Court Opinion

ID: 9375390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 17:03:29.267346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:58.460044
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 220169
                                  No. 2-22-0169
                          Opinion filed February 27, 2023
______________________________________________________________________________

                                            IN THE

                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of McHenry County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 20-CF-864
                                       )
CASEY F. PURTA,                        ) Honorable
                                       ) Michael E. Coppedge,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Justices Jorgensen and Kennedy concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                          OPINION

¶1     Following a bench trial in the circuit court of McHenry County, defendant, Casey F. Purta,

was convicted of disorderly conduct for knowingly making a false complaint to a public safety

agency. 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(6) (West 2020). Defendant argues on appeal that the State failed to

prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse.

¶2                                    I. BACKGROUND

¶3     At trial, William Worley testified that he was employed by Mattress Firm as a district

manager. Defendant was employed at a Mattress Firm location in McHenry, within Worley’s

district. On June 1, 2020, Worley spoke with his staff, including defendant, about civil unrest
2023 IL App (2d) 220169

occurring throughout the nation. 1 He told his staff members to contact him if they felt uneasy, and

then a decision would be made whether to close a Mattress Firm location for safety reasons. Later

that day, shortly before 5 p.m., Worley received a call from defendant stating that he was

“frightened” because “a couple of vehicles pulled into the parking lot, parked erratically, and two

or three individuals got out of the car, one with a shotgun, another with an AK-47 type assault

rifle, and walked by the front of the store.” (On cross-examination, Worley testified that he did not

recall whether defendant said he actually saw the men emerge from the vehicles or only saw them

coming from that direction.) Worley told defendant to lock the front door if it was safe to do so,

seek shelter in the back storage room, and dial 911.

¶4     After defendant’s call, Worley called Michael Glenky, Mattress Firm’s regional vice

president. Glenky decided to close all 100 Mattress Firm locations in the Chicagoland region

because of “the civil unrest that had been going on during that time period and the riots and so

forth that had taken place throughout the market.” Glenky also called Mattress Firm’s loss

prevention director, Michael Deprey. Worley testified that he was aware that Deprey contacted

law enforcement authorities. The parties then stipulated that Deprey made the report.

¶5     After speaking with Glenky, Worley called his other nine Mattress Firm locations and told

them to close for the day. Worley then called defendant again. Defendant wanted to leave, but

       1
           Worley was apparently referring to protests that followed the death of George Floyd

during an encounter with police. See, e.g., Braxton Booker, Bill Chappell, David Schaper, Danielle

Kurtzleben, & Joseph Shapiro, Violence Erupts as Outrage Over George Floyd’s Death Spills Into

a New Week, NPR (June 1, 2020) https://www.npr.org/2020/06/01/866472832/violence-escalates-

as-protests-over-george-floyd-death-continue [https://perma.cc/ZS46-TBWN].

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because the armed men were still unaccounted for, Worley advised defendant to lock the door and

shelter in the back. Worley told defendant to cooperate with the police and then “get out of there.”

Worley went to the store after things “calmed down.” Defendant had already left. Defendant and

Worley spoke again later. Defendant was scheduled to work on June 2, 2020, and he advised

Worley that he thought he would be able to do so. Later, however, defendant texted Worley,

indicating that “he didn’t realize how shaken up he was given the situation.” Defendant asked for

the day off. On cross-examination, Worley testified that, in his experience, defendant had been an

honest employee.

¶6     Maria Joseph, a 911 dispatcher for the City of McHenry, testified that at approximately 5

p.m. on June 1, 2020, she received a call through a nonemergency number. The caller reported

“two suspicious males, possibly armed, with vests approaching a mattress store.” The caller, whose

name Joseph did not recall, identified himself as the store’s manager. However, he said he was not

on the premises. Rather, he had received the information about the incident from an employee

hiding in the store.

¶7     Craig Hampton testified that, in the mid to late afternoon on June 1, 2020, he and some

friends were sitting in lawn chairs in the parking lot of a Starbucks located about 200 yards from

Mattress Firm. During the half to one hour that he was at Starbucks, Hampton did not see an

individual holding a firearm or an object that could be mistaken for a firearm. Lia McCoo testified

that on June 1, 2020, she and her friend Karen Dulski met at the same Starbucks at about 4 to 4:30

p.m. and drank their beverages in McCoo’s vehicle. The vehicle was facing away from Mattress

Firm, but McCoo could see Mattress Firm in her rearview mirror. At no time did she see anyone

walk by carrying a firearm or an object that could be mistaken for a firearm. Although Dulski

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testified that she was mostly facing forward and not looking at Mattress Firm, she saw no civilians

carrying assault rifles, shotguns, or anything one could mistake for such weapons.

