Court Opinion

ID: 9896934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:15.73191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:06.368182
License: Public Domain

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  TOWN OF MIDDLEBURY v. FRATERNAL ORDER
       OF POLICE, MIDDLEBURY LODGE
               NO. 34, ET AL.
                 (SC 20733)
                  Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,
                        Mullins and Alexander, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The plaintiff town appealed to the trial court from the decision of the
   defendant State Board of Labor Relations, which concluded that the
   town had violated the Municipal Employee Relations Act (§ 7-467 et
   seq.) by unilaterally changing its past practice of including extra duty
   pay in calculating pension benefits for members of the named defendant
   union. The labor board’s decision was based on its conclusions that
   the town had violated the statute (§ 7-470 (a) (4)) requiring municipal
   employers to bargain in good faith, that there had been a consistent
   past practice of including extra duty pay in the calculation of pension
   benefits, and that the union had not waived its right to bargain with
   respect to changes to the calculation of future retirement benefits. In
   reaching its decision, the labor board applied its well established stan-
   dard that a union’s waiver of its right to bargain with respect to an
   otherwise mandatory subject of bargaining must be clear and unmistak-
   able. During the pendency of the town’s administrative appeal to the
   trial court, however, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued
   a decision in MV Transportation, Inc. (368 N.L.R.B. No. 66), in which
   the NLRB abandoned the clear and unmistakable waiver standard in
   favor of the contract coverage standard, under which the NLRB initially
   reviews the plain language of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement
   to determine whether the change made by the employer was within the
   compass or scope of the contractual language granting the employer
   the right to act unilaterally. Because the NLRB had held that the contract
   coverage standard applied retroactively to all pending cases, the trial
   court remanded the case to the labor board to consider whether to
   adopt that new federal standard. Subsequently, the labor board declined
   to adopt the contract coverage standard, and the trial court rendered
   judgment dismissing the town’s administrative appeal, concluding, inter
   alia, that the town had failed to demonstrate any illegality, abuse of
   discretion, or prejudice to the town’s rights in the labor board’s decision.
   On appeal to the Appellate Court, that court concluded that, because
   NLRB decisions are not binding on the labor board, the labor board did
   not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion
   in declining to adopt the contract coverage standard. The Appellate
   Court also concluded that, because the labor board is the administrative
   agency tasked with enforcing the Municipal Employee Relations Act,
   its policy decision to continue to apply the clear and unmistakable waiver
   standard was entitled to deference. On the granting of certification, the
   town appealed to this court.

Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the labor board did
   not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion
   when it declined to follow MV Transportation, Inc., and to apply the
   contract coverage standard in determining whether the town’s unilateral
   change to the way it calculated pension benefits for union members
   violated the Municipal Employee Relations Act:

   Although the Municipal Employee Relations Act was predicated on, and
   its phraseology was patterned after, the National Labor Relations Act
   (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.), and although this court frequently has relied
   on federal labor law precedent in interpreting parallel state legislation,
   including the Municipal Employee Relations Act, the federal act does
   not apply to Connecticut municipalities, the labor board was neither
   bound by NLRB precedent nor required to follow the NLRB’s decision
   in MV Transportation, Inc., and, accordingly, the labor board did not
  act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion in
  declining to follow that case.

  Moreover, even if the labor board had followed MV Transportation,
  Inc., and had adopted the contract coverage standard, the outcome of
  the present case would not have changed, as the NLRB has clarified that
  application of the contract coverage standard is limited to cases involving
  unexpired collective bargaining agreements, and it was undisputed that
  the agreement between the town and the union expired before the town
  unilaterally changed its past practice of including extra duty pay in the
  calculation of pension benefits.

