Court Opinion

ID: 9535568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:50:57.638889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:17.015434
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause for a new trial. I agree with the appellate court that the oral instruction directing the jury to decide whether defendant was guilty of murder prior to considering the charge of manslaughter served to erroneously circumscribe the jury’s right to choose which offense, if any, defendant had committed. I am also of the opinion that under People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, People v. Underwood (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 124, People v. Jenkins (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 61, and People v. Joyner (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 302, the giving of the instmction resulted in a “substantial defect” which was not waived, and that it was properly recognized as plain error. The People concede in their brief that the circuit court correctly gave the manslaughter instruction, based on section 9-2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-2(a)). Properly instructed, the jury should have been free to consider the elements of the offenses charged and determine which offense, if any, had been proved by the evidence. There is no rule of law, statutory or opinion, which required that the most serious offense be considered first. It must be presumed that the jury followed the court’s oral instruction. It may therefore be assumed that the jury examined the evidence solely in the light of the instructions concerning murder, thus precluding consideration of the evidence which was the basis for the giving of the manslaughter instruction. I do not agree with the majority that the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. On this record, properly instructed, the jury could have found defendant guilty of manslaughter, or acquitted her. Fundamental fairness and simple justice require that defendant be given a new trial. JUSTICE SIMON joins in this dissent.