Court Opinion

ID: 9908992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 15:00:38.628293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:39.462611
License: Public Domain

20-4170
     Al Omaisi v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                           A079 120 289

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of December, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                   REENA RAGGI,
 8                   RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 9                   BETH ROBINSON,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   HAZAEA MOHAMMED SENAN AL
14   OMAISI,
15           Petitioner,
16
17                   v.                                          20-4170
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21              Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                     Kai W. De Graaf, New York, NY.
 2
 3   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 4                                       General; Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant
 5                                       Director; Sherease Pratt, Senior Litigation
 6                                       Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation,
 7                                       United States Department of Justice,
 8                                       Washington, DC.
 9
10         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

11   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

12   DECREED the petition for review is GRANTED, the denial of reopening is

13   VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for further consideration of

14   the motion to reopen in light of this decision.

15         Petitioner Hazaea Mohammed Senan Al Omaisi, a native and citizen of

16   Yemen who was removed from the United States to Yemen in January 2020, seeks

17   review of a November 20, 2020 decision of the BIA denying his post-removal

18   motion to reopen his removal proceedings so that he can apply for asylum,

19   withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

20   (“CAT”). In re Al Omaisi, No. A079 120 289 (B.I.A. Nov. 20, 2020). We assume

21   the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

22         A motion to reopen removal proceedings “shall not be granted unless it

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 1   appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not

 2   available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

 3   Heredia v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)).

 4   Moreover, to secure reopening, a petitioner must demonstrate “prima facie

 5   eligibility for asylum,” i.e., a “realistic chance” that he will be able to obtain such

 6   relief. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation

 7   marks omitted).       This requires the petitioner “to carry the heavy burden of

 8   demonstrating that the proffered new evidence would likely alter the result in h[is]

 9   case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, a motion to reopen

10   must be made within 90 days of a final order of removal, but that time limit does

11   not apply if asylum or related relief is sought based on materially changed

12   conditions in the country to which removal has been ordered.                 8 U.S.C.

13   § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

14          We review the BIA’s decision denying reopening for abuse of discretion, see

15   Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006), which we will identify only if the

16   BIA’s decision “provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from

17   established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or

                                                   3
 1   conclusory statements.” Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir.

 2   2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).           “Despite our generally deferential

 3   review of . . . BIA opinions, we require a certain minimum level of analysis to

 4   allow for meaningful judicial review.” Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 329 (2d Cir.

 5   2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the “BIA need not expressly

 6   parse or refute on the record each . . . piece of evidence offered by the petitioner,

 7   there must be some indication of reasoned consideration and adequate findings.”

 8   Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

 9            It is undisputed that Al Omaisi’s 2020 motion to reopen was filed more than

10   90 days after his 2006 removal order. The BIA agreed, however, that conditions

11   in Yemen have changed since 2006 and that the changed conditions in Yemen were

12   “material to [Al Omaisi’s] potential claim.”          Certified Administrative Record

13   (“CAR”) 4. Accordingly, Al Omaisi’s motion is not time barred.

14            The BIA nonetheless concluded that Al Omaisi failed to carry his burden to

15   establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought and to submit evidence to

16   support a grant of relief. 1 The BIA stated that Al Omaisi failed to allege that he

     1   The BIA also declined to exercise its authority to reopen sua sponte. We do not address

                                                   4
 1   had received specific threats of future harm on a protected ground or to identify

 2   aspects of the record showing an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.

 3   On the present record, we conclude that the BIA exceeded its discretion in reaching

 4   that conclusion without further analysis. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d

 5   at 146; Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d at 329. That is because the record appears to

 6   demonstrate Al Omaisi’s prima facie eligibility for asylum.

 7          Because Al Omaisi did not claim past persecution, he had to demonstrate a

 8   well-founded fear of future persecution on a protected ground in order to establish

 9   prima facie eligibility for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a),

10   (b).   An applicant may make this showing by demonstrating a “pattern or

11   practice” of persecuting similarly situated people. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii),

12   1208.16(b)(2).    To make a pattern or practice claim, an applicant must

13   demonstrate both membership in a group and persecution of that group that is

14   “systemic or pervasive.” In re A–M–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (B.I.A. 2005).

