Court Opinion

ID: 9644052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:47:34.481485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:08.164128
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While I agree with the result reached by the majority in Part II B of its opinion that the alleged Miranda violation was in any event harmless error, I cannot accept the dichotomy which the opinion seeks to draw in its discussion of the harmless error doctrine. In my view such a distinction is for all practical purposes non-existent. Asi discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed.2d 705 (1967), the concept of harmless error represents a determination by a court that although testimony has been erroneously admitted at trial, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it in no way influenced the verdict. Whether that conclusion is reached as a result of a finding that the impact of the challenged evidence is de minimis or whether the evidence supports a fact already established and is therefore no longer in dispute, the final result is identical in both cases. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 *461L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). Thus, the ultimate test is whether, in fact, it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence in question did not influence the verdict. Milton v. Wainwright, supra; Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 81 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); Harrington v. California, supra; Chapman v. California, supra; Commonwealth v. Hale, 467 Pa. 293, 356 A.2d 756 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bullard, 465 Pa. 341, 350 A.2d 797 (1976); Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715 (1973).
Additionally, I am compelled to comment upon Part III of the majority opinion concerning the admissibility of the notes of testimony from the preliminary hearing. First, the majority appears to accept a per se rule that prior testimony from a preliminary hearing of an unavailable witness is admissible at trial provided that defendant had counsel to cross-examine the witness during the earlier proceeding. While I am in agreement that such testimony should be admissible provided there has been a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the prior hearing, I believe that such an opportunity usually does not exist at this proceeding. As expressed in my concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Stasko, 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350 (1977), due to the limited opportunity for pre-trial discovery in this jurisdiction, the preliminary hearing has become a vehicle through which the defense attempts to glean information from the Commonwealth’s witnesses. Rarely, however, is it used for the purpose of impeaching these individuals. Therefore, before such evidence is admissible at trial, there should first be a thorough review of the testimony of the witness during the preliminary hearing. Only if it is determined that cross-examination was in fact employed to attack the witness’ credibility at that proceeding should the testimony be admitted. However, I need not make a judgment in the instant case since I do not believe the witness was unavailable at the time of trial.
*462As noted by the majority, there is long-standing support for the view that upon conviction and imposition of sentence a witness may no longer claim the privilege against self-incrimination and may be compelled to testify about the transaction in question. Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 81 S.Ct. 260, 5 L.Ed.2d 249 (1960); United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1031, 88 S.Ct. 1424, 20 L.Ed.2d 288 (1968); United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Romero, 249 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Cioffi, 242 F.2d 473 (2nd Cir. 1957); Commonwealth v. Tracey, 137 Pa.Super. 221, 8 A.2d 622 (1939); Cherb v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 472 S. W.2d 273 (1973). See also Wigmore, Evidence § 2279 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Additionally, there are those authorities which hold that the privilege should be extended while a direct appeal is actually pending on the conviction. See e. g., Ottomano v. United States, 468 F. 2d 269 (1st Cir. 1972); Mills v. United States, 281 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1960); Kohler v. Meade, Ky.App., 479 S.W.2d 885 (1972); McClain v. State, 10 Md.App. 106, 268 A.2d 572 (1970).
However, the majority today attempts to further extend the privilege against self-incrimination to those instances in which the witness has exhausted his right of direct appeal and merely expresses the intention of seeking collateral relief some time in the future. In my view, such an extension is unwarranted and without any basis for support. To allow this protection to an individual upon the possibility that he may, at some future time, attempt to attack the judgment of sentence collaterally would make any final resolution of the issue of. his availability impossible since the witness could always make such a representation to the court. Moreover, despite the majority’s attempt to restrict the privilege to those collateral attacks which are not “patently frivolous”, such a standard provides no limitation at all. Since *463there is no way to ascertain when a future change in the law might provide a basis for some form of collateral relief, the witness would in fact enjoy the privilege indefinitely.
I believe that such an unwarranted and unreasonable extension of the Fifth Amendment protection was never envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. Nor can I perceive of any reason for this jurisdiction to embrace such a novel approach.
In the instant case, I do not believe the privilege was properly invoked nor that the witness was unavailable and therefore, his prior testimony should not have been admitted at trial. Further, in view of the fact that this testimony supplied direct evidence of appellant’s actual presence in the home of the victim and his participation in the homicide, I cannot conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and award a new trial.