Court Opinion

ID: 9300752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:07:11.255922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:40.561547
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, Circuit Justice.
This controversy has arisen from a difference of opinion as to what was the measure of compensation to which the principal defendant was entitled. The condition of the respective bonds is that the incumbent in the office shall faithfully discharge all his duties as navy agent for the port where he was appointed. A doubt cannot be entertained that the officer, under that condition, was obliged to account for and pay over all public money which came to his hands, except what he was entitled to retain as compensation for his services. The question presented, therefore, cannot be satisfactorily solved, without first ascertaining what sum the incumbent was lawfully entitled to retain as compensation.
Navy agents were first authorized to be appointed by the third section of the act of the 3d of March, 1809; and the same section provides that their compensation shall not in any. instance exceed that allowed to the purveyor of public supplies. 2 Stat. 536; Browne v. U. S. [Case No. 2,036]. They are described in the section authorizing their appointment, not in terms as navy agents, but as agents appointed either for the purpose of making contracts, or for the purchase of supplies, or for the disbursement, in any other manner, of moneys for the use of the navy of the United States. U. S. v. Cutter [Id. 14,-911.] Such agents receive and disburse large sums of money, and they are required by law to make monthly returns, in such form as may be prescribed by the treasury department, of the moneys received and expended during the preceding month, and of the un-expended balance in their hands. 2 Stat. 536. Their term of office is for four years, removable at pleasure; and such appointments are required to be submitted to the senate for confirmation. 3 Stat. 582; 5 Stat. 703. The provision for their compensation as originally enacted, remained unchanged until the 3d of March, 1855, when the act was passed which gives rise to the present controversy. 10 Stat. 676. An express provision is made by that act, that in lieu of $2,000 per annum, the maximum compensation now allowed by law to navy agents, there shall be allowed two per centum commission on the first $100,000, or under, dis*528bursed by them, and one per centum on every succeeding $100,000 disbursed by them, until the compensation reaches $3,000 per annum, which amount shall be the maximum compensation for such agents. Certain provisos are also annexed to the section, which it is not important to notice at the present time. Statutory regulations can hardly be clearer or more explicit than is the language of the section upon the subject under consideration. The compensation of the officers named cannot exceed the sum of $3,000 for the services of one year. Attention to the language employed will show, that the maximum is in terms based on the period of one year, and in point of fact upon nothing else, because, let the amount be ever so great, the compensation of the officer cannot exceed the yearly sum of $3,000. The amount disbursed does not determine the maximum, but only the proportion of the maximum to which the officer is entitled, as is evident from the fact that the excess of one year cannot aid the deficiency of another. The maximum compensation is fixed by law at $3,000 per an-num,.. and the reference undoubtedly is to the calendar year, as is obvious from the fact that the allowance of the per centum, that is, the one per centum or two per centum, as the case may be, is continued until the compensation reaches the sum of $3,000. The compensation per annum,-therefore, is the rule of decision, and not per quarter, nor for any other legal subdivision of the year. Yearly disbursements, as ascertained by the monthly accounts, furnish the means of computing the yearly compensation of the officer, and of determining what proportion of the maximum he is entitled to receive for that period of time, subject to two important limitations prescribed by law; that is to say, that the compensation cannot exceed $3,000, and, that the act prescribing the maximum shall not be so construed as to reduce the salary to which any navy agent was entitled under previous laws.
The time of service and the amount disbursed, are the data for computing the amount of the compensation for any fractional portion of the year, because the maximum being based on an entire calendar year, the proportion of it due to the officer, if earned, can only be determined by ascertaining the proportion of the year which has elapsed. Where officers of the United States, entitled to a yearly compensation are superseded within the year, the general rule is that they are entitled to a pro rata compensation. Reference is made by the defendants to the case of U. S. v. Dickson, 15 Ret. [40 U. S.] 141, where a different rule was applied, but in the judgment of this court, the rule there prescribed is not applicable in this case.. Hoyt v. U. S., 10 How. [51 U. S.] 143. The contrary rule is the correct one in the settlement of accounts with collectors and all other revenue officers, and with ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary, and perhaps, at the present day, with all other- persons holding office under the federal government. 9 Stat. 3; 11 Stat. 52. The act of the 11th of February, 1S46, provides that collectors and all other officers of the customs, serving for a less period than one year, shall not be paid for the entire year, but shall be allowed in no case more than a pro rata of the maximum compensation of said officers respectively, for the time only which they actually serve as such collectors or other officers, whether the same be under one or more appointments, or before or after confirmation. A special reference is also made by the defendants to the case of U. S. v. Pearce [Case No. 16,-021]; but it is a sufficient answer to that case, to say that the act of congress first referred to, passed since the date of that decision, establishes a different rule.
The conclusion, therefore, upon this branch of the case, is that the accounts of the principal defendant, so far as respects the balance of $1,123.60, reported to be due, and which on the 30th of August, 1861, he was directed to deposit to the credit of the treasury, were correctly adjusted by the accounting officers of the department, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover for that amount, together with interest on the same from the date of settlement
The second proposition of the plaintiffs is that the principal defendant having refused to deposit the balance reported to be due, as directed by the proper officer of the department they, the plaintiffs, were authorized to recharge the whole amount of the commissions previously allowed to him during the whole period of his service in that office. The claim is based upon the first section of the act of the 3d of March, 1797, which in effect provides that when a person accountable for public money shall neglect or refuse to pay into the treasury the sum or balance reported to be due, upon the adjustment of his account, it shall be the duty of the comptroller to institute suit for the recovery of the same, adding to the sum stated to be due, the commissions of the delinquent; and the act declares that the same shall be forfeited in every instance where suit is commenced and judgment is obtained thereon. 1 Stat. 512. But the proposition cannot be sustained, because the whole amount recharged had been lawfully and conclusively adjusted and allowed to the defendant. The “commissions of the delinquent” are only such as are pending, and are not such as have been paid to the officer, under a final adjustment of his accounts. Where suit is commenced under the circumstances described in the provision, all un*529settled and pending commissions are to be adjudged forfeited in ease judgment is obtained in favor of the United States. Addition may be made to the sum reported to- be due of the unsettled commissions in the hands of the delinquent, but it -is- not the purpose of the act to reopen accounts fairly and conclusively adjusted and settled. Instances may be found where the same person has- held a particular office for forty years, and if the proposition be correct, a dispute in the settlement of his account for the last quarter of the fortieth year would open the accounts for the entire period he held the office. Such a construction of the act of congress cannot be adopted, and the proposition is accordingly overruled. Referring to the agreed statement, it will be seen that the whole amount reported to be due from the principal defendant accrued under the bond declared on in the second suit. The plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in the second suit, but in the first suit judgment must be entered for the defendants. Costs are allowed in the second suit but the United States are never liable to costs.