Court Opinion

ID: 9940127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:13:43.272301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:36.411061
License: Public Domain

The majority of this court concedes that there is no substantial difference between the factual basis of the present case and that shown in Dean v. Kuchel, 35 Cal.2d 444
[218 P.2d 521]. For the reasons I expressed in connection with the latter decision (35 Cal.2d at p. 449), I believe that the transaction between the county and the retirement board, although designated a "Lease Agreement with Options to Purchase," is no more than a cleverly designed subterfuge to evade the limitations of article XI, section 18, of the Constitution. *Page 703 
By the terms of the "lease," the county is immediately obligated to pay for the construction of a $6,000,000 building. It may do this in one of two ways. The total amount of the investment, plus 3 3/4 per cent interest, may be paid in installments under the guise of rent. But the county must continue "rent payments" until it has returned to the retirement board all of the investment with interest. During the next 40 years, should the county desire to discontinue the installment payments it may do so only by exercising its option to purchase.
The option price is computed by "taking the total investment of the Lessor in such Building and reducing such total at the rate of 2% per annum on the remaining balance." The longer the county delays exercising its option, the lower the price becomes but, in the meantime, the monthly installments must be paid. These payments are closely geared to the option price; in one way or another the county must pay for the building. Manifestly, the ultimate purpose of the transaction is for the county to acquire ownership of the building without securing the approval of the electorate.
I would also deny relief in this proceeding upon grounds of public policy. (Dean v. Kuchel, supra, at p. 454; City andCounty of San Francisco v. Linares, 16 Cal.2d 441, 448 [106 P.2d 369].)