Court Opinion

ID: 9622937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:25:24.182822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:49.439029
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice.
Appellant Daphne Darice Grissom (“Wife”) and appellee Marquis Dean Grissom (“Husband”) executed a prenuptial agreement prior to their marriage in July 2000. The agreement incorporated Exhibits A and B, wherein Wife and Husband listed their respective separate property, and various provisions of the agreement addressed the disposition of this property in the event of the termination of the parties’ marriage. At issue here are two items listed as Husband’s separate property on Exhibit B: a home located at 110 Fiddlers Ridge in Fairburn, Georgia, valued at two million dollars (the “Fiddlers Ridge property”); and a Merrill Lynch brokerage account valued at four million dollars.
Wife filed for divorce in May 2005 and a final judgment and decree was entered in January 2006. The trial court found that, pursuant to the terms of the prenuptial agreement, Wife waived any interest in the Fiddlers Ridge property or in an American Express brokerage account into which the funds from the Merrill Lynch account had been transferred during the marriage. We granted Wife’s application to appeal this ruling pursuant to this Court’s pilot project for divorce cases. See Wright v. Wright, 277 Ga. 133 (587 SE2d 600) (2003).
1. Relying on Curtis v. Curtis, 255 Ga. 288 (336 SE2d 770) (1985), Husband argues that Wife has waived the right to appeal by accepting the benefits of the final judgment and decree, i.e., a payment of $ 150,000 in lieu of alimony or equitable division of property pursuant to paragraph 14 of the parties’ prenuptial agreement; a fifty percent interest in four parcels of real property; fifty percent of an income tax refund; and monthly child support payments. Although Curtis accurately states the general rule that an appellant cannot accept the benefits of a judgment and then seek to have it set aside, “[p]ublic policy . . . requires that divorce be treated differently because of the *268unique and important issues involved, including the severing of the marital relationship, custody and support of minor children, support of spouses, and division of property.” Southworth v. Southworth, 265 Ga. 671, 675 (461 SE2d 215) (1995) (Fletcher, P. J., concurring specially). We have long found an exception to the estoppel rule in situations where the acceptance of child support is at issue, reasoning that the benefit belongs to the child rather than the appealing spouse. See Coley v. Coley, 128 Ga. 654, 656 (1) (58 SE 205) (1907). We also find persuasive the approach taken by other states that have carved out exceptions to the estoppel rule in recognition of the realities of divorce and the policy considerations involved. See Liming v. Liming, 723 NW2d 89, 96-97 (Neb. 2006) (no waiver of right to appeal where spouse’s right to benefits accepted is conceded by other spouse; spouse entitled as matter of right to benefits accepted such that outcome of appeal could have no effect on right to those benefits; or benefits accepted pursuant to severable award not subject to appellate review); 5 AmJur2d, Appellate Review, § 636 (rule precluding appeal by party who has accepted benefits of judgment applied less strictly in divorce cases, depending on factors such as whether amount received was small portion of total judgment; party’s right to benefit accepted was undisputed; acceptance of benefits was due to financial distress; paying spouse has suffered prejudice; and only issue on appeal is whether award will be increased); Annot., Spouse’s Acceptance of Payments under Alimony or Property Settlement or Child Support Provisions of Divorce Judgment as Precluding Appeal Therefrom, 29 ALR3d 1184. Thus, to the extent that Curtis and other cases can be read to hold that the acceptance of any benefit under a final judgment and decree of divorce results in an automatic waiver of the right to appeal any aspect of that judgment, they are hereby overruled.
Here, Wife’s acceptance of child support payments is subject to our well-settled exception to the estoppel rule. As for the other accepted benefits at issue, Husband has not cross-appealed to dispute Wife’s entitlement to the lump sum payment or the fifty percent interest in certain real property and an income tax refund. Under these circumstances, we find no waiver by Wife of her right to appeal the unrelated issues of her claimed interest in the Fiddlers Ridge property and the American Express account.
2. Neither party challenges the trial court’s finding that the prenuptial agreement is enforceable. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of the agreement provide, inter alia, that Husband retains “sole and exclusive ownership of all of his separate property as set forth in Exhibit ‘B’ ” during his lifetime; that Husband and Wife each retain “free and clear of the other party any substitutions, transmutations and replacements of any assets set forth in Exhibits A’ and ‘B’ ”; and that *269Wife waives “all right, title and interest in and to any and all of [Husband’s] separate property as set forth in Exhibit ‘B.’ ”
During the parties’ marriage, the Fiddlers Ridge property was refinanced and conveyed to the parties as joint tenants with right of survivorship. When the American Express account was opened, Wife was shown as “Co-account holder.” Wife claims that these changes entitle her to an ownership interest in the properties, relying on language in paragraph 11 of the parties’ agreement providing that “the ownership of any real [or personal] property acquired by the parties in the future shall be determined in reference to the legal title to said property.” But because the provision only applies to properties acquired “in the future,” i.e., during the marriage, and both the Fiddlers Ridge property and the predecessor to the American Express brokerage account were acquired prior to the marriage, as established by their inclusion on Exhibit B of the prenuptial agreement, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that this language does not afford Wife an ownership interest in these assets.
Although the presence of Wife’s name on the title to or registration of these properties gives Wife no rights in the assets under paragraph 11, paragraph 15 states that, notwithstanding any other provision of the agreement, each party has the right “to transfer, give or convey to the other any property or interest therein” and that any property so transferred “shall become the separate property” of the recipient. Wife relies upon this paragraph, along with Lerch v. Lerch, 278 Ga. 885 (608 SE2d 223) (2005), in support of her argument that Husband’s conveyance to himself and Wife jointly of the Fiddlers Ridge property and the American Express account changed them from separate property to marital property. In Lerch, the parties had a prenuptial agreement in which the wife promised not to make any claims against the husband’s property in the event of a divorce. Id. at 886 (2). Although the marital home had been purchased by the husband prior to the marriage, we held that the husband manifested an intent to transform his own separate property into marital property by transferring ownership of the home during the marriage to both himself and the wife as tenants in common. Id. at 886 (1). Here, however, Husband has claimed that the changes in ownership of the Fiddlers Ridge property and the brokerage account occurred without his knowledge and that he did not intend to convey any interest to Wife.
A review of the final judgment and decree in this case reveals that the trial court expressly declined to reach Husband’s claims of accident, mistake and fraud before rendering its ruling.
In any situation involving the construction of a domestic or non-domestic contractual agreement, the goal is to look for *270the intent of the parties. [Cits.] We look first to the language employed in the agreement to determine the intent of the parties. If the language is plain and unambiguous and the intent may be clearly gathered therefrom, we need look no further. [Cits.]
Carlos v. Lane, 275 Ga. 674, 675 (571 SE2d 736) (2002). The agreement should be construed in a manner that will allow it to be upheld as a whole and not make any provision meaningless. OCGA § 13-2-2 (4); Dohn v. Dohn, 276 Ga. 826, 828 (584 SE2d 250) (2003). Here, the plain language of paragraph 15 in the prenuptial agreement is clear that the legitimate conveyance of the Fiddlers Ridge property and the brokerage account from Husband to Husband and Wife jointly would change the treatment of these assets for purposes of distribution in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Without findings of fact regarding the circumstances surrounding the changes at issue, however, it is not clear that the conveyances were legitimate. Thus, we reverse and remand for the trial court to make such findings and to construe the parties’ agreement as a whole in accordance with its findings.

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

All the Justices concur, except Thompson, J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Carley, Hines and Melton, JJ., who dissent.