Court Opinion

ID: 9388820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 18:00:48.483966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.899417
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60587         Document: 00516720503             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/21/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 22-60587
                                     Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                     ____________                                  April 21, 2023
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
   Martha Dee,                                                                         Clerk

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Donald Gater, in his Individual and Official Capacity,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Mississippi
                                USDC No. 3:20-CV-752
                      ______________________________

   Before Davis, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Defendant-Appellant, Donald Gater, appeals the district court’s
   order denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative,
   motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. As set forth
   below, our jurisdiction over the denial of qualified immunity on summary
   judgment is limited. Because this appeal challenges the genuineness of a fact

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60587      Document: 00516720503           Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/21/2023

                                     No. 22-60587

   issue, which we are prohibited from reviewing, we must DISMISS it for
   lack of jurisdiction.
                                          I.
          Plaintiff-Appellee, Martha Dee, and Gater were both employed by the
   Jackson Police Department (JPD) in the Investigative Division. Gater was a
   Commander in the division, and Dee was a detective. Dee alleges that on
   April 2, 2019, she was in the JPD building assisting another detective with a
   homicide investigation. She further alleges that when she and the other
   detective were leaving to perform investigatory work, Gater approached
   them in the hallway. She contends Gater asked the other detective a
   question, but when the other detective did not answer, she responded
   instead. Gater then told Dee, “I was not talking to you.” Dee explained that
   she responded to Gater’s question because she knew the answer. Dee
   maintains that Gater then pulled out his loaded service revolver and pointed
   it directly at her forehead. Gater then returned the firearm to its holster and
   stated, “I’m sorry. I shouldn’t have done that.”
          Gater denies he pointed his service revolver at Dee. He agrees that he
   approached the detectives, and that he spoke to them. Specifically, he
   contends that he talked to them about weapon retention and pulled out his
   firearm to demonstrate “firearm retention issues,” but that he never pointed
   a firearm at Dee.
          Dee thereafter filed suit against Gater, as well as against the City of
   Jackson and its police chief. 1 She alleged that Gater and the police chief were
   at all relevant times “acting under the color of state law.” She asserted
   claims of sex discrimination in the workplace in violation of the Equal
          _____________________
          1
              The City and the police chief were granted summary judgment dismissing
   Plaintiff’s claims against them. Those claims are not at issue in this appeal.

                                               2
Case: 22-60587       Document: 00516720503             Page: 3      Date Filed: 04/21/2023

                                        No. 22-60587

   Protection Clause and Title VII, disability discrimination in violation of the
   Americans with Disabilities Act, and unlawful seizure and excessive force
   under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
          Gater filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for
   judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, for summary judgment based
   on qualified immunity as to the § 1983 claims. Gater argued that Dee did not
   sufficiently plead any cognizable action against him, but just “threadbare
   allegations that Gater seized Dee when he pointed his service weapon at
   her.” In the alternative, Gater asserted that he was entitled to qualified
   immunity because Dee testified that she was not under arrest at any point
   during the incident, and she described no injury from any alleged excessive
   use of force.
           As the district court explained, because the parties presented evidence
   outside the pleadings, and that evidence was not excluded, the court was
   required to treat Gater’s motion “as one for summary judgment under Rule
   56.” 2 The district court determined that a genuine dispute of material fact
   existed as to whether Dee was seized as contemplated by the Fourth
   Amendment. Specifically, the court determined that Dee’s version of the
   facts supports that a jury could conclude a reasonable person felt seized,
   while Gater’s version supports the opposite conclusion. The district court
   concluded: “A jury must weigh the evidence and credibility of the witnesses
   to determine whether qualified immunity applies.” The district court also
   determined that based on the parties’ differing accounts of the incident, a
   genuine dispute of material fact also existed as to Dee’s excessive force claim.
   Based on these findings, the district court denied Gater’s motion for
           _____________________
          2
             See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c),
   matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
   must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”).

                                                  3
Case: 22-60587          Document: 00516720503             Page: 4      Date Filed: 04/21/2023

                                           No. 22-60587

   summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Gater filed a timely notice
   of appeal.
                                                II.
          “The denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified
   immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine to the
   extent that it turns on an issue of law.” 3               “Where the district court
   determines that genuine issues of material fact preclude a determination of
   qualified immunity, we have jurisdiction only to address the legal question of
   whether the genuinely disputed factual issues are material for the purposes
   of summary judgment.” 4               “We have no jurisdiction to consider the
   correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts and cannot review the
   district court’s factual determination that a genuine factual dispute exists.” 5
          As he did in the district court, Gater argues that he did not seize Dee,
   and that both parties testified that no arrest occurred. Gater further argues
   that because Dee was not seized, then no excessive force could have been
   used. However, as the district court noted, a seizure occurs when “a
   reasonable person would have believed that [she] was not free to leave.” 6 We
   agree with the district court that in light of the parties’ varying accounts,
   there is a genuine dispute whether a reasonable person would have believed
   she was free to leave. As noted above, we lack jurisdiction to consider Gater’s

          _____________________
          3
            Ducksworth v. Landrum, 62 F.4th 209, 212 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted).
          4
              Id. (citation omitted).
          5
              Id. (citations omitted).
          6
              See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).

                                                      4
Case: 22-60587          Document: 00516720503                Page: 5   Date Filed: 04/21/2023

                                              No. 22-60587

   appeal of the genuineness of the district court’s factual determinations. 7
   Therefore, we must dismiss this appeal.
           Citing to a case from the Seventh Circuit, Gater argues that “[t]his
   was an action between two co-workers. It was not an arrest or use of force
   situation.” While our circuit has addressed similar arguments in the context
   of whether a law enforcement officer was “acting under color of state law”
   for purposes of § 1983, 8 we decline to address this issue for the first time on
   appeal. 9
                                                  III.
           Based on the foregoing, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of
   jurisdiction.

           _____________________
           7
               Ducksworth, 62 F.4th at 213.
           8
            See Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that a prison
   guard did not act under color of law when he stabbed an inmate during a game of horseplay
   unrelated to the guard’s official duties).
           9
             See Frederking v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 195, 200 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The
   district court did not reach these issues. We decline to address them for the first time on
   appeal.”).

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