Court Opinion

ID: 2795196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-04-20 21:11:35.143807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:04.453058
License: Public Domain

o
                                                                                               wo
           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON                                  -Her
                                                                                       en      >,PO
                                                                                                 CD
In the Matter of the Marriage of                          No. 72830-0-1                •20     a-rj
LUCINDA B. CARPENTER,                                                                  ro      -176 Wn. App. 185, 195, 312 P.3d 976 (2013).

       Under CR 55(a)(3), a party who "has appeared in the action for any purpose" is

entitled to notice of another party's motion for default. CR 55(a) states, in pertinent part:

                (1) Motion. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
       relief is sought has failed to appear, plead, or otherwise defend as provided
       by these rules and that fact is made to appear by motion and affidavit, a
       motion for default may be made.

               (3) Notice. Any party who has appeared in the action for any
       purpose shall be served with a written notice of motion for default and the
       supporting affidavit at least 5 days before the hearing on the motion. Any
       party who has not appeared before the motion for default and supporting
       affidavit are filed is not entitled to a notice of the motion, except as provided
       in rule 55(f)(2)(A).

       "A defendant appears in an action when he or she answers, demurs, makes any

application for an order therein, or gives the plaintiff written notice of his or her

appearance." RCW 4.28.210.

       Bradley argues that the acceptance of service of process is the equivalent of a

notice of appearance for purposes of CR 55(a)(3). We disagree.

       Acceptance of service of process, without more, does not constitute an

appearance. To appear by filing a notice of appearance, the notice must "be in writing,

shall be signed by the defendant or his attorney, and shall be served upon the person

whose name is signed on the summons." CR 4(a)(3); see In re Estate of Stevens, 94
No. 72830-0-1/6

Wn. App. 20, 32, 971 P.2d 58 (1999) (defendant did not appear by "accepting] service

of the petition, summons, and notice of hearing" and then choosing "to do nothing").

       Bradley's reliance on Southerlin v. Automotive Electronics Corp., 773 P.2d 599

(Colo. App. 1988), is misplaced. In Southerlin, the parties entered into "a stipulation in

open court" to resolve objections to a foreclosure. Southerlin, 773 P.2d at 600. The

plaintiffs later filed a lawsuit against the defendants and attached the stipulation to the

complaint. Southerlin, 773 P.2d at 600. The defendants' attorney "signed a written

acceptance of service, indicating that he was doing so 'as the attorney' for defendants."

Southerlin, 773 P.2d at 600. After accepting service of process, the defendants'

attorney and the plaintiffs' attorney entered into a "specific agreement extending the

time for defendants to file a responsive pleading." Southerlin, 773 P.2d at 602. The

Colorado Court of Appeals held that defendants were entitled to notice of the motion for

default "[i]n light of all of these circumstances." Southerlin, 773 P.2d at 602.

       Here, there is no dispute that Bradley received the summons and the petition for

legal separation on June 14. There is also no dispute that Bradley did not file a notice

of appearance until after the court entered the decree on September 30.

       The summons clearly informed Bradley that the court could enter an order of

default if he did not file a written response within 20 days of service, and that he was

entitled to notice before entry of an order of default only if he served a notice of

appearance on Lucinda. The summons states, in pertinent part:

       If you do not serve your written response within 20 days . . . after the date
       this summons was served on you, . . . the Court may enter an order of
       default against you, and the Court may, without further notice to you, enter
       a decree and approve or provide for the relief requested in the petition. . . .
       If you serve a notice of appearance on the undersigned person, you are
       entitled to notice before an order of default or a decree may be entered.
No. 72830-0-1/7

       Bradley admits he met with an attorney about the petition in June but chose not

to hire an attorney until "late September," after entry of the order of default. Because

Bradley did not appear in the legal separation proceeding, he was not entitled to notice

of the motion for default.

CR 54(c)

       Bradley also contends the court erred in granting relief that exceeds or differs

from the relief requested in the petition for legal separation.

       Under CR 54(c), "[a] judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or

exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment." "To the extent a default

judgment exceeds relief requested in the complaint, that portion of the judgment is

void." In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wn.2d 612, 618, 772 P.2d 1013(1989).

       Here, the allocation of assets and liabilities does not exceed or differ from the

relief Lucinda requested. The petition for legal separation specifically requested a "fair

and equitable division of all the property" and an award of "attorney fees, other

professional fees and costs."

Allocation of Assets and Liabilities

       In the alternative, Bradley contends the court abused its discretion in allocating

the assets and liabilities.

