Court Opinion

ID: 9380093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 07:09:22.873759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.424780
License: Public Domain

In The

                           Court of Appeals

                Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                           __________________

                          NO. 09-21-00281-CV
                           __________________

                    CITY OF GROVES, Appellant

                                    V.

              SCOTT LOVELACE, INDIVIDUALLY,
       AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF MINOR, C.L., Appellee
__________________________________________________________________

            On Appeal from the 172nd District Court
                    Jefferson County, Texas
                    Trial Cause No. E-203,308
__________________________________________________________________

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

     The City of Groves (a home-rule municipality located in Jefferson

County, Texas) appeals from the district court’s order denying its plea to

the jurisdiction.1 To resolve the issues the City raises in this appeal, we

     1See  Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (permitting
interlocutory appeals from orders granting or denying pleas to
jurisdiction filed by governmental units); Wagstaff v. Groves, 419 S.W.2d
441, 443 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting the
City of Groves’ status as a home-rule city).
                                    1
must decide whether the trial court erred in finding it possessed subject-

matter jurisdiction over the suit the plaintiffs filed against the City to

recover on tort claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The plaintiffs

alleged that Scott Lovelace was injured when a “dead tree” on property

the City did not own but in the City’s right-of-way fell on Scott. In its

plea, the City alleged it was immune from the plaintiffs’ suit and that its

immunity had not been waived because it did not have actual knowledge

the tree was in an unreasonably dangerous condition before it fell. The

City produced evidence supporting its claim that it did not know of the

unreasonably dangerous condition of the tree before Scott’s injury

occurred. The City also alleged that the tree did not create a special defect

under the Tort Claims Act and that the plaintiffs could not recover under

the Tort Claims Act based on proof that it should have discovered the tree

was rotten and in danger of falling before it fell and injured Scott.

     We conclude the plaintiffs’ claims are properly characterized as a

premise defect claim, not a special defect claim.2 We further conclude the

     2See  Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 500 S.W.3d 380, 391 (Tex.
2016) (explaining that for premise defect claims under the Tort Claims
Act, the premises owner has a duty to “use ordinary care either to warn
a licensee of, or to make reasonably safe, a dangerous condition of which
the owner is aware and the licensee is not”).
                                    2
plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact exists on the

issue of whether the City had actual knowledge of the tree’s unreasonably

dangerous condition before Scott’s injury occurred. Thus, the trial court

did not have jurisdiction over Scott’s claim, and it lacked jurisdiction over

the bystander claim that was filed by his son.

      We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment for the

City. We order the plaintiffs’ claims against the City dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction.

                                Background

      Scott lives in a home that faces Jackson Boulevard in Groves,

Texas. Joseph Collazo lives across the street. A tree in Collazo’s yard fell

and hit Scott while Scott had his back to the tree and while Scott was

raking his yard. Scott’s son, a minor, was inside their home when the tree

fell. The petition alleges Scott’s son was “a bystander near the scene . . .

and suffered extreme shock, fear and mental anguish as a result of direct

emotional impact from a sensory and contemporaneous perception of the

accident and injuries to his father.”

      Scott described what happened to him in a deposition, which is in

the exhibits the plaintiffs filed to oppose the City’s plea. Scott estimated

                                        3
the tree that fell on him from Collazo’s yard was more than thirty-feet

tall. According to Scott, when he was hit by the tree it just “threw [him]

forward,” but didn’t knock him down. Scott testified he injured his head

and back, but he made it to his front porch before he collapsed.

      Dr. Todd Watson, hired to testify by the City as an expert, has a

doctorate in plant pathology. Dr. Watson, whose report is among the

exhibits in evidence, attributed the tree’s fall to “above normal” levels of

rainfall in the area. Dr. Watson noted the area had experienced eighteen-

inches of rainfall in September 2018 alone. He also stated the area had

above normal levels of rain in October and November 2018, and the day

the tree fell, the area received two inches of rain. Given the rain in the

area over the two-year period before November 2018, Dr. Watson opined:

“[T]he tree fell from root and soil failure[,] . . . likely [because] some of the

roots were dead and decayed because of past flooding events and stress.”

