Court Opinion

ID: 9897413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:15.215906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.080950
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Apr 28 2023, 9:25 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William W. Gooden                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Mt. Vernon, Indiana                                         Attorney General of Indiana
                                                            Courtney Staton
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Peggy Sue Higginson,                                        April 28, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-CR-2634
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Posey Circuit
                                                            Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable Craig S. Goedde,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                         Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            65C01-1806-MR-293

                                 Opinion by Judge Riley.
                         Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023                           Page 1 of 26
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Defendant, Peggy Sue Higginson (Higginson), appeals her sentence

      after pleading guilty to voluntary manslaughter, a Level 2 felony, Ind. Code §

      35-42-1-3.

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUES
[3]   Higginson presents a single issue on appeal, which we restate as the following

      two issues:

          (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing; and

          (2) Whether her sentence is appropriate in light of the nature of the offense

              and her character.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   Higginson and Troy Higginson (Troy) got married in May 2011. On October

      23, 2013, Troy called 911, claiming that Higginson “had gone crazy and

      attacked him with a whiskey bottle and that he was bleeding.” (Appellant’s

      App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 77) (internal quotation marks omitted). The State

      charged Higginson with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery the next day.

      As part of a pretrial diversion agreement, Higginson agreed to attend anger

      management and all recommended services, which she successfully completed.

      Accordingly, on April 28, 2014, the charge against Higginson was dismissed.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023         Page 2 of 26
[5]   On March 13, 2018, at about 4:09 p.m., Posey County Sheriff’s Department

      (PCSD) was dispatched to the Higginson’s residence at 1000 Wade Road,

      Wadesville, Indiana. Troy, who had called 911, reported that Higginson had

      “lost it” and torn “everything up in the residence.” (Appellant’s App. Conf.

      Vol. II, p. 101). Troy claimed that Higginson had a history of violence.

      (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 101). At approximately 4:11 p.m., an officer

      from Mount Vernon Police Department arrived at the residence and detained

      Higginson. PCSD arrived shortly thereafter. Troy informed PCSD that he was

      afraid Higginson would attack him and that she was “unstable and he was not

      sure what she might do[.]” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 101). PCSD

      advised Troy to go somewhere else for the night and to file a protective order

      the next day. PCSD also informed Troy that there was nothing they could do

      since he and Higginson were married and that either one of them could destroy

      anything in the house and face no criminal repercussions. Before the officers

      left, Higginson assured them that she would stay in a separate bedroom from

      Troy that evening and that there would be no further issues. Both were advised

      to call 911 if things got out of hand. The next day, on March 14, 2018, Troy

      petitioned for an order of protection and a request for a hearing in which Troy

      claimed that he had been a victim of domestic violence. Troy claimed that

      Higginson had destroyed their house on November 23, 2014, and March 13,

      2018, and had hit him in the face with a liquor bottle in October 2013. The trial

      court issued an ex parte order for protection on the same day. The ex parte order

      expired, and neither Troy nor Higginson appeared for the hearing set by the

      court.
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023      Page 3 of 26
[6]   Troy filed for divorce on April 30, 2018, 1 and the final dissolution hearing was

      scheduled for June 29, 2018. In that petition, Troy claimed that he had been

      living separately from Higginson since April 28, 2016. Shortly after filing for

      divorce, Troy filed another petition for an order of protection and a request for

      a hearing, offering the same examples of abuse he offered in his prior petition.

      Due to the parties’ impending divorce, Troy’s petition for an order of protection

      was denied on May 2, 2018.

[7]   About a month later, on June 20, 2018, at around 10:24 p.m., Indiana State

      Trooper Zack Fulton (Trooper Fulton) and Deputy Jacob Melliff (Deputy

      Melliff) of the PCSD were dispatched to the Higginson’s marital home due to

      another domestic violence complaint. Higginson was identified as the

      “aggressor in the altercation.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 132). When asked

      what had happened, Troy reported that Higginson had wanted to leave in his

      expensive vehicle. When he refused, he offered to give her a ride to her

      stepdaughter’s house in Evansville, which led to a verbal argument. Troy

      denied hitting Higginson. Higginson reported that there was no physical

      altercation, but Troy had attempted to take the vehicle keys out of her hands.

