Court Opinion

ID: 9579158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:52:04.275904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:30.219022
License: Public Domain

Lesinski, C. J.
Defendant was convicted by a Recorder’s Court jury of breaking and entering a business establishment with intent to commit larceny. MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305. He appeals as of right.
The first challenge raised on appeal concerns the defendant’s arrest. He argues that there was insufficient probable cause to justify his arrest. The arresting officer responded to a radio run alerting him that a breaking and entering of a garage on an alley was occurring near the intersection of Butternut and Tillman Streets. The officer was driving in the area with his lights off when he saw a light in a garage adjacent to a Butternut address approximately one-half block away from the intersection of Butternut and Tillman. After seeing the defendant and a companion walk out of the garage, the officer turned his lights on, whereupon the defendant and his companion began to run. The officer gave chase on foot and made the arrest.
The Legislature has prescribed a police officer’s power to arrest without a warrant in response to a radio run. He may arrest:
"[w]hen he has received such positive information broadcast from any recognized police or other governmental radio station * * * as may afford him reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed it.” MCLA 764.15(f); MSA 28.874(f).
This Court has held that where the arresting officers received information by radio of a glass breaking, and defendant was the only person on the street coming from the store in which a plate glass door had been smashed and defendant had *757responded negatively to the officer’s question as to whether he had heard glass breaking, such facts constituted probable cause to arrest without a warrant. People v Daniel Jones, 37 Mich App 91; 194 NW2d 433 (1971).
In the instant case, the radio run’s specification of garage, alley, and location, coupled with the officer’s observance of the defendant coming from the garage and running when the police car’s lights were turned on, constitute sufficient probable cause to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a felony had been committed and that the defendant had committed it. Thus, the arrest was valid.
Defendant next contests the admissibility of evidence obtained from a search of his cár.
Defendant’s arrest occurred at approximately 11:30 p.m. After being taken to the police station, a codeferidant who was arrested simultaneously with the defendant made a statement at 2 a.m. that the defendant had taken a fishing box out of the garage and placed it in the trunk of his car. The police then removed the keys to the defendant’s car without his consent from the inventory of his property, picked up the car, and searched the car immediately upon its arrival at the station. The search disclosed a fishing box full of tooling accessories and other tools appropriate for use in a machine shop, which was the nature of the business located on the property the garage was incident to.
Upon learning of the search of the car at the trial, the defendant objected to admission of the above items, but the trial court allowed the fruits of the trunk search into evidence.
Automobile searches and seizures have been a popular topic of review before the United States *758Supreme Court. As early as 1925, the Court made clear that warrant requirements in automobile situations differed from those in home or office situations. Carroll v United States, 267 US 132; 45 S Ct 280; 69 L Ed 543 (1925). However, the articulation of precisely what these differences are has been recently described by the Court as "something less than a seamless web”. Cady v Dombrowski, 413 US 433, 440; 93 S Ct 2523, 2527; 37 L Ed 2d 706, 714 (1973).
Granting this difficulty, the principle which controls the instant case threads the course of most of the Supreme Court decisions on automobile searches. That principle is simply that the minimal justification of a warrantless search requires probable cause plus an additional factor, sometimes denominated as "exigent circumstances”, sanctioning the substitution of the searching officer’s determination of probable cause for that of a neutral magistrate. This additional factor has ranged from the mobility of a car on the open road in Carroll, supra, and Chambers v Maroney, 399 US 42; 90 S Ct 1975; 26 L Ed 2d 419 (1970), to the local official noncriminal involvement with automobiles enunciated in Cady, supra, at 413 US 441-442; 93 S Ct 2528; 37 L Ed 2d 714-715.
This principle was applied to station searches in Chambers, supra. Chambers held that if Carroll applies at the scene of the contact, that is, if there is probable cause at the scene plus an additional factor justifying the lack of a warrant, then the car may be taken to the station and searched. This holding was supported by the common sense rationale that there is no greater intrusion at the station than there would have been at the scene.
The application of these principles to the instant case dictates a conclusion that the search of the *759defendant’s car without a warrant was invalid. At the scene of the defendant’s arrest, there was no probable cause whatsoever to search the defendant’s car. The police did not know that the car was involved until the accomplice’s statement at the station two hours after the arrest. Therefore, this lack of probable cause at the scene prevents a Chambers justification of the station search.
Once the accomplice made the statement that the defendant had placed a fishing box from the complainant’s premises into the car trunk, there is no question that at this point probable cause existed to search the automobile. However, we find that the failure of the police to obtain a warrant was inexcusable. Both the defendant and his accomplice were in custody. There is no appearance on the record of any additional factor which when coupled with probable cause would justify the warrantless search. The subsequent appearance of probable cause at the station cannot alone justify the warrantless search. "Here there was probable cause, but no exigent circumstances justified the police in proceeding without a warrant.” Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 464; 91 S Ct 2022, 2037; 29 L Ed 2d 564, 581 (1971). As stated in Carroll, supra, at 267 US 156; 45 S Ct 286; 69 L Ed 552-553: "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used”. (Emphasis supplied.)
This case is distinguishable from this Court’s decision in People v Bukoski, 41 Mich App 498; 200 NW2d 373 (1972), which upheld the search of an automobile without a warrant. Although the car was, as here, unoccupied, locked, and parked on the street, in Bukoski, the defendants were still at large, and the possibility that they could have therefore moved the car was a sufficient exigent *760circumstance to make the opportunity to search "fleeting” and to justify search without a warrant. Here the defendant and his accomplice were in custody and there was no similar fleeting opportunity to search.
Since the failure to secure a warrant thus invalidated the search and seizure, the trial court erred in admitting the fruits of that search into evidence. There was clearly sufficient evidence apart from the fruits discovered in the trunk to convict the defendant. However, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the excluded evidence did not contribute to the conviction of the defendant. Harrington v California, 395 US 250; 89 S Ct 1726; 23 L Ed 2d 284 (1969); People v Timmons, 34 Mich App 463; 192 NW2d 75 (1971). Therefore, the conviction of the defendant must be reversed.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Bashara, J., concurred.