Court Opinion

ID: 9768634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 07:00:25.299235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:46.370305
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     TIMOTHY TEN PAS,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         PH-0752-17-0430-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: August 28, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Timothy Ten Pas, Topsfield, Massachusetts, pro se.

           Joshua R. Carver, Esquire, Augusta, Maine, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant and the agency have both filed petitions for review of the
     initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal.           For the reasons
     discussed below, we DENY the appellant’s petition, GRANT the agency’s
     petition, AFFIRM the initial decision as to the appellant’s claim of disability

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

     discrimination, and REVERSE the initial decision as to the removal action. The
     appellant’s removal is SUSTAINED.

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant served as a GS-13 Support Services Chief before his August
     2017 removal for excessive absence. The facts leading up to the removal are
     largely undisputed.
¶3        On May 13, 2016, the appellant stopped coming to work based on medical
     documentation indicating that he was suffering from severe depression and
     anxiety.   The appellant’s doctor stated that he was incapacitated and that the
     period of his incapacitation was expected to be lengthy, and he recommended that
     the appellant remain off work for 2 months and then be reevaluated.        Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 86.        The appellant requested and was granted
     2 months of sick leave. Id. at 87. Approximately every 2 months thereafter, the
     appellant requested an additional 2 months of leave which t he agency granted
     (sick leave and annual leave, including Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave)
     until all his leave was exhausted, after which he requested and was granted leave
     without pay (LWOP).      Id. at 88-98    On March 10, 2017, in response to the
     appellant’s most recent request for additional LWOP, the agency advised him that
     he had not submitted medical documentation sufficient to support his request and
     that he should do so. The agency explained that the appellant had the following
     options:   request advanced sick or annual leave, LWOP, or leave under the
     agency’s    Voluntary    Leave     Transfer   Program,   request   a   reasonable
     accommodation, retire, apply for disability retirement, resign, or seek services
     under the Employee Assistance Program. IAF, Tab 9 at 58-60. Based on the
     appellant’s requests, with the barest supporting evidence, the agency continued to
     grant him LWOP.       Id. at 52.    On May 31, 2017, again in response to the
     appellant’s request for more LWOP, the agency approved his request in part, for
     the period from May 3-31, 2017, but advised him that, because he had exhausted
                                                                                       3

     all his leave, and because his absence had existed past a reasonable timeframe, he
     was to return to duty on June 12, 2017, and that his failure to do so “may lead to
     disciplinary action up to and including removal.” Id. at 41. The agency again
     described the appellant’s options as it had in the earlier letter. Id. at 41-42. In
     response, the appellant stated that he had not been approved to return to work,
     and he again requested additional LWOP. Id. at 31.
¶4        On June 29, 2017, when the appellant had not returned to duty, the agency
     proposed his removal for excessive absence.       Id. at 19.   In the narrative, the
     agency stated that from May 3, 2016, to date, he had used 1,927.6 hours of
     approved non-FMLA leave, that is, 356.3 hours of annual leave, 819.3 hours of
     sick leave, and 752 hours of LWOP. The agency acknowledged that the absences
     were for a compelling reason beyond the appellant’s control such that its approval
     or disapproval was immaterial, but stated that the absences had continued for an
     unreasonable amount of time and that the appellant had been warned that adverse
     action might be initiated if he did not return to duty. The agency added that the
     appellant’s position needed to be filled by an employee available for duty on a
     regular, full-time basis and that his extended absence had created undue hardship
     on his team and directly impacted the efficiency with which the team provided
     services to veterans.   Id.   The appellant responded with a brief medical note
     stating that he could still not return to duty and requested an additional 2 months
     of LWOP. Id. at 18. The agency granted in part the request for LWOP, allowing
     the appellant to remain in that status during the 30-day notice period of the
     proposed removal. Id. at 16. However, on August 1, 2017, the agency issued a
     letter of decision finding the charge sustained and stating that the appellant would
     be removed, effective August 9, 2017. Id. at 9.
¶5        The appellant filed an appeal, IAF, Tab 1, and requested a hearing. Id. at 2.
     In addition to challenging the agency’s action, he alleged that it was based on
     disability discrimination under a failure-to-accommodate theory.          Id.; IAF,
     Tab 20.
                                                                                      4

¶6        Thereafter, the administrative judge issued an initial decision in which he
     first found that most of the elements of the charge were largely undisputed, that
     is, that the appellant was absent for compelling reasons beyond his control so that
     agency approval or disapproval was immaterial because he could not be on the
     job and that his absences had continued beyond a reasonable time. IAF Tab 31,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 6. Nevertheless, the administrative judge reversed the
     agency’s action on the basis that it did not provide the appellant with “adequate
     notice that a disciplinary action was potentially forthcoming.” ID at 1, 6-10, 12.
     The administrative judge further found that the appellant failed to establish his
     claim of disability discrimination. ID at 10-11.
¶7        The agency has filed a petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tab 3, and the appellant has filed petition for review, PFR File, Tab 1, to which
     the agency has responded, PFR File, Tab 5.

