Court Opinion

ID: 9373771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:07:15.397962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.946124
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BRANDON SINCLAIR BRUCE,                         DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-0752-21-0022-I-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND                        DATE: April 14, 2022
       HUMAN SERVICES,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Brandon Sinclair Bruce, San Diego, California, pro se.

           Sara M. Klayton, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his constructive suspension appeal as moot. For the reasons discussed
     below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     decision, and REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The parties to this appeal neglected to submit many of the primary
     documents that would normally be found in an ably-prepared case file. In order
     to determine what transpired, we have relied largely on copies of the equal
     employment opportunity (EEO) and arbitration decisions that the parties
     submitted below. Nevertheless, the material facts do not appear to be in dispute.
¶3        On January 26, 2014, the appellant was appointed to the position of
     Regulatory Counsel in the agency’s Center of Tobacco Products.           Bruce v.
     Department of Health & Human Services, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-21-0022-
     I-2 (RAF), Tab 8 at 93. His official duty station was at the agen cy’s White Oak
     Campus in Silver Spring, Maryland. RAF, Tab 10 at 12, 246, 282. The appellant
     has various medical conditions.      Bruce v. Department of Health & Human
     Services, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-21-0022-I-1 (IAF), Tab 1 at 16.              He
     requested accommodations prior to the date of his appointment and has been
     receiving some form of accommodation ever since. Id. at 75.
¶4        Over time, developments in the appellant’s medical conditions required
     some changes in his accommodations, most notably for full time telework from
     his home in the Washington, D.C. area, beginning in June 2016. Id.; RAF, Tab 8
     at 157. For health reasons, in or around August 2017, the appellant moved from
     the Washington, D.C. area to San Diego, California. RAF, Tab 8 at 133, Tab 12
     at 32. The agency approved the appellant’s request to telework full time from his
     new home in San Diego for a period of 6 months, beginning November 12, 2017.
     RAF, Tab 9 at 168. The agency informed the appellant that at the end of that
     period, on May 14, 2018, he would need to return to duty at the White Oak
     Campus. Id.
¶5        On April 25, 2018, the appellant contacted the agency and requested that his
     temporary arrangement of teleworking from San Diego be made permanent. IAF,
     Tab 1 at 36. On May 10, 2018, the agency denied the appellant’s request and
     ordered him to return to duty at the White Oak Campus according to the terms of
     the telework agreement.       Id. at 37.     The appellant did not report for duty as
     directed but instead attempted to cover his absence with var ious forms of leave.
     Id. at 38-40. Nevertheless, the appellant’s leave requests for May 22, 23, and 25,
     2018, were denied, and he was carried in absence without leave (AWOL) status
     on those dates. Id. at 26, 39. Soon thereafter, the appellant exhausted his leave
     balance, and he began a lengthy period of AWOL, beginning June 5, 2018. Id.
     at 26, 39-40.     On July 11, 2018, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal
     based on charges of AWOL, failure to follow leave-requesting procedures, and
     failure to follow instructions. Id. at 17. The appellant was removed effective
     December 1, 2018. Id. at 42.
¶6        Meanwhile, the appellant elected to contest his removal through negotiated
     grievance procedures, and he filed multiple EEO complaints about various other
     matters, including the agency’s denial of his request for accommodation through
     telework from San Diego.            In July 2019, an Equal Employment Opportunity
     Commission (EEOC) administrative judge found that, in light of the permanent
     nature   of     the   appellant’s    disability,   the   agency   committed   disability
     discrimination by granting his telework request on less than a 2 -year basis. Id.
     at 27, 76.      On March 5, 2020, an arbitrator, relying in part on the EEOC
     administrative judge’s finding of discrimination, issued a part ial opinion and
     award, mitigating the appellant’s removal to a 5-day suspension. 2 Id. at 74-79.
¶7        On August 24, 2020, an EEOC administrative judge issued a prehearing
     decision on three of the appellant’s other EEO complaints. IAF, Tab 1 at 24 -72.
     Three of the claims encompassed in these complaints are directly relevant to the
     2
       The second partial award, dated July 20, 2020, concerned additional status quo ante
     relief related specifically to the removal. IAF, Tab 1 at 80-82.
     issues now before the Board. Id. at 24-27. Specifically, the appellant claimed
     that the agency discriminated against him by (1) denying his requests for leave
     for May 22, 23, and 25, 2018, and carrying him in AWOL status for those dates,
     (2) subjecting him to a “‘de facto’ indefinite suspension,” when it placed him in a
     nonduty status without due process beginning on May 14, 2018, and (3) carrying
     him in AWOL status from June 5, 2018, forward. IAF, Tab 1 at 26-27; RAF,
     Tab 8 at 157, Tab 7 at 23, 38-40, Tab 10 at 10-12.
¶8        On the first issue, the EEOC administrative judge found that the appellant
     was properly considered AWOL on May 22, 23, and 25, 2018, and she granted
     summary judgment in favor of the agency. IAF, Tab 1 at 56-58. On the second
     issue, the EEOC administrative judge found that the appellant’s indefinite
     suspension claim amounted to a mixed-case complaint not properly before her at
     that stage of the proceedings, and she remanded the claim to the agency to issue a
     new decision with Board appeal rights.      Id. at 47-48. On the third issue, the
     EEOC administrative judge granted summary judgment in favor of the appellant,
     finding that the agency discriminated against him ba sed on disability when it
     carried him in AWOL status beginning June 5, 2018.          Id. at 68-71.    After a
     hearing on some remaining claims, the EEOC administrative judge issued a bench
     decision, ordering among other things that the agency award the appellant pa y
     and benefits for the period between May 21, 2018, and December 1, 2018, as well
     as $60,000 in compensatory damages due to the physical and emotional
     consequences of the agency’s failure to accommodate him during that period. 3
     RAF, Tab 5 at 60-73.
¶9        As for the indefinite suspension claim on remand to the agency, the agency
     identified the claim accepted for adjudication as whether it discriminated against

