Court Opinion

ID: 9484324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:48:46.790996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:10.152691
License: Public Domain

*1183DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
As amended in 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
“No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.... ” (Emphasis supplied.)
My colleagues on the panel have concluded that as a matter of law, the plaintiff physician cannot be said to have been excluded from defendant hospital’s medical staff “solely” by reason of his handicap. I fully agree. I write separately, however, because my reasons for reaching this conclusion differ somewhat from those of the other members of the panel.
The plaintiff contends, as I understand it, that the disruptive covert activities in which he engaged were the product of a mental handicap; that the hospital suspended his medical staff privileges solely by reason of this handicap; that he subsequently began a course of psychiatric treatment in which salts of lithium were administered; that although this course of treatment was successful, the hospital refused to reinstate his staff privileges; and that like the original suspension, the refusal to reinstate the privileges was solely the result of the mental handicap.
Turning first to the initial act of the hospital in suspending the plaintiffs staff privileges, it is clear that the suspension was a direct result of the hospital’s discovery that it was the plaintiff who had been removing medical correspondence and other material from the boxes of other doctors at the hospital. There is no dispute about this. Whether the hospital knew or had reason to know that the plaintiffs conduct was attributable to mental illness is immaterial, in my view; no hospital could be expected to tolerate the theft of correspondence addressed to physicians on its staff. The plaintiff was clearly suspended because of his intolerable conduct, and not solely because of his mental condition.
The plaintiff argues, however, that there is a material issue of fact as to whether the hospital acted legally in refusing to reinstate him after he started taking lithium to control his mental disorder. I do not find the argument persuasive.
The stated reasons for the adverse decision on reinstatement are set forth in an 11 page single-spaced typewritten report of the medical staff executive committee dated March 7, 1989. The reasons given in the report were “manifold,” as the magistrate subsequently observed; they “included the plaintiffs history of vindictive acts, which had continued to occur after his suspension, his lack of honesty with regard to his misconduct, not only in the past, but with regard to more recent events, problems with monitoring future conduct, concerns about possible unresponsiveness to treatment, and the impact from the plaintiffs conduct on his professional relationships.” Report and Recommendation of Magistrate James G. Carr, entered April 13, 1992, at page 17.
Insofar as the plaintiffs responsiveness to treatment is concerned, the report of the medical staff executive committee notes that Dr. Resnick, a psychiatric consultant to the committee, did not believe that the plaintiff was suffering from the sort of “affective” disorder that could be controlled by lithium. This psychiatrist was further of the view that even if the plaintiff had such a disorder, his covert harassment activities were unrelated to it. In this connection it was noted that as recently as October of 1988, at a time when the plaintiff was taking lithium and was undergoing psychiatric care, the plaintiff had put super glue in the locks at the home of a woman who had had the locks changed after the termination of a romantic relationship with the plaintiff.
The report of the medical staff executive committee concluded its analysis of the plaintiffs history of vindictive acts with this paragraph:
“It appears that these vindictive acts are a consequence of Dr. Landefeld’s personality disorder that may or may not be complicated by an affective disorder. Although there is disagreement between the psychiatrists as to the nature of the affec*1184tive disorder, Dr. Resnick in his oral and written communications with the Committee has indicated that there is a strong likelihood that the type of vindictive acts in which Dr. Landefeld has engaged in the past will continue to occur. This is especially true since the most recent incident occurred while Dr. Landefeld was on Lithium and undergoing psychiatric care. Dr. Harding believes that this is less likely, but even he acknowledges that there is no guarantee that there will not be a reoccur-rence of this type of activities. The Committee is of the opinion that Dr. Lande-feld’s history of this type of covert harassment activities, including the activities that have occurred while he has been under psychiatric care, indicates that there is a strong likelihood that he will continue to engage in this type of activity in the future. This type of activity is inconsistent with and detrimental to the professional relationships within the medical staff.”
After discussing in detail a perceived lack of honesty in the plaintiffs professional relationships, the committee expressed itself as follows:
“The Committee believes that Dr. Lande-feld has demonstrated both before and after psychiatric treatment that he continues to be dishonest in his dealings with others. This obviously creates a problem with respect to any future covert harassment activities, and may have been and could continue to be a problem on questions such as quality of care review. Dr. Landefeld’s lack of honesty is, therefore, a matter of considerable concern.”
The report went on to discuss the surveillance problems that would be posed if the plaintiff were returned to the staff; the impracticability of monitoring the plaintiffs psychiatric progress; the poor prospects for effecting major change in the narcissistic personality disorder from which Dr. Resnick believed the plaintiff suffered; and problems created by the plaintiffs troubled professional relationships. As to the latter, the report made these observations:
“It is fundamental to the medical staff relationships that there be trust among professionals and the professionals be able to deal with one another in an appropriate manner. Both Dr. Harding and Dr. Res-nick recognized the importance of this element. Dr. Landefeld’s consistent and continuing inappropriate behavior, coupled with his dishonesty when confronted with this behavior, reflects an attitude that is inconsistent with the trust relationship that must exist.”
There is much more in the report, but the reasons described above amply justify the recommendation that the plaintiffs reapplication for membership on the staff be denied. That recommendation was adopted by a unanimous vote of the hospital’s board of directors. Neither Magistrate Carr nor Judge Potter, the district judge to whom Magistrate Carr’s recommendations were addressed, could find any probative evidence that the hospital’s announced reasons for refusing reinstatement amounted to a pretext for denying the benefits of staff membership on an illegal basis. My independent review of the record has likewise failed to disclose any reason for withholding summary judgment in this case; I therefore concur in the affirmance of the district court’s order.