Court Opinion

ID: 9405720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 00:00:32.517812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:23.952181
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20113        Document: 00516803839             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/28/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                  June 28, 2023
                                       No. 22-20113                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                     Clerk

   Dionne A. Montague,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   United States Postal Service,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:20-CV-4329
                     ______________________________

   Before Jones, Southwick, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge: *
         Many federal civil rights laws prohibit discrimination of various kinds.
   But for certain classifications—namely, religion and disability—Congress
   requires more.         Employers must affirmatively provide “reasonable
   accommodations” to people of faith and the disabled. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
   § 2000e(j) (Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); 42 U.S.C.
   § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Americans with Disabilities Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12133

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-20113      Document: 00516803839               Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/28/2023

                                     No. 22-20113

   (Rehabilitation Act).     This requirement no doubt imposes costs on
   employers. But it’s a legislative policy judgment that we are duty-bound to
   implement.
          In this case, we must determine whether an employee may request to
   work from home in the mornings, and at the office in the afternoons, as an
   accommodation for her disability. In particular, we must decide whether the
   record here is sufficient to warrant trial rather than summary judgment.
          It’s often said that 90% of life is showing up. But the right number no
   doubt varies from job to job. It may be reasonable to work part of the day at
   home for some jobs—but not for others. The correct answer turns on the
   nature of the job and the facts of the case. In this case, we conclude that
   genuine fact disputes preclude the grant of summary judgment to the
   employer. See, e.g., Groff v. DeJoy, 35 F.4th 162, 176 (3rd Cir. 2022)
   (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (“without more facts,” summary judgment
   should be reversed and religious accommodation claim should be remanded
   for trial), cert. granted, _ U.S. _ (2023). The district court held otherwise, so
   we accordingly reverse.
                                          I.
          Dionne Montague         worked as         a    Communication Programs
   Specialist—a public relations employee—for the United States Postal
   Service in the Houston area from 2009 to 2017. As her neurologist has
   explained, Montague suffers from peripheral neuropathy, a nerve condition
   that often flares up in the morning. But she can drive to the office in the
   afternoon. So she asked the Postal Service to let her to work mornings from
   home as needed and report to the office each afternoon.
          The Postal Service denied her request, prompting this claim for failure
   to accommodate in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
   (prohibiting disability discrimination by the Postal Service); Smith v. Harris

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   County, 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he Rehabilitation Act . . .
   impose[s] upon public entities an affirmative obligation to make reasonable
   accommodations for disabled individuals.”) (cleaned up).
           The Postal Service stipulated that Montague stated a disability for
   purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. But it maintained that her requested
   accommodation was not reasonable.
           The district court found that driving and travel were essential to
   Montague’s job. So it concluded that Montague’s requested accommodation
   of work-from-home in the mornings was unreasonable. The district court
   therefore granted summary judgment to the Postal Service.
           We review de novo, “viewing all facts and evidence in the light most
   favorable to” Montague. EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th
   Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the Postal
   Service “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
                                               II.
           This case turns on whether it’s reasonable, given the particulars of her
   job, for Montague to work from home in the mornings as needed, and at the
   office in the afternoons. 1

           _____________________
           1
              We note that the circuits are split on whether the commute to and from the
   workplace is subject to federal disability statutes. Compare Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, 68
   F.3d 1512, 1517 (2nd Cir. 1995) (federal law “requir[es] an employer to furnish an otherwise
   qualified disabled employee with assistance related to her ability to get to work”), and
   Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 504 (3rd Cir. 2010) (same), with Regan v. Faurecia
   Automotive Seating, Inc., 679 F.3d 475, 480 (6th Cir. 2012) (federal law “does not require
   an employer to accommodate an employee’s commute”), and Unrein v. PHC-Fort Morgan,
   Inc., 993 F.3d 873, 878 (10th Cir. 2021) (same).
         We do not take sides in this circuit split, because the Postal Service forfeited the
   argument. See, e.g., Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt, 143 S. Ct. 677, 685 (2023)

