Court Opinion

ID: 9690701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:36:14.274005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:10.201072
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 1. This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals. Petitioner Forest S. Shomberg (Shomberg) appeals the decision of the court of appeals upholding the judgment and order of the circuit court. We address three main issues on appeal. First, we must examine whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in refusing to allow Shomberg to present expert testimony on eyewitness identification. Second, we are asked to determine whether the circuit court's exclusion of the expert testimony violated Shomberg's constitutional right to present a defense. Finally, this court must resolve whether the circuit court erred in refusing to allow in evidence the fact that Shomberg had offered to take a polygraph examination. Shomberg asks this court to reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand his case to the circuit court for a new trial in the interest of justice.
¶ 2. We conclude that the circuit court did not, at the time of its decision in 2002, erroneously exercise its discretion in excluding the expert testimony on eyewitness identification proffered by Shomberg. We also determine that even if the circuit court did commit error, any such error was harmless. Further, we hold that the absence of expert testimony on eyewitness identification did not deprive Shomberg of his constitutional right to present a defense. In addition, we determine that Shomberg should not be granted a new trial in the interest of justice, as the real controversy in this case has been fully tried. Finally, we conclude that the offer to take a polygraph was properly excluded, because there was insufficient evidence in the record to *7find either that Shomberg had initiated the offer to take a polygraph examination, or that he believed the results of the test were admissible.
I
¶ 3. The relevant facts are not in dispute. S.B., a University of Wisconsin undergraduate, was walking home from a party at approximately 2:45 on the morning of March 9, 2002, when she heard footsteps behind her. When she turned to see who was there, she saw the face of a male approximately 12 inches behind her. When S.B. turned away from him to flee, the assailant grabbed her from behind, placing both hands over her mouth. With his hands still over her mouth, he lifted S.B. off the ground, and carried her into an alleyway adjacent to the Frances Street parking ramp near the University of Wisconsin campus. He forced S.B. to her knees with the weight of his body. She managed to pry his hands off her mouth, and she screamed for help. The assailant again covered her mouth with his hands, then, with his right hand, reached under her skirt and grabbed her vaginal area through her pantyhose and panties. S.B. was able to pry his left hand loose and scream again for help.
¶ 4. Alan Ferguson (Ferguson), a private security guard, was in his patrol vehicle at the Frances Street parking ramp working on his shift report when he heard S.B.'s screams. He got out of the car, and followed the sounds down to the alleyway adjacent to the parking ramp. When Ferguson reached the alleyway, he saw a man on the ground on his knees and what appeared to be a person beneath the man. Ferguson then switched his radio to the main dispatch channel, which caused his radio to beep. The assailant turned and looked at Ferguson, got up from the ground and ran away toward an apartment building. Ferguson ran after the man. *8Ferguson testified at trial that, during the chase, the man slipped on some snow, looked over his shoulder in Ferguson's direction and then continued to flee. Ferguson did not apprehend the man he had chased.
¶ 5. S.B. described her assailant as being 20 or 30 years old, about 5'10" tall, lean, athletic build, with blue eyes. She indicated he had no facial hair and no glasses. She could not recall anything about his hair, but at cross-examination she indicated she knew he was wearing long pants and a long-sleeved shirt. S.B. did not notice any tattoos on her assailant's hands, nor deformities to his fingers.
¶ 6. Ferguson described the assailant in his incident report as a white male in his mid 20's, who was 5'8" to 5' 10" tall (and to police as 5'8"), with a muscular build and a shaved head. Ferguson said the assailant had no facial hair or glasses, and that he saw no scars on his face or head, nor any tattoos on his body. He described the man as wearing a gray, long-sleeved shirt, possibly a sweatshirt, and blue jeans or dark-colored trousers.
¶ 7. On April 4, 2002, S.B. and Ferguson each attended a lineup. S.B. was told that she would see a lineup that may or may not include the man they arrested for assaulting her. All of the individuals in the lineup were wearing jail outfits. Both S.B. and Ferguson independently identified suspect number five on their individual Witness Line-Up Identification Forms. Shomberg was suspect number five, although he was the second person to enter the room.
