Court Opinion

ID: 9757722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:56:55.750068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:43.621702
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge KELLEY.
Unlike the Majority, I believe that Respondents’ preliminary objections should be overruled. Section 1401 of the County Code1 provides, in pertinent part, that *713“[t]he Commonwealth shall annually reimburse each county with a full-time district attorney an amount equal to sixty-five percent of the district attorney’s salary.” 16 P.S. § 1401(p). As a result, I believe that Stilp possesses standing to prosecute the instant matter as a taxpayer of this Commonwealth. See, e.g., Common Cause/Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 710 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), aff'd per curiam, 562 Pa. 632, 757 A.2d 367 (2000) (“Based upon the above five factors [for taxpayer standing outlined in Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 507 A.2d 323 (1986) ], we conclude that the circumstances of the present case warrant the granting of standing to petitioners. We believe that the actions taken by the General Assembly in passing HB 67 would likely go unchallenged but for the present proceeding, because the very individuals who enacted such legislation are not going to be inclined to challenge the constitutionality of the process by which Act 3 was enacted. See League of Women Voters [of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 692 A.2d 263 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) ]. We further believe that judicial relief may be appropriate since the ultimate function of the judiciary is to determine the constitutionality of an act. Zemprelli v. Daniels, 496 Pa. 247, 255-56, 436 A.2d 1165, 1169 (1981). Moreover, redress through other channels is unavailable as there is no administrative agency which can provide relief and the members of the General Assembly, themselves, are unlikely to provide a meaningful mechanism for redress. Finally, we believe that there are no other persons better situated to assert the constitutional claims which have been raised in the present case than Petitioners.”).2
Like the Majority, I do believe that the instant petition for review should be dismissed. However, I believe that the petition should be dismissed on the basis that the relevant provisions of Section 1401 of the County Code do not violate Article 3, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.3 Under Section 1401(g) of the County Code 4, in counties of the eighth class, a *714part-time district attorney may become a full-time district attorney either by ordinance enacted by the county commissioners or by order of the president judge of the court of common pleas following consideration of statutorily-enumerated criteria. Under Section 1401(h) of the County Code5, in counties of the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh class, a part-time district attorney either holding office or elected to office following the effective date of the statute may elect to become a full-time district attorney by filing a notice of his intention to do so with the county commissioners, the Pennsylvania Seere-tary of Revenue and the Pennsylvania *715State Treasurer. Under Section 1401(k) of the County Code6, a full-time district attorney is precluded from engaging in private practice or receiving income from his or her former firm. Under Section 1041(i) of the County Code, “[o]nce the office of district attorney becomes full time, it shall not thereafter be changed.” 16 P.S. § 1401(i). Moreover, under Section 1041(j) of the County Code, “[a] full-time district attorney shall be compensated at one thousand dollars ($1,000) lower than the compensation paid to a judge of the court of common pleas in the respective judicial district.” 16 P.S. § 1401(j).7
In Commonwealth ex rel. v. Corrigan, 75 Pa. D. & C.2d 533 (1976), Judge Garb of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County considered an issue similar to that presented in the instant matter. In that case, the plaintiff was appointed the part-time district attorney to fill the unexpired term of his predecessor who had resigned. In the following general election, he was elected to serve a four-year term of office as the part-time district attorney for the county. During this term of office, this part-time district attorney became a full-time district attorney through the enactment of an ordinance by the county commissioners pursuant to a former version of Section 1401 of the County Code. Under the ordinance, the new full-time district attorney was to be paid $1,000.00 dollars less than the judges of the court of common pleas.8 When the Controller of Bucks County refused to authorize the payment of this increased salary, the plaintiff filed an action in mandamus seeking to compel him to do so. The Controller defended on the basis that the increase in salary in the ordinance violated the provisions of Article 3, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In rejecting this assertion, Judge Garb stated the following, in pertinent part:
