Court Opinion

ID: 9786223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:51:08.599409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:42.803245
License: Public Domain

McFarland, C.J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part: I dissent from tire portion of the majority which holds drat the prosecutor s misstatement of the law prejudiced the jury and denied dre defendant a fair trial and thereby requires that his conviction be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
On tire prosecutorial misconduct issue, which serves as the sole basis for the majority’s reversal of the convictions, I agree with the majority’s reliance on State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004), as the correct analytical framework for reviewing such claims. I believe however, that the majority has misapplied the Tosh framework to tire facts in this case.
*417The Tosh framework has two steps. In the first step, a reviewing court decides whether the prosecutor s comments .are outside the wide latitude allowed in discussing the evidence. The majority concluded that the prosecutor misstated tire law and that “[misstating the law is not within the wide latitude given to prosecutors in closing arguments.” I agree completely with the majority’s decision on this point.
In the second step of the analysis, a reviewing court decides whether the statements prejudiced the jury against the defendant and denied him or her a fair trial. Three factors, none of which are controlling, bear on this inquiry: (1) whether the misconduct is gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct shows ill will on the prosecutor’s part; and (3) whether the evidence against the defendant is of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have little weight in the minds of the jurors. 278 Kan. 83, Syl. ¶ 2.
As to the first factor, the majority seeks to define gross and flagrant misconduct by equating it to language found in State v. Villanueva, 274 Kan. 20, 34, 49 P.3d 481 (2002), and State v. Lewis, 238 Kan. 94, 98, 708 P.2d 196 (1985), where the court parenthetically said that in deciding whether misconduct is gross and flagrant, the question is whether “ ‘the objectionable statements [were] likely to affect the jurors to the defendant’s prejudice.’ ” While determining whether misconduct was likely to affect the jury is tire cornerstone of the second prong of the Tosh test, we must also decide whether tire misconduct was gross and flagrant, as those terms are commonly understood.
In my view, we can simply look to the ordinary meaning of the terms “gross” and “flagrant” to guide us. “Gross” describes something that is “ ‘glaringly noticeable usually because of inexcusable badness or objectionableness,’ ” “ ‘[o]ut of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; as a gross dereliction of duty, a gross injustice, gross carelessness or negligence. . . . Such conduct as is not to be excused.’ ” Jones v. Kansas State University, 279 Kan. 128, 150, 106 P.3d 10 (2005) (quoting Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 507 [1973] and Black’s Law Dictionary 702 [6th ed. 1990] in context of “gross misconduct” as used in employment *418security law statutes). “Gross” is a modifying term that “emphasize^] extremity or intensity. . . [and] suggests a magnitude of offense or failing that cannot be overlooked or condoned.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 498 (1971) (discussing “gross” as a synonym for “flagrant”).
The term “flagrant,” a listed synonym for “gross,” describes something that is “conspicuously bad or objectionable;” and “so obviously inconsistent with what is right or proper as to appear to be a flouting of law or morality.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 468 (1991). Like its synonym “glaring,” “flagrant” “stress[es] the conspicuousness of what gives cause for concern or offense. . . . hut flagrant often makes the stronger implication of wrongdoing as a moral offense rather than an act of miscalculation or ineptitude.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 498 (1971) (discussing “glaring” as a synonym for “flagrant”).
The term “gross,” therefore, denotes a higher degree of impropriety than ordinary misconduct, while “flagrant” concerns misconduct that is not the result of mistake or ineptitude, but instead is so blatantly inconsistent with well-settled law that it evidences a purposeful effort to ignore the law.
Reviewing the record with these concepts in mind, I do not find the prosecutor’s misstatements of the law to be “gross and flagrant” misconduct. At the time the misstatements were made, no case law existed for the rule that the mere force of the penis into the vagina cannot constitute the element of force under the crime of rape. Thus, the statement was not so conspicuously contrary to a well-settled point of law that it could be said the prosecutor was “flouting” the law in making the misstatement. See State v. Morton, 277 Kan. 575, 585, 86 P.3d 535 (2004) (noting that an experienced prosecutor should have been and was apparently aware of numerous cases finding error in conveying that premeditation can occur in an instant).
