Court Opinion

ID: 9516578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:45:43.918507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:38.135980
License: Public Domain

BEILFUSS, C.J.
(dissenting). The majority affirms the trial court’s termination of B.B.’s parental rights, holding that the statutory grounds for involuntary termination were met and that due process does not require a finding of parental unfitness before termination. Because the record before this court does not support the holding that the statutory grounds were met, and because I believe due process requires a finding of unfitness before B.B.’s rights can be terminated, I dissent.
The majority glosses over the nature of the interest at stake in an involuntary termination hearing. Therefore I must start with an examination of the nature of B.B.’s rights which must be accorded before termination. The relationship between parent and child is protected by the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); In Interest of J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 136, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981). Both this court and the United States Su*452preme Court have consistently recognized the firmly established principle that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), and cases cited therein; In Interest of D.L.S., 112 Wis. 2d 180, 332 N.W.2d 293 (1983); Termination of Parental Rights of T.R.M., 100 Wis. 2d 681, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981). The right to conceive and raise one’s own child has been described as essential, one of our basic civil rights and more precious than property rights. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
The fundamental nature of this right is not affected by the fact that the child was born without the benefit of a marriage ceremony between the parents. The United States Supreme Court in recent decisions has made it clear that the parental rights of putative fathers are also entitled to constitutional protection. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) ; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). While the United States Supreme Court has recently indicated that unwed fathers who have an opportunity to develop a parental relationship and fail to do so may not always be entitled to the same due process protections as other parents, Lehr v. Robertson,-U.S.- (June 27, 1983), this court has expressly recognized “that the bond of nature between a parent and a child born out of wedlock should not be less protected by the law ‘simply because her natural father has not married her mother.’ ” State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973), quoting Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), (emphasis supplied). Further, in In Interest of J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W. 2d 46 (1981), this court recognized that the parental rights of unmarried parents are entitled to protection under the due process clause of the state constitution. Thus I believe that B.B. has a fundamental parental right as to his daughter, Baby Girl K.
*453This fundamental right to raise one’s own child is not absolute, but is qualified by the parens patriae power of the state to protect the best interests of children, which in some circumstances requires termination of parental rights. But because the termination of parental rights “implicates the fundamental rights of a parent” such rights “must be accorded a high order of respect and must be considered paramount until circumstances show that the parent has forfeited these rights.” Termination of Parental Rights to T.R.M., 100 Wis. 2d at 689. Therefore the procedure that must be followed in terminating parental rights is necessarily rigorous.
The procedure in Wisconsin for involuntarily terminating is threefold: the statutory grounds must be satisfied, sec. 48.415; except in unusual circumstances the parent must be found unfit; and the termination must be in the child’s best interests. In Interest of J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981). Further, as recognized by the majority, due process and Wisconsin statutes require that the party seeking termination show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is appropriate. Sec. 48.31, Stats. 1979-80; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
My review of the record leads me to the conclusion that neither the statutory grounds nor the requirement of unfitness were satisfied.1 I address first the majority’s holding that the statutory grounds for termination were met. Sec. 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats., allows for termination of an unwed father’s parental rights if he does not establish a “substantial parental relationship” with his child prior to adjudication of paternity. This statute explicitly directs considerations of the father’s conduct toward both the mother and the child from conception through the paternity determination.
*454Contrary to the language of the statute, the majority relies solely on B.B.’s actions during L.K.’s pregnancy to affirm the trial court’s finding that the statutory grounds were met and ignores his conduct during the nine months between Baby Girl K.’s birth and the adjudication of paternity. Even assuming that B.B.’s conduct during L.K.’s pregnancy showed a complete disregard for the health and welfare of the unborn child and the mother (which the record does not support), there is evidence in the record that immediately after Baby Girl K.’s birth B.B. consistently demonstrated, through the legal process and correspondence with the trial court, foster parents and Marathon County Department of Social Services, his interest and concern for his daughter and his desire to raise her after his release from criminal confinement. The majority completely ignores the first nine months of Baby Girl K.’s life, and relies solely on the nine months of pregnancy. This is an erroneous and unconstitutional application of sec. 48.415(6) (a) 2, Stats. Clearly B.B.’s conduct during Baby Girl K.’s life is at least equally important to the determination of whether he established a parental relationship with his daughter as the gestation period.