[Considering the increasing responsibilities of the office of district attorney because of the complicating nature of the developing sociology of the larger counties, particularly those immediately next to large urban centers, involving the increase in crime and the escalating complexities of the criminal law, the legislature has, most appropriately, addressed itself to a problem of great seriousness .... In order to accomplish this, it may be argued that the legislature has taken a circuitous route in order to in*716crease the compensation of a district attorney in office trying by that circuitry to avoid encumbrance of this section of the Constitution. However, we do not view it that way. Although the legislature has fixed the salaries of district attorneys, it is nowhere mandated that it do so. The legislature may impose that duty upon the several boards of county commissioners. Rather than doing that, the legislature has vested in the county commissioners the option to determine the requirements of the office of district attorney, based upon local need, and considering the recommendations of the district attorney and the president judge. Where, in the wisdom of the county commissioners, the need for a full-time district attorney is not demonstrated, the district attorney may continue, as heretofore, as a part-time functionary receiving the salary as set forth by the legislature.... Where, however, the county commissioners determine that local needs dictate a full-time prosecutor, the county commissioners are vested with the discretion to make that determination and, upon so doing, the salary of the district attorney is commensurately increased by virtue of this act of assembly.
Of greater importance, where the duties of a public officer are significantly increased, an increase in compensation is not prohibited by this section of the Constitution. While conceivably it may be argued that this act of assembly does not increase the duties or responsibilities of the district attorney, it is clear that the act of assembly materially changes the nature of that office and, therefore, the parameters of the qualifications for said office. While it is true that district attorneys are constitutional officers, it is likewise clear that nowhere in the Constitution are his duties prescribed and, therefore, the legislature may regulate the performance of such duties.... This act of assembly provides for new and more stringent qualifications and restrictions on the person holding this high office. Most importantly, it provides, essentially, that he may receive no outside legal related income if he fills this office on a full-time basis. The quid pro quo from the district attorney is his full time and undiminished attention to the duties of district attorney, at the same time abjuring outside income. In so providing, the legislature has mandated that he shall give his undivided attention to his office, shall receive no other law-related compensation or emoluments, related or unrelated to the district attorney’s office, and has, thereby, imposed upon him restrictions significantly extended beyond those which a part-time district attorney has. Recognizing that the salary of the district attorney may constitutionally be increased where the duties and responsibilities of his office are significantly increased, it is entirely logical and consistent that his salary may likewise be increased where the restrictions upon the district attorney in fulfilling that office have been made more stringent. Where the quid pro quo for an increase in salary may be found from an increase in his duties and responsibilities, we believe that there may be an equally compelling quid pro quo for an increase in salary where he has accepted significantly more severe restrictions upon his outside activities, in particular, upon a significant diminution in his outside earnings and activities. The quid pro quo imports justification for an increase in salary whether it be by virtue of an increase in his duties and responsibilities or a significant decrease in his opportunities for, and receipt of, outside income. It is clear from this that the spirit and *717underlying philosophy of this provision of the Constitution is not violated, as there is no occasion for political or partisan pressure upon the district attorney in return for the implementation of this act. Therefore, we conclude that the action of the board of county commissioners in enacting ordinance no. 39 does not constitute a violation of Article III, sec. 27, of the Constitution.
Corrigan, 75 Pa. D. & C.2d at 539-542 (citations omitted).
Likewise, under the present provisions of Section 1401 of the County Code, a part-time district attorney that is either appointed to, or elects to, become a full-time district attorney is precluded from maintaining an outside law practice or from receiving funds from outside sources. In exchange for the increase in the duties of a full-time position, and the diminution in outside income, Section 1401 authorizes an increase in salary for the new full-time district attorney. Such a statutory scheme in no way implicates the prohibitions outlined in Article 3, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Corrigan.
Accordingly, unlike the Majority, I would overrule Respondents’ preliminary objections. However, like the Majority, I would dismiss the instant petition for review.

