Court Opinion

ID: 9551340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:51:49.754382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:35.452285
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(concurring) :
I concur. The law of this case is not one of determining the rights of the parties, but simply to the effect that there was a genuine issue of fact that should be settled by an arbiter of the facts at a trial. Mr. Justice Ellett’s dissent overlooks the purpose of the reversal in this case by discussing substantive rights before they have been established. I think the summary judgment route is that road that leads to a cul du sac because the fact issues cannot penetrate the barrier. 1 The main opinion simply says there is an issue of fact that pierces the veil, — that’s' all,-^r and no title insurance company would .sell a policy on .the grounds that the main opin,-ion has salted down res adjudicata-wise the substantial rights of the parties in this case. Not even Lloyds' of London would gamble on the rights, where the main opinion simply says “Let’s establish *208the facts at a trial in order to establish the correlative rights.” The minute the seller gave a notice to “pay up or quit,” and accepted and retained rental payments in response thereto, there was precipitated a genuine issue of fact not determinable, under the rules, by summary judgment.