Yet Dr. Watson also acknowledged that it was “obvious from photographs

[of the tree taken after the incident] that the tree was partially alive with

some dead branches.” Even so, Dr. Watson testified the presence of dead

limbs in the tree “does not necessarily mean the entire tree would have

fallen.”

                                       4
     Frank Thibodeaux, hired to testify by the plaintiffs as their expert

witness, has a master’s degree in urban forestry. Thibodeaux wrote a

report, which the plaintiffs filed to support their response to the City’s

plea. Thibodeaux reached the following conclusions in his report: (1) the

weather played no part in causing the tree to fall; (2) the City’s

“maintenance of the subsurface utilities (water and sewer) in right-of-

way (within the subject tree’s root plate) more likely than not led to the

decayed condition and failure of subject tree[;]” (3) he would have

expected “any lay person to see this tree appear[ed] to be dying or dead[;]”

and (4) the work the City performed in the easement near the tree over

the years led to “a prolonged period of senescence, slow death, and

eventual failure of the tree.”

     For the purpose of the hearing on the City’s plea, the Lovelaces’

Third Amended Petition was their live pleading. The petition alleges the

City had actual and constructive knowledge of the unreasonably

dangerous condition—the “dead tree”—which fell and struck Scott. The

petition alleges that Collazo owned the property where the tree was

located and alleges the City has a right-of-way there. The petition

concludes that both Collazo and the City had a duty to Scott to exercise

                                     5
ordinary care and to take reasonable steps to either remove the tree, to

warn Scott of the tree’s dangerous condition, or to otherwise make the

condition of the premises safe.3

     As to the City, the plaintiffs relied on the Tort Claims Act, section

101.021, to establish the legislature waived the City’s immunity from suit

so the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over their claims.4 The

petition asserts the City was liable for causing Scott’s injury under the

Tort Claims Act on three theories: (1) a premise-liability claim, which is

tied to the tree’s location in the City’s right-of-way; (2) a special defect

claim, which alleges the City should have known of the dangerous

condition of the tree before it injured Scott; and (3) a motor-driven

equipment claim, which is tied to the plaintiffs’ theory that when City

employees installed pipes for its stormwater and water system in the

right-of-way the employees damaged the tree’s roots. The plaintiffs also

alleged the City was liable to them on a constitutional nuisance claim,

which the plaintiffs allege the City caused by “creating and/or

     3Collazo   is a defendant in the trial court, but he is not a party to
this appeal.
      4Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 (Governmental

Liability).
                                6
contributing to create the nuisance at issue (the dead/rotten tree)

through installation, maintenance and use of the [City’s] equipment [in

the easement].”

       The City challenged the trial court’s authority to adjudicate the

dispute by filing a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for

summary judgment. 5 Generally, the combined plea and the evidence the

City filed supporting it assert that, before the tree fell, no one from the

City knew the tree was dead or knew the tree was in the City’s right-of-

way.

       For example, the evidence the City filed includes the affidavit of

Brad Bailey, the City’s mayor. Bailey also lives next door to the

Lovelaces. In his affidavit, Bailey swore that before November 17, the day

Scott was injured, he had noticed and picked up dead branches that had

fallen onto the street from the tree in Collazo’s yard. Even so, Bailey

continued, he didn’t “pay any attention to the tree in question.” As to

       5A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that is used to defeat a
plaintiff’s cause of action without regard to whether the plaintiff’s claims
have merit, as the plea requires the court to decide whether it has subject
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s case. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000).

