Court Opinion

ID: 9788310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:40:20.089863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:07.874371
License: Public Domain

FRANCHINI, Justice (dissenting) {51} I share the concerns raised by Justice Minzner and concur in her dissent. I write separately to reiterate my opinion, expressed in my dissent in State v. Guilez, 129 N.M. 240, 4 P.3d 1231, 2000-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 27-36, that the Motor Vehicle Code preempts the child abuse statute under Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068 ¶¶ 26-29, 122 N.M. 596, 930 P.2d 131. {52} I also believe that the majority opinion misapplies the general/specifie rule. I agree with the majority that “if two statutes dealing with the same subject conflict, then the more specific statute will prevail over the more general statute----” Majority Opinion ¶ 7. In my view, application of that rule necessitates the dismissal of the child abuse convictions rather than vehicular homicide convictions, as the majority holds. The vehicular homicide statute prohibits “the killing of a human being in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle.” NMSA § 66-8-101(A). The relevant section of the child abuse statute criminalizes “causing or permitting a child to be placed in a situation that may endanger the child’s life or health.” NMSA § 30-6-l(C). Because I believe that the vehicular homicide statute addresses Defendant’s criminal conduct with greater specificity, I would uphold the convictions based on that statute rather than the convictions based on the less specific child abuse statute.