Court Opinion

ID: 9957402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 15:07:46.230408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:18.587234
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                  CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                          APRIL 4, 2024
                                                                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                 2024 ND 60

State of North Dakota,                                 Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Cory R. Henke,                                      Defendant and Appellant

                                No. 20230302

Appeal from the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District,
the Honorable Donovan J. Foughty, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Beau M. Cummings, State’s Attorney, Devils Lake, ND, for plaintiff and
appellee; submitted on brief.

Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.
                               State v. Henke
                                No. 20230302

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Cory Henke appeals from a jury verdict, a district court judgment, and
sentencing for corruption or solicitation of a minor. Henke argues he was
convicted of a non-cognizable offense and received an illegal sentence. We
affirm.

                                       I

[¶2] On the evening of September 2, 2021, M.B., a 15-year-old, left her home
and joined Henke, a 50-year-old, in his pickup. After M.B. left with Henke, a
parent pursued but was unable to apprehend them.

[¶3] Henke and M.B. pulled into a field where Henke gave M.B. the choice of
using drugs or having sex. M.B. chose to use drugs. After taking drugs, Henke
and M.B. went to Henke’s home in Devils Lake where the police recognized the
pickup and arrested Henke.

[¶4] The State charged Henke with “Corruption/Solicitation of a Minor” aged
15 when the defendant is at least 22 years old, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05(2), and
luring a minor by computer. On August 17, 2023, the district court convened a
two-day jury trial. The jury found Henke guilty of “Corruption/Solicitation of a
Minor” aged 15 when the defendant is at least 22 years old, but did not find
him guilty of luring a minor by computer.

[¶5] The district court sentenced Henke to five years imprisonment with
credit for 714 days served, and the balance suspended. The court ordered
probation to begin when the Department of Corrections released Henke after
a three-year sentence on unrelated charges. The court stated, “[a]nd my
expectation is that, once you’re off parole, you’re going to be on supervised
probation on this case for five years.” The court noted that it wanted “the most
time hanging over [Henke’s] head, and I want [Henke] to be on supervised
probation for five years from [his] date of release from parole.” Henke’s
unrelated charges were possession of a controlled substance with the intent to

                                       1
deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. Both are felonies and both
occurred in 2021. Henke received his sentence for these charges before
December 2021 and served 714 days of his sentence by the end of trial for the
solicitation of a minor. Henke timely appealed.

                                       II

[¶6] Henke argues an improper jury instruction was used, creating an
obvious error that resulted in convicting Henke of a non-cognizable crime.
Henke requested that the district court give the jury instruction for solicitation
of a minor. The district court used Henke’s requested instruction. “It is a
cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a
ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.” State v. Houle, 2022 ND
96, ¶ 7, 974 N.W.2d 401. Under the invited error doctrine, a “defendant [cannot]
sit by and invite the error in the hope that if he did not prevail the first time,
he would prevail upon appellate review of invited error.” State v. Bird, 2015
ND 41, ¶ 24, 858 N.W.2d 642.

[¶7] “The ‘invited error doctrine’ applies unless a constitutional error is
structural, but few constitutional errors qualify as structural.” Houle, 2022 ND
96, ¶ 7; see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 263 (2010) (list of
recognized structural errors including an erroneous reasonable doubt
instruction). Obvious error analysis “does not apply to errors waived through
the doctrine of invited error.” State v. Yoney, 2020 ND 118, ¶ 12, 943 N.W.2d
791; N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b).

[¶8] Henke’s claimed error is not structural. But the error was invited
because he requested use of the instruction and did not thereafter object or
attempt to stop the district court from using his requested jury instruction. We
therefore decline to further review whether Henke’s requested instruction
erroneously advised the jury on the law.

                                      III

[¶9] Henke argues the district court imposed an illegal sentence because the
court ordered his probation to begin after the DOCR released him from custody

                                        2
on the non-related charges. Henke further alleges the court’s order for
probation created ambiguity by failing to say when his probation would begin.
He argues this ambiguity requires that his probation start on the date the
court sentenced him.

                                       A

[¶10] Henke cites us to N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a)(1), which provides, “The
sentencing court shall correct an illegal sentence at any time.” However, Henke
did not make a Rule 35 motion in the district court, and we do not have the
district court’s ruling on such a motion. Under these circumstances, “Our
review of the sentence is generally confined to whether the court acted within
the statutory sentencing limits.” State v. Murchison, 2004 ND 193, ¶ 15, 687
N.W.2d 725. “When a question arises concerning the commencement of
probation, the controlling consideration is the intention of the trial court
imposing the sentence.” Dailey v. State, 2011 ND 223, ¶ 9, 807 N.W.2d 225
(cleaned up).

[¶11] Under our cases, a sentence becomes illegal when the sentence is no
longer within the statutory limits or the sentence is unable to be served within
the statutory limits. State v. Glasser, 2021 ND 60, ¶ 7, 956 N.W.2d 373 (list of
illegal sentences recognized); Dailey, 2011 ND 223, ¶ 11. Henke claims the lack
of a date certain for commencement of his probation violates the law. Henke
relies on our decision in Dailey to mean release from incarceration must be
related to the crime being sentenced. “If it did not, there would be no way to
ensure that probation was not imposed past the maximums allowed.” Like the
dissent in Dailey, Henke reads that majority opinion too narrowly.

