Court Opinion

ID: 9714848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:47:05.764315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:29.018076
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, specially concurring: The trial court should be affirmed. I agree with the majority, the testimony of Grigsby and Lewis falls within the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Also, the testimony of Reents and Meinzen was admissible pursuant to section 115—13 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 115—13). I do not agree with the necessity, relevance, or reasoning of the extended discussion of unavailability and confrontation. Inadi, as the majority points out, involved the admissibility of a coconspirator’s statements. This is not the case here. Once we determine the evidence is admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, or proper under section 115—13, confrontation or availability is gone. As stated in the Handbook of Illinois Evidence: “Exceptions to the general rule excluding hearsay other than admissions *** are separated into two categories: those exceptions that are not affected by the availability or unavailability of the declarant, §803 infra, and those exceptions that require that the declarant be unavailable before the hearsay statement may be admitted, §804 infra.” M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §803.1, at 545 (4th ed. 1984). Two statements, Grigsby’s and Lewis’, are spontaneous declarations. This hearsay exception is “ ‘firmly *** rooted in our jurisprudence.’ ” (Coy v. Iowa (1988), 487 U.S. 1012, 1021, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857, 867, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2803, quoting Bourjaily v. United States (1987), 483 U.S. 171, 183, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144, 157, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783.) Availability or confrontation is not a needed element or criterion. Ingram, 162 Ill. App. 3d 257, 515 N.E.2d 1252. The admissibility of the statements made to Reents and Meinzen was proper under section 115—13. Likewise, availability and confrontation are neither elements nor required for admissibility. The statements were made for proper diagnosis or treatment and met the requirements of the statute, as well as the long-standing rule. Roberts involved a different factual setting concerning availability: preliminary hearing testimony used at trial. Here, the statement from Roberts (488 U.S. at 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 608, 100 S. Ct. at 2539), “Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,” confirmed in Coy, determines the issue. The statement by the majority, “that we be clear and emphatic in our holding on this point: Whether the out-of-court declarant is unavailable is totally irrelevant to the determination of whether an out-of-court statement of that declarant is admissible under an exception or exemption to the hearsay rule” (198 Ill. App. 3d at 658), is correct as to the issues in this case, spontaneous declaration and medical history, section 115—13. It is not a correct statement as to all hearsay.