Court Opinion

ID: 9555629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 16:16:20.351124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:45.221398
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 8, 2023

                                    In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                   For The

                         First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                  NOS. 01-21-00523-CR & 01-21-00524-CR
                          ———————————
            DIAWANNAH CORTEASHER THOMAS, Appellant
                                      V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                  On Appeal from the 208th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                  Trial Court Case Nos. 1661383 & 1661384

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted appellant Diawannah Corteasher Thomas of the offenses of

felony murder and aggravated assault on a public servant by threat with a deadly
weapon.1 The trial court assessed her punishment at two concurrent 34-year terms

of confinement in prison. On appeal, Thomas argues that (1) the evidence was

insufficient to support her conviction for aggravated assault of a public servant and

(2) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for felony murder.

Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support both convictions,

we affirm the judgment for both convictions.2

                                    Background

      In the early morning hours of January 21, 2020, off-duty police officer H.

Recinos observed a large U-Haul moving truck parked directly in front of the closed

Sunny’s Food Mart. Recinos noticed the vehicle and several individuals running in

and out of the store. He then called 9-1-1 to report his suspicions that the business

was being burglarized.

      Officer M. Daily, who was assigned by the Houston Police Department to

patrol the area where Recinos saw the suspected burglary in progress, located the U-

Haul near the reported area shortly after Recinos’s 9-1-1 call. Officer Daily followed

1
      See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(3) (felony murder); id. § 22.02(a)(2) (aggravated
      assault with deadly weapon); id. § 22.02(b)(2)(B) (elevating aggravated assault to
      first-degree felony when committed against public servant).
2
      Thomas was indicted for the offense of aggravated assault in trial court cause
      number 1661383, resulting in appellate cause number 01-21-00523-CR. Thomas
      was indicted for the offense of felony murder in trial court cause number 1661384,
      resulting in appellate cause number 01-21-00524-CR.

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the U-Haul in a marked police unit. He observed the U-Haul driving erratically,

failing to signal turns, and running a stop sign. Because of this, Officer Daily

activated the patrol unit’s lights and sirens to initiate a traffic stop. The U-Haul then

sped off through the neighborhood, running stop signs, and red lights.

      Thomas, who was later identified as the driver, and her co-actors Denise

Miles, James Robertson, and Lance Prater fled from Officer Daily in the U-Haul.

Other HPD officers, including Officers B. Aber and S. Precour, joined Officer Daily

in attempting to stop Thomas. The chase that ensued lasted approximately 26

minutes, covering over 25 miles of commercial and residential areas. In the course

of the chase, two of Thomas’s co-actors jumped out of the U-Haul. This resulted in

Prater, the complainant in the felony murder case, being run over by Thomas in the

U-Haul as he attempted to exit the truck. As she fled police, Thomas also struck a

police vehicle, injuring Officer Precour. Thomas was finally stopped when officers

deployed a spike strip.

      At trial, Officers Daily, Precour, and others testified that Thomas drove

erratically, recklessly, and dangerously, exceeding 80 miles per hour while

committing numerous traffic violations. The jury was also presented with body

camera footage and other videos of the events that occurred in the chase. At one

point during the chase, as Thomas slowed to make a U-turn, Officer Daily observed

Robertson climb out of the front passenger window and jump from the vehicle to

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flee on foot. Robertson sustained no injuries. Prater then attempted the same but

clung to the extended passenger side mirror after exiting the window as Thomas

accelerated out of the slow U-turn. Prater clung to the mirror for over a minute

despite his feet dragging on the pavement below as Thomas continued to speed and

drive erratically. The danger of Prater’s situation was clear to Officer Daily, yet

Thomas continued the high-speed chase.

      Officer Daily testified that, as the U-Haul sped down a service road of the 610

Loop with Prater clinging to the side mirror, Thomas veered the U-Haul sharply to

the left and then sharply back to the right to avoid colliding with a motorcycle turning

onto the same 610 service road from North Main Street. These maneuvers shook

Prater from the passenger side mirror and swept his body under the U-Haul. Thomas

ran over Prater with the back axle of the U-Haul and then continued to flee the police.

