Court Opinion

ID: 9949816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 17:03:37.848918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:33:38.157084
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/11/24 P. v. Zamora CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                  D082264

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. INF2000580)

 FRANCISCO URIAS ZAMORA,

            Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Alfonso Fernandez, Judge. (Retired judge of the Santa Clara Super. Ct.
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Affirmed.
          Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
      Francisco Urias Zamora was charged with (1) two counts of aggravated
sexual assault of C.G., a child under 14 years of age, based on underlying acts
of forcible sodomy and forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, § 269, subds. (a)(3)
& (4); counts 1 and 3); and (2) five counts of forcible lewd acts on C.G. (id.,
§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 2 and 4 through 7). Zamora claimed C.G. initiated
inappropriate sexual acts but adamantly denied any acts of sodomy or oral
copulation occurred. A jury convicted him of all seven charged offenses.
      Zamora claims the trial court prejudicially: (1) abused its discretion in
excluding evidence Zamora offered under Evidence Code section 782 that
C.G. had initiated certain sexual behaviors with his younger half-sister; and
(2) erred in omitting the “without consent” element from its jury instruction
on forcible sodomy. We disagree. First, we conclude the trial court properly
found any minimal probative value of the excluded evidence substantially
outweighed by Evidence Code section 352 factors, given the lack of factual
similarity between the charged incidents and the proffered evidence. Second,
even assuming the trial court’s forcible sodomy instruction was erroneous, we
find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on the uncontroverted
evidence before the jury of C.G.’s lack of consent to any act of sodomy. We
accordingly affirm.
                                         I.
      First, Zamora argues the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding
evidence C.G. had initiated sexual acts with his sister purportedly similar to
those Zamora contends C.G. initiated with him. We conclude the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence. (People v. Fontana
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 351, 370 (Fontana).)

                                         2
                                        A.
      “Evidence of the sexual conduct of a complaining witness is admissible
in a prosecution for a sex-related offense only under very strict conditions.”
(Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 362.) Such evidence is inadmissible to
prove the complaining witness’s consent but potentially admissible to attack
his or her credibility. (Evid. Code, § 1103, subds. (c)(1) & (5).) To present
such evidence, the defendant must file a motion supported by an offer of
proof. (Id., § 782, subds. (a)(1)-(2).) If adequate, the trial court must hold a
hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine if the proposed evidence is
(1) relevant and (2) inadmissible under section 352. (Id., subds. (a)(3)-(4).)
Section 352 vests the trial court with discretion to exclude relevant evidence
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . undue consumption
of time or . . . substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues,
or of misleading the jury.” (Id., § 352.) Only if the proffered evidence clears
these hurdles is it admitted. (Id., § 782, subd. (a)(4).)
      Our Supreme Court has held these provisions “represent[ ] a valid
determination that victims of sex-related offenses deserve heightened
protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of
privacy.” (Fontana, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 362.) This policy encourages the
reporting of possible sex crimes “[b]y affording victims protection in most
instances” from potentially embarrassing testimony about their sexual
history. (Id. at pp. 362, 370.) Section 782 thus should be read narrowly so
the exception does not swallow the rule. (Id. at p. 363.)
                                        B.
      Zamora filed a section 782 motion seeking to introduce two items of
evidence. The first was that C.G. had viewed pornography in the past.
Zamora argued this evidence was relevant to both (1) show C.G.’s sexual

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knowledge was not attributable to Zamora and (2) C.G.’s motive to “downplay
any of his actions” and “shift the focus” to Zamora, given C.G. had been
disciplined severely for this. The People opposed, claiming the evidence was
(1) irrelevant, as C.G. had received sex education in school, and (2) highly
prejudicial.
      Second, Zamora sought to introduce evidence that C.G. had (1) on three
occasions “held [his sister] down on the bed[ ] and attempted to touch her
vaginal area over the clothes,” and (2) once “touch[ed] her vagina over her
underwear” while she was sleeping. The sister disclosed this information in a
forensic interview following C.G.’s allegations against Zamora. Zamora again
sought to introduce this evidence for prior knowledge and motive, but
additionally “to prove conformity of character” and bolster Zamora’s
credibility. Zamora claimed the evidence corroborated his version of events
and was “an act involving moral turpitude” relevant to C.G.’s credibility. The
People contended this “extremely inflammatory” evidence was (1) “exactly
what the rape shield laws were designed to protect against” and
(2) irrelevant, as an 11-year-old child is incapable of acts of moral turpitude.
      The trial court found the pornography evidence admissible “so we don’t
have . . . jurors coming to that conclusion that where else would the alleged
victim have learned this.” As to the other evidence, the trial court stated:
“I’m not really sure it’s relevant. If it is, I’m going to disallow it coming in
under [section] 352 of the Evidence Code because there’s a substantial danger
of it confusing the issues or misleading the jury. And it almost seems like it’s
going out on a tangent of some sort.”
                                         C.
      We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in questioning
the relevance of the proffered evidence to C.G.’s credibility. To be admissible,

