Court Opinion

ID: 9952748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 17:09:11.43521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:10.706029
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Simon, 2024-Ohio-925.]

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  GALLIA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                 :
                               :
     Plaintiff-Appellee,       :    Case No. 23CA3
                               :
     v.                        :
                               :    DECISION AND JUDGMENT
SHAWN C. SIMON,                :    ENTRY
                               :
    Defendant-Appellant.       :    RELEASED 3/08/2024
_____________________________________________________________
                         APPEARANCES:

Shawn C. Simon, St. Clairsville, Ohio, Appellant Pro Se.

Jason Holdren, Gallia County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jeremy Fisher,
Gallia County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Gallipolis, Ohio, for
Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________

Smith, P.J.

           {¶1} Shawn C. Simon appeals the January 24, 2023 Journal Entry of

the Gallia County Common Pleas Court. On appeal, Simon challenges the

trial court’s decision overruling two motions:

           1. Motion for Leave to File Untimely Post-Convictions, Pursuant to
              R.C. 2953.53, Requesting to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of
              Conviction or Sentence filed August 26, 2022; and,

           2. Motion to Amend Untimely Post-Conviction to Add a New Claim,
              Requesting to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction or
              Sentence.1

1
    Hereinafter for brevity, we will reference these pleadings as “Motion for Leave” and “Motion to Amend.”
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                            2

Simon raises six assignments of error relating to his claim that he was denied

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law when he was denied

certain Brady material and when his Motion for Leave was denied without a

hearing. In the seventh assignment of error, Simon asserts that the trial court

abused its discretion when it refused to recognize and apply to his case the

retroactive holding set forth in State v. Turner, 163 Ohio St.3d 421, 2020-

Ohio-6773, 170 N.Ed.3 842.

      {¶2} However, our review has found that Simon’s postconviction

pleadings are untimely, and that he has failed to provide clear and

convincing evidence that he was unavoidably prevented from discovery of

evidence which he claims is relevant to the propriety of the traffic stop

which led to his arrest on two felony drug charges and ultimately, two

convictions. Furthermore, our review has found that the Turner holding is

not applicable to the facts in Simon’s case. Thus, we conclude that the trial

court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the constitutional claim of deprivation

of due process set forth in Simon’s untimely postconviction petition.

Therefore, we modify the judgment appealed to reflect the dismissal of

Simon’s constitutional claim of a Brady violation. As to Simon’s seventh

assignment of error regarding Turner, this claim should have been raised in
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                            3

his direct appeal and is now barred by res judicata. The judgment of the trial

court is affirmed as modified.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      {¶3} At the conclusion of a jury trial in August of 2020, Shawn C.

Simon was convicted of Count One, Possession of Cocaine, R.C.

2925.11(A)/(C)(4)(e), and Count Two, Trafficking in Cocaine, R.C.

2925.03(A)(2)/(C)(4)(f). The underlying facts and circumstances leading to

Mr. Simon’s arrest and convictions stem from a traffic stop conducted by

Trooper Drew Keuhne of the Ohio State Highway Patrol on September 19,

2019 in Gallia County. The factual background is set forth fully in our

decision in Simon’s direct appeal, State v. Simon, 2021-Ohio-3090, 176

N.E.3d 1208, at Paragraphs 1-22, “Simon I.”

      {¶4} At Simon’s sentencing, the trial court merged the two felony

counts and sentenced Simon to a maximum indefinite prison sentence of 11

to 16 ½ years. Id. at ¶ 23. Simon timely appealed. In Simon I, Simon raised

two assignments of error, first asserting that his waiver of trial counsel was

not knowingly and intelligently made and thus, the trial court erred by

accepting his waiver. Under the second assignment of error, Simon argued

that the trial court should have, sua sponte, ordered a competency

evaluation.
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                         4

      {¶5} We found no merit to Simon’s assignments of error and affirmed

his convictions in our decision entered September 3, 2021. On August 26,

2022, Simon filed a “Motion for Leave to File Untimely Post-Convictions,

Pursuant to R.C. 2953.23, Requesting to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of

Conviction or Sentence.” On October 17, 2022, Simon subsequently filed a

“Motion to Amend Untimely Post-Conviction to Add a New Claim,

Requesting to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment of Conviction or Sentence.”

