Court Opinion

ID: 9643131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:20:19.194178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:57.731113
License: Public Domain

HUDSON, Justice,
concurring.
While I concur with the majority’s decision, I write separately to speak to an issue that both parties asked this court to address.
In his first argument, relator claims the contempt judgment is void because the trial court failed to credit him with social security payments made to his former wife, Jerry Smith (“Smith”). These payments were allegedly made in lieu of relator’s regular child support payments. This is an issue of first impression in Texas.
In a contempt hearing, the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and the contemnor must be deemed possessed of all the rights and privileges of one accused of a crime. Ex parte Cardwell, 416 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Harris, 581 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1979, orig. proceeding). The trial court must presume at the inception of a contempt hearing that a person is not in contempt. Ex parte Elmore, 161 Tex. 585, 342 S.W.2d 558, 561 (1961) (orig. proceeding). If found in contempt, however, there is no appeal from the trial court’s judgment.
An original habeas corpus proceeding is a collateral attack upon the order of contempt, and the relator may obtain relief only if the order is void. Ex parte Dustman, 538 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Tex.1976) (orig. proceeding). A contempt order is void if (1) it was beyond the power of the court or (2) it deprives the relator of his liberty without due process of law. Ex parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex.1980) (orig. proceeding).
In reviewing an order of contempt, this Court must take into consideration the entire record, including evidence offered at the contempt hearing, to determine whether due process has been accorded the relator. Ex parte Cardwell, 416 S.W.2d at 384; Ex parte Elmore, 342 S.W.2d at 561; Ex parte Cox, 479 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist] 1972, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Fiedler, 446 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1969, orig. proceeding).
The relator contends he was disabled for several years. He further claims he applied for disability benefits on behalf of his daughter. During the first year of his disability, he alleges social security benefits were paid to Smith in the amount of $466 per month. During the remainder of his disability, he asserts the payments were raised to $506 per month. The trial court refused to admit or consider any evidence of the social security disability payments, but did permit the relator to make a bill of exception.
A majority of the states which have considered the issue have held that social security disability payments may be credited toward the parent’s child support obligations.1 “Social security payments are a substitute for the disabled parent’s earnings and are not gratuities from the federal government.” Pride v. Nolan, 31 Ohio App.3d 261, 31 OBR 546, 511 N.E.2d 408, 411 (1987). In fact, “[o]ne of the prime purposes of the social security act is to provide a means for a disabled worker to meet his obligations during a period of disability.” Perteet v. Sumner, 246 Ga. 182, 269 S.E.2d 453, 454 (1980). *800An order to pay child support is for the benefit of the children. “If the amount due is paid by the government through Social Security benefits on account of the father, then the purpose of the support order is accomplished.” Windham v. State ex rel. Windham, 574 So.2d 853, 855 (Ala.Civ.App.1990). The rationale of these decisions is persuasive. I would hold that social security disability payments made on behalf of a disabled parent for the benefit of his or her children should be credited toward satisfaction of court ordered child support payments.
Habeas corpus will lie only to absolve the bonds of illegal restraint. It is not available as a writ of error to review or correct erroneous proceedings or as an appeal from erroneous judgments. Ex parte Beamer, 116 Tex. 39, 285 S.W. 255, 256 (1926) (orig. proceeding). Moreover, this Court cannot, on an original writ of habeas corpus, review the trial court’s exercise of discretion nor the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s action. Ex parte Hightower, 877 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding). The issue before us, however, is whether the trial court denied relator due process of law when it refused to permit him to introduce evidence which could have established total or partial satisfaction of his child support obligations.
The majority’s conclusion that the motion for contempt failed to provide sufficient notice is correct. I would further hold, however, that the contempt judgment and commitment order are void because relator was deprived of the right to present admissible evidence in his defense. This issue will probably reemerge in subsequent proceedings between these parties. Believing the issue should be addressed while it is presently before the Court, I concur.

. See generally Bruce I. McDaniel, Annotation, Right to Credit on Child Support Payments for Social Security or other Government Dependency Payments made for Benefit of Child, 77 A.L.R.3d 1315 (1977). Also Matter of Marriage of Callaghan, 19 Kan.App.2d 335, 869 P.2d 240, 242 (1994); In re Marriage of Henry, 156 I11.2d 541, 190 Ill.Dec. 773, 779, 622 N.E.2d 803, 809 (1993); Poynter v. Poynter, 590 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind.App. [1st Dist.] 1992); Board v. Board, 690 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Ky.1985); In re Marriage of Robinson, 651 P.2d 454, 455 (Colo.Ct.App.1982); Mooneyham v. Mooneyham, 420 So.2d 1072 (Miss.1982); Mask v. Mask, 95 N.M. 229, 620 P.2d 883 (1980); Potts v. Potts, 240 N.W.2d 680 (Iowa 1976); Cohen v. Murphy, 368 Mass. 144, 330 N.E.2d 473, 475-76 (1975).