Court Opinion

ID: 9624334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:58:36.628935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:43.974179
License: Public Domain

DENECKE, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion appears to be based upon three grounds: First, the admissions of the defendant were not obtained by interrogation; Second, the defendant did not ask to consult with an attorney or ask to see an attorney prior to answering questions; and Third,, the defendant waived his right to consult with an attorney before answering questions by answering questions in response to the continued interrogation by'the officers.
With'regard to the first ground, it is a question of fact whether the admissions made in the auto enroute from Pendleton were'made without interrogation. In Portland, according to the police officer’s testimony, at least' some of the inculpatory statements admitted *28into evidence were obtained as a result of interrogation.
As to the second ground, I agree that the defendant did not say precisely, “I do not desire to answer any question until I have had the opportunity to confer with a lawyer.” However, the defendant’s requests for an attorney are at least as precise as the advice given him on his rights to an attorney.
The magistrate advised him: “I also told bim that he was entitled to the services of an attorney, if he was unable to hire his own, that the State would appoint one to represent him.”
Sgt. Thomine advised the defendant: “Yes, we had advised him of his rights, that he was entitled to an attorney and he had the right to remain silent, of course. And that if he didn’t feel that he could afford an attorney, the Court would appoint him one and advised him of the charge * *
An officer testified about the defendant’s request for an attorney as follows: “Well, he was asked by a deputy DA, Ierulli, if he wanted to give a statement at that time in the detectives’ office and he stated that he didn’t, he wanted an attorney. He had told us the same thing.”
In my opinion the most reasonable inference to be drawn from the testimony is that the defendant said he did not want to talk until he consulted with an attorney. If this is not a reasonable inference then it would likewise follow that it could not be inferred from the advice given by the officers to the defendant that he was advised that he had a right to consult with an attorney before answering questions. The advice being insufficient, the case would have to be reversed upon that ground.
As to the third ground, that the defendant waived *29Ms right to consult with an attorney by finally answering questions asked in the continuing interrogation, a majority of tMs court so decided in State v. Rosenburger, 242 Or 376, 409 P2d 684 (1966), and State v. Atherton, 242 Or 621, 410 P2d 208 (1966). The majority believed that such decisions were permissible despite Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US 478, 492, 84 S Ct 1758, 12 L ed2d 977 (1964), and State v. Neely, 239 Or 487, 395 P2d 557, 398 P2d 482 (1965). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L ed2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974 (1966), I respectfully submit, proved that State v. Rosenburger, supra (242 Or 376), and State v. Atherton, supra (242 Or 621), were incorrectly decided. Miranda v. Arizona, supra (384 US at 444-445), stated: “If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.”
I do not believe that the retroactivity of Miranda v. Arizona, supra (384 US 436), is an issue in this case. State v. Allen, 248 Or 376, 434 P2d 740, 745 (1967).
Sloan and O’Connell, JJ., join in this dissent.