Court Opinion

ID: 9381991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 15:01:41.944381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.397018
License: Public Domain

Rel: March 24, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0836
                                _________________________

                                  Tiara Young Hudson

                                                  v.

   Kay Ivey, in her official capacity as Governor of Alabama;
 Patrick Tuten, in his official capacity as appointee to a circuit-
 court judgeship in the Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit; and Tom
     Parker, in his official capacity as Chair of the Judicial
               Resources Allocation Commission

                   Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
                              (CV-22-900892)

STEWART, Justice.
SC-2022-0836

     This case concerns the reallocation of a circuit-court judgeship from

the 10th Judicial Circuit located in Jefferson County to the 23d Judicial

Circuit located in Madison County. Tiara Young Hudson, an attorney

residing in Jefferson County, had been a candidate for appointment and

election to the Jefferson County judgeship before its reallocation to

Madison County. In response to the reallocation of that judgeship,

Hudson initiated an action in the Montgomery Circuit Court ("the trial

court") seeking a judgment declaring that the act providing for the

reallocation of judgeships, § 12-9A-1 et seq. ("the Act"), Ala. Code 1975,

violated certain provisions of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Hudson

also sought a permanent injunction removing the Madison County circuit

judge that had been appointed to fill the reallocated judgeship from office

and directing the governor to appoint a new person nominated by the

Jefferson County Judicial Commission to fill the judgeship in Jefferson

County. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground that it did not

have subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. We affirm.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     On May 24, 2022, Hudson won the Democratic Party primary

election to be that party's nominee for the Place 14 circuit-court judgeship

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in the criminal division of Alabama's 10th Judicial Circuit for a term

beginning in January 2023. On June 1, 2022, then Place 14 circuit judge

Clyde Jones retired, leaving a vacancy in the Place 14 judgeship. In

response to that vacancy, on June 9, 2022, the Alabama Judicial

Resources Allocation Commission ("the Commission") convened and,

pursuant to powers granted it by the Act,1 voted to reallocate the Place

14 judgeship from 10th Judicial Circuit, the circuit least in need of an

additional circuit-court judgeship according to a formal judicial-caseload

study, to the 23d Judicial Circuit, the circuit most in need of an additional

judgeship according to the same study. On July 18, 2022, Governor Kay

Ivey appointed Judge Patrick Tuten, then a district judge in Madison

     1Section   12-9A-2(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in part:

     "Only in the event of a vacancy due to death, retirement,
     resignation, or removal from office of a district or circuit
     judge, the Judicial Resources Allocation Commission shall
     have 30 days to determine whether to reallocate such
     judgeship to another district or circuit. … All reallocation
     decisions require a two-thirds vote of the commission
     members. In determining whether to reallocate such
     judgeship, the commission shall consider the need based on
     the district and court rankings as determined pursuant to
     Section 12-9A-1. …"
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County, to fill the newly reallocated circuit-court judgeship, a position he

assumed the next day.

     On July 19, 2022, several hours after Tuten had taken the oath of

office, Hudson filed a complaint in the trial court seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief. The only three defendants named in the action were

Governor Ivey, who has the authority to make appointments to fill

judicial vacancies; Chief Justice Tom Parker, who is the chair of the

Commission; and Tuten. Specifically, Hudson asserted that the Act

represented an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative authority to

establish circuit-court judgeships and requested the following relief:

     "A. Declare that the [Commission]'s duties under Ala. Code
     § 12-9A-2 represent an unconstitutional delegation of
     legislative authority, to the extent that Ala. Code § 12-9A-2
     allows for the reallocation by [the Commission] of vacant
     judgeships;

     "B. Declare invalid and unconstitutional the Governor's
     appointment of Patrick Tuten to serve as circuit judge in the
     newly created Madison County judicial seat;

     "C. Preliminarily and permanently enjoin Patrick Tuten
     from taking the oath of office to serve as a circuit judge in the
     newly created Madison County seat or otherwise assuming
     the purported duties of that seat and exercising any authority
     as a circuit judge in that seat;

     "D. Order the Governor to choose a candidate from those
     submitted by the [Jefferson County Judicial Commission] to
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     fill the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Place 14 judgeship vacancy in
     Jefferson County as mandated by the constitution of the State
     of Alabama."

