Court Opinion

ID: 9954119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:10:14.5299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.084469
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re J.G., 2024-Ohio-1101.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  MAHONING COUNTY

                                        IN THE MATTER OF:

                                                J.G.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                        Case No. 23 MA 0075

                               Juvenile Appeal from the
           Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, of Mahoning County, Ohio
                              Case No. 2018 JC 00939

                                            BEFORE:
            William A. Klatt, Retired Judge of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
                                     Sitting by Assignment,
                          Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

                                            JUDGMENT:
                                              Affirmed.

 Atty. Alyson Byerly Carbon, for Appellee and

 Atty. Tracey A. Laslo, for Appellants.

                                        Dated: March 21, 2024
                                                                                         –2–

 KLATT, J.

       {¶1}   Appellants, W.M. and R.M., maternal great uncle and great aunt of J.G.
(d.o.b. 3/22/2016), appeal the judgment entry of the Mahoning County Court of Common
Pleas, Juvenile Division, awarding legal custody of J.G. to his father, S.G. The juvenile
court sustained Father’s objections to the original and amended magistrate’s decision, in
which the magistrate concluded J.G.’s best interest was served by Appellants’ continuing
custody.
       {¶2}   A.L., J.G.’s mother and his residential parent prior to the decision of the
Juvenile Court currently on appeal, suffers from illegal drug dependency and did not
participate in the proceedings. Appellants and Father each filed motions for custody of
J.G. after Mother relinquished J.G.’s care to Appellants in July of 2021. Father was an
illegal drug abuser at the time of J.G.’s birth through October of 2020. Mother and Father
regularly entrusted J.G. to Appellants in the first four-and-a-half years of his life.
       {¶3}   In their first assignment of error, Appellants argue the juvenile court abused
its discretion in awarding custody to Father, and the judgment entry is against the manifest
weight of the evidence and not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In their
second assignment of error, Appellants contend Father committed a procedural error due
to his failure to file objections to the magistrate’s second amended decision, which was
filed after Father’s objections to the original and amended decisions were filed. Appellants
further argue the trial court exceeded its authority by relying on arguments that were not
raised by Father’s objections. For the following reasons, the judgment entry of the
juvenile court awarding custody of J.G. to Father is affirmed.

                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶4}   On August 14, 2018, a complaint was filed by the Mahoning County
Children Services Agency (“Agency”) alleging J.G. was a dependent child. J.G. was twice
found wandering unsupervised by a stranger while in Mother’s care. As a consequence,
J.G. was placed in the interim temporary custody of the Agency.
       {¶5}   On October 18, 2018, interim temporary custody was awarded to
Appellants, based in large measure on the fact that Mother and Father had routinely

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placed J.G. in Appellants’ care for extended periods of time. Parenting time for Mother
was to be supervised by the Agency. Father’s parenting time was to be supervised by
Appellants.
       {¶6}   After Mother underwent treatment for her addiction, the Agency filed a
motion to transfer custody to Mother and for an order of protective supervision on August
2, 2019. On October 23, 2019, custody of J.G. was returned to Mother subject to court-
ordered protective supervision. No parenting time was granted to Father at that time.
Appellants’ temporary custody was terminated.
       {¶7}   After Mother successfully completed additional court-ordered drug
treatment programs, protective services were terminated on September 15, 2020.
Accordingly, Mother was awarded legal custody and ordered to provide one hour of
supervised parenting time per week and video contact two times per week to Father.
Father agreed to the juvenile court’s award of custody of J.G. to Mother.
       {¶8}   On October 18, 2021, Appellants filed a complaint for custody, as well as a
motion for temporary custody and motion for an expedited hearing for educational
purposes. J.G. had once again been left in Appellants’ care by Mother. Appellants filed
the motion for temporary custody and an expedited hearing in order to acquire the legal
authority to enroll J.G. in kindergarten.
       {¶9}   On October 21, 2021, the juvenile court awarded temporary custody of J.G.
to Appellants. J.G. was enrolled in the Marlington Local School District where he attends
Lexington Elementary School. J.G. began kindergarten approximately two months after
the first day of school.
       {¶10} Pretrial hearings were held on January 13, 2022 and February 16, 2022.
Both hearings resulted in temporary custody remaining with Appellants. No parenting time
for J.G.’s parents was ordered. A guardian ad litem (“GAL”) was appointed on February
17, 2022.
       {¶11} On March 4, 2022, Father filed his motion for custody/reallocation of
parental rights and responsibilities and support. At a pretrial hearing on April 6, 2022,
Father was awarded supervised parenting time at the Hope House. Father submitted to
periodic drug testing pursuant to an order of the juvenile court.

