Court Opinion

ID: 9476476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:56:58.735376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:20.517168
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Different reasoning prompts me to reach the same result as the Court. The state’s witness, McClusky, denied on cross-examination that the card-game conversation concerning the “hit” on Ryan occurred. To the extent that the testimony of Davis’ brother was offered simply to show that McClusky was lying about the conversation, the brother’s version of the conversation was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The brother’s version was offered to show that McClusky was not a credible witness. Ordinarily, a court need not admit impeachment testimony designed to contradict a witness’ denial on cross-examination that he made a previous out-of-court statement. See 3A J. Wig-more, Evidence § 878 at 647 (Chadboum Rev.1970); C. McCormick, Evidence 66-67 (2d ed. 1972). Hence, the state trial court did not violate normal rules of evidence in disallowing the testimony by Davis’ brother as impeachment evidence.
To the extent that the brother offered McClusky’s statements to infer that McClusky considered killing and ultimately did kill the victim himself, the statements were offered for the truth of the matter asserted and were therefore hearsay. The petitioner has not suggested that the hearsay falls within a traditional exception to the hearsay rule but rather suggests that the Due Process and Confrontation clauses require its admission. Petitioner argues that the brother’s version of McClusky’s statement is highly probative of the proposition that McClusky, not Davis, murdered the victim. He argues that the statement must therefore be admitted as a constitutional matter even if it does not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. I disagree with this argument because the inference sought to be drawn from this statement, i.e., McClusky killed the victim, is extremely weak. This inference is much weaker than the repeated confessions heard by several witnesses in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). A number of other inferences consistent with McClusky’s innocence and Davis’ guilt are also possible, including the inference that Davis took McClusky’s advice and killed the victim. In light of the weakness of the brother’s proffered hearsay testimony, the state court was not constitutionally required to admit it.