Court Opinion

ID: 9961622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 14:06:41.841061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:12.238643
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                   No. 23–0055

                  Submitted March 20, 2024—Filed April 19, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellee,

vs.

CLAYTON CURTIS BROWN,

      Appellant.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Derek Johnson

(trial) and John R. Flynn (sentencing), Judges.

      The State seeks further review of a court of appeals decision reversing the

defendant’s convictions for possession of a firearm as a felon and aggravated

eluding. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN

PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
      Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.
      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant Ap-

pellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.
                                         2

CHRISTENSEN, Justice.
      As the saying goes, “You can run, but you can’t hide.” That was certainly

the case for this defendant, as he eluded a police officer’s attempt to initiate a

routine traffic stop by running a stop sign, speeding, and swerving through park-

ing lots, only for the police officer to locate that same car abandoned on a side

street about forty minutes later. The police officer obtained a warrant to search

the car and subsequently discovered a loaded handgun under the driver’s seat

and ammunition in the center console and under the front passenger seat. A jury

ultimately convicted the defendant of possession of a firearm as a felon, aggra-

vated eluding, and driving while barred.

      On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions for

possession of a firearm as a felon and aggravated eluding, concluding there was

insufficient evidence to show the defendant knowingly possessed the handgun.

We disagree and hold that the State’s evidence—and all reasonable inferences

from that evidence—was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the de-

fendant had constructive possession of the firearm. Therefore, we vacate the por-

tion of the court of appeals decision reversing those convictions and affirm the

district court judgment in full.
      I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      On September 29, 2021, Officer Joseph Slight observed a man driving a

car without wearing a seat belt while he was on routine patrol in Boone at around

12:20 p.m. Officer Slight turned on his emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop,

but the driver did not stop. Upon seeing the driver turn into an alleyway, Officer

Slight turned on his sirens and continued to pursue the car. During the pursuit,

he also maintained contact with dispatch, describing his belief that he was fol-

lowing C.H., a wanted person. The driver made a series of turns through parking
lots and streets to escape, ran a stop sign, and accelerated his speed far beyond
                                          3

the speed limit, prompting Officer Slight to stop his pursuit because he had a

passenger with him.

      Officer Slight located the car forty minutes later, parked, unlocked, and

abandoned with valuable belongings inside. He ran the car’s information through

dispatch to discover that it had not been reported stolen. Officer Slight had the

car seized and retrieved a search warrant for the car. This search uncovered

personal items belonging to Clayton Brown, including a wallet in the cupholder

that held Brown’s debit card and a belt slung over the front passenger seat with

Brown’s name handwritten on it. Additionally, Officer Slight found a loaded

handgun under the driver’s seat with ammunition in the center console and un-

der the front passenger seat. He also retrieved a cell phone with cash inside the

phone case.

      At some point, Officer Slight used Brown’s name to look up his driver’s

license photo and recognized Brown—not C.H.—as the car’s driver during the

pursuit. He also learned that Brown’s girlfriend was the car’s owner. Conse-

quently, the State charged Brown with possession of a firearm as a felon under

Iowa Code section 724.26(1) (2021), a class “D” felony; aggravated eluding under

Iowa Code section 321.279(3), a class “D” felony; and driving while barred under
Iowa Code sections 321.560 and 321.561, an aggravated misdemeanor.

      The case proceeded to a jury trial on September 20, 2022. Prior to trial,

the parties stipulated the following: “1. On September 29, 2021, the defendant’s

driver’s license was barred as a habitual offender. 2. On September 29, 2021,

the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony.” The district court read

this stipulation to the jury before the State called its only witness, Officer Slight.

      During Officer Slight’s testimony, the prosecutor asked him why the gun

in the car was “important or relevant to you through the course of this.” Officer
Slight responded, “Because there was convictions on his record that he should
                                         4

not --,” to which defense counsel interrupted, “Objection, Judge. Move to strike.”

The district court sustained the objection, and the prosecutor rephrased the

question, asking Officer Slight, “From your check, did you learn that he had at

least a prior felony?” Officer Slight answered, “Yes.”

