Court Opinion

ID: 9372795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:41.10536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.594586
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                      MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                      2022 MSPB 4
                            Docket No. PH-1221-16-0010-W-1

                                    Garilynn Smith,
                                       Appellant,
                                            v.
                               Department of the Army,
                                         Agency.
                                      April 13, 2022

           Graig P. Corveleyn, Esquire, Hopewell, New Jersey, for the appellant.

           Jason Guiliano, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, for the agency.

                                        BEFORE

                             Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                               Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     granted the appellant’s request for corrective action in this individual right of
     action (IRA) appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we DENY the petition and
     AFFIRM the initial decision AS MODIFIED by this Opinion and Order, still
     granting corrective action. We modify the initial decision by applying the clear
     and convincing evidence standard for nondisciplinary IRA cases set forth in
     Gonzales v. Department of the Navy, 101 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶¶ 11-12 (2006), and by
     directly addressing the second and third factors set forth in Carr v. Social
     Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
                                                                                           2

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         On July 17, 2006, the appellant’s husband, a U.S. Army sergeant and
     explosive ordnance disposal technician, was killed in action in Iraq.            Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 20 at 38; Hearing Transcript, Volume 1 (HT1) at 7, 18
     (testimony of the appellant).      Following her husband’s death, the appellant
     attempted to obtain information about the disposition of his remains, which had
     been flown to Dover Air Force Base, where they were handled by Air Force
     Mortuary Affairs Operations (Dover MAO) personnel.               HT1 at 29-39, 121
     (testimony of the appellant).       On April 21, 2011, 1 Dover MAO’s Deputy
     Commander sent the appellant a letter stating that her husband’s remains had been
     cremated, further incinerated by a medical disposal company, and sent to a
     Virginia landfill. IAF, Tab 20 at 39.
¶3         Shortly after receiving this information, the appellant notified the media
     and a policy advisor for U.S. Congressman Rush Holt about the mishandling of
     service members’ remains by Dover MAO. Id. at 40; HT1 at 42, 48 (testimony of
     the appellant). On December 7, 2011, The Washington Post published an article
     about the matter that identified the appellant by name. IAF, Tab 8 at 22-26. The
     following week, Representative Holt delivered a speech in the U.S. House of
     Representatives in which he explained that he would not vote for the National
     Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA) because, inter alia, it did not
     mention the desecration of the remains of deceased service members at Dover
     MAO. IAF, Tab 21 at 59-60. In his speech, Representative Holt stated that the
     appellant had brought the matter to his attention. Id. at 60.
¶4         During this time, the appellant was working at the agency’s Picatinny
     Arsenal (Picatinny) in New Jersey. IAF, Tab 4 at 19-20. The appellant served as

     1
      Due to an apparent typographical error, the letter is dated April 21, 2008, rather than
     April 21, 2011. HT1 at 40-41 (testimony of the appellant).
                                                                                      3

     a GS-08 Management Support Assistant with the Office of the Project Manager,
     Maneuver Ammunition Systems (PM MAS), at Picatinny from October 2010,
     until March 2012, when she transferred to the Naval Sea Systems Command. Id.;
     HT1 at 23 (testimony of the appellant). The appellant was unhappy with her new
     position, however, and sought to return to PM MAS. IAF, Tab 20 at 77-79; HT1
     at 76 (testimony of the appellant). On July 24 and August 14, 2012, respectively,
     a PM MAS Management Services Specialist notified the appellant that a GS-09
     Executive Assistant (EA) at PM MAS had taken another job and that a vacancy
     announcement for the position was forthcoming.       IAF, Tab 20 at 70, 74; HT1
     at 80 (testimony of the appellant). The agency issued the vacancy announcement
     on September 4, 2012. IAF, Tab 4 at 40-46.
¶5        The appellant applied for the position and was one of 14 candidates on the
     certificate of eligibles.   IAF, Tab 6 at 33-37.       Shortly after the vacancy
     announcement closed, two additional news reports were published about the
     landfill issue: (1) a September 23, 2012 article in The Washington Post, which
     identified the appellant by name, included a photograph of her at the landfill, and
     stated that she was instrumental in uncovering the scandal; and (2) a
     September 29, 2012 article in The Army Times, which also identified the appellant
     by name. IAF, Tab 23 at 5-14. In early October, the selecting official canceled
     the vacancy announcement. IAF, Tab 17 at 13.
¶6        On October 19, 2012, the agency posted a second vacancy announcement
     for the EA position, which included three additional duties. IAF, Tab 4 at 30-36,
     38. The appellant applied for the position and was again placed on the certificate
     of eligibles; however, the selecting official chose another candidate for the
     position. IAF, Tab 6 at 28-32, Tab 21 at 158-59.
¶7        On January 11, 2013, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of
     Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that she was not selected for the EA position in
     reprisal for her disclosures concerning the improper disposal of human remains
                                                                                             4

