Court Opinion

ID: 9581172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:12:14.27575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:45.259042
License: Public Domain

DAY, J.
(concurring). I concur with the majority opinion and write for the purpose of stating that the conclusions reached by Justice Abrahamson in her concurrence which attempts to justify this defendant father’s failure to support his family are not and should not be the law in this state.
Justice Abrahamson suggests that the “seek-work” order in this case “raises questions of due process, equal protection and involuntary servitude.” (Abrahamson, J. concurrence, infra, p. 275).
The public might well wonder by what legal legerdemain one can equate a court order “directing [a] parent to take alternative employment” to support his children to “involuntary servitude.” (Abrahamson, J. concurrence, infra, p. 275).
*263The phrase comes from the anti-slavery thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution passed following the Civil War. It provides:
“Article XIII. Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”
The Wisconsin Constitution provides in Article I, section 2:
“Slavery prohibited. There shall be neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”
To compare the enforcement of the obligation of a parent to support a child with slavery lacks appreciation for the social desirability of the former and the social monstrousness of the latter.
It is clear that under Wisconsin law the receipt of state relief may be conditioned on the recipient’s willingness to work. Section 49.05 (1), Stats. 1981-82, states:
“49.05 Work relief. (1) Any municipality or county required by law to administer relief may require persons entitled to relief to labor on any work relief project authorized and sponsored by the municipality or county, at work which they are capable of performing. . . .”
Section 49.50(7) (a) (Act 27, sec. 1075, 1983 Regular Session) makes participation in a work incentives demonstration (WIN-DEMO) program a condition for receipt of aid to families with dependent children.
“49.50(7) Work Incentive Demonstration Program. (a) The department shall ensure that all appropriate individuals so required by federal law and regulations as a condition of eligibility for aid to families with dependent children shall register for manpower services, *264training and employment under the work incentive demonstration program under 42 USC 645. . . .”
Until July 1, 1983, sec. 49.50(7) (d) 1, 1981-82, provided that an unemployed AFDC-U parent registered in the WIN program could be required to accept employment if full time employment paying a wage or salary equal to or greater than the federal minimum wage became available. Since over ninety percent of the AFDC recipients are women, to require them to work while permitting the fathers of their dependent children to ignore their responsibilities would be the rankest kind of discrimination against women.
State law also imposes a specific duty of support on parents of dependent persons. Section 52.01(1) (a), Stats. 1981-82. A parent who deserts or willfully neglects his support obligation may be subject to criminal prosecution. Section 52.05(1), 1981-82, states:
“52.05 Abandonment; uniform act. (1) Penalty. Any person who deserts or willfully neglects or refuses to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her spouse or child under 18 years (legitimate or born out of wedlock) in destitute or necessitous circumstances shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than 2 years or both. It is a defense to criminal liability that the person has just cause to desert, willfully neglect or refuse to provide support and maintenance . . . .”
Proof of desertion of one’s children in destitute or necessitous circumstances or of neglect or refusal to provide for the support and maintenance of one’s children is prima facie evidence that such desertion, neglect or refusal is willful. Section 52.05 (6).
This court has already determined that refusal to do “work of a particular kind” can be a “willful” refusal to support one’s family and subject such a parent to the penalties of the criminal law. Zitlow v. State, 213 Wis. 493, 498, 252 N.W. 358 (1934). In Zitlow the defendant, *265who was a molder by trade, had lost his job during- the depression. Under the county relief program in effect, when a family was in need of assistance the county furnished the needed relief and set up an account in which the head of the family receiving relief was charged with the value of the supplies furnished. When the county had highway or other work available, the heads of families who were on relief were summoned to appear for work. When the defendant Zitlow failed to appear for work as requested, he was prosecuted and convicted of abandonment by a jury. On appeal the defendant argued that he had just cause for refusing to work. He claimed that he could not be punished for refusing to participate in the county relief program where payment was made in part by crediting an account for relief previously furnished. He insisted that he should be paid his full wages in cash and that, considering the conditions of employment, to enforce the statute would be to imprison him for debt and subject him to “involuntary servitude.” In upholding the conviction for willful neglect, the court said:
