Court Opinion

ID: 9906051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:03:30.617041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.084524
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 Drooyan v. Action Property Management Co. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 JOHN N. DROOYAN,                                                       B314211

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                     (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. BC694438)
           v.

 ACTION PROPERTY
 MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC.,
 et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Richard L. Fruin, Judge. Affirmed.
     John N. Drooyan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffry A. Miller, Ernest
Slome, and Daniel R. Velladao; Stratman & Williams-Abrego and
Amy L. Powers for Defendants and Respondents.
              _________________________________
                        INTRODUCTION
       Plaintiff and appellant John N. Drooyan, the owner of a
unit in a common interest development, filed this action against
the development’s community association, its board of directors,
and its property manager. Drooyan alleged claims for breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion, and violation of the Rosenthal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act; Civ. Code, § 1788
et seq.). At a bench trial on Drooyan’s claims, the trial court
granted a defense motion for judgment under Code of Civil
Procedure section 631.8, and following the entry of judgment,
awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants under the Davis-
Stirling Common Interest Development Act (Davis-Stirling Act;
Civ. Code, § 4000 et seq.). On appeal, Drooyan seeks to challenge
both the judgment and the postjudgment award of attorney’s fees.
We affirm the judgment because Drooyan failed to establish that
the evidence compelled a finding in his favor as a matter of law
on any of his claims. We dismiss the purported appeal from the
postjudgment order for attorney’s fees for lack of jurisdiction
because Drooyan did not file a timely appeal from that order.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     The parties
       The Centre Street Lofts is a common interest development
located in San Pedro, California. The development is managed by
the Centre Street Lofts Community Association (Association) and
the Association’s board of directors (Board). Action Property
Management Company, Inc. (Action) is the property manager for
the Centre Street Lofts and handles the collection of the
homeowners’ association fees. Drooyan purchased a unit in the
development in 2008, and was a member of the Board from 2010
through 2013.

                               2
II.   The construction defect lawsuit and settlement
      In 2010, the Board hired the Miller Law Firm to represent
the Association in connection with certain construction-related
problems in the Centre Street Lofts. In 2011, the Miller Law
Firm filed a construction defect lawsuit on behalf of the
Association against the property developer. The case settled in
late 2013 for $6.1 million, of which the Association received
$3,439,521.
      On November 7, 2013, the Miller Law Firm sent a letter to
the Association’s members to advise them that the lawsuit had
settled. The letter provided that “[t]he settlement funds, less
costs and attorney’s fees, will be placed into an interest bearing
separate account for making common area repairs and
replenishing reserves.” The letter further stated that “[t]he
settlement funds are for the benefit of the Association, and no
funds from this settlement will be disbursed to individual
members.”
      On December 12, 2013, members of the Board, including
Drooyan, held an executive session meeting with the Miller Law
Firm about the settlement. Shortly after the meeting, Drooyan
resigned from the Board. The following year, in October 2014,
the Association received the settlement funds.
III. The Board’s postsettlement actions
      The Centre Street Lofts is governed by a declaration of
covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). The CC&Rs
provide that the Association is responsible for managing and
maintaining the common areas of the development. If any
portion of the common areas is damaged or destroyed, the
Association must restore that property to its former condition as
promptly as possible. The CC&Rs also authorize the Association

                                3
to establish and collect regular and special assessments and late
payment penalties for delinquent assessments. Assessments are
delinquent if not paid within 15 days after the date set by the
Association. Any money paid to the Association must be
deposited into an operating fund, reserve fund, or other fund
established by the Association, and must be used solely for the
common benefit of the owners.
      At the end of 2015, the Board increased the homeowners’
association fees. In a December 2015 e-mail to the property
manager and the Board, Drooyan objected to the fee increase,
stating: “This increase is inexplicable to me since after Centre
Street received the $3.4 million lawsuit settlement funds, the
[B]oard discussed with the Miller [L]aw [F]irm whether the funds
from the lawsuit could be used to reimburse the HOA for past
expenditures to repair the gates and hot water system, and we
were advised by the Miller [L]aw [F]irm that YES—the HOA
could be reimbursed for the many thousands of dollars that were
expended by the HOA for the repairs . . . . To the best of my
knowledge this has not been done.”
      Drooyan later presented the Board with an unfiled class
action complaint, and requested that the Board participate in a
mediation with the homeowners. In a series of letters sent to
Drooyan in early 2016, the Association’s legal counsel, David
Swedelson, disputed Drooyan’s claim that the Board was
mismanaging the settlement funds. While Swedelson
acknowledged that the cost of certain prior repairs totaling
approximately $200,000 was a source of damages claimed in the
construction defect lawsuit, he stated that the Board never
promised to use the settlement funds to reimburse the
homeowners for those costs. Swedelson also explained that the

