Court Opinion

ID: 9905519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:05.769695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:42.650599
License: Public Domain

J-A20043-23
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 RICHARD WORTHINGTON LODGE,      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 JOHN STERLING LODGE, AND        :        PENNSYLVANIA
 MARIE-LOUISE LODGE              :
                                 :
                                 :
            v.                   :
                                 :
                                 :
 WILLIAM HOYT, MARK HOYT,        :   No. 1294 MDA 2022
 EDWARD C. HOYT, THEODORE R.     :
 HOYT, AND GEORGE HOYT,          :
 COMPRISING THE FIRM OF HOYT     :
 BROTHERS, MARY HOYT, ANNA A.    :
 HOYT, CORDELIA IDA HOYT, AND    :
 ALL THEIR HEIRS, SUCCESSORS,    :
 AND ASSIGNS, HOYT ROYALTY, LLC, :
 AND MICHAEL J. SOLOMON AND      :
 LORI A. SOLOMON, HOYT ROYALTY,  :
 LLC, TRUSTEES OF THE MARGARET   :
 E. HAIGHT TRUST, THOMAS PEDDER :
 BISPHAM, SYDNEY WYNNE           :
 WOODWARD, GERTRUDE WEBER,       :
 JOHN WEDEL, KAREN ELITHIA       :
 WEDEL, ANN HOYT WEBER,          :
 CAROLINE HOKE WEBER, VIRGINIA   :
 FOOTE HAGGERTY, NATHAN CLARK    :
 SWEET, JOHN WEBER SWEET, AND    :
 ALL OTHER UNKNOWN HEIRS,        :
 SUCCESSORS, AND ASSIGNS OF      :
 WILLIAM HOYT, THEODORE R. HOYT, :
 AND GEORGE S. HOYT,             :
 INDIVIDUALLY, JOINTLY, AND/OR   :
 TRADING AS HOYT BROTHERS        :
                                 :
                                 :
            v.                   :
                                 :
                                 :
 RICHARD WORTHINGTON LODGE,      :
 JOHN STERLING LODGE, MARIE-     :
 LOUISE LODGE, MICHAEL J.        :
 SOLOMON AND LORI A. SOLOMON     :
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                                 :
                                 :
 APPEAL OF: HOYT ROYALTY, LLC,   :
 TRUSTEES OF THE MARGARET E.     :
 HAIGHT TRUST, THOMAS PEDDER     :
 BISPHAM, SYDNEY WYNNE           :
 WOODWARD, GERTRUDE WEBER,       :
 JOHN WEDEL, KAREN ELITHIA       :
 WEDEL, ANN HOYT WEBER,          :
 CAROLINE HOKE WEBER, VIRGINIA   :
 FOOTE HAGGERTY, NATHAN CLARK    :
 SWEET, JOHN WEBER SWEET, AND    :
 ALL OTHER UNKNOWN HEIRS,        :
 SUCCESSORS, AND ASSIGNS OF      :
 WILLIAM HOYT, THEODORE R. HOYT, :
 AND GEORGE S. HOYT,             :
 INDIVIDUALLY, JOINTLY, AND/OR   :
 TRADING AS HOYT BROTHERS        :

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Sullivan County Civil Division at No(s):
                               2008CV-321

 RICHARD WORTHINGTON LODGE,              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 JOHN STERLING LODGE, AND                :        PENNSYLVANIA
 MARIE-LOUISE LODGE                      :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 WILLIAM HOYT, MARK HOYT,                :   No. 1363 MDA 2022
 EDWARD C. HOYT, THEODORE R.             :
 HOYT, AND GEORGE HOYT,                  :
 COMPRISING THE FIRM OF HOYT             :
 BROTHERS, MARY HOYT, ANNA A.            :
 HOYT, CORDELIA IDA HOYT, AND            :
 ALL THEIR HEIRS, SUCCESSORS,            :
 AND ASSIGNS, HOYT ROYALTY, LLC,         :
 AND MICHAEL J. SOLOMON AND              :
 LORI A. SOLOMON, HOYT ROYALTY,          :
 LLC, TRUSTEES OF THE MARGARET           :
 E. HAIGHT TRUST, THOMAS PEDDER          :
 BISPHAM, SYDNEY WYNNE                   :
 WOODWARD, GERTRUDE WEBER,               :

