Court Opinion

ID: 9440276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 14:06:31.139404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:45.986648
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Hershey Company,                            :
                Petitioner                      :
                                                :
               v.                               :
                                                :
Shawn Woodhouse (Workers’                       :
Compensation Appeal Board),                     :   No. 904 C.D. 2022
                Respondent                      :   Submitted: April 6, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                                  FILED: August 3, 2023

               The Hershey Company (Employer) petitions this Court for review of
the Workers’ Compensation (WC) Appeal Board’s (Board) July 25, 2022 order
reversing in part the WC Judge’s (WCJ) decision, and granting Shawn Woodhouse’s
(Claimant) petition for specific loss benefits (Claim Petition). The sole issue before
this Court is whether the WCJ and the Board erred as a matter of law by concluding
that Claimant provided timely constructive notice pursuant to Section 311 of the WC
Act (Act)1 that his November 6, 2017 injury was work related. After review, this
Court reverses.

                                         Background
               Claimant began working for Employer full time on May 8, 2017, at
which time he had a previous history of diabetic neuropathy. Claimant developed a
right diabetic foot ulcer in June 2017, for which his podiatrist instructed him to rest

      1
          Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 631.
his foot, and prescribed gel, medicine, and a DARCO Boot2 (Boot). Employer did
not permit Claimant to wear the Boot on the factory floor because he worked in the
food industry3 or remain seated while working because his job duties required he be
able to see and check on the machines.4 Thus, Claimant’s doctor placed him off
work from June 13, 2017 to August 26, 2017, during which time Claimant worked
at Verizon Wireless.
               On September 11, 2017, Claimant emailed Employer to inquire
whether he could return to work with a full cast. He did not return to work at that
time. On September 26, 2017, Claimant’s doctor released him to work with one
restriction, that he wear regular shoes due to his diabetic foot ulcer and infected
blister. Thereafter, Claimant returned to work.
               On November 6, 2017, Claimant passed out at work and was taken by
ambulance to the Hershey Medical Center, where he was admitted. Claimant sent
an email on January 2, 2018, to Carly Danz (Danz)5 notifying Employer that after
being taken from work by ambulance, Claimant had emergency foot surgery and
was awaiting doctor approval to return to work. Claimant returned to work on March
22, 2018, and the following month underwent a below-the-knee amputation of his

       2
          The DARCO Boot provides post-operative protection with a closed-toe design that keeps
dressings and toes warm and dry, and accommodates bulky dressings.                             See
https://darcointernational.com/product/apb-all-purpose-boot (last visited August 2, 2023).
        3
          Claimant testified that “[b]ecause it’s the food industry[,] [he] was told [he] was not
allowed to wear it on the factory floor.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 124a. Hershey required its
factory floor employees to wear steel-tipped boots, but if an employee had foot problems, he or
she could request to wear steel-tipped sneakers. See R.R. at 178a. Claimant regularly wore “steel
tip boots, but [Employer] did allow [him] to wear a [steel-tipped] sneaker.” R.R. at 124a.
        4
          Claimant testified that although he had a chair, “[y]ou weren’t supposed to sit for very
long because you do have to watch the machine. You can’t really sit there.” R.R. at 177a-178a.
        5
          Danz worked for Employer monitoring active and claimed work injuries.
                                                2
right leg. Thereafter, he did not return to work and was awarded Social Security
Disability benefits effective May 2018.6
              On December 1, 2019, Claimant filed the Claim Petition, alleging
therein that he suffered a work injury on November 6, 2017, consisting of an
aggravation of a diabetic foot ulcer and a below-the-knee amputation of his right leg.
Claimant asserted that the injury was caused by standing for long periods of time at
work, bagging and wrapping product, and by not being able to use the medically
prescribed Boot to protect his diabetic foot ulcer. Claimant did not seek disability
benefits; rather, his claim was limited to specific loss benefits. Employer filed an
answer denying that Claimant suffered a work injury and contending the Claim
Petition was its first notice that Claimant was alleging he had suffered a work injury
in 2017.
              The WCJ held hearings on December 19, 2019, January 21, March 9,
June 22, and September 2, 2020, and March 1 and May 27, 2021. On October 12,
2021, the WCJ granted Claimant’s Claim Petition and awarded Claimant specific
loss benefits for the loss of his great toe and remaining toes of his right foot, but
denied specific loss benefits for Claimant’s below-the-knee amputation. The WCJ
also awarded Claimant litigation costs.
              Concerning the notice issue, the WCJ opined:

