Court Opinion

ID: 9377966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 14:00:29.057706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:18.337060
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11820   Document: 27-1    Date Filed: 03/09/2023    Page: 1 of 11

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-11820
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        MICHAEL ROBERT GRANT,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        SHERIFF OF OKEECHOBEE COUNTY,
        JOHN DOE 1,
        CHIEF JUDGE, NINETEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE
        STATE OF FLORIDA,
        JOHN DOE 2,
        Bailiff,
                                                Defendants-Appellees,

        OKEECHOBEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al.,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11820

                                                                 Defendants.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-14294-AMC
                            ____________________

        Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Michael Grant, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
        order dismissing his second amended complaint with prejudice as
        to his claims against Florida state court Judge Charles Schwab on
        immunity grounds and without prejudice as to his claims against
        the remaining parties -- Sheriff Noel Stephen, John Rouleau and
        John Ashby -- as an impermissible shotgun pleading. On appeal,
        Grant argues that: (1) the district court erred in dismissing without
        prejudice Grant’s claims against Stephen, Ashby, and Rouleau be-
        cause, generally, his complaint was sufficient; (2) the district court
        erred in dismissing his claims against Judge Schwab on immunity
        grounds because Judge Schwab is liable for the state court’s Amer-
        icans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) compliance in his official capac-
        ity as Chief Judge; and (3) the district court improperly dismissed
        his second amended complaint rather than affording him another
        opportunity to amend. After careful review, we affirm.
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        22-11820               Opinion of the Court                       3

                                         I.
               We review the district court’s dismissal of a complaint on
        shotgun pleading grounds for abuse of discretion. Weiland v. Palm
        Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). A
        court has inherent authority to control its docket and, in some cir-
        cumstances, dismiss pleadings that fail to conform with the Federal
        Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. We also review for abuse of discre-
        tion a district court’s decision to deny leave to amend. Woldeab v.
        Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018).
               Whether an official is entitled to absolute immunity is a
        question of law that we review de novo. Stevens v. Osuna, 877
        F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017). In considering a claim of absolute
        immunity, we accept as true the allegations of the complaint, along
        with any reasonable inference that may be drawn from them.
        Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999).
              We may affirm the judgment of the district court on any
        ground supported by the record, regardless of whether that ground
        was relied upon or even considered by the district court. Kernel
        Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012).
                                        II.
               First, we are unpersuaded by Grant’s claim that the district
        court erred in dismissing without prejudice Grant’s claims against
        Stephen, Ashby, and Rouleau. It is well recognized that a court
        should construe pro se litigants’ pleadings liberally. Tannenbaum
        v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However,
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11820

        when an appellant fails to identify a particular issue in his brief for
        us or fails sufficiently to argue the merits of his position on an iden-
        tified issue, he is deemed to have abandoned it. Hamilton v. South-
        land Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2012).
        When an appellant abandons or “forfeits” an issue on appeal, we
        will not address it absent extraordinary circumstances. United
        States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873–75 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
        denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022). Moreover, a district court’s judgment
        should be affirmed if an appellant fails to challenge each of the
        court’s independent, alternative grounds for its ruling. Sapuppo v.
        Allstate Floridian Ins., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014).
               A party does not adequately brief a claim where he fails to
        plainly and prominently raise it by, for example, making only pass-
        ing references to it in the “statement of the case” or “summary of
        the argument” or failing to advance arguments or cite authority
        establishing that the district court’s holding was in error. Id. at 681–
        82. Additionally, an issue is abandoned when references to it are
        no more than conclusory assertions or are “mere background to
        the appellant’s main arguments” or “buried within those argu-
        ments.” Id. at 682 (quotations omitted).
               A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered para-
        graphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circum-
        stances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). If doing so would promote clarity,
        each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence must
        be stated in a separate count or defense. Id. “Shotgun pleadings
        are those that incorporate every antecedent allegation by reference
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        22-11820                Opinion of the Court                          5

