Court Opinion

ID: 9762140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:12:08.625592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:30.713478
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Judge:
This is an appeal by the natural mother from an order terminating her parental rights.1
Barbara C. was 17 years old at the time of Michael’s birth on April 24, 1981. Approximately one month before his birth, she decided to place her child for adoption and made arrangements with an attorney who was to act as the intermediary. While she was still in the hospital recuperating from the baby’s birth, Barbara executed an Affidavit of Consent and surrendered the child to the intermediary who then turned the child over to George and Barbara A., the preadoptive parents. On June 8, 1981, a Report of Intent to Adopt was filed. Some time during the summer, Barbara contacted the intermediary and requested visitation with Michael and his ultimate return to her. When these re*150quests were denied, Barbara filed a habeas corpus petition, on August 12, 1981. This petition was transferred to the Orphans’ Court Division on September 14, 1981, and a hearing was scheduled for October 20,1981. On September 16, 1981, Barbara’s request for visitation was denied without a hearing. The petition to involuntarily terminate Barbara’s parental rights was not filed until October 27, 1981. Further delays ensued and hearings were finally held on January 5, 6 and 7, 1982. Ultimately, the Honorable Francis Catania entered an order terminating Barbara’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). Barbara appealed and a panel of this court affirmed with Judge Lipez dissenting. Barbara’s petition for reargument before the court en banc was granted.
Barbara first argues that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that she had timely revoked her consent to the adoption and in failing to order Michael’s return to her immediately upon such revocation. The natural parent’s “right” to revoke a consent to adoption is derived from the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2101 et seq. The general rule is that the natural parent’s consent to an adoption is required. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(a)(3).2 Regardless of § 2711, however, consent is not required if the parent’s rights have already been terminated or if, after notice and hearing, the court finds that grounds for involuntary termination exist under § 2511 of the Act. 23 Pa.C. S.A. § 2714. Thus, the revocation of consent by a natural parent does not automatically halt the adoption proceeding. Rather, it triggers an inquiry into the statutory grounds for involuntary termination set forth in § 2511(a). Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, 289 Pa.Super. 495, 433 A.2d 1363 (1981). These are:
*151(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(3) The parent is the presumptive but not the natural father of the child.
(4) The child is in the custody of an agency, having been found under such circumstances that the identity or whereabouts of the parent is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent search and the parent does not claim the child within three months after the child is found.
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the condition which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a).
In terminating Barbara’s rights, Judge Catania specifically relied on § 2511(a)(2). We are not, therefore, dealing with the six-month period set forth in § 2511(a)(1). Cf., Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, supra; K.N. v. Cades, 288 Pa.Super. 555, 432 A.2d 1010 (1981)3. For these rea*152sons, we cannot accept appellant’s argument that her revocation of consent within six months required the trial court to return Michael to her and terminate the adoption proceeding.
Appellant’s main argument centers around the applicability of § 2511(a)(2) to the involuntary termination of parental rights of a natural parent within the factual context presented here; that is, where the natural parent voluntarily surrenders the child for adoption to an intermediary, who is not an agency (a “private” adoption), the surrender takes place prior to the mother’s discharge from the hospital after the birth, and the mother revokes her consent to the adoption within six months (so as to make § 2511(a)(1) inapplicable).
In any context, the complete and irrevocable termination of parental rights is one of the most serious and severe steps a court can take, carrying with it great emotional impact for both the parent and the child. In re Adoption of Sarver, 444 Pa. 507, 281 A.2d 890 (1971). The right to conceive and raise one’s children has long been recognized as one of our basic civil rights. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). Freedom of personal choice in matters of family life, and the concomitant freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion, is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Because of the importance placed on the family unit, governmental intrusion into the family, and disruption of the parent-child relationship, is warranted only in exceptional circumstances. Even when such intrusion is warranted, it must be accompanied by every possible effort to reunite the family. Matter of M.L.W., 307 Pa.Super. 29, 452 A.2d 1021 (1982). Termination of parental rights does more than disrupt the parent-child relationship; it totally *153destroys it. “The termination of parental rights, however, means that the child is dead so far as that parent is concerned.” In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228 (1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting). The standard of proof is the same whether the termination action is brought by the state or by private individuals because of the state’s parens patriae interest. In re T.R., 318 Pa. 460, 465 A.2d 642 (1983).
Involuntary termination of parental rights can only be accomplished through the statutory scheme set forth in the Adoption Act and only as an aid to adoption. In re B.E., 474 Pa. 139, 377 A.2d 153 (1977). To effect an adoption, this statutory scheme must be strictly complied with. In re Adoption of E.M.A., 487 Pa. 152, 409 A.2d 10 (1979) . With these principles in mind, we turn to an examination of the particular statutory provision relied upon.
Prior to the Adoption Act of 1970, the only basis for terminating parental rights was abandonment. Jones Appeal, 449 Pa. 543, 297 A.2d 117 (1972). The additional grounds of parental incapacity, abuse or neglect appeared as § 311(2) in the 1970 Act. Section 2511(a)(2) of the Adoption Act of 1980, the section relied upon here, is a verbatim reenactment of § 311(2); therefore, the substantive law developed under § 311(2) is continued under § 2511(a)(2). Christner v. Christner, 366 Pa. 41, 76 A.2d 361 (1950).
In order to terminate parental rights under this “parental incapacity” section, three things must be shown: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal which (2) has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence, and (3) the causes of this incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975). If any of these elements are missing or insufficiently proven, the court cannot terminate the parent’s rights. See, e.g., Jones Appeal, supra (a single act does not demonstrate continuing incapacity so as to justify termination).
