Court Opinion

ID: 9717204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:00:07.15093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.987076
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
by Me. Justice Robeets:
Today a majority of this Court has denied appellant his constitutionally-guaranteed right to free appellate counsel. In so doing, the majority has ignored the facts of this case, our recent decisions in this area, and controlling principles of federal constitutional law. For our state courts, this decision means new uncertainties; an area of the law presumably settled by us now becomes unclear. For the federal courts, this decision means unnecessary burdens; an area of the law in which our decisions were in accord with federal constitutional law now becomes one in which our decisions are in conflict. I cannot accept these results and I must dissent.1
First, the majority ignores several critical facts which are relevant to appellant’s knowledge of his right to free appellate counsel. The record made at trial is devoid of any indication that appellant was informed of his right to free appellate counsel. Likewise, the PCHA record is devoid of any evidence that appellant knew of his right to free appellate counsel.2 Ap*15pell ant’s trial counsel were never questioned on this point. The Commonwealth produced no evidence on this point. And the hearing court made no finding on this point.3
Yet, despite the lack of any evidence indicating that appellant knew of his right to free counsel on appeal, the majority finds that “[i]t is clear that defendant knew of his right to free Court-appointed counsel to represent him in post-trial motions and in an appeal, and that he voluntarily and intelligently waived his right.” Since there is nothing in the record to support such a “finding,”4 I can only conclude that the *16majority’s “finding” is based on an assumption that since appellant “had been represented at trial by two experienced, free counsel,” he must have known of his right to free appellate counsel. Only by such an assumption could the majority eliminate the need for affirmative record evidence on the crucial issue of appellant’s actual knowledge of his right to free appellate counsel.
I find this substitution of assumption for evidence unusual, particularly in light of a long, and until today unbroken, line of cases which we have decided over the past several years: See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Herge, 436 Pa. 542, 260 A. 2d 787 (1970) (alternative holding); Commonwealth v. Gist, 433 Pa. 101, 249 A. 2d 351 (1969) ; Commonwealth v. Zaffina, 432 Pa. 435, 248 A. 2d 5 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Ezell, 431 Pa. 101, 244 A. 2d 646 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Mumford, 430 Pa. 451, 243 A. 2d 440 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Hall, 430 Pa. 163, 242 A. 2d 241 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Stewart, 430 Pa. 7, 241 A. 2d 764 (1968); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 430 Pa. 1, 241 A. 2d 760 (1968) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 435 Pa. 449, 257 A. 2d 251 (1969) (reaffirming earlier Stewart holding) ; Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 431 Pa. 269, 245 A. 2d 446 (1968) (concerning counsel at trial; reaffirms standard enunciated in Stewart, supra); Commonwealth ex rel. Fink v. Rundle, 431 Pa. 264, 244 A. 2d 648 (1968) (not a silent record and therefore petitioner had burden of proving he did not know of his right to free appellate counsel); Commonwealth v. Blose, 430 Pa. 209, 241 A. 2d 918 (1968) (counsel at trial). These-cases stand for the proposition that there must be a finding of fact that an accused indigent not *17only knew of Ms right to appeal, but also that he knew of his right to free counsel on appeal, and intelligently waived both rights by not appealing. And, not only must there be a showing of an accused’s knowledge of both rights, but where there was no trial record on the issue, the Commonwealth has the burden, at the PCHA hearing, of proving that the defendant had the requisite knowledge.
Commonwealth v. Wilson, supra, is particularly instructive, for it is clear that Wilson and the instant case are identical in every respect—except for this Court’s disposition. Wilson, like Freeman, was an indigent represented by court-appointed counsel at trial. Wilson, like Freeman, was not told at trial of his right to appeal, or of his right to free counsel to prosecute his appeal. Wilson, like Freeman, filed a petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, alleging a denial of his constitutional right to appeal, as set forth in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963). Wilson, like Freeman, was denied relief by the hearing court, on a finding only that he knew of his right to appeal, and waived that right by not appealing.
