Court Opinion

ID: 9926099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 18:10:44.246326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:02.168905
License: Public Domain

01/23/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                 Assigned on Briefs at Knoxville December 19, 2023

                 KIP DYLANE BUIE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lawrence County
                 No. 36009, 34998, 35244 Stella L. Hargrove, Judge
                       ___________________________________

                            No. M2022-01232-CCA-R3-PC
                        ___________________________________

The Petitioner, Kip Dylane Buie, pled guilty to second degree murder and attempted second
degree murder. He received an effective forty-year sentence. Subsequently, he filed a
petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his plea counsel was ineffective during the
plea process and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a
hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed to this
Court. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

                         Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right;
                        Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER
and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined.

Casey A. Long, Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kip Dylane Buie.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Brent Cooper, District Attorney General; and Gary Howell and Christi
Thompson, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                         OPINION

                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       A.     GUILTY PLEAS

      On April 1, 2019, the Petitioner pled guilty to the second degree murder of his
mother, and he was sentenced to serve a term of twenty-five years. He also pled guilty to
the attempted second degree murder of Mr. Thomas Wright, and he was sentenced to serve
a term of fifteen years. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court ordered that the
sentences be served consecutively.

         At the plea hearing, the Petitioner initially stated that he thought he could “beat” the
attempted murder charge. Due to this statement, the trial court advised him to go to trial
instead of pleading guilty. Plea counsel explained to the trial court that the Petitioner
initially thought he should have been charged with aggravated assault, but, after further
discussions with counsel, knew that he would be convicted of attempted first degree murder
at trial. The trial court clarified that the Petitioner, not counsel, had to decide whether to
plead guilty or go to trial. The court told the Petitioner it would hold a trial quickly if he
wished to proceed.

       At that point, plea counsel asked for a ten-minute recess to speak with the Petitioner.
Upon returning to court, the Petitioner insisted upon accepting the plea agreement. The
Petitioner affirmed that he understood that he was a Range I, standard offender, but that he
was pleading outside his range as a Range II, multiple offender with release eligibility after
serving thirty-five percent of his sentence in confinement. The trial court observed that the
Petitioner’s sentences would be served consecutively, and when asked if he knew what that
meant, the Petitioner answered, “That means following each other.”

       The Petitioner told the court that he was thirty-six years old and had attended school
through the eleventh grade. He confirmed he had sufficient time to discuss his case with
plea counsel.

       The Petitioner stated that no threats or promises were made to get him to plead
guilty. He also acknowledged the rights he was waiving by entering the guilty pleas and
agreed that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily. The Petitioner further stated that
he understood the terms of his plea agreement. The trial court found that the Petitioner
entered the guilty pleas “freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, upon the advice
of counsel.”

      The State recounted a factual basis for each offense. Regarding the second degree
murder conviction, the State said the proof at trial would have shown that on or about
January 23, 2018, first responders were dispatched to the home of the Petitioner and his
mother, Glenda Gail Buie. Upon arriving, they found the Petitioner and Ms. Buie. Ms.
Buie was unresponsive, and she was taken to the hospital, where she died four days later.
The medical examiner determined that the cause of her death was manual strangulation.

                                               2
         Regarding the attempted second degree murder conviction, the State said the proof
at trial would have shown that on or about January 27, 2018, the Petitioner was at the home
of Mr. Thomas Wright. While there, the Petitioner struck Mr. Wright in the back of his
head with a hammer and attempted to take Mr. Wright’s gun. The Petitioner fled the scene
and was later arrested.

       B.     POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS

       On November 1, 2019, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction
relief. In the petition, he maintained that (1) his guilty pleas were not knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently entered; and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel during the plea proceedings. The post-conviction court appointed an attorney to
represent the Petitioner, but no amended petition was filed.

              1.     Petitioner’s Testimony

       The post-conviction court held a hearing on January 13, 2021. At the hearing, the
Petitioner testified that he never felt that plea counsel was “on [his] side.” He stated that
plea counsel did not speak often with him about the charges, and he did not think the
preparation time was appropriate. In preparation for trial, the Petitioner underwent a
forensic evaluation at the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute around December
2018.

