Court Opinion

ID: 9946475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 19:10:23.42581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:28.564691
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re H.R., 2024-Ohio-739.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE H.R.                                   :
                                                             No. 113026
                                             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 29, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                                 Case No. DL23105771

                                       Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Sarah E. Hutnik, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellant.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Britta Barthol, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                 Appellant the state of Ohio appeals from the juvenile court’s July 13,

2023 judgment denying its motion to transfer jurisdiction of the juvenile’s, H.R.,

case to the common pleas court for adult criminal prosecution. After a thorough

review of facts and pertinent law, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment and

remand for further proceedings.
Procedural and Factual History

             A seven-count complaint against H.R. was filed in juvenile court,

alleging that the juvenile committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would

constitute attempted murder (C0unt 1); felonious assault (Counts 2 and 3); having

weapons while under disability (Count 4); improperly handling firearms in a motor

vehicle (Count 5); breaking and entering (Count 6); and criminal damaging or

endangering (Count 7). Counts 1, 2, 3, and 6 contained one- and three-year firearm

specifications. H.R. was 17 years old at the time of the alleged acts.

             The state filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction of the case from the

juvenile court to the court of common pleas, general division. The juvenile court

held a probable cause hearing on the motion, at which the following testimony was

elicited from the sole witness, the investigating Cleveland police detective, John

Kosko.

             The complaint arose from the May 4, 2023 shooting of the 18 year-old

victim, Mohamed Ali Mohamed. Mohamed and H.R. had worked together at a KFC

restaurant. Approximately two weeks prior to the within incident, Mohamed and

H.R. had a physical altercation while at work. As a result of the altercation, H.R.

was fired from the KFC; Mohamed was not terminated.

             Three Ring doorbell cameras captured the May 4 shooting. That

evening Mohamed arrived home from his KFC job around midnight; someone

driving a white van dropped him off.       The first recording (state’s exhibit No. 3)

showed that as Mohamed walked toward his house someone yelled, apparently to
get his attention. Mohamed stopped, turned in the direction of the voice, and

immediately brandished a gun he had at his side.

            Seconds later, an individual wearing all black, a hoodie, and a mask up

to his eyes, came from behind Mohamed, tackled him to the ground, and numerous

shots were fired. The muzzle flash appeared to come from the person who tackled

Mohamed. The tackler ran off to a black vehicle that was parked on the street across

from Mohamed’s house. Another person also ran from the scene, got into the black

vehicle, and the driver drove away. The second individual was never identified. This

shooting incident occurred in less than 30 seconds.

            The second video recording (state’s exhibit No. 4) showed Mohamed,

who was lying on the ground, being approached by a male. The man forcefully

moved Mohamed around, and it appeared as if he was looking for something near

Mohamed or on his person.

            The third video recording (state’s exhibit No. 5) showed another man

approach Mohamed. According to Detective Kosko, that man was Mohamed’s

brother. First responders were called to the scene.

            Sergeant Day of the Cleveland police was the first law enforcement

official to arrive on the scene. Mohamed told the sergeant that “Abed” shot him. Six

9 mm casings were recovered from the scene. The police also recovered the victim’s

gun and discovered that its magazine was full; thus, the police concluded that his

gun was not discharged during the incident. Mohamed was transported to the
hospital; he sustained several gunshot wounds, including to his face, arms, legs, and

abdomen. One of his lungs and his liver were punctured as a result.

                Detective Kosko interviewed Mohamed at the hospital; the detective

knew at that time that Mohamed had identified “Abed” as his shooter. Mohamed

told the detective that H.R. shot him. Mohamed informed the detective about the

“bad blood” between himself and H.R. and explained that he believed H.R. was the

perpetrator because H.R. knew his work schedule. However, Mohamed admitted

that he did not believe H.R. knew where he lived. Mohamed also admitted that, with

the exception of the eyes, the shooter’s face was covered by a mask. Detective Kosko

did not testify that the shooter said anything to Mohamed. The detective further did

not question Mohamed about him telling Sergeant Day that “Abed” was the shooter.

               Mohamed told Detective Kosko that he carried a gun for protection.

The detective described Mohamed as not being fully cooperative with the

investigation. Specifically, the detective believed the person who dropped Mohamed

off at home that evening may have been in a good position to see the perpetrator and

wanted to interview him or her, but Mohamed would not tell the detective that

person’s name. Mohamed also indicated that H.R. may have said something about

him on social media, but he would not grant the detective access to his phone to

investigate.

