Court Opinion

ID: 9706750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:50:54.256699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.760826
License: Public Domain

Gillis, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority’s resolution of the remaining issues, I dissent because I believe that the trial court’s failure to instruct with regard to the necessarily lesser included offense of third-degree criminal sexual conduct was not harmless error. Contrary to the prosecutor’s assertion and as the majority opinion recognizes, our Supreme Court has thus far adopted a harmless error analysis only where the trial court has failed to instruct with regard to a cognate lesser included offense. People v Beach, 429 Mich 450, 466; 418 NW2d 861 (1988). In People v Garrett, 161 Mich App 649, 651-652; 411 NW2d 812 (1987), this Court held:
It is well established that a trial court must instruct upon a necessarily lesser included offense when requested to do so, even though the evidence showed a completed offense. This is known as the automatic instruction rule. Failure to do so is error requiring reversal. A necessarily lesser included offense is one which must be committed as *213part of the greater offense, i.e., it is impossible to commit the greater without first having committed the lesser.
The reason for the automatic instruction rule is that the denial of a proper request for instructions on lesser included offenses exposes a defendant to possible conviction on a charged offense simply because a jury may be reluctant to acquit a person who is really guilty only of a lesser crime. Conversely, such a denial of a requested instruction increases the possibility that a person guilty of a lesser crime may be acquitted. Moreover, the jury is the sole judge of all facts presented and may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all evidence, whether logical or not. [Citations omitted.]
See also People v Herbert Ross, 73 Mich App 588, 593-594; 252 NW2d 526 (1977). Instructing with regard to second-degree criminal sexual conduct did not alleviate the failure to instruct with regard to third-degree criminal sexual conduct because first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(b)(ii), requires penetration while second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(ii); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(b)(ii), requires sexual touching. Both offenses require the existence of the familial relationship, unlike third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d(1)(a); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(a). Therefore, I continue to apply the remedy applied by our Supreme Court in People v Cargill, 405 Mich 482, 500-501; 275 NW2d 777 (1979). Hence, I would reverse and remand for entry of a judgment of conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d(1)(a); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(a), and for resentencing. In the alternative, the prosecutor may, in his discretion, upon notice to the trial court before resentencing, have the trial court vacate the judgment of conviction and retry defendant on the charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.