*154Appellant contends that, since Michael was never in her physical custody, the requirements of the statute could not be proven because her conduct could not have caused him harm. While we agree with appellant that the “causation” element must be proved before parental rights can be terminated, and that this element was not sufficiently proved in this case, we need not go so far as to hold that the causation element can never be proved unless the parent has physical custody of the child. Cf., In re Interest of Black, 273 Pa.Super. 536, 417 A.2d 1178 (1980).
Factually, the trial court relied in part on a variety of admittedly serious problems Barbara had when she was 15 and 16 years old. These included use of illegal drugs and alcohol, sexual promiscuity, one hospital admission for alleged drug or alcohol overdose, at least two incidents of alleged violence — one toward her mother and one toward a child who lived in the same apartment complex, an admission to Delaware County Children’s Cottage, dropping out of school, and taking a trip to Florida without her mother’s permission. However inappropriate such behavior might be, we believe that such behavior alone, without a showing of the effect on the child, is an insufficient basis on which to terminate parental rights.
In both neglect and custody cases, we have required such a nexus. For example, in In re Rinker, 180 Pa.Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955), it was held that a mother’s adultery and excessive use of alcohol did not warrant a finding that her children were neglected because the evidence revealed that these activities took place away from the home and the children and the children were apparently adequately cared for. In custody cases, “immoral conduct” must be shown to adversely affect the welfare of the child before it can be considered as a factor in determining custody. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, 468 Pa. 134, 360 A.2d 587 (1976) (meretricious relationship). Since the legal standard in these types of cases is less stringent than that required to terminate parental rights, we do not hesitate to use them to support *155our position that such a causal connection is also required in termination cases. See also, Matter of M.L.W., supra (mother’s I.Q. of 65 given undue weight); In re Custody of Myers, 242 Pa.Super. 225, 363 A.2d 1242 (1976) (difference in income irrelevant unless it vitally affects the child’s welfare); In re Custody of Temos, 304 Pa.Super. 82, 450 A.2d 111 (mother’s relationship with married man and mother’s career-mindedness not shown to have adverse effect on children); Commonwealth ex rel. Peterson v. Hayes, 252 Pa.Super. 487, 381 A.2d 1311 (1977) (father’s violence toward mother, outside the presence of the children, insufficient to deny visitation).
In the instant case, the particular incidents listed in the trial court’s opinion occurred for the most part at least one year prior to Michael’s birth and two years prior to the hearing and no evidence was presented to show that Barbara’s conduct adversely affected him; (for example, there is no evidence of addictive drug use during her pregnancy which adversely affected his health). In addition, we are cognizant of the principle that one’s past misconduct is not controlling where a parent is presently fit. Commonwealth ex rel. Horton v. Burke, 190 Pa.Super. 392, 154 A.2d 255 (1959). We cannot, therefore, affirm the termination order on this basis.
The only other evidence presented in support of the termination petition was the testimony of two psychiatrists, both of whom had evaluated Barbara solely for the purpose of this proceeding. For several reasons, we are unable to find that this testimony is sufficient to support the termination order.
In the first place, this evidence does not completely fulfill the requirements of § 2511(a)(2). The most obvious omission is the lack of testimony concerning the element of remediability. Both of appellees’ experts opined that Barbara was presently incapable of parenting. This alone is insufficient because termination cannot be ordered if there is a reasonable possibility that the causes of incapacity can *156be remedied. In Interest of C.M.E., 301 Pa.Super. 579, 448 A.2d 59 (1982).
It is on this point that we observe a crucial distinction between what occurred in this “private” adoption and what would have been required if an agency had been involved — the elements of notice and opportunity to correct any deficiency. In response to an argument that § 311(2) (the predecessor of § 2511(a)(2) is unconstitutionally vague, our Supreme Court has held that the “remediability” requirement excludes the possibility that a parent’s rights will be terminated when the parent has insufficient notice of what conduct is required or prohibited. In re William L., supra. Indeed, in that case, Justice Roberts noted that
... the requirement that the conduct be shown to be irremediable could be met rarely, if ever, absent evidence that the deficiencies in parental conduct had been identified, and the parent was nonetheless unwilling or unable to modify the conduct to remedy the situation.
Id., 477 Pa. at 332 n. 5, 383 A.2d at 1232 n. 5.
Although the petitioner in William L. was an agency, rather than a private individual as in the instant case, this difference cannot change the burden of proving all the elements of § 2511(a)(2). See, In re T.R., supra.
We note as well that in “agency” adoptions the court must consider the services or assistance offered by or available from the agency before determining that the parent’s incapacity cannot or will not be remedied. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5). While we certainly do not mean to imply that an agency be involved in every adoption,4 we think it might be advisable in many “private” cases for the trial court to determine what assistance is available to the parent, whether the parent is aware of such services and whether any attempt has been made to procure such assistance. In this way the court could avoid the double standard problem often present when parental rights are terminated *157in a “private” proceeding when such rights could not have been terminated in an “agency” proceeding.
However, even if the experts’ opinions had addressed all the elements of § 2511(a)(2), we would be unable to affirm a termination order based only on such evidence.5 Both the United States Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have held that an order terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, a more demanding standard than the preponderance of the evidence standard permissible in other cases. Santosky v. Kramer, supra; In re T.R., supra. Since appellant had not had the opportunity of parenting her child, the experts’ opinions were basically predictions of Barbara’s parenting capabilities, based at least in part on her past conduct as enumerated above. While such information might well be an important element of Barbara’s life for therapeutic purposes, it was not relevant to terminating her parental rights. The interests of the therapist and the interests of the law are not necessarily the same. Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, supra.
