Court Opinion

ID: 9927244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 16:09:56.657857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:11.689176
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Quaker Valley School District         :
                                      :
                v.                    :      No. 1474 C.D. 2022
                                      :      ARGUED: October 10, 2023
Leet Township Zoning Hearing Board, :
Leet Township, William Jasper,        :
Michelle Antonelli, and Leet Township :
Municipal Authority                   :
                                      :
Appeal of: William Jasper and         :
Michelle Antonelli                    :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
             HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER                                FILED: January 26, 2024

             Objectors, William Jasper and Michelle Antonelli, appeal from an order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County which reversed a decision of
the Leet Township Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) that had denied Quaker Valley
School District’s (QVSD) application for a special exception. Upon review, we
affirm.
                                  I. Background
             The pertinent facts are as follows. QVSD owns approximately 108
acres of land located at 200-210 Camp Meeting Road within Leet Township’s AAA
Residence Zoning District (AAA District). ZHB’s Findings of Fact (F.F.) 3;
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 10a. The property “is situated at the top of a steep hill
consisting in part of landslide-prone Pittsburgh Red Bed clay that is common
throughout Western Pennsylvania.”                Id.    Both Objectors own property and
residences in close proximity to, and downhill from, QVSD’s property.
               A school is a use permitted by special exception in the AAA District
pursuant to Section 27-301 of the Leet Township Zoning Ordinance. Leet Twp.,
Allegheny Cnty., Pa., Zoning Ordinance § 27-301 (1978). As such, QVSD filed an
application for a special exception seeking to construct a new public high school on
the property under Township Ordinance No. 2019-02.1                       F.F. 1; R.R. at 10a.
Approximately 650 students will attend the school and about 47 of the 108 acres will
be cleared for the project. F.F. 2, 4; R.R. at 10a. While the school will be served by
only one road – Camp Meeting Road – the preliminary plans call for two access
driveways off that road and into the school. F.F. 7-8; R.R. at 11a.
               The ZHB held multiple hearings on the application between June 2021
and February 2022.2 The following witnesses testified on behalf of QVSD: licensed
professional engineer and traffic expert Charles Wooster; engineer, program
manager, and feasibility expert Jon Thomas; and licensed professional engineers
Geoffrey Phillips and Joseph Boward. QVSD submitted into evidence, among other
things, Mr. Wooster’s initial traffic impact study and rebuttal report, and Mr.
Thomas’s expert report.

       1
         On March 11, 2019, the Leet Township Board of Commissioners passed Ordinance No.
2019-02, which provides the requirements for special exceptions within the Township. See R.R.
at 35a. Ordinance No. 2019-02 repealed in its entirety and replaced former Chapter 27, Part 6 of
the Leet Township Zoning Ordinance pertaining to special exceptions. Id.

       2
          It bears noting that at multiple times during the lengthy ZHB proceedings, QVSD’s
counsel objected to the scope and subject matter of the testimony and evidence presented, arguing
that it went beyond the issue of the property’s use and the parameters of the application for special
exception, treading into development issues and details, consideration of which lies with the
Planning Commission and Township Commissioners during the project’s land development phase.
See R.R. at 28a.

                                                 2
               Objectors, who were represented by counsel, presented testimony and
evidence in opposition to the application, including the testimony and expert report
of James French, a licensed engineer and traffic expert. Numerous residents testified
throughout the hearings, some in support of the application and many in opposition.
Those opposed to the application, including Objectors, cited such concerns as
increased traffic, the steepness and poor sight lines of Camp Meeting Road,
diminution of property values, and the enhanced risk of accidents due to the volume
of teenage drivers on what Objectors characterized as an already problematic
roadway.      Objectors also voiced environmental concerns due to the proposed
leveling of the hilltop site and clear cutting of woodlands, and the risk of landslides
due to the topography and geography of the site and the blasting that would most
likely be involved during construction of the school.3
               The ZHB subsequently issued its decision denying the application for
special exception, along with findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a statement
of reasons for the decision. R.R. at 1a-34a.4 The ZHB stressed the concerns raised
“that Camp Meeting Road was already congested during times of shift changes at
nearby employers and that, with the addition of two-third[s] more student drivers
and school buses [], first responders would be delayed in reaching the school” in the
event of an emergency. R.R. at 21a. The ZHB determined that QVSD’s failure to

       3
         Leetsdale Borough initially objected to the application. As counsel for the Borough
explained during the ZHB’s October 26, 2021 public hearing, the Borough engaged in discussions
with QVSD given concerns regarding the impact the proposed school use could have on downhill
neighbors. Following these discussions, QVSD and the Borough entered into a Mutual
Cooperation Agreement (MCA) outlining various agreed-upon conditions. The Borough
subsequently withdrew its objection to the application subject to the conditions approved through
the MCA.

