Court Opinion

ID: 9927827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 15:01:00.368465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:28:16.442465
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12456    Document: 77-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                 No. 22-12456
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       LUIS ELIAS ANGULO LEONES,
       JHONIS ALEXIS LANDAZURI ARBOLEDA,
       DILSON DANIEL ARBOLEDA QUINONES,

                                                  Defendants-Appellants.

                          ____________________

                 Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12456

                   D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cr-00138-CEH-JSS-1
                          ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Luis Elias Angulo Leones, Jhonis Alexis Landazuri Arboleda,
       and Dilson Daniel Arboleda Quinones (collectively, Defendants)
       appeal their convictions for conspiracy to distribute and possess
       with the intent to distribute cocaine while on a vessel subject to the
       jurisdiction of the United States and possession with intent to dis-
       tribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction
       of the United States. The Defendants contend the district court
       erred by admitting statements by Quinones in violation of Bruton
       v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and subsequently declining to
       sever the joint trial. Individually, Landazuri asserts the district
       court abused its discretion by excluding statements Defendants
       made to Coast Guard personnel as hearsay, and contends we
       should reconsider our decision in United States v. Obando, 891 F.3d
       929 (11th Cir. 2018), to find the Coast Guard lacked jurisdiction to
       board the Defendants’ vessel under the Maritime Drug Law En-
       forcement Act (MDLEA). After review, we affirm the Defendants’
       convictions.
                                I. DISCUSSION
       A. Motion to Sever
             The Confrontation Clause provides that, “[i]n all criminal
       prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
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       22-12456                  Opinion of the Court                                3

       with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Bruton,
       the Supreme Court held the Confrontation Clause was violated by
       the admission of a codefendant’s confession that inculpated the de-
       fendant at their joint trial, despite a curative instruction given to
       the jury. 391 U.S. at 126. The standard derived from Bruton and
       subsequent precedent is that the right to confront witnesses is vio-
       lated when a court admits a codefendant’s statement that, in light
       of the government’s whole case, compels a reasonable person to
       infer the defendant’s guilt. United States v. Schwartz, 541 F.3d 1331,
       1351 (11th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court recently determined the
       Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of a non-testify-
       ing codefendant’s confession where the confession did not directly
       inculpate the defendant and was subject to a proper limiting in-
       struction. Samia v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 2004, 2010 (2023).
               Under Rule 14(a), the district court may sever the defend-
       ants’ trials if joinder appears to prejudice the defendants or the gov-
       ernment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). We favor trying together those
       defendants who have been charged together and are reluctant to
       reverse a district court’s denial of a motion for severance. United
       States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 984 (11th Cir. 1997). A defendant
       claiming misjoinder must demonstrate that a joint trial will result
       in specific and compelling prejudice to his defense. Id.
             The district court did not abuse its discretion 1 when it de-
       clined Leones and Landazuri’s requests to exclude Quinones’

       1 We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion to sever for an abuse

       of discretion. United States v. Taylor, 186 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999). We
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       4                        Opinion of the Court                     22-12456

       statements or sever Quinones from the joint trial. Quinones’ state-
       ments did not directly inculpate Leones or Landazuri. See Samia,
       143 S. Ct. at 2010. In addition, Quinones did not obviously refer to
       the involvement of any other person in his statements, and the jury
       could not have immediately made such an inference. See id. at 2017
       (noting Bruton applies where “[t]he inferences at issue . . . involve
       statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to
       someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve infer-
       ences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the
       confession the very first item introduced at trial”). The district
       court subjected the statements to the limiting jury instruction that
       any statement made by a defendant after arrest “is not evidence
       about any other Defendant.” This cautionary jury instruction was
       sufficient to cure the potential inculpation of Leones and Landaz-
       uri. See id. at 2010. The Government’s contention in its closing
       arguments—that all three Defendants were aware of the criminal
       purpose of the voyage—did not ask the jury to hold Quinones’
       statements against his codefendants and undo the effect of the lim-
       iting instruction. Rather, the Government refuted Leones and
       Landazuri’s mens rea defense with agent testimony that suggested
       the complexity of the operation required all parties to be aware of
       the criminal operation, and individually addressed Quinones’ state-
       ments as compounding proof of his own mens rea. Accordingly, the

       also review evidentiary rulings, such as those on Bruton claims, for abuse of
       discretion. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007).
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       22-12456                  Opinion of the Court                                5

