Court Opinion

ID: 9662476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:10:31.609321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:39.918538
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe the trial court improperly admitted extrinsic evidence to now show that a prior assault conviction was actually an assault against a family or household member. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(2) (Vernon Supp.2003). I believe that the State is prohibited from collaterally attacking a prior judgment that does not contain the family violence finding. Article 42.013 requires the trial court to include an affirmative finding of family violence in any Title 5 assault when the court finds that family violence occurred. Tex.Code Ceim. PROC. Ann. art. 42.013 (Vernon Supp.2003). Because the prior judgment contains no such finding, the State should not be allowed to re-try that fact issue in a subsequent prosecution. “[C]ollateral estoppel bars any retrial of specific and discrete facts that have been fully and fairly adjudicated.” Ex parte Watkins, 73 S.W.3d 264, *921267 (Tex.Crim.App.2002), aff’g 62 S.W.3d 858 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. granted).
I would sustain appellant’s third issue, reverse the judgment and remand the case back to the trial court for entry of a correct judgment and a retrial of punishment.