Court Opinion

ID: 2964479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:18.315212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:32:56.927836
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 96-1619

                        ROSS-SIMONS OF WARWICK, INC., ET AL.,

                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

                                   BACCARAT, INC.,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                 [Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                         __________________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Cyr and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                              _________________________

               Jeffrey A.  Oppenheim, with whom Kane Kessler, P.C., John H.
               _____________________            __________________  _______
          Blish,  Joseph V. Cavanagh, Jr.,  Michael W. Carroll  and Blish &
          _____   _______________________   __________________      _______
          Cavanagh were on brief, for appellant.
          ________
               Steven E. Snow, with whom Thomas R. Noel and Partridge, Snow
               ______________            ______________     _______________
          & Hahn were on brief, for appellees.
          ______

                              _________________________

                                  December 13, 1996
                              _________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.   Defendant-appellant Baccarat,
                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.
                            ______________

          Inc. (Baccarat) implores us to dismantle a preliminary injunction

          that compels it to continue selling its wares to the plaintiffs.1

          Discerning  neither  error of  law  nor abuse  of  discretion, we

          affirm.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    We  divide  our  account  of  the  relevant  background

          material into four segments.

                             A.  The Commercial Climate.
                             A.  The Commercial Climate.
                                 ______________________

                    Baccarat is a subsidiary of Compagnie des Cristalleries

          de Baccarat, a prestigious French  lead crystal manufacturer.  It

          is  the  exclusive  distributor  in  the  United  States of  this

          aristocratic product line.

                    Ross-Simons  sells  jewelry,  tableware,  crystal,  and

          sundry other  merchandise from  retail stores located  in several

          states.  Roughly eighty-five percent of its business, however, is

          generated   through   catalog  and   telemarketing  sales.     It

          distributes 45,000,000 catalogs annually and maintains a bustling

          distribution  center in  Cranston, Rhode Island.   A  bridal gift

          registry  comprises an  integral part of  Ross-Simons' business.2
                              
          ____________________

               1Ross-Simons,  Inc.,  Ross-Simons  of  Warwick,  Inc., Ross-
          Simons of  Barrington, Inc.,  Ross-Simons of Atlanta,  L.L.C. and
          Ross-Simons of  North Carolina,  L.L.C. are all  named plaintiffs
          herein.  For simplicity's  sake we refer to them  collectively as
          "Ross-Simons."

               2The mechanics of a  bridal gift registry are uncomplicated.
          In its  simplest iteration,  betrothed couples select  items that
          they would like  to possess  and "register" with  a merchant  who
          carries those items.   Persons who wish to give  wedding presents
          or  gifts  for other  occasions  can then  contact  the merchant,

                                          2

          The firm  acquires approximately 15,000 new  registrants annually

          and has about 30,000  active registrations at any given time.  In

          1995 Ross-Simons grossed  $150,000,000 from  all its  operations,

          including  $1,000,000  attributable to  Baccarat  crystal (mostly

          from catalog sales).

                    Ross-Simons  carved its  niche as  a discount  or "off-

          price" retailer,  frequently advertising prices as  much as fifty

          percent below  suggested retail  prices.  Baccarat  comes from  a

          different  school, having  steadfastly  resisted discounting  and

          discounters.  For many years Baccarat refused to sell its crystal

          to  Ross-Simons.   Moreover, when  Baccarat became  the exclusive

          American  distributor of  Haviland  Limoges porcelain  dinnerware

          (not a  product that Baccarat manufactured),  it terminated Ross-

          Simons as an authorized dealer for that line.

                    Rather  than  turning   the  other  cheek,  Ross-Simons

          responded by filing  an antitrust  suit.   Its complaint  alleged

          inter  alia that Baccarat refused to deal with Ross-Simons due to
          _____  ____

          the latter's  proclivity for  discount pricing.   In  November of

          1992,  the  parties  entered  into  a  written  accord  (the 1992

          Agreement)  that settled  their differences.3   Pursuant  to that

          agreement,  the federal  district court  dismissed  the antitrust

          suit without prejudice.

                              
          ____________________

          choose  an  item from  the list,  and  have it  delivered  to the
          registrant(s).

               3In  addition  to  Baccarat,  other  named  defendants  were
          parties  to  both   the  lawsuit  and  the  settlement.     Their
          involvement does not affect this appeal.

