Court Opinion

ID: 9387588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 15:06:37.796425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.652690
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthony Miller,                                 :
                              Appellant         :
                                                :
              v.                                : No. 274 C.D. 2022
                                                : Argued: March 6, 2023
Craig Coulter, Badge # 9208                     :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
               HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE                                             FILED: April 18, 2023

       Anthony Miller (Miller) appeals from the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County’s (trial court) order denying his petition for relief from a
judgment of non pros,1 which the trial court entered following his failure to appear
at an arbitration hearing. On appeal, Miller argues2 the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his petition because he had two legitimate excuses for not
attending the arbitration hearing: (1) the trial court previously entered an order
removing his case from compulsory arbitration and (2) the arbitration program did
not have jurisdiction to hear his case. Miller also argues the trial court’s judgment

1
  Non pros is an abbreviation for non prosequitur, which Black’s Law Dictionary indicates is
Latin for “he does not prosecute,” and defines as a “judgment rendered against a plaintiff who has
not pursued the case.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1269 (11th ed. 2019).
2
  We have reframed and reorganized Miller’s issues on appeal for clarity and ease of analysis.
of non pros violated his constitutional and statutory rights to a jury trial. Upon
review, we affirm.
                                       I.     Background
        On October 27, 2019, Miller filed a civil complaint in the trial court against
Craig Coulter (Coulter). Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 6. In his complaint, Miller
alleged Coulter, acting in his official capacity as a detective for the Philadelphia
Police Department, detained Miller in the process of executing an arrest warrant for
another individual who was in Miller’s rental car at the time. Id. at 10. Thereafter,
Miller alleges Coulter falsely arrested, assaulted, and battered him, in addition to
depriving Miller of a legally purchased firearm and his rental car.3 Id. at 10-14.

3
    The relevant factual allegations from Miller’s complaint are as follows:
        5. At around 2:30 PM on March 23, 2018, Plaintiff and his cousin, . . . were sitting
        inside of Plaintiff’s rental car, parked in front of [Plaintiff’s cousin’s] house [in
        Philadelphia].
        6. [Plaintiff’s cousin] had an active arrest warrant for carjacking.
        7. As Plaintiff and [his cousin] were sitting in the rental car, [Philadelphia Police
        Department (PPD)] officers arrived at the scene, seeking to execute the arrest
        warrant for [Plaintiff’s cousin].
        8. Upon noticing [Plaintiff’s cousin] sitting in Plaintiff’s passenger seat, PPD
        officers, including and at the direction of Defendant Coulter, took [Plaintiff’s
        cousin] into custody under the authority of the arrest warrant.
        9. At the direction of Defendant Coulter, PPD officers detained and searched
        Plaintiff and his vehicle based solely upon his close proximity to [his cousin].
        10. Upon searching Plaintiff’s person and vehicle, officers discovered Plaintiff’s
        firearm that was stored in the vehicle. Plaintiff had a valid license to carry the
        firearm issued by PPD.
        11. Defendant Coulter seized Plaintiff’s rental vehicle and his legally possessed
        firearm.
        12. Although Plaintiff did not commit any crime, and there was no evidence that he
        was ever involved in any criminal activity, Defendant Coulter had Plaintiff arrested
        and thoroughly searched for allegedly participating in the robbery that provided the
        basis for [his cousin]’s arrest warrant.
        13. Plaintiff was then taken to PPD’s 35th District stationhouse where Defendant
        Coulter interrogated him and lectured him about “hanging out” with [his cousin].
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  2
Miller did not allege that he suffered any physical injuries during this incident. See
id. at 8-10. Nevertheless, he sought damages “in an amount in excess of Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($50,000) plus interest and the cost of suit, and such other further
relief as is just and proper.” Id. at 12-14.
       On February 6, 2020, after the conclusion of an initial case management
conference, trial court Judge Daniel Anders (Judge Anders) issued a Case
Management Order, which set forth various procedural deadlines and a date by
which he expected the case to be ready for trial. R.R. at 16-17. By order entered
February 28, 2020, however, Judge Anders, “having determined that the amount in
controversy is below the mandatory arbitrations limits,” referred the case to
arbitration pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1021(d).4 Id. at 18.
       On March 2, 2020, Miller filed a motion requesting the case be removed from
compulsory arbitration and placed back on the jury trial list. R.R. at 3, 17-19. In his
motion, Miller alleged that “[t]he sole basis” for Judge Anders’ decision to refer the
case to arbitration was Coulter’s “preference for the more defense friendly
arbitration forum,” and that the trial court considered “no evidence, no law, no

