Court Opinion

ID: 9959776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:10:31.561763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:53.291590
License: Public Domain

J-S06005-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JAMES SANDERS                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 994 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000944-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                 FILED APRIL 12, 2024

       Appellant, James Sanders, appeals from the February 3, 2023 judgment

of sentence of 9 to 23 months of incarceration entered in the Montgomery

County Court of Common Pleas following his non-jury trial conviction of one

count each of Endangering the Welfare of a Child (“EWOC”) and one count of

Simple Assault.1      Appellant challenges certain evidentiary rulings and the

sufficiency of the evidence. After careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. Appellant and

K.J. (“Victim”) are parents to two minor children, A.S. and J.S. 2 On January

29, 2022, at approximately 10:55 AM, 911 dispatch in Stowe, Montgomery

County, received a call from Victim reporting that Appellant, who was

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4304(a)(1) and 2701(a)(1), respectively.

2 In January 2022, A.S. was 13 years old and J.S. was seven years old.
J-S06005-24

reportedly intoxicated, was beating Victim and A.S. inside their home.

Immediately prior to Victim’s 911 call, 911 dispatch received a call from

Victim’s neighbor who was listening to the altercation taking place in Victim’s

home and narrating the events as they were occurring.

        West Pottsgrove Township Police Officer Adam Zieske responded to the

scene at 10:59 AM. When he arrived, he began to walk towards the residence,

when Victim, who was seated in the front seat of her vehicle parked on the

street, flagged him down.          A.S. was seated in the vehicle with Victim;

Appellant was inside the residence with J.S.3

        Victim appeared “clearly upset” to Officer Zieske, but she was not

crying.4   “Talking quickly and in an excited manner[,]” 5 Victim told Officer

Zieske that she had called 911 because she had had a physical altercation

with Appellant. She reported that when Appellant woke up that morning he

was intoxicated from the night before.           She further reported that she and

Appellant began to argue when Appellant demanded that Victim take him to

the store, but she refused. Victim told Officer Zieske that Appellant grabbed

her, head-butted her, and threw her around the bedroom.              When Victim,

holding J.S., tried to leave the residence, Appellant pushed them down the
____________________________________________

3 As Officer Zieske approached the vehicle, he could hear Appellant yelling and

he saw Appellant inside the residence crouched down behind the front screen
door.
4 N.T. Trial, 10/11/22, at 23.

5 Id.

                                           -2-
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stairs. Victim reported that A.S. heard the altercation and yelled to Appellant

“this is why nobody wants you here,” at which point Appellant grabbed A.S.

and began to throw her around the house.6

       Officer Zieske noticed that A.S. was “visibly upset[,]” with a “flushed

red” face and “swelling in the eye area.”7 A.S. was not crying, “but very clearly

seemed to be someone who had just – was just crying, watery eyes, very

upset.”8

       After speaking with Victim, Officer Zieske went to the residence to speak

with Appellant, who was still inside with J.S., through the front screen door.

Appellant refused to let Officer Zieske enter the residence and refused to exit

the residence at Officer Zieske’s request. Officer Zieske attempted to open

the screen door, but it was locked.            Appellant then closed and locked the

deadbolt on the front door leaving Officer Zieske outside.           Officer Zieske

obtained a key to the door from Victim and entered the home. In order to

enter, Officer Zieske had to rip open the screen door, which was locked, and

damage molding on the door frame to push open the latched chain lock.

       Once inside the residence, Officer Zieske could hear noises that sounded

like a child. Officer Zieske directed Appellant to come down to the first floor

of the residence numerous times; Appellant did not comply, instead remaining

____________________________________________

6 Id. at 28-29.

7 Id. at 34-35.

8 Id. at 28-29.

                                           -3-
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upstairs in a room with J.S.        Over the course of a few minutes, Appellant

slowly moved out of the room towards the stairwell, at which point Officer

Zieske apprehended him. Appellant was “very angry, yelling, unorganized.”9

He smelled strongly of alcohol.

       The     Commonwealth       charged      Appellant   with   numerous   offenses

pertaining to Victim, A.S., and J.S. arising from these events.10

       On October 11, 2022, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial at which the

Commonwealth presented the testimony of Officer Zieske. Relevant to the

instant appeal, during Officer Ziekse’s testimony, Appellant objected on

confrontation and hearsay grounds to Officer Zieske testifying regarding

statements made to him by Victim. The Commonwealth argued that Victim’s

statements were admissible pursuant to the excited utterance exception to

the hearsay exclusion rule. After considering, among other things, evidence

that the Victim’s 911 call ended at 10:59:17 AM and Officer Zieske arrived at

Victim’s residence and began speaking with her at 10:59 AM, and noting that

it “clearly heard [Victim’s] demeanor[,]” the court concluded that Victim’s

statements to Officer Zieske were “an appropriate exception under the excited

utterance exception of the hearsay rule” and permitted Officer Zieske to testify

to what Victim said to him.11

____________________________________________

9 Id. at 33.

10 The Commonwealth withdrew the charges pertaining to J.S. prior to trial.

11 Id. at 27.

                                           -4-
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      Also relevant to the instant appeal, the parties stipulated to the

authenticity of the recorded 911 calls made by Victim; however, Appellant

objected to the admission of the recording arguing that it was hearsay. The

Commonwealth argued that the call from Victim was admissible because it

satisfied the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to the

hearsay exclusion rule. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objections and

admitted the recordings as evidence.

