Court Opinion

ID: 9863855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:55:26.942478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:27.165357
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, J.,
specially concurring.
¶ 17 The majority finds the statute ambiguous and therefore turns to legislative intent to interpret its meaning. I write separately because I cannot agree that the language of the statute itself is ambiguous. I concur in the result because the statement of legislative intent is quite clear, and, in such cases, I believe that intent should govern in statutory construction and application.
¶ 18 True’s eligibility for early release credits is governed by present A.R.S. §§ 41-1604.09 and 41-1604.10. The language (which the majority refers to as “limiting language”) governing application of each statute is identical and makes each statute applicable “only to persons who commit felonies before January 1, 1994.” See A.R.S. §§ 41-1604.090) and 41-1604.10(e) (emphasis added). The word “only” thus limits application to persons who committed crimes before 1994 and excludes those who committed crimes after January 1, 1994. True committed his crime before 1994. The statutes contain no language qualifying or restricting membership in the covered class to some subgroup whose crimes were committed before 1994. Because True committed his felony in 1985, it was committed “before January 1, 1994,” and the statute’s plain, unambiguous language makes its provisions applicable to him.
¶ 19 But the majority finds ambiguity because the provision in question uses the word “only” instead of “all.” The majority says:
If the legislature had instructed that each renumbered section “applies to all persons who commit felonies before January 1, 1994,” the new sections would, on their face, apply to all inmates, even those like True who were not affected by the 1990 and 1992 amendments. The limiting clause, however, while applying “only” to persons who committed felonies prior to January 1, 1994, does not expressly apply to “all” persons who committed felonies before that date. This language leaves open the possibility that the legislature did not intend to apply [the sections] to those inmates who were not governed by the 1990 and 1992 amendments.
Opinion at ¶ 12 (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added). Suppose this statute omitted both “only” and “all” and simply said it applied to “persons whose crimes were committed before 1994.” Could we say this is ambiguous?
¶ 20 The use of the word “only” does not create ambiguity but simply excludes others from the covered class. When something is said to apply to only a certain category of persons, it means that the principle applies to that category and not to others. True falls within the included category, and this unambiguously makes the statutory language applicable to him. Thus, if we were to be literalists, depending on text alone, True would be entitled to his earned release credits.
¶21 The problem, however, is that such construction destroys the statute’s clear intent. That intent is accurately described in ¶¶ 9 to 15 of part II of the majority opinion, and the details need not be repeated here. As the majority states, all versions of the legislation in question contained intent or applicability provisions:
All versions of the omnibus legislation contained intent or applicability provisions stating that the legislation applied only to persons who committed offenses after the effective date of the act. The enacted version of the intent provision clearly states that, for persons who committed offenses before January 1, 1994 [such as True], incarceration and release are to proceed as though the legislation had never passed. If the legislature had not passed the omnibus bill, the class of inmates into which True falls would have remained ineligible to earn early release credits.
Id. at ¶ 13 (citations omitted).
¶ 22 We thus have a clear ambiguity, not with respect to the statute’s language but between the language and the drafters’ clear *401intent. In my view, it would be better not to reach for some internal linguistic ambiguity but to hold simply that when the intent is clear but conflicts with statutory language, the drafters’ intent should govern. See Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980) (The “starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” (Emphasis added.)). We have followed this rule in Arizona. See Mail Boxes Etc., U.S.A. v. Industrial Comm’n, 181 Ariz. 119,121, 888 P.2d 777, 779 (1995) (“Where language is unambiguous, it is normally conclusive, absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.”) (emphasis added)(quoting State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 136 Ariz. 589, 592, 667 P.2d 1304,1307 (1983)).
¶ 23 The rule applied in Consumer Product Safety Commission and its Arizona analogues is not a radical new approach to statutory interpretation. As early as 1916, this court wrote that:
It is the spirit [the object] and purpose of a statute which are to be regarded in its interpretation, and if they find fair expression in the statute, it should be so construed as to carry out the legislative intent, even though such construction is contrary to the literal meaning of some provisions of the statute.