                                          3

                               B.  The 1992 Agreement.
                               B.  The 1992 Agreement.
                                   __________________

                    An understanding  of the 1992 Agreement  is critical to

          reasoned consideration  of the issues  on appeal.   Baccarat  and

          Ross-Simons styled the  pact as an  "Agreement of Compromise  and

          Settlement"  and stipulated that  it would  be governed  by Rhode

          Island  law.  They memorialized  it "as a  compromise between the

          parties  for  the settlement  of  their  claims, differences  and

          causes of action."  However, they  did not ask the district court

          either  to  approve the  settlement terms  or  to enter  a decree

          embodying those terms.

                    By virtue  of  the 1992  Agreement, Baccarat  appointed

          Ross-Simons  as an  authorized dealer  "entitled to  purchase and

          resell  [Baccarat crystal] products at  such prices and upon such

          terms as are available to other authorized dealers."  In addition

          Baccarat  agreed "not  [to] terminate  Ross-Simons' status  as an

          authorized dealer, nor otherwise discriminate against Ross-Simons

          in  any manner, [for its  refusal] to adhere  to suggested resale

          prices  or  due  to  Ross-Simons'  marketing through  direct-mail

          catalogs."   The 1992 Agreement contains no  durational term, but

          it specifically  provides that  its covenants and  conditions are

          not terminable on the basis of changed facts.

                             C.  The Proposed Agreement.
                             C.  The Proposed Agreement.
                                 ______________________

                    Ross-Simons sold  Baccarat  products for  three  years,

          without  incident,  until  a   series  of  events  shattered  the

          increasingly fragile  business  relationship.   A new  management

          regime took control of Baccarat in 1994 and Jean-Luc Negre became

                                          4

          the firm's chief executive  officer.  Early on, Negre  made known

          his  view that  it was  inappropriate for  retailers to  discount

          luxury items.  He then reshaped Baccarat's marketing  strategy in

          an attempt,  as he  put it,  to  improve the  "overall image  and

          prestige . . .  of [Baccarat's] world-renowned name."   Under the

          revised plan, Baccarat limited the number of retailers to whom it

          would  sell  its products  and  simultaneously  introduced a  new

          "Authorized  Dealer Program."   To  retain authorized  dealership

          status in 1996  and beyond, a  retailer had to sign  a particular

          form of  dealer agreement (the Proposed Agreement)  no later than

          December 15, 1995.

                     Although Baccarat invited  Ross-Simons (along with 379

          other retailers)  to participate in this  neoteric program, there

          was  a rub;  by its  terms the  Proposed Agreement  prohibits the

          advertising of  Baccarat products in any catalog or other printed

          medium that promotes at  off-prices more than twenty-five percent

          of  the items  advertised.   In  addition, Baccarat  reserved the

          right to determine in its sole discretion "whether an advertising

          or promotional practice  is damaging to  the image, prestige  and

          goodwill" of its products.   If Baccarat found any  such practice

          offensive, it could terminate  the dealership forthwith.  Because

          Ross-Simons (alone among Baccarat's invitees) devotes most of its

          catalog  to discounted  items, and  because Negre  previously had

          proclaimed that off-pricing was inconsistent with prestige, Ross-

          Simons  viewed the proposal as a "suicide note," asserted that it

          violated  the terms of the  1992 Agreement, and  refused to sign.

                                          5

          Presumably in anticipation that  Baccarat would follow through on

          its  threat  of  termination,  Ross-Simons   stockpiled  Baccarat

          products  in late  1995.   The  precaution  proved justified,  as

          Baccarat refused  to  fill Ross-Simons'  orders  (including  1995

          orders  previously received  but  theretofore unfilled)  from and

          after January 1, 1996.

                              D.  The Proceedings Below.
                              D.  The Proceedings Below.
                                  _____________________

                    Ross-Simons  sued  Baccarat  in a  Rhode  Island  state

          court, claiming breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant

          of good  faith and fair  dealing, and tortious  interference with

          advantageous business  relationships.  Baccarat  removed the case

          to  the federal  district  court.    See  28  U.S.C.      1332(a)
                                               ___

          (diversity jurisdiction),  1441 (permitting  removal of cases  in

          which  diversity  jurisdiction  exists).   In  short  order,  the

          district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and granted Ross-

          Simons'  motion to compel Baccarat, pendente lite, to continue to
                                              ________ ____

          sell products  in pursuance of the 1992 Agreement.  In its ruling

          the court  predicted that  Ross-Simons probably would  prevail on

          the   theory   that  the   Proposed   Agreement  constituted   an

          impermissible attempt by Baccarat  to subvert the 1992 Agreement.

          Relatedly,  the court  concluded  that  Ross-Simons would  suffer

          irreparable harm  in the absence of  mandatory injunctive relief,

          and conversely, that Baccarat would undergo scant hardship should

                                          6

          a preliminary injunction issue.  This appeal ensued.4

          II.  ANALYSIS
          II.  ANALYSIS

                    In the  sections that  follow, we peruse  the checklist

          applicable  to preliminary  injunction  determinations  and  then

          assess how well the  district court's order withstands Baccarat's

          multi-pronged attack.

