Court Opinion

ID: 9900504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 23:01:22.363739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.902800
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                   Before
                         KISOR, KIRKBY, and DALY
                          Appellate Military Judges

                          _________________________

                            UNITED STATES
                                Appellee

                                       v.

                   Christopher R. JOHNSON
      Machinist’s Mate Petty Officer Third Class (E-4), U.S. Navy
                              Appellant

                               No. 202200125

                          _________________________

                          Decided: 7 November 2023

     Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                               Military Judges:
                       Ryan J. Stormer (arraignment)
                        Andrea K. Lockhart (motions) 1
                      Chad C. Temple (motions and trial)

   Sentence adjudged 15 April 2022 by a general court-martial convened
   at Naval Base San Diego, California, consisting of officer and enlisted
   members for findings and a military judge alone for sentencing. Sen-
   tence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to E-1, confinement for eight-
   een months, and a dishonorable discharge.

   1 Judge Lockhart heard a number of substantive motions on 17 February 2022 and

issued rulings, which were later vacated by Judge Temple for reasons that were ex-
plained in United States v. Painter, 82 M.J. 806 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2022).
                  United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                                Opinion of the Court

                                 For Appellant:
                          LtCol Matthew E. Neely, USMC

                                For Appellee:
              Lieutenant Commander Paul S. LaPlante (argued)
            Lieutenant Colonel James A. Burkart, USMC (on brief)
                Colonel Joseph M. Jennings, USMC (on brief)

   Senior Judge KISOR delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge
   DALY joined. Judge Kirkby filed a separate opinion concurring in the
   judgment.

                            _________________________

         This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
              may be cited as persuasive authority under
               NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                            _________________________

KISOR, Senior Judge:
    A general court-martial composed of members with enlisted representation
convicted Appellant of two specifications of sexual assault in violation of Article
120, UCMJ. 2 Appellant elected to be sentenced by the military judge. 3 As the
Specifications had been charged under alternative theories of criminal liabil-
ity, after the entry of findings, the military judge conditionally dismissed Spec-
ification 2, to become effective upon completion of final appellate review. 4 For
Specification 1, the military judge sentenced Appellant to be reduced to
paygrade E-1, to be confined for eighteen months, and to be discharged with a
dishonorable discharge. 5

   2 10 U.S.C. § 920; R. at 673.

   3 R. at 676.

   4 R. at 675. Specification 1 alleged that Appellant penetrated the victim’s vulva

with his finger when “he knew or reasonably should have known she was asleep” while
Specification 2 alleged that the same act was done “without consent.” Charge Sheet.
   5 R. at 710.

                                        2
              United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                            Opinion of the Court

   Appellant raises five assignments of error before this Court:
   (1) Did the convening authority violate Appellant’s Rule for
       Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 707 speedy trial right by sua
       sponte excluding post hoc delay without finding good
       cause for the delay when the convening authority’s fail-
       ure to convene a court-martial properly caused the de-
       lay?

   (2) Did the military judge abuse his discretion in excluding
       evidence that no more than a few months before the al-
       leged offense, non-sexual physical contact triggered the
       complaining witness’s memory of past sexual abuse when
       Appellant said he touched the complaining witness but
       never penetrated her vulva?
   (3) Did the trial counsel commit prosecutorial misconduct
       by arguing in closing and rebuttal that no evidence
       demonstrating the complaining witness’s past sexual
       trauma adversely impacted her ability to perceive and re-
       call events accurately exists, and defense counsel’s at-
       tacks on her credibility were consequently just “specula-
       tion”?
   (4) Is the evidence factually sufficient to support Appellant’s
       sexual assault conviction?
   (5) Did the military judge err in denying the Defense’s mo-
       tion for a unanimous verdict?
   We find no prejudicial error and affirm.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

    The general factual circumstances in this case (with a notable exception)
are largely undisputed. On the evening of 5 January 2019, two Sailors (Petty
Officer Golf and Mr. Mike), and two women (Ms. C.G. and Ms. Alpha) went out
for the evening in Honolulu, Hawaii. 6 They ended up at “Bar 35” where they

   6 R. at 442-43. All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges,

and counsel, are pseudonyms. Ms. Alpha, Mr. Delta, and Mr. Mike were all United
States Navy Sailors in January 2019 but were civilians by the time of trial in April
2022, and are not referred to here by military titles.

