Court Opinion

ID: 9912512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 17:09:06.539343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:48.090625
License: Public Domain

J-S22041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  BOBBIE MITCHELL, JR.                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1242 EDA 2021

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 26, 2019
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004404-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                         FILED DECEMBER 22, 2023

       Bobbie Mitchell, Jr. (“Mitchell”) appeals nunc pro tunc from the

judgments of sentence imposed following his convictions of first-degree

murder, persons not to possess firearms, and possessing an instrument of

crime (firearm).1 After careful review, we affirm Mitchell’s convictions, vacate

the judgment of sentence for possessing an instrument of crime, and remand

for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to correct its self-recognized

error at sentencing.

       The trial court summarized the factual history of the case as follows:

             On the [morning] of April 1, 2018, the Pottstown police
       received notification of a possible shooting victim and information
       that someone was seen leaving the scene on foot. In the early
       morning hours of April 1, 2018 . . ., Siani Overby [“the victim”]
       was found lying in a pool of blood . . ., clearly deceased.

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 6105, 907(b).
J-S22041-22

       Witnesses saw an African American man fleeing the scene after
       screaming alerted the witnesses that something was wrong.

              Police at the scene of the crime recovered a cell phone that
       was lying between the victim’s legs.[2] This cell phone was a black
       Alcatel phone [“the Alcatel phone”], with the phone number
       ending in 8227. It was assumed by police that the phone located
       between the victim’s legs belonged to the victim. A download of
       the phone revealed this assumption to be incorrect, and police
       were able to determine that the phone belonged to [Mitchell].
       [Mitchell] and the victim had previously been in an intimate
       relationship and it was once believed that they shared a child.
       Based upon the testimony of [Mitchell], a DNA test was performed
       a year and a half before the victim’s death, and it was determined
       that [Mitchell] was not the child’s father.

             In the hours after the murder, [Mitchell] called his girlfriend
       Deniqua Butler to let her know that he would be coming to her
       home in Norristown and that they would be traveling to
       Connecticut that morning to visit [Mitchell]’s father. [Mitchell]
       arrived at the home of Ms. Butler in the very early morning hours
       wearing a white t-shirt under a dark jacket with dark jeans.
       [Mitchell], Ms. Butler and their children left for Connecticut around
       4 a.m. in Ms. Butler’s Chevy Malibu.

             The police initiated a search for [Mitchell] after it was
       discovered that he was no longer in Pottstown and that his kids
       were unexpectedly not in school. Out of concern for the safety of
       [Mitchell]’s children and Ms. Butler, the police performed an
       emergency ping on Ms. Butler’s phone. As a result of the ping,
       the police discovered Ms. Butler and [Mitchell] in Waterbury,
       Connecticut.

             An arrest warrant was issued in Montgomery County, and
       pursuant to that warrant, police in Waterbury, Connecticut
       arrested [Mitchell]. Search warrants for both the apartment
       where [Mitchell] was staying and . . . the Chevy Malibu [“the
       Malibu”] were obtained and executed. Detective Todd Richard of
____________________________________________

2 The police found the victim’s body lying face-up in an alley.        See N.T.,
9/23/19, at 34-38, 165.

                                           -2-
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      the Montgomery County Detective Bureau and Detective Heather
      Long of the Pottstown Police Department performed an interview
      of [Mitchell] upon his arrest.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/3/21, at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

      Police charged Mitchell with murder, persons not to possess firearms,

and possessing an instrument of crime.        Thereafter, Mitchell sought to

suppress several items of evidence pre-trial, including, in relevant part, the

Alcatel phone found between the victim’s legs at the murder scene, and the

fruits of that search, an audio recording of the homicide, and the evidence

seized from the Chevy Malibu Mitchell drove to Waterbury, Connecticut, hours

after the murder. See Mitchell’s Motion to Suppress and Motion to Exclude

Audio Evidence, 1/9/19; Mitchell’s Motion in Limine 1/9/19, Mitchell’s Motion

to Suppress, 3/29/19. The Commonwealth sought the admission of the cell

phone, the audio recording of the homicide, evidence recovered from the

Malibu, statements the victim made to her brother concerning Mitchell’s gun

and drug involvement, and Mitchell’s history of violence against the victim.

