Court Opinion

ID: 9733080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:52:56.719959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:38.267778
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(dissenting). The penalty for violation of numerous statutes is a civil forfeiture. Cities, villages, towns and counties adopt many state statutes by ordinance, see sec. 66.051, Stats, (power of municipalities to prohibit criminal conduct), and impose civil forfeitures for violation of those ordinances. Therefore, our decision herein which permits the state to prove a necessary element of a criminal offense by showing conduct for which the defendant has been prosecuted civilly is very significant. Because of the impact of our decision, especially on prosecutors and trial courts, see Anne B. Poulin, Double Jeopardy: Grady and Dowling Stir the Muddy Waters, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 889, 927-930 (1991), I would certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. If we do not, I conclude that Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) requires that we grant the defendant's motion to dismiss this action because the state proposes to convict the defendant of two counts of homicide by the intoxicated use of a motor vehicle by showing conduct — operating *476while under the influence — for which he has been prosecuted and convicted. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Prior to Grady, it was widely assumed that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment1 did not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution of a defendant for “conduct for which the defendant had been prosecuted in a civil proceeding.2 Under the double jeopardy clause, it was thought that the conduct subject to a civil penalty was simply not the "same offence" as that subject to a criminal penalty. ”[T]he risk to which the [Double Jeopardy] Clause refers is not present in proceedings that are not 'essentially criminal.' " Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398 (1938)). Grady has dispelled previous assumptions as to the reach of the double jeopardy clause in successive-prosecution cases.3
*477The double jeopardy clause embodies three protections: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. Grady, 495 U.S. at 516. Grady and the instant case present a second prosecution after conviction. In Grady, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause barred a subsequent prosecution for vehicular homicide and assault where the prosecutor intended to prove as elements of the crimes conduct constituting previously prosecuted traffic offenses. One of the traffic offenses was failing to keep to the right of the median, which under New York law was not a crime and for which the penalty was not punishment. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 155 (McKinney 1986).
The majority is "troubled," maj. op. at 473, by the fact that one of the prior offenses for which the defendant in Grady was convicted was a civil traffic infraction. The majority assumes that the Grady Court simply overlooked this fact. The majority cites Taylor v. Sherrill, 819 P.2d 921 (Ariz. 1991), where the court held that the "key element," id. at 926, of Grady was the Supreme Court's erroneous assumption that the initial proceedings were a "prosecution." I suggest that the Grady Court did not overlook the fact that the prosecutor intended to prove vehicular homicide and assault by showing that Corbin had caused the fatal accident by *478crossing the median. I further suggest that the majority herein, and the Arizona court, have failed to appreciate that Grady was a successive-prosecution, not a multiple-punishment, case. I conclude that the raison d'etre of Grady is that the double jeopardy clause prevents the state from "rehearsing] its presentation of proof," 495 U.S. at 518, "honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence," id. (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970)), by prosecuting a lesser offense in anticipation of its prosecution of a more serious offense. The Grady majority was satisfied that a civil traffic offense was the "same offence" as a more serious criminal offense for such "rehearsal" purposes.
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan began by explaining that the traditional Blockburger [v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)] test was developed "in the context of multiple punishments imposed in a single prosecution." Grady, 495 U.S. at 516 (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985)). If the Block-burger test reveals that two offenses have identical statutory elements or that one is a lesser included offense of the other, a subsequent prosecution is barred. Id. (citing Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977)).
Justice Brennan concluded that "a subsequent prosecution must do more than merely survive the Blockburger test." Grady, 495 U.S. at 521. Justice Scalia, dissenting, contended that Blockburger was the exclusive definition of "same offence" in the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 528-30 (citing cases). Justice Brennan responded that in each of the cases cited by Justice Scalia, the Blockburger test was applied to determine the permissibility of cumulative punishments. Id. at 517 n.8. He said: "None of the cases even suggests that Block-burger is the exclusive definition of 'same offense' in the *479context of successive prosecutions."4 Id. Justice Brennan stated that " [successive prosecutions . . . whether following acquittals or convictions, raise concerns that extend beyond merely the possibility of an enhanced sentence." Grady, 495 U.S. 518 (footnote omitted). These concerns include that the state will use its resources and power "to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense . . .." Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
One commentator criticizes Justice Brennan for relying on post-acquittal cases, such as Green, in analyzing a post-conviction case. Poulin, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. at 908. However, Justice Brennan correctly pointed out that if Blockburger constituted the entire double jeopardy inquiry in successive-prosecution cases, the state could have tried the defendant in four consecutive trials: for failure to keep right of the median, for driving while intoxicated, for assault, and for vehicular homicide. *480Grady, 495 U.S. at 520. Regardless of the outcome of any one trial, "[t]he State could improve its presentation of proof with each trial, assessing which witnesses gave the most persuasive testimony, which documents had the greatest impact, which opening and closing arguments most persuaded the jurors." Id. at 520-21. In any instance in which the defendant's conduct is subject to a penalty in a civil proceeding and also to penalty in a criminal proceeding, the temptation is present to use the less serious charge as a tryout for the main event. I conclude that Grady holds that the double jeopardy clause forbids such unfair conduct in successive-prosecution cases.
We need not decide in this case whether the double jeopardy clause forbids the state from using in a criminal prosecution proof of conduct which the state has used to subject the defendant to a civil remedied sanction. The civil penalty imposed against the defendant herein serves the purposes of punishment at least as fully as the penalty to which the defendant in Grady was subjected for violating the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law. In fact, the New York statute expressly disclaimed that the penalty for its violation was punishment. We must assume that the Grady majority was satisfied that the defendant's traffic offense was sufficiently similar to the subsequent criminal proceeding that it constituted the "same offence" under the double jeopardy clause. Therefore, Grady extends the protection of the double jeopardy clause to the second prosecution of the defendant herein after his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.
