Court Opinion

ID: 9487089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:08:01.02547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:05.593449
License: Public Domain

FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially
I concur in Judge Noonan’s opinion except as I express my disagreements below.
I
I agree with the majority that the conspiracy indictment is not duplicitous, but I believe it is worth spelling out in greater detail why this is so. Under United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1401 (9th Cir.1988), an indictment which charges a coverup conspiracy distinct from the primary conspiracy is duplicitous because it poses the risk of a nonunanimous jury verdict. This ease initially appeared to be similar to Gordon, because the mail fraud conspiracy charged in the indictment appeared to have been carried out pursuant to a separate agreement, and at a different time than the primary conspiracy to defraud. In other words, the mail fraud conspiracy charged in Count 1 appeared to track precisely that kind of coverup conspiracy which Gordon held must be charged separately.
The government has convincingly argued, however, that the primary activity of defrauding the winery and the subsidiary conspiracy of concealing the fraud overlapped. Alfieri testified that the purpose behind writing the letters which eventually became the basis of the Count 5 mail fraud “was to justify the delivery to cover everything up so payment could be made.” Tr. at 265. Through the same actions, the conspirators attempted to ensure that they would continue to perpetrate their fraud on the winery and thereby make money, and that they would conceal their fraud. As a factual matter, there was a single conspiracy. It is for this reason that the indictment was not duplicitous.
II
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “the absence of mens rea” requires reversal of the conspiracy conviction under the first of the government’s two conspiracy theories.
To understand my point, it is important to keep in mind that 18 U.S.C. § 371 consists of both an “offense” clause and a “defraud” clause: it criminalizes both conspiracies “to commit any offense against the United States” and conspiracies “to defraud the United States or any agency thereof.” The offense clause is premised on a conspiracy to commit a predicate act that violates a statute other than the conspiracy statute; the defraud clause involves a violation of the conspiracy statute itself. Count 1 included a charge under both clauses. Judge Noonan would affirm the conspiracy conviction under the offense clause, on the basis that Licciardi conspired to commit mail fraud; a conviction under the defraud clause, according to the majority, cannot stand. My focus is on the charge under the defraud clause.
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975), clarified the body of conspiracy law relating to conduct falling under the offense clause: Feola held that the level of intent required to meet the jurisdictional element of a conspiracy charged under the offense clause was the same as the level of intent required to meet the jurisdictional element of the underlying offense. In Feola, intent to assault was all that was required; knowledge that the victim was a federal officer was not required. The majority is certainly correct that the outcome in Feola provides only limited assistance to the government in this case, since the underlying offense in Feola clearly did not require anti-federal intent, while the same cannot be said here. But by the same token, eases like Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 79 S.Ct. 1314, 3 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1959), in which the underlying statute did require knowledge that the United States was being deprived of money which was its due, offer no support for the assertion that knowledge of federal involvement is required in this case. In contrast to both Feola and Ingram, the charge in this case falls under the defraud clause, and hence involves no underlying offense at all. Without an underlying offense and without Feola’s formulation to guide us, the matter of determining what level of intent is required is more difficult than it is in the case of an offense clause conspiracy. The *1136issue should not be confused, however, by reference to cases like Ingram.
The Supreme Court case which addresses conspiracy charges brought under the defraud clause is Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987). I disagree with the majority’s reading of that case. The majority emphasizes Tanner’s statement that a conspiracy criminalized by § 371 is “most importantly” defined by the “target of the conspiracy.” 483 U.S. at 130. The majority derives from the latter phrase the conclusion that a person whose conspiratorial acts have the effect of defrauding the federal government escapes § 371 liability unless he knew that his acts would have the effect of defrauding the government. In fact, however, the Supreme Court’s disposition in Tanner indicates just the opposite.
In Tanner, the prosecution tried to link the defendants’ deceptive acts to an effect on the federal government in two distinct ways. The Court rejected the first way, but accepted the second. The government’s first argument, which the Court disposed of in that part of the opinion on which the majority relies, was that a fraud on a private corporation which receives government funding is a fraud on the government. In dismissing that argument, the Court pointed out that such a “sweeping interpretation of § 371 ... would [i]n effect substitute] ‘anyone receiving federal assistance and supervision’ for the phrase ‘the United States or any agency thereof.’ ” 483 U.S. at 132, 107 S.Ct. at 2754.
