Court Opinion

ID: 9799108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 05:47:03.106145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:45.765154
License: Public Domain

Burgess, J.,
¶ 20. concurring. I concur with the majority’s mandate as well as its underlying reasoning, but I also concur with Judge Bent’s opinion as an alternative basis for reversing the superior court summary judgment decisions.
¶ 21. Bent, Supr. J., Specially Assigned, concurring. I concur with the majority’s mandate because Mangini cannot rely upon 27 V.S.A. § 141(a) to avoid an existing mortgage that merely refinanced a debt on the homestead that existed before she established the homestead. Under the circumstances of this case, I agree with the majority that neither her pending divorce action, nor the family division’s interim domestic order prohibiting either spouse from encumbering any marital property, created an equitable interest to support Mangini’s homestead exemption claim with respect to the. Vermont property. I am concerned, however, with the implication in the majority’s opinion that spouses generally may not rely upon § 141(a) to avoid the consequences of a unilateral spousal conveyance unless they can prove an equitable interest equivalent to a contractual right to marital property owned solely by the conveying spouse. As I indicate below, this implied holding could be applied in future cases under circumstances where § 141(a) would appear to provide protection to nonsigning spouses. I believe that a more fundamental basis for rejecting Mangini’s reliance upon § 141(a) in the present circumstances is simply that the 2008 mortgage did not increase the debt existing at the time Mangini established a homestead in the Vermont property and thus may not be deemed inoperative under § 141(a). See 27 V.S.A. § 107 (“Such homestead shall be subject to attachment and levy of execution upon causes of action existing at the time of acquiring the homestead, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.”).
¶ 22. Like §§ 101 and 107 of Title 27, the prohibition against unilateral spousal alienation of the marital homestead in § 141(a) has been the law in Vermont since 1849. 1849, No. 20, § 5.6 The purpose of “joinder” statutes such as this, which are part of *155virtually every state’s homestead laws, is not only to protect the financial interests of the family, but in particular to protect the nonsigning spouse from unilateral alienation of the homestead by the conveying spouse. See, e.g., In re Clark, 384 B.R. 563, 566 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008) (stating that purpose of Missouri’s statute prohibiting unilateral conveyance of homestead “is to protect the non-conveying spouse”); HSBC Mortgage Servs., Inc. v. Graikowski, 812 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that Minnesota courts have applied joinder statute “in numerous cases to protect a nonsigning spouse to a conveyance”).
¶ 23. This statutory right against unilateral spousal alienation or encumbering of homesteads is provided to spouses notwithstanding — in fact because of — the nonsigning spouse’s lack of title in the homestead property. See Taylor v. Maness, 941 So. 2d 559, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that homestead status may not be destroyed unless both spouses join in conveyance of homestead to third party, even where homestead is owned by only one spouse); Rendleman v. Rendleman, 8 N.E. 773, 776 (Ill. 1886) (“[I]t is unimportant whether the title to the homestead premises is in the husband or in the wife. Whether in the one or the other, the holder of the title cannot wrongfully deprive the other of the enjoyment of the homestead premises.”); R. Waples, Homestead and Exemption, ch. 3, § 5, at 68 (1893) (“The homestead is that of both husband and wife, though he owns it ... . Neither had the sole right of [ejncumbering, alienating or enjoying it, before they were legally parted from each other; their homestead rights were equal.”). In other words, the homestead right in joinder statutes is typically derivative in nature.
¶ 24. Indeed, the right obtained through joinder statutes is merely one against unilateral spousal alienation and vests no title in the nonowner spouse. See Cole v. Cole, 117 Vt. 354, 364, 91 A.2d 819, 825 (1952) (“The homestead law does not vest any title to the homestead in the wife of the general and legal owner, during his life-time, but only a contingent and inchoate right which, if she *156do[es] not release, by joining in a conveyance or otherwise become barred by operation of law, she may enforce, after his death, even though he may have conveyed it away absolutely in his lifetime.”); Winkles v. Powell, 55 So. 536, 538 (Ala. 1911) (“The wife has no estate in the homestead when the legal title is in the husband, and the only rights she has with respect thereto are the common-law right of occupancy jointly with the husband, and the statutory right of veto against its alienation, so long as it remains the family homestead.”); Speck v. Anderson, 318 N.W.2d 339, 343 (S.D. 1982) (“The [statutory] requirement . . . that a spouse must join in the conveyance of a homestead does not create in the non-owner spouse any estate in the land represented by the homestead.”); R. Waples, supra, ch. 4, § 7, at 121 (“The joint-title, created by the husband’s declaration of homestead upon his separate property, is merely a title to estate of homestead — not to the realty itself, as a general rule. The husband conveys no land to his wife by declaring homestead; he lets her in to equal control as to alienation, and equal right to enjoyment, and to that protection which the law gives to all homestead holders.”).7
