Court Opinion

ID: 9628840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:33:04.369836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:12.254414
License: Public Domain

BRYSON, J.,
dissenting.
It is reasonable to conclude that petitioner Marbet’s right to challenge, through judicial review, the Energy Facility Siting Council’s (Council) final order is limited to the scope of his intervention; that the Court of Appeals usurped the Council’s function when it affirmatively appears that petitioner Marbet failed to present such contentions regarding standards to the Council, and the court nevertheless undertook to rule upon the sufficiency of the rules and standards pro*472mulgated by the Council. Christiansen did not petition this court for review of Marbet v. Portland Gen. Elect., 25 Or App 469, 476, 550 P2d 465 (1976).
The result of the majority opinion is that notwithstanding over four years of investigation and study by the Council, still more private and public money must be spent for additional administrative hearings and proceedings before ruling upon Portland General Electric Company’s (PGE) request for a power plant site permit on the "Pebble Springs” project. These additional sums of money are eventually paid by the energy consumers in the rate structure and in additional taxes.
The majority concludes that this further expenditure of time and money is mandated by the Council’s failure to promulgate standards sufficient to satisfy ORS 469.4701 and 469.510 (set forth in footnote of majority opinion) and to make adequate findings.
Petitioner Marbet was an intervening party in the proceedings before the Council. The Council properly *473placed certain limitations upon petitioner in presenting matters contained in his petition:
"A. Conditions imposed upon Intervenor Marbet—
"(1) Intervenor Marbet may cross-examine and give testimony only on the following subject matters:
"(a) The long-handling and storage of the high level radioactive wastes generated by the proposed plans;
"(b) Possible dangers to the public health, safety and welfare associated with military attacks on nuclear power plants;
"(c) The environmental consequences of radioactive emissions from the plant;
"(d) The propriety of 'banking’ sites for the construction of nuclear power plants at some indefinite date in the future.
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Basically, petitioner, in his appearance before the Council, addressed himself to issues of nuclear safety and nuclear waste disposal technology and made no attempt to concern himself with the administrative standards that the Council had or had not adopted. Petitioner Marbet expressly consented to the limitation placed upon his participation. He derives his standing to seek judicial review from ORS 469.380, which provides:
"(1) Any person may appear personally or by counsel to present testimony in any hearing before the council on any application for a site certificate.
"(2) The council may, by proper order, permit any person to become a party complainant or defendant by intervention who appears to have an interest in the results of the hearing or who represents a public interest in such results. However, the request for intervention must be made before the final taking of evidence in the hearing.
"(3) Any person authorized to intervene in the hearing on a site certificate may appeal the council’s recom*474mendation in the manner prescribed in ORS chapter 183. Such recommendation shall be deemed a final order for purposes of such appeal.
[Formerly 453.375]”
ORS 469.380 does not grant a limited intervenor in a Council’s site hearing any right to appeal issues beyond the scope of his petition and intervention before the Council.
ORS 183.480(1) provides:
"(1) Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order or any party to an agency proceeding is entitled to judicial review of a final order * *
The legislature has chosen to open participation in site licensing procedures to anyone who has an interest in the results of the hearing or who "represents a public interest in such results.” However, there is nothing to indicate any intent on the part of the legislature to permit a limited intervenor to judicially challenge the Council’s final order on a ground which is neither related to that raised by petitioner’s intervention nor made an issue before the Council.
Contrary to the majority’s contentions, there is nothing incongruous about the fact that persons "adversely affected or aggrieved” may challenge the Council’s final order where that person has neither participated in the contested case nor raised its contentions before the agency while a limited intervenor cannot. Even if the APA did not provide such a right to persons adversely affected or aggrieved, these persons would still have the right to judicially challenge an administrative final order.3 However, it is apparent *475from the statutory scheme of the Act and from the judicial interpretations which have given meaning to the words "adversely affected or aggrieved”4 that the intervention standards are less rigorous than those giving a nonparty the right to contest in court the final order of an administrative agency. If this were not so, then ORS 469.380(3) would be redundant and without purpose.
It is logical to conclude that the legislature, in facilitating input by persons representing particular public interests and viewpoints, did not intend to grant those individuals the right to protest Council actions unrelated to the purpose of their intervention or to the special interest they represent. To hold otherwise would be to grant standing to contest every aspect of the Council’s order to individuals not possessing the proximity of interests required to qualify for standing as a person adversely affected or aggrieved and whose only participation before the Council has been on a *476discrete issue unrelated to the alleged errors of the Council. It is difficult to see the value in permitting a limited intervenor to argue on appeal issues unrelated to the reasons why he was deemed valuable as an intervenor at the administrative level.
Petitioner Marbet has made no showing of any interest which would qualify him as a person adversely affected or aggrieved. Regardless of any special competency he might possess to serve as a spokesman for the public interest on matters of health and safety, Marbet has no greater personal interest in the Council’s final order than does any other resident of Oregon or, for that matter, of the Pacific Northwest.
The majority’s argument that his limited participation before the Council makes him a person aggrieved is without basis. By the same rationale, any party to the administrative proceedings should be given the right to appeal issues to the court not raised previously before the administrative agency. This clearly is not the law.
