Court Opinion

ID: 9387582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 15:06:34.914098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.597344
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kim Myers and Jarvis Payton,                    :
                       Appellants               :
                                                :
               v.                               : No. 275 C.D. 2022
                                                : Argued: March 6, 2023
Nikolas Romito and Simone                       :
Molotsky                                        :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
               HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE                                             FILED: April 18, 2023

       Kim Myers (Myers) and Jarvis Payton (Payton) appeal from the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County’s (trial court) order denying their petition for
relief from a judgment of non pros,1 which the trial court entered following Myers’
and Payton’s failure to appear at an arbitration hearing. On appeal, Myers and
Payton argue the trial court abused its discretion in denying their petition, because
(a) they were excused from participating in compulsory arbitration since the
arbitration program did not have jurisdiction to hear their case, and (b) the trial

1
  Non pros is an abbreviation for non prosequitur, which Black’s Law Dictionary indicates is
Latin for “he does not prosecute,” and defines as a “judgment rendered against a plaintiff who has
not pursued the case.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1269 (11th ed. 2019).
court’s judgment of non pros violated their constitutional and statutory rights to a
jury trial.2 Upon review, we affirm.
                                      I.      Background
        On October 27, 2019, Myers and Payton filed a civil complaint in the trial
court against Nikolas Romito and Simone Molotsky (police officers). Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 6. In their complaint, Myers and Payton alleged the police officers,
acting in their official capacities as patrol officers for the Philadelphia Police
Department, stopped their vehicle on October 28, 2017 and then falsely imprisoned
and assaulted them.3 Id. at 8-13. Myers and Payton did not allege they suffered any

2
    We have reframed Myers’ and Payton’s issues on appeal for clarity and ease of analysis.
3
    The relevant factual allegations from Myers’ and Payton’s complaint are as follows:
        9. Upon exiting the patrol vehicle, Defendant Molotsky asked Plaintiff Payton for
        his driver’s license and proof of insurance and registration for the [vehicle].
        Defendant Romito stood outside of Plaintiff Myers’ passenger window, watching
        her.
        10. After Plaintiff Payton provided his driver’s license to Defendant Molotsky,
        Defendants gave Plaintiff Myers permission to open the [vehicle]’s glove box to
        obtain the registration and insurance cards.
        11. Plaintiff Myers retrieved the insurance and registration credentials from the
        glovebox then immediately closed the glovebox. However, before she was able to
        give the credentials to Defendants, Defendant Romito started panicking.
        12. Defendant Romito unholstered his Glock pistol, pointed it in the direction of
        Plaintiff Myers’ head and started hysterically accusing her of having a gun inside
        of her vehicle’s glovebox. Before Plaintiff Myers could explain that she had [a]
        valid license to carry, Defendant Romito started loudly yelling, while still pointing
        his Glock pistol at her, “Gun, gun. She has a gun.”
        13. Defendant Romito then immediately snatched Plaintiff Myers out of the
        [vehicle] and informed her that she was going to jail, placed her in handcuffs, and
        put her in the back of a police vehicle.
        14. As Defendant Romito took Plaintiff Myers into custody at gunpoint, Defendant
        Molotsky did the same to Plaintiff Payton, even though he did not possess or have
        access to Plaintiff Myers’ gun. Plaintiff Payton was also advised that he was going
        to jail for illegal gun possession.
        15. While both Plaintiffs were locked in the back of separate police vehicles,
        Defendants subsequently verified that Plaintiff Myers had a valid license to carry.
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                 2
physical injuries during this incident. See id. at 8-10. Nevertheless, they sought
damages “in an amount in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) plus interest
and the cost of suit, and such other further relief as is just and proper.” Id. at 10-13.
       On February 6, 2020, after the conclusion of an initial case management
conference, trial court Judge Daniel Anders (Judge Anders) issued a Case
Management Order, which set forth various procedural deadlines and a date by
which he expected the case to be ready for trial. R.R. at 14-15. By order entered
February 28, 2020, however, Judge Anders, “having determined that the amount in
controversy [was] below the mandatory arbitrations limits,” referred the matter to
arbitration pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1021(d), Pa.R.Civ.P.
1021(d).4 Id. at 16.
       On March 2, 2020, Myers and Payton filed a motion requesting the case be
removed from compulsory arbitration and placed back on the jury trial list. R.R. at
3, 17-19. In their motion, Myers and Payton alleged that “[t]he sole basis” for Judge
Anders’ decision to refer the case to arbitration was the police officers’ “preference
for the more defense friendly arbitration forum,” and that the trial court considered
“no evidence, no law, no argument, [and] no briefing . . . .” Id. at 19. As a result,
Myers and Payton alleged Judge Anders’ decision violated their constitutional and

