Court Opinion

ID: 9417551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:24:47.973402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.086761
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Gray,
Mr. Justice Brown and myself are unable to concur in the foregoing conclusions. Beyond all dispute the settled law of this court, established by repeated decisions, is that the question how far the title of a riparian owner extends is one of local law. For a determination of that question the statutes of the State and. the decisions of its highest court furnished the best and the final authority. In the case of St. Louis v. Rutz, decided at the present term, 138 U. S. 226, 242, it was said by Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking- for the court: “ The question as to whether the fee of the plaintiff, as a riparian proprietor on the Mississippi Biver, extends to the middle thread oB the stream, or only to the water’s edge, is a question in regard to a rule of property, which is governed by the local law of Illinois. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 338; St. Louis v. Myers, 113 U. S. 566; Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661. In Barney v. Keokuk, it' is said that if the States ‘ choose to resign to the riparian proprietor rights which properly belong to them in their sovereign capacity, it is not for others to raise objections.’ ” The cases referred to in this .quotation affirm the same doctrine.
If we turn to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, we find one rule laid down for running water and another for *403lakes and ponds; In the former case the riparian owner owns to the thread of the current; in the latter to the water line. No. distinction is made on account of the size of either stream or pond. Without noticing the. thorities in reference to rivers or other running water, it enough to refer to the decisions in reference to lakes and nds. In the case of Seaman v. Smith, decided in 1860, 21 Illinois, 521, 525, it was held that a riparian owner on a large lake, Lake Michigan, took title only to the water line. The reason of that decision was thus expressed in the opinion of the court: “ These great bodies of wnter, having no currents, like rivers and other running streams, cannot present the same reasons why the boundary should be extended beyond the water’s edge, where- it is ordinarily found, that apply to running bodies of water. Where such streams are called for as a boundary, the thread of the current is held to be the line from each side. Such a rule could not, for the want of a current, be adopted in this-case. It would not be sanctioned either by analogy to the rule or by reason. And if the outer edge of the water be passed, owing to the approximation of these bodies to a circular shape, it would be found exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain where the boundary should be fixed, or the shape it should assume.” It will be perceived that the same reasoning applies whether the lake be a large or a small one. There is no decision or intimation by the Supreme Court of that State questioning the rule thus laid down.
Again, in 1886, in a later case, Trustees of Schools v. Schroll, 120 Illinois, 509, the question arose as to a small lake, no larger than the one in controversy, and the same rule was applied there as in the case of Lake Michigan ; and it was held that the title of the riparian owner stopped at the water line, and the case of Seaman v. Smith, supra, was cited as furnishing the authority and reasoning for the rule. Nor was this a mere casual or incidental remark in the course of an opinion. The opinion is some seven pages in length, arid over four pages are devoted to a discussion and decision of this question. It was the principal and paramount' question, fully reasoned out and obviously carefully considered. We quote as follows: “It is *404equally well settled that grants of land bounded on streams or rivers above tide' water carry the exclusive right and title of the grantee to the centre of the stream, usque ad filum aquae, subject to the easement of navigation in streams navigable in fact, unless the terms of the grant clearly denote the intention to stop at the edge or margin of the stream. 3 Kent’s Com. 427; 2 Hilliard on Real Prop. 92; Angell on Water-courses, sec. 5; Jones v. Soulard, 24 How. 41; State of Indiana v. Milk, 11 Fed. Rep. 389; Canal Appraisers v. The People, 17 Wend. 571, 596; Child v. Starr, 4 Hill, 369; Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521; Rockwell v. Baldwin, 53 Ill. 19; Braxon v. Bressler, 64 Ill. 488; Washington Ice Co. v. Shortall, 101 Ill. 46. But an entirely different rule applies when land is conveyed bounded along or upon a natural lake or pond. In such case the-grant extends only to fhe water’s edge. Angell on Watercourses, secs. 41, 42; 3 Kent’s Com. 439, note a, citing Bradley v. Rice, 13 Maine, 198, 201, and Waterman v. Johnson, 13 Pick. 261. See also Warren v. Chambers, 25 Arkansas, 120; State of Indiana v. Milk, U. S. Cir. Ct. Dist. Ind., Gresham, J., 11 Fed. Rep. 389, citing Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N. Y. 377; Mansur v. Blake, 62 Maine, 38; State v. Gilmanton, 9 N. H. 461; Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160; Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vermont, 257; Austin v. Rutland Railroad Co., 45 Vermont, 215; Boorman v. Sunnuchs, 42 Wisconsin, 233; Delaplaine v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 42 Wisconsin, 214, and Seaman v. Smith, 24 Illinois, 521. See also Nelson v. Butterfield, 21 Maine, 229; West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 7 Allen, 158; Canal Co. v. The People, 5 Wend. 423; Jakeway v. Barrett, 38 Vermont, 316; Primm v. Walker, 38 Missouri, 94, 99; Wood v. Kelley, 30 Maine, 47.” And again: “Indeed, the controlling distinction between a stream and a pond or lake is, that in the one case the water has a natural motion — a current — while in the other, the water is,' in its natural state, substantially at rest. And this is so, independent of the size of the • one or the other. The flowing rivulet of but a few inches.in' width is a stream as certainly.as the Mississippi. And when lands are granted by the proprietor of both land and stream, bounding such grant upon the stream, the grantee *405acquires right and title to the thread or middle of the stream. This right is grounded upon the presumption that- the grantor, by making the stream the boundary, intended, his. grantee to take to the middle of the stream; and this presumption will prevail until a contrary intent is made to appear. Rockwell v. Baldwin, 58 Illinois, 19. The right spoken of does not rest upon the principle that when a grant, is bounded on a stream the bed of the stream to the thread or middle passes as incident or appurtenant to the bordering land, for the bed of the stream is land, though covered with water, and land cannot pass as appurtenant to land. As is said in Child v. Starr, 4 Hill, 369: ‘ A conveyance of one acre of land can never be made, by any legal construction, to carry another acre by way of incident or appurtenance to the first.’ The riparian proprietor claiming to the thread or middle of the stream must show the bordering water to be a stream, and that his grant, in terms or legal effect, is bounded upon or along such stream — that the stream is made the boundary.”
These quotations' show that there was no mere inadvertent or casual remark, but that it was the distinct and well considered as it was also the unanimous decision of the highest court of the State. We do not think it sufficient to overthrow the force of this decision to say that the common law of England was different, a proposition which, in passing, we may say we doubt; nor that there was another question in the case also referred to in the opinion, which fully justified the decision; and that therefore the discussion and" decision of this question were unnecessary, for that other question was put after this in the opinion, and was evidently intentionally made subordinate to this.
Believing that the law of Illinois has been determined by its Supreme Court, we think that determination is conclusive on this court. As strengthening the views we have expressed,, may also be noticed the opinions of the Circuit and District Judges, in this very case, on separate trials, (see 16 Fed. Rep 823,) both announced before the' decision in 120. Illinois, and agreeing that under the laws of Illinois the title of the riparian owner stopped with the water.. The long judicial experience *406of those judges and their familiarity with the laws of Illinois give to these opinions great weight. We, therefore, dissent from the conclusions of the court