Court Opinion

ID: 9573462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:55:33.722188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:58.448540
License: Public Domain

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.
¶ 50. (concurring in part, dissenting in part). Wisconsin Stat. § 980.05(lm) provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll constitutional rights available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding are available to the person" who is the subject of a sexually-violent-person petition under § 980.02. The majority concludes that this provision "grants a ch. 980 respondent the same rights at his or her ch. 980 commitment trial as a defendant is entitled to in a criminal case." Majority op., ¶ 2. Since a defendant in a criminal proceeding has a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the majority reasons that any statements by a defendant which are 1) testimonial; 2) compelled; and 3) incriminating must be excluded at a ch. 980 commitment trial. Majority op., ¶¶ 28, 42. The majority defines "incriminating" as "statements [that] could incriminate [one] in a pending or subsequent criminal prosecution. . . ." Majority op., ¶ 29 (citing State v. Zanelli, ("Zanelli II") 223 Wis. 2d 545, 568, 589 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1998). Applying that definition to the ch. 980 proceeding, the majority remands two of the four statements at issue it determines to be incriminating to the circuit court to determine whether those statements were compelled. Majority op., ¶¶ 30-34.
¶ 51. I respectfully disagree with the majority's analysis as well as its conclusion. I conclude that the majority first misapplies Wis. Stat. § 980.05(lm) to provide for constitutional protections that do not exist *33in a ch. 980 proceeding, and then mischaracterizes Zanelli II to develop a definition of "incriminating" which is not grounded in the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and which is inconsistent with the definition provided by the United States Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n.5 (1980).
¶ 52. I conclude that statements made to a parole agent would be admissible in a civil ch. 980 proceeding, and that a proper application of the Fifth Amendment privilege in such a proceeding would result in the exclusion of testimonial, compelled, incriminating statements at a subsequent criminal proceeding only. I would thus admit all four statements in the ch. 980 proceeding against Mark, but bar their admission in subsequent criminal proceedings. I would also adhere to the definition of "incriminating" set forth previously by the United States Supreme Court. I therefore concur in part, and dissent in part from the court's decision and mandate.1
HH
¶ 53. The Wisconsin Legislature has provided persons being tried to determine whether they are sexually violent with all constitutional rights available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Wis. Stat. § 980.05(lm). In doing so, the legislature has not spelled out how those rights should be applied at a ch. 980 proceeding.
¶ 54. At issue in this case is how the Fifth Amendment should he applied to ch. 980 respondents under Wis. Stat. § 980.05. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, *34that "[n]o person . .. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const, amend. V (emphasis added). The majority, in applying Wis. Stat. § 980.05(lm), apparently reads this provision in conjunction with the statute to mean that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to ch. 980 proceedings, thereby allowing a person subject to a ch. 980 proceeding to refuse to answer any questions that may be used to incriminate the person in a future criminal case. The majority then applies the label "self-incrimination" to ch. 980 proceedings, instead of applying the constitutional right that is protected. The constitutional right that is protected is that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in any criminal case, and not merely that no person is compelled to be a witness against himself.
¶ 55. This court has recognized that ch. 980 proceedings are not criminal trials, but are civil proceedings that authorize the civil commitment of persons previously convicted of a sexually violent offense, who currently suffer from a mental disorder that predisposes them to commit such acts. State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 294, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995). The purpose of civil commitment "is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness." Id. at 308 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983)). The court has specifically held that "ch. 980 was not enacted to punish convicted sex offenders but rather to protect public safety and treat sexually violent persons." State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 274, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995). Consequently, ch. 980 trials are not criminal cases, and as such, the Fifth Amendment does not preclude the use of compelled incriminating statements in ch. 980 proceedings, so long as those statements are not used in subsequent *35criminal proceedings. The Fifth Amendment precludes such use in criminal cases only.2 See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) ("Allen I"); State v. Lombard, 2004 WI 95, ¶¶ 42-43, 273 Wis. 2d 538, 684 N.W.2d 103. The grant of constitutional rights available to a defendant in a criminal prosecution to respondents in a ch. 980 proceeding does not alter the fundamental character of the Fifth Amendment. The statute cannot be construed to confer nonexistent constitutional rights.3
¶ 56. I would follow the lead of the Illinois Supreme Court and conclude that there is no privilege against self-incrimination in sexually-dangerous-person proceedings. See People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 103, 481 N.E.2d 690 (1985) ("Allen II"). There, the court noted that since treatment, not punishment, is the aim *36of the statute, the legislative determination that the proceedings are civil in nature was eminently reasonable. Id. at 100-01. The court reasoned that "the state has a substantial interest in treating as well as protecting the public from sexually dangerous persons," and that its substantial interest would be almost totally thwarted by a strict application of the privilege. Id. at 102-03. As the court so aptly put it, "[i]f a defendant is allowed to refuse to answer questions during a psychiatric interview then it would be nearly impossible for the State to determine whether or not the defendant was sexually dangerous." Id. at 103.
¶ 57. The persuasive analysis of the Illinois court is certainly applicable here. Our sexually-dangerous-persons provisions, like those in Illinois, are also civil in nature. Our statute's purpose, as in Illinois, is to provide treatment and to protect the public from sexually-dangerous persons. While this case involves statements made to a parole agent as opposed to a psychiatrist, to allow a person to refuse to truthfully and accurately account to his or her agent the person's whereabouts and activities would similarly frustrate the purposes of the sexually-dangerous-person provisions by making it more difficult to determine if the person was sexually dangerous. It makes perfect sense to require a potential committee to communicate with probation and parole agents and psychiatrists as part of the process in determining whether the person is dangerous and in need of treatment. We should encourage procedures that lead to a proper determination of dangerousness, not frustrate them.
¶ 58. The Illinois court was mindful of the problems associated with allowing a person who might be sexually dangerous to refuse to answer questions which might incriminate him or her as a means of protecting *37that person's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in future criminal proceedings. Id. at 103. The court concluded that to allow even a limited privilege "would unduly frustrate the purposes of the sexually dangerous persons provisions by making it nearly impossible to identify sexually dangerous persons." Id. Accordingly, citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468-69 (1981), the court concluded that statements made to a psychiatrist in a compulsory examination under the sexually-dangerous person provisions may not be used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings. Id. at 104. "Consequently, defendants must answer all questions at such examinations regardless of the possible incriminatory nature of the answers." Id.