                                4
Board was in the process of repairing a number of construction
defects in the common areas of the development, and needed to
ensure there were sufficient funds in the Association’s
reconstruction account to make those repairs. Swedelson further
noted that the Board previously transferred a portion of the
settlement funds to the Association’s general account, and would
likely transfer additional funds to the reserve account to be
available for future common area repairs if necessary. Although
Swedelson initially indicated that mediation was “likely a good
idea,” he later informed Drooyan that the Board would not agree
to a mediation because it acted appropriately.
       The homeowners’ association fees for the Centre Street
Lofts are due on the first of each month, and the Association
charges a late fee if a payment is received after the 15th of the
month. At the end of 2016, the Board increased the late fee from
$10 to 10 percent of the payment due.
IV. The current lawsuit
       On February 16, 2018, Drooyan filed an individual lawsuit
against Action, the Association, and the Board (collectively,
Defendants). The operative complaint alleged causes of action for
violation of the Rosenthal Act, conversion, and breach of fiduciary
duty.
       The first cause of action for violation of the Rosenthal Act
was brought against Action only. Drooyan alleged that Action
violated the Rosenthal Act by improperly charging him late fees
in 2016 and 2017. Drooyan alleged that the late fees were not
reasonably related to the costs incurred by Action in collecting
the homeowners’ association fees, and violated the Association’s
CC&Rs.

                                5
       The second cause of action for conversion was asserted
against the Association and the Board. Drooyan alleged that the
Board used the homeowners’ association fees to pay for
$207,847.97 in temporary repairs through August 2012, and to
pay for additional repairs from August 2012 to November 2013.
Drooyan alleged that the Board refused to reimburse him for his
proportionate share of these repair costs from the settlement
funds that the Association received in the construction defect
lawsuit. Drooyan alleged that, by improperly retaining the
settlement funds, the Association and the Board committed the
tort of conversion.
       The third cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was
also asserted against the Association and the Board. Drooyan
alleged that the Association and the Board owed him a fiduciary
duty to properly manage the settlement funds, and that they
breached that duty by refusing to use the settlement funds,
either to reimburse Drooyan for his share of the temporary repair
costs or to avoid an increase in the homeowners’ association fees.
In addition, Drooyan alleged that the Association and the Board
breached their fiduciary duty by increasing the late fee for
delinquent homeowners’ association fees without providing
proper notice of the increase.
V.     Drooyan’s evidence at trial
       The trial court held a bench trial on Drooyan’s claims in
May 2021. Drooyan represented himself at trial and testified on
his own behalf.
       With respect to his claims arising out of the Board’s
management of the construction defect settlement funds,
Drooyan testified that, during the litigation, temporary repairs
were made to the common areas of the development, and the

