Court Opinion

ID: 9755837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:53:15.530163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:11.946602
License: Public Domain

Joslin, J.,
whom Kelleher, J., joins, concurring. At trial the petitioner’s two confessions were admitted without objection, and now on habeas corpus he argues that they were coerced and therefore inadmissible. The majority do not reach his contention, but decide instead that petitioner, by taking the stand and testifying, acquiesced in his counsel’s trial strategy and thereby waived his right to assert his constitutional claims. I agree with their result, but not for the reason given.
Obviously, the majority seek to avoid a strict application of State v. Mendes, 99 R. I. 606, 210 A.2d 50. In that case a majority held that a claim under Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, could not be waived by counsel’s failure to interpose objection, unless •the record affirmatively indicated that the accused participated in that decision. I dissented. It was then and is •now my opinion that save in exceptional circumstances, a *316conscious, deliberate and intentional failure by competent counsel as a part of his trial strategy to interpose contemporaneous objection to the admission of a confession will preclude the accused from arguing, even in post-conviction proceedings, that his constitutional rights were violated. 99 R. I. at 621, 210 A.2d at 59. To the same effect is Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, where the constitutional claim was addressed to evidence allegedly the product of an illegal search and seizure, rather than to a confession. The court relying on and quoting Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L. Ed. 2d 408, the case on which I principally relied in my dissent in Mendes, said at 81, that ''* * * counsel’s decision, although made 'without prior consultation with an accused,’ to by-pass the contemporaneous-objection rule as part of trial strategy, will nevertheless 'preclude the accused from asserting constitutional claims * * *.’ ” Expanding on its conclusion the court gave as its reasons:
“* * * that only counsel is competent to make such a decision, that counsel must be the manager of the lawsuit, that if such decisions are to be made by the defendant, he is likely to do himself more harm than good, and that a contrary rule would seriously impair the constitutional guaranty of the right to counsel. * * * One of the surest ways for counsel to lose a lawsuit is to permit his client to run the trial. We think that few competent counsel would accept retainers, or appointment under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, to defend criminal oases, if they were to have to consult the defendant, and follow his views, on every issue of trial strategy that might, often as a matter of hindsight, involve some claim of constitutional right.”
Because I do not give Mendes the broad sweep of an absolute requirement of prior consultation between counsel and client whenever a constitutional claim arises, I need not resort to the accommodation of finding acquiescence, as do the majority in petitioner’s testifying, but instead rest denial of relief directly on counsel’s failure to object. *317There was no need for him to engage in discussion with his client on this tactic inasmuch as it was his business to decide when and under what circumstances to interpose objections. There being evidence suggesting that his failure to object was in this instance dictated by reasons of trial strategy, his deliberate choice, so long as competent and made in good faith, bound the petitioner.
James Cardono, Public Defender, William F. Reilly, Special Counsel to Public Defender, for petitioner.
Herbert F. DeSimone, Attorney General, Donald P. Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Motion for reargument denied.