Court Opinion

ID: 9681923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:01:15.63778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:36.636789
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice. Appellant took 11.01 acres from a 262-,acre tract owned by appellees for the construction of Interstate Highway 40, a controlled-access highway. It appeals from a judgment awarding appellees $12,000 as just compensation, .asserting only two grounds for reversal. The first is the refusal of the trial court to strike that portion of the testimony of Charles L. Ormond, one of the landowners, relating to values based on use of the land for commercial catfish farming. The other is that there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict. We agree that appellant’s motion to strike that portion of Ormond’s value testimony of which it complained should have been sustained. He had fixed a value of $102,114 on the whole tract before the taking and a value of $17,240 on the remaining lands, consisting of 92.5 acres north of, and 158 acres south of, the new highway. Thus, his difference between before and after values was $84,874. Ormond, a realtor and farmer, demonstrated his familiarity with real estate values in Conway County. He testified that the highest and best use for the lands was for catfish farming, and that he had commenced operations to devote the lands to that purpose before the taking. According to him, he had constructed a preliminary pond in 1963 or 1964 and had constructed a dam on the north part of the land which had not been completed when the condemnation suit was filed. Ormond stated that he acquired the land several years before the taking after having studied the entire county to find land suitable for flooding. He felt that this land had these attributes and a terrain such that adjoining lands would not be flooded from dams necessary for his purposes. This taking destroyed accessibility to the north residual, so that there was no way to proceed with catfish farming plans. On cross-examination, it was revealed that Ormond had made extensive investigation as to markets, prices, demands, methods, yields and costs he might anticipate when his plans were implemented. He admitted that his before taking value was based entirely on income he anticipated upon the basis of his own estimates of market prices, yields and costs. Ho also admitted that prices would fluctuate and that one could not say as much as a year in advance what the price would be when the crop was yielded. His estimate of costs included 6c for fingerling minnows, even though he acknowledged a current range of 4%c to 7c. There is nothing whatever in the record to indicate that Ormond had any experience in this business or anything related thereto. Appellant’s objection was that the value based upon his anticipated future profits was highly speculative. Thus, appellant met its burden of showing that there was no reasonable basis for Ormond’s opinion of the value of the entire tract before the taking. Even if we should consider that evidence of income and production from commercial catfish farming is admissible under the recognized exception in cases of agricultural property, as appellees urge, there is no exception which permits such values to be based on pure speculation, as must be the case when the testimony is given by one without experience or expertise in the undertaking about which he. testifies, when there is no history as to the particular land upon which to base anticipated income or production. See Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Alister, 62 Ark. 1, 34 S. W. 82. Even though the value testimony. of Ormond was improper, this does not require reversal, if other evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict. Owen v. Jones, 14 Ark. 502; Jones v. Malvern Lumber Co., 58 Ark. 125, 23 S. W. 679. It is only when there is no other evidence to sustain the verdict or when it is manifest that appellant was prejudiced by the incompetent evidence that a reversal is proper under circumstances existing here. See Owen v. Jones, supra; Fordyce v. McCants, 51 Ark. 509, 11 S. W. 694, 4 L. R. A. 296, 14 Am. St. R. 69. We have held that error will not require reversal where it is manifestly not prejudicial,. or where it is evident that the error did not affect the verdict. Insured Lloyd’s v. Mayo, 244 Ark. 802, 427 S. W. 2d 164; Keathley v. Yates, 232 Ark. 473, 338 S. W. 2d 335; Street v. Shull, 187 Ark. 180, 58 S. W. 2d 932; Lamden v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 115 Ark. 238, 170 S. W. 1001. We must determine, then, whether, in view of other evidence in the case, this error was prejudicial to appellant or whether it affected the verdict. In doing so we must also determine the other question posed, i. e., whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. We find that there was and that the error in relation to the Ormond testimony does not require reversal. It must be remembered that only Ormond’s opinion as to the land value before the taking would have been stricken. This would leave for the jury’s consideration, not only Ormond’s opinion as to the value of the remaining lands, but his testimony as to the characteristics of the land and as to a much disputed point — its highest and best use. This was appropriate. Ormond was entitled to show every advantage that his property possessed, present and prospective, in order that the jury might satisfactorily determine what price it could have been sold for on the market. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Carder, 28 Ark. 8, 305 S. W. 2d 330; Arkansas State Highway Commission v. O. & B., Inc., 227 Ark. 739, 301 S. W. 2d 5; City of El Dorado v. Scruggs, 113 Ark. 239, 168 S. W. 846; Little Rock Junction Ry. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S. W. 792, 4 Am. St. R. 51; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Boles, 88 Ark. 602, 115 S. W. 375. He could state and have his witnesses state any and every fact concerning the property which he would naturally be supposed to adduce in order to place it in an advantageous light if he were selling it to a private individual. Little Rock Junction Ry. v. Woodruff, supra; Stuttgart & R. B. R. Co. v. Kocourek, 101 Ark. 47, 141 S. W. 511. An owner is entitled to show the availability of his property for any and all purposes to which it is plainly adapted, or for which it is likely to have value and induce purchases. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Brewer, 240 Ark. 390, 400 S. W. 2d 276: Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Griffin, 241 Ark. 1033, 411 S. W. 2d 495; Gurdon & Ft. Smith R. Co. v. Vaught, 97 Ark. 234, 133 S. W. 1019. The same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale between private parties. Ft. Smith & Van Buren Bridge District v. Scott, 103 Ark. 405, 147 S. W. 440; Little Rock & Fort Smith Railway v. McGehee, 41 Ark. 202. Appellees also offered the testimony of Lloyd Pearce, a realtor with 14 years’ experience as a real estate appraiser. He described a 10-acre lake on the property and a dam which held water on some 35 to 40 acres thereof. He recognized that these lakes had a potential for fish farming. He considered that the highest and best use of the lands was for agricultural purposes with a potential for rural homesites and commercial fish farming. His opinion was that the fair market value of the whole tract Avas $52,400 and of the remaining lands, $35,300, leaving a difference of $17,100 or $5,100 more than the jury verdict. Appellant’s argument that Pearce’s value testimony is not substantial is difficult to follow. He was the first witness called. Our attention is not directed to any objection to his testimony or the basis therefor made during the trial. Apparently appellant did not consider his testimony to be without any reasonable basis at the time it was given. As we interpret the argument, appellant contends that Pearce based his valuation of the Ormond land before the taking substantially on two sales, one of which Avas not comparable, and the other based on incorrect information, but ignored a sale which was comparable. It is also argued that there was no basis for his difference in values before and after the taking. Pearce said that he used market data in making his appraisal. He used a sale of ,a tract by one Isley to Walls on June 18, 1966. This was a 66-acre tract, and Pearce stated that he confirmed a sale price of $18,000, or $290 per acre, with the real estate man who handled the sale, hnt not with the seller or purchaser. Federal revenue stamps on the deed also indicated an $18,000 consideration. Appellant argues that Pearce was wrong because one of its witnesses, a highway department staff appraiser, testified that he confirmed this sale with the purchaser Walls and found that the consideration was $12,-000 or $182 per acre. It has been recognized that a value expert may rely upon hearsay in determining market values in the vicinity of the lands in question. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Russell, 240 Ark. 21, 398 S. W. 2d 201. It has never been recognized that one person who has firsthand knowledge of a real estate sale as a party is a source of information superior to another participant. Apparently, no one made any effort to contact the seller. An interesting question would be posed if he had given another witness still a third figure as the true consideration. The jury was not required to accept the version of either of the witnesses. Buyers and sellers of real estate are often reluctant to disclose true prices. A question of credibility and weight was presented for jury determination on this point, at least in the absence of direct and uncontradicted evidence on the subject. Appellant contends that this sale and another could not be considered as comparable because the lands involved in those transactions fronted upon, or were near, Highway 64,’while the property in question was accessible only by an unimproved dirt road, which may not have been used for some time, or by a permissive access to a county road which intersected with a dirt road from Highway 64, one-fourth to one-half mile away. The Ormond property was 1% miles east of the city limits of Morrilton. Its characteristics were fully described by Pearce, Ormond, and by appellees’ witness Hayes. No effort was made by appellant to show dissimilarity of these tracts in any respect other than the means of access. We have said many times that no two tracts of land are identical and that reasonable latitude must be allowed in considering comparability of sales. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Duff, 246 Ark. 922, 440 S. W. 2d 563; Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Sargent, 241 Ark. 783, 410 S. W. 2d 381; Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Clark, 247 Ark. 165, 444 S. W. 2d 702. We also have repeatedly said that there are many factors to be considered in determining comparability, but that reasonable resemblance is all that is required. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Witkowski, 236 Ark. 66, 364 S. W. 2d 309; Arkansas State Highway Commission v. McAlister, 247 Ark. 757, 447 S. W. 2d 649. We cannot say that the one element of dissimilarity was sufficient to require that the sales, as a basis for opinion evidence, be held not comparable as a matter of law. Appellant contends that Pearce should have considered the sale of a tract near the Ormond land to Nash by one Wallenjohn at $125 per acre just three months prior to the date of taking. Pearce admitted he did not investigate this sale. This tract may. or may not have been comparable to the subject property. This failure on the part of Pearce was a matter to be considered by the jury in testing Pearce’s credibility and weighing his testimony. It did not render his testimony insubstantial, as a matter of law. Appellant’s contention that there was no basis for Pearce’s difference in values is premised largely upon the argument that he based his damages to the north residual of 92.62 acres upon the fact that it was left without any access after the taking. This position is not really justified, because Pearce also pointed out that the tract was severed into two separate and distinct tracts, with resulting alterations in size and shape, and with no means of communication between them. He did consider this north residual to be isolated, because he said, as did both of appellant’s witnesses, that while the south residual had the same means of access it always had, the north tract was left without any means of access because of the location of the highway right-of-way. There were jury questions as to the potential use of the property and as to values. The highest and best use of a landowner’s property is for the jury’s determination. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Griffin, 241 Ark. 1033, 411 S. W. 2d 495. We also held in Griffin that it is proper to allow evidence of all potential uses of a landowner’s property. The fact that one is not an expert pertaining to some use to which the property may be put goes only to the weight to bo given to his testimony. In Ft. Smith & Van Buren Bridge Dist. v. Scott, 103 Ark. 405, 147 S. W. 440, we said: “The sole question here was the market value of the land, and the witnesses gave their opinions as to that value, basing them on different facts and reasons in support thereof. It is true, some of them had no knowledge of the sale of lands under like conditions for bridge site purposes, nor information as to the prices realized at such sales, nor were they expert engineers, but -all who testified were intelligent men, long familiar with the lands taken and the locality and neighborhood where they were situated, knew their value for some purpose, and in giving their opinion as to the most valuable purpose for which they were adapted and could be used, they stated their reasons for so doing. Their knowledge of the facts upon which their opinions were based and the reasons therefor and the value and weight thereof could have been and were ‘readily and satisfactorily tested by cross-examination,’ as said in Railway v. Kirby, 44 Ark. 106.” In that case we held that the question as to who was competent to give an opinion is one which must be left largely to the discretion of the trial court. This further statement in that opinion is also applicable here: “The jury were capable of and it was within their province to determine the weight that should be accorded to the opinions of the witnesses, and we do not think there was any abuse of the discretion of the trial court in permitting the estimates of the witnesses and the reasons therefor submitted to the jury, or that any prejudicial error was committed in the introduction of the testimony.” The case most nearly similar to this is Little Rock & Fort Smith Railway v. McGehee, 41 Ark. 202. The court faced the question as to whether there was support for the actual amount of the damages. The property involved fronted on the river for a quarter of a mile and consisted of a rock bluff entirely unfit for cultivation or human habitation. The estimate of damages on behalf of the landowner was based upon the susceptibility of the property for use as a ferry landing. No ferry had ever been established or operated on the land and no license had been granted by the county court for such a ferry. It was said to be an eligible site by reason of the deep water at that point. The land was less than one mile distant from a licensed ferry at Van Burén which had been in operation since territorial times, but which was said to labor under disadvantages. There was no public highway reaching any point in the land, but it was shown that one could be constructed from Van Burén or Fayetteville .at a moderate expense. The tract consisted of 76 acres, only three or four of which were actually taken. The evidence showed that the landowner had destined the land for this use and had once leased it with the condition that the lessee obtain a license and establish a ferry or surrender the premises. No other use for the property was suggested. The condemnor had moved to exclude all evidence relating to the feasibility of establishing a ferry from the landowner’s property to the opposite bank of the river. The court said that although no ferry may have ever been established there it was possible and maybe probable that a change of circumstances or the development of the country might require one in the near future. It was held that the jury had not placed an exaggerated estimate upon the injury inflicted upon the owner’s tract of land. "We have always held that a jury verdict will not be disturbed if there is any substantial evidence to support it. Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Sargent, 241 Ark. 783, 410 S. W. 2d 381; Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Jelks, 203 Ark. 878, 159 S. W. 2d 465. To do otherwise would invade the province of the jury. Washington County v. Day, 196 Ark. 147, 116 S. W. 2d 1051. Here the Ormond value testimony was manifestly not prejudicial, and obviously disregarded by the jury. The verdict was only a fraction of the damages he stated. It was substantially less than Pearce’s assessment. We have heretofore entered remittiturs when the owner’s value testimony was without reasonable basis down to the amount that was shown by his other value witnesses. See City of Harrison v. Moss, 213 Ark. 721, 212 S. W. 2d 334. The logic applied in such cases requires affirmance of this judgment, where the error obviously did not enhance the award and the verdict is less than the amount for which there is substantial evidentiary support. George Hose Smith, Jones and Byrd, JJ., dissent.