¶ 8. Shomberg waived his right to a jury trial and a trial to the court, Judge Patrick J. Fiedler, took place on April 8 and 9, 2003. Shomberg was found guilty of second-degree sexual assault, false imprisonment, and two counts of bail jumping, all as a habitual offender pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.225(2)(a), 940.30, and *9946.49(l)(b) (2003-04).1 He was sentenced to one 20-year term, with an initial confinement of 12 years, and two 10-year sentences, each to run concurrently. On November 14, 2003, Shomberg filed a motion for a new trial and sentencing memorandum. A hearing was held on the motion for a new trial on February 2, 2004. The motion was denied on that same day.
¶ 9. Shomberg filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court on February 25, 2004. The court of appeals filed an unpublished decision on December 23, 2004, affirming the judgment of the circuit court and denying Shomberg's post-conviction motion. This court granted review on March 8, 2005.
II
¶ 10. "The admissibility of expert opinion testimony lies in the discretion of the circuit court." State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶ 37, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777 (citing Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶ 28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698; State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 186, 595 N.W.2d 403 (1999)). "We review a circuit court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under an erroneous exercise of discretion standard." Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 28 (citations omitted). We apply the erroneous exercise of discretion standard to both evidentiary issues in this case.
¶ 11. The inquiry into a circuit court's exercise of "discretion in making an evidentiary ruling is highly deferential. . . ." Id., ¶ 29. As we have previously stated:
*10The question on appeal is not whether this court, ruling initially on the admissibility of the evidence, would have permitted it to come in, but whether the trial court exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance with the facts of record. The test is not whether this court agrees with the ruling of the trial court, but whether appropriate discretion was in fact exercised.
Id. (citations omitted).
"We will not find an erroneous exercise of discretion if there is a rational basis for a circuit court's decision." Id. (citations omitted).
¶ 12. Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02 provides "[I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Wis. Stat. § 907.02.
¶ 13. The circuit court denied Shomberg's request to allow expert testimony on the factors that may influence a witness's ability to identify a stranger, including the relative reliability of sequential versus simultaneous lineups, relative judgment, transference, the absence of a reliable relationship between confidence of the witness and the accuracy of the identification, and examples of people wrongly convicted of crimes based solely on an incorrect identification. The circuit court felt that " 'everything that the expert would testify to in essence is within the common knowledge and sense and perception of the jury.'" State v. Blair, 164 Wis. 2d 64, 76-77, 473 N.W.2d 566 (1991) (footnote omitted).
*11¶ 14. Counsel for Shomberg was unable to articulate satisfactorily for the circuit court the basis upon which the factors influencing the reliability of eyewitness identifications would assist the trier of fact. The factors that Shomberg's lawyer offered were, in the court's estimation, ones that could be adequately explored by cross-examining a testifying witness, and in opening statements and closing arguments.
THE COURT: It sounds like the factors involved here, how much light was available, how long did the person have to view the individual, how close was the individual, was there anything that obstructed the individual's face, had the person who is making the identification been drinking or taking drugs, et cetera, these are all matters of perception within the realm of lay people, aren't they?
MR. COHEN (COUNSEL FOR SHOMBERG): What about the area that a person viewing six people tends to use relative judgment? Natural inclination to say to pick somebody out, it must be the person, rather than there's a reason for —
THE COURT: Do you have anything beyond that?
MR. COHEN: No.
THE COURT: So what we're back to is, you want to call this individual who will opine that sequential lineups are better than simultaneous lineups?
MR. COHEN: And the reason why, not just that they're better, but here's why. Here's the problems with simultaneous ones.
THE COURT: Because, in part, it's a process of elimination as opposed to positive identification.
*12MR. COHEN: The fact that exactly, at least part of what the victim said, when she put down her answer, "Well, I knew it wasn't one and three because they were too big. I knew it wasn't two and four because they were too old."
THE COURT: But isn't that something that you would also ask the witness on cross-examination?
MR. COHEN: I sure could. I sure could, but it's a process that, I think it's important. What I was impressed with was the experiments that they have done. That really sort of, you know, sewed it up for me. This was really a much better way of doing it.