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  JOHN WEDEL, KAREN ELITHIA                      :
  WEDEL, ANN HOYT WEBER,                         :
  CAROLINE HOKE WEBER, VIRGINIA                  :
  FOOTE HAGGERTY, NATHAN CLARK                   :
  SWEET, JOHN WEBER SWEET, AND                   :
  ALL OTHER UNKNOWN HEIRS,                       :
  SUCCESSORS, AND ASSIGNS OF                     :
  WILLIAM HOYT, THEODORE R. HOYT,                :
  AND GEORGE S. HOYT,                            :
  INDIVIDUALLY, JOINTLY, AND/OR                  :
  TRADING AS HOYT BROTHERS                       :
                                                 :
                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
  RICHARD WORTHINGTON LODGE,                     :
  JOHN STERLING LODGE, MARIE-                    :
  LOUISE LODGE, MICHAEL J.                       :
  SOLOMON AND LORI A. SOLOMON                    :
                                                 :
                                                 :
  APPEAL OF: RICHARD                             :
  WORTHINGTON LODGE, JOHN                        :
  STERLING LODGE, AND MARIE-                     :
  LOUISE LODGE                                   :

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Sullivan County Civil Division at No(s):
                              2008-CV-321

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: NOVEMBER 28, 2023

       Hoyt Royalty, LLC, Trustees of the Margaret E. Haight Trust, Thomas

Pedder Bispham, Sydney Wynne Woodward, Gertrude Weber, John Wedel,

Karen Elithia Wedel, Ann Hoyt Weber, Caroline Hoke Weber, Virginia Foote

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

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Haggerty, Nathan Clark Sweet and John Weber Sweet (collectively “Hoyt

Appellants”) filed an appeal to challenge the trial court’s order granting

summary judgment in favor of Michael J. Solomon and Lori Solomon

(hereinafter Appellees). Richard Worthington Lodge, John Sterling Lodge, and

Marie-Louise Lodge (collectively “the Lodge Appellants”) filed a separate

appeal challenging the same order.1 After careful review, we reverse the trial

court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

       By way of background, in an April 22, 1893 deed, William Hoyt, Mark

Hoyt, Edward C. Hoyt, Theodore R. Hoyt, and George S. Hoyt (“Hoyt

Brothers”) along with Mary Hoyt, wife of William Hoyt, Ann A. Hoyt, wife of

Mark Hoyt, and Cordelia Ida Hoyt, wife of Edward C. Hoyt (collectively the

“Hoyts”) conveyed a vast amount of real property in Sullivan County to Union

Tanning Company. However, in the same deed, the Hoyts reserved the oil,

gas, and mineral rights to such property. The Hoyt Appellants have claimed

that they own the subsurface rights to 20,916 acres of land.

       In a deed dated February 4, 2011, the Lodge Appellants acquired

property containing 303.63 acres (identified as Sullivan County Tax Parcel

Number 06-076-002) from the Richard S. Lodge Revocable Trust and the

____________________________________________

1 We will address the appeals of the Hoyt Appellants and Lodge Appellants
together in one decision as they raise the same issues and challenge the same
order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees. See Pa.R.A.P. 513
(“[w]here there is more than one appeal from the same order, or where the
same question is involved in two or more appeals in different cases, the
appellate court may, in its discretion, order them to be argued together in all
particulars as if but a single appeal”).

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Marie-Gay Lodge Revocable Trust. The Lodge Appellants asserted that the

303.63 acre property was described in a previous deed as three separate

parcels with different chains of title. Amended Complaint, at 2. The Lodge

Appellants admitted that one of the parcels (approximately 111 acres in size)

was subject to the Hoyts’ oil, gas, and mineral reservation set forth in their

1893 deed. Amended Complaint, at 2-3.

