Court Opinion

ID: 9655249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:03:37.178282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:17.049301
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
I.
Appellant Mildred Cecil (Cecil) presents thirteen points of error in her motion for rehearing, the first eleven claiming we erred in holding that she failed to preserve her appellate points of error numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 for review under Tex.R.App.P. 52(a) (hereinafter Rule 52(a)). She presents two points of error (12 and 13) by which she asserts that we erred in overruling her appellate points of error numbers 4 and 8 by which she claimed the trial court erred in giving certain instructions on the law of “delivery” and in refusing to submit Cecil’s requested jury question number 9. We will overrule the motion for rehearing.
Essentially, Cecil contends by her first eleven points of error in her motion for rehearing that:
1. she fully complied with Tex.R.Civ.P. 324 and 329b (hereinafter referred to as Rules 324 and 329b), thereby satisfying the requirements of Rule 52(a);
2. our application of Rule 52(a) “ignores governing rules of construction”;
3. we misinterpreted Rules 324 and 329b;
4. our ruling conflicts with the decisions in Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.1989), Berry v. Berry, 770 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied); and Metot v. Danielson, 780 S.W.2d 283 (Tex.App. —Tyler 1989, writ denied);
5. our “holding” denies her “due process of law [under] ... the Texas *714Constitution or the United States Constitution”;
6. our “ruling creates an impractical obstacle to the administration of justice,” and
7. we erred in concluding that this court lacked jurisdiction “to consider [her four] points of error_” challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support certain jury findings.
Cecil contends by her twelfth and thirteenth points of error assigned in her motion for rehearing that (1) we “erred in affirming the trial court’s instruction ... on what constituted delivery of a deed,” and (2) we “erred in upholding the trial court’s refusal to submit a question concerning ownership of the monies used to obtain a certificate of deposit.”
II.
We remain persuaded, for the reasons expressed in our original opinion, that Cecil’s appellate points of error numbers 4 and 8 are without merit. Therefore we overrule hér twelfth and thirteenth assignments of error.
We turn now to consider Cecil’s remaining complaints that this Court erred in holding that she failed to preserve her appellate points of error numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 for review, and Cecil’s arguments thereunder.
Cecil argues that she complied with the provisions of Rules 324 and 329b, and that this court failed to recognize that Rule 52(a) in these circumstances is a “general rule” and Rule 329b a special rule. Hence, our conclusion that Rule 52(a) controls over Rule 329b is contrary to the generally accepted rule of construction that where a conflict exists between a general rule and a special or specific rule, the specific or special rule controls. Additionally, Cecil argues that our ruling is at odds with Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Magallenes, 763 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.1989); Berry v. Berry, 770 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied); Metot v. Danielson, 780 S.W.2d 283 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, writ denied); and Voth v. Felderhoff, 768 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1989, writ denied).
Rule 52(a) provides in part:
(a)General Rule. In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling he desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context. It is also necessary for the complaining party to obtain a ruling upon the party’s request, objection or motion_ (Emphasis ours.)
Rule 324 reads in part:
(b) Motion for New Trial Required. A point in a motion for new trial is a prerequisite to the following complaints on appeal:
(1) A complaint on which evidence must be heard such as one of jury misconduct or newly discovered evidence or failure to set aside a judgment by default;
(2) A complaint of factual insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding;
(3) A complaint that a jury finding is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence;
(4) A complaint of inadequacy or ex-cessiveness of the damages found by the jury; or
(5) Incurable jury argument if not otherwise ruled on by the trial court. (Emphasis ours.)
Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 329b provide rules governing motions for new trial and other motions, and require original and amended motions for new trial to be filed within “thirty days after the judgment ... complained of is signed.”
Paragraphs (c) and (e) of Rule 329b read, in pertinent part, as follows:
(c) In the event an original or amended motion for new trial or a motion to modify, correct or reform a judgment is not determined by written order signed within seventy-five days after the judgment was signed, it shall be considered *715overruled by operation of law on expiration of that period. (Emphasis ours.)
