Court Opinion

ID: 9892892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 14:10:22.0606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:58.111108
License: Public Domain

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22-P-705                                              Appeals Court

               COMMONWEALTH    vs.   CHRISTOPHER CONLEY.

                              No. 22-P-705.

           Hampshire.       July 6, 2023. - October 25, 2023.

                 Present:    Sacks, Shin, & Grant, JJ.

Attempt. Homicide. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous
     Weapon. Assault and Battery. Evidence, Expert opinion,
     Prior misconduct, Motive, Intent, Admissions and
     confessions, Court record, Prior consistent statement,
     Cross-examination. Practice, Criminal, Assistance of
     Counsel, Admissions and confessions, Continuance, Failure
     to object, Argument by prosecutor. Witness, Expert.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on August 11, 2015.

     The cases were tried before Richard J. Carey, J., and a
motion for a new trial, filed on November 30, 2021, was heard by
him.

     MarySita Miles for the defendant.
     Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

    SACKS, J.     In 2015, the defendant confessed to having tried

to kill his seven year old daughter, who had complex medical
                                                                    2

problems, by putting "Liquid Plumr" drain cleaner into a tube

surgically connected to her large intestine.   The defendant was

indicted in 2015 for attempted murder (G. L. c. 265, § 16),

assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon on a child

(G. L. c. 265, § 15A [c] [iv]), and assault and battery on a

child causing substantial bodily injury (G. L. c. 265, § 13J).

Despite recanting his confession at his 2020 Superior Court jury

trial, he was convicted on all charges.

    The defendant now appeals, arguing principally that the

trial judge abused his discretion in (1) excluding the testimony

of the defendant's expert on false confessions; (2) admitting

evidence that, in the defendant's 2015 confession, he also

acknowledged intentionally causing his daughter's blood

infections in 2009 by dipping part of her central line in stool;

and (3) excluding evidence that, shortly before the 2015

confession, the defendant told his attorney in a related care

and protection case brought by the Department of Children and

Families (DCF) that he "didn't do it" but was going to confess

because "this is what we do for our family."   The defendant also

appeals from the judge's order denying his motion for a new

trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel.   We affirm.
                                                                   3

     Background.   The jury heard evidence that the defendant's

daughter, M.C.,1 had complex medical conditions that, among other

things, interfered with her feeding normally.   As of 2009, M.C.

had a total parenteral nutrition (TPN) central line inserted

through her chest.   In March of 2009, when she was seventeen

months old, she was admitted to the intensive care unit at Tufts

Medical Center and treated by Dr. H. Cody Meissner for unusual

blood infections related to the TPN line.

     Dr. Meissner believed that the infections were caused by

several types of bacteria found in M.C.'s bloodstream that were

ordinarily found in the gastrointestinal tract -- a separate,

contained system -- and in stool.   His "strong suspicion was

that the tip of [M.C.'s] catheter was being placed in stool"; he

could not think of any other medical explanation.   He was "very

worried that something was going on with this family," and,

indeed, the "infections stopped when [M.C.] was separated from

the family."   Based on suspicions that someone was tampering

with M.C.'s TPN line, DCF became involved and filed its first

petition for the care and protection of M.C.    She was removed

     1 See Care & Protection of M.C., 479 Mass. 246, 250 & n.1
(2018), S.C., 483 Mass. 444 (2019).
                                                                   4

from the custody of the defendant and his wife2 (M.C.'s mother)

for eighteen months but was ultimately returned to them.

     By late 2014, when M.C. was seven years old, Dr. Doruk

Ozgediz, a pediatric surgeon at Yale New Haven Hospital (YNHH),

had implanted a cecostomy tube (C-tube) directly into her

digestive tract.   The C-tube provided access to M.C.'s cecum

(the upper part of her large intestine) so that it could be

irrigated regularly with saline solution to relieve her severe

constipation.

     On the morning of April 15, 2015, the defendant stayed home

with M.C. while the defendant's wife went to a school meeting

from 8 A.M. to 9 A.M.     School records later confirmed her

attendance at the meeting, and employment records later

confirmed that the defendant arrived at work at 9:30 A.M. that

day, which was later than usual, and then left again at noon.

     That afternoon, the defendant and his wife brought M.C. to

YNHH with a high fever.    M.C. was readmitted and seen by

Dr. Ozgediz for a fever with rigors (shaking of the body) and

abdominal distension causing mild discomfort; her vital signs

were relatively normal.    Her condition remained similar until

April 17, when she became critically ill, with signs of

     2 Sometime between his 2015 confession and his 2020 trial,
the defendant and his wife apparently divorced. For convenience
we refer to her as "wife" throughout.
                                                                     5

perforation of her intestines.    Dr. Ozgediz performed surgery on

M.C. and discovered that segments of her intestines "had

essentially liquified and melted and had holes in them and were

leaking fluid."   He found that the portions of M.C.'s intestines

immediately adjacent to the C-tube, including the cecum itself,

were "essentially . . . dead"; two-thirds of her intestinal

tract had to be removed.    Her life was in danger.   Dr. Ozgediz

found no sign of any blood supply problem, infection, or tissue

adhesion that could have caused the intestines to die, nor did

the pathology results from the tissue and fluid show any clear

cause.

    M.C. initially recovered well from her surgery, but a week

and a half later, fluid began to leak into her abdominal cavity.

