Court Opinion

ID: 9769074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:30:11.911219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:35.100651
License: Public Domain

LIVINGSTON, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the opinion as to the result of the case, but differ with the majority about the standard of review to be used in a speedy trial analysis. As set forth in my original opinion, which is now withdrawn, I believe that an appellate court should review the trial court’s application of the Barker v. Win-go balancing test to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 877 F.2d 734, 739 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Pomeroy, 822 F.2d 718, 722 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 902, 102 S.Ct. 409, 70 L.Ed.2d 221 (1981); State v. Perkins, 911 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.); State v. Empak, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 618, 625 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1994, pet. ref'd); State v. DeBlanc, 858 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1993, no pet.); State v. Hernandez, 830 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1992, no pet.); State v. Owens, 778 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref'd).
Clarke cites Emery v. State, 881 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1257, 131 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) for the proposition that the court of criminal appeals has definitively held that a reviewing court applies the Barker balancing test de novo, and the majority agrees. However, I respectfully decline to follow a de novo review of a speedy trial claim. First, Emery misquotes Barker v. Wingo when it says that “[t]he reviewing court must consider four factors.” 881 S.W.2d at 708 (emphasis added). The Barker v. Wingo opinion does not state that the reviewing court should apply the factors de novo. It simply states, “The approach we accept is a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-92, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117. Secondly, Barker mentions the “trial court’s” need “to exercise judicial discretion based on the circumstances.” Id. at 529-30, 92 S.Ct. at 2191, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117. The Supreme Court even states that this approach allows:
*724a court to attach different weight to a situation in which the defendant knowingly fails to object from a situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay.... It would also allow a court to weigh the frequency and force of the objections as opposed to attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma objection.
Id. This statement obviously applies only to a trial court’s ability to apply the tests.
The Supreme Court further refers to the need for “courts” to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. “We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right.” Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117. Again, the Supreme Court is clearly referring to the duty of trial courts in their application of the balancing test.
I believe that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of review for two reasons. First, the Barker test calls for case specific evidence, and the trial court is in a better position to judge the credibility of this evidence. See Burgett v. State, 865 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref'd). Second, a more deferential standard is appropriate to review a trial court’s application of legal rules to specific facts. See In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (1st Cir.1993).1 The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles or, in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).2 I believe that we should affirm judicial rulings if the trial court followed the appropriate analysis and balancing factors, although we might disagree with the weight given those individual factors. Id.
Recently, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that it must review a trial court’s factual determinations in a speedy trial claim “with considerable deference.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2691, 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 529 (1992). Further, federal courts of appeals do not conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s determination on a speedy trial claim. See United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1520 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 737, 133 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) (reviews for “plain error”); United States v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir.1995) (reviews for clear error); Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431, 1438 (3rd Cir.1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1229, 112 S.Ct. 3055, 120 L.Ed.2d 921 (1992) (reviews findings for clear error);3 United States v. Doggett, 906 F.2d *725573, 582 (11th Cir.1990), rev’d, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (reviews for clear error); United States v. Sears Roebuck, Inc., 877 F.2d at 739 (Ninth Circuit reviews for abuse of discretion); United States v. Pomeroy, 822 F.2d at 722 (Eighth Circuit reviews for abuse of discretion). Thus, in my opinion, our review necessitates an examination of the Barker test as applied by the trial court. For these reasons, I concur.

. In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (1st Cir.1993), discusses a degree-of-deference continuum along which appeals are arrayed:
At the "no deference” end of the continuum lie appeals involving unadulterated questions of law, the resolution of which customarily entails de novo review. At the other end of the continuum lie appeals involving straight factual determinations, the resolution of which customarily entails acceptance of the trier’s judgment in the absence of palpable error.... [T]he more fact-dominated the question, the more likely it is that the trier’s resolution of it will be accepted unless shown to be clearly erroneous.
Id. (citations omitted).

. In Montgomery v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals first clearly enunciated the test for abuse of discretion in criminal cases. 810 S.W.2d at 379-80. Appropriately, the court adopted the abuse of discretion standard to review another balancing test conducted by trial courts: whether to exclude relevant evidence under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. Id. at 379.

.Speedy trial claims are a mixed question of fact and law. As Burkett shows, federal appellate courts sometimes review findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo. However, there is no rigid rule that mixed questions are to be reviewed in this way. A reviewing court may apply a more deferential standard "when it appears that the district court is “better positioned’ than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine.” Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1222, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991).
Federal appellate courts have also sometimes used the term “clear error” to mean a deferential standard of review of mixed questions of law and fact. Because "clear error” is a federal term of art derived from Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the preferential term for a deferential standard of review of mixed questions is "abuse of discretion.” Ornelas v. United States, - U.S. -, - n. 3, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661 n. 3, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).
In Texas, we review such mixed questions for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Romero v. State, *725800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (admissibility of an oral confession). An appellate court is not at liberty to disturb a trial court’s findings of fact so long as evidence exists in the record to support the findings. Id.; see also Holley v. Holley, 864 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). If there is evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision, we address only the question of whether the trial court followed the appropriate analysis of law. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380.