      Following trial, the court convicted Appellant of one count of Simple

Assault pertaining to Victim and one count of EWOC pertaining to A.S. The

trial court deferred sentencing pending a pre-sentence investigation.

      On February 3, 2023, the court sentenced Appellant to a term of 9 to

23 months of incarceration followed by one year of probation for the EWOC

conviction and a consecutive one-year term of probation for the Simple

Assault conviction.

      Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion alleging that the verdict

was against the weight of the evidence. On April 12, 2023, the trial court

denied the motion.

      This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

      1. Did the lower court err in admitting the 911 call made by
         [Victim] because the testimony did not fall under the
         exceptions to the hearsay rule of excited utterance or present
         sense impression?

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      2. Did the lower court err in allowing Officer Zieske to testify as
         to statements made to him by [Victim] because they were
         testimonial, which is a violation of his right to confrontation,
         and the testimony did not fall under the excited utterance
         exception to the rule against hearsay?

      3. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain a
         guilty verdict for count seven of the information, [EWOC],
         because it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
         victim was under eighteen years old or that [] Appellant
         knowingly endangered her welfare?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

                                       A.

      In his first two issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s admission

of the Victim’s recorded 911 call and her statements to Officer Zieske. It is

axiomatic that the “admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the

trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly

abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Shelton, 170 A.3d 549, 552 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (citation omitted). We will not find an abuse of discretion unless

the “ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias,

or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.”     Id. (citation

omitted). Where “the trial court indicated the reason for its decision to admit

[the evidence], our scope of review is limited to an examination of the stated

reason.” Commonwealth v. Minerd, 753 A.2d 225, 229 (Pa. 2000).

                                       I.

      Appellant first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting the Victim’s recorded 911 call as evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 15-

19. He argues that Victim’s statement in the 911 call was hearsay and should

                                      -6-
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not have been admitted as either an excited utterance or a present sense

impression   because   the   Commonwealth      did   not   present   any   direct,

independent evidence corroborating the occurrence of an assault. Id. at 18-

19.

      The Honorable Risa Vetri Ferman has authored a comprehensive,

thorough, and well-reasoned opinion, including a discussion of relevant case

law, to explain why the trial court, in its discretion, overruled Appellant’s

hearsay objection. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/15/23, at 6-9 (concluding that: (1)

the 911 recording satisfied the excited utterance exception because Victim

was the victim of a startling event and, while the event was ongoing and while

under duress, and without time to reflect or consult with others, provided

spontaneous statements describing the event; and (2) the 911 recording

satisfied the present sense exception because the Victim gave the statement

contemporaneously with the assault, with no time for reflection).          After a

thorough review of the relevant authority, record, the briefs of the parties,

and the trial court’s opinion, we discern no abuse of discretion. We, thus,

affirm on the basis of the trial court’s June 15, 2023 opinion.

                                      II.

      Appellant next claims that the court abused its discretion in permitting

Officer Zieske to testify regarding the statements Victim made to him.

Appellant’s Brief at 20-24. He argues that this testimony is hearsay that fails

to satisfy the excited utterance exception because it was testimonial in nature

and the Commonwealth presented no direct evidence to corroborate it. Id.

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at 21-22. He asserts that the “statement may have appeared to have been

spontaneous, but it was obvious from the setting that [Victim] expected any

information given to the officer to be accusatory” because Victim was sitting

in her car while Appellant was inside the residence when Officer Zieske arrived.

Id. at 22.

      Bootstrapping his confrontation clause claim onto his hearsay argument,

Appellant asserts that “the testimonial nature of [Victim’s] statement required

that she be present at the time of trial for confrontation and cross[-

]examination[.]” Id. at 22-23. He baldly claims that Victim failed to appear

at trial because she understood “the accusatory nature of the statement she

made to the police officer.” Id. at 23. He avers that the Victim “clearly knew”

her statement would be “used by police against [Appellant], and her absence

from trial precluded him from confronting her on the truthfulness of her

statement and her purpose and motivation for making it.” Id.