Further tests revealed that the fluid was urine, coming from a

substantial hole in her bladder -- a condition that Dr. Ozgediz

had never seen before.     M.C.'s bladder necrosis was unusual,

extending to a third or more of her bladder, with a clear line

between the necrotic tissue and the healthy tissue.     This, and

the lack of any medical explanation for the damage to the

intestines or bladder, led Dr. Ozgediz to conclude that he was

"a hundred percent certain" that the cause was a "chemical

injury."   He further concluded that a caustic substance had been

introduced through the C-tube into the intestines.     It had
                                                                    6

burned its way out of the intestines into the abdominal cavity,

and from there into the bladder, over the course of a few days.

     Shortly thereafter, on May 6, 2015, Dr. Ozgediz and others

from the YNHH care team met with DCF, police, and a prosecutor

to discuss their suspicions that the defendant and his wife had

deliberately caused M.C.'s injuries.    DCF then filed a second

care and protection petition and informed the defendant and his

wife that it was taking custody of M.C.    That same day, a search

warrant was executed on their home seeking items including a

caustic substance such as drain cleaner; police found

prescription opioids, saline solution, and sixty cubic

centimeter (60 cc) plungers, but no drain cleaner.

     Two days later, on May 8, 2015, the defendant met with the

attorney appointed to represent him in the care and protection

case.    Although, as explained infra, the jury heard no evidence

of it, the defendant told the attorney, "I am going to give the

[d]istrict [a]ttorney a confession.    I didn't do it.   But this

is what we do for our family."3

     On May 20, 2015, the defendant, at his own request, met

with a State police trooper working with the district attorney's

     3 More than three years later, and assertedly with the
defendant's permission, the attorney submitted to a recorded
interview with police in which she related the defendant's
statement and said that she had taken careful notes of the
conversation.
                                                                     7

office.    In a recorded interview played at trial, the defendant

told the trooper that on the morning of April 15, while his wife

was at the school meeting, he used a 60 cc plunger to inject

M.C.'s C-tube with Liquid Plumr, saline solution, and extra pain

medicine.     His goal was "to kill her" in order to "put her out

of her misery."    Pressed on whether his wife was also involved,

he insisted that she was not.    The defendant further stated that

when M.C. was hospitalized at Tufts Medical Center in 2009, he

had tried to "end it for her" in the course of a diaper change

by dipping part of her TPN line in her stool and then

reconnecting it.

    At his 2020 trial, however, the defendant testified that

this confession was false and that he had confessed only so

"that [DCF] would focus on [him] and the DCF would back off of

[his] wife and that [his] daughter could go back to her mom.

And that way, [M.C.] would grow up with . . . one parent rather

than none."    The defendant also introduced expert evidence that

60 cc of Liquid Plumr could have produced a reaction for only

fifteen minutes, a much shorter time than what Dr. Ozgediz

posited.    Further, two pathologists testified that M.C.'s

injuries were caused not by a caustic agent but by loss of blood

circulation to portions of her intestines and bladder.

    Discussion.     1.   Expert testimony on false confessions.

The defendant first argues that the judge abused his discretion
                                                                   8

in allowing the Commonwealth's motion to exclude the testimony

of Alan Hirsch, an attorney and professor at Williams College,

who would have testified about the existence of false

confessions and the factors that would lead someone to make a

false confession.   The defendant asserts that the judge too

strictly applied the Daubert-Lanigan4 factors to the social

science behind Hirsch's testimony.

     The Daubert-Lanigan standard requires that expert testimony

"rest[] on a reliable foundation" and be "relevant to the task

at hand" (quotation omitted).   Commonwealth v. Hinds, 487 Mass.

212, 217–218 (2021).   The factors bearing on reliability are

"whether the scientific theory or process (1) has been generally

accepted in the relevant scientific community; (2) has been, or

can be, subjected to testing; (3) has been subjected to peer

review and publication; (4) has an unacceptably high known or

potential rate of error; and (5) is governed by recognized

standards."   Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 238 (2007).

See Hinds, supra at 221.   But "[n]ot all of the factors . . .

will be applicable in every case" (quotation and citation

omitted), and there are "methodological distinctions that divide

. . . hard sciences" from "soft" sciences, i.e., social

     4 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
585-595 (1993); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 25-26
(1994).
                                                                        9

sciences.   Hinds, supra at 222.    "[A]pplication of the Daubert-

Lanigan standard to soft sciences requires flexibility with

special attention being paid to the criteria of reliability that

different disciplines develop."     Id., citing Canavan's Case, 432

Mass. 304, 314 n.5 (2000).

    "Whether the methodology applied by the expert satisfies

gatekeeper reliability is a preliminary question of fact," and

we review the judge's determination for abuse of discretion.

Hinds, supra at 218.   "[O]ur review under this standard is

deferential and limited, [but] it is not perfunctory.       A judge's

findings must apply the correct legal standard to the facts of

the case and must be supported by an examination of the record"

(quotation and citation omitted).    Id.   See generally L.L. v.

Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014) (abuse of

discretion is "clear error of judgment in weighing" relevant

factors such that "decision falls outside the range of

reasonable alternatives").

    Here, at a voir dire hearing, Hirsch testified that he had

a law degree but no education or training in psychology or

psychiatry.    His principal expertise was in interrogation

methods.    He asserted that false confessions occur with

"surprising frequency," but he could not estimate their
                                                                   10

frequency in numerical terms.5   He identified three types of

false confessions:   (1) "the coerced-compliant false confession

in which a suspect under interrogative pressure concludes that

the best or only way of getting out of a despairing situation is

to confess"; (2) "the internalized false confession, which is

also typically in an interrogation situation, where the suspect

actually comes to believe that he committed the crime or may

have, even though he did not"; and (3) "the voluntary false

confession . . . [involving] someone who will come forth either

completely outside of an interrogative situation or without any

interrogative pressure and claim to have committed a crime that

he did not."   See generally Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass.

395, 415 n.10 (2014) (noting these types of false confessions).