The assistant medical examiner testified that Prater’s death was caused by contact

with a vehicle. Thomas’s U-Haul was the only vehicle that contacted Prater’s body.

      The chase continued into a residential neighborhood with multiple police units

in pursuit. There, Officers Daily, Aber, and Precour, all in marked police units with

lights and sirens activated, witnessed the U-Haul lose control and crash into a tree

with large low-hanging branches in a resident’s front lawn. Thinking Thomas would

stop, or the U-Haul would be disabled from the collision, officers attempted to

surround the vehicle with their police units to perform a “felony stop.”

                                           4
      Thomas, however, refused to stop and turned directly into the driver’s side of

Officers Aber and Precour’s police unit as they attempted to block the U-Haul’s

forward path. The collision occurred in the street before the police unit had entered

the front lawn where Thomas had crashed. Multiple officers testified to the

availability of other routes of escape which would have avoided contact with the

police unit. Damage resulting from the collision included a broken front axle and

shattered driver’s side window, disabling the police unit and injuring Officer

Precour’s knee.

      Undeterred by the damage, Thomas continued to flee in the U-Haul. The chase

finally ended several minutes after a successful deployment of spike strips by an

HPD officer. Thomas tried to keep going on bare tire rims, but she and co-actor

Miles eventually surrendered to police. The U-Haul sustained “substantial” damage

during the chase. Additionally, large amounts of stolen alcohol, stolen clothing, and

criminal tools were found in the U-Haul.

      The jury found Thomas guilty of felony murder in connection with Prater’s

death. The jury also found her guilty of aggravated assault of a public servant for

striking Officer Precour’s vehicle with the U-Haul, which the jury found she used as

a deadly weapon. The trial court assessed two 34-year sentences to run concurrently.

Thomas now appeals both judgments of conviction.

                                           5
                                Standard of Review

      In two issues on appeal, Thomas contends that the evidence presented at trial

was insufficient to support the first-degree felony convictions of (1) felony murder

and (2) aggravated assault on a public servant by threat with a deadly weapon. To

assess the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, all

evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine

whether, based on evenly weighted direct and circumstantial evidence, in addition

to reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, a rational juror could have found

all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979) (holding that it is “the responsibility of the

trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to

draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts”).

      If a rational trier of fact could have found all essential elements of the alleged

crime beyond a reasonable doubt, then the evidence is considered legally sufficient.

See Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (affirming that

“sufficiency-of-the-evidence reviews . . . should be conducted under the well-

established Jackson standard”). The reviewing court may rely on events occurring

before, during, or after the commission of the offense to conclude on the sufficiency

of the evidence. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Guevara v. State,

                                           6
152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Should the evidence contain any

inconsistencies, they are resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d

394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

                                   Felony Murder

      In her sole issue under appellate cause number 01-21-00524-CR, Thomas

argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for the offense of

felony murder in connection with Prater’s death because her actions were not

sufficient to cause his death.

A.    Relevant Law

      A person commits the offense of felony murder when a person

      commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and
      in the course and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in
      immediate flight from the commission or attempt, [she] commits or
      attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes
      the death of an individual.

TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(3). The trial court instructed the jury that it should find

Thomas guilty if it found beyond reasonable doubt that she committed or attempted

to commit the felony offense of evading arrest or detention in a motor vehicle, and

while in furtherance of that crime, she committed or attempted to commit an act

clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of Prater.

      Appellant conceded that all elements of felony evading arrest were satisfied

by the evidence presented at trial. See id. § 38.04(b)(2) (evading arrested elevated to

                                          7
felony when vehicle used and injury to another directly results). Thomas challenges,

instead, the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the “but for” causation of Prater’s

death, alleging that Prater’s actions created a concurrent cause sufficient to cause his

death independent of any of Thomas’s own actions.