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                                       No. 22-20113

          A proposed accommodation is not reasonable if it “fundamentally
   alter[s] the nature of the service, program, or activity.” Cadena v. El Paso
   County, 946 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2020). And “a job is fundamentally
   altered if an essential function is removed.” Credeur v. Louisiana, 860 F.3d
   785, 792 (5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
          Whether a requested accommodation would fundamentally alter a
   particular job is generally a fact determination. As we’ve explained, “[f]act-
   finders must determine whether a function is ‘essential’ on a case-by-case
   basis.” Id. (quoting LHC Group, 773 F.3d at 698).
          Under circuit precedent, “seven non-exhaustive factors . . . guide the
   essential-function inquiry.” Id. These factors are: (1) “[t]he employer’s
   judgment,” (2) “[w]ritten job descriptions,” (3) “[t]he amount of time spent
   . . . performing the function,” (4) “[t]he consequences of not requiring the
   incumbent to perform the function,” (5) “[t]he terms of a collective
   bargaining agreement,” (6) “[t]he work experience of past incumbents,” and
   (7) “[t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.” Id.
   Applying these factors here, we conclude that the district court should have
   denied summary judgment to the Postal Service. See, e.g., Riel v. Electronic
   Data Systems Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 682–83 (5th Cir. 1996) (listing these factors
   and describing a fact dispute that the employer and employee had about some
   of these factors); id. at 683 (“Given the dispute as to this material fact, [the
   employee] is entitled to present his evidence to a jury.”).
          The central disagreement between Montague and the Postal Service
   is whether travel and mornings at the office were essential to her job, thus
   making it unreasonable for her to work from home in the morning. Applying

          _____________________
   (“[The defendant] did not raise that argument . . . . Following our usual practice, we
   therefore decline to address its merits.”).

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   the governing “essential function” factors to the summary judgment record
   presented here, we conclude that this case presents genuine disputes of
   material fact that must be decided by a fact-finder.
                                         A.
          To begin with, Montague raises a genuine fact question about whether
   travel was essential. She argues that travel could not have been an essential
   function of her job because her time spent on travel in the past was minimal.
   See Credeur, 860 F.3d at 792 (“amount of time spent on the job performing
   the function” can determine whether that function is essential). The Postal
   Service’s own documents indicate that Montague traveled just twice in 2013,
   twice in 2014, and three times in 2015.
          Montague’s supervisor, Polly Gibbs, noted that the job “sometimes”
   involved travel within the Houston area, where Montague lived and worked.
   But the summary judgment record permits the inference that Montague
   could have performed that aspect of the job by traveling locally during the
   afternoon.      Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (“The term ‘reasonable
   accommodation’ may include . . . job restructuring, . . . or modified work
   schedules . . . .”). There is no evidence in the record that Montague was
   required to attend events in the morning, and the Postal Service does not
   point to any.
          Our precedents also require us to take into account the fact that
   Montague’s written job description does not mention travel as an essential
   part of her job. See Credeur, 860 F.3d at 792 (“[w]ritten job descriptions”
   determine if job function is essential).        Her job description mentions
   “gathering, writing, editing and disseminating a wide variety of
   information.” It nowhere refers to driving or travel as a job requirement. We
   have previously found a genuine dispute of material fact even where the job
   description specifically mentions travel. See LHC Group, 773 F.3d at 698