       On November 21, 2008, the Lodge Appellants filed a quiet title action

against the Hoyts and their heirs, successors, and assigns. Pursuant to the

trial court’s July 24, 2013 order, the Lodge Appellants filed an amended

complaint on September 3, 2013 in order to include additional defendants in

its quiet title action, including Appellant Hoyt Royalty, LLC (the successor to

the Hoyts).2 With respect to Appellant Hoyt Royalty, LLC and all other heirs,

successors, and assigns of the Hoyts (collectively, the “Hoyt Appellants”), the

Lodge Appellants asserted that the Hoyt Appellants’ reservation of oil, gas,

____________________________________________

2 Although this action names as defendants the members of the Hoyt family

involved in the 1893 conveyance, all such individuals are deceased. Hoyt
Royalty, LLC is a limited liability company that was formed “to acquire, own,
possess, and manage all rights, title and interests in any and all natural gas,
oil, coal, and other minerals and mineral rights located in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania and elsewhere that were originally owned and possessed by
the Hoyts … and their heirs, successors, and assigns.” Hoyt Appellants’
Answer, Cross-Claim, and Counterclaim, at 36-37. Hoyt Royalty, LLC owns
and possesses 84.4% of the subsurface estate owned or possessed by the
Hoyts’ heirs, successors, and assigns. Hoyt Appellants’ Answer, Cross-Claim,
and Counterclaim, at 36. The owners of the remaining portion of the
subsurface estate were joined to this action in the Hoyt Appellants’
counterclaim and cross-claim, as discussed infra.

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and mineral rights in the 1893 deed was invalid and had been cancelled with

respect to the 111-acre parcel.

      The Lodge Appellants’ amended complaint also named Appellees (the

Solomons) as defendants as Appellees had asserted an interest in the

subsurface estate of Lodge Appellants’ entire 303.63-acre property after this

quiet title action had commenced. Appellees cited to a May 28, 1981 Tax Claim

Deed in which the Sullivan County Tax Claim Bureau purported to convey the

subsurface estate on Parcel “MR-6-3” to Appellees. Amended Complaint, at 5.

The Tax Claim Deed refers to the exception in the “deed from William Hoyt

and others to the Union Tanning Company dated April 22, 1893” and describes

the property as approximately 313 acres. Amended Complaint at 3.

      The Lodge Appellants specifically argued that Appellees have no claim

to the subsurface rights of their 303.63 acreage parcel as Appellees’ May 1981

Tax Claim deed was void. The Lodge Appellants cited to the records for the

tax sale underlying the Tax Claim Deed which indicated that the premises sold

included “80 acres of mineral rights in Elkland Township’s Jesse Parker

Warrant”; in comparison, the Lodge Appellants emphasized that their 303.63-

acre property at Parcel Number 06-076-002 falls within Elkland Township’s

David Turner Warrant. Amended Complaint, at 5.

      Thus, the Lodge Appellants argued that the Tax Deed erroneously

described the taxed and sold property as 313 acres in the David Turner

Warrant instead of 80 acres in in the Jesse Parker Warrant. As such, the Lodge

Appellants argued that Appellees “may own the oil, gas, and mineral rights in

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80 acres located in the Jesse Parker Warrant, but they do not hold or own title

to the oil, gas, or mineral rights in any part of the subject property [belonging

to the Lodge Appellants].” Amended Complaint, at 7.

       In addition, the Lodge Appellants argued that notice of the tax sale for

Sullivan County Tax Parcel MR-6-3 (“80 acres in Jesse Parker”) was not

provided to their predecessors in title nor was Appellees’ Tax Claim Deed listed

in the Sullivan County grantor indexes under the Hoyt Appellants.

       On November 7, 2013, Appellees filed an Answer and New Matter to the

Amended Complaint, asserting affirmative defenses which included a claim

that the quiet title action was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

Appellees did not make any counterclaim against the Lodge Appellants or file

a cross-claim against the Hoyt Appellants.

       On November 20, 2013, the Hoyt Appellants filed an Answer and New

Matter to the Amended Complaint as well as a Counterclaims and Cross-Claim,

which included three counts: 1) quiet title, 2) declaratory judgment, and 3)

slander of title. The Hoyt Appellants’ Counterclaim and Cross-Claim added

multiple plaintiffs3 who “are known living heirs, successors and/or assigns of

____________________________________________

3 The Hoyt Counterclaim and Cross-Claim Plaintiffs were identified as the
Trustees of the Margaret E. Haight Trust, Thomas Pedder Bispham, Sydney
Wynne Woodward, Gertrude Weber, John Wedel, Matt Wedel, Jay Wedel,
Karen Elithia Wedel, Ann Hoyt Weber, Caroline Hoke Weber, Helen Hoyt
Weber, Virginia Foote Haggerty, Nathan Clark Sweet and John Weber Sweet.
The Hoyt Appellants deemed these individuals to be “involuntary counterclaim
plaintiffs” along with all other unknown, successors, and assigns of the Hoyts.
Hoyt Appellants’ Answer, Cross-Claim, and Counterclaim, at 36-37.

