Court Opinion

ID: 9370697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 17:00:27.291789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:23.211665
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-4047       Document: 010110812606     Date Filed: 02/14/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                                FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       February 14, 2023
                            _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  XAVIER BRADLEY,

            Plaintiff Counter Defendant -
            Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 21-4047
                                                     (D.C. No. 2:18-CV-00486-BSJ)
  DHYBRID SYSTEMS, LLC, an Ohio                                 (D. Utah)
  limited liability company,

            Defendant - Appellant,

  and

  WORTHINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., an
  Ohio corporation,

            Defendant Counterclaimant -
            Appellant.
                          _________________________________

                                ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                            _________________________________

 Before CARSON, BRISCOE, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        In any given contract, parties often make many promises to each other. Courts

 usually view these promises together as related parts of the same transaction. But

        *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 21-4047    Document: 010110812606        Date Filed: 02/14/2023     Page: 2

 when a contract’s language indicates that the parties intended to create more than one

 distinct agreement, a court may find the parties’ contract divisible.

         Such a situation arises here. Defendants Worthington Industries and dHybrid

 Systems promised to pay Plaintiff Xavier Bradley $20,000 to drop a workers’

 compensation claim he had against them. They also promised to pay Plaintiff $100

 to drop all other potential claims. Although Defendants paid the $20,000, they failed

 to pay the $100. So Plaintiff sued on his other claims. At summary judgment, the

 district court concluded that the two agreements were divisible and that Defendants’

 failure to pay the $100 allowed Plaintiff to rescind the second agreement. The

 Parties then stipulated for Plaintiff to take a $495,000 final judgment. Defendants

 now appeal the district court’s summary judgment ruling, arguing that the settlement

 should have barred Plaintiff’s claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

 § 1291, we affirm.

                                           I.

       Plaintiff previously worked for Defendants. During his employment, Plaintiff

 filed a workers’ compensation claim against Defendant Worthington and its

 insurance carrier, Phoenix Insurance Company. Also during his employment,

 Plaintiff alleges three of his coworkers racially harassed him in violation of Title VII.

 Defendants ultimately terminated Plaintiff, which Plaintiff claims was retaliation for

 reporting his abusers.

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       After his termination, Plaintiff hired different lawyers to pursue his claims—

 one an attorney who practiced almost exclusively workers’ compensation cases, and

 the other a law firm that handled employment claims. He also filed a discrimination

 charge against Defendant Worthington with the Equal Employment Opportunity

 Commission (EEOC). The EEOC later issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue,

 authorizing him to sue Defendants in federal court.

       Before Plaintiff sued on his discrimination claim, however, Defendant

 Worthington and its insurance carrier agreed with Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation

 attorney to settle Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim for $20,000. And as a

 condition of that settlement, Defendant Worthington also insisted that Plaintiff sign a

 full release of any other employment claims he had. But counsel for Defendant

 Worthington and its insurance carrier believed the Utah Labor Commission would

 reject any workers’ compensation settlement containing such a release.1 So he

 structured the settlement to consist of two separate agreements each supported by

 their own separate consideration. The first—the Compromise—released Plaintiff’s

 workers’ compensation claim for $20,000. The second—the Settlement

 Agreement—released all other claims Plaintiff had against Defendant Worthington

 for $100.

       1
        Utah law requires all worker’s compensation claims to be approved by the
 Utah Labor Commission. Utah Code § 34A-2-420.

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        Plaintiff signed both documents. Defense counsel, believing Plaintiff’s

 workers’ compensation attorney to be Plaintiff’s only attorney, never informed

 Plaintiff’s employment attorneys that Plaintiff signed a general release of claims.2

 And Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation attorney, also unaware of Plaintiff’s

 employment attorneys, never informed them that Plaintiff signed the general release

 either.3 The Commission approved the Compromise a few days later. One week

 after that, Defendant Worthington’s insurance carrier timely paid the $20,000 due

 under the Compromise. But because of a clerical mistake, Defendant Worthington

 never paid the $100 due under the Settlement Agreement.

        Several months later, the EEOC informed Plaintiff’s employment attorneys

 that Plaintiff had settled his employment claims. And when Plaintiff’s employment

 attorneys investigated the settlement, they learned that Defendant Worthington never

 paid Plaintiff the $100 to settle his employment claims. After discussions with

 Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s employment-discrimination attorneys notified the company that

 Plaintiff rescinded the Settlement Agreement and planned to pursue his employment-

 discrimination claims. Only then, after receiving Plaintiff’s letter, did Defendant

 Worthington send Plaintiff a check for the $100.

