Court Opinion

ID: 9853704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:52:41.52024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:01.247467
License: Public Domain

Swanson, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. When appointed to the Lovelands' hearing tribunal on April 5, 1975, Ms. Linda Hume was not affiliated with the Human Rights Commission. At the time of the hearing, however, Hume had since become an official member of the Commission "actively involved in its affairs." The Lovelands were never advised of this change in Hume's relationship with the Commission. I find this clearly violative of the appearance of fairness doctrine which proscribes even the semblance of bias or prejudice on the part of an adjudicatory board member.
The case of Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R. v. State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wn.2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976) presented a situation which the majority acknowledges is quite similar to the facts at hand. There, "[a]n impermissible conflict of interest existed . . . because one of the tribunal members . . . had a job application pending with the Commission " while the case was being processed and decided by the tribunal. Chicago, at 806. The court in Chicago expounded upon the importance of the doctrine of the appearance of fairness:
*93It is fundamental to our system of justice that judges be fair and unbiased. ... An interest that is alleged to create bias or unfairness need not be direct or obvious. "Any interest, the probable and natural tendency of which is to create a bias in the mind of the judge for or against a party to the suit, is sufficient to disqualify. . . . Pecuniary interest in the result of the suit is not the only disqualifying interest."
(Citations omitted.) Chicago, at 807-08. These concepts of judicial integrity apply equally to administrative hearing tribunals when performing an adjudicatory, as opposed to legislative or policy-making, function. Further, and of utmost import, it is not enough that the proceeding be in fact fair or that no bias or unfairness be proven; the proceeding must appear to be fair.
Our system of jurisprudence also demands that in addition to impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge, there must be no question or suspicion as to the integrity and fairness of the system, i.e., "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." . . . Thus it is apparent that even a mere suspicion of irregularity, or an appearance of bias or prejudice, is to be. avoided by the judiciary in the discharge of its duties. . . . The Court of Appeals recently summarized this long standing principle rather well in State v. Madry [8 Wn. App. 61, 504 P.2d 1156 (1972)], at 70:
The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice as would be the actual presence of bias or prejudice. The law goes farther than requiring an impartial judge; it also requires that the judge appear to be impartial.
(Citations omitted.) Chicago, at 808-09. The standard applied in appearance of fairness doctrine questions turns on how the proceeding appears to a reasonably prudent and disinterested person. Chicago, at 810; Swift v. Island County, 87 Wn.2d 348, 361, 552 P.2d 175 (1976); State v. Buntain, 11 Wn. App. 101, 521 P.2d 752 (1974). I believe Chicago controls herein and Hume's undisclosed membership on "the very Commission appearing before the tribunal as an advocate . . . strips the proceeding of the appearance of fairness." Chicago, at $10.
*94The majority, however, distinguishes Chicago on the basis of RCW 49.60.250, which permits a Commission member to participate on a hearing tribunal provided she has not previously been involved with the case (see also RCW 34.04.115), and on the outside evidence considered by the trial judge demonstrating Hume had no contact with this case prior to the hearing. The majority goes on to aver that Hume neither stood to gain by virtue of any decision of the tribunal, nor was her impartiality challenged.
First, I must emphasize that actual evidence of bias or prejudice is immaterial in discussing the appearance of fairness doctrine. As stated in Chicago, at page 810,
There is no direct evidence that Ms. Ammeter was prejudiced or motivated in favor of the Commission, and we do not even suggest that she performed her duties as a tribunal member in less than an exemplary manner.
The same can be said of Hume in the instant case. The question remains, however, how the hearing proceeding would appear to a reasonably prudent and disinterested party.
Second, I do not feel that the reviewing trial court's efforts to ascertain whether Hume's participation violated RCW 49.60.250, no matter how thorough, can eradicate the initial blemish on the fairness doctrine caused by Hume's undisclosed Commission membership. One problem with such a retrospective approach is that it may not have afforded the Lovelands the same manner or degree of review as was their substantive right under WAC 162-08-211(5), which permits challenges of tribunal members. On a more abstract plane, the combination of functions of an administrative agency such as the Human Rights Commission should encourage the most intensive scrutiny permissible within the applicable scope of review to insure protection of individual rights.
The anomaly in procedure which permits the board of education, an administrative body, to serve in the triple capacity of complainant, prosecutor, and judge makes it *95vitally necessary that in reviewing administrative decisions courts zealously examine the record with the view to protecting the fundamental rights of the parties, . . .
State ex rel. Steele v. Board of Educ., 252 Ala. 254, 261, 40 So. 2d 689, 695 (1949).
Given the narrow scope of review permitted by the administrative procedures act, RCW 34.04.130, and the concentration of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions within the Commission, I believe it vitally necessary that reviewing courts scrutinize the record with great care to protect fundamental rights of parties and insure the preservation of fundamental notions of justice and fair play. Thus, I would not permit the reviewing trial court to decide with hindsight that a proceeding appearing unfair on its face was, in fact, acceptable, but would remand the matter to the Commission for a new proceeding.1
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1978.
Review denied by Supreme Court March 16, 1979.

 As an additional reason for invalidating the proceedings in Chicago, the court stated at page 812, "The general policies and informal procedures used by the Commission in constituting the hearing tribunal in this case fall within the definition of 'rule' in RCW 34.04.010(2)(b). Cf. Island County Comm. v. Department of Revenue, 81 Wn.2d 193, 500 P.2d 756 (1972). To the extent the Commission wishes to use such procedures, the administrative procedures act requires their formal adoption pursuant to RCW 34.04.025. Since these policies and procedures were not properly adopted, they cannot be given effect and, therefore, the proceedings before the hearing tribunal are invalid for this reason also. See RCW 34.04.020(2); RCW 34.04.027." Such an objection appears proper in this case also.