Court Opinion

ID: 9643175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:21:11.938055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:57.897984
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, GLASSMAN and CLIFFORD, Justices,
dissenting.
[¶ 11] I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the Court’s interpretation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 7070(2)(E). That provision is a part of chapter 372 of title 5, which establishes the State Civil Service System. In a subpart dealing with employee benefits, records, and training, section 7070 provides control of personnel records and states, “The following records shall be confidential and not open to public inspection, and shall not be ‘public records,’ as defined in Title 1, section 402, subsection 3.” Section 7070(2) provides protection for personal information such as medical information, performance evaluations, creditworthiness, and personal and family history. Paragraph (E) of subsection (2) provides protection for personnel records of “complaints, charges or accusations of misconduct, replies to those complaints, charges or accusations and any other information or materials that may result in disciplinary action.”
[¶ 12] It is obvious that the Legislature intended to create a distinction between “complaints, charges or accusations” of misconduct and disciplinary action itself. The purpose of the distinction was to protect public employees against the disclosure of unfounded charges of misconduct. The provision goes on to specify that only in the event that “disciplinary action is taken” shall the final written decision relating to that action be made available to the public.
[¶ 13] The key issue in this case is whether disciplinary action was taken against the plaintiffs. The Court takes the position that disciplinary action, as contemplated by the Legislature, includes even those instances when action taken against employees is unfounded. Such an interpretation is at odds with the statute’s plain purpose of protecting employees against unfounded charges of misconduct. In this case, disciplinary action was never taken against the plaintiffs, they suffered no penalty, and the Department’s actions were found to have been taken without just cause.
[¶14] The Court’s parsing of the second paragraph of section 7070(2)(E), which was added by P.L.1991, ch. 229, § 1, is not persuasive. The addition merely defines “final written decision” and addresses the consequence of a delay in the arbitration process that is not present in the record before us. The second sentence of the first paragraph remains the same, except for a minor grammatical change. That critical sentence permits the release of otherwise confidential personal information contained in personnel records. That sentence is preceded by the clause “[i]f disciplinary action is taken.” The Court’s interpretation of section 7070(2)(E) ignores this important point and disregards the Legislature’s desire to protect employees against charges not proven to be true. See Jordan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 651 A2d 358, 360 (Me.1994) (in addition to examining the plain meaning of language to determine legislative intent, we also consider the whole statutory scheme of which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result may be achieved). I would vacate the judgment.