Court Opinion

ID: 9955804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 15:04:55.621383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:22.458965
License: Public Domain

MODIFIED OPINION1

                          NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 126,233

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                  In the Interests of Y.B. and L.B.,
                                           Minor Children.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; RICHARD A. MACIAS, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Original opinion filed February 2, 2024. Modified opinion filed March 29, 2024. Affirmed.

       Rachel N. Gonzales, of Morris Laing Law Firm, of Wichita, for appellant natural mother.

       Kristi D. Allen, assistant district attorney, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., MALONE and BRUNS, JJ.

       PER CURIAM: A.S. appeals the Sedgwick County District Court's order
terminating her right to parent Y.B. and L.B., her two youngest children, and principally
argues the evidence does not support the finding she is unfit. The termination proceedings
were unusual in that the district court relied heavily on evidence showing A.S.'s
continuing inability to care for her eldest daughter, who was the subject of an earlier
action in which she relinquished her parental rights. Unusual, however, does not translate

1
 REPORTER'S NOTE: Opinion No. 126,233 was modified by the Court of Appeals in
response to the State's motion for rehearing or modification filed February 6, 2024.
Concurrences have been added.
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into erroneous. A.S. has failed to demonstrate any sound basis for reversing the district
court, and we, therefore, affirm the termination order.

       We issued an opinion affirming the district court on February 2, 2024, and the
State timely filed a motion for rehearing or modification on two legal points. A.S. did not
file a response. We address both points in this modified opinion and find them
unavailing. The outcome and our overall reasoning remain unchanged. Given the issues,
we find oral argument would be unhelpful.

                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The precipitating event in this case occurred in late March 2022, when Haysville
police conducted a welfare check on Y.B., who was then about three years old, and her
brother L.B., who was about a year younger. At the time, A.S. was residing with her
brother in a house they jointly inherited from their mother. A.S. left her brother to care
for the children while she was at work or otherwise out. The officers found the children
had been placed in a bedroom with the door fastened shut using a telephone charging
cord. A.S. was not at home. Later, A.S. and her brother each blamed the other for locking
the children in the room. The children indisputably had been confined all morning and
much of the afternoon. They had relieved themselves during that time without being
cleaned up and apparently had had nothing to eat or drink since being placed in the room.
The officers took Y.B. and L.B. into protective custody. They noted the bedroom was in
disarray, dirty, and smelled of urine and feces. Upon examination at a local hospital, both
children showed signs of continuing neglect: They had bruises in various stages of
healing, red marks, and scratches; severe diaper rash; and rashes on other parts of their
bodies.

       The district court ordered that Y.B. and L.B. be placed in temporary state custody.
Several days after Y.B. and L.B. were taken into protective custody, the district attorney's

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office filed petitions to have them declared children in need of care. The same day as
those petitions were filed, A.S. relinquished her parental rights to her daughter X.B. in a
child in need of care proceeding that had begun in 2019 shortly after X.B.'s birth. See
K.S.A. 38-2268(a) (during child in need of care proceeding, parent may voluntarily
relinquish parental rights). A.S. testified that Z.S., her oldest child, lives with his father;
Z.S. is not involved in these proceedings.

       The district court handled the proceedings involving Y.B. and L.B. in tandem, and
we have consolidated them for appeal. Y.B. and L.B.'s father relinquished his parental
rights to both children, so he neither participated in the termination hearing in the district
court nor joined in this appeal.

       The district court adjudicated Y.B. and L.B. to be children in need of care in late
May 2022, and given A.S.'s lackluster performance in meeting many of the substantial
objectives in the family reunification plan for X.B., the district court declined to order a
reunification plan for them. Rather, the district court directed the State to file motions for
termination of A.S.'s parental rights and directed St. Francis Ministries, the designated
social service agency, to provide A.S. with a 90-day "achievement" plan. We have little
reason to conclude there was much difference between the objectives of the achievement
plan and a typical reunification plan. The parties have not suggested otherwise. But the
timeframe would be unusually short for family reunification, as A.S. has pointed out.

       The State filed the motions to terminate in mid-June. The district court heard
evidence at the termination hearing over three days in mid-November and early
December. The district court made a bench ruling terminating A.S.'s parental rights in
mid-January 2023 and filed a corresponding journal entry of termination about two
months later.

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       At the termination hearing, the State called as witnesses A.S., case managers from
St. Francis Ministries assigned to work with A.S. in these cases and in X.B.'s case, two
other employees of the social service agency, and A.S.'s treating therapist. At the end of
the hearing, A.S. testified on her own behalf but called no other witnesses. The district
court admitted various documents into evidence, including status reports from St. Francis
Ministries and the therapist, and took judicial notice of the case file pertaining to X.B.
and the case file of a criminal prosecution of A.S. in which she pleaded guilty to two
counts of aggravated child endangerment based on the conditions that led to Y.B. and
L.B. being taken into protective custody.

