Court Opinion

ID: 9743184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:27:29.121375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:39.794917
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STOUDER, specially concurring: I agree with the result reached by the majority of the court, and in particular I agree the prior statement was properly admitted for impeachment purposes under the authority of People v. Weaver (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 545, 442 N.E.2d 255. I do not agree with the dicta of the majority that such statement might have been also admissible as substantive evidence. The law in Illinois is that a prior statement which is inconsistent with a witness’ testimony may only be used to impeach the testimony and may not be used as substantive evidence. (People v. Gant (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 178, 317 N.E.2d 564.) To the extent People v. Jenkins (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 522, 432 N.E.2d 1171, intimates a prior inconsistent statement can be used as substantive evidence, the opinion is itself confusing and inconsistent and does not rely on Illinois authority. For all practical purposes Jenkins is based on United States v. Insana (2d Cir. 1970), 423 F.2d 1165, a conclusion which is difficult to understand, since the Insana case applies Federal rules relating to evidence not applicable to Illinois. Insana specifically refers to the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, not yet then adopted, which apparently incorporated the then existing Federal rule. At the time of the decision in Jenkins, no rule equivalent to this Federal rule of evidence had been approved or applied in Illinois. Consequently, the reliance of Jenkins on Insana seems inappropriate. I would also note two additional reasons for doubting the applicability of the Jenkins case to the present case. First, the opinion in Jenkins refers to the prior inconsistent statement as impeachment, and second, the legally significant facts in Jenkins are substantially different from those in the present case.