Court Opinion

ID: 9865047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:21:42.810657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:59.498077
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Otto Bock
dissenting.
I dissent. Admittedly, paragraph 3 of Instruction No. 2, quoted in the majority opinion, is erroneous. It assumes that defendant would be guilty if the deceased died of the injuries received in the accident without any negligence whatever. There was some evidence by defendant to the effect that the cause of the accident was a sideswiping of the car of defendant by a third car, which caused him to lose control of his own machine, culminating in the fatal collision. In my opinion, it is an unreasonable assumption to say, under the circumstances, that the jury was not misled because an erroneous instruction on a specific element was cured by certain general recitals in other instructions. It would be more reasonable to assume that the jury paid more attention to the specific elements required under Instruction No. 2 than to general statements in other instructions. Under these circumstances, I prefer to err on the side of liberty within the law rather than incarceration.
In Stevens v. People, 97 Colo. 559, 51 P. (2d) 1022, we construed the words “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,” contained in section 39, chapter 48, ’35 C. S. A., and said on page 561 of the opinion: “If the words, ‘while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,’ appearing in section 1, are given a broader meaning than the words ‘while intoxicated,’ appearing in the title, so as to cover the case of a person who, though under the influence of intoxicating liquor, is not intoxicated, that part of section 1 would be void as not embraced *129within the title. Colorado Constitution, art. V, §21. The authorities are not harmonious, but we believe that in our statute by using the word ‘intoxicated’ the General Assembly indicated an intent that the words ‘under the influence of intoxicating liquor,’ appearing in section 1, are to be understood as synonymous with ‘intoxicated.’ Thus construed, section 1 is within the scope of the title.”
From a reading of the evidence it appears that the instant case was tried upon a theory somewhat inconsistént with this construction. While Instruction No. 10 is correct so far as it goes, it fails to instruct the jury that such a degree of intoxication as required in Stevens v. People, supra, was necessary to convict, and read together with other instructions, such as numbers 2, 8 and 12, may have misled the jury on this element of the offense. The medical expert produced by the people testified that defendant was moderately under the influence of liquor, but refused to testify that his capacity to operate an automobile was impaired thereby. Defendant’s tendered and refused Instruction No. 6 was in harmony with our construction of this section.
This case should be reversed and remanded, with directions that a new trial be granted.
Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Knous concur in this dissent.