Court Opinion

ID: 9806344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 18:57:35.004287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:03:05.992944
License: Public Domain

Manzanet-Daniels, J.,
dissents in a memorandum as follows: Since I believe it was error for the trial court to allow the prosecution to reopen its case to introduce prejudicial evidence relevant to a putative agency defense, I would reverse and order a new trial.
The prosecution alleged that defendant acted in concert to sell heroin to an undercover police officer. At the end of the People’s case, defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the trial evidence did not make out a prima facie case, asserting that the testimony established “nothing more than criminal facilitation.”
The prosecutor responded that defense counsel was “arguing an agency defense,” and asked to present rebuttal evidence. The court agreed, and asked counsel whether he was “making an agency defense.” The court noted that counsel had repeatedly stated that he was not asserting an agency defense, and indicated that counsel’s manner of handling the issue had been “inappropriate.”
During the ensuing colloquy, defense counsel repeatedly insisted that he was not interposing an agency defense, stating,
“I am making a trial order of dismissal based upon what I argue are failings or shortcomings or deficiencies in the People’s case.
“Whatever the Court’s ruling is, the defense will put on a case, but it will not be an agency nor will I ask the Court to charge itself so to speak in this bench trial on criminal facilitation as a lesser-included.
“I am merely arguing at this juncture, which is a procedural step after the People’s direct case as they have rested, that this evidence fall[s] short legally. The defense case will consist of my client testifying, but he will not claim agency, to use the vernacular, nor will I argue that he acted as an agent, nor will I ask the Court to charge itself that criminal facilitation should be submitted.”
The court accused defense counsel of “trying to draw distinctions without a substantive difference. And to the extent that you are trying to do so at this point, it would seem to me a bad faith response to the discussion that we had before as to what this trial is about and you have misled the People as to what your intentions were.” The court stated that “whether you call *457it an order of dismissal or otherwise,” it would permit the prosecution, which had “effectively relied on what [defense counsel] had said,” to reopen its case.
At the end of the People’s reopened case, defendant again moved for a trial order of dismissal. Defense counsel reiterated that he was not interposing an agency defense. The court replied that whether or not defendant had “intend[ed] to interpose” an agency defense, defendant had nonetheless made a “back door attempt” to assert the defense, entitling the People to submit rebuttal evidence.
Defendant denied having taken part in the sale of heroin to the undercover officer. He testified that he had a social relationship with the alleged accomplice, and had been present in the park for the purpose of exercising with him. According to defendant, the alleged accomplice and the man referred to as “JD Braids” retrieved the heroin, and he took no part in the transaction. He denied having taken money from the undercover, or handing heroin to the officer. At the conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel specifically declined to have the court, acting as factfinder, receive an agency charge. Defense counsel noted, inter alia, that his client had altogether denied participating in the sale.
Rather than simply denying the motion to dismiss, the court agreed with the People that defendant was interposing an agency defense, and ruled that doing so opened the door to rebuttal evidence.
As even the majority recognizes, there was no justification for ascribing an agency defense to defendant when counsel explicitly stated that he was not asserting one. While a court possesses discretion in determining whether to permit the reopening of the prosecution’s case (see People v Whipple, 97 NY2d 1, 8 [2001]), that discretion ought to be sparingly exercised — where, for example, the missing element is not seriously contested, and reopening the case is not unduly prejudicial to defendant (id.). The court’s discretion should not be exercised to allow reopening of the prosecution’s case so as to present evidence rebutting a defense the defendant has expressly disavowed.
Assertion of an agency defense opens the door to evidence that tends to disprove agency, but would otherwise be inadmissible, such as Molineux evidence (see e.g. People v Nealon, 36 AD3d 1076, 1078 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 988 [2007]), and prior convictions (see e.g. People v Rivera, 260 AD2d 323 [1st Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 977 [1999]). The introduction of such evidence here subverted defendant’s right to chart *458his own defense and deprived him of a fair trial. Given the breadth and amount of the erroneously admitted evidence, including an analysis indicating that a large volume of calls and texts had been placed between defendant and the putative accomplice’s cell phones, and texts related to other, uncharged drug sales, the error likely affected the outcome and was not harmless. While a court sitting as the trier of fact is presumed to have considered only the legally competent evidence adduced and to have excluded extraneous matters from its deliberations (see e.g. People v Gibson, 210 AD2d 8, 9 [1st Dept 1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 1031 [1995]), the colloquy among court and counsel indicates that notwithstanding defense counsel’s protestations to the contrary, the court construed defendant as asserting a “back door” agency defense. I would accordingly reverse and remand for a new trial.