Court Opinion

ID: 9653586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:49:23.049957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:00.165428
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In its motion for rehearing Republic points out that article 5541 not only provides a presumption that death occurred on the date of the certificate, but also provides that “such certificate may be admitted as prima facie evidence ... of the date and place where such person died.” Consequently, Republic argues, although the presumption may have disappeared when rebutted, the certificate remains as evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue. In support of this argument, Republic cites Hill v. Cabral, 62 R.I. 11, 2 A.2d 482 (1938), and Thornes v. Meyer Store, 268 Mass. 587, 168 N.E. 178 (1929).
Notwithstanding the holdings in those eases, we are not persuaded that our legislature, in enacting article 5541, intended the certificate to be accepted as evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue, regardless of the strength of opposing testimony. “Pri-ma facie evidence” is a phrase with no fixed meaning. Sometimes it means evidence raising a presumption; that is, proof establishing the existence of the fact at issue as a matter of law if no opposing evidence is offered. In other contexts it means proof that merely entitles the proponent to go to the jury on the existence of the fact at issue if no opposing proof is offered. Coward v. Gateway Nat’l Bank, 525 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex.1975); 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2494 (3rd ed. 1940); 1 C. McCormick and R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 55 (2nd ed. 1956); and see Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Casselman, 417 S.W.2d 146, 149-50 (Tex.1967) (official certificate is prima facie evidence of contents of judgment, but presumption is destroyed by opposing evidence). In a number of Texas cases “prima facie evidence” is defined in this latter sense to mean that which suffices for the proof of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Simonds v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 134 Tex. 332, 136 S.W.2d 207, 209 (1940); Dodson v. Watson, 110 Tex. 355, 358, 220 S.W. 771, 772 (1920).
Under these authorities, if “prima facie evidence” is not used in article 5541 in the sense of evidence raising a presumption, it *277has even less force. So interpreted, the statute simply makes the certificate admissible in evidence and provides that when admitted it creates a presumption. The phrase “prima facie” qualifies and limits the term “evidence.” If the statute provided that the certificate “shall be evidence” of the date of death, then perhaps it would support a fact finding, regardless of opposing evidence. The statute provides, however, only that it shall be “prima facie evidence.” We are not persuaded that the ambiguous term “prima facie evidence” means that the certificate alone raises a fact issue, regardless of what opposing evidence may have been introduced. For instance, we do not believe that the legislature intended to authorize a court or jury to find that death occurred on the date specified in the certificate, even though disinterested eye-witness testimony should conclusively establish that it occurred at an earlier date. Consequently, we conclude that the certificate has no probative force if it is rebutted by other evidence of the date.
Republic’s motion also raises the question as to whether the evidence contained in the stipulation is sufficient to rebut the presumption. We adhere to our decision on original submission that the presumption has been rebutted. We recognize that there are expressions in some Texas cases that evidence to rebut a presumption must be conclusive or so clear, positive and disinterested that it should be given conclusive effect. Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Greenwade, 138 Tex. 450, 159 S.W.2d 854, 858 (1942) (presumption of receipt of letter from proper mailing); see Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Muegge, 135 Tex. 520, 143 S.W.2d 763, 768 (1940) (recognizing conflicting authorities). More recently, however, the supreme court has set this question at rest by holding that in order to rebut a presumption, the opponent is not required to prove non-existence of the fact in issue as a matter of law, but may rebut it by the testimony of an interested witness, thus shifting to the proponent the burden of offering other evidence to prove the fact at issue. Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Tex.1971) (presumption of scope of employment of truck driver). That opinion recognizes that if the facts on which the presumption is based, without the aid of the presumption, logically tend to establish the fact at issue, then, although the presumption disappears as a rule of law, the fact inference remaining may be sufficient to raise an issue for the jury. Examples cited by the court are Sudduth v. Commonwealth County Mut. Ins. Co., 454 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex.1970) (inference of non-mailing of notice from non-arrival); Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Greenwade, 138 Tex. 450, 159 S.W.2d 854, 858 (inference of receipt of letter from proper mailing).
Applying these rules, we conclude that the presumption has been rebutted in this case. The certificate by the Navy Department shows only that February 24, 1976, is the date on which the insured’s status was changed on the department’s records from “missing in action” to “presumed killed in action.” In itself, the certificate does not tend logically to establish the date of death. Only by virtue of the presumption provided by article 5541 does it have any force to establish the date of death. When that presumption was rebutted by evidence of circumstances tending to show his death at an earlier date, the certificate had no further force as a presumption or as “prima facie evidence.”
Although the opposing evidence here may fall short of direct eye-witness testimony, we hold that it is sufficient to rebut the presumption and to raise a counter-presumption that the insured died in 1967. The circumstances of his disappearance, as established by the stipulation, provide circumstantial evidence that he died when his plane was shot down over North Vietnam. Proof of the perilous circumstances in which he was last seen raises a counter-presumption, which serves to overcome the presumption established by the certificate, and thus to cast on Republic the burden to produce evidence intending to prove that he survived that peril. See 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2493 (3rd ed. 1940). *278Since, by the terms of the stipulation, no other evidence is available, judgment should be rendered accordingly.
Motion for rehearing overruled.