Court Opinion

ID: 9828348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:19:01.676883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:47.390941
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Among other defenses, the railway company alleged: “That Article 1329 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Dallas, 1921, provided, in substance, that any vehicle, before entering an intersection, shall slow down to not more than 3 miles an hour, but that the driver of said taxi-cab, long before he reached St. Paul Street, saw that the light was orange and would be green by the time he reached there, and instead of slowing down before entering the intersection, he speeded up and entered the intersection at a speed greater than 3 miles per hour, in violation of- said ordinance; that if he had slowed down to 3 miles an hour before entering the intersection,, there would have been no collision and he would have had his automobile under control and would have stopped before he reached the street car, and the negligence of the driver in not so reducing his speed was the sole proximate cause of the collision.”
This plea was stricken out on special exceptions urged by plaintiffs, based on the idea that the ordinance pleaded was in conflict with the state speed regulations, therefore void. While we disagreed with the trial court and sustain the validity of the ordinance, yet for another reason held that the action of the- court, in striking out the *893plea, was nevertheless correct, in that we held that article 1329 of the City Ordinances, upon which the special defense was based, was inapplicable;, saying in that connection that: “We think it obvious that this ordinance was designed to regulate traffic at street intersections, other than those controlled by the signal and light system, as was the intersection where the collision occurred, hence the ordinance plead not being applicable to the situation, the court did not err in striking out the plea.”
In its motion for rehearing, the railway company complains that, in arriving at the conclusion that the ordinance in question was not applicable to the facts of the case, we erred in taking cognizance of the entire article, instead of confining our consideration to the particular part emphasized in the plea. We have heretofore set out in full the plea of the railway company, from which it appears that article 1329 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Dallas was set up; the provisions thereof requiring vehicles, before entering an intersection, to slow down to not more than three miles per hour, being particularly stressed. As the ordinance was pleaded by reference to article number, we were authorized, in determining the correctness of the action of the court in striking out the plea, to take cognizance of the entire article. Courts are at liberty to take judicial notice of a city ordinance either when its existence is admitted, or the same is pleaded by reference to its title or article. See 23 C.J., Evidence, 139, § 1961; Seattle, etc., R. Co. v. Seattle (C.C.) 190 F. 75; Buhner v. Reusse, 144 Minn. 450, 175 N.W. 1005. Also see 33 Tex.Jur. p. 557, § 122. So, we do not think it can be said that we added to or amplified the record, as contended by appellant; we simply took judicial knowledge of the entire article pleaded by number, the existence of which, in this way, was admitted by the appellant.
We held further that, even if the action of the court in striking out the defensive plea was erroneous, the same was harmless, in that to all intents and purposes the case was tried upon the matters embraced in the plea, were submitted to the jury and found adversely to the railway company. With reference to the latter holding, the railway company, in its motion for rehearing, has this to say: “Furthermore, where a case is tried on one theory in the trial court, and briefed on that same theory by the parties in the appellate court, the Court of Civil Appeals errs in disposing of the case upon a theory not raised in the trial court, and not raised by the briefs of any party in the appellate court. We find no contention in the trial court, or in the appellate court, or in the pleadings, the transcript, the statement of facts, or briefs, to the effect that' the ordinance involved was not applicable to this intersection. We find no contention in the trial court that the ordinance should be construed as inapplicable to the facts of this case, and to this intersection. We find no such contention in the brief of any party. We find no contention that the matters involved in this defense were submitted in other issues, thereby rendering this exception immaterial.”
Thus the contention is made that we disposed of the question or .phase of the case under consideration upon a theory that previously had not been raised during the progress of the trial. We dissent from the view that a theory was adopted by us other than the one on which the case was tried; what we did was to find and state reasons, other than those previously suggested, for the holding that the action of the court, in striking out the plea on exception, was correct; but even if not correct that the erroneous ruling was rendered harmless, and became a mere irregularity not affecting the merits of the cause, for reasons fully stated in the original opinion.
After duly considering all grounds set up by the railway company, for rehearing, we see no reason for changing our decision, therefore overrule the motion.
Overruled.