Court Opinion

ID: 9555411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 21:00:36.69678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:04.795402
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4336

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        JAMAR GREEN,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Newport News. Mark S. Davis, Chief District Judge. (4:20-cr-00001-MSD-LRL-1)

        Submitted: July 31, 2023                                          Decided: August 10, 2023

        Before AGEE, WYNN, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Cary S. Greenberg, GREENBERG COSTLE, PC, Tysons Corner, Virginia,
        for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Joseph Attias, Assistant United
        States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Jamar Green appeals his conviction and sentence imposed following his guilty plea

        to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

        §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846. On appeal, Green raises four claims of error. He contends

        that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; that the district court erred

        in allowing him to represent himself; that the court erred in calculating his Sentencing

        Guidelines range; and that the delay between the date of his federal charge and the date of

        his guilty plea violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Government seeks

        to enforce the waiver of appellate rights in Green’s plea agreement as to the final two

        claims. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

               We first consider the validity of Green’s guilty plea. Prior to accepting a guilty plea,

        a court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and determines

        that the defendant understands, the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty, any

        applicable mandatory minimum sentence, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the

        various rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United

        States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016).

               Because Green neither raised an objection during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 proceeding

        nor moved to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, we review the plea colloquy

        only for plain error. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014); see United

        States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 73 n.10 (2002). To establish plain error, Green “must show

        that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial

        rights.” United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

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               Green argues that his guilty plea is invalid because the district court failed to advise

        him that credit for time spent in pretrial detention would not be applied to his federal

        sentence, as that time was instead credited to an undischarged state sentence pursuant to

        18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). We conclude this claim is without merit. Rule 11 “does not require

        a district court to inform the defendant of mandatory consecutive sentencing.” United

        States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 2002). Indeed, here, the application of

        § 3585(b) did “not affect the length or nature of the federal sentence, even though it

        increase[d] the total length of [Green’s] incarceration.” United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d

        1223, 1231 n.3 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted). The district court therefore was not

        required to include this information in its Rule 11 colloquy. Accordingly, the district court

        did not err, plainly or otherwise, in accepting Green’s guilty plea.

               Green next contends that the district court erred in allowing him to represent himself

        without properly advising him of the risks of proceeding without the assistance of counsel

        and, further, needed to readmonish him when the court learned that Green had entered plea

        negotiations with the Government. We conclude, however, that Green waived these

        nonjurisdictional challenges when he entered his valid, unconditional guilty plea; Green’s

        assertion that his guilty plea was invalid because it was not counseled is without merit. See

        United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279 (4th Cir. 2010).

               Finally, we review de novo the validity of an appeal waiver. United States v. Cohen,

        888 F.3d 667, 678 (4th Cir. 2018). We generally will enforce a waiver if it is valid and the

        issue being appealed falls within the scope of the waiver. United States v. Dillard, 891

        F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 2018). A defendant’s waiver of appellate rights is valid if he entered

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        it “knowingly and intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir.

        2010). After review of the plea agreement and the transcript of the Rule 11 hearing, we

        conclude that Green knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction

        and sentence. Thus, we conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable and that Green’s

        remaining claims fall squarely within the scope of the waiver.

               Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as to the claims foreclosed by the appellate

        waiver and affirm as to the remainder of the appeal. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                               AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                               DISMISSED IN PART

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