Court Opinion

ID: 9366550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 00:02:03.437018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:53.394836
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/26/23 P. v. Palacios CA4/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E074054

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FVA04210)

 ALEXANDER PALACIOS,                                                     OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Knish,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief

Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorneys

General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Scott C. Taylor, and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
                                               I

                                      INTRODUCTION

       In 1995, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Alexander Palacios of first

degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and found true the allegation that a principal

was armed with a firearm during the commission of the murder (§12022, subd. (a)(2)).

       In 2019, defendant filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction and for

resentencing under section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95).2 The trial court denied the

petition, concluding defendant was prosecuted as a direct aider and abettor.

       Defendant appealed that ruling, arguing the trial court erred in summarily denying

his petition because he established a prima facie case entitling him to a full evidentiary

hearing pursuant to section 1172.6. In our original opinion, we concluded defendant’s

record of conviction showed that he directly aided and abetted in the murder and

therefore affirmed the denial of defendant’s petition.

       Defendant petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, and following the

Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis), the matter

was remanded to us with directions to vacate our original opinion and reconsider the

matter in light of Lewis. We vacated our original decision and provided the parties the

       1   All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.

       2 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as
section 1172.6, with no substantive change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to
section 1172.6 for ease of reference unless otherwise indicated.

                                               2
opportunity to file a supplemental brief. Having reconsidered defendant’s appeal in light

of Lewis, we continue to affirm the order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.

                                              II

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

       A. Factual Background

       On May 1, 1995, the Peralta Family lived on Valencia Street in Fontana. The

family included Kathy Velasquez and her three children, Arthur Peralta (age 16), Valerie

Peralta (age 14), and George Peralta (age 10). Roger Coffman (age 16) also lived with

them. Down the street, Albert Zamora lived in an apartment complex. Zamora had

moved to Fontana from West Covina where he was friends with defendant, George

Maldonado (age 18), Lewis Pham (age 16), Harry Nabeshima (age 18), and others. The

group referred to themselves as OSK, or Old School Krew.4

       Prior to May 1, 1995, Maldonado visited Zamora in Fontana. On May 1,

Maldonado and Zamora tried to rob Roger Coffman. They threatened him with a knife,

chasing after him as he ran to the Peralta house. At the house, Zamora and Maldonado

attempted to force their way inside. Arthur Peralta pushed them out. Also present were

       3  The factual background is taken from this court’s nonpublished opinion in
defendant’s direct prior appeal, case No. E017475. (People v. Palacios (Oct. 20, 1997,
E017475) [nonpub. opn.]) We took judicial notice of the nonpublished opinion in case
No. E017475; a copy of the opinion is attached to defendant’s January 27, 2020, request
for judicial notice as attachment A. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

       4 In response to a pretrial motion, the trial court ordered the parties not to refer to
“gangs,” but did permit the parties to refer to the group or association to which defendant
belonged.

                                              3
Chester Howard, Haley Stockdale, Michael Moorer, Zamora’s sister, Zamora’s mother,

and some of her friends. After Zamora and Maldonado kicked down the front door to the

Peralta house, Arthur Peralta shot Maldonado in the neck. The wound was not fatal.

       Soon after defendant heard that Maldonado had been shot, he (defendant) called

Pham to talk about the shooting. Defendant was angry. He drove a gray Toyota minivan

to Nabeshima’s house to convey the news of the shooting and his desire to get even with

Arthur Peralta. Defendant tried to get Nabeshima to go with him (defendant), but

Nabeshima refused to go. Nabeshima was afraid of defendant and Pham. Defendant told

Nabeshima to call Pham and tell him to be ready and to have his gun ready. Defendant

left, saying that he was going to Pham’s house.

       Nabeshima called Pham who indicated that he had spoken with defendant. Pham

was very angry. He stated that he was going to take care of Arthur Peralta. He had a

.380-caliber gun. Nabeshima said that he did not want anything to do with it. However,

he conveyed defendant’s message that he was coming to get Pham and that Pham should

get his gun and be ready.

       Anticipating trouble in return for the shooting of Maldonado, Velasquez asked her

friend, Jenny Gomez, to come and pick up the children and take them to Moreno Valley

for safekeeping. Gomez went with Velasquez and Valerie Peralta to take Arthur Peralta

to the police station where he surrendered himself to the police. The Peraltas returned

from the police station after 10 p.m. Gomez, her cousin Kathy Guerrero, Coffman,

George Peralta, and Velasquez were all in the living room in the front part of the house.

                                             4
Valerie Peralta was in the den with her boyfriend, Robert Kalo White (age 14). They had

turned off most of the lights because they anticipated trouble. The only lights on were

the kitchen lights.

