Court Opinion

ID: 9532693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:24:03.632528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:48.680818
License: Public Domain

On the Merits
The first assignment of error is to the effect that the trial court erred in overruling respondents’ demurrer to the bill of complaint. No mention is made of this assignment of. error in brief filed here on behalf of the appellants, respondents below, hence it will not be considered. Vinson v. Vinson, 256 Ala. 259, 54 So.2d 509; MacMahon v. City of Mobile, 253 Ala. 436, 44 So.2d 570; Morgan County v. Hill, 257 Ala. 658, 60 So.2d 838.
Under 'appropriate assignments of error, appellants argue that the decree appealed from is erroneous in its entirety for two reasons.
It is said that the provisions of the ordinance which relate to the licensing of businesses within the police jurisdiction of the city of Jasper expired at the end of 1951.
It is true that § 2 of the ordinance does not contain the language of § 1 to the effect that the licenses are levied for the year 1951 and for each calendar year thereafter. But even if it be assumed that the provisions of § 1 as to the duration of the levy have application only to businesses carried on within the corporate limits, the provisions of § 11 of the ordinance, copied above, are a complete answer to this insistence of appellants. It is not contended the provisions of the ordinance adopted December 26, 1950, have been repealed or superseded by the adoption of any other ordinance. We hold that there is no merit in this contention.
It is next insisted that as applied to appellants, whose place of business is without the corporate limits but within the police jurisdiction of said city, § 2 of the ordinance is void in that it was enacted for the purpose of raising revenue rather than regulation and supervision.
The legislature is without authority to extend to cities the right to make a license charge for conducting a business outside of its corporate limits for the general revenue of the city, but cities have the right to enact a license on businesses located and conducted in their police jurisdiction as a reasonable and proper exercise of their right and duty to supervise them in that territory, in amounts reasonably necessary to defray the cost of such supervision, in the absence of prohibitory legislation. Van Hook v. City of Selma, 70 Ala. 361, 45 Am. Rep. 85; Standard Chemical & Oil Co. v. City of Troy, 201 Ala. 89, 77 So. 383, L.R.A. 1918C, 522; Woco Pep Co. of Montgomery v. City of Montgomery, 213 Ala. 452, 105 So. 214; Walden v. City of Montgomery, 214 Ala. 409, 108 So. 231; White v. City of Decatur, 25 Ala.App. 274, 144 So. 872, certiorari denied, 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873, 86 A.L.R. 914; City of Homewood v. Wofford Oil Co., 232 Ala. 634, 169 So. 288; City of Birmingham v. Wilson, 27 Ala.App. 288,172 So. 292, certiorari denied, 233 Ala. 410, 172 So. 295; Alabama Power Co. v. City of Carbon Hill, 234 Ala. 489, 175 So. 289; City of Prichard v. Harold, 28 Ala.App. 235, 186 So. 499, certiorari denied, 237 Ala. 277, 186 So. 504; City of Andalusia v. Fletcher, 240 Ala. 110, 198 So. 64; City of Prichard v. Richardson, 245 Ala. 365, 17 So.2d 451; Hawkins v. City of Prichard, 249 Ala. 234, 30 So.2d 659; Alabama Gas Co. v. City of Montgomery, 249 Ala. 257, 30 So.2d 651; City of Prichard v. Hawkins, 255 Ala. 676, 53 So.2d 378.
There is another well-established rule that applies here. When the question as to. the reasonableness of a municipal ordinance is raised and the ordinance has reference to a subject matter within the corporate jurisdiction, it will he presumed to be reasonable unless the contrary appears on the face of the law itself or is established by proper evidence. Van Hook v. City of Selma, supra; Town of Oxanna v. Allen, 90 Ala. 468, 8 So. 79; Gamble v. City Council of Montgomery, 147 Ala. 682, 39 So. 353; Giglio v. Barrett, 207 Ala. 278, 92 So. 668; Walden v. City of Montgomery, supra; City of Birmingham v. Wilson, supra; City of Prichard v. Harold, supra; City of Andalusia v. Fletcher, supra; City of Prichard v. Richardson, supra.
In view of this principle, the burden rests upon the licensee to demonstrate any *647claim of .invalidity. Walden v. City of Montgomery, supra; City of Andalusia v. Fletcher, supra; Standard Chemical & Oil Co. v. City of Troy, supra. See City of Bessemer v. Bessemer Theatres, 252 Ala. 117, 39 So.2d 658; American Bakeries Co. v. City of Huntsville, 232 Ala. 612, 168 So. 880; City of Birmingham v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 216 Ala. 178, 112 So. 742.
