Court Opinion

ID: 9376030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 17:07:10.337264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.895678
License: Public Domain

J-S45039-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ACKEEM MORRIS                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 498 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 16, 2021
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0011393-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED MARCH 1, 2023

       Ackeem Morris (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury found him guilty of attempted murder, aggravated

assault, criminal conspiracy to commit attempted murder, conspiracy to

commit aggravated assault, firearms not to be carried without a license,

carrying a firearm without a license on the public streets of Philadelphia,

possession of an instrument of a crime, simple assault, and recklessly

endangering another person.1 We affirm in part and vacate in part.

       The trial court summarized the factual history underlying this appeal as

follows:

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a) and 2502, 2702(a)(1), 903(a), 6106(a)(1),
6108, 907(a), 2701(a)(1), 2705. Immediately after the jury’s verdicts,
Appellant pled guilty to persons not to possess firearms. Id. § 6105(a)(1).
J-S45039-22

           This case stems from Appellant’s shooting of Brandon Davis
     (“Mr. Davis” [or “the victim”]) on September 17, 2016. Mr.
     Davis’s multiple gunshot[] wounds were nearly fatal and included
     a lacerated liver and kidney, kidney failure, a collapsed lung,
     respiratory failure, sepsis, internal bleeding, acute post-
     hemorrhagic anemia, and bone fractures. On that date, officers
     investigating a shooting were advised that the victim had been
     transported to Temple University Hospital in a private vehicle. Mr.
     Davis was uncooperative and refused to give an interview about
     the shooting.

            Detectives obtained video footage from the scene of the
     shooting which [occurred] outside a corner store. The videos
     show Mr. Davis, a male later [] identified as Talil Williams [(Mr.
     Williams)], and Appellant, who [wa]s wearing “a black Khimar [(,
     i.e., a traditional Muslim outerwear garment)], sunglasses, yellow
     socks with blue stripes on them, black sneakers ... [and] carrying
     a tan or goldish satchel or purse over his shoulder.”

            The videos show that Appellant enters a store, exits and
     shoots Mr. Davis multiple times from a proximity of about five
     feet. After the shooting, Appellant flees northbound on Carlisle
     Street from York Street. Appellant’s directions of travel led the
     detectives to a nearby apartment complex at 2411 North 11th
     Street, where they obtained additional videos from the building’s
     surveillance cameras. These videos show a man wearing the
     same Muslim garments, distinctive socks and satchel as the
     shooter, along with Mr. Williams, enter and exit the building
     together just before the shooting. Within minutes after the
     shooting, the two men are again on videotape entering the
     elevator together, and although Appellant had removed his
     traditional Muslim garments that covered his face and body, he
     still wore black sneakers and [the] same distinctive “yellowish
     socks with blue markings on them.” The video shows Appellant
     re-enacting to Mr. Williams how he shot Mr. Davis.

           After extensive investigation, Detectives located Mr.
     Williams, who gave a statement identifying Appellant as the other
     person wearing Muslim garb involved in the shooting.

           Detectives recovered the satchel the shooter was carrying
     at the scene, along with the distinctive socks and black shorts.
     DNA samples extracted from the black shorts matched the DNA
     obtained from Appellant. Gunshot residue was found in the

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       purse/satchel recovered from the apartment.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 3-4 (citations to record omitted; some

capitalization modified).

       The trial court also detailed the procedural history:

              On December 18, 2017, this court sentenced Appellant to
       consecutive terms of ten (10) to twenty (20) years’ incarceration
       for his convictions of attempted murder and conspiracy [to commit
       attempted murder]. This court imposed no further sentences for
       Appellant’s remaining convictions.