        Defendants eventually released Plaintiff Myers from the back of the police vehicle
        but did not release Plaintiff Payton from the back of the patrol car until after,
        approximately, an additional thirty minutes.
        16. Both Plaintiffs were subsequently released without being criminally charged,
        except that Defendants issued Plaintiff Myers a citation for permitting Plaintiff
        Payton to operate her vehicle while having a suspended driver’s license.
        17. As a direct consequence of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs have suffered severe
        emotional distress, temporary loss of liberty, among other things.
R.R. at 8-10.
4
   “The court on its own motion or motion of any party may by discovery, pre-trial conference,
hearing or otherwise, determine the amount actually in controversy and enter an order of reference
to arbitration.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1021(d).

                                                3
statutory rights to a jury trial. Id. The trial court assigned Myers’ and Payton’s
motion to Judge Edward Wright. Id. at 3.
       By order docketed June 8, 2020, Judge Wright deferred to Judge Anders’
previous decision and denied Myers’ and Payton’s request to remove the case from
compulsory arbitration.        R.R. at 25.       Judge Anders ultimately scheduled an
arbitration hearing for January 10, 2022, but Myers and Payton did not appear at the
arbitration hearing.5 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1303(b)(2)
and Philadelphia County Local Rule 1303(a), the board of arbitrators transferred the
case “to the major non-jury program with the consent of all parties present to be
heard before a judge of the [trial court] . . . .” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1303(b)(2); Phila.Civ.R.
*1303(a); Trial Ct. Op., 5/25/22, at 2. The trial court then entered a judgment of non
pros against Myers and Payton for their failure to appear at the scheduled arbitration
hearing.
       On January 16, 2022, Myers and Payton filed a petition for relief from the trial
court’s judgment of non pros pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
3051, Pa.R.Civ.P. 3051. R.R. at 4, 29. In addition to the arguments Myers and
Payton asserted in their motion to have the case removed from arbitration, Myers
and Payton alleged Judge Anders “intentionally misplaced” the case “into
compulsory arbitration as a result of personal bias and animosity towards black
litigants.” Id. at 31. On March 8, 2022, trial court Judge Abbe Fletman denied
Myers’ and Payton’s petition for relief from judgment of non pros. Myers and
Payton timely appealed to this Court.

5
   Myers and Payton filed a motion for a jury trial on January 10, 2022, refusing to attend
arbitration and “claiming Judge Anders committed ‘obvious legal error’ in determining the amount
in controversy in [Myers’ and Payton’s] case was within arbitration limits and assert[ing],
‘[b]ecause of their political beliefs, [Myers and Payton] would commit suicide before trying this
case before a judge or arbitration.’” See R.R. at 4; Trial Ct. Op., 5/25/22, at 2.

