Court Opinion

ID: 9925297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 14:06:33.303757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:42.183590
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Camp v. Gerwin, 2024-Ohio-84.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 THOMAS H. CAMP,                            :     APPEAL NOS. C-230066
                                                              C-230082
      and                                   :     TRIAL NO. A-2103908

 PATRICIA E. CAMP,                          :

      Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-           :        O P I N I O N.
      Appellants,
                                            :

   VS.                                      :

                                            :
 ROBERT F. GERWIN, II,
                                            :
      and
                                            :
 CAMP SAFETY EQUIPMENT, INC.,
                                            :
      Defendants-Appellants/Cross-
      Appellees.

Civil Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 12, 2024

Flagel & Papakirk LLC, James Papakirk, Hallie Schneider Borellis and Zachary P. Elliot,
for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

Strauss Troy Co., LPA, and Alex S. Rodger, for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Judge.

       {¶1}    After the sale of a small business in 2016, financial difficulties besieged the

company, leading to the renegotiation of several agreements and ultimately contentious

litigation as both buyer and seller sought to assign blame.          Plaintiffs-appellees/cross-

appellants Thomas and Patricia Camp (“the Camps”) sold their safety equipment business,

defendant-appellant/cross-appellee Camp Safety Equipment (“CSE”), to defendant-

appellant/cross-appellee Robert H. Gerwin. Following the failure of CSE and Mr. Gerwin

(collectively, “Defendants”) to meet their payment obligations, Mr. Camp sued for breach of

contract. Mr. Gerwin countersued, accusing the Camps of breaching the initial contract and

committing fraud at the time of the sale. Sorting through all of this, the trial court ultimately

granted the Camps’ summary judgment motions, finding that Defendants defaulted on their

payment obligations and rejecting their efforts to escape the governing contracts. After

reviewing the appeal and cross-appeal, we conclude that the trial court got it right and affirm

its judgment in full.

                                               I.

       {¶2}    In January 2016, the Camps sold their business, CSE, to Mr. Gerwin pursuant

to a Stock Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) wherein he agreed to purchase all issued and

outstanding shares of CSE. A prototypical transaction document, the SPA contained various

representations and warranties regarding the assets of CSE, including that “all inventory of

the business recorded and unrecorded on the Company’s balance sheet as of the Closing Date

(“the inventory”), as shown on Schedule 6.18, * * * shall be at least equal to the amount shown

on Schedule 6.11 for Inventory as of the Closing Date.” The survival provision of the SPA

provided that all covenants, agreements, representations, and warranties expressed in the

agreement “shall survive the Closing for a period of five (5) years from the Closing Date.” The

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

SPA also included a setoff provision, allowing either party to deduct any amount owed to them

under the agreement from any amount owed by them under the agreement.

       {¶3}     In connection with the transaction, CSE executed a promissory note (“Note”)

in favor of Mr. Camp, and Mr. Gerwin executed a guaranty of payment (“Guaranty”). Under

the Note, CSE agreed to pay Mr. Camp $371,950 over a period of time with annual interest of

five percent.    And under the Guaranty, Mr. Gerwin personally and unconditionally

guaranteed the payment of certain debts under the Note, including: (1) the outstanding

principal balance of $371,950 plus applicable interest, (2) a Bank of America credit card with

an outstanding balance of $20,541.29 at closing, and (3) a Discover credit card with an

outstanding balance of $11,342.29 at closing.

       {¶4}     After the transaction closed, Mr. Gerwin began operating CSE. From the

outset, however, he uncovered accounting discrepancies related to CSE’s inventory and

accounts payable, spurring him to close the business for two weeks to perform an inventory

count. This deep dive into the books and records allegedly uncovered that the inventory

amount disclosed in the SPA was short by almost $100,000. Despite this shocking discovery,

Mr. Gerwin stayed mum about it and said nothing of consequence to Mr. Camp.

