Court Opinion

ID: 9517229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:10:36.933266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:55.277280
License: Public Domain

MEYER, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would not require that an emergency-aid search be supported by evidence establishing proba*791ble cause to believe an emergency exists at a particular location, and instead I would inquire whether the emergency-aid search was based on a reasonable belief supported by specific and articulable facts. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the facts of this case give rise to an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency-aid search was justified. Finally, I would conclude that the evidence obtained as a result of that search was improperly admitted, prejudicing defendant Wintersun Lemieux as to two of the three counts against him.
The Minnesota Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
Minn. Const, art. 1, § 10; cf. U.S. Const, amend. IV. This constitutional guarantee renders warrantless searches per se unreasonable, subject to limited exceptions. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Minn.1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). This “per se unreasonable” principle applies with greatest force when it is a home that is to be invaded, as “[cjourts are particularly reluctant to find exceptions to this rule in the context of a warrantless search or seizure in a home.” Id. (citing Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 586,100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). Despite this reluctance, we have recognized an exception to the warrant requirement in the context of an emergency, stating that “[t]he police may enter a dwelling without a warrant if they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of emergency aid.” Id. at 223. For an emergency-aid search to be justified, the search must be objectively reasonable. Id. (citing Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir.1971)). “The court should ask whether with the facts available to the officer at the moment of the * * * search, would a person of reasonable caution believe that the action taken was appropriate.” Id. The state has the burden of showing that the emergency exception applies. Id.
As an initial matter, the majority appears to establish a new test for the emergency-aid exception to the prohibition on unreasonable searches, apparently holding that the facts known to law enforcement officers must establish probable cause to associate the area to be searched with an emergency. State v. Lemieux, supra, at 788. I believe the court errs in indicating that the probable cause standard applies in the emergency-aid search context. Application of the probable cause standard would be a departure from our case law on emergency-aid searches. See, e.g., Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 223 (requiring only a reasonable belief in the need to provide emergency aid); see also 3 Wayne R. La-Fave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), at 452-53 (4th ed. 2004). More importantly, the probable cause standard, arguably approaching a more-probable-than-not level, is too high. Society needs law enforcement officers, when legitimately acting in their roles as first responders rather than criminal investigators, “to act, not to speculate or meditate” on whether the proper legal standard has been met; “[pjeople could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process.” See Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963). Consequently, instead of applying the probable cause standard, I would require that an emergency-aid search be based on a reasonable belief, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a need *792to render emergency aid justifies the resulting intrusion. See Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 223; cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); 3 LaFave, supra § 6.6(a), at 452-53. This standard certainly requires less proof than that sufficient to establish a preponderance of the evidence, cf. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), but it protects liberty interests from arbitrary infringement by requiring a specific factual basis and certainty beyond a mere hunch. In addition, because the state bears the burden of justifying an emergency-aid search and because meritless and opportunistic cries of “emergency!” should not permit officers acting as criminal investigators to evade the requirement of a warrant based on probable cause, a court gauging the propriety of an emergency-aid search should give full and fair scrutiny to all available facts.