                                          3
                  United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                                Opinion of the Court

met up with two other people, Appellant and Mr. Delta. 7 Mr. Delta and Ms.
Alpha had previously been stationed together, but Appellant did not know ei-
ther Ms. C.G. or Ms. Alpha prior to that evening. 8 Appellant spent the evening
drinking and flirting with Ms. Alpha at Bar 35 and then at another bar. 9 Ap-
pellant and Ms. Alpha danced together and at one point kissed on the dance
floor. 10 At the end of the evening, Petty Officer Golf, who had not been drinking,
drove the group back to Ms. C.G.’s house and then he took an Uber home as he
had duty the next day. 11
    At Ms. C.G.’s house, Appellant followed Ms. Alpha up to the guest bedroom
in an unsuccessful attempt to convince her to engage in sexual relations. 12 Ap-
pellant was heavily intoxicated, but Ms. Alpha was not. Appellant’s brief sum-
marizes the aftermath of that interaction as follows:
       After his drunken advances went nowhere with Ms. Alpha, Ap-
       pellant sat down on the floor, fell asleep, and shortly after that
       began to vomit. Ms. Alpha led Appellant to the bathroom to fin-
       ish vomiting and clean up. As Appellant cleaned up his vomit,
       he became further nauseated and vomited more. He then re-
       turned to Ms. Alpha’s room to finish cleaning up the vomit. After
       he finished cleaning, Ms. Alpha sent him out of the room with
       the odorous trash and directions to “go downstairs.” 13
    Rather than go downstairs, Appellant then wandered into the master bed-
room where Ms. C.G. and her boyfriend, Mr. Mike, were sleeping. Ms. C.G.
testified that she woke up with Appellant’s fingers in her vagina (which she
initially thought was Mr. Mike waking her up to have sex). 14 She exclaimed
“what the fuck” and woke up Mr. Mike, telling him that someone else was in
the room. 15 Appellant then went to the foot of the bed and crouched down and

   7 R. at 445.

   8 R. at 451-52, 497.

   9 R. at 447.

   10 R. at 446-47, 466.

   11 R. at 444-45.

   12 R. at 456.

   13 Appellant’s Br. at 13, citing to various pages in the Record.

   14 R. at 492.

   15 R. at 492-93.

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               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                             Opinion of the Court

attempted to hide. 16 Mr. Mike stood up, and Appellant ran out of the room. 17
As it was dark, Mr. Mike did not recognize Appellant. 18 After coming down-
stairs, Mr. Mike directed Appellant and Mr. Delta (who was asleep on a couch)
to leave the house, which they did. 19
    Some months later, Appellant was interviewed twice by the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service [NCIS], on 30 October 2019 and 10 March 2020. 20 Those
interviews were video recorded and admitted into evidence at trial. 21 After the
second interview, Appellant wrote a letter of apology to Ms. C.G., which was
delivered to Ms. C.G. by her Victims’ Legal Counsel and later admitted into
evidence at trial. 22
    The Charge was preferred against Appellant on 24 June 2021. After a short
(11 day) period of defense-requested delay, an Article 32 hearing was held on
11 August 2021. Commander, Navy Region Southwest, referred the charge to
a general court-martial convened by General Court-Martial Convening Order
[GCMCO] 01-21. Appellant was arraigned on 15 October 2021, which was on
day 99 of the then-operative 120-day R.C.M. 707 speedy trial clock. Appellant
was never in pretrial confinement.
    However, on 21 December 2021, the military judge ruled, in a different case
also referred to GCMCO 01-21, that that general court-martial was improperly
convened because the convening authority detailed the assistant staff judge
advocate as a member. 23 Likewise, on 31 January 2022, the military judge also
found Appellant’s general court-martial to be improperly convened for the
same reason, and vacated the referral and removed the case from the court’s
docket, but did not dismiss the underlying preferred charge and its specifica-
tions.
    Ultimately, the charge in this case was re-referred to a general court-mar-
tial convened by GCMCO 01-22. As arraignment occurred on 11 February

