Court Opinion

ID: 9851954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:22:08.8702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:20.252444
License: Public Domain

Brodkey, J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. I believe that the majority opinion, although it correctly sets forth several general principles of law, misapplies those prin*141ciples to the facts of this case, and ignores other applicable law. Under the particular facts of this case, it was error for the trial court to overrule defendant’s motion for new trial.
Section 29-2101, R. R. S. 1943, provides that a new trial may be granted to a defendant for “any of the following reasons affecting materially his substantial rights: * * * newly discovered evidence material for the defendant which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial.’’ See, also, State v. Atkinson, 191 Neb. 9, 213 N. W. 2d 351 (1973). There is no dispute whatsoever in this case that the evidence on which defendant relies was newly discovered evidence which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial. Therefore the only question presented is whether the new evidence was material and of sufficient importance and weight to warrant a new trial.
It will be helpful to scrutinize more closely the evidence on which defendant relies. In summary, the new evidence was that the informant Landrie had falsely accused, or attempted to “frame,’’ one Bruce Bamford, an accused in a case analogous to the defendant’s case. The evidence in question was presented in the form of affidavits in connection with defendant’s motion for new trial. Those affidavits set forth the following facts. At a preliminary hearing in the Bamford case, Landrie testified under oath that Bamford had sold him 4,000 amphetamine tablets on December 20, 1974; and that Bamford had sold him y2 ounce of cocaine on December 28, 1974. The sales were allegedly made at a trailer court in Kearney, Nebraska. In Bamford, as was true in the present case, Landrie was the sole witness to the alleged crimes, and was working as a paid informer for the State Patrol.
Bamford contradicted Landrie’s accusations with respect to both alleged sales. As to the first, Bamford stated that he was at his home at the relevant *142time, and not at the trailer court. Three witnesses, as well as a telephone company record, supported Bamford’s assertion. In addition, one Jerry Davis stated that it was he who sold 4,000 amphetamine tablets to Landrie on December 20, 1974, at the trailer court, although Davis was never charged with a criminal offense for that act.
As to the second alleged sale, Bamford stated that he had been in Colorado on the relevant date. Three witnesses and a motel receipt signed by Bamford supported this assertion. Furthermore, one Danny Anderson stated that on December 28, 1974, he delivered *4 ounce of cocaine to Landrie, and one Pat Gifford stated that on the same date he observed Landrie adding ounce of baking soda to what Landrie represented to be cocaine. As noted previously, Landrie had accused Bamford of selling him y2 ounce of cocaine on December 28, 1974. On May 21, 1976, the charges against Bamford were dismissed by the District Court on motion by the county attorney.
The above evidence was such that a jury could reasonably conclude that Landrie had falsely accused, or attempted to “frame,” another defendant in an analogous case, during a relevant time period, while Landrie was employed as a paid informer. In the majority opinion this evidence is characterized as “cumulative,” and also as evidence that would “ ‘merely impeach or discredit a witness who testified at the trial.’ ” I disagree. I believe that the new evidence was relevant to the issue of bias, a partiality of mind on the part of Landrie, and not merely to the issue of Landrie’s reputation for truth and veracity or his credibility in general. The defendant did not attempt to attack Landrie for bias at trial by showing that he had falsely accused another defendant in a parallel case, but sought only to impeach Landrie’s credibility in general. Therefore the new evidence is not simply cumulative.
Support of this position is found in Johnson v. *143Brewer, 521 F. 2d 556 (8th Cir., 1975), a case on which defendant relies, but which is not referred to in the majority opinion. In Johnson, the defendant made an offer of proof at trial to show that the sole witness against him, a professional informant, attempted to “frame” another defendant in. an analogous case. The trial court denied the defendant the opportunity to adduce such evidence at trial, and the defendant was convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted a writ of habeas corpus and vacated the defendant’s conviction. .
The court first noted that the use of paid informants by the government, although perhaps necessary, is an “inherently dangerous procedure” to the extent that extensive precautions must be taken to insure that an innocent man should not be punished. The court noted that a variety of motives exist on the part of a paid informant to “ ‘produce as many accuseds as possible.’ ” 521 F. 2d at p. 560. In characterizing the evidence refused by the trial court, the court stated: “The offer here made was thus to show that the informant before the court and jury was completely insensitive to the obligations of his oath and that from motivations the origin of which we can only surmise, but nevertheless apparently existent, he had, as demonstrated in a parallel case, neither compunction nor scruple against ‘framing’ a man. We have difficulty in envisioning a situation responding more completely to the orthodox test of bias, the quality of emotional partiality.” 521 F. 2d at pp. 560, 561. (Emphasis supplied.)
The court also found that the exclusion of evidence as to the attempt by the informant, the only witness to the alleged crime, to frame another defendant in a precisely parallel case, went beyond mere error with respect to rules of evidence, but was error of constitutional dimension. The essential point was that the jury must be given an opportunity to assess the evidence of the “frame-up” in the prior case.in *144whatever manner it wished. The court noted in conclusion that it was not passing upon the truth or falsity of the matters set forth in the offer of proof, but that they were neither immaterial nor collateral, and that the defendant was entitled to put them before the jury. See, also, Steinmark v. Parratt, 427 F. Supp. 931 (Neb., 1977), a case in which the court followed Johnson and found that it was error to deny a defendant the opportunity to present evidence from which the jury could conclude that a professional informant, the same Dennis Landrie, had falsely accused another person in a similar case.
