Court Opinion

ID: 9908049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 17:09:57.790961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:13.287296
License: Public Domain

J-S41034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DANIEL RAYFORD SHAULIS                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 290 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 25, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-11-CR-0000049-2022

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DANIEL RAYFORD SHAULIS                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 291 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 25, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-11-CR-0000050-2022

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                       FILED: DECEMBER 7, 2023

       Appellant, Daniel Rayford Shaulis, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County following

his guilty plea to one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, two

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S41034-23

counts of indecent assault, and two counts of corruption of minors1 at lower

court docket number CP-11-CR-0000049-2022 (“49-2022”), as well as one

count of indecent assault2 at lower court docket number CP-11-CR-0000050-

2022 (“50-2022”). After a careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Appellant, who

was fifty-one years old, was arrested and charged in connection with the

sexual abuse of his eleven-year-old granddaughter (“the victim”). Appellant

proceeded to an arraignment on November 5, 2021, at which time bail was

set at 10% of $75,000.00. Appellant did not post bail and remained

incarcerated; however, he filed a motion seeking a bail reduction.

       In response, the Commonwealth filed a motion to increase Appellant’s

bail. Therein, the Commonwealth relevantly indicated:

       A review of [Appellant’s] criminal history reveals that he was
       charged and convicted between the years of 2001 and 2003 via
       the United States Military Criminal Justice System of Indecent
       [Acts or] Liberties with a Child[.] [Appellant’s] criminal history
       also shows that he served a term of confinement, was
       dishonorably discharged, and required to register as a sex
       offender after release as a result of these convictions. As a result
       of his previous convictions and pursuant to 40 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2,
       if [Appellant] is convicted of any one of the counts charged in the
       present criminal Information, he faces a mandatory minimum
       sentence of twenty-five (25) years of total confinement.

Commonwealth’s Motion to Modify Bail, filed 1/20/22, at 2-3.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b), 3126(a)(7), and 6301(a)(1)(ii), respectively.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7).

                                           -2-
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         Thereafter, at the conclusion of Appellant’s preliminary hearing on

January 12, 2022, the magisterial district justice held a hearing on the issue

of bail. During the hearing, Appellant admitted he was charged with a crime

while he was in the military. N.T., 1/12/22, at 38. He specifically testified he

“took a guilty plea to a sex offense regarding a minor family member[.]”3 Id.

at 39.

         On March 1, 2022, at lower court docket number 49-2022, the

Commonwealth filed an Information charging Appellant with 319 crimes

related to the sexual abuse of the victim over a four-year period. On that

same date, at lower court docket number 50-2022, the Commonwealth filed

an Information charging Appellant with three crimes related to the sexual

abuse of the same victim at Appellant’s place of employment. The

Commonwealth provided notice of compulsory joinder of the two cases

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 582(B)(1).

         On May 24, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion for a protective

order to secure Appellant’s prior criminal military records. Therein, the

Commonwealth noted that, when Appellant was in the United States Army, he

was previously convicted of, inter alia, indecent acts or liberties with a child

by the United States Military criminal justice system. The Commonwealth

____________________________________________

3 Although not pertinent to this appeal, we note the magisterial district justice

denied Appellant’s request to reduce             bail,   as   well   as   denied   the
Commonwealth’s request to increase bail.

                                           -3-
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noted it requested the official records related to Appellant’s prior criminal

military court-martial; however, the United States Army responded that it

required a protective order limiting disclosure by a signed judge prior to

releasing the certified criminal records. In its motion, the Commonwealth

specifically averred the “records will have bearing on the sentence imposed

by the trial court in the [instant] cases.” Commonwealth’s Motion For

Protective Order, filed 5/24/22. On May 24, 2022, the trial court signed the

protective order so that the United States Army would release Appellant’s

certified criminal military court-martial records to the Commonwealth.

       On May 26, 2022, Appellant, who was represented by counsel,

proceeded to a hearing where he entered a negotiated open guilty plea to the

six charges set forth supra. In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to nol

pros all remaining charges.4         Relevantly, at the on-the-record guilty plea

hearing, Appellant acknowledged his plea agreement contained no agreement

as to his sentence.5 N.T., 5/26/22, at 2. He acknowledged his right to have

a bench trial or a right to a jury trial, and he confirmed his understanding that

____________________________________________

4 Specifically, the Commonwealth agreed to nol pros all remaining charges
thirty-one days after sentencing unless post-sentence motions or an appeal
was filed in which case the charges would be nol prossed thirty-one days after
the resolution of the matter.