      Deputy Melliff observed no injuries on Higginson’s exposed arms and hands,

      and to avoid further issues in the night, Deputy Melliff offered Higginson a ride

      to her stepdaughter’s house in Evansville. Later that evening, Higginson posted

      1
       The record shows that in July 2015, Troy filed for divorce, but the trial court dismissed the matter in March
      2016 “due to lack of prosecution pursuant to Trial Rule 41(E).” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 163).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023                                Page 4 of 26
      pictures of bruises on her arms and hands on Facebook alleging that Troy had

      physically hurt her that night.

[8]   The next day, on June 21, 2018, Higginson’s stepdaughter dropped Higginson

      at Troy’s home. According to Higginson, she was there to do laundry. When

      Troy arrived later that day, the two began arguing. Troy eventually locked

      himself in the main bedroom while Higginson locked herself in a second

      bedroom, and they communicated via text. Higginson issued provocative

      statements, which included that she had been sleeping with other men during

      their marriage and that she was searching for new partners such as “young fuck

      buddies.” (Exh. Vol. II, p. 70). Troy requested that Higginson leave the

      premises peacefully and “not to make this ugly.” (Exh. Vol. II, p. 66).

      Higginson responded by referencing Troy’s statement of wanting to reconcile

      and asking her to stay the previous night while Deputy Melliff and Trooper

      Fulton were present. Although Higginson finally agreed to leave Troy’s home,

      she demanded to leave on Troy’s motorcycle and asked for the keys. Troy

      refused per his attorney’s instructions and stated that he would give her the keys

      after their divorce finalized in the coming week. Troy, instead, offered to drive

      Higginson to her stepdaughter’s house in Evansville. When the two got inside

      Troy’s vehicle, they continued to argue. As they left Troy’s house, Higginson

      texted her stepdaughter, “dickhead is bringing me home.” (Exh. Vol. II, p. 75).

      The specifics of what occurred in the vehicle remain unclear, as Higginson

      offered various versions; however, what is clear is that she fatally shot Troy in

      the chest with her gun.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023        Page 5 of 26
[9]    At approximately 9:31 p.m., Higginson contacted 911 and reported that she had

       shot Troy. Before making the call, Higginson consumed “25 Seroquel pills” in

       an attempt to alleviate her anxiety before the police arrived. (Appellant’s App.

       Vol. II, p. 60). Soon after, Deputy Bryan Hicks (Deputy Hicks) of the PCSD

       arrived at 1200 Wade Road, which was not too far from Troy’s home, to

       investigate the incident. Deputy Hicks identified a black BMW, which he

       confirmed belonged to Troy, and found Higginson seated on the side of the

       road, while Troy was found unresponsive in the driver’s seat of the vehicle.

       Troy died at the scene from a gunshot wound in the upper chest area. After

       detaining Higginson and placing her in the police vehicle, Higginson explained

       that her firearm was on the passenger side floorboard. When Deputy Hicks

       attempted to question 2 Higginson about the shooting, Higginson appeared to be

       under the influence of “narcotics given her manner of speech”, and she did not

       offer any information at that point. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 60).

       Higginson was transported to the hospital for an evaluation, and Deputy Melliff

       accompanied Higginson in the ambulance. Although Deputy Melliff did not

       observe any injuries on Higginson from the prior evening when he responded to

       the domestic disturbance, he observed bruising on Higginson’s arms and thigh.

[10]   Four days after the shooting, Deputy Fortune advised Higginson of her Miranda

       rights during his visit to the hospital. Higginson stated that Troy was pulling

       2
        There is no indication in the record as to whether Higginson had received her Miranda warnings at this
       point, but she did not make any self-incriminating statements when questioned.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023                              Page 6 of 26
       her hair while they were driving on Wade Road, and she responded by

       retrieving her .357 caliber revolver from her purse and placing it on top of the

       purse. Higginson reported that when she asked Troy to stop pulling her hair, he

       refused and asked, “what are you going to do about it?” (Appellant’s App. Vol.

       II, p. 65). In response, Higginson shot Troy in the chest.

[11]   After being discharged from the hospital, Higginson had a second interview

       with Deputy Fortune, during which she was reminded of her Miranda rights.

       During this conversation, Higginson stated that she asked Troy to stop pulling

       her hair while driving on Wade Road, but he refused, called her a “bitch,” and

       pushed her head toward the floorboard, knowing that would upset her.

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 65). Higginson added that she retrieved her

       revolver from her purse and shot Troy before he could react. She also disclosed

       to Deputy Fortune that she and Troy had experienced fewer than five physical

       altercations but concealed them from the public to protect their car racing

       business. However, Deputy Fortune confronted Higginson with a Facebook

       post showing her injuries and another post written one hour before the shooting

       in which she suggested that Troy needed “some good old-fashioned ass

       whooping to knock some of the air out of his swollen ego[-]filled head.”

