Court Opinion

ID: 9407478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 16:00:59.956364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:38.589867
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10575      Document: 65-1       Date Filed: 07/07/2023   Page: 1 of 92

                                                                 [PUBLISH]
                                       In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                             ____________________

                                   No. 22-10575
                             ____________________

        GEORGE TERSHAKOVEC,
        DIANA TERSHAKOVEC,
        JACQUES RIMOKH,
        HERBERT ALLEY,
        individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
        MICHAEL DELAGARZA, et al.,
                                                         Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
        versus
        FORD MOTOR COMPANY, INC.,

                                                       Defendant-Appellant.

                             ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10575      Document: 65-1     Date Filed: 07/07/2023     Page: 2 of 92

        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10575

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-21087-FAM
                            ____________________

        Before NEWSOM, LUCK, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
               Ford Motor Company advertised its Shelby GT350 Mustang
        as “track ready.” But some Shelby models weren’t equipped for
        long track runs, and when the cars overheated, they would rapidly
        decelerate. A group of Shelby owners sued Ford on various state-
        law fraud theories and sought class certiﬁcation, which the district
        court granted in substantial part. Ford challenges class certiﬁcation
        on the ground that proving each plaintiﬀ’s reliance on the alleged
        misinformation requires individualized proof and, therefore, that
        common questions don’t “predominate” within the meaning of
        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
                For reasons we will explain, the predominance inquiry turns
        on the speciﬁcs of the state laws under which plaintiﬀs have sued—
        and, in particular, on (1) whether those laws require proof of reli-
        ance, (2) if so, whether they permit reliance to be presumed, and
        (3) if so, under what circumstances. Having considered those ques-
        tions, we hold that some of plaintiﬀs’ claims may be certiﬁed for
        class treatment, that others may not, and that some require the dis-
        trict court to take a closer look at applicable state-law require-
        ments.
USCA11 Case: 22-10575        Document: 65-1        Date Filed: 07/07/2023       Page: 3 of 92

        22-10575                 Opinion of the Court                              3

                                             I
                                             A
               The putative class representatives hail from seven states—
        California, Florida, Missouri, New York, Tennessee, Texas, and
        Washington. Each purchased one of two models of Ford’s Shelby
        GT350 Mustang.
               The Shelby is an upgrade of the standard Mustang and, im-
        portantly here, was advertised as “an all-day track car that’s also
        street legal.” 1 Track-capability refers to the vehicle’s capacity to
        perform at higher-than-normal speeds in a controlled environ-
        ment—like, say, on a racetrack. Track-readiness was a central
        theme in Ford’s Shelby advertising. For example, in a race-day in-
        vitation to Shelby owners, Ford’s marketing manager touted the
        Shelby’s “exceptional racetrack capabilities” and said that he was
        “sure” they were “one of the reasons you purchased your GT350—
        perhaps the main reason.” Other Shelby ads included descriptions
        like “track capable,” “track ready,” and “tested endlessly on the
        most challenging roads and tracks in the world,” as well as state-
        ments like, “[W]e wanted to build the best possible Mustang for the
        places we most love to drive—challenging back roads with a variety
        of corners and elevation changes—and the track on weekends.”

        1 The designer for whom the Shelby was named, Carroll Shelby, was por-
        trayed by Matt Damon in the 2019 blockbuster Ford v. Ferrari. FORD V. FERRARI
        (Twentieth Century Fox 2019).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10575

              The Shelby comes in ﬁve trims. Plaintiﬀs are purchasers of
        the “Base” and “Technology” trims. Those trims lack “transmis-
        sion and diﬀerential coolers,” a feature—originally included as
        standard on all Shelbys—that is designed to prevent engine over-
        heating. Without these coolers, the Shelbys compensate at high
        RPMs by reverting to “limp mode,” a self-preservation status that
        reduces the vehicle’s power, speed, and performance to avoid en-
        gine damage. “Limp mode” presents a problem for car enthusiasts
        who want to take Ford up on its promise of “track capab[ility].”
                One way that Shelby owners indulge their need for speed is
        by participating in “Track Days,” organized events at which drivers
        can take their Shelbys around controlled racetracks at triple-digit
        clips. According to some plaintiﬀs, though, “limp mode” set in af-
        ter six or seven laps—about ten minutes of track time—resulting
        in rapid deceleration and rendering the vehicles “essentially unusa-
        ble for sustained track driving,” which, they say, was “the main rea-
        son many [of them] bought the car.”
                                          B
               Plaintiﬀs ﬁled this putative class action alleging, among
        other things, common-law fraud claims and state-speciﬁc statutory
        violations. Plaintiﬀs alleged that Ford falsely advertised all Shelbys
        as being track-capable, that those representations induced them to
        buy Shelbys, but that their Shelbys couldn’t perform as billed.
               Following discovery and a hearing, the district court granted
        plaintiﬀs’ request for class certiﬁcation. In particular, the court
        chose to create multiple state-law classes within a single class-
USCA11 Case: 22-10575         Document: 65-1          Date Filed: 07/07/2023         Page: 5 of 92

        22-10575                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

        action case. Although it acknowledged that, as thus structured, the
        case “look[ed] more like a Multi-District Litigation than a standard
        class action,” the court thought that this framework would “avoid
        the choice of law issues concomitant with a proposed nationwide
        class (an issue that would almost certainly defeat [Rule 23(b)(3)]
        predominance).” The district court separately dismissed Ford’s
        concerns about “the . . . diﬃculties in managing a class action,”
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D), on the grounds that the proposed classes
        were “small enough” and that variations among state laws could be
        addressed through “appropriate jury instructions” and “multiple
        verdict forms that tick[ed] through the elements of the nine certi-
        ﬁed state class[es’] statutory and common law fraud claims.”
                The district court certiﬁed classes of plaintiﬀs whose claims
        arose under the common and/or statutory law of California, Flor-
        ida, Illinois, Missouri, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, and
        Washington. 2 The district court also certiﬁed two classes—one in
        California and another in Texas—stemming from alleged breaches
        of implied warranties and violations of the Magnuson-Moss War-
        ranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. On appeal, twelve separate claims

        2 Each class consisted of “[a]ll persons who purchased a Class Vehicle from a
        Ford-authorized dealer or distributor located in [insert state here] before April
        [27], 2016.” Doc. 231 at 28; see also Tershakovec v. Ford Motor Co., No. 17-21087-
        CIV, 2021 WL 3711444, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2021) (amending the “class
        certification order to reflect a class cut-off date of April 27, 2016” instead of
        April 1). The “Class Vehicles” cover Ford’s Shelby GT350 Base and Technol-
        ogy trims purchased during the relevant period. Plaintiffs estimate that there
        are 1,668 Class Vehicles nationwide.
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        6                             Opinion of the Court                     22-10575

        remain, arising under the laws of seven states: California, Florida,
        Missouri, New York, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. 3
               We granted Ford’s Rule 23(f ) petition to appeal the district
        court’s class-certiﬁcation order.
                                                  II
                 We review a district court’s decision granting or denying
        class certification for abuse of discretion. See Local 703, I.B. of T.
        Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d
        1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014). The district court abuses its discretion
        if it “applies the wrong legal standard, follows improper procedures
        in making its determination, bases its decision on clearly erroneous
        findings of fact, or applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect
        manner.” Id. At the class-certification stage, “the trial court can
        and should consider the merits of the case to the degree necessary
        to determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 will be satis-
        fied.” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1188
        n.15 (11th Cir. 2003).
                                                 III
               Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions. In
        addition to satisfying Rule 23(a)’s four familiar “[p]rerequisites”—
        numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representa-
        tion—a proposed class must ﬁt within one of the three “[t]ypes”
        speciﬁed in Rule 23(b). Plaintiﬀs here sought class certiﬁcation

        3 Plaintiffs   are no longer pursuing their claims under Oregon and Illinois law.
USCA11 Case: 22-10575     Document: 65-1      Date Filed: 07/07/2023    Page: 7 of 92

        22-10575              Opinion of the Court                        7

        under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires both that “questions of law or
        fact common to class members predominate over any questions af-
        fecting only individual members” and that a class action be “supe-
        rior to other available methods for fairly and eﬃciently adjudicat-
        ing the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
              We must decide whether plaintiﬀs’ proposed class satisﬁes
        Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements. We’ll consider in turn 23(b)(3)’s two
        prongs—predominance and superiority, the latter of which entails
        an inquiry into a class action’s manageability.
                                         A
                First, predominance. Common questions “predominate”
        within the meaning of Rule 23(b)(3) when the substance and quan-
        tity of evidence necessary to prove the class claims won’t vary sig-
        niﬁcantly from one plaintiﬀ to another. See Brown v. Electrolux
        Homes Prods., 817 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2016). The ﬁrst step in
        assessing predominance is to “identify the parties’ claims and de-
        fenses and their elements” and to categorize “these issues as com-
        mon questions or individual questions by predicting how the par-
        ties will prove them at trial.” Id. A common issue is one that will
        likely be proved using the same evidence for all class members; an
        individualized issue, by contrast, is one that will likely be proved
        using evidence that “var[ies] from member to member.” Id. (cita-
        tion and internal quotation marks omitted).
               In general, a fraud-related claim comprises the following el-
        ements: a misrepresentation or omission, materiality, reliance, cau-
        sation, and injury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 525, 550
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        8                           Opinion of the Court                         22-10575

        (1977); W. Prosser, The Law of Torts §§ 108, 110, at 714, 731–32
        (4th ed. 1971). The parties vigorously dispute whether the reliance
        element—that is, the question whether Shelby owners relied on,
        and were induced to buy their cars based on, Ford’s advertise-
        ments—is capable of class-wide proof or whether reliance issues
        are instead inherently individualized. Because the parties focus
        only on the reliance element, so do we.4
               In granting class certiﬁcation over Ford’s objection that the
        issues pertaining to plaintiﬀs’ reliance were too individualized, the

        4 Our dissenting colleague disagrees that we can focus solely on reliance be-
        cause he views two traditionally separate elements—reliance and causation—
        as inextricably intertwined. See Dissenting Op. at 32 (“[C]ausation inherently
        requires reliance.”). Respectfully, we think that conflation overlooks relevant
        state law. As explained below, see infra at 16–20, each of the states whose class
        certification the dissent disputes expressly distinguishes the two elements. See,
        e.g., Carriuolo v. Gen. Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 983, 986 (11th Cir. 2016) (Florida)
        (holding that plaintiffs “need not show actual reliance on the representation
        or omission at issue,” even when causation is an element); Hess v. Chase Man-
        hattan Bank, USA, N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 774 (Mo. 2007) (Missouri) (holding
        that a claim under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act “expressly does
        not” require proof of reliance, though it does require causation); Thornell v.
        Seattle Serv. Bureau, Inc., 363 P.3d 587, 592 (Wash. 2015) (Washington) (reject-
        ing “the principle that reliance is necessarily an element of” a consumer-fraud
        claim, even when causation is); Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 396
        F.3d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 612
        (N.Y. 2000)) (New York) (holding that statutory consumer-fraud claims do
        “not require proof of actual reliance,” but do require causation); Walker v. Life
        Ins. Co. of the Sw., 953 F.3d 624, 631 (9th Cir. 2020) (California) (requiring proof
        of reliance only under certain circumstances). Because we think the dissent
        mistakes the meaning of reliance, we needn’t further discuss its critiques—or
        the manifold constitutional violations it alleges.
USCA11 Case: 22-10575      Document: 65-1      Date Filed: 07/07/2023     Page: 9 of 92

        22-10575               Opinion of the Court                         9

        district court leaned heavily on the notion that reliance can some-
        times be presumed. Although the court acknowledged that “a pre-
        sumption of . . . reliance is only appropriate in some states and in
        some fact patterns,” one of those “fact patterns,” it said, was “when
        a [d]efendant’s representations to the entire class were uniform.”
        The court reasoned that “Ford’s representations to Plaintiﬀs were
        uniform” and that “the evidence appears to show that no class
        member could possibly have known [about the defect] from
        Ford[.]” Accordingly, it concluded that a presumption of reliance
        was appropriate in this case—and, therefore, that individualized re-
        liance issues didn’t present a predominance-related barrier to class
        certiﬁcation.
                The root of the district court’s error was in overgeneralizing
        the presumption-of-reliance issue. The court’s task was to “pre-
        dict[] how the parties will prove” common and individualized ques-
        tions. Brown, 817 F.3d at 1234. But doing so requires carefully ex-
        amining the particular state laws on which plaintiﬀs’ claims in this
        case are based. True, a presumption that a plaintiﬀ or group of
        plaintiﬀs relied on Ford’s misstatements may apply—but only if the
        relevant state’s common-law-fraud cause of action or deceptive-
        practices statute allows for that presumption. And while the dis-
        trict court seemed to appreciate that the presumption was “only
        appropriate in some states,” it never seriously investigated whether
        and under what circumstances each of the various state-law claims
        at issue permit the presumption. See, e.g., Doc. 231 at 43 (Califor-
        nia); id. at 44 (Missouri); id. at 45 (Tennessee); id. at 45 (Texas).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10575

               In fact, as we’ll see, states’ fraud-based causes of action
        meaningfully diﬀer in terms of both whether proof of reliance is
        necessary and, if it is, how it is established. Reliance is often,
        though not uniformly, an essential element of a fraud-based claim.
        Where it is, it sometimes must be aﬃrmatively proved; in other cir-
        cumstances, it may be presumed. Aﬃrmatively proving reliance is
        a very individualized inquiry, the kind that would predominate
        over other common questions in a class action. By contrast, where
        the presumption of reliance applies, it does so generally and can
        therefore be resolved on a class-wide basis.
               Bottom line: To assess Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance re-
        quirement, we must consider whether each cause of action at issue
        here requires proof of reliance and, if so, whether and under what
        circumstances a presumption of reliance is appropriate.
                                          B
                So a (perhaps the) key issue in this case is whether each of
        the several state-law causes of action that plaintiﬀs have alleged per-
        mits a presumption of reliance and, if it does, under what circum-
        stances. That’s a question that we’ll need to decide on a state-by-
        state (and claim-by-claim) basis, and we’ll get to those details soon
        enough. But ﬁrst, a more general, preliminary point. All seem to
        recognize—and we agree—that the permissibility of a presump-
        tion of reliance will often turn on whether a fraud-based claim pri-
        marily alleges aﬃrmative misrepresentations, omissions (or non-
        disclosures), or, perhaps, a mixture of both.
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        22-10575                Opinion of the Court                         11

                While not strictly applicable here, cases decided under the
        federal securities laws illustrate the distinction between misrepre-
        sentations and omissions, as well as the eﬀect that distinction can
        have on the operation of the presumption of reliance. Here’s a
        brief summary: In Aﬃliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, the
        Supreme Court held, in a case arising under Rule 10b-5, that
        “[u]nder the circumstances of th[e] case” before it, which “in-
        volv[ed] primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is
        not a prerequisite to recovery,” but rather may be presumed. 406
        U.S. 128, 153 (1972). Signiﬁcantly, though, we have since clariﬁed
        that the Ute presumption applies only to cases “involving primarily
        a failure to disclose in which defendants who had an aﬃrmative
        duty to disclose stood mute, leaving plaintiﬀs with absolutely noth-
        ing upon which to rely.” Cavalier Carpets, Inc. v. Caylor, 746 F.2d 749,
        755 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
        F.2d 534, 547 (5th Cir. Unit A March 1981), aﬀ’d in part and rev’d in
        part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (“If a person who has an
        ‘aﬃrmative duty under [Rule 10b-5] to disclose’ a material fact”
        fails to disclose “material facts that reasonably could be expected to
        inﬂuence [a security-holder’s] decision to sell, positive proof of re-
        liance . . . is not a prerequisite to recovery.”). No presumption of
        reliance applies, we have emphasized, either in cases primarily al-
        leging aﬃrmative misrepresentations or in those “mixing allega-
        tions of omissions and misstatements.” Cavalier Carpets, 746 F.2d
        at 757. So, for instance, in a securities case where plaintiﬀs “alleged
        three omissions and three misstatements,” the “mixed case rule of
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                         22-10575