      The Penal Code speaks directly to the nature of causation required to hold a

person criminally liable: the actor “is criminally responsible if the result would not

have occurred but for [her] conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with

another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the

result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.” Id. § 6.04(a); Cyr v. State,

665 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). “But for” causation is not satisfied

where an actor’s conduct is a mere contributing factor to the resulting injury. See

Cyr, 665 S.W.3d at 558; see also Medina v. State, 962 S.W.2d 83, 86–87 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d) (holding that police chasing defendant’s

car was not clearly sufficient concurrent cause, and defendant hitting victim’s car

after running red light was not clearly insufficient cause of victim’s injuries).

However, “an actor need not be the sole cause of the harm.” Cyr, 665 S.W.3d at 557.

“Where two or more causes satisfy ‘but for’ causation, a criminal defendant remains

liable if her conduct was either sufficient to have caused the result alone ‘regardless

of the existence of a concurrent cause,’ or both causes ‘together’ were sufficient to

                                           8
cause the result.” Id. (quoting Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1986) (emphasis in original)).

B.    Analysis

      Here, the evidence at trial demonstrated that Prater’s death occurred during

Thomas’s commission of felony evading arrest as she attempted to evade police in

the U-Haul. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 6.04(a), 38.04(b)(2). The evidence and

testimony detailed Thomas’s reckless driving, which a rational jury could have

determined constituted “an act clearly dangerous to human life.” See id.

§ 19.02(b)(3). Following the U-Haul throughout the chase, Officer Daily noted the

numerous traffic violations that Thomas committed while she fled. Thomas’s driving

in the large U-Haul truck was erratic; she was observed speeding, swerving through

lanes of traffic, running stop signs and red lights, nearly colliding with other

motorists, crashing into a residential front yard, and ramming a police unit.

Thomas’s dangerous and reckless driving occurred “in the course and in furtherance

of the commission or attempt” of felony evading arrest. See id. Operating a large

motor vehicle recklessly during the commission of a felony satisfies the requirement

of “an act clearly dangerous to human life.” See e.g., Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d

360, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (concluding that driving Jeep towing trailer across

center-line constituted act clearly dangerous to human life); Carter v. State, No. 01-

07-00301-CR, 2008 WL 5177903, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 11,

                                          9
2008, pet. struck) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming felony

murder conviction based on commission of acts clearly dangerous to human life in

course of felony DWI, including by failing to maintain single lane of traffic, failing

to take proper evasive action, failing to control his speed, failing to properly use

safety appliances, and failing to maintain proper lookout).

      Thomas argues that Prater’s actions—i.e., exiting the U-Haul while in motion

and hanging from the side mirror—were a sufficient concurrent cause of his death

regardless of her own actions. While Prater’s actions were dangerous, they are not

“clearly sufficient to produce the result” or to render Thomas’s own conduct “clearly

insufficient” to cause Prater’s death. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.04(a); Cyr, 665

S.W.3d at 557–58. Prater’s actions in exiting the U-Haul through the passenger

window and hanging on the side mirror were a contributing factor to his death. But

his death would not have occurred but for Thomas’s conduct in speeding up,

continuing to drive, and swerving erratically while Prater clung to the side of the

vehicle. See Cyr, 665 S.W.3d at 557 (holding that “an actor need not be the sole

cause of the harm” and remains criminally liable “if her conduct was either sufficient

to have caused the result alone ‘regardless of the existence of a concurrent cause,’

or both causes ‘together’ were sufficient to cause the result); see also Medina, 962

S.W.2d at 86–87 (holding that “to have established police conduct as a concurrent

cause, appellant had to do more than simply show that the police actions contributed

                                         10
to the result”; rather, appellant “had to show that the conduct of the police . . . was

sufficient to produce the result”).