¶8     McHenry police officer Christina Noyes testified that she was dispatched to Mattress Firm

to respond to a report of two suspects wearing camouflage and bulletproof vests and carrying

assault rifles. Noyes and her partner, Officer Popp, confronted defendant, who was then seated in

his white Toyota Prius. (For reasons that need not be detailed here, Noyes had been advised that

the armed suspects might have arrived in that vehicle.) Noyes did not recall whether she or Popp

had their guns drawn when they first approached defendant. After determining that defendant was

an employee of Mattress Firm—not one of the suspected armed men—Noyes and Popp, along

with several other officers, searched the vicinity, including a nearby wooded area, but did not find

any armed men. They then released defendant from the scene, but later called and asked him if he

would be willing to return and answer questions. Defendant agreed.

¶9     Noyes subsequently tried to get in touch with defendant by leaving voicemail messages for

him, but he never returned her calls. A few days after the incident, she went to Mattress Firm.

Defendant was there but did not greet Noyes in any way and did not seem pleased that she was

there. Noyes asked defendant if he would voluntarily come to the police department to speak with

her. Defendant responded that he was unable to do so because he was working. She asked if

defendant would be available the following day. He said he had plans and would not be in the area.

Noyes asked if defendant wanted to speak with her. He responded that he had nothing more to tell

her. Following Noyes’s testimony, the State rested.

¶ 10   Defendant called two witnesses who testified that he had a reputation for honesty.

Defendant also testified on his own behalf that on June 1, 2020, at around 2:30 p.m., he was part

of a Microsoft Teams chat meeting where the participants discussed the current social unrest and

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protests. The discussion participants were advised to contact their district manager if they saw

“anything regarding” the unrest or protests. Shortly before 5 p.m., defendant was sitting at his desk

when he saw two men walk past the store. He got a clear view of one of the men. That man was

wearing a black vest over a camouflage T-shirt and was carrying a weapon. Later, defendant

testified that both men “were holding what [he] thought were assault rifles.” According to

defendant, the store faced west, and the men were walking north. Defendant testified that, after

seeing the men, he walked to the front of the store and looked around. He stepped outside but did

not see the two men. Defendant did see two vehicles parked “askew” that he had not seen before

he saw the men. Defendant assumed that the men had arrived in the vehicles. (In fact, the record

reveals that the vehicles belonged to McCoo and Dulski.) Defendant called Worley and told him

what he had seen. Worley told him to “lock up the store and to call the police and to stay safe until

the police had arrived.” Worley further told defendant that he could leave when the police arrived.

¶ 11   After the call ended, defendant started closing procedures. He cleaned up the store and

gathered the trash. Then he looked for the McHenry Police Department’s nonemergency number.

Defendant explained that he did not believe the situation was an emergency. While defendant was

looking for the nonemergency number, Worley called back. While speaking with Worley,

defendant took the trash out. At that point, he saw some squad cars in the area. Defendant told

Worley that the police had been called, but he did not tell Worley that he (defendant) had called

the police. After that call ended, defendant locked the back door and walked to his car. When he

got in his car, squad cars and police officers immediately surrounded him with their guns drawn.

Defendant told Officer Popp that he was the one who had reported the incident. Officer Popp then

“dismissed” defendant, and defendant started driving home. Before he arrived, he received a phone

call from Noyes. She asked him to return to the scene and talk to her. Defendant returned to the

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2023 IL App (2d) 220169

scene and spoke with Noyes again. Defendant testified that he never called the police. He did not

think there was an emergency or a crime was being committed.

¶ 12   The trial court found defendant guilty of disorderly conduct based on his call to Worley, in

which he reported the presence of armed men outside Mattress Firm. The court found, inter alia:

               “Certainly anytime someone reports seeing two men with weapons in bulletproof

       vests in a *** retail shopping area at 5 p.m. ***, there could be an emergency response. It

       would seem axiomatic that someone reporting this information would be consciously aware

       that an emergency response is practically certain to result.”

¶ 13   After denying defendant’s posttrial motion, the court sentenced defendant to an 18-month

term of conditional discharge. This appeal followed.

¶ 14                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15   Defendant maintains that his report to Worley that armed men were outside Mattress Firm

was not a sufficient basis to convict him of disorderly conduct for knowingly making a false

complaint to a public safety agency. A reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction

unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the

defendant’s guilt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). When the sufficiency of the

evidence is challenged, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “The trier of fact has the responsibility to assess the credibility of the

witnesses, weigh their testimony, resolve inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence, and draw

reasonable inferences therefrom.” People v. Ressa, 2019 IL App (2d) 170439, ¶ 42. We will not

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substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions of the credibility of the witnesses

or the weight of the evidence. Id.