In § 1 of the ordinance which has application to businesses carried on within the corporate limits of the city, there is set out 206 different types of businesses, with the amount of license tax levied against each, which amounts vary according to the type or character of business. In § 2 of the ordinance applicable to the police jurisdiction, the city authorities fixed the amount of license required for doing business in the police jurisdiction at a sum equal to one-half the amount specified in § 1 for carrying on the same type or character of business within the corporate limits. Thus the amount fixed is not in excess of the maximum authorized under the provisions of § 733, Title 37, Code 1940,' as amended.
Appellants contend that it appears from the face of § 2 of the ordinance that it was enacted for general revehue purposes inasmuch as the amounts of the licenses there imposed are fixed at the maximum amounts which could be imposed under the limitations prescribed in § 733, Title 37, Code 1940, as amended, without any specific mention being made of the various businesses within the police jurisdiction and the amount which each should pay to defray the costs of supervision and regulation; that, therefore, the invalidity of § 2 of the ordinance is apparent on its face.
In the case of Walden v. City of Montgomery, supra, a section of the ordinance of that city was under attack which was very similar to § 2 of the ordinance here involved. Section 15 of the Montgomery ordinance read:
“§ 15. Any person, firm or corporation engaged in any business outside of the city of Montgomery, but within the police jurisdiction thereof, shall pay one-half of the amount of license imposed for like business within the city of Montgomery. It is the purpose of this section to license for police and fire protection only, and not for revenue.”
In upholding the validity of the ordinance-as against the attack there made, this court said:
“The ordinance appears upon its face to have been enacted in the exercise of the police power, and is presumed to be reasonable. Van Hook v. City of Selma, 70 Ala. 361, 45 Am.Rep. 85; Standard [Chemical &] Oil Co. v. City of Troy, 201 Ala. 89, 77 So. 383, L.R.A. 1918C, 522. Nothing to the contrary is made to appear and we therefore hold the ordinance a valid exercise of the police power.
“Appellant sought to show that at the point where his ’lumber yard is located the service both as to fire and police protection was inadequate, but the trial court held such evidence immaterial to the issue presented. We think the ruling correct. These were executive or administrative matters, not involved in the question of the validity of the ordinance. We are cited to no authority holding that such an ordinance is subject to attack upon the ground that, in the opinion of the taxpayer, the police or fire protection was inadequate. Such questions are not to be presented in such form.
“We are of the opinion the ordinance is valid, and the judgment of conviction should accordingly be here affirmed.” 214 Ala. 411, 108 So. 233.
It seems clear that the holding in Walden v. City of Montgomery, supra, answers completely the insistence of appellants that § 2 of the ordinance under consideration appears on its face to be unreasonable and invalid.
In City of Birmingham v. Wilson, 27 Ala. App. 288, 172 So. 292, the Court of Appeals had under consideration the provisions of an ordinance of the city of Birmingham very similar to that under consideration here and that in the Walden case, supra. The validity of the ordinance as it applied to business in the police jurisdiction was upheld on the authority of the Walden case, *648supra. We denied certiorari, 233 Ala. 410, 172 So. 295.
Counsel for appellants, in support of the argument that § 2 of the ordinance of present concern is unreasonable and invalid on its face, rely upon the case of Alabama Power Co. v. City of Carbon Hill, 234 Ala. 489, 175 So. 289. No reference is made in the opinion in that case to the rule previously announced by this court that ordinances of the character there involved are presumed to be valid and that the burden is upon the licensee to establish their invalidity, nor was consideration given to our holding in Walden v. City of Montgomery, supra, and that of the Court of Appeals in City of Birmingham v. Wilson, supra. The opinion does contain language which is perhaps subject to the construction that the burden is upon the municipality to show that the businesses in the police jurisdiction have been properly classified and that the amount of license fixed for each such classification has been properly determined.
The question for determination in that case was not whether the ordinance was unreasonable or invalid on its face, but whether under the agreed statement of facts it was shown that the ordinance as it affected the business carried on by the Alabama Power Company within the police jurisdiction of the city of Carbon Hill was in fact a revenue measure.
