Court Opinion

ID: 9790840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:00:16.132031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.998800
License: Public Domain

CHAVEZ, Judge, (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in certifying this case, but would reverse the ruling that there was sufficient evidence to convict because only prior inconsistent uncorroborated statements were used to prove the charges. Defendant contends that the prior inconsistent statements alone are insufficient evidence for convictions. The state argues that there is independent corroborative evidence that, combined with the prior inconsistent statements, amounts to sufficient evidence to allow the jury to convict. Both parties’ arguments rely on State v. Maestas, 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182 (Ct.App.1978). In Maestas, the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery. Id. at 137, 584 P.2d at 184. At trial, the victim refused to identify the defendant as the man who beat her. Id. at 138-39, 584 P.2d at 185-86. The prosecution, therefore, elicited prior inconsistent statements of the victim from three other witnesses. Id. Each witness testified that the victim had said the defendant was the man who beat her. Id. The prior out of court statements were the only evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. On appeal, the defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to convict him because only prior inconsistent statements linked him to the crime. Id. at 145, 584 P.2d at 190. The Maestas court distinguished between evidence proving the “corpus delicti” (the substance of the crime) and evidence proving the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Id. The court noted that the substance of the crime, aggravated battery, was properly proved by circumstantial evidence. Id. The sole issue for the court was whether prior inconsistent statements alone were sufficient evidence to establish the identity of the defendant. Id. The court found that there was corroborative evidence of the prior inconsistent statements. Id. The corroborative evidence listed by the court was that 1) the victim lived with the defendant in his home for a week, 2) no other person bore an unfavorable relationship with the victim that would lead to a severe beating, 3) defendant presented no evidence to cast doubt upon the truth of the prior inconsistent statements, and 4) no evidence of defendant’s good character was presented. Id. The court concluded that the above evidence corroborated the truth of the prior statements made by the victim. Id. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to prove the defendant was the perpetrator because the prior inconsistent statements were not the “sole basis for a conviction.” Id. This court’s holding in Maestas implied that prior inconsistent statements, without corroboration, are .insufficient evidence upon which to base a conviction. Consequently, in this case we must decide if prior inconsistent statements were the sole basis for convicting defendant as an accessory to attempted CSPM and CSCM. The accessory statute provides that a person may be convicted of a crime as an accessory “if he procures, counsels, aids or abets in its commission.” NMSA 1978, § 30-1-13 (Repl.Pamp.1984). The question is, therefore, whether there is corroborative evidence of the boy’s prior inconsistent statements that defendant helped Villegas to commit the crimes. The state argues there is corroborative evidence of the prior statements. I disagree. The boy’s prior statements were not inconsistent regarding defendant’s presence at the bar or whether Villegas tried to sexually assault the boy. Rather, the inconsistency arose from the boy’s subsequent denial at trial that defendant helped Villegas. I fail to see how the evidence pointed to by the state corroborates the truth of the prior inconsistent statements. I do not read Maestas to mean any evidence that corroborates that the declarant was telling the truth as to any fact in the past is sufficient corroborative evidence to support the conviction. The corroboration must go to the prior inconsistent statements themselves and not simply to prior consistent statements. A close examination of the facts excluding the prior inconsistent statements discloses that those facts do not corroborate the commission of the crime. There is nothing that would corroborate defendant’s helping Villegas commit the offenses. The fact that the evidence shows that the boy was in the custody of defendant, that defendant took the boy to the bar, and that defendant told the boy’s mother about the incident between Villegas and the boy do not corroborate the commission of the crime by defendant. Unlike Maestas, there was another person who committed the crime and there was evidence to cast doubt upon the truth of the prior inconsistent statements. For example, Dr. Luis Natalicio testified for the defense. He stated that the interview techniques used by Yolanda Morales, a counselor at Border Area Mental Health, caused the boy to lose any