Court Opinion

ID: 9963042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 15:04:03.951826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:16.378541
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                                State of Florida

                          Opinion filed April 24, 2024.
        Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                             ________________

                              No. 3D23-1298
                        Lower Tribunal No. 21-19859
                           ________________

                          Bottling Group, LLC,
                                   Appellant,

                                      vs.

                          Giovanni E. Bastien,
                                   Appellee.

     An appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Jose M. Rodriguez, Judge.

      Ford & Harrison LLP, Dawn Siler-Nixon, and Daniel K. Miles (Tampa),
for appellant.

      Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., Thomas A. Valdez, Megan G.
Colter (Tampa), Reginald J. Clyne, Andres F. Vidales, and Chanelle Artiles,
for appellee.

Before EMAS, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

     MILLER, J.
      Appellant, Bottling Group, LLC, appeals from a nonfinal order denying

its motion for partial summary judgment in the underlying tort lawsuit filed by

appellee, Giovanni E. Bastien. On appeal, Bottling Group contends the trial

court erred in finding it was equitably estopped from presenting its workers’

compensation immunity defense. 1 Adhering to our precedent, we affirm.

                                BACKGROUND

      Bastien was employed by Bottling Group at a Pepsi packaging and

distribution facility in Medley, Florida. He was seriously injured when a co-

worker, purportedly disgruntled over union activities, shot him several times.

While recovering in the hospital, Bastien notified his manager that he

intended to file a workers’ compensation claim. He was informed he was not

entitled to benefits, and Bottling Group later emailed the compensation

carrier, Sedgwick, to oppose the claim.

      Bastien received a notice of denial of benefits from the Florida

Department of Financial Services Division of Workers’ Compensation. The

notice stated, in relevant part: “[c]laim is denied in its entirety, as not a

1
   Because this court denied Bastien’s motion for relinquishment of
jurisdiction, the trial court’s superseding order of clarification is a nullity. See
Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(f) (authorizing trial court to “proceed with all matters,
including trial or final hearing,” except for rendition of final order disposing of
matter pending review); see also Heritage Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Williams,
338 So. 3d 1119, 1121–22 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (concluding trial court is
without “jurisdiction to clarify or modify a non-final order” pending on appeal).

                                         2
compensable accident or injury. Injury did not occur in the course or scope

of employment. Accident/Injury occurred off premises . . . .”

     Bastien filed a tort lawsuit in the circuit court against Bottling Group’s

parent company, PepsiCo, Inc. PepsiCo moved to dismiss, contending it

was entitled to workers’ compensation immunity.         Bastien argued that

PepsiCo was equitably estopped from asserting immunity.

     Before the court rendered ruling on the motion, the parties agreed to

the filing of an amended complaint substituting PepsiCo with Bottling Group.

Bottling Group answered the complaint. Included in the answer was the

allegation that liability did not lie because “neither [Bastien] nor [his co-

worker] were acting within the line and scope of their employment or agency

with Bottling Group.” Bottling Group further asserted that “[n]o unlawful or

tortious action alleged to have been perpetrated by an employee of Bottling

Group was within the scope and course of his duties while employed by

Bottling Group, or in the furtherance of Bottling Group’s business.”

     Bottling Group moved for partial summary judgment on the basis it was

entitled to workers’ compensation immunity. Bastien opposed the motion,

asserting that estoppel and the intentional tort exception precluded the

operation of immunity.

                                      3
      On the eve of the summary judgment hearing, Bastien moved to

amend his complaint to again add PepsiCo as a defendant. The trial court

granted leave to amend, and neither Bottling Group nor PepsiCo answered

the first amended complaint before the summary judgment hearing.

      No party requested a continuance. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the trial court entered a reasoned order denying summary judgment and

prohibiting Bottling Group from raising its immunity defense at trial. The

instant appeal ensued.

