Court Opinion

ID: 9551685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:57:23.145931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:23.715969
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
My primary concern in writing this dissent is with that portion of the majority opinion which concludes that the plaintiff, Lucy Ross, is estopped from asserting error with regard to the date at which the community terminated for purposes of division of property as a result of the partial summary judgment of divorce. Were it not for the majority’s bizarre use of estoppel in this case, as discussed infra, I could otherwise concur1 in the majority opinion.
The concern of the plaintiff on this particular issue is that the trial court refused to take additional evidence on the amount of earnings that the defendant earned, and the amount of any other community proper*419ty that had accumulated after the partial summary judgment, but before the final judgment, so that those earnings and that property could be included in the property division. As recognized in the majority opinion, Idaho law did not recognize or authorize an interlocutory judgment of divorce prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by Idaho in 1959. Newell v. Newell, 77 Idaho 355, 362, 293 P.2d 663, 667 (1956). With the adoption of the federal rules, such judgments have been permissible, but only within the strictures of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, in particular I.R.C.P. 54(b), which governs the “entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims" at issue. In order to make a partial summary judgment a final judgment on any issue, including divorce, I.R.C.P. 54(b) specifically requires “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and ... an express direction for entry of the judgment.”2 Absent such determination and direction, the partial summary judgment was “subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all of the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties,” and thus would not have constituted a final judgment of divorce and would not have terminated the marital community. In the present case, the “order for partial summary judgment and judgment of divorce” contained neither a determination that there was no just reason for delay, nor a direction for entry of the judgment. Thus, I.R.C.P. 54(b) clearly indicates that the uncertified partial summary judgment was not final, and therefore did not have the force of law. Joyce Livestock Co. v. Hulet, 102 Idaho 129, 627 P.2d 308 (1981); Dawson v. Mead, 98 Idaho 1, 557 P.2d 595 (1976). While an uncertified partial summary judgment on the issue of divorce removes that issue from trial, it does not terminate the marriage until the date of the final judgment adjudicating all of the claims between the parties. Since the partial summary judgment in the case at bar did not meet the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(b), the accumulation of community property continued until the date of the final judgment.3
The continuing nature of the marriage following the partial summary judgment of divorce in this case is of particular significance in light of the trial court’s order that the final judgment be entered nunc pro tunc to the date of the partial summary judgment. The purported effect of that order was to relate the property division *420and all other aspects of the final judgment back to September 20,1976, the date of the partial summary judgment.4 In the absence of a Rule 54(b) certification finally terminating the marriage as of that time, however, such action was improper.
An entry of judgment nunc pro tunc represents “the power of the court to amend records of its judgments by correcting mistakes or supplying omissions therein, and to apply such amendments retroactively .... ” 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 186 (1969) (emphasis added). However, “[t]he failure of a court to act, or its incorrect action, can never authorize a nunc pro tunc entry. If a court does not render judgment, or renders one which is imperfect or improper, it has no power to remedy any of these errors or omissions by treating them as clerical misprisions. Omitted judicial actions cannot be supplied, even though it would have been proper in the first instance.....” 1 Freeman on Judgments, § 131 (5th ed. 1925); see Annot. 19 A.L.R.3d 648 (1968). Consequently, since the partial summary judgment was lacking Rule 54(b) certification, that omission cannot later be supplied by an order nunc pro tunc changing the nature of the partial summary judgment. As was stated in Black v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona, 83 Ariz. 121, 317 P.2d 553, 555 (1957), “[T]he court cannot do more than to make the record correspond with the actual facts.”
We have recently affirmed the power of our courts to enter an order nunc pro tunc within the context of a motion made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(a), which outlines the procedure for correcting “clerical mistakes” in the record. Merrick v. Pearce, 97 Idaho 250, 542 P.2d 1169 (1975). In Merrick, the court entered an amended judgment nunc pro tunc to correct a clerical mistake in the amount of the original judgment.
“The case was tried before a jury which returned special verdicts of $5,422.99 for the plaintiff in his claim against the defendants and for $7,994.67 for the defendants upon their counterclaim against the plaintiff. The trial judge, however, entered judgment for the defendants against the plaintiff in the amount of $8,441.35 rather than in the amount of $2,571.68, the difference between the special verdicts.” Id. at 251, 542 P.2d at 1170.
