Court Opinion

ID: 9761788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:54:36.773638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:26.438222
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent. The principle in this case involves the extent to which the “social superstructure” may permissibly interfere in the natural combination of parents and their children. The decisions are weighty ones, their consequences heartrending. Because I agree with the Superior Court that the *426Orphans’ Court has terminated this mother’s parental rights prematurely, I would affirm the reversal of the Orphans’ Court.
The child is described by the Orphans’ Court as a respiratory cripple who requires intensive care. The condition is, however, of temporary duration. His custodian requires intensive and extensive specialized training, but apparently this training is within the grasp of an ordinary person.
Initially, at least, the mother failed to learn the necessary medical techniques. Her inability to spend sufficient time at the hospital with her child to learn all that was necessary for his care was due to her work at some distance from the hospital in addition to emotional stress due to the premature birth of this child and his two siblings, the death of those siblings, the presence of two other small children, another pregnancy and other influences. The mother has, however, made improvements in her condition through psychotherapy! In addition, she has received training in Child and Infant Life Support Systems (infant CPR), cared for her other children, and maintained a new residence. She has also professed an intention to learn to give this child the medical attention he requires. All these facts were accepted by the Orphans’ Court.
The critical basis for the Orphans’ Court’s decision to terminate this mother’s parental rights is that her “professed good intentions for the future to the contrary notwithstanding, the history indicates that such neglect and incapacity will not be remedied.” In other words, because the mother failed in the first instance to get the training she needed to properly administer the medical attention required by the child, the court concluded that she will again fail to get this training. In view of the mother’s accomplishments in improving her living conditions, the wisdom of the Orphans’ Court’s ruling is questionable.
The applicable statutory language provides that a parent’s rights in regard to a child may be terminated where “repeated and continued incapacity, ... neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential *427parental care ... and the conditions and causes of the incapacity ... neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) (Supp. 1987). Superior Court interpreted this language as prospective and reversed the lower court on the ground that the mother should yet be afforded a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate her professed interest in attending to her child’s medical needs. Absent such an opportunity, in light of the remarkable improvements already implemented by the mother, Superior Court reasoned that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that she will again fail to learn the techniques required by her child’s medical condition. In my view, Superior Court’s interpretation of the statutory language as prospective is correct; and the error in the Orphans’ Court’s disregard of the mother’s accomplishments in favor of an assumption that, simply because she failed in the first instance to learn whatever is required to attend to her child’s medical needs, she will again fail is, to me, inescapable.
We are not here dealing with a question of custody. The record is clear that, at the time of the Orphans’ Court proceedings, due to the mother’s inability to provide the medical attention required by the child, custody was properly in the foster parents, both of whom are registered nurses. The question here is whether, without affording the mother an opportunity to learn to provide the medical attention this child requires, her parental rights should be terminated over her opposition. Like Superior Court, before this mother’s rights were terminated, I would offer her a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate her professed interest in attending to her child’s medical needs.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm Superior Court’s reversal of the decree of the Orphans’ Court terminating appellee’s parental rights.
NIX, C.J., joins.