Court Opinion

ID: 9885939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 15:26:13.695457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:49:20.742979
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
  

   I concur in Part III of the court's opinion remanding the case to the panel to determine whether unlawful use of a weapon under
   
    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030.1
   
   (4) qualifies as a "violent felony" under the ACCA. I respectfully dissent, however, from the court's decision to overrule
   
    United States v. Bell
   
   . My understanding of Missouri case law leads me to conclude that "Missouri's second-degree robbery statute ... does not necessarily require the use of violent force as one of its elements."
   
    840 F.3d at 967
   
   .
  

   In short, my disagreement rests on a different understanding of what constitutes a "realistic probability"-as opposed to a merely theoretical one-"that the State would apply its statute to conduct" that constitutes something less than violent force.
   
    See
   

    Moncrieffe
   
   ,
   
    569 U.S. at 191
   
   ,
   
    133 S.Ct. 1678
   
   (quoting
   
    Duenas-Alvarez
   
   ,
   
    549 U.S. at 193
   
   ,
   
    127 S.Ct. 815
   
   );
   
    see also
   

    Bell
   
   ,
   
    840 F.3d at 966
   
   . I do not dispute that the relevant language from
   
    Lewis
   
   constitutes dicta, but I take that dicta to mean what it says. In Missouri, according to
   
    Lewis
   
   : "[W]here there was no physical contact, no struggle, and no injury, courts have found the evidence insufficient to support a [second-degree] robbery conviction. But where one or more of those circumstances is present, a jury reasonably could find a use of force."
   
    466 S.W.3d at 632
   
   (citation omitted). The most natural reading of this language is that "in Missouri a defendant can be convicted of second-degree robbery when he has physical contact with a victim but does not necessarily cause physical pain or injury."
   
    Bell
   
   ,
   
    840 F.3d at 966
   
   . "[T]his is not the same as concluding the force used by such a defendant is not capable of causing physical pain or injury," but it is sufficient to conclude there is a "reasonable probability" that Missouri would apply the statute to conduct that does not amount to violent force.
   

     Id.
    

   (cleaned up).
  

   Furthermore, simply because a principle has been stated in dicta does not mean that lower courts will not rely on it when assessing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument; or that prosecutors will not rely on it when making charging decisions; or that defendants and their attorneys will not rely on it when deciding whether to plead guilty or go to trial. Because I believe that
   
    Lewis
   
   's description of second-degree robbery creates a realistic probability-albeit in dicta-that it will be applied to conduct that does not involve the use or threatened use of violent force, I respectfully dissent from the court's opinion overruling
   
    Bell
   
   .