Court Opinion

ID: 9907169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 20:02:48.585938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:34.275533
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/5/23 P. v. Adams CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B318241

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. TA155931)
           v.

 DARYL EUGENE ADAMS,

           Defendant and
           Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, John J. Lonergan, Jr., Judge. Remanded in
part with instructions, affirmed in part.
      Andrea Keith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Appellant Daryl Adams pled no contest to willful infliction
of corporal injury upon his ex-girlfriend. (Pen. Code, § 273.5.)1
The trial court imposed sentence, including various fines and
fees, but suspended its execution and placed appellant on formal
probation. The court subsequently revoked appellant’s probation
and executed the three-year sentence. Appellant presents two
issues in this appeal from the resultant judgment.
       First, appellant contends the court erred by imposing fines
and fees without first holding a hearing on his ability to pay. We
agree with respondent Attorney General that this contention is
forfeited due to appellant’s failure to request such a hearing
below. Second, appellant contends remand is necessary to clarify
the nature of a modification to a protective order. Respondent
does not oppose this request, which we grant. We accordingly
affirm the judgment but remand the matter for clarification of
the protective order as well as correction of clerical errors in the
abstract of judgment and a minute order documenting the
sentencing hearing.
                          BACKGROUND
       A felony complaint filed November 4, 2021 charged
appellant with two felony counts of willfully inflicting corporal
injury upon his ex-girlfriend (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), one felony count
of making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), and two
misdemeanor counts of willfully disobeying a restraining order
(§ 166, subd. (a)(4)).
       On December 23, 2021, the prosecution offered and
appellant accepted a plea deal. Pursuant to the agreement,
appellant pled no contest to one of the section 273.5, subdivision

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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(a) charges and the remaining charges were dropped. The offer
also included an agreed-upon sentence of the midterm of three
years, execution of which would be suspended in favor of a three-
year term of formal probation. The agreed-upon sentence also
included a domestic violence fund fee (§ 1203.097, subd. (a)(5)(A))
and a protective order directing appellant to stay away from the
victim.
       The court imposed sentence in accordance with the
agreement. Regarding fees and fines, the court stated, “There is
a $500 fine to the domestic violence fund. There is a $300
restitution fine, a $40 court operations fee and a $30 criminal
conviction assessment. Those you have to pay. There is,
however, the $300 probation revocation fine which is stayed upon
– permanently upon successful completion of probation. I hope
you do successfully complete probation because if you don’t, you
will be looking at state prison.” Neither appellant nor his counsel
indicated that appellant lacked the ability to pay the fines and
fees or requested a hearing on appellant’s ability to pay.
       On January 20, 2022, appellant’s probation officer filed a
supplemental report alleging that appellant violated the
protective order. The same day, the trial court ordered probation
revoked and issued a bench warrant for appellant’s arrest.
       The court held a probation violation hearing on February 8,
2022. Appellant admitted the violation. The trial court lifted the
suspension and imposed the three-year prison term. Neither the
court nor the parties said anything about fees, fines, or
appellant’s ability to pay. However, the minute order
documenting the hearing indicates that the court imposed a $300
restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b); imposed a
$300 restitution fine under section 1202.44; and imposed and

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stayed a $300 parole revocation restitution fine under section
1202.45.
      During the hearing, the prosecutor expressed interest in
extending the length of the protective order. The court stated,
“Counsel, . . . the violation was sent to me. That would be
something to take up with the previous judge because I believe
counsel has a right to be heard after it’s already been issued and
going back on a modification. So I’m not going to make any
ruling whatsoever on that because to be honest, I’m not sure you
have that right at this stage.” Later, the court reiterated, “if
either side wishes to do anything, then I suggest you go to
[Department] 14 who issued the order this past December 23rd.”
The prosecutor responded that she would like the file sent to
Department 14. The court then stated, “We will send this back to
14. Then they can do whatever they are going to do.” The
appellate record contains a 10-year protective order filed
February 8, 2022. However, it does not contain a reporter’s
transcript from Department 14 or any other trial court
documenting a hearing on the issue.
                            DISCUSSION
I.    Fines and Fees
      Appellant contends the trial court erred under People v.
Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas) by imposing fines
and fees without first holding a hearing to assess his ability to
pay them. He acknowledges that he did not raise the issue below,
but contends it is preserved for appeal because the trial court
imposed statutory minimum fines and fees. We conclude the
issue is forfeited.
      In Dueñas, Division Seven of this court held that imposing
fines and assessments “upon indigent defendants without a

