Court Opinion

ID: 9946312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 17:10:46.983351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.297622
License: Public Domain

J-S05045-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 TERREL NOAKS                             :
                                          :
                   Appellant              :   No. 719 WDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 15, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0013737-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                  FILED: FEBRUARY 29, 2024

      Appellant, Terrell Noaks, appeals pro se from the post-conviction court’s

May 15, 2023 order dismissing, as untimely, his petition filed under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review,

we affirm.

      The facts of Appellant’s underlying convictions are not pertinent to his

instant appeal. The PCRA court summarized the procedural history of his case,

as follows:
      On February 4, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant … of third-degree
      murder and firearms not to be carried without a license [relating
      to the death of Antwan Leake].1         The Superior Court of
      Pennsylvania affirmed the judgement [sic] of sentence on August
      25, 2017. [Commonwealth v. Noaks, 175 A.3d 1116 (Pa.
      Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum).] The Supreme Court
      of Pennsylvania denied the petition for allowance of appeal on
      December 27, 2017. [Commonwealth v. Noaks, 176 A.3d 858
      (Pa. 2017).]
J-S05045-24

          1 Co-defendant  Jared Cager, CP-02-CR-13713-2011, was
          convicted of similar offenses….

       On June 27, 2018, Appellant filed a PCRA petition. This court
       appointed counsel[,] who filed a “no merit” letter on November
       26, 2018.[1] This court dismissed the PCRA [petition] without a
       hearing on February 6, 2019. On May 28, 2020, the Superior
       Court of Pennsylvania affirmed this court’s order dismissing the
       PCRA [petition]. [See Commonwealth v. Noaks, 236 A.3d 1063
       (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum).]

       While [that] appeal was pending, Appellant filed a second[, pro
       se] PCRA [petition] on February 18, 2020. Appellant retained
       counsel on December 16, 2021, who ultimately withdrew on July
       25, 2022. Counsel did not adopt or amend the pro se PCRA
       [petition]. Appellant did not refile or amend his PCRA [petition].
       Instead, Appellant filed a motion for counsel[,] which this court
       denied on October 26, 2022, and a “Request for Self
       Representation” on February 14, 2023. This court ordered the
       Commonwealth to respond, and the Commonwealth complied by
       filing an Answer on April 10, 2023.           This court issued a
       [Pa.R.Crim.P. 907] notice of [its] intent to dismiss the PCRA
       [petition] on April 12, 2023. On May 15, 2023, this court
       dismissed the second PCRA [petition on the basis that it was
       untimely filed]. Appellant filed a [timely, pro se] notice of appeal
       on June 20, 2023, and a [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] concise statement
       [of errors complained of on appeal] on August 3, 2023.

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 10/24/23, at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization

omitted). The PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 24, 2023,

in which it now indicates that it should have quashed Appellant’s petition

because he filed it while his appeal from the denial of his first petition was still

pending, which we discuss further infra. See PCO at 3.

____________________________________________

1  See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)
(setting forth the procedure for counsel to withdraw from representing a PCRA
petitioner, including counsel’s filing of a ‘no merit’ letter detailing why the
petitioner’s claims lack merit).

                                           -2-
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      Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review: “Did the PCRA [c]ourt

err in dismissing … Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely when he clearly met

the timeliness exceptions provided by [42 Pa.C.S. §] 9545(b)(1)(ii)?”

Appellant’s Brief at 1.

      Appellant contends that he has met the newly-discovered-fact exception

to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar based on a letter he received from the District

Attorney’s Office, dated September 9, 2019, which included a statement from

a witness named Clayton McCray.         In his statement, McCray claimed that

another individual, who is now deceased, had confessed to him that he had

shot and killed the victim, Antwan Leake. Appellant insists that he “could not

have ascertained the information provided by [] McCray through the exercise

of due diligence[,]” Appellant’s Brief at 3, and that he timely-filed his PCRA

petition within one year of the date he discovered McCray’s statement, as

required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2), id. at 2. Thus, he concludes that the

PCRA court erred by dismissing his petition as untimely.