      This prompted defense counsel to ask the district court to discuss the

matter outside the jury’s presence, where Brown moved for a mistrial. Brown

argued that Officer Slight’s mention of “convictions” resulted in “every juror

know[ing] [Brown] has a greater criminal record than what we agreed to or what

they should know about.” The district court denied Brown’s motion, explaining,

“[Brown] stipulated to basically two convictions. I don’t believe the evidence was

two felony convictions. I don’t believe the witness testified to multiple felony con-

victions. I think he just said ‘convictions’ plural.” The district court offered to

provide a curative instruction for the jury, but Brown indicated that was unnec-

essary.

      After Officer Slight completed his testimony, Brown rested without pre-

senting any evidence on defense. The jury found Brown guilty as charged on all

three counts, and the district court sentenced Brown to indeterminate terms of

incarceration for five years on each of the class “D” felony counts and two years
on the aggravated misdemeanor. The district court ordered Brown to serve these

sentences concurrently to each other but consecutively to his sentences in two

other cases.

      Brown appealed, and we transferred his case to the court of appeals. The

court of appeals affirmed Brown’s conviction for driving while barred, but it re-

versed his other convictions upon concluding there was insufficient evidence

that Brown knowingly possessed a firearm. We granted the State’s application

for further review.
                                                5

       II. Analysis.

       Brown raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends the district court

should have granted his motion for mistrial based on Officer Slight’s testimony

that Brown had “convictions on his record.” Second, Brown maintains there was

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he was driving the car that

eluded Officer Slight. Finally, even if the evidence was sufficient to show that

Brown was driving, he claims there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly

possessed the firearm that was located underneath the driver’s seat of the car.

       A. Brown’s Motion for Mistrial. Brown asserts that the district court

should have granted his motion for mistrial based on Officer Slight’s testimony

that Brown had “convictions on his record” because this testimony exceeded the

information about Brown’s criminal history that was in the stipulation.1 “[W]e

review Brown’s challenge to the district court’s denial of a mistrial for an abuse

of discretion.” State v. Brown, 996 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Iowa 2023). In doing so, we

give district courts “considerable discretion in ruling upon motions for mistrial,

since they are present throughout the trial and are in a better position than the

reviewing court to gauge the effect of the matter in question on the jury.” State v.

Jirak, 491 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). Accordingly, we ordinarily only

        1Brown’s mistrial argument also raises evidentiary issues, characterizing Officer Slight’s

testimony as “either irrelevant or substantially more prejudicial than probative.” Further, he
contends Officer Slight’s testimony violated the prohibition on bad acts evidence under our rules
of evidence. Brown never raised these evidentiary objections with the district court when he
moved for a mistrial, nor did he reference any of these rules or arguments in objecting to Officer
Slight’s testimony. He simply objected to the testimony without any explanation, and the district
court sustained it. Therefore, we decline to address these arguments for the first time on appeal.
See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appel-
late review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we
will decide them on appeal.”); see also State v. Trane, 984 N.W.2d 429, 434–35 (Iowa 2023) (hold-
ing that the defendant waived his evidentiary concerns on appeal by failing to raise a proper
specific objection before the district court).
                                         6

find an abuse of discretion upon the denial of a mistrial “where there is no sup-

port in the record for the trial court’s determination.” Id. That is not the case

here.

        We agree with the district court that Brown “stipulated to basically two

convictions” when he stipulated that: (1) he was a felon, and (2) his driving priv-

ileges had been barred for being a habitual offender. Brown’s characterization of

his barred driver’s license as a habitual offender as merely a “refer[ence] to his

licensing status” instead of a criminal conviction is a distinction without a dif-

ference. That he was barred for being a habitual offender necessarily implies re-

peated convictions. Iowa Code section 321.555’s definition of “habitual offender”

further supports this conclusion by defining the term as “any person who has

accumulated convictions for separate and distinct offenses described in subsec-

tion 1, 2, or 3, committed after July 1, 1974, for which final convictions have

been rendered.” (Emphasis added.)

