Court Opinion

ID: 9929987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 20:09:06.114948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:58:02.272360
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hennigan, 2024-Ohio-404.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                    CASE NO. 2023-L-058

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                  Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                    Court of Common Pleas

COREY J. HENNIGAN,
                                                  Trial Court No. 2022 CR 001199
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                              OPINION

                                     Decided: February 5, 2024
                                        Judgment: Affirmed

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Jennifer A. McGee, Assistant
Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490,
Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Brian A. Smith, Brian A. Smith Law Firm, LLC, 123 South Miller Road, Suite 250,
Fairlawn, OH 44333 (For Defendant-Appellant).

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

        {¶1}      Defendant-appellant, Corey J. Hennigan (“Appellant”), appeals from his

conviction of Domestic Violence, a first-degree misdemeanor, Failure to Comply With

Order or Signal of Police Officer, a felony of the third degree, and Obstructing Official

Business, a felony of the fifth degree, from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas. For

the following reasons, we affirm.

        {¶2}     On December 20, 2022, the Lake County Grand Jury returned a four-count

indictment charging appellant with, Abduction, a third degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2919.25(A)(2) (Count 1), Domestic Violence, a first degree misdemeanor, in violation of

R.C. 2923.161(A) (Count 2), Failure to Comply with Order or Signal of Police Officer, a

third degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) (Count 3), and Obstructing Official

Business, a fifth degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2921.31 (Count 4).1

        {¶3}    Appellant entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment on December 27, 2022,

and bond was continued at $75,000.00. On January 25, 2023, appellant filed a notice of

alibi, alleging that at the time of the charged offenses, he was at or near property located

in Follansbee, West Virginia. 2

        {¶4}    On April 5, 2023, the State filed a motion to determine the admissibility of

evidence, certified Verizon records, or, in the alternative, to allow for witness to testify via

remote means. Similar motions were filed by the State pertaining to certified Google

records on April 12, 2023.

        {¶5}    This matter proceeded to a jury trial on April 17, 2023.

        {¶6}    The following facts were established at trial.

        {¶7}    A.M. testified that she and appellant were visiting appellant’s parents in

Rock Creek, Ohio on April 11, 2022. According to A.M., she and appellant left around

5:00 or 6:00 p.m. in a white Chevy hatchback. A.M. believed that they were going to see

the appellant’s niece. A.M. testified that appellant then travelled in a different direction

travelling toward Fairport Harbor. A.M. and appellant began to argue. Appellant then

punched A.M. in the face multiple times. A.M. testified that she tried to exit the moving

vehicle several times, but appellant would maneuver the vehicle to cause the door to

1. This case originated in Painesville Municipal Court, Case No. 22CRA01683, which was bound over on
October 27, 2022.
2. At some point, the alibi was withdrawn as noted by defense counsel during the trial. T.p. Vol. III, p. 228.
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Case No. 2023-L-058
close. A.M. also testified she attempted to move to the back seat to avoid appellant’s

strikes but was unsuccessful. She called 911.

       {¶8}   At 5:59 p.m. on April 11, 2022, Fairport Harbor Police Officer Kyle Ochsner

(“Officer Ochsner”) was dispatched for a 911 hang up. Dispatch was able to conduct a

fast person search and identified the phone number of the caller as belonging to A.M.

Officer Ochsner responded to the area of High Street and Sixth Street in Fairport Harbor,

Lake County, Ohio. A.M. testified that when she saw the police officer’s vehicle, she was

able to get out of the Chevy driven by appellant.

       {¶9}   Officer Ochsner located A.M. walking on the corner of Sixth Street and Plum

Street. He testified that A.M.’s face was “covered in blood and she had blood on her shirt.”

Officer Ochsner requested the fire department to assist given A.M.’s injuries. Jeffrey

Smith, a firefighter/paramedic for Fairport Harbor Fire Department arrived to assess

A.M.’s injuries. He testified that A.M. was “obviously assaulted. She had blood dripping

from her face, her hands, and her shirt were covered in blood as well.” Photographs were

taken of her injuries.

