Court Opinion

ID: 9772979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:34:15.654461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.552753
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion. It is not necessary for us to reach the question of whether TEX.INS.CODE ANN. art. 5.82 § 4 (1975) (now TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4590i § 10.01) (Vernon’s Supp.1984) is unconstitutional because all issues can be disposed of on other grounds.
The court’s opinion is inconsistent in holding that the parents have a cause of action for wrongful birth but that the child does not have a cause of action for wrongful life. The court’s opinion is merely using the labels of “wrongful life” and “wrongful birth,” the meaning of which is the same, in an attempt to differentiate truly identical causes of action; one which is brought by the parents, and the other which is brought by the child. On the one hand the court is saying that the child has no cause of action for wrongful life based upon the public policy that life, in whatever condition, is more valuable than non-life. On the other hand, the court does an about-face and holds that the parents have a cause of action for wrongful birth. In so doing, the court ignores the logical extension of its prior statement that courts are unable to make a comparison between life in whatever condition as opposed to non-*936life. If that is true, it must follow that the courts are in no better position to determine if the parents are better off with a child with physical defects requiring medical expense than with no child at all.
I would overrule Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.1975).
I would affirm the judgments of the courts below holding that the Plaintiffs Tom L. Nelson et al. take nothing.
McGEE, J., joins in this dissent.