Court Opinion

ID: 9720952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:45:23.712159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.499444
License: Public Domain

BRAUER, J., Concurring
I agree with the holding that defendant’s first admission was made in a custodial setting and was therefore inadmissible. I believe, as does the majority, that his subsequent post -Miranda statement was inextricably tied to the first one and was given under circumstances replete with earmarks of coercion so as to be inadmissible even under Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 [84 L.Ed.2d 222, 105 S.Ct. 1285],
But I cannot join in the discussion of the difference between a federal and California standard, here the alleged presumption of taint. I readily concede that the California Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of the California Constitution. No one has put it more clearly than Mr. Justice Cardozo: “A judgment by the higest court of a state as to the meaning and effect of its own constitution is decisive and controlling everywhere.” (Highland Farms Dairy v.Agnew (1937) 300 U.S. 608, 613 [81 L.Ed. 835, 840, 57 S.Ct. *675549].) But while I do not challenge the power, I question the manner of its exercise in the last 15 years.
Intent upon shedding the obligation to follow unpalatable constitutional doctrine, the California Supreme Court has endeavored to infuse different meaning into language of the California Constitution which is essentially identical to that of its federal counterpart.1 In People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628 [100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880], the decision which outlawed the death penalty, the court labored mightily and brought forth2 the fact that the delegates to the constitutional convention adopted the “cruel or unusual punishment” language from the North Carolina Constitution rather than the “cruel and unusual” words contained in the Iowa and United States Constitutions, and that such choice was purposeful. Purposeful, perhaps, but to what purpose? No evidence was cited in Anderson, none has ever been cited, none can be cited, that the delegates by that choice, or the People in adopting the California Constitution and its amendments, intended to accord to lawbreakers any greater immunity from being held accountable than is vouchsafed them by the United States Constitution. If there ever was doubt on that subject, it was dispelled by Proposition 8.3
In People v. May (Cal.), the California Supreme Court again reaffirmed an exclusionary rule applicable to defendants’ statements, broader than one permissible under federal precedents. Rehearing has been granted in that case.4 Our High Court now has an opportunity to take another look at “the newly discovered separate and independent state constitutional interpretations.”51 respectfully suggest that if such scrutiny is undertaken, the “independent state ground” doctrine will be revealed to rest on a historical foundation of sand.

See Clark, J., dissenting in People v. Norman (1975) 14 Cal.3d 929, 940 [123 Cal.Rptr. 109, 538 P.2d 237],

“The mountains will be in labor, and a mouse will be brought forth.” (Horace, Epistles, Ars Poética, line 139.)

California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (d); In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879, 889, 890 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].

Minutes of the Supreme Court, March 26, 1987 (Crim. 24991).

Richardson, J. dissenting in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 120 [127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272],