Court Opinion

ID: 9942616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:04:48.567038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:20.623294
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                        Tipton County Board of Zoning Appeals
                                        Appellant-Respondent                 FILED
                                                                        Feb 21 2024, 10:13 am

                                                    v.                       CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

                                      Hope for the Hurting
                                          Appellee-Petitioner

                                          February 21, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                          23A-MI-1733
                              Appeal from the Grant Circuit Court
                             The Honorable Mark E. Spitzer, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                       27C01-2210-MI-219

                                  Opinion by Judge Riley
                               Judges Brown and Foley concur

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024        Page 1 of 21
      Riley, Judge.

      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Respondent, Tipton County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA),

      appeals the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions thereon, reversing the

      BZA’s decision and concluding that the BZA’s findings were arbitrary,

      capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence when it denied Appellee-

      Petitioner’s, Hope for the Hurting (Hope), application for a special use

      exception under the Tipton County Zoning Ordinance.

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUE
[3]   The BZA presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as:

      Whether the trial court properly determined that the BZA’s decision in denying

      Hope’s request for a special use exception was arbitrary, capricious, and not

      supported by substantial evidence.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   This case comes before us as a judicial review proceeding, challenging the

      BZA’s denial of Hope’s request for a special use exception under the Tipton

      County Zoning Ordinance (Ordinance) to operate a drug treatment center in

      rural Tipton County, approximately six to seven miles outside the City of

      Tipton. Hope is a faith-based charity that operates various types of treatment

      facilities in the country for those suffering from addiction. Warren and

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024      Page 2 of 21
      Michelle Stine, longtime residents of Tipton County, donated their property

      (Property) to Hope because of their support for treatment facilities to combat

      “the devastation, destruction and grief” caused by drug addiction. (Appellant’s

      App. Vol. III, p. 87). The donated Property includes two large homes,

      sufficient for Hope to treat twenty-five to thirty residents, and is surrounded by

      trees and fields, all of which are zoned agricultural. There are no other homes

      within a half mile of the Property.

[5]   Hope intends to use the Property as the “Oasis,” which will be a ninety-day

      voluntary addiction treatment residence. (Appellant’s App. Vol II, p. 41).

      Residents will be attending the treatment plan of their own free will and not as

      part of a court deferment or a release from jail. Their participation will not be

      compelled by the court, law enforcement, or their employer. The residence will

      be staffed around the clock by medical personnel, which will include doctors

      and nurses. Eventually, the Oasis will have twenty-five to thirty employees,

      resulting in a 1-to-1 ratio between staff and residents. No drug use will be

      allowed on the premises and residents will have no access to drugs while at the

      facility. To ensure compliance with the drug-free environment, residents will be

      drug-tested during their stay. Hope will perform background checks on each

      resident prior to enrollment in the facility to determine whether they have a

      history of violent or criminal behavior. Residents will be monitored throughout

      the day to ensure compliance with Oasis’s rules, and any occasional visitation

      will be supervised. Residents will be chaperoned while outdoors on the

      grounds around the residence for worship, relaxation, meditation, or exercise.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024     Page 3 of 21
      The Oasis’s security system will be comparable to similar facilities throughout

      Indiana and will consist of security cameras that constantly monitor inside and

      around the Property. Doors will be alarmed, and staff will be trained in how to

      handle security measures. Residents will not be allowed to keep their vehicles

      at the Oasis and will remain onsite twenty-four hours a day. They may choose

      to leave the Oasis prior to completion of the program but must go through a

      checkout process before being allowed off the premises. Oasis staff will return

      the resident to their family and will not release them from the Property itself.

[6]   Hope already operates several similar facilities in Howard County for those

      overcoming substance abuse, including homes in rural areas comparable to the

      facility proposed by Hope for Tipton County. Neighbors of these Howard

      County facilities are supportive of the facilities and confirmed that they have

      not been negatively impacted by them nor have they experienced safety issues

      related to the residents. The Howard County sheriff concurred that there have

      been no problems with the facilities within his jurisdiction and a probation

      officer referred to the facilities maintained by Hope as “top notch.”

