Court Opinion

ID: 9609190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:23:43.851379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:20.083751
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
dissenting:
I disagree with the majority on the issue of the admissibility of the “other crime” evidence under the common scheme or plan exception.
Although the appellant was on trial for a robbery which occurred in Creek County, extensive evidence of a Tulsa County robbery was introduced under 12 O.S.1981, § 2404(B). The trial court ruled that this testimony was admissible to prove identity and common scheme or plan. The trial court’s ruling limited its admissibility, holding that the “other crime” evidence was only allowed to the extent required to secure admission of a gun and mask allegedly used in both robberies. However, the trial court allowed five witnesses to testify about the Tulsa County robbery after the gun and mask had been admitted into evidence.
The majority upholds the ruling of the trial court, stating that such evidence falls within the common scheme or plan exception. This Court has repeatedly stated that there must be a visible connection between the crime on trial and the other crime. Roubideaux v. State, 707 P.2d 35, 37 (Okl.Cr.1985); Atnip v. State, 564 P.2d 660, 663 (Okl.Cr.1977); Roulston v. State, 307 P.2d 861, 868 (Okl.Cr.1957). A common scheme can be shown by a method of operation so distinctive as to demonstrate a common plan. As stated by this Court in Atnip v. State, supra, at 663:
*745“Common” implies that although there may be various crimes, all said crimes must come under one plan or scheme whereby the facts of one crime tend to establish the other such as where the commission of one crime depends upon or facilitates the commission of the other crime, or where each crime is merely a part of a greater overall plan.
If there is no distinct and visible connection, the evidence is not admissible under the common scheme exception.
In the instant case, both the Tulsa and Creek County incidents involved convenience store robberies perpetrated by masked individuals carrying guns. Here the similarity ends. The robberies occurred in two different counties almost two weeks apart. Apparently, the number of persons in each robbery was different. The driver of the vehicle was different in both robberies. There is also a conflict as to whether the same gun was used. These circumstances do not indicate a method “so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.” Johnson v. State, 710 P.2d 119, 120 (Okl.Cr.1985).
There is nothing to indicate that the two robberies are connected in any manner. As I stated in my dissent in Roubideaux v. State, supra, at 41, mere similarity is not enough to establish admissibility under the common scheme or plan exception. The crimes involved here were two separate and distinct crimes. Therefore, the admission of evidence of the Tulsa robbery was error.
Moreover, the appellant was not given ten (10) days notice of the use of this evidence as required by Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771, 774 (Okl.Cr.1979). The State admits that notice was not given until three (3) days before trial.
Because the appellant’s trial consisted mainly of “other crime” evidence which should not have been admitted, I respectfully dissent.