Court Opinion

ID: 9894270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 08:09:20.86055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:29.182489
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-23-00085-CR

          PERRY DWYANE DIXON, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

          On Appeal from the 19th District Court
               McLennan County, Texas
             Trial Court No. 2020-1386-C1

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
      Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

           A McLennan County1 jury convicted Perry Dwyane Dixon of continuous sexual abuse of

young children,2 and the trial court assessed a sentence of life imprisonment. In his sole issue on

appeal, Dixon asserts that the trial court reversibly erred when it admitted extraneous-offense

testimony in the State’s rebuttal without conducting an Article 38.37 hearing before admitting

the testimony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2-a. Because Dixon failed to

preserve his complaint, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.         Background

           In its indictment, the State alleged that Dixon committed two or more acts of sexual

abuse against E.D. and A.E.,3 two children younger than fourteen years of age, for a period that

was thirty or more days in duration. During his cross-examination of the State’s witnesses,

Dixon asked the witnesses whether E.D.’s and A.E.’s allegations were fabricated and inquired

about their motives for making the allegations. After the State rested its case-in-chief, Dixon

testified in his own defense and specifically denied each allegation made by E.D. and A.E.

Dixon also accused E.D. of attempting to get his other children to say that Dixon touched them

and asserted that E.D. made the accusations against him so he could live with his mother. Dixon

1
 Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We are unaware of any
conflict between precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 41.3.
2
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b).
3
 We refer to any person who was a minor at the time an offense was committed by their initials. See TEX. R. APP. P.
9.10.
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also testified that he “didn’t do nothing to nobody’s kids” and denied that he had ever had any

sexual contact with any child.

            After Dixon rested his case-in-chief, the State advised the trial court that it would offer

the testimony of E.G., another alleged victim of Dixon, under Rule 404 to rebut Dixon’s

defensive theories and his testimony that he never did anything to any child that lived with him.

Dixon objected to the testimony based on relevance and under Rule 4034 because of the danger

of prejudice and confusion of the issues. The trial court overruled those objections. The trial

court also granted Dixon a running objection to E.G.’s testimony based on relevance and Rule

403.5

            E.G. identified Dixon as his stepfather and testified that Dixon stayed with his mother

and him for seven or eight years. He testified that, from the time he was in elementary school

until he was about sixteen, Dixon’s sexual organ would contact E.G.’s mouth or anus and that

Dixon would ejaculate in him, on him, or in front of him. He testified that this would occur

almost every time he and Dixon were alone together.6

II.         Dixon’s Complaint Was Not Preserved

            In the trial of certain sexual offenses against a child, Article 38.37 allows the admission

of evidence that the defendant committed other specified sexual offenses against children. See
4
 See TEX. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).
5
    On appeal, Dixon does not assert that the trial court erred in overruling his relevance and Rule 403 objections.
6
 Before that testimony, Dixon requested that the trial court give the jury a limiting instruction. The trial court
instructed the jury as follows: “I instruct the jury, this testimony is to aid you, if it does, to show the motive, scheme
or plan or the state of mind of the Defendant. You should only consider it for that purpose, if you do, if you believe
it beyond a reasonable doubt.”
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TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, §§ 1, 2. However, before that evidence may be

introduced, “the trial judge must: (1) determine that the evidence likely to be admitted at trial

will be adequate to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the separate

offense beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury for

that purpose.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2-a.

       In his sole issue, Dixon complains that the trial court erred in admitting E.G.’s testimony

without conducting an Article 38.37 hearing before his testimony.        However, Dixon never

asserted an objection to the testimony in the trial court on the ground that the trial court had

failed to conduct an Article 38.37 hearing. Nevertheless, Dixon asserts that the trial court’s

failure to hold an Article 38.37 hearing is not subject to the rules of error preservation because

the statute requires the trial court to hold a hearing. As a result, Dixon argues, his right to a

hearing is a waivable-only right. The State contends that the rules of error preservation apply

and that Dixon failed to preserve this complaint. We agree.

       A.      Error Preservation

       Rule 33.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the “prerequisite to

presenting a complaint for appellate review.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Under that rule, “[t]o

preserve a claim of error in the admission or exclusion of evidence for appeal, ‘the record must

show that appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion, and that the trial court ruled on

it.’” Ratliff v. State, No. 10-19-00113-CR, 2021 WL 2693813, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco June 30,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d

79, 81–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). “The purposes behind the

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requirement of a timely, specific objection are: (1) to inform the judge of the basis of the

objection and give him a chance to make a ruling on it; and (2) to give opposing counsel the

chance to remove the objection or provide other testimony.” Id. (citing Garza, 126 S.W.3d at

82). In other words, “the party making the complaint must bring the issue to the trial court’s

attention at a time and in a manner that the trial court can correct the problem.” Rodriguez v.