                                               4
                                     II.    Analysis
      In reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a petition to open or strike a
judgment of non pros, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269, 279 (Pa. 2006)
(citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment. . . .
Rather, discretion is abused only ‘if in reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden
or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence of record.’”
Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v. Plymouth Twp., 572 A.2d 814, 817 n.1 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1990) (citation omitted). Thus, we will only overturn a trial court’s
decision to deny a petition to open or strike a judgment of non pros if it “reflects
manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of
support as to be clearly erroneous.” Womer, 908 A.2d at 279.
      When a board of arbitrators “is convened for hearing, if one or more parties
is not ready the case shall proceed and the arbitrators shall make an award unless the
court (1) orders a continuance, or (2) hears the matter if the notice of hearing contains
the statement required by subdivision (a)(2) and all parties present consent.”
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1303(b). Philadelphia County Local Rules also provide that “if one or
more parties is not present at the [arbitration] hearing, the matter may be heard at the
same time and date before a judge of the court without the absent party or parties.”
Phila.Civ.R. *1303. When that occurs, the trial court may “take action not available
to the arbitrators, including the entry of a nonsuit if the plaintiff is not ready or a non
pros if neither party is ready.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1303(b) cmt.
      Once a trial court enters a judgment of non pros, a plaintiff may petition the
trial court for relief from the judgment of non pros pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

                                            5
Civil Procedure 3051. “A request to open a judgment of non pros, like the opening
of a default judgment, is in the nature of an appeal to the equitable powers of the
court.” Madrid v. Alpine Mountain Corp., 24 A.3d 380, 382 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted). Rule 3051 establishes the requirements for obtaining relief from
a judgment of non pros as follows:

      (a) Relief from a judgment of non pros shall be sought by petition. All
      grounds for relief, whether to strike off the judgment or to open it, must
      be asserted in a single petition.

      (b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), if the relief sought includes
      the opening of the judgment, the petition shall allege facts showing that

             (1) the petition is timely filed,

             (2) there is a reasonable explanation or legitimate excuse for the
             conduct that gave rise to the entry of judgment of non pros, and

             (3) there is a meritorious cause of action.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 3051. “Any appeal related to a judgment of non pros lies not from the
judgment itself, but from the denial of a petition to open or strike.” Madrid, 24 A.3d
at 382.
      The trial court denied Myers’ and Payton’s petition for relief from a judgment
of non pros because it determined they did not provide a reasonable explanation or
legitimate excuse for failing to appear at their arbitration hearing. Trial Ct. Op.,
5/25/22, at 7-8. The trial court noted in its written opinion that Myers’ and Payton’s
lawyer sent an email to the police officers’ lawyer wherein he

      referred to arbitration as a ‘cat scratch pile’ and stated that he ‘would
      kill [himself] before [he] did arbitration.’ (Answer to Petition, Exhibit
      A, Dkt. At 2/4/22 ¶¶ 2, 14). In that correspondence, [Myers’ and
      Payton’s lawyer] also wrote, ‘We will get our trial date after we
      intentionally fail to show up for that stupid ass arbitration ‘scheme’ next

                                            6
       month. That is why I am not filing any more motions about it. Only
       an idiot would put these cases in arbitration.’ (Id. at ¶ 16). [Myers’ and
       Payton’s lawyer] further asserted, ‘Plaintiffs do not have to show up to
       arbitration because the arbitration court has no jurisdiction over their
       cases that seek more than $50K. So, no matter what, we would not show
       up to arbitration.’ (Id. at ¶ 5). [Myers’ and Payton’s lawyer] maintained
       that ‘[p]laintiff Myers would never attend an arbitration proceeding on
       a police brutality case and would just no-show and appeal for a jury.
       The whole arbitration ‘scheme’ has no traction on this road.’ (Id. at ¶
       10).

Trial Ct. Op., 5/25/22, at 4. Myers’ and Payton’s lawyer did not deny making any
of these comments in this appeal, rather he defended making them, as follows:

       Second, it is true that the undersigned said, in an email to [the police
       officers’] counsel, “We will get our trial date after we intentionally fail
       to show up for that stupid ass arbitration ‘scheme’ next month.”
       Counsel is well within his rights to express righteous indignation[6] in
       the face of manifest injustice, and he should not be punished for his
       protected speech. U.S. Const. amend. I. [The police officers’] argument
       should be rejected to the extent that it implies that [Myers’ and
       Payton’s] rights should be denied because they have a negative view of
       the arbitration program’s appropriateness for this case. Rosenberger v.
       Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829-830 (1995)(observing that viewpoint
       discrimination violates the First Amendment).