       4
          While not explicitly stated, it is apparent from the ZHB’s statement of reasons for decision
that it found the testimony of QVSD’s experts to be credible. See R.R. at 30a-34a.

                                                  3
implement an emergency management plan that included an emergency only road
(EOR) created substantial risks to public safety and welfare, and that such risks were
abnormal for a school use. See R.R. at 23a-24a. Among the ZHB’s findings of fact
were the following:

             10. The current high school has two roads serving it – Ohio
             River Boulevard and Beaver Street – that are available to
             first responders.
             ....

             12. First responder delays of minutes or seconds in
             reaching the school can cost students and faculty members
             their lives.
             ....

             15. No first responders or emergency management experts
             testified.
             ....

             25. Based on Mr. Wooster’s testimony, Mr. Thomas’s
             testimony, and the objectors’ testimony on the EOR issue,
             [the] ZHB determined [i]t is an abnormal risk for a school
             not to implement an emergency management plan that
             included an EOR if reasonably recommended by the first
             responders.

             26. If a public high school’s emergency management plan
             does not include an EOR reasonably recommended by first
             responders, the risks to public safety and welfare will be
             substantial, serious, highly probable and virtually certain,
             and will be abnormal for a school.

             27. On February 9, 2022, [the] ZHB made its public oral
             decision denying the application but giving QVSD [30]
             days to amend the application with regard to the EOR.

             28. Also on February 9, 2022, [the] ZHB announced [that]
             if an EOR amendment were made to the application, then
             it would convert the denial into an approval subject to the
             condition that the EOR would be implemented if and as

                                          4
            reasonably recommended by first responders, and subject
            to several other conditions involving safety measures for
            landslides, water runoff, Camp Meeting Road, insurance,
            monitoring of conditions[,] and other matters unrelated to
            the EOR.
            ....

            34. QVSD responded that it would commit to
            collaboration with first responders and to considering their
            recommendations in its plan. It stopped abruptly short of
            committing to implement the first responders’ reasonable
            recommendations concerning an EOR.

F.F. 10, 12, 15, 25-28, 34 (emphasis added); R.R. at 11a, 13a-14a. The ZHB also
issued 13 conclusions of law, including:

            2. It is an abnormal risk for a school not to implement an
            emergency management plan that included an []EOR[] if
            reasonably recommended by the first responders.

            3. If an EOR reasonably recommended by first responders
            is not implemented by []QVSD[], the risks to public safety
            and welfare would be substantial, serious, highly
            probable[,] and virtually certain.

            4. [The] Township’s special exception ordinance
            [Ordinance No. 2019-02] shifts the burden of persuasion
            in proving issues addressing risks to health, safety[,] and
            welfare from the objectors to the applicant as permitted by
            law.

            5. The EOR issue is [a] matter of health, safety[,] and
            welfare.

            6. QVSD failed to meet its burden of persuasion to prove
            that, if first responder reasonable EOR recommendations
            were not implemented, the risks would nevertheless be
            normal for a school without a resulting serious and highly
            probable risk of harm to public health, safety[,] and
            welfare.

                                           5
             7. Applicable case law does not permit a zoning hearing
             board to use a condition to rectify a failure to meet a
             burden of proof and, as a result, [the] ZHB could not
             simply grant the application with the EOR condition
             attached. Instead, it had to deny the application altogether.
             And even if [the] ZHB was mistaken about the burden
             shifting, [O]bjectors satisfied the burden of persuasion.

             8. The school will be a regular public high school with a
             normal curriculum and normal extra-curricular activities
             and sports.

