Court Opinion

ID: 9898264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:31.715247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:36.272420
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                   SEPTEMBER 5, 2023
                                                                In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                               WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

In the Matter of the Marriage of              )
                                              )         No. 39062-4-III
KATHERINE ANDERSEN                            )
                                              )
                     Appellant,               )
                                              )
       v.                                     )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                              )
JASON TILSON,                                 )
                                              )
                     Respondent.              )

       STAAB, J. — Katherine Andersen appeals from the trial court’s entry of a phased

parenting plan that eventually resulted in a shared residential schedule for her and Jason

Tilson’s child, C.A. Andersen argues that upon finding a history of domestic violence

and alcohol abuse the trial court was statutorily required to impose limitations on Tilson’s

decision-making authority and residential time. Alternatively, she contends that the trial

court’s parenting plan was an abuse of discretion. We agree in part.
No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

       Upon finding a history of domestic violence, a trial court is required to impose

restrictions on a parent’s residential time unless the court makes additional findings set

forth in RCW 26.09.191(2)(n). Here, the court made such findings, but the findings are

insufficient to support the court’s conclusion that the exception in RCW 26.09.191(2)(n)

applies. Given the numerous allegations of domestic violence, the finding that Tilson’s

acts of domestic violence are “remote” is too conclusory to determine if the finding

supports the conclusion.

        A finding of domestic violence also precludes a court from requiring joint

decision-making under RCW 26.09.191(1). This restriction has no exception. Thus,

once the court found that Tilson has a history of domestic violence, it was error to require

joint decision-making.

       Otherwise, we agree with Tilson and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in structuring the parents’ residential time in light of its findings on Tilson’s

alcohol use and treatment. We deny both parties their attorney fees on appeal with leave

for the trial court to award Andersen her fees on remand.

                                      BACKGROUND

       C.A. is the child of Jason Tilson and Katherine Andersen, who separated shortly

after C.A.’s birth in 2019. In the four years since their separation, the parties have

continued to disagree over parenting plan provisions.

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Andersen v. Tilson

       In January 2022, Andersen filed another proposed parenting plan, requesting

limitations be placed on Tilson under RCW 26.09.191 for three reasons: domestic

violence, substance abuse, and abusive use of conflict. Andersen requested that Tilson’s

residential time with C.A. be limited and she be given sole decision-making authority.

Tilson opposed Andersen’s proposed parenting plan and requested joint-decision making

and a shared residential schedule.

       At trial, Andersen presented evidence of multiple incidents of domestic violence

allegedly perpetrated by Tilson over the span of several years against three different

people, including herself. She presented the testimony of Breanna Hogan, who has two

older children with Tilson. Hogan testified that while she was together with Tilson from

2009 to 2016, Tilson was physical with her on multiple occasions, usually after drinking

alcohol. The last incident resulted in Tilson being arrested and convicted of fourth

degree assault—domestic violence. Hogan also testified that for the immediately

preceding year, Hogan and her children were protected by a domestic violence no contact

order against Tilson stemming from an incident in which Tilson had picked up one of

their children by the throat and thrown her into a chair. On cross-examination, Hogan

admitted that she had previously written a declaration on behalf of Tilson in the parenting

dispute with Andersen, stating that he was a good dad and was taking good care of C.A.

       Andersen testified as well. She said that there had been multiple domestic

violence incidents between her and Tilson and testified about specific incidents. She

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

testified that at one point she had obtained a restraining order against Tilson because he

had contacted her employer. Andersen also testified that Tilson had an alcohol problem.

She acknowledged that the current parenting plan allowed her to test Tilson for alcohol

consumption when he picked up or dropped off C.A. Despite her allegations, according

to Tilson, Andersen had only tested him once and the results were negative.

       Andersen additionally testified that Tilson told her he had been diagnosed with

mental health disorders. Andersen admitted that C.A.’s medical records indicated that

C.A. had reported no domestic violence at C.A.’s doctor’s appointments.

       Tilson testified and denied Andersen’s allegations. He said that Andersen

frequently referred to him as “psycho,” at times in front of C.A. However, he admitted

that he had called Andersen names. He also said he bore partial responsibility for the

poor communication between himself and Andersen. Tilson admitted that he had sought

counseling following the death of his parents and had been diagnosed with mental health

disorders. He said that he had significantly reduced his alcohol consumption, although

admitted that he had four prior DUIs as well as a pending DUI charge.