      The Honorable Risa Vetri Ferman has authored a comprehensive,

thorough, and well-reasoned opinion, including a discussion of relevant case

law, to explain why the trial court, in its discretion, overruled Appellant’s

hearsay objection. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/15/23, at 9-15 (concluding that: (1)

Victim’s statements to Officer Zieske were excited utterances because: (a)

Victim initiated the statements; (b) they were spontaneous and voluntary and

not in response to questioning; (c) Victim was clearly upset and talking in a

quick and excited manner when making them; (d) Victim made the statements

near in both place and time to the assault while Appellant was still yelling

                                     -8-
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inside the residence with J.S.; and (e) Victim’s neighbor’s 911 call

corroborated the events of the assault; and (2) the admission of Victim’s

statements did not violate Appellant’s right to confrontation because Victim

made the spontaneous, unsolicited statements for the purpose of enabling

police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency and not in response to any

questions posed by the officer or for use at a later trial). After a thorough

review of the relevant authority, the record, the briefs of the parties, and the

trial court’s opinion, we discern no abuse of discretion. We, thus, affirm on

the basis of the trial court’s June 15, 2023 opinion.

                                          B.

      In his final issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in

support of his EWOC conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 25-27. In particular,

Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he knowingly

endangered A.S.’s welfare because it did not present evidence that she

sustained any injuries or sought medical intervention. Id. at 27. In addition,

he argues that the Commonwealth failed to present evidence of the nature of

the “interpersonal relationships between [Victim and A.S.] and [Appellant]”

and that “the lack of familiarity with any of the parties [prevented] any ability

to evaluate or contrast any observations of A.S.” Id. Appellant concludes

that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to establish that any

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injuries resulted from the incident or that he placed A.S. in circumstances that

threatened her welfare.12 Id.

       When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we are governed by the

following standard of review:

       In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
       whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable
       inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to
       the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every
       element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As an
       appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute
       our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of doubt is
       for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
       that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from
       the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Martin, 297 A.3d 424, 434 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

       Section 4304 of the Crimes Code defines EWOC, in relevant part, as

follows: “A parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child

under 18 years of age, or a person that employs or supervises such a person,

commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by

violating a duty of care, protection or support.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1).

       This Court has established a three-element test for EWOC: “(1) the

accused is aware of his/her duty to protect the child; (2) the accused is aware

that the child is in circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or

psychological welfare; and (3) the accused has either failed to act or has taken
____________________________________________

12 Appellant has not presented any argument in support of the claim that the

Commonwealth failed to prove that A.S. was under the age of 18 at the time
of the incident.

                                          - 10 -
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action so lame or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to

protect the child’s welfare.” Commonwealth v. Pahel, 689 A.2d 963, 964

(Pa. Super. 1997) (citation omitted).

       “In reviewing [S]ection 4304, we must be aware that the legislature

attempted to prohibit a broad range of conduct in order to safeguard the

welfare and security of our children.          Further, the common sense of the

community should be considered when interpreting the language of the

statute.” Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 194 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(citations and quotations omitted).

       The statute does not require the actual infliction of physical injury.
       Nor does it state a requirement that the child or children be in
       imminent threat of physical harm. Rather it is the awareness by
       the accused that his violation of his duty of care, protection and
       support is practically certain to result in the endangerment to
       [the] children’s welfare, which is proscribed by the statute.

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 817 A.2d 485, 491-92 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(emphasis in original, quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds,

Commonwealth v. Howard, 257, A.3d 1217 (Pa. 2021).

       Instantly, Officer Zieske’s testimony established that Appellant placed

his minor child, A.S., in a dangerous situation that threatened her physical

and psychological welfare by knowingly “throw[ing A.S.] around the house”13

when A.S. attempted to break up the altercation between Appellant and

Victim. From this evidence, we conclude that it was reasonable for the trial

court to find that “Appellant’s conduct of grabbing A.S. and throwing A.S.
____________________________________________

13 N.T. Trial at 29.

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around while in the midst of an assault upon [Victim] demonstrates his

awareness that he placed the minor child in a dangerous situation that

threatened A.S.’s physical or psychological welfare.”      Trial Ct. Op. at 17.

Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to prove each of

the elements of the offense of EWOC lacks merit.

                                       C.

      In conclusion, we find both of Appellant’s evidentiary challenges and his

sufficiency of the evidence claim meritless.      We, thus, affirm Appellant’s

judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Appellant is directed to attach a copy

of the trial court’s June 15, 2023 opinion to any future filings.

Date: 4/12/2024

                                     - 12 -
Opinion                                                                  Circulated 03/12/2024 04:29 PM

                             IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                           MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
                                    CRIMINAL DIVISION

     COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                                          CP-46-CR-944-2022
                   vs.
                                                          994 EDA2023
     JAMES SANDERS

                                           OPINION

     FERMAN, J.                                                 June 15, 2023

                                 Factual and Procedural History

           Appellant, James Sanders (hereinafter "Appellant") appeals from the

     judgement of sentence imposed on February 3, 2023, which became final on

     March 12, 2023 when this court denied his post-sentence motion.