      {¶6}As indicated, the trial court overruled both motions. This timely

appeal followed.

                         ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

      I.     THE    TRIAL  COURT     ABUSED   ITS
             DISCRETION AND DENIED APPELLANT DUE
             PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR POST-
             CONVICTION REVIEW HEARING WHEN IT
             FAILED    TO  DETERMINE    WHETHER
             APPELLANT     WAS       UNAVOIDABLY
             PREVENTED FROM DISCOVERY OF THE
             FACTS UPON WHICH APPELLANT RELIED
             UPON TO PRESENT HIS CLAIM.

      II.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
             APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
             UNTIMELY POST CONVICTION PETITION
             WHERE APPELLANT SHOWED THAT HE
             WAS UNAVOIDABLY PREVENTED FROM
             DISCOVERING THE FACTS UPON WHICH HIS
             CLAIM RELIES, AND MADE A CLEAR AND
             CONVINCING SHOWING THAT BUT FOR THE
             CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS WHICH
             OCCURRED DURING THE CRIMINAL
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                               5

             PROCEEDINGS, NO REASONABLE FACT
             FINDER WOULD HAVE FOUND APPELLANT
             GUILTY OF THE CRIMES FOR WHICH HE
             WAS CONVICTED.

      III.   APPELLANT      WAS     UNAVOIDABLY
             PREVENTED FROM DISCOVERING THE
             EVIDENCE RELATED TO THE TERRY STOP
             DUE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL
             COURT WHERE THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED
             TO ORDER THE PROSECUTOR AND APPOINT
             TRIAL COURT TO PROVIDE APPELLANT
             WITH DISCOVERY AFTER THE COURT
             GRANTED APPELLANT’S REQUEST TO
             REPRESENT HIMSELF PRO SE, THEREBY
             DENYING DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS
             GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 16
             OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND THE
             FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
             UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

      IV.    APPELLANT     WAS      UNAVOIDABLY
             PREVENTED FROM DISCOVERING THE
             EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE TERRY STOP
             DUE TO BRADY VIOLATION REGARDING
             PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT WHERE THE
             PROSECUTOR INTENTIONALLY WITHHELD
             AND/OR SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE THAT
             TROOPER KUEHNE DID NOT ISSUE A
             TRAFFIC CITATION FOR THE ALLEGED
             TRAFFIC VIOLATION USED AS CAUSE FOR
             A TERRY STOP BY FAILING TO PROVIDE
             APPELLANT WITH DISCOVERY AFTER THE
             TRIAL COURT GRANTED APPELLANT’S
             REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF PRO SE
             AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING, ALL OF
             WHICH DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF HIS DUE
             PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING AND
             TRIAL   AS   GUARANTEED    BY   THE
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                           6

             CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE AND THE
             UNITED STATES.

      V.     APPELLANT      WAS     UNAVOIDABLY
             PREVENTED FROM DISCOVERING THE
             EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE TERRY STOP
             REGARDING TROOPER KUEHNE FAILURE
             TO ISSUE A TRAFFIC CITATION WAS DUE
             TO APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL FAILURE
             TO PROVIDE APPELLANT WITH DISCOVERY
             GIVEN TO HIM BY THE PROSECUTOR,
             AFTER THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED
             APPELLANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT
             HIMSELF PRO SE AT THE SUPPRESSION
             HEARING AND TRIAL.

      VI.    APPELLANT SHOWED BY CLEAR AND
             CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT, BUT FOR
             CONSTITUTIONAL    ERROR   AT   THE
             SUPPRESSION HEARING, NO REASONABLE
             FACTFINDER WOULD DENIED THE MOTION
             TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.

