Court Opinion

ID: 9744484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:04:28.07637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:49.607336
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting: For the reasons set forth in my dissent in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 636 (2001), I agree with Chief Justice Harrison’s conclusion that the new supreme court rules governing capital cases should be applied retroactively. At a minimum, I again state that the issue of retroactivity should have been more fully addressed by this court following the submission of supplemental briefs. The majority concludes in this case that Faretta conclusively settles the issue of self-representation in all criminal cases, including capital cases. 204 Ill. 2d at 574. I disagree and contend that Faretta remains an open question with respect to capital cases. Not only was Faretta decided at a time when the United States Supreme Court considered the death penalty unconstitutional, but the Court has recognized that the right to self-representation is not absolute. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, 528 U.S. 152, 161, 145 L. Ed. 2d 597, 607, 120 S. Ct. 684, 691 (2000); see also United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1101-09 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J., specially concurring) (criticizing Faretta). In Martinez, the Court characterized the Faretta rationale as a balance between the right of self-representation and competing governmental interests. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 607, 120 S. Ct. at 691. In considering those interests, Martinez stated that “[e]ven at the trial level, *** the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.” (Emphasis added.) Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 607, 120 S. Ct. at 691. Equally important, Faretta does not trump the mandatory minimum requirements of our capital rules because the “status of the accused defendant, who retains a presumption of innocence throughout the trial process, changes dramatically when a jury returns a guilty verdict.” Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 607, 120 S. Ct. at 691. In a capital case, the death penalty phase is sought only after the return of a guilty verdict. Thus, Martinez recognizes that the Faretta right of self-representation may well yield to other governmental interests after a guilty verdict, including the same interests espoused by our rules to ensure reliability and fundamental fairness in capital cases. 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 3.8, 43, 411, 412, 416, 417, 701, 714. Accordingly, in view of Martinez, we should examine carefully the right to self-representation during the aggravation-mitigation phase. See also E. Rieder, Note, The Right of Self-Representation in the Capital Case, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 130, 152-54 (1985). In his concurring opinion in Martinez, Justice Breyer cites a Ninth Circuit judge’s observation that the right of self-representation frequently conflicts squarely with the constitutional right to a fair trial. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 164, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 608-09, 120 S. Ct. at 692 (Breyer, J., concurring), citing Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101-09 (Reinhardt, J., specially concurring). Specifically, Justice Breyer notes Judge Reinhardt’s observation that “the Court has never directly addressed the argument of the Faretta dissenters [Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist] that the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation would lead to unfair trials and unjust convictions.” Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1101 (Breyer, J., concurring). In Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, 149, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697-98 (1988), the Supreme Court clarified that, under certain circumstances, individual sixth amendment rights must yield to society’s interests in assuring fair trials. The Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s attempt to waive a sixth amendment right because “the institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases may be jeopardized.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 149, 108 S. Ct. at 1698. Hence, Wheat raises the open question of the extent of the conditional nature of the right of self-representation. For example, this court has an overriding obligation to protect a defendant’s rights. That obligation almost certainly goes unfulfilled when, as is often the case, a pro se defendant presents a lacking and inept defense. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 77 L. Ed. 158, 170-01, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64 (1932) (discussing the typical quality of self-representation). Fundamental fairness prevents a court from imposing the ultimate sentence of death when the court lacks the ability to discern exculpatory or mitigating facts due to inadequate self-representation. Without expressing an opinion on the propriety of the death penalty, I believe that, at a bare minimum, justice requires that we ensure that capital punishment is imposed only under appropriate circumstances. This case represents the exact kind of capital defendant whom we should not allow to represent himself. Defendant suffered from frequent and severe headaches, dizziness, and fainting spells. After his conviction, it came to light that defendant has a lodged bullet in his head. It was similarly learned that defendant suffered long-term psychological conditions and deficits. We need not conclude that defendant’s state of mind allowed for a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s failure to present existing mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase amply demonstrates the potential destructiveness of self-representation. Despite strong admonitions from the trial court, defendant capriciously effected his own inevitable death sentence. Faretta allowed the waiver of counsel conditioned upon a trial court’s determination that a defendant’s waiver is made with “ ‘eyes open.’ ” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 582, 95 S. Ct. 2545, 2541 (1975), quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 87 L. Ed. 268, 274, 63 S. Ct. 236, 242 (1942). Toward that end, we must not allow capital defendants to undertake self-representation in conflict with this court’s constitutional duties to assure a fair trial for every defendant. See Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1102 (Reinhardt, J., specially concurring). In short, I again urge that our new mandatory rules eliminate the right of self-representation in a capital case. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I express no opinion regarding the propriety of the death penalty, nor do I express any opinion in relation to the other issues raised by Chief Justice Harrison’s dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998).