        Huddleston” applied—meaning that a presumption of reliance did
        not. Id. 5
               So, what kind of claims have plaintiﬀs alleged here? Perhaps
        not surprisingly, especially given Ute and its underlying principles,
        plaintiﬀs insist that their case is solely about omissions. See Br. of
        Appellees at 4 (“[T]he fraud-based class claims are based solely on
        omissions.”). Equally unsurprisingly, Ford counters that this is fun-
        damentally a case about aﬃrmative misrepresentations or, at the
        very least, a “mixed” case. See Reply Br. of Appellants at 1 (“The
        record in this case could not be clearer that plaintiﬀs’ fraud-based
        claims rest on Ford’s alleged aﬃrmative misrepresentations con-
        cerning the track capabilities of plaintiﬀs’ vehicles.”). Having con-
        sidered plaintiﬀs’ own framing of their claims, the basic facts

        5 We implemented this framework in the class-action context in Kirkpatrick v.
        J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987). There, as here, the parties
        debated whether individual reliance issues defeated Rule 23(b)(3)’s predomi-
        nance requirement, and there, as here, the answer to that question depended,
        in part, on whether a Ute-like presumption of reliance applied. We held that
        the plaintiffs’ claims there couldn’t “be properly characterized as omissions
        cases” under Ute because they didn’t allege that “‘[t]he defendants . . . st[ood]
        mute in the face of a duty to disclose.’” Id. at 722 (quoting Cavalier Carpets, 746
        F.2d at 749 n.22). Rather, we explained, the plaintiffs asserted that “the de-
        fendants ‘undertook . . . to disclose relevant information . . . alleged to contain
        certain misstatements of fact and [that] fail[ed] to contain other facts necessary
        to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances, not misleading.’”
        Id. (quoting Cavalier Carpets, 746 F.2d at 749 n.22) (alterations in original). Ac-
        cordingly, we held that “the complaints at most allege[d] mixed claims of mis-
        representations and omissions,” that Ute’s “presumption of reliance d[id] not
        apply,” and, therefore, that (at least on that ground) the presumption couldn’t
        eliminate individualized reliance issues. Id.
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        22-10575               Opinion of the Court                         13

        underlying those claims, and the district court’s treatment of the
        various allegations in the case, we conclude that Ford has the better
        of the argument: At its core, this case is about misrepresentations,
        not omissions.
                For starters, plaintiﬀs’ own complaint repeatedly targets
        Ford’s “marketing” and “advertising.” Doc. 43 at 69–86. Indeed,
        the complaint’s ﬁrst factual allegation concerns plaintiﬀs’ shared
        love of track racing—the very subject of Ford’s alleged misrepre-
        sentation about the Shelby’s track-readiness. Id. at 69–70. Plain-
        tiﬀs’ motion for class certiﬁcation and their response to Ford’s Rule
        23(f ) petition likewise both repeatedly complain about Ford’s “mar-
        keting communications.” See Doc. 122 at 8, 10–11, 15–18; Br. of
        Plaintiﬀ-Respondents in Response to Petition for Permission to Ap-
        peal at 3–5, Ford Motor Company v. George Tershakovec, et al., No. 21-
        90019 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2022). Even before us, plaintiﬀs continue
        to focus on Ford’s “advertising.” Br. of Appellants at 12–14. And
        that focus makes sense. Plaintiﬀs’ grievance, fundamentally, is that
        Ford misled them to believe that their Shelbys could zip around
        racetracks for hours. And they arrived at that belief not as a result
        of Ford’s mere silence but, rather, they claim, as a result of Ford’s
        boasting about the Shelby’s track-readiness.
               The district court itself treated plaintiﬀs’ claims as primarily
        alleging aﬃrmative misrepresentations. In its order granting class
        certiﬁcation, for instance, the court described plaintiﬀs’ theory as
        follows: “Ford advertised all Shelbys as track-capable, the advertis-
        ing induced Plaintiﬀs to purchase the car, and then the car did not
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10575

        perform as advertised.” Doc. 231 at 3. Contrast that with a claim
        that plaintiﬀs pleaded in their complaint but that the district court
        later dismissed. There, plaintiﬀs separately alleged that their Shel-
        bys can enter “limp mode” even during non-track conditions, when
        being driven normally. See Doc. 43 at 72. Notably, the district court
        referred to this as “the omission claim[]”—and rejected it on the
        ground that there was no evidence that Ford was aware of the de-
        fect and thus couldn’t have fraudulently concealed it. Doc. 231 at
        13–15 (emphasis added).
               In the end, even interpreted charitably, plaintiﬀs’ current
        claims allege an omission only derivatively: Ford aﬃrmatively mis-
        represented the Shelbys as track-capable, which entailed an implicit
        “omission” that the cars can enter “limp mode” under track condi-
        tions. In the language of our securities cases, plaintiﬀs don’t allege
        that Ford “st[ood] mute in the face of a duty to disclose”; rather,
        they contend that it made misstatements of fact and then failed to
        include “other facts necessary to make the statements . . . not mis-
        leading.” Kirkpatrick, 827 F.2d at 722 (quotation omitted). And as
        already explained, that means that plaintiﬀs’ complaint “at most al-
        lege[s] mixed claims of misrepresentations and omissions.” Id.
               Having established that plaintiﬀs’ case is fundamentally
        about misrepresentations—or, at most, a mix of misrepresenta-
        tions and corollary omissions—we’re ready to dive into the central
        question: Which of the various fraud-based causes of action that
        plaintiﬀs have alleged requires proof of reliance, and which among
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        22-10575                   Opinion of the Court                                15

        those permits reliance to be presumed—and under what circum-
        stances? 6
                                               C
               On, then, to the core of our analysis. Because diﬀerent
        states’ fraud-related causes of action—both statutory and com-
        mon-law—treat reliance diﬀerently, we have to get into the speciﬁcs
        of those laws. We ﬁnd that we can group plaintiﬀs’ claims into

        6 One final bit of housekeeping: Echoing the district court, plaintiffs cite our
        decision in Klay v. Humana, 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on
        other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008), for the
        proposition that common evidence can be used to prove reliance on a class-
        wide basis. Klay is distinguishable in important respects. True, we held there
        that a class of physicians who brought a RICO-based action against an HMO
        for misrepresenting that it would pay for medically necessary procedures had
        to prove reliance. And true, we held that their reliance could be proved
        through common evidence. Id. at 1257. But we did so for two reasons unique
        to the transactions at issue there, neither of which applies here. First, we em-
        phasized that the doctors relied on the HMO’s standardized misrepresentation
        that they would be reimbursed for medically necessary services provided to
        insureds and that the HMO’s nationwide conspiracy to underpay doctors was
        the “very gravamen of the RICO claims.” Id. And second, we stressed that
        the transactional exchange between the physicians and the HMO hinged on
        the latter’s payment guarantees, which served as the “heart of the[] agree-
        ments” and was the “very consideration upon which those agreements are
        based.” Id. at 1259 (emphasis added). As the Second Circuit has observed,
        contractual financial transactions between a purchaser and provider of medi-
        cal services don’t implicate “the same type or degree of personal idiosyncratic
        choice as does a consumer purchase.” McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., 522
        F.3d 215, 225 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008). While one who provides services in exchange
        for a payment relies only on the payment guarantee, a purchaser of a car may
        choose to rely on any of a number of marketing and branding representations.
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10575

        three categories. First, some causes of action don’t require proof
        of reliance at all. Needless to say, reliance poses no predominance-
        related barrier to class treatment of those claims. Second—at the
        other end of the spectrum, so to speak—some claims require indi-
        vidual plaintiﬀs to prove reliance aﬃrmatively, without the beneﬁt
        of any presumption. Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement
        will bar class treatment of those claims, as the facts pertinent to
        reliance will have to be proved on a plaintiﬀ-by-plaintiﬀ basis. Fi-
        nally—in the middle—under some causes of action, proof of reli-
        ance is required but may be presumed, at least under certain cir-
        cumstances. Whether the predominance requirement can be satis-
        ﬁed for those claims depends on details speciﬁc to this case, some
        of which the district court will need to investigate on remand.
               In the sections that follow, we’ll sort the claims that plaintiﬀs
        have alleged into these three categories.
                                           1
               The ﬁrst category comprises state causes of action that don’t
        require proof of reliance. Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance require-
        ment poses no barrier to class treatment of these claims because
        it’s unnecessary to make any individualized inquiry into what each
        plaintiﬀ knew and relied on in purchasing his or her Shelby. Four
        of plaintiﬀs’ claims fall into this category.
               Three are easy. First, the district court certiﬁed a class of
        plaintiﬀs who sued under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
        Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq. To establish a consumer
        claim for damages under FDUTPA, a plaintiﬀ must show (1) a
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        22-10575                Opinion of the Court                         17

        deceptive act or unfair practice, (2) causation, and (3) actual dam-
        ages. Carriuolo v. General Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 983 (11th Cir.
        2016) (citing City First Mortg. Corp. v. Barton, 988 So. 2d 82, 86 (Fla.
        4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). Dispositively here, “a plaintiﬀ asserting a
        FDUTPA claim need not show actual reliance on the representa-
        tion or omission at issue.” Id. at 985 (quotation omitted). Because
        a FDUTPA plaintiﬀ needn’t prove that he or she relied on any al-
        leged misstatement, Ford’s reliance-based predominance objection
        fails.
                Second, the district court certiﬁed a class of plaintiﬀs alleg-
        ing claims under New York’s consumer-fraud statute, N.Y. Gen.
        Bus. Law § 349(a). As the Second Circuit has explained, a “§ 349
        claim has three elements: (1) the defendant’s challenged acts or
        practices must have been directed at consumers, (2) the acts or
        practices must have been misleading in a material way, and (3) the
        plaintiﬀ must have sustained injury as a result.” Cohen v. JP Morgan
        Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Oswego Labor-
        ers’ Loc. 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 647 N.E.2d
        741, 744–45 (N.Y. 1995). Again, dispositively, private actions
        brought under § 349 do “not require proof of actual reliance.” Pel-
        man ex rel. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 511 (2d Cir.
        2005) (citing Stutman v. Chemical Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 612 (N.Y.
        2000)). So there can be no reliance-based predominance objection
        to class treatment of plaintiﬀs’ § 349 claims, either.
              Third, the district court certiﬁed a class of plaintiﬀs alleging
        claims under Washington’s consumer-fraud statute, which
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10575

        prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
        acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Wash.
        Stat. § 19.86.020. Washington courts have held that a plaintiﬀ suing
        under the statute must prove “a causal link between the act and the
        injury.” Peoples v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 452 P.3d 1218, 1221
        (Wash. 2019). But they have clariﬁed that reliance is merely one
        way to establish causation—reliance is not itself a necessary ele-
        ment. Thornell v. Seattle Serv. Bureau, Inc., 363 P.3d 587, 592 (Wash.
        2015) (“[I]n Indoor Billboard this court rejected the principle that re-
        liance is necessarily an element of plaintiﬀ’s CPA claim.”) (citing
        Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d
        10 (Wash. 2007)); see also Young v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 472 P.3d
        990, 996 (Wash. 2020) (“We rejected the company’s argument that
        as a matter of law, any false or deceptive act it committed could not
        be the cause of the plaintiﬀ’s injury because the customer could
        not show he relied on the deceptive act in deciding to pay the bill.”).
        Accordingly, as with the statutory claims arising under Florida and
        New York law, Ford’s reliance-based predominance objection to
        certifying the Washington consumer-fraud claims fails.
                A ﬁnal claim also belongs in this category. The Missouri
        Merchandising Practices Act prohibits “deception, fraud, . . . mis-
        representation, . . . or the concealment, suppression, or omission
        of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement
        of any merchandise in trade or commerce.” Mo. Rev. Stat.
        § 407.020.1 (2020). As Ford has acknowledged, the MMPA does not
        by its terms require a plaintiﬀ to prove that he or she relied on for-
        bidden misrepresentations. See Oral Arg. at 7:22–7:35. And indeed,
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        22-10575                Opinion of the Court                         19

        Missouri courts have repeatedly observed that “[a] consumer’s reli-
        ance on an unlawful practice is not required under the MMPA.”
        Murphy v. Stonewall Kitchen, LLC, 503 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Mo. Ct. App.
        2016) (quotation omitted); accord, e.g., Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
        USA, N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 774 (Mo. 2007) (“[A] fraud claim re-
        quires both proof of reliance and intent to induce reliance; the
        [M]MPA claim expressly does not.”).
                Even so, citing State ex rel. Coca-Cola Co. v. Nixon, 249 S.W.3d
        855 (Mo. 2008), Ford asks us to imply a reliance element for MMPA
        claims. But Coca-Cola isn’t quite on point. There, plaintiﬀs sought
        to certify a class of consumers who alleged that they wouldn’t have
        purchased certain Diet Coke products had they known that they
        contained both saccharin and aspartame, rather than just aspar-
        tame as advertised. Id. at 858. Evidence showed, however, that the
        “proposed class undoubtedly include[d] an extremely large number
        of uninjured class members, that is, those who did not care if the
        Diet Coke they purchased contained saccharin.” Id. at 862. The
        Missouri Supreme Court declined to “imply” harm with respect to
        those “uninjured” plaintiﬀs and aﬃrmed the district court’s denial
        of class certiﬁcation on the ground that the class was “overbroad.”
        Id. at 862–63. Although we understand Ford’s point, Coca-Cola was
        concerned about an altogether diﬀerent element—injury—and the
        proper deﬁnition of classes, not the existence or non-existence of a
        reliance requirement.
             Nor does White v. Just Born, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-04025-NKL,
        2018 WL 3748405 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 7, 2018), persuade us that the
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10575

        MMPA entails an implicit reliance requirement. In fact, the White
        court cited the Missouri Court of Appeals’s decision in Murphy, al-
        ready noted, for the proposition that “[a] consumer’s reliance on an
        unlawful practice is not required under the MMPA.” Id. at *4. It’s
        true that the federal district court in White held that class certiﬁca-
        tion was improper there because individualized issues concerning
        plaintiﬀs’ injuries and causation would predominate over common
        ones. See id. But state courts in Missouri have held that the injury-
        and causation-related elements of an MMPA claim can be estab-
        lished class-wide under what those courts call a “beneﬁt-of-the-bar-
        gain rule.” See, e.g., Plubell v. Merck & Co., 289 S.W.3d 707, 714–15
        (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Craft v. Phillip Morris Companies, Inc., No. 002-
        00406A, 2003 WL 23355745, at *8–9 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec. 31, 2003)
        (“[T]he necessary causation element is satisﬁed under § 407.025, as
        is the economic harm element, whenever a plaintiﬀ can simply
        show that he purchased a product that was falsely represented, and
        that he thereby received a product that would have been worth
        more money if it had truly been as represented.”). Accordingly, we
        reject Ford’s contention that individualized reliance issues prevent
        certiﬁcation of plaintiﬀs alleging MMPA claims.
                                          2
                The second category occupies the opposite pole—it com-
        prises those causes of action (1) that require a plaintiﬀ to prove that
        he or she relied on a defendant’s misinformation and (2) that don’t
        recognize a presumption of reliance. Plaintiﬀs’ claims brought un-
        der these causes of action can’t be certiﬁed for class treatment be-
        cause proving an individual’s reliance will necessarily require
USCA11 Case: 22-10575     Document: 65-1      Date Filed: 07/07/2023     Page: 21 of 92

        22-10575               Opinion of the Court                        21

        individualized evidence. We conclude that, as relevant here, this
        category includes four claims.
                Proving a negative—here, that the causes of action in this
        group don’t allow reliance to be presumed—can be tricky, of
        course. Some state courts have simpliﬁed our task by expressly in-
        terpreting their own law to exclude the presumption. More often,
        though, our research has revealed decisions that (1) clearly require
        proof of reliance and (2) then contain no suggestion that reliance
        may be presumed or otherwise inferred. Absent any indication that
        a presumption is permissible, we decline to expand state law to in-
        clude one. See, e.g., Salinero v. Johnson & Johnson, 995 F.3d 959, 967
        (11th Cir. 2021) (“For us to create a wholly new doctrine, virtually
        out of whole cloth, would work a profound change in Florida’s
        law.”).
               The district court certiﬁed a class of plaintiﬀs who sued un-
        der the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protect Act.
        That statute prohibits “[f ]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or
        practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,” Tex. Bus. &
        Com. Code § 17.46(a), and expressly requires a plaintiﬀ to prove,
        among other things, that he or she “relied on” an enumerated act
        or practice “to [his or her] detriment,” id. § 17.50(a)(1)(B). Im-
        portantly here, we have previously held that the Texas statute re-
        quires a plaintiﬀ to prove that he or she “actually did rely” on the
        “statement or omission.” Brown, 817 F.3d at 1236 (quotation and
        emphasis omitted). Because a plaintiﬀ must prove actual reliance—
        seemingly without the beneﬁt of any presumption—claims
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        22                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10575

        brought under the Texas statute will turn on individualized issues
        that make them inappropriate for class treatment.
               The district court also certiﬁed a class of plaintiﬀs who al-
        leged common-law fraud claims under Washington law. Washing-
        ton courts have held that a fraud plaintiﬀ must prove, among other
        things, “the listener’s reliance on the false representation, [] the lis-
        tener’s right to rely on the representation, and [] damage from re-
        liance on the false representation.” Landstar Inway Inc. v. Samrow,
        325 P.3d 327, 337 (Wash. App. 2014) (citing Baertschi v. Jordan, 413
        P.2d 657, 660 (Wash. 1966)). To be sure, that description doesn’t
        expressly foreclose a presumption of reliance, but neither it nor any
        other that we’ve found expressly authorizes one, and we decline to
        graft one onto Washington law.7 So plaintiﬀs’ Washington com-
        mon-law fraud claims are not appropriate for class treatment.
               The district court’s certiﬁcation of plaintiﬀs’ New York com-
        mon-law fraud claims was also improper. According to the New
        York Court of Appeals, the elements of a New York common-law
        fraud claim include, among others, “justiﬁable reliance by the
        plaintiﬀ.” Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward & Kissel, LLP, 910 N.E.2d
        976, 979 (N.Y. 2009). Indeed, that court has emphasized that

