Court Opinion

ID: 9480298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:44:00.853645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:35.883356
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
This appeal arises from an order granting summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in favor of the defendant, the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, in an individual-capacity damages suit brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 by a state prison inmate who claims the Secretary unlawfully refused to deduct “gain-time” 1 from a prior sentence, thus prolonging his previous imprisonment. The majority affirms on the ground that Lee’s right to the disputed gain-time was not “clearly established” when this occurred. Because the Secretary is not entitled to qualified immunity on the facts of this case, I respectfully dissent.
DISCUSSION
A. Introduction
The district court’s grant of summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity is a conclusion of law subject to de novo review. Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir.1988). The Secretary is entitled to immunity if his “conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The narrow issue presented in this appeal is whether a reasonable official in March 1984, in the same position and with the same knowledge as the Secretary, would have concluded that denying Lee his claimed gain-time under the circumstances of this case violated Lee’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
B. Lee’s Gain-Time Rights
Florida law provides for granting and revoking gain-time according to specified standards and procedures. See Fla.Stat. Ann. §§ 944.275 and 944.28 (West 1985 & Supp.1989). These provisions were construed in March 1984 in Baranko v. Wainwright, 448 So.2d 1067 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984), a case with facts remarkably similar to Lee’s. In Baranko, a prisoner had been denied gain-time for 31 months during *827which he was in close confinement,2 as authorized under the existing version of section 944.275. Effective June 15, 1983, however, section 944.275 was revised to require a hearing for all denials of gain-time,3 and Baranko applied the new law retroactively to 1978.4 Baranko held that gain-time could be lost only through “forfeiture” accompanied by a hearing,5 and that gain-time withheld under the old scheme without a forfeiture hearing had to be restored. See Baranko, 448 So.2d at 1069.6
Under Florida law, then, at least by March 1984, Lee clearly had a liberty interest in his gain-time protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (“the State having created the right to good time and ... recogniz[ed] that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and ... entitle[s] him to those minimum procedures ... required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated”); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 471-72, 103 S.Ct. 864, 868, 871-72, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-89, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1261-62, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). Baranko’s retroactive application of section 944.28’s stringent procedural guarantees relating to gain-time establishes Lee’s liberty interest beyond any doubt. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471, 103 S.Ct. at 871 (relevant to establishing liberty interest that state law “has used language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures ‘shall,’ ‘will,’ or ‘must’ be employed”).
The inquiry next turns to what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment regarding deprivation of Lee’s liberty interest. This is a federal question resolved independently of the procedures provided by the state. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491-93, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). It is not necessarily sufficient for a state to follow its own established procedures. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 490-91, 100 S.Ct. at 1262-63; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560, 94 S.Ct. at 2976. In depriving an inmate of gain-time, the due process clause requires at least written notice of claimed rule violations, written findings, and some opportunity for the inmate to offer evidence and witnesses on his behalf. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-80.
In this case, the Secretary does not dispute that Lee was completely denied his state-law rights as construed by Baranko. It appears that Lee was denied any hearing or procedural rights regarding the deprivation of his gain-time.7 Thus, the only difficult issue in this case is whether Bar-anko, upon which Lee’s liberty interest primarily rests, was clearly established law in March 1984 when the Secretary allegedly refused to deduct the disputed gain-time.8 *828If this is found to be so, it clearly follows under the circumstances of this case that such refusal deprived Lee of liberty without due process of law.
C. The Qualified Immunity Analysis
To show that the law is “clearly established” under qualified immunity analysis, it is not enough to assert the violation of a broad or abstract right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Rather, in the “particularized” context of the case, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039; see also Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir.1989); Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321, 1322-23 (11th Cir.1989). Anderson requires an “objective (albeit fact-specific)” analysis “in light of clearly established law and the information the ... officers possessed.” 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3040; see also Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876, 881 (11th Cir.1988).
Baranko was indisputably “clearly established law” for Anderson purposes. It established a highly specific rule of law on facts virtually identical to Lee’s case: A Florida prisoner is entitled to gain-time, even for months spent in close confinement, unless that gain-time was denied by a section 944.28 forfeiture hearing. The Secretary, unable to assert any ambiguity or vagueness in this rule’s application to Lee, urges that “one case in a district court of appeal ... does not clearly establish the law.” The majority agrees, relying on Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom. Duffy v. Ward, 483 U.S. 1020, 107 S.Ct. 3263, 97 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987). Ward, however, denied Harlow immunity to an official who cited a single state decision supporting the lawfulness of his conduct. See id. at 1333. Thus, Ward held that the law may condemn official conduct with sufficient clarity even when one precedent arguably vindicates that conduct. Lee claims, more modestly, that the law is clearly established when the sole authoritative construction of the relevant law by a court in the controlling jurisdiction clearly prohibits such conduct.9 No precedent appears to support the Secretary’s position that the law is not “clearly established” for qualified immunity purposes simply because the relevant case was decided recently by an intermediate court.
It is apparent from the record that Florida corrections officials, far from being confused by Baranko, understood it all too well and simply disagreed with it.10 They responded to Lee’s habeas petition in the Florida District Court of Appeal by unsuccessfully urging that court to reconsider its Baranko decision, arguing that it conflicted with the legislative intent behind the gain-time revisions.11 The majority holds that “the Department was entitled to attempt to persuade the same court that its prior decision was in error.” The issue under Harlow, however, is whether it was objectively reasonable not to recognize Lee’s claimed rights following Baranko.12 *829The officials’ conduct merely reinforces the objective conclusion that the law was “clearly established,” although not to their liking, as of March 1984. The fact that state officials may wish to follow a policy of nonacquiescence toward a court decision with which they disagree, in the hope of obtaining a change in the law, cannot cloak them with immunity under Harlow.13
CONCLUSION
Lee’s right to the gain-time deduction was clearly established in March 1984. Therefore, the Secretary is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. I would reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case to the district court.