           This case stems from a physical domestic incident that occurred on

     January 29, 2022 just before 11 :00 am at a residence located at 313 Lemon

     Street in Stowe, West Pottsgrove Township, Montgomery County. (N.T. Bench

     Trial 10/ 11 /22 at 13-14). At approximately 10:55 a.m. 911 dispatch received a

     call from K.J., one of the victims in this case (hereinafter "K.J."). K.J. and

     appellant are the parents of two (2) minor children: A.S., age thirteen (13) at the

     time of the incident (hereinafter "minor child A.S."); and J .S., age seven (7) at the

     time of the incident (hereinafter "minor child J.S.").      K.J. stated to the 91 l

     operator that appellant was beating her up, and beating up their. minor child

     A.S. inside the residence. K.J. also stated that appellant was intoxicated. Id at

     17-18. Just before K.J.'s 911 call, at approximately 10:54 am, 911 dispatch

                                           Page 1 of 17
received a call from a neighbor who was listening to the ongomg domestic

altercation happening at 313 Lemon Street. The neighbor was narrating what

was occurring as she heard it.

      Officer Adam Zieske of the West Pottsgrove Township Police Department

responded to the scene.       He arrived at 313 Lemon Street at 10:59 am,

approximately three (3) or four (4) minutes after he was dispatched. Id. at 22,

25-27. When he arrived he began to walk toward the residence, but was flagged

down by K.J. By that time, K.J. was seated in the front seat of her vehicle which

was parked on the street. Id. at 22. Minor child A.S. was seated in the back seat

of the vehicle. Id. at 23. Appellant was inside the residence with minor child J.S.

Officer Zieske approached the vehicle.

      Officer Zieske was able to see appellant inside the residence because the

front door was open (there was a screen door that was closed). Id. at 22 Officer

Zieske observed appellant at the door, crouched down and yelling through the

partition of the door. Id. K.J. told Officer Zieske that she had just called 911.

Officer Zieske observed that K.J. was "clearly upset, but not crying. Talking

quickly in an excited manner." Id. at 22-23. She told Officer Zieske that she

was in a physical altercation with appellant, who is the father of her two children,

inside the residence at 313 Lemon Street. K.J. stated that when appellant woke

up, he was intoxicated from the night before. Id. at 28. He demanded that she

take him to the store, and she refused.             Id. An argument broke out and it

escalated to appellant grabbing K.J., head-butting her in the area of her forehead

and throwing her around the bedroom. K.J. attempted to leave the residence

                                     Page 2 of 17
while holding minor child J.S., and appellant pushed K.J. down the stairwell.

Id. at 28. K.J. stated that minor child A.S. heard the altercation and came to

where she and appellant were located.        Minor child A.S. yelled, "this is why

nobody wants you here," at which point, appellant grabbed minor child A.S. and

"began to throw [minor child A.S.] around the house." Id. at 28-29.

      Officer Zieske observed minor child A.S.'s demeanor to be "visibly upset.

Not engaged in crying, but very clearly seemed to be someone who had just - was

just crying, watery eyes, very upset." Id. Officer Zieske did not observe injuries

on K.J. Officer observed that minor child A.S.'s face was flushed red and had

swelling in the eye area. Id. at 34-35.

      After speaking with K.J., Officer Zieske went to the residence to speak with

appellant.   Minor child J.S. was inside the residence with appellant and his

condition was unknown. Id. at 30. Officer Zieske began speaking with appellant

through the front screen door (appellant inside and Officer Zieske outside).

Appellant would not allow Officer Zieske to enter the home to speak with him.

Officer Zieske then asked appellant to step outside, but appellant refused. At

that point, Officer Zieske attempted to open the screen door to gain entry into

the home, but the screen door was locked. Appellant then closed and locked the

front door to the residence (Officer Zieske heard the deadbolt lock) leaving Officer

Zieske outside. Id. at 30-31.

      Officer Zieske obtained a key to the residence from K.J. and gained entry

into the home. Id. at 31. He had to rip open the screen door, which was locked,

and ruin molding on the door frame to push open the latched chain lock. Id.

                                     Page 3 of 17
Once inside, Officer Zieske could hear appellant upstairs with "what sounded

like a child." Id at 31. Officer Zieske directed appellant to come to the stairwell

and come downstairs numerous times. Id. at 31-32. Appellant did not comply;

he remained with minor child J.S. in a room upstairs. Over the course of a few

minutes, appellant slowly moved out of the room towards the stairwell, at which

point Officer Zieske apprehended him. Id. at 31-32. Appellant's demeanor was

"very angry, yelling, unorganized." Id. at 33. He smelled heavily of alcoholic

drinks. Id.