             On December 18, 2017, Appellant filed post-sentence
       motions, which this court denied on that same day. On January
       10, 2018, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Superior Court
       (255 EDA 2018), and on April 9, 2019, Appellant filed a
       “Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal” consisting of forty-
       eight (48) numbered paragraphs. On June 22, 2020, the Superior
       Court affirmed the convictions[;] however[,] the court vacated the
       sentence imposed and remanded for re-sentencing to correct an
       error made by the trial court whereby it sentenced Appellant for
       committing two (2) inchoate crimes in error. [See generally
       Commonwealth v. Morris, 237 A.3d 1072 (Pa. Super. 2020)
       (unpublished memorandum).]

             On April 16, 2021, the trial court conducted a re-sentencing
       hearing and while changing the structure of the sentence, [the
       court] nonetheless again sentenced Appellant for two (2) inchoate
       crimes,[2] in error[, which we explain further below. Appellant’s
       c]ounsel thereafter filed an untimely post-sentence motion to
       correct the sentence; said motion was denied. However, the trial
       court appointed new counsel to represent Appellant and he filed a
       notice of appeal to the Superior Court on May 26, 2021 (1141 EDA
____________________________________________

2 With respect to attempted murder, the court resentenced Appellant to 15 –
30 years in prison. The court imposed a concurrent sentence of 10 – 20
years for conspiracy to commit attempted murder. Finally, for persons not to
possess firearms, the court imposed a sentence of 5 – 10 years in prison, to
run consecutive to the sentence for attempted murder. Thus, Appellant
received an aggregate sentence of 20 – 40 years in prison (i.e., the
same aggregate sentence he received in 2017).

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        2021), despite the fact that the late post-sentence motion would
        render the appeal untimely.

              Therefore, [Appellant’s] counsel filed a praecipe to
        discontinue the untimely appeal (1141 EDA 2021) and filed a
        timely [] petition on September 1, 2020[, pursuant to the Post
        Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546].
        … [Appellant thereafter withdrew his PCRA petition,] and the trial
        court granted reinstatement of Appellant’s right to file his post-
        sentence motion and a direct appeal, nunc pro tunc.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 1-2 (footnote added; some capitalization

modified).

        On January 25, 2022, Appellant filed a nunc pro tunc post-sentence

motion, seeking, inter alia, reduction of the purportedly excessive sentence

imposed at resentencing.       Appellant claimed the trial court abused its

discretion in “increasing” the sentence originally imposed for Appellant’s

conviction of attempted murder. See Post-Sentence Motion, 1/25/22, at ¶¶

13-14 (“At the [April 16,] 2021 [re]sentencing hearing, the court incorporated

its reasoning and bases from the [December 18,] 2017 sentencing hearing.

Despite incorporating the same bases from 2017, the court raised

[Appellant’s] sentence on the charge of attempted murder by 50% despite the

absence of any new facts warranting an increased sentence.”). The trial court

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on January 28, 2022. This timely

appeal followed. The trial court and Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Appellant presents two issues for review:

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      1. Is the sentence imposed illegal where [A]ppellant was
         convicted of — and sentenced on — both conspiracy to commit
         attempted murder, and attempted murder in violation of 18
         Pa.C.S.A. § 906?

      2. Is the sentence imposed unduly harsh and excessive under the
         circumstances of this case?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (issues reordered).

      Appellant first claims the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because

he “was convicted of – and sentenced on – both conspiracy to commit

attempted murder, and attempted murder ….” Id. at 21. We agree.

      “The determination as to whether a trial court imposed an illegal

sentence is a question of law; an appellate court’s standard of review in cases

dealing with questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. White, 268

A.3d 499, 500 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Our scope of review is

de novo.   Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 697 (Pa. Super.

2021).

      The Commonwealth agrees that Appellant’s illegal “sentence for

conspiracy should be vacated[.]” Commonwealth Brief at 7 (bold omitted).

The Commonwealth points out this Court’s holding, in Appellant’s direct

appeal, that the original sentencing court improperly “imposed a sentence on

both of [Appellant’s] attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder

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convictions — two inchoate crimes.”            Morris, 237 A.3d 1072 (unpublished

memorandum at 11);3 see also Commonwealth Brief at 7 (same).