¶ 25. The majority’s point that a homestead claim must be founded on either legal title or equitable title equivalent to a contractual right to the property is supported by cases construing 27 V.S.A. § 101, which generally defines homesteads, rather than the statute that is the subject of this appeal, § 141(a), which concerns a spouse’s derivative homestead rights. I realize that in this case Mangini is claiming a homestead in her own right, following her separation from her husband, in a different property than the homestead established during the marriage before the parties separated. But the majority’s broad holding regarding the requirement of equitable title in the strictest sense would appear to carry over into situations where the nonsigning, nonowner spouse remained in the original marital homestead after the owner spouse left the marital home and established a separate homestead. For example, would the majority’s strict equitable title requirement apply if the nonowner spouse obtained a relief-from-abuse order, and, as a result, the owner spouse left the marital *157homestead, established a new homestead, and afterwards burdened the marital homestead with a new mortgage not signed by the nonowner spouse? Under the same scenario, would the marital homestead be subject to liabilities incurred by husband, say in an automobile accident, after he left the home? Apparently so in both cases, given the majority’s broad holding, yet the law in this area is convoluted and uncertain. Compare Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Se. Fire Ins. Co., 751 F.2d 771, 777 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding under Mississippi homestead law that “[w]hen a husband removes himself from homestead property without any intent to return and his wife consents, the homestead is abandoned notwithstanding wife’s continued residence on the land.”), with Larson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963 (D. Minn. 2011) (finding mortgage signed by husband void based on wife not having signed it, even though she had separated from husband twenty years earlier and lived in separate home), and Coy v. Mango Bay Prop. & Invs., Inc., 963 So. 2d 873, 877-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that husband who had left marital home owned by wife pursuant to injunction was entitled to hearing on issue of whether he had constitutionally protected right in marital home so as to preclude wife under joinder law from unilaterally mortgaging property). See generally R. Waples, supra, ch. 9, § 2, at 258-60 (describing joinder statutes as giving nonowner wife an estate to possess and enjoy homestead during life of householder unless certain exceptions applied).
¶ 26. Rather than rely upon a potentially overbroad holding that could ensnare spouses entitled to § 141(a)’s protection under different circumstances, I would reject Mangini’s claim under § 141(a) based on the uncontested fact that the 2008 mortgage signed solely by her husband did not increase the debt on the subject property that existed prior to Mangini’s homestead claim. The superior court found that the debt associated with the property was originally a purchase money mortgage that was refinanced in 2004, 2005 and 2008. The court also found that Mangini began living in the subject property in April 2007. At that time, the property was encumbered by the debt from the 2005 refinancing of the mortgage. The court found that the 2008 refinancing was with no cash out. Hardie asserted that the 2008 mortgage refinance was intended simply to obtain a lower interest rate and did not increase the preexisting debt on the property. Mangini produced no evidence to contradict this assertion, which is consistent with the court’s findings.
*158¶ 27. Under these circumstances, I believe that 27 V.S.A. § 107 applies, as Brattleboro Savings argued both below and on appeal, to preclude Mangini from relying upon § 141(a) to make the 2008 mortgage inoperative. Section 107, which was also part of the original Homestead Act in 1849, 1849, No. 20, § 6, provides that homesteads “shall be subject to attachment and levy of execution upon causes of action existing at the time of acquiring the homestead, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) Recently, this Court noted that, early on, we “squarely rejected the contention that ‘causes of action’ in the statute were limited to a creditor’s suit on the [preexisting] debt.” Weale v. Lund, 2006 VT 66, ¶ 11, 180 Vt. 551, 904 A.2d 1191 (mem.) (citing Robinson v. Leach, 67 Vt. 128, 129, 31 A. 32, 33 (1895), which stated that statute was “the same ... as though it read, ‘debts existing’ ”). We reaffirmed the view that § 107 applies to “debts existing when the homestead was acquired.” Id. ¶ 5.