Conclusions of Law (COL) 2-8 (emphasis added); R.R. at 16a-17a.
             The ZHB’s decision explains that had QVSD agreed to amend its
application to include the EOR provision, the ZHB would have approved the
application with certain conditions. R.R. at 1a. These conditions include conducting
a full watershed impact study and complying with its recommendations; naming the
downhill property owners in QVSD’s general liability insurance policy as direct
additional insureds for personal injury and property damage resulting from
landslides and water runoff caused by the project; monitoring of serious traffic
accidents on Camp Meeting Road and monitoring to check for earth movement on
the site for three years after construction of the project is completed; and
implementing all of the conditions and safeguards “recommended” by QVSD’s
experts during their testimony before the ZHB. R.R. at 1a-3a.
             QVSD appealed to the trial court, and the Township, Objectors, and the
Leet Township Municipal Authority intervened.             Without taking additional
evidence, the trial court reversed the ZHB’s decision. The trial court explained that
while the previous Ordinance provision expressly required that certain conditions be
met to grant a special exception, Ordinance No. 2019-02 does not set forth any
specific or general criteria for review of an application for special exception and

                                          6
merely requires that an application address certain topics. Trial Ct. Op. 11/28/22 at
3. As such, it was improper for the ZHB to require QVSD to include an EOR
provision in its application.
               The trial court further determined that “[t]he record lacks evidence to
support the [ZHB]’s finding that the failure to provide an [EOR] would, to a high
degree of probability, pose a substantial threat to the health, safety[,] and welfare of
the community beyond what would normally be expected by use of the [p]roperty
for a school.” Id. The ZHB incorrectly applied the burden of proof as to general
welfare because “objectors must first raise an objection showing to a high degree of
probability that the use as a school may cause a substantial harm beyond what is
normally expected, and that the impact would pose a substantial threat to the
community. This burden may not be shifted by the ordinance.” Id. at 4 (emphasis
added) [citing Bray v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 A.2d 909 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980)].
While “recogniz[ing] that implementing an emergency plan is a legitimate concern
to members of the community,” the trial court reasoned that “the [EOR] is a matter
to be addressed as part of the land development process, not zoning use approval.”
Id. at 5. Objectors now appeal to this Court.5
                                            II. Issues
               At bottom, Objectors argue that the ZHB did not commit an error of
law or abuse of discretion in reaching its decision and, therefore, the trial court’s

       5
         The ZHB filed a notice of non-participation with the Court on May 9, 2023. In addition,
the Court issued an order precluding the Township and the Leet Township Municipal Authority
from filing briefs and participating in oral argument given their failure to file briefs in compliance
with previous orders. As such, Objectors, William Jasper and Michelle Antonelli, are the only
remaining appellants participating in this matter.

                                                  7
order should be reversed.6 The specific issues identified by Objectors can be
distilled to the following: (1) whether Ordinance No. 2019-02 imposes any specific
criteria that must be met to grant an application for a special exception; (2) whether
Ordinance No. 2019-02 shifts the burden from Objectors to QVSD regarding issues
affecting the health, safety, and welfare of the community; (3) whether the parties
met their respective burdens; and (4) even if the trial court correctly held that the
ZHB erred or abused its discretion in denying QVSD’s application for a special
exception, whether the trial court erred by granting the application without imposing
the conditions that the ZHB would otherwise have imposed, including the EOR. See
Objectors’ Br. at 7-8.
                                         III. Analysis
               As for the first issue raised by Objectors, “the primary objective of
interpreting ordinances is to determine the intent of the legislative body that [passed]
the ordinance. In pursuing that end, we are mindful that a statute’s plain language
generally provides the best indication of legislative intent.” Tri-Cnty. Landfill, Inc.
v. Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 83 A.3d 488, 509 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citations
omitted). Moreover,

               [t]he rules of statutory construction are applicable to
               statutes and ordinances alike. One of the primary rules of
               statutory construction is that an ordinance must be
               construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions.
               An interpretation of an ordinance which produces an
               absurd result is contrary to the rules of statutory
               construction.