       {¶5}     About two and a half years later, as CSE struggled financially, the Camps and

CSE executed an amended promissory note (“Amended Note”).               The Amended Note

acknowledged that the outstanding balance on the Note was $361,860, amended the

amortization schedule of the Note, and extended its maturity date. The parties also ratified

and reaffirmed the remaining terms and conditions of the Note and the Guaranty in the

Amended Note. Throughout the negotiations leading to this amended document, Mr. Gerwin

raised no objection about the missing inventory.

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶6}   In December 2020, more than two years after the ratification of the Amended

Note, Mr. Camp and Defendants entered into an Inventory Agreement, which reduced the

principal amount owed by Defendants under the Note and Guaranty by $150,000 in exchange

for the transfer of “substantially all” of CSE’s inventory from Defendants back to Mr. Camp.

In the Inventory Agreement, Defendants acknowledged that CSE and Mr. Gerwin jointly and

severally owed Mr. Camp the original principal amount of $371,950 under the Note, as

amended by the Amended Note, and the Guaranty. They also expressly acknowledged and

agreed that the Note and Guaranty were in default, and that Mr. Camp had accelerated the

remaining principal and accrued and unpaid interest. Again, Mr. Gerwin raised no objection

at this time about missing inventory, even in the midst of negotiating an Inventory

Agreement. And phantom inventory or no, he agreed to transfer all of the inventory back to

Mr. Camp.

       {¶7}   In November 2021—nearly one year after the Inventory Agreement and almost

six years after closing—Mr. Camp filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging breach of the

Note and the Guaranty and requesting attorney fees. Defendants subsequently filed an

answer and counterclaim against Mr. Camp, claiming breach of the SPA, fraud, and breach of

a noncompete agreement. Defendants contemporaneously filed a separate action against Ms.

Camp, asserting the same breach of the SPA and fraud claims based on the same events.

Eventually, the trial court consolidated both cases.

       {¶8}   In April 2022, Mr. Camp filed a partial motion for summary judgment on all

three counts asserted in the complaint. After receiving an extension of time to conduct

discovery, Defendants opposed the summary judgment motion. On the date of the scheduled

summary judgment hearing, the Camps filed a second motion for summary judgment,

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                           OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

targeting the counterclaims asserted against them by Defendants. Defendants again filed a

response in opposition to that summary judgment motion.

       {¶9}   In January 2023, the trial court granted the summary judgment motions,

awarding judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $221,143.74

plus interest and costs and reasonable attorney fees. The entry further provided that “Plaintiff

shall submit said attorney’s fees to the Court by Motion and Affidavit.” And it included the

following language: “This is a final appealable order and there is no just cause for delay.”

       {¶10} Following that judgment, the Camps filed a motion to correct a clerical error

under Civ.R. 60(A), asserting the trial court’s entry omitted the amounts owed for the

corporate credit cards under the Guaranty. In response, Defendants cried foul, pointing out

that Mr. Camp did not seek explicit damages for the credit card debt in his motion for

summary judgment and that the court awarded the exact amount that he had requested. The

court denied the motion without explanation. The trial court’s judgment triggered an appeal

(by Defendants) with three assignments of error, and a cross-appeal (by the Camps) with one

assignment of error.

                                              II.

       {¶11} As a preliminary matter, we must address whether the trial court’s summary

judgment entry constitutes a final, appealable order. Generally, a final, appealable order must

resolve the whole case or a distinct claim or claims and be certified by Civ.R. 54(B). We will

address appealability regarding the resolution of two claims: (1) Mr. Camp’s claim against Mr.

Gerwin for nonpayment of the credit card obligations under the Guaranty, and (2) Mr. Camp’s

claim for attorney fees.