        Thus, Officer Slight’s isolated statement that Brown had “convictions” was

cumulative to evidence already before the jury. Moreover, the district court acted

quickly to sustain Brown’s objection to this testimony. And it offered to provide

the jury with a remedial instruction on the matter, but Brown informed the dis-
trict court that such an instruction was unnecessary. See, e.g., State v. Brown,

397 N.W.2d 689, 699 (Iowa 1986) (en banc) (“Generally, trial court’s quick action

in striking the improper response and cautioning the jury to disregard it, cou-

pled, when necessary, with some type of general cautionary instruction, will pre-

vent any prejudice. A defendant who asserts these actions were insufficient bears

the heavy burden of demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion on the part of [the]

trial court.”). Accordingly, nothing leads us to believe that the district court

abused its discretion in denying Brown’s motion for a mistrial.
                                         7

      B. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Brown contests the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his convictions, arguing that the State failed to prove his

identity as the driver of the car that eluded Officer Slight. Alternatively, even if

the State presented sufficient evidence to show that he was the driver, Brown

maintains there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the fire-

arm that Officer Slight found tucked underneath the driver’s seat in the car. We

review these challenges “for the correction of errors at law, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the State.” Brown, 996 N.W.2d at 695–96. This

includes making “legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and

reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50,

54 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017)). There

is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict “when the evidence ‘would

convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018)).

      1. Evidence of Brown’s identity as the driver. Brown asserts that the State

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the driver who eluded

Officer Slight, noting Officer Slight was behind the vehicle during the entire pur-

suit “and never close enough to see the driver’s face well enough to make a pos-
itive identification.” Brown also cites Officer Slight’s acknowledgment that he

originally believed a different person was driving. But Officer Slight explained

during cross-examination why he initially believed the driver was a different per-

son, in addition to how he identified Brown as the actual driver.

      And contrary to Brown’s claim, Officer Slight was not always directly be-

hind the car, as the car was on a road perpendicular to the one Officer Slight

was on when the driver first turned in front of Officer Slight. Additionally, Officer

Slight still had the ability to see the driver’s face through the car’s rear and side
                                         8

view mirrors when he was following it, which occurred in the daylight. This evi-

dence, combined with Officer Slight’s in-court identification of Brown as the

same person he saw driving, his testimony that he found Brown’s personal items

in the vehicle about forty minutes after the chase, and the fact that Brown’s

girlfriend owned the car all support Officer Slight’s identification of Brown as the

driver.

      “[I]t is not within the province of our court ‘to resolve conflicts in the evi-

dence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of

explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.’ ” State v.

Slaughter, 3 N.W.3d 540, 550 (Iowa 2024) (quoting State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d

247, 256 (Iowa 2022)). The jury found Officer Slight’s testimony credible and his

explanations plausible. Especially viewing the evidence in the light most favora-

ble to the State, which we do in challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence,

there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination that Brown was

driving the car when it eluded Officer Slight. See Brown, 996 N.W.2d at 695–96.

      2. Evidence that Brown knowingly possessed a firearm. Brown insists that

the State failed to prove that he knowingly possessed the handgun Officer Slight

located in the car to support Brown’s convictions for possession of a firearm as
a felon and aggravated eluding. “Possession may be actual or constructive,” and

the State relied on the theory that Brown had constructive possession of the

firearm. State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Iowa 2021). “Constructive posses-

sion may be proved by inferences” and “turns on the peculiar facts of each case.”

State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 705 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State v. Webb, 648

N.W.2d 72, 79 (Iowa 2002)). It “occurs when the defendant has knowledge of the

presence of the [firearm] and has the authority or right to maintain control of it,”

and the district court instructed the jury accordingly. State v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d
31, 38–39 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Iowa 2003));
                                        9

see also Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 705 (“Although the doctrine of constructive pos-

session evolved in drug-possession cases, we apply the same principles in fire-

arm cases.”).

      Specifically, the jury instruction explained,

             A person who, although not in actual possession, has both the
      power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or con-
      trol over a thing, either directly or through another person or per-
      sons, is in constructive possession of it. A person’s mere presence
      at a place where a thing is found or proximity to the thing is not
      enough to support a conclusion that the person possessed the thing.

