Court Opinion

ID: 9397849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 18:00:29.770994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:28.187721
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50607        Document: 00516765592             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/26/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                      No. 22-50607                                   May 26, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar
                                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                    ____________
                                                                                          Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Darius Letrayal King,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                              USDC No. 6:20-CR-183-1
                     ______________________________

   Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Darius Letrayal King was convicted by a jury of one count of aiding
   and abetting carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119 & 2 (count one of
   11-count superseding indictment); two counts of aiding and abetting robbery,
   in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) & § 2 (counts three and seven, Hobbs
   Act robbery); three counts of brandishing a firearm in relation to those

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50607     Document: 00516765592           Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/26/2023

                                    No. 22-50607

   offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (counts two, four, and
   eight); and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (count nine). He was sentenced to a total
   of 427 months of imprisonment and a total of five years of supervised release.
          On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
   conviction for carjacking and both convictions for robbery. He further argues
   that, because he could not have been convicted of those offenses, his
   convictions for brandishing a firearm predicated on those offenses must be
   set aside. Additionally, he argues that the written judgment conflicts with
   the oral pronouncement of sentence because it included a special search
   condition of supervised release that he asserts was not pronounced at
   sentencing.
          Because King preserved his challenges to the sufficiency of the
   evidence, we review his challenges de novo, determining whether “after
   viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
   to the [Government], any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
   elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Vargas-
   Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (citing Jackson v.
   Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Our review is highly deferential to the
   jury’s verdict. See United States v. Chon, 713 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2013).
   The question on appeal is not whether the jury’s verdict was correct but
   whether it was rational. United States v. Lopez-Urbina, 434 F.3d 750, 757 (5th
   Cir. 2005).
          With respect to his challenge to his carjacking conviction, King argues
   that the Government failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove one
   essential element of the offense: that he intended to cause death or serious
   bodily injury to the victim, Terrance West. He also urges us to adopt a
   “brandishing-plus” standard, under which the Government must provide

                                             2
Case: 22-50607       Document: 00516765592         Page: 3   Date Filed: 05/26/2023

                                    No. 22-50607

   evidence that a weapon, if brandished during a carjacking, was loaded or some
   other evidence showing that the defendant had a specific intent to cause
   death or serious bodily injury. We do not reach this argument, however, as
   the record reflects that the Government provided sufficient evidence from
   which a jury could have found that King “would have at least attempted to
   seriously harm or kill the driver if doing so had been necessary to complete
   the taking of the car.” See United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 209 (5th Cir.
   2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The jury heard
   testimony that King took West’s keys and, after getting into the driver’s seat,
   pointed a handgun at West, cocked the gun, and threatened to kill West as
   West protested King’s taking of his vehicle. That evidence, together with
   the testimony of King’s accomplice, Corey Jackson, was sufficient to permit
   a rational jury, drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence, to find the
   requisite nexus between the taking of the car and the requisite intent to cause
   death or serious bodily harm. See United States v. Harris, 420 F.3d 467, 475
   (5th Cir. 2005). Based on the evidence, the jury could have reasonably
   inferred that King had the requisite intent to shoot or seriously harm West if
   West tried to stop him from completing the taking of the vehicle at the
   moment of the taking. See id. In drawing that inference, the jury was free to
   choose among any reasonable construction of the evidence, see United States
   v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 422-23 (5th Cir. 2012), and “retain[ed] the sole
   authority” to evaluate the credibility of West and Jackson and to weigh their
   testimony, see United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 351 (5th Cir. 2005). The
   jury’s verdict was rational in light of the record. See Lopez-Urbina, 434 F.3d
   at 757.
             Because the evidence is sufficient to show that King committed
   carjacking under § 2119, and because carjacking is a crime of violence, King
   cannot show that his conviction for brandishing a firearm in connection with
   that offense should be overturned based on the argument presented. See

