Court Opinion

ID: 9913145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 22:01:45.276026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:30.014445
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/26/23 Myers v. Sundby CA4/1

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

                                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 JEFFREY MYERS et al.,                                                D081600

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,                                (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
                                                                      00055006-CU-UD-CTL)
           v.

 DALE SUNDBY,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge. Dismissed.
         Dale Sundby, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
         Lewis R. Landau for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

         This appeal arises out of an unlawful detainer action filed by Jeffrey
Myers and Kathleen Myers (the Myerses) against Edith Littlefield Sundby
and Dale Sundby (the Sundbys).1 Dale appeals a postjudgment order dated
February 10, 2023, denying his postjudgment motion for mandatory joinder
of the Sundby Declaration of Trust, Trust No. 1989-1, Dated January 26,
1989 (the Sundby Trust). The Myerses filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
and for sanctions. We grant the motion to dismiss and deny the motion for
sanctions.

             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

      The Sundbys, as trustees of the Sundby Trust, are the former owners of
two parcels of real estate located in La Jolla, California (the property). The
Sundby Trust defaulted in the payment of a promissory note secured by a
deed of trust on the property. The owner and holder of the promissory note
and deed of trust recorded a notice of default, held a foreclosure sale, and sold
the property to the Myerses. On September 16, 2021, the Myerses served a
written three-day notice to quit due to foreclosure and a ninety-day notice to
quit due to foreclosure, demanding possession of the property within three
days after service on the Sundbys.
      The Myerses filed a verified unlawful detainer complaint against the
Sundbys, in their capacity as co-trustees of the Sundby Trust, after the
Sundbys refused to deliver possession of the property. The trial court entered
default judgments against Edith and Dale. In prior consolidated appeals, we
affirmed the trial court’s denial of Dale’s motion to vacate his default and the

1   We refer to Edith Littlefield Sundby and Dale Sundby by their first
names for clarity.

2     The parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of the
case, much of which is of limited relevance to this appeal. Accordingly, we
summarize only the case history most pertinent to the issues presented in the
appeal and the motion for dismissal and sanctions.
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resulting default judgment against him. (Myers v. Sundby (Jan. 25, 2023,

D080011, D080348, D080687) [nonpub. opn.] (Myers I).)3
      While Myers I was pending decision, Dale filed a motion for mandatory

joinder of the Sundby Trust pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure4 section 389,
subdivision (a)(2). On February 10, 2023, the trial court denied Dale’s motion
finding that Dale’s default status cut off his right to file pleadings and
motions. On the merits, the court found that complete relief could be
afforded on the Myerses’s complaint without addition of the Sundby Trust as
a party. Dale timely appealed from this order.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Dale’s opening brief presents five issues for review, whether: (1) an
eviction is unlawful where the trial court is in receipt of a claim of right to
possession; (2) the sole settlor, trustee and beneficiary of a person’s
community property interest in a trust can be denied the right to self-
represent those trust interests; (3) a court can deny a nonparty the right to
bring a motion for mandatory joinder to protect an interest in property; (4) a
party who has been defaulted may be denied the right to file a motion for
mandatory joinder; and (5) a living trust’s interest in possession of property
may be summarily denied in an unlawful detainer action.
      Dale’s notice of appeal specifies he is appealing from the February 10,
2023, postjudgment order denying his motion for mandatory joinder. Issues
1, 2 and 5 are beyond the scope of this appeal because these issues were not
before the trial court when it ruled on Dale’s motion for mandatory joinder of

3     On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the record in the prior
consolidated appeals, Myers I, supra, D080011, D080348, D080687. (Evid.
Code, §§ 459, subd. (a), 452, subd. (d)(1).)

