Court Opinion

ID: 9851120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:07:34.264956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:48.934176
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe the majority errs in concluding that there is insufficient evidence to support the habeas court’s finding of prejudice on Means’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, I dissent.
The majority bases its holding on trial counsel’s testimony that, even if he had seen the victim’s medical record in which she stated that Means did not penetrate her, he would nevertheless have recommended that Means plead guilty. In this regard, the majority notes that a factor leading to this testimony by trial counsel was trial counsel’s recognition that, despite the DNA test results, which provided Means with a “no penetration” defense, the victim could have testified at trial that penetration had occurred. Moreover, another factor that led to trial counsel’s testimony that he would not have changed his recommendation even if he had seen the report was the fact that at the time of the plea negotiations Means had the “no-penetration” defense based upon the DNA test results, and yet the prosecutor would agree only to a plea of guilty to rape. In relying on trial counsel’s testimony to conclude that Means failed to prove prejudice, what the majority fails to recognize is that the habeas court was authorized to infer from the victim’s medical record (1) that it would have been unlikely the victim would have testified at trial that penetration had occurred and (2) that Means’s “no penetration” defense would have been significantly strengthened. These reasonable inferences also authorized the habeas court to conclude that the plea negotiations would have been significantly altered by trial counsel’s knowledge of the victim’s medical report, and authorized the habeas *714court to discount trial counsel’s testimony that he would not have changed his recommendation even if he had known of the report at the time of the plea negotiations. I therefore believe that the evidence of the medical report itself, coupled with trial counsel’s testimony, authorized the habeas court to find that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error in failing to obtain the medical report before the plea negotiations, the result of those negotiations would have been different.3
Decided October 18, 1999
Reconsideration denied November 15, 1999.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Frank A. Ilardi, Daniel G. Ashburn, Angelica M. Woo, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Stephen T. Maples, Bernard Knight, for appellee.
For these reasons, I dissent to the majority’s conclusion that Means failed to show prejudice. I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins in this dissent.

 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).