Under these cases, the conclusion is inescapable that had the evidence at issue in the present case been available to the defendant and offered by him at the time of trial, it would have been reversible error for the trial court to exclude it from evidence and deny the defendant the right to impeach Landrie for bias. Furthermore, there can be no question that the evidence would have been admissible. Not only would the defendant have been able to attack Landrie for bias on cross-examination, he would not be bound by Landrie’s answers, and could prove the alleged bias by extrinsic evidence. See, Johnson v. Brewer, supra, 521 F. 2d at 562; Smith v. Hornkohl, 166 Neb. 702, 90 N. W. 2d 347 (1958); Johnson v. Griepenstroh, 150 Neb. 126, 33 N. W. 2d 549 (1948); 3 Weinstein’s Evidence, § 607 (03), at p. 607-17; McCormick, Evidence, § 40, at p. 81 (2d Ed., 1972); 3A Wigmore, Evidence, § 948, at p. 783 (Chadbourn Rev., 1970). Evidence indicating that a witness was consciously willing to falsify his testimony is always admissible to prove bias. 3 Weinstein’s Evidence, § 607 (03), at p. 607-29.
As stated in Vassar v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 121 Neb. 140, 236 N. W. 189 (1931): “Cross-examination of a witness to show bias, hostility, or that he is actuated by a spirit of revenge is entirely distinct from impeachment, which is governed by its own *145rules of evidence. ******* a jury would scrutinize, more closely and doubtingly, the evidence of a hostile than that of an indifferent or friendly witness. * * * Generally, on cross-examination of a witness, any fact may be elicited which tends to show bias or partiality, and if the witness denies the fact showing the bias or interest, the cross-examining party may call other witnesses to contradict the witness.’ ”
Significantly, the evidence of the kind at issue in the present case has been characterized in the above cases as so material and important that its exclusion at trial constitutes error of constitutional dimension.
The general rules on which the majority opinion relies do not satisfactorily dispose of this case, and simply gloss over the fundamental issues. Landrie, an admitted convicted felon and a paid informant, was the sole witness to the alleged crimes. He testified that the defendant made sales to him both on the morning and the evening of January 7, 1975, yet witnesses, some of whom could be fairly characterized as disinterested, corroborated defendant’s alibi with respect to the evening sales, and the jury acquitted the defendant on the charges arising from the alleged evening sales. Although the jury had the right to credit or reject the whole or any part of the testimony of Landrie in its role as the trier of fact, the verdict of acquittal alone, at least in the context of this case, raises a most serious doubt as to Landrie’s credibility and lack of impartiality. See Steinmark v. Parratt, supra, 427 F. Supp. at p. 934. The credibility which the jury attached to Landrie’s testimony must inevitably have determined the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but, at the time of trial, evidence of bias on the part of Landrie was not available to the defendant. In my opinion, had the evidence in question been presented to the jury, which apparently rejected Landrie’s testimony with respect to the alleged evening sales, it would have affected the jury’s conclusion with respect to the al*146leged morning sales, and probably would have produced a substantial difference in result. The materiality and importance of the new evidence under the particular and unusual facts of this case cannot be denied.
I recognize that the general rule is that a “new trial will not ordinarily be granted for newly discovered evidence which, when produced, will merely impeach or discredit a witness who testified at the trial.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Wycoff, 180 Neb. 799, 146 N. W. 2d 69 (1966). This, however, is not an ordinary case, and the new evidence is material to the issue of Landrie’s possible bias, not merely to his credibility in general or to his general reputation for truth and veracity. See Johnson v. Brewer, supra. This case is not analogous to the cases on which the majority opinion relies. In State v. Evans, 187 Neb. 474, 192 N. W. 2d 145 (1971), the evidence on which the defendant relied in moving for a new trial was only that which would have impeached one of several prosecuting witnesses. In State v. Wycoff, supra, the new evidence related only to a collateral matter not material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. In the present case, both the evidence at issue, as well as its materiality and probable impact on the jury, are substantially different.
Since exclusion of the evidence, had it been available to and offered by the defendant at trial, would have constituted reversible error, I find no rational or consistent basis for concluding that no error occurred simply because defendant’s only alternative was to move for a new trial because he did not discover the evidence until after his trial. In this case the jury’s determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence inevitably rested on the credibility which it attached to the testimony of a paid informant, who was an admitted convicted felon. Such testimony is not necessarily false, nor is it necessarily true. The *147essential point, however, is that in such a situation the jury must be given an opportunity to assess all material evidence before it reaches its decision. The only fair and just result is to grant the defendant a new trial and permit him the opportunity to present to the jury the evidence from which it could conclude that the informant was biased. I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the cause for a new trial.
McCown and White, C. Thomas, JJ., join in this dissent.