More important, however, is the fact that the expert testimony involved in this case was predictive in nature; that is the experts were expected to render their opinion on whether Barbara would be able to parent when, because of the factual circumstances of the case, she had no opportunity to do so. The problem with relying on this type of evidence as a basis for terminating parental rights was somewhat understated by one of appellant’s experts: “Predictability is very difficult” (T.l/6/82 p. 377). Our research in this regard reveals not only that it is difficult to predict that a person will behave in a certain way but that expert opinion which predicts behavior is not particularly reliable.6 *158See, People v. Burnick, 14 Cal.3d 306, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352 (1975); and Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Cal.L.Rev. 693 (1974) for a collection and discussion of the studies done in this area. Without other evidence of parental incapacity, we do not believe the speculative type of testimony presented in the instant case constitutes clear and convincing evidence of parental incapacity. See, Matter of Mark T., 296 Pa.Super. 533, 442 A.2d 1179 (1982) (Beck, J., Concurring Opinion).
Appellees contend that § 2511(b), a section added to the Adoption Act in 1980, modifies § 2511(a)(2) by mandating that the court take into consideration the “best interests of the child.” Specifically, this section provides:
(b) Other considerations. — The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
We disagree with appellees for two reasons. First, we do not find the concepts of the “best interest of the child” and the “needs and welfare of the child” to be interchangeable. The “best interests” standard traditionally has been applied to custody disputes. Commonwealth ex rel. Bender v. Bender, 197 Pa.Super. 397, 178 A.2d 779 (1962). Where the issue is visitation, or partial custody which closely resembles visitation, a stricter standard prevails; that is, visitation can be denied only if the parent possesses such severe mental or moral deficiencies as to constitute a grave threat to the welfare of the child. Scott v. Scott, 240 Pa.Super. 65, 368 A.2d 288 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Turner v. Strange, 179 Pa.Super. 83, 115 A.2d 885 (1955). The “best interests” standard is not the correct principle to apply to visitation cases. In re Damon *159B., 314 Pa.Super. 391, 460 A.2d 1196 (1983). If such a standard cannot be used to limit a parent’s relationship with her child, surely it cannot be used to sever such a relationship completely.7 Rather, we believe that the words “needs and welfare” mean something quite different from the “best interests.” The former phrase denotes certain minimum requirements that all children are entitled to — adequate housing, clothing, food and love — whereas the latter connotes a weighing of two adequate but unequal situations (traditionally, the respective households of mother and father). Our Supreme Court has, in the past, refused to sanction the termination of parental rights where the children are fed and clothed, are in generally good health, and are not abused although the home is “submarginal” and the children might suffer from cultural deprivation. In re Geiger, supra. As noted most eloquently by the Honorable Robert E. Woodside, the law
was not intended to provide a procedure to take the children of the poor and give them to the rich, nor to take the children of the illiterate and give them to the educated, nor to take the children of the crude and give them to the cultured, nor to take the children of the weak and sickly and give them to the strong and healthy.
In re Rinker, supra, 180 Pa.Superior Ct. at 148, 117 A.2d 783 (1955).
Secondly, the addition of § 2511(b) to the Adoption Act does not abrogate the requirements of § 2511(a). Section 2511(b) does not contain an additional ground for terminating parental rights; such grounds are contained in § 2511(a) only. Thus, until the requirement of § 2511(a) are met, there is no need to consider § 2511(b). Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, supra. We must, therefore, *160reverse the order of the lower court terminating Barbara’s parental rights.
Appellees have argued that this interpretation of the Adoption Act and the result we have reached will compel an all-or-nothing result; that is, unless parental rights are terminated, nothing could be done until some harm actually occurs to the child. We stress, however, that our decision in this regard relates only to the termination of Barbara’s parental rights; the determination of custody is a separate issue. There are numerous intermediate possibilities — temporary foster care, visitation, assistance to Barbara in learning appropriate parenting skills — between irrevocably terminating her parental rights and granting her unrestricted custody.
This brings us to the final issue in this matter — the determination of who should have custody of Michael at the present time. Appellant contends that a reversal of the termination order automatically requires that custody be granted to her whereas appellees argue that the evidence supports a determination that Michael’s best interests require that custody be granted to them. The resolution of this issue is made even more difficult because Michael has now been in the custody of appellees for over two years and, because Barbara’s visitation petition was denied, he does not even know his natural mother. While some of this delay can be attributed to the court system itself (but see, In re Davis, 502 Pa. 110, 465 A.2d 614 (1983) (even “normal” delays resulting from crowded court calendars “cannot be tolerated in child placement cases.”), at least one continuance resulted because appellees’ counsel had another trial scheduled at the same time as this one. In addition, Michael’s lack of a relationship with his mother could have been avoided had appropriate visitation been ordered. We find the denial of Barbara’s visitation petition without a hearing to be a highly unusual procedure; indeed, we do not see how the trial court could possibly determine that visitation would constitute a grave threat to the child’s welfare, Scott v. Scott, supra, without receiving any evidence. *161Nevertheless the damage is done and the issue that must be decided is whether Michael should remain in appellees’ custody,8 whether appellant should be awarded custody or whether some intermediate solution is preferable.
A custody determination, of course, must be based on the present circumstances of the parties. In re Leskovich, 253 Pa.Super. 349, 385 A.2d 373 (1978). Over two years have passed since the hearings in this matter. Those hearings dealt only with the termination issue and not with Barbara’s petition for custody or visitation. Therefore, we believe the appropriate course to be to remand this matter for proper consideration of this petition and for development of the complete and comprehensive record required in custody matters. See, In re Custody of White, 270 Pa.Super. 165, 411 A.2d 231 (1979).
The order of the court below terminating the parental rights of Barbara C. is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is not retained.
McEWEN, J., files a dissenting opinion.