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       {¶12} On May 11, 2022, the GAL issued his original report recommending that
legal custody be awarded to Appellants. On May 18, 2022, the competing motions for
custody were tried before the magistrate. Mother did not attend the trial.
       {¶13} Father testified he had been sober since October of 2020 (nineteen months
of sobriety as of the date of the hearing). He suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
and is prescribed medical marijuana. He had last seen J.G. on March 22, 2022, and had
visited J.G. on three occasions in the previous year.
       {¶14} According to Father’s testimony, Appellants had severely limited his ability
to visit J.G. and completely prohibited him from spending time with J.G. outside of their
home. Appellants countered they were as cooperative as possible with Father’s requests
to visit with J.G., however they believed a previously-issued court order required
supervised visitation.
       {¶15} Father similarly blamed Mother for his failure to parent J.G. while she was
the residential parent. Despite his allegations, Father conceded he never sought court
enforcement of his visitation rights.
       {¶16} At the trial, Father misidentified J.G.’s birthday, could not identify J.G.’s
teacher, and had no information regarding J.G.’s classes or grades. Despite Father’s
limited exposure to J.G. over the course of the previous year, Father opined that J.G.
suffered from depression based on J.G.’s abnormal weight gain and “sad behavior
whenever [Father] would leave.” (5/18/22 Trial Tr., p. 96.)
       {¶17} Father testified he had been employed as a warehouse selector for roughly
one year. At the hearing on Father’s objections to the magistrate’s decision roughly one
year later, Father had just began working at a new job. There was no testimony taken at
the hearing, but the new job was mentioned during a colloquy with the juvenile court
regarding drug screening.
       {¶18} At the trial, Father testified he had a child support enforcement obligation of
$50 per month for J.G., but was roughly $1,250 in arrears. Father is legally obligated to
financially support two children. Father conceded he did not provide any necessities or
sustenance for J.G., nor did he provide any basic care for J.G. in the past year. Father
could not recall when he began making child support payments for J.G.

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      {¶19} Father obtained an independent living space, that is, a small apartment in
Kent, Ohio, roughly one month prior to the trial. The GAL expressed concern about the
size and location of Father’s apartment, as it is located in close proximity to a busy
highway. Although there is no yard for recreation at Father’s apartment, a park is located
within walking distance. The GAL conceded he had not observed any interaction between
Father and J.G.
      {¶20} L.M., J.G.’s paternal grandmother, testified on Father’s behalf. She had not
seen J.G. since he was two years of age. Father lived with her for approximately four
years after Father and Mother ended their relationship. Although Paternal Grandmother
conceded Father’s illegal drug use, she denied Father was ever addicted to illegal drugs.
      {¶21} Paternal Grandmother explained she would assist Father with J.G.’s care
should he be awarded custody of J.G. However, she conceded on cross-examination
that each of her five children had been the subject of Agency intervention and oversight.
      {¶22} Appellants testified a typical day in J.G.’s life includes quality time with each
of them. Great Aunt is J.G.’s full-time caretaker and she assists J.G. with his schoolwork.
Great Aunt further testified that she and J.G. play outside with various toys and games.
Great Uncle has a full-time position as a laboratory supervisor.
      {¶23} Great Uncle testified J.G., who was 6 years of age on the date of the
hearing, attends counseling because he struggles with the knowledge that he had an
older brother who died before J.G.’s birth. J.G.’s preoccupation and sadness about his
deceased brother and the instability of his early years prompted Appellants to arrange for
counseling sessions for J.G.
      {¶24} The GAL testified J.G. told him he was “happy” residing with Appellants and
had a few friends at school. However, the GAL conceded he had not consulted with J.G.’s
counselor or teacher.     When asked about Father’s belief that J.G. suffered from
depression, the GAL responded J.G. was “pretty happy” during the GAL’s single visit.
(Id., p. 121.) Nonetheless, the GAL expressed concern for J.G.’s health because he is
“obesely overweight.” (Id.)
      {¶25} According to the GAL, Appellants could not identify J.G.’s pediatrician
during their interview. However, J.G. was a patient at Akron Children’s Hospital and had
seen various physicians there, most recently for a COVID-19 test. Despite Appellants’

