Court Opinion

ID: 9384569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 13:10:06.894779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.388571
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Athey and Callins
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued by videoconference

              GARLAND ELLIS KING, JR.
                                                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0563-22-3                                 JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS
                                                                                 APRIL 4, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY
                                             W. Chapman Goodwin, Judge

                              Jennifer T. Stanton, Senior Appellate Attorney (Indigent Defense
                              Commission, on briefs) for appellant.

                              John Beamer, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Garland Ellis King was indicted in the Circuit Court of Augusta County for one count of

              possessing more than one ounce of marijuana, but less than five pounds, with intent to distribute.

              See Code § 18.2-248. Before trial, King moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the police

              officer did not have probable cause to search his car because personal possession of marijuana

              was only subject to a civil penalty at the time, and thus there was no evidence that a crime had

              been committed. The trial court denied King’s motion and King entered a conditional guilty

              plea, allowing him to appeal that decision. We affirm.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     The material facts are not in dispute. On August 30, 2020, Corporal Chandler, of the

              Augusta County Sheriff’s Office, saw a person who appeared to be asleep in his car at a gas

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
station. Corporal Chandler approached the car and found King alone and asleep in the driver’s

seat. After King’s car door was opened, Corporal Chandler noticed the smell of burnt marijuana

emanating from the car. Based on that smell, Corporal Chandler searched the car. In the

backseat, he found a backpack that contained “a smoking device, marijuana residue, digital

scales, and multiple large plastic baggies which contained marijuana.” The Department of

Forensic Science confirmed that the baggies contained approximately 12.2 ounces of marijuana.

King was subsequently indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to sell, give, or

distribute.

        At the time of the search, personal possession of marijuana had been decriminalized and

was punishable only by a civil fine less than $25. See Code § 18.2-250.1 (2020). Before trial,

King moved to suppress all evidence obtained by Corporal Chandler’s search. He argued that

Corporal Chandler did not have probable cause to search the car because Corporal Chandler had

no evidence that a crime had been committed. King also argued that Code § 4.1-1302 should

apply retroactively and bar the fruits of the search because it was conducted based solely on the

smell of marijuana.

        The trial court denied King’s motion to suppress, ruling that the smell of marijuana gave

Corporal Chandler probable cause to search the car. The court reasoned that possession of

marijuana was still illegal at the time of the search, and marijuana was therefore still considered

contraband. Thus, based on the smell of burnt marijuana, Corporal Chandler had probable cause

to believe that a crime had been committed.

        King entered a conditional plea, pleading guilty to one count of possession of marijuana

with intent to sell, give, or distribute. He reserved the right to appeal the adverse judgment on

his motion to suppress, and he does so here.

                                                -2-
                                           ANALYSIS1

       In reviewing a motion to suppress, “we review de novo the trial court’s application of

defined legal standards such as probable cause and reasonable suspicion to the particular facts of

the case.” Cherry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 347, 356 (2004).

       At the outset, we recognize that Code § 4.1-1302 does not apply retroactively. See Street

v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 298, 311 (2022). The interpanel accord doctrine binds us to that

holding in Street, so we will not consider King’s argument that we should apply Code § 4.1-1302

retroactively. See White v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 599, 612 n.7 (2017) (explaining the

interpanel accord doctrine). Similarly, we do not consider King’s request that we overturn

Bunch v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 491 (2008), because as far as it is applicable, we are also

bound by that decision under the interpanel accord doctrine.2 See White, 67 Va. App. at 612 n.7.

Thus, we only address King’s argument that Corporal Chandler did not have probable cause to

search King’s car.

       “The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 375, 380 (2019). Warrantless vehicle searches

       1
          After the parties argued this case, we decided Commonwealth v. Spencer, No.
1443-22-1 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2023). In that case, a police officer approached a parked car
and asked the person in the driver’s seat if the cigarette in her hand was “a little bit of weed.”
The appellee responded affirmatively but stated that “All I have is a blunt.” The officer
described the appellee as “cooperative” and “acting normal.” Under those facts, we concluded that
the officer did not have probable cause to search the car because the circumstances did not suggest
that the car contained additional contraband. Conversely, here, the officer could not identify the
source of the smell, except that it came from inside the car. The circumstances suggested that the
car contained contraband because, unlike in Spencer, King did not explain the smell of marijuana
and the officer could not plainly see any burning marijuana. Thus, we do not rely on Spencer in our
analysis. See Coffman v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 163, 172 n.7 (2017) (explaining that
unpublished cases are only persuasive authority).
       2
          We agree with King that Code § 4.1-1302 abrogated the “plain smell” doctrine
articulated in Bunch for searches occurring after Code § 4.1-1302 became effective. However,
Code § 4.1-1302 is not applicable to this case.
                                                -3-
are reasonable if a police officer has probable cause to search the car. Collins v. Virginia, 138

S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018). Probable cause exists when “there is a fair probability that contraband

or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Curley v. Commonwealth, 295 Va.

616, 622 (2018). In other words, a vehicle search “is not unreasonable if based on facts that

would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.”

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Ross,

456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982)). Search warrants may be issued for contraband, “[g]oods that are

unlawful to . . . possess.” See Contraband, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); Code

§ 19.2-53 (authorizing issuance of search warrants for “[a]rticles or things the sale or possession

of which is unlawful”).

       At the time of the search, it was “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to

possess marijuana.” Code § 18.2-250.1 (2020). Despite that statutory language, King argues

that marijuana was “legitimate” and not contraband at the time of the search because possession

of marijuana had been decriminalized. See id. (“Any person who violates this section is subject

to a civil penalty of no more than $25. A violation of this section is a civil offense.”). King

makes this argument because items that may be used for a legitimate purpose, even if they may

also be used for an improper purpose, cannot give rise to probable cause. See Brown v.

Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 420-21 (2005) (finding that a hand-rolled cigarette does not give

rise to probable cause).

       We disagree with King’s premise that marijuana was not contraband. Despite reducing

the punishment for possession of marijuana, the legislature declined to make possession of

marijuana lawful and legitimate until July 1, 2021, when the legislature’s repeal of Code

§ 18.2-250.1 became effective. 2021 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I chs. 550, 551. At the time Corporal

Chandler searched King’s car, marijuana was not a legitimate, lawful substance.

                                                -4-
       We have previously held that the smell of marijuana, localized to a particular person, gives a

police officer reason to believe that person possesses marijuana. Bunch, 51 Va. App. at 496. Here,

Corporal Chandler could localize the smell of marijuana to King, so it was reasonable for him to

believe that King possessed marijuana and that searching King’s car would yield marijuana.

Because it was unlawful for an individual to possess marijuana at the time of the search, Corporal

Chandler could have validly requested a search warrant. See Code § 18.2-250.1 (2020); Code

§ 19.2-53. Thus, his warrantless automobile search was “based on facts that would justify the

issuance of a warrant” and it was reasonable. See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467.

       In other words, Corporal Chandler’s search was supported by probable cause. The smell of

marijuana emanating from the car gave Corporal Chandler reason to believe that he had a fair

probability of finding contraband when he searched the car. See Curley, 295 Va. at 622; see also

Contraband, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra; Code § 18.2-250.1 (2020). Corporal Chandler’s

search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.3

                                          CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying King’s motion

to suppress. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

      Because we find that Corporal Chandler’s search did not violate the Fourth
       3

Amendment, we do not need to consider whether the good faith exception applied.
                                           -5-