Court Opinion

ID: 9929469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 18:09:59.947617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:23:32.929570
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  THEODORE WORNER AND ADELINA                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  WORNER                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LAUREN N. STONE                              :
                                               :   No. 2260 EDA 2023
                       Appellant               :

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                    Domestic Relations at No(s): XC2200813

BEFORE:       LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 2, 2024

       Lauren N. Stone (“Mother”) appeals from the order filed in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas that denied her exceptions and

granted Theodore Worner and Adelina Worner (“Paternal Grandparents”),

partial physical custody of their granddaughter, G.W. (d.o.b. 11/2018). We

affirm.

       Mother and G.W.’s father, Joey Worner (“Father”), separated in 2021,

and Father subsequently died in March 2022. On November 28, 2022, Paternal

Grandparents filed a Complaint for partial custody of G.W. pursuant to section

5325(1) of the Grandparents’ Custody Act, which provides, in pertinent part,

that “grandparents and great-grandparents may file an action … for partial

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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physical custody or supervised physical custody … where the parent of the

child is deceased[.]” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1). The Custody Hearing Officer held

a two-day hearing on the Complaint on February 1, 2023 and March 6, 2023,

at which the following relevant facts were adduced.

      Prior to June 2021, G.W. shared a close relationship with Paternal

Grandparents and spent a significant amount of time with them. In 2019,

Paternal Grandparents shared childcare responsibilities with Lisa Stone

(“Maternal Grandmother”) when Mother returned to work. See N.T. Hearing,

2/01/23, at 20. In September 2020, Paternal Grandparents assumed full-time

care of G.W. on Tuesdays through Fridays. See id. at 18-21, 61-62; N.T.

Hearing, 3/06/23, at 56. Paternal Grandparents introduced videos into

evidence that showed how happy G.W. was in their care. See N.T. Hearing,

2/01/23, at 22-26.

      In June 2021, G.W. suffered an elbow dislocation while at Paternal

Grandparents’ home. Paternal Grandmother explained that G.W. forcefully

pulled away while she was changing her, almost falling off the table. See id.

at 49-50. In an effort to avoid the fall, Paternal Grandmother caught G.W.’s

elbow, causing it to come out of its socket, a condition called, “nursemaid’s

elbow.” Id. at 50; see id. at 51-52, 100. Paternal Grandfather contacted

Mother, who immediately took G.W. to the hospital, where staff easily put her

elbow back in its socket. G.W. did not require x-rays or follow-up care, has no

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long-term injury, and neither hospital staff nor Mother or Father contacted

DHS about the incident. See id. at 108.

      Soon after the incident, Paternal Grandfather texted Mother to check on

G.W., and Mother said that G.W. was “feeling fine Just a little sore.” N.T.

Hearing, 3/06/23, at 81-82, 84. Mother admitted she had experienced

nursemaid’s elbow as a child herself and it “wasn’t a big deal.” N.T. Hearing,

2/01/23, at 57, 68. However, Mother testified that, after the June 2021

incident, Mother and Father decided to no longer have Paternal Grandparents

take care of G.W. Id at 1, 106. This conflicted with text message evidence

introduced by Paternal Grandparents that reflected Mother and Father told

them that they no longer needed to care for G.W. because she had been on a

waiting list to attend a particular daycare and finally had been approved

around that time. Mother claimed that they only told Paternal Grandparents

this story so as not to hurt their feelings.

      Over the years, Father had been in and out of drug rehabilitation

facilities for his substance abuse issues. See id. at 77; N.T. Hearing, 3/06/23,

at 36. After Mother and Father separated in October 2021, Father lived with

Paternal Grandparents who saw G.W. during his periods of custody, which

Mother conceded G.W. enjoyed. See N.T. Hearing, 2/01/23, at 59, 65-67. In

October 2021, Father even left G.W. alone with Paternal Grandparents for a

couple of hours. Id. at 67. In January 2022, Father entered an in-patient

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rehabilitation program. He was discharged in February 2022, but subsequently

died on March 27, 2022. Id. at 63.

      After Father’s funeral, Mother brought G.W. to Paternal Grandparents’

home to pick up a check, which contained donations Paternal Grandmother

had requested for G.W. and Mother in lieu of flowers. See id. at 29. Mother

also brought G.W. to the home one other time to pick up Father’s death

certificate so she could apply for social security benefits. See id. at 14-15, 71.