              Admittedly, the issue of notice in this dispute is a close
              call, particularly considering [] Danz’s testimony
              regarding her understanding of the evidence offered by
              Claimant.     Nevertheless, given this evidence from
              Claimant, and Claimant’s reminder that the Act’s notice
              requirement is to be liberally construed[FN]6, it will be
              concluded that an adequate basis for []Employer to have
              had constructive notice of Claimant suffering a work
              injury to his right foot existed by November 2017. In

       6
          Claimant and Danz related that “[o]ut of a 312-work[-day] year, [Claimant] worked a
total of 86.47 [days].” R.R. at 194a; see also R.R. at 331a.
                                             3
           short, Claimant did meet his burden of proof that notice of
           his injury was timely given to []Employer.
               [FN]6
                     Claimant, at an earlier point in his brief, cites
               McCann v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 208
               A.2d 887 (Pa. Super. 1965)[,] for the position that
               the notice requirement is to be liberally
               construed.[7]
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 66a.

             Claimant and Employer appealed to the Board. On July 25, 2022, the
Board reversed the WCJ’s decision as to the denial of relief for Claimant’s below-
the-knee amputation, and affirmed the WCJ’s decision in all other respects.
Regarding the notice requirement, the Board explained:

             The burden was on Claimant to establish timely and
             adequate notice of a work-related injury. [] Danz
             essentially corroborated Claimant’s testimony as to the
             communications between Claimant and [Employer] and
             Claimant’s provision of notes and restrictions pertaining
             to his right foot condition. The WCJ acknowledged that
             the issue in this matter was close, but he made a factual
             determination that [Employer] had constructive notice
             of Claimant’s right foot condition and of the relationship
             between his foot condition and his employment duties as
             of Claimant leaving work on November 6, 2017, given

      7

             [Although Claimant], . . . relie[d] on McCann . . . , for the
             proposition that a formalistic notice statement is not necessary
             where the employer has knowledge of the occurrence of the injury[,]
             . . . the facts in McCann are distinguishable from the present
             case. In McCann, there was a leak in the refrigeration system
             permitting ammonia fumes to escape into the claimant’s working
             area. Further, the claimant’s supervisor visited him in the hospital,
             and representatives of the employer’s insurance carrier interviewed
             the claimant and members of his family. Here, [] [E]mployer was
             not aware that [Claimant] was alleging his [amputation] was a work-
             related injury until he filed the [C]laim [P]etition [23] months after
             [the amputation].
City of Phila. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Wills), 618 A.2d 1162, 1165 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1992).
                                               4
               [Employer’s] knowledge of the right foot ulcer and
               blister[,] and Claimant’s restrictions and his need for
               alternative footwear while on his feet, as well as
               [Employer’s] access to Claimant’s medical records.

R.R. at 105a-106a (citations omitted; bold and italic emphasis added). Employer
appealed to this Court.8

                                           Discussion
               Employer argues that both the WCJ and the Board erred as a matter of
law by concluding that Claimant provided timely, adequate, and/or proper notice of
his alleged work injury within the 120-day time period established by Section 311
of the Act.
               Section 311 of the Act specifies:

               Unless the employer shall have knowledge of the
               occurrence of the injury,[9] or unless the employe . . . shall
               give notice thereof to the employer within [21] days after
               the injury, no compensation shall be due until such notice
               be given, and, unless such notice be given within [120]
               days after the occurrence of the injury, no
               compensation shall be allowed. However, in cases of
               injury . . . in which the nature of the injury or its

       8
          “[This Court’s] review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were
supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed[,] or whether
constitutional rights were violated.” DiLaqua v. City of Phila. Fire Dep’t (Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd.), 268 A.3d 1, 4 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting Bristol Borough v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Burnett), 206 A.3d 585, 595 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)).
        9
          “[F]or the purposes of Sections 311 and 312 of the Act, [77 P.S. § 632,] the term “injury”
includes any medical malady reasonably associated with the work place incident or injury,
as well as any subsequent causally related medical problems stemming from that injury.” Crown
Servs., Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Beck), 682 A.2d 1333, 1339 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996),
aff’d, 701 A.2d 221 (Pa. 1997); see also City of Lower Burrell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Babinsack) (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 120 C.D. 2019, filed Mar. 12, 2020).

                                                 5
             relationship to the employment is not known to the
             employe, the time for giving notice shall not begin to
             run until the employe knows, or by the exercise of
             reasonable diligence should know, of the existence of the
             injury and its possible relationship to his employment.