       {¶12} Mr. Camp’s claim against Mr. Gerwin for nonpayment of the credit card

obligations under the Guaranty was fully resolved by the trial court’s entry. The Camps, in

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

their cross-appeal, contend that the trial court erred in failing to award them all of their

damages, alleging the trial court incorrectly omitted the credit card debt from its award of

damages in its entry granting their motions for summary judgment. The dissent seems to

take the position that the Guaranty was not at issue in the motion for partial summary

judgment, since Mr. Camp limited the relief sought in the motion to claims under the Note.

But we see things differently—the trial court adjudicated claims under the Guaranty at

summary judgment. After all, the Note only implicates CSE. The purpose of the Guaranty

was to put Mr. Gerwin personally on the hook for the obligations under the Note. As such,

because the court entered judgment against Mr. Gerwin personally, it necessarily concluded

that the partial summary judgment motion included claims under both the Note and the

Guaranty.

        {¶13} Further, throughout the partial motion for summary judgment, Mr. Camp

expressly indicated that he was seeking relief under both the Note and Guaranty. He even

stated: “Accordingly, because there are no genuine issues of material fact, Mr. Camp is

entitled to judgment against Gerwin and CSE on the Note and the Guaranty as a matter of

law.”

        {¶14} On the other hand, while Mr. Camp’s claim for attorney fees was not fully

resolved by the trial court, the claim is distinct from the fully-resolved claims at issue in this

appeal. The entry awarded attorney fees but did not establish any particular amount. It also

invoked the language of Civ.R. 54(B), providing: “This is a final appealable order and there is

no just cause for delay.”

        {¶15} The inclusion of Civ.R. 54(B) language does not magically transform all non-

final orders that fail to dispose of a single claim in its entirety into final ones. See LEH

Properties v. Pheasant Run Assn., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 07CA9275, 2008-Ohio-4500, ¶ 11

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

(“[T]he mere inclusion of Civ.R. 54(B) language will not remedy a non-final order, which fails

to dispose of a single claim in its entirety.”). And the mere mention of attorney fees in the

complaint does not rise to the level of a separate claim for relief. Evanston Acquisitions, LLC

v. STAG II Dayton, LLC, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27480, 2017-Ohio-5755, ¶ 8. But when a

party brings a separate contractual claim for attorney fees (as Mr. Camp did here), the trial

court may enter an award of fees without determining an amount and still render the order

final and appealable through the mechanism of the Civ.R. 54(B) language. See Internatl. Bd.

of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 8 v. Vaughn Industries, LLC., 116 Ohio St.3d 335, 2007-

Ohio-6439, 879 N.E.2d 187, ¶ 2 (“We also hold that when attorney fees are requested in the

original pleadings, an order that does not dispose of the attorney-fee claim and does not

include, pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B), an express determination that there is no just reason for

delay, is not a final, appealable order.”); Evanston Acquisitions at ¶ 7-11 (“A decision that

awards attorney fees but does not specify the amount is likewise not final and appealable

without a Civ.R. 54(B) certification.”).

       {¶16} Consistent with this authority, although the attorney fees amount remains

undetermined, because it was presented by a separate claim under a specific contractual

provision for fees, the trial court rendered the order final and appealable by including Civ.R.

54(B) language.

       {¶17} Satisfied with our jurisdiction, we can accordingly proceed to consider the

merits of the parties’ arguments.

                                             III.

       {¶18} We begin with Defendants’ claim that the trial court erred in granting Mr.

Camp’s motion for partial summary judgment. We review this issue “de novo, conducting an

independent review of the record to determine the propriety of summary judgment.” Meyer

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Tool, Inc. v. Mikrolar, Inc., 2023-Ohio-704, 210 N.E.3d 602, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.), citing Al Neyer,

LLC v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2020-Ohio-5417, 163 N.E.3d 106, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.).

       “ ‘Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper where the moving party

       establishes that “(1) no genuine issue of any material fact remains, (2) the

       moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from

       the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and

       construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that

       conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary

       judgment is made.” ’ ”

       Id., quoting Al Neyer at ¶ 14, quoting State ex rel. Duncan v. City of Mentor City

Council, 105 Ohio St.3d 372, 2005-Ohio-2163, 826 N.E.2d 832, ¶ 9.

