Court Opinion

ID: 9405435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 16:01:30.095441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.183535
License: Public Domain

21-6159
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                            Navarro, IJ
                                                                           A205 935 071

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 28th day of June, two thousand twenty-
 4   three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              REENA RAGGI,
 8              RICHARD C. WESLEY,
 9              BETH ROBINSON,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   SUKHWINDER SINGH,
14          Petitioner,
15
16                      v.                                       21-6159
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                     Suraj Raj Singh, Esq., Richmond Hill, NY.
 2
 3   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 4                                       General; Jessica E. Burns, Senior Litigation
 5                                       Counsel; Scott M. Marconda, Trial Attorney,
 6                                       Office of Immigration Litigation, United
 7                                       States Department of Justice, Washington,
 8                                       DC.
 9
10         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

11   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

12   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

13         Petitioner Sukhwinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of

14   a February 23, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming an October 4, 2018 decision of an

15   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

16   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).            In re

17   Sukhwinder Singh, No. A205 935 071 (B.I.A. Feb. 13, 2021), aff’g No. A205 935 071

18   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 4, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

19   underlying facts and procedural history.

20         We have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions decisions “for the sake

21   of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.

22   2006). “We review the agency’s factual findings, including adverse credibility

23   findings, under the substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891

                                             2
1    F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018); such “administrative findings of fact are conclusive

2    unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

3    contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

4          In making credibility determinations, the trier of fact must consider “the

5    totality of the circumstances,” and may consider factors such as,

 6         the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness,
 7         the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the
 8         consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral
 9         statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and
10         considering the circumstances under which the statements were
11         made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the
12         consistency of such statements with other evidence of record
13         (including the reports of the Department of State on country
14         conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,
15         without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
16         goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.

17   Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless,

18   from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder

19   could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d

20   162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

21         Singh alleged that members of the Mann Party attacked him and his family

22   and threatened to kill him on account of his support for the Congress Party. In

                                               3
 1   considering Singh’s claims, the agency found Singh’s story not credible.

2    Substantial evidence supports this adverse credibility determination.

3          The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies in Singh’s statements and

4    between    his   statements    and   supporting     documents.       See   8 U.S.C.

5    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh’s statements were inconsistent as to how many times he

6    was attacked, and his statements and supporting documents were inconsistent as

7    to how many attackers were present. The agency was not required to accept

8    Singh’s explanation that he was attacked twice in India but his family was attacked

9    twice after he left, particularly as his application indicated that there were five

10   incidents while Singh was in India. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.

11   2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his

12   inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable

13   fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks

14   omitted)). Further, Singh’s explanation that he did not know why his wife’s and

15   father’s accounts differed and that he had suffered an injury did not explain the

16   discrepancy, especially as he was unable to describe the injury. See id. Moreover,

17   Singh was inconsistent as to whether he donated money to the Congress Party: he

18   testified that he did not, but he submitted a document reflecting a donation. The

                                              4
1    agency was not compelled to credit his explanation that giving money to the

2    Congress Party to give to the poor was different from contributing to the party

 3   because the explanation does not explain why Singh failed to mention the

 4   donation when first asked and his documentary evidence reflects payment to

 5   “party funds.” See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there

 6   are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them

 7   cannot be clearly erroneous.” (citation omitted)).

 8         The adverse credibility determination is bolstered by Singh’s lack of

 9   familiarity with his evidence and lack of knowledge regarding the Congress

10   Party’s leadership and its position within the Indian Government.             Singh

11   submitted a supporting letter from Amarjit Singh and testified that Amarjit was

12   “just a member” of his local party who did not hold any positions; but the letter

13   identified Amarjit as local Vice President. He also testified incorrectly that the

14   Indian president and prime minister in 2012 were members of the Mann Party, but

15   they were members of the Congress Party. And he conceded that he did not know

16   who was elected president in 2012. The agency did not err in finding Singh’s claim

17   implausible due, in part, to this lack of knowledge because Singh testified that his

18   family had been affiliated with the Congress Party since his childhood and that he

                                              5
 1   was “a worker of the Congress Party” and attended meetings once a month. See

 2   Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that there are instances

 3   “in which the nature of an individual applicant’s account would render his lack of

 4   a certain degree of doctrinal knowledge suspect and could therefore provide

 5   substantial evidence in support of an adverse credibility finding”).

 6         The agency also reasonably relied on a lack of reliable corroboration. See

 7   Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to

 8   corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of

 9   corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that

10   has already been called into question.”). The agency was not required to credit the

11   portions of the letters that were consistent with Singh’s testimony because the

12   declarants were not subject to cross-examination and the documents contained

13   information inconsistent with Singh’s statements. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d

14   137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that “the IJ acted within her discretion in according

15   [letters from a wife and friend] little weight because the declarants (particularly

16   [the] wife) were interested parties and neither was available for cross-

17   examination”).

                                               6
 1         In sum, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination

 2   given Singh’s implausible and inconsistent statements and the lack of reliable

 3   corroboration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; see also

 4   Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8 (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an

 5   alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple

 6   inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”).               This adverse

7    credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and

8    CAT relief because all three forms of relief were based on the same factual

9    predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

10         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

11   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

12                                           FOR THE COURT:
13                                           Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
14                                           Clerk of Court
15

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