                                      7
Bailey’s knowledge about whether the tree was in danger of falling and

whether it was in the City’s right-of-way, Bailey swore:

      I had no clue it was about to fall, did not think that it was
      dead or subject to falling, did not know or believe it was on the
      City of Groves[’] property, never perceived there was a danger
      from that tree falling across the street, never spoke with
      anyone about there being a danger it would fall, never
      reported to a private citizen or to the City of Groves any type
      of concern about the tree falling, was never told by anyone the
      tree was in danger of falling, and there was nothing to alert
      me to the fact the tree was about to fall or posed some danger
      of falling at any point before it actually fell on November 17,
      2018.

      In another affidavit, D.E. Sosa, the City’s manager, swore that

typically, he would be the person who would be notified of concerns about

problems in the City’s right-of-way. According to Sosa, the first time the

City learned about “this tree . . . was when the Fire Department notified

the Public Works Department for the [C]ity of Groves sometime after the

accident on November 7, 2018, [that an accident] had occurred.” Sosa

swore that before November 7, to his knowledge, “no employee or official

of the City . . . had received . . . any complaint and/or report, nor had they

made any complaint, report or observation that the tree was dead, that

the tree was in danger of falling, that the tree was dangerous[,] or [ ]

about to fall.”

                                      8
     The Lovelaces responded by filing evidence opposing the City’s

combined plea. The plaintiffs’ evidence includes a survey drawing of

Collazo’s lot, which was done by a surveyor that Collazo hired around

four months after the tree fell. It shows the surveyor, Randall Creel,

found a stump hole and 30-inch-tree stump in the City’s right-of-way.

According to the notes near the bottom of Creel’s drawing, the stump hole

he found is “IN PUBLIC R.O.W. BY [ONE FOOT, EIGHT INCHES].”

     For its part, the City doesn’t dispute that City equipment, which

includes a water meter, underground pipe and drain line, are on Collazo’s

side of the street on Jackson Boulevard and in the City’s right-of-way. As

to this equipment, the plaintiffs’ evidence shows that City employees

used an excavator to install a sewer line in the City’s right-of-way on

Collazo’s side of the street in 2002. In 2003 and 2008, City employees

replaced the water meter serving the house where Collazo now lives. The

water meter to Collazo’s home is near the base of the tree.

     The plaintiffs also produced other evidence that City employees

were in the neighborhood around Jackson Boulevard before the tree fell.

For example, the record shows City employees connected or disconnected

water-utility services to Collazo’s home three times in the year before the

                                    9
tree fell, twice in March 2018 and once in November 2017. Once a week,

City employees drove garbage trucks on Jackson Boulevard to pick up

the trash cans that residents placed outside their homes on Jackson

Boulevard. Once a month, a City employee drove a truck down Jackson

Boulevard while using an electronic device in the truck to gather signals

from water meters so the meter readings could be taken remotely.

     In response to the arguments raised in the plaintiffs’ response, the

City argued that when properly characterized under the Tort Claims Act,

the plaintiffs’ claim was a premise-defect claim and not special defect

claim under the Act. So they argued that because the plaintiffs couldn’t

show the City had actual knowledge of the alleged defect before the tree

fell on Scott, they couldn’t prove the City’s governmental immunity from

suit had been waived. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied

the City’s combined plea without stating a basis for its ruling.

                Standard of Review and Applicable Law,
                      The Texas Tort Claims Act

     We review trial court rulings on pleas to the jurisdiction de novo.6

We look first to the facts the plaintiffs pleaded in their petition to

     6See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226,
228 (Tex. 2004).
                                   10
determine whether the petition affirmatively demonstrates the trial

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute. 7 We construe the

petition liberally and in the plaintiffs’ favor, looking to the plaintiffs’

intent.8 When the defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction challenges the

existence of jurisdictional facts, the trial court may consider evidence,

and when necessary, it must do so to resolve the jurisdictional issues the

pleadings raise. 9

      If the evidence the parties submit implicates the merits of the case,

the standard of review we follow generally mirrors the standard followed

in motions for summary judgment.10 Under that standard, the burden is

on the governmental unit that filed the plea to present evidence to

support its plea. 11 When the governmental unit meets its burden, the

burden shifts to the party opposing the plea to show that a disputed issue

of material fact exists on the jurisdictional issue. 12

      7Id.   at 226.
      8Id.
      9Id. at 227 (citing Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 555).
      10Id. at 227-28; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
      11Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
      12Id.

