Court Opinion

ID: 9897790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:25:09.339908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.466587
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Humphreys, Malveaux and Fulton
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued by videoconference

              MICHAEL JOHN STAR
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1537-22-4                                   JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
                                                                                SEPTEMBER 19, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                             FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
                                             James C. Clark, Judge

                             Tameka N. Casey (Robert A. Ades and Associates, PC, on briefs),
                             for appellant.

                             Lindsay M. Brooker, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                             Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a bench trial, the circuit court convicted Michael John Star for making a false

              police report in violation of Code § 18.2-461. Star challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

              support his conviction. He also asserts that the circuit court imposed an invalid sentencing

              condition.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

              light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party [below].” Poole v. Commonwealth,

              73 Va. App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)). In

              doing so, we discard any of Star’s conflicting evidence and regard as true all credible evidence

              favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that

              evidence. Gerald, 295 Va. at 473.

                     * This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
        In 2020, Charisse Hines was an attorney who practiced with her own firm in Alexandria.

Hines’s law firm used the “DocuSign” system for retainer agreements when accepting new clients.

DocuSign “allow[ed] clients to electronically sign agreements without having to be physically

present” in Hines’s office. Typically, Hines’s assistant drafted the firm’s engagement letter and fee

arrangement for new clients, which Hines would review and approve. Then, Hines’s assistant

uploaded the document in PDF format into the DocuSign system and emailed the document to the

new client for electronic signature.

        In July 2020, Star sought Hines’s assistance in collecting the debts on some civil judgments

he had obtained against three individuals. Star communicated with Hines and her assistant through

email about legal representation. Hines’s office generated a document entitled “Engagement Letter

and Fee Arrangement” dated July 10, 2020, and addressed to Star. The terms of the agreement

provided for Star to pay Hines’s firm a retainer of $1,200 and, thereafter, a rate of $300 per hour for

legal services. The document instructed Star to sign the letter and email it to Hines’s law firm if he

agreed with the terms. Hines’s firm received a copy of the agreement, with a DocuSign signature

above Star’s printed name, on July 10, 2020. Star paid Hines the retainer of $1,200. Hines

provided legal services by filing documents to collect on the judgments but made no court

appearances on Star’s behalf.

        In telephone and email conversations on August 31, 2020, Star advised that he wished to

pursue the matters on his own and would contact Hines if he needed further assistance.

Nonetheless, Star continued to submit inquiries and requests for information and documents and

Hines’s firm continued to respond. After applying the retainer fee to Star’s bill for legal services

rendered between the retention and September 25, 2020, Hines’s firm invoiced Star $741 for the

balance he owed.

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          Star sued Hines for repayment of the $1,200 retainer, alleging that she had breached the

engagement agreement by not providing him with legal services. Hines counterclaimed, seeking

$741 in unpaid legal fees. At trial in general district court on March 4, 2021, the court found that

Star signed the engagement letter and fee arrangement with DocuSign and, thus, agreed to the terms

for retention and payment of fees. The court entered judgment for Hines in the amount of $741 and

dismissed Star’s warrant in debt. Star did not perfect an appeal from the general district court

judgment to the circuit court.

          On March 7, 2021, Star called the Alexandria police. Star said he had hired Hines’s law

firm to represent him to collect unpaid judgments and that, at trial in a dispute over legal fees, Hines

had presented an engagement letter with an electronic signature that he did not sign. Star claimed

that he had never seen the document before it was presented at trial. In addition, Star charged that

“somebody in the law firm had signed it.” At the police officer’s request, Star emailed him the

document in question.

          The police contacted Hines regarding an investigation of an allegedly forged document.

Hines provided the police with the engagement letter and fee arrangement signed by Star using

DocuSign. Hines also obtained a “Certificate of Completion” from DocuSign indicating that the

engagement letter had been signed properly using Star’s email on July 10, 2020.

          The police went to Star’s home on March 11, 2021, and questioned him about the forgery

allegation. When asked, Star said he did not use email to provide his electronic signature although

he did have a laptop computer. The police then charged Star with making a false report to the

police.

