Court Opinion

ID: 2964842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:00.385429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.393579
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1960

                                  FRANCES A. ROGERS,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                         MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY, INC., ET AL.

                                Defendants, Appellees,

                                 ____________________

                                  RICHARD CAVALLARO,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                  PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND APPEAL FROM THE

            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Nancy J. Gertner, District Judge]
                                               ______________
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________
                                 ____________________

            Jennifer H. Zacks, with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney
            _________________            _______________
        General, Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Barbara L.
                 _______________                              __________
        Herwig, Attorney, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, were on
        ______
        brief for appellant, Richard Cavallaro.
            Paul A. Manoff for appellee Frances A. Rogers.
            ______________
                                 ____________________

                                   August 12, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.   The United States
                                ____________________

            and its employee, Richard Cavallaro, appeal from the district

            court's order  remanding  a slander  action  brought  against

            Cavallaro back to the Massachusetts state court.  The slander

            action had earlier been removed to the federal court pursuant

            to the Attorney General's  Westfall Act certification,  which

            stated that Cavallaro had been acting within the scope of his

            federal  employment  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  slander

            incident.  Appellants  now complain that the  district court,

            ignoring the Attorney General's certification, wrongly placed

            upon  them  the  burden of  establishing  that  Cavallaro was

            acting  within the  scope  of  his  federal  employment  when

            committing  the alleged tort.  Appellants further complain of

            the  absence of  any express  determination  by the  district

            court that Cavallaro had in fact been acting beyond the scope

            of his federal employment.  We vacate and remand.

                                I.  Factual Background
                                ______________________

                      The plaintiff,  Frances A. Rogers,  was employed by

            Management  Technology Inc.,  a government  contractor, until

            August 1993.   At that time, Rogers was  fired, allegedly for

            falsifying the records  of the hours she had worked as a data

            entry  help desk  coordinator  at  Hanscom  Air  Force  Base.

            Rogers  then  filed  a  state  action  in  the  Massachusetts

            superior  court against, among  others, Richard  Cavallaro, a

            civil service employee  of the United States Air  Force.  She

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                                          2

            asserted  that following a dispute she had had with Cavallaro

            over  a  parking space,  he  had  defamed her      wrongfully

            telling her  superiors that she had falsified  her time cards

               causing the loss of her job.

                      The  United  States  Attorney,  acting  under   the

            Westfall  Act, certified  that  Cavallaro  had  been  "acting

            within the scope of his  office or employment at the  time of

            the incident  out of which  the claim  arose."1  28  U.S.C.  

            2679(d)(1).    The government  then removed  the case  to the

            federal  district court and  moved that the  United States be

            substituted  for Cavallaro as  the party defendant,  and that

            Cavallaro be  dismissed, under  28 U.S.C.     2679(d)(2)  and

            (b)(1).  

                      At  the  same  time,   the  government  also  moved

            separately  for  summary  judgment, arguing  that  since  the

            Westfall  Act provides that a plaintiff's sole remedy against

            a  federal  employee  for "injury  or  loss  of  property, or

            personal  injury or  death  arising  or  resulting  from  the

            negligent or wrongful act or  omission of any employee of the

            Government while  acting within  the scope  of his  office or

            employment," 28 U.S.C.    2679(b)(1), is  a suit against  the

            United States  under the Federal  Tort Claims Act,  and since

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Although the statute designates the Attorney General as
            the person who makes the scope decision, the Attorney General
            has delegated this authority to the United States Attorneys. 
            See 28 C.F.R.   15.3(a).
            ___

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                                          3

            the Federal Tort  Claims Act provides no waiver  of sovereign

            immunity for the  types of claims asserted by  Rogers, see 28
                                                                   ___

            U.S.C.   2680(h), Rogers had no remedy.

                      The case  was assigned initially  to United  States

            District   Judge  Harrington.    On  April  29,  1994,  Judge

            Harrington  ordered   both  parties   to  submit   affidavits

            "delineating  the   duties  and  responsibilities   of  their

            employment . . . ."   Whether because it was  never received,

            as the government  now contends,  or for  some other  reason,

            neither  party  filed  affidavits  in  compliance  with  this

            order.2

                      On May 16, 1994, the case was reassigned to  United

            States District Judge Gertner.   On September 16, 1994, Judge

            Gertner  held a  hearing  on  the  government's  motions  for

            substitution  of the  United States  as  party defendant  and

            dismissal  of  Cavallaro  and  for summary  judgment  against

            Rogers  in her  defamation action.   On  May 30,  1996, Judge

            Gertner   denied   all  the   government's   motions,  citing

            Cavallaro's failure to  file an affidavit in  compliance with

            the April  29, 1994 order and a  lack of basis for concluding

            that Cavallaro was acting within the scope of his employment.