Even though the majority apparently applies the higher probable cause standard, it nevertheless determines that it was objectively reasonable for officers to believe a person inside Tawnya Rainey’s house may have needed emergency aid. In support of this conclusion, the majority cites the possibility that Rainey’s house had been burglarized, potentially by Teitelbaum’s murderer. Evidence for this includes the skipping music, the torn screen in an open window, an unlatched front door, the failure of anyone to answer the door, statements by a neighbor indicating that someone had been home the night before, and the house’s proximity to the earlier “brutal and seemingly random” homicide.1
I disagree that the facts of this case satisfy the state’s burden of establishing that the search was objectively reasonable, even under a less-than-probable-cause standard. The music and reports of possible occupants are certainly indicative that someone had been inside the house in the recent past. But it seems odd to count the possibility that someone had been inside recently as an affirmative factor necessitating immediate entry rather than a minimum requirement that the state must prove for the search not to be deemed per se unreasonable. In addition, while a torn screen on an open window, an unlatched door, and skipping music may be somewhat unusual, the merely unusual does not indicate actual trouble, and eccentricity alone is not enough to abrogate constitutional guarantees. This is particularly true where invasion of the home is concerned. A reasonable suspicion is not just any suspicion and, accordingly, even if evidence of a burglary alone may be sufficient to justify an emergency-aid search, the *793facts of this case are insufficient to sustain a reasonable belief that Rainey’s house had been the subject of a random burglary..
Similarly, the facts known by the officers are not sufficient to support an objectively reasonable belief that Teitelbaum’s murderer had left a second victim in need of emergency aid inside Rainey’s house.2 The majority emphasizes that Teitelbaum’s murder was “brutal and seemingly random,” but, while the nearby homicide is relevant to our analysis, the court neglects to explain why “brutal” murderers are more likely to kill again or how this murder appeared more random than most other homicides. In addition, six hours had passed between the homicide and the time of the emergency-aid search, which gave the murderer ample time to flee and indicated that anyone battered as Teitelbaum had been would already be dead. Most importantly, the majority points to no evidence, aside from the house’s general proximity to the murder scene, connecting Rainey’s house to the homicide. Viewing the circumstances as a whole, I cannot say that the facts of this case justify, warrant-less entry into Tawnya Rainey’s house under an emergency-aid search rationale— there is both too little evidence of an emergency and too little evidence connecting any potential emergency to Ramey’s house.
While the validity of an emergency-aid search is determined by an objective test, “this court will not look kindly upon war-rantless entries of family residences, justified on the flimsiest and most pretextual of excuses.” Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 224 (emphasis added). The subjective intent of the officers, although largely unscrutin-ized by the majority, is unquestionably relevant. See State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 369 n. 12 (Minn.2004) (“While not dispositive to our objective evaluation, the absence of any subjective perception of risk by [the officer] is noteworthy.”). That an officer did not actually believe that an emergency-aid search was required is evidence that an emergency-aid search was not in fact objectively reasonable under those circumstances and, when courts are forced to review the facts far removed from the actual events and through second-hand accounts, such information may be of great probative value. In this case, there is ample- evidence that the officers did not actually believe an emergency-aid search was required. The testimony of several officers indicates that initial police interest in Tawnya Rainey’s house was related to gathering information in the course of the homicide investigation.3 *794Nevertheless, an emergency-aid, search of Ramey’s house was preliminarily ordered before Officers Haataja and Harris arrived at the house4 and made the observations that allegedly justified the emergency-aid search.5 No other residence near the crime scene was the subject of similar concern from the police. Finally, the officers abandoned concern for Tawnya Rai-ney’s welfare immediately after finding evidence that the murderer had in fact been in her house,6 which was the very possibility that supposedly made the police fear for Rainey’s safety in the first place. Rather than confirming that Tawnya Rainey was safe, the officers immediately picked up the criminal investigation upon exiting the house, if indeed the criminal investigation was ever actually abandoned.7 This evidence of absence of good faith on the part of the police officers, while not determinative, further undermines the state’s claim of objective reasonableness.
