Court Opinion

ID: 9896165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 17:10:11.386332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:11.712424
License: Public Domain

J-S14036-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  U.S. BANK, NATIONAL                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  ASSOCIATION, AS SUCCESSOR IN                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
  INTEREST TO BANK OF AMERICA,                 :
  NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS                     :
  TRUSTEE AS SUCCESSOR BY                      :
  MERGER TO LASALLE BANK,                      :
  NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS                      :
  TRUSTEE FOR CERTIFICATE-                     :
  HOLDERS OF BEAR STEARNS ASSET                :   No. 1146 WDA 2022
  BACKED SECURITIES 1 LLC, ASSET               :
  BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES                  :
  2006-HE6                                     :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  WILLIAM O. GREENWALT, AND                    :
  PATRICIA GREENWALT                           :
                                               :
                       Appellants

             Appeal from the Order Entered September 1, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at
                          No(s): No. 482 of 2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                       FILED: November 9, 2023

       William O. Greenwalt and Patricia Greenwalt (Appellants) appeal from

the September 1, 2022 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland

County (trial court) granting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment in this

ejectment action. We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S14036-23

      We glean the following facts from the certified record.      Following a

mortgage foreclosure action instituted by Appellee, it purchased the property

at 52 Circle Drive, Irwin, Pennsylvania (the Property) at a sheriff’s sale in

March of 2020. The deed for the sale was recorded on June 5, 2020. In

December of 2021, Appellee served a notice to vacate the Property on

Appellants, followed by a complaint in ejectment in February of 2022.

Appellants filed a response averring that Appellee had not proven its chain of

title in the Property or standing to initiate the action. In all other respects,

they admitted the allegations in the complaint.

      On May 26, 2022, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment and

supporting brief, which it served on Appellants.     It argued that summary

judgment was appropriate because it had established ownership of the

Property based on the recorded deed, served Appellants a notice to vacate

and