Court Opinion

ID: 9712631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:57:36.833024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:13.416371
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Cercone, J.:
While I agree that appellant is entitled to a new trial with respect to his conviction for burglary on Indictment No. 228, I cannot agree with the rationale proffered by Judge Hoffman’s opinion in support of that result.
The determination of whether a mistrial should be granted rests squarely in the discretion of the trial court, and that question will vary with the facts of a particular case. 88 C.J.S., Trial §36. Hence, the refusal of the trial court to grant a mistrial may only be reversed in a flagrant case. Gregg v. Fisher, 377 Pa. 445 (1954); Cook v. Erie Electric Motor Co., 225 Pa. 91 (1909). Since the question of a mistrial necessarily depends largely on the atmosphere of the trial, appellate courts are in a poor position to review the propriety of the court’s refusal of a mistrial motion. Stephens v. Sulkin, 280 Pa. 211 (1924). In the instant case the trial court could either have permitted the Commonwealth’s offer of proof to establish the relevance of the alleged threats, or it could have determined that the issue was not sufficiently important *518to justify such a diversion. The court having chosen the latter course, it correctly and forcefully admonished the jury to disregard the testimony, and stated that the threats were not evidence against appellant. Given this curative instruction quoted in the majority opinion, from which the jury would logically infer that the threats could not be linked to appellant, I submit that the court acted well within its discretion in refusing to grant appellant’s mistrial motion. I do not think that we should so readily presume that a jury will disregard a court’s instructions in situations where an improper appeal to the passions of the jury, calculated to be inflammatory and prejudicial, has not been made. Judge Hoffman’s opinion today evinces the very scepticism for jury instructions which we recently condemned in Commonwealth v. Williams, 230 Pa. Superior Ct. 72 (1974). There is nothing in the facts of the instant case to justify our reaching a different conclusion herein.
I do find error, however, in the court’s permitting an investigating police officer to testify as to his informant’s selection of appellant’s photograph from an array shown to the informant at the state police barracks. At trial, under examination by the assistant district attorney, the following testimony transpired:
“BY MR. BARO:
Q. Well, in your own words, then, Trooper Brunozzi, what did you do as a result of the information you received from Morris Hendricks?
A. We continued our investigation. On the 11th of June, ’71, at the Downingtown Barracks, Morris Hendricks identified Joseph Markle, the gentleman sitting over there (indicating), as the person he, along with Thomas McDonald, burglarized the home of Miller in Berks County.
MR. BERNHART: Again, I object to this. There’s no foundation, it’s hearsay and it’s a conclusion. I ask that that be stricken.
MR. BARO: Your Honor, I’ll develop — he says that *519Morris Hendricks identified Joseph Markle, and that was at the barracks, I assume?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
BY MR. BARO:
Q. Was Joseph Markle there?
A. No, sir.
Q. How did he identify him at that time?
MR. BERNHART: I object, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Answer the question.
THE WITNESS: By using photographs.
MR. BERNHART: Your Honor, I ask for a mistrial. THE COURT: Motion refused.
BY MR. BARO:
Q. How many photographs did you have present at that time?
A. Nine, sir.
Q. And then he identified the photograph of Joseph Markle; is that right?
A. That’s correct, yes, sir.
Q. And is this the same person who he had previously identified or said to you that was ‘Joe from Philly?’
MR. BERNHART: I object to that question.
THE COURT: On what grounds?
MR. BERNHART: As leading.
THE COURT: It is leading. Objection sustained.
BY MR. BARO:
Q. Will you state whether or not the Joseph M. Markle that he identified by the use of the photograph was ‘Joe from Philly?’
A. Yes, sir.”
The following day, apparently after counsel had a full opportunity to argue the admissibility of the photographic identification, the court instructed the jury that they could not consider the previous day’s identification testimony of Trooper Brunozzi as evidence against appellant. Undoubtedly in a dilemma, the court did not refer to the question of the jury’s likely inference that *520appellant had a prior criminal record because of the existence of police photographs of him. The instruction, therefore, did not cure the problem with which I am now concerned.
In Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177, 182 (1972), our Supreme Court stated in a unanimous decision: “Once it is determined that a jury could reasonably conclude from the photographic reference prior criminal activity on the part of the defendant prejudicial error has been committed.” Under the circumstances of the photographic reference in the instant case, which certainly was not a passing reference likely to go unnoticed, the jury would naturally infer that the witness had been shown police photographs, or mugshots, thus leading them inexorably to the conclusion that appellant had previously engaged in criminal conduct. The Commonwealth points to nothing in the record which could serve to militate against that inference. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 Pa. 439 (1973). Hence, the instant case is virtually indistinguishable from Commonwealth v. Taylor, 460 Pa. 616, 334 A.2d 261 (1975), so that the reference effectively destroyed appellant’s presumption of innocence and entitles him to a new trial. Id. at 183. See also Commonwealth v. Trowery, 211 Pa. Superior Ct. 171, 173-74 (1967).
I would therefore reverse the judgment of sentence on Indictment No. 228, and remand for a new trial, solely on the basis of the improper reference to the photographic identification.
Spaeth, J., joins in this concurring opinion.