     by Dover MAO. IAF, Tab 1 at 13-21. On August 4, 2015, OSC terminated its
     inquiry into her allegations and issued her a close-out letter and notice of Board
     appeal rights. Id. at 9-12.
¶8         The appellant timely filed this IRA appeal and requested a hearing. IAF,
     Tab 1. The administrative judge determined that the Board had jurisdiction over
     the appeal. IAF, Tab 11. Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued an
     initial decision granting the appellant’s request for corrective action.            IAF,
     Tab 47, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 25. He found that the appellant proved by
     preponderant evidence that she made protected disclosures regarding Dover
     MAO’s improper handling of her husband’s remains, and that these disclosures
     were contributing factors in the agency’s decision not to select her for the EA
     position. ID at 17-22. The administrative judge also concluded that the agency
     failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would not have selected
     the appellant for that position in the absence of her protected disclosures. ID
     at 22-24.
¶9         The agency has filed a petition for review, 2 alleging that the administrative
     judge failed to properly admit evidence at the hearing, relied on “inadmissible”
     hearsay evidence in the initial decision, and improperly allowed the appellant to
     testify as an expert witness on mortuary affairs, yet denied the agency the
     opportunity to present a rebuttal expert witness. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tab 3 at 5-16. The agency further alleges that the appellant failed to prove the
     contributing factor element of her whistleblower claim and that, in any event, it
     proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would not have selected the

     2
       With its petition for review, the agency submits the hearing transcript in this appeal.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3 at 21-550. Because the transcript is already part of
     the record, IAF, Hearing Transcript, Volumes 1-2, it does not constitute new evidence. See
     Meier v. Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980).
                                                                                              5

      appellant for the EA position absent her disclosures. Id. at 16-20. The appellant
      has filed a response to the petition for review. 3 PFR File, Tab 6.

                                           ANALYSIS 4
      The Board declines to dismiss the agency’s petition for review for failure to
      comply with the administrative judge’s interim relief order.
¶10         When, as here, the appellant was the prevailing party in the initial decision
      and the decision granted the appellant interim relief, any petition for review filed
      by the agency must be accompanied by a certification that the agency has
      complied with the interim relief order. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a). The agency’s
      failure to provide the required certification may result in the dismissal of the
      agency’s petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(e).
¶11         In her response to the agency’s petition for review, the appellant moves to
      dismiss the petition on the grounds that the agency has failed to provide interim

      3
        On July 6, 2017, the day before the agency filed its petition for review, the appellant
      filed a “Motion for Enforcement of Interim Relief” with the Board’s Northeastern
      Regional Office, alleging that the agency has failed to comply with the administrative
      judge’s interim relief order. Smith v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket
      No. PH-1221-16-0010-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab 1. The regional office docketed
      the motion as a petition for enforcement. Id. On August 17, 2017, the administrative
      judge issued an initial decision in the compliance matter stating that the appellant
      should have filed her petition for enforcement with the Clerk of the Board instead of the
      regional office because the agency had a petition for review of the initial decision
      pending before the Board. CF, Tab 5, Compliance Initial Decision (CID) at 3 (citing
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.116). The administrative judge thus dismissed the petition for
      enforcement and forwarded it to the Clerk of the Board for joinder with the agency’s
      petition for review. CID at 3. The initial decision became final on September 21, 2017,
      when neither party filed a petition for review. Id. at 4. We DENY the petition for
      enforcement because our regulations do not allow for a petition for enforcement of an
      interim relief order. See Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 7 (2015);
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a)-(b).
      4
       We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                              6