     The defendants jointly moved to dismiss the action based on three

main grounds. First, they argued that the trial court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction because a quo warranto action -- not a declaratory-

judgment    action   --   provided   the   exclusive   remedy   under   the

circumstances. Second, the defendants argued that Hudson lacked

standing because she had not suffered an injury in fact and because, the

defendants claimed, her purported injury was neither caused by nor

capable of being redressed by the named defendants. Finally, the

defendants contended that Hudson had failed to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted because the legislature had lawfully empowered

the Commission to reallocate the judgeship. On August 12, 2022,

following a hearing and briefing by the parties, the trial court entered a

judgment dismissing Hudson's action for all the reasons asserted by the

defendants. Hudson timely appealed.

                            Standard of Review

     The defendants asserted that Hudson's action was due to be

dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), Ala.

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R. Civ. P., and because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could

be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. On appeal, no

presumption of correctness is given to a dismissal. " 'We review de novo

whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction.' " Taylor v.

Paradise Missionary Baptist Church, 242 So. 3d 979, 986 (Ala. 2017)

(quoting Solomon v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 1211, 1218

(Ala. 2006)). "The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[,

Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are

viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader

could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief."

Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). Furthermore, this

Court reviews questions of law de novo. See Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life

Ins. Co., 209 So. 3d 486, 489 (Ala. 2016).

                                 Analysis

     We first address whether the trial court correctly concluded that

Hudson's exclusive remedy in this case was to petition for a writ of quo

warranto. As this Court has explained,

          "[t]he writ of quo warranto is a common law writ used to
     determine whether one is properly qualified and eligible to
     hold a public office. The writ is utilized to test whether a
     person may lawfully hold office, unlike impeachment, which
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     is the removal of an officeholder for inappropriate acts while
     lawfully holding office. See Sullivan v. State ex rel. Attorney
     General of Alabama, 472 So. 2d 970 (Ala. 1985); State ex rel.
     Chambers v. Bates, 233 Ala. 251, 171 So. 370 (1936). Stated
     another way, the purpose of the writ of quo warranto is to
     ascertain whether an officeholder is 'constitutionally and
     legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any
     functions of, the office to which he lays claim.' 65 Am Jur. 2d
     Quo Warranto § 122 (1972).

          "In Alabama, actions for the writ of quo warranto may
     be brought by private citizens pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, §
     6-6-591. Rouse v. Wiley, 440 So. 2d 1023 (Ala. 1983). Section
     6-6-591 states, in pertinent part:

                 " '(a) An action may be commenced in the
           name of the state against the party offending in
           the following cases:

                      " '(1) When any person usurps,
                 intrudes into or unlawfully holds or
                 exercises any public office ….'

     "The issuance of a writ of quo warranto must serve the public
     good, although it may also incidentally benefit the person or
     persons that institute the action. Floyd v. State ex rel. Baker,
     177 Ala. 169, 59 So. 280 (1912); State ex rel. Fuller v.
     Hargrove, 277 Ala. 688, 174 So. 2d 328 (1965)."

Ex parte Sierra Club, 674 So. 2d 54, 56-57 (Ala. 1995).

     A declaratory judgment, on the other hand, serves the broader

function of enabling parties to obtain a judicial determination of their

legal rights related to an actual controversy between them in advance of

an invasion of such rights and whether or not further relief is or could be
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claimed. See, e.g., Harper v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 873 So. 2d

220, 224 (Ala. 2003) (stating that a purpose of Alabama's Declaratory

Judgment Act, § 6-6-220 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, is "to enable parties

between whom an actual controversy exists or those between whom

litigation is inevitable to have the issues speedily determined when a

speedy determination would prevent unnecessary injury caused by the

delay of ordinary judicial proceedings").