5 Appellant agreed as part of the plea agreement that he would complete a

SORNA assessment with the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board, and he
would be subject to SORNA’s registration requirements.

                                           -4-
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he was “giving up” that right by entering a guilty plea. Id. at 3. Appellant

indicated his attorney had been available to consult with him and answered

his questions.     Id.   He specifically acknowledged he was satisfied with his

attorney’s representation. Id. Appellant confirmed he was entering his guilty

plea voluntarily and of his own free will, and no one made any threats or

promises beyond those in the written plea agreement.6 Id.

       On June 23, 2022, the Commonwealth filed notice of its intent to seek

the mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years at each of the six counts to

which Appellant pled guilty. Specifically, the Commonwealth asserted it had

received Appellant’s certified military records, which confirmed that Appellant

has a prior conviction for indecent acts or liberties with a child, dated June 5,

2003, from a United States Army General Court Martial. The acts underlying

____________________________________________

6 We note the oral guilty plea colloquy in this case was brief.
                                                              During the oral
colloquy, the trial court noted Appellant completed a written “pleaders
memorandum” with the assistance of his counsel. N.T., 5/26/22, at 2. In the
“pleaders memorandum,” the charges to which Appellant pled guilty are set
forth. The “pleaders memorandum” contains either “n/a” or a handwritten
line next to the area for “mandatory minimum” for each crime.
      The written plea agreement, which is signed by the Commonwealth, lists
the charges to which Appellant pled guilty, notes Appellant will be subject to
SORNA, notes the condition precedent for the Commonwealth to nol pros the
remaining charges, and indicates “except as expressly provided otherwise
herein, there is no other agreement as to sentence or any other matter.”
Written Plea Agreement, filed 5/27/23.

                                           -5-
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Appellant’s military conviction included Appellant fondling an eleven-year-old

victim’s vaginal area and placing her hand on his penis.7

       On July 22, 2022, at both lower court docket numbers, Appellant filed a

counseled pre-sentence motion seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas. Therein,

Appellant relevantly averred that, on June 23, 2022, the Commonwealth

advised that it was seeking a mandatory 25-year sentence on each of the six

individual offenses to which Appellant pled guilty, and Appellant was unaware

of the mandatory minimums that would be associated with his offenses when

he pled guilty. Appellant averred the Commonwealth would not be prejudiced

if his pleas were withdrawn.

       On August 1, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition to

Appellant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Therein, the

Commonwealth relevantly averred:

             Appellant cannot credibly claim that he was unaware of
       applicable mandatory minimums.          The Commonwealth has
       repeatedly represented to [Appellant] through counsel that a
       conviction for any Megan’s Law offense in the instant case would
       invoke a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years, which the
       Commonwealth intended to seek. Pursuant to applicable rules of
       criminal procedure, the Commonwealth gave written notice of this
       intention after conviction/plea and before sentencing.
               Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that it would be
       prejudiced if [Appellant] is permitted to withdraw his pleas.
       Withdrawal of said pleas will allow [Appellant] to further prolong
       trial resulting in the memories and recollection of the minor victim
____________________________________________

7 The certified military records confirmed that Appellant entered a guilty plea

during the military court-martial, and he was sentenced to twenty-one months
in confinement, as well as dishonorably discharged from the military.

                                           -6-
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       and other witnesses fading. The Commonwealth would be further
       prejudiced by said withdrawal as co-defendant, [Appellant’s] son,
       Michael Shaulis, has pled and has been sentenced pursuant to a
       closed plea.[8] Michael Shaulis had previously indicated a
       willingness to cooperate against [Appellant]. However, Michael
       Shaulis was sentenced on June 6, 2022, with the understanding
       that his cooperation would not be necessary against [Appellant]
       since [Appellant] had pled guilty days earlier. Having pled and
       been sentenced, Michael Shaulis’s credibility may be called into
       question at the trial of his father, and Michael Shaulis may lose
       willingness to cooperate since his case has been disposed of and
       his sentence rendered. Had [Appellant] not pled guilty, the
       Commonwealth would not have pursued the sentencing of Michael
       Shaulis prior to the trial of [Appellant].

Commonwealth’s Brief, filed 8/1/22, at 2-3 (footnote added).

