was “fine,” and

that he did not know what had happened to her. He denied he had

ever “put hands on” his kids or any of his romantic partners. He said

he “wasn’t even angry that night.” And he said no accident had

happened. He then suggested that “maybe [he] fell asleep and rolled

                                 11
over on her.” After a break in the interview, Johnson began with, “I

didn’t think this was an issue because she didn’t cry, but . . .” He

went on to explain that at one point in the evening before they went

to sleep, he was on the bed with Jordan on his chest when he noticed

that her brother had spit up, causing him to react by jumping up

and accidentally hitting Jordan’s head against the headboard. He

said she did not cry, so he laid her on the bed so he could clean up

his son. He said he “really forgot” that this had happened, and that

“that’s the only thing that happened.” Detective Moore said Johnson

showed little emotion during the interview. Johnson also gave a

written statement that tracked what he said in the interview,

including the part about the headboard.

     (e) The medical examiner who performed Jordan’s autopsy, Dr.

Gerald Thomas Gowitt, testified that Jordan had significant head

trauma but few external injuries, which was not unusual in a case

of child abuse. Examination of Jordan’s head revealed substantial

hemorrhaging and bruising and multiple skull fractures, including

a 10-inch fracture running from one side to the other and additional

                                12
fractures on each side with “tributaries” branching off. The fracture

patterns indicated multiple impacts of “considerable force” and were

not characteristic of a simple fall; the only possible accidental cause

of such injuries would be a car crash or a fall from a great height.

There was no evidence that any of these injuries had begun to heal.

In addition to the brain injuries, there was retinal hemorrhaging in

both eyes, the characteristics of which were “highly suggestive of

acceleration and deceleration of the head at high speed.”

     Dr. Gowitt also testified that once a fatal head injury is

inflicted, the symptoms appear almost immediately and are obvious,

even to a layperson. So too, he said, for the retinal hemorrhaging;

after an injury of that type, a child likely would be unconscious and

would not be smiling, cooing, or otherwise responding. Because of

the lack of external injuries, Dr. Gowitt opined that it was likely that

Jordan had been slammed into something hard, smooth, and broad,

and that an adult male would be capable of creating enough force to

cause those injuries. According to Dr. Gowitt, six-month-olds have

the same sensory nerves as adults, so they have the same ability to

                                  13
feel pain.

     Dr.     Gowitt   concluded   that   the   cause   of   death   was

craniocerebral trauma and the manner of death was homicide.

     (f) Johnson’s counsel cross-examined the State’s medical

experts about the concept of a “lucid interval,” which can occur after

a person has suffered head trauma. As these experts testified, head

trauma victims typically experience confusion, loss of consciousness,

or other symptoms immediately after sustaining the injury, but that

initial period is sometimes followed by a “lucid interval” during

which the victim appears “asymptomatic,” before symptoms

reappear. The emergency physician, while agreeing on cross that he

could not “rule . . . out medically” the theory that Jordan had

experienced a lucid interval, testified on redirect that “you don’t

suffer this degree of trauma . . . and then have a lucid period.” Dr.

Messner testified that the “vast majority” of lucid intervals occur

when the patient is experiencing epidural bleeding rather than—as

                                  14
Jordan experienced—subdural bleeding. 3 And Dr. Gowitt opined

that Jordan’s injuries were not those with which he might expect to

see a lucid interval.

     Johnson’s counsel also unsuccessfully sought, in cross-

examining Cole and Cole’s mother, to elicit that Cole’s sister and

brother had been present during the day on April 3 when she and

the twins had been at her mother’s home. Johnson’s counsel did,

however, elicit from Woodard that her notes indicated Cole had told

her that her brother and sister had been playing with Jordan at

their mother’s home on April 3.