                                        ANALYSIS
     The agency proved the charge.
¶8        To prove a charge of excessive absences, an agency must establish that:
     (1) the employee was absent for compelling reasons beyond his control so that
     agency approval or disapproval was immaterial because the employee could not
     be on the job; (2) the absence continued beyond a reasonable time, and the agency
     warned the employee that an adverse action could be taken unless the employee
     became available for duty on a regular full-time or part-time basis; and (3) the
     position needed to be filled by an employee available for duty on a regular
     full-time or part-time basis. Gartner v. Department of the Army, 104 M.S.P.R.
     463, ¶ 9 (2007); Cook v. Department of the Army, 18 M.S.P.R. 610, 611-12
     (1984).
¶9        The parties do not dispute on review the administrative judge’s findings that
     the appellant was absent for compelling reasons beyond his control as a
                                                                                              5

      consequence of his depression and anxiety 2 and that he was absent for longer than
      a reasonable time, specifically, for more than 1900 non-FMLA hours. 3 PFR File,
      Tabs 1, 3; ID at 7. We discern no reason to disturb these findings which show
      that the administrative judge considered the evidence as a whole , drew
      appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions.             See Crosby v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997); Broughton v. Department of
      Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987).

            The agency provided sufficient warning that an adverse action could be
            taken unless the appellant became available for duty.
¶10         In finding that the agency’s notice to the appellant was not adequate, the
      administrative judge relied on its May 31, 2017 letter. He acknowledged that it
      directed the appellant to return to duty on June 12, 2017, and cautioned him that
      failure to do so may lead to discipline, up to removal, but the administrative
      judge found that the agency’s offering the appellant “other options” immediately
      after the order to return to work fatally undermined “any hope” that the letter
      served notice that he must return to work. ID at 8. The administrative judge
      further found that the agency’s prior letter to the appellant, the letter of March 10,
      2017, diluted the impact of the May 31, 2017 letter. ID at 9.
¶11         On review, the agency argues that it did, in the May 31, 2017 letter, in fact,
      adequately notify the appellant that he could be disciplined for using approved
      leave. PFR File, Tab 3 at 6-12. We agree. The letter specifically warned the
      appellant that “[f]ailure to report to duty as directed may lead to disciplinary
      action up to and including removal.” IAF, Tab 9 at 41. The Board’s case law

      2
        The administrative judge found that the appellant testified, and that his physicians
      certified, that he could not have returned to work at any time from his initial absence on
      May 3, 2016, until the close of the record below. ID at 12; Hearing Compact Disc
      (testimony of the appellant); IAF, Tab 10 at 8, 17, 85, Tab 25 at 4. Although the
      appellant speculates on review that he might have been able to return to work, PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 7, he has provided no evidence in support of his assertion.
      3
       An employee may not be disciplined for use of leave covered by the FMLA.
      McCauley v. Department of the Interior, 116 M.S.P.R. 484, ¶ 11 (2011).
                                                                                          6

      does not require that, to be adequate, the notice must warn the employee that an
      adverse action will be taken unless the employee becomes available for duty but
      only that such action could be taken under those circumstances.              Gartner,
      104 M.S.P.R. 463, ¶ 9; Cook, 18 M.S.P.R. at 611-12. The agency’s May 31, 2017
      return-to-duty letter clearly did so, and the fact that it provided the appellant with
      other options neither detracts from nor fatally undermines the adequacy of the
      notice. ID at 8.    In finding that the May 31, 2017 letter did not provide the
      appellant adequate notice that he could be disciplined for continued use of
      approved leave, the administrative judge relied upon the fact that the agency
      actually approved a portion of his request for additional LWOP and that the
      appellant responded by requesting even more LWOP. Id. However, the May 31,
      2017 letter specifically advised the appellant that the granting of LWOP is at the
      discretion of management, IAF, Tab 9 at 41-42, and it is well established that the
      authorization of LWOP is a matter within the agency’s discretion , Oates v.
      Department of Labor, 105 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶ 11 (2007).           While the agency had
      indeed been generous in its granting of LWOP to the appellant, it was not thereb y
      required to continue to grant his requests without end. Additionally, the agency’s
      May 31, 2017 letter did not warn the appellant that his continued absences could
      result in his being placed on absence without leave (AWOL), and he never was
      placed on AWOL. In fact, as noted, the agency continued to grant the appellant’s
      LWOP request through the notice period of his removal. Therefore, he could not
      have been misled by the language of the May 31, 2017 letter into thinking that the
      possibility of disciplinary action applied to any other status besides LWOP.
¶12         The agency challenges on review the administrative judge’s statement,
      referencing the agency’s earlier letter to the appellant, that “this history of form
      correspondence further diluted the impact of the May 31, 2017 letter.” PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 9-10; ID at 9. Contrary to the administrative judge’s claim, the two
      letters are not “almost identical.” ID at 8. The March 10, 2017 letter informed
      the appellant that he had failed to provide supporting medical documentation that
                                                                                        7