      Before we can review Appellant’s issue, we must address the PCRA

court’s conclusion that it should have quashed Appellant’s PCRA petition,

rather than dismissing it as untimely. See PCO at 3. The court reasons that

it “had no jurisdiction to provide Appellant relief” because Appellant filed the

instant petition while his appeal from the denial of his first, timely petition was

still pending. Id. The Commonwealth agrees with the PCRA court, cogently

explaining:

                                       -3-
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     “Pennsylvania law makes clear the trial court has no jurisdiction
     to consider a subsequent PCRA petition while an appeal from the
     denial of the petitioner’s prior PCRA petition in the same case is
     still pending on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d
     957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 218 A.2d 850 (Pa.
     2019), citing Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa.
     2000)[,] and Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359,
     364 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), appeal denied, 190 A.3d 1134
     (Pa. 2018). Furthermore,

        [a] petitioner must choose either to appeal from the order
        denying his prior PCRA petition or to file a new PCRA
        petition; the petitioner cannot do both … because “prevailing
        law requires that the subsequent petition must give way to
        a pending appeal from the order denying a prior petition.”
        In other words, a petitioner who files an appeal from an
        order denying his prior PCRA petition must withdraw the
        appeal before he can pursue a subsequent PCRA petition. If
        the petitioner pursues the pending appeal, then the PCRA
        court is required under Lark to dismiss any subsequent
        PCRA petitions filed while that appeal is pending.

     Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “Since this rule is
     one of jurisdictional magnitude, this Court has held that PCRA
     filings advanced in violation of Lark are legal nullities.”
     Commonwealth v. Belle, 2022 WL 17087536 *2 (Pa. Super.,
     November 21, 2022) (unpublished [memorandum]),13 appeal
     denied, 304, A.3d 328 (Pa.[] Sept[.] 12, 2023) (table) (citing
     unpublished cases).
        13 Although unpublished and therefore non-precedential,
        Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2) allows citation to non-precedential
        cases as persuasive authority for decisions filed after May 1,
        2019. See Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 221 A.3d 196, 200
        n. 11 (Pa. Super. 2019). Thus, while this Court is not bound
        by Belle, it can be considered persuasive.

     Thus, upon receiving the [September 9, 2019] letter from the
     District Attorney’s Office, [A]ppellant had the choice of either
     withdrawing the appeal of his first PCRA petition and filing a
     subsequent petition citing the statement as a newly-discovered
     fact, or continuing with the appeal of the first petition. There is
     no question that [A]ppellant continued with the appeal of his first
     petition. Consequently, the post-conviction court was without
     jurisdiction to address the February 18, 2020 petition and should

                                    -4-
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       have immediately dismissed it as a legal nullity. Beatty, supra,
       207 A.3d at 964. See also Commonwealth v. Patton, 2020 WL
       6708229[, at] *3 (Pa. Super. Nov[.] 16, 2020) (unpublished
       [memorandum]) ([finding that the] post-conviction court lacked
       jurisdiction over [the] petitioner’s third PCRA petition because he
       filed it while his appeal from the denial of his second petition
       remained pending).

Commonwealth’s Brief at 8-10.

       Based on our review of the legal authority cited by the Commonwealth,

we agree with the PCRA court and the Commonwealth that the court was

without jurisdiction to rule on Appellant’s February 18, 2020 petition, as it was

filed during the pendency of his appeal from the denial of his first petition.

Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s

petition.2,3

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

2 As stated supra, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition on the basis

that it was untimely, only raising for the first time in its Rule 1925(a) opinion
that it should have quashed Appellant’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, we “may affirm a PCRA court’s order on any legal basis.”
Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 595 (Pa. Super. 2021).

3 We observe that Appellant filed another, pro se PCRA petition on April 30,

2020, which was after this Court affirmed the denial of his first petition on
April 17, 2020. Therein, Appellant raises the same, newly-discovered-fact
claim that he raised in the instant petition. It does not appear that the PCRA
court has ruled on the April 30, 2020 petition. Moreover, the fact that
Appellant’s April 30, 2020 petition was filed during the litigation of the instant,
February 18, 2020 petition would not appear to render the April 30 th petition
a legal nullity, as the February 18th petition was itself a legal nullity that should
not have been litigated but, instead, immediately dismissed. Given that our
decision herein ends Appellant’s appeal from the denial of the February 18,
2020 petition, the PCRA court can now proceed to ruling on his April 30, 2020
petition.

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FILED: 2/29/2024

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