Only the third category, voluntary false confessions, was

asserted to be relevant here.

     Hirsch explained that voluntary false confessions could be

motivated by a desire for notoriety in high-profile cases, the

desire to protect another person, mental illness, or feelings of

guilt about other crimes.   Hirsch testified that voluntary false

confessions to protect another had been seen "anecdotally" but

that he had "no idea about the[ir] frequency."   Neither Hirsch

     5 The closest he came was to cite a study in which six
hundred professional investigators had been asked how often they
thought innocent suspects confessed falsely during
interrogation; the average of their estimates was 4.78 percent.
                                                                   11

nor any other researcher had ever conducted a study focused on

this type of false confession.    In answer to the judge's

question about how his testimony could assist the jury in this

case, Hirsch said that false confessions are "deeply

counterintuitive" and difficult for lay people to understand, so

he would explain that they were "surprisingly frequent" and that

"protecting someone is something that is in the literature."

    In allowing the Commonwealth's motion to exclude Hirsch's

testimony, the judge found that "his published scholarly works

are few [and] not recent."    Moreover, although voluntary false

confessions to protect another had been mentioned in "some

'literature,'" Hirsch neither had conducted nor knew of any

study focused on this type of confession.    "Nothing presented in

the voir dire hearing show[ed] that Hirsch's proposed testimony

[about this type of false confession] [was] based on principles

and methods that are generally accepted in the relevant

scientific community or that they have otherwise been shown to

be reliable or valid."

    The judge also considered Hoose, 467 Mass. at 413-420,

where the court affirmed the exclusion of a defendant's

proffered expert testimony on false confessions in connection

with interrogations.     In the course of doing so, the Hoose court

observed that such testimony might be found sufficiently

reliable to be admissible in a future case "where several of the
                                                                    12

false confession factors thus far identified are present."       Id.

at 420.   See id. at 415 n.11, 418 (discussing factors including

impaired mental or physical condition, police use of false

evidence or offers of leniency, and social isolation).     The

judge concluded that because none of those factors was present

here, the defendant's reliance on Hoose was unavailing.6

     We see no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision.

Hirsch offered no reliable information or even an opinion on how

often voluntary false confessions to protect another occur (as

opposed to other types of false confessions) or on what factors

might make them more likely.   Although in the social science

context we pay "special attention . . . to the criteria of

reliability that different disciplines develop," Hinds, 487

Mass. at 222, Hirsch did not describe, nor does the defendant

identify, any reliability criteria that any relevant discipline

has developed regarding Hirsch's proposed testimony.     Further,

as the judge's discussion of Hoose suggested, testimony about

other types of false confessions would have been of dubious

relevance here.

     6 We add that Hoose, involving a confession after
interrogation, did not focus on whether the factors discussed
therein would necessarily be relevant in a case, like this one,
of an assertedly false voluntary confession made to protect
another.
                                                                      13

      2.    Prior bad act evidence.    The defendant next argues that

the judge abused his discretion in admitting evidence that the

defendant had intentionally caused M.C.'s TPN line infections in

2009.      The defendant also argues that, once the judge decided to

admit that prior bad act evidence, he further abused his

discretion by denying two defense motions aimed at countering

it.   None of these arguments persuades us.

      a.    2009 bad acts.   The defendant filed a motion in limine

to exclude (1) the part of his 2015 confession in which he

admitted causing M.C.'s infections in 2009 by dipping her TPN

line in stool at Tufts Medical Center, and (2) Dr. Meissner's

testimony that M.C.'s 2009 infections were likely caused by

dipping her TPN line in stool.7       The Commonwealth argued in

opposition that the 2009 evidence was probative of whether the

defendant, as he had confessed before recanting, put Liquid

Plumr into M.C.'s C-tube in 2015.       The judge agreed, ruling that

the 2009 evidence was "highly probative of his intent, motive,

knowledge and opportunity that, six years earlier, he introduced

a harmful substance into his daughter's medical tubing with the

      7On cross-examination, Dr. Meissner acknowledged having
previously testified in the 2009 care and protection case that
he had no opinion on whether the bacteria found in M.C.'s
bloodstream had been intentionally introduced by another person.
Even if the defendant had argued this point in support of his
motion in limine, it went only to the weight of Dr. Meissner's
testimony, not its admissibility.
                                                                  14

intent to kill her."   The judge further considered whether the

probative value was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice;

concluding that it was not, he denied the defendant's motion in

limine.8

     Evidence of other bad acts is inadmissible to prove the

defendant's "bad character or propensity to commit the crime

charged, but such evidence may be admissible if relevant for

some other purpose . . . , such as to show a common scheme,

pattern of operation, absence of accident or mistake, identity,

intent, or motive" (citations omitted).   Commonwealth v.

Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986).   Even if relevant for one of

these purposes, such evidence "will not be admitted if its

probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to

the defendant."   Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249

     8 At the time the evidence was admitted, the judge
instructed the jury about the limited purposes for which it
could be considered, including for the existence of a "pattern
of conduct." Although the defendant did not object at the time,
it appears that he did so when later reviewing a draft of the
judge's final charge. In response, the judge altered the charge
and emphatically instructed the jury to disregard, as erroneous,
his previous mentions of a pattern of conduct. On appeal, the
defendant argues for the first time that the final instruction
was insufficient to cure the asserted harm flowing from the
earlier instructions. We see no reason not to presume that the
jury followed the final instruction; if there was any error, we
see no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 587 (2005) (where
curative instruction is requested and given, party believing it
insufficient must object, or issue is waived).
                                                                   15

(2014).   Although that balancing is to consider the incremental

probative value of the bad acts evidence, see Commonwealth v.