        7 Plaintiffs point to a pure-omission case, in which they say that the court (in
        accordance with the rules that typically apply in federal-law cases, see supra at
        11–12) approved a rebuttable presumption of reliance on the ground that “it
        is virtually impossible to prove reliance in cases alleging nondisclosure of ma-
        terial facts.” Morris v. International Yogurt Co., 729 P.2d 33, 41 (Wash. 1986).
        For reasons already explained, though, this is not a pure-omission case. See
        supra at 12–14. Morris is therefore inapposite.
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        22-10575               Opinion of the Court                        23

        “[j]ustiﬁable reliance is a ‘fundamental precept’ of a fraud cause of
        action.” Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 106
        N.E.3d 1176, 1182 (N.Y. 2018) (quoting Danann Realty Corp. v. Har-
        ris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 599 (N.Y. 1959)). Absent support for presuming
        reliance under New York law—of which we have been shown
        none—individualized issues prevent class treatment.
               So too with respect to plaintiﬀs’ Tennessee common-law
        fraud claims. “In an action for fraudulent misrepresentation”
        brought under Tennessee law, “a plaintiﬀ must show,” among other
        elements, that he or she “acted reasonably in relying on the repre-
        sentation.” City State Bank v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 S.W.2d
        729, 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). And courts applying Tennessee law
        have looked to a whole host of factors “in determining whether a
        party reasonably relied,” all of which turn on individualized facts
        about the plaintiﬀ, the defendant, and the speciﬁcs of their relation-
        ship. See, e.g., Boynton v. Headwaters, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931
        (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (citing City State Bank, 948 S.W.2d at 737). Ac-
        cordingly, plaintiﬀs’ Tennessee common-law claims will turn on in-
        dividualized issues that make class treatment inappropriate.
                                          3
               The third category includes causes of action that require
        proof of reliance but allow it to be presumed in certain circum-
        stances. Class certiﬁcation may be appropriate with respect to
        plaintiﬀs pursuing claims in this category—but only if the circum-
        stances support the presumption’s application. This category, we
USCA11 Case: 22-10575      Document: 65-1       Date Filed: 07/07/2023       Page: 24 of 92

        24                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10575

        conclude, covers the California claims, both statutory and com-
        mon-law.
                First, what we’ll call the California statutory claim. Techni-
        cally, plaintiﬀs have presented claims under three diﬀerent Califor-
        nia statutes—the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
        § 17200, the False Advertising Law, id. § 17500, and the Consumer
        Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. But because all three
        have similar reliance requirements, we treat them together. See
        Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2020)
        (“Any violation of the FAL necessarily violates the UCL.”); see also
        Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014)
        (discussing reliance in the context of both the UCL and FAL). Cal-
        ifornia’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent busi-
        ness act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading ad-
        vertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 8 Courts applying Cali-
        fornia law have held that a presumption of reliance may be appro-
        priate for statutory claims, but only when “the defendant so perva-
        sively disseminated material misrepresentations that all plaintiﬀs
        must have been exposed to them.” Walker v. Life Ins. Co. of the Sw.,
        953 F.3d 624, 631 (9th Cir. 2020) (UCL and FAL presumption); see
        also Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2011)
        (likewise applying a reliance presumption under the CLRA where
        “the trial court ﬁnds that material misrepresentations have been

        8 The False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, and Consumer
        Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1770, prohibit similar misrepresenta-
        tions in commercial transactions.
USCA11 Case: 22-10575     Document: 65-1      Date Filed: 07/07/2023     Page: 25 of 92

        22-10575               Opinion of the Court                        25

        made to the entire class”) (quotation omitted). So far as we can tell,
        the district court never considered whether that precondition to the
        presumption’s application obtained here. On remand, the court
        must therefore determine whether plaintiﬀs have established that
        Ford “pervasively disseminated” material misrepresentations.
                Second, the California common-law claim. “The necessary
        elements of fraud” under California law include, among others,
        proof (1) that the defendant “inten[ded] to defraud (i.e., to induce
        reliance [by])” the plaintiﬀ and (2) that the plaintiﬀ “justiﬁabl[y]
        reli[ed]” on the defendant’s misinformation. Alliance Mortg. Co. v.
        Rothwell, 900 P.2d 601, 608 (Cal. 1995). “California courts have al-
        ways required plaintiﬀs in actions for deceit to plead and prove the
        common law element of actual reliance.” Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858
        P.2d 568, 572 (Cal. 1993) (citations omitted). As in the statutory
        context, though, California courts have permitted a presumption
        of reliance “when the same material misrepresentations have actu-
        ally been communicated to each member of a class.” Id. at 575
        (emphasis omitted). Because the district court didn’t consider
        whether that precondition to the reliance presumption was satis-
        ﬁed, it will need to make that determination on remand.
                                         D
               Finally, we turn to the two certiﬁed classes—one in Califor-
        nia, one in Texas—for breach-of-implied-warranty claims and vio-
        lations of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The Mag-
        nuson-Moss Act merely “supplement[s] state-law implied warran-
        ties” by “aﬀording a federal remedy for their breach,” Richardson v.
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10575

        Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001) (inter-
        nal citations omitted), so the Magnuson-Moss claims can be certi-
        ﬁed only if the state-law breach-of-implied-warranty claims are also
        certiﬁed. See 15 U.S.C. § 2308; see also Brown, 817 F.3d at 1231 (“The
        claims under the Magnuson-Moss Act are identical to the other
        warranty claims because they are also based on state law.”).
               In Brown, we held that to certify California and Texas im-
        plied-warranty classes, like those here, the district court ﬁrst
        needed to decide “whether California and Texas law require pre-
        suit notice, an opportunity to cure, and manifestation of the de-
        fect.” 817 F.3d at 1237. The answers to these questions were im-
        portant, we explained, as they “bear on predominance.” Id. at 1238.
        As we have explained:
              If California and Texas law do not excuse pre-suit no-
              tice and an opportunity to cure when the defendant
              had prior knowledge of the design defect, as the dis-
              trict court speculated, then each class member will
              need to prove that he gave [the defendant] pre-suit no-
              tice and an opportunity to cure. This showing could
              require individual proof. And if California and Texas
              law require the defect to manifest, then each class
              member will need to prove that his washing machine
              actually grew mildew during the warranty period.
              This showing could also require individual proof. Be-
              cause the answers to these preliminary questions of
              California and Texas law could aﬀect whether Rule
              23(b)(3) is satisﬁed, the district court had a duty to re-
              solve them.
USCA11 Case: 22-10575     Document: 65-1      Date Filed: 07/07/2023    Page: 27 of 92

        22-10575               Opinion of the Court                       27

        Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
               The district court here said only (1) that “notice is an indi-
        vidual issue,” (2) that the notice issue “is a simple one” that could
        be determined by a claims administrator, and (3) that the “big ques-
        tion of whether the product was defective at the time it was sold is
        a common one.” Brown requires more than that. Here, nothing
        indicates that the district court determined “what the law is in Cal-
        ifornia and Texas,” which would, in turn, “help it identify the over-
        all mix of individual versus common questions for purposes of pre-
        dominance.” Id.
              For this reason, we must “remand to the district court so it
        can answer these questions of state law in the ﬁrst instance.” Id.
        We express no view on whether the implied-warranty claims will
        ultimately satisfy the predominance requirement for class certiﬁca-
        tion.
                                         IV
                Having tackled the predominance inquiry, we turn to supe-
        riority. Under Rule 23(b)(3), a class action must be “superior to
        other available methods for fairly and eﬃciently adjudicating the
        controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The superiority requirement
        includes consideration of “the likely diﬃculties in managing a class
        action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). Ford contends that the class
        action that the district court certiﬁed isn’t the superior means of
        adjudicating plaintiﬀs’ claims because it’s unmanageable. In partic-
        ular, Ford fears that jurors will have to remember testimony from
        multiple witnesses, all while keeping track of the class members’
USCA11 Case: 22-10575     Document: 65-1      Date Filed: 07/07/2023    Page: 28 of 92

        28                     Opinion of the Court                22-10575

        states, the applicable common-law rules and statutes, and burdens
        of proof.
                The district court acknowledged that authorizing a single
        trial for eleven proposed state-law classes was “unusual,” but it as-
        serted that it could deal with the complexity by issuing “appropri-
        ate jury instructions” and “multiple verdict forms that tick through
        the [varying] elements of [the] certiﬁed state class[es]’ statutory
        and common law fraud claims.” We aren’t so conﬁdent.
                “Rule 23 demands an early consideration of class certiﬁca-
        tion, including its practical implications for case manageability.”
        Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). For
        reasons we have already explained, Rule 23(b)(3) certiﬁcation was
        improper for classes that require individualized proof of each plain-
        tiﬀ’s reliance on Ford’s alleged misstatements. Our vacatur of the
        district court’s certiﬁcation of several classes and our ensuing re-
        mand will necessarily aﬀect the scope and course of the proceed-
        ings—and with it, the manageability of those proceedings. The
        district court should consider the manageability challenges anew
        on remand and should more clearly articulate a plan for addressing
        them to ensure that the diﬃculties of managing the class action do
        not impede the fair and eﬃcient adjudication of the case.
                                         V
               In summary, we aﬃrm the district court’s certiﬁcation of the
        statutory classes in Florida, New York, Missouri, and Washington.
        We reverse certiﬁcation of the Texas statutory consumer-fraud
        claim and the Tennessee, New York, and Washington common-law
USCA11 Case: 22-10575       Document: 65-1        Date Filed: 07/07/2023       Page: 29 of 92

        22-10575                 Opinion of the Court                            29

        fraud claims. And we remand for the district court to consider
        whether the facts in this case support a presumption of reliance for
        the California statutory and common-law fraud claims and
        whether the California- and Texas-based breach-of-implied-war-
        ranty claims satisfy state-law requirements. Finally, we instruct the
        district court on remand to reconsider the manageability issue. 9
             AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and VACATED
        and REMANDED in part.

        9Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Ford’s appeal as improvidently granted is DE-
        NIED.
USCA11 Case: 22-10575       Document: 65-1        Date Filed: 07/07/2023       Page: 30 of 92

        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                   1

        TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
               I agree with the Majority that required proof of reliance
        makes class certification of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-
        Consumer Protect Act claim, and the Tennessee, Washington, and
        New York common law fraud claims inappropriate. 1 I part com-
        pany with the Majority, however, regarding the certification of the
        classes for the Florida, New York, Missouri, California, and Wash-
        ington statutory claims, as well as the California common law
        claim. I do not believe these six classes satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s pre-
        dominance requirement, and I would decertify them.
                My reasoning derives from lifting the hood and examining
        the various parts of the law before this Court on appeal. At first
        glance, the six claims with which I disagree with the Majority look
        ready to drive off the lot, but in fact, they are lemons. Here is the
        User’s Manual for this opinion as we engage in a multi-point diag-
        nostic. This opinion (1) begins by surveying the consumer protec-
        tion scheme provided by the Federal Trade Commission Act (the
        “FTC Act”); (2) compares and contrasts that scheme to the mecha-
        nisms established by Florida, New York, Missouri, Washington,
        and California’s respective consumer protection statutes; (3) iden-
        tifies the inherent causal mechanism required for misrepresenta-
        tion causes of action; (4) outlines four constitutional defects—First

        1I also concur with the Majority’s treatment of the California and Texas im-
        plied warranty classes. Those classes are properly remanded to the District
        Court under Brown v. Electrolux Homes Prods., 817 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir.
        2016).
USCA11 Case: 22-10575     Document: 65-1      Date Filed: 07/07/2023    Page: 31 of 92

        2         TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        Amendment, due process, Article III standing, and separation of
        powers—inherent in allowing certification of claims under these
        statutes; and (5) explains why none of the cases cited by the Major-
        ity ought to bind or persuade this Court.
                                         I.
                The FTC Act declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods of compe-
        tition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
        practices in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). That
        which the FTC Act declares unlawful is vague. How will a business
        know how to conduct its affairs? How will it know what consti-
        tutes an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act
        or practice prohibited under the act? The Federal Trade Commis-
        sion (the “FTC”) will tell it. See id. § 45(a)(2) (empowering and di-
        recting the FTC “to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations .
        . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
        merce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
        merce” (emphasis added)). But the way the FTC tells businesses
        that they are violating the FTC Act provides notice before punish-
        ment. To get a sense of this process, let us walk through a hypo-
        thetical FTC action as outlined by the FTC Act.
               Charlie owns Brown’s Gas and an attached hamburger
        stand—called the Chuck Wagon and run by his business partner,
        Patty—off a state highway between fictional towns Riverton and
        Clifton. Travelers from Clifton pass Brown’s Gas on their way out
        of town and never fuel up—even though they love Patty’s burg-
        ers—because Charlie consistently charges $3 more per gallon than
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                    3

        the average price in Clifton. Travelers from Riverton, on the other
        hand, pass Brown’s Gas after having driven 120 miles with no gas
        station, and those travelers cannot see that Clifton lies just on the
        other side of a hill. The Riverton travelers consistently fill up with
        Charlie’s inflated fuel.
                Enter the FTC. The FTC determines that this sort of behav-
        ior “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
        which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and
        not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
        competition.” Id. § 45(n). Having “reason to believe” Charlie is
        violating one of the FTC’s definitions of a practice that violates the
        FTC Act, the FTC serves Charlie with a complaint and schedules a
        hearing—which must be at least thirty days later. Id. § 45(b). Char-
        lie has the “right to appear” at this hearing and “show cause why a[
        forward-looking cease and desist] order should not be entered by
        the Commission.” Id.
               The FTC ultimately issues Charlie a cease and desist order,
        which Charlie can appeal to a United States court of appeals. 2 Id.
        § 45(c). Charlie has not yet been punished for his business practice.
        He has merely been told that he cannot continue it in the future.
        Any further engagement in the practice—assuming the court of

        2“To the extent that the order of the Commission is affirmed, the court shall
        thereupon issue its own order commanding obedience to the terms of such
        order of the Commission.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(c).
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        4           TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        appeals affirms the FTC—is punishable by the court’s contempt
        power.
                After the cease and desist order “has become final,” 3 Charlie
        continues to charge $3 more per gallon than other Clifton estab-
        lishments, and so, the Attorney General can now file a civil action
        against Charlie for a monetary penalty.4 Id. § 45(l). With that final
        order—Charlie is therefore already on notice that his actions vio-
        late the FTC Act—United States district courts are empowered to
        grant “equitable relief” in addition to mandatory injunctions and
        civil penalties. Id. This equitable relief may include restitution. Id.
        § 45(a)(4)(B).
               Importantly for the claims against Ford, the FTC Act does
        not allow for damages and contains no private right of action. See
        Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
        (“[P]rivate actions to vindicate rights asserted under the Federal
        Trade Commission Act may not be maintained.”); id. at 999–1000
        (recognizing that “the FTC has no power to award damages” and

        3 Relevantly, the order becomes final at the judgment and decree of an affirm-
        ing court, id. § 45(c), unless the Supreme Court grants certiorari. Id.
        § 45(g)(2)(C), (3)(C) & (4)(C); id. § 45(h). Or the order becomes final if the time
        to appeal the FTC’s order to a court of appeals lapses, id. § 45(g), with time
        built in to allow for petitions for review. Id. § 45(i).
        4 The FTC would also be able to recover civil penalties from Charlie before
        issuing a final order if Charlie committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice
        “with actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective
        circumstances.” Id. § 45(m)(1)(A), (B)(2). The mental state here constitutes
        the notice that Charlie was performing a bad act.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                         5

        that the “1938 amendments [to the FTC Act] relied instead on the
        FTC’s cease and desist procedures, and their provision of oppor-
        tunity for voluntary compliance and informal administrative con-
        flict resolution”); Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1249 n.2 (5th Cir.
        1978) (“[T]here is no private cause of action for violation of the
        FTC Act.”);5 Am. Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 414 (10th Cir.
        1992) (“[T]here is no private right of action under [the FTC Act].”).
        Rather, section 5 of the FTC Act empowers the FTC itself or the
        Attorney General—both arms of the government—to pursue vio-
        lators for forward-looking relief and, after notice and opportunity
        to be heard, civil penalties.
              While the state consumer protection statutes at issue in this
        appeal derive from the FTC Act, the differences cause problems
        that we will come back to later.
                                               A.
               Florida’s analogous consumer protection statute, the Florida
        Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (the “FDUTPA”) de-
        clares a similarly vague set of acts unlawful.6 Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1).
        Interestingly, the FDUTPA’s text clearly directs the courts and the
        executive branch to give “due consideration and great weight . . .