       On August 22, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s pre-

sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. At the hearing, defense counsel

acknowledged that, prior to Appellant entering his guilty pleas, he and the

Assistant District Attorney had “conversations with regard to sentences.”

N.T., 8/22/22, at 3. He confirmed the Assistant District Attorney indicated

“there could possibly be mandatories as a result of a conviction that

[Appellant] had back in the Army many years prior.” Id. However, defense

counsel averred Appellant “was not aware [when he pled guilty] that he was

receiving a mandatory.”         Id. at 5.      Defense counsel indicated Appellant

entered his guilty plea “on the assumption that there was no agreement…with

regard to any mandatories that the Commonwealth was seeking.” Id.

____________________________________________

8 The record reveals that, with Appellant’s encouragement, Michael Shaulis
also sexually abused the victim. As the trial court noted, Appellant was the
“orchestrator…the scheduler” of the abuse. N.T., 10/25/22, at 17.

                                           -7-
J-S41034-23

      Defense counsel further indicated that, when he informed Appellant of

the Commonwealth’s June 23, 2022, notice, Appellant indicated “it was not

acceptable,” so defense counsel filed a pre-sentence motion to withdraw the

guilty pleas. Id. at 4. Defense counsel informed the trial court that “quite

frankly, [Appellant] does not want to withdraw his plea. He would rather have

the plea stand and have you sentence him without the mandatories that he

was advised of after.” Id.

      The Commonwealth, in response, noted Appellant’s argument at the

hearing “centered mostly on the fact that he doesn’t want the court to impose

a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years.” Id. at 6-7. The Commonwealth

noted that, before Appellant entered his plea, the Commonwealth informed

Appellant that it was obtaining Appellant’s criminal military record to

determine the applicability of the mandatory minimum sentencing scheme in

the case sub judice. Id. at 7. The Commonwealth indicated:

             There were no representations prior to plea that the
      Commonwealth would not seek the mandatory. And as [defense
      counsel] told you, there was discussion that the Commonwealth
      believed that the mandatory may be applicable here.
            The [written] plea agreement, which is part of the record in
      this case, indicates that there is no further agreement as to
      sentence. There was no agreement that the Commonwealth would
      or would not seek mandatories in this case.

Id.

                                    -8-
J-S41034-23

       Additionally, the Commonwealth advised the trial court that it would be

substantially prejudiced if Appellant was permitted to withdraw his guilty

pleas. Specifically, the Commonwealth indicated:

              [Appellant] has to prove that the Commonwealth would not
       be prejudiced by withdrawal of [his pleas in] this case. The
       Commonwealth maintains the opposite. We would, in fact, be
       prejudiced if the court were to allow withdrawal here. The co-
       defendant, Michael Shaulis, [who is Appellant’s] son and the uncle
       of the victim here, had indicated his willingness to cooperate
       against [Appellant] to testify against him. [Michael Shaulis] pled
       guilty, and we were waiting his sentencing pending [Appellant’s]
       decision to plead guilty.
            [Michael Shaulis] was sentenced on June 6, 2022[.] [This
       was] [a]fter [Appellant] had entered a plea and with the
       understanding that [Michael Shaulis’s] cooperation would not be
       necessary against [Appellant] because he had entered a plea.
             [The appellate courts] have indicated that the [trial] court
       properly denied [a] defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea where
       a cooperating co-defendant had been pled and sentenced prior to
       the [motion to] withdraw and would therefore lack motivation to
       cooperate against the defendant at issue. For that reason, [the
       Commonwealth] believes that [the Commonwealth] would also be
       severely prejudiced should the [trial] court grant [Appellant’s]
       motion to withdraw [in the instant case].

Id. at 7-8.

       The trial court denied Appellant’s pre-sentence motion orally on the

record.9 In so doing, the trial court noted that, when Appellant pled guilty, he

was aware the Commonwealth was seeking his military records for the

purposes of sentencing with the possibility that the mandatory minimum

____________________________________________

9The trial court also filed a written order denying Appellant’s pre-sentence
motion to withdraw on August 22, 2022.

                                           -9-
J-S41034-23

sentence would be applicable. Id. at 9. The trial court noted that the written

plea agreement indicated there was no agreement as to the imposition of any

sentence.   Id. Thus, the trial court concluded Appellant entered his plea

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id.