In that case we permitted the amendment nunc pro tunc because it was clear that the actual net judgment was for $2,571.68.5 The amendment nunc pro tunc was merely to make the written record conform with the true actions of the court. However, the order nunc pro tunc in the present case is quite different from that permitted under I.R.C.P. 60(a) and Merrick v. Pearce, supra. Rather than merely correcting the record to accurately reflect the actual facts of the court’s prior actions, the order nunc pro tunc in this case purported to create a new condition, i.e., finality of the partial summary judgment of divorce, which changed both the property rights and status of the parties, but which had not previously been certified as final by the court. Such action constitutes reversible error. The effect of the order nunc pro tunc was to arbitrarily deprive the plaintiff of an accounting of a portion of the community property.
The majority has employed the ubiquitous last resort theory of estoppel6 to de*421feat the plaintiff’s obviously correct reading of Rule 54(b) by stating that “the plaintiff has taken advantage of the favorable provisions of the judgment” and thus cannot assert the clear provisions of Rule 54(b).7 The majority cites Culbertson v. Culbertson. 91 Nev. 230, 533 P.2d 768 (1979), and Willis v. Willis, 93 Idaho 260, 460 P.2d 396 (1969) to support its estoppel finding. Both of those cases, however, involved attacks upon final judgments. Estoppel was not employed in those cases to establish the finality of an otherwise interlocutory judgment.
The existence of estoppel, be it quasi, equitable, promissory, or of some other chameleonic guise, requires some act by the person being estopped which yields benefit to himself and, conversely, induces some detrimental act on the part of the estoppor. Such is recognized by the majority in its citation to Tommerup v. Albertson’s, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 6, 606 P.2d 1055, 1060 (1980).
However, there is nothing in the record to support the majority’s bald conclusion that the plaintiff has received any “advantage” from the partial summary judgment. The majority asserts that “[s]he has received large amounts of property,” but fails to point out that it was her own property wrongfully withheld from her by her husband. She did not receive that from the partial summary judgment in any event, as the majority infers, but only after entry of the final judgment, and then only after having to resort to a writ of execution in order to obtain from her husband that which was already hers. Another “advantage” of the partial summary judgment which the majority finds was the removal of the divorce issue from trial, something which the plaintiff did not want and which she opposed — which is hardly an “advantage.”8 Finally, the majority states that plaintiff “has received $2,000.00 per month alimony during the pendency of this appeal” and therefore should be estopped. However, that benefit was not derived from the partial summary judgment, or even the final judgment which awarded $2,500 a month, but has its source in an agreement by both parties.
It is obvious that the majority, in applying its “quasi estoppel” doctrine, fails to distinguish between the partial summary judgment to which it is applying the so-called “quasi estoppel,” and the final judgment, from which the so-called “advan*422tages” flow. If the majority is really serious about applying the doctrine of “quasi estoppel” to situations where a party receives some but not all of the relief to which he is entitled in a final judgment, and then appealing from that judgment is “quasi estopped” to assert error on appeal as to that judgment unless he disavows those portions of the judgment which were to his advantage, it has unwittingly made a radical change in appellate practice.
Additionally, if Lucy Ross is estopped under these facts from arguing error in the court’s disposition of property, then applying the same rule of “quasi estoppel” the defendant John Ross should also be es-topped from appealing the award of alimony to Lucy Ross. It was John Ross who actively sought the divorce by moving for partial summary judgment of divorce. John Ross has benefited from the decree of divorce in no lesser degree than did the plaintiff. John Ross obtained the benefit of being free from his wife so that he could immediately marry his office assistant. Lucy Ross was disadvantaged in that she was left in middle age after serving as homemaker for almost twenty-five years to start from scratch in qualifying herself for outside employment. She was disadvantaged in that she felt compelled by the tragic events surrounding the divorce to travel thousands of miles across the country in an attempt to pick up the pieces and establish a new life. As to the property which the majority found that Lucy Ross received and which she has taken “advantage” of, the defendant John Ross received an equal amount and has taken “advantage” of it. Now, John Ross attempts in this appeal to both take advantage of the “favorable provisions of the judgment” and “maintain a position which is inconsistent” with his acceptance of those benefits under the judgment, by seeking to eliminate the plaintiff’s alimony lifeline. If Lucy Ross is estopped from attacking the judgment in order to seek her full share of the community property, then applying the majority’s own rationale, why isn’t John Ross also estopped from attacking the alimony provision of the judgment? If the Court’s new rule of “quasi estoppel” is anything akin to the recognized rules of equitable estoppel which have previously existed in Anglo-American jurisprudence, then it has its genesis in the determination that one party is at fault, or has come into court with “unclean hands.” On the record in this case it is absolutely clear that in an “unclean hands” contest the defendant John Ross would lose hands down. Why then is the wife being penalized? The only other explanation for the unequal application of the Court’s “quasi estoppel” rule in this case suggests a veiled attempt to circumvent the constitutional prohibitions imposed by the United States Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971), and Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979).
If the majority’s “quasi estoppel” holding is going to be the law in this state, then it should also be applied against the husband John Ross, and the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed in toto.

