Court Opinion

ID: 9853606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:51:01.697537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:55.493023
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — For the purposes of summary judgment, we must review materials submitted for and against a motion for summary judgment in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made and when evidence is so considered; if reasonable men might reach different conclusions, the motion should be denied. Duffy v. King Chiropractic Clinic, 17 Wn. App. 693, 565 P.2d 435 (1977).
Plaintiff's claim was for unjust enrichment. As stated in Bill v. Gattavara, 34 Wn.2d 645, 209 P.2d 457 (1949), at page 650:
As is noted in Gladowski v. Felczak, 346 Pa. 660, 31 A. (2d) 718, the terms "restitution" and "unjust enrichment" are the modern designations for the older doctrine of "quasi contracts." See, also, 66 C.J. 32, Unjust Enrichment. "Quasi contracts" are not true contracts but are obligations created by the law when money or property has been placed in one person's possession, under such circumstances that, in equity and good conscience, he ought not to retain it. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Lustbader, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 328; see, also, 35 Words and Phrases 621. Thus, the substance of an action for unjust enrichment lies in a promise, implied by law, that one will render to the person entitled thereto that which, in equity and good conscience, belongs to the latter. At common law, such actions are brought under the principles of assump-sit; and where the cause of action arises from a tortious wrong, it is the general rule, whether or not there be an express contract, that the injured party may waive the tort and sue in assumpsit, in which case the law will *853imply a contract on the part of the tort-feasor to pay the injured party a just remuneration for the damages suffered to his property.
As we have no affidavits available to us in this case, we must look to the pleadings to determine the facts of the case.
Paragraphs 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the complaint provide as follows:
10. That defendant acquired the device approximately eighteen years ago, by mutual consent of the parties, and has used it since without compensating plaintiff.
11. That the failure to compensate plaintiff for the use of said device has resulted in and will continue to result in the unjust enrichment of defendant corporation.
13. That for each year of defendant's use of said device plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount not now known but to be proved at the time of trial.
14. That for each year that defendant continues to use said device, plaintiff will suffer damages in an amount not now known but to be proved at the time of trial.
(Italics ours.)
The majority, in reading the pleadings, came to this conclusion:
The promise to pay, implied by law, is the promise that was broken. While the record does not reflect the precise time of the "breach," it is clear that the fact that Eckert had not been compensated was susceptible of proof during the first 3 years of Skagit's use of Eckert's invention. The cause of action fully matured at that time. More than 3 years passed between the breach and the commencement of this lawsuit.
However, from reading the complaint, and resolving the inferences in favor of the nonmoving party plaintiff, one could find that there was an agreement by defendant to pay plaintiff at the end of each year, in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of the complaint. Consequently, the statute of limitations of 3 years would run at the end of each year of each agreement. In other words, the complaint could be interpreted to be a suit for unjust enrichment on 18 separate yearly causes of action. By such interpretation, *85415 years of damages would be barred by the statute of limitations but the remaining 3 years of claimed compensation would still be viable.
The majority, in reaching its conclusion, inappropriately gave the benefit of inferences to the moving party which they are not allowed to do.
In any event, there is nothing in the majority opinion to prevent plaintiff from repossessing his tool, and negotiating a compensation agreement prospectively.
I would reverse the trial court's judgment of dismissal.