Court Opinion

ID: 9527884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:35:21.215696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:16.089656
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the position taken by my colleagues in rendering this decision. A cardinal principle of statutory construction is that repeal by implication is not favored. (United States v. Borden Co. (1939), 308 U.S. 188, 84 L. Ed. 181, 60 S. Ct. 182.) Additionally, a repeal of a statute by implication will not be found unless the legislature clearly intended to do so. People v. Moffitt (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 106, 485 N.E.2d 513. The language of section 11 — 610(a) prior to the adoption of the amending language specifically stated that the section was to pertain to the “failure to observe an applicable speed limit.” (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 95½, par. 11— 610(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970).) Other than bringing section 11— 610(a) into complete conformance with section 11 — 807 of the Uniform Vehicle Code and Model Traffic Ordinance, I am unable to discern any particular purpose to the adoption of the new language. If we are to interpret section 11 — 610(a) strictly, as the majority suggests, then we violate that cardinal rule of construction and effectively repeal the offense enumerated in section 11 — 601(a). This section, by its very language, is not susceptible of an objective determination as is the violation of a specific speed-limit statute. To require that such a violation be stated in specific terms eliminates its purpose and such an intent can not be attributed to the legislature. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold that the charge stated an offense with sufficient specificity.