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inability to identify J.G.’s pediatrician, they informed the GAL that J.G. was fully
vaccinated, because it is a requirement for enrollment in public school.
       {¶26} The GAL reported that Appellants provided for J.G.’s basic needs and were
his sole financial support. The GAL opined at the trial that custody should be awarded to
Appellants, and Father should be granted progressive liberal visitation.
       {¶27} On December 21, 2022, Father filed an ex parte/emergency motion for
immediate custody or visitation. Although Appellants had agreed to visitation at their
residence following the closure of Hope House, Father alleged Appellants terminated all
means of contact and/or visitation “under the pretense of being advised to withhold
visitation until a decision is rendered.” An agreed entry was filed on December 22, 2022
permitting Father two hours of visitation on Christmas Eve at Appellants’ home.
       {¶28} On January 31, 2023, the original magistrate’s decision and judgment entry
adopting the original decision was filed. On February 3, 2023, an amended magistrate’s
decision was filed. On February 6, 2023, a judgment entry adopting the amended
magistrate’s decision was issued.1 On February 14, 2023, Father filed objections to the
original and amended magistrate’s decisions.
       {¶29} On March 16, 2023, a second amended magistrate’s decision was filed. For
the first time in the second amended magistrate’s decision, the magistrate concluded that
no change of circumstances had occurred. The first two magistrate’s decisions did not
undertake any change of circumstances analysis. No objections were filed to the second
amended magistrate’s decision. It appears the second amended magistrate’s decision
was issued in order to address a change of circumstances, which was one of the
objections advanced by Father in his February 14, 2023 pleading.
       {¶30} On March 27, 2023, oral argument on Father’s objections was held. At the
hearing, Father’s counsel incorporated the second amended magistrate’s decision into
his objections.

1On February 6, 2023, a magistrate’s decision was issued relating to Appellants’ request for child
support, which was adopted on February 7, 2023. No appeal was taken from the child support
entry.

Case No. 23 MA 0075
                                                                                        –7–

        {¶31} On May 1, 2023, the juvenile court conducted an in camera interview with
J.G., which the GAL attended. J.G. was seven years of age during the in camera interview
and was within a month of completing first grade.
        {¶32} On May 30, 2023, the GAL filed a supplemental report changing his
recommendation. In the supplemental report, the GAL opined that custody should be
awarded to Father, with liberal visitation awarded to Appellants. On June 2, 2023, the
judgment entry on appeal was issued by the juvenile court sustaining Father’s objections
and overruling generally the “magistrate’s decision.”
        {¶33} In the judgment entry on appeal, the juvenile court first opines that a change
of circumstances has occurred based on the “positive improvements” Father had made
in his life. The juvenile court also cites J.G.’s considerable weight gain as a change in
circumstances. (6/2/23 J.E., p. 3.) The parties concede on appeal that a change of
circumstances occurred when Mother, the then-residential parent pursuant to the juvenile
court’s September 25, 2020 judgment entry, relinquished J.G.’s care to Appellants.
        {¶34} With respect to the statutory factors, the juvenile court noted “the in camera
interview was significantly important in determining this matter and reversing the
[magistrate’s decision.]” (Id., p. 2.) More specifically, the juvenile court found:

        Father has made great strides in overcoming past challenges. He has
        made considerable adjustments to his life and home and is prepared to
        parent [J.G.]. Father is sincere, loving, and caring. He is passionate about
        raising his son. [Great] Aunt and Uncle have been good guardians of [J.G.]
        when they were needed to assist. The time has come for Father to assume
        his role as parent and he is prepared to do so. [J.G.] expressed his wishes
        and the Court has considered them. The Court found [J.G.] competent,
        truthful, and sincere. The [GAL] also found [J.G.] to be truthful and honest.
        The Court finds that [J.G.] loves his Father and wishes to be with him too.
        Minor Child is appreciative of the care provided to him by [Great] Aunt and
        Uncle. The in camera interview was very compelling and much weight is
        given to it by this reviewing Court.

