Court Opinion

ID: 9639474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:19:18.080869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:18.967885
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I see no reason to change the view indicated by my vote for the original decision of this Court.1 It, therefore, behooves me now to clothe that judicial act in, I hope, appropriate, and mayhap even convincing, language. In doing so, let me first emphasize the exact nature of the question in litigation. In my opinion, a failure to properly allot emphasis thereon may have led to my colleagues’ change of mind.
We are concerned, and solely concerned, with an additional tribunal. The matter is not one of an employee’s right, but of the forum for her remedy. There has been a discharge and in the view both of the Board and of the writer, an improper discharge. Its cause is of no moment. It may have been, as the Board found, the too familiar discriminatory discharge for union activities, or it may have been because the newspaper made an unfair estimate of her “sweet reasonableness” or, again, it may have been simply because the managing editor did not appreciate her taste in millinery. In any *270event, the employee qua employee had already become a party to a contract designed especially for her protection. This contract is a collective bargaining agreement. It was entered into, it is true, as a consequence of the events of which the employee here complains. That circumstance in no way affects the puissance of the agreement however. It is in the form used generally by the American Newspaper Guild and contains clauses fully covering the dispute now in issue.2 The employee presented her grievances to that committee. She found their response unsympathetic, the voting being ten to two against her. 3 She contends that this vote is tainted with the very vice of the original proceeding. Even if this is so, it is quite irrelevant. She is still a party to a contract. In her suit for the enforcement thereof she may meet any defense based on the unfavorable vote of the Guild’s committee by a rejoinder embodying her theory of its inspiration.
That any individual employee can obtain redress for the breach of a collective bargaining agreement is no longer an open question. I say “no longer” because earlier courts accompanied their, shall we say rigid, attitude toward the working man or woman generally, by a specific hostility to his rights under a collective labor agreement. 4 But modern judges, despite the divergence of theories adopted, will enforce these agreements at the instance of employer, employee, or union.5 Nor will specific enforcement *271be barred by the ancient and now considerably weakened “slavery” doctrine. 6 Whatever the effect given to individual employment contracts, collective agreements are held to be in a special category. So where money damages are inadequate, equity will enforce their terms.
We can assume, then, that the discharged employee here may, if she establishes her facts, get either damages, if she is money-minded, or her job back. We can further assume that this may be done with the assistance of those courts ordained to help all of her fellow-citizens and not only those working within the nebulous conception of interstate commerce. With this right and with these courts neither the employee in the case at bar, nor the National Labor Relations Board in her behalf, are satisfied. They do not, naturally, criticize courts that have existed for centuries prior to their own existence. They merely express a preference for and insist upon initial administrative remedies. One has to say initial because for enforcement they find themselves in these very same courts.7 ’ Nor is the writer in his turn critical of the theory and practice of quasi-judicial bodies. He had occasion to give it some consideration in another dissenting opinion recently filed.8 Some prefer them, others disparage them. 9
The trouble with that preference and insistence lies in its being but another instance of the wishful thinking by which we strive to make so much of life tolerable. The Congress may, and frequently has, assigned what it deemed appropriate subject matter to administrative tribunals for preliminary decision. Many such instances are listed in the dissenting opinion just referred to. These tribunals may be exclusive, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communications Commission, or they may be concurrent, as in the instances of the Board of Tax Appeals, the Federal Trade Commission, and in the contention of the principal case. The majority concede, as they must, that any such legislative assignment is by implication only and in the spirit rather than in the letter of the law. Their argument may be paraphrased thus. Collective bargaining is, by definition, the fundamental device of labor unionism. Discharging its members in sufficient quantities will destroy any union. Erg'o the Labor Board should have jurisdiction to prevent such discharges. The non sequitur seems plain to the writer. Destruction by unredressed discharge is inevitable. Destruction because the redress is in one form and not another, is inconsistent with the meaning of the word. If the remedy is there, a labor union is impervious. This is so whether the remedial process starts in a hearing room in Washington or in a court room in New Jersey and *272whether the hearers wear black robes or business suits.