       The evidenced presented during the termination hearing showed:

       • Based on home visits in the months before the law enforcement welfare check in
March 2022, case workers found A.S.'s residence cluttered with garbage, dirty dishes,
and rotting food, and the garage was littered with animal feces. On one visit, the case
worker also saw A.S. take Y.B. and L.B. out in cold weather without shoes and otherwise
underdressed for the conditions. (This evidence invites an inquiry as to why the social
service agency or the State did not then actively intervene to protect Y.B. and L.B. The
answer is neither relevant to the issues on appeal nor readily apparent from the record
before us.)

       • A.S. testified that she considered her brother to be an unreliable caregiver for
Y.B. and L.B. and wanted to hire a babysitter. But A.S. had purchased a comparatively
expensive car and had fallen behind in making the payments, so she doubled-up on those
payments and decided she had no money for childcare. Notwithstanding those financial
pressures, A.S. acknowledged she purchased four snakes and a reptile for about $1,000
several months before the termination hearing because she was depressed. The car was
repossessed shortly before the start of the hearing.

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       • After Y.B. and L.B. were taken into protective custody, A.S. moved in with her
boyfriend in a house his mother owned. The evidence indicates A.S. and her boyfriend
had a sometimes volatile relationship that may have involved instances of abusive
physical contact. A.S. financially supported her boyfriend who apparently was
chronically unemployed. According to A.S., her boyfriend's mother did not want Y.B.
and L.B. living in the house. So at the time of the termination hearing, A.S. had no
housing suitable for family reunification and no plan for securing such housing.

       • At the start of the termination hearing, A.S. testified she had not visited with
Y.B. or L.B. for about five months. She testified that she believed the district court had
entered a no-contact order in the criminal case filed against her that remained in effect
until October 13, 2022. But A.S. agreed she had not requested visits with the children
since then because she was trying to improve her mental outlook. She described herself
as "gloomy" and needing to get to "unbeing depressed." In that regard, A.S. said her first
priority was to get another car and then to resume visits with the children. Overall, A.S.
conceded she was not ready to assume custody of Y.B. and L.B.; she estimated she would
require another six months to get things in place for full reunification.

       • Although A.S. had been gainfully employed in the same job for an extended
period, the district court concluded she was not in a position to financially support Y.B.
and L.B. in a reliable way. The district court pointed to poor financial decisions A.S. had
made over the course of the cases involving each of her children—buying a car she
couldn't afford, spending a large amount on exotic pets, and continually supporting her
boyfriend when he appeared to be capable of working—and noted the social service
agency's unsuccessful efforts to get her to budget responsibly.

       In making its bench ruling on termination, the district court said it was relying on
the statutory grounds of unfitness the State had alleged in its motion to terminate, except
for the presumption under K.S.A. 38-2271(a)(3). The district court concluded the

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evidence did not establish the predicate fact supporting that presumption. The district
court recited the other grounds as parental unfitness under K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(2), (b)(3),
(b)(7), and (b)(8) and under K.S.A. 38-2269(c)(2) based on the children having been in
an extended out-of-home placement. In citing subsections (b)(3) and (c)(2), the district
court misspoke. The State actually requested termination under subsections (b)(4), and
(c)(3). The journal entry of termination reflected the correct subsection (b)(4), but also
included the incorrect subsection (c)(2) the district court orally identified. Six months
later, the district court filed an order correcting the journal entry reference from K.S.A.
38-2269(c)(2) to (c)(3).

       Relying heavily on evidence from the proceedings involving X.B.—showing that
A.S. had failed to make substantial progress on many components of the family
reunification plan crafted in that case over the course of several years—the district court
concluded the conditions of unfitness pertaining to Y.B. and L.B. were unlikely to change
in the foreseeable future. The district court also found that under the circumstances,
termination of A.S.'s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. A.S. has
appealed the ruling terminating her parental rights.

                                     LEGAL ANALYSIS

       On appeal, A.S. primarily challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the district court's statutory findings of unfitness and secondarily disputes the conclusion
that those conditions were unlikely to change in the near term. In taking up those issues,
we first outline pertinent legal principles governing the termination of parental rights and
then consider the evidentiary record in light of those principles.

                                              6
Outlining the Legal Principles

       A person has a constitutionally recognized right to a parental relationship with his
or her child. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L.
Ed. 2d 599 (1982); In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 697-98, 187 P.3d 594 (2008) (citing
Santosky). The right entails a protected liberty interest. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000) (substantive fundamental liberty
interest); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed.
1070 (1925) (recognizing "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control"). Accordingly, the State may extinguish the
legal bond between a parent and child only upon clear and convincing proof of parental
unfitness. K.S.A. 38-2269(a); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70; In re R.S., 50 Kan. App. 2d
1105, Syl. ¶ 1, 336 P.3d 903 (2014). The Legislature has enacted the Revised Kansas
Code for Care of Children, K.S.A. 38-2201 et seq., to codify processes for finding
children in need of care, for fostering family reunification, and for terminating parental
rights if those efforts fail.