       We review a trial court's division of marital property for a manifest abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d 795, 803, 108 P.3d 779 (2005).

" 'A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on

untenable grounds or untenable reasons.'" Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d at 803 (quoting in

re Marriage of Littlefield. 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997)). We review a
No. 72830-0-1/8

trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn.

App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence

sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true. Olson, 69 Wn.

App. at 626. In determining whether substantial evidence supports the court's findings,

we review the record "in the light most favorable to the party in whose favor the findings

were entered." In re Marriage of Gillespie, 89 Wn. App. 390, 404, 948 P.2d 1338

(1997). Where, as here, the court does not enter explicit findings as to the value of

property allocated, "the appellate court may look to the record to determine the value of

the assets." In re Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 712, 986 P.2d 144 (1999).

        Bradley asserts the court abused its discretion in allocating assets and liabilities

because neither the decree of legal separation nor the findings of fact and conclusions

of law state the value of the assets or the amount of the "obligations related to Treos

Cafe." Bradley also asserts substantial evidence does not support the valuation of the

other liabilities.

        But the record establishes Bradley did not challenge Lucinda's valuation of the

retirement accounts, the vehicles, the Whistler time-share property, or the debt related

to Treos Cafe.3 See RAP 2.5(a) ("The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of

error which was not raised in the trial court.").

        Below, Bradley challenged the valuation of only the family home. The record

supports the court's valuation of the family home. Lucinda submitted a declaration

stating the house has "a value of approximately $475,000.00 subject to a debt of

        3 Lucinda testified her retirement account has "a balance of approximately $19,0000.00" and
Bradley's retirement account "has a value that I believe is in excess of $100,000.00." Lucinda testified
that her car has "substantially negative equity" and Bradley's car "has a value approximately equal to its
debt." Lucinda also testified that "the Treos Cafe that [Bradley] owns is worth . . . equal to or greater than
the debt he is assuming."
No. 72830-0-1/9

$269,000.00 which, after sales costs, would net about $155,000.00." In response,

Bradley claimed the outstanding debt on the first mortgage is "approximately

$271,000.00," the debt on the second mortgage is "around $150,000.00," and the value

of the home is "approximately $570,000.00." In his second declaration, Bradley

asserted the home "is listed by Zillow at $538,727.00." Bradley's estimate of the net

equity value of the home does not differ substantially from Lucinda's $155,000.00

valuation. Bradley testified that "after the first and second mortgage the house has

between $140,000.00 and $150,000.00 in equity at this time." Viewed in the light most

favorable to Lucinda, substantial evidence in the record supports the court's valuation of

the family home. See Gillespie, 89 Wn. App. at 404.

       Bradley also claims the allocation of assets and liabilities is not just and

equitable. In a legal separation proceeding, the court must "make such disposition of

the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as shall

appear just and equitable." RCW 26.09.080. The court must consider a number of

factors, including the "economic circumstances of each spouse or domestic partner at

the time the division of property is to become effective." RCW 26.09.080(4).

       The court's "paramount concern" in allocating assets and liabilities is "the

economic condition in which the decree leaves the parties." Gillespie, 89 Wn. App. at

399. Because the trial court is in "the best position to assess the assets and liabilities of

the parties," it has "broad discretion" to determine what is just and equitable under the

circumstances. In re Marriage of Brewer, 137 Wn.2d 756, 769, 976 P.2d 102 (1999).

       Bradley relies on his assertion of the relative income of the parties to argue the

allocation of assets and liabilities is not just and equitable. But the 2012 income tax
No. 72830-0-1/10

return Bradley submitted shows he received far more in retirement account distributions

than Lucinda's gross earnings. Substantial evidence supports the valuation and

allocation of the assets and liabilities.

        Bradley also contends the court erred in awarding Lucinda attorney fees for

responding to his motion to vacate the decree of legal separation but provides no

citation to authority in support of his argument. See RAP 10.3(a)(6) (Appellant's brief

must contain "argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with

citations to legal authority."); Regan v. McLachlan, 163 Wn. App. 171, 178, 257 P.3d

1122 (2011) ("We will not address issues raised without proper citation to legal

authority.").

       We affirm entry of the decree of legal separation.4

                                                                 A*r~dQ<,K ,
WE CONCUR:

      )Jy/_ ( ^o^~          , >S.J >                              /^f^^r-, 148 Wn. App. 887, 906, 201 P.3d 1056 (2009); In re Marriage of
Mattson. 95 Wn. App. 592, 605-06, 976 P.2d 157 (1999).

                                                   10