Court Opinion

ID: 9525344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:02:23.217652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:24.173855
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TULLY, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion, which required respondent-appellant Hannah E. to be involuntarily confined at Chicago Read Mental Health Center. The facts stem from prior court cases which resulted in the confinement of respondent at Chicago Read Mental Health Center. Most of the events transpired on respondent’s first involuntary commitment, which was affirmed by this court in In re Hannah E., 372 Ill. App. 3d 251, 259-60 (2007). In essence, this case involves a long-standing feud dating back to at least 1988 with a City of Chicago alderman, who had received complaints about the condition of Hannah’s property. It is to be noted that this neighborhood was a community where teardown and construction of new buildings was occurring. Apparently, respondent had various animals in her Chicago home, and the City of Chicago had sent Mae Wormely, employed at animal care and control, to remove the multitude of animals. The majority notes that respondent threatened Wormely after Wormely entered her home to remove the animals, as well as the alderman’s aide. However, statements made in frustration do not significantly support involuntary commitment based on harm. See In re Schumaker, 260 Ill. App. 3d 723, 726-29 (1994). Here, respondent’s threat was nothing more than an empty threat spoken out of frustration for having her home intruded upon and her animals taken away. Respondent has never attempted to carry out her threats or even begun to act upon them. As Dr. Sharpe noted, if respondent were “inclined to inflict serious harm on somebody she certainly had plenty of time” in the month and a half subsequent to the threat to Wormely and the aide. The majority also discusses respondent’s statement that she owns three guns. It concluded that she is suffering from mental illness and places significant reliance on respondent’s statement that she owns three guns allegedly kept in a suburb, but not within Chicago’s limits. Following a “very thorough” search where every piece of furniture was moved, and every drawer, bag, and box was inspected, two guns were found in respondent’s Chicago home, but no third gun. Although only two of the three guns were found, it could be posited that if a person is mentally ill, these statements perhaps are the result of mental illness and, therefore, not reliable. As such, it is possible that only two guns existed all along. Furthermore, Dr. Sharpe testified that he did not see how the “presence or absence of this weapon is really an issue as far as her risk to anybody else.” Dr. Sharpe further testified that the missing third gun was unimportant in that respondent had never been known to brandish a gun, threaten anyone with a gun, or fire a gun at anyone. Also discussed was an incident that occurred on April 6, 2006, after a second involuntary commitment petition was filed and later dismissed because respondent signed an application for voluntary admission. Respondent again stayed at Chicago Read Mental Health Center where, during the 180 or so days she was there, a scratching incident occurred where a technician grabbed her hand in the process of initiating a body search, whereupon they forced her to the floor to restrain her. The scars the technician suffered, which the majority emphasized, resulted from scratches that were bandaged for only 48 hours, did not require time off from work, and apparently resulted in “two little marks” on his wrist. This alleged attack was in fact no more than a minor incident in the course of an interaction between staff and patient. As Dr. Sharpe explained, the injury the technician suffered while restraining respondent was likely the “by-product of that particular procedure not necessarily as a result of something the patient deliberately did.” Furthermore, respondent visited an animal control facility where her animals were being held and spoke with Anne Kent. Ms. Kent was advised to notify police if respondent visited and did so. Although Ms. Kent did not remember the circumstances of respondent’s visit, respondent did not cause any harm or make any threats, and eventually left in her vehicle before police arrived. This is further evidence that respondent does not present any threat to herself or anyone else and is not violent or threatening so long as she is not being restrained or having her house intruded upon. The majority largely relies on Dr. Baetiong’s testimony recommending the respondent be involuntary committed. When asked as to whether it was reasonable to believe that respondent may harm others in the future, Dr. Baetiong responded that, “It is very possible. I cannot guarantee one hundred percent that she can be — she cannot hurt anyone.” However, her opinion was at most supported by her seven-month-old threat to Wormely and the alderman’s aide, which were made in frustration, the allegedly missing third gun, and the incident where respondent scratched a technician while being restrained. All of these factors are surrounded by circumstances raising doubt as to their support regarding respondent’s involuntary commitment. Furthermore, it should be noted that respondent had committed no harm whatsoever in her 57 years of living within the community. Considering the circumstances and facts of all the situations, it is questionable whether the judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As to the 15-day period allowed for continuances, section 3 — 800(b) of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3 — 800(b) (West 2004)) requires and mandates that no continuances on hearings beyond 15 days can be allowed. I must disagree to the extent that the majority found that respondent had waived the issue on appeal. Although respondent did not specifically object to the issue of timeliness, these continuances were objected to when they were requested. Vital issues of freedom are inherent in these hearings and such continuances make light of the entire procedure. The Code’s procedural safeguards are not mere technicalities, but “tools to safeguard the liberty interests of respondents in mental health cases.” In re Nancy A., 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 549 (2003). As such, these procedural safeguards should be strictly construed in favor of respondent. Nancy A., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 550. After reviewing this case, I cannot agree with the majority in finding that the manifest weight of the evidence showed clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was poised to inflict serious harm upon herself or others. Respondent is an individual who has had her home and liberty taken away from her for far longer than justified by the law. In consideration of the evidence, circumstances, and nature of respondent’s mental illness, I do not believe that she is the sort of person that must remain involuntarily committed for the length of time she has been.