Court Opinion

ID: 9570771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:26:07.262393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:25.043201
License: Public Domain

DAVISON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of my fellow Justices. In reaching the results that it did, the majority opinion puts great emphasis upon the fact that a private citizen may not be compensated for damage to his property right of access unless there is a taking. The majority opinion also suggests that when a governmental authority regulates a private citizen’s right to access for the public’s safety and welfare, such regulation is not compensable. In discussing these concepts, the majority opinion states:
“ * * * ^ right of access belonging to the landowner whose property abuts upon a street or highway may not be taken by government authorities without payment of just compensation, but such right of access may be regulated for the public safety or welfare, and such regulation is not compensable. The problem therefore is to determine whether the right of access has been merely regulated for the public safety or welfare by the exercise of the police power, or whether the regulation amounts to a compensable taking.”
Thus, under the law created in the majority opinion, private citizens may be required to suffer significant property damage at the hands of the government and not be compensated for that damage. Such should not be the law, and such is not the law. In *1212emphasizing the government’s right to regulate, and not compensate unless a taking is present, the majority opinion ignores the fact that private property rights of the appellant were damaged for the benefit of the general public, and that the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma requires that a private citizen be compensated for damage to his private property. Article II, Section 24 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides in part:
“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation * * *
[Emphasis added]
I respectfully suggest that appellant’s property may have been damaged in order to benefit the general public, and that the above Constitutional provision requires compensation. The instructions given to the jury emphasized the right of the State to build and maintain roads, if done in a reasonable, noncapricious and nonarbitrary manner and virtually ignored a citizen’s right to be compensated for damage to his private property. Such lack of proper instruction was clearly prejudicial and, for that reason, I would reverse the jury’s verdict and remand the case for a new trial.
An examination of the record in this case clearly demonstrates that there was a distinct possibility that appellant motel owner’s property right of “reasonable access” was substantially damaged — the jury should have been instructed that the occurrence of such substantial damage gives rise to compensation. In support of this contention, I respectfully offer the following examination of the concept of “right of access” as “property”, as reflected by the law of Oklahoma.
In City of Shawnee v. Robbins Bros. Tire Co., 134 Okl. 142, 272 P. 457 (1928), this Court stated in its first syllabus:
“The right of access to property abutting upon public highway is appurtenant to the lot, and is private property, and passes to the lessee of the property while he is in the lawful possession, and while subject to reasonable regulation, cannot ordinarily be denied, and of which the owner or lessee may not be deprived, without just compensation.’’
[Emphasis added]
In the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, Okl, 316 P.2d 828 (1957), this Court held that:
“ * ⅜ * (1) a property owner had the right to adequate access to his property from either end of a street, and destruction of such right results in an injury not merely in degree, but different in kind from that suffered by the general public; (2) where there was evidence the landowner suffered more than mere inconvenience, it was for the jury to decide whether the right of ingress and egress had been impaired, even though the means of access had not been destroyed entirely. . . . ”
Similarly, in State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Bowles, Okl., 472 P.2d 896 (1970), we held that the taking or damaging of free or convenient access to landowner’s property, is a compensable injury.
The case law cited above, clearly demonstrates that this State recognizes the right of reasonable access to private property as a private property right.
At trial and in the briefs, great emphasis was put upon the fact that not one inch of appellant’s property had been physically taken or invaded. The question implicitly raised by such emphasis is:
Whether the property right of reasonable access can be violated, necessitating compensation, if no portion of the landowner’s property has been physically taken or invaded?
Even a casual examination of this State’s case law indicates that a physical invasion or a physical taking is not necessary in order to constitute a violation of a landowner’s right to reasonable access in such a manner as to require compensation.