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 116). Several employers in Tipton County

      expressed their support for Hope’s “high end clinical inpatient program.”

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 58).

[7]   Because the Property is zoned as agricultural, Hope applied for a special use

      exception as a “Social Rehabilitation Center” under the Ordinance.

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20). The Ordinance requires the BZA to grant this

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024     Page 4 of 21
special use exception when a number of criteria (Subsections) are met, which

include:

        A. the zoning ordinance authorizes the special exception request,
        and the request conforms to all general regulations of this
        Ordinance;

        B. the proposed use shall not involve any element or cause any
        condition that may be dangerous, injurious, or noxious to any
        other property or persons, and shall comply with the
        performance standards herein;

        C. the proposed use shall be sited, oriented, and landscaped so
        that the relationship of its buildings and grounds to adjacent
        buildings and properties does not impair health, safety, or
        comfort, and does not adversely affect values of adjacent
        properties;

        D. the proposed use shall produce a total environment effect
        which is consistent with, and not harmful to, the environment of
        the neighborhood;

        E. the proposed use shall organize vehicular access and parking
        to minimize conflicting traffic movement on adjacent streets;

        F. in the case of a change in nonconforming use, the proposed
        use shall be equally appropriate or more appropriate to the
        district than the existing or former non-conforming use; and

        G. the proposed use shall promote the objectives of this
        Ordinance and shall be consistent with the Comprehensive Plan.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024      Page 5 of 21
      (Ordinance § 805. 01; Appellant’s App. Vol. IV, p. 42). Hope initially sought

      this special use exception in 2020. At that time, the BZA indicated that the

      Oasis needed to obtain a license from the State before it would consider the

      application. While the State does not license treatment facilities prior to zoning

      approval, Hope worked with Governor Holcomb to obtain certification that

      showed the State preliminarily approved the Oasis. Hope re-applied for the

      special use exception on February 28, 2022. The BZA then set the application

      for hearing on June l, 2022.

[8]   During the hearing, after Hope had presented its evidence in support of the

      requirements for the special use exception, a number of remonstrators to the

      Oasis spoke and presented letters against granting the special use exception.

      Several remonstrators used derogatory language, labeling those trying to get

      help as being “not disciplined and [] irresponsible,” with one commentator

      opining that it “makes me sick to my stomach” to think that there might be

      recovering addicts a half mile from his home. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp.

      140, 148). The remonstrators offered hypotheticals of the perceived dangers if

      the Oasis was allowed to commence treatment, including, that residents would

      cause “[t]oxic spills into fields and waterways,” use farm fields as “a meeting

      place for drugs as they hide out or as an escape route out of the neighborhood,”

      become “menacing or angry runaway clients from detoxing and withdrawal,”

      attack children who are playing outside, start a “fire in the fields from secretly

      smoking cigarettes and/or negligent acts,” be violent criminals, sex offenders,

      and child molesters, leave the facility and come to nearby homes “looking for

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024      Page 6 of 21
      transportation, money, weapons, or take someone hostage if that’s their goal,”

      and force a local landowner to keep “a handgun strapped to [his] hip when

      [he’s] out there on the lawn mower.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, pp. 141, 149,

      158, 169, 172). At the close of the hearing, after receiving testimony from

      Hope, the remonstrators, and others, the BZA denied the special use exception.