Moreover, permitting an emergency-aid search under the facts of this case would expand the exception beyond the scope previously recognized in our decisions. Tellingly, we appear to have held that an emergency-aid search of a home was proper only two times in the last 30 years. In State v. Terrell, we held that entry was proper when officers entered a home in response to a report that a person had *795been shot and when the officers subjectively believed that the victim might still be alive. 283 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn.1979). In State v. Bradford, we held that entry was lawful in response to a 911 call reporting that a woman had shot herself. 618 N.W.2d 782, 787, 795 (Minn.2000). In both cases, the evidence was supplied by persons requesting police assistance and indicated a much greater probability of a specific and actual emergency compared to the case now before the court.8
The majority cites several foreign cases for the principle that a reasonable belief that an illicit entry has occurred is enough to establish a reasonable belief that someone inside may need emergency care, but, under closer scrutiny, none of these cases support a finding of objective reasonableness in this case. In United States v. Tibolt, the police officers were called to a residence by a security company in response to a security alarm, no one in the house responded to phone calls or on-site efforts to contact occupants, and the officers arrived ivithin ten minutes of activation of the alarm. 72 F.3d 965, 970 (1st Cir.1995). Most importantly, no direct challenge to the objective reasonableness of the search appears to have even been made on appeal. Id. n. 3. In Murdock v. Stout, police were summoned by a neighbor who had actually seen someone run from a neighbor’s house, and officers entered only after finding an open door and evidence that someone was home but non-responsive. 54 F.3d 1437, 1439 (9th Cir.1995). Moreover, the Murdock court “observe[d] that there was no indication here that the officers were using their burglary investigation as a pretext for conducting a search for evidence in Murdock’s house.” Id. at 1442-43. In United States v. Lenoir, the police received a call about a disturbance involving an armed man. 318 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir.2003). The responding officers arrived to find a visibly drunk man gripping an assault rifle and a shotgun, and the officers followed him when he fled into a nearby house. Id. Finally, in Carroll v. State, 335 Md. 723, 646 A.2d 376 (1994), the court emphasized the importance of determining whether the officers were “using the situation as an excuse to conduct an unlawful search for evidence,” id. at 382, and, in contrast to the present case, the court ultimately found that there was no evidence in the record indicating that the officers “entered * * * for any reason other than to investigate the suspicious condition.” Id. at 385. These cases all involve additional factors— factors such as third parties requesting help, stronger connections between the anticipated dangers and the suspected victims or suspected locations, apparent good faith on the part of the investigating officers — that distinguish them from the present situation.
While we review the legality of the search de novo, I agree with the district court that, without admissible evidence of the house’s interior being in a state of disarray, the emergency-aid search was unjustified. The remaining evidence of an emergency, including the officers’ apparent *796failure to subjectively believe that Tawnya Rainey might need aid, is too weak for entry to have been objectively reasonable. Moreover, application of the exception in this case would be out of line with other emergency-aid decisions and would imper-missibly erode constitutional protections from warrantless searches in the very context where they should be the strongest— in one’s home.
Because the emergency-aid search of Tawnya Rainey’s house was improper and because information from that search formed the basis for the search warrant under which evidence against defendant Lemieux was recovered, the evidence from Rainey’s house should not have been admitted at trial. See State v. Nelson, 355 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn.1984). Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the verdicts against Lemieux were surely unattributable to the erroneously admitted evidence — in other words, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997). The evidence obtained from Rainey’s house was the strongest evidence against Lemieux regarding robbery and, consequently, premeditation. While the evidence that Lemieux murdered Teitel-baum is overwhelming, without the evidence from Rainey’s house, the evidence of robbery and premeditation is not, and inclusion of the improperly recovered evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would affirm Lemieux’s conviction for second-degree intentional murder but reverse his convictions for first-degree murder and for first-degree murder while committing aggravated robbery.