        According to the Petitioner, the State initially offered a plea agreement “with an
aggravated assault charge[.]” He noted that the State insisted that he plead guilty to both
charges in a “package deal” or otherwise face a trial on each. The Petitioner said he wanted
to go to trial because he was not guilty of the charges, but he did not think plea counsel
would be helpful or supportive. The Petitioner testified that he did not know how to ask
the trial court to appoint a new lawyer or tell the court that he had no confidence in plea
counsel.

       The Petitioner said he “lacked sleep” and was “not stable” on the day of the plea
hearing. He explained, “[T]hat’s a lot of pressure, and it’s not a clear state of mind going
into a court hearing on a case that big.” He also suffered from depression, which was
treated with medication. He stated that during the plea hearing, his anxiety, depression,
and headaches impacted his thought processes.

        Additionally, the Petitioner claimed that plea counsel cautioned him that if he went
to trial, he risked receiving a life sentence. The Petitioner alleged that plea counsel

                                             3
threatened him with the death penalty; however, he clarified that he meant that she
threatened him with the possibility of a life sentence.

        After these discussions, the Petitioner said he still wanted to go to trial but “didn’t
know what to do under so much pressure.” Nevertheless, he decided to plead guilty
because he lacked confidence in plea counsel’s abilities. He wanted to avoid the risk of a
life sentence and believed that plea counsel did not want to represent him.

              2.     Plea Counsel’s Testimony

        Plea counsel testified that due to the severity of the charges, she asked for an
evaluation to determine the Petitioner’s competency to stand trial. The evaluation found
that the Petitioner was competent to stand trial and that neither an insanity nor a diminished
capacity defense could be supported. Additionally, the evaluating clinician advised “that
it will be necessary for the [Petitioner] to take psychiatric medication in order for his
psychiatric condition to remain sufficiently stable to remain competent to stand trial.”

       Plea counsel testified that she had no concerns about the Petitioner’s competency.
She noted that the Petitioner had been a drug user, but that he had been incarcerated for
some time before she began representing him. She stated that the Petitioner did not mention
having any issues with his mental health or well-being.

       Plea counsel stated that the Petitioner never expressed any lack of confidence in her
and that she had “many conversations” with him. She cautioned the Petitioner that if he
went to trial on the first degree murder charge and were convicted, he would face a life
sentence.

        Plea counsel said that the first plea offer the Petitioner received from the State was
an effective sentence of forty-five years. Specifically, the State offered for the Petitioner
to plead guilty to second degree murder with a sentence of thirty-five years at one hundred
percent and attempted second degree murder with a consecutive sentence of ten years at
thirty percent. Plea counsel acknowledged that the Petitioner wished to go to trial on the
attempted murder charge related to Mr. Wright. However, he did not want to go to trial on
the charge related to his mother, and the State would not accept a plea to only one of the
two cases. As such, the Petitioner ultimately accepted “a compromised offer” negotiated
by plea counsel with the State.

      Plea counsel explained that, although the Petitioner admitted that he hit Mr. Wright,
he thought the offense should be “tried separately as a self-defense charge[.]” She
reviewed the elements of the offenses with the Petitioner and explained the defense of self-

                                              4
defense. Nevertheless, she advised the Petitioner that she was ready to try the cases if he
wished to do so. At that point, the Petitioner decided to enter the guilty pleas.

              3.      Denial of Post-Conviction Relief and Appeal

       On January 22, 2021, the post-conviction court entered an order denying the
petition. The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner was not a credible witness and
that he had not offered any proof to establish his claims.

       The Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal on September 1, 2022. This Court
ordered the Petitioner to explain whether the requirement of a timely-filed notice of appeal
should be waived. Upon review of the Petitioner’s response, this Court waived “the filing
deadline for the notice of appeal” and permitted “this appeal to proceed in accordance with
the applicable rules.”

                                         ANALYSIS

       The Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides an avenue for relief “when
the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right
guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. A post-conviction petitioner has the burden of proving his
or her allegations of fact by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-
110(f). For evidence to be clear and convincing, “it must eliminate any serious or
substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.”
Arroyo v. State, 434 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Tenn. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).