   16 R. at 492.

   17 R. at 493, 512.

   18 R. at 512.

   19 R. at 523-24.

   20 R. at 550.

   21 R. at 534, 538; Pros. Ex. 3, 4.

   22 R. at 496, 545; Pros. Ex. 6.

   23 United States v. Jaramillo, findings of fact and conclusions of law.

                                          5
               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                             Opinion of the Court

2022, 233 days after preferral, the Defense moved to dismiss the Charge for a
speedy trial violation under both R.C.M. 707 and the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The military judge denied the motion. 24 Central to
the military judge’s analysis was that the convening authority properly ex-
cluded 108 days from the speedy trial clock (15 October 2021 to 31 January
2022: the time between the initial arraignment on the defective convening or-
der and the military judge’s vacating the referral).
    Prior to trial, Appellant also filed a motion under Mil. R. Evid. 412 to be
allowed to present testimony: (1) that Ms. C.G. had been sexually assaulted in
the past; and (2) that on one instance when Mr. Mike was lying down in a bed
with her, the particular (non-sexual) position their bodies were in caused her
to “kind of freak[ ] out” as it restricted her movement. 25 The military judge
granted the motion in part and denied it in part, allowing the Defense to ask
Ms. C.G. if she was sexually assaulted in the past (to provide the foundation
for the Defense expert to opine as to her memory and perception). 26 The mili-
tary judge, however, excluded the evidence of the interaction between Mr. Mike
and Ms. C.G. in bed that caused her to become upset as not constitutionally
required under Mil. R. Evid. 412 and also inadmissible under Mil. R. Evid.
403. 27
    At trial, the Defense called Major Charlie, who was recognized as an expert
in the field of forensic and clinical psychology. 28 He testified about memory
formation generally, and the effects of both alcohol and sexual trauma on
memory and perception. 29 He conceded on cross-examination that he had no
evidence that any past trauma that Ms. C.G. experienced was similar to what
she testified about at Appellant’s court-martial. 30

   24 App. Ex. LXXIII.

   25 App. Ex. XLIII at 2.

   26 App. Ex. LXXII at 6.

   27 App. Ex. LXXII at 7-8.

   28 R. at 585.

   29 R. at 586-92.

   30 R. at 601.

                                      6
               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                             Opinion of the Court

    Finally, Appellant filed a pretrial motion requesting that—notwithstand-
ing the statutory requirements of Article 52, UCMJ—the military judge in-
struct the members that in order to convict Appellant they must reach a unan-
imous verdict. 31 The Military Judge denied the motion. 32

                                  II. DISCUSSION

A. Exclusion of 108 days by the convening authority was not improper
under Rule for Courts-Martial 707.
    Appellant contends, essentially, in his first assignment of error, that this
Court should dismiss the charges because the convening authority improperly
excluded 108 days from the R.C.M. 707 speedy trial clock prior to the second
arraignment (the one under the second convening order.) 33 Appellant specifi-
cally does not assert a Sixth Amendment violation. 34

   1. Standards of review and applicable law.
     This Court generally reviews speedy trial claims de novo. 35 However, this
Court reviews whether the military judge properly granted excludable delay
for an abuse of discretion. 36 Under R.C.M. 707, an accused must “be brought to
trial within 120 days after . . . [p]referral of charges.” 37 For purposes of Rule
707, an “accused is brought to trial . . . at the time of arraignment.” 38 Ordinar-
ily, when an accused is not under pretrial restraint and charges are dismissed,
a new 120-day time period begins on the date of re-preferral. 39 “If charges are

   31 App. Ex. LII.

   32 R. at 142.

   33 Appellant’s Br. at 21-37.

   34 Appellant’s Reply Br. at 10.

   35 See United States v. Guyton, 82 M.J. 146 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

   36 See id. at 151.

   37 R.C.M. 707(a)(1).

   38 R.C.M. 707(b)(1).

   39 R.C.M. 707(b)(3)(A)(ii).

                                         7
               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                             Opinion of the Court