     3
       The EEOC administrative judge explicitly excluded relief for May 22, 23, and 25,
     2018, because she had already found that the appellant was properly considered AWOL
     on those dates. RAF, Tab 5 at 60. She also excluded relief for a period equivalent to
     the 5-day suspension to which the arbitrator had mitigated the removal. Id.
      the appellant based on race, sex, or disability, or retaliated against him for
      protected activity when it “‘unlawfully’ forced him to serve a ‘De Facto’
      indefinite suspension by classifying him in a Non-Duty status, without first
      providing him ‘due process’ or an explanation for the Agency’s actions.” IAF,
      Tab 1 at 9-10. On October 8, 2020, the agency issued a final decision finding no
      discrimination and notifying the appellant of Board appeal rights.       Id. at 9-22.
      The appellant timely appealed that final agency decision to the Board and
      requested a hearing. Id. at 1-8; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(b).
¶10         The administrative judge conducted a status conference, during which the
      appellant clarified “that he was appealing his placement on [AWOL] for an
      extended period of time, which he alleged was tantamount to a constructive
      suspension.” RAF, Tab 6 at 1. The agency raised the issue of mootness, arguing
      that, in prior EEO and arbitration proceedings, the appellant had already obtained
      all the relief that he could receive if he prevailed in his Boa rd appeal. Id. at 1-2.
      The administrative judge provided the parties notice of the mootness issue, of the
      appellant’s jurisdictional burden in his constructive suspension claim, and of
      issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel that may be implicated by the prior
      related proceedings. Id. at 1-7. She ordered the appellant to file evidence and
      argument to show that the appeal is within the Board’s jurisdiction. Id. at 7.
¶11         After the parties responded, the administrative judge issued an initial
      decision dismissing the appeal as moot. RAF, Tabs 7-14, Tab 16, Initial Decision
      (ID). She found that the agency returned the appellant to the status quo ante with
      respect to all of the AWOL dates at issue. ID at 6. She further found that the
      agency had restored all of the leave that the appellant had expended in order to
      avoid AWOL after May 21, 2018, and that the Board lacks the authority to restore
      leave used prior to that date. ID at 7-8. The administrative judge also found that
      the Board lacks the authority to grant relief for the tax liability that the appellant
      incurred because of the back pay awards, to order compensatory damages in
      addition   to those   ordered by the       EEOC, to grant        any injunctive or
      forward-looking relief, or to adjudicate the appellant’ s due process claim absent
      an otherwise appealable action. ID at 8-11.
¶12         The appellant has filed a petition for review, contesting some procedural
      matters and arguing that the Board should allow an exception to the mootness
      doctrine due to the agency’s ongoing acts of discrimination. Petition for Review
      (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

