Court Opinion

ID: 9544503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:56:20.065067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:06.678869
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.
I dissent. The majority opinion, in my view, transgresses fundamental rules of both law and equity. It sets a precedent which certainly is potentially inimical to the interests of every owner of income property in California of a class similar to that here involved and, by reason of the character of the rules which are breached, may well affect other types of income property. Briefly, the majority opinion grants equitable relief—full release from the executory obligation to pay rent, evidenced by a written lease— to a defaulting tenant who had abandoned the leased premises, had failed to pay the rent, and had unconditionally renounced *685his obligations under the lease while the lessor was in no way-in default.
The grounds upon which the majority place their conclusion are: (1) that the lessor breached a restrictive covenant to protect the lessee against competition in the same building by renting an adjoining store in that building for a somewhat similar business after the lessee had retired from his business, had ceased paying rent, and had abandoned the premises, and (2) that by so renting the adjoining store the lessor either constructively evicted the tenant or accepted his abandonment of the lease and released him from his obligations thereunder.
The majority opinion in words concedes that “The plaintiff, being in default under the lease, was not entitled to rescind without curing his default by tendering the amount due to the time of the claimed breach by the lessor. . . . He therefore had not effected rescission of the lease and the trial court correctly concluded that he was not entitled to prevail on his complaint.” But having made such concession it proceeds to completely disregard the effect of it. The majority say that “The question of the correctness of the trial court’s findings and conclusions [for the plaintiff] is therefore resolved by a consideration of the issues raised by the defendant’s cross-complaint and the plaintiff’s answer thereto.” This seems to me to be but a quibble in that the controlling issues “raised by the defendant’s cross-complaint and the plaintiff’s answer thereto” are precisely the same as those raised by the complaint and answer. In fact the plaintiff’s answer to the cross-complaint incorporates therein all the allegations of his complaint and the relief granted him by the judgment is, as far as it goes, precisely the relief sought in his complaint. To hold that “the trial court correctly concluded that he was not entitled to prevail on his complaint” but that he was entitled to prevail on his answer to the cross-complaint begs the question. As previously stated the only relief awarded him by the judgment is that sought in the complaint.
As to the suggestion that the lessor constructively evicted the tenant after the tenant had previously abandoned the premises and unconditionally renounced his obligations under the lease, it seems to me that the very statement of the proposition sufficiently exposes its infirmity. How can a tenant be evicted from that which he has already abandoned? And the contention that defendant accepted the tenant’s *686abandonment of the premises and released him from his obligations under the lease by renting an adjoining store for a somewhat similar business after the tenant had ceased doing business and had abandoned the premises and renounced his obligations, seems likewise devoid of merit in law and justice, as hereinafter discussed more fully.
In order that there may be no misapprehension or uncertainty as to the precise facts involved it seems necessary to relate them with particularity. This is a suit in equity by a lessee to rescind or terminate a written lease of a portion of a store building. The demised premises had been used to house a furniture store. The so-called rescission is sought upon the ground that the defendant lessor breached a restrictive covenant not to “permit any space ... in the same building ... to be used or occupied for the purpose of conducting therein a furniture store without the consent in writing of the Lessee first had and obtained.” Defendant answered and cross-complained for delinquent rent and attorney’s fees and plaintiff, by way of answer (amended) to the cross-complaint and as an equitable defense thereto, incorporated in such answer all the allegations of his complaint and in addition alleged “that on or about the first day of February, 1941 plaintiff abandoned the lease alleged in the complaint . . . and thereupon abandoned the premises described in said lease and that on the first day of May, 1941 cross complainant accepted said abandonment of said lease and of said premises; and by said acceptance of said abandonment all liability of plaintiff under said lease ceased except as heretofore admitted by plaintiff.” The admissions referred to (not wholly consistent as to dates with the allegations above quoted) contain an express concession by the plaintiff that he had not paid the rent accruing February 1, 1941, or subsequent thereto and also that he owed the rent accruing up to April 18, 1941. In such answer to the cross-complaint plaintiff further alleged that he “offers to pay the same,” referring to the admittedly due rent, but denied that he owed, and admitted that he refused to pay, any rent for any period of time subsequent to April 18, 1941; and alleged also “that on or about the first day of May, 1941 defendant and cross complainant evicted plaintiff from the premises . . . and thereby terminated all liability of plaintiff to cross complainant except as hereinbefore admitted.”