      VII. THE     TRIAL     COURT       ABUSED      ITS
           DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
           RECOGNIZE THE RETROACTIVE HOLDING
           SET FORTH IN STATE V. TURNER, 163 Ohio
           St.3d 421, 2020-Ohio-6773,170 N.E.3d 842. (12-
           22-20)

                          A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

      {¶7} In State v. McDaniel, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 22CA9, 2023-Ohio-

3051, at fn 3, this court recently observed that we continue to use the abuse

of discretion standard of review when we review petitions for postconviction
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                              7

relief. See State v. Carver, 2022-Ohio-2653, 194 N.E.3d 393 (4th Dist.), ¶¶

11-12; State v. Jayjohn, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 20CA722, 2021-Ohio-2286, ¶

9; State v. Osborn, 4th Dist. Adams No. 18CA1064, 2018-Ohio-3866, ¶ 9;

see also State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d

77, ¶ 58. In general, an “abuse of discretion” implies that a court's attitude is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. McDaniel, supra, at ¶ 7.

Jayjohn, id.; State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d 246, 255, 762 N.E.2d 940

(2002); State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). In

reviewing for an abuse of discretion, an appellate court must not substitute

its judgment for the trial court's judgment. State ex rel. Duncan v. Chippewa

Twp. Trustees, 73 Ohio St.3d 728, 732, 654 N.E.2d 1254 (1995).

                               B. LEGAL ANALYSIS

      {¶8} R.C. 2953.21 governs a petition for postconviction relief.

McDaniel, supra, at ¶8. Any person convicted of a criminal offense who

claims a denial or infringement of rights to such a degree as to render a

judgment void or voidable may file a petition for postconviction relief. Id.;

R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(I). “ ‘[A] postconviction proceeding is not an appeal

of a criminal conviction but rather, is a collateral, civil attack on a criminal

judgment.’ ” McDaniel, at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Broom, 146 Ohio St.3d 60,

2016-Ohio-1028, 51 N.E.3d 620, ¶ 28, citing State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                              8

399, 410, 639 N.E.2d 67 (1994); accord State v. Betts, 4th Dist. Vinton No.

18CA710, 2018-Ohio-2720, ¶ 11; State v. Brown, 4th Dist. Scioto No.

20CA3917, 2022-Ohio-519, ¶ 6.

      {¶9} Postconviction relief is not a constitutional right; instead, it is a

narrow remedy that gives the petitioner no more rights than those granted by

statute. McDaniel, supra, at ¶ 9; State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Highland No.

19CA16, 2020-Ohio-116; Carver, supra, 2022-Ohio-2653, 194 N.E.3d 393,

¶ 11; Brown, supra, at ¶ 7. Postconviction relief is a means to resolve

constitutional claims that cannot be addressed on direct appeal because the

evidence supporting the claims is not contained in the record. Carver at ¶

11. This means that “any right to postconviction relief must arise from the

statutory scheme enacted by the General Assembly.” State v. Apanovitch,

155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121 N.E.3d 351, ¶ 35.

      {¶10} R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(1) provides that a petitioner must file a

postconviction relief petition no later than 365 days after the date on which

the trial transcript was filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the

judgment of conviction. McDaniel, supra, at ¶ 10. Herein, the trial court

did not address timeliness in its decision on Simon’s “Motion for Leave.”

However, Simon did file a direct appeal, and the trial transcript in Simon I

was filed on December 11, 2020. Simon’s “Motion for Leave” was filed on
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                              9

August 26, 2022. It is obvious that Simon is over 365 days past the filing

deadline for his postconviction motion. Therefore, the lapse of time should

bar consideration of his untimely “ Motion for Leave.”

