Court Opinion

ID: 9470508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:07:55.484162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:56.392736
License: Public Domain

MAHON, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join the opinion of the Court concerning the two substantive issues presented and would remand the case on these issues; however, I do not join in the opinion as to the doctrine of exhaustion nor remand for failure to exhaust.

Remand to the District Court

Absent the majority remand for failure to exhaust state remedies, the case still should be remanded.
Initially, the case should be remanded so the district court may consider whether denial of respondent’s Rule 9(a) motion for dismissal was proper in view of the November 15,1982 decision in Marks v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.1982). As footnote 4 suggests the appellate record is inadequate for an evaluation.
*771In the event respondent’s Rule 9(a) laches motion is denied, the case also should be remanded for consideration by the district court of the issues of:
1. whether the 1960 theft conviction was constitutionally infirm; and
2. ineffective assistance of counsel in the 1977 conviction
in keeping with this Court’s decision in Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir.1982).1

Exhaustion is Equitable Discretion

The key to the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies prior to resorting to the federal courts is understanding the ground upon which the doctrine is based — jurisdictional or equitable discretion. The court in Hairston v. State of Alabama, 465 F.2d 675, 679 (5th Cir.1972) held: '
In the first place, the exhaustion principle is one of comity, not jurisdiction....
This court speaking through Judge Thornberry in Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549, 551, 552, 554, 555 (5th Cir.1982) held that the doctrine of exhaustion is rooted in comity and is a question of equitable discretion not of federal power.
The doctrine of exhaustion is rooted in considerations of federal-state comity. “[T]he exhaustion requirement is an accommodation of the federal system to give the state the initial opportunity to decide (and correct if need be) alleged violations of federal constitutional rights.... The exhaustion rule does not relate to the jurisdiction of the federal court but rather addresses the appropriate exercise of that jurisdiction in light of our unique American system of dual sovereignty....” (“[i]n deciding whether the merits ... are properly before us, we must be mindful that the question is not one of federal power, but of equitable discretion”). See generally 17 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4264 (1978); Developments, Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1093-94 (1970).
The nature of the exhaustion requirement is clearly relevant to the issue of whether it can be waived. “If exhaustion goes to the jurisdiction of the federal court, then the state could not waive it any more than a party can waive any other jurisdictional requirement.” Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, at 652. Exhaustion, however, is not a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, and a court of appeals need not raise it sua sponte. Hopkins v. Jarvis, 648 F.2d 981, 983 n. 2 (5th Cir.1981)....
In Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.1978), the State explicitly stated at the trial that it had no objection to the defendant’s failure to exhaust state remedies. The district court reached the merits in that case. On appeal, counsel for the State conceded that the State was satisfied with the procedural posture of the case. This court held: “Since the exhaustion requirement is non-jurisdictional, it may be waived by the State, and we may give consideration to the expenditure of federal judicial resources below .... [T]he State has never even made the argument which prevails, if at all, only as a matter of comity and has instead acquiesced in the expenditure of substantial resources in litigating the merits. In these circumstances, we hold that Houston’s claim is properly before us. To hold otherwise ... would be to elevate a rule of equitable discretion into one of jurisdiction.” 569 F.2d at 375-76 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
We conclude that this analysis applies equally to the federal habeas proceeding before us. As in [Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v.] Hodory [431 U.S. 471, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 52 L.Ed.2d 513], supra, the State has chosen a federal forum because it explicitly wishes to avoid lengthy and protracted state judicial proceedings. We see no reason why a federal court, in the name of comity, should refuse to abide by the State’s wishes. This conclusion is supported by our analy*772sis of the doctrine of comity as applying to proper relations between sovereign states, rather than between judicial systems. (footnote omitted).
The recent Supreme Court holding in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), as well as the policies outlined in Galtieri [v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir.1978)], do not mandate a different conclusion. Neither Lundy nor Galtieri addressed or even contemplated the issue of waiver by the state. We agree with Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper that “[t]he policies that the exhaustion rule serves are important ones, .... [But a court] need not make a fetish of exhaustion.” 17 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, at 653-54.
We hold that the state may explicitly waive the exhaustion requirement in federal habeas corpus proceedings under 27 U.S.C. § 2254.
Judge Higginbotham in his concurring opinion at page 555 notes:
No one here suggests that the Attorney General of the State of Texas is unauthorized by Texas law to express the state sovereign’s decision. The existence of authority to decide is a relevant inquiry, but it is one thing to ask who speaks for the state, and quite another to say that no one may or that the state cannot decide who may. Nor can it be an answer then to suggest that permitting waiver would allow the state to bypass its own courts to the “detriment of comity.” That approach confuses the means of expressing comity with the essence of comity itself. It is a confusion that timidly refuses to give comity full expression and in doing so strikes at its heart. That is, it undertakes to accept its legitimacy, yet denies its force — namely the sovereign right of a state to decide how, within constitutional limits, it will enforce its police power. It equally follows that to read Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), as requiring a contrary result achieves a perverse, and I think unintended, result.
The majority opinion erroneously raises the doctrine of exhaustion from equitable discretion to a jurisdictional matter when it states:
.... The exhaustion doctrine requires that a state prisoner’s constitutional claims first be presented to the state courts....
The exhaustion requirement therefore is clearly, though not solely, a rule of comity....
Having its basis partly in comity, the exhaustion doctrine recognizes that federal intrusions into the state court system frustrates both the state’s sovereign power to punish offenders and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights....
The majority opinion cites no authority for this proposition, nor has such authority been found, but rather numerous Fifth Circuit cases were found holding either expressly or by implication that the exhaustion requirement is a matter of comity, rather than a jurisdictional requirement.2