“The term ‘willful’ as here used involves either a design or intent on the part of the person charged to evade the duties which the law casts upon him by reason of his marriage and parenthood, or a neglect based upon aversion or disinclination to work generally, or to work of a particular kind. If, however, the defendant in good faith, but by erroneous process of reasoning, came to the conclusion that the working conditions imposed by the county were oppressive and intolerable, his refusal to work, even though resulting in distress and want on the part of his family, would not be willful in the sense used in the statute. . . . [T]he less substantial and rational the objections of the defendant to the conditions of employment, the more reasonable the conclusion that the refusal to work was actuated by improper motives rather than an objection expressed in good faith to the working conditions.” 213 Wis. at 498. (Emphasis added.) See also: State v. Freiberg, 35 Wis. 2d 480, 151 N.W.2d 1 (1967).
*266Section 52.055 authorizes a less severe criminal penalty for a parent who “intentionally” refuses to provide support. That section also provides that “ [s] ubstantial failure by the parent or person to provide for the support or maintenance for more than 21 consecutive days immediately prior to the date when complaint is made under this section shall be prima facie evidence of intent. . . .”
The criminal statute also provides for a court order of support that may be imposed in lieu of or in addition to the criminal penalties. Section 52.05(4), Stats. The determination of the amount of the payments ordered is to be made with regard “to the circumstances, and to the financial ability or earning capacity of the defendant. . . .” (Emphasis added.) This clearly demonstrates that a court may take into account a defendant’s earning capacity in evaluating his ability to pay and need not defer to the defendant’s desire to remain in a job the income from which is grossly inadequate to meet his legal obligations to his family.1
*267In justification for doing nothing to make this father support his children, Justice Abrahamson speculates: “I wonder what the prospects for job stability are, considering his employment history and that he is being forced to work at a job he does not want.” (Abrahamson, J. concurrence, infra, p. 276). One might also speculate on how this mother will finish raising these children at the low economic level of public relief, or on how these children’s lives will be affected by knowing they are public charges, living without things other children take for granted, and knowing their father refuses to support them. Such speculation admittedly is less pleasant than “wondering” about a father “forced to work at a job he does not want,” but it has infinitely greater social consequences.
There are countless men and women “forced to work at a job [they] do . . . not want,” jobs that require long hours of hard, boring, often dangerous labor, in unpleasant surroundings, “forced” because they have children, spouses or parents looking to them for support. They do not look upon their jobs as “involuntary servitude.” They might, however, feel that the tax bite taken out of their wages to support the families of the able bodied who prefer to let the taxpayers bear their burdens approaches a form of “servitude” they should not be asked to endure.
I am authorized to state that Justice William G. Callow joins in this concurring opinion.

 The New York courts have expressly recognized the propriety of taking into account a person’s earning potential in fixing the amount of a support order. In Porcelain v. Porcelain, 94 Misc. 2d 891, 406 N.Y.2d 961 (N.Y. Fam. Ct, 1978), the Family Court for Nassau County said:
“The law is well settled that the respondent’s present economic condition is not the measure of the proper amount of support for the petitioner and his dependent children, but rather it is his ability to provide — his potential earning power which must be considered. The fact that he does not work, does not, in and of itself, preclude his capacity to work, nor preclude a finding that he has means wherewith to discharge an order for support. (DeLaFerriere v. DeLaFerriere, Dom. Rel. Ct., 94 N.Y.S.2d 147). The court is under an affirmative duty to fix an order measured by respondent’s ability to earn a living (De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 203 N.Y. 460, 96 N.E. 722). The measure of ability to support is not based upon what an irresponsible husband designs to earn, but what he is potentially able to earn in light of his established capabilities. (Brandt v. Brandt, 36 Misc. 2d 901, 233 N.Y.S.2d 993; Diana L. v. State of New York, 70 Misc. 2d 660, 335 N.Y.S.2d 3.).” 94 Misc. 2d at 896, 405 N.Y.2d at 964.