                                6
homeowners’ association fees were increased to cover the cost of
those repairs. As of August 2012, the cost of the repairs was
$207,847.97. Between August 2012 and October 2014, an
additional $80,022.08 was spent on the repairs. Drooyan claimed
that he was entitled to recover 1.16 percent of the total cost of the
repairs as his proportionate share of the settlement funds, which
according to his calculation, was $3,346.55.
       Drooyan testified that he believed he had a right to this
monetary recovery based on statements made by Tom Miller of
the Miller Law Firm, the Association’s counsel in the construction
defect lawsuit. According to Drooyan, Miller told the Board at
the December 12, 2013 executive session meeting that the costs of
the temporary repairs “[were] damages in the settlement for
which homeowners would be . . . reimbursed.” Drooyan did not
regard Miller’s statement to mean that the homeowners would be
paid directly, but rather that the settlement funds would be used
to reimburse the Association’s general account in order to reduce
the homeowners’ association fees. In a January 15, 2016 e-mail
to Drooyan, Miller confirmed that these prior repair costs were
claimed as damages in the construction defect lawsuit, although
Miller also noted in the e-mail that no specific instructions were
made as to how the settlement funds were to be spent.
       On cross-examination, Drooyan acknowledged that Miller
expressly told the Association’s members in a November 7, 2013
letter that none of the settlement funds would be distributed to
the individual homeowners. Drooyan testified that he “never . . .
sought to have homeowners be paid specifically from the
settlement,” and that he “just wanted to see that . . . the
reconstruction settlement funds went into the general fund
through reduced H.O.A. fees.” He further testified, “It’s not that .

                                 7
. . I’m owed money directly from the settlement, but . . . my belief
is that . . . the H.O.A. fees should have been reduced in
accordance with the temporary repair costs that were part of the
settlement.”
        During Drooyan’s testimony, the trial court noted that he
had not shown that the Board took any action to deprive the
homeowners of the value of the settlement funds. In response,
Drooyan stated, “[I]t wasn’t what the Board did as much as how
they did it. When we wanted to mediate with them and talk to
them about these repairs that were not being done . . . and this
whole issue of trying to reimburse homeowners who were hurting
financially, they did not want to talk.” Drooyan agreed with the
court that the Board was allowed to make decisions that it
believed were in the best interests of the development. Drooyan
stated that his concern was that “when things were not being
done . . . and issues were arising where homeowners’ interests
were at stake, they didn’t want to have a neutral to talk to them
about it, they didn’t want to talk to the homeowners.”
        Drooyan testified that the Board also breached its fiduciary
duty by failing to complete the repairs in a timely manner.
The trial court pointed out that Drooyan’s complaint contained no
allegations based on the timeliness of the repairs, and that his
breach of fiduciary duty claim was based solely on the Board’s
alleged conduct in managing the settlement funds and increasing
the late fee charged for delinquent homeowners’ association fees.
Drooyan acknowledged that his complaint did not include a claim
based on the Board’s failure to make timely repairs, and that he
never sought leave to amend the complaint to add such a claim.
When defense counsel later sought to cross-examine Drooyan on
the subject of untimely repairs, he declined to answer, stating:

                                 8
“It’s not in the complaint, so I don’t think we need to talk about
it.” Drooyan added, “That’s all history—Okay? . . . [¶] . . . That’s
not part of this case anymore.”
       With respect to his claims arising out of the Board’s
increase in the late fee charged for delinquent homeowners’
association fee payments, Drooyan testified that he did not
receive written notice of the increase. On cross-examination,
Drooyan was shown a notice to the owners of a December 28,
2016 meeting to decide whether to increase the late fee from $10
to 10 percent. Drooyan stated that he did not recall seeing the
notice, and that he first learned of the late fee increase when he
received the payment vouchers for his 2017 homeowners’
association fees. While he acknowledged that the Davis-Stirling
Act allowed the Board to increase the late fee, Drooyan stated
that his issue was that the fee was being paid to Action, not the
Association. Drooyan also testified that he believed a 400 to 500
percent increase in the late fee was “against the homeowners’
interests,” and that the Board “can approve it, yes; but that
doesn’t make it right.”
       With respect to his claim against Action for its collection of
the late fees, Drooyan testified that he was charged a late fee in
July 2016 and every month in 2017. Drooyan further testified
that the late fees accrued interest at 12 percent per year, and
continued to appear on his monthly homeowners’ association fee
statements until he paid off a lien that had been placed on his
property. The trial court admitted into evidence certain late fee
notices that Drooyan received from Action, which reflected that
he was charged a $10 late fee on July 18, 2016, a $23.08 late fee
on February 16, 2017, and a $34.63 late fee on March 16, 2017.
The court also requested that Drooyan and defense counsel each