           " 'The Declaratory Judgment Act, §§ 6-6-220 through
     -232, Ala. Code 1975, "does not ' "empower courts to … give
     advisory opinions, however convenient it might be to have
     these questions decided for the government of future cases." ' "
     Bruner v. Geneva County Forestry Dep't, 865 So. 2d 1167,
     1175 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Stamps v. Jefferson County Bd. of
     Educ., 642 So. 2d 941, 944 (Ala. 1994) (quoting in turn Town
     of Warrior v. Blaylock, 275 Ala. 113, 114, 152 So. 2d 661, 662
     (1963))) (emphasis added in Stamps). This Court has
     emphasized that declaratory-judgment actions must "settle a
     'bona fide justiciable controversy.' " Baldwin County v. Bay
     Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 45 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Gulf South
     Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 557 (Ala. 1979)). The
     controversy must be " 'definite and concrete,' " must be " ' real
     and substantial,' " and must seek relief by asserting a claim
     opposed to the interest of another party " ' upon the state of
     facts which must have accrued.' " Baldwin County, 854 So. 2d
     at 45 (quoting Copeland v. Jefferson County, 284 Ala. 558,
     561, 226 So. 2d 385, 387 (1969)). " ' Declaratory judgment
     proceedings will not lie for an "anticipated controversy." ' "
     Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So.
     2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002) (quoting City of Dothan v. Eighty-Four
     West, Inc., 738 So. 2d 903, 908 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)).' "

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Etowah Baptist Ass'n v. Entrekin, 45 So. 3d 1266, 1274-75 (Ala. 2010)

(quoting Bedsole v. Goodloe, 912 So. 2d 508, 518 (Ala. 2005)).

      Furthermore, this Court has recognized that a declaratory-

judgment action cannot serve as a substitute for a quo warranto action.

"[T]he exclusive remedy to determine whether a party is usurping a

public office is a quo warranto action pursuant to § 6-6-591, Ala. Code

1975, and not an action seeking a declaratory judgment." Riley v.

Hughes, 17 So. 3d 643, 646 (Ala. 2009) (footnote omitted). As explained

in Riley, "[a] declaratory-judgment action cannot be employed where quo

warranto is the appropriate remedy because the declaratory judgment

would violate public policy," 17 So. 3d at 646, and is, therefore, not

justiciable:

                     " 'This remedy [quo warranto,] "looks to the
               sovereign power of the state with respect to the use
               or abuse of franchises -- which are special
               privileges -- created by its authority, and which
               must, as a principle of fundamental public policy,
               remain subject to its sovereign action in so far as
               the interests of the public, or any part of the public,
               are affected by their usurpation or abuse."

                     " 'Our statute has extended the right to
               institute such proceeding to a person giving
               security for costs of the action. But, in such case,
               the action is still prerogative in character, brought
               in the name of the State, on the relation of such
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           person, who becomes a joint party with the State.
           The giving of security for the costs of the action is
           the condition upon which the relator is permitted
           to sue in the name of the State. Without such
           security, he usurps the authority of the State.

                 " '….

                " 'As indicated, it is the policy of the law of
           Alabama that [quo warranto] proceedings should
           be had in the name of the State, and instituted in
           the manner designated by statute.

                " 'To sanction a private action inter partes
           with the same objective would operate a virtual
           repeal of the quo warranto statute.

                 " '….

                " 'The Declaratory Judgment Law was never
           intended to strike down the public policy involved.'

     "Birmingham Bar Ass'n v. Phillips & Marsh, 239 Ala. 650,
     657-58, 196 So. 725, 732 (1940) (citations omitted).

           "Where a controversy presented in a declaratory-
     judgment action is not justiciable, this Court may notice the
     defect ex mero motu."

Riley, 17 So. 3d at 646-47.

     In Sierra Club, an environmental organization brought an action

for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Alabama

Environmental     Management       Commission      ("the    Environmental

Management      Commission")     and     the   Alabama     Department   of
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Environmental Management ("ADEM"), challenging the qualifications,

appointments, and confirmations of three members of the Environmental

Management Commission. The three members thereafter challenged the

circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a consent judgment in

that action, arguing that a quo warranto action was the sole method to

review the legality of their appointments. This Court agreed, rejecting

the environmental organization's claim that the case was about

"procedure" and not whether the three members were to be permanently

removed from office:

     "A declaratory judgment action is not appropriate in this case
     because, contrary to [the environmental organization's]
     contentions, this case is not merely one concerning the
     interpretation of a statute. Rather, it directly concerns
     whether [the three members] are unlawfully exercising their
     positions as commissioners …. The question whether [the
     three members] were properly or improperly appointed and
     confirmed strikes directly at the heart of their qualifications
     for those offices. Because their qualifications for service in
     office are being questioned, the writ of quo warranto is [the
     environmental organization's] only proper remedy in this
     case. …. To suggest otherwise -- that the qualifications of [the
     three members] are not at issue -- is to ignore [the
     environmental organization's] attempts to remove them from
     office or, at least, require them to submit to another
     confirmation process.

