Court Opinion

ID: 9964259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 16:03:39.34616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:15.632742
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Apr 29 2024, 9:23 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

                                             IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                                   J.R.,
                                          Appellant-Petitioner

                                                     v.

                          Indiana Department of Child Services,
                                         Appellee-Respondent

                                             April 29, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-MI-2166
                             Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
                            The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                      49D06-2210-MI-34568

                                    Opinion by Judge Tavitas

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024             Page 1 of 17
                                Judges Mathias and Weissmann concur.

      Tavitas, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   After the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) substantiated a report of child

      neglect against her, J.R. (“Mother”) filed an administrative appeal, and the

      administrative law judge (“ALJ”) recommended that DCS unsubstantiate the

      report. DCS’s Final Agency Authority (“Agency”), however, rejected the

      ALJ’s recommendation and affirmed the substantiation determination. Mother

      then filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court affirmed the Agency’s

      determination. Mother appeals and argues that the trial court erred because the

      Agency’s determination is not supported by substantial evidence. We are not

      persuaded, and we, accordingly, affirm.

      Issue
[2]   Mother raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court

      erred by affirming the Agency’s substantiation of a report of child neglect

      against Mother.

      Facts
[3]   Mother’s daughter is Je.B. (“Daughter”), and Daughter’s father is Jo.B.

      (“Father”). Mother and Father live separately. On Friday, January 15, 2021,

      Daughter was six years old, and Daughter’s paternal grandmother watched her

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024        Page 2 of 17
      while Mother and Father celebrated Mother’s birthday. Mother and Father

      used marijuana and cocaine while celebrating, and Mother then returned to her

      residence.

[4]   Father exercised his regularly scheduled parenting time with Daughter that

      weekend, and on the morning of Monday, January 18, 2021, Mother drove to

      Father’s house to pick up Daughter. After eating breakfast at Father’s house,

      between approximately 8:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Mother had a headache, so

      she used marijuana and took a nap. Mother was not in Daughter’s presence

      when she used the marijuana.

[5]   Between approximately 1:30 and 2:30 p.m., Mother and Daughter left Father’s

      residence to drive to an appointment and were involved in a “head-on

      collision,” during which the “airbags deployed.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp.

      124, 111. Mother asked another motorist to drive her and Daughter to the

      hospital because Daughter complained of stomach pain after the car accident.

      Along the way, Mother asked a police officer to escort them. 1

[6]   At the hospital, Mother was frustrated with hospital staff because she believed

      they kept repeating the same questions and were not examining Daughter.

      According to Nurse Haley Himmelhaver, Mother was “erratic,” “extremely

      irate,” and Mother’s behavior “did not match up with the situation.” Id. at 101,

      1
          Mother was not charged with any offenses related to the car accident.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024          Page 3 of 17
      122, 123. Nurse Himmelhaver attempted to calm Mother down, and Mother

      admitted that she used marijuana that morning.

[7]   Later that day, DCS received a report alleging that Mother neglected Daughter,

      and Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Dava Bonds went to the hospital and

      spoke with Mother. Mother admitted to using marijuana prior to the car

      accident. DCS requested and Mother submitted to an “instant urine drug

      screen,” which was positive for marijuana and cocaine. Id. at 125. Mother

      then admitted to using marijuana and cocaine on the previous Friday. The

      drug screen was sent to the lab for further testing, which was negative for

      cocaine. The testing revealed, however, that Mother had a THC 2 concentration

      of 804 nanograms per milliliter. The threshold for a positive result was 50

      nanograms per milliliter. Meanwhile, hospital staff determined that Daughter

      was not injured, and she was released.

[8]   Based on the conversation with Mother and Mother’s positive drug screens,

      FCM Bonds believed that Mother was “possibly under the influence at the time

      of the accident.” Id. at 137. FCM Bonds submitted an assessment report to

      DCS recommending that the neglect allegation be substantiated on the grounds

      that Mother “failed to provide [Daughter] with a safe, stable, and appropriate

      living environment free from neglect and substance abuse,” and DCS later

      approved the substantiation recommendation. Id. at 46-47. DCS also filed a

      2
        THC is the common abbreviation for tetrahydrocannabinol, which is the main active chemical
      in marijuana. Medina v. State, 188 N.E.3d 897, 900 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024                             Page 4 of 17
       petition in the Marion County Superior Court alleging that Daughter was a

       child in need of services (“CHINS”) based upon Mother’s alleged neglect;

       however, the CHINS case was later dismissed on April 7, 2021, without a fact-

       finding hearing.