       After a child has been adjudicated in need of care, a district court may terminate
parental rights "when the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is
unfit by reason of conduct or condition which renders the parent unable to care properly
for a child and the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future."
K.S.A. 38-2269(a). In considering a parent's unfitness, the district court may apply the
factors outlined in K.S.A. 38-2269(b) and, when the child has been removed from the
home for an extended time, the additional factors in K.S.A. 38-2269(c). In this case, the
district court drew from both of those sources to find A.S. unfit. A single factor may be
sufficient to establish unfitness. See K.S.A. 38-2269(f). A district court may
independently find a parent unfit based on any of 13 statutory presumptions in K.S.A. 38-
2271(a). As we have said, the district court expressly declined to rely on the one
presumption the State cited in its motion for termination.

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       In gauging the likelihood of change in the foreseeable future under K.S.A. 38-
2269(a), the courts should use "child time" as the measure. As the Code recognizes,
children experience the passage of time in a way that makes a month or a year seem
considerably longer than it would for an adult, and that difference in perception typically
tilts toward a prompt, permanent disposition. K.S.A. 38-2201(b)(4); In re M.B., 39 Kan.
App. 2d 31, 45, 176 P.3d 977 (2008); In re G.A.Y., No. 109,605, 2013 WL 5507639, at
*1 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion) ("'child time'" differs from "'adult time'" in
termination of parental rights proceedings "in the sense that a year . . . reflects a much
longer portion of a minor's life than an adult's").

       When the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a decision to terminate parental
rights is challenged, an appellate court will uphold the decision if, after reviewing the
record evidence in a light most favorable to the State as the prevailing party, the district
court's findings on unfitness and foreseeability of change are supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Stated another way, the appellate court must be persuaded that a
rational fact-finder could have found it highly probable that the circumstances warrant the
termination of parental rights. In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. at 705. In evaluating the record, the
appellate court does not weigh conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses,
or redetermine factual disputes. In re Adoption of B.B.M., 290 Kan. 236, 244, 224 P.3d
1168 (2010); In re M.H., 50 Kan. App. 2d 1162, 1170, 337 P.3d 711 (2014).

       The district court's best interests determination is governed by a less stringent
standard. As directed by K.S.A. 38-2269(g)(1), the district court should give "primary
consideration to the physical, mental and emotional health of the child" in making a best
interests finding. A district court decides best interests based on a preponderance of the
evidence. See In re R.S., 50 Kan. App. 2d at 1115-16. The decision essentially rests in the
district court's sound judicial discretion. 50 Kan. App. 2d at 1116. An appellate court
reviews those sorts of conclusions for abuse of discretion. A district court exceeds that

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broad latitude if it rules in a way no reasonable judicial officer would under the
circumstances, if it ignores controlling facts or relies on unproven factual representations,
or if it acts outside the legal framework appropriate to the issue. See Biglow v. Eidenberg,
308 Kan 873, 893, 424 P.3d 515 (2018); In re M.S., 56 Kan. App. 2d 1247, 1264, 447
P.3d 994 (2019).

Applying the Legal Principles

       As this court has recognized, some of the statutory grounds for unfitness overlap.
In re A.T., No. 125,654, 2023 WL 3667581, at *6 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished
opinion) ("As we often point out, the statutory grounds of unfitness tend to overlap and
the evidence supporting one often will support others."); In re B.C., No. 125,199, 2022
WL 18046481, at *4 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion). We consider the district
court's findings of unfitness in that light.

       The district court found A.S. unfit under both K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(2), applicable
when a parent directs "conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally or sexually
cruel or abusive nature," and K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(4), applicable when a parent acts in a
way causing "physical, mental or emotional abuse or neglect or sexual abuse of a child."
The two subsections look at forms of parental behavior having largely the same kinds of
detrimental effects on a child. Subsection (b)(2) finds unfitness based on a parent's
"conduct," strongly suggesting intentional actions that harm a child in one of the
proscribed ways. Subsection (b)(4) entails the same sort of actions in basing unfitness on
abuse, but it goes further than subsection (b)(2) by including "neglect," thereby covering
inaction or inadvertent rather than deliberate actions injurious to a child.

       The record here arguably does not depict A.S. as engaging in deliberately cruel or
abusive conduct aimed at Y.B. and L.B. For example, she did not beat the children or
purposefully withhold food from them for extended periods as a misguided means of

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punishment. But A.S. plainly exposed the children to an unhealthful home environment
for some time and either left them in the care of an adult who confined them in a room
without food or facilities for much of the day or did so herself in the absence of a suitable
caregiver. Either way, A.S. was neglectful of Y.B. and L.B.'s basic physical needs in a
manner that rendered her unfit. Her behavior similarly would have been neglectful of the
children's emotional need for a protective and nurturing environment. Accordingly, there
was sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding of unfitness under K.S.A.
38-2269(b)(4).

