Court Opinion

ID: 9582685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:30:18.90182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:14.531538
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Presiding Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case for entry of necessary factual findings under the proper legal standard.
The trial court has never applied the legal standard set forth in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), as previously directed by this court in an unpublished opinion. See State v. Mirquet, No. 900402-CA, slip op. (Oct. 26, 1990). On remand, the trial court followed Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983), a pre-Berkemer, state-court, interpretation of the federal constitution.1 earner's, prece-*1002dential value has been greatly diminished by the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions applying a different standard. There is a distinct difference between custody determinations under Car-ner and custody determinations under Ber-kemer. Under Carner, a Miranda warning was necessary if “the environment becomes custodial or accusatory.” Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170 (emphasis added). In Berkemer, on the other hand, the Supreme Court focused not on the nature of the questioning, but on whether the defendant’s freedom was restricted. 468 U.S. at 441-42, 104 S.Ct. at 3151; see also 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 6.6(c) (Supp.1991).
Berkemer is supported by, and consistent with, other Supreme Court decisions which hold that the accusatory nature of police questioning does not alone create the need for a Miranda warning. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977), the defendant was contacted by the police and asked to come to the police station, which he did. He was then informed that he was suspected of committing a burglary. The police continued interviewing the defendant without giving him a Miranda warning. The defendant then admitted his participation in the burglary. Following his admission, the defendant was given a Miranda warning and his confession was recorded by the police. The defendant was then allowed to leave, pending the District Attorney’s decision to bring formal charges. Oregon’s supreme court had ruled that a Miranda warning was necessary when the police first informed the defendant that he was suspected of committing a burglary. In summarily reversing the Oregon Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court stated: “Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a ‘coercive environment.’ ” Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714. The Supreme Court subsequently noted in California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3519, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983), that its Mathiason “holding relied on the very practical recognition that ‘[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.’ ” Id. (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714).
In Beheler, the defendant had told the police about his tangential involvement in a murder. He subsequently went to the police station to be interviewed and was not given a Miranda warning. He was then allowed to return home. He was subsequently arrested for aiding and abetting, at which time he was given his first Miranda warning. The California Court of Appeals had reversed the defendant’s conviction because he was not given a Miranda warning when he was clearly a suspect at the time of the interview and “the interview was designed to produce incriminating responses.” Id., 463 U.S. at 1123, 103 S.Ct. at 3519. The Supreme Court reversed the California court’s reversal because the “ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest,” not the accusatory nature of the questioning. 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714).
*1003In Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, the police officer pulled over a motorist after he noticed the motorist was driving erratically. The officer observed that when the motorist exited his car he was having difficulty standing. At that time, the officer decided that the motorist would not be allowed to leave. The officer did not, however, tell the motorist that he would be taken into custody. The officer then asked the motorist to perform a field sobriety test. The motorist could not perform the test. Without any Miranda warning, the officer then asked the motorist whether he had been using intoxicants. The motorist responded that “he had consumed two beers and had smoked several joints of marijuana a short time before.” 468 U.S. at 423, 104 S.Ct. at 3141. The officer thereupon placed the motorist under formal arrest and transported him to jail. At the jail, the motorist was further interviewed without the benefit of a Miranda warning. The Supreme Court held that the responses at the jail should be suppressed for lack of a Miranda warning, but that the roadside responses were admissible. The Supreme Court recognized that all persons detained during an investigation of a traffic violation have their freedom significantly restrained, and that it is unlikely that a person in such a situation would ever feel free to leave. The Supreme Court also acknowledged that “[i]t is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as the suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ ” 468 U.S. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 3150 (quoting Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3520). It then concluded that persons restrained during traffic stops are not entitled to a Miranda warning unless they are “subjected to treatment that renders [them] ‘in custody’ for practical purposes.” Id. (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714). The Supreme Court held that despite the accusatory nature of the officer’s questioning, no Miranda warning was necessary because there was no showing that the treatment of the motorist was “the functional equivalent of formal arrest.” Id. See also Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 109 S.Ct. 205, 102 L.Ed.2d 172 (1988).
