Court Opinion

ID: 9838948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 23:04:06.198828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:59.294802
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/9/23 Certified for Publication 9/8/23 (order attached)

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 Estate of FRANK J. SANCHEZ,                                      H045037
 Deceased.                                                       (Santa Clara County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. 16PR178756)
 LESLIE ANN PERALTA,

             Petitioner and Appellant,

             v.

 CAROLINE SANCHEZ, et al.

             Objectors and Respondents.
         Appellant Leslie Ann Peralta seeks review of various orders arising from
proceedings related to the probate of the estate of her father, Frank J. Sanchez. The only
issue properly raised in the instant appeal is whether Leslie,1 as executor and personal
representative of Frank’s estate, can appear in propria persona in proceedings related to
her complaint against respondents Caroline Sanchez and Nationstar Mortgage LLC
(Nationstar) for partition by sale of real property in San Jose that was owned in part by
Frank’s estate, and other relief. On appeal, Leslie contends the trial court erred in
striking the complaint on the grounds that she could not proceed without counsel.
Caroline and Nationstar (collectively Respondents) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing

         1
         As several of the parties share the same last name, we will refer to the individual
parties by their first names.
that Leslie could not proceed with the appeal in propria persona. We agree with
Respondents, and will dismiss the appeal accordingly.
                         I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
       Frank passed away in April 2016. Leslie, Frank’s eldest child, filed a petition to
be appointed Frank’s executor and to probate Frank’s will. The probate court appointed
her executor and personal representative of the estate, granting her full authority to
administer the estate under the Independent Administration of Estates Act (IAEA, Prob.
Code, § 10400 et seq.). Caroline is Frank’s surviving spouse. In his will, Frank
confirmed Caroline’s interest in their community and quasi-community property, and
bequeathed all of his separate property, as well as his one-half interest in their community
and quasi-community property, to his three children, Leslie, Frank Jr., and Julie,
explicitly disinheriting Caroline, who is not the mother of Frank’s children, as to that
portion of his estate.

       2
         Leslie contends her appeal concerns not only the probate court’s order filed May
31, 2017, striking her complaint for partition, but also an order denying Leslie’s request
to borrow against the estate’s assets in order to retain counsel, and an order granting
Caroline a temporary probate homestead in the property she co-owned with the estate.
Leslie concedes in her appellant’s opening brief that she filed a separate notice of appeal
on September 27, 2017, to seek review of the latter two orders, which, although heard on
the same date as the motion to strike the partition complaint, were not memorialized in
written orders until August 2017. While Leslie contends that the September 27, 2017
notice of appeal was “added to the instant appeal,” it was properly treated by this court as
a separate appeal, and assigned appeal number H045804. On its own motion, the court
takes judicial notice of the docket of appeal number H045804. Neither the docket in this
appeal nor that in appeal number H045804 reflects that Leslie sought to consolidate these
two appeals. This court dismissed appeal number H045804 by order issued June 22,
2018, after Leslie failed to procure the record on appeal and that order is final. Thus, this
opinion will address only the May 31, 2017 order striking the partition complaint, as
identified in the notice of appeal filed in this matter.

                                              2
       In January 2017, Leslie, on behalf of Frank’s estate, filed in propria persona in the
probate action a complaint against Caroline and Nationstar3 for partition by sale of real
property and other related causes of action. She alleged that, during their marriage, Frank
and Caroline purchased a home on Eulalie Drive in San Jose. Claiming that Caroline
improperly withdrew funds from an account containing proceeds from a reverse
mortgage, the note for which was held at various times by Bank of America and
Nationstar, and that Caroline engaged in other allegedly fraudulent and/or improper
conduct, Leslie sought partition of the Eulalie property by sale “for the common benefit
of the estate beneficiaries” in order to “preserve and secure” the estate’s minimum
50 percent interest in the property. She further alleged that the partition action should
include an accounting of Frank’s separate property contributions to the Eulalie property,
and appropriate reimbursement thereof. In addition to the partition cause of action
against all defendants, Leslie stated causes of action against Caroline for: breach of
fiduciary duty; fraudulent concealment; pre- and post-death conversion; neglect,
abandonment, elder abuse and financial elder abuse under the Welfare and Institutions
Code; ejectment and damages for wrongful detention; accounting, appointment of
receiver, and allocation; and “Penal Code §115(a).”4
       Caroline filed a motion to strike the complaint for partition and related causes of
action.5 Citing City of Downey v. Johnson (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 775 (Downey) and

