Court Opinion

ID: 9960545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 16:00:37.991039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:36.360783
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 22-50217

                  Plaintiff-Appellee,              D.C. No.
                                                5:18-cr-00335-
    v.                                             MWF-2

GABRIEL MIRABAL,
                                                   OPINION
                  Defendant-Appellant.

          Appeal from the United States District Court
              for the Central District of California
         Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

              Argued and Submitted March 5, 2024
                     Pasadena, California

                      Filed April 16, 2024

    Before: Holly A. Thomas and Roopali H. Desai, Circuit
         Judges, and James Alan Soto,* District Judge.

                 Opinion by Judge H.A. Thomas

*
 The Honorable James Alan Soto, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
2                         USA V. MIRABAL

                          SUMMARY **

                          Criminal Law

     The panel vacated Gabriel Mirabal’s conviction by jury
trial for two counts of assaulting a federal officer resulting
in bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111, and
remanded for further proceedings.
    The panel held the district court abused its discretion in
excluding the sworn statement of a government attorney as
hearsay at Mirabal’s trial because, in a criminal case, the
sworn statement of a government attorney in a plea
agreement or sentencing memorandum is a party admission,
excluded from the definition of hearsay under Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2). The panel further held that the error
was not harmless.

                           COUNSEL

Alix L. McKenna (argued) and Jena A. MacCabe, Assistant
United States Attorneys; Bram M. Alden, Assistant United
States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Appeals Section; E. Martin
Estrada, United States Attorney; United States Department
of Justice, Office of the United States Attorney, Los
Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Elizabeth Richardson-Royer (argued), Law Office of
Elizabeth Richardson-Royer, San Francisco, California, for
Defendant-Appellant.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                           USA V. MIRABAL                               3

                              OPINION

H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

    Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) excludes from the
definition of hearsay several categories of statements
“offered against an opposing party.” 1 Thirty-five years ago,
in United States v. Van Griffin, 874 F.2d 634, 635, 638 (9th
Cir. 1989), we held that in a criminal prosecution for driving
under the influence of alcohol on federal land, the defendant
could introduce a United States Department of
Transportation manual on sobriety testing under Rule
801(d)(2). We reasoned that the document had been written
by “the relevant and competent section of the government,”
and was thus the admissible statement of the government as
a party opponent. Id. at 638 (citing Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(D)).
    Today, we examine the application of Van Griffin and
Rule 801(d)(2) in the context of government attorney
statements. Doing so, we hold that, in a criminal case, the
sworn statement of a government attorney in a plea
agreement or sentencing memorandum is a party admission,
excluded from the definition of hearsay under Rule
801(d)(2).
                                    I.
                                   A.
    Gabriel Mirabal is a prisoner at a federal correctional
institution in Victorville, California. On June 17, 2022,

1
  These exclusions from hearsay are commonly described as the
exclusions for party admissions. See, e.g., United States v. Burreson, 643
F.2d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981).
4                      USA V. MIRABAL

Mirabal was convicted of two counts of assaulting a federal
officer resulting in bodily injury under 18 U.S.C. § 111. He
now appeals, arguing in part that the district court abused its
discretion when it excluded the sworn statement of a
government attorney as hearsay at his trial. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
Because we conclude that the statement was improperly
excluded, and that this exclusion was not harmless, we
vacate Mirabal’s conviction and remand for further
proceedings.
                              B.
    On August 19, 2017, Mirabal and a fellow inmate, Erik
Rojo, passed through metal detectors while returning to their
housing units after lunch. One of them wore a white shirt,
and the other wore a brown shirt. The white-shirted
individual traversed the metal detectors without incident, but
the brown-shirted individual triggered an alarm. Two
correctional officers, Brian Moreno and Anthony Guerrero,
were stationed at the metal detectors. After the brown-
shirted individual triggered the alarm on a second
passthrough, Moreno initiated a pat-down search.
    The parties dispute exactly what happened next. They
agree that the brown-shirted individual and Moreno entered
a verbal back-and-forth, and that the former threw the first
punch. The government claims that the blow was
unprovoked; Mirabal, however, asserts that the brown-
shirted individual threw the punch in self-defense after
Moreno first quickly raised his arm.
    After the fight broke out between the brown-shirted
individual and Moreno, Guerrero rushed to assist his fellow
officer. The white-shirted individual—who by now was
already some distance beyond the metal detectors—turned
                       USA V. MIRABAL                        5

