Court Opinion

ID: 9955774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 14:15:20.429776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:21.384418
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-801

                                   RAYAN TOBY

                                       vs.

                 DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       This appeal stems from Rayan Toby's efforts to obtain

 pandemic unemployment assistance benefits (PUA benefits) as made

 available under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic

 Security Act (CARES Act or Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001.              The

 Department of Unemployment Assistance (department) determined

 that after Toby became eligible to receive regular unemployment

 benefits under G. L. c. 151A (UI benefits), he became ineligible

 for PUA benefits.      A Boston Municipal Court judge affirmed the

 department's decision and Toby appealed from the resulting

 judgment.    We affirm.

       Background.     We summarize the facts found by the

 department's hearing examiner, supplemented with additional
undisputed facts drawn from the appellate record. 1    As of June

2020, Toby was working two full-time jobs.     He separated from

one of those positions on August 21, 2020, and having done so,

applied to the department for both UI benefits and PUA benefits. 2

Because Toby had no earnings in 2019 or in the first quarter of

2020, the department determined that Toby was "monetarily

ineligible" for UI benefits at that time.     His ineligibility for

UI benefits, however, left him qualified for PUA benefits, which

the department approved with an effective date of August 16,

2020, 3 at a weekly rate of $267. 4   The department later

1 To the extent that Toby's argument implies that he disputes the
facts found by the examiner, he has failed to show that the
facts summarized here lacked the support of "substantial
evidence." See Lincoln Pharmacy of Milford, Inc. v.
Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 74 Mass.
App. Ct. 428, 431 (2009).

2 Under the CARES Act, certain individuals not covered by, inter
alia, regular unemployment compensation or pandemic emergency
unemployment compensation benefits were entitled to PUA benefits
"for weeks of unemployment, partial unemployment, or inability
to work caused by COVID-19 -- (i) beginning on or after January
27, 2020; and (ii) ending on or before September 6, 2021." 15
U.S.C. § 9021(c)(1)(A).
3 We note that Toby was deemed eligible for benefits from a date

before his separation from the first job because, in the context
of a claim for unemployment benefits through the department, the
"effective date" identifies when the claimant registered the
claim. See 430 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.01(3) (2009) ("The
effective date of a claim for an individual in partial
unemployment shall be the Sunday of the week immediately
preceding the week in which such registration and filing
occurred").

4 We find no support for Toby's contention that the PUA benefits
he received were connected to his employment with the YMCA.

                                  2
determined his eligibility period for these PUA benefits as "up

to [seventy-nine] weeks." 5

     Toby's remaining full-time employment ended in mid-December

2020, and once it did so, he reapplied for UI benefits. 6   Given

Toby's earnings history in the second, third, and fourth

quarters of 2020, the department determined that as of the end

of the third quarter of 2020 (a date defined by the department's

regulations as September 30, 2020, see 430 Code Mass. Regs.

§ 4.83 [2023]), Toby had become eligible for UI benefits.    Toby

also applied and was determined to be eligible for pandemic

emergency unemployment compensation benefits (PEUC benefits). 7

Nothing in the record supports a finding that Toby worked for
the YMCA in 2020 or 2021, nor is there support for the
proposition that he stopped working for the YMCA as a result of
COVID-19. See 15 U.S.C. § 9021(c)(1)(A) (PUA eligibility
dates).

5 The notice including this eligibility period was dated March
22, 2021. The department suggests that at the time the notice
issued, the duration of the PUA program was limited to seventy-
nine weeks.

6 In his brief, Toby suggests that the department solicited his
application for these benefits, then terminated his PUA benefits
notwithstanding his explanation that he wished to exhaust his
PUA benefits before applying for "regular unemployment." This
contention is not supported in the appellate record. Even if it
were, as we explain below, Toby's entitlement to PUA benefits
terminated by operation of law when he became eligible for UI
benefits.
7 Under the CARES Act, PEUC benefits were available to

individuals who "[had] exhausted all rights to regular
compensation under the State law or under Federal law with
respect to a benefit year" ending after July 1, 2019, and who

                                3
He received UI benefits until his benefit weeks were exhausted

on the claim, then received PEUC benefits until the termination

date of the CARES Act programs.

     The flip side of the department's determination that Toby

was eligible for UI benefits, however, was its decision

(reflected in a January 21, 2021, Notice of Eligibility

Determination) that his qualification for "regular unemployment

insurance benefits" rendered him ineligible for PUA benefits.

See 15 U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(i).

     Toby appealed the department's PUA determination to a

department hearing examiner.   In a written decision issued after

the August 30, 2022, hearing, 8 the examiner affirmed the

department's determination that Toby's claim for UI benefits

rendered him ineligible for PUA benefits "after the week ending

October 3, 2020."   See 430 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.83.

     On September 1, 2022, the department issued another Notice

of Monetary Redetermination which, like the March 22, 2021,

notice, informed Toby, "[y]ou meet the monetary eligibility

requirements to establish a claim for [PUA] benefits [and] . . .

are entitled to receive benefits as long as you are not

met a series of other qualifying conditions.   15 U.S.C.
§ 9025(a)(2)(A).

