Court Opinion

ID: 9710161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:03:29.630827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.778629
License: Public Domain

NARICK, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent.
The trial court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over Edinboro to enforce the alleged settlement, stating:
The Board of Claims Act provides that the Board ‘shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims against the Commonwealth arising from contracts hereafter entered into with the Commonwealth, where the amount in controversy amounts to $300.00 or more_’ Pursuant to such statute, the Board of Claims is the exclusive forum to hear all contractual claims against the Commonwealth. Shovel Transfer and Storage, Inc. v. Simpson, 523 Pa. 235, 565 A.2d 1153 (1989). Since the Defendant is seeking to enforce a contractual settlement agreement in which the Commonwealth is a party, this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter and the Board of Claims is the appropriate forum.
Even though both state and federal law recognize that a court in which a settlement was reached has the power to enforce said settlement, Melnick, Edinboro contends that only the Board of Claims has jurisdiction over enforcement of a contract, when the Commonwealth is involved. This would not pertain to enforcement of the settlement over non-Commonwealth parties.
As stated by the majority, the jurisdiction of the Board of Claims is set forth under Section 4 of the Claims Act, 72 P.S. § 4651-4, which provides in pertinent part:
The Board of Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims against the Commonwealth arising from contracts hereafter entered into with the Commonwealth, where the amount in controversy amounts to $300.00 or more.
This means that the Board of Claims is empowered to entertain all claims based in contract against the Commonwealth, irrespective of the type of relief sought or whether the Board has the power to grant the type of relief requested. Xpress Truck Lines; Ezy Parks; Emergency Medical Services Council. Athough sovereign immunity originally barred claims against the Commonwealth, the establishment of the Board of Claims essentially waived such immunity by creating a tribunal, which specifically entertains contract actions against the Commonwealth.
Two Supreme Court cases, Shovel Transfer & Storage, Inc. and Keenheel represent the law regarding the Board’s jurisdiction. I will closely examine the facts of each case, as these facts are controlling here.
*1095In Shovel Transfer & Storage, Inc., Shovel entered into a lease with the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) for a warehouse facility. The PLCB furnished Shovel with a fully negotiated contract signed by all of the necessary signators, except the Comptroller and the Budget Secretary, who refused to affix them signatures because the contract did not follow the normal bidding process. Shovel filed an action in the Commonwealth Court to compel the Comptroller and the Budget Secretary to sign the contract or to have the contract declared valid without their signatures. The Commonwealth filed preliminary objections, stating that proper jurisdiction was with the Board of Claims. This Court accepted Shovel’s theory of the case as being statutory rather that contractual and retained jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rights Shovel asserted derived only from the underlying contract and not from any statutory basis and thus, the Board of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction. The Court held that the mere fact that the validity of the contract may turn upon issues of statutory duty, the focus must be upon the origin of the rights claimed.
Decided a few days prior to Shovel Transfer & Storage, Inc., Keenheel also addressed whether the Board of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the underlying claim. Keenheel was an attorney with the Pennsylvania Securities Commission. In early 1987, he filed race discrimination charges against the Commission. In June, the Commission terminated him, effective September 1, 1987. In response, Keenheel filed a petition in Commonwealth Court, alleging that the termination was in retaliation for filing the charges of race discrimination. Negotiations commenced between Keenheel and the Commission regarding the alleged retaliatory discharge. However, shortly before the termination was to occur, the parties entered into a settlement agreement whereby Keenheel would resign and would receive six thousand dollars in satisfaction of costs and expenses. The agreement further provided that all personnel records would be held “non-public,” if Keenheel would withdraw his charges of race discrimination.
The Commission, however, purportedly disclosed to a member of the general public unfavorable allegations regarding Keenheel’s job performance. Because of the Commission’s breach, Keenheel commenced an action seeking rescission of the settlement agreement in Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court determined that the cause of action arose from a contract and transferred the action to the Board of Claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court did not agree, distinguishing the case from Shovel.
While the majority cites Keenheel, it does not cite this pertinent section in full, which states:
While it may be true that the contract is the subject of the instant action, it is not the basis for the claim asserted by the appellant against the Commonwealth. Indeed, the instant contract poses an impediment to the claim appellant seeks to assert against an agency of the Commonwealth. This distinction is critical to the instant inquiry. We are not here concerned with a contract claim being asserted against the Commonwealth. To the contrary, appellant has brought the instant action in an effort to avoid any obligation arising from the challenged contract.
The jurisdiction of the Board of Claims is not triggered simply because a contract may be involved in an action, rather the jurisdictional predicate is satisfied only when the claimant relies upon the provisions of that contract in asserting the claim against the Commonwealth.
Id. at 227-228, 565 A.2d at 1149. (Emphasis added notes the portion the majority has edited from its opinion).
Maleno maintains that the cause of action does not arise from a contract, but that the claim is based in common law negligence and nuisance. However, Shovel and Keenheel do not dictate such a conclusion.
In Shovel, the Supreme Court concluded that Shovel’s objective was to establish a contractual relationship, while in Keenheel, it concluded that the claimant did not rely on the provisions of the contract to assert his claim. Here, all the parties have attempted to come together and establish their duties in *1096relation to the construction of a storm water drainage system. Their objective was none other than to create a contractual relationship. The majority asserts that as in Keen-heel, the basic claim was not based upon a contract, but Maleno relies only upon the provisions of the alleged settlement agreement in the Motion to Enforce against the Commonwealth. Maleno makes no argument based upon statute or tort law. Therefore, based upon the Supreme Court’s analysis in Shovel and Keenheel, I would hold that proper jurisdiction lies with the Board of Claims.1
I would, however, instruct the Board that before reaching the point of discussing the enforcement of the “settlement,” that it must determine whether a settlement was in fact reached. While many issues were covered in the letter of August 2, 1992, major technical points were not discussed. These points include the location of the retention pond, the discharge rate of the water and whether the retention pond must meet the 100-year storm requirements of Millcreek Township.
In Shovel Transfer & Storage, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the Board was “competent to evaluate the legal issues attendant to a determination of whether a contract has been ‘entered into’ for purposes of determining its jurisdiction.”2 Id. at 242, 565 A.2d at 1156. Thus, the Board of Claims must be directed to first, determine whether, in fact, the parties entered into a lawful settlement agreement. As all other judicial tribunals, Foley Brothers v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 584, 163 A.2d 80 (1960), the Board of Claims has the duty to decide all issues in a cause of action, over which it has jurisdiction. Thompson v. Fitzgerald, 329 Pa. 497, 198 A. 58 (1938), aff'd sub nom. Princess Lida of Thum & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 59 S.Ct. 275, 83 L.Ed. 285 (1939).
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s finding that the Board of Claims has jurisdiction and transfer the motion to enforce settlement in 83-E-1986 and 96-E-1986 to the Board of Claims.

. Further, the portion of this Court’s December 4, 1992 Order which the majority cites is from Erie County case 15-E-1989, which was transferred to this Court’s original jurisdiction and became No. 41 M.D.1991. That case is not the consolidated appeal presently before us and concerns issues separate from those before this Court on appeal.

. Appeals from legal errors by the Board are to the Commonwealth Court. See e.g. Commonwealth, State Highway and Bridge Authority v. E.J. Albrecht Co., 59 Pa.CmwIth. 246, 430 A.2d 328 (1981).