¶ 28. As stated above, it is undisputed that the debt from the 2005 refinanced mortgage existed at the time Mangini “acquired” the homestead. I do not believe that Mangini can escape the consequences of that preexisting debt under § 141(a) based simply on the fact that it was refinanced with no cash out solely by the owner-husband a month or so after she claimed to have established a homestead on the property. In Robinson, the issue was “whether a homestead is exempt from a note given by the homesteader after its acquisition, in renewal of his notes given before its acquisition, the parties to the notes being the same.” 67 Vt. at 129, 31 A. at 33. We stated that, particularly with respect to the renewal of mortgage notes, “[a]s long as the original debt can be traced the security remains, no matter how many renewals there have been.” Id. In allowing the claim against the homestead, we reasoned as follows:
The new note was but a new evidence of the old debt. True, the old notes were extinguished as affording a ground or cause of action, but the debt evidenced thereby continued to exist for the purpose of preserving the right against the homestead that was originally connected with it.
Id. at 130, 31 A. at 33.
¶ 29. Commentators and courts agree with this principle. See, e.g., R. Waples, supra, ch. 10, § 2, at 284 (stating that wife need *159not sign mortgage on homestead given to secure debt created prior to establishment of homestead when “it creates no additional burden relative to her rights and interests”), ch. 12, § 4, at 377 (stating that some courts do not require joinder of spousal signatures on mortgage that merely secures debt antecedent to establishment of homestead); Harris v. Mosley, 111 S.W.2d 563, 564-65 (Ark. 1937) (stating that “any increase in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage made” without wife’s signature would not be binding on her (emphasis added)). Some courts have arrived at the same principle on equitable grounds.8 Cf. Swift v. Kraemer, 13 Cal. 526, 530 (1859) (refusing on equitable grounds to apply joinder rule to prevent creditor from collecting on husband’s unilateral loan that paid off preexisting homestead lien); Katsivalis v. Serrano Reconveyance Co., 138 Cal. Rptr. 620, 627 (Ct. App. 1977) (concluding that policy of joinder law is not subverted by allowing lender, who had loaned money to one spouse to pay off preexisting encumbrances on homestead, to be subrogated to rights of prior lender to avoid unjust enrichment).
¶ 30. Interpreting § 107 in this manner does not undermine either the underlying policy or the plain language of § 141(a). Section 141(a) is intended to preclude one spouse from burdening another by unilaterally alienating or encumbering a homestead without the agreement of both spouses. That statute is not intended to allow spouses to avoid debts existing at the time of the establishment of the homestead based on one spouse’s unilateral signing of a mortgage that does not increase that preexisting debt. Cf. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Newton, 646 N.W.2d 888, 895 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that “harsh result” of trial court’s interpretation of joinder statute to invalidate mortgage signed by one spouse was inconsistent with policy underlying statute, given that nearly half of unilaterally signed mortgage was used to refinance original contract for deed on homestead and thus could be considered, to that extent, purchase money mortgage). Whether we consider the 2008 mortgage to be subject to the express purchase money mortgage exception contained in § 141(a) or the preexisting debt rule set forth in § 107, wife cannot avoid the consequences of that mortgage under § 141(a). See *160Fraser v. Sleeper, 2007 VT 78, ¶ 12, 182 Vt. 206, 933 A.2d 246 (“We interpret statutes to avoid absurd and illogical results ... in favor of reasonable construction when a plain reading of the statute would produce a result demonstrably at odds with any conceivable legislative purpose.” (quotation omitted)). For the above reasons, I concur in the majority’s mandate but not the reasoning underlying that mandate.

 This earliest version of the statute provided as follows:
*155Such homestead shall not be alienated or mortgaged by the owner thereof, if a married man, except by the joint deed of such husband and wife, executed and acknowledged in the manner provided for the conveyance of the lands of married women: Provided, however, that such husband may, without the consent of his wife, mortgage such homestead, at the time of the purchase thereof, for the payment of the purchase money.

 By citing to early cases that refer to archaic legal relationships and presumptions concerning men and women, I do not mean to suggest that such relationships and presumptions have any validity today, but rather only to emphasize that joinder laws were meant to establish derivative homestead rights in spouses notwithstanding a spouse’s lack of any claim to title in the marital homestead.

 Equitable subrogation may also serve as an available alternative remedy in situations such as this. In this case, however, the appellant did not raise that remedy until its sur-reply in connection with a post-judgment motion.