Court Opinion

ID: 9673617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:15:19.542827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:23.122020
License: Public Domain

BLOODWORTH, Justice (dissenting) :
I most respectfully dissent. Though I agree that the original opinion should be withdrawn, I would grant the application for rehearing.
The original opinion was prepared for the court by Bowen W. Simmons, Supernumerary Circuit Judge. Following are pertinent portions of that opinion which set out the facts and issues. I think they are helpful in understanding this case.
“It appears from the petition and briefs of the parties that the State of Alabama filed eminent domain proceedings in the Probate Court of Elmore County to condemn, for public road purposes, six parcels of described land located within one large area or tract, all of which was the property of the same owners; also, it is alleged that the Probate Court entered ‘judgments’ condemning each parcel. The same appraisers, duly appointed, returned separate *679appraisals assessing damages as to Parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; no damages were awarded as to Parcel 6. These separate appraisals, as to each parcel, were ordered by the Probate Court.
“It appears without dispute that some of the defendants appealed from orders of condemnation as to Parcels 1, 3, and 6 to the Circuit Court of Elmore County and demanded trial by jury.
“Petitioner filed notices of appeal in the Probate Court with respect to alleged orders condemning 1, 2, 3, 4, S, and 6, and to them as a whole. These notices of appeal were filed on September 2, 1970, and were misplaced. They were not filed with the Circuit Court until December 16, 1970. Petitioner had kept copies of the appeal notices, duly marked filed by the Probate Judge. These copies were used. These appeals were not on the pleading docket when that docket was called on December 15, 1970.
“Thereafter, on or about January 4, 1971, petitioner moved the trial court to consolidate all the appeals, namely, those with respect to Parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6; also the appeal as a whole. The motion to consolidate apparently was not ruled on. The defendants who appealed from the orders of condemnation with respect to Parcels 1, 3, and 6, moved the trial court, on January 4, 1971, to dismiss the State’s appeals. Ground 8 of the motion asserts that there is no order of condemnation from which an appeal may be taken. Copies of the bench notes attached as exhibits to the petition here filed indicate that the motion to dismiss these appeals was granted instanter, and the State’s appeals were all dismissed without any reason therefor appearing in the bench notes.
“Petitioner prays that this court issue a peremptory writ of mandamus directing respondent to reinstate the dismissed appeals and to consolidate all the cases, involving Parcels 1 through 6, for trial; also for general relief.
“This court, on January 8, 1971, issued its rule nisi to respondent requiring him to set aside his orders of dismissal of the State’s relative to Parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, or appear in this court within thirty days and show cause why he should not do so.
“On the same date, we stayed all appeals to the Circuit Court taken by defendants and all trials and further proceedings in the Circuit Court with respect to said Parcels 1 to 6, inclusive, pending determination by this court of the proceedings on the petition for mandamus filed by the State.”
When a majority of the court concurred in that original opinion, it appeared that the record evidence before us was insufficient to show that final orders of condemnation had been entered in the probate court in the cases in which the petitioner appealed. In the absence thereof, there could be no valid appeals to the circuit court and that court’s order dismissing the appeals would be free from error. And, we held the writ was due to be denied.
On application for rehearing, I became convinced that we were in error in concluding that no valid orders of condemnation had been entered in the probate court in these cases. Thus, I concluded we ought to grant the rehearing.
As I understand it, the Per Curiam opinion holds that mandamus is not the proper remedy because there is an adequate remedy by appeal. I have no quarrel with the rule that mandamus will not lie where there is an adequate remedy by appeal. I happen to disagree that there is an adequate remedy by appeal in this case.
The relief sought by petitioner is twofold: reinstatement by respondent judge of the dismissed appeals; and, consolidation of all the appeals for trial.
I fail to see how the petitioner can ever raise the consolidation issue under the majority opinion. Consolidation would not be properly presented to the trial judge until it is held by an appellate court that the ap*680peals should be reinstated in the circuit court. In the meanwhile, the circuit court will, presumably, have tried and disposed of the three appeals by the landowners.
MADDOX, J., concurs.