Court Opinion

ID: 9579817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:58:55.06182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:48.367316
License: Public Domain

ADDENDUM
ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
BURNETT, Judge.
Appellants Beck and Beco argue that we have misapplied the standard of harmless error enunciated by our Supreme Court in Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 (1986). As readers of our lead opinion will recall, we interpreted Soria to hold that an error is harmless unless a different result would have been probable had the error not occurred. Appellants now contend that Soria’s reference to the probability of a different result is merely a dictum appearing in a footnote. They further assert that even if harmless error does turn upon the probability of a different result, Soria requires such probability to be tested against evidence that might be adduced at a new trial in the future, not against the existing record of the trial actually conducted.
Although we share appellants’ misgivings about Soria, we do not think a fair *571reading of the Supreme Court’s decision sustains their argument here. The issue in Soria was whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of a settlement agreement among certain defendants. The Supreme Court said that such a ruling would not be reversed unless it was erroneous and it had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict. The Court cited Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976), and Rowett v. Kelly Canyon Ski Hill, Inc., 102 Idaho 708, 639 P.2d 6 (1981), in support of this two-fold test for reversal. The Court then declared that it need not decide whether the trial judge had erred in excluding evidence of the settlement agreement because the error, if any, was harmless. The Court quoted the harmless error rule, I.R.C.P. 61, and examined the impact of the judge’s ruling on the course of the trial. The Court concluded its discussion of harmless error as follows:
The record in this case speaks for itself. We are convinced that Sierra Pacific has “not adequately demonstrated that had the [agreement’s contents] been introduced at trial, a different result would have been probable.” Rowett, supra, 102 Idaho at 711, 639 P.2d at 9.13 Accord. Bambrough, supra, 552 P.2d at 1290. Even if there were error, it did not involve substantial justice and was not of the type that had a “substantial influence in bringing about the verdict.” Bambrough, supra, 552 P.2d at 1290. Hence, we affirm the district court on this issue.
Ill Idaho at 608, 726 P.2d at 720.
With this language the Supreme Court added rigor to the “substantial influence” test by requiring an appellant to show the probability of a different result if the error below had not occurred. In footnote 13 of its opinion, the court elaborated the reason for imposing such increased rigor:
Rowett dealt with the standard of review for determining whether enlargements of two photographs which were admitted into evidence at trial justified the ordering of a new trial. The court held that the enlargements did not qualify as newly discovered evidence which would warrant a grant of a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(4), I.R.C.P. Rowett, supra, 102 Idaho at 711, 639 P.2d at 9. It is clear then that Rowett dealt with a motion for new trial based on allegations of newly discovered evidence.
In our case, Sierra Pacific argues that it received an unfair trial because the contents of the agreement were not disclosed. Hence, it argues that it should be granted a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1), I.R.C.P. Thus, while Rowett and this case involve motions for new trials based upon different subsections of Rule 59(a), there is no substantive reason to distinguish and not apply the rule of Rowett to our case. In both instances wise appellate review should only require the ordering of a new trial where there is a probability that a different result would occur upon the completion of the new trial. To rule otherwise would foster unnecessary litigation and expenses — something which was never intended to occur under Rule 59(a).
Id. at 608 n. 13, 726 P.2d at 720 n. 13.
In the present case, as in Soria, the appellants moved unsuccessfully for a new trial. Our lead opinion explains why we think the harmless error doctrine should not become entangled with a standard governing motions for new trials — particularly a unified standard that does not distinguish between motions based on newly discovered evidence and motions based on other grounds. Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has declared otherwise. The passages quoted above make it clear that an error is harmless under Soria unless the appellant shows that a different result would have been probable had the error not occurred. Contrary to the appellants’ contention in this case, the Soria standard is not a mere dictum confined to a footnote. The standard is set forth and applied in the text of the Supreme Court’s opinion; the footnote is explanatory. Moreover, in applying the probability standard, the Supreme Court focuses — as it must — on the existing record rather than on hypothetical evidence that might be adduced at a trial in *572the future. As quoted previously, the Supreme Court declares: “The record in this case speaks for itself.”
Accordingly, we must decline the appellants’ invitation to find a way around Soria in order to reverse the judgment in the present case. If the Soria standard is to be altered or clarified, that task properly belongs to the Supreme Court.
WALTERS, C.J., and SWANSTROM, J., concur.