  Furthermore, contrary to the town’s claim, the Appellate Court did not
  improperly defer to the labor board’s decision to apply the clear and
  unmistakable waiver standard, as the labor board has applied that stan-
  dard for approximately fifty years, this court long has approved of the
  labor board’s application of that standard to claims that an employer’s
  unilateral change violated the Municipal Employee Relations Act, prior
  to MV Transportation, Inc., the United States Supreme Court had
  endorsed the NLRB’s application of the clear and unmistakable waiver
  standard to claims that an employer’s unilateral change to employment
  conditions constituted a refusal to bargain collectively, and the labor
  board was the administrative agency authorized and vested with broad
  powers to enforce collective bargaining rights in this state, such that its
  policy decision to retain the long-standing and judicially approved clear
  and unmistakable waiver standard was entitled to deference.
        Argued March 30—officially released October 24, 2023

                           Procedural History

   Appeal from the decision of the defendant State
Board of Labor Relations that the plaintiff’s change in
its practice of including extra duty pay in the calculation
of pensions for members of the named defendant vio-
lated the Municipal Employee Relations Act, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,
where the case was transferred to the judicial district
of New Britain; thereafter, the court, Hon. Stephen F.
Frazzini, judge trial referee, remanded the case to the
State Board of Labor Relations to determine whether a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board applied
retroactively; subsequently, the case was tried to the
court, Hon. Stephen F. Frazzini, judge trial referee,
who, exercising the powers of the Superior Court, ren-
dered judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the
plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, Bright, C. J.,
and Moll and Bear, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s
judgment, and the plaintiff, on the granting of certifica-
tion, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Thomas G. Parisot, with whom were Connor P.
McNamara and Anne Murdica, for the appellant
(plaintiff).
  Frank N. Cassetta, general counsel, with whom was
Tamara Titre, assistant general counsel, for the appel-
lee (defendant State Board of Labor Relations).
   Stephen F. McEleney, with whom was David S. Tay-
lor, for the appellee (named defendant).
                          Opinion

  ALEXANDER, J. In the absence of a valid defense, a
municipal employer’s unilateral change to an employment
condition constitutes a refusal to bargain collectively
in good faith in violation of the Municipal Employee
Relations Act (MERA), General Statutes § 7-467 et seq.
One such defense is that the union consented, either
expressly or impliedly, to the unilateral change at issue.
For nearly fifty years, the defendant State Board of
Labor Relations (labor board) has required municipal
employers to demonstrate such consent by establishing
that the union clearly and unmistakably waived its right
to bargain with respect to the particular employment
condition.1 In this certified appeal, the plaintiff, the town
of Middlebury (town), challenges the trial court’s dis-
missal of the town’s administrative appeal from the
decision of the labor board concluding that the town
violated MERA by unilaterally changing the town’s past
practice of including extra duty pay in the calculation of
pension benefits for members of the named defendant,
Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge No. 34 (union).
The town claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly
determined that the labor board did not act unreason-
ably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion
when it declined to apply the ‘‘contract coverage’’ stan-
dard, as adopted by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) in MV Transportation, Inc., Case No. 28-CA-
173726, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 66, slip op., pp. 1–2, 9–11 (Sep-
tember 10, 2019),2 and instead applied the clear and
unmistakable waiver standard to the union’s claim that
the town’s unilateral change to its pension plan consti-
tuted a refusal to bargain collectively in good faith in
violation of MERA. We disagree and affirm the judgment
of the Appellate Court.
   The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the
relevant procedural background and facts as found by
the labor board. See Middlebury v. Fraternal Order of
Police, Middlebury Lodge No. 34, 212 Conn. App. 455,
458–64, 275 A.3d 664 (2022). In its decision, the labor
board found that ‘‘the town violated General Statutes
§ 7-470 (a) (4)3 when the [town’s] retirement [plan] com-
mittee4 excluded extra duty pay from the calculation
of members’ pension benefits. . . . The labor board
. . . determined that the union had established a prima
facie case of unlawful unilateral change to a term or
condition of employment. Specifically, the labor board
found that there was a consistent past practice of
including extra duty pay in the calculation of pension
benefits that had endured for almost thirty years before
the retirement [plan] committee’s October, 2017 meeting.