*687The trial court made findings of fact, which will be more particularly noted hereinafter, and gave judgment substantially as prayed in plaintiff’s complaint and affirmative answer to cross-complaint, decreeing that “the lease referred to in plaintiff’s complaint between plaintiff and defendant was terminated on the first day of May, 1941,” and awarding defendant only the rent accruing “for the months of February, March and April of 1941, together with legal interest, ’ ’ $300 attorney’s fees and costs. Defendant appeals, specifying that its appeal is taken from those portions of the judgment decreeing the termination of the lease, denying recovery of rent accruing on and subsequent to May 1, 1941, and limiting recovery of attorney’s fees to the sum of $300. It is my conclusion, for the reasons hereinafter set forth, that the appeal is well taken.
The majority rely, for affirmance of the judgment, primarily upon an asserted breach of the restrictive covenant above quoted. Such covenants (to protect a lessee against competition) are valid and a substantial and material breach thereof, persisted in by the lessor after reasonable notice and demand for discontinuance, will justify the lessee in “rescinding” (terminating) the lease and will relieve him from further obligation thereunder. (Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse (1942), 21 Cal.2d 411 [132 P.2d 457].) This rule is based upon the proposition that covenants “not to lease” and “to pay rent” are mutually dependent (ibid., pp. 418-419). If these covenants are truly mutually dependent it is obvious that a party in default on his own obligation has no right to demand performance of the correlative obligation. By the same token that a lessor who has first breached substantially a restrictive covenant may not require a lessee (who elects to vacate the premises) to pay rent, so likewise is it true that a lessee who first defaults and refuses to pay rent may not require performance of the restrictive covenant. The principle underlying this proposition is applied to matters of law (see Civ. Code, §§ 1439 and 1440, hereinafter quoted and discussed) and it has even more basic and universal application where equitable relief is sought. Equity will not “aid him who is guilty of breach of contract connected with the transaction concerning which he asks for a decree in his favor.” (De Garmo v. Goldman (1942), 19 Cal.2d 755, 764 [123 P.2d 1]; Harrison v. Woodward (1909), *68811 Cal.App. 15, 24 [103 P. 933].) The admissions and averments of the plaintiff in his pleadings, the findings of the trial court, and the evidence all unite to bring this case within the operation of the rule stated.
The record discloses that the lease between plaintiff and defendant was executed on June 20, 1938. By it defendant demised to plaintiff for a term of four years a storeroom in a building in Oakland to be used as a furniture store. The lessee covenanted to pay “the total rent or sum of $15000.00 plus 5% of the gross sales-price of all merchandise sold in said premises and also on sales originating in said premises but consummated elsewhere, in excess of $90,000.00 annually. ’ ’ Provision was made for the payment of the rent in installments; the lessee agreed “not ... to allow any sale of property by auction, except upon retiring from business, on said premises, . . . that in the event said Lessor shall bring action at law against said Lessee to enforce the payment of any rent due or to enforce any of the terms or conditions hereof . . . then said Lessee agrees to pay to said Lessor attorney fees adjudged reasonable by the court . . . and . . . should the Lessee abandon or vacate said premises during the term of this lease, the Lessor may, at his option and without notice to Lessee, relet the same for such rent and upon such terms as he may see fit and . . . Lessee agrees to satisfy and pay any deficiency and to pay the expense of such reletting and collecting.” (Italics added.) The only covenant upon the part of the defendant lessor which is material here is the previously mentioned one whereby it agreed that it would “not during the term of this lease . . . permit any space or store room in the same building ... to be used or occupied for the purpose of conducting therein a furniture store without the consent in writing of the Lessee first had and obtained. ’ ’
The trial court found the facts as to execution of the lease and entry into possession by plaintiff; “that in the month of January, 1941 plaintiff did retire from said furniture business on said premises and plaintiff did in and during said month of January, 1941 hold a public auction in said premises at which auction plaintiff sold and disposed of all plaintiff’s furniture and personal property connected with the plaintiff’s said furniture business on said premises and thereafter plaintiff discontinued his said furniture business on said premises; *689that plaintiff failed to pay the rent of said premises provided in said lease to be paid February first 1941 and pláintiff has paid none of the rent provided in said lease to be paid each month during the life of said lease following said first day of of February, 1941; that after holding said auction and on the first day of February, 1941 plaintiff abandoned said leasehold and the premises described in said lease. ’ ’
