Court Opinion

ID: 9462182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:33:54.24392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:26.643707
License: Public Domain

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
As one whose musical accomplishments go barely beyond a mastery of “Chopsticks”, I take up the cudgels for appellees with some diffidence. However, since I believe that this case is being wrongly decided, I must respectfully express my dissent.
To place the opinion of my brothers in proper perspective, one should bear in mind that the contest herein is not between the penurious family of a deceased composer and an “unscrupulous” publisher; it is between a son and his mother. Bela Bartók, as a loving and thoughtful husband, executed a will in which he left the royalties from all copyrights and renewal copyrights in trust for his widow with the remainder, upon her death, to his son Peter, the appellant herein. Apparently, appellant is unwilling to wait for his remainder to accrue.
He asks this Court to declare that appellee publisher has no right to renew the copyright of his father’s works and to continue to pay all royalties following such renewal to his mother. Instead, he claims the right of renewal with his mother and brother, with the result that Bela Bartok’s widow, to whom the composer left all the royalties during her lifetime, will end up getting only one-third of them, the remaining two-thirds going to appellant and his brother. I believe that the injustice to Mr. Bartok’s widow which results from the majority’s frustration of Mr. Bartok’s wishes is neither required nor justified by the Copyright Law.
The provisions governing copyright renewal are contained in § 24 of the Copyright Law (17 U.S.C. § 24). This provides in pertinent part:
“That in the case of any posthumous work . . upon which the copy*950right was originally secured by the proprietor thereof . . the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright of such work for the further term of twenty-eight years . .: That in the case of any other copyrighted work . . . the widow, widower, or children of the author . shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years . . .
Judge Owen found that the word “posthumous” as used in the field of music for over a century has a specific meaning, i. e., “published after the death of its author”. My colleagues do not hold this finding to be erroneous, as indeed they could not. My limited facilities for research completely substantiate ' it and indicate further that the same finding could be made in the field of literature. The following references are illustrative:
Dunstan, A Cyclopaedic Dictionary of Music (1973):
“Published after the composer’s death.”
Blom, Everyman’s Dictionary of Music (1971):
“A work published after its composer’s death is described as Posthumous. The common abbreviation is Op. posth.”
Riemann, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Music (1908):
“. . . published after the death of the author.”
The Oxford English Dictionary (1933): “Of a book or writing: Published after the death of the author.”
Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language (1829):
“Done, had, or published after one’s death.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1971):
“Published after the death of its author, as posthumous poems.”
Ringer, Renewal of Copyrights 128 (Copyright Office Study No. 31):
“The generally accepted definition of ‘posthumous works’ is ‘one which is published subsequent to the death of its author’.”
Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property § 89, at 195 (1944):
“A posthumous work is one originally published and copyrighted after the author’s death. . . . ”
1 Fisher, Studies on Copyright 524 (1963):
“The generally-accepted definition of ‘posthumous work’ is ‘one which is published subsequent to the death of its author’.”
Ringer and Gitlin, Copyrights 59 (1965):
“The term ‘posthumous work’ is not defined in the statute, but in general it probably refers to works published for the first time after the author’s death.”
Nicholson, A Manual of Copyright Practice 144 (2d ed. 1956):
“. . . works published after the author’s death.”
Kupferman, Renewal of Copyright, 44 Colum.L.Rev. 713, 715 (1944):
“This must mean a work published after the author’s death by someone to whom he passed the right to reproduce it.”
Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S.Cal.L.Rev. 23, 38 (1955):
“A posthumous work is one which is published subsequent to the death of its author.”
2 Nimmer, The Law of Copyright § 114.1 (1975):
“The accepted dictionary definition for ‘posthumous’ used in this context is ‘Published after the death of its author, as posthumous poems’.”
Funk & WagnalPs Standard Dictionary (Britannica World Language Ed. 1963):
*951. . published after the author’s death, as a book.”
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1933):
“. . . of a book or writing: Published after the death of the author 1668.” 1
Berk, Legal Protection for the Creative Musician 190, at § 7.3 (1970):
“. . .a posthumous work is, of course, simply one which is published after the death of the author.
The New Century Dictionary (1927): “. . . published after the death of the author, (as, a posthumous book).”
The Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia (1895):
“. . . appearing or existing after the death or cessation of that to which its origin is due; especially of books published after the death of the author: as to posthumous works.”2
Having established the existence of a commonly accepted and well established meaning for the term “posthumous works”, Judge Owen then applied an equally accepted and established rule of statutory interpretation, viz., “The popular or accepted import of words furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of statutes.’ Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907, 69 S.Ct. 1048, 93 L.Ed. 1719 (1949); Banks v. Chicago Grain Trimmers, 390 U.S. 459, 465, 88 S.Ct. 1140, 20 L.Ed.2d 30 (1967); United States v. Peller, 170 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1948).3
In United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1008, 89 S.Ct. 615, 21 L.Ed.2d 557 (1968), we said:
“It must be assumed ‘that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning’ of words used in the statute [citations omitted], and where they have a basic and usual sense, they require no resort to legislative history.”
My brothers, nonetheless, rely heavily on certain congressional dialogue which they quote at some length. This discussion concerned a debate then taking place before the 1908 Joint Congressional Committee on whether the proposed new law should provide for a long non-renewable copyright term or a shorter renewable one. See Arguments before the Committee on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives Conjointly on the Pending Bills to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright (1906-8). The Congress opted for the latter. At the same time, it specified four situations in which the ordinary rules of renewal would not apply — post*952humous works, composite works, works copyrighted by a corporate body and works copyrighted by an employer for whom such works were made for hire.
From the outset of the Joint Committee’s deliberations, it was obvious that these four exceptions were to be given different treatment than ordinary works of copyright insofar as the copyright term was concerned. However, I find nothing in the language which the majority quotes, or anywhere else in the reports of the Joint Committee’s hearings, which indicates that the term “posthumous works” was to be given a meaning different from that which it had had for hundreds of years, viz., works published after the death of the author.
I cannot believe that Judge Hand was unfamiliar with this traditional and commonly accepted definition when he wrote his opinion in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1941). His description of “posthumous works” as “those on which the original copyright has been taken out by someone to whom the literary property passed before publication” was, therefore, in my opinion, simply a reiteration of the same definition.
