Court Opinion

ID: 9942666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 18:01:31.112752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:23.395371
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 21 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VICTOR PONCE HENRIQUEZ,                         No. 22-1364
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A094-310-087
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted February 15, 2024**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Victor Ponce Henriquez, a native and citizen of El Salvador,

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order, which

dismissed his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision which denied his

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because the parties are familiar with the facts,

we do not recount them here.

      We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. When, as here, the BIA agrees

with the IJ’s reasoning and adds reasoning of its own, we review the BIA’s decision

and those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which the BIA relied. Sharma v. Garland,

9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2021). We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s

factual findings underlying its determination that a petitioner has failed to establish

eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634,

641–42 (9th Cir. 2021). “We also review for substantial evidence the BIA’s

particular determination that a petitioner’s past harm does not amount to past

persecution.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1060 (cleaned up). We deny the petition.

      1.     Substantial evidence supports the agency’s findings that the threats

Cuatreros gang members made against Ponce Henriquez did not amount to past

persecution. “Threats standing alone . . . constitute past persecution in only a small

category of cases, and only when the threats are so menacing to cause significant

actual suffering or harm.” Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Ponce

Henriquez does not identify any evidence establishing that the threats were “so

menacing” or caused him actual “suffering or harm,” despite his burden to do so. See

Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing burden of

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proof). Although Ponce Henriquez asserts that the death threats against him were

accompanied by threats and violence towards his friends and family, the record

contains no evidence to support these assertions.

      Ponce Henriquez proffered evidence that, after he reported the gang members

to the police for killing two of his cattle and stealing six others, he received one in-

person death threat and a series of unspecified threats over the telephone for around

eighteen months. But the gang members never performed any acts of violence,

followed through on their threats, or physically harmed Ponce Henriquez in any way.

See Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding death

threats did not constitute past persecution where the alleged persecutor “confronted

[the alien] several times over a period of weeks, did not perform any acts of violence,

and never followed through on any of his threats”). Nor did Ponce Henriquez proffer

evidence to show that the threats were escalating or accompanied by particularly

menacing circumstances. Cf. Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir.

2004) (determining that a death threat was particularly menacing where the threat

included a Nazi slogan and was followed by the slashing of petitioner’s tires,

ransacking of her home, and chasing by a mob of neo-Nazis).

      Although an alien can establish past persecution based on death threats even

if he has not been “beaten or physically harmed,” see Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d

1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004), the unfulfilled threats at issue here do not rise to the level

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that we have held compels a finding of past persecution. Compare Marcos v.

Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112, 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that substantial

evidence supported an IJ’s finding of no past persecution when the alien had received

death threats in person, over the radio, and on the telephone on a continuing basis

for years), with Ruano v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 1155, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding

that an alien established past persecution where he “received multiple death threats

over a period of six years,” “was confronted on two occasions,” and “was chased on

multiple occasions by four men armed with pistols”), and Antonio v. Garland, 58

F.4th 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that, “[t]aken together . . . death threats,

mob violence, involuntary transport to the police station, and repeated whipping”

compelled a finding of past persecution). Therefore, we do not disturb the agency’s

determination that Ponce Henriquez did not demonstrate past persecution.

      2.     Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that

Ponce Henriquez did not meet his burden to establish a well-founded, country-wide

fear of future persecution in El Salvador. An “‘applicant does not have a well-

founded fear of [future] persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution by

relocating to another part of the applicant’s country,’ unless doing so would be

unreasonable under the applicant’s circumstances.” Hussain, 985 F.3d at 648

(alteration in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii)). The agency

determined that it would not be unreasonable for Ponce Henriquez to relocate to an

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urban area of El Salvador, because his fear of the Cuatreros was tied to the rural area

where he owned cattle and had resisted gang-related cattle theft, and Ponce

Henriquez did not proffer specific evidence, aside from bare assertions, to show the

gang could locate him in an urban area. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir.

1996) (en banc) (explaining that a well-founded fear must be demonstrated through

“credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record”). The evidence does not

compel a contrary conclusion. Indeed, Ponce Henriquez testified that his family

members who reside in other areas of El Salvador have never experienced problems

with the gang. Moreover, Ponce Henriquez testified that gang-based violence is

widespread throughout El Salvador, but “[r]elocation is generally not unreasonable

solely because the country at large is subject to generalized violence.” Hussain, 985

F.3d at 648. Therefore, we do not disturb the agency’s determination that Ponce

Henriquez did not meet his burden to show that he had a well-founded, country-wide

fear of future persecution throughout El Salvador.

      3.     To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must satisfy a more

demanding standard than that required to establish eligibility for asylum. Because

Ponce Henriquez has not established eligibility for asylum, “he necessarily fails to

satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of removal.” See Mansour v.

Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 2004).

      4.     Ponce Henriquez has not “specifically and distinctly argued and raised”

                                         5                                   22-1364
in his opening brief that the agency erred when it denied his application for

protection under CAT. See Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1070 (9th Cir.

2005) (citation omitted). He has therefore forfeited that claim.

      PETITION DENIED.

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