Court Opinion

ID: 9657819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:38:54.036006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:48.647803
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
Alimony or no alimony award? That is the question.
Majority opinion, almost interminably, waxes on and on concerning procedural conflict and procedural impropriety. It complicates and obscures the true issue before us.
Basically, a judgment must be supported by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Put another way, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law must support a Judgment. Knodel v. Bd. of Co. Comm’rs. of Pennington Co., 269 N.W.2d 386 (S.D.1978). Here, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law did not support an award of alimony.
Moreover, the award of alimony does not reflect if it is (1) rehabilitative or (2) restitu-tional or (3) permanent alimony. However, it does not appear to be an award of permanent alimony because the trial judge’s Judgment reflected that the alimony award was to be terminated at the age of 65. Were this to' come to fruition, this lady would receive $101,600.00 by the time she received her last payment. With all due respect to one of the senior trial judges of this state, who has given greatly of himself in the legal profession, I earnestly, and sincerely, must disagree with such an award under the facts of this case. Indeed, the trial court has broad discretion in an award of alimony, but such an award may be set aside when it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion. Owen v. Owen, 351 N.W.2d 139, 141 (S.D.1984). Four of us who serve on this Court have been trial judges; of the participating Justices on this Court, only Justice Sabers has not served on the trial bench. In truth of fact, he is, therefore, the only serving member hereon, who has not been reversed. So all of us, in any walk of life, from time to time, err. Therefore, I am constrained to say that this trial judge erred in that there was an abuse of discretion concerning alimony.
This case is being reversed and remanded on the award of alimony. I would exhort the trial judge, who has been called upon by this Court to serve on this Court as a substitute Justice, to carefully review the factors set forth in Tesch v. Tesch at 884, a case cited by the majority opinion, written on behalf of this Court by this special writer.
It is for, of course, the trial judge to now make his decision on alimony. It is respectfully suggested that, perhaps, no alimony should be awarded at all. These facts appear to have little dispute:
1. Sandra Eichmann receives Social Security Disability Income and Disability Insurance Income;
2. Sandra Eichmann, although Arthur Eichmann was the chief financial contributor of the marriage, received approximately 55 to 56 percent of the assets;
3. Sandra Eichmann received $5,706.15 in interim support;
4. Sandra Eichmann came into the marriage owing $5,000.00 which was paid off during the marriage;
5. Sandra Eichmann’s property award must be considered when deciding if she is entitled to alimony, as both must be considered together; (Krage v. Krage, 329 N.W.2d 878 (S.D.1983));
*2106. Sandra Eichmann habitually frequented bars and she traveled extensively, all of which was costly, and nearly all of which her husband had to defray; such type of general conduct is hardly equitable; she should not be granted equity when she shows no equity;
7. Sandra Eichmann would go out at night and stay out until the early morning hours, frequenting bars in the general area of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and ultimately had a sexual relationship, over an extended period of time, with a man she met in a bar;
8. Sandra Eichmann’s trashy life style does not warrant a $101,600.00 alimony award;
9. Sandra Eichmann’s health is not so bad that it restricts her outside sex life, imbibing alcohol, and tripping the light fantastic;
10.Sandra Eichmann made no contributions whatsoever, by way of entertainment or actual work, to the employment of Arthur Eichmann; husband’s career was established twenty years prior to his marriage to Sandra Eichmann; essentially, she played no role whatsoever in educating him, comforting him in his arduous employment, aiding him in his serious health problems, and did not forego any employment opportunities.
Unfortunately, the trial judge zeroed in on Sandra Eichmann’s medical condition in awarding alimony. It stands totally uncon-tradicted in this record that she had a disabling condition of veneous insufficiency in 1978; she had surgery for said condition in 1978 or 1979. Justice, not sympathy, should govern an alimony award. Sandra Eichmann had this condition, and it was disabling, when she married Arthur Eichmann. No testimony in this record posits that her disabling condition was exacerbated by facts arising from, or during the marriage. She has a circulation problem, associated with the aforesaid condition, and she has been medically advised that she should not smoke. But she smokes. Her overall medical condition is not now — any worse — than when she married Arthur Eichmann. So marriage or no marriage to Arthur, her medical condition is the same.
Arthur Eichmann is the innocent party here. He was not out boozing into the early hours of the morning, dancing, raising hell, chasing women, spending money, leaving his wife home, and reveling in the throes of fornication.1 It was his Mrs. Sandra Eichmann; and she is, without question, before the courts of equity in this state, with unclean hands. Miiller v. County of Davison, 452 N.W.2d 119, 121 (S.D.1990). She should not prevail.2
Therefore, for reasons expressed above, I specially concur, believing an award of alimony below was improper.

. Sandra Eichmann testified under oath that she had intimate relationships.

. I am reminded of William Faulkner's epoch remark that man shall not only endure but will prevail. Arthur Eichmann has endured enough; he should now prevail.