In light of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Berkemer, Beheler, and Mathiason, the trial court’s reliance on the Camer analysis — with its overriding emphasis on the accusatory nature of the questioning — is clearly contrary to current governing federal constitutional law. Since Camer, the Utah Supreme Court has twice applied Ber-kemer in traffic stop cases. In both cases, it held that the drivers’ freedoms were not curtailed to the degree of a formal arrest, even though the officers questioned the drivers about drinking alcohol after smelling alcohol on their breath (an admittedly accusatory question), and ordered the drivers to perform field sobriety tests (a potentially inculpatory act). No Miranda warnings were therefore required. See Salt Lake City v. Womack, 747 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Utah 1987); State v. East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987).2 I do not see any material distinction between the conduct of the officer in the present case and the officers’ actions in Womack and East that justifies the majority’s departure from the supreme court’s rulings in those cases.3
*1004Inasmuch as the trial court identified and applied an incorrect legal standard, it has never answered the correct inquiry: Was defendant, at any time between the initial traffic stop and his formal arrest, subjected to treatment that could “fairly be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151.
In United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953 (1st Cir.1986), the trial court was required to determine whether the defendants were in custody for Miranda purposes. The trial court, like the trial court in this case, focused on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, not on the Berkemer test of whether the “suspect’s freedom of action [was] curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ ” Id. 781 F.2d at 961 (quoting Berkemer, 104 S.Ct. at 3151 (quoting Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. at 3519-20)). The appellate court held that the trial court erroneously treated it’s finding that the suspects did not feel “free to leave” as “largely disposi-tive” of the custody issue. Streifel, 781 F.2d at 961. The Streifel court noted that the Supreme Court made clear in Berkemer that
whether “a reasonable person ... would have believed he was not free to leave,” ... is the standard for determining whether a person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment, but is not alone determinative of whether he has been placed in custody for the purposes of the fifth.
Id. 781 F.2d at 960 (citations omitted). The trial court’s finding that defendants were in custody for Miranda purposes because they did not feel free to leave was therefore inadequate to support the finding of custody under the Berkemer test. One of the critical findings missing was “precisely when, if ever, prior to defendant’s formal arrest, a custodial situation requiring Miranda warnings arose.” Id. at 962.
The Streifel court held that due to the lack of adequate findings relating to the Berkemer test, the suppression order needed to be vacated and remanded for further findings. The court reasoned that the trial court “is in the best position to sort out the record and make the additional necessary findings conforming to the case law....” Id. The court further reasoned that “a court of appeals is ill-equipped to undertake its own de novo assessment of the facts against the proper standard.” Id. The court “expressed] no view on the ultimate disposition of the defendant’s motion to suppress, because this necessarily involves fact-specific assessments and inquiries which the district court is in the best position to make.” Id.
In the present case, it is clear that the trial court’s ruling that a Miranda warning was needed prior to defendant’s formal arrest was based on whether defendant felt free to leave. It did not make any findings on the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Berkemer. 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151.4 As in Streifel, we have no finding by the trial court as to precisely when defendant’s custody reached the degree of a formal arrest so as to require a Miranda warning. Berkemer makes it clear that a mere finding that reasonable persons would not consider themselves free to leave does not invoke Miranda. Streifel, 781 F.2d at 961 (whether Miranda warning was required “could not be resolved simply by inquiring whether or not a reasonable person in the defendant's] posi*1005tion would have felt free to leave”). The only other finding made by the trial court is that the officer accused defendant of committing a crime. As discussed above, the existence of an accusatory environment, standing alone, is insufficient to require a Miranda warning.5
The lack of adequate findings under the Berkemer standard is not harmless as asserted by the majority. The record suggests to me that defendant’s freedom was not curtailed to the degree of a formal arrest. I doubt that after a “formal arrest,” a police officer would allow a suspect the freedom to get out of the police car and return alone to his own car. Such freedom seems totally inconsistent with a formal arrest since it would create an obvious opportunity for the suspect to obtain a weapon or to escape. Since the majority disagrees, it is clearly debatable whether or not this defendant’s freedom was sufficiently curtailed under the standard set forth in Berkemer. Since the record “admits of conflicting interpretations,” Streifel, 781 F.2d at 962, the question is best left to the discretion of the trial court to apply its judgment in view of its advantaged front-line position. Id.6 The trial court, however, never determined whether defendant’s detainment prior to his formal arrest was “the functional equivalent of formal arrest.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151.
Despite the trial court’s failure to apply the correct legal standard and make the necessary findings, the majority affirms by stepping into the role of the trial court and making the missing findings for it. In attempting to apply the correct legal standard for the first time on appeal, the majority unabashedly makes its own subsidiary and ultimate factual findings that were never made by the trial court.7 This is not the proper role of an appellate court. Our duty is to review the findings actually made by the trial court, not to make our own findings. In effect, the majority is sitting as both the trial court and the appellate court by making its own findings and then affirming them.
In order to preserve the integrity of our judicial system, this matter should be remanded to the trial court. The trial court may then make its own factual findings under the correct legal standard — a task it has yet to perform.