See Commonwealth’s motions in limine, 1/9/19.

      On August 29, 2019, the court conducted a hearing on all of Mitchell’s

and the Commonwealth’s motions.         After the hearing, the court denied

Mitchell’s motion to suppress the results of the search of the Alcatel phone,

the “fruits” of that search, and the audio recording of the homicide. In so

doing, the court credited the testimony of Montgomery County Detective Todd

                                     -3-
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Richard (“Detective Richard”) that the detectives at the murder scene believed

the Alcatel phone found between the legs of the victim lying in an alley was

hers because it was found in close proximity to her body in a public area. The

trial court also credited Detective Richard’s testimony that when the police

discovered the phone did not belong to the victim, the search was suspended

and the police applied for and obtained a search warrant. See Order 9/6/19,

at 1-2. The court found the Alcatel phone was abandoned because it was left

lying on the victim’s body of the ground at the scene of the killing, and Mitchell

had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone. See id. at 2, 4.3

       The Commonwealth argued the audio testimony, which contained

sounds of pleading, gunshots, and someone screaming after the gunshots,

was evidence of the shooter’s specific intent to kill. See N.T., 8/29/19, at 94-

97. The court denied Mitchell’s motion to suppress the audio testimony. See

id. at 97; Order sur [Mitchell’s] motion to exclude audio evidence, 9/6/19.

       Mitchell asserted that the $117,000 found in the search of the Malibu

was the fruit of the poisonous tree of the illegal search of the victim’s cell

phone and probable cause did not exist for issuance of the search warrant.

See id. at 26, 91. The court found that the search warrant for the Malibu was

____________________________________________

3 The court also stated that a finding of abandonment of the cell phone was

supported because Mitchell had driven to Connecticut leaving the phone
behind and told another person not to contact the Alcatel phone. See Order
9/6/19, at 3-4.

                                           -4-
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issued upon probable cause because a warrant had been issued for Mitchell’s

arrest, Mitchell was seen getting into the Malibu, and the Malibu was

registered to a known associate of his. See Order sur [Mitchell’s] motion to

suppress the evidence obtained through the April 2, 2019 warrant for the 2015

Chevy Malibu, 9/6/19, at 1-2.

      The court found that the victim’s statement to her brother, Carlton

Overby (“Overby”), regarding Mitchell’s involvement with guns and drugs was

admissible evidence of Mitchell’s state of mind pursuant to Pa.R.E. 803(3); it

also found that the Commonwealth’s proffer of the victim’s mother’s testimony

established the existence of admissible evidence of Mitchell’s prior threats and

violence against the victim.    See N.T., 9/23/19, at 100-03; Order sur the

Commonwealth’s motion in limine for the admission of victim’s statements

regarding [Mitchell] pursuant to state of mind hearsay exception, 9/6/19;

Order sur the Commonwealth’s motion in limine for the admission of evidence

of [Mitchell’s] prior bad acts under Pa.R.E. 404(b), 9/6/19.

     In addition to the evidence discussed above, at trial the evidence also

included the victim’s brother Overby’s testimony that Mitchell threatened to

kill the victim if she revealed his drug-related activities, see N.T. 9/23/19, 48;

evidence a witness heard a woman scream, “Please don’t do it,” after the first

shot, see id. at 63-64; evidence a man dressed in dark clothes fled the scene

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of the killing, see id. at 41-43;4 Linwood Brown’s testimony that Mitchell, his

