Court Opinion

ID: 9675696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:02:49.595759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:37.587154
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge,
dissenting.
On a plea of guilty, appellant was convicted of theft over the value of $200 and less than the value of $10,000. The majority overrules the State’s motion for rehearing. More of the facts will be set out.
On April 1, 1977, appellant was indicted in Deaf Smith County. On April 8, 1977, the judge of the District Court of Deaf Smith County ordered the sheriff to transport appellant from the New Mexico State Penitentiary to Deaf Smith County jail no later than May 1, 1977 and that the cause be set down number one on the next jury docket.
The district attorney was informed by a latter from the warden of the New Mexico penitentiary that Riggall could not be returned until the interstate compact on de-tainers was complied with.
The State made attempts to return Rig-gall to Deaf Smith County for trial. As reflected by the correspondence in the records, on the 13th of May, 1977, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the prosecution because he had been denied a speedy trial.
On May 25, 1977, the judge entered an order denying the dismissal of the prosecution and found (1) that the prosecution stood ready since September, 1976, and stands ready, to try the defendant at the earliest opportunity; (2) the reason there has not been a trial is that defendant had failed to sign a waiver of extradition and the proper papers for extradition from New Mexico; (3) that the only reason defendant had not been tried as of this date was of his own doing; (4) that should the defendant wish to be tried, he must complete the necessary papers from New Mexico authorities and send them to the receiving agency in Deaf Smith County, then the sheriff of Deaf Smith County or his agent will pick up the defendant immediately and will set him down for the next jury docket.
The clerk of Deaf Smith County filed a letter from Riggall, dated July 1, 1977, which is as follows:
“I am at this time advising the Honorable Court of my intent to withdraw my consent to and my application for speedy trial in your court, cause No. DC 2800. I have also notified the District Attorney and the Warden here of my intent.
Sincerely,
/s/ James Riggall
23597”
August 29, 1977, the court ordered an attorney appointed for Riggall.
On October 5,1977, the attorney asked to withdraw from the case and on the same date another attorney was appointed.
*464On October 28, 1977, appellant signed a document approved by his attorney and the district attorney and the judge entitled “Waiver of Rights and Plea of Guilty” where he recited that he had been advised of his rights (1) to remain silent and not testify against himself, (2) to employ a lawyer, (3) to demand a jury trial, (4) to notice for two days before the time for arraignment, and (5) to have ten (10) days to prepare for trial; that he waived his rights without coercion or duress and entered the plea of guilty as charged and asked the court to assess the punishment.
After this case was tried, the Legislature passed the Speedy Trial Act, Article 32A.02, Section 3, V.A.C.C.P., which provides, in part:
“[Fjailure of a defendant to move for discharge under the provision of this Article prior to trial or the entry of a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of the rights accorded this article.” (Emphasis supplied)
It provides that the entry of a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of his rights. The reasoning of the Legislature in enacting the statute should apply in this case.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty in accordance with the plea bargaining agreement in an effort to receive a lesser punishment. He could have entered a plea of not guilty and had a full-fledged trial.
If the court had not denied the motion to dismiss the prosecution, appellant would have been in the same position as he was when he filed the motion. No harm has been shown. In either event, he was not denied a .speedy trial.
No reversible error is shown; the judgment should be affirmed.