Court Opinion

ID: 9488603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:50:15.895071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:59.254618
License: Public Domain

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with all but part II.A of the majority opinion, but dissent as to that part.
First of all, it is important to say what this case is not. This is not a case where a party sought to obtain a dismissal without prejudice and was then either denied that outright or subjected to intolerable terms and conditions. Far from it. Resorts asked that the case be dismissed with prejudice but asked for special terms and conditions that would bind the bankruptcy court to allowing Resorts to come back into this very case at some future time. It also wanted a condition that would permit it to remain a party-in-interest even though its claim had been dismissed at its own behest. It wanted to retain all of the rights of a party to the case while avoiding the necessity of a trial. In other words, Resorts claims that it should be allowed to tell the bankruptcy court if and when that court is permitted to adjudicate the basic issue in the Lowensehuss reorganization: did Mr. Lowensehuss himself commit fraud upon Resorts either for his own benefit or for someone else’s? The bankruptcy court said that the time had come to try that issue, but Resorts disagreed. Resorts wanted to decide when and where it would pursue its assertion that Lowensehuss committed a wrong, but it never for one moment eschewed the pursuit. It wanted to control the bankruptcy court’s calendar.
Of course, the bankruptcy court did not require Resorts to withdraw its claim with prejudice after Resorts had merely made a voluntary withdrawal motion. That court, at all times, afforded Resorts the right to go forward with its claim, even though Resorts thought that might turn out to be a useless act.1 If Resorts thought that withdrawal of its claim without the special conditions it demanded would be too burdensome, it could have proceeded with the case on the merits. See Lau v. Glendora Unified School Dist., 792 F.2d 929, 930-31 (9th Cir.1986) (per curiam order); see also Gravatt v. Columbia Univ., 845 F.2d 54, 56 (2nd Cir.1988).
Again, Resorts did not simply want to obtain a voluntary dismissal, which was denied to it. Cf. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir.1994). It wanted a voluntary dismissal with prejudice and with a guarantee that it could stay in the fray at the same time. In my view, it was not entitled to that and still is not. It, like others who dismiss their actions, simply had to abide the vicissitudes of the future. Perhaps it would want to return, perhaps not. Perhaps it would be able to return, perhaps not. It was not entitled to an advance declaration that would allow it to continue participating in the bankruptcy proceedings and that would require the bankruptcy court to conduct all further proceedings with an eye on the possibility that Resorts would later demand a trial of the issue in question.
In fine, Resorts might have been permitted to leave this case and to hope that it could find a procedural way back in, if it found that necessary. Resorts was not permitted to dictate how the bankruptcy court was to handle the case, its calendar, and any possible later request by Resorts to return to the case.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent as to Part II.A.

. I am dubious about Resorts's premise. By any account, Lowensehuss, the alleged wrongdoer, was the trustee, administrator, and sole beneficiary of the Pension Plan. Could it be that the Plan would not be bound by an adjudication that he had committed fraud when he engaged in the redemption transaction on its behalf? I doubt it.