Court Opinion

ID: 9839291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 18:04:01.443194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:57.237123
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/12/23 In re E.K. CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re E.K. et al., Persons Coming
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                 D082144
 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
 AND HUMAN SERVICES
 AGENCY,                                                         (Super. Ct. Nos. NJ57474A-B)
           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 R.R.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Nadia
J. Keilani, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
         Janelle B. Price, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Evangelina Woo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                              INTRODUCTION
      R.R. (Mother) appeals from orders terminating parental rights to her
children, E.K. and D.K. (collectively, the children) at the permanency

planning and selection hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 366.26. On appeal, Mother contends, and the San Diego County
Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) concedes, the Agency did not
comply with its inquiry duties under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), and thus the juvenile court abused its
discretion in finding that ICWA did not apply. We accept the Agency’s
concession, conditionally reverse the orders terminating Mother’s parental
rights, and remand for the limited purpose of compliance with ICWA and its
related statutory provisions. We reject, however, Mother’s other contention
that the juvenile court prejudicially erred by denying her request for a
continuance of the section 366.26 hearing. The orders are otherwise
affirmed.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                    I.
                        Events Leading to Dependency
      In May 2021, Mother and the children were living in a hotel room
funded by a program to help them obtain housing. In mid-May, police
responded to Mother’s hotel room to investigate allegations of domestic

violence. Mother reported that the children’s father (Father)2 punched her in
the face and strangled her in the presence of the children. Mother admitted

1     Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

2     Father is not a party to this appeal and is discussed only when
relevant.
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there was methamphetamine and fentanyl in the hotel room, and that she
was “smoking every day.” An officer described Mother as “erratic, nervous,
and crying,” and he believed she was experiencing symptoms of drug
withdrawals. Father was the subject of a criminal protective order that
prohibited him from having negative or unsupervised contact with the
children.
      Three days later, Mother told a hotel manager that she was
experiencing withdrawals and feeling suicidal. The hotel manager spoke
with an Agency social worker and reported that Mother said, “I need help, I
need treatment, and I don’t feel [the children] are safe with me.” Mother told
the Agency social worker, “I need help. I am suicidal, my husband beat me
up the other day and I need treatment.” A medical team arrived at the hotel
and took Mother to a hospital, where she was placed under a psychiatric
hold. (§ 5150.) The children were taken to Polinsky Children’s Center.
      Following Mother’s hospitalization, hotel staff informed the Agency
that Mother had been leaving the children, who were three and six years old,
in the hotel room unsupervised. They observed her leave the children alone
and return late at night with a male companion. Mother called the front desk
and asked for alcohol and Benadryl because she was “withdrawing from drug
use,” and she told the staff they needed to watch the children. The staff
reported they had been providing food and toys to the children. Mother
admitted she was using “methamphetamine, fentanyl, heroin, and Xanax” in
her hotel room.
      The day after Mother was placed on a psychiatric hold, the Agency filed
dependency petitions on behalf of each child pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (b)(1). The petitions alleged the children were at substantial risk
of serious physical harm or illness because of Mother’s drug use and her

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mental health crisis. At the detention hearing, the court made prima facie
findings that the children fell within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and
detained the children in out-of-home care.
      A contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place in August
2021. The juvenile court made true findings on the petitions and declared
the children dependents of the juvenile court. Reunification services were
offered to both parents and they were permitted to have supervised visitation
with the children. The Agency’s case plan required Mother to complete
counseling, psychotropic medication monitoring, parenting classes, and
substance abuse treatment and drug testing.
                                     II.
                              Reunification Period
      During the initial reunification period, Mother was twice admitted to a
psychiatric hospital. During her second hospitalization, the Agency reported
she was “detoxing” from methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl use. She
was released from the hospital to an in-patient treatment program where she
participated in individual and group counseling and had weekly visitation
with the children.
      While at the in-patient program, Mother enrolled in an “off[-]campus”
medically assisted treatment program. Mother’s roommate disclosed to her
counselor that Mother used methamphetamine and fentanyl while at the off-
campus program. Upon learning of her alleged drug use, Mother’s counselor
required her to drug test. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and
she was discharged from the in-patient program.
      After leaving the drug treatment program, Mother failed to maintain
consistent contact with the Agency. Mother’s social worker documented that
she had 13 different telephone numbers for Mother, and that her