      relief as ordered by the administrative judge, and has failed to certify its
      compliance with the interim relief order. PFR File, Tab 6 at 5-6; see 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.116(d). We agree with the appellant that the agency has failed to show
      that it has complied with the administrative judge’s interim relief order.           The
      agency’s petition for review did not include a certification that the agency had
      complied with the interim relief order, 5 and the agency has not presented any
      evidence of compliance. Moreover, although it had the opportunity to do so, the
      agency did not reply to the appellant’s response to the petition for review. Thus,
      it has not challenged the appellant’s allegations that it failed to provide interim
      relief. 6
¶12          Although the Board may dismiss an agency’s petition for review if the
      agency fails to establish its compliance with the interim relief order, it need not
      do so. Kolenc v. Department of Health & Human Services, 120 M.S.P.R. 101,
      ¶ 11 (2013). We exercise our discretion in this case not to dismiss the petition for
      review because the issue of the agency’s compliance with the interim relief order
      is now moot by virtue of our final decision ordering corrective action. See Elder
      v. Department of the Air Force, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 20 (2016).

      5
       As the appellant notes on review, the agency does not mention interim relief in its
      petition for review. PFR File, Tab 6 at 6; see generally PFR File, Tab 1.
      6
        Although the agency has not addressed the compliance issue, the record in the
      compliance matter indicates that the appellant returned to work with the agency as a
      GS-09 EA on August 7, 2017. CF, Tab 4. This does not demonstrate full compliance
      with the interim relief order, however, as the order directed the agency to appoint the
      appellant to the GS-09 EA position effective as of the date of the initial decision, i.e.,
      May 19, 2017. ID at 1, 26.
                                                                                            7

      The appellant made protected disclosures.
¶13         Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, at the merits stage
      of the appeal, the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence 7 that she made a
      protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), or engaged in activity protected
      by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and that such disclosure or
      activity was a contributing factor in a personnel action taken against her.
      5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Lu v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R.
      335, ¶ 7 (2015).     If the appellant meets that burden, the agency is given an
      opportunity to prove by clear and convincing evidence 8 that it would have taken
      the same personnel action absent the protected disclosure or activity. 5 U.S.C.
      § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Lu, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7.
¶14         A protected disclosure is a disclosure that an appellant reasonably believes
      evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a
      gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
      public health or safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); Parkinson v. Department of
      Justice, 874 F.3d 710, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2017).         A reasonable belief exists if a
      disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily
      ascertainable by the appellant could reasonably conclude that the actions of the
      Government     evidence    one   of   the   categories   of   wrongdoing     listed   in
      section 2302(b)(8)(A). Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
      The appellant need not prove that the matter disclosed actually established one of
      the types of wrongdoing listed under section 2302(b)(8)(A); rather, the appellant

      7
        Preponderant evidence is “[t]he degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
      considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
      fact is more likely to be true than untrue.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
      8
       Clear and convincing evidence is “that measure or degree of proof that produces in the
      mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established.”
      5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(e).
                                                                                          8

      must show that the matter disclosed was one which a reasonable person in her
      position would believe evidenced any of the situations specified in 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8). Chavez v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 18
      (2013).
¶15         Following the hearing in this appeal, the administrative judge issued a close
      of record order directing the appellant to submit a brief addressing why she
      believed that her disclosure reported a type of wrongdoing listed in 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8).   IAF, Tab 37.      In response, the appellant asserted that Dover
      MAO’s practice of sending service members’ remains to a landfill violated
      Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1300.22, Mortuary Affairs Policy,
      paragraph 4.2, which provides that the remains of all military members “will be
      handled with the reverence, care, and dignity befitting them and the
      circumstances.” IAF, Tab 39 at 20.
¶16         The administrative judge provided the agency the opportunity to respond to
      the appellant’s brief, and it did so. IAF, Tabs 37, 45. In its post-hearing brief,
      the agency argued that the appellant did not make a protected disclosure because
      the DOD directive cited by the appellant does not clearly state that what occurred
      with the ashes in this case violated that directive or any law, policy, or regulation.
      IAF, Tab 45 at 5-6.
¶17         The administrative judge agreed with the appellant, and found that
      “dumping the ashes of [service members] into a landfill” fails to accord those
      remains the “reverence, care and dignity” required by the DOD directive. ID
      at 19-20.   Therefore, the administrative judge found that the appellant made a
      protected disclosure by reporting conduct that violated this directive.            ID
      at 18-20.
¶18         In the alternative, the administrative judge found that, even if Dover MAO
      did not violate the DOD directive, the appellant’s disclosures were nonetheless
      protected because she established that she reasonably believed that Dover MAO
                                                                                        9