4     Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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the Sundby Trust. Additionally, we have no jurisdiction to review an order
not mentioned in the notice of appeal. (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70,
75.) Accordingly, this appeal is limited to the denial of Dale’s motion for
mandatory joinder of the Sundby Trust and we shall disregard the portion of
Dale’s briefs addressing issues 1, 2 and 5.
      As to issues 3 and 4, which relate to the denial of Dale’s motion for
mandatory joinder of the Sundby Trust, the Myerses argued in their
respondents’ brief that the order denying joinder is not appealable because it
does not affect or relate to the judgment. They subsequently moved to
dismiss the appeal on these grounds. Dale responded to the appealability
argument in his reply briefing, asserting: (1) any claim of right to possession
affects a writ of possession and the judgment upon which it is based; and
(2) his right as a trustee to be joined, after being denied his due process right
to have his claim of right to possession to be determined also affects any prior

judgment.5
      “A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there
is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.” (Griset v. Fair
Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) Because an appealable
order is essential to appellate jurisdiction, we must dismiss an appeal from a
nonappealable order. (Daugherty v. City and County of San Francisco (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 928, 942.) An order entered after an appealable judgment is
itself appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2). However, “not every
postjudgment order that follows a final appealable judgment is appealable.
To be appealable, a postjudgment order must satisfy two additional
requirements.” (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644,

5     Although Dale filed opposition to the motion to dismiss, he presented
no substantive arguments in this brief.
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651.) The first requirement “is that the issues raised by the appeal from the
order must be different from those arising from an appeal from the
judgment.” (Ibid.) The second is “that ‘the order must either affect the
judgment or relate to it by enforcing it or staying its execution.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 651-652.) A postjudgment order “affects” the judgment or “relates to its
enforcement” when “it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties
arising from the judgment, is not preliminary to later proceedings, and will
not become subject to appeal after some future judgment.” (Id. at p. 656.)
      Here, Dale does not explain how denying joinder of the Sundby Trust,
after the Myerses have already obtained possession of the property, affected
the unlawful detainer judgment or related to its enforcement. Instead, he
contends any claim of right to possession affects a writ of possession and the
judgment upon which it is based. However, the writ of possession is not at
issue on this appeal. He also appears to assert that joining the Sundby Trust
would affect the prior unlawful detainer judgment because this judgment
would not apply to the joined party. He cited no authority for this argument

and we need not discuss it.6 (Golden Day Schools, Inc. v. Department of
Education (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 681, 695, fn. 9 [“An issue merely raised by a
party without any argument or authority is deemed to be without foundation
and requires no discussion.”].) We conclude the February 10, 2023,
postjudgment order denying joinder of the Sundby Trust is not appealable
because Dale has not shown how this order determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties arising from the unlawful detainer judgment.

6      In any event, we note that a trust “ ‘is not an entity separate from its
trustees’ ” and it “cannot sue or be sued.” (Portico Management Group, LLC
v. Harrison (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 464, 473.) “ ‘As a general rule, the trustee
is the real party in interest with standing to sue and defend on the trust’s
behalf.’ ” (Ibid.)
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Consequently, the February 10, 2023, postjudgment order denying joinder is
not appealable. Because we lack jurisdiction to review a nonappealable
order, this appeal must be dismissed.
      The Myerses seek sanctions under section 907 and California Rules of
Court, rule 8.276 for filing a frivolous appeal. Section 907 provides, “When it
appears to the reviewing court that the appeal was frivolous or taken solely
for delay, it may add to the costs on appeal such damages as may be just.”
(See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1) [Court of Appeal may impose
sanctions on party or attorney for “[t]aking a frivolous appeal or appealing
solely to cause delay”].) “[T]he punishment should be used most sparingly to
deter only the most egregious conduct.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982)
31 Cal.3d 637, 651.) Because we dismiss this appeal based on lack of
jurisdiction, we decline to find that the appeal is so egregious as to warrant
the imposition of sanctions. Accordingly, the motion for sanctions is denied.
                                DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed. Respondents’ motion for sanctions is denied.
Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal.

                                                           O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P.J.

DATO, J.

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