Court Opinion

ID: 9832540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:59:17.997946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:47.807756
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[6] After careful consideration, we conclude there is no merit in any of the contentions made in appellee’s motion for rehearing, except the one to the effect that judgment should not have been rendered by this court, but the cause should be remanded if we adhered to our view that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the judgment of the court upon the cross-action. This would be done were it not for the fact that in further considering this case we have arrived at the conclusion that we should have sustained the first assignment of error, wherein complaint was made because the court overruled plaintiff’s exception to defendant’s cross-action, which exception was to the effect that it was attempted by the cross-action to set off against plaintiff’s liquidated claim, which is founded in tort, an uncertain and unliquidated demand founded in tort, and which was not in any way connected with, incident to, or arising out of plaintiff’s cause of action. Appellee contends that his cross-action was founded upon a demand connected with plaintiff’s cause of action. His theory is that the $63.10, belonging to plaintiff, converted by him to his own use, was the proceeds of crops grown on the leased premises, and therefore he could offset his claim which arose from a *907breach of the lease contract. But the pleadings do not disclose that the check cashed by defendant was given plaintiff for crops grown on the leased premises. Defendant merely alleges that plaintiff had $63.10 worth of cotton to which he was entitled by the rent contract and that defendant applied said sum to the payment of the debt due him for his mule. But, even if it had been alleged that the money converted by defendant to his own use was the proceeds of rent cotton, such fact would not show that'defendant’s cross-action was connected with or incident to plaintiffs cause of action. Plaintiff’s cause of action is founded upon tort, and is not dependent upon the contract. Defendant contends that plaintiff could only recover upon the ground that he was appellee’s tenant under a contract to receive one-half of what he made on appellee’s land. This contention is erroneous. Plaintiff can recover by showing the conversion by defendant of the proceeds of a check belonging to plaintiff, and defendant can defeat the action to the extent of one-half by showing that one-half of the sum was justly due him by plaintiff. He then goes further and shows that he has an unliquidated claim for damages for tort which is connected with the contract he sets up to defeat plaintiff’s suit to the extent of one-half, but is not connected with, arising out of, or incident to plaintiff’s cause of action. The exception should have been sustained.
The former judgment of this court is set aside, and judgment entered as follows: That the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and judgment here rendered in favor of appellant against appellee for $63.10, with interest thereon from October 17, 1913, at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum, and all costs incurred in all of the courts, and dismissing appellee’s cross-action without prejudice.