        14. Defendant Coulter did not release Plaintiff from the 35th District until more
        than eight hours from the time that he was initially detained.
        15. However, Defendant Coulter never returned Plaintiff’s firearm. Additionally,
        Defendant kept Plaintiff’s rental car for approximately two months which resulted
        in Plaintiff incurring $3,000 in fees owed to the rental car agency.
        16. As a result of Plaintiff’s arrest, PPD revoked his license to carry a firearm on
        May 25, 2018.
        17. As a result of Defendant Coulter’s actions, Plaintiff has suffered severe
        emotional distress, [been] deprived of his personal property, and suffered monetary
        loss.
R.R. at 10-12.
4
   “The court on its own motion or motion of any party may by discovery, pre-trial conference,
hearing or otherwise, determine the amount actually in controversy and enter an order of reference
to arbitration.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1021(d).

                                                3
argument, [and] no briefing . . . .” Id. at 22. As a result, Miller alleged Judge Anders’
decision violated his constitutional and statutory right to a jury trial. Id. The trial
court assigned Miller’s motion to Judge Paula Patrick. Id. at 3.
      An order signed by Judge Anders, which scheduled an arbitration hearing in
this matter, was docketed at 12:13 p.m. on June 8, 2020. R.R. at 3. An order signed
by Judge Patrick, which was dated June 4, 2020, was subsequently docketed at 3:31
p.m. on June 8, 2020. Id. Judge Patrick’s order granted Miller’s motion to remove
his case from mandatory arbitration and reinstated the previous scheduling order.
Id. Nevertheless, by order entered November 4, 2021, Judge Anders rescheduled an
arbitration hearing in this matter for January 20, 2022. Id.; Trial Ct. Op., 5/26/22, at
2.
      Despite receiving notice, Miller did not appear at the arbitration hearing.
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1303(b)(2) and Philadelphia
County Local Rule 1303(a), the board of arbitrators transferred the case “to the major
non-jury program with the consent of all parties present to be heard before a judge
of the [trial court] . . . .” See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1303(b)(2); Phila.Civ.R. *1303(a); Trial
Ct. Op., 5/26/22, at 2. The trial court then entered a judgment of non pros against
Miller for his failure to appear at the scheduled arbitration hearing. Id.
      On January 25, 2022, Miller filed a petition for relief from the trial court’s
judgment of non pros pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3051,
Pa.R.Civ.P. 3051. R.R. at 4-5, 31. In addition to the arguments Miller asserted in
his motion to have the case removed from arbitration, Miller alleged Judge Anders
“intentionally misplaced” the case “into compulsory arbitration as a result of
personal bias and animosity towards black litigants.” Id. at 33. Miller also noted
that Judge Patrick had already removed the case from arbitration, yet Judge Anders

                                           4
ignored that order. R.R. at 33. On March 21, 2022, trial court Judge Abbe Fletman
denied Miller’s petition for relief from judgment of non pros. Id. at 5. Miller timely
appealed to this Court.
                                    II.    Analysis
      In reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a petition to open or strike a
judgment of non pros, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 279 (Pa. 2006)
(citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment. . . .
Rather, discretion is abused only ‘if in reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden
or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence of record.’”
Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v. Plymouth Twp., 572 A.2d 814, 817 n.1 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1990) (citation omitted). Thus, we will only overturn a trial court’s
decision to deny a petition to open or strike a judgment of non pros if it “reflects
manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of
support as to be clearly erroneous.” Womer, 908 A.2d at 279.
      When a board of arbitrators “is convened for hearing, if one or more parties
is not ready the case shall proceed and the arbitrators shall make an award unless the
court (1) orders a continuance, or (2) hears the matter if the notice of hearing contains
the statement required by subdivision (a)(2) and all parties present consent.”
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1303(b). Philadelphia County Local Rules also provide that “if one or
more parties is not present at the [arbitration] hearing, the matter may be heard at the
same time and date before a judge of the court without the absent party or parties.”
Phila.Civ.R. *1303. When that occurs, the trial court may “take action not available

