Court Opinion

ID: 9431838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:33:18.509237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:30.486837
License: Public Domain

Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
The majority holds that “least-restrictive-means” analysis does not apply to commercial-speech cases, a holding it is able to reach only by recasting a good bit of contrary language in our past cases.1 I would have preferred to leave the least-restrictive-means question to another day, and dispose of the case on the alternative — and, in this case, narrower — ground *487of overbreadth.2 While respondents failed to file a cross-petition on the issue, this omission is not a jurisdictional barrier, see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 435-436, n. 23 (1984), and is more than outweighed by the opportunity the overbreadth claim affords to avoid a substantial revision of the Court’s precedents in the area of commercial speech.
That Resolution 66-156 is substantially overbroad in its potential application to noncommercial speech is readily apparent. As the university interprets the resolution, any speech in a dormitory room for which the speaker receives a profit is speech by a “private commercial enterprise,” prohibited by the resolution. See ante, at 482-483. As the majority correctly observes, ante, at 482, the resolution so interpreted prohibits not only commercial speech (i. e., speech proposing a commercial transaction), but also a wide range of speech that receives the fullest protection of the First Amendment. We have been told by authoritative university officials that the resolution prohibits a student from meeting with his physician or lawyer in his dorm room, if the doctor or lawyer is paid for the visit. We have similarly been told that the resolution prohibits a student from meeting with a tutor or job counselor in his dorm room. Ibid. Presumably, then, the resolution also forbids a music lesson in the dorm, a form of tutoring. A speech therapist would be excluded, as would an art teacher or drama coach.
*488A public university cannot categorically prevent these fully protected expressive activities from occurring in a student’s dorm room. The dorm room is the student’s residence for the academic term, and a student surely has a right to use this residence for expressive activities that are not inconsistent with the educational mission of the university or with the needs of other dorm residents (the distinction between tuba lessons and classical guitar lessons, or between drawing lessons and stone sculpture lessons, comes immediately to mind). See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969); cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). It cannot plausibly be asserted that music, art, speech, writing, or other kinds of lessons are inconsistent with the educational mission of the university, or that a categorical prohibition of these activities is the “least-restrictive means” (or is even “narrowly tailored”) to protect the interests of other dorm residents. Nor is there any possible basis for believing that in-dorm psychological or vocational counseling is incompatible with the university’s objectives or the needs of other residents. Thus, the broad reach of Resolution 66-156 cannot be squared with the dictates of the First Amendment.
More important, the resolution’s overbreadth is undoubtedly “substantial” in relation to whatever legitimate scope the resolution may have. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451, 458 (1987); Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569, 574 (1987). Even assuming that the university may prohibit all forms of commercial speech from a student’s dorm (a proposition that is by no means obvious under our precedents),3 the resolution’s impermissible restrictions upon fully protected speech amount to a considerable portion of the resolution’s potential applica*489tions. Because the resolution makes no effort to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech, or to narrow its scope to the perceived evil it was intended to address, see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97 (1940), it sweeps within its reach far more protected expression than is tolerable under the First Amendment.
In this respect, the resolution here is equivalent to the one struck down on overbreadth grounds in Jews for Jesus, supra, a resolution that banned all “First Amendment activities” within the central terminal area of a major urban airport. By prohibiting all speech in a dorm room if the speaker receives a fee, the resolution in this case, like the resolution in Jews for Jesus, indiscriminately proscribes an entire array of wholly innocuous expressive activity, and for that reason is substantially overbroad. I therefore would hold Resolution 66-156 unconstitutional on its face now, in order to avoid chilling protected speech during the pendency of proceedings on remand.

 The majority concedes that it must repudiate the Court’s repeated assertion that regulation of commercial speech may be “not more extensive than is necessary to serve [a substantial governmental] interest” in order to decide that “least-restrictive-means” analysis does not apply to commercial-speech cases. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980); see ante, at 476-477. Indeed, to reach its result, the majority must characterize as “dicta” the Court’s reference to “least-restrictive-means” analysis in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, 644 (1985), see ante, at 476, although this reference seems integral to the Court’s holding that the ban on attorney advertising at issue there was not “necessary to the achievement of a substantial governmental interest.”

 Although at times we have suggested that as-applied challenges should be decided before overbreadth challenges, see Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491 (1985), we have often felt free to do otherwise, see Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569 (1987); Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451 (1987). Here, the Court has a choice between deciding the general question whether “governmental restrictions upon commercial speech are invalid if they go beyond the least restrictive means to achieve the desired end,” ante, at 471, and the specific question whether this particular resolution is void because of unconstitutional overbreadth. Surely, the former question is the more sweeping one in terms of constitutional law.

 For example, it is highly doubtful that the university could prohibit students from inviting to their rooms a representative from a birth-control clinic, from whom the students seek information about services the clinic provides for a fee. Cf. Bigeloio v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 822 (1975).