Court Opinion

ID: 9711456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:32:16.469079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:05.175712
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
First of all, in no way do I depart from my prior positions as expressed in the dissenting opinions of Satter I (422 N.W.2d at 430) or Satter II (434 N.W.2d at 728). I write in the present case, however, because I believe that even if the April 2 statement was involuntary and inadmissible (a conclusion with which I do not agree), the admission of this statement was harmless error either under the harmless error rule set forth in State v. Davis, 401 N.W.2d 721 (S.D.1987) or State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815, 819 (S.D.1987). Also, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the April 11 statement was involuntary and inadmissible under the facts in this case. Considering the totality of the circumstances, I would conclude the April 11 statement was voluntary and thus admissible. For these reasons, then, I would affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The majority declares that Satter is entitled to a new trial because the April 2 statement was taken in violation of Satter’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. The majority then goes on to hold that the April 5 statement is admissible with which I agree. The April 2 statement and the April 5 statement are essentially the same. The only real difference between the two statements is that in the April 5 version, a man named “Pianto” rather than “Deluci” had paid Satter to dispose of the bodies. This difference be*772tween the two statements, in my opinion, is not of substantial significance. The fact remains that the two statements are essentially the same. Considering this fact, I do not believe the jury might have and probably would have returned a different verdict if the April 2 statement had been excluded from the evidence. Thus, if the admission of the April 2 statement constituted an error, such error was not prejudicial. See, State v. Davis, 401 N.W.2d 721, 725 (S.D.1987). For this reason, I would conclude that the admission of the April 2 statement, if an error at all, was a harmless error not affecting the substantial rights of the appellant. See, SDCL 23A-44-14; SDCL 19-9-3. Even under the Michalek test applied by the majority, this alleged error was harmless since, I believe beyond a reasonable doubt the alleged error did not contribute to the conviction. State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815, 818 (S.D.1987).
I now address the issue regarding the admissibility of April 11 statement made by Satter. The undisputed facts reveal that prior to the taking of this statement, Satter was given Miranda warnings and he waived them. Pursuant to the Miranda warnings, Satter was informed that his subsequent statements could and would be used against him in court. At some point it was agreed that Satter’s statement would be given if a polygraph examination would be offered to him at a future date, and also that the state would not contest or object to the polygraph test being offered in court. After all of this was done, Satter made a statement in which he admitted killing the two victims. The statement reflected this killing was done in self defense.
Satter contends that the State, in making its offer concerning the polygraph test, deceived him because it never followed through on its promise to provide a polygraph test. Because of this alleged deception, Satter contends that his April 11 statement must be deemed involuntary be-
cause Satter claims he would not have made the statement were it not for the polygraph agreement. In considering whether Satter’s statement was voluntary, we must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. State v. Caffrey, 332 N.W.2d 269, 271 (S.D.1983). Although deception is a factor to be considered in evaluating the totality of the circumstances, Caffrey, supra at 272, it is not the only factor to be considered. Here, Satter was given Miranda warnings prior to his statement.1 Pursuant to these warnings, Satter was informed that anything he said could and would be used against him in court. Understanding this, Satter agreed to make a statement. The record reflects that Satter is an intelligent person who had much experience with the criminal justice system.2 I find these factors to be persuasive regarding the voluntariness of Satter’s statement. Further, I do not believe that alleged deception by the State renders Satter’s statement involuntary since I am not convinced that Satter would not have given the statement in the absence of the State’s polygraph offer. Considering the evidence that was surfacing against Satter, I believe it was wise for him to make the April 11 statement, particularly since the statement supports his claim of self-defense. Finally, I note that “polygraph results are not admissible as evidence in South Dakota Courts.” State v. Muetze, 368 N.W.2d 575, 588 (S.D.1985); also see, State v. Watson, 248 N.W.2d 398 (S.D.1976); State v. O’Connor, 86 S.D. 294, 194 N.W.2d 246 (1972). Considering all these factors, I would hold Satter’s April 11 statement was voluntary and properly admitted.
Finally, the majority opinion holds we should not apply the new rules set forth in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) and in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 *773S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). I agree. See my special concurrence in Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514 (S.D.1990).

. The majority opinion cites Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963) and Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959) in favor of its holding that deception may render a statement involuntary. It is significant to note that these cases were rendered before the Miranda case. Thus, the warnings advocated in the Miranda case were not given in Lynumn and Spano.

. The opposite was true in Caffrey, supra, where the appellant was a juvenile. In Caffrey, we held that although Miranda warnings were given, appellant’s statement was still involuntary.