                       A.  The Preliminary Injunction Standard.
                       A.  The Preliminary Injunction Standard.
                           ___________________________________

                    Over time,  we have  crafted a four-part  framework for

          use  in determining  whether the grant  or denial  of preliminary

          injunctive relief is appropriate.   Under this formulation, trial

          courts must consider (1) the likelihood of success on the merits;

          (2)  the  potential for  irreparable  harm if  the  injunction is

          denied;  (3)  the  balance  of relevant  impositions,  i.e.,  the

          hardship to  the nonmovant  if enjoined  as  contrasted with  the

          hardship  to  the movant  if no  injunction  issues; and  (4) the

          effect (if any)  of the  court's ruling on  the public  interest.

          See Weaver v.  Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 &  n.3 (1st Cir. 1993);
          ___ ______     _________

          Narragansett  Indian Tribe v. Guilbert,  934 F.2d 4,  5 (1st Cir.
          __________________________    ________

          1991).

                    An  appellate court  affords considerable  deference to

          the  district  court's  evaluative  judgment  of  these  discrete

          factors and of their interrelationship.  See  Anthony v. Sundlun,
                                                   ___  _______    _______

          952 F.2d 603, 605 n.2 (1st Cir. 1991).  Thus, a party who appeals

                              
          ____________________

               4Baccarat's endeavors to secure  a stay were unavailing, and
          the preliminary injunction is in force.

                                          7

          from  the   issuance  of  a  preliminary   injunction  bears  the

          considerable  burden  of  demonstrating   that  the  trial  court

          mishandled the four-part framework.  See EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc.,
                                               ___ ____    _______________

          94  F.3d 738, 743 (1st Cir. 1996).   In sum, unless the appellant

          can show that the lower court misapprehended the law or committed

          a palpable abuse  of discretion,  the court of  appeals will  not

          intervene.    See  Narragansett  Indian  Tribe, 934  F.2d  at  5;
                        ___  ___________________________

          Independent  Oil &  Chem. Workers  of Quincy,  Inc. v.  Procter &
          ___________________________________________________     _________

          Gamble Mfg.  Co., 864  F.2d  927, 929  (1st Cir.  1988).   Though
          ________________

          mistake of law is a rubric that requires no elaboration, abuse of

          discretion is a fuzzier concept.   That inquiry is case-specific,

          see Weaver, 984 F.2d  at 13; Narragansett Indian Tribe,  934 F.2d
          ___ ______                   _________________________

          at 5-6, and  a finding  of abuse usually  entails proof that  the

          nisi  prius  court,  in  making the  challenged  ruling,  ignored

          pertinent  elements  deserving  significant   weight,  considered

          improper criteria,  or, though  assessing all appropriate  and no

          inappropriate  factors,  plainly  erred  in balancing  them,  see
                                                                        ___

          Procter & Gamble, 864 F.2d at 929.
          ________________

                    We proceed  to scrutinize the  district court's  ruling

          under this  deferential glass.  In so  doing, we address only the

          first  two rungs of the four-part framework, as Baccarat does not

          challenge the district court's analysis anent either the third or

          fourth rung.

                            B.  The Likelihood of Success.
                            B.  The Likelihood of Success.
                                _________________________

                    Likelihood of success is  the main bearing wall  of the

          four-factor framework.  See  Weaver, 984 F.2d at 12;  Auburn News
                                  ___  ______                   ___________

                                          8

          Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1981),
          ___    ______________________

          cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).  Here, Baccarat challenges the
          _____ ______

          district court's assessment of  this factor in two respects.   We

          examine each  in turn.   Before  doing  so, however,  we deem  it

          prudent to  remind the reader that,  just as the trial  court, at

          the preliminary  injunction stage, need not  predict the eventual

          outcome on  the merits with absolute  assurance, see Narragansett
                                                           ___ ____________

          Indian Tribe,  934  F.2d  at  6  (cautioning  that  decisions  on
          ____________

          preliminary  injunction "are  to be  understood as  statements of

          probable   outcomes"   only),  an   appellate   court   need  not

          conclusively  determine the  merits of  the underlying  claims to

          execute abuse-of-discretion review.