Judge Hand discussed posthumous works in the same breath as composite works and works copyrighted by an employer, for whom such works were made for hire, and said that these cover “those cases in which the ‘proprietor’ of the copyright ... is not the author of the work”. It seems rather obvious that he was discussing proprietorships which came into being during the author’s lifetime. This accords with the language of § 9 (17 U.S.C. § 9) which provides in part:
“The author or proprietor of any work made the subject of copyright by this title, or his executors, administrators, or assigns, shall have copyright for such work . . . (Emphasis supplied).4
In short, I agree with the commentator in 29 S.Cal.L.Rev. 23, 39, supra, who said, “. . . there is nothing in the statute, Committee Report or any judicial opinion which would indicate that the term posthumous works was intended to have anything but its ordinary and usual meaning.”
Finally, and most significantly, the United States Copyright Office itself has adopted and used the same definition as the above cited authorities. If we examine the records of that office, we see that in Circular No. 15 (1953) “posthumous works” are defined as “works published and copyrighted after the death of the author”.5 The identical definition is contained in the Copyright Office’s “Certificate of Registration of a Claim to Renewal Copyright”. This is a “contemporaneous and long-continued construction of the statutes by the agency charged to administer them”, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213, 74 S.Ct. 460, 468, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954), and courts should ordinarily “give weight to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with its administration”. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577, 76 S.Ct. 974, 978, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956).
Of course, my brothers are correct in stating that the interpretation of the Copyright Office should not be given “controlling weight”. Yet, before the guidelines of the Copyright Office are swept aside, some thought should be given as to what is being swept with them. One wonders, for example, how many widows and children are depending upon royalties from copyright renewals filed in accordance with the existing guidelines. “A renewal of a copyright by a person not entitled thereto is void and cannot be cured by subsequent ratifica*953tion by the person allegedly entitled to renew.” Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F.Supp. 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y.1943), aff’d sub nom. Gumm v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 158 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946); Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 650, 59 S.Ct. 243, 83 L.Ed. 420 (1932).
One wonders, also, how many widows like Mrs. Bartók, will be deprived of the full benefit of their husband’s testate bounty because this Court is now changing the long-standing rules of the Copyright Office upon which the will was predicated.6
The affidavits submitted below establish, to my satisfaction at least, that there was no publication of Bela Bartok’s Concerto prior to his death. The intimation in the majority opinion that the playing of the Concerto in concert might have constituted a publication is completely without support in the law. A public performance of a musical composition is not a publication or an abandonment of the composition to the public. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435, 32 S.Ct. 263, 56 L.Ed. 492 (1912); Nutt v. National Institute, 31 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 1929); Rosette v. Rainbo Record Manufacturing Corp., 354 F.Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y.1973); McCarthy and Fischer, Inc. v. White, 259 F. 364 (S.D.N.Y.1919); 1 Nimmer, The Law of Copyright, § 53.1, at 208 (1975); Gold-stein, Copyrighting the New Music 10 (Ascap Copyright Law Symposium, Number Sixteen, 1966). The original Certificate of Registration gives the date of publication as March 20, 1946, six months after the composer’s death. This is prima facie proof of the facts. Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, 23 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1927); Freudenthal v. Hebrew Publishing Co., 44 F.Supp. 754 (S.D.N.Y.1942). This proof has not been rebutted.
In the final analysis, my objection to what this Court does today can best be summarized by the following admonition of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 618, 64 S.Ct. 1215, 1221, 88 L.Ed. 1488 (1944):
“While the judicial function in construing legislation is not a mechanical process from which judgment is excluded, it is nevertheless very different from the legislative function. Construction is not legislation and must avoid ‘that retrospective expansion of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.’ Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 522 [62 S.Ct. 1116, 1119, 86 L.Ed. 1638]. To blur the distinctive functions of the legislative and judicial processes is not conducive to responsible legislation.”
My brothers are creating a definition of “posthumous works” which appears nowhere in the legislation or the legislative history; which is completely at odds with long-standing and accepted usage; which is contrary to the definition accepted by the Copyright Office and most authorities in the copyright field; and which is not unanimously recommended by those who seek change.7 This is not the proper role of the judiciary.
I have no quarrel with my brothers’ good intentions but question the philosophy which underlies them. I am not convinced, for example, that the dis*954traught widow of an author or composer is more capable than he to negotiate with a publisher for the sale and assignment of renewal rights. Giving full recognition to the increased worldliness of what was once described as the “weaker sex”, it can hardly be seriously contended that a widow is in as good a position to evaluate the merits of a musical composition as was her husband who composed it. Neither does she have as complete and accurate knowledge of the music publishing field.8
Of course, a widow can wait for twenty-eight years before assigning her right to renew. But will she? She, like her deceased husband, must put groceries on the table today. Insofar as the composer is concerned, the decision of my brothers reduces the value of what he has to sell at the time when he probably is most in need.9
I see no compelling reasons why the resolution of these differences cannot await the considered judgment of the Congress which has been working on a revision of the 1909 Copyright Act for a number of years. Justice would then be accorded to Mrs. Bartók, and her husband’s wishes would be fulfilled. In short, if I may again quote Mr. Justice Frankfurter, this time from his opinion in Fisher Co. v. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657, 63 S.Ct. 773, 779, 87 L.Ed. 1055 (1943):
“It is not for courts to judge whether the interests of authors clearly lie upon one side of this question rather than the other. If an author cannot make an effective assignment of his renewal, it may be worthless to him when he is most in need. Nobody would pay an author for something he cannot sell. We cannot draw a principle of law from the familiar stories of garret-poverty of some men of literary genius. Even if we could do so, we cannot say that such men would regard with favor a rule of law preventing them from realizing on their assets when they are most in need of funds. Nor can we be unmindful of the fact that authors have themselves devised means of safeguarding their interests. We do not have such assured knowledge about authorship, and particularly about song writing, or the psychology of gifted writers and composers, as to justify us as judges in importing into Congressional legislation a denial to authors of the freedom to dispose of their property possessed by others. While authors may have habits making for intermittent want, they may have no less a spirit of independence which would resent treatment of them as wards under guardianship of the law.”
I believe Judge Owen’s decision was correct, and I would affirm.

