Court Opinion

ID: 9379926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 18:00:28.963305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.432486
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60109        Document: 00516678766             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/16/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                     FILED
                                                                               March 16, 2023
                                       No. 22-60109                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk

   William Jody Cromwell,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Boa Vida Hospital of Aberdeen, MS, L.L.C., doing business as
   Monroe Regional Hospital,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 1:20-CV-174

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and King and Higginson, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          William Jody Cromwell, a former anesthetist at Boa Vida Hospital
   (Hospital), alleges that he was terminated solely due to his disabilities in
   violation of § 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 1 The district court
   granted the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment. Because Cromwell

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
         1
             See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
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                                    No. 22-60109

   failed to show that the Hospital’s nondiscriminatory reasons for his
   termination were merely pretextual, we affirm.
                                          I
          Cromwell has been an anesthetist since 1976 and began working for
   the Hospital in 2014. He has multiple disabilities. First, he acknowledges
   that he used a walker due to knee pain while working at the Hospital. Second,
   he has hearing loss and stated that he wears hearing aids.
          At the Hospital, Nancy Williams managed the operating room.
   Although four physicians used the operating room, most of the surgeries and
   the most complex surgeries were performed by the chief of surgery, Dr.
   Woodrow Brand. In late 2015, Williams told Chris Chandler, the Hospital’s
   administrator, about Cromwell’s mobility struggles. Before the end of 2015,
   Dr. Brand also brought concerns regarding Cromwell’s limited mobility to
   Chandler.
          Chandler testified that Dr. Brand, Williams, and other members of the
   surgery team raised concerns over the quality of Cromwell’s anesthesia
   services. Both Dr. Brand and an operating room nurse, Dana Thompson,
   testified that Cromwell appeared to have trouble hearing alarms going off
   during surgery. Thompson testified that when this happened, she would
   check on the patients to make sure they were safe. Williams testified that she
   received questions from patients and their families about Cromwell’s
   inability to hear. Cromwell admits that nurses questioned him about alarms
   going off, but he claims he was ignoring false alarms.
          Chandler testified that Dr. Brand told him three or four times that
   Cromwell had provided patients with insufficient anesthesia. Further, Dr.
   Brand, Williams, and Thompson all testified that intubation seemed more
   difficult for Cromwell than for others in his position.

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          In November 2017, Cromwell had difficulty intubating a patient.
   According to Dr. Brand, Cromwell tried to intubate the patient multiple
   times without success, which caused significant bleeding and endangered the
   patient. Cromwell testified that the patient had undergone more than twenty
   surgeries on her face, which made her difficult to intubate. Dr. Brand
   testified that Cromwell did not discuss the second intubation attempt with
   him, which was symptomatic of Cromwell’s inability to communicate
   effectively. Williams and Thompson testified that before Dr. Brand could
   speak to the patient’s family about what had occurred, Cromwell spoke to
   the family, even though the conversation should have been reserved for the
   treating physician.
          Chandler testified that when he heard what had occurred, he launched
   an investigation into the incident and sought information from the surgery
   team. Chandler testified that he concluded that Cromwell’s intubation
   difficulty was a concern and that Cromwell had overstepped his role in his
   conversation with the patient’s family. Cromwell admitted that he had
   difficulty intubating the patient, he spoke with the family of the patient who
   was difficult to intubate, and there was an investigation into the
   circumstances surrounding the difficult intubation. However, he did not
   admit to having done anything wrong.
          Chandler testified that, after the investigation, he contacted Dr.
   Kimjot Singh, the Hospital’s owner, who had ultimate authority in
   employment decisions. Dr. Singh had never met Cromwell. Chandler told
   Dr. Singh that, over time, the quality of Cromwell’s job performance had
   deteriorated to the point of potential liability. Chandler recommended
   terminating Cromwell. Before terminating Cromwell, Dr. Singh contacted
   Dr. Brand, who expressed patient safety concerns regarding Cromwell’s job
   performance.    In January 2018, Chandler informed Cromwell that his
   contract was being terminated. Chandler explained to Cromwell that there

