Court Opinion

ID: 9944818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:40:08.621533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:22.371504
License: Public Domain

This litigation involved a construction of the last will and testament of Russell B. Johnston, deceased. It developed, *Page 335 
under the pleadings, into a controversy, between the two daughters of the testator, namely, Mrs. Lounora Johnston Berry and Mrs. Jerryldine Johnston Ferguson, on the one hand, and the grandchildren of the testator on the other. The guardian ad litem, for the grandchildren, and the executors and trustees, under the will, both contended that the will was legal and valid in all respects and that the grandchildren are entitled to the benefits and bequests which were provided for them. On the contrary, the two daughters contended that there was in fact no valid provision for the grandchildren; that no estates were vested in them; and that any attempt toward that end was in violation of the rule against perpetuities.
The learned chancellor, in his written opinion, held that the will did not create a vested interest in the grandchildren of the testator; but that, if an interest was in fact created, it did not vest until the distribution should occur and that this would not happen within the time required by the rule against perpetuities. He therefore ordered and decreed that the trustees should manage and handle the assets of the estate in accordance with the terms of the will and pay unto each of the two daughters annually 30% of the net income from the estate; but that until the death of the two sisters, namely, Mrs. Vera Johnston Cooper and Mrs. Edra Mai Johnston Bowling, the two daughters will not be entitled to receive any of the corpus of the estate, with certain exceptions not necessary to be mentioned. From the decree entered, the guardian ad litem for the grandchildren and the executors and trustees appealed, and the daughters cross appealed.
Russell B. Johnston was a substantial citizen of Lowndes County. He possessed large holdings of real estate, with dominating interests in several corporations and manufacturing enterprises, together with stocks, cash, and other personal property. The two named *Page 336 
daughters were the sole offspring of his marriage. Along the way, domestic difficulties arose, and the wife, on October 9, 1950, was awarded separate maintenance, the custody of the daughters, Lounora and Jerryldine, born January 12, 1934, and December 17, 1936, respectively, and support both for herself and the children.
Prior to this estrangement and separation, the testator, on June 15, 1945, had set up irrevocable trusts in favor of his two daughters.
On December 22, 1950, Lounora married Charles E. Berry; and on January 19, 1955, the trust in her behalf terminated. Pursuant thereto a substantial amount of property was delivered to her, namely, $31,292.21 cash; 55 shares of stock in Johnston Furniture Mfg. Company; and 82 1/2 shares of stock in Tombigbee Mill and Lumber Company. In February 1953, Jerryldine married Jimmy Ferguson; and, in December 1957, the trust in her behalf terminated. Pursuant thereto, a substantial amount of property was delivered to her, namely, $50,000 cash; 55 shares of stock in Johnston Furniture Mfg. Company; and 82 1/2 shares of stock in Tombigbee Mill and Lumber Company. (The assets of the two trusts constituted more than 25% of the father's interest in the capital stock of the corporations and amounted to a substantial part of his principal worth.) The husbands of the two daughters, on the date of the testator's death, were gainfully employed.
On July 29, 1955, when he was 51 years of age, Johnston published and declared his last will and testament. His death occurred on August 11, 1958, when he was 54 years of age.
Three sons had been born to Mrs. Lounora Johnston Berry, to wit, Charles R. Berry, October 15, 1952; Thomas S. Berry, September 4, 1953; and Jerryald R. Berry, April 16, 1955. These children were of course grandsons of the decedent Johnston and were living both at the time of the execution of the will and at the time *Page 337 
of the testator's death. According to the record Mrs. Jerryldine Ferguson has borne no children.
In the will, the following named persons were recognized as beneficiaries or devisees: Mrs. Ruth Williams Johnston, the widow; Mrs. Vera Johnston Cooper, the testator's sister; Mrs. Edra Mai Johnston Bowling, the testator's other sister; and the testator's grandchildren. The testator gave his reasons in the will for the exclusion of Mrs. Lounora Johnston Berry and Mrs. Jerryldine Johnston Ferguson.
