Court Opinion

ID: 9581903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:20:19.133098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:19.859772
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from the majority because I am of the opinion that it was incumbent upon John Magee to disaffirm his employment of Petersen as his attorney within a reasonable time after John arrived at the age of twenty-one years and this he failed to do.
The better-reasoned authorities hold that an infant’s employment of an agent or attorney is voidable and not void. 2 Am. Jur., Agency, p. 20, sec. 12, and Anno. 31 A. L. R. 1001. Furthermore, the employment of an attorney can be effected through an agent. 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, p. 279, sec. 30. When John was served with the original summons in the two actions in June of 1953 he turned them over to his father as his agent to take whatever steps might be necessary to protect John’s interest and the father made the arrangements whereby Petersen, or his law firm, was engaged to act as attorney for John in the actions.
John at least knew from what transpired at the taking of the adverse examination on June 23, 1953, and his reading of the transcript thereof soon thereafter, that Petersen was appearing in the actions as John’s attorney. Thus not only had his father as his agent made the arrangement which resulted in the retainer of Petersen, but John was fully apprised of such fact long in advance of his twenty-first birthday, which occurred on March 24, 1955. On April 14, 1955, John read in the Prescott paper that the two actions were on the calendar of the spring term of court for Pierce county which was to open on April 18th.
An infant can ratify a voidable contract made by him during his minority by failing to disaffirm the same within a reasonable time after arriving at his majority. Annotation *518entitled, “Failure to disaffirm as ratification of infant’s ex-ecutory contract,” 5 A. L. R. (2d) 7, and cases cited therein. The reasonableness of the time must be determined from the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Hobbs v. Hinton Foundry, Machine & Plumbing Co. (1914), 74 W. Va. 443, 82 S. E. 267, Ann. Cas. 1917D 410.
Under the facts and circumstances of the instant case where John knew in April, 1955, that Petersen was retained to represent him as attorney, that Petersen only the month before had written him advising him that the plaintiff’s claimed damages greatly exceeded the policy limits and suggesting the employment of other counsel, and that the actions were set for trial at the term of court commencing April 18th, there was an immediate duty on his part to speak out and disaffirm his prior voidable retainer of Petersen. This he failed to do until after the two-year period available to plaintiff for giving the notice of injury required by sec. 330.19 (5), Stats., had expired on May 6, 1955. Such notice was not required to be given by the plaintiff unless John disaffirmed the voidable retainer of Petersen.
Comment a, Restatement, 1 Agency, p. 234, sec. 94, deals with the question of when silence or failure to act on the part of a principal may constitute ratification, and states:
“Silence under such circumstances that, according to the ordinary experience and habits of men, one would naturally be expected to speak if he did not consent, is evidence from which assent may be inferred.”
John delayed an unreasonable time in disaffirming his voidable retainer of Petersen as his attorney, and, therefore, the order appealed from, which set aside the service of the summons on John, should be reversed.