As demonstrated by the above paragraph, this statutory construction issue concerning the scope of the right to appeal granted to limited intervenors is closely related to the policy considerations involved in the doctrine of exhaustion and the procedural rule that, with a few exceptions not relevant here,5 issues *477cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.6
In United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 US 33, 37, 73 S Ct 67, 97 L Ed 54 (1952), the court noted that:
"* * * Simple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.”
Three policy rationales support the rule that parties air their objections first before the agency.
(1) Danger that the proceedings before the agency would be reduced to a preliminary bout, preparatory for the main event, the role of agencies might be reduced to that of takers of evidence.
(2) Presumption that if all arguments are fairly and fully presented before the agency, it will in most cases reach the correct result.
(3) Energies of the reviewing court should not be dissipated in considering points that might never be raised on appeal, if they had been properly presented to the agency.
See 2 Cooper, State Administrative Law at 597. See also Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 452 (1965).
*478In the instant case, these policy rationales argue that Marbet’s petition be dismissed. As the majority opinion notes, the statutory scheme of the Act does not require all of the rules and standards provided for by ORS 469.470 and 469.510 be formulated prior to the commencement of the site application proceedings. We can only speculate as to the agency’s reaction had the insufficiency of their rules and standards been brought to their attention. The presumption in favor of administrative fairness described by Professor Cooper would indicate that this shortcoming might well have been rectified without this court’s intervention, had the objection been timely made before the agency. Nor in the instant case should Marbet be allowed to contest the adequacy of the Council’s findings. As the Court of Appeals noted in its opinion, Marbet v. Portland Gen. Elect., 25 Or App 469, 475, 550 P2d 465 (1976):
"* * * In addition, the [Council] staff served upon all parties, including petitioners, the proposed findings of fact, order and site certificate and an opportunity was given to the parties to file objections thereto. Petitioners did not avail themselves of the opportunity to object to the proposed findings of fact, order or site certificate.”
Having failed to take advantage of this opportunity to protest the proposed findings, it should follow from what has been discussed above that petititioner Mar-bet should be foreclosed to contest their adequacy before this court.
In his petition for review to this court, petitioner emphasizes, "We are not lawyers in this proceeding but laymen forced to represent our own interests.” He argues that it would do the public a great disservice to limit his appeal to the issues on which he intervened and to which he addressed himself before the Council. But there is more than one "public interest” to be preserved here.
The public also has an interest in efficient and *479speedy administrative proceedings.7 They have an interest in insuring that the agencies charged with responsibility for protecting the public interest8 will be presented with all of the facts and objections to its action before making its decision. In many ways, the name of the game in anti-nuclear power (or the providing of any additional energy for consumption) litigation is delay. The court should not encourage this tactic. Petitioner, as a matter of policy and statutory construction, should be limited on appeal to those issues upon which he intervened before the Council. In the present case the Council was never given an opportunity to consider or change its administrative standards and now the petitioner asks that we reverse and send the matter back to the Council.
It must be admitted that this court is not schooled in the sciences of nuclear and thermal energy. We do know from common experience that learned scientists and engineers are still arguing their respective positions before the people competent to decide what will be the ultimate outcome on nuclear and thermal energy. With this in mind, the courts should exercise *480judicial restraint and should not assume responsibilities that belong to others in our constitutional system of government.
The "standards” to be set by the Council will continue to fluctuate in this complex field of science. The courts, by necessity, must give way to the criteria set by the Council which in itself could fluctuate within a relative short span of time as more knowledge is gained in the field of energy production. The legislative scheme seems to have contemplated this very problem and placed an unusual amount of authority in the Council.
The legislature has adopted statutory safeguards to protect the public health and safety. ORS 469.400(7) provides, "* * * If the Governor does not sign the certificate on or before the 30th day after it is submitted to him, the certificate is void.” The Director of the Department of Energy has the statutory authority to "curtail” or "halt” plant operation "without hearing or prior notice” whenever there "is cause to believe that there is clear and immediate danger to the public health and safety from continued operation.” ORS 469.540, 469.550. These statutes provide most clearly the power of the Council and Director regardless of any "standards” that could possibly be adopted. It is part of the statutory scheme.
The Court of Appeals correctly held in Marbet that:
"It is a well-recognized rule of administrative law 'that a "reviewing court usurps the agency’s function when it sets aside the administrative determination upon a ground not heretofore presented” ’ to the agency, thereby depriving the agency of an opportunity to consider the matter. Neeley v. Compensation Department, 246 Or 522, 524-25, 426 P2d 460 (1967); Stanbery v. Smith, 233 Or 24, 32-33, 377 P2d 8 (1962); see also 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 20.06 (1958); Easton Utilities Commission v. Atomic Energy Commission, supra, 424 F2d at 851-52.” 25 Or App 469, 477 (1976).
However, the Court of Appeals chose to then ignore *481this "well-recognized rule,” and to waive Rule 4.15 of the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals (1974)9 and rule upon the sufficiency of the standards promulgated by the Council. This the Court of Appeals should not have done. As a matter of statutory construction and policy, petitioner Marbet’s petition for review should be dismissed as he is without standing in this court.
The present state of the law on this subject, by whom and on what grounds the Council’s orders may be attacked, is an open invitation to future delay and confusion. There is no finality on which the government or its governed may rely with any degree of security. With this in mind, the legislature may desire to reconsider the provisions of ORS 469.380 and 183.480 and related statutes.