THE COURT: Well, are you seeking to elicit his opinion that there have been a hundred cases in which identification testimony secured a conviction, later found to be faulty, due to subsequent DNA testing?
MR. COHEN: No.
THE COURT: So what we're back to is his opinion that sequential is better than simultaneous.
MR. COHEN: And why.
THE COURT: Because simultaneous means the person, the witness, in essence, has the burden of making a positive identification as opposed to simply eliminating people that the witness does not feel were the perpetrator with the, I guess implicit within the witness's belief, that one of these people must be the perpetrator.
MR. COHEN: Yes. Relative judgment.
THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. COHEN: No.
*13¶ 15. In 2002, at the time of the circuit court's decision to exclude testimony from Shomberg's expert, New Jersey was the only state to mandate sequential rather than simultaneous lineup procedures. In the intervening years, much has been learned about the processes and limitations of memory. There has been a wealth of information that has come to the public that has increased awareness of some of the inherent difficulties with eyewitness identification.2
¶ 16. In State v. Dubose, this court recognized that "[t]he research strongly supports the conclusion that eyewitness misidentification is now the single greatest source of wrongful convictions in the United States, and responsible for more wrongful convictions than all other causes combined." State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶ 30, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582. Indeed, just this year the Wisconsin Department of Justice published recommended guidelines for law enforcement on eyewitness identification, including a Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification and a Comprehensive Review & Analysis of Best Practices.3 In a similar vein, a legislative task force was created in December 2003 to examine cases of wrongful convictions, and develop recommendations on ways to improve the criminal justice system.4 Indeed, just this year, the Criminal Justice Reform Act was signed into law implementing many of the recommendations of the *14task force regarding, among other things, eyewitness identification reform.5
¶ 17. Were this case to come before the circuit court today, given the developments that have occurred in the interim, it is highly likely that the judge would have allowed the expert to testify on factors that influence identification and memory. However, the issue before us is not what we would have done, or what a court might do today. The issue is whether, at the time of the decision, the bases upon which the circuit court decided to exclude Shomberg's expert testimony constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion. The court clearly felt that the limitations of eyewitness identification, as articulated by counsel for Shomberg, were known and understood by the court.6 Neither counsel's written motion nor oral advocacy at the motion hearing was sufficient to satisfy the court that Shomberg's eyewitness expert would assist the trier of fact "to determine a fact in issue," especially since the arguments were known and understood by the court.7 Wis. *15Stat. § 907.02. We conclude that the " 'court exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance with the facts of the record,'" and therefore it was not an erroneous exercise of discretion for the circuit court to deny Shomberg's motion to admit expert eyewitness testimony. Martin-dale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶ 29 (citations omitted).8
HH HH HH
¶ 18. This court has found that there was no erroneous exercise of discretion by the circuit court. *16However, even if the circuit court had erred, the error was harmless here. The test for harmless error was set forth by this court in State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189. Applying the test laid out by the United State Supreme Court in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999), the Harvey court articulated the harmless error inquiry as whether it is " 'clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?'" Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d, ¶ 46 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18). "In other words, if it is 'clear • beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have [rendered the same verdict] absent the error,' then the error did not 'contribute to the verdict,'" and is therefore harmless. Hannemann v. Boyson, 2005 WI 94, ¶ 57, 282 Wis. 2d 664, 698 N.W.2d 714 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 18).
¶ 19. Applying Harvey and Neder to this case, we conclude that even if the circuit court's exclusion of Shomberg's expert testimony did amount to error, the error was harmless. We believe it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have reached the same result as the circuit court did for two reasons. First, although the court was limited to basing the decision on evidence in the record as a jury would have been, there was a vigorous cross-examination of three key witnesses.9 During the cross-examinations, counsel was able to flesh out factors that could cast doubt on the reliability of a witness's identification. Second, in addition to the eyewitness identifications, there was strong evidence in the record of Shomberg's guilt.