       We may similarly consider the district court's findings of unfitness under K.S.A.
38-2269(b)(7) and (b)(8) in tandem. Under subsection (b)(7), a parent may be found unfit
when a social service agency's "reasonable efforts" have failed to "rehabilitate the
family." And under subsection (b)(8), unfitness may be based on a parent's "lack of
effort" to change his or her behavior or circumstances "to meet the needs of the child."
Frequently, an agency is unable to reunify a family precisely because either parent or
both will not modify behaviors, such as substance abuse, or conditions, such as unsafe
housing, that effectively preclude restoration. That common scenario constitutes
"unfitness" as described in both subsection (b)(7) and subsection (b)(8).

       Here, A.S. never provided a suitable residence for herself and Y.B. and L.B.,
despite the social service agency's efforts to assist her. Suitable housing requires both
adequate space for the children and some degree of stability, as evidenced by the parent's
ongoing possession of the premises in contrast to living with roommates or significant
others at their sufferance. See In re M.S., 56 Kan. App. 2d at 1260-61 (After being
evicted from her apartment, mother "bounced between" living with her own mother and
grandmother and, therefore, lacked sufficient housing for family reunification with her
two children.); In re A.T., 2023 WL 3667581, at *6 (residence of sufficient size necessary
for reunification); In re A.E., No. 117,585, 2017 WL 5616743, at *5 (Kan. App. 2017)
(unpublished opinion) (parent must demonstrate some history of stable housing). The

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housing, likewise, must be safe, meaning the premises themselves are relatively clean and
free of physical hazards and no regular occupant poses a danger to the children. See In re
A.T., 2023 WL 3667581, at *6 (residence unsafe because mother permitted adult half-
brother of minor children to live there even though he directed violent outbursts or
physically abusive conduct toward her and some of his half-siblings); In re J.E., No.
119,943, 2019 WL 1087037, at *3, *7 (Kan. App. 2019) (housing must be reasonably
clean and free of insect or rodent infestation). The evidence established the house A.S.
owned with her brother was unsafe and, thus, unsuitable for Y.B. and L.B. And the house
she shared with her boyfriend was inadequate because the owner (boyfriend's mother)
would not permit the children to live there.

       At the termination hearing, A.S. admitted to having no tangible plan for obtaining
suitable housing, prompting her to suggest she needed more time to regain custody of
Y.B. and L.B. The hearing evidence showed that when law enforcement officers took
X.B. into protective custody in April 2019, the house the child shared with A.S. was
filthy and had unsecured objects that posed a physical danger to her, given her young age.
Those circumstance replicated some of the conditions that prompted officers to remove
Y.B. and L.B. from A.S.'s home almost three years later.

       The chronology shows that A.S. could not or would not improve her children's
home environment. After A.S.'s two youngest children were temporarily placed with the
State, she did not secure appropriate housing and simply squandered the time leading up
to the termination hearing. We find no fault with the district court's conclusion that the
evidence showed A.S. failed to change her circumstances to accommodate the needs of
the children for suitable housing and the social service agency's reasonable efforts in that
respect were unsuccessful. Given the central importance of adequate housing to family
reunification, the district court properly found A.S. to be unfit under K.S.A. 38-
2269(b)(7) and (b)(8). See In re A.T., 2023 WL 3667581, at *6 (characterizing "suitable
housing" as "integral component[]" of family reunification plan).

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       The hearing record similarly shows that A.S. appeared to be unable to adjust her
circumstances to meet the financial needs of a reunified family coupled with a
complementary failure of the social service agency to effect rehabilitation. Typically, a
parent's financial instability is the result of irregular employment or continuing
unemployment, sometimes tied to other conditions like drug abuse or mental health
issues. Here, however, A.S. had a regular job with good wages. But she was unable to
prioritize her spending and to budget to meet the needs of her children. As the district
court found, A.S. bought a high-priced car and fell behind on the payments, limiting her
financial resources for childcare or acquiring better housing. She also spent a large
amount on new pets in the months leading up to the termination hearing, reflecting what
the district court found to be a poor set of priorities. And A.S. continually subsidized her
unemployed boyfriend. So A.S. regularly made bad choices in spending her money,
leaving her with insufficient resources to adequately care for her children. That, too,
entails unfitness under K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(8) and likely (b)(7).

       In sum, we are persuaded that the evidence presented at the termination hearing,
viewed in the State's favor, could have convinced a rational fact-finder it was highly
probable A.S. was unfit under K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(4), (b)(7), and (b)(8). That is, the State
presented clear and convincing evidence of unfitness on those statutory grounds. The
evidence may fall short of establishing the requite deliberateness contemplated in K.S.A.
38-2269(b)(2), but any failure of proof on that ground would not change the ultimate
outcome.

