Court Opinion

ID: 9636904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:48:39.472557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:51.178956
License: Public Domain

VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). I regret that I am unable to agree with my associates in the conclusion reached, nor can I assent to all the views expressed in the opinion by which that conclusion is announced. The issues are simple. It stands without contradiction that a sale of morphine was made by the defendant to the witness Sivewright as charged by the government. The only defense'made is that of alleged entrapment, analogous to confession and avoidance. The elements of this defense were clearly’and correctly set forth by the court in its charge. The jurors were told that “if you find and believe from the evidence in this ease that the agents of the government or its employees — and in this -case the informer was an employee of the government — acting for the government incited, induced and persuaded the defendant to commit a crime which he would not otherwise have committed, then you must find the defendant not guilty.” The comment of the court to which reference has been made consisted merely of legitimate reference to the outstanding facts from which the issue was to be resolved — uneontradicted facts which necessarily involved the defense interposed in all its aspects; upon these facts the court expressed no opinion.
At the Outset the jurors were told-that they were the sole judges of the facts and of the question of guilt or innocence, of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight and value to be attached to testimony. Again, in entering upon his brief reference to facts, the court said: “I shall not take up much of your time in a review of the testimony in the ease. You are the sole judges of the testimony, and whatever I might say by way of referring to the testimony would be merely to assist you. Neither my recollection nor the recollection of the attorneys is binding upon you. Your own recollection must govern you in your deliberations and in your decision in this case.”
And, at the close, this: “I am not expressing any views upon the subject at all, but am merely referring to the facts and testimony for your consideration.”
If he had seen fit to express an opinion upon the facts, or if his remarks could be so construed, the trial judge would have been well within his rights. “The presiding judge may, if in his discretion he think proper, sum up the facts to the jury; and if no rule of law is incorrectly stated, and the matters of facts are ultimately submitted to the determination of the jury, it has been held that an expression of opinion upon the facts is not reviewable on error.” Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 614, 624, 625, 14 S. Ct. 919, 38 L. Ed. 841; Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436-442, 14 S. Ct. 387, 38 L. Ed. 224; Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148-155, 12 S. Ct. 171, 35 L. Ed. 968; Lovejoy v. United States, 128 U. S. 171-173, 9 S. Ct. 57, 32 L. Ed. 389; Rucker v. Wheeler, 127 U. S. 85-93, 8 S. Ct. 1142, 32 L. Ed. 102. When in his judgment the due administration of justice requires it. United States v. Philadelphia & Reading Railroad, 123 U. S. 113, 114, 8 S. Ct. 77, 31 L. Ed. 138; Vicksburg, *497etc., R. R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545-553, 7 S. Ct. 1, 30 L. Ed. 257.
This court in Itudd v. United States, 173 F. 912-914, has announced the rule, often quoted with approval, that a trial court in both civil and criminal cases has the right to comment upon the facts, to express its opinion upon them, and to sum up the evidence, as one of the most valuable features of the practice in the courts of the United States; and that “a judge should not be a mere automatic oracle of the law, but a living' participant in the trial, and, so far as the limitations of his position permit, should see that justice is done.” Upon the conceded facts adduced by the government the offense charged was complete. Whether it was finally established to the satisfaction of the jury depended upon the view taken by that body of the defense of entrapment. The issue was fully and fairly submitted and the decision was for the jury alone.
It is suggested that the testimony of the defendant and of his friend, the informer, upon the subject of entrapment is uneontradicted. But uncontradicted testimony is not necessarily conclusive. The credibility of witnesses which may be determined by their manner and demeanor while testifying, and their interest in the controversy, is for the triers of the facts, who are to decide whether they believe the witnesses or not. A court or jury is not bound to adopt the statements of witnesses simply for the reason that no other witness has denied 'them. “The. eourt will pay all due respect to the testimony of a witness, who stands uncontra,dieted and unimpeached; hut the credit of every witness must be taken into the consideration of the jury; and this is peculiarly and emphatically within their province.” Wait v. McNeil, 7 Mass. 261-263; 4 Corpus Juris, 848; Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U. S. 417, 420, 421, 11 S. Ct. 733, 851, 35 L. Ed. 501; In re Baumhauer (D. C.) 179 F. 966; Woey Ho v. United States (C. C. A. 9) 109 F. 888; Loan Co. v. Killian, 153 Mo. App. 106-111, 132 S. W. 280 (reviewing Missouri decisions); S. W. Brewery & Ice Co. v. Schmidt, 226 U. S. 162-169, 33 S. Ct. 68, 57 L. Ed. 170; Koehler v. Adler, 78 N. Y. 287; Reiss v. Reardon, Trustee (C. C. A. 8) 18 F.(2d) 200, opinion filed March 22, 1927.
The knowledge of facts respecting this alleged entrapment rested wholly with the defendant and the informer. This defense interposed at the trial leaves the government without means or opportunity to refute it by affirmative testimony. The situation is analogous to that o£ alibi, concerning which it is held not to be error to warn the jury that evidence of an alibi should be 'considered with caution and care. It is unnecessary to apply that rule to the case at bar; but the situation calls at least for the exercise of discretion in weighing the credibility of witnesses. The use of addicts in bringing to light the source of their supply is recognized as one of the most effective and necessary instrumentalities to he employed in the prevention of this unlawful traffic. If the testimony of informers, who are interested in continued procurement of the drug, and of their purveyors, is to be accepted as conclusive, in the absence of contradiction, a regrettable bander has been erected in the path of law enforcement.
In my judgment, a substantial case was made, and was fairly submitted. The verdict of the jury finds ample support in the record, and the judgment should be affirmed.