      had committed some violation of law, rule, or regulation when it dumped portions
      of her husband’s remains in a Virginia landfill. ID at 20-21. The administrative
      judge noted that all of the agency’s managerial witnesses, including a U.S. Army
      Major General, testified that they were appalled to learn how the appellant’s
      husband’s remains had been handled, and Representative Holt also believed that
      Dover MAO had treated service members’ remains in a most undignified manner.
      ID at 19-21. Based on this evidence and hearing testimony, the administrative
      judge found that a disinterested observer could reasonably conclude that the
      actions the appellant disclosed evidenced a violation of a law, rule, or regulation.
      ID at 21.   Therefore, the administrative judge found, and we agree, that the
      appellant’s disclosures are protected. Id.

      The appellant proved contributing factor under the knowledge/timing test.
¶19        To prevail in an IRA appeal, an appellant also must prove by preponderant
      evidence that her protected disclosures were a contributing factor in a personnel
      action. Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 21 (2016). The
      term “contributing factor” means any disclosure that affects an agency’s decision
      to threaten, propose, take, or not take a personnel action regarding the individual
      who made the disclosure. Id.; 5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(d). The most common way of
      proving the contributing factor element is the “knowledge/timing test.” Scoggins,
      123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 21. Under that test, an appellant may prove the contributing
      factor element through evidence that the official taking the personnel action knew
      of the disclosure and took the personnel action within a period of time such that a
      reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in
      the personnel action. Id. Once an appellant has satisfied the knowledge/timing
      test, she has demonstrated that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor in
      a personnel action. Id.
¶20        Regarding the knowledge prong of the test, the administrative judge found
      that the evidence presented at the hearing shows that Picatinny management
                                                                                           10

      officials were aware of the appellant’s disclosures since at least the spring of
      2011. ID at 21. As for the timing prong of the test, the administrative judge
      found that the appellant’s disclosures, and the news reports about those
      disclosures, continued until September 2012, i.e., approximately 1 month before
      the selecting official decided not to select the appellant for the EA position. 9 Id.;
      see Scoggins, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 25 (finding that a personnel action that occurs
      within 2 years of the appellant’s disclosure satisfies the timing component of the
      knowledge/timing test). Therefore, the administrative judge found, the appellant
      clearly satisfied the knowledge/timing test. ID at 22.
¶21            The agency challenges this finding on review; however, it does not dispute
      that Picatinny management officials knew of the appellant’s disclosures before
      they decided not to select her. PFR File, Tab 3 at 16 (stating that the agency
      “freely admits” that it was aware of the appellant’s alleged whistleblowing prior
      to the personnel action in question); IAF, Tab 24 at 4-5 (same). It also does not
      dispute that the length of time between the appellant’s disclosures and her
      nonselection was sufficiently short to satisfy the timing prong of the test.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 16-18. The agency contends that the appellant nonetheless
      failed to prove contributing factor because the knowledge/timing test also
      “requires a reasonable person standard as to that knowledge being a contributing
      factor to the personnel action” and the appellant has not met that standard. Id.
      at 16.
¶22            This argument is unpersuasive. As previously indicated, once an appellant
      has satisfied the knowledge/timing test, she has met her burden of proving
      contributing factor. Scoggins, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 21. The appellant clearly has

      9
        Although it is unclear exactly when the agency decided not to select the appellant for
      the EA position, the agency contends that the appellant’s nonselection occurred on or
      about October 31, 2012. IAF, Tab 4 at 8.
                                                                                        11

      satisfied that test, as it is undisputed that agency management officials knew of
      the appellant’s whistleblowing disclosures and made the decision not to select her
      within a period of time sufficiently short to satisfy the knowledge/timing test.
      Under these circumstances, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      appellant proved that her protected disclosures were a contributing factor in her
      nonselection. ID at 21.

