Court Opinion

ID: 9664134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:04:19.721274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:02.519260
License: Public Domain

OTIS, Justice
(dissenting).
The single issue for determination in these two cases is whether or not Minn.St. 360.0216 applies to airplane accidents which occur beyond the borders of the State of Minnesota. The majority finds the language of the statute unclear but nevertheless extends its application beyond the borders of the state as if the issue were simply a matter of applying the choice of law doctrine.
The statute to be construed could not, in my opinion, be more unambiguous and straightforward in its language and purpose. Minn.St. 360.0216 reads as follows:
“When an aircraft is operated within the airspace above this state or upon the ground surface or waters of this state by a person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, expressed or implied, the operator shall in case of accident be deemed the agent of the owner of the aircraft in its operation.”
In essence the statute provides very simply that when an aircraft is operated over the State of Minnesota, the pilot, in case of accident, is deemed to be the agent of the owner. The word “when” quite obviously defines the circumstances under which the statute is operative. The ordinary and obvious purpose of the word “when” in the context of this statute means “if at the time” an aircraft is operated within the airspace above this state there is an accident, the operator shall be deemed the agent of the owner.
The majority takes a position that leads to a totally absurd result. For example, as construed by the majority, the statute would impose vicarious liability on an owner if an aircraft owned, licensed, and hang-ared in the State of Washington passed over a corner of Minnesota for as briefly as 60 seconds and proceeded to crash land in New York.
Section 360.0216 was adopted following our decisions in Darian v. McGrath, 215 Minn. 389,10 N.W.2d 403 (1943) and Haskin v. Northeast Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963). In the Darian case we were construing Minn.St.1941, § 170.04 of the Safety Responsibility Act which then read as follows:
“When any motor vehicle shall be operated upon any public street or highway of this state by any person other than the owner with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall, in case of accident, be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle in the operation thereof.”
We held in Darían that our Financial Responsibility Act did not apply with respect to an accident which occurred in Wisconsin and said:
*101“As this cause of action arose in Wisconsin, it is conceded that we are governed by the law of that state. Wisconsin has no owner’s responsibility statute, and our statute does not apply to Minnesota cars while operated in Wisconsin.” 215 Minn, at 391, 10 N.W.2d at 405.
Significantly the language used in § 360.-0216 and in § 170.04 is virtually identical, yet our court unequivocally held in Darían that the law of Wisconsin applied and not that of Minnesota. Nor has there ever been any suggestion which has come to my attention that the vicarious liability statute, as it applies to motor vehicles, has ever been enforced by a Minnesota court as to accidents beyond its borders, in the light of Darían. I have great difficulty in distinguishing that case,where the language of the two statutes so nearly coincide.
In 1963 we decided Haskin v. Northeast Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210,123 N.W.2d 81 (1963) and held that airplane owners are not vicariously liable for the negligence of their operators. We said:
“The strong considerations of public policy which would justify a change in the law in this regard are for the legislature and not this court to evaluate.” Id. at 216, 123 N.W.2d at 86.
The legislature has now spoken in derogation of what we stated the common law to be. Quite obviously they had in mind the Haskin case in adopting § 360.0216.
In my opinion, it is of considerable significance that the Haskin case denying vicarious liability dealt only with an intrastate flight beginning in Eveleth, Minnesota, and ending near Hibbing, Minnesota. If, as seems likely, the legislature was addressing our decision in Haskin, it was not called upon to deal with any airplane accidents except those which occurred within the boundaries of the state. In any event, the rules with respect to construing statutes in derogation of the common law have been stated by this court on numerous occasions. In Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 44, 70 N.W.2d 886, 897 (1955):
“ * * * This court has also said that, when legislation, even though in derogation of the common law, is remedial in character, a liberal construction should be adopted; but it has likewise recognized that the remedial nature of such legislation does not, however, justify a construction which gives to the statutory language an application and a meaning not intended by the legislature.”
In Car Lease Incorporated v. Kitzer, 276 Minn. 289, 291, 149 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1967), we cited with approval the rule:
“ ‘ * * * A statute in derogation of a well-established principle of common law will not be extended by construction beyond its most obvious import.’ ”
Again in In re Involuntary Dissolution of Lakeland Develop. Corp., 277 Minn. 432, 442, 152 N.W.2d 758, 765 (1967) we approved the rule in the following language:
“‘ * * * A statute is not to be construed in derogation of well-established principles of common law, * * * unless so required by express words or by necessary implication and then only to the extent clearly indicated.’ ”
If the legislature had not acted, and Minnesota had jurisdiction as the forum state, we would be at liberty to apply whatever we deemed to be the better rule of law in extra-territorial matters. Where, however, the legislature has explicitly defined the rights and obligations of the parties, they have exercised a prerogative exclusively theirs, and we have no authority to modify, amend, or expand their determination of policy. All of the reasons cited by the majority opinion for extending the statute to cover accidents beyond the borders of the state are valid arguments for urging the legislature to amend the statute but are not reasons for our taking on that responsibility, out of hand, to include what is not covered by the unambiguous language of the statute.
I would reverse.