Court Opinion

ID: 9710039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:00:31.61605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:52.220643
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). There was a time when the saying in underworld circles was, “Pull a job in Wisconsin one day, and you’re on your way to Waupun the next day.” Caught red-handed and pleading guilty, that might well have been the result. Times have changed. More crimes are committed and more cases are brought to court. The invitation to extended negotiations for bargained pleas has created an added incentive to defense-procured delays. Multiple opportunities for pretrial challenges to pleadings and procedures and mandated hear*370ings as to admissibility of evidence result in trials delayed. Engineering such delays has become an arrow in the defense quiver. Months, not days or weeks, often separate the filing of a criminal complaint and trial of the case, even where the eventual plea is guilty and the trial brief. Along with inbuilt delays and crowded court calendars, there come, predictably, multiplied claims by defendants that they ought to be free because they were denied a constitutional right to a speedy trial.1
Following the United States Supreme Court decision in Barker v. Wingo,2 this court, in Day v. State, a 1973 decision,3 adopted the balancing of relevant factors test, mandated by Barker, and set forth “. . . criteria [to be used] in determining whether the defendant was, under the individual circumstances of his case, denied his right to a speedy trial . ...” 4 The writer would follow such balancing test in determining whether the defendant in the case before us was, under these circumstances, denied a speedy trial.

“Mere lapse of time.”

Lapse of time not enough. In Day, this court clearly held that: “. . . A mere lapse of time, absent more, does not constitute a denial of the right to a speedy trial. ...” 5 The court thus reaffirmed its earlier holdings, quoting from one, that: “ ‘Mere lapse of time does not, *371by itself, constitute denial of the right to speedy trial ....’” 6 Quoting from Barker that: “ ‘Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance,’ ” 7 this court, in Day, set no specific period of time as standard upon which to determine, conclusively or presumptively, whether or not the right to a speedy trial had been violated. In Day, this court specifically stated: “We think that if a specific period of time is to be adopted as a condition precedent to the application of the balancing test, it should come from the legislature.” 8 The balancing of the factors involved, length of delay included, was thus left to be considered on an ad hoc or case-by-case basis.
Federal court rule 46. The majority opinion cites a District of Columbia appeals court decision,9 finding a denial of speedy trial where a defendant was confined for thirteen months prior to trial, even though the defendant there “. . . was not prejudiced at his trial by the pretrial delay . . . .” 10 But in that case there was admitted noncompliance by the government with Rule 46 (g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.11 As the federal appeals court pointed out, this rule “. . . requires the United States Attorney to furnish the district courts with bi-weekly reports of persons in custody for more than ten days. The rule also requires him to give the reason that the defendant is being held.” 12 Along with *372this federal court rule, the District of Columbia federal courts have held that “a delay of more than one year between arrest and trial gives prima fade merit to a Sixth Amendment challenge.” 13 With defendant West confined in jail for thirteen months between his arrest and trial, the prima facie merit or presumption of denial of speedy trial arose. If we had the same rule and implementation here, the result would be the same. However, there is no such rule of court or statute in Wisconsin and the situation present in West could not arise here. The statute in this state provides that, if the trial of a defendant charged with a felony does not commence within ninety days from the date trial is demanded, the defendant “. . . shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bond.” 14 With adequate protection against oppressive pretrial incarceration thus assured, the writer sees no reason for abandoning its oft-repeated refusal to set “. . . a specific period of *373time as a standard upon which to determine whether or not the right to a speedy trial had been violated. . . .” 15 particularly so because the United States Supreme Court in Barker specifically declined to do just that.16

“The balancing test.”