     (g) After the State rested, the defense called its own expert

forensic pathologist, Dr. Janice Ophoven, who concluded that

Jordan had died from blunt force trauma to the head, “consistent

with a single impact,” and opined that Jordan could have

experienced one or more lucid intervals during which her body was

     3  Dr. Gowitt explained that between the inside of the skull and the
outside surface of the brain there are two “spaces”: the “epidural” space and
the “subdural” space, which lies between the epidural space and the brain
itself.
                                     15
“compensating” after sustaining the initial injury. She described the

skull fracture as an “eggshell fracture,” “characteristic of babies of

less than a year because of their deformable skull,” and opined that

the injury had been inflicted sometime within the 24-hour period

before she became unresponsive, the complications from which had,

“over time,” led to brain swelling and death. Dr. Ophoven opined

that the retinal hemorrhages could have been caused by medical

intervention and thus were not necessarily indicative of any

particular mode of injury. She also opined that the fact that Jordan’s

twin was found lying on top of her could have affected her injury,

and that Jordan’s mother’s depression and substance abuse were

“red flags.”

     Johnson himself testified, maintaining that he had done

nothing to cause his daughter’s death or any pain and described

himself as having a loving, kind, and peaceful nature. He said he

had concerns about Cole’s depression and had on a prior occasion

reported those concerns to a DFCS worker in connection with a

hospital visit for Jordan’s twin brother. He recounted Cole’s

                                 16
chronology of April 3 from the time Cole picked him up until she

dropped him and the twins off at his aunt’s home. He said that, after

arriving at his aunt’s, he played with the twins, watched TV with

them, gave them their bottles—although Jordan did not take hers—

and then put them to bed. He said Jordan seemed fine that afternoon

and evening, aside from refusing her bottle and having a runny nose.

He recounted the headboard incident, waking up in the night to find

Jordan’s brother kicking her, and later waking up to find him lying

on top of her, with Jordan unresponsive.

     When asked why he had failed to mention the headboard

incident until his interview with the detectives, Johnson replied that

he “honestly just forgot about it.” And when asked about the calls

from Detective Moore he never returned, he explained that he

“didn’t pay attention” to his phone during that time because he was

“grieving,” and said he had already given a statement to the

detective at the hospital. As to why he had not initially appeared at

the DFCS proceeding on April 10, he said his family had told him he

did not need to be there.

                                 17
     Johnson admitted that he had been convicted of domestic

violence in Tennessee in connection with a fight with his ex-wife’s

cousin, which left the cousin bloodied and momentarily unconscious.

He admitted on cross-examination that he told police at the time

that he had “snapped.” Johnson also admitted that, on one occasion,

an argument with Cole had become “physical” and he had given her

a black eye. In addition, he admitted that he had been previously

convicted of obstruction and giving a false name and that in this case

he had violated the condition of his bond that required him not to

contact any witnesses.

     The defense also presented Johnson’s aunt, Sallie White, who

testified that she did not notice anything amiss with Jordan on the

evening of April 3 and did not hear any commotion or unusual noises

during that night. Johnson’s father also testified, noting that on the

afternoon of April 3 he noticed that Jordan was “not responding” to

him but figured she was just sleepy. Various character witnesses,

including family, friends, and Johnson’s ex-wife, also testified,

describing Johnson as loving, kind, and a good father.

                                 18
      2. Johnson contends that the evidence was insufficient, both

as a matter of constitutional due process and as a matter of Georgia

statutory law, to support his convictions.

     (a)   When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, the evidence

presented at trial is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts

to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the crimes of

which he was convicted. See Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 598 (2) (820

SE2d 696) (2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III)

(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). In making this

determination, we do not evaluate witness credibility, resolve

inconsistencies in the evidence, or assess the weight of the evidence;

these tasks are left to the sole discretion of the jury. See Walker v.

State, 296 Ga. 161, 163 (1) (766 SE2d 28) (2014). The jury’s verdicts

will be upheld as long as some competent evidence, even if

contradicted, supports each fact necessary to make out the State’s

case. See Jones, 304 Ga. at 598 (2).

