Court Opinion

ID: 9819579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:28:09.213344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:40.262654
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I believe there is evidence of manipulation or technical evasion by the State, and I believe defendant is entitled to receive credit for the time he spent in custody on the burglary charge. In September 1999 defendant was arrested and charged with committing the offense of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 — 1(a) (West 1998)), to which he posted a bail bond. On October 25, 1999, defendant failed to appear in court, and the trial court thereafter issued a warrant for defendant’s arrest pursuant to section 110 — 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110 — 3 (West 1998)). Section 110 — 3 provides: “Upon failure to comply with any condition of a bail bond *** the court having jurisdiction at the time of such failure may, in addition to any other action provided by law, issue a warrant for the arrest of the person at liberty on bail ***. The contents of such a warrant shall be the same as required for an arrest warrant issued upon complaint. When a defendant is at liberty on bail *** on a felony charge and fails to appear in court as directed, the court shall issue a warrant for the arrest of such person. Such warrant shall be noted with a directive to peace officers to arrest the person and hold such person without bail and to deliver such person before the court for further proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/110 — 3 (West 2000). The warrant authorizing defendant’s arrest clearly states that the original violation was that of burglary. Because the offense of burglary is a felony (see 720 ILCS 5/19 — 1(b) (West 2000)), the trial court was required to issue a warrant for defendant’s arrest when he failed to appear in court on October 25, 1999. See 725 ILCS 5/110 — 3 (West 2000). The bench warrant to arrest is merely a procedural tool by which law enforcement personnel may lawfully seize and detain a defendant until such time as she or he is brought back to the jurisdiction to face prosecution on the underlying offense. See 725 ILCS 5/107 — 1 et seq. (West 2000); People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 127 (1990), overruled on other grounds, People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210 (2002). The issuance of an arrest warrant does not, in and of itself, formally charge a defendant with a crime. People v. Racanelli, 132 Ill. App. 3d 124, 130 (1985). In the present case, the offense or violation underlying the issuance of the bench warrant to arrest was burglary. The October 25, 1999, warrant for defendant’s arrest was predicated on his failure to appear in court on the burglary charge. The October 25, 1999, warrant did not formally charge defendant with committing a crime; it was merely a procedural tool the trial court was statutorily required to utilize to effect defendant’s return so that he could face prosecution on the burglary. Indeed, the warrant for defendant’s arrest was effected on April 23, 2000, when law enforcement personnel in California gained custody of defendant. I believe the April 23, 2000, arrest merely relates back to the original charge of burglary and I believe that section 5 — 8—7(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections applies. The Unified Code of Corrections mandates that a defendant receive credit for time served. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—7 (West 2000). Forfeiture rules do not apply. People v. Dieu, 298 Ill. App. 3d 245, 249 (1998). This court has previously stated that a defendant is entitled to receive credit against each sentence imposed for an offense for which the defendant was in custody when simultaneously in custody for more than one offense. People v. Wyatt, 305 Ill. App. 3d 291, 299 (1999), citing People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 454 (1996). I recognize that the State did not formally charge defendant with violating his bail bond until January 16, 2001; however, defendant was chargeable with that offense as early as October 25, 1999, when he failed to appear in court. I believe the State manipulated defendant’s liberty when it allowed him to remain in custody for approximately eight months without bail before charging him with violating his bail bond. Clearly, had the State charged defendant with violating his bail bond when the arrest warrant was effected in California, he would have been in simultaneous custody on both the burglary and the violation-of-bail-bond offenses. Then there would have been no question whether defendant was entitled to the credit for time spent in custody. See Wyatt, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 299. For the State to wait until the eleventh hour to formally charge defendant with violating his bail bond and then for the trial court and this court to forfeit his eight months spent in custody ostensibly for the offense of “failure to appear” is patently unfair. The result is that defendant’s four-year sentence is now four years and eight months. I would modify defendant’s sentence to reflect an extra 267 days’ credit for time served.