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 66).

[12]   On June 25, 2018, the State filed an Information, charging Higginson with

       murder, a felony. The State later filed its notice of intent to seek a sentencing

       enhancement for Higginson’s use of a firearm while committing the offense.

       On October 3, 2018, Higginson filed a notice of intent to raise a claim of self-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023        Page 7 of 26
       defense under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11(b)(2) (effects-of-battery-statute)

       through Dr. Polly Westcott’s (Dr. Westcott) testimony. The trial court granted

       the State’s motion to exclude Dr. Westcott’s testimony and Higginson moved

       to certify the trial court’s order for an interlocutory appeal. We accepted

       jurisdiction and conducted an oral argument. We, however, reversed the trial

       court’s order and determined that on remand, “Dr. Westcott may testify as to

       the objective component of a person’s reasonable belief that they were under

       threat of imminent harm, given their PTSD, but not [to Higginson’s] specific

       subjective belief” that her PTSD, which resulted from domestic violence, led

       her to use justifiable force. See Higginson v. State, 183 N.E.3d 340, 346 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2022).

[13]   On August 23, 2022, Higginson entered into a plea agreement with the State in

       which she agreed to plead guilty to Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter, and

       the State dismissed the murder and firearm sentence enhancement charges.

       Sentencing was left open to the trial court. A guilty plea hearing was conducted

       on the same day, and the trial court accepted Higginson’s plea. The trial court

       then directed the preparation of a presentencing report (PSI) ahead of the

       sentencing hearing.

[14]   The PSI established that, along with the current charge, Higginson’s criminal

       history includes a Class A misdemeanor battery charge committed in 2013 but

       was dismissed in 2014 after her successful completion of a pretrial diversion

       program. In her account of the events leading up to Troy’s death, Higginson

       provided additional statements that she had not previously disclosed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023        Page 8 of 26
       Specifically, she informed the probation department that on the day she shot

       and killed Troy, she had engaged in a physical altercation with him earlier. She

       explained that Troy grabbed her hand and repeatedly slammed it on the

       nightstand to obtain her key. Higginson also reported that when she argued

       with Troy inside the BMW, she feared that he would take her gun and use it

       against her since he was a skilled shooter. She explained that she accidentally

       fired the weapon while holding it with her non-dominant hand. Furthermore,

       Higginson claimed that the protective orders and ongoing divorce proceedings

       initiated by Troy were part of his manipulative tactics to portray her as the

       abuser. Ultimately, the probation department noted that Higginson’s version of

       events during the interview significantly differed from what she had once told

       law enforcement.

[15]   During the sentencing hearing on October 6, 2022, Dr. Westcott testified that

       based on her evaluation, she diagnosed Higginson with Post-Traumatic Stress

       Disorder (PTSD). Although Higginson had experienced a number of traumatic

       events throughout her life, including a molestation incident when she was five

       years old, as well as physical, sexual, and verbal abuse during her previous

       marriage, which had lasted for ten years, Dr. Westcott concluded that none of

       those events directly contributed to her present PTSD symptoms. Instead,

       Higginson’s PTSD symptoms arose “as a result of her marriage to Troy.” (Tr.

       Vol. II, p. 26). Dr. Westcott explained that people diagnosed with PTSD are

       susceptible to extreme reactions, including the use of deadly force, to seemingly

       minor triggers that mimic past abuse.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023       Page 9 of 26
[16]   Higginson then made a statement in allocution in which she expressed remorse

       and requested forgiveness from Troy’s family. However, most of her statement

       focused on the extensive physical and emotional abuse she had endured at the

       hands of Troy. Higginson explained that Troy had been the main perpetrator of

       domestic violence and a skilled manipulator who played the victim while

       physically and emotionally abusing her. She also criticized Troy’s family and

       society for failing to recognize the warning signs of domestic violence. Finally,

       Higginson urged the trial court to recognize her as a victim and to treat her with

       the same level of empathy and understanding as it would for Troy.

[17]   Ahead of the sentencing hearing, each party submitted a memorandum on

       sentencing. Higginson’s memorandum focused on presenting at least ten

       mitigating factors, while the State’s memorandum focused on the aggravating

       factors. The State’s memorandum also included several exhibits, including Dr.