                                  19
     Here, the evidence viewed most favorably to the verdicts

showed that Jordan suffered non-accidental blunt force injuries

during a time when Johnson was the only person present and

capable of inflicting such injuries. The jury was authorized to not

believe Johnson’s story, and to credit the medical experts’ testimony

that Jordan’s injuries would have been apparent within a short time

after their infliction, and that the theory that Jordan had

experienced a “lucid interval” during the afternoon of April 3 was

unsound. And the jury was authorized to find that Jordan had

experienced cruel and excessive pain from the injuries she

sustained. See Moore v. State, 283 Ga. 151, 153 (1) (656 SE2d 796)

(2008) (noting that “evidence of a child’s age, the extent of injuries,

the nature of the assault to which the child was subjected, and the

force with which the child was struck is sufficient evidence from

which the jury can conclude whether the defendant caused the child

cruel or excessive physical pain”). Therefore, the evidence was

sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support

Johnson’s convictions for felony murder and cruelty to children in

                                  20
the first degree. See id. (affirming convictions for felony murder and

first-degree cruelty to children).

       (b) A conviction on circumstantial evidence is authorized if the

proved facts “exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of

the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. “Not every hypothesis is

a ‘reasonable’ one, and the evidence need not exclude every

conceivable inference or hypothesis, only the reasonable ones.”

Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 23-24 (2) (880 SE2d 158) (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted). Whether an alternative hypothesis is

reasonable and whether the evidence excludes any such hypotheses

are questions for the jury, whose findings on those questions must

stand unless they are “insupportable as a matter of law.” Id. at 24

(2).

       Here, the evidence authorized the jury to reject as

unreasonable the alternative hypothesis that someone other than

Johnson—i.e., Cole or Cole’s mother, sister, or brother—caused

Jordan’s fatal injuries at some point before Johnson assumed her

care. There was no evidence that Jordan was exhibiting any signs of

                                     21
trauma or distress until Johnson called 911, and three medical

experts opined that Jordan’s symptoms would have begun to

manifest immediately or shortly after the trauma—and that a lucid

interval was improbable given the nature of her injuries. Johnson

contends that the evidence shows Jordan’s injuries could just as

likely have been the result of an accident as opposed to an

intentional act, but the jury was well within its authority to reject

that theory as unreasonable. We thus have no basis for disturbing

the jury’s findings. See Willis, 315 Ga. 25 (2).

     3. Johnson next contends that the verdict and judgment are

“decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence.”

     “Even when the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a

conviction, a trial judge may grant a new trial if the verdict of the

jury is ‘contrary to . . . the principles of justice and equity,’ OCGA §

5-5-20, or if the verdict is ‘decidedly and strongly against the weight

of the evidence.’ OCGA § 5-5-21.” Drennon v. State, 314 Ga. 854, 860

(2) (880 SE2d 139) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). When

these so-called “general grounds” are properly raised in a timely

                                  22
motion for new trial, the trial judge must “exercise a broad discretion

to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

This role requires the judge to consider matters typically reserved

to the jury, including conflicts in the evidence, witness credibility,

and the weight of the evidence. See id.

     As is plain from the order denying Johnson’s motion for new

trial, the trial court performed its role as the thirteenth juror. In its

order, the court noted that, after considering “[the] conflicts in the

evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the

evidence,” “[t]he Court, in an exercise of discretion finds that the

verdict was neither ‘contrary to evidence and the principles of justice

and equity’ . . . nor ‘decidedly and strongly against the weight of the

evidence[.]’” The trial court’s decision in this regard is not subject to

our review—this Court “does not sit as an arbiter of the general

grounds, which are solely within the discretion of the trial court.”

Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 456 (3) (883 SE2d 357) (2023) (citation

                                   23
and punctuation omitted).4 So this claim fails.

      4. Johnson contends that the trial court erred by admitting into

evidence certain photographs from before and during Jordan’s

autopsy. Before trial, Johnson moved to exclude the photographs,

arguing that they were not relevant and were gruesome and unduly

prejudicial under OCGA § 24-4-403. The trial court disagreed and

admitted the photographs, over Johnson’s objection, when they were

tendered at trial.

      (a) Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. Relevant evidence is generally

admissible, see OCGA § 24-4-402, but such evidence “may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

      4Because we have already rejected Johnson’s claim that the evidence
was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process under Jackson v.
Virginia, we need not consider whether it would be proper to analyze Johnson’s
general-grounds claim by reference to the Jackson constitutional sufficiency
standard. See King v. State, No. S23A0214, slip op. at * __ (2) n.8 (decided June
21, 2023) (noting this Court’s past practice of analyzing general-grounds claims
by performing or referencing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence review under
Jackson but declining to determine the propriety of that practice).
                                       24
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the

jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-403. That said,

“the exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an

extraordinary remedy that should be used only sparingly.” Albury v.