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   (“[B]ecause the record contains evidence that traveling was not as prominent
   a part of a Team Leader’s duties as the position description suggests . . . there
   is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether driving was an essential
   function of that position.”). We likewise find a genuine dispute of material
   fact here.
                                          B.
          Montague also presents a genuine fact dispute over whether her job
   requires her to be in the office in the mornings as well as the afternoons. She
   does so by invoking the experience of two of her colleagues: fellow
   Communication Programs Specialists McKinney Boyd and Stephen
   Seewoester.
          Boyd worked in the Dallas and Louisiana districts of the Postal Service
   for over two decades. Seewoester served the Arkansas, Albuquerque, Fort
   Worth, Gulf Atlantic, and Rio Grande districts at various points spanning
   nearly two decades.
          Montague was the only Communication Programs Specialist assigned
   to Houston. So Boyd and Seewoester provide relevant evidence about the
   nature of her position. They reported to the same supervisor as Montague.
   And the Postal Service employed only six Communication Programs
   Specialists throughout the South, including Montague.
          Boyd held the same position at the same time as Montague, during the
   period at issue in this case. See Riel, 99 F.3d at 683 (contemporary “work
   experience of incumbents” can determine if job function is essential). He
   also served as a substitute for Montague at various points during her tenure.
   His sworn statement notes that “telecommuting was part of [his] weekly
   schedule.” In his experience, a Communication Programs Specialist “can
   effectively manage a postal district[] by telephone and electronic

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                                    No. 22-20113

   communication.” Accordingly, Boyd came into the office only four days a
   week, and worked the remaining day at home.
          Similarly, Seewoester “[f]or 19+ years . . . conducted [his] daily duties
   remotely” at all times, not just in the mornings. As his affidavit explained,
   “[u]sing electronic communication . . . [he] was able to successfully complete
   all the requirements of [his] position.” Seewoester left his position in 2014,
   prior to the period at issue in this appeal. But he is a “past incumbent[],” so
   his work experience is relevant to our analysis. Credeuer, 860 F.3d at 792.
          Considering the experience of Boyd and Seewoester, a jury could find
   that it was reasonable for Montague to do her job at home in the mornings.
                                        III.
          The Postal Service not only denies that Montague’s requested
   accommodation is reasonable—it also claims that it offered alternative
   accommodations that should have been sufficient. After all, an employee has
   “a right to reasonable accommodation, not to the employee’s preferred
   accommodation.” EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 471 (5th
   Cir. 2009).    But the reasonableness of the Postal Service’s suggested
   alternatives also presents a fact dispute under this summary judgment record.
          The Postal Service suggested two potential alternatives to Montague:
   her husband could drive her to the office, or she could hire a taxi to take her
   to the office each day.     But Montague maintains that these were not
   reasonable alternatives. She explained that her husband could not drive her
   every morning because his own commute required him to leave hours before
   Montague’s job began each morning. And his work schedule often took him
   away from home. She also noted that she could not afford to take a taxi every
   day, and that the Postal Service never offered to reimburse her taxi

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                                          No. 22-20113

   expenses. 2 Based on this summary judgment evidence, a jury could conclude
   that the alternatives suggested by the Postal Service were not reasonable. 3
           Montague also raises a factual question as to whether the Postal
   Service offered its alternative accommodations in good faith. See Loulseged
   v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen an employer’s
   unwillingness to engage in a good faith interactive process leads to a failure
   to reasonably accommodate an employee, the employer violates the [law].”).
   According to Montague, members of the Postal Service reasonable
   accommodation committee “began mocking [her] and used derogatory
   statements, showing true contempt toward [her].” A jury could choose to
   credit Montague’s testimony and accept her argument that the Postal Service
   demonstrated “an unwillingness to conduct the interactive and reasonable
   accommodation process in good faith.”
                                              ***
           Our precedent recognizes the “general consensus among courts . . .
   that regular work-site attendance is an essential function of most jobs.”
   Credeur, 860 F.3d at 793. But a jury could conclude that the accommodation
           _____________________
           2
              Employing a car service to get to and from work every day would impose a
   meaningful cost on Montague. The Postal Service does not contend otherwise, and for
   good reason. A simple illustration should suffice: If a car service would have cost
   Montague, say, an additional $10 per ride, twice a day, five days a week, for fifty weeks each
   year, the total annual cost would amount to something like $5,000. Moreover, nothing in
   the record indicates that drivers have to pay for parking in the suburban part of the Houston
   area at issue here. So there’s no reason to think that hiring a car service would have saved
   Montague money on parking. In any event, these are all issues that the parties are entitled
   to contest on remand.
           3
              In LHC Group, we noted the possibility that “a taxi or van service” might
   constitute a reasonable accommodation. 773 F.3d at 699. But we concluded that it was a
   fact issue for a jury to determine. Id. And whether a taxi or van service might have been a
   reasonable accommodation for the employee in LHC Group does not dictate whether it
   would be a reasonable accommodation for Montague.