brother, called him crying on the morning of the killing and directed him to

tell their friend, John Sutton (“Sutton”), not to call him on the Alcatel phone,

see id. at 117, 127-31, 165, 167, 192; cell phone tower evidence the Alcatel

phone found at the murder scene had been at Mitchell’s girlfriend’s house with

Mitchell’s other cell phones less than one hour before the killing, and then

went to the area of the murder, see N.T., 9/25/19, at 62-64, 93-95; evidence

that moments after the murder, Mitchell called his girlfriend and his son from

the scene of the murder and told them to pack up for a trip, and they left for

Connecticut at 4:00 a.m., see N.T. 9/24/19, 112, 121, 151-53, 157-58, 166-

67, 181, 207; N.T., 9/25/19, at 81; evidence Mitchell activated a new cell

phone shortly after the murder and had nearly a one-hour phone call with his

brother, see id. at 192-96 and evidence all three cell phones Mitchell used to

communicate with his girlfriend and family immediately after the murder were

found with him in Connecticut, see id. at 214. Additionally, a series of angry

text exchanges between the victim and Mitchell was admitted, from a phone

later found in Mitchell’s possession, close in time to the actual shooting and

the 911 call, see id. at 8-16, 69-78.

       After a four-day trial, the jury convicted Mitchell of all above-listed

____________________________________________

4 The man’s flight immediately after the shooting was also captured on home

video surveillance. See N.T., 9/24/19, 13.

                                           -6-
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offenses. The trial court imposed a term of life imprisonment for murder, and

erroneously imposed two sentences for one count of possessing an instrument

of crime and failed to state a sentence for the charge of persons not to possess

firearms, See N.T., 9/26/19, at 100-01.5

       Mitchell did not file post-sentence motions. He filed a timely notice of

appeal but counsel failed to file an appellate brief, resulting in the dismissal of

the appeal in March 2021. The trial court later granted Mitchell’s right to a

direct appeal nunc pro tunc in the interests of justice. See Order 8/3/21, at

2. Both Mitchell and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       On appeal, Mitchell raises the following issues for our review:

       [1.]   Did the trial court err in denying [Mitchell]’s motion to
              suppress . . . a[] cell phone and the data stored therein . . .
              because the Commonwealth failed to provide probable
              cause to search the phone without a warrant[?]

       [2.]   Did the trial court err in its determination that the . . . cell
              phone was abandoned by [Mitchell] at the scene of the
              crime, and thus concluding that [Mitchell] had no
              expectation of privacy in the data stored in the device[?]

       [3.]   Did the trial court err in . . . admitting into evidence data
              and information obtained from the . . . cell phone, which
              was obtained pursuant to a search warrant, secured after
              the phone had been initially searched, as any such evidence
              was “fruit of the poisonous tree[?]”

       [4.]   Did the trial court err in granting the Commonwealth’s
              motion in limine allowing the admission into evidence of the
____________________________________________

5 The court concedes it erred in doing so.
                                         See Trial Court Opinion, 8/3/21, at
7. The sentencing order does not appear in the certified record.

                                           -7-
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              alleged victim’s statements regarding [Mitchell], pursuant
              to Pa.R.E. 803(3)[?]

       [5.]   Did the trial court err in denying [Mitchell]’s pre-trial motion
              to exclude audio evidence of the homicide[?]

       [6.]   Did the trial court err in granting the Commonwealth’s
              motion in limine to admit prior bad acts evidence in the form
              of alleged threats and abuse inflicted upon or towards the
              alleged victim by [Mitchell][?]

       [7.]   Did the trial court err in sentencing [Mitchell] to . . . five [to]
              . . . ten . . .years on Count 4, charging Mitchell with a
              misdemeanor of the first degree . . . [?]

       [8.]   Did the trial court err in denying [Mitchell’s] motion to
              suppress evidence seized from the 2015 Chevrolet Malibu
              because there was insufficient probable cause articulated in
              the search warrant to substantiate the issuance of the
              warrant and the authorization to search[?6]

Mitchell’s Brief at vii-viii (issues reordered; full capitalization omitted).7

       Mitchell’s first three issues concerning his motion to suppress

information from the Alcatel phone and the fruits of that alleged illegal search.

