Court Opinion

ID: 9624963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:23:13.305295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:57.793779
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Justice
(dissenting):
I cannot agree with the majority’s characterization of events or legal conclusions and must, therefore, dissent.
Although recognizing that Turner never obtained appellant’s permission to search his bedroom, the majority, nevertheless, concludes that appellant’s acts of reporting that he was a victim of a crime and showing Garrett around portions of the house amounted to an unequivocal expression of consent to the later search by Turner.
The majority is correct in stating that Officer Garrett was the first policeman to arrive at the house; that appellant invited him into the house explaining that he had been the victim of a robbery, and that Garrett did not make a search of the house at that time. While the record does not indicate precisely how much time elapsed between Garrett’s arrival and Turner’s later arrival and search of the house, it can be determined from the sequence of events that Turner searched the house sometime between thirty and sixty minutes after Garrett was invited into the house.
In quoting portions of the testimony of Turner, the majority opinion leaves the reader with the impression that Garrett testified that appellant escorted him to his bedroom and pointed out the ransacked condition of the room. Conspicuously absent from the majority opinion, though, is testimony by Garrett himself as to the circumstances under which he viewed the room.
A close examination of the record reveals that Garrett never testified that appellant led him to the back bedroom to show him its condition. In fact, when asked whether he went anywhere in the house other than the living room, Garrett answered uncertainly, “I believe at one point I walked into a rear bedroom area with Mr. Tucker when he got some cigarettes, if I recall right”.
I would hold that appellant’s acts of calling the police to report that he was the victim of a robbery, inviting Garrett into the living room of the house, and his failure to protest Garrett’s following him into the bedroom to retrieve cigarettes fall well short of the required unequivocal expression of consent to the later search by Turner.
After the appellant was arrested and had received his initial appearance, an oral agreement was made between the appellant’s attorney, the county attorney and the police polygraph examiner that the appellant would submit to a polygraph examination on July 17, 1976. It was stipulated that the results of the examination would be inadmissible. The appellant alleges, and the state does not argue or offer evidence to the contrary, that the agreement among the parties was that the polygraph examination and the stipulation as to inadmissibility included any statement the appellant would make during the session.
Before the examination was begun, the appellant was informed of his Miranda rights and signed a form waiver of those rights. The polygraph examiner, Mr. Bangs, questioned the appellant in detail about his involvement in the planning of the kidnapping and robbery. At one point in the examination, the appellant asked to be released from the attachments of the polygraph instrument. Immediately after releasing the defendant, Bangs informed the appellant that he had registered deceptive. At this point detective Turner, who had not been present during the testing period, entered the examination room. With Turner present, Bangs continued interrogating appellant. After asking a few more questions, Bangs left the room and Turner took over the interrogation. While he was alone with Turner, the appellant made a number of incriminating statements including an admission that he had planned the robbery. All of these statements were admitted at trial.
The appellant contends that the questions by Turner were asked pursuant to the polygraph examination and that appellant’s responses are inadmissible by reason of the stipulation. While it is not articulated in *82the opinion, the majority apparently agrees with the state’s contention that the polygraph examination had terminated by the time appellant made his statements, that the statements were not covered by the stipulation, and that they are therefore admissible because the appellant signed a waiver of his rights.
As a preliminary matter, I would hold as a matter of law that when an accused signs a waiver of his right to remain silent and his right to assistance of counsel to facilitate the taking of a polygraph examination, the waiver is effective only for the duration of the examination. Hence, even if the majority is correct in asserting that the polygraph examination had terminated by the time appellant confessed, the state would have been required to prove more than that appellant signed a form waiver for purposes of taking an examination in order to prove that there had been a waiver at the time of the confession.
I would not decide the issue of waiver exclusively on the basis of the above reasoning, though, because I strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant could not possibly have had any misapprehension as to whether the polygraph examination had terminated at the time he confessed. Consequently, I would hold that the state has not established that the appellant waived his constitutionally guaranteed right not to incriminate himself. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
To establish a waiver of constitutionally guaranteed rights the state must prove “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). Furthermore, “courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver”. Id. at 1242.
To prove that an accused has intentionally relinquished his right not to incriminate himself, the state must demonstrate that he was aware that anything he said could be used against him in court. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, supra. Although the form appellant signed contains a sentence to the effect that any statement he made could be used against him, it must be recognized that there was an overriding understanding among the parties that much of what the defendant was about to say could not be used against him. When ■ such an understanding is juxtaposed with a signed waiver, a defendant will invariably be confused as to which of the statements he is about to make can ultimately be used against him and which cannot. Moreover, because of the nature of the agreement among the parties,1 it is quite possible that the appellant assumed that the stipulation as to inadmissibility completely negated his signed recognition that anything he said could be used against him in court.
