Court Opinion

ID: 9930096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 11:12:21.611106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:03:28.644786
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                     NO. 03-22-00031-CV

                             Charles “Chip” Weersing, Appellant

                                                v.

                  OneTouchPoint Southwest Corp. d/b/a Ginny’s, Appellee

               FROM THE 126TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
      NO. D-1-GN-19-004820, THE HONORABLE KARIN CRUMP, JUDGE PRESIDING

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Appellant Charles “Chip” Weersing appeals the trial court’s grant of appellee

OneTouchPoint’s (OTP’s) traditional motion for summary judgment in five issues. In his first

issue, Weersing contends that the trial court erred by excluding emails between OTP employees

and Weersing on hearsay grounds. In his second through fourth issues, he contends that the trial

court erred by granting OTP’s summary judgment motion because, as Weersing contends, there

was a genuine issue of material fact for his three pleaded causes of action—breach of contract,

promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit. In his final issue, Weersing contends that the trial

court erred by granting OTP’s motion for summary judgment because “OTP misstated the law

regarding reliance and restitution damages recoverable under” his three pleaded causes of action.

Because we conclude that Weersing was not harmed by the trial court sustaining OTP’s hearsay

objection and that the trial court did not err by granting OTP’s traditional summary judgment

motion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
                                        BACKGROUND

               Weersing worked for OTP, a marketing and supply chain management company,

as an account executive in the sales department. His employment was terminated in December

2012. Weersing was rehired by OTP in January 2014. In October 2014, Weersing brought in the

Condren account as a new account.        In September 2015, Weersing was informed that his

commissions on the account would be reduced to 5.5 percent due to low profitability of the

account. Weersing alleged that the profitability issues were entirely the fault of OTP and out of

his control. In May 2016, the commissions were reduced to 3 percent. In August of 2019,

Weersing resigned from the company. Weersing filed his breach of contract suit against OTP

alleging that he was promised 8 percent commissions on all new accounts for the first two years

and then 5.5 percent commissions after that.

               OTP filed a motion for traditional summary judgment. In support of its motion, it

attached copies of two documents that are both titled “Payroll/Personnel Status Change

Request.” The first payroll document is dated December 27, 2012 and documents Weersing’s

termination from the company.        The second is dated January 29, 2014 and documents

Weersing’s rehire with the company. The rehire document lists Weersing’s job title as an

account executive. Under a section for “other comments,” the document states, “earns 8%

com[mission] on everything until we transition com[mission] plan then he gets [standard] plan.” 1

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           The record is unclear regarding what the terms of the “standard plan” referenced in the
payroll form were. OTP’s chief operating officer, Chris Greene, testified in his deposition that in
January 2014 the standard plan was 8 percent on new accounts for two years and then 5.5 percent
after that, but that the company maintained discretion to reduce the percentage based on
profitability factors. However, Weersing testified in his deposition that he was told at the time
he was hired that he would start at an 8 percent commission rate, which would change to the
standard plan “once they came up with one.”
                                                2
Both    payroll     documents     include   an    “officer   authorization”   signature   but   not

Weersing’s signature.

                  OTP also attached excerpts of Weersing’s deposition transcript, which as relevant

here included the following highlighted portions of testimony: when asked to describe how

commissions work at OTP, Weersing stated “Well, when I was hired back, I was hired at an 8

percent commission rate and was told that that would change to the standard plan once they came

up with one”; when asked what the terms of his contract for commissions was, he stated that “it

was 8 percent for two years on all new work and 5 and a half percent thereafter,” but that there

“was not a timeline” for when the transition to the standard plan would take place and that

“nothing was ever signed,” and that in exchange for his promised commission rate he promised

future work without a set timeframe; and when asked if the contract was written or oral,

Weersing testified that it was written and that the contract was his rehire document and admitted

that it did not include what he promised to do in exchange for a set commission rate.

                  OTP also attached an unsworn declaration by Chris Greene, who was the chief

operating officer of OTP at the time of trial. Green stated that “OTP has always had a policy of

adjusting commissions on accounts when they are not sufficiently profitable,” that this was “a

long-standing policy that all OTP salespersons knew or should have known,” and that the

Condren account “was never particularly profitable.” OTP also attached exhibits showing that

the Condren account had lower profitability than other accounts managed by OTP.

                  Weersing provided the following evidence in opposition to OTP’s summary

judgment motion: excerpts from his own deposition with highlighted portions that focused on

Weersing’s testimony that he expected to receive 8 percent commission on the Condren account

and explaining his reasoning for his belief that the low profitability of the account was the fault

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of others in OTP and not his own; excerpts from the deposition of Greene that focused on

discussion of the production issues that affected the Condren account; a copy of the rehire

payroll form; and a series of emails sent from or to Weersing regarding his commissions for the

Condren account.