The prosecution’s second argument was encapsulated in the language of the indictment, which the Tanner Court quoted:
“It was further a part of the conspiracy that the defendants would and did cause [a third person] to falsely state and represent to the [government] that a [government]approved competitive bidding procedure had been followed ...”
483 U.S. at 132, 107 S.Ct. at 2754. The Court accepted this method of connecting the conspiracy to the defrauding of the government, and remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for a determination of whether “the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that petitioners conspired to cause [the third person] to make misrepresentations to [the government].” Id.
The evidence in this case was sufficient to establish just such a conspiracy. There is no question but that Licciardi conspired with Bavaro, Alfieri and others to provide false field tags, and that Delicato passed these on to the BATF in compliance with its reporting obligations. This linkage between the conspiracy and the government — in which the defendant directly manipulated a third person and caused that person to make a false statement to the government — appears to be precisely what the Tanner Court held would be sufficient to uphold a § 371 conviction. And it is entirely distinct from the linkage which was rejected by Tanner — where the fraud perpetrated on a private person may have some impact on the government simply because the government has a fiscal relationship with the private person.
This case can also be conceptualized as one in which defendant himself made false statements to the government, passing them along through the conduit provided by the third person. In this light, the government’s election to charge under the defraud clause is ironic. The government easily instead could have charged Licciardi with conspiring to commit an offense against the United States — making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Under United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984), the lack of anti-federal intent does not bar a conviction for the substantive offense.1 And under Feola, the same would pertain to the offense of conspiracy. In other words, Licciardi’s conviction could easily be sustained under the offense clause of § 371 had the government simply drafted the indictment differently.
Irony aside, of course, we must evaluate the charges against Licciardi as they were framed by the government. The government has made precisely the linkage between the conspiracy and its federal “target” that was endorsed as adequate in Tanner: it has *1137shown that Liceiardi “conspired to cause [a third person] to make misrepresentations to [the government].” The prosecution need not show that Liceiardi knew that the federal government was the ultimate recipient of the misrepresentations.2 Because this case seems to fall precisely within that portion of Tanner in which the Supreme Court held that the government had correctly charged a conspiracy under the defraud clause of § 371, I do not agree that a conviction under the defraud clause must be reversed on the grounds that the government failed to show anti-federal intent.3
Because the conviction can be affirmed on the basis of a conspiracy under the defraud clause, I would not reach the question of whether a conviction based on conspiracy to violate the mail fraud statute could be affirmed in this case. I am not suggesting that it cannot be affirmed on that basis, but I am uncomfortable relying on a theory eschewed by the government.

. Indeed, Licciardi’s situation seems very much parallel to Yermian’s: both defendants supplied false documents to a third party, which passed those documents along to the government pursuant to regulations which applied to that third party, even though they did not directly apply to the defendant.

. This case is entirely distinguishable from Staples v. United States, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), relied on by the majority. The Staples Court was concerned with the use of mens rea to ensure that those who engage in “ostensibly innocuous conduct” do not wind up facing criminal liability. Id.-U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1800. As even the majority acknowledges, Licciardi's conduct was anything but "ostensibly innocuous.” Liceiardi knew he was defrauding the winery and he knew he was defrauding the state regulators. It was his purpose to do so. Staples is inapposite.

. It should also be pointed out that Tanner's "target” language, on which the majority primarily relies, appears to apply to all "conspiracies criminalized by § 371" — not just to those falling under the defraud clause. 483 U.S. at 130. If the language pertains to conspiracies under the offense clause as well as to those under the defraud clause, then the "target” requirement clearly cannot be the same as a requirement for anti-federal intent, since ever since Feo-la it has been clear that a defendant can be convicted under the offense clause even if he knew nothing about the federal consequences of his wrongdoing.