Court Opinion

ID: 9736535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:59:00.52253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:07.244680
License: Public Domain

*93DRUCKER, J. pro tem.*
I dissent.
The record discloses that there was no conflict of interest requiring the appointment of separate counsel.
The defendant Gallardo was charged with, and convicted of, three counts of robbery of the first degree, and found to have suffered two prior felony convictions. At the time of sentencing, counts I and II were dismissed and he was sentenced to state prison on count III. Ruiz was charged with, and found guilty of, six counts of robbery of the first degree, and found to have suffered five prior felony convictions. He was sentenced to state prison on each of the six counts, sentences to run concurrently. The defendants offered no testimony in their own behalf.
Gallardo and Ruiz appeal from the judgment upon the grounds that the defendants were denied the right to separate counsel, and that the court erred in not ordering a separate trial for each of them. The record affords no support for the contentions of the defendants.
Defendants now argue that the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering separate counsel for each of them. The defendant Ruiz, at the beginning of the trial claimed there was a “conflict of interest,” but the substance of his claim only proved to be statements of his dissatisfaction with his counsel, the deputy public defender. This case, first set for trial on January 24, 1967, was continued three times, on each occasion, on motion of the defendants. On the day of trial, March 13, 1967, just after the first juror was summoned into the jury box, the defendant Ruiz asked permission to address the court. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel informed the court that Ruiz wanted to tell the court that he thought there was a 1 ‘ conflict of interest; ’ ’ that, as his counsel, he did not see any conflict of interest, and was unable to obtain any information from either of them to indicate such conflict; that Ruiz, on a number of occasions, had suggested a conflict, and that when counsel asked Ruiz what the conflict was, he did not get any kind of response indicating any conflict.
The defendant Ruiz was permitted to address the court as to the reasons why he thought there was a conflict of interest. First, he requested that his counsel be dismissed and that an *94attorney be appointed to represent him. He next stated that his counsel believed in his guilt and did not believe in his innocence, and that he had not been up to see him or discussed this ease with him at all; that he came to the conclusion his counsel was not very interested in his case; that counsel had failed to answer several questions pertaining to the law; that he wanted some legal advice so “I can have some defense.” Defendant Ruiz admitted upon inquiry of the court that his counsel advised him to admit the priors but he did not know whether that was good advice. His position is summed up by the following statement: “Well; I would like someone I can talk the case over with and the legal aspects of the case so I can know more about them and give him some help also in defending myself. ’ ’
Defense counsel denied the statements attributed to him by Ruiz, and advised the court that he had seen the defendant in the county jail at least four times and discussed his case at length with him; that to his recollection he had answered all of Ruiz’ questions, and that if he had any additional questions, he would be happy to answer them for him. The request for appointment of new counsel was denied. Defendant Gallardo did not request to be heard and made no application to the court for change of counsel. There was no specific request made to the trial court for separate counsel by either of the appellants.
No showing has been made by the appllants that there was conflict of interest between them. A review of the record discloses no conflict of interest or potential conflict of interest between the appellants, and no disadvantage to either defendant from their joint representation by the public defender. In People v. Chacon, 69 Cal.2d 765, pp. 773-774 [73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106] the Supreme Court said: “The right to counsel at trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution [citations] and article 1, section 13 of the California Constitution does not include an automatic right to separate counsel for each codefendant. One counsel may represent more than one defendant so long as the representation is effective. [Citations.] Effective assistance of counsel is assistance ‘untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests.’ [Citations.] If counsel must represent conflicting interests or is ineffective because of the burdens of representing more than one defendant, the injured defendant has been denied his constitutional right to effective *95counsel. [Citations.] ” If no adverse interest exists and none is claimed, the representation of both defendants by a single attorney is permissible. (People v. Kerfoot, 184 Cal.App.2d 622, 644-645 [7 Cal.Rptr. 674].)