merely withdrawn and not subsequently dismissed, however, the R.C.M.
707 ‘speedy-trial clock continues to run.’ ” 40
    The Court of Appeals for the Armed forces has stated that applying the
speedy trial provisions of R.C.M. 707(c) does not merely consist of calculating
the passage of calendar days. The rule explicitly states that certain days “shall
not count for [the] purpose of computing time.” 41 For example, R.C.M. 707(c)(1)
states that prior to referral, “[a]ll ... pretrial delays approved by a military
judge or the convening authority shall be ... excluded” from the 120-day clock
imposed by R.C.M. 707(a)(1). (After referral, only the military judge has the
authority to approve pretrial days that are excluded from the 120-day
clock. R.C.M. 707(c)(1)). The R.C.M. “does not preclude after-the-fact approval
of a delay by” the military judge. 42
    The non-binding discussion to R.C.M. 707 states that “[t]he decision to
grant or deny a reasonable delay is a matter within the sole discretion of the
convening authority or a military judge. This decision should be based on the
facts and circumstances then and there existing.” 43 However, there must be
good cause for the delay and the length of time requested must be reasonable
based on the facts and circumstances of each case. 44
    Regarding a remedy, a dismissal for a R.C.M. 707 violation may be with or
without prejudice. In selecting a remedy for a non-constitutional claim such as
this, the Court considers, among other factors, (1) the seriousness of the of-
fense; (2) the facts and circumstances of the case that led to the dismissal for a
Rule 707 violation; (3) the impact of pre-prosecution on the administration of
justice; and (4) prejudice to the accused. 45

    40 United States v. Leahr, 73 M.J. 364, 367 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States

v. Britton, 26 M.J. 24, 26 (C.M.A. 1988)).
    41 R.C.M. 707(b)(1).

    42 United States v. Thompson, 46 M.J. 472, 475 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

    43 R.C.M. 707(c)(1) Discussion.

    44 Thompson, 46 M.J. at 475 (stating the delay must “meet[ ] good-cause and rea-

sonable-in-length standards”).
    45 R.C.M. 707(d)(1).

                                             8
              United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                            Opinion of the Court

   2. The timeline in this case.
              Timeline                         Date           R.C.M. 707 Clock
 Charges Preferred:                     24 June 2021                0 Days
 Defense Requested Excludable De- 31 July 2021 – 11                 26 Days
 lay:                             August 2021 (11
                                  Days)
 Article 32 Hearing:                    11 August 2021              37 Days
 Charges and Specifications Re- 1 October 2021                      88 Days
 ferred to GCMCO 01-21:
 Defense Requested Excludable De- 12 October 2021 –                 99 Days
 lay:                             15 October 2021 (3
                                  Days)
 First Arraignment:                     15 October 2021            Excluded
 Ruling Vacating Referral to 21 December 2021                      Excluded
 GCMCO 01-21 ICO U.S. v. Jara-
 millo:
 Ruling Dismissing Referral         to 31 January 2022             Excluded
 GCMCO 01-21 in this Case:
 Convening Authority Grants Ex- 9 February 2022                    109 Days
 cludable Delay from 15 October
 2021 – 31 January 2022:
 Charge and Specifications Referred 9 February 2022                109 Days
 to GCMCO 01-22:
 Arraignment:                           11 February 2022           111 Days

   3. Analysis.
    The central issue here is whether the convening authority improperly ex-
cluded the time between 15 October 2021 and 31 January 2022 (108 days) from
the R.C.M. 707 speedy trial clock. If this time were not excluded it would result
in a lapse of well over 120 days between preferral and arraignment. The De-
fense contends that the convening authority did not have good cause for doing

                                       9
               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                             Opinion of the Court