Similarly, there is no evidence these remarks were a purposeful misstatement of the law — a point the majority implicitly recognizes by finding a lack of ill will. Intent, or lack thereof, is a relevant consideration in deciding whether conduct is gross and flagrant. *419See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 279 Kan. 563, 592, 112 P.3d 883 (2005) (“flagrant” violation of defendant’s right to fair trial where prosecutor intended to imply that only guilty people contact attorneys, and intended to cause jury to infer guilt on that basis); State v. Broyles, 272 Kan. 823, 833, 36 P.3d 259 (2001) (in evaluating whether conduct was gross and flagrant, court considered that comment appeared to be merely a misguided attempt to counter a defense argument); State v. Graham, 247 Kan. 388, 397, 799 P.2d 1003 (1990) (gross misconduct to assert a fact as true which prosecutor knows to be false); State v. Murrell, 215 Kan. 10, 523 P.2d 348 (1974) (“gross and fraught with . . . prejudice” especially applies where the prosecutor has persisted in making comments calculated to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury); State v. Dill, 3 Kan. App. 2d 67, 76, 589 P.2d 634 (1979) (conduct is gross and flagrant where “[ejven an experienced prosecutor knows” that insinuating addiction to narcotics is improper).
The remarks in this case were not intentional misstatements of the law, but rather, appear to be the result of an inept mistake drat arose out of the effort to malee the legitimate point that force does not require the infliction of violence.
The fact that the prosecutor’s statements prompted neither an objection by counsel nor interruption by the judge also indicates that they were not glaring misstatements or conspicuously offensive (though I recognize that the lack of either does not remove the misconduct from our review). See People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965, 972 (Colo. 1990) (recognizing lack of objection is factor to consider in examining prosecutorial misconduct, as lack of objection may demonstrate defense counsel’s belief that argument was not overly damaging).
Taking the gross and flagrant analysis to the next step, I disagree that the misstatements were likely to affect the jurors to the defendant’s prejudice. The majority reasons, in part, that the misconduct by the prosecutor was gross and flagrant because of two problems with the jury instructions: (1) the jury instructions did not define the “overcome by force or fear” element of rape; thus, the only guidance the jury had as to what constituted force was the *420misstatement of law; and (2) the jury instructions were insufficient on the post-penetration rape issue.
With respect to the fact the jury instructions did not define the element of “overcome by force,” it must be noted that all of the instructions given by the trial court concerning the elements of rape were straight from PIK Crim. 3d 57.01, requested by defense counsel, and never objected to. There is no claim on appeal by the defendant that the jury received incorrect oral or written jury instructions from the court. Moreover, although the majority sees significance in the fact the instructions did not provide a definition of the “overcome by force” element, force is a widely used and readily comprehensible term that does not require a definition. See State v. Norris, 226 Kan. 90, 95, 595 P.2d 1110 (1979) (term which is widely used and which is readily comprehensible need not have a defining instruction).
Additionally, the idea that the jury was prejudiced by the misstatement is contradicted by the acquittals on the other two charges. The facts underlying the three rape counts are extremely similar both as to what occurred, as well as to what did not occur, especially with respect to the element of force. As the majority opinion notes, each of the victims described her resistance to Bun-yard’s conduct as essentially a wrestling match. None of the victims testified that he used a weapon, made threats, tied her up, beat her, acted in anger, or sought to demean or otherwise injure her. Because the facts were so similar, and the misstatements at issue concerned the element of force with respect to all three victims, the acquittals in the two other cases provide a clear indication the misstatements did not prejudice the juiy against the defendant.
Furthermore, the misstatements were not significant under the facts of E.N.’s case. Under both versions of the event, consent was withdrawn during the intercourse. The point of contention centered on whether there was forcible continuation of the intercourse after consent was withdrawn. In E.N.’s version of the facts, her struggles against Bunyard as she was pinned under him in the tight confines of the backseat of his two-door Chrysler Sebring convertible provided sufficient evidence of forcible continuation of the intercourse above and beyond mere penetration. In contrast, Bun-*421yard’s version had no forcible continuation at all. Under Iris version, E.N. was on top of him during the encounter, was in control of whether and when the intercourse ended, and she did, in fact, end the intercourse when she no longer desired that it continue. Thus, whether or not the force of his penis in her vagina, standing alone, was sufficient to constitute the force element was simply not a significant issue.
I also take issue with the majority’s conclusion that the failure to provide the jury with additional instruction that post-penetration rape can occur when consent is withdrawn is significant in determining whether the misstatements about force prejudiced the jury. Although the jurors had a question about whether consent can be withdrawn after penetration, their request asked the court to “[pjlease elaborate on the law, if there is any [to] elaborate.” This shows the jury anticipated the possibility there was no law on the issue and, therefore, the jurors anticipated they might have to resolve the issue themselves. Moreover, their guilty verdict demonstrates that even in the absence of additional instruction the jurors were able to, and did, resolve the issue consistent with the rule announced by the majority, for had they concluded that consent cannot be withdrawn after penetration, they necessarily would have acquitted Bunyard. Therefore, had the jury been instructed that consent can be withdrawn after penetration, the outcome would not have been any different and, thus, no prejudice is shown.