The labor board rejected the town’s contract defense,
concluding that the union had not waived its right to
bargain over changes to the calculation of future retire-
ment benefits by referencing the retirement plan in the
parties’ agreement. In so concluding, the labor board
applied its well established standard for determining
whether a union has waived its right to bargain over
an otherwise mandatory subject of bargaining, which
requires that the waiver be clear and unmistakable. . . .
   ‘‘The town appealed from the labor board’s decision
to the Superior Court pursuant to [the Uniform Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-
183]. After the parties appeared for oral argument and
submitted briefs in the trial court, the [NLRB] issued a
decision in which it abandoned the clear and unmistak-
able waiver standard5 in favor of the contract coverage
standard6 in cases over which it has jurisdiction. See
MV Transportation, Inc., [supra, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 66].
Because the NLRB held that the newly adopted rule
applies retroactively to all pending cases, the trial court
remanded the present case to the labor board to con-
sider whether to adopt the new federal standard in
Connecticut and, if so, whether to apply it retroactively
in the present case.
   ‘‘On December 12, 2019, the labor board issued an
order declining to adopt the contract coverage stan-
dard, and the [trial] court . . . dismiss[ed] the town’s
appeal on March 12, 2020. The [trial] court determined
that the labor board’s decision was supported by sub-
stantial evidence and that the town had failed to demon-
strate any illegality, abuse of discretion, or prejudice
to its rights in the labor board’s decision.’’ (Citation
omitted; footnotes added; footnotes omitted.) Mid-
dlebury v. Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury Lodge
No. 34, supra, 212 Conn. App. 462–64.
   The town appealed from the judgment of the trial
court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the labor
board had improperly declined to follow the NLRB’s
decision in MV Transportation, Inc., and to apply the
contract coverage standard to the union’s claim that
the town’s unilateral change to the way it calculates
pension benefits violated MERA. Id., 478. The Appellate
Court disagreed, concluding that, because NLRB deci-
sions are not binding on the labor board, the labor
board did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or
in abuse of its discretion in declining to adopt the con-
tract coverage standard. Id., 485–86. The Appellate
Court further concluded that, because the labor board
is the administrative agency tasked with enforcing
MERA, its policy decision to continue applying the clear
and unmistakable waiver standard was entitled to defer-
ence. Id. On appeal, the town challenges both determi-
nations.
   ‘‘We begin by articulating the applicable standard of
review in an appeal from the decision of an administra-
tive agency. Judicial review of [an administrative
agency’s] action is governed by the [UAPA] . . . and
the scope of that review is very restricted. . . . The
court’s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light
of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably,
arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . .
Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency
must stand if the court determines that they resulted
from a correct application of the law to the facts found
and could reasonably and logically follow from such
facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 1st Alliance
Lending, LLC v. Dept. of Banking, 342 Conn. 273, 280,
269 A.3d 764 (2022).
  We find no merit in the town’s claim that the labor
board acted unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in
abuse of its discretion when it declined to follow MV
Transportation, Inc., and to apply the contract coverage
standard in determining whether the town’s unilateral
change to its pension plan violated MERA. In support
of its claim, the town argues that MV Transportation,
Inc., demonstrates that the clear and unmistakable
waiver standard is ‘‘theoretically and practically unsup-
portable,’’ setting an unattainable goal for employers
to meet in defending unilateral changes to employment
conditions. The town further argues that the contract
coverage standard ‘‘give[s] effect to the thoroughly and
properly negotiated terms and conditions of collective
bargaining agreements.’’
   The labor board was not required to follow the
NLRB’s decision in MV Transportation, Inc. Although
MERA was predicated on, and its phraseology was pat-
terned after, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2018); see Connecticut State
Labor Relations Board v. Connecticut Yankee Grey-
hound Racing, Inc., 175 Conn. 625, 633, 402 A.2d 777
(1978); and although this court frequently has relied on
federal labor law precedent when interpreting parallel
state legislation, including MERA; see, e.g., Danbury
v. International Assn. of Firefighters, Local 801, 221
Conn. 244, 251–52, 603 A.2d 393 (1992); the NLRA does
not apply to Connecticut municipalities. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 152 (2) (2018) (defining ‘‘employer’’ for purposes of
NLRA to exclude ‘‘any [s]tate or political subdivision
thereof’’).