                                           ANALYSIS
¶13         Mootness can arise at any stage of litigation, and an appeal will be
      dismissed as moot where the appellant has obtained all of the relief he could have
      obtained had he prevailed before the Board, or where there is no further relief the
      Board can grant. Uhlig v. Department of Justice, 83 M.S.P.R. 29, ¶ 7 (1999). In
      order to render an appeal moot, an agency must prove that it completely
      rescinded its action, thereby returning the appellant to the status quo ante and not
      leaving him in a worse position because of the rescission than he would have
      been in if the matter had been adjudicated. Fernandez v. Department of Justice,
      105 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶ 5 (2007).
¶14         This appeal concerns an alleged constructive suspension                  allegedly
      beginning on May 14, 2018, which preceded the appellant’s removal. 4                IAF,
      Tab 1 at 9-23; RAF, Tab 6 at 1-2, Tab 7 at 4.           However, before determining
      whether the appellant’s constructive suspension claim is moot, we must first
      determine the dates that his claim encompasses. In the EEO proceedings, the
      agency construed the appellant’s claim as encompassing only the periods during

      4
        The Board has jurisdiction to review an arbitrator’s final decision under 5 U.S.C.
      § 7121(d) when the subject matter of the grievance is one over which the Board has
      jurisdiction and the appellant alleged EEO discrimination in connection with the
      underlying action. Brookens v. Department of Labor, 120 M.S.P.R. 678, ¶ 4 (2014).
      The appellant here has not sought additional relief for his removal in the context of the
      instant appeal. Nor has he expressed dissatisfaction with the decision of the arbitrator.
      Therefore, we have not interpreted his pleadings below or on review as requesting
      review of the arbitration decision under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(d).
      which the agency had previously carried him in AWOL status. IAF, Tab 1 at 10
      n.2. In so doing, the agency disregarded the explicit language of the accepted
      claim, i.e., that the agency had constructively suspended the appellant “by
      classifying him in a Non-Duty status.” Id. at 10, 27. The agency explained that
      “[w]hile the claim is framed as non-duty status, the proper characterization per
      the proposed removal is [AWOL]. As such, all subsequent references in this final
      agency decision will be to non-duty status, specifically, AWOL.” Id. at 10 n.2.
      We are not satisfied with this explanation.
¶15        A “suspension” is the temporary placement of an employee in a nonpay,
      nonduty status.    Engler v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 6
      (2014). It is well settled that a constructive suspension may encompass not only
      unpaid absences but periods of paid leave that an employee was forced to take
      due to an improper agency action.             E.g., Bean v. U.S. Postal Service,
      120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 14 (2013); Kaminsky v. Department of Health & Human
      Services, 13 M.S.P.R. 397, 398-99 (1982). We find insufficient basis to restrict
      the appellant’s constructive suspension claim to periods of only unpaid,
      unapproved absences. Nor do we believe his claim is limited to the absences that
      served as the basis of his proposed removal.
¶16        Indeed, the appellant has reconfirmed in this Board appeal that his
      constructive suspension claim encompasses not only the periods in which he was
      classified as AWOL, but the entire “six (6) months and seventeen (17) days” of
      nonduty status leading up to the removal, i.e., the entire period during which he
      was in nonduty status, beginning with the expiration of the telework agreement
      on May 14, 2018. RAF, Tab 7 at 4, 23, 28. He explained that, in addition to the
      periods of AWOL, he is seeking relief for the agency forcing him to use leave
      that he did not intend to use, beginning April 25, 2018. Id. at 8, 21-22, 26.
¶17        With those parameters in mind, we proceed first to the issue of whether the
      appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction over a constructive
      suspension.   To establish Board jurisdiction over a constructive suspension
      appeal, an appellant must show that (1) he lacked any meaningful choice but to
      absent himself from work, and (2) it was the agency’s wrongful actions that
      deprived him of that choice. Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶¶ 8, 13. The appellant
      must also meet the other requirements of chapter 75 jurisdiction which , as
