Court Opinion

ID: 9634938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:29:40.274894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:07.196952
License: Public Domain

*403
Levine, J.,

dissenting:

Because in my view the result in this case reduces Maryland Rule 530 to a virtual nullity, Í respectfully dissent.
The basic flaw in the majority opinion lies in its undue emphasis on the amount of discretion vested in the trial judge. At the same time, it merely pays lip service to the limitation in Rule 580 that its operation be suspended only where “good cause” is shown. Where, as in this case, the record is utterly barren of any circumstance sufficient to constitute good cause, no policy favoring the free exercise of judicial discretion can justify suspension of the involuntary dismissal rule.
The majority conspicuously avoids any reference to the four grounds cited by Langrall in support of its motion to suspend Rule 530. These were: that Langrall’s very own motion for summary judgment filed with the original declaration two years earlier had never been scheduled for hearing; that three depositions had been taken — all at the instance of the Gladdings — during the two years following institution of the action; that the litigation was of a complex nature; and that the calendar of plaintiffs’ counsel was congested. Even when considered collectively, the reasons offered by appellant were so grossly deficient in terms of satisfying the “good cause” requirement that the motion to suspend was simply unworthy of consideration.
“Good cause,” when required to forestall dismissal of an action for want of prosecution, as in Rule 580 c, contemplates a “substantial reason” for suspension of operation. State v. Churchill, 82 Ariz. 375, 313 P. 2d 753, 756 (1957). “There roust be something upon which a discretion can rest.” Dunsmuir Masonic Temple v. Siskiyou County Sup. Ct., 12 Cal. App.3d 17, 90 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (1970) (emphasis in original). As J udge Lowe stated below for the Court of Special Appeals, “a showing of good cause presupposes a showing of some cause.” Gladding v. Langrall, Muir & Nopp’r, 36 Md. App. 225, 233, 373 A. 2d 958 (1977) (emphasis in original). The discretion vested in the trial judge in this context “is not an arbitrary or unrestrained discretion.” Little v. Sullivan, 173 So. 2d 135, 136-37 (Fla. 1965).
*404This Court considered the “good cause” requirement in Stanford v. District Title Insur., 260 Md. 550, 555, 273 A. 2d 190 (1971), where the dismissal of an action under Rule 530 was affirmed on appeal. There Judge Digges said for the Court:
“[Rule 530 c] permits the trial judge to allow a brief reprieve where it is affirmatively demonstrated that total inaction has been justified____The primary focus of his inquiry should be on diligence and whether there has been a sufficient amount of it during an eighteen month period of inaction for the court to affirmatively conclude that the case should not be automatically dismissed.” (emphasis added).
The reasons advanced by Langrall simply do not withstand the scrutiny mandated by these requirements of Rule 530. What the Court of Special Appeals said in this regard is especially apposite:
“First, [Langrall’s] unresolved motion for summary judgment is as much its responsibility as the unresolved case itself____ (citation omitted) Secondly, how the Gladdings’ taking of depositions indicates Langrall’s diligence is ‘rather hard to understand.’ Thirdly, that [Langrall] only realized the complexity of the case after the depositions taken by [Gladding] seems quite the contrary of diligence, and if counsel’s congested calendar is good cause for overriding the dismissal rule established to overcome delay, the Court of Appeals had best repeal its rule.” 36 Md. App. at 233 (emphasis in original).
With this assessment of Langrall’s reasons, I most certainly agree. Those grounds fell far short of that affirmative demonstration of diligence the rule required of Langrall during the two years its claim lay dormant.
I do not quarrel with a general presumption that the trial judge acts in the proper exercise of his discretion. But that presumption is not absolute and irrefutable. We should not *405presume an exercise of sound discretion where, as here, the record affirmatively discloses a lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff contrary to the requirement of the rule.
Nor do I question the proposition that it is the responsibility of the party who brings the appeal to furnish a transcript of proceedings in the trial court. This principle, however, should not be permitted to obscure the issue actually presented by this case, which is whether Langrall made an affirmative showing of good cause and not, as the majority apparently holds in contravention of Stanford, whether Gladding established “a lack of good cause.”
Propounding what amounts to nothing more than a “red herring” argument, Langrall makes much of the fact that Gladding failed to produce a transcript of the proceedings before the trial judge; however, at no point does Langrall suggest that any testimony was ever presented in support of its motion to suspend. Absent any assertion to the contrary, I would refrain from engaging in fantastical speculation and would accept Gladding’s representation that no such testimony was, in fact, ever produced. Indeed, as I view the record in this case, it is apparent that beyond the motion itself, nothing was offered to the trial judge save for mere argument of counsel.
Rule 321 b is explicit in providing that where a motion is founded on facts not apparent from the record or from papers on file in the proceeding, it “shall be supported by affidavit and shall be accompanied by the papers on which it is based.” No such affidavit or papers are contained in the record here. See Ventresca v. Weaver Brothers, 266 Md. 398, 402, 292 A. 2d 656 (1972). Absent a stipulation by opposing counsel, any possible statements of fact made during the argument in chambers could not elevate the reasons set out in the motion here to a showing of good cause.
Since the record is absolutely devoid of any evidence tending to show that Langrall had good cause for failing to prosecute its claim, I find myself unable to agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the motion to suspend operation of the dismissal rule. In my opinion, the majority’s decision not only *406may emasculate Rule 530, but may foster neglect and carelessness in the practice of law which, in light of present day sentiments, the legal profession can ill afford. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.