Court Opinion

ID: 9631533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:41:40.082672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:56.509700
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J., Dissenting.
For the second time in little more than a year (see People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 941 P.2d 1121]), this court ventures into the legal thicket of rules and restrictions *844emanating from the state and federal double jeopardy clauses. (U.S. Const., Amend. V; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Unlike in People v. Monge, however, deciding the double jeopardy issue in this case may be wholly unnecessary, for there exist in this case two statutory questions which, if resolved in defendant’s favor, would require reversal of the trial court’s decision sustaining the prior serious felony conviction enhancement allegation. (Pen. Code, § 667, former subd. (a), now subd. (a)(1).)1 By proceeding to address a potentially gratuitous constitutional issue, the majority inexplicably acts in direct violation of the well-established rule of constitutional procedure counseling against just such judicial adventurism. I cannot, therefore, join its opinion; accordingly, I dissent.
I
A jury convicted defendant of, among other crimes, battery with serious bodily injury. (§ 243, subd. (d).) Defendant then waived his right to have the same jury decide whether the alleged prior serious felony conviction was true. (§ 667, former subd. (a), now subd. (a)(1).) At the bifurcated hearing before Judge Finlay, the court found defendant had suffered a qualifying prior conviction. Defendant argued, however, that none of his present crimes qualified as a “serious felony” as required by section 667, former subdivision (a), now subdivision (a)(1). Only his battery conviction possibly came within the statutory definition of a “serious felony,” for section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) defines a serious felony as “any other felony in which the defendant personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice . . . .”
The parties contested whether, for section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) to apply, defendant must have specifically intended to cause serious bodily injury. Judge Finlay continued the hearing for a week to obtain briefing on the issue. Returning to the issue the next week, Judge Finlay found specific intent was legally required, the People had failed to prove defendant specifically intended to cause serious bodily injury, and, therefore, the battery was not a “serious felony” as defined in section 1192.7. Accordingly, Judge Finlay found the prior serious felony conviction enhancement allegation was not true.
At the sentencing hearing approximately four weeks later before Judge Rodriguez, the People moved for reconsideration of Judge Finlay’s ruling on the prior serious felony conviction enhancement, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. The People contended Judge Finlay had erred in *845requiring proof of specific intent to cause serious bodily injury and, in support, cited People v. Moore (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1868 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 713]. This legal authority was available at the time of the bifurcated hearing before Judge Finlay, but the People alleged they did not discover it until after the hearing. Defendant opposed the motion for reconsideration, arguing Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 did not apply in criminal cases, the court lacked jurisdiction to order reconsideration, and that Judge Finlay’s ruling constituted an acquittal of the enhancement allegation precluding a rehearing. Judge Rodriguez sent the matter back to Judge Finlay for reconsideration.
At the renewed hearing to determine the truth of the prior serious felony conviction enhancement allegation, Judge Finlay rejected defendant’s argument that she lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, she considered People v. Moore, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 1868, and reversed herself, this time finding defendant’s conviction for battery with serious bodily injury was a qualifying present crime for section 667 purposes despite the lack of evidence he specifically intended to inflict serious bodily injury. Because the judge previously had found defendant suffered a qualifying prior felony conviction, she now found the section 667 enhancement allegation true. At sentencing, Judge Rodriguez imposed a five-year sentence for the enhancement.
On appeal, defendant contended both that Judge Finlay’s reconsideration of the enhancement allegation violated the state and federal constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy and that she had erred in finding his conviction for battery with serious bodily injury constituted a “serious felony” pursuant to sections 1192.7 and 667. Because the Court of Appeal decided the constitutional double jeopardy issue in defendant’s favor, it determined it need not decide the statutory issue.
II
The United States Supreme Court long ago recognized several situations in which, for prudential reasons, it would decline to address constitutional issues in cases admittedly within the court’s jurisdiction. Justice Louis Brandeis, in his seminal concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Valley Authority (1936) 297 U.S. 288, 346-348 [56 S.Ct. 466, 482-484, 80 L.Ed. 688], outlined many of these situations, and one is particularly pertinent here: “The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied *846application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.” (Id. at p. 347 [56 S.Ct. at p. 483] (conc. opn. of Brandeis, J.), italics added.)
Regarding the rule that “[c]ourts do not review issues, especially constitutional issues, until they have to” (Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath (1951) 341 U.S. 123, 154-155 [71 S.Ct. 624, 639-640, 95 L.Ed. 817] (conc. opn. of Frankfurter, J.)), the Supreme Court explained: “[T]his practice reflects the tradition that courts, having final power, can exercise it most wisely by restricting themselves to situations in which decision is necessary. In part, it is founded on the practical wisdom of not coming prematurely or needlessly in conflict with the executive or legislature.” (Id. at p. 155 [71 S.Ct. at p. 640].) The high court has characterized this rule as “[a] fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint . . . .” (Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Assn. (1988) 485 U.S. 439, 445 [108 S.Ct. 1319, 1323, 99 L.Ed.2d 534] (Lyng); see also Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering (1984) 467 U.S. 138, 157 [104 S.Ct. 2267, 2278-2279, 81 L.Ed.2d 113] [characterizing the rule as a “fundamental” one “of judicial restraint”].)