. In addition, while the majority does not cite this fact explicitly in its analysis, the majority makes vague reference to some possibly crime-related "problems” supposedly linked to Tawnya Rainey's house. The majority does not explain how these ill-defined problems could have been related to Teitelbaum's murder or to any other potential cause of an emergency. Instead, at least some of these "problems” appear to have been unrelated to the emergency supposedly feared by the police. For example, Officer Harris sought out Tawnya Rainey in part because she learned that Rainey's former boyfriend had violated an order for protection at some unknown time, in' some unknown place, and in some unknown manner. It is true that links to criminal activity may potentially have been reason to investigate Ramey’s house in connection with the murder, in which case, as the majority notes, the officers would be "somewhat constrained,” presumably by our constitutional protections from unreasonable search and seizure. However, it is not clear why links to criminal activity might be indicative of the need to render emergency aid, a scenario in which the police are “somewhat” less "constrained.”

. To the extent that the possibility of a random burglary and entry by Teitelbaum’s murderer are two separate reasons to conduct an emergency-aid search, the majority appears to be "summing” potential threats in a manner unprecedented in our earlier cases. Even if adding threats from separate sources in this manner satisfies the specificity requirement of our reasonable suspicion test, it is not clear whether any limiting principle would prevent the aggregation of many small possibilities of harm to satisfy the reasonableness requirement, thereby permitting police intrusion into a citizen's home without a warrant even when no single serious threat was present. Permitting warrantless searches under such circumstances would both contravene our Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and create an unworkable standard for police officers, citizens, and courts to apply-

. For example, Officer Harris testified that her original purpose in seeking out Tawnya Rainey was to see "[i]f she could give me anything, you know, any leads, any names that maybe she thought were suspicious.” Moreover, Officer Haataja’s report from July 10, 2004, stated that his interest in finding *794Tawnya Rainey was related to seeking "information relating to the ongoing investigation.”

. Lieutenant Brasel clearly contemplated warrantless entry into Tawnya Rainey's house and discovery of evidence related to the homicide when he ordered Officer Haataja to visit the house, testifying that "I realized that if we entered an apartment without a warrant and we did find — although, at that point, it was a big ‘if’ — * * * evidence of a homicide, that there would be an argument made to suppress that, evidence.” Moreover, Lieutenant Brasel also testified that he sent Officer Haa-taja to make contact with Tawnya Rainey precisely because he wouldn't exceed the permitted scope of an emergency-aid search, which might cause evidence to be excluded. Officer Haataja testified that he was sent ”[t]o conduct a welfare check for the resident who lived there” and that "[i]t was my intent to attempt to contact this Tawnya Rainey and to verify that she was — her health and welfare w[ere] okay.”

. Lieutenant Brasel testified that he had insufficient evidence to order an emergency-aid search before Officers Haataja and Harris arrived at the house.

. After he found Teitelbaum's bank card, Officer Haataja ordered everyone out of the house and posted guards at the front and back doors to protect the scene until a proper search warrant could be obtained. Officer Haataja then called a parole officer to check on Wintersun Lemieux's whereabouts. Officer Harris left the house and engaged Tawnya Rainey's neighbor in a conversation about the neighbor's upcoming camping trip; this conversation lasted "quite some time.” Officer Harris did eventually call Lisa Rainey, Tawn-ya Rainey’s sister, but Officer Harris did not ask Lisa Rainey about how to contact Tawnya Rainey. While Officer Harris did apparently ask Lisa Rainey to contact Tawnya Rainey herself, Officer Harris’s primary concern in the phone call was related to learning where Wintersun Lemieux could be found. Id. While Officer Mike Erickson did eventually learn that Tawnya Rainey was busy attending a powwow and not staying in her house, he failed to mention this to other officers or include it in his report despite the alleged concern for Tawnya Rainey’s welfare.

.Officer Mike Erickson testified that he was aware of some connection between the Rai-ney family and Wintersun Lemieux prior to the major crime briefing held at 10:30 a.m. This, along with Officer Haataja’s attempts to immediately track down Lemieux after finding evidence related to the homicide in Tawn-ya Rainey's house, supports the possibility that the entire visit to Tawnya Rainey's house was motivated by an interest in investigating Wintersun Lemieux specifically rather than in investigating the homicide more generally.

. Moreover, we have held emergency-aid searches to be improper even when an emergency actually appeared to exist but was being attended to by medical professionals, Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 223, and when police were summoned by an informant's report that an occupant "may need help,” State v. Fitzgerald, 562 N.W.2d 288, 288 (Minn.1997) (holding that entry was unlawful as it was based on one-day-old information and the circumstances generally did "not suggest the kind of emergency that would justify a warrantless entry ”).