*17¶ 20. There are several other pieces of evidence which support our conclusion that a rational jury would find Shomberg guilty of the sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. First, Shomberg was immediately identified from the police sketch by both his parole officer, and by an acquaintance who resided with Shomberg in February 2002 in a drug rehabilitation facility. When each viewed the sketch that had been published in the newspaper, each independently contacted the police identifying the person in the sketch as Shomberg.
¶ 21. Second, Shomberg wrote a letter to his friends/alibi witnesses, asking them to corroborate his story. Shomberg's letter recounts in great detail the version of the events he had related to police concerning his whereabouts on March 8 and 9, 2002, and his being in the presence of these persons at the time of the assault. The police had asked Shomberg repeatedly about contact with his alibi witnesses, lest their credibility be called into question. On April 10 Shomberg wrote a letter to an alibi witness, Elizabeth Granby, who, at the time, lived in an apartment with her boyfriend, Pat Fiegel, another of Shomberg's friends and alibi witnesses. On April 11 Detective Wall met with Shomberg and specifically asked him if he had contacted Granby or Fiegel. Shomberg said he had not.
¶ 22. Third, Ferguson had reported to the police that the assailant was wearing a long-sleeved gray knit shirt or sweatshirt. In court, Ferguson positively identified a long-sleeved gray sweater that police had recovered from Shomberg's grandmother as belonging to Shomberg. Shomberg often stayed with his grandmother.
¶ 23. Fourth, Shomberg's alibi witnesses were not determined to be credible by the circuit court. The trier *18of fact is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In this case, the circuit court found that various inconsistent statements, admissions of lies or a willingness to lie to police, and difficulties answering questions directly, destroyed the credibility of Shomberg's alibi witnesses.
¶ 24. Finally, it is significant that although the lineups were simultaneous in form, they were sequential in fact. Both S.B. and Ferguson stated that they recognized Shomberg as soon as he walked through the door. Shomberg was the second person to enter the room. S.B. told the court on direct examination that "I was looking at each one trying to see if they resembled the person that assaulted me that night, and right away I picked out number five [Shomberg]. His face and just the way his body was built was exactly like the man who assaulted me." Similarly, Ferguson's trial testimony on direct examination indicates that the problems of relative judgment and the comparative nature of simultaneous lineups were not a factor in this case.
MR. KAISER, Q. As you were watching the people come onto the stage, who, if anyone, did you see?
FERGUSON, A. I saw the perpetrator that I had identified the night of the attack.
Q. Did you recognize him as he was walking through the door?
A. Yes, I did.
¶ 25. From this testimony it appears clear that what occurred was recognition memory, not relative judgment. Therefore, for all of these reasons, we conclude that even if excluding Shomberg's expert eyewitness testimony had constituted error, the error was harmless.
*19IV
¶ 26. Next, we must determine whether Shomberg was denied his constitution^ right to present a defense. "This determination is a question of 'constitutional fact' that this court determines independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals but benefiting from their analyses." St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶ 16 (footnote omitted). We conclude that the court's decision to exclude expert eyewitness testimony did not deprive Shomberg of his constitutional right to present a defense.
¶ 27. In Si. George, this court held that the circuit court's exclusion of testimony of a defense expert about the victim's recantation, and about interview techniques particular to child sexual assault cases, unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of his right to present a defense. St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶ 73. In St. George, this court applied a two-part inquiry "[f]or the defendant to establish a constitutional right to the admissibility of the proffered expert witness testimony. ..." Id., ¶ 53. "In the first part of the inquiry, the defendant must satisfy each of the following four factors through an offer of proof." Id., ¶ 54. First, the testimony of the expert must meet "the standards of Wis. Stat. § 907.02 governing the admission of expert testimony." Id. (footnote omitted). Second, the expert witness's testimony must be "clearly relevant to a material issue in [the] case." Id. (footnote omitted). Third, the expert testimony must be "necessary to the defendant's case." Id. (footnote omitted). Finally, "[t]he probative value of the testimony of the defendant's expert witness [must] outweigh[] its prejudicial effect." Id. If the defendant is able to satisfy "these four factors *20to establish a constitutional right to present the expert testimony, a court undertakes the second part of the inquiry by determining whether the defendant's right to present the proffered evidence is nonetheless outweighed by the State's compelling interest to exclude the evidence." Id., ¶ 55 (footnote omitted).