        5 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
        this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the Former Fifth Cir-
        cuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
        6 The FDUTPA outlaws “[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable
        acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
        trade or commerce.” Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1).
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        6              TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the
        federal courts relating to s. 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commis-
        sion Act.” 7 Id. § 501.204(2) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)). This
        means, despite the vague language in the FDUTPA, a person in
        Charlie’s shoes could be on notice about his behavior if a success-
        ful, similar action was brought against someone else either under
        the FDUTPA, or federally under the FTC Act.
                Florida’s Department of Legal Affairs, like the FTC, has
        power to issue cease and desist orders; a defendant business has the
        right (1) to respond to the complaint at a hearing and (2) to judicial
        review of the ultimate agency decision. Id. §§ 501.208(1),
        501.208(3) (citing Fla. Stat. § 120.68). After a cease and desist order
        becomes final, the Department of Legal Affairs may pursue civil pen-
        alties for violations.8 Id. § 501.208(7). Finally, the Department of
        Legal Affairs 9 may pursue three remedies in court: (1) a forward-

        7 The state’s Department of Legal Affairs possesses rulemaking authority to
        administer the FDUTPA, but all substantive rules must conform with the
        “rules, regulations, and decisions of the [FTC] and the federal courts in inter-
        preting the provisions of s. 5(a)(1) of the [FTC] Act.” Id. § 501.205.
        8 The Department of Legal Affairs—or the “office of the state attorney if a
        violation of this part occurs in or affects the judicial circuit under the office’s
        jurisdiction,” id. § 501.203(2)—may also pursue civil penalties prior to a final
        cease and desist order if the defendant “is willfully using, or has willfully used,
        a method, act, or practice declared unlawful under [Fla. Stat. § 501.204], or
        who is willfully violating any of the rules of the department adopted under
        this part.” Id. § 501.2075. Much like with the FTC Act, the mental state serves
        as the notice.
        9   Or the office of the state attorney. See supra n.8.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part             7

        looking declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates the
        FDUTPA; (2) a forward-looking injunction against a defendant busi-
        ness “who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise likely to vio-
        late” the FDUTPA; or (3) a suit on behalf of one or more consum-
        ers to recover “actual damages caused by” a violating act or prac-
        tice. Id. § 501.207. Until this last remedy, the FDUTPA follows the
        FTC Act’s pattern of only preventing future action unless the defend-
        ant has been placed on notice that a particular act or practice vio-
        lates the statute.
               The FDUTPA continues differentiating itself from the FTC
        Act by providing two private rights of action. Anyone “aggrieved
        by a violation of” the FDUTPA can bring a declaratory judgment
        action and enjoin a “person who has violated, is violating, or is oth-
        erwise likely to violate” the FDUTPA. Id. § 501.211(1). While pri-
        vate, this cause of action is still forward-looking. Additionally,
        someone “who has suffered a loss as a result of a violation of” the
        FDUTPA “may recover actual damages, plus attorney’s fees and
        court costs.” Id. § 501.211(2). Therefore, despite closely hewing to
        the FTC Act and its interpretations, the FDUTPA has two features
        the FTC Act does not: private rights of action and backward-look-
        ing damages provisions.
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        8           TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

                                              B.
               New York’s consumer protection law also utilizes vague lan-
        guage.10 The statute authorizes the state attorney general to enjoin
        (forward-looking) unlawful acts or practices by anyone who “has
        engaged in or is about to engage in any of the acts or practices
        stated to be unlawful.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(b). The attorney
        general can also “obtain restitution of any moneys or property ob-
        tained directly or indirectly” by the unlawful acts or practices. Id.
        The statute requires the attorney general “to give the person
        against whom such proceeding is contemplated notice . . . and an
        opportunity to show in writing . . . why proceedings should not be
        instituted against him.” 11 Id. § 349(c).
                In addition to enforcement actions by the attorney general,
        “any person who has been injured by reason of any violation of this
        section may bring an action in his own name to enjoin such unlaw-
        ful act or practice, an action to recover his actual damages or fifty
        dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions.” Id. § 349(h).

        10 The statute declares unlawful “[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct
        of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this
        state.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a).
        11 The statute provides an exception to the notice and opportunity to be heard
        when the attorney general seeks preliminary relief and finds “that to give such
        notice and opportunity is not in the public interest.” Id. § 349(c).
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                     9

        Much like the FDUTPA, the New York statute adds private rights
        of action and backward-looking relief to the FTC Act scheme. 12
                                             C.
               The Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (the “MMPA”)
        more specifically defines the prohibited acts under the statute than
        do the Florida and New York statutes, including specifically prohib-
        iting “misrepresentation.” 13 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020(1). 14 The
        state attorney general may issue and serve “an order prohibiting” a
        person from “engaging or continuing to engage in” a violation of
        the MMPA after notifying the defendant business of the supposed
        violation and allowing two business days from receipt of the noti-
        fication for the business to answer. 15 Id. § 407.095(1).
              The MMPA authorizes the attorney general to pursue for-
        ward-looking injunctions against further violations of the MMPA
        and authorizes courts in such actions to award restitution “as may

        12 The New York statute specifically allows for acting in conformance with the

        rules, regulations, and statutes administered and interpreted by the FTC to
        serve as a complete defense to claims under the New York consumer protec-
        tion law. Id. § 349(d).
        13 The MMPA declares unlawful “any deception, fraud, false pretense, false
        promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression,
        or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement
        of any merchandise.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020(1).
        14The MMPA makes the willful and knowing violation of the act a felonious
        criminal offense. Id. § 407.020(3).
        15The attorney general may also initiate an investigation of any suspected vi-
        olation of the MMPA. Id. § 407.040.
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        10            TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        be necessary to restore to any person who has suffered any ascer-
        tainable loss . . . which may have been acquired by means of any”
        violation of the MMPA. Id. § 407.100(1), (4). The MMPA also au-
        thorizes civil penalties where the defendant is already on notice of
        its conduct: for violations of voluntary compliance agreements be-
        tween the business and the attorney general, id. § 407.030(2), or for
        violations of the “terms of an injunction, an order to make restitu-
        tion, or any other judgment or order issued under section
        407.100.” 16 Id. § 407.110.
               Much like the Florida and New York statutes, the MMPA
        authorizes a private cause of action to recover damages to those
        who “suffer[] an ascertainable loss of money or property, real or
        personal, as a result of” an MMPA violation. Id. § 407.025. In so
        doing, the MMPA endorses an objective test for damages. 17 Id.
        § 407.025(1)(2). The MMPA also specifically authorizes class

         Willfully and knowingly violating an attorney general’s order under the
        16

        MMPA carries a felony criminal penalty. Id. § 407.095(3).
        17   The elements of an MMPA private cause of action are:
                  (a)      That the person acted as a reasonable consumer would
                  in light of all circumstances;
                  (b)     That the method, act, or practice declared unlawful by
                  [the MMPA] would cause a reasonable person to enter into the
                  transaction that resulted in damages; and
                  (c)     Individual damages with sufficiently definitive and ob-
                  jective evidence to allow the loss to be calculated with a rea-
                  sonable degree of certainty.
        Id. § 407.025(1)(2).
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                    11

        actions for damages, id. § 407.025(5)–(9), and states that unnamed
        class members “shall establish individual damages in a manner de-
        termined by the court.” Id. § 407.025(5).
                                             D.
               The Washington consumer protection statute also uses
        vague language to outlaw conduct. 18 Wash. Rev. Code
        § 19.86.020. The statute authorizes the state attorney general to
        bring a forward-looking action “to restrain and prevent the doing
        of any act” prohibited by the statute. Id. § 19.86.080(1). And in
        such an action, a court “may make such additional orders or judg-
        ments as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any
        moneys or property, real or personal, which may have been ac-
        quired by means of” a prohibited act. Id. § 19.86.080(2). Much like
        some of the other statutes, this statute provides for civil penalties
        for the violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this statute. Id.
        § 19.86.140.
               In addition to the attorney general’s remedies, “[a]ny person
        who is injured in his or her business or property by a violation” of
        the consumer protection statute “may bring a civil action in supe-
        rior court to enjoin further violations, to recover the actual dam-
        ages sustained by him or her, or both.” Id. § 19.86.090.

        18 The statute prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or decep-
        tive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Wash. Rev.
        Code § 19.86.020.
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        12          TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

                                               E.
              Finally, the California Unfair Competition Law 19 (the
        “UCL”) defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair or
        fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or
        misleading advertising and any act prohibited by” Cal. Bus. & Prof.
        Code § 17500 et seq. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. The UCL
        authorizes forward-looking injunctive relief as well as “such orders
        or judgments” by a court “as may be necessary to restore to any
        person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which
        may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” Id.
        § 17203.
               The same section provides for a private cause of action by
        stating, “Any person may pursue representative claims or relief on
        behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing require-
        ments of Section 17204.” Id. That standing section authorizes ac-
        tions for relief under the UCL by various public parties, such as the
        state attorney general, or “a person who has suffered injury in fact
        and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competi-
        tion.” Id. § 17204.
               Much like the other five statutes, the UCL authorizes civil
        penalties. Id. § 17206. Unlike those other statutes, it does not ap-
        pear that the statute provides for civil penalties only after a business
        has violated a court order, final agency order, or agreement; rather,

        19Like the Majority and for the sake of simplicity, this opinion treats all three
        separate California statutes together. See Maj. Op. at 24 n.8.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                     13

        the UCL authorizes civil penalties for the bare violation of the stat-
        ute itself. 20 Id.
                To summarize, though each of the five state consumer pro-
        tection laws closely resemble the FTC Act in certain respects, they
        differ as well. All five authorize damages. All five authorize a pri-
        vate right of action. All five apparently allow the respective state
        attorneys general to recover restitution in the initial injunctive pro-
        ceeding against an alleged violator. Missouri and California each
        define unlawful conduct more specifically than the FTC Act does.
        Missouri, Washington, and California do not have provisions that
        suggest the state law must conform with FTC law. Missouri spe-
        cifically authorizes class actions and provides for an objective test
        to obtain private damages. California penalizes violators without
        a preliminary injunctive or cease and desist step. Finally, as a gen-
        eral matter, the statutes award damages only to the extent that
        such damages function like restitution—requiring actual damage.
                                              II.
               With the statutory landscape before us, we must now define
        the claims with which I disagree with the Majority and determine
        where they fit in with that landscape. This is an important step
        because these state consumer protection statutes, on their faces,
        cover the waterfront of prohibited conduct by outlawing anything
        qualified as an “unfair business practice.”

        20 The UCL also provides for a civil penalty to punish violations of an injunc-
        tion issued under the statute. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17207.
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        14        TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

                The claims against Ford have three features that make them
        what I define as “Misrepresentative Advertising Class Actions.”
        First, the claims assert that Ford’s alleged unlawful conduct was
        contained in its advertising. See Maj. Op. at 4. Second, the claims
        against Ford assert that Ford misrepresented something in its ad-
        vertisements, making the claims specifically about misrepresenta-
        tion as opposed to some other type of unfair business practice. See
        id. at 13. Third, the complaint alleges harm against a class rather
        than against an individual or named individuals.
               The significance of the class action nature will become clear
        in part III, and that of the advertising element in part III.A. For
        now, the nature of the claims asserted against Ford as involving
        misrepresentation carries two significances: (1) the deleterious ef-
        fects of the vague statutes are reduced and (2) misrepresentation
        comes with an inherent causal mechanism.
               As mentioned in part I, supra, the consumer protection stat-
        utes at issue here—with the possible exceptions of the MMPA and
        the UCL—including the FTC Act itself, are written very broadly to
        capture much ill-defined “unfair” or “deceptive” acts in business.
        As part III.A will further flesh out, these statutes, standing alone,
        pose a notice problem. The statute itself does not alert Charlie that
        what he is doing is prohibited by the statute. To avoid the notice
        problem, we must find further definition of the prohibited conduct
        elsewhere. There are two places to look.
               First, we can look to prior decisions under the statute. “Un-
        fair business practice” might not in itself tell a cruise ship company
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                     15

        that it cannot charge customers an additional fee, label it a “port
        charge,” then pocket some of that extra money as profit. See, e.g.,
        Latman v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., 758 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
        App. 2000). But a previous case decided by a court under the con-
        sumer protection statute dealing with that situation would. 21
               Second, we might solve the notice issue by importing the
        common law definition of fraudulent misrepresentation. In that
        regard, if a defendant’s conduct rises to the level of common law
        fraudulent misrepresentation, the defendant gets his notice from
        the common law. But the plaintiff would then need to make out a
        prima facie statutory claim by making out a prima facie misrepre-
        sentation claim—proving a misrepresentation, materiality, reli-
        ance, causation, and injury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
        § 525 (1977).
               Therefore, to get around the notice problem inherent in the
        vaguely worded statutes before us, plaintiffs in a Misrepresentative
        Advertising Class Action have two options: present the district
        court with a case on point adjudicating similar behavior as violating
        the statute or satisfy the common law elements of misrepresenta-
        tion. Utilizing either option, a misrepresentation allegation comes
        with a built-in causal mechanism: reliance. The latter option

        21The FDUTPA goes one step further. By requiring “due consideration and
        great weight . . . to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and
        the federal courts relating to s. 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,”
        Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1), the FDUTPA also allows FTC decisions to guide the
        definition of prohibited conduct.
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        16          TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        requires it explicitly while the former must require it unless a plain-
        tiff need not prove causation.
               Misrepresentation only causes harm if the misrepresentee
        relies on the misrepresentation of the misrepresentor. For in-
        stance, take the instant case. Some of the class members (1) may
        not have seen the advertisements at issue, (2) may not have wanted
        a track-ready car, or (3) wanted merely to collect the car without
        ever driving it around the track. None of these three kinds of class
        members could have relied on Ford’s alleged misrepresentation.
        Either they did not see the misrepresentation, or the misrepresen-
        tation did not play any part in their decision to buy this car. The
        alleged misrepresentation therefore could not have caused any
        complained-of harm. Insofar as these three kinds of class members
        suffered an injury, it remains independent of any misrepresentation
        on the part of Ford. Therefore, in a misrepresentation case, reli-
        ance is the causal mechanism. No reliance inherently means no
        causation.
                None of the consumer protection statutes at issue here—
        Florida, Missouri, New York, Washington, or California—explic-
        itly disclaims a reliance element. 22 That is to say, none of those