State, 314 Ga. 459, 461 (3) (877 SE2d 548) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Decisions whether to admit evidence under

these rules are “committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”

Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

     (b) Five of the six contested photographs were taken during the

autopsy. Two of those photographs depicted, from different angles,

Jordan’s head with the scalp peeled back to show the hemorrhaging

beneath the scalp. Three others showed the various fractures on

Jordan’s skull. At the pretrial hearing, the State told the trial court

that Dr. Gowitt had specifically selected those photographs for use

during his testimony. During trial, Dr. Gowitt referred to these

photographs while describing the hemorrhaging and bruising

underneath Jordan’s scalp and the multiple fractures, some

                                  25
affecting more than one bone within the skull—all of which, Dr.

Gowitt testified, indicated multiple impacts sustained from a non-

accidental cause, the effects of which would have been apparent

immediately or within a very short period of time.

     The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these

five photographs. Autopsy photographs may be relevant to show the

nature or extent of a victim’s injuries. See Albury, 314 Ga. at 462 (3);

Lanier v. State, 310 Ga. 520, 527-528 (4) (852 SE2d 509) (2020).

These photographs, which assisted the medical examiner in

describing the nature and severity of Jordan’s injuries, were highly

relevant to the issues of both how and when the injuries were

sustained. Because both the timing of the injuries and the manner

of their infliction were contested issues in the case, the photographs’

probative value was high. See Albury, 314 Ga. at 462 (3) (autopsy

photograph had “significant probative value” in supporting State’s

theory of how injuries were inflicted); Lanier, 310 Ga. at 527-528 (4)

(autopsy photographs admissible where they “corroborated the

State’s evidence of the circumstances of the killings”). And although

                                  26
the photographs may have been graphic, we cannot say the trial

court abused its discretion in concluding that their probative value

was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

See Albury, 314 Ga. at 462 (3) (although photograph of victim’s head

with scalp and face peeled back may have been “gruesome,” trial

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it because of its

probative value).

     (c) The remaining photograph was taken before the autopsy.

This photo showed Jordan as she arrived from the hospital, with

various tubes, wires, and a neck collar still attached to her body. The

defense argued that the photo was inflammatory because of all the

“apparatuses”    on Jordan;     the State    argued that     was    its

“identification” photo, as it had the medical examiner’s case number

on it, and it was being used to establish that the subject of the

autopsy was in fact the victim. After looking through various full

body pictures of the victim, the court ruled that the photograph at

issue could be used “as an ID shot.”

     The relevance of the pre-autopsy photograph is questionable

                                  27
given that the victim’s identity was not contested and the fact that,

unlike the other autopsy photos, it was of little relevance to the

victim’s injuries, which were largely internal. Cf. Perez v. State, 309

Ga. 687, 695 (3) (848 SE2d 395) (2020) (pre-autopsy photos were

properly admitted because they showed the nature and location of

victim’s wounds and thus were probative of “how the killing

occurred”). But we need not decide whether admitting the

photograph was error, because even assuming it was, the error was

harmless.

     “Erroneous evidentiary rulings are subject to a harmless-error

test.” Jones v. State, 315 Ga. 117, 122 (4) (880 SE2d 509) (2022). A

nonconstitutional error is harmless if it is “highly probable that the

error did not contribute to the verdict.” Id. (citation and punctuation

omitted). The burden to make this showing is the State’s to bear,

and in determining whether the showing has been made, we review

the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect

reasonable jurors to have weighed it. Id. (citation and punctuation

omitted). Here, the single pre-autopsy photograph was not nearly as

                                  28
graphic as the five properly admitted autopsy photographs, and the

evidence that Jordan’s injuries were inflicted on purpose, during a

period in which Jordan was under the supervision of Johnson alone,

was strong. Under these circumstances, it is highly probable that

any error in admitting this single pre-autopsy photograph did not

contribute to the verdicts. See Jenkins v. State, 270 Ga. 607, 609 (3)

(512 SE2d 269) (1999) (even assuming admission of pre-autopsy

photos was error, error was harmless in light of overwhelming

evidence of defendant’s guilt).