The widow renounced the will, as applicable to her. Her claim against the estate has been satisfactorily settled, and is not in controversy. Mrs. Vera Johnston Cooper, born April 7, 1900, is still living. Mrs. Edra Mai Johnston Bowling, born May 21, 1908, is still living, and has three children, one son and two daughters.
The pertinent provisions of the will, necessary for construction in this controversy, are set out as Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 as follows:
 Part 1
"I hereby give, devise and bequeath all my property and estate whatsoever, both real, personal, mixed, and of every kind, character, nature and description whatsoever, and wheresoever located or situated, of which I may die seized and possessed, or over which or as to which I may have any right of testamentary control or disposition, or as to which I may in anywise be entitled to (all of same being hereinafter referred to as my ESTATE during the administration of my ESTATE by EXECUTORS and thereafter being referred to and being my TRUST ESTATE) unto T.E. LOTT and VERA JOHNSTON COOPER (nee Vera Johnston, my oldest sister), and to the survivor of them, as EXECUTORS of this my Last Will and Testament for and during the administration of my ESTATE, and thereafter unto T.E. LOTT, VERA JOHNSTON COOPER, JOHN ROBERTSON HENRY, J. EARL BISHOP and *Page 338 
HARVEY SEIFERT, and their respective successors, as TRUSTEES, all in TRUST as follows: * * *
 Part 2
"* * * After payment by my executors during the administration of my ESTATE and after payment by my trustees during the administration of my TRUST ESTATE, as the case may be, of the aforesaid items, the net income from my ESTATE and from my TRUST ESTATE, as the case may be, shall be paid over as follows:
 "(a) Twenty percent (20%) of said net income shall be paid over to my sister VERA JOHNSTON COOPER for and during her lifetime;
 (b) Twenty percent (20%) of said net income shall be paid over to my other sister EDRA MAI JOHNSTON BOWLING for and during her lifetime;
 (c) Sixty percent (60%) of said net income shall be held and managed by my trustees as a part of the corpus of my TRUST ESTATE pursuant to and in accordance with the powers hereinafter given and granted to said Trustees.
3. My said Trustees shall hold, manage and deal with my said TRUST ESTATE, and any and all increases and increments thereof, in accordance with the powers, authorities and discretions herein granted, and in accordance with the terms and provisions hereof. Upon the death of my said sister, EDRA MAI JOHNSTON BOWLING, my EXECUTORS or TRUSTEES, as the case may be, shall transfer, deliver and pay over in fee simple unto the children of my said sister, EDRA MAI JOHNSTON BOWLING, living at the time of her death twenty (20) per cent of my said ESTATE or TRUST ESTATE, as the case may be, share and share alike. The remaining property and assets of my said TRUST ESTATE (80% of the amount on hand upon the death of my sister, EDRA MAI JOHNSTON *Page 339 
BOWLING) shall be held by my TRUSTEES in accordance with the terms and provisions hereof, and said TRUST ESTATE shall continue until, and shall terminate when, my youngest grandchild (whether now living or hereafter born) shall become twenty-five (25) years of age; provided, however, that in no event shall said TRUST ESTATE continue for a longer period than thirty-five (35) years from the date of this my Last Will and Testament. Upon the termination of said TRUST ESTATE, the entire TRUST ESTATE remaining on hand shall be transferred, delivered over, divided and distributed by my TRUSTEES to my said grandchildren, per capita.