Moreover, the instruction defined “[d]ominion and control” as “ownership or right

to the firearm and the power or authority to manage, regulate or oversee its use.”

Thus, the State had to prove that Brown had the power and intention to exercise

authority over the firearm’s use.

      “Constructive possession is recognized by inferences,” and we have iden-

tified nonexclusive factors to consider in making this determination. State v.

Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 193–94 (Iowa 2008); see also Reed, 875 N.W.2d at

706. Those factors include:

      (1) incriminating statements made by a person; (2) incriminating ac-
      tions of the person upon the police’s discovery of a [firearm] among
      or near the person’s personal belongings; (3) the person’s finger-
      prints on the packages containing the [firearm]; and (4) any other
      circumstances linking the person to the [firearm].

Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 706 (quoting State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 161 (Iowa

2013)). And when the “premises” where the contraband is located is a motor

vehicle, we have explained,

      a court may consider these additional factors: (1) was the [firearm]
      in plain view, (2) was it with the accused’s personal effects, (3) was
      it found on the same side of the car seat as the accused or immedi-
      ately next to him, (4) was the accused the owner of the vehicle, and
      (5) was there suspicious activity by the accused.

Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 39.
                                        10

      True, some of these factors weigh in Brown’s favor. For instance, there was

no evidence of incriminating statements or fingerprints connecting Brown to the

firearm or the ammunition discovered in the car. See Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 706.

Likewise, Brown was not the car’s registered owner, nor was he in the car when

Officer Slight discovered the firearm. See id.; see also Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 39.

      Yet, there was ample evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Brown

had constructive possession of the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt—espe-

cially viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State. See Brown,

996 N.W.2d at 695–96. Much of that evidence is comparable to the evidence

supporting the constructive possession of a controlled substance in State v. Max-

well. See 743 N.W.2d 185. That case also involved a police officer’s pursuit of a

defendant after the officer observed the defendant drive out of a parking lot with-

out a seat belt on and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. Id. at 188–89. Like

Brown, the defendant continued driving and eventually parked and walked away

from his vehicle. Id. at 189. When the officer searched the vehicle soon thereafter,

he discovered a plastic baggie protruding from a cigarette pack between the two

front seats that contained cocaine, leading to the defendant’s conviction for pos-

session of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Id.
      In affirming the verdict based on a theory of constructive possession, we

noted many similar factors to the evidence in Brown’s case. See id. at 194. For

example, we explained that the defendant was the only person in the vehicle from

the time the officer saw the vehicle pull out of a parking lot until the officer ap-

prehended him. Id. Here, the jury could equally infer that Brown was the most

recent driver of the car—and the sole person in the car—throughout the pursuit

and in the brief period between the pursuit and police seizure. We have previ-

ously held that “[t]his circumstance is relevant to the constructive possession
analysis, even if it does not amount to exclusive possession entitling the State to
                                          11

the inference discussed.” State v. Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 475–76 (Iowa 2012).

Brown’s “frequent and recent use of the car remains pertinent, though not dis-

positive,” even though he did not own the car. Id. at 476. Likewise, evidence

linked Brown to the car as the owner’s boyfriend.

      Additional evidence supporting the verdict in Maxwell was that the officer

found the drugs immediately next to where the defendant had been sitting, as

they were lodged between his seat and the front passenger seat. 743 N.W.2d at

194. Here, too, the jury could reasonably infer Brown’s knowledge of the firearm’s

presence in the car and his dominion and control over it based on the location

of the firearm directly under the seat where Brown had recently been sitting to

drive. As Officer Slight testified, the firearm was “tucked back a little bit, but just

close enough [for the driver] to be able to grab.” See Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 39

(stating one factor supporting constructive possession is whether the item was

found where the accused was sitting).

      Moreover, the presence of Brown’s personal effects strewn about in the car

next to the ammunition supports the State’s theory of constructive possession.

Officer Slight found ammunition under the front passenger seat, which had

Brown’s belt with his handwritten name slung over it. And Brown’s wallet con-
taining his debit card was in the cupholder next to the center console compart-

ment in which Officer Slight similarly discovered ammunition for the firearm.