      The agency failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
      nonselected the appellant for the EA position absent her protected disclosures.
¶23        When, as in this case, an appellant shows by preponderant evidence that she
      made protected disclosures and that those disclosures were a contributing factor
      in the decision to take a personnel action, the burden shifts to the agency to prove
      by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel action in
      the absence of the whistleblowing.        See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Scoggins,
      123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 26. In determining whether an agency has met its burden,
      the Board generally considers the following factors:       (1) the strength of the
      agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any
      motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the
      decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against
      employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.
      Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
      Factor (1) does not apply straightforwardly to this case, however, as the personnel
      action at issue here is not disciplinary in nature, and therefore does not require
      supporting evidence of misconduct. Gonzales, 101 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 12. Instead,
      it is appropriate to consider instead the broader question of whether the agency
      had legitimate reasons for the appellant’s nonselection.       Id.; see Schnell v.
      Department of the Army, 114 M.S.P.R. 83, ¶¶ 17, 23 (2010) (applying Gonzales
      in adjudicating a nonselection for a temporary position).       The U.S. Court of
      Appeals for the Federal Circuit has further clarified that “[e]vidence only clearly
                                                                                             12

      and convincingly supports a conclusion when it does so in the aggregate
      considering all the pertinent evidence in the record, and despite the evidence that
      fairly detracts from that conclusion.”          Whitmore v. Department of Labor,
      680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
¶24         Regarding the first Carr factor, the administrative judge found that the
      agency’s explanation for not selecting the appellant lacked credibility because it
      was “riddled with inconsistencies” and that the agency “utterly failed to justify its
      selection decision.” ID at 23-24. In making this finding, the administrative judge
      noted that the selecting official and two other management officials testified
      during the hearing that the appellant was not suited for the EA position for the
      following reasons: (1) the appellant had problems getting along with coworkers;
      (2) she had “leave usage” issues; and (3) she frequently demanded teleworking
      arrangements.    ID at 24.    The administrative judge found that none of these
      reasons for refusing to select the appellant were supported by the evidentiary
      record. Id. In particular, the administrative judge found that the agency’s claim
      that the appellant had trouble getting along with coworkers was directly
      contradicted    by   management     in    the   appellant’s      2010-2011    performance
      evaluation, as she received the highest possible rating under the category
      “Working Relationships & Communications.” ID at 15, 24; IAF, Tab 22 at 89.
¶25         The administrative judge further noted that the appellant’s second-line
      supervisor,    who   criticized   the    appellant’s   ability    to   work   with   other
      administrative assistants and cast doubt on her leadership ability during the
      hearing, praised the appellant’s performance on her evaluation form. ID at 15.
      As the administrative judge noted, the supervisor stated in his Senior Rater
      comments that the appellant could be relied on to train and assist senior
      administrative assistants on various tasks, had the capability and desire to excel
      in positions well above the administrative level, and had outstanding potential to
      succeed in a position of higher authority and responsibility. ID at 15-16; IAF,
                                                                                          13

      Tab 22 at 89.     The administrative judge also found management’s purported
      concern about the appellant’s request for telework “an odd one,” given that she
      made the request so that she could work for the agency while she was out on
      maternity-related sick leave, instead of being unable to make any work-related
      contributions during that time. ID at 14.
¶26         On review, the agency argues that, because the appellant was applying for a
      GS-09 position and the performance evaluation pertains to her performance in a
      GS-08 position, the administrative judge should have given less weight to the
      appellant’s performance evaluation and more weight to the testimony of agency
      officials   regarding   their   concerns    about   the   appellant’s   potential   for
      accomplishing GS-09 level work.       PFR File, Tab 3 at 18.       This argument is
      unpersuasive.    If the appellant had difficulty getting along with others, that
      should have been reflected in her performance evaluation. Her excellent rating in
      all categories, including “Working Relationships & Communications,” and the
      praise she received from agency management in her performance evaluation,
      severely undermine the legitimacy of the agency’s reasons for its decision not to
      select her for the EA position. Accordingly, we agree with the administrative
      judge’s assessment of the first Carr factor and find that the agency did not have
      legitimate reasons for not selecting the appellant.
¶27         We next consider the second Carr factor, the strength of any motive to
      retaliate on the part of any agency officials who were involved in the decision in
      question. As the administrative judge noted in the initial decision, although the
      appellant’s protected disclosures exposed misconduct by personnel from the
      Department of the Air Force, rather than the Department of the Army, the
      evidence shows that the ramifications of the appellant’s disclosures were not
      confined to the Air Force.       ID at 22.    For example, the record contains a
      December 6, 2011 email from a Washington Post reporter notifying the appellant
      of DOD personnel’s reaction to a Facebook post in which she stated that an
                                                                                      14