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the Hoyts who have not assigned and transferred their rights, title, and

interests to Hoyt Royalty.”4

       With respect to the Appellees’ claims, the Hoyt Appellants agreed with

the Lodge Appellants that “to the extent that [the] 1981 Solomon Tax Deed

sought to convey the Hoyt Sullivan County Subsurface Estate in, on, and under

the Subject property, which is expressly denied, any such tax sale and tax

title derived therefrom is void and invalid as a matter of law.” Hoyt Appellants’

Answer, Cross-Claim, and Counterclaim, at 36-37. The Hoyt Appellants also

argued    that    the   only    tracts    identified   in   the   Hoyts’   1893   Deed

Exception/Reservation are from warrants other than the Jesse Parker warrant.

       On December 23, 2013, Appellees filed a reply to the Hoyt Appellants’

claims and pled as new matter several affirmative defenses, including the

statute of limitations.

       On October 7, 2021, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment,

seeking to bar both the Hoyt Appellants’ and Lodge Appellants’ quiet title

actions with a statute of limitations defense. On November 29, 2022, the

Lodge Appellants filed an Answer along with a countermotion for summary

judgment, asking the trial court to declare that Appellees’ Tax Claim Deed is

void ab initio and to bar Appellees from asserting any right, lien, title or

interest in the subsurface rights at issue. On March 23, 2022, the Hoyt
____________________________________________

4 The Hoyt Appellants attempted to join lessees of the disputed subsurface
rights as defendants, but ultimately filed a motion to discontinue the action as
to those parties. On April 25, 2018, the trial court discontinued the action
against all defendants excluding the Lodge Appellants and Appellees.

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Appellants filed its Answer and countermotion for partial summary judgment,

raising the same claim against Appellees based on its contention that

Appellees’ Tax Claim Deed was void. The Hoyt Appellants also asked the trial

court to enter summary judgment in its favor against the Lodge Appellants as

to the parties’ competing claims for quiet title and declaratory judgment.

      In its countermotion for partial summary judgment, the Hoyt Appellants

provided that they had taken the oral deposition of the director of the Sullivan

County Tax Claim Bureau, Susan McCarty. In this deposition, Ms. McCarty had

no explanation for how Appellees’ May 28, 1981 Tax Deed was prepared or

issued. S. McCarty Dep. Tr., at 66-150. Ms. McCarty agreed that the real

estate description contained in that Deed was inconsistent with the records

and documents underlying the sale of 80 acres of mineral rights from the Jesse

Parker Warrant taxed as Elkland Township Parcel MR-6-3. Id. at 148-49.

      Ms. McCarty also indicated that Bureau has no records that indicate that

the mineral rights to the approximately 303.63-acre parcel owned by the

Lodge Appellants in the David Turner Warrant were ever taxed or sold prior to

the 1981 private sale. Id. at 149. Ms. McCarty conceded that the 1981 Tax

Deed was erroneous as she agreed that the Bureau had no authority to convey

the subsurface rights at issue as the relevant property was never assessed or

sold for taxes. Id. at 38-39, 56-60, 63-65, 148-150.

      On August 15, 2022, the trial court entered an order granting Appellees’

motion for summary judgment and denying the Lodge Appellants’ motion for

summary judgment and the Hoyt Appellants’ motion for partial summary

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judgment. In its accompanying opinion, the trial court concluded that both the

Lodge Appellants and Hoyt Appellants were barred from challenging Appellees’

recorded May 1981 Tax Claim Deed pursuant to the statutes of limitations

under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5527 and 5530.

