Court Opinion

ID: 9700624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:38:14.270033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:12.399596
License: Public Domain

Hill, J.,
dissenting. I have considered the opinions of both the majority and dissent, and concur in the majority’s analysis of issues I, III and IV. I am reluctantly compelled to dissent from its analysis of issue II, but for reasons which differ from those set forth in the dissent of my brother Billings.
The analysis of the second issue must begin with the initial determination of whether plaintiff was afforded the due process guaranteed him through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975), the United States Supreme Court clearly established that “a student’s legitimate entitlement to a public education [is] a property interest which is protected by the *425Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that Clause.” Accord, Diggles v. Corsicana Independent School District, 529 F. Supp. 169, 172 (N.D. Tex 1981). In addition, that a legitimate claim of entitlement to a public education is a protected property interest is embodied in both the Vermont Constitution as well as Vermont’s education laws. See, e.g., Vermont Constitution, Ch. II, § 68; 16 V.S.A. § 1073; Ouimette v. Babbie, 405 F. Supp. 525, 529 (D. Vt. 1975). However, “[o]nce it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
In Goss v. Lopez, supra, the Supreme Court, in a decision expressly limited to short suspensions not exceeding 10 days in length, outlined those minimum procedures due a student prior to such suspensions. “[D]ue process requires . . . that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Id. at 581. Fundamental to Goss’ analysis of what process was due was the notion “that the interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause are intensely practical matters and that ‘[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.’ ” Id. at 578 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). Likewise, this Court has stated that “the ‘rudimentary elements of fair play’ meet general requirements of due process.” Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 133 Vt. 225, 229, 335 A.2d 321, 324 (1975). Simply put, the requirements of due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are neither fossilized nor engraved in granite.
As the dissent of my brother Billings correctly points out, the Goss decision specifically left open for future review those situations involving longer suspensions or expulsions which “may require more formal procedures.” Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. at 584. However, in Nzuve v. Castleton State College, supra, this Court has already had the occasion to set forth the minimum process due a student being expelled from state college:
*426[T]he criteria of due process prior to expulsion from a state college . . . are a statement of specific charges and grounds for expulsion under appropriate regulations; a hearing approaching more than an informal interview with administrative authority; an opportunity for both sides to be heard in considerable detail at a hearing best suited to protect the rights of all involved, not necessarily public; the “rudiments” of an adversary proceeding. A full-dress judicial hearing, with right of cross-examination, is not required, but a right to present a defense, by oral testimony or affidavits, is.
Id. at 229, 335 A.2d at 324 (citing Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150,158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961)).
In my view, Nzuve provides fair and adequate protection for the due process rights of the student, while at the same time it recognizes that “public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.” Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Since fundamental due process as required by the United States Constitution, as well as our own, requires above all else fairness, I cannot say that plaintiff was denied a fair, open and patient hearing with actual notice. Therefore, I would reaffirm the due process protections outlined in Nzuve, but would not, as the dissent of my brother Billings would have us do, extend the Nzuve requirements so as to include written notice to the student in all cases.
However, our analysis must not stop here, for the plaintiff insists that he never received written notice of the committee hearing containing a statement of charges against him as contemplated by the defendant committee’s own regulations. Indeed, the findings of the trial court clearly state that “[c]ontrary to its own rules and regulations, neither the committee nor its agents gave plaintiff a written statement of the charges. . . .” Since this finding has not been challenged by either party, it must stand. Town of Lyndon v. Burnett’s Contracting Co., 138 Vt. 102, 107, 413 A.2d 1204, 1207 (1980) (citing Delance v. Hennessey, 137 Vt. 214, 216, 401 A.2d 903, 904 (1979)). The essence of plaintiff’s argument, then, is that defendant’s failure to comply with its own procedural regulations amounted to a denial of due process. I agree.
*427Embodied within the regulations of the school board is a higher standard of due process than that of Nzuve. In particular, the procedures for expulsion, as set forth in the Essex Junction Student Handbook, provide in part as follows:
Only the Prudential Committee shall have the authority to expel a student, and its decision shall be final. A recommendation for expulsion shall be made in writing to the Prudential Committee with a certified copy being sent to the student and his/her parent or guardian at their home address. The procedure in any case involving a recommendation for expulsion shall include the following steps.
2. Before the Prudential Committee considers any recommendation for expulsion, the student shall be given an opportunity to present his/her case to the Prudential Committee, and to present witnesses in his/her own behalf. The student shall be sent formal written notification of his/her opportunity to appear before the Prudential Committee and to present witnesses at least one week prior to the first scheduled session during which the recommendation is to be considered. (Emphasis in original.)
In addition, the defendant committee’s “Procedures for Hearing Process For Student Suspension or Expulsion” further require that the written notice contain “a statement of charges or the facts as known by the assistant principal and/or principal.” Finally, the regulations clearly state that said written notice is to be part of a larger “fact sheet” package consisting of suspension letters, a guidance counselor evaluation report, a police report, and a summation of prior disciplinary reports. There is no indication in the record that the student received any of these.
In Nzomo v. Vermont State Colleges, 136 Vt. 97, 385 A.2d 1099 (1978), a case dealing with a grievance before the State Labor Relations Board, we stated that “[i]t is a firmly established principle of administrative law that defined dismissal procedures, although generous beyond the due process requirements that bind the agency, are binding and must be scrupulously observed.” Id. at 100, 385 A.2d at 1101 (citing Vitarelli *428v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Although Nzomo was not a case specifically addressing student suspensions or expulsions, it is nonetheless instructive, since it illustrates the principle that “[a] governmental agency violates a person’s due process rights when it renders a decision or takes an action without complying with its own regulations.” Moss v. Ward, 450 F. Supp. 591, 598 n.8 (W.D. N.Y. 1978) (citing Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954)). This principle is totally consistent with the above discussion of due process, for a “[fjailure to follow such guidelines tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice contrary to fundamental concepts of fair play and due process.” International House v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting NLRB v. Welcome-American Fertilizer Co., 443 F.2d 19, 20 (9th Cir. 1971)); see also Superior Savings Association v. City of Cleveland, 501 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (citing Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957)).
In the instant case, defendant’s regulations for expulsion were specific and unambiguous. They were not foisted on the committee; rather, they were promulgated by the committee. Indeed, some of the procedural matters were important enough in the eyes of the committee to be underlined so as to reflect added emphasis. Moreover, the record discloses that the school was well aware of the written notice requirements, since it belatedly sent such notice to the plaintiff’s parents, not plaintiff, two days after the expulsion hearing. In light of Nzomo, I would hold that defendant had a duty to abide by its own regulations. As indicated in Nzomo, “the absence of any constitutionally impermissible bias or motive, or indeed the presence of absolute good faith, does not vindicate the defendant for its failure to comply with the termination procedure.” Id. at 102, 385 A.2d at 1102.
Accordingly, since the unchallenged findings clearly establish that defendant failed to comply with its written notice requirements, I would grant plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction, reinstate the student in good standing, and remand to the trial court for a redetermination of damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.