Court Opinion

ID: 9790522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:54:22.318623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:35.154875
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
In their petition for rehearing, appellants have correctly pointed out the error in this Court’s initial opinion in this appeal. Following this Court’s disposition of the first appeal in Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983) (Leliefeld I), in which we reversed the trial court’s finding of liability and remanded for a new trial on that issue, there existed no judgment upon *912which our post-judgment interest statute, I.C. § 28-22-104(2), could operate. Thus, any attempt to award interest to respondents based upon the first judgment which we reversed in Leliefeld I runs directly contrary to the longstanding rule in this state that prejudgment interest is not allowed in tort cases. Furthermore, in adopting the comparative negligence statute from Wisconsin, the Idaho legislature did not in the same action adopt the remainder of the Wisconsin code. The majority’s strained interpretation of Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, 624 P.2d 383 (1980), and of Nelson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 102 Wis.2d 159, 306 N.W.2d 71 (1981), as requiring such a result is clearly erroneous. Therefore, I dissent.
I
In the recent case of Davis v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 712 P.2d 511 (1985), we expressly stated that “this Court has [not] in the past awarded prejudgment interest in a tort case outside of the area of conversion.” Id. at 815, 712 P.2d at 516. In an apparent attempt to avoid the rule as stated by the Court in Davis, the majority in the present case argues that its holding does not violate the general rule regarding prejudgment interest. The majority argues that the prejudgment rule is inapplicable because the interest awarded in this case is based on the trial court’s “judgment” regarding damages. However, that is merely a play on words. There was no separate “judgment” on damages involved in the Leliefeld I appeal. The appeal in Leliefeld I was from a single judgment entered on the jury’s determination of both liability and damages. While we affirmed the jury’s determination of damages, we nevertheless reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for a new trial on the liability issue. After Leliefeld I, there was no “judgment” upon which our post-judgment interest statute, I.C. § 28-22-104 (2) (or any other post-judgment proceedings, such as execution, etc.), could operate. In Leliefeld I, we merely indicated that the total amount of damages determined by the jury need not be retried upon remand.
“The quantum of damages awarded by the jury is adequately supported by the record. Because we find no reversible error with respect to the determination of damages and we consider the damages severable from the liability issue, we affirm that determination.” Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho at 375, 659 P.2d at 129.
Though upholding the jury’s determination of damages, we nevertheless reversed the judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial to determine the liability of the various parties.
Having reversed the judgment, there remained no basis for a separate judgment on the damages. Without a final determination or judgment regarding liability, there could be no final judgment regarding the amount of damages assessed to the individual parties to the lawsuit. The majority itself states that any “judgment” as to damages is “ultimately subject to a finding of liability____” Ante at 911, n. 3, 728 P.2d at 1320, n. 3. Thus, there was no “liquidated” or “readily ascertainable” amount of damages assessed against any one party to the lawsuit.1 It would have been impossible for appellants to have tendered the correct payment on such an unknown amount of damages.2 Again, the *913rule in this state as we held in Davis v. Professional Business Services, Inc., supra, is that interest on damages in a tort case is only allowed from the date judgment is entered until the date such damages are paid. The judgment entered on September 6, 1978, and appealed to this Court in Leliefeld I, was reversed, and thus it is as if that judgment never existed. The only date from which interest should be permitted to run is October 19, 1983, the date judgment was entered following retrial after our remand in Leliefeld I.
II
In Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, 624 P.2d 383 (1980), we held that in adopting the Wisconsin statutory scheme for comparative negligence, the Idaho legislature was also deemed to have adopted any prior judicial construction of the Wisconsin statute.
“A statute which is adopted from another jurisdiction will be presumed to be adopted with the prior construction placed upon it by the courts of such other jurisdiction.
“We should follow the interpretation which the Wisconsin Supreme Court [has] placed upon their comparative negligence statute prior to 1971.”
Thus, the only Wisconsin eases which are controlling are those which construe or interpret Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statute prior to 1971. The majority now purports to take that holding one giant step further by holding that the legislature also intended to adopt Wisconsin’s prejudgment interest statute, a statute without counterpart in Idaho and unrelated in any way to Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statutes. The majority’s rationale for its holding is that Wisconsin, as part of its comparative negligence scheme, permits the award of prejudgment interest.
The basis for the majority’s assertion is its own interpretation of the Wisconsin Supreme Court case of Nelson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 102 Wis.2d 159, 306 N.W.2d 71 (1981). However, Nelson was not, as asserted by the majority, a comparative negligence case; it did not at any point attempt to construe Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statute. Nelson dealt solely with the application of Wisconsin’s prejudgment interest statute, Wis.Stat. § 814.04(4) (1977), to the operative facts of Nelson. The operative facts of Nelson are those concerning the entry of judgments after two separate trials, and not the fact that the underlying case in Nelson involved application of the comparative negligence statute. The Wisconsin court made it very clear at the outset of its opinion (with language omitted by the majority in its extensive quotation of Nelson) that Nelson dealt solely with the application of its specific pre-judgment interest statute to the operative facts of the ease.
“The sole issue before this court is whether under sec. 814-04(4), Stats.1977, when a personal injury action results in a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, but upon appeal the liability portion of the verdict is set aside and those issues, including a question of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, are retried, again resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff, interest on the damage award should be paid from the date of the lirst verdict (when damages were determined) or the second (when the liability was determined).
“In this case, we need not pursue this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion since we are dealing with post-verdict interest only, and we can look to the language of sec. 814-04(4), Stats.1977, for guidance.” Nelson, 306 N.W.2d at 72, 76 (emphasis added).
*914The Nelson court at the conclusion of its opinion adequately expressed its holding in the following language:
“We hold that the resulting ‘uncertainty’ [following remand after appeal from a first trial regarding both damages and liability] in the computation of the amount is not sufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s statutory right to interest under Sec. 814-04(4), Stats.1977, from the date of the first verdict.” Nelson, 306 N.W.2d at 77. (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, the plaintiff’s right to pre-judgment interest in the Nelson case was based on their express “statutory right” under the pre-judgment interest statute and not based upon any implied right to such interest under Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statute. The Nelson court never once attempted to interpret or construe the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute.3 It was mere coincidence that the underlying case was a comparative negligence case. That the underlying case was a comparative negligence case is of no relevance whatsoever to the holding in Nelson. It might just as well have been a property or contracts case, or even a non-negligence tort case. To argue, as does the majority, that simply because the underlying case in Nelson was a comparative negligence case, the statutory provision for prejudgment interest has wondrously become part and parcel of Wisconsin’s comparative negligence law and thereby adopted by the Idaho legislature when it drafted our comparative negligence statute requires a quantum leap in logic.
The Wisconsin prejudgment interest statute is entirely independent and separate from Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statute. The prejudgment interest provision is part and parcel of Wisconsin’s civil procedure code. Indeed, Section 814.04 is part of chapter 814 of the civil procedure code entitled “Costs and Fees in Courts of Record.” Section 814.04 itself is entitled “Items of Cost.” Thus, it would appear that Section 814.04 is analogous to Rule 54(d)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Rule 54(d)(1) has no counterpart to subsection (4) of Section 814.04, i.e., Wisconsin’s prejudgment interest rule.
Furthermore, the current version of Section 814.04 construed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Nelson was enacted in 1973 and modified by order of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1975. Thus, the current version of Section 814.04 was not in existence in 1971 when our own legislature enacted Idaho’s comparative negligence statute. Nelson is a 1981 case interpreting a 1975 version of Section 814.04. Clearly, under the holding of Odenwalt, such a case or statute is not relevant with regard to the intent of the Idaho legislature in adopting Wisconsin’s statutory scheme of comparative negligence.
Under Odenwalt, the only case law which would be controlling would be pre1971 case law. The majority opinion does not even discuss pre-1971 Wisconsin case law. The majority relies solely on Nelson’s (a post -1971 case — actually 1981) “interpretation of pre-1971 Wisconsin case law.” While Nelson does discuss some pre-1971 cases, each of those cases involved interpretation of Wisconsin .unique pre-judgment interest statute (some involved the predecessor to current Section 814.04(4)) and not the comparative negligence statute.4 Thus, the Nelson decision does not represent the comparative negligence law of Wisconsin prior to 1971, the time the Idaho legislature passed our comparative negligence statute. Rather, it represents a post-1971 statement of law in Wisconsin regarding pre-judgment interest, based on *915a pre-judgment interest statute which Idaho never had in 1971, and still doesn’t.
The majority’s assertion that the Wisconsin prejudgment interest provision was intended by the Idaho legislature to be included as part of Idaho’s comparative negligence scheme raises the question of what other Wisconsin statutes may ultimately be incorporated into Idaho law on the claim that they are comparative negligence law baggage.
SHEPARD, J., concurs.

. The majority relies on the cases of Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 506 P.2d 455 (1973); Farm Development Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918, 478 P.2d 298 (1970); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889, 452 P.2d 993 (1969); and Guyman v. Anderson, 75 Idaho 294, 271 P.2d 1020 (1954), for support of its "liquidated” and "readily ascertainable” damages rationale. However, every one of these cases was a contract case wherein prejudgment interest on damages was governed by specific contract provisions relating to interest or by specific statutory provisions found in the Idaho Code, in particular I.C. § 28-22-104(1). The pre-judgment interest rule in these cases was not based upon any common law interest rule. Thus, such cases are wholly inapposite to the case at hand, a tort case.

. The majority asserts that appellants should have known that they would ultimately be held *913liable for more than the amount of damages determined after the first trial and judgment entered on September 6, 1978. If the appellants had the foresight, which the majority asserts, in hindsight, that they should have had, and the appellants had paid a greater amount of damages than that ultimately awarded, one wonders if the majority would also hold that appellants would be entitled to interest from plaintiffs on any overpaid amount?

. The comparative negligence statute is mentioned only once in the entire Nelson opinion, both majority and dissenting. It is mentioned only in passing and is of no relevance whatsoever to the court's interpretation of Sec. 814.04(4), Wisconsin's pre-judgment interest statute.

. Furthermore, the Nelson court expressly stated that its holding was not based upon such prior case law. It found the prior cases to be non-dis-positive of the issue before it. “It is evident from the foregoing [discussion of prior case law] that the resolution of this case cannot be achieved by the simple application of the rule in any previous case.” Nelson, 306 N.W.2d at 74.