      Co-actor Robertson was able to climb out of the U-Haul’s passenger window

and jump from the vehicle without injury as Thomas decreased speed to perform a

U-turn. Prater then attempted the same action. But, as Prater exited the vehicle,

Thomas accelerated out of the U-turn to continue to evade the police, forcing Prater

to cling to the extended side mirror of the U-Haul rather than allowing him to get

clear of the vehicle as Robertson had done. Although Prater was clinging to the

extended side mirror for over a minute while his feet dragged on the pavement

below, Thomas never slowed and continued to drive erratically to avoid collisions

with other motorists. This ultimately resulted in Prater losing his grip on the mirror,

being pulled under the U-Haul, and run over by the back wheels, causing his death.

Thomas’s actions of continuing to speed and drive erratically while committing the

offense of evading arrest cannot be considered a mere contributing factor to Prater’s

death. See Cyr, 665 S.W.3d at 557–58. But for Thomas’s hazardous driving, Prater

would not have been shaken from the side of the U-Haul and swept under its rear

axle. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(3); § 6.04(a).

      Thus, we conclude that a rational jury could have determined beyond a

reasonable doubt that Thomas committed or attempted to commit the felony offense

of evading arrest or detention in a motor vehicle, and while in furtherance of that

                                          11
crime, she committed or attempted to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life

that caused the death of Prater. See id. § 19.02(b)(3); Robinson, 466 S.W.3d at 173.

We overrule Thomas’s sole issue in cause number 01-21-00524-CR.

                    Aggravated Assault with Deadly Weapon

      In her sole issue under appellate cause number 01-21-00523-CR, Thomas

argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for the offense of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Specifically, she contends that the

evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that she acted intentionally or knowingly

in striking Officer Precour’s vehicle with the U-Haul and to demonstrate that she

used the U-Haul as a deadly weapon.

A.    Relevant Law

      A person commits the offense of aggravated assault on a public servant by

threat with a deadly weapon when a person “commits assault as defined by

§ 22.01”—i.e., intentionally or knowingly threatens imminent bodily injury to

another—and the actor “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of

the assault” against “a person the actor knows is a public servant while the public

servant is lawfully discharging an official duty.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2),

(b)(2)(B); § 22.01(a)(2); see Cuevas v. State, 576 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Tex. Crim. App.

2019) (holding that peace officers discharge official duty anytime they enforce

provisions of Texas code which they are bound by statute to enforce). “The actor is

                                         12
presumed to have known the person assaulted was a public servant or a security

officer if the person was wearing a distinctive uniform or badge indicating the

person’s employment as a public servant or status as a security officer.” TEX. PENAL

CODE § 22.02(c).

      “A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his

conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to

engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(a). “A person acts knowingly,

or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his

conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(b). “Intent is almost

always proven by circumstantial evidence.” Trevino v. State, 228 S.W.3d 729, 736

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006, pet. ref’d); see also Hart v. State, 89

S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“Direct evidence of the requisite intent is

not required[.]”); Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding that “[p]roof of a mental state, such as intent, must

almost always be proved by circumstantial evidence and that jury may infer intent

to kill from use of deadly weapon). “A jury may infer intent from any facts which

tend to prove its existence, including the acts, words, and conduct of the accused,

the method of committing the crime, and from the nature of wounds inflicted on the

victims.” Trevino, 228 S.W.3d at 736.

                                          13
      A vehicle is considered a deadly weapon if used in a manner that may result

in serious bodily injury or death to others. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(17)(B);

see also Moore v. State, 520 S.W.3d 906, 908–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (holding

that vehicle is considered deadly weapon when driven in manner that can cause

death; no intent to actually cause death or serious bodily injury need be shown). In

determining whether a vehicle is a deadly weapon, the way it was used during the

crime is assessed to see whether it could have caused death or serious bodily injury.

See Sierra v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250, 255–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that

“dangerous and reckless driving and the violation of traffic laws” are determinative

factors in deadly weapon finding). Mere existence of a “hypothetical potential for

danger” is insufficient. See Cates v. State, 102 S.W.3d 735, 738–39 (Tex. Crim. App.

