Court Opinion

ID: 9457664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:29:18.148601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:27.509776
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
In this case, as in Watson v. United States, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 439 F.2d 442 (1970), appellant claims that Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962), imposes a constitutional bar to criminal conviction1 of an addict for possession of narcotics simply to satisfy his own addiction. As in Watson, the Court does *1312not reach this contention. It finds the record in the trial court factually inadequate for informed adjudication — “particularly in respect of the impact of addiction at the time of the alleged violation” — and therefore declines to decide whether § 4704(a) can be constitutionally applied to an addict in possession of narcotics for his own use. Instead, it remands the case for resentencing under Title II of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 (NARA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-4255. I adhere to the view stated in my dissenting opinion in Watson. “[A]s to appellant’s constitutional claims, we do not sit as triers of fact. * * * We may not avoid deciding whether or not the statute was constitutionally construed by the trial court simply by speculating that, in any event, the jury might have resolved the factual issues against appellant.” 2
The Court does not dispute that appellant raised the constitutional question in the trial court. Thus, even if the record was inadequate, the appropriate course is not to affirm the conviction but to remand for additional findings, unless an alternative disposition fully moots appellant’s claim. Resentencing is not such an alternative because treatment under Title II of NARA is available only to an “eligible offender” which is defined, in part, as “any individual who is convicted of an offense against the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 4251(f). The point of appellant’s claim is that he is not guilty of an offense. Having properly raised the point, appellant is entitled to this Court’s consideration of its merits.3

. 439 F.2d at 462 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

. Compare Kleinbart v. United States, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 439 F.2d 511 (1970). There appellant challenge as cruel and unusual only the irreducible ten year minimum sentence imposed on those twice convicted of narcotic offenses, and re-sentencing under Title II of NARA would moot that point.