(Id., p. 3.)

Case No. 23 MA 0075
                                                                                             –8–

       {¶35} The juvenile court discounted the fact that Great Aunt provided full-time care
for J.G. The juvenile court observed that many parents place their children in day care,
and further there is “no evidence that Paternal Grandmother posed any harm to J.G.” (Id.)
Finally, the juvenile court found that Father “will be more likely to facilitate visitation.” (Id.)
       {¶36} With respect to the best interest analysis, the juvenile court opined J.G.
“does not have access to physical sports but spends most of his time playing videos or
watching television.” (Id., p. 3-4.) The juvenile court further opined J.G. had “free and
open access to non-nutritional food” and his weight gain has “negatively affected his
ability to interact with other children.”
       {¶37} The juvenile court concluded, “[t]here has been some significant harm to
[J.G.] while in the care and custody of [Appellants’] home and care [sic]. [J.G.] has gained
considerable weight and his medical and basic needs are not being addressed despite
[Appellants’] testimony.” (Id., p. 3.)
       {¶38} As a consequence, the juvenile court awarded custody to Father, with
companionship time awarded to Appellants, including one week during each summer.
This timely appeal followed.

                                              LAW

       {¶39} The juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the
custody of a child who is not a ward of another Ohio court. R.C. 2151.23(A)(2). See also
R.C. 2151.23(F)(1) (the juvenile court shall exercise its jurisdiction in child custody
matters in accordance with R.C. 3109.04). The custody of a child is a “fundamental liberty
interest” of a parent. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d
599 (1982).
       {¶40} This right of a parent to rear her own child presents itself in custody
proceedings between a parent and a non-parent, as opposed to a custody proceeding
between two parents. In re Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 96, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977). In
such a dispute, it has long been held that a “suitable” parent has a “paramount right” to
the custody of their minor child “unless they forfeit that right by contract, abandonment,
or by becoming totally unable to care for and support those children.” Id. at 97, citing Clark

Case No. 23 MA 0075
                                                                                          –9–

v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 310 (1877); Masitto v. Masitto, 22 Ohio St.3d 63, 65, 488
N.E.2d 857 (1986).
       {¶41} However, Mother was J.G.’s residential parent, pursuant to the September
15, 2020 judgment entry, when the motions for legal custody filed by Appellants and
Father were before the juvenile court. Appellants were awarded temporary custody of
J.G. for the purpose of admitting him to public school and during the pendency of
Appellants’ motion for legal custody, which was combined in the same pleading with the
motion for temporary custody. Insofar as the competing motions for legal custody did not
involve the original award of custody, but instead a modification of the original award of
custody, the suitability test does not apply. In re DeLucia v. West, 7th Dist. Mahoning No.
05-MA-5, 2005-Ohio-6933, ¶ 32.
       {¶42} R.C. 2151.42, captioned “Modification or termination of dispositional order,”
reads in its entirety:

       (A) At any hearing in which a court is asked to modify or terminate an order
       of disposition issued under section 2151.353, 2151.415, or 2151.417 of the
       Revised Code, the court, in determining whether to return the child to the
       child’s parents, shall consider whether it is in the best interest of the child.

       (B) An order of disposition issued under division (A)(3) of section 2151.353,
       division (A)(3) of section 2151.415, or section 2151.417 of the Revised
       Code granting legal custody of a child to a person is intended to be
       permanent in nature. A court shall not modify or terminate an order granting
       legal custody of a child unless it finds, based on facts that have arisen since
       the order was issued or that were unknown to the court at that time, that a
       change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the person who
       was granted legal custody, and that modification or termination of the order
       is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.