Rule 5

The legislative history of Section 2254 contains no reference to state waiver of the exhaustion requirement; accordingly, analysis of the policies underlying the statute is necessary to decide when exhaustion should be required. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 405, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1202-03, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1983).
Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides in keeping with Section *7732254(b) that the respondent shall answer the allegations of the petition and
.... shall state whether the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies....
The Advisory Committee Note states this requirement was on the attorney generals of the respective states because such official
.... has both the legal expertise and access to the record and thus is in a much better position to inform the court on the matter of exhaustion of state remedies. ...
The highest elected attorney of the state has pursuant to legislated rule answered that he believes the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies. Neither party has raised the question of exhaustion.
Judge Thornberry in Felder v. Estelle, supra points out at page 550 that the Congress probably never considered this problem. With thirty-five years of experience and perfect hindsight, the second sentence of Rule 5 of said Section 2254 Rules might better be stated:
In addition, the attorney general on behalf of the state shall answer the following questions: (1) does the state assert that the petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies including any post-conviction remedies available to him under the statutes or procedural rules of the state and including also his right of appeal both from the judgment of conviction and from any adverse judgment or order in the post-conviction proceeding and (2) if a failure to exhaust is claimed, does the state (a) waive the failure to exhaust, or (b) seek under comity a dismissal for failure to exhaust.
The problem stems from a failure of the present said Rule 5 to require the state to make an explicit statement concerning waiver of exhaustion. Adoption by this Court of a requirement encompassing the above suggested language would foreclose problems concerning state waiver under the doctrine of exhaustion by requiring that waiver of exhaustion be explicitly made. The most recent case concerning the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies by this Court, although not completely analogous, supports the position taken in this dissent. Brown v. Estelle, 701 F.2d 494 (5th Cir.1983).
Clearly, neither party seeks the result of the majority opinion.
This court in Barksdale v. Blackburn, 670 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct. 2912, 73 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1982) in addressing the same point holds that actual consideration by the state courts is irrelevant when the state’s chief lawyer states that he thinks the petitioner has exhausted.

Rose v. Lundy

The opinion in Rose v. Lundy, supra, provides the proper mode of analysis only when the state has raised the exhaustion issue. Barksdale v. Blackburn, supra. Thus in a Rose v. Lundy fact situation, remand for failure to exhaust when shown is mandatory-
Failure by the state to raise a lack of exhaustion of state court remedies ordinarily constitutes a waiver of a request for comity. Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir.1978). It is inappropriate in all except the rare case bordering on wilful deception of the court for an appellate court to raise the question of exhaustion sua sponte, since any other holding would be to dogmatize the equitable discretion of comity to a jurisdictional level. See Grooms v. Wainwright, 610 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir.1980); Mixon v. United States, 608 F.2d 588 (5th Cir.1979). In this case, the state acting by and through her highest elected lawyer has never even asked for dismissal for failure to exhaust, but rather has acquiesced in the expenditure of substantial resources in litigating the merits. Houston v. Estelle, supra at 376.

Federal Judicial Resources

The opinions in Felder v. Estelle, supra and Houston v. Estelle, supra each develop that consideration should be given to the expenditure of federal judicial resources at the district and appellate levels. If the state does not raise exhaustion but rather states exhaustion exists and acquiesces in the expenditure of substantial resources in litigating the case, neither the district nor appellate court should raise the question of exhaustion of state remedies unless a fraud is being perpetrated on the court. To hold otherwise constitutes a holding that the attorney general is not qualified to represent the state, is a thwarting of federal-state comity, and as a practical matter adds a requirement for both the district and the appellate courts to go behind the respondent’s declaration of exhaustion resulting in considerable additional time to the handling *774of each 2254 case at the district and appellate court level, where the respondent states that the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies.3
The panel is unified that guidance is needed where the respondent states exhaustion is satisfied but such statement is less than an explicit waiver. Our difference lies in the means of precluding the problem in the future.
In summary, the doctrine of exhaustion is rooted in comity and is a matter of equitable discretion. Rose v. Lundy, supra provides the proper mode of analysis when the state raises the exhaustion issue. The exhaustion requirement is non-jurisdictional and may be waived by the state. Raising the doctrine of exhaustion sua sponte is inappropriate for either the district or appellate court.

. See footnote 5, supra.

. Burns v. Estelle, 695 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.1983); Felder v. Estelle, 693 F.2d 549 (5th Cir.1982); Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.1982); Barksdale v. Blackburn, 670 F.2d 22 (5th Cir.1982); Bufalino v. Reno, 613 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.1980); Grooms v. Wainwright, 610 F.2d 344 (5th Cir.1980); Stinson v. State of Alabama, 585 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.1978); Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.1978); Hairston v. State of Alabama, 465 F.2d 675 (5th Cir.1972); and Pate v. Holman, 343 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.1965).

. The majority laudably seeks resolution of state habeas issues, where the respondent states exhaustion is satisfied but such statement is less than an explicit waiver, upon practical efficiency and correctly concludes this is best accomplished in the state courts.
The state has made an exhaustion statement that is less than an explicit waiver, but has not sought a return to the state courts.
The plurality opinion elevating exhaustion from equitable discretion to jurisdiction disregards comity and imposes on both the federal district and appellate courts in habeas cases with an exhaustion statement less than explicit the burden to determine whether the state attorney general accurately expressed the state’s sovereign decision on exhaustion. A needless increase in the workload of both the federal trial and appellate courts will occur.