Court Opinion

ID: 9947032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 21:01:52.190719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:45.473846
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 24a0093n.06

                                          No. 22-2116

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                    FILED
                                                                                     Mar 01, 2024
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                               )                   KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
                                                         )
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                              )
                                                         )      ON APPEAL FROM THE
 v.                                                      )      UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                                                         )      COURT FOR THE WESTERN
 ROBERT LEE CATO, JR.,                                   )      DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
        Defendant-Appellant.                             )
                                                         )                              OPINION
                                                         )

             Before: BATCHELDER, STRANCH, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

      BATCHELDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which DAVIS, J., joined in full,
 and STRANCH, J., joined in part. STRANCH, J. (pp. 18–23), delivered a separate opinion
 concurring in all but the application of the enhancement explained in Section II.a. of the majority
 opinion.

       ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Robert Lee Cato, Jr. pleaded guilty to

distributing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). After calculating

Cato’s recommended sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court

imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Cato challenges two guidelines

enhancements. First, the district court increased Cato’s offense level by five points because his

offense involved distributing child pornography for any valuable consideration other than

pecuniary gain. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). Second, the district court increased Cato’s offense

level by five more points because Cato previously engaged in a pattern of activity involving the

sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5). Cato also challenges the special

conditions of his supervised release. Because we find no error, we affirm.
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

                                                 I.

                                       a. Offense Conduct

       Cato pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(2)(A). Cato admitted that he used Kik Messenger, a messaging and social media

application, to share three videos containing child pornography. The first video showed an adult

female trying to engage in sexual intercourse with a naked prepubescent male between two and

five years old. The second video showed two prepubescent girls, naked from the waist down,

fondling each other’s genital areas. And the third video showed an adult female inserting a pacifier

into the vagina and anus of a female infant. Cato admitted that he shared these videos while living

in Kalamazoo, Michigan.1

       Cato also conversed with someone who used the screenname “Mel_Alt.” This person sent

Cato a photograph of someone separating the legs of a four-year-old girl, exposing her vagina.

According to Mel_Alt, this girl was Mel_Alt’s daughter. Cato told Mel_Alt that he was “just living

vicariously through” Mel_Alt and was “enjoying everything that you are graciously sharing with

me.” Cato even printed out the picture and then sent Mel_Alt a picture that included the printed

child pornography with either human or dog ejaculate on it. Cato also told Mel_Alt that he shared

the picture of Mel_Alt’s four-year-old daughter to at least one other group that shared child

pornography.

                                        b. Past Conduct

       This was not Cato’s first child-sex-related offense. In 2015, Cato was convicted under

Michigan law for possessing sexually abusive material, accosting children for immoral purposes,

1
  At the time of his arrest, Cato resided in Truth or Consequences, New Mexico, where he moved
either to get away from his family in Michigan or for the warmer weather.
                                                -2-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

using a computer to commit a crime, and using the internet to communicate with someone else to

commit a crime. While investigating those crimes, law enforcement discovered that Cato had tried

to convince two teenage girls to send him naked pictures. The first victim was Cato’s fifteen-year-

old niece. He sent her pornography and pictures of his exposed penis through Snapchat. In return,

Cato requested that his fifteen-year-old niece send him naked pictures of herself. She did not

comply.

          Cato’s second victim was the minor niece of Cato’s then-girlfriend. When she was fifteen,

Cato showed her nude images through his Facebook page and posted captions directed toward her

by using her first initial. Cato would post images of nude women performing sex acts, and he told

the minor niece that he would bring her Taco Bell for lunch if she performed these acts on him.

He also twice sent roses to her at her high school on Valentine’s Day. And Cato sent her pictures

of his naked penis, first claiming that the pictures were meant for his girlfriend but later sending

them without apology. Cato’s girlfriend’s niece eventually shared naked images of her breasts and

buttocks as well as pictures of her undergarments.

                                       c. Sentencing Hearing

          Cato made two objections to the PSR’s calculation of his guidelines sentence.2 First, he

objected to the application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), which provides a five-level enhancement

when a defendant distributes child pornography for any valuable consideration other than

pecuniary gain. We have previously held that this enhancement requires “an agreement or mutual

understanding between two parties,” rather than a “mere ‘expectation of receipt.’” United States

v. Oliver, 919 F.3d 393, 401 (6th Cir. 2019). Cato argued that his exchange with Mel_Alt—in

which he thanked Mel_Alt for “graciously” sharing child pornography with him and stated he was

2
    Cato withdrew a third objection at his sentencing hearing.
                                                 -3-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

“just living vicariously through” Mel_Alt—did not qualify as an agreement to exchange child

pornography for anything of value.