There seems to me something patronizing in this particular effort to help out the Congress. That body has shown no sign of failing to comprehend the distinction between a statute which creates the new right of bargaining by “representatives of one’s own choosing” and a statute which affords a new and additional tribunal for the primary adjudication of one of the oldest rights known to the common law — the rights under a contract So in the Railway Labor Act, the Congress declared: “The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.” 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 (i).10
Other legislative bodies, both in this country 11 and abroad,12 have been equally specific. On the other hand, in New York, where the State Labor Board has a grant of power comparable to the National Labor Board,13 the court has held that the Board “was not given any power * * * to interpret, enforce or abrogate any contract made by any two parties, particularly where it [the Board] is not a party to the contract.” 14
*273A common form of legislative construction of statutes is to be found in the prior and subsequent proceedings of the legislative body whose handiwork is to he interpreted. The proceedings anent the National Labor Relations Act leave no room for doubt. A leading authority on labor problems and industrial relations, Professor Wolf, and the writer of a note in the Harvard Law Review have observed:
“The first step in making collective bargaining agreements legally enforceable would be to declare that a violation of the agreement, or of any of its terms, by either party thereto would constitute an unfair labor practice. This could be done by simply adding a paragraph to that effect to Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. A violation, or a threatened violation would then set the machinery of enforcement in operation upon appeal by either party.
“Such machinery might well consist of, first a federal agency comparable to the National Labor Relations Board. Unless the additional duties arising out of the enforceability of agreements would place too great a burden on an already overworked and understaffed body, there is much to be said for making the Board itself the superstructure of the machinery here contemplated.” Wolf, The Enforcement of Collective Labor Agreements: A Proposal, 5 Law ci Contemporary Problems 273, 282 (italics ours).
“It should be borne in mind that the Wagner Act was predicated upon the assumption that collective agreements were adequately protected by existing judicial remedies. Administrative enforcement of these agreements, although a reasonable possibility, is not yet receiving serious consideration by the present Congress.” The Proposed Amendments to the Wagner Act, 52 Harvard Law Review 970, footnote 29, 973 (note) (1939) (italics ours).
In the Hearings on the National Labor Relations Board before the Committee on Education and Labor of the United States Senate in the spring of 1935, we find that Mr. William H. Davis 15 submitted on behalf of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., the following finding and recommendation:
“We think it is desirable that such agreements, freely arrived at between employers and their employees, should, if the parties to the agreement so desire, and after registration by an appropriate ¡governmental agency, he sanctioned by giving to such agency appropriate power to enforce the agreements. * * *
“We recommend that the act provide for a Federal Labor Commission, a permanent and independent governmental agency whose- members shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and which shall have the following functions * * * the power under appropriate rules and regulations to register, at the joint request of the parties, and to enforce trade agreements of definite duration freely entered into by employers and their employees.” Hearings on S. 1958, Part. 3, pp. 720-721 (italics ours).
This recommendation did not, however, find its way into the Act. Furthermore, although various members of the Congress seemed to have been dissatisfied with one or another of the provisions of the statute as finally enacted, such displeasure did not take the form of repeating by way of amendment proposals anything like those offered by Mr. Davis.16 The conclusion seems irresistible that, in the first place, Congress frowned upon the Twentieth Century Fund’s theory of power for the Board and, in the second place, that nothing subsequently transpired to change the frown into a smile.
Analogous in principle and in operation to legislative construction is executive construction. The writer has never favored the extreme views of this doctrine held by some courts.17 However, he has felt it should be used as a marker rather than as a channel or, in a different metaphor, as a wise precedent rather than as a binding authority. Although the judicial notice available to me indicates no other instance of redress by a Labor Board after a collective bargaining agreement, my information is, of course, geographically limited. *274Therefore, a departmental or administrative practice in the technical sense cannot be relied on. It does seem proper, nevertheless, to submit the following quotations in their capacity as markers and wise precedents.

