Court Opinion

ID: 9706253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:37:28.301368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:20.804096
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that part of the majority opinion which affirms Pillars’ conviction on Count IV. I also agree that the seven-day delay caused by the continuance of the arraignment is chargeable to Pillars. With the remainder of the opinion, however, I cannot agree.
The record in this case shows that Pillars’ counsel filed a motion to withdraw based upon Pillars’ failure to contact or cooperate with counsel. A hearing was held fifteen days later, at which time the motion was denied. Plainly, the delay caused by this motion did not end until that ruling. See: Shack v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 450, 288 N.E.2d 155; Rudy v. State (1976), Ind.App., 341 N.E.2d 516. Since any act of counsel is deemed to be an act of the defendant, the filing of the motion to withdraw occasioned a delay attributable to Pillars.
The record also shows that at the omnibus hearing held April 18,1977, not only did the court order Pillars to comply more fully with discovery, but it also scheduled a further omnibus hearing “by which time said additional discovery should be complete.” Clearly, the scheduling of this second hearing, necessitated by Pillars’ noncompliance with discovery, delayed Pillars’ trial. Regardless of whether that noncompliance was willful or innocent, the delay occasioned by the noncompliance (fourteen days) was chargeable to Pillars. For, as stated in State v. Moles (1975), Ind.App., 337 N.E.2d 543, at 553, it is the effect of a defendant’s act, not his motive, which determines whether the resulting delay is chargeable to him.
As I would find that each of the three delays were properly charged to Pillars by the trial court, I would find that the June 7th trial setting did indeed meet the requirements of CR. 4(C).
Furthermore, even if the seven-day delay was the only one properly charged to Pillars (thus making May 24 the last permissible trial date), I would hold that there was no timely objection to the June 7th trial setting.
Assuming that Pillars’ counsel did not learn of the resetting of the trial date on May 16, it is inconceivable that he would not have learned of it on May 17, the originally scheduled trial date. When the case did not proceed to trial on that date, the fact that it had been reset would be obvious. Thus, Pillars had ample opportunity to file his objection to a setting later than May 24.
The majority reasons that Pillars had no notice of that setting because “Pillars’ attorney claims he was unable to obtain the docket sheet until May 26, 1977.” But the affidavit of Pillars’ attorney, filed in support of his August 3, 1977 Motion for Discharge, discloses that Pillars’ attorney received notice of the rescheduling by mail “several days” after the June 7th date was set. Nowhere in that affidavit does Pillars’ counsel allege that he had no actual notice of the June 7th setting until he examined the docket sheet on May 26, 1977, nor does he allege that he received actual notice after May 24. In fact, Pillars’ counsel alleged in that same affidavit that he tried to *687locate the docket sheet several times during the week following the clerk’s notice in order to verify, not determine, the new trial date.
On this record I would hold that Pillars had an opportunity, albeit a brief one, to object to the June 7th trial setting before the May 24 deadline passed. As he failed to timely object, he waived his right to complain of the setting.
For all the above reasons I would hold that Pillars was brought to trial within the requirements of CR. 4(C) and that the court below properly denied his Motion for Discharge.