Court Opinion

ID: 9853033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:41:29.305069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:40.090125
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I cannot agree with the majority that the trial court did not commit reversible error by denying Burns’ request for his counsel to withdraw from the case, I must respectfully dissent. Assistance of counsel free from conflicts of interest is implicit in the concept of effective assistance of counsel. Cates v. Superintendent, Indiana Youth Center, 981 F2d 949, 953 (II) (B) (7th Cir. 1992).
Further, I would hold that joint representation by members of the same public defender’s office is the same as joint or dual representation by a single attorney. Joint representation by attorneys in the same public defender’s office is not more benign than joint representation by one private attorney or by a firm of private attorneys. Although the danger of an actual conflict of interest is obviously greater when only one attorney is providing joint representation because one attorney obviously cannot have separate knowledge of *693the information gleaned from the clients, a danger exists within public defenders’ offices that information could be inadvertently shared by staff as well as by the attorneys. In addition, even though the profit motive may not exist, the potential exists that loyalty to the office or the other attorneys might affect the representation given to the client. This is an unnecessary risk that should not be taken.
In another context, our Supreme Court held that “attorneys in a public defender’s office are to be treated as members of a law firm” for asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ryan v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662 (409 SE2d 507) (1991). I would extend that treatment to claims of conflicts of interest, and would extend that treatment particularly to those cases in which one of the defense counsel involved asserted that he had a conflict of interest. Those cases cited by the majority suggesting that a lower standard should be applicable to public attorneys generally concern disqualification of district attorneys’ offices. Such offices, however, plainly do not have the same problems with the competing interests of individual clients; the district attorney has but one client: the State.
Indeed, the general rules practiced, apparently even by the trial court, preclude joint representation by attorneys from the public defender’s office, and our rules of professional responsibility prohibit such representation. The decision not to hire outside counsel to represent one of the defendants is a highly questionable and unusual practice. United States v. Lane, 752 F2d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985).
Further, and most importantly, the trial court did not address this issue fully, and consequently the record is silent on the basis for counsel’s statements. The procedures in Federal Court would not permit this silence.
Because a possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation, a defendant who objects to multiple representation must have the opportunity to show the trial court that potential conflicts impermissibly imperil his right to a fair trial. But, unless the defendant objects and the trial court fails to afford such opportunity, a reviewing court cannot presume that the possibility of a conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cates v. Superintendent, Indiana Youth Center, supra, 981 F2d at 953 (II) (B). In effect, the majority opinion assumes that counsel’s claims had no factual basis. I do not believe the law permits that assumption. Further, our Supreme Court recognized that, while vicarious disqualification of a government office is neither necessary nor wise, measures should be taken to prevent multiple government lawyers from participation in and *694discussion of the case, directly or indirectly. Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690, 694 (9) (362 SE2d 351) (1987). Because the trial court conducted no investigation of the matter, other than expressing its concerns about the timing of the motion, we do not know what, if any, measures were taken to preserve client confidences. Although a hearing may not be constitutionally required whenever defendants are jointly represented, good practice demands that the trial court conduct an inquiry into the matter as soon as it is apparent that one attorney or one firm or one public defender’s office is jointly representing multiple defendants. See, e.g., Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44 (c). If the trial court in this case had done so, we would not be presented with such an incomplete record on this crucial issue.
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I find that an actual conflict of interest existed because the members of the same public defender’s office represented both defendants and, even though neither co-defendant testified, each raised defenses asserting that the other defendant was the guilty party. This is more than a possibility of a conflict, and the trial judge was aware of the actual conflict of interest because he presided over the first trial of these defendants.
Our Supreme Court has held that
[a]s the court in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 488 (98 SC 1173, 55 LE2d 426) (1978), noted, since the decision in Glasser [a. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (62 SC 457, 86 LE 680) (1942)], most courts have held that an attorney’s request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted. The attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial. Defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise the court at once of the problem. Finally, attorneys are officers of the court, and when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath. We find these considerations persuasive. Whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. State, 257 Ga. 352,353 (359 SE2d 661) (1987). In this case, Burns’ counsel informed the court that the conflict existed and the court failed to investigate the matter properly. Consequently, I believe that reversal is required because *695the trial court “failed either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel.” (Footnote omitted.) Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 453 U. S. at 484.
Decided June 24, 2005
Reconsideration denied July 28, 2005
Wystan B. Getz, for appellant (case no. A05A0084).
Mathis & Williams, Tony E. Mathis, for appellant (case no. A05A0499).
Jeffrey H Brickman, District Attorney, Robert M. Coker, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Accordingly, as I would reverse both convictions, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Blackburn joins in this dissent.