Brown, 389 Mass. 382, 385–386 & n.7 (1983), "the Commonwealth

[is] not required to show that it need[s] the prior bad act

evidence to prove its case," Commonwealth v. Copney, 468 Mass.

405, 413 (2014).   Whether to admit such evidence is "committed

to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be

disturbed by a reviewing court absent palpable error" (quotation

and citation omitted).   Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461,

478 (2010).

    i.    Probative value.   The defendant argues that the 2009

evidence had no probative value on the issues of his motive,

intent, knowledge, or opportunity, because "none of [them] were

in dispute."   He points out that the jury had heard him admit in

his recorded confession that in 2015, with the motive of putting

M.C. out of her misery, he intentionally put drain cleaner in

her C-tube in order to kill her.

    His position at trial, however, was that his confession was

a lie -- that he "lived for" M.C. and "ha[d] never hurt" her.

Whether he had any motive to harm her, and whether he acted

intentionally on that motive, were very much in dispute.     The

judge could reasonably view the evidence that the defendant had

confessed to having and acting on the same motive in 2009 by

dipping M.C.'s TPN line in her stool -- along with corroborative
                                                                  16

evidence that Dr. Meissner believed M.C.'s 2009 infections were

caused by bacteria normally found in stool -- as highly

probative of whether he had and acted on the same motive and

intent in 2015.   This was a sufficient nonpropensity basis on

which to admit the 2009 evidence.9   See Commonwealth v. Keown,

478 Mass. 232, 244 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1038 (2018)

(defendant's embezzlement and lies years before wife's murder by

poisoning with antifreeze admissible to show his state of mind,

motive, and intent).   Without the 2009 evidence, the defendant's

putting drain cleaner into M.C.'s C-tube in 2015 "could have

appeared to the jury as an essentially inexplicable act of

violence."   Commonwealth v. Melendez, 490 Mass. 648, 663 (2022),

quoting Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 464 (2004).

     We are not persuaded by the defendant's argument, made for

the first time on appeal, that the 2009 evidence had no

probative value because "one extrajudicial confession may not

corroborate another extrajudicial confession."   Commonwealth v.

     9 We thus need not decide whether admission of that evidence
on the issues of knowledge or opportunity was also proper. The
defendant points out that his knowledge of and opportunity to
tamper with M.C.'s C-tube was undisputed. The Supreme Judicial
Court has recently "emphasize[d] the importance of specificity
and precision in the context of ruling on bad act evidence" and
has cautioned against "justifying the admission of bad act
evidence simply by reciting a list of permissible nonpropensity
purposes that have been previously accepted." Commonwealth v.
Samia, 492 Mass. 135, 148 n.8 (2023).
                                                                  17

Costello, 411 Mass. 371, 375 (1991).   Costello involved the rule

that, for purposes of evaluating the sufficiency of the

evidence, "a conviction cannot be based solely [o]n evidence of

a defendant's uncorroborated extrajudicial confession."      Id. at

374, citing Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 457-458

(1984).   Here, the Forde corroboration of the defendant's

confession to putting drain cleaner in M.C.'s C-tube was

provided not by the 2009 evidence but by Dr. Ozgediz's testimony

that M.C.'s 2015 injuries were caused by a caustic substance.

In other words, the Commonwealth met the Forde requirement with

medical evidence, rather than attempting to meet it with

evidence of another confession, as in Costello.   The

Commonwealth offered the defendant's confession to having tried

to kill M.C. in 2009 not to provide Forde corroboration10 but for

the narrower purpose of showing that, because he had the motive

and intent to kill M.C. in 2009, the defendant was more likely

     10The defendant's confession to having tried to kill M.C.
in 2009 did not require corroboration in the Forde sense,
because he was not being tried for any charge based on the 2009
events. In any event, Dr. Meissner's testimony provided that
corroboration, and was relevant to a disputed issue, because the
defendant had recanted that confession and the Commonwealth was
entitled to show with medical evidence that the confession was
true.
                                                                    18

to have had the same motive and intent in 2015.    Costello is

thus inapposite here.11

     We also reject the defendant's argument based on the

superficially similar case of Brown, 389 Mass. 382, which

involved allegedly fabricated confessions both to charged

conduct and to similar prior bad acts.    Id. at 383-386.

Although the court held that the evidence of confessions to the

prior bad acts should not have been admitted, it did not adopt

any general rule about the probative value of such evidence.

Id. at 385-386.    The court held only that in the particular

circumstances of that case, the confessions to the four charged

offenses were adequate to achieve the Commonwealth's stated

purpose of proving a common scheme or plan, and so the

incremental probative value of the confessions to the prior bad

acts was minimal and did not outweigh the resulting undue

prejudice.   Id.   That case-specific analysis is inapplicable

here.

     ii.   Risk of unfair prejudice.   The judge reasonably

balanced the probative value of the 2009 evidence against the

potential for unfair prejudice.    "Relevant evidence is presumed

     11Costello is also inapposite because there the
Commonwealth sought to corroborate a confession to crimes with
evidence that the defendant had made a second confession to
those same crimes, not to an earlier crime. Costello, 411 Mass.
at 373-374.
                                                                   19

to be prejudicial or harmful to the party against whom it is

offered, but exclusion is warranted only when the prejudice is

unfair. . . .   Unfair prejudice may result when jurors are

unnecessarily exposed to inflammatory evidence that might cause

them to decide the case based on emotion" (citations omitted).

Mass. G. Evid. § 403 note (2023).

