Court Opinion

ID: 9777573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:15:53.873534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:56.504845
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
This is an ineffective assistance of counsel case. The Court of Appeals held appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective. The majority appears to hold that the Court of Appeals erred because appellant would not be able to show prejudice.1 In my view, the Court of Appeals erred because counsel was not ineffective for the reasons alleged by appellant. I also write to explain more precisely than the majority the legal dilemma presented by the facts in this ease, and to point out that what may appear to be a legally frustrating position for defendants can be avoided or at least alleviated.
In appellant’s trial for sexual assault, the trial court permitted admission of evidence of multiple encounters between appellant and the victim on dates other than the date alleged in the indictment. On appeal appellant claimed his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to admission of the evidence, or request a limiting instruction. The Court of Appeals agreed, reasoning that the evidence of conduct on dates other than the date alleged in the indictment was extraneous and therefore admissible only for limited purposes. Yzaguirre v. State, 938 S.W.2d 129, 133 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1996). As such, the defendant would have been entitled to a limiting instruction as to the extraneous offense evidence. The court concluded the error was prejudicial because with a limiting instruction, there would not have been enough substantial evidence on which to support the conviction. Id. The Court of Appeals is wrong because, under the facts presented, none of the multiplé offenses were “extraneous” so as to be objectionable. Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective for the *40reason that he failed to object to the evidence as “extraneous” although he was probably ineffective for a closely related reason. I will explain.
The first question to be addressed in deciding whether counsel was ineffective is whether the evidence was admissible or admissible only for a limited purpose. For the most part, the Rules of Criminal Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials. Under Rule 404(b), extraneous offense evidence is not admissible for the purpose of showing character conformity. Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 404(b). This evidence may be admitted for other reasons, however, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. Thus, evidence of extraneous sexual assaults between the defendant and the victim are not admissible to show that the defendant was acting in conformity therewith, but may be admitted for some other purpose. If it is admitted for some other purpose, the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed that the evidence is to be considered only for that limited purpose.
Cases of sexual assault of a child often involve multiple incidents of similar conduct between the defendant and the victim over time. The defendant is entitled to know ahead of trial whether the State plans on offering evidence of more than one incident in proving its case. See Tex.R.CRIM. Evid. 404(b). When multiple incidents involving the same type conduct are to be shown, the law regarding the statute of limitations has a direct bearing on the matter because thereunder, the State is not bound by the date alleged in the indictment but may prove the offense occurred on any date within the statutory period. Therefore, any of the incidents (that otherwise meet the definition of the offense) occurring within the statutory period may be considered as general proof so as to support a conviction—none are “extraneous” since proof of any of them could support the conviction.
But this does not mean that counsel must sit helplessly by as the State offers proof of multiple incidents without any way of limiting their admission. A defendant can force the State to “elect” which incident it will rely upon to support the conviction so that the evidence as to other conduct can then be deemed extraneous. E.g., O’Neal v. State, 746 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1988)(“general rule is that where one act of intercourse is alleged in indictment and more than one act of intercourse is shown by the evidence in a sexual assault trial, the State must elect the act upon which it would rely for conviction”); Crawford v. State, 696 S.W.2d 903, 905-906 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Bates v. State, 165 Tex.Crim. 140, 305 S.W.2d 366, 368 (1957); Crosslin v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 467, 235 S.W. 905, 906 (1921). Once the State makes such election, the defendant is entitled to a limiting instruction as to remaining or extraneous incidents. Crawford, 696 S.W.2d at 907-908; Bates, 305 S.W.2d at 368. So, upon notice that the State intends to offer evidence of a number of incidents that took place within the statutory period, the defendant should request the State to elect which one it will rely upon for conviction so that the-others can be designated extraneous and their admission limited accordingly.2 Even if the State is not compelled to make an election until after the close of its ease in chief,3 once an election is made, the defendant is entitled to have the jury given a limiting instruction as to evidence of conduct occurring on other dates.
In the instant case, appellant did not request an election and limiting instruction as to non-elected or “extraneous” incidents, although he would have been entitled to both. Appellant's counsel was probably ineffective in failing to do so. But appellant does not claim his counsel was ineffective in this regard. He claims counsel should have objected to the admission of evidence of the numerous incidents on dates other than the date *41alleged in the indictment. As to this specific claim, counsel was not ineffective since, without an election, there was no way to determine which incidents were extraneous so as to prohibit or limit their admission.4
I concur in the judgment of the Court.
BAIRD, J., joins.

. The majority’s holding is not all that clear to me. It seems to suggest that counsel was not ineffective because his objection would have been properly overruled but also says appellant could not show prejudice because the evidence would have been sufficient to support the conviction. Yzaguirre v. State, 957 S.W.2d at 39.

. Incidents occurring outside of the statute of limitations would necessarily be extraneous, assuming there was no tolling.

. The trial court has discretion to order an election at any time prior to the resting of the State’s case. O'Neal, 746 S.W.2d at 772. However, once the State rests its case, the trial court must order a requested election. Id.

. The majority relies exclusively on Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), decided after the Court of Appeals’ opinion was issued. The Court of Appeals is wrong under the law as it stood even before Sledge. The holding in Sledge really has little or nothing to do with this case except that it reiterated some of the law regarding the statute of limitations. The specific issue raised in Sledge had to do with whether the operation of such rules violated a defendant’s grand jury rights. Appellant in this case does not complain about the lack of a grand jury screening of the offense for which he was convicted. Rather, his complaint is directed at statute of limitations law that has been around for a very long time.