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the complaining witness’s prior sexual acts must be “similar to the acts of
which the defendant stands accused.” (People v. Daggett (1990)
225 Cal.App.3d 751, 757.) C.G.’s minor sister claimed C.G. attempted to, and
once did, touch her clothed genitalia with his hand. These acts bear no
similarity to those charged against Zamora, including forcing C.G. to touch
and masturbate Zamora’s unclothed penis, forcing C.G. to orally copulate
him, and forcibly sodomizing C.G. Even were we to compare the sister’s
allegations with Zamora’s version of events, we agree with the People that
any similarity is superficial. There is a significant difference between a
preadolescent boy initiating sexual contact between his hand and a clothed
minor female’s genitalia and the same boy initiating sexual contact with his
own genitalia, including without clothing, with a grown man and father
figure by physically forcing the adult’s hand. (See Diaz v. SATF-SP,
Corcoran CA (E.D. Cal., June 18, 2014, No. 1:12-CV-00399 JLT) 2014
WL 2767392, at pp. *11-*13.) The trial court implicitly and correctly found
the relevance of this testimony minimal at best.
      We further determine the trial court correctly excluded the evidence
under section 352, as significant countervailing concerns far outweighed any
minimal probative value. Zamora claims “[t]he evidence was not likely to
confuse or mislead the jury,” as its source was not suspect, the People did not
argue its falsity, and it “would not require a mini-trial.” According to
Zamora, the evidence would require, at most, (1) cross-examining three
witnesses already called as witnesses: C.G., his mother, and the social
worker who interviewed C.G. and his siblings; (2) calling the sister; and
(3) calling the social worker who interviewed the sister about the disclosure.
We cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in finding this unduly
time-consuming in a trial spanning eight court days, including five of

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testimony. The risk of confusion was also great given the tangential
relevance of the evidence, as already explained. The trial court’s stated
reasons alone thus justified exclusion.
      While Zamora notes the trial court did not expressly rely on prejudice,
“[w]e review the trial court’s decision, not its reasoning, and will affirm the
trial court’s order if it reached the correct result.” (People v. Accredited
Surety & Casualty Co. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 185, 190.) Prejudice was the
People’s main reason for requesting exclusion, and both parties briefed
prejudice on appeal. The evidence’s significant prejudice to C.G. and his
minor sister further justified exclusion. As the People argue, jurors could
have drawn a negative inference unrelated to credibility about C.G.’s
character from this evidence that could adversely impact the verdict. More
fundamentally, the policy underlying the rape shield law—to safeguard
victims’ privacy—is relevant to the prejudice inquiry. (Fontana, supra,
49 Cal.4th at p. 370.) Here, not only was C.G.’s privacy interest at risk, but
also that of his minor sister. This further confirms the court’s sound exercise
of its discretion.
      Ultimately, the trial court did not exclude wholesale the evidence
relevant to Zamora’s defense such that his right to present a defense was
violated. (People v. Mestas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1517.) The court
partially granted Zamora’s motion, admitting the pornography evidence.
Further, Zamora had ample opportunity to attack C.G.’s credibility during
cross-examination. Zamora’s counsel probed C.G.’s possible motive to lie and
the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in his testimony, hammering
these points during closing argument. On this record, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion.