But Wilson, unlike Freeman, was given relief. This Court held that the right to free appellate counsel is part of an accused’s rights under Douglas. This Court held that “an accused cannot waive his right to . . . assistance of appellate counsel unless he is told of his right to such court appointed counsel.” 430 Pa. at 5, 241 A. 2d at 763. This Court stated that “[t]he record below, although it does indicate that appellant may have been told that he could appeal, is completely silent as to whether appellant was at any point informed or was aware that he was entitled to court appointed counsel.” Id. This Court held that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving such knowledge. And this Court, although it could have concluded that the Common*18wealth had not met its burden, remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the question of Wilson’s knowledge of his right to. free appellate counsel, since it was arguable that our prior decisions had not made it clear that “the Commonwealth must demonstrate, where the record is silent, that the post-conviction applicant was aware of both his right to appeal and his right to court appointed appellate counsel.” Id. (emphasis in original). ...
Wilson was decided on May 3, 1968, nine months after Freeman had his evidentiary hearing, and five months after the hearing court rendered its opinion. Thus Wilson and. Freeman were in precisely the same posture when they had their evidentiary hearings—i.e., the parties did not have the decision in Wilson to guide them—and they were in precisely the same posture on appeal. How, then, can this Court now refuse Freeman at least what it granted Wilson? In fact, it is even arguable that Freeman should not be required to go through another hearing, because on this record, even without the guidance of Wilson, there is uncontradicted testimony by Freeman indicating, that he did not know of his right to free appellate counsel.5
Clearly, Wilson should control the instant case. The holding in Wilson has never been doubted by this Court and was just recently termed “settled law in this Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Herge, 436 Pa. at 549, 260 A. 2d at 790. The holding has been constantly, and explicitly, reaffirmed in later cases. Commonwealth v. Ritchey,. 431 Pa: at 274-75, 245 A. 2d at 450: “We reaffirm our earlier holding that as a matter of law there cannot be a finding of á knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel unless the accused shall have been explicitly informed that he is entitled to free counsel if he is indigent. Commonwealth v. Wilson *19. . . .” (Emphasis in the original) Commonwealth v. Zaffina, 432 Pa. at 438-39, 248 A. 2d at 7: “In Commonwealth v. Wilson . . . and again in Commonwealth v. Mnmford ... we held unequivocally that where the trial record is silent on the issue of waiver, ‘the Commonwealth has the burden to show not only that a defendant was told, or knew, of his absolute right to appeal, but also that he knew he could have counsel for this appeal, and, if indigent, that he could have free counsel.’ Mumford, supra, at 454, 243 A. 2d at 442.”
And yet today, for the first time, the majority holds that an indigent defendant represented by free trial counsel does not have to be told of his right to free appellate counsel. Evidently, it will now be presumed, without any evidence, that all indigent defendants, represented by free counsel at trial, know that they can have free counsel on appeal. I submit that such a presumption is arbitrary, contrary to our prior decisions,6 and totally unjustifiable. One could as easily say that once an indigent is informed of his Miranda right to free counsel at interrogation, he is presumed to know that free counsel will follow him through the rest of the trial and appeal. Further, the majority’s decision will undoubtedly create uncertainties in the trial courts of this Commonwealth. Nothing, of course, could be more confusing to our trial courts, and the profession, than to say we are following Wilson while reaching a totally opposite result.
Besides creating problems for our state court system, today’s decision unwisely imposes additional bur*20dens on the federal courts. Now the two court systems will be in disagreement in this area of federal constitutional law, for the majority’s opinion imposes upon the federal courts the uncomfortable and burdensome task of correcting constitutional errors, and protecting constitutional rights, which the state system leaves uncorrected. The federal courts have not, and will not, ignore the dictates of federal constitutional law which, until today, we ourselves had followed in Wilson and its progeny.
We are dealing here with a waiver of a federal constitutional right, the right to free appellate counsel as mandated by Douglas v. California, supra. As such, we must follow the federal standard for finding waiver: “For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ ” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1171 (1969) (emphasis added). We cannot presume knowledge, and hence waiver, of constitutional rights, for “ ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938) (emphasis added). There must be proof that the defendant knew he had the right to free appellate counsel; without such proof we cannot find that he knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right: “Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.” Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S. Ct. 884, 890 (1962) (emphasis added).
The majority has done precisely what the United States Supreme Court has held impermissible. Waiver of a federal constitutional right has been presumed *21from, a silent record. There is no proof that appellant knew of his right to free counsel on appeal. There is no record to show such knowledge. There can he no waiver. While, in my view, appellant will have no difficulty vindicating his constitutional right in federal court,7 it is indeed most unfortunate that the majority refuses to allow him to vindicate it here.
Mr. Justice O’Bkien joins in this dissent.

