Court Opinion

ID: 9593212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:20:36.492763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:18.818392
License: Public Domain

NETTESHEIM, P.J.
(concurring). I concur. I write separately to acknowledge that the double jeopardy methodology which I advocated by dissent in State v. Sauceda, 163 Wis. 2d 553, 472 N.W.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1991), and which the state urges here, has since been rejected by the supreme court in State v. Sauceda, 168 *515Wis. 2d 486, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992). Alternatively, I contended in Sauceda that even under the two-prong analysis, the state's multiple prosecution did not violate double jeopardy. Applying this analysis, the supreme court agreed. The merits aside, the supreme court's decision resolves any conflict or confusion which may have existed under prior case law as to the methodology which the courts are to apply in a double jeopardy challenge to multiple prosecutions arising out of the same act.
I also write separately to express my view that under the second prong of the Sauceda analysis, which inquires into legislative intent, sec. 939.65, Stats., will likely govern nearly all future double jeopardy challenges involving multiple charges. That statute stands as a clear and unequivocal statement of the legislature's intent that multiple charging under different statutory provisions is permitted where an act forms the basis for a crime under more than one statutory provision. Therefore, unless the specific statute or its legislative history expresses a contrary intent, and assuming no abuse of prosecutorial discretion, sec. 939.65 should govern this question for purposes of future cases.
The supreme court's decision in Sauceda should also put the legislature on notice that, as to future enactments, it should clearly state its intent (if it be so) that multiple prosecutions are not intended. See, e.g., secs. 346.63(1)(c), 939.66, 939.71, and 939.72, Stats.