       Tilson denied ever being physically violent toward Andersen. He acknowledged

that there was a domestic violence order in place against him but said he had never

committed domestic violence around C.A. or when C.A. was in the house. He also

testified that the investigation into Hogan’s allegations that he had committed domestic

violence against his daughter resulted in no findings.

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

       Multiple witnesses who were friends with Tilson testified that he was a good

father and interacted well with C.A.

       In its oral decision, the trial court determined that both parties demonstrated that

they were loving and caring parents. The trial court found that it was clear the parties did

not get along and that there were issues with credibility and exaggeration on both sides.

The trial court also noted that Tilson had testified that he had been diagnosed with mental

health disorders but had sought counseling, and was taking medication as a result.

       The trial court denied Andersen’s request for limitations on Tilson’s decision-

making and residential time. The court found no abusive use of conflict, but noted that if

it were to make such a finding, it would be that both parties engaged in such behavior.

       In its oral decision, the court found that Tilson had a history of domestic violence

but did not indicate which of the alleged incidents of domestic violence it found

credible.1 The court noted that Tilson disputed Hogan’s claims of domestic violence

against her. While acknowledging the protection order obtained by Andersen, the court

commented that it had removed C.A. from the permanent order after finding that C.A.

was not threatened by Tilson. And while characterizing Andersen’s allegations as “a

wash,” the court did not clearly articulate that the allegations were not proved. With

       1
        The written parenting plan found that neither parent had a problem with domestic
violence. CP at 563. On appeal, both parties proceeded based on the trial court’s oral
decision.

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

respect to the allegations by Tilson and Hogan’s child that resulted in the imposition of a

protection order, the court indicated that it was not the judge who imposed the order and

did not know what occurred. Finally, the court noted Hogan’s testimony about incidents

of domestic violence while she was with Tilson, and commented that their relationship

ended in 2016 when Tilson was convicted of fourth degree assault domestic violence. RP

at 333-35.

       Despite finding a history of domestic violence, the court found that limitations

should not be imposed because the exception provided by RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) applied

in this case. In line with this statutory provision, the court expressly concluded that

contact between Tilson and C.A. would not cause physical, sexual, or emotional abuse or

harm to C.A. and that the probability that Tilson’s harmful abuse of contact would recur

was so remote that it was not in C.A.’s best interests to implement a domestic violence

limitation.

       Regarding Andersen’s request for limitations based on Tilson’s alcohol abuse, the

trial court found that Tilson “has a long-term problem with drugs, alcohol, or other

substances that gets in the way of his/her ability to parent.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 564.

Based on this finding, the trial court entered a three-phase parenting plan that placed

limits on Tilson in the first two phases to ensure that he addressed his alcohol issues. As

part of phase one, the trial court ordered that Tilson undergo a substance abuse evaluation

that would include information received from “all sources, including [ ] Andersen,” and

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

follow any recommended treatment. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 342. Tilson was required to

provide a copy of the evaluation and treatment plan, but additional language requiring

Tilson to provide compliance reports to Andersen’s attorney was crossed out by the court.

       Andersen appeals.

                                        ANALYSIS

       While Andersen identifies seven issues on appeal, we consolidate these into four

issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to place limitations on Tilson under

former RCW 26.09.191(1) (2020) and (2)(a) based on the court’s finding of domestic

violence, (2) whether the trial court’s residential schedule violated RCW 26.09.187(3)(b)

and was an abuse of its discretion based on the court’s finding that Tilson suffers from

long-term alcohol abuse, (3) whether the trial court failed to enter findings on Tilson’s

mental health issues and abusive use of conflict, and (4) whether either party should be

awarded attorney fees on appeal.

       Following a bench trial, we review the trial court’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Unchallenged findings constitute verities on appeal. In re Estate of

Jones, 152 Wn.2d 1, 8, 93 P.3d 147 (2004). Challenged findings are verities if they are

supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Black, 188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392

P.3d 1041 (2017). “Substantial evidence” requires us to determine if the evidence is

“sufficient to persuade a rational, fair-minded person of the truth of the finding.” Jones,

152 Wn.2d at 8. “We do not review the trial court's credibility determinations or weigh

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

conflicting evidence ‘even though we may disagree with the trial court in either regard.’”

Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127 (quoting In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 740, 513 P.2d

831 (1973)). We review conclusions of law de novo and consider whether they are

supported by the trial court’s findings. Littlefair v. Schulze, 169 Wn. App. 659, 664, 278

P.3d 218 (2012).

       This court reviews a trial court’s entry of a parenting plan for an abuse of

discretion. In re Parentage of C.A.S., 25 Wn. App. 2d 21, 25-26, 522 P.3d 75 (2022).

An abuse of discretion occurs where a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on

untenable grounds or reasons. Id. at 26. A manifestly unreasonable decision is one

which is outside the range of acceptable choices in light of the facts and relevant legal

standard. Id.

A.     LIMITATIONS BASED ON A FINDING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

       Andersen argues that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to impose

limitations in the parenting plan after finding that Tilson had a history of domestic

violence. The trial court concluded that despite the finding of domestic violence,

Tilson’s residential time and decision making should not be limited because the exception

provided in RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) applied. For different reasons we conclude that the

trial court abused its discretion with respect to limitations on Tilson’s residential time and

joint decision making.

       1.        Limitations on Residential Time

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

       Generally, a parent’s residential time with their child shall be limited if the court

concludes that the parent has a history of domestic violence. Former RCW

26.09.191(2)(a)(iii) (2021).2 However, even when domestic violence is found, a trial court

retains discretion, and need not apply the limitations to a parent’s residential time, if either

one of two exceptions apply: (1) the court specifically finds that the child will not be

harmed by contact with the offending parent and that the probability if reoccurring violence

is so remote that it would not be in the best interest of the child to apply the limitations, or

(2) the conduct did not have an impact on the child. Former RCW 26.09.191(2)(n).3

       Here, the court made findings under the first exception:

           I do so expressly find that even though there is a history of domestic
           violence under 2(n) I expressly find based on the evidence, that contact
           between Mr. Tilson and [C.A.] will not cause physical, sexual, or
           emotional abuse or harm to [C.A.]. It is remote. It is so remote that it

       2
         Former RCW 26.09.191(2)(a) (2021): “The parent’s residential time with the
child shall be limited if it is found that the parent has engaged in any of the following
conduct: . . . (iii) a history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010(3)
or an assault or sexual assault that causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm
or that results in a pregnancy.”
       3
         Former RCW 26.09.191(2)(n): “If the court expressly finds based on the
evidence that contact between the parent and the child will not cause physical, sexual, or
emotional abuse or harm to the child and that the probability that the parent’s or other
person’s harmful or abusive conduct will recur is so remote that it would not be in the
child’s best interests to apply the limitations of (a), (b), and (m)(i) and (iv) of this
subsection, or if the court expressly finds that the parent’s conduct did not have an impact
on the child, then the court need not apply the limitations of (a), (b), and (m)(i) and (iv)
of this subsection.”

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

            would not be in the child's best interest to apply the limitations. That’s
            my finding there.

RP at 341.

       This finding is too conclusory to support the legal conclusion that the exception

applies. “While the degree of particularity required in findings of fact depends on the

circumstances of the particular case, they should at least be sufficient to indicate the

factual bases for the ultimate conclusions.” City of Walla Walla v. $401,333.44, 164 Wn.

App. 236, 254, 262 P.3d 1239 (2011). Findings should be sufficient to identify the

conflicting contentions and resolve the material issues of fact. Id.

       Here, the parties disputed the extent of Tilson’s history of domestic violence. Yet

the trial court did not specify which allegations of domestic violence it found credible.

The finding of remoteness could be supported by substantial evidence depending on the

allegations of domestic violence the court finds credible. But the conclusory finding that

the domestic violence was remote, without more specific findings, is insufficient to

provide a factual basis for the conclusion that the exception in RCW 26.09.191(2)(n)

applies.4 Because the court’s findings are insufficient to support its conclusion that the

exception in RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) should apply, , the trial court’s decision was an abuse

of discretion.

       2.          Limitations on Joint Decision-Making

       4
           To be clear, we are not finding that the evidence does not support the findings.

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

       Andersen also challenges the trial court’s decision to require joint decision making

after finding that Tilson had a history of domestic violence. We agree with Andersen.