This extension is not as broad a leap as the majority suggests. We have held:
Because civil forfeitures are not crimes, sec. 939.12, Stats., the constitutional prohibition against multi*481plicity derived from the double jeopardy clause is not directly controlling. However, a similar analysis may be used. A person cannot be subject to a double forfeiture if his conduct constituted a single violation, even if his conduct is not a crime.
State v. Braun, 103 Wis. 2d 617, 630, 309 N.W.2d 875, 882 (Ct. App. 1981). It would be anomalous if a defendant who could not be subject to a double forfeiture for the same conduct could be subject to a civil forfeiture and a criminal penalty for the same conduct. See State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 124, 369 N.W.2d 145, 156 (1985) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
I anticipate the argument that one of the traffic offenses for which the defendant had been prosecuted in Grady — driving while intoxicated — was a misdemeanor and thus, it was not necessary to address the effect of the civil traffic infraction. This argument fails because the Court considered that "the State has admitted that it will prove the entirety of the conduct for which Corbin was convicted — driving while intoxicated and failing to keep right of the median — to establish essential elements of the homicide and assault offenses. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars this successive prosecution . . .." 495 U.S. at 523 (emphasis added).
If I have misread Grady and the "civil/criminal methodology" still controls in successive-prosecution cases, I reach the same result because the civil forfeiture for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, first offense, constitutes "punishment." In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989), the Court said: "Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment." The Court also added that " [r]etribution and deterrence are *482not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives." Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
The state cites Thomas J. Hammer,5 The New OMVWI Law: Wisconsin Changes its Approach to the Problem of Drinking and Driving, 55 Wis. Bar. Bull. 9 (April 1982), 15 (May 1982) in support of its position that the sanctions for an OMVWI first offense are remedial, not punitive. Professor Hammer stated that,
With the enactment of the new statutes, the legislature has redefined Wisconsin's approach to driver rehabilitation. Under prior law, the offender's participation in an assessment and in a rehabilitative program (or school) could reduce the penalties incurred as a result of conviction.
Under, the new laws . . . the process of assessing and rehabilitating the offender is separate and distinct from the penalty process. Participation in an assessment and in a driver safety plan become mandatory and are enforced through the Department of Transportation's power to suspend the operating privilege.
Id. at 11 (April 1982).
As Professor Hammer pointed out, the legislature severed the alcohol assessment and driver safety plan from the structure of penalties under the new OMVWI law. He stated: "Under the new legislation, the matter of rehabilitation is separate and distinct from penalization." 55 Wis. Bar. Bull, at 16 (May 1982). If legislative intent remains any part of the double jeopardy analysis, *483it must be concluded that the monetary penalties of the OMVWI law, including the forfeiture for a first offense, serve the traditional goals of punishment — retribution and deterrence.
Procedurally, prosecutions to recover forfeitures closely resemble criminal prosecutions. Procedurally, a prosecution for OMVWI, second offense, would differ from a first-offense prosecution only in the state's burden of proof. Forfeiture actions require the entry of criminal-type pleas and the taking of criminal-type verdicts. State ex rel. Schaeve v. Van Lare, 125 Wis. 2d 40, 44 n. 3, 370 N.W.2d 271, 274 n.3 (Ct. App. 1985). The required degree of proof — clear and convincing — is not far removed from the criminal burden of proof.
Further, many of the common-law principles developed in the context of criminal proceedings have been applied to civil monetary forfeiture prosecutions. For example, the supreme court has held that the frivolous claims statute, sec. 814.025, Stats., does not apply to a city attorney prosecuting an ordinance violation because application of the statute would interfere with the broad prosecutorial discretion granted the city attorney. City of Janesville v. Wiskia, 97 Wis. 2d 473, 483, 293 N.W.2d 522, 527 (1980). The court characterized the city's prosecution as "quasi-criminal."
I recognize that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that a city prosecution for disorderly conduct did not bar a criminal prosecution for the same conduct, on either double jeopardy or collateral estoppel grounds. State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 369 N.W.2d 145 (1985). The court, however, based its holding that the multiple prosecutions were not for the "same offence” solely on the Blockburger test, which the legislature has codified in sec. 939.71, Stats. Id. at 111 n.7, 369 N.W.2d at 149-50 n.7. The "neat, almost mathematical struc*484ture," id. at 127, 369 N.W.2d at 157 (Bablitch, J., dissenting), of the majority opinion must be reformulated in light of Grady.
Perhaps Blockburger should provide the sole test to define "same offence" under the double jeopardy clause. It would be a perversion of the clause to allow a defendant to escape answering for serious offenses solely because he or she has paid a small civil penalty for a minor offense. However, Grady is the law and Block-burger is not the sole test in successive-prosecution cases.
The evils which motivated the Grady majority to expand the "same offence" definition in successive-prosecution cases — principally abuse by the state — can be effectively dealt with under the due process clause, even if Blockburger is reinstated as the sole test to define "same offence" under the double jeopardy clause. Successive prosecutions (local forfeiture/state forfeiture; local forfeiture/state criminal; or state forfeiture/state criminal) to punish the same conduct are fundamentally unfair and violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. I, sec. 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution. See Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d at 124, 369 N.W.2d at 156 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); id. at 124-25, 133, 369 N.W.2d at 156, 160 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
Grady can be dealt with through appropriate administration responses by prosecutors and tried courts, Poulin, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. at 926-30, but, as Justice Scalia points out in his dissent, Grady poses difficulties for trial courts. 495 U.S. at 541. However, until Grady is overruled or modified, I conclude that only administrative *485responses can prevent unfortunate results such as that which Grady requires in this case.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