       In this case, the Petitioner generally alleges that he did not understand his guilty
plea or its terms. Our supreme court has recognized that “[t]he validity of a guilty plea is
a mixed question of law and fact.” Lane v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2010). As
such, our review of whether the Petitioner entered a valid guilty plea in this case is de novo,
applying a presumption of correctness only to the post-conviction court’s findings of fact.
Holland v. State, 610 S.W.3d 450, 455 (Tenn. 2020).

        When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she “waives several constitutional
rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the
right to confront his accusers.” State v. Mellon, 118 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tenn. 2003). To
that end, “[i]n the landmark case of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United
States Supreme Court held that to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the United States

                                               5
Constitution, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”
Garcia v. State, 425 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Tenn. 2013). Thus, a claim challenging the
constitutional validity of a guilty plea “falls squarely within the ambit of issues
appropriately addressed in a post-conviction petition.” State v. Wilson, 31 S.W.3d 189,
194 (Tenn. 2000).

       To determine whether a guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
entered, a court must consider “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Jaco v. State, 120
S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tenn. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A
defendant cannot make this voluntary and intelligent choice if the decision “results from,
among other things, ignorance or misunderstanding.” State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112,
118 (Tenn. 2011). Therefore, before a trial court may accept a guilty plea, it must canvass
“the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea
connotes and of its consequence.” Garcia, 425 S.W.3d at 262 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).

       Ultimately, the issue of “whether an accused’s plea of guilty was voluntarily,
understandingly, and knowingly entered is to be determined based upon the totality of the
circumstances.” State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see Rigger
v. State, 341 S.W.3d 299, 308-09 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010). Our supreme court has
recognized several factors that may inform this analysis, including the following:

       1) the defendant’s relative intelligence; 2) the defendant’s familiarity with
       criminal proceedings; 3) the competency of counsel and the defendant’s
       opportunity to confer with counsel about alternatives; 4) the advice of
       counsel and the [trial] court about the charges and the penalty to be imposed;
       and 5) the defendant’s reasons for pleading guilty, including the desire to
       avoid a greater penalty in a jury trial.

Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 330-31 (Tenn. 2006).

       In this case, the Petitioner offers two reasons why his guilty pleas were not
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. First, he asserts that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel before entering his plea. More specifically, he argues that
plea counsel was not prepared for a trial and that, although he wished to have a trial, he
was forced to accept a plea because he did not know how to request another lawyer.
Second, he asserts that he was not competent to enter a plea. He argues that he suffered
from cognitive impairments and that he experienced anxiety, depression, and headaches
during the plea and in the days leading up to the plea. We take each of these issues in turn.

                                             6
       A.     INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

        In his first issue, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel because his plea counsel was not prepared to try his case. Article I, section 9 of
the Tennessee Constitution establishes that every criminal defendant has “the right to be
heard by himself and his counsel.” Similarly, the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that
all criminal defendants “shall enjoy the right . . . to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel[.]”
“These constitutional provisions guarantee not simply the assistance of counsel, but rather
the reasonably effective assistance of counsel.” Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 786
(Tenn. 2014). A petitioner’s claim that he or she has been deprived “of effective assistance
of counsel is a constitutional claim cognizable under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.”
Moore v. State, 485 S.W.3d 411, 418 (Tenn. 2016); see Howard v. State, 604 S.W.3d 53,
57 (Tenn. 2020).

       Counsel is responsible for rendering effective assistance “during the plea bargain
process, as at all critical stages of the criminal process.” Nesbit, 452 S.W.3d at 787. Thus,
counsel’s “effectiveness may implicate the requirement that a plea must be entered
knowingly and voluntarily, i.e., that the petitioner made the choice to plead guilty after
being made aware of the significant consequences of such a plea.” Johnson v. State, No.
W2015-02498-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 192710, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2017), no
perm. app. filed; see State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999). Stated another
way, once a defendant enters a guilty plea, the effectiveness of counsel is relevant only to
the extent that it affects the voluntariness of the plea. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
56 (1985) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).

