Court Opinion

ID: 9948888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 14:02:15.32432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:17.850392
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D22-1369
                  LT Case Nos. 2019-CP-058938
                                2011-CP-053637
                                2012-CP-024994
                  _____________________________

GEORGE DORA, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF
MARY ROSE MORRISON, the
surviving spouse of PAUL
DOUGLAS MORRISON, and as Co-
Trustee of the MARY ROSE AND
DOUGLAS MORRISON FAMILY
TRUST, et al.

    Appellants,

    v.

MARC MORRISON, as Co-Trustee
of the MARY ROSE AND DOUGLAS
MORRISON FAMILY TRUST, U/A/D
10/05/2007, JULIE MORRISON
POIRIER, et al.

    Appellees.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County.
Morgan Laur Reinman, Judge.

Jennifer Kerkhoff, St. Petersburg, for Appellant, George
Dora.

Laurel A. Nugent, Rockledge, for Appellants, Lauren
Johnson, Alexis Johnson, and Christopher Johnson.
Alec Russell, of Gray Robinson, P.A., Melbourne, for Appellee,
Marc Morrison.

R. Lee McElroy, of Downey McElroy, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens,
for Appellee, Gould Cooksey Fennell, PLLC.

Matthew G. Hawk, of Sugarman Law, LLP, Atlanta, GA., for
Appellee, Julie Morrison Poirier.

                          March 8, 2024

KILBANE, J.

     George Dora (“Trustee Dora”), as personal representative of
Mary Rose Morrison’s estate and co-trustee of the Mary Rose and
Douglas Morrison Family Trust (“Family Trust”), and Lauren,
Alexis, and Christopher Johnson (collectively “Appellants”),
appeal an order granting Marc Morrison’s (“Trustee Morrison”), as
co-trustee of the Family Trust, motions to strike petition to
determine homestead status of real property.1 On appeal,
Appellants argue, inter alia, that the trial court erred because the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in non-adversary
probate proceedings. We find that Appellants are judicially
estopped from asserting this argument. However, Appellants also
argue that the motions to strike were procedurally deficient. We
agree and reverse.

                              Facts

    In 2011, Mary Rose and Paul Douglas Morrison, a married
couple, passed away. They both had adult children from previous
marriages, and together they owned residential property in
Melbourne, Florida (“the Subject Property”). Years prior to their

    1   Julie Morrison Poirier and Gould Cooksey Fennell, PLLC,
are parties to this appeal along with Trustee Morrison and are
collectively referred to as “Appellees.”

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death, they transferred title of the Subject Property to the Family
Trust.

     In 2013, Trustee Morrison and Trustee Dora, as co-trustees of
the Family Trust, filed a verified complaint for partition and sale
of the Subject Property in lieu of partition. The trial court entered
a final order granting the co-trustees’ uncontested motion for
partition and sale in lieu of partition and approved the sale of the
Subject Property.

     In 2021, Mary Rose Morrison’s adult children–Lauren, Alexis,
and Christopher Johnson–filed petitions to determine homestead
status of the Subject Property. They essentially argued that
Florida’s homestead protections were improperly applied to the
Subject Property because it was still owned as tenancy by the
entireties property. Trustee Dora joined the proceedings, as
personal representative of Mary Rose Morrison’s estate and co-
trustee of the Family Trust, on the side of the Johnsons.

      Trustee Morrison filed motions to strike the petitions to
determine homestead status of real property or for more definite
statement. The motions to strike did not identify which rule of
civil procedure authorized their filing but argued various reasons
why the petitions should be stricken including res judicata,
collateral estoppel, lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction, and
statute of limitations. The motions to strike were not verified or
supported by an affidavit.

     Prior to the hearing on Trustee Morrison’s motions to strike,
Appellants moved to consolidate the probate cases with three
pending trust cases pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.270. Two of the pending trust cases were filed in the circuit civil
division. The motion to consolidate was contested but ultimately
granted.

     Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on Trustee
Morrison’s motions to strike, the transcript of which is not
provided on appeal. The court granted the motions and struck the
petitions in their entirety. The court found, inter alia, that the
property was not held as tenancy by the entireties, the facts
alleged did not support a finding that the Subject Property did not

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constitute protected homestead, and the petitioners were
otherwise time barred and lacked standing. The court’s order did
not mention any rule of civil procedure, and it made no indication
that the pleadings were a sham.