      Moreover, the trial court concluded that, if Appellant was permitted to

withdraw his guilty pleas, “the Commonwealth would be significantly

prejudiced since they had already completed their agreement with the co-

defendant.” Id. at 9-10. Further, the trial court noted the emotional trauma

the child victim would likely suffer given that she was told she would not have

to testify at trial against her grandfather. Id. at 10.

      On October 25, 2022, Appellant proceeded to a sentencing hearing, at

which the trial court acknowledged it had a pre-sentence investigation report.

The trial court also acknowledged it had the official records from the United

States Army regarding Appellant’s prior military criminal conviction. Appellant

objected to the introduction of the United States Army’s records on the basis

the records were hearsay. N.T., 10/25/22, at 6.           Appellant contended the

Commonwealth was “required to bring someone in from the Department of

Army” to testify about the records. Id.

      Moreover, during the sentencing hearing, defense counsel requested the

trial court reconsider permitting Appellant to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Defense counsel asserted Appellant was unaware that the Commonwealth was

pursuing the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence and, had Appellant

                                      - 10 -
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known, he would not have entered guilty pleas.         Id. at 7. Alternatively,

defense counsel noted Appellant “is willing to stand by the guilty pleas that he

previously entered in this court on May 26, 2022, and asks the court not to

impose the mandatory sentences that the Commonwealth is requesting.” Id.

at 8.

        The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argued the mandatory

minimum sentence is applicable based on Appellant’ prior military convictions,

as confirmed by the official United States Army records.           Further, the

Commonwealth argued the           trial court should   impose    the   sentences

consecutively since, not only did Appellant commit the sex acts against the

young victim, but he encouraged his son, the victim’s uncle, to sexually abuse

the victim, as well. Id. at 13.

        Appellant informed the trial court that he was “pushed and forced” into

“taking the deal” while he was in the military. Id. at 14. He noted his current

victim’s mother is an “unfit mother.” Id. He indicated he had remorse for

what happened to the victim. Id.

        The trial court concluded the Commonwealth established the existence

of Appellant’s prior military conviction by a preponderance of the evidence.

The trial court further concluded the military conviction qualified as a previous

conviction for purposes of applying the mandatory minimum under 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2. The trial court then sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

                                     - 11 -
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of 75 years to 150 years in prison.10 The trial court gave Appellant credit for

time served.

       Appellant filed a timely, counseled post-sentence motion averring the

trial court illegally imposed a mandatory minimum sentence under 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9718 and 9799. Also, Appellant contended the trial court erred

in denying his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis

that, when Appellant pled guilty, he was unaware the Commonwealth would

be asking for a mandatory minimum sentence.

       By order entered on February 27, 2023, the trial court denied Appellant’s

post-sentence motion. This timely, counseled appeal followed,11 and all

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been met.

       On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of

the Questions Involved” (verbatim):

       1. Did the court err by not permitting your Appellant to withdraw
          his plea after he was notified that the Commonwealth would be
          seeking the imposition of a mandatory sentence based upon
          the prior military history?

____________________________________________

10 Specifically, imposing the mandatory minimum sentence, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to 25 years to 50 years in prison for each charge to which
Appellant pled guilty. The trial court directed that the sentence for each count
of indecent assault at lower court docket number 49-2022 would run
consecutively to the sentence for the sole count of involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse at lower court docket number 49-2022. The sentences for the
remaining convictions at both docket numbers were imposed concurrently.

11Appellant filed separate notices of appeal at each lower court docket
number, and this Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals.

                                          - 12 -
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     2. Did the court err by allowing hearsay evidence to establish a
        prior military conviction such that a mandatory sentence
        became applicable?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (suggested answers omitted).

     Initially, we address Appellant’s second issue. Appellant contends the

trial court unlawfully sentenced him at each count to a mandatory minimum

of 25 years of incarceration under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2(a)(1), where the

Commonwealth failed to prove Appellant had a prior qualifying conviction.

     “When reviewing the legality of a sentence, our standard of review is de

novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Summers, 245

A.3d 686, 697 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

     Section 9718.2 provides, in relevant part:

     Any person who is convicted…of an offense set forth in section
     9799.14 (relating to sexual offenses and tier system) shall, if at
     the time of the commission of the current offense the person had
     previously been convicted of an offense set forth in section
     9799.14…or an equivalent crime in another jurisdiction, be
     sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least 25 years of total
     confinement[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2(a)(1) (bold added).

