Court Opinion

ID: 9398235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 17:01:30.292569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.830159
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     MAY 30 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHERYL BISHOP,                                   No.    22-35139

                  Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01375-RSM

     v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General; et al.,

                  Defendants-Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Washington
                     Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted February 14, 2023
                                Seattle, Washington

Before: PAEZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and LIBURDI,** District Judge.
Partial Dissent by Judge PAEZ.

          Cheryl Bishop appeals the district court’s order excluding evidence and

granting summary judgment against her three Title VII discrimination claims. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
 The Honorable Michael T. Liburdi, United States District Judge for the District of
Arizona, sitting by designation.
      Bishop argues that the district court abused its discretion in excluding

evidence of conduct from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

(ATF) and Brad Devlin’s conduct occurring before the 2019 settlement agreement.

We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, reversing only “if the exercise

of discretion is both erroneous and prejudicial.” Wagner v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 747

F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2013).

      In response to ATF’s motion for summary judgment, Bishop relied on various

facts predating the 2019 settlement. The district court concluded that, although these

facts could serve as background, relying on these pre-settlement facts to state a claim

would violate the parties’ settlement agreement and would “allow Bishop to simply

relitigate claims she has already settled.” The court also denied Bishop’s motion to

strike ATF’s argument that the court disregard pre-settlement facts.

      Bishop argues that ATF failed to raise the exclusion of this evidence in its

motion for summary judgment and thus forfeited the issue. But ATF sufficiently

raised the point in its motion, quoting the settlement agreement and analyzing only

post-settlement conduct.

      Bishop also argues that Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp. allows

the pre-settlement conduct to be considered as evidence of “the existence of a pattern

or scheme.” 656 F.2d 1295, 1300–01 (9th Cir. 1981). But her settlement agreement

clearly forecloses the success of any claim “growing out of [Bishop’s] employment

                                          2
to date” with ATF or “arising out of” the litigation that resulted in settlement. And

our decision in Dosier, which considered how res judicata affected the use of pre-

settlement conduct, does not govern here, where the settlement agreement bars

claims based on pre-settlement conduct. See id. at 1298–99. The district court did

not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence or denying Bishop’s motion to

strike.

          Nor did the district court err in granting summary judgment against Bishop’s

Title VII claims. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to determine

whether there is any “genuine dispute of material fact after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Henry v. Adventist Health Castle

Med. Ctr., 970 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

          First, the court did not err in granting summary judgment against Bishop’s

disparate treatment claim. To succeed on a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff

must show that she suffered an “adverse employment action.” Campbell v. Haw.

Dep’t of Educ., 892 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2018). “[A]n adverse employment

action is one that ‘materially affects the compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment.’” Id. (quotation omitted). The district court correctly

concluded that Bishop did not suffer adverse employment action, reasoning that the

“words [in the email], spoken by a former supervisor and shared widely, did not

                                            3
result in any material change to Ms. Bishop’s compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment.”

      Bishop argues that ATF subjected her to an adverse employment action by not

“correct[ing] the misimpression [Devlin] had created,” because the email caused her

to “experience[] chilly, isolating hostility” from her coworkers and “tended to

undermine her team’s confidence in her.” But chilly treatment from coworkers is

not an adverse employment action. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.

742, 761 (1998). And although Bishop speculates that ATF created a “physically

dangerous workplace” for her by undermining her team’s confidence in her, she

offers only one occasion where she claims she felt unsafe. That occasion was when,

sometime after the email, her team allegedly “disregarded her orders” in the field.

But she provides no evidence that the agents had read Devlin’s email or that their

alleged disobedience was in any way connected to the email. Moreover, in the two

and a half years after the email before her retirement in May 2021, Bishop received

bonuses and a promotion. Bishop fails to show any adverse employment action for

her disparate treatment claim.1 We affirm summary judgment against her disparate

treatment claim.

1
 Nor did the district court preclude Bishop from offering direct or circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory motive and require Bishop to use the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework, as Bishop argues.