As these issues present similar questions of law and arise from related facts,

we analyze them together.

       Our standard of review regarding a challenge to a trial court’s

suppression ruling is limited to determining whether the court’s findings of

____________________________________________

6 Mitchell states in his brief that he is not proceeding upon his eighth issue

and is withdrawing it from consideration on appeal. See Mitchell’s Brief at viii,
25. Accordingly, we do not address it.

7 For reasons of judicial efficiency and clarity, we have reordered Mitchell’s
arguments.

                                           -8-
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fact are supported by the record and the legal conclusions drawn from those

facts are correct. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 273 A.3d 1190, 1195

(Pa. Super. 2022). Where the Commonwealth has prevailed below, this Court

may only consider the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the defense

evidence as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record.

See id. It is the suppression court’s sole province as fact-finder to pass on

the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. See id.

When the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings, we are

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its

legal conclusions from those facts. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 941

A.2d 14, 27 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

     Our scope of review is limited to the evidentiary record at the

suppression hearing. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 302 A.3d 123, 126 (Pa.

Super. 2023). When an appellant asserts legal error in a suppression court’s

ruling, it is the Court’s duty to determine if the suppression court properly

applied the law to the facts. See id. at 7. See Commonwealth v. James

Byrd, 235 A.3d 311, 319 (Pa. 2020) (stating that a suppression court’s

conclusions and legal rulings are subject to de novo review).

     The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people against

unreasonable searches and seizures.     See U.S. Constit., amend. IV.    The

ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. See Riley

                                    -9-
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v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (“Riley/Wurie”). Reasonableness

generally requires law enforcement officials to obtain search warrants in

seeking to discover evidence of wrongdoing. See id. “In the absence of a

warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the

warrant requirement.” Id. (citation omitted).

      One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is abandonment;

abandonment can occur quickly and deprives a party of the right to contest

the search and seizure of abandoned items. See Commonwealth v. Ronald

Byrd, 987 A.2d 786, 790-93 (Pa. Super. 2009); Commonwealth v. Clark,

746 A.2d 1128, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2000).          A defendant cannot establish a

legitimate expectation of privacy when he has “meaningfully abdicated his

control, ownership or possessory interest. . . . [A]bandonment of a privacy

interest is primarily a question of intent and may be inferred from words

spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.” Commonwealth v. Dowds,

761 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Pa. 2000) (internal citations and footnote omitted).

The test for abandonment focuses upon “whether the person prejudiced by

the search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his

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interest in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a

reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 1131 n.7.8

       There can be nothing unlawful in the government’s appropriation of

abandoned property.          See Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960);

Commonwealth v. Hall, --- A.3d ---, ---, 2023 WL 7266701 at *5 (Pa.

Super., filed November 3, 2023), citing Ronald Byrd, 987 A.2d at 790-93

(stating that a suspect does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in

items he has voluntarily abandoned); Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 127 A.3d

819, 825 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding when a person abandons property

voluntarily the police may recover it and use it as evidence against him).

       Mitchell initially asserts that the court erred in finding he abandoned the

Alcatel phone he argues he unintentionally dropped. He claims the court erred

in denying suppression of the phone and its data because he did not abandon

it and the police lacked probable cause to search it without a warrant. Because

he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Alcatel phone, Mitchell

____________________________________________

8 See also Commonwealth v. Shoatz, 366 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Pa. 1976)
(emphasis added) (explaining the definition of abandonment for Fourth
Amendment purposes differs from the strict property-right sense; the
abandonment analysis turns not on a property interest in the item but an
appellant’s possession of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property
in question at the time of the search).

