Court Opinion

ID: 9497115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:43:35.00891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:00.561630
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority’s opinion concludes that a particular offense, in this case embezzlement, may be treated as either a continuing offense or a non-continuing offense for statute of limitations purposes, depending on how the crime is carried out. See ante at 567-68. Because I do not believe this conclusion is consistent with the teachings of Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970), I respectfully dissent. Toussie begins with a word of caution from the Supreme Court: “the doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied in only limited circumstances.” Id. at 115, 90 S.Ct. 858. The Court held that an offense should be considered continuing for statute of limitations purposes only if “[1] the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or [2] the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.” Id. The crime charged in Toussie, failure to register for the draft, was not a continuing offense because (1) “there is no language in [the registration] Act that clearly contemplates a prolonged course of conduct,” id. at 120, 90 S.Ct. 858, and (2) “[t]here is also nothing inherent in the act of registration itself which makes a failure to do so a continuing crime,” id. at 122, 90 S.Ct. 858.
*569The majority relies on the second Tous-sie factor — the nature of the crime — to conclude that embezzlement is a continuing offense “at least in those cases where the defendant created a recurring, automatic scheme.... ” Ante at 567. The majority goes on to say that “it may well be that different embezzlement conduct must be differently characterized” for purposes of the continuing offense doctrine. Ante at 568. See also ante at 568 (“the particular kind of embezzlement that occurred in this case is correctly considered ... to be a continuing offense”). Under Toussie, however, whether an offense is continuing “turns on the nature of the substantive offense, not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue.” United States v. Niven, 952 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir.1991). See also United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir.1999) (continuing offense doctrine does not apply simply because “the charged conduct is continuous in nature”); United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493, 1506 n. 12 (10th Cir.1996) (same). In other words, whether an offense is continuing in nature does not change depending on the manner in which the offense is committed. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 413, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) (escape from prison is continuing offense); United States v. Blizzard, 27 F.3d 100, 102 (4th Cir.1994) (“possession [of stolen government property] is by nature a continuing offense”); United States v. Garcia, 854 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.1988) (kidnaping is continuing offense).
There is nothing inherent in the act of embezzlement that makes it a continuing offense. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 122, 90 S.Ct. 858. Embezzlement is simply a variant of larceny with the additional element that “the original taking of the property was lawful or with the consent of the owner.” Ante at 567. The majority says that embezzlement is frequently conducted “over some time and in relatively small, but recurring, amounts.” Id. But to say that embezzlement is frequently conducted in this way does not alter the substantive (or inherent) nature of the offense. Indeed, the fact that embezzlement can be completed in one distinct transaction undermines the notion that it is inherently a continuing crime. I realize that Congress in some circumstances punishes acts that involve the execution of a scheme, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (“Whoever knowingly executes ... a scheme ... to defraud a financial institution ... shall be fined ... ”), and in those circumstances the underlying crime might be a continuing offense. See United States v. Nash, 115 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir.1997) (“Section 1344 punishes the execution of a scheme to defraud or obtain money — language that suggests the violation should be treated as continuing.”). But when, as here, the language of the statute (“Whoever embezzles ... money ... of the United States”) does not “clearly contemplate a prolonged course of conduct,” Toussie, 397 U.S. at 120, 90 S.Ct. 858, the manner in which the offense is carried out cannot provide justification for finding a continuing offense. By introducing the prospect that an offense may be either continuing or non-continuing, depending on the manner in which it is committed, the majority brings about an unwarranted expansion of the continuing offense doctrine. As the Supreme Court said in Toussie, “continuing offenses are not to be too readily found.” 397 U.S. at 116, 90 S.Ct. 858.
I would resolve this case by applying the principles enunciated in United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873 (7th Cir.1999). There, the Seventh Circuit was presented with facts almost -identical to those here. The defendant Yasher was “indicted for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666, which makes it a federal crime for an agent of a local government to embezzle, steal, obtain by fraud, or otherwise misapply property of that government or agency, that is valued *570at more than $5000 during any one-year period.” Id. at 875 (emphasis added). The indictment alleged that Yasher was on the payroll of a local government committee from June 1, 1989, until September 1, 1992. It charged that from September 1, 1991, until September 1, 1992, Yasher received almost $10,000 in compensation, although he did little or no work. The indictment was returned on August 13, 1997, more than five years after Yasher had received most, but not all, of the compensation. The Seventh Circuit thus had to decide how the statute of limitations applied to an ongoing embezzlement scheme that “straddle[d] the limitations period.” Id. at 876. The court, relying on Toussie, rejected the argument that embezzlement could be treated as a continuing offense merely because it was charged as a continuing course of conduct. Id. at 877. It held that the statute of limitations begins to run on embezzlement, like other non-continuing offenses, “once all elements of the offense are established, regardless of whether the defendant continues to engage in criminal conduct.” Id. at 880.
Yashar compels the conclusion that Alfred Smith was indicted for certain conduct that falls outside the five-year statute of limitations. The indictment was returned on January 24, 2003. It says that “beginning in or about March 1994, and continuing until in or about February 1998 ... Alfred Smith did knowingly, intentionally and willfully embezzle, steal, purloin and convert to his own use, on a recurring basis, a record, voucher, money, and thing of value belonging to the Social Security Administration, to wit: Social Security Administration benefits issued to Estelle Smith totaling approximately $26,336.00.” It appears that Smith received these monies in an amount between $525.00 and $583.00 on or about the 3rd of each month. Under 18 U.S.C. § 641 Smith was chargeable with a felony as soon as he embezzled $1000 of the government’s money. Therefore, by April 3, 1994, Smith had embezzled enough money to support a felony charge. At that point, the continuing course of conduct with which Smith was charged was complete, and the statute of limitations began to run. The date April 3, 1994, and every other date before January 24, 1998, on which Smith received government money fall outside the five-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment and remand for application of the statute of limitations as set forth in Yasher. This does not mean that Smith will automatically avoid punishment. The record indicates that some of Smith’s conduct occurred within the applicable limitations period, that is, on or after January 24, 1998. The government would be able to obtain a superseding indictment charging that conduct. Thus, if Smith embezzled $1000 on or after January 24,1998, he would still be guilty of a felony. If he embezzled less than $1000 in that period, he would be guilty of a misdemeanor.