Court Opinion

ID: 9619347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:26:45.778666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:29.814511
License: Public Domain

*961DUBOFSKY, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority rules that the respondent district court possesses the inherent power to order the issuance of a citation to show cause why the City and County of Denver and the state court administrator should not be required to provide air conditioning, but concludes that the district court lacks the authority to do so. I believe that we lack the information necessary to determine whether the respondent court acted properly, and I would remand this case for a hearing on the issue of whether the established methods for providing funds necessary for the efficient functioning of the court have failed.1 Therefore, I would discharge the rule.
I agree with the majority holding that a court has inherent power to do those things reasonably necessary for the efficient performance of its judicial functions. One of the court’s most important responsibilities is ensuring that citizens receive a fair trial. It is obvious to me that the respondent court cannot perform its functions efficiently and fairly if its courtroom is so hot that jurors faint and become ill. I agree also with the majority observation that the doctrine of inherent powers has the potential to create damaging political conflicts with other branches of government, and that it should-only be invoked in situations of clear necessity. The procedure described in Chief Justice Directive No. 79-6 is important and should be followed in most circumstances, thereby reducing conflicts between the judicial branch of government and the executive and legislative branches. However, where the method contained in Directive No. 79-6, or other established methods for procuring necessary funds have been attempted and the attempts have failed, a district court maintains its authority to order expenditures necessary for the effective performance of its own functions under the inherent powers doctrine. See Rose v. Palm Beach City, 361 So.2d 135 (Fla.1978); Knuepfer v. Fawell, 96 Ill.2d 284, 70 Ill.Dec. 708, 449 N.E.2d 1312 (1983); O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 287 N.E.2d 608 (1972).
The only evidence in the record before us on this issue is a statement by the respondent district court to the effect that the state court administrator had indicated to the court his refusal to request funds for air conditioning from the General Assembly or to bring any action against Denver. If this is the case, and I have no reason to believe that it is not, this court should not conclude, as has the majority, that the respondent court lacks the authority to order the issuance of a citation to show cause. The majority’s result is to some extent based on its conclusion that the Chief Justice Directive removes all inherent powers from every judge except for the chief judge of every district and the chief justice. I read the Directive as providing a procedure to be followed in most cases, not as a document doing away with a court’s common-law power to control its own courtroom in a way necessary for the fulfillment of its judicial duties.
The record before us indicates that the parties were not specifically advised of the need to discuss the issue of the failure of established methods. Therefore, I would discharge the rule but suggest to the court that further proceedings should include a consideration of whether established methods to obtain adequate courtroom facilities have failed.

. The district court had scheduled a hearing to determine the adequacy of the courtroom facilities, the necessity of court intervention, and the appropriate remedy, if any. We stayed the scheduled hearing.