       To carry its evidentiary burden, the government introduced testimony from Mark

Waldvogel, an FBI agent. Agent Waldvogel reviewed the communications on Cato’s devices.3 He

reported that Cato exchanged images with Mel_Alt by printing out the image he received from

Mel_Alt of Mel_Alt’s four-year-old daughter’s genitalia and then returned to Mel_Alt a picture of

the printed child pornography with ejaculate on it. Agent Waldvogel also reported that Cato shared

images, including images from Mel_Alt, with others via the messaging applications Telegram and

Kik. Cato then received additional images of child pornography from the same people with whom

he shared child pornography. In Agent Waldvogel’s professional experience, because of the risks

of sharing child pornography, distributors will require individuals—in order to provide

authentication of their identity—to share existing child pornographic images and videos before

receiving new ones. Cato traded child pornography through these messaging apps on a regular

basis. Cato’s counsel chose not to ask Agent Waldvogel any questions. Instead, counsel argued

that Agent Waldvogel failed to provide any proof of specific exchanges that Cato had made.

       The district court overruled Cato’s objection to the five-level enhancement for distributing

child pornography for valuable consideration other than pecuniary gain. It determined that Cato’s

child-pornography exchanges with others provided circumstantial evidence of the agreement

required by Oliver.

       Second, Cato objected to the application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5), which provides a five-

level enhancement when a defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse

3
  When law enforcement arrested Cato, officers confiscated four cell phones, four flash drives,
eight compact disks, and one disposable camera with rolls of film.
                                               -4-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

or exploitation of a minor. Cato argued that his requests for naked photographs from his niece and

his then-girlfriend’s niece were not specific enough to qualify as sexual abuse or exploitation. He

said that his niece never sent him naked pictures and that his then-girlfriend’s niece sent him

pictures of only her naked breasts and buttocks. The government responded that Cato sent

pornography and pictures of his exposed penis to his niece, making clear his desire for sexually

explicit pictures. The government also stated that Cato discussed with his then-girlfriend’s niece

the sexual acts he wanted her to perform on him, contending that, as to both minors, Cato tried to

sexually exploit them.

       The district court overruled Cato’s second objection too, holding that the preponderance of

evidence showed that Cato exhibited a pattern of trying to sexually abuse or exploit minors. In

overruling both objections, the district court determined that Cato’s total offense level was forty-

two. When combined with his criminal-history of Category II, this offense level resulted in a

guidelines range higher than the twenty-year statutory maximum. The district court determined

that the guidelines sentence then became the statutory maximum.

       The district court imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. While acknowledging

Cato’s dysfunctional childhood, the district court pointed out that Cato had committed serious

crimes and that his conduct made him a significant threat to the public. The statutory maximum

sentence would deter Cato from committing similar crimes in the future and deter others who may

contemplate committing similar crimes. The district court also found that Cato needed significant

supervision because he committed the instant offense soon after he had been discharged from

parole.4 To provide Cato with additional supervision, the district court imposed a ten-year term of

4
 Cato’s state-sex-crime conviction above resulted in a prison sentence and then parole. Cato’s
parole ended in June of 2020.
                                                -5-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

supervised release. The supervised release includes a special condition that Cato may not associate

with persons under the age of eighteen outside the presence of a responsible adult who knows

about Cato’s background and criminal offenses and is preapproved by Cato’s probation officer.

While on supervised release, Cato also is not permitted to date or socialize with anyone who has

children under the age of eighteen without Cato’s first receiving his probation officer’s permission.

Cato also may not use computers or electronic devices without the express permission of his

probation officer, and he must have his computer use monitored.

       In addition, the district court stated that even if Cato’s offense level were thirty-seven, the

resulting guidelines range would include the twenty-year statutory maximum, which the district

court still would have imposed.

       This appeal followed.

                                                  II.

       A challenge to whether the district court calculated a defendant’s guideline sentence

correctly is a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of a sentence. United States v. Gould, 30

F.4th 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2022). We review for abuse of discretion challenges to a sentence’s

procedural reasonableness. Id. A district court abuses its discretion when it “fail[s] to calculate (or

improperly calculate[es]) the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We

“deferentially review” the district court’s evaluation of undisputed facts. Gould, 30 F.4th at 542.

However, we review de novo the legal conclusions the district court made when applying the

enhancement. United States v. Buchanan, 933 F.3d 501, 514 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v.

Canestraro, 282 F.3d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 2002).

