Court Opinion

ID: 9851064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:06:57.362713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:48.189548
License: Public Domain

SCARBOROUGH, Chief Justice (dissenting). McCarty was prosecuted for the burglary of Schumpert’s Music Company in Roswell. The State filed a demand for notice of alibi. On demand the State is entitled to the pre-trial identification of the defendant’s alibi witnesses. SCRA 1986, 5-508. Reciprocal discovery rules are designed to serve the ends of justice by affording both parties, as the majority observe, “the maximum possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases.” McCarty failed to respond to the demand and the trial court excluded defendant’s alibi evidence. The majority acknowledge that the excluded evidence was alibi evidence. Defendant willfully failed to comply with the rule. He provided no notice to the State that he intended to introduce alibi evidence. The alibi evidence surfaced for the first time after the State had completed its case-in-chief, during the questioning of the first defense witness. The prosecutor objected and advised the court that as late as that morning she had inquired as to defense counsel’s intention to present alibi evidence, and was advised there would be none from that defense witness. Defendant concedes that his noncompliance was intentional. He states that the demand for notice of alibi was so vague he was unable to frame a proper response. Defendant ignored the alibi rule providing for pre-trial discovery for the State. The majority countenance such conduct. Confronted by the defendant’s willful noncompliance with SCRA 1986, 5-508, the trial court fashioned a reasonable response which permitted both defendant’s alibi witnesses to testify and excluded only their alibi testimony. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning such a remedy in light of defendant’s total failure to respond to the State’s demand for notice of alibi pursuant to SGRA 1986, 5-508. The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988), specifically approved total witness exclusion for intentional noncompliance with state criminal discovery rules, a much harsher remedy than the trial court utilized in this case. It is obvious from a review of the record of the court proceedings in this case that the trial court balanced the defendant’s right to a full and fair trial against the competing interests of the State in avoiding surprise and delay. The majority cites Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir.1984), as the source of its balancing test. However, Fendler, like Taylor, did not impose standards to guide the exercise of a trial court’s discretion in applying sanctions for noncompliance with discovery rules designed for specific kinds of evidence. Both Fendler and Taylor dealt with permissible sanctions for noncompliance with general reciprocal-discovery rules. Fendler specifically excluded a reciprocal notice-of-alibi discovery rule from the impact of its holding. Id. at 1190 n. 19. Nevertheless, the majority, based upon Fendler, create a legal presumption against the exclusion of alibi evidence even when the trial court is confronted with willful noncompliance. Such a presumption was not adopted by the Supreme Court in Taylor even where the noncompliance involved general criminal discovery rules. As noted by the court in Fendler, unexpected alibi defenses have a special tendency to cause unfair surprise and lengthy trial delays. Id. at 1188 n. 12. In such a case the State has an especially strong legitimate interest in securing pretrial disclosure of alibi evidence. I also take issue with the assertion of the majority that the State had the opportunity to prepare its case without the advance notice contemplated by Rule 5-508 that defendant would introduce an alibi defense. “Given the ease with which an alibi defense can be fabricated, the State’s interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate.” Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1895-1896, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970). Contrary to the assertion of the majority, the State has no opportunity to adequately prepare to meet an alibi defense injected by a defendant at the eleventh-hour. Even when the State knows the identity of the defense witnesses, the State may still be surprised to learn that they intend to testify about an alibi. United States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.1978). If a trial court should permit introduction of an eleventh-hour alibi, I must presume that a continuance would be granted to allow the prosecutor to meet the defense and to comply with his duty to disclose rebuttal witnesses. See id. at 757. The majority direct a trial judge to “consider other available ways to enforce a criminal discovery rule” before resorting to preclusion. The majority overlook the preventative purpose of preclusion. Preclusion of alibi evidence in the face of willful noncompliance and surprise at trial is a sanction intended not to enforce compliance with the discovery rule after a violation occurs, but to deter willful discovery violations in the first instance. Alternative sanctions would likely prove ineffective to deter violations. See Comment, Alibi Notice Rules: The Preclusion Sanction as Procedural Default, 51 U.Chi.L.Rev. 254, 276 (1984). The threat of a continuance would hardly deter violations and may even prove to be an attractive strategy to stall the trial after the prosecution has rested its case. As the Supreme Court observed in Taylor, “[defendants who are willing to fabricate a defense may also be willing to fabricate excuses for failing to comply with a discovery requirement.” Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 655. There is no incentive to conform to the rule if an intentional violation results in an automatic continuance or mistrial. The Taylor Court observed that more is at stake than just possible prejudice to the prosecution. Compliance with the notice-of-alibi rule is a reasonable requirement needed to ensure the integrity of the judicial process itself. The rule merely conditions the exercise of a defendant’s rights under the sixth amendment upon timely disclosure, that is, upon the assertion of the constitutional right at the appropriate point in the litigation. The Supreme Court in Taylor plainly rejected the contention that every preclusion of testimony distorts the truth-seeking process. The Court recognized that alternative sanctions might well be appropriate in most cases, but concluded that “[tjhere are instances in which they would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the State and the adversary process.” Id. The Court agreed that the severest sanction is appropriate in the case of “willful misconduct.” Id. at 656. Additionally, the Taylor Court affirmed the ruling of the Illinois Appellate Court that “ ‘[t]he decision of the severity of the sanction to impose on a party who violates discovery rules rests within the sound discretion of the trial court’.” Id. at 651, (quoting, People v. Taylor, 141 Ill.App.3d 839, 844, 96 Ill.Dec. 189, 193, 491 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1986)). I see no abuse of discretion in this case and would, accordingly, affirm the decision of the district court and the court of appeals.