Once the court found that Tilson had a history of domestic violence, the limitations of

RCW 26.09.191(1) applied and the court abused its discretion by requiring joint decision

making. Unlike the discretion to limit residential time upon a finding of domestic

violence under RCW 26.09.191(2)(a)(iii) and (2)(n), the limitations on decision-making

under RCW 26.09.191(1) are mandatory and without exception.

       Former RCW 26.09.191(1) provides in part:

       The permanent parenting plan shall not require mutual decision-making or
       designation of a dispute resolution process other than court action if it is
       found that a parent has engaged in any of the following conduct: . . . (c) a
       history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010(3) or an
       assault or sexual assault that causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of
       such harm or that results in a pregnancy.

       Division One of this court recently confirmed that this statutory provision is non-

discretionary. C.A.S., 25 Wn. App. 2d at 27-28. “On its face the statute affords no

discretion, it prohibits trial courts from requiring mutual decision-making or nonjudicial

dispute resolution where there is a history of domestic violence.” Id. The limitation

applies even when the acts of domestic violence were committed against a third person or

child. Id. at 28.

       Nor does the exception for limitations on residential time provided in former RCW

26.09.191(2)(n) apply to the limitations on joint decision making required by former

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

RCW 26.09.191(1). Subsection (2)(n) provides that if the court makes the express

findings set forth in the subsection “then the court need not apply the limitations of (a),

(b), and (m)(i) and (iv) of this subsection.” A close reading of this sentence makes it

clear that the exception applies to certain limitations under subsection (2), not subsection

(1). See C.A.S., 25 Wn. App. 2d at 28 (court’s discretion provided in subsection (2)(n)

does not apply to limitations required by subsection (1)).

       Here, the trial court held that it could require joint decision making despite its

finding of domestic violence because the exception provided in RCW 26.09.191(2)(n)

applied. This conclusion is untenable, and thus, the trial court’s order requiring joint

decision making was an abuse of discretion.

B.     LIMITATIONS BASED ON A FINDING OF ALCOHOL ABUSE

       Next, Andersen contends that after finding Tilson had a long-term problem with

alcohol that interferes with his ability to parent, the trial court abused its discretion by

entering a parenting plan that increased Tilson’s residential time as his treatment

progressed. She argues that the limitations and residential schedule are unreasonable and

the final shared residential schedule is prohibited by RCW 26.09.187(3)(b).

       The trial court found that Tilson had a long-term problem with alcohol abuse that

impacted his ability to parent and then provided a phased-in residential schedule based on

Tilson’s progress in treatment. In its oral ruling, the court indicated that Tilson’s initial

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

alcohol evaluation should include information from all sources, including Andersen.

After indicating that Tilson was to follow any treatment recommendations, the court also

indicated that Tilson was to provide copies of “everything” to Andersen’s attorney. RP at

342. Andersen points out that the written parenting plan does not include language that

Andersen is to provide information to the evaluator and the court crossed out language

that Tilson was to provide compliance reports to Andersen. Andersen contends that the

court’s written plan is unreasonable because there is no way for Andersen to verify the

accuracy of the evaluation or confirm compliance with treatment. For several reasons,

we disagree.

       First, it is not clear that the court’s written parenting plan is inconsistent with its

oral decision. Even if it is, the record does not indicate that Andersen objected to the

written parenting plan so as to provide the trial court with an opportunity to address or

correct the perceived differences. See RAP 2.5(a) (providing that issues generally may

not be raised for the first time on appeal).

       As we noted above, the trial court has discretion in crafting an appropriate

parenting plan. In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 801, 854 P.2d 629 (1993).

Here, the court’s parenting plan requires Tilson to show proof of complying with specific

stages of his treatment before he is entitled to more residential time with C.A. under the

next phase in the parenting plan. This phased-in approach is not manifestly

unreasonable.

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

       Nor do we agree with Andersen that the trial court’s final residential schedule,

providing for shared residential time, violated RCW 26.09.187(3)(b). This statute

provides that “[w]here the limitations of RCW 26.09.191 are not dispositive, the court

may order that a child frequently alternate his or her residence between the households of

the parents for brief and substantially equal intervals of time if such provision is in the

best interests of the child.” RCW 26.09.187(3)(b) (emphasis added).

       Andersen’s assignment of error raises an issue of statutory construction. This

court reviews questions of statutory construction de novo. C.A.S., 25 Wn. App. 2d at 26.

