Court Opinion

ID: 9744851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:19:42.809107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:52.509261
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CARMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: When this court last considered the constitutionality of this statute, three justices would have found the statute unconstitutional on its face. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 480-82 (Heiple, J., specially concurring); Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 482-83 (Rathje, J., specially concurring, joined by Heiple and Freeman, JJ.) (concluding that the statute is facially unconstitutional because the “fatal flaw *** will be present in every section 607(b)(1) case” (emphasis omitted)). Thus, at the time this court considered Lulay, we were aware that each subsection of section 607(b) was vulnerable to the same criticism — that the state lacked a compelling interest to justify this significant intrusion into the decision making of fit parents. The majority reaches the question left unanswered in Lulay, whether the entire section must be found unconstitutional on its face, and answers that question in the affirmative. A statute is facially unconstitutional if “ c “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” ’ ” In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 297 (2001), quoting In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994), quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987). I agree with the majority that section 607(b)(3) is unconstitutional on its face. This provision states that when one parent has died, the surviving parent “shall not interfere” with the grandparents’ rights to visitation. 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(3) (West 2000). Because a fit parent is constitutionally entitled to the presumption that he or she is acting in the child’s best interest (Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 59, 120 S. Ct. at 2062), this provision, which purports to limit the decisionmaking capability of a fit parent in order to protect “rights” of grandparents, without first requiring rebuttal of the presumption, is unconstitutional on its face. Section 607(b)(1), however, is another matter. While this section defines a rather narrow class of persons who may bring petitions for visitation — grandparents, great-grandparents, and siblings — it does not limit the class of persons who may be named respondents in such actions. 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(l) (West 2000). Logically, any person who exercises guardianship or custody over a minor child might be named a respondent in a petition for visitation brought pursuant to this section. Thus, it is easily possible to conceive of a set of circumstances in which this section could be validly applied. 199 111. 2d at 320-21. Consider, for example, the case of a young family involved in a tragic automobile accident that kills the father and leaves the mother so severely injured that her parents seek and are given custody and guardianship of the child. Perhaps blaming their late son-in-law for the accident, the maternal grandparents refuse to permit visitation with the paternal grandparents. Section 607(b)(1)(C) confers standing upon the paternal grandparents to seek visitation by filing a petition naming the maternal grandparents as respondents. 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(l)(C) (West 2000). Yet, by declaring the statute unconstitutional on its face, the majority has implicitly held that the custodial grandparents in this example have the same fundamental rights to the care, custody, and control of the child as natural or adoptive parents, that they are constitutionally entitled to the benefit of the presumption that they are acting in the best interests of the child, and that the state may not interfere in their decisionmaking unless the interference is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. This implicit holding, moreover, has implications far beyond visitation disputes. In my opinion, when the respondent in the visitation action is a nonparent, the statute could be constitutionally applied because the nonparent respondent would not be exercising a fundamental constitutional right and, thus, strict scrutiny would not apply. In other words, unlike a natural or adoptive parent, a nonparent custodian or guardian is not constitutionally entitled to the presumption that he or she is acting in the best interest of the child. Without necessarily concluding that section 607(b)(1), as applied to nonparent respondents, meets the rational basis test, I am unwilling to prejudge this issue by finding this provision unconstitutional on its face. The majority is inclined to resolve the constitutional question once and for all so that piecemeal litigation is not required to invalidate the statute. However, by declaring this section facially invalid, the majority has implicitly declared that nonparent custodians or guardians have fundamental constitutional rights equal to those of parents. This question was not presented by either of the consolidated cases, nor was it briefed or argued. There is no need for the court to go so far. On the other hand, a good reason exists for narrowing our holding to declaring the statute unconstitutional as applied. At some future date, a nonparent custodian or guardian will stand before an Illinois court asserting a fundamental constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of a child and demanding the benefit of the presumption. That litigant will cite this case as support and we may, at that time, have to undo what was done here. I firmly believe that we should go only so far as is necessary to resolve the question presented to us in the present case and no further. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the portion of the opinion that would declare section 607(b)(1) unconstitutional on its face. I would find this provision unconstitutional as applied to any fit parent.