      article about Dover MAO would be published soon. IAF, Tab 23 at 299. In the
      email, the reporter states that the appellant “gave some DoD people a heart
      attack” and that DOD personnel were “really worried” about the upcoming
      article. Id. Thus, as the administrative judge found, the record shows that the
      appellant’s disclosures were a source of anxiety for DOD personnel other than Air
      Force officials. ID at 22. Further, because Representative Holt decided not to
      vote for the NDAA of 2012, in part due to the appellant’s disclosures, and the
      NDAA provides funding to all DOD agencies, those disclosures arguably
      jeopardized funding for every agency in DOD. Id.; IAF, Tab 21 at 59-60.
¶28        In evaluating the second Carr factor, we also have considered the court’s
      decision in Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1371, which cautioned the Board against taking
      an unduly dismissive and restrictive view of retaliatory motive. The Whitmore
      court stated that, “[t]hose responsible for the agency’s performance overall may
      well be motivated to retaliate even if they are not directly implicated by the
      disclosures, and even if they do not know the whistleblower personally, as the
      criticism reflects on them in their capacities as managers and employees.” Id.
      at 1370. Applying this broader view of retaliatory motive, the court has found
      that an official may have a retaliatory motive even if he is not “directly involved
      in the work at issue in an employee’s disclosure.”       Miller v. Department of
      Justice, 842 F.3d 1252, 1261-62 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In another case, an agency
      official took a personnel action against a whistleblower employee, but that
      official was not personally implicated in the employee’s disclosures, which
      concerned congressional testimony by a different agency official.       The court
      determined that the Board’s administrative judge erred by failing to consider
      whether the agency official who took the personnel action nonetheless had a
      “professional retaliatory motive” against the employee because his disclosures
      regarding the alleged inaccuracy of an agency Under Secretary’s congressional
      testimony “implicated the capabilities, performance, and veracity of [agency]
                                                                                      15

      managers and employees, and implied that the [agency] deceived [a] Senate
      Committee.”     Robinson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 923 F.3d 1004,
      1008-09, 1018-19 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
¶29        In this matter, although none of the agency officials involved in the
      decision not to select the appellant was directly implicated in the mishandling of
      service members’ remains, the misconduct the appellant disclosed was egregious
      and her disclosures generated a significant amount of negative publicity for the
      DOD. Given these circumstances, the appellant’s disclosures reflected poorly on
      DOD officials as representatives of the general institutional interests of the DOD,
      which is sufficient to establish a retaliatory motive.    See Whitmore, 680 F.3d
      at 1370; Chambers v. Department of the Interior, 116 M.S.P.R. 17, ¶ 69 (2011).
      We therefore find that the agency officials involved in the decision not to select
      the appellant had some motive to retaliate against her for her disclosures.
¶30        As for the third Carr factor, there is no record evidence concerning the
      agency’s treatment of similarly situated nonwhistleblowers.          As previously
      explained, it is the agency that bears the burden of proving that it would have
      taken the same action in the absence of the appellant’s protected activity. Alarid
      v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 14 (2015). While the agency
      does not have an affirmative burden to produce evidence concerning each and
      every Carr factor, and “the absence of any evidence relating to Carr factor three
      can effectively remove that factor from the analysis,” the failure to produce such
      evidence if it exists “may be at the agency’s peril,” and “may well cause the
      agency to fail to prove its case overall.”      Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374-75.
      Moreover, because the agency bears the burden of proof at this stage of the
      analysis, when the agency fails to introduce relevant comparator evidence, the
      third Carr factor cannot favor the agency.            Smith v. General Services
      Administration, 930 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Siler v. Environmental
      Protection Agency, 908 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Here, the agency has
                                                                                         16

