Court Opinion

ID: 9919270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 20:01:14.975686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:44.569798
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14292    Document: 49-1     Date Filed: 01/17/2024   Page: 1 of 4

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14292
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       GIOVANNI DEPALMA,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-02745-CEH-CPT
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-14292         Document: 49-1         Date Filed: 01/17/2024         Page: 2 of 4

       2                          Opinion of the Court                       22-14292

       Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Giovanni DePalma, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
       court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1981 civil complaint for failure
       to state a claim in light of Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973),
       and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). DePalma asserts the
       district court erred by not addressing his arguments regarding the
       state criminal convictions challenged in his complaint, including
       that the state trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and vio-
       lated the Double Jeopardy Clause. After review, 1 we affirm.
               A court shall dismiss a prisoner’s complaint if the court de-
       termines that the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
       a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.
       § 1915A(b)(1). “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact
       or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is
       a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speed-
       ier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ
       of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.
              A § 1983 action cannot be used to collaterally attack a con-
       viction or sentence unless the underlying conviction or sentence
       “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

       1 A district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is re-

       viewed de novo, viewing the allegations in the complaint as true. Mitchell v.
       Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).
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       22-14292                  Opinion of the Court                                3

       declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such deter-
       mination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
       writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Although Heck
       involved a prisoner seeking money damages, the Supreme Court
       later clarified that prisoners cannot use § 1983 to obtain relief
       where success would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sen-
       tence, even if the prisoner is seeking injunctive relief. Wilkinson v.
       Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
              The district court did not err in dismissing DePalma’s com-
       plaint as barred under Preiser and Heck. First, although DePalma
       presented his claim under § 1981 rather than § 1983, Preiser and
       Heck apply to his § 1981 complaint. Liberally construing his com-
       plaint, DePalma likely meant to challenge his conviction under
       § 1983, rather than § 1981, because he raises constitutional claims,
       not claims regarding racial discrimination in making or enforcing a
       contract. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
       Cir. 1998) (stating pro se pleadings are liberally construed); compare
       42 U.S.C. § 1983 with 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Moreover, Preiser and Heck
       apply to § 1981 claims as well as § 1983 claims. See Cruz v. Skelton,
       502 F.2d 1101, 1102 (5th Cir. 1974) 2 (citing Preiser and holding that
       since relief sought by prisoner was injunctive relief requiring his
       release from confinement, his proper remedy was habeas corpus,
       not a suit under § 1981). DePalma’s complaint challenges the

       2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

       this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
       cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14292

       validity of his convictions, and he requests “immediate discharge”
       from incarceration. These claims are precisely the type that are
       barred by Preiser because DePalma is seeking a determination he is
       entitled to an immediate release. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500. De-
       Palma’s claims are also barred by Heck because a determination he
       is entitled to immediate release because the amended information
       leading to his conviction was void would necessarily undermine
       the validity of his convictions, and he has not demonstrated that
       his convictions have been overturned. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-
       87; Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81-82.
              Additionally, even if the district court had liberally con-
       strued his complaint as a habeas petition, it would have been dis-
       missed as an unauthorized second or successive petition because
       DePalma had already filed a habeas petition and had not received
       authorization from this Court to file a second or successive peti-
       tion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (providing to file a second or
       successive § 2254 petition, a petitioner must first get approval from
       this Court); Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997) (ex-
       plaining without our authorization, the district court lacks jurisdic-
       tion to consider a second or successive petition). Accordingly, we
       affirm.
              AFFIRMED.