Court Opinion

ID: 9671227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:33:09.115062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.834334
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In point of error one the majority has approved the trial court’s ruling that Highway Patrolman Young was qualified to testify as an expert. *926The majority restates two well-established propositions: it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine if a witness is qualified to offer expert testimony and this court gauges abuse of discretion by whether the trial court acted without any reference to any guiding rules or principles, citing United Blood Ser. v. Longoria, 938 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.1997) and Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.1996).
The trial court certainly had guiding rules and principles under Clark v. Cotten, 573 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Estate of Brown v. Masco Corp., 576 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1978, writ refd n.r.e.), in two areas, yet did not follow those cases. The first area being Patrolman Young’s qualifications and the second being the extra weight a police officer’s opinion carries with the average juror.
In Clark, Chief Justice Dies held the trial court was correct in excluding the testimony of a highway patrolman who had been with the Department of Public Safety eight and one-half years, had received seventeen weeks of training, and had investigated 350 accidents. Chief Justice Dies stated the general rule that accident analysts and reconstruction experts • can be qualified if they are highly trained in the science of which they testify and noted a quote from Ewing Wer-lein, Jr., Note, Evidence-Witnesses Admission in Evidence-Automobiles-Collisiovr-Opinion Testimony of Expert “Accident Analyst” Reconstructing Collision Admissible. Bolstad v. Egleson, 326 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.), 38 Tex. L. Rev. 503, 506 n. 14 (1960):
As for regular police officers, sheriffs, mechanics, etc., it generally may be said that they lack such training and experience as would qualify them to make a scientific analysis from physical evidence, regardless of how many accident scenes they may have examined.
(See also Chief Justice Dies’ opinion in Estate of Brown, 576 S.W.2d at 105.)
Justice Barajas, now Chief Justice, in Lopez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 847 S.W.2d 330 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, no writ) acknowledged the general rules that a police officer is not qualified to render an expert opinion regarding an accident based upon his position alone, citing Pyle v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 774 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied), and that accident analysts and reconstruction experts may be qualified to testify as to causes of accidents if they are highly trained in the science of which they testify, citing Clark, 573 S.W.2d at 886; Texaco v. Romine, 536 S.W.2d 253, 256-57 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Hooper v. Torres, 790 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1990, writ denied). In discussing what amount of training is mandated in order to qualify one as an expert in accident reconstruction, he opined the question is one that has continually escaped a “bright line” analysis and set out the officers qualifications in Clark, Brown, and St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. King, 817 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1991, no writ). Alternatively, he noted, in DeLeon v. Louder, 743 S.W.2d 357, 359-60 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1987), writ denied per curiam, 754 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.1988), a state trooper who had accident reconstruction training and had taught accident investigation was qualified to testify as an expert.
The majority “distinguishes” Clark, because, although the patrolman had been with the Department of Public Safety eight and one-half years and had investigated 350 accidents, there was no showing of any specialized training in accident investigation or accident reconstruction during that patrolman’s seventeen weeks of training, while Young had attended a three-week advanced accident reconstruction school. The majority also say the qualifications of the officer in Brown, his training only included three days on investigation of accidents, he had only investigated about twenty accidents and his degree was in elementary education, “substantially differ” from Young’s qualifications. This comparison of the “numbers” associated with each officer misses the legal issue established by Brown and Clark, i.e., an officer who only has the minimum training and experience of a regular patrolman or officer, does not qualify as an expert. Young testified all Department of Public Safety officers went to the basic academy and all highway patrolmen *927attended the three-week advanced accident reconstruction school. Today the majority has held a highway patrolman who has taken the training given all regular highway patrolmen, who still required supervision by a veteran patrolman and had investigated between 35 and 40 accidents at the time of the Sciarrilla accident, is qualified to testify as an expert. Consequently, the majority has taken the well-reasoned legal rule, which can be uniformly applied, established by Brown and Clark and overruled it.