The court further found that the restrictive covenant was “a, material and essential part of said lease. . . . That plaintiff did not at any time, in writing or otherwise, consent that any space ... be used or occupied by any other tenant . . . for the purpose of conducting therein a furniture store; that on the 1st day of Hay, 1941 defendant rented a store in said building to William Smith for the purpose of selling linoleum and kindred products therein; . . . that on the said first day of May, 1941 said Smith entered the store . . . and commenced the sale of linoleum and kindred products therein and has continuously thereafter, to and including the trial of this action, persisted in the advertising and sale to the general public of linoleum and kindred products from said store . . .; that by said renting to said Smith said defendant on the first day of May, 1941 accepted the abandonment by plaintiff of the premises leased to plaintiff under the terms of said lease and evicted plaintiff therefrom; that during the latter part of March, 1941 and the early part of April, 1941 plaintiff did undertake to commence the reestablishment of his furniture business in the premises described in said lease but plaintiff did on the 18th day of April, 1941 abandon said premises leased to plaintiff upon receiving information that Smith was to use said adjoining store in said building for the sanie of linoleum and kindred products. . . . that it is true that by conducting an auction in January of 1941 plaintiff did give notice to the defendant that plaintiff was retiring from business and discontinuing the conduct of a furniture store in the leased premises, but prior to the granting to said William Smith of any right to possession of said store . . . and during the latter part of March, 1941, plaintiff was.engaged in reestablishing the furniture business of plaintiff in the premises . . .; that said lease was terminated May 1, 1941 and it is true that defendant violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment and evicted plaintiff on said first day of May 1941 and did on said first day of May, 1941 accept the *690abandonment by plaintiff of the premises.” (Italics added.)
This suit was commenced on October 18, 1941, at which time plaintiff was in arrears on the rent, if his obligation under the lease was not terminated, in the sum of $3,150. In any event he admitted that he owed, and that there was due and payable to defendant, the rent which accrued on February 1, March 1, and on April 1, for the period up to April 18, 1941. As to rent for any period of time subsequent to April 18, plaintiff - alleged in his amended answer to the cross-complaint that “no rent and no installment of rent mentioned in said lease is payable or unpaid or owing . . . for any period of time following April 18, 1941.” Paragraph III of the defendant’s cross-complaint pleads the rent reserved under the lease and specifically alleges that plaintiff “refused to pay said rent or any part thereof accruing on February 1, 1941, or at any time thereafter.” Plaintiff’s answer to this allegation is'as follows: “Answering paragraph III of said cross-complaint, plaintiff admits the allegations therein contained save and except that plaintiffs refusal to pay rent dates from April 18, 1941 and not February 1, 1941, as alleged therein.” (Italics added.) It thus becomes apparent that plaintiff unconditionally refused to pay any rent for any period of time subsequent to April 18, 1941. Under these circumstances he was not entitled to the aid of equity to relieve him from the obligation which he had unequivocally renounced unless a right to renounce it had already matured on April 18, 1941. In this connection it will also be remembered that the trial court found that “plaintiff did on the 18th day of April, 1941 abandon said premises leased to plaintiff upon receiving information that Smith was to use said adjoining store in said building for the same of linoleum and kindred products. ’ ’
The tenancy of Smith, which was negotiated during the early part of the month of April, was to commence on May 1, and was on a month to month basis. It could have been terminated by the defendant at any time on not more than one month’s notice to Smith. At the time plaintiff learned of the plan to rent the store to Smith he (plaintiff) was not actually conducting a furniture business. He had retired from that business. There is no finding, and no evidence in the record which would support a finding, that plaintiff notified defendant that he was contemplating or preparing reestab*691lishment of the furniture business. He did not at any time demand that defendant desist from the plan to rent the adjoining store to Smith. He abandoned the premises on April 18, according to the finding of the trial court, and thereafter gave notice of unequivocal renouncement of his obligations under the lease. His notice reads, “lessee hereby gives notice that he will no longer be bound to the provisions of the lease on his part to be performed; that since telephonic notification to you of the foregoing, given April 21, 1941, lessee has moved his stock of furniture from, and has given up possession of, the said premises.”