                                  9
submit a chart summarizing the late fees that were imposed
during the relevant time period. After reviewing the charts, the
court found that the one submitted by Drooyan failed to show in a
comprehensible form what amounts in late fees were charged to
Drooyan and when those charges were imposed. At trial, the
parties stipulated that “[l]ate fees are determined by when the
fees are received and not when they are mailed.”
       Drooyan called two other witnesses to testify in his case-in-
chief. Kevin Franklin was the head of a general contracting firm
that worked with the Miller Law Firm on the construction defect
litigation. Franklin testified that his firm conducted testing,
made temporary repairs, and later prepared an analysis of the
repairs that should be prioritized following the settlement.
Rebecca Johns was a member of the Association’s Board. She
testified that the increase in the late fee from $10 to 10 percent of
the monthly homeowners’ association fee was made in reliance on
the advice of Action.
VI. Defendants’ motion for judgment
       At the completion of Drooyan’s case-in-chief, Defendants
moved for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8.
Defense counsel argued that Drooyan failed to meet his burden of
proof as to each cause of action. The trial court indicated that it
was inclined to grant the motion, but first asked Drooyan
whether he had any argument in opposition. After Drooyan
stated that he did not, the court granted the motion.
       On May 24, 2021, the trial court entered judgment in favor
of Defendants on each of Drooyan’s claims. In the judgment, the
court stated that, following Drooyan’s case-in-chief, it did not find
a breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, or violation of the
Rosenthal Act.

                                 10
VII. Defendants’ postjudgment motion for attorney’s fees
       On June 7, 2021, Defendants filed a motion for attorney’s
fees. Defendants argued that the Association and the Board were
entitled to attorney’s fees under the Davis-Stirling Act, and that
Action was entitled to attorney’s fees under the Rosenthal Act.
Defendants sought to recover approximately $47,000 in attorney’s
fees for the work performed by two law firms: (1) Stratman,
Schwartz & Williams-Abrego, defense counsel in the litigation,
and (2) Swedelson Gottlieb, the Association’s personal counsel.
       Drooyan opposed the motion for attorney’s fees. Among
other arguments, Drooyan contended that Action was not entitled
to attorney’s fees because there was no showing that Drooyan
acted in bad faith in pursuing the Rosenthal Act claim;
Defendants could not recover attorney’s fees for the work
performed by Swedelson Gottlieb prior to the filing of the action;
and Defendants failed to prove that the amount of attorney’s fees
sought was necessary and reasonable.
       On July 12, 2021, the trial court granted in part and denied
in part the motion for attorney’s fees. The court denied the
request for attorney’s fees under the Rosenthal Act because
Defendants failed to show that Drooyan pursued his claim
against Action in bad faith. The court also denied the request for
attorney’s fees for the work performed by Swedelson Gottlieb.
The court granted the request for attorney’s fees for the work
performed by Stratman, Schwartz & Williams-Abrego, but
reduced the amount of fees awarded to $15,500 because
Defendants were only entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees for
the claims arising under the Davis-Stirling Act.
       Drooyan filed a timely appeal from the May 24, 2021
judgment. He did not file an appeal from the July 12, 2021

                                11
postjudgment order granting Defendants’ motion for attorney’s
fees. We accordingly requested the parties submit supplemental
briefs addressing whether there is appellate jurisdiction to review
the attorney’s fees award. Both parties filed supplemental briefs.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Appeal from the judgment
       On appeal, Drooyan challenges the trial court’s ruling
granting Defendants’ motion for judgment under Code of Civil
Procedure section 631.8. Drooyan contends the evidence at trial
was insufficient to support a judgment in favor of Defendants on
each of his three causes of action. We conclude the trial court did
not err in granting the motion for judgment.
       A.       Governing law
       Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 provides, in relevant
part, that “[a]fter a party has completed his presentation of
evidence in a trial by the court, the other party, without waiving
his right to offer evidence in support of his defense or in rebuttal
in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a judgment.
The court as trier of the facts shall weigh the evidence and may
render a judgment in favor of the moving party, . . . or may
decline to render any judgment until the close of all the
evidence.” (Id., subd. (a).)
       “ ‘ “The purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 is
‘to enable the [trial] court, when it finds at the completion of
plaintiff’s case that the evidence does not justify requiring the
defense to produce evidence, to weigh evidence and make findings
of fact.’ ” ’ ” (Orange County Water Dist. v. MAG Aerospace
Industries, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 229, 239 (Orange County
Water Dist.).) “A motion for judgment is to be granted if the court
concludes, after ‘weighing the evidence at the close of the