      In reaching this conclusion, the trial court admitted that it did not need

to “get to the merits” of the Lodge Appellants’ and Hoyt Appellants’ summary

judgment motions, but ruled “as a matter of law, the recording of a deed from

a tax claim bureau places the public on notice of the sale and the passage of

time and/or constructive notice bars challenges to that deed.” Trial Court

Opinion, 8/15/22, at 6 (citing Pfeifer v. Westmoreland Cnty. Tax Claim

Bureau, 127 A.3d 848 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2015)).

      On August 24, 2022, the Hoyt Appellants, unsure of whether the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment was a final order, filed a motion asking

the trial court to amend its order to include a finality determination pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c). On September 6, 2022, the trial court amended its order

to include a finality determination, stating an immediate appeal of its August

15, 2022 order would facilitate resolution of the entire case.

      On September 12, 2022, the Hoyt Appellants filed a notice of appeal

docketed at 1294 MDA 2022. On September 19, 2022, the Lodge Appellants

filed a notice of appeal docketed at 1363 MDA 2022. Although the Lodge

Appellants titled their appeal as a cross-appeal, both the Lodge Appellants and

the Hoyt Appellants’ indicated that they were challenging the trial court’s

decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Appellees.

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      On October 31, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to

whether the Hoyt Appellants and Lodge Appellants intended to raise issues

that oppose each other and designate the appeals as cross-appeals, or

whether the appeals should be designated at joint appeals pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 512. On November 10, 2022, counsel for both the Hoyt Appellants

and Lodge Appellants indicated that they did not intend to raise on appeals

that oppose each other as the trial court did not resolve the merits of their

respective summary judgment motions, but denied them on the basis of

Appellees’ statute of limitations defense. Thus, the Hoyt Appellants and Lodge

Appellants did not object to their matters being designated as joint appeals.

      On November 22, 2022, this Court issued an order indicating that the

appeals would be listed consecutively, rather than as cross-appeals. This Court

also authorized Appellees to file one brief in response to both appeals.

      The Hoyt Appellants raise the following issues in their appeal:

      1) Can the invalidity of a recorded tax claim bureau deed for
         property never assessed or sold for taxes be challenged
         through a quiet title or similar action filed over six or twenty-
         one years from the deed’s recording?

      2) Did the trial court err in its application of the summary
         judgment review standard in that, by not reaching the merits
         of the parties’ motions, the trial court presumed the validity of
         the recorded tax claim bureau deed, although the burden of
         proving such validity rested upon the tax claim purchaser who
         offered no undisputed evidence of the deed’s validity?

      3) Did the trial court err in its application of the summary
         judgment review standard in that, by not getting to the merits
         of the parties’ motions, the Court ignored the existence of
         genuine issues of material fact about the invalidity of the
         recorded tax claim bureau deed?

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Hoyt Appellants’ Brief, at 6-7 (renumbered, suggested answers omitted).

      The Lodge Appellants raise the following issues in their appeal, which

are essentially the same as those raised by the Hoyt Appellants:

      1) Did the trial court err in ruling, as a matter of law and based
         on the Pfeifer decision, that a recorded tax claim bureau deed
         for property that was never validly assessed or sold for taxes
         is protected from all challenges due to the passage of time
         and/or constructive notice?

      2) Did the trial court err in its application of the summary
         judgment motion standards in that, by not getting to the merits
         of the parties’ motions, the Court presumed that the recorded
         May 1981 Tax Claim Bureau deed was valid, despite the fact
         that the burden of proof of validity rested upon [Appellees] who
         offered no undisputed evidence of such validity?

      3) Did the trial court err in its application of the summary
         judgment motion standards in that, by not getting to the merits
         of the parties’ motions, the Court ignored the existence of
         genuine issues of material fact concerning the validity of the
         May 1981 Tax Claim Bureau Deed?

Hoyt Appellants’ Brief, at 5-6 (renumbered, suggested answers omitted).

      As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether this appeal is

properly before this Court. An appellate court only “has jurisdiction to

entertain appeals taken (1) as of right from a final order; (2) from

interlocutory orders by permission; (3) from certain interlocutory orders as of

right; and (4) from certain collateral orders.” Redevelopment Auth. of

Cambria City v. Int'l Ins. Co., 685 A.2d 581, 585 (Pa.Super. 1996)

(citations omitted).