       3
          The complaint also named Bank of America, N.A., as a defendant. Leslie
dismissed the action as to Bank of America in 2017.
        4
          “Every person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged instrument
to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office within this state, which instrument,
if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the
United States, is guilty of a felony.” (Pen. Code, § 115, subd. (a).)
        5
          Leslie did not designate Caroline’s complete motion as part of the record on
appeal. During the pendency of this appeal, each party has filed motions to augment the
record and/or requests for judicial notice in order to cure deficiencies in the record
provided to this court, all of which we deferred ruling on for consideration with the
appeal. This court has discretion to augment the record with materials that were before

                                              3
Hansen v. Hansen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 618 (Hansen), she argued that the complaint
should be stricken because Leslie, as the personal representative of Frank’s estate, could

the trial court when it issued the order on appeal. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest
Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) We may take judicial notice of
appropriate materials under Evidence Code section 451 et seq., where relevant to a
material issue on appeal. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.)
        The requests for judicial notice filed by Leslie on March 11, 2022, in both this
appeal and in appeal number H045974 are denied as this court does not need to take
judicial notice of case law in order to rely on it in the opinion. (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart
Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46, fn. 9.) Exhibit E of the request filed in this
appeal appears to be a table created by an unidentified person documenting alleged
statutory violations by the trial court. This is not a proper subject for judicial notice
under Evidence Code section 451, et seq. To the extent relevant to the appeal, we can
consider the statutes referenced by the parties without taking judicial notice. (Ibid.)
Exhibit F is a blank “Nonattorney Unauthorized Practice of Law Complaint Form” from
the State Bar of California. Leslie has not demonstrated that the form is a proper subject
of judicial notice.
        Leslie’s motion to augment filed August 2, 2021, is granted as to the documents
included as pages 1 to 70 of volume 1 submitted with the motion, as she has
demonstrated that they were part of the record before the trial court at the time it issued
the May 31, 2017 order that is the subject of this appeal. The remainder of the
documents included in volumes 1 through 13 of the attachment to the motion are dated
after the court issued the May 31, 2017 order, and thus are not the proper subject of a
motion to augment. Further, Leslie has failed to demonstrate how those documents
predating the order are useful to the resolution of this appeal. We will deem Leslie’s
motion as a request to take judicial notice of documents dated after May 31, 2017, and as
such will deny the request. The pleadings and transcripts Leslie wants judicially noticed
are not relevant to the issues in this appeal. Correspondence from Leslie or Caroline to
various entities is not the proper subject of judicial notice.
        Caroline’s September 8, 2022 request for judicial notice, included in her motion to
dismiss this appeal, is granted as to exhibits B and C. It is denied as to Exhibits A, D,
and E, as those pleadings are already included in the record on appeal. The request is
denied as to Exhibits F and G, as they are not relevant to the issues on appeal.
        Nationstar’s November 30, 2022 request for judicial notice is granted. We take
judicial notice of the opinion issued October 31, 2022, by this court in Estate of Sanchez
(Oct. 31, 2022, No. H048814) [non.pub. opn.] (Sanchez). In that opinion, this court
affirmed a trial court order granting Caroline a probate homestead in the Eulalie property
for the remainder of her life.
        Leslie’s July 10, 2023 request for judicial notice is denied as untimely.

                                             4
not appear in propria persona in that representative capacity. She further alleged that the
causes of action set forth in the complaint should be determined in a civil action, not in
the probate action. In addition to asking the court to strike the entire complaint, Caroline
argued that portions of the complaint should be stricken as including “irrelevant, false
and improper matters.” Nationstar joined in Caroline’s motion to strike citing the same
grounds.
       Leslie opposed Respondents’ motions to strike. She argued that she had a right to
file a partition action as a tenant in common to the property and an estate beneficiary.
She further contended that Probate Code section 850 authorized her to file the partition
action, along with related causes of action, in the probate proceeding.6 Leslie claimed
that the estate and its beneficiaries had a constitutionally protected due process right to
proceed with Leslie appearing in propria persona, as the case law cited by Respondents
only precluded such appearance in matters outside of the probate context.
       The probate court held a hearing on May 31, 2017. Relying on Hansen and
Downey, Caroline argued that the complaint Leslie filed did not comply “with any of the
Probate Code 850 procedures,” instead arguing that the gravamen of the claims were
“general civil litigation claims” that could not be prosecuted “by an in pro per
representative of the estate. . . .” Nationstar reiterated its position that Leslie could not
represent the estate without an attorney, and that the matter should proceed in a civil
action rather than in the probate matter.
       Leslie argued that Hansen and Downey were easily distinguishable from her case,
claiming those cases stood for the proposition that a pro per litigant could not represent