back to join the fray, punching Moreno in the back of the
head and knocking him unconscious, before attacking
Guerrero. Other officers eventually arrived and stabilized the
situation, but not before Moreno and Guerrero both suffered
physical injuries.
    On December 11, 2018, a grand jury indicted both Rojo
and Mirabal on two counts of assaulting a federal officer
resulting in bodily injury and the aiding and abetting thereof,
with one count for the assault on Moreno and the second for
the assault on Guerrero. Mirabal proceeded to trial.
                              C.
    To fully explain Mirabal’s trial, a detour is necessary to
discuss the proceedings in Rojo’s case. On August 15, 2019,
Rojo and the government entered into a plea agreement in
which Rojo pleaded guilty to one count of assaulting a
federal officer resulting in bodily injury. The plea
agreement’s factual basis identified Rojo as the individual in
the white shirt who passed through the metal detectors
without incident, and Mirabal as the individual in the brown
shirt who set off the alarm, was searched by Moreno, and
threw the first punch. The United States Attorney’s Office
(USAO) for the Central District of California agreed to and
accepted the plea agreement, and a Special Assistant United
States Attorney signed it.
    The district court held Rojo’s change of plea hearing
roughly one month later. The district court summarized the
factual basis of the plea agreement as describing a “scuffle
or altercation between Mirabal and the two correctional
officers” in which Rojo subsequently “got involved.” Rojo
agreed to this description of events, and the government
raised no objection to it. For the next two months, the
government showed no signs of deviating from this
6                          USA V. MIRABAL

narrative. Indeed, on November 25, 2019, the government
reiterated this factual basis in its sentencing position,
deeming Mirabal the brown-shirted individual who got into
an altercation with the correctional officers, and Rojo the
white-shirted individual who ran back after the fact to get
involved.
    The following day, however, the government filed a
notice of errata withdrawing its sentencing position. And on
December 4, 2019, the government filed an amended plea
agreement, which removed all references to Mirabal from
the factual basis. 2
                                  II.
    We have discussed Rojo’s proceedings at length, and we
repeatedly employ the phrases “the brown-shirted
individual” and “the white-shirted individual,” because a key
issue at Mirabal’s trial concerned what color shirt he wore
on the day of the incident. At Mirabal’s trial, the government
consistently portrayed him as the person in the white shirt,
while Mirabal consistently maintained that he was clad in
brown.
    That the jury conclude Mirabal was wearing brown was
key to his defense, which was predicated upon the theory
that he acted to protect himself from perceived aggression
by Moreno during the search. This self-defense theory was,
practically speaking, unavailable to the white-shirted
individual, who ran back from across the courtyard to join
the fight after it started. To support his theory, Mirabal

2
  As do the parties and the district court, we refer collectively to the
statements contained in the factual basis in Rojo’s original plea
agreement, and those same statements in the government’s first
sentencing memorandum, as Rojo’s original factual basis.
                        USA V. MIRABAL                        7

sought to introduce, as the statement of a party opponent,
Rojo’s original factual basis as evidence that the government
had previously taken the position that Mirabal wore the
brown shirt.
    The government filed a motion in limine to exclude the
original factual basis under Federal Rules of Evidence 401,
403, and 802. The government argued, in part, that the
original factual basis was irrelevant because, “[a]s a general
matter, the fact of a plea or conviction of a non-testifying co-
defendant is inadmissible”; the original factual basis was
merely the mistaken “personal opinion” of the prosecutor at
the time; and the original factual basis was inoperative and
no longer had any “legal significance.” The government also
maintained that the original factual basis constituted hearsay
because it was “an out-of-court admission by Rojo,” who
was not testifying at Mirabal’s trial.
    The district court granted the government’s motion,
reasoning that the original factual basis constituted
inadmissible hearsay. The court held that Rule
801(d)(1)(A)’s hearsay exclusion for prior inconsistent
statements did not apply to the original factual basis because
Rojo was not called to testify at Mirabal’s trial. And it
reasoned that Rule 801(d)(2)’s hearsay exclusion for an
admission of a party opponent did not apply to the “opinion”
of a prosecutor.
    Who wore which shirt was a significant focus at
Mirabal’s trial, with the parties eliciting conflicting evidence
on the matter. The government presented surveillance
footage and photographic evidence and called multiple
correctional officers, including Moreno and Guerrero, to
testify about the incident. Moreno and Guerrero each
testified that Rojo wore the brown shirt. But other officers—
8                       USA V. MIRABAL