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Rogers submitted an affidavit on May 2, 1994 that did not
            address the "duties and responsibilities" of either her
            employment or Cavallaro's.  Rogers says she filed this
            affidavit in support of her opposition to the government's
            summary judgment motion, and not in response to Judge
            Harrington's order.

                                         -4-
                                          4

            Judge   Gertner  then   remanded  the   case   back  to   the

            Massachusetts   state    court.       Without   moving    for

            reconsideration, the government filed this appeal.3

                        II.  Review of the Scope Certification
                        ______________________________________

                      The   Westfall   Act   states   that   the    scope

            certification  by  the  Attorney General      that  a federal

            employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment

            when committing the alleged  tort from which the claim  arose

                "shall  conclusively   establish  scope   of  office   or

            employment  for purposes of removal."  28 U.S.C.   2679(d)(2)
                        _______________________

            (emphasis added).   In Gutierrez de Martinez  v. Lamagno, 115
                                   _____________________     _______

            S. Ct. 2227 (1995), the Supreme Court construed the Act so as

            to allow  district courts  to review  the Attorney  General's

            scope certificate relative  to the matter of  substitution of

            the United States as a party defendant.  The Court wrote:

                      Congress spoke in discrete sentences in  
                      2679(d)(2)  first  of  removal,  then  of
                      substitution.   Next,  Congress made  the

                                
            ____________________

            3.  The government says that it did not file a motion for
            reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 because it "did not
            become aware of the district court's orders denying the
            United States' motion for substitution and remanding the case
            to state court until a few days before the deadline for
            filing a notice of appeal . . . ."  Given the government's
            complaint that it was not notified of Judge Harrington's
            order to file affidavits, it would have been sensible to
            bring this matter to the district court's attention.  The
            government's excuse that it did not learn of Judge Gertner's
            order rejecting its motion until shortly before the
            expiration of the time to appeal is not persuasive.  It could
            have filed its notice of appeal first and then asked the
            district court to reconsider its order.  See Puerto Rico v.
                                                     ___ ___________
            The SS Zoe Colocotroni, 601 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1979).
            ______________________

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                                          5

                      Attorney General's certificate conclusive
                      solely  for  purposes   of  removal,  and
                      notably not for purposes of substitution.
                      It  follows   . . . that  the   scope-of-
                      employment   judgment   determinative  of
                      substitution can  and properly  should be
                      checked by the  court, i.e., the Attorney
                                             ____
                      General's      scarcely     disinterested
                      certification  on   that  matter   is  by
                      statute made the first, but not the final
                      word.

            Id. at 2235. 
            ___

                      Gutierrez did  not speak to the question of who has
                      _________

            the burden  of proof on the scope  issue, but our language in

            Nasuti v. Scannell,  906 F.2d 802 (1st Cir.  1990), indicates
            ______    ________

            clearly  that  in  situations  such  as  this  one,  where  a

            plaintiff asserts that a defendant acted outside the scope of

            his  or  her  employment   despite  the  Attorney   General's

            certification to the contrary, the  burden of proof is on the

            plaintiff.  We wrote:

                      The Attorney General  can see  to it,  by
                      making   the   certification,   that  the
                      federal  defendant's   scope  status   is
                      resolved  by  a   federal,  not  a  state
                      tribunal; employee immunity  will thus be
                      protected, in  keeping with  the Westfall
                      Act's purpose, except where the plaintiff
                                     __________________________
                      can  convince  a federal  court  that the
                      _______________________________
                      government  employee  was  acting outside
                      the   scope   of  his   employment   and,
                      therefore,   by   definition,   was   not
                      entitled   to   immunity   from  personal
                      liability.

            Id. at 813 n.16 (emphasis added).  See also Aversa v.  United
            ___                                ________ ______     ______

            States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209 (1st Cir. 1996).
            ______

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                                          6

                      Neither the Supreme Court nor our own en banc court

            has  said anything  to undermine  the  panel's conclusion  in

            Nasuti that the plaintiff has  the burden of proof in respect
            ______

            to  overturning the  Attorney General's  scope certification.

            The  holding therefore remains binding in  this circuit.  See
                                                                      ___

            Institut  Pasteur v. Cambridge  Biotech Corp., 104  F.3d 489,
            _________________    ________________________

            493 n.8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, No. 96-1698, 1997 WL 219862
                                ____________

            (U.S.  June 27, 1997);  Williams v. Ashland  Engineering Co.,
                                    ________    _________________________

            Inc., 45  F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
            ____                                 ____________

            51 (1995).          Here,  the district  court explained  its

            reasons for  overturning the  scope certification,  rejecting

            the government's motions,  and remanding to the  state court,

            solely as follows:

                      On April  29, 1994, this court  issued an
                      order  requiring  defendant  Cavallaro to
                      submit  an   affidavit  delineating   his
                      duties and responsibilities  with the Air
                      Force.   No such affidavit  was received.
                      This  Court  therefore has  no  basis for
                      concluding  that  Cavallaro   was  acting
                      within the  scope of his  employment when
                      he made the allegedly defamatory remarks.