    Here, the emotional impact of the bad act evidence flowed

from the defendant's own admission -- as part and parcel of his

later-recanted confession to having tried to kill M.C. in 2015

-- that he had also tried to kill her in 2009.   The judge could

reasonably have concluded that the disturbing nature of the 2009

acts to which the defendant confessed would not distract the

jury from the central question, which was whether to believe his

confession or his recantation.   "It has long been held that, in

balancing the probative value against the risk of [unfair]

prejudice, the fact that evidence goes to a central issue in the

case tips the balance in favor of admission."    Commonwealth v.

Jaime, 433 Mass. 575, 579 (2001).

    b.   Delay of trial.   Once the judge ruled on January 23,

2020 (eleven days before trial), that evidence of the 2009 acts

would be admitted, the defendant moved to stay the proceedings

to allow him time to obtain an infectious disease expert to help

counter Dr. Meissner's expected testimony.   The motion asserted

that, until the judge's ruling, the defendant "had no reason to
                                                                       20

believe that events from 2009[] would be relevant to events in

2015."    The judge denied the motion.     The defendant argues that

this ruling unfairly prevented him from effectively cross-

examining Dr. Meissner.    We are unpersuaded.

    "The decision whether to grant a motion to continue lies

within the sound discretion of the trial judge" and is reviewed

for abuse of that discretion.    Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass.

67, 85 (1995).    "However, a trial judge may not exercise his

discretion in such a way as to impair a defendant's

constitutional right to have counsel who has had reasonable

opportunity to prepare a defense" (quotation and citation

omitted).   Id.   In reviewing the judge's decision, we focus in

particular on the "reasons presented to the trial judge"

(quotation and citation omitted).    Id.    See Commonwealth v.

Super, 431 Mass. 492, 497 (2000).

    Here, the record belies the defendant's claim that, until

late January of 2020, he had no reason to believe that the

events of 2009 would be at issue.    On September 4, 2019, the

Commonwealth filed a three-page anticipated witness list

identifying Dr. Meissner, among others from Tufts Medical

Center, as a witness on the issue of the defendant's other bad

acts.    On September 18, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a notice of

its intention to call Dr. Meissner as an expert witness to offer

opinions regarding M.C.'s 2009 blood infections and their
                                                                   21

causes.   At a hearing on September 20, 2019, the Commonwealth

confirmed this intention.    On October 24, 2019, on the

defendant's motion for disclosure of prior bad acts the

Commonwealth expected to offer at trial, the judge struck the

Commonwealth's submissions mentioned above, essentially on the

ground that they did not describe the evidence with sufficient

specificity.    The judge ordered the Commonwealth to file a new

and more detailed description of that evidence.    The

Commonwealth did so on December 19, 2019, more than six weeks

before trial, and once again stated that Dr. Meissner would

testify regarding M.C.'s blood infections.    The defendant's

brief acknowledges that this response was "appropriate[]."

    The judge could thus have concluded that, although the

Commonwealth's disclosures were at times deficient, the

defendant knew as early as five months before trial, and

certainly no later than six weeks before trial, that the

Commonwealth would call Dr. Meissner to testify.    Indeed, the

fact that, on January 13, 2020, the defendant filed the motion

in limine to preclude that testimony showed he was on notice

that the evidence might otherwise be admitted.    Although he no

doubt hoped that the motion would be allowed, he could not rely

on that hope.    Thus, upon denying the motion in limine, the

judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the defendant's

claim, eleven days before trial, that he needed a stay because
                                                                  22

he previously had "no reason to believe" that Dr. Meissner would

testify.    Moreover, the defendant did not, and on appeal does

not, identify any specific issue on which the lack of a defense

expert prevented him from effectively cross-examining

Dr. Meissner.12

     c.    Evidence of order ending 2009 care and protection case.

The defendant argues that, after the judge admitted the 2009 bad

acts evidence, he abused his discretion by denying the

defendant's motion that he take judicial notice, and allow the

jury to hear, of the order that ended the 2009 care and

protection case.   That one-page order, issued by a Juvenile

Court judge in March 2011, dismissed the case because the

defendant and his wife "were found to be fit" parents and "there

was no need for an adjudication of [c]are and [p]rotection."

The Commonwealth opposed the motion on two grounds:

(1) although the content of the 2011 order was undisputed, it

represented the Juvenile Court judge's opinion and so was not

relevant; and (2) the jury had already heard evidence that the

     12The judge also could have considered whether, between the
time the defendant was indicted in August of 2015, and the
scheduled beginning of the trial in February of 2020, trial
counsel had gained sufficient knowledge of M.C.'s medical
history, and various experts' views of it, to cross-examine
Dr. Meissner effectively without the assistance of an additional
expert. Our review of the transcript suggests that counsel did
so with considerable skill.
                                                                   23

defendant and his wife, after losing custody of M.C. to DCF for

eighteen months starting in 2009, had regained custody after a

trial and a judge's order.   The judge denied the motion for the

reasons argued by the Commonwealth.

     This ruling was within the judge's discretion.   The 2011

order represented the Juvenile Court judge's opinion that DCF

failed to meet its burden of proving the allegations of

unfitness in the 2009 care and protection case.   That opinion

was of marginal, if any, relevance to the issues in this case.

