Court Opinion

ID: 9746985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:50:30.781256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.041154
License: Public Domain

Grimes, J.,
dissenting:
In my view the statute as construed by the court is void for vagueness. It forbids acts “in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 322, 328, 46 S. Ct. 126, 127 (1926); State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 303 A.2d 197 (1973); Entertainment Ventures, Inc. v. Brewer, 306 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Coon v. Cupp, 467 P.2d 140 (Ore. App. 1970); State v. Hodges, 457 P.2d 491 (Ore. 1969); Paulsen, The Legal Framework For Child Protection, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 679 (1966). Although I agree with the lofty purposes of the statute, they cannot constitutionally be accomplished by placing persons in a position of not knowing what conduct is prohibited and what is not. No one has been able to determine what conduct *244tends to produce delinquency of the type defined as deportment “as to injure or endanger the health or morals of himself or others”. RSA 169:2 (Supp. 1972). A citizen can never know whether some act or omission of his “might just possibly, sometime, somewhere lead to some child’s becoming a delinquent”. State v. Crary, 10 Ohio Ops. 2d 36, 155 N.E.2d 262, 265 (1959); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972).
I would construe our statute more narrowly and thus avoid the constitutional invalidity. The statute by its terms requires proof that the defendant has “knowingly and wilfully done any act to produce, promote or contribute to the delinquency of such child”. RSA 169:32 (Supp. 1972). There must in other words be some criminal intent. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 848, 860 (1970). I believe that it must not only be proved that the defendant knowingly committed the act but also that he knew that it was an act which was likely to produce delinquency in the child.
In this case there is no evidence whatever that the defendant sold the button, that he knew it had been sold to a minor, that he authorized such sales to minors or that he was even in the store at the time of the sale. He was not shown to have the necessary criminal intent and in a case such as this it cannot be imputed to him from acts of an agent not directed by him. Opinion of the Justices, 25 N.H. 537, 541 (1852); Commonwealth v. Kempisty, 191 Pa. Super. 602, 159 A.2d 541 (1960); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 84 (1961).