Court Opinion

ID: 9703458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:57:46.444836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:49.152685
License: Public Domain

SILVESTRI, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
In the first paragraph of the opinion, the majority accurately states that our scope of review of a Board decision is limited; if no errors of law or violations of constitutional rights have occurred, we simply perform our appellate review by ascertaining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The jurisdiction of this court is fixed by the legislature and statutorily set forth at 2 Pa.C.S. § 704. We have exceeded our appellate authority when we reach beyond the jurisdiction granted to us. However, the majority overlooks the scope of review of this court when it proceeds to look to “evidence” outside the record and unsubstantiated assertions and allegations in Petitioner’s brief which it then relies upon to justify a remand in this case. Such reliance is inappropriate. “Evidence” outside the record does not constitute evidence.
There is no dispute procedurally that official verification was received by the Board on November 26, 1991, a parole revocation hearing was held on February 27, 1992, the scheduled revocation hearing was within 120 days of the Board’s receipt of Petitioner’s guilty plea. Thus, applying our limited standard of review to the record before us, the order of the Board must be affirmed.
Two problems exist with the majority’s reliance upon the unsubstantiated allegations advanced by Petitioner in his brief. First, nothing in the official record before the Board *132substantiates the averments. Second, Petitioner’s appeal for reform of probation and parole regulations should be addressed to the legislature, not to this court. By allowing a remand the majority creates by implication a new method of record retrieval in parole proceedings.
I would affirm. Accordingly, I dissent.