[9]   On August 3, 2022, the BZA issued its written findings. Upon review of the

      presented evidence, the BZA concluded that the special use exception should be

      denied because Hope had failed to satisfy Subsection B and G of paragraph

      805.01 of the Ordinance. With respect to Subsection B, the BZA concluded:

              Petitioner presented information as to the type of treatment
              services which would be provided, the expected day-to-day
              operations to be conducted, [and] a generalized description of the
              type of individual clients who would be treated at the facility.
              Petitioner attempted to assuage the safety concerns which had
              been expressed by neighbors and remonstrators, by describing the
              minimal nature of security measures that Petitioner believed to
              be appropriate at this type of treatment facility, along with
              Petitioner's beliefs as to why only minimal security and safety
              measures were needed. Still, despite Petitioner’s representations
              and attempted reassurances, several remonstrators expressly
              controverted the Petitioner[’s] claim, and asserted their beliefs
              that the proposed safety and security measures were inadequate.
              The statements and testimony of some remonstrators were more
              relevant and more credible than others. The BZA gives
              appropriate weight and due consideration to the testimony and
              statements which appear to be based on reason or supported by
              credible argument. Any testimony or statements which appeared
              utterly devoid of relevant facts, or which seemed to go against all
              common sense, was discounted and not relied upon.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024     Page 7 of 21
        Keith Willis, a close neighbor to the property, asserted his belief
        that the proposed use, at that location, would create a potential
        danger to his family and those living in his residence.

        Other remonstrators, including Ed Ripberger, asserted that the
        operations of the use, as described by Petitioner, would still cause
        or create a condition that may be dangerous, or it posed an
        unacceptable level of risk of potential injury to nearby properties
        and neighbors in the area. Remonstrators gave examples as to
        how they believe such dangerous or injurious conditions could
        occur as a result of the proposed special exception.

        Dave Colbert, another neighbor, asserted his belief that the
        operational plans as described by Petitioner actually serves to
        show that adequate security and safety measures are not going to
        be provided.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. IV, p. 44). With respect to Subsection G, the BZA

concluded:

        Several remonstrators testified, asserting their understanding and
        beliefs as to how the proposed special exception use, at that
        particular location, was not consistent with the goals expressed in
        the Comprehensive Plan.

        ****

        Petitioner has failed to provide substantial, persuasive evidence
        which demonstrates that the proposed special exception use, at
        this particular rural residential site, would promote the objectives
        of the Tipton County Zoning Ordinance. Petitioner has failed to
        adequately demonstrate, by substantial evidence, that the
        proposed special exception use, at this particular site, would be
        consistent with the Comprehensive Plan.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024         Page 8 of 21
       (Appellant’s App. Vol. IV, pp. 44-45).

[10]   On June 30, 2022, Hope filed a verified petition for judicial review of BZA’s

       denial of the special use exception. On February 24, 2023, after the parties filed

       their respective briefs, the trial court conducted a hearing. On June 30, 2023,

       the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions thereon, reversing the

       BZA. In its Order, the trial court found that:

               Notably, the opponents’ presentations did not consist of factual
               observations regarding the project or the Property (other than its
               proximity to their real estate) but was made up largely of
               opinions of people in recovery and speculative “parade of
               horribles” of imagined scenarios where the patients of the facility
               would engage in criminal or reckless behavior. These opponents
               used disparaging and derogatory language, labeling those in
               recovery as being “not disciplined and are irresponsible.” One
               commentator said it “makes me sick to my stomach” to think
               that there might be recovering addicts half mile from his home.
               However, the opponents offered no substantive evidence that
               they would be at risk from those voluntarily seeking help under
               the watchful eye of Hope and under the rules set for the Oasis.
               Instead, they provided hypotheticals that have no basis in fact or
               the record but are grounded in distrust of those in recovery from
               substance dependency.

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 10). Turning to Section B of the Ordinance, the

       trial court concluded

               The BZA’s findings as to Subsection B rest not on facts but on
               the opponents’ unreasonable and irrational animus towards those
               trying to recover from addiction. The BZA found that the Oasis
               did not satisfy Subsection B because it accepted the opponents’
               comments as fact and rested its decision on hypotheticals that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024     Page 9 of 21
               have no connection to how the evidence indicated that the Oasis
               would actually be operated. As such, those findings amounted to
               “speculation and conjecture.”