                                              A.

       {¶19} In their first assignment of error, Defendants insist that the trial court erred in

finding that CSE breached the Note. This argument contains four branching paths: (1) the

trial court did not first determine any right to a setoff before finding a breach; (2) the Camps

did not perform under the contract; (3) Defendants properly pleaded an affirmative defense

based on fraud and, as a result, fraud invalidates the contracts; and (4) the statute of

limitations did not preclude their affirmative fraud defense. Because the first and second

issues raised involve Defendants’ claims that the trial court erred in finding that the Camps

did not breach the SPA, we will consider them with the second assignment of error

(concerning the Camps’ alleged breach of the SPA) below. Defendants’ third and fourth issues

intertwine, so we will consider them together for ease of analysis.

       {¶20} The fraud claim pursued by Defendants essentially accuses the Camps of

misrepresenting the nature of the inventory. But this claim trips over an insurmountable

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

statute of limitations hurdle. The statute of limitations for a cause of action for fraud is four

years, see R.C. 2305.09(C), and when they filed the answer, nearly six years had elapsed since

the closing and Mr. Gerwin’s discovery of the alleged fraud. Tacitly acknowledging the point,

Defendants do not attempt to rehabilitate their fraud claim on appeal.

       {¶21} Instead, they seek to recast it as an affirmative defense, seizing upon the last

sentence of Civ.R. 8(C): “When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim

or a counterclaim as a defense, the court, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if

there had been a proper designation.” This provision “was intended to permit trial courts to

overlook clerical errors made in designating counterclaims and affirmative defenses, but it

was not designed as a means by which a party may correct a substantive error in pleadings

long after the time for amendment to those pleadings has passed.” Canty v. Vandegrift, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 92AP-1317, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 1723, 18-19 (Mar. 23, 1993), citing

Millar v. Bowman, 13 Ohio App.3d 204, 206, 468 N.E.2d 754 (12th Dist.1983).

       {¶22} Nothing in the record suggests that Defendants mistakenly designated fraud as

a counterclaim rather than an affirmative defense. A party may use fraud as either “an

affirmative defense to defeat the contract” or “as a counterclaim to recover damages on the

contract.” Id. at 19. Here, rather than attempt to rescind the contract and avoid the

obligations thereunder, Mr. Gerwin chose to assert a counterclaim to recover damages on the

underlying contract. That tactical choice does not seem to be the product of mistake or a

clerical oversight.

       {¶23} Consistent with this litigation position, Mr. Gerwin admittedly knew of the

alleged misrepresentations in the SPA shortly after the ink dried on the contract, yet he did

not try to extricate himself from the agreement and instead continued to operate CSE for

nearly five years. He even entered into subsequent agreements—the Amended Note and the

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Inventory Agreement—whereby he ratified all the terms and conditions of the Note that were

unchanged by the agreement and acknowledged the Note and Guaranty were in default. And

“[i]n Ohio, one who performs a contract after learning of fraud in its inducement ratifies the

contract and may not subsequently disaffirm it.” Hawes v. Downing Health Techs L.L.C.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110920, 2022-Ohio-1677, ¶ 54.

       {¶24} We accordingly see no reason why the fraud counterclaim should be

recategorized as an affirmative defense under Civ.R. 8(C), and we reject Defendants’ fraud-

based arguments.

                                             B.

       {¶25} In their second assignment of error, Defendants allege that the trial court erred

in finding that the Camps did not breach the SPA. Specifically, Defendants raise three issues:

(1) their breach claim is not time barred, (2) the Camps did not perform under the SPA, and

(3) the trial court erred when it did not determine the setoff amount. We will address each of

those issues in turn.