       6
         Under Probate Code section 850, subdivision (a)(2)(C) and (D), the personal
representative may file a petition in a probate matter requesting that the court make an
order when the decedent died in possession of, or holding title to, or having a claim to
real property, and title to, possession of, or some interest in the property is held or
claimed to belong to another. Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the
Probate Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                               5
an estate outside of the probate context. Because Leslie filed her complaint in the probate
action, pursuant to sections 855 and 9823, subdivision (b), she contended that she was
allowed to proceed without an attorney.7
       At the close of argument on the motions to strike, the probate court issued a
written order granting the motions with 20 days leave to amend to give Leslie the
opportunity to retain counsel. While the court recognized that sections 850 and 855
authorized certain matters to be filed in a probate proceeding that would otherwise
proceed in a civil action, the court determined that Leslie’s complaint “does not clearly
resemble in material part a petition under Probate Code section 850, which is the gateway
for invoking Probate Code section 855 as a vehicle to include causes of action normally
raised in a civil action in a probate proceeding.” Even if the court liberally construed the
complaint as a petition under section 850, the court found that “the pleading primarily
consists of civil claims typically raised in a civil action. [Leslie], a non-attorney, cannot
properly prosecute those claims in propria persona in any venue.” The probate court
noted that Leslie did not “cite[] legal authority permitting her to prosecute any cause of
action asserted in the Complaint on behalf of others.”8

       7
          Section 855 provides that an action brought under section 850 et seq., “may
include claims, causes of action, or matters that are normally raised in a civil action to the
extent that the matters are related factually to the subject matter of a petition filed under
[section 850 et seq.].” Under section 9823, subdivision (b), “The personal representative
may bring an action against the other cotenants for partition of any property in which the
decedent left an undivided interest.”
        8
          The probate court’s order notes that Leslie filed all of her pleadings with an
“identifier” beneath her name referencing a “State Bar Associate” number. The issue on
appeal is not whether Leslie was attempting to mislead Respondents or the court into
believing she was licensed to practice law. Leslie never argued that she was a licensed
attorney. This court’s analysis of the issue would be the same whether or not Leslie, who
has gone to law school, identified herself as a “State Bar Associate.” We thus will not
consider evidence in the record or argument concerning Leslie’s status with the State Bar.
The State Bar previously allowed its sections to enroll non-member “associates” or
“affiliates.” (See Rules of the State Bar of Cal., former rules 3.50, 3.52.) Pleadings in
the record indicate Leslie enrolled as such while in law school.

                                              6
       On June 12, 2017, before the time to amend her complaint expired, Leslie, as
executor and personal representative of Frank’s estate, filed a notice of appeal from the
May 31, 2017 order. She filed additional notices of appeal on July 19, 2017, after her
time to amend her complaint had passed. The first notice did not identify the order being
appealed; the second again listed the May 31, 2017 order as the order on appeal.9
       After the record was filed in this appeal, and Leslie filed her appellant’s opening
brief, Caroline and Nationstar each filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.10 As they did in
the probate court regarding the complaint for partition, Respondents argued that Leslie
could not prosecute this appeal in propria persona in her representative capacity as
executor and personal representative of the estate.
       Leslie filed opposition to each motion, contending that this court lacked
jurisdiction to hear such motions, and that the motions violated her constitutional rights.
Leslie argued that she was allowed to proceed in propria persona because she had full