[9]    Mother subsequently filed a request for an administrative hearing to challenge

       DCS’s substantiation of the neglect allegation, and the parties appeared before

       an ALJ for an administrative hearing on November 9, 2021. Mother testified

       and admitted to using marijuana and cocaine during her birthday celebration

       and to using marijuana on the morning of the car accident. Mother also

       admitted that hospital staff thought her “behavior was erratic”; however,

       Mother attributed her behavior to anxiety and frustration with hospital staff. Id.

       at 101. Mother called Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Logan Atzhorn

       as a witness. Although Officer Atzhorn testified that he would have conducted

       “further investigation” if he suspected a driver of being under the influence, he

       did not remember this incident, Mother, or the completion of a vehicle accident

       report for the January 18 car accident. Id. at 96. Mother did not offer an

       accident report as an exhibit.

[10]   DCS entered into evidence Mother’s drug screen results as an exhibit, to which

       Mother did not object. Although Nurse Himmelhaver did not testify at the

       hearing, FCM Bonds testified regarding Nurse Himmelhaver’s statements

       concerning Mother’s erratic behavior at the hospital, to which Mother objected

       on hearsay grounds. The ALJ overruled the objection. FCM Bonds further

       testified that she was unaware of the cause of the car accident; however, she

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024       Page 5 of 17
       requested that the ALJ uphold the substantiation finding. She stated that the

       fact that the trial court dismissed the CHINS case only meant that the trial court

       “no longer need[ed] to be involved with the family” and did not “mean that the

       allegation being substantiated against [Mother was] not true.” Id. at 134-35.

[11]   On December 9, 2021, the ALJ issued its notice of hearing recommendation

       and recommended that DCS unsubstantiate the neglect allegation. The ALJ

       determined that, although Mother used marijuana prior to the car accident,

       DCS had not proved a “causal connection between [Mother’s] use of marijuana

       and the vehicular accident” or that Mother was impaired at the time of the car

       accident. Id. at 40. The ALJ relied, in part, on Officer Atzhorn’s testimony

       and discounted Nurse Himmelhaver’s statements to FCM Bonds as hearsay.

[12]   The ALJ’s recommendation was submitted to the Agency for a “Final Agency

       Review.” Appellant’s App. Vol II p. 42. On September 22, 2022, the Agency

       issued its “Notice of Final Agency Action,” wherein the Agency rejected

       several of the ALJ’s findings and the ALJ’s recommendation and instead

       affirmed the substantiation finding. Id. at 25. Because Officer Atzhorn had no

       memory of Mother or the car accident, the Agency disagreed with the ALJ’s

       finding that Officer Atzhorn’s testimony indicated Mother was sober at the time

       of the car accident. The Agency concluded:

               The facts of this case combine to show that it is more likely than
               not, that [Mother’s] actions in smoking marijuana and then
               driving with her child in the vehicle, put that child’s physical
               health in serious danger. [Mother] had a high degree of
               marijuana in her system when she was involved in a vehicle

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024           Page 6 of 17
               collision. The use of marijuana near in time to the accident is not
               merely a coincidence. It is commonly known that marijuana
               impairs judgment and physical reaction time and that such
               impairment is incompatible with driving. [Mother’s] behavior
               afterward was “very irate” and “out of the ordinary” for some
               time after the collision. Irrational behavior is also a common
               sign of intoxication from drugs or alcohol. Finally, [Mother]
               flagged down a stranger rather than calling the police. That is
               highly odd behavior in today’s world, and likely due to
               [Mother’s] mental impairment caused by marijuana. Given
               [Mother’s] awareness of her condition, she was likely concerned
               that police or emergency personnel would discover she was
               [intoxicated] and would find the accident to have been her fault.
               Indeed, [Mother] likely further endangered her child by flagging
               down a stranger to go to the hospital instead of calling an
               ambulance. All of this evidence, combined, equates to proof by a
               preponderance of the evidence that [Mother’s] impairment put
               her daughter in serious danger.

       Id. at 23. The Agency, thus, concluded that “DCS was persuasive, by a

       preponderance of the evidence, in proving that [Mother] was responsible for the

       neglect of [Daughter].” Id.