Rather, the correct application of the statute is to examine B.B.’s conduct from the time he learned of the pregnancy to the time he was adjudicated (here by his own motion) Baby Girl K.’s father. A review of the entire record in this light leads to the conclusion that the trial court’s finding that B.B. failed to establish a substantial parental relationship was “clearly erroneous.” Sec. 805.17(2), Stats.
The review of the record before the court is somewhat complicated by the fact that there is evidence in the record as a whole relating to the issue of establishment of a “substantial parental relationship” which was not presented at the termination hearing nor considered by the *455trial judge. I began with an examination of the evidence presented at the termination hearing. There was undisputed evidence that the father did not contribute to the expenses of the pregnancy that arose before he was incarcerated, although he had the funds to do so. It is also undisputed that on one occasion B.B. physically assaulted L.K. while she was pregnant. Finally, it is undisputed that on two occasions B.B., in disregard of L.K.’s welfare, asked L.K. to smuggle marijuana into the prison. All this evidence militates toward a finding that B.B. was not concerned for the welfare of either the mother or baby.
However, other testimony of the mother shows that B.B. did have a concern for both her and Baby Girl K., both during and after the pregnancy. The evidence demonstrates that B.B. was “happy” when he learned of the pregnancy, intended to marry the mother, and spent “every day” with the mother until his incarceration. Her testimony established that during the pregnancy he did pay her dental expenses and that following his incarceration she wrote to B.B. telling him not to worry about the expenses of her pregnancy. Finally, the evidence introduced at the hearing indicates that following his incarceration B.B. repeatedly informed L.K., through letters and telephone conversations, that he was willing to provide for both the mother and the child by the placement in his mother’s home until he was released.2 *456B.B. presented evidence that made his interest in the child known by filing a Declaration of Parental Interest.
If this was the extent of the evidence in the record relating to whether B.B. had shown parental interest, it would be a much closer question whether the trial court’s finding should be upheld based on the trial judge’s ability to view the witnesses and assess credibility. However, there is other information in the record of the trial court as presented to the court which bears directly on the issue of B.B.’s attempts to assume parental responsibility for Baby Girl K. under the terms of sec. 48.415(6) (a) 2, Stats.
There are references in the record to the fact that since the child’s birth B.B. wrote to the foster parents, the trial judge and the Department which had legal custody of Baby Girl K., requesting photographs and information on the child’s placement and welfare, and expressing his intent to have the child placed with his mother’s family until he was released and could care for the child himself. The record demonstrates that on one occasion the trial judge explicitly rejected B.B.’s attempts to communicate with his daughter, stating that such action was premature until paternity was established. Further, when the record is looked at as a whole, it is clear that consistently since the child’s birth the father had attempted through the legal process to demonstrate his interest in and concern for the child and his intent to provide for the child.3 In light of B.B.’s *457limited opportunity and ability to personally provide care and support for Baby Girl K. following his incarceration (five months into the pregnancy) and the fundamental nature of the right at issue, I find the information in the record of B.B.’s attempts through the legal process and correspondence to assert his interest in his child to be especially important.
This information was in the record before the trial court when it made its determination that parental rights should be terminated, but the record demonstrates that the trial court did not consider this evidence. Rather, the trial court, in its findings of fact, explicitly found that B.B. “failed to present evidence of any attempts on his part to establish a parental relationship with Baby Girl K. such as attempts to contact said child, write to persons caring for said child or to send the child cards or gifts.” The entire record before this court simply does not support this finding. The majority perpetuates the trial court’s error by also ignoring this very relevant and important evidence.
On the basis of the entire record before this court and the trial court, I believe that the trial court’s finding that the statutory grounds for involuntary termination were met to be unsupported by the record. However, because of the nature of the evidence in the record, I would remand the action for a new hearing on this issue rather than simply finding that the statutory grounds were not met. Some of the evidence of B.B.’s attempts to contact the child consists of references to letters which, are not in the record and their actual content is unknown. Further, some of the evidence that is actually *458contained in the record may not have been properly before the trial court. Finally, I believe that the trial court is in a better position to assess the credibility of such evidence and witnesses. This is especially important in this case because L.K. and the guardian ad litem state that B.B.’s concern for the child is motivated solely by his desire to effect a reconciliation with the mother. B.B. denies any such motivation and there is some evidence in the record showing that his interest is genuine, see n. 2, supra. This court is simply not in a position to make an informed decision on this issue which involves a credibility determination. For these reasons I believe this issue should be retried under authority granted to this court by sec. 751.06, Stats.