2003) (finding no deadly weapon in failure to stop and render aid, because no

evidence of speeding, violating traffic laws, or endangering others while driving

vehicle at time of or after offense).

      At trial, the jury was instructed that it should find Thomas guilty if it found

beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally or knowingly threatened Officer

Precour with imminent bodily injury by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon—

namely, the U-Haul truck—while she knew that Officer Precour was a public servant

discharging an official duty.

                                         14
B.    Analysis

      Thomas challenges the sufficiency of evidence regarding (1) whether she

intentionally or knowingly threatened Officer Precour with imminent bodily injury,

and (2) whether she operated the U-Haul in a manner that a jury could reasonably

conclude it was used as a deadly weapon.

      The evidence was sufficient to show that Thomas intentionally or knowingly

threatened Officer Precour with imminent bodily injury. Minutes after Thomas ran

over and killed Prater, she lost control of the U-Haul in a residential neighborhood

and crashed into a tree. With lights and sirens activated, Officers Precour and Daily

attempted to block Thomas’s path forward with their police vehicles. Officer Daily

testified that the U-Haul “turned, veered away from the tree, and drove at [Officer

Precour and Aber’s] marked patrol unit.” The officers described Thomas’s actions

as a deliberate ramming because she could have stopped after crashing into the tree,

because alternate escape routes were available that would have avoided striking the

patrol unit, and because she struck Officers Precour and Aber before they were able

to enter the front lawn to block her forward path.

      Thomas argues on appeal that Officer Precour’s body camera footage shows

him ramming the U-Haul. Officer Precour, however, testified that he tried to avoid

contact with Thomas:

      I was actually trying to get away because when I drove up, we kind of
      started positioning on the side of the U-Haul. So the first car positioned

                                         15
      towards the rear of the U-Haul, the second car positioned kind of
      towards the middle of the U-Haul, and I came up front. And when I
      came up front, I was kind of coming to slow down to position for the
      felony stop. The U-Haul kept going, so I tried to speed up; and that’s
      when the U-Haul rammed me.

The video footage from Officer Precour’s body camera shows his vehicle driving

along the side of the U-Haul before the U-Haul veered to the right and struck his

patrol vehicle. To the extent there was any conflict in the evidence, it must be

resolved in favor of the jury verdict. See Curry, 30 S.W.3d at 406. We defer to the

factfinder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw

reasonable inferences from the facts. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007); see also Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016) (reviewing court’s role “is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence

when a fact finder does not act rationally”).

      We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Thomas acted

intentionally or knowingly in threatening Officer Precour with imminent bodily

injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 6.03(a)–(b), 22.01(a)(2).

      Furthermore, the evidence is sufficient to show that Thomas used the U-Haul

as a deadly weapon. Moments before striking the police unit with so much force that

it was unable to continue in the chase, Thomas ran over and killed Prater. The jury

could rely on the fact that Thomas used the U-Haul to cause Prater’s death to infer

her intent to use it as a deadly weapon against Officer Precour. See Moore, 520

                                          16
S.W.3d at 908–09 (holding that vehicle is considered deadly weapon when driven in

manner that can cause death). Additionally, recklessly evading police, committing

countless traffic violations, nearly causing multiple accidents, crashing into a

resident’s front lawn, ramming a police unit, and injuring Officer Precour are factors

demonstrating that the U-Haul was used as a deadly weapon. See id. at 913 (deadly

weapon finding justified where defendant rear-ended vehicle parked at intersection

resulting in minor injuries); Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 255–56 (considering whether

defendant’s driving was “reckless” or “dangerous” in reviewing deadly-weapon

finding).

      We conclude that a rational jury could have determined beyond a reasonable

doubt that Thomas used the U-Haul in a manner that may result in serious bodily

injury or death to others. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(17)(B); Moore, 520

S.W.3d at 908–09, 913.

      We overrule Thomas’s sole issue in appellate cause number 01-21-00523-CR.

                                         17
                                   Conclusion

      We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support both judgments of

conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                Richard Hightower
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Hightower, and Guerra.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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