Court Opinion

ID: 9692057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:38:36.393412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:30.170364
License: Public Domain

*399Amestoy, CJ.,
dissenting. I agree with the majority that the trial court’s findings on the need to seat R.L. — a child witness — with her back to defendant were inadequate. I do not agree that the deficiency requires reversal of the judgment. The evidence at the heart of the State’s case — the videotaped deposition testimony of the seven-year-old victim, M.C. — leaves no doubt that the jury would have reached exactly the same result without R.L.’s testimony. The majority is mistaken, as well, in concluding that R.L.’s testimony was inadmissible under V.R.E. 404(b) to prove that defendant’s misconduct was not the result of accident or mistake. Defendant placed his intent sufficiently at issue to admit the testimony, as the trial court here reasonably concluded. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The Sixth Amendment issue arose in response to the State’s motion for a special seating arrangement for R.L., who was nine years old at the time and had not seen defendant since she had alleged that he molested her two years earlier. The trial court approved an arrangement whereby the child sat at a table in front of the jury, with her back to defendant. As the majority correctly observes, this arrangement was not necessarily invalid; the right to confrontation is not absolute, and may give way upon an adequate showing of necessity to protect the welfare of a child witness. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850-55 (1990). The problem here arose because the court failed to make specific findings on the record that the accommodation was necessary to avoid causing the child emotional trauma, as the high court has required. See id. at 855-56.
In this regard, however, it is worth noting that although defense counsel objected to the seating arrangement, the objection was principally on the basis that defendant had an absolute right to physically confront the witness, a right which is qualified. Counsel did not object on the ground that the State’s showing of need was insufficient to justify the proposed seating arrangement, the issue which defendant has raised on appeal. Nor did counsel object that the court’s findings in response to the State’s motion were deficient. Although defendant’s objection may have been adequate to preserve the constitutional claim for review, a proper objection would have provided the trial court an opportunity to determine whether the requirements of Craig had been satisfied, and to make the requisite finding of need on the record.
Nevertheless, as the majority notes, the trial court’s failure to make the requisite finding of need does not mark the end of our inquiry. Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis, focusing on the strength of the remaining evidence and the potential prejudice of the otherwise improper evidence. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, *4001021 (1988). Analyzed in this light, the majority concludes that the trial court’s omission cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the only other evidence of guilt was the victim’s testimony, and because R.L.’s evidence was highly prejudicial. Neither argument withstands analysis.
First, this case was not merely “a classic swearing contest,” as the majority asserts, nor were the victim’s accusations uncorroborated. 174 Vt. at 385,817 A.2d at 34. While it is rare to adduce eyewitnesses to a child molestation, here the State presented the next best thing, a generally consistent report to a third party, the victim’s mother, with such authenticating details as the fact that the mother first learned of the misconduct by overhearing a conversation between the victim and her sister, that the victim was initially reluctant to reveal what had happened, and that doing so caused her to become upset. Defendant admitted, moreover, that his genitals had come into contact with the victim’s hand, although he claimed that the touching was inadvertent.
Nor, in determining harmless error, are we required to disregard the quality of the remaining evidence and its likely impact on the jury. The jury here had the opportunity to view the deposition testimony of M.C., the seven-year-old victim in this case, to consider her detailed and graphic description of defendant’s numerous acts of sexual misconduct, and to weigh her credibility against that of defendant. This, in my view, removes any doubt that the jury would have reached the identical verdict in the absence of R.L.’s testimony.
The substance of R.L.’s brief testimony, in contrast to M.C.’s, was that defendant had once touched her “privates,” which she was able to define as the vagina and penis. Although the majority characterizes the testimony as “particularly explosive and prejudicial,” 174 Vt. at 388,817 A.2d at 36, the deputy state’s attorney — who otherwise utilized every possible piece of incriminating evidence — made no mention of R.L. during closing argument. Thus, in the context of this case, the record supports the conclusion that any error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority also claims that the substance of R.L.’s testimony was improperly admitted under V.R.E. 404(b) as prior bad act evidence. The State had argued, among other theories, that R.L.’s testimony was relevant to show that “the contact between defendant and M.C. was not an accident,” and that defendant “intentionally, and not mistakenly, assaulted M.C.” The trial court agreed, ruling that the evidence was relevant and admissible on the issue of accidental sexual contact.