so because that period of “delay was caused by, at best, stunning negligence”
in the initial referral. 46
    The military judge examined this issue at trial. He found that “[t]he ar-
raignment in Johnson I tolled the speedy trial clock and it did not begin to run
again until the military judge found an improper referral.” 47 After the referral
was vacated, the convening authority then regained the ability to exclude de-
lay. The military judge explained,
       Despite this excludable delay occurring post hoc, the Court finds
       no improper reason for doing so by the Convening Authority.
       There was no prohibition on the convening authority from con-
       tinuing the ongoing litigation on the issue of the propriety of
       GCMCO #01-21 as the matter was unresolved in Johnson I.
       Even though the matter was resolved in favor of the accused in
       a separate court-martial, the government is not enjoined from
       raising and litigating the matter again in order to seek a more
       favorable outcome. Finally, the Court concludes there is no cred-
       ible evidence of bad faith on the part of the government. 48
   Central to the Defense’s reasoning here, is that once the military judge
found GCMCO #01-21 to be fatally defective, the convening authority was
somehow enjoined from proceeding in other cases referred to that convening
order. We disagree. Nothing in the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the
Rules for Courts-Martial permits a military judge detailed to preside over an
individual case to strike down referrals collectively, or grant any other type of
de facto class-wide relief in other unrelated cases before the court. The fact
that an identical ruling was foreseeable on this issue does not deprive the Gov-
ernment of the ability to re-litigate the issue, because a military judge’s ruling
on a particular issue is not binding in other cases, even in the same circuit.
    We find that the convening authority thus had good cause to exclude the
time between 15 October 2021 to 31 January 2022. Further, the military judge
did not abuse his discretion in agreeing with that action. We find that the mil-
itary judge also properly tolled the R.C.M. 707 clock for the several relatively
short periods of delay requested by the Defense totaling 14 days. Thus, we hold
that there was no speedy trial violation because, at the time Appellant was re-

   46 Appellant’s Br. at 27.

   47 App. Ex. LXXIII at 6.

   48 App. Ex. LXXIII at 6-7.

                                       10
               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                             Opinion of the Court

arraigned on 11 February 2022, it was on day 111 of the operative speedy trial
clock, within the time permitted by R.C.M. 707.

B. The military judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding evi-
   dence that, on a prior occasion, non-sexual physical contact with
   Mr. Mike triggered Ms. C.G.’s memory of past sexual abuse.
    Appellant contends that the military judge abused his discretion by exclud-
ing evidence that on one occasion Ms. C.G., when Mr. Mike touched her in bed,
she recalled a past sexual assault, and therefore could have had memory or
perception problems when Appellant touched her. 49 Appellant further con-
tends that this ruling denied him the “fundamental right to challenge and dis-
credit her testimony.” 50
   1. Standard of review.
    We review a military judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an
abuse of discretion. 51 Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact
of consequence in determining the action more or less probable than it would
be without the evidence. 52 Materiality “is a multi-factored test looking at the
importance of the issue for which the evidence was offered in relation to the
other issues in this case; the extent to which the issue is in dispute; and the
nature of the other evidence in the case pertaining to th[at] issue.” 53
    Evidence offered to prove an alleged victim engaged in other sexual behav-
ior is, with limited exceptions, generally not admissible at a trial involving a
sexual offense. 54 One of the rule’s three exceptions is relevant here, that is “ev-
idence the exclusion of which would violate the accused’s constitutional
rights.” 55 “The constitutionally required exception encompasses an accused’s
Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against

   49 Appellant’s Br. at 39-40.

   50 Appellant’s Br. at 39.

   51 See United States v. McElhany, 54 M.J. 120, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2000).

   52 Mil. R. Evid. 401.

   53 Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 318 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

   54 Mil. R. Evid. 412(a)(1). “Sexual behavior” includes “any sexual behavior not en-

compassed by the alleged offense.” Mil. R. Evid. 412(d).
   55 Mil. R. Evid. 412(b)(3).

                                          11
               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                             Opinion of the Court

him, which includes the right ‘to impeach, i.e., discredit the witness.’” 56 Evi-
dence is admissible under this exception if it is relevant, material, and favora-
ble to the defense, no matter how embarrassing it may be to the alleged vic-
tim. 57
    Any evidence introduced under the exceptions to Mil. R. Evid. 412 must
also pass the Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing test. Further, military judges receive
wide discretion in conducting balancing under Mil. R. Evid. 403 where they
reasonably describe the nature of the evidence and properly state the legal
standard for making an admissibility determination. 58 To pass the Mil. R.
Evid. 403 balancing test, the evidence’s probative value must not be substan-
tially outweighed by such dangers as “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally
relevant.” 59