       6
        Where, as in the present case, “the trial court does not take additional evidence, our scope
of review is limited to determining whether the zoning board committed an error of law or a
manifest abuse of discretion. A zoning board abuses its discretion only if its findings are not
supported by substantial evidence.” Siya Real Est. LLC v. Allentown City Zoning Hearing Bd.,
210 A.3d 1152, 1156 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quotations omitted).

                                                 8
In re Thompson, 896 A.2d 659, 669 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
             We begin, as we must, with the plain language of Ordinance No. 2019-
02 and its predecessor. As mentioned in footnote one, supra, in 2019 the Township
repealed and replaced former Chapter 27, Part 6 of the Ordinance pertaining to
special exceptions with the current Ordinance No. 2019-02. The relevant repealed
provision of the Ordinance expressly required that certain conditions be met. It
stated, in pertinent part: “The following additional requirements must be met for the
granting of a [s]pecial [e]xception.” QVSD’s Br. at 10, Appendix A (emphasis
added). The ordinance applicable here, Ordinance No. 2019-02, in contrast, contains
no such express language. Instead, under the heading “procedures for approval,” it
provides as follows:

             2. Approval of uses by special exception. The Z[HB] shall
             hear and decide requests for uses by special exception.
             The Z[HB] shall not approve an application for a use by
             special exception unless and until:

                   A. A written application for approval of a use by
             special exception is submitted to the Township. The
             application shall indicate the section of this chapter under
             which approval of the use by special exception is sought
             and shall state the grounds upon which it is requested. The
             application shall include the following . . . .

R.R. at 38a. Ordinance No. 2019-02 then lists 13 items to be included in an
application for special exception, such as a current property survey, the application
fee, and a traffic impact study when appropriate. R.R. at 38a-39a. What Ordinance
No. 2019-02 does not include is express criteria which must be considered by the
ZHB when reviewing an application for special exception.
             Importantly, Ordinance No. 2019-02 also contains several subsections
devoted to particular special exception uses – such as motels, gasoline stations and

                                          9
automobile dealerships, and mobile home parks – and enumerates very specific
criteria that are to be considered for each use. For example, subsection 2 states that
motels are permitted in certain zoning districts provided that 8 express requirements
are met, including that no part of the building exceeds 2 stories, no more than 40%
of the ground area on the lot is occupied by buildings, and no building is set nearer
than 50 feet to the front, side, and rear lot lines, etc. R.R. at 40a-41a. Importantly,
a school is not one of the uses for which explicit conditions are delineated.
              Given the plain language of Ordinance No. 2019-02 – which was
enacted by the Township within the last five years and which removed the explicit
conditioning language of the former Ordinance provision – as well as the absence of
a particular subsection discussing a school use, we must agree with the trial court
that there simply are no specific requirements for the granting of a special exception
for a school use. Unless the proposed special exception use is one for which there
is a subsection enumerating express criteria, Ordinance No. 2019-02 merely
provides what must be included in an application before it can be considered by the
ZHB.7
              The remaining issues Objectors raise concern where the burdens lie
with respect to the general criteria of detriment to health, safety, and public welfare,
and whether those burdens have been met. Objectors point to subsection 2.D of
Ordinance No. 2019-02, which states:

              D. In proceedings involving a request for a use by special
              exception, both the duty of initially presenting evidence
              and the burden of persuading the Z[HB] that the proposed
              use is available by special exception and satisfies the
              specific or objective requirements for the grant of a use by

       7
         There is no allegation that the application was in any way deficient. Further, it is
undisputed that Ordinance No. 2019-02 does not mention an EOR.

                                             10
             special exception as set forth in this chapter rest upon the
             applicant. The burden of persuading the Z[HB] that the
             proposed use will not offend general public interest, such
             as the health, safety[,] and welfare of the neighborhood,
             rests upon the applicant.

