Court Opinion

ID: 9746069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:55:29.676303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:23.802389
License: Public Domain

MOSK,
I respectfully dissent. “[G]eneral costs of prosecuting and rehabilitating criminals” are not recoverable absent express statutory authority to the contrary. (People v. Baker (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 550, 559-560 [113 Cal.Rptr. 248] (Baker) [power to require reimbursement to the state for costs of prosecution and of probation supervision is a function of statute]; People v. Burnett (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 320 [150 Cal.Rptr. 126] (Burnett) [extradition costs are general costs of prosecuting and rehabilitating criminals]; People v. Rugamas (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 518, 523 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 271] [citing Baker for proposition that government is entitled to restitution only if it has incurred actual loss due to the crime, “excluding those general costs of prosecuting and rehabilitating criminals”].) Penal Code section 1203.1b, subdivision (a),1 constitutes an express statutory authority provided for in Baker. Section 1203.1b, subdivision (a), allows a court to require a probationer to pay certain expenses, including the reasonable “cost” of “probation supervision” and the costs of conducting presentence or preplea investigations and preparing presentence or preplea reports—which activities are the type of services the probation department performs. (See, e.g., §§ 1202.8, 1203.)2
The term “cost of any probation supervision” is not defined and does not manifestly include the costs of extraditing or otherwise apprehending a probationer. Extradition is not the type of probation department service provided for by section 1203.1b. There is no indication in the record that either Brian Washington’s probation officer or the probation department apprehended or extradited him. Instead, the record shows that the probation officer reported Brian Washington’s desertion to the court and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and extradition costs were paid by the state to the district attorney’s office. Costs associated with extradition, rather than being necessary to maintain probation supervision, often result in the termination of probation supervision.
*597The legislative history of section 1203.1b does not support the People’s position that extradition costs may be charged to a probationer. That legislative history suggests that the “cost” of probation supervision was intended to be computed by allocating a standard amount per month to the probationer to cover the “average” monthly cost of probation services rendered. Thus, the legislative history of section 1203.1b references the “monthly” or “average” cost of probation supervision. (Cal. Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3323 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) July 9 and 11, 1980, p. 2 [“This measure allows the court to order a probationer to pay the average cost of probation services.”]; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3323 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) Probation Costs, as amended May 7, 1980, pp. 1-2 [payments of reasonable cost of probation “would be made, if practicable, on a monthly basis”]; Legis. Bull., No. 14 (June 9, 1980) Probation Costs (Assem. Bill. No. 3323 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.)) [average cost of probation supervision per probationer was $21.63 per month]; M. Steven Zehner, County Supervisors Assn, of Cal., letter to Governor Brown re Assem. Bill No. 3323 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.), July 18, 1980 [“(section 1203.1b) limits the cost imposed to no more than the average monthly cost of probation”].) Courts, in providing for the “reasonable cost of any probation supervision,” have imposed a monthly fee determined by the probation department for its supervision services. (People v. Phillips (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 66 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 321] [defendant ordered to pay probation supervision fee not to exceed $20 per month]; see also People v. Hart (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 902, 905-906 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 837] [the costs of probation supervision accrue monthly].) It is unlikely that the monthly or average fee includes an extraordinary cost such as extradition costs, all or portions of which may not even be incurred by the probation department.
In enacting section 1203.1b, the Legislature responded to Baker by providing the statutory authority to impose specific costs on a probationer. The Legislature could have responded to Burnett, which precluded imposing the costs of extradition on a defendant-probationer, by providing express authority for extradition costs to be charged to a probationer, but it did not do so. The legislative history of section 1203.1b makes no mention of extradition costs or Burnett. There is no suggestion in the legislative history, explicit or implicit, that the Legislature intended to deal with extradition costs as a part of probation expenses that can be charged to a probationer. Had the Legislature intended to supersede Burnett by permitting extradition costs to be passed on to a probationer, it expressly would have so provided. (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078] [Legislature “is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof’]; see also People v. Gangemi (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1797 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d *598462] [“If the Legislature intended a defendant to pay for some or all of the prosecution costs, it had ample opportunity to say so in these sections [§§ 1203.1b, 1203.1c and 987.81].”].)3
To interpret section 1203.1b as broadly permitting sentencing courts to impose upon a probationer extradition costs as a cost of probation supervision leads to the conclusion that anything remotely related to probation is a probation cost that could be shifted to the probationer. For example, if a defendant violates his or her probation by committing another crime and police apprehend the defendant, under the People’s interpretation of section 1203.1b, the costs of apprehending the defendant would be a “cost of probation supervision.” Such costs, like extradition costs, are expenses incurred in connection with the State’s performance of its regular duties, and they should not be viewed as statutorily authorized costs recoverable from a defendant. (People v. Rugarmas, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 523 [government not entitled to recover costs of weapons or bullets used, gasoline for squad cars, and officers’ salaries]; Baker, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 550.)
Although a court has said that “[p]olicy considerations . . . support a more flexible interpretation of the [recoupment] statute” (People v. Phillips, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th 62, 69), our Supreme Court has reiterated that “[a] rule of strict construction of penal statutes has generally been applied in this state to criminal statutes.” (People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 312 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042]; People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1] [“true ambiguities are resolved in a defendant’s favor” if the appellate court cannot “fairly discern a contrary legislative intent”].) The defendant “must be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to whether the statute was applicable to him.” (In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal.2d 666, 668 [36 Cal.Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d 182, 10 A.L.R.3d 840].)
Because there is no express statutory authority to impose extradition costs on a probationer, the trial court should not be able to require Brian Washington to pay extradition costs.
On August 15, 2002, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 2, 2002. Kennard, 1, was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Probation officers are peace officers and may engage in various activities to carry out their primary functions. (§ 830.5.)

Other states that have allowed extradition costs to be charged to a defendant as a cost of prosecution have done so pursuant to express statutory authority. (See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 631.48 (West 2002); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2724 (1995).)