Court Opinion

ID: 9493379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:06:28.236905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:48.549546
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join in the result reached by the majority, but I cannot join in the majority’s reasoning. I write separately to emphasize those points. First, the majority ignores the standard of review that governs this case, and I believe that the standard ought to be explicated and applied. Second, the majority makes its own estimate (though it should not) of Coulston’s ability to repay the SSA.
I
Federal courts review many different kinds of decisions rendered by the Commissioner of Social Security. In virtually every such case, courts’ review is governed by the statutory “substantial evidence” test. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive”).
We subject the Commissioner’s decision to deny a claimant’s request for a waiver of repayment in an overpayment of benefits case to the very same standard of review. See Gladden v. Callahan, 139 F.3d 1219, 1220, 1222, 1223 (8th Cir.1998); accord Watson v. Sullivan, 940 F.2d 168, 169, 171 (6th Cir.1991); Viehman v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 223, 227 & n. 5 (11th Cir.1982) (“Substantial evidence sets the parameters for our review of the Secretary’s adverse final determination in this [overpayment of benefits] case.”).
The majority explains that Coulston bore the burden of proving that he was not at fault. That is true enough. But it misses the point. We are not here concerned with whether Coulston met his burden of proving to the Commissioner that he was not at fault. Our sole concern is to determine whether the Commissioner’s ultimate decision — that Coulston was at fault, and was not entitled to a waiver of repayment — was based upon “substantial evidence.” If so, we are obliged to affirm the Commissioner’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by “substantial evidence,” for the simple reason that the Commissioner introduced no evidence to controvert Coul-ston’s account of events. The Commissioner failed to come forward with any evidence supporting its position that Coul-ston was at fault. Coulston, for his part, presented evidence (much of which the ALJ did not discredit) that he had relied upon the SSA’s representations that the money was his. Hence, the ALJ’s ultimate decision that Coulston was at fault lacked support in the record — substantial or otherwise. As a matter of logic, the utter absence of evidence in the record cannot be deemed “substantial.”1
*902The majority apparently confuses Coul-ston’s administrative burden (proving non-fault) with his appellate burden (demonstrating a lack of “substantial evidence”). For that reason, I cannot join in the majority opinion. Reviewed under the proper standard, the record reveals no substantial evidentiary basis to support the Commissioner’s conclusion that Coulston was at fault.
II
The majority properly proceeds to examine the second step of the overpayment analysis, whether Coulston’s repayment “would defeat the purpose of [Title II] or would be against equity and good conscience.” 42 U.S.C. § 404(b). The majority compares Coulston’s monthly income with the poverty line and determines that Coulston could not afford to repay the SSA. Yet the record suggests the possibility of a different answer. Coulston receives about $650 a month in SSA benefits, and he earns about $500 per month as a part-time dishwasher. Adding those sums together, his total monthly income exceeds $1100. Given Coulston’s remarkably low estimate of his monthly expenses, he appears to have at least $500 per month in disposable income. Presumably, some portion of that income could be used to repay the SSA without defeating the purpose of social security.
These calculations are, of course, my own findings of fact. The majority’s conclusion that Coulston cannot repay the SSA is equally dependent on implicit fact-finding. Our disagreement illustrates why circuit judges are properly loathe to find the facts on appeal. See Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1210 (8th Cir.1998). Faced with a fact-dependent impasse, the majority ought to remand to permit the ALJ to make “ability to repay” findings.2
Despite the presence of this potential factual dispute, however, we need not remand. A claimant’s reliance on agency representations automatically establishes that repayment would offend equity and good conscience. See Gladden, 139 F.3d at 1223. Much like the claimant in Gladden, Coulston relied upon a host of SSA representations in assuming that the lump-sum check belonged to him. I am hard-pressed to overlook Gladden’s clear language in favor of the majority’s own calculation ■ of Coulston’s ability to repay. I deem Gladden controlling, and I would avoid analyzing Coulston’s financial picture entirely. The majority’s methodology leads ineluctably to the conclusion that this matter ought to be remanded — a conclusion in considerable tension with Gladden.
I respectfully concur in the judgment of the court.

. The one exception to this rule of thumb is when a claimant fails to present evidence. Then, the Commissioner ought to deny relief on the ground that the claimant has not met *902his burden of proof. If, in such a case, the Commissioner also failed to present evidence, the total absence of any evidence in the record would not preclude our affirmance — despite the ostensible absence of "substantial evidence.” That’s because the Commissioner's ruling would be based purely upon the burden of proof, not upon the evidentiary merit of the claimant’s contentions.

. The ALJ never calculated Coulston's ability to repay (the second step) since he found Coulston "at fault” (the first step).