                    1.    The  Nondiscrimination  Clause.    As  previously
                    1.    The  Nondiscrimination  Clause.
                          ______________________________

          mentioned,  see supra Part I(B),  Baccarat agreed in  1992 not to
                      ___ _____

          "discriminate against  Ross-Simons in any manner"  because of its

          predilection for off-pricing.  The district  court relied on this

          clause  in holding that  Ross-Simons likely would  prevail on its

          breach of  contract claim.   However, Baccarat maintains  that it

          terminated Ross-Simons for failing to sign the Proposed Agreement

          and,  in  doing so,  treated Ross-Simons  the  same as  any other

          dealer who refused to honor this uniform set of terms.  Since the

          lower  court's  order  requires  Baccarat  to  treat  Ross-Simons

          differently than  other  dealers    that is,  more favorably,  by

          allowing Ross-Simons  to buy Baccarat crystal  without abiding by

          the Proposed Agreement's uniform terms   it is the court's order,

          not Baccarat's conduct, this  thesis holds, which contradicts the

                                          9

          nondiscrimination clause  contained in the 1992  Agreement.  This

          resupinate reasoning  stands the nondiscrimination clause  on its

          head and ignores the district court's factual findings.

                    Judge  Boyle  found  that  of the  380  retailers  whom

          Baccarat invited to become authorized dealers, only one of them  

          Ross-Simons   engaged in systematic off-pricing.  Thus, while the

          proscription against widespread discounting  was part and  parcel

          of  a uniform contract (i.e., the Proposed Agreement), only Ross-

          Simons would feel  its sting.   Building on  this foundation  the

          judge  drew  the  eminently  reasonable inference  that  Baccarat

          (which had not previously attempted to impose a monolithic set of

          dealer  agreements)  wrote  these  particular  provisions  in   a

          deliberate  effort to  circumvent the  1992 Agreement.    On this

          basis, he  concluded that  Ross-Simons probably would  succeed on

          the   merits   inasmuch   as  the   proscription   violated   the

          nondiscrimination clause.5

                    To be sure, these findings are not inevitable, but they

          reflect a  plausible rendition  of the  evidence then  before the

          court.    The findings,  in turn,  support  the court's  chain of

          reasoning  and give  meaningful  effect to  the 1992  Agreement's

          nondiscrimination  clause.    That  ends  the  matter:   at  this

          preliminary  stage, it is both  the trial court's prerogative and

          its  duty   "to  assess  the  facts,   draw  whatever  reasonable
                              
          ____________________

               5Among other things, Baccarat's former president (who signed
          the  1992   Agreement  on  its  behalf)   executed  an  affidavit
          supporting  Ross-Simons' view  of  the nondiscrimination  clause.
          This testimony buttresses the district court's application of the
          clause.

                                          10

          inferences it might favor,  and decide the likely ramifications."

          Procter & Gamble, 864 F.2d at 933.
          ________________

                    2.  The  Uniform Commercial  Code.  In  its next  foray
                    2.  The  Uniform Commercial  Code.
                        _____________________________

          Baccarat  attempts  to  characterize  the  1992  Agreement  as  a

          contract for the sale  of goods, thus bringing into  play Article

          Two of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), R.I. Gen. Laws    6A-2-

          101 to  6A-2-725 (1992), and, in particular, R.I. Gen. Laws   6A-

          2-309(2)   ("Where   the   contract   provides   for   successive

          performances  but is  indefinite in  duration it  is valid  for a

          reasonable time, but unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at

          any  time by either party.").   In Baccarat's  view, this statute

          renders the 1992 Agreement terminable at will and thus undermines

          Ross-Simons'  contract claims.   This argument,  though burnished

          with considerable care, builds on a false premise.

                    We  begin with  bedrock.   Courts look to  the apparent

          intentions   of   the  contracting   parties   when  interpreting

          contracts.  See  United States  v. Seckinger, 397  U.S. 203,  212
                      ___  _____________     _________

          n.17 (1970); McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 355 (1st Cir. 1994);
                       ________    _____

          Fashion House,  Inc. v. K  mart Corp.,  892 F.2d 1076,  1084 (1st
          ____________________    _____________

          Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 641  A.2d 47,
                      _______    ___________________________

          48 (R.I. 1994).   A valid settlement agreement is  an enforceable

          contract subject to  this basic principle  of construction.   See
                                                                        ___

          ITT Corp. v.  LTX Corp., 926 F.2d 1258,  1266-67 (1st Cir. 1991);
          _________     _________

          Mathewson  Corp. v. Allied Marine Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 856
          ________________    __________________________

          (1st Cir. 1987); T & T Mfg. Co. v.  A.T. Cross Co., 587 F.2d 533,
                           ______________     ______________

          537  (1st  Cir. 1978),  cert. denied,  441  U.S. 908  (1979); cf.
                                  _____ ______                          ___

                                          11

          Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1221 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating
          _______    ________

          that  consent decrees  between  private parties  in a  commercial

          setting are  treated as contracts).   Thus,  whether Article  Two

          applies to the  1992 Agreement hinges  primarily on the  parties'

          intentions.