                                          - 11 -
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asserts, the court should have suppressed the data and information from the

phone as the fruit of the poisonous tree.9

       At the suppression hearing, Detective Richard testified he learned the

Alcatel phone had been found between the victim’s legs and went to the scene

with Detective Edward Schikel (“Detective Schikel”) to recover and download

the contents of the phone, believed to be the victim’s. See N.T., 8/26/19, at

64-65, 70. When the detectives left the scene with the phone, the police had

not yet determined the victim’s identity. See id. at 69, 72. The detectives

took the phone to the Pottstown Police Department where an officer

downloaded its contents. Detective Richard looked at the last few contacts

obtained from the cell phone download, which included a person identified as

“J.J.”10 Detective Richard testified when he realized the Alcatel phone was

____________________________________________

9 The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine generally requires the exclusion of

evidence obtained from, or acquired as the consequence of, an illegal search.
See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016); Commonwealth v. Gatlos,
76 A.3d 44, 63 (Pa. Super. 2013). Evidence uncovered as the result of a legal
search is not the fruit of the poisonous tree and will not be suppressed.
Gatlos, 76 A.3d at 63.

10 Detective Richard reached out to “J.J.,” whose name was John Sutton
(“Sutton”), who said he received a text before 5:00 a.m. on the morning of
the killing from Mitchell’s brother, Brown, telling him not to call the Alcatel
phone. See N.T., 8/26/19, at 65-66, 72, 78-79, 113 (discussing the contents
of Commonwealth’s Exhibit 11).

                                          - 12 -
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likely connected to a suspect, he stopped looking at it and obtained a search

warrant to examine its contents. See id. at 66-68.

       The court found that the Commonwealth presented evidence at the

suppression hearing the Alcatel phone had been abandoned and Mitchell failed

to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone that the police

conduct violated. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/3/21, at 8-10. We agree.

       Detective Richard’s testimony, which the court credited, showed the

police found the phone in a public alley on a city street between the victim’s

legs. The court also credited Detective Richard’s testimony that the officers

on scene believed the phone belonged to the victim, and that at the time the

phone was recovered the victim’s identity had yet to be determined. Mitchell

offered no testimony at the suppression hearing to show he attempted to

assert possession of the Alcatel phone when the first police officers arrived at

the murder scene, when the detectives arrived, or when the detectives took

the phone from the scene and downloaded its contents. In fact, as the court

found, Mitchell’s   actions   supported    the   Commonwealth’s    evidence   of

abandonment, including his: 1) call to his brother instructing him to tell Sutton

not to call that phone, 2) shutting down that phone, and 3) setting up a new

phone within hours of the murder.         See Order sur [Mitchell’s] motion to

suppress warrantless search of the Alcatel phone and the search warrant

obtained for the Alcatel phone, 9/6/19, at 3-4. Under these facts, we conclude

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the trial court properly found the Alcatel phone abandoned. See Abel, 362

U.S. at 241; Hall, --- A.3d ---, 2023 WL 7266701 at *5 (affirming a

suppression court’s finding that a suspect voluntarily abandoned a cell phone

he left in his car when he fled the scene of a collision); Ronald Byrd, 987

A.2d at 791-93 (finding a suspect abandoned a gun he threw under an SUV

parked on a public street when he saw a police officer, whose mere presence

did not force the abandonment); Clark, 746 A.2d at 1143 (finding the decision

to hide drugs in a public area demonstrates abandonment of any reasonable

expectation of privacy in them).

       As support, Mitchell asserts Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d

912 (Pa. 2019), and Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475 (Pa. 2018),

recognize that cell phones are the repositories of strong expectations of

privacy and compel a finding the Alcatel phone was not abandoned and he had

a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. See Mitchell’s Brief at 15-17. While

we do not disagree that Santiago and Fulton stand for the principal that

there are privacy expectations in cell phones, these cases are distinguishable

from this matter. Critically, neither of those cases involves an abandoned

phone. Santiago involved an improper search incident to arrest by a police

officer during an interaction that resulted in Santiago’s phone falling out of his

car.   The Commonwealth conceded on appeal that Santiago had not

abandoned his phone and the search of a phone incident to arrest without a

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warrant was illegal. See Santiago, 210 A.3d at 188 n.2. Similarly in Fulton,

the police seized Fulton’s cell phone incident to arrest and searched it without

a warrant or an applicable exception to the search warrant requirement. See

Fulton, 179 A.3d at 316.

