Court Opinion

ID: 9364849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 15:04:32.540577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.816662
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 13, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals

                                  NO. 2019-CA-1748-MR

MARTIN HERNANDEZ-VAZQUEZ                                            APPELLANT

                      APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                      HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
                             ACTION NO. 14-CR-00098

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, Martin Hernandez-Vazquez (Hernandez-Vazquez),

pro se, appeals from an order of the Warren Circuit Court denying his RCr1 11.42

motion following an evidentiary hearing. After our review, we affirm.

                On February 12, 2014, a Warren County Grand Jury indicted

Hernandez-Vazquez and charged him with one count of rape, first degree (child

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
less than 12 years of age); one count of sodomy, first degree (child less than 12

years of age); one count of unlawful transaction with a minor, first degree; and one

count of unlawful use of electronic means originating or received within the

Commonwealth to induce a minor to engage in sexual or other prohibited

activities.

                 On May 15, 2014, Hernandez-Vazquez appeared at a hearing before

the Warren Circuit Court on a guilty plea pursuant to Alford, 2 but as the colloquy

progressed, he changed his mind and withdrew his plea.

                 Ultimately, on September 5, 2014, before Judge Wilson, Hernandez-

Vazquez entered an Alford plea to the rape and sodomy charges. The prosecutor

agreed to dismiss the other charges and to recommend a sentence of imprisonment

of 25 years with mandatory participation in the sexual offender treatment program

-- to be followed by conditional discharge for five years after his release. If

Hernandez-Vazquez had gone to trial and been found guilty, he could have

received a life sentence.

                 On November 5, 2014, the circuit court sentenced Hernandez-

Vazquez in accordance with the plea agreement.

                 On September 18, 2017, Hernandez-Vazquez, pro se, filed a motion to

vacate, set aside, or amend final judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42 alleging that his

2
    North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).

                                                 -2-
trial counsel was ineffective. The circuit court subsequently appointed counsel,

who supplemented the motion.

             On April 17, 2019, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing.

Trial counsel, Kristy Vick-Stratton, testified, and so did Hernandez-Vazquez and

Nidia Picol, an interpreter. Following the hearing, the parties submitted briefs. By

order entered on October 21, 2019, the circuit court denied Hernandez-Vazquez’s

RCr 11.42 motion.

             On appeal, Hernandez-Vazquez contends that trial counsel was

ineffective when she: (I) failed to suppress his interview and statements to police;

(II) failed to review any discovery with him; conduct any pretrial investigation and

properly investigate the case; failed to seek, interview, and take depositions of the

Commonwealth’s witnesses and witnesses for the defense; failed to inform him of

the rights he would waive if he accepted the plea agreement; and failed to advise

him of different plea agreements that existed -- such as a conditional plea; and (III)

failed to confer with him without undue delay and as often as necessary; failed to

prepare or advance a defense; and failed to properly defend him against the

Commonwealth’s allegations.

             [T]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
             counsel, the defendant must satisfy the two-part test set
             forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
             Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord, Gall v.
             Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (1985), cert.
             denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S. Ct. 3311, 92 L. Ed. 2d 724

                                         -3-
             (1986). In analyzing trial counsel’s performance, the
             court must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
             conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
             professional assistance[.]” Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
             In order to show actual prejudice in the context of a
             guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate that there is a
             reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
             unprofessional errors, he would not have pled guilty and
             would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart,
             474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369-70, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203
             (1985).

Phon v. Commonwealth, 51 S.W.3d 456, 459-60 (Ky. App. 2001).

             “In reviewing an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the appellate court reviews

the trial court’s factual findings for clear error while reviewing the application of

its legal standards and precedents de novo.” Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d

147, 156 (Ky. 2021). “The test for a clearly erroneous determination is whether

that determination is supported by substantial evidence. This does not mean the

finding must include undisputed evidence, but both parties must present adequate

evidence to support their position.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 490,

500 (Ky. 2008) (citations omitted). “When the trial court conducts an evidentiary

hearing, the reviewing court must defer to the determinations of fact and witness

credibility made by the trial judge.” Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905,

909 (Ky. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279

S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009).

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                 As the appealing party, Hernandez-Vazquez “has the burden of

showing that the trial court committed an error in reaching its decision.” Brown,

253 S.W.3d at 500. Instead of demonstrating any error, Hernandez-Vazquez

essentially re-argues his case on appeal.

                 In its order denying the RCr 11.42 motion, the circuit court made

detailed findings of fact summarizing the evidence presented at the hearing. We

are satisfied from our review of the record, including the recorded proceedings of

the plea colloquies and the evidentiary hearing, that the court’s factual findings

have a substantial evidentiary foundation. Consequently, they are not clearly

erroneous. The focus of our review then must be on whether the circuit court

correctly applied the law.

                 With respect to “Argument I,” the circuit court concluded that “Ms.

Vick-Stratton’s decision not to seek suppression of the defendant’s statement to

police was not deficient performance.” Specifically, it recited as follows:

                        The recording of the defendant’s statement to
                 police at issue does not show such a clear violation of
                 Miranda v. Arizona[3] that it was an unreasonable
                 strategic decision not to seek suppression of the
                 statement. Ms. Vick-Stratton has consistently stated that
                 she reviewed the discovery with the defendant and that
                 she believed, based on his statements to her, that he
                 wanted to avoid trial and plead guilty. Her testimony that
                 filing a suppression motion meant the Commonwealth
                 Attorney rescinded plea offers was not contradicted.

