Court Opinion

ID: 9378292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 21:03:13.37344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:20.060566
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/9/23 In re F.L. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 In re F.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
 Court Law.

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                 F084301

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                          (Super. Ct. No. 21JL-00057B)

                    v.
                                                                                          OPINION
 F.L.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Merced County. Mark V.
Bacciarini, Judge.
         Kendall Dawson Wasley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

                                      SEE CONCURRING OPINION
                                    INTRODUCTION
       F.L. (appellant) appeals from the juvenile court’s order granting the People’s
motion to transfer appellant from juvenile court to criminal court pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (a).1 While this appeal was pending, the
Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2022,
ch. 330, § 1), which increased the standard of proof necessary to support transfer to “clear
and convincing evidence.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).) The parties agree, as do we, that the
change in law applies retroactively to appellant. Because the burden of proof has been
increased for transfer motions, we reverse the juvenile court’s order granting transfer and
remand the matter to the juvenile court to conduct a new transfer hearing applying the
law as amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361.
                                    BACKGROUND
       The Merced County District Attorney’s Office filed a juvenile wardship petition
alleging appellant committed the following offenses: Assault with a firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1), with an enhancement for acting for the benefit of or in
association with a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)); criminal
threats (Pen. Code, § 422; count 2); participating in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code,
§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 3); carrying a loaded firearm while an active participant in a
criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 25850, subds. (a), (c)(3); count 4); and misdemeanor
carrying a loaded firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a); count 5).2 Prior to the transfer
hearing, the juvenile court granted the People’s motion to dismiss count 2.
       The People moved to transfer appellant to criminal court. After considering the
report of the probation officer and conducting a transfer hearing, the juvenile court

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2      Because we determine a new transfer hearing is required, we need not summarize
the facts underling these allegations.

                                             2.
granted the transfer motion, finding the People had “shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that [appellant] should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court.”
                                      DISCUSSION

I.     We Reverse the Juvenile Court’s Order Granting Transfer and Remand for a
       New Transfer Hearing in Light of Assembly Bill No. 2361.
       In September 2022, the Governor signed Assembly Bill No. 2361. Effective
January 1, 2023, this bill amended section 707 to require the juvenile court apply a higher
standard of proof in a transfer hearing. As amended, section 707, subdivision (a)(3) now
states: “In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal
jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Italics
added.) Previously, a juvenile court was to apply the preponderance of the evidence
standard. (Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 186.)
       Respondent concedes Assembly Bill No. 2361 and its amendments to section 707
apply retroactively to appellant, as his judgment was not final when Assembly Bill No.
2361 came into effect. (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).) We agree.
Under Estrada, we assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that an amendatory statute
“mitigat[ing] the possible punishment for a class of persons” is “presumptively
retroactive and applie[s] to all persons whose judgments were not yet final at the time the
statute took effect.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624.) More specifically, in
People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303, our high court held that
Proposition 57, which prohibited charging juveniles directly in criminal court, applies
retroactively under Estrada to nonfinal judgments, reasoning that “[t]he possibility of
being treated as a juvenile in juvenile court—where rehabilitation is the goal—rather than
being tried and sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically different and more lenient
treatment.” Like Proposition 57, Assembly Bill No. 2361’s amendments to section 707

                                             3.
constitute an “ ‘ameliorative change[] to the criminal law,’ ” as they increased the
prosecution’s evidentiary burden at a transfer hearing. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 309.)
         Despite this change in the applicable standard of proof, appellant contends this
court should still review the juvenile court’s order for substantial evidence, but also apply
the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard. Conversely, respondent argues
that application of the wrong standard should be reviewed for harmless error.
         We decline to adopt either approach. Assembly Bill No. 2361 fundamentally
altered the nature of the findings that must be made by a juvenile court to justify transfer.
As our high court has explained, the clear and convincing evidence standard requires “ ‘a
finding of high probability.’ ” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998.) This
elevated standard of proof also affects the type and quality of the evidence that must be
presented by the prosecution, which bears this increased burden. We therefore decline
the parties’ invitation to act as a trier of fact and apply this new standard in the first
instance. Instead, we reverse the juvenile court’s order and remand for the juvenile court
to conduct a new hearing. This will allow the parties to fully litigate the transfer motion
under the clear and convincing evidence standard and allow the juvenile court to develop
a new record and issue a new ruling with the new standard in mind.
         Thus, on remand, the juvenile court is directed to conduct a new transfer hearing
in accordance with section 707, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361. At this new
hearing, the People bear the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that
appellant is “not a suitable candidate for treatment under the juvenile court system.”
(J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 715.) Furthermore, in ruling on the
transfer motion, the court shall “clearly and explicitly ‘articulate its evaluative process’
by detailing ‘how it weighed the evidence’ and by ‘identify[ing] the specific facts which
persuaded the court’ ” including an explanation of “how the different statutory criteria
affected its transfer decision.” (C.S. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1009,
1035.)

                                               4.
                                     DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s order granting transfer of appellant from juvenile court to
criminal court is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to conduct a new
transfer hearing pursuant to section 707, as amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361.

                                                                      LEVY, Acting P. J.
I CONCUR:

DETJEN, J.

                                            5.
POOCHIGIAN, J., Concurring.
       Evidence adduced in the proceedings below indicated that appellant, seven days
before turning 18, assaulted someone, struck them with a firearm, shot indiscriminately in
a parking lot, and subsequently fled when stopped by police. All this after failing to
rehabilitate multiple times in the past, and with an increasingly serious record.
       Appellant’s conduct was violent and dangerous, and his prospects for
rehabilitation within the timeframe for confinement in the juvenile justice system would
seem inauspicious. Nonetheless, the order transferring him to adult criminal court must
be reversed. Because, while today’s result may be viewed by some as imprudent given
appellant’s violent and dangerous behavior, it is also the result intended by statute.
Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) follows the current trend of legislation
that has broadly sought to provide offenders more leniency. And the Legislature is well-
aware of the retroactivity rules espoused in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 and its
progeny. We are duty-bound to defer to that intent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.)
       On remand, if the People prove the propriety of transfer by clear and convincing
evidence, appellant may again be transferred to adult criminal court.
       For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.

                                                                          POOCHIGIAN, J.