      As this Court has explained, both Riley/Wurie and Fulton address

warrantless searches of cell phones seized incident to arrest.             See

Commonwealth v. Kane, 210 A.3d 324, 332 (Pa. Super. 2019). In Kane,

this Court expressly rejected the argument that Fulton applies to warrantless

searches of abandoned cell phones:

      [W]e decline to conclude that Fulton stands for the overbroad and
      sweeping proposition that police must get a warrant to search a
      cell phone, even if it has been abandoned, when the facts of the
      case and our case law pertaining to abandoned property do not
      support that proposition.

Kane, id. (emphasis in original). The Kane court also noted that the holdings

in Riley/Wurie and Fulton “do not relieve a defendant of the burden of

demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy on a cell phone that is

searched.” See id. (citation omitted). Because Mitchell abandoned the Alcatel

phone, Santiago and Fulton do not apply. It necessarily follows that the

search of the phone was legal and there is, thus, no suppressible fruit of the

poisonous tree, see Gatlos, 76 A.3d at 73, and no right for Mitchell, who

abandoned the phone, to contest its search and seizure.          See Hall, ---

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A.3d ---, ---, 2023 WL 7266701 at *7. Mitchell’s suppression claims regarding

the abandoned phone accordingly do not merit relief.11

       Mitchell’s next issue asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the

victim’s statements to her brother, Overby, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 803(3).

Overby testified that Mitchell sold guns and drugs, see N.T., 9/23/19, at 48,

to establish Mitchell’s motive to kill her.

       The admission of evidence is within a trial court’s sound discretion and

will only be reversed where that discretion is clearly abused.                See

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 273 A.3d 13, 19 (Pa. Super. 2022). An abuse

of discretion is demonstrated only where the judgment is “manifestly

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that

the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.”   Id. (internal

citation omitted). It is not enough to persuade an appellate court that it would

have reached a different result; an appellant must show that the trial court

abused its discretionary power. See Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d

____________________________________________

11  Further, in Riley/Wurie, the Supreme Court expressly stated even in
instances where cell phones are searched pursuant to arrest, exigent
circumstances may exist that permit a warrantless search of a cell phone,
including “to pursue a fleeing suspect.” Riley/Wurie, 573 U.S. 373, 402
(2014). See also Fulton, 179 A.3d at 316 n.18 (acknowledging that
Riley/Wurie left open the possibility of exigent circumstances). Here,
independent of Mitchell’s abandonment of the phone, compelling exigent
circumstances may have existed to use the phone to find a fleeing, armed
killer.

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112, 120 (Pa. 2019).

      A statement is hearsay if made out of court and offered in court for the

truth of the matter asserted in the statement.        See Commonwealth v.

Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d 452, 458 (Pa. 2021). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it

satisfies a hearsay exception prescribed by statute or rule. See Pa.R.E. 802.

Evidence of a declarant’s then-existing state of mind, not including a

statement of memory or belief, is admissible to prove a fact the declarant

remembered or believed pursuant to the “state of mind” exception to the

hearsay rule.    See Pa.R.E. 803(3).      The state of mind hearsay exception,

however, does not permit the admission of a declarant’s statement to prove

the intent or motive of another person. See Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d at 472,

482 (holding that a victim’s written assertion that the accused would be

responsible if she met an untimely death was an inadmissible factual averment

offered to prove the accused’s intent).

      Mitchell asserts the trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth’s

motion in limine admitting the victim’s statement to Overby as evidence of

Mitchell’s state of mind and his motive, and that he suffered prejudice from

that evidence.    The trial court asserts it properly admitted the victim’s

statement as evidence establishing Mitchell’s motive to kill the victim. See

Trial Court Opinion, 8/3/21, at 7-8.