                    The  district  court  eschewed  any  reference  to  the

          statute, apparently convinced  that it  did not  govern the  1992

          Agreement.   We believe that this action is supportable.  Article

          Two  does not purport to regulate nonsale transactions.  See R.I.
                                                                   ___

          Gen.  Laws    6A-2-102.   Furthermore, if  a contract  contains a

          blend of sale and  nonsale elements, Article Two applies  only if

          the  dominant  purpose  behind  the  contract  reflects  a  sales

          transaction.  See ITT, 926 F.2d at 1266; Cianbro Corp. v. Curran-
                        ___ ___                    _____________    _______

          Lavoie, Inc., 814  F.2d 7,  13-14 (1st Cir.  1987); Bonebrake  v.
          ____________                                        _________

          Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th  Cir. 1974); see generally 1 J. White
          ___                                      ___ _________

          &  R.  Summers, Uniform  Commercial Code     1-1 (4th  ed. 1995).
                          ________________________

          Consequently,  Article Two is not in play if the dominant purpose

          of  an agreement  is to settle  litigation.  See,  e.g., ITT, 926
                                                       ___   ____  ___

          F.2d  at 1266;  New Eng.  Power Co.  v. Riley  Stoker Corp.,  477
                          ___________________     ___________________

          N.E.2d 1054, 1060-61 (Mass. App.  Ct.), review denied, 481 N.E.2d
                                                  ______ ______

          197 (Mass. 1985).

                    While it  is not  necessary definitively to  decide the

          issue  of predominant purpose  at this stage  in the proceedings,

          the  record strongly  suggests  that  the  parties  to  the  1992

          Agreement  intended first  and foremost  to settle  the antitrust

          litigation.  For one thing, the title of the pact   "Agreement of

                                          12

          Compromise  and Settlement"   is a good barometer of the parties'

          intentions.  Though  the label that contracting  parties affix to

          an agreement is not  necessarily determinative of the agreement's

          predominant purpose,  it can  constitute potent evidence  of that

          purpose.   See, e.g.,  Triangle Underwriters, Inc.  v. Honeywell,
                     ___  ____   ___________________________     __________

          Inc.,  604  F.2d 737,  742-43 (2d  Cir.  1979) (holding  a hybrid
          ____

          contract  entitled  "Agreement for  the  Sale of  [Goods]"  to be

          precisely that);  Riley Stoker, 477 N.E.2d  at 1060-61 (declining
                            ____________

          to characterize  a document labelled "Settlement  Agreement" as a

          contract for the sale of goods).

                    For  another  thing, the  body  of  the 1992  Agreement

          contains  language  that  is  more consistent  with  the  purpose

          suggested  by its  title  than  with  any  other  purpose.    The

          agreement  opens  with  a   declaration  that  it  represents  "a

          compromise  between  the  parties  for the  settlement  of  their

          claims,  differences  and causes  of action  with respect  to the

          dispute."  A  later section reiterates that the  parties executed

          the document "for  the sole purpose of  compromising and settling
                                 ____

          the  matters involved  in  [the antitrust]  dispute."   (Emphasis

          supplied).   These excerpts  comprise powerful evidence  that the

          primary impetus  for  the  agreement  was to  abate  the  pending

          litigation.

                    Baccarat tries to throw cold water on this proposition.

          Since  the  antitrust  suit  was   dismissed  without  prejudice,

          Baccarat suggests that Ross-Simons  could have revived the claims

          at  any  time, and,  thus, the  predominant  purpose of  the 1992

                                          13

          Agreement  must have been the sale of  goods.  We think that this

          is  a classic non sequitur.   Dismissing a  lawsuit, even without

          prejudice, is not an idle matter; it has consequences in terms of

          costs,  legal expenses,  time bars,  and the  like.   Because the

          parties' intentions (and, therefore, the contract's meaning) must

          be  gleaned from  all the  surrounding circumstances,  see, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Seckinger, 397 U.S. at 212 n.17, the dismissal without prejudice,
          _________

          by itself, cannot support Baccarat's characterization.

                    There is  a second  problem with Baccarat's  attempt to

          invoke  Article Two:  even  this scant record  indicates that the

          parties never  intended the  1992 Agreement  to be  terminable at

          will.  Indeed,  the parties  must have understood  that the  1992

          Agreement would operate at  some length because they specifically

          provided  in section  four that  each party  assumed the  risk of

          changes in  the operative  facts and  relinquished  any right  to

          terminate  the  agreement on  the basis  of such  factual shifts.