                         STANDARD OF REVIEW

      We conduct a de novo review of a summary judgment order

determining that a party is not entitled to workers’ compensation immunity

as a matter of law. See Bal Harbour Tower Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Bellorin,

351 So. 3d 96, 99 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).

                                    ANALYSIS

      We have jurisdiction.       See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(v)

(authorizing appeals from nonfinal orders determining “that, as a matter of

law, a party is not entitled to workers’ compensation immunity”); see also Fla.

Highway Patrol v. Jackson, 288 So. 3d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 2020) (reiterating

that “‘[n]onfinal orders denying summary judgment on a claim of workers'

compensation immunity are not appealable unless the trial court order

                                      4
specifically states that, as a matter of law, such a defense is not available to

a party’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Hastings v. Demming, 694 So. 2d

718, 720 (Fla. 1997)).

      Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law, codified in chapter 440, Florida

Statutes, is designed to “assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability

and medical benefits to an injured worker and to facilitate the worker’s return

to gainful reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer.” § 440.015,

Fla. Stat. (2021). The law operates without regard to fault, as “the employee

gives up a right to a common-law action for negligence in exchange for strict

liability and the rapid recovery of benefits.” Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d

683, 686 (Fla. 2000); see also Gerth v. Wilson, 774 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 2d DCA

2000).

      If an employee sustains an injury on the job, workers’ compensation is

ordinarily the exclusive remedy. See Turner, 754 So. 2d at 686. Certain

exceptions, of course, apply. For instance, as Bastien properly argued

below, chapter 440 does not shield an employer from liability for intentional

torts. See id. at 687; see also Gerth, 774 So. 2d at 6. Equitable estoppel

may similarly preclude the application of immunity. Pursuant to a well-

developed body of case law, “an employer may be equitably estopped from

raising a workers’ compensation exclusivity defense if the employer denies

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the employee’s claim by asserting that the injury did not occur in the course

and scope of his or her employment.” Coastal Masonry, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 30

So. 3d 545, 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); McNair v. Dorsey, 291 So. 3d 607, 609–

10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

      To establish estoppel, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the

employer made “a representation as to a material fact that is contrary to a

later-asserted position;” (2) the plaintiff relied upon that representation; and

(3) the plaintiff changed his position to his detriment because of his reliance

on the representation. Specialty Emp. Leasing v. Davis, 737 So. 2d 1170,

1172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); see also Francoeur v. Pipers, Inc., 560 So. 2d

244, 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

      A series of reported cases inform the proper application of estoppel in

the workers’ compensation arena. In the first, Byerley v. Citrus Publ’g, Inc.,

725 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), Byerley’s employer denied his

workers’ compensation claim on the basis that the “[i]njury did not arise out

[of] the course and scope of [Byerley’s] employment.” Id. at 1231 (second

and third alterations in original). Byerley then filed a tort-based lawsuit in the

circuit court. See id. The employer moved for summary judgment, citing

workers’ compensation exclusivity. See id. The trial court found immunity

applied. See id. In the accompanying order, the court found “as a matter of

                                        6
law that the alleged accident occurred in the scope and course of [Byerley’s]

employment and is the major contributing cause to her injuries.” Id. The

court further stated, “[p]laintiffs have not asserted estoppel nor does this

[c]ourt find that it is supported by the record presented.” Id. at 1231–32.

      On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal observed:

      The employer created a Hobson's choice for Byerley: the
      employer, through its insurance carrier, denied her claim for
      workers' compensation, and then, when Byerley elected to
      proceed in a tort action, argued that she could not sue because
      her exclusive remedy was the Workers' Compensation Act. The
      employer argues that it cannot be estopped from claiming
      workers' compensation immunity because the denial of benefits
      was issued by its workers' compensation carrier, and thus, is not
      attributable to the employer.

Id. at 1232. Concluding this dichotomy was irreconcilable, the court reversed

the order under review, concluding,

      We think it would be inequitable for an employer to deny
      worker[s’] compensation coverage on the ground that the
      employee's injury did not arise out of the course and scope of
      employment, then later claim immunity from a tort suit on the
      ground that the injury did arise out of the course and scope of
      employment. This argument, if accepted, would eviscerate the
      Workers' Compensation Act and allow employers to avoid all
      liability for employee job related injuries.