*401Contrary to the trial court’s express finding, the majority holds that defendant had not placed his intent at issue. This holding is based, in my view, upon a mistaken reading of the record and the law. Detective Demar testified that although defendant denied engaging in sexual contact with M. C., he admitted that it was possible that M.C.’s hand had accidentally touched his penis while she was getting into his shower and he was getting out, and defendant later admitted that the touching had occurred. Defendant also told the detectives that he had gone to the store with M.C. to buy her candy “before we took the shower.” Defendant further described an incident in which he was playing with the girls when they allegedly pulled down his pants and M.C. reached up and grabbed his penis. During the videotaped deposition of M.C., defense counsel closely questioned the minor about the shower incident, attempting to establish that defendant was unaware of M.C.’s presence. This line of questioning by defense counsel tended to corroborate defendant’s pretrial statement to Detective Demar that any touching was inadvertent and accidental.
While this Court has not fully explored the circumstances sufficient to put the question of intent “genuinely in issue,” State v. Winter, 162 Vt. 388, 393, 648 A.2d 624, 627 (1994), other courts have routinely held that intent may become sufficiently material to warrant the admission of prior bad acts evidence through a variety of means, including the defendant’s pretrial statements, defense counsel’s opening statement, counsel’s cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, or defendant’s case-in-chief. See, e.g., State v. Mincey, 636 P.2d 637, 653 (Ariz. 1981) (defendant opened door to prior crimes evidence through counsel’s opening statement), cert. denied, Mincey v. Arizona, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982); Butcher v. State, 627 N.E.2d 855, 858-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant placed his intent at issue through pretrial statement to the police claiming that the victim had caused the touching by pulling defendant toward her); Day v. State, 643 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant placed his intent at issue through defense counsel’s cross-examination of the two victims which “suggested the lack of [defendant’s] intent as they emphasized the innocent nature of the touches being made during a game of tag”); People v. Vandervliet, 508 N.W.2d 114, 126-27 (Mich. 1993) (defendant’s general denial of alleged sexual misconduct with minor did not preclude admission of other acts evidence where defendant’s pretrial statements claimed that touching was accidental); Welch v. State, 2 P.3d 356, 367 (Okla. Crim. App.) (defense counsel’s opening statement and questioning of witnesses raised issue of mistake or accident sufficiently to warrant admission of other crimes evidence), cert. denied, Welch v. Oklahoma, 531 U.S. 1056 (2000); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68-69 (1991) (although *402defendant did not assert accident defense at trial, prior bad acts demonstrating battered child syndrome were admissible where defendant had claimed in pretrial statements that child had injured herself by falling from couch).1
The majority also cites a treatise on prior bad act evidence for the “general rule” that intent is not genuinely at issue when the defendant implicitly concedes mens rea by raising an identity or alibi defense. 2 E. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 813, at 69 (1999). The point is inapposite. Whatever the merits of the general rule, it is — in my view — of assistance only where there is no doubt that a crime has been committed. I accept that mens rea can be characterized as “undisputéd” where the prosecution’s eyewitness testimony describes a crime that was obviously committed (as, for example, where witnesses have seen a perpetrator’s unprovoked assault), and the defendant has denied he was the perpetrator through, for example, an alibi defense. In such a case, intent cannot be said to be sufficiently material to allow the use of bad acts evidence, since the jury’s determination of the defendant’s guilt will depend entirely upon their acceptance or rejection of the alibi.
This is a very different case. As the majority correctly observes, rather than having eyewitnesses describing a crime obviously committed, the victim’s allegations of sexual abuse had no direct corroboration. Apart from the circumstantial evidence described earlier that lent credibility to the victim’s allegations, the evidence here might have described a “classic swearing contest” but for the one piece of suspicious conduct that defendant could not deny without jeopardizing his credibility. That, of course, was the “shower incident.” I have a much different view of the significance of this incident than does the majority.
