Court Opinion

ID: 9549895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:26:07.958227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:01.450166
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, Vice Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom KAUGER, Chief Justice, LAVENDER and SIMMS, Justices, join.
¶ 1 This dissenting opinion should not be read to infer that the county should be liable for its deputy’s acts in this case. It may well be that Deputy Cunningham did nothing negligent. But the federal court’s certified question to us assumed the presence of negligence. In saving the County from liability the Court today has unnecessarily stretched the meaning of the words creating immunity for a governmental entity in its method of providing police and fire protection.
¶ 2 The immunity relied on by the majority, found at 51 O.S.1991 § 155(6), is in an action for injury as result of:
6. Civil disobedience, riot, insurrection or rebellion or the failure to provide, or the method of providing police, law enforcement or fire protection (emphasis added)
No other state with language like our section 155(6) has held as the Court does here. *599Four states have language in their Governmental Tort Claims Acts very similar to that we have in Oklahoma: Texas, Kansas, West Virginia and Georgia. Of those states three have interpreted the clause. All three have held that “method of providing” does not include all actions of police or firefighters, but applies only to policy decisions made by a governmental unit in charge of providing such protection. State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Tex.1979); Beckley v. Crabtree, 189 W.Va. 94, 428 S.E.2d 317 (1993); Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 235 Kan. 278, 680 P.2d 877, 888 (1984). In fact, in reaching this conclusion, the Kansas Supreme Court relied heavily on an Oklahoma case, Shockey v. City of Oklahoma City, 632 P.2d 406 (Okla.1981). In Shockey, the plaintiffs sued the city for negligently failing to maintain water to a fire hydrant which resulted in the fire loss of their home. We held that the supplying of water through fire hydrants was part of the method chosen by city officials to fight fires, and thus fell with the exception.
¶ 3 When speaking of “methods” of providing fire or police protection, states have not looked to the actions of the individual officer or firefighter. Rather, when defining “method of providing fire protection,” North Carolina and Indiana have explained that this includes such things as levying taxes to raise funds to provide protection, contracting with incorporated cities or towns for protection, or by providing firefighting services through itself. N.C.Stat. § 69-25.5; Ind.Stat. § 36-8-13-3. The Kansas Court explained:
We believe subsection (m) is aimed at such basic matters as the type and number of fire trucks and police ears considered necessary for the operation of the respective departments; how many personnel might be required; how many and where police patrol cars are to operate; the placement and supply of fire hydrants; and the selection of equipment options. Accordingly, a city is immunized from such claims as a burglary could have been prevented if additional police ears had been on patrol, or a house could have been saved if more or better fire equipment had been purchased. We do not believe subsection (m) is so broad as to immunize a city on every aspect of negligent police and fire department operations. Should firemen negligently go to the wrong house and chop a hole in the roof thereof, we do not believe the city has immunity therefor on the basis the negligent act was a part of the method of fire protection. Jackson, supra, 680 P.2d at 889.
No other state has included within its “method” of providing protection immunity fi"om suits such as the one at bar.
¶4 The interpretation adopted by the majority leaves vacant the arena in which a governmental entity should be accountable for negligent acts of police or fire fighters. Under the guise of avoiding an interpretation which would render meaningless the exemption which protects discretionary decisions 1, the majority fails to pay heed to the purpose of the Act: Sovereign immunity is waived for torts of employees unless specifically exempted. 51 O.S.1991 § 153(A). In other words, liability is supposed to be the rule, while immunity is the exception. Jackson, supra at 886. Our Court seems to have it the other way around. I respectfully dissent.

. The states which have adopted the interpretation I urge today also have exemptions dealing with discretionary decisions, but have not concluded that by interpreting “method” of providing police or fire protection to include only policy decisions they render meaningless the "discretionary act” exemption.