Court Opinion

ID: 9750763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:30:58.788789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:21.523096
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority’s order affirming the judgment in favor of appellees on appellant’s complaint; I dissent, however, from the majority’s order reversing the judgment in favor of appellees on their counterclaim.
Pressler v. Pittsburgh, 419 Pa. 440, 446, 214 A.2d 616, 619 (1965), held that there is only one standard of care — due care under the circumstances. When the circumstances involve an emergency, therefore, the defendant’s conduct must be appraised in light of that emergency. If the defendant is an ambulance driver, rushing someone to the hospital, he may be found to be acting with due care even though he does go through a red light, provided he has his lights flashing and his siren wailing, and otherwise looks out for the safety of others. If he does these things, and is still hit by another driver, two results should follow: First, the ambulance driver should not be held liable in damages to the other driver; he may only be held liable if he acted recklessly. And second, if the ambulance driver was himself hurt, he should be able to recover from the other driver, if the other driver was negligent.
Here, the majority has entered an inconsistent order. It has held, correctly, that the ambulance driver, and his em*496ployer, may not be held liable in damages to the other driver, because, given the emergency circumstances, the driver was acting with due care. This holding is expressed in Part II of the majority’s opinion. At the same time the majority has also held, in Part I of its opinion, that the ambulance driver may not recover damages from the other driver, even though the other driver was negligent, if the ambulance driver was “negligent.” Majority opinion at 1271, 1272. Thus, the majority creates two standards of care for ambulance drivers, depending upon whether the driver is defendant (no liability unless “reckless”) or plaintiff (no recovery if “negligent”). This is just what Pressler forbids. Given the jury’s finding that in the emergency circumstances presented, the ambulance driver here was driving with due care, the conclusion follows that he was not “negligent”; he — more precisely, his employer — was therefore entitled to recover on the counterclaim.
Both judgments should be affirmed.