Court Opinion

ID: 9404443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 05:06:51.567897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:14.041696
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                       UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       June 22, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                      No. 363252
                                                                       Ionia Circuit Court
RAVONN MARQUISE REYNOLDS,                                              LC No. 2021-018254-FC

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MURRAY and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       The prosecution appeals as of right the trial court’s order dismissing with prejudice one
count of being a prisoner in possession of a controlled substance (PPCS), MCL 800.281(4).
Because double jeopardy precludes retrial of this offense, we affirm.

                  I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        In September 2020, correctional officers at the Michigan Reformatory received a tip of
possible contraband. The officers conducted a search of defendant’s cell, in which they discovered
a suspected controlled substance hidden within two deodorant stick containers. At trial, Susan
Isley, Controlled Substances Supervisor at the Michigan State Police Crime Laboratory, testified
she tested the substance and confirmed that it contained buprenorphine, a Schedule III controlled
substance. The prosecution made no attempt to qualify Isley as an expert witness, and the defense
did not object to this failure. The trial court also entered, without objection, Isley’s lab report with
her opinion that the seized contraband was buprenorphine. After the prosecution rested, the trial
court noted the prosecution’s failure to offer an expert witness, concluding Isley’s testimony
amounted to “lay opinion” testimony. It ordered a dismissal with prejudice because the jury could
not convict defendant of the charged offense without expert testimony identifying the substance at
issue. This appeal followed.

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                                    II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY

        The prosecution argues the trial court’s dismissal was a mistrial, and therefore, the charge
against defendant should be reinstated. Defendant contends double jeopardy bars retrial because
the dismissal with prejudice amounted to an acquittal. We agree with defendant.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

      The invocation of the double jeopardy clause is a constitutional issue, which we review de
novo. People v Lett, 466 Mich 206, 212; 644 NW2d 743 (2002).

                                   B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

        The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” US Const, Am V; see also Const
1963, art 1, § 15. The prohibition against double jeopardy protects “against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal.” People v Ford, 262 Mich App 443, 447; 687 NW2d 119
(2004). “[A]n acquittal and retrial is impermissible when the judge evaluated the Government’s
evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.” People v Szalma,
487 Mich 708, 721; 790 NW2d 662 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        “However, the general rule permitting the prosecution only one opportunity to obtain a
conviction must in some instances be subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to
end in just judgments.” Lett, 466 Mich at 215 (quotation marks and citations omitted). When a
trial ends prematurely, “a retrial for that offense is prohibited unless the defendant consented to
the interruption or a mistrial was declared because of a manifest necessity.” People v Mehall, 454
Mich 1, 4; 557 NW2d 110 (1997).

        The trial court did not specify whether its dismissal with prejudice was an acquittal or a
mistrial. “Although an acquittal or conviction is considered an adjudication on the merits, a
mistrial is a trial that the judge brings to an end, without a determination on the merits.” People v
Golba, 273 Mich App 603, 614; 729 NW2d 916 (2007) (alterations, quotation marks, and citations
omitted). This Court must “look to the substance of the trial court’s ruling, not its outward form,”
to ascertain the reason a court ended trial. Szalma, 487 Mich at 722.

        In dismissing this case, the trial court referenced the elements of PPCS,1 stating the “heart
of the crime” was whether defendant possessed a controlled substance. To that end, the trial court
stated: “There is nothing on the record—the People have rested now—that I think a jury, a
reasonable jury, could make that leap, if you will, at this point that this is a controlled substance
without that expert testimony.” In other words, the trial court determined there was insufficient
evidence to convict defendant of PPCS. A determination of the sufficiency of the evidence is an

1
 To prove PPCS, the prosecution must show, (1) “that the defendant is, in fact, a ‘prisoner;’ ” and
(2) “that the defendant ‘possessed’ a controlled substance . . . .” People v Ramsdell, 230 Mich
App 386, 392; 585 NW2d 1 (1998).

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adjudication on the merits. See, e.g., Szalma, 487 Mich at 721. Therefore, the trial court’s
dismissal is properly characterized as an acquittal, not a mistrial. As such, double jeopardy
attaches and the prosecution cannot retry this offense.2

       Having concluded retrial is barred by double jeopardy, we need not consider the
prosecution’s remaining arguments.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola

2
  We note the prosecution takes issue with the trial court raising its concern, sua sponte, about Ms.
Isley’s testimony only after the prosecution rested its case. The trial court explained that it was
exercising its gatekeeping role to “prevent error in trials.” While we agree that trial courts serve
an important gatekeeping role regarding the admissibility of evidence, we are perplexed why the
trial court did not serve this function during Ms. Isley’s testimony. It is likewise unclear why the
trial court would admit a lab report containing expert opinions that it would later conclude could
not be considered as evidence by the jury.

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