      {¶11} However, Simon argues that he was unavoidably prevented

from discovering the fact that he was not issued a traffic citation on or about

September 19, 2019, the date he was stopped by Trooper Kuehne. When a

defendant files an untimely petition or a successive petition R.C. 2953.23(A)

prevents trial courts from considering the petition unless both of the

following apply: (1) petitioner shows he or she “was unavoidably prevented

from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present

the claim for relief,” or “the United States Supreme Court recognized a new

federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner's

situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right;” and (2) “[t]he

petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional

error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner

guilty.” McDaniel, at ¶10; R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and (b)(4). “ ‘A

defendant is “unavoidably prevented” from the discovery of facts if he had

no knowledge of the existence of those facts and could not have, in the

exercise of reasonable diligence, learned of their existence within the time

specified for filing his petition for postconviction relief.’ ” McDaniel, at ¶
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                            10

11, quoting State v. Cunningham, 65 N.E.3d 307, 2016-Ohio-3106, ¶ 19 (3d

Dist.), citing State v. Holnapy, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-002, 2013-Ohio-

4307, ¶ 32, and State v. Ruark, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-142, 2015-

Ohio-3206, ¶ 11; see also Brown, supra, at ¶ 9. Moreover, “[t]he ‘facts’

contemplated by this provision are the historical facts of the case, which

occurred up to and including the time of conviction.” State v. Williamitis, 2d

Dist. Montgomery No. 21321, 2006-Ohio-2904, at ¶ 18.

      {¶12} A trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider an untimely or a

successive petition if the petitioner fails to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and

(b). McDaniel, at ¶12; State v. Parker, 157 Ohio St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-

3848, 137 N.E.3d 1151, ¶ 19. Whether a court possesses jurisdiction to

entertain an untimely or a successive petition is a question of law that

appellate courts review independently and without deference to the trial

court. Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121 N.E.3d 351,

at ¶ 24; Brown at ¶ 10.

      {¶13} Simon’s claims in the underlying postconviction petition and

on appeal center around his claim that he was allegedly not provided

discovery (i.e., information that he was not issued any traffic citations as a

result of the traffic stop conducted by Trooper Kuehne) prior to the trial

court’s granting of Simon’s request to represent himself at the suppression
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                          11

hearing. Simon alleges that he did not become aware until August 1, 2022

that Trooper Kuehne did not issue traffic citations when he stopped Simon’s

vehicle on September 19, 2019. Simon apparently views the fact that he

was not given traffic citations as exculpatory material which would have

benefitted him at the suppression hearing, the denial of which constitutes a

Brady violation as discussed in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83

S.Ct. 1194 (1963).

      {¶14} Brady governs situations in which the state withholds

evidence that tends to exculpate a criminal defendant. State v. Burton,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109658, 2021-Ohio-851, at ¶20. “When the

prosecution withholds material, exculpatory evidence in a criminal

proceeding, it violates the due process right of the defendant under the

Fourteenth Amendment to a fair trial.” State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio

St.3d 48, 60, 529 N.E.2d 898 (1988). Brady violations may be found

regardless of whether the defense requested the evidence and

“irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady,

supra, at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963); State v. Magwood, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 108155, 2019-Ohio-5238, ¶ 19.

      {¶ 15} “In addition,[f]or Brady purposes, the United
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                       12

States Supreme Court ‘disavowed any difference between exculpatory

and impeachment evidence * * *.’ ” Burton, supra, at ¶21, quoting,

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995). “ ‘When

the “reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt

or innocence,” nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls

within this general rule.’ ” Burton, supra, quoting, Giglio v. United

States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972), quoting Napue v.

Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (1959).

      {¶ 16} In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held “that

the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith

or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id., at 87; Burton, at ¶33. “Brady is

not implicated when the information ‘is not wholly within the control

of the prosecution.’ ” Burton, supra, quoting Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d

320, 344 (6th Cir. 1998). “ Further, the prosecution ‘is not required

under Brady to furnish a defendant evidence which, with any

reasonable diligence, he can obtain for himself.’ ” Burton, supra,

quoting United States v. Glass, 819 F.2d 1142, [1987 WL 37592, *2],

1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 7247, 6 (6th Cir. 1987), citing United States v.
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                           13

Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986) (1986); McFeeture, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108434, 2020-Ohio-801, ¶ 13.

