Court Opinion

ID: 9901741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 15:06:29.161156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:38.292555
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0302-22

EUGENE SABYAN,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ACCOUNTING PRINCIPALS, INC.,
AJILON PROFESSIONAL
STAFFING, LLC, and RICK
FRANKOVITS, individually and in
his supervisory capacity with
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPALS, INC.,

     Defendants-Respondents.
_________________________________

                   Argued November 8, 2023 - Decided November 22, 2023

                   Before Judges Whipple, Mayer and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-3335-20.

                   John Einreinhofer argued the cause for appellant.

                   Michael J. Westwood-Booth argued the cause for
                   respondents (Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
                   Stewart, PC, attorneys; Thomas J. Rattay and Michael
                   J. Westwood-Booth, on the brief).
PER CURIAM

     Plaintiff Eugene Sabyan appeals from a September 23, 2022 order

granting summary judgment to defendants Accounting Principals, Inc. (API),

Ajilon Professional Staffing, LLC, and Rick Frankovits, and dismissing his

complaint with prejudice. We affirm.

     We recite the facts from the summary judgment motion record.         API

employed plaintiff from October 1999 until his termination in October 2019.

At the time of his termination, plaintiff was the managing director of API's

Paramus location, which had been the company's "flagship" location. In his

capacity as a managing director, plaintiff was responsible for the "overall

growth, maintenance, development, and profitability" of API's Paramus office.

     From January 1, 2018 until his termination, plaintiff reported to

Frankovits, who was API's Senior Regional Vice President of Professional

Recruitment and Solutions in North America.       Before that time, plaintiff

reported to Linda Marioni.

     During his career with API, plaintiff received praise for his work. From

2015 to 2018, the Paramus office was API's highest grossing branch. In her

2015 evaluation, Marioni opined plaintiff's performance "far exceed[ed]

expectations." Additionally, plaintiff was named a company All-Star, invited

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                                       2
to a corporate dinner for employees who performed highly, and received

performance bonuses for his work.

      When Frankovits became the head of API's Paramus office in 2018,

Marioni explained she had concerns about the branch's financial health. Net

profits for API's Paramus office, which had once been among the highest in the

company, declined after 2016. Based on Marioni's concerns, Frankovits, using

API's financial records, prepared spreadsheets showing a decline in the overall

financial health of the Paramus office. The spreadsheets revealed net profits in

API's Paramus office declined about twenty percent in 2016 and thirteen

percent in 2017.     Additionally, the financial data indicated the branch's

revenue, profits, growth, and ability to meet its budget were trending negative

from 2017 to 2018.

      On April 20, 2018, Frankovits emailed Amy Schneider, who worked in

API's human resources department, requesting permission to terminate plaintiff

due to the declining performance at API's Paramus office.         In this email,

Frankovits wrote:

            As follow up to our conversation this morning, I
            would like to proceed with the termination of
            [plaintiff's] employment. Below is a recap of several
            issues that have been recurring concerns in [plaintiff's]
            ability to perform his job. After numerous discussions

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                                      3
             with [plaintiff] there has either been no improvement[]
             or improvement that has not met expectations.

             Branch revenue year-over-year consistently declining
             -Q1 2018 vs Q1 2017 revenue down 11%

             Branch [net profits] down year-over-year
             -Q1 2018 vs Q1 2017 [net profits] down 15%

             Branch budget not being met
             -Q1 2018 budget vs actual-branch at 81% of budget
             target

             FTE growth goals not being met
             From Q1 2017 to Q1 2018 FTE declined from 16 to 12

        After receiving Frankovits' email, Schneider consulted with API's in-

house    counsel,   Vanessa   Hodgerson,    regarding   plaintiff's    termination.

Hodgerson recommended against terminating plaintiff at that time due to a

pending wrongful termination lawsuit by a former API employee, Renee Metje

(Metje litigation). 1 Hodgerson explained plaintiff, who fired Metje, was a

named defendant in the Metje litigation and the company anticipated plaintiff

would be API's primary witness in that case.