In Brown^ Chief Justice Dies also recognized a police officer’s opinion as to the cause of a traffic accident carries extra weight with the average juror.1 In this case the trial judge acknowledged admitting Young’s testimony, as an expert, was “a close question.”2 In my view, the trial court should have followed Chief Justice Dies’ previous writings3 and resolved this close question in favor of excluding Young’s expert testimony and opinions.
Stare decisis alone requires a continued adherence, by this court, to the rule established in Brown and Clark. Our two highest courts and this court have expressed their thoughts on stare decisis and its importance.
Our Texas Supreme Court in Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 319-20 (Tex.1995) acknowledged they had, on occasion and for compelling reasons, overruled earlier decisions, but they generally had adhered to precedents for reasons of efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy. They noted if they did not follow their own decisions, no issue could ever be considered resolved and the potential volume of speculative relitigation under such circumstances alone ought to persuade them that stare decisis is a sound policy. They also said they should give due consideration to the settled expectations of litigants who justifiably rely on principles articulated in earlier cases, referencing “Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 321, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 1916, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (J. Sealia, concurring) (‘[Rjeliance on a square, unaban-doned holding of the Supreme Court is always justifiable reliance_’)” They concluded by noting that, under our form of government, the legitimacy of the judiciary rests in large part upon a stable and predictable decision making process that differs dramatically from that properly employed by the political branches of government, citing ‘Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986) (‘[Stare decisis] permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact.’)”
Likewise the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Porter, 827 S.W.2d 324, 330-31 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), noted a quote from Chief Justice Rehnquist in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 736-37 (1991):
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. [Citations omitted.] Adhering to precedent “is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.” [Citations omitted.]
The court also noted: “Chief Justice Rehnquist listed several exceptions in which the Supreme Court was not constrained to follow the doctrine of stare decisis: (1) constitutional cases, because in such cases “correction through legislative action is practically impossible;” (2) cases involving procedural and evidentiary rules, as opposed to cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are the greatest; (3) opinions *928decided by narrow margins involving “spirited dissents” challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions; (4) decisions which were questioned by members of the Court in later decisions; and (5) decisions that have defied consistent application by the lower courts. Id. at [828-831, 111 S.Ct. at] 2610-2611.”
In Texas Dep’t of Human Services v. Penn, 786 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1990, writ denied), Chief Justice Walker, the majority writer, stated: “... stare decisis must be the “Rosetta Stone” with which to guide us in our application of the statutory language to the probative evidence”4 and went on to follow cases from the Supreme Court and other courts of appeal in reaching this court’s decision.
The majority, rather than determine why the reasons for stare decisis enumerated in Weiner v. Wasson and by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Payne v. Tennessee do not apply or if any of the exceptions to stare decisis noted in Ex parte Porter do apply, simply chooses to “distinguish” Clark and Brown, rather than follow or overrule them. This only increases uncertainty and decreases predictability in our Ninth Judicial District.
Having concluded it was error to allow Patrolman Young to testify as an expert, did that error amount to such a denial of the rights of Mrs. Sciarrilla as was calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment? See Tex.R.App. P. 81(b)(1). In my view, it did. When Young was asked to give his opinion “as to how this accident occurred,” he not only gave the opinion that Mrs. Sciarrilla left the roadway to the right, came back upon the roadway, left the roadway for the right up on the gravel or the shoulder and flipped over; he used “buzz” words and phrases such as “lost control of the vehicle,” “panicked to some extent,” “overcorrected to the left,” “attempted to regain control of her vehicle,” and “jerked over to the right.”
