Court Opinion

ID: 9749493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:47:38.95408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:50.009606
License: Public Domain

MURRAY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority in their finding that the trial justice acted in accord with applicable case law. He properly exercised his discretion within the dictates of Rules 4(b) and 41(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; and the sanction invoked by him against the plaintiff was in conformity with our previous rulings on this point. See Germano v. Campbell, 116 R.I. 524, 359 A.2d 34 (1976); Sousa v. Casey, 111 R.I. 623, 306 A.2d 186 (1973); Burns v. Hirsch, 108 R.I. 251, 274 A.2d 421 (1971); Barton v. D’Attorro, 106 R.I. 697, 262 A.2d 834 (1970); Caprio v. Fanning & Doorley Construction Co., 104 R.I. 197, 243 A.2d 738 (1968).
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion in that I believe that the rule of law in the above-cited cases invites injustice and *750should, therefore, be modified. In a case such as the one now before us, the defendant should be required to demonstrate prejudice, as well as the mere fact of delay in service of process. See Lloyd v. Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., 454 F.Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y.1978); H. Alpers & Associates v. Omega Precision Hand Tools, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 408 (E.D.Pa.1974); and Ashland Oil & Refining Co. v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 51 F.R.D. 512 (S.D.Ohio, W.D., 1970). Such a requirement would permit the trial justice to make a more realistic factual, determination before denying a plaintiff his or her “day in court.”