       Gregory Hale’s (Dr. Hale) evaluation of Dr. Westcott’s assessment of

       Higginson’s PTSD diagnosis. Dr. Hale’s report exposed weaknesses in Dr.

       Westcott’s assessment of Higginson. While he agreed with Dr. Westcott’s

       diagnosis of PTSD, he raised some concerns about the evaluation process.

       Specifically, Dr. Hale pointed out that Dr. Westcott’s report failed to mention

       the mutually combative relationship between Troy and Higginson during their

       marriage. He also criticized the report for relying too heavily on self-reported

       information provided by Higginson when making the diagnosis. Dr. Hale’s

       report further stated, in part, that:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023      Page 10 of 26
        The PTSD diagnosis does not explain Ms. Higginson’s actions
        nor is it an explanation for killing [Troy]. Individuals with PTSD
        are more a danger to themselves than others. Discomfort with
        their symptoms is usually something they want to avoid and is
        used as justification for suicide. Also, there is no discussion
        regarding other causal factors for the psychological condition
        identified by Ms. Higginson’s actions. Ms. Higginson has had
        exposure to multiple trauma events in her lifetime. Any of these
        events could be a casual factor for the symptoms attributed to
        PTSD. It is unreasonable to assume [Troy’s] violent behavior in
        the relationship with Ms. Higginson is the factor causing PTSD.
        That is not to say that the PTSD diagnosis is inaccurate, but that
        is not an explanation for Ms. Higginson shooting her husband.

        I am concerned the context of this event is not being properly
        explored. That is, Mr. Higginson was shot one week prior to the
        dissolution of their marriage. A postnuptial agreement was filed
        on May 30, 2018, and signed by Ms. Higginson. Obviously, her
        life circumstances were going to change significantly once
        divorced. Thus, the reason for the June 2018 deadly encounter
        might not be related to a history of interpersonal violence but,
        rather, to external factors connected to the current circumstance.

        Finally, another issue not addressed thus far is why Ms.
        Higginson would kill her soon to be ex-husband. In evaluating
        women involved in violent relationships, a critical precursor to
        killing the violent partner is a belief that the victim is in imminent
        danger. As I understand the sequence of events at the time of the
        shooting [Troy] was driving Ms. Higginson to his daughter’s
        home. Ms. Higginson had previously stayed with [her]
        [step]daughter the night before when law enforcement drove her
        from their [marital] home to his [step]daughter’s home. As told
        by Ms. Higginson, they were once again engaged in behavior
        common for them. Interesting to me, given her concern about
        Mr. Higginson behavior, Ms. Higginson went back to their house
        the next day to “do laundry.” It is highly unusual for a woman

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023          Page 11 of 26
               who believes she is in imminent danger to return to a dangerous
               situation and risk an encounter with her abuser. This choice is
               contrary to the behavior of a woman experiencing the effect of
               [battered woman syndrome] and believes she is in imminent
               danger.

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 184-85).

[18]   After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court analyzed

       all thirteen mitigating circumstances outlined in Indiana Code section 35-38-1-

       7.1. First, the trial court declined to find that the crime did not cause or

       threaten serious harm to persons or property, as Troy died due to Higginson’s

       actions. Secondly, the trial court rejected the argument that the crime resulted

       from circumstances unlikely to recur, as it could not be sure that Higginson

       would not react violently in the future given her criminal history and PTSD

       diagnosis. The trial court also evaluated whether Troy had induced or

       facilitated the offense and concluded that Higginson had caused it by putting

       herself back in a highly charged environment after being safely removed. The

       text messages between Higginson and Troy further supported this finding, as

       they showed that Higginson instigated the altercation while Troy attempted to

       diffuse the situation by asking her to leave peacefully. The trial court then

       considered whether there were substantial grounds to excuse or justify the crime

       and whether Higginson acted under strong provocation, and it found that

       Higginson’s inconsistencies with law enforcement made it difficult to believe

       her version of events or that her PTSD caused her to react as she did.