The majority also holds that due process does not require a finding that B.B. is an unfit parent before his parental rights can be terminated. I disagree. The majority relies on the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Lehr v. Robertson, - U.S. - (June 27, 1983), to support this position. I believe their reliance on the Lehr decision is misplaced.
First, the court in Lehr was addressing the limited issue of whether the New York statutory scheme adequately protected the putative father’s opportunity to form a parental relationship with his child, such that he would then be entitled to notice of adoption proceedings. Lehr, - U.S. - , slip, op., p. 14. The New York statutory scheme under review in Lehr has absolutely no similarity to sec. 48.415(6) (a) 2, Stats., and thus Lehr at best has only very limited applicability to the instant case.
Second I read Lehr to fall into the holding of Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) as interpreted by this court in In Interest of J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981). In J.L.W. the court held that “except under unusual circumstances like those presented *459in Quilloin, the due process protections of the state and federal constitutions prohibit the termination of a natural parent’s rights, unless a parent is unfit.” 102 Wis. 2d at 136. The unusual circumstances in Quilloin which allowed the court to terminate parental rights without a finding of unfitness are as follows: an unwed father attempted to block the adoption of his son by the natural mother and her husband when the child was eleven years old and had been in the mother’s custody his entire life. The father never had custody and was not seeking custody but wanted to block the adoption which would terminate his parental rights. The Court rejected the father’s argument that he was denied due process, stating:
“We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended ‘[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.’ Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977) (STEWART, J., concurring in judgment). But this is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child. Nor is this a case in which the proposed adoption would place the child with a new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived. Rather, the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appellant. Whatever might be required in other situations, we cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find anything more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the ‘best interests of the child.’ ” 434 U.S. at 255.
Similarly, in Lehr, the putative father “never had any significant custodial, personal or financial relationship (with his child), and he did not sek to establish a legal tie until after she was two years old.” Lehr, - U.S. -, slip op., p. 14. Also, as in Quilloin, the father was *460attempting to block the adoption by the natural mother who had had custody since birth.
The facts in this case are clearly distinguishable from those in Quilloin and Lehr. This is not a situation as in Quilloin and Lehr where the natural parent displayed almost no interest in the child for its entire life although well aware of the fact of parenthood and able to provide and care for the child. Here B.B. has indicated interest and concern for the child since he learned of her conception and has since shortly after birth requested custody. Further, B.B. is not attempting to block the adoption of Baby Girl K. by the natural mother or into an established family unit as in Quilloin and Lehr. In this case the natural mother, three days after the birth, released custody of Baby Girl K. to the Marathon County Department of Social Services. Here there are no adoptive parents nor adoption proceedings pending. Nor could there be until B.B.’s parental rights are terminated. Thus we find that the narrow “unusual circumstances” exception recognized in J.L.W. does not apply and due process requires that B.B. be found unfit before his rights can be terminated. As discussed above, the record simply does not support the finding of the majority that B.B. failed to establish a substantial parental relationship. He is therefore entitled to a finding of unfitness before his parental rights can be terminated. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Further, contrary to the holding of the court of appeals, this court can not find that B.B. is an unfit parent as a matter of law based on the record before this court. Initially, there is an insurmountable constitutional obstacle to the court making such a finding based on this record — the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. It is beyond dispute that due process demands adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard when a person is threatened with termination of *461a fundamental liberty interest. B.B. was never accorded this constitutionally mandated hearing and thus his parental rights can not be terminated by this court. The record clearly demonstrates that B.B. was never notified that the petitioner was attempting to prove he was an unfit parent. Further, the record shows that the issue was never litigated in the termination hearing, nor even considered by either the trial court or the petitioner. The issue before the trial court at this hearing, and all the evidence presented, was directed solely to the question of whether the statutory grounds for involuntary termination were met. Thus, on this basis alone, the majority’s termination of B.B.’s parental rights unquestionably violates due process and should not be sustained.
Further, even without this constitutional impediment, the record is insufficient to support the court of appeals holding that as a matter of law B.B. is an unfit parent. The evidence required to support a finding of parental unfitness must be very substantial:
“The standards for a finding of unfitness in Wisconsin have long deferred, as much as possible, to parental rights. When unfitness is found, however, it must be based upon most substantial grounds. The standards for unfitness have long been stringent. To support a finding of unfitness,
“ ‘it must appear that the [parent] has “so conducted himself, or shown himself to be a person of such description, or is placed in such a position, as to render it not merely better for the children, but essential to their safety or to their welfare, in some very serious and important respect, that his rights should be treated as lost or suspended, — should be superseded or interfered with.” [Emphasis added.] ’
Lemmin v. Lorfeld, 107 Wis. 264, 266, 83 N.W. 369, 360 (1900). It is evident, then, that a finding of unfitness is a determination that further contact between parent and child will be seriously detrimental to the *462child.” Termination of Parental Right to A.M.K., 105 Wis. 2d 91, 102, 312 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1981).
The record simply does not support a finding that as a matter of law it is essential for Baby Girl K.’s safety or welfare that B.B.’s parental rights be terminated.
The court of appeals, in holding that a finding of unfitness was “clearly sustained by the record,” stated:
“The trial court found that prior to his incarceration, B.B. had funds available to provide care and support for L.K. but failed to do so. The court also considered the incident of physical violence by B.B. toward the mother during her pregnancy and the fact that he requested that she smuggle marijuana into the prison for him twice during her pregnancy. At the very least, B.B.’s conduct demonstrates a complete indifference to the welfare of the child. The court also found that although B.B. was interested in the child, he failed to carry through with actions that would establish a substantial parental relationship.”
The court of appeal’s reference to the failure of B.B. to support L.K. and establish a substantial parental relationship can not be considered by this court in determining unfitness because the trial court’s finding that that statutory grounds were met was not supported by the record. Further, I conclude that evidence of one isolated physical assault on the mother and two requests for marijuana while in prison do not as a matter of law make B.B. an unfit parent by clear and convincing evidence.
The only other evidence in the record that goes to unfitness is the fact that B.B. is now incarcerated for a burglary conviction, has a criminal record, and according to L.K.’s testimony, B.B. “dealt in drugs” and “robbed places.” While all this evidence clearly is relevant to the issue of fitness, there are no facts in the record detailing any of this evidence. All the record contains is the bare facts stated above. Without an examination into *463the details of B.B.’s actions, a finding of unfitness is not supportable.
This court cannot, based on this inadequate record, make the far-reaching finding of unfitness which leads to the irrevocable termination of parental rights. As stated by this court in Termination of Parental Rights to T.R.M., 100 Wis. 2d at 689: “An examination of a record seldom is adequate to make the necessary factual determinations that are a part of this type of controversy.” I would also remand the action to the trial court to conduct a hearing on B.B.’s fitness as a parent.
I therefore dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justices Heffernan and Abrahamson join in this dissent.

 B.B. does not challenge the trial court’s finding that termination would promote Baby Girl K.’s best interests and that issue is not before the court.

 The majority chooses one sentence from one letter to demonstrate that B.B. in his letters to L.K. showed that his only interest in the child was to perpetuate his relationship with L.K. (Supra, p. 433, n. 4). The majority fails to point out that in this same letter, along with the other letters contained in the record, B.B. on a number of occasions speaks of his concern for the mother and the child, both during and after pregnancy and his intent to provide for both of them. The record also contains a letter to the trial court from the chaplain of Kettle Moraine Correctional Institute in which he expresses his opinion that B.B. was genuinely inter*456ested in his daughter and was not motivated by an intent to retain a relationship with the mother.

 B.B.’s attempts through the legal process to assert his interest in Baby Girl K. are as follows: Less than one month after her birth, B.B. filed a Declaration of Parental Interest; at an initial hearing on the “Chip’s” petition filed by L.K., B.B.’s counsel informed the court that B.B. wanted the child placed with his mother until his release; in August of 1981, B.B. filed a petition for determination of paternity and custody and a motion for summary *457judgment on the issue of paternity; at an initial hearing on the paternity petition and L.K.’s petition to terminate B.B.’s parental right, B.B.’s counsel asked the court to allow B.B. to communicate with his daughter through the Department of Social Services, which had legal custody of Baby Girl K.