Court Opinion

ID: 9584874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:53:30.407801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:09.826839
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Judge,
dissenting.
With Presiding Judge Ruffin, I fully concur with Divisions 2, 3,4, and 5, but must respectfully dissent as to Division 1. I write separately to note that Keller sufficiently objected to State’s Exhibit 3, the “Official Notice of Revocation and Service by the Court.”
Prior to the first witness, Keller objected to introduction of the relevant exhibits by invoking his right to confrontation, the hearsay rule, and statutes that allow the admission of properly certified documents:
My third objection that I have gave [sic], Your Honor, is the objection to the use of . . . documents of the Department of Public Safety without calling the witness to testify to them under both OCGA § 24-3-17 (a) and provisions allowed for certified documents. And I contend that that would be unconstitutional hearsay. And we would ask that those documents not be permitted to be admitted without the calling of a witness for the purposes [sic] for defense to have cross-examination. And I base that upon the traditional rule, but that’s been permitted [sic] but following the decision from Miller v. [State, 266 Ga. 850 (472 SE2d74) (1996)], that that would fall into the — that is unconstitutional hearsay.
During the testimony, when the State offered the documents, Keller reiterated:
I object to State’s Exhibit 3 on the grounds that it violates the defendant’s right to confrontation under the 6th Amendment, as well as applicable portions of the Georgia Constitution, and it has been amended by a witness who is not present in court.
*84Decided December 1, 2004
Reconsideration denied December 16, 2004
Head, Thomas, Webb & Willis, Thomas J. Thomas, Jamie S. Wingler, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Amelia G. Pray, W. Thomas Weathers III, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
The majority claims that these objections were insufficient to raise the issue of whether the document was certified. But Keller’s objection fairly raises the relevant issue.
Hearsay objections and objections based on the failure of the State to comply with an exception to the hearsay rule arise from the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause embodied in the Sixth Amendment. See generally Miller v. State, supra at 853; Hill v. State, 223 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (478 SE2d 406) (1996). OCGA § 24-3-17, which was invoked by Keller, was enacted “to amend Article 1 of Chapter 3 of Title 24 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to general provisions concerning hearsay evidence. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 1988, p. 470, § 2.
OCGA § 40-5-2 (d) (1), which is applicable here, is similar. It provides that Department of Motor Vehicle Safety records, when properly certified, “shall be admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding as proof of the contents thereof.” See also Shapiro v. State, 233 Ga. App. 620, 621-622 (504 SE2d 719) (1998). Thus, Keller objected on grounds sufficient to cover the attempted admission of an uncertified document that the State attempted to introduce by way of an exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, I would find that Keller sufficiently objected to State’s Exhibit 3.