Court Opinion

ID: 9668207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:05:43.674182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:43.519491
License: Public Domain

ANDELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Taken individually, the rulings on Duer’s motion to withdraw as counsel, Daniels’s motion to replace Duer, and Duer’s motion for continuance do not necessarily reflect an abuse of discretion. Taken together, however, they do. The presence of additional elements in this ease, factors that do not fit neatly within the considerations expressed by the Windham court, distinguish this case. Although I am mindful of the trial court’s fear of being held hostage to the threats of an unhappy defendant, I also recognize the distinctiveness and singularity of this particular aggregate of factors. Not only was there a motion for continuance before the court because co-counsel could not appear, there was also an effort by lead counsel to withdraw and an effort by appellant to replace lead counsel.
Duer sought to withdraw as counsel based on appellant’s alleged intent to offer perjured testimony. Duer also faced a conflict of interest because of the grievance appellant had filed against him. In addition, appellant had informed the trial court he had filed a section 19831 civil rights suit against Duer. Appellant faced the unattractive choice of going forward with counsel whom he did not want, and who no longer wanted to represent appellant, or representing himself. Granting the motion for continuance to allow co-counsel Rodriguez to represent appellant would have provided an appropriate solution to this dilemma. Given this, I would have held the denial of the motion for continuance was so arbitrary as to violate due process. I would have sustained appellant’s third and fourth points of error and would have reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Accordingly, I dissent.
O’CONNOR, J., joins this dissent.

. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (Law.Co-op.1994).