       At the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner testified that he had no faith in counsel
and wanted to go to trial because he thought he could “beat the attempted first degree
murder charge.” However, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner was “not a
credible witness.” Instead, the court implicitly accredited the testimony of plea counsel,
who testified that she was prepared to try both cases. Plea counsel testified that she met
with the Petitioner and discussed the charges, his potential sentencing exposure, and the
plea offers. She also negotiated a more favorable plea agreement for the Petitioner, and
she said that the Petitioner never indicated that he lacked confidence in her representation.

       The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to establish that counsel
rendered deficient performance or that any alleged deficiency prejudiced the Petitioner.
Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence fully supports the post-
conviction court’s findings that the Petitioner’s guilty pleas were not rendered unknowing
or involuntary due to any alleged ineffective assistance by counsel. See also Merritt v.

                                               7
State, No. W2021-01448-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 17077555, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Nov. 18, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2023); Payne v. State, No. E2021-01017-
CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 3683793, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2022), no perm. app.
filed.

       B.     KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEA

       The Petitioner also asserts that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily
entered as required by Boykin v. Alabama. He argues that “he was suffering from anxiety,
depression, and headaches both on the date of the plea and in the days leading up to [the]
same.” He also maintains that he was not stable at the time of the pleas because he had not
been sleeping and was under pressure. The Petitioner asserts that he is a “mildly mentally-
retarded person whose cognitive ability is significantly impaired due to an infantry head
injury and decade-long drug abuse.”

        The State responds that the post-conviction court properly found that the Petitioner
failed to establish that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The
State noted that the Petitioner did not claim that he had an intellectual disability until his
pro se “Notice of Delayed Appeal,” which was filed after the post-conviction court entered
its order denying the petition.

              1.     Absence of Medical Proof

       When a petitioner asserts that his or her mental health issues affected the plea, the
petitioner should offer “independent corroboration that he [or she] was incapable of making
a rational decision.” Burrell v. State, No. M2015-02115-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 943363,
at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017), no perm. app. filed. For example, the petitioner
should present medical testimony or evidence to support or corroborate his claims that a
mental health impairment rendered his plea unknowing or involuntary. Wright v. State,
No. W2019-02116-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 5742872, *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24,
2020), no perm. app. filed. This proof could include, for example, evidence from mental
health records or from a mental health professional attesting that the petitioner suffered
from a mental health condition that affected the petitioner’s cognitive abilities or his level
of understanding. Mack v. State, No. E2019-00273-CCA-R3-PC, 2021 WL 753643, at *6
(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2021), no perm. app. filed.

       During the post-conviction hearing, although the Petitioner testified generally about
alleged mental health conditions, his testimony was specifically discredited by the post-
conviction court. The Petitioner also failed to offer the testimony of a mental health

                                              8
professional or any mental health records to substantiate his claim that he was incapable of
making a rational decision.

       Instead, the Petitioner cites the fact of plea counsel’s two requests for pretrial
competency evaluations as evidence that he must have had a mental illness. However, each
evaluation found the Petitioner competent to proceed to trial, and the Petitioner does not
identify anything in the completed evaluations to support his argument that he was
incapable of making rational decisions. Indeed, plea counsel testified that the evaluations
were requested because of the severity of the cases and not because of any concerns about
the petitioner’s mental health. Because the Petitioner failed to support his claim with
independent corroborative proof that he could not make a rational decision, we affirm the
judgment of the post-conviction court denying relief on these grounds.

              2.     Petitioner’s Statements at the Plea Hearing

       The post-conviction court also denied the petition because of the Petitioner’s
statements made during his plea hearing. The court reviewed the transcript from that
hearing and made findings in three separate areas. First, the post-conviction court found
that the Petitioner was properly advised of his constitutional rights. The court found that
the Petitioner “understood those rights, waived his right to a trial by jury, and more than
once advised the Court he wanted the Court to accept his plea.” The record fully supports
these findings.