       {¶17} In Simon’s first assignment of error, he asserts that the trial

court abused its discretion and denied his “due process right to a fair post-

hearing conviction review hearing” when it failed to determine whether he

was unavoidably prevented from discovering the fact that he was not issued

traffic citations by Trooper Kuehne. We interpret this assignment of error as

arguing that the trial court denied his “Motion for Leave” without a hearing.

A criminal defendant seeking to challenge a conviction through a petition for

postconviction relief is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

See State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 282, 1999-Ohio-102, 714 N.E.2d

905, citing State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169 (1982). Before

granting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court must determine whether

substantive grounds for relief exist. R.C. 2953.21(D). In making such a

determination, the court shall consider the petition, supporting affidavits,

documentary evidence, and all the files and records from the case. See

Calhoun at 284, (noting that R.C. 2953.21 “clearly calls for discretion in

determining whether to grant a hearing” on a petition for postconviction

relief).
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                                                    14

         {¶18} “Substantive grounds for relief exist and a hearing is warranted

if the petitioner produces sufficient credible evidence that demonstrates the

petitioner suffered a violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights.” In re

B.C.S., 4th Dist. Washington No. 07CA60, 2008-Ohio-5771, ¶ 11.

Moreover, before a hearing is warranted, the petitioner must demonstrate

that the claimed “errors resulted in prejudice.” Calhoun at 283. A court

may dismiss a petition for postconviction relief without a hearing when the

petitioner fails to submit evidentiary material “demonstrat[ing] that

petitioner set forth sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds

for relief.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. See also State v. Lewis, 4th

Dist. Ross No. 10CA3181, 2011-Ohio-5224, ¶ 11; State v. Slagle, 4th Dist.

Highland No. 11CA22, 2012-Ohio-1936, ¶ 14.2

         {¶19} In Simon’s August 26, 2022 Motion for Leave, he argued he

obtained a statement from the deputy clerk of the Gallipolis Municipal

Court, dated July 28, 2022, attesting to the fact that no traffic tickets were

issued to him on or about September 19, 2019. In his affidavit attached to

         2
           Generally, our Court affords considerable leeway to pro se litigants. See State v. Headlee, 4th
Dist. Washington No. 2009-Ohio-873, at ¶ 6; see also Besser v. Griffey, 88 Ohio App.3d 379, 382, 623
N.E.2d 1326, 1328 (4th Dist. 1993); State ex rel. Karmasu v. Tate, 83 Ohio App.3d 199, 206, 614 N.E.2d
827, 832 (4th Dist. 1992). “Limits do exist, however. Leniency does not mean that we are required ‘to
find substance where none exists, to advance an argument for a pro se litigant or to address issues not
properly raised.’ ” Headlee, supra, quoting State v. Nayar, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 07CA6, 2007-Ohio-
6092, at ¶ 28.
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                          15

his Motion for Leave, Simon averred that he did not receive this information

until August 1, 2022. Simon argues that because Trooper Kuehne did not

issue a traffic citation: (1) Trooper Kuehne lacked probable cause to

conduct the traffic stop and to extend the stop to a search of his vehicle; and,

(2) Trooper Kuehne “committed perjury under oath and provided false

evidence” when he testified at the suppression hearing and at trial that

Simon had committed traffic violations for improper lane change and failing

to maintain an assured clear distance ahead. Simon reiterates these

arguments in his second assignment of error. In his third, fourth, and fifth

assignments of error, Simon specifically argues that he was unavoidably

prevented from discovering that he was not given traffic citations because:

(1) the trial court failed to order the prosecutor to provide him with

discovery prior to the court’s allowing him to represent himself at the

suppression hearing; (2) prosecutorial misconduct occurred due to the failure

to provide discovery prior to the suppression hearing; and, (3) his former

trial counsel failed to provide him with discovery prior to the suppression

hearing. As a result, Simon believes he has shown by clear and convincing

evidence that, but for the constitutional error via an alleged Brady violation,

no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the two felony drug
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                            16

offenses at trial. Simon believes that he has raised a substantive ground for

relief warranting a hearing. We are not persuaded.