    Thus, ‘‘[although] the interpretation of provisions of
the [NLRA] may be extremely helpful . . . neither the
state [labor] board nor our courts are compelled to
slavishly follow policies [that] have been adopted by
the NLRB for the purpose of ensuring administrative
efficiency at the federal level.’’ Connecticut State Labor
Relations Board v. Connecticut Yankee Greyhound
Racing, Inc., supra, 175 Conn. 633–34; see id., 638–39
(when applying MERA, state labor board is not bound
to follow NLRB evidentiary rules); see also id., 638
(‘‘[t]he [state] labor board, like the NLRB, has broad
discretion in administering the state labor laws’’); In
re Winsted Memorial Hospital, Conn. Board of Labor
Relations Decision No. 1172-A (August 14, 1973) p. 2
(‘‘[a]lthough NLRB precedents are indeed persuasive,
they are not binding [on] us and we have departed from
them when we have found that local conditions and
policies require a different result’’). Because the labor
board is not bound by NLRB precedent, the town cannot
prevail on its claim that the labor board acted unreason-
ably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion
in declining to follow MV Transportation, Inc.
  We note, moreover, that, even if we agreed with the
town that the labor board should have followed MV
Transportation, Inc., and adopted the contract cover-
age standard, it does not appear that the outcome of
this case would change because it is undisputed that the
parties’ collective bargaining agreement expired before
the town unilaterally changed its past practice of includ-
ing extra duty pay in the calculation of pension benefits.
In MV Transportation, Inc., the employer made the
challenged unilateral change during the term of the
collective bargaining agreement. MV Transportation,
Inc., supra, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 66, slip op., p. 3. The NLRB
expressly stated that its decision did not ‘‘[speak] to
the status of contract provisions authorizing unilateral
employer action after the contract containing the provi-
sions has expired’’; id., p. 15 n.36; thereby limiting its
holding to cases involving an employer’s unilateral
changes made during the duration of the contract and
leaving open the question of whether the new standard
would apply to postexpiration unilateral changes.
   As the Appellate Court observed, less than one year
after MV Transportation, Inc., was decided, the NLRB
clarified that ‘‘provisions in an expired [collective bar-
gaining] agreement do not cover postexpiration unilat-
eral changes [to employment conditions] unless the
agreement contained language explicitly providing that
the relevant provision would survive contract expira-
tion.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Middlebury v. Fraternal Order of Police,
Middlebury Lodge No. 34, supra, 212 Conn. App. 486
n.8, quoting Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., 369 N.L.R.B.
No. 61, slip op., p. 2 (April 21, 2020); see National Labor
Relations Board v. Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., 4 F.4th
801, 811 (9th Cir. 2021) (granting NLRB’s petition for
enforcement of its decision in Nexstar Broadcasting,
Inc.). The NLRB explained that, as a general matter,
contractual obligations cease ‘‘upon termination of the
bargaining agreement. . . . Thus, an expired contract
has by its own terms released all its parties from their
respective contractual obligations, except obligations
already fixed under the contract but as yet unsatisfied.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., supra, 369 N.L.R.B. No.
61, slip op., p. 3. Upon the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement, ‘‘an employer has a duty to main-
tain the status quo. Although the status quo is ascer-
tained by looking to the substantive terms of the expired
contract . . . the obligation to maintain the status quo
arises out of the [NLRA], not the parties’ contract. After
a contract expires, terms and conditions continue in
effect by operation of the NLRA. They are no longer
[agreed on] terms; they are terms imposed by law.’’
(Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.; see also National Labor Relations
Board v. Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., supra, 4 F.4th 809
(‘‘an employer may not excuse itself from its obligation
to maintain status quo working conditions after the
[collective bargaining agreement’s] expiration by sim-
ple reference to the broad compass or scope of expired
contractual terms’’ (emphasis in original)); PG Publish-
ing Co., 371 N.L.R.B. No. 141, slip op., pp. 5–6 (Septem-
ber 21, 2022) (employer’s unilateral change to conditions
of employment after expiration of collective bargaining
agreement violated NLRA when expired agreement did
not clearly and unmistakably waive union’s statutory
right to require employer to maintain status quo); North-
star Memorial Group, LLC, 369 N.L.R.B. No. 145, slip
op., p. 2 (July 30, 2020) (applying clear and unmistakable
waiver standard in determining that union had not
waived right to bargain over conditions of employment
that employer had unilaterally changed after expiration
of collective bargaining agreement).7 The NLRB’s limita-
tion on the application of the contract coverage stan-
dard to unexpired collective bargaining agreements
provides further support for our conclusion that the
labor board did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbi-
trarily, or in abuse of its discretion when it declined to
apply that standard to the town’s unilateral change to
its pension plan after the expiration of the parties’ col-
lective bargaining agreement.
   Finally, we find no merit in the town’s claim that
the Appellate Court improperly deferred to the labor
board’s decision to continue applying the clear and
unmistakable waiver standard. The town contends that
whether to adopt the contract coverage standard pre-
sented a ‘‘novel’’ question, and, therefore, the labor
board’s decision to apply the clear and unmistakable
waiver standard, unsupported by any analysis, was enti-
tled to no deference.
   There is nothing novel about the labor board’s appli-
cation of the clear and unmistakable waiver standard.
As the Appellate Court explained, the labor board has
applied that standard for approximately five decades.
See Middlebury v. Fraternal Order of Police, Mid-
dlebury Lodge No. 34, supra, 212 Conn. App. 485; see
also, e.g., In re Waterbury Board of Education, Conn.
Board of Labor Relations Decision No. 4337 (September
8, 2008) p. 8; In re New Haven, Conn. Board of Labor
Relations Decision No. 1342 (October 31, 1975) p. 7.
This court has approved of the labor board’s application
of the clear and unmistakable waiver standard for
nearly as long. See, e.g., Greater Bridgeport Transit
District v. State Board of Labor Relations, 232 Conn.
57, 64, 653 A.2d 151 (1995) (adopting decision of trial
court in Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. State
Board of Labor Relations, 43 Conn. Supp. 340, 358, 653
A.2d 229 (1993), which upheld labor board’s decision
that employer’s unilateral change violated MERA and
observed that, ‘‘[b]ecause waiver of statutory rights by
unions is disfavored, the purported waiver must be clear
and unmistakable’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Prior to MV Transportation, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court twice endorsed the NLRB’s application
of the clear and unmistakable waiver standard to claims
that an employer’s unilateral change to employment
conditions constituted a refusal to bargain collectively.
See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 460 U.S. 693, 708, 103 S. Ct. 1467, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 387 (1983) (In interpreting collective bargaining
agreements, ‘‘[the United States Supreme Court] will
not infer from a general contractual provision that the
parties [intend] to waive a statutorily protected right
unless the undertaking is ‘explicitly stated.’ More suc-
cinctly, the waiver must be clear and unmistakable.’’);
National Labor Relations Board v. C & C Plywood
Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 428, 87 S. Ct. 559, 17 L. Ed. 2d
486 (1967) (in applying clear and unmistakable waiver
standard, NLRB ‘‘has done no more than merely enforce
a statutory right [that] Congress considered necessary
to allow labor and management to get on with the pro-
cess of reaching fair terms and conditions of employ-
ment’’).