                                12
plaintiff’s case,’ that ‘the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden
of proof.’ ” (Hart v. Darwish (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 218, 227.)
In making its ruling, “ ‘the trial court assesses witness credibility
and resolves conflicts in the evidence.’ ” (Jones v. Quality Coast,
Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 766, 772.) The court “may disbelieve
the plaintiff’s evidence, draw adverse (rather than favorable)
inferences therefrom, and credit contrary evidence introduced
through cross-examination or otherwise.” (Orange County Water
Dist., at p. 239.)
       In general, the substantial evidence standard of review
applies to a judgment granted under Code of Civil Procedure
section 631.8. (Eriksson v. Nunnink (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 708,
732.) “This standard, however, can be ‘misleading’ in cases when
the judgment for one party is based on the other party’s failure
to satisfy a burden of proof.” (Ibid.) Therefore, “ ‘[w]hen the trier
of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with
the burden of proof failed to carry that burden and that party
appeals . . . the question for a reviewing court becomes whether
the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a
matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes
whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and
unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave
no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 733.) “This is ‘an onerous
standard’ [citation] and one that is ‘almost impossible’ for a losing
plaintiff to meet, because unless the trier of fact made specific
factual findings in favor of the losing plaintiff, we presume the
trier of fact concluded that ‘plaintiff’s evidence lacks sufficient
weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof.’ ” (Estes v.
Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 651.)

                                  13
       B.     Breach of fiduciary duty
       In his cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, Drooyan
alleged that the Association and the Board breached a fiduciary
duty owed to him by (1) failing to use a portion of the settlement
funds from the construction defect lawsuit to reimburse Drooyan
for his share of the temporary repair costs, and (2) increasing the
late fee charged for delinquent homeowners’ association fees from
$10 to 10 percent of the payment due without proper notice.
       To prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the
plaintiff must prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship,
breach of a fiduciary duty, and damages. (Oasis West Realty,
LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) “ ‘[B]efore a person
can be charged with a fiduciary obligation, he must either
knowingly undertake to act on behalf and for the benefit of
another, or must enter into a relationship which imposes that
undertaking as a matter of law.’ ” (City of Hope National Medical
Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 386.) Directors
on the board of a homeowner or community association generally
have a fiduciary duty to exercise due care and undivided loyalty
for the interests of the association. (Frances T. v. Village Green
Owners Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, 513.)
       Under the business judgment rule, however, judicial
deference must be given to board decisionmaking when the
owners in common interest developments seek to litigate
business decisions that are entrusted to the discretion of their
associations’ board of directors. (Lamden v. La Jolla Shores
Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 249, 251.)
“ ‘Generally, courts will uphold decisions made by the governing
board . . . so long as they represent good faith efforts to further
the purposes of the common interest development, are consistent