. The majority blithely assumes that the trial court actually applied Berkemer simply because it was directed to in our previous remand. Such an assumption is totally unsupported by the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court did not merely fail to "recite the precise words of the custody standard," as asserted by the majority; the trial *1002court totally failed to recognize or apply the proper standard to any degree. The trial court's order only mentions Berkemer in passing for the general proposition that traffic stops do not constitute custody for Miranda purposes. There is no indication that the trial court ever attempted to apply the Berkemer analysis as to when a traffic stop might evolve into a custody situation requiring a Miranda warning. The only substantive difference between the trial court’s first order (which we reversed for not applying Ber-kemer) and the trial court's second order (following remand) is the incorporation and application of Carner. I therefore do not share the majority's view that the trial court actually applied the legal standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Berkemer.

. In East, the supreme court only cited Camer in passing, as part of a string cite, without any discussion. See East, 743 P.2d at 1212. In Womack, the supreme court did not even cite Camer when discussing the need for a Miranda warning. See Womack, 747 P.2d at 1042. Inasmuch as the supreme court itself no longer seems to follow the Camer analysis when Ber-kemer applies, Camer’s precedential value in this case seems minimal. To the extent State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App.1990), relied on the accusatory prong of Camer, rather than the custodial prong expressly adopted in Ber-kemer, it is inconsistent with federal law.

. The majority's reliance on the form of questioning is also directly at odds with Berkemer. The majority justifies its decision because the officer clearly had reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a crime, and the questioning was an attempt "to get evidence to support that conclusion.” See majority opinion page 1000. The officer in Berkemer likewise had a reasonable suspicion that the motorist had committed a crime, and likewise questioned the motorist to get evidence in support of that suspicion. Furthermore, the accusatory questioning in Berkemer was held not to have revealed a coercive intent. The majority in this case, however, without distinguishing Berkemer, *1004holds that the officer’s accusatory questioning was coercive.

. Contrary to the representations of the majority, the trial court also did not find that "the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and that it would appear to the reasonable individual that he would be in custody under the circumstances of this case.” No such statement appears anywhere in the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The majority resorts to the trial court’s memorandum decision for this finding — contrary to the rule that unless the signed written findings and conclusions of the trial court are challenged as not representing the trial court’s view, ”[w]e must assume that he found them satisfactory in all particulars.” State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990) (findings and conclusions governed even though they reached an issue the trial court expressly stated it was not reaching in its memorandum decision). It is, after all, the trial court’s final decision that we are called upon to review, not the memorandum decision. The majority’s reliance on the memorandum decision is therefore improper.

. When we initially remanded this matter, there was a concurring opinion implying that the relevant question on remand was whether defendant felt free to leave once the officer accused him of smoking marijuana. While this concurring opinion did not represent the opinion of a majority of that panel, it helps explain why the trial court once again erroneously based its decision on an incorrect legal standard.

. If a legal standard is flexible enough to allow two different factfinders to interpret the same evidence and reach different results, the trial court is to decide the issue as a matter of fact. State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517 (Utah App.1992) (Bench, P.J., concurring).

. For example, the majority purportedly finds that defendant’s freedom was restrained to the degree of a formal arrest even though defendant was allowed to leave the custody of the police. The majority claims this freedom was not significant because of "the proximity of the cars, the officer’s opportunity to maintain constant surveillance, and the limited time period.” See majority opinion at page 999. The trial court, however, did not make findings on any of these subsidiary facts. We do not know how far apart the cars were, whether the officer could or did maintain constant surveillance, or the time period defendant was free. In making its own subsidiary findings, the majority does not, and cannot, point to any evidence in the record as support therefor. Instead, the majority claims it may infer these facts. An inference, however, is
a logical and reasonable conclusion of the existence of a fact in a case, not presented by direct evidence as to the existence of the fact itself, but inferred from the establishment of other facts from which by a process of logic and reason, based upon common experience, the existence of the assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of fact.
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881-82 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added). Given the paucity of underlying facts from which logical deductions may be made, the "inferences” drawn by the majority are little more than unsubstantiated "speculations” or "assumptions” as to what actually occurred and the amount of freedom defendant in fact had. Furthermore, since this court is clearly not the “trier of fact,” it is improper for the majority to be drawing any inferences. Remand is therefore required.