Deyo v. Arizona Grading & Constr. Co., 18 Ariz. 149, 154, 157 P. 371, 372-73 (1916) (quoting People v. Lacombe, 99 N.Y. 43, 1 N.E. 599 (1885)).
¶ 24 It sometimes seems that in interpreting a statute, one can reach almost any result simply by selecting the rule of construction to be applied. Thus, the Arizona Reports are full of cases in which courts have articulated all or part of some canon of construction, whether applicable or inapplicable to the case. For example, in Hayes v. Continental Insurance Co., a case written by this author, we stated that if “a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation.” 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668, 672 (1994). Hayes, however, was a case in which the language was not clear and unambiguous but, rather, susceptible to conflicting interpretations. Id.; see also cases such as State v. Riggs, 189 Ariz. 327, 333, 942 P.2d 1159, 1165 (1997); State v. Reynolds, 170 Ariz. 233, 234, 823 P.2d 681, 682 (1992); State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 269, 693 P.2d 921, 924 (1985); State v. Chavez, 172 Ariz. 102, 104, 834 P.2d 825, 827 (App.1992) (“consequence of literalism” is to enact a statute when the legislature, “had it recognized the tendency of its chosen words, would have surely undertaken to avoid” such consequence).
¶ 25 In fact, Arizona cases have long cautioned courts to reject literal statutory construction that would result in an absurdity and defeat the purpose of the statute being construed. See In re Marriage of Gray, 144 Ariz. 89, 91, 695 P.2d 1127, 1129 (1985); State v. Weible, 142 Ariz. 113, 118, 688 P.2d 1005, 1010 (1984). Nor is Arizona the only jurisdiction presenting this seeming incompatibility of cases on the subject of statutory construction. For example, while the United States Supreme Court indicated that legislative intent should govern in Consumer Product Safety Commission, it has also stated that “a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (citations omitted).
¶ 26 This and other courts have also continued to maintain what I think is the proper rule of deference to the legislature: the primary rule of construction is the legislature’s intent, and when that intent is clear, it should govern. Means v. Industrial Comm’n, 110 Ariz. 72, 74, 515 P.2d 29, 31 (1973); Ward v. Frohmiller, 55 Ariz. 202, 207, 100 P.2d 167, 169 (1940); see also Austin v. Bawett, 41 Ariz. 138, 144, 16 P.2d 12, 14-15 (1932) (when intent is clear, longstanding administrative practice provides little support for erroneous construction); Hospital Corp. of Northwest, Inc. v. Arizona Dep’t of Health Servs., 195 Ariz. 383, 384, 988 P.2d 168, 169 *402(App.l999)(citing Pickrell, 136 Ariz. at 592, 667 P.2d at 1307).
¶ 27 The words “only” and “all” are clearly synonymous within the context of §§ 41-1604.09(i) and 41-1604.10(e). Moreover, the legislature’s intent is not only apparent but manifest, as expressed in the omnibus intent provisions. See Opinion at ¶¶ 9 to 15. To disregard that clear intent in favor of rigid application of statutory prose does violence to the foundational principle of statutory construction: effect the will of the legislature.
¶ 28 Thus, we should not attempt to construe statutes in such a way as to defeat clearly ascertainable legislative intent or to reach results that are absurd in light of such intent. Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 498, 990 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1999) (“With only a few exceptions, if the language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without using other means of statutory construction”) (emphasis added); State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 314, 996 P.2d 113, 115 (App.1999); State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474, 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Western Technologies, Inc., 179 Ariz. 195, 201, 877 P.2d 294, 300 (App.1994). In construing and applying a statute, we should “consider the statute’s context; its language, subject matter, and historical background; its effects and consequences; and its spirit and purpose.” Hayes, 178 Ariz. at 268, 872 P.2d at 672. Among other things, we consider the context of the overall legislative scheme. Estate of Hernandez v. Arizona Board of Regents, 177 Ariz. 244, 866 P.2d 1330 (1994).
¶ 29 Applying the principles outlined above, and given the clear legislative intent, I readily agree with the majority’s ultimate construction of the statute and the result it reaches; however, I cannot join in the determination of ambiguity.