     The Statute further provides the following:

     (c) Proof of sentencing.--The provisions of this section shall not
     be an element of the crime, and notice thereof to the defendant
     shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of
     the Commonwealth’s intention to proceed under this section shall
     be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The
     applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The
     sentencing court, prior to imposing sentence on an offender under
     subsection (a), shall have a complete record of the previous
     convictions of the offender, copies of which shall be furnished to

                                    - 13 -
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       the offender. If the offender or the attorney for the
       Commonwealth contests the accuracy of the record, the court
       shall schedule a hearing and direct the offender and the attorney
       for the Commonwealth to submit evidence regarding the previous
       convictions of the offender. The court shall then determine, by a
       preponderance of the evidence, the previous convictions of the
       offender and, if this section is applicable, shall impose sentence in
       accordance with this section. Should a previous conviction be
       vacated and an acquittal or final discharge entered subsequent to
       imposition of sentence under this section, the offender shall have
       the right to petition the sentencing court for reconsideration of
       sentence if this section would not have been applicable except for
       the conviction which was vacated.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2(c) (bold in original).

       Here, Appellant does not dispute that, if established, a prior military

conviction for the offense of indecent acts or liberties with a child, as set forth

in the United States Courts-Martial 2000 Manual, is a qualifying trigger for the

application of the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 9718(a)(1).

See Commonwealth v. Smith, 528 Pa. 380, 598 A.2d 268 (1991) (holding

military court-martial convictions may qualify as a prior conviction for

purposes of applying mandatory minimum sentencing provisions).12

____________________________________________

12 As the trial court explained, under military law, the elements of the offense

of indecent acts or liberties with a child are: (1) physical contact-the accused
committed a certain act upon or with the body of a certain person; the person
was under 16 years of age and not the spouse of the accused; the act of the
accused was indecent; the accused committed the act with intent to arouse,
appeal to, or gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the accused, the
victim or both; and under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. (2) No physical contact-
the accused committed a certain act; the act amounted to the taking of
indecent liberties with a certain person; the accused committed the act within
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 14 -
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       However, Appellant contends the Commonwealth did not present

sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that he had a prior military conviction, so as to trigger the

applicability of Section 9718.2(a)(1). In this vein, Appellant argues the

Commonwealth improperly relied solely upon “a military document,” which

____________________________________________

the presence of this person; this person was under the age of 16 years old
and not the spouse of the accused; the accused committed the act with intent
to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the
accused, the victim or both; and under the circumstances, the conduct of the
accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces
or was a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. See Trial Court
Opinion, filed 2/27/23, at 11 (citing Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
Part IV, pp. IV-110-11 (2000 ed.)). The military law defines “indecent” as
“that form of immorality relating to sexual impurity, which is not only grossly
vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, but tends to excite lust
and deprave the morals with respect to sexual relations.” Id. at IV-110-112
¶¶ 88(3), 90(c).
       The trial court concluded the military conviction for indecent acts or
liberties with a child-physical contact, to which Appellant pled guilty, is
equivalent to indecent assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126, which provides a
person is guilty of indecent assault “if the person has indecent contact with
the complainant…and the person does so without the complainant’s consent;
the person does so by forcible compulsion; the complainant is less than 13
years of age; or the complainant is less than 16 years of age and the person
is four or more years older…and…not married to each other.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3126. Further, the trial court concluded the military conviction for indecent
acts or liberties with a child-no physical contact, to which Appellant pled guilty,
is equivalent to Pennsylvania’s crime of corruption of minors under 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(ii), which provides a defendant being 18 years or more,
“by any course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual
offenses) corrupts or tends to corrupt the moral of any minor…or who aids,
abets, entices or encourages any such minor in the commission of an offense
under Chapter 31 commits a felony of the third degree.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
6301(a)(ii). Appellant raises no claim of error regarding the trial court’s
analysis in this regard.
       .

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was hearsay, to prove the existence of his prior military conviction. Appellant

avers the trial court should have required the Commonwealth to introduce a

qualified United States Army official to testify to the contents of the document.