       For the same reason, we need not formally address the district court's finding of
unfitness based on K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(9), incorporating subsection (c)(3). In
combination, those provisions permit a district court to find a parent unfit for failing to
carry out a reasonable plan for family reunification when the child has been in State
custody and an out-of-home placement for 15 of the most recent 22 months, counting

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from 60 days after removal of the child from the home. When a district court has
removed a child from the home and placed the child in temporary State custody, the time
period in subsection (b)(9) must be satisfied to consider one of the circumstances in
subsection (c) as a ground for parental unfitness. In its motion for reconsideration, the
State contends the time period is not a necessary condition for finding unfitness under
subsection (c). We disagree. Subsection (b)(9) specifically refers to children placed in
State custody. The State's suggested reading would render subsection (b)(9) and its time
period statutorily superfluous. State v. Van Hoet, 277 Kan. 815, 826-27, 89 P.3d 606
(2004) ("The court should avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that part of it
becomes surplusage.").

       Here, Y.B. and L.B. were removed from A.S.'s home and custody in late March
2022, and placed in State custody. The termination hearing began in mid-November
2022. It is not readily apparent how the 15-month period for out-of-home placement
would apply to Y.B. and L.B., so unfitness could not be shown as a matter of law under
K.S.A. 38-2269(c)(3). Although we assume the finding to be mistaken, our assumption
makes no difference in the disposition of A.S.'s appeal. The circumstances here do not
require us to consider subsection (c) when a child is not in temporary State custody, and
we offer no suggestion on how it should then be applied.

       On appeal, A.S. offers a short suggestion that the evidence fails to show any
unfitness on her part was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. A.S. rests her
position on the district court's decision to move promptly to a termination hearing as to
Y.B. and L.B. and directing she be given only 90 days to accomplish an achievement
plan. The argument, such as it is, ignores the hearing evidence related to the child in need
of care proceeding involving X.B. A.S. does not dispute the admission of that evidence,
and we see don't see any relevance or foundation problems with the testimony from the
case manager involved in that proceeding and the associated records.

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       As we have already explained, X.B.'s case ended after about three years when A.S.
voluntarily relinquished her parental rights, just as the cases involving Y.B. and L.B.
were filed in March 2022. A.S.'s documented lack of progress in X.B.'s case, particularly
pertinent here in failing to secure suitable housing, strongly supports the district court's
conclusion that more time would not have salvaged the family. By the time of the
termination hearing, A.S. had roughly three and a half years to establish an adequate
home for herself and the children. Not to put too fine a point on it, she failed miserably at
that essential task. Nothing in the evidence suggested some remarkable turnaround was in
the offing or, really, at any foreseeable point even on the distant horizon.

       Taking account of child time, as we and the district court must, and the young ages
of Y.B. and L.B., we find no error in the district court's conclusion on this component of
the termination standard. The conclusion is buttressed by, though not dependent upon,
A.S.'s persistent financial difficulties directly traceable to her apparent inability to budget
and otherwise responsibly handle her income notwithstanding the continuing efforts of
the social service agency.

       Although on appeal A.S. had not disputed the district court's finding that the best
interests of Y.B. and L.B. support termination, we turn briefly to the issue in the interest
of completeness. We consider a district court's best interests ruling under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard. What we have outlined to this point foretells a finding of no
abuse of that broad judicial authority. The conditions in which Y.B. and L.B. were living
in March 2022—and presumably for much, if not all, of their short lives given the
circumstances prompting the State's intervention with their older sister in 2019—could be
fairly characterized as unhealthful to the point of being injurious to their well-being. The
specific circumstances prompting their removal from the house likewise can be fairly
characterized as physically and emotionally damaging.

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       Taken favorably to the State, the evidence shows A.S. persistently kept Y.B. and
L.B. in conditions so far removed from a safe, nurturing home environment as to be, at
best, deplorable and, more accurately, shocking. And the district court had every reason
to conclude A.S. simply could not or would not grasp what she needed to do to provide
an appropriate home for her children. Given the centrality of suitable housing to the
welfare of children generally and the overarching legislative policy making "the ongoing
physical, mental and emotional needs of the child decisive considerations in proceedings"
under the Code, we cannot say the district court stepped outside its broad discretion in
concluding termination of A.S.'s parental rights served the best interests of Y.B. and L.B.
K.S.A. 38-2201(b)(3) (outlining public policies behind Code).

       In closing out our review, we mention that A.S. has included an argument in her
brief that the district court erred in finding her unfit based on the presumption in K.S.A.
38-2271(a)(3). The point is inapposite. While the State raised the presumption as a
ground for unfitness in its motion to terminate A.S.'s parental rights, the district court
explicitly rejected that ground in its bench ruling, and the journal entry of termination
does not mention the presumption in laying out the statutory bases for termination.

