Court Opinion

ID: 9474358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:55:33.143421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:02.771114
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT
ADAMS, Circuit Judge.
Juan Martinez appeals from his conviction and sentence of life imprisonment without parole for first degree murder, V.I. Code, tit. 14, § 922(a)(1). On appeal Martinez does not deny that he killed Felipe Gomez, but argues that the killing was not willful, premeditated, and deliberate as required for a first-degree conviction. Specifically, he appeals on two grounds. First, he contends that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of first-degree murder. Second, Martinez maintains that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to his counsel, despite a specific request by the defense. We conclude that the evidence supports Martinez’s conviction. However, we believe that Martinez has made out an arguable violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) which requires that prosecutors disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. As a result, we will remand for a hearing in order for the district court to determine whether Martinez should be afforded a new trial.
I.
Juan Martinez killed Felipe Gomez on the night of March 4, 1984, in front of Building # 4 of the Walter I.M. Hodge Pavilion in Frederiksted, St. Croix. Miguel Lopez, who knew both Martinez and Gomez, and in whose house Martinez was staying that night, testified that he encountered Gomez while walking outside the housing project at about 10:00 p.m. Appellant’s App. at 27A-29A. Gomez, who was intoxicated and armed with a knife, told Lopez that he was looking for Martinez. Id. at 27A. Lopez replied that Gomez was drunk, and should go home, but Gomez insisted that “he didn’t care, that he wanted to go there and take [Martinez] out of the house.” Id.
Gomez and Martinez appear to have been involved in a feud. Id. at 43A; 106A. Just three nights earlier, Gomez had been seen at the same apartment complex looking for Martinez. On that occasion, Gomez, who was drunk and armed with a shotgun, sought entry to Lopez’s house in order to kill Martinez, who was known as Titoi. Id. at 43A. When Gomez was denied entry, he said to Martinez, “Titoi, if you don’t get out, if you don’t kill me I gonna kill you.” Id. at 62A. This was not the first time Gomez had threatened to take Martinez’s life. Id. at 106A. After a previous death threat which Gomez delivered in a face-to-face confrontation with Martinez, Martinez walked away. Later, though, he apparently vowed to take revenge; a friend testified Martinez told her, “if he don’t kill Felipe [Gomez] his name is not Titoi [Martinez].” *304Id. at 108A. Gomez was known to be a drinker and a fighter; asked whether Gomez knew how to fight, one witness testified that “that’s all the man does.” Id. at 129A.5.
On the night of March 4, after encountering Lopez outside of the project, Gomez proceeded to the front door of Lopez’s house, where Martinez was staying, and pounded on it. Id. at 72A. Martinez answered from the side door, from which the front entrance can be viewed through a brick garden wall containing openings. Id. at 34A. An argument ensued, and shortly thereafter Martinez shot Gomez through the wall two or three times. Id. at 136A. Gomez fell to the ground. Martinez then came around to the front of the house, shot Gomez once or twice more while Gomez lay on the ground; Martinez then ran away. Id. at 38A-39A; 70A-85A.
When the police arrived shortly thereafter, they found no evidence of the knife Gomez had been seen brandishing outside the project before the shooting. Nor did they find any other weapon. The only person to have approached Gomez between the time he was shot and the time the police arrived was Gomez’s brother, who was seen leaning over the body and opening Gomez’s shirt. Id. at 54A; 66A.
All the above evidence was presented by government witnesses. At the close of the prosecution’s case, Martinez’s defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal of first-degree murder, on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence to support first-degree homicide. She argued that “Mr. Gomez, himself, was known at the time to have been very drunk, to have been armed and to have previously threatened my client’s life,” and that the facts did not support the necessary premeditation and deliberation. The judge denied the motion. In his case, Martinez presented only an alibi defense, denying he had killed Gomez. He testified that he left Lopez’s house at approximately 7 p.m., and spent the evening first at his sister’s house and then at his father’s house. Martinez’s father, brother, and two sisters testified in support of his story.
Only after his conviction, and during the separate sentencing proceding, did Martinez reveal that, before trial, he had confessed to the killing to a Spanish-speaking police officer, Detective Vigo. Martinez told the court that Gomez had arrived at Lopez’s house with a shotgun as well as a knife, and that he had broken in the louver window to get to Martinez. Martinez said that he shot Gomez when Gomez pointed the gun at him. App. at 143-147. According to an affidavit taken later by an investigator for the Federal Public Defender, Detective Vigo stated that he relayed this confession to Detective Steve Brown, the principal case agent, who sat at the prosecutor’s table throughout the trial, and to Assistant United States Attorney Frederick Jones, who prosecuted the case. App. at 14A.2. At oral argument in this appeal, the Assistant U.S. Attorney admitted that the confession had been passed on to Detective Brown, but denied that he himself was aware of it.