including the one who handcuffed the brown-shirted
individual, and another who escorted the brown-shirted
individual to a restricted housing unit after the fight—
testified that Mirabal wore the brown shirt. In closing
arguments, the government suggested, for the first and only
time, that the jury could convict Mirabal regardless of
whether he wore the brown or white shirt. The district court
instructed the jury on self-defense.
    The jury convicted Mirabal on both counts of assault
resulting in bodily injury against Moreno and Guerrero.
Mirabal was ultimately sentenced to 57 months’
imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution in the amount
of $8,983.39 for Moreno and Guerrero’s lost wages.
                              III.
    We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003, 1035
(9th Cir. 2018). “[A] district court abuses its discretion when
it makes an error of law.” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d
1247, 1261 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
                              IV.
                              A.
   Mirabal argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it excluded Rojo’s original factual basis as hearsay.
We agree and, for the reasons described below, vacate
Mirabal’s conviction and remand for further proceedings.
    Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), a statement
is not hearsay if it is offered against an opposing party and if
the statement
    (A) was made by the party in an individual or
        representative capacity;
                       USA V. MIRABAL                       9

   (B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed
       to be true;
   (C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to
       make a statement on the subject;
   (D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a
       matter within the scope of that relationship and while
       it existed; or
   (E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in
       furtherance of the conspiracy.
Rojo’s original factual basis plainly falls within Rule
801(d)(2)(A)–(D). It therefore should not have been
excluded on the basis that it constitutes hearsay.
    Our decision in United States v. Van Griffin, 874 F.2d
634 (9th Cir. 1989), supports this conclusion. There, the
defendant, charged with driving under the influence on
federal land, sought to introduce at his trial a Department of
Transportation pamphlet regarding the procedures to be used
in field sobriety tests, including a test for nystagmus. The
district court excluded the pamphlet as hearsay. Although we
found that the exclusion of the pamphlet was harmless, we
held that it was nevertheless in error. We explained that
under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), the pamphlet “could have been
introduced by the defendant . . . to show the measures that
are necessary to be taken in order to have a reliable test for
nystagmus.” Id. at 638. Although we explicitly refrained
from holding that “every publication of every branch of
government of the United States can be treated as a party
admission by the United States,” we held that the pamphlet
had been developed by the “relevant and competent section
of the government,” one “charged with the development of
10                     USA V. MIRABAL

rules for highway safety.” Id. We therefore found the
pamphlet “was an admissible party admission.” Id.
    There is no question that, as our decision in Van Griffin
implies, “the Federal Rules clearly contemplate that the
federal government is a party-opponent of the defendant in
criminal cases.” United States v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 937
n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)). Nor can
it be seriously disputed that, as the Department of
Transportation in Van Griffin was the “relevant and
competent section of the government” when it came to
highway safety, so is the Department of Justice with respect
to criminal prosecutions. The logic of our decision in Van
Griffin comfortably encompasses formal, signed statements
made by a government attorney in filings before a court,
such as plea agreements and sentencing memoranda. We
therefore hold that when a criminal defendant seeks to
introduce such statements at trial, they fall within Rule
801(d)(2)’s hearsay exclusion for statements made by an
opposing party.
                              B.
   The government contends that allowing the introduction
of Rojo’s original factual basis is to mistake the mere
“opinions” of a government attorney for a statement of the
kind admissible as a hearsay exclusion under Rule 801(d).
This argument is unpersuasive.
    As the D.C. Circuit stated in Morgan, “when the
government authorizes its agent to present his sworn
assurances to a judicial officer[,] the statements of fact or
belief in the officer’s affidavit represent the position of the
government itself, not merely the views of its agent.” 581
F.2d at 937 n.10. Similarly, here, the government’s theory of
the case was not the mere errant remark or personal
                       USA V. MIRABAL                       11