      failed to proffer any evidence pertaining to Carr factor three.         Under these
      circumstances, Carr factor 3 cannot weigh in the agency’s favor.
¶31         We therefore find that the agency did not have legitimate reasons for its
      failure to select the appellant for the EA position, that the agency officials
      involved in the decision had some motive to retaliate, and that the agency’s
      failure to provide evidence in support of Carr factor 3 does not favor the agency.
      Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency failed to prove by
      clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action absent the
      appellant’s protected disclosures. 10   ID at 24.     We therefore agree with the
      administrative judge’s determination that the appellant is entitled to corrective
      action. Id.

      The agency’s evidentiary arguments provide no basis to disturb the initial
      decision.
¶32         The agency also argues on review that the administrative judge did not
      follow “required evidentiary procedures” and erred in relying on documents that
      were not properly admitted as evidence during the hearing. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5,
      7-11. In addition, the agency claims that the administrative judge improperly
      considered hearsay evidence, such as excerpts from Representative Holt’s speech.
      Id. These arguments are unavailing, as it is well settled that strict adherence to
      the Federal Rules of Evidence and of Civil Procedure is not mandatory in
      administrative proceedings, Crawford v. Department of the Treasury, 56 M.S.P.R.

      10
         Although the administrative judge did not explicitly address the second and third
      Carr factors in his analysis, we find it unnecessary to remand the appeal because
      resolution of the clear and convincing issue in this case does not require additional
      credibility determinations or further development of the record. Cf. Shibuya v.
      Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 37 (2013) (finding that the
      administrative judge was in the best position to reweigh the evidence on the clear and
      convincing issue because she was the one who heard the live testimony and made
      credibility determinations).
                                                                                       17

      224, 233 (1993), and hearsay evidence is admissible in Board proceedings,
      Shannon v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 15 (2014).
¶33        The agency further argues on review that the administrative judge erred by
      allowing the appellant to testify as an expert in Air Force mortuary affairs policy,
      but not granting its post-hearing request to present rebuttal expert testimony from
      Dover MAO personnel familiar with the regulations at issue and the handling of
      remains by the Air Force. PFR File, Tab 3 at 11-16; IAF, Tab 45. The agency
      asserts that such testimony was necessary for the appellant to prove that Dover
      MAO’s handling of service members’ remains violated a law, rule, or regulation.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 15.
¶34        An administrative judge has wide discretion to control the proceedings
      before him, to receive relevant evidence, and to ensure that the record on
      significant issues is fully developed. See Tisdell v. Department of the Air Force,
      94 M.S.P.R. 44, ¶ 13 (2003); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b).         The hearing transcript
      shows that the appellant did not testify as an expert witness in mortuary affairs.
      Hearing Transcript, Volume 2 (HT2) at 517-26 (testimony of the appellant).
      Rather, the administrative judge merely questioned the appellant as to her
      knowledge of Dover MAO policy regarding the disposition of service members’
      remains. Id. at 519-26 (testimony of the appellant). This line of questioning was
      entirely appropriate and agency counsel did not object to it during the hearing.
      Id. Also, agency counsel had the opportunity to question the appellant about her
      testimony, but chose not to do so. HT2 at 526 (testimony of the appellant).
¶35        Further, even assuming that expert testimony was necessary for the
      appellant to establish that Dover MAO’s mishandling of service members’
      remains violated a law, rule, or regulation, the absence of such testimony
      provides no reason to disturb the initial decision because it did not affect the
      outcome of the case. See Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124,
      127 (1981) (explaining that an administrative judge’s procedural error is of no
                                                                                        18

      legal consequence unless it is shown to have adversely affected a party’s
      substantive rights). As previously discussed, the appellant was not required to
      prove that a violation of law, rule, or regulation had occurred. Rather, she was
      required to prove that a disinterested observer could reasonably conclude that the
      actions of Dover MAO personnel evidenced a violation of a law, rule, or
      regulation. Lachance, 174 F.3d at 1381. Satisfying this standard did not require
      expert testimony.