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determination that they have the present ability to pay violates
due process under both the United States Constitution and the
California Constitution.” (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p.
1168, fn. omitted.) The same court later held that “a defendant
must in the first instance contest in the trial court his or her
ability to pay the fines, fees and assessments to be imposed and
at a hearing present evidence of his or her inability to pay the
amounts contemplated by the trial court.”2 (People v. Castellano
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490.) Appellant did not challenge the
court’s imposition of fees in any way, at either his initial
sentencing hearing or at his probation violation hearing. “In
general, a defendant who fails to object to the imposition of fines,
fees, and assessments at sentencing forfeits the right to challenge
those fines, fees, and assessments on appeal.” (People v. Greeley
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 624.)
       Appellant argues that the general rule should not apply
here because the court imposed only the minimum fines. We
disagree. Prior to Dueñas, a defendant could challenge a
restitution fine on ability-to-pay grounds only where it exceeded
the statutory minimum. (See § 1202.4, subd. (c); People v.
Guitierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1033.) It has been clear
since Dueñas, which was decided approximately three years
before appellant was sentenced, that such challenges to minimum
fines are also permissible. Appellant thus should have been well

2      Our Supreme Court has granted review in People v. Kopp
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844,
on the issue of whether a trial court must “consider a defendant’s
ability to pay before imposing or executing fines, fees, and
assessments,” and if so, “which party bears the burden of proof
regarding defendant’s inability to pay.”

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aware of the availability of such an objection, and his need to
timely raise the issue. Appellant points to People v. Montes
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1115-1119 (Montes), in which the
court remanded the matter for an ability-to-pay hearing despite
the defendant’s failure to object, and collected other cases doing
the same. Montes—and many of those cited therein—is
distinguishable because the defendant was sentenced prior to
Dueñas and the sea change it brought to the law. Appellant was
sentenced long after Dueñas and its progeny. His challenge is
forfeited.
II.    Protective Order
       Appellant next contends the matter should be remanded to
clarify the basis for the modification of the protective order,
because the appellate record does not contain a reporter’s
transcript of the hearing on the issue.3 Respondent does not
oppose the request. We agree that a limited remand is
appropriate.
       The trial court’s oral pronouncement is the rendition of
judgment. (People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.) “Where
there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of
judgment and the minute order . . . , the oral pronouncement
controls.” (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.)
Here, it is not possible to determine what the court’s oral
pronouncement was, the circumstances under which it was made,
or whether it conforms to the protective order in the record.
Appellant’s notice of appeal asserts that the protective order was
“extended to 10 years over objection,” but we are not able to
review the objection, consider its merits, or otherwise assess the

3     Appellant’s counsel made several unsuccessful attempts to
obtain and augment the record with the transcript.

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propriety of the extended order. We are authorized to “order the
superior court to settle disputes about omissions or errors in the
record” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(c)(2)) and do so here. On
remand, the trial court shall hold a hearing regarding the
modification of the protective order.
III. Clerical Errors
       Respondent contends that the record contains several
clerical errors that must be corrected. First, it points to the
minute order documenting the February 8, 2022 parole violation
hearing, which documents fees and fines not orally imposed by
the court at that hearing. Second, it points out that the judgment
does not impose the mandatory $300 parole revocation restitution
fine (§ 1202.45). Finally, it notes that the abstract of judgment
does not accurately reflect the fines and fees imposed by the
court. We agree that these errors should be corrected.
       We have the inherent authority to correct clerical errors,
including those in the minute order and abstract of judgment.
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) We also may
correct the failure of a sentencing court to impose mandatory fees
or fines, as this omission results in an unauthorized sentence
that may be corrected at any time. (People v. Rodriguez (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 372, 376; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.)
We therefore direct the trial court to strike the fees referenced in
the February 8, 2022 minute order; to correct the judgment to
reflect the imposition of all required mandatory fees and fines;
and to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the imposition of
the $500 domestic violence fund fee (§ 1203.097, subd. (a)(5)(A)),
the $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), the now-due $300
probation revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.44), the suspended
$300 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), the $40 court operations

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assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)), and the $30 criminal conviction
assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)). The court shall
forward a copy of the corrected abstract to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
                          DISPOSITION
      The matter is remanded for the limited purpose of settling
the record regarding the issuance of the 10-year protective order.
The court shall also correct the February 8, 2022 minute order,
the judgment, and abstract of judgment as set forth above, and
forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                           COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

MORI, J.

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