viewpoint of a government attorney. Memorialized in
writing and set forth multiple times before the district court
in sentencing memoranda and plea agreements, Rojo’s
original factual basis constituted the official position of the
United States regarding what happened during the August 19
altercation. The factual basis plainly states that “Defendant
[Rojo] and the USAO agree to the statement of facts
provided below and agree that this statement of facts is
sufficient to support a plea of guilty to the charge described
in this agreement.” The factual basis was signed by both the
Special Assistant United States Attorney and by Rojo
himself.
    It is true that the government subsequently filed an
amended plea agreement. But that amendment does not
change the fact that the government had once adopted the
original factual basis. Nor, as the government contends, does
Rojo’s status as a co-signatory to that factual basis change
the fact that the government’s independent statements fall
within the party admission hearsay exclusion. Both Rojo and
the government were declarants within the meaning of Rule
801(b). No issue of nested hearsay presents itself because the
factual basis reflected the government’s understanding of the
case based upon the entirety of its investigation at the time,
not merely a parroting of Rojo’s statements. Cf. Breneman
v. Kennecott Corp., 799 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1986)
(nested hearsay occurs when one declarant testifies as to
another declarant’s out-of-court statement).
                              C.
    We do not determine how far Rule 801(d)(2) extends to
other government employees. And exactly which
departments of the federal government are a party-opponent
will depend on a case’s factual circumstances. Today, we
12                           USA V. MIRABAL

hold only that “in criminal cases, the Justice Department
certainly should be considered” a party-opponent of criminal
defendants. United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 130 (1st
Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); see also Morgan, 581 F.2d at
937 n.10; United States v. Yildiz, 355 F.3d 80, 82 (2d Cir.
2004) (“[T]he government’s attorneys can bind the
government with their in-court statements.”). 3 Rule
801(d)(2)’s hearsay exclusions, in turn, apply to government
attorneys’ statements in plea agreements and sentencing
memoranda. 4
                                    D.
    “We may only conclude that an error was harmless if it
is ‘more probable than not that the erroneous admission of
the evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict.’” United States
v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 1995)
(quoting United States v. Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 458 (9th Cir.

3
  But see United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1351–52 & n.4 (7th Cir.
1997) (declining “to apply Rule 801(d)(2) to statements made by
government employees in criminal cases,” based upon “the common law
principle that no individual should be able to bind the sovereign,” but
ultimately upholding the exclusion of evidence at issue under Rule 403).
We reject Zizzo’s dicta as unpersuasive when applied to government
attorneys. It is indisputable that government attorneys can and do bind
the United States because the United States “can act only through its
officers and agents” when conducting a criminal prosecution.
Wellingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406 (1969). And, in any event,
applying Rule 801(d)(2) does not “bind the sovereign” because it merely
allows a party to admit in-court statements that government agents
previously made; it does not mandate a course of conduct, forbid any
action, or even require the government to continue to stand by those
statements.
4
  In so holding, we of course do not suggest that trial courts should refrain
from analyzing such statements under Rule 403, or that they should
admit such statements when they are irrelevant.
                      USA V. MIRABAL                      13

1991)). Applying this principle here requires vacating
Mirabal’s conviction.
    Had Mirabal had the opportunity to present Rojo’s
original factual basis, his argument that he wore the brown
shirt would have had considerably more support. As the
district court noted, “who was who c[ould] make a difference
here,” because the brown-shirted individual had a stronger
self-defense claim than did the white-shirted individual, who
joined the altercation after it had begun. The focus of the
government’s evidence at trial was demonstrating that Rojo,
not Mirabal, wore the brown shirt. Mirabal elicited
testimony suggesting that Moreno raised his arm shortly
before the first punch was thrown and that he gave
inconsistent reasons for doing so. Although the jury
theoretically could have convicted Mirabal regardless of
whether he wore the brown or white shirt, the government
pressed that point only once, in its closing argument. And
although the government presented to the district court a
facially innocuous explanation for changing the original
factual basis—namely that its previous prosecutor was
simply mistaken—we cannot conclude based on our review
of the record that the jury would have credited its
explanation.
                             V.
    Rojo’s original factual basis, containing statements of
the USAO, was a party admission under Rule 801(d)(2). The
government has not met its burden of showing that the
exclusion of this basis did not affect the outcome of
Mirabal’s trial. Mirabal’s conviction is therefore
14                          USA V. MIRABAL

VACATED and this matter is REMANDED for further
proceedings. 5

5
  Because we vacate Mirabal’s conviction and remand for further
proceedings, we do not address at length his remaining contentions on
appeal, noting only that we perceive no due process violations that would
have warranted the granting of his motion for a new trial, nor any abuse
of discretion related to the exclusion of evidence of Moreno’s Three
Percenters tattoo. While we do not presume the course of any further
proceedings, we also remind the parties that “[a]ny dispute as to the
proper amount or type of restitution” raised at sentencing must be
“resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence,” with the
government bearing the burden of “demonstrating the amount of the loss
sustained by a victim as a result of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e); see
also United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 556–57 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the government does not meet its burden when it relies only
on conclusory loss summaries).