                                          6
                                       II.
      Second, Zamora claims the trial court prejudicially erred in omitting
from the jury instruction on forcible sodomy the element that the victim did
not consent. Whether lack of consent is an element of certain sex offenses
involving minors is unsettled. (See People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d
248, 257 [consent in child sex offenses a question of fact]; People v. Soto
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 247-248 [minors lack capacity to consent to sexual acts
regardless of their actual state of mind].) But even assuming instructional
error of federal constitutional dimension, we determine it harmless under

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).1
                                       A.
      As relevant here, Penal Code section 286 declares it a crime for a
person to “commit[ ] an act of sodomy with another person who is under
14 years of age when the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by
means of force[ or] duress.” (Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c)(2)(B).) The standard
jury instruction includes three elements: (1) an act of sodomy, (2) “[t]he other
person did not consent to the act,” and, pertinent to this matter, (3) the act
was accomplished by force or duress. (CALCRIM No. 1030.) At the People’s
request and over Zamora’s objection, the trial court’s jury instruction omitted
the second element on the basis a minor lacks the capacity to legally consent.

1     As we assume error occurred, we need not address Zamora’s claim that
the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument about the quantum of
force necessary for forcible sodomy failed to cure this error. Nonetheless, we
note Zamora is mistaken that the prosecutor wrongly defined “force,” as it
has a common meaning in the sodomy statute. (People v. Griffin (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1015, 1024-1028.) For the same reason, we need not address
Zamora’s arguments on alternative theory error.
                                        7
      Under Chapman, “[w]e review the evidence in the light most favorable
to the defendant” without “reweigh[ing] the evidence or resolv[ing]
evidentiary conflicts.” (People v. Madrigal (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 219, 243.)
Where a jury instruction omits an element of the offense, “[e]ven when the
prosecution’s case is strong, the error is not harmless if the record contains
evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding.” (Ibid.) In other
words, such instructional error is harmless if “the omitted element was
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error.” (Neder v. United States
(1999) 527 U.S. 1, 17.)
                                         B.
      The jury was presented with two accounts of the incident underlying
count 1: C.G.’s and Zamora’s.
      The jury heard two versions of C.G.’s account: (1) his trial testimony
and (2) the videorecording of his second forensic interview. During the
forensic interview, C.G. said Zamora, in the middle of the night, entered the
bedroom C.G. and his brother shared. C.G. was sleeping on the bed, and his
brother, “a deep sleeper,” was on a trundle bed. C.G. awoke when he heard
his bed creak and Zamora call him by his nickname. Zamora got into the bed
next to C.G. and took C.G.’s shorts off. C.G. tried to pull them back on, but
Zamora prevented him. Zamora took out his own “private part” and started
rubbing it on C.G.’s bottom. He lifted one of C.G.’s “butt cheeks” with his
hand. Zamora was “tryin’ to put his private part in” C.G.’s anus. It went in
“[a] little bit,” and Zamora “tr[ied] to put more in.” C.G. said it felt “cold”
because of the air conditioning. C.G. “turned around . . . real quick” and put
his shorts back on to stop the encounter. C.G. denied ever “ask[ing] or
sa[ying] something to [Zamora] about wanting to” engage in any such

                                         8
conduct. C.G.’s trial testimony was largely consistent. His memory was
clearer at the time of his forensic interview, but the transcript refreshed his
recollection. Using a water bottle and a tissue box, C.G. demonstrated that
the tip of Zamora’s penis went inside his anus for “about a second before
[C.G.] turned around.” C.G. did not “want that to happen.”
      Meanwhile, the jury heard Zamora’s account via a videorecording of his
police interview. Zamora claimed he was awake in bed with C.G.’s mother at
night. C.G. climbed into the bed and under the blanket, and C.G.’s mother
left the room. Zamora hugged C.G., who “grabbed [Zamora’s] hand so that
[Zamora would] grab [C.G.].” Zamora tried to move away, but C.G. moved
closer. Zamora felt C.G. pull his boxers down, but they had no skin-to-skin
contact because they “only hugged” “[f]rom a distance.” Zamora asked, “‘Are
you sure about what you want to do?’” C.G. nodded, and Zamora left the
room. He was adamant he “didn’t do anything to [C.G.]” after C.G. pulled
down his boxers. He said if he “would’ve wanted to” “‘[p]ut it in [C.G.]’” he
“would’ve done it,” “[b]ut [he] didn’t.”
      The People introduced evidence that child victims of sexual abuse:
frequently delay disclosing abuse, if they disclose it at all; initially may reveal
only portions of the abuse; sometimes require a second forensic interview;
and may struggle to recall or sequentially recount abuse given their trauma.
C.G. had an initial interview in May 2020, during which he disclosed the
incidents underlying counts 5 through 7. During a second interview a month
later, he disclosed the sodomy and oral copulation incidents. C.G. “didn’t tell
[the interviewer] . . . the complete . . . story” the first time, but what he said
previously was “completely true.”
      During closing arguments, Zamora’s counsel focused on undermining
C.G.’s credibility. He argued the “physical unlikelihood” of and