¶ 59. The United States Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the procedure approved by the Illinois Supreme Court. Allen I, 478 U.S. 364. The nation's high court noted that Illinois had expressly provided that proceedings under the act were civil in nature. Id. at 368. The Court determined that the state had disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for treatment of those it commits, and established a system under which committed persons could be released permanently or conditionally. Id. at 370. The Court indicated that in Illinois, the "proceedings under the Act are accompanied by procedural safeguards usually found in criminal trials[,]" including the right to counsel, the right to demand a jury trial, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and a burden of proof upon the state beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 371. Yet, the court concluded that the proceedings under the Act were not "criminal" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 374.
¶ 60. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a person whom the state attempts to commit under the Act is protected from use *38of the compelled answers in subsequent criminal proceedings. Id. at 368. Thus, "[w]hat we have here ... is not a claim that petitioner's statements... might be used to incriminate him in some future criminal proceeding, but instead his claim that because the sexually-dangerous-person proceeding is itself 'criminal,' he was entitled to refuse to answer any questions at all." Id. In approving the Illinois court's handling of the case, the Court concluded that:
[t]his Court has never held that the Due Process Clause of its own force requires application of the privilege against self-incrimination in a noncriminal proceeding, where the privilege is protected against his compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case. We decline to do so today.
Id. at 374.
¶ 61. I agree with the approach taken by the Illinois Supreme Court in Allen II, and approved by the United States Supreme Court in Allen I. Our statute provides a person facing commitment with all constitutional rights available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding, no more and no less. There is no constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination available to a defendant in a sexually-dangerous-person proceeding, as the proceeding is civil, not criminal, so long as any compelled statements are precluded from use in subsequent criminal proceedings. By excluding statements made in anticipation of a ch. 980 proceeding to a probation and parole agent in subsequent criminal actions against the person, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.4 I would not, as an *39alternative means of protecting the privilege in some potential future prosecution, allow a defendant to refuse to provide the very answers that would enable a court to determine whether he or she should be committed as a sexually-dangerous person. The State of Wisconsin has a substantial interest in treating the person's mental illness and protecting that person and society from his or her future dangerousness. Accordingly, I would admit all four statements in the ch. 980 proceeding against Mark, but bar their admission in subsequent criminal proceedings.
HH I — I
¶ 62. The majority defines "incriminating" as "statements [that] could incriminate [one] in a pending or subsequent criminal prosecution. . .." Majority op., ¶ 29 (citing Zanelli II, 223 Wis. 2d at 568). In doing so, the majority inadvertently mischaracterizes Zanelli II by taking the language out of context in providing the above definition when, in fact, the Zanelli II court was saying something else. The actual language taken from Zanelli II is as follows:
Zanelli never specifies the statements he is challenging and has not set forth any facts to establish that he was compelled to choose between giving answers that would incriminate him and risking revocation of his conditional liberty. A review of the record reveals that Coffey, *40Miller, and Porter testified regarding the 1977 and 1991-92 matters for which Zanelli had already been convicted, so such statements could not subject Zanelli to future criminal prosecution. Further, any statements about Zanelli's background, including his employment and family, could not, by themselves, incriminate Zanelli in a subsequent criminal prosecution. The fact that such statements can be used in a ch. 980, Stats., case does not mean that the statements could incriminate him in a pending or subsequent criminal prosecution as ch. 980 is a civil commitment proceeding, not a criminal proceeding. See State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 270-72, 541 N.W.2d 105, 112-13 (1995).
Zanelli II, 223 Wis. 2d at 568 (emphasis added).
¶ 63. Zanelli II cited this court's decision in Carpenter when it stated that ch. 980 proceedings were civil, not criminal. Carpenter, in turn, cites to the analysis in Allen I in determining that the principal purposes of ch. 980 are the protection of the public and the treatment of convicted sex offenders who are at risk to offend, and not punishment. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 270-72. Accordingly, instead of creating a new definition for "incriminating," the Zanelli II court was merely applying Allen I in determining why no privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies to ch. 980 civil proceedings. A new definition for the word "incriminating" can be discerned only by adding words to what was written by the court and deleting a portion of the sentence, and that has the effect of altering the meaning. I instead view Zanelli II as being consistent with Part I of this concurring/dissenting opinion, and not creating a new definition for the term "incriminating."
¶ 64. As the majority notes, "incriminating response" has already been defined by the United States Supreme Court. Majority op., ¶ 30. "By 'incriminating *41response' we refer to any response — whether inculpa-tory or exculpatory — that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial." Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.5 (emphasis in original). The Court continued by quoting Miranda in the footnote to explain its meaning:
No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory". If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966).
¶ 65. I see no reason to deviate from the definition provided by our high court in Innis. That definition is perfectly consistent with the Fifth Amendment, which, after all, provides that no person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against oneself. Compelling a person to give information and then seeking to use that information in a trial against that person, whether that information was inculpatory or exculpatory, is the same as compelling a person to be a witness against oneself. We must be ever mindful that the privilege to be applied is not the label (compulsory *42self-incrimination), but the constitutional provision itself (to not be a witness against oneself in a criminal proceeding). I would not do damage to the Fifth Amendment privilege by redefining it, particularly when the privilege does not apply to ch. 980 civil proceedings. Zanelli II does not redefine "incriminating" or "incriminating response;" it merely adopts Carpenter, which in turn adopts Allen I. I would do the same, and avoid satellite litigation on what constitutes "incriminating response" down the road.
HH HH » — I
¶ 66. I conclude that statements made to Mark's parole agent are admissible in his civil ch. 980 proceeding, and that a proper application of the Fifth Amendment privilege in such a proceeding would result in the exclusion of testimonial, compelled, incriminating statements at a subsequent criminal proceeding only. I would thus admit all four statements in the ch. 980 proceeding against Mark, but bar their admission in subsequent criminal proceedings. I would also adhere to the definition of "incriminating" set forth previously by the United States Supreme Court. I therefore concur in part, and dissent in part from the court's decision and mandate.