       {¶26} Defendants first argue that their claim that the Camps breached the SPA is not

time-barred. The Camps, on the other hand, point to the survival provision contained in

Section 14.1 of the SPA, which provides the representations and warranties only survived

closing for five years. Since more than five years had passed from the closing by the time the

lawsuit was filed, the Camps maintain that these provisions bar any claim for breach.

       {¶27} We are unpersuaded by the Camps’ efforts to bar the claim based on Section

14.1. The Sixth Circuit considered whether survival provisions (akin to those at issue here)

are permissible contractual modifications of the applicable statute of limitations in Arcade

Co., Ltd. v. Arcade, LLC, 105 Fed.Appx. 808 (6th Cir.2004). The court looked to the plain

language of the provision (which contained language similar to the survival provision in this

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

case), and because the provision did not purport to limit any “action,” “lawsuit,” or “demand,”

the court concluded that the parties did not adequately convey an intention to modify the

statute of limitations. Id. at 811. “Statutes of limitation exist to provide finality for potential

litigants,” so the court reasoned that any agreements purporting to limit finality “must be

made manifest in clear, unequivocal language.” Id. Subsequently, an Ohio appellate court

applied the Arcade Co. analysis to a survival provision, finding that a survival clause did not

establish a contractual limitations period when it did not contain “unequivocal language”

purporting to “limit an action, lawsuit, or demand.” Shoregate Towers Partners L.L.C. v.

Antebi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109817, 2021-Ohio-2688, ¶ 107-108.

        {¶28} We find that basic reasoning persuasive, and we likewise see no such language

purporting to restrict the statute of limitations in Section 14.1. Accordingly, the survival

clause does not operate to shorten the six-year statute of limitations, and Defendants’ breach

claim is not time-barred.

        {¶29} But just because the claim is timely does not render it meritorious. We

accordingly next address Defendants’ allegation that the Camps did not perform under the

SPA. Specifically, Defendants maintain that because the Camps failed to deliver nearly

$100,000 in inventory, they did not materially perform under the contract.               The SPA

contained an asset provision—Section 1.2—stating: “all inventory of the Business recorded

and unrecorded on the Company’s balance sheet as of the Closing Date (the “Inventory”), as

shown on Schedule 6.18, it being agreed to by the parties that such Inventory shall be at least

equal to the amount shown on Schedule 6.11 for Inventory as of the Closing Date.” (Emphasis

sic.)

        {¶30} Defendants’ position, however, begs more questions than it answers. First, the

nature of the claimed breach remains unclear—Defendants’ briefs and motions do not clearly

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

explain if the discrepancy in inventory involved the valuation of the inventory or the inventory

items received. For example, if the SPA promised inventory including 1,000 widgets, and the

Camps only delivered 900 widgets, Defendants could attack the paucity of items received. By

contrast, if the Camps promised inventory valued at $1,000 yet only delivered inventory

totaling $900, Defendants would need to present valuation evidence of the inventory,

presumably through an expert or similar means to establish how the Camps failed to deliver

an appropriately valued inventory.

       {¶31} Under either scenario, we need to review the contractual requirements and

measure them against the concomitant evidence. Schedule 6.18 seems to be the key to this

conundrum since it presumably explains exactly what inventory (either in terms of items or

valuation) must be delivered. But unfortunately, it does not appear in the record. While Mr.

Gerwin provided testimony alleging the breach, he did not produce a copy of Schedule 6.18.

Nor did he provide any details of the inventory count that allegedly revealed the

discrepancies, a list of missing items, or details of a flawed valuation of the items received

(nor do we see any expert testimony on this point).

       {¶32} To demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the breach

claim, Defendants needed to establish the inventory promised in the SPA—Schedule 6.18—

and evidence demonstrating what specific inventory was not delivered or was incorrectly

valued. Without such evidence in the record, there is nothing to present to a jury to establish

a breach.