Martinez, who primarily spoke Spanish and used English only in a most rudimentary manner, never told his court-appointed counsel, a white female attorney who spoke only English, about this confession or about Gomez’s gun. Until the sentencing hearing, he maintained to her that he had a valid alibi. There is some evidence he misunderstood her role as counsel, and believed that she was part of the adjudicatory apparatus that would rule on his guilt or innocence: in the pre-sentencing hearing, he related to the judge his fear “that she [his attorney] could find me in the first-degree murder.” Appellant’s App. at 145A.
Martinez’s counsel had given the prosecutor a specific request, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), for “all oral confessions or statements, subsequently reduced to writing, summarized in police reports, made by the defendant.” Martinez’s confession.put the prosecution in a position to know that there was little basis for Martinez’s alibi defense, *305but also that there was considerable question about the elements of premeditation and deliberation. The confession, therefore, although inculpatory, was also exculpatory.
Once she learned of the confession at the sentencing proceeding, Martinez’s counsel informed the court that she would seek a new trial based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose the confession. The judge denied Martinez’s motion for a new trial, and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Martinez filed a timely appeal.
II.
Martinez first contends that the evidence submitted to the jury was insufficient to support premeditation and therefore does not support a conviction for first degree murder. The evidence, however, adequately supports the jury’s finding.
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Lake, 362 F.2d 770 (3d Cir.1966), this Court addressed the elements of willfulness, deliberateness, and premeditation which must be established to prove first-degree murder:
To premeditate a killing is to conceive the design or plan to kill. State v. Anderson, 1961, 35 N.J. 472, 173 A.2d 377, 389-390. A deliberate killing is one which has been planned and reflected upon by the accused and is committed in a cool state of the blood, not in sudden passion engendered by just cause of provocation. State v. Roedl, 1945, 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741, 749. It is not required, however, that the accused shall have brooded over his plan to kill or entertained it for any considerable period of time. Although the mental processes involved must take place prior to the killing, a brief moment of thought may be sufficient to form a fixed, deliberate design to kill. State v. Hammonds, 1939, 216 N.C. 67, 3 S.E.2d 439, 445; Keenan v. Commonwealth, 1863, 44 Pa. 55, 56-57. See, also, Bullock v. United States, 1941, 74 App.D.C. 220, 122 F.2d 213, 214; 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure (1957) §§ 267, 268; 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 33.
362 F.2d at 776. The element of premeditation may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the homicide. Government of Virgin Islands v. Roldan, 612 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir.1979).
Martinez submits that the evidence in the record does not establish premeditation. Factors casting doubt on Martinez’s premeditation include the evidence that the victim was armed and intoxicated; that the victim came looking for Martinez and not vice versa; that an argument immediately preceded the shooting; and that three nights earlier the victim, intoxicated then also, had sought entry to the same house, told Martinez that he would kill him, and had then fired a shotgun several times in the air. These facts prove, Martinez argues, that he acted out of defensive fear, and not in the “cool state of the blood” necessary for first-degree murder. Lake, 362 F.2d at 776.
On appeal we are not to review the evidence independently, but are limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to support the verdict. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149-50, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). The government presented evidence that Martinez had vowed to kill the deceased, had a gun, and had shot the deceased four times — two or three times from behind a wall, and one or two times at close range when he was lying on the ground. These elements support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.1
III.
Martinez’s second ground of appeal raises a more, perplexing question. He con*306tends that the prosecution’s failure to disclose his confession violated his right to a fair trial. The confession, he argues, provided evidence that Gomez was carrying a gun at the time of the shooting. According to the evidence presented at trial, however, Gomez was only seen carrying a knife. Based on that version of the events in question, it seems quite unlikely that Martinez, who concededly had a gun and was behind a garden wall, felt threatened by Gomez when he shot him. But, with evidence that Gomez had a gun, the defense contends it could have made a far stronger argument that Martinez fired the fatal shots but of fear, and not in cold-blood, as first-degree homicide requires.
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny, a defendant has a constitutional right to disclosure from the prosecution of material exculpatory evidence. See also United States v. Bagley, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (plural opinion); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Bagley declares that a defendant is entitled to a new trial where “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 105 S.Ct. at 3384. A “reasonable probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The Bagley inquiry requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including possible effects of non-disclosure on the defense’s trial preparation. Id.
Where a factual question is raised as to whether a Brady violation occurred, the defendant is “entitled to have it determined by the district court in a hearing appropriate to the factual inquiry.” United States v. Alexander, 748 F.2d 185, 193 (4th Cir.1984). As this Court held in United States v. Dansker, 565 F.2d 1262 (3d Cir.1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052, 98 S.Ct. 905, 54 L.Ed.2d 805 (1978):