          This proviso would be  nonsensical if either party had  the right

          to terminate the agreement at will.

                    Raw logic bolsters this evidence.  In exchange for  the

          covenants   contained   in   the   1992   Agreement,  Ross-Simons

          surrendered the  opportunity to pursue colorable antitrust claims

          against Baccarat.  A  reasonable factfinder easily could conclude

          that Ross-Simons would not have abandoned such  an opportunity in

          exchange for a settlement that, in Judge Boyle's phrase, Baccarat

          could  have ripped up  the next morning.   Based  on the parties'

          intent, made manifest by  the language of the 1992  Agreement and

                                          14

          the circumstances of the settlement itself, it seems quite likely

          that the Agreement was not meant to be terminable at will.

                    We have said enough on this score.   For the reasons we

          have enumerated, the  lower court's four major actions in respect

          to this  issue   namely,  its refusal  to apply Article  Two, its

          determination that  the terms  of the  1992  Agreement remain  in

          effect,  its interpretation  of those  terms, and  its conclusion

          that  Ross-Simons had  demonstrated a  significant likelihood  of

          success on the merits of its contract claims   are  impervious to

          Baccarat's assault.

                                C.  Irreparable Harm.
                                C.  Irreparable Harm.
                                    ________________

                    Civil  Rule  65(a),  as  interpreted  in  this circuit,

          places  the  burden of  demonstrating  that a  denial  of interim

          injunctive relief would cause  irreparable harm squarely upon the

          movant.   See Narragansett Indian Tribe, 934 F.2d at 6.  Baccarat
                    ___ _________________________

          questions whether Ross-Simons carried this burden.

                    The  burden  is  substantial,  but it  is  possible  to

          overstate  its dimensions.    Baccarat falls  into  this trap  by

          insisting that,  since Baccarat  crystal comprises less  than one

          percent  of Ross-Simons'  total  annual sales,  there  can be  no

          irreparable  harm   because  withholding   the  line  could   not

          jeopardize  Ross-Simons'  economic   viability.    To   establish

          irreparable harm, however, a  plaintiff need not demonstrate that

          the  denial of injunctive relief  will be fatal  to its business.

          See General Leaseways, Inc. v. National  Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744
          ___ _______________________    _____________________________

          F.2d  588, 591  (7th Cir.  1984).   It is  usually enough  if the

                                          15

          plaintiff shows  that its  legal  remedies are  inadequate.   See
                                                                        ___

          Weinberger   v.  Romero-Barcelo,   456  U.S.   305,  312   (1982)
          __________       ______________

          (collecting cases); Lopez v.  Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 68  (1st Cir.
                              _____     _______

          1990).  If the plaintiff suffers a substantial injury that is not

          accurately measurable or adequately compensable by money damages,

          irreparable harm is a  natural sequel.  See, e.g.,  Multi-Channel
                                                  ___  ____   _____________

          TV Cable Co. v.  Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating  Co., 22
          ____________     ____________________________________________

          F.3d  546, 551 (4th Cir.  1994); K-Mart Corp.  v. Oriental Plaza,
                                           ____________     _______________

          Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 915 (1st Cir. 1989); Danielson v.  Local 275,
          ____                                     _________     __________

          Laborers Int'l Union,  479 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1973).  Thus,
          ____________________

          a cognizable threat of such harm can support a restraining order.

                    Even so, whether Ross-Simons made the requisite showing

          in  this  case poses  a close  question.   Although  there  is no

          mechanical test that permits a court to make an exact calculation

          of  the quantum  of  hard-to-measure harm  that  will suffice  to

          justify  interim  injunctive  relief,  there  are  some  relevant

          guideposts.   In the  first place, the  plaintiff's showing  must

          possess some substance; a preliminary injunction is not warranted

          by a tenuous or overly speculative forecast of anticipated  harm.

          See  Narragansett Indian Tribe, 934 F.2d at 6-7; Public Serv. Co.
          ___  _________________________                   ________________

          v. Town of W. Newbury, 835 F.2d 380, 383 (1st Cir. 1987).  In the
             __________________

          second  place,  an attempt  to  show irreparable  harm  cannot be

          evaluated in a vacuum;  the predicted harm and the  likelihood of

          success on the merits  must be juxtaposed and weighed  in tandem.