I also disagree that Bunyard was prejudiced by the combination of the failure to instruct the jury that he had a reasonable time to respond to the withdrawal of consent, and the misstatements concerning force. Under Bunyard’s defense he did not respond to the withdrawal of consent — he contended it was E.N. who ended the intercourse. Thus, whether or not he continued the intercourse for an unreasonable time after E.N. withdrew consent was not an issue relevant to the defense theory.
As we said in Tosh, it is the function of the appellate courts to consider the degree of seriousness involved and the likely effect of prosecutorial misconduct when deciding whether a particular case merits reversal. Tosh, 278 Kan. at 93-94. In this case, the misstatements did not involve a degree of impropriety beyond ordinary *422misconduct, were not so obviously inconsistent with well-settled law that it can be said the prosecutor was flouting the law, and under the unique facts of this case, were not likely to have any prejudicial effect on the jury. For these reasons, I would hold that the prosecutor s misstatements of the law during closing argument did not amount to gross and flagrant misconduct.
The second factor in the second step of the Tosh analysis poses the question of whether the misconduct shows ill will on the prosecutor’s part. The majority answered this question in the negative, and I would agree that the record is absent any indication of ill will.
The third factor in determining if the prosecutorial misconduct so prejudiced the jury against the defendant requiring a new trial poses the question of “whether the evidence against the defendant is of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would have little weight in the minds of the jurors.” Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, Syl. ¶ 2. As stated in Tosh, before this factor can “ever” override the other two factors (gross and flagrant and ill will) the reviewing court must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967) (error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in that it had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result at trial), have been met. 278 Kan. at 97.
The majority concludes that the evidence regarding whether E.N. was “overcome by force” was not so direct and overwhelming that the misstatements would have had little weight in the minds of the jurors. Of course, this is often the case in rape cases, and particularly date rape or acquaintance rape type cases; the evidence boils down to a credibility contest between the victim and the defendant. However, in order for a misstatement of the law by the prosecutor to be reversible error, it is not enough to simply say the evidence was conflicting. For a misstatement of the law to constitute reversible error, the facts must be such that the jury could have been confused or misled by the misstatement. State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 619, 44 P.3d 466 (2002) (a misstatement of the law by the prosecutor denies the defendant his or her right to a fair *423trial when the facts are such that the jury could have been confused or misled by the statement).
In my opinion, under the facts of this case, the jury was not misled or confused by the prosecutor s misstatement. The question of whether the mere force of his penis in the victim’s vagina was sufficient to constitute force was not critical to Bunyard’s defense, nor was it a significant issue in the case. The victim’s version of events was sufficient to establish that intercourse was continued by force other than mere penetration, while Bunyard’s defense was a completely different version of events in which there was no continuation of the intercourse after consent was withdrawn — by force or otherwise. The misstatement could not have misled the jury in this case, and the verdict would have been the same had the misstatement not been made. Cf. State v. Redford, 242 Kan. 658, 671-72, 750 P.2d 1013 (1988) (where defense to rape by force or fear was a completely different version of events than that given by the victim, and was based on consent, omission of the force or fear element from the jury instructions was harmless error).
Lastly, I disagree with the majority’s reliance on the fact that the juiy instructions did not fully explain the elements of rape in a post-penetration withdrawal of consent situation, to conclude that the misstatements constitute reversible error under the third factor. As tlie majority acknowledges, given this was a novel issue of first impression, the trial judge did the best he could in responding to the jury’s question.
It can also be said with certainty that the juiy resolved the withdrawal of consent issue • correctly and, therefore, the outcome would not have been different even had the jury been provided additional instruction. If the failure to provide this jury additional instruction could have had no effect on the outcome of this case, that failure certainly cannot serve to tilt the scales toward reversal.
For all the foregoing reasons, and given the entire record of the case, I would hold that the misstatements of the law made by the prosecutor in this case do not satisfy the second step of the Tosh analysis. The misconduct was not gross and flagrant, was not a product of ill will, and would have had little weight in the jurors’ minds. The misstatements did not prejudice the defendant and *424were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because they had little, if any, likelihood of changing the result. I would, therefore, affirm tire conviction.
Having reviewed all the arguments posed by the defendant and the entire record on appeal, I would affirm the defendant’s conviction.