Court Opinion

ID: 9765393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:01:46.96397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.631674
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. Although I find the language of the analysis unnecessarily broad, I agree that the terms and conditions of employment under the collective bargaining agreement which expired on August 31, 1981 (the “status quo”) included Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage. Because the employees offered to continue working for a reasonable time under these terms, and the employer refused to take the action necessary to preserve this “status quo”, the work stoppage constituted a lockout. Moreover, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in the Dissenting Opinion in High v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 505 Pa. 379, 479 A.2d 967 (1984).
[T]he conclusion that “a work stoppage which is initially a strike may be subsequently converted into a lockout” or vice versa, simply does not follow from the premise that “each week of unemployment is the subject of separate claim, the validity of which is determined by a consideration of conditions existing within that week.” I agree that the statute requires that each week of unemployment is the subject of a separate claim. I disagree, however, that this statutory requirement provides a basis for the conclusion that the work stoppage in this case was converted from a lockout to a strike. Whether a work *275stoppage is a lockout or a strike is determined by the circumstances that caused the stoppage in the first instance.
505 Pa. at 387-88, 479 A.2d at 971 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
LARSEN, J., joins in this concurring opinion.