Court Opinion

ID: 9786059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:46:13.364985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:36.758841
License: Public Domain

WOLLHEIM, J.,
dissenting.
The trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress, based on its determination that defendant posed an immediate threat to the officer’s safety, which justified the officer shining a flashlight into defendant’s front pants pocket. The majority concludes that shining a flashlight into defendant’s pocket violated defendant’s right under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution1 to be free from unreasonable searches. Accordingly, the majority reverses defendant’s judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, former ORS 475.992 (2003), amended by Or Laws 2005, ch 708, § 39, renumbered as ORS 475.840 (2005). Because I agree with the trial court that shining a flashlight into defendant’s pocket was justified by the officer’s concern for his safety, I respectfully dissent.
To set the scene, around 4:00 a.m. one day in August 2004, Officer Babb was dispatched to a residence where an active burglar alarm was sounding. Approximately a block away from the residence, Babb saw defendant walking away from the residence. Babb stopped his car and approached defendant, who was acting very nervous; his hands were shaking, and he was sweating profusely. Babb noticed that defendant’s front pants pockets were bulging, and when Babb asked defendant what was in his pockets, defendant fished around in the pockets and selectively removed some items. Visible bulges remained and defendant was getting more nervous. Defendant told Babb that “he didn’t want [Babb] to look in his pockets.” At that point Babb suspected that defendant had either “burglar tools,” “something stolen from the burglary,” “a weapon,” or “drugs” in his pockets. *440Concerned for his safety, Babb attempted to pat-down defendant, but defendant turned his body so that Babb could not touch his pockets. Despite instructions to stop moving, defendant again maneuvered himself to avoid being patted down. Babb then handcuffed defendant, used his finger to pull open defendant’s front pocket, and shone his flashlight inside.
The majority does not dispute that “police officers are entitled to take steps reasonably necessary to their safety.” State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 523, 747 P2d 991 (1987). Rather, the majority concludes that the state failed to demonstrate specific and articulable facts that defendant posed an immediate threat to the officer’s safety after he was handcuffed to justify Babb’s looking into defendant’s pocket. 219 Or App at 439. The majority’s focus on the events that occurred after defendant was handcuffed is too narrow; the proper focus is on the totality of the circumstances facing the police officer once the officer determined that defendant posed an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer.
Here, Babb’s safety concern was sufficiently particularized by the circumstances surrounding the stop — the proximity and apparent connection to the residential burglary — and by defendant’s conduct during the stop — shaking, sweating profusely, selectively removing items from his pockets and actively trying to conceal other items, and moving his body during the attempted patdown so that Babb could not have access to his pockets.
The proper inquiry under the officer safety doctrine is “whether the precautions taken were reasonable under the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time that the decision was made.” Bates, 304 Or at 525 (emphasis added). The sequence of events here likely occurred in a matter of seconds. As Babb testified, he was very concerned that defendant was “hiding something from me. And I don’t know if this is a weapon, or what he’s got there. But, if I’m patting someone down and they’re pulling away from me and not following instructions, then that’s an officer-safety risk.” As did the trial court, I would conclude that Babb’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances as they appeared at that time.
*441Babb was not required to take the least intrusive course available to him in order to come within the officer safety doctrine. Rather, we measure an officer’s actions by a test of reasonableness. State v. Swibies, 183 Or App 460, 470, 53 P3d 447 (2002). The fact that defendant was handcuffed at the time that Babb looked inside defendant’s pocket did not remove all possibility of danger. State v. Rickard, 150 Or App 517, 526, 947 P2d 215, rev den, 326 Or 234 (1997).
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, State v. Weems, 190 Or App 341, 79 P3d 884 (2003), does not compel the conclusion that Babb’s shining a flashlight into defendant’s pocket was not justified on officer safety grounds. 219 Or App at 436-37. In Weems, we held that the officer’s “further search [into the defendant’s pockets] was not justified because, after the patdown there was no evidence that defendant posed an immediate threat of injury to the officers present.” Weems, 190 Or App at 347 (emphasis added). However, the circumstances facing the officer in Weems were different from the circumstances here. In Weems, the officer had completed the patdown before searching the defendant’s pockets. Id. Here, Babb attempted twice to patdown defendant, but defendant failed to follow Babb’s order to stop moving and would not allow Babb to patdown defendant’s pockets. Additionally, in Weems, the officer’s safety concern was based on the defendant’s “ ‘felony-caution’ ” warrant and the fact that when the defendant got out of his car, the officer saw a knife on his seat. Id. at 343. Nothing suggests that the defendant in Weems was conducting himself in a manner that gave rise to safety concerns. In contrast, here, Babb’s safety concern was based on defendant’s conduct during the stop — specifically, defendant manipulating and concealing the contents of his pockets, his nervousness, his failure to obey Babb’s instruction to stop moving, and his refusal to allow Babb to patdown his pocket.
As the Supreme Court stated,
“Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, does not forbid an officer to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the *442officer or to others then present. * * * [I]t is not our function to uncharitably second-guess an officer’s judgment. A police officer in the field frequently must make life-or-death decisions in a matter of seconds. There may be little or no time in which to weigh the magnitude of a potential safety risk against the intrusiveness of protective measures. An officer must be allowed considerable latitude to take safety precautions in such situations.”
Bates, 304 Or at 524.
In these circumstances, I would not second-guess Babb’s split-second decision to pull open defendant’s front pants pocket and shine a flashlight into it as a safety precaution to determine whether defendant possessed a weapon.
I respectfully dissent.
Sercombe, J., joins in this dissent.

 Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part:
“No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure[.]”