               OTP objected on hearsay grounds to the emails that Weersing included in his

summary judgment evidence. Weersing responded, arguing that the objections were too vague

and arguing that various hearsay exceptions applied. The trial court sustained OTP’s hearsay

objection to the emails. The trial court granted OTP’s traditional motion for summary judgment

and dismissed Weersing’s three causes of action with prejudice. Weersing appealed.

                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW

               A party moving for traditional summary judgment must demonstrate that “there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). “We review summary judgments de novo, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-movant, crediting evidence favorable to the non-movant if

reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.”

Zive v. Sandberg, 644 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. 2022). When, as here, the trial court does not

specify the grounds for granting the motion, we must uphold the judgment if any of the grounds

asserted in the motion and preserved for appellate review are meritorious. See Provident Life &

Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003). A genuine issue of material fact

exists if it “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their

conclusions.” First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220

(Tex. 2017) (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)).

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Evidence does not create an issue of material fact if it is “so weak as to do no more than create a

mere surmise or suspicion” that the fact exists. Id. (citing Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 432 S.W.3d

865, 875 (Tex. 2014)).

               We review evidentiary rulings, including those connected to a summary judgment

motion, for an abuse of discretion. See Starwood Management LLC v. Swaim, 530 S.W.3d 673,

678 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam). We do so by considering whether the trial court acted “without

reference to any guiding rules and principles.” Id. Even if evidence was erroneously excluded,

we will not reverse unless appellant shows that the error was harmful. Texas Dep’t of Transp.

v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. 2000); Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a).

                                           ANALYSIS

The Excluded Emails

               Weersing contends that the trial court erred by excluding a set of emails

discussing the reductions in his commission rate based on hearsay. He contends that OTP’s

hearsay objection was too vague and that the statements in the emails were admissible because

multiple hearsay exceptions applied. In contending that the exclusion of the emails was harmful

error, Weersing alleges that “each email, in itself, created a genuine issue of material fact that

precluded summary judgment.” Contained within the emails sent by Weersing are the following

statements that we understand Weersing to allege would have created a genuine issue of material

fact if not excluded: “My deal made long ago was for 8%,” and, “My deal I made long ago was

for 8% commission.” We also understand the statement from the work email sent to Weersing

that he contends would have created a genuine issue of material fact to be, “This change does not

have to be forever.” We further understand Weersing to contend that his reference to a “deal”

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and his manager’s acknowledgment that there had been a “change” to his commission rate to be

evidence of a contract between the parties for an 8 percent commission rate.

               Evidence of OTP’s acknowledgment that Weersing’s commission rate had been

changed and Weersing’s assertion that he had a “deal” for 8 percent commission also appeared in

the summary judgment evidence considered by the court. Specifically, Greene testified that

Weersing’s commission was set at 8 percent with a plan to transition to a standard plan and

Greene’s declaration stated that the company had a policy of adjusting commissions on accounts

based on profitability. Weersing testified during his deposition that his “deal was 8 percent.”

Thus, the complained of excluded statements are cumulative and any error was harmless. See

Able, 35 S.W.3d at 617–18 (holding that even if exclusion of evidence was error, it was harmless

error because excluded evidence was cumulative).

               Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred by excluding the emails, we

conclude that any error was harmless. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). We overrule Weersing’s

first issue.

Breach of Contract

               Weersing contends that the trial court erred by granting OTP’s traditional

summary judgment motion and dismissing his breach of contract claim because, as he contends,

the summary judgment evidence established a genuine issue of material fact. “The essential

elements of a breach-of-contract claim are: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance

or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4)

damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach.” Valero Mktg. & Supply Co.

v. Kalama Int’l, L.L.C., 51 S.W.3d 345, 351 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

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               The first element, whether there was a valid contract, is dispositive here.

Weersing contends that the payroll form is either a written unilateral contract or is evidence of an

oral unilateral contract to pay Weersing 8 percent commission on all new accounts for two years,

and that the written or oral unilateral contract became binding when Weersing performed under

the contract. “A unilateral contract . . . is created by the promisor promising a benefit if the

promisee performs. The contract becomes enforceable when the promisee performs.” Vanegas

v. American Energy Services, 302 S.W.3d 299, 302 (Tex. 2009) (cleaned up). OTP contends that

there was no contract for a fixed commission rate. Specifically, OTP relies on its summary

judgment evidence of the rehire payroll form that states that the commission rate may be

changed at an indefinite time, it’s corporate officer’s testimony that the company had a long

standing policy of adjusting commission rates to match profitability of accounts, and the lack of

any specific terms in the rehire payroll form regarding what Weersing was required to do for an

account before being entitled to a commission.

               The record is silent regarding what performance Weersing had to complete on an

account for the commission to vest his 8 percent commission. Weersing contends that his

required performance was to perform his job duties as an account executive. In his summary

judgment response and reply filed in the trial court he alleged that his commission had vested

when he performed as required. However, there is nothing in the summary judgment evidence of

what was required of him for the commissions to vest, that he did that specific thing, or when it

happened to create a fact issue that would preclude summary judgment. See American Petrofina,

Inc. v. Allen, 887 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex. 1994) (“A mere pleading or a response to the summary

judgment motion does not satisfy this burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to

prevent summary judgment.”). Additionally, the record is silent regarding who Weersing made

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the alleged oral contract with and how that person had the authority to bind the company to such

an agreement.

