Court Opinion

ID: 9747978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:46:50.465635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:29.973531
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that it is “absurd” to expect “juries [to] consider the existence of good-conduct time[ ] and how [it factors] into the formula for determining parole eligibility but still refrain from applying that formula in [determining] an appropriate punishment.”1 It is particularly absurd when the State’s jury argument dwells on computing the mathematics of parole law as applied to the specific defendant:
*378So if he has good-conduct time that gives him extra credit, he might — it’d be less than 15 years. Okay? You understand that?

All right. So the reality of the situation is, if you give him 60 years or more, you’re doing all that you can do.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed us that the jury is “not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to [a] particular defendant” but that it is perfectly acceptable for the jury to consider how the parole law applies to the particular defendant by deciding the earliest date on which the jury wants the particular defendant to first become eligible for parole.2 Rather than play semantic games, we should look to the plain meaning of the statute.3 But it makes no sense:
In the penalty phase of the trial of a felony case in which the punishment is to be assessed by the jury rather than the court, if the offense is punishable as a felony of the first degree, if a prior conviction has been alleged for enhancement of punishment as provided by Section 12.42(b), (c)(1) or (2), or (d), Penal Code, or if the offense is a felony not designated as a capital felony or a felony of the first, second, or third degree and the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for the offense is longer than 60 years, unless the offense of which the jury has found the defendant guilty is an offense that is punishable under Section 21.02(h), Penal Code, or is listed in Section 3g(a)(l), Article 42.12, of this code or the judgment contains an affirmative finding under Section 3g(a)(2), Article 42.12, of this code, the court shall charge the jury in writing as follows:
Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, may earn time off the period of incarceration imposed through the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities may award good conduct time to a prisoner who exhibits good behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison authorities may also take away all or part of any good conduct time earned by the prisoner.
It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant will be imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole.
Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served plus any good conduct time earned equals one-fourth of the sentence imposed or 15 years, whichever is less. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct time might be applied to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison and parole authorities.
You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider *379the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.4
The legislature could solve the problem by admitting that it wants the jury to consider how the parole law might apply to a particular defendant and by expressly allowing evidence and argument on parole eligibility. Or the legislature could remove its mandate requiring the nonsensical jury instruction and state clearly that parole should not be placed before the jury because the jury’s function is to decide the appropriate sentence for the defendant based on the facts of the case as they stand on the day of trial. But courts should not expand or contract the clear language of a statute, no matter how nonsensical it may be.
To say that a jury who is urged to consider a particular defendant’s parole eligibility date is not considering how the parole law applies to that particular defendant defies any rational thought. I am aware that this court is required to follow the precedent of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,5 and I realize that the majority does exactly what it is required to do in following that precedent. But because the reasoning and the result so directly conflict with the clear legislative mandate, conscience requires that I respectfully dissent.

. Majority op. at 374.

. See Taylor v. State, 233 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (Womack, J., concurring) (quoting Byrd v. State, 192 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd) (Frost, J., concurring)).

. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(b) (Vernon Supp. 2010).

. Id.

. See Taylor, 233 S.W.3d at 359.