Court Opinion

ID: 9618567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:13:54.7598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:34.324614
License: Public Domain

HARGRAVES, Judge Pro Tern.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I will concur with the majority decision as it relates to Blincoe Farms for the reason that there was insufficient evidence in the record to show that Blincoe Farms was aware of the fall work which had been done *668by respondent. I dissent with respect to Storm Circle.
I
I do not agree with the majority’s interpretation of the agreement that “Gillette’s option was to expire on January 5, 1976.” The pertinent part of the option read:
“(2) If the Option is not exercised by July 24, 1975, the Lessee shall give notice of the date it wants the Option to Purchase exercised and if no notice is given prior to December 15, 1975, the Lessee shall purchase said property as of January 5, 1976, on the terms as provided herein.” (Emphasis added.)
The agreement also provides for the manner of payment in the event lessee is able to obtain financing and an alternative method if a “sufficient” loan is unobtainable. It is unclear under the alternative method just who is supposed to tender a “Contract of Sale of Real and Personal Property with standard terms and conditions,” but it is clear that no payments were due (by Gillette) until either the contract was executed or until February, 19^7. There was no requirement that Gillette make any payments between January 5, and January 23, 1976.
I believe the proper construction to be placed on this agreement is that failure to give notice of the exercise of the option prior to December 15, 1975, amounts to an automatic self-activating exercise of the option. Thereafter, Storm Circle would be obliged to tender a contract within a reasonable time and only then would the option expire in the event Gillette did not execute the contract of sale. It is clear from the record that Gillette was still attempting to secure financing when, as found by Judge Kramer, “It (the farm) was sold out from under him.” There was never an offer by Storm Circle to reduce the purchase price to Gillette to assist him in the purchase.
II
I feel that confusion rather than clarity will result from the majority statements relating to proof of damages. The opinion reads first: Gillette presented no evidence which would indicate the extent to which his fall work may have enhanced the market value of the property.
Then: It may be that Gillette’s proof at trial would have been adequate to establish the value of any benefit received by Storm Circle from Gillette’s fall work had Storm Circle farmed the property in 1976 and harvested the crops planted by Gillette.
Finally: Any benefit received by Storm Circle as a result of Gillette’s fall work could have been reflected only in an increased price received for the property.
As I read this, there are three separate and inconsistent measures of damage set forth. The first is market value. The second is a net profit approach. Third is market price. Market value and market price may be, and frequently are, disparate, and neither relates to net profit.
In my opinion, the majority’s reliance on Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 P.2d 196 (1974), is not well founded. There the action was to recover damages for improvements to undeveloped land. I feel that Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 518 P.2d 1201 (1974), is more applicable. In Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, when faced with the necessity of attempting to reconcile the apparent difference in the measure of damages enunciated in Nielson and Continental, had this to say:
“Although Idaho law appears to measure recovery under quantum meruit by the fair market value of the goods or services received and used by the defendant, while under ‘unjust enrichment’ the focus is on the value of the benefit which it would be unjust for the defendant to retain, Idaho has also recognized that generally there is no difference between the two. . Mitchell also suggests that recovery should be measured by the extent to which its assets were increased by the use of the forms, analogizing his situation to that of a defendant whose land has been improved by the construction of unbar-*669gained for improvements. See Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 P.2d 196 (1974). The trial judge properly did not employ this less precise standard when a just and more precise one was available.
This more just and precise standard was the [net] rental price [of the forms].” 575 F.2d at 1278.
Thus, in Interform the Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of Continental, in which case it seems apparent that plaintiff’s proof was not directed at showing the value of (any) benefit received, but rather the value of the materials furnished by defendant. I believe that the “more just and precise standard” required in the case at bar is to measure the unjust enrichment by the value of Gillette’s labor and material. This is the measure that would have been appropriate in the action to enforce the labor and seed liens which action failed simply for the reason that the lien claims were not timely filed.
Ill
In further justification of denying Gillette any recovery, the majority says: “Furthermore, Gillette received the benefit of field preparation and planting done by Storm Circle in the fall of 1974 prior to Gillette’s taking possession of the property in April, 1975. The value of that work would have reduced the value of Gillette’s claim that Storm Circle was unjustly enriched by Gillette’s fall work in 1975. Gillette made no showing of the value of the 1974 work which he benefited from.”
In other words, respondent is required to prove not only his own claim but also an unasserted claim, or setoff, which Storm Circle may have had. I believe this to be an unfair double burden of proof never heretofore contemplated or required. In regard to any “claim,” the following appears in the record:
“Q. [Mr. Parsons] Did you reimburse Storm Circle for any of the work that they had done in the prior year in 1974 when you took it over?
“A. [Mr. Gillette] No, sir.
“Q. So when you say it’s a standard practice, why didn’t you pay them then for the work that they had done?
“A. Well, I will have to make a statement on that. I took the farm over as is with the understanding they could not come up with their share of the finance. I made the sprinkler payment. I paid the electrical bills, and all and this I figured compensated for what work they had done, me advancing the money.
“Q, In fact you were reimbursed with interest, were you not?
“A. I was reimbursed but I did loan them the money and they couldn’t borrow from anywhere else. Maybe they could. They said they couldn’t.
“Q. In this connection on your direct examination Mr. Duff inquired of you, Mr. Gillette, relative to $5,000 having been fully settled and I think the parties agree that that $5,000 was paid without prejudice to this lawsuit and it has no place in the lawsuit, that it was totally unrelated and it’s not prejudicial to either party?
MR. DUFF: Yes, Your Honor, we are stipulating that for the record and the inquiry was so the Court would be aware there was a claim concerning the $5,000.
“THE COURT: Very well.”
Thus, it would seem that Storm Circle was satisfied concerning any claim it may have had against Gillette, or at least was not pressing such claim.
I would affirm the district court’s award of damages against Storm Circle, with costs awarded to respondent.