       Second, the post-conviction court found that the plea was voluntary, in part, due to
the Petitioner’s decision to accept the agreement. The record also supports this finding as
well. At the beginning of the plea hearing, the trial court informed the Petitioner that he
did not have to plead guilty and could choose a trial instead. The Petitioner responded that
he could “beat the attempted [murder] case.” The court observed, “Well, then you
shouldn’t plead. You should go to trial, then.”

       The trial court permitted the Petitioner to speak with plea counsel, and after their
discussion, the Petitioner announced that he wished to proceed with the plea. As the post-
conviction court observed in its order:

       Page 4 of the plea transcript reflects that Mr. Buie told the Court he thought
       “he could beat that attempted case.” The Court advised him he should not
       plead and go to trial. Page 5 reflects that the Court took a break so that Mr.
       Buie could have further discussions with his lawyer. After a break, Mr. Buie
       testified that he wanted to go forward with his plea. Mr. Buie never wavered
       in staying with his plea beyond that.

                                             9
We also note that the Petitioner denied needing additional time to discuss the plea
agreement with plea counsel, and he affirmed that he had “plenty of time to talk about this”
with his lawyer.

       Third, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner understood the
consequences of his plea. Again, the record fully supports this finding. The record shows
that the trial court reviewed the conviction offenses, the nature of the sentences, the
presence of consecutive sentences, the increased release eligibility, and the role of the
Department of Correction in calculating release dates. The Petitioner acknowledged each
of these aspects of his plea, including that the plea agreement would result in him “taking
more [time] than the Court could give [him].”

       Indeed, the Petitioner’s awareness of the terms of the agreement can be seen in his
responses to the trial court’s questions. For example, when the trial court asked the
Petitioner what “consecutive” meant during the discussion of the sentence to be imposed,
the Petitioner answered, “That means following each other.” Similarly, the trial court later
asked the Petitioner to identify the proposed sentence. The Petitioner responded, correctly,
“Twenty-five at a hundred percent and 15 consecutive at 35 percent.”

        Finally, the Petitioner’s awareness of the agreement can be seen in his answers to
the trial court’s questions. We have also recognized that where a petitioner asks questions
during the plea colloquy, these questions may show that the petitioner was “alert and
focused on his plea during the hearing.” Weaver v. State, No. W2017-00172-CCA-R3-PC,
2018 WL 324348, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2018), no perm. app. filed; Sanders v.
State, No. W2019-01797-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 7042934, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov.
30, 2020) (finding voluntary plea, in part, “[t]he Petitioner engaged the trial court with
multiple questions and discussed his plea agreement with counsel before entering the guilty
plea in this case.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 8, 2021); Stevens v. State, No. M2018-
00530-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 91837, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2020) (finding
voluntary plea, in part, where “Petitioner even took the time to clarify how his sentence
alignment would affect his parole eligibility, showing that he was not just mindlessly
saying ‘yes’ to every question asked by the trial court.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr.
15, 2020). In this case, the record shows that the trial court asked the Petitioner whether
he had any questions on at least four occasions, noting that “[i]f you have any questions
about any of this, it is good to ask right now.” The Petitioner asked questions regarding
the running of the consecutive sentences. He also told the court that the discussion of
pretrial credits was confusing “at first,” but that “we got it straightened out. I understand.”
At the end of the hearing, he represented to the court he had no further questions.

      A “defendant’s solemn declaration in open court that his plea is knowing and
voluntary creates ‘a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceeding’ because

                                              10
these declarations ‘carry a strong presumption of verity.’” Transou v. State, No. W2022-
00172-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 8047703, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2022) (quoting
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)), no perm. app. filed. The record supports
the post-conviction court’s finding that the Petitioner’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

                                      CONCLUSION

       In summary, we hold that the record supports the findings of the post-conviction
court that the Petitioner entered knowing, voluntary, and intelligent pleas of guilty.
Accordingly, because the Petitioner’s convictions or sentences are not void or voidable
because of the violation of a constitutional right, we respectfully affirm the denial of post-
conviction relief in all respects.

                                           ____________________________________
                                                 TOM GREENHOLTZ, JUDGE

                                             11