Factors involved. Among the factors which a court should assess in determining if a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, the high court in Barker lists four: (1) Length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.17 In Barker, the high tribunal makes clear: “We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition tos the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” 18 As Barker puts it, “Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. ...” 19 It is under the totality of relevant circumstances involved, that the court “. . . must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” 20 This does not mean that a defendant must establish “an affirmative demonstration of prejudice ... to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” 21 Nor does it mean that if he does he *374is by such demonstration entitled to a finding of denial of speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial is relative, not fixed and absolute, with the right of the public to justice, as well as the right to speedy proceedings, involved. As the United States Supreme Court said in Barker:
“ ‘The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.’ ” 22
Four factors suggested. In balancing the right of the public to the imposition of appropriate penalties on the provably guilty and the right of a defendant or the public to speediness of trials, the writer places, side by side, the fact situation, as to the four factors suggested in Barker, alongside the facts in the case before us.
1. Length of delay. In Barker, there was more than a four-year delay between the indictment of the defendant and the trial of the defendant which resulted in a conviction on the charge of murder.23 In the case before us, there was an eighteen-month delay between the filing of the criminal complaint and the trial which resulted in the conviction of the defendant on the charge of armed robbery.
2. Reasons for delay. In Barker, the reasons for delay include a series of 16 continuances sought and secured by the prosecution, most of them requests for continuances to the next term of court.24 (The circuit court in which the case was pending held three terms of court each year.) Most were secured by the state awaiting the outcome of the trial of codefendant Silas Manning.25 Some continuances were sought and secured by the state *375due to the illness of an ex-sheriff who was the chief investigating officer in the case.26 In the case before us, none of the adjournments were sought or attributable to the prosecution. One reason for delay was the request of defendant for an adjournment not only of this case, but of four other charges for masked, armed robbery and aiding and abetting robbery, for a time of trial six to eight weeks hence. Another reason clearly was the illness of the trial court judge, necessitating the appointment of substitute judges, the first of whom resigned after his appointment. The writer would find such illness of the presiding judge to be a “strong excuse,” the term used to describe the illness of the ex-sheriff in the Barker Case.27 Unlike Barker, none of the continuances involved in the case before us can be attributed to the prosecution or to action of the prosecutor.
3. Assertion of right. In Barker, the defendant first asserted his claim of right to speedy trial twenty months before the actual trial date.28 In the case before us, the defendant moved for a speedy trial at the time of arraignment, eighteen months before the trial. In Barker, the high court rejected the demand-waiver requirement, holding that “. . . [t]he result in practice is likely to be either an automatic, pro forma demand made immediately after appointment of counsel or delays which, but for the demand-waiver rule, would not be tolerated. . . .” 29 Instead, it left defendant’s assertion of or failure to assert the right to a speedy trial as “. . . one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the right. . . .” 30 Obviously it is no longer a factor to be given any heavy weight.
*3764. Prejudice to the defendant. In Barker, the elements to be assessed as to prejudice to the defendant by delay are set forth: (1) Oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) anxiety and concern; and (3) the possibility that the defense will be impaired.31 In Barker, the court adds: “Of these, the most serious is the last . . . .” 32 Each of the three elements will be reviewed, and compared to the fact situation in Barker, separately.
(a) “Oppressive pretrial incarceration.” In Barker, while the defendant was released on bond for most of the pretrial period of four years, he did spend ten months in jail before trial.33 In the case before us, the defendant, soon after the expiration of the ninety-day period referred to in the statute,34 was ordered released without the requirement of bond. For one month thereafter, he was held in custody on a holding order on a criminal matter pending against him in a neighboring state. One month after his release without bond on this charge, he was sentenced, upon conviction, to another of the five felony charges pending against him in this state. Confinement in a state penal institution on a different criminal conviction hardly qualifies as “pretrial incarceration” due to delay in trying the charge here involved. His situation would have been no different if this case had not been pending. He was incarcerated, to be sure, but not on this charge or because of this case.
(b) “Anxiety and concern.” In Barker, the high court held that “. . . Of course, Barker was prejudiced to *377some extent by living for over four years under a cloud of suspicion and anxiety. . . .” 35 In the case before us, the cloud of anxiety and concern over the defendant for eighteen months was not only shorter-lived, but much smaller. With the robbery here a masked and armed one, the testimony of customers in the tavern-restaurant held up could hardly have been feared as sufficient for conviction. The case of the state rested largely on the testimony of an accomplice, one of four men involved, who was prepared and willing to testify that the defendant was a participant in the armed and masked stickup. The change that the passage of time here might mean or bring was a change of heart on the part of the willingness of the accomplice to testify as to the involvement of the defendant. Any concern as to the consequences of delay must have been diluted by the hope, eventually disappointed, that the key witness for the prosecution might become unable or unwilling to be a witness against the defendant.
(c) “Defense impaired.” In Barker, the court referred to the death, disappearance or loss of memory of defense witnesses as possible impairments of defense.36 However, in Barker, it found no claim that any defense witnesses died “or otherwise became unavailable owing to the delay,” and “only two very minor lapses of memory— one on the part of a prosecution witness.” 37 In the case before us, there is no basis for a finding of any impairment of the defense due to delay. The trial was a short *378one. Presentation of the case by the state, direct and cross-examinations included, took six hours. Only the defendant himself testified for the defense. Lapses of memory due to delay on the part of the prosecution witnesses could only weaken the case against the defendant. There is no claim that the defendant suffered any lapse of memory as to what he did or did not do on the day of the robbery. Appellate counsel for defendant does claim that defendant’s incarceration in the state reformatory hampered communication between counsel and client. That situation resulted from his conviction on another charge, and earlier trial of this case could not have increased either the frequency or ease of lawyer-client contacts on the charge here involved. There is no basis in this record for finding any impairment of the defense due to delay.
5. Wanting a speedy trial. As an additional relevant circumstance, in Barker, the high court found that “. . . the record strongly suggests that while he [defendant] hoped to take advantage of the delay in which he had acquiesced, and thereby obtain a dismissal of the charges, he definitely did not want to be tried. . . .” 38 In the case before us, the same “strong suggestion” is in the record. When defense counsel made his pro forma motion for a speedy trial, he coupled with it a motion for continuance of all five felony charges pending against him for a six to eight weeks’ period of time. He stated on the record his reason for so doing: “. . . I feel that it would give the defense adequate time to prepare and still be well within the three-month period required by statute for a speedy trial.” (Emphasis supplied.) The reference is to the statute prescribing a ninety-day limit for trial of a felony charge, with release without requirement of bond the consequence of delay in trial beyond ninety days.39 *379Defense counsel thus set the stage for the motion, subsequently made, for the dismissal of all five felony charges because they were not tried within ninety days of demand. That the statutory escape hatch counsel saw open was in fact closed does not alter the obvious trial strategy expressed in seeking both a continuance of five charges for two months, and insisting upon their trial within three months. When the trial judge became ill, substituted judges assigned this case found not a defendant wanting to go to trial, but rather a defendant moving for dismissal on ground of denial of speedy trial. There is a clear difference between seeking a speedy trial and seeking dismissal of charges because of denial of speedy trial.40 Here the repeated motions for dismissal “involved time and delayed the trial.” 41 Here the defendant, by his conduct, involved himself in five separate armed robbery prosecutions and, as a trial tactic, intertwined them for the purpose of joint preparation, but not joint trial, of all five. If the highway here was crowded and traffic delayed, it was defendant’s conduct, trial tactic and repeated motions for dismissal that contributed to the slowdown — not any action by the state.42