       9
          Generally, an order granting a motion to strike with leave to amend is not
appealable prior to entry of judgment. However, the order was issued based on Leslie’s
purported claim pursuant to section 850. “[A]n appeal may be taken from the making of,
or the refusal to make, any of the following orders: [¶] . . . [¶] Adjudicating the merits of
a claim made under Part 19 (commencing with Section 850) of Division 2.” (§ 1300,
subd. (k).) By striking the complaint for partition and related causes of action, the
probate court refused to make orders adjudicating the merits of Leslie’s claim under
section 850. We thus conclude Leslie took her June 12, 2017 notice of appeal from an
appealable order. The probate court did thereafter grant a motion by Nationstar to
dismiss the complaint after Leslie failed to amend within the allotted time, ultimately
entering judgment in Nationstar’s favor in November 2017. On its own motion, this
court takes judicial notice of Nationstar’s motion to dismiss, the resulting order granting
the motion, and the judgment of dismissal in Nationstar’s favor, attached as exhibits to
Nationstar’s motion to dismiss the appeal.
        10
           At Leslie’s request, this appeal was ordered considered together with appeal
numbers H045974 and H046499, taken from orders issued in related civil actions.
Caroline sought dismissal of each of the three appeals. This court granted her motion in
part and dismissed appeal number H045974. It ordered appeal number H046499, which
arose from a limited jurisdiction unlawful detainer action, transferred to the Appellate
Division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court.

                                              7
authority under the IAEA to administer the estate without trial court approval,
referencing cases out of the United States Supreme Court that involved probate appeals
with a pro se appellant.11 This court deferred ruling on the motions to dismiss for
consideration with the appeal.
                                         II. DISCUSSION
       The issue presented in both the motions to dismiss this appeal, and in the appeal
itself, is whether Leslie can proceed in propria persona on issues related to the complaint
for partition which are raised in her capacity as executor and personal representative of
Frank’s estate. Based on the holdings in Downey, supra, 263 Cal.App.2d 775 and
Hansen, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 618, the parties do not dispute that outside of the probate
context a personal representative must have counsel to prosecute or defend claims on
behalf of an estate. They disagree whether those holdings preclude an executor and
personal representative from proceeding in pro per within a probate case on claims that
could have been raised in a separate civil action. Having considered the relevant case law
and provisions of the Probate Code, we conclude that Leslie’s complaint for partition and
other relief is a claim made against third parties for the benefit of the estate’s
beneficiaries, such that it could not be prosecuted by Leslie in propria persona. By
extension, Leslie cannot prosecute the appeal before us without counsel. We will grant
Respondents’ motions and dismiss the appeal accordingly.
   A. Leslie Cannot Represent the Estate in Propria Persona
       “No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active licensee
of the State Bar.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6125.) Under the statute, a person who is not a
licensed attorney cannot appear in court for another person. (Russell v. Dopp (1995) 36
Cal.App.4th 765, 774.) Where the facts are undisputed, we review de novo whether a

       11
         The additional arguments Leslie raised in her opposition to the motions to
dismiss are not relevant to the determination of the motion or the appeal and will not be
repeated here.

                                               8
person’s conduct amounts to practicing law without a license. (See Hansen, supra, 114
Cal.App.4th at p. 618 [issue resolved as a matter of law].)
       Appellate courts, including those in Hansen and Downey, have confirmed that this
rule precludes the personal representative of an estate from appearing without counsel in
actions outside of the probate case. In Downey, a city brought an eminent domain
proceeding against a property owner and her son as the conservator, and later executor, of
her estate. (Downey, supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at pp. 777-778.) The son proceeded to
defend the suit in propria persona in the trial court, and to prosecute an appeal from the
resulting judgment in the city’s favor without counsel. (Id. at p. 778.) The appellate
court held that “in a judicial action or proceeding which is not an integral part of the
proceedings within the jurisdiction of the probate court[,]” the son could not appear pro
per to conduct either the trial proceedings or the appeal. (Id. at pp. 778, 780.) “[I]n
absence of statutory authorization, [fn. omitted] neither an executor, administrator, nor a
guardian may appear except through a licensed attorney in proceedings involving matters
other than his personal rights as such a representative, e.g. accounting to a probate court.
‘[A] person who is not a licensed attorney and who is acting as an administrator, executor
or guardian cannot practice law in matters relating to his trusteeship on the theory that he
is practicing for himself[.]’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 779.) The appellate court did not
decide “the right or capacity of a conservator or an executor to appear in propria persona
in probate court proceedings affecting rights personal to his office as executor or
conservator to which he has been appointed by the probate court.” (Id. at p. 780.) The
court determined the notice of appeal filed by the executor was valid, but it struck all
other pleadings filed by him in the appeal. (Id. at pp. 780-781.) The court held that the
trial court judgment was invalid because the executor could not appear in the action pro
per, and the papers and documents he drafted and purported to file should have been
stricken. (Id. at pp. 782-783.)