 Part 3
"4. During the continuance of the trust herein created I hereby direct that my Trustees herein named, and all successor trustees, may expend such portions of the income and/or corpus of said TRUST ESTATE as they, in their sole discretion, determine to be reasonable for the support, maintenance and/or education of any of my said grandchildren, any and all amounts so paid out or expended by my said Trustees pursuant to the aforesaid provision to be charged against the account of the grandchild for whose use and benefit the same is expended, and said amount to be taken into account and deducted from said grandchild's share when final distribution is made of said TRUST ESTATE. I further direct that any and all amounts, if any, so paid out by my said Trustees pursuant to this provision may be paid by them to the mother of the grandchild or grandchildren for whose use and benefit the same is paid, and that a receipt from said mother shall be sufficient receipt for any such amount, or amounts, so paid out. I further direct that said mother shall not be required to make any accounting therefor either to my said Trustees or to said grandchild for whose use and benefit the same is received. *Page 340
"5. I direct that neither the income from nor the principal of said TRUST ESTATE hereinabove created shall be liable for the debts, present or future, of any beneficiary thereof, and shall not be subject to the right on the part of any creditor of any beneficiary to seize or reach the same under any writ or by any proceeding at law or in equity; and no beneficiary shall have any power to give, grant, sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, encumber, or anticipate the income, or any installment thereof, or any share in the principal thereof, it being my will that no right of disposition of any such property shall vest in any beneficiary until the same shall have been actually transferred or paid over to said beneficiary. * * *
 Part 4
"I have made no provision herein for either of my two daughters, namely, Lounora Johnston Berry and Jeraldine Johnston Ferguson, for the reason that I have heretofore made, in my judgment, and after due consideration by me, adequate provision for them with TRUST AGREEMENTS," referring to the dates and book and page numbers where recorded.
(Hn 1) In construing a will, the intention of the testator must control. That is the object of the construction — to ascertain the intention and give effect thereto. This must be done if possible. See cases listed in Volume 14, Miss. Digest, Wills, Sec. 439. This intention controls unless it is invalid under the law. Boxley v. Jackson, 191 Miss. 134, 2 So.2d 160; Carter v. Sunray-Mid-Continent Oil Co., 231 Miss. 8,94 So.2d 624. (Hn 2) If reasonably possible, the Court will so construe an ambiguous will as to render it not invalid under the rule against Perpetuities or the Two-Donee Statute. Bratton v. Graham,146 Miss. 246, 111 So. 353. (Hn 3) The case of Henry V. Henderson, 103 Miss. 48, 60 So. 33, recognized the fact that no two wills were ever written in precisely the same language throughout, or that two testators ever *Page 341 
died under precisely the same circumstances as to their estate, families or friends, and pointed out that technical rules of law and adjudicated cases are not of as great assistance in the construction of a will as they are in the construction of some instruments of a different character. Still the opinion pointed out that these rules and decisions are not to be disregarded altogether, but should be followed, unless to do so would do violence to the clear intent of the testator.
In McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 5 S.Ct. 652, 28 L.Ed. 1015, at page 1026 thereof, it was said by the Supreme Court of the United States: "For many reasons, not the least of which are that testators usually have in mind the actual enjoyment rather than the technical ownership of their property, and that sound policy as well as practical convenience requires that titles should be vested at the earliest period, it has long been a settled rule of construction in the courts of England and America that estates, legal or equitable, given by will, should always be regarded as vesting immediately, unless the testator has by very clear words manifested an intention that they should be contingent upon a future event."
Thus it will be seen that, after the claim of the widow is ignored on account of her renunciation and settlement, and since there was a lack of provision for the daughters because of the testator's recitation in the will that he had already, by irrevocable trusts which had been fully discharged, made such provision as he desired for them, the executors were directed first to administer the estate, that is, pay all obligations, debts and taxes, due from the estate, and collect all claims and obligations due to the estate. The residue of the property of all kinds was then set up as a trust to be handled, managed, operated and even disposed of in whole or in part by the trustees, according to their judgment and discretion. The sole remaining objects and *Page 342 
beneficiaries of that trust became and were the two sisters and the grandchildren of the testator. Mrs. Vera Johnston Cooper, now 61 years of age, was to receive 20% of the net income from the trust fund during her lifetime. At her death, this 20% would be added to the 60% to be devoted to the grandchildren. Mrs. Edra Mai Johnston Bowling, now 53 years of age, was to receive 20% of the net income from the trust fund during her lifetime; and upon her death, 20% of the estate was to be transferred and delivered to her children, living at the time of her death, share and share alike. The testator directed the trustees to expend "such portions of the income and/or corpus" of his trust estate as they, in their discretion, should determine to be reasonable, for the support, maintenance and/or education of his grandchildren. A record of all benefits to each grandchild should be kept in order that deductions could be made when a final distribution of the estate was had. The will contained a spendthrift provision to prevent the sale, encumbrance or disposition by any grandchild until the trust terminated and the property was actually transferred. The trust of 80% of the net income and corpus, following the death of Mrs. Cooper and Mrs. Bowling, would terminate when the testator's youngest grandchild, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born thereafter, should reach the age of 25 years; but the trust, in no event, should continue for a longer period than 35 years from the date of the will, namely, until July 29, 1990.