       {¶43} Although the statute does not provide specific best interest factors, courts
may consider the best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D) (applicable to permanent
custody) in conjunction with R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) (applicable to allocation of parental

Case No. 23 MA 0075
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rights). In re M.G., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 22 MA 0078, 2023-Ohio-3423, ¶ 29. The
permanent custody statute provides a non-exhaustive list of considerations including the
child’s interactions, interrelationships, wishes, custodial history, and need for
permanence. R.C. 2151.414(D). The custody statute includes similar considerations and
additionally lists the child’s adjustment, the mental and physical health of all involved,
support arrearage, the history and likelihood of honoring visitation orders, certain criminal
convictions, and establishment of a residence out of state or plan to do so. R.C.
3109.04(F)(1). Finally, “[a] change of circumstances must be one of substance, not slight
or inconsequential, to justify modifying a prior custody order.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio
St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.26 1159 (1997).
       {¶44} Although the trial court was required to consider all relevant factors, the
statute does not require a court to address each listed factor considered in its written
decision. In re J.K., 7th Dist. Carroll No. 14 CA 899, 2014-Ohio-5502, ¶ 31. Moreover, a
court is presumed to consider the factors absent evidence to the contrary. Id. citing In re
Henthorn, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 00BA37 (Nov. 28, 2001).
       {¶45} “[L]egal custody where parental rights are not terminated is not as drastic a
remedy as permanent custody.” In re Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d 445, 455, 751 N.E.2d 552
(2001). Accordingly, “[t]he trial court’s standard of review is not clear and convincing
evidence, as it is in a permanent custody proceeding, but is merely preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. An award of legal custody is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. An
abuse of discretion exists if the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). If
the court’s decision on the children's best interests or on other factual issues surrounding
legal custody is not supported by competent and credible evidence, then it is
unreasonable. In re M.G., 2023-Ohio-3423, 224 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 9 (7th Dist.).
       {¶46} Credibility issues are critical in custody cases, and important information
may be evident from the demeanor and attitude of the witnesses that does not translate
into the record. Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). The
trial court is in the best position to weigh the testimony and observe the witnesses’
demeanor in order to gauge their credibility. Id. at 418-419.

Case No. 23 MA 0075
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       {¶47} The Ohio Supreme Court in Davis further cautioned:

       “ * * * A reviewing court should not reverse a decision simply because it
       holds a different opinion concerning the credibility of the witnesses and
       evidence submitted before the trial court. A finding of an error in law is a
       legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of
       witnesses and evidence is not. The determination of credibility of testimony
       and evidence must not be encroached upon by a reviewing tribunal,
       especially to the extent where the appellate court relies on unchallenged,
       excluded evidence in order to justify its reversal.”

       This is even more crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much
       evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the
       record well.

Id. at 419, quoting Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 81, 461
N.E.2d 1273 (1984).

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
       GRANTING LEGAL CUSTODY OF [J.G.] TO [FATHER] AS SUCH
       DECISION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND WAS
       NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
       SUCH DECISION WAS IN [J.G.’S] BEST INTEREST.

       {¶48} In their first assignment of error, Appellants argue Father’s sobriety is
laudable, however he offered no testimony regarding a treatment regimen or a support
system in place to maintain his sobriety. They further argue Father has little to no support
system to help care for J.G., but for Paternal Grandmother, who has a troubled history of
raising her own children.
       {¶49} Appellants assert the juvenile court ignored Father’s lengthy struggle with
drug addiction, as well as his failure to financially support J.G. They also cite Father’s