15          As to group membership, Al Omaisi alleged that he was susceptible to

     that aspect of its decision, which Al Omaisi does not challenge. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448
     F.3d at 518 (holding that we lack jurisdiction to review BIA’s “entirely discretionary”
     decision not to reopen sua sponte).
                                                5
 1   persecution in Yemen based on his (1) publicly expressed political opinions

 2   against the Houthis in control of northern Yemen (including his former home

 3   village in the Sanaa governate) and the militia groups active elsewhere in the

 4   country (including Aden, to where he was deported), (2) more than 20 years

 5   residency in the United States before removal, and (3) status as a northern Yemeni

 6   displaced to the south. Al Omaisi alleged a series of encounters during his first

 7   few weeks in Yemen that, if true, might support a conclusion that potential

 8   persecutors recognized that he had these characteristics, as well as a threat against

 9   his family while he was still in the United States because of his political activities.

10         Al Omaisi also presented evidence of widespread persecution in Yemen on

11   these grounds.     See, e.g., CAR 244–46, 248–49, 253–54, 258, 260–61 (detailing

12   persecution of political opponents of Houthis, the Yemeni government, and

13   militias backed by Saudi Arabia); id. at 296 (same); id. at 246 (citing abuse of

14   internally displaced persons by security forces controlling Aden); id. at 210

15   (asserting that northerners in southern Yemen “face regular discrimination,

16   persecution, imprisonment, deportation and general hostility”; “thousands of

17   northerners living in Aden during the past several years” were deported or

                                                6
 1   imprisoned; and Houthis and terrorist groups active in Yemen “are deeply hostile

 2   toward the United States” and “would likely imprison and torture” person who

 3   had recently lived in United States “for propaganda purposes”); id. at 63 (reporting

 4   conflict with Houthis began when members of a militant group chanted “Death to

 5   America!” in then-president’s presence); see also id. at 283 (warning that U.S.

6    citizens and dual national Yemeni-Americans are at “very high risk of

 7   kidnapping” and detention). 2

 8         Here, the BIA failed to explain why this evidence did not establish a prima

 9   facie pattern or practice claim, and that conclusion is not obvious from the evidence

10   itself. Moreover, although the BIA correctly stated that Al Omaisi failed to allege

11   any specific threat of future harm on a protected ground, the BIA did not explain

12   why evidence of such a threat is necessary where Al Omaisi asserted a series of

     2 The Government asserts that Al Omaisi presented substantial evidence of a risk of
     indiscriminate harm rather than targeted harm. But evidence of potential indiscriminate
     harm does not undermine Al Omaisi’s claim that he is also likely to be harmed on the
     basis of a protected ground. To the contrary, these conditions support his claim that he
     cannot reasonably avoid persecution by relocating within Yemen and that the Yemeni
     government is unable to control potential persecutors—both issues on which he carries
     the burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.1, 1208.13(b)(2)(ii), (3). The Government also
     argues that the Court should not order Al Omaisi’s immediate return to the United States.
     We need not consider that issue, as Al Omaisi does not explicitly request that relief.
                                                7
 1   implicitly threatening encounters himself and an explicit threat against his family

 2   related to protected grounds and also presented country-condition evidence

 3   showing abuses of similarly situated people. On this record, the BIA’s summary

4    conclusion that Al Omaisi did not present evidence indicating an objectively

5    reasonable fear of future persecution is insufficient for us confidently to conclude

6    that the BIA acted within its discretion in denying reopening. On remand, the

7    BIA should reconsider Al Omaisi’s motion to reopen, providing greater

8    explanation for any further denial decision in light of the record evidence or

 9   granting reopening. 3

10         Al Omaisi’s due process argument, on the other hand, is without merit. Al

11   Omaisi does not explain what remedy we should or could provide if we were to

12   identify a due process violation. In any event, Al Omaisi cannot establish a due

13   process violation stemming from his removal because he could have sought

14   reopening earlier given that the conditions that form the basis of his claim existed

15   for years prior to his 2020 removal. See Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149

16   (2d Cir. 2008) (“Parties claiming denial of due process in immigration cases must,

     3 Because we remand as to asylum, we do not separately consider whether the BIA
     abused its discretion in finding that Al Omaisi did not state a prima facie CAT claim.
                                               8
1    in order to prevail, allege some cognizable prejudice fairly attributable to the

2    challenged process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   In sum, Al Omaisi

3    cannot fairly attribute the lack of opportunity to move for reopening prior to

4    removal to any government process.

5          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED, the denial

6    of reopening is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for further

7    consideration of the motion to reopen in light of this decision.   All pending

8    motions and applications are DENIED.

 9                                        FOR THE COURT:
10                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
11                                        Clerk of Court
12

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