Court Opinion

ID: 9780839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:59:56.27472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:13.921659
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Robert C., Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence in this case is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that defendant constructively possessed the marijuana and drug paraphernalia found in the bedroom in which he and two other individuals were detained. As the trial court should have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the related charges for insufficient evidence, I dissent.
“When considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court’s inquiry is limited to a determination of ‘whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.’ ” State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, *68145, 567 S.E.2d 137, 139 (2002) (quoting State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996)). “Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion.” State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 597, 573 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002). While the trial court, in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, is required to consider the evidence in the light most beneficial to the State, making all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State, as well as resolving all contradictions and discrepancies in its favor, In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 656, 260 S.E.2d 591, 602 (1979), “ ‘[e]vidence which merely shows it possible for the fact in issue to be as alleged, or which raises a mere conjecture that it is so, is an insufficient foundation for a verdict and should not be left to the jury[,]’ ” State v. Madden, 212 N.C. 56, 60, 192 S.E. 859, 861 (1937) (quoting State v. Vinson, 63 N.C. 335, 338 (1869)). If the evidence is “sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the motion to dismiss must be allowed,” even if “the suspicion aroused by the evidence is strong.” State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176, 179, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983); accord State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988) (“[A] motion to dismiss should be allowed where the facts and circumstances warranted by the evidence do no more than raise a suspicion of guilt or conjecture since there would still remain a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt.”).
It is well established that the State may obtain a conviction for a possessory offense by establishing that the defendant either had actual or constructive possession of the contraband. State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 12, 187 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1972). “A person has actual possession of [a thing] if it is on his person, he is aware of its presence, and either by himself or together with others he has the power and intent to control its disposition or use.” State v. Reid, 151 N.C. App. 420, 428-29, 566 S.E.2d 186, 192 (2002). In contrast, “[a] person is in constructive possession of a thing when, while not having actual pos-. session, he has the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over that thing.” State v. Beaver, 317 N.C. 643, 648, 346 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1986). When, however, the defendant does not have exclusive possession of the place where the contraband is found, constructive possession “exists only upon a showing of some independent and incriminating circumstance, beyond mere association or presence,” linking the defendant to the contraband. State v. Alston, 131 N.C. App. 514, 519, 508 S.E.2d 315, 318 (1998). “As the terms ‘intent’ and ‘capability’ suggest, constructive possession depends on *69the totality of circumstances in each case,” and thus “ordinarily the question will be for the jury.” State v. James, 81 N.C. App. 91, 93, 344 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1986).
The majority relies almost exclusively on our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 678 S.E.2d 592 (2009), for its “conclu[sion] that there is substantial evidence that defendant constructively possessed the marijuana [and drug paraphernalia] in the bedroom and the matter was properly submitted to the jury.” In Miller, after observing that “the defendant’s proximity to the contraband and indicia of the defendant’s control over the place where the contraband is found” are “two factors frequently considered” in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable inference of constructive possession, the Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss:
Here, police found defendant in a bedroom of the home where two of his children lived with their mother. When first seen, defendant was sitting on the same end of the bed where cocaine was recovered. Once defendant slid to the floor, he was within reach of the package of cocaine recovered from the floor behind the bedroom door. Defendant’s birth certificate and state-issued identification card were found on top of a television stand in that bedroom. The only other individual in the room was not near any of the cocaine. Even though defendant did not have exclusive possession of the premises, these incriminating circumstances permit a reasonable inference that defendant had the intent and capability to exercise control and dominion over cocaine in that room.
Id. at 100, 678 S.E.2d at 595.
In comparing the evidence in this case to the evidence presented in Miller, the majority concedes- — and I agree — that “the primary evidence supporting defendant’s constructive possession of the marijuana [and drug paraphernalia] was his proximity to the contraband”:
without question, defendant did not have exclusive control over the place where the contraband was found. In addition, there was no evidence that he owned any other items found in proximity to the contraband, that he was the only person who could have placed the contraband in the positions where it was found, that he acted nervously in front of law enforcement personnel, that he resided in or regularly visited the premises where the contra*70band was found, or that he possessed a large amount of cash on his person.
The majority nonetheless concludes that “the State presented far more evidence of defendant’s proximity to and knowledge of the contraband here than it did in Miller.” With this conclusion, I strongly disagree.
With respect to proximity, this Court has cautioned:
Necessarily, power and intent to control the contraband material can exist only when one is aware of its presence. Therefore, evidence which places an accused within close juxtaposition to [contraband] under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable inference that he knew of its presence may be sufficient to justify the jury in concluding that it was in his possession. “However, mere proximity to persons or locations with [contraband] about them is usually insufficient, in the absence of other incriminating circumstances, to convict for possession.”
State v. Weems, 31 N.C. App. 569, 571, 230 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1976) (quoting B. Finberg, Annotation, What constitutes “possession” of a narcotic drug proscribed by § 2 of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, 91 A.L.R.2d 810, 811 (1963)) (emphasis added); accord State v. Barron, — N.C. App. —, —, 690 S.E.2d 22, 27 (“It is well-settled that the mere ‘fact that a person is present in a room where drugs are located, nothing else appearing, does not mean that person ha[d] constructive possession of the drugs.’ ” (quoting James, 81 N.C. App. at 93, 344 S.E.2d at 79)), disc. review denied, — N.C. —, 700 S.E.2d 926 (2010).