Members of the Board

“All that the Act intends to accomplish in regard to collective bargaining is to see that the employer may not by tactics of obstruction and bad faith so conduct himself as to make negotiations impossible and thereby defeat the consummation of an agreement.” Edwin S. Smith.18
“Yes; I think so, but that answer does not mean that it is applicable in exactly the same way, and I was just going to remark in connection with Senator Burke’s question about the mediation provision of the Railway Labor Act, that the question ha.s often been asked me why has that not applied to the other industries ? My answer usually is this: The Labor Relations Act proceeds on the theory of the novel writer. It says that the employer shall not discriminate against organizations or interfere with them, and then it says employers shall not refuse to bargain collectively. That is where the authority of the Labor Relations Board ends, at bringing the employer and employee together, but negatively. The moment the employer does not refuse to bargain collectively, the Board is through. In other words, it is like the novel, when the hero and heroine get together they live happily ever after. Well, anyone who is married knows that is not all the story. The Railway Labor Act starts where the Labor Relations Act leaves off with the provision protecting the rights of employees. The Railway Act starts just the other way, positively. It says it shall be the duty of every carrier and fus officers and agents and of all the employees to exert every effort to make and maintain agreements. That is collective-bargaining agreements. It is their duty to do that, to exert every effort to do it. Instead of stating it negatively, they shall not refuse to bargain, it says they shall bargain, and then it provides that every one of those agreements shall be filed with the National Mediation Board.” William M. Leiserson.19

Counsel for the Board (or its predecessors)

“The National Railroad Adjustment Board, created in 1934 by amendment to the Railway Labor Act of 1926, is, so far as I know, the only administrative tribunal, federal or state, which has ever been set up in this country for the purpose of rendering judicially enforceable decisions in controversies arising out of the interpretation of contracts.” Lloyd K. Garrison20 (italics ours).
“A signed contract is then the end — all of the process, so far as the National Labor Relations Act is concerned; for regarding the observance of contracts the National Labor Relations Board, to which the act entrusts the application of its standards, has no responsibility. It is ‘the practice and procedure of collective bargaining’ that is the board’s concern. The formation of the contract is the culmination of collective bargaining. At that point the legislative process in labor relations is over, and the executive process of application and interpretation begins.” William G. Rice 21 (italics ours).
“The Act does not deal with the enforcement of agreements at all, either against the employer, or against the employee. It leaves the law on this matter where it stood before.” Calvert Magruder22 (italics ours).
“It is perfectly true, and there has never been any doubt about it, that the law does deal with the somewhat limited field of labor relations, that is, it is not a mediation board or an arbitration board, or a conciliation agency. It was set up to protect, under the terms of the statute, certain rights, which were very simply stated, that is, the right of collective bargaining, and as an incident thereto, the right of self-organization.
“Now, that is all that the function of the Board is.” Charles Fahy.23
