Court Opinion

ID: 9680946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:41:29.215007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.524569
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Judge,
dissenting.
A trial judge has some latitude in inferring that a disagreement exists among jurors even when a jury note does not contain the word “disagree.” The manner in which the trial court determines whether there is a factual dispute between the jurors is left to his sound discretion. Robison v. State, 888 S.W.2d 473, 480 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) cert. denied 515 U.S. 1162, 115 S.Ct. 2617, 132 L.Ed.2d 859 (1995). The question in this case is simply whether it was unreasonable for the trial court to infer disagreement from the jury’s question, “Did Officer Keener testify that Mr. DeGraff told him that he hit Ms. Royer?” I think that the trial court reached not only a reasonable conclusion, but the most reasonable conclusion. The question “plainly manifested a disagreement.” DeGraff v. State, 932 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996)(Anderson, J. dissenting). Even trial counsel did not contend that the note failed to show disagreement — the gist of his objection was that the testimony the court proposed to read back was out of context.
Article 36.28 does not require that the jury’s disagreement appear explicitly in a request for testimony, and neither should this Court so require. If we are to abide by our holding in Robison, we should defer to the trial court when, as in this case, it makes a reasonable inference.
I respectfully dissent.
McCORMICK, P.J., and HOLLAND and WOMACK, JJ., join.