      relevant here, are that he was an “employee” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C.
      § 7511(a)(1), and his suspension was for more than 14 days.         Id., ¶ 8; see
      5 U.S.C. § 7512(2).
¶18        In this case, it is undisputed that, during the time of the claimed
      constructive suspension, the appellant was an “employee” under 5 U.S.C.
      § 7511(a)(1)(A).     IAF, Tab 1.   It is also undisputed that the appellant was
      continuously absent from work from May 14, 2018, until his removal 6½ months
      later. RAF, Tab 14 at 279-93. We further find that the appellant has made a
      nonfrivolous allegation that he lacked a meaningful choice in this lengthy
      absence. Specifically, after the agency discontinued his ability to telework, the
      appellant was faced with the choice of being absent from work or returning to
      duty at the White Oak Campus, which he alleges would have violated his medical
      restrictions. IAF, Tab 1 at 37; see Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶¶ 13-14. We also
      find a nonfrivolous allegation that the appellant was deprived of his choice
      through a wrongful agency action because two different EEOC administrative
      judges found that the agency’s refusal to allow the appellant to telework after
      May 14, 2018, was discriminatory and a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of
      1973. IAF, Tab 1 at 27, 68-71, 76. For these reasons, we find that the appellant
      has made nonfrivolous allegations of Board jurisdiction over his constructive
      suspension appeal.
¶19        We now turn to the issue of whether the appellant’s claim is moot. For the
      reasons explained in the initial decision, we agree with the administrative judge
      that the appellant has already received full relief for the period that he was
      carried in AWOL status, from June 5 to December 1, 2018, including status quo
      ante relief and compensatory damages arising from his claim of discrimination.
      ID at 6-7, 9-10. We also find that, to the extent that the appellant did not receive
      status quo ante relief for the other AWOL dates of May 22, 23, and 25, 2018, he
      is precluded from litigating that issue before the Board. The EEOC, a tribunal of
      competent jurisdiction, has already rendered a final judgment on the merits,
      finding that the appellant was properly carried in AWOL status on those dates. 5
      IAF, Tab 1 at 56-58; see Carson v. Department of Energy, 398 F.3d 1369, 1375
      (Fed. Cir. 2005) (setting forth the elements of res judicata).          Finally, the
      administrative judge found the agency already restored all of the leave that the
      appellant took beginning May 21, 2018, to avoid AWOL. ID at 8. However,
      although the EEOC ordered the agency to award the appellant “back pay from the
      time beginning May 21, 2018,” RAF, Tab 5 at 60, the agency’s records appear to
      reflect that it did not restore the 10 hours of sick leave that the appellant took on
      May 24, 2018, 6 RAF, Tab 14 at 278-82.        Nor is there any indication that the
      appellant has been compensated for the 40 hours of annual leave that he took at
      the beginning of the alleged constructive suspension period, between May 14
      and 17, 2018. Id. at 278-79.
¶20        For these reasons, we find that the appeal is not moot. If the appellant were
      to prevail on the merits of his constructive suspension claim, the Board could
      provide him additional relief by ordering the agency to restore the 10 hours of
      sick leave and 40 hours of annual leave that the appellant took between May 14
      and 24, 2018.     See Borden v. Department of Justice, 59 M.S.P.R. 353, 357
      (1993); Clements v. Department of the Navy, 21 M.S.P.R. 275, 277 & n.2 (1984).
      Because the appellant has otherwise made a nonfrivolous allegation of Board

      5
        Regardless of what was required by the EEOC administrative judge’s orders, the
      agency changed the appellant’s status on May 22, 23, and 25, 2018, from AWOL to
      “excused absence,” but it is not clear whether the agency afforded the appellant back
      pay and benefits for those dates. ID at 6 & n.4; RAF, Tab 14 at 279. In any event, we
      find that the matter is immaterial to the issues in this appeal.
      6
        During the relevant time period, the appellant worked a compressed schedule of
      10 hours per day, 4 days per week. RAF, Tab 9 at 168.
      jurisdiction over his constructive suspension claim, he is entitled to the
      jurisdictional hearing that he requested.   See Moore v. U.S. Postal Service,
      117 M.S.P.R. 84, ¶¶ 11-14 (2011); Holden v. U.S. Postal Service, 78 M.S.P.R.
      420, 423 (1998).

                                          ORDER
¶21        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.