 1 join Part III of the majority opinion.

 I do not mean to suggest that the Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be asserted in a civil proceeding. It has "long been recognized in Wisconsin that a person may invoke the fifth amendment in a civil case in order to protect himself [or herself] from the use of such evidence against him [or her] in a subsequent criminal action...." Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 687, 176 N.W.2d 292 (1970) (citation omitted). However, "[assertion of the fifth amendment does not itself result in the right to remain silent in the face of interrogation during the course of civil proceedings. '[T]he pendency of criminal proceedings does not by itself excuse a witness of his obligation to give testimony in civil proceedings. Some nexus between the risk of criminal conviction and the information requested must exist.1" B & B Investments v. Mirro Corp., 147 Wis. 2d 675, 686, 434 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment privilege is protected by precluding the use of any compelled statements in subsequent criminal proceedings.

 This does not render Wis. Stat. § 980.05(lm) superfluous. Properly applied, that statute would ensure that any compelled statements used during a ch. 980 proceeding cannot be used against the respondent in any future criminal proceeding.

 If the State had decided to forego a ch. 980 commitment proceeding and instead initiate new criminal charges against Mark, then the use and derivative use immunity rule would *39apply to both revocation proceedings and the new criminal charges. See State ex rel. Tate v. Schwarz, 2002 WI 127, ¶¶ 17-22, 257 Wis. 2d 40, 654 N.W.2d 438; State v. Evans, 77 Wis. 2d 225, 234, 252 N.W.2d 664 (1977); State v. Thompson, 142 Wis. 2d 821, 825, 831, 419 N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1987). As he was not charged with any new crimes as a result of his statements, that rule is not applicable or necessary to ch. 980 proceedings if we adopt the Illinois procedure.