The appellees concede that, where the testator's intention is clear as to the time of vesting, this controls. But they contend that there was no vesting. They say that the "spendthrift" provision, the "discretionary" trust feature, the "divide and pay over" phase, and the "no right of disposition" until actual transferral provision — all negative and protest an intention to vest at the time of the testator's death. Besides, they *Page 343 
say that the contingencies are so insuperable that there can be no bar of the rule against perpetuities; and that, when the will is construed as if the rule did not exist, then such rule must be remorselessly applied, even though the application defeats the testator's intention.
The rule against perpetuities is the law limiting the time within which future interests can be created. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, Fourth Edition, Sec. 4, p. 4. It is stated as follows: "No interest subject to a condition precedent is good, unless the condition must be fulfilled, if at all, within twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." And also: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." Sec. 201, p. 191, ibid. (Hn4) But, a true vested interest is never obnoxious to that Rule, while a contingent interest not only may be, but often is, violative of the Rule. Sec. 99, p. 88, ibid. And again, "A vested interest is not subject to the Rule against Perpetuities." Sec. 205, p. 194, ibid. See also 70 C.J.S., Perpetuities, Sec. 10, p. 585.
In Nichols v. Day, 128 Miss. 756, 91 So. 451, the deed granted ten years in which to cut and remove the timber, with a perpetual right to an annual extension upon payment of 10% of the purchase price for each extension. The opinion, in upholding this provision and declaring that it was not in violation of the rule against perpetuities, cited the above-stated principles from Gray's Rule against Perpetuities as well as 1 Tiffany on Real Property (2nd Ed.), Sec. 183, and said: "From these statements of the rule it will be seen, and the courts hold, that it has no application to vested interests, but only to such interests as may not vest within the prescribed period of time."
The cases from this jurisdiction are helpful in some particulars, but they do not form a pattern by which the court can shape a true model for the answer to *Page 344 
this problem. In fact, in all of the cases, although there are similarities, there are also factual differences. Some of the cases from other jurisdictions have been found to be helpful.
For instance, in Endsley v. Hagey, 151 A. 799 (1930), from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, J.E. Hagey had died testate on April 8, 1920. By his will, he devised his entire estate, after the payment of debts and certain small legacies, to his wife and a named daughter for their natural lives. He directed that his entire net estate, other than certain exceptions, "should be held in trust, with the right of both to use all the income derived during their lifetime, or that of the survivor, with power to sell such part of the real estate as might be needed for their support. Any portion remaining, upon the death of both, was directed to be held in trust until the youngest grandchild reached his twenty-fifth year, when any then living should receive the corpus."
The opinion then stated: "The residuary estate not disposed of at the expiration of the life tenancy was directed to be held in trust until the youngest grandchild reached the age designated, when the proceeds were to be distributed. There was no postponement, however, of the vesting of the estate beyond a life or lives in being at the death of the testator and twenty-one years thereafter. The estate became fixed in the grandchildren immediately on the termination of the tenancy of the two granted life interests, * * *. This disposition did not violate the rule against perpetuities. The right to take the remainder did not depend upon the happening of some contingent event, but passed to persons definitely determined as to the death of the testator. The mere fact that the time of distribution was deferred, or that unborn grandchildren might share, does not alter this conclusion. * * * In the present case, the only grandchildren who could take would be the one (there was only one then) living at the time of testator's death, or *Page 345 
those born to the sole living daughter, a life tenant. Should any so come into existence, they would be entitled to share, but such a provision does not violate the rule, for the takers would be determined during the lifetime of the life tenants named. * * * The law favors vested estates, especially where descendants are being provided for * * * and if there were doubt here, which there is not, it should be resolved in favor of a vested estate. * * * In the present case, there was a vesting in the grandchild living, and such as might be born to the daughter during her lifetime." Thus it was held that a devise to life tenants, with remainder in trust until testator's youngest grandchild reached his twenty-fifth year, did not violate the rule against perpetuities.