       Regarding Higginson’s criminal history, the trial court rejected the argument

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023        Page 12 of 26
       that she had no history of delinquent or criminal activity and instead found that

       she had a history of criminal conduct involving Troy as the victim. The trial

       court also declined to find that Higginson would respond affirmatively to

       probation or short-term imprisonment, nor that her character and attitude

       indicated she was unlikely to commit another crime. The trial court reasoned

       that it could not definitively say that Higginson would not commit a similar

       crime in the future. Additionally, the trial court rejected the argument that a

       period of incarceration would pose an undue hardship on Higginson’s

       dependents, stating that imprisonment inevitably involved some form of

       hardship. The trial court then evaluated Higginson’s PTSD diagnosis, and it

       ultimately found that the evidence presented did not support a conclusion that

       Higginson’s PTSD caused her to respond with deadly force to Troy’s alleged

       words, actions, or behaviors. Finally, the trial court considered whether to give

       mitigating weight to Higginson’s plea agreement. The trial court determined

       that Higginson had derived a substantial benefit from pleading guilty because

       the State had agreed to dismiss the firearm sentence enhancement and allowed

       her to plead to voluntary manslaughter, a lesser-included offense of murder.

[19]   As for aggravating factors, the trial court found that the victim suffered

       significant harm as he lost his life, Higginson’s criminal history, which included

       the dismissed misdemeanor battery charge, the protective order that Troy had

       obtained against Higginson, Higginson’s prior threats against Troy, and her

       dishonest character depicted through the conflicting reports she provided to the

       police and the probation department. After considering all the factors, the trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023       Page 13 of 26
       court determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.

       The trial court found that a maximum sentence was appropriate and ordered

       Higginson to serve thirty years in the Department of Correction.

[20]   Higginson now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[21]   Higginson asserts that her thirty-year sentence for her voluntary manslaughter

       conviction is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her

       character. Although Higginson claims to challenge the appropriateness of her

       sentence and her standard of review is limited on this basis, her argument on

       appeal is entirely focused on whether the trial court abused its discretion at

       sentencing. “As our Supreme Court has made clear, inappropriate sentence

       and abuse of discretion claims are to be analyzed separately.” King v. State, 894

       N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482,

       491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). Therefore, if a

       defendant fails to develop an independent discussion to support an

       inappropriate sentence claim, the defendant waives the issue for review. See

       Allen v. State, 875 N.E.2d 783, 788 n. 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Waiver

       notwithstanding, we will address the independent sentencing arguments

       separately.

       I. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion

[22]   Sentencing decisions “rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are

       reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023          Page 14 of 26
       490. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic

       and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable,

       probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. When imposing a

       sentence for a felony, a trial court must enter a sentencing statement including

       reasonably detailed reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Id. at 491. A

       trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to issue a sentencing statement,

       gives reasons for imposing a sentence that are not supported by the record,

       omits reasons clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,

       or considers reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.

       Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating and

       mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a trial court

       cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to properly weigh

       such factors. Id.

       A. Aggravating Factors

[23]   Higginson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in crafting her

       sentence by: (1) using an element of the charged offense as an aggravating

       factor; (2) considering the facts surrounding the commission of the crime as an

       aggravating factor; (3) improperly considering her criminal history based on a

       dismissed charge; and (3) allocating too much weight to a certain aggravator. 3

       3
         Higginson argues that the trial court afforded too much weight in her attempt to conceal information
       regarding the shooting incident, we, however, need not address these argument as it was a proper aggravator,
       and it is not a cognizable claim on appeal. See Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995) (holding that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023                               Page 15 of 26
       i. Element of the Charged Offense

[24]   Higginson argues that the trial court improperly relied on an element of her

       charged offense as an aggravating factor. As noted, Higginson pleaded guilty to

       Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter. Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(1)

       provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human

       being commits murder. However, a person who knowingly or intentionally

       kills another human being while acting under “sudden heat” commits voluntary

       manslaughter. I.C. § 35-42-1-3(a). While “a trial court may not use a material

       element of the offense as an aggravating circumstance, it may find the nature

       and circumstances of the offense to be an aggravating circumstance.” Plummer

       v. State, 851 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); See also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-

       7.1(a)(1) (permitting the trial court to consider the harm, injury or damage

       suffered by the victim as an aggravating factor where it is significant and greater

       than the elements of the offense). “[T]o enhance a sentence using the nature

       and circumstances of the crime, the trial court must detail why the defendant

       deserves an enhanced sentence under the particular circumstances.” Plummer,

       851 N.E.2d at 391. This aggravator is thought to be associated with particularly

       heinous facts or situations. See Vasquez v. State, 762 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind. 2001).

       a trial court may consider a defendant’s effort to interfere in the investigation of a crime by concealing
       information to be an aggravating circumstance). To the extent it is not a cognizable claim on appeal, as
       noted, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion by failing to properly weigh aggravating
       and mitigating factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E .2d at 491.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023                               Page 16 of 26
[25]   After the sentencing court reiterated the provision of Indiana Code section 35-

       38-1-7.1(a)(1), its preceding statement was, “as I indicated earlier, obviously

       [][Troy] lost his life in this matter. Uh, I don’t know what damage or loss could

       be suffered by a victim in a particular matter greater than the loss of life. . . .”