    2. The ruling in this case.
   The military judge allowed the defense to present evidence that Ms. C.G.
had prior sexual trauma. This allowed the Defense to present its theory that
Ms. C.G.’s perception and memory issues may have caused her to misperceive
Appellant’s touching her as a sexual assault. 60
    However, the military judge excluded the evidence that Ms. C.G. had a
strong reaction to her interaction with Mr. Mike in the bed. First, the military
judge concluded that the evidence of the interaction between Mr. Mike and Ms.
C.G. was not constitutionally required under Mil. R. Evid. 412; and second, he
concluded that the proffered evidence was inadmissible under Mil. R. Evid.
403. 61 The military judge explained the nature of the evidence and his reason-
ing in significant detail, finding that the circumstances of that interaction were
not in any way relevant to the charge offenses. 62 The military judge found that

    56 Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 318 (quoting Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988))

(additional citations omitted).
    57 United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216, 222-23 (2004), abrogated by United States

v. Gaddis, 70 M.J. 248, 256 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
    58 See United States v. St. Jean, 83 M.J. 109 (C.A.A.F. 2023).

    59 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see United States v. St. Jean,

83 M.J. 109 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
    60 App. Ex. LXXII at 6; R. at 586.

    61 App. Ex. LXXII at 7.

    62 App. Ex. LXXII at 7.

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               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                             Opinion of the Court

there was no evidence of Appellant restricting the movement of Ms. C.G.’s legs
nor any other similarity between the prior interaction with Mr. Mike and the
incident of Appellant touching her. 63 We agree that the two events are mark-
edly dissimilar. Thus, the military judge found that it was not constitutionally
required under Mil R. Evid 412 and was also irrelevant. 64 Then after conduct-
ing the proper balancing test under Mil. R. Evid. 403, the military judge also
concluded, “the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
the danger of confusion of the issues, misleading the members, and considera-
tions of waste of time.” 65
    We find that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding
this evidence. We conclude that Ms. C.G.’s reaction to being touched in a non-
sexual way while in bed does not constitute “other sexual behavior” within the
meaning of Mil. R. Evid. 412. Nonetheless, it was unquestionably irrelevant
and not probative of anything, and therefore inadmissible under Rules of Evi-
dence 402(b) and 403. Further, it was not constitutionally required. The mili-
tary judge conducted the proper balancing test under Mil. R. Evid. 403, and he
sufficiently explained his analysis and reasoning. We find no abuse of discre-
tion in excluding this evidence.

C. Trial counsel’s argument on findings was not improper.
    Appellant next argues that trial counsel committed prosecutorial miscon-
duct when he argued “nothing has been hidden from you” and that “you have
the data” because trial counsel knew that the military judge had excluded evi-
dence that a prior non-sexual interaction between Mr. Mike and Ms. C.G. had
“triggered the complaining witness into recalling prior sexual abuse.” 66 During
his rebuttal argument, trial counsel also stated “there is no evidence here to
support that she had any kind of false memory.” 67 The Defense made no objec-
tion to these arguments at trial. 68

   63 App. Ex. LXXII at 7.

   64 App. Ex. LXXII at 7

   65 App. Ex. LXXII at 8.

   66 Appellant’s Br. at 52-53.

   67 R. at 655.

   68 R. at 645.

                                      13
                 United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                               Opinion of the Court

   1. Standard of review
    Improper argument is a question of law that appellate courts review de
novo. 69 The test for improper argument is “whether the argument was errone-
ous and whether it materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the ac-
cused.” 70 A failure to timely object to an improper argument constitutes forfei-
ture of the objection. 71 But even if the objection is forfeited, we will review an
allegation of an improper argument for plain error. 72 Plain error is (1) error,
(2) that is plain or obvious, and (3) that results in material prejudice to a sub-
stantial right of the accused. 73

   2. The argument in this case.
   Appellant quotes these statements with incomplete context. Trial counsel’s
argument was:
       Members, you heard today that MM3 Johnson hid at the end of
       the bed. He hid in the corner of the room, that he hid his where-
       abouts concerning the day of the assault from NCIS, and he hid
       the fact he even knew of [Ms. C.G.]. Nothing has been hidden
       from you. You have it all. The defense expert said during his tes-
       timony that the more data you have, the more accurate your
       opinion and your vote can be. That’s true for you as well. You
       have the data, the data that provides the only just conclusion in
       this case and that is that MM3 Johnson is guilty. 74
   The thrust of defense counsel’s closing argument was that no contact had
occurred between Appellant and Ms. C.G. at all, and that she was mistaken
and was misremembering due to her prior sexual trauma. He stated:
       And [Major Charlie] explained that past trauma and sexual as-
       sault can impact how we see present situations. So even if she
       could have truly believed at that point that she had fingers in

   69 See United States v. Witt, 83 M.J. 282, 285 (C.A.A.F. 2023) citing United States

v. Frey, 73 M.J. 245, 248 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
    70 See id.