      Initially, we note “a preponderance of the evidence is the lowest burden

of proof in the administration of justice, and it is defined as the greater weight

of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly in one’s favor.” Commonwealth

v. A.R., 990 A.2d 1, n. 4 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quotation marks, quotation, and

brackets omitted).     Stated differently, preponderance of the evidence is

tantamount to a “more likely than not” standard. Commonwealth v. Heater,

899 A.2d 1126, 1133 (Pa.Super. 2006).

      Moreover, we observe that the admission of evidence presented at a

sentencing hearing is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court

applying the rules of evidence. Commonwealth v. Hairston, 624 Pa. 143,

84 A.3d 657, 674 (2014). As such, our standard of review of a trial court’s

evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Walter, 625

Pa. 522, 93 A.3d 442, 449 (2014). Thus, we will not disturb an evidentiary

ruling unless “the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised

is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-

will, as shown by evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Cooper, 596 Pa.

119, 941 A.2d 655, 667 (2007) (citation omitted). This includes rulings on the

admission of hearsay. Id.

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      Hearsay is a statement that the declarant does not make while testifying

at a trial or hearing that is offered into evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted in the statement. Pa.R.E. 801(c)(1)-(2). Statements that

meet this definition are not admissible unless a hearsay exception applies or

is permitted by other rules prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or

by statute. Pa.R.E. 802. “The rule against admitting hearsay evidence stems

from its presumed unreliability, because the declarant cannot be challenged

regarding the accuracy of the statement.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 585

Pa. 547, 889 A.2d 501, 532 (2005) (citation omitted).

      Still, for the purposes of sentencing a defendant, a trial court may admit

evidence as to any matter that it deems relevant and admissible on the

question of the sentence to be imposed, and the evidence shall include matters

relating   to   any   of   the   aggravating   or   mitigating   circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Young, 536 Pa. 57, 637 A.2d 1313, 1321-22 (1993).

Notably, “a proceeding held to determine [a] sentence is not a trial, and the

court is not bound by the restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to

trials.” Commonwealth v. Medley, 725 A.2d 1225, 1229 (Pa.Super. 1999).

            Hearsay testimony is precisely the type of evidence which is
      the right of a court in sentencing to consider even though such
      information is obtained outside the courtroom from persons whom
      the defendant has not been permitted to confront or cross-
      examine. Significantly, the admission of hearsay in sentencing
      proceedings, especially those which do not involve a capital crime,
      is a common occurrence. In fact, sentencing courts as a matter
      of course, consider hearsay in nearly every sentencing case since
      pre-sentence investigations are routinely ordered and considered
      by the court and a pre-sentence report is the very definition of

                                     - 17 -
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      hearsay, i.e., the report is a report by a probation officer reciting
      other person’s out-of-court statements offered for their truth.

Medley, 725 A.2d at 1230. Notably, the Victim’s Bill of Rights, the Sentencing

Code, and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure all permit a trial court

to consider a pre-sentence investigation report and victim impact statement

prior to imposing a sentence, which include statements of hearsay. See 18

P.S. § 11.201(5); 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9721(b) and 9731: Pa.R.Crim.P. 702(A).

      However, the consideration of hearsay, even at a sentencing hearing, is

not unfettered. See Pa.R.E. 101 cmt. Instead, a sentencing court may rely

on hearsay evidence in the limited circumstance where the hearsay originated

from a dependable source under reliable circumstances. Medley, 725 A.2d

at 1225. For example, in Medley, the Commonwealth established the

defendant’s prior record based on a detective’s testimony that he had

contacted out of state authorities to verify a prior conviction.       Also, the

defendant admitted he had a prior conviction. Although the detective’s

testimony constituted hearsay, it had sufficient indicia of reliability under the

circumstances to be relied upon by the sentencing court. Id. at 1230.

      In the case sub judice, the trial court relevantly explained as follows:

            [Appellant] argues that the [trial] court erred in relying on
      the records of his court-martial at the time of sentencing [in the
      instant case] as those records were hearsay. The Commonwealth
      argues that the records were certified copies of the [military court-
      martial] record as evidence[d] by the Motion for Protective Order.
      The Commonwealth argues that even if the records constituted
      hearsay, the [trial] court could rely on them in determining if
      [Appellant] had a prior qualifying offense as required by Section
      9718.2(a) as courts routinely rely on hearsay during sentencing.