                                     11
     When examining evidence on a plea, we take as true the evidence

favoring the party opposing the plea and we indulge every reasonable

inference and resolve any doubts in that party’s favor. 13 If the evidence

creates a fact issue on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court may not

grant the plea, and the issue of fact needed to resolve the jurisdictional

issue is left to the factfinder based on the evidence presented in the

trial. 14 But if the undisputed evidence establishes no jurisdiction exists,

or if it fails to raise a fact issue on the jurisdictional issue, whether the

trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction of the dispute is decided as a

question of law.15

     As political subdivisions of the state, governmental immunity

protects cities from being sued unless their immunity from suit has been

waived by a statute waiving the entity’s right to governmental immunity

in clear and unambiguous language. 16 When a governmental unit like a

city is immune from suit, its allegations implicate the trial court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit, meaning the power the trial

     13Id.
     14Id. at 227-28.
     15Id. at 228.
      16City of Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 457

(Tex. 2020).
                                   12
court was delegated by the legislature to adjudicate the dispute on its

merits. 17

      Cities seeking to challenge a trial court’s power to adjudicate a

lawsuit generally do so by filing pleas to the jurisdiction.18 They may also

raise claims of immunity by filing motions for summary judgment on

evidentiary grounds. 19 Here, the City challenged the trial court’s right to

adjudicate the dispute by combining their plea with a traditional and no-

evidence motion for summary judgment.

      In the trial court and here, the Lovelaces argue that the Texas Tort

Claims Act waives the City’s immunity from suit for the claims on which

they based their suit. In their Third Amended Petition, which is their live

pleading, the Lovelaces alleged the tree that fell on Scott and caused his

injuries raised both a premise and a special defect claim, which were

waived by the Act. The plaintiffs further alleged the City used motor-

driven equipment when installing a water meter and piping in its right-

of-way, work that involved excavating near the base of the tree. They

      17See EBS Sols, Inc. v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tex. 2020).
      18Cityof Magnolia 4A Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Smedley, 533 S.W.3d 297,
299 (Tex. 2017).
     19Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550-551 (Tex.

2019); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a.
                                     13
claimed the City’s use of that equipment “caused and contributed to cause

the tree to become dead and rotten and fall[.]”

     In the trial court, the Lovelaces argued the City was liable to them

for Scott’s injury because the City had damaged the tree’s roots when

using motor-driven equipment to install a water meter and piping in the

right-of-way. Under the Tort Claims Act, the legislature waived

governmental immunity for injuries caused by a governmental unit’s

employee’s operations or use of motor-driven equipment while in the

course and scope of their employment “if the governmental unit would,

were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas

law.” 20

     The TTCA also provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity

for premise defect claims. 21 For example, the TTCA waives governmental

immunity for the varied unreasonably dangerous conditions that a

factfinder may determine exists on a governmental unit’s premises,

      20Tex.  Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2).
       21See id. §§ 101.022(a) (providing for governmental unit’s liability

for premise defects), (b) (providing for governmental unit’s liability for
special defects), .025 (waiving sovereign immunity to suit “to the extent
of liability created by this chapter” and allowing person with claim under
TTCA to sue governmental unit for damages); Univ. of Tex. at Austin v.
Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113, 115-16 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam).
                                      14
defects the Act categorizes as “premise defect[s].”22 The legislature also

waived governmental immunity for “special defects,” a subset of premise

defects, which consist of defects like “excavations or obstructions on

highways, roads or streets[.]” 23

    The classification of the defect as a general or as a special defect

matters because it affects the duties the governmental unit owes the

person who is injured while on the government’s premises.24 For premise

defect claims under the TTCA, the plaintiff must generally plead and

prove:

     (1) a condition of the premises created an unreasonable risk
     of harm to the licensee; (2) the owner actually knew of the
     condition; (3) the licensee did not actually know of the
     condition; (4) the owner failed to exercise ordinary care to
     protect the licensee from danger; (5) the owner’s failure was a
     proximate cause of injury to the licensee.25

    Proving a governmental unit possessed actual knowledge of a defect,

however, is more onerous than proving that it had constructive

     22Tex.  Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(a).
     23Id. § 101.022(b).
     24Id. § 101.022; City of Dallas v. Reed, 258 S.W.3d 620, 622 (Tex.

2008) (per curiam).
     25See Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 391. Additionally, plaintiffs may

recover if they plead and prove the governmental unit engaged in willful,
wanton, or grossly negligent conduct. Id. But the Lovelaces didn’t allege
the City engaged in willful, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct.
                                    15
knowledge (should have known) of the unreasonably dangerous

condition. For example, it doesn’t satisfy the actual knowledge

requirement if the proof merely shows that government employees knew

“materials deteriorate over time and may become dangerous[,] . . . [as]

the actual knowledge required for liability is of the dangerous condition

at the time of the accident, not merely of the possibility that a dangerous

condition can develop over time.”26

    When they exist, special defects on premises under government

control place a greater duty of care on the government and its employees

than when the defect is classified as an ordinary premise defect.27 When

classified as a special defect, the government owes the person injured on

the government’s premises the same duty that a private landowner owes

to an invitee. “Whether a condition is a special defect is a question of

law.”28 If the defect is classified as a special defect, the duty the

government owes to the user of its premises requires the government to

use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm

     26City of Dallas v. Thompson, 210 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Tex. 2006).
     27Compare   Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b), with id.
§ 101.022(a).
     28Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116.

                                   16
created by the special defect of which the government is or reasonably

should be aware.29 That said, when deciding whether a condition is a

special defect, our Supreme Court has cautioned: “The class of special

defects contemplated by the statute is narrow.”30 In deciding whether a

special defect exists the focus is on the expectations of an “‘ordinary user’

who follows the ‘normal course of travel.’” 31

                                  Analysis

    In the first six issues of the City’s brief, the City argues the plaintiffs’

pleadings and the evidence the trial court considered in ruling on the

City’s plea fails to show the City’s governmental immunity was waived

for Scott’s claims that he was injured by 1) motor-driven equipment, 2) a

condition or use of tangible personal property, 3) a condition or use of real

property, 4) a special defect, or 5) a nuisance. In the City’s sixth issue, it

argues the trial court erred in considering the report from the plaintiffs’

expert in urban forestry, Thibodeaux, over the City’s objections that the

report shouldn’t have been admitted because Thibodeaux’s opinions are

     29See  State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d
235, 237 (Tex. 1992).
      30Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116.
      31Id.

                                   17
conclusory and were not based on competent summary-judgment

evidence.

                    The Motor-Driven Equipment and
                   Tangible Personal Equipment Claims

    First, we consider whether the plaintiffs’ claims arose from the City’s

operation and use of motor-driven equipment. The Tort Claims Act

waives a city’s governmental immunity for personal injury claims

“arise[ing] from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-

drive equipment[.]” 32 But here, the evidence shows the tree fell from

rotting over time and not because it was hit by any of the City’s motor-

driven equipment, which then caused it to fall.

    Without question, the plaintiffs’ theory is that the City used motor-

driven equipment and cut some of the tree’s roots, which weakened the

tree and over many years, starved the tree, and caused its death. In their

petition, the plaintiffs alleged the City’s use of motor-driven equipment

in the right-of-way “contributed to causing the dead, dangerous condition

of the tree[.]” The evidence supporting the claim includes deposition

testimony from City employees, which shows the City installed a sewer

     32Tex.   Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(1)(A).
                                   18
line and a water meter in the right-of-way more than a decade before the

tree fell. The plaintiffs also filed a report from their urban forestry expert,

Thibodeaux, whose report states the City’s work in the easement over the

years “more likely than not led to the decayed condition and failure of the

tree.”