       statements were not admitted in violation of the Confrontation
       Clause. See id.
              As to Quinones, the admission of his own statements cannot
       violate his Confrontation Clause rights. See United States v. Curbelo,
       726 F.3d 1260, 1272 n.7 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[A] defendant’s own ad-
       missions may be admitted against him without violating the Con-
       frontation Clause.”). Moreover, he does not have standing to ar-
       gue his statements prejudiced his codefendants. See United States v.
       Fredericks, 586 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1978) 2 (stating, in a criminal
       proceeding, “defendants do not have standing to assert in their own
       defense the denial of certain constitutional rights to others” (quo-
       tation marks omitted)). Further, the defenses were not mutually
       antagonistic because Leones and Landazuri were still free to argue
       they lacked the requisite mens rea, especially in light of the limiting
       instruction. See United States v. Zafiro, 506 U.S. 534, 538-39 (1993)
       (holding mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se
       and stating limiting instructions are often sufficient to cure any risk
       of prejudice). While Quinones argues the evidence was prejudicial,
       evidence in criminal trials is inherently prejudicial and he has not
       shown the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. See Fed.
       R. Evid. 403 (providing otherwise admissible evidence may be ex-
       cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
       ger of unfair prejudice); United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631 (11th

       2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

       this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
       cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12456

       Cir. 1983) (explaining Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which
       should be used only sparingly, as relevant evidence in criminal tri-
       als is inherently prejudicial). The admission of the statements was
       not fundamentally unfair because Defendants were put on notice
       the Government intended to monitor and potentially use their calls
       after the trial was continued. Accordingly, we affirm as to this is-
       sue.
       B. Hearsay
              Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered as evi-
       dence “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”
       Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible
       unless it falls under one of the stated exceptions to the hearsay rule.
       See Fed. R. Evid. 802. However, an out-of-court statement that is
       either (1) offered to show its effect on the listener or (2) more in the
       nature of an order or a request that, to a large degree, is not even
       capable of being true or false, is not hearsay. United States v. Rivera,
       780 F.3d 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2015).
              Rule 803(1) creates an exception for hearsay statements “de-
       scribing or explaining an event or condition, made while or imme-
       diately after the declarant perceived it,” also known as “present
       sense impressions.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). Likewise, Rule 803(2)
       creates an “excited utterance” exception for hearsay statements
       “relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant
       was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Fed. R. Evid.
       803(2). Courts ruling on the exception should consider the totality
       of the circumstances to determine if the declarant was still under
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       22-12456               Opinion of the Court                         7

       the stress or excitement of the startling event at the time the state-
       ment was made. United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 817 (11th Cir.
       2010).
               The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ex-
       cluded Defendants’ statements as hearsay. See Rivera, 780 F.3d at
       1090 (“We ordinarily review a district court’s evidentiary rulings
       for abuse of discretion.”). The statements were offered to show
       the truth of the matter asserted within—specifically, that Defend-
       ants lacked mens rea. The argued hearsay exceptions do not apply
       because the statements were not made spontaneously and con-
       cerned earlier alleged events. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). Nor does
       the record indicate that Defendants were under the stress or excite-
       ment of the alleged events, given the totality of the circumstances.
       See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2); Belfast, 611 F.3d at 817. Boarding officers
       testified Defendants did not seek rescue or help, did not appear ag-
       itated or under duress when approached, and did not make their
       statements spontaneously. Accordingly, the district court did not
       abuse its discretion in determining that Defendants failed to estab-
       lish a foundation for the present sense impression and excited ut-
       terance exceptions to hearsay. We affirm as to this issue.
       C. Obando decision
              The MDLEA grants the United States extraterritorial juris-
       diction over vessels that fail to make a claim of nationality. Obando,
       891 F.3d at 933; 46 U.S.C. § 70502. The MDLEA provides three
       methods for making a claim of nationality:
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12456

             (1) possession on board the vessel and production of docu-
             ments evidencing the vessel’s nationality as provided in arti-
             cle 5 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas;
             (2) flying its nation’s ensign or flag; or
             (3) a verbal claim of nationality or registry by the master or
             individual in charge of the vessel.
       46 U.S.C. § 70502(e). We held in Obando that a flag painted on the
       hull of a vessel is not “flying” the flag for the purpose of making a
       “claim of nationality or registry.” Obando, 891 F.3d at 933.
              Landazuri’s claim is foreclosed because Obando remains
       binding precedent. See United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228
       (11th Cir. 2016) (stating the prior precedent rule requires us to fol-
       low a prior binding precedent unless it is overruled by this Court
       en banc or by the Supreme Court). Accordingly, we affirm as to this
       issue.
                               II. CONCLUSION
              The district court did not err in admitting Quinones’ state-
       ments because the statements did not directly implicate Leones and
       Landazuri, and the court gave a limiting jury instruction to cure
       potential prejudice. The district court did not abuse its discretion
       by excluding Defendants’ statements because the statements were
       hearsay and Defendants failed to lay a proper foundation for their
       argued hearsay exceptions. Finally, Ladazuri’s jurisdictional claim
       is precluded by Obando. Accordingly, we affirm.
             AFFIRMED.