Court Opinion

ID: 990619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:24:12.024645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:52.477297
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 96-4205

JEFFREY ROY CROSBY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
C. Weston Houck, Chief District Judge.
(CR-95-619)

Submitted: October 3, 1996

Decided: October 16, 1996

Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Debra Owens Jackson, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. J.
Rene Josey, United States Attorney, William E. Day, II, Assistant
United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Jeffrey Roy Crosby appeals his conviction, by a jury, of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 922(g)(1) (West Supp. 1996), on the ground that his Miranda1 and
Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were violated by
the district court's admission, over objection, of a statement Crosby
made to his probation officer while at the police station. We affirm
Crosby's conviction.

The statement Crosby challenges was made during a forty to forty-
five minute interrogation in an open room at the police station, after
Crosby voluntarily accompanied officers to the station for question-
ing. Prior to going to the station, one of the officers specifically told
Crosby that he was not under arrest, and that he was free to go.
Crosby made no requests during the interrogation. Moreover, even
without the challenged admission that his fingerprints may be on the
firearms which officers seized pursuant to Crosby's consensual
search, there were multiple witnesses who testified at trial that Crosby
had been in possession of firearms.

Based on these undisputed facts, we find that there was no custo-
dial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda , nor anything in this
record to suggest that Crosby was significantly deprived of his free-
dom, or coerced or restrained so as to render him in custody at any
time prior to making the statement at issue. See e.g., Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429-31, 433 (1984); California v. Beheler,
463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam); Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778
F.2d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1985). Nor does the fact that Crosby was on
probation at the pertinent time automatically render him in custody
for purposes of receiving Miranda protection. See generally
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 433.2
_________________________________________________________________
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 Moreover, even if the district court's admission of the statement was
a violation of Crosby's constitutional rights, we find that given the other
ample evidence of his guilt, any error was, at most, harmless.

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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3