*380
“Balancing the scales.”

In conclusion. In Barker, balancing the relevant factors to be assessed and considered, the United States Supreme Court found no denial of the right to a speedy trial where it was established that: (1) There was more than a four-year delay between indictment and trial; (2) the reasons for the delay included sixteen motions for continuance by the prosecution and the seven months’ illness of the state’s key witness; (3) the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial twenty months before the delayed trial; and (4) there was no significant impairment of the defense and that “. . . prejudice [to the defendant] was minimal. . . .” 43 In the case before us, considering the same factors weighed in Barker, the writer would find no denial of right to speedy trial where it is established that: (1) There was an eighteen-month delay between arraignment and trial; (2) the reasons for the delay included a two months’ continuance sought by defendant, the illness of the judge and repeated motions for dismissal by the defendant; (3) the defendant made a motion at time of arraignment for speedy trial, but subsequently sought, not trial, but dismissal for want of speedy trial; and (4) there was no impairment in any way of the defense at trial and prejudice to the defendant was nonexistent.
In Barker, the United States Supreme Court stated that “. . . more than four years was too long a period, particularly since a good part of that period was attributable to the Commonwealth’s failure or inability to try Manning [the codefendant] . . . .” 44 Nonetheless, it concluded that: “Two counterbalancing factors, however, outweigh these deficiencies. The first is that prejudice was minimal. . . . [The second] is the fact that Barker did not want a speedy trial. . . . Instead the record *381strongly suggests that while he hoped to take advantage of the delay in which he had acquiesced, and thereby obtain a dismissal of the charges, he definitely did not want to be tried. . . .” 45 In the case before us, the writer would hold that eighteen months was too long a period between arraignment and trial, even though no part of that period is attributable to the prosecution. The writer would conclude that two counterbalancing factors outweigh the lapse of time occurring. The first is that any prejudice to the defendant is completely nonexistent. The second is that the record here, from defendant’s first request for a two months’ continuance on, strongly suggests that he hoped to take advantage of the delay he had originally procured, and thereby obtain a dismissal of the charge, rather than a trial on the charge. So the writer would affirm the conviction, finding here no denial of defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Han-ley and Mr. Justice Connor T. Hansen join in this dissent.

 Art. VI, Amendments to the United States Constitution, providing: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” See also: Art. I, sec. 7, Wisconsin Constitution, providing for “. . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed . . . .”

 (1972), 407 U. S. 514, 92 Sup. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101.

 (1973), 61 Wis. 2d 236, 212 N. W. 2d 489.

 Id. at page 244.

