Court Opinion

ID: 9421406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:58:10.020403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:30.047178
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Burton,
whom Mr. Justice Clark joins,
dissenting.*
I believe the Court is mistaken in its interpretation of the proviso which Congress added to § 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act in 1947.1 It is my view that the proviso was added merely to make it clear that *13the National Labor Relations Board had the power, by making specific agreements, to cede jurisdiction to state or territorial agencies over certain labor disputes. Congress sought thereby to facilitate state cooperation in the supervision of labor practices affecting interstate commerce. The Court is not justified in interpreting this action as evidencing an unexpressed and sweeping termination of the States’ pre-existing power to deal with labor matters over which the Board, for budgetary or other administrative reasons, has declined, or obviously would decline, to exercise its full jurisdiction.
The Labor Acts of 1935 and 1947 granted to the Board extensive jurisdiction over labor controversies affecting interstate commerce but neither Act required the Board to assert at all times the full measure of its jurisdiction. In each Act the first sentence of § 10 (a) “empowered,” but did not direct, the Board to prevent unfair labor practices. Likewise, the first sentence of § 10 (b) granted the “power,” instead of imposing the duty, to issue complaints upon receipt of appropriate charges.2 The Board is not a court whose jurisdiction over violations of private rights must be exercised. It is an administrative agency whose function is to adjudicate public rights in a manner that will effectuate the policies of the Act. See Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261.
From the beginning, budgetary limitations and other administrative considerations have prevented the Board *14from exercising jurisdiction over all cases in which interstate commerce was affected. Congress knew this when, in 1947, it left unchanged the discretionary language of § 10 and added the proviso to § 10 (a). Congress has consistently refrained from appropriating funds sufficient to permit the Board to entertain all complaints within its jurisdiction. In recent years Congress has repeatedly recognized the Board's j urisdictional practice.3 In Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U. S. 675, 684, this Court said that “Even when the effect of activities on interstate commerce is sufficient to enable the Board to take jurisdiction of a complaint, the Board sometimes properly declines to do so, stating that the policies of the Act would not be effectuated by its assertion of jurisdiction in that case.” Courts of Appeals have approved the Board’s practice4 and none of the parties to the instant cases question it.
Unless restricted by the proviso added to § 10 (a), there is little doubt that the States have the necessary power to act in labor controversies within their borders, even when interstate commerce is affected, provided the Eederal Government has not occupied the field and the National Board has not taken jurisdiction. Where the Board has *15declined, or obviously would decline, to take jurisdiction, then federal power lies “dormant and unexercised.” Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Board, 330 U. S. 767, 775. Unless the proviso stands in their way, the States may then exercise jurisdiction since their action will not conflict with the Board’s administration of the Act.5 Substantive provisions of the Act may limit the action of the States. See United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U. S. 62, 75. But the States are not deprived of all power to act.6
By this decision the Court restricts the power of the States to those labor disputes over which the National Board expressly cedes its jurisdiction to the appropriate state agencies. However, the proviso’s requirements are so highly restrictive that not a single cession has been made under it.7 The result of this decision is the crea*16tion of an extensive no man’s land within which no federal or state agency or court is empowered to deal with labor controversies. It is difficult to believe that Congress, sub silentio, intended to take such a step backward in the field of labor relations.
The immediate occasion that led to the enactment of the proviso throws light on its proper interpretation. That occasion was this Court’s decision in the Bethlehem case, supra, where it was held that a State Board did not have jurisdiction to certify a union of foremen as a collective-bargaining agency because the National Board, by asserting general jurisdiction over foremen’s unions, had occupied the field.8 Although an agreement had been negotiated between the National Board and the State Board ceding jurisdiction over certain labor matters, this Court concluded that the agreement did not cede jurisdiction over foremen’s unions. Three Justices decried certain overtones they found in the opinion of the Court to the effect that the National Board lacked authority to cede jurisdiction over predominantly local labor matters *17by agreement with state agencies. It was to clarify the power of the National Board to make such a cession that the proviso was added to § 10 (a).
While the proviso thus evidenced a congressional purpose to encourage state action, there is no indication that it was intended to wipe out, by implication, the States’ recognized power to act when the National Board declined to take jurisdiction. Neither the language of the proviso nor its legislative history discloses a conscious congressional intent to eliminate state authority when the National Board has declined to act. Unequivocal legislative history would be necessary to sustain a conclusion that Congress intended such a drastic result. In the Bethlehem case, supra, the Court did not question the authority of the States to act when the Board, for budgetary or other administrative reasons, declined to exercise its full jurisdiction. The Court expressly refrained from passing on that question9 but three Justices said that they found in the opinion of the Court a “suggestion that the National Board’s declination of jurisdiction ‘in certain types of cases, for budgetary or other reasons’ might leave room for the State in those situations . . . .” 330 U. S., at 778.
As a matter of fact, in 1947, nearly 40 States lacked labor agencies and comprehensive labor legislation.10 *18Obviously, those States were ineligible to take advantage of the proviso. It is hard to imagine that Congress meant to make the proviso the exclusive channel for state jurisdiction when so many States would be automatically excluded from using it. The full mission of the proviso was to supply the National Board with express authority to cede jurisdiction over labor disputes by agreement where, as a matter of deliberate judgment, it concluded that due regard for local interests made that course desirable. The Board’s jurisdictional yardsticks always have reflected its need to distribute its limited resources so as best to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Board does not “cede” jurisdiction when it declines to exercise its full jurisdiction; it merely allows the States to exercise their pre-existing authority.11
The Court’s interpretation of the proviso is contrary to the established practice of the States and of the National Board, as well as to the considered position taken by the Board as amicus curiae. Congress has demonstrated a continuing and deep interest in providing governmental machinery for handling labor controversies. The creation by it of a large, unsupervised no man’s land flies in the face of that policy. Due regard for our federal system suggests that all doubts on this score should be resolved in favor of a conclusion that would not leave the States *19powerless when the federal agency declines to exercise its jurisdiction. As three Justices said in the Bethlehem case, supra:
“Since Congress can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the full extent of the far-reaching Commerce Clause, Congress needs no help from generous judicial implications to achieve the supersession of State authority. To construe federal legislation so as not needlessly to forbid preexisting State authority is to respect our federal system. Any indulgence in construction should be in favor of the States, because Congress can speak with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full federal authority, completely displacing the States.” 330 U. S., at 780.
• I would sustain the jurisdiction of the respective States in these cases.