                             Analysis

                       A. Judicial Estoppel

     When analyzing a probate case, “[t]he characterization of the
proceedings is critically important for it determines which rules of
court shall govern.” In re Est. of Brown, 310 So. 3d 1131, 1132 (Fla.
2d DCA 2021) (quoting In re Beeman’s Est., 391 So. 2d 276, 278
(Fla. 4th DCA 1980)). “[R]ule 5.080(a) identifies rules of civil
procedure that are applicable to all probate proceedings. Those
rules pertain primarily to discovery, subpoenas, and depositions.”
Id. (citing Fla. Prob. R. 5.080(a)). Rule 1.270, Consolidation;
Separate Trials, is not one of the rules of civil procedure
enumerated in probate rule 5.080(a). Aside from rule 1.525, for
the remainder of the rules of civil procedure to apply in probate
cases, the proceeding must either be a listed adversary proceeding
or declared an adversary proceeding. See Fla. Prob. R. 5.025.

     Here, the underlying petitions are two petitions to determine
homestead status of real property. Such a petition is not a listed
adversary proceeding. See Fla. Prob. R. 5.025(a). Consequently,
the proceedings needed to be declared adversary in order for the
rules of civil procedure not listed in probate rule 5.080(a) to apply.
Such a declaration did not occur.

     However, beginning with the motion to consolidate, the
parties carried on as if the proceedings were adversary. While an
appellate court will not ordinarily apply the adversary proceeding
label for the first time on appeal, an exception exists in cases of
waiver or estoppel. In re Beeman’s Est., 391 So. 2d at 278. Here,
the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents Appellants from now
taking the position that the rules of civil procedure should not have
applied to the motions to strike.

    “Judicial estoppel provides that ‘[o]ne who assumes a
particular position or theory in a case is judicially estopped in a

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later phase of that same case, or in another case, from asserting
any other or inconsistent position toward the same parties and
subject matter.’” Whittingham v. HSBC Bank USA, NA as Tr. for
Holders of Deutsche Alt-A Sec. Mortg. Loan Tr., Series 2007-OA1,
275 So. 3d 850, 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Adoption of D.P.P., 158 So. 3d 633, 639 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2014)). In Florida, there are four elements to judicial
estoppel:

    [1] A claim or position successfully maintained in a
    former action or judicial proceeding [2] bars a party from
    making a completely inconsistent claim or taking a
    clearly conflicting position . . ., [3] to the prejudice of the
    adverse party, [4] where the parties are the same in both
    actions, subject to the “special fairness and policy
    considerations” exception to the mutuality of parties
    requirement.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Salazar-Abreu v. Walt Disney
Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc., 277 So. 3d 629, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA
2018)). “[J]udicial estoppel ‘protects the integrity of the judicial
process and prevents parties from making a mockery of justice by
inconsistent pleadings and playing fast and loose with the courts.’”
Anfriany v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. for Registered Holders of
Argent Sec., Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certifs., Series 2005-
W4, 232 So. 3d 425, 427 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Grau v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 396, 400 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2005)).2

    2  We note that application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel
may be invoked at the discretion of the court because it is
“intended to prevent ‘improper use of judicial machinery.’” See
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (quoting
Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see
also Davis v. District of Columbia, 925 F.3d 1240, 1256 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (“[T]he doctrine is not only a defense; because it also protects
the integrity of the judicial process, a court may invoke judicial
estoppel ‘at its discretion.’” (quoting New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at
750)).

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     In their motion for rehearing and on appeal, Appellants argue
that motions to strike were not permissible below because the
proceedings were non-adversary probate proceedings. Typically,
Appellants would be correct, and that argument would carry the
day. Neither of the proceedings in which the motions were filed
had been declared adversary and there is no similar probate rule
under which Appellees could have been traveling. See In re Est. of
Brown, 310 So. 3d at 1132 (finding rule 1.420(a), providing for
voluntary dismissal of actions, inapplicable to non-adversary
probate proceeding); In re Est. of Arroyo v. Infinity Indem. Ins. Co.,
211 So. 3d 240, 244–46 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (finding probate court
erred and abused discretion when it improperly applied rule 1.230,
providing for interventions, to non-adversary probate proceeding).
However, this position is inconsistent with Appellants’ successful
motion to consolidate pursuant to rule 1.270, a rule which also does
not apply in non-adversary proceedings. See Fla. Prob. R. 5.080(a).

     Appellants urged the trial court to consolidate probate cases
with circuit civil cases pursuant to rule 1.270. Appellants pursued
consolidation for both discovery and trial, detailing the scathing
nature of the litigation between and among the several parties
involved here, over the opposition of Appellees, who relied on rule
1.270 to support their own position against consolidation for trial
purposes. Once Appellants were granted their consolidation
request in toto and only after having their petitions stricken did
Appellants contest the applicability of the rules of civil procedure
on rehearing, which was then noticeably filed pursuant to probate
rule 5.020(d).

