Court Opinion

ID: 9904164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:22:25.052641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:14.735735
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                     FIFTH DISTRICT

                                   NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                   FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                   DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CATHY LINN O’BRIEN,

           Appellant,

v.                                          Case No. 5D21-892
                                            LT Case No. 2008-DR-0878

GARY PATRICK O’BRIEN,

         Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed September 2, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for St. Johns County,
Christopher S. Ferebee, Judge.

Nancy C. Harrison, Danielle M.
Manos, and Paul M. Eakin, of Nancy
C. Harrison, Esq., P.L., Atlantic
Beach, for Appellant.

Michael J. Korn, of Korn & Zehmer,
P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.

LAMBERT, C.J.

     Cathy Linn O’Brien (“Former Wife”) appeals the final order entered by

the trial court after trial granting Gary Patrick O’Brien’s (“Former Husband”)
second amended supplemental petition to terminate or modify his alimony

obligation and denying her motion for contempt and enforcement regarding

Former Husband’s nonpayment of his court-ordered alimony.

      Former Wife raises numerous arguments for reversal on appeal. After

a careful review of the record, because we find merit in two of her arguments,

we reverse the order, in part, and remand for further proceedings. 1

BACKGROUND—

      The parties’ marriage was dissolved in July 2008. The final judgment

incorporated their Marital Settlement Agreement (“MSA”), which provided, in

pertinent part:

            ALIMONY: The Husband shall pay to the Wife the
            sum of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) per
            month as and for permanent alimony commencing
            June 1, 2008 and continuing on the first day of each
            month thereafter until the Husband or Wife dies, the
            Wife remarries or upon the Husband reaching the
            age of 65 whichever shall first occur. Alimony shall
            be modifiable in accordance with Florida Statutes,
            except that an increase in the Wife’s income shall not
            be considered a substantial change of circumstances
            permitting a modification.

      Former Husband paid his monthly alimony obligation through the

January 1, 2016 payment. He lost his job later that month and made no

      We find it unnecessary to detail Former Wife’s unsuccessful
      1

arguments.

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alimony payments thereafter.

      In late March 2016, Former Husband filed a supplemental petition to

terminate or modify alimony; and, shortly thereafter, Former Wife filed a

motion for contempt and enforcement based on Former Husband’s

nonpayment of alimony. The case remained relatively inactive until May

2019 when Former Wife filed an amended motion for contempt and

enforcement. Former Husband later filed his second amended supplemental

petition; and the case proceeded to trial over two days in July and October

2020, at which both parties testified.

      In its final order, the trial court found that Former Husband had

established a substantial, uncontemplated, and material change in his

circumstances since the final judgment that was sufficient, involuntary, and

permanent in nature. See Befanis v. Befanis, 293 So. 3d 1121, 1123 (Fla.

5th DCA 2020).       The court “suspended” Former Husband’s alimony

obligation, retroactive to the March 2016 filing date, “until his ability to pay

alimony is restored.”2    The court also denied Former Wife’s motion for

      2
        We note that Former Husband turned sixty-five on January 13, 2022,
during the course of this appeal. Under the terms of the parties’ MSA, from
that date forward, his monthly obligation to pay alimony ended. Accordingly,
while the trial court’s order retroactively “suspended” Former Husband’s
alimony payment until his ability to pay alimony was “restored,” because
Former Husband is now sixty-five years of age, the practical result of the

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contempt and enforcement, finding that she had failed to meet her burden of

showing that Former Husband had willfully and intentionally violated the final

judgment by not paying alimony while having the ability to pay.

      Following an unsuccessful motion for rehearing, Former Wife timely

brought this appeal. As previously indicated, we find merit in two of her

arguments; and, for the reasons discussed below, we reverse on these

issues. The final order is otherwise affirmed.

PRE-PETITION ALIMONY ARREARAGES—

      Former Wife argues that the trial court erred in failing to award her

$6,000 in alimony arrearages that accrued in February and March 2016

before Former Husband filed his initial supplemental petition for modification.

We agree.

      “A trial court has the discretion to modify alimony effective as of the

date of the petition for modification or subsequent thereto, but it cannot

modify alimony that was due prior to the filing of the petition.” Ray v. Ray,

707 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (citing McArthur v. McArthur, 106

So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1958) (additional citations omitted)). Former Wife’s right to

the $6,000 owed to her in pre-petition alimony became vested when Former

order is that Former Husband’s monthly alimony obligation to Former Wife,
beginning with the April 1, 2016 payment, was essentially terminated.