After that, Mother “ghosted” Paternal Grandmother and would not let Paternal

Grandparents see G.W., including preventing them from having any contact

when they dropped off Easter and Halloween gift baskets for her. Id. at 79;

see id. at 15, 27-28.

      Although Mother and Paternal Grandmother have no relationship

anymore and Mother does not communicate with any other members of G.W.’s

paternal family, Mother testified that she and Paternal Grandfather text

regularly, have a good relationship and that she trusted him to care for G.W.

See id. at 84; N.T. Hearing, 3/06/23, at 71. In fact, in July 2021, Mother

texted Paternal Grandfather to wish him a happy birthday. See N.T. Hearing,

3/06/23, at 88.

      Because the parties did not conclude testimony on February 1st, the

Hearing Officer scheduled a second day to continue the hearing, March 6th. At

the commencement of the March 6th hearing, Mother mentioned her intent to

present the testimony of Maternal Grandmother for the first time. See id. at

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7. When asked for a proffer, Mother’s counsel explained that Maternal

Grandmother would testify about her interactions with Paternal Grandparents,

what she witnessed of them and how they treated G.W. and Mother. See id.

at 8. Paternal Grandparents’ counsel stipulated that Maternal Grandmother’s

testimony would be negative toward his clients. The Hearing Officer precluded

Maternal Grandmother from testifying due to the unfair surprise and the fact

that her testimony would be cumulative.

      On March 10, 2023, the Hearing Officer entered the Proposed Order and

Findings of Custody Hearing Officer. She recommended that Paternal

Grandparents have partial physical custody of G.W. for at least four hours,

once a month, at a time agreed to by Mother, but if the parties could not

agree, custody would be on the third Saturday of each month. The Officer

found that G.W. and Paternal Grandparents “enjoyed a significant [and] loving

relationship[,] [and that] limited partial custody, overseen by Paternal

Grandfather,” was not only in the best interest of G.W. but it also addressed

any safety concerns of Mother. Proposed Order and Findings of Custody

Hearing Officer, 3/10/23, at 4.

      Mother timely filed fifteen exceptions to the recommendation, and the

trial court held a hearing on them on August 23, 2023. It denied the exceptions

and adopted the Proposed Order and Findings. Mother timely appealed and

contemporaneously filed a concise statement of errors complained of on

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appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). She also filed a motion

for stay pending appeal that the court denied.

       On appeal, Mother raises one claim for our review in which she argues

that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the Proposed Order and

Findings of the Hearing Officer and granting partial physical custody of G.W.

to Paternal Grandparents over her objection. See Mother’s Brief, at 1. She

maintains the court did not apply either the “special weight” to her decision

about G.W. that federal law requires under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57

(2000), or the “clear and convincing evidence” standard required by

Pennsylvania law. See id. In the argument section of her brief, Mother also

complains that the Hearing Officer erred when she precluded maternal

grandmother from testifying.1 See id. at 31.

       Our standard of review of these claims is deferential:

              Our standard of review over a custody order is for a gross
       abuse of discretion. Such an abuse of discretion will only be found
       if the trial court, in reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies
       the law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable,
       or reaches a conclusion that is the result of partiality, prejudice,
       bias, or ill-will as shown by the evidence of record.

              In reviewing a custody order, we must accept findings of the
       trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as
       our role does not include making independent factual
       determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and
       weight of the evidence, we must defer to the trial court who
       viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we are
       not bound by the trial court's deductions or inferences from its
____________________________________________

1 Although it is well-settled that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is

stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby,”
we will provide a brief review of this claim. Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).

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      factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s
      conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.
      We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve
      an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable
      findings of the trial court.

Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 60-61 (Pa. Super. 2023) (internal

citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).

      Here, the trial court adopted the Proposed Order and Findings of the

Custody Hearing Officer after the parties appeared at a custody conference

before her. In such a situation we have explained:

      Where ... the parties proceed by agreement before a hearing
      officer on the issues of standing and partial custody for purposes
      of visitation, the trial court is required to make an independent
      review of the record to determine whether the hearing officer's
      findings and recommendations are appropriate. See generally
      Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4-1, 1915.4-2. Although advisory, the hearing
      officer's report and recommendations are given the fullest
      consideration particularly on the issue of credibility of witnesses,
      which the trial court is not empowered to second-guess. See
      generally Neil v. Neil, 731 A.2d 156 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding
      that reviewing court may not second-guess hearing officer's
      credibility determinations).

K.B. v. M.F., 247 A.3d 1146, 1150 (citation omitted).