¶ 28. Applying the facts of this case to the first part of the inquiry, we conclude that even though the first, second and fourth factors are arguably met (making no assessment as to the qualification of the individual to testify as an expert), Shomberg failed to establish that the expert eyewitness testimony was necessary to his case. Although the expert himself did not testify, Shomberg's counsel was able to convey adequately the concepts of relative judgment and recognition memory, as well as the factors present in this case that would tend to render the eyewitness' testimony unreliable in his cross-examinations of both S.B. and Ferguson.
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF S.B.
MR. COHEN, Q. And it's 3:00 in the morning, so we know it's dark out, right?
S.B., A. Yes.
Q. The street light's on, but that's it, right?
A. Right.
Q. And the only lighting there is very shadowy, right?
A. Right.
*21Q. And the person you saw when you saw that face, you saw that face for a split second, right?
A. Right.
A. I turned around and saw his face, and he like whipped me off into the air at that same split second. You know, it happened very fast.
Q. Okay. Very fast. All right. And you never see the suspect again?
A. No.
Q. So the only way you knew that you could estimate as to what his body was like was how he felt behind you?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, Because you never - you never could look at his body, right? You never did in fact look at his body, did you?
A. No.
Q. Okay. You didn't say look, I'd recognize that guy in a minute, I really got just a great look at this guy. You said possibly.
A. Yeah. I said possibly.
Q. Now, you went to the lineup, right?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you know to come to a lineup?
*22A. I got a phone call telling me to come.
Q. And so this was now about a month after the incident, right?
A. Right.
Q. And you thought well, sounds like the police did their work and they might have somebody, right?
A. Right.
Q. And you went to that lineup, and they brought six people out and they were all in jail outfits, right?
A. Right.
Q. So you knew that whoever it was was already arrested, right?
A. Right.
Q. And the person you picked out was essentially the best of the six people there, right?
A. Right.
Q. But you really weren't sure, were you?
A. I was not a hundred percent sure.
Q. You weren't even — basically, what you were sure is he was the best of the six, but that's all you were sure of, right?
A. Right.
*23Q. He very well could have not been the guy; he just was the best of the six?
A. Right.
Q. And basically, I think you said to the police officer he was the closest, right?
A. Right.
Q. Never said that's the guy, did you?
A. No, not that I remember.
Q. Because you weren't really sure.
A. Right.
Q. And when they brought the six people in, you know right away it couldn't be number one, three, and six because they were too big, right?
A. Right.
Q. And that left two, four, and five, right?
A. Right.
Q. And you knew it couldn't be two and four because they were too old, right?
A. Right.
Q. What did that leave?
A. Five.
Q. Number five, and that's why you picked him out, right?
A. Right.
*24Q. He was the best, and in fact, he was the only one left after you eliminated the other five people?
A. That's right.
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ALAN FERGUSON
MR. COHEN, Q.: Now, you got a call to come to the lineup, right?
FERGUSON, A.: Yes
Q. Okay. And she [Detective Ricksecker] said something like hey, we've caught a suspect, want you to come down and look at a lineup?
A. Something like that.
Q. Okay. Now, you picked out the person who was number five at the lineup, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said he looks familiar from the assault? A. Okay. Yes.
Q. Those are the words you used, familiar?
A. That sounds -
Q. Familiar, does that mean like similar?
A. It's semantics.
Q. Well, your words were he looked familiar from the sexual assault?
*25A. Right.
Q. And then you went on to say he looked very similar to the person I saw that I followed?
A. Correct.
Q. You didn't say that's the guy. You said he looks similar to the guy?
A. Correct.
Q. They asked you how sure you were, and you said I'd say about 90 percent?
A. Right.
¶ 29. In addition, in his cross-examination of Detective Marion Morgan, counsel for Shomberg was able to convey the concept that some experts believe sequential lineups are relatively more reliable than simultaneous lineups, and the reasoning thereof, as Detective Morgan had attended training on eyewitness identification given by Shomberg's expert, which was also attended by Shomberg's counsel.