                                                 -6-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

          a. Distribution for Valuable Consideration Other Than Pecuniary Gain

       We consider first Cato’s first challenge. The district court applied a five-level enhancement

because Cato distributed child pornography “for any valuable consideration, but not for pecuniary

gain.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). For this enhancement to apply, the government must show that

the defendant: (1) “agreed—either explicitly or implicitly—to an exchange with another person”

and (2) “knowingly distributed child pornography to that person” (3) “for the specific purpose of

obtaining something of valuable consideration” (4) “from that same person.” United States v.

Oliver, 919 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2019). The enhancement requires more than “a mere

‘expectation of receipt.’” Id. at 401. Instead, the enhancement applies only when “the defendant

understands or believes—even if incorrectly—that his distribution is in pursuance of his obligation

under the agreement.” Id. at 403. And additional child pornography that the defendant expects to

receive in return qualifies as “something of valuable consideration.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. 1.

       Cato argues that his conversation with Mel_Alt was not specific enough to warrant the

application of this five-level enhancement. Although Cato sent a picture of him and his dog

enjoying the child pornography Mel_Alt had shared, Cato claims that his conversation with

Mel_Alt is not specific enough to conclude that he and Mel_Alt made an implicit or explicit

agreement. Instead, Cato argues that telling Mel_Alt that he was “living vicariously through” him

and was “really enjoying” the images that Mel_Alt was “graciously sharing” amounts to a mere

expectation of receipt. But this argument is wholly irrelevant.

       As the district court found, the record contains uncontested evidence that Cato agreed to

distribute child pornography to others in return for valuable consideration other than pecuniary

gain—namely, more child pornography. At sentencing, Agent Waldvogel testified that, based on

his review of Cato’s electronic devices, Cato had distributed child pornography via Telegram and

                                                -7-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

received additional child pornography from the same users to whom he had given child

pornography. Cato also did the same via the messaging application Kik. As Agent Waldvogel

described, because distributing child pornography carries criminal risk, people who seek child

pornography must verify themselves or authenticate their desire by first sharing child pornography

themselves. In essence, Cato knew that he would only receive new images and videos if he shared

his collection first. In other words, this implicit agreement—I’ll show you mine if you show me

yours—is essential to the very communities in which Cato distributed child pornography. And

Cato did not contest Agent Waldvogel’s testimony.

       Cato’s exchanges via Telegram and Kik satisfy the elements necessary to apply the five-

level enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). See Oliver, 919 F.3d at 399. Cato made implicit

agreements to trade child pornography for additional child pornography. On appeal, he argues that

the record “lacks evidence that any other person discussed or understood the ‘contours’ of an

agreement with Mr. Cato.” Reply Br. 2. This argument is not well taken. Agent Waldvogel testified

that such agreements are commonplace among those who distribute child pornography. His

testimony provided sufficient basis for the district court to find that the people with whom Cato

exchanged child pornography understood this implicit tit-for-tat agreement. See Oliver, 919 F.3d

at 405 (noting that actions can be circumstantial evidence of agreement to exchange child

pornography). Indeed, Oliver cited to long-established principles from conspiracy cases holding

“that ‘acts done with a common purpose can establish an implicit agreement’ and that a ‘conspiracy

may be inferred from relevant and competent circumstantial evidence, such as the acts of the

conspirators themselves.’” Id. (emphasis in Oliver) (quoting United States v. Milligan, 17 F.3d

177, 182–83 (6th Cir. 1994)). It also recognized that “‘[a] conspiracy may be inferred form

                                               -8-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

circumstantial evidence which may reasonably be interpreted as participation in a common plan.’”

Id. (emphasis in Oliver) (quoting United States v. Walls, 293 F.3d 959, 967 (6th Cir. 2002)).

       From this language, the Oliver case expressly allows district courts to consider the

“reasonably inferred purpose” of both parties based on those parties’ actions. Id. Agent

Waldvogel’s testimony adequately shows that Cato behaved as if he had made implicit agreements

to exchange child pornography in return for more child pornography from that same person—and

that Cato’s counterparts would have understood the same. And in addition to citing Cato’s

interaction with Mel_Alt, the government encouraged the district court to apply the enhancement

based on these exchanges via Kik and Telegram. The district court did so. As it properly found,

Agent Waldvogel’s testimony satisfied all the elements of Oliver: Cato made an implicit agreement

to knowingly distribute child pornography in return for more child pornography from that same

person. For this reason, the district court properly applied the first five-level enhancement.

