Court Opinion

ID: 9386939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 05:04:40.585844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:09.744080
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

DU,                                                                  UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     April 13, 2023
               Petitioner-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 359622
                                                                     Livingston Circuit Court
CU,                                                                  Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 21-056628-PP
               Respondent-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and GARRETT and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order denying his motion to terminate an ex
parte personal protection order (PPO) entered in favor of petitioner. We reverse and remand for
entry of an order granting respondent’s motion.

                                            I. FACTS

        On November 25, 2021, Thanksgiving Day, petitioner and respondent, who were then
husband and wife, had an argument while at their home. During the argument, petitioner asked
respondent to give her some space. According to respondent, he went upstairs and changed his
clothes, then went outdoors and sat in his van, where he eventually fell asleep. Respondent later
explained to the trial court that he did not drive the van anywhere because he was still emotional
from the argument and thought it would be unwise to drive.

         According to petitioner, before leaving the home respondent said that he was going to kill
himself, and she therefore grew afraid because she knew that respondent kept a gun in his van.
Respondent testified that he is an electrician and regularly works in dangerous neighborhoods in
Detroit, and therefore has a concealed pistol license (CPL) and keeps a pistol in his van for
protection while working. Respondent denied that he said he was going to kill himself, and also
testified that on the day of the argument petitioner had been smoking marijuana. Petitioner agreed
that she uses marijuana, but could not remember whether she had been using it on the day of the
argument. Both petitioner and respondent agreed that respondent did not threaten petitioner in any
way, either verbally or physically, and did not access the gun nor brandish it.

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        While respondent slept in the van, petitioner texted his phone. When respondent did not
reply, she texted her mother and respondent’s mother, then called the police and told them she was
afraid respondent might shoot her and take his own life. Respondent awoke in the van to discover
police officers outside the van. The officers took respondent to a hospital for evaluation, where
he was released within two hours after medical personnel concluded that he was not suicidal.

        Two days later, petitioner filed for divorce and sought an ex parte PPO. In her petition,
she alleged that on November 25, 2021, she “was absolutely terrified that he would kill me and
then himself.”1 On November 29, 2021, the trial court granted petitioner an ex parte PPO against
respondent, which was to remain in effect until November 29, 2022. Respondent timely moved to
terminate the PPO on the basis that petitioner had falsely represented that he had threatened to kill
himself.

         The trial court denied respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO. The trial court explained
that it found respondent to be credible, but also thought it likely that respondent had threatened to
kill himself, which frightened petitioner. The trial court stated that the decision was “a very close
call” and that resolution of the motion “could have gone either way,” but “in this time in our world,
people are doing very serious things that would scare a lot of people.” The trial court further stated
that “I think in order to make the Petitioner feel safe during this divorce, I am going to sign an
order. I’m continuing the PPO.” Respondent now appeals.

                                          II. DISCUSSION

1
  Petitioner also alleged that in 2017 respondent threw a handrail from a dog gate at her. The
couple nonetheless were married in 2018. Petitioner alleged that thereafter, in 2019, respondent
threw a vase at her head during an argument. In denying the motion to terminate the ex parte PPO,
the trial court discussed the allegations of earlier conflict between the parties, but based its decision
solely upon the events of November 25, 2021. The dissent suggests that the trial court erred by
limiting its consideration to events close in time to the November 2021 incident and failing to
consider the allegations and testimony regarding the parties’ earlier disputes. We note that the trial
court did not fail to consider the allegations of earlier disputes; the trial court discussed the
allegations, but stated that it was not giving any weight to the parties’ contentions about those
disputes. How much weight, if any, to accord a given piece of evidence is the sole prerogative of
the fact-finder. Mitchell v Kalamazoo Anesthesiology, PC, 321 Mich App 144, 156; 908 NW2d
319 (2017). The trial court’s decision to accord more weight to some evidence and none to other
evidence was well within its discretion as fact-finder, and this Court does not interfere with the
trial court’s determinations on such matters. See Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 715; 747
NW2d 336 (2008). If, however, we were to examine the parties’ allegations about their earlier
disputes, it would be necessary to consider respondent’s testimony that the parties’ 2017 dispute
was precipitated by petitioner driving away after declaring in front of her daughter and respondent
that she was going to kill herself, thus engaging in the same conduct in 2017 that she found so dire
when respondent acted similarly in 2021.

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       Respondent contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
terminate the ex parte PPO against him.2 We agree.

        We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a PPO, as
well as the trial court’s decision on a respondent’s motion to terminate a PPO. CAJ v KDT, 339
Mich App 459, 463; 984 NW2d 504 (2021). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision
falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Berryman v Mackey, 327 Mich
App 711, 717; 935 NW2d 94 (2019). A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes
an error of law. CAJ, 339 Mich App at 464. We review for clear error the trial court’s underlying
factual findings. CNN v SEB, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No.
359007); slip op at 4. A finding is clearly erroneous if we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Berryman, 327 Mich App at 717-718. We review de
novo questions of statutory interpretation. Le Gassick v Univ of Mich Regents, 330 Mich App 487,
495; 948 NW2d 452 (2019).

