Court Opinion

ID: 9809370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:10:22.776384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:36.051066
License: Public Domain

Walker, J.,
dissenting: I concur with Mr. Justice Brown in dissenting from the opinion of the Court. It seems to me clear that the Legislature did not intend to deprive this Court of the power to determine who is a fit and proper person to be admitted to practise in the courts of the State, but only to require that the applicant for license should, “before being allowed to stand an examination,” file with the Clerk a certificate of his good moral character to be signed by two attorneys who practise in this Court, and that this should be prima facie sufficient to entitle him to his license, if otherwise qualified; but it was not intended to make this certificate conclusive evidence.' Such a construction would defeat the manifest intention of the Legislature, that no person should be admitted to the bar who was not of good repute.
Suppose that after a certificate has been given by the two ' attorneys, the applicant should to our knowledge be convicted of a felony, or any infamous offense, or should commit some-act of so grave a nature as to admittedly disqualify him for the position of an attorney at law, would this Court be bound to issue his license under such circumstances, and can it be imagined that the Legislature intended any such result? And yet under the decision of the Court in this matter, the filing of the certificate and the possession" of a competent knowledge of the law would require us to admit an applicant in just such a case. A construction which could impose that duty upon us might so corrupt the administration of justice *29in the courts that it should not be presumed to be in accordance with, tbe true meaning of tbe statute.
Tbe courts of tbis country have, therefore, beld that statutes similarly worded merely provide that tbe applicant, as a condition precedent to bis examination, shall furnish prima facie evidence of bis good character, and they were not intended to restrict tbe power of tbe Court to finally determine whether or not be possessed tbe requisite character. Tbe Court is therefore not limited in its inquiry as to tbe moral character of tbe applicant for an attorney’s license to tbe certificate, but it will, and is bound by tbe obligation of tbe duty necessarily imposed by law, to look behind it in all proper cases. Attorney's License Application, 21 N. J. L., 345.
Tbe Legislatures of tbe several States have from time to time assumed to prescribe rules for tbe admission of attorneys to practise at tbe bar, and tbe courts have generally acted upon them when they have seemed reasonable, and in deference to tbe wishes of a coordinate department of tbe government; but tbe power to decide finally who.possesses sufficient character for admission is a judicial function from tbe nature of the question, and is so regarded by all well-considered authorities. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall., 333; Matter of Goodell, 39 Wis., 240.
In Garland’s case tbe Court says: “Tbe order of admission is tbe judgment of tbe Court that tbe parties possess tbe requisite qualifications as attorneys and counsellors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry tbe parties become officers of tbe Court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and' declared by tbe judgment of tbe Court after opportunity to be beard has been afforded. Their admission or their exclusion is not tbe exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is tbe exercise of judi*30cial power, and bas been so beld in numerous cases. Attorneys and counsellors are not only officers of the Court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature. And hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted'to the courts, and the latter in performing this duty may very justly be considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions,” citing Matter of Cooper, 22 N. Y., 81. So in the case of Ex parte Secombe, 19 How., 9, the same Court said: “It has been well settled by the rules and practice of common-law courts that it rests exclusively with the Court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.” 4 Cyc., p. 900, et seq., and notes.
The solution of this question does not depend upon the jurisdiction of this Court, as supposed in the opinion of the majority, but upon its judicial power, there being a clearly marked difference between the -two in respect to this matter. Art. IV, sec. 8, of the Constitution .confers jurisdiction upon this Court to review matters of law and legal inference-and of certain issues and questions of fact, with the power to issue any remedial writs necessary to give it a general supervision and control over proceedings of the inferior courts. It shall have jurisdiction, that is, the power to hear and determine all such matters; but a moment’s reflection will suffice to show that this cannot be all the judicial power the Court has. This was merely intended to define and determine its appellate jurisdiction, but not even by implication to deprive it of any part of the broad judicial power given by sec. 2. There are matters of a judicial nature which this Court may hear and determine other than those which are specified in sec. 8. . Some of its powers are inherent, as being necessary for the preservation of its very existence, its dignity and the enforcement of obedience to its orders and decrees. There are still others which arise by implication, as being *31essential to tbe full and efficient exercise of tbe powers and jurisdiction wbicb have been specifically granted. Tbe two terms are not, therefore, exactly coextensive, altbougb they may generally be considered as practically synonymous. But whether they are or not tbe same in meaning, it must be remembered that sec. 8 refers only to tbe appellate jurisdie- • tion of this Court, and does not by its inclusive words deprive it of tbe jurisdiction or judicial power wbicb must always reside in every court.
Those powers wbicb are implied, as being necessary to tbe exercise of those wbicb are expressed, are as much given as if they bad themselves been expressed. This is an unquestioned rule of construction, applicable alike to constitutions and statutes.
I think, therefore, that no argument in favor of tbe conclusion of tbe majority can legitimately be drawn from the language of sec. 8 of Art. IY of tbe Constitution, as limiting tbe power of this Court.
Nor do I think any insuperable difficulty is presented by tbe suggestion that if tbe power of tbe Court to pass upon the character of tbe applicants is inherent, it inheres in all tbe courts. It belongs, of course, to any court having tbe power to examine and admit applicants to tbe practice of law, and this Court has been designated for that purpose for nearly a hundred years. If an application could be made to any court, then tbe particular court to which it is made would bave the same power that we bave.
Tbe best statement of tbe principle governing a case like this one is perhaps to be found in Gwrlcmd’s case, namely, that tbe Legislature may prescribe -the qualifications of an applicant, but tbe Court before wbicb be is examined must determine whether be possesses them, that being a judicial and not a legislative function. Tbe application of this simple rule excludes any discussion of tbe inherent power of tbe Court and places tbe decision of tbe question upon a sensible *32and practical basis and one in entire harmony with all onr notions of tbe duties and functions of tbe different branches of our government.'
It is unfortunate that tbe explicit language of tbe former statute was changed, but I am quite sure it was tbe result of inadvertence and was not intended by tbe Revisers or tbe Legislature to change tbe meaning of tbe law and to divest this Court of a power it has exercised since tbe first year of its existence.
Tbe case of Ex parte Thompson, 10 N. C., 355, which is cited in tbe opinion of the Court, would seem to be an authority against the conclusion that we have been divested by tbe Revisal of tbe right to inquire into tbe character of. an applicant. It is true Chief Justice Taylor said that if tbe Act of 1777 appeared, according to the usual rules of interpretation, to convey a peremptory direction to tbe Court to examine tbe applicants then before tbe Court,- it could only yield obedience to the mandate, however striking might be tbe mischief and impolicy of such a course of legislation. He was then speaking of tbe qualification of citizenship in this State, which involved a political and not a judicial question. It was for tbe Legislature to say who should be citizens, or who should enjoy tbe rights of citizenship, such as tbe right to apply for license to - practise law. It was a matter solely of public policy, and it was with reference to tbe question, in that phase of it, that the Chief Justice said what we have substantially stated. But the Court undertook to decide, and did decide, that notwithstanding the Acts of 1777 and 1818 provided for the admission by the Court to the bar of a person found to have competent law knowledge and an upright character, the Court could still reject any one who did not have the qualification of citizenship, and even though the act also provided that a person coming into this State from any foreign country should be admitted, if he had resided in the *33State one year and exhibited a testimonial of bis unexceptionable moral character in the manner therein provided.
The Court added another qualification to those required by the act, it being deemed essential that it should be possessed by any one who should apply for admission to practise in our courts. The language of the Court used in this connection is strong and most impressive:. “Viewing the profession of the law as the source from which the superior judicial magistrates must be derived, and from which a large proportion of enlightened and efficient public officers is usually selected, every one must naturally feel solicitous that it should not fall into such hands as would lower it in the national opinion.” And again: “No longer a nursery in which merit is trained under the directing hand of experience and qualified to render manly and essential service to the community, the legal profession, fin its nature the noblest and most beneficial to mankind; in its abuse and debasement the most sordid and pernicious,* would sink into a mere mercenary instrument, without sympathy .in the public prosperity, and without hold on the public confidence.”