Court Opinion

ID: 9471429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:32:25.595557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:24.516654
License: Public Domain

SKOPIL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I agree that the district court erred in examining the juror without all defendants present. I also agree that we must reverse unless the government is able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this error did not contribute to the verdicts. I believe, however, that the government met its burden here.
Prior to examining the juror in-chambers in the presence of defense attorney Wolkin, the judge stated in open court her intention to conduct the examination. Despite being aware that the court recessed for the specific reason of examining the juror, none of appellants’ counsel objected to it being conducted in their absence. Their failure to object is to be considered when determining *679whether the error was harmless. United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1379 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Walls, 577 F.2d 690, 698 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893, 99 S.Ct. 251, 58 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978).
Appellants’ attorneys not only failed to object to the examination, but attorney Wolkin was present to guard against any irregularities. Ford, 632 F.2d at 1379; United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 121 (9th Cir.1979). Defendants charged with conspiracy have similar interests. Attorney Wolkin exercised his opportunity to question the juror directly and came away satisfied of his impartiality. At the end of the examination, he expressed his agreement with the court’s conclusion not to remove the juror. It is difficult to conceive of any value from the presence of defendants and the remaining defense attorneys. Their questions would have been mere sur-plusage to those posed by attorney Wolkin and the court.
The examination at issue was made part of the official record. In Spain v. Rushen, 543 F.Supp. 757, 770 (N.D.Cal.1982), aff’d without opinion, 701 F.2d 186 (9th Cir.1983), no record was made of the conversations between judge and juror. This private nature prevented any error from being “readily apparent on the record.” Here, no objection was registered by defendants over the subject matter or the conduct of the examination. Review of the record suggests why defendants did not object.
After assuring the juror that the drawing by Mr. Gagnon would cease, the court asked the juror whether he was upset to the extent that he could not judge Mr. Gagnon and the others fairly. The juror responded negatively. The court then posed other similar questions. The juror indicated that he would continue to be impartial. Attorney Wolkin’s question elicited the same response. Upon terminating the examination the court properly instructed the juror to not discuss the matter with other jurors. Id. at 767.
The examination of the juror in the absence of all but one defense attorney was harmless error. The added presence of the defendants and their counsel would have been superfluous and quite possibly detrimental to their interests. Polizzi v. United States, 550 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.1976). The district court clearly did not abuse its discretion in determining that the juror would remain impartial. United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 663 (9th Cir.1981). The court and attorney Wolkin were aware of the potentially damaging influence and their questions were directed to that end. The juror consistently responded that he would remain fair and impartial. More specific questioning was unnecessary.
I would affirm.