Court Opinion

ID: 9711508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:33:26.018575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:05.586409
License: Public Domain

Arthur H. Healey, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that “[w]e are confronted here with an ambiguous order regarding alimony.”1 While I do agree that this order clearly permits a modification in amount in the event that a material change in circumstances intervenes within three years of the date of the order, I cannot agree that the order may be modified so as to extend alimony payments beyond its three-year life.
Section 46b-86 (a) of the General Statutes provides in pertinent part: “Unless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification, any final order for the periodic payment of permanent alimony . . . may at any time thereafter be continued, set aside, altered or modified by said court upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party.” (Emphasis added.) In my view, *282the language of the referee’s decree precludes modification that would extend alimony beyond three years.
The order in issue, which is part of the decree, reads as follows: “The defendant shall pay the plaintiff alimony of $100.00 per week for a period of three years from the date of this memorandum. At the end of the three year period, the payment order of alimony shall terminate.” (Emphasis added.) “A judgment is to be construed like other written instruments. The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed.” Cooper v. Cooper, 158 N.W.2d 712, 713 (Iowa 1968), quoting Whittier v. Whittier, 237 Iowa 655, 663, 23 N.W.2d 435 (1946). The same rules of interpretation apply in ascertaining the meaning of a judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of every other writing. Lesh v. Lesh, 8 Cal. App. 3d 883, 890, 87 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1970). In interpreting a decree, particularly one issued in a divorce proceeding, the important object is to carry out the purpose and intent of the court that issued it. Pope v. Pope, 7 Ill. App. 3d 935, 937, 289 N.E.2d 9 (1972). The language of an order must be given its ordinary meaning unless a technical or special meaning is clearly intended. Cf. Perruccio v. Allen, 156 Conn. 282, 285, 240 A.2d 912 (1968) (construing language of contract) ; General Statutes § 1-1 (a) (construing language of statutes).
The referee ordered the defendant to pay weekly alimony in the amount of $100 “for a period of three years from the date of this memorandum.” He then stated: “At the end of the three year period, the *283payment order of alimony shall terminate.” The three-year limitation of the order is clear; it is mentioned not once, but twice. Moreover, the language “shall terminate” is mandatory, as opposed to permissive. See Akin v. Norwalk, 163 Conn. 68, 74, 301 A.2d 258 (1972). “Terminate,” we have said, means to “come to a limit in time; to end.” Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. New Canaan Historical Society, 133 Conn. 706, 714, 54 A.2d 696 (1947); Webster, Third New International Dictionary. The plain language of the order clearly demonstrates that the referee intended that alimony terminate at the end of three years. Thus, to that extent, the decree precluded modification.

 The majority relies upon two eases, Easton v. Easton, 172 Conn. 451, 374 A.2d 1090 (1977), and Lasprogato v. Lasprogato, 127 Conn. 510, 18 A.2d 353 (1941), for the proposition that when faced with “similar ambiguities” in alimony orders this court has construed the orders as modifiable. My examination of those cases reveals, however, that in neither was this court faced with the applicability of General Statutes § 46b-86 (a). Lasprogato, which antedated the enactment of § 46b-86 (a), was decided under then General Statutes § 5182, which provided: “Any order for the payment of alimony from income may, at any time thereafter, be set aside or altered by such court.” Lasprogato v. Lasprogato, supra, 514. Easton concerned the modifiability of an award of alimony under California law. Easton v. Easton, supra, 453.