Court Opinion

ID: 9594286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:28:41.645625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:31.968405
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Judge TAUBMAN
dissents in part from the denial of the defendant’s petition for rehearing.
I would grant this petition for rehearing based on the recently decided People v. Chavez, 853 P.2d 1149 (Colo.1993). In his appeal, the defendant, David Turley, claimed among other things, that, based upon People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo.1984), the trial court did not adequately advise him of his right to testify and, thus, his relinquishment of that right was invalid. The trial court advised the defendant:
If you choose to testify, you will be subject to cross examination the same as any other witness who is called in any criminal case. If you have been previously convicted of felony offenses, those offenses may be made known to the jury as those offenses affect your credibility, not as they go toward any trait of character.
After this advisement, defendant chose not to testify.
The defendant contends in his petition for rehearing that Chavez requires a different result. I agree. He maintains that this advisement failed to explain that evidence of his prior felonies could be used only to challenge his credibility. He further asserts that the trial court failed to advise him that the prosecution still bore the burden of proving each prior felony at the habitual criminal stage of the trial, and that evidence of prior felony convictions revealed earlier in the trial could not be used to prove these convictions.
The panel’s original decision here was made prior to the supreme court’s decision in Chavez. In Chavez, the supreme court reaffirmed the vitality of Curtis, holding that “the advisement given must include the Curtis elements and avoid misleading a defendant about the consequences of a decision not to testify.” Chavez, supra, at 1152. Chavez thus requires a clear advisement regarding the use of prior felony convictions before the defendant may voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to testify. Since a clear advisement was not given here, I would grant the defendant’s petition for rehearing.
In Chavez, the supreme court found that the trial court failed to inform Chavez that, if he testified, his prior felony convictions could be considered only to impeach his credibility. The court further found that “by its silence, the trial court left the impression that the prior convictions could be used as substantive proof for the habitual criminal phase of the trial.” Chavez, supra, at 1152.
Here, the trial court advised the defendant that evidence of prior felony offenses would be considered as they affect credibility but not as to any trait of character. While this advisement rises above the complete failure to advise in Chavez, it is still insufficient to permit me to infer that the defendant waived his right to testify voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
The trial court’s advisement failed to inform the defendant that the prosecution still had the burden of proving the prior felonies for the habitual criminal phase of his trial. Significantly, the advisement failed to state that “if he testified, his prior felony convictions could be considered only to impeach his credibility.” Chavez, supra, at 1152 (emphasis added).
Although the Chavez court stated, “there is no prescribed litany or formulas which must be followed in advising the defendant of his right to testify,” 853 P.2d at 1152, I believe the advisement here was legally insufficient. Despite the absence of a litany, the trial court’s advisement failed to include a clear explanation of the use of prior felony conviction evidence and the prosecution’s continued burden of proof in the habitual offender stage. This advisement did not clarify that prior felony conviction evidence revealed during the substantive phase of the trial could not be considered as proof of those convictions at the habitual phase nor did it permit such an inference by use of the word “only”. Therefore, it was manifestly misleading.
*506Moreover, if the supreme court chooses to revisit this issue, I suggest that a prescribed litany might be helpful for both trial and appellate courts in future cases. As the Chavez dissent stated, “If this court is of the opinion that Curtis advisements should be delivered without technical error, then this court should set forth a precise statement that trial judges must give.” Chavez, supra, at 1154 (Vollaek, J., dissenting). Because I believe that in the absence of a litany, the trial court’s advisement here was defective, I would grant the defendant’s petition for rehearing and remand the cause for a new trial.