*275At the second argument learned counsel for the Board rather intimated that our first decision had been due to an oversight. He suggested that we had been unconscious of the last phrase of Section 157 which reads “ * * * for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”.24 That a court whose frequent duty it is to enforce the Act generally, should be unaware of any of its provisions seems unlikely. However, we did not overlook the quoted words. We thought then and from tile majority opinion it appears to be tlie only thing on which we agree now, that the phrase has absolutely “nothing to do with the case”. They derive via the famous Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act25 and from the preamble of Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.26 Frankfurter and Greene, in discussing that preamble, have this to say:
“This pronouncement recognizes the futility of freedom of contract in the absence of the freedom to contract. That a single enterprise may, and increasingly does, control the opportunity for the employment of thousands, and that through cooperative tactics of these large units the practical dominance of a whole industry may. be achieved — these are facts of our economic life which form the major premise of the proposed legislation.
“As formula, this expression of policy is far from novel. Many courts, including the Supreme Court itself, have repeatedly given it judicial benediction. The need for legislative assertion arises, as we have seen, from the fact that in action the courts have honored this policy more in the breach than in the observance. The new legislative exordium is doubtless also susceptible of judicial evaporation. But in its setting the section is useful rhetoric. It is intended as an explicit avowal of the considerations moving Congresssional action and, therefore, controlling any loyal app’ication of national policy by the courts.” Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction, pp. 211-212 (italics in second paragraph ours).
It seems hardly necessary to point out that the “useful rhetoric” is used in a statute that does not concern itself in any way with a Labor Board and can scarcely, therefore, have much to do with conferring power thereon. If this were not enough, I may also observe that the shop-worn rule of ejusdem generis applies here, as elsewhere. 27 A writer in the Yale Law Journal applies it specifically. He says: “ * * * A second reading reveals, however, that the Section protects in the line of union activities only organizational and defensive activities — concerted activities ‘for mutual aid or protection’. The word ‘protection’ should be enough to establish this, but the conclusion is reinforced by use of the word ‘other’, which refers back to ‘collective bargaining’. By familiar principles of statutory construction, therefore, ‘other’ limits what follows to activities of the same general nature as collective bargaining.” Ward, “Discrimination” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 Yale Law Journal 1152, 1161.
If this language goes beyond a “rhetoric” meaning, it is possibly found in the views of a Congressional opponent of the original Act. He says: “Under rights o f employees it is provided that they may engage in concerted activities for mutual aid — and this is not restricted to an employer’s own employees but labor agitators from anywhere may thrust themselves into a man’s business and interfere with his employees and try to get them dissatisfied and demand that they unionize against their will.” 79 Cong. Rec., Ft. 9, p. 9701, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
The writer of this dissent ends where he began. The case presents no issue of labor’s rights or relations. This country’s policy has favored the negotiation rather than the compulsion of agreements. 28 A wise Congress has, by the Wagner Act, freed that negotiation from the unfairness which may arise from the difference in economic position of the bargaining parties. To assign their enforcement to the same agency that protects their formation is a step toward *276the compulsion we have so far eschewed. It is clearly no far cry from fostering agreements to wanting to say what should be in them. The courts coming fresh to an already existing contract are free from that temptation. On the other hand, the administrative process has the advantages of- flexibility and familiarity. The choice should be made by direct, and not by judicial, legislation.

