Court Opinion

ID: 9464765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:41:53.562515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:48.209021
License: Public Domain

TONE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
While I agree with Part I of the opinion for the court, I would affirm the judgment because the record shows that McClindon was not adequately advised of the dangers of multiple representation. If he had been, his decision to retain Pride would have been a waiver. United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038, 1045 (7th Cir. 1976). Because such advice was not given, however, there should be a new trial.
If the facts are as stated by Pride in his testimony, neither he nor any other counsel could have advised McClindon to take the stand and offer self-exculpatory testimony without suborning perjury. The Sixth Amendment would not be violated by a denial of such advice.
Pride, or other counsel representing McClindon, could, however, without suborning perjury or otherwise violating his duty as an officer of the court, have pointed in his closing argument to shortcomings in the prosecutor’s case. Thus he could have pointed out that it was Hubbard who was seen putting the gun away as the two men *117fled the scene of the crime and that the evidence did not demonstrate that McClin-don either participated in the use of deadly force or had advance knowledge of a possibility that Hubbard would use such force. This argument, however, would have hurt Hubbard’s defense. With the interests of his two clients thus in conflict, Pride was disabled by his representation of Hubbard from deciding solely on the merits whether to make such an argument.
Absent an adequate warning before trial by counsel or the state trial judge as a predicate to McClindon’s decision to be represented by the same counsel as his code-fendant, that judge had a duty to intervene when the testimony that Hubbard was carrying the gun exposed the conflict of interest. As we said in Gaines,
When the possibility of a conflict appears during trial, the court must investigate the relevant facts, advise the defendant, and determine whether continued representation, absent waiver, would violate the sixth amendment.
529 F.2d at 1043. Further,
When an actual conflict appears, the court must bring the fact of its existence and the resulting dangers which are reasonably foreseeable to the attention of each affected defendant so he can make an informed judgment at that time as to whether he wishes new counsel or wishes to continue with present counsel. Having done that, the court has fulfilled its duty and, if, despite the conflict and the attendant dangers, the defendant elects to continue with the same counsel, he thereby waives his sixth ' amendment right.
Id. at 1044 (footnote omitted). Neither the trial judge nor counsel gave the required warning before trial or when the conflict developed. McClindon is therefore entitled to a new trial.