       {¶33} Beyond these record problems, Defendants’ own conduct dooms their breach

claim. Years after the alleged breach, Defendants entered into the Inventory Agreement

which acknowledged default under the Note and Guaranty: “The Loan Documents are in

default and the entire unpaid principal balance and accrued and unpaid interest have been

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

accelerated.” By acknowledging default, Defendants “conduct[ed] [themselves] in a manner

inconsistent with an intention to insist on that term.” See Vivi Retail, Inc. v. E & A Northeast

Ltd. Partnership, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90527, 2008-Ohio-4705, ¶ 30. In other words,

Defendants’ present litigation position is that the Camps’ predicate breach essentially excuses

their performance under the Note and Guaranty. But by acknowledging a default, they have

taken a position fundamentally at odds with that claim. Beyond that, by transferring all of

the inventory back to the Camps, they received a negotiated value for the inventory, warts and

all. The positions taken by Defendants, particularly in the Inventory Agreement, ultimately

operate to waive the particular breach claim that they present on appeal.

       {¶34} Relatedly, Defendants allege that the trial court erred in awarding summary

judgment because it did not determine any setoff amount owed to them. Pointing to Section

14.2.4 of the SPA, they contend that the trial court could not determine whether a breach of

the Note occurred until it determined CSE’s and Mr. Gerwin’s setoff rights. Section 14.2.4

provides:

       “Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, Buyer and/or

       Company may setoff any amount owed to it by Seller pursuant to the

       indemnification or other provisions of this Agreement against any amount

       owed by Buyer and/or Company to Seller under this Agreement including,

       without limitation, the obligation of Company under the Camp Note, or any

       agreement or document contemplated hereby.”

       {¶35} But the SPA does not provide, or even suggest, that a claim for setoff precludes

a breach of the Note or Guaranty. At most, under Section 14.2.4, Defendants could reduce

the amount they owe under the Note (or by extension the Guaranty) with a viable setoff claim.

Ultimately, because their setoff theory hinges entirely on the inventory point that we

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

discussed above, Defendants fail to establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether they are

entitled to a setoff of any amount. Accordingly, Defendants cannot prevail on their breach or

setoff arguments. We thus overrule Defendants’ first and second assignments of error.

                                              C.

       {¶36} In their third assignment of error, Defendants claim that the trial court erred

by excluding evidence produced by Mr. Gerwin in opposition to the Camps’ summary

judgment motions. But we see no indication in the record that the trial court failed to consider

any evidence submitted on summary judgment. As the Camps emphasize, the trial court’s

entry explicitly states that it reviewed “all materials provided in support and against the

Motions.” And regardless, this court considered all evidence in the record when evaluating

this appeal.

       {¶37} Therefore, we overrule Defendants’ third assignment of error.

                                              III.

       {¶38} Turning to the Camps’ cross-appeal, they contend that the trial court erred in

failing to award them all of their damages. Specifically, they maintain that the trial court

incorrectly omitted the credit card debt from its award of damages in its entry granting their

motions for summary judgment. In this respect, they insist that the credit card issue was

before the court on the motion for partial summary judgment, and they even moved the trial

court to correct a clerical error in the judgment when it failed to account for the credit card

fees in its judgment.

       {¶39} In his initial complaint, Mr. Camp provided the amount owed on the credit

cards. Yet he failed to include this amount in his motion for partial summary judgment, nor

did he include the amount in his overall computation of damages. Although his motion

flagged the credit card debt issue (emphasizing: “The guaranty also contained promises from

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Gerwin, personally guaranteeing payment of the Bank of America and Discover Credit

cards”), Mr. Camp failed to present any Civ.R. 56 evidence to substantiate the alleged credit

card damages: he did not proffer any credit card statements or evidence substantiating the

amount owed on the credit cards. Without such evidence, he cannot prevail on his claim.

