Court Opinion

ID: 9739079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:08:26.015938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:09.877788
License: Public Domain

*747Holbrook, Jr., P.J.,
(dissenting). I would reverse. I would also reject defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the personal injury element serving to elevate defendant’s conviction from criminal sexual conduct in the third degree to the first degree. See People v Hollis, 96 Mich App 333, 336-338; 292 NW2d 538 (1980); People v Kraai, 92 Mich App 398, 402-403; 285 NW2d 309 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 954 (1980). Additionally, I would reject defendant’s double jeopardy claim. See People v McPherson, 38 Mich App 534; 197 NW2d 173 (1972).
Where I disagree with Judge Grathwohl is with respect to defendant’s argument that by subjecting him to repeated retrial due process was violated. I agree with defendant and premise my opinion for reversal on the conclusion that the course these proceedings took at some point amounted to a denial of due process. Due process is violated by a failure to accord the defendant fundamental fairness. People v Thompson, 424 Mich 118, 133; 379 NW2d 49 (1985). A corollary of this basic principle is that prosecutorial misconduct depriving the defendant of a fair proceeding can amount to a denial of due process. See People v Walls, 117 Mich App 691; 324 NW2d 136 (1982).
In Thompson, supra, the defendant contended that his retrial after a mistrial declared due to jury deadlock in the second of three trials violated both Michigan and federal due process guarantees. Although the Court rejected the claim on its facts, which did not rise to the level of fundamental unfairness, the Court explicitly refused to foreclose the possibility that repeated retrials could violate due process. Taking prompting from the intimation by our Supreme Court in Thompson that due process does act to constrain repeated retrials at *748some point,1 I would conclude that each case must be examined on its own facts and turn to the controlling considerations in the case at bar. Unlike a double jeopardy evaluation, which is limited in focus to the trial in which jeopardy is claimed to bar any subsequent retrial, consideration of a possible due process violation extends to an overview of the entire history of the prosecution against defendant.
Defendant was subjected to the expense, ordeal, and state of anxiety attendant to four trials. Although I do not believe that four trials for one offense necessarily amount to a due process deprivation in most instances, I note the predominant role that prosecutorial and police misconduct and neglect played in withholding a final determination of guilt or innocence in the course of a single trial. Some instances of misconduct appear to be blatant and inexcusable. Although this case factually presents a close question, at some point enough becomes enough. I would conclude that a fourth trial in this case surpassed that point and thereby denied defendant a fair trial. Accordingly, I would reverse with the direction that the charges against defendant be dismissed._

 See also People v Pribble, 72 Mich App 219; 249 NW2d 363 (1976), lv den 409 Mich 902 (1980); Harris v State, 312 Md 225; 539 A2d 637 (1988).