    Still, the Tort Claims Act requires the government’s tortious act to

“relate to the defendant’s operation of the vehicle rather than to some

other aspect of the defendant’s conduct.” 33 And in its appeal, the City

argues there “is no evidence that any yet to be identified employee could

be held liable under Texas law, for any yet to be identified act or omission

involving the operation or use of any yet to be identified motor driven

equipment, which allegedly caused injury some 16 years later.”

    We agree with the City that there is no evidence in the record raising

an issue of material fact about whether any City employee’s negligent use

of motor-driven equipment in the right-of-way proximately caused the

tree to fall on Scott. The survey drawing in evidence shows that before

the tree fell, the tree in question was located just inside the City’s right-

             Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette Cty., 453 S.W.3d 922,
         33Ryder

928 (Tex. 2015).
                                   19
of-way on Jackson Boulevard. By statute, home-rule municipalities like

the City have “exclusive control over and under the . . . streets . . . of the

municipality.”34 Here, no one disputes that the City had the right to

install City-owned pipes, drains, and meters in its own right-of-way.

Moreover, there is no testimony in the record that the City acted

negligently in performing the work when it dug the ditch to lay the lines

to install the pipes in the right-of-way, or that the City negligently

installed the City’s water meters there.

    Without evidence of tortious conduct, meaning negligence, there is

no tortious act that relates to the City’s use of any motor-driven

equipment. The plaintiffs did not claim the City damaged a tree located

outside the City’s right-of-way. Nor did they claim that City employees

dug in areas where the City had no legal right to dig. For the City to be

liable to Scott under the Tort Claims Act for operating equipment, the

plaintiffs needed to show an “employee would be personally liable to the

claimant according to Texas law” to establish the Tort Claims act waiver

     34Tex.   Transp. Code Ann. § 311.001(a).
                                    20
applied to their claims.35 They failed to make that showing on the record

before us here.

    We reach the same result as to the plaintiffs’ claim alleging the City

employees injured Scott by installing City-owned tangible personal

property in the right-of-way “at or near the base of the tree.” 36 The waiver

that applies to the use of tangible property also requires plaintiffs to show

the “governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the

claimant according to Texas law” to establish the Tort Claims Act waiver

applies to the claim. 37 The utilities at issue are in the City’s right-of-way.

Since the parties agree the City had the right to install the utilities

within the City’s right-of-way, a City employee would not have been

negligent in cutting some of the tree’s roots installing equipment in a

location over which the City had a right of control. 38

                    The Premise and Special Defect Claims

    The Tort Claims Act generally limits a governmental unit’s duty to

those who may be injured by defects on government property “by

      35Tex.    Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(1)(B).
      36Id.   § 101.021(2).
      37Id.

          Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 311.011(a); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
      38See

Code Ann. § 101.021(1)(B)(2).
                                21
classifying the user of the government’s property as a licensee rather

than an invitee.”39 That said, when the plaintiff’s injury is caused by a

special defect like an excavation or an obstruction on a highway, road, or

street, the government’s duty to the plaintiff isn’t as limited. 40 Special

defects “include other defects of the same kind or class as the two

expressly mentioned in the statute.”41

    Lovelace claimed that, when the tree fell, “it qualified as both a

premise defect and a special defect.” He alleged the City had actual and

constructive notice of the unreasonably dangerous condition of the dead

tree and failed to exercise ordinary care to keep its right-of-way in a safe

condition or to warn him of the danger of the tree.

    We address the plaintiffs’ special defect claim before addressing their

ordinary premise-defect claim. It’s undisputed the tree was standing

until it fell and injured Scott. Generally, conditions are considered special

defects like the two identified in the statute “only if they pose a threat to

the ordinary users of a particular roadway.” 42 Until the tree fell and

     39City  of Denton v. Paper, 376 S.W.3d 762, 763 (Tex. 2012); Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(a).
      40Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b).
      41Paper, 376 S.W.3d at 764.
      42Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 238 n.3.