 Filed February 3, 1941.

 “Article IV.' Discharge
“1. The Publisher shall not discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employe because of Guild membership or because of bis activity in the Guild.
“2. Upon dismissal for any cause other than wilfull gross misconduct, the Publisher shall pay any employe as a dismissal indemnity a sum of money varying with bis length of service, according to the following schedule: * * *
“Article VII. Standing Committee
“1. The Guild shall designate a committee of its own choosing to take up with the Publisher or his authorized agent any matter arising from the application of this agreement. * * * ” Agreement, August 12, 1937, Respondent’s Exhibit No. 10, Appendix to Respondent’s Brief, p. 147.

 Appendix to Respondent’s Brief, p. 177.

 On the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements see Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 Yale Law Journal 194; Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements In American Law, 10 St. Louis Law Review 1; Johnson, An Analysis of the Present Legal Status of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 10 Notre Dame Lawyer 413; Rice, Collective Bargaining Agreements in American Law, 44 Harvard Law Review 572; Christen-son, Legally Enforceable Interests in American Labor Union Agreements, 9 Indiana Law Journal 69; Pipin, Enforcement of Rights Under Collective Bargaining Agreements, 6 University of Chicago Law Review 651; Hamilton, Industrial Rights Arising From Collective Labor Contracts, 3 Missouri Law Review 252; Anderson, Collective Bargaining Agreements, 15 Oregon Law Review 229; Agger, Contracts — Collective Bargaining Agreements — Rights of Unions and Individuals, 18 Marquette Law Review 251; Theories of Enforcement of Collective Labor Agreements, 41 Yale Law Journal 1221 (comment); Collective Labor Agreements, 31 Columbia Law Review 1156 (note); Contracts — Collective Labor Agreements — Right of Nonunion Employee, 23 Washington University Law Quarterly 570 ; Labor Law — Employee’s Rights Under Union-Employer Agreements, 10 North Carolina Law Review 394 (note); Labor Law- -Collective Labor Agreement Violated by Employer — Action for Damages by Non-Member of Union. 26 Illinois Law Review 922 (note); Labor Law — Nature, Validity and Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 11 New York University Law Quarterly Review 262 (note); Labor Law —Contracts—Rights of Employee Under Collective Agreement. 2 University of Chicago 335; The Present Status of Collective Labor Agreements, 51 Harvard Law Review 520 (note); Contracts — Contracts for Benefit of Third Party — Trade Unions —Right of Non-Member to Sue Employer for Damages Resulting from Breach of Contract With Union, 16 Minnesota Daw Review 100 (note). Cf. Deguit, Collective Acts As Distinguished from Contracts, 27 Yale Law Journal 753, 766. Por a survey of effect given to these agreements in other countries see Mackintosh, Legislation Concerning Labour Agreements, 14 Canadian Bar Review 97 and 220; Rice, Collective Bargaining Agreements in American Law, 44 Harvard Law Review 572, 575.

 See articles cited in footnote 4. Also 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining §§ 163, 166. .
“That the employment under ' a craft agreement is one at will, or that such agreement may be changed at any future time, is no bar to relief. So long as the *271employee continues to work and the craft agreement is in effect, he is entitled to his rights under the contract.” Pipin, Enforcement of Rights Under Collective Bargaining Agreements, 6 University of Chicago Law Review 651, 653.

 See Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S.W. 459; Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S.W. 1042, 33 A.L.R. 322; McGregor v. Louisville & N. Ry., 244 Ky. 696, 51 S.W.2d 953.
“If the union has not the right to invoke the aid of a court of equity to prevent the unlawful violation of a contract such as exists in the case at bar, then such a contract loses most of its force, and the rights of collective bargaining are narrowed, and the economic benefits to the community from collective bargaining to a great extent lost.” Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App.Div. 631, 634, 227 N.Y.S. 311, 314.
See also Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts, 48 Yale Law Journal 194, 201 et seq.; Rice, Collective Bargaining Agreements In American Law, 44 Harvard Law Review 572, 607 ; Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 Harvard Law Review 171, 200-201; Equity: Specific Performance of Collective Bargaining Contract At the Suit of a Trade Union, 16 Cornell Law Quarterly 96 (note); Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Seniority Clause, 41 Columbia Law Review 304 (comment). Of. Mason, Organized Labor as Party Plaintiff in Injunction Cases, 30 Columbia Law Review 466.
“The agreements into which this bargaining crystallizes must be adequately enforced by the courts not only to gira effect to the intent of the parties and insure fair dealing between them, but also to avoid the inevitable alternative to' judicial sanction, strikes and lockouts, costly aline to employer, employee, and consumer.” Theories of Enforcement of Collective Labor Agreements, 41 Yale Law Journal 1221, 1222 (comment).

 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e).

 Burk Brothers v. N. L. R. B., 3 Cir., 117 F.2d 686, filed February 3, 1941.

 Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, United States Government Printing Office, 1941.

 Chamberlain, The Railway Labor Act, 12 American Bar Association Journal 633; Ellengwood, The Railway Labor Act of 1926, 36 Journal of Political Economy 53; Gause & Kightlinger, The Railway Labor Act Decision, 12 Indiana Law Journal 403; Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale Law Journal 567; Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 Harvard Law Review 1071, 1086 et seq.; Mayper, Industrial Arbitration, 1 Arbitration Journal 322; Railroad Labor Legislation of 1934, 29 Illinois Law Review 789 (note).

 Minnesota Acts of 1939, c. 440, §§ 2, 8, 9, 11 (a) and 12 (a); Wisconsin Acts of 1939, c. 57, § 111.06 (2c), 111.06 (1F), 111.10, 111.11. Compare, 2 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining § 451; Rice, Wisconsin Labor Relations Act in 1937 ; 1938 Wisconsin Law Review 229; The State Labor Relations Acts, 51 Harvard Law Review 722 (note).