      PPOs in the context of domestic relationships are governed by MCL 600.2950. See TM v
MZ, 501 Mich 312, 315; 916 NW2d 473 (2018). MCL 600.2950(1) states, in relevant part:

       [A]n individual may petition the family division of circuit court to enter a personal
       protection order to restrain or enjoin a spouse . . . from doing 1 or more of the
       following:

               (a) Entering onto premises.

               (b) Assaulting, attacking, beating, molesting, or wounding a named
               individual.

               (c) Threatening to kill or physically injure a named individual.

               (d) Removing minor children from the individual having legal custody of
               the children, except as otherwise authorized by a custody or parenting time
               order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.

               (e) Purchasing or possessing a firearm.

               (f) Interfering with petitioner’s efforts to remove petitioner’s children or
               personal property from premises that are solely owned or leased by the
               individual to be restrained or enjoined.

               (g) Interfering with petitioner at petitioner’s place of employment or
               education or engaging in conduct that impairs petitioner’s employment or
               educational relationship or environment.

2
 Although the PPO has expired, the issue on appeal is not rendered moot. See TM v MZ, 501
Mich 312, 319; 916 NW2d 473 (2018).

                                                -3-
               (h) If the petitioner is a minor who has been the victim of sexual assault, as
               that term is defined in section 2950a, by the respondent and if the petitioner
               is enrolled in a public or nonpublic school that operates any of grades K to
               12, attending school in the same building as the petitioner.

               (i) Having access to information in records concerning a minor child of both
               petitioner and respondent that will inform respondent about the address or
               telephone number of petitioner and petitioner’s minor child or about
               petitioner’s employment address.

               (j) Engaging in conduct that is prohibited under [MCL 750.411h (stalking)
               or MCL 750.411i (aggravated stalking)].

               (k) Any of the following with the intent to cause the petitioner mental
               distress or to exert control over the petitioner with respect to an animal in
               which the petitioner has an ownership interest.

                        (i) injuring, killing, torturing, neglecting, or threatening to injure,
               kill, torture, or neglect the animal. A restraining order that enjoins conduct
               under this subparagraph does not prohibit the lawful killing or other use of
               the animal as described in section 50(11) of the Michigan penal code, 1931
               PA 328, MCL 750.50.

                       (ii) Removing the animal from the petitioner’s possession.

                       (iii) Retaining or obtaining possession of the animal.

                (l) Any other specific act or conduct that imposes upon or interferes with
               personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.

       An ex parte PPO is a “restraining order granted without notice” under MCR 3.310(B)(5).
Pickering v Pickering, 253 Mich App 694, 698; 659 NW2d 649 (2002). MCL 600.2950(12)
provides:

               A court shall issue an ex parte personal protection order without written or
       oral notice to the individual restrained or enjoined or his or her attorney if it clearly
       appears from specific facts shown by a verified complaint, written motion, or
       affidavit that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the
       delay required to effectuate notice or that the notice will itself precipitate adverse
       action before a personal protection order can be issued.

        An individual who is restrained or enjoined by an ex parte PPO issued under MCL
600.2950(12) may file a motion to modify or rescind the PPO and request a hearing. MCL
600.2950(13). When a respondent moves to dissolve a restraining order granted without notice,
the petitioner must justify the continuation of the PPO. MCR 3.310(B)(5) provides, in relevant
part:

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       . . . At a hearing on a motion to dissolve a restraining order granted without notice,
       the burden of justifying continuation of the order is on the applicant for the
       restraining order whether or not the hearing has been consolidated with a hearing
       on a motion for a preliminary injunction or an order to show cause.

        Under MCL 600.2950(4), a trial court must issue a PPO if the trial court determines that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the person to be restrained may commit an act stated in
MCL 600.2950(1). MCL 600.2950(4) provides:

       The court shall issue a personal protection order under this section if the court
       determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the individual to be
       restrained or enjoined may commit 1 or more of the acts listed in [MCL
       600.2950(1)]. In determining whether reasonable cause exists, the court shall
       consider all of the following:

       (a) Testimony, documents, or other evidence offered in support of the request for a
       personal protection order.

       (b) Whether the individual to be restrained or enjoined has previously committed
       or threatened to commit 1 or more of the acts listed in subsection (1).

