Court Opinion

ID: 9893984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 14:07:53.465716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:01.871456
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-215

                                       H.A.

                                       vs.

                                       S.A.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The plaintiff filed a complaint for an abuse prevention

 order under G. L. c. 209A, alleging that the defendant, her

 brother, placed her in fear of imminent serious physical harm.

 A temporary order issued ex parte, but, after a two-party

 hearing, a District Court judge concluded that the plaintiff had

 failed to prove that she was suffering from abuse within the

 meaning of c. 209A.       The judge thus declined to extend the

 temporary order and ordered that it be vacated.             The plaintiff

 appeals.

       The plaintiff's testimony, in summary, was as follows.               In

 December 2014 the plaintiff obtained a c. 209A order against the

 defendant, following an incident in which he pushed her and put

 his hands around her neck.        The plaintiff did not seek an

 extension of that order when it expired in December 2015, and
she then had no contact with the defendant until the summer of

2022 when their mother became ill.   Thereafter, the defendant

was "aggressive" toward the plaintiff when they encountered each

other at their mother's house.   On one occasion the defendant

"[s]cream[ed]" at the plaintiff while she was at their mother's

bedside, telling her that she had "no medical knowledge" and "no

right to decide anything for . . . mom."    The defendant would

also "[g]lare" at the plaintiff, "shut the door on [her]" when

she rang the doorbell, and "had cameras to record [her]."    The

plaintiff eventually decided to apply for a c. 209A order after

she saw a car that she believed was the defendant's drive up to

the driveway of her house. 1

     While crediting the plaintiff's testimony about "the

disdain with which [the defendant] regards his sister," the

judge concluded that that testimony did not "meet the standard

for the issuance of a [c. 209A] order."    We discern neither an

abuse of discretion nor an error of law in the judge's ruling.

See Vanna V. v. Tanner T., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 552 (2023)

(appellate review of judge's decision whether to grant c. 209A

order is for abuse of discretion or other error of law).    It was

the plaintiff's burden to prove that she was in fear of imminent

serious physical harm and that her fear was reasonable.    See id.

1 On appeal the plaintiff concedes that the defendant presented
evidence proving that the car was not in fact his.

                                 2
The plaintiff acknowledged at the hearing that she had no

contact with the defendant for over six years after the prior

c. 209A order expired in 2015, and that the defendant did not

physically harm or threaten to harm her in any way once they

reestablished contact in 2022.    Although the plaintiff testified

that she feared imminent physical harm because of the

defendant's general aggressiveness towards her, the judge

permissibly found that, when viewed objectively, the plaintiff's

fear did not rise to the level necessary to justify the issuance

of a c. 209A order.    See Carroll v. Kartell, 56 Mass. App. Ct.

83, 86-87 (2002).   Indeed, the plaintiff does not argue

otherwise on appeal.

     Instead, the plaintiff argues that the judge applied the

wrong legal standard by requiring her to prove that her fear of

imminent physical harm was reasonable.    According to the

plaintiff, the reasonableness requirement applies only to claims

predicated on the second definition of "abuse" in G. L. c. 209A,

§ 1, namely, "placing another in fear of imminent serious

physical harm."   The plaintiff maintains that, because she

suffered actual physical harm in 2014, her claim falls under the

first definition of "abuse" in G. L. c. 209A, § 1 -- "attempting

to cause or causing physical harm" -- and that the appropriate

standard is therefore whether she has a "continued need for [a

c. 209A] order to protect [her] from the impact of the violence

                                  3
already inflicted."    Callahan v. Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct.

369, 374 (2014).

     We reject the plaintiff's argument for two reasons.     First,

the plaintiff did not preserve the argument in the trial court.

The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was suffering abuse

because the defendant "placed [her] in fear of imminent serious

physical harm."    Likewise, the plaintiff's attorney argued at

the hearing that a c. 209A order should issue because the

plaintiff was "in reasonable fear of imminent serious physical[]

injury."   Thus, by not raising it to the judge, the plaintiff

waived her claim that a c. 209A order was warranted to protect

her from the impact of past abuse, even if she could not prove

that her fear was objectively reasonable.     See Wilhelmina W. v.

Uri U., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 641 (2023) (arguments not raised

to judge are waived); Vanna V., 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 552 n.2

("Because the plaintiff sought relief under the 'fear of

imminent serious physical harm' definition of abuse under G. L.

c. 209A, § 1, we do not address the alternative definitions").

     Second, even putting aside waiver, the plaintiff is

incorrect that the relevant inquiry is whether she has a

"continued need" for a c. 209A order.     "Continued need" is the

standard that applies at a hearing to extend an initial order

issued after a two-party hearing.     See Iamele v. Asselin, 444

                                  4
Mass. 734, 739 (2005); Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 374. 2

Here, the plaintiff did not seek to extend the c. 209A order

that she obtained in 2014, and several years had passed by the

time she brought her current complaint in 2022.    In this

circumstance, while the past abuse is certainly relevant to

evaluating the totality of the parties' relationship, the

plaintiff still had the burden of proving that her fear of

imminent serious physical harm was reasonable.    See Vanna V.,

102 Mass. App. Ct. at 554-555.   As we have explained, the judge

did not abuse her discretion in concluding that the plaintiff

failed to meet that burden.

                                     Order dated November 9, 2022,
                                       vacating temporary G. L.
                                       c. 209A order affirmed.

                                     By the Court (Shin, Brennan &
                                       Hodgens, JJ. 3),

                                     Clerk

Entered: October 31, 2023.

2 Even then, and contrary to the plaintiff's suggestion,
extension of a c. 209A order predicated on actual physical abuse
is not automatic. Rather, the judge must consider "the totality
of the conditions that exist at the time that the plaintiff
seeks the extension, viewed in the light of the initial
[c. 209A] order," in determining "the risk of harm to the
plaintiff should the order expire." Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct.
at 374, quoting Iamele, 444 Mass. at 740.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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