           "Although Rule 57, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides for the use
     of declaratory judgment actions, Rule 81[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,]
     states that the rules are applicable 'to the extent that the
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     practice in such matters is not provided by statute'; it then
     notes that quo warranto proceedings 'or actions in the nature
     thereof' fall under this rule. Rule 81(a)(23). … [T]he Alabama
     legislature provided for the use of the writ of quo warranto in
     § 6-6-591[, Ala. Code 1975]. In contrast to the writ of quo
     warranto, the declaratory judgment procedure is designed to
     settle a justiciable controversy where each side has standing
     to engage the power of the courts for a determination of that
     controversy. In this case, however, the only question at issue
     at this time is the legality of the appointments of [the three
     members]. The consequence of an action to test whether they
     are entitled to hold these offices requires that the petitioner
     have standing. [The environmental organization] would have
     standing to petition the trial court for a writ of quo warranto,
     on behalf of the State, to determine the legality of these
     appointments. It does not have standing to file a declaratory
     judgment action under these circumstances. Even under our
     Rules of Civil Procedure, a declaratory judgment action is not
     convertible to a quo warranto action."

674 So. 2d at 58.

     In this case, Hudson argues that her action was not initiated with

the direct purpose of removing Tuten from office but, rather, to challenge

the constitutionality of the Act under which a judgeship was removed

from the 10th Judicial Circuit. She contends that her action only

"collaterally implicates Judge Tuten's authority to occupy an unlawfully

created [judicial] seat." Hudson's brief at 17. We cannot overlook,

however, the fact that Hudson's action named Tuten as a defendant and

sought a judgment declaring that Tuten's appointment was "invalid and

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unconstitutional" and a permanent injunction prohibiting Tuten from

"exercising any authority as a circuit judge." Moreover, the relief Hudson

sought from Governor Ivey -- appointing a person to fill the judgeship in

the 10th Judicial Circuit that has been reallocated to the 23d Judicial

Circuit and is currently occupied by Tuten -- necessarily contemplates

the removal of Tuten from his judicial office. In other words, this action

is not one merely concerning the interpretation of a statute; rather,

Hudson directly challenges Tuten's exercise of his judicial office. Under

our law, such claims must be brought as a quo warranto action.

       Hudson further posits that a quo warranto action will not afford her

the complete relief she seeks, i.e., an adjudication on the purported

unconstitutionality of the Act and a declaration that the reallocation of

the judgeship was, therefore, void. We note, however, that a quo warranto

action would not preclude a determination as to the constitutionality of

the Act or the legality of the Commission's reallocation of a judgeship.

Indeed, Hudson's challenge to Tuten's appointment and exercise of

powers relates directly to the purported constitutional infirmities of the

Act.

            "It is fully settled in this State that statutory quo
       warranto is the appropriate remedy to test the existence of a
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     de jure office, the same as to oust a usurper intruding into an
     office; and in adjudicating the existence of such office vel non,
     the court may determine the constitutionality of the act
     purporting to create the same."

Corprew v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 241 Ala. 492, 493-94, 3 So. 2d 53, 54 (1941).

Nor is a trial court precluded from issuing appropriate injunctive relief

in a quo warranto action. See Tyson v. Jones, 60 So. 3d 831, 843 (Ala.

2010) (rejecting argument that a circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue

injunctive relief in a quo warranto action).

