Court Opinion

ID: 9703651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:03:30.614948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:12.155738
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in result.
I base my affirmance on the reasoning set out in State ex rel. M.T.A. v. Ind. Rev. Bd. (1969), 144 Ind.App. 63, 87-88, 253 N.E.2d 725, 731;
"Plaintiff, Mass Transportation Authority of Marion County, Indiana, obtained, in this court, a judgment. Such judgment was entered of record on December 31, 1968. The effect of that judgment was to settle the respective interests of the parties to the suit. Subsequently, the General Assembly passed House Enrolled Act No. 1115 (Acts 1969, ch. 20), which we have just held was a legitimate exercise of legislative power. However, the application of House Enrolled Act No. 1115 with respect to the judgment in favor of the Mass Transportation Authority of Marion County, was invalid. See: The C., C. & I.C.R.W. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs. of Grant Co., et al., [65 Ind. 427 (1879)] supra; Searcy v. Patriot & Barkworks Turnpike Co. [79 Ind. 274 (1881)], supra.
To hold, as defendants urge, that the Act (House Enrolled Act No. 1115) prevailed in its application as to the judgment in favor of Mass Transportation Authority of Marion County would deprive the Mass Transportation Authority of its judgment by legislative action. The General Assembly cannot interfere with a judicial determination. Article 8, § 1, of the Constitution of the State of Indiana. Without a doubt, the General Assembly had every right to give prospective and retroactive effect to their legislation, with the exceptions heretofore pointed out. However, the attempt to encroach upon the determination of a co-equal branch of government was an unwarranted and unconstitutional action by the General Assembly, and its application to the judgment of this court has no force and effect. It should be abundantly clear that this court has no intention of sacrificing that which the Constitution of this- State guarantees to the judicial branch of government."
and the cases cited therein.
Also, Prog. Imp. Assoc. v. Catch All Corp. (1970), 254 Ind. 121, 126, 258 N.E.2d 403, 405:
"'The judicial sanction, once granted, would continue to bolster the improvement in its new and final form, but the court would be cut off from further control over the proceedings at which the plans, specifications and estimates of cost became finalized. Such interference impairs the control of the courts over their own judgments and deprives those judgment of their conclusiveness. State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble (1888), 118 Ind. 350, 21 N.E. 244. This the Legislature cannot constitutionally do either directly or indirectly." (Citations omitted.)