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                                          No. 22-20113

   sought by Montague is consistent with that principle: She sought to work
   from home in the morning—and at her worksite every afternoon. Whether
   that’s a reasonable request is for a fact-finder to decide, considering the
   evidence available in the summary judgment record.
           We reverse the grant of summary judgment to the Postal Service and
   remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 4

           _____________________
           4
              The district court granted summary judgment to the Postal Service on
   Montague’s disability discrimination claim, but it did not discuss or even mention her
   separate claim for constructive discharge. See Montague v. United States Postal Service, No.
   CV H-20-4329, 2022 WL 35825, at *1–*3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2022). On remand, the district
   court should therefore analyze this constructive discharge claim in the first instance.

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                                     No. 22-20113

   No. 22-20113, Montague v. USPS
   Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
           With due respect, I would affirm the district court’s judgment.
   Having closely reviewed the record in light of governing Rehabilitation Act
   law and precedents, I do not believe Montague established genuine issues of
   material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment. A plaintiff bears the
   burden of proving the reasonableness of an accommodation in her prima facie
   case. Smith v Harris Cnty., 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020). Further, an
   employer is free to choose the less expensive accommodation or the
   accommodation that is easier for it to provide. Thompson v. Microsoft Corp.,
   2 F.4th 469 (5th Cir. 2021). Applying these principles to the facts, Montague
   did not create triable issues about whether travel was an essential job function
   of a Communications Program Specialist, nor about the reasonableness of the
   USPS suggestions that she either rely on her husband or use a car service like
   Uber to travel 700 yards to her office. The employer may insist that
   employees work in its office, rendering Montague’s request to work from
   home, either every morning or on an “as-needed basis,” an extraordinary
   accommodation that should require extraordinary justification. I find none
   here.
           As the majority note, the employer may decide what job functions are
   essential, and these need not be written down. Though travel was not
   mentioned in Montague’s written description, her supervisor attested to the
   need to travel within Houston for public events and occasionally out of town.
   Montague’s suggestion that CPS employees from other districts could
   substitute for her on out-of-town travel would impose unreasonable costs on
   USPS, and her suggestion that public events could be adjusted to afternoons
   is counterintuitive and unreasonable.        The affidavits of retired CPS
   employees are also insufficiently probative because each of them admits the

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                                     No. 22-20113

   necessity of occasional travel for the job. And Montague conceded that
   Mr. Boyd, who handled two districts “remotely,” still worked in an office
   except when the USPS expressly permitted teleworking.
          Here, USPS failed to argue that it has no obligation under federal
   disability law to facilitate or accommodate an employee’s commuting to
   work. That important issue is sidelined. But even accepting Montague’s
   premise arguendo, the employer’s suggestion that she could “Uber” to work
   should be held reasonable as a matter of law. The distance was less than a
   half mile! Her only complaint was that it would cost too much, but she
   offered no evidence to support this claim. Since a large proportion of
   commuters in and around Houston regularly bear the growing costs of tolls
   and parking in addition to operating their cars, Montague’s objection is
   frivolous without further support. She does not contend that commuting
   with an “Uber” service would not offset the physical symptoms she
   experiences from medication, and the medication is intended to control her
   symptoms of diabetic neuropathy.
          In sum, while I agree with the law as expounded by the majority, I
   differ in its application to the facts at hand and respectfully dissent.

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