        22 The Missouri Code of State Regulations says, “Reliance, knowledge that the

        assertion is false or misleading, intent to defraud, intent that the consumer rely
        upon the assertion, or any other capable mental state such as recklessness or
        negligence, are not elements of misrepresentation as used in section
        407.020.1.” Mo. Code Regs. Ann. Tit. 15, § 60-9.070(2). While this language
        appears in the regulation, the regulation merely adopts language from state
        court decisions. Therefore, we also treat Missouri as if nothing in that statute
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                     17

        statutes say, “reliance is not an element of a cause of action under”
        the statute. Rather, state court cases have interpreted the con-
        sumer protection statutes as not requiring reliance. See Maj. Op. at
        16–20, 23–25. As discussed in part III.D, infra, by reading out a re-
        liance element in all cases, a court usurps the legislature’s power
        and attempts to bind future courts in a way inconsistent with our
        conception of judicial power.
                                             III.
               Now that we have laid out the statutory frameworks and
        shown that misrepresentation claims require a showing of reliance,
        this opinion now explains why a Misrepresentative Advertising
        Class Action cannot be certified. Certifying such a class runs afoul
        of the United States Constitution in four ways creating four distinct
        but related problems: the Free Speech Problem, the Due Process
        Problem, the Separation of Powers Problem, and the Standing
        Problem.
                                              A.
               We begin with the Free Speech Problem. This case involves
        speech because it involves advertising. The plaintiffs claim Ford’s
        advertisements misrepresented something to them. While the
        First Amendment does not protect untruthful commercial speech,
        see Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
        U.S. 748, 771, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1830 (1976), the judicial elimination of

        explicitly disclaims a reliance element. Any removal of the reliance element is
        a judicial removal.
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        18        TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        a causation element makes a speaker liable for speech with or with-
        out the speech actually harming anyone. This chills protected
        speech. Let us go back to our hypothetical from part I.A.
               Clifton has an ordinance that prohibits unfair business prac-
        tices and enforces it by the FTC Act model. Lucy, a resident of
        Clifton, needs to sell her blue car. She takes out an advertisement
        in the Clifton Chronicle that says, “Buy my red car.” Lucy thus en-
        gages in speech—albeit unprotected speech. If Lucy did not know
        the Clifton ordinance prohibited her false advertisement, that
        would still be ok under the FTC Act model. Before any damages
        or penalties could be assessed against her, the Clifton authorities
        would have to tell her to stop, and if Lucy did not want to stop, she
        could get a court to weigh in.
                Now, suppose Clifton instead has an ordinance that prohib-
        its unfair business practices and allows for private damages. This
        is closer to the state models. Lucy advertises her blue car as a red
        car. Sally agrees to buy Lucy’s car on Monday and pays Lucy. On
        Tuesday, Lucy delivers the car and Sally discovers it is blue. Sally
        sues under the Clifton ordinance alleging misrepresentation and
        can either (1) rescind the contract, or (2) recover the difference be-
        tween the value of a blue car and the value of a red car—the two
        possible remedies for fraud. Lucy’s speech would not be protected.
        Lucy could not claim she was not on notice that her conduct vio-
        lated the ordinance, even if a previous case dealing with similar
        conduct had not yet been decided. That is because Sally proved
        the elements of common law fraud, including that she relied on
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                    19

        Lucy’s misrepresentation about the car’s color. See supra part II
        (naming two ways in which a defendant may have notice under
        vague consumer protection statutes).
                Finally, imagine Clifton has just enacted the same ordinance;
        it is new so there are no prior decisions to define prohibited con-
        duct. A state court has interpreted the ordinance as not requiring
        a plaintiff to prove reliance (and therefore causation). Lucy, now
        the owner of a car dealership that only sells blue cars, places an
        advertisement in the Clifton Chronicle that says, “Our cars are red
        hot!” accompanied by a cartoon picture of a red car. Sally, who
        wants to purchase a red car, sees the advertisement and purchases
        a car over the phone only to later discover that it is blue. Sally
        begins a class action against Lucy on behalf of everyone who has
        ever bought a car from Lucy’s car dealership. Because Lucy en-
        gaged in an unfair business practice and all her customers bought
        less valuable blue cars, Judge Franklin decides that Lucy’s adver-
        tisement violated the ordinance and orders her to pay the differ-
        ence in value between a red car and a blue car to every class mem-
        ber. 23
               Where is the free speech problem here? For one, Lucy was
        not on notice that her advertisement fell under the ambit of the
        ordinance. Perhaps she thought she was merely puffing. The or-
        dinance used vague language, and neither of our two workarounds
        apply. See supra part II. Sally could not use a prior decision to prove

        23In so holding Lucy liable, Judge Franklin would inherently need to find that
        Lucy engaged in unprotected misrepresentative commercial speech.
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        20         TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        the advertisement was prohibited because the ordinance was new,
        and the common law analogy could not help because nobody had
        to prove reliance (and therefore causation). This notice problem
        already implicates the Due Process Problem. See infra part III.B.
        The First Amendment concern comes due to the almost certain
        consequence of Judge Franklin’s ruling.
               In engaging in speech that Judge Franklin would later deem
        violated the statute and fell outside the First Amendment’s protec-
        tion, what sanction did Lucy incur? She was not merely told to
        stop through a cease and desist order. See supra part I.A. That
        would be fine. She was not even held liable for the actual damage
        her advertisement caused Sally.24 Rather, Lucy had to pay dam-
        ages to all of her customers irrespective of whether (1) they saw the
        advertisement, (2) they thought the advertisement was advertising
        red cars, or (3) they wanted a red car. Class member Snoopy could
        recover damages because he bought a blue car from Lucy despite
        having never seen the advertisement and the fact that he shopped
        at Lucy’s car dealership specifically because he wanted a blue car.
        This is troubling in and of itself, as part of the Due Process Prob-
        lem. See infra part III.B. But now we get to the Free Speech Prob-
        lem.
              What would a rational businessperson do if faced with a
        vague statute that might penalize her advertising with runaway
        damages liability to an unforeseeable number of plaintiffs? Not

        24 A question remains whether this scenario would also implicate the Due Pro-

        cess Problem.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part             21

        advertise, or at least severely restrict her advertising. So, while the
        ordinance on its face only prohibits unprotected speech, any ra-
        tional businessperson would stand so far away from the ill-defined
        line between outlawed advertising and permissible advertising—
        thus chilling protected speech—to avoid the potentially cata-
        strophic consequences of damages to all. This is the Free Speech
        Problem.
               All the consumer protection statutes at issue in this case
        touch speech in some way by barring misrepresentation—either
        explicitly like Missouri, or implicitly like the other four statutes.
        While, again, forbidding such misrepresentative commercial
        speech generally falls within the ambit of a state’s police power, a
        court that allows unforeseeable damages to unforeseeable plaintiffs
        through a reliance-less cause of action, in effect, prophylactically
        prohibits potentially misleading—and therefore protected—speech.
        And chilling that extra, protected speech goes well beyond that nec-
        essary to further a state’s interest in protecting consumers from
        misrepresentation. See Cen. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
        Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569–70, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2353 (1980).
                                          B.
               Though we have already touched on the Due Process Prob-
        lem, let us hit a couple more points.
               Class actions can be an efficient method by which to resolve
        a great quantity of legal claims. A class action can benefit putative
        plaintiffs by allowing many individuals with meritorious claims—
        though perhaps small—to pool their resources to vindicate their
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        22           TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        injuries against a common defendant. A class action can benefit
        defendants by allowing them to defend against many similar legal
        claims in one fell swoop as opposed to defending individually
        against death by a thousand cuts.
               But efficiency is not the be-all-end-all, especially in a justice
        system. In addition to the First Amendment interests explored in
        part III.A, supra, interests in efficiency must yield to due process
        concerns when they arise. See Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
        857 F.3d 1169, 1218 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., dissent-
        ing) (highlighting the due process dangers that serve as a backstop
        to the efficiency of issue and claim preclusion); see also Rollins, Inc.
        v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860, 874–75 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (ex-
        plaining that (a) “considerations of administrative convenience do
        not trump the class action defendant’s right to due process of law”
        and (b) the argument that “ordinary standards concerning rules of
        evidence, burdens of proof, or proof of the elements of a cause of
        action must be relaxed in the class action context” is circular be-
        cause it “assumes what remains to be proved: that the individual
        members of the putative class have a right to recovery in the first
        place” (citation omitted)).
                The predominance requirement of Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 23(b)(3) serves as one layer of protection for the due pro-
        cess rights of class action defendants.25 If a class sues under a claim

        25 “A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . . the court

        finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
        over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                        23

        that—by its elements—ought to require too much of an individual
        inquiry, a class action that reaches a jury risks ironing over the dif-
        ferences within a class. These ironed-over differences may have
        made the difference between one class member’s successful prima
        facie case (like Sally’s) from another class member’s failed one (like
        Snoopy’s). This ironing, in effect, leaves defendants liable to (1)
        plaintiffs who would not have a meritorious individual claim
        against the defendant and (2) plaintiffs who were simply not held
        to their burdens of proof and persuasion due to their riding the
        coattails of other plaintiffs.
                Much as a court eliminating causation from the traditional
        elements of negligence would deprive a defendant of property
        without notice—thus denying the defendant due process—so
        would excusing the reliance (and therefore causation) element in
        these state consumer protection statutes. All a plaintiff needs to
        prove under a causation-less cause of action is that the defendant
        committed an act prohibited by the statute and the plaintiff suf-
        fered some sort of recoverable injury, whether or not any causal
        connection exists between the two. That would be like if defend-
        ant Linus—under a duty not to leave his blanket on the ground for
        fear of creating a slip hazard and yet breaching that duty—was held

        is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
        controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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        24          TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        liable to plaintiff Schroeder for his injury sustained from a falling
        piano on the other side of Clifton.26
                                               C.
                Any elimination of a reliance (and thus causation) element
        in a Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action also poses a Stand-
        ing Problem. It is hard for me to believe that—especially after
        TransUnion—any class action scheme in a Misrepresentative Adver-
        tising context can pass muster under Article III standing law if the
        cause of action contains no reliance or causation requirement or
        allows a class to ride the coattails of named class representatives as
        to reliance or causation. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct.
        2190 (2021). While two of the three standing requirements allow
        a plaintiff to enter the courthouse on probabilities, one does not.
        The Supreme Court identified three standing requirements: (1)
        “that the injury was likely caused by the defendant”; (2) “that the
        injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief”; but (3) that the
        plaintiff “suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized,
        and actual or imminent.” Id. at 2203 (emphasis added) (citing Lujan
        v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136
        (1992)). Therefore, an objective test that asks something along the
        lines of, “is the defendant’s conduct likely to cause injury to the rea-
        sonable consumer” cannot excuse a standing requirement of actual
        injury in a backward-looking damages suit in federal court.

        26 Add to this hypothetical the idea that it may not be   clear that Linus had such
        a duty, and the Due Process Problem only grows.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                       25

                Contrast such a suit to an objective test for a forward-look-
        ing injunction. See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 103 S. Ct.
        1660, 1667 (1983) (evaluating injunctive standing using a “likely to
        suffer future injury” standard). For forward-looking relief, only
        one plaintiff need show an actual injury because, with injunctive
        relief, whether the suit is brought by one plaintiff or one million
        plaintiffs, the injunction preventing future conduct remains the
        same.
                Any use of the state legislative power does not solve the
        standing problem. “[E]ven though ‘Congress [or a state legislature]
        may elevate harms that exist in the real world before [the legisla-
        ture] recognized them to actionable legal status, it may not simply
        enact an injury into existence.’” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2205 (in-
        ternal quotations omitted) (quoting Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882
        F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir. 2018)). And the Supreme Court has already
        rejected the idea that “a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-
        in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory
        right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that
        right.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549
        (2016). “[T]he public interest that private entities comply with the
        law cannot ‘be converted into an individual right by a statute that
        denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens . . . to sue.’” 27
        TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2206 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–77,
        112 S. Ct. at 2145).

        27This particular point goes to the heart of the justification for the California
        statutory claim as discussed infra part V.D.
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        26          TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

               Further, vindicating the public interest ought to be in the
        hands of a democratically accountable enforcing party, such as a
        state attorney general, not private parties with no standing. “Pri-
        vate plaintiffs are not accountable to the people and are not
        charged with pursuing the public interest in enforcing a defendant’s
        general compliance with regulatory law.” Id. at 2207 (citation
        omitted).
                 Importantly for a Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action,
        “[e]very class member must have Article III standing in order to
        recover individual damages.” Id. at 2208. In other words, un-
        named class members cannot get into court using the named plain-
        tiff’s ticket. 28
                                               D.
              Finally, the way these statutory causes of action are pre-
        sented in the Majority opinion presents a Separation of Powers
        Problem.
                Each and every statutory cause of action—Florida, New
        York, Washington, and Missouri—requires causation as an ele-
        ment. See City First Mortg. Corp. v. Barton, 988 So. 2d 82, 86 (Fla. 4th
        Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (requiring “causation”); Cohen v. JP Morgan
        Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2007) (requiring the plaintiff
        to have sustained an injury “as a result” of defendant’s act or prac-
        tice); Peoples v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 452 P.3d 1218, 1221 (Wash.

        28This also strikes at the heart of the California statutory claim. See infra part
        V.D.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part              27

        2019) (requiring “a causal link between the act and the injury”);
        Murphy v. Stonewall Kitchen, LLC, 503 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Mo. Ct. App.
        2016) (requiring the plaintiff’s injury to occur “as a result of” a vio-
        lation of the statute); Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Ct., 246 P.3d 877, 887
        (Cal. 2011) (requiring causation for standing under the UCL).
               As shown in part II, supra, the inherent causal mechanism in
        a misrepresentation claim is reliance. Therefore, any state court
        that announces that the respective state statute does not require a
        showing of reliance must have done one of two things.
               One, it might be that the case before that state court, though
        brought under the state consumer protection statute, was not a
        misrepresentation case. Perhaps then, a causal mechanism other
        than reliance might suffice and the plaintiff in fact does not need to
        prove reliance. If so, an announcement that the statute does not
        require a showing of reliance has nothing to say about this case—a
        Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action—where reliance is the
        causal mechanism.
               Two, the state court might have usurped the state legisla-
        ture’s power and rewrote the statute. Separation of powers princi-
        ples in all five of the states at issue here forbid such a usurpation.
        See Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co., 748 So. 2d 993, 1000 (Fla. 1999)
        (“[T]his Court may not rewrite statutes contrary to their plain lan-
        guage.”); In re Chase Nat’l Bank of City of N.Y., 28 N.E.2d 868, 871
        (N.Y. 1940) (“[I]t is not within the province of this court to rewrite
        the enactments of the Legislature.”); City of Charleston ex rel. Brady
        v. McCutcheon, 227 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Mo. 1950) (“To so rewrite this
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        28         TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        statute would be but judicial usurpation of the legislative function.
        That we cannot do.”); Millay v. Cam, 955 P.2d 791, 795 (Wash. 1998)
        (“Courts do not amend statutes by judicial construction . . . nor
        rewrite statutes to avoid difficulties in construing and applying
        them.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Seaboard
        Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, 5 P.2d 882, 885 (Cal. 1931) (“This court
        cannot . . . in the exercise of its power to interpret, rewrite the stat-
        ute.”).
               This Separation of Powers Problem is further exacerbated
        by the Free Speech Problem. While state legislatures can exercise
        their police power to proscribe unprotected speech, if the govern-
        ment has an interest in protecting the populace from some sort of
        injury, it is a completely different matter if courts, which do not
        possess police power, do so. Compare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
        652, 670, 45 S. Ct. 625, 631 (1925) (finding that an enactment by the
        state legislature did not exceed the police power and violate the
        defendant’s free speech right), with Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
        296, 307–308, 60 S. Ct. 900, 905 (1940) (coming to the opposite con-
        clusion because a state court rather than the legislature attempted
        to engage in the police power by weighing the state’s interest
        against the First Amendment interest).
               As stated in part III.A, supra, in reading out the causation el-
        ement of these statutes on its own initiative, the state court creates
        a prophylactic ban on protected and unprotected speech alike out
        of whole cloth. If a state desires to penalize unprotected speech,
        the state legislature can craft a prohibition by utilizing the police
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part             29

        power. But the state court cannot so exercise the police power. See
        Gandy v. Borras, 154 So. 248, 249 (Fla. 1934) (“When a subject lies
        within the police power of the state, debatable questions as to rea-
        sonableness of the exercise of the power are not for the courts but
        for the Legislature.”); People v. Munoz, 172 N.E.2d 535, 539 (N.Y.
        1961) (“It is for the courts to determine, not how the police power
        should be exercised, but whether there is reasonable relation be-
        tween the statute or ordinance and the object sought to be at-
        tained.”); Star Square Auto Supply Co. v. Gerk, 30 S.W.2d 447, 462
        (Mo. 1930) (“The propriety, wisdom, and expediency of legislation
        enacted in pursuance of the police power is exclusively a matter for
        the Legislature. The single question which lies within the province
        of the judiciary for its determination is whether the Legislature, in
        the exercise of the police power, has exceeded the limits imposed
        by the Constitution, federal or state.”); Granat v. Keasler, 663 P.2d
        830, 832 (Wash. 1983) (implying that the police power rests outside
        the judiciary because “[a]n exercise of the police power . . . is sub-
        ject to judicial review”); Frost v. City of L.A., 183 P. 342, 345 (Cal.
        1919) (“The Legislature is possessed of the entire police power of
        the state . . . .”).
               Normally, the legislature exercises the police power, and the
        courts serve as backstops to ensure the legislature’s use of the
        power does not violate the state or federal constitutions. The situ-
        ation we have here turns this on its head. In reading out a neces-
        sary element of a Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action,
        courts usurp the police power and do so not to remedy constitu-
        tional deficiencies, but to create them.
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        30         TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