State, 630 S.W.3d 522, 528–29 (Tex. App.—Waco 2021, no pet.) (Gray, C.J., concurring) (citing

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).

       As a result, to complain about the admission, exclusion, or suppression of evidence, the

party “must, at the earliest opportunity, have done everything necessary to bring to the judge’s

attention the evidence rule [or statute] in question and its precise and proper application to the

evidence in question.” Bonilla v. State, 452 S.W.3d 811, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (alteration

in original) (quoting Martinez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 331, 335–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).

Further, “errors in the admission of evidence” are generally “subject to procedural default,

regardless of the constitutional right involved.” Darcy v. State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016) (citing Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“We

have consistently held that the failure to object in a timely and specific manner during trial

forfeits complaints about the admissibility of evidence. This is true even though the error may

concern a constitutional right of the defendant.” (citations omitted))).

       “Except for complaints involving systemic (or absolute) requirements, or rights that are

waivable only, . . . all other complaints, whether constitutional, statutory, or otherwise, are

forfeited by failure to comply with Rule 33.1(a).” Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 342 (Tex.

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Crim. App. 2004). Included in waivable-only rights are “the rights to the assistance of counsel

and the right to trial by jury.” Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

Systemic requirements include jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, compliance with the

constitution’s separation of powers section, and “the constitution[’s] prohibition [against] ex post

facto laws.” Id. at 888–89.

       B.      Analysis

       Although the Waco Court of Appeals has not decided the issue, several of our sister

courts of appeals have held that a complaint regarding a trial court’s failure to conduct an Article

38.37 hearing is subject to the error preservation rules under Rule 33.1(a). See Corporon v.

State, 586 S.W.3d 550, 560 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.); Carmichael v. State, 505 S.W.3d

95, 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. ref’d); Andrade v. State, No. 07-21-00194-CR,

2023 WL 1469149, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 2, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); Jurado v. State, No. 08-17-00010-CR, 2019 WL 1922757, at *8

(Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 30, 2019, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); Baker v. State,

No. 03-18-00240-CR, 2019 WL 1646260, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 17, 2019, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication); Murphy v. State, No. 01-17-00588-CR, 2018 WL

6378004, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); Cathcart v. State, No. 05-15-01176-CR, 2017 WL 34588, at *5

(Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 4, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Stephens

v. State, Nos. 02-15-00046-CR, 02-15-00047-CR, 2016 WL 2586639, at *7 (Tex. App.—

                                                 6
Fort Worth May 5, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Appellant has

not cited, and we have not found, any Texas authority that holds to the contrary.

       As the Austin Court of Appeals has noted, “Complaints regarding article 38.37 concern

the admissibility of evidence.” Corporon, 586 S.W.3d at 560. Because the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals has repeatedly held that “complaints about the admissibility of evidence” are

subject to Rule 33.1(a)’s error preservation rules, see Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 889, these courts of

appeals “have held that a defendant, by not objecting during trial, forfeits his complaint that the

trial court failed to conduct an Article 38.37 hearing.” Corporon, 586 S.W.3d at 560; see also

Carmichael, 505 S.W.3d at 103; Stephens, 2016 WL 2586639, at *7.

       Further, several courts of appeals have rejected Dixon’s argument that the requirement of

a hearing under the statute makes his right to a hearing a waivable-only right. See Carmichael,

505 S.W.3d at 103 (reasoning that, in the absence of “language expressly requiring a waiver” in

the statute, any error in failing to hold an Article 38.37 hearing “is subject to the general

requirement of preservation, and is therefore subject to forfeiture”); see also Corporon, 586

S.W.3d at 560; Jurado, 2019 WL 1922757, at *8 (“The fact that a right or procedure has a

statutory basis does not mean that it is a waiveable [sic] only right as opposed to a right that can

be forfeited.” (citing Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 342)); Stephens, 2016 WL 2586639, at *7 (same).

Dixon has not cited, and we have not found, any authority holding that the requirement to hold

an Article 38.37 hearing is a waivable-only right that may be asserted for the first time on appeal.

       We agree with our sister courts of appeals that a complaint regarding a trial court’s

failure to conduct an Article 38.37 hearing is subject to the error preservation rules under Rule

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33.1(a). As a result, because Dixon did not object to the failure to conduct an Article 38.37

hearing at trial, he has forfeited this complaint and presents nothing for our review. We overrule

Dixon’s sole issue.

III.   Conclusion

       For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                     Scott E. Stevens
                                                     Chief Justice

Date Submitted:       October 19, 2023
Date Decided:         October 31, 2023

Do Not Publish

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