R.R. at 39a (emphasis added). Objectors maintain that the explicit language of
subsection 2.D places the burden of persuasion regarding health, safety, and welfare
on QVSD as the applicant, not on Objectors, and that QVSD failed to meet this
burden.    In support of their argument, they cite this Court’s decisions in
Elizabethtown/Mt. Joy Associates, L.P. v. Mount Joy Township Zoning Hearing
Board, 934 A.2d 759, 764 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), and Greaton Properties, Inc. v.
Lower Merion Township, 796 A.2d 1038, 1046 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Objectors’
argument, however, glosses over the preliminary issue of whether they met their own
evidence presentation burden.
             As we have repeatedly explained, despite its name, “[a] special
exception is not an exception to the zoning ordinance, but rather a use to which the
applicant is entitled provided the specific standards enumerated in the ordinance . . .
are met[.]” In re Thompson, 896 A.2d at 670. See also Greaton, 796 A.2d at 1045.
Generally, “an applicant for a special exception has both the duty of presenting
evidence and the burden of persuading the board that his proposed use satisfies the
objective [or specific] requirements of the zoning ordinance for the grant of a special
exception.” Siya Real Est. LLC v. Allentown City Zoning Hearing Bd., 210 A.3d
1152, 1157 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). Once the
applicant meets its burden of proof and persuasion regarding the objective
requirements, “a presumption arises that [] the proposed use [] is consistent with the
health, safety[,] and general welfare of the community.” Id. (quotation omitted). As
explained above, there are no objective requirements for a special exception within

                                          11
Ordinance No. 2019-02. Therefore, it is presumed that QVSD’s proposed use of the
property as a school is consistent with the health, safety, and general welfare of the
community. “The burden then normally shifts to the objectors to the application to
present evidence and persuade the [zoning hearing] board[] that the proposed use
will have a generally detrimental effect on health, safety, and welfare.”          Id.
(quotation omitted). See also Marr Dev. Mifflinville, LLC v. Mifflin Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 166 A.3d 479, 483 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc).
             Objectors correctly assert that, in some instances, the express language
of a zoning ordinance can alter the parties’ respective burdens in the context of an
application for special exception. See, e.g., Siya, 210 A.3d at 1157; Bray, 410 A.2d
at 912-13. However, regarding general detriment to the health, safety, and welfare
of the community, this Court has repeatedly explained that the express terms of an
ordinance “can place the burden on the applicant but cannot shift the duty.” Siya,
210 A.3d at 1157 (citations omitted). Stated differently,

             [w]here, as here, [] the ordinance specifically places the
             burden on the applicant to show that the proposed use will
             not have a detrimental effect, the applicant only retains
             the burden of persuasion. Objectors still retain the
             initial presentation burden with respect to the general
             matter of the detriment to health[,] safety, and general
             welfare.

Greaton, 796 A.2d at 1046 (emphasis added) [citing Manor Healthcare Corp. v.
Lower Moreland Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 590 A.2d 65, 70 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991)].
See also Siya, 210 A.3d at 1160; Bray, 410 A.2d at 912 (“The objectors have the
initial evidence presentation duty with respect to the general matter of detriment to
health, safety[,] and general welfare, even if the ordinance has expressly placed the

                                         12
persuasion burden upon the applicant, where it remains if detriment is identified.”)
(emphasis added).
               Here, the ZHB correctly determined that the language of subsection 2.D
of Ordinance No. 2019-02 shifts the burden of persuasion to QVSD with respect to
the health, safety, and general welfare of the community. See R.R. at 39a. However,
this determination is of no moment here as Objectors retain the initial evidence
presentation duty in this regard, a duty which cannot be shifted by a zoning
ordinance. See, e.g., Siya; Greaton; Bray.8
               This initial “burden placed on the objectors is a heavy one.” Marr Dev.
Mifflinville, LLC, 166 A.3d at 483. Crucial to the present matter, “[t]he evidence
presented by objectors must show, to a high degree of probability, that the use will
generate adverse impacts not normally generated by this type of use and that these
impacts will pose a substantial threat to the health and safety of the community.”
Siya, 210 A.3d at 1157 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re
Thompson, 896 A.2d at 679 (citing Manor Healthcare Corp.). Moreover, the
“[o]bjectors must demonstrate more than unsubstantiated concerns or vague
generalities, and mere speculation as to possible harm is insufficient.” Siya, 210
A.3d at 1160 (quotation omitted).
               Again, Ordinance No. 2019-02 contains no objective criteria for a
special exception and, therefore, a presumption arose that QVSD’s proposed use is
consistent with the health, safety, and general welfare of the community. As such,
Objectors bore the initial burden of rebutting this presumption. If, and only if,

       8
          Despite Objectors’ argument, the trial court did not hold that a zoning ordinance cannot
shift the burden of persuasion. To the contrary, the trial court properly stated and applied the
parties’ respective burdens here in keeping with both Ordinance No. 2019-02 and our courts’
precedent.