                                          IV.
               With these four constitutional problems, how could these
        six Misrepresentative Advertising Class Actions go forward? These
        four constitutional problems, see supra part III, can remain hidden
        under the hood if a court adopts state court language wholesale.
        The Majority opinion illustrates this point. The Majority frames
        the predominance inquiry of the state laws at issue here as asking
        “(1) whether those laws require proof of reliance, (2) if so, whether
        they permit reliance to be presumed, and (3) if so, under what cir-
        cumstances.” Maj. Op. at 2.
               The Majority correctly sets off on the proper inquiry under
        the predominance requirement:
               The first step in assessing predominance is to “iden-
               tify the parties’ claims and defenses and their ele-
               ments” and to categorize “these issues as common
               questions or individual questions by predicting how
               the parties will prove them at trial.” Id. A common
               issue is one that will likely be proved using the same
               evidence for all class members; an individualized is-
               sue, by contrast, is one that will likely be proved using
               evidence that “var[ies] from member to member.”
        Id. at 7 (quoting Brown v. Electrolux Homes Prods., 817 F.3d 1225,
        1234 (11th Cir. 2016)). The Majority also correctly states that if the
        plaintiffs had to prove reliance, that would be “a very individual-
        ized inquiry, the kind that would predominate over other common
        questions in a class action.” Id. at 10. For the reasons discussed in
        part III, supra, the Majority errs by not essentially ending its analysis
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                       31

        there. To recap, in a Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action,
        (1) causation inherently requires a showing of reliance, (2) each
        statute (and the California common law claim) requires a showing
        of causation, and (3) no state court could possibly possess the
        power to eliminate that causation element.
                Instead of ending its analysis, however, the Majority splits
        the claims before us into three buckets: Bucket One—the Florida,
        Missouri, Washington, and New York statutory claims—includes
        the class certifications which the Majority affirms; Bucket Two—
        the Texas statutory claim and Tennessee, Washington, and New
        York common law fraud claims—includes the class certifications
        which the Majority reverses; 29 and Bucket Three—the California
        statutory and common law claims—which the Majority remands
        for further factual findings. Maj. Op. at 16. In apparent reference
        to all three buckets, the Majority suggests that “a (perhaps the) key
        issue in this case is whether each of the several state-law causes of
        action that plaintiffs have alleged permits a presumption of reliance
        and, if it does, under what circumstances.” Id. at 10 (emphasis in
        original).
               But the Majority’s analyses of the Bucket One claims do not
        rely on a presumption because that bucket “comprises state causes
        of action that don’t require proof of reliance.” Id. at 16. It therefore
        appears a presumption analysis only plays a part in the Buckets
        Two and Three analyses. Id. at 20–25. As to the Bucket One

        29   Again, I agree with the Majority’s disposition of the claims in Bucket Two.
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        32        TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        claims, in a Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action, causation
        inherently requires reliance. See supra part II.B. And just as state
        courts cannot pluck the causation element out of a statutory cause
        of action, see supra part III.D, the Majority cannot do the same in
        this Court without itself violating the four constitutional principles
        outlined in part III, supra.
               What about the two California claims in Bucket Three? The
        Majority identifies the Bucket Three claims as those causes of ac-
        tion that rely on the presence of a presumption. Maj. Op. at 23.
        Presumptions come in two flavors: what I will call classical and
        conclusive. A classical presumption, which generally applies to a
        fact the plaintiff must prove to establish a claim, temporarily ex-
        cuses the plaintiff’s burden of proving such a fact to establish a
        claim sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of
        law at the close of the plaintiff’s case. The defendant can rebut the
        presumption and, if successful, the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
        ing the presumed fact at trial.
               The classical presumption could not possibly apply to any of
        the claims asserted in this case. The classical presumption works
        when a defendant possesses evidence the plaintiff needs to establish
        a prima facie case. Therefore, the plaintiff needs evidence of the
        presumed fact to avoid a judgment as a matter of law. The classical
        presumption temporarily relieves the plaintiff until the defend-
        ant—the party with control over the evidence necessary to prove
        or disprove the presumed element—rebuts the presumption.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part             33

               A conclusive presumption, on the other hand, operates as a
        matter of policy—if enacted in a statute itself—or interpretation—
        if a court creates the presumption through a judicial decision “de-
        claring” common law—and serves as a prophylactic. Essentially,
        because it permanently relieves a party of the burden to prove an
        element, the conclusive presumption erases the element. For ex-
        ample, if a cause of action requires (1) a false statement, (2) an eco-
        nomic injury, and (3) reliance, a judicially created conclusive pre-
        sumption as to reliance makes a defendant liable whether or not a
        plaintiff relied, despite the statute requiring a showing of reliance.
        The constitutional problems, therefore, that accompany a court
        reading out an element of a claim discussed in part III, supra, all
        apply to a judicially created conclusive presumption as well.
               With the conclusive presumption a non-starter, what about
        the classical version? The classical presumption makes absolutely
        no sense in the context of reliance. Between the purchasing cus-
        tomer and the manufacturing seller, who is more likely to possess
        evidence of the reliance or non-reliance of any given purchaser?
        Obviously, the purchaser him or herself. What could the seller—
        defendant Ford in this case—possibly have to offer the factfinder
        by way of getting to the truth of whether a plaintiff relied on al-
        leged misrepresentations? A rebuttable presumption also does lit-
        tle to change these claims into those where common issues pre-
        dominate. It only changes the order of proof. The defendant will
        need to produce individual evidence to rebut the presumption for
        each individual class member and, if the defendant succeeds, each
        class member will then need to individually prove reliance at trial.
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        34          TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        Even if the burden to prove or disprove reliance properly and tem-
        porarily shifted to Ford going forward with the evidence, Ford
        would need to rebut—or at least have the opportunity to rebut—
        reliance for each individual plaintiff. This would still make a class
        action inappropriate and unmanageable because each individual
        case would still need to be tried by a jury to determine (1) if Ford
        presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and (2) if
        each individual plaintiff ultimately proved his or her case. 30
               So, the Majority, in focusing on a presumption of reliance
        for the Bucket Three claims, must mean a conclusive presumption.
        As for the California statutory claim, a presumption—let alone a
        conclusive presumption—does not derive from the statute. See su-
        pra part I.E. Rather, “Courts applying California law” have de-
        clared the statute implies it. Maj. Op. at 24. Likewise, the Majority
        indicates that the California common law claim includes reliance
        as an element, but that courts apply a presumption to those com-
        mon law claims as well. Id. at 25. The Majority says that they do
        this where “the same material misrepresentations have actually
        been communicated to each member of a class.” Id. (quoting
        Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 575 (Cal. 1993)). The fact that
        courts interpreting California law had to create and apply a

        30 In addition to a potential trial being unmanageable, discovery would be an
        unmitigated mess. At bottom, with a rebuttable presumption, either the plain-
        tiffs will have to produce evidence of each individual class member’s reliance,
        or the defendant will have to depose each individual class member and each
        individual class member would have to produce evidence of reliance once the
        defendant rebuts the presumption.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                  35

        presumption (thus excusing proof of reliance) suggests that the de-
        fault prior to the court-created presumption, even for the common
        law misrepresentation claim, required plaintiffs to plead and prove
        reliance. Thus, the judicial elimination of an element—despite be-
        ing labelled a presumption—runs afoul of the four constitutional
        problems explained in part III, supra. 31
                                            V.
                The Majority’s analysis integrates two errors: (1) it interprets
        state cases about non-Misrepresentative Advertising Class Actions
        as issuing guidance (though in dicta) for decisions involving Mis-
        representative Advertising Class Actions; and (2) it allows state
        court cases that involve Misrepresentative Advertising Class Ac-
        tions but that do not wrestle with the four constitutional problems,
        see supra part III, to bind this Court, when we should refuse to give
        full faith and credit to those decisions. The Majority cites other
        federal courts and state courts interpreting the consumer protec-
        tion statutes in this case and, at first glance, they seem to say that
        for the Florida, New York, Washington, Missouri, and California
        statutory claims and the California common law claims, there is no
        need for each individual plaintiff to plead and prove individual reli-
        ance. But these prior cases do not cure the four constitutional ills
        discussed in part III, supra.

        31 Of course, the Separation of Powers Problem does not exist for the common

        law cause of action, but the Standing, Due Process, and Free Speech Problems
        do.
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        36         TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

                Normally, we defer to state courts in interpreting their own
        state law. But we need not give credit and follow state court cases
        that violate the United States Constitution. “A State may not grant
        preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm judg-
        ment, and other state and federal courts are not required to accord
        full faith and credit to such a judgment.” Kremer v. Chem. Constr.
        Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482, 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1898 (1982) (footnote omit-
        ted); see also U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v.
        McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15, 27 S. Ct. 236, 238 (1907) (“The constitu-
        tional requirement that full faith and credit shall be given in each
        state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
        other state is necessarily to be interpreted in connection with other
        provisions of the Constitution, and therefore no state can obtain in
        the tribunals of other jurisdictions full faith and credit for its judicial
        proceedings if they are wanting in the due process of law enjoined
        by the fundamental law.”). If such is the case for a constitutionally
        infirm state court judgment, how much more so for constitutionally
        infirm state court precedent? In fact, this Court is duty-bound by the
        United States Constitution to inquire whether we ought to afford
        a case full faith and credit. See Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
        857 F.3d 1169, 1288 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., dissent-
        ing). If this Court ought not to give credit, and it does, then this
        Court violates the Constitution in the ways discussed in part III, su-
        pra.
               The remainder of part V looks to each state and the case or
        cases where the Majority finds either a state law presumption of
        reliance (for Bucket Three) or an elimination of a reliance
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                     37

        requirement (for Bucket One). Then, for each state court case, I
        provide an explanation why either (1) the proposition the Majority
        cites the case for is dicta due to the case being so different from the
        Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action we have here, or (2) the
        state court case was constitutionally deficient and should therefore
        not be followed, or (3) both.
                                              A.
               We begin with New York. The Majority correctly identifies
        a claim under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a) as having three ele-
        ments: “(1) the defendant’s challenged acts or practices must have
        been directed at consumers, (2) the acts or practices must have
        been misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff must have
        sustained an injury as a result.” Maj. Op. at 17–18 (quoting Cohen
        v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2007)). The
        Majority also correctly notes that private actions under § 349—at
        least as interpreted by the Second Circuit 32—do not require proof
        of actual reliance. Id. at 18 (quoting Pelman ex rel. Pelman v. McDon-
        ald’s Corp., 396 F.3d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Stutman v. Chem.
        Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 611 (N.Y. 2000))).
               Does Stutman control here? In short, no. In Stutman,
               [The] plaintiffs allege[d] that defendant violated sec-
               tion 349 by promising . . . that there would be no

        32We, of course, need not follow a sister circuit’s interpretation of state law
        even if said state is encompassed by that sister circuit. The only potentially
        binding precedent for this Court (other than our own and that of the United
        States Supreme Court) are decisions rendered by the state’s own courts.
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        38          TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

                “prepayment charge,” but then assessing a $275 “at-
                torney’s fee” when plaintiffs sought to refinance their
                loan. Plaintiffs contend that the $275 fee was a “pre-
                payment charge” in disguise and that the note was de-
                ceptive for not revealing that fee.
        Stutman, 731 N.E.2d at 612. The New York Court of Appeals rec-
        ognized that while a § 349(a) cause of action has no reliance ele-
        ment, it does have a causation element. See id. (“The plaintiff, how-
        ever, must show that the defendant’s material deceptive act caused
        the injury.” (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation
        omitted)). 33
               The New York court stated that the Stutmans and their as-
        sociated class members “allege[d] that defendant’s material decep-
        tion caused them to suffer a $275 loss” by “alleg[ing] that because
        of defendant’s deceptive act, they were forced to pay a $275 fee that
        they had been led to believe was not required.” Id. at 612–13 (em-
        phasis added). According to the New York court, they did not also
        need to “additionally allege that they would not otherwise have
        entered into the transaction.” Id. at 613. For the Stutmans’ claim,
        causation and reliance could be separated. In a Misrepresentative
        Advertising Class Action, however, causation inherently requires

        33 The Stutman court also stated, “Reliance and causation are twin concepts,
        but they are not identical. In the context of fraud, they are often intertwined.”
        Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 612 (N.Y. 2000). Even the Stutman
        court implicitly recognized, therefore, that when the § 349(a) claim sounds in
        fraud, like in a Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action, the causation re-
        quirement becomes intertwined with a showing of reliance.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part               39

        reliance. See supra part II. Stutman’s general statements about reli-
        ance cannot bind this Court now.
                Further, the entire reliance discussion in Stutman is dicta. As
        soon as the New York court declared that the plaintiffs adequately
        alleged causation, it held, “Nevertheless, we uphold the Appellate
        Division’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim, for a different reason: plain-
        tiffs have failed to show that defendant committed a deceptive act.”
        Stutman, 731 N.E.2d at 613. The Majority’s look to New York state
        court precedent does not change the analysis in parts I–III, supra.
        Individual issues will predominate for the New York claim class be-
        cause each plaintiff will need to individually establish reliance.
                                           B.
                Let us move on to Missouri. The MMPA requires a plaintiff
        to prove that he has “(1) purchased merchandise (which includes
        services) from defendants; (2) for personal, family or household
        purposes; and (3) suffered an ascertainable loss of money or prop-
        erty; (4) as a result of an act declared unlawful under the [MMPA].”
        Murphy v. Stonewall Kitchen, LLC, 503 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Mo. Ct. App.
        2016) (citing Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, 220 S.W.3d 758,
        773 (Mo. 2007)). Just as with the New York statute, “there is no
        denying that causation is a necessary element of an MMPA claim.”
        Owen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 533 F.3d 913, 922 (8th Cir. 2008).
               Murphy likely could not guide this Court even without any
        concern over not following constitutionally deficient state court
        cases. In Murphy, the intermediate appellate court in Missouri re-
        versed the trial court’s dismissal of Murphy’s MMPA claim that
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        40         TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        asserted the defendant misrepresented that “its cupcake mix was
        ‘all natural’ when it contained the ingredient of sodium acid pyro-
        phosphate (SAPP), a chemical that acts as a leavening agent and is
        found in commercial baking powders.” Murphy, 503 S.W.3d at 310.
        In its reasoning, the Murphy court declaims a reliance requirement
        and uses an objective test. 34 Id. at 311–12. But the court made such
        declarations not in discussing causation or reliance, but rather in
        discussing the primary question on appeal: whether the defendant
        actually violated the MMPA. Id. at 312 (“[M]ore discovery is re-
        quired regarding whether SAPP is an artificial or natural ingredient,
        whether SAPP is ordinarily expected to be included in such a cup-
        cake mix, whether an ordinary consumer would be misled by the
        term ‘all natural,’ and whether labeling the mix as ‘all natural’ was
        deceptive.” (emphasis added)).
               In actually addressing the “ascertainable loss” prong, the
        Murphy court briefly remarked that Murphy adequately pled an as-
        certainable loss under the “benefit-of-the-bargain rule.” Id. at 313.
        In so doing, however, the Murphy court explicitly recognized that
        the “plaintiff’s loss should be a result of the defendant’s unlawful
        practice.” Id. (emphasis added). In a Misrepresentative Advertising
        Class Action, such causation requires reliance. See supra part II. I
        also note that, though Murphy filed the complaint as a putative