(e) If a motion for new trial is timely filed by any party, the trial court, regardless of whether an appeal has been perfected, has plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment until thirty days after all ... timely-filed motions are overruled, either by a written and signed order or by operation of law, whichever occurs first. (Emphasis ours.)
Cecil contends that by our ruling we have reinstated the “presentment” language of former Rule 329b that was eliminated in 1981. That language required the movant for new trial “to present the [motion] to the court....” Our response to that argument is simple. The significance, if any, of the omission of that requirement in the 1981 version of Rule 329b is more than overwhelmed by the language placed in Rule 52(a) in 1986 by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the thrust of the 1981 rewrite of Rule 329b was to confer considerably more control to the trial court over its judgments, by giving that court absolute control thereover for an additional thirty days after the overruling of timely filed original or amended motions for new trial so that the trial court may correct, modify, vacate or reform the judgment, or grant a new trial in the case. Contrary to Cecil’s contention, we found no conflict between Rules 324 or 329b and the provisions of Rule 52(a). Therefore, it makes no sense to argue under these rules that an appellate court has authority, in the face of Rule 52(a), to review an error attributed to the trial court but which, in reality, is an error which the trial court was not apprised of, and had no opportunity to correct or otherwise rule on. Contrary to Cecil’s arguments, the litigants, the public at large, and the judicial system as a whole benefit when an appeal is avoided because the trial judge is afforded the opportunity to correct his own error.
Also contrary to Cecil’s arguments, we did not hold, or even suggest in our opinion, that she had to “present” a motion for new trial, in the context of securing a hearing thereon, but only stated that she “never directed the trial court’s attention to her [timely filed] motion for new trial_” Cf. Moore v. Mauldin, 428 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.1968).
Cecil incorrectly asserts that our ruling conflicts with the opinion of the Supreme Court in Cherne Industries, Inc. That decision does not support Cecil’s arguments, but to the contrary, by way of analogy, supports our ruling. The case deals with Tex.R.Civ.P. 296 and 297, which govern the procedures for procuring findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Cherne court points out that the
[S]cheme established by ... the rules is a sensible one. The initial request should be simple, filed with the [clerk of court] like any other pleading. If the judge does not comply, whether intentionally, through neglect, or through no fault at all, the more rigorous procedure of Rule 297 will ensure that the court is in a timely fashion fully apprised of the request and the party’s continuing interest in having it honored. (Emphasis ours.)
Cherne, 763 S.W.2d at 772.
Moreover, in Cherne, Chief Justice Phillips observes, as Cecil notes in her motion:
In a time when the cost and delay of litigation threaten the right of meaningful access to the courts for many of our citizens, we cannot condone an erroneous interpretation of our rules, however embedded in our practice, which discourages litigants from availing themselves of a cheaper and quicker means of judicial resolution. (Emphasis ours.)

Id.

We agree with Judge Phillips. That is exactly what our ruling will serve to bring about, that is, “a cheaper and quicker means of judicial resolution.”
We now respond to Cecil’s argument that our application of Rule 52(a) somehow “creates an impractical obstacle to the administration of justice.” Cecil alleges that we have “set a trap” precluding review of a case on its merits. This is not so. Rule 52(a) prescribes the predicates required for *716preserving errors for appellate review. It is likewise a sensible rule, and is imminently fair and certainly essential to a sound appellate process in which the main task of all intermediate appellate courts is to correct errors. See Tex.R.App.P. '50(d), which places the burden on the appellant to bring a record to this court sufficient “to show error [complained of] requiring reversal.”