       {¶10} A.M. reported to Officer Ochsner that the appellant hit her and provided a

description of the vehicle. During their encounter, the appellant drove by in the Chevy

Malibu Maxx (a white hatchback) and A.M. was able to point out the vehicle to Officer

Ochsner. Officer Ochsner left A.M. with the fire department for treatment and pursued

appellant. Appellant then led Officer Ochsner on a high-speed pursuit lasting

approximately 16 minutes and spanning approximately 21 miles. Officer Ochsner testified

that appellant was driving more than the posted speed limits and in places exceeding 100

miles per hour. According to Officer Ochsner and the dash cam video of the pursuit,

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Case No. 2023-L-058
Appellant failed to stop at several stop signs, and nearly hit other vehicles. The roadways

were wet, it was raining, and visibility was diminished. The pursuit was ultimately

terminated without apprehension.

       {¶11} A.M., who was without health insurance, refused to go to the hospital.

Instead, she was taken to the Fairport Harbor Village Hall. Officer Ochsner returned to

speak with A.M. and he took additional photographs of her injuries. A.M. provided

appellant’s phone number and two email addresses, as well as appellant’s possible

location at Andover Lake Campgrounds.

       {¶12} A search warrant was obtained for Google records from the email

addresses as well as the Verizon phone records for appellant’s cell phone number. Officer

Kevin Rastall of the Willoughby Police Department utilized the Zetx program to upload

the electronic records obtained from Google and Verizon into Google Earth. This

information put appellant’s phone in Erie or Greater Edinboro, PA the following day, April

12, 2022.

       {¶13} On April 19, 2023, the jury found appellant guilty of Count 2, Domestic

Violence, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A); Count 3, Failure to

Comply With Order or Signal of Police Officer, a felony of the third degree, in violation of

R.C. 2921.331(B); and Count 4, Obstructing Official Business, a felony of the fifth degree,

in violation of R.C. 2921.31. The jury did not return a verdict on Count 1, Abduction. Bond

was revoked and a presentence investigation (“PSI”) was ordered.

       {¶14} A sentencing hearing was held on May 17, 2023. The trial court determined

that Count 3 and 4 merged for purposes of sentencing and the State elected to proceed

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on Count 3. The court below sentenced appellant to 180 days on Count 2 which was

ordered to run concurrently with the 36-month sentence imposed on Count 3.

       {¶15} Appellant timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error:

              [1]. Appellant’s convictions are against the manifest weight of
              the evidence.

              [2]. The failure of [a]ppellant’s trial counsel to object to the
              State’s presentation of photographs of the alleged victim,
              A.M., and of her injuries allegedly inflicted by appellant,
              marked as State’s Exhibits 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 3A, and 3B,
              constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of
              Appellant’s right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
              Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
              Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. [T.t. 125-126, 147, 279].

              [3]. The trial court’s decision to admit State’s Exhibits 2A, 2B,
              2C, 2D, 3A, and 3B constituted plain error and violated
              [a]ppellant’s right to Due Process under the Fifth and
              Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
              and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. [T.t. 125-
              126, 147, 279].

              [4]. The trial court’s decision to admit electronic data, from
              [a]ppellant’s cell phone and Google accounts, from April 12,
              2022, following the alleged pursuit of [a]ppellant’s vehicle,
              was an abuse of discretion, in violation of [a]ppellant’s right to
              Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
              the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the
              Ohio Constitution. [T.t. 7, 235-237, 254].

       {¶16} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that his convictions are

against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

       {¶17} “[W]eight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing

belief.” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25. “In

other words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence is more persuasive—the state’s or

the defendant’s?” Id. “‘The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in
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Case No. 2023-L-058
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [factfinder] clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting

State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

       {¶18} “‘When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis

that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a

‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting

testimony.’” Id., quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652

(1982). “‘The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the

exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id.,

quoting Martin at 175.

       {¶19} As noted above, appellant was convicted of Domestic Violence, in violation

of R.C. 2919.25(A); Failure to Comply with Order or Signal of Police Officer in violation of

R.C. 2921.331(B); and Obstructing Official Business in violation of R.C. 2921.31.

       {¶20} R.C. 2919.25(A) provides: “[n]o person shall knowingly cause or attempt to

cause physical harm to a family or household member.”

       {¶21} R.C. 2921.331(B) provides: “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle so as

willfully to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal from a

police officer to bring the person's motor vehicle to a stop.”