       Even if the district court misapplied this enhancement, doing so can amount only to

harmless error. A procedural sentencing error is harmless when we are “convinced that the error

at sentencing did not cause the defendant to receive a more severe sentence than would have

existed without the error.” United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted). Cato’s offense level was forty-two. Combined with his criminal-history category of II,

Cato’s guidelines sentence was higher than the statutory maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment.

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1). Even if Cato’s offense level were thirty-seven, his guidelines range

would have included the statutory-maximum twenty-year sentence. The district court recognized

this possibility, and it announced that without one of the five-level enhancements, it still would

have sentenced Cato to a statutory-maximum sentence.

                                                 -9-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

       Cato argues that the district court’s pronouncement is “boiler-plate language designed to

thwart a deserved resentencing.” See United States v. Montgomery, 969 F.3d 582, 583 (6th Cir.

2020) (Moore, J., concurring in denial of en banc rehearing). But the concurrence Cato cites notes

that we have counted similar statements “as a point in favor of harmless error” in many other cases.

Id. (collecting cases). And Cato offers no reason for us to suspect that the district court’s statement

was mere boiler-plate language. Instead, the district court’s statement occurred immediately after

it undertook a thorough examination of the sentencing factors. The district court placed great

weight on Cato’s extensive collection of child pornography, the need to specifically deter Cato

from committing future offenses, and the danger Cato presents to the public. The circumstances of

Cato’s sentencing hearing assure us that the district court imposed a statutory-maximum sentence

because of the appropriate sentencing factors—a sentence that would have remained the same even

if one five-level enhancement were applied in error.5

                       b. Engaging in a Pattern of Activity Involving the
                           Sexual Abuse or Exploitation of a Minor

       Now for Cato’s second challenge. He received another five-level enhancement because he

“engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2.2(b)(5). The pattern of activity that triggers this enhancement is “any combination of two

or more separate instances of the sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor by the defendant.”

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.1. It does not matter whether the abuse or exploitation “occurred during

the course of the offense,” “involved the same minor,” or “resulted in a conviction.” Id. “Sexual

abuse” and “sexual exploitation” refer to enumerated federal child sex offenses, a state-law crime

5
  Cato is correct to say that, if both five-level enhancements were imposed in error, then the district
court’s statement would not prevent resentencing. Although true, for the reasons we set forth infra,
the district court properly applied the five-level enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5). So we
need not address the situation in which Cato’s sentence would no longer amount to harmless error.
                                                 -10-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

that would constitute an enumerated federal child sex offense, and “an attempt or conspiracy” to

commit any of the offenses. See id. The Guidelines specify that sexual abuse or exploitation “does

not include possession, accessing with intent to view, receipt, or trafficking in material relating to

the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.” Id.

       The government directs our attention to two offenses relevant here. First, a defendant

sexually exploits a child when the defendant “employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or

coerces” a child to “engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any

visual depiction of such conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Sexually explicit conduct means “sexual

intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal”; “masturbation”; or

“lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A).

The conduct can be “actual or simulated.” Id. A defendant commits attempted sexual exploitation

of a child when the defendant “specifically intended to create child pornography . . . and took a

substantial step towards the creation of child pornography.” United States v. Sims, 708 F.3d 832,

835 (6th Cir. 2013). Second, a defendant coerces or entices a minor when the defendant uses “any

facility or means of interstate . . . commerce” to “knowingly persuade[], induce[], entice[], or

coerce[]” a minor to “engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be

charged with a criminal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

       The district court correctly found that Cato’s conduct with his niece and his ex-girlfriend’s

niece warranted the five-level enhancement of § 2G2.2(b)(5). First consider his interaction with

his ex-girlfriend’s niece. Cato posted “images of nude women” on his Facebook page and told his

ex-girlfriend’s niece that “the acts were things she could do to him” in exchange for his bringing

her fast food. PSR, R.48, PageID#140. We have previously recognized that, for the crime of

coercing or enticing a minor, the focus “always remains on the defendant’s subjective intent

                                                -11-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

because the statute is ‘designed to protect children from the act of solicitation itself.’” United States

v. Roman, 795 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Hughes, 632 F.3d 956, 961

(6th Cir. 2011)). The “essence of the crime” is a “communication or attempted communication

with a minor child with the intent to transform the minor into a sexual victim.” Id. Cato attempted

to sexually abuse or exploit his ex-girlfriend’s niece when he told her that he would bring her fast

food in exchange for sex acts.