 ORS 469.470: "The council shall:
"(1) Conduct and prepare, independently or in cooperation with others, studies, investigations, research and programs relating to all aspects of site selection.
"(2) After public hearings, designate areas within this state that are suitable or unsuitable for use as sites for the following types of energy facilities:
"(a) Nuclear-fueled and fossil-fueled thermal power plants with nominal electric generating capacity of more than 200,000 kilowatts.
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"(3) Establish standards and promulgate rules that applicants for site certificates must meet including, but not limited to, standards of financial ability and qualifications as to ability to construct and operate the energy facility to which the site certificate applies and prescribe the form.
* ifc # * ”
At the time litigation was begun before the Court of Appeals, the applicable section was ORS 453.455. This section was renumbered by Oregon Laws 1975, ch 606, which provides for the replacement of the Nuclear and Thermal Energy Council of Oregon by the Energy Facility Siting Council.

The limitations placed upon petitioner in accordance with his petition to the Council are set forth in full in Marbet v. Portland Gen. Elect., 25 Or App 469, 476, 550 P2d 465 (1976).

«* * * The standing of an aggrieved person need not depend upon a specific legislative grant of standing. Standing grows out of the allegation of a substantial injury directly resulting from the challenged governmental action. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 45 S Ct 571, 69 L Ed 1070, 39 ALR 468 (1925). One who alleges that he is or has been adversely and substantially affected by governmental action should have standing to challenge that action if it is judicially reviewable at all. See Davis, Administrative Law * * * 398 [(1959)].” Ore. Newspaper Pub. v. Peterson, 244 Or 116, 121, 415 P2d 21 (1966).