The defendant's sole assertion of relevance is that the jury

here were entitled to learn that "another judicial body found

Dr. Meissner's allegations untrue."   But nothing in the 2011

order did any such thing; the order did not mention Dr. Meissner

or his allegations.   Moreover, even if the Juvenile Court judge

did not credit Dr. Meissner's testimony in that case --

something that cannot be determined from the 2011 order -- the

credibility of Dr. Meissner's testimony in this case was a

matter for this jury.13

     13The defendant's reliance in this connection on
Commonwealth v. Fayerweather, 406 Mass. 78 (1989), is
unavailing. There the court held that it was error to exclude
evidence in a psychiatric hospital record, including statements
by the complaining witness, that bore directly on her ability to
accurately perceive her interactions with the defendant and that
was offered to impeach her trial testimony. Id. at 81-83 & n.1.
                                                                    24

     3.    Statement of intention to confess.   The defendant

argues that the judge abused his discretion in precluding the

defendant's attorney in his 2015 care and protection case from

testifying that the defendant told her of his intention to

confess.    Specifically, the attorney would have testified that

on May 8, 2015 -- twelve days before he confessed -- the

defendant said to her, "I am going to give the [d]istrict

[a]ttorney a confession.    I didn't do it.   But this is what we

do for our family."14   The Commonwealth moved in limine to

preclude as hearsay the attorney's testimony that the defendant

made that statement.    The defendant argued, as relevant here,15

that his statement fell within the state of mind exception for

statements indicating an intention to engage in particular

conduct.    See Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 767 (2009).

The judge ruled that the exception was inapplicable.     We

conclude that the judge did not abuse his "broad discretion in

determining whether [this] hearsay exception applies" (citation

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 491 Mass. 247, 260

(2023) (discussing state of mind exception).

     14We adopt the punctuation used in the parties' motion
papers, but nothing turns on it. Our ruling would be the same
if the three phrases appeared in a single sentence, separated by
different punctuation, or linked by different conjunctions.

     15The defendant has not pressed on appeal the other grounds
for admissibility he argued to the judge.
                                                                     25

    "Statements, not too remote in time, which indicate an

intention to engage in particular conduct, are admissible to

prove that the conduct was, in fact, put in effect.     Statements

of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed do

not fall within this exception."     Mass. G. Evid.

§ 803(3)(B)(ii).    See Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 91

(2013); Commonwealth v. Fredette, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 219–220

(2020).

    Here, the judge reasoned that the only part of the

defendant's statement expressing an intention to engage in

"conduct" was, "I'm going to give the [d]istrict [a]ttorney a

confession."   The judge ruled that this statement was

inadmissible "simply because it's not relevant" that the

defendant told a third party he was going to confess.     On

appeal, the defendant does not challenge this aspect of the

judge's analysis.

    The parts of the statement that the judge viewed as "of

particular value to the defense" were, "I didn't do it," and,

"this is what we do for our family."     The defendant wished to

show not that he had confessed but that his confession was false

and to explain why he had made it.     The judge ruled that those

parts "aren't conduct," which we take to mean that they did not

express an intention to engage in conduct.
                                                                    26

     This ruling was within the judge's "broad discretion."        Yat

Fung Ng, 491 Mass. at 260.   The statement, "I didn't do it,"

does not contemplate future conduct.   Rather, it states the

defendant's memory or belief and was offered to prove the fact

remembered or believed (that he did not "do it").     Thus, the

statement "do[es] not fall within th[e] exception."    Mass. G.

Evid. § 803(3)(B)(ii).   "Th[e] exception applies only to the

declarant's present intent to act, not to past conduct."

Commonwealth v. Pope, 397 Mass. 275, 281 (1986) (suicide note

stating, "I killed Jimmy," did not disclose intent to kill in

future and so not within exception).   See Commonwealth v.

Bianchi, 435 Mass. 316, 327 & n.15 (2001) (suicide note

purporting to explain past conduct inadmissible under state of

mind exception); Fredette, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 219-220.     See

also M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 8.8, at

635 (2019 ed.).   And the statement, "this is what we do for our

family," offered to explain why the defendant intended to

confess, was no more relevant than the statement of intent

itself.16

     16The defendant argues that his entire statement should
have been admitted under the doctrine of verbal completeness.
But that doctrine applies only where there is a need to explain
a portion of a statement already admitted in evidence, which was
not the case here. See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 246-247.
Likewise, the defendant's argument that relevant statements must
                                                                    27

       The defendant's reliance on Commonwealth v. Vermette, 43

Mass. App. Ct. 789 (1997), has some force but ultimately is

unavailing.   In Vermette, the defendant, charged with a

shooting, introduced third-party culprit evidence that one

Gonsalves had confessed to the shooting.    Id. at 792-793 & n.3.

The Commonwealth then introduced evidence that Gonsalves,

deceased by the time of trial, had told a witness that he

(Gonsalves) "was going to get $400,000 for 'taking the rap' for

the shooting" and that "'he was going to make tapes and letters

and fake his death,' after which the defendant's father would

fly him to the Bahamas."   Id. at 796.   Police later discovered

Gonsalves's body along with letters and tape recordings in which

he confessed to the shooting.   Id. at 792-793.   The Commonwealth

offered Gonsalves's earlier statements to the witness "to show

that he, Gonsalves, intended to lie and confess to [the

shooting], a showing from which the jury could infer that his

subsequent statements, the letters and the tapes, were the doing

of the intended act, viz., lying.   As such, they were properly

admitted" as statements of Gonsalves's intention.    Id. at 801-

802.

be given context presupposes that some part of his statement was
relevant and admissible in the first place.
                                                                  28

     We acknowledge that Vermette, like this case, involved a

statement of intention to confess along with an implication that

the confession would be false.    The critical statements in

Vermette, however, expressed the declarant's intention to engage

in future conduct,17 whereas the critical statement here, "I

didn't do it," is purely about the past.   "Declarations of

intention, casting light upon the future, have been sharply

distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to

the past.   There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule

against hearsay if the distinction were ignored."    Shepard v.

United States, 290 U.S. 96, 105–106 (1933).    See Commonwealth v.