MR. COHEN, Q: Did you go to.any kind of training on lineup, sequential versus simultaneous?
DET. MORGAN, A: Yes, I did.
Q. And you learned why simultaneous lineups like the one that occurred tend to be unreliable, right?
*26A. There were some discussion about why that presenter didn't believe they were as reliable.
Q. Part of the problem is that it gets to be comparative. The witness who is watching the lineup tries to figure out which one most resembles the person, right?
A. That's what the instructor said, yes.
Q. And the instructor also gave us examples how, when they remove the actual suspect from a lineup and show another lineup without that person, other people tend to get picked out because they remove the actual suspect, right?
A. I don't remember that specific example.
Q. Do you remember many discussions about the problems, though, with comparison when you look at six people?
A. Yes, and actually, I believe most of that was directed toward photo arrays as opposed to in person.
Q. And lineups too?
A. Okay.
Q. City of Madison is now doing a sequence lineup program now, are they not?
A. Yes, we will be trained in that.
Q. Because it tends — because statistics tends to show that you have less false positives that way, right?
A. That's part of the training that they plan to present.
*27¶ 30. We do not believe the exclusion of the expert testimony deprived Shomberg of his constitutional right to present a defense, as it had in St. George. In that case, the five-year-old daughter of the defendant's long-term girlfriend told her mother that the defendant had fondled her vagina the previous night as the three slept in the mother's bed. St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶¶ 7-8. Over the next few months, the daughter "allegedly also reported the fondling to a doctor and a social worker." Id., ¶ 8. "The defendant, was charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(1999-2000)." Id. (footnote omitted).
¶ 31. "At trial, [the daughter] denied the incident had ever occurred and even that she had ever made some of the reports." Id., ¶ 9. The defendant sought to introduce his own expert to testify on recantation in child sexual assault cases, but the court excluded the testimony. Id., ¶ 5. A jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Id., ¶ 10. The defendant challenged his conviction hy arguing that the circuit court's exclusion of the testimony of his expert witness deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense. Id., ¶ 30. This court agreed, concluding that "exclusion of the testimony of the expert witness about recantation and interview techniques denied the defendant his constitutional right to present evidence clearly central to his defense." Id., ¶ 73.
¶ 32. The facts of St. George are distinguishable from this case in three critical respects. First, St. George involved the recantation of an alleged victim of child sexual assault. Recantation is a subject clearly beyond the common knowledge or understanding of a jury or other fact finder. As such, it is an example of an area of "specialized knowledge that will assist the trier *28of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" as contemplated by Wis. Stat. § 907.02. Second, the state in St. George relied upon expert testimony to support its case. The defendant was prevented from presenting expert testimony to rebut that of the state. Third, the state emphasized in closing argument that the defendant had failed "to rebut the testimony of the State's two expert witnesses." Id,., ¶ 65.
¶ 33. In contrast, Shomberg's expert was to testify on eyewitness identifications. The difficulties with eyewitness identification are something we all have some appreciation for as part of our common knowledge and understanding. In addition, in this case, the State of Wisconsin presented no expert testimony supporting the accuracy of the eyewitness identifications. Therefore, unlike the defendant in St. George, there was no expert testimony to rebut, and no inference of guilt due to the absence of rebuttal.
¶ 34. In addition, Shomberg presented an entirely separate alibi defense. There were two elements to Shomberg's defense. First, that S.B. and Ferguson misidentified him as the assailant. Second, that on the evening of March 8 and through the night until the morning of March 9, he was 30 blocks from the scene of the assault, at an apartment with several friends.
¶ 35. The dissent's reliance on the use of the word "might" in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988) (Justice Butler's dissent, ¶ 75) is misplaced. A more recent discussion from the United States Supreme Court has clarified the right to present a defense by use of an expert witness. The Court has repeatedly held that "[a] defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (citing Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410; Rock v. Arkansas, *29483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (footnote omitted)). Therefore, under some circumstances, "[a] defendant's interest in presenting such evidence may thus 'bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.'" Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the Court has found "the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused." Id. (citations omitted). The Court noted that the exclusions of evidence it had declared unconstitutional "significantly undermined fundamental elements of the defendant's defense." Id. at 315. The same cannot be said here.