                Because OTP’s evidence demonstrated that there is not a genuine issue of

material fact regarding the existence of a contract and Weersing’s evidence does no more than

create a mere surmise or suspicion that the fact exists, we conclude that the trial court did not err

by dismissing Weersing’s breach of contract claim. We overrule Weersing’s second issue.

Quantum Meruit

                Weersing’s third issue contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his

quantum meruit cause of action. Quantum meruit is an equitable remedy based on the promise

implied by law to pay for beneficial services rendered and knowingly accepted when there is no

express contract for the services.        Vortt Exploration Co., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,

787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex.1990). To recover under the equitable theory of quantum meruit, the

claimant must prove that:

       (1) valuable services were rendered or materials furnished; (2) for the person
       sought to be charged; (3) which services and materials were accepted by the
       person sought to be charged, used and enjoyed by him; (4) under such
       circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the
       plaintiff in performing such services was expecting to be paid by the person
       sought to be charged.

Id. Recovery of damages is proper when nonpayment would result in unjust enrichment to the

party that benefited from the work. Id.

                Because it is dispositive, we address the fourth element of quantum meruit. OTP

provided uncontroverted evidence that it was a longtime policy of the company to reduce

commissions on an account based on profitability. Furthermore, the payroll form documenting

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Weersing’s rehire stated the company’s intention to transition Weersing to a different plan with

an unspecified rate at an unspecified time. The record is silent regarding any reasonable notice

to the company at the time he was hired that Weersing expected a fixed commission rate contrary

to company policy.

               Because OTP’s evidence established that there is no genuine issue as to a material

fact regarding reasonable notice to OTP of any expectation by Weersing of a fixed commission

rate contrary to company policy, the trial court did not err by dismissing Weersing’s quantum

meruit cause of action. We overrule Weersing’s third issue.

Promissory Estoppel

               Weersing’s fourth issue contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his

promissory estoppel cause of action. We understand Weersing to contend that his initial and

continuing work on the Condren account, including work done after his commission was

reduced, was done in reliance that all commissions for two years would be at a fixed 8 percent

rate. He testified in his deposition that he would not have worked at OTP at all if he was not

offered a fixed 8 percent commission rate.

               Weersing testified in his deposition that he “was hired at an 8 percent commission

rate and was told that that would change to the standard plan once they came up with one.” He

also testified that “in 2014, it was 8 percent until they transitioned to another plan.· We really

never got another plan, but it was told to us that it was 8 percent for two years on all new work

and 5 and a half percent thereafter.” When asked what he understood the timeline to be to

transition to the “standard plan” he testified that “[t]here was no timeline.” Greene stated in his

declaration that it had been a long-time company policy that all employees should know that the

                                                9
commission rate would be adjusted based on profitability. Additionally, Weersing’s rehire

payroll form reads, “earns 8% on everything until we transition com[mission] plan, then he gets

[standard] plan.”

               “The requisites of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise, (2) foreseeability of

reliance thereon by the promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment.”

English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1983). Weersing’s testimony that he was hired at

8 percent commission until that was changed to a standard plan and that no timeline was ever

given combined with Greene’s uncontroverted testimony that the company had a long-time

policy of adjusting commissions based on the profitability of an account, renders the alleged

“promise” “too vague and indefinite to be enforced in a suit for promissory estoppel.” Ellen

v. F.H. Partners, LLC, No. 03-09-00310-CV, 2010 WL 4909973, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin

Dec. 1, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Gilmartin v. KVTV-Channel 13, 985 S.W.2d 553,

558-59 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Further, the “[r]eliance on the promise must be

reasonable and justified.” Gilmartin, 985 S.W.2d at 558. Here, the alleged promise came with

“no specific length of time and with no clear limit on the employer’s freedom of action” resulting

in the reliance being based on “subjective expectations and was unjustified.” Collins v. Allied

Pharmacy Mgmt., Inc., 871 S.W.2d 929, 938 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

               Because OTP’s evidence established that there is no genuine issue of material fact

of a promise that was reasonably relied on, the trial court did not err in dismissing Weersing’s

promissory estoppel claim. We overrule Weersing’s fourth claim.

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Damages

                 Weersing’s final issue contends that the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment because OTP misstated the law regarding damages for all three causes of action.

Because we have concluded that OTP is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it

demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding an element or elements for

each cause of action other than damages, we do not need to address his final issue. See Tex. R.

App. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as

practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of

the appeal.”).

                                         CONCLUSION

                 Because we overruled Weersing’s first four issues and did not reach his fifth, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing his three causes of action on traditional

summary judgment.

                                              __________________________________________
                                              Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Smith
 Dissenting Opinion by Justice Triana

Affirmed

Filed: January 31, 2024

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