. It should be noted, however, that the discussion in the majority opinion of both the method of assessing attorney fees under I.C. §§ 32-704 and -708, and the division of property pursuant ty I.C. § 32-712, concern the application of those statutes prior to significant amendments made in all of them during the 1980 legislative session.

. I.R.C.P. 54(b) still contains the same requirement, but has since been amended to require a formal 54(b) certificate setting forth such determination and direction. The use of the word “certification” in the present opinion refers to meeting the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(b) as they existed at the time of the proceedings below.

. By granting such uncertified partial summary judgments of divorce, courts may be fostering in the parties a false sense of “freedom.” Parties believing they are divorced may enter into new relationships or marriages when in fact the prior marriage has not been terminated. Property division and maintenance obligations are also subject to confusion when a partial summary judgment of divorce is entered. Community property is created by the efforts of the parties, and marital financial obligations continue until the divorce is final. See Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976). Thus, despite a partial summary judgment of divorce, marital obligations and the accumulation of community property continue absent a Rule 54(b) certificate.
Problems, however, are not avoided by merely adding a Rule 54(b) certificate of finality to such a partial summary judgment granting a divorce. Assuming that such a Rule 54(b) certificate would be upheld, see Joyce Livestock Co. v. Hulet, 102 Idaho 129, 627 P.2d 308 (1981), Pichon v. L. J. Broekemeier, Inc., 99 Idaho 598, 586 P.2d 1042 (1978), it might well result in an interminable delay in the litigation. If a notice of appeal were filed by either party as a result of the entering of such a certified partial summary judgment, the trial court would then be ousted from any further jurisdiction to proceed to determine the property and support rights of the various parties, I.A.R. 13(b) First Security Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 570 P.2d 276, 282 (1977), and the parties’ property rights would be in limbo for as long as it would take this Court to ultimately decide the appeal, at present nearly three years. Consequently, regardless of whether certified under Rule 54(b) or not, partial summary judgments granting only divorce, leaving the difficult property, support and custody questions for later, may accomplish little and are apt to cause severe dislocations, as this case is a good example.

.Although the district court did set out in its order that “the community property should be valued as close in time to the March 14, 1977, trial date, as possible,” the order is ambiguous. It is not clear whether “valued” means merely that community property accumulated as of September 21, 1976, shall be valued as of March 14, 1977, or whether “valued” also means the inclusion of community property accumulated through March 14, 1977. However, the order clearly excludes additional community property acquired during the eight months between trial and the entry of final judgment.

. I.R.C.P. 54(b) provides in part: “If any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other such as on a claim and counterclaim, or upon cross-claims, such judgments shall be offset against each other and a single judgment for the difference shall be entered in favor of the party entitled to the larger judgment.”

. The trial court made no factual finding of estoppel. It was not raised by the defendant *421John Ross on appeal. The majority has made that factual determination for the first time on appeal.

. The estoppel action taken by the majority has not only rendered the certification requirements of Rule 54(b) utterly meaningless, but has arbitrarily deprived the plaintiff of her share of the community property accumulated during the fourteen month period between the interlocutory uncertified partial summary judgment and the final judgment which was rendered in this action. With the Court’s decision today, the certification provision of I.R.C.P. 54(b) has been effectively eliminated. First this Court held, in Pichon v. L. J. Broekemeier, Inc., 99 Idaho 598, 586 P.2d 1042 (1978), that even though a partial summary judgment was certified to be final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b), it nevertheless was held not to be. In this case, the Court now holds that a partial summary judgment which is not certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) is, nevertheless, final. The certainty which the I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificate was intended to provide has been nullified. That rule, by the majority’s action, has been abandoned to an unfortunate union with a multitude of other sound legal doctrines that have fallen victim to the voracious appetite of estoppel.

. While it is true that the plaintiff initially filed the divorce action, the record clearly indicates that the motion for partial summary judgment for an interlocutory order of divorce was made by the defendant, John Ross, and was opposed by the plaintiff. Furthermore, neither party requested that the partial summary judgment, after it was entered, be certified as final. The unfortunate action of the defendant in attempting another marriage following the uncertified partial summary judgment was not the result of any inducements by the plaintiff, but was caused by the defendant’s own failure to respect the interlocutory nature of the uncertified partial summary judgment which he himself requested. Following the logic of the majority, any party who successfully moves for a partial summary judgment may treat that judgment as final, even though uncertified, if he should happen to get himself into a bad enough fix. Such a result clearly exceeds even the amorphous bounds of estoppel, which the majority claims to be employing.