It was pointed out in the case of City of Andalusia v. Fletcher, supra, in response to application for rehearing, that the holding in Alabama Power Co. v. City of Carbon Hill, supra, did not change the rule as to the burden of proof and that the holding in that case was based on the fact that the license fee charged by the City of Carbon Hill was directed at a single corporation engaged in a single business within and without the corporate limits and that under the percentage basis of gross revenue the license fee without the corporate limits but within the police jurisdiction equalled in amount the license charge for the same business within the corporate limits.
The holding in the case of Hawkins v. City of Prichard, 249 Ala. 234, 30 So.2d 659 (followed in City of Prichard v. Hawkins, 255 Ala. 676, 53 So.2d 378), was not based on a finding that the ordinance was invalid on its face, but that it was made to so appear from the evidence presented. While no reference is made in the opinion in that case to the rule that the burden is on the licensee to show the invalidity of such an ordinance, nothing said therein was intended to reflect upon that well-established principle.
We hold, therefore, that § 2 of the ordinance here under consideration is not invalid on its face and that the burden of proof was upon the licensee to establish its invalidity by competent evidence. Walden v. City of Montgomery, supra.
The only evidence offered by appellants, respondents below, for the purpose of proving the invalidity of the license levied on appellants’ business within the police jurisdiction of the city of Jasper was that going to show the inadequacy of service rendered by the city of Jasper within the police jurisdiction. This evidence, under the rule often stated, was not alone sufficient to justify a finding that the licenses so levied were unreasonable. Walden v. City of Montgomery, supra; City of Prichard v. Harold, supra; City of Birmingham v. Wilson, supra; * City of Andalusia v. Fletcher, supra. The facts of this case are unlike the facts presented in the case of City of Prichard v. Richardson, supra. In that case there was evidence both as to the amount of revenue derived from the ordinance and evidence as to the cost and amount of regulation, fire and police protection. In this case there was no evidence under which the trial court could have found that the revenue exacted by the ordinance was all out of proportion to the cost of regulation and protection, as was shown in City of Prichard v. Richardson, supra.
We conclude, therefore, that there is no merit in those assignments of error to the effect that the decree appealed from is erroneous in its entirety.
Appellants under "proper assignments of error argue that the trial court erred in decreeing that they were liable for a license for “the privilege of operating a rolling store in connection with the operation” of their business.
*649Schedule 165 of § 1 of the ordinance reads:
“Rolling Stores Retailing — Persons operating what is known as rolling stores, and including the sales of articles in merchandise license only $100.00”
As heretofore shown, the trial court decreed that appellants, respondents below, owed the city of Jasper the sum of $50, plus penalty and issuance fee, for the operation of a rolling store. Hence, it is apparent that the trial court found that such sums were due because of the operation of the rolling store in the police jurisdiction of the city.
Schedule 165, supra, does not purport to apply to the operation of a delivery truck whereby merchandise sold at an established place of business is delivered to customers, nor does it require a license solely for the use of the streets and highways. It applies, as we understand it, to the operation of a miniature store on wheels. There is no definition of a rolling store in the ordinance nor is such a store described in the evidence. However, we think it can be said as a matter of common knowledge that a rolling store is generally understood to be a miniature store stocked with all kinds of merchandise usually carried in general merchandise and grocery stores, placed on a motor vehicle chassis, so that the store can be moved from house to house and the merchandise sold therefrom the same as it would be sold from a store at a fixed location. The scheme of the business is to give customers cash and carry prices at their doors. See Erwin v. City of Omaha, 118 Neb. 331, 224 N.W. 692; H. G. Hill Co. v. Whitice, 149 Tenn. 168, 258 S.W. 407; State v. Webster, 29 Ala.App. 407, 197 So. 87; Harris Bros. v. State, 240 Ala. 160, 198 So. 443.
There is no evidence in this record to support a finding that the respondents have operated a rolling store within the police jurisdiction of the city of Jasper. It is admitted that appellants own a rolling store which they have loaded with groceries from their fixed place of business located within the police jurisdiction. But there is no evidence to the effect that any merchandise was sold or offered for sale from the rolling store at any point within the police jurisdiction of said city. In the absence of such evidence, we cannot agree that appellants are liable for a license based on the operation of-a rolling store within the police jurisdiction of the city.
We therefore direct that the decree of the circuit court be modified so as to eliminate therefrom the sum of $55.50, which sum the trial court decreed appellants owed the city of Jasper for the privilege of operating a rolling store.
As so modified, the decree of the circuit court is affirmed. The costs of appeal are to be equally divided between appellants and appellee.
Modified and affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and STAKELY and MERRILL, JJ., concur.