Court Opinion

ID: 9719899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:08:28.552283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:11.017832
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I am nonetheless in disagreement with both the route taken by the majority to reach that conclusion and the width of the path the majority elects to traverse. Accordingly, I write separately to indicate *93my views, which are somewhat more constrained than those of the majority.
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“[I]t is well settled in Michigan that, ‘[constitutional questions will not be passed upon when other decisive questions are raised by the record which dispose of the case.’ ” Lisee v Secretary of State, 388 Mich 32, 40-41; 199 NW2d 188 (1972), quoting People v Quider, 172 Mich 280, 288-289; 137 NW 546 (1912). This longstanding rule requires us to consider constitutional questions only as a last resort, and to avoid such questions where a nonconstitutional basis exists for resolving the matter. The case before us presents the question whether defendant’s presidential search procedure violated the Open Meetings Act (oma). Long before we need consider the constitutionality of the OMA, we must first logically address the question actually before us, i.e., whether the search in fact violated the OMA.
I am in agreement with the reasoning and rationale of Justice Kelly’s dissent with respect to this issue, and concur, for the reasons stated in her opinion, with her finding that the OMA was indeed violated by the search proceeding undertaken by defendant. Accordingly, from this point, and not before, I am required to proceed with an analysis of the constitutional question.1
*94n
In regard to the resolution of this constitutional question, I find persuasive the language and history of Const 1963, art 8, § 4. 2 As noted by the majority, a review of the official record regarding this provision would tend to indicate that the framers considered that, where they were constitutionally creating a number of additional university governing boards, they should constitutionally include a provision opening the formal meetings to the public.3 The obvious logic of this is that the framers thought that such an opening would need to be made constitutionally. Were that the case, a provision such as the oma, enacted by the Legislature, would be insufficient to forcibly open a meeting of the board of a constitutional university. Further, where the framers have determined that only formal sessions of the board need be open, it would appear both that the defendant board complied with the constitutional provisions, and that an attempt to apply the OMA to force further openings of sessions *95that were less than formal sessions of the board would be constitutionally prohibited.
Accordingly, I am able to agree with the majority that, when applied to the facts of this case, the oma unconstitutionally invades the province of the defendant board to hold less than formal meetings in a closed setting. Because I am not persuaded of the need to rule on issues not directly before us, I would proceed no further.
Thus, I dissent from the majority’s failure to ascertain whether the oma was violated by defendant’s actions, and from the majority’s departure from our longstanding rule of judicial restraint regarding constitutional questions. For the reasons stated in Justice Kelly’s opinion on this issue, however, I find defendant’s actions to have violated the oma, and thus would address the constitutional question. Given the language and history of Const 1963, art 8, § 4, it appears that the framers constitutionally required formal meetings of university governing boards to be open, and by this action indicated that meetings of a less than formal nature could be held in a closed setting. The existence of these constitutional parameters leads to the conclusion that a less than constitutional attempt to invade the province of these provisions (i.e., a legislative enactment such as the OMA) must fail. Accordingly, I join in the result, but only a portion of the reasoning, of the majority on this issue.

 Traditionally, we have, as noted above, exhibited a- great reluctance to resolve constitutional questions, and done so only when that was clearly required. Respect for both our constitution and the acts of our Legislature, as well as concepts of judicial restraint, demand no less. The majority appears to act under the theory that the constitutionality of the oma is relevant to whether the Legislature has the power to legislate in a particu*94lar area. Of course this is true. The majority’s theory strays, however, in implying we should thus inquire about the constitutionality of an act before considering its effects, since, if it is unconstitutional, it must have no effect. This truism hardly justifies the underlying suggestion, which would, effectively, replace our longstanding rules of judicial restraint and constitutional reluctance with a mandate to address constitutional questions as a preliminary matter of statutory construction. I both challenge the need for such an approach and fear the results of such unwarranted zeal.

 I specifically do not rely on In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich 660; 255 NW2d 635 (1977), because I find the opinion, which dealt with the interrelation of the judicial and legislative branches, to be distinguishable. Given my reliance on the language of Const 1963, art 8, § 4, I need not reach any question regarding the applicability of our decisions concerning separate branches of government to university boards.

 See 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1187, quoted by the majority ante at 90.