      would allow the agency to grant his most recent LWOP request and direct ed him
      to submit such documentation, and it also addressed his current leave status, that
      is, that he had exhausted all of his leave, including his annual allotment of time
      under FMLA, and explained his options. IAF, Tab 9 at 58-59. The letter further
      reminded the appellant that he must request leave appropriately, that failing to do
      so could result in his being charged AWOL, and that disciplinary action up to and
      including removal could be taken on that basis. Id. at 59. Although the May 31,
      2017 letter similarly addressed the appellant’s current leave status and explained
      his options, id. at 41-42, it also informed him that his absence from work had
      existed past a reasonable timeframe and ordered him to return to duty, reminding
      him that his failure to do so could lead to disciplinary action up to and including
      removal. Id. at 41. An examination of the two letters demonstrates that they
      served different purposes and that the March 10, 2017 letter, which urged the
      appellant to properly request leave, in no way diluted the impact of the May 31,
      2017 letter, which for the first time warned him that failing to return to duty
      could result in his removal.
¶13           We find, therefore, that the agency proved that it adequately warned the
      appellant that an adverse action could be taken unless he became available for
      duty.

              The position needed to be filled by an employee available for duty on a
              regular full-time or part-time basis.
¶14           On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that
      the agency proved that his position needed to be filled by an employee available
      for duty, claiming that the agency had not filled his position by the time of his
      Board hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. The administrative judge found that the
      agency presented ample evidence that, as head of a division and its only
      supervisor, the appellant’s absence caused a significant hardship for the agency.
      ID at 7.      Specifically, the administrative judge relied on testimony of the
      proposing official, who was appellant’s supervisor and the Assistant Director of
                                                                                        8

      the Boston Regional Office, to the effect that she spent several hours each day
      performing the appellant’s duties and that a division chief from another regional
      office had to be detailed to cover for the appellant. Id.; Hearing Compact Disc
      (HCD) (testimony of the proposing official); IAF, Tab 10 at 44.                The
      administrative judge also relied on testimony of the deciding official, Director of
      the Boston Regional Office, that the situation created by the appellant’s extended
      absence had become untenable.        ID at 7; HCD (testimony of the deciding
      official). Beyond his unsupported claim, the appellant has not shown error in the
      administrative judge’s findings on this issue, and we discern no basis upon which
      to disturb them. Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 105-06.

                Conclusion
¶15         We conclude, therefore, that the agency proved all the elements of the
      charge of excessive absences.         Gartner, 104 M.S.P.R. 463, ¶ 9; Cook,
      18 M.S.P.R. at 611-12. We further find that the agency established that its action
      promotes the efficiency of the service and that, given that the appellant’s absence
      has no foreseeable end, removal is a reasonable penalty. Bair v. Department of
      Defense, 117 M.S.P.R. 374, ¶ 5 (2012).

      The appellant failed to establish that the administrative judge was biased.
¶16         On review, the appellant also argues that, while the administrative judge
      ruled in his favor, he nonetheless exhibited bias towards him. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 4-8.     Specifically, the appellant refers to an employee, formerly under his
      supervision, whose removal he proposed.       During the proceedings before the
      agency in that matter, the appellant claims that the employee “besmirched” the
      appellant’s character and that, when the employee appealed his removal to the
      Board, he continued to attack the appellant’s character. Id. at 5. The appellant
      explains that he learned at his own hearing that the administrative judge in his
      case was also the administrative judge in his subordinate’s case and suggests that,
      because of the attack on the appellant’s character in that other proceeding, the
                                                                                          9

