Court Opinion

ID: 9773423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:45:40.914799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:53.593924
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In his motion for rehearing appellant says that we erred in holding that the trial *721court was authorized to render a judgment against appellant personally for $1,500, or any other sum. Appellant attacks our holding on the grounds that (1) no cause of action for such judgment was pled, and no evidence was introduced to support it; and (2) our holding is contrary to Art. 4619, V.A.C.S., which provides that community property shall be subject to the husband’s control and disposition; and, though he is accountable for community property he may still have at the time a divorce is granted, the husband is not accountable to the wife for property he may have expended, or lost in trading, or otherwise prior to the divorce.
In her amended petition appellee pleads as follows: “That under orders of this court issued on July 16, 1957, defendant was ordered to make a sworn inventory of the community assets of the parties and his separate assets, and that said inventory which is a part of the papers in this cause is incorrect and incomplete * * * if the court finds that the defendant has disposed of community assets in fraud of said plaintiff, * * * plaintiff be given a monetary judgment against the defendant for the balance of her interest in the community property of the parties. * * * That on or about January 30, 1957 in cause No. 21115, entitled Marie Olene Pride v. James Hartwell Pride, in the 116th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, plaintiff filed suit for divorce against defendant, * * * defendant came to plaintiff’s apartment and asked plaintiff to drop said divorce suit and preserve their marriage, and that defendant on that occasion in February, 1957, promised plaintiff to refrain and desist from the activities of defendant listed in paragraph 5 above if she would go back to him; that plaintiff, in good faith and in reliance on said promises and pleas of defendant, did consent to drop suit and live with defendant as man and wife and that said suit was dismissed on or about February 14, 1957. * * * plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s reasons for asking for said reconciliation were to defraud plaintiff and to regain control of said monies in said bank and credit union, * * * plaintiff alleges that the representations made to her by the defendant from February 7, 1957 until February 15, 1957 were to defraud plaintiff of her community interest in said money as above stated, and that as shown above and based on actions of the defendant after February 15, 1957 until July 16, 1957, the defendant was not in good faith in effecting said reconciliation”.
In other parts of her petition appellee sets out in detail the activities of appellant which she alleges constitute the fraud practiced by appellant to deprive her of her community interest in a bank account of approximately $2,000 and credit union deposits of approximately $2,000.
The testimony of appellant himself, though it is vague, general, inconsistent, evasive and contradictory, is sufficient to support appellee’s allegations of fraudulent concealment. Immediately following the reconciliation with his wife and dismissal of the first divorce suit about February 15, 1957 appellant changed a joint bank account of more than $2,000 from the Grand Avenue State Bank to the Lakewood State Bank. However, he really deposited only $282 in the new bank account, and caused a cashier’s check for $2,000 to be issued to himself. He kept this cashier’s check on his person until July 16, 1957 the day his wife filed suit for divorce. On that day having been informed by his wife that she was filing suit for divorce, appellant cashed the $2,000 cashier’s check, put $1,000 cash in a hole in his apartment floor, and put $1,000 cash in his pocket.
On April 18, 1957, fearing that his wife was about to file suit for divorce, appellant drew out $2,000 from a credit union account and hid the entire amount in cash in the hole in the apartment floor. He claimed that he later spent part of this money for “relaxation” in the form of short trips to Denton, Lake Texhoma, Waco and other places. All these trips except two were *722completed in one day, that is the trips to the destinations and the return home were completed in one day. On each of two trips he spent one night away from home. These trips were taken while his wife, who was also employed, was on her vacation. The evidence furnishes no sufficient basis for holding that of the money he had hidden appellant spent any substantial portion for gasoline, oil and meals on the various trips.
On July 16, 1957 appellee filed suit for divorce and obtained a restraining order enjoining appellant from disposing of their community property. This restraining order was served on appellant at 3:45 o’clock P.M. that same day. It was also the same day that appellant cashed the $2,000 cashier’s check, put $1,000 in his pocket, and hid $1,000 in a hole in the apartment, where he had already placed $2,000 cash — a total of $3,000 placed in the hole.
When he filed an inventory and appraisement of community property on July 26, 1957 appellant did not list, or mention the $3,000 he had placed in the hole in the floor of his apartment.
At the divorce trial on October 14, 1957 appellant testified concerning this hidden money as follows:
“The Witness: Am I permitted to ask you a question?
“The Court: Well, yes, go ahead and ask me.
“The Witness: Just a moment ago you quoted from your notes there that I said it was gone. I said I couldn’t find it. That doesn’t mean it wasn’t there, I was just not able to find it. You said I said it was gone; I don’t believe I testified .to that, Your Honor. * * *
“Q. You know the money wasn’t there when you went back — on August 16th? A. I do not know it wasn’t there, I was unable to find it. * * *
Q. * * * did you take any of that money out? A. I never removed any of that money.
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We do not hold that a husband, as community manager, is ordinarily accountable to his wife for community property which he has expended or lost in trading, or otherwise prior to divorce. What we do' hold is that the wife is entitled to a personal judgment against her husband when she pleads and proves, in connection with her suit for divorce, that her husband is fraudulently concealing, or has fraudulently disposed of community property in order to defraud her of her community interest. Swisher v. Swisher, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 382, 384. In the Swisher case the court quotes Speers “Law of Marital Rights in Texas, 1929” at page 204, as follows: “The remedy of the wife who is defrauded by the husband’s wrongful disposition of the community is not confined to a recovery of the property, for obviously this may be impossible, but there is no reason why she may not have her action against him personally for her loss. He would no more have the right fraudulently to appropriate her community property than her separate property.”
We think the rule is especially applicable when, as in this case, the husband is under a restraining order forbidding him to dispose of the community property.
It has been held by our Supreme Court that when it is necessary for protection of property rights either spouse may sue the other. Trimble v. Farmer, Tex., 305 S.W.2d 157 (syl. 2).
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.