Court Opinion

ID: 9646594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:04:07.923962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:39.714896
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellee points out in his motion for rehearing that at the time of the accident, he was a minor, being 19 years of age, and, therefore, excused from compliance with the notice requirement of the policy sued on herein while under the disability of minority.
This question was considered recently by the Supreme Court in McCrary v. City of Odessa, 482 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.1972), wherein it was held in a case of first impression: “We conclude that legal incapacity should be treated in a manner similar to and consistent with our rules concerning *853mental and physical incapacity and hold that Thomas Alton McCrary, being under legal incapacity to institute or settle a claim in court, was excused from compliance with the notice requirement until he reached the age of twenty-one or until his disabilities were removed.” Thus, it was held that McCrary was excused from compliance with the provision of the Odessa City Charter which required written notice within sixty days from date of accident. See also: Latcholia v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n, 140 Tex. 231, 167 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.Comm’n App.1943, opinion adopted).
Appellant urges that this rule has no application here in that appellee’s obligation to give written notice as soon as practicable was a contractual obligation. Accordingly, it is urged that appellee may not claim benefits under the insurance policy while repudiating his obligations under same. See Carrizales v. W. O. W. Life Insurance Society, 140 Tex. 259, 167 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.Comm’n App.1943, opinion adopted).
The application of the notice requirement of an automobile liability policy to a minor was considered in Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Tex. Civ.App., 449 S.W.2d 93 (1969), and Central Surety & Insurance Corporation v. Anderson, Tex.Civ.App., 446 S.W.2d 897 (1969). Both cases were decided by the Second Court of Civil Appeals prior to the McCrary holding, and there was no application for “writ of error in either case. The following rule was adopted by the Second Court of Civil Appeals: “In determining whether an additional insured has given notice within a reasonable time, all the circumstances are considered, including, but not confined to, age, experience, capacity for understanding and knowledge that coverage exists in one’s favor.” Such a rule would appear to be in conformity with the policy requirement that notice be given as soon as practicable.
Nevertheless, a similar rule, as set forth in Wones v. City of Houston, 281 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Civ.App.- — Galveston 1955, no writ), was rejected by the Supreme Court in McCrary v. City of Odessa, supra. It is seen that the purpose of the notice requirement is the same in the insurance policy sued on herein as the notice requirement of the city charter. Furthermore, the physical and mental disability rule considered by the Supreme Court in McCrary is applicable also to the notice requirement in an insurance policy. We see no reason for drawing a distinction as to the effect of the disability of minority because of the type of cause of action asserted by the minor.
Accordingly, we hold that since the undisputed record establishes that appellee was under disability of minority until after this suit was filed, he was excused from complying with the notice requirement of the policy.
Our judgment of July 26, 1972, is withdrawn, and judgment here rendered that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.