Court Opinion

ID: 9462005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:29:37.442651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:21.440303
License: Public Domain

*840GARTH, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I agree with the majority of the Court that a federal question is presented by the petition for habeas corpus and that the case must be remanded for further proceedings. Nevertheless, I believe it important to note my disagreement with the majority’s jurisdictional analysis (Part I of the Majority Opinion) which holds that the petition suffices as a claim alleging state “custody in violation of the . . . laws ... of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Majority Opinion at 834-836.
I read the majority’s theory of jurisdiction as stating: that on the date (December 9, 1970) that the United States’ enactment of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers became effective for the United States (March 9, 1971), all statutes of those states which had previously enacted the Agreement by such statutes were immediately transformed into a law of the United States. See Majority Opinion at 834.
While the majority’s analysis reaches the same result as the analysis set forth below under the particular facts present here, it neither specifies nor articulates the authority by which a state statute enacting the Agreement as a law of that state can suddenly become a law of the United States when the Agreement is enacted by the United States but “on its [the United States’] own behalf and on behalf of the District of Columbia . . . .” 18 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 2 (1975 Supp.).1 Nor does the majority’s analysis answer the question of whether a violation of the Agreement between two states, one of which is not the United States would give rise to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.
The majority’s analysis also fails to provide a jurisdictional basis for a claim arising out of a pre-1971 violation of the Agreement. This analytical failure is evident even if the violation occurred as between the United States and another party state let alone between two party states, one of which was not the United States.
Finally, the theory advanced by the majority does not explain which law governs in the interpretation and application of the Agreement in the courts of each of the party states.
It is true, of course, that we are presented here only with a violation which took place after March 9, 1971 and which involves only the United States and New Jersey. Hence, as a general rule of jurisprudence, it could be expected that the majority go no further than to decide whether the facts in this particular case give rise to jurisdiction. However, I believe that as jurisdiction is at issue, the majority’s approach is too restricted. Instead, because federal jurisdiction is at issue, all possible circumstances that may arise should be considered to determine the validity and the soundness of the proposed jurisdictional theory.
In my view, a much sounder and appropriate jurisdictional basis is afforded by reference to the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Accordingly I believe that the majority’s jurisdictional analysis, while effective in resolving the issue in this case, is, at most, a secondary and less desirable jurisdictional basis for Esola and for future cases that may arise. After analyzing the possible theories by which federal habeas corpus jurisdiction *841may lie in the context of the Agreement, I find the most appropriate to be a theory predicated upon congressional approval of Interstate Agreements or a “Compact Clause” analysis.
The Compact Clause requires congressional approval of agreements between the states. New Jersey’s enactment of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers is an agreement between it and other states which have enacted the Agreement. As such, its approval by Congress under the Compact Clause is required. Such congressional approval for the states’ agreement on detainers was provided in advance by the Act of June 5, 1934, 4 U.S.C. § 112(a). See 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4866.
It necessarily followed that upon approval by the United States Congress in 1934 (even though the United States did not itself become a party state under the Agreement until 1970),2 federal law, rather than the particular law of each party state, governed, and is to govern, the interpretation of the Agreement.3 See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 279-80, 79 S.Ct. 785, 3 L.Ed.2d 804 (1959); Interstate Wrecking Co., Inc. v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 57 N.J. 342, 273 A.2d 10, 13-14 (1971). As such, the Agreement and its construction by judicial authorities, involves a “federal ‘title, right, privilege, or immunity’. . . ” Delaware River Comm’n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 427, 60 S.Ct. 1039, 1041, 84 L.Ed. 1287 (1940) (emphasis supplied); see Engdahl, Construction of Interstate' Compacts: A Questionable Federal Question, 51 Va.L.Rev. 987 (1965). Accordingly, I believe that congressional consent to New Jersey’s enactment of the Interstate Agreement under which Agreement federal rights were created, transformed New Jersey’s enactment of the Agreement into a “law” of the United States. League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 507 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974, 95 S.Ct. 1398, 43 L.Ed. 654 (1975). See Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 565, 14 L.Ed. 249 (1851). That federal law became binding on New Jersey not on March 9, 1971, the effective date of the United States’ enactment of the Agreement, but rather on April 18, 1958, the effective date of New Jersey’s enactment of the Agreement. In similar fashion this federal law is binding as to each party state as of the date on which that particular state entered into or joins the Agreement.
In League to Save Lake Tahoe, supra, the Ninth Circuit held that congressional sanction of an interstate agreement transformed it into a “law” of the United States for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) jurisdiction. I believe that a similar conclusion must be reached with respect to New Jersey’s enactment of a congressionally approved agreement.
As earlier stated, under the majority’s analysis certain significant questions concerning jurisdiction and its effects are unanswered. In contrast, under a “Compact Clause” analysis, the answers would appear to be evident. Under the “Compact Clause” analysis, it is immaterial whether the United States is one of the “transacting” jurisdictions. By virtue of the congressional action approving the Agreement, the Agreement as enacted by each state subsequent to 1934 is a “law” of the United States. As such, a violation of the Agreement is a violation of a law of the United States within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Hence since 1934 and not 1971, habeas corpus jurisdiction in the federal courts should have been, and is, available for violations of the Agreement where neither the receiving party jurisdiction nor the sending *842party jurisdiction was or is the United States.
I believe only the “Compact Clause” analysis provides the breadth of habeas corpus availability in federal courts and the concomitant uniformity of interpretation. Uniformity of interpretation is necessary as the Agreement deals with more than local concerns; indeed, the remedial provisions of the Agreement, by allowing relief only in the receiving jurisdiction, even for violations occurring in the sending jurisdiction, encompasses and affects activities beyond the control of a single state.4 The majority’s analysis seriously jeopardizes the attainment of such a uniform interpretation. The possibility exists under the majority’s theory of jurisdiction, that the Agreement may be interpreted by the same receiving state under two, potentially different, standards of law: one being a federal standard (and then if at all, only after March 9, 1971), where the United States is the sending jurisdiction, thus giving a “federal” content to the Agreement, and the other being a state standard where the sending jurisdiction is a state, thus permitting the Agreement to be interpreted according to the law of one of the two states. In contrast to the majority’s view, the “Compact Clause” analysis would require that the courts of the several jurisdictions (38 states plus the United States) which have enacted the Agreement interpret the Agreement according to a single standard — a federal one. See note 3, supra.
The majority and I have reached the same conclusion as to the petition before us, that is that habeas corpus jurisdiction is available in the federal courts. We part company, however, in the respective routes chosen to reach this conclusion. It would appear that the majority’s route must either begin with the United States at one end of the prisoner’s transfer or terminate with the United States at the other end. In my view, the majority’s route is too narrow and limited as it may deny a federal forum for habeas corpus relief to petitioners with justifiable grievances arising out of actions by states where the United States is not a party. Certainly this would be so under the majority’s theory where pre-1971 matters are in issue. I would hope that in time this Court will depart from the narrow one-lane route constructed by the majority to traverse the broader jurisdictional highway which I have outlined.
I am obliged, however, to make still another observation with respect to the Majority Opinion. The majority, by its own statement, has decided no more than “. . . that a cause of action is stated by the apparent failure of New Jersey to comply with the terms of the Agreement, and hence that further proceedings in the district court are required.” Majority Opinion at 839. Indeed, it would be improvident for us to decide otherwise since by reason of the district court’s dismissal of the petition, the record before us is silent. Taking the majority at its word, I thus disregard as gratuitous and advisory any discussion in the Majority Opinion which treats with any of the merits of the petition. The merits of Esola’s petition, having been assumed to be true for purposes of appellate review,5 we should *843defer after remand to the district court for its resolution of all questions of fact and law, other than, of course, jurisdiction.