 Although the federal courts have interpreted the federal APA to include as persons adversely affected or aggrieved those individuals urging noneconomic or nonpecuniary interests, this court has not yet gone so far. See, e.g., Ore. Newspaper Pub. v. Peterson, 244 Or 116, 121, 415 P2d 21 (1966); Broughton’s Estate v. Central Or. Irr. Dist., 165 Or 435, 101 P2d 425, 108 P2d 276 (1940). Compare United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) et al, 412 US 669, 93 S Ct 2405, 37 L Ed 2d 254 (1973) (5-3 standing issue, Powell, C.J., not participating).
The following is found in 2 Cooper, State Administrative Law 535-36:
"* * * Under some statutes, and under some court decisions, it is required that the appellant must be able to show that particular type of injury which is classified as a legal wrong. However, the present trend, both by statute and by decision, is toward the principle that it is enough to confer standing to appeal if the appellant can establish that he is aggrieved by the order, in the sense that he has suffered substantial and adverse economic effects.”
See also 2 Cooper, State Administrative Law at 541-42, 554; Nader v. Altermatt, 166 Conn 43, 347 A2d 89 (1974) (fundamental test by which status of aggrievement for purposes of qualifying to take an appeal from an administrative order or regulation is determined encompasses determination whether party claiming aggrievement has successfully demonstrated a specific, personal and legal interest in subject matter of decision, as distinguished from general interest, such as is the concern of all members of a community as a whole, and whether party claiming aggrievement has successfully established that the specific, personal and legal interest has been specifically and injuriously affected by decision).

These exceptions pertain to the cases where the subject matter of the appeal goes to the constitutionality of the agency’s actions, or to the jurisdiction of the agency to act. Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson, 183 Or 305, 193 P2d 543 (1948) is such a case. There the question went to the agency’s jurisdiction to act. In McKart v. United States, 395 US 185, 89 S Ct 1657, 23 L Ed 2d 194 (1969), the United States Supreme Court added another exception in holding that the taking of an- administrative appeal on a question of statutory interpretation is not a prerequisite to a challenge of an order in defending a criminal prosecution. In Miller v. Schrunk, 232 Or 383, 375 P2d 823 (1962), we held that errors of law on the part of-the administrative agency not going to the original jurisdiction of the agency may not be appealed in the absence of proof of exhaustion. That case involved a plaintiff’s right to challenge an administrative agency’s acts through writ of review, ORS 34.010 et seq. See also Vollmer v. Schrunk, 242 Or 196, 199, 409 P2d 177 (1965) (Denecke, J., specially concurring).

 See 2 Cooper, State Administrative Law596(1965);3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 96-97, § 20.06 (1958). See also, Neeley v. State Compensation Dept., 246 Or 522, 426 P2d 460 (1967); Blackstone Valley Nat. Bank v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 537 F2d 1146 (1st Cir 1976); Beatrice Foods Co. v. F. T. C, 540 F2d 303, 313 (7th Cir 1976); Cistemas-Estay v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 531 F2d 155, 160 (3rd Cir 1976) (failure of agency to consider amendment to regulation); Dobbs v. Train, 409 F Supp 432 (DC Ga 1975) (objections to standards should be made in the first instance to the administrative agency and courts will not entertain objections not made in agency proceedings); Mulvey v. Washington Dept, of Social and Health Services, 15 Wash App 292, 548 P2d 597 (1976); Scoville v. SAIF, 22 Or App 62, 537 P2d 1170 (1975).
This requirement that parties raise issues first before the agency has also been described in terms of waiver. See State ex rel. State Sanitary Authority v. Pacific Meat Co., 226 Or 494, 496-97, 360 P2d 634 (1961); Environmental Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Bd., 37 Ill App 3d 519, 346 NE2d 427 (1976).

Professor Ernest A. Gellhom offers us a good example of the costs which unwarranted delay can impose upon the public.
"* * * As Mr. Luce noted this morning, public participation in an administrative proceeding may have other costs. The Scenic Hudson power plant license at Storm King was first applied for in 1963, and in 1974 the plant has not been built. On the other hand, my understanding is that the last decision of the Federal Power Commission was to go ahead with the project. There is the obvious cost of delay. There is the additional cost of increased allocations required to build the facility. The original proposal was for 160 million dollars (approximately). The current proposal for the same kilowatt output is for 465 million dollars. Inflation has not been the total difference. And third, of course, there is the equal and more serious problem of the denial of service.” Panel H: Standing, Participation and Who Pays?, 26 Ad L Rev 423, 424 (1974).

 The policy setting out the responsibility of the Council to the people of this state is provided in ORS 469.310:
"In the interests of the public health and the welfare of the people of this state, it is the declared public policy of this state that the siting, construction and operation of energy facilities shall be accomplished in a manner consistent with protection of the public health and safety and in compliance with the energy policy and air, water, solid waste, land use and other environmental protection policies of this state * *

"Rule 4.15
"SCOPE OF REVIEW
"The petitioner shall be restricted on judicial review to points specified in the petition and shall not urge additional grounds.”