¶ 16   Section 26-1(a)(6) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(6) (West

2020)) provides, in pertinent part:

               “(a) A person commits disorderly conduct when he or she knowingly:

                                                    ***

                       (6) Calls the number ‘911’ or transmits or causes to be transmitted in any

               manner to a public safety agency for the purpose of making or transmitting a false

               alarm or complaint and reporting information when, at the time the call or

               transmission is made, the person knows there is no reasonable ground for making

               the call or transmission and further knows that the call or transmission could result

               in the emergency response of any public safety agency[.]”

¶ 17   Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

knowingly caused transmission to the McHenry Police Department of a report of armed men

outside Mattress Firm. Second, defendant alternatively argues, in essence, that the State failed to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that there was no reasonable ground for

making the transmission. According to defendant, the State failed to prove that the information

defendant conveyed to Worley was false, let alone that defendant knew it was false. We accept

defendant’s first argument and need not consider his second.

¶ 18   The State insists that it was required to prove only that defendant knew his call to Worley

“could” result in an emergency response by a public safety agency. That is simply incorrect. In a

prosecution under section 26-1(a)(6) of the Code, the State must prove both that the defendant

knowingly “transmits or causes to be transmitted in any manner” information to a public safety

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2023 IL App (2d) 220169

agency and that the defendant “further knows” the transmission could lead to an emergency

response. (Emphases added.) Id. Unless the State first proves that the defendant knowingly

transmitted, or caused to be transmitted, information to a public safety agency, it is of no

consequence whether the defendant knew that such information could lead to an emergency

response.

¶ 19   It is undisputed that defendant did not himself transmit information about the armed men

to a public safety agency. The salient question is whether, by calling Worley, defendant knowingly

caused that information to be transmitted. Only if the answer to that threshold question is “yes” is

it necessary to consider whether defendant “further [knew] that the call or transmission could result

in the emergency response of any public safety agency.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

¶ 20   Section 4-5 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/4-5 (West 2020)) provides, in pertinent part:

       “A person knows, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of:

                       ***

                       (b) The result of his or her conduct, described by the statute defining the

               offense, when he or she is consciously aware that that result is practically certain

               to be caused by his conduct.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 21   Thus, to prove defendant knew his call to Worley would result in someone contacting a

public safety agency, the State was obligated to prove that defendant was consciously aware that

that result was practically certain to occur. Knowledge is often proven with circumstantial

evidence (People v. Maples, 2018 IL App (2d) 160577, ¶ 31), and at least in some settings,

knowledge may be established with reference to what a reasonable person would know under the

circumstances (see, e.g., People v. Miller, 2013 IL App (1st) 110879, ¶ 55 (“Whether defendant

had knowledge [that the vehicle was stolen] ‘may be established by proof of circumstances that

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would cause a reasonable man to believe that the property [was] stolen.’ ” (quoting People v. Kaye,

264 Ill. App. 3d 369, 383 (1994)))). Here, given the national climate of civil unrest following

George Floyd’s death and the Microsoft Teams chat earlier in the day, we believe a reasonable

person in defendant’s circumstances would be aware that it was likely or perhaps even probable

that the call to Worley would result in someone contacting a public safety agency. However, we

do not believe a reasonable person would be aware that such a result would be “practically certain.”

The average reasonably knowledgeable person would not necessarily know whether it is legal to

openly carry long guns, including assault rifles, in Illinois. Moreover, defendant did not report the

presence of armed men in connection with the kinds of incidents of civil unrest that were the

subject of the Microsoft Teams chat. Under these circumstances, it is unreasonable to infer that

defendant was consciously aware that it was practically certain that his call to Worley would result

in someone contacting a public safety agency. Because the State failed to prove that defendant

knowingly caused the report of armed men to be transmitted to a public safety agency, we must

reverse defendant’s conviction.

¶ 22                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23   For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County.

¶ 24   Reversed.

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2023 IL App (2d) 220169

                          People v. Purta, 2023 IL App (2d) 220169

Decision Under Review:        Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County, No. 20-CF-
                              864; the Hon. Michael E. Coppedge, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                     Jed Stone, of Stone & Associates, Ltd., of Waukegan, for
for                           appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                     Patrick D. Kenneally, State’s Attorney, of Woodstock (Patrick
for                           Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and John G. Barrett, of State’s
Appellee:                     Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the
                              People.

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