Defendant admitted to investigating officers that he took M.C. to buy candy “before we took the shower.” The majority notes that, despite this statement, defendant thereafter consistently denied that he and M.C. showered together. But even defendant’s later version of the incident conceded that the “separate” showers of defendant and M.C. were so closely related in time that defendant felt compelled to explain that M.C. *403may have accidentally touched his penis while she was getting into the shower and he was getting out.2
The “accidental touching” defense to the shower incident was pertinent not only to the lewd and lascivious charge, but to the other counts, as well. We have previously observed that “many people, including juries, and judges, find it difficult to believe that [sexual abuse of children] happens.” State v. Forbes, 161 Vt. 327, 332, 640 A.2d 13, 16 (1993) (internal quotation and citation omitted). It may be true, as the majority speculates, that no juror who believed M.C.’s testimony could conclude that defendant’s actions were accidental. But it is at least as valid to speculate that a juror who believed defendant’s touching of M.C. in the shower was accidental would also conclude that none of the other alleged acts occurred. The relevance of the accidental touching explanation to all of the charges was well understood by the prosecution, the defense, and the court.
The question here is not whether evidence falls within an exception to a supposed rule of exclusion, but whether the “evidence [is] in any way relevant to a fact in issue other than by showing mere propensity.” Vandervliet, 508 N.W.2d at 121 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Notwithstanding defendant’s general denial, the record and the law amply support the trial court’s conclusion that defendant had placed his intent sufficiently at issue to support the admission of R.L.’s testimony under the “mistake or accident” exception to V.R.E. 404(b).
. The majority also argues that any probative value of R.L.’s testimony was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact under V.R.E. 403.3 Again, the record does not support the claim. Although clearly relevant to rebutting defendant’s claim of accidental or inadvertent touching, R.L.’s testimony was limited. In contrast to M.C.’s extensive, videotaped testimony graphically describing the multiple acts of sexual misconduct perpetrated by defendant, R.L.’s pertinent testimony consisted of a few brief questions and answers to the effect that defendant had once touched her privates while they were watching television. Defense counsel asked no questions of R.L. on cross-examination, and the prosecutor made no *404reference to her testimony during closing argument. In addition, the court issued a limiting instruction to the jury confining the relevance of her testimony. Accordingly, I do not agree that the court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony, or that its prejudicial impact so outweighed its probative value as to require reversal of the judgment. See State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366, 383-84, 534 A.2d 184, 195 (1987) (record did not support conclusion that court abused or withheld its discretion in admitting evidence of prior sexual misconduct given logical relevance of evidence and court’s limiting instruction).
Finally, the majority posits afatal inconsistency in the State’s effort to characterize R.L.’s testimony as sufficiently probative for admission, but insufficiently probative to have affected the jury’s decision. The dynamic of trial, however, frequently results in the admission of relevant evidence of ultimately little importance. Viewed in its entirety, the record here fully supports the conclusion that the verdict would have been guilty, even if R.L. had never testified. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment.

 The supplemental federal authorities submitted by defendant suggest only that a defendant may in some cases remove intent as a contested issue, and thereby preclude the admission of prior bad acts evidence, through “some statement to the court of sufficient clarity to indicate that the issue will not be disputed.” United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 659 (2d Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272-74 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1173-76 (1st Cir. 1993). Whatever the merits of this approach, there was no such statement or stipulation in this case.

 The majority asserts that there was, in fact, no evidence of accidental touchinginthe shower, but rather that “defendant described accidental touching outside the shower,” as he exited and M.C. entered. 174 Vt. at 394 n.9, 817 A.2d at 41 n.9. Thus, the majority concedes that defendant placed his intent at issue; the fact that M.C.’s version of the incident differed somewhat from defendant’s does nothing to undermine the point.

 Rule 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unían- prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”