. By order dated January 7, 1982, the putative father’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1). He has never contested this determination and he is not involved in this appeal.

. In 1982, § 2711 was amended to set forth certain requirements of a valid consent. We note at this point that the consent in the instant case does not fulfill all of those- requirements and, thus, would be invalid were those amendments applicable here. This would not change our reasoning, however. We note it only to underscore the importance of proceeding with caution in cases of this nature.

. We do not believe this changes the settled law that consent can be revoked within six months and the child will be returned to the *152natural parent where the only ground for termination of parental rights would be § 2511(a)(1).

. Any change in the status of "private" adoptions, which have long been recognized as valid, must come from the legislature.

. It does not appear that the trial court gave too much weight to the expert testimony but rather based its order primarily on the past conduct discussed previously in this opinion.

. Indeed, one commentator has gone so far as to state that psychiatric judgments have not been shown to be substantially more reliable and valid than “a procedure by which judges flipped coins ” Ennis & *158Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Cal.L.Rev. 693, 743 (1974).

. “If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest, I should have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on ‘the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter’ ”. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) (Stewart, J., Concurring Opinion).

. Of course, in this case, as in any custody dispute between a natural parent and a third party:
... the parties do not start out even; the parents have a "prima facie right to custody,” which will be forfeited only if “convincing reasons” appear that the child's best interest will be served by an award to the third party. Thus, even before the proceedings start, the evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the parents’ side. In re Custody of Hernandez, 249 Pa.Super. 274, 286, 376 A.2d 648, 654.
See also, In re Desiree B., 304 Pa.Super. 461, 450 A.2d 1003 (1982); Commonwealth ex rel. Gorto v. Gorto, 298 Pa.Super. 509, 444 A.2d 1299 (1982); Palmer v. Tokarek, 279 Pa.Super. 458, 421 A.2d 289 (1980).