The double jeopardy clause states: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const, amdt V. It is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).

In State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 369 N.W.2d 145, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 901 (1985), a divided court held that the double jeopardy clause did not bar a state criminal prosecution for the same conduct for which the defendant had been prosecuted under a municipal ordinance.

Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), has evoked a storm of judicial activity and interpretative commentary. Despite its recentness, Grady has been cited in numerous decisions and has been the subject of a number of commentaries: Anne B. Poulin, Double Jeopardy: Grady and Dowling Stir the Muddy Waters, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 889 (1991); Note, Increased Double Jeopardy Protection for the Criminal Defendant: Grady v. Corbin, 27 Willamette L. Rev. 913 (1991); James M. Herrick, Comment, Double Jeopardy Analysis Comes Home: The "Same Conduct" Standard in Grady v. Corbin, 79 Ky. L.J. 847 (1990-91); Lori A. McGinnis, *477Casenote, Grady v. Corbin: Doubling the Scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause? 17 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 873 (1991); Sara Barton, Case Comment, Grady v. Corbin: An Unsuccessful Effort to Define "Same Offense," 25 Ga. L. Rev. 143 (1990); Craig J. Webre, Casenote, Grady v. Corbin: Successive Prosecutions Must Survive Heightened Double Jeopardy Protection, 36 Loy. L. Rev. 1171 (1991).

The majority complains that / suggest that the definition of "same offence," found in the Court's multiple-punishment cases, is inapplicable to a successive-prosecution case. It is not I who makes that suggestion but the majority of the Court in Grady. See 495 U.S. at 517 n. 8.
The majority yearns to return to the good old days recalled by Justice Scalia when the Blockburger test provided the exclusive definition of "same offence" under the double jeopardy clause. However, Grady is the latest pronouncement of double jeopardy law in successive-prosecution cases and we must try to understand and follow it. The majority does not further that effort by relying on the discredited and discarded "civil/criminal methodology" (maj. op. at 4-5) in deciding successive-prosecution cases. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 n.7 (1989) ("[I]n determining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal punishment, it is the purposes actually served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated").

At the time of writing his article, Professor Hammer was a visiting assistant professor of law at Marquette University Law School. Prior thereto, he had served as an assistant district attorney in Milwaukee County for six years, during which he supervised the prosecution of all criminal OMVWI cases in Milwaukee County. 55 Wis. Bar. Bull, at 70 (April 1982).