More specifically, the United States Supreme Court consistently follows the rule that, where resolution of either a constitutional or a statutory claim could entitle a litigant to relief, the court should first address the statutory claim. (Lyng, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 446 [108 S.Ct. at pp. 1323-1324]; Massachusetts v. Westcott (1977) 431 U.S. 322, 323 [97 S.Ct. 1755, 1755-1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 349] (per curiam); Hagans v. Lavine (1974) 415 U.S. 528, 549 [94 S.Ct. 1372, 1385, 39 L.Ed.2d 577]; Dandridge v. Williams (1970) 397 U.S. 471, 475-476 [90 S.Ct. 1153, 1156-1157, 25 L.Ed.2d 491]; see also Whalen v. United States (1980) 445 U.S. 684, 702 [100 S.Ct. 1432, 1443, 63 L.Ed.2d 715] (dis. opn. of Rehnquist, J.) [“Axiomatically, we are obligated to avoid constitutional rulings where a statutory ruling would suffice.”].)
This court follows the same rule. (Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230-231 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 207, 902 P.2d 225] (Guardino); College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 882 P.2d 894]; In re Michael G. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 283, 295 [243 Cal.Rptr. 224, 747 P.2d 1152]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 50 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]; Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 65-66 [195 P.2d 1].) The rule requiring that a court address a potentially dispositive statutory issue before turning to a constitutional one “is itself an application of the larger concept of judicial self-restraint, succinctly stated in the rule that ‘we do not reach *847constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us.’ ” (Guardino, supra at p. 230, quoting People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667 [128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000]; see also People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 229, 250 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 961 P.2d 984] (conc. and dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [because reasonable suspicion existed on the facts, court should not decide whether Fourth Amendment permits warrantless search of adult parolee absent reasonable suspicion]; People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 139 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073] (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [declining to express an opinion on majority’s gratuitous discussion of the separation of powers question]; People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 393 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 850, 949 P.2d 947] (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [opining that “principles of judicial restraint counsel that we not reach out to decide gratuitously constitutional questions”].) Then Associate Justice George rightly described the rule as a “settled maxim” of constitutional law. (Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1, 17 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490, 820 P.2d 1000] (conc. opn. of George, J.).)
The majority, as did the Court of Appeal below, ignores this venerable line of precedent to reach out unnecessarily to decide a difficult constitutional double jeopardy question. Having done so, only then does the majority recognize the existence in the case of a potentially dispositive nonconstitutional issue. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 843.) Thus, the majority directs the Court of Appeal to address, on remand, whether People v. Moore, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at page 1871, on which the trial court relied, is correct, i.e., whether specific intent to cause serious bodily injury is indeed a requirement for a battery to qualify as a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). The majority neglects, moreover, to mention a second potentially dispositive nonconstitutional issue, that is, whether, irrespective of the double jeopardy issue, the trial court had jurisdiction in this case to reconsider its initial decision on the applicability of the enhancement.
Of course, defendant, on remand to the Court of Appeal, may prevail on either or both of these nonconstitutional questions. If so, the majority’s analysis today, refuting defendant’s contention that he was denied his constitutional rights under the state and federal double jeopardy clauses, would be rendered obiter dictum, for the final ruling on the legal propriety of the section 667 enhancement would have been decided on grounds other than those propounded by the majority. The majority’s decision would, in essence, stand as an improper advisory opinion. It is to avoid just this type of outcome that courts historically have avoided unnecessary decisions on questions of constitutional law.
*848III
Rather than deciding any issue in this case, I would invoke this court’s powers under California Rules of Court, rule 29.4(e)2 and transfer the case to the Court of Appeal with directions to address—if properly preserved for appellate review—the two identified nonconstitutional issues. If the Court of Appeal were to rule against defendant on those issues, it would then be proper for it to address the double jeopardy issue in the case in light of our decision in People v. Monge, supra, 16 Cal.4th 826, as well as the high court’s decision in Monge v. California (1998) 524 U.S. 721 [118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615]. Because the majority declines to follow the “fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint” (Lyng, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 445 [108 S.Ct. at p. 1323]) requiring resolution of statutory issues before constitutional ones, I cannot join its opinion and respectfully dissent.3
Mosk, J., concurred.

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

 “After granting review of a decision of a Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court may transfer the cause to a Court of Appeal with instructions to conduct such further proceedings as the Supreme Court deems necessary.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.4(e).)

 Because I believe it is improper for this court to address the double jeopardy question under the state or federal Constitutions, I express no opinion on either issue.