      Generally, only final orders are appealable, and final orders are defined

as orders disposing of all claims and all parties. Spuglio v. Cugini, 818 A.2d

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1286, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting American Independent Ins. Co. v.

E.S. Ex. Rel. Crespo, 809 A.2d 388 (Pa.Super. 2002); Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1)).

       In this case, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary

judgment concluding that all claims challenging Appellees’ ownership of the

313-acre subsurface estate described in the Tax Claim Deed were barred by

the statute of limitations. While the trial court did not specifically resolve the

Lodge Appellants’ claims against the Hoyt Appellants or the Hoyts’ respective

counterclaims, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Appellees was a final determination that neither the Hoyt Appellants nor the

Lodge Appellants are permitted to assert any right, title, interest, and/or

ownership in the subsurface estate at issue.

       Even assuming arguendo that the trial court’s order did not dispose of

all claims and all parties, the Hoyt Appellants also attempted to perfect an

interlocutory appeal by permission by timely seeking and obtaining the trial

court’s certification pursuant to Rule 341(c). The trial court determined that

an immediate appeal would facilitate the resolution of the entire case. Both

the Hoyt Appellants and Lodge Appellants filed a notice of appeal within thirty

days of the date of the certification of the trial court’s order granting summary

judgment.5 We conclude that we have jurisdiction to proceed in this matter.

____________________________________________

5 If the trial court agrees to enter a certification pursuant to Rule 341(c), “an

immediate appeal of an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order may be
filed as of right within 30 days of the date of certification of the order.”
Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria Cnty. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 685 A.2d 581,
586 (Pa.Super. 1996) (citations omitted)).

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     Our review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is as follows:

     [W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing all the
     evidence of record to determine whether there exists a genuine
     issue of material fact. We view the record in the light most
     favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
     existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
     against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue
     as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is
     entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment
     be entered. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a
     material fact must be resolved against the moving party.

     Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly implicate
     the plaintiff's proof of the elements of [a] cause of action.
     Summary judgment is proper if, after the completion of discovery
     relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports,
     an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has
     failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action
     or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be
     submitted to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine
     issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause
     of action or defense, which could be established by additional
     discovery or expert report and the moving party is entitled to
     judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate.

     Thus, a record that supports summary judgment either (1) shows
     the material facts are undisputed or (2) contains insufficient
     evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or
     defense.

     Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court's
     conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.

Olszewski v. Parry, 283 A.3d 1257, 1262–63 (Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting

True Railroad Realty, Inc. v. McNees, Wallace & Nurick, LLC, 275 A.3d

490. 494 (Pa.Super. 2022)).

     In granting summary judgment in this case, the trial court ruled that

the Hoyt Appellants and Lodge Appellants were barred from attacking the

validity of Appellees May 1981 Tax Claim Deed and the underlying tax sale in

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their quiet title actions by the statute of limitations set under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

5527 and 5530. However, in reaching this conclusion, the trial court did not

address the Hoyt Appellants’ and Lodge Appellants’ challenges to the validity

of the tax sale itself.

      We begin by noting the following general principles:

      The purpose of a quiet title action is to settle competing claims to
      interests in property or to determine right or title or the validity
      of any deed affecting any interest in land. Quiet title actions can
      be used to determine the respective interests of different parties
      claiming an interest in oil and gas rights, and these actions have
      become more common in this Commonwealth as landowners seek
      to enter into gas leases. Title searches incident to such leases may
      reveal competing claims to the gas rights or royalties.

      A quiet title action is the appropriate forum for testing the validity
      of titles obtained at tax sales. Price–Jeffries Co. v. Tillman, 11
      Pa.Cmwlth. 153, 312 A.2d 494 (1973). Former owners may use a
      quiet title action to attack defects in tax sales that would invalidate
      the deed by which they lost title, and purchasers at tax sales can
      file such an action to clear or confirm the deed by which they
      obtained title. Pa.R.C.P 1061(b)(4). Despite a presumption of
      good title in the possessor of a tax deed, the presumption falls
      when the regularity of the deed is questioned.