Appellants’ Reply Br. at 7.

6
   As our Superior Court aptly set forth in Hall v. Reeb, 555 A.2d 926, 928 (Pa. Super. 1989),
“[w]e do not, under any circumstances countenance the temerity of any member of the bar who
instructs or encourages a party to intentionally fail to appear at a scheduled arbitration
hearing . . . .” Rather, we exhort all members of the bar to thoroughly research their positions, as
knowledge and understanding can remove the blinders that far too often accompany righteous
indignation.

                                                 7
   A. Myers’ and Payton’s Arguments on Appeal
      In this appeal, Myers and Payton argue the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to grant their petition for relief from its judgment of non pros because they
had a legitimate excuse for not attending arbitration. Myers and Payton argue that
pursuant to the plain language of 42 Pa.C.S. § 7361(b)(2)(i), compulsory arbitration
programs do not have jurisdiction to hear cases where the litigants request more than
$50,000 in damages. See Appellants’ Br. at 10. To support this position, Myers and
Payton cite Robert Half International Inc. v. Marlton Technologies, Inc., 902 A.2d
519, 529 (Pa. Super. 2006), for the proposition that “the monetary limits of
compulsory arbitration are jurisdictional.” Accordingly, Myers and Payton believe
that their request for over $50,000 of damages “automatically divested” the
arbitration program of jurisdiction, excusing them from participation. Appellants’
Br. at 11-12.
      Even if the arbitration program was not automatically divested of jurisdiction,
Myers and Payton argue they were excused from attending arbitration because Judge
Anders erred in placing this case in arbitration. Although Myers and Payton concede
that a trial court “can determine an amount in controversy” pursuant to Pennsylvania
Rule of Civil Procedure 1021(d) (Rule 1021(d)), they argue Rule 1021(d) requires a
trial court to “first hav[e] a basis for its determination by obtaining actual evidence
through ‘discovery, pretrial conference, hearing or otherwise.’” See Appellants’ Br.
at 13 (quoting Pa.R.Civ.P. 1021(d)). Since the trial court issued its decision before
receiving any evidence, Myers and Payton argue it failed to follow the procedure set
forth in Rule 1021(d) for referring the case to compulsory arbitration.
      Myers and Payton also argue the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
grant their petition for relief from its judgment of non pros because Pennsylvania’s

                                          8
Constitution and statutes guarantee them a right to a trial by jury. See Appellants’
Br. at 15-16. Since they demanded a jury trial in writing, Myers and Payton argue
the trial court violated their right to a jury trial by conditioning their right on
participation in compulsory arbitration and by dismissing their case with prejudice
after they did not participate. Id. at 16.
   B. Compulsory Arbitration – Amount in Controversy
      Pennsylvania’s compulsory arbitration program is governed by Section 7361
of the Judiciary Code, as follows:

      (a) General rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b), when
      prescribed by general rule or rule of court such civil matters or issues
      therein as shall be specified by rule shall first be submitted to and heard
      by a board of three members of the bar of the court.

      (b) Limitations.--No matter shall be referred under subsection (a):

             (1) which involves title to real property; or

             (2) where the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and
             costs, exceeds $50,000.

      (c) Procedure.--The arbitrators appointed pursuant to this section shall
      have such powers and shall proceed in such manner as shall be
      prescribed by general rules.

      (d) Appeal for trial de novo.--Any party to a matter shall have the
      right to appeal for trial de novo in the court. The party who takes the
      appeal shall pay such amount or proportion of fees and costs and shall
      comply with such other procedures as shall be prescribed by general
      rules. In the absence of appeal the judgment entered on the award of the
      arbitrators shall be enforced as any other judgment of the court. For the
      purposes of this section and section 5571 (relating to appeals generally)
      an award of arbitrators constitutes an order of a tribunal.