                                               13
Objectors satisfied this initial hurdle would the burden then shift to QVSD. See,
e.g., Siya; Bray.
               The crux of the ZHB’s decision, truly the singular reason for its denial,9
is the fact that QVSD’s application for a special exception does not include an EOR
for access to the school in case of an emergency. Specifically, the ZHB found: “If a
public high school’s emergency management plan does not include an EOR
reasonably recommended by first responders, the risks to public safety and welfare
will be substantial, serious, highly probable and virtually certain, and will be
abnormal for a school.” F.F. 26; R.R. at 13a (emphasis added).10 We agree with the
trial court that the record lacks substantial evidence to support this determination.
               First, the ZHB’s holding is premised purely on speculation as “[n]o first
responders or emergency management experts testified,” F.F. 15; R.R. at 11a, let
alone recommended that failure to include an EOR presented an abnormal risk for a

       9
          Indeed, the ZHB found that Objectors did not prevail on their assertions that the increased
traffic, water-runoff, and landslide potential due to QVSD’s proposed school use presented an
abnormal risk for this type of use, or that the risk of serious injury to the public was “highly
probable or a virtual certainty.” R.R. at 31a; see also R.R. at 30a. We discern no error in this
regard.
         By way of brief explanation, Objectors testified generally about the potential for more
accidents given the topography of Camp Meeting Road and the increased numbers of young,
inexperienced drivers that would frequent the roadway. “However, ‘an increase in traffic is
generally not grounds for denial of a special exception unless there is a high probability that the
proposed use will generate traffic not normally generated by that type of use and that the abnormal
traffic threatens safety.” Marr Dev. Mifflinville, LLC, 166 A.3d at 484 [quoting Accelerated
Enters., Inc. v. The Hazle Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 773 A.2d 824, 827 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)].
Objectors’ speculative testimony regarding teenage drivers fails to meet this standard and, at all
events, would apply to any ordinary high school. Their general concerns regarding potential
increased risk of landslides and water-runoff issues suffer the same deficiency.

       10
         See also COL 2; R.R. at 16a (“It is an abnormal risk for a school not to implement an
emergency management plan that included an []EOR[] if reasonably recommended by the first
responders.”).

                                                14
proposed school use. Objectors’ assertion that the testimony of QVSD’s own
witnesses supports the ZHB’s determination regarding an EOR is simply without
merit. To the contrary, our review of the record reveals that QVSD’s witnesses
clearly stated they had not consulted any first responders or emergency management
experts when preparing their reports. Moreover, QVSD’s witnesses reiterated time
and again that the site and proposed plan is safe, there is nothing unique about Camp
Meeting Road, and they do not have any additional concerns for neighboring
property owners above and beyond those normally inherent when a new school is
built.11 As QVSD’s witnesses also explained, the ZHB’s finding is premature since
we are not at the land development stage and an emergency management plan for
the proposed school has yet to be developed. See In re Thompson, 896 A.2d at 670
(noting well established principle that special exceptions involve only the proposed
use of land, not the particular details of the design and development).
               Further undermining the ZHB’s determination is its own conclusion,
which is amply supported by the record, that QVSD’s proposed “school will be a
regular public high school with a normal curriculum and normal extra-curricular
activities and sports.” COL 8; R.R. at 17a. Such a conclusion is directly at odds
with the ZHB’s ultimate decision. The conclusion also prevents Objectors from

       11
            See, e.g., Notes of Testimony (N.T.) 8/20/21 at 17 (testimony of licensed professional
engineer Geoffrey Phillips that the site can be safely developed as a school); N.T. 7/15/21 at 76
(testimony of traffic expert Charles Wooster that the traffic generated from this school would not
be any greater than the traffic that would be expected from any other typical high school); id. at
184 (testimony of Mr. Wooster: “I wouldn’t say there is anything that unique about [] this
location.”); id. at 198-99 (testimony of Mr. Wooster indicating he does not have any additional
concerns for neighboring property owners above and beyond those normally inherent when a new
school is built); id. at 203 (opinion of Mr. Wooster that when and if QVSD’s proposed school is
built, Camp Meeting Road will not be materially more dangerous or materially more inconvenient
than it is now).