     5. Johnson next contends that the trial court “erred and

violated the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation” by limiting

the defense’s cross-examination of Cole on certain topics.

     Both the United States and Georgia Constitutions guarantee

to an accused the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses

against him. See U.S. Const. amend VI; Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I,

Sec. I, Par. XIV. See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (2) (94

SCt 1105, 39 LE2d 347) (1974); Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 856 (7)

(472 SE2d 74) (1996). To that end, our Evidence Code affords

                                  29
criminal defendants “the right of a thorough and sifting cross-

examination . . . as to the witnesses called against [them].” OCGA §

24-6-611 (b). But “the right of cross-examination is not an absolute

right that mandates unlimited questioning by the defense.” Howard

v. State, 286 Ga. 222, 225 (2) (686 SE2d 764) (2009) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Trial courts have “wide latitude to impose

reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about,

among other things, interrogation that is only marginally relevant.”

Lucas v. State, 303 Ga. 134, 137 (2) (810 SE2d 491) (2018) (citation

and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 24-6-611 (b) (providing

that scope of cross-examination extends to “any matter relevant to

any issue in the proceeding”). Trial courts also have discretion to

limit witness interrogation to “[p]rotect witnesses from harassment

or undue embarrassment.” OCGA § 24-6-611 (a) (3). We review a

trial court’s limitation on the scope of cross-examination for abuse of

discretion. See Lucas, 303 Ga. at 136-137 (2).

     Here, Johnson contends that the trial court unduly limited his

right to confront Cole on three topics: (1) her purported dishonesty

                                  30
about the paternity of the twins’ half-brother; (2) the fact that she

had lost custody of that child as well as Jordan’s twin; and (3) Cole’s

postpartum depression. Johnson contends broadly that, because

Cole was a “likely suspect” in Jordan’s death, he had the right to

“impeach” her on all of these subjects.

     Johnson’s counsel cross-examined Cole at length on a variety

of topics, including her relationship with Johnson, her chronology of

the events of April 3 and 4, whether her brother and sister were

present at her mother’s home on April 3, and her statements to

Woodard and to law enforcement on April 4. Johnson’s counsel also

cross-examined Cole on her drug and alcohol abuse, her pending

felony charges, her depression, and the fact that she had lost custody

of Jordan’s twin and their older half-brother. So Johnson was

afforded a “thorough and sifting” cross-examination of Cole as a

general matter. And as to the specific topics of Cole’s depression and

her loss of custody, the trial court allowed Johnson to question Cole

about both. The only limitation the court imposed on these topics

was on questioning, related to the hospital visit during which

                                  31
Johnson reported his concerns about Cole’s depression, which could

have created a false impression about the cause of the hospital visit.5

This limitation was well within the trial court’s discretion. See

Lucas, 303 Ga. at 138-139 (2).

      The trial court also prohibited Johnson’s counsel from

questioning Cole about her purported dishonesty about the

paternity of the twins’ half-brother. But although Johnson correctly

notes that “[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any

party,” OCGA § 24-6-607, a defendant does not have carte blanche

to question a witness on issues of marginal relevance that are

intended primarily to impugn the witness’s character or motives.

See Lucas, 303 Ga. at 138-139 (2) (trial court did not abuse

discretion by prohibiting cross-examination of prosecution witness

on his immigration status); Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 795-796 (4)

(733 SE2d 715) (2012) (trial court did not abuse discretion by

      5 The trial court sought to prevent questioning that might have falsely
implied that the trip to the hospital resulted from Jordan’s twin brother’s fall
from a chair while unattended, when the actual reason for the trip was his
severe constipation.
                                      32
prohibiting cross-examination of prosecution’s medical expert about

a   purported   “understanding     among     some   Georgia    medical

examiners that one will not testify ‘against’ the findings of another”).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting Johnson

from probing into Cole’s purported dishonesty about the paternity of

her twins’ half-brother. See Lucas, 303 Ga. at 138-139 (2).

     Johnson’s claim that he was improperly limited in his ability

to cross-examine Cole therefore fails.