 Id. at page 244, citing as to requirement of actual prejudice: Williams v. State (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 154, 161 N. W. 2d 218; State v. Kwitek (1972), 63 Wis. 2d 563, 193 N. W. 2d 682.

 Id. at pages 243, 244, citing Hansen v. State (1965), 26 Wis. 2d 238, 242, 131 N. W. 2d 837, quoting Kopacka v. State (1964), 22 Wis. 2d 457, 461, 126 N. W. 2d 78.

 Id. at page 245, quoting Barker v. Wingo, supra, footnote 2, at page 530.

 Id. at page 245.

 United States v. West (D. C. Cir. 1974), 504 Fed. 2d 253.

 Id. at page 256.

 Id. at page 255.

 Id. at page 257, referring to Rule 46 (g), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, providing in pertinent part: “The attorney for the government shall make a bi-weekly report to the court *372listing each defendant . . . who has been held in custody pending indictment, arraignment or trial for a period in excess of ten days. ... As to each defendant so listed the attorney for the government shall make a statement of the reasons why the defendant is still held in custody.”

 Id. at page 255, the court stating: “In this circuit a delay of more than one year between arrest and trial gives prima facie merit to a Sixth Amendment challenge. ... In cases tried after 1972, a delay of more than six months is 'subject to inquiry and need for justification.' . . . Because the delay in this case exceeded one year, the burden shifted to the government to justify the delay. If the government cannot justify the delay, the indictment must be dismissed. . . .” (p. 256) Of such time-fixing presumptive rule, the District of Columbia court stated: “In Barker v. Wingo . . . the court said that each case must be decided on its own facts and declined to establish a constitutional rule requiring all criminal defendants to be brought to trial within a specified time. Nevertheless, the court noted that ‘[njothing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court m the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought."’ (p. 255) (Emphasis supplied.)

 See: Sec. 971.10 (2) (a) and (4), Stats.

 Day v. State, supra, footnote 3, at page 245, and cases there cited.

 Barker v. Wingo, supra, footnote 2, at pages 629, 630, the court stating: “We, therefore, reject both of the inflexible approaches — the fixed-time period because it goes further than the Constitution requires; the demand-waiver rule because it is insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental. . . .”

 Id. at page 530.

 Id. at page 533. (Emphasis supplied.)

 Id. at page 533. (Emphasis supplied.)

 Id. at page 533.

 See: Moore v. Arizona (1973), 414 U. S. 25, 26, 94 Sup. Ct. 188, 38 L. Ed. 2d 183, holding: . . Barker v. Wingo expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.”

 Barker v. Wingo, supra, footnote 2, at page 522, quoting with approval from Beavers v. Haubert (1905), 198 U. S. 77, 87, 25 Sup. Ct. 573, 49 L. Ed. 950.

 Id. at pages 516-519.

 Id. at page 516.

 Id. at page 516.

 Id. at pages 517, 518.

 Id. at page 534, the court stating: “. . . seven months of that period can be attributed to a strong excuse, the illness of the ex-sheriff who was in charge of the investigation. . . .”

 Id. at pages 518, 519.

 Id. at page 528.

 Id. at page 528.

 Id. at page 532, the court stating: . . Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.

 Id. at page 532.

 Id. at page 534.

 Sec. 971.10 (2) (a), Stats.

 Id. at page 534.

 Id. at page 532, the court stating: “. . . If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. . . .”

 Id. at page 534, the court stating: “. . . But there is no claim that any of Barker’s witnesses died or otherwise became unavailable owing to the delay. The trial transcript indicates only two very minor lapses of memory — one on the part of a prosecution witness — which were in no way significant to the outcome.”

 Id. at page 535.

 Sec. 971.10 (2) (a) and (4), Stats.

 McGrath v. State (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 292, 298, 166 N. W. 2d 172, this eourt there finding the making by defendant of repeated pretrial motions, including two for dismissal due to denial of speedy trial, as one of four factors . . for which the defendant, not the prosecution, must be held in law responsible.”

 Id. at page 297, this court stating: “. . . Quite aside from the substance or lack of substance of the issues raised, each of these pretrial motions involved time and delayed the trial. They need not be called delaying tactics to be identified as time-consuming impediments to early trial.”

 State v. Stoeckle (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 378, 389, 164 N. W. 2d 303, this court stating: “. . . The record is clear that the defendant could long ago have received his trial and, if convicted and sentenced, could be serving that sentence. The fact that he is not is a matter of his own choosing — not a denial of speedy trial by the state.”

 Barker v. Wingo, supra, footnote 2, at page 534.

 Id. at page 534.

 Id. at page 534 and page 535.