Also in Hill v. Birmingham, 38 A.2d 604 (1944) from the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, Nicholas S. Hill, Jr. had executed his will in 1932 and died in 1936. He left surviving him his widow, the plaintiff Nicholas S. Hill III, his daughter, Mrs. Guthrie, and four grandchildren. In the fourth article of his will, the testator gave $50,000 to trustees with provisions that the income should be paid to his widow for her life and that, at her death, the principal should be paid "into the trust fund established for the benefit of my grandchildren". He also gave the residue of the estate to a bank and the testator's wife as trustees, directing that the income be paid to her for her life. He provided also that at her death the bank as surviving trustee should "pay the principal of the above trust fund into a trust, in equal shares, per capita and not per stirpes, for the benefit of my grandchildren"; that the bank and the testator's daughter, Mrs. Guthrie, should be trustees of this fund; that the income should be paid to her to be used in equal shares "for the benefit of my grandchildren as may in her judgment be deemed proper;" and that the trustees or the surviving trustee should "pay the principal of this trust fund to each of my *Page 346 
grandchildren, in equal proportion, when the youngest of my grandchildren then living shall have reached the age of twenty-five years," but that, if any of his grandchildren had died before that time leaving lawful issue surviving, the share of the trust fund which would have gone to that grandchild should be paid to the issue. The opinion said: "The gift to the testator's grandchildren was a class gift. * * * It is not necessary for the solution of the problem before us to decide whether the class closed when, at the death of the testator's widow, the fund was to be paid into a trust for the grandchildren `in equal shares.' No grandchild could be born to the testator later than the time when the survivor of his son and daughter died, with a possible addition of nine months representing the period of gestation, and consequently the class would necessarily close at that time. The period limited by the rule against perpetuities is a life or lives in being at the death of the testator and twenty-one years thereafter, with an extension of nine months, if necessary, to cover the period of gestation. * * * Any interest which vested within the period when grandchildren could be born to the testator would not offend against the rule. This would necessarily be so with reference to the right of grandchildren, though born after the testator's death, to receive income from the fund. While the grandchildren could not enjoy the principal until the youngest became twenty-five years of age, that would not postpone the vesting of the right to receive it. * * * The rule against perpetuities is concerned with the right to succeed to property; * * * and the fact that, as in this case, the time when the beneficiaries may come into enjoyment of it is beyond the period fixed in the rule does not make the gift invalid. * * * The death of a grandchild before the time to distribute the principal had arrived would, at most, merely divest his interest, but it would not make the gift to him invalid under the rule." *Page 347 
The decree of the trial court was affirmed, the opinion saying: "The trial court correctly ruled that gifts to the grandchildren were not in any respect invalidated by the rule against perpetuities."
Likewise, in McKibben v. Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank,6 N.E.2d 619 (1937), from the Supreme Court of Illinois, where Katherine M. McKibben was a widow. Her only heir at law was a son, Thomas Stanley McKibben. In her will, she bequeathed only $1.00 to him, stating why she did that. By Item 15 of the will, after other directions and bequests of comparatively small amounts, she left the bulk of her estate, valued at about $100,000 "in trust" for the children of her son, share and share alike. The Pioneer Trust Savings Bank was named as trustee. The provisions applicable to the trust were as follows: "`b. The trust estate herein established shall continue until the youngest of said children living at the time of my death shall reach the age of thirty-five years, or if said youngest child shall die before reaching such age, at the date such child would have reached such age if he or she had lived.
"`c. In the period from my death until the termination of said trust, the income from said trust estate shall be divided equally among such children as may be living, and paid to them in quarterly installments. Should any such child die during the period of said trust estate, leaving no children, the income shall be divided among the surviving children equally. The child or children of any deceased child shall succeed to the share of the parent, per stirpes and not per capita.