                                             3
Case: 22-50607      Document: 00516765592          Page: 4    Date Filed: 05/26/2023

                                    No. 22-50607

   Frye, 489 F.3d at 209-10. Accordingly, his conviction and sentencing for
   carjacking and brandishing a firearm in connection with carjacking are
   AFFIRMED.
          Next, King argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he
   aided and abetted the robberies of the 7-Eleven and Family Dollar store. He
   also argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that the robberies of
   the two local stores had the requisite effect on interstate commerce.
          The Hobbs Act imposes criminal penalties on anyone who “in any
   way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any
   article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or
   conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence . . . in
   furtherance of a plan or purpose to” violate this section. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
   To satisfy the jurisdictional element of § 1951(a), the Government must show
   that the defendant’s unlawful activity caused a “minimal effect on interstate
   commerce.” United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1212 (5th Cir. 1997).
          King does not argue that there was insufficient evidence to show that
   the robberies caused a minimal effect on interstate commerce; instead, he
   argues that in establishing whether conduct affects commerce for purposes
   of the Hobbs Act, the Government must show that the conduct had a
   substantial effect on interstate commerce. As he concedes, that argument is
   unavailing in light of this court’s precedent. See Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1208
   (holding that the Government does not need to prove that the effect was
   substantial and concluding that “[i]t suffices to show a slight effect in each
   case, provided that the defendant’s conduct is of a general type which,
   viewed in the aggregate, affects interstate commerce substantially”); United
   States v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 886 n.5 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that the de
   minimus impact on interstate commerce can be shown by evidence that
   robbed stores carried items that came from out of state); see also United States

                                              4
Case: 22-50607      Document: 00516765592           Page: 5     Date Filed: 05/26/2023

                                     No. 22-50607

   v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 313 n.34 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that one panel of
   this court may not overrule another absent en banc reconsideration or
   superseding contrary Supreme Court decision). Further, any rational juror
   could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that King aided and abetted the
   robberies based on the evidence presented, when viewed in the light most
   favorable to the Government. See Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d at 301.
          Because the evidence is sufficient to show that King took affirmative
   actions in furtherance of the robberies with the intent of facilitating the
   robberies, his robbery convictions are AFFIRMED. Given that his sole
   challenge to the related firearm offenses of brandishing a firearm in relation
   to crimes of violence rests on his argument that there was insufficient
   evidence that he committed the predicate offenses, his firearm convictions
   likewise are AFFIRMED.
          For the first time on appeal, King argues that the district court failed
   to properly pronounce the special, discretionary search condition of
   supervised release. Because the challenged special search condition is not
   required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), it is discretionary, and its pronouncement
   at sentencing was required. See United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 559
   (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
          The inclusion of the special condition in the presentence report
   (PSR), which King affirmed he reviewed and which the district court
   adopted, was sufficient to provide King with notice such that our review is
   for plain error only. See United States v. Martinez, 47 F.4th 364, 366-67 (5th
   Cir. 2022); Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560-62. We addressed a similar challenge to
   an identical search condition in United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 350-52
   (5th Cir. 2020), and we conclude, consistent with the reasoning in Grogan,
   that King failed to show a clear or obvious error that affected his substantial
   rights, see id. at 353; Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).

                                               5
Case: 22-50607      Document: 00516765592           Page: 6    Date Filed: 05/26/2023

                                     No. 22-50607

          However, we have sua sponte identified an error with the sentence
   imposed for his conviction on count nine, possession of a firearm by a
   convicted felon, in violation of § 922(g)(1). Since June 25, 2022, violations
   of § 922(g)(1) have a statutory maximum of 15 years under § 924(a)(8).
   18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8). However, from December 21, 2018, through June 24,
   2022, violations of § 922(g)(1) were penalized under § 924(a)(2) and carried
   a 10-year statutory maximum term of imprisonment. See § 924(a)(2) (2019).
   King committed the offense of conviction in January 2020. The PSR reflects
   that the maximum term of imprisonment for count nine is 10 years, and the
   district court noted, at the outset of the sentencing hearing, that the statutory
   maximum for count nine was 10 years. However, the district court went on
   to pronounce concurrent sentences of 175 months on counts one, three,
   seven and nine, notwithstanding that the maximum sentence it could impose
   on count nine was 120 months. The judgment also reflects a 175-month
   sentence for count nine.
          While King’s total sentence is not affected, his sentence for the
   § 922(g) offense exceeds the 10-year statutory maximum in effect at the time
   the offense was committed. See United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 835, 836-37
   (5th Cir. 1989). Because the imposition of a sentence exceeding the statutory
   maximum is an illegal sentence and constitutes plain error, see United States
   v. Sias, 227 F.3d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 2000), we VACATE King’s sentence on
   count nine, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and REMAND the
   case for resentencing on this count within the statutory maximum sentence.
          In all other respects, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED.

                                              6