       {¶22} R.C 2921.31 (A) provides: “[n]o person, without privilege to do so and with

purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any

authorized act within the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or

impedes a public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties.”

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Case No. 2023-L-058
       {¶23} In regard to the domestic violence conviction, appellant alleges that “A.M.’s

testimony was not credible,” thus, his conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

       {¶24} When assessing witness credibility, “[t]he choice between credible

witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact and an

appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.” State v.

Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986). This is because the trier of fact is

in the best position to “observe and evaluate the demeanor, voice inflection, and gestures

of the witnesses.” State v. Dach, 11th Dist. Trumbull Nos. 2005-T-0048, 2005-T-0054,

2006-Ohio-3428, ¶ 42. “A fact finder is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony

of each witness appearing before it.” State v. Fetty, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0091,

2012-Ohio-6127, ¶ 58.

       {¶25} Appellant asserts that A.M.’s testimony was incredible because she could

not testify to the exact number of times appellant struck her, and because A.M. testified

to additional facts which she did not provide in her written statement. Appellant also notes

that A.M. did not approach the officer but was walking away from him until he exited his

car. The jury was free to believe all or none of the testimony.

       {¶26} A.M.’s testimony did not reveal any inconsistencies or suggest that her

testimony was not credible. In fact, A.M. consistently stated in her written statement and

at trial that appellant struck her repeatedly causing physical injury.

       {¶27} Notably, after consideration of the evidence, the jury could not reach a

unanimous verdict as to the abduction charge. The record supports the jury’s conclusion,

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Case No. 2023-L-058
and their decision does not create a miscarriage of justice. As such, appellant’s conviction

for domestic violence is consistent with the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶28} With respect to his convictions of failure to comply with order or signal of

police officer and obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31, Appellant

argues that these convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence as Officer

Ochsner was “the only person to witness Hennigan behind the wheel of the vehicle during

the pursuit” and that his identification was “tainted by confirmation bias.” A.M. testified

that appellant was operating the Chevy Malibu Maxx when he began punching her. No

one else was in the vehicle except for a dog. During her interaction with Officer Ochsner,

appellant drove by. A.M. pointed out the vehicle shortly after Officer Ochsner arrived on

the scene. Officer Ochsner pursued the vehicle and became locked in a circular driving

pattern where he observed, through the open driver-side window, the appellant. Officer

Ochsner testified that he had “no doubt” that appellant was the driver of the Chevy Malibu

Maxx that he pursued on April 11, 2022.

       {¶29} The jury was free to believe all or none of the testimony provided by Officer

Ochsner. The record supports the jury’s conclusion, and their decision does not create a

miscarriage of justice. As such, appellant’s convictions are consistent with the manifest

weight of the evidence.

       {¶30} Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶31} In his second assignment of error, appellant alleges that trial court was

ineffective for failing to object to the State’s presentation of photographs of A.M., which

were admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibits 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 3A, and 3B.

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Case No. 2023-L-058
       {¶32} In his third assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in

admitting State’s Exhibits 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 3A, and 3B.

       {¶33} Because the second and third assignments of error relate to photographic

evidence that was admitted at trial, these assignments of error will be discussed

collectively.

       {¶34} A decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the

trial court. State v. Thompson, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2018-P-0099, 2020-Ohio-67, ¶ 87.

Absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s decision.

Id., citing State v. Sledge, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2001-T-0123, 2003-Ohio-4100, ¶ 20.

       {¶35} “The failure to object to the admission of evidence waives all but plain error.

State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 108. See Evid.R.

103(D) (“Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain error affecting substantial

rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court”); Crim.R. 52(B) (“[p]lain

errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not

brought to the attention of the court”).” Thompson at ¶ 88.

       {¶36} Defense counsel did not object to the admission of State’s Exhibits 2A, 2B,

2C, 2D, 3A, or 3B. Thus, we review for plain error.

       {¶37} “A reviewing court is subject to three limits when correcting plain error: (1)

there must be an error or deviation from a legal rule, (2) which is plain, i.e., an obvious

error in the trial proceedings (3) affecting a ‘substantial right,’ meaning the trial court's

error affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Taugner, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2022-P-

0043, 2023-Ohio-2117, ¶ 13, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d

1240 (2002).