                      The district court's  language    that  without the

            government's  affidavit it had  no basis for  concluding that

            Cavallaro was acting  within the scope  of his employment    

            ignored the  Attorney General's existing  scope certification

            and  improperly placed  upon  the  defendant  the  burden  of

            establishing anew that  he had acted within the  scope of his

            federal employment.

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                                          7

                      In Nasuti, as the government points out, this court
                         ______

            further held that it is  illegal for the district court, when
                                     _______

            confronted with an outstanding scope certification, to remand

            to the state court unless  it makes "an express determination

            of   its  own  that  defendant,  when  he  allegedly  injured

            plaintiff,  was  acting  beyond  the  scope  of  his  federal

            employment."   Nasuti, 906 F.2d  at 808.  The  district court
                           ______

            made  no  such  express scope  determination  here,  pointing

            instead merely  to Cavallaro's  failure to  have produced  an

            affidavit    delineating   his    Air   Force    duties   and

            responsibilities.    It  is  far  from  clear  that  such  an

            affidavit would have  resolved the scope  issue as framed  by

            Rogers,  namely,  that  Cavallaro was  motivated  by personal

            animosity stemming from a parking space dispute when  he told

            Plaintiff's  superiors  that  she   had  falsified  her  time

            records.  In any case,  the district court's reference to the

            missing  affidavit  delineating duties  and  responsibilities

            fell   short  of   Nasuti's   requirement  that   the   court
                               ______

            affirmatively make an  express determination of its  own that

            Defendant was acting beyond the  scope of his employment when

            he injured the plaintiff.

                      We   do  not  say,  of  course,  that  the  express

            determination of scope  called for in Nasuti may  not be made
                                                  ______

            in  the  context  of  a  summary  judgment  type  proceeding,

            assuming there  is  no issue  of disputed  fact requiring  an

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                                          8

            evidentiary  hearing.   But Rogers  never  moved for  summary

            judgment on the scope issue.  Nor did the district court ever

            determine  on the  basis of uncontested  facts in  the record

            that Cavallaro  had acted  outside the  scope of  his federal

            employment.

                      This  is not a situation  where it might be thought

            that  the district court had validly granted summary judgment

            to a non-requesting party.  See National Expositions, Inc. v.
                                        ___ __________________________

            Crowley Maritime Corp.,  824 F.2d  131, 133  (1st Cir.  1987)
            ______________________

            ("[A] district court  has the legal power to  render 'summary

            judgment  . . . in favor'  of the  party  opposing a  summary

            judgment  motion 'even  though he has  made no  formal cross-

            motion under rule 56.'") (quoting  10A C. Wright, A. Miller &

            M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure   2720, at 29-30 (1st
                     ______________________________

            ed.  1983)).  The major limitation on this rule is that "'the

            losing party' must be 'on notice that she had to come forward

            with all  of her evidence.'"   Id. (quoting Celotex  Corp. v.
                                           ___          ______________

            Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).   In order to be  "on notice,"
            _______

            the original movant  must have "'had an  adequate opportunity
                                                 ________________________

            to show  that there is a genuine  issue and that his opponent

            is  not entitled  to judgment  as  a matter  of  law.'"   Id.
                                                                      ___

            (quoting 10A C. Wright,  A. Miller & M. Kane, supra,    2720,
                                                          _____

            at 34) (emphasis added by cited case). 

                      Here it cannot be said that Cavallaro understood he

            was on notice that he  had to produce all his scope  evidence

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                                          9

            or else face  summary judgment against him.   It is true that

            he  was ordered  by Judge  Harrington  to produce  affidavits

            delineating  his duties and  responsibilities.  But  even had

            Cavallaro  complied,   such  an  affidavit   would  not  have

            addressed  Rogers'  argument  that  Cavallaro's  conduct  was

            outside the scope of his  federal duties because it was based

            on personal spite.  Rogers  herself, in her opposition to the

            government's  summary  judgment  motion,  stated,  "There  is

            insufficient  evidence in the record presently, for the court

            to make [the  scope] determination."  Rogers argued  that she

            needed to take three depositions before enough evidence would

            exist.   In these confusing circumstances, we  do not believe

            the defendants were  on notice they had to  come forward with

            all their  evidence on scope,  on peril of  suffering summary

            judgment on that issue in favor of the non-moving plaintiff.

