Court Opinion

ID: 9497194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:45:22.928012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:02.959023
License: Public Domain

LOURIE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the decision of the court not to rehear this case en- banc, just as previ-' ously the court also declined to hear a written description case en banc. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970-75 (Fed.Cir.2002). That is because this .case was properly decided based on one of the grounds relied on by the district court in invalidating the Rochester patent, see Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed.Cir.2004), the analysis of which will not be repeated here.
Contrary to the assertions of the appellant, certain amici, and some of the dissenters, there is and always has been a separate written description requirement in the patent law. The requirement to describe one’s invention is basic to the patent law, and every patent draftsman knows that he or she must describe a client’s invention independently of the need to enable one skilled in the relevant art to make and use the invention. The specification then must also describe how to make and use the invention (i.e., enable it), but that is a. different task.
The requirements of the statute cannot be swept away by claiming that it relates only to priority issues or that the prohibition on introduction of new matter takes care of the need for a written description. The statute does not contain a limitation that it pertains only to priority issues. Moreover, the prohibition on introduction of new matter (35 U.S.C. § 132) is not a substitute for the written description requirement. Section 282 of the Patent Act lists as a defense to an infringement action invalidity arising from a failure to comply with a requirement of section 112 of the Act, which includes written description. In contrast, the new matter provision, section 132, appears in a provision entitled “Notice of rejection; reexamination;” Failure to comply with that section is not expressly listed in the statute as an invalidity defense to infringement, although we have held that the unsupported claims are invalid. See, e.g., Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577 (Fed.Cir.1995) (invalidating claims that were broadened in scope during, reexamination in violation of *130635 U.S.C. § 305, which is analogous to section 132).
The separate written description requirement poses no conflict with the role of the claims. It is well established that the specification teaches an invention, whereas the claims define the right to exclude. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n. 14 (Fed.Cir.1985). While claims must be supported by the written description, the latter contains much material that is not in the claims. The written description contains an elucidation of various aspects of an invention as well as material that is necessary for enablement. Moreover, the written description often contains material that an applicant intended to claim that has been rejected in examination. Thus, the written description and the claims do not duplicate each other.
The fact, if it is a fact, that written description has only been relied upon in recent years as a ground of invalidity does not remove that requirement from the statute. Legal holdings arise when they do because litigants raise them and courts have to decide them. Contrary to what has been asserted, the interpretation of the statute as containing a separate written description requirement did not originate with Lilly. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed.Cir.1991); In re Ruschig, 54 C.C.P.A. 1551, 379 F.2d 990 (CCPA 1967). It has always been there. And if a particular scope of claim has not been sustained by the courts for failure to comply with the written description requirement, it is because the applicant did not describe, and presumably did not invent, the subject matter of the scope sought.
Moreover, it is not correct, as has been asserted, that our decisions, particularly Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed.Cir.1997), have created a “heightened” written description requirement for biotechnology inventions. We have applied the written description requirement to cases that are not in the fields of chemistry or biotechnology. See, e.g., In re Curtis 354 F.3d 1347 (Fed.Cir.2004) (dental floss); Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154 (Fed.Cir.1998) (artificial hip sockets); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed.Cir.1998) (sectional sofas); Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed.Cir.1997) (automated sales terminals); Vas-Cath (double lumen catheters). The statute is the same for all types of inventions, although it may be applied differently, based on the technology and what is known by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time an invention was made. Indeed, Rochester’s claimed invention at issue in the present case is not biotechnological. Although the inventors apparently contemplated that the tools of biotechnology would be used to determine whether a given drug is a COX-2 inhibitor insofar as the specification of the '850 patent describes how to make cell lines that express one or the other of COX-1 and COX-2, that method is claimed in another patent. The claims of this patent are all directed to pharmaceutical methods for selectively inhibiting a natural process in the human body. That is not what one commonly refers to as biotechnology.
It has been noted that genes can be described by their informational function, not just by structure or physical or chemical properties, and that a lesser written description may be adequate than is required for other types of inventions. Maybe so. Technology progresses, and what one skilled in the art would read from a particular disclosure may change. The PTO has now provided guidelines that help to guide applicants in preparing their patent applications.
It is obviously correct that genes convey information (e.g., to make other nucleic *1307acids or to encode particular proteins). That fact does not serve to deny the existence of a written description requirement in the law. It only goes to whether, under the facts of a particular case, the written description requirement has been met. A fact-finder may have to decide whether claiming a material solely by its information-conveying character results in a “single means claim” purporting to claim everything that works, a dubious fulfillment of the requirement to “distinctly claim the subject matter” of the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112. In any event, it is fact-intensive. But, once again, these matters go to whether the written description requirement has been met, not whether it exists.
As for the proposition that an original claim is part of the written description, that is clear. See In re Gardner, 475 F.2d 1389, 1391 (CCPA 1973). However, the issue may still remain in a given case, especially with regard to generic claims, whether an original claim conveys that one has possession of and thus has invented species sufficient to constitute the genus. Thus, the fact that a statement of an invention is in an original claim does not necessarily end all inquiry as to the satis1 faction of the written description requirement. See Enzo, 323 F.3d at 968-69 (“[Rjegardless whether the claim appears in the original specification and is thus supported by the specification as of the filing date, § 112, ¶ 1 is not necessarily met.... If a purported description of an invention does not meet the requirements of the statute, the fact that it appears as an original claim or in the specification does not save it. A claim does not become more descriptive by its repetition, or its longevity”).
In sum, I concur in the decision of the court not to rehear this case en banc. Our precedent is clear and consistent and necessitates no revision of written description law.

. Circuit Judges Newman, Rader, Bryson, Ga-jarsa, and Linn voted in favor of en banc reconsideration. Chief Judge Mayer and Circuit Judges Michel, Lourie, Clevenger, Schall, Dyk, and Prost voted against en banc reconsideration.