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Husband failed to make these payments. While the trial court here exercised

its discretion in not holding Former Husband in contempt for this

nonpayment, Former Wife is nevertheless owed the $6,000 and is entitled to

enforce this obligation by legal process and by such other equitable remedies

as the trial court may determine to be appropriate and necessary. See

Smalbein v. Smalbein, 487 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (citations

omitted).

      Additionally, Former Wife is correct that she is entitled to prejudgment

interest on the $6,000 arrearages, with the interest accruing from the date

that each $3,000 installment was due (February 1 and March 1, 2016). See

Burkley v. Burkley, 911 So. 2d 262, 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“Courts must

award prejudgment interest on [child support] arrearages found to be due in

the final judgment.” (emphasis added)); Gremel v. Gremel, 45 So. 3d 978,

980 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (applying Burkley in the alimony context and finding

that an obligee was entitled to prejudgment interest on the alimony arrearage

owed by the obligor (additional citation omitted)).

TRIAL COURT’S USE OF THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE GROSS
INCOMES IN DETERMINING ALIMONY—

      The trial court found that Former Husband met his burden of

establishing the requisite change in his circumstances to modify his $3,000

                                      5
per month alimony obligation.3      The court’s next task was determining

whether, as requested by Former Husband, to terminate his alimony

obligation entirely or to order him to pay alimony in an amount less than his

$3,000 per month obligation. This duty necessitated that the court consider

and evaluate the parties’ respective financial conditions.

      Former Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

suspending Former Husband’s alimony obligation4 because it relied on the

parties’ respective gross incomes, instead of their net incomes, in evaluating

their financial conditions. Former Wife is correct that a trial court errs when

it uses the parties’ respective gross incomes in determining an award of

alimony. See Brady v. Brady, 229 So. 3d 892, 893 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)

(“[T]he trial court must first determine the parties’ respective monthly net

incomes and thereafter make a specific determination as to whether [one

spouse] has the need for alimony and whether [the other spouse] has the

ability to pay alimony, not only prospectively but also for an award of

      3
       Former Wife’s challenge to this finding is one of the issues that we
have affirmed without discussion.
      4
        “[T]he standard for an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s
decision to modify alimony is abuse of discretion.” Dunn v. Dunn, 277 So.
3d 1081, 1085 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Jarrard v.
Jarrard, 157 So. 3d 332, 336 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)).

                                      6
retroactive alimony.” (citing Motie v. Motie, 132 So. 3d 1210, 1213–14 (Fla.

5th DCA 2014))). The final order before us shows that the trial court did

consider the parties’ respective gross incomes instead of net incomes when

ruling.

      Former Wife brought this error to the trial court’s attention through a

timely motion for rehearing.5 In her motion, Former Wife described what, in

her view, the trial evidence showed to be Former Husband’s net income

during the years 2016 through 2019. Significantly, her motion submitted that

Former Husband’s net income during these years was either less than or, in

2019, approximately equal to hers. Under these specific circumstances, we

conclude that any error committed by the trial court in utilizing the parties’

gross incomes, at least regarding the suspension of Former Husband’s

alimony obligation through 2019, was harmless.

      Our record, however, does not allow us to reach that same conclusion

for calendar year 2020. As the trial court considered the parties’ gross

incomes, and not net incomes, in also suspending Former Husband’s

alimony obligation for 2020, we reverse that part of the final order and

remand for the trial court to first determine the parties’ net incomes for 2020

      5
         Judge Ferebee, who denied the motion for rehearing, did not preside
over the trial or enter the final order on appeal. The judge who presided over
the trial is no longer on the bench.

                                      7
from the evidence previously presented at trial.     Upon determining the

parties’ respective monthly net incomes during 2020 up to the trial held in

October 2020, the court shall then address whether to award a reduced

amount of alimony per month to Former Wife, effective January 1, 2020, or,

alternatively, to suspend Former Husband’s monthly alimony obligation from

that date forward and enter an appropriate order.

     In sum, we reverse the final order insofar as it (1) failed to award

Former Wife the sum of $6,000, plus accrued interest, for pre-petition

alimony arrearages and (2) suspended Former Husband’s monthly alimony

obligation from January 1, 2020, forward; and we remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We otherwise affirm the final order

without additional discussion.

     AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED for further

proceedings.

WALLIS and TRAVER, JJ., concur.

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