                               Conclusion

     Hudson's action expressly sought relief concerning whether Judge

Tuten lawfully holds or exercises his judicial office. Therefore, under

Alabama law, Hudson's exclusive remedy was to petition for a writ of quo

warranto. We, thus, affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing

Hudson's declaratory-judgment action for want of subject-matter

jurisdiction, and we pretermit discussion of the constitutionality of the

Act or Hudson's standing to seek declaratory relief.2

     AFFIRMED.

     2We   also do not address at this time the issue, raised for the first
time in Hudson's reply brief, whether Hudson could pursue a stand-alone
declaratory-judgment action against the Commission addressing only the
Act's constitutionality.
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    Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.

    Mitchell, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

    Parker, C.J., and Cook, J., recuse themselves.

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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).

     I concur in the decision to affirm the trial court's judgment. 3 I write

separately to explain my concerns with certain aspects of Tiara Young

Hudson's submissions to the trial court and to this Court.

                                     I.

     As the main opinion makes clear, Hudson's complaint states only

one claim: a nondelegation challenge to the statute that authorizes the

Judicial Resources Allocation Commission ("JRAC") to create and

eliminate judgeships. Hudson does not allege a violation of the 14th

Amendment to the United States Constitution, nor does she bring any

claim for which racial discrimination (or any other type of discrimination)

     3As  the main opinion notes, our precedents establish that a petition
for the writ of quo warranto is the "exclusive" mechanism for seeking to
expel a public official from office. Riley v. Hughes, 17 So. 3d 643, 646
(Ala. 2009). Since Hudson's complaint expressly demands Judge Patrick
Tuten's ouster from office, our precedents dictate that Hudson was
required to seek relief through a quo warranto action (which comes with
heightened procedural strictures) rather than a declaratory-judgment
proceeding. See id. Our caselaw has also held that "the unavailability of
a declaratory-judgment action as a substitute for a quo warranto action"
means that any declaratory-judgment action that should have been
brought as a quo warranto action suffers from "a jurisdictional defect,"
which renders the case nonjusticiable. Id. at 648. Hudson never asks us
to reconsider these (or, indeed, any) aspects of our quo warranto caselaw
and has therefore failed to identify any reversible error.

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is an element. Yet the statements of fact in Hudson's complaint and

opening brief begin by highlighting the fact that Hudson is "a Black

female." C. 19; Hudson's brief at 6. Hudson then goes on to describe the

races of various people who are involved in the case, even though their

races also have nothing to do with the legal claim stated in her complaint

or the questions presented on appeal.

     It appears that Hudson spends so much time focusing on race -- her

own race, the races of JRAC's members, and the racial demographics of

Jefferson and Madison Counties -- to insinuate that JRAC's decision to

reallocate the Jefferson County judgeship to Madison County was

motivated by bigotry rather than by objective consideration of the factors

listed in § 12-9A-1(d), Ala. Code 1975. But Hudson stops short of actually

arguing that point or presenting any evidence in support of it. On the

contrary, Hudson's counsel conceded below that JRAC's reallocation

decision was based on the race-neutral "fact that all the studies show that

Madison County is most in need and Jefferson County was the least in

need" of circuit judgeships based on the two counties' respective

caseloads. T. 27, C. 820. To turn around after making such a concession

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and insinuate that the reallocation decision was motivated by racism

reveals, at a minimum, questionable professional judgment.

     Hudson's implicit accusations of racism are particularly puzzling

given that her own filings use overtly biased language when referring to

different racial groups. Those filings capitalize "Black" every time it

appears but do not capitalize "white" anytime it appears, even when the

two words appear side-by-side in the same sentence. See, e.g., Hudson's

brief at 6, 8; C. 6, 9, 11, 12, 19, 21. The persistence of this pattern

suggests that it is not an accident but instead a deliberate choice, the

effect of which is to signal that certain races deserve heightened respect

while others do not.