      administrative judge in this case, rather than rule against the appellant, limited his
      prehearing narrative and did not address significant failures of the agency, denied
      his request for additional witnesses, and ordered only minimal relief. Id. at 6.
¶17         A claim of bias must be raised as soon as practicable after a party has
      reasonable cause to believe that grounds exist for an administrative judge’s
      disqualification on such basis, and a party cannot wait until after the adjudication
      is complete to object for the first time.      Gensburg v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 85 M.S.P.R. 198, ¶ 7 (2000); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.42(b). By not raising the
      claim below, the appellant failed to follow the regulatory procedures for seeking
      disqualification of an administrative judge based on bias due to his alleged
      involvement    in   the   appeal   of   the   appellant’s   subordinate.   5   C.F.R.
      § 1201.42(b)-(c). Therefore, we need not address this claim on review.
¶18         In any event, bearing in mind that the administrative judge ruled in the
      appellant’s favor, the administrative judge’s actions do not establish bias. For
      example, the appellant argues that the administrative judge limited his prehearing
      narrative. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. In his first Order and Summary of Telephonic
      Prehearing Conference, the administrative judge emphasized that the only matters
      before him were the appellant’s removal for excessive absences and his
      affirmative defense of disability discrimination and that a proposed performance
      improvement plan in 2016, agency understaffing, and a particularly difficult
      employee were not relevant to the removal action.             IAF, Tab 21.     In the
      administrative judge’s second Order and Summary of Telephonic Prehearing
      Conference, he set forth, inter alia, the same two issues and stated that any
      objections to the summary must be received b y a date certain. IAF, Tab 28. The
      appellant did file a timely response, but it did not address the issues.         IAF,
      Tab 29. Therefore, as to the matters at issue in this appeal, the administrative
      judge’s summary is deemed final, IAF, Tab 28, and not subject to challenge on
      review. Crowe v. Small Business Administration, 53 M.S.P.R. 631, 635 (1992).
                                                                                       10

¶19         The appellant also argues that the administrative judge denied him
      “additional witnesses.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. The appellant originally requested
      six witnesses, IAF, Tab 18, two of whom also were requested by the agency, IAF,
      Tab 19. The administrative judge provisionally excluded one of the appellant’s
      requested witnesses on the agency’s objection as irrelevant. IAF, Tab 28. The
      appellant did challenge the exclusion, IAF, Tab 29, but was unsuccessful. He has
      not on review further explained his challenge to the administrative judge’s
      disallowance of the witness, and we therefore need not address this claim further.
¶20         In making a claim of prejudice against an administrative judge, a party must
      overcome    the   presumption   of   honesty   and   integrity   that   accompanies
      administrative adjudicators. Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R.
      382, 386 (1980). An administrative judge’s conduct during the course of a Board
      proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if the administrative judge’s
      comments or actions evidence “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
      make fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d
      1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
      555 (1994)). There is nothing in the record to support a finding of bias by the
      administrative judge. 4

      The appellant has not established the agency failed to provide him a reasonable
      accommodation.
¶21         Finally, the appellant argues that his removal was improper because the
      agency did not first “see if an accommodation could be made.” PFR File, Tab 1
      at 7. We construe this claim as challenging the administrative judge’s finding
      that he did not establish his defense of disability discrimination based on a theory
      of failure to accommodate. After he presumed that the appellant is a qualified

      4
        We note the appellant’s claim that the administrative judge’s bias is shown by his
      order of only minimal relief. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 7-8. The appellant’s claim is
      rendered moot by this final decision.
                                                                                     11

individual with a disability, 5 the administrative judge thoroughly considered the
failure to accommodate issue, finding that the appellant’s various claims were
“implausible, incredible, or inconsistent.” ID at 10. Regarding the appellant’s
assertion     that   the   agency   denied   him    reasonable   accommodation,     the
administrative judge found no evidence that the appellant ever started the
interactive process, Miller v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 15
(2014), and that his own testimony on this point was inconsistent and otherwise
incredible, ID at 11. In the absence of “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so,
we discern no basis upon which to disturb the administrative judge’s credibility
determinations in this regard or to reweigh the evidence or substitute our
assessment of the record evidence for his.          Haebe v. Department of Justice,
288 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002). As such, the administrative judge did not
err in finding that, other than indefinite LWOP which the agency was not required
to provide, the appellant did not request reasonable accommodation and therefore
did not establish his claim of disability discrimination.

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
         The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.       5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the a ppropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

5
    The record does not appear to support such a presumption.
6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      12

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
                                                                                   13

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.           See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
                                                                                     14

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 7   The court of appeals must receive your petition for

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                15

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.           5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.