Court Opinion

ID: 9759987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:37:22.431823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:07.249216
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. There are several reasons why the trial court should not be reversed in this instance: first, because the defense initiated the issue of hard feelings between the defendant, Stanley Lackey, and the victim’s father by specifically asking if there was “friction” between them. This opened the door for some response by the prosecution and we have said that that is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Walls v. State, 280 Ark. 291, 658 S.W.2d 362 (1983) and Decker v. State, 255 Ark. 138, 499 S.W.2d 612 (1973). Second, the court admonished the jury to disregard the evidence and we have held, with rare exceptions, that an admonition to the jury to disregard improper, and even prejudicial matters cures such mistakes. Of necessity, the trial court has broad discretion in these areas and we will not disturb his ruling where that discretion is not abused. Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 659 S.W.2d 168 (1983) and Cary v. State, 259 Ark. 510, 534 S.W.2d 230 (1976). Third, we have said repeatedly a mistrial is an extreme, drastic measure and to be appropriate the error must not only be irreparable, but so prejudicial that the trial cannot in justice continue. Combs v. State, 270 Ark. 496, 606 S.W.2d 61 (1980); Johnson v. State, 254 Ark. 293, 495 S.W.2d 115 (1973). Here, we are holding that the prejudice is so overwhelming that an admonition, given promptly at the request of the defense, is not sufficient and a mistrial should have been declared simply because the victim had “heard” that the defendant, Stanley Lackey, had given marijuana to her younger sister and cousins. In that connection, we ought to give the jury more credit than to think it would convict a married couple of an unspeakable crime not because it believed them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with the court’s instructions, but because of a single comment admittedly based on hearsay that one of them had given marijuana to children, notwithstanding the judge’s instructions to disregard it! There seems to be a lack of consistency in our approach. We have held in similar cases that an admonition is sufficient. In Sanders v. State 277 Ark. 159 639 S.W.2d 733 (1982), for example, a police officer testified in a rape case of having seen evidences of marijuana in the defendant’s room when he arrested him, yet we held that an instruction to the jury to disregard the evidence precluded the necessity of a mistrial. Finally, errors in the reception or rejection of evidence, to be reversible, must be shown to substantially affect the rights of the appealing party. Unif. R. Evid. 103. Appellant, Susan Lackey, was not even remotely connected with the evidence for which the court is reversing this case, so how can it be said her rights were substantially affected?