        During the pendency of the Metje litigation, Frankovits worked to

improve performance at API's Paramus office. Frankovits met with plaintiff

1
  Three days prior to Frankovits' email, defendants were served with the
complaint in the Metje litigation.

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                                      4
twice in May 2018 to discuss steps to improve plaintiff's personal performance

and the performance of API's Paramus office.          Frankovits again met with

plaintiff on October 3, 2018 to discuss performance at the Paramus office. In

an email memorializing the items discussed at this meeting, Frankovits stated

plaintiff failed to improve the performance of API's Paramus office. He wrote

the "situation in the Paramus branch [was] dire," and "there [were] serious

concerns about [plaintiff's] ability to effectively run the branch."

      On May 30, 2019, Frankovits emailed Schneider asking about the status

of the Metje litigation.     In his email, Frankovits wrote he "remain[ed]

frustrated with [plaintiff]'s management of the Paramus [office]" and "[t]he

[Metje] litigation was putting things on hold." Schneider forwarded the email

to API's in-house counsel, who replied she would try to schedule plaintiff's

deposition in the Metje litigation immediately.         Upon completion of the

deposition, Hodgerson advised that API would be able to terminate plaintiff.

      On July 2, 2019, plaintiff told Frankovits he may have suffered a small

heart attack and required a surgical procedure to clear arterial blockages.

Because plaintiff had previously scheduled vacation time for the week after

July 2, plaintiff scheduled the procedure during his vacation time. About a

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                                        5
week after the procedure, on July 15, 2019, plaintiff emailed Frankovits to

advise he had returned to work and felt "good."

        On July 31, 2019, the Metje litigation settled.2 On September 6, 2019,

Frankovits again met with plaintiff to discuss the performance of API's

Paramus office. As a follow-up to the meeting, Frankovits sent a September

11, 2019 email to plaintiff renewing "concerns [about] . . . [plaintiff's] ability

to effectively manage the branch," and stating "[w]e have reached a point

where there must be immediate and sustained improvement . . . or you will be

subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination."

        On September 9, 2019, three days after his meeting with Frankovitz,

plaintiff informed defendants he needed a second heart procedure. Plaintiff

underwent the procedure four days later. The second surgery did not resolve

plaintiff's heart issues and he underwent another procedure on October 22,

2019.

        At no time between plaintiff's first heart procedure until his termination

did plaintiff request API provide any job-related accommodations. Nor did

2
  However, the stipulation reflecting the settlement was not entered until
October 8, 2019.

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                                        6
plaintiff apply for a leave of absence. For each procedure plaintiff received

paid time off. He was not required to seek permission for using paid time off.

      On September 24, 2019, Frankovits and API's Human Resources Leader,

Cheridah Gatti, discussed plaintiff's termination. In an email sent that same

day to Schneider, Gatti wrote she "spoke to [Frankovits] th[at] morning" and

plaintiff could be terminated "[because] there [was] no concern from a

retaliation standpoint." On October 4, 2019, Frankovits terminated plaintiff's

employment with API.

      After his termination, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants

alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the New Jersey Law

Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.          Plaintiff claimed

defendants knew as of June or July 2019 that he had heart issues. Plaintiff

further asserted defendants retaliated against him because he took time off

from work to address his heart issues. Defendants filed an answer and the

parties exchanged discovery.

      After the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment

and plaintiff filed opposition. Defendants argued they decided to terminate

plaintiff fourteen months before plaintiff ever disclosed his heart problem and

before plaintiff requested paid time off for his heart procedures.

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                                       7
      The motion judge heard oral argument on September 23, 2022, and

placed his decision granting summary judgment to defendants on the record

that same day. The judge found "[t]he evidence in this case [was] beyond any

serious dispute . . . [that] defendants decided to terminate plaintiff in April of

2018." The judge concluded "[t]he only reason plaintiff was not terminated

was that he was a defendant in a discrimination lawsuit filed by another

employee and defendants did not want to terminate him while that action was

pending." The judge specifically noted "[t]here [were] numerous emails that

confirm[ed] that Frankovit[s] intended to and wanted to terminate plaintiff but

. . . was prevented from doing so by legal counsel because of the [Metje]

lawsuit." Because "[t]here[] [was] absolutely no evidence to support plaintiff's

contention that Franko[v]it[s] decided to terminate him because of his medical

condition," the judge found plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination.