[¶12] The problem with the district court’s sentence in Dailey was not that
more than one crime was or might have been involved, as suggested by the
dissent. The problem was that under the math used by the district court, the
period of incarceration and the start and duration of probation made the
resulting sentence illegally long. 2011 ND 223, ¶ 11. Therefore, we held in
Dailey that “probation for the DUI conviction would not and could not be

                                       3
completed within five years of Dailey completing his 18 month period of
incarceration for DUI.” Id.

[¶13] Here, Henke’s sentence for solicitation of a minor is a class C felony, the
punishment for which includes a mandatory minimum probation of five years
and a maximum probation of ten years. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-06.1(4). The district
court sentenced Henke to five years of probation to begin when he was released
on parole for unrelated crimes. Thus, under Glasser and the facts of this case
as currently known, Henke’s sentence is legal because he has not established
he will be on probation for less than five years or more than ten years after
release from custody for solicitation of a minor.

[¶14] The next question is whether Henke will be able to serve his sentence
within statutory limits. The district court ordered Henke’s probation to begin
when he is released from the DOCR on his unrelated crimes. Henke’s unrelated
crimes included two felony charges: possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. It is unknown what
level of felonies he was charged with, but Henke received a three-year sentence
for these charges and spent 714 days incarcerated before he was sentenced for
solicitation of a minor. Thus, mathematically, Henke’s sentence for the
unrelated charges would delay his probation by 381 days. His probation would
end six years and 18 days after he was sentenced, which is well within ten
years. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-06.1(4). Thus, Henke’s sentence is legal under Dailey.
2011 ND 223, ¶ 11 (probation could not be completed within five years of
completing an 18-month sentence).

[¶15] The fact that Henke’s sentence could become impermissibly long if parole
was extended, he breaks the law, or a litany of other reasons for not being
released, does not change the present state of the record. Under the record as
we have it, his sentence is within statutory limits. Therefore, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Henke to probation for five years
commencing on his release from incarceration on the unrelated charges.

                                        4
                                       B

[¶16] Henke alleges the district court’s sentencing order is ambiguous because
it is unclear when probation begins. He alleges the ambiguity must result in
his probation starting when the court sentenced him. Henke argues the
sentencing in State v. Berger is comparable. 2002 ND 143, 651 N.W.2d 639. We
disagree.

[¶17] A sentence can become illegal when it “is ambiguous with respect to the
time and manner in which it is to be served.” Glasser, 2021 ND 60, ¶ 7. This
Court has held the conditions of probation are “to be strictly construed in favor
of the offender,” which mandates a sentence be “certain, definite, or free from
ambiguity, and serious uncertainty in the sentence should be resolved in favor
of liberty.” Berger, 2002 ND 143, ¶ 7. “If a condition of probation is capable of
two reasonable constructions, we will construe the condition in favor of the
offender.” Id. But when “a question arises concerning the commencement of
probation, the controlling consideration is the intention of the trial court
imposing the sentence; that intent is to be found in the language employed to
create the probationary status.” Id. at ¶ 10.

[¶18] The district court sentenced Henke to five years with credit for 714 days,
and the balance suspended. The court told Henke that his probation would
begin when he was released from the DOCR on unrelated charges. The court
clarified Henke’s sentence by stating, “my expectation is that, once you’re off
parole, you’re going to be on supervised probation on this case for five years.”
The judge told Henke he wanted “the most time hanging over your head, and
I want you to be on supervised probation for five years from your date of release
from parole.” Henke would have been on parole in January 2023 if the
solicitation of a minor charge was not pending.

[¶19] The district court’s intent for Henke’s sentence and the sentence itself is
not ambiguous, and therefore this case is not like the situation in Berger. In
Berger, the defendant was given conflicting directions about when to report for
probation. 2002 ND 143, ¶ 11. The court ordered probation to commence on
August 1. Brief of Appellant at 7, Berger, 2002 ND 143 (No. 9). The court
provided Berger with a probation card stating he needed to contact his

                                       5
probation officer no later than the next business day, which was July 11, 2000.
Id. at 7-8. The court also told Berger his probation conditions required him to
report one day after release from incarceration. Id. at 8. Berger had several
reasonable interpretations about the starting date for his probation. Id. at 7-8.
This Court held Berger’s probation began on the day the court sentenced him
because the district court’s intent was ambiguous when it sentenced him.
Berger, at ¶ 12.

[¶20] Here, the district court’s intent for the sentence and the sentence itself
is clear because it specified that probation started the day Henke was released
from the DOCR on the non-related convictions. This is not ambiguous for
reasons including that Henke and the court discussed the unrelated charges,
noting these charges had a three-year sentence, and Henke would have been
released on parole in January 2023, but for the pending charge for soliciting a
minor. While we agree the district court could have been clearer by choosing a
specific date, a reasonable interpretation exists for when Henke would be
released, and thus, when his probation would begin. Under the facts of this
case, the sentence is not ambiguous and the court did not abuse its discretion
sentencing Henke.

                                      IV

[¶21] The district court did not abuse its discretion because Henke’s probation
was within the statutory limits. Moreover, the starting date of Henke’s
probation was not ambiguous. We decline to review the issue of jury
instructions because it was an invited error. The district court’s judgment is
affirmed.

[¶22] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                                       6