[13]   Mother filed a petition for judicial review of the Agency’s substantiation

       determination on October 5, 2022. The trial court held a hearing on the

       petition on June 12, 2023, and on August 22, 2023, the trial court denied the

       petition. The trial court determined that, although Mother’s “post-accident

       actions” did not support the Agency’s substantiation finding, Mother was

       “likely impaired, to some degree” at the time of the car accident, and her “pre-

       accident decisions” in driving with Daughter in the car after using marijuana

       earlier that morning did support the finding. Id. at 209. Mother now appeals.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024       Page 7 of 17
       Discussion and Decision
[14]   Mother challenges the trial court’s denial of her petition for judicial review of

       the Agency’s substantiation of a report of child neglect against her. She argues

       that the Agency’s substantiation determination is not supported by substantial

       evidence. We begin by explaining the procedures leading to this appeal and our

       standard of review. We then explain our conclusion that, contrary to Mother’s

       argument, substantial evidence supports the Agency’s decision here.

       I. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

[15]   DCS is statutorily required to assess reports of child neglect and to “classify

       reports as substantiated or unsubstantiated.” Ind. Code § 31-33-8-12; see also

       Ind. Code § 31-33-8-7 (discussing the requirements for the assessment). DCS

       substantiates a report “whenever facts obtained during an assessment of the

       report provide a preponderance of evidence” for DCS to determine “that child

       abuse or neglect has occurred.” 3 Ind. Code § 31-9-2-123. Under certain

       circumstances, the alleged perpetrator of the child abuse or neglect may then

       request an administrative hearing before an ALJ to “contest the classification of

       a substantiated report . . . .” Ind. Code § 31-33-26-8(c)(3). At this hearing,

       3
         A substantiation of abuse or neglect results in the perpetrator being placed in the Child Protection Index, “a
       centralized, computerized child protection index to organize and access data regarding substantiated reports
       of child abuse and neglect that [DCS] receives from throughout Indiana” established pursuant to Indiana
       Code Section 31-33-26-2. “An individual identified as a perpetrator of child abuse or neglect in a
       substantiated report may file a petition with a court exercising juvenile jurisdiction in the county in which the
       individual resides, requesting that the court order [DCS] to expunge the substantiated report and related
       information.” Ind. Code 31-33-27-5(b).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024                                  Page 8 of 17
       DCS “must prove by a preponderance of credible evidence that the perpetrator

       is responsible for the child’s abuse or neglect.” Ind. Code § 31-33-26-9(b).

[16]   The ALJ then makes a “recommendation” that the Agency “will review” in a

       process called “Final Agency Review” for the issuance of an ultimate “Final

       Agency Action.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 42. “Final Agency Review can

       result in the Administrative Law Judge’s recommendation being adopted,

       affirmed, modified, dissolved or remanded for further action.” Id.

[17]   Following the issuance of the Final Agency Action, a qualifying party may then

       file a petition for judicial review with the appropriate trial court pursuant to the

       Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (“AOPA”), Indiana Code Chapter

       4-21.5-5. The AOPA “provides the exclusive means for judicial review of a

       final agency action” and governs this proceeding. Ind. Fam. and Social Servs.

       Admin. v. Meyer, 927 N.E.2d 367, 370 (Ind. 2010) (citing Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-

       1). Under the AOPA, the trial court’s decision is “appealable in accordance

       with the rules governing civil appeals from the courts.” Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-

       16.

[18]   When we review the trial court’s decision on an administrative agency’s final

       agency action, “we stand in the trial court’s shoes.” Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v.

       Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 991 (Ind. 2014). At the time of the proceedings here,

       the AOPA provided that we may set aside an agency’s action only if it is:

               (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
               in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right,
               power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024            Page 9 of 17
                jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
                (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5)
                unsupported by substantial evidence.[ 4]

       Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d). We defer to the agency’s findings if the findings are

       supported by substantial evidence, and we “ordinarily” review an agency’s

       conclusions of law de novo. Moriarity v. Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 113 N.E.3d 614,

       619 (Ind. 2019). We, however, afford “[a]n interpretation of a statute by an

       administrative agency charged with the duty of enforcing the statute . . . great

       weight, unless this interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself.”

       Id. We do not “reweigh the evidence,” and we “consider the record in the light

       most favorable” to the agency’s decision. Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d at 992.

[19]   As the party seeking judicial review, Mother bears the “burden of

       demonstrating the invalidity” of the Agency’s action. Id. Here, Mother

       challenges the Agency’s substantiation determination by arguing that the

       decision was unsupported by substantial evidence as required by the AOPA.