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Case No. 2023-L-058
       {¶38} Appellant argues the photographs were gruesome and their admission ran

afoul of Evid. R. 403.

       {¶39} This Court noted in State v. O'Brien, 2013-Ohio-13, 986 N.E.2d 531, ¶ 51

(11th Dist.):

                As to the introduction of photographs in a non-capital murder
                case, the mere fact that [photographs] are gruesome or
                horrendous is not an automatic reason for exclusion. [State v.
                Handwork, 11th Dist. No. 2002-P-0134, 2004-Ohio-6181,], at
                ¶ 21. Instead, the basic balancing test under Evid.R. 403(A)
                must be employed; i.e., it must be decided if the probative
                value of the photographs is substantially outweighed by the
                danger of unfair prejudice. [State v. Kovacic, 2012-Ohio-219,
                969 N.E.2d 322 ¶ 29 (11th Dist.)].

       {¶40} A total of six photographs were admitted depicting A.M.’s injuries to her face

which include blood, bruising, and swelling. The first set of photographs, State’s Exhibits

2A and 2B, depicted the injuries as observed by Officer Ochsner when he first arrived on

scene. The second set of photographs, State’s Exhibits 2C and 2D, depicted the injuries

a few hours later after A.M. was treated by paramedics. These pictures show some

increased redness and swelling, with minimal blood on her shirt. The third set of

photographs were of the injuries a day later, which depict increased bruising and swelling.

These photographs corroborate the testimony of the witnesses, including the victim’s

testimony that appellant struck her repeatedly in the face. The photographs also tracked

the visual progression of A.M.’s injuries which were consist with an assault.

       {¶41} Upon review of the record, we conclude that the probative value of the

photographs was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the

defendant. Moreover, these photographs were not cumulative. While they depict the

same injuries, the photographs offer different views and provide a progression of the

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Case No. 2023-L-058
injuries. As such, the admission of these photographs did not constitute plain error.

Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶42} Turning now to appellant’s second assignment of error regarding counsel’s

alleged failure to object to the admission of these photographs, the Supreme Court of

Ohio noted in State v. Burke, 97 Ohio St.3d 55, 2002-Ohio-5310, 776 N.E.2d 79, ¶ 6-7:

              Under Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
              2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], a defendant claiming
              ineffective assistance of counsel “must show that counsel's
              representation fell below an objective standard of
              reasonableness.” Id. at 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
              674. He must also show that the ineffective representation
              prejudiced his case: “The defendant must show that there is a
              reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
              errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
              A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
              undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct.
              2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. See, also, State v. Bradley (1989), 42
              Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraphs two and three of
              the syllabus.

              Under Strickland, a court must apply “a heavy measure of
              deference to counsel's judgments,” 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct.
              2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, and “indulge a strong presumption that
              counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
              professional assistance.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
              L.Ed.2d 674.

       {¶43} Therefore, in order to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

the defendant must satisfy the two-prong test as set forth in Strickland. First, he must

show that counsel’s performance was deficient, which requires appellant to show that his

trial counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687. He must also show that

the ineffective representation prejudiced his case: “The defendant must also “show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

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Case No. 2023-L-058
of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. See, also, State v. Bradley,

42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.

       {¶44} Because we concluded that the trial court did not err in the admission of the

photographs of the victim’s injuries, Appellant cannot satisfy either prong of the Strickland

test. Thus, his second assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶45} In appellant’s fourth and final assignment of error, appellant alleges that the

trial court erred in admitting electronic data from appellant’s cell phone and Google

accounts from April 12, 2022.

       {¶46} As noted above, we review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude

evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Thompson, 2020-Ohio-67, at ¶ 87.

Absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s decision.

Id., citing State v. Sledge, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2001-T-0123, 2003-Ohio-4100, ¶ 20.

An abuse of discretion is “the trial court’s ‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal

decision-making.’” State v. Raia, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2013-P-0020, 2014-Ohio-2707,

¶ 9, quoting State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62,

quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004).

       {¶47} Appellant asserts that the Verizon and Google records were inadmissible

as they were irrelevant and prejudicial. Specifically, appellant argues that “any electronic

data from the following day was irrelevant to whether Hennigan was guilty of any of the

four counts in the Indictment.” As previously noted, appellant filed a notice of alibi,

indicating that he was in West Virginia at the time of the alleged offenses. At some point,

this notice was withdrawn by counsel prior to the testimony of Officer Rastall. The State

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Case No. 2023-L-058
argues that the evidence was relevant to establish flight and in turn, consciousness of

guilt.