¶ 36. Here, as in Scheffer, "the court . .. heard all the relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective of the accused," and the exclusion of expert testimony "did not preclude him from introducing any factual evidence." Id. at 317. The Scheffer court concluded that "respondent was barred merely from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility," and therefore concluded that "respondent's defense was [not] significantly impaired by the exclusion. . .." Id.
¶ 37. When we consider the information elicited by Shomberg's counsel during cross-examination of the three witnesses noted earlier, opening statements and closing arguments, and his alibi defense, we conclude that the testimony of Shomberg's expert was not necessary to his defense. Therefore, Shomberg's constitutional right to present a defense was not violated by the exclusion of expert eyewitness testimony. As the first portion of the inquiry was not satisfied, we need not proceed to the second part of the St. George inquiry.
*30V
¶ 38. We are satisfied that Shomberg should not be granted a new trial in the interest of justice. "This court may exercise its power of discretionary reversal under the first part of Wis. Stat. § 751.06, without finding the probability of a different result on retrial when it concludes that the real controversy has not been fully tried." State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 160, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996) (citations omitted). We have explained that we will determine that the real controversy has not been fully tried if the fact finder "was erroneously not given the opportunity to hear important testimony that bore on an important issue of the case...." Id. In Hicks, the court found that the jury had not heard about DNA evidence that excluded Hicks as the donor of one of the hair specimens. Id. at 161. As the excluded DNA evidence was relevant to the critical issue of identification, the court in Hicks determined the real controversy had not been fully tried. Id. at 172. As we stated earlier, the circuit court as the fact finder in this case was not denied the opportunity to hear important testimony regarding the identification of Shomberg, since such testimony was provided through cross-examinations discussed herein, and such issues were also referred to extensively during opening statements and closing arguments. We conclude that the real controversy in this case has been fully tried, and, therefore, Shomberg should not be granted a new trial.
VI
¶ 39. Finally, we determine that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in refusing to *31admit testimony regarding Shomberg's offer to take a polygraph examination. The result of a polygraph test is inadmissible in Wisconsin. See State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 278-79, 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981). Yet, "an offer to take a polygraph test is relevant to an assessment of the offeror’s credibility and may be admissible for that purpose." State v. Pfaff, 2004 WI App 31, ¶ 26, 269 Wis. 2d 786, 676 N.W.2d 562 (citing State v. Hoffman, 106 Wis. 2d 185, 217, 316 N.W.2d 143 (Ct. App. 1982)). However, such an offer is only "relevant to the state of mind of a person making the offer as 'long as the person making the offer believes that the test or analysis is possible, accurate, and admissible.'" Neumann v. Neumann, 2001 WI App 61, ¶ 65, 242 Wis. 2d 205, 626 N.W.2d 821 (quoting State v. Santana-Lopez, 2000 WI App 122, ¶ 4, 237 Wis. 2d 332, 613 N.W.2d 918).
¶ 40. The evidence in the record is insufficient to establish that Shomberg offered to take a polygraph examination, as opposed to agreeing to take one. See Neumann, 242 Wis. 2d, ¶ 64. During the court's ruling on the motion to admit the polygraph offer, Shomberg's counsel first explained: "I talked to Mr. Shomberg fairly soon after this case got started as to whether or not he'd be willing to take a polygraph. He said he would." Shortly thereafter, however, counsel for Shomberg clarified: "When I talked to Mr. Shomberg about this, and I'm sorry if I sound like I'm back-peddling. I stated it off hand before. We talked about the lie box, and I suspected it was Mr. Shomberg who first brought that up to me, 'hey, can I take a lie box. . ..'" Shomberg himself did not testify about whether he offered to take a polygraph. We believe, therefore, there is insufficient support in the record to conclude that Shomberg initiated the offer to take a polygraph test.