       {¶40} While he appeared to claim damages for the credit cards in his partial summary

judgment motion (as the reconsideration motion ratified), he explicitly sought damages of

$221,143.74 plus interest and fees, without any mention of the money owed on the credit

cards. Ultimately, the trial court granted Mr. Camp what he sought, damages of $221,143.74

plus interest and fees.

       {¶41} We see no error in the trial court’s decision not to award damages that were

unsupported by evidence, and we therefore overrule this assignment of error.

                                       *      *      *

       {¶42} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule all three of Defendants’

assignments of error, overrule the Camps’ sole cross-assignment of error, and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                                                         Judgment affirmed.
Kinsley, J., concurs.
Zayas, P.J., dissents.

Zayas, P.J., dissenting.
       {¶43} I respectfully dissent because I would hold that the order appealed from is not

a final, appealable order.

       {¶44} “By definition, a final appealable order disposes of the whole case or some

separate and distinct branch thereof.” RBS Citizens, NA v. Sharp, 2015-Ohio-5438, 47 N.E.3d

170, ¶ 6 (7th Dist.), citing Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 94, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989).

“An order granting partial summary judgment is not separate and distinct when the issue

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                            OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

determined is based on the same facts and circumstances as the claims that remain pending

before the court.” Id.; see, e.g., Kinzel v. Ebner, 2020-Ohio-4165, 157 N.E.3d 898, ¶ 98 (6th

Dist.), quoting Internatl. Managed Care Strategies, Inc. v. Franciscan Health Partnership,

Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-010634, 2002-Ohio-4801, ¶ 9 (“ ‘[W]here claims arise from the

same alleged conduct, they are inextricably intertwined and not appealable despite Civ.R.

54(B) certification.’ ”).

       {¶45} A review of the pleadings reveals that the instant appeal ultimately involves

seven claims deriving from the exact same facts and circumstances: (1) Mr. Camp’s claim

against CSE for breach of the Note, (2) Mr. Camp’s claim against Mr. Gerwin for breach of the

Guaranty, (3) Mr. Camp’s claim against CSE and Gerwin for attorney fees “pursuant to the

note and guaranty,” (4) Mr. Gerwin and CSE’s counterclaim against Mr. Camp for breach of

the SPA, (5) Mr. Gerwin and CSE’s counterclaim against Mr. Camp for fraud, (6) Mr. Gerwin

and CSE’s claim against Mrs. Camp for breach of the SPA, and (7) Mr. Gerwin and CSE’s claim

against Mrs. Camp for fraud. Among these claims, one inextricably intertwined issue remains

unresolved: Mr. Camp’s claim against Mr. Gerwin for breach of Guaranty based on

nonpayment of the credit-card obligations.

       {¶46} Mr. Camp’s claim against Mr. Gerwin derives from the Guaranty in which Mr.

Gerwin guaranteed the payment of five distinct obligations, to and for the benefit of Mr.

Camp. Three of these obligations are relevant here. First, he guaranteed payment of “that

certain Amended and Restated Promissory Note from [CSE].” Next, he guaranteed the

payment of “that certain Bank of America credit card shown in the trade payables of [CSE].”

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                           OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Last, he guaranteed the payment of “that certain Discover credit card shown in the trade

payables of [CSE].”1

        {¶47} In April 2022, Mr. Camp moved for partial summary judgment on his claims

against CSE and Mr. Gerwin. The motion expressly stated that Mr. Camp was seeking “partial

summary judgment on the issues of: (1) whether [Mr. Gerwin and CSE] jointly and severally

owe Mr. Camp certain sums under a promissory note [the Note], and (2) the amount due

under said Note.” (Emphasis added.) The motion sought judgment for the exact amount of

damages due under only the Note, “plus fees, costs, advances, and expenses allowable under

the Note.” (Emphasis added.) Yet, the majority treats the issue of Mr. Gerwin’s liability for

the credit-card damages—a claim which arises under separate and distinct obligations of the

Guaranty unrelated to the Note—as included with the partial summary-judgment motion and

proceeds to hold that such claim was appropriately denied for lack of evidence in the record.

