Court Opinion

ID: 9641537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:34:03.129965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:38.220372
License: Public Domain

Ellen B. Brantley, Special Justice, concurring. While I, too, would reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for trial on the Fennells’ claim for restitution, I would do so on different grounds. I do not believe it necessary to decide whether Mrs. Whiteman was the Fennells’ agent. The majority may well be correct in its conclusion that, under the circumstances of this case, Mrs. Whiteman is properly considered a sub-agent of the Rosses. However, agency issues in the Multiple Listing Service conflict can arise in many different ways, and the resolution of those issues raises many complex problems. See, e.g., Burke, Law of Real Estate Brokers, § 1.5, pp. 9-10 (1982); Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1350 (1972). Since I would reverse the case even if I accepted the trial court’s finding on agency, I do not believe the case should turn on that issue. The case involves a material misrepresentation of fact in the sale of property. The misrepresentation about whether the property was located in the flood plain concededly began with the Rosses. The failure of Mrs. Whiteman (and Mrs. Reddick) to independently discover that the property was so located, even if they could have done so by the exercise of reasonable care, should not allow the Rosses to profit by their own misrepresentation. A contract may be rescinded if there was a mutual mistake of material fact. Foster v. Dierks Lmbr. & Coal Co., 175 Ark. 73, 298 S.W. 495 (1927). Hubbard v. Elam, 238 Ark. 976, 385 S.W.2d 925 (1965). Precisely such a mutual mistake occurred here, and the trial court erred in refusing rescission.