Cornwall Mountain Invs., L.P. v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr., 158 A.3d

148, 160 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

      This Court has recognized that “procedural irregularities in the notice,

assessment, and tax sale process” are required to be raised in a timely action

to upset a tax sale. Id. Nevertheless, “statutes of limitation and repose do not

preclude one from defending a quiet title action on the basis that a tax sale

was void, i.e., where there were jurisdictional defects.” Id. See Trexler v.

Africa, 33 Pa.Super. 395, 410 (1907) (finding that a challenge based on a

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five-year statute of limitations could not “breathe life into a void tax title”);

see also Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Thomas E. Proctor Heirs Tr.,

455 F. Supp. 3d 127, 152 (M.D.Pa. 2020) (claim that tax sale was void ab

initio raised a “jurisdictional defect immune to statute of limitations

challenges”).

       In concluding that the Hoyt Appellants and Lodge Appellants were

barred from challenging the 1981 tax sale by applicable statutes of limitations,

the trial court relied on Pfeifer v. Westmoreland Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau,

127 A.3d 848 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2015)). In Pfeifer, individuals filed an action in

2013 seeking to challenge the 1990 upset tax sale of certain oil and gas rights,

by claiming the tax claim bureau did not provide them with proper notice of

the sale. The Commonwealth Court held that a “cause of action to set aside a tax

sale on the basis of deficient notice accrued and the statute of limitations began to

run on the date of the tax sale.” Pfeifer, 127 A.3d at 851. The Commonwealth

Court found that the individuals had received constructive notice of the tax

sale since “as a matter of law, the recording of a deed from a tax claim bureau

places the public on notice of the sale and the passage of time and/or

constructive notice bars challenges to that deed.” Id.

       However, even if the Pfeifer decision was binding on this Court,6 the

the Commonwealth Court has itself since ruled that Pfeifer is not applicable
____________________________________________

6“This Court is not bound by the decisions of the Commonwealth Court.
However, such decisions provide persuasive authority, and we may turn to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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to cases raising a jurisdictional challenge to a void tax sale and accompanying

deed. In re Sale of Real Est. by Lackawanna Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau,

255 A.3d 619, 631 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2021). Consistent with this Court’s decision

in Cornwall, the Commonwealth Court has since clarified that a statute of

limitations does not bar a challenge to a tax sale that is found to be void ab

initio. Id.

       As both Hoyt Appellants and the Lodge Appellants both sought to quiet

title against Appellees based on their claim that Appellee’s tax claim deed was

void, the Hoyt Appellants and the Lodge Appellants were not precluded from

challenging Appellees’ claim of ownership on this basis by the statute of

limitations.

       Our review of the record reveals that the Hoyt Appellants and Lodge

Appellants demonstrated that a disputed issue of fact existed on whether the

Bureau had the authority to convey 313 acres of oil, gas, and mineral rights

from property in the David Turner Warrant in Appellees’ Claim Deed. Given

that the underlying tax sale records and documents involved 80 acres of

mineral rights in the Jesse Parker Warrant, there is a genuine issue of material

fact to determine whether Appellees’ Tax Claim Deed mistakenly included

mineral rights that had not been assessed.

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our colleagues on the Commonwealth Court for guidance when appropriate.”
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 220 A.3d 582, 591 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citations
omitted).

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       Thus, in this case, the trial court erred in granting Appellees’ summary

judgment motion based solely on its determination that the quiet title actions

were barred by the statutes of limitations without considering the Hoyt

Appellants’ and Lodge Appellants’ claims seeking to invalidate Appellees’ Tax

Claim Deed as void.7

       Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order granting

Appellee’s summary judgment motion and vacate the trial court’s order in all

other respects. We remand for the trial court to address the merits of the

countermotions for summary judgment filed by the Lodge Appellants and Hoyt

Appellants.

____________________________________________

7 Based on its conclusion, the trial court also did not address the Hoyt
Appellants’ argument in its motion that summary judgment was appropriate
for the Hoyt Parties against the Lodge Appellants’ with respect to the parties’
competing claims for quiet title and declaratory relief.

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      Order reversed in part with respect to its grant of Appellees’ motion for

summary judgment, order vacated in part with respect to denial of Lodge

Appellants’ and Hoyt Appellants’ countermotions for summary judgment.

Remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

      Date: 11/28/2023

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