 I agree with the majority that since the holding in Miranda does not apply to the instant case, appellant’s confessions were properly admitted at trial. Were Miranda applicable, however, the confessions would be inadmissible for failure to give the proper warnings.

 There was only one question asked at the PCHA hearing which even remotely concerned appellant’s knowledge of his right to free counsel on appeal: “Q. [W]hen the appeal was explained or discussed with you, did you or did you not understand that an appeal would be provided at public expense if you didn’t have any money? A. [Freeman] I didn’t understand anything about an appeal. I didn’t know the power of an appeal, what it meant, what jt was based on.” This statement was never contradicted.

 The hearing court stated that the issue was “whether Petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal.” No mention is made of petitioner’s right to free counsel on appeal.

 The testimony of trial counsel that they “explained to him these rights” does not support the majority’s “finding.” “These rights,” taken in context, refers only to the rights to file post-trial motions and take an appeal. No reference was made to appellant’s right to free counsel on appeal. But, so that the reader may determine for himself the context of the quotation, the paragraph from which it was taken is quoted in its entirety below.
In response to a question by the district attorney, Arlington Williams, one of appellant’s original trial counsel, testified: “Well, my recollection is this, that Mr. Scanlon [co-counsel] and I together went to see Mr. Freeman for the express purpose of advising him what his rights were in connection with a motion for new trial and possible appeal if the new trial was denied. Mr. Scanlon and I went to the Monroe County Jail, and, as I recall it, this conviction, the jury verdict, came in on a Saturday, and we talked to Mr. Freeman in the early part of the week following the day the jury rendered the verdict. At that time, Mr. Scanlon did the explanation. He advised Mr. Freeman concerning his rights, first, to make him have his counsel move for a new trial, and secondly, that if that new trial was denied, that he had a right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and have his case reviewed. There was a mention of four days, as I recall it, in which, under our rule of court, this motion would normally be made. It is my recollection that in this particular instance, since the verdict was rendered on the last day the court sat, that under the rule, there was additional time in that a motion could be filed at the next session *16of the court. Mr. Scanlon explained to him these rights and then told him that whether he wanted us to file this motion for a new trial and a subsequent appeal if a new trial was denied was a matter for his decision.”

 See note 2, supra.

 In none of our past decisions have we ever indicated that we would draw a distinction between defendants who were represented at trial by free counsel, and those who became indigent after trial, and thus it is difficult to determine how many of our past decisions fit into either category. But from the facts recited by the Court in those cases, it appears that at least Wilson and Zaffina were represented at trial by free counsel.

 Dor example, the second circuit, in an opinion by Judge Medina, has recently held that Douglas “imposes upon the state a duty to warn every person convicted of crime of his right to appeal and his right to prosecute his appeal without expense to him by counsel appointed by the state, if he is indigent.” The case was then remanded for “a further hearing and finding on the subject: was Joel Smith [the defendant] informed or did he know prior to the expiration of his time to appeal that he could appeal without cost to himself and with counsel appointed by the state.” United States ex rel. Smith v. McMann (No. 336, September Term, 1968, decided en banc, October 10, 1969) (emphasis added). In United States ex rel Sliva v. Rundle, 295 F. Supp. 613, 615-16 (E.D. Pa. 1969), the court—relying on, and quoting with approval, our decision in Commonwealth v. Ezell, supra—stated that “[t]he fact that an indigent does not specifically request counsel on appeal cannot in itself be construed as a knowing and intelligent waiver .... Relator clearly knew of his right to appeal, hut there is nothing on the record to indicate that he knew of his right to counsel on appeal.” The court therefore granted the writ, subject to the Commonwealth giving relator his right to direct appeal with court-appointed counsel. It is also interesting to note that F. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(2), designed to implement a defendant’s rights under Douglas, provides that the trial court must advise a defendant not only of his right to appeal but also of his right to proceed in forma pauperis if indigent, even if defendant is at the time represented by counsel. See Advisory Committee’s Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 193; United States v. Smith, 387 F. 2d 268, 269-70 (6th Cir. 1967).