Court Opinion

ID: 9716375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:36:24.298973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:44.694867
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, J.,

dissenting:

The majority’s decision in this case cannot be reconciled with In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), and later Supreme Court cases dealing with the constitutional rights to be accorded accused children in juvenile proceedings. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); McKeiver v. Pennslyvania, *710403 U. S. 528, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971); Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U. S. 203, 92 S. Ct. 1951, 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972).
The majority opinion, in my view, correctly construes Gault, and the subsequent Supreme Court cases, as setting forth a two-pronged test for determining whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to a juvenile proceeding. The test is: (1) whether the juvenile “is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult,” In re Winship, supra, 397 U. S. at 359; Ivan V. v. City of New York, supra, 407 U. S. at 203; and (2) whether the child may be “subjected to the loss of his liberty,” or whether the proceedings “may result in commitment to a state institution,” Gault, supra, 387 U. S. at 36, 44, 49.
Moreover, as the majority opinion in this case seems initially to acknowledge, labels are not controlling as to either aspect of the test. It does not matter whether the name of the proceedings is “delinquency” or “child in need of supervision” (“CINS”), or whether the loss of liberty may be commitment to an “industrial school” or a “receiving home.” Gault, supra, 387 U. S. at 24, n. 31, 27. The child’s entitlement to the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination depends upon the substance of the matter, namely whether he or she is charged with an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult and whether the proceedings could result in a deprivation of liberty.
Despite an apparent recognition of these principles by the majority in this case, and specifically a recognition that labels are not controlling, the majority opinion goes on to make the labels “victim” and “CINS” determinative. Although the acts by petitioner Cindy Ann Spalding which caused these proceedings, and her subsequent deprivation of liberty, would have been criminal acts if committed by an adult, the majority labels her the “victim” of “sex crimes.” Based upon this label, and the fact that the charge and title of the proceedings were later limited to a “child in need of supervision,” the majority denies petitioner the *711constitutional right not to incriminate herself and upholds the action of the trial court in compelling her to take the witness stand and testify against herself.
There can be no question in this case about the fact that the original basis for the charges against petitioner, and one of the grounds for the ultimate adjudication of a “child in need of supervision,” was her commission of acts which would have constituted crimes if committed by an adult. In the petition to the juvenile court, filed February 1, 1973, Cindy Ann Spalding was charged with being a delinquent child and a child in need of supervision. The only specific facts alleged in the petition as a basis for the charges were that “respondent has consumed controlled and prohibited narcotics and engaged in acts of sexual intercourse and sexual perversion with an unknown number of male and female adults for a period of more than one year.” It was also alleged, without any additional supporting facts being set forth, that Cindy Ann Spalding was “ungovernable and beyond the control of her parent” and was “a danger to herself and others.”
The juvenile court master, Mr. Kahl, on February 1, 1973, signed a “Commitment Order,” which recited that Cindy Ann Spalding has been adjudged a child in need of supervision and which committed her to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services. The “Memorandum” of Master Kahl which accompanied that order stated, “Police investigation indicates that these young girls have been victimized by a group of adults in the Dundalk area and elsewhere, for purposes of sexual abuse and drug experimentation.” Other than a reference to the fact that the girls needed medical treatment, the sexual conduct and drug abuse constituted the only facts or basis set forth in the memorandum for the commitment order.
On March 7, 1973, petitioner was returned from the Maryland Children’s Center and was committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services by Juvenile Court Master Peach. In Master Peach’s memorandum accompanying the order committing petitioner, he referred *712to her “participation in unbelievable sex orgies” and the use of drugs. While the master also referred to the fact that petitioner had not been attending school and had been in the habit of sleeping until two or three o’clock in the afternoon, there is no doubt that the behavior which furnished in large part the basis for the commitment order was engaging in “sex orgies” and drug abuse.
At the juvenile court trial itself, testimony offered by the prosecution to sustain the charge of “child in need of supervision” largely related to the girls’ use of narcotics, to petitioner’s having “drugged” her mother, and to the “sex orgies.” The trial judge, in his opinion delivered at the end of' the trial adjudicating petitioner and her co-defendant to be “children in need of supervision,” found as a fact that the girls “have been associated in immoral sexual activities” and have “indulged” in the taking of “drugs of a narcotic nature.” While the trial judge also placed some weight upon petitioner’s failure to attend school, there is no question but that the sexual and drug abuse activities furnished the principal factual basis for the judge’s adjudication and commitment order.
Of course, using “controlled and prohibited narcotics” and engaging in “acts of . . . sexual perversion,” to use the language of the petition against Cindy Ann Spalding, are serious crimes in Maryland. Maryland Code (1971 Repl. Vol., 1974 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 554, punishes “unnatural or perverted sexual practices” of the type which petitioner was alleged to have committed, by a maximum sentence of ten years in the penitentiary. Art. 27, § 276 et seq., the “Controlled Dangerous Substances” law, sets forth various criminal penalties for the use of prohibited narcotic drugs. Petitioner was clearly “charged with . . . act[s] that would constitute . . . crime[s] if committed by an adult,” In re Winship, supra, 397 U. S. at 359; Ivan V. v. City of New York, supra, 407 U.S. at 203, and these acts furnished a large part of the basis for the ultimate “CINS” adjudication and commitment.