     As such, Appellants would gain an unfair advantage derived
from a clearly conflicting position asserted for the first time at
rehearing if not judicially estopped. See Anfriany, 232 So. 3d at
428 (explaining that prejudice occurs when “the party seeking to
assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage
or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not
estopped” (quoting Grau, 899 So. 2d at 400)). This conduct is the
“playing fast and loose with the courts” judicial estoppel is
designed to prevent. Up until the motion for rehearing, the parties
acted as though this was an adversary probate proceeding, so we
review the propriety of the motions to strike pursuant to the rules

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of civil procedure as though these were adversary probate
proceedings.

                        B. Motions to Strike

    A lower court’s ruling on a motion to strike is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Belson v. Miller, 314 So. 3d 525, 527 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2020) (citing Upland Dev. of Cent. Fla., Inc. v. Bridge, 910 So.
2d 942, 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)). “Because striking a pleading is
an extreme measure, it is disfavored in the law.” Bridge, 910 So.
2d at 944 (citing Yunger v. Oliver, 803 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2002)).3

    Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.150 and 1.140(f) address
motions to strike. Rule 1.150 exists for the purpose of striking a
“sham pleading.” See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150. Under rule 1.150(b), a
“motion to strike shall be verified and shall set forth fully the facts
on which the movant relies and may be supported by affidavit.” A
motion to strike filed pursuant to rule 1.140(f) is used to strike
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter from
any pleading, and it contains no verification requirement. See Fla.
R. Civ. P. 1.140(f).

     Here, neither the motions to strike nor the trial court’s order
identifies which rule of civil procedure authorized the court to
strike the petitions.4 Nonetheless, “rule 1.150 is the only rule that
authorizes the striking of an entire pleading.” Bridge, 910 So. 2d
at 945 (citing Decker v. Cnty. of Volusia, 698 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla.

    3   Appellees argue that our review is precluded because
Appellants failed to provide a transcript from the hearing below.
Our review is not precluded despite the lack of a hearing
transcript. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Hirsch, 642 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 5th DCA
1994) (“[T]he appellate court is authorized to reverse a judgment
as a matter of law where an error of law is apparent on the face of
the judgment.” (citing Casella v. Casella, 569 So. 2d 848, 849 (Fla.
4th DCA 1990))).
    4  The probate rules contain no parallel rules that would
authorize a motion to strike.

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5th DCA 1997)).5 We previously rejected the argument that rule
1.140(f) “provides a mechanism for striking a pleading that
proposes to ‘re-hash’ prior issues, causes of action, or previously
adjudicated arguments.” Id. The petitions in this case similarly
sought to “re-hash” prior issues. Under these circumstances and
because the motions sought to strike the entire pleading, they had
to have been filed and subsequently granted pursuant to rule
1.150, and verification was required. See id.; Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.150(b).6

     Moreover, the trial court’s order made several factual findings
without making a determination that the petitions were a sham.
This is not the purpose of a hearing on a motion to strike. See
Bridge, 910 So. 2d at 944–45. “For a trial court ‘to justify the
striking of a pleading for being sham or false it must be so
undoubtedly false as not to be subject to a genuine issue of fact.’”
Bornstein v. Marcus, 169 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)
(quoting Meadows v. Edwards, 82 So. 2d 733, 735 (Fla. 1955)).
“The fact that a court may perceive little prospect in the success of
an alleged sham proceeding is not a sufficient ground to grant a
motion to strike the pleading.” Gleman v. MWH Ams., Inc., 309
So. 3d 681, 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (quoting Sunex Int’l Inc. v.
Colson, 964 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)). And “[n]either

    5   Decker based its reasoning on the plain language of the
applicable rules. See 698 So. 2d at 651 & n.1. Rule 1.150(a) states
in pertinent part that “[i]f a party deems any pleading or part
thereof filed by another party to be a sham, that party may move
to strike the pleading or part thereof,” (emphasis added), while rule
1.140(f) states that “[a] party may move to strike or the court may
strike redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter
from any pleading at any time.” (emphasis added).
    6   We are aware of Varnadoe v. Union Planters Mortgage
Corp., 898 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). We question its
viability but need not reach that issue here. In Varnadoe, the trial
court expressly relied on rule 1.140(f), and this Court affirmed
because “the entire pleadings were wholly irrelevant” to the cause
of action. Id. at 993. Here, the trial court did not rely on rule
1.140(f) and the pleadings were not wholly irrelevant.

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the failure to include all the essential elements of a cause of action,
the inclusion of redundant allegations, nor the frivolous nature of
a pleading constitute sufficient grounds to strike a pleading in its
entirety under the rule.” Bridge, 910 So. 2d at 944 (quoting Decker,
698 So. 2d at 652).

     Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand for
further proceedings. We do not reach the merits of any other issue
raised on appeal and express no opinion regarding the merits of
the petitions.

    REVERSED AND REMANDED.

LAMBERT and SOUD, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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