                                        4
      Second, the court did not err in granting summary judgment against Bishop’s

hostile work environment claim. To succeed on a hostile work environment claim,

a plaintiff must show that she was subject to unwelcome conduct that was

“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions” of her employment and

“create an abusive working environment.” McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d

1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Bishop fails to present evidence of

any adverse effects of the email, other than perceived ostracism from her coworkers

and her opinion that the email had tarnished her reputation. This falls short of

conduct that was sufficiently “severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions” of her

employment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (cleaned

up). She also argues that, like in her disparate treatment claim, her safety was

endangered by the email. But she again fails to tie any claimed endangerment to the

email. We affirm summary judgment against her hostile work environment claim.

      Third, the court did not err in granting summary judgment against Bishop’s

retaliation claim. To succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show she

suffered a “materially adverse” employment action. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.

Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). That requirement is met when a plaintiff shows

that the “challenged action … well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from

making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. (cleaned up). The district

                                         5
court concluded that Bishop failed to show an adverse employment action

supporting her retaliation claim.

      Bishop fails to offer evidence of an adverse employment action. She spends

much of her attention on the email itself—but ATF did not send the email, one of

her coworkers did.2 Bishop argues that ATF can be liable for the email because ATF

“ratified” the email through its inaction. But even assuming ATF could be liable for

ratifying retaliatory conduct by its employees in some contexts, ATF did not ratify

this email through inaction. Darek Pleasants, Devlin’s supervisor, referred the

matter to ATF’s Internal Affairs Division for investigation, which referred the matter

to the Department of Justice’s Office of Inspector General, which then referred the

matter back to Internal Affairs, which finally referred the matter back to Pleasants.

By the time the matter had returned to Pleasants for his action, Devlin had retired.

ATF’s decision to take no further action following Devlin’s retirement did not ratify

the email through inaction.3 See Campbell, 892 F.3d at 1017. Nor has Bishop shown

2
  The dissent points out that Devlin sent the email to more than one person and that
the email was forwarded to additional people. Regardless of how many received it,
however, it was still one email.
3
  The dissent criticizes the sufficiency of this investigation because, inter alia, ATF
refused to send out a follow-up email “unless Bishop would agree to waive her legal
claims.” But the fact that ATF offered to send out another email if Bishop waived
her claim does not imply that ATF believed such an email was legally necessary.
Indeed, the Assistant Director of Field Operations testified he thought such an action
was inappropriate because it would draw more “attention to the email.” The dissent

                                          6
that ATF supervisors “ratified” the email by forwarding it, especially because

Bishop does not provide evidence that any supervisor with authority over her

endorsed the content of the email by forwarding it. Id.

      The dissent would conclude that, unless ATF censored Devlin or Devlin’s

coworkers for sending, forwarding, and responding to the email, it is liable for the

email’s contents and consequences. But ATF did not ratify the email. It instead

took reasonable action given the context and content of the email.4 Bishop had

accused Devlin of racism in her initial lawsuit against ATF; Devlin responded to that

charge by explaining in an email to his coworkers his position that he did not believe

his actions were motivated by racism.5 His email may have ignored basic principles

of tact and civility, but it was nonetheless an act of self-defense against a charge of

also emphasizes that although Devlin’s supervisor claims he admonished Devlin,
Devlin disputed this admonishment ever occurred. Although the dissent is correct
that this is a disputed fact, it is an immaterial dispute because the resolution of that
fact is unnecessary to our decision.
4
  The dissent charges us with adopting two “internally inconsistent holdings,” but in
so arguing the dissent misrepresents our reasoning. We do not claim that “ATF had
no obligation to act at all”—that is, that the ATF had “no obligation” to investigate.
The ATF did investigate the email, and we conclude its investigation was reasonable.
And, given the context, we conclude its ultimate decision following its investigation
to not further “address” the email through affirmative action was also reasonable.
There is no inconsistency.
5
 For example, Devlin explained that the reason he had a swastika tattoo was because
of an undercover assignment in an Aryan Biker Club, a club that required the tattoo.
After the assignment concluded, the agency refused to pay the substantial sum
required to remove the tattoo.

                                           7
racism. In situations like this, our sister circuits have concluded that “[a] person or

entity accused of discrimination must be allowed to defend himself or itself” and

have explained that those accused of discrimination “can explain their denials of

discrimination allegations without fear that those denials might create additional

liability.” Dixon v. Int’l Brotherhood of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 84 (1st Cir.

2007) (noting that “[t]here are limits on what speech can be proscribed as

retaliatory”); Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 697 (4th Cir. 2018).