77 P.S. § 631 (emphasis added). The purpose of the Act’s notice requirement is to
“protect[] the employer from stale claims for accidental injuries, of which [the
employer] would have no knowledge, made after the opportunity had passed for a
full and complete examination thereof.” Penske Logistics v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Troxel), 132 A.3d 1029, 1035 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting Canterna v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 317 A.2d 355, 356 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974)).
             Further, Section 312 of the Act mandates: “The notice . . . shall inform
the employer that a certain employe received an injury, described in ordinary
language, in the course of his employment on or about a specified time, at or near
a place specified.” 77 P.S. § 632 (emphasis added). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held: “Section 312 [of the Act] does not speak . . . to the determination of
whether notice is adequate. . . . [T]he parameters of what constitutes adequate notice
in a given case has been developed through our case law.” Gentex Corp. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Morack), 23 A.3d 528, 534 (Pa. 2011).
             “[T]he claimant bears the burden of demonstrating that proper notice
was given.” City of Pittsburgh v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Flaherty), 187 A.3d
1061, 1066 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). The issue of whether adequate notice of injury was
given to an employer “presents a mixed question of fact and law[.]” Gentex, 23 A.3d
at 534. Further, “what constitutes adequate notice pursuant to Section 312 of the
Act is a fact-intensive inquiry, taking into consideration the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. at 537. Moreover,

             [i]n a substantial evidence challenge,
                 it is irrelevant whether the record contains
                 evidence to support findings other than those made

                                          6
                   by the WCJ; the critical inquiry is whether there
                   is evidence to support the findings actually
                   made. . . . We review the entire record to
                   determine if it contains evidence a reasonable
                   mind might find sufficient to support the WCJ’s
                   findings. . . . If the record contains such evidence,
                   the findings must be upheld even though the record
                   contains conflicting evidence.
               Lahr Mech. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Floyd), 933
               A.2d 1095, 1101 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citations omitted).

Columbia Cnty. Comm’rs v. Rospendowski (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 286 A.3d
436, 446 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (emphasis added).
               Here, Employer does not challenge the WCJ’s findings of fact.
Employer specifically contends that Claimant knew of the alleged causal connection
between his amputations and his work-related duties in November 2017, but did not
provide notice to Employer until his Claim Petition was filed in December 2019.
The Board affirmed the WCJ’s determination that Employer had “constructive
notice” of Claimant’s injury and of the relationship between his injury and his
employment duties. R.R. at 105a-106a. The Board held that Claimant’s “provision
of notes and restrictions pertaining to his right foot condition” 10 and post-2017
amputation communications with Danz11 constituted constructive notice that
satisfied the Act. R.R. at 105a. Employer asserts that “Claimant’s attempts to
‘bootstrap’ notice through documents must fail where the [communications between

       10
           Specifically, Danz received: the June 12, 2017 doctor’s note stating Claimant’s Boot and
seating restrictions; the June 12, 2017 doctor’s note placing Claimant off work; the September 11,
2017 email from Claimant inquiring if he could return to work with a full cast; and the September
26, 2017 doctor’s note releasing Claimant to work with one restriction - that he wear regular shoes.
See R.R. at 329a-344a.
        11
           Specifically, Danz received: a June 17, 2017 phone call from Claimant advising he was
being admitted to the hospital due to “elevated cardiac enzyme [sic][,]” R.R. at 329a; the January
2, 2018 email from Claimant stating he had foot surgery; and a May 30, 2018 email from a co-
worker stating: “[G]rapevine talk someone who talked to [Claimant] outside of work that he had
to get his leg cut off.” R.R. at 347a.

                                                 7
Employer and Claimant] fail to even initiate any causal connection between
diagnoses and employment.” Employer Br. at 23. Employer further cites injury logs
in the record that indicate Claimant’s injury as “non-occupational” as evidence that
it did not have constructive notice of Claimant’s injury. Employer Br. at 25.
               Claimant rejoins that “based on the totality of the circumstances, there
was enough information for Employer to have constructive notice of the work-
relatedness of the aggravation of the ulceration that led to the infection and ultimate
amputation.” Claimant Br. at 11. Claimant does not dispute that the ulceration in
and of itself is non-occupational, but contends that “the aggravation of the
underlying ulcer by failing to properly offload [it] while at work is occupational in
nature.”     Id.   Additionally, Claimant contends that “Employer had enough
information available to it to trigger its duty to investigate this claim as a work injury
as required under Section 406.1 of the Act[12] as early as June 2017; however, it
failed to do so.” Id. at 12. Claimant asserts that he and Employer communicated
multiple times in 2017 and 2018 before the end of the 120-day notice period, and