In Foster Lumber Co. v. Arkansas Valley & W. Ry. Co., 20 Okl. 583, 95 P. 224 (1908), this Court stated:
“ * * * Plaintiff has, by virtue of its ownership of said lots, an interest in Street A on which said lots abut, and a *1213right therein common with the public to pass over the same as a public highway. In addition thereto, it has a special right in said street not common to the public, to wit, the right of ingress and egress over the same to and from its lots. The decisions of the courts made under statute or constitutional provision to the effect that the complaining party can recover only where there is a ‘taking of private property for public use’ are nearly uniform on the question that, where the injury complained of by the abutting property owner is one that is common to the general public, such injury is damnum absque injuria. The decisions of the courts, however, are by no means uniform upon what constitutes a ‘taking’ of property in cases similar to the one at bar, but we believe the weight of the better authorities, if not the greater in number, is that such a ‘taking’ may result without conversion of the property or any part thereof, as under statutes and constitutional provisions which provide that private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation. . . . ”
(Emphasis added).
Citing prior authority, this Court took the same position in Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Prigmore, 180 Okl. 124, 68 P.2d 90 (1937). In that case, we stated:
“ * * * Under section 24, article 2, Okl.Const., providing that ‘Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation,’ a recovery is authorized although there is no physical invasion of the property damaged. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Larwood (1935) 175 Okl. 96, 51 P.(2d) 508; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Jennings (1936) 175 Okl. 524, 53 P.(2d) 691. . . ”
(Emphasis added).
Also see Grand River Dam Authority v. Misenhimer, 195 Okl. 682, 161 P.2d 757 (1945).
Having seen that a physical taking or invasion is not necessary for a taking or damage to occur, I will next consider whether such taking or damage can occur when a landowner’s right of ingress and egress is limited, but not entirely cut off. In Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, supra, this Court held that a landowner may recover for a material infringement on his right to ingress and egress, even though the landowner still had access to the highway abutting his property through a more inconvenient route. In so holding, we stated:
“ ‘ * * * If the highway upon which his property abuts is so closed that said property is placed in a pocket or cul-de-sac, he suffers a special injury and may recover damages even though he has access thereto by a more inconvenient circuitous route. We think this expressed the better view as well as the rule to which we are committed in this jurisdiction.’ ” (Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, supra, 316 P.2d at p. 832 citing Grand River Dam Authority, supra).
In Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 180 Okl. 604, 71 P.2d 693 (1937), we held that an owner of property abutting a public street closed by construction of a viaduct under a railroad track was entitled to damages for violation of his right of ingress and egress, even though an alternate route had been provided. The alternate access which was provided was set between the concrete embankments used in the viaduct and adjacent property so that vehicles coming from the closed street onto an avenue were forced to turn sharply to the left, and after getting to the end of the embankment, those wishing to proceed north were compelled to turn sharply to the right into the viaduct.
A similar holding was reached in Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Jennings, 175 Okl. 524, 53 P.2d 691 (1936), under the same basic set of facts.
Although language in Brewer v. City of Norman, Okl, 527 P.2d 1134 (1974), suggests that compensation is only available and appropriate when complete denial of egress or ingress exists, such is not the law in Oklahoma. The language we refer to reads as follows:
*1214“On the basis of the foregoing, we hold that plaintiff’s evidence, without anything therein to indicate that the Flood Street changes effected an absolute denial of ingress or egress between said street and his property, * * *, was insufficient to establish a cause of action for the damages he claimed. . . . ”
The court’s meaning, although we believe clear in the context of our full discussion, is not easily discerned by looking at the above language out of context. The intent of the statement was to state that landowners are only entitled to compensation when they are denied reasonable access.
In short, the reasoning in the Brewer case was that plaintiff Brewer, after the modification of Flood Street, still had reasonably adequate access to the street.
In the case now before us and in the Brewer case, the causes of action were in part predicated upon the theory that an abuse of police power caused or contributed to the loss of access.
In State v. Burden, Okl., 338 P.2d 154 (1959), we held that the fact that the State might have had a legitimate right to construct a curbing along condemned land did not bar the condemnee’s right to damages resulting from the interference with the landowner’s right of ingress and egress, caused by the construction of the curbing. Using the same rationale, I would hold that the fact that the State did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in constructing the limited access highway does not bar a citizen’s right to be compensated for the loss of a substantial part of his access to and from his property.
In reaching our decision in Brewer v. City of Norman, supra, we briefly discussed the existence of a dichotomy between the exercise of police power and the exercise of eminent domain. The rationale accompanying such a dichotomy is that a governmental entity, when exercising its police power, can only be held liable, regardless of the damage it causes, if its exercise of police power is unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary. Although, the use of either the eminent domain approach or the police power approach can reach the same result, with courts finding a denial of reasonable access to be an unreasonable exercise of police power, I find that such an analysis is confusing and obfuscates the principal issue in cases dealing with the loss of access. The controlling issue for the finder of fact in such a case is: Did governmental action cause a substantial loss of access to the main system of roads? If the finder of fact answers this question affirmatively, liability attaches, and the landowner is entitled to compensation.
A clear understanding of the logical analysis underlining the substantial loss rationale is essential to its proper application. The underlying analysis contains four steps:
First, the “property right of access” should be defined. This property right to access, as demonstrated by the case law discussed above, is not a right to unlimited access, but is a right to reasonable access.
I would thus define the “property right to access” as: The reasonable ability of a landowner to reach the abutting public ways by customary means of locomotion and then to reach the general system of public ways in a reasonable manner.
Second, the finder of fact must determine if any governmental activity has affected one’s property right to access.
Third, the finder of fact must determine whether the property right of access involved has been “damaged” — that is, whether there has been a substantial or unreasonable loss of the right to access.
Fourth, if it is determined that a substantial or unreasonable loss of the right to access has occurred, the finder of fact must then assess the damages caused by such loss.
The measure of damages in such instances is the difference between the market value of the property before and after the loss. In awarding damages, the finder of fact may consider any change in the highest and best use which may have occurred as a result of the loss. For this limited purpose, the court may in its discretion receive with *1215caution evidence of lost patronage. See State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Bowles, Okl., 472 P.2d 896 (1970). However, no damage as such may be asserted for diversion of traffic or for loss of customers, business, good will, income, or profits, the latter depends not only on the location of access, but on many complex intangible variables. See Oldfield v. City of Tulsa, 170 Okl. 329, 41 P.2d 71 (1935), and State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Bowles, supra. Thus, only the diminution in value of the real estate and improvements thereon is relevant.
The evidence in this case clearly demonstrated that appellant motel corporation’s right to access had been damaged. The jury should have been given the opportunity to determine whether appellant’s right to access had been substantially damaged.
At trial, the evidence showed that appellant corporation owned the Suntide Motel and Restaurant, and the surrounding property, presently located at the intersection of Highway 66 (which runs east and west) and Interstate Highway 240 (formerly Grand Boulevard, which runs north and south). When appellant motel corporation acquired the property in question, its north boundary line abutted directly upon the service road south of old Highway 66. This service road was also known as N.W. 39th Street.
From 1957 at the completion of the construction of old Highway 66 until the construction of the limited access highway, the principal means of ingress and egress to and from the motel property was an exit on old Highway 66, which exited directly onto the service road in front of appellant’s motel at the place directly in front of the motel property. This exit allowed those seeking access to the motel from Highway 66 to exit the highway and drive straight across the service road onto appellant’s property. Access to the highway from the motel could be achieved by driving directly from the motel property across the service road and onto the highway, using the “exit.” The exit afforded access to and from the motel to those traveling in either direction on old Highway 66. Additionally, until the time of the construction of the limited access highway, the service road in front of the motel property was a two-way street.
After the construction of the limited access highway, a portion of the service road on which the motel was located, was designated a one-way street going east, and access to and from the motel from the highway became more difficult than in the past.
Now, eastbound travelers on the limited access highway, using the less circuitous means possible, must, in order to obtain access to appellant’s property, exit onto the southeast service road several blocks east of appellant’s property, on the same side of the highway, but must then by virtue of the construction of the exit and the one-way service road, proceed east for approximately another half mile to May Avenue, turn north (left) onto May Avenue, crossing May Avenue, turn back west (left) onto the northeast service road, proceed west on the northeast service road to Drexel Avenue, turn south (left) under the highway to a point on the southeast service road west of where he exited in the first place, then turn west (right) and travel down the two-way part of the southeast service road to appellant’s property.
Westbound travelers seeking the less circuitous route to appellant’s property must exit at May Avenue on the north side of the limited access highway more than a mile before reaching the property, cross May Avenue and proceed west on the northeast service road to Drexel Avenue, turn south (left) under the highway and finally turn west on the two-way portion of the southeast service road. These means of access are further limited by the fact that between the hours of 4:00 and 6:00 P.M., left turns at the intersection of May Avenue and the northeast service road are prohibited by City ordinance.
Additionally, direct access from May Avenue was also limited after construction, as the one-way portion of the southeast service road makes it impossible for drivers to turn left and proceed west to appellant’s motel using the southeast service road.
*1216There are other means of access to and from appellant’s motel, but they are just as or more circuitous.
I respectfully suggest that, as shown above, the law in Oklahoma is as follows:
1. The State or a subdivision thereof may not damage private property for public use without making just compensation for the property damaged.
2. A citizen’s right to reasonable access to his land is recognized in Oklahoma as a “property right,” constituting property.
3. Citizens are entitled to be compensated when the State or a subdivision thereof substantially damages their right of reasonable access to their land, regardless of the reasonableness of the State’s action.
In a nutshell, the above stated principles of law may be expressed as follows:
When the action of the State or one of its subdivisions, causes substantial damage to a citizen’s property right of reasonable access to his property, the citizen is entitled to just compensation.
This is the law in Oklahoma, and should remain the law, for it requires those benefiting from such damage to bear the burden, rather than requiring individuals to bear the burden of the damage for the benefit of their fellow citizens. Under the facts presented in the case, the jury could easily have found that appellant’s property right to reasonable access had been substantially damaged. The jury was not properly instructed that such substantial damage would give rise to liability. The law requires such instruction — it should have been given, but was not.
In examining the instructions given by the trial court, we first note that the jury was instructed to consider the instructions as a whole, and not a part to the exclusion of the rest.
In Lewallen v. Cardwell, Okl., 325 P.2d 1074 (1958), we held that when a trial court instructs the jury, that they “must consider the instructions as a whole and not a part to the exclusion of the rest”, we will assume that the jury, in accordance with the instruction, viewed the instructions as a whole.
In viewing the instructions as a whole, we find that they overemphasized the State’s police powers.
The instructions also emphasized, “in laundry list fashion”, what the State may do in exercising its police power.
Only two brief phrases in the court’s instructions focused on the impairment of the right of egress and ingress. In the final two lines of paragraph three of Instruction No. 3, the court, after setting forth the State’s right to regulate egress or ingress to streets, added the following restriction:
“ * * * as long as there is no unreasonable or absolute denial of ingress or egress to the street or highway.”
Secondly, the court, in summing up the first issue before the jury, in the last paragraph of Instruction No. 3, stated:
“The issue for you to first determine is whether or not the action of the State was arbitrary, capricious and/or unreasonably impaired ingress or egress to the Plaintiff’s property.”
These brief references to the main issue at hand, coupled with the fact that (1) the majority of the instructions emphasized the police power, and that (2) the court did not define “unreasonable impairment”, compels me to conclude that the instructions as a whole did not provide the jury with adequate guidelines with which to decide the central issue in the case.
I am of the opinion that because of the inadequacy of the instructions, which were clearly prejudicial to the plaintiff below, the verdict of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded for new trial.
I am authorized to state that Vice Chief Justice LAVENDER concurs in the views herein expressed.