Court Opinion

ID: 9590424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:54:48.223222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:48.414632
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The evidence of record demanded a finding that Scott actually received no funds in exchange for signing any of the promissory notes, but that fact does not avail Scott with his contention that the renewal note sued on was unenforceable due to lack of consideration. Under OCGA § 11-3-408, a new consideration is not necessary for a renewal note. James Pair, Inc. v. Gentry, 134 Ga. App. 734 (215 SE2d 707) (1975). Concerning the series of promissory notes executed by Scott that created the antecedent debt renewed by the promissory note sued on, consideration may exist if any benefits accrued to Scott or *622any detriment was suffered by the bank. Zachos v. C & S Nat. Bank, 213 Ga. 619 (2) (100 SE2d 418) (1957). The benefit bargained for by the promissor may actually flow to another party. OCGA § 13-3-42 (d); Bowman v. McDonough Realty Co., 143 Ga. App. 128 (2) (237 SE2d 647) (1977). In the instant case, it was undisputed that Scott’s execution of the promissory notes resulted in some benefit to a third party and that the bank suffered some loss.
However, I find convincing Scott’s additional contention that even if consideration existed, the note was unenforceable because the consideration was illegal. OCGA § 13-3-45 provides that “[i]f the consideration is illegal in whole or in part, the whole promise fails.” “ ‘An illegal consideration consists of any act or forbearance, or a promise to act or forbear, which is contrary to law or public policy.’ ... ‘It is a general rule that agreements against public policy are illegal and void.’ ” Hanley v. Savannah Bank &c. Co., 208 Ga. 585 (68 SE2d 581) (1952). In the instant case, the arrangement devised by Dekle and Castleberry and participated in by Scott was nothing more than a scheme to conceal information or a predicament that should properly have been disclosed to the bank examiners. To enforce Scott’s participation in that scheme would further the perpetration of fraud, and this court should not hesitate to consider that contrary to public policy, regardless of whether Scott specifically pled illegality of consideration as an affirmative defense or not.
Further, I cannot concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion that Scott was an accommodation party under OCGA § 11-3-415 (1). That Code section states that “[a]n accommodation party is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party to it.” The plain, ordinary, and unmistakable meaning of that statute is that the accommodated party must be an actual party to the instrument. If this court intimated otherwise in Lewis v.C & S Nat. Bank, 139 Ga. App. 855 (229 SE2d 765) (1976), and Wall v. Fed. Land Bank of Columbia, 156 Ga. App. 368 (274 SE2d 753) (1980), this court simply misconstrued the statute. However, it is unclear in those cases whether the accommodated parties were not also parties to the promissory notes, and those cases thus should not be so strongly cited as authority for the proposition stated and applied by the majority opinion.
In summary, the promissory note in this case was void and unenforceable because of the illegality of the consideration. The trial court should have denied summary judgment for the appellee and granted it for the appellant. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s affirmance of the trial court’s opposite disposition.
*623Decided September 6, 1988
Rehearing denied September 30, 1988
James M. Skipper, Jr., for appellant.
Benjamin F. Easterlin IV, for appellee.