     That signaling may be fashionable in certain circles, 4 but it has no

place in our legal system. Our system of justice "is color-blind, and

     4See,   e.g., Explaining AP Style on Black and white, Associated
Press       (July      20,     2020),      currently      available      at:
www.apnews.com/article/9105661462 (explaining that "AP's style is now
to capitalize Black in a racial, ethnic or cultural sense" but stating that
"AP style will continue to lowercase the term white in racial, ethnic and
cultural senses" because white people lack shared "history and culture"
and because "white people's skin color plays into systemic inequalities
and injustices"); Nancy Coleman, Why We're Capitalizing Black, N.Y.
Times        (July      5,    2020),       currently      available      at:
www.nytimes.com/2020/07/05/insider/capitalized-black.html               and
archived at: https://perma.cc/747M-335G ("our policy will now capitalize
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neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson,

163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Displays of racial bias

would be shameful no matter the source, but they are especially troubling

coming from a legal organization (the Southern Poverty Law Center) that

purports to advance racial equality. It should -- but apparently does not

-- go without saying that the act of singling out certain races for special

'Black' but not 'white' "); Mike Laws, Why we capitalize "Black" (and not
"white"), Colum. Journalism Rev. (June 16, 2020), currently available at:
www.cjr.org/analysis/capital-b-black-styleguide.php and archived at:
https://perma.cc/3RCA-BKJW (arguing that it should be "take[n] as a
given that Black ought to be capitalized," while "white" should not be,
and mocking "fusspot grammarians" who believe that the two races
should be treated equally when it comes to capitalization).

      In my own writing, I do my best to follow the rule I was taught in
grade school: capitalize proper nouns and adjectives while leaving
common nouns and adjectives lowercase. Since black and white have
traditionally been treated as common adjectives, I prefer to leave them
both lowercase. In contrast, I capitalize proper adjectives like African,
European, and Asian. Others take the view that any descriptor for a
racial or ethnic group should be treated as a proper adjective and that,
as a result, black and white should be capitalized whenever they refer to
groups of people. Our Court of Criminal Appeals, for example, has done
this. See, e.g., Smith v. State, [Ms. CR-17-1014, Sept. 2, 2022] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2022) ("The struck jury consisted of nine White
members and three Black members."). I have no issue with that approach
as long as it's applied to all groups equally. But that is not the approach
taken by Hudson's attorneys, who have rejected any evenhanded rule and
instead use capitalization in a way that signals heightened regard for
favored groups at the expense of other groups.
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favor or disfavor does nothing to advance our nation's shared

commitment to "equality before the law." Id. at 562.

                                     II.

     Racialized language is not the only example of inappropriate

material in Hudson's brief. Hudson's attorneys also chose to list their

preferred personal pronouns in their briefs' signature blocks, even

though that information has no relevance to their client's legal

arguments or to the attorneys' ability to practice before the Court. I don't

recall seeing this practice in any briefs previously filed with our Court,

and I regard this novel use of the signature block as improper. Lawyers

sign pleadings in order to verify those pleadings, not to convey

biographical details about themselves.

     The Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure exempt "signature

blocks" from a brief's word count, see Ala. R. App. P. 28(j) and 32(c), based

on the manifest presumption that signature blocks will be used only to

convey   information    necessary    to    enable   attorneys   to   receive

correspondence and to verify the attorneys' ability to practice before the

Court (such as the attorneys' names, bar numbers, email and physical

addresses, and phone numbers). Extraneous information -- including

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information about attorneys' personal histories or their membership in

political, religious, sexual, racial, or other identity groups -- is

inappropriate. Inclusion of such information can create the appearance

that an attorney is attempting to circumvent word-count limitations or,

more seriously, to curry favor based on the attorneys' political views or

identity-group memberships (imagine an advocate who puts a "✝" or

"><>" next to his or her name when practicing before a panel of all

Christian judges).

     Counsel in future cases should be aware that inclusion of irrelevant

information in a brief's signature block may result in that brief's being

stricken as noncompliant. Our Court may also benefit from adopting

amendments to the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure and other

rules of court that make this explicit.

                                   ***

     One unfortunate consequence of the recent trend toward lawyer-

driven litigation is that it tends to elevate ideological signaling over

substantive legal arguments. This case is an example. The legal disputes

here are about subject-matter jurisdiction and nondelegation principles;

they have nothing to do with race, sex, or professions of gender identity.

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Yet repeated references to these latter characteristics are made

throughout Hudson's filings in this case, for no apparent reason other

than to make an ideological point. I caution attorneys practicing in our

courts not to repeat these tactics in future cases.

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