                                              9
       The appellate court in Hansen confirmed the principles enunciated in Downey:
“[A] conservator, executor, or personal representative of a decedent’s estate who is
unlicensed to practice law cannot appear in propria persona on behalf of the estate in
matters outside the probate proceedings. When such a nonlawyer brings a nonprobate
action in propria persona on behalf of the estate, the proper appellate remedy is to reverse
with directions for the trial court to strike the complaint.” (Hansen, supra, 114
Cal.App.4th at p. 619.) In Hansen, the personal representative of an estate sued her sister
for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty; she filed
the complaint as a general civil matter, not as a petition within the probate case. (Id. at
p. 619.) The trial court sustained the respondent’s demurrer without leave to amend, and
the personal representative appealed. While the personal representative prosecuted the
complaint in propria persona in the trial court, an attorney filed the appeal on her behalf.
(Id. at p. 620.) The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with
directions to the trial court to strike the complaint without prejudice because the personal
representative could not appear in propria persona to represent the interests of the estate.
(Id. at pp. 622, 623.) The court noted, “[The personal representative] may have been able
to present the claims asserted in the Complaint in a petition in the probate proceedings
(see Prob. Code, § 850, subd. (a)(2)), and [Downey], supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at page 778,
suggests (but does not hold) a nonlawyer representative of a decedent’s estate may appear
in propria persona on behalf of the estate in matters within the probate proceedings. But
we are not presented with that issue.” (Hansen, at p. 622.) “Further, in [Downey], supra,
263 Cal.App.2d 775, 780, the court did not decide whether the executor could appear in
propria persona in probate proceedings affecting rights personal to the executor’s office
(for example, for recovery of executor’s fees). We also do not decide that issue because
the Complaint did not affect [the personal representative’s] rights personal to her office
as personal representative.” (Hansen, at p. 622.)

                                             10
       Leslie argues that the holdings in Downey and Hansen only preclude her from
appearing in propria persona in matters outside of the probate case. Indeed, the Hansen
court left open the possibility that a personal representative could appear in pro per to
prosecute a petition filed in the probate court under section 850, the situation presented in
the instant matter. However, additional cases clarify that the primary concern raised by a
personal representative appearing in propria persona is that they are representing the
interests of others and not just themselves. This concern was thoroughly addressed in the
recent case of Donkin v. Donkin (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 469 (Donkin). There, successor
trustees of a family trust appealed an order rejecting their proposed interpretation of the
trust. (Id. at p. 470.) The beneficiaries of the trust argued that the trustees engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law by representing themselves in the matter.
       The appellate court rejected that argument. (Donkin, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 471.) In doing so, the court distinguished Ziegler v. Nickel (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 545
(Ziegler), wherein the appellate court held that a nonattorney trustee could not represent a
trust without counsel in a lawsuit between the trust and a mobilehome park. “Ziegler did
not involve probate proceedings, but rather a lawsuit between a mobilehome park and a
trust—appearing, as a trust necessarily does, through its trustee. [Citation.] In
concluding the trustee could not represent himself in prosecuting the trust’s lawsuit
against the mobilehome park, Ziegler explained that ‘ “ ‘a trustee’s duties in connection
with his or her office do not include the right to present argument [while representing
himself] in courts of the state, because in this capacity such trustee would be representing
interests of others and would therefore be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
[Citations.]” [Citations.] [¶] Stated otherwise, “[a] trustee must always act solely in the
beneficiaries’ interest. [Citations.]” [Citations.] The actions of the trustee affect the
trust estate and therefore affect the interest of the beneficiaries. A nonattorney trustee
who represents the trust in court is representing and affecting the interests of the
beneficiary and is thus engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.’ (Ziegler, supra, 64