This is especially true here, given that federal agencies, just as much as courts, are

entitled to take First Amendment concerns into account. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 1331

(requiring federal elected or appointed officials swear or affirm that they will

“support and defend the Constitution of the United States”).

      Although those cases distinguish between “defending oneself … and

threatening, intimidating, or otherwise interfering with someone’s right to pursue a

discrimination claim,” Devlin’s email was clearly defensive and not—contrary to

the dissent’s characterization—a threat, an act of intimidation, or interference with

Bishop’s right to pursue a discrimination claim. Feminist Majority Found., 911 F.3d

at 697 (alteration in original) (quoting Dixon, 504 F.3d at 84). Bishop’s original

claim against Devlin was that he engaged in racist misconduct. Although the dissent

notes that Devlin “questioned Bishop’s motives for engaging in protected activity,

criticized her settlement with ATF for discrimination charges, and insulted her

                                          8
character,” those were the precise means by which Devlin defended himself against

Bishop’s charge of racism. For example, Devlin admitted that—as reported by a

local newspaper—he had called Bishop a “trainwreck,” but he argued that the

criticism was “never based on [Bishop’s] race.” Instead, he said he called her that

“based on her incompetence as an agent and lack of investigative experience.” No

one is defending the way that Devlin defended himself. But attempting to explain

that prior actions were supposedly rooted in legitimate criticisms and not racially

motivated is not—as the dissent claims—going “far beyond self-defense” against a

charge of racism. See id. at 698 (“The fact that a response to a discrimination

complaint calls into question the credibility of the complainants … does not make

the response a materially adverse retaliatory action.”).

      Given that the First Amendment ordinarily entitles individuals to defend

against public charges of misconduct, it makes sense that Title VII does not require

employers to censor their employees’ defensive speech. See Mulligan v. Nichols,

835 F.3d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Th[e] marketplace of ideas is undermined if

public officials are prevented from responding to speech of citizens with speech of

their own.” (citation omitted)); see also Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d

638, 646 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes

conduct “incidental to the prosecution of [a] suit” so as to “preserve the breathing

space required for the effective exercise of the rights the Petition Clause protects”

                                          9
(cleaned up)). Accordingly, ATF acted reasonably and its mere inaction in declining

to censor an employee’s protected speech does not serve to ratify such speech. The

dissent’s approach would require employers to muzzle employees who attempt to

defend themselves against public charges of misconduct. We ought not take that

path, and we do not take it in this case.6

      And again, assuming arguendo that ATF could be liable for what harm came

from its response to the email—not from the email itself—Bishop must still show

that a reasonable person in her position would not have filed the initial lawsuit

because ATF responded as it did. See Campbell, 892 F.3d at 1021. She has made

6
  The dissent accuses us of “conjur[ing] a First Amendment issue out of thin air,”
violating the party-presentation principle. But recall that the reason the First
Amendment is relevant here is to determine whether ATF ratified the email through
inaction. ATF argued in its answering brief that Bishop’s focus on Devlin’s email
was misplaced because ATF did not send the email. Bishop replied by arguing that
ATF is liable for retaliation because it ratified the email—an argument that does not
appear in her opening brief. It does not violate the party-presentation principle to
explain why ATF is correct that it is not liable for Devlin’s email and, in the process,
reject Bishop’s ratification argument raised for the first time in her reply brief. See
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (noting that the role
of the court is to decide the “questions presented by the parties” (quotation omitted));
see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Airlines Div. v. Allegiant Air, LLC, 788 F.3d 1080,
1090 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We have discretion to consider an issue raised in a reply brief
where, as here, an appellee raised an issue in its brief.”). Moreover, contrary to what
might be inferred from the dissent’s exposition on the government’s ability to
regulate speech, we offer no conclusion on whether ATF would have violated the
First Amendment if it had censored Devlin. We conclude only that this government
agency’s decision not to censor Devlin was reasonable given the obvious First
Amendment concerns at play. It is thus the dissent, in opining on whether ATF
could have censored Devlin in some hypothetical world where it did so, that
“conjures a First Amendment issue out of thin air.”

                                             10
no such showing. She contends that she was humiliated, that “[h]er peers ignored

her and avoided her,” and she speculates that her team lost trust in her as a leader.