       In its motion for reconsideration, the State submits the presumption would apply
in this case. We find the argument unpersuasive. The presumption of unfitness is
triggered if a parent has had a child adjudicated as being in need of care "on two or more
prior occasions" on particular grounds identified in K.S.A. 38-2202(d). K.S.A. 38-
2271(a)(3). The State argues that the adjudications of Y.B. and L.B. in these cases count
along with the adjudication of X.B. in the earlier case to satisfy the factual predicate of
two "prior" adjudications. But there must be an adjudication of the child as being in need
of care in every case that reaches a termination hearing. If the district court were to find
no basis for adjudication, it would be obligated to dismiss the case at that stage. K.S.A.
38-2251(a). So the State essentially argues that an adjudication in one earlier case will
support the presumption in K.S.A. 38-2271(a)(3).

                                              15
       The argument does considerable linguistic violence to the meaning of "prior." See
Webster's New World College Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 2016) (defining "prior" as
"earlier; previous; former"); Black's Law Dictionary 1444 (11th ed. 2019) (defining
"prior" as "preceding in time"). Giving the phrase "prior occasions" its common meaning
would naturally refer to occasions before this one—that is, "previous" ones. The statutory
reference, then, entails two adjudications in cases preceding the adjudication made in the
pending child in need of care case. The State's contrary position collides with the settled
canon that we give the words of a statute their common or usual meanings unless the
Legislature has provided special definitions. See Midwest Crane & Rigging, LLC v.
Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 306 Kan. 845, 851, 397 P.3d 1205 (2017) (absent statutory
definition, words in statute should be given their usual dictionary meaning).

       Affirmed.

                                            ***

       MALONE, J., concurring: I concur with the result reached in the modified opinion
that the district court's termination of A.S.'s parental rights to Y.B. and L.B. should be
upheld. But I disagree with the majority's interpretation of the interrelationship between
the grounds for parental unfitness set forth in K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(9) and K.S.A. 38-
2269(c). More specifically, I disagree with the majority's finding that "[w]hen a district
court has removed a child from the home and placed the child in temporary State custody,
the time period in subsection (b)(9) must be satisfied to consider one of the circumstances
in subsection (c) as a ground for parental unfitness." Slip op. at 12. Based on the plain
statutory language, I do not believe there is a need for out-of-home placement for 15 of
the most recent 22 months for the district court to make a finding of unfitness under one
of the factors in subsection (c). The grounds for unfitness under subsection (c) apply

                                             16
when a child is not in the physical custody of a parent. That prerequisite distinguishes the
grounds for unfitness under subsection (c) with the grounds under subsection (b).

       This interpretation does not render K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(9) superfluous. K.S.A. 38-
2269(b)(9) and K.S.A. 38-2269(c) are separate factors for a district court to consider in
determining whether a parent is unfit. There can never be a finding of unfitness under
subsection (b)(9) unless one of the factors under subsection (c) applies. But the converse
is not true; there can be a finding of unfitness under one of the factors in subsection (c)
without a finding under subsection (b)(9). Proof under subsection (b)(9) is more
strenuous because it includes the additional requirement of state custody with out-of-
home placement for 15 of the most recent 22 months. This explains why the State did not
seek to terminate A.S.'s parental rights under subsection (b)(9).

       The legislative history of K.S.A. 38-2269 supports this interpretation of the two
subsections. Language substantially the same as K.S.A. 38-2269(c) has been on the books
since 1982. See L. 1982, ch. 182, § 54. Language substantially similar to K.S.A. 38-
2269(b)(9) was not added to the statute until 2008. See L. 2008, ch. 169, § 19. The fact
that subsection (c) was enacted 26 years before subsection (b)(9) negates any
interpretation that the time period in subsection (b)(9) must be satisfied to consider one of
the circumstance in subsection (c) as a grounds for parental unfitness.

       K.S.A. 38-2269(b) and (c) both set forth factors the court shall consider in
determining parental unfitness. The explanatory language in the two subsections is nearly
the same and does not have a significant effect on the interpretation. Subsection (b)
includes a nonexclusive list of factors the court shall consider, if applicable, in making a
determination of unfitness. Subsection (c) begins by stating: "In addition to the foregoing
. . . ." The nonexclusive factors included in subsection (c) are additional grounds the court
shall consider in determining unfitness; but these factors only apply when a child is not in

                                             17
the physical custody of a parent. That is the distinction between subsection (b) and
subsection (c).

