Court Opinion

ID: 9772235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:11:27.831935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.747725
License: Public Domain

HOLMAN, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with that part of the principal opinion which holds that welfare benefits are “private rights” within the meaning of Art. V, § 22, Mo. Const., and hence decisions of the department are subject to judicial review under the constitutional and statutory provisions providing for review of administrative decisions.
I dissent, however, on the merits. This court has heretofore stated that the scope of our review in this type of case extends to a “determination of whether the findings and decision of the Commissioner are supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record, and authorized by law. We may not substitute our judgment on the evidence for that of the Commissioner and we may not set aside his decision, unless it is not supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record, or it is not authorized by law, is arbitrary, capricious or involves an abuse of discretion.” Tom Boy, Inc. v. Quinn, 431 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Mo.1968). In this case appellant was required to receive a fair and valuable consideration for her interest in the farm. Section 208.010, subsec. 2(1) (a), provides that such consideration means “money or real or personal property received at the time of the transaction * * (Emphasis added.) Here, the transaction was with a brother and was certainly not consummated in a businesslike manner. Appellant did not receive any money in return for her conveyance. If the brother had the money in the bank, as he stated, it is difficult to understand why he did not give appellant a *13check at the time of the conveyance. As it turned out his promise to pay was worthless.
In view of the foregoing I do not think it may reasonably be said as a matter of law (as did the principal opinion) that the unsecured oral promise to pay by the brother was a consideration “approximately equal to the * * * value of the property * * * conveyed,” as required by the statute. It is my view that this court cannot reasonably conclude that the decision of the Director was not supported by competent and substantial evidence.
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision on the merits.
DONNELLY, C. J., concurs.