   As the administrative agency authorized and vested
with broad powers to enforce collective bargaining
rights in this state, the labor board’s policy decision to
retain the long-standing and judicially approved clear
and unmistakable waiver standard when determining
whether a union has waived its statutory right to bargain
collectively is entitled to deference. See, e.g., Lieber-
man v. State Board of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253,
262, 579 A.2d 505 (1990) (‘‘an agency’s factual and dis-
cretionary determinations are to be accorded consider-
able weight by the courts’’); Connecticut State Labor
Relations Board v. Connecticut Yankee Greyhound
Racing, Inc., supra, 175 Conn. 640 (‘‘[b]ecause the rela-
tion of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for admin-
istrative competence, courts must not enter the
allowable area of the [labor] [b]oard’s discretion and
must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously
from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious
domain of policy’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In light of the foregoing, we disagree with the town
that it was improper for the Appellate Court to defer
to the labor board’s decision to apply the clear and
unmistakable waiver standard rather than the contract
coverage standard in determining whether the union
had waived its statutory right to bargain collectively
with respect to the manner in which the town calculates
its members’ pension benefits.
     The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
     In this opinion the other justices concurred.
 1
     Under the clear and unmistakable waiver standard, a waiver of the
statutory right to bargain over a condition of employment ‘‘may be estab-
lished by either an express provision in the collective bargaining agreement,
or by the conduct of the parties, including past practices and bargaining
history. . . . An employer relying on a claim of waiver of a duty to bargain
bears the burden of demonstrating it clearly and unmistakably.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Greater Bridgeport Transit
District v. State Board of Labor Relations, 43 Conn. Supp. 340, 358, 653
A.2d 229 (1993), aff’d, 232 Conn. 57, 653 A.2d 151 (1995). ‘‘This standard
. . . requires bargaining partners to unequivocally and specifically express
their mutual intention to permit unilateral employer action with respect to
a particular employment term, notwithstanding the statutory duty to bargain
that would otherwise apply.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MV Trans-
portation, Inc., Case No. 28-CA-173726, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 66, slip op., p. 4
(September 10, 2019).
   2
     In adopting the contract coverage standard, the NLRB overruled seventy
years of precedent applying the clear and unmistakable waiver standard
to claims that an employer unilaterally changed a term or condition of
employment. See MV Transportation, Inc., supra, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 66, slip
op., p. 1. ‘‘Under [the] contract coverage [standard], the [NLRB] will examine
the plain language of the [collective bargaining] agreement to determine
whether action taken by an employer was within the compass or scope of
contractual language granting the employer the right to act unilaterally.’’
Id., p. 2. When ‘‘the agreement does not cover the employer’s disputed act,
and that act has materially, substantially and significantly changed a term
or condition of employment constituting a mandatory subject of bargaining,
the employer will have violated [the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 et seq.] unless it demonstrates that the union clearly and unmistakably
waived its right to bargain over the change or that its unilateral action
was privileged for some other reason. Thus, under the contract coverage
[standard] . . . the [NLRB] will first review the plain language of the parties’
[collective bargaining] agreement, applying ordinary principles of contract
interpretation, and then, if it is determined that the disputed act does not
come within the compass or scope of a contract provision that grants the
employer the right to act unilaterally, the analysis is one of waiver.’’ (Empha-
sis omitted; footnotes omitted.) Id.
   3
     General Statutes § 7-470 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Municipal employ-
ers or their representatives or agents are prohibited from . . . (4) refusing
to bargain collectively in good faith with an employee organization which
has been designated in accordance with the provisions of said sections as
the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit . . . .’’
   4
     The town created the retirement plan committee to administer the town’s
retirement plan. See Middlebury v. Fraternal Order of Police, Middlebury
Lodge No. 34, supra, 212 Conn. App. 458, 467.
   5
     See footnote 1 of this opinion.
   6
     See footnote 2 of this opinion.
   7
     The parties have not addressed in their briefs to this court what effect,
if any, Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc., has on the town’s claim that the labor
board improperly declined to apply the contract coverage standard to the
union’s prohibited practice claim. Because we conclude that the labor board
did not act unreasonably, illegally, arbitrarily, or in abuse of its discretion
in declining to adopt the contract coverage standard, we need not resolve
definitively whether that standard ultimately would have applied to the
town’s waiver defense.