       (Tr. Vol. II, p. 145). We agree with Higginson that the trial court’s statement,

       reiterating an essential element of the offense (i.e., the loss of life), cannot be

       used as an aggravator to enhance Higginson’s sentence unless the trial court

       provides additional clarification regarding how Higginson’s participation in the

       crime surpasses the scope of the offense’s elements.

[26]   Nevertheless, we need not remand for resentencing, as here, if we can say with

       confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence if it had

       considered proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances. McCain v. State,

       148 N.E.3d 977, 984 (Ind. 2020). As we will continue to discuss below, there

       were other valid aggravating factors upon which the trial court relied on

       imposing Higginson’s sentence. Thus, we are certain that the trial court would

       have rendered the same sentence irrespective of this aggravator.

       ii. Circumstances Surrounding the Crime

[27]   Next, Higginson argues that the trial court improperly considered the

       circumstances surrounding the crime, i.e., the 24 hours leading up to the

       commission of the crime. The State responds by arguing that the trial court was

       permitted to consider the 24 hours prior to the commission of the crime

       “because it goes to the nature and circumstances of the crime and belies

       Higginson’s account that Troy initiated the violence against her and that she

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023          Page 17 of 26
       was an innocent victim of violence who was pushed to respond with deadly

       force.” (Appellees’ Br. p. 23).

[28]   “‘Generally, the nature and circumstances of a crime is a proper aggravating

       circumstance.’” Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)

       (quoting Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 853 (Ind. 2014)). “[T]o enhance a

       sentence using the nature and circumstances of the crime, the trial court must

       detail why the defendant deserves an enhanced sentence under the particular

       circumstances.” Plummer, 851 N.E.2d at 391.

[29]   As noted, despite having a safe place to stay following the previous night’s

       domestic complaint episode, Higginson returned to Troy’s residence the next

       day and argued with Troy. In an attempt to further aggravate Troy, she sent

       him text messages threatening to find new partners and confessed to cheating

       on him while they were married. Troy’s response was kind and considerate and

       he requested her to peacefully leave. When Troy refused to give Higginson the

       keys to his motorcycle and offered to drive her, another argument ensued, but

       Higginson agreed to leave. Higginson then shot Troy on the drive home. The

       trial court noted in its sentencing statement that Higginson gave at least three

       varying accounts of how she retrieved her firearm and shot Troy, and while not

       entirely discounting her PTSD diagnosis as the reason for her violent reaction,

       the trial court found that Higginson put herself in a “very volatile situation,

       after having been removed from it” the night before. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 148). Here,

       we find no error in the trial court’s consideration of the circumstances

       surrounding the commission of the offense as an aggravating factor. See Ousley

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023         Page 18 of 26
       v. State, 807 N.E.2d 758, 760, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that the

       trial court may consider the nature and circumstances of a crime when

       sentencing a defendant).

       iii. Criminal History

[30]   Higginson’s criminal history is limited to one misdemeanor charge for the

       domestic battery that was disposed of through a pre-trial diversion program in

       2014. Higginson challenges the trial court’s use of that dismissed charge as an

       aggravating factor. Our supreme court has stated:

               Charges that do not result in convictions may be considered by
               the sentencing court in context, but something more than mere
               recitation unaccompanied by specific allegations should be
               shown. We have held that “[i]n order to enhance a criminal
               sentence based, in whole or in part, on the defendant’s history of
               criminal activity, a sentencing court must find instances of
               specific criminal conduct shown by probative evidence to be
               attributable to the defendant. A bare record of arrest will not
               suffice to meet this standard.”

       McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 591 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Tunstill v. State, 568

       N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ind. 1991). Despite Higginson’s successful completion of the

       pre-trial diversion program in 2014, which included her participation in an

       anger management program and ultimately leading to the dismissal of the

       domestic battery charge, Higginson continued to engage in acts of violence and

       aggression. In identifying Higginson’s dismissed charge as an aggravating

       factor, the trial court noted that Higginson’s dismissed charge was not a

       conviction but was a “history of behavior” toward Troy and considered the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023       Page 19 of 26
       behavior to be “significant” as she was the “aggressor” in that past domestic

       incident and had not been deterred from engaging in further “anti-social

       behavior.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 145). In the given context, the trial court properly

       determined Higginson’s record of arrest for battery to be significant because

       Higginson has not been deterred from engaging in additional domestic violent

       episodes despite her arrest. See Belcher v. State, 138 N.E.3d 318, 328 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2019) (where trial court at sentencing considered the fact that Belcher had

       been given prior opportunities to rehabilitate himself through anger

       management and domestic violence classes, but Belcher had continued to

       commit battery offenses), trans. denied.

[31]   As a final note, Higginson relies on Douglas v. State, 878 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2007) in support of her argument that her dismissed offense, which

       occurred approximately four years before the current offense, should not have

       been considered as an aggravating factor because of its lack of “gravity and

       proximity” to the instant offense. (Appellant’s Br. p. 10). In Douglas, we

       reversed Douglas’ thirty-month sentence because his criminal history consisted

       of convictions that were over ten years old, and the remaining traffic infractions

       were not similar in nature to his offense, i.e., Douglas’ failure to register as a sex

       offender. Douglas, 878 N.E.2d at 877. We find Douglas inapplicable to

       Higginson’s case because her past arrest for domestic battery involved violent

       acts against Troy, the same victim in the current offense. Therefore, we

       conclude that Higginson’s dismissed charge, while only appearing as a record of

       arrest, was relevant, and a proper aggravating factor.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023         Page 20 of 26
       B. Mitigating Factors

[32]   When a defendant claims a trial court abused its discretion by failing to find a

       mitigating circumstance, the defendant must establish the claimed mitigator is

       both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at

       493. Although a failure to find mitigating circumstances clearly supported by

       the record may imply that the trial court improperly overlooked them, the trial

       court “is not obligated to explain why it has chosen not to find mitigating

       circumstances. Likewise, the court is not obligated to accept the defendant’s

       argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor.” Id. Higginson argues that

       the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the following

       mitigating factors, namely, (1) that the crime was the result of circumstances

       likely to recur; (2) that the crime was induced or facilitated due to her PTSD

       diagnosis; and (3) that there are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify

       the crime due to her PTSD diagnosis.

[33]   Turning to Higginson’s first contention, that the circumstances that led to the

       crime are unlikely to recur since Troy is “regrettably deceased” and “[t]here is

       no evidence of [her] bad behavior toward other persons” other than Troy, this is

       an argument that the trial court expressly rejected. (Appellant’s Br. p. 12). For

       this proffered mitigator, the trial court determined that it could not “necessarily

       say what would or would not happen” in the future, given Higginson’s PTSD

       diagnosis. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 141). Stated differently, the trial court gave limited

       mitigating weight to this factor since it could not be certain that Higginson

       would not react violently in the same way in case of another incident.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023           Page 21 of 26
[34]   As for mitigating factors two and three, which we understand as claims that the

       trial court failed to consider her PTSD diagnosis as it related to those factors,

       our supreme court has held that “mental illness at the time of the crime may be

       considered a significant mitigating factor.” Castor v. State, 754 N.E.2d 506, 509

       (Ind. 2001). With that said, our supreme court has emphasized that evaluating

       the validity of a claim that mental illness deserves mitigating weight requires the

       exercise of “a high level of discernment.” Covington v. State, 842 N.E.2d 345,

       349 (Ind. 2006). The following considerations are relevant when the trial court

       determines the significance of a defendant’s mental illness for sentencing: (1)

       the extent of the defendant’s inability to control his or her behavior due to the

       disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration

       of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or

       impairment and the commission of the crime. Id.

[35]   Dr. Westcott’s testimony was that a victim of domestic abuse might enter into

       “fight or flight mode” based on a triggering event, and it was not “uncommon”

       for such a victim to use deadly force “to try to survive” the abuse. (Tr. Vol. II,

       p. 19). According to Dr. Westcott, the domestic abuse Higginson experienced

       during her eight years of marriage to Troy led to her PTSD symptoms, and she

       suggested that incidents that resemble past domestic abuse may prompt a victim

       who suffers from such trauma to resort to the use of deadly force. While the

       trial court expressed its overall concern with Dr. Westcott’s reliance on using

       “subjective information” solely provided by Higginson to diagnose her with

       PTSD, it nevertheless accepted that diagnosis. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 148).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023       Page 22 of 26
[36]   Based on our review of the record, we find that, notwithstanding the trial

       court’s acceptance of Higginson’s PTSD resulting from the domestic abuse she

       endured during her lengthy marriage to Troy, other evidence strongly suggests

       that Higginson deliberately engaged in violent behavior, demonstrating the

       ability to control her actions without limitation. As noted, the trial court had

       the opportunity to review Dr. Hale’s report, which provided that Higginson’s

       behavior of returning to a home where she had endured abuse after having been

       removed from it the day before was inconsistent with a person who has PTSD.