          Star filed a civil complaint in circuit court against Hines alleging that she “forged” his

signature on the engagement letter and fee agreement. The circuit court dismissed Star’s claim by

order entered June 17, 2021. The dismissal order stated that the finding that the engagement

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agreement was “valid and enforceable was essential to the General District Court’s judgment

dismissing Star’s claim and granting Hines’s counter-claim.” The dismissal order further stated that

“Star’s claim that Hines forged his signature on the agreement is precluded by the doctrine of

collateral estoppel . . . .” The circuit court found that the general district court’s judgment was final

and valid against Star and that he had failed to perfect an appeal of the judgment. The circuit court

also found that Star filed the complaint “without just cause in violation of Va. Code § 8.01-271.1.”1

The circuit court thus “order[ed] an injunction preventing Michael Star from filing any future

claims” in that court against Hines relating to the retention agreement or any aspect of Hines’s

representation of him.

        Testifying at his trial for making a false report to the police, Star admitted that he hired

Hines to represent him for debt collection work and that he paid the $1,200 retainer. Star said that

after contacting the police, he provided them with a copy of the engagement letter with his “wet”

signature, claiming that he signed it while at Hines’s office on July 10, 2020. He also gave the

police a copy of the engagement letter with the DocuSign signature and said he did not recall seeing

it before the trial in general district court. Star testified that, when he contacted the police, his

understanding was that a person signing the name of another to a document without permission was

forgery. Star claimed that he contacted the police thinking it was “a proper civil duty,” not that he

was making a false police report. He said that when he called the police, he “simply wanted

clarification as to whether or not this DocuSign agreement was signed by [him].” The circuit court

rejected Star’s explanation that he did not intend to make a false report of a crime to the police and

found him guilty.

        1
         Code § 8.01-271.1 permits a court to impose “an appropriate sanction” upon “the person
who signed the paper or made the motion” that is not “well grounded in fact” or was “interposed
for any improper purpose.”
                                              -4-
        At sentencing, Hines testified that Star had a long, established history of filing frivolous

lawsuits. She noted that the circuit court had sanctioned Star by ordering him not to file lawsuits

against her or her law firm. Hines stated that Star had paid $700 toward the outstanding judgment

but had failed to pay the additional $46 that he owed to satisfy her judgment against him with

interest.

        The circuit court noted Star’s long history of abusing the judicial system, thus

inconveniencing other people and the courts. The circuit court sentenced Star to 12 months in jail,

with all but 90 days suspended, probation for 6 months, and good behavior for 12 months after his

release from confinement. In its pronouncement of sentence, the circuit court stated that Star’s

suspended sentence was conditioned upon his satisfaction of the judgment rendered against him and

in favor of Hines; the circuit court further prohibited him from filing lawsuits against Hines, her

staff, or anyone in the city of Alexandria without prior permission from the court. The circuit

court’s sentencing order, however, did not contain the condition that Star satisfy the outstanding

judgment. This appeal followed.

                                             ANALYSIS

                                    I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

        Star challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for falsely

reporting a crime to the police. “On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘the judgment of

the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without

evidence to support it.’” Ingram v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 59, 76 (2021) (quoting Smith v.

Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “The question on appeal, is whether ‘any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Id. (quoting Yoder v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 180, 182 (2019)). “If there is evidentiary support

for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its

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opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App.

273, 288 (2017)).

       Under Code § 18.2-461(i), it is unlawful “to knowingly give a false report as to the

commission of any crime to any law-enforcement official with intent to mislead.” “The statute

does not require that such false report lead to the filing of a false charge, much less result in a

false conviction.” Dunne v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 24, 31 (2016). That a “false report of

a crime might leave open hypothetical defenses to such falsely reported crime does not excuse or

decriminalize [the] lie.” Id.

       Admitting that he contacted the police on March 7, 2021, Star argues that he did not

knowingly report a false crime with the intent to mislead and that his allegation did not describe

the commission of a crime. “Proving intent by direct evidence often is impossible.” Kelley v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 628 (2019) (quoting Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App.

463, 470 (2000)). “Therefore, intent, ‘[l]ike any other element of a crime, . . . may be proved by

circumstantial evidence.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Adams, 33 Va. App. at 471).

“An offender’s ‘intent may be inferred from the nature of the overt act and the surrounding

circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Parish v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 324, 331 (2010)).