       Defendant and Pham drove to the Peralta’s house. As they approached, they

turned off the headlights of the van. One of the men, wearing dark clothes, quickly

walked up to the darkened house. He returned to the van, then both Pham and defendant

quickly came back to the house. They squatted down at the knees while running. Gomez

and Coffman saw the men approaching the house and ushered everyone into a front

bedroom to hide. Gomez, her cousin, and Velasquez locked themselves in the bathroom

and called the police from a cordless phone. They were not able to warn Valerie Peralta

or White because they could not safely walk through the lighted kitchen to get to them.

       The next door neighbor, Patricia Castanaza, heard someone at the Peralta’s back

door say in Spanish, “‘here, here it is.’” She was aware of the shooting of Maldonado

and was expecting trouble.

       Valerie Peralta and White heard a knock on the kitchen door. As Valerie started to

get up to answer it, White pushed her down and went instead. Someone outside asked if

Arthur Peralta was there. White replied that he was not. A few seconds later two

gunshots were fired through the window portion of the door. White was struck in the

chest by one of the shots and died a short time later.

       Upon hearing the shots, Castanaza went to the floor and crawled to her children’s

room to protect them. She saw a man, with many of the same characteristics as

                                              5
defendant, run across the yard in front of her house and jump into a gray van, which had

its engine running with the lights off.

       A few days later, Nabeshima, Maldonado, Pham, and other members of OSK met

outside a video store in West Covina. Pham bragged about shooting Arthur Peralta. The

group agreed that the members would each tell a false story implicating a fictitious

person named “Mark,” who would be described as a member of B & G, a West Covina

Filipino gang, as the shooter. They decided to use the nickname “Dopey” for the

fictional shooter⸺similar to Pham’s nickname of Dope.

       Nabeshima initially went along with the gang and lied to the police. He picked a

picture of a boy name Mark Zamala out of a yearbook. However, after the police told

Nabeshima that they knew he was lying and that he could be prosecuted for his lies, he

decided to tell the truth. He admitted that the story involving “Mark” was false, and

implicated defendant and Pham as the persons who had really gone to Fontana and who

were actually involved in the shooting of White.

       On May 24, 1995, Pham was taken into the police station for questioning. During

the interrogation, Pham stated that he had gone to the Peralta house in a van and had a

.380 handgun with him. Pham stated that he had knocked on the door and asked for

Arthur; however, the person at the door stated that Arthur was not there. Pham stated that

he fired two shots through the glass door, and subsequently gave the gun to a friend who

lived in Los Angeles County. The gun was recovered by the police and tested; however,

                                             6
the test results were inconclusive as to whether or not the gun recovered had actually

fired the bullets that killed White.

       At trial Gomez said that defendant fit the description of the person she saw at the

Peralta house that night because he had the same color of skin, same height and body

structure. The facial features and complexion looked like him. On the night of the

murder, Castanaza told the police that she did not see anything because she was afraid of

retaliation. Later, she told the police that she had seen a Hispanic or very light skinned

Black man running from the scene. She was shown three photo lineups with Black men;

however, she did not pick any of those as the perpetrator. Castanaza picked defendant

out of a separate photo lineup. She identified him at the preliminary hearing. Although

she did not definitively identify him at trial as the perpetrator, she did testify that he

shared all of the characteristics of the person she saw running away from the murder.

       Coffman told the police that he thought the assailants were Black. Valerie Peralta

told the police that the voice at the door sounded like Chester Howard’s voice.

       Defendant presented no affirmative defense. Instead, he argued that this was a

case of mistaken identification; that there was simply not enough evidence to place him at

the scene of the murder.

       B. Procedural Background

       On September 14, 1995, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (§ 187,

subd. (a)) and found true the allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm during

the commission of the murder (§12022, subd. (a)(2)). Defendant was sentenced to an

                                               7
indeterminate term of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole on the murder charge,

with a consecutive one-year term on the firearm allegation.

       On October 20, 1997, we affirmed the judgment. In doing so, we rejected

defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to prove the killing of White

was a natural and probable consequence of the attempted murder of Arthur Peralta. We

also disagreed with defendant’s contention that if Pham mistakenly believed he shot

Arthur Peralta, then the transferred intent doctrine, not the natural and probable

consequences doctrine, applies to assess liability. In addition, we rejected all of

defendant’s instructional error claims with the exception of one, finding the error to be

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We also disagreed with defendant’s argument that

the natural and probable consequences doctrine violates the separation of powers

doctrine.