        Thus, a trial court must issue a PPO if it determines that reasonable cause exists to believe
that the respondent may commit one or the more of the acts listed in MCL 600.2950(1). The trial
court, however, “must make a positive finding of prohibited behavior by the respondent before
issuing a PPO.” SP v BEK, 339 Mich App 171, 181; 981 NW2d 500 (2021), quoting Kampf v
Kampf, 237 Mich App 377, 386; 603 NW2d 295 (1999). The burden of establishing reasonable
cause for the issuance of the PPO, and the burden of establishing justification for the court to
continue a PPO upon a motion to terminate an ex parte PPO, is upon the person petitioning the
court for the PPO. SP, 339 Mich App at 181.

         We conclude that the trial court in this case abused its discretion by denying respondent’s
motion to terminate the PPO. The trial court did not make a positive finding of prohibited behavior
by respondent before issuing the PPO, and petitioner did not establish justification for continuing
the PPO upon respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO. See SP, 339 Mich App at 181; MCR
3.310(B)(5). The only act alleged against respondent is that he stated that he was going to kill
himself. Respondent left the couple’s home on November 25, 2021 because petitioner asked him
to give her “space.” Petitioner agreed that respondent did not verbally or physically threaten her
in any way, but that she nonetheless became afraid for her own safety because of respondent’s
statement. Petitioner testified that she could not remember whether she had been using marijuana
at the time of the incident.3

3
 As the dissent accurately notes, petitioner testified that she did not remember whether she had
been using marijuana that day. She testified in detail regarding the events of that day, including a
detailed description of respondent’s conduct, who she called, what was said, and the extent of her

                                                -5-
        After leaving the home at petitioner’s request, respondent did not engage in any conduct to
justify petitioner’s fear. When police arrived, respondent was sleeping in his van. He cooperated
with police and participated in evaluation at a hospital, where he was quickly determined not to be
suicidal and was released. In the days following the incident and leading up to the hearing on his
motion, respondent did not engage in any “act or conduct that imposes upon or interferes with
personal liberty or that causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.” See MCL 600.2950(1)(l).
The only basis found by the trial court to support the PPO was petitioner’s allegation that she
became afraid when respondent stated that he was going to kill himself. The trial court found the
decision to be “a very close call” whether a PPO was warranted, and that the decision “could go
either way,” but concluded that current events in general were frightening and speculated that
petitioner might be comforted if a PPO were issued against respondent. The PPO was thus
continued not because respondent had engaged in any prohibited conduct, but to allay petitioner’s
general fearfulness. The record thus is insufficient to meet petitioner’s burden to justify
continuation of the PPO.

        In addition, the evidence presented by petitioner was insufficient to support a finding of
reasonable cause to believe that respondent might in the future commit an act prohibited under
MCL 600.2950(1). As discussed, under MCL 600.2950(4), a trial court must issue a PPO if the
trial court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the person to be restrained may
commit an act stated in MCL 600.2950(1). Here, the only alleged prohibited conduct by
respondent was his alleged statement that he would harm himself. The only support for this
allegation is petitioner’s uncorroborated testimony that he made this statement.4

        The trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and we do
not weigh the credibility of the witnesses on appeal. Brandt v Brandt, 250 Mich App 68, 74; 645
NW2d 327 (2002). In this case, however, the trial court found both petitioner and respondent
credible, found the case to be a close call, but nonetheless chose to defer to the uncorroborated

fear. She also testified that if she used marijuana that day, she used an amount that did not affect
her or heighten her emotions. That is, she remembered how much she used if she used it, and what
effect it had on her if she used it, but did not remember whether she used it. And she remembers
everything else that occurred that day with great clarity, even though perhaps she was using
marijuana, which she testified had no effect on her if she used it. But she did not remember whether
she used it.
4
  The dissent observes that “[a] domestic violence victim’s testimony can be believed as credible
even if uncorroborated.” We agree. Nonetheless, we observe that the only evidence supporting
the PPO is petitioner’s statement that respondent threatened to harm himself. The trial court found
this statement by petitioner credible, and we give regard to the special opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses that appear before it. MCR 2.613(C). But, like the trial
court, we are constrained by the concepts of burden of proof and sufficiency of the evidence.
Petitioner, whether a domestic violence victim or not, had the burden to justify continuation of the
PPO. Similarly, the trial court was required to make a positive finding of prohibited conduct by
respondent before issuing the PPO. See SP, 339 Mich App at 181. Petitioner’s lone statement,
even accepted as credible, neither carries her burden of proof nor supports a positive finding of
prohibited conduct by respondent.

                                                 -6-
version of events presented by petitioner, who admitted that she did not remember if she was using
marijuana on the day of the events in question. Although we do not second-guess the trial court’s
finding that petitioner experienced fear, her fear alone is not sufficient to meet petitioner’s burden
to justify continuation of the PPO. Nor did petitioner demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that
respondent may commit an act prohibited under MCL 600.2950(1) in the future. Accordingly, the
trial court abused its discretion by denying respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO.

        The trial court’s order is reversed, the PPO is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the
trial court, with instructions that the PPO be updated in LEIN as having been rescinded. We do
not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                              /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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