Court Opinion

ID: 9796561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:00:04.901821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:36.839498
License: Public Domain

Rose, J.,
dissenting:
The Nylunds’ condominium was seriously damaged in the major Carson City flood of 1996-1997 that was created by melting snow and rain running down Fifth Street in Carson City, a flood drainage area designated by the city. The Nylunds have shown that their damage may have been caused by a low spot in the flood drainage area near their home and that Carson City had *920been notified about this problem fifteen years earlier. At this early stage of the proceeding, we do not know whether the city had done anything to correct the problem. If this case were permitted to go to trial, a jury might ultimately find this inaction to be negligence. I do not think responsibility for this alleged negligent act that resulted in damage fifteen years later should be excused simply because an emergency situation was created when the damage occurred.
The alleged negligence of Carson City in failing to address a recognized flaw in its flood control plan would be actionable when the negligence was recognized and the damage sustained — that being early 1997. We have recognized similar lawsuits for damages.1 However, the majority holds that the negligence that occurred more than a decade earlier is not actionable if the later flood and damage resulted in the authorization of emergency powers that in turn invoked immunity for those acting to address the immediate problem. I believe this is giving greater immunity than the legislature intended when it enacted NRS 414.110, the emergency management immunity statute.
The purpose of the emergency management immunity statute is to grant protection to those who are taking immediate action in a crisis situation. Nothing indicates that the statute is meant to forgive all prior negligent acts contributing to the crisis at hand. Statutes limiting Nevada’s long-standing waiver of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed.2 Rather than follow this well-established legal direction, the majority gives the emergency management immunity statute an expansive interpretation that is not justified by the statute itself or by our case law.
Further, the emergency management immunity statute specifically states that immunity attaches to all those acting in a crisis when the Governor declares an emergency. The majority concludes that anyone in some office of authority has the power to declare the emergency and thus invoke the statutory immunity protection. In this case, it was the City Manager of Carson City. I believe this too is error.
We have often stated, “[wjhere the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself.’ ’3 The emergency *921management immunity statute specifically requires an emergency called by the Governor to trigger immunity. I find this legislative directive clear and unambiguous and would enforce it as written. Since it is undisputed that neither the Governor nor his office declared this emergency, the immunity statute should be declared inapplicable in this case.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for trial.

See, e.g., Foley v. City of Reno, 100 Nev. 307, 680 P.2d 975 (1984); Crucil v. Carson City, 95 Nev. 583, 600 P.2d 216 (1979); State v. Webster, 88 Nev. 690, 504 P.2d 1316 (1972); Harrigan v. City of Reno, 86 Nev. 678, 475 P.2d 94 (1970).

See State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 914, 478 P.2d 591, 593 (1970).

Erwin v. State of Nevada, 111 Nev. 1535, 1538-39, 908 P.2d 1367, 1369 (1995).