Court Opinion

ID: 9839390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 23:00:30.193075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:16.657863
License: Public Domain

21-6272
     Ahmed v. Garland
                                                                                  BIA
                                                                          McCarthy, IJ
                                                                          A206 733 418

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                              SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of September, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                  MICHAEL H. PARK,
 8                  ALISON J. NATHAN,
 9                  SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   JAHED AHMED,
14           Petitioner,
15
16                  v.                                           21-6272-ag
17
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23
24
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                    Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, Esq., New York,
 2                                      NY.
 3
 4   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
 5                                      Attorney General; Holly M. Smith, Assistant
 6                                      Director; Kasey J. Chapman, Attorney, Office
 7                                      of Immigration Litigation, United States
 8                                      Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

 9         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

10   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

11   AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

12         Petitioner Jahed Ahmed, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks review of

13   an April 23, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming an October 30, 2018 decision of an

14   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

15   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jahed

16   Ahmed, No. A206 733 418 (B.I.A. Apr. 23, 2021), aff’g No. A206 733 418 (Immigr. Ct.

17   N.Y.C. Oct. 30, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

18   facts and procedural history.

19         Under the circumstances, we have considered the IJ’s decision as

20   supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.

21   2005). We review an adverse credibility determination “under the substantial

22   evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and
                                             2
 1   presume “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable

 2   adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

 3   § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 4         Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier
 5         of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or
 6         responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the
 7         applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or
 8         witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not
 9         under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements
10         were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency
11         of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies
12         or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an
13         inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's
14         claim, or any other relevant factor.
15
16   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination

17   unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-

18   finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

19   534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

20         Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Ahmed was

21   not credible as to his claim that members of the Awami League attacked him and

22   his father on account of their involvement with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party

23   (“BNP”). First, the agency reasonably relied on Ahmed’s inconsistent statements

24   regarding whether his father was beaten to death, when he was attacked, and what

                                               3
 1   role he had in the BNP. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d

 2   137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien

 3   from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple

 4   inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”).         Ahmed failed to

 5   adequately explain these inconsistencies, and instead changed his testimony,

 6   which introduced additional inconsistencies. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77,

 7   80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

 8   for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a

 9   reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (quotation

10   marks omitted)).

11         The agency also reasonably relied on Ahmed’s failure to state his age

12   consistently or to provide a plausible age for his mother.              See 8 U.S.C.

13   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2007)

14   (recognizing that an adverse credibility determination may be based on inherent

15   implausibility if the finding “is tethered to the evidentiary record” or “record

16   facts . . . viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary experience”).

17         Contrary to Ahmed’s argument, the IJ was not required to give him an

18   additional opportunity to provide corroborating evidence.           See Wei Sun v.

                                               4
 1   Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 31 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is reasonable not to require that

 2   applicants receive a second opportunity to present their case after the IJ identified

 3   the specific evidence they need to prevail.”). And there is no merit to Ahmed’s

 4   argument that the IJ ignored issues with the language interpretation at his hearing.

 5   He does not identify any such issues but instead points to an instance in which he

 6   claimed not to have understood a question only to admit later that he had

 7   understood but misremembered a date, along with instances when the interpreter

 8   asked for clarification or requested that an attorney speak louder or repeat a

 9   question. Cf. Guo Qi Wang v. Holder, 583 F.3d 86, 89 n.1 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting a

10   mistranslation argument because petitioner “failed to identify any translation

11   errors that significantly alter[ed] the meaning of his testimony”).

12         We conclude that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was

13   supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao, 968

14   F.3d at 145 n.8; Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165–67.            The adverse credibility

15   determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.

16   See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

17

                                               5
1        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

2   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

3                                      FOR THE COURT:
4                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
5                                      Clerk of Court

                                         6