Court Opinion

ID: 9794608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:27.938749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.501944
License: Public Domain

WOOD, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the discussion in the majority opinion concerning the competency of the minor’s testimony and concerning the stolen property conviction. I disagree with the majority’s treatment and disposition of the search warrant and prosecutorial misconduct issues, and dissent from the disposition of those two issues. Search Warrant Issue The majority skew the facts. (a) There were three search warrants. The first warrant authorized a search of defendant’s person and the premises — 504 South Platinum in Deming, New Mexico. There is no issue as to the propriety of this warrant or searches pursuant thereto. The second warrant authorized a search of defendant’s person and the premises — 919 En-canto Circle in Deming. The propriety of this warrant is attacked. The third warrant authorized a second search of the Encanto premises and was based on observations by officers during the first search of the Encanto premises. If the second warrant was improperly issued, the third warrant was also improper. (b) The majority fail to identify what was included within the affidavit submitted in support of the first warrant to search the Encanto premises. The affiant was Detective Coussons. The detective included, as a part of the affidavit, the signed question and answer statement of Fry and reports concerning offenses at three residences. (c) Fry’s statement includes admissions that he burglarized two residences, stole property therefrom and traded the stolen property to defendant for marijuana. These being statements against penal interest, Fry’s credibility is established. State v. Archuleta, 85 N.M. 146, 509 P.2d 1341 (Ct.App.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876, 94 S.Ct. 85, 38 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973). (d) One of the offense reports, made by the detective, concerns the larceny at the Williams’ residence. Property stolen included a tool box and some silver dollars. The report states that McGee told the detective that McGee was one of three persons who pushed the tool box out of the window of the Williams’ residence; several silver dollars were recovered from McGee. The credibility of McGee is established. State v. Archuleta, supra. (e) Both Fry and McGee refer to Morris Burns. The reliability of information supplied by Morris is the crucial issue. Hudson v. State, 89 N.M. 759, 557 P.2d 1108 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 2198, 53 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977). Morris went with Fry to 504 South Platinum when Fry first traded stolen property to defendant for marijuana. Fry went with Morris to the Encanto address; Morris was going there to talk to defendant. When Fry and Morris arrived, defendant opened the door and Morris went inside. The magistrate could properly infer that Morris knew where to locate defendant. State v. Snedeker, 99 N.M. 286, 657 P.2d 613 (1982). McGee identified Morris as one of the three who stole the tool box. Morris told Fry that after the tool box was pushed out the window, defendant took it and that Morris had gone to defendant to try to get it back. Morris’ activity in connection with this stolen property, together with Morris’ knowledge of where to locate defendant, was sufficient for the magistrate to consider that information supplied by Morris was reliable. State v. Snedeker, supra. (f) Fry’s statements provided probable cause that defendant was dealing with stolen goods. Fry stated: (1) he twice traded stolen property to defendant; (2) Morris tried to get the tool box back from defendant; (3) defendant told Fry to bring defendant all the jewelry, but also wanted Fry to bring TVs and guns. Probable cause to search defendant for stolen goods was established; no one contends to the contrary. (g) The majority state the affidavit failed to establish probable cause that stolen goods were located at the Encanto address. If the affidavit and supporting documents permit a reasonable inference that defendant lived at the Encanto address, there was probable cause to search that address for the stolen goods. State v. Snedeker, supra; see also State v. Ferrari, 80 N.M. 714, 460 P.2d 244 (1969). The majority state there was nothing to establish probable cause that defendant lived at the Encanto address. I disagree. Morris knew where to locate defendant and Morris went to the Encanto address. In addition, the detective stated that he knew defendant, and described him. The detective stated that defendant “gives the address” of 509 South Platinum (not 504) and “is know[n] to frequent the above described house in this affidavit.” The “above described house” was the Encanto address. The magistrate could reasonably infer that the detective spoke from the personal knowledge, regardless of the grammar used. The combination of the knowledge of Morris and the detective provided probable cause that defendant resided at the Encanto address. There is more here than in State v. Baca, 97 N.M. 379, 640 P.2d 485 (1982). Although not pertinent to this legal issue, at the suppression hearing, defendant testified he lived at the Encanto address. (h) The majority state that only “double hearsay” suggested that drugs could be found at the Encanto premises. This is incorrect. Fry’s statement, a part of the affidavit, includes Morris’ report of the presence of drugs — only one layer of hearsay is involved. Morris told Fry of seeing “bags of pills and coke .... Black Beauties and stuff like that.” Morris’ credibility being established, there was probable cause to search for controlled substances. I would hold that the search warrants for the Encanto address were properly issued. Intent to Distribute Cocaine Cocaine was seized at the Encanto address. The majority hold that the cocaine should be suppressed. My view is to the contrary, thus, I answer the claim that the evidence was insufficient to show an intent to distribute. I would hold the evidence was sufficient. Thirteen and seven tenths grams of cocaine were found in bulk; twenty-four smaller packets of cocaine were found — one marked “1”, five marked “V2” and eighteen marked “A”. The amount, together with the packaging, negates the contention that the cocaine was for defendant’s personal use and permits the inference of an intent to distribute. Prosecutorial Misconduct To reach the conclusion of purposeful misconduct, the majority omit a portion of the prosecutor’s question, thus distorting what happened. The majority refer to objectionable evidence which “appears to have been intentionally solicited”. (My emphasis.) I disagree with this characterization, and rely on the trial court record. Fry gave a signed question and answer statement to the police. Fry repudiated this statement at the preliminary examination. At trial, Fry affirmed the statement, explaining that he had not told the truth at the preliminary examination. Asked why he testified as he did at the preliminary examination, Fry stated that he was scared of being hurt by defendant’s friends. The prosecutor then asked a series of questions directed to having Fry explain why he was scared; these questions produced nothing that explained Fry’s fear. The prosecutor then asked: Q. O.K. Donald, what reasons did you have for feeling afraid when you testified on July 13, 1981, besides what anybody told you? [My emphasis.] A. I heard that he was in the Mafia. Responding to the defense objection, the trial court remarked: THE COURT: — the problem, Mr. District Attorney, you don’t know what you are going to get and if the question at that point had been objected to I would have sustained it. It is not proper testimony. Neither the question asked nor the trial court’s remark permits this Court to rule that the prosecutor intentionally solicited the “Mafia” answer. This being a dissent, I do not quote the strong admonition of the trial court, to the jury, that the non-responsive Mafia remark be disregarded. On the basis of the trial record, I would hold any prejudice was cured by the trial court’s admonition. State v. King, 90 N.M. 377, 563 P.2d 1170 (Ct.App.1977); State v. McFerran, 80 N.M. 622, 459 P.2d 148 (Ct.App.1969). I would affirm.