42 Pa.C.S. § 7361 (bold in original, italics added).

                                             9
      Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1021 establishes a trial court’s
procedure for making a “Determination of Amount in Controversy” as follows:

      (c) In counties having rules governing compulsory arbitration the
      plaintiff shall state whether the amount claimed does or does not exceed
      the jurisdictional amount requiring arbitration referral by local rule.

      (d) The court on its own motion or motion of any party may by
      discovery, pre-trial conference, hearing or otherwise, determine the
      amount actually in controversy and enter an order of reference to
      arbitration.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1021(c), (d) (emphasis added).
      A litigant’s request for damages that exceed Pennsylvania’s compulsory
arbitration limit does not forever divest the compulsory arbitration program of
jurisdiction over the case. Although Myers and Payton are correct in noting that 42
Pa.C.S. § 7361(b)(2) states “[n]o matter shall be referred [to compulsory arbitration]
where the amount in controversy . . . exceeds $50,000,” Myers and Payton are not
correct in their belief that the “amount in controversy” is fixed by the subjective
amount of damages a litigant requests. Instead, Rule 1021(d) recognizes a trial
court’s unique position and authority to determine the “amount actually in
controversy” before trial. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1021(d).
      If trial courts did not have the authority to determine the amount actually in
controversy and refer appropriate cases to arbitration, every litigant who wished to
avoid arbitration would simply request an amount of damages that exceeds the
arbitration limit. This would quickly turn Pennsylvania’s compulsory arbitration
program into a voluntary arbitration program. In Robert Half, the Superior Court
recognized this, as follows:

      The Court of Common Pleas is better equipped through its extensive
      pre-trial processes to determine whether the case truly belongs in the

                                         10
      trial program or in arbitration. The court’s mandatory pretrial
      conferences and case management deadlines put the court in a better
      position to decide if the counterclaim is viable or just a ruse to defeat
      arbitration jurisdiction. . . . Of course, the trial court can also remand
      the case to arbitration if the court resolves through its pre-trial processes
      that the entire case really belongs in arbitration.

Robert Half, 902 A.2d at 529 (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1021(d)) (emphasis added). Thus,
Rule 1021(d) enables trial court judges to prevent litigants from manipulating
Pennsylvania’s compulsory arbitration system. This is a critical function for a trial
court because “abuses of the arbitration system impede the judiciary’s ability to
expeditiously dispose of pending litigation which is the overall objection of
compulsory arbitration.” Hall v. Reeb, 555 A.2d 926, 928 (Pa. Super. 1989).
      In practice, when a litigant requests less than $50,000 in damages and their
case is otherwise eligible for arbitration, a trial court will immediately refer the case
to arbitration. When a litigant requests more than $50,000 in damages, a trial court
will not immediately refer the case to compulsory arbitration. Instead, a trial court
will place the case on a trial track, where it remains until and unless a judge of the
trial court determines the amount actually in controversy is less than $50,000
pursuant to Rule 1021(d). If a trial court judge makes that determination, she then
refers the case to compulsory arbitration. This practice is widely accepted, and it
does not violate 42 Pa.C.S. § 7361(b)(2), because the “amount in controversy” is not
forever fixed by the amount of damages a litigant requests.
      In determining the amount actually in controversy pursuant to Rule 1021(d),
a trial court is not required to consider “evidence,” as Myers and Payton argue. To
the contrary, Rule 1021(d) does not use the word “evidence.” Instead, Rule 1021(d)
permits a trial court to determine the amount actually in controversy “by discovery,
pre-trial conference, hearing or otherwise.” Rule 1021(d)’s use of the disjunctive