The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent and interpret

the statute to carry out the intent. Id. This court should begin its interpretation by

examining a statute’s plain language. Id. “‘If the plain language is subject to only one

interpretation, our inquiry ends because plain language does not require construction.’”

Id. (quoting Homestreet, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 166 Wn.2d 444, 451, 210 P.3d 297

(2009)).

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

       RCW 26.09.191 provides for mandatory limitations and discretionary limitations.

Under RCW 26.09.191(3)(c), a trial court “may preclude or limit any provisions of the

parenting plan” if it finds [a] long-term impairment resulting from drug, alcohol, or other

substance abuse that interferes with the performance of parenting functions.” RCW

26.09.191(3)(c) (emphasis added). “The word ‘may’ in a statute denotes discretion and is

distinct from the word ‘shall,’ which indicates a mandatory action.” In re Marriage of

Kim, 179 Wn. App. 232, 250-51, 317 P.3d 555 (2014). Thus, under this provision the

trial court had discretion to impose limitations upon finding long-term impairment from

alcohol abuse, but the finding of impairment did not require limitations. In other words,

the finding of impairment was not dispositive on the residential schedule. Since the

limitations imposed by the trial court under RCW 26.09.191 were not dispositive the

court’s shared residential schedule did not violate RCW 26.09.187(3)(b).

C.     FINDINGS ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABUSIVE USE OF CONFLICT

       Andersen contends that the trial court erred in failing to enter findings or

limitations on Tilson’s mental health issues and abusive use of conflict. The record does

not reflect that Andersen requested limitations based on mental health issues. Nor did the

record reflect that Andersen objected to the lack of findings based on this factor. We

decline to address this issue for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a).

       The trial court declined to find that Tilson exhibited abusive use of conflict,

commenting that if it were to find this factor existed, it would find it against both parties.

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

Andersen argues that the court did not explain how she employed abusive use of conflict

and argues that there is no evidence that she suffers from mental health issues. The trial

court’s finding was based on its evaluation of the evidence and credibility of the

witnesses; two areas of the law that we do not re-examine on appeal. “An essential

function of the fact finder is to discount theories which it determines unreasonable

because the finder of fact is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence, the weight to be

given thereto, and the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703,

709, 974 P.2d 832 (1999).

       Even if the trial court had found an emotional impairment or abusive use of

conflict, the statute does not require the court to impose limits on Tilson’s residential

time. Andersen fails to cite any provision that supports her contention that the trial court

was prohibited from entering a parenting plan with a shared residential schedule based on

Tilson’s alcohol abuse, abusive use of conflict, or mental health struggles. The trial court

did not abuse its discretion in ordering a shared residential schedule.

D.     ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

       Tilson and Andersen both request their attorney fees on appeal. Tilson requests

fees under RAP 18.9(a) and claims that Andersen’s appeal was frivolous. Given our

holding, we reject Tilson’s argument.

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No. 39062-4-III
Andersen v. Tilson

       Andersen requests fees based on need and ability to pay under RAP 18.1 and

RCW 26.09.140. The statute provides this court with discretion to award attorney fees

after considering each parties’ financial resources. Although Andersen filed a timely

financial declaration, it is difficult to determine if she has a financial need for attorney

fees. In view of our decision to remand, we decline to consider attorney fees and costs

with leave to the trial court to consider them on remand. RAP 14.4(c).

                                       CONCLUSION

       We hold that the trial court’s findings of fact pertaining to Tilson’s history of

domestic violence is insufficient to provide effective appellate review of the court’s

conclusion that it maintained discretion under RCW 26.09.191(2)(n) to impose

limitations on Tilson’s residential time with C.A. We remand with instructions for the

court to supplement its findings on this issue and revise its conclusions accordingly.

       We further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring joint

decision-making despite its finding that Tilson had a history of domestic violence. The

limitations provided in former RCW 26.09.191(1) are mandatory and not subject to the

exception provided in RCW 26.09.191(2)(n). We remand with instructions for the court

to modify the parenting plan and remove the requirement for joint decision making.

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No. 39062-4-III
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       Otherwise, we find that the trial court’s phased-in residential schedule, after

finding that Tilson suffered from a long term impairment from alcohol, was not an abuse

of discretion and affirm this portion of the trial court’s parenting plan.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                               _________________________________
                                                       Staab, J.
WE CONCUR:

_________________________________
      Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.

_________________________________
      Pennell, J.

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