Court Opinion

ID: 9791284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:08:30.256833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:35.205609
License: Public Domain

Judge JONES,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I conclude that judgment should be entered against Howe for the full amount of the attorney fees due appellants from Salle.
This is not a case in which collection of the judgment was uncertain. Collection was guaranteed by the letter of credit. Hence, in my view, appellants had an interest in the judgment which could not be bargained away by Salle without their consent. And, I believe that our supreme court, in effect, recognized this concept as an exception to the “good faith settlement” rule in Nichols v. Orr, 63 Colo. 333, 166 P. 561 (1917).
I also believe that Howe should be deemed to have notice of appellants’ full lien claim as a matter of law. Even if one assumes that the inquiry rule adopted in Board of County Commissioners v. Berkeley Village, 40 Colo.App. 431, 580 P.2d 1251 (1978) does not apply to judgment debtors, there is one additional fact which I conclude furnishes notice to Howe of the lien claim in this case as a matter of law.
Howe knew or should have known that the original default judgment against him included an award of attorney fees that exceeded the amount of the cash settlement with Salle. Under such circumstances, I would apply the rule that precludes any settlement by a client the effect of which is to reduce, in any manner, the award of attorney fees by court order. See Grynberg v. Bancroft, Avery, & McAlister, 48 B.R. 726 (D.Colo.1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1398 (10th Cir.1985). I would extend this rule to require that Howe make inquiry regarding the attorney lien claim, and since he failed to do so, I would conclude that he settled the claim at his peril.
Hence, I would reverse the order in its entirety and would remand the case for entry of judgment against Howe for the full amount of the appellants’ claim.