These claimed consequences do not rise to the level of a materially adverse

employment action.     See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68

(distinguishing materially adverse actions from “trivial harms”). Although she

repeats her claim that her physical safety was endangered in a mission because her

team was disobedient, she still fails to show that this disobedience was retaliatory or

attributable to the email. The dissent’s view that Bishop suffered a materially

adverse employment action focuses on its judgment that the “act” itself was

“material,” ignoring Bishop’s lack of any material consequences.

      The dissent marshals a host of cases in an apparent effort to prove that we are

wrong for affirming the district court’s dismissal of Bishop’s retaliation claim. The

dissent points out that the majority of our sister circuits have “held that retaliatory

harassment, including coworker harassments, can rise to the level of material

adversity.” Feminist Majority Found., 911 F.3d at 694 (emphasis added). But we

have assumed it is true that retaliatory harassment “can rise to the level of material

adversity.” Id. We instead conclude that ATF is not liable for Devlin’s email

because ATF did not ratify the email, and we have concluded that the consequences

of ATF’s response to the email do not amount to a materially adverse employment

action. If the dissent intended to point its army of cases at these two conclusions,

                                          11
they are irrelevant. None of those cases hold that a government agency ratifies its

employee’s conduct when it declines to censor that employee’s attempt to defend

himself against a charge of serious misconduct, nor do they require holding that the

consequences of ATF’s response in this case amounted to a materially adverse

employment action.

      We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                        12
                                                                           FILED
Bishop v. Garland, No. 22-35139
                                                                           MAY 30 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
Paez, J., dissenting in part:                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

      I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the evidentiary rulings, the hostile

work environment claim, and the disparate treatment claim. I respectfully dissent,

however, from the majority’s decision to affirm summary judgment on Bishop’s

retaliation claim.

      1. In rejecting Bishop’s challenge to the disposition of her retaliation claim,

the majority disregards the evidentiary record to reach its conclusion. This case

did not involve one lone email sent by a disgruntled coworker. Rather, Bishop’s

coworker, Brad Devlin, sent copies of the email to 150 colleagues and partners at

law enforcement agencies around the country. The email, among other things,

called Bishop a “trainwreck,” denigrated her work ethic, and suggested that she

manufactured previous claims of racial discrimination as a strategy to recover

damages against the government. The email was then forwarded widely to new

recipients in and outside of ATF for almost two more years, without any attempt

by ATF leadership to stop its spread. In fact, ATF supervisors forwarded the email

themselves—Monique Villegas, Special Agent in Charge of the Arizona Field

Division, responded directly to the email, “Amen, brother!” and then forwarded it

to dozens of her subordinates. Other supervisors took similar actions.

                                         1
      To defend ATF’s response, the majority adopts two separate and internally

inconsistent holdings. First, the majority holds that ATF “took reasonable action”

to address the email because a supervisor, Darek Pleasants, initiated a formal

investigation. But Bishop has submitted compelling evidence disputing the

legitimacy of that investigation, which the majority fails to view in her favor. See

Sandvik v. Alaska Packers Ass’n, 609 F.2d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 1979). There is

evidence that ATF refused to send out a corrective email or admonish employees

not to spread the email unless Bishop would agree to waive her legal claims.

Indeed, Deputy Assistant Director John Durastanti, a high-ranking ATF official,

admitted that ATF considered sending out a “notice to the workforce on behalf of

[Bishop],” but “no action was taken pending a negotiated resolution of [her EEO

complaint].” Furthermore, Bishop asserted, and ATF officials admitted, that they

never contacted her about the email, interviewed any witnesses, or even conducted

a formal interview of Devlin about the incident. While Pleasants claimed that he

verbally admonished Devlin, (which would have constituted the only discipline

Devlin ever received), Devlin testified at his deposition that Pleasants never told

him the email was inappropriate or ordered him not to share it further. All of this

evidence directly contradicts the majority’s conclusion that ATF acted reasonably.

By dismissing every disputed fact as irrelevant, the majority takes the illogical

                                          2
position that any investigation ATF undertook was reasonable—regardless of the

steps that investigation entailed, or whether those steps even occurred.

      Pivoting from ATF’s actions, the majority adopts a second, contradictory

holding: that ATF had no obligation to act at all because Devlin’s email constituted

First Amendment protected speech. It is unclear why the majority conjures a First

Amendment issue out of thin air. Because ATF has never claimed that Devlin’s

email was an act of free speech, neither party briefed this issue. By raising a First

Amendment issue on its own volition, the majority violates the principle of party

presentation. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S.Ct. 1575, 1579, 1581-82

(2020) (citation omitted).