Where the submission of written affidavits raises genuine issues of material fact and where, as here, the Brady claims are neither frivolous nor palpably incredible, an evidentiary hearing should be conducted.
Id. at 1264.
A.
Application of the foregoing principles suggests that this case be remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. If the evidence sought by Martinez had been disclosed, there appears to be a “reasonable probability” that the result of his trial would have been different. Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at 3384. Evidence that Gomez was carrying a gun would have enabled Martinez to argue that he was guilty of a lesser degree of homicide,2 either because he shot in the “heat of passion” or out of fear of the victim, and thus did not act in a “cool state of the blood,” Lake, 362 F.2d at 776, as first degree requires. To be sure, this theory could be undercut by the final shots Martinez fired into Gomez’s prostrate body — the coup de grace, as the dissent characterizes it. Consequently, a jury might well have rejected this defense, and returned a first-degree verdict nonetheless. Yet, given Gomez’s reputation for violence, his repeated threats on Martinez’s life, and the fact that Gomez actively sought out Martinez on the night of the shooting, a second-degree defense based on the additional evidence that Gomez was also armed that night may have influenced the jury’s assessment of Martinez’s mental state.3
*307The dissent makes much of the fact that such a theory is not borne out by the record. But if Martinez’s statement had been disclosed, the record arguably would have been different; it might well have included not only evidence that Gomez was armed, but other evidence uncovered as a result of the confession.4 We cannot, of course, predict with assurance how the jury would weigh any new evidence, but the chance that it would have resulted in a verdict of a lesser degree of homicide would seem “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at 3384.
Moreover, there remain unresolved “genuine issues of material fact,” Dansker, 565 F.2d at 1264, as to whether a Brady violation took place. First, it is not clear from the record whether Martinez’s confession was reduced to writing by Detective Vigo, either contemporaneously or in any subsequent reports or memoranda. If it was reduced to some form of writing by one of the governmental agents, it would appear to fall within the literal terms of defense counsel’s discovery request, which specifically asked for:
All written or recorded statements or oral confessions or admissions, subsequently reduced to writing, summarized in police reports, made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the Government, the existence of which is known or by the exercise of due diligence may become known to the Government. This request includes statements made to witnesses other than police officers at any time the defendant was in custody.
If the suppressed information was specifically requested, review of its materiality must take that fact into account. In Bag-ley, the Supreme Court noted that where a specific request has been made, it is more likely that a prosecutor’s failure to respond will have an adverse effect on “the preparation or presentation of the defendant’s case.” 105 S.Ct. at 3384.5
A second issue that requires further factual development is the extent of the information obtained from Martinez in the confession. This inquiry should include consideration whether, as a result of Martinez’s confession, the government obtained other exculpatory evidence that it did not turn over to the defense.6 The affidavit submitted by Andre Peterson, investigator for the Federal Public Defender, relates what Detective Vigo said Martinez confessed to him. It further states that Detective Vigo admitted that “this information” was relayed to Detective Brown and to Assistant U.S. Attorney Mr. Jones. Examination of Martinez, Vigo, Brown, and Jones might be helpful. Particularly where much of the substance of the affidavit has been admitted by the prosecution, it would appear to be improvident to close the inquiry without looking further into the substance and implications of the information. Absent testimony from the direct participants as to *308what was confessed or discovered, it is difficult — perhaps impossible — to determine the materiality of that information to the degree of Martinez’s culpability.
Finally, the record is scanty concerning the extent of the prosecution’s knowledge of the confession. The only evidence consists of the affidavit, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jones’s admissions at oral argument that Detective Brown had been apprised of the information, and that Detective Brown, the case agent, sat at Jones’s side during Martinez’s trial.7 While it has been suggested that Detective Brown’s knowledge of the information is sufficient as a matter of law to establish a Brady violation by the government,8 we need not reach that issue if the facts disclose, as the affidavit suggests, that the prosecutor was personally aware of the confession.
B.
The prosecution raises a strong counterargument to Martinez's Brady claim when it contends that in this case the defendant himself knew of the exculpatory evidence. The only reason his counsel was unaware, the government insists, was because Martinez lied. Until the district court resolves the issues outlined above, though, the relevance of Martinez’s untruthfulness cannot be determined.