                                     22
obstructed the street, it didn’t prevent any cars from driving on Jackson

Boulevard. The danger that Scott identified in his petition concerned the

City’s failure to remove a rotten, standing tree before it fell. And he sued

the City because the tree fell on him and injured him while he was in his

own yard, not because the tree was obstructing traffic in the street. 43 For

all these reasons, the tree was not a special defect under the statute as

to Scott’s or his son’s claims. 44

    Next, we address whether the evidence the plaintiffs filed raised a

genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether the City had actual

knowledge of the rotten and dangerous condition of the tree before it fell

and injured Scott. Under the Tort Claims Act, an ordinary premise-defect

claim requires the plaintiff to prove a fact issue exists on the issue of the

government’s actual knowledge to establish the trial court has

jurisdiction to allow the case to proceed. 45 That is because in the ordinary

premises defect claim, the legislature limited “the duty that a private

person owes to a licensee on private property[.]”46

      43See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(b).
      44Id.§ 101.022(a).
      45Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 385
      46See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.022(a).

                                   23
    Under Texas law, the duty owed a licensee is “not to injure a licensee

by willful, wanton or grossly negligent conduct” and “to use ordinary care

either to warn a licensee of, or to make reasonably safe, a dangerous

condition of which the [entity] is aware and the licensee is not.”47 So the

plaintiffs not only had to show the City knew the tree was in the right-

of-way and had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition of the tree,

but they also had to show the City had actual knowledge of the

“dangerous condition at the time of the accident.” 48 Stated another way,

the plaintiffs needed to prove that some City employee or a City official

realized either from the way the tree looked or from being notified by

someone that a dead tree that was in danger of falling was in the City’s

right-of-way on Jackson Boulevard before Scott was injured by the tree.

     Yet here, the evidence shows at most that the City had constructive

knowledge of the tree’s potential danger. There is no evidence showing

that a City employee or official had actual notice of the dangerous

condition of the tree before Scott’s injury occurred. Depositions taken

from City employees and the City’s mayor show they denied knowing

     47Sampson,    500 S.W.3d at 385 (cleaned up).
     48Hayes,   327 S.W.3d at 117.
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there was a dead tree in the right-of-way before the tree fell. Scott’s

deposition, which for the appeal we accept as true, shows that sometime

after he was injured, he and Bailey were mowing grass when Scott

“mentioned to him about [the tree] throwing branches on the street[.]”

According to Scott, “I’m pretty sure I thought he said it was dead too.”

But even if accepting as true that Bailey acknowledged he thought the

tree was dead, Bailey denied knowing the tree was in the City’s right-of-

way. And while Bailey also acknowledged having seen dead branches

from the tree in the street before the tree fell, he swore “there was

nothing to alert [him] to the fact the tree was about to fall or posed some

danger of falling at any point before it actually fell[.]” Scott never claimed

that he told Bailey before the tree fell that he (Scott) thought the tree was

dead, in danger of falling, or in the City’s right-of-way. Scott also testified

that to his knowledge, Bailey was not knowledgeable about trees.

      When Scott was deposed, he candidly admitted he “never expected

the whole thing” to fall even though he too had seen branches that had

fallen from the tree in the street. And there’s simply no other evidence

that anyone from the City was notified by any source there were any

problems with the tree before it fell and injured Scott.

                                      25
     All in all, the evidence the Lovelaces point to doesn’t show the City

had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition of the tree before it fell

on Scott. Even if the evidence supports the inference that the City should

have realized the tree was dead from the fact it was dropping branches

in the street, an issue we need not decide, the issue in this case is whether

the City had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition of the tree

before it fell on Scott.49 Because the evidence doesn’t raise a fact issue

showing the City had that kind of knowledge, the trial court erred in

concluding it had jurisdiction over the City under the Tort Claims Act.