"`d. When said trust is so terminated, the corpus thereof and any undistributed income shall be divided equally among such children of Thomas Stanley McKibben as may then be living, the children of any who may have died to take their parents share, per stirpes and not per capita. *Page 348 
"`e. It is my intention and desire that such residue of my estate shall be kept intact in the hands of said trustee, or some other bank or corporate trustee, until the youngest child of my said son who may be living at the time of my death shall reach the age of thirty-five years; that during that period there may be an equal distribution among my grandchildren, including the children of any who may die; and that then there may be a similar distribution of the body of said trust."
By paragraph f, the trustee was given full power to rent, manage, control, sell and convey property as it deemed best. By paragraph g provision was made for suitable persons to receive shares of the income of the trust and disburse it for the benefit of the minors, it being provided that "such person or persons shall expend such income for the care, support and education of such minor or minors as he in his discretion may deem wise and expedient, and for the benefit of such minor."
The sole question in the case was whether or not Item 15 violated the rule against perpetuities.
In that case, just as in the present case, it was "contended by appellants that item 15 of the will, considered as a whole, creates a contingent remainder pursuant to which the equitable estate might possibly not vest until a period of time beyond a life or lives in being and twenty-one years and nine months thereafter, thus violating the rule against perpetuities, and that even if the equitable estate vested in the three living grandchildren upon the date of testatrix' death, it was an artificial and imperfect vesting, subject to partial divesting in the event of subsequent birth of other children who might not become invested with a share in the estate until a time beyond a life in being and twenty-one years and nine months thereafter." But the theory of appellees, sustained by the chancellor in that case, was "that the legal title to the property conveyed in trust by item *Page 349 
15 vested in the trustee at the death of testatrix, the equitable title then also vested in the three grandchildren, and as the entire interest in the estate became vested, the rule against perpetuities does not apply."
The opinion said: "The rule against perpetuities is in force in Illinois. As commonly stated, it is as follows: `No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.' Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, 1915, Ch. 6, p. 174. By its express terms, it applies only to contingent future interests and not to interests that are vested. The rule applies only to the beginning of the interest and is not involved in the postponement of its enjoyment. * * * The law favors the vesting of an interest. An estate will vest at the earliest possible time, and will be held to vest at the death of the testator unless some later time is clearly expressed in the will or appears by necessary implication. * * * In construing wills we have frequently held that each will must be considered on its own facts * * * and that the intention of the testator must be gathered from the entire will and not from any portion of it considered alone."
The opinion said that by Item 15 Mrs. McKibben "created atrust leaving her entire residuary estate to a bank as trustee,with provisions for the income therefrom and its ultimatedistribution to be equally divided between the children of ThomasStanley McKibben, her grandchildren. By paragraph a of item 15,the immediate legal estate vested in the trustee at the death oftestatrix, and the immediate beneficial interest then also vestedin Stanley's three children, share and share alike. Paragraph b
fixed the period of the trust, using the life of the youngestchild living at the death of testatrix merely to measure an exactperiod of time. Paragraph c provided the distribution of theincome from the trust, and paragraph d directed the distributionupon its termination. *Page 350 These provisions show, beyond question, the immediate vesting ofthe estate in trust for the benefit of the grandchildren oftestatrix. The period of the rule, being twenty-one years when not based on a life in being, has no application to a remainderwhich vested upon the death of testatrix. Here, under paragraphs b and d, the testatrix merely used the period between the age of Stanley's youngest child living at her death and the date when he would become thirty-five, as the period of the trust. The timefor distribution was fixed definitely by the age of the youngestchild living at her death, and at that instant could have been projected forward to a definite calendar date.
"The deferring of the enjoyment of the principal, for reasonsof the testatrix and not for reasons personal to the legatee ordevisee, does not prevent the immediate vesting of the estate. * * * Where all the income goes to those who will take ondistribution, the estate is vested. * * * The opening up of thetrust to let in afterborn children, or to drop out a beneficiarywho dies without children, or to let in children of a deceasedbeneficiary, does not make the trust contingent." (Emphasis supplied.)
The opinion said that the court previously had held that "the rule against perpetuities had not been violated, because the gift to all the grandchildren, as a class, immediately vested in them an equitable title in the trust property, subject to opening up to let in those after-born. * * * An estate now vested remains vested, even though there may be a partial divesting later."