Here, the evidence presented at trial, even when considered in the light most favorable to the State, as is required in reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, tends to show only that defendant and two other individuals were detained by the tactical team and placed on the floor of a 10-by-15 foot bedroom in the back of the mobile home, which had a pervasive odor of marijuana. Inside the bedroom, police found, in plain view, numerous bags — some small, some large — containing marijuana, approximately $38,000 in cash, several firearms, a grinder, and a digital scale. Stacks of $20 and $100 bills, plastic sandwich baggies, and marijuana residue were found in the bathroom adjoining the bedroom.
As defendant points out in his brief, the State presented absolutely no evidence of defendant’s proximity to the contraband prior to being “placfed] ... on the floor” face down in the bedroom *71where the contraband was found, see Miller, 363 N.C. at 100, 678 S.E.2d at 595 (noting, in holding evidence was sufficient to support finding of constructive possession, that, “[w]hen first seen, defendant was sitting on the same end of the bed where cocaine was recovered” (emphasis added)), defendant’s proximity to the contraband after being placed on the floor, see id. (observing that defendant, when ordered by police officers to get on the floor, “slid to the floor” where he was then “within reach” of package containing cocaine), or defendant’s proximity to the contraband relative to the other two individuals detained in the room, see id. (noting that while defendant near cocaine, “[t]he only other individual in the room was not near any of the cocaine”); State v. Richardson, — N.C. App. —, —, 689 S.E.2d 188, 191-92 (vacating cocaine possession conviction for insufficient evidence of constructive possession where defendant and two other men detained in backyard, defendant was “about two feet” from package of crack cocaine, but other two men were roughly equidistant from contraband), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 246, 699 S.E.2d 643 (2010). In short, “[t]he most the State has shown is that defendant [was] in an area where he could have committed the crimes charged.” State v. Minor, 290 N.C. 68, 75, 224 S.E.2d 180, 185 (1976).
Without evidence of proximity, we are left only with presence. Despite the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry into whether there is substantial evidence of constructive possession, our caselaw is quite clear that “mere presence in a room where [contraband] [is] located does not itself support an inference of constructive possession.” James, 81 N.C. App. at 96, 344 S.E.2d at 81; accord State v. Acolatse, 158 N.C. App. 485, 490, 581 S.E.2d 807, 811 (2003) (“[T]there must be more than mere association or presence linking the person to the item in order to establish constructive possession].]”). Without “a showing of some independent and incriminating circumstance, beyond mere association or presence,” Alston, 131 N.C. App. at 519, 508 S.E.2d at 318, there is insufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference of constructive possession. See, e.g., Barron, — N.C. App. at —, 690 S.E.2d at 27 (“The State contends that the following evidence is sufficient to support the charges of possession of controlled substances: When [Officer] Herbert entered the residence, he noticed some plastic baggies on the couch, about three feet away from where Defendant had been standing at the front door. The baggies were later determined to contain marijuana and cocaine. Additionally, in executing a search warrant, police found a crack pipe approximately two-and-a-half feet away from where Defendant had *72been standing, and a push rod and a piece of Chore Boy approximately 10 or 12 feet away from where Defendant had been standing. . . . We are not persuaded by the State’s argument.”).
Nor does the evidence that the contraband was in plain view in the bedroom take this case out of the realm of conjecture. The contraband being in plain view suggests that defendant knew of its presence, but there is no evidence — and the majority points to none— indicating that defendant had “the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over it.” James, 81 N.C. App. at 93, 344 S.E.2d at 79 (emphasis in original). I have found no North Carolina appellate decision — and the majority cites to none — where a defendant’s mere presence in a location where contraband is visible is sufficient to support a conviction for a possessory offense based on constructive possession. Our State’s jurisprudence has always required more. See, e.g., State v. Kraus, 147 N.C. App. 766, 770, 557 S.E.2d 144, 148 (2001) (finding “sufficient incriminating circumstances exist[ed] to infer that defendant had the intent and capability to maintain control and dominion” over marijuana and drug paraphernalia found in motel room where, in addition to evidence showing that defendant and another person were “in a small motel room filled with marijuana smoke” with “a quantity of marijuana and drug paraphernalia ... in plain view,” evidence also showed that “[defendant was ‘stoned,’ ” had “spent the previous night in the motel room,” and had “equal access to the room key” (emphasis added)).
In this case, I believe, contrary to the majority’s holding, that the State presented less evidence — not more — of incriminating circumstances than it did in Miller. To uphold the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss, as the majority does in this case, means that “mere association or presence,” Alston, 131 N.C. App. at 519, 508 S.E.2d at 318, without more, is now sufficient to establish constructive possession. I decline to set sail on such a dangerous “sea of conjecture and surmise.” Minor, 290 N.C. at 75, 224 S.E.2d at 185. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.