Court Opinion

ID: 9892081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 15:07:37.221536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:07.387143
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 13, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals
                    NO. 2022-CA-0965-MR

LEXINGTON ALZHEIMER’S
INVESTORS, LLC D/B/A THE
LANTERN AT MORNING POINTE
ALZHEIMER’S CENTER OF
EXCELLENCE; BROOKE GRIFFITH,
IN HER CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE LANTERN AT
MORNING POINTE OF LEXINGTON;
GREG A. VITAL; INDEPENDENT
HEALTHCARE PROPERTIES, LLC;
AND J. FRANKLIN FARROW                              APPELLANTS

           APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 21-CI-02030

SANDRA NORRIS, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF RAYFORD CHARLES
NORRIS                                                APPELLEE

                         OPINION
                        AFFIRMING

                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND TAYLOR,
JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Lexington Alzheimer’s Investors, LLC d/b/a the

Lantern at Morning Pointe Alzheimer’s Center of Excellence (hereinafter referred

to as the Lantern), along with other related appellants appeal from an order of the

Fayette Circuit Court denying their motion to compel arbitration. We find no error

and affirm.

                      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

               Sandra Norris was the wife of Rayford Charles Norris. Mr. Norris

was a resident at the Lantern from October 25, 2019, until March 6, 2020. Mr.

Norris died on August 9, 2020. On July 8, 2021, Ms. Norris filed the underlying

action alleging that Mr. Norris received negligent care while at the Lantern which

resulted in his death. Appellants then moved to compel arbitration because Ms.

Norris signed a mandatory arbitration agreement1 on Mr. Norris’s behalf when he

was admitted to the Lantern. The trial court ultimately held that Ms. Norris did not

have the authority to enter into the arbitration agreement on Mr. Norris’s behalf as

executing such an agreement was not a health care decision. The trial court denied

Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration and this appeal followed.

1
 Mr. Norris would not have been able to be treated at the Lantern if the arbitration agreement
was not executed.

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                                    ANALYSIS

             “It is well established that construction and interpretation of a written

instrument are questions of law for the court. We review questions of law de

novo and, thus, without deference to the interpretation afforded by the circuit

court.” Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998) (citations omitted).

             Appellants argue on appeal that Ms. Norris did have the authority to

enter into the arbitration agreement on Mr. Norris’s behalf. They base this

argument on Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 311.631(1)(c) which states:

             (1) If an adult patient whose physician has determined
             that he or she does not have decisional capacity has not
             executed an advance directive, or to the extent the
             advance directive does not address a decision that must
             be made, any one (1) of the following responsible parties,
             in the following order of priority if no individual in a
             prior class is reasonably available, willing, and
             competent to act, shall be authorized to make health care
             decisions on behalf of the patient:

             ...

                   (c) The spouse of the patient[.]

Appellants’ argument is that this statute authorized Ms. Norris to enter into the

arbitration agreement on Mr. Norris’s behalf because it was a health care decision.

             Courts in this Commonwealth have held that when an arbitration

agreement is presented as a condition of admission to a medical facility, entering

into the agreement can be considered a health care decision. See LP Louisville

                                         -3-
East, LLC v. Patton, 651 S.W.3d 759, 770 (Ky. 2020), as modified on denial of

reh’g (Apr. 29, 2021); Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, 376 S.W.3d 581, 593 (Ky.

2012). In other words, if an arbitration agreement is mandatory in order to be

treated at a medical or nursing home facility, as it was in this case, then entering

into the agreement can be considered a health care decision. Appellants argue that

KRS 311.631(1)(c) and cases like those cited above indicate that the arbitration

agreement in this case is valid.

             The cases cited by Appellants and those found during this Court’s

research concern arbitration agreements as they relate to a power of attorney, but

there is no power of attorney in this case. An illustration of the cases found during

our research is still advisable. In Patton, supra, Tommy Patton was admitted into a

long-term nursing home facility in Louisville, Kentucky. 651 S.W.3d 759. Upon

Tommy’s admission into the facility, Kenneth Patton, his son, signed a mandatory

arbitration agreement as Tommy’s power of attorney. The power of attorney

documents gave Kenneth “all powers . . . necessary . . . to provide for [Tommy’s]

support, maintenance, [and] health.” Id. at 768.

             A few weeks after being admitted into the facility, Tommy died.

After Tommy’s death, Kenneth filed suit against the facility. The facility then

moved to compel arbitration due to the agreement executed by Kenneth. The

Kentucky Supreme Court held that “when an agreement to arbitrate is presented as

                                          -4-
a condition of admission to a nursing home, unless otherwise agreed, a power of

attorney expressing general authority to make necessary health care decisions

includes the incidental or reasonably necessary authority to enter that agreement.”

Id. at 770.

              Appellants argue that KRS 311.631(1)(c) allows Ms. Norris to make

health care decisions on her husband’s behalf just like the power of attorney

allowed Kenneth to make health care decisions for his father. Appellants believe

that because the arbitration agreement at issue here was mandatory for Mr. Norris

to be admitted to the Lantern, it was a necessary health care decision. We

disagree. The power of attorney in Patton gave Kenneth broad and general powers

to provide for the health of his father. According to the Kentucky Supreme Court,

that included entering into a mandatory arbitration agreement in order to have him

treated at a nursing home facility. In our opinion, the statute at issue here does not

grant such a broad array of powers.

              KRS 311.631(1)(c) allows a wife to make health care decisions on

behalf of her husband; however, KRS 311.621(8) defines “health care decisions”

as “consenting to, or withdrawing consent for, any medical procedure, treatment,

or intervention[.]” We believe this is a narrow definition and does not encompass

the ability to enter into an arbitration agreement, even if the agreement was

required to be admitted into a nursing home facility. The legislature chose not to

                                          -5-
grant one person broad or general powers over another person’s health care

decisions. The legislature chose to allow a person to consent to medical

procedures, treatments, or interventions on behalf of another person. Entering into

an arbitration agreement is not a medical procedure, treatment, or intervention.

                                   CONCLUSION

             Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

KRS 311.631(1)(c) did not allow Ms. Norris to enter into an arbitration agreement

on her husband’s behalf. Entering into the arbitration agreement was not a health

care decision as defined by KRS 311.621(8). A power of attorney granting general

health care authority may encompass the ability to enter into an arbitration

agreement; however, the health care decisions granted by the statutes discussed

above do not include this power.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -6-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:        BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Paul A. Dzenitis              Tyler S. Stewart
Emily W. Newman               Lexington, Kentucky
Corey J. Taylor
Louisville, Kentucky          ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                              APPELLEE:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT LEXINGTON           Tyler S. Stewart
ALZHEIMER’S INVESTORS, LLC    Lexington, Kentucky
D/B/A THE LANTERN AT
MORNING POINTE ALZHEIMER’S    Chad Gardner
CENTER OF EXCELLENCE:         Lexington, Kentucky

Emily W. Newman               Jake Grey
Louisville, Kentucky          Lexington, Kentucky

                             -7-