. This is often referred to as “good-time” in other prison systems and indicates days deducted from a prisoner’s sentence for each month he remains in conformance with prison rules.

. Lee was denied gain-time for 13 months during which he was in close confinement.

. 1983 Fla.Laws c. 83-131, §§ 8, 43. Based on the record, construing it in Lee’s favor on this summary judgment appeal, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), it appears that no hearing or other procedural mechanism attended the "withholding" of gain-time under the old version of section 944.275, in force while both Lee and Baranko were in close confinement. However, the law did provide that ”[t]he department shall grant ... deductions for gain-time on a monthly basis, as earned, from the sentence of every prisoner who has committed no infraction of the rules ... and who has performed in a satisfactory and acceptable manner the work, duties, and tasks assigned.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 944.275(1) (West 1985) (pre-1983 version reprinted in historical note).

. The new law applies "to all sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1978.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 944.275(6)(a) (West 1985 & Supp.1989).

. Both before and since the 1983 revision, section 944.28 has imposed a hearing requirement on all "forfeitures.”

. No subsequent case has overruled or modified Baranko, and it remains today the sole authoritative statement of Florida law on this point.

. See footnote 3 supra.

. Lee had originally requested deduction of the disputed gain-time in August 1983, following the revision of section 944.275, and renewed his request immediately after Baranko.

. Furthermore, Ward conflicts with this Court's decision in Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1193—94, reh'g denied, 871 F.2d 122 (11th Cir.1989), which held that even a single judicial ruling upholding official conduct could be decisively relevant in supporting qualified immunity. In this case, of course, there was no conflict or ambiguity among courts, but rather a single, authoritative, controlling decision on a narrow, fact-specific point of law.

. Officials apparently informed Lee that Bar-anko did not affect him because it was not a class action. Needless to say, a rule of law need not strictly bind a party to a case in order to be "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3040 ("[t]his is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful").

. The Deputy Secretary of the Department had helped draft the new gain-time legislation. Whatever the merits of this issue may be, the parties agree that the state habeas court followed Baranko in an unreported decision and ordered Lee’s release in November 1984.

. The undisputed evidence of the officials’ conduct is not offered to suggest any subjective bad faith on their part. Such an inquiry would be inappropriate under Harlow, which held that ”[i]f the law at that time was not clearly estab*829lished, an official could not ... fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed.” 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. For purposes of Harlow analysis, it can be assumed that the Florida officials believed, in subjective good faith, that they might be able to persuade the Florida court to reverse itself.

. The Secretary continues to argue before this Court that Baranko erred in construing "a retroactive application of the statute ... in total conflict with the departmental and legislative intent.” Even if Baranko were in error, of course, it is not our province to correct the Florida courts on a matter of Florida law.