        into each subsequent claim for relief or affirmative defense.” Wag-
        ner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir.
        2006). “The typical shotgun complaint contains several counts,
        each one incorporating by reference the allegations of its predeces-
        sors, leading to a situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but
        the first) contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclu-
        sions.” Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg
        Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). We have repeatedly
        condemned the use of shotgun pleadings because those types of
        complaints do not provide a “short and plain statement of the
        claim” as is required under Rule 8. Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d
        1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted).
               A shotgun complaint often is a complaint replete with con-
        clusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to
        any particular cause of action. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322. We have
        said the unifying characteristic of shotgun pleadings is that they fail
        to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them
        and the grounds upon which each claim rests. Id. at 1323.
               In his appeal brief, Grant does not challenge all of the district
        court’s independent, alternative grounds for dismissing his second
        amended complaint against Sheriff Stephen, Rouleau and Ashby.
        Notably, the district court dismissed these portions of Grant’s sec-
        ond amended complaint as an impermissible a shotgun pleading
        because Counts 1 and 2 “bundle[d] together multiple, separate
        claims” and did not separate each cause of action into a different
        count. In addition, it said that the pleading was “difficult to
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11820

        understand and replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial
        facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.”
        However, in his brief on appeal, Grant does not even mention, let
        alone challenge, these specific grounds for dismissal. At most,
        when making a general argument that his pleading, overall, com-
        plied with the Federal Rules, he mentions the dismissal as a shot-
        gun pleading in passing. Because Grant fails to prominently raise
        the shotgun pleading issue in his brief on appeal, we affirm the dis-
        trict court’s dismissal without prejudice of Grant’s claims against
        Stephen, Ashby, and Rouleau. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680–82.
                                         III.
               We also find no merit to Grant’s argument that the district
        court erred in dismissing with prejudice his claims against Judge
        Schwab under the judicial immunity doctrine. Judges enjoy abso-
        lute judicial immunity when they act in their judicial capacity as
        long as they do not act “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Si-
        bley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations
        omitted). Absolute immunity also applies to claims made in an in-
        dividual capacity. Stevens, 877 F.3d at 1300–01, 1304–08 (stating
        that the plaintiff’s claims were against the judge in his individual
        capacity and applying absolute immunity). A judge must decide all
        cases before him, including cases that are controversial and may
        arouse intense feelings in the litigants. Id. at 1301. Although a
        judge’s error may be corrected on appeal, he should not have to
        fear that unsatisfied litigants may pursue litigation charging malice
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        22-11820               Opinion of the Court                       7

        or corruption, which would not promote principled or fearless de-
        cision-making. Id.
               Absolute immunity is not reserved only for Article III judges
        and is not based on rank or title, but rather flows from the “nature
        of the responsibilities of the individual official.” Id. at 1301–02
        (quotations omitted). Courts instead use a functional approach to
        determine whether an official is entitled to absolute immunity. Id.
        at 1302. Factors to consider in deciding whether to apply absolute
        immunity to a particular person include: (1) the need to assure that
        the individual can perform his functions without harassment or in-
        timidation; (2) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for
        private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional
        conduct; (3) insulation from political influence; (4) the importance
        of precedent; (5) the adversary nature of the process; and (6) the
        correctability of error on appeal. Id. Thus, absolute immunity has
        been extended to state court judges. Id.
                Under Rule 8, a pleading that states a claim for relief must
        contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
        pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A pleading
        must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
        grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
        544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
        (ellipsis omitted)). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does
        not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than
        an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
        Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted).
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11820

        Furthermore, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
        entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and
        a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
        do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and brackets omitted).
               Here, the district court did not err in dismissing Grant’s
        claims against Judge Schwab. For starters, the district court cor-
        rectly determined that Grant’s allegations that Judge Schwab de-
        layed in granting him an accommodation to file papers manually
        solely concerned an action taken within Judge Schwab’s judicial ca-
        pacity while he was performing a normal judicial function. Sibley,
        437 F.3d at 1070. In another part of the second amended complaint,
        Grant sought to hold Judge Schwab liable for another state court
        judge’s conduct of allegedly publishing details of Grant’s disability
        in open court. But it is unclear, and Grant does not attempt to ex-
        plain how Judge Schwab would be liable for the acts of another
        judge’s conduct in that judge’s courtroom, even considering Judge
        Schwab’s role as Chief Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit. Be-
        cause Grant did not allege that Judge Schwab ever acted beyond
        the scope of his judicial capacity or in the clear absence of jurisdic-
        tion, these claims were barred by judicial immunity. Id.
               Grant also appears to have alleged more generally that the
        Nineteenth Judicial Circuit improperly restricted disability access
        to the court. But regardless of whether Judge Schwab was entitled
        to judicial immunity from those claims, they were still properly dis-
        missed because Grant’s pleading did not comply with the require-
        ments of the Federal Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Among
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        22-11820               Opinion of the Court                         9