       12
          Added by Section 3 of the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, 77 P.S. § 717.1. Section
406.1(a) of the Act provides, in relevant part:
               The employer and insurer shall promptly investigate each injury
               reported or known to the employer and shall proceed promptly to
               commence the payment of compensation due either pursuant to an
               agreement upon the compensation payable or a notice of
               compensation payable as provided in [S]ection 407 [of the Act, 77
               P.S. § 731 (relating to agreements),] or pursuant to a notice of
               temporary compensation payable as set forth in subsection (d), on
               forms prescribed by the department and furnished by the insurer.
77 P.S. § 717.1(a). Because Claimant did not develop this argument on appeal, this Court will not
address it. See Commonwealth v. Feineigle, 690 A.2d 748, 751 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (quoting
Wicker v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 460 A.2d 407, 408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)) (“When issues are not
properly raised and developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific
issues for review, a court will not consider the merits thereof.”).

                                                8
that Danz’s knowledge of Claimant’s right foot ulcer was sufficient evidence to
support a finding of constructive notice. See id. at 10-11.
             During the September 2, 2020 hearing, Claimant admitted that he
suspected that his amputation was related to his job duties in 2017; however, he did
not notify Employer because Employer never asked him about it. Specifically,
Claimant testified:

             Q. [Employer’s Counsel:] [Claimant], I want to follow up
             on what I asked you at the first hearing. And that is, when
             did you first suspect or even believe that you[r] job
             duties had anything to do with your amputation? Was
             that in November of 2017 or April of 2018?
             A. [Claimant:] 2017, when I got my toes removed.
             Q. Okay. So at that time you believe that your work duties
             had something to do with your amputations. Correct?
             A. Correct.
             Q. Okay. And that was following discussion with your
             doctors. Correct?
             A. Correct.
             Q. Okay. And in 2017, you never said anything to
             anybody at [Employer] that you felt that your
             amputation had anything to do with your work duties.
             Correct?
             A. Nope.
             Q. Am I right on that?
             A. Yeah.
             Q. Okay.
             A. But they never asked me that.

R.R. at 180a-181a (bold and underline emphasis added). Notably, Claimant was not
aware that his toe amputations were work related until after “discussion with [hi]s

                                          9
doctors[,]” R.R. at 180a, yet Claimant contends that Employer should have been
aware that his toe amputations were work related based on Claimant’s non-
occupational condition coupled with his November 7, 2017 foot surgery.
            Further, during the December 19, 2019 hearing, Claimant testified:

            Q. [Employer’s Counsel:] And you were told during
            orientation that if you suffer what you felt was a work[-
            ]related injury or condition, you were to immediately
            approach your supervisor and let them know. Correct?
            A. [Claimant:] Correct.
            Q. You - you never did that. Correct?
            A. No, because I didn’t - .
            Q. You didn’t what?
            A. I wasn’t dire when I was working.

R.R. at 137a (emphasis added). The WCJ found Claimant “on balance, credible”
during both the December 19, 2019 and September 2, 2020 hearings. R.R. at 63a.
Given Claimant’s testimony, Section 311 of the Act required Claimant to provide
Employer notice that his injury was work related within 120 days of November 7,
2017. Although Claimant informed Danz in the January 2, 2018 email that he had
emergency foot surgery in November 2017, he made no reference to that surgery
being work related.
            Specifically, Claimant wrote the following to Danz:

            My name is Shawn Woodhouse and in November I was
            taken from work to Hershey Med[ical Center]. I had
            emergency surgery on my foot. I am healing nicely and I
            am awaiting the approval to be in a normal shoe and return
            to work. I will be sure to give you all notes and releases
            before doing so.