       For the purposes of judicial review, “[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a

       scintilla, but something less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Ind. Dep’t of

       Nat. Res. v. Prosser, 132 N.E.3d 397, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied;

       4
        In 2024, our General Assembly amended subsection (d)(5) to require that “a person seeking judicial relief”
       be “prejudiced by an agency action that is . . . unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence,” rather than
       substantial evidence. Pub. L. No. 128-2024 (effective July 1, 2024). “Absent explicit language to the
       contrary, statutes generally do not apply retroactively,” N.G. v. State, 148 N.E.3d 971, 973 (Ind. 2020), and
       we discern no such language in the amendment. Additionally, neither party argues that this amendment
       affects our decision. Accordingly, we review this case under the version of the AOPA in effect at the time of
       proceedings below, which employs the substantial evidence standard.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024                              Page 10 of 17
       accord Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inv. v. Watson, 938 N.E.2d 672, 680-81 (Ind.

       2010).

       II. The Agency’s substantiation determination is supported by
       substantial evidence

[20]   Mother argues that the Agency’s substantiation determination is not supported

       by substantial evidence because it relies on hearsay and because Mother’s

       marijuana use is insufficient to support a substantiation of neglect. We,

       however, conclude that the Agency’s substantiation determination is supported

       by substantial evidence.

[21]   We first address Mother’s argument that the Agency’s substantiation

       determination impermissibly relied upon Nurse Himmelhaver’s hearsay

       statements to FCM Bonds. Hearsay is defined as a statement that: (1) “is not

       made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing”; and (2) “is

       offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid. R. 801(c).

       Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-3-26 governs the admission of hearsay evidence in

       administrative hearings in the relevant part of subsection (a):

                [I]n the absence of proper objection, the administrative law judge
                may admit hearsay evidence. If not objected to, the hearsay
                evidence may form the basis for an order. However, if the
                evidence is properly objected to and does not fall within a
                recognized exception to the hearsay rule, the resulting order may
                not be based solely upon the hearsay evidence.

       Additionally, Indiana Code Section 31-33-26-9(c) governs administrative

       hearings before DCS and similarly provides:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024       Page 11 of 17
               During an administrative hearing under this section, the
               administrative hearing officer shall consider hearsay evidence to
               be competent evidence and may not exclude hearsay based on
               the technical rules of evidence. If not objected to, the hearsay
               evidence may form the basis for an order. However, if the
               evidence is properly objected to and does not fall within a
               recognized exception to the hearsay rule, the resulting order may
               not be based solely upon the hearsay evidence.

       See also 465 Ind. Admin. Code 3-3-13(d) (“The ALJ may admit and consider

       hearsay evidence.”). This “codification of the common law ‘residuum rule’ has

       been interpreted as requiring some corroborative evidence to support an

       administrative order when hearsay has been admitted over objection.” Amoco

       Oil Co., Whiting Refinery v. Comm’r of Labor, 726 N.E.2d 869, 874 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2000) (quoting Hinkle v. Garrett-Keyser-Butler Sch. Dist., 567 N.E.2d 1173, 1178

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied).

[22]   We are not persuaded that the Agency’s substantiation determination

       impermissibly relied on Nurse Himmelhaver’s hearsay statements to FCM

       Bonds because other evidence corroborates these statements and supports the

       Agency’s determination. Mother admitted to FCM Bonds that she used

       marijuana and cocaine several days before the car accident and that she used

       marijuana again several hours before the car accident. FCM Bonds’s testimony

       regarding Mother’s statements is not hearsay. See Evid. R. 801(d)(2) (defining

       statements made by an opposing party and offered against that party as not

       hearsay). Additionally, Mother admitted in her testimony before the ALJ that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024      Page 12 of 17
       hospital staff believed her behavior was “erratic,” and Mother did not move to

       strike this testimony. 5 Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 101.

[23]   Next, Mother argues that her marijuana use is insufficient to support a

       substantiation of neglect. We begin by noting that, although the CHINS

       proceeding against Mother was dismissed, the elements required to prove child

       neglect for the purposes of a substantiation determination are different than the

       elements required to prove child neglect in a CHINS proceeding. For example,

       in a CHINS adjudication pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, DCS

       must prove the following:

                [B]efore the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

                (1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
                or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
                neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the
                child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
                education, or supervision:

                         (A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially
                         able to do so; or

                         (B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent,
                         guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other
                         reasonable means to do so; and

       5
        To the extent Mother also argues that the Agency impermissibly relied on the drug screen results as
       hearsay, Mother did not object to the drug screens as hearsay at the hearing, so they may form a basis for the
       Agency’s determination. See Clay v. Marrero, 774 N.E.2d 520, 521 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Indiana
       Code Section 4-21.5-3-26(a) and holding that, even if AOPA governed petitioner’s hearsay challenge,
       petitioner waived challenge by failing to lodge a hearsay objection at the hearing).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024                               Page 13 of 17
                  (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

                          (A) the child is not receiving; and

                          (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
                          coercive intervention of the court.