      On the merits, the majority is wrong. The First Amendment does not

guarantee employees a right to use their workplace emails for “act[s] of self

defense against charge[s] of racism.” To the contrary, “the Supreme Court has

recognized that the government may impose ‘certain restraints on the speech of its

employees’ that would be ‘unconstitutional if applied to the general public.’”

Riley’s Am. Heritage Farms v. Elsasser, 32 F.4th 707, 720 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing

City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam)). Because the

government has a more significant interest “in regulating the speech of its

employees” than the “speech of the citizenry in general,” id. (citation omitted), the

First Amendment only protects employee speech “on matters of public concern,
                                          3
typically matters concerning government policies that are of interest to the public

at large.” City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 81; see also Pickering v. Board of Ed. of

Twp. High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1968). Even then,

the government can impose restrictions by demonstrating “that its legitimate

administrative interests in . . . avoiding workplace disruption outweigh” the

employee’s free speech rights. Riley’s Am. Heritage Farms, 32 F.4th at 721

(citation omitted) (describing the Pickering balancing test).

      Brushing aside these principles, the majority jumps to the unfounded

conclusion that Devlin’s email was “protected speech.” It was not. As a threshold

matter, “speech by public employees addressing individual personnel disputes and

grievances is not” speech related to public concern under the First Amendment.

McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983); see City of San

Diego, 543 U.S. at 82-83 (describing the public concern test as a “threshold

inquiry”). Tellingly, the majority fails to cite any cases recognizing an employee’s

First Amendment right to rebut allegations of racism. The two cases the majority

cites do not rely on the First Amendment nor categorize such speech as

constitutionally protected. See Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674,

697 (4th Cir. 2018); Dixon v. Int’l Bhd. Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 84 (1st Cir.

                                          4
2007). The majority attempts to justify ATF’s failure to act by invoking “First

Amendment concerns” that do not exist. 1

      And even if, in some contexts, employees maintain a right to defend

themselves against charges of misconduct, Devlin’s email went far beyond self-

defense. He questioned Bishop’s motives for engaging in protected activity,

criticized her settlement with ATF for discrimination charges, and insulted her

character. The contents of the email were sufficiently offensive that ATF counsel

believed Devlin might have violated ATF’s policy against harassment in the

workplace. As Dixon explains, “[t]here is an important difference between

defending oneself, on the one hand, and threatening, intimidating, or otherwise

interfering with someone's right to pursue a discrimination claim on the other.”

504 F.3d at 84. A person denying a charge of discrimination does not have a “safe

harbor . . . for any and all sort of speech in response.” Id. Here, Devlin “did not

limit his comments to defending” his own conduct, but rather “turned on” Bishop

and launched unjustified attacks against her while “encouraging her colleagues to

1
 The majority says that it offers no conclusion on whether “ATF would have
violated the First Amendment if it had censored Devlin,” but only that it was
“reasonable” for ATF “not to censor Devlin . . . given the obvious First
Amendment concerns at play.” Mem. 11 n.6. But the majority misses the point:
there are no “First Amendment concerns at play” because Devlin’s email is not
First Amendment speech. The majority simply assumes that the First Amendment
applies and that some vague “concerns” exist, while ignoring all of the caselaw
that governs free speech rights in this context.
                                           5
stand against her as well.” Id. at 84. The law provides no protection for such

speech, and nothing the majority cites counsels otherwise.

2.     The majority’s decision is also wrong on Title VII grounds. ATF’s failure

to intervene in the face of coworker harassment can constitute an adverse

employment action under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. As background, the

Supreme Court has adopted a broad interpretation of adverse employment actions

in the antiretaliation context. To prevail on a retaliation claim, one must only show

that a challenged action is materially adverse, meaning it “could well dissuade a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). As the Court

explained, “a limited construction” of the antiretaliation provision “would not deter

the many forms that effective retaliation can take.” Id. at 64. Hence,

“[i]nterpreting the antiretaliation provision to provide broad protection from

retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act's

primary objective depends.” Id. at 67.