ability to discern the difference between truth and falsehood. Dr. Natalicio further testified that the interview hopelessly contaminated the boy’s testimony. Although the jury was entitled to disregard Dr. Natalicio’s expert opinion, see State v. James, 85 N.M. 230, 511 P.2d 556 (Ct.App.1973), as the court in Maestas recognized, the doubt created by the doctor’s testimony was an added reason not to accept the prior inconsistent statements made by the boy as the sole basis for convicting defendant as an accessory. In fact, there was evidence that defendant prevented Villegas from committing the crime. The state is correct when it asserts that this court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, resolving all conflicts therein and indulging all permissible inferences in favor of the verdict. See State v. Lankford, 92 N.M. 1, 582 P.2d 378 (1978). However, as the supreme court also declared, where “the evidence must be buttressed by surmise and conjecture, rather than logical inference in order to support a conviction, this Court, as the final arbiter charged with the protection of civil liberties, cannot allow such conviction to stand.” State v. Vigil, 87 N.M. 345, 349, 533 P.2d 578, 582 (1975). In accepting the evidence offered by the state as corroborative of the truth of the prior inconsistent statements, the majority opinion is resorting to impermissible surmise and conjecture rather than logical inference. Evidence that the declarant was telling the truth about prior statements consistent with his trial testimony does not provide a logical basis to infer that the prior inconsistent statements must also be true. In addition, the majority takes victim’s statements out of context. The majority opinion stated that “[a]t the trial the victim was asked by the prosecutor if he remembered telling other people that defendant helped Villegas and that defendant himself had touched the child. The victim said that he had and that this was the truth.” This statement, taken out of context, is then used to prove that there was direct evidence that supports the jury verdict. However, the victim qualified his statement by stating that he did not remember saying that defendant had helped Villegas, and that he made a mistake at an earlier interview when he said that defendant had touched him. I do not believe Maestas, or this case, should be read to mean that prior inconsistent statements can never be sufficient evidence standing alone. However, the emphasis on corroboration demonstrates that the prior inconsistent statements must be trustworthy. Maestas and the lack of corroboration in this case makes the prior inconsistent statements untrustworthy and, therefore, insufficient evidence as a sole basis for conviction. Without the prior inconsistent statements, there is no other evidence to show that defendant was an accessory to CSCM or attempted CSPM. At most, the evidence shows that defendant was present when Villegas committed the acts in question, Mere presence, without some outward manifestation or expression of approval, is insufficient to sustain a conviction as an accessory. See State v. Luna, 92 N.M. 680, 594 P.2d 340 (Ct.App.1979). Because presence alone is not enough, the prior inconsistent statements are necessary to the state’s case against defendant as an accessory. The majority opinion cites a North Carolina case for the proposition that a parent of a child should be convicted as an aider and abettor solely on the basis that the parent failed to take reasonable steps to protect the child. The majority then extends this out-of-state case to include other guardians or baby-sitters who are charged with the care of the child. The majority then proposes to incorporate this proposition into New Mexico’s accessory statute. I do not believe our legislature intended such an extension. Penal statutes must be strictly construed, and any doubts about their construction must be resolved in favor of lenity. State v. Bybee, 109 N.M. 44, 781 P.2d 316 (Ct.App.1989). Further, the majority opinion makes unreasonable leaps in logic. It states: Even if the jury believed the victim’s trial testimony that defendant at some point pulled the victim’s pants up when Villegas pulled them down, there was direct evidence from which the jury could infer that Villegas succeeded in sexually contacting the victim and that defendant failed to intervene to stop it. We believe that the jury could find one in defendant’s position could be criminally liable in the circumstances of the case. There is an illogical jump from holding defendant responsible for standing by idly to the majority arguing that defendant must be successful in preventing the abuse. Also, as stated above, untrustworthy prior inconsistent statements alone are insufficient evidence upon which to base a conviction. See also United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113 (6th Cir.1979) (prior inconsistent statements as sole support for central element of a crime are insufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would reverse defendant’s convictions.