Court Opinion

ID: 9575685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:15:56.717515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:47.092599
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(concurring). This appeal involves 2 cases consolidated for trial. Plaintiffs were granted,on motion, the right to discovery of what is described by defendant as a joint stenographic statement taken by defendant’s agents from the plaintiffs shortly after occurrence of the events resulting in this litigation; Defendant appeals, on granted leave, claiming1 production of the plaintiffs’ statement should, not be *326required because (1) Court Rule No 35, § 6 (1945), * does not permit discovery of matter not admissible under tbe rules of evidence and (2) production of the statement will prevent defendant from using it to impeach plaintiffs’ expected trial testimony, — defendant’s assumption apparently being that plaintiffs will, if necessary, pervert their testimony to conform to the statement regardless of their present actual recollection of the facts referred to therein.
Mr. Justice Kavanagh affirms without squarely ruling upon the applicability of Court Rule No 35, § 6, to the discovery allowed by the trial court but affirms, nevertheless, on the theory that such discovery would have been within the range of the trial court’s discretion under our old Court Rule No 40 (1945) practice. I concur in affirmance, but prefer to do so on the authority of Court Rule No 35, § 6, the rule relied upon below by plaintiffs, defendant, and the trial court.
First. Were these plaintiffs, whose cases were consolidated for trial, not related by marriage or by blood, but merely strangers involved in a single accident with like claims arising therefrom against the same defendant, we would not have much difficulty concluding that each plaintiff would be entitled under Court Rule No 35, § 6 (1945), to discovery from the common defendant of a statement taken from the other plaintiff. I see no compelling reason to treat these plaintiffs differently because they are married to one another or because the statement was a joint one.
Second. Defendant’s concern about losing the advantage of possible impeachment of plaintiffs by having to produce this statement needs detain us only briefly. The function of a trial is to ascertain *327truth for rendition of justice under law, not to impeach parties or other witnesses. We make no effort to deprive prospective witnesses of an opportunity to examine, if they wish, their depositions taken before trial. It could he argued that truth would he encouraged at trial were we somehow to forbid them the right to copies of such depositions; hut we do not indulge such absurdities. I see no more valid reason to deny these plaintiffs the right to examine the stenographically recorded joint statement involved here.
It is not necessary to rule upon the right of a party under our present rules to discovery of his own statement given to an adverse party absent the circumstances of consolidated cases and of a joint statement by joint plaintiffs. See annotation at 73 ALR2d 12, “Statements of parties or witnesses as subject of pretrial or other disclosure, production, or inspection.” That ruling someday may have to he made by us, but it is not necessary to decision in this case. See GCR 1963, 306.2 for pertinent practice in such matters on and after January 1, 1963.
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiffs.
Adams, J., concurred with Souris, J.
Black, J., did not sit.

 As added and amended. See 334 Mich xl and 352 Mich xvii.— Reporter.