                                           11
word “or,” means that any method listed is sufficient by itself. Thus, a trial court
can review only discovery materials and determine the amount actually in
controversy is below the arbitration limit. A trial court could also only conduct a
pre-trial conference or only conduct a hearing and determine the amount actually in
controversy is below the arbitration limit. Each option provides the trial court with
an opportunity to gather information and make an informed decision before trial.
      These methods are not exclusive, however, because Rule 1021(d) also permits
a trial court judge to “otherwise” determine the amount actually in controversy.
Thus, if a trial court judge can obtain sufficient information to make an informed
decision in other ways, Rule 1021(d) permits the trial court judge to do so. In some
cases, a trial court judge may even be able to review the pleadings alone and
determine the amount actually in controversy is below the arbitration limit.
      Myers and Payton alleged in their complaint that the police officers
wrongfully arrested and detained them for approximately one hour or less. They did
not allege in their complaint that they sustained any bodily injuries in the process.
Based on these allegations alone, the trial court determined the amount actually in
controversy was less than $50,000. Under the facts of this case, we cannot say that
the trial court’s determination “reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous.” See
Womer, 908 A.2d at 279.
      Since the trial court’s arbitration program was not automatically and forever
divested of jurisdiction to hear Myers’ and Payton’s case because they requested
greater than $50,000 in damages and the trial court did not fail to follow the
procedures outlined in Rule 1021(d) in referring the case to arbitration, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it determined the arbitration program’s alleged lack

                                           12
of jurisdiction was not a legitimate excuse for Myers’ and Payton’s failure to appear
at arbitration.
    C. Right to Trial by Jury
        Myers and Payton argue the trial court’s judgment of non pros violated their
constitutional7 and statutory8 rights to a jury trial. Appellants’ Br. at 15-16. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has already determined Pennsylvania’s compulsory
arbitration system does not violate a plaintiff’s constitutional right to a jury trial, as
follows:

        It is true, of course, that . . . the [Pennsylvania] Constitution would be
        violated by a statute the effect of which was to compel parties to submit
        to arbitration against their will or without their assent. Indeed
        compulsory arbitration conflicts also with the 14th Amendment of the
        Federal Constitution in that it works a deprivation of property and
        liberty of contract without due process of law. But this is so only where
        the statute closes the courts to litigants and makes the decision of the
        arbitrators the final determination of the rights of the parties; therefore
        there is no denial of the right of trial by jury if the statute preserves
        that right to each of the parties by the allowance of an appeal from
        the decision of the arbitrators or other tribunal. In [Capital
        Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 23 (1899)] it was said, . . . : ‘It [the
        Constitution] does not prescribe at what stage of an action a trial by jury
        must, if demanded, be had, or what conditions may be imposed upon
        the demand of such a trial, consistently with preserving the right to it.’
        The only purpose of the constitutional provision is to secure the right
        of trial by jury before rights of person or property are finally
        determined. All that is required is that the right of appeal for the purpose
        of presenting the issue to a jury must not be burdened by the imposition
        of onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations which would make the
        right practically unavailable.

7
    “Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate.” PA. CONST. art.
I, § 6.
8
    “Except where the right to trial by jury is enlarged by statute, trial by jury shall be as heretofore,
and the right thereof shall remain inviolate.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5104(a).

                                                   13
Application of Smith, 112 A.2d 625, 629–30 (Pa. 1955) (emphasis added).
Pennsylvania’s compulsory arbitration program preserves the right of every litigant
to appeal the determination of a board of arbitrators and receive a trial. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 7361(d). Accordingly, Myers’ and Payton’s general argument9 that
conditioning their right to a jury trial on their participation in arbitration violated
their constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial is without merit.
        Similarly, Myers’ and Payton’s argument that “the trial court deprived [them]
of their right to a jury trial . . . by dismissing their case with prejudice without ever
affording them an opportunity to have a jury assess the merits of their case” is
without merit. See Appellants’ Br. at 16. Myers and Payton had an opportunity to
have a jury assess the merits of their case; that opportunity simply required them to
first participate in arbitration. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 7361(d).
        No plaintiff is entitled to file his complaint and immediately receive a jury
trial. Instead, there are a number of procedural obstacles a litigant must navigate
along the winding path to trial. Typically, a litigant must engage with and cooperate
in discovery, file and brief or defend dispositive motions, attend status conferences,
attend hearings, etc. Although each of these procedures are, in a sense, a condition
on a litigant’s right to a jury trial, they are not so onerous as to make the right to a