                During his investigation, Detective Kosko learned that the black

vehicle in which the two individuals left in right after the shooting was driven by an

individual identified as A.M. The detective contacted A.M., who told him he was
driving “Tyshawn” and “Vonn” around to collect money. Detective Kosko learned

that “Tyshawn” and “Vonn” are not nicknames associated with H.R., and that in fact,

they were fictious names. The detective further learned that “Abed” was not a

nickname associated with H.R.; rather, it is a derogatory reference to people of a

certain ethnicity.

               When questioned as to how he decided the shooter was H.R.,

Detective Kosko stated that, in addition to what Mohamed told him, he “spoke to

the victim’s family and got some information that it could be” H.R. and his brother.

Detective Kosko obtained a driver’s license photograph of H.R. and showed it to

Mohamed, who identified him as his shooter. Officer Kosko learned that a neighbor

saw the men involved in the shooting, but the officer did not present a photographic

lineup to her to see if she could identify the shooter.

               On this testimony, the juvenile court denied the state’s motion to

transfer the case to the common pleas court. The court noted that the state’s burden

of proof was probable cause and that “[t]he obvious issue in this case is

identification.” Tr. 79. The court explained that when it considered the evidence in

light of a probable-cause standard of proof, “I do not find that the State of Ohio has

met its burden as it relates to any counts of the complaint * * * based on the

testimony regarding all of the conversations with the victim, I don’t find that that’s

more than a mere suspicion of guilt.” Id. at 80. The state now appeals, raising the

following sole assignment of error:
      I.     The trial court erred as a matter of law when it found no probable
             cause to believe the juvenile committed the offenses charged in
             the juvenile court complaint.

Law and Analysis

              Initially, we consider our jurisdiction over this matter. The state has

a limited right of appeal in criminal and delinquency matters.          By statute, a

prosecuting attorney “may appeal as a matter of right any decision of a trial court in

a criminal case, or any decision of a juvenile court in a delinquency case, which

decision grants a motion to dismiss all or any part of an indictment, complaint, or

information, a motion to suppress evidence, or a motion for the return of seized

property or grants postconviction relief * * *.” R.C. 2945.67(A).

              As will be discussed below, this is a mandatory bindover case. The

Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a juvenile court order that denies a transfer of

jurisdiction in a mandatory bindover case “bars the state from prosecuting a juvenile

offender as an adult for a criminal offense. It is therefore the functional equivalent

of a dismissal of a criminal indictment and constitutes a final order from which the

state may appeal as a matter of right.” In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-

5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, syllabus. Thus, the order from which the state appeals in this

case is a final, appealable order and we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

              R.C. 2151.12 governs bindovers from juvenile court to adult court.

Under R.C. 2151.12(A)(1)(a)(i), governing mandatory bindovers,

      (a) After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent
      child for committing one or more acts that would be an offense if
      committed by an adult, if any of those acts would be aggravated
      murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted murder
      if committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing shall transfer
      the case if either of the following applies:

      (i) The child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of the act
      charged that would be aggravated murder, murder, attempted
      aggravated murder, or attempted murder and there is probable cause
      to believe that the child committed the act charged.

               H.R. was charged in Count 1 with attempted murder with one- and

three-year firearm specifications and was 17 years old at the time of the alleged act.

Therefore, this case falls within the purview of the mandatory bindover provision set

forth in R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i). Pursuant to Juv.R. 30(A), “[i]n any proceeding

where the court considers the transfer of a case for criminal prosecution, the court

shall hold a preliminary hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe

that the child committed the act alleged * * *.”

               The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “the state must present

credible evidence of every element of an offense to support a finding of probable

cause, but that evidence does not have to be unassailable.” In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio

St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, at ¶ 46, citing State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio

St.3d 83, 752 N.E.2d 937 (2001). The Supreme Court described the juvenile court’s

role in bindover proceedings as that of a “gatekeeper” because it is “charged with

evaluating whether sufficient credible evidence exists” to warrant transfer to adult

court. Id., citing In re A.J.S., 173 Ohio App.3d 171, 2007-Ohio-3216, 877 N.E.2d 997

(10th Dist.). The court stated that the state’s burden is to produce evidence that

“‘raises more than a mere suspicion of guilt.’” State v. Martin, 170 Ohio St.3d 181,
2022-Ohio-4175, 209 N.E.3d 688, ¶ 19, quoting Iacona at 93; see also In re E.S.,

Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4273, ¶ 1 (reaffirming Martin and Iacona).

