Court Opinion

ID: 9784944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:58:29.618043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:01.404041
License: Public Domain

RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
126 I respectfully dissent. Justice Wilkins' opinion neglects to recognize that while counsel may stipulate as to facts, " 'such is not the case ... when points of law requiring judicial determination are involved'" Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 2000 UT 14, I 40, 1 P.3d 528 (quoting First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979)). It is generally held, and our research has found no states which rule otherwise, that "[plarties cannot bind a court by stipulating to ... the legal effect of facts." Domagaiski v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Ill.2d 228, 73 Ill.Dec. 485, 454 N.E.2d 295, 298 (1983); see also Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 281, 289, 37 S.Ct. 287, 61 L.Ed. 722 (1917); Valdes v. Taylor Auto. Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 810, 278 P.2d 91, 97 (1954); District of Columbia v. Coleman, 667 A.2d 811, 820 n. 14 (D.C.1995); People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E2d 218, 216 (1950); Bright v. LSI Corp., 254 Kan. 853, 869 P.2d 686, 690-91 (1994); Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 78 N.J.Super. 485, 189 A.2d 448, 457-58 (App.Div.1963); City of Houston v. Deshotel, 585 SW .2d 846, 849 (Tex.Civ.App.1979). The rationale for this rule is that if we were to "be bound by an erroneous stipulation of law, then an erroneous concept of the law espoused by one or more of the parties would compel the court to adopt an erroneous precedent." Bright, 869 P.2d at 690 (internal quotation omitted). "The stipulation requires the trial court to affirm, as factually true, a claim which may not, in light of the record before the trial court, be factually true." Id. at 690-91. We cannot allow a stipulation to rule the legal effect of the facts that are before the trial court.
1 27 Parties can stipulate to facts, and such stipulations are generally binding on the court. See Adkins, 2000 UT 14 at €40, 1 P.3d 528. Parties can sometimes even stipulate as to conclusions of law, such as liability. However, parties cannot stipulate to facts and then dictate the legal effect of those facts. Stipulations as to "the legal effect of a contract," "the sufficiency ... of evidence to prove a given fact," or "the legal conclusion from a given state of facts" are inoperative because they bind the court on a question of law. 88 C.J.S. Stipulations § 10(e) (1953).
28 The parties in this case stipulated as follows:
47. For purposes of insurance coverage by State Farm, the parties stipulate that it *546does not matter whether Amy Motuapuaka or Phillip Toledo were [sic] driving Linda Motuapuaka's car at the time of the accident.
Contrary to the statement in paragraph 47 of the stipulation, however, it does matter, as to the legal effect of the insurance contract, whether Amy Motuapuaka or Phillip Toledo was driving Linda Motuapuaka's car at the time of the accident. If Amy Motuapuaka was driving the car at the time of the accident, she is clearly covered by the State Farm policy because she is the daughter of the named insured. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(a)(iii) (Supp.1999). However, if Phillip Toledo was driving, he would be covered only if he received permission from the named insured, Linda Motuapuaka, or her spouse, if any. See id. § S1A-22%-3038(1)(a)(@)(A).
{29 As plaintiffs concede, paragraph 47 of the stipulation is an agreement as to the legal effect of the insurance policy. However, the insurance policy is a written instrument, and the construction and "legal effect of written instruments is necessarily a question of law, and hence is one that must be determined by the court." Verdi v. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502, 510, 196 P. 225, 228 (1921); see also Swift, 243 U.S. at 289, 37 S.Ct. 287 (holding that court must decide case on basis of facts admitted, unaffected by stipulation made by counsel). Thus, paragraph 47, as to the legal effect of the stipulated facts, is ineffective. As a result, the trial court had a duty to determine the legal effect of the facts before it. By allowing the stipulation to determine the question of law rather than doing so itself, the trial court abused its discretion.
T30 Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a factual determination of who was driving the car at the time of the accident and whether that person was an insured under the terms of the insurance contract.
I 31 Having disqualified himself, Chief Justice HOWE does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge JAMES Z. DAVIS sat.