                                               15
meeting their evidence presentation burden, that QVSD’s proposed school use will
generate adverse impacts not normally generated by this type of use.
             Simply put, there is no evidence in the record that an EOR is required,
let alone that failure to provide an EOR will, to a high degree of probability, generate
adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare not normally generated by a
school use. See Siya, 210 A.3d at 1157. Objectors’ testimony and evidence
“amounted to allegations of mere possibilities and fell far short of the high degree
of probability standard necessary to sustain” their heavy burden of going forward.
Manor Healthcare Corp., 590 A.2d at 71. Therefore, the burden never switched to
QVSD and the ZHB abused its discretion in determining otherwise. See id. at 70.
             Finally, Objectors argue that even if the trial court correctly held that
the ZHB erred in denying QVSD’s application for a special exception, the trial court
should have imposed the conditions the ZHB would have required for the proposed
school use. Objectors maintain that the ZHB was well within its authority to place
conditions on approval of the special exception as subsection 2.E of Ordinance No.
2019-02 states: “In considering an application for approval of a use by special
exception, the Z[HB] may prescribe appropriate conditions and safeguards in
conformity with the spirit and intent of this article.” R.R. at 39a.
             Objectors’ argument neglects the remainder of subsection 2.E of
Ordinance No. 2019-02, which states: “A violation of such conditions and
safeguards, when made a part of the terms and conditions under which approval of
a use by special exception is granted, shall be deemed a violation of this chapter.”
Id.   Objectors similarly fail to address Section 912.1 of the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code, which provides that “[i]n granting a special
exception, the [zoning hearing] board may attach such reasonable conditions and

                                          16
safeguards, in addition to those expressed in the ordinance, as it may deem necessary
to implement the purposes of this act and the zoning ordinance.” Act of July 31,
1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by Section 91 of the Act of December 21, 1988,
P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10912.1. Here, the ZHB obviously denied QVSD’s application
for a special exception. Moreover, the conditions it would have imposed were
premised upon QVSD amending its application to include an EOR, among other
things, not on the application that was currently before it. As such, the conditions
the ZHB theoretically would have imposed if QVSD had amended its application
and if the ZHB had granted the application are a legal nullity.
             In addition, the conditions themselves seem to constitute development
issues rather than zoning use issues. As stated earlier, it is well established that
“[s]pecial exception . . . proceedings involve only the proposed use of the land, and
do not involve the particular details of the design of the proposed development.” In
re Thompson, 896 A.2d at 670 [citing Schatz v. New Britain Twp. Zoning Hearing
Bd. of Adjustment, 596 A.2d 294, 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (“Zoning only regulates
the use of land and not the particulars of development and construction.”) (emphasis
in original)]. As such, the specific details regarding development and construction
outlined in the ZHB’s proposed conditions should be addressed further along in the
land development and permitting process. See Elizabethtown/Mt. Joy, 934 A.2d at
768 (citing Schatz). Simply, the ZHB’s proposed conditions do not relate to
requirements under the Ordinance, but instead are essentially the ZHB’s attempt to
control development issues.

                                         17
                                  IV. Conclusion
             In sum, we agree with the trial court that the ZHB’s decision,
specifically the determination regarding an EOR, was based on speculation and is
not supported by substantial record evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

                                       _____________________________________
                                       BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                       President Judge Emerita

                                         18
       IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Quaker Valley School District         :
                                      :
                v.                    :   No. 1474 C.D. 2022
                                      :
Leet Township Zoning Hearing Board, :
Leet Township, William Jasper,        :
Michelle Antonelli, and Leet Township :
Municipal Authority                   :
                                      :
Appeal of: William Jasper and         :
Michelle Antonelli                    :

                                 ORDER

            AND NOW, this 26th day of January, 2024, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County is AFFIRMED.

                                    _____________________________________
                                    BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                    President Judge Emerita