       As the trial court pointed out, notwithstanding her PTSD diagnosis and her

       claim that Troy had consistently engaged in domestic violence against her for

       the past eight years, it could not “objectively” understand why Higginson chose

       to return to Troy’s house the next day and put herself in “a very volatile

       situation”. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 148). Based on the trial court’s statement, it is clear

       that it considered Higginson’s PTSD diagnosis at sentencing. Despite the

       possible connection between her PTSD and the crime, we conclude that

       Higginson had the capacity to control her behavior, without limitation, at the

       time of the offense. Therefore, as in Covington, we are not persuaded that the

       trial court “erred in assigning some, but not determinate, weight” to

       Higginson’s PTSD diagnosis. Covington, 842 N.E.2d at 349.

       II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[37]   Higginson claims that her thirty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the

       nature of the offense and her character. Although a trial court may have acted

       within its lawful discretion in imposing a sentence, Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023         Page 23 of 26
       provides that an appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if,

       after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the court finds that the

       sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character

       of the offender.” The primary role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to

       leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and

       those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a

       perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225

       (Ind. 2008).

[38]   Whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our

       sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage

       done to others, and a myriad of other considerations that come to light in a

       given case. Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),

       trans. denied. An appellant bears the burden of persuading this court that his

       sentence is inappropriate. Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2014).

[39]   The sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is between ten and thirty years, with

       the advisory being seventeen and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. The

       trial court sentenced Higginson to the maximum sentence of thirty years.

       When reviewing the nature of the offense, we look at the details and

       circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s participation therein. Madden

       v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Higginson shot and killed

       Troy while being offered a ride home.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023        Page 24 of 26
[40]   Finally, we turn to the character of the offender. It is well settled that, when

       considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant’s

       criminal history. Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

       Higginson’s sole criminal charge was dismissed in 2014 due to a pretrial

       diversion agreement. However, it as a record of arrest, and it reflects poorly on

       her character. See Zavala v. State, 138 N.E.3d 291, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“A

       record of arrests reflects on the defendant’s character in part because such

       record reveals that subsequent antisocial behavior by the defendant has not

       been deterred even having been subject to police authority and having been

       made aware of its oversight.”), trans. denied. Higginson’s character is further

       diminished by the fact that an hour before she shot Troy, she issued a threat to

       him on Facebook, stating that he needed a “good old-fashioned ass whooping

       to knock some of the air out of his swollen ego[-]filled head.” (Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II, p. 66). Although the trial court indicated that such threats would

       typically be ignored, in Higginson’s case, her “threats came to life.” (Tr. Vol.

       II, p. 143); See McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (holding that a

       defendant’s “Facebook posts showing a desire for violent conflict” reflected

       poorly on his character). Finally, even though Higginson pleaded guilty to

       voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense to murder, she blamed Troy

       for her actions, and she provided multiple inconsistent accounts of how she shot

       Troy to various parties, including the police, Dr. Westcott, the probation

       department, and also in her allocution statement. By doing so, she attempted to

       shift the blame away from herself and undermine her own responsibility for the

       crime, which reflects poorly on her character. See Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023       Page 25 of 26
       1055 1061-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (defendant placing blame on victim showed

       poor character and allowed for aggravated sentence).

[41]   In sum, Higginson has failed to meet her burden of persuading us that her

       overall thirty-year sentence, which we do not find to be an outlier, is

       inappropriate in light of her character and the nature of her offense. See e.g.,

       Eversole v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1111, 1113-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding a

       thirty-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter, without a firearm

       enhancement, as appropriate under 7(B) even though defendant, who killed his

       wife’s lover with a single gunshot, had no criminal record and possessed “good

       character”), trans. denied.

       CONCLUSION

[42]   For the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

       sentencing Higginson, and the sentence is not inappropriate in light of the

       nature of Higginson’s offense and her character.

[43]   Affirmed

[44]   Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2634 | April 28, 2023        Page 26 of 26