Court Opinion

ID: 9650825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:52:52.65102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:26.413377
License: Public Domain

PASHMAN, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment and opinion of the Court with the following reservation. The Court’s opinion observes that the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and State constitutions, U.S.Const., Amend. V; N.J.Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 11, raise “serious questions” regarding the propriety of a second trial under the correct legal standards adopted by the Appellate Division and this Court. See ante at 212-214. While the majority does not appear to answer these questions, I believe they must be addressed and resolved. In its petition for certification, the State sought review of “the improper preclusion of retrial even if the Appellate Division’s antitrust analysis was correct.” Pet. for Certif. at 1. Since our grant of certification, 81 N.J. 400 (1979), was not limited, the propriety of denying a retrial is an issue squarely before this Court.
After concluding that the trial court had applied an erroneous standard of per se illegality to the vertical restraints employed by defendants, the Appellate Division independently assessed the record under the “rule of reason” and found insufficient evidence of any wrongdoing. State v. Lawn King, Inc., 169 N.J.Super. 346, 353-359 (App.Div.1979). The court thus exercised its power under our Rules of Court to conduct a factual inquiry for “the complete determination of any matter on review.” R. 2:10-5. Once the Appellate Division conducted this *217review of the record, defendants were placed in jeopardy of conviction under the proper legal standards. After the court found the existing evidence could not support any convictions, defendants were thus in the same position as a defendant whose conviction “was reversed by an appellate court solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain [a guilty] verdict.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 2, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2143, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) . Accordingly, the double jeopardy clauses of both the State and federal constitutions prohibit a retrial under legal principles embodying the “rule of reason.” See Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978); Burks, supra; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); State v. Lynch, 79 N.J. 327, 399 A.2d 629 (1979) ; see also State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309, 394 A.2d 355 (1978); State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145, 224 A.2d 481 (1966), cert. den., 386 U.S. 991, 87 S.Ct. 1305, 18 L.Ed.2d 335 (1967). I would therefore reject on constitutional grounds the State’s argument that a second trial is warranted. Except for the apparent view of the majority that there is no need to make this constitutional ruling, I join in the judgment and opinion of the Court.
PASHMAN, J., concurring in the result.
For affirmance —Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK —6.
For reversal —None.