                                             11
Cal.App.4th at pp. 548-549, italics omitted.)” (Donkin, at pp. 471-472.) By comparison,
in Donkin, the trustee was seeking instructions to effectuate the intent of the trustor rather
than to represent the interests of the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries could disagree with
the trustee as to the interpretation or the trustee’s duties, rendering the trustee adverse to
the beneficiaries and not representing the beneficiaries’ interests. (Id. at pp. 472-473.)
          The Donkin court found instructive the holding in Finkbeiner v. Gavid (2006) 136
Cal.App.4th 1417 (Finkbeiner), wherein the appellate court determined that a trustee did
not engage in the unauthorized practice of law by representing herself when filing a
petition in probate litigation between herself and the beneficiaries to modify and
terminate the trust. (Donkin, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 473.) “The court distinguished
Ziegler on the basis that the trustee in Finkbeiner ‘[was] not suing a third party. She filed
the petition as part of her fiduciary responsibility to the court. [The trustee] correctly
note[d] that trustees have various statutory duties. She was appointed by the court for the
purpose of selling the property. She had a duty to account for trust assets, a right to seek
her fees and a responsibility to notify the court if she felt maintaining an ineffective trust
was wasteful to the trust estate. By filing her petition to modify and terminate the trust,
she was simply fulfilling her duties as trustee. [Citation.] She was not engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.’ (Finkbeiner, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1421.)”
(Donkin, at p. 473.) Like Finkbeiner, the Donkin court determined that the matter before
it was “between trustees and trust beneficiaries in the context of probate proceedings, not
between trustees and a third party in nonprobate litigation,” and thus found the reasoning
in Ziegler did not apply to preclude the trustees from appearing in propria persona.
(Ibid.)
          The matter before this court can be distinguished from Downey and Hansen, in
that it involves proceedings filed in the probate matter. Yet, unlike in Donkin and
Finkbeiner, and more akin to the facts of Downey and Hansen, here Leslie filed claims
against third parties for the benefit of the beneficiaries of Frank’s estate. That Leslie

                                              12
brought the petition pursuant to section 850 does not alter the fact that she did so for the
benefit of the estate’s beneficiaries, including herself, rather than to fulfill her duties as
executor and personal representative. That is not to say that Leslie did not have authority
to bring the action on behalf of the estate. Clearly she did. Section 10553, a provision of
the IAEA, specifically authorizes a personal representative to commence and maintain
actions for the benefit of the estate, and to defend actions against the decedent or estate.
But that statute does not address whether the personal representative must retain counsel
in order to commence or defend actions authorized by section 10553. Nor does Leslie
cite any legal authority that specifically allows the personal representative to proceed in
propria persona in any such action.
       Leslie contends that the full authority provided to her by the IAEA includes the
right to proceed in propria persona, as the IAEA allows the appointed executor to sell real
property without court supervision. (See §§ 10500, subd. (a), 10503, 10511.) The IAEA
also allows the personal representative to obtain court supervision for any action taken by
the representative during the administration of the estate. (§ 10500, subd. (b).) There is
not a provision in the IAEA indicating that the personal representative can proceed in
propria persona if he or she seeks court supervision via a petition filed under section 850.
However, the IAEA contemplates situations where the personal representative will have
an attorney, even if given full authority to administer the estate without court supervision.
(See § 10501, subd. (a) [requiring court supervision for the allowance of compensation to
the personal representative’s attorney, as well as for other actions involving the
attorney].) Construing these statutes as a whole, as we are required to do under basic
principles of statutory construction (People v. Gray (2014) 58 Cal.4th 901, 906), we
conclude that the mere existence of the IAEA does not eliminate the requirement that the
personal representative retain counsel if proceeding against third parties for the benefit of
the estate’s beneficiaries.