3
    384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

                                                -5-
                    The defendant testified during the evidentiary
             hearing that he barely understands English and does not
             understand the legal process. During the plea colloquy
             with this Court he stated that he can read English a little
             bit. During this plea colloquy, Ms. Vick-Stratton
             explained that she took the plea agreement to the jail with
             an interpreter and explained everything through an
             interpreter. The defendant did not object to this
             statement. In fact, he stated he understood everything in
             the documents, and he had no questions about them.
             During the plea colloquy with Judge Wilson, he stated
             that he could read and write English. Furthermore,
             during the police interview, he only twice asked for help.
             This Court cannot definitely rule on whether his
             statement to police would have been suppressed, but the
             defendant has failed to overcome the strong presumption
             that Ms. Vick-Stratton’s decision not to seek suppression
             of his statement to police was a reasonable decision and
             exercise of professional judgment.

             “It is not the function of this Court to usurp or second guess counsel’s

trial strategy.” Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Ky. 2000), overruled

on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). We

find no error.

             We address Hernandez-Vazquez’s remaining arguments together.

The circuit court determined that Hernandez-Vazquez’s “argument that he was not

fully advised of his rights and defenses is not sufficiently supported by evidence or

case law.” The court found Hensley v. Commonwealth, 305 S.W.3d 434 (Ky. App.

2010), illustrative. In Hensley, this Court affirmed the denial of the defendant’s

RCr 11.42 motion where his claims of ineffectiveness of counsel were inconsistent

                                         -6-
with and were directly contradicted by his statements during the guilty plea

colloquy; i.e., that he had no complaints about his attorney’s performance.

             Concluding that the present case “is essentially the same” as Hensley,

the circuit court explained as follows:

             [Hernandez-Vazquez] confirmed during his plea colloquy
             with Judge Wilson that he was satisfied with Ms. Vick-
             Stratton’s representation and that they had fully discussed
             the case. [His] testimony that he simply went along with
             the plea colloquy because that is what he told to do is
             contradicted by his voluntary spontaneous statement
             during the plea colloquy, “God bless her,” in reference to
             Ms. Vick-Stratton. Likewise, [Hernandez-Vazquez’s]
             claim that he did not plead guilty knowingly,
             intelligently, and voluntarily is contradicted by his
             confirmations that he understood what was going on
             during the plea colloquy and his explanation of a jury’s
             role in a trial, which Judge Wilson stated was “as good as
             I’ve heard.”

                    [Hernandez-Vazquez] also argues that Ms. Vick-
             Stratton provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
             misadvising him when he would be deported. He quotes
             Padilla v. Kentucky to say, “unreasonable and incorrect
             information concerning the risk of removal can give rise
             to an ineffectiveness claim.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
             U.S. 356, 388 (2010). This quote is from Justice Alito
             and Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion. The
             majority opinion’s holding was “that counsel must
             inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of
             deportation.” Id. at 374. There is no dispute that Ms.
             Vick-Stratton advised [Hernandez-Vazquez] that he
             would be deported. This argument was not raised in the

                                          -7-
               defendant’s briefs until the evidentiary hearing[4] when he
               testified that he thought he would be deported a few
               weeks after signing his guilty plea because that is what
               Ms. Vick-Stratton told him. During that hearing, when
               asked by the Commonwealth’s Attorney, [Hernandez-
               Vazquez] repeatedly claimed not to remember what he
               said or what happened in hearings around the same time
               of the alleged incorrect advice. [Hernandez-Vazquez’s]
               statements during the plea colloquy with Judge Wilson
               and his signature on the plea agreement indicate that he
               understood he risked deportation. He did not ask Judge
               Wilson to clarify about the time of his deportation during
               that plea colloquy, but he now claims to have thought he
               would be deported weeks after that hearing while also
               claiming that he cannot remember a number of things
               when [asked] by the Commonwealth Attorney. This
               complaint is not reasonable or credible.

                      The claims of failure to investigate, advance any
               defense, confer without undue delay, review discovery
               with him, and question witnesses[,] arguments raised
               solely in the defendant’s pro se motion[,] are also
               contradicted during one or both plea colloquies.
               Therefore, these arguments are not sufficiently supported
               by evidence.

               This appeal is premised upon a credibility determination. The circuit

court had the “opportunity to see the witnesses and observe their demeanor on the

stand, and recognition must be given to its superior position to judge their

credibility and the weight to be given their testimony.” We cannot -- and will

4
 To clarify, at page 8 of its order, the circuit court explained that “[i]n his post-evidentiary
hearing brief, [Hernandez-Vazquez] asserts for the first time that Ms. Vick-Stratton misadvised
him of his plea’s deportation consequences . . . .”

                                               -8-
not -- substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court and preempt its exercise

of its proper purview. McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Ky.

1986). We find no error.

             Therefore, we affirm the order of the Warren Circuit Court denying

Hernandez-Vazquez’s motion to vacate judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Martin Hernandez-Vazquez, pro se          Daniel Cameron
 La Grange, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Perry T. Ryan
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

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