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   needed to be “a change in the anesthesia department.” Cromwell testified
   that Chandler told him that Williams and Dr. Brand were the individuals who
   wanted the change.
           Cromwell contends that he was fired not because of poor job
   performance, but rather, because of his disabilities. In support of this claim,
   he points to the two statements regarding his disabilities that were made by
   Dr. Brand and Williams. Further, to negate the testimony of Dr. Brand and
   Williams, five witnesses testified that they did not have any issues with
   Cromwell’s job performance.
           The district court granted the Hospital’s motion for summary
   judgment, concluding that Cromwell failed to prove a prima facie case of
   employment discrimination or, in the alternative, that Cromwell failed to
   show that the Hospital’s justification for his termination was pretextual.
   Cromwell timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
   § 1291.
                                                II
           Cromwell argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim
   for discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. “The Rehabilitation Act
   ‘prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by recipients of federal
   funds.’” 2 Where a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence in support of a
   discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act, as is the case here, the

           2
             Cohen v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 557 F. App’x 273, 277 (5th Cir. 2014) (per
   curiam) (unpublished) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 614
   n.5 (5th Cir. 2009)).

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   claim is analyzed at summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas 3
   burden-shifting framework. 4
           Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case
   of discrimination. “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
   the Rehabilitation Act, ‘a plaintiff must prove that (1) she is an “individual
   with a disability”; (2) who is “otherwise qualified”; (3) who worked for a
   “program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”; and (4) that she
   was discriminated against “solely by reason of her or his disability.”’” 5
           If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the
   defendant to ‘articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason’ for its
   actions.” 6 To satisfy this burden, the defendant need only produce “any
   evidence ‘which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a
   nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. . . .’” 7
           “If the defendant meets his burden . . . , then the burden shifts back to
   the plaintiff to show that the nondiscriminatory justification was mere pretext
   for discrimination . . . .” 8 A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext “by showing

           3
               McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
           4
            See Houston v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 17 F.4th 576, 585 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Cohen,
   557 F. App’x at 277).
           5
             Id. at 586 (quoting Hileman v. City of Dall., 115 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1997)
   (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a))).
           6
            Cohen, 557 F. App’x at 278 (quoting Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394,
   396 (5th Cir. 1995)).
           7
             Daigle, 70 F.3d at 396 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509
   (1993)); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (“This
   burden is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’”
   (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 509)).
           8
              Cohen, 557 F. App’x at 278 (citing Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 179 F.3d 297, 300-01
   (5th Cir. 1999)).

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   that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” 9 “An
   explanation is false or unworthy of credence if it is not the real reason for the
   adverse employment action.” 10
           A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. 11
   “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no
   genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
   as a matter of law’” 12 and not appropriate if “a reasonable jury could return
   a verdict for the non-moving party.” 13 We view the evidence in the light most
   favorable to the non-movant. 14 “However, the non-movant must go beyond
   the pleadings and present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial in
   order to avoid summary judgment.” 15 “[T]his court typically will not
   consider evidence or arguments that were not presented to the district court
   for its consideration in ruling on the motion.” 16

           9
                Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (citation omitted).
           10
             Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Sandstad v. CB
   Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 899 (5th Cir. 2002)).
           11
             See Feist v. La., Dep’t of Justice, Off. of the Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir.
   2013) (citation omitted).
           12
             Johnston & Johnston v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., 732 F.3d 555, 561 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
           13
             Bluebonnet Hotel Ventures, L.L.C. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 754 F.3d 272, 276
   (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 234 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir.
   2000)).
           14
                Feist, 730 F.3d at 452 (citation omitted).
           15
              Bluebonnet Hotel Ventures, 754 F.3d at 276 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
   U.S. 317, 324 (1986)).
           16
              Grogan v. Kumar, 873 F.3d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and
   citations omitted); see also Davidson v. Fairchild Controls Corp., 882 F.3d 180, 185 (5th Cir.
   2018) (“When evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the nonmovant fails
   even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not