In order to resolve this question, the district court should consider whether Martinez was incapable, for any reason, of communicating truthfully with his attorney. It is possible that Martinez may not have understood his English-speaking lawyer’s role; this is suggested by his willingness to confess to a Spanish-speaking police officer before trial, but not to his own counsel, and by his comment to the judge about the attorney’s power to convict him. If Martinez’s situation proves to have been analogous to that of the defendant in Na-gell v. United States, 354 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1966), then Martinez’s foreknowledge would not necessarily bar his Brady claim. In Nagell, the defendant received a new trial on a Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 “newly-discovered evidence” ground, despite the fact that he knew of the evidence prior to trial and concealed it from his attorney. The court fashioned an exception to the Rule 33 requirement where defendant “was suffering from a mental disorder that caused, if not compelled, him to [lie to his attorney].” 354 F.2d at 448-49.9
Assuming Martinez cannot make out a claim under Nagell, the effect of a defendant’s untruthfulness on a Brady claim would be squarely presented. We decline to resolve this issue on the present record, although we can sketch the contours of the argument.
*309It could be contended that where evidence is material — defined by the Supreme Court in Bagley as meeting a reasonable probability that the outcome would be changed assuming disclosure by the government — only as a result of the defendant’s lying to counsel, the defendant may not invoke Brady to win a new trial. Under this view, when making the materiality judgment, the court is limited to considering whether there is a reasonable probability that disclosure would have led to a different outcome even if the defendant had not lied to his attorney. Thus, a Brady violation would occur only where, assuming the defendant had been candid with his attorney, the nondisclosed evidence would still be of significant value to the defendant’s case. The counterargument is that the Brady rule has little to do with lying, but instead aims to encourage desired prosecutorial conduct to promote fair trials. Further, denial of Brady’s protections to defendants who are not candid with their counsel, and indeed who lie in their testimony, appears to create a penalty for lying, which may vary depending on what charge the defendant faces at the time that material evidence is withheld.
C.
While we merely note the complexities raised by a defendant’s dishonesty, and await a more complete record before attempting to formulate any necessary rule, the dissent would go further and decide that Martinez has no right to a Brady claim under any circumstances.
The dissent concludes that no hearing is required, believing that where a defendant knows that he confessed to the police, he has no Brady right to have the substance of that confession disclosed, even if it is exculpatory and specifically requested. This conclusion would appear to be founded upon an expansive reading of United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256 (3d Cir.1984), and upon an assumption that a defendant necessarily knows of or has access to the substance of his or her confession. Both bases appear open to some question.
Starusko held only that where defense counsel had independently discovered before trial an exculpatory statement that the prosecution failed to disclose, there was no prejudice, and thus no adverse effect on defendant’s fair trial rights. The language in Starusko upon which the dissent relies was, at best, only peripheral to its decision. Drawn from United States v. Campagnuo-lo, 592 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir.1979), that language states that “the government is not obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant with information which he already has or, with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself.” But the holding in Campagnuolo, as in Starusko, did not rely on this statement, but rather on the narrow determination that the non-disclosure did not prejudice defendant’s right to a fair trial. In Campagnuolo, the exculpatory material was disclosed, although not until the day before trial, and the defense counsel admitted that the defense was not prejudiced by the late disclosure. 592 F.2d at 861 n. 9.
In any event, the language taken from Campagnuolo does not apply to a request for the substance of a confession taken by the police. The police account of the confession is not “information which [the defendant] already has or, with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself.” The assumption that a defendant has access to his own confession or statement overlooks both the possibility that a defendant may not have total recall of what he said to the police, especially if the statement was made under pressured circumstances, and the reality that a defendant cannot, absent disclosure, know what the authorities recorded or retained of what he said. Thus, it is difficult to say as a matter of law that a defendant will never need to know the substance of a confession in order to receive a fair trial.
Indeed, although not authority for deciding the constitutional claim under Brady, Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(A) illustrates the point that it cannot be assumed defendants will, without disclosure, know the information contained in their own confessions to *310the police. Rule 16 was amended in 1966 to provide for discovery of a defendant’s own statements and confessions, and extended to provide even more liberal discovery of such material in 1974. See generally 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 251-53. It rests on the premises that some defendants are not aware of what they have confessed to police, and that knowledge of the substance of such confessions is often critical to a fair trial. In United States v. Lewis, 511 F.2d 798, 802 (D.C.Cir.1975), the court stated:
Discovery of government evidence of relevant and incriminating statements made by a defendant to police is of the utmost importance to the preparation of the defense as it must be kept in mind that given the traumatic circumstances of arrest, the memory of a defendant as to exactly what occurred may well be hazy and defective. Even where a defendant’s memory is crystal clear, it is not every defendant who chooses to tell his own attorney all that he remembers.