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 13). In its evaluation as to whether the objectives

       of the Ordinance and the Comprehensive Plan were satisfied as called for in

       Subsection G, the trial court determined that “[t]he BZA’s findings were

       irrational and unsupported by substantial evidence as to both the [] [O]rdinance

       and the [C]omprehensive [P]lan.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 19).

[11]   The BZA now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Standard of Review

[12]   When reviewing a decision of a zoning board, this court and the trial court are

       bound by the same standard. Midwest Minerals Inc. v. Bd of Zoning Appeals of Area

       Plan Dep’t/Comm’n of Vigo Cnty, 880 N.E.2d 1264, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008),

       trans. denied. We presume the determination of the BZA, an administrative

       agency with expertise in zoning matters, is correct. Id. Therefore, we will

       reverse only if the BZA’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of

       discretion. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our decision for

       that of the BZA. Id.

[13]   Here, in its application to the BZA, Hope formulated its request as a special use

       exception to the Ordinance.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024    Page 10 of 21
               It is often true, [], that if a petitioner for a special exception
               presents sufficient evidence of compliance with relevant statutory
               requirements, the exception must be granted. However, . . .
               while some special exception ordinances are regulatory in nature
               and require an applicant to show compliance with certain
               regulatory requirements (e.g. structural specifications), providing
               the zoning board with no discretion, some special exception
               ordinances provide a zoning board with a discernable amount of
               discretion (e.g. those which require an applicant to show that its
               proposed use will not injure the public health, welfare, or
               morals). The position that a board of zoning appeals must grant
               a special exception upon the applicant’s submission of substantial
               evidence of compliance with the relevant criteria is true only as to
               ordinances falling within the former category. In other words,
               when the zoning ordinance provides the board of zoning appeals
               with a discernable amount of discretion, the board is entitled, and
               may even be required by the ordinance, to exercise its discretion.
               When this is the case, the board is entitled to determine whether
               an applicant has demonstrated that its proposed use will comply
               with the relevant statutory requirements.

       Crooked Creek Conservation & Gun Club v. Hamilton Cnty. N. Bd. of Zoning Appeals,

       677 N.E.2d 544, 547-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted), trans. denied.

[14]   Hope proceeded pursuant to the Social Rehabilitation Center exception under

       the Ordinance, which is a special use exception in all Tipton County zoning

       districts and which is defined as:

               A secure or non-secure facility licensed by a department of state
               or local government in which persons reside while receiving,
               either within the facility or elsewhere, services which are
               designed to equip them for independent living within the
               community. Such services may include therapy, treatment,
               training, and/or counseling which is directed at one or more of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024    Page 11 of 21
               the following groups: assisting persons to recover from the
               [e]ffects of drugs or alcohol or the dependence thereon; assisting
               persons with family, school, or social adjustment problems to
               return to normal family or communal life; or assisting persons to
               be housed under supervision while under the constraints of
               alternatives to imprisonment, including, but not limited to work-
               release, pre-release, and probationary programs. For the purpose
               of this Ordinance, this definition does not include state or
               federally owned and operated facilities.

       (Ordinance § 201; Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 20). However, in order to be

       granted this special use exception, the applicant also must establish satisfaction

       with the seven Subsections enumerated in paragraph 805.01 of the Ordinance,

       two of which are the focus of this appeal and which state:

               B. the proposed use shall not involve any element or cause any
               condition that may be dangerous, injurious, or noxious to any
               other property or persons, and shall comply with the
               performance standards herein;

               G. the proposed use shall promote the objectives of this
               Ordinance and shall be consistent with the Comprehensive Plan.

       It is clear that these Subsections, having no absolute objective standards against

       which they can be measured, involve discretionary decision making on the part

       of the BZA. See Crooked Creek, 677 N.E.2d at 548. Thus, the BZA was entitled

       to determine whether Hope satisfied the requirements for the grant of a special

       use exception. Id.

