Court Opinion

ID: 9568192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:01:18.40351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:26.034011
License: Public Domain

Harshbarger, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
The majority today does not reject the family purpose doctrine. It reaffirms it for West Virginia.1 What it does, is limit it unnecessarily and I believe, unwisely.
Our Court supports the public policy underlying the rule as articulated in Watson v. Burley, 105 W. Va. 416, 420, 143 S.E. 95, 96 (1928):
A moving consideration for this adoption [of the family purpose doctrine] was to place “the financial responsibility of the owner behind the automobile while it is being used by a member of the family, who is likely to be financially irresponsible.” Should we not give to the word “family” a comprehensive definition in order to meet the practical purpose behind the adoption of this doctrine?
Watson defined an appropriate “family purpose” liability test - “[N]ot whether the child is adult or minor, but whether he was using the car for a purpose for which the parent provided it with the permission of the parent *398either express or implied.” Id., at 421, 143 S.E. at 97. In Freeland v. Freeland, 152 W. Va. 332, 162 S.E.2d 922 (1968), Justice Caplan explained:
[T]he family purpose doctrine is founded on the principles of the law of agency or of master and servant. Where one purchases and maintains an automobile for the comfort, convenience, pleasure, entertainment and recreation of his family, any member thereof operating the automobile will be regarded as an agent or servant of the owner, and such owner will be held liable in damages for injuries sustained by a third person by reason of the negligent operation of the vehicle by such agent or servant. The family member is carrying out the purpose for which the automobile was provided. Were not liability incurred by the owner of the automobile in such circumstances, an innocent victim of the negligence of a financially irresponsible driver would be entirely without recourse. This could not be condoned.
“This doctrine puts the financial responsibility of the owner behind the automobile while it is being used by a member of the family (who is likely to be financially irresponsible), in furtherance of the business and purposes for which it is maintained.” From the reasoning employed in the Jones case, supra, as noted in Watson v. Burley, 105 W.Va. 416, 143 S.E. 95, 64 A.L.R. 839, it is evident that the Court will require the owner of an automobile to be financially responsible for the operation of such automobile by a member of his family. In the latter case the owner was liable even though the member of his family operating the vehicle was an adult. Public policy requires financial responsibility from one who permits his automobile to be used for its intended purpose. Justice demands such responsibility—lest an innocent victim be left remediless. Id. at 336-337, 162 S.E.2d, at 925-926.
*399See Burns v. Main, (D.C. Alaska 1950) 87 F. Supp. 705; Hutchins v. Haffner, 63 Colo. 365, 167 P. 966 (1917); Michaelsohn v. Smith, 113 N.W.2d 571, 8 A.L.R.3d 1183 (N.D. 1962); King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918).
Here, we have an innocent victim; we have a family car or truck; we have a father (owner) who permitted his family car to be used by a family member (his son). A family is a family whether its members live together or not. A son does not become merely a “friend” because he lives in another house-or even in another country-or has a job. Contra, Marques v. Ross, 105 Ga. App. 133, 123 S.E.2d 412 (1961); Daniel v. Patrick, _ Ky. _, 333 S.W.2d 504 (1960).
In our transient, dispersed society, families are often divided by divorce, by distant educational and job opportunities: many parents do not enjoy the live-in or close company of their driving-age children. When their children come “home” or to visit, parents frequently give them unrestricted use of the family car for their pleasure. If- a family member is financially irresponsible (the only instance when the doctrine is important) and negligently uses the family car injuring an innocent third party, there exists the very situation to which the doctrine was devised to apply. See White v. Varanda, 13 N.C. App. 19, 185 S.E.2d 247, 251 (1971). We should not look to age, self-sufficiency or residence of the parties-we should only determine that there is a family car, and that it was used by a family member with its owner’s permission.
If the doctrine were intended to cover only persons in the same household, it would be called the “same household” doctrine. It is not. Nor is it called the “dependent party” doctrine or “unemancipated child” one. “Family” means “family” and a family does not lose that quality through years, distance or financial independence.2
*400I see no reason to hold that the family purpose doctrine does not apply. I would reverse the summary judgment and permit the issues of liability and damages to be adjudicated.

 We are aware that many jurisdictions have rejected the doctrine entirely. See Annot., Modern Status of Family Purpose Doctrine with respect to motor vehicles, 8 A.L.R.3d 1191, 1221, §13. Most of these states have “owner liability” statutes, however, that hold vehicle owners liable for the negligence of any driver of their cars.

 We note that when the child is financially responsible, joint liability will not “hurt” the parent. If the child is financially irresponsible, the parent or family member, rather than the innocent tort victim, should bear the cost of that child’s negligent use of a family motor vehicle.