Lowe, 391 Mass. 97, 104-106, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 840 (1984)

(emphasizing this distinction).   The defendant's out-of-court

statement denying past conduct, which he plainly offered for the

truth of the denial, did not become admissible merely because he

accompanied it with a statement -- irrelevant here -- that he

intended to confess to that conduct.18

     4.   Motion for new trial.   The defendant's motion for a new

trial asserted that trial counsel was ineffective in four ways:

     17The admissibility of the statement that the defendant's
father would fly the declarant to the Bahamas was not separately
considered. Vermette, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 800-802.

     18Ruling as we do, we need not address whether the
defendant's statements, made twelve days before his confession,
were too remote in time to be admissible.
                                                                    29

(1) by failing to offer a prior consistent statement of the

defendant in order to rehabilitate his credibility after cross-

examination, (2) by failing to object to Dr. Ozgediz's testimony

that he was "a hundred percent certain" of the cause of M.C.'s

injuries, (3) by failing to object to the Commonwealth's cross-

examination of the defendant, and (4) by failing to object to

factual inaccuracies in the Commonwealth's closing argument.    In

a thorough written decision, the judge rejected each of these

claims.

    We review the judge's decision for "a significant error of

law or other abuse of discretion," and we "extend[] special

deference to the action of a motion judge who was also the trial

judge."   Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).    To

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the

defendant must establish that counsel's performance fell

"measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary

fallible lawyer" and "likely deprived the defendant of an

otherwise available, substantial ground of defence."

Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).

    a.    Prior consistent statement.   The Commonwealth's cross-

examination sought to cast doubt on the defendant's testimony

that his 2015 confession was false.     The defendant argued that

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to rebut this attack by

offering the defendant's pre-confession statement to his care
                                                                     30

and protection attorney that he "didn't do it" but was

confessing for the sake of his family.     The judge ruled that the

statement would have been inadmissible in any event because it

had not been made before the defendant had a motive to

fabricate, and thus counsel was not ineffective in failing to

offer it.    See Commonwealth v. Lally, 473 Mass. 693, 703 n.10

(2016) (not ineffective to decline to file motion that would not

have materially aided defense).     We see no error or other abuse

of discretion in this ruling.

    A prior consistent statement is usually inadmissible,

because "the testimony of a witness in court should not need --

and ought not -- to be pumped up by evidence that the witness

said the same thing on some prior occasion" (quotation and

citation omitted).     Commonwealth v. Morales, 483 Mass. 676, 678

(2019).     However, "[i]f the court makes a preliminary finding

that there is a claim that the witness's in-court testimony is

the result of recent contrivance or a bias, and the prior

consistent statement was made before the witness had a motive to

fabricate or the occurrence of the event indicating a bias, the

evidence may be admitted for the limited purpose of rebutting

the claim of recent contrivance or bias."    Mass. G. Evid.

§ 613(b)(2).    See Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 284

(2017).
                                                                     31

    The use of prior consistent statements for this purpose

"should be allowed only with caution, and where the probative

value for the proper purpose is clear" (quotation and citation

omitted).    Commonwealth v. Lareau, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 683

(1994).     The test is "one of probative value[:]    whether the

prior consistent statement has a logical tendency to meet and

counter the suggestion that the witness has recently contrived

his testimony for purposes of trial."     Commonwealth v. Darden, 5

Mass. App. Ct. 522, 530 (1977).     "In making that determination,

a measure of discretion must be given to the trial judge . . . ,

who is in a better position than an appellate court to evaluate

the subtleties and nuances of the trial . . ." (citation

omitted).    Id.   See Caruso, 476 Mass. at 285; Lareau, supra.

    Here, the judge ruled that, although the Commonwealth had

indeed argued that the defendant's claim of the confession's

falsity was a contrivance, the defendant already had a motive to

claim its falsity when he spoke to his care and protection

attorney.    That motive was "to avoid conviction."     The defendant

testified that, before he confessed, he knew that he would be

arrested once he did so.    Therefore, as the judge put it, when

the defendant spoke to the attorney, he already had a "motive to
                                                                  32

undermine the confession he was about to give."19   Contrary to

the defendant's argument that a person (such as himself) without

legal training would not be motivated to make such statements,

we have previously recognized the danger that once a "witness

has a reason to build up his position," the witness may "know[]

that repetitions of his claims may be helpful later to blunt the

force of an accusation that he is fabricating his testimony."

Commonwealth v. Healey, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 30, 35 n.5 (1989).

The prior consistent statement doctrine is structured to exclude

such statements.   See id.

     Although the defendant may have had an additional,

potentially conflicting motive for making the confession

itself,20 the defendant does not dispute that establishing the

     19We reject the defendant's argument that the Commonwealth
claimed at trial that "it was only now," i.e., at the time of
trial, "that he was facing conviction and his daughter had been
permanently taken away that [he] was recanting" his confession.
Nothing in the record supports this argument. The defendant
testified that he knew before he confessed that the confession
would lead to his arrest and the loss of custody of M.C.

     20As the judge recognized, the defendant claimed another
motive: "a motive to confess -- in order to (as he testified)
ensure that [his daughter] would remain in at least her mother's
custody." That motive was in tension with his motive to avoid
conviction; recanting might also jeopardize his stated goal of
getting "DCF [to] back off of my wife [so] that my daughter
could go back to her mom [and] grow up with . . . one parent
rather than none." But the Commonwealth was not required to
present an internally consistent explanation of all the
defendant's possible motives.
                                                                      33

falsity of his confession would have reduced the likelihood of

conviction.    And the motive that the Commonwealth suggested he

had at trial -- to falsely claim the confession's falsity in

order to avoid conviction -- could, if it existed at all,

logically also be thought to have existed at the time he made

his statement to his care and protection attorney.    The judge

did not abuse his discretion in so concluding.