        Cato confuses the record when he argues that the pictures he received from his ex-

girlfriend’s minor niece of her breasts, buttocks, and undergarments cannot constitute sexually

explicit conduct. While such pictures may not fit into any of the categories listed in

Section 2256(2)(A), Cato’s behavior toward his ex-girlfriend’s niece is best understood as

coercing or enticing a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity under Section 2422(b). Cato

takes issue with the “spartan information” contained in the PSR. Reply Br. 14. But it strains

credulity to suggest that the “acts” Cato asked his ex-girlfriend’s niece to perform were non-sexual.

After all, he showed the girl images of nude women when describing the acts that he wanted her

to perform. And a forensic examination of his telephone at this time discovered a great deal of

child pornography, including “photos of prepubescent girls exposing their breasts and vaginas,”

images of nude prepubescent girls performing oral sex, and images of adults engaging in sexual

acts with dogs. PSR, R.48, PageID#139–40. Cato’s intent is the “pivotal issue,” and he offers no

reason to think that his was innocent. Sims, 708 F.3d at 835.

        Finally, we turn to Cato’s interaction with his own niece. Cato’s niece did not comply with

Cato’s request to send him naked pictures of herself. But the niece’s non-compliance is not

dispositive of whether Cato’s behavior was criminal. Once again, we must look to Cato’s intent.

                                                  -12-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

Roman, 795 F.3d at 516; Sims, 708 F.3d at 835. The PSR provided an uncontested finding6 that

Cato sent his niece “pornographic pictures” through Snapchat, including pictures of Cato’s

“exposed penis.” PSR, R.48, PageID#139. Cato argues that because his niece never sent him naked

pictures of herself, he could not have engaged in sexual exploitation. But crediting this argument

would nullify the subsection that criminalizes attempting or conspiring to sexually exploit a child.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). Under the logic of the argument Cato advances, unsuccessful attempts to

sexually exploit children—such as when Cato asked his niece to send him naked pictures and she

refused—would no longer be criminal.

       We reject this argument. Instead, like many panels before us, we determine that the “pivotal

issue” is Cato’s intent. Sims, 708 F.3d at 835; see also Roman, 795 F.3d at 516. And the facts

contained in the PSR sufficiently support the conclusion that Cato intended for his niece to send

him a picture that would lasciviously exhibit her genitals.7 After all, he sent her a picture of his

own exposed penis and exposed her to pornographic images online. Again, Cato provides no

evidence that he intended to receive something more innocent.

       In imposing Cato’s sentence, the district court placed great weight on Cato’s extensive

collection of child pornography, the need to specifically deter Cato from committing future

offenses, and the danger Cato presents to the public. The circumstances of Cato’s sentencing

hearing assure us that the district court imposed a statutory-maximum sentence because of the

6
  A district court “may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of
fact.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A); see also United States v. Geerken, 506 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir.
2007) (noting a district court can rely on even disputed facts if defendant “fails to produce any
evidence to contradict the facts set forth in the PSR”).
7
 In making this holding, we need not address Cato’s argument that this circuit should adopt the
D.C. Circuit’s holding in United States v. Hillie, 39 F.4th 674, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
                                               -13-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

appropriate sentencing factors—a sentence that would have remained the same even if one five-

level enhancement were applied in error.

                                                III.

       Cato’s final challenge is to the special conditions of his supervised release. We would

normally review this challenge using an abuse-of-discretion standard. See United States v. Inman,

666 F.3d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 2012). But Cato never objected to his supervised-release conditions.

Because he did not object, we review the special conditions only for plain error. Inman, 666 F.3d

at 1003. This requires Cato to show (1) an error; (2) that is clear or obvious; (3) that affects his

substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings. Id. at 1003–04. This, he cannot do.

       Cato challenges two conditions. The first condition permits Cato to use computers or other

electronic devices only when given express permission by his probation officer. The second

condition prevents Cato from dating or socializing with anyone who has children under the age of

eighteen unless Cato first obtains the permission of his probation officer. Each condition

reasonably relates to promoting Cato’s rehabilitation while protecting the public. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d). Neither condition amounts to plain error.

       We turn first to the computer-monitoring condition. Cato confessed to his using messaging

applications to electronically distribute child pornography. During a presentence interview, Cato

stated that monitoring provided by parole “kept me out of trouble.” When the pandemic isolated

Cato from his support groups and prevented him from engaging with his church and community,

Cato said, he “fell back into old habits.” The computer-monitoring condition reasonably relates to

promoting Cato’s rehabilitation. It also protects the public by having a probation officer closely

monitor Cato’s internet use to reduce the odds that he will reoffend. Indeed, we have previously

                                               -14-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

upheld similar conditions of supervised release. See United States v. Phillips, 370 F. App’x 610,

621 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding condition requiring probation-officer approval before using

computers, the internet, or e-mail); United States v. Smith, 564 F. App’x 200, 208 (6th Cir. 2014)

(upholding computer and internet limitation requiring monitoring and parole-officer supervision).