[Note: This dissenting opinion applies also to No. 41, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., post, p. 20, and No. 50, San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, post, p. 26.]

 Section 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 453, was amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 by the addition of the proviso shown below:
“Sec. 10 (a) The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act or has received a construction inconsistent therewith.” 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (a).

 “ (b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint 49 Stat. 453, 61 Stat. 146, 29 ü. S. C. §160 (b).

 See Report of the Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations, S. Rep. No. 986, Pt. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-15; S. Rep. No. 99, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 40; H. R. Rep. No. 1852, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 10; Hearings before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 249, Pt. 1, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 175-177; Hearings before Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments on S. Res. 248, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 120.

 E. g., Optical Workers’ Union v. Labor Board, 227 F. 2d 687; Local Union No. 12 v. Labor Board, 189 F. 2d 1; Haleston Drug Stores v. Labor Board, 187 F. 2d 418. See Labor Board v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U. S. 9, 18-19. The Board discusses its jurisdictional practice in Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N. L. R. B. 493. See also, Note, Discretionary Administrative Jurisdiction of the NLRB Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 62 Yale L. J. 116 (1952).

 “. . . The care we took in the Garner case [346 U. S. 485] to demonstrate the existing conflict between state and federal administrative remedies in that case was, itself, a recognition that if no conflict had existed, the state procedure would have survived.” United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U. S. 656, 665. See also, Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, 479-480.

 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761; Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U. S. 1; H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79; Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Railway Commission, 297 U. S. 471; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U. S. 612.

 The National Labor Relations Board in its brief filed in these cases states that—
“It should be noted here that the Board has been unable, because of the prescribed conditions, to consummate any such agreements. Congress has been aware of this situation and considered the feasibility of deleting these conditions in order to reduce the tremendous volume of cases brought before the Board. S. Rep. No. 986, Joint Committee Report, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 31 (1948). Congress, however, has taken no action in this regard. The advocates of federal preemption argue from this post-legislative history that Congress has *16thereby manifested its intent to preclude State action in the absence of cession by the Board. Precisely what inference may be drawn from such Congressional inaction is, in our judgment, wholly speculative.”

 . . It [the National Board] made clear that its refusal to designate foremen’s bargaining units was a determination and an exercise of its discretion to determine that such units were not appropriate for bargaining purposes. Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 733. We cannot, therefore, deal with this as a case where federal power has been delegated but lies dormant and unexercised.
"... The federal board has jurisdiction of the industry in which these particular employers are engaged and has asserted control of their labor relations in general. It asserts, and rightfully so, under our decision in the Packard case, supra [330 U. S. 485], its power to decide whether these foremen may constitute themselves a bargaining unit. We do not believe this leaves room for the operation of the state authority asserted.” 330 U. S., at 775, 776.

 “The National and State Boards have made a commendable effort to avoid conflict in this overlapping state of the statutes. We find nothing in their negotiations, however, which affects either the construction of the federal statute or the question of constitutional power insofar as they are involved in this case, since the National Board made no concession or delegation of power to deal with this subject. The election of the National Board to decline jurisdiction in certain types of cases, for budgetary or other reasons presents a different problem which we do not now decide.” 330 U. S., at 776.

 In 1947 only 11 States had comprehensive labor statutes. Of those, eight had established an administrative procedure for the adjudication of unfair labor practices while three had left these matters *18to conventional law-enforcement agencies — prosecuting attorneys and regular courts. See Killingsworth, State Labor Relations Acts (1948), 1-3, 111-112. Labor legislation in the other 37 States was fragmentary. Killingsworth said of these laws “that they are aimed exclusively at one or a few union practices, place few or no restrictions on employers, and do not attempt to establish a comprehensive labor relations policy.’-’ Id., at 3.

 When in 1954 the Board revised upward its jurisdictional yardsticks, it stated that “a desire to establish broader State jurisdiction is in no wise a factor in our decision.” Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N. L. R. B. 493, 497.