       The trial court concedes it illegally sentenced Appellant with respect to

his conspiracy conviction:

              The trial court held a re-sentencing hearing on Aril 16, 2021,
       as per direction of the Superior Court (Commonwealth v.
       Morris, 255 EDA 2018 Opinion filed June 22, 2020) to correct a
       previous error in sentencing, whereby the trial court imposed a
       sentence on two inchoate crimes in violation of Commonwealth
       v. Maguire, 452 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. 1982). In so doing, the
       trial court again erred in the imposition of sentence by failing to
       recognize that a sentence on the 2nd inchoate crime would still be
       illegal even if it ran concurrently, and not consecutively. While
       [Appellant’s] aggregate sentence of 20-40 years did not
       change, the structure of the sentence was illegal. Therefore,
       this court recommends the sentence for conspiracy to commit
       attempted murder be vacated, and the remaining sentence be
       affirmed. It was for this reason that the PCRA petition was
       withdrawn, and Appellant’s appellate rights were reinstated nunc
       pro tunc.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 6 (emphasis added; citations altered).         We

agree. Because the sentence imposed for Appellant’s conviction of conspiracy

to commit attempted murder is unlawful, we vacate that sentence.

       We next address Appellant’s second issue, in which he challenges the

discretionary aspects of his sentence imposed at resentencing.          Appellant

____________________________________________

3The panel in Morris cited as support Commonwealth v. Maguire, 452 A.2d
1047, 1050 (Pa. Super. 1982) (recognizing a trial court may not sentence a
defendant on two inchoate crime convictions), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 (“A
person may not be convicted of more than one of the inchoate crimes of
criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy for conduct
designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime.”).
Morris, 237 A.3d 1072 (unpublished memorandum at 10-11).

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emphasizes that when the trial court originally sentenced him in 2017, it

imposed on the attempted murder conviction a sentence of 10 – 20 years in

prison, whereas at resentencing, the court sentenced Appellant to 15 – 30

years for attempted murder. See Appellant’s Brief at 26-27, 28. According

to Appellant:

      The imposition of the significantly increased sentence on the
      attempted murder charge with no accompanying explanation of
      what warranted the 50 percent increase is excessive under the
      circumstances. The fact that the only new facts and information
      adduced at the re-sentencing hearing warranted a mitigation in
      the sentence, rather than an increase, results in imposition of a
      sentence on this charge which violates the “fundamental norms
      which underlie the sentencing process.” The [resentencing court
      also failed] to adequately account for the additional mitigating
      factors presented at the re-sentencing hearing….

Id. at 30 (italics in original; break omitted); see also id. at 29 (detailing

mitigating factors, including Appellant’s difficult childhood and purported

mental health conditions).

      There is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a

sentence. Summers, 245 A.3d at 691. Rather, where, as here, the appellant

preserved his sentencing challenge in a timely post-sentence motion, he must

(1) include in the appellate brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) concise statement of the

reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal of; and (2) show that there is a

substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under the

Sentencing Code. Summers, 245 A.3d at 691.

      Instantly, Appellant’s brief includes a Rule 2119(f) statement, and his

claims present a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Knox, 165

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A.3d 925, 929-30 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“A claim that the trial court focused

exclusively on the seriousness of the crime while ignoring other, mitigating

circumstances, such as [the defendant’s] mental health history and difficult

childhood, raises a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167

A.3d 110, 123 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc) (a claim of judicial vindictiveness

in resentencing following a remand presents a substantial question); see also

Appellant’s Brief at 23. Accordingly, we review the merits of Appellant’s claim.

      We are mindful of our standard of review: “Sentencing is a matter

vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will

not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Barnes,

167 A.3d at 122 n.9 (citation omitted).

      In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an
      error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by
      reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or
      misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of
      partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly
      unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation

omitted).

      The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly
      deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing
      court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a
      particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual
      circumstances before it.

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

omitted).