       Here, the district court found A.S. unfit under K.S.A. 38-2269(c)(3) for failure to
carry out a reasonable plan approved by the court directed toward the integration of the
child into the parental home. This finding was supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Even though A.S. was only given a 90-day "achievement" plan to reintegrate
with Y.B. and L.B., the district court properly considered A.S.'s unsuccessful efforts
toward reintegration in X.B.'s case that had extended for about 3 years before A.S.
voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to X.B. And even though a motion for
termination was filed around 90 days after Y.B. and L.B were removed from the home,
the hearing did not begin for another 5 months, so A.S. had more than 90 days to work
toward reintegration. During this time, A.S. was involved in a volatile relationship with
her boyfriend, was making poor financial decisions, and was making no effort to
overcome her depression. At the time of the termination hearing, A.S. had no housing
suitable for family reunification and no plan for securing such housing. The district court
did not err in finding A.S. unfit to parent her children under K.S.A. 38-2269(c)(3).

                                           ***

       ATCHESON, J., concurring: The State's motion for reconsideration has prompted a
discussion of the interplay of subsections (b) and (c) of K.S.A. 38-2269 governing
parental unfitness under the Revised Kansas Code for Care of Children, K.S.A. 38-2201
et seq.—an exercise that has no effect on the outcome here affirming the Sedgwick
County District Court's decision to terminate A.S.'s parental rights. Because the
relationship between the conditions listed in subsection (c) and the grounds for unfitness
listed in subsection (b) is a recurring one, I offer my take on how they should be read and
pose a counterpoint to Judge Malone's concurring opinion.

                                            18
       The State sought to terminate A.S.'s parental rights for several reasons, including a
claim that she was unfit because she had failed to carry out a reasonable plan for family
reintegration as listed in subsection (c)(3). We affirmed the district court's finding of
unfitness on other grounds and its ultimate decision to terminate A.S.'s rights. The
majority held that when children have been removed from the home and placed in
temporary State custody—as happened here—the circumstances identified in subsection
(c) may be considered grounds for unfitness only if the time constraints in subsection
(b)(9) have been satisfied. And the record clearly established A.S.'s children had not been
in an out-of-home placement for 15 of the 22 months preceding the termination hearing
counting from 60 days after their removal from the home, as required under subsection
(b)(9). We, therefore, simply declined to consider that part of the district court's decision
in affirming the termination order and specifically chose not to discuss how the two
subsections may interact when a child is neither in the physical custody of a parent nor in
the temporary custody of the State.

       I agree with the majority opinion, as far as it goes. That is, the time period in
subsection (b)(9) is a necessary condition to find a parent unfit based on any of the
criteria in subsection (c) when a child has been placed in temporary State custody. And
we do not need to say any more given the facts of this case. Judge Malone disagrees with
the first point, and to explain why, he delves into the second. Essentially, Judge Malone
concludes the criteria in subsection (c) are freestanding grounds establishing parental
unfitness that a district court can consider at any time. Although K.S.A. 38-2269 is hardly
a model of statutory drafting, I read the language otherwise: The four circumstances in
subsection (c) establish parental unfitness only when a child has been placed in State
custody for the time period defined in subsection (b)(9). Otherwise, the district court may
consider those circumstances to augment or enhance the grounds of unfitness identified
as such in K.S.A. 38-2269(b). I come to that conclusion for these reasons:

                                              19
       • To terminate a parent's rights under K.S.A. 38-2269(a), a district court must find
the parent "unfit" and that the condition of unfitness is "unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future." In K.S.A. 38-2269(b), the Legislature has identified nine specific
grounds of unfitness with this introductory language: "In making a determination of
unfitness the [district] court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following, if
applicable." So those grounds are sufficient to find unfitness, although other
circumstances may be considered. Similarly, in K.S.A. 38-2269(d), the Legislature
directed that "[a] finding of unfitness may be made" when a parent has abandoned a
child, has statutorily relinquished his or her parental rights, or cannot be identified despite
"diligent searching." And in K.S.A. 38-2269(e), the Legislature provided that "a finding
of unfitness may be made" in particular circumstances involving sexual abuse.

       But the descriptive language in K.S.A. 38-2269(c) is different. The Legislature
instructed that "'[i]n addition to the foregoing, when a child is not in the physical custody
of a parent, the court, shall consider, but is not limited to the following:" and lists four
circumstances. Subsection (c) does not direct that a finding of unfitness may be based on
any of those circumstances. In reading the statute, we should give the difference in
language and the omission of an explicit reference to findings of unfitness in subsection
(c) some meaning unless doing so would be wholly unworkable within the statutory
scheme or otherwise patently unreasonable. Here, it is neither. See Law v. Siegel, 571
U.S. 415, 422, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 188 L. Ed. 2d 146 (2014) (applying "'"normal rule of
statutory construction"'" recognizing that "words repeated in different parts of the same
statute generally have the same meaning"); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23,
104 S. Ct. 296, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1983) (use of different terms within statute demonstrates
legislative intent to convey different meanings); State v. James, 301 Kan. 898, 903, 349
P.3d 457 (2015) (court should construe statute "to avoid unreasonable or absurd results");
Casco v. Armour Swift-Eckrich, 283 Kan. 508, Syl. ¶ 6, 154 P.3d 494 (2007) (judicial
reading should avoid adding something to statutory language or negating something
already there).