I must also dissent to the disposition of point of error three. Under point of error two, the majority correctly held that based on the objections made at trial, the trial court did not err in admitting the patrolman’s written report. The admission of that report has a definite bearing on point of error three. Clearly two members of the jury panel5 were interested in who was given traffic citations because, during voir dire, they asked Mrs. Seiarrilla’s attorney about citations and tickets.6 Furthermore, patrolman Young in response to questions by Osborne’s attorney, testified:
Q Officer, under the traffic laws of the state of Texas, is a vehicle required to maintain a single lane?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q Was their [sic] physical evidence at the scene that indicated Mrs. Sciarrilla had not — had failed to maintain a single lane?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q Also, is a driver required to maintain proper control of their vehicle?
A Yes, ma’am.
Q And that’s something they’re required to do at all times, is that correct?
A That’s correct.
Q And according to what you just told us, the physical evidence, you were able to trace the path of Mrs. Sciarrilla’s vehicle; is that right?
A To an extent, yes, ma’am.
Q Based on the path you were able to trace, did that vehicle — was that driver — did that driver maintain proper control of their [sic] vehicle?
A Did not appear so.
After each set of questions, the next logical exchange is:
Q And did you give Mrs. Sciarrilla a citation?
A Yes, ma’am.
*929Of course, this exchange did not occur literally.7 However, I contend, it did occur, in fact. Jurors are not mindless robots who only take a literal input, analyze that input without reference to logical inferences, life experiences and common sense and produce a literal output. Every reasonable, logical juror would conclude, and rightfully so, when a Texas Department of Pubic Safety Highway Patrolman testifies what the law is and a person did not obey the law, then that Trooper would and did issue that person a citation. Furthermore, Young’s written report showed “factors and conditions listed are the investigator’s opinion” and “factors/conditions contributing” listed Mrs. Sciarrilla’s vehicle as “failed to drive in single lane” and “faulty evasive action.” These notations fortified his opinion that Mrs. Sciarrilla had violated the traffic laws and was at fault. The majority notes all references to traffic citations were redacted. While this is true, the redactions not only oblterated the typed words, but oblterated portions of the preprinted lines. Once again, it does not take Sherlock Holmes to figure out something had been there and that something could have only been Mrs. Seiarrflla’s name since Young did not attribute any violations or fault to Osborne. Consequently, not only was the question of Young’s opinion about neglgence and causation before the jury, but the question of his opinion about violations of the traffic laws also. Thus his entire credibilty was certainly before the jury.
Ordinarily acquittals in criminal actions are not admissible as evidence in subsequent civil proceedings involving common fact issues. See State v. Benavidez, 365 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex.1963); accord American Gen. Fire and Cas. Co. v. McInnis Book Store, Inc., 860 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ). However, when one party offers evidence which is inadmissible (Young’s testimony that Mrs. Sciarrilla had violated the law), the “door is open” and the other party is entitled to meet the evidence. See McCormicK, Evidence § 57, at 229 (4th ed.1992). Mrs. Sciarrilla should have been able to counteract the effect of Young’s testimony. Evidence that Mrs. Sciarrilla had been found “not guilty” of the citations was relevant because it tended to offset the prejudice caused by Osborne’s evidence.8 See Carter v. Exxon Corp., 842 S.W.2d 393, 400 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1992, writ denied). I would sustain this point of error.
It was error to allow the jury to decide this case on evidence that should have been excluded, Young’s opinion testimony. That error was compounded when other evidence was then excluded, Mrs. Sciarrila’s acquittal. Consequently, this case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

.If that was true in 1977, it is even more so today. Law enforcement personnel are better trained, better educated and more professional than at any time in our history. This, and the increased risks these underpaid, overworked public servants face everyday, most certainly has lead to more respect and gratitude from the general public.

. The record does not reflect if Patrolman Young was in uniform when he testified. If so, that fact, also carries weight with the average juror.

. Dare I say "precedent”?

. Since the Chief Justice did not expound on the "Rosetta Stone” in his original opinion, I shan't either.

. The record indicates venire persons Harvill and Waits asked the questions.

.It is not shown whether these venire persons served on the jury, since the jury list was not included in the transcript and the foreperson was neither of the venire persons.

. Osborne’s motion in limine regarding the mention of the Justice of the Peace trial or the disposition of the traffic citation had been granted by the trial court.

. The difference between the criminal and civil burdens of proof go to the weight rather than the admissibility.