Court Opinion

ID: 9385483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 21:00:18.166009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.015141
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4094

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        RALPH JEFFREY WEATHINGTON, JR.,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:19-cr-00174-1)

        Submitted: March 31, 2023                                          Decided: April 5, 2023

        Before WYNN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Tim C. Carrico, CARRICO LAW OFFICES, LC, Charleston, West Virginia,
        for Appellant. Lisa G. Johnston, Acting United States Attorney, Jeremy B. Wolfe,
        Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Ralph Jeffrey Weathington, Jr., appeals his jury convictions and 188-month

        sentence for distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21

        U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), distribution of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and

        possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, cocaine, and 50 grams or more of

        methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, Weathington claims

        that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, refusing to sever

        the charges, admitting unfairly prejudicial evidence, and concluding that his prior

        conviction was a serious drug felony triggering application of enhanced statutory penalties.

        We affirm.

               In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review legal

        conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d

        370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021). “Because the district court denied [Weathington’s] motion to

        suppress, ‘we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment.’”

        United States v. Clarke, 842 F.3d 288, 293 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Kelly,

        592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir. 2010)).

               Under the exclusionary rule, “the introduction at criminal trial of evidence obtained

        in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights” is generally prohibited. United

        States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). “The

        Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, and searches conducted without a

        warrant are per se unreasonable.” United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir.

        1996). However, voluntary consent to search “obtained . . . from the individual whose

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        property is searched” is an exception to the warrant requirement. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497

        U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (citation omitted). “In determining whether consent to search was

        freely and voluntarily given, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent must

        be examined.” Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 650.

               Weathington argues that the district court should have suppressed evidence

        recovered from an apartment because the apartment’s tenant did not consent to the initial,

        warrantless search. In particular, he asserts that the court should not have credited a law

        enforcement officer’s testimony that the tenant provided consent. However, because “it is

        the role of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-

        trial motion to suppress,” the court was entitled to credit the officer’s testimony,

        particularly given that the tenant, who denied giving consent to search, admitted she had

        lied to law enforcement officers. Pulley, 987 F.3d at 376 (citation and quotation marks

        omitted). Furthermore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government

        and “defer[ring] to [the] district court’s credibility determinations,” our review of the

        record confirms that the tenant freely and voluntarily consented to the search. Id. Thus,

        the warrantless search of the apartment did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and,

        accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Weathington’s motion to suppress.

               Next, Weathington asserts that the district court erred by refusing to sever the

        charges against him. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to sever for abuse of

        discretion. United States v. Zelaya, 908 F.3d 920, 929 (4th Cir. 2018). “Joinder of related

        charges is broadly permitted to avoid needless duplication of judicial proceedings,” and a

        defendant moving to sever properly joined offenses “bears the burden of demonstrating ‘a

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        strong showing of prejudice.’” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 341 (4th Cir. 2008)

        (quoting United States v. Goldman, 750 F.2d 1221, 1225 (4th Cir. 1984)) ). “[I]t is not

        enough to simply show that joinder makes for a more difficult defense,” Goldman, 750

        F.2d at 1225; rather, the defendant must show that “there is a serious risk that a joint trial

        would compromise a specific trial right . . . or prevent the jury from making a reliable

        judgment about guilt or innocence,” United States v. Qazah, 810 F.3d 879, 891 (4th Cir.

        2015) (quotation marks omitted).

               On appeal, Weathington fails to explain how the joinder of the related drug charges

        against him made his defense more difficult, let alone how the joinder prejudiced him at

        trial. He has therefore failed to make the strong showing of prejudice necessary to justify

        severance. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

        denying his motion to sever.

               Weathington also claims that the district court erred by refusing to exclude evidence

        of a handgun pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 allows a district court

        to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger

        of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.

        403. Our review of Rule 403 rulings is highly deferential, looking “at the evidence in a

        light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its

        prejudicial effect.” United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting

        United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1990))). Accordingly, “a trial court’s

        ‘decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be overturned except under

        the most extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.’”

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        United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Udeozor, 515 F.3d at

        265).

                It is well established that firearms are “tools of the trade” in drug trafficking. United

        States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 629 (4th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the handgun evidence

        was relevant and probative of the elements of the offense—namely, whether Weathington

        intended to distribute the drugs he possessed. Moreover, Weathington does not explain

        how the admission of the handgun evidence had “an undue tendency to suggest decision

        on an improper basis” such as “an emotional one.” United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991,

        994 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining unfair prejudice). Thus,

        Appellant fails to establish that the admission of the handgun created a danger of unfair

        prejudice. We therefore find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining

        to exclude the handgun evidence.

                Finally, Weathington argues that the district court erred in concluding that his prior

        state conviction triggered 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)’s enhanced mandatory minimum, a claim that

        we review de novo. United States v. Valdovinos, 760 F.3d 322, 325 (4th Cir. 2014). A

        defendant who commits “a violation [of § 841(a) punishable under § 841(b)(1)(A)] after a

        prior conviction for a serious drug felony . . . has become final . . . shall be sentenced to a

        term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). A “serious

        drug felony” is defined as “an offense described in [18 U.S.C. §] 924(e)(2) . . . for which

        – (A) the offender served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months; and (B) the

        offender’s release from any term of imprisonment was within 15 years of the

        commencement of the instant offense.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(57). An “offense described in

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        [18 U.S.C. §] 924(e)(2)” includes “an offense under State law, involving . . . distributing

        . . . a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or

        more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).

               We have reviewed the record and conclude that Weathington’s prior conviction

        qualifies as a “serious drug felony” under § 841(b). Therefore, the district court properly

        determined that Weathington’s statutory mandatory minimum was 15 years’

        imprisonment.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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