8 The transcript of the hearing was part of the record in the
Superior Court but is not included in the appellate record.

                                  4
disqualified or held ineligible for other reasons."     The notice

set the weekly benefit up to $267 per week and the eligibility

period up to fifty-nine weeks.

     Toby appealed the hearing examiner's August 30 decision to

the department's Board of Review (board), relying on G. L.

c. 151A, § 40.     When the board affirmed that decision, Toby

appealed the board's decision to a judge of the Boston Municipal

Court.   After a hearing, the judge affirmed the board's

decision.   This appeal followed.

     Discussion.    We review the department's decision to deny

unemployment benefits to "determine whether it was unsupported

by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise

based on an error of law."     Lincoln Pharmacy of Milford, Inc. v.

Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 74 Mass.

App. Ct. 428, 431 (2009).     See Lisbon v. Contributory Retirement

Appeal Bd., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 257 (1996), quoting G. L.

c. 30A, § 1 (6) (defining "substantial evidence" as "such

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion").     Our review is "highly deferential to

the agency," requiring us to accord "due weight to the

experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of

the agency, as well as to the discretionary authority conferred

upon it" (quotation omitted).     Hotchkiss v. State Racing Comm'n,

45 Mass. App. Ct. 684, 695-696 (1998).

                                    5
     Applying this standard, we discern no basis on which to

overturn the department's determination that Toby was not

eligible for PUA benefits after October 3, 2020.       Toby does not

dispute the department's determination that he qualified

financially for UI benefits as of the completion of the third

quarter of 2020 -- a period that ended the week of October 3,

2020.   The record before the examiner included substantial

evidence to support the examiner's finding that it did so.

Specifically, the records of Toby's wages for 2020 document the

fact that in the last three quarters of that year, Toby's

earnings exceeded the minimum monetary threshold for UI

eligibility. 9   See G. L. c. 151A, §§ 1 (defining "base period"

for determining eligibility for unemployment insurance

benefits), 24 (a) (eligibility for unemployment insurance

benefits contingent upon, inter alia, recipient's "[h]av[ing]

been paid wages in the base period amounting to at least thirty

times the weekly benefit rate").       Nor does Toby challenge the

department's or the hearing examiner's determination that he

qualified for and received PEUC benefits once his UI benefits

were exhausted and through the termination date of the CARES Act

under which the PUA benefits were offered.

9 The department represents that the relevant weekly benefit
amount was $274.

                                   6
     Under the terms of the CARES Act, Toby's eligibility for UI

benefits and his eligibility for PEUC benefits each disqualified

him from eligibility for PUA benefits.   See 15 U.S.C.

§§ 9021(a)(3)(A)(i) (defining "covered individual" as one "who

. . . is not eligible for regular compensation or extended

benefits under State or Federal law or pandemic emergency

unemployment compensation"), 9021(c)(1)(A) (availability of

benefits limited to "covered individual[s]").   The department's

Notices of Monetary Redetermination did not state otherwise;

although they confirmed that Toby "[met] the monetary

eligibility requirements to establish a claim for [PUA] benefits

[emphasis added]," they were explicit that "[y]ou are entitled

to receive benefits as long as you are not disqualified or held

ineligible for other reasons [emphasis added]."   The

department's determination that Toby was eligible for UI

benefits as of the end of the third quarter of 2020 -- on or

about October 3, 2021 -- rendered Toby ineligible for PUA

benefits after the end of the week beginning with that date.

See 430 Code Mass. Regs. § 4.83 (for purposes of determining

unemployment benefits, "Calendar Quarter means any one of the

following periods in any year:   January 1st to March 31st; April

1st to June 30th; July 1st to September 30th; and October 1st to

December 31st").   Toby's qualification for PEUC benefits upon

the exhaustion of his UI benefits likewise precluded Toby from

                                 7
entitlement to PUA benefits while his PEUC claim remained

viable.    See 15 U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(i).

       To the extent Toby argues that the designations of his

"benefit years" and potential weeks of eligibility included in

the department's notices to him about his benefits applications

require a different conclusion, we are not persuaded.    The CARES

Act, and not the terms of the notices, governed Toby's

eligibility for PUA benefits.    Even if that were not the case,

however, the notices addressed only Toby's "monetary

eligibility" for PUA benefits "as long as [he] [was] not . . .

held ineligible for other reasons" -- for example, his failure

to exhaust his other benefits as required for coverage under the

Act.    See 15 U.S.C. § 9021(a)(3)(A)(i).

       We likewise discern no merit in Toby's due process claims;

his reliance on Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408

U.S. 564, 577 (1972), is misplaced where the department properly

applied G. L. c. 151A and 15 U.S.C. § 9021 to determine Toby's

eligibility for UI, PEUC, and PUA benefits.    Finally, regardless

of the success of his challenge to the department's decision in

his case, we conclude that Toby chose the proper route for

appeal in G. L. c. 30A, § 14.    To the extent that he argues for

relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; G. L. c. 151A, § 71;

                                  8
and 20 C.F.R. § 625.9(c) (2019), they do not aid him.

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Meade, Neyman &
                                        Hand, JJ. 10),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    March 29, 2024.

10   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  9