       Star placed his call to the police just days after losing at trial in general district court and

being ordered to pay Hines $741 in legal fees. As the circuit court later ruled, the general district

court, in dismissing Star’s warrant in debt, determined that Star signed the engagement letter and

fee agreement through DocuSign and the document was valid and enforceable against him.

Notwithstanding these findings, Star told the police that, in court, Hines presented an engagement

letter with an electronic signature that he did not make, he had not seen the document before trial,

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and that “somebody in the law firm had signed it.” In doing so, Star alleged that the crime of

forgery was committed.

       After the police contacted Hines, she produced the “Certificate of Completion” from

DocuSign confirming that the electronic signature came from Star’s own email, which further

supported the general district court’s finding. When the police questioned Star, he replied that he

never used email for an electronic signature. The only reasonable conclusion from such

circumstances was that Star reported false information to the police to mislead them that Hines,

or someone at her law firm, unlawfully forged his name on the document.

       Star’s claim that he contacted the police because he was merely seeking “clarification” on

the matter, and not criminal consequences, is unavailing. Star sought out the assistance of the

police, who are responsible for enforcing Virginia’s criminal statutes not dispensing legal advice.

The timing of Star’s call to the police—just days after losing his case to Hines—also supports his

intent to mislead the police. Star’s civil action claiming forgery against Hines further supports a

conclusion that he called the police to falsely report forgery. Given all of these facts and

circumstances, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Star

was guilty of knowingly making a false report of a crime with the intent to mislead.

                                 II. Prohibition of Future Lawsuits

       Star maintains that the circuit court abused its discretion by prohibiting him, as a

condition of his sentence, from filing lawsuits against Hines, her staff, or anyone in Alexandria

without prior approval by the court.2 The Commonwealth correctly observes that Star failed to

       2
          Star also maintains that the circuit court abused its discretion by conditioning his
sentence “upon his satisfaction of a civil judgment entered against him in the [g]eneral [d]istrict
[c]ourt[.]” Though the circuit court stated this condition at the sentencing hearing, it was not
included in the sentencing order. “A court of record speaks only through its written orders.”
Robertson v. Sup. Of the Wise Corr. Unit, 248 Va. 232, 235 n.* (1994). We do not “consider the
transcript[] of the sentencing proceeding in order to determine the intent of the trial court.” Id.

                                                -7-
raise this issue in the circuit court. Star requests that this Court address his asserted error to

attain the ends of justice.

        “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an

objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause

shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. “The purpose of this

contemporaneous objection requirement is to allow the trial court a fair opportunity to resolve

the issue at trial, thereby preventing unnecessary appeals and retrials.” Creamer v.

Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 185, 195 (2015). Star acknowledges that, in the circuit court, he

did not preserve the argument regarding the imposition of a sentencing condition but asks this

Court to consider this issue under the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18.

        “The ‘ends of justice’ exception to Rule 5A:18 is ‘narrow and to be used sparingly.’”

Melick v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 122, 146 (2018) (quoting Pearce v. Commonwealth, 53

Va. App. 113, 123 (2008)). Whether to apply the ends of justice exception involves two

questions: “(1) whether there is error as contended by the appellant; and (2) whether the failure

to apply the ends of justice provision would result in a grave injustice.” Commonwealth v. Bass,

292 Va. 19, 27 (2016) (quoting Gheorghiu v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 678, 689 (2010)). Thus,

the “ends of justice” exception to Rule 5A:18 “requires proof of an error that was ‘clear,

substantial[,] and material.’” West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 338 (2004) (quoting

Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 132 (1989)). “[A] defendant must affirmatively show

that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Melick,

69 Va. App. at 146 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215,

221 (1997)). Given this high bar, the exception has been applied only in “very limited

Because it was not a condition imposed in the sentencing order, we need not consider Star’s
argument concerning the satisfaction of the civil judgment.
                                               -8-
circumstances including, for example, where the record established that an element of the crime

did not occur, a conviction based on a void sentence, [and] conviction of a non-offense.”

Williams v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 25, 28 (2017) (quoting Gheorghiu, 280 Va. at 689). Star

has failed to meet this high burden. We do not find that this is one of the rare instances where

we invoke the ends of justice exception and consider the issue raised on appeal.

                                         CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

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