[15]   Because the burden of demonstrating satisfaction of the relevant statutory

       criteria rests with the applicant for a special exception, this court has been
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024     Page 12 of 21
       cautious to avoid imposing upon remonstrators an obligation to come forward

       with evidence contradicting that submitted by an applicant. Id. Thus, Hope

       bore the burden to show that the Oasis would comply with the above-

       mentioned Subsections. See id. Neither those opposed to Hope’s application

       nor the BZA were required to negate Hope’s case. Id.

[16]   As remonstrators need not affirmatively disprove an applicant’s case, the BZA

       may deny an application for a special use exception on the grounds that an

       applicant has failed to carry his burden of proving compliance with the relevant

       statutory criteria, regardless of whether the remonstrators present evidence to

       negate the existence of the enumerated factors. Id. However, because the BZA

       determined that Hope was not entitled to a special use exception and appears to

       have based its determination upon testimony presented by the remonstrators,

       we will determine whether the BZA’s decision was based upon substantial

       evidence. See id.

[17]   When analyzing whether an administrative decision is supported by substantial

       evidence, the reviewing court must determine from the entire record whether

       the agency’s decision lacks a reasonably sound evidentiary basis. Id. Thus, we

       have noted that evidence will be considered substantial if it is more than a

       scintilla and less than a preponderance. Id. at 549. In other words, substantial

       evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

       adequate to support a conclusion. Id. At a minimum, substantial evidence

       “must be more than speculation and conjecture.” Terra Nova Dairy, LLC v.

       Wabash Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 890 N.E.2d 98, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024   Page 13 of 21
       II. Analysis

[18]   While not disputing that Hope can be characterized as a Social Rehabilitation

       Center and may apply for the special use exception, the BZA contends that

       Hope did not satisfy the mandated Subsections found in paragraph 805.01 of

       the Ordinance prior to being granted the special use exception. Specifically, the

       BZA points to Subsections B and G as being unmet by Hope’s application.

       A. Subsection B

[19]   Pursuant to Subsection B, a special use exception can be denied if it will involve

       a condition that “may be dangerous, injurious, or noxious to any other property

       or persons.” (Ordinance § 805.01; Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 31). In support

       of its decision that this Subsection was not met, the BZA focused on Hope’s

       proposed security measures and the remonstrators’ “beliefs that the proposed

       safety and security measures were inadequate.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. IV, p.

       44).

[20]   During the hearing before the BZA, Hope detailed the security measures that

       would surround the Oasis and which would be consistent with similar facilities

       in Indiana. Representatives of Hope testified that cameras on the property

       would continuously monitor the residents, doors would be alarmed, and

       residents would not be allowed on the grounds unchaperoned. Background

       checks will be run on the residents prior to their tenancy at the facility and no

       drug use will be allowed while participating in the program. Numerous

       witnesses who lived nearby Hope’s similar facility in Howard County testified

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024    Page 14 of 21
       that there have been no incidents and that they have not experienced any safety

       concerns.

[21]   Ignoring this testimony and evidence, the BZA instead singled out the

       testimonies of certain remonstrators who voiced their “beliefs” that the facility

       would create a potential danger. (Appellant’s App. Vol. IV, p. 44). Without

       any substantiation of the remonstrators’ beliefs, their testimonies merely

       reflected the bias harbored by the remonstrators and the convictions that those

       in recovery are inherently dangerous while they participate in voluntary

       treatment. Their speculation has no grounding in fact. See Terra Nova Dairy,

       LLC, 890 N.E.2d at 104 (evidence must be more than speculation and

       conjecture).