      {¶20} In order for this court to find a Brady violation, Simon must

establish that “ ‘(1) the suppressed evidence is favorable to him, “either

because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching”; (2) the evidence was

suppressed by the state, “either willfully or inadvertently”; and (3) that

“prejudice * * * ensued.” ’ ” State v. Lett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111350,

2023-Ohio-2580, at ¶ 21, quoting State v. Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d 362, 2022-

Ohio-783, 192 N.E.3d 470 ¶ 19, quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,

281-282, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (1999). The defendant bears the burden of proving

that a Brady violation rises to the level of a denial of due process. State v.

Allen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103492, 2016-Ohio-7045, 2016 WL 5630980,

¶ 11. “ ‘[F]avorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results

from its suppression by the government, “if there is a reasonable probability

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” ’ ” Lett, supra, quoting Bethel at ¶

19, citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995),

quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375(1985).

Whether withheld evidence is material under Brady is a matter of law for

which the de novo standard of review applies. Lett, at ¶22; Allen at ¶ 11. De
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                           17

novo review requires an independent analysis of the record without

deference to the trial court's decision. Demeraski v. Bailey, 2015-Ohio-

2162, 35 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).

      {¶21} Based upon our de novo review, it does not appear that the fact

that Simon was not cited for traffic violations is new and material evidence

which would exculpate him or impeach Trooper Kuehne. It is simply not

relevant evidence because Trooper Kuehne conducted a lawful traffic stop

based on probable cause and nothing required him to charge Simon with the

traffic violations Trooper Kuehne observed. See State v. Ewing, 2017-Ohio-

7194, 95 N.E.3d 1112, at ¶ 42 (2d Dist.) (The fact that a jaywalking citation

was dismissed, and that defendant may have had a defense to the ordinance

he was cited under was immaterial to stop's validity); State v. Kelly, 188

Ohio App.3d 842, 2010-Ohio-3560, 937 N.E.2d 149, at ¶27 (12th Dist.),

(Fact that deputies neither contacted the dispatcher to verify defendant’s

license and registration information nor issued a traffic citation for

defendant’s violation of R.C. 4511.34 was irrelevant when deputies had

probable cause to initiate the lawful traffic stop). See State v. Willis (May

23, 1996), 10th Dist. Franklin No. 95APC11-1552, 1996 WL 274100, at *3

(Where appellant argued trial court’s dismissal of failure to maintain an

assured clear distance ahead charge suggested a lack of reasonable
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                            18

suspicion, appellate court disagreed. Court’s analysis is an objective

consideration of the evidence of erratic driving behavior). Herein, Simon is

unable to show that the evidence that he was not cited is either exculpatory

or impeaching. Accordingly, Simon is unable to show that the alleged

failure to provide this information to him was in violation of Brady. And,

even if Simon’s allegation of a Brady violation had been supported, nothing

suggests that Simon was prejudiced by the State’s failure to provide this

evidence prior to his trial, as required by the third prong of the Brady test.

      {¶22} Even if the fact that Simon was not cited was somehow

relevant, nothing demonstrates that Simon was unavoidably prevented from

discovering this fact with reasonable diligence. While Simon attached an

affidavit to his underlying motion reiterating his general claims, his affidavit

does not explain how he was unavoidably prevented from learning that he

was not given a traffic citation. We cannot find that Simon’s lack of

knowledge or awareness that he was not given traffic citations was because

it was unfairly withheld from him by the prosecutor, by Simon’s former trial

counsel, or due to the court’s alleged error in “failing to order” it be

provided. The transcript in the underlying pretrial proceeding and at trial is

replete with instances in which Simon’s felony counts were discussed and in
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                               19

which it should have been quite obvious to Simon that traffic violations were

not being pursued for conviction. For example:

    1. Prior to Simon’s suppression hearing on August 5, 2020,
       the trial court inquired as to whether Simon was given a
       packet of discovery. Simon answered affirmatively.3

    2. At the suppression hearing, Simon questioned his sole
       witness, Kalli Khepera Bey about the syntax of certain
       documents, including the police report. At the conclusion
       of the hearing, a set of documents appearing to be a report
       of Mr. Bey was entered into evidence as Defendant’s
       Exhibit B. The last page of Exhibit B appears to be
       Trooper Kuehne’s statement on the incident report he
       prepared on September 19, 2019. The last paragraph of
       the report reads: “I transported Mr. Simon to the Gallia
       County Jail. He was incarcerated there and charged with
       F1 possession of cocaine and F1 drug trafficking.” This
       report does not indicate additional charges, traffic or
       otherwise, were filed.

    3. At the status hearing on August 14, 2020, Simon’s former
       counsel represented to the court that Simon had received a
       full copy of his discovery and that Simon had picked it up
       from his office. Counsel represented to the court that he
       had a signed receipt dated June 30, 2020.

    4. At Simon’s trial, the trial court gave opening and closing
       jury instructions, instructing the jurors that Simon was
       charged with two counts, drug possession and drug
       trafficking.

    5. At Simon’s trial, the prosecutor’s opening and closing
       statements, although not evidence, provided information
       to the jurors that the State was seeking convictions on two
       counts. No traffic charges were mentioned.
3
  In our opinion in the direct appeal, we noted that Simon acknowledged receiving
discovery at his suppression hearing. Simon I at ¶ 17.
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                        20

   {¶23} Simon’s interrelated arguments that he was unavoidably

prevented from discovery of information that he was not cited by Trooper

Kuehne for traffic violations is without merit. However, because his petition

was untimely, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider it. His

constitutional claim of a Brady violation should have been dismissed.

      {¶24} As an additional consideration, even if Simon’s Motion

for Leave had been timely, we would also be barred from considering

it by application of the doctrine of res judicata. “ ‘Under the doctrine

of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted

defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating

in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense

or claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been

raised by the defendant at the trial, * * * or on appeal from that

judgment.’ ” State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 671 N.E.2d 233

(1996), quoting State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104

(1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus; see also State v. Davis, 139

Ohio St.3d 122, 2014-Ohio-1615, 9 N.E.3d 1031, ¶ 28. “ ‘ “Res

judicata does not, however, apply only to direct appeals, but to all

postconviction proceedings in which an issue was or could have been

raised.” ’ ” State v. Creech, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 19CA3877, 2020-
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                           21

Ohio-582, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Heid, 4th Dist. Scioto No.

15CA3710, 2016-Ohio-2756, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Montgomery,

2013-Ohio-4193, 997 N.E.2d 579, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.). Simon had

appellate counsel on his direct appeal. Simon, with reasonable

diligence, would have known that he was not given any traffic

citations as early as his arraignment date in the Gallipolis Municipal

Court, which the court record indicates took place on September 23,

2019. Simon could have informed his appellate counsel to pursue this

argument in his direct appeal. Apparently, he did not. Thus, his

Brady claim is also barred by res judicata.

      {¶25} In cases where a postconviction motion is untimely and an

appellant fails to argue one of the exceptions set forth in R.C.

2953.23(A)(1), we do not apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to

the argument but instead conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

entertain such motions. JayJohn, supra, at ¶ 20; Osborn, supra, at ¶ 12.

Therefore, to the extent that Simon’s Brady claim was filed as part of an

untimely postconviction motion, we find the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

address his constitutional argument. Consequently, we find the trial court

did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on Simon’s Motion for Leave as he

failed to present substantive grounds for relief. We further find that the
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                             22

constitutional claim raised in Simon’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and

sixth assignments of error is barred as having been brought in an untimely

petition for postconviction relief. Thus, the trial court should have

dismissed, rather than denied, the claim. Accordingly, the judgment

appealed is affirmed but modified, under the authority of App.R.