                                           5
to the arbitrators, including the entry of a nonsuit if the plaintiff is not ready or a non
pros if neither party is ready.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1303(b) cmt.
       Once a trial court enters a judgment of non pros, a plaintiff may petition the
trial court for relief from the judgment of non pros pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 3051. “A request to open a judgment of non pros, like the opening
of a default judgment, is in the nature of an appeal to the equitable powers of the
court.” Madrid v. Alpine Mountain Corp., 24 A.3d 380, 382 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted). Rule 3051 establishes the requirements for obtaining relief from
a judgment of non pros as follows:

       (a) Relief from a judgment of non pros shall be sought by petition. All
       grounds for relief, whether to strike off the judgment or to open it, must
       be asserted in a single petition.

       (b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), if the relief sought includes
       the opening of the judgment, the petition shall allege facts showing that

              (1) the petition is timely filed,

              (2) there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse for the
              conduct that gave rise to the entry of judgment of non pros, and

              (3) there is a meritorious cause of action.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 3051. “Any appeal related to a judgment of non pros lies not from the
judgment itself, but from the denial of a petition to open or strike.” Madrid, 24 A.3d
at 382.
       The trial court denied Miller’s petition for relief from a judgment of non pros
because it determined he did not provide a reasonable explanation or legitimate
excuse for failing to appear at his arbitration hearing. Trial Ct. Op., 5/26/22, at 7-8.
The trial court noted in its written opinion that Miller’s lawyer sent an email to
Coulter’s lawyer wherein he

                                             6
       referred to arbitration as a ‘cat scratch pile’ and stated that he ‘would
       kill [himself] before [he] did arbitration.’ (Answer to Petition, Exhibit
       A, Dkt. At 2/4/22 ¶¶ 2, 14). In that correspondence, [Miller’s lawyer]
       also wrote, ‘We will get our trial date after we intentionally fail to show
       up for that stupid ass arbitration ‘scheme’ next month. That is why I
       am not filing any more motions about it. Only an idiot would put these
       cases in arbitration.’ (Id. at ¶ 16). [Miller’s lawyer] further asserted,
       ‘Plaintiffs do not have to show up to arbitration because the arbitration
       court has no jurisdiction over their cases that seek more than $50K. So,
       no matter what, we would not show up to arbitration.’ (Id. at ¶ 5).

Trial Ct. Op., 5/26/22, at 3. Miller’s lawyer did not deny making any of these
comments in this appeal, rather he defended making them, as follows:

       Second, it is true that the undersigned said, in an email to Detective
       Coulter’s counsel, “We will get our trial date after we intentionally fail
       to show up for that stupid ass arbitration ‘scheme’ next month.”
       Counsel is well within his rights to express righteous indignation [5] in
       the face of manifest injustice, and he should not be punished for his
       protected speech. U.S. Const. amend. I. Coulter’s argument should be
       rejected to the extent that it implies that Mr. Miller’s rights should be
       denied because he has a negative view of the arbitration program’s
       appropriateness for this case. Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819,
       829-830 (1995)(observing that viewpoint discrimination violates the
       First Amendment).

Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6-7.
       We begin by analyzing Miller’s argument that he was excused from attending
his scheduled arbitration hearing because the trial court previously entered an order
removing this case from arbitration and placing it back on the trial list. See
Appellant’s Br. at 16-17. Miller notes that Judge Patrick entered an order which

5
   As our Superior Court aptly set forth in Hall v. Reeb, 555 A.2d 926, 928 (Pa. Super. 1989),
“[w]e do not, under any circumstances countenance the temerity of any member of the bar who
instructs or encourages a party to intentionally fail to appear at a scheduled arbitration
hearing . . . .” Rather, we exhort all members of the bar to thoroughly research their positions, as
knowledge and understanding can remove the blinders that far too often accompany righteous
indignation.

