Court Opinion

ID: 9851247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:09:27.573011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:51.884575
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree that the State failed to articulate adequate, racially-neutral reasons related to the specifics of this case for three potential jurors, and that retrial is therefore warranted under Batson and Georgia cases applying Batson.
I write separately to point out that since the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Purkett v. Elem,_U. S._(115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995), the law regarding Batson challenges is in a state of flux. In Purkett, a per curiam decision issued on a petition for certiorari without benefit of briefing or oral argument, the United States Supreme Court implicitly overruled Batson in part, concluding that despite explicit language in Batson to the contrary, the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution does not require the State’s racially-neutral reason to be related to the case (or even sensible); as long as the trial court believes the State’s denial of purposeful discrimination, any reason (other than “because he is African Ameri*365can”) is legally sufficient.1
Decided December 5, 1995.
Alden W. Snead, for appellant.
J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Robert M. Coker, Desiree S. Peagler, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Thus, this case would have to be affirmed if we considered only the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. Our consideration is not so limited, however, as the Georgia Constitution also has an equal protection clause. The Georgia Supreme Court has consistently required the State’s racially-neutral reason to be related to the case. See, e.g., Congdon v. State, 262 Ga. 683 (424 SE2d 630) (1993); Lewis v. State, 262 Ga. 679 (2) (424 SE2d 626) (1993); Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 327 (5) (357 SE2d 792) (1987) (‘““(Rubber stamp” approval of all nonracial explanations, no matter how whimsical or fanciful, would cripple Batson’s commitment to “ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race” ’ ”). I therefore think the proper course is to continue to follow this line of cases and require the racially-neutral reason to be related to the case unless and until the Georgia Supreme Court determines that case relatedness is not required under the equal protection clause of the Georgia Constitution.
In Justice Marshall’s separate concurrence in Batson, he accurately predicted the difficulties courts would face in trying to eliminate racially discriminatory peremptory strikes. See 476 U. S. at 102-108. This prediction was based not just on an assumption that some prosecutors would lie about their reasons, but also on a realization that our racial and ethnic stereotypes may be so deep rooted that prosecutors may not even realize they are relying on them. Id. at 106. As a result, Justice Marshall suggested that we should simply eliminate peremptory strikes as the only way to eliminate discriminatory strikes. Id. at 107-108. And after years of reviewing these cases, I am beginning to see the wisdom of such a course.

 The prosecutor in Purkett had explained his strike by saying that the struck juror “seemed suspicious” because he had long, unkempt hair, a mustache and a beard. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this explanation, holding that the racially-neutral reason for a strike must bear some relationship to the person’s ability to serve as a juror in that case, and where the reason was facially irrelevant, the prosecutor at least had to articulate some plausible reason for believing those factors would somehow affect the person’s ability to serve as a juror. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s obligation to articulate a racially-neutral reason “does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.” 131 LE2d at 839.