       On January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective, which amended the

felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to

murder. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Senate Bill

No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), which created a

procedure for offenders previously convicted of murder to seek retroactive relief if they

could no longer be convicted of murder under the new law. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)

       On January 4, 2019, defendant in propria persona filed a petition for resentencing

pursuant to former section 1170.95, requesting that his murder conviction be vacated

based on changes to sections 188 and 189, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. The trial

                                              8
court thereafter appointed counsel to represent defendant, and the People filed opposition

to defendant’s petition. The People argued that defendant failed to make a prima facie

showing he falls within the provisions of former section 1170.95, and thus requested the

court deny defendant’s request for relief.

       The trial court heard the petition on August 22 and September 9, 2019. The court

denied the petition for resentencing, finding defendant had not set forth a prima facie case

for relief. After analyzing defendant’s record of conviction, including the jury

instructions and our opinion from defendant’s direct appeal, the court explained the case

was not prosecuted under a felony-murder theory but “an aiding and abetting of an

attempted murder that led to a murder of someone else, and so this law doesn’t apply to

[defendant].”

       On November 5, 2019, defendant timely appealed. We affirmed, and our Supreme

Court granted review, holding the case for decision pending resolution of Lewis, supra,

11 Cal.5th 952. Thereafter, the Supreme Court remanded the case with directions to

vacate our opinion and to reconsider the cause in light of Lewis.

       We vacated our opinion and allowed the parties to file a supplemental brief, with

which the parties have now supplied us.5 Defendant again argues for reversal, but the

People argue for affirmance.

       5  The People have also filed a request for this court to take judicial notice of the
records from defendant’s 1997 direct appeal in case No. E017475, which include the
verdict forms and jury instructions. Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452,
subdivision (d), we take judicial notice of the record of conviction from case
No. E017475.

                                              9
                                              III

                                       DISCUSSION

       Defendant contends the matter should be remanded under Lewis because the trial

court erred in relying solely on this court’s prior nonpublished opinion from his direct

appeal and the court engaged in impermissible factfinding. He further argues that any

error was not harmless. The People respond that under Lewis, the trial court properly

denied defendant’s petition without issuing an order to show cause because the record of

conviction unequivocally shows defendant acted with an intent to kill, thereby precluding

him from making a prima facie case for relief.

       A. Legal Background

       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 “‘to amend

the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to

murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual

killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying

felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10

Cal.5th 830, 846-847 (Gentile); see Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The Legislature

accomplished this by amending sections 188 and 189.

       Section 188, which defines malice, now provides in part: “Except as stated in

subdivision (e) of [s]ection 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime

shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely

on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)

                                              10
       Section 189, subdivision (e), now limits the circumstances under which a person

may be convicted of felony murder: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted

perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) [defining first degree murder] in which a

death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The

person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the

intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or

assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The

person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless

indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.” (Stats.

2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)

       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 expanded eligibility for relief to

include individuals convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based

solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), as amended by

Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg.

Sess.).) But it did not expand eligibility for relief pursuant to section 1172.6 to one who

directly aids and abets another who commits murder or attempted murder.

       Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedure for offenders previously convicted

of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek

retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted of murder under the new law.

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at

                                             11
p. 959; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).) “[T]he process begins

with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility

are met [citation], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of

murder or attempted murder because of changes to . . . [s]ection 188 or 189 made

effective January 1, 2019 . . . .” (Strong, at p. 708, fn. omitted.) “When the trial court

receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and other required information,

the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima

facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition and record in the case establish

conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the

petition.” (Ibid.)

       In Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, our Supreme Court explained the trial court’s role

in deciding a section 1172.6 petition: Petitioners who request counsel “are entitled to the

appointment of counsel upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition . . . .” (Id. at

p. 957.)6 “[O]nly after the appointment of counsel and the opportunity for briefing may

the superior court consider the record of conviction to determine whether ‘the petitioner

makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief.’” (Ibid., italics omitted;

see id. at p. 966 [“a complying petition is filed; the court appoints counsel, if requested;

the issue is briefed; and then the court makes [its] prima facie determination”].) The

court’s “prima facie inquiry . . . is limited. . . . ‘“[T]he court takes petitioner’s factual

       6  In Senate Bill No. 775, the Legislature amended the language of section 1172.6,
codifying Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, expanding the scope of the petitioning process
and clarifying some of the procedural requirements. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)

                                               12
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner

would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court

must issue an order to show cause.”’ [Citation.] ‘[A] court should not reject the

petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an

evidentiary hearing.’” (Id. at p. 971.) Importantly, “[i]n reviewing any part of the record

of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding

involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at p. 972.) The

court further concluded that a trial court’s failure to follow the procedures enacted in

section 1172.6 is analyzed for prejudice under the state law standard of People v. Watson

(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Lewis, at pp. 973-974.) Under this standard, we ask whether

it is reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome if

counsel proper procedures had been followed. (Id. at p. 974.)

