Court Opinion

ID: 9471259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:28:10.977235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:19.458929
License: Public Domain

ERVIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Waymare Billups was required to stand trial in shackles. On its own motion, the state superior court ordered the restraints, and its exercise of discretion was upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court over a dissent written by Justice Exum and joined by Justice Copeland. State v. Billups, 301 N.C. 607, 272 S.E.2d 842 (1981). Because I agree with Justice Exum that the shackling order was an unconstitutional abuse of discretion, I respectfully dissent.
The trial judge’s order was based primarily on his belief that only one deputy sheriff was available to provide security in the courtroom. The judge made four findings that, in his view, justified shackling Billups: the serious nature of the crime for which Billups was to be tried; the existence of other serious charges against Billups, and his felony conviction the week before; the existence of a Maryland escape warrant outstanding against Billups; and the availability of only one deputy sheriff to serve in the courtroom. In ordering the restraints, however, the judge stated that they were necessary “until such time as more deputies are made available.” The judge once again mentioned the shortage of deputies in his instruction concerning the shackles. It seems clear, therefore, that it was the “shortage of deputies problem,” Billups, 272 S.E.2d at 851 (Exum, J., dissenting), which was crucial to the trial judge’s decision.
The state now concedes that the trial judge was mistaken and that there were actually four or five armed officers present during the trial. This concession undermines the essential factual predicate for the shackling order and is not answered by the post hoc justification that the additional officers were not assigned to guard Billups. Furthermore, even if I accepted that explanation of the trial judge’s factual error, I do not think his order can be reconciled with the governing rule of law. A trial judge may order the use of visible methods of restraint only as a “last resort,” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), and “in extraordinary circumstances.” State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 226 S.E.2d 353, 366 (1976). Because “a trial in shackles is inherently prejudicial,” the trial judge has discretion to order the defendant restrained only when “it is shown by the State to be necessary notwithstanding any such prejudice.” Tolley, 226 S.E.2d at 367. The state has never made this showing.1 The Constitution does *670not permit the placing of visible restraints on a criminal defendant — restraints which can “mark [the defendant] as an obviously bad man or ... suggest that the fact of his guilt is a foregone conclusion,” United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 614-5 (4th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 964, 28 L.Ed.2d 229 (1971) — for the mere convenience of the government.
The state’s position is further weakened by the fact that there were numerous less intrusive remedies available to the trial judge. He could have sent for additional officers or pressed one or more of the city or state officers waiting in the courtroom or the courthouse into service as courtroom deputies. We are told that they were assigned “other duties” but the record is silent as to what those duties were. It is not unreasonable to suspect that some of these armed officers were there as witnesses in this or other cases, and would be in or around the courtroom in any event. Deputizing some of them would not have created any major problems for them or interfered with their duties. As another alternative, the trial judge could have continued the case for whatever period of time was necessary to bolster the courtroom security force. I would even suggest that he could have considered recalling some of the Perquimans County deputies from Dare County, for after all, their principal responsibilities were in their assigned jurisdiction.2
Even if shackling was the only viable solution, a view I reject, the trial judge did not see to it that Billups’s rights were fully protected. As I read the trial judge’s certification, he admits that after the decision was made to shackle Billups, Billups was required to walk in shackles in the presence and sight of the jurors when he was being initially brought into the courtroom for jury selection. This exposure was completely unnecessary, for all prospective jurors could have been excluded from the courtroom long enough to bring Billups in and seat him at counsel table. By use of table placements or baffleboards, his leg irons could have been concealed from the jurors’ view. The trial judge apparently consistently excused the jury before Billups was moved during the course of the trial, but by then the damage had already been done.
Unlike the majority, I take no comfort from the trial judge’s so-called curative instructions. In the first place, these instructions served to call attention to the fact that Billups was in shackles, thereby causing any juror who had failed to notice his condition to become aware of it. They were directed to the panel as a group and as any experienced trial judge or lawyer knows, jurors so addressed rarely ever respond to such inquiries. Arguably, they also violated the spirit, if not the letter, of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1031(1) which states in part:
If the judge orders a defendant restrained he must:
(1) Enter in the record out of the presence of the jury and in the presence of the person to be restrained and his counsel, if any, the reasons for his action.
The curative instruction given to the jury contains some of the reasons for the trial judge’s actions.
I am also troubled by the fact that most of the cases cited by the majority to uphold the trial judge’s actions are cases involving disruptive defendants: Billups simply fails to qualify as such. The use of shackles is a harsh, “last ditch” measure which should *671not be tolerated in a fact situation like this one.
I am reluctant to conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in this case. However, when it is clear that there were numerous less prejudicial solutions to the judge’s perceived problem, all of which would have been preferable to the one he chose and which could have been employed without jeopardizing the security he sought, I am compelled to conclude that there was an abuse of discretion.
I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus.

. As Justice Exum’s dissent makes plain, none of the suggested reasons for shackling Billups will support the trial judge’s decision:
There is no indication in the record that defendant at the time of his trial posed a threat to any person in the courtroom, was likely to be unruly or disruptive, or was likely to try to escape. All indications are that he would do none of these things. That defendant is charged with serious crimes, is young and healthy, and has recently been convicted of other serious crimes does not justify the shackles. Although these are among the “material circumstances” which in a proper case may be considered, our courts regularly try young, healthy defendants who have criminal records and who are on trial for serious offenses; yet we do not shackle them. These trials include, of course, even those defendants who have escaped from pe*670nal institutions. That only one deputy was available cannot be seized upon as a justification. The absence of adequate courtroom staff was an administrative problem which the trial court should not have solved at the expense of defendant’s right to a fair trial. The most telling circumstance of all is that defendant sat quietly through his uneventful trial on other charges held the previous week and at his preliminary hearing. It thus appears that the trial court, seeking to solve a shortage of deputies problem, simply decided sua sponte to shackle defendant unnecessarily. Neither the state nor any representative of the county, so far as the record reveals, advised the court of feelings of insecurity or any felt need for restraining defendant.
Billups, 272 S.E.2d at 851 (Exum, J., dissenting).

. See Billups, 272 S.E.2d at 851 n. 2 (Exum, J., dissenting).