        On or about January 29, 2022, appellant was charged with five crimes

pertaining to K.J. and minor child A.S.: two counts of endangering the welfare of

a child, 1 two counts of simple assault, 2 and one count of recklessly endangering

another person. 3 Appellant was also charged with three crimes pertaining to

minor child J.S., but the Commonwealth withdrew those charges prior to trial. 4

        On October 11, 2022, following a bench trial, this court found appellant

guilty of the following crimes: one count of simple assault (for K.J.) 5 and one

count of endangering the welfare of a child (Ml) (for minor child A.S.). 6 The court

found appellant not guilty of the following crimes: endangering the welfare of a

child (F3) (for minor child A.S.), 7 simple assault (for minor child A.S.), 8 and

1
  18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(l). One count (count I) was charged as F3 and one count (count 7) was charged as Ml.
Both counts were for minor child A.S.
2
  18 Pa.C.S.A. § 270l(a)(l) (M2). One count (count 3) for K.J. and one count (count 4) for minor child A.S.
3
  18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705 (M2) for K.J.
4
  Count 2, endangering the welfare of a child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(l) (F3); count 6, recklessly endangering
another person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705 (M2); count 8, endangering the welfare of a child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(l)
(Ml).
5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 270l(a)(l)(M2)
6
  18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(l) (Ml).
7
  18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(l) (F3).
8
  18 Pa.C.S.A. § 270l(a)(l) (M2).

                                                   Page 4 of 17
recklessly endangering another person (for K.J.) 9 Sentencing was deferred

pending a presentence investigation and report ("PSI").

          On February 3, 2023, this court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced

appellant to the following: for the crime of endangering the welfare of a child, a

term of imprisonment for not less than nine (9) months nor more than twenty-

three (23) months, a one (1) year term of probation consecutive to end of parole,

plus the costs of prosecution; for the crime of simple assault, a consecutive one

(1) year term of probation. Appellant was made eligible for work release after six

(6) months. The jail sentence imposed for endangering the welfare of a child was

in the mitigated range of the guidelines; the probation sentence imposed for the

crime of simple assault was below the mitigated range of the guidelines.

          On February 13, 2023, appellant filed a timely post sentence motion for a

new trial alleging that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. On

April 12, 2023, the court denied the post sentence motion. On April 19, 2023,

appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania,

appealing the judgement of sentence imposed on February 3, 2023. On April 26,

2023, this court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of matters

complained of on appeal, which he timely filed on May 17, 2023.                The

undersigned now files her l 925(a) Opinion.

                                            Issues

          In this appeal Appellant raises the following issues m his concise

statement verbatim:

9
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705 (M2).

                                       Page 5 of 17
      1. The trial court erred in admitting the 911 call made by [K.J.] because
         the testimony did not fall under the exceptions to the rule against
         hearsay of excited utterance or present sense impression.

      2. The trial court erred in allowing Officer Zieske to testify about
         statements made to him by [K.J.] because they were testimonial, which
         is a violation of his right to confrontation, and the testimony did not fall
         under the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay.

      3. There was insufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain the guilty
         verdict for count seven of the information, endangering the welfare of a
         child, because it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
         victim was under eighteen years old or that the Appellant knowingly
         endangered her welfare."

                                    Discussion

      The trial court exercised proper discretion in admitting the 911 call made

by K.J. Prior to the start of trial, counsel stipulated to the authenticity of the

911 call. The stipulation was: if the 911 respondent was called to testify, they

would testify that they received a call the morning of January 29, 2022 at 10:55

am from K.J. (N.T. Bench Trial 10/11/22 at 10-11, 14). The 911 call made by

K.J. was admitted into evidence pursuant to the excited utterance exception to

the hearsay rule and the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.

      The admissibility of evidence is solely within the discretion of the trial court

and will be reversed only if the trial court has abused its discretion.

Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 572 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 552 Pa. 621, 717 A.2d 468, 477 (1998), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 827, 120 S.Ct. 78, 145 L.Ed.2d 66 (1999)). Hearsay is defined

as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial

or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Pa.R.E.

                                      Page 6 of 17
80l(c). Hearsay testimony is per se inadmissible in this Commonwealth, except as

provided in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, by other rules prescribed by the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court or by statute. See Pa.R.E. 802.