       If a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, “‘the court

shall issue an order to show cause.’” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Once the

court determines that a defendant has made a prima facie showing, it “must [then] hold an

evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving, ‘beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder’ under state

law as amended by Senate Bill [No.] 1437. [Citation.] ‘A finding that there is substantial

evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is

insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for

resentencing.’ [Citation.] ‘If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior

                                              13
conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be

vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.’” (Strong, at

p. 709; accord, Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) “Senate Bill [No.] 1437 relief is

unavailable if the defendant was either the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or

‘was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to

human life . . . .’” (Strong, at p. 710.)

       B. Standard of Review

       In this case, the trial court denied defendant’s petition at the prima facie stage

under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). A denial at this stage is appropriate only if the

record of conviction demonstrates that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of

law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) This is a purely legal conclusion, which we

review de novo. (See id. at p. 961.)

       C. Analysis

       The trial court here properly relied on defendant’s record of conviction, including

the jury instructions, to discern defendant’s ineligibility as a matter of law at the prima

facie stage. As our Supreme Court has stated, “the parties can, and should, use the record

of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a

prima facie case for relief under [section 1172.6,] subdivision (c),” but cannot “engage in

‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)

                                              14
       The trial court here did not weigh evidence or exercise any discretion. Rather, the

court explained the jury instructions given at defendant’s trial, the jury’s findings, and

this court’s decision from defendant’s direct appeal. Discerning what the jury found is

not weighing evidence; it is determining what the factfinder found after the factfinder

weighed the evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 546-547

(Coley) [analyzing jury instructions to determine prima facie eligibility]; People v.

Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 894-895 [same].)

       Here, there is no dispute defendant was not the actual killer. However,

defendant’s record of conviction shows that he directly aided and abetted in the murder

and that he acted with the specific intent to kill. Defendant’s record of conviction

demonstrates that defendant knowingly aided and encouraged Pham in the attempt to

murder Arthur Peralta. In our prior opinion, we explained, “Assuming that defendant

intended to kill Arthur Peralta, but not White, the jury was instructed that, in order to find

defendant guilty as an aider and abettor of murder, it was required to find that defendant

and Pham shared that intent. The transferred intent instruction does not alter that

requirement. Moreover, the evidence was plainly sufficient for the jury to infer that

defendant engaged Pham’s support and both went to the Peraltas’ house gunning for

Arthur Peralta. Whether defendant and Pham were both mistaken that White was Arthur

Peralta, or whether only Pham made the mistake, both shared the same intent—to kill

Arthur Peralta—and defendant was properly liable as an aider and abettor. [Citation.]”

                                             15
       Moreover, the jury instructions given at defendant’s trial did not allow defendant

to be convicted based upon imputed malice but a showing of actual malice as an aider or

abettor. The jury was instructed with the general rules of principals under CALJIC

No. 3.00 and aiding and abetting liability pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.02, which, at the

time of defendant’s trial, provided: “‘One who aids and abets another in the commission

of a crime is not only guilty of that crime but also guilty of any other crime committed by

a principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the crime originally aided and

abetted. [¶] In order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of murder as charged in

Count 1 you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the crime of murder

was committed and (2) that the defendant aided and abetted such crime, (3) that a co-

principal in such crime committed the crime of murder, and (4) the crime of murder of

Robert Kalo White was a natural and probable consequence of the attempted commission

of the crime of murder of Arthur Peralta.’”

       The trial court also instructed the jury regarding attempted murder being the target

offense. At the time of defendant’s trial, CALJIC No. 8.66 defined attempted murder.

That instruction provided that the crime of attempted murder necessarily required the jury

to find that the accused “harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent

to kill unlawfully another human being.” (CALJIC No. 8.66.) And this court in

defendant’s direct appeal concluded the record conclusively demonstrated that the jury

found defendant had “harbored express malice.” Based on the record before us, there can

be no question that the uncontradicted evidence established that defendant harbored

                                              16
express malice when he went with Pham to the Peralta house. With respect to

defendant’s conviction of murder, the jury found that defendant committed murder in the

first degree. Thus, it found that defendant harbored express malice.