          See  Astra USA, 94  F.3d at 743 (explaining  that the greater the
          ___  _________

          likelihood  of merits success, the  less that is  required in the

                                          16

          way of irreparable harm); Gately v. Commonwealth of Mass., 2 F.3d
                                    ______    _____________________

          1221,  1232  (1st Cir.  1993)  (noting  the same  phenomenon  and

          suggesting that irreparable harm is subject to a  "sliding scale"

          analysis),  cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1832 (1994).  Finally, it is
                      _____ ______

          clear  that battles  over the  quality and  quantity of  the harm

          alleged most often will be  won or lost in the trial court.   See
                                                                        ___

          K-Mart, 875 F.2d at  915 ("District courts have  broad discretion
          ______

          to  evaluate  the irreparability  of  alleged  harm  and to  make

          determinations  regarding the  propriety of  injunctive relief.")

          (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

                    In this  instance  the district  court determined  that

          Ross-Simons  made   the  requisite  showing   because,  absent  a

          restraining  order,  it  would  lose  incalculable  revenues  and

          sustain  harm  to  its  goodwill.     The  court  grounded   this

          determination  on two  factual  findings.    First,  due  to  the

          uniqueness  of Baccarat  crystal,  Ross-Simons  could not  simply

          replace the Baccarat line with some other brand, and, without the

          availability of  Baccarat,  its bridal  registry  business  would

          suffer.   The resultant  damage,  including lost  sales of  other

          registry items, alienation of future registrants, and harm to its

          reputation,  would defy  accurate quantification.    Second, when

          Baccarat  ceased filling Ross-Simons' orders, Ross-Simons already

          had  printed  and  distributed  millions of  copies  of  its 1996

          catalog,6 and  that catalog held Ross-Simons out as an authorized
                              
          ____________________

               6Following its  usual praxis, Ross-Simons prepared  its 1996
          catalog in the fall of 1995 and began mailing it later that year.
          The  catalog identifies  Ross-Simons  as  an authorized  Baccarat

                                          17

          purveyor of Baccarat crystal.  The court found that the inability

          to  supply products  as advertised  would wreak  substantial (but

          immeasurable)   damage   to   the   goodwill   that   Ross-Simons

          painstakingly had created  over the years.   The court  dismissed

          Baccarat's  counter-argument  that  Ross-Simons'  stockpiling  of

          Baccarat crystal safeguarded it  from this type of harm,  finding

          that  Ross-Simons would  deplete  its  beefed-up  inventory  well

          before the litigation ended.

                    Like  the district  court, we  think that  Ross-Simons'

          bridal registry  business is the focal point  of irreparable harm

          in this case.   Similar to full-line distributors who  hawk "one-

          stop  shopping" as a means of meeting all their customers' needs,

          Ross-Simons promotes  its bridal registry as  offering a complete

          line  of giftware, including  many choices of  crystal.  Although

          not among Ross-Simons' best-selling  lines, Baccarat crystal is a

          prestigious  item      a  unique,  top-shelf   line  that  boasts

          considerable allure and that is capable of serving as a beacon to

          attract  potential  customers.    In  the  context  of  a  bridal

          registry,  as  in a  variety  of other  commercial  settings, the

          availability  of  a product  line is  as  important, if  not more

          important, than  the  amount  of  sales generated.    See,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          Supermarket Servs., Inc.  v. Hartz Mountain  Corp., 382 F.  Supp.
          ________________________     _____________________

          1248, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (noting  the importance of offering  a

          particular  brand  lest  customers  go   elsewhere).    Potential

          registrants,  unable  to  include  Baccarat  crystal among  their
                              
          ____________________

          dealer and contains a listing of available Baccarat products.

                                          18

          selections, may  choose not to register at  all with Ross-Simons,

          enlisting instead with a competitor  who offers the full spectrum

          of desired products.

                    To  be sure,  the district  court's findings  anent the

          bridal registry  rest  on a  number  of assumptions  about  Ross-

          Simons' business,  its customers' attitudes, and the way in which

          the marketplace operates.  But the assumptions are reasonable and

          are  consistent with  the available  evidence; thus,  the court's

          subsidiary findings are not unduly speculative.  These subsidiary

          findings, in  turn, are  enough  to bottom  the court's  ultimate

          finding  of  irreparable  injury.   After  all,  if  the  court's

          subsidiary findings are correct, it could never be shown how many

          brides opted not to associate themselves with Ross-Simons because

          Baccarat  products   were  unavailable,   and  it  would   follow

          inexorably  that neither  the  adverse impact  on  sales nor  the

          concomitant  insult to  goodwill could  be measured  accurately.7

          See Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 417 F.2d 621, 622 (2d Cir.
          ___ ________________    _____________
                              