       Rule 803(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence permits the admission

of an excited utterance as an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence.

is inadmissible. The Rule defines an excited utterance as: "A statement relating

to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress

of excitement that it caused." Pa.R.E. 803(2). For a statement to be considered

an excited utterance, it must be made spontaneously and without opportunity

for reflection:

       [A] spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been suddenly
       made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and
       shocking occurrence, which that person has just participated in or closely
       witnessed, and made in reference to some phase of that occurrence which
       he perceived, and this declaration must be made so near the occurrence
       both in time and place as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated
       in whole or in part from his reflective faculties .... Thus, it must be shown
       first, that [the declarant] had witnessed an event sufficiently startling and
       so close in point of time as to render her reflective though processes
       inoperable and, second, that her declarations were a spontaneous reaction
       to that startling event. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 532 Pa. 242, 615 A.2d
       704, 712 (1992), quoting Commonwealth v. Green, 487 Pa. 322, 409 A.2d
       371, 373-74 (1979).
       Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 570-71 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing
       Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 566 Pa. 349, 781 A.2d 110, 119-120 (2001))
       "In assessing a statement offered as an excited utterance, the court must

consider, among other things whether the statement was in narrative form, the

elapsed time between the startling event and the declaration, whether the

declarant had an opportunity to speak with others and whether, in fact, she did

so." Gray, supra (citing Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 147

                                      Page 7 of 17
(Pa.Super.2002)). Pennsylvania Courts have not established a bright line rule

regarding the amount of time that may elapse between the declarant's experience

and her statement. Id. Rather, "[t]he crucial question, regardless of time lapse,

is whether, at the time the statement is made, the nervous excitement continues

to dominate while the reflective processes remain in abeyance." Id. (quotations

omitted). "It is the spontaneity of ... an excited utterance [that] is the source of

reliability and the touchstone of admissibility." Id. (quotations omitted).

      The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule is addressed

in Rule 803(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidenc, and provides:

      The following statements, as hereinafter defined, are not excluded by the
      hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
      (1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an
      event or condition made while or immediately after the declarant perceived
      it.
      The trustworthiness of these declarations does not depend upon whether

the declarant is excited or is emotionally affected by the event. Comment,

Pa.R.E. 803(1). Rather, the trustworthiness of the statements depends upon the

timing of the statement. Id. "The observation must be made at the time of the

event or so shortly thereafter that it is unlikely that the declarant had the

opportunity to form the purpose of misstating his observation." Gray, supra.

(citing Cunningham, 805 A.2d at 573).

      In this case, the court exercised proper discretion in admitting the 911 call

made by K.J. pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

The evidence in this case reveals that K.J., the declarant, was the victim of a

startling event, namely, a physical assault perpetrated upon her by her

                                     Page 8 of 17
children's father inside the residence while their children were there. She stated

in the 911 call that appellant was beating her up and beating up minor child

A.S. (N.T. Bench Trial 10/11/22 at 17-18). While this assault is ongoing, K.J.

called 911 and provided spontaneous statements to the 911 respondent while

shouting and describing the assault as it is happening. K.J. made these

statements under distress and during the excitement of the assault.           The

statements were contemporaneous with the ongoing assault, spontaneous and

subject to overpowering emotion. K.J. had no time to reflect or consult with

others before making the statements. Accordingly, the court exercised proper

discretion in admitting K.J.'s 911 call as an excited utterance.

      In addition, the 911 call qualifies as a present sense impression. K.J.'s

statement was given contemporaneous with the assault, thereby offering no

chance of reflection. The statement is given at the time the assault is occurring

and is describing the events as they occur. K.J. has personal knowledge of what

she is describing because the assault is occurring upon her. Accordingly, the

court exercised proper discretion by admitting K.J. 's 911 call as a present sense
.      .
1mpress10n.

      Appellant's second claim of error is that the trial court erred in allowing

Officer Zieske to testify about the statements made to him by K.J. because they

were testimonial, which is a violation of the defendant's right to confrontation.

Appellant also claims that the testimony (K.J.'s statements to Officer Zieske) did

not fall under the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. The

court will address the excited utterance exception first.

                                     Page 9 of 17
      The Jaw pertaining to the excited utterance exception is set forth above. In

this case, Officer Zieske responded to the 911 call made by K.J. When he arrived

on location, he was immediately flagged down by K.J., who stated to the officer

that she was the one who called 911. K.J. was inside her vehicle, which was

parked on the street outside the residence. Minor child A.S. was in the backseat.

Appellant was inside the house behind a screen door, yelling through the screen

partition of the door. Minor child J .S. was inside the residence. The statements

made to Officer Zieske were initiated by K.J.        They were spontaneous and

voluntary and not in response to any questions by the officer. She stated that

she was in a physical altercation with appellant, who is the father of her children.

(N.T. Bench Trial 10/ 11/22 at 27-28). She stated that appellant and minor child

J.S. were inside the residence. Id. at 28. She told Officer Zieske that appellant

woke up intoxicated from the night before, demanding that she take him to the

store, which she did not do. Id. An argument broke out, which escalated into

appellant grabbing K.J. and throwing her around the bedroom.            She stated

appellant "head-butted her in the area of her forehead." She also stated that she

attempted to leave the residence while holding minor child J.S., and appellant

pushed her down the stairwell. She went on to say that minor child A.S. heard

the altercation from where she was in the house and came to where K.J. and

appellant were located.     She stated that minor child A.S. yelled: "this is why

nobody wants you here," at which point, appellant "turned his attention to

[minor child A.S.]" and "grabbed [minor child A.S. and began to throw her around

the house." Id. at 28-29.