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      The Sentencing Code directs a trial court to follow the general principle

that “the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with

the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative

needs of the defendant.”        42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).          “A sentencing

court has broad discretion in choosing the range of permissible confinements

that best suits a particular defendant and the circumstances surrounding his

crime.” Commonwealth v. Celestin, 825 A.2d 670, 676 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citation omitted). The court “need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its

reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in

question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s

consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.”

Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

      The trial court must also consider the sentencing guidelines.       See

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here, it

is undisputed that the sentences imposed for each charge fall within the

standard range of the sentencing guidelines. See Appellant’s Brief at 32 n.19;

Commonwealth Brief at 6.       Therefore, we may only vacate Appellant’s

sentence if “the case involves circumstances where the application of the

guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2); see

also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2014).

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     The trial court opined it did not abuse its sentencing discretion, and

reasoned:

           [T]o the extent that Appellant argues that the increase in
     his sentence for attempted murder to 15-30 years is excessive
     and an abuse of this court’s discretion, Appellant’s argument has
     no merit. The aggregate sentence remains the same: 15-30
     years for attempted murder and [a consecutive sentence of] 5-10
     years for [persons not to possess firearms].

                                     ***

               Appellant complains that when he was re-sentenced, the
     court failed to consider numerous factors, including Appellant’s
     difficult childhood, mental health diagnosis, and various ways in
     which he has changed during his period of incarceration. As noted
     by this court, however, the lengthy discussion of the factors
     weighed by the court at Appellant’s prior sentencing hearing was
     referenced and made a part of the re-sentencing hearing. The
     court was extremely detailed when weighing the factors at
     [Appellant’s] first sentencing. In that regard, the court recognized
     Appellant’s difficult circumstances:

            THE COURT: Having reviewed the presentence [report
            (PSI)] information that I have regarding [Appellant], and
            all his family has already told the [c]ourt, certainly
            [Appellant] had a very, very difficult childhood with his
            mother being incarcerated and his father, who was very
            forth[right] with the Court in coming here today, also
            spending time in and out of jail. [Appellant] did not have
            his parents to rely upon, but he did have his
            grandmother, Ms. Harris, who raised him and obviously
            still care[s] about him. She worked to support him.
            Because of her efforts, there was a somewhat stable
            household for [Appellant] to grow up in and his needs
            were met by his grandmother …[.]            Unfortunately,
            [Appellant] started having behavior issues very, very
            early in grade school and has a juvenile history that
            reflects that…. There are … six commitments, I believe
            as a juvenile []. Over and over and over[, Appellant]
            being discharged from placement, being put back into
            placement. … Unfortunately, this went on all throughout
            school. Nothing [Appellant did] as a juvenile indicat[es]

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         violent behavior, but certainly [Appellant’s] juvenile
         [history] … mak[es] it clear [Appellant] was not
         particularly amendable towards the guidance that was
         being offered to him through the [c]ourt and through all
         of his placements.

     (N.T., 12/8/17, pgs 16, 17).

              The court went on to note [that at Appellant’s original
     sentencing,] Appellant received his high school diploma but that
     he had yet to obtain a legitimate source of employment. In that
     regard, Appellant admitted to supporting his own children by
     selling drugs on Lehigh Avenue[,] where he was earning good
     money. At age 17[,] Appellant was adjudicated for statutory
     sexual assault and he was committed as a juvenile until he turned
     18 years old. Then, he amassed 6 arrests, 3 convictions, 3
     commitments, 2 violation of probations, [and] 2 sentence
     revocations. All of that occurred between the ages of 18-21, when
     [Appellant] was arrested for shooting the [victim] in this case.

              Thus, the record confirms that prior to imposing its
     sentence, this court closely considered Appellant’s [PSI], his
     lengthy criminal history in the City of Philadelphia, his repeated
     failure to rehabilitate, his abhorrent conduct in this case, his
     history of substance abuse and mental health issues, his
     education, his lack of employment history, and his family and
     personal circumstances. (N.T., 12/8/17, at pgs. 16-24).