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employment history alleging that Father has changed jobs three different times in the
previous three years.
       {¶50} Next, Appellants argue there is no evidence in the record that J.G. has free
and open access to non-nutritious food. They argue in the absence of evidence to the
contrary that J.G.’s weight problem may be genetic.
       {¶51} Finally, Appellants contend there is no evidence in the record to show they
intentionally interfered with Father’s visitation. They assert the juvenile court blamed
them for Father’s failure to spend time with J.G., despite Father’s historical failure to care
for and support J.G. Appellants allege the juvenile court “unmistakably has a strong
disdain for [Appellants] for some unknown reason despite [Appellants] willingly and
unquestionably caring for [J.G.]” (Appellants’ Brf., p. 18.) Appellants conclude, “[i]t is clear
that the [juvenile court] supports parents having custody of a child, when it is not in the
child’s best interest.” (Id., at p. 19.)
       {¶52} The juvenile court was clearly impressed with Father’s efforts to amend his
life. As of the date of the oral argument on Father’s objections, Father had maintained
his sobriety for over two-and-a-half years, and had been living independently for more
than one year. Father had been employed for roughly three years. Although he changed
employers three times, there is no evidence in the record that he was terminated from
any job.
       {¶53} Father impressed the juvenile court as “sincere, loving, and caring,” and
“passionate about raising his son.” The foregoing observations fall within the ambit of
credibility, which did not translate in the record, so we must defer to the juvenile court’s
characterization of Father.
       {¶54} In determining J.G.’s best interest, the juvenile court was required to
consider    a   non-exclusive      list    of   factors,   including   the   child’s   interactions,
interrelationships, wishes, custodial history, need for permanence, the child’s adjustment,
the mental and physical health of all involved, any support arrearage, and the history and
likelihood of honoring visitation orders. There was no testimony offered at the hearing
that J.G.’s interactions and interrelationship would be affected by a change in custody, or
that any adjustment, for instance J.G.’s school, would be impacted should Father be
awarded custody. As a consequence, the juvenile court focused on two factors, J.G.’s

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health and the likelihood that the respective parties would honor visitation orders. Both
factors favored Father.
       {¶55} The juvenile court was particularly troubled by J.G.’s weight. According to
Father’s testimony, J.G.’s weight increased dramatically over the course of the previous
year. The GAL described J.G. as morbidly obese. While Father expressed concern about
J.G.’s weight, Appellants neither acknowledged the problem nor offered any testimony
regarding their effort to help J.G. maintain a healthy weight.
       {¶56} Next, the juvenile court opined that Father would be more likely to honor
visitation orders. While there was conflicting testimony regarding the responsibility for
Father’s limited visits over the previous year, we must defer to the juvenile court’s
credibility determination regarding the parties’ dispute.
       {¶57} Finally, the juvenile court described the in camera interview with J.G. as
“very compelling” and the juvenile court afforded “much weight” to the interview in its best
interest analysis. Likewise, the GAL amended his recommendation following the in
camera hearing in favor of Father.
       {¶58} “[C]ustody issues are some of the most difficult and agonizing decisions a
trial judge must make. Therefore, a trial judge must have wide latitude in considering all
the evidence before him or her * * *.” Davis, supra, at 418. The juvenile judge heard and
saw the parties as they spoke and judged their credibility, sincerity, and attitude, which is
the trial court’s primary function and prerogative. Id. at 418-419. Having reviewed the
record, we find the juvenile court’s decision was supported by competent, credible
evidence, and therefore, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting
custody to Father. Accordingly, Appellants’ first assignment of error has no merit.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, THUS ABUSING
       ITS DISCRETION, IN RULING ON FATHER’S OBJECTIONS TO
       MAGISTRATE’S DECISIONS WHEN SAID MAGISTRATE’S DECISIONS
       WERE AMENDED, WITHOUT FURTHER OBJECTION; WHEN THE
       OBJECTIONS DID NOT COMPLY WITH OHIO RULES OF CIVIL

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         PROCEDURE 53(D); WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE
         OBJECTIONS RAISED.

