Court Opinion

ID: 9544802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:01:53.606657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:40.874542
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting):
The main opinion treats the crime of criminal mischief1 as a crime against the person when in fact it is a crime against property and the public.
The common-law crime of malicious mischief2 had, as one of its elements, the specific intent of malice toward the owner of the damaged property. However, the Utah Legislature has seen fit to delete that element and to extend the common-law offense to cover acts of indiscriminate public vandalism.3 Consequently, the essential elements of the offense consist only of (1) the intentional damaging of (2) the property of another. It matters not whether the actor damages the property of one or many, so long as the property is “of another,” and is damaged in a single, continuous act.4
In the instant case, notwithstanding the fact that the State has no burden of proof as to specific intent of malice toward the property owners, the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence of such intent, and he may proceed to do so if he deems it to be in his best interest. However, as yet, no such evidence has been presented. The mere fact that the 16 vehicles involved are in separate ownership, standing alone, certainly does not resolve the matter of defendant’s intent.
There is no dispute that the property damaged was “of another” and it is readily apparent that the act of the defendant in breaking the 16 windshields was of continuous duration punctuated only by the insignificant lengths of time necessary to move from one vehicle to another. Therefore, the ipse dixit of the main opinion is unacceptable that the defendant did not commit a single act of public vandalism.
When viewed in the light of the foregoing, the “single larceny” doctrine has application, by analogy, to the crime of malicious mischief. The wrongful deprivation of private property (by whatever means) is involved in both offenses, and the same public wrong is perpetrated.
A majority of U.S. jurisdictions (including Utah5) have long embraced the view that “the stealing of property from different owners at the same time and at the same place constitutes but one larceny.”6 This single larceny doctrine is based on the theory that the felonious taking of property constitutes an offense against the public generally, whether one or several rightful owners be involved. As a result, a taking which occurs at a single time and place constitutes a single offense.7
Jurisdictions have not been uniformly rigid on what constitutes “the same time” or “the same place.” Some have opted for a strict construction of the rule, holding that, where items are taken consecutively (albeit rapidly) rather than at once,8 or where the items are taken from separate locations in the same vicinity,9 the doctrine is not appli*698cable. Were the taking of private property, rather than its destruction, involved in the present case, however, we would be obliged by the underlying policy of the single larceny doctrine to hold that a single offense, rather than a series of related offenses, was committed. To hold otherwise would subvert the doctrine’s purpose by resort to a largely irrelevant technicality.
Defendant argues that, where the Legislature has intended the aggregation of value of the property involved in several offenses, it has specifically provided therefor. The cited examples are those dealing with the issuance of bad checks10 and with the fraudulent use of credit cards.11 In both of these cases, it was necessary for the Legislature to specify that aggregation of value is permissible, as the common law would not otherwise have provided therefor. The cited provisions permit aggregating the value of property if taken over an extended period of time (up to six months). Absent the specific language of the statute, the issuance of each bad check, or each fraudulent use of a credit card, would constitute a separate and distinct criminal offense. No such difficulty exists in the present case, where all the property involved was allegedly damaged during the course of a single criminal act.
Defendant likewise resorts to Utah’s “single criminal episode” provision12 for the proposition that the offense involved must be regarded as a series of separate acts. The cited provision states that, where a defendant commits several criminal violations in the course of a single episode, he may be charged with all of them. It also imposes limitations on the holding of separate trials for each criminal offense involved in a single episode, and sets out guidelines regarding the giving of instructions on lesser-ineluded offenses. At no point does the cited provision preclude the aggregation of value for the purpose of bringing a single criminal charge, nor does it impose upon the State the requirement of segmenting a defendant’s actions for the purpose of reducing the magnitude of the offense.
It must also be observed that no apparent policy objective would be served by imposing the interpretation of the trial court and the defendant upon the legislative provision in question. To the contrary, it seems little more than a technical escape-hatch, which would permit a criminal defendant to engage in the wholesale destruction of private property, and then evade the statutory punishment assigned simply on the basis that multiple owners were involved. Such an interpretation is clearly in derogation of the intended purpose of the Legislature.
The majority of the Court opines that its ruling is supported by the underlying purpose and policy of the single larceny doctrine, i. e., the prevention of the aggregation of criminal penalties for a single act. However, my reading of the single criminal episode statute13 would indicate that just the opposite is true, since the State will now be free to file a complaint setting forth 16 separate misdemeanor counts against the defendant, each punishable by imprisonment up to 90 days and by a fine up to $299.
I would reverse and remand for a trial on the merits.
CROCKETT, J., concurred in the dissenting opinion of HALL, J., before his retirement January 5, 1981.

. U.C.A., 1953, 76-6-106.

. Formerly provided for by U.C.A., 1953, 76-60-5, but now superceded by “criminal mischief’ provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 76-6-106, supra.

. In construing a similar Colorado statute, the court in People v. Cisneros, 193 Colo. 380, 566 P.2d 703 (1977), reached the same conclusion.

. U.C.A., 1953, 76-1 — 401 defines a “single criminal episode” as all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.

. State v. McKee, 17 Utah 370, 53 P. 733 (1898); State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507, 65 P. 484 (1901).

. 2 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, § 451.

. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Larceny, § 3.

. State v. Maggard, 160 Mo. 469, 61 S.W. 184 (1901).

. State v. Norman, 135 Iowa 483, 113 N.W. 340 (1907).

. U.C.A., 1953, 76-6-505.

. U.C.A., 1953, 76-6-506.1.

. U.C.A., 1953, 76-1-401, et seq.

. U.C.A., 1953, 76-1-402(1).