Court Opinion

ID: 9486303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:43:52.686222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:38.066169
License: Public Domain

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge,
joined by CUDAHY and MANION, Circuit Judges, dissenting.
Lonnie Stephens claims that on the night of March 17, 1987, he made comments to the complainant that caused her to end their consensual sexual encounter, send Stephens immediately from her home, wake her sister, and the next day to file a groundless charge of attempted rape. The content of the offending statement-a cornerstone of Stephens’ case — was never presented to the jury, the trial judge having ruled that the proposed testimony was barred by the Indiana Rape Shield Statute, Ind.Code Ann. § 85-87-4-4 (Burns 1985). The exclusion of this evidence indisputably gives rise to a colorable claim that the application of an evidentiary rule, the rape shield statute, has interfered with the defendant’s right to present his defense. When a defendant presents such a colorable claim, the task of the court is to balance the exculpatory import of the excluded evidence against the interest of the state manifested in the rule at issue. See Johnson v. Charns, 844 F.2d 482, 484 (7th Cir.), certiorari denied, 488 U.S. 835, 109 S.Ct. 95, 102 L.Ed.2d 71 (1988); McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir.), certiorari *1010denied, 455 U.S. 967, 102 S.Ct. 1479, 71 L.Ed.2d 684 (1982).
The interests served by the Indiana Code § 35-37-4-4 are obvious — and substantial. The Indiana Rape Shield Statute furthers laudable and pragmatic goals. It protects victims from needless exposure of their past sexual conduct; ensures that the focus of rape trials remains the guilt or innocence of the accused rather than the sexual history of the complainant; and, by reducing the embarrassment and anguish of trial, encourages victims to report rapes. Without the protection provided by rape shield statutes, victims may find trial an ordeal not worth enduring. Cf. 124 Cong.Rec.H. 11944 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman); Fed.R.Evid. 412 cmt. (1993) (“[M]any [rape victims] find trial almost as degrading as the rape itself_”). Moreover, Indiana has the power to pursue these goals through evidentiary rules — it is each state’s “sovereign prerogative” to regulate the presentation of evidence in its courts. McMorris, 643 F.2d at 460. Indiana’s rape shield statute is a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection from harassment and unnecessary explorations into their personal life, cf. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205, and exceptions to it should not be carved out liberally. Nonetheless, the desire to shield rape victims from harassment must yield in certain cases to another vital goal, the accused’s right to present his defense. Sending the innocent to jail, or depriving the guilty of due process, is not a price our Constitution allows us to pay for the legitimate and worthy ambition to protect those already victimized from additional suffering. Though relevant and competent evidence may properly be excluded to accommodate other legitimate interests, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, evidence with genuine exculpatory potential must be admitted. See Sharlow v. Israel, 767 F.2d 373, 377-378 (critical evidence may not be excluded); cf. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049. In the end then, what matters here — and what must be weighed against Indiana’s poli-ey choice — is the significance of the contested evidence to Lonnie Stephens’ case.
The jury in this case heard conflicting accounts of the events that occurred at the complainant’s house trailer: she testified that Lonnie Stephens was an unwelcome guest who attempted to rape her; Stephens testified that he and the complainant were engaging in consensual sex, but that in response to statements he made during intercourse she became angry, ended the encounter, ordered him to leave and fabricated a rape allegation in retaliation. The prosecution offered physical and testimonial evidence tending to corroborate complainant’s version. Stephens’ account consisted primarily of his own testimony. The plausibility of Stephens’ defense turned in substantial part on whether the jury could be persuaded that something Stephens had said to the complainant could have so enraged her that she would have responded in the manner he alleged. Central to Stephens’ case then are the words he claims to have said that night, words the jury never heard. Stephens proposed to testify that while he and the complainant were engaged in intercourse “doggy fashion,” he said to her “Don’t you like it like this?.... Tom Hall said you did.” (Trial Tr. at 1278).* Stephens instead was permitted only to testify without elaboration that he had said something that angered the complainant. The judge required Stephens to convince the jury of the truth of his story without allowing him to reveal the fragments on which its plausibility turned. He was asked to counter the detailed and vivid depiction offered by the prosecution with a version whose essential elements had been expunged. The jury might well have disbelieved Stephens’ testimony even if he had testified fully; however, it is hard to imagine his story being believed absent this evidence.
The majority is dismissive of the significance of Stephens’ statements to his defense — the exclusion is but a “very minor burden” on Stephens (p. 1002). Stephens, according to the majority, is not harmed by the exclusion because he “was allowed to give [the rest of] his [] version of the facts” (p. *10111002) and little was expurgated. That Stephens was allowed to present the rest of his defense, however, is irrelevant to the question of whether the excluded evidence was in itself important. At issue is not whether Stephens was allowed to present some defense, but whether the Sixth Amendment requires that he be allowed to present the specific evidence excluded. Since the majority has failed to explore the exculpatory significance of the excluded evidence, it is not surprising that it concludes that the exclusion of Stephens’ testimony is not “disproportionate to the purposes [of] the Indiana Rape Shield Statute” (p. 1002) — the majority has weighed only one of the issues to be balanced.
Moreover, I do not believe that allowing the evidence at issue would undermine the operation of the Indiana Rape Shield Statute. The statute may, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, operate to exclude a significant body of evidence — likely the type of evidence with which the drafters of the legislation were most concerned. Prohibited still is evidence suggesting that because of an alleged victim’s past sexual conduct she probably consented this time or “asked” to have intercourse or other argument that seeks to explain or excuse a rape based on the victim’s past behavior. (The Indiana Statute does allow introduction of evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the defendant, Ind. Code § 35-37-4-4(b)(l).) Admittedly, allowing Stephens’ testimony would create an exception to the statute, but the exception is a narrow one. That Stephens allegedly uttered these comments during the evening in question is not alone sufficient to compel admission. The Sixth Amendment does not create a broad res gestae exception to rape shield statutes. Neither does the Sixth Amendment require that the statements be admitted because they have some tendency to. aid Stephens’ defense. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. at 1045 (relevant and competent evidence may be excluded). Rather, Stephens’ statements must be admitted here because they are central to his defense.
This is not to say that the purpose of the rape shield statute would not be frustrated at all by the admission of Stephens’ offered testimony. Although admitting Stephens’ statement is unlikely to transform the trial into an inquiry into the complainant’s private life, she would undoubtedly suffer some anguish and embarrassment — anguish and embarrassment from which Indiana, in the cause of encouraging victims to report assaults, has an interest in protecting her. However, the state’s interest in allowing rape victims to testify “free of embarrassment and with [their] reputation unblemished must fall before the right of [the defendant] to seek out the truth in the process of defending himself- [T]he State cannot ... require [the defendant] to bear the full burden of vindicating the State’s interests].... ” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1112, 39 L.Ed.2d 347.
Allowing Stephens’ testimony acknowledges that because the protection of defendants’ rights is fundamental to our system, at times other interest may be impaired. Given the significance of the excised testimony to his ease, Indiana’s interests must yield to Stephens’ fundamental constitutional right to present his defense. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

 There was also a statement in the offer of proof apparently alleging that defendant reminded the complainant that she had switched sexual partners with Drema_and Tom Hall.