        2
          Defendant Worthington, despite having received a demand letter from
 Plaintiff’s employment attorneys, never informed its attorney that Plaintiff had
 retained separate counsel to represent him in connection with his employment claims.
        3
            Nor did Plaintiff himself inform his employment attorneys of the general
 release.
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       But Plaintiff returned the $100, keeping his promise to sue Defendants instead.

 Before the district court, Defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that the

 Settlement Agreement prevented Plaintiff from suing them. Although Defendants

 acknowledged the missed payment, they argued that their failure to pay on time was

 not a material breach because they timely paid $20,000 out of $20,100 owed from

 both agreements, which Defendant’s asserted merged into one integrated contract.

 Plaintiff sought partial summary judgment. He contended that even if the parties

 integrated the agreements, Defendant Worthington failed to keep its promise to pay

 the $100 consideration and thus materially breached.

       The district court granted Plaintiff’s partial summary judgment motion, first

 finding the Compromise and the Settlement Agreement divisible. It then held that

 Plaintiff properly rescinded the Settlement Agreement because Defendant

 Worthington failed to pay the $100, a material term of the Settlement Agreement.

 Defendants appeal.

                                           II.

       We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo,

 applying the same standard as the district court. Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Sys., Inc.,

 726 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013). We will affirm summary judgment if the

 moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Because

 the parties have agreed Utah state law governs the interpretation of their contract, we

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 analyze the substantive legal questions associated with their dispute under Utah law.

 Flood v. ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 1110, 1117 (10th Cir. 2010). And we

 review the district court’s answers to those substantive legal questions de novo. Id.

                                           III.

       Defendants argue that the Compromise and Settlement Agreement comprise

 one integrated agreement they substantially performed by timely paying nearly all the

 money owed. We disagree and hold that the agreements are divisible under Utah

 law. We further hold Plaintiff could rescind the Settlement Agreement because

 Defendant Worthington did not pay the promised $100 consideration.

                                           A.

       Defendants assert that the district court erred in finding the Settlement

 Agreement and Compromise divisible because the agreements are integrated. They

 argue that because the Settlement Agreement’s plain language incorporates the

 Compromise, the two documents are one, final contract. And because Defendants

 paid $20,000 of the $20,100 owed to Plaintiff, Defendants contend that they did not

 materially breach their contract with Plaintiff. Thus, Defendants conclude, without a

 material breach, Plaintiff could not rescind the contract and sue them for his

 employment claims.

       This argument lacks merit. Divisibility and integration are unrelated concepts.

 Whether two writings form an integrated agreement determines if the parol evidence

 rule applies. See Tangren Fam. Tr. v. Tangren, 182 P.3d 326, 330–32 (Utah 2008)

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 (exemplary integration analysis); 11 Williston on Contracts, § 33:14 (4th ed.) (“the

 parol evidence rule applies only when parties integrate their agreement”). On the

 other hand, a divisible contract is “in legal effect, independent agreements about

 different subjects though made at the same time.” iDrive Logistics LLC v.

 IntegraCore LLC, 424 P.3d 970, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 2018) (quoting In re Payless

 Cashways, 203 F.3d 1081, 1085 (8th Cir. 2000)). Whether the contract at issue

 consists of a single document—or two documents unambiguously incorporating each

 other—is largely immaterial to whether that contract is divisible. See Est. Landscape

 & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322,

 328–31 (Utah 1992) (analyzing whether a single contract for snow removal was

 divisible); 15 Williston on Contracts, § 45:1 (4th ed.) (“a divisible contract. . . is

 always an ‘entire’ contract in the sense of being one and not several contracts”).

        For that reason, the key issue in this case is whether the Settlement Agreement

 and Compromise, even if one contract, are divisible. Whether a contract is divisible

 is a question of law that turns on the intent of the parties at the time they entered the

 contract. Est. Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, 844 P.2d at 328 (collecting

 cases). To determine their intent, we turn first to the agreement’s plain language. Id.

 And to this end, we note that the distinguishing feature of a divisible contract is that

 it divides each party’s consideration into two or more corresponding parts. Brown v.

 Bd. of Educ. of Morgan Cnty. Sch. Dist., 560 P.2d 1129, 1131 (Utah 1977) (citing 6

 Williston on Contracts, § 860 (3rd ed.)).