[22]   Before the trial court and on appeal, the BZA contended that a danger to

       neighbors could exist based on the fact that the Hope facility in Los Angeles

       experienced three resident overdoses in the span of a decade. However, as

       pointed out by Hope, this does not constitute a danger to neighbors, and the

       BZA cites no evidence indicating that the Los Angeles facility endangered its

       surrounding neighbors. Instead, the evidence reflects that, unlike the Oasis, the

       Los Angeles facility is a sober living house where residents are allowed to come

       and go. Residents at the Oasis are “not going to be able to leave. They’re not

       going to be able to call somebody to say, come bring me drugs. They’re going

       to be tested routinely. But a sober living is not that.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II,

       p. 82).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024    Page 15 of 21
[23]   In another effort to substantiate its denial under Subsection B, the BZA

       attempts to shoehorn remonstrator Willis’s concern “that the proposed use, at

       that location, would create a potential danger to his family and those living in

       his residence,” into an allegation of traffic safety by linking this statement to

       Willis’s other statement in which he noted “my oldest is five years old and I

       think having this facility is an extreme danger to them, one because of the

       traffic that is going to be increased on that road. Right now, I see more tractors

       than I see cars going down that road, and that is the way I would like to keep

       it.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. IV, p. 44; Vol. II, pp 166-67). Seizing on these

       linked statements, the BZA, before the trial court and now on appeal, asserts

       that the Oasis’s staff will create a traffic danger when the facility’s employees

       arrive or depart. However, the BZA did not include a finding in Subsection B

       that traffic would create a condition that may be ‘dangerous, injurious, or

       noxious to any other property or persons’; it did not even use the word ‘traffic’

       in its findings, but instead focused on the type of treatment services offered at

       the Oasis and its security.

[24]   Although the Ordinance allows the BZA to consider whether “the proposed use

       shall organize vehicular access and parking to minimize conflicting traffic

       movement on adjacent streets” in Subsection E, the BZA expressly declined to

       make a separate finding about traffic conditions under this Subsection.

       (Ordinance § 805.01; Appellant’s App. Vol. IV, pp. 43-44). Nor is there a

       finding on traffic elsewhere in the BZA’s findings. On judicial review, this

       court is limited to the findings specifically found by the BZA and we cannot

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024     Page 16 of 21
       enter “new findings of fact for the BZA.” Riverside Meadows I, LLC v. City of

       Jeffersonville, Indiana Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 72 N.E.3d 534, 540 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2017); Burcham v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals Div. I of Marion Cnty., 883 N.E.2d

       204, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[25]   The comments voiced by remonstrators during the hearing about their beliefs

       and concerns against granting Hope the special use exception do not amount to

       evidence upon which a reasonable mind would rely. Lockerbie Glove Factory

       Town Home Owners Assoc’, Inc. v. Indianapolis Historic Pres. Comm’n, 106 N.E.3d

       482, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (A decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is

       “patently unreasonable[;] made without consideration of the facts and in total

       disregard of the circumstances and lacks any basis which might lead a

       reasonable person to the same conclusion.”), trans. denied. The BZA’s own

       findings acknowledged that remonstrators’ statements veered into unsupported

       territory when it observed that “[t]he BZA gives appropriate weight and due

       consideration to the testimony and statements which appear to be based on

       reason or supported by credible argument. Any testimony or statements which

       appeared utterly devoid of relevant facts, or which seemed to go against all

       common sense, was [sic] discounted and not relied upon.” (Appellant’s App.

       Vol. IV, p. 44). However, by still crediting these ungrounded statements and

       explicitly incorporating them in its findings, the BZA elevated fear and bias to

       the level of evidence. The BZA cannot support its decision with conjecture or

       speculation, but that is precisely what it did in its findings on Subsection B.

       Because there was no “basis that would lead a reasonable and honest person to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024     Page 17 of 21
       the same conclusion,” the BZA’s conclusion with respect to Subsection B

       should be reversed. Rice v. Allen Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 852 N.E.2d 591 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2006).

       B. Subsection G

[26]   Subsection G of the Ordinance requires that “the proposed use shall promote

       the objectives of this Ordinance and shall be consistent with the Comprehensive

       Plan.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 247). As the Ordinance specifically allows

       the location of a Social Rehabilitation Center—defined in part as an

       independent living facility providing treatment and assistance to people

       recovering from the effects of drugs or alcohol—in an agricultural area, the

       Oasis promotes the objectives of the Ordinance. Not disputing this conclusion,

       the BZA instead contends that the better inquiry is whether this particular

       proposed Social Rehabilitation Center at this particular site promotes the

       objectives of the Comprehensive Plan.