The majority opinion states that there is a “marked contrast” between the “delinquent” classification and the *713“CINS” or “child in need of supervision” classification.1 However, as this case illustrates, criminal conduct may furnish the factual basis for the “CINS” adjudication. For example, “CINS” includes children who are “habitually disobedient, ungovernable, and beyond [their parents’] control.” Code (1974), § 3-801 (f) (2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The evidence of such characteristics, as in this case, may be criminal acts. “CINS” also includes a child who “[d]eports himself so as to injure or endanger himself or others,” § 3-801 (f) (3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Of course, a child who commits criminal acts such as using narcotic drugs or “drugging” someone else, is deporting herself “so as to injure or endanger” herself or others. This is why “labels” should not be, and under the Supreme Court’s decisions are not, controlling.
While not dealt with in the majority opinion, the other “prong” or requirement of the Gault test was also met in this case. While petitioner was in fact committed to a “foster home” instead of an “institution,” forced living for a period of years in a “foster home” and away from one’s own home and family is a “loss of his liberty,” Gault, supra, 387 U. S. at 36. Moreover, even if commitment to a foster home, and against the will of the child and her parents, would not be deemed to meet the second requirement of the Gault test, petitioner was subjected to the possibility of commitment to an institution. Code (1972 Repl. Vol., 1974 Cum. Supp.), Art. 52A, § 5 (c), specifically authorizes a juvenile court judge to commit a “CINS” child “to any public or private institution . . . .” As to limitations upon this authority, the pertinent statute in effect at the time of petitioner’s trial, Code (1966 Repl. Vol., 1972 Cum. Supp.), Art. 26, § 70-19, authorized confinement of a “CINS” child in an institution provided that the institution were not designed or operated for the benefit of delinquent children. There were exceptions even to *714that proviso. The present statute, Code (1974), § 3-832 (c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, adds the further limitation to the authority to commit “CINS” children to institutions, requiring that such institutions may not be juvenile training schools or something similar to juvenile training schools. Limitations upon the nature of the institutions to which “CINS” children may be committed do not change the fact that under Maryland law, a child adjudicated to be in need of supervision may be committed to “an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time.” Gault, supra, 387 U. S. at 27.
The two-pronged test of Gault was therefore met in this case. Petitioner was charged with acts that would be crimes if committed by adults, and petitioner was subjected to the prospect of a loss of liberty or confinement in an institution. Consequently, under Gault, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was fully applicable to this proceeding.
There can be no doubt in this case that the petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated. At no time were the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, reh. den. 385 U. S. 890, 87 S. Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966), given. Both the trial court and the Court of Special Appeals stated that petitioner was not yet in custody when her incriminating statements were first made to the police on January 31, 1973, and therefore under Miranda warnings were not required. This view of what constitutes “custody” is a dubious one. The Supreme Court in Miranda defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U. S. at 444. Here, petitioner was brought to the police station by her mother at 6:30 a.m. on January 31, 1973, following a phone call from the investigating police officer and a request from the officer that she be brought to the station. As far as the record *715shows, she has never been at liberty to return home since that time. She was interrogated during the day at the station, gave a written statement, and was then taken to another police station where, with the approval of the Department of Juvenile Services, she was “detained” overnight. On the following morning, February 1, 1973, petitioner was formally charged and committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services. To say that petitioner was not in custody from and after the morning of January 31, 1973, is to be unrealistic. Moreover, even if it be assumed arguendo that petitioner was not yet in custody on January 31st, the record shows that after the first hearing before the juvenile master and the commitment order on February 1st, petitioner was interrogated further by the police and the juvenile authorities, gave information to them, and no Miranda warnings were given at those times either.
Finally, wholly apart from the matter of Miranda warnings, petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated when at the trial she was compelled, over her attorney’s objection, to take the witness stand and testify against herself. At the trial, after several prosecution witnesses testified, the following took place:
“MR. NEWELL [prosecuting attorney]: I call Cindy Ann Spalding to the stand.
“MR. MEOLA [petitioner’s attorney]: Objection.
“THE COURT: Well —
“MR. MEOLA: I instruct my witness not to testify at all. She may be —
“THE COURT: All right, take the stand, Cindy, step up to the stand. All right, you’ll be sworn first.”
Petitioner was then examined extensively by the trial judge and the prosecuting attorney. Objections made by her attorney to incriminating questions were ignored or overruled. The language of the Fifth Amendment is that “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a *716witness against himself . . . No more clear-cut violation of that provision could be imagined than what occurred at petitioner’s trial.
The majority opinion in this case could have significant consequences. Because Cindy Ann Spalding is labelled a “victim,” and because the proceedings are called “CINS” instead of “delinquent,” she is deemed not entitled to those constitutional rights which the Supreme Court has held are applicable in juvenile proceedings. However, if petitioner was a “victim,” anytime a juvenile is engaged in criminal activity with adults, the juvenile could be said to be a “victim.” A teenager might be enticed by an adult into engaging in a series of armed robberiés with the adult, and could be viewed as a “victim.” Turning to the name of the proceeding, since criminal acts may be the basis for “CINS” proceedings, and since an adjudication that a child is in need of supervision may lead to confinement in an institution for as long a period as an adjudication that he is delinquent, virtually all juvenile proceedings could be labelled “CINS” by the authorties without significant consequences. Thus by using the right labels, i.e., “victim” and “CINS,” the police and juvenile authorities will be able to by-pass the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in Gault.

. Actually, as the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in this case points out, much of what is now contained in the “CINS” definition was formerly included in the definition of a “delinquent” child. Matter of Carter and Spalding, 20 Md. App. 633, 650, 318 A. 2d 269 (1974).