Like the court in Phillips, we assume that a probation officer would not deny a probationer’s using

a computer “in a manner that would enable legitimate professional pursuits or other activities that

would contribute to [his] rehabilitation.” 370 F. App’x at 621. So here, if a probation officer were

ever to unreasonably withhold permission, Cato could petition the court to “modify” or “reduce”

the conditions of his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).

       Cato also argues that the computer-monitoring condition sweeps too broadly because the

district court imposed a preapproval requirement for both computers and electronic devices. Cato

worries that the condition will force him to seek preapproval from his probation officer to use an

electric toothbrush or a non-internet-capable alarm clock. We find such concerns misplaced. By

imposing the preapproval condition on Cato’s “computer use or other electronic device use,” the

district court showed that it used the term “electronic device” to refer to any other internet-capable

device. See United States v. Shultz, 733 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir. 2013) (interpreting supervised-

release condition in context). So the preapproval condition does not extend to an electric

toothbrush or a non-internet-capable alarm clock—but it does cover smartphones, tablets, and

anything else that Cato may use to browse the internet, a prohibition that reasonably relates to

Cato’s using the internet to distribute, receive, and solicit child pornography. Beyond this, we

decline to engage in “mere conjecture” about how frequently society will require citizens to use

internet-capable electronic devices in 2040, when Cato’s sentence of incarceration will end. United

States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 662 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Massey, 349 F. App’x

                                                -15-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

64, 70 (6th Cir. 2009)). As already stated, Cato may seek modification or reduction of the

conditions of his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).

       Cato’s second condition is reasonable too. Cato pleaded guilty to distributing child

pornography. And he previously tried to persuade two minors to send him naked pictures of

themselves, including by his sending unsolicited pictures of his naked penis to them. He also asked

one of those minors to perform sex acts on him in exchange for fast food. Requiring his probation

officer’s permission before dating or socializing with anyone with minor children thus serves to

protect the public from the possibility that Cato would again relapse.

       Cato argues that this condition will bar him from speaking to another adult at a grocery

store—who unbeknownst to him happens to have a minor child—unless he obtains preapproval

from his probation officer to do so. We again interpret the condition in its proper context. Shultz,

733 F.3d at 622. The district court imposed this condition because Cato sought child pornography

from his niece and his ex-girlfriend’s niece. The condition applies to prevent Cato’s having

repeated contact without preapproval with an adult whose child would be as vulnerable to this

conduct as were Cato’s niece and ex-girlfriend’s niece. See Socialize, Merriam-Webster Dictionary

Online, https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/socialize (last accessed Feb. 26, 2024) (defining

“socialize” as “to participate actively in a social group”). The condition does not prohibit truly

“incidental” contact. United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 574 (6th Cir. 2012). It instead prohibits

the type of socializing that provided Cato an opportunity to sexually abuse or exploit his niece and

ex-girlfriend’s niece. And for this reason, it reasonably relates to protecting the public. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d).

       Consider the supervised-release conditions upheld in Shultz. The district court prevented

the defendant on supervised release from associating with, being alone with, or being in the same

                                                -16-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

residence as a child without written approval from a probation officer. Shultz, 733 F.3d at 620. We

upheld this condition because “[t]he probation officer is well placed to assess whether [the

defendant] poses a danger to a particular child.” Id. We also upheld the condition that the Shultz

defendant not go near “any place where children . . . normally congregate . . . or any business that

caters to [or] targets child customers.” Id. at 621. We described this condition as “strict but for

good reason.” Id. We find that the same applies here even though the Shultz condition applied only

to children while the condition here applies to adults with children—it is simply another condition

preventing Cato from his having access to minors unless in the presence of a responsible adult

preapproved by Cato’s probation officer. Again, Cato previously preyed on his girlfriend’s minor

niece. The condition that Cato not date or socialize with anyone with minor children unless he first

obtains approval from his probation officer protects the public by allowing the probation officer

to assess whether Cato poses a danger to a particular child. The reason the district court imposed

this condition is readily apparent from the record. We find no error here.

       Because the district court did not err in imposing the special conditions Cato challenges,

we uphold both conditions.

                                                IV.

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Cato’s sentence.

