Court Opinion

ID: 9741109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:49:37.841038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.351711
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Justice
(concurring specially).
Although due process does not impose the stringent principles of Gault and Winship upon a post-adjudicative juvenile proceeding, due process nevertheless is a requisite in such proceedings. Cf. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948). The difference in the post-adjudicative proceeding is in the process which is due. I believe the process which is due depends upon the nature and purpose of the proceeding.
After the November 15 adjudication of delinquency the child was placed in his home subject to supervision of a probation officer. § 232.34(2), The Code. Allegations of subsequent misconduct against the child resulted in the February hearing, the purpose of which was two-fold: (1) to inquire into the truth of the allegations, and (2) if the allegations were established, to determine the appropriateness of a different disposition. § 232.36, The Code. This proceeding was in many respects analogous to an adult probation or parole revocation hearing. The April hearing dealt solely with the choice of disposition.
I believe the minimum requirements of due process in a juvenile dispositional hearing under Code § 232.36, like the February hearing in this case, would include: (1) written notice to the child of the allegations upon which a change in disposition will be considered, (2) disclosure to the child of the evidence supporting those allegations, (3) an opportunity of the child to be heard in person and to present evidence, (4) the right of the child to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, (5) the right of the child to be represented by counsel throughout the proceeding, to be appointed by the court if •he is indigent (see § 232.28, The Code), and (6) a written statement by the court showing the evidence relied on and reasons for any change in disposition. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). In addition, the allegations supporting a change in disposition must be established by a preponderance of competent evidence. See State v. Hughes, 200 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1972). The child’s right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is defined and explained in In re Delaney, 185 N.W.2d 726 (Iowa 1971).
In the present case, the child complains the juvenile court relied on incompetent evidence in finding the allegations of mis*292conduct subsequent to the adjudication of delinquency were established in the February hearing. He also complains the competent evidence was insufficient to sustain those allegations. I concur with the majority because I believe, after de novo review of the record, that the allegations were sustained by a preponderance of competent evidence. It is not necessary under this record to determine whether the other requisites of due process were met.