         {¶48} “It is ‘well established that the flight of an accused from justice is admissible

as evidence of the consciousness of guilt * * * “and thus of guilt itself.” (Citation omitted.)’

State v. James, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2022-T-0107, 2023-Ohio-3524, ¶ 61, quoting

State v. Cline, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2007-T-0052, 2008-Ohio-1500, ¶ 60. “‘The

probative value of flight as circumstantial evidence of guilt depends upon the degree of

confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from the defendant's behavior to

flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to

consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt

concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged.’” (Citation omitted.)

State v. Kessler Scott, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2022-L-018, 2022-Ohio-4054, ¶ 46. See James

at ¶ 61.

         {¶49} “It has been held that ‘[f]light is more than merely leaving the scene of the

crime—it would be unrealistic to expect persons who commit crimes to remain on the

scene for ready apprehension.’” James at ¶ 62, quoting State v. Ramos, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 103596, 2016-Ohio-7685, ¶ 28.

         {¶50} As this Court has noted in James:

                Flight includes “‘some escape or affirmative attempt to avoid
                apprehension’” and “requires the accused to appreciate that
                he or she has been identified as a person of interest in a
                criminal offense and is taking active measures to avoid being
                found.” (Citations omitted.) Kessler Scott at ¶ 45. “The jury
                may infer that such circumstances demonstrate that the
                accused is avoiding the police only because he or she knows
                he or she is guilty and wishes to avoid the inevitable
                consequences of his or her crime.” Id.

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James, at ¶ 62.

       {¶51} The jury was given the following instruction prior to deliberations:

                      “Testimony has been admitted indicating that the
                      defendant fled Fairport Harbor, Lake County, Ohio.
                      You are instructed that flight alone does not raise a
                      presumption of guilt but it may tend to indicate the
                      defendant's consciousness or awareness of guilt. If you
                      find that the facts do not support that the defendant
                      fled, or if you find that some other motive prompted the
                      defendant's conduct, or if you are unable to decide
                      what the defendant's motivation was, then you should
                      not consider this evidence for any purpose. However,
                      if you find the facts support that the defendant engaged
                      in such conduct and if you decide that the defendant
                      was motivated by a consciousness or awareness of
                      guilt, you may, but are not required to, consider that
                      evidence in deciding whether the defendant is guilty of
                      the crimes charged. You alone will determine what
                      weight, if any, to give to this evidence.”

       {¶52} Appellant argues that the testimony should have been excluded as its

probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Evid.R.

403(A). We disagree.

       {¶53} At trial, Officer Ochsner testified that that the pursuit of appellant was

terminated. Appellant was not apprehended at that time. Officer Ochsner attempted to

locate appellant. A.M. did provide a possible location of Appellant, but neither he nor the

Chevy were there. He then obtained search warrants for Google and Verizon records of

appellant’s email accounts and cell phone number. These records were later uploaded to

software by Officer Rastall.

       {¶54} Officer Rastall testified that the information which includes the location of

the tower which was used, can be plotted using Google Earth. The exhibit created with

this information was presented to the jury. The location data did not place appellant in or
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Case No. 2023-L-058
near the area of the crime when the crime occurred. However, later pings placed

appellant’s phone around Greater Edinboro or Erie, Pennsylvania, the day after the

underlying offenses occurred. Officer Rastall was also subject to cross-examination

regarding his direct testimony and methodology for creating the cell-site location chart

with Google Earth.

       {¶55} This evidence could be considered by the jury, in conjunction with the

testimony, that appellant was aware he or she has been identified as a person of interest

in a criminal offense, to wit domestic violence, and was taking active measures to avoid

being found by fleeing to a neighboring state. James, 2023-Ohio-3524 at ¶ 62. See also

Kessler Scott, 2022-Ohio-4054, ¶ 45.

       {¶56} Based upon our review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the electronic data from Verizon and Google from April 12, 2022.

Thus, appellant’s fourth and final assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶57} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Lake County Court

of Common Pleas.

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.,

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

concur.

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