        34The Murphy court specifically states, a “consumer’s reliance on an unlawful
        practice is not required under the MMPA.” Murphy v. Stonewall Kitchen, LLC,
        503 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
        USA, 220 S.W.3d 758, 774 (Mo. 2007)).
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                     41

        class action, the opinion suggests that no court had yet analyzed
        whether a putative class could be certified and therefore no court
        had yet wrestled with the predominance questions we wrestle with
        here. Therefore, Murphy seems to be inapposite, especially in its
        adoption of a reliance-less causation standard and objective test for
        causation. Insofar as Murphy is on point, however, we need not
        give it weight as the court would have overstepped constitutionally
        by not requiring a showing of reliance (and thus causation) in a
        misrepresentation case.
                Further, I do not think the benefit-of-the-bargain rule can ap-
        ply to a case like that which the instant plaintiffs allege against Ford.
        The Majority notes that “state courts in Missouri have held that the
        injury- and causation-related elements of an MMPA claim can be
        established class-wide under what those courts call a ‘benefit-of-
        the-bargain rule.’” Maj. Op. at 20 (citing Plubell v. Merck & Co., 289
        S.W.3d 707, 714–15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)). 35 While that may work
        for some types of MMPA claims, in my view the “benefit-of-the-

        35 The benefit-of-the-bargain theory mirrors one of two options for damages
        in a fraud action: contract recission or the difference between the value bar-
        gained for and the value received. Even if a fraud cause of action could go
        forward as a class action, the contract recission option would be unmanagea-
        ble because it would require all the unnamed plaintiffs to return their cars at
        the end of successful litigation. The benefit-of-the-bargain option is more
        manageable, but only if the raw value received (value of car minus price paid)
        was uniform among the class. Further, a benefit-of-the-bargain theory, when
        properly applied, can perhaps solve the damages predominance problem, but
        I am not convinced that it solves the causation predominance problem where,
        as here, the causal mechanism is reliance.
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        42          TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        bargain” theory does not work when it comes to products like cars
        and houses. Unlike most other products, the final price of a car or
        home results from negotiations between a buyer and a seller. The
        price is not taken as a given like with most products one picks up
        at the local big box store. For plaintiffs to show they did not receive
        the benefit of their bargain, they would need to show what they
        specifically bargained for with the seller, here, the Ford dealership.
        This would cause the same predominance problems as an individ-
        ual reliance requirement. And if we were to allow a presumption
        that the plaintiff did not receive the benefit of their bargain without
        giving Ford a chance to respond or rebut, we would violate Ford’s
        due process rights. 36 Therefore, Missouri case law, as cited by the
        Majority, does not change the analysis in parts I–III, supra. Individ-
        ual issues will predominate for the Missouri claim class because
        each plaintiff will need to individually establish reliance.
                                               C.
               Now, we move to Washington. Even the Majority recog-
        nizes that such a Washington statutory claim explicitly requires “a

        36 It is a closer call whether a benefit-of-the-bargain theory or price-inflation
        theory could solve the predominance conundrum if all Ford Shelby GT350
        Mustangs sell in Missouri for $50,000, but track-ready Shelbys go for $55,000.
        In that scenario, the inflated price is clearly $5,000—an extra premium every
        purchaser pays. But cars are different. Some pay sticker price. Some pay less.
        There is no indication that every purchaser paid the same amount of price
        premium here, however. Therefore, causation, injury, and damages, are all
        still individualized inquiries, complicated by individual negotiations, represen-
        tations, and reliance.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part               43

        causal link between the act and the injury.” Peoples v. United Servs.
        Auto. Ass’n, 452 P.3d 1218, 1221 (Wash. 2019); Maj. Op. at 18. The
        Washington Supreme Court adopted a proximate cause standard
        that requires a plaintiff to “establish that, but for the defendant’s
        unfair or deceptive practice, the plaintiff would not have suffered
        an injury.” Schnall v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 129, 137
        (Wash. 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Indoor Billboard/Wash.,
        Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d 10, 22 (Wash. 2007)).
        This sounds like the Washington high court recognizes that in a
        Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action, reliance would be re-
        quired to prove causation.
                The Majority relies on Thornell v. Seattle Serv. Bureau, Inc. for
        the proposition that reliance is not necessarily required to make out
        a cause of action under Washington’s consumer protection statute.
        363 P.3d 587 (Wash. 2015). This case involved answering two cer-
        tified questions from the United States District Court for the West-
        ern District of Washington. First, the Washington court said the
        Washington consumer protection act “allows a cause of action for
        a plaintiff residing outside Washington to sue a Washington corpo-
        rate defendant for allegedly deceptive acts.” Id. at 589. Any discus-
        sion of this point cannot have any bearing on the instant analysis
        except via dicta. Second, the Washington court said, “the [con-
        sumer protection statute] supports a cause of action for an out-of-
        state plaintiff to sue an out-of-state defendant for the allegedly
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        44          TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        deceptive acts of its in-state agent.” Id. Again, any discussion on
        this holding relevant to our discussion would have to be in dicta. 37
               Because the Washington consumer protection claim re-
        quires a showing of causation and causation means reliance in a
        Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action, see supra part II, the
        Washington class claim fails the predominance requirement.
        Washington case law, as cited by the Majority, does not change the
        analysis in parts I–III, supra. Individual issues will predominate for

        37 In dicta, the Thornell court cites to Indoor Billboard for the proposition that
        reliance is not required to make out a claim under the Washington consumer
        protection statute. In that case, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant “engaged
        in an unfair or deceptive act or practice by assessing its Washington local ex-
        change customers a surcharge known as a presubscribed interexchange carrier
        charge.” Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 170 P.3d
        10, 12 (Wash. 2007). The Washington court adopted a proximate cause stand-
        ard. Id. at 22. In so doing, the court “reject[ed] [the plaintiff’s] argument that
        causation may be established merely by a showing that money was lost.” Id.
        at 21. Further, the court—though having before it a class action—did not ad-
        dress how such a proximate cause standard fit in with the predominance re-
        quirement. The court also did not necessarily indicate whether the plaintiffs
        satisfied the proximate cause test, it just reversed summary judgment because
        proximate cause is for the finder of fact to decide. Id. at 22.
                Finally, even though the Washington court characterized the Indoor
        Billboard claim as an affirmative misrepresentation claim, it is not analogous
        to the instant facts. The extra charge alleged to violate the statute in Indoor
        Billboard is more akin to a fraud on the market cause of action, whereas the
        instant plaintiffs’ claims against Ford are akin to traditional fraud. Either way,
        to the extent Indoor Billboard is analogous to the instant facts, we need not give
        weight to constitutionally deficient state court precedent.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part             45

        the Washington claim class because each plaintiff will need to indi-
        vidually establish reliance.
                                          D.
                The California statutory claim’s deficiency cannot be cured
        by additional factual findings on remand. The Majority points to a
        possible court-created presumption of reliance where “the defend-
        ant so pervasively disseminated material misrepresentations that
        all plaintiffs must have been exposed to them.” Walker v. Life Ins.
        Co. of the Sw., 953 F.3d 624, 631 (9th Cir. 2020); Maj. Op. at 24. But
        the instant case, at bottom, involves the plaintiffs asserting that
        Ford falsely or misleadingly advertised the Shelby GT350. Such a
        claim is encapsulated by the “untrue or misleading advertising”
        prong of the UCL. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. This sounds in
        fraud. As the Majority acknowledges, fraud requires reliance. Maj.
        Op. at 20–23. In creating “‘a conclusive presumption’ of reliance in
        UCL cases,” Walker, 953 F.3d at 630 (citation omitted), as applied
        to a claim sounding in fraud, the court effectively eliminates the
        causation element in the statute, see supra parts II, IV, causing the
        four constitutional problems discussed in part III, supra.
                The supposed conclusive presumption of reliance derives
        from a case in which the Supreme Court of California constitution-
        ally overstepped. In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20 (Cal. 2009). In
        that iteration of the wide-ranging tobacco class action litigation, the
        California high court held (1) “that standing requirements [under
        the UCL] are applicable only to the class representatives” and (2)
        “a class representative proceeding on a claim of misrepresentation
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        46        TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        as the basis of his or her UCL action must demonstrate actual reli-
        ance on the allegedly deceptive or misleading statements, in ac-
        cordance with well-settled principles regarding the element of reli-
        ance in ordinary fraud actions.” Id. at 25–26. The California court,
        quoting its previous cases, concluded, “[T]o state a claim under ei-
        ther the UCL or the false advertising law, based on false advertising
        or promotional practices, it is necessary only to show that mem-
        bers of the public are likely to be deceived.” Id. at 29 (alteration in
        original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This
        probabilistic objective test would be troubling by itself, but the
        court goes on, again quoting itself, “A UCL action is equitable in
        nature; damages cannot be recovered. . . . We have stated under
        the UCL, [p]revailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive
        relief and restitution.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quota-
        tion marks and citation omitted). The California court seems to
        miss the difference between forward-looking injunctive relief and
        backward-looking damages, and creates Due Process, Standing,
        and Free Speech Problems for future California class litigants.
                 The court continues by differentiating a fraudulent business
        practice UCL claim from common law fraud. “None of these ele-
        ments[, including reliance,] are required to state a claim for injunc-
        tive relief under the UCL.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation
        marks and citation omitted). Despite recognizing that an objective
        test springs from relief under the UCL being injunctive, the Tobacco
        II court appears to adopt the objective test for damages actions as
        well, at least as far as unnamed plaintiffs go:
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                      47

               Similarly, the language of section 17203 with respect
               to those entitled to restitution—“to restore to any
               person in interest any money or property, real or per-
               sonal, which may have been acquired ” . . . by means of
               the unfair practice—is patently less stringent than the
               standing requirement for the class representative—
               “any person who has suffered injury in fact and has
               lost money or property as a result of the unfair compe-
               tition.” . . . This language, construed in light of the
               “concern that wrongdoers not retain the benefits of
               their misconduct” . . . has led courts repeatedly and
               consistently to hold that relief under the UCL is avail-
               able without individualized proof of deception, reli-
               ance and injury.
        Id. at 35 (emphases in original) (citations omitted). Even if the Cal-
        ifornia court correctly interpreted the statute as a linguistic mat-
        ter, 38 excusing such proof of reliance runs afoul of the four consti-
        tutional problems discussed in part III, supra.
               Named class members must still prove actual reliance. To-
        bacco II, 207 P.3d at 39. Excusing the unnamed class members from
        this burden causes a practical problem in addition to the constitu-
        tional problems. How is an unnamed class member to obtain

        38 I note that the cases the Supreme Court of California cites for this proposi-
        tion were all decided before the California citizens revised the UCL in 2004 to
        “eliminate frivolous unfair competition lawsuits” and “prevent uninjured pri-
        vate persons from suing for restitution on behalf of others” by adding the
        standing requirement. In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 31, 33 (Cal. 2009)
        (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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        48        TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        restitution without an individual inquiry into injury and damages?
        For this reason, California’s interpretation of the UCL is erroneous,
        at least as applied to a misrepresentation case like we have here.
        For all the reasons just discussed, we should not follow the Califor-
        nia court’s lead in not requiring an individual showing of reliance
        because such a holding would violate the United States Constitu-
        tion. Because California case law, as cited by the Majority, does
        not change the analysis in parts I–III, supra, individual issues will
        predominate for the California statutory claim class because each
        plaintiff will need to individually establish reliance.
               I briefly note that, even without the Separation of Powers
        Problem, the same reasoning above applies to the California com-
        mon law fraud claim. Even California courts recognize that “there
        is no doubt that reliance is the causal mechanism of fraud.” Tobacco
        II, 207 P.3d at 39. For the reasons discussed above, California
        courts cannot constitutionally skirt this required element of fraud
        by deploying a conclusive presumption. See Mirkin v. Wasserman,
        858 P.2d 568, 572 (Cal. 1993) (requiring actual reliance for a com-
        mon law deceit cause of action). Therefore, this claim should also
        be reversed.
                                         E.
                                          1.
               Finally, we come to the FDUTPA claim. This claim suffers
        from the same deficiencies as many of the other claims we have
        discussed. A FDUTPA claim requires a plaintiff to show (1) a de-
        ceptive act or unfair practice, (2) actual damages, and (3) causation.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part               49

        Carriuolo v. Gen. Motors Co., 823 F.3d 977, 983 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing
        City First Mortg. Corp. v. Barton, 988 So. 2d 82, 86 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
        App. 2008)). In a Misrepresentative Advertising Class Action, cau-
        sation inherently requires a showing of reliance. See supra part II.
        Because Florida is geographically within this Circuit and we often
        have cause to interpret Florida law, the FDUTPA claim merits ad-
        ditional attention. The Majority finds it dispositive that we said in
        Carriuolo that “a plaintiff asserting a FDUTPA claim need not show
        actual reliance on the representation or omission at issue.” Carri-
        uolo, 823 F.3d at 985 (internal quotations and citation omitted). We
        have followed Florida case law in adopting this objective test for
        FDUTPA claims in a few other cases as well. But all the Eleventh
        Circuit cases excusing a reliance requirement for a FDUTPA claim
        rely on the same erroneous interpretation of federal law, and this
        Court sitting en banc ought to reconsider our precedent.
                To begin, almost all roads lead back to Davis v. Powertel, Inc.,
        a case out of the Florida First District Court of Appeal. 776 So. 2d
        971 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000). In Davis, the plaintiffs alleged that
        Powertel sold cell phones without informing purchasers that the
        phones “had been programmed to work only with Powertel’s wire-
        less communication service,” despite looking identical to cell-
        phones from the same brands one could buy at other retail outlets.
        Id. at 972. The plaintiffs sought damages because they argued the
        nondisclosure of this modification “reduced the value of the phone
        in each case,” even for those who actually desired Powertel’s wire-
        less service. Id. at 973. The court held that a class action for dam-
        ages under the FDUTPA does not require “an allegation that
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        50        TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        individual members of the class relied on the act or omission that
        is alleged to be unlawful.” Id. at 972. In reaching this conclusion,
        though, the Davis court incorrectly interpreted federal law. There-
        fore, despite Davis being a Florida court’s interpretation of Florida
        law—and in addition to the reasons discussed in part IV, supra, for
        not crediting state courts’ unconstitutional statutory interpreta-
        tions—the Davis court incorrectly interpreted federal law to inter-
        pret the FDUTPA and this federal Court need not have accepted
        the Florida court’s incorrect interpretation of federal law. I explain.
               The FDUTPA explicitly requires courts to interpret the stat-
        ute by giving “‘due consideration and great weight’ to Federal
        Trade Commission and federal court interpretations of section
        5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” Davis, 776 So. 2d at
        974 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 501.204(2)). Davis says that because the
        FTC Act allows suits without proving reliance, so should the
        FDUTPA. Id. at 974–75 (citing three FTC cases in support of adopt-
        ing an objective “likely to mislead” test). That makes no sense.
                The FTC Act only allows for forward-looking relief (ini-
        tially) pursued by an arm of the government. See supra part I.A.
        The FDUTPA, however, allows for damages through a private
        right of action. Fla. Stat. § 501.211(2). Hypothetically, if a Florida
        court interpreted the FDUTPA, through its common law powers,
        to not require a showing of reliance where doing so does not run
        afoul of the part III constitutional problems—so, not in a misrepre-
        sentation context—we might be right in crediting the Florida
        court’s interpretation in other non-misrepresentation cases. But
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part             51

        the Davis court did not use its common law powers. It explicitly
        recognized that the FDUTPA guides courts to interpret the dam-
        ages provision in light of the FTC Act and its federal interpreta-
        tions. Davis, 776 So. 2d at 974. That would have been an impossi-
        ble task. How the FTC Act treats reliance has nothing to say about
        the FDUTPA’s damages provision.
                In sum, the FTC Act does not require reliance because suits
        are brought by the government and offer only prospective relief or
        civil damages. Retrospective private damages are a completely dif-
        ferent animal. The FDUTPA does not deputize every Florida citi-
        zen to police false advertising violations. See TransUnion LLC v.
        Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2207 (2021). It only offers damages to
        remedy an injury. Without causation (which requires reliance in a
        misrepresentation claim), there are no damages. Therefore, the
        FTC Act is inapposite for interpreting the FDUTPA’s damages pro-
        vision, and the Davis court incorrectly interpreted federal law in
        interpreting the FDUTPA. While we are bound by Florida courts’
        interpretations of Florida law, we are not bound to follow Florida
        courts’ (incorrect) interpretations of federal law. I therefore call on
        this Court sitting en banc to overturn those cases from our Circuit
        that relied on this erroneous interpretation to reach their conclu-
        sions.
                                          2.
                 Unfortunately, our survey of the shaky ground on which Da-
        vis sits continues. The Davis court cited a case from another Florida
        District Court and further confuses the difference between
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        52        TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        damages and injunctive relief. Davis, 776 So. 2d at 974 (citing Mil-
        lennium Commc’ns & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Off. of the Att’y Gen., 761 So.
        2d 1256 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). One can tell merely from the
        title of the case that Millennium was not a damages action by a pri-
        vate plaintiff, but rather an enforcement action by the Florida at-
        torney general under the FDUTPA; a situation actually analogous
        to the actions under section five of the FTC Act. But let us not
        judge a book by its cover or a case by its title. In fact, Millennium
        was an appeal of a temporary injunction (equitable relief) in a case
        brought by the Attorney General’s Department of Legal Affairs,
        not a private party. Millennium, 761 So. 2d at 1257. The Depart-
        ment ultimately sought only “an injunction, civil penalties and
        other statutory relief,” not damages. Id. at 1258.
                Next, the Davis court enlisted the help of another case from
        Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal for the objective test; this
        one seemingly more relevant. Davis, 776 So. 2d at 974 (citing Lat-
        man v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., 758 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
        2000)). In Latman, the District Court of Appeal reversed denials of
        class certification. Latman, 758 So. 2d at 700–01. Plaintiffs, cruise
        ship passengers, alleged claims under the FDUTPA against defend-
        ant cruise lines related to “port charges” that cruise lines included
        in the ticket price and allegedly kept for themselves. Id. at 701. The
        Latman court analogized the cruise lines’ alleged behavior to a hy-
        pothetical company before adopting an objective, reliance-free test
        under the FDUTPA. Id. at 703.
               Suppose that a company systematically overcharges
               its customers on sales tax. The hypothetical company
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part               53