See id. (noting one factor supporting constructive possession is whether the item

was found with the accused’s personal effects); see also Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 706

(explaining one factor to consider in determining constructive possession is any

circumstances linking the person to the item).

      And although it is not as compelling given Brown had additional reasons

to flee because he was driving while barred, both the defendant in Maxwell and
Brown made the decision to flee when the police attempted to initiate a traffic
                                          12

stop. See 743 N.W.2d at 194. Brown’s suspicious decision to flee is also similar

to the situation in State v. Thomas. See 847 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa 2014). There, po-

lice entered an apartment with six people inside, but only the defendant ran into

a bedroom upon their arrival, attempted to hold the door shut, and gave a false

name. Id. at 440–42. The police subsequently found drugs where the defendant

had been holding the door, and we affirmed the defendant’s conviction for pos-

session based on a theory of constructive possession. Id. at 439, 447. In doing

so, we reasoned, “The defendant was the person who had been most recently in

the spot where the drugs were found, his conduct prior to his arrest was highly

suspicious and makes sense only if his goal was to get the drugs off of his person,

and he offered resistance.” Id. at 444.
      Much of that logic applies here. The court of appeals disagreed and re-
versed Brown’s convictions by hypothesizing that Brown’s decision to elude Of-
ficer Slight “could have been related to driving while barred as [a] habitual of-
fender—he had reason for a guilty conscience even without knowingly possessing
the handgun.” We have said that “the probative value of evidence showing a de-
fendant avoided apprehension turns on the circumstances under which the
avoidance occurred.” State v. Wilson, 878 N.W.2d 203, 213 (Iowa 2016). Here,
the evidence showed the defendant engaged in quite a serious effort to avoid
being stopped by Officer Slight. “[T]he State need not discredit every other po-
tential theory to be drawn from circumstantial evidence.” Ernst, 954 N.W.2d at
57; see also Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 342 (“Whether the State’s evidence is direct,
circumstantial, or some combination of the two, the State is not required to ne-
gate any and all rational hypotheses of the defendant’s innocence.”). That is also
the case “when a jury makes inferences from the evidence presented at trial.”
Ernst, 954 N.W.2d at 57. Further, while the jury was free to reach the same
conclusion regarding Brown’s decision to flee as the court of appeals did, “[e]vi-
dence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions
                                          13

from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding actually made,
not whether the evidence would support a different finding.” Jones, 967 N.W.2d
at 339 (quoting Brokaw v. Winfield–Mt. Union Cmty. Sch. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 386,
393 (Iowa 2010)); see also Wilson, 878 N.W.2d at 215 (“Once a district court
admits such evidence [of flight], it is for the jury to decide whether to credit the
inferential chain leading from a particular act of the defendant to guilt for the
crime charged.”).
      As the district court expressed, it was just as logical for the jury to

      find that it does not make sense for an individual to commit multiple
      additional driving offenses such as eluding, stop sign violations, and
      speeding, in order to avoid being charged with or delay being
      charged with driving while barred. Based upon the dangerous oper-
      ation of the motor vehicle in an attempt to get away from law en-
      forcement, the jury was able to conclude that the Defendant’s flight
      was done in an effort to prevent detection of the firearm by law en-
      forcement. The jury was aware that the Defendant’s license was
      barred, but the jury weighed the evidence and determined that the
      Defendant committed the offense of eluding because he was know-
      ingly possessing a firearm as a felon. Furthermore, the jury could
      conclude that since Defendant was witnessed operating a motor ve-
      hicle in broad daylight by a police officer that the Defendant likely
      believed he would be charged with driving while barred, but since
      the officer was not able to see the gun that the Defendant needed to
      flee or buy more time to hide the gun.

      In summary, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury’s verdict, the jury’s verdict is supported by logical inferences drawn from the
record rather than impermissible speculation. See Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 342.
Consequently, we vacate the portion of the court of appeals decision reversing
Brown’s convictions for possession of a firearm as a felon and aggravated eluding
and affirm the judgment of the district court.
      III. Conclusion.
      We affirm all three of Brown’s convictions.
      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DIS-
TRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.