   71 R.C.M. 919(c).

   72 See United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 179 (C.A.A.F. 2005).

   73 See Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 179; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 60 M.J. 87, 88

(C.A.A.F. 2004).
   74 R. at 645.

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               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                             Opinion of the Court

       her vagina, though no contact anywhere else, that doesn’t mean
       that was actually happening. Her past trauma made her believe
       something that wasn’t real, what wasn’t happening. 75
    This opened the door to trial counsel’s rebuttal argument that “there is no
evidence here to support that she had any kind of false memory.” Trial coun-
sel’s arguments were fair comment on the evidence admitted at trial, and the
fact that the military judge had excluded testimony about the unrelated non-
sexual incident between Mr. Mike and Ms. C.G. does not in any way render
trial counsel’s comments improper in the context of this case.
   We find no error here, let alone an error that rises to the level of plain error.

D. The evidence adduced at trial is factually sufficient.
   Appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a
conviction. In evaluating factual sufficiency for cases where the alleged mis-
conduct occurred before 2021, we determine “whether, after weighing the evi-
dence in the record of trial and making allowances for not having personally
observed the witnesses, [we] are . . . convinced of [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 76 In conducting this unique appellate function under the
version of Article 66, UCMJ applicable to cases like this one which occurred in
2019, we take “a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,” applying “neither a
presumption of innocence nor a presumption of guilt” to “make [our] own inde-
pendent determination as to whether the evidence constitutes proof of each
required element beyond a reasonable doubt.” 77 Proof beyond a “[r]easonable
doubt, however, does not mean the evidence must be free from conflict.” 78
    The court-martial members found Appellant guilty of sexually assaulting
Ms. C.G. by penetrating her vulva with his finger with an intent to arouse or
gratify his sexual desire, when he knew or should have known that she was
asleep. 79 To prove sexual assault, as charged in Specification 1, the Govern-
ment had to prove that: (1) Appellant committed a sexual act on Ms. C.G. by
causing penetration, however slight, of her vulva by his finger; (2) he did so in

   75 R. at 652.

   76 Turner, 25 M.J. at 325.

   77 United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002).

   78 United States v. Rankin, 63 M.J. 552, 557 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2006).

   79 The members also found Appellant guilty of Specification 2, which alleged the

same sexual act “without her consent” (as she was asleep) and the military judge dis-
missed Specification 2 prior to sentencing. R at 675.

                                         15
               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                             Opinion of the Court

order to arouse or gratify his sexual desire; and (3) he knew or reasonably
should have known that Ms. C.G. was asleep. 80 The Government further had
to prove that Appellant did not honestly and reasonably believe that he was
committing a sexual act with someone other than Ms. C.G. 81
    Appellant contends that the fact that he prodigiously and repeatedly vom-
ited is evidence that he was too drunk to form the specific intent to commit a
sexual offense. 82 Appellant further contends that “a fair and reasonable hy-
pothesis supports concluding that Appellant simply wandered into the wrong
room of a dark, unfamiliar house and was tapping the complaining witness on
the crotch area over her clothes while he was unsure of where he was or what
he was doing.” 83 We decline Appellant’s invitation to reach this conclusion be-
cause we find it to be rather dubious.
    Thus, having considered all the testimony and the evidence admitted at
trial, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that that Appellant, though
drunk, was able to form the specific intent to gratify his sexual desires and
that he penetrated Ms. C.G.’s vagina with his finger while he knew (or should
have known) she was asleep. Appellant had been pursuing a sexual encounter
with Ms. Alpha, which was ultimately unsuccessful. Ms. C.G. was in a dark
room, in bed with her boyfriend. She had not invited Appellant into that room,
nor had she interacted with him romantically at any point. Further, Appellant
had the initial thought to try to hide when Ms. C.G. woke up, which shows
some awareness both that he knew what he was doing, and that she had been
asleep.
   The evidence is factually sufficient to sustain the conviction.