. Act of August 9, 1955, P.L. 323, as amended, 16 P.S. § 1401.

. Although not addressed by the Majority, I likewise do not believe that the Speech and Debate Clause of Article 2, Section 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution compels dismissal of the instant petition for review. See, e.g., Common Cause/Pennsylvania, 710 A.2d at 119 ("In the present case, Petitioners are seeking judicial review of legislative action as described in Powell [v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969)]. They have alleged that the General Assembly, as a whole, violated mandatory provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution when it enacted Act 3. Based upon the pleadings in this case, we are not persuaded that judicial review of the legislative action taken by the General Assembly in this case is inappropriate_”).

. Article 3, Section 27 provides:
No law shall extend the term of any public officer, or increase or diminish his salary or emoluments, after his election or appointment.
Pa. Const, art. Ill, § 27.

.Section 1401(g) of the County Code provides, in pertinent part:
(g) In counties of the eighth class, the district attorney shall be full time where any of the following apply:
(1) The commissioners of the county have by ordinance fixed the services of the district attorney at full time....
(2) The president judge of the county court of common pleas orders that the office of district attorney shall be full time. Upon motion of the district attorney, the president judge shall conduct a hearing and shall issue an order whether the office of district attorney shall be full time within 180 days of the filing of the motion.... An order under this clause directing that the office of district attorney be full time shall be made if the president judge finds that two or more of the following factors are present in the county:
(i) the average caseload of felony, misdemeanor and juvenile cases for the past five years has exceeded two hundred per year;
*714(ii) the average caseload for homicide cases for the past five years has equaled or exceeded one per year;
(iii) the county has any State correctional facility, juvenile detention facility, youth development center, youth forestry camp, other licensed residential facility serving children and youth, or mental health or mental retardation facility or institution, with a population exceeding two hundred fifty, or if the county has more than one such facility or institution, the aggregate population of such facilities and institutions exceeds two hundred fifty;
(iv) a major controlled substances transportation route passes through the county;
(v) the average number of convictions under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or the former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) subject to the alcoholic ignition interlock statutory provision requirements exceeds thirty per year; or
(vi) the county constitutes a single and separate judicial district.
16 P.S. § 1401(g).

. Section 1401(h) of the County Code provides:
(h) In counties of the third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh class:
(1)Each part-time district attorney holding office on the effective date of this subsection whose term expires January 7, 2008, shall become full time on January 2, 2006, if, after exercising due diligence in conducting an assessment of the best interests of public safety and the administration of criminal justice in the county, the part-time district attorney provides written notice to the chairman of the county commissioners, the Secretary of Revenue and the State Treasurer, no sooner than December 1, 2005, and no later than December 30, 2005, of the part-time district attorney's choice to serve as a full-time district attorney. Where a part-time district attorney holding office on the effective date of this act does not provide such notice, the office of district attorney shall remain part time for the remainder of the current term of office.
(2) A person who has been elected to the office of district attorney in a county where the district attorney is part time and whose term commences on January 2, 2006, shall, upon taking the oath of office, be a full-time district attorney if, after exercising due diligence in conducting an assessment of the best interests of public safety and the administration of criminal justice in the county, the district attorney-elect has provided written notice to the chairman of the county commissioners, the Secretary of Revenue and the State Treasurer no sooner than December 1, 2005, and no later than December 30, 2005, of the district attorney-elect's choice to serve as a full-time district attorney. Where the district attorney-elect does not provide such notice, the office of district attorney shall remain part time for the entire term of office commencing January 2, 2006.
(3) A person seeking election or re-election as district attorney in a county where the office of district attorney is a part-time position after January 2, 2006, shall, upon election and taking the oath of office, become a full-time district attorney if, prior to the deadline for filing nomination petitions or papers, the person has provided written notice to the chairman of the county commissioners, the Secretary of Revenue and the State Treasurer of the person's choice to serve as a full-time district attorney. Where the person does not provide such notice, the office of district attorney shall remain part time for the entire term of office.
16 P.S. § 1401(h).

.Section 140 l(k) of the County Code provide:
(k) In a county where the office of district attorney is full time, the district attorney shall devote full time to the office. The district attorney while in office, shall not derive any other income as a result of honorariums, profit shares or divisions of income from any firm with which the district attorney was associated prior to election. This limitation shall not be construed, however, to preclude payment of fees earned for legal work done prior to, but not concluded until after the earlier of his being made full time or being sworn in as a full-time district attorney. In addition the district attorney shall not engage in any private practice and must be completely disassociated with any firm with which the district attorney was affiliated prior to the earlier of being made full time or being sworn in as a full-time district attorney. The district attorney-elect may not accept any civil or criminal cases after being elected to the office.
16 P.S. § 140l(k).

. Although not relevant here, it should be noted that Section 1401(m) of the County Code provides that ‘‘[e]xcept as provided in subsection (g), any office of district attorney that is part time on January 2, 2012 shall become full time as of that date.” 16 P.S. § 1401(m).

. Like the present provisions of Section 1401(j) of the County Code, the former provisions of Section 1401 directed that full-time district attorneys were to be paid $1,000.00 less than the judges of the court of common pleas.