                      Indeed, although we  need not decide the  point, it

            seems  unclear  whether  the  facts  stated   in  Cavallaro's

            affidavit (treating them, arguendo,  as uncontested) provided

            a  sufficient   basis  for   a   scope  determination   under

            Massachusetts  law against Cavallaro and the government.  See
                                                                      ___

            Wang  Laboratories, Inc.  v. Business  Incentives, Inc.,  501
            ________________________     __________________________

            N.E.2d   1163,  1166  (Mass.   1986)  ("The  fact   that  the

            predominant motive  of the agent  is to benefit  himself does

            not  prevent  the   act  from  coming  within  the  scope  of

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                                          10

            employment as long as the act is otherwise within the purview

            of his authority.").  

                      We hold, therefore, that the district  court lacked

            an adequate basis in the present record and on the procedures

            conducted to date for awarding  a judgment on the scope issue

            in Plaintiff's favor.

                      Nor  can the district  court's ruling be  upheld as

            tantamount  to  the  entry  of  a  default  judgment  against

            Cavallaro  and the government designed to discipline them for

            their   failure  to  file  the  affidavit  ordered  by  Judge

            Harrington.    The  court's  order  denying  the government's

            motions for  dismissal of Cavallaro as a  party defendant and

            for  substitution of  the  United  States,  and  for  summary

            judgment, does  not contain either  the word  "default" or  a

            citation  to  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P. 55,  which  sets  forth  the

            procedure for issuing  a judgment by default.4   Nor was that

            procedure  followed.    Rogers did  not  move  for  a default

            judgment;  written  notice  of  an  application  for  default

            judgment  was not  served; and  no  hearing was  held on  the

            matter of a default judgment.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
                                           ___

                                
            ____________________

            4.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) states, in relevant part:

               [T]he party entitled to a judgment by default shall
               apply to the court therefor . . . .  If the party
               against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared
               in the action, the party . . . shall be served with
               written notice of the application for judgment at least
               3 days prior to the hearing on such application.

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                                          11

                      Rogers argues  that we lack jurisdiction  to review

            the district court's remand order through a writ of mandamus.

            Just as  in Nasuti, however, the district  court's failure to
                        ______

            make an express finding that Cavallaro was acting outside the

            scope of  his employment  left the  Attorney General's  scope

            certification intact.  As we wrote:

                      [S]o  long  as   the  Attorney  General's
                      certificate  is validly  in effect,  [the
                      defendant] must  be deemed  conclusively,
                      for removal purposes, to have been acting
                      within the scope  of his employment,  and
                                                            ___
                      is thus absolutely immune from any  civil
                      _________________________________________
                      action or  proceeding for  money damages.
                      ________________________________________
                      The   district   court's   current  order
                      remanding   to   the  state   court   is,
                      therefore,  totally  unauthorized,  being
                      contrary to  Congress's mandate  that the
                      Attorney General's scope certification be
                      conclusive.

            Nasuti,  906 F.2d at 809-10 (footnote omitted).  Accordingly,
            ______

            mandamus is  appropriate in  this case as  it was  in Nasuti.
                                                                  ______

            "At least where, as here, remand was  on grounds inextricably

            mixed  with the  scope of  employment issue, and  was plainly

            barred by  the scope  certification, we  believe mandamus  is

            appropriate . . . ."  Id. at 812 n.15.5
                                  ___

                                
            ____________________

            5.  The district court's order may also be reviewable on
            direct appeal.  See Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 812 n.15; Flohr v.
                            ___ ______                        _____
            Mackovjak, 84 F.3d 386, 389 (11th Cir. 1996); Kimbro v.
            _________                                     ______
            Velten, 30 F.3d 1501, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
            ______                                       ____________
            115 S. Ct. 2584 (1995); Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 233
                                    _______    _____
            (4th cir. 1994); Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350, 1353 (3d
                             ______    ______
            Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 817 (1993); Mitchell v.
                   ____________                       ________
            Carlson, 896 F.2d 128, 132-33 (5th Cir. 1990).
            _______

                                         -12-
                                          12

                      We  therefore  vacate  the district  court's  order

            denying the government's motions for substitution and summary

            judgment and remanding the case to state court.  We remand to

            the district court for an express determination as to whether

            Cavallaro was acting  within the scope of his  duties when he

            allegedly  injured Rogers.   Just  as in  Nasuti, "As  we are
                                                      ______

            confident that the district court and the parties will comply

            with our orders  in this regard, we  see no need to  issue an

            actual writ of mandamus at this time."  Id. at 814.
                                                    ___

                      Vacated and remanded.
                      ____________________

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