                                               13
       Similarly, the fact that the Probate Code, outside of the IAEA, authorizes the
personal representative to commence, maintain, and defend actions for the benefit of the
estate or against the estate (§ 9820) and to bring an action against co-tenants for partition
of any property in which the decedent left an undivided interest (§ 9823, subd. (b)), does
not by implication allow the personal representative to do so without retaining counsel
where those actions are brought for the benefit of the estate beneficiaries, and not in the
furtherance of the representative’s duties as executor and personal representative.
       Leslie suggests that requiring her to obtain counsel to proceed with the complaint
gave Caroline “carte blanche to steal the estate’s real property[,]” as 20 days was
insufficient time for Leslie to retain an attorney, particularly given the probate court’s
order denying her request to borrow against the estate so she could have funds to obtain
counsel. There is no evidence in the record on appeal that Leslie requested additional
time to obtain counsel and file an amended complaint. Rather, Leslie indicates in her
appellant’s opening brief that she did retain counsel on the 19th day after the court
granted the motion to strike. According to Leslie, that attorney “committed complete
malpractice, failing to ever do any work in this case as well as in the related cases (now
also on appeal) as he had signed a contract with Leslie and her two siblings to perform.”
While this court recognizes that an attorney’s failure to perform his or her obligations to a
client places the client in a challenging position, it does not allow us to disregard the law
precluding a nonattorney from representing others where unauthorized by the law.12
       Leslie filed the instant appeal as the representative of Frank’s estate. Although she
had authority to file the notice of appeal without an attorney, her conduct in filing briefs
and other pleadings as representative of the estate constituted the unlicensed practice of

       12
          We reference Leslie’s allegations regarding this attorney for informational
purposes only. We offer no opinion as to whether the attorney committed malpractice, as
Leslie alleges.

                                             14
law, and those pleadings must be stricken. (Downey, supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at pp. 780-
782.)
   B. This Court has Authority to Hear Respondents’ Motions to Dismiss
        Without citing any cognizable legal authority, Leslie contends that this court, as a
court of review, does not have jurisdiction to consider Respondents’ motions to dismiss,
brought on the grounds that Leslie cannot prosecute the appeal in propria persona, as that
is the same basis the trial court used to grant the motion to strike at issue in the appeal. It
is well established that appellate courts have jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal that has
been abandoned by a failure to file an opening brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.220(a); Doran v. White (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 676, 677.) As is clear from the legal
authority cited by Respondents in the motions to dismiss, the pleadings filed by an
appellant improperly proceeding in propria persona must be stricken. (Downey, supra,
263 Cal.App.2d at pp. 780-782.) As a result, there is no lawfully filed opening brief
before us. Leslie had sufficient notice that this was a potential result of these proceedings
and failed to take corrective action by retaining counsel to file an amended opening brief.
It is thus appropriate for us to dismiss the appeal.
                                      III.    DISPOSITION
        The appeal filed June 12, 2017, amended July 19, 2017, is dismissed.

                                              15
                                  _______________________________
                                   Greenwood, P. J.

 WE CONCUR:

__________________________________________
  Bamattre-Manoukian, J.

_______________________________
  Bromberg, J.

Peralta v. Sanchez et al.
H045037
Filed 9/8/23

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                           SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Estate of FRANK JOSEPH SANCHEZ, Deceased.
________________________________________

LESLIE ANN PERALTA,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
CAROLINE SANCHEZ et al.,
Objectors and Respondents.

H045037
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 16PR178756

BY THE COURT:

       The written opinion which was filed on August 9, 2023, has now been certified for
publication pursuant to rule 8.1105(b) of the California Rules of Court, and it is therefore
ordered that the opinion be published in the official reports.

     (Greenwood, P. J., Bamattre-Manoukian, J., and Bromberg, J. participated in this
                                      decision.)

Date: _______________                     ___________________________________ P.J.

                                             1
 Trial Court:                                 Santa Clara County Superior Court
                                              Superior Court No.: 16PR178756

 Trial Judge:                                 The Honorable Rise Jones Pichon

 Petitioner and Appellant,                    Pro Per
 Leslie Ann Peralta:

 Attorneys for Objector and Respondent,       James L. Dawson
 Caroline Sanchez:                            Marc A. Eisenhart
                                              Gates Eisenhart Dawson

                                              Jon David Ives
                                              Severson & Werson

                                              Rita Ann Rehaste
                                              Sanders Rehaste Sternshein & Harvey LLP

                                              James Lambert Leestma
                                              Law Office of James Lambert Leestma

Attorneys for Objector and Respondent,    Jared Daniel Bissell
Nationstar Mortgage LLC:                  Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP

H045037
Peralta v. Sanchez et al.

                                          2