Court Opinion

ID: 9885481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:03:52.884887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:54.198789
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. The majority, in my view, has abandoned its appellate rule on reversing this matter. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, as is our duty, I believe substantial evidence exists to support the appellant’s conviction. The appellant, Tracy Kastl, a seventeen-year-old girl, was convicted of being a minor in possession of alcohol. Her driver’s license was suspended for one year. It is well established the state need not prove the appellant, as the accused, had actual possession of the contraband; constructive possession is sufficient. See Plotts v. State, 297 Ark. 66, 759 S.W.2d 793 (1988). In Osborne v. State, 278 Ark. 45, 643 S.W.2d 251 (1982), we said that constructive possession can be implied when the contraband is found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the defendant and subject to his control, or to the joint control of the accused and another. We recently said that the state can sufficiently link an accused to contraband found in an automobile jointly occupied by more than one person by showing additional facts and circumstances, indicating the accused’s knowledge and control. One such circumstance is when the contraband is found on the same side of the car as the accused was sitting or in his or her immediate proximity. See Plotts, 297 Ark. at 70, 759 S.W.2d at 795. Here, it is undisputed that Tracy was seated in the immediate proximity of a six pack of beer. However, there are even more facts to show Tracy’s knowledge and control of the beer or contraband seized in this case. In considering only that testimony in support of the trial court’s verdict, David v. State, 286 Ark. 205, 691 S.W.2d 133 (1985), the evidence shows as follows: * Officers Smith and Eisenhower drove on to the lot where the car, in which Tracy was a passenger, was parked. There was a beer can by the car and one on the lot. The officers had been on the lot earlier and no beer cans were on it. * Five people were in the car, two young men in the front and Tracy and two young men in the rear seat. A six pack of beer was seen immediately behind the rear seat and the beer was within arm’s reach of Tracy. * Several of the subjects were seen with open beer cans between their legs, although Tracy was not one of them. * Both officers smelled the odor of intoxicating beverage about Tracy’s person. The foregoing evidence speaks for itself. The trial judge could have reasonably inferred that Tracy had been drinking and that Tracy was within arm’s reach of the six pack of beer found in the car. Some of the others in the car had open beer cans in their possession, and it is fair to infer occupants of the car had discarded two beer cans onto the lot—one of the cans was located immediately next to the car. From this evidence, the trial judge, as factfinder, could have reasonably believed Tracy had knowledge and control of the beer located in the car. In fact, to have found and decided otherwise would, in my estimation, have ignored the obvious. The trial judge’s decision should clearly stand. Hays and Newbern, JJ., join this dissent.