      Mother first claims the trial court abused its discretion by adopting the

Findings and Proposed Order because granting partial custody to Paternal

Grandparents violated her federal due process rights and failed to give her

decisions regarding G.W. the “special weight” identified in Troxel. Mother’s

Brief, at 1.

      We first consider whether this argument is properly before us or

whether, as the trial court found and Paternal Grandparents maintain, Mother

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waived the argument by raising it for the first time in her Rule 1925(b)

statement. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/03/23, at 15-16; Appellees’ Brief, at

10-11.

      It is well-settled that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); As such,

issues raised for the first time in a Rule 1925(b) statement are waived. see

Estate of O’Connell ex. rel. O’Connell v. Progressive Ins. Co., 79 A.3d

1134, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2013)..

      Our review of the record confirms the observation of the trial court and

Paternal Grandparents that Mother raised her arguments about the Hearing

Officer’s failure to apply the “special weight” identified in Troxel or that

granting Paternal Grandparents partial physical custody violates her federal

due process rights for the first time in her Rule 1925(b) statement. Therefore,

these claims are waived. See Estate of O’Connell, 79 A.3d at 1140; Pa.R.AP.

302(a).

      However, even if not waived, Mother’s claims would not merit relief.

      Similar to the circumstances before us, Troxel involved a grandparent

seeking partial physical custody of a grandchild after a parent’s death. The

United States Supreme Court found the Washington statute on which the

grandparent relied to be unconstitutionally broad because it directed “that any

person may petition the court for visitation at any time.” J. & S.O. v. C.H.,

206 A.3d 1171, 1177 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67)

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(emphases in original). However, in J. & S.O. this Court concluded that

Troxel’s holding was inapplicable to the Pennsylvania Grandparents’ Custody

Act because section 5325(1) is narrowly tailored to grandparents whose child

has died. See id. at 1177-78.

      Additionally, although Mother argues the Grandparents’ Custody Act is

“constitutionally infirm because it does not require [] a showing of harm”

before a court may intervene into a fit parent’s authority, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court rejected such an argument in Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875

(Pa. 2006). Mother’s Brief, at 17-18 n.1. There, the Court concluded that,

although proof of “significant harm” could justify longer periods of visitation,

such harm is implicit in the statute and “requiring grandparents to

demonstrate that the denial of visitation would result in harm in every

[section 5325(1)] case would set the bar too high, vitiating the purpose of

the statute and the policy [of ensuring] the continued contact between

grandchildren and grandparents when a parent is deceased.” Id. at 890;

see id. at 890 n.24.

      Moreover, Mother’s focus on the language of Troxel that she should

have been afforded “special weight” that is somehow more than the

presumption already afforded to such parents is not availing. As explained

further in Justice Newman’s concurrence in Hiller, in cases involving

grandparent custody, “the court must presume that a fit parent’s decision is

in the best interest of the child, and the court may reach a decision contrary

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to the wishes of the parent only if there is evidence sufficient to overcome

that presumption. Troxel goes no further.” Id. at 902; see also J. & S.O.,

206 A.3d at 1177 (holding that the Pennsylvania Grandparents’ Custody Act

does not violate the surviving parent’s due process rights).

      Therefore, as aptly observed by the Paternal Grandparents, “[t]he

ultimate decision [of when to grant custody to grandparents] is based on the

amount of prior contact that grandparents had with the child, whether an

award would interfere with the parent-child relationship, and what is in the

best interest of the child.” See N.T. Hearing, 3/06/23, at 161; see also 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c). This is precisely what the Hearing Officer considered

when reaching her decision. See Proposed Order and Findings of Custody

Hearing Officer, 3/10/23, at 4 (finding G.W. spent approximately four days a

week with Paternal Grandparents with whom she had loving, close relationship

until Mother stopped all contact; that a narrowly tailored custody order would

not interfere with G.W. and Mother’s relationship; and spending time with her

deceased father’s family is in G.W.’s best interest). Mother’s claim that the

custody order violates her federal constitutional rights and Troxel lacks merit.

      Mother next argues her Pennsylvania Constitutional rights were violated

because the Custody Hearing Officer failed to apply the clear and convincing

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evidence standard before granting Paternal Grandparents partial physical

custody. See Mother’s Brief, at 21.2

       “[I]n a dispute between a parent and … a grandparent, the parent has

a prima facie right to custody which will be forfeited only if convincing reasons

appear that the child’s best interest will be served by an award to [the

grandparent].” Douglas v. Wright, 801 A.2d 586, 590-91 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(citation omitted). “The burden is on grandparents seeking rights under

[section 5325(1)] to demonstrate that partial custody or visitation in their

favor is in the child’s best interest and will not interfere with the parent-child

relationship.” Id. (citations omitted).