                                               20
       Moreover, had the Legislature intended the enumerated paragraphs in subsection
(c) to be treated as sufficient grounds for unfitness comparable to those in subsection (b),
that's where they would be. Subsection (b) simply would be longer, and there would be
no separate subsection (c). The Legislature's avoidance of an obvious and logical way to
accomplish that result strongly suggests some other intent and purpose in fashioning
subsection (c) as it did. We would, in effect, be rewriting the statute if we were to
functionally merge subsection (c) into subsection (b) by treating them as legally
equivalent.

       • If the criteria in subsection (c) were freestanding grounds for finding a parent
unfit, then subsection (b)(9) would serve no independent purpose, since subsection (b)(9)
incorporates subsection (c) by reference and adds a requirement that the child have been
in temporary State custody and placed with neither parent for 15 of the preceding 22
months leading up to the termination hearing. So proof of a basis for unfitness under
subsection (b)(9) would necessarily require proof of a basis under subsection (c). Were
that reading the right one, subsection (b)(9) would add nothing to the statutory outline of
grounds of unfitness, and it would seem to typify a superfluous or vestigial statutory
provision. We, of course, should avoid rendering statutory language a nullity if at all
possible—a canon that ought to be redoubled when a proposed reading would negate an
entire section of a statute rather than a word or phrase. See Fisher v. Kansas Crime
Victims Comp. Bd., 280 Kan. 601, 613, 124 P.3d 74 (2005); State v. Van Hoet, 277 Kan.
815, 826-27, 89 P.3d 606 (2004) ("The court should avoid interpreting a statute in such a
way that part of it becomes surplusage."); Aql v. Peterson, No. 125,038, 2023 WL
3408761, at *4 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 317 Kan. 843 (2023).

       The Legislature added subsection (b)(9) to K.S.A. 38-2269 in 2008, although the
subsection then referred to a child "in extended out of home placement"—a defined term
meaning in temporary State custody for 15 of the most recent 22 months. See K.S.A.

                                             21
2023 Supp. 38-2202(n) (defining extended out of home placement). The subsection was
amended in 2018 to replace the defined term with the definition itself, a nonsubstantive
change. In all other respects, K.S.A. 38-2269 has remained the same since the revised
code was enacted in 2006. It seems improbable the Legislature intended to amend K.S.A.
38-2269(b) in a way that functionally did nothing when it adopted subsection (b)(9). And
we would be remiss if we came to that conclusion unless we had no other choice. Here,
we do.

         • What, then, does K.S.A. 38-2269(c) do? A district court may find a parent unfit if
the State proves one or more of the grounds of unfitness in K.S.A. 38-2269(b). But the
district court need not do so. K.S.A. 38-2269(b) ("In making a determination of unfitness,
the court shall consider . . . the following:"). In other words, proof of a statutory ground
permits a finding of unfitness but does not mandate the finding. Subsection (c) identifies
circumstances a district court should consider in making the permissive determination of
unfitness after the State has otherwise established one or more of the grounds in
subsection (b). Those circumstances become an extra weight on the side of the scales
favoring a finding of unfitness. By their nature, they logically contribute to a finding of
unfitness.

         For example, a parent may be found unfit based on a felony conviction and
imprisonment under K.S.A. 38-2269(b)(5). But a district court could conclude no finding
of unfitness should be made because the period of incarceration would be comparatively
short and the parent had already established a sound and continuing relationship with the
child. See In re M.H., 50 Kan. App. 2d 1162, 1172, 337 P.3d 711 (2014); see also In re
T.H., 60 Kan. App. 2d 536, 548, 494 P.3d 851 (2021). One of the criteria in K.S.A. 38-
2269(c) is the parent's "failure to maintain regular visitation, contact[,] or communication
with the child." K.S.A. 38-2269(c)(2). So a district court could weigh the incarcerated
parent's failure to communicate with the child in any of the ways the prison permitted.
Depending on the circumstances, that failure might be enough to tip the case to a finding

                                              22
of unfitness under subsection (b)(5). See In re A.P., No. 121,537, 2020 WL 499816, at
*4-5 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion); In re K.O., No. 116,704, 2017 WL
2403304, at *4-5 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion).

       In short, K.S.A. 38-2269(c) serves a useful purpose in identifying circumstances
that would tend to bolster a permissive finding of unfitness under K.S.A. 38-2269(b) and,
thus, in channeling the district court toward criteria the Legislature viewed as especially
worthy of consideration for that purpose. I would impute that function to subsection (c)
rather than treating the criteria as independent grounds supporting a finding of unfitness
in the first instance—a function that would leave subsection (b)(9) with no useful
purpose.

                                           ***

       BRUNS, J., concurring: I concur in the result based on the rationale expressed in
the majority opinion.

                                             23