      The agency has failed to prove its allegation of judicial bias.
¶36         The agency also raises an apparent claim of bias on review, alleging that the
      administrative judge “was obviously sympathetic” to the appellant and was so
      outraged by the mishandling of her husband’s remains that he decided to rule
      against the agency, regardless of the evidence. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5, 14. It
      further contends that, in the initial decision, the administrative judge engaged in a
      “shocking personal attack” on agency counsel when addressing the agency’s
      argument in its post-hearing brief that, because DOD Directive 1300.22 does not
      specify what qualifies as the “requisite care, reverence, and dignity befitting [the
      remains] and the circumstances . . . what we have here is more of a philosophical
      or theological debate than anything else.” Id. at 14.
¶37         Although the agency does not specifically identify the administrative
      judge’s alleged “personal attack” on agency counsel, it appears to be referring to
      the following statement by the administrative judge in response to the above
      argument: “The agency should be disabused of the notion that a landfill is a
      dignified resting place for the remains of a U.S. Army Soldier who gave his life
      in the service of his nation.” ID at 18. This statement is not a personal attack on
      agency counsel. Moreover, given the reprehensible manner in which Dover MOA
      personnel handled the remains of the appellant’s husband and other service
      members, we find the administrative judge’s statement to be a measured and
      reasonable response to the agency’s appalling suggestion that dumping service
                                                                                        19

      members’ remains in a landfill could ever qualify as “the requisite care,
      reverence, and dignity befitting the remains and the circumstances.”
¶38         Further, in making a claim of bias or prejudice against an administrative
      judge, a party must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that
      accompanies     administrative    adjudicators.      Oliver    v.    Department   of
      Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980). An administrative judge’s conduct
      during the course of a Board proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if his
      comments or actions evidence “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
      make fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d
      1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
      555 (1994)); Smets v. Department of the Navy, 117 M.S.P.R. 164, ¶ 15 (2011),
      aff’d per curiam, 498 F. App’x 1 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The agency’s allegations on
      review, which do not relate to any extrajudicial conduct by the administrative
      judge, neither overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that
      accompanies an administrative judge, nor establish that he showed a deep-seated
      favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.

                                            ORDER
¶39         We ORDER the agency to appoint the appellant to the position of Executive
      Assistant, GS-03019-09, at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. See Kerr v. National
      Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984).              The agency must
      complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision.
¶40         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
                                                                                     20

      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶41        We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and to describe the
      actions it took to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified,
      should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶42        No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision in this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶43        For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
      Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
      made within the 60-day period set forth above.
¶44        This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).
                                                                               21

                     NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT
                 REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                     ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                     NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT
                 REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                     CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your consequential
damages, including medical costs incurred, travel expenses, and any other
reasonable and foreseeable consequential damages. To be paid, you must meet
the requirements set out at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(g) or 1221(g). The regulations may
be found at 5 C.F.R. § § 1201.202, 1201.202 and 1201.204. If you believe you
meet these requirements, you must file a motion for consequential damages
WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.                        You
must file your motion with the office that issued the initial decision on your
appeal.

                          NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
      A copy of the decision will be referred to the Special Counsel “to
investigate and take appropriate action under [5 U.S.C.] section 1215,” based on
the determination that “there is reason to believe that a current employee may
have committed a prohibited personnel practice” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 5 U.S.C. § 1221(f)(3). Please note
                                                                                     22

that while any Special Counsel investigation related to this decision is pending,
“no disciplinary action shall be taken against any employee for any alleged
prohibited activity under investigation or for any related activity without the
approval of the Special Counsel.” 5 U.S.C. § 1214(f).

                        NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 11
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

11
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                    23

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.            5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
                                                                                24

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court‑appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                     25

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 12   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:

12
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                 26

                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

          Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
          If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
          Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
          http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
   describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
            collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
   Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the
   type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave
   to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1‑7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum
Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
       a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
       b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
       c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.