                                14
with the development’s governing documents, and comply with
public policy.’ ” (Id. at p. 265.) Thus, where the board, “upon
reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the
best interests of the community association and its members,
exercises discretion within the scope of its authority under
relevant statutes, covenants and restrictions to select among
means for discharging an obligation to maintain and repair a
development’s common areas, courts should defer to the board’s
authority and presumed expertise.” (Ibid.)
       The Centre Street Lofts is a common interest development
governed by the Davis-Stirling Act (Civ. Code, § 4000 et seq.).
As a common interest development, it is managed by a
homeowners’ association that is responsible for, among other
duties, repairing, replacing, and maintaining the common areas
of the development (id., § 4775, subd. (a)), levying regular and
special assessments on the owners sufficient to perform its
obligations (id., § 5600), and levying late payment penalties on
the owners for delinquent assessments (id., § 5650). Consistent
with the Davis-Stirling Act, the Centre Street Lofts’ CC&Rs
charge the Association with the management, maintenance, and
restoration of the common areas. The CC&Rs also entrust the
Association with the authority to establish and collect
assessments and late fee penalties, and to manage the operating,
reserve, and other funds for the common benefit of the owners.
       Drooyan argues the Association and the Board breached
their fiduciary duty because, once the Association received the
settlement funds from the construction defect lawsuit, the Board
should have reduced the homeowners’ association fees in order to
reimburse the owners for the cost of temporary repairs made
during the litigation. Drooyan does not claim the Board was

                               15
legally obligated to disperse the settlement funds in this manner
under the Davis-Stirling Act, the Association’s CC&Rs, or any
other statute or contract. Rather, he contends the owners were
entitled to reimbursement because the repair costs were claimed
as damages in the construction defect lawsuit. Even if the repair
costs were damages, however, the evidence did not establish that
the terms of the settlement required the Association to reimburse
the owners for any such costs. To the contrary, the evidence
showed that, shortly after the settlement, the Association’s
counsel advised the owners that the settlement funds would be
“placed into an interest bearing separate account for making
common area repairs and replenishing reserves,” and that “no
funds from this settlement will be disbursed to individual
members.” The evidence also showed that the Board established
a separate reconstruction account for the settlement funds, and
then used the funds to make repairs to construction defects in the
common areas of the development. The trial court reasonably
could find that the Board acted within the scope of its authority
under the CC&Rs and governing statutes, and made a good faith
decision to apply the settlement funds to common area repairs
rather than reduced homeowners’ fees.
       Drooyan also asserts the Association and the Board
breached their fiduciary duty by increasing the late fee imposed
for delinquent homeowners’ association fees from $10 to
10 percent of the payment due. Drooyan does not dispute that
the Board had the authority under the Davis-Stirling Act and the
Association’s CC&Rs to make this increase. Indeed, the Davis-
Stirling Act provides that, unless the CC&Rs state otherwise,
homeowner assessments “are delinquent 15 days after they
become due,” in which case the association may recover “[a] late

                               16
charge not exceeding 10 percent of the delinquent assessment or
ten dollars ($10), whichever is greater,” unless the CC&Rs specify
a smaller amount. (Civ. Code, § 5650, subd. (b)(2).) The CC&Rs
likewise provide that the assessments are delinquent if not paid
within 15 days after the date set by the Association, and that the
Association may require the delinquent owner to pay a late fee.
The evidence reflected that the Board decided to increase the late
fee at the end of 2016 in reliance on advice provided by the
property manager. While Drooyan testified that he had no
recollection of receiving notice of the meeting where the increase
was approved, the trial court was entitled to disbelieve this
testimony. In any event, none of the evidence showed that the
Board made the increase decision in bad faith or outside the
scope of its broad discretion.
       On appeal, Drooyan argues the Association and the Board
further breached their fiduciary duty by failing to make timely
repairs after receiving the settlement funds, and by refusing to
mediate with the homeowners about those delays. As the trial
court noted during Drooyan’s testimony, the operative complaint
contained no allegations based on the timeliness of the repairs.
It also did not include any allegations about the Board’s refusal
to mediate. When questioned by the trial court, Drooyan
admitted that his complaint did not allege untimely repairs as a
basis for his breach of fiduciary duty claim, and that he never
sought leave to amend to add such a claim. Drooyan offered no
further evidence on the subject, and he conceded on cross-
examination that his allegations about the timeliness of the
repairs were “not part of this case anymore.” Under these
circumstances, Drooyan waived any claim on appeal that the
Association or the Board breached a fiduciary duty based on