      Mitchell is correct, Overby’s statement that the victim said Mitchell sold

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drugs and guns was not admissible as evidence of his (Mitchell’s) “state of

mind” pursuant to Pa.R.E. 803(3). See Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d at 482. Thus,

the trial court erred.

      Although we note that Mitchell’s analysis is correct, and the trial court

erred, that conclusion is not the end of the analysis. The Court must also

consider whether the statement’s admission was “harmless”.         An error is

harmless only where:

      (1) the error did not prejudice defendant or the prejudice was de
      minimis; or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely
      cumulative of other, untainted evidence which was substantially
      similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly
      admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
      overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
      insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
      contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 274 A.3d 722, 735 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted and italics added).

     At trial, there was one reference in Overby’s testimony to Mitchell’s sale

of guns and drugs. See N.T., 9/23/19, at 48. Following this one sentence,

Overby testified he overheard an argument outside of his house where Mitchell

told the victim, “If you mess up my operation, I will kill you.”     See N.T.

9/23/19, at 50. Overby also testified Mitchell said he “would kill [the victim]

if anything happened as far as his operation.” See id. Mitchell himself also

testified at trial that he sold high-grade marijuana. See N.T., 9/25/19, 39.

The improperly-admitted evidence was thus merely cumulative of other,

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untainted evidence of Mitchell’s threats to kill the victim if she disclosed those

activities. See Williams, 274 A.3d at 735.

     Alternatively, the prejudicial effect of the error was de minimis and the

properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was overwhelming and

the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the

error could not have contributed to the verdict.        In addition to Overby’s

properly-admitted testimony showing Mitchell threatened to kill the victim if

she exposed his operation, there was also untainted and overwhelming

evidence regarding Mitchell’s guilt. The phone records from the non-Alcatel

phones established that Mitchell exchanged a series of angry, menacing, and

profane texts with the victim, on one of the three cell phones later found in

his possession, over the course of one and one-half hours, and that ended six

minutes before the victim’s death at 1:58 a.m. See N.T. 9/25/19, at 10-16,

48-50, 59-60.

     Cell tower address evidence placed the Alcatel phone and Mitchell’s other

phones at his girlfriend’s house, then traveling to the area of the murder at

the time it occurred. See id. at 78-79. The trial evidence also showed all

three phones in Mitchell’s possession went from the area of the murder to

Mitchell’s girlfriend’s house shortly after the murder, and Mitchell and his

girlfriend left home with their children at approximately 4:00 a.m. and drove

to Waterbury, Connecticut. See id. at 81-90. Mitchell’s brother also testified

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that Mitchell called him shortly after the murder and directed him to tell Sutton

he should not call or use the Alcatel phone anymore, and Mitchell’s brother

texted that warning to Sutton. See N.T., 9/23/19, at 117, 127-31, 165, 167,

192. In light of this evidence, the improper admission of a single statement

from Overby that the victim said Mitchell sold guns and drugs had a de minimis

effect. See Williams, 274 A.3d at 735. Any harm from the introduction of

Overby’s single statement did not harm Mitchell where the evidence

compellingly proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

       Mitchell’s next issue asserts the court abused its discretion in denying

his pre-trial motion to exclude audio evidence of the shooting.

       Before we reach the merits of Mitchell’s claim, we must first address

whether we have jurisdiction to address it. Mitchell has not identified the place

in the record where the recording was played, as the Rules of Appellate

Procedure require. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d). Nor has Mitchell indicated where in

the certified record the recording appears.        We will not serve as Mitchell’s

advocate and scour the record for evidence to support his argument.           See

Commonwealth v. Leap, 222 A.3d 386, 391 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2019).12 Thus,

his claim is waived.

