Court Opinion

ID: 9571590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:33:04.231235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:40.164104
License: Public Domain

Mikell, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to Division 3 of the majority opinion and to the judgment. Trial courts exercise broad discretion in qualifying jurors, and, on appeal, we will not disturb that discretion in the absence of manifest abuse.37 It is well settled that:
In order to disqualify a juror for cause, it must be established that the juror’s opinion was so fixed and definite that it would not be changed by the evidence or the charge of the court upon the evidence. The law does not set an impossible standard on the state to obtain jurors completely free of the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused. . . . It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 723 (81 SC 1639, 6 LE2d 751) (1961).38
As the majority noted above, the following exchange took place during voir dire between the prospective juror and defense counsel:
Q: [W]ould you have a difficult time following the law and being a fair and impartial juror in this case?
A: I don’t have a problem following the law. It’s just that I don’t think DUI laws are strict enough. I think once you’ve been convicted, you should not be driving.
Q: Okay. Given the fact that he has been convicted and you know that now —.
A: Right.
Q: — would you be able to follow the law in this case and be an impartial juror?
A: No.
However, the prospective juror clarified her answers in the following exchange between the state and the same juror:
Q: [Prospective juror], do you understand at this point Mr. Foster is presumed innocent?
A: Right.
*611Q: Do you understand that what’s pending against him are mere allegations?
A: Right.
Q: Do you understand that the state, which would be my side, has the burden of proof of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?
A: Yes,
Q: And the way we prove that is through testimony and evidence that would come into court through the witness stand or through documents?
A: Right.
Q: Would you be able to look at that testimony and that other evidence and make your decision about his guilt or innocence based on the testimony and evidence you’d get in court even if that includes some prior DUI’s when the judge tells you why you can consider them and when you can consider them? Would you be able to follow the law and make your decision based on what you hear in court?
A: I understand what you are saying. You want me to listen to what you have to say and you want me to listen.to what the judge says. You can and cannot admit — use as —.
Q: Could you do that, considering your feelings?
A: Yes, I could do it but I just have really strong feelings against DUI.
Q: And that’s ultimately our question. Could you do that even though you have these strong feelings?
A: Yes.
This case is analogous to Heath v. State,39 in which we affirmed the trial court’s refusal to excuse a juror for cause. In Heath, as in the case at bar, the defendant was charged with DUI, and the prospective juror expressed her strong disapproval of drinking and driving.40 Based on a colloquy between the court and the juror similar to the exchanges with the prospective juror in this case, we reasoned that although the juror had expressed her disapproval of drinking and driving and demonstrated some initial bias, “she affirmed her belief in the presumption of innocence, her impartiality with regard to the presentation of evidence, and her sincere intent to do her very best to *612set aside her biases.”41 Based on that conclusion, we held that there was no manifest abuse of discretion.42
Decided November 26, 2002.
J. Louise Dietzen, for appellant.
Gwendolyn R. Keyes, Solicitor-General, Kimberly Sanders-Bjurmark, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellee.
I believe that we should reach the same result in the case sub judice. Although the juror was candid regarding her strong feelings about drinking and driving, she ultimately testified that she could be fair and impartial and that she would be able to follow the law and make her decision based on the evidence. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the juror for cause.43
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.

 Greene v. State, 268 Ga. 47, 50 (485 SE2d 741) (1997); accord Klaub v. State, 255 Ga. App. 40, 47 (3) (564 SE2d 471) (2002).

 Klaub, supra at 47, citing Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 425 (3) (B) (a) (349 SE2d 717) (1986); accord Kelly v. State, 242 Ga. App. 30, 32 (2) (528 SE2d 812) (2000).

 223 Ga. App. 680 (478 SE2d 462) (1996).

 Id. at 682 (3).

 Id. at 683.

 Id.

 See Kelly, supra at 32 (2).