Court Opinion

ID: 9445071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:19:05.281538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:06.921797
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Buckles, 5 Cir., 232 F.2d 257. I think it was error for the Court below to consider or apply the doctrine res ipsa loquitur. I developed in that opinion the general rule that this doctrine was a rule of necessity only, and was applicable only when necessary evidence is absent and not readily available. Here, as there, I think that the facts were fully developed in the evidence.
Plaintiff Justis showed exactly what he was doing, and the brakeman- who was in the caboose with him supplemented that testimony. All of the members of the train crew showed - exactly what they were doing. The condition of the brakes was disclosed in the evidence, and the brakes had worked properly on all of the equipment. The condition of the roadbed, the terrain, and all of the equipment was shown by the testimony.
The engineer was the only man who performed any duties in- bringing the train to a stop and he used the automatic braking system on all of the cars to reduce the speed from about fifty miles to about twenty miles an hour, and thereupon slacked off on the automatic brake and applied the independent engine brake gradually until the train came to a complete stop. It was proved by him and by a number of outside experts that what he did was the proper thing to do.
Plaintiff developed, by his examination of the witnesses, the theory that sufficient notice was not given to the train crew about a change of method which took place a few days before this accident and which related to the char*273acter and details of the inspection which occasioned the stopping of the train. Apparently plaintiff tried to develop the idea that maybe the members of this train crew had not been advised of the change of practice so that they could perform their duties as members of the team which was the crew of the train.
Considerable evidence was introduced concerning the placement of loads and empties in a train of this character, and the plaintiff had certain responsibilities in connection therewith. Without dispute, he knew how the loads were distributed in the train, and he knew further that the train was in the act of coming to a stop, and he stated that the speed had been reduced from about fifty miles an hour to about five miles per hour at the time of the jerk which caused his trouble. It was uncontradicted that, if he had taken a seat or had caught hold of the safety rod within his reach, his injuries would not have occurred. He did not take that precaution because he assumed that the stop would be a gentle and easy one and not a violent one.
All of the testimony of all of the witnesses was clear and understandable, and the Court and jury knew from it what happened. Every aspect of the operation was placed before the Court and jury, and there were no gaps or obscure places in the testimony. Neither the Court below nor the jury should have placed upon the railroad company the burden accompanying the application of res ipsa loquitur. It had no place in the case because evidence had been introduced about every phase of it, including the actions and the failure to act on the part of the plaintiff. The Court below and the jury ought to have reached their respective decisions on the facts and not on any presumption of negligence.
There was satisfactory proof that a hard jerk does not occur in the day to day handling of freight trains. While conceding that it was his duty to be prepared constantly for sudden starts or stops and for setting of the brakes and for slack action, plaintiff classified the stop which occasioned his injury as an “awful rough stop”. That is a vague and uncertain term and does not put any definite appraisal on the character of the stop. What one man would consider an “awful” rough stop, another, especially an experienced railroad man, would consider a normal stop. Plaintiff established that each draw-bar of the freight ears had a play in it of four inches, making a total of eight inches between each two cars. That would make more than forty feet of play or slack between the engine and the caboose. Without dispute, it is necessary to handle that slack in bringing a train to a stop by slowing down and finally stopping the motion of the heavy engine and letting the cars proceed forward under their own momentum until all of the slack is taken up. It is common knowledge that every time that is done or the opposite is done when a freight train begins a movement, a jerk of varying proportions takes place. While some short passenger trains do have rigid couplings, freight cars universally and necessarily have this play in their couplings and operation could not continue without this play. ' Every man who railroads knows that and is bound to accommodate his own actions to that known fact.
The doctrine res ipsa loquitur would be applicable only if it was necessary to furnish evidence which was not readily available, if the accident was of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence, and if it was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. The evidence in this case did not, in my opinion, satisfy those conditions.
It is manifest that the Court below did apply it, both in charging the jury and in reaching its own conclusions with respect to the various motions challenging the sufficiency of the proof. Among these were the motion at the conclusion of all of the evidence for a directed verdict, and the motion for *274new trial. In every instance the attention of the Court was called specifically to defendant’s reliance upon its contention that the doctrine should not be applied.
The cases are legion and are on every side of the problem under consideration. I have found none directly in point or which are determinative of the problem. The law cited in my dissent in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Buckles, supra, applies here and nothing would be gained by citing other cases. In my opinion, the actions and judgment of the Court below were produced in part by applying res ipsa loquitur, and this was error for which its judgment should be reversed.
Rehearing denied: CAMERON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.