Court Opinion

ID: 9885608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:08:01.936182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:55.330514
License: Public Domain

Desmond, J.
(dissenting). This employer had, in the absence of countervailing statute or agreement, an absolute, common-law right to discharge its employees, with or without cause (Watson v. Gugino, 204 N. Y. 535, 541; Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 117,121). Since, concededly, no statute and no agreement has cancelled or cut down that right, there is nothing here to arbitrate. True, the arbitration clause is a broad one, but not broad enough to send to arbitrators a supposed question of whether the employer has waived his common-law right or agreed to arbitrate as to discharges, when there is not a word in the agreement to say or suggest that the parties were dealing with any such matter.
Indeed, appellant concedes in its brief on this appeal, that ‘£ on the face of the contract there appears no limitation of the right of the employer to discharge.” Since there was.no such contractual limitation, the right remained, unimpaired, and no ££ dispute ” about it could arise merely on appellant’s say-so. Furthermore, there is in the contract itself (article Fifteenth) evidence that the parties were, knowingly, abstaining from any agreement as to discharges. After defining “ lay-off ” and ££ discharge ” and noting that a distinction is being made between “ discharge ” and ££ lay-off ”, the agreement makes certain rules as to ££ lay-offs ” but none as to ££ discharges ”. In practical effect, that was a declaration that the employer’s rights as to discharges were unimpaired by the agreement.
There should be an affirmance, with costs.
Conway, Fuld and Froessel, JJ., concur with Lewis, Ch. J.; Desmond, J., dissents in opinion in which Dye, J., concurs; Van Voorhis, J., taking no part.
Ordered accordingly.