       While the amendment to section 188 effectively eliminated use of the natural and

probable consequences doctrine to support a murder conviction, the change did not “alter

the law regarding the criminal liability of direct aiders and abettors of murder because

such persons necessarily ‘know and share the murderous intent of the actual

perpetrator.’” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118; see People v. Chiu

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 167 [a direct aider and abettor “acts with the mens rea required for

first degree murder”] (Chiu).) Hence, a direct aider and abettor can be convicted of

murder notwithstanding the amendments to sections 188 and 189, which changed nothing

with regard to direct aider and abettor liability. Defendant was required to make a prima

facie showing that he was not convicted as a direct aider and abettor, and thereby “‘falls

within the provisions of’ the statute.’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 961; § 1172.6,

subds. (a)(3) & (c).) He failed to do so. The trial court therefore properly denied the

petition on the basis of its finding that defendant had not established a prima facie case

for relief by relying on this court’s prior opinion in defendant’s direct appeal.

                                             17
       In this case, the jury was presented with two theories of liability, direct aiding and

abetting and natural and probable consequences. In addition, the jury was instructed as to

a single target offense—attempted murder. As noted previously, the jury was also

instructed with CALJIC No. 3.02, the aiding and abetting instruction. The jury was

further informed that “[a]n attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements, namely, a

specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done towards its

commission.” Even if defendant’s first degree murder conviction was premised on the

natural and probable consequences theory, the jury necessarily found, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that when defendant acted as an aider and abettor, he did so with the

specific intent to kill. When the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 it acted “‘to

ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who . . . did not act with the intent

to kill[.]’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) The record shows as a matter of law that

defendant directly aided and abetted Pham and that he acted with an intent to kill. He

thus cannot show he is entitled to relief under section 1172.6.

       Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 539 is also instructive. The defendant in Coley was

convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder and appealed the denial of his

petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. (Coley, at pp. 541-542.) The trial court

concluded that the record of conviction showed the jury had found express malice, i.e., a

specific intent to unlawfully kill, when it convicted the defendant of attempted murder,

and therefore denied the petition. (Id. at p. 545.) The Court of Appeal affirmed,

concluding that the defendant’s conviction for attempted murder “demonstrates that he

                                             18
was convicted of second degree murder with express rather than implied malice.” (Id. at

p. 547.) The court explained that the defendant was “convicted of murder based on his

aiding and abetting of the same shooting that gave rise to the attempted murder

conviction” and that “[t]he jury was instructed by CALCRIM No. 600 that attempted

murder requires a determination that ‘the defendants intended to kill that person.’”

(Ibid.) “[B]y finding [the defendant] guilty of attempted murder, the jury necessarily

found he had personally harbored intent to kill or express malice when he aided and

abetted the second degree murder.” (Ibid.)

       Defendant argues that the trial court violated the procedures established in

section 1172.6 and Lewis when the court solely relied on this court’s opinion from

defendant’s direct appeal and admitted it had “not reviewed the transcripts of the trial.”

Citing to a statement made by the court, namely when the court stated that “it seems that

there’s no other reason to go over there other than to⸺to try to kill Peralta” (italics

omitted), defendant believes the court engaged in impermissible factfinding. We

disagree.

       Presuming the trial court violated some of the procedures established by

section 1172.6, we find any error to be harmless for the reasons noted above. (Lewis,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 973-974.) The error will be deemed harmless if the record of

conviction establishes as a matter of law that defendant was convicted under a theory of

murder that remains valid after Senate Bill No. 1437. (People v. Daniel (2020) 57

Cal.App.5th 666, 677-678.) The jury’s verdict and the jury instructions show as a matter

                                             19
of law that defendant was convicted as a direct aider and abettor, and therefore was

convicted under a theory of murder that still remains valid after Senate Bill No. 1437.

       Defendant also asserts that he is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing under

section 1172.6. Defendant has already challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in

support of his conviction as an aider and abettor in his direct appeal and lost. As

discussed above, nothing in the amendments to sections 188 and 189 altered the criminal

liability of direct aiders and abettors of murder. Such persons may still be convicted of

first degree premeditated murder based on their own knowledge of the perpetrator’s

unlawful purpose and their own intent to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission

of the murder. (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167 [direct aider and abettor “acts with the

mens rea required for first degree murder”].) Defendant cannot challenge the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting his first degree murder conviction as a direct aider and abettor

in an appeal from the denial of his section 1172.6 petition.

       In sum, the allegations in the petition that defendant “could not presently be

convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective

January 1, 2019,” a statutorily mandated prerequisite for a section 1172.6, are

contradicted by the record of conviction. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Defendant is thus

ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. We conclude the trial court

properly denied defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.

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                                         IV

                                   DISPOSITION

     The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                            CODRINGTON
                                                                      Acting P. J.
We concur:

SLOUGH
                        J.

FIELDS
                        J.

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