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                                   ***
             Here, the Commonwealth offered into evidence the records
      related to [Appellant’s] 2003 court-martial in which he entered
      guilty pleas to one specification each of indecent liberties with a
      female under the age of 16….and two specifications of an indecent
      act with a female under the age of 16. As evidenced by the May
      24, 2022, Motion for Protective Order, these records were
      provided by the United States Army Crime Records Center (“Crime
      Records Center”). [Appellant] has not offered any evidence to
      suggest records from the Crime Records Center were not obtained
      from a dependable source under reliable circumstances such that
      they should not be considered, whether hearsay or not, at
      sentencing.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 2/27/23, at 7-9.

      We find no abuse of discretion. As the trial court noted, in response to

the trial court signing a protective order, the Commonwealth received a

certified copy of Appellant’s military court-martial records from the Crime

Records Center. Trial courts routinely rely upon certified court records, which

contain hearsay, in determining whether a defendant has a prior conviction

because the hearsay originates from a dependable source under reliable

circumstances. Medley, 725 A.2d at 1225. See Commonwealth v. Norris,

819 A.2d 568, 576 (Pa.Super. 2003) (indicating a trial court considers a

defendant’s written court records in determining whether the defendant has

qualifying prior convictions for purposes of applying mandatory minimum

sentences). We agree with the trial court this reasoning applies to official

military court-martial records, as well.

      Further, we note Appellant admitted during the January 12, 2022, bail

hearing, which occurred immediately after his preliminary hearing, that he

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pled guilty before a military tribunal to sex offenses involving a minor victim

in the early 2000s. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding, beyond

a preponderance of the evidence, that Appellant had a prior military

conviction,   which      triggered   the    applicability   of Section    9718.2(a)(1).

Accordingly, we find no merit to Appellant’s claim the trial court unlawfully

sentenced     him   to    the   25-year     mandatory       minimum      under   Section

9718.2(a)(1) since the Commonwealth proved a prior qualifying offense

meeting the requirements of the statute.

      Next, we turn to Appellant’s claim the trial court erred in denying his

pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Appellant contends that,

when he pled guilty, he was unaware that he would be subject to the

mandatory minimum sentences under Section 9718.2(a)(1). Thus, he

contends he set forth a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing his guilty pleas

prior to sentencing.

      We review the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s pre-sentence motion to

withdraw his guilty pleas for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Baez,

169 A.3d 35, 39 (Pa.Super. 2017); Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185,

1187 (Pa.Super. 2017). “An abuse of discretion is not a mere error in

judgment but, rather, involves bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, manifest

unreasonableness and/or misapplication of law. By contrast, a proper exercise

of discretion conforms to the law is based on the facts of record.”

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Commonwealth v. Gordy, 73 A.3d 620, 624 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation

omitted).

       We presume “a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of what

he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise.”

Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 665 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation

omitted). This Court has recently held:

       Where a defendant requests to withdraw his guilty plea before he
       is sentenced, the trial court has discretion to grant the withdrawal
       and that discretion is to be liberally exercised to permit withdrawal
       of the plea if two conditions are present: 1) the defendant
       demonstrates a fair and just reason for withdrawing the plea and
       2) it is not shown that withdrawal of the plea would cause
       substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v.
       Carrasquillo, 631 Pa. 692, 115 A.3d 1284, 1291-92 (2015);
       Baez, 169 A.3d at 39; Islas, 156 A.3d at 1188; see also
       Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A) (“At any time before the imposition of
       sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of
       the defendant,…the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo
       contendere and the substitution of a plea of not guilty”)[.]

Commonwealth v. Jamison, 284 A.3d 501, 505 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(emphasis added).

       In the case sub judice, assuming, arguendo, Appellant presented a “fair

and just reason” for withdrawing his plea based on his alleged unawareness

the Commonwealth would be seeking the mandatory minimum sentence

under Section 9718.2(a)(1),13 we find the trial court did not abuse its

____________________________________________

13 To the extent the Commonwealth suggests, and the trial court concludes,

that, as applied to the instant case, Section 9718(c) requires notice of
mandatory minimums after conviction and before sentencing, we note the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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discretion in denying Appellant’s pre-sentence motion since it was “shown that

withdrawal     of   the    plea   would        cause   substantial   prejudice   to   the

Commonwealth.” Jamison, 284 A.3d at 505 (citations omitted).

             In the context of a pre-sentence request for plea
       withdrawal, the term “prejudice” means that, due to events
       occurring after the entry of the plea, the Commonwealth’s
       prosecution of its case is in a worse position than it would have
       been had the trial taken place as originally scheduled. Thus,
       prejudice is about the Commonwealth’s ability to try its case, not
       about the personal inconvenience to complainants unless that
       inconvenience     somehow       impairs   the    Commonwealth’s
       prosecution.