*32¶ 41. Neither does evidence in the record support the second requirement to admit an offer to take a polygraph — that Shomberg believed the results of a polygraph would be admissible in court. Again, Shomberg did not testify on his belief concerning admissibility. Counsel for Shomberg stated "He was aware that the general rule is it's not admissible, but there was also this new stuff coming in from the Department of Corrections where they were using them all the time, and the hope was that the Court would let us get these results in." With no other facts in the record to indicate that Shomberg believed the results of a polygraph test would be admissible in court, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in its exclusion of Shomberg's offer to take a polygraph examination.
VII
¶ 42. In its amicus brief, the Innocence Project of the Frank J. Remington Center, University of Wisconsin Law School, asked this court to adopt a presumption of admissibility of expert eyewitness testimony in cases involving eyewitness identification. We decline to do so. Our concern is that adopting a presumption would all but eliminate the discretion of the circuit court on such evidentiary matters. Most troubling is that if we did adopt such a presumption, there is no clear guidance as to when and how such a presumption could be overcome.
¶ 43. However, we encourage circuit court judges to carefully consider, in each case, whether the admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact. Because of our growing appreciation for the difficulties inherent in eyewitness identification, we appreciate the work of the Department of Justice *33and the legislative task force in the development, education and promotion of better practices and procedures for eyewitness identification including, but not limited to, lineups.
VIII
¶ 44. In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not, at the time of its decision in 2002, erroneously exercise its discretion in excluding the expert testimony on eyewitness identification proffered by Shomberg. We also determine that even if the circuit court did commit error, any such error was harmless. Further, we hold that the absence of expert testimony on eyewitness identification did not deprive Shomberg of his constitutional right to present a defense. In addition, we determine that Shomberg should not be granted a new trial in the interest of justice, as the real controversy in this case has been fully tried. Finally, we conclude that the offer to take a polygraph was properly excluded, because there was insufficient evidence in the record to find either that Shomberg had initiated the offer to take a polygraph examination, or that he believed the results of the test were admissible.
By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.

 For a non-exhaustive list of some of the more recent studies examining identification evidence, see State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶ 29, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.

 Available at: http://www.doj.state.wi.us/news/nr030905_ PL.asp.

 Available at: http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/eye-witness_guidelines.htm.

 2005 Wisconsin Act 60. Although the new act became effective December 31, 2005, the provision requiring law enforcement agencies to adopt written policies for eyewitness identification procedures will take effect on December 1, 2006.

 Since Justice Butler's dissent spends time discussing jurors and jury instructions (Justice Butler's dissent, ¶ 72), it must again be noted that this case was tried to the court, without a jury. Judge Fiedler was informed, before he made his ruling on the admissibility of the expert testimony, that Shomberg would be waiving his right to a jury trial. In fact, that waiver occurred immediately after the circuit court's ruling on the admissibility issue.

 Contrary to Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, we do not seek to justify the circuit court's exclusion of Shomberg's expert witness "on the ground that the expert witness would offer a *15relatively new explanation of the weakness of simultaneous lineups." Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶ 53. As we have previously noted, Judge Fiedler had read and was familiar with the contents of the expert's report. Because he knew the case would he tried to the bench, the judge made repeated attempts to evoke a response from defense counsel that would tell him what the expert would testify to that he had not already gleaned from that report. The testimony was excluded because the court determined Shomberg's expert would not assist the trier of fact.

 Justice Butler's dissent is wrong when it states that "the decision of the trial court to exclude the expert testimony regarding the factors surrounding eyewitness identification was clearly erroneous." Justice Butler's dissent, ¶ 74. Justice Butler's dissent is also wrong when it concludes that "the proffered expert testimony in this case is relevant, because the proffered expert testimony would assist the trier of fact...." Id. The circuit court concluded that the proposed testimony would not assist the trier of fact. In addition, the court focused on specific portions of the proposed testimony, and found they were not relevant. At the time of the motion hearing, the circuit court had in front of it the report of the expert and his proposed testimony. While the circuit court did not specifically reference Wis. Stat. § 904.03, it can reasonably he inferred from the court's oral decision that the court was also concerned about confusion of the issues and the needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

 See Infra, ¶¶ 28-29.