Court Opinion

ID: 9578518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:46:00.622821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:16.984234
License: Public Domain

GILLETTE, J.,
concurring.
I join in the majority opinion, but wish to add a few points for emphasis.
The allegations of the petition here are demurrable because, to be very specific, the fact that a child makes serious charges to a third party concerning her parent or parents does not, standing alone, create grounds for juvenile court jurisdiction. The fact that one of the child’s parents — but not one against whom the allegations are made — makes corroborating statements to third parties does not create juvenile court jurisdiction. The state’s claim that these facts, considered together or separately, do create juvenile court jurisdiction is wrong. The fact of the statements, standing alone, does not show that the child meets the criteria of either ORS 419.476(1)(c) or (e), the only subsections under which the state claims jurisdiction:
ORS 419.476(l)(c) provides that a juvenile is within the jurisdiction of the court where the child’s
*765"* * * behavior, condition or circumstances are such as to endanger his own welfare * *
The state’s claim here is that the mere making of the statements shows that the child’s "behavior, condition or circumstances” endanger her welfare. Accepting the state’s premise that the child’s making of the statements shows that she is disturbed and requires care, the state’s claim nonetheless fails because it is nowhere alleged that the parents are not making reasonable efforts to deal with her disturbed state. It is only if they are not doing so that the child may be "endangered” in a sense which justifies interference by the state with the parent-child relationship.
ORS 419.476(l)(e) provides that a juvenile is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court when
"* * * his parents * * * have * * * failed to provide him with the care, guidance and protection necessary for his physical, mental or emotional well-being ifc }£ ifc »
Precisely the same analysis made with respect to subsection (c), supra, applies here: the petitioner’s allegations may be sufficient to show that this child is disturbed, but the fact of distrubance does not show any failure to provide care. The petition alleges no facts which would show the additional element of parental culpability under subsection (e). The demurrer should have been sustained.
It is useful to note that the pleadings here are not deficient by inadvertence. The whole course of the proceedings demonstrates that the state intended to test the limits of jurisdiction in this case: the only evidence it offered was the fact that the statements were made. Neither mother nor daughter testified.
It is true that what the child is reported to have said is most serious, perhaps all the more serious because of their sexual nature.. One wonders if the state would have even considered bringing this petition if the child had been telling third parties that her father was a three-headed, green-skinned Martian *766bent on destroying the world, and her mother had agreed. In any event, we hold today that the state is not authorized to become the guardian of every child who makes wild statements. That was all that was alleged — or proved — here.
Buttler and Joseph, JJ., join in this opinion.