 Great Britain: Sells, The Settlement of Industrial Disputes in Great Britain, 5 Law & Contemporary Problems 321. Australia: Evatt, Control of Labor Relations in the Commonwealth of Australia, 6 University of Chicago Law Review 529; Russell, The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1928, 2 Australia Law Journal 147. Canada: Mackintosh, Government, Intervention in Labour Disputes in Canada (1924); Fisher, Industrial Disputes and Federal Legislation, pp. 139-148; Nicholis, Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes in Canada, 2 Arbitration Journal 375. Sweden: Childs, This is Democracy; Robbins & Heekseher, Collective Bargaining in Sweden, 24 American Bar Association Journal 926; United States Department of Labor, Report of Comm’n on Industrial Relations in Sweden (193S); Hagander, The Swedish Labor Court, 1 Arbitration Journal 411; Robbins, Jurisdiction of the Labor Court in Sweden, 35 Illinois Law Review 396. Philippine Islands: Compulsory Industrial Arbitration in the Philippines, 2 Arbitration Journal 29. France: Sobernheim & Rothschild, Regulation of Labor Unions and Labor Disputes in France, 37 Michigan Law Review 1025; Riesenfeld, Recent Developments of French Labor Law, 23 Minnesota Law Review 407. Germany: Lehmann, Collective Labor Laws Under the German Republic, 10 Wisconsin Law Review 324. Compare, Mitchell, Industrial Relation Laws of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 22 Minnesota Law Review 921; Malick, Labor Studies Under Democracy (University of Colorado Studies, Series C., Studies in the Social Sciences Vol. 1, No. 1).

 “The New York State Labor Relations Act (Laws of 1937, Chapter 443, effective July 1, 1937; Article 20 of the Labor Law, Consol.Laws, c. 31, § 700 et seq.) * * * provides a complete supervision of labor relations for employers in intrastate enterprises similar to that set up by the National Labor Relations Act with respect to interstate or foreign commerce. The state act, with added details, follows closely the national act.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 222, 223, 59 S.Ct. 206, 214, 83 L.Ed. 126.

 United Baking Co., Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers’ Union, etc., 257 App.Div. 501, 14 N.Y.S.2d 74, 80.

 Now, interestingly enough, Chairman of the Defense Mediation Board and then Chairman of a Special Committee on the Government and Labor -of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., New York.

 Report of the National Labor Relations Board to the Senate Committee on Education and Labor Upon S. 1000, S. 1264, S. 1392, S. 1550, and S. 1580, April 1939 (included in Hearings Before the Senate on the above bills. Part, 3, p. 467).

 Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities Corp., 3 Cir., 117 F.2d 62, 72. Cf. Feller, Addendum to the Regulations Problem, 54 Harvard Law Review 1311, 1319.

 Hearings Before the Committee on Education and Labor, U. S. Senate, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 1000, S. 1264, S. 1392, S. 1550, S. 1580, and S. 2123, Bills to Amend the National Labor Relations Act, p. 1607.

 Hearings, supra, p. 998.

 Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale Law Journal 567.

 Rice, The Legal Significance of Labor Contracts Under the National Labor Relations Act, 37 Michigan Law Review 693-694.

 Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining, 50 Harvard Law Review 1071, 1112.

 Hearings, supra, pp. 444-445.

 29 U.S.C.A. § 157.

 48 Stat. 195, declared unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947.

 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. § 102.

 Texas v. United States, 292 U.S. 522, 54 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed. 1402.

 For an unsuccessful state attempt at compulsory industrial arbitration see Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 43 S.Ct. 630, 67 L.Ed. 1103, 27 A.L.R. 1280; Id., 267 U. S. 552, 45 S.Ct. 441, 69 L.Ed. 785; Bowers, Kansas Court of Industrial Relations ; Fisher, Industrial Disputes and Federal Legislation, pp. 249-251.