Court Opinion

ID: 9931382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 21:00:54.870993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:31.813563
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-1831

        JANUARY CREWS-SANCHEZ,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        FRITO-LAY, INC.,

                            Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Lynchburg. Norman K. Moon, Senior District Judge. (6:21-cv-00030-NKM-RSB)

        Submitted: January 31, 2024                                       Decided: February 7, 2024

        Before GREGORY and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Thomas E. Strelka, Brittany M. Haddox, L. Leigh R. Strelka, N. Winston
        West, IV, STRELKA EMPLOYMENT LAW, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Alison
        R. Ashmore, Dallas, Texas, Melanie L. Fry, DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC, San Antonio,
        Texas; Charles Garrison Meyer III, Christopher Quinn Adams, O’HAGAN MEYER
        PLLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               January Crews-Sanchez appeals the district court’s order granting summary

        judgment in favor of Frito-Lay, Inc. (“Frito-Lay”) on her claims under the Americans with

        Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213, and Virginia state law. Specifically,

        Crews-Sanchez alleged failure-to-accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation claims

        under the ADA and retaliation claims under Virginia state law. We affirm.

               “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Battle v.

        Ledford, 912 F.3d 708, 712 (4th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate only when

        “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

        as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine issue of

        material fact exists, we view the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the

        light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir.

        2011). “If the record, so viewed, gives rise to genuine factual disputes . . . , then those

        questions must be resolved by a jury, not on summary judgment.” Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d

        295, 301-02 (4th Cir. 2021). “A dispute is ‘genuine’ for these purposes so long as a

        reasonable jury could resolve it in [the nonmovant’s] favor.” Id. at 302. To avoid summary

        judgment, “the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere

        speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla

        of evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).

               The ADA “prohibits employers from ‘discriminating’ against ‘qualified individuals

        on the basis of disability.’” Laird v. Fairfax Cnty., 978 F.3d 887, 892 (4th Cir. 2020)

        (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b) (cleaned up)). This prohibition on discrimination

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        includes an employer’s failure to “make reasonable accommodations” to an employee with

        a qualifying disability. Id. at 892 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). To establish a

        failure-to-accommodate claim, a “plaintiff must prove: (1) that she had a disability within

        the statutory meaning; (2) that the employer knew of her disability; (3) that a reasonable

        accommodation would permit her to perform the essential functions of the position; and

        (4) that the employer refused to make the accommodation.” Perdue v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S.,

        LLC, 999 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 2021).

               We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Crews-Sanchez

        would have been unable to perform the essential functions of her position with the

        requested accommodation of being allowed to work from home. Specifically, Crews-

        Sanchez’s own testimony established that, at the time of her request for remote work, her

        essential job duties required her presence onsite.

               A claim for disability discrimination under the ADA requires a plaintiff to “show

        (i) she was disabled, (ii) she was discharged, (iii) she was fulfilling her employer’s

        legitimate expectations when she was discharged, and (iv) the circumstances of her

        discharge raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.” Cowgill v. First Data

        Techs., Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 379 (4th Cir. 2022). Under the ADA, the employee’s disability

        must be the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment action. Gentry v. East West

        Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 235-36 (4th Cir. 2016).

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               Absent direct evidence of discrimination, an employee is required to establish a

        prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas * burden-shifting

        framework. See Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir.

        1995) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to ADA claim).               If the employee

        successfully establishes such a case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a

        legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for her termination. Cowgill, 41

        F.4th at 381. If the employer is successful, the burden shifts back to the employee to

        provide that the proffered reasons for her termination are pretextual. Id. “[I]mportantly,

        although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework, the

        ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact” of the intentional discrimination or

        retaliation “remains at all times with [the employee].” Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650

        F.3d 321, 336 (4th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).

               We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Crews-Sanchez

        failed to establish that the circumstances of her termination raised a reasonable inference

        of unlawful discrimination.     The nearly four-month gap between Crews-Sanchez’s

        requested accommodation and her termination did not establish a sufficient temporal

        proximity from which the court could draw a reasonable inference of causation. See Clark

        Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) (explaining that temporal

        proximity may suffice to establish causation when protected activity and adverse action are

        “very close” and relying on decisions ruling that three- and four-month periods were

               *
                   McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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        insufficient (internal quotation marks omitted)); Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998

        F.3d 111, 123 (4th Cir. 2021) (stating that three months between employee’s termination

        and protected activity was too long to support a causal inference). Furthermore, the district

        court did not err in determining that Crews-Sanchez failed to establish that she was

        fulfilling Frito-Lay’s legitimate business expectations at the time of her discharge given

        her disclosure of confidential employee health information to a third party in violation of

        company policy.

               The ADA also provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual”

        for opposing an unlawful practice under the ADA, making a charge, or participating in an

        ADA process. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under

        the ADA, an employee must establish “that: (1) she has engaged in protected conduct;

        (2) she suffered an adverse action after engaging in the protected conduct; and (3) there

        was a causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse action.” Laird, 978 F.3d

        at 892 n.4. “An employee may establish prima facie causation simply by showing that

        (1) the employer either understood or should have understood the employee to be engaged

        in protected activity and (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee soon

        after becoming aware of such activity.” Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 335-36

        (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing causation in context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

        as amended); see Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that

        courts use Title VII precedent in ADA cases).

               We conclude that the district court did not erring in determining that Crews-

        Sanchez’s ADA retaliation claim lacks merit for the same reason her discrimination claim

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        fails. Specifically, the attenuated temporal connection between her protected activity and

        termination, in combination with her intervening disclosure of confidential information in

        violation of company policy, defeats any inference of causation that could otherwise be

        drawn from the circumstances. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary

        judgment to Frito-Lay on Crews-Sanchez’s ADA claims.

               Finally, as to Crews-Sanchez’s state law claims, Virginia Code § 40.1-51.2:1

        provides that:

                         No person shall discharge or in any way discriminate against an
                         employee because the employee has filed a safety or health complaint
                         or has testified or otherwise acted to exercise rights under the safety
                         and health provisions of this title for themselves or others.

        Va. Code. Ann. § 40.1-51.2:1 (2023). Therefore, to state a claim under this section, an

        employee must claim that (1) she has been terminated or retaliated against for (2) partaking

        in a protected activity, such as reporting a safety and health complaint, and it was (3) related

        to the safety, health, and welfare of employees. Similarly, Virginia Code § 40.1-27.3,

        Virginia’s whistleblower statute, provides that “[a]n employer shall not discharge,

        discipline, threaten, discriminate against, or penalize an employee, or take other retaliatory

        action . . . because the employee . . . in good faith reports a violation of any federal or state

        law or regulation to a supervisor or to any governmental body or law-enforcement official.”

        Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-27.3 (2023).

               Frito-Lay did not terminate Crews-Sanchez’s employment for the mere act of

        reporting a safety and health complaint or for reporting a violation of federal or state law

        or regulation. Rather, Frito-Lay terminated Crews-Sanchez’s employment for reporting an

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        issue to a third party—not a supervisor, governmental official, or law enforcement

        official—in a way that violated the company’s confidentiality policy. Consequently, we

        find that the district court did not err in determining that Crews-Sanchez’s actions fell

        outside the protections of both of these statutory provisions. The court therefore properly

        granted summary judgment on Crews-Sanchez’s state law claims.

               Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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