Because the record shows differently, 2 I hold that the claim for credit-card damages was never

1 For clarification, these obligations originate from Article 2 of the SPA, entitled “Certain Obligations.” With
respect to the Note, Article 2 provides that Mr. Camp made certain loans to CSE over the course of the
business, as evidenced by the Note, and that “[s]uch payment obligations shall be guaranteed by [Gerwin]
at Closing.” With respect to the credit card obligations, Article 2 provides that the company was the debtor
on a Bank of America credit card and a Discover credit card, and that such obligations were to remain
outstanding at Closing.

Consistent with the SPA, a review of the Note reveals that the Note solely provides that CSE promises to
pay Camp a principal balance consistent with the Note provision under Article 2. The Note does not
mention any credit card obligations, nor does it provide any further promises to pay any other balance.
Thus, it is clear that the credit card obligations are separate and distinct from the Note, and do not derive
from the Note.
2 To be sure, the only mention of credit-card obligations in the motion was in one sentence—of an 11-page
motion—that supposedly “flagged,” as the majority posits, the issue of the credit-card damages. However,
a review of the motion as a whole reveals that, despite the brief mention of the credit-card obligations in
one factually correct sentence, neither the motion nor the paragraph containing the aforementioned
sentence actually seek judgment on this issue. The paragraph in question states:

                In this case, Mr. Camp averred in his complaint that he is the holder of the original
        Note, and entitled to enforce the same. This allegation is not disputed. Further, the Note
        was signed on January 27, 2016 by Gerwin as sole [sic] member of CSE, and contained an
        unconditional promise to pay Mr. Camp, separate and apart from the SPA. The Note
        contained a ten (10) year term. Gerwin executed a personal guaranty on the same day,
        under which Gerwin unconditionally guaranteed the payment of the Note. Mr. Camp is the
        holder of the guaranty. The guaranty also contained promises from Gerwin, personally
        guaranteeing payment of the Bank of America and Discovery Credit [sic] cards.

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                           OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

expressly or otherwise included within the summary-judgment motion and therefore remains

outstanding.3

        {¶48} Consequently, I would hold that the order appealed from is not a final,

appealable order as all the claims in this case derive from the exact same set of facts and

circumstances, regardless of the claimant, thereby making them inextricably intertwined for

purposes of appeal. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal as this court lacks jurisdiction

to consider the appeal.

Please note:

        The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

3 The majority asserts that I am of the position that the Guaranty was not at issue in the motion for partial

summary judgment. This is a mischaracterization. The motion for summary judgment sought liability
against CSE and Mr. Gerwin on the Note. The Note itself is only between Mr. Camp and CSE. Therefore,
the Guaranty is necessarily included within the summary judgment motion to the extend of Mr. Gerwin’s
liability under the Note because liability cannot be obtained against Mr. Gerwin without inclusion of the
Guaranty. However, unlike the majority, I do not see the motion as extending to Mr. Gerwin’s liability for
the credit-card obligations under the Guaranty as the credit cards are unrelated to the Note. As such, the
correct characterization of my position is that Mr. Gerwin’s liability under the Guaranty for the credit cards
was not at issue in the motion for partial summary judgment.

In support of its position that the credit cards were included within the summary judgment motion, the
majority points to a sentence in the motion where Mr. Camp states that he is seeking judgment on both the
Note and the Guaranty. However, a review of the portion of the motion discussing why the Guaranty is in
default reveals that the argument was only concerning the Guaranty being in default in relation to the Note.
More specifically, the motion states, “the Note and Guaranty are in default for failure to make payments
when due,” and points to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Mr. Camp’s affidavit in support of this statement. In
paragraphs 9 and 10 of his affidavit, Mr. Camp avers, “Gerwin and CSE agreed in the Inventory Agreement
that the Note is in default. Because the Note is in default, the Guaranty is also in default.”

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