12(A)(1)(a), to reflect the dismissal of Simon’s constitutional claim. The

judgment of the trial court shall remain intact with respect to Simon’s

remaining meritless claim, presented in the seventh assignment of error, and

discussed below.

      {¶26} In Simon’s seventh assignment of error, he contends that the

trial court refused to take into consideration the Supreme Court of Ohio’s

holding in State v. Turner in determining whether Trooper Kuehne had

probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. Simon was stopped on September

19, 2019. The Turner decision was issued on December 22, 2020. In

Turner, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “the single solid white

longitudinal line on the right-hand edge [of] a roadway—the fog line—

marks the edge of the roadway and that such a marking merely ‘discourages

or prohibits’ a driver from ‘crossing’ it, not ‘driving on’ or ‘touching it.’ ”

2020-Ohio-6773, 170 N.E.3d 842 at ¶ 37, citing MUTCD Section 3A.06(B).

In reaching its decision, the court noted that “[t]his interpretation of R.C.
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                         23

4511.33(A)(1) is consistent with the greater weight of authority in

jurisdictions across the nation that touching the single solid white

longitudinal line on the right-hand side of the roadway does not constitute a

violation of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1).” (Citations omitted.) See State v. Oliver,

2023-Ohio-1550, 214 N.E.3d 624 at ¶ 53 (8th Dist.); Turner, at ¶ 36.

      {¶27} Simon’s assertion is without merit. Given that we have

determined that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain Simon’s

untimely petition, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying his request to add this claim to his petition.

      {¶28} Moreover, Simon’s reliance on Turner’s holding is misplaced

because of factual differences and due to the application of res judicata. At

Simon’s suppression hearing, Trooper Kuehne testified as follows:

              When the vehicle passed it looked to me like there
      was only one occupant in the car, but whoever the person
      was back behind the B pillar where I could barely even see
      their face or anything about them. Uh, after the vehicle
      passed, I pulled out to catch up to it. It made a quick lane
      change from the right lane to the left lane and after it made
      that lane change it crossed over the yellow line on the left
      side of the road with its left side tires. As I got closer to
      the car I believe that’s probably when the driver noticed I
      was behind him, uh, the vehicle changed lanes from the
      left lane to the right lane and took away the assured and
      clear distance of the vehicle that was already in the right
      lane. So after that lane change was complete there was
      about one car length of space between that and the other
      vehicle, uh, so I drew closer to the car and then I initiated
      a traffic stop with it at Milepost 6.
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                          24

Not only did Trooper Kuehne testify that Simon’s tires “crossed over the left

side of the road with its left side tires,” the trooper also observed Simon

commit an assured clear distance violation. Furthermore, Simon was

stopped on September 19, 2019. Turner was decided on December 22,

2020. Simon was sentenced on August 27, 2020. He timely appealed. The

Gallia County Clerk of Court’s docket, of which we may take judicial

notice, reflects that Simon’s appellate brief was filed on February 9, 2021.

Any argument regarding Turner’s supposed relevance and application

should have been brought in Simon’s direct appeal and is now barred by res

judicata. Accordingly, his seventh assignment of error is without merit and

is hereby overruled.

      {¶29} In the case at bar, Simon’s Motion for Leave was untimely.

Simon also raised no issues that he could not have raised during his direct

appeal. Here, the trial court “technically erred” by summarily overruling

Simon’s Motion for Leave rather than issuing a dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction. Thus, under App.R. 12(A)(1)(a), we modify the trial court’s

judgment to reflect the dismissal of his postconviction petition “Motion for

Leave.” The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified.
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                                          25

                    JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

                            JUDGMENT ENTRY

      It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
and costs be assessed to Appellant.

      The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Gallia County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into
execution.

       IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE
UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to
exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued
stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a
stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the
expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice
of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period
pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of
Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior
to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

      Hess, J., & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                 For the Court,

                                 ________________________
                                 Jason P. Smith
                                 Presiding Judge
Gallia App. No. 23CA3                                               26

                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.199