Gordy, 73 A.3d at 624 (citations omitted).

       Here, in explaining the reasons it would be substantially prejudiced if

Appellant was permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas, the Commonwealth

averred as follows during the pre-sentence motion hearing:

              [Appellant] has to prove that the Commonwealth would not
       be prejudiced by withdrawal of [his pleas in] this case. The
       Commonwealth maintains the opposite. We would, in fact, be
       prejudiced if the court were to allow withdrawal here. The co-
       defendant, Michael Shaulis, [who is Appellant’s] son and the uncle
       of the victim here, had indicated his willingness to cooperate
       against [Appellant] to testify against him. [Michael Shaulis] pled
       guilty, and we were waiting his sentencing pending [Appellant’s]
       decision to plead guilty.
            [Michael Shaulis] was sentenced on June 6, 2022[.] [This
       was] [a]fter [Appellant] had entered a plea and with the

____________________________________________

appellate courts have construed the statute differently for defendants who
enter guilty pleas. For a defendant who pleads guilty, notice that the
Commonwealth intends to seek application of a mandatory minimum sentence
is required prior to the defendant’s entry of a guilty plea. See
Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124 (Pa.Super. 2009).

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      understanding that [Michael Shaulis’s] cooperation would not be
      necessary against [Appellant] because he had entered a plea.
            [The appellate courts] have indicated that the [trial] court
      properly denied [a] defendant’s motion to withdraw a plea where
      a cooperating co-defendant had been pled and sentenced prior to
      the [motion to] withdraw and would therefore lack motivation to
      cooperate against the defendant at issue. For that reason, [the
      Commonwealth] believes that [the Commonwealth] would also be
      severely prejudiced should the [trial] court grant [Appellant’s]
      motion to withdraw [in the instant case].

N.T., 8/22/22, at 7-8.

      The trial court found the Commonwealth’s representation to be credible,

and, in denying Appellant’s pre-sentence motion, specifically found “the

Commonwealth would be significantly prejudiced since they had already

completed their agreement with the co-defendant.” Id. at 9-10. Further, the

trial court noted the emotional trauma the child victim would likely suffer given

that she was told she would not have to testify at trial against her grandfather.

Id. at 10.

      Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion. This Court has held that

substantial prejudice exists if a defendant makes a withdrawal request only

after the Commonwealth enters into agreements with the defendant’s co-

defendants. Commonwealth v. Davis, 191 A.3d 883 (Pa.Super. 2018). In

such cases, the co-defendant’s “lack of motivation to cooperate with the

prosecution would severely prejudice the Commonwealth if it sought to try

[the] appellant.” Id. at 891 (citing Commonwealth v. Ross, 498 Pa. 512,

447 A.2d 943 (1982) (finding that the “request to withdraw the plea, which

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had been made after the dismissal of numerous key Commonwealth witnesses

in reliance on the plea, was properly denied”)).

       Moreover, this Court has noted that, although a child victim may still

“be available in a technical sense,” the emotional trauma and diminished

memory of a child victim are also appropriate considerations in determining

whether the Commonwealth has been substantially prejudiced by a defendant

seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas. Commonwealth v. Carr, 543 A.2d

1232, 1234 (Pa.Super. 1988). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in finding that the prosecution would be substantially

prejudiced    if   Appellant    were    allowed    to   withdraw   his   guilty   pleas.

Consequently, the trial court properly denied Appellant’s pre-sentence motion

to withdraw his guilty pleas.14

       For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

____________________________________________

14We note that:

       [A] request to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing is subject
       to higher scrutiny [than a pre-sentence request] since courts
       strive to discourage [the] entry of guilty pleas as sentence-testing
       devices. Therefore, in order to withdraw a guilty plea after the
       imposition of sentence, a defendant must make a showing of
       prejudice which resulted in a manifest injustice. A defendant
       meets this burden only if he can demonstrate that his guilty plea
       was entered involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.
Commonwealth v. Culsoir, 209 A.3d 433, 437 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citations
and quotation marks omitted). Here, given that we have found no relief is
due regarding the denial of Appellant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas, we also find that, to the extent Appellant contends the trial court
erred in denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw on the same grounds,
he is not entitled to relief. See id.

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     Affirmed.

DATE: 12/7/2023

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