                                     Page 10 of 17
      When Officer Zieske encountered K.J., she was clearly upset and talking

in a quick and excited matter. K.J. and minor child A.S. had just endured a

physical assault by appellant. While the two were seated in the vehicle, appellant

continued to yell from inside the residence. Minor child J.S. was still inside the

residence with appellant.

      Officer Zieske testified that K.J. made the statements near in both time

and place to the assault. The 911 call came in at 10:55 and thirty (30) seconds.

The 911 call ended at 10:59 and seventeen (17) seconds. Officer Zieske is on the

scene by 10:59. (N.T. Bench Trial 10/ 11/22 at 25-27.). The statements were

made to Officer Zieske immediately following the 911 call. K.J. was just outside

the residence where the incident occurred, in a vehicle parked on the street.

Appellant was yelling through the screen door at the entry to the residence while

minor child J.S. was still inside. The Commonwealth presented evidence of a

911 call from a neighbor who called 911 as she was listening to the ongoing

domestic altercation from two doors over to corroborate that appellant committed

the assault. When K.J. made these unsolicited statements to Officer Zieske, she

had just participated in a startling and traumatic event. Officer Zieske arrived

at the scene at the same time that K.J's 911 call ended. K.J. had no time to

reflect on the incident. The court exercised proper discretion in admitting K.J.'s

spontaneous statements to Officer Zieske pursuant to the excited utterance

exception to the hearsay rule.

                                    Page 11 of 17
      The statement made by K.J. to Officer Zieske was not testimonial.        In

Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d at 572-74, the Superior Court explained the

law in Pennsylvania related to the confrontation clause. The Court stated:

      [In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177
      (2004)] the Supreme Court held that, when the prosecution seeks to
      introduce a "testimonial" out-of-court statement into evidence against a
      criminal defendant, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
      requires: (1) that the witness who made the statement is unavailable; and
      (2) that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
      witness.

The Confrontation Clause only seeks to protect a defendant from testimonial out-

of-court statements.     The United States Supreme Court did not define

"testimonial," but offered the following guidance:

      Various formulations of this core class of "testimonial" statements exist:
      "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material
      such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
      defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
      declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;"
      "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials,
      such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;"
      "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
      objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
      available for use at a later trial."

      Gray, supra, (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52).

      To further clarify the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial

statements, the Court in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266,

165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), addressed two types of statements to police and held

that whether a statement is testimonial depends on its "primary purpose:"

      Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
      interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary

                                    Page 12 of 17
      purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
      ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
      objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
      primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
      potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.

Commonwealth v. Yohe, 621 Pa. 527, 544-45, 79 A.3d 520, 531 (2013) (citing
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822)

      In this case, the record reveals that K.J. made spontaneous, unsolicited

statements to Officer Zieske when he arrived at the scene where the assault

occurred immediately following the assault.        K.J.'s statements described the

assault that occurred just seconds prior, and qualified as excited utterances.

K.J. ended her 911 call reporting the assault around the same time that Officer

Zieske arrived on scene. When Officer Zieske arrived, he headed toward the

residence, but K.J. flagged him down. K.J. initiated the statements to Officer

Zieske and they were not in response to any questions posed by the officer. The

primary purpose of the statements was to obtain police assistance for herself

and her children to meet an ongoing emergency.

      These statements do not qualify as testimonial pursuant to Crawford.

First, they do not constitute "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional

equivalent." (i.e. "affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the

defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that

declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially"). K.J.'s

statements were not taken from an affidavit or prior testimony and were not the

product of a custodial examination. In considering whether K.J. would have

reasonably expected her statements to be used prosecutorially, the Gray court

                                   Page 13 of 17
determined that an unsolicited excited utterance to police that is made to obtain

assistance during the commission of a crime would not constitute a statement

made in contemplation of prosecution. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 577. In such a

situation, the declarant is not subject to police interrogation and is not

influenced by reason or deliberation. Id.         The declarant volunteers this

information in an effort to remedy a perceived emergency, not to create a record

against another for use in a future prosecution. Id. This reasoning applies to this

case because K.J. made unsolicited excited utterances to the police immediately

following an assault upon herself and her child (which assault led her to call

911) while the perpetrator was still yelling, inside the residence, with her other

child inside. The court finds that K.J. did not make the statements with the

contemplation that they would be used in a future prosecution. Accordingly,

these statements do not fall under the "ex parte in-court testimony or its

functional equivalent" classification of testimonial statements articulated in

Crawford.