                                           9
inconsistencies in C.G.’s testimony as to all the charged acts, not simply the
sodomy count. As to the sodomy incident specifically, Zamora’s counsel
questioned how Zamora could have accomplished the act without waking
anyone and without C.G.’s mother noticing. Zamora’s counsel also
questioned how C.G. could have stopped a forcible encounter by simply
“roll[ing] over” and how “Zamora’s erect penis” could be “cold.” More
generally, Zamora’s counsel suggested C.G. had “a strong motivation” to deny
initiating the acts, having been grounded for viewing pornography. Further,
were Zamora guilty, he would “have flown the coop” rather than meet C.G.
and his mother at the police station to be interviewed. Consent was not
mentioned.
      The People also did not address consent in closing. They focused on
Zamora’s motive to lie and C.G.’s lack of motive. They noted Zamora’s
answers changed over his police interview while C.G.’s story was consistent
despite his embarrassment and plausible lapses in memory.
      The jury was then instructed that the testimony of a single witness can
prove a fact, on how to weigh and assess the credibility of evidence, and on
how to use circumstantial evidence in determining Zamora’s guilt. The jurors
repeatedly were admonished it was the People’s burden to prove Zamora’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
      After two hours of deliberation and no substantive questions, the jury
convicted Zamora of all the charged counts, rejecting the lesser included
offenses.
                                       C.
      On this record, we “conclude[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt” that the
trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that lack of consent was an element of
count 1 “did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th

                                       10
1172, 1201.) Contrary to Zamora’s claims, even if the given instruction did
not require the jury to affirmatively find Zamora sodomized C.G. against his
will, it is indisputable that, given the evidence and verdicts, the jury would
have so found had it been properly instructed. (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th
562, 592.)
      The evidence presented to the jury was that Zamora either (1) never
sodomized C.G. at all or (2) sodomized C.G. despite his unequivocal
unwillingness. C.G. clearly expressed he (1) did not want the sodomy to
happen and (2) almost immediately stopped it by physically turning over to
interrupt the act. Zamora’s defense, meanwhile, focused solely on disproving
the first element of forcible sodomy, the act itself, without addressing the
second element of lack of consent. Thus, despite Zamora’s claims to the
contrary, there was no evidence introduced to support an intermediate
scenario in which Zamora sodomized C.G. with C.G.’s consent. Zamora is
correct that jurors are “not limited to accepting” or “reject[ing] a witness’s
testimony in full.” But a jury is limited by the evidence before it. Here, a
finding of consensual sodomy would require speculating that something “in
between” what was presented to the jury had occurred. Such
unsubstantiated “‘mere possible doubt’” is not reasonable doubt. (Pen. Code,
§ 1096.)
      We are not persuaded by the People’s claim that the jury necessarily
decided C.G.’s lack of consent by convicting Zamora of count 3 (aggravated
assault premised on forcible oral copulation). As Zamora notes, the oral
copulation and sodomy incidents were distinct acts; thus, the jury’s finding of
no consent in the one instance does not necessarily carry over to the other.
Nonetheless, given the speed with which the jury found Zamora guilty of all
the charged offenses, it universally credited C.G.’s version of events over

                                       11
Zamora’s. The unambiguous evidence of C.G.’s lack of consent,
uncontradicted by any conflicting evidence, establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt the jury would have convicted Zamora of count 1 even had it been
instructed that lack of consent was an element of the crime. And as C.G. did
not consent, any force beyond that required for the act itself was force
overcoming his will.
      Accordingly, we conclude any error in the trial court’s failure to instruct
the jury that lack of consent is an element of count 1 was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Given the evidence before it, the jury, properly instructed,
would have reached the same result.
                                      III.
      We affirm.

                                                                  CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.

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