. With all due respect to my colleagues, I do not believe that the statement in the majority opinion that Judge Owen concluded “that were he to look solely to congressional intent he would hold the work not posthumous” correctly interprets Judge Owen’s holding. This creates an unfair inference that Judge Owen interpreted the statute in a manner which he believed to be contrary to the intent of the Congress.

. Public Ledger v. New York Times, 275 F. 562 (S.D.N.Y.1921) (L. Hand, J.): “I think the word ‘proprietor’ of the present act must be treated as having the same meaning as in the old and as equivalent to ‘assign’.”

. Cited as authoritative in Seidel, What the General Practitioner Should Know About Trademarks and Copyrights 134 (1959).

. Since the two preceding paragraphs were written, some additions have been made to the majority opinion. My brothers cite several cases to distinguish Von Tilzer and Tobani which I deem inapposite because they involve renewal applications made by less than all joint owners or owners in common.
My brothers also state that their decision shall be prospective only and shall not apply to those who, up to this date, have relied upon the copyright office’s long-standing interpretation of “posthumous work”. Putting aside any argument as to the concession concerning long standing and accepted usage which may be implicit in such holding, I would only point out that the holding will be of little comfort to Mrs. Bartók whose case we are presently deciding.

. Nimmer suggests, for example, that “posthumous works” shall include only those which have received no public dissemination during the author’s life. 2 Nimmer, The Law of Copyright § 114.1 at 464-5 (1975).

. Mr. Bartok’s contract with his publisher provided for the following royalties:
15% of the selling price of all copies;
15% to 20% from the hire or purchase of orchestral material;
50% to 662/3% of performing right fees;
70% to 80% of performing right fees from stage performances;
662/3% of royalties and fees from mechanical adaptations;
50% of royalties and fees from reproduction in movies and television.
No one has expressed any dissatisfaction with this monetary arrangement.

. “If promotion of artistic production as a whole is the overriding purpose of copyright, regulation of copyright transfers in the author’s interest should be concerned predominantly with revenues that can be realized for the author relatively soon after creation, since the prospect of receiving a reward in the distant future will probably have negligible effect on an author’s production. Little concern should be paid to revenues that will accrue only to the author’s heirs.”
Curtis, Protecting Authors in Copyright Transfers: Revision Bill § 203 and the Alternatives 194 (Ascap Copyright Law Symposium, Number twenty-one, 1971).