     6. Johnson contends that the trial court erred in allowing the

medical examiner to testify about confessions in child-abuse cases,

because that subject was outside the field in which he was qualified

as an expert. Dr. Gowitt testified on direct examination that he had

been involved with at least 200 cases involving fatally abused

children, and that he had done consulting work for defendants in 40

to 50 such cases. He testified that in “about half” of the cases, the

defendant had confessed to the abuse; that “perpetrator confessions

are something that we read frequently” when doing defense work;

and that he was familiar with “many articles” in the “pediatric

                                  33
forensic literature” on confessions by perpetrators of fatal child

abuse. Dr. Gowitt testified that, based on his experience and

knowledge of the literature, the “majority” of those who confessed

“admit that they lost their temper.” At this point, defense counsel

objected based on relevance, but the court overruled the objection.

     Johnson now claims that the court erred in admitting this

testimony because it was outside the scope of forensic pathology.6

But because Johnson did not object on this basis at trial, we review

this claim only for plain error. See Mann v. State, 307 Ga. 696, 704

(2) (e) (838 SE2d 305) (2020). “To show plain error, an appellant

must show that (1) the alleged error was not affirmatively waived,

(2) it was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, and (3) it affected the

appellant’s substantial rights, which ordinarily means showing that

it affected the outcome of the trial.” Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 272-

273 (4) (882 SE2d 227) (2022).

     6  Johnson also asserts that he had no pretrial notice that Dr. Gowitt’s
testimony would exceed the scope of his expert qualifications. But because we
conclude below that the testimony was within the scope of Dr. Gowitt’s
qualifications, no such notice was required.
                                     34
     Given Dr. Gowitt’s direct experience with confessions in child-

abuse cases and his knowledge of the medical literature on the topic,

we see no obvious error in the trial court’s allowing him to testify on

this subject. See Wellborn v. State, 258 Ga. 570, 572 (2) (372 SE2d

220) (1988) (no error in allowing expert to testify on a subject that

“was within the scope of his field according to his testimony”). And

whether or not allowing this testimony was obvious error, Johnson

has not shown how allowing the testimony, which fills scarcely two

of the almost 100 transcript pages of Dr. Gowitt’s testimony, affected

Johnson’s substantial rights. This claim is without merit.

     7. Johnson contends that the trial court erred in excluding

testimony from a private investigator about his unsuccessful efforts

on behalf of the defense to locate and serve a subpoena on the

medical fellow who had assisted in the hospital’s investigation into

possible child abuse.

     Before trial, the defense apparently had tried to locate the

medical fellow who had helped conduct interviews with Jordan’s

family members and had written a report with conclusions, which

                                  35
Dr. Messner reviewed and approved. According to the defense, the

medical fellow was no longer employed with the hospital, and they

could not find her. Noting that both Dr. Messner and Woodard had

referred to “the information [the fellow] would have in this case,” the

defense argued that it needed to “demonstrate to the jury that we

did make attempts to track her down because we wanted to know

what she had to say.” The State objected, noting among other things

that the defense had failed to ask for a material-witness subpoena

for this witness, see OCGA § 17-7-191 (setting out a process by which

a criminal defendant may apply to “obtain subpoenas for such

witnesses as he deems material for his defense”), and that there was

no evidence she had been intentionally evading a subpoena. The

trial court excluded the testimony but noted that the defense would

be allowed to comment on the State’s failure to present the medical

fellow as a witness.

     Johnson now claims that the exclusion of this evidence violated

his due process rights, but in support of this argument he cites only

                                  36
two provisions of the Evidence Code that plainly do not apply. 7

Particularly given the defense’s failure to avail itself of the statutory

process for securing the attendance of material witnesses, see id., we

see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to allow

testimony on this ancillary topic.

      8. Lastly, Johnson contends that the trial court committed

plain error by failing to give a jury instruction on accident. See

OCGA § 16-2-2 (“A person shall not be found guilty of any crime

committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears

there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal

negligence.”).

      In his written requests to charge, Johnson asked for an

instruction on the affirmative defense of accident. At the charge

conference, defense counsel argued that “our defense is that we don’t

know what happened. There’s not enough evidence to rule out.