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       Here, the plain language of the Compromise and Settlement Agreement

 establishes that the parties intended to enter “independent agreements about different

 subjects though made at the same time.” iDrive, 424 P.3d at 986. In the

 Compromise, Defendant Worthington and its insurance carrier, Phoenix, agreed to

 settle Plaintiff’s “alleged industrial claims”—meaning his workers’ compensation

 claim—for a “lump sum consideration totaling $20,000.” In the Settlement

 Agreement, Defendant Worthington agreed to pay Plaintiff $100, “which amount

 shall constitute full and complete payment,” to settle “any and all” other claims he

 might bring against the company. Even if we treat the Compromise and the

 Settlement Agreement as if they were a single document, its plain language would

 still apportion the parties’ consideration into two distinct sets of reciprocal promises.

 And the drafting attorney concedes that when he drafted the agreements, he intended

 to do exactly that.4 Thus, we agree with the district court that the agreements are

 divisible. See Brown, 560 P.2d at 1131.

       4
          Defendant insists that the parol evidence rule bars us from considering the
 drafting attorney’s testimony. But the parol evidence rule only excludes evidence
 offered for the purpose of “varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract.”
 Tangren, 182 P.3d at 330. So while we look first to the contract’s plain language, we
 remain free to consider extrinsic evidence offered to show the parties’ intent to create
 a divisible contract. See, e.g., Mgmt. Servs. Corp. v. Dev. Assocs., 617 P.2d 406,
 408 (Utah 1980). And in this case, even if we were to look only to the plain language
 of the parties’ contract, the result would be the same.

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                                           B.

       Having concluded that the agreements, even if integrated, are divisible, the

 question becomes whether Defendant Worthington failed to perform his end of the

 bargain and thus materially breached the part of the contract that required it to pay

 Plaintiff $100.

       “The formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a

 manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.” Aquagen Int’l,

 Inc. v. Calrae Tr., 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998). Utah law defines consideration as

 “an act or promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a promise.” Coulter &

 Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 859 (Utah 1998). Under Utah law, one party

 can rescind a contract if the other party materially breaches it. See McArthur v. State

 Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 P.3d 981, 987 (Utah 2012) (citing Polyglycoat Corp.

 v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979)). The “failure of consideration” is

 always a material breach. See Aquagen, 972 P.2d at 414 (Utah 1998).5 Indeed, “[i]t

       5
          The idea of a failure of consideration—or better put, a failure of
 performance—is distinct from that of a lack of consideration. See General Ins. Co.
 of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976) (“Where
 consideration is lacking, there can be no contract. Where consideration fails, there
 was a contract when the agreement was made, but because of some supervening
 cause, the promised performance fails”); see also Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
 129, 137 (2009) (“When the consideration for a contract fails—that is, when one of
 the exchanged promises is not kept—we do not say that the voluntary bilateral
 consent to the contract never existed, so that it is automatically and utterly void; we
 say that the contract was broken. The party injured by the breach will generally be
 entitled to some remedy, which might include the right to rescind the contract
 entirely; but that is not the same thing as saying the contract was never validly
 concluded.”) (internal citations omitted).
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  is entirely permissible for a party to rescind a contract based on a failure of

  consideration.” Id. (citing Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah 1982)).

  The failure of consideration occurs when “one who has either given or promised to

  give some performance fails without his fault to receive in some material respect the

  agreed exchange for that performance.” Id. at 414 (quoting Copper State Leasing Co.

  v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88, 91 (Utah 1988) (internal

  quotation marks omitted)).

        Like Defendant Worthington, the contract in Aquagen required the defendant

  to pay for rights he received from the contract. Id. But he never paid. Id. Because

  the defendant “failed to perform the only obligation required of him in the contract,”

  the Utah Supreme Court held that he “committed an ‘uncured material failure’

  sufficient to render the contract unenforceable for failure of consideration.” Id. The

  same reasoning applies here. The only promise Defendant Worthington made in

  exchange for Plaintiff releasing his other employment claims was to pay Plaintiff

  $100. And at the time Plaintiff rescinded the contract—five months after the parties

  signed the Settlement agreement—Defendant Worthington still had not performed.

  That failure of performance was material breach of a divisible part of the parties’

  agreement, allowing Plaintiff to validly rescind that portion of their contract.

        Simply put, after settling Plaintiff’s employment claims for $100, Defendant

  Worthington failed to uphold its end of the bargain. We therefore hold that the

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  district court correctly granted partial summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor.

        AFFIRMED.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Joel M. Carson III
                                              Circuit Judge

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