      Next, K.J.'s statements were not extrajudicial statements contained in

formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony

or confessions. Finally, K.J.'s statements to police would not qualify under the

third classification of testimonial statements, namely, "statements that were

made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to

believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford,

541 U.S. at 52. 124 S.Ct. at 1364. When K.J. made her statements to police, the

officer had not asked her a question; K.J. flagged Officer Zieske down as he was

                                    Page 14ofl7
heading toward the residence. Since K.J.'s statements to police did not arise

during the context of a formal, structured police interrogation, an objective

witness would not conclude that the statements would be available for use at a

later trial. Gray, 867 A.2d at 577. Rather, an objective witness would more likely

conclude that the officers would utilize this information to intervene in the

alleged assault and would later obtain a more formal statement from the witness,

which they did.               (N.T. Bench Trial 10/11/22 at 35). Accordingly, K.J.'s

statements do not qualify as testimonial and Appellant's Sixth Amendment right

of confrontation was not violated by their admission.

         Last, appellant claims that there was insufficient evidence presented at

trial to sustain the guilty verdict for the charge of endangering the welfare of a

child because it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that A.S. was under

the age of 18 or that appellant knowingly endangered A.S.'s welfare.

         The standard jury instruction for the crime of endangering the welfare of

a child sets for the four (4) elements the Commonwealth must prove: (1) that the

defendant endangered the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care,

protection or support; (2) that the defendant endangered the welfare of the child

knowingly; 10 (3) that the defendant was at the time a parent, guardian, person

supervising the welfare of the child under the age of 18, or a person that employs

or supervises such a person; (4) the child was under the age of 18 at the time of

the endangering.

10
   A person's conduct is knowing when he or she is aware that it is practically certain that his or her conduct will
cause a particular result.

                                                     Page 15 of 17
         For the element pertaining to the age of the child, counsel stipulated at

trial that [appellant] is the biological father of A.S. and that A.S. is currently age

14. (N.T. Bench Trial 10/11/22 at 10-11). If minor child A.S. was age 14 at the

time of the trial, she was necessarily under the age of 18 at the time of the

incident, which was ten (10) months earlier.            Therefore, the Commonwealth

proved this element beyond a reasonable doubt. Pertaining to the element that

appellant knowingly endangered the welfare of A.S. "Endanger" is defined, inter

alia, as "to bring into danger or peril," or "to create a dangerous situation."

https:/ I www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ endanger. Thus, the material

element of endangering the welfare of a child is the creation of a perilous or

dangerous situation.       Commonwealth v. Howard, 257 A.3d 1217, 1227 (Pa.

2021).

         Pennsylvania courts have employed a three-prong standard to determine

whether the Commonwealth's evidence is sufficient to prove the intent element:

1) the accused must be aware of his or her duty to protect the child; 2) the

accused must be aware that the child is in circumstances that could threaten

the child's physical or psychological welfare; and 3) the accused either must have

failed to act or must have taken action so lame or meager that such actions

cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child's welfare. Commonwealth v.

Retkofsky, 860 A.2d 1098, 1099-100 (Pa. Super. 2004)

         In this case, appellant is A.S. 's father and has a duty to protect A.S. as his

minor child.      Next, appellant knowingly placed his minor child, A.S., in a

dangerous situation that threatened A.S.'s physical and/ or psychological

                                        Page 16 of 17
welfare. He knowingly "threw [A.S.] around" when A.S. came to break up the

altercation between appellant and K.J. A.S. was not just caught in the crossfire

of appellant's assault upon K.J. Rather, A.S. consciously interjected in order to

break up the ongoing altercation, while stating "this is why nobody wants you

here." At this point appellant "turned his attention to [A.S.] ... grabbed [A.S.] and

began to throw [A.S.] around the house." (N.T. Bench Trial 10/11/22 at 29).

This shows that appellant acted knowingly. As A.S.'s father, he knew that he

has a duty to protect the minor child. Appellant's conduct of grabbing A.S. and

throwing A.S. around while in the midst of an assault upon K.J. demonstrates

his awareness that he placed the minor child in a dangerous situation that

threatened A.S.'s physical or psychological welfare. Based on the foregoing, the

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of

endangering the welfare of a child.

                                           Conclusion

       Based on the foregoing, the judgment of sentence entered on February 3,

2023 should be AFFIRMED.

Copies of Opinion sent on U>  I\ 'SIl~to:
Robert M. Falin, Esquire, Chief, Appeals Division, District Attorney's Office
Emily Phou, District Attorney's Office
James Berardinelli, Esquire and Jeffrey Mattus, Esquire, Counsel for Appellant
Court Administration - Criminal Division

                                         Page 17 of 17