                                                 7
removed this case from compulsory arbitration and placed it back on the trial list.
Id. Miller also notes that Judge Patrick’s order was never vacated or overruled by
Judge Anders. Id. at 17.
      Judge Anders defends his order scheduling arbitration by citing the coordinate
jurisdiction rule and arguing that Judge Patrick acted improperly in overruling his
earlier decision to transfer this case from the trial list to the compulsory arbitration
program. Trial Ct. Op., 5/26/22, at 5. Miller responds by arguing that he meets an
exception to the coordinate jurisdiction rule. See Appellant’s Br. at 19.
      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the coordinate jurisdiction
rule as follows:

      One of the distinct rules that are encompassed within the “law of the
      case” doctrine is the coordinate jurisdiction rule. Generally, the
      coordinate jurisdiction rule commands that upon transfer of a matter
      between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, a transferee trial judge
      may not alter resolution of a legal question previously decided by a
      transferor trial judge. Commonwealth v. Starr, . . . 664 A.2d 1326, 1331
      ([Pa.] 1995); see also Riccio v. American Republic [Ins.] Co., . . . 705
      A.2d 422, 425 ([Pa.] 1997). More simply stated, judges of coordinate
      jurisdiction should not overrule each other’s decisions. Id.; Okkerse v.
      Howe, . . . 556 A.2d 827, 831 ([Pa.]1989).

      The reason for this respect for an equal tribunal’s decision, as explained
      by our court, is that the coordinate jurisdiction rule is “based on a policy
      of fostering the finality of pre-trial applications in an effort to maintain
      judicial economy and efficiency.” Starr, 664 A.2d at 1331.
      Furthermore, consistent with the law of the case doctrine, the
      coordinate jurisdiction rule serves to protect the expectations of the
      parties, to insure uniformity of decisions, to maintain consistency in
      proceedings, to effectuate the administration of justice, and to bring
      finality to the litigation. Id.

      This general prohibition against revisiting the prior holding of a judge
      of coordinate jurisdiction, however, is not absolute. Departure from the
      rule is allowed in “exceptional circumstances” when there has been a
      change in the controlling law or where there was a substantial change

                                           8
      in the facts or evidence. Id. at 1332. Of import for this appeal, an
      exception is permitted where “the prior holding was clearly erroneous
      and would create a manifest injustice if followed.” Id. The purpose for
      this limited exception is largely self-evident. To accede to a coordinate
      judge’s order that is clearly erroneous would be not only to permit an
      inequity to work on the party subject to the order, but would allow an
      action to proceed in the face of almost certain reversal on appellate
      review. Moreover, the requirement that the prior holding also
      create a manifest injustice serves as a significant curb on the
      exception so that it would apply to only those situations in which
      adhering to the prior holding would be, in essence, plainly
      intolerable.

      In sum, while a judge must in most circumstances defer to the prior
      decision of another judge of coordinate jurisdiction, he or she is not
      required to do so in the limited and exceptional situation in which, inter
      alia, the prior judge’s order is clearly erroneous and would result in a
      manifest injustice.

Zane v. Friends Hosp., 836 A.2d 25, 29–30 (Pa. 2003) (emphasis added).
      In determining whether the coordinate jurisdiction rule applies, we must
evaluate the procedural context of the litigant’s motion and the trial court’s
conflicting rulings. See Riccio, 705 A.2d at 425. As the Supreme Court has
explained:

      Where the motions differ in kind, as preliminary objections differ from
      motions for judgment on the pleadings, which differ from motions for
      summary judgment, a judge ruling on a later motion is not precluded
      from granting relief although another judge has denied an earlier
      motion. However, a later motion should not be entertained or granted
      when a motion of the same kind has previously been denied, unless
      intervening changes in the facts or the law clearly warrant a new look
      at the question.

Goldey v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 675 A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 1996).
      With these general rules regarding orders of judges of coordinate jurisdictions
in mind, as well as their exceptions, we turn to whether Judge Patrick’s order

