Court Opinion

ID: 9450238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:39:25.365176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:12.638920
License: Public Domain

LEWIS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent. Although it is clear from the case law of Kansas that it is the public policy of that state to encourage the independent settlement of property rights in divorce cases and to leave the enforcement of such agreements to the law of contracts, it is equally clear that jurisdiction of the property settlement may be retained in the divorce court by merger of the settlement in the decree. The intent to so merge will not be read into the decree absent clear and unequivocal language to that effect. In my opinion, the language contained in the decree at bar requires the conclusion that a merger was intended. The decree not only recites that the agreement “be a part of the judgment” but contains a specific provision for enforcement of the agreement by both affirmative and negative orders directed to the parties. Such language seems entirely inconsistent with a contract deemed independent of the decree and over which the court would have no continuing jurisdiction. Unless the Kansas court intended that the property settlement be merged in the decree it could not order “that * * * the parties * * * carry out and perform all of the provisions of the stipulation * * * ” nor bar the parties “from any claim or demand against the other * * * except as provided in the stipulations * **."
Nor can I agree that the fraud indicated in the case at bar was extrinsic either traditionally or under Kansas law. Prideaux v. Prideaux, 169 Kan. 644, 220 P.2d 538, is distinguishable. There Mrs. Prideaux was induced to withdraw an affirmative claim, to abandon a defense and to submit to a default. She was, in effect, led right out of court. But in the case at bar Mrs. Hood appeared in the divorce court, was represented by counsel, testified in person, called a witness in her behalf and sought and obtained a decree of divorce and other relief.1 Mr. Hood’s unconscionable conduct induced her to agree to and present to the divorce court for approval a settlement of property rights; the other inducements stated in the prevailing opinion, and there properly qualified, are not specifics. Had Mr. Hood given undisputed but perjured testimony at the *592trial Mrs. Hood would have been victimized to the same extent.
I would hold that the instant action, though couched in terms of tort, is actually a collateral attack upon a state judgment and, as such, prohibited both under state and federal law. McCormick v. McCormick, 82 Kan. 31, 107 P. 546; Murrell v. Stock Growers’ Nat’l Bank, 10 Cir., 74 F.2d 827. Relief from Mr. Hood’s fraud should be left to the state court in which it warped the judicial process.

. The state court record states:
“Now on this 16th day of January, 1960 a regular day of this January term Plaintiff appears by Chas. Vance, his attorney and Defendant appears in person and by Rex Neubauer, her attorney.
“Both parties agree that the case should be tried at this time. Plaintiff offers evidence and rests and Defendant offers evidence and the cause is argued by the attorneys. The Court being fully advised in the premises finds that Plaintiff has been guilty of extreme cruelty and Defendant is entitled to a divorce and that the settlement of their property rights and the custody and support of their minor child, which stipulation should be made a part of judgment of this Court.”
The federal trial court found:
“The wife appeared at the divorce ease in person with her attorney and a corroborating witness. The husband did not appear, but his attorney Charles Vance, was present.”