Court Opinion

ID: 9743728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:41:40.375146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.112125
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent. The majority imagines an ambiguity where none exists. Ambiguity of language is not established by the mere fact that parties assert different interpretations of that language. Ethyl Corp. v. Forcum-Lannom Associates (1982), Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 1214, 1218.
Provision 3 of the dissolution decree provides:
"3. That Respondent be and hereby is ordered to pay to the Clerk of this Court for the maintenance and support of said child the sum of $200.00 per month, commencing forthwith, said sums to be paid by the Clerk to the Petitioner herein. Respondent is further ordered to pay to the Clerk of this Court the annual support service fee."
How could any reasonable mind find this order ambiguous? Simple and straightforward, provision 83 ordered Barker to pay $200.00 per month to the court clerk. It is undisputed that Barker made no payments to the clerk. Thus, Flynn had established a prima facie case of support arrearage. Castro v. Castro (1982), Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 366, 367.
The question is whether Barker can receive credit for the more than $200.00 per month in social security and military pension funds received by the minor child. See Castro, supra; accord, Payson v. Payson (1982), Ind.App., 442 N.E.2d 1123; contra, Breedlove v. Breedlove (1981), Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 739. To receive credit, it was incumbent on Barker to present evidence that the benefits were received in discharge of the support obligation. However, Barker presented no evidence from which the trial court could have found that Flynn received the benefits because the dissolution decree ordered Barker to pay support. In other words, there was no indication that Flynn would not have received the benefits had the dissolution decree not ordered support payments. Because there was no evidence that Flynn received the benefits in discharge of the support obligation, Barker can not receive credit for them.
The majority allows the trial court to retroactively modify the support order to exclude the ordered payments. It is well settled that a trial court may not retroactively modify a support order. E.g., Jahn v. Jahn (1979), 179 Ind.App. 368, 385 N.E.2d 488, 490. However, Barker contended that the trial court was merely "interpreting" the support order which Barker asserts is similar to the trial court's action in Lankenau v. Lankenau (1977), 174 Ind.App. 45, 365 N.E.2d 1241.
In Lankenau, the trial court corrected its judgment to allow the petitioner in a marriage dissolution to receive a tax deduction for the payments he had made to the respondent. It was apparent from the record that the trial court had intended the petitioner to receive the tax deduction. As was stated in Lankenau:
"It appears clear to this court that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it corrects a judgment to make that judgment conform to the intent of the trial court in entering the judgment in first instance. It is the opinion of this court "that the action taken by the trial court would be a clear example of the relief from the operation of a judgment to which TR 60(B)(1), ie., 'mistake' is directed." (Emphasis added.)
Id., Ind.App. at 48, N.E.2d at 1243.
In no way does the holding in Lankenau apply to the present case. Here, the trial court was not correcting a "mistake" in its original order. The record is barren of any indication that the trial court originally had intended to order Barker to pay support only if Flynn did not receive at least $200.00 per month from another source.
The majority erroneously believes such an indication can be transmogrified from provision 11. That provision provides:
"11. That the Respondent be and hereby is declared the owner of his U.S. Social Security Rights and any rights from Canada."
Instead of giving provision 11 its plain meaning, the majority believes this provision "presumably" refers to benefits paid to *1011Barker's minor child; not to Barker's personal benefits. The majority believes any other interpretation would render provision 11 meaningless because, the majority opines, without benefit of authority, Barker already owns his personal benefits and neither Flynn nor their minor child would have any claim to them through the dissolution proceedings. The clamoring fallacy in this logic is that while neither Flynn nor the minor child could have any claim in the dissolution proceeding to the benefits Barker already receives, Barker was mystically imbued with a claim to the benefits which the minor child already receives. Thus, on the one hand the majority asserts that the trial court had no power to award Barker's personal benefits to Flynn or their minor child, but on the other hand the majority asserts that the trial court did have the power to award the minor child's benefits to Barker.
This Court should not allow a trial court to retroactively modify a support order under the guise of "interpreting" it. In effect, the majority has rewritten the dissolution decree. Provisions 3 and 11 are not meaningless as they are written. Their meaning is plain.