      With respect to the retaliation claim, the judge found plaintiff failed to

"offer a shred of evidence to support a retaliation claim." The judge stated his

analysis regarding plaintiff's failure to prove a claim for discrimination applied

to plaintiff's failure to prove retaliation.     In fact, the judge explained

"[p]laintiff's retaliation claim . . . actually cuts against [plaintiff's]

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                                       8
discrimination claims." In support of his retaliation claim, plaintiff alleged

defendants decided to terminate him after being served with the complaint in

the Metje litigation in April 2018. However, in support of his discrimination

claim, plaintiff alleged defendants decided to terminate him after learning of

plaintiff's heart issues in July 2019. Moreover, aside from this inconsistency

in plaintiff's allegations, the judge found plaintiff offered "baseless

speculation" that defendants' termination decision was the result of the Metje

litigation.

      Regarding plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim, the judge found it

lacked merit because plaintiff never requested an accommodation. Plaintiff

requested paid time off, which the judge determined was not a request for an

accommodation. Further, even if paid time off constituted a request for an

accommodation, the judge stated plaintiff's requests were routinely granted.

Based on these findings, the judge entered a September 23, 2022 order

dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

      On appeal, plaintiff argues the motion judge erred in granting summary

judgment. Plaintiff claims he established a prima facie case of employment

discrimination based on his disability and presented evidence that defendants'

stated reasons for termination were pretextual. He further contends defendants

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                                      9
retaliated against him based on his taking paid time off from work to address

his heart issues.

      "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard as the trial court." Norman Int'l, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 251 N.J.

538, 549 (2022) (quoting Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J.

501, 511 (2019)).     Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a

matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we

must then 'decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'"

DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super.

325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J.

Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)). "[A]n issue of [material fact] is genuine

only if, considering the burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted

by the parties on the motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom

favoring the non-moving party, would require submission of the issue to the

trier of fact." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).

      New Jersey courts have adopted the three-part test in McDonnell

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Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which must be satisfied by a

plaintiff alleging a LAD claim. Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436,

447 (2005). Under the McDonnell Douglas test:

              (1) the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient
              evidence to constitute a prima facie case of
              discrimination; (2) the defendant then must show a
              legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision;
              and (3) the plaintiff must then be given the
              opportunity to show that [the] defendant's stated
              reason was merely a pretext or discriminatory in its
              application.

              [Dixon v Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J.
              432, 442 (1988).]

      Based on the McDonnell Douglas framework, to defeat an employer's

summary judgment motion, an employee plaintiff must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination. Zive, 182 N.J. at 447. Once the plaintiff has

done so, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for [their] action." Id. at 449.

      If the employer can articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

termination, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the stated reason is

pretextual.    Ibid.   The plaintiff must "point to some evidence, direct or

circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve

the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious

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                                      11
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative

cause of the employer's action." Id. at 455-56 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32

F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).

      To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff

must allege:

               (1) a disability or the employer's perception that the
               employee was disabled; (2) the employee remains
               qualified to perform the essential functions of the job
               and was performing at a level that met the employer's
               expectations; (3) an adverse employment action
               because of the disability or perceived disability; and
               (4) the employer thereafter sought a similarly
               qualified individual.

               [Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc., 458 N.J.
               Super. 416, 429 (App. Div. 2019).]

      Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the motion judge properly

granted summary judgment because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie

case of disability discrimination.      Based on the uncontroverted evidence,

defendants decided to terminate plaintiff in April 2018, fourteen months before

plaintiff disclosed his heart condition.

      The emails produced in support of summary judgment demonstrated

defendants' dissatisfaction with plaintiff's job performance.        As early as

January 2018, Marioni discussed with Frankovits her concerns about the

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                                       12
financial decline within API's Paramus office.        Defendants' emails further

evidenced defendants' intent to terminate plaintiff well before the disclosure of

plaintiff's heart issues. However, API's in-house counsel advised the company

to retain plaintiff because he was a key witness for API in the Metje litigation.

Consistent with in-house counsel's advice, two months after a stipulation of

settlement was filed in the Metje litigation, defendants terminated plaintiff.

      Further, defendants offered ample evidence of API's legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff.         Defendants introduced

evidence supporting the financial decline of API's Paramus office under

plaintiff's guidance starting in 2016 and continuing through 2018. As a result

of the declining financial situation at the Paramus office, defendants presented

emails addressing their decision to terminate plaintiff more than a year before

plaintiff disclosed his heart issues.