[24]   For the purposes of substantiating an assessment report, however, child

       “neglect” refers to a child described in Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, among

       other statutes, “regardless of whether the child needs care, treatment,

       rehabilitation, or the coercive intervention of a court.” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-

       14(a) 6; see Ind. Code § 31-9-2-133 (similarly defining “[v]ictim of child abuse or

       neglect” for the purposes of DCS report assessments); In re A.H., 992 N.E.2d

       960, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that the “extent and nature of DCS’s role

       in completing an assessment under Ind. Code § 31-33-8-7 . . . to determine

       whether a report is substantiated is clearly distinct from the coercive

       intervention of DCS on behalf of the state under . . . CHINS proceedings”). A

       substantiation determination, thus, requires fewer elements than a CHINS

       adjudication.

[25]   The issue in this case is not whether Mother’s conduct constitutes child neglect

       for the purposes of a CHINS adjudication, but rather whether it constitutes

       child neglect for the purposes of the Agency’s substantiation determination

       under Indiana Code Section 31-9-2-14(a). Thus, although the trial court

       6
           The statute has since been amended; however, the amendments do not affect our analysis.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024                            Page 14 of 17
       dismissed the CHINS case against Mother, because different elements govern

       substantiation determinations and CHINS adjudications, the dismissal of the

       CHINS case does not necessarily mean that the substantiation determination

       was erroneous. And we conclude that the substantiation determination here

       was not erroneous because it was supported by substantial evidence before the

       Agency.

[26]   Mother admitted to using marijuana several hours before driving with Daughter

       in the car, and Mother and Daughter were subsequently involved in a head-on

       car accident. Mother asked a stranger to drive her and Daughter to the

       hospital, and Mother’s behavior was “erratic” and “did not match up with the

       situation” at the hospital. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 101, 123. Mother later

       tested positive for marijuana with a concentration of 804 nanograms of THC

       per milliliter.

[27]   For the purposes of the Agency’s substantiation determination, this meets the

       low threshold of substantial evidence for DCS to conclude that Mother was

       impaired at the time she drove with Daughter in the car. 7 Whether or not

       Mother’s impairment caused the car accident or whether Daughter was actually

       injured is beside the point because Mother endangered Daughter merely by

       7
         Although Mother points out that Officer Atzhorn testified he would have conducted “further investigation”
       if he suspected a driver of being under the influence, his role in the instant car accident is unclear because he
       did not remember Mother or the car accident. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 96. And even if Officer Atzhorn’s
       testimony suggests that Mother was sober at the time of the car accident, we do not “reweigh the evidence.”
       Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d at 992.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024                                 Page 15 of 17
       driving with Daughter after using marijuana. Cf. K.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs.,

       24 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing In re R.P., 949 N.E.2d 395,

       401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)) (noting that, in CHINS cases, a child may be

       “endangered” even if the child is not actually “physically or emotionally

       harmed”).

[28]   In arguing that her marijuana use is insufficient to support the substantiation

       determination, Mother relies on Ad.M. v. Indiana Department of Child Services,

       103 N.E.3d 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), which we find distinguishable. 8 In that

       case, DCS alleged that the children were CHINS due, in part, to the mother’s

       marijuana use. Id. at 713. The DCS caseworker, however, could not explain

       how the mother’s marijuana use “impacted” the children at all. Id. at 714. A

       panel of this Court ultimately held that the mother’s use of marijuana alone did

       not support a finding that the children were CHINS because DCS did not

       present any evidence that the mother’s drug use “seriously endangered” the

       children. Id.

[29]   Unlike in Ad.M., here we are reviewing a substantiation determination rather

       than a CHINS determination. Moreover, Mother did not merely use

       marijuana, but rather drove with Daughter in the car after using marijuana.

       8
        Mother also relies on an unpublished decision, In re J.E., Case No. 49A02-1705-JC-1026 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct.
       31, 2017) (mem.). Pursuant to Appellate Rule 65(D)(2), only unpublished decisions issued on or after
       January 1, 2023, may be cited for persuasive value, so we do not consider J.E.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024                            Page 16 of 17
       Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Agency’s

       substantiation determination, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 9

       Conclusion
[30]   Substantial evidence supports DCS’s substantiation determination.

       Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[31]   Affirmed.

       Mathias, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
       C. Matthew Zentz
       Thomas B. Roberts
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana

       Frances Barrow
       Supervising Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       9
        We also note that, as DCS points out, Mother may petition to have the substantiation of neglect
       determination expunged. See Ind. Code § 31-33-27-5.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2166 | April 29, 2024                            Page 17 of 17