                               17
conduct not alleged in the complaint. (See Shaw v. County of
Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 285–286; Telles
Transport, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2001) 92
Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166–1167.)
       Because Drooyan cannot establish that the evidence at trial
compelled a finding in his favor as a matter of law, the trial court
did not err in granting judgment for the Association and the
Board on Drooyan’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.
       C.     Conversion
       In his cause of action for conversion, Drooyan alleged that
the Association and the Board committed the tort of conversion
by improperly retaining the portion of the settlement funds that
represented his pro rata share of the homeowners’ association
fees that were used to pay for the prior repairs. At trial, Drooyan
testified that he calculated his share to be $3,346.55, and that he
was seeking this amount as damages for conversion.
       “ ‘ “Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over
the property of another.” ’ ” (Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mora
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 202, 208.) The elements of a cause of
action for conversion are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to
possession of personal property, (2) the defendant’s disposition of
property in a manner inconsistent with plaintiff’s property rights,
and (3) resulting damages. (Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th
1141, 1150.) To prevail on conversion claim, “the plaintiff must
prove an ‘ “ ‘ownership or right to possession of the property at
the time of the conversion.’ ” ’ ” (Nelson v. Tucker Ellis LLP
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 827, 845.)
       Drooyan contends the trial court erred in granting
judgment in favor of the Association and the Board on his
conversion claim, because there was no evidence that he and the

                                18
other owners lacked a monetary interest in the repair costs that
were claimed as damages in the construction defect lawsuit.
However, as the party with the burden of proof at trial, Drooyan
was required to present evidence to establish his ownership or
right to possession of the property. The trial court reasonably
could have concluded that Drooyan failed to meet that burden
because he did not prove he had a possessory right to any of the
settlement funds that the Association received in the construction
defect lawsuit. Instead, the evidence presented at trial showed
that the settlement funds belonged to the Association, not the
individual homeowners, and that the Board was responsible for
managing those funds for the benefit of the Association and its
members. Drooyan also admitted he lacked an ownership or
possessory interest in the settlement funds when he testified:
“It’s not that . . . I’m owed money directly from the settlement,
but . . . my belief is that . . . the H.O.A. fees should have been
reduced in accordance with the temporary repair costs that were
part of the settlement.” On this record, the evidence did not, as a
matter of law, compel a finding in Drooyan’s favor on his cause of
action for conversion.
       D.     Violation of the Rosenthal Act
       In his cause of action for violation of the Rosenthal Act
(Civ. Code, § 1788 et seq.), Drooyan alleged that Action violated
the statute by improperly charging him late fees on his monthly
homeowners’ association fees.
       “ ‘The Rosenthal Act was enacted “to prohibit debt
collectors from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the collection of consumer debts.” ’ ” (Young v. Midland Funding
LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 63, 77.) It prohibits specified acts by
debt collectors (Civ. Code, §§ 1788.10–1788.16), and requires

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them to comply with provisions of the federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA; 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.).
The FDCPA regulates the conduct of debt collectors by, among
other acts, prohibiting “any false, deceptive, or misleading
representation or means in connection with the collection of any
debt” (15 U.S.C. § 1692e), including a false representation of
“the character, amount, or legal status of any debt” (15 U.S.C.
§ 1692e(2)(A)).
       Drooyan argues Action falsely represented the character,
amount, or legal status of a debt in violation of the Rosenthal Act
by improperly charging him late fees despite his timely payment
of his monthly homeowners’ association fees. As discussed, the
homeowners’ association fees are due on the first day of the
month, and are subject to a late fee if not paid within 15 days
after they become due. At trial, the parties stipulated that “[l]ate
fees are determined by when the fees are received and not when
they are mailed.”
       The evidence admitted by the trial court showed that
Drooyan was charged a late fee for the homeowners’ association
fees that he paid in July 2016, February 2017, and March 2017.
While Drooyan claims these late fees were improper because he
timely mailed his homeowners’ association fee payments prior to
the 15th of each month, none of the evidence admitted at trial
established when the payments were actually received by Action.
The chart that Drooyan submitted to the court to support his
Rosenthal Act claim also did not show when his 2016 or 2017
homeowners’ association fee payments were received.
       On appeal, Drooyan relies on various exhibits that he
offered at trial to demonstrate that he paid his homeowners’
association fees prior to the 15th of each month. The trial court