There is a great deal of confusion among the parties as to what constitutes a polygraph examination. The state contends that a polygraph exam is limited to interrogation while the subject is connected to the polygraph instrument. The state’s polygraph expert, however, testified that a polygraph exam includes both a pre and post test period of questioning. Of course, while the state’s differing notions of what a polygraph examination consists of are irrelevant to a determination of whether the appellant knowingly waived his right not to incriminate himself, the confusion does serve to illustrate my view that the appellant cannot be charged with having known whether, at any given moment, the polygraph examination had terminated and the waiver he had previously signed “reattached” to the statements he was about to make.
Even if the majority is correct in concluding that appellant was aware that the polygraph examination had terminated at the time he made his admissions, I would, nevertheless, hold that the statements were taken in violation of appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of coun*83sel. Essentially my position is that when a party accused of a crime agrees to submit to a polygraph examination after consulting with his retained or appointed attorney, the police may not interrogate that party after the termination of the examination without first obtaining the permission of the accused’s attorney.
Of course, it is elementary that an accused has the right to the assistance of counsel at any time after judicial proceedings have begun against him. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). It is also well settled that once a defendant is advised of his right to counsel, he may waive that right and make a voluntary confession. Miranda v. Arizona, supra. In order to counteract the “inherently coercive” atmosphere of a police interrogation at the stationhouse, the court in Miranda stated “If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning”. (Emphasis added.) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 443, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
While I recognize that many of the concepts articulated in the Miranda opinion have been substantially eroded by subsequent case law, the proposition that an accused has the right not to be interrogated after any assertion of his right to counsel has been reaffirmed as recently as 1977 by both the Arizona and U.S. Supreme Courts. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977); See also, State v. Edwards, 111 Ariz. 357, 529 P.2d 1174 (1975). Even in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), where it was held that there was no per se proscription of further interrogation after an accused has indicated a desire to remain silent, the court was careful to distinguish between an assertion of the right to remain silent and an assertion of the right to counsel and to exclude the latter right from its discussion.
To be contrasted with the cases cited above, is a separate line of cases holding that an accused may waive his right to counsel and make a voluntary confession without notification to his already appointed or retained counsel. State v. Richmond, 23 Ariz.App. 342, 533 P.2d 553 (1975); State ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 553, 468 P.2d 580 (1970). Reinke v. United States, 405 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1968). However, a close reading of these cases discloses that a statement taken from an accused after he has consulted with counsel is admissible only if the accused volunteers the statement without questioning by the police, or, if interrogation is involved, only if the accused initiates the reopening of the interrogation process by informing the police that he wishes to make a statement, and the accused is given the appropriate Miranda warnings at that time.2 See also, State v. Moore, 27 Ariz.App. 275, 554 P.2d 642 (1976); Brewer v. Williams, supra, (Powell, J. concurring).
Hence, the law still is that once the right not to be interrogated as to a particular crime has attached, no statement made by the accused in response to questions of the police is admissible if the police, without the permission of the accused’s attorney, initiated the interrogation session.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, appellant asserted his right to the assistance of counsel and, therefore, his right not to be interrogated by consulting with his appointed counsel prior to taking the polygraph examination. As I have stated above, it is my view that when appellant signed a waiver of his rights to facilitate the taking of a polygraph examination, that waiver was effective only for the duration of the examination. Hence, assuming the *84majority is correct in concluding that the polygraph examination had ended by the time Bangs left the interrogation room, appellant’s right not to be interrogated as to the burglary and robbery without the permission of his attorney was re-established before Turner began his interrogation. The appellant did not initiate that interrogation process by advising Turner that he wanted to make a statement. He was not given the appropriate Miranda warnings and the interrogation was conducted without the permission of appellant’s attorney. Consequently, no statement made by appellant during that session should have been admitted.
In conclusion, my view of this issue is that the police, with the approval of appellant’s attorney, were successful in separating the appellant from his attorney and isolating him in the “coercive atmosphere” of an interrogation room for the limited purpose of conducting a polygraph examination. I simply cannot countenance their conduct in seizing upon appellant’s legitimately procured isolation from his attorney to interrogate him immediately after the polygraph examination terminated without first informing his attorney of their intent to do so.

. As I stated above, the state did not controvert appellant’s contention that the agreement among the parties was that the polygraph examination and stipulation as to inadmissibility extended to everything appellant would say during the session.

. In State v. Marks, 113 Ariz. 71, 546 P.2d 807 (1976) and State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 560 P.2d 41 (1976) the defendants were interrogated by the police after they had been appointed counsel. Their statements were ruled admissible even though the respective defendants did not initiate the reopening of the interrogation process. These cases are distinguishable, however, for the reason that the interrogation in each case was limited to crimes unrelated to those for which counsel had been appointed.