      None    of   plaintiff's   proffered   explanations   of   why   defendants'

nondiscriminatory motives were pretextual could support a factfinder

disbelieving defendants' reasons for termination or finding a discriminatory

motive for the termination. Plaintiff's reliance on his designation as an API

All-Star does not support his claim that defendants' termination decision was

pretextual. Defendants presented evidence that plaintiff's designation as an

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                                        13
All-Star was a formulaic calculation without regard to his personal

performance.3 Here, defendants presented evidence of API's downward yearly

corporate trends starting in 2016. Thus, on this record, defendants' decision to

terminate plaintiff was not pretextual or motivated by a discriminatory intent.

      Nor was plaintiff's invitation to the Champions Club dinner evidence of

pretext by defendants. Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff was invited to the

dinner because one of his direct reporting employees received an award as a

top sales producer.   Nothing in the record suggested plaintiff attended the

dinner as a result of his own positive work performance at API.

      Similarly, plaintiff's positive performance review in 2015 failed to

support his claim that defendants' reasons for termination were pretextual.

Plaintiff's 2015 performance review was issued three years prior to the

decision to terminate him. During the years following the 2015 performance

review, defendants documented a steady decline in the financial performance

of the Paramus office. Having reviewed the record, nothing about defendants'

termination decision supported a discriminatory motive.              Defendants

3
    The calculation reflected that the All-Star designation was given to
individual employees upon reaching a certain personal billing threshold and
managing directors, such as plaintiff, were designated based on branch
profitability rather than personal achievement.

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                                     14
terminated plaintiff as a result of his poor job performance, despite API's

efforts to improve plaintiff's personal performance and the performance of the

Paramus branch.

      We also reject plaintiff's claim the judge erred in finding insufficient

evidence to support his retaliation claim. To establish a prima facie case of

retaliation under the LAD, the plaintiff must show "(1) plaintiff was in a

protected class; (2) plaintiff engaged in protected activity known to the

employer; (3) plaintiff was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment

consequence; and (4) that there is a causal link between the protected activity

and the adverse employment consequence." Victor v. State of N.J., 203 N.J.

383, 409 (2010).

      Having reviewed the record, we agree plaintiff failed to establish a prima

facie case of retaliation.     In his complaint, plaintiff alleged defendants

retaliated against him for using paid time off. However, plaintiff failed to

proffer any evidence establishing a causal connection linking plaintiff's request

for time off and defendants' termination decision.

      We also reject plaintiff's claim of retaliation based on his involvement in

the Metje litigation. This allegation is not set forth in plaintiff's complaint but

was first raised in plaintiff's opposition to defendants' summary judgment

                                                                            A-0302-22
                                      15
motion. We are satisfied the judge properly rejected plaintiff's newly asserted

retaliation claim because plaintiff never pleaded that allegation.      Nor did

plaintiff pursue that theory of retaliation in responding to defendants'

discovery requests.    Moreover, plaintiff failed to produce any evidence

causally connecting defendants' termination decision with the Metje litigation

other than the fact that defendants' decision occurred around the same time as

the filing of the Metje litigation. Although temporal proximity may suffice to

prove causation, it may be discarded when "an objective view of the facts . . .

does not" support a cause of action for retaliation. El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's

Univ. Hosp., 382 N.J. Super. 145, 177 (App. Div. 2005).

      Here, defendants presented ample evidence of their decision not to

proceed with plaintiff's termination until the Metje litigation resolved. The

decision was based upon advice provided by API's in-house counsel because

plaintiff, who was named as a defendant in the Metje litigation, would likely

be a witness for API in that case. On this record, defendants' reasons for

terminating plaintiff were tied to the decline in profits at API's Paramus office

and plaintiff's failure to improve his personal performance and the

performance of the branch.

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      We next consider plaintiff's claim that he requested a reasonable

accommodation for his disabling heart issues. He asserts his request for paid

time off constituted a request for reasonable accommodation.

      Here, plaintiff admitted he did not require any accommodations and

never requested any accommodation. Moreover, we are satisfied that a request

for paid time off does not equate with an unambiguous request for an

accommodation. Additionally, each time plaintiff requested paid time off, his

requests were routinely approved by defendants.       Thus, even if a claim

alleging a failure to accommodate could be gleaned from plaintiff's complaint,

such a claim would have failed on this record.

      Affirmed.

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