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communication was sporadic. For example, she sent her social worker a
message claiming that her spinal cord was infected and required surgery, and
four days later she told the social worker that she had travelled to Florida.
Although Mother admitted she was struggling with substance abuse, she
informed the Agency that she did not intend to complete a substance abuse
treatment program. She also failed to start her parenting classes or
participate in counseling or mental health treatment.
      Meanwhile, the children were placed together in the same resource
home. Their caregiver reported that Mother maintained inconsistent
communication with the children, missing 51 of 75 scheduled calls. The
Agency referred Mother to a family visitation center to establish a visitation
schedule, but the referral was closed when she repeatedly failed to show up
or return the facility’s phone calls. Once a visitation schedule was
established, the Agency documented their observations of three supervised
visits between Mother and the children during this reunification period. The
social worker observed that their visits were positive and Mother
appropriately engaged with the children.
      In a report prepared for the 12-month review hearing, the Agency
recommended that the juvenile court terminate Mother’s reunification
services. The Agency reported that Mother had not completed any
reunification services, including substance abuse and mental health
treatment, counseling, or parenting classes, and that she failed to maintain
contact with her social worker. According to the Agency, Mother was not
truthful regarding her participation in substance abuse treatment; she
claimed she was receiving services from a specific mental health provider, but
the Agency confirmed she received no such services.

                                       5
      At the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court found returning the
children to Mother’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment to their
physical or emotional well-being, and that there was no substantial
probability that the children would be returned to her care within 18 months
of the initiation of dependency proceedings. The court terminated
reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
                                    III.
                            Section 366.26 Hearing
      The juvenile court conducted the section 366.26 on March 23, 2023.
The Agency submitted the section 366.26 report and two addendum reports
into evidence without objection. Mother did not present affirmative evidence
at the hearing, nor did she cross-examine the Agency social worker who was
available to provide testimony.
      The section 366.26 report described the children’s progress in their
foster home. The children were placed together in the same home shortly
after they were removed from Mother’s care in May 2021, and they had
remained with their caregivers throughout the dependency case. E.K. was
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, and he required additional
services and therapy to meet his needs. D.K. did not have any developmental
delays, but required counseling to address behavioral issues in which he was
observed hitting, pushing, and punching others. The caregivers ensured the
children consistently received the services they needed to help with their
development and behavioral needs.
      The caregivers, who had provided foster care for over 12 years and
specialized in the care of children with special needs, expressed a strong
interest in pursuing the children’s adoption. The Agency opined that the
children would benefit from the “stability and consistency in the care they

                                       6
have had for over a year” with the caregivers. Thus, the Agency
recommended that the juvenile court select a permanent plan of adoption.
      In their closing argument, Mother’s counsel asked the court to select a
“lesser permanent plan” than adoption. Counsel asserted the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception to adoption was applicable, noting that
the children lived the entirety of their lives in Mother’s care prior to the
dependency case. Counsel argued Mother had maintained regular visitation
and contact with the children, aside from instances in which visitation was
affected by Mother’s medical issues. Counsel argued the benefits of adoption
did not outweigh the detriment of terminating Mother’s parental rights
because of the strength of Mother’s bond with the children.
      The juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
children were likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated. The
court then addressed the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to
adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). It noted that Mother had
not maintained consistent in-person and telephonic communication with the
children and that she repeatedly failed to show up to their scheduled visits.
On days when Mother did not show up for visitation, E.K. exhibited harmful
behavior in which he “kicked staff, screamed, and threw chairs.” However,
the court acknowledged that when Mother did have visitation with the
children, the visits were appropriate and the children appeared to enjoy
them. Nonetheless, the court found that Mother and the children did not
share a “significant positive emotional relationship,” namely due to the
“inconsistency of the parents in their children’s lives.” The court found that
any potential detriment arising from the termination of the parental
relationship would be mitigated through therapeutic intervention, and the

                                        7
consistent care, love, and support the children were receiving from their
caregivers.
      Accordingly, the juvenile court found “the benefits of stability and
permanency, which adoption provides, far outweigh the benefit of
maintaining what is at best an inconsistent relationship with [the parents].”
It concluded that none of the statutory exceptions enumerated in section
366.26, subdivision (c)(1), including the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception, were applicable. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights
and declared the children free from her custody and control.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                     I.
               The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion
               by Denying Mother’s Request for a Continuance

      Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her
request to continue the section 366.26 hearing. According to Mother, she
established good cause to support her request, and a continuance was not
contrary to the children’s best interests. Additionally, she argues the juvenile
court’s error was prejudicial because it is reasonably probable that her
testimony would have compelled a more favorable result. We disagree.
      Nearly two years before the section 366.26 hearing, in July 2021,
Mother reported to the Agency that she was diagnosed with cancer and was
discussing treatment options with her medical providers. The record does not
include documentation of her diagnosis, or any information related to her
treatment plan. Although Mother testified at the 12-month review hearing
and discussed her substance abuse and mental health issues, she did not
mention a cancer diagnosis or any related medical issues or procedures.
      After Mother’s reunification services were terminated at the 12-month
review hearing, the court scheduled the section 366.26 hearing for
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January 25, 2023, as an “appearance hearing.” At the “appearance hearing,”
the juvenile court set a contested section 366.26 hearing for February 22,
2023. Although Mother was present, she did not mention any upcoming
medical procedure to the court.
      On February 22, 2023, Mother appeared telephonically and requested a
continuance of the section 366.26 hearing. Her counsel represented that
Mother was feeling ill, and that she wished to be present for the hearing to
testify in person. The juvenile court found good cause to continue the hearing
to March 23, 2023. Once again, Mother did not mention any upcoming
medical procedures.
      On March 23, 2023, Mother was not present for the hearing and her
counsel requested another continuance. Her counsel proffered the following
in support of the continuance request: “[Mother] advised me that they have a
current medical procedure in the time frame of trial is scheduled to take
place today. I don’t have any further information.”
      The Agency, as well as counsel for the children, objected to the
continuance. The children’s counsel informed the court that the delays in the
court proceedings were “affecting the children.” They argued that Mother
“has been inconsistent with visits and [the children were affected by] the
ongoing continuances and the delaying of this case[.]” E.K.’s therapist
reported he was having behavioral issues at school because of inconsistent
visitation with the parents, and that further delay would be detrimental to
the children.
      After argument from the parties, the court found that a continuance
would be “contrary to the children’s best interest[s].” The court noted that it
previously granted Mother’s continuance request based on an unspecified
illness, and that Mother was aware of the time and date of the section 366.26

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hearing “for some time.” The court did not find good cause to continue the
hearing and denied Mother’s request.
      “We review the juvenile court’s decision to deny a continuance for abuse
of discretion. [Citation.] ‘Discretion is abused when a decision is arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd and results in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.’ ” (In re D.Y. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1056.) Continuances of
hearings in dependency proceedings are generally discouraged. (In re
Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 604.) In dependency cases, the
juvenile court may not grant a continuance “that is contrary to the interest of
the minor. In considering the minor’s interests, the court shall give
substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her
custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and
the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements. [¶] Continuances
shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of
time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the
motion for the continuance.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1)−(2).)
      Here, Mother’s second request to continue the section 366.26 hearing
did not comply with the requirements set forth in section 352, subdivision
(a)(3), that required her to file her request in writing two days prior to the
hearing. (§ 352, subd. (a)(3) [to request a continuance in a dependency
proceeding, “written notice shall be filed at least two court days prior to the
date set for hearing, together with affidavits or declarations detailing specific
facts showing that a continuance is necessary, unless the court for good cause
entertains an oral motion for continuance.”].) Instead, her counsel requested
a continuance orally and on the date of the hearing. Nevertheless, the
juvenile court considered the merits of her continuance request and found
that she did not present good cause.

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      We conclude the juvenile court’s finding is supported by the record.
Mother was personally present when the section 366.26 hearing was
continued to March 23, 2023 at her request, and yet she made no mention of
any upcoming medical procedure. To the extent that the procedure was an
emergency, Mother’s counsel did not provide any information regarding the
nature of the proceeding or how long her procedure would delay the
proceedings. While we understand, as Mother notes in her opening brief on
appeal, that she previously disclosed a cancer diagnosis, there is no evidence
in the record to suggest the medical procedure was related to this diagnosis.
      Importantly, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that an
additional continuance of the section 366.26 hearing would be contrary to the
children’s best interests. The children’s counsel explained that the delays
and inconsistent visitation with Mother were creating behavioral issues for
E.K. The Agency’s reports also documented the negative effect of Mother’s
inconsistent visitation and contact on the children. On the other hand, the
Agency’s reports demonstrated that the children benefitted greatly from the
consistency and stability offered by the children’s prospective adoptive
family. The juvenile court reasonably concluded that further delay in the
selection of a permanent plan was contrary to the children’s best interests.
We therefore perceive no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s decision.
      But even assuming the juvenile court did err in denying Mother’s
request for a continuance, Mother has not met her burden of demonstrating
that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice requiring reversal of the
section 366.26 order. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 59–60 (Celine R.)
[“The California Constitution prohibits a court from setting aside a judgment
unless the error has resulted in a ‘miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art.
VI, § 13.)”].) The Supreme Court has applied the “miscarriage of justice”