                                          9
violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule. Judge Anders determined that the actual
amount in controversy was less than the compulsory arbitration program’s limit of
$50,000 and referred the case to arbitration. Miller immediately filed a motion
requesting the case be removed from arbitration and returned to the trial list. Judge
Patrick, without any intervening changes in the facts or the law, placed the case back
on the trial list. The issue determined by Judge Anders was of the same kind as the
issue subsequently determined by Judge Patrick. Thus, the coordinate jurisdiction
rule would apply and render Judge Patrick’s order invalid unless Judge Anders’
determination “was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if
followed.” Zane, 836 A.2d 29.
       In reviewing Judge Anders’ order, we first note that Judge Patrick did not
make a specific finding that Judge Anders’ determination was clearly erroneous, or
that it created a manifest injustice. See R.R. at 3. Instead, she simply granted
Miller’s motion to remove the case from compulsory arbitration and placed it back
on the trial list. Id.
       In his complaint, Miller essentially alleged that Coulter illegally detained him
for approximately eight hours, illegally searched his vehicle and his person, illegally
seized and retained his firearm and rental vehicle, illegally interrogated him, and
illegally revoked his license to carry a firearm. R.R. at 10-12. Miller claimed he
suffered financial losses in the amount of $3,000 in the form of fees owed to his car
rental company. Id. at 11. Miller did not allege he suffered any physical injuries
during the incident. Id. at 10-12. Based upon these facts, we cannot say that Judge
Anders’ determination that the amount actually in controversy was less than $50,000
was “clearly erroneous” or “plainly intolerable.”        Zane, 836 A.2d at 29-30.
Accordingly, Judge Anders’ determination does not justify an exception to the

                                          10
coordinate jurisdiction rule. See id. at 29-30. Therefore, we must conclude Judge
Patrick’s order violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule.
      Miller’s argument that he was nevertheless excused from attending arbitration
due to Judge Patrick’s order is untenable. We acknowledge that Judge Patrick’s
order could have caused Miller some confusion. We also acknowledge that Judge
Anders did not address Judge Patrick’s order, but instead simply ignored it and
continued to list Miller’s case for arbitration. Nevertheless, Miller does not deny
that he received Judge Anders’ order, which the trial court entered on November 4,
2021, scheduling an arbitration hearing in this matter on January 20, 2022.
      Miller had from early November 2021 to January 20, 2022 to obtain
clarification on the discrepancy between Judge Patrick’s and Judge Anders’ orders.
Rather than doing so, Miller’s attorney defiantly refused to bring the issue before the
trial court, stating in an email to Coulter’s attorney:

      ‘We will get our trial date after we intentionally fail to show up for that
      stupid ass arbitration ‘scheme’ next month. That is why I am not
      filing any more motions about it. Only an idiot would put these cases
      in arbitration.’ . . . ‘Plaintiffs do not have to show up to arbitration
      because the arbitration court has no jurisdiction over their cases that
      seek more than $50K. So, no matter what, we would not show up to
      arbitration.’

Trial Ct. Op., 5/26/22, at 3 (emphasis added and citations omitted). Miller’s attorney
made it abundantly clear that Miller’s excuse for not attending his scheduled
arbitration was not that he was confused by Judge Patrick’s order, nor that he was
relying on Judge Patrick’s order. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Judge Patrick’s order did not provide Miller with a
reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse for failing to appear at arbitration. See
Pa.R.Civ.P. 3015.

                                           11
      This Court recently addressed and rejected the remainder of Miller’s
arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition for relief
from its judgment of non pros in Myers v. Romito (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 275 C.D. 2022,
filed April 18, 2023) (Myers). That case was nearly identical to this matter, including
the fact that the plaintiffs were represented by Miller’s attorney, the defendants
shared the same attorney, the complaints alleged incidents of police misconduct, and
the complaints were filed on the same date and in the same court. In addition, the
conduct that caused the trial court to enter judgments of non pros was identical in
both cases (Miller’s attorney was even e-mailing the defendants’ attorney about his
refusal to attend arbitration in both cases).
      The only significant difference between these cases is that in Myers the trial
court judge who handled the plaintiffs’ motion to remove their case from mandatory
arbitration deferred to Judge Anders’ previous decision and denied the plaintiffs’
request. Since we addressed the unique issues presented in this case by this
procedural difference, we resolve Miller’s remaining, identical arguments by
incorporation and following our decision in Case Number 275 C.D. 2022.
                                  III.   Conclusion
      For the reasons outlined above, as well as for the reasons outlined in this
Court’s memorandum opinion in Myers, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Miller’s petition for relief from a judgment of non pros. Therefore, we
affirm the trial court’s order.

                                                ______________________________
                                                STACY WALLACE, Judge

                                           12
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Anthony Miller,                       :
                        Appellant     :
                                      :
           v.                         : No. 274 C.D. 2022
                                      :
Craig Coulter, Badge # 9208           :

                                    ORDER

     AND NOW, this 18th day of April 2023, the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered in this matter on March 21, 2022, is
AFFIRMED.

                                      ______________________________
                                      STACY WALLACE, Judge