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did not admit any of these exhibits, however, and Drooyan does
not raise any argument on appeal regarding the exclusion of this
evidence. Because none of the admitted evidence established the
dates on which Drooyan’s homeowners’ association fees were
received, he failed to meet his burden of proving a violation of the
Rosenthal Act. The trial court accordingly did not err in granting
judgment for Action on the Rosenthal Act claim.
II.     Purported appeal from the postjudgment award of
        attorney’s fees
        Drooyan asserts the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s
fees to Defendants. After considering the parties’ supplemental
briefs, we conclude we lack jurisdiction to review the trial court’s
postjudgment order granting Defendants’ motion for attorney’s
fees because Drooyan did not file a timely appeal from that order.
        The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a prerequisite to
appellate jurisdiction. (Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 113.) Unless a notice of appeal is timely
filed, “ ‘an appellate court is without jurisdiction to determine the
merits of the appeal and must dismiss the appeal.’ ” (Ibid.)
Thus, “ ‘ “[i]f a judgment or order is appealable, an aggrieved
party must file a timely appeal or forever lose the opportunity to
obtain appellate review.” ’ ” (Silver v. Pacific American Fish Co.,
Inc. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 688, 693 (Silver).)
        With respect to a postjudgment award of attorney’s fees,
“ ‘ “[a]n appellate court has no jurisdiction to review an award of
attorney fees made after entry of the judgment, unless the order
is separately appealed.” [Citation.] “ ‘[W]here several judgments
and/or orders occurring close in time are separately appealable
(e.g., judgment and order awarding attorney fees), each
appealable judgment and order must be expressly specified—in

                                 21
either a single notice of appeal or multiple notices of appeal—in
order to be reviewable on appeal.’ ” ’ ” (Nellie Gail Ranch Owners
Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1007–1008 (Nellie);
accord, Silver, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 693.)
       Here, the trial court entered judgment in Defendants’ favor
on May 24, 2021, and granted in part Defendants’ postjudgment
motion for attorney’s fees on July 12, 2021. In ruling on the
motion for attorney’s fees, the trial court decided both
Defendants’ entitlement to attorney’s fees and the amount of fees
to be awarded. On July 19, 2021, Drooyan filed a single notice of
appeal in which he expressly stated that he was appealing from
the “judgment after court trial” entered on “May 24, 2021.”
The notice of appeal did not reference the trial court’s July 12,
2021 ruling on the motion for attorney’s fees, or otherwise
indicate that Drooyan intended to appeal the attorney’s fees
award. Because Drooyan did not file a separate appeal to
challenge the trial court’s order granting the motion for
attorney’s fees, we have no jurisdiction to review that order. (See
Nellie, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1008–1010; Silver, supra,
190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 692–694.)
       In his supplemental brief, Drooyan concedes he did not file
a notice of appeal from the postjudgment award of attorney’s fees.
He nevertheless contends that we have jurisdiction to review the
attorney’s fees award under the collateral order doctrine.
The collateral order doctrine is a recognized exception to the “one
final judgment rule,” and provides that an interim order which is
collateral to the subject matter of the litigation is appealable
under certain limited circumstances. (In re Marriage of Skelley
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368.) In this case, however, there is no
question that the trial court’s postjudgment order granting

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Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees is an appealable order.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) [appeal may be taken from
an order made after a judgment]; Silver, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th
at p. 693 [postjudgment order which awards or denies costs or
attorney’s fees is separately appealable].) Rather, the question is
whether Drooyan filed a timely appeal from that order, which is a
prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. Here, Drooyan’s July 19,
2021 notice of appeal specified the judgment only, and omitted
any reference to the postjudgment order for attorney’s fees.
We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider Drooyan’s challenge to
the attorney’s fees award.
                          DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. The purported appeal from the
postjudgment order awarding attorney’s fees to Respondents is
dismissed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.

                                          VIRAMONTES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                  STRATTON, P. J.

                  WILEY, J.

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