Cecil correctly argues that our present ruling is contrary to our decision in Metot. In that case, the majority of this court rejected appellee’s (Danielson) contention that appellant (Metot) “did not properly preserve their allegations that the jury findings were against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Metot v. Danielson, 780 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, writ denied). Danielson claimed “that merely filing a motion for new trial is not sufficient to preserve error on appeal; the movant must in some way ‘direct the court's attention’ to the motion for new trial.” Id. This court, in so ruling, said, “[w]e do not agree with this contention because to do so would have the effect of adding a requirement to [Rule 324] not present in the literal language of the rule.” Id. (footnote omitted). Although our original opinion in this case refers to the concurring opinion in Metot and overruled Metot’s holding by implication, we should have, and do now, for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion in Metot and the reasons stated in this opinion, overrule Metot to the extent that it is in conflict with our decision in this case.
We will not address Cecil’s argument that our conclusion that she failed to preserve her appellate points of error numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 under Rule 52(a) is in conflict with Voth v. Felderhoff. Those arguments attack the language in our opinion which reads, “Moreover, Cecil did not thereafter present any motion to the court under Rule 329b(e) seeking a new trial or any other relief from the judgment as authorized by that rule.” Our legal conclusion that Cecil’s points of error numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 were not preserved for review rests upon Cecil’s failure to call the trial court’s attention to her timely filed motion for new trial that alleges those claimed errors. Our implied conclusion that those errors could have been preserved by a “tardy motion” filed by Cecil to invoke the trial court’s plenary powers under the rule was a mere gratuity, unnecessary to our holding. We amend our original opinion by striking that language found on page 5 of our original opinion in this case. We now address Cecil’s claims that our ruling violates her “due process” and “due course of ... law” rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Tex. Const, art. I, § 19 by refusing to pass on the merits of her points of error numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. Cecil cites no authority in support of this argument, but baldly asserts that “[pjrior to this Court’s decision, a party has been entitled to a review on the merits of issues raised in a motion for new trial when the motion was overruled by operation of law.” She argues that this deprivation of review on the merits constitutes a violation of those constitutional rights. To begin with, we are unaware of any case, other than Metot (now overruled) that actually passes on the question. Moreover, our decision not to review her points of error on the merits because of her failure to preserve them for review is required by Rule 52(a) and does not offend, or even implicate her claimed constitutional rights. Cf. Howell v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 710 S.W.2d 729, 732-734 (Tex.App. —Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r. e.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018, 107 S.Ct. 1898, 95 L.Ed.2d 505 (1987). Therefore, we reject her contentions to the contrary.
Next we discuss Cecil’s arguments that we erred in concluding that we lacked jurisdiction to consider her four “no” evidence or “legal” insufficiency points. As we understand Cecil’s eleventh assignment of error,1 she contends that although she failed (1) to make objections to the submission of jury question numbers 3 and 4, (2) to file a motion for instructed verdict, (3) to file a motion to disregard the jury’s an*717swers to those questions, or (4) to file a motion for judgment non obstante veredic-to, she did preserve the points of error by filing her motion for new trial in which she alleged those errors. Ambox, Inc.’s holding, pertinent here, was based on Rosas v. Shafer, 415 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.1967). Cecil has obviously misread our opinion. We did not conclude that “legal” insufficiency points cannot be preserved by a party’s assertion thereof in a timely filed motion for new trial; we only concluded that since she did not otherwise preserve those points of error for review, and she failed, as required by Rule 52(a), to call the trial court’s attention to the motion for new trial, those points were not preserved for review. There is no merit in her argument and we reject it.
Finally, Cecil maintains that if a trial judge refuses to take action, meaning to conduct a hearing or rule on the motion before the motion is overruled by operation of law, what then? The answer to that question is easy. Since those circumstances show that the trial judge was aware of the motion but refuses to rule, then a simple objection to that refusal is, in itself, sufficient to preserve the error. See Rule 52(a).
Based on our careful consideration of Cecil’s motion for rehearing, and for the reasons set forth in our original opinion, in this opinion, and in the concurring opinion in Metot, we are persuaded that the ruling we made in our original opinion delivered on April 16, 1990, is correct. Therefore we overrule Cecil’s motion for rehearing.

. Based on the authorities cited, see, e.g., Am-box, Inc. v. Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc., 518 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.1 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).