      Here, ATF allowed a disparaging email to spread unchecked for two years,

in direct response to an employee’s claims of racial discrimination. A reasonable

jury could conclude that ATF’s inaction “could well dissuade” a worker from

making a discrimination charge. Indeed, “[a] clear majority of our sister circuits

have . . . held that retaliatory harassment, including coworker harassment, can rise
                                          6
to the level of material adversity.” Feminist Majority Found., 911 F.3d at 694; see

also Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 346 (6th Cir. 2008)

(collecting cases from the Third, Ninth, Second, Tenth, and Seventh Circuits). 2

Several of these cases are similar to the case before us. For example, in Knox v.

State of Indiana, the Seventh Circuit upheld a jury’s finding that the state was

liable under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision for failing to address the actions of

Knox’s prison coworkers. 93 F.3d 1327, 1334-36 (7th Cir. 1996). The coworkers

made “insulting and demeaning statements” about Knox “both to staff and in front

of inmates” in retaliation for Knox bringing sexual harassment charges against a

supervisor. Id. at 1331. Much like the plaintiff in Knox, Bishop contends that her

coworkers (and several supervisors) circulated “insulting and demeaning

2
 For example, see Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 349 (3d. Cir.
2006) (“An employer may be liable under Title VII for retaliatory harassment
perpetrated by an employee’s co-workers”); Richardson v. N. Y. State Dept. of
Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 445 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A]n employee suffers ‘adverse
employment action’ for the purposes of a retaliation claim when . . . her employer
allows her co-workers to harass her because she engaged in protected activity”);
Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that “co-worker hostility or retaliatory harassment” can constitute an
adverse employment action for a retaliation claim); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35
F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (recognizing “toleration of harassment by other
employees” as an adverse action).

We similarly recognized in Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973, 985 (9th Cir.
2000) that “Title VII . . . [extends] to employer liability for co-worker retaliation,”
but that decision was vacated on other grounds in light of Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002).

                                           7
statements” about her in retaliation for her federal discrimination lawsuit. Id. And

like in Knox, Bishop argues that ATF is liable for “sitting on its hands in the face

of [a] campaign of co-worker harassment.” Id. at 1334-35.

      The majority also dismisses Bishop’s claim because, in its view, Bishop did

not suffer consequences severe enough to be “materially” adverse. But the

majority distorts the distinction between “material” and “trivial” harms under

Burlington. Plainly, an employer’s failure to rectify an offensive, widely spread

email is not “trivial,” meaning a “petty slight[] or minor annoyance[] that often

take[s] place at work and that all employees experience.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at

68. Devlin’s email and its aftermath were not a typical occurrence in the

workplace, such as an offhand joke between colleagues or a “simple lack of good

manners.” Id. Apart from such trivial, everyday matters, Burlington holds that any

act can be material if it might deter victims of discrimination from coming

forward. See id. at 68-69. In my view, ATF’s inaction in the face of Bishop’s

colleagues’ harassment would create such deterrence. I am not alone in my view,

as demonstrated by the deposition testimony of Tehran Palmer, ATF’s Division

Chief for the Recruitment Diversity Hiring Division. When he was asked whether

he thought that “ATF’s failure to publicly respond to the [email]” or take other

corrective action “might deter other people from coming forward and filing any

EEO charge,” he responded “yes.”

                                          8
      Finally, even if there were merit to the majority’s position, the majority errs

by substituting its own judgment for that of a jury. We have explained that “in

close cases . . . where the severity of . . . abuse is questionable, it is more

appropriate to leave the assessment to the fact-finder than for the court to decide

the case on summary judgment.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1096

(9th Cir. 2008). That is because the question of materiality is highly context-

dependent, and reasonable minds can disagree on the impact of an act of

retaliation. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69. Whether ATF’s behavior could well

dissuade a reasonable employee from protected activity is a question that should be

decided by a jury, not by this court. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d

1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (expressing “the importance of zealously guarding an

employee’s right to a full trial” on employment discrimination claims, and warning

against courts “too readily grant[ing] summary judgment” in this context).

      3. The majority decision is wrong factually and legally. The majority fails

to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Bishop, invents a First

Amendment issue where none exists, and improperly analyzes the standard for

retaliation claims under Burlington. Because the evidence supporting Bishop’s

retaliation claim raised material factual disputes, the district court erred in granting

summary judgment. We should reverse that ruling, and I dissent from our failure

to do so.

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