         {¶59} Appellants argue Father committed a procedural error by failing to object to
the second amended magistrate’s decision.             Although Father did not amend his
objections, he did incorporate the second amended magistrate’s decision into his
objections at oral argument.       However, Appellants do not argue they suffered any
prejudice as a result of the procedural error.
         {¶60} Next, Appellants contend Father’s objections were general in nature,
contrary to the requirements of Civ. R. 54(D)(3)(b)(ii) which reads, “[a]n objection to a
magistrate’s decision shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for
objection.”    To the contrary, Father advances specific procedural and substantive
objections to the magistrate’s decisions.
         {¶61} Finally, Appellants assert the juvenile court relied on facts that were not the
subject of Father’s specific objections. Juvenile Rule 40(D), captioned, “Action of Court
on Magistrate's Decision and on Any Objections to Magistrate’s Decision; Entry of
Judgment or Interim Order by Court,” reads in relevant part:

         (b) Action on Magistrate’s Decision. Whether or not objections are timely
         filed, a court may adopt or reject a magistrate’s decision in whole or in part,
         with or without modification. A court may hear a previously-referred matter,
         take additional evidence, or return a matter to a magistrate.

         {¶62} The juvenile court rejected the magistrate’s decision based in large
measure on the in camera interview. Insofar as the juvenile court acted within its authority
to take additional evidence, we find no procedural error.
         {¶63} Based on the foregoing analysis, Appellants have failed to demonstrate any
procedural error. Accordingly, we find Appellants’ second assignment of error has no
merit.

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                                         CONCLUSION

       {¶64} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment entry of the juvenile court awarding
custody of J.G. to Father is affirmed.

Robb, P.J., concurs.

Hanni, J., dissents with dissenting opinion.

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                                                                                           – 16 –

Hanni, J., dissenting.

        {¶65} With regard and respect to my colleagues, I must dissent from the majority
opinion. I agree that Father’s current drug-free status is commendable, as well as the
facts that he has a job, and recently moved into an apartment.
        {¶66} However,     reviewing    R.C.   2151.414(D),     in   conjunction    with    R.C.
3109.04(F)(1), the factors for determining the child’s best interest, I would find that it is in
J.G.’s best interest to remain with his maternal aunt and uncle. Factors to review include
the child’s interactions, wishes, custodial history, need for permanence, the child’s
adjustment, the mental and physical health of all involved, any support arrearage, and the
likelihood of honoring visitation.
        {¶67} Father has had three jobs in three years and moved into his apartment just
one month prior to the court hearing. Father has visited J.G. only three times in the past
year.
        {¶68} J.G. has a strong relationship with maternal aunt and uncle. Maternal aunt
and uncle have been J.G.’s only familial stability throughout his young life. Maternal aunt
is home all day and maternal aunt and uncle have consistently provided for J.G’s mental
and physical needs. They enrolled him in school and have him in counseling to assess
and provide for his mental well-being.
        {¶69} Father has cared for J.G. for only 2 out of his 7 years of life. Father did not
know where J.G. was enrolled for school, who his teachers were, or what his classes or
grades were. Father is in arrears with his child support. J.G.’s paternal grandmother has
offered to help father provide care for J.G. while father is at work. However, she last saw
J.G. when he was two years old and all of her five children had involvement with children’s
services agencies when they were young. Further, the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) had not
observed any interactions between father and J.G.
        {¶70} The court and the GAL expressed great concern over J.G.’s increased
weight. The court even considered this weight gain a “significant harm” to J.G. while in
the care of maternal aunt and uncle. The court held that due to this weight gain, J.G.’s
“medical and basic needs are not being addressed” despite the contrary testimony of
maternal aunt and uncle. The court further found that J.G. did not have access to physical
sports and spent most of his time playing videos or watching television.

Case No. 23 MA 0075
                                                                                    – 17 –

       {¶71} However, the GAL did not speak to J.G.’s teachers, counselor or the
pediatricians who had treated J.G. to provide additional relevant information, considering
the significance placed on this factor. Further, there was no evidence that J.G. lacked
access to physical sports or activity while in the custody of maternal aunt and uncle.
       {¶72} Accordingly, I would find that the court abused its discretion by overruling
the magistrate’s decision and granting custody to father. I would sustain maternal aunt
and uncle’s first assignment of error.

Case No. 23 MA 0075
[Cite as In re J.G., 2024-Ohio-1101.]

         For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
 are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of
 the Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed.
 Costs to be taxed against the Appellants.
         A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
 in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that
 a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into
 execution.

                                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

         This document constitutes a final judgment entry.