Consequently it was held that "The rule against perpetuities does not apply to the provisions of the will of Katherine M. McKibben, and the circuit court properly so held."
In the case of Wurst v. Savings Deposit Bank Trust Co., et al., 47 N.E.2d 676 (1940), from the Court of Appeals of Ohio, the relief sought was the termination *Page 351 
of a testamentary trust on the ground that it violated the rule against perpetuities. The testator, after providing for the administration of the estate and certain bequests, had devised the residue to the Savings Deposit Bank and Trust Company, with the net income to be paid to his wife, Ella J. Wurst, during her natural life in quarterly installments. Upon her decease, one-half of this net income should be paid in quarterly installments to his son Earl H. Wurst, during his natural life; and at his decease, this half should be divided into equal parts between the children of Earl that may survive him or have heirs until Earl's youngest child should arrive at the age of 30 years. At that time, the Trust Company should turn the one-half of the estate then remaining over to Earl's children. A like devise was made for Charles J. Wurst, another son, and his children, after the death of the mother Ella J. Ella J. Wurst predeceased the testator and he afterwards married Anna G. Wurst, who, upon his death, elected to take according to law and not under the provisions of the will.
The opinion pointed out the general rules of construction, and then quoted with approval the language of the trial court wherein it was said: "`The trustee has the naked legal title for the uses and purposes stated in the will. Item 2 (paragraph second of Item 3rd) of the will deals with the rights and interests of Earl H. Wurst and his children. As to them the trustee holds the legal title until the youngest child of Earl Wurst becomes thirty years of age, at which time distribution is to be made."
The trial judge had cited McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 5 S.Ct. 652, 28 L.Ed. 1015, and then said that, according to the holding in this case, "the children of Earl H. Wurst living at the death of the testator took equitable vested remainders, opening, if necessary, to let in those born after the testator's death, and subject *Page 352 
to be divested as to any of them as might be required by the terms of the will." Hence it was said that the provisions of the will of the testator there under consideration did not violate the rule against perpetuities.
The Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Illinois and Ohio cases, cited above, emphasize the principal that, if there is a vesting at the time of the testator's death, the rule against perpetuities has no application; and, under the factual situations in those cases, there was no violation of that rule. It was pointed out that the deferment of the time of distribution, after such vesting, would not defeat the devise; and also the withholding of the enjoyment would not postpone the vesting of the right to receive the benefit.
As the opinion in Henry v. Henderson, supra, pointed out, no two wills, if they depart from the laws of descent and distribution, were ever written in precisely the same language throughout because it would be rare indeed if two testators should die under precisely the same circumstances as to their estate, families or friends. And so it is here. In comparing the present case with the decided cases, there are similarities and dissimilarities. The elaborate and exhaustive briefs, filed by learned and experienced counsel on both sides, have been unable to find a situation of which the present case is a duplicate. This may not be impossible; but it is highly improbable that such a discovery could be made. The Court, in its research has not been able to find what might be termed the proverbial needle in the haystack.
But, taking the instrument by its four corners, and applying the rules of construction heretofore referred to, and bearing in mind that it is the duty of the Court to uphold it, if this can be reasonably done, the Court is definitely of the opinion that the interest of the grandchildren in the trust estate vested at the time of the testator's death. The 60% of the net income was to be held and managed by the trustees as a part of the *Page 353 
corpus of the trust estate in accordance with instructions given in Paragraphs 3 and 4 as shown in the will.
It is unlikely that Sir Walter Scott, if he were living today, would select, as the perfect exemplification of literary precision and exactitude, the language of the testator in reference to the expenditure of the income and corpus of the trust for the support, etc. of his grandchildren, as stated in Paragraph 4, Part 3 of the will, supra. But, from all of the circumstances, this necessarily means: "I hereby direct that my Trustees * * * may expend such portions of the income and/orcorpus of said Trust Estate as they, in their sole discretion, determine to be reasonable for the support, maintenance and/or education of my said grandchildren * * *". (Emphasis supplied.) So great was the testator's concern for the support, maintenance and education of his grandchildren that both the income and the corpus itself were dedicated to that purpose. It is true that the reasonableness of the amount of such expenditures was left to the discretion of the trustees, but the imposition of the duty to make them was positive and mandatory. A chancery court would no doubt remedy an abuse of that discretion. A careful study of the whole will reflects the supreme confidence which the testator evinced in the business judgment, ability and integrity of those to whom he entrusted the performance of the trust both as to the management and operation of his businesses and the welfare of his grandchildren. But he did not leave even to them the discretion as to whether or not the income and the corpus might be used for the purposes stated — he enjoined it upon them to do it, leaving it to them to determine the reasonableness of the amounts for that purpose. This was unmistakeable evidence of an actual vesting of both the income and the corpus.