          ____________________

               7While the  district court's finding of  irreparable harm is
          sustainable  on this basis alone, the fact that the 1996 catalogs
          already were in circulation  when the contretemps arose increases
          the  threat  to Ross-Simons'  goodwill.    Absent an  injunction,
          catalog  recipients  might place  orders  for  Baccarat products,
          believing  that Ross-Simons  could supply  advertised  items, and
          then  be disappointed.  The harm to Ross-Simons' general goodwill
          stemming from its inability to fill such orders likewise would be
          incalculable,  and, thus,  irreparable.   See,  e.g., Blackwelder
                                                    ___   ____  ___________
          Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 196-97 (4th  Cir.
          _____________    _______________
          1977); Bascom Food Prods.  Corp. v. Reese Finer Foods,  Inc., 715
                 _________________________    ________________________
          F. Supp.  616, 637-38 (D.N.J. 1989)  (collecting cases); Robinson
                                                                   ________
          v. United  States Postal Serv., 573  F. Supp. 244, 245  (D. Mass.
             ___________________________
          1983); see also Hypertherm,  Inc. v. Precision Prods.,  Inc., 832
                 ___ ____ _________________    _______________________
          F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that substantial damage to
          business reputation  is a sufficient showing  of irreparable harm
          to justify preliminary injunctive relief).

                                          19

          1969) (per curiam); Supermarket Servs., 382 F. Supp. at 1256-57.
                              __________________

                    This is far from  an aberrational result.  By  its very

          nature  injury to goodwill and reputation  is not easily measured

          or  fully compensable in damages.  Accordingly, this kind of harm

          is often  held to be irreparable.  See, e.g., K-Mart, 875 F.2d at
                                             ___  ____  ______

          915;  Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst.  of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry
                _________________________________________    ______________

          Goods Corp.,  799 F.2d 6, 14-15  (1st Cir. 1986).   Of particular
          ___________

          interest  for  purposes  of  this  appeal,  several  courts  have

          recognized that the loss  of a prestigious brand or  product line

          may create a  threat of irreparable injury  if it is  likely that

          customers (or prospective customers) will turn to competitors who

          do not labor under  the same handicap.  See,  e.g., Multi-Channel
                                                  ___   ____  _____________

          TV, 22 F.3d  at 552; Jacobson  & Co. v.  Armstrong Cork Co.,  548
          __                   _______________     __________________

          F.2d 438, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1977); Bergen Drug  Co. v. Parke, Davis
                                           ________________    ____________

          & Co., 307  F.2d 725, 728 (3d Cir. 1962);  Hendricks Music Co. v.
          _____                                      ___________________

          Steinway,  Inc.,  689  F.  Supp.  1501, 1512  (N.D.  Ill.  1988);
          _______________

          Supermarket Servs., 382  F. Supp. at 1256-57; see  also Automatic
          __________________                            ___  ____ _________

          Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 390 F.2d 113, 116-17 (1st Cir.)
          ______________    ______________

          (suggesting  in  dictum that  irreparable  harm  to a  retailer's

          goodwill may result  from an inability  to supply a full  line of

          products),  cert. denied, 391 U.S.  914 (1968); Leone  v. Town of
                      _____ ______                        _____     _______

          New Shoreham, 534 A.2d 871, 874 (R.I. 1987) (holding that loss of
          ____________

          goodwill   due  to   inability  to   serve  returning   customers

          constitutes irreparable harm).

                    Baccarat's  other  arguments regarding  the  nature and

          degree  of  the harm  that  Ross-Simons  alleges  do not  require

                                          20

          comment.8   Mindful of the preliminary stage  of the proceedings,

          the  strong  likelihood  that  Ross-Simons will  prevail  on  the

          merits, and  the trial court's  broad discretion,  we uphold  the

          finding  that  Ross-Simons  faced  irremediable  harm if  interim

          injunctive relief were withheld.

          III.  CONCLUSION
          III.  CONCLUSION

                    We  need  go  no further.    Here,  the district  court

          applied  the  traditional  four-part framework  to  the  evidence

          before it.   In doing so,  the court mulled  all the  appropriate

          criteria,  eschewed reliance  on inappropriate  criteria, weighed

          the relevant factors with  considerable care, and determined that

          Ross-Simons made a sufficient showing to justify the  issuance of

          an  injunction pendente  lite.   Given the  case-specific factual
                         ________  ____

          findings that anchor this determination,  we cannot say that  the

          court's action constituted an abuse of discretion.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                              
          ____________________

               8For example, Baccarat suggests that Ross-Simons could   and
          still  can     avoid any  harm  simply  by  signing the  Proposed
          Agreement.   This is  sheer persiflage.   The law    much  less a
          court of equity   should  not compel a litigant to sign  away the
          farm in order to save the crops.

                                          21