Court Opinion

ID: 9959802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 17:01:15.445725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:54.447475
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                       No. 23-2893
                                       __________

                            RAYMOND CRAIG JOHNSON,
                                               Appellant

                                             v.

                            WARDEN ALLENWOOD FCI
                       ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                          (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-00641)
                     District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
                      ____________________________________

                   Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                   March 29, 2024

                Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

                              (Opinion filed: April 12, 2024)

                                       ___________

                                        OPINION*
                                       ___________

       *
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM

       Raymond Craig Johnson appeals pro se from the decision of the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (“the MDPA”) denying his habeas

petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, we will vacate

that judgment and remand for further proceedings.

                                               I.

       In 2016, the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina

sentenced Johnson to 140 months in prison and three years of supervised release for

Hobbs Act robbery (i.e., interfering with commerce by robbery in violation of the Hobbs

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)). His projected release date is August 18, 2024.

       In 2022, at which point Johnson was incarcerated at FCI Allenwood in White

Deer, Pennsylvania, he filed a pro se § 2241 habeas petition in the MDPA, arguing that

he is eligible for time credits to his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3632. Under this

statute, which is part of the First Step Act of 2018, eligible prisoners “who successfully

complete[] evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities”

earn time credits that, under certain circumstances, “shall be applied toward time in

prerelease custody or supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (C).1 But a

prisoner is not eligible to earn these time credits if (1) he is serving a prison sentence of

       1
        If an eligible prisoner earns time credits under § 3632, those credits may be
applied to his sentence if he satisfies 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3632(d)(4)(C). Section 3624(g) is satisfied if the prisoner has, inter alia, “shown
through the periodic risk reassessments a demonstrated recidivism risk reduction or has
maintained a minimum or low recidivism risk, during [his] term of imprisonment.” 18
U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(B); see id. § 3624(g)(1).

                                               2
more than one year for “[a]n offense described in [18 U.S.C. §] 3559(c)(2)(F),” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3632(d)(4)(D)(li), and (2) he previously served a prison sentence of more than one year

for a federal or state offense listed in § 3632(d)(4)(D)(li), see id.2 Section

3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) defines the term “serious violent felony” in relevant part as

              any [] offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment
              of 10 years or more that has as an element the use, attempted
              use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
              of another or that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk
              that physical force against the person of another may be used
              in the course of committing the offense.

Id. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) (emphasis added). The bolded language is commonly referred to

as the “elements” clause, while the italicized language is commonly referred to as the

“residual” clause. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 82 F.4th 1039, 1044 (11th Cir. 2023).

       The Government opposed Johnson’s habeas petition, arguing that he is not eligible

to earn time credits under § 3632 because (1) his Hobbs Act robbery conviction qualifies

as a “serious violent felony” under § 3559(c)(2)(F)’s elements clause, and (2) he has a

prior North Carolina state-court conviction for an offense listed in § 3632(d)(4)(D)(li).

On September 26, 2023, the MDPA agreed with the Government and denied Johnson’s

habeas petition. This timely appeal followed.3

       2
          Section 3632(d)(4)(D) comprises 68 subsections that identify offenses that render
a prisoner ineligible to earn time credits under § 3632. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(i)-
(lxviii). But only subsection (d)(4)(D)(li) is at issue here.
        3
          We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).
See also United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(explaining that a federal prisoner does not need to obtain a certificate of appealability to
proceed with an appeal in a § 2241 case), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v.
Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012). Our review of the MDPA’s denial of Johnson’s habeas
petition is de novo. See Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

                                              3
                                            II.

       On appeal, Johnson challenges the MDPA’s determination that his Hobbs Act

robbery conviction qualifies under § 3559(c)(2)(F)’s elements clause.4 In making that

determination, the MDPA relied on our conclusion in United States v. Walker, 990 F.3d

316, 326 (3d Cir. 2021), vacated on other grounds 142 S. Ct. 2858 (2022) (mem.), that a

completed Hobbs Act robbery “necessarily has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.”5 But that

reliance was error.

       Walker concerned whether Hobbs Act robbery categorically satisfies the elements

clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)’s definition of “crime of violence.” See 990 F.3d at 319.

But unlike that elements clause, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), the elements clause of

§ 3559(c)(2)(F) does not encompass force against “the person or property of another.”

Rather, the relevant clause here may only be satisfied when the offense in question “has

as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). This distinction is critical, for we

have previously explained that Hobbs Act robbery sweeps too broadly to categorically

       4
         Johnson’s brief does not challenge the MDPA’s determination that his prior
conviction in North Carolina state court involves an offense listed in § 3632(d)(4)(D)(li).
Accordingly, we deem that issue forfeited. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir.
2016).
       5
         The MDPA’s decision also indicated that the Government had submitted Bureau
of Prisons Program Statement 5162.05 (Categorization of Offenses) in opposing
Johnson’s habeas petition. But this program statement was issued nearly a decade before
the enactment of § 3632, it does not address § 3559(c)(2)(F), and the Government does
not mention it (let alone rely on it) on appeal. We cannot conclude that this program
statement controls the analysis of Johnson’s eligibility under § 3632.

                                             4
satisfy a provision that involves force against only “the person of another.” See United

States v. Scott, 14 F.4th 190, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that Hobbs Act robbery does

not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines’ elements clause

because “Hobbs Act robbery sweeps more broadly by including force against property,

not just persons”); see also id. at 195 n.1 (distinguishing Walker). Accordingly, Scott,

not Walker, is the controlling decision here.6

       In view of the above, we cannot conclude that Johnson’s Hobbs Act robbery

conviction qualifies under § 3559(c)(2)(F)’s elements clause. The question that remains

is whether the conviction qualifies under § 3559(c)(2)(F)’s residual clause. We decline

to address this question for the first time on appeal, particularly given that it has not been

briefed by the parties. Instead, we will vacate the MDPA’s judgment and remand for

further proceedings so that it may have an opportunity to address this question in the first

instance. See Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2010)

(“We ordinarily decline to consider issues not decided by a district court, choosing

instead to allow that court to consider them in the first instance.”). In addressing this

question, the MDPA should consider the constitutionality of § 3559(c)(2)(F)’s residual

clause. See, e.g., Langford v. United States, 993 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2021) (“The

Government agrees that the residual clause in [§] 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) is unconstitutionally

       6
         On appeal, the Government does not mention Walker. Instead, it points to our
decision in United States v. Stoney, 62 F.4th 108 (3d Cir. 2023). But Stoney does not
bolster the Government’s position. Like Walker, Stoney concluded that Hobbs Act
robbery qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)’s elements clause — a clause
that involves force against the person or property of another. See Stoney, 62 F.4th at
110-11, 114.

                                              5
vague . . . .”); Gatewood v. United States, 979 F.3d 391, 394 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that

the Government “concedes that the residual clause of § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) is

unconstitutionally vague”). Given that Johnson’s projected release date is only a few

months away, we trust that the MDPA will take swift action upon remand.

                                             6