                A juvenile court’s probable cause determination in a bindover

proceeding involves questions of both fact and law. In re A.J.S., 120 Ohio St.3d 185,

2008-Ohio-5307, 897 N.E.2d 629, at ¶ 51. An appellate court will defer to the

juvenile court’s “determinations regarding witness credibility, but [will] review

de novo the legal conclusion whether the state presented sufficient evidence to

demonstrate probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the acts

charged.” Id.

                Probable cause “deals with probabilities.” Maryland v. Pringle,

540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003), citing Brinegar v. United

States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). It “‘is a fluid concept—

turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.’” Pringle at

370-371, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527

(1983). Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances are sufficient to

provide a reasonable belief that the accused has committed a crime. Brinegar at

175-176, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543

(1925). The inquiry requires the judge to review all the circumstances and make “a

practical, common-sense decision” as to whether probable cause is present. Gates

at 238.

                Concerning witness credibility, “[t]he trier of fact is in the best

position to make credibility determinations because it is able to view the demeanor
of a witness while he or she is testifying; this court cannot. The trier of fact is

therefore in the best position to determine if the proffered testimony is credible.”

Khatib v. Peters, 2017-Ohio-95, 77 N.E.3d 461, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.).

                  The state contends that the juvenile court erred in not transferring

the case because the state provided credible evidence of every element of the

offenses to support a finding of probable cause to believe H.R. committed them. The

state is essentially challenging the juvenile court’s conclusion that there is not more

than “a mere suspicion of guilt,” and in particular, the issue the court had with

identification.     According to the state, it presented sufficient evidence to

demonstrate that H.R. was the shooter:

       Here, the State presented evidence that Mohamed worked with H.R. at
       KFC. Mohamed knew H.R. well enough to get into a physical
       altercation at work two weeks prior to this incident. Even though the
       shooter was wearing a mask that covered the bottom of his face,
       Mohamed recognized the shooter as H.R. Mohamed also identified
       H.R. in a photograph.

Appellant’s brief, p. 7.

                  The state further notes that the juvenile court “did not make a

credibility determination about Det. Kosko’s testimony, but instead held that there

wasn’t more than a mere suspicion that H.R. committed these offenses.” The state

contends that the juvenile court’s concern was “misplaced,” because “[a]ny

discrepancy or contradiction could be explained at a trial and need not be addressed

at a probable cause hearing.” Without citation to any legal authority, the state
contends that “[a] victim’s identification of an assailant is sufficient for a probable

cause determination.”

               Although the trial court did not make an explicit determination

regarding Detective’s credibility, it is evident from the court’s denial of the state’s

request to bind this case over that the court did not find the detective’s statement

that he found Mohamed’s identification of H.R. as his shooter credible. See T.M. v.

R.H., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29556, 2020-Ohio-3013, ¶ 39. Further, in addition to

Detective Kosko’s testimony, the trial court also viewed the video evidence from the

three Ring doorbell cameras, which factored into its decision.

               We are not persuaded by the state’s contention that Mohamed’s

identification of H.R. as his shooter was credible because he knew him well enough

to get in an altercation with him two weeks before the shooting. One does not have

to know someone well to get into an altercation with them — altercations between

strangers happen all the time. We are also not persuaded by the state’s contention

that Mohamed’s identification alone was sufficient to establish probable cause and

any inconsistencies would be ironed out at trial. That approach would gut the trial

court’s ability to make a credibility determination, a result that would be contrary to

law.   We reiterate the deference we afford to a trial court’s credibility

determinations, because the trial court is in the best position to make those

determinations.

               Further, Mohamed’s identification of H.R. from his driver’s license

photo does not advance the state’s identification contentions. This is not a case
where the victim did not know his alleged assailant but was able to get a good look

at him, and then later identify him. Rather, Mohamed told Detective Kosko that it

was H.R. who had attacked him because of the bad blood between them — Mohamed

always knew what H.R. looked like. Moreover, Detective Kosko did not have the full

picture regarding the animosity between H.R. and Mohamed because Mohamed was

less than cooperative with the investigation.

              On this record, we agree with the juvenile court’s determination that

the state’s evidence did not raise more than a mere suspicion of guilt. That is, the

state failed to present sufficient credible evidence — probable cause — on the issue

of identification to warrant transfer of the case from juvenile court to adult court.

We note that Detective Kosko did not identify H.R. from the video evidence; the

second person on the video (also unidentified) appeared to be looking for something

on or about Mohamed’s person; the entire incident occurred in under 30 seconds at

night; the masked perpetrator attacked Mohamed from behind and immediately

tackled him to the ground; and there was no evidence that H.R. had threatened

Mohamed, or even knew where he lived. The state’s assignment of error is therefore

overruled.

              Judgment affirmed and case remanded for further proceedings.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR