Court Opinion

ID: 9927173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:04:17.979655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:03.360183
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No.21–0102

           Submitted September 13, 2023—Filed January 26, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellee,

vs.

DEMETRIAS MARTIN,

      Appellant.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Tamra Roberts,

Judge.

      A defendant appeals the mandatory minimum term imposed with his

sentence for first-degree robbery. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
      McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.
      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.
                                       2

MCDERMOTT, Justice.
      Demetrias Martin was convicted of first-degree robbery. At his sentencing

hearing, the district court considered results from an assessment tool designed

to estimate Martin’s risk of reoffending. That tool, the Iowa Risk Assessment

Revised, indicated that Martin scored as “high” risk for violent recidivism and

“moderate/high” risk for continuous victimization, resulting in an assigned

recommended level of correctional supervision of “intensive.” Martin argues that

the district court’s reliance on these conclusions from the risk assessment,

without any information about how the tool actually arrived at them, was an

abuse of discretion.

                                       I.

      In March 2019, Martin was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison with

a requirement to serve at least 70% of his sentence under a statutory mandatory

minimum. Martin appealed, challenging this conviction and sentence on several

grounds. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction. But because of a retroac-

tive amendment to the robbery sentencing statute passed in June 2019, it de-

termined that Martin was eligible for resentencing with a potential mandatory

minimum as low as 50%. See 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 8 (codified at Iowa Code
§ 902.12(3) (2020)).

      The amendment to the sentencing statute added factors for the district

court to consider when determining the mandatory minimum to impose: “all per-

tinent information including the person’s criminal record, a validated risk as-

sessment, and the negative impact the offense has had on the victim or other

persons.” Iowa Code § 901.11(3) (2020). After the court remanded for resentenc-

ing, the State filed a motion requesting that the department of correctional ser-

vices prepare an addendum to Martin’s presentence investigation report to in-
clude a validated risk assessment since one had not been required when Martin
                                         3

was originally sentenced. The district court granted the motion and ordered an

addendum to include a “Validated Risk Assessment pursuant to Iowa Code Sec-

tion 901.11(3).”

      An updated presentence investigation report filed about three weeks later

included the following paragraph under the heading “Addendum Update”:

      On November 03, 2020, [t]he defendant was assessed utilizing the
      Iowa Risk Assessment Revised. The Iowa Risk Assessment Revised
      is a brief actuarial instrument used to estimate offenders’ level of
      risks associated with them violently reoffending and their continu-
      ous victimization. The defendant is noted to have scored a High risk
      for violent recidivism, and a Moderate/High risk for continuous vic-
      timization, with an Intensive level of recommended correctional su-
      pervision.

      At the sentencing hearing two months later, Martin’s lawyer made several

statements about this risk assessment information. He conceded that “the stat-

ute tells the Court that they can take it into consideration.” But he argued

against the district court’s consideration of the risk assessment because he

lacked information about how the assessment tool arrived at the proffered con-

clusions. He stated:

      I don’t think that the way our Seventh Judicial District does the
      Risk Assessment really qualifies as providing my client with any
      due process. Just because it’s statutorily authorized doesn’t mean
      that it’s, necessarily, the way it’s being used, appropriate.

             . . . [W]hen we’re talking about sentencing, . . . the defend-
      ant . . . has the right to be sentenced based upon accurate infor-
      mation and he has the right to challenge facts and circumstances
      that might impact his sentencing.

              You know, what we have here is just a conclusory state-
      ment, just that he’s high risk. I don’t have the ability to cross-
      examine anybody as to why that is, what criteria were used, or
      standard, or questions, . . . what answers were given, whether it
      was norm to local populations. I don’t have any way to respond to
      that at all. It’s just a conclusory statement, and I don’t feel that
      it’s fair for that to be considered.
                                          4

              . . . And so I raise the objection to using that simply because
      I think to do my duty and to be an effective defense attorney I
      have to point out that I don’t have any way to challenge that, and
      it appears to be a big part of what the Court might consider. . . .
      [I]t’s unfair to use that to determine . . . the length of the sentence
      . . . because I don’t know what -- what went into it.

      Neither Martin nor the State presented any evidence at the sentencing

hearing. Martin argued for the 50% mandatory minimum. The State again ar-

gued for the 70% mandatory minimum.

      In explaining its sentencing decision, the district court noted that it had

reviewed the presentence investigation report and the risk assessment adden-

dum. The district court described how it would treat the risk assessment:

      I understand the factors that [Martin’s lawyer] has pointed out. And
      the Court can only weigh the Validated Risk Assessment minimally
      because the Court doesn’t have the factors on which that assess-
      ment has relied either to make [its] own determination of whether or
      not that’s appropriate. However, I have taken it into consideration,
      as required by the code, but I don’t think that I’m weighing it heavily
      by any means since I don’t know what factors it relied on either,
      other than what’s, I guess, in the instrument that they use.

The district court explained that “the bulk of the reason” for the sentence it would

impose on Martin—twenty-five years with the same 70% mandatory minimum

as before—centered on his crime’s negative impact on the victim and the com-
munity.

      Martin appealed the district court’s sentence. We transferred the case to

the court of appeals, which affirmed the sentence. We granted Martin’s request

for further review.

                                         II.

      Iowa Code § 901.11(3) specifies several factors that the district court must

consider when sentencing a defendant for robbery:

      At the time of sentencing, the court shall determine when a person
      convicted of robbery in the first degree . . . shall first become eligible
      for parole . . . based upon all pertinent information including the
                                        5

      person’s criminal record, a validated risk assessment, and the neg-
      ative impact the offense has had on the victim or other persons.

      Martin argues on appeal that despite a lack of evidence that the risk as-

sessment had been “validated,” the district court nonetheless considered it based

on an erroneous belief that it had to consider it. “Although the district court was

under the impression it was required to consider this conclusory statement,”

Martin writes, “it was not required to, especially absent evidence that the assess-

ment was validated or without evidence of what the assessment specifically

measured.” The district court’s failure to recognize that it had discretion not to

consider the risk assessment in fashioning the sentence, according to Martin,

requires us to reverse and remand so he can be resentenced.

      This argument strays in part from the one Martin made at his sentencing.

His objection at sentencing was that he had no way to challenge the risk assess-

ment. Now, on appeal, Martin argues for the first time that the State failed to

show that the presentence investigation report referenced a statutorily author-

ized—i.e., “validated”—risk assessment. Martin made no objection on that

ground below. A district court may rely on information in a presentence investi-

gation report when the defendant fails to object to the information in it. State v.

Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2018). Without an objection and ruling in the
district court on Martin’s new validation argument, we’re unable to address it on

appeal. See id. at 23–24 (holding that alleged error through considering risk as-

sessment information in a presentence investigation report requires an objection

to be preserved for appeal). We leave for another day questions about the neces-

sary showing to establish that a risk assessment has been validated under

§ 901.11(3).

      We turn to the issue preserved for appeal: Whether the district court
abused its discretion by considering the risk assessment information “without
                                         6

evidence of what the assessment specifically measured.” When the sentence

challenged on appeal was within the statutory limits, we apply an abuse of dis-

cretion standard. State v. Wilson, 941 N.W.2d 579, 585 (Iowa 2020). Referring to

risk assessments specifically, we have said that “if we need further evidence to

determine if the sentencing factor is improper, the defendant must object to the

factor and ask to make the appropriate record before sentencing.” State v. Head-

ley, 926 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Iowa 2019) (emphasis added). Martin’s lawyer argued

at his sentencing hearing that he lacked sufficient information about the risk

assessment to challenge it, but he offered nothing further to support this con-

tention. Martin needed to do more than object at the sentencing hearing for us

to find that the district court’s consideration of the risk assessment was an abuse

of discretion. The district court does not abuse its discretion by considering risk

assessment information in a presentence investigation report where a defendant

has notice of the risk assessment and fails to present evidence exposing some

actual unsoundness in it. See id.

      As the State points out, Martin could have called the presentence investi-

gation report’s author to testify at the sentencing hearing about the risk assess-

ment; he did not. The presentence investigation report was made available to
Martin’s lawyer about two months before his sentencing—well in advance of the

statutory deadline. See Iowa Code § 901.4 (requiring that the defense attorney

have access to the presentence investigation report at least three days before the

date set for sentencing). The Code affords a defendant and defense counsel the

opportunity to “file with the presentence investigation report . . . a denial or ref-

utation of the allegations, or both, contained in the report,” which then “shall be

included in the report.” Id. These provisions provide for the “orderly presentation

of information to the court for sentencing purposes and the fundamental notion
                                        7

of fairness.” State v. Ashley, 462 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Iowa 1990). No denial or ref-

utation of any part of the presentence investigation, including the risk assess-

ment, appears in the report. The record similarly shows no request to postpone

the sentencing hearing to enable further investigation into the matter before the

hearing or to subpoena witnesses to testify at the hearing.

      Nothing prevents defendants from attacking—or, should they choose,

defending—a conclusion generated by a risk assessment tool in a presentence

investigation report. But we’ve previously expressed the importance of evidence

in evaluating these tools. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d at 24 (“[I]f risk assessment is a

legitimate state exercise, it needs to be cabined by principles that demand that

the methods used to implement it are legally germane, accurate, and fairly

applied.” (quoting Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment:

Sentencing and Policing, 15 Ohio State J. Crim. L. 583, 596 (2018))). Despite

receiving the presentence investigation report well in advance of the sentencing

hearing, Martin presented no evidence to show that the district court abused its

discretion by considering the information in it.

      We thus affirm the district court’s sentence and affirm the decision of the

court of appeals.
      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.