Court Opinion

ID: 9425902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:16:09.613248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:58.205396
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Rehtstquist,
with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Stewart join,
concurring in the result.
We agree with the Court that the members of political parties enjoy a constitutionally protected right of freedom of association secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The right of members of a political party to gather in a national political convention in order to formulate proposed programs and nominate candidates for political office is at the very heart of the freedom of assembly and association which has been established in earlier cases decided by the Court. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960); Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972).
We also agree that the interest of the State of Illinois in protecting its electoral processes for primary delegate selection is not sufficient to authorize a flat prohibition against petitioners’ efforts to have the 1972 National Democratic Convention seat them as party delegates from Illinois. The operation of the injunction issued by ■ the Illinois Circuit Court in this case was as direct and *492severe an infringement of the right of association as can be conceived. Beside it, the sort of “subtle governmental interference” which was referred to in Bates v. Little Bock, supra, pales. We would by no means downplay the legitimacy of the interest of the State in assuring that delegates to the Party Convention chosen pursuant to its electoral processes, and presumably representing the view of the majority of the party’s electors in that State, are seated at the Convention. But since it is conceded that the National Convention, and not the State, had the ultimate authority to choose among contesting delegations, we do not believe the State’s interest is sufficient to support a total restriction on the petitioners’ right to assemble, associate with fellow members of a political party, and urge upon the Convention their claim to be seated as delegates.
While the Court arrives at substantially the same conclusion, in the process of doing so it seems to us to use unnecessarily broad language, to intimate views on questions on which it disclaims any intimation of views, and to turn virtually on its head the Court’s opinion in O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U. S. 1 (1972).
Footnote 4 of the Court’s opinion disclaims any intimation of views on the following questions: “(1) whether the decisions of a national political party in the area of delegate selection constitute state or governmental action .... (2) whether national political parties are subject to the principles of the reapportionment decisions, or other constitutional restraints, in their methods of delegate selection and allocation. ... (3) whether or to what extent national political parties and their nominating conventions are regulable by, or only by, Congress.” But immediately following the disclaimer, the Court proceeds to cite numerous opinions of courts of appeals and district courts, as well as law review commentaries, which to the unsophisticated mind might seem to portend an *493answer to each of these questions. Conspicuous by its absence in the footnote is any reference to this Court’s opinion in O’Brien v. Brown, supra, decided slightly more than two years ago, where we reviewed two cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. That court in those cases had taken the view that action by the National Party did constitute “state action” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, and proceeded to apply its interpretation of that Amendment to action of the Credentials Committee of the Democratic National Convention. We stayed the orders of the Court of Appeals in those cases, saying:
“It has been understood since our national political parties first came into being as voluntary associations of individuals that the convention itself is the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates shall be seated. Thus, these cases involve claims of the power of the federal judiciary to review actions heretofore thought to lie in the control of political parties. Highly important questions are presented concerning justiciability, whether the action of the Credentials Committee is state action and, if so, the reach of the Due Process Clause in this unique context. Vital rights of association guaranteed by the Constitution are also involved. While the. Court is unwilling to undertake final resolution of the important constitutional questions presented without full briefing and argument and adequate opportunity for deliberation, we entertain grave doubts as to the action taken by the Court of Appeals.” 409 U. S., at 4-5. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same opinion, we distinguished the cases of Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953), and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944), both cited in n. 4 of the *494Court’s opinion in the present case, on the ground that they involved invidious discrimination based on race in a primary contest within a single State. 409 U. S., at 4.
We see no reason to recede from any of the language we used in O’Brien v. Brown, supra, and therefore find the Court’s citation of that case to be a virtual repudiation-of it. The Court says, ante, at 491:
“Whatever the case of actions presenting claims that the Party’s delegate selection procedures are not exercised within the confines of the Constitution— and no such claims are made here — this is a case where ‘. . . the convention itself [was] the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates [should] be seated.’ O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U. S. 1, 4 (1972).”
In O’Brien v. Brown we were dealing, as we need not deal here, with actions presenting claims that the Party’s delegate selection procedures were not exercised within the confines of the Constitution, and it was in that context that the earlier quoted language from that case was used. That issue is not present in this case, nor are the others on which the Court disclaims any views, and for that reason we would think it better judicial procedure not to go beyond what we have already said in O’Brien v. Brown, and foreshadow results in cases not before us.1
*495The Court states, ante, at 490, that the National Convention “serves the pervasive national interest in the selection of candidates for national office, and this national interest is greater than any interest of an individual State.” While this may be a perfectly apt statement of a political fact, we believe it is an unnecessarily broad and vague statement to be contained in an opinion of this Court. The political fact — that the interest served by national political conventions transcends the boundaries of any single State — weighs in favor of petitioners on the scale which balances their constitutional claim against the State’s interest in the integrity of its electoral process. But the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney in Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 285 (1921), without more, does not establish for us that there is a “national interest” which standing alone, apart from valid congressional legislation or constitutional provision, would override state regulation in this situation.
Nor can we agree with the Court’s characterization of the role of the States in this process when it says that “[tjhe States themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.” Ante, at 489-490. Under Art. II, § 1, the States are given the power to “appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct” Presidential electors.2 See In re Green, 134 U. S. 377, 379 (1890); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27-28 (1892); Ray v. Blair, 343 U. S. 214 (1952); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 291 (1970) (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J.). *496Under our constitutional system, the States also have residual authority in all areas not taken from them by the Constitution or by validly enacted congressional legislation. The question for us, therefore, is not whether the States have a “constitutionally mandated role” in the task of selecting Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, but whether the authority of the State of Illinois is sufficient in this case to authorize an injunction flatly prohibiting petitioners from asserting before the Democratic National Convention their clhim to be seated as delegates. We do not believe that it is, and therefore concur in the result reached by the Court. But we would rest the result unequivocally on the freedom to assemble and associate guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and neither discuss nor hint at resolution of issues neither presented here nor previously resolved by our cases.

 Gratuitous observations are particularly inappropriate in this area where the Court has long eschewed passing on issues not required for resolution of the case presented. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 378 n. 10 (1963). The crucial and sensitive nature of questions relating to the process of Presidential selection was pointed out by James Wilson, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in commenting on the manner of Presidential selection set forth in the Constitution:
“This subject has greatly divided the House,- and will also divide people out of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of all on which we, have had to decide.” 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 601 (Rev. ed. 1937).

 Article II, § 1, provides in part:
“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors .... The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes ....”