____________________________________________

12 Another deficiency of Mitchell’s claim is his failure to identify where in the

trial record the recording was played, which prevents this Court from
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Even if reviewable, the claim would lack merit. As our Supreme Court

has recognized on the related issue of the admissibility of photographs of a

murder victim:

       [t]o permit the disturbing nature of the images of the victim to
       rule the question of admissibility would result in exclusion of all
       photographs of the homicide victim, and would defeat one of the
       essential functions of a criminal trial, inquiry into the intent of the
       actor. There is no need to so overextend an attempt to sanitize
       the evidence of the condition of the body as to deprive the
       Commonwealth of opportunities of proof in support of the onerous
       burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 454 A.2d 547, 549 (1982).                      Mitchell’s

assertion that the screaming and gunshots heard on the tape fails to overcome

this standard.13

       Mitchell’s next issue asserts the trial court abused its discretion with its

pre-trial ruling that it would admit evidence Mitchell had threatened and

physically abused the victim. Once again, we cannot exercise jurisdiction over

this claim because Mitchell’s brief does not discuss what evidence was at issue

____________________________________________

determining if he requested a cautionary instruction concerning the audio
evidence and whether the trial court granted any such request.

13 Moreover, Mitchell’s argument that the audio evidence was inadmissible
because the facts could have been proved by the testimony of witnesses is
unpersuasive. That witnesses can describe the condition of a body that
photographs also depict does not render those photographs cumulative or
inadmissible. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1033 (Pa.
2012). Even allegedly inflammatory evidence is not precluded from admission
by the availability of alternative testimony. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez,
36 A.3d 24, 49 (Pa. 2011).

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(or what evidence was admitted at trial); instead, he offers only a citation to the

record of the suppression hearing. We will not scour the record nor develop

Mitchell’s claim for him; thus, Mitchell waived this claim.        See Pa.R.A.P.

2119(d); Leap, 222 A.3d at 391 n.5.14

       Mitchell’s final issue asserts that the trial court imposed an illegal

sentence for possessing an instrument of crime. Our scope and standard of

review for assessing the legality of a sentence is as follows:

       If no statutory authority exists for a particular sentence, that
       sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence
       must be vacated. In evaluating a trial court’s application of a
       statute, our standard of review is plenary and limited to
       determining whether the trial court committed an error of law.

Commonwealth v. Dixon, 161 A.3d 949, 951 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted).

       The trial court itself declared its intention to impose a one-to-two year

term of imprisonment for possessing an instrument of crime and a five-to-ten

year term of imprisonment for persons not to possess firearms, and

____________________________________________

14 Even were the Court to review Mitchell’s undeveloped claim, Mitchell failed

to show the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence.
Although generally inadmissible, evidence of other crimes or bad acts is
admissible, among other purposes, to show the relationship between the
parties to prove ill-will, motive, and malice. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 1009 (Pa. 2023). Evidence of Mitchell’s prior threats
and violence against the victim was admissible pursuant to the well-
established case law admitting evidence of prior bad acts by the accused
against his victim.

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mistakenly imposed two sentences for Count 3, possessing an instrument of

crime. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/3/21, at 6-7.15

       Examination      of   the   record      confirms   the   trial   court   mistakenly

pronounced two sentences for Count 3. See N.T., 9/26/19, 100-01. We thus

remand for correction of Mitchell’s sentences in accordance with its stated

intention.

       In sum, we affirm Mitchell’s convictions, vacate the judgments of sentence

in part, and remand for the court to correct its self-recognized error at

sentencing.

       Convictions affirmed; judgment of sentence for first-degree murder

affirmed; judgment of sentence for possession of instrument of crime vacated.

Case remanded for limited resentencing consistent with this decision.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________

15 The maximum term of imprisonment for possessing an instrument of crime,

a misdemeanor of the first degree, is five years of imprisonment, when the
weapon is a concealed firearm or other weapon. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 907(b),
1104(1). The maximum term of imprisonment for person not to possess
firearms, a felony of the second degree, is ten years of imprisonment. See
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6015(a.1)(1), 1103(2).

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Date: 12/22/2023

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