Id.

Our decision in United States v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir.1963), would seem to lend further support to the conclusion that in appropriate situations failure to disclose a requested confession, where exculpatory and material, may constitute a Brady violation. In Maroney, this Court held that the prosecution’s withholding of a defendant’s own statement concerning a witness’s admission violated Brady, and warranted the granting of a writ of habeas corpus.10 See also United States v. Padrone, 406 F.2d 560 (2d Cir.1969) (new trial ordered where prosecution failed to disclose defendant’s confession admitting guilt to defense counsel; court found nondisclosure prejudicial because defendant maintained innocence at trial). The dissent seeks to distinguish Maroney by noting that the Maroney court did not specifically address the issue of the defendant’s knowledge. This would seem to beg the question, however, for if the Maroney Court had considered defendant’s knowledge a bar to a Brady claim, it would have denied relief.
Nor can Maroney be distinguished by asserting that the Brady request there was specific while here it was not. There are two problems with this distinction. First, it assumes that Martinez’s confession was not “reduced to writing,” and therefore did not come within the defense’s specific request. But the only support for this assumption is the prosecutor’s statement at oral argument before this Court. It is not our role to find facts and resolve factual issues at the appellate level. Indeed, that is the basis for Dansker’s requirement of an evidentiary hearing by the trial court to resolve colorable claims of Brady violations. Second, the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in Bagley would appear to refute any contention that the existence of a specific request vel non requires a different result. 105 S.Ct. at 3384. Under Bag-ley, the existence of a specific request must be taken into account, but it does not trigger any different legal analysis. Id.11 Accordingly, without further factual find*311ings, we cannot conclude that Martínez, either by lying to his lawyer or by not making a specific request, has forfeited his Brady claim.
IV.
In summary, there is sufficient evidence to support Martinez’s conviction. As to his Brady claim, the district court’s evidentia-ry hearing should take into account 1) whether the confession was reduced to writing either contemporaneously or in subsequent police reports or memoranda; 2) the scope of the information obtained from Martinez, and whether it led the government to any other evidence; and 3) the extent of the prosecution’s knowledge of the confession. All of these factors will be appropriate elements in the court’s application of the Bagley materiality standard. The court may then find it in order to consider the implications of Martinez’s dishonesty, i.e., whether there is any excuse for his behavior, and whether his behavior is relevant to the materiality determination or any other aspect of a Brady claim. If it is determined that the Brady rule has not been violated, the judgment of conviction should of course be affirmed. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1244 (3d Cir.1985).
The record before us does not portray Martinez in a favorable light. As found by both the majority and the dissent, the evidence introduced supported his conviction on first degree murder. Moreover, he fabricated an alibi defense and lied to the court. However blameworthy this conduct may be, though, it does not deprive Martinez of his constitutional rights, including his right to disclosure by the prosecution of exculpatory evidence. Adherence to the constitutional prerequisites for a fair trial is vital in all cases; it is especially critical where, as here, the alleged violation may have contributed to a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, “the penultimate sentence.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3016, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983).
The matter will be remanded for action consistent with this opinion.

