Court Opinion

ID: 9541796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:28:44.370215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:49.908647
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. I agree with the well-reasoned opinion of the appellate court and would hold that the power shovel is a structure within the contemplation of the Structural Work Act. I find it difficult to reconcile this opinion with Warren v. Meeker, 55 Ill.2d 108, in which we held that a grain bin, sold under a lease agreement as personalty, and admittedly easily removable, was a “structure.” The majority purports to rely upon the New York case of Caddy v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (1909), 195 N.Y. 415, 88 N.E. 747, which upon careful reading is not authority for the position which the majority takes. The majority adopts the interpretation placed upon the statute in Juenger v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. (E.D. Ill. 1968), 286 F. Supp. 286. In reaching his conclusion the United States District Court judge who decided Juenger relied on Bullman v. City of Chicago, 367 Ill. 217. That case involved a statute which authorized cities to license and regulate second-hand stores, and, as pointed out in Bullman, statutes granting powers to municipal corporations are to be strictly construed. We have repeatedly held that the purpose and intent of the Structural Work Act is to protect workmen from the hazards of dangerous work and that to effect this purpose the Structural Work Act is to be liberally construed. Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 55 Ill.2d 121. Nor am I particularly impressed with the dire prediction of the anomalous consequences that might flow from our holding this brobdingnagian monster to be a structure. This argument is utterly demolished by the very logical statement in the appellate court opinion that the Structural Work Act does not apply unless “ ‘scaffolds *** or other mechanical contrivances’ are utilized when work is performed upon the structure.” 20 Ill. App. 3d 402, 406.