      7 Johnson cites OCGA §§ 24-8-804 (a) (5) (providing that a hearsay
declarant is “unavailable as a witness” if he is absent from the hearing and the
proponent of his statement “has been unable to procure [his] attendance”) and
§ 24-9-923 (regarding authentication of recordings and like evidence), neither
of which would have offered a basis for the private investigator’s testimony.
                                      37
There’s certainly not enough to prove—to prove an intentional act.

And we think that there’s not enough evidence to rule out accident.”

But the trial court noted that binding precedent required the

defendant to admit to committing the act that caused the victim’s

death and thus ruled the instruction would not be given. Johnson’s

counsel relented and said, “OK. No objection.” Johnson now

contends that the failure to instruct the jury on accident was plain

error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (where a party fails to object to the

omission of a jury charge, such omission may be reviewed only for

plain error).

     The court’s refusal to give an accident instruction was

consistent with the law in effect at the time of trial, which held that

the accident defense “generally requires an admission by the

defendant that [he] committed the act that caused the victim’s

death.” Kellam v. State, 298 Ga. 520, 522 (2) (783 SE2d 117) (2016)

(citation and punctuation omitted). But when we review jury

instructions for plain error, we look to the law in effect at the time

of our review. See Lyman v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 317 (2) (800 SE2d

                                  38
333) (2017) (in the review of asserted plain error under OCGA § 17-

8-58 (b), “whether an error is “clear or obvious” is judged at the time

of the appellate court’s review). And current law is clear that “[a]

criminal defendant is not required to ‘admit’ anything, in the sense

of acknowledging that any particular facts are true, in order to raise

an affirmative defense.” McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 857 (834

SE2d 96) (2019). So the reason the trial court gave for refusing to

instruct on accident is not correct under current law. And because

Johnson’s testimony about the headboard incident offered some

evidence—albeit slight—from which the jury might have found that

Jordan’s injuries resulted from an accident, we must conclude that

the failure to give an accident instruction was an error that is

“obvious beyond reasonable dispute.” Moore, 315 Ga. at 272 (4). See

Sullivan v. State, 308 Ga. 772, 778-779 (2) (843 SE2d 411) (2020) (to

warrant the giving of a requested jury charge, the evidence

supporting the theory of the charge need only be “slight”).

     Nonetheless, this error was unlikely to have “affected the

outcome of the trial.” Moore, 315 Ga. at 273 (4). Johnson’s primary

                                  39
theory at trial was not that Jordan’s injuries resulted from an

accident, but that someone else—most likely Cole but possibly

anyone else who had contact with Jordan in the 24 hours before the

911 call—inflicted the injuries that caused her death. And although

Johnson offered up the headboard incident as a possible explanation

for Jordan’s injuries, testimony from all of the medical experts—

including Johnson’s—established that Jordan’s injuries were the

result of “considerable force” that was plainly inconsistent with

Johnson’s description of the headboard incident. For this reason,

Johnson has failed to establish plain error. See Sullivan, 308 Ga. at

778-780 (2) (failure to give accident instruction was harmless where

evidence of accident was contradicted by other evidence, including

expert testimony, that strongly supported a finding of intentional

conduct); Thomas v. State, 297 Ga. 750, 753 (2) (778 SE2d 168)

(2015) (no plain error in trial court’s refusal to give an instruction

on accident). See also McClure, 306 Ga. at 866-867 (Nahmias, P.J.,

concurring) (noting that failing to give an instruction on an

alternative defense supported by “only the slightest evidence” will

                                 40
likely be harmless and “almost certainly will not amount to plain

error”). 8

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

      8  In our analysis, we have assumed that the trial court erred by
admitting the pre-autopsy photograph and held that the trial court committed
a clear and obvious error by declining to instruct the jury on accident. Johnson
has not claimed cumulative error and therefore has not made any specific
argument as to why these two errors in combination prejudiced his defense.
See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 18 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (“[A] defendant who
wishes to take advantage of the [cumulative error rule] should explain to the
reviewing court just how he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple
errors.”). In any event, “we discern no apparent cumulative prejudice on this
record.” Prickett v. State, 314 Ga. 435, 445 (3) n.8 (877 SE2d 573) (2022).
                                      41