Court Opinion

ID: 9758703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:40:50.912568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:54.114966
License: Public Domain

Marbury, C. J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion in which Collins, J., concurred.
The question whether an ordinance prohibiting a slaughter-house anywhere in Mount Airy (or in any other similar community) is ultra vires of the municipality has never been before this Court, and has not been answered by it, either in the affirmative or in the negative, “for more than eighty years” or for any other period of time.
The Maryland cases from Glenn v. Mayor, etc., Baltimore, 1833, 5 Gill & J. 424, to Mayor and Councilman of Frostburg v. Sleeman, 1945, 185 Md. 393, 45 A. 2d 113, were not concerned with slaughter-houses or any similar kinds of nuisances. They dealt with things, not usually nuisances, which the municipalities sought to make nuisances by their unauthorized declarations, and then to prohibit. This Court has uniformly held that this cannot be done, that, by the simple declaration of town authorities, a thing not ordinarily a nuisance cannot be made one, if it is not one in fact, and therefore it cannot be summarily prohibited. But the cases so holding were not considering slaughterhouses.
The case relied on and quoted or referred to by many of them is Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. Ed. *269984. In that case the city had attempted to prevent an individual from building a ivharf by declaring it to be a nuisance. In Glenn v. Baltimore, supra, what was sought to be prohibited was a turpentine distillery. In Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123, 17 Am. Rep. 516, it was a factory for the manufacture of felt roofing. In State v. Mott, 61 Md. 297, 48 Am. Rep. 105, Limekilns. In New Windsor v. Stocksdale, 95 Md. 196, 52 A. 596, a boardwalk and drain. In King v. Hamill, 97 Md. 103, 54 A. 625 a private stable. In Frostburg v. Wineland, 98 Md. 239, 56 A. 811, 64 L. R. A. 627, 1 Ann. Cas. 783, shade trees. In Frostburg v. Hitchins, 99 Md. 617, 59 A. 49, structure across an alley. In Hagerstown v. Baltimore and Ohio Railway, 107 Md. 178, 68 A. 490, 126 Am. St. Rep. 382, a stock yard. In Jewel Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 A. 417, door to door solicitation of customers. In Burley v. Annapolis, 182 Md. 307, 34 A. 2d 603, a pool room and gambling establishment. In Frostburg v. Sleeman, supra a raised sidewalk.
Slaughter-houses have always been in a different class from these things which are ordinarily innocuous and harmless. Slaughter-houses are presumptively or prima facie nuisances. 2 Kent Com. 340, Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall 36, 21 L. Ed. 394; Butchers’ Union etc. Co. v. Crescent City etc. Co., 111 U. S. 746, 4 S. Ct. 652, 28 L. Ed. 585, Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed. Vol. 2, Section 690, Joyce Law of Nuisance, paragraph 126 et seq.; Wood on Nuisances, Sec. 504; Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. 1, 40 Am. Rep. 419, Sitterle v. Victoria Cold, Storage Co., Tex. Civ. App., 33 S. W. 2d 546 and numerous authorities therein quoted.
Since that fact is universally recognized, and is not disputed, it was not necessary for the municipal authorities of Mount Airy to declare slaughter-houses to be nuisances, present or -prospective. They are already prima facie or potential nuisances. As a matter of fact, the town authorities made no such declaration. They have express authority from the legislature to suppress and remove all nuisances affecting or liable to affect *270the peace, quiet or health of the town, Act of 1906, Chapter 785, Code P. L. L. (Art. 7, Section 236, page 1797). They have exercised that authority by the passage of the ordinance in question which prohibits these presumptive nuisances from invading the town. There has been no previous decision of this Court which denies them that right. It requires an unwarranted stretching of the cases above mentioned to reach any such conclusion.
The opinion of the majority of the Court indicates that the remedy is to wait until after the proposed slaughterhouse of the appellees is erected and is in operation. If then it is shown to be a nuisance, the municipality can enjoin its maintenance. To so hold is to ignore the realities of the situation. It is not necessary to sit by until the appellees have completed their investment, and until the cries of the dying animals are heard, the blood begins to flow, and the disposition of the offal commences. The town can reasonably and lawfully anticipate the result discussed by Chancellor Kent, by the Supreme Court of the United States, by this Court, by the textbook writers previously mentioned and by the Texas Civil Court of Appeals and the authorities cited by it. There is nothing else the legislature could have intended when it authorized the Mount Airy authorities to “remove” nuisances “liable to affect” conditions in the community. A prima, facie nuisance is one “liable to affect” adversely peace, quiet, and health. The town has acted under specific authority given it in its Charter. The ordinance should be upheld, and the decree reversed.
Judge Collins authorizes me to state that he concurs in this opinion.