Court Opinion

ID: 9848046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:11:53.859098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:56.789278
License: Public Domain

*508LOUIS J. CECI, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. The fundamental issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in transferring custody of the parties’ child from the mother to the father. It is my conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that this court should affirm the court of appeals decision.
The court of appeals’ opinion clearly summarizes the law:
Under sec. 767.82(2), Stats., any modification of a custody order that removes a child from the care of a parent having custody of the child, shall be based on a finding that the removal is necessary to the child’s best interests as shown by substantial evidence supporting a change in custody under sec. 767.24(2), Stats. The burden of proof is on the moving party to show that removal is necessary. Substantial evidence is required to warrant a change of custody. Corcoran v. Corcoran, 109 Wis. 2d 36, 42-43, 324 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Ct. App. 1982).
The petitioner argued in this court that the trial court failed to apply the “necessary” standard of sec. 767.32, Stats., since the court spoke in terms of merely “enhancing” Kimberly’s well-being and did not mention the specific language of sec. 767.32(2). While it is true that the court below never mentioned sec. 767.32(2) specifically, the court did expressly note that “the target is the best interest of the child” and that the court “must consider the guidelines of sec. 767.24.”1
The majority overstates the meaning of “necessary” as used in the statute and, therefore, implies that a change *509of custody is “necessary” to a child’s best interests only when there is substantial evidence that there is present harm to the child. A child’s best interests may be far better served by living with one parent even if living with the other would not actually harm the child.2
There was no substantial evidence that living with the mother caused Kimberly any present harm and that she was happy and doing well in school; nevertheless, the “physical, moral, spiritual, social, and educational environment and opportunities with the father would be far better in the long run and the child would certainly benefit. . . .” (Emphasis added.) This satisfies the sec. 767.32(2) requirement that the court’s decision be based on a finding that the change is necessary to the child’s best interest. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or base its decision on an erroneous rule of law.
As was aptly stated by the court of appeals:
The decision of the circuit court in custody matters is given great weight upon review. A custody decision is a matter peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the circuit court, which has seen the parties, had an opportunity to observe their conduct and is in a better position to determine where the best interests of the child lie than is an appellate court. The circuit court’s decision will be upset only if it is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, or represents a clear abuse of discretion, or is based on an erroneous rule of law. [Corcoran *510v. Corcoran, 109 Wis. 2d] at 43-44, 324 N.W.2d at 904-905.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in transferring custody of the parties’ child from the mother to the father, and, therefore, I would affirm.

 Section 767.32(2), Stats., provides in part: “. . . Any modification of a custody order which removes a child from the care of a parent having custody of the child shall be based on a finding that such removal is necessary to the child’s best interest as shown by substantial evidence supporting a change in custody under s. 767.24(2).”

 It is worth noting, as did the court of appeals in Corcoran, 109 Wis. 2d at 41-42, that the legislative history of sec. 247.24(2), Stats, (now sec. 767.24(2)), reveals that while the legislature was deliberating on the amendment to (2), it considered and rejected an express presumption that the child’s best interests were served by no change in custody; it lowered the standard for determining whether custody should foe changed from “essential” to “necessary” to the child’s best interest; and it moved from requiring “compelling countervailing factors” before a change of custody would be allowed to simply “substantial evidence” supporting the change.