    Accordingly, if the defendant's 2015 confession was false,

his prior statement to the attorney that it was going to be

false did not logically rebut the Commonwealth's suggestion that

he recanted the confession at trial only to avoid conviction.

The defendant made that prior statement at a time when he

already wanted to avoid conviction, and thus it was not "made

before the witness had a motive to fabricate."   Mass. G. Evid.

§ 613(b)(2).

    Contrary to the defendant's argument, the judge's analysis

did not rest on any implicit conclusion that the confession was

true and that the defendant lied about its being false.      Those

were obviously jury questions.   Nor did the judge conclude that

the Commonwealth was correct in suggesting that the defendant's

testimony was motivated by the desire to avoid conviction.      The

question before the judge was not one of fact, but solely one of

logic and probative value:   whether the defendant's prior

consistent statement "ha[d] a logical tendency to meet and
                                                                   34

counter the suggestion that [he had] recently contrived his

testimony for purposes of trial" (emphasis added).     Darden, 5

Mass. App. Ct. at 530.   The judge did not abuse his discretion

in concluding that because the prior statement had no such

logical tendency, offering it in evidence would have been futile

and counsel was not ineffective in failing to do so.    See Lally,

473 Mass. at 703 n.10.

     b.   Dr. Ozgediz's testimony.   The defendant argued that

counsel should have objected to Dr. Ozgediz's testimony that he

was "a hundred percent certain" that M.C.'s injuries were caused

by a chemical.21   Although the judge agreed that the testimony

was "improper," he rejected this claim of ineffective assistance

on the ground, among others, that even if counsel's failure to

object was not strategic, the defendant had not shown sufficient

prejudice.22

     21The defendant argued that counsel should also have
objected to Dr. Ozgediz's use of the phrase "a hundred percent"
in testifying that in his opinion, M.C.'s C-tube could have been
flushed with saline solution a day after a caustic substance had
been introduced into the C-tube. The judge acknowledged the
argument but did not analyze it separately. The defendant makes
no separate argument regarding this statement, and we conclude
that no separate analysis is required.

     22We pass over the judge's rulings that, although an
objection would likely have been sustained, counsel's decision
not to object could have been strategic.
                                                                  35

    The judge ruled that the over-all impact of a successful

objection "would likely have been minimal."     He reasoned as

follows:

    "This was one statement . . . made in the context of hours
    of testimony from Dr. Ozgediz regarding his treatment of
    [M.C.], his attempts to discover the source of her
    injuries, and the factual and scientific basis for his
    conclusion that they were caused by the injection of a
    caustic substance into her cecostomy tube. This plethora
    of evidence would still have been before the jury even if
    the improper 'one hundred percent' statement had been
    stricken. Its admission did not deprive [the defendant] of
    an otherwise-available defense -- indeed, he ably and amply
    challenged Dr. Ozgediz's opinion with three experts of his
    own -- nor does it raise a significant concern that the
    jury would have otherwise reached a different conclusion."

    On appeal, the defendant merely repeats the same prejudice

arguments made in his motion for a new trial.    Mindful of the

"special deference" due a motion judge who was also the trial

judge, Grace, 397 Mass. at 307, and concluding that the judge

reached a reasonable decision after considering the relevant

factors, L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27, we reject the defendant's

claim of an abuse of discretion.

    c.     Cross-examination of defendant.   The defendant next

argues that counsel should have objected to certain rhetorical

questions the prosecutor posed in cross-examining the defendant.

These included whether the defendant, who had cried during both

his 2015 confession and his trial testimony recanting it, had

"[t]aken theater courses" or "won an Oscar," and whether he felt

"smug" after he slipped into an answer on cross-examination a
                                                                   36

reference to his wife visiting him in jail, despite the judge's

previous order excluding such testimony.

    The judge, applying the standards in Commonwealth v.

Murphy, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 586, 589-590 (2003), for evaluating

assertedly inflammatory or degrading questions, agreed that the

prosecutor's rhetorical questions were improper.   He concluded,

however, that trial counsel's failure to object did not

"remotely" create the requisite prejudice for an ineffective

assistance claim.   The judge recognized that the prosecutor and

the defendant had engaged in "vigorous verbal sparring" and that

in some instances here, as in Murphy, "the defendant deflected

the question by turning it back on the prosecutor."    Murphy,

supra at 591.   On balance, the judge concluded that the improper

questions "appear[] to have come and gone without fanfare."      Id.

The judge did not abuse his considerable discretion in so

ruling.

    d.    Commonwealth's closing argument.   Finally, the

defendant argued that counsel was ineffective in failing to

object to various asserted inaccuracies in the Commonwealth's

closing argument.   These concerned an entry on the defendant's

work timesheet, the results of a computed tomography scan taken

at YNHH, Dr. Ozgediz's testimony, and matters that called into

question the credibility of the defendant's experts.   The judge

reviewed each of these claims in detail and concluded that, with
                                                                37

one minor exception, the prosecutor did not misrepresent the

evidence.   As for the exception, the judge ruled that the

prosecutor's description of one statement by Dr. Ozgediz "may

have been technically inaccurate from a medical standpoint,

[but] it did not misstate or misrepresent the substance of

Dr. Ozgediz's testimony."

     We have carefully reviewed each of the defendant's

arguments and the judge's careful resolution of them.     No

purpose would be served by repeating the judge's analysis.

There was no abuse of discretion.23

     Conclusion.   We affirm the judgments and the order denying

the defendant's motion for a new trial.

                                      So ordered.

     23We are unpersuaded by the defendant's further argument
that even if no single error warrants relief, the cumulative
effect of the asserted errors justifies a new trial.