                                               -17-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

        STRANCH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
        I concur with the majority in all respects except its affirmance of the district court’s

application of the enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), as the majority explained in Section

II.a. I would hold that the district court failed to follow the analysis required under United States

v. Oliver, 919 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2019), and improperly applied the enhancement. I agree, however,

that Cato’s sentence should be affirmed under harmless error review.

        Section 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) directs a sentencing court to increase the offense level by five

levels “[i]f the defendant distributed [prohibited material] in exchange for any valuable

consideration, but not for pecuniary gain.” This language reflects the 2016 amendment by the

United States Sentencing Commission, which served to address the split among circuits regarding

“the mental state required for the enhancement in the context of peer-to-peer programs.” 1 Oliver,

919 F.3d at 398. As emphasized in Oliver, “[t]he Sentencing Commission considered the

amendment ‘an appropriate way to account for the higher level of culpability when the defendant

had the specific purpose of distributing child pornographic material to another person in exchange

for valuable consideration.’” Id. at 398 (quoting 2016 Amendments to the Sent’g Guidelines at

12).

        Our governing precedent has made clear that to apply § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), as amended, “the

government must show that the defendant: (1) agreed—either explicitly or implicitly—to an

exchange with another person under which (2) the defendant knowingly distributed child

pornography to that other person (3) for the specific purpose of obtaining something of valuable

consideration (4) from that same other person.” Oliver, 919 F.3d at 397-98, 403. To find that “an

1
 “Peer-to-peer programs are ‘file-sharing application[s which] allow[] two or more users to essentially have
access [to] each other’s computers and to directly swap files from their computers.’” Oliver, 919 F.3d at
398 (quoting 2016 Amendments to the Sent’g Guidelines at 10).
                                                   -18-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

‘implicit agreement’” existed, “a court must examine the purpose (or reasonably inferred purpose)

of both parties, including the context of their discussions and circumstantial evidence such as their

actions or comments.” Id. at 405. This “requires an agreement or mutual understanding between

two parties, rather than the defendant’s personal belief or expectation.”        Id. at 401 (citing

Exchange, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2018)).             Under the plain meaning of the

enhancement’s amended language, “[w]ithout any statement or action from the ‘other person’ from

which the defendant could reasonably extrapolate—even incorrectly—that the defendant’s

distribution was part of the agreement, the defendant has not ‘agreed to an exchange’ with that

‘other person.’” Id. Our sister circuits agree. See United States v. Morehouse, 34 F.4th 381, 391-

92 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Oliver and adopting the test); United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645,

652 (5th Cir. 2018) (adopting a similar four-part test).

       Here, nothing in the excerpted messages indicates that Cato and Mel_alt struck an

agreement.    The Government introduced testimony by the FBI agent assigned to Cato’s case,

Mark Waldvogel, that users share photographs on social media applications to receive images in

return; however, by the Government’s own terms, this merely reflects Cato’s distribution of

photographs “for a particular purpose.” It reveals nothing about Mel_alt’s state of mind, much

less a meeting-of-the-minds between Cato and Mel_alt regarding a commitment to exchange

images. Absent evidence of a bargained-for exchange between Cato and Mel_alt, the Government

failed to substantiate that Cato’s images served as “valuable consideration” for purposes of the

enhancement. USSG § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B).

       Likewise, Agent Waldvogel’s affirmation that Cato regularly “obtain[ed] other images

from the same users to which he was distributing” is insufficient, on its own, to satisfy the

enhancement because it reveals nothing about the other users’ mindsets. Though the Government

                                                -19-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

described Cato’s interactions on the application as “trading” child pornography “with other users,”

the PSR contained no excerpts or other details regarding the exchanges between Cato and these

other users, and the Government did not introduce excerpts or attempt to paraphrase these

conversations.   Indeed, in response to Cato’s objection to the PSR’s application of the

enhancement, the probation officer pointed exclusively to Cato’s exchange of images with

Mel_alt—not other social media application users. See R. 48, PageID 152 (“In this case, Mr. Cato

clearly sent photos of child pornography and other pornographic images to ‘Mel_alt’ in the hopes

of gaining additional child pornographic material. The probation officer believes this was scored

appropriately and, accordingly, no change was made.”).

       At the sentencing hearing, Agent Waldvogel did not “provide any context of specific

distribution that occurred and trades that were made.” The Government focused exclusively on

Cato’s conduct. In keeping with long-established principles of conspiracy law, application of the

enhancement also requires evidence of the mindset of “the ‘other person.’” Oliver, 919 F.3d at

401; see also United States v. Walls, 293 F.3d 959, 967 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that “[t]o

sustain a conviction” for drug conspiracy, “the government must prove the existence of an

agreement to violate the drug laws and that each conspirator knew of, intended to join, and

participated in the conspiracy”).