R.R. at 374a. Because Claimant’s email did not specify that his employment
aggravated his condition, it did not satisfy Section 312 of the Act’s notice

                                          10
requirements. Claimant did not notify Employer that his foot surgery was work
related until he filed his Claim Petition in December 2019, well beyond the
statutorily mandated 120 days. For the first time, in his December 2019 Claim
Petition, Claimant explained that “standing for long periods of time and continuing
to work without the ability to protect his foot using an appropriate off[-]loading
device aggravated and worsened [his] condition.” R.R. at 7a.
            Relative to Claimant’s argument that his notice was acceptable as
having been delivered through a series of communications, the series of
communications between Claimant and Employer did not establish notice because
Claimant knew his injury was work related in 2017, and he only informed Employer
that it was work related in their last communication (i.e., the Claim Petition). In
Gentex, our Supreme Court stated that notice under Section 312 of the Act “may be
provided over a period of time or a series of communications, if the exact nature of
the injury is not immediately known by the claimant.” 23 A.3d at 537 (bold and
italic emphasis added). However, Claimant admitted that he first knew in November
2017, when his toes were amputated, that his foot surgery was work related, but he
did not provide notice of the same to Employer.
            This case is distinguishable from the series of communications’ cases
our Supreme Court cited to in Gentex. In State Workmen’s Insurance Fund v.
Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Wagner), 677 A.2d 892 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1996), this Court held that a claimant’s initial conversation with her employer in a
series of communications satisfied Section 312 of the Act where the claimant
mentioned in the initial conversation that she thought her disease was work related.
In Kocher’s IGA v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Dietrich), 729 A.2d 145
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), this Court held that a claimant gave proper notice when the
claimant was injured at work and immediately informed her supervisor of the injury,
stating that she was not sure whether it was work related.
                                        11
                 Here, Claimant did not mention that his foot surgery was work related
or that he suspected it was work related until the last communication - the Claim
Petition - in his series of communications with Employer regarding his diabetic foot
ulcer. The communications between Claimant and Employer prior to the November
2017 surgery list his restrictions at work as “Non-Occupational” and “NOC.”13 R.R.
at 363a. Thus, it was clear that both Claimant and Employer believed at that time
that Claimant’s right diabetic foot ulcer was not work related. Claimant, in the
communications after his foot surgery and before the Claim Petition, never stated to
Employer that he suspected or believed that his foot surgery was work related. It
was not until the Claim Petition 23 months later that Claimant alleged that the foot
surgery was work related.

                 The notice required by Section 311 of the Act must
                 “inform the employer that a certain employee received an
                 injury, described in ordinary language, in the course of his
                 employment on or about a specified time, at or near a place
                 specified.” 77 P.S. § 632. . . . [G]iven the totality of the
                 circumstances, [Employer’s knowledge of Claimant’s
                 right foot ulcer and blister and Claimant’s need for
                 alternative footwear and restrictions while on his feet, as
                 well as Employer’s access to Claimant’s medical records,]
                 were not sufficient to satisfy these criteria.

Newman v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Geisinger Cmty. Health Servs.) (Pa.
Cmwlth. No. 1850 C.D. 2016, filed Aug. 22, 2017), slip op. at 12. 14 Viewing the
totality of these communications, substantial evidence does not support the WCJ’s
conclusion that Claimant communicated to Employer that his foot surgery was work
related or that he suspected a work-related injury before the end of the 120-day

        13
             NOC appears to stand for non-occupational created, as in “NOC restrictions.” R.R. at
363a.
         This Court’s memorandum opinions may only be cited “for [their] persuasive value, but
        14

not as binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating
Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). This Court cites Newman for its persuasive value.

                                                12
notice period. To hold otherwise would be placing the burden on an employer, every
time a claimant has a non-occupational restriction, to review his medical records and
determine if, and/or when, a non-occupational medical condition becomes work
related. This is contrary to the Act’s notice provision.
             This is not a case where the series of communications can provide the
required notice as it did in Gentex, because Claimant: (1) knew that he suffered a
work-related injury in November 2017; (2) knew that he was to immediately report
suspected work-related injuries to his supervisor; and (3) sent an email to Employer
within the required 120 days without stating, or in any manner indicating, that his
injury was work related. Because substantial record evidence did not support the
WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant provided Employer with adequate notice of his
work-related injury pursuant to Section 312 of the Act within 120 days as required
by Section 311 of the Act, this Court is constrained to reverse the Board’s order.

                                     Conclusion
             For all of the above reasons, the Board’s order is reversed.

                                       _________________________________
                                       ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

                                          13
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Hershey Company,                    :
                Petitioner              :
                                        :
            v.                          :
                                        :
Shawn Woodhouse (Workers’               :
Compensation Appeal Board),             :   No. 904 C.D. 2022
                Respondent              :

                                   ORDER

            AND NOW, this 3rd day of August, 2023, the Workers’ Compensation
Appeal Board’s July 25, 2022 order is reversed.

                                     _________________________________
                                     ANNE E. COVEY, Judge