Moreover, immediately following the positive direction as to the income and/or corpus, the testator provided *Page 354 
that "any and all amounts so paid out or expended by my said Trustees pursuant to the aforesaid provision to be charged against the account of the grandchild for whose use and benefit the same is expended, and said amount to be taken into account and deducted from said grandchild's share when final distribution is made of said Trust Estate." (Emphasis supplied.) The testator was thereby saying that each grandchild already had a share; and each one, in the final distribution, would get his share less the amount which had already been spent in his interest for the authorized benefits. The Court therefore holds that not only did the testator intend to vest the specified estate in his grandchildren as a class, but that he actually did so.
Since the Court is confirmed in the rightness of the result which it has reached, there does not devolve upon it the duty to strike down and wholly defeat the dominant will of the testator, take from the grandchildren the estate which was dedicated to and vested in them, and award it to others whom he had seen fit to exclude.
The appellees argue that the provision of the so-called "spendthrift" trust, as found in the will, negatives the idea that there was a vesting of an estate in the grandchildren. Among the cases which they cite are Mitchell v. Choctaw Bank, 107 Miss. 314, 65 So. 278; Calhoun v. Markow, 168 Miss. 556, 151 So. 547; West Tennesee Company v. Townes, 52 F.2d 764. The first two cases involved efforts on the part of alleged creditors to subject property of adversary parties held for them as trusts under the terms of so-called "spendthrift" trusts. The third was a suit by the vendee of the purchaser at a foreclosure sale and would properly fall into the same category. That question is not before the Court. This is not a suit by a creditor to subject the income or corpus of this trust to the debts or obligations of the grandchildren. Such an action may never arise. *Page 355 
The appellees also argue at length about various possibilities and contingencies in connection with what may happen to the living grandchildren, and the outcome in the event of the birth of others, and the uncertainty in the determination of such devisees.
(Hn 5) As heretofore stated, the testator had three grandchildren at the time of the execution of the will. Those children were still living when he died, but no others have been born. It is clear, from what has already been said, that the Court is holding that there was a vesting of this specified estate in those grandchildren at the time of the testator's death. In other words, the gift was to a class. At that time, it consisted of those then living. Any further observations on this question are wholly unnecessary although the decisions of this Court seem to indicate clearly that this jurisdiction is committed to the principle that, when the devise is to a class, it vests, upon the death of the testator, in those members then in being, subject to be opened up and "let in members of such class who may afterwards come into existence before the date fixed for the ascertainment of the members of the class." Branton v. Buckley, 99 Miss. 116, 54 So. 850; Allen v. Allen, 145 Miss. 368,110 So. 685.
No construction was sought insofar as the devises to Mrs. Cooper and Mrs. Bowling are concerned. Presumably all parties were satisfied of their validity.
(Hn 6) From what has been said, it is obvious that the Court is of the opinion that the learned chancellor was manifestly wrong in holding that no estate was vested by the testator, at the time of his death, in the grandchildren, but that such trust, as was created, was violative of the rule against perpetuities. Consequently, the decree so providing and invalidating the devise to the grandchildren is reversed, and a decree will be entered here for the appellants sustaining and upholding the validity of the devise. *Page 356 
In view of the Court's conclusion that the devise to the grandchildren is valid, and that the two daughters of the testator, under the will, are not entitled to anything, it follows that the appeal of the daughters, whether it is denominated direct or cross, must fail in its entirety.
Reversed and decree here for appellants.
Kyle, Arrington, Ethridge and Gillespie, JJ., concur.