Court Opinion

ID: 9792395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:28:53.553092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.594889
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Justice,
dissenting, joined by ROSE, J.
I undertake the disconsolate task of differing from the majority, with a feeling that I am probably right.
A dissent has a limited purpose. It is a voice in the wilderness urging repentence, begging or chiding the majority to correct a mistake into which it has been seduced. It may help rescue for another day a principle that is not supported today. It is also an appeal to greater enlightenment tomorrow, a plea to later courts to set things right. A dissenter fancies that he has a sense of history and does not want to associate himself with an opinion that he believes is wrong and has only a short day in the sun. For that reason, I urge the court to overrule Chapman v. State, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1280 (1982).1
In affirming, the majority relies principally on Chapman v. State, supra. I dissented in Chapman and will not repeat all my reasons, but will reemphasize that:
“The admission in evidence of hypnotically enhanced testimony developed by experts is suspect, even under correct scientific procedures. The admission of hypnotically enhanced testimony, developed by a rank amateur absent any scientific procedure is totally unreliable.” Chapman v. State, supra, at 1287.
“In cases cited by the majority permitting hypnotically enhanced testimony, and in other cases that I have read, the hypnotist had at least a modicum of expertise and employed some verification procedure. Here we have questionable expertise and a total lack of verification. I know of no case that has permitted the admission of hypnotically enhanced testimony with such a total lack of foundation.” Chapman v. State, supra, at 1292.
Under Chapman a hypnotist need not possess any qualifications, have any experience, or employ any verification procedures.2 It follows, therefore, that a hobo *106passing through town or a derelict in the county jail could hypnotize a potential witness, and the witness’ testimony would be admissible at trial.3 According to the holding in Chapman, the party who objects to hypnotically enhanced testimony can test its unreliability through cross-examination. An objection to hypnotically enhanced testimony, even testimony enhanced by a person with no skill or training, goes to the weight of the testimony, and not to its admissibility. A long time judge of the Third Judicial District would have put it this way: “The testimony may be received for whatever it is worth.”
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 641 P.2d 775, 785 (1982), cert, denied, 103 S.Ct. 13 (1982), was decided two months after Chapman. The California Supreme Court traced the history of hypnotically enhanced testimony and said:
“ * * * In the earlier cases, as in Harding, [v. State, 5 Md.App. 230, 246 A.2d 302], the courts engaged in little or no analysis of the issue, and merely reiterated the general proposition that the fact of hypnosis ‘goes to the weight, not the admissibility’ of the evidence. If they discussed the point at all, the courts simply noted that the witness believed he was testifying from his own memory and that his credibility could presumably be tested by ordinary cross-examination. [Citations.]”
The court then determined:
“For all these reasons, we join instead a growing number of courts that have abandoned any pretense of devising workable ‘safeguards’ and have simply held that hypnotically induced testimony is so widely viewed as unreliable that it is inadmissible under the Frye test. * * * ” People v. Shirley, supra, at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 641 P.2d 775.
I do not advocate that hypnotically enhanced testimony be inadmissible per se, but rather that the hypnotist have some qualifications and that some safeguards or verification procedures be followed. We require neither; in this area of evidence Wyoming stands alone.
In all probability the State could have obtained a conviction here without the use of a witness whose testimony had been enhanced by hypnotism. The majority opinion implies that even without the testimony of the hypnotized witness, there is still overwhelming evidence of guilt. This latter notion, however, is a fragile reason for upholding a conviction, and is particularly dangerous with respect to a hypnotized witness. There is a myth that when a person is hypnotized he tells the truth.4 “It ain’t necessarily so.”5
“To a layperson, hypnosis is ‘cloaked in a veil of mysticism’ and seems to magically produce fantastic recall. Laymen commonly give great credibility to hypnosis and a jury is likely to place undue emphasis on what transpired during a hypnosis session.” 1 Land & Water Review, p. 346 (1983).
We cannot know that the jury convicted appellant on evidence that was free of taint. Because of fascination with hypnotism and the false idea that a hypnotized person tells the truth, the jury may have convicted primarily .on the testimony of the witness Davidson whose testimony had been *107enhanced by hypnotism. This case can be reversed without overruling any part of Chapman, and it should be.
A majority of the jurisdictions have held that the prosecution has an affirmative duty to advise the defense if a witness has been hypnotized. United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2nd Cir.1969); Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F.Supp. 1025 (N.D.Ga.1975); Lemieux v. Superior Court of Arizona, etc., 132 Ariz. 214, 644 P.2d 1300 (1982); People v. Tait, 99 Mich.App. 19, 297 N.W.2d 853 (1980); State v. Hurd, supra.6
In this ease the majority opinion says that the hypnosis of the witness Davidson was made known to appellant before trial. Before trial the State made its files available to appellant. On one of the supplemental reports in the prosecutor’s file was a notation that Ms. Davidson had been hypnotized. This is the pretrial notice of hypnotism that the State gave appellant and that was deemed to be sufficient by the majority. During the cross-examination at trial of the witness Davidson, appellant had actual notice for the first time that the witness had been hypnotized. I think that what the majority considered to be notice is insufficient.
I would hold that the fact that a witness has been hypnotized is exculpatory information or is otherwise discoverable under Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 5.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), for the reason that the credibility of the witness becomes an issue. Emmett v. Ricketts, supra. Furthermore, the State should have an affirmative duty to specifically advise defendant of the hypnotism before trial; making the State’s files available to defendant is not sufficient to discharge that duty. Emmett v. Ricketts, supra, 397 F.Supp. at 1043.
Discovery during trial that a state’s witness has been hypnotized is useless information. Advice that a witness has been hypnotized immediately before trial is not much better. When a defendant’s counsel receives late information on hypnotism his ability to prepare for trial is impaired. He needs time to prepare cross-examination questions, consult and perhaps call expert witnesses of his own, review the law, check circumstances surrounding the hypnotic sessions, check the qualifications of the person who hypnotized the witness, and review the record of the hypnotic session. Such a process cannot be accomplished immediately before trial or during trial.
When the ability to prepare for trial is impaired, the right to effective counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution is rendered meaningless. The difficulty of adequately cross-examining a previously hypnotized witness constitutes a serious infringement of the right of confrontation.
For these reasons I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. See article, “Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony,” 1 Land & Water Law Review, p. 335 (1983).

. In this case the person hypnotized did not remember the name of the person who had *106hypnotized her. Initially, the prosecutor was unable to give the qualifications of the hypnotist. The prosecutor was not sure when the hypnotic session took place; in fact, he missed the date by two or three months.

.There is a man in Oakland, California, who is the dean and lone “professor” at “Croaker College.” For the sum of $150 each, this man trains frogs to jump. (Many graduates, after receiving their degrees, go on to compete in the famous jumping contest of Calaveras County.) As part of his rigid training curriculum, the “professor” claims that he hypnotizes the frogs; while they are in their hypnotic trance, he plays an attitude-improvement tape to them. Under our present standards the dean of “Croaker College,” would be over-qualified as a hypnotist.

. Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 Ohio N.U.URev. 1, 2 (1977) (quoting 9 Encyclopedia Britannica Hypnosis 133 (1974)).

. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981).

. In the case here the majority have determined that the prosecution must henceforth specifically advise the defense that a witness was hypnotized. I certainly agree with that. However, that does not help the defendant here.