               pays the state the sales tax that it owes, and then keeps
               the overcharge for itself.
               We would not hesitate to say that an intentional over-
               charge of sales tax, which is kept by the company it-
               self, is an unfair and deceptive trade practice and that
               the consumer must be repaid. That is so even though
               the consumers clearly were willing to pay the price
               charged—in the hypothetical example, they actually
               paid the sales tax overcharges—nor would it make a
               difference that the consumers paid no attention to the
               sales tax amount.
        Id. This hypothetical differs vastly from a situation like the instant
        case where the alleged misrepresentation derived from multiple
        sources and a plaintiff class member may not have actually suffered
        damages depending on his or her intended use of the vehicle or
        negotiations prior to purchasing the vehicle. In fact, the analogous
        circumstance in the instant case would be if Ford charged 1% addi-
        tional sales tax and pocketed that money. That deception would
        be uniform, and damages would be, if not uniform, easily ascer-
        tainable by a formula. The Latman court’s broad adoption of an
        objective test under FDUTPA goes beyond its holding. Id. In fact,
        as the same district court of appeal has said in distinguishing Lat-
        man, the “FDUTPA requires proof of each individual plaintiff’s ac-
        tual (not consequential) damage and defendant’s causation of dam-
        age, requiring evidence regarding how specific misrepresentations
        to individual [plaintiffs] decreased the value of their deal for a car.”
        Mia. Auto. Retail, Inc. v. Baldwin, 97 So. 3d 846, 857 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
        App. 2012). Therefore, insofar as Davis relies on Latman for
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        54         TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        adopting the objective test to obtain FDUTPA damages, it extends
        the holding beyond what it can bare. 39
               The Davis court tries to strengthen its citation to Latman by
        pointing to one other jurisdiction where a court favorably cited the
        case and three other jurisdictions that also adopted an objective test
        under their respective consumer protection statutes. History has
        not been kind to these citations.
                First, Davis says Washington adopted Latman’s objective
        test. Davis, 776 So. 2d at 974 (citing Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Wes-
        tours, Inc., 6 P.3d 63 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)). However, after Davis,
        the Supreme Court of Washington reversed the Pickett court’s “de-
        ciding the merits of the trial court’s denial of class certification,”
        which included that court’s approval of Latman. Pickett v. Holland
        Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 35 P.3d 351, 360, 362 (Wash. 2001).
               Second, Davis looks to an Illinois court’s rejection of a reli-
        ance element in that state’s consumer protection statute. Davis,
        776 So. 2d at 974 (citing Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 726 N.E.2d 51 (Ill.
        App. Ct. 2000)). Again, after Davis, the Supreme Court of Illinois
        reversed the Oliveira court’s decision, explicitly stating that the Illi-
        nois consumer protection statute requires something akin to reli-
        ance. Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 776 N.E.2d 151, 161 (Ill. 2002). The
        plaintiff in that case did not successfully allege the statute’s

        39Further, this Court has never cited directly to Latman for its objective
        FDUTPA test holding.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                55

        proximate cause element because he did not allege he was deceived
        by the advertisements in that case. Id. at 164.
               Third, Davis tries Pennsylvania. Davis, 776 So. 2d at 974 (cit-
        ing Weinberg v. Sun Co., 740 A.2d 1152 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)). But
        again, after Davis, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the
        Weinberg court in part, holding that the state consumer protection
        statute “clearly requires, in a private action, that a plaintiff suffer an
        ascertainable loss as a result of the defendant’s prohibited action.
        That means . . . a plaintiff must allege reliance.” Weinberg v. Sun
        Co., 777 A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis in original).
                 Fourth and finally, Davis points to Michigan’s objective test.
        Davis, 776 So. 2d at 974 (citing Dix v. Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co.
        of Fla., 415 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 1987)). Admittedly, Dix has not been
        overturned and directly states, “We hold that members of a class
        proceeding under the [Michigan] Consumer Protection Act need
        not individually prove reliance on the alleged misrepresentations.
        It is sufficient if the class can establish that a reasonable person
        would have relied on the representations.” Dix, 415 N.W.2d at 209
        (footnote omitted). Not only is Dix in no way binding on either
        this Circuit or the Florida courts, but its reasoning implicates all the
        constitutional concerns discussed in part III, supra. Further, the Dix
        holding resides in a discussion of the “convenient administration of
        justice” prong of a Michigan class action, after incredibly brief men-
        tions of common questions of law and fact and common relief, as
        well as no discussion of due process concerns for the defendant.
        Dix, 415 N.W.2d at 209. Therefore, the Michigan high court’s
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        56         TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        reasoning ought to have no influence on our discussion here. As
        the United States Supreme Court has often stated, “the fact that a
        given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facili-
        tating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it
        is contrary to the Constitution.” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2207
        (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781
        (1983)).
                                           3.
                While Davis recognizes that “the ‘likely to mislead’ standard
        was developed for use with the Federal Trade Commission Act,
        which has no provision for a suit by a private citizen,” it still adopts
        the test, absent more specific guidance about the interpretative
        clause of the FDUTPA. Davis, 776 So. 2d at 974. This was errone-
        ous. And because the Davis court explicitly looked to federal law
        to interpret Florida law, this issue falls within our bailiwick and we
        need not blindly follow this Florida court’s holding. Hopefully, the
        preceding analysis shows that Davis is a thin reed to lean on, the
        Davis court misinterpreted the FTC Act, and we should not have
        relied on that case to interpret the FDUTPA in this Court. Again,
        I call on the court en banc to address our erroneous cases that adopt
        Florida’s supposed objective test and correct the case law in this
        Circuit. Let us now examine the Eleventh Circuit cases that seem
        to adopt the objective test and determine whether or not they can
        stand.
              In Zlotnick v. Premier Sales Group, Inc., a plaintiff appealed the
        dismissal for failure to state a claim of his class action complaint
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part             57

        alleging FDUTPA violations against real estate companies for
        “market[ing a] condominium complex, solicit[ing] deceptive reser-
        vation agreements to secure financing and then terminat[ing] the
        reservation agreements with the sole purpose of reaping the bene-
        fits of a rising real estate market.” 480 F.3d 1281, 1283–84 (11th Cir.
        2007). The Zlotnick court adopted the objective test from Millen-
        nium Commc’ns—which we have already seen is inapposite to a
        damages claim—rather than from Davis. Id. at 1284 (citing 761 So.
        2d at 1263). The erroneous reading of Florida law did not nega-
        tively impact the outcome, however, because the Court found
        Zlotnick failed to state a claim even under the objective test. Id. at
        1287.
               In Fitzpatrick v. General Mills, Inc., this Court considered an
        interlocutory appeal of class certification. 635 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th
        Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs in that case claimed to have been duped
        by General Mills’s advertisements touting the digestive health ben-
        efits of YoPlus yogurt and filed a FDUTPA claim. Id. at 1281.
        While remanding for a new definition of the class, this Court
        agreed with the District Court and praised its analysis that con-
        cluded the class members did not need to individually prove reli-
        ance, specifically that they purchased YoPlus “to obtain its claimed
        digestive health benefits.” Id. at 1282–83. In reaching this conclu-
        sion, the Court cited the objective test prescribed by Davis as well
        as in another Florida state court case. Id. (citing Davis, 776 So. 2d
        at 973 and State, Off. of Att’y Gen. v. Com. Com. Leasing, 946 So. 2d
        1253, 1258 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). We have already dis-
        cussed Davis at length. But Com. Com. Leasing serves as a bad guide
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        58        TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        as well. That case involved the Florida Attorney General suing to
        enforce the FDUTPA, not a class action under the FDUTPA. Com.
        Com. Leasing, 946 So. 2d at 1255. Therefore, the en banc Court
        should overturn Fitzpatrick as erroneously adopting the objective
        test for the FDUTPA.
               In Carriuolo v. General Motors Co., this Court considered an
        interlocutory appeal of class certification. 823 F.3d 977, 980–81
        (11th Cir. 2016). The nub of the claim in that case was that the
        National Highway Traffic Safety Administration had not yet as-
        signed safety ratings to the 2014 Cadillac CTS sedan, despite the
        cars being sold with a sticker touting its five-star rating on certain
        features. Id. at 981–82. General Motors argued that common is-
        sues did not predominate because “some class members may have
        known that the safety ratings were inaccurate; some may not have
        been aware of the Monroney sticker; and each member negotiated
        the purchase or lease price individually with the dealer from whom
        the member purchased or leased the vehicle.” Id. at 985. But this
        Court relevantly held that the District Court did not abuse its dis-
        cretion in certifying the plaintiff class for the FDUTPA claim be-
        cause Davis instructs that plaintiffs do not need to show actual reli-
        ance. Id. at 985, 990 (citing Davis, 776 So. 2d at 973). Carriuolo also
        looks to Com. Com. Leasing, and Fitzpatrick. As already discussed,
        all three of these cases led the Carriuolo court astray, and the en
        banc Court ought to overturn Carriuolo as well.
              In Debernardis v. IQ Formulations, LLC, plaintiffs appealed the
        dismissal of their complaint on grounds that they lacked standing.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part                59

        942 F.3d 1076, 1080 (11th Cir. 2019). The complaint sought class
        action certification and alleged that the defendants sold dietary sup-
        plements that were “adulterated” as defined by the Federal Food,
        Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id. at 1081–82. We remanded that case,
        id. at 1089, finding standing because the plaintiffs alleged that they
        “would not have purchased” the supplements “had they known
        that sale of the supplements was banned,” thus eliminating “the
        entire benefit of their bargain,” and establishing economic loss
        standing. Id. at 1088. The Debernardis opinion cites Carriuolo for
        the benefit-of-the-bargain theory under the FDUTPA. Id. at 1084
        (citing 823 F.3d at 986–87). While Carriuolo did not in itself taint
        Debernardis, and thus, the case likely need not be addressed en banc,
        I again warn against utilizing the benefit-of-the-bargain theory in
        misrepresentation cases involving negotiated products. See supra
        part V.B.
                The plaintiff in Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc. filed a putative
        class action against Bacardi and Winn-Dixie asserting, relevantly, a
        FDUTPA claim that defendants “adulterat[ed] Bombay [Sapphire
        Gin] with grains of paradise.” 17 F.4th 1084, 1089–90 (11th Cir.
        2021). The District Court dismissed the amended complaint, and
        we affirmed. Id. This Court affirmed the dismissal “because Mar-
        rache’s FDUTPA claims fall under FDUTPA’s safe harbor provi-
        sion,” and in the alternative “because Marrache failed to state a
        plausible claim for actual damages under FDUTPA.” Id. at 1101.
        Though Marrache takes the objective test from Carriuolo and Zlot-
        nick, id. at 1097–98, the erroneous reading of the FDUTPA did not
        negatively impact this decision, as the Court ultimately concluded
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        60        TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        none of the class members alleged actual damages. Id. at 1101.
        Therefore, Marrache also likely need not be addressed en banc.
                                          4.
                I take a moment now to discuss another Florida District
        Court of Appeal case cited in Carriuolo, Debernardis, and Marrache
        for the benefit-of-the-bargain theory under FDUTPA: Rollins, Inc.
        v. Heller, 454 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Heller was an
        appeal of a final judgment awarding the plaintiffs damages on their
        claims for gross negligence and deceptive and unfair trade prac-
        tices. Id. at 582. The claims arose out of the installation of an alarm
        system by defendant and the subsequent burglary of the plaintiffs’
        home. Id. This case was not a class action. While that distinction
        itself makes the case less relevant in the class action context, there
        are two other reasons our Court’s use of Heller in Carriulo, Mar-
        rache, and Debernardis perhaps merited more reasoning before ap-
        plication.
               First, the benefit-of-the-bargain damages measurement Hel-
        ler adopted from Texas (and for which our Court cites Heller), was
        used to limit, the plaintiff’s damages in Heller itself. Id. at 585–86.
        The Hellers originally won damages for the property stolen during
        the burglary, but the District Court of Appeal limited the FDUTPA
        damages to “the difference in the market value of the [alarm sys-
        tem] in the condition in which it was delivered and its market value
        in the condition in which it should have been delivered according
        to the contract of the parties.” Id. at 585 (citation omitted). Absent
        other Florida courts independently adopting the test, we should
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part              61

        hesitate before leaning too heavily on this case to expand liability
        and damages in the class action context. Second, before adopting
        the Texas test for damages, the Heller court recognized erroneously
        that the Florida “legislature specifically provided that great weight
        was to be given to the federal courts’ interpretations of the Federal
        Trade Commission Act.” Id. at 584. Of course, this is only errone-
        ous because Heller involved a FDUTPA damages claim, see supra
        V.D.1, not an injunctive FDUTPA claim.
                                           5.
               Before signing off, I also would like to point out that a Flor-
        ida state court has recognized the dangers of rolling over due pro-
        cess rights in the interest of class action efficiency.
                In Rollins Inc. v. Butland, plaintiffs filed a class action com-
        plaint in part under the FDUTPA, alleging violations “arising from
        Orkin’s contractual undertakings related to the control of subterra-
        nean termites.” 951 So. 2d 860, 865 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
        Plaintiffs sought actual damages for payments made to Orkin as
        well as property damage caused by subterranean termites. Id. at
        866. “[M]embership in the proposed class was not limited to cus-
        tomers who sustained damage to their residences as a result of an
        infestation of subterranean termites,” but members who did not
        suffer damages were limited to the actual damages from payments
        to Orkin. Id. The District Court of Appeal reversed class certifica-
        tion, id. at 882, specifically finding that individual questions pre-
        dominated both to prove the deceptive acts and unfair practices
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        62        TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part 22-10575

        themselves (prong one of the FDUTPA), id. at 871, and to prove
        causation and damages. Id. at 873.
               The court lucidly stated the following regarding the trial
        court’s attempt to utilize the class-wide proof for this complex con-
        tract case alleging fourteen separate deceptive acts, id. at 870:
               In a case such as this, authorizing class-wide proof to
               be made based on alleged company-wide pervasive
               schemes and business practices is not only incon-
               sistent with established Florida precedent, but it also
               has the potential to deny the Appellants substantive
               due process of law. Under the substantive law appli-
               cable to the FDUTPA damages claim, each member
               of the putative class must establish that the Appellants
               committed a deceptive act or unfair practice that
               caused their actual loss. Under the circumstances pre-
               sent here, collective proof cannot satisfy the class
               members’ burden. However, if the Appellees are per-
               mitted to establish the putative class members’ claims
               by proof of common schemes or patterns of behavior,
               the Appellants will be unable to defend against indi-
               vidual claims where there may be no liability. By any
               standard, this would amount to a violation of substan-
               tive due process of law.
        Id. at 873–74.
                                         VI.
               In sum, I concur in the Majority’s handling of the Texas stat-
        utory class, the Washington, New York, and Tennessee common
        law classes, and the California and Texas implied warranty classes.
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        22-10575 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring and Dissenting in Part            63

        I dissent with respect to the Majority’s position on the Florida, Cal-
        ifornia, Missouri, New York, and Washington statutory classes and
        the California common law class. Rather than affirming them, I
        would have held the District Court abused its discretion when it
        certified those classes.