Court Opinion

ID: 9743933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:50:43.121109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:45.842513
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: It is customarily said that the primary object in construing a contract is to give effect to the intention of the parties. Such intent is to be determined from the language used when no ambiguity in such language exists, and a strict construction of that language which reaches a different result should not be adopted. Schek v. Chicago Transit Auth., 42 Ill.2d 362, 247 N.E.2d 886. The words used are to be given their usual, normal and natural meaning, Knockaert v. Studebaker Corporation, 84 Ill.App.2d 16, 228 N.E.2d 101, and the instrument is to be read and considered as a whole. Cenco Instrument Corp. v. Thomas, 80 Ill.App.2d 136, 225 N.E.2d 482; Johnson v. Continental Illinois Natl. Bank, 88 Ill.App.2d 124, 232 N.E.2d 59. We consider the operative language of a contract to indemnify for: “(A) 11 expenses, claims, suits and judgments of every kind whatsoever ... by reason of, arising out of, or connected with, accidents . . . which may occur upon or about the Subcontractor’s work.” To minimize laborious detail with the dictionary, the stated forms of liability are patently expanded by the words, “every kind whatsoever.” “Every” is generally synonymous with complete or entire; “whatsoever” is generally synonymous with “any kind at all”; “by reason of” is synonymous with cause and “arising out of’ is synonymous with originating from a source. In De Tienne v. S. N. Nielsen Co., 45 Ill.App.2d 231, 195 N.E.2d 240, the issue was whether the subcontractor was liable to indemnify the contractor for the latter’s negligence causing injury to the employees of the subcontractor. The contract provided indemnity for injuries: “(C)aused directly or indirectly, or occasioned by . . . work in this order.” The court determined that the words “occasioned by” meant more than “caused by” and included that which provided opportunity for causal agencies to work injury, and that the injury was incurred by reason of being on the premises to do the job. This construction was followed in Jeschke v. Mercury Builders, Inc., 122 Ill.App.2d 461, 259 N.E. 2d 342. In the latter case, the court pointed out that such language was described as meaning more than one level of accountability. The language here, which includes injuries which may “occur upon or about the Subcontractor’s work” is equally if not more, encompassing and explicit than the words “occasioned by” as there construed. The principal opinion calls for strict construction upon the authority of Leach v. Eychaner (Ill.App.2d), 273 N.E.2d 55. That opinion held that the language of a lease indemnifying the lessor: “(A)gainst and from any and all loss . . . arising out of or from any accident or other occurrence on or about said premises ...” was, in fact, sufficient to indemnify the lessor upon claims arising from the lessor’s own negligence. The court simply refused to transfer the indemnifying clause of the real estate lease into and make it a part of a subsequent and different lease of machinery. If, in fact, the intent was to require indemnity only for the subcontractor’s own negligence, the language of the subsequent insurance provision would suffice. The conclusion reached in the principal opinion eliminates from consideration and makes meaningless better than sixty words of the text of the contract contained in the sentence which includes the language heretofore termed operative. This is not in accord with the principles cited that the instrument must be considered as a whole giving the words a usual and normal meaning. The words “Subcontractor’s work” at the end of the sentence considered are not, in fact, a limitation upon the text providing indemnity. Rather, they are necessary to set this subcontractor apart from other subcontractors who might have a comparable incidence of liability to indemnify, and to separate and limit such liabilty of this subcontractor from that of others on the job. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order of the Circuit Court dismissing the complaint and remand the cause for further proceedings.