9
    Myers and Payton also raised specific arguments for why Pennsylvania law cannot condition
litigants’ rights to a jury trial upon their participation in compulsory arbitration, including: (1) “it
is impossible . . . to participate in ‘good faith’ in arbitration because [Myers and Payton] seek
substantially more damages than the arbitration panel is legally authorized to award,” (2)
“arbitration . . . requires their attorney to engage in frivolous litigation – in violation of Pa. R. Prof.
C. 3.1 – by requesting the arbitration panel to violate the law by awarding [them] more than
$50,000,” and (3) arbitration “requires [them] to waste limited judicial resources by frivolously
litigating their case at an arbitration proceeding that was pre-ordained to be appealed no matter the
outcome.” Appellants’ Br. at 17-18. These specific arguments all lack merit because they rely
upon the assumption that the compulsory arbitration program lacked jurisdiction to hear their case
because they requested greater than $50,000 in damages.

                                                   14
jury trial impracticable. See Application of Smith, 112 A.2d at 30. Accordingly, the
procedures themselves do not violate a litigant’s right to a jury trial. Id.
      If litigants deliberately fail to participate in a trial court’s pretrial procedures,
they do not pass go and wind up at trial. Instead, the trial court will dismiss their
case. Thus, to get to a trial, litigants must actively participate in the court’s pretrial
proceedings. A trial court’s dismissal of a case due to the litigant’s own failure to
pursue his case also does not violate the litigant’s right to a jury trial.
      We see no reason to treat Myers’ and Payton’s deliberate refusal to participate
in compulsory arbitration any differently than if they had refused to engage in other
pretrial proceedings. In this case, Myers’ and Payton’s argument that the trial court
erred in dismissing their case due to their failure to appear at arbitration is even less
compelling, as they do not deny that they received a notice stating:

      This matter will be heard by a board of arbitrators at the time, date and
      place specified but, if one or more of the parties is not present at the
      hearing, the matter may be heard at the same time and date before a
      judge of the court without the absent party or parties. There is no right
      to a trial de novo on appeal from a decision entered by a judge.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1303(a)(2). In addition, a note to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
1303(b)(2) states that “[i]n hearing the matter, the trial court may take action not
available to the arbitrators, including the entry of a nonsuit if the plaintiff is not
ready or a non pros if neither party is ready.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1303(b)(2).
      Thus, Myers and Payton knew the trial court scheduled an arbitration hearing
in their case. Myers and Payton also knew that if they failed to appear at the
arbitration hearing, their case could be heard by a judge in their absence. Myers’
and Payton’s attorney should have also known that if they failed to attend their
arbitration hearing, the trial court could enter a judgment of non pros in their case.

                                            15
Nevertheless, Myers’ and Payton’s attorney referred to arbitration as a “stupid ass
scheme” and refused to attend. As advertised, the trial court entered a judgment of
non pros. Under these facts, it was Myers’ and Payton’s own actions, not the trial
court’s, that denied them an opportunity for a jury trial.
                                  III.   Conclusion
      For the reasons outlined above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Myers’ and Payton’s petition for relief from a judgment of non pros.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order.

                                                ______________________________
                                                STACY WALLACE, Judge

                                          16
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kim Myers and Jarvis Payton,        :
                       Appellants   :
                                    :
           v.                       : No. 275 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Nikolas Romito and Simone           :
Molotsky                            :

                                ORDER

     AND NOW, this 18th day of April 2023, the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered in this matter on March 8, 2022, is
AFFIRMED.

                                    ______________________________
                                    STACY WALLACE, Judge