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           We assume—but do not decide—that Cromwell has established a
   prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. 17 Pursuant
   to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the Hospital has
   asserted its “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason[s]” 18 for terminating
   Cromwell’s employment, which were Cromwell improperly dosing patients,
   ignoring        alarms,      struggling       with     intubation,       and     ineffectively
   communicating. We therefore consider whether Cromwell can show that the
   Hospital’s purported reasons were pretextual such that a reasonable jury
   could conclude that his termination was due to his disabilities. The district
   court concluded that Cromwell failed to show pretext, and we similarly
   conclude that none of the evidence upon which Cromwell relies creates an
   issue of fact as to the Hospital’s articulated reasons for terminating his
   employment.
           Although Cromwell denies that he had performance problems, merely
   disputing the Hospital’s assessment of his performance does not create an
   issue of fact because the issue at the pretext stage is whether the reason for
   termination was the real reason for termination, not whether the reason was
   correct. 19 Moreover, Cromwell admits to many of the underlying events
   upon which the Hospital claims it based its termination decision, including

   properly before the district court.” (quoting Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir.
   2003))).
           17
             See Houston v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 17 F.4th 576, 582 (5th Cir. 2021); Cohen v.
   Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 557 F. App’x 273, 278 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
   (unpublished).
           18
                Richardson v. Monitronics Int’l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 2005).
           19
             See Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 899 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing
   Evans v. City of Hous., 246 F.3d 344, 355 (5th Cir. 2001)); see also Ogden v. Brennan, 657 F.
   App’x 232, 236 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Sandstad, 309 F.3d at
   899).

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   ignoring alarms, having difficulty intubating a patient, and speaking with the
   family of the patient who was difficult to intubate. Additionally, he admits
   that Hospital employees investigated the November 2017 incident and asked
   him about his communication with the patient’s family. That the Hospital
   was sufficiently concerned with the event that it conducted an investigation
   weighs against a finding of pretext. Finally, the fact that the hospital received
   no written complaints about Cromwell does not undermine the deficiencies
   in his performance observed directly by hospital employees, and the district
   court correctly stated that Cromwell’s testimony that some employees did
   not have a problem with his work “did not negate the testimony of those that
   did.”
           To connect his termination to his disabilities, Cromwell provides
   evidence of disability-related comments made by Dr. Brand and Williams.
   Dr. Brand testified regarding his conversations with Chandler: “Really, as
   best I can recall, the first conversations were more about just [Cromwell’s]
   walking and the difficulty hearing and the perception. It was just about the
   perception that the patients would have. . . . [I]nitially it was pretty, you
   know, limited to just those concerns and how can we make it better.”
   Cromwell admits in his reply brief that these comments occurred two years
   prior to his termination.        Thus, this comment is insufficient to show
   pretext. 20 Similarly, that Williams described Cromwell’s admitted disability

           20
               See, e.g., Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 2001)
   (“Where comments are vague and remote in time they are insufficient to establish
   discrimination.” (internal brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted));
   Nguyen v. Univ. of Tex. Sch. of L., 542 F. App’x 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
   (unpublished) (finding statements made over a year before discharge to be too remote to
   raise a fact issue).

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   to Chandler does not show pretext, especially where the conversation
   occurred multiple years prior to Cromwell’s termination. 21
           Additionally, the Hospital knew of Cromwell’s disabilities by 2015 but
   did not terminate his employment until early 2018. The timing of his
   termination does not indicate pretext because (1) for multiple years, the
   Hospital accommodated his disabilities and (2) the termination occurred two
   months after the November 2017 incident. 22
           On appeal, Cromwell also argues that there is evidence of pretext
   because Dr. Singh did not mention the November 2017 incident explicitly in
   his deposition and because Williams and Dr. Brand are “interested
   witnesses.” However, he did not raise these arguments for pretext in the
   district court. We therefore do not consider them here. 23
           Considered individually and collectively, Cromwell’s evidence
   properly before this court does not show that the Hospital’s articulated
   nondiscriminatory reasons for Cromwell’s termination were merely
   pretextual. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in granting
   the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Cromwell’s
   claims under the Rehabilitation Act.

           21
                See Wallace, 271 F.3d at 222; Nguyen, 542 F. App’x at 325.
           22
              See Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 240 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (“Timing standing alone is not sufficient absent other evidence of pretext.” (quoting Boyd
   v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 1998))); Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs.,
   L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 354 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding possible inference of pretext due to
   temporal proximity of protected conduct negated by even greater temporal proximity to
   inappropriate, nonprotected conduct).
           23
                See Grogan v. Kumar, 873 F.3d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 2017).

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                              *        *         *
         The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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