Court Opinion

ID: 9445221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:23:04.586334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:10.349914
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the result and in all that my colleagues say except that I disagree concerning the interpretation of the statute. I think that Rolland v. U. S., 5 Cir., 200 F.2d 678, and Freidus v. U. S., 96 U.S. App.D.C. 133, 223 F.2d 598, correctly hold that the second clause of Section 1001 requires proof of the materiality of the false statements.1
However, I think the allegations of the indictment sufficient, and that they satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c). In statutory terms, the indictment alleged that the false statements were made “in a matter within the jurisdiction of a department of the United States.” If the statute, correctly interpreted, makes materiality an essential part of the crime, then the statute, although not expressly referring thereto, nevertheless, by implication, imports the element of materiality. Accordingly, the indictment, using the very words of the statute, necessarily by implication imports an allegation that the false statements were material. To put it differently, if the statute, without mentioning materiality, implies that element, then so does the indictment; the shorthand expression sufficient in the one is equally sufficient in the other. Consequently .to dismiss the indictment merely because it omitted the word “material” would be irrational and contrary to modern pleading practice.2

. It will be noted that both parts of the section, are prefaced by the clause “within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.”

. To the extent that Rolland v. U. S., 5 Cir., 200 F.2d 678 is contra, I disagree with it.