The cases of People v. Donohoe, 200 Cal.App.2d 17 [19 Cal.Rptr. 454]; People v. Douglas, 61 Cal.2d 430, 436-437 [38 Cal.Rptr. 884, 392 P.2d 964]; People v. Chacon, 69 Cal.2d 765 [73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106], cited in the majority opinion, in support of their reasons for reversal of the judgment, cannot be equated with the case at bench. In Donohoe, the defendant had three priors, the codefendant had none. In addition appointed counsel for both defendants stated to the court positively that there would' be a definite conflict of interest. It was held that this objection was sufSeient to require separate counsel. In Douglas the public defender moved for the appointment of separate counsel for the reason that there would be a conflict of interest. The eodefendant in a related case was convicted of murder in a joint trial with Douglas, and Douglas was acquitted; the eodefendant had a record of felony convictions while Douglas did not; eodefendant was an habitual criminal, Douglas was not. In Chacon, in addition to the conflict that exists when the jury must fix the penalty, the Supreme Court observed that “the facts of the case are fraught with potentially effective individual defenses, ’ ’ particularly ‘ ‘ self defense. ’ ’
The case at bench is analogous to Glavin v. United States, 396 F.2d 725. (U.S. appeal pending) In that case counsel for the defendants advised the trial court that perhaps there may be a conflict of interest and moved the court to be relieved as attorney for one of the defendants. But his statements only suggested that the problem was rather that one of counsel’s two clients was dissatisfied and wished to replace him. The motion was denied. Upon appeal the court said at page 727:
“Appellants now contend that the motion was intended to advise the court that there was a conflict of interest between the two appellants and therefore representation of both by a single attorney would deprive them of effective assistance of counsel. Denial of such a motion is reversible error where there is some possibility that appellants have divergent interests so that one or both might not receive ‘untrammeled and unimpaired’ assistance from common counsel. (Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 [at p. 699] (1942).
*96“But common representation is not error per se. There must be some possibility of conflicting interest, and hence of prejudice. [Footnote omitted.] Appellants did not identify any possible divergence of interest in the trial court; their briefs to this court suggest none; the government contends that no possible conflict could have existed and we have found none in our examination of the record. ’ ’
And so it is in the ease before us. The defendants did not identify any possible divergence of interest in the trial court ; their brief to this court suggests none; and there is none found in the examination of the record. The defendant Ruiz’ statements and misstatements to the trial court were only indicative of a refusal to follow the advice of his counsel and his desire to replace him.
Furthermore counsel for the defendants represented to the court he could not find any conflict of interest. In determining the question of conflict of interest, the trial court must be able, and be freely permitted, to rely upon counsel’s representations that the possibility of such a conflict does or does not exist. The necessary adequate representation of an accused by an attorney which the law requires, implies that the court may rely on the solemn representation of a fact made by such attorney as an officer of the court. (Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897, cert. den. 389 U.S. 839 [19 L.Ed.2d 103, 88 S.Ct. 67].)
The majority opinion quotes from Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 247: “ [O]nly where ‘ “we can find no basis in the record for an informed speculation” that appellant’s rights were prejudicially affected, ’ can the conviction stand. . . . In effect, we adopt the standard of 'reasonable doubt,’ a standard the Supreme Court recently said must govern whenever the prosecution contends the denial of a constitutional right is merely harmless error.” It contends that the very error of not appointing separate counsel makes it so difficult for the defendants to point to tangible evidence of prejudice and that as recognized in Lollar “informed speculation” is all they have to work with in these cases. All they can see is the “tip of the iceberg.” Whatever “informed speculation” means or is intended to mean as it applies to this ease, the majority opinion predicates its decision mainly on speculation. This indeed would be an unfortunate precedent.
A reviewing court may not speculate whether 6?. not there could have existed some possible conflict of interest not fae*97tually disclosed, or even suggested, by a careful reading of the record. (Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 898.)
The additional point raised by the appellants that the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering a separate trial for each defendant is not sustainable. When two or more defendants are jointly charged with a public offense they must be tried jointly, unless the court orders separate trials. (See Pen. Code, § 1098.) No motion for severance was made in the trial court; nor was there any reason for the court to order separate trials. In the absence of a showing as to why a severance should have been granted, the joint trial was proper. (People v. King, 255 Cal.App.2d 551, 556 [63 Cal.Rptr. 345]; People v. Van Valkenburg, 111 Cal.App.2d 337 [244 P.2d 750].)
I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 19, 1969. Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Retired judge o£ the superior court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.