                           The Nuisance Claim

     The plaintiffs’ petition also raises a “constitutional nuisance” claim,

as they alleged the City created a nuisance—the dead tree—by installing,

maintaining, and using the utilities the City’s employees installed in the

easement. This nuisance allegedly “resulted in an interference” with the

plaintiffs’ “constitutional rights of use and enjoyment of their property, .

. . which rights are protected by the Texas Constitution.”

     49We    note the plaintiffs asked the Court to remand the case to the
trial court to allow them to amend their petition and cure any deficiencies
in their pleadings. But we have disposed of their premise-defect claim on
the basis they presented no evidence of the City’s actual knowledge of the
defect, not because they didn’t plead a sufficient claim.
                                      26
     Article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution provides that “[n]o

person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to

public use without adequate compensation being made[.]”50 To start, the

plaintiffs didn’t plead or present any proof that their property was

damaged when the tree fell on Scott. They sought to recover the type of

damages that plaintiffs usually seek in personal injury cases—damages

for pain, suffering, mental anguish, lost wages, and medical expenses.

They also didn’t plead or prove that their property was taken by the City

and applied to a public use.

     On top of those problems, the plaintiffs failed to plead or prove the

City intended to take his property, or that it knew to a substantial

certainty that the property damage resulting from the City’s decision to

lay the pipe was substantially certain to result from the City’s actions in

cutting the tree’s roots and to maintain the City’s water and storm utility

systems in the City’s right-of-way. 51 We have already explained how the

plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to present any evidence to raise a

fact issue showing that any City officials or employees knew the dead tree

     50Tex.   Const. art. I, § 17(a).
     51See   City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. 2004).
                                      27
was in the City’s right-of-way before the tree fell on Scott. We have also

explained there is no evidence in the record proving that any of the City’s

employees engaged in negligent conduct by cutting tree roots in the City’s

right-of-way to install pipes for its utility systems there.

      Last, to avoid governmental immunity, plaintiffs may not alter the

nature of their claims by recasting them as nuisance claims by artful

pleading to avoid a plea to the jurisdiction. When evaluating a plaintiffs’

petition, we are not bound by the petition when determining the true

nature of plaintiffs’ cause of action; instead, we may consider the entire

record and depending on what it shows, decide what the plaintiffs’ cause

of action actually is depending on what the record shows the facts are

that gave rise to the claims. 52

      The Lovelaces’ petition states a claim for the accidental result of the

City’s act, that is the City’s alleged negligence in failing to remove a dead

tree in the City’s right-of-way after it should have known a dead tree was

there. The tree did not belong to Scott, and even though Scott claimed he

was hit by the tree when it fell, the Lovelaces’ real property was not

      52SeeLake Jackson Med. Spa, Ltd. v. Gaytan, 640 S.W.3d 830, 848
(Tex. 2022).
                                28
“taken or damaged for public use.” 53 On this record, no valid factual basis

exists to support the pleading of a constitutional nuisance claim.

                                Conclusion

     We conclude the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that an issue of

material fact proves that Scott’s injury resulted from the City’s operation

or use of motor-driven equipment, the City’s use of tangible personal

property, a defect in the City’s premises, or a special defect. We further

conclude the plaintiffs do not have a constitutional-takings claim. We

sustain issues one through five. We need not address the City’s sixth

issue, since resolving that issue in favor of the City would not give the

City any greater relief. 54 We reverse the trial court’s judgment and

dismiss the plaintiffs’ case against the City for lack of jurisdiction.

     REVERSED AND RENDERED.

                                               _________________________
                                                    HOLLIS HORTON
                                                         Justice

Submitted on March 23, 2022
Opinion Delivered March 16, 2023
Before Horton, Johnson and Wright, JJ.

     53Jennings,  142 S.W.3d at 313 (cleaned up).
     54Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring opinions to address each issue that
is necessary to resolving the appeal).

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