. It would appear that the only tenable theory by which the majority could support its thesis is one of contract, inasmuch as the Agreement itself refers to “The contracting states solemnly agree that. . . . ” 18 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 2 (1975 Supp.) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, § 2 by its terms appears in a contract context, i. e., “the Interstate Agreement. . . is hereby enacted into law and entered into by the United States . . . with all jurisdictions legally joining in [enactment of the Agreement] . . ..” Id. (emphasis supplied). Nothing, however, appears in the Majority Opinion to indicate that the federal law concept arises out of a contract by the United States with the other party states. If in fact that is the underlying and implicit authority of the Majority Opinion, I nevertheless am of the view that there are shortcomings to such a jurisdictional predicate, some of which are indicated in the text of this Concurring Opinion.

. See 18 U.S.C.A. Appendix (1975 Supp.).

. I recognize, as does the majority, that the enactment of the Agreement by each party state is undoubtedly in identical statutory terms. Nevertheless, the gloss which may be imparted by the courts to identical language may vary significantly among the states which have separately enacted the Agreement. It is for this reason that I consider the need for a uniform interpretation of the Agreement to be significant, and indeed mandatory.

. Although the courts of each jurisdiction which has enacted the Agreement are to interpret and apply their own respective statutes, it is only in the courts of the receiving party state (here New Jersey) that remedies are available for noncompliance with the Agreement. As the remedy provided by the Agreement for acts of noncompliance is dismissal of the indictment “with prejudice”, it follows that any allegations that the Agreement has been violated are to be presented to and resolved by only the courts of the jurisdiction where the indictment is pending. See Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Art. V(c); 18 U.S.C.A. Appendix (1975 Supp.); N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-5(c). Thus, even though violation of the Agreement occurs in the sending jurisdiction, such as by failure of the warden to comply with Art. III(c) in notifying the prisoner of the detainer and of the prisoner’s right to request a final disposition of the charges, the Agreement anticipates that relief lies only in the courts of the receiving jurisdiction. People v. Esposito, 37 Misc.2d 386, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Cty.Ct.1960); see State v. West, 79 N.J.Super. 379, 191 A.2d 758 (App.Div.1963). But see King v. State, 5 Md.App. 652, 249 A.2d 468, 475 (1969) (No sanction provided for warden’s failure to give prisoner required notice under an Intrastate Detainer Act containing language similar to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers).

. See Majority Opinion at 833.