Court Opinion

ID: 9564304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:57:44.087136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:20.526937
License: Public Domain

*27Donworth, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. The majority have injected into the case an issue of fact (constructive fraud) which is wholly foreign to the pleadings and for which there is no foundation in the record. This theory has never been urged, nor even recognized, by either plaintiff or defendants. By so doing, the majority sua sponte have avoided any discussion of the principal issues presented on this appeal.
The majority opinion says:
“If pleaded by the plaintiff in her reply, the following matters, appearing from the showing on the motion, would raise an issue of constructive fraud.” (Italics mine.)
The matters thereafter related are facts brought before the trial judge by defendants in their affidavit in support of their alternative motions for abatement or dismissal. Collectively, these facts show nothing more than that plaintiff was awarded the widow’s pension (under the workmen’s compensation act) with reasonable promptness after she had applied for it. By counsel, she thereafter attempted to disclaim her right to take under the act and returned previously drawn pension warrants. The supervisor of industrial insurance, at the request of plaintiff’s counsel, entered an order purporting to suspend the operation of his prior order and to hold plaintiff’s claim in “abeyance” while she prosecuted this action in the superior court.
Wherein does the fraud lie? We are not told. But, apparently, it arises from the prompt, expeditious processing of plaintiff’s claim by the supervisor of industrial insurance. If that be fraud, then it is certainly a type of fraud which the legislature has encouraged.
Prompt disposition of workmen’s compensation claims was one of the fundamental objectives which our legislature sought to obtain in 1911, when, in adopting the workmen’s compensation act, it said:
“The common law system governing the remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received in hazardous work is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions. . . . The remedy of the workman has been uncertain, *28slow and inadequate. . . . ” (Italics mine.) Laws of 1911, chapter 74, § 1, p. 345 (RCW 51.04.010).
Furthermore, this court has heretofore recognized this fact by stating that the act was adopted “in order that the delay and frequent injustice incident to civil trials might be avoided” (State v. Mountain Tbr. Co., 75 Wash. 581, 135 Pac. 645 (1913), L. R. A. 1917D, 10) and to “afford a remedy to the workmen that would be certain, expeditious, and adequate” (State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 196 Wash. 308, 82 P. (2d) 865 (1938)). The majority, by calling the supervisor’s allowance of plaintiff’s claim constructively fraudulent, implicitly sanctions the opposite type of administrative action, thereby imposing a penalty for promptness and efficiency and putting a premium on procrastination and inefficiency.
Next, assuming that such fraud is present, plaintiff has had two opportunities to raise such ah issue, but has not done so. First, all matters related by the majority were brought before the trial court by defendants in their affidavit in support of their alternative motions for summary judgment of dismissal or for an order of abatement. Plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion, but did not claim fraud. Second, on November 8, 1957 (twenty-two days after the order abating this action was entered), plaintiff did file her reply to defendants’ affirmative defenses, generally denying them, but raising no issue of fraud.
Furthermore, subsequent to the departmental hearing of this case and preliminary to the reargument en banc, plaintiff answered certain questions propounded by the court, as follows:
“Question Six — ‘Does the fact that the supervisor processed the widow’s claim promptly and awarded her a pension deprive him of jurisdiction to decide the issue [whether or not deceased was in the course of his employment at the time of his death] referred to in the preceding question?’
“Answer From Plaintiff — Plaintiff would answer the above question in the negative.
“Question Seven — ‘Does the fact that the widow filed her claim with the Department of Labor & Industries before *29consulting counsel deprive the supervisor of jurisdiction to process her claim and award her a pension?’
“Answer From Plaintiff — Plaintiff would answer the above question in the negative.”
It would, therefore, seem that plaintiff has specifically disavowed any claim of fraud in this case.
Since there is neither allegation nor proof in this entire record that any of the defendants ever contacted plaintiff subsequent to her husband’s death, the “constructive fraud” suggested by the majority could only have been perpetrated by the supervisor of industrial insurance. He is not a party to this suit, yet the majority tacitly approve this collateral attack upon his order allowing plaintiff the widow’s pension for which she applied. The supervisor’s order, if fraudulent, can only be attacked directly, not collaterally.
The issue of fraud raised by the majority renders any discussion of the merits of either of defendants’ alternative motions unnecessary. Although the majority have commented upon defendants’ plea in abatement, I find it unnecessary to do so.
I would eliminate from the case the court-created issue of constructive fraud and proceed to a determination of the merits of the only issues raised by the parties and supported by the record. As I view the case, this is the only course which can result in a final determination of the questions presented by this lawsuit.
Mallery and Ott, JJ., concur with Don worth, J.