              Regarding Appellant’s depraved shooting of Mr. Davis,
     this court [stated at the original sentencing hearing]:

             So[, Appellant’s counsel] has argued mitigation for
         you based on your childhood and upbringing and did so
         very well, but I will note that having sat through the trial
         and watched [the surveillance] video over and over
         again, … I have to agree with the prosecution that it
         shows somebody who was intent on the execution of Mr.
         Davis….

              Put together, what it all shows is someone who
         disguised themselves [sic] from head, almost to toe, in
         Muslim garb, walk[ed] down to that co[r]ner store, go in,
         go out, draw your gun, and almost in point-blank range,
         try to kill [Mr.] Davis and you nearly succeeded. It’s only

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         for the grace of God that Mr. Davis is alive and that you
         did not face a homicide trial and a homicide conviction.

             In my mind ... what [Appellant] did shows the same
         type of culpability, the same type of intent to kill, the
         same cold-blooded premeditated plan to shoot and kill
         Mr. Davis. … [A]dding to the disturbing nature of what
         we saw [on the video] was [Appellant] acti[ng] out in the
         elevator [immediately after the shooting]. Clearly[,
         Appellant was] not in the least bit disturbed by what [he]
         had just done, showing almost an animated reenactment
         to Mr. Williams….

             I have to say … that there are [] few times that I
         have had on this bench for now 13 years that I’ve seen
         such intentionally, brutal behavior.

     (Id. at pgs. 20-21).

              Before shooting Mr. Davis, Appellant had already
     amassed a considerable criminal record that included twelve
     arrests, several adjudications or convictions, and multiple
     probation violations. Notwithstanding the many opportunities
     provided to him, Appellant made no effort toward rehabilitation.
     (Id. at pgs. 16-20).

              Returning to [Appellant’s] re-sentencing hearing, the
     court clearly stated that all of the aforesaid information would not
     be reiterated but would be incorporated into the record.

         THE COURT: All right. I will say, of course, that I
         remember the details of this case very, very clearly. And
         I believe I stated on the record at sentencing all of the
         reasons and all of the considerations that I have weighed
         in issuing the sentence that I did. I’m not going to go
         into a full recitation of those reasons again since they are
         already of record. I will just incorporate that record into
         today’s record. However, suffice it to say, that this was
         a cold[-]blooded attempt … to commit murder. And I did
         find that [Appellant’s] actions [after the shooting]
         seemed to indicate that he was somewhat cavalier about
         his intent immediately afterwards as we saw on the video
         that was taken when [Appellant] was in the elevator of
         the building as well as in the courtroom.

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        (N.T., 4/16/21, pgs 7, 8.)

                  Counsel for Appellant argued [at resentencing] that the
        sentence should be lowered to a total 10-20 years because
        Appellant is still young and that a lesser sentence would enable
        him to participate in rehabilitation programs in state custody.
        Appellant exercised his right to allocution and detailed the ways
        in which he believes he has tried to better himself while
        incarcerated. Notably, however, Appellant did not express any
        remorse for his actions in connection with the [victim], nor did he
        express any concern for the [victim] and his family. The court
        was not compelled to comment nor question Appellant’s assertions
        in this regard.

                                      ***

                Considering Appellant’s vicious and remorseless
        conduct in this case, together with his overall penchant for
        crime and disregard of its effect on his community, this
        court’s aggregate sentence of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration
        is thoroughly justified.

Trial   Court   Opinion,   6/1/22,   at     6-7,   8-11   (emphasis   added;   some

capitalization, citations and punctuation modified).

        Our review discloses record and legal support for the court’s reasoning.

This Court rejected a similar claim in Barnes, supra:

        We have held that preserving the integrity of a prior sentencing
        scheme     is   a   legitimate    sentencing   concern.       See
        [Commonwealth v.] Walker, 568 A.2d [201,] 205 [(Pa. Super.
        1989)] (“Upon resentencing, a court has a valid interest in
        preserving the integrity of a prior sentencing scheme.”) (citation
        omitted).    Indeed, a trial court properly may resentence a
        defendant to the same aggregate sentence to preserve its
        original sentencing scheme. See Commonwealth v. Bartrug,
        732 A.2d 1287[, 1289] (Pa. Super. 1999) (noting a resentence of
        7½ to 15 years for burglary was lawful after not receiving a
        sentence for burglary and having been given previously the same
        sentence for theft by unlawful taking)….             “[I]n most
        circumstances, a judge can duplicate the effect of the original

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      sentencing plan by adjusting the sentences on various counts so
      that the aggregate punishment remains the same.” Walker, 568
      A.2d at 206. However, “[i]f a judge could have imposed the same
      aggregate sentence he handed down at the original sentencing
      hearing, and … instead imposes a harsher aggregate sentence,
      the presumption of vindictiveness could not be rebutted by
      invoking the need to preserve the original sentencing plan.” Id.
      In Commonwealth v. McHale, 924 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa. Super.
      2007), overruled in part on other grounds as stated in
      Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15 (Pa. Super. 2007),
      we upheld the trial court’s resentencing of the defendant when his
      conviction on the most serious charges, two counts of aggravated
      assault, previously had been reversed based on insufficient
      evidence. McHale, 924 A.2d at 673-74. After remand, to
      maintain the same total aggregate sentence as originally imposed,
      the trial court increased the overall sentence on the surviving
      counts. Id. at 667. Noting that the aggregate sentence remained
      unchanged, we upheld the new sentence. Id. at 674. In so doing,
      we noted:

          [O]ur conclusion is not altered by the fact that remand
          and resentencing were prompted by reversal of two of
          [the defendant’s] convictions…. Whether remand is the
          result of reversal of one or more convictions or vacation
          of an illegal sentence, we conclude that the trial court has
          the same discretion and responsibilities in resentencing.

      Id. at 673-74.

             … [C]onsistent with [] Walker, and McHale, the trial court’s
      resentencing [appellant] did not rise to vindictiveness because the
      trial court here sought to preserve the integrity of the original
      sentencing scheme by imposing the same aggregate sentence.

Barnes, 167 A.3d at 124-25 (emphasis in original; some citations modified).

      Finally, where, as here, a sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI, “it

will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along

with mitigating statutory factors.”   Commonwealth v. Conklin, 275 A.3d

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1087, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). “[W]here the court has been

so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.”     Commonwealth v.

Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also Commonwealth

v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 767 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“The sentencing judge can

satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the

record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the pre-sentencing

report; thus properly considering and weighing all relevant factors.” (citation

omitted)).

      In sum, we discern no abuse of the resentencing court’s discretion.

Contrary to Appellant’s claim, his standard-guideline-range sentences were

neither excessive nor unreasonable.     See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926

A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007) (stating that “rejection of a sentencing court’s

imposition   of   sentence   on   unreasonableness   grounds   [should]   occur

infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline ranges.”);

Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating “where a sentence is within the standard

range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate

under the Sentencing Code.”).

      Based on the foregoing, we vacate Appellant’s unlawful sentence

imposed for conspiracy to commit murder. Because the trial court ordered

the conspiracy sentence to run concurrent to the sentence imposed for

attempted murder, our disposition does not affect the overall sentencing

scheme. See Commonwealth v. Henderson, 938 A.2d 1063, 1067 (Pa.

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Super. 2007) (stating that “since appellant’s sentences were concurrent, the

trial court’s overall sentencing scheme has not been compromised, and it

[wa]s not necessary to remand for re-sentencing” after this Court held the

sentence imposed on one count to be unlawful); cf. Commonwealth v.

Tanner, 61 A.3d 1043, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding vacatur of a

consecutive sentence in the context of a larger sentencing scheme

necessitates vacatur of the entire sentence). We affirm Appellant’s judgment

of sentence in all other respects.

      Judgment of sentence vacated in part and affirmed in part. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/01/2023

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