Court Opinion

ID: 9597381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:58:10.513134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:37.910997
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the state’s articulated racially neutral reason for striking prospective black juror Katherine M. Galloway (Galloway) was clearly a pretext, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. (2d) 69 (1986), and State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E. (2d) 891 (1989). I would reverse.
The state claims Galloway was excluded because she “appeared to be very weak on the death penalty,” based upon her answers to voir dire questions, and the fact that she had children of about the same age as the appellant.
According to this record, the state accepted white jurors whose answers bore a marked similarity to Galloway’s. Additionally, white jurors seated by the state had children of about the same age as the appellant.
Following is the pertinent portion of Galloway’s voir dire testimony.
COURT: Are you in favor of the death penalty, opposed to it or just where do you sit?
GALLOWAY: I — I believe in our legal system, and I feel when everything is brought to the court and presented to the court, I do believe in the jury selection, well, choosing a verdict. I don’t really — can’t say yes or no.
GALLOWAY: I believe it’s wrong for someone to take somebody else’s life.
COURT: Well, could you, however — could you, just answer, not in this case, but if the facts were bad enough, could you return a death penalty?
GALLOWAY: If all the evidence pointed to that person, I believe I could.
*23COURT: And you could return a verdict that speaks the truth according to your finding either a life sentence or if it was, as you stated, the other way, a death penalty, you could do that? You could consider both?
GALLOWAY: I could consider them both.
COURT: Could you sign your name to a death penalty along with all the other twelve jurors?
GALLOWAY: I think it would be kind of difficult, but I— if I — if that’s what we chose as a verdict—
STATE: Would the fact that the Defendant might be about the same age as some of your children might make it more difficult for you to vote for the death penalty?
GALLOWAY: That’s hard to say. I don’t — I, or [sic] course, think that I have a child that age. I sound ruthless when I say, but this is something that’s happened that needs to be decided upon, and if I’ve been chosen as a juror, I would do my best with everybody else to be fair, and I would sign.
As an example, the voir dire testimony of one white juror, Grace Ann Gast, follows for comparison with Galloway’s voir dire responses.
COURT:... What is your position on the death penalty?
GAST: I hadn’t give it a whole lot of thought until I was called for this particular case. I know in South Carolina it has the death penalty in this state. Personally I feel if somebody admits to a crime that they have murdered somebody, then I feel like the death penalty is in order. If its — you know, the person maintains he’s innocent, we have to go through and a group of twelve people decide, first of all, innocence or guilty, and then decide what the punishment should be, I have a personal problem with, you know, can I sit up there and be the person that says this man’s got to die. I don’t know — I don’t know how I feel about that.
*24COURT: Would you auto — just automatically regardless of what the facts are, only return life imprisonment? Could you consider both sides?
GAST: I guess it gets down to the point of the moral issue. Even if we have all of this evidence and, you know, eleven other people in that room says, you know, yes, the death penalty on that, you know, I look at it I’m the last vote, hypothetical situation, would I be able to say, you know, put my vote in and say, yes. To me it’s like playing God in some cases. I don’t know. I’ve never been in that position. I don’t know what I would do.
COURT: Let me ask you this, not about this case, talking about any case. If the facts were bad enough in any case, now not this one, if the facts were bad enough—
COURT: — could you return a verdict of death along with the other eleven jurors?
GAST: Possibly.
COURT: You could consider it?
GAST: Uh-huh.
Without posing any questions, the state accepted Juror Gast whose position was, in my view, more vacillatory than Galloway’s. Thus, I would conclude that the state’s “neutral” reason of excluding prospective jurors “weak on the death penalty” is a pretext for racial discrimination where, of two persons expressing similar viewpoints, the state accepts the white venireperson and rejects the black venireperson on the basis of her viewpoint. See State v. Patterson, (Patterson II), — S.C. —, 396 S.E. (2d) 366 (1990) (Finney dissenting).
The state’s second articulated reason for striking Galloway was that she had children of about the same age as the appellant. Six white venirepersons had children of similar age, all of whom were accepted by the state. Of the six, three were excluded by the defense and three were seated on the jury. The state contends the appellant has not shown that the solicitor was aware of information concerning the ages of venireper-sons’ children. The record reflects that this information is fur*25nished on juror questionnaire sheets completed prior to the court term. I find ludicrous any suggestion that such information was not available to the state.
I would hold that the state’s asserted racially neutral reasons for excluding black venireperson Galloway were a pretext for racial discrimination since the state accepted similarly situated white jurors. State v. Oglesby, supra. I would reverse.