Court Opinion

ID: 9902609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:20:41.145515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:54.976283
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D22-2188
                  LT Case No. 2019-10302-CIDL
                  _____________________________

ROBERT J. SANCHEZ AND CARRIE
SANCHEZ,

    Appellants,

    v.

VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Randell H. Rowe, III, Judge.

Ronald A. Hertel, of Hertel Legal PLLC, Ormond Beach, for
Appellants.

Thomas R. Brown, III, Senior Assistant County Attorney,
DeLand, for Appellee.

                         October 6, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     Robert and Carrie Sanchez appeal the trial court’s Order
Denying Defendants’ Motion to Vacate Order Granting Summary
Judgment and Final Judgment of Foreclosure and Order to Show
Cause Directed to Plaintiff. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
                        Procedural History

      On March 7, 2019, Volusia County filed its Amended
Complaint to Foreclose Code Enforcement Lien against Sanchez in
the Seventh Judicial Circuit. According to the complaint, Sanchez
failed to bring the subject property into compliance with the
County Code of Ordinances and failed to pay debts accrued under
the resulting lien amounting to $548,000.

      Sanchez counterclaimed and filed four affirmative defenses,
including the only defense relevant here: setoff. After a hearing on
a motion to strike by Volusia County, the trial court struck all
affirmative defenses, but noted, “[T]his setoff defense will be
reinstated in the event that any portion of the now dismissed
Counterclaim should be reinstated after the appeal,” since it was
stricken for mootness.

       Following dismissal of Sanchez’s affirmative defenses,
Volusia County filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in its
favor. A hearing was held on the motion December 9, 2020, and the
trial court entered an order granting it on December 14, 2020.
Sanchez appealed the order to this Court. On appeal, Sanchez
challenged the dismissal of his first affirmative defense, which was
affirmed without discussion, but did not challenge the dismissal of
the setoff defense. Sanchez also challenged the dismissal of his
counterclaim, which this court reversed in a per curium decision.

       On remand, Sanchez moved to reinstate his affirmative
defense and to vacate the order granting summary judgment and
final judgment of foreclosure. The trial court denied the motion to
vacate its order granting summary judgment and final judgment
of foreclosure. The trial court noted in its order that the summary
judgment had not been disturbed on appeal.

      Sanchez appeals that order.

                           Jurisdiction

      At the outset, Volusia County makes a straightforward case
that this court does not yet have jurisdiction to hear this case.
Volusia claims that because there are compulsory counterclaims

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remaining in the case, it is not yet final. A compulsory
counterclaim is not appealable until final disposition of the
original action. 4040 IBIS Circle, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
193 So.3d 957, 960 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). Volusia’s counterclaim
argument seems to be more aptly directed to appealability of the
trial court’s original dismissal of Sanchez’s counterclaims. That
issue has already been decided by this court. Sanchez v. Cnty. of
Volusia, 331 So. 3d 853 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021).

   Notably, this is not an appeal of the lower court’s summary
judgment—that has already been appealed and was left
undisturbed by this court. Id. This is an appeal of the lower court’s
Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Vacate. Further, the motion
to vacate the standalone summary judgment is premised entirely
on the trial court’s implicit refusal to reinstate an affirmative
defense. An order denying a motion to reinstate an affirmative
defense would not by itself be appealable as a nonfinal order. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.130. This would leave us to resolve whether the
summary judgment is a standalone “partial final judgment,” thus
establishing jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 9.110(k), Florida Rules
of Appellate Procedure. However, as we note above, this is not an
appeal of the summary judgment—that has already happened.
Arguably justified by the trial court’s assertions or not, Sanchez
chose not to challenge the striking of the setoff defense when the
summary judgment was previously appealed. That summary
judgment was not reversed, and this court finds that it would
strain the boundaries of our jurisdiction to use Rule 9.110(k) as a
vehicle for appellants to take repeated shots at the same target.

    DISMISSED.

EDWARDS, C.J., WALLIS, and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

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          _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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