       In addition to the sixteen custody factors outlined in section 5328(a),

when deciding whether to award partial physical custody to a grandparent who

has standing pursuant to section 5325(1), as we stated previously, the

tribunal must consider: (1) the amount of personal contact between the child

and the party prior to the filing of the action, (2) whether the award interferes

with any parent-child relationship, and (3) whether the award is in the best

____________________________________________

2 Paternal Grandparents maintain that Mother is relying on an incorrect legal

burden for this argument because this burden is found in Section 5327, which
only applies where a party is seeking primary physical custody. See Paternal
Grandparents’ Brief, at 13; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(b). This is not persuasive
because a review of Mother’s brief reveals she only mentioned Section 5327(b)
when directly quoting the Hearing Officer. See Mother’s Brief, at 11; Proposed
Order and Findings of Custody Hearing Officer, 3/10/23, at 3..

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interest of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(c); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

5328(a).

      “[T]he goal in each case is to foster those relationships which will be

meaningful for the child, while protecting the child from situations which would

have a harmful effect. Factors to consider in determining the best interests of

the child include the child's ‘physical, intellectual, emotional and spiritual well-

being.’” Douglas, 801 A.2d at 591 (citations omitted).

      Instantly, the Custody Hearing Officer explained:

             Paternal Grandparents are requesting partial physical
      custody of the child. Mother, however, feels that Paternal
      Grandparent[s] should not be afforded any custodial time with the
      child. Paternal Grandparents shared a loving, close relationship
      with the child until she was injured. Then, both Mother and Father
      decided together to revoke their consent and deny Paternal
      Grandparents unsupervised time with the child. Unfortunately, the
      [c]ourt does not have the benefit of Father’s testimony to know
      how strongly Father felt about the situation. The [c]ourt cannot
      ascertain whether Father agreed with Mother to keep the peace or
      whether he felt as vehemently as Mother did. Prior to Father’s
      death, he was living with Paternal Grandparents and their custody
      rights would have been derivative of Father’s rights. Sadly, Father
      has passed and the [c]ourt must now consider if it is in child’s best
      interest to never see her grandparents again as Mother has
      requested.

             Prior to the child’s injury, the child enjoyed a significant
      relationship with Paternal Grandparents. The child saw them
      nearly every day and it is clear from the demeanor of Paternal
      Grandparents, video evidence presented, and text message
      evidence discussed in the hearing that the child shared a loving
      relationship with Paternal Grandparents. An award of partial
      physical custody would not interfere with the parent child
      relationship. Mother testified she and the child share a close bond.
      An appropriately tailored award of custodial time to Paternal
      Grandparents would not be overly burdensome or interfere with
      the child’s scheduled activities. As Paternal Grandparent[s’]

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      counsel argued, their intent is not to replace Mother or Father in
      the child’s affection but to maintain the loving relationship they
      had developed with their granddaughter. Finally, this Custody
      Hearing Officer believes it would be in the child’s best interest to
      award Paternal Grandparents partial physical custody. One of the
      factors the [c]ourt must consider in determining the best interest
      of the child is the availability of extended family. Now more than
      ever, it is important for the child to remain connected to Father’s
      extended family. Mother testified that she has lost contact with
      other members of Father’s extended family following the discord
      with Paternal Grandparents. Providing limited custodial time,
      overseen by Paternal Grandfather, provides the child the
      opportunity to remain connected with Father’s extend[ed] family
      while addressing Mother’s safety concerns.

Custody Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendation, 3/10/23, at 4.

      Based on our independent review of the record, we discern no abuse of

discretion. The record confirms that prior to Mother denying Paternal

Grandparents any contact with G.W., they had a loving relationship with her

in which they saw her multiple times per week. The state has a strong interest

in preserving this relationship between G.W. and her deceased father’s family.

The narrowly tailored order only grants Paternal Grandparents four hours per

month with their grandchild, with Paternal Grandfather, with whom Mother

admits she has a good relationship, present at all times. Mother’s claim that

the Paternal Grandparents failed to produce sufficient evidence to support the

partial custody award lacks merit.

      Nor are we persuaded by Mother’s summary claims that the Custody

Hearing Officer failed to apply certain custody factors.

