Court Opinion

ID: 9720084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:14:57.187629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:12.960645
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority's decision to affirm the grant of summary judgment for Quakertown Marina, Inc., I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the trial court's denial of summary judgment with respect to Michael and his parents.
I embrace the "totality of the cireum-stances" test in determining whether a landowner should be exposed to potential liability for the criminal act of a third person. See Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 971 (Ind.1999). I am compelled to part ways, however, with the majority's application of this test as it relates to the designated evidence that was put before the trial court. First, the majority presupposes that the teenagers aboard the houseboat were "under the influence of drugs or alcohol." Op. at 224. Marling initially testified in his deposition that he thought everyone on the boat was drinking. He then acknowledged that some of the people might not have been drinking. The evidence does not establish that Michael knew anyone was intoxicated at the time of the incident. The uncontro-verted evidence establishes that Michael had consumed less than one beer prior to the incident, and there has been no showing that Michael supplied Legear with any intoxicant. Marling testified that he did not know who supplied the marijuana or who may have supplied Legear with any alcohol. Moreover, none of the alcohol stored on the houseboat by his parents was consumed on the day of the incident, and the evidence is undisputed that Michael did not make the others aware of the aleohol that his parents kept on the houseboat because he did not want to get into trouble.
I would also note that the designated evidence established that, prior to the incident, Legear had commented to the others that she was interested in swimming at a beach near the marina. Jessica remarked that she had been swimming with a friend earlier in the day. In my view, one cannot be negligent for failing to foresee that another, who would propose to go swim*227ming, would actually not know how to swim. Thus, in applying the "totality of the cireumstances" test set forth in Delta Tau Delta, I cannot agree that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether Michael exercised the requisite degree of care for Legear's safety. I would affirm the trial court's judgment entered in Michael's favor.
With respect to the potential liability of Michael's parents, the majority acknowledges the general rule that parents are not liable for the tortious acts of their minor children. Op. at 224 (citing Wells v. Hickman, 657 N.E.2d 172, 176 (Ind.Ct.App.1995)). An exeeption to this "no liability" rule exists, though, when the child is entrusted with an instrumentality which, "because of the child's lack of age, judgment, or experience, may become a source of danger to others." Op. at 224 (citing Ross v. Lowe, 619 N.E.2d 911, 915 (Ind.1993)). The imposition of a duty with respect to a parent in such a circumstance is limited to incidents where a reasonably foreseeable victim is injured by a reasonably foreseeable harm. Wells, 657 N.E.2d at 177-78.
I cannot agree with the majority's notion that "Michael's history of drug abuse" was a factor in imputing knowledge on the part of the Trainis to exercise greater control or supervision over their son. Specifically, the designated evidence showed that Michael had one arrest for marijuana possession prior to the incident. He then completed a drug counseling program. Moreover, the evidence is equivocal at best as to whether Michael had used marijuana on June 25, 1996.13 I thus cannot agree that questions of fact exist regarding whether any alleged negligence on Michael's part could be imputed to his parents under the "dangerous instrumentality" exception on this basis.
The undisputed evidence also shows that the Trainis maintained the requisite safety equipment on the houseboat. There is no evidence showing that the Trainis consented to, directed, or sanctioned any wrongdoing. To the contrary, they established rules for Michael to follow, including those that were taught by the Coast Guard. The Trainis prohibited Michael from inviting people onto the houseboat without their permission, and he was forbidden to use alcohol or illegal drugs. In my view, the parents' knowledge that Michael had previously smoked marijuana does not rise to the level of an actual and immediate knowledge of his incapacity to operate the houseboat. The totality of the cireum-stances here does not dictate a determination that the Trainis should be faced with any potential lability. To hold otherwise would inappropriately render the Trainis an insurer of Legear's safety.
Finally, there is no evidence that the Trainis had ever met Legear or Marling. Hence, there is nothing to suggest that they might have reasonably foreseen that Marling would push Legear from the houseboat into the lake and cause her death. In essence, there is no showing that the Trainis breached any duty here that may have prevented Legear's drowning. Given these cireumstances, I cannot agree that any genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether any negligence on Michael's part may be imputed to the Trainis. Therefore, I vote to affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.

. When Marling was asked during deposition as to what had occurred on the boat, he responded that '"[al couple of people were drinking, a couple of people were smoking weed." R. at 866. Marling later opined that Jessica was smoking "with [eJverybody that was on the boat." R. ai 891. Michael denied smoking marijuana that day.