E. Military members panels are not required to reach a unanimous
verdict.
    Appellant challenges his conviction because the military judge did not in-
struct the members that their verdict must be unanimous. 84 Appellant cites to

   80 Article 120, UCMJ.

   81 R. at 625-26. See R.C.M. 916(j)(1).

   82 Appellant’s Br. at 61.

   83 Appellant’s Br. at 62.

   84 Appellant’s Br. at 65. See R. at 656 (military judge’s instructions that three-

fourths of the members must concur in a guilty finding). Of course, we do not know
whether the verdict in this case was unanimous or not.

                                            16
              United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                            Opinion of the Court

the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Ramos v. Louisiana for the prop-
osition that a jury trial must reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict. 85
The statute governing members’ verdicts in courts-martial provides that the
concurrence of three-fourths of the members is required for a finding of guilt
in a noncapital case. 86 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and this
Court have already held that the Sixth Amendment’s requirement for a unan-
imous verdict for serious offenses tried in state or civilian federal criminal
courts does not apply to courts-martial. 87 Accordingly, we decline to set aside
the findings and sentence in this case on that basis.

                                III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs, as well as the excellent
oral arguments of appellate counsel, we have determined that the findings and
sentence are correct in law and fact and that no error materially prejudicial to
Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. 88
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

   85 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).

   86 Art. 52, UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 852.

   87 United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J. 291 (C.A.A.F. 2023); United States v. Causey,

82 M.J. 574 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2022).
   88 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

                                          17
               United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                   KIRKBY, J. (concurring in the judgment)

KIRKBY, Judge (concurring in the judgment):
     I write separately to express my concern with the Government’s seemingly
cavalier approach to the selection of members under Article 25 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], in this case. While the opinion correctly an-
alyzes the Rule for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 707 speedy trial clock issue before
us, the underlying problem was the inclusion of the Assistant Staff Judge Ad-
vocate to the Convening Authority on the original convening order. It is highly
improper by any stretch of the imagination. While not a violation of the lan-
guage of Article 25, UCMJ, it is without a doubt a violation of the spirit of
justice the government is charged with overseeing in the military.

                                 I. DISCUSSION

    As the majority opinion points out, the Government is not foreclosed from
raising similar issues in different cases with the hope of different outcomes. 1
However, even hoping that the inclusion of the Assistant Staff Judge Advocate
on the Convening Order would be permissible, except in extreme circum-
stances not present here, it raises questions of fundamental fairness. 2 Once the
Government was put on notice that the military judge saw an issue with the
convening order, the prosecution should have reviewed it, taken a step back
and considered the greater purpose of military law—to promote justice, to as-
sist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote
efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to
strengthen the national security of the United States. 3 The inclusion by the
Convening Authority of the Assistant Staff Judge Advocate on the Convening
Order objectively called into question the justice of this proceeding, under-
mined its efficiency by 108 days, and invited public scrutiny and criticism of
the military justice process.
   While I agree with both the opinion and the military judge that the 108
days of time could be excluded and no R.C.M. 707 violation occurred, convening
authorities and staff judge advocates should be cognizant of the appearance of
impropriety. Even though there is no technical violation of Article 25, UCMJ,

   1 Opinion at 9.

   2 At oral argument, the government appellate counsel acknowledged never having

seen a situation where a Staff Judge Advocate was listed on the convening order.
   3 Preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Part I, para. 3.
              United States v. Johnson, NMCCA No. 202200125
                  KIRKBY, J. (concurring in the judgment)

there is a real threat of undermining military justice when members of a con-
vening authority’s legal staff are offered up as impartial panel members in any
case.

                               II. CONCLUSION

   Accordingly, while I do not join the majority analysis in all respects, I con-
cur with the judgment reached by the Court.

                                 FOR THE COURT:

                                 MARK K. JAMISON
                                 Clerk of Court

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