Id. (emphasis in original).

      In the second case, Coastal Masonry, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 30 So. 3d 545

(Fla. 3d DCA 2010), Gutierrez filed a petition for workers’ compensation

benefits after he sustained an injury while lifting concrete blocks on his

                                      7
jobsite. See id. at 547. His employer, Coastal Masonry, denied the petition,

claiming his condition was “not the result of an injury by accident arising out

of and in the course and scope of employment.” Id. Gutierrez then filed a

negligence action in the circuit court against Coastal Masonry. See id.

Coastal Masonry moved for summary judgment asserting workers’

compensation immunity. See id. The trial court denied the motion and

Coastal Masonry appealed. See id.

      The court affirmed, explaining that, by first denying the workers’

compensation claim on the grounds that the injury did not arise “out of and

in the course and scope of employment,” and then later asserting workers’

compensation exclusivity after suit was filed, Coastal Masonry had “taken

inconsistent positions.”   Id. at 548.       The denial of the claim, the court

reasoned, caused Gutierrez to dismiss the claim, incur medical expenses,

and file a tort lawsuit. See id. These facts, the court held, was sufficient to

establish estoppel. See id.

      In the third case, Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1

(Fla. 3d DCA 2012), this court again examined the application of equitable

estoppel in the workers’ compensation context. Wilczewski sustained a

workplace injury. See id. at 2. Her employer, Ocean Reef, did not notify its

compensation carrier the injuries were work-related until after Wilczewski

                                         8
filed a tort lawsuit. See id. As a result, the carrier denied Wilczewski’s

workers’ compensation claim on the grounds the injuries were sustained

outside the course and scope of employment. See id. The court imputed

the denial of coverage to Ocean Reef and affirmed, reasoning that:

      Where, as here, the carrier's denial is absolutely clear on its face
      that the reason for denial is “[n]o accident in the course and
      scope of employment,” it is “clearly irreconcilable” with the
      defense of tort immunity asserted by Ocean Reef. Ocean Reef
      cannot now contend that the injuries were, in fact, related to work
      and therefore covered by workers' compensation when it has
      clearly denied coverage on inconsistent grounds earlier.

Id. at 4 (alteration in original).

      These cases are, of course, all factually driven, and we are mindful that

“[e]quitable estoppel must be applied with great caution.” Watson Clinic, LLP

v. Verzosa, 816 So. 2d 832, 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). As the Fourth District

Court of Appeal explained in Gil v. Tenet Healthsystem N. Shore, Inc., 204

So. 3d 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), “if an employer merely states a defense

within the workers’ compensation proceeding, an employer will not be

estopped from later asserting immunity.” Id. at 127.

      Against these principles, we turn to the case at hand. Bottling Group

first raises a procedural argument. It contends the failure to plead estoppel

in a reply is fatal to the order under review. Consistent with Byerley, we are

not so persuaded. At the time of the summary judgment hearing, Bottling

                                       9
Group had not yet answered the first amended complaint. Nobody sought a

continuance, and no reply was ripe. Moreover, the prior answer contained

language denying the injuries occurred within the course and scope of

employment. There was therefore no obligation to file an avoidance.

      As to the substantive contention of error associated with the failure to

apply immunity, the facts of this case are virtually indistinguishable from the

trilogy of cases previously discussed. Bottling Group opposed the workers’

compensation claim on the contended basis the injuries did not occur within

the course and scope of employment. Bastien accepted and relied upon the

denial, bore his medical expenses, and then sued Bottling Group in tort, as

permitted by the workers’ compensation statute. See Byerley, 725 So. 2d at

1232–33; see also § 440.11(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (“[A]n injured employee . . . may

elect to claim compensation under [chapter 440] or to maintain an action at

law or in admiralty for damages on account of such injury . . . .”).

      Given these undisputed facts, we impute no error to the decision to

preclude the presentation of a workers’ compensation immunity defense.

See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(f)(1) (authorizing court to “grant summary judgment

for a nonmovant”).

      Affirmed.

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