. The totality of these facts presents a reasonable case of predisposition. In light of this conclusion, we need not decide the government’s contention that the final one or two shots, administered at close range after Gomez had fallen to the ground, are sufficient, standing alone, to establish willful, premeditated and deliberate murder. Appellee’s Brief at 15.

. V.I.Code tit. 14, § 922 provides in relevant part:
(a) all murder which—
(1) is perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, torture or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, ... is murder in the first degree.
(b) All other kinds of murder are murder in the second degree.

. Thus, the final shots, though significant, do not necessarily foreordain a first-degree conviction. For example, should a jury, based on the additional evidence that Gomez was armed, determine that Martinez's initial shots were not premeditated, then it could equally conclude that the final shots, under the circumstances, were also fired in the heat of passion.
*307The dissent places great emphasis on the probative value of these final shots, but we do not understand it to argue that the coup de grace requires a first-degree verdict as a matter of law. Nor could it plausibly make such an argument. Although the shots are concededly quite important, the jury is assigned the role of weighing such evidence against competing evidence. Indeed, even though Martinez did not present a second-degree defense, the district court in this case instructed the jury as to lesser degrees of murder, including a fatal shooting committed in the heat of passion.

. The extent of information obtained from Martinez in the confession, as well as other exculpatory evidence it might have led to, should be explored by the district court at the evidentiary hearing. See infra at 307.

. Even if the confession was not reduced to writing, the request for any of defendant’s oral confessions may have been sufficiently specific to put the prosecution on notice, see United. States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), and to contribute to the misleading effects of non-disclosure. See Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at 3384.

. For example, Martinez’s statement might have led the government to investigate the presence of the victim’s gun, to locate the gun, or even to pursue further questioning of the victim’s brother, who apparently carried away the knife, and may have carried away the gun.

. Prosecutor Jones stated at oral argument that he himself was not aware of the information. According to the affidavit, though, Detective Vigo stated that he relayed the information to the prosecutor. These statements raise an unresolved issue of fact, reflecting upon the knowledge of the prosecution, which can only be resolved in an evidentiary hearing.

. See, e.g., Martinez v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d 184 (5th Cir.1980) (Brady applies even where the prosecutor was personally unaware of existence of evidence requested but it was available in medical examiner’s office); see also United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478 (5th Cir.1980) (Brady applies where prosecutor failed to run FBI check on witness, and FBI check would have revealed requested information); cf. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110, 96 S.Ct. at 2400 (prosecutor charged with knowledge of evidence in his file “even if he has actually overlooked it").

. To the extent that Martinez’s potential Nagell claim is founded upon his assertions of “cultural differences” with his lawyer, it might also be construed as a claim of entitlement to court appointment of an Hispanic lawyer. However, the case law appears to foreclose any such claim. Although it is true that a defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court has held that ineffectiveness cannot be inferred from the situation but must be supported by specific allegations of misconduct. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Moreover, it is clear that a defendant has no absolute right to choose appointed counsel, see, e.g., Williams v. Nix, 751 F.2d 956, 959-60 (8th Cir.1985), nor even a right to enjoy a "meaningful relationship” with counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). Based upon these cases, it would appear that any cultural differences between Martinez and his lawyer are insufficient to excuse any voluntary decision by Martinez to lie to his counsel.

. If Starusko is construed to stand for the proposition that the government is never obligated under Brady to turn over its records of a defendant's statements, it would appear to be at variance with Maroney. Even though Maroney was not cited to the Starusko panel and indeed has not been relied upon by any court for the point at issue, but see Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at 3396 n. 7 (Marshall, J., dissenting), we are obliged to ignore Starusko to the extent that it is inconsistent with the earlier Maroney opinion. See O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir.1981) (citing United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Internal Operating Procedures, Ch. VII, § C (1978)). If there is a conflict between Maroney and Starusko, only the Court sitting in banc may make Starusko (and thus Campagnuolo) the law of the Circuit. We are reluctant to construe Starusko in such a way that it would conflict with Maroney.

. The dissent also seems to suggest that Maro-ney is somehow overruled by the statement in Agurs that the prosecution need not turn over all of its files to the defense. But holding Brady and Agurs applicable to defendant's statements would not open the prosecutor's entire file; it means only that where the prosecutor has knowledge of a defendant’s statement that is exculpatory and material, that statement should be disclosed to defense counsel.