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      The Custody Act provides, in pertinent part, that, “in ordering any form

of custody, the court shall determine the best interest of the child by

considering …

      (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child's education,
      family life and community life[,] … (9) Which party is more likely
      to maintain a loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship
      with the child adequate for the child's emotional needs[, and] (13)
      The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness and
      ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A party's effort
      to protect a child from abuse by another party is not evidence of
      unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(4), (9), (13).

      Mother’s entire argument in support of this issue is that:

             [T]he lower court incorrectly applied factor 4 in light of the
      evidence showing that mother has been the primary source of
      stability and safety for the child. The lower court incorrectly
      applied factor 9 in light of the evidence showing that the mother
      has maintained a loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing
      relationship with the child and has supported her emotional needs.
      The lower court incorrectly applied factor 13 in light of the
      evidence showing a high degree of conflict between the mother
      and the paternal grandparents at the time of the grandparents’
      petition.

Mother’s Brief, at 30-31.

      No one disputes that Mother has been G.W.’s primary source of stability

who maintains a loving environment for her. Paternal Grandparents’ four

hours per month certainly will not conflict with this. Also, although Mother and

Paternal Grandmother seem to have a contentious relationship, Mother and

Paternal Grandfather have a good one and he will be present during any

custodial time. Mother’s argument lacks merit.

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      Finally, Mother contends that the Custody Hearing Officer abused her

discretion when she precluded Maternal Grandmother from testifying, thereby

infringing on Mother’s due process rights to a fair trial. See Mother’s Brief, at

31. We disagree.

      It is well-settled that our standard of review of the Custody Hearing

Officer’s evidentiary ruling is for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth

v. Walter, 93 A.3d 442, 450 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

“[P]rocedural due process requires, at its core, adequate notice, opportunity

to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself before a fair and impartial

tribunal having jurisdiction over the case. Due process is flexible and calls for

such procedural protections as the situation demands.” Interest of K.L., 296

A.3d 1267, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

      In this case, Mother had the opportunity to be heard over the course of

a two-day hearing. Specifically, the Custody Hearing Officer conducted a

hearing on February 1, 2023, and when it became evident that the parties

would not finish, she scheduled a second day for March 6, 2023. Mother, who

was represented by two different counsel, had the opportunity to testify on

her own behalf, present evidence and cross-examine Paternal Grandparents.

      At the March 6, 2023 hearing, Mother advised, for the first time, that

she intended to present Maternal Grandmother as a witness, proffering that

Maternal Grandmother would testify “about her interactions with the Paternal

Grandparents, and what she’s witnessed, with how the Paternal Grandparents

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are with [G.W.], as well as how the Paternal Grandparents are with [Mother].”

N.T. Hearing, 3/06/23, at 8. Paternal Grandparents’ counsel argued that

Maternal Grandmother’s testimony was irrelevant and he agreed to stipulate

that she would “say negative things about [his] client[s], and they behaved

badly, and that they don’t behave well with the child.” Id. at 124.

       We discern no abuse of discretion in the Hearing Officer’s preclusion of

this testimony on the bases that the lack of notice prejudiced Paternal

Grandparents and because her proposed testimony would be cumulative of

Mother’s. See id. at 130. Mother’s final issue lacks merit.3

       In their response brief, Paternal Grandparents seek attorney’s fees,

arguing that this appeal is frivolous and brought only to delay their seeing

G.W. See Paternal Grandparents’ Brief, at 21-23. It is well-settled that “[t]he

general rule is that the parties to litigation are responsible for their own

counsel fees and costs unless otherwise provided by statutory authority,

agreement of the parties, or some other recognized exception.” Wrenfield

Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. DeYoung, 600 A.2d 960, 962 (Pa. Super.

1991). Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2744, this Court may award reasonable counsel

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3 We are not persuaded by Mother’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Ward,

605 A.2d 796 (Pa. Super. 1992), in support of this issue. See Mother’s Brief,
at 32. Ward was a criminal case in which the trial court precluded the
testimony of a police detective that individuals other than the defendant had
a motive to commit the crime at issue. This is wholly irrelevant to the situation
here, where Mother sought to introduce a surprise witness in a custody trial
whose testimony would have been cumulative.

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fees if we “determine[] that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or

that the conduct of the participant against whom costs are to be imposed is

dilatory, obdurate or vexatious.” Pa.R.A.P. 2744(1).

      We deny Paternal Grandparents’ request. While ultimately we conclude

that Mother’s appeal lacks merit, we cannot find that, on their face, the issues

raised by Mother could only be perceived as frivolous delay tactics justifying

sanctions.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 2/2/2024

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