It indisputably appears from the foregoing recital that plaintiff lessee undertook to absolutely and finally terminate the lease without previous notice to the lessor, without curing his own prior and continuing default, without an offer to pay the overdue rent and in the face of his unconditional refusal to pay rent. He was not actually engaged in the furniture business in April, 1941. He had retired from that business in the preceding January. He was not then in a position where he could complain of competition in a similar business. (See Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Morton & Converse (1942), supra, 21 Cal.2d 411, 428 [132 P.2d 457].) The defendant lessor had notice that plaintiff had retired from the furniture business; it apparently was not given notice at any time prior to the trial of the suit (at least not prior to plaintiff’s abandonment of the premises and unconditional renouncement of his obligations under the lease) that plaintiff had ever formed an intention to reestablish a furniture business in the leased premises. The amended answer to the cross-complaint upon which the suit went to trial contains plaintiff’s sworn declaration, twice repeated, “that this cross defendant did on or about the first day of February 1941 abandon the lease alleged in the complaint . . . and referred to in cross complainant’s said Cross Complaint and thereupon abandoned the premises described in said lease and that on the first day of May, 1941 cross complainant accepted said abandonment.” (Italics added.) The plaintiff’s pleadings contain no suggestion that he ever contemplated, or notified defendant that he contemplated, reestablishing a furniture business in the leased premises.
The discontinuance of plaintiff’s business was a matter of concern to defendant. The lease called for a stated cash *692consideration to be paid defendant lessor “plus 5% of the gross sales price of all merchandise sold in said premises . . . -in.excess of $90,000.00 annually.” Such lease also authorized the lessor, in the event that lessee “should . . . abandon or vacate said premises during the term of this lease,” to relet .the.premises without notice to lessee. Certainly under such .circumstances the lessor had a right to rent the adjoining storeroom to Smith on a month to month basis for the conduct of any lawful business.
. The finding that plaintiff did “undertake to commence” the reestablishment of a furniture business in the premises in the absence of a finding that defendant had notice or knowledge of such intention or undertaking is immaterial and .is insufficient .upon which to predicate the equitable relief releasing him from his obligation to pay the contracted rent. He did not perform the obligations upon his part to be performed und he did not offer to perform them. On the contrary he unconditionally renounced his obligations while he was in default. Under no heretofore known principle should equity aid him under such circumstances.
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record to support the finding that defendant on May 1, 1941, evicted plaintiff from the premises. Whether plaintiff be deemed to have abandoned the lease and premises on February 1, 1941, as alleged in his pleadings and found by the court, or on April 18, .as also inconsistently found by the court, is immaterial. In either event he had abandoned the premises prior to May 1, and hence could not then have been evicted by defendant. (Cf. Universal Milk Co. v. Wood (1928), 205 Cal. 751, 756 [272 P. 745].) Obviously, the renting of the adjoining store to Smith under the circumstances shown did not constitute an eviction of plaintiff from the premises demised to him or a release of plaintiff from the obligations of the lease. The court also found that defendant on May 1, did “accept the abandonment by plaintiff of the premises described in said lease.” The mere circumstance that defendant rented the adjoining storeroom to Smith for “the sale óf linoleum and kindred products,” while it may show cognizance of the fact that plaintiff had retired from the furnii ture business, does not show an acceptance of plaintiff’s aban- | donment of the premises in the sense of releasing him from ) the obligations of the lease. The substance of the evidence *693precludes a finding or conclusion of law that defendant released plaintiff from such obligations.
It may well be that if plaintiff had paid or offered to pay the delinquent and accruing rent, had given notice to defendant that he, plaintiff, intended to reestablish his business in the leased premises as of some definite date, and demanded that defendant prior to such date terminate the renting to Smith (see Strong v. Morrison (1927), 87 Cal.App. 169, 171 [261 P. 1051]), plaintiff would have been entitled to declare a breach of the lease by defendant and secure its cancellation or termination in equity if defendant failed to accede to such demand. But plaintiff had taken none of those steps at the time he gave notice to defendant of rescission and forfeiture or at the time he sued for equitable relief, and no valid reason appears why defendant should be obliged in the meantime to forego the rental received from Smith, on pain of forfeiture of the lease of his defaulting tenant—the plaintiff.
Plaintiff has urged that equitable principles are inapplicable because, he asserts, “The judgment awards no relief in equity. ... No decree or judgment of rescission was given. ’ ’ Although by its judgment the trial court did not declare the lease rescinded db initio it did decree the same forfeited or terminated as to executory provisions including the obligation to pay all rent accruing subsequent to April 30, 1941. This is an equitable decree (it has been termed “rescission”; see Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse (1942), supra, 21 Cal.2d 411, 432) and it should stand or fall by the same principles which govern rescission, insofar as the basic right to invoke equity is concerned.
By both legal and equitable principles plaintiff was bound to perform the obligations on his part to be performed before he could claim relief .against defendant. As stated in Johnson v. Moss (1873), 45 Cal. 515, 518, “The plaintiff then was the first to violate the agreement, and if ... he suffered damage, we do not see how he can be heard to complain of it. He should have performed his part of the agreement before insisting upon performance by the defendant.” Section 1439 of the Civil Code provides that “Before any party to an obligation can require another party to perform any act-under it, he must fulfill all conditions precedent' thereto. imposed upon himself; and must be able and offer to fulfill all conditions concurrent so imposed upon him on the like fulfillment *694by the other party, except as provided by the next section [hereinafter quoted].” Obviously, plaintiff did not “offer to fulfill all conditions concurrent .... imposed upon him.” On the contrary he was, by his own sworn admissions and averments, in default on such conditions at all times concerned up to and including the time of trial. (Cf. Universal Milk Go. v. Wood (1928) supra, 205 Cal. 751.) According to such sworn admissions and averments he abandoned the premises and the lease on February 1, 1941, and failed to pay any rent thereafter. He again abandoned, or reaffirmed abandonment of, the premises on April 18, 1941, and six days later notified the defendant in writing that he would “no longer be bound to the provisions of the lease on his part to be performed.” This notice was unconditional. It contained^ no offer to pay delinquent rent or accruing rent. It set forth no demand that defendant discontinue the plan to rent the adjoining storeroom to Smith commencing the following May 1. It contained no notice that plaintiff intended to reestablish a furniture business in the leased premises or elsewhere. Obviously, defendant was not in default for any breach of the restrictive covenant at the time of plaintiff’s abandonment of the premises and unconditional renouncement of his obligations whether the abandonment be regarded as having taken place on February 1 or April 18.
The restrictive covenant in question was an agreement to protect plaintiff against competition in the same building in the same line of business. Since plaintiff had retired from business not later than in the preceding January and since it is true, as the trial court found, “that by conducting an auction in January of 1941 plaintiff did give notice to the defendant that plaintiff was retiring from business and discontinuing the conduct of a furniture store in the leased premises,” it is apparent that plaintiff could not place himself in a position where he could rightfully complain of the month to month tenancy of Smith without first offering to pay both the delinquent and the accruing rent and giving defendant reasonable notice that he intended to reestablish and resume conduct of a furniture store at some definite date. After plaintiff had retired from business and ceased paying rent the covenant to protect plaintiff against competition in the furniture business in the same building became immaterial and would so remain until and unless plaintiff offered to cure his default, and resume the payment of rent, and *695notified the defendant that he intended to reestablish a furniture business in the premises. Plaintiff, by giving notice that he would not perform the conditions on his part to be performed (at a time when defendant was not in default) brought himself and defendant within the purview of section 1440 of -the Civil Code, which provides that “If a party to an obligation gives notice to another, before the latter is in default, that he will not perform the same upon his part, and does not retract such notice before the time at which performance upon his part is due, such other party is entitled to enforce the obligation without previously performing or offering to perform any conditions upon his part in favor of the former party.” (See, also, Twomey, v. People’s Ice Co. (1884), 66 Cal. 233 [5 P. 158]; Dunn v. Daly (1889), 78 Cal. 640, 644 [21 P. 377] ; Wood, Curtis & Co. v. Seurich (1907), 5 Cal.App. 252, 253-255 [90 P. 51], Ross v. Tabor (1921), 53 Cal.App. 605, 612 [200 P. 971]; Rathbun v. Security Mfg. Co. (1927), 82 Cal.App. 793, 796 [256 P. 296]; State Ath. Com. v. Massachusetts Bonding etc. Co. (1941), 46 Cal.App.2d 839, 842 [117 P.2d 80]; 6 Cal.Jur. 488-489, § 288.) Furthermore, it is to be remembered that the relief sought by plaintiff both in his complaint and in his answer to the cross-complaint is equitable and that “It is elementary that a party to an agreement may not rescind it while himself in default in respect to a material part thereof.” (Gavina v. Smith (1944), ante, p. 501 [154 P.2d 681]; North American D. Co. v. Outer Harbor etc. Co. (1918), 178 Cal. 406, 413 [173 P. 756]; see, also, State of California v. McCauley (1860), 15 Cal. 429, 454, 457-458; Fairchild etc. Co. v. Southern Ref. Co. (1910), 158 Cal. 264, 273 [110 P. 951]; California Sugar etc. Agency v. Penoyar (1914), 167 Cal. 274, 280 [139 P. 671].) And under the circumstances of this case, no actual damage whatsoever having been incurred by plaintiff, equity should not deny to defendant a reasonable opportunity, after proper demand, to rectify the asserted breach. (See 10 Cal.Jur. 492, § 34; 12 Cal.Jur. 633-634, § 3.)