                                        11
standard to dependency matters and interpreted this standard “as permitting
reversal only if the reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result
would have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error.”
(Celine R., at pp. 59–60, citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
      Mother contends she was unable to present “testimonial evidence
critical to her case and favorable to her position” because the juvenile court
conducted the hearing in her absence. But she fails to explain how it is
reasonably probable that her testimony would have influenced the juvenile
court’s decision. She asserts only in a conclusory manner that the court’s
error was prejudicial because her testimony would have allowed the court to
“consider Mother’s testimony, judge Mother’s credibility firsthand, and to
receive critical information directly relevant to the court’s obligation to
consider the parent-child relationship[.]”
      However, the juvenile court had ample evidence within the Agency’s
reports supporting its finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception did not apply. The Agency documented Mother’s repeated failure
to maintain consistent visits and communication with the children, and the
negative effect of her inconsistency on the emotional well-being of the
children. This evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings that Mother
failed to maintain regular visitation and contact with the children, and thus
their relationship did not rise to “significant positive emotional relationship.”
The juvenile court’s findings, which Mother does not effectively challenge,
foreclosed application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.
(See In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631 [the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception requires the parent to prove: “(1) regular visitation
and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit

                                       12
the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child”].)
      Mother makes no showing that her testimony would have affected the
juvenile court’s findings, particularly considering that she failed to maintain
regular contact and visitation with the children for the nearly two years of
the dependency case. Although we do not find any abuse of discretion by the
juvenile court in denying Mother’s request for a continuance, we conclude any
error was harmless.
                                       II.
           A Limited Remand for ICWA Compliance is Appropriate
      During the Agency’s initial investigation, Mother reported to have
Native American ancestry from the “Blackfoot tribe.” Mother also informed
the juvenile court directly that she was, at one point, a “registered member”
of the tribe. In response to Mother’s proffers, the Agency mailed and faxed an
“informal inquiry letter” to the Blackfeet tribe. The Agency received letters
from the Blackfeet tribe stating the children were not members of the tribe,
eligible for enrollment, or domiciled on their reservation. However, the
letters did not indicate that the tribe evaluated whether Mother was eligible
for tribal membership.
      The record also fails to demonstrate that neither the Agency nor the
juvenile court asked Father about potential Native American ancestry at any
time during the dependency case. Although the Agency had contact with two
paternal aunts and the paternal grandfather, the record does not indicate
they were asked about Native American ancestry.
      Mother contends the Agency failed to comply with its inquiry duties
pursuant to ICWA for several reasons. First, she contends the juvenile court
failed to instruct the parents to file the necessary documentation attesting to

                                       13
their Native American ancestry. Next, she contends the Agency failed to
discharge its inquiry duties to ask all relevant persons about the children’s
potential Native ancestry. Finally, Mother asserts the Agency did not
provide sufficient evidence to the court of its inquiry of the Blackfeet tribe,
and relatedly that the juvenile court erred by finding the Agency complied
with its inquiry duties.
      The Agency concedes error and agrees that a limited remand is
appropriate so the Agency may perform its requisite ICWA inquiries and
submit its findings to the juvenile court. Specifically, the Agency agrees
there was no ICWA inquiry made of Father who was present at multiple
hearings, or of two paternal aunts or the paternal grandfather for whom the
Agency had contact information. The Agency also agrees that Mother
claimed to have “Blackfoot ancestry,” and although the Agency made an
informal inquiry with the Blackfeet tribe, the record does not indicate
whether the Agency included Mother’s demographic information in its letter.
The Agency also failed to submit their inquiry letter with the Blackfeet tribe
to the juvenile court.
      We accept the Agency’s concession as proper and conclude the juvenile
court’s ICWA findings were not supported by substantial evidence. (In re
Charlotte V. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 51, 57 [“We review the trial court’s [ICWA]
findings for substantial evidence.”].) Thus, we conclude a limited remand is
appropriate so the Agency may perform its requisite ICWA inquires and
submit its findings to the juvenile court. We therefore conditionally reverse
the orders terminating Mother’s parental rights with a limited remand for
the Agency to comply with ICWA and section 224.2.

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                                DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s orders terminating Mother’s parental rights are
conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with
directions that the Agency comply with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and
section 224.2. If, after Agency compliance with ICWA and section 224.2, the
juvenile court finds that no ICWA notice is required to be given, the orders
terminating Mother’s parental rights shall be reinstated. If, after compliance
with section 224.2, the juvenile court finds that ICWA notice is required, the
Agency shall comply with its ICWA notice obligations and the juvenile court
shall proceed accordingly.

                                                                         DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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