        other things, Grant’s second amended complaint was replete with
        conclusory allegations that were difficult to decipher and did not
        state discernible factual allegations that would warrant relief. See
        Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, his pleading did not give Judge
        Schwab fair notice of what claims were being brought against him,
        nor did it state cognizable grounds for relief. See Twombly, 550
        U.S. at 555. Although the district court did not dismiss the second
        amended complaint on the grounds of failure to state a claim, the
        record clearly supports that the court would have been justified in
        doing so. See Kernel Records, 694 F.3d at 1309. Accordingly, all
        claims against Judge Schwab were properly dismissed.
                                         IV.
                Finally, we are unconvinced by Grant’s argument that the
        district court erred in dismissing his second amended complaint
        without granting him leave to amend. Generally, a plaintiff pro-
        ceeding pro se must receive at least one opportunity to amend the
        complaint if he might be able to state a claim by doing
        so. Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291–92; see also Silberman v. Miami
        Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132–33 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that
        in some situations, further leniency -- or “an extra dose of grace” --
        may be warranted “in recognition of the difficulty in proceed-
        ing pro se”). In Woldeab, we held that a district court abused its
        discretion by dismissing a pro se plaintiff’s case with prejudice be-
        cause the plaintiff never clearly indicated that he did not want to
        amend his complaint and because a more carefully crafted
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11820

        complaint with more specific allegations against the proper defend-
        ant might have been able to state a claim. 885 F.3d at 1291–92.
               However, a district court need not grant leave to amend
        where the district court has a clear indication that the plaintiff does
        not want to amend his complaint or where a more carefully drafted
        complaint could not state a claim. Id. at 1291. Leave to amend
        would be futile “if an amended complaint would still fail at the mo-
        tion-to-dismiss or summary-judgment stage.” L.S. ex rel. Hernan-
        dez v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2020). A district
        court does not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend as
        futile where a plaintiff fails to identify any new facts that might
        form the basis for stating a claim successfully. Vanderberg v. Don-
        aldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2001).
                Here, the district court properly dismissed Grant’s second
        amended complaint without granting him leave to amend. As the
        record reflects, by the time Grant filed his second amended com-
        plaint, he had be given numerous opportunities to revise his plead-
        ing in a way that could have potentially sustained a claim. See
        Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291–92. Further, as we see it, a third
        amended complaint still would fail at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
        See L.S. ex rel. Hernandez, 982 F.3d at 1332. This is especially true
        since Grant’s claims against Judge Schwab continue to appear to
        depend on Judge Schwab’s actions in his official capacity. See
        Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291. Thus, the district court did not abuse
        its discretion by dismissing the claims against Judge Schwab with
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        22-11820                 Opinion of the Court                            11

        prejudice and by denying Grant leave to amend a third time. Van-
        derberg, 259 F.3d at 1326–27.
                As for the other defendants, Grant also had multiple oppor-
        tunities to revise his pleading in a way that could have potentially
        sustained a claim and he failed to do so. See Woldeab, 885 F.3d at
        1291–92. Notably, Stephen, Ashby, and Rouleau pointed to specific
        issues with Grant’s complaint throughout the district court pro-
        ceedings in their various motions to dismiss, and, the district court
        correctly pointed out that Grant did not address Stephen, Ashby,
        and Rouleau’s argument that his complaint constituted an imper-
        missible shotgun pleading. To date, Grant never has substantively
        responded to those arguments. Nevertheless, on appeal, he again
        appears to argue that he should be given yet another opportunity
        to amend his entire complaint. However, he does not indicate
        what he would say in a third amended complaint that would fix
        any of the issues that led to the current dismissal. And, in any
        event, his claims against Stephen, Ashby, and Rouleau were dis-
        missed without prejudice. Thus, nothing precludes Grant from re-
        filing his claims against Stephen, Ashby, and Rouleau in a new pro-
        ceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting
        the defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety.
               AFFIRMED. 1

        1 In addition, because we see no reason to remand for an evidentiary hearing
        on any of the issues on appeal, Appellant’s “Motion to Remand” is DENIED.