[27]   The Comprehensive Plan provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]lthough the

       County’s agricultural areas are spotted with some residential properties and

       isolated developments, any new, large-scale development in remote

       Agricultural areas should be discouraged.” (Comprehensive Plan, Sec. 4, p.

       4.3). In this light, the BZA points to its discretionary power to conclude that

       Hope did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the Oasis was compliant

       with the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan because “a thirty-person facility

       with equal staff changing shifts three times a day did not ‘respect the character

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024   Page 18 of 21
       of surrounding areas’ and was not of the same ‘scale’ as the surrounding uses,”

       while “[n]ew development should be concentrated in areas with access to

       municipal services and infrastructure.” (Appellant’s Br. pp. 35-36).

[28]   Contrary to the BZA’s contention, the Oasis is not a new development subject

       to the language in the Comprehensive Plan. The undisputed evidence

       establishes that there will be no change in the existing structures that would

       impact neighboring use of the Property as agricultural and the Oasis will

       occupy the identical footprint of the original two houses that exist at the site.

       There will be no change to the exterior of the buildings. The Oasis will have no

       impact on agriculture and will not create new development, much less

       development in remote agricultural areas. Although the premises will house up

       to thirty residents, the homes will remain the same and no new exterior

       construction will take place to enlarge or modify the original buildings.

[29]   The BZA argues that Hope would need a new parking lot that could impinge

       on the agricultural nature of the surrounding properties. Expanding a parking

       lot does not create a new structure and does not represent the large-scale

       development envisioned under the Comprehensive Plan. Moreover, the new

       parking lot would be created within the boundaries of the existing Property and

       therefore would not hamper the farming operations of Hope’s neighbors.

[30]   We agree with the trial court’s statement that “[p]erhaps the best evidence that

       operating a Social Rehabilitation Center is consistent with the Comprehensive

       Plan is the [O]rdinance itself, which has long allowed such use as a special

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024     Page 19 of 21
       exception under the zoning ordinance.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 23). If

       the Ordinance itself encourages the establishment of new Social Rehabilitation

       Centers, then such use would certainly include the Oasis which will be located

       in existing residential houses on Property that has always complied with the

       Ordinance. Any inconsistency with the Comprehensive Plan is eliminated

       because the Oasis utilizes the same footprint as the existing residential homes.

       Hope’s proposal here does not contemplate the construction of new buildings to

       serve as a Social Rehabilitation Center but rather intends to utilize the existing

       footprint of current residential structures, which is much less disruptive to the

       existing character of the surrounding agricultural area. Therefore, we conclude

       that Hope’s special use request complies with the requirements of the

       Comprehensive Plan.

[31]   The totality of the evidence before us reflects that the BZA’s findings in denying

       Hope’s request for a special use exception are based on a catalogue of

       speculative and hypothetical dangers the Oasis residents might pose. This

       hyperbole and conjecture have no basis in fact and do not amount to substantial

       evidence sufficient to support the BZA’s denial. See Crooked Creek, 677 N.E.2d

       at 548; Terra Nova Dairy, LLC, 890 N.E.2d at 104 (At a minimum, substantial

       evidence must be more than speculation and conjecture). Accordingly, we

       affirm the trial court’s Order, reversing the BZA’s decision.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024    Page 20 of 21
       CONCLUSION
[32]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly determined

       that the BZA’s decision, denying Hope’s request for a special use exception,

       was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence.

[33]   Affirmed.

       Brown, J. and Foley, J. concur

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
       Bradley M. Dick
       Alan S. Townsend
       Bose McKinney & Evans, LLP
       Indianapolis, Indiana
       David Langolf Smith
       Tipton, Indiana

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
       Mark J. Crandley
       Barnes & Thornburg, LLP
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1733 | February 21, 2024   Page 21 of 21