       On this record, the court had no factual basis to assess whether the other users entered into

an agreed-upon bargain to provide Cato with explicit images in exchange for other pornography

as is required by our own precedent. See Oliver, 919 F.3d at 401, 405. The court did not—and

indeed, could not, on this record—determine whether “some kind of discussion or understanding

between [Cato] and the [other application users] regarding the contours—whether implicit or

explicit—of the agreement” to trade child pornography took place. Id. at 401. This record does

                                               -20-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

not demonstrate that Cato sent images “in response to another user’s request to trade,” id. at 402,

or that the other users remarked to Cato “that the [social media application they were using] was

‘better for trading pictures,’” id. (quoting Cameron v. United States, No. 1:17-cv-00275-JAW,

2018 WL 5801535, at *6-8 (D. Me. Nov. 6, 2018)). Nor does it provide any other indication of a

bargained-for-exchange as required by Oliver, as there was no evidence of the other users’

intentions at all. It was impossible, then, for the court to analyze “the purpose (or reasonably

inferred purpose) of both parties,” as it must under Oliver, 919 F.3d at 405, or to ascertain whether

Cato’s receipt of images from other users resulted from a gratuitous transfer rather than the

“exchange for valuable consideration” to which the enhancement applies, U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2(b)(3)(B).

        Simply accessing a social media site associated with child pornography is not sufficient

under the enhancement’s amended language. See Oliver, 919 F.3d at 402 (“As written, the

enhancement makes no distinction between defendants who use peer-to-peer programs and

defendants who directly engage with agents or other individuals.”). Instead, the record must

provide some indication of a bargain and meeting-of-the-minds to exchange images. See id. at

401-02; see also Morehouse, 34 F.4th at 391 (emphasizing that the 2016 amendment “requires the

Government to show that the defendant entered an agreement with a specific individual that the

defendant would provide child pornography in exchange for valuable consideration, such as

additional child pornography”) (emphasis added). This record contains no such indication. Agent

Waldvogel’s testimony based on his experiences in other child pornography cases cannot cure the

lack of evidence in this case regarding the exchanges (generally), and the states of mind of the

participants (specifically).

                                                -21-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

       None of this is to suggest that Oliver interferes with district courts’ inherent discretion to

appropriately sentence defendants. Consistent with the “longstanding tradition in American law,

dating back to the dawn of the Republic, that a judge at sentencing considers the whole person

before him or her ‘as an individual,’” district courts enjoy wide latitude in sentencing criminal

defendants. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 486 (2022) (quoting Koon v. United

States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)). The Guidelines “reflect a rough approximation of sentences that

might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007). Procedural

reasonableness accordingly requires a district court to begin its sentencing by properly calculating

the Guidelines range. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). It is only after such a

proper calculation that a court may, subject to the requirements of substantive reasonableness, see

United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 796 (6th Cir. 2011), vary from that range.

       Given the discretion retained by the district court and the specific circumstances presented

here, I concur in the affirmance of Cato’s sentence on the basis that the district court’s procedural

error was ultimately harmless. “[A] remand for an error at sentencing is required unless we are

certain that any such error was harmless—i.e. any such error ‘did not affect the district court’s

selection of the sentence imposed.’” United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir.

2005) (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)). With the five-level

§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) enhancement removed from the calculation of Cato’s criminal history score, his

total offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines would have been 37, rather than 42. Both

offense level 37 and offense level 42 “have an advisory guideline range that includes the statutory

maximum” of 20 years, or 240 months. The sentencing court stated that it “would still impose a

sentence at the statutory maximum”—240 months, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1)—

if Cato’s offense score had been 37, not 42. The court explained its basis for that substantial

                                                -22-
No. 22-2116, United States v. Cato

sentence after considering the need for both specific and general deterrence and acknowledging

Cato’s positive and negative personal characteristics, all of which led it to conclude that “Mr. Cato

[was] a threat to the public.” This explanation went beyond “unadorned boilerplate” that we have

found insufficient to justify harmless error affirmance. United States v. Walters, No. 22-5930,

2023 WL 6601887, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2023) (quoting United States v. Lucas, Nos. 19-6390,

19-6392, 19-6393, 19-6394, 2021 WL 4099241, at *13 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2021)). Accordingly, I

would treat the district court’s § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) error as harmless and affirm Cato’s sentence. For

these reasons, I concur in the majority opinion and dissent only from application of the

enhancement as explained in Section II.a, and rely instead on a finding of harmless error.

                                                -23-