It has also been suggested, on behalf of plaintiff, that a letter written to his attorney by defendant’s attorneys on April 29, 1941, constituted an actual, a constructive, or an anticipatory breach of the restrictive covenant. But this letter was not written until after plaintiff had defaulted, had . abandoned the premises, and had unconditionally renounced *696.his obligations. It could not operate retroactively to give plaintiff as of April 18 a right of action or of affirmative defense . or of equitable disavowal of obligations which he did not then possess. Furthermore, such letter does not purport •to declare, nor does it warrant the inference, that the defendant- would have declined- to respect its obligations to protect the plaintiff against competition in the building if the plaintiff had cured his default, retracted his renouncement of obligations, and notified defendant that he intended to reestablish . a furniture business in the leased premises. Relative to the Smith tenancy the letter merely states as factual matters that . “We are advised that the new tenancy that has been created affecting one of the stores in the same building does not in fact authorize the new tenant to conduct therein a furniture store or to conduct any business therein except the business of selling linoleum. In this connection we are also advised that even while, your client was in busines_in the leased premises he did not handle linoleum. We are advised further that your client 'wholly discontinued business at the leased premises before the newtenancy was created. . . .” (Italics added.) Such statements relate wholly to a factual situation, which, if erroneously stated, could have been corrected. They do not dispute the legal- obligation of the lessor to protect the lessee against competition in the building during any period while lessee might be conducting a furniture business in the leased • premises. Such letter also negatives any conclusion that the defendant intended to release the plaintiff from his promises; • it states specifically that ‘ ‘ The lessor insists that the lessee is still, bound by the terms of the lease and that the lessee is obligated to continue to pay the rent provided for the lease. ’ ’ Under the conditions existing on April 29, when the letter 'was written, it cannot be held that any statement in that letter constituted or evidenced a breach of the restrictive covenant, ■either actual, anticipatory, or constructive.
‘ Defendant contends, further, that inasmuch as the trial ■ court limited defendant to only three months’ rental—in the sum of $1,050—the award of $300 as attorney’s fees was ■•granted for the recovery of that amount, and that should additional rent be found to be due then an increased award of ■ attorney’s fees should follow. Plaintiff asserts that inasmuch as the- defendant lessor neither brought nor instituted this ’ action; but merely cross-complained in the suit filed by plaintiff, he should have been awarded no attorney’s fees. How*697ever, as stated in Pacific Finance Corp. v. Superior Court (1933), 219 Cal. 179, 182 [25 P.2d 983, 90 A.L.R. 384] (see also Millar v. Millar (1921), 51 Cal.App. 718, 722 [197 P. 811]), “ cross-actions . . . are still distinct and independent causes of action, so that when properly interposed and stated the defendant becomes in respect to the matters pleaded by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions pending between the same parties wherein each is at the same time both a plaintiff and a defendant.” It therefore appears that plaintiff’s action in filing its cross-complaint entitled it to attorney’s fees upon the recovery of rentals from plaintiff lessee, within the hereinabove quoted provision of the lease.
In my opinion the portions of the judgment appealed from, including the portion limiting recovery of attorney’s fees to the sum of $300, should be reversed.
Traynor, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 25, 1945. Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.