Court Opinion

ID: 9852382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:29:33.055855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:27.016743
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
I submit that the majority makes a fundamental mistake in footnote 2 of its opinion which ultimately leads it erroneously to believe that Appellants have standing to bring suit against a State agency challenging its issuance of a license for a neighboring landowner to build a structure on State-owned property. In the absence of statutory provisions that protect such property and govern standing of third-party landowners, Appellants cannot utilize principles of standing which are applicable only in zoning cases or pursuant to specific statutory standing provisions.
Neither the majority nor Appellants rely upon standing based on an interest created by either statutory or constitutional law, presumably because Appellants do not have a property right in what the State permits or prohibits on its own property, and because there is no statute authorizing any challenge to such a decision by the State. *631Georgia Power Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., 233 Ga. 558, 560-561 (1) (212 SE2d 628) (1975). See also Concerned Citizens of Douglas County v. Douglas County, 256 Ga. 82, 84 (344 SE2d 641) (1986) (a mere decision by a governmental body to use its land for an authorized purpose “ ‘in no way affects the constitutionally protected property rights of abutting landowners’ ”); Lindsey v. Guhl, 237 Ga. 567, 572-573 (II) (229 SE2d 354) (1976). Therefore, Appellants have standing to challenge the State’s grant of the license if that governmental action was “ ‘of a sort that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action cognizable by the courts[.] . . .’ [Cit.]” Georgia Power Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp., supra at 560 (1). Appellants clearly would not have a right of action against a private party who merely permitted construction on its own adjoining property, at least so long as the structure did not constitute a nuisance. Thus, Appellants, having already dismissed their claims for trespass and nuisance, likewise do not have standing to sue the State.
Moreover, even if standing were allegedly based upon a statutory or constitutional interest, “[t]he simple existence of an adverse effect on [ AJppellants is not in itself sufficient. Appellants must also show that it is the feature of the . . . administrative action which they seek to attack that was the direct cause of the injury. [Cits.]” Davis v. Jackson, 239 Ga. 262, 264-265 (236 SE2d 613) (1977). The direct cause of any injury to Appellants is not the State’s grant of a license to build the dock on its property, but rather can only be the actual construction of the dock by Ms. Vasarhelyi once she obtains all necessary approval and permits from other entities.
Citing DBL v. Carson, 262 Ga. App. 252, 254 (2) (585 SE2d 87) (2003), footnote 2 of the majority opinion adopts the standing analysis used in zoning cases. However, the test for standing in zoning matters has a peculiar history during which its statutory origin was judicially extended and adapted because it was appropriate for a broader range of zoning cases. Massey v. Butts County, 281 Ga. 244 (637 SE2d 385) (2006). The somewhat relaxed standing analysis in zoning cases is appropriate when a landowner complains that a governmental entity with zoning authority has permitted a neighboring property owner to use his land in violation of ordinances which protect all residents and businesses in a certain area. However, a looser standard for standing is not appropriate in the absence of any legislative definition of who is an aggrieved person and especially in the complete absence of any statute or ordinance whatsoever.
DBL is distinguishable because the lease of State property in that case was governed by the Coastal Marshlands Protection Act of 1970. OCGA § 12-5-280 et seq. That Act contains a specific provi*632sion which sets forth a standing test similar to that for zoning, in its definition of persons who are “aggrieved or adversely affected.” OCGA § 12-5-283 (c). However, the Act specifically exempts a single-family dock such as that permitted by the State in this case. OCGA § 12-5-295 (7). Where, as here, the State is simply determining what to allow on its own property, there exists no authority for an adjacent landowner to bring suit unless there is some contrary statutory provision or he is directly injured by the governmental action. The opposite holding by the majority opens the door to a wholesale loosening of standing requirements never intended by any legislative body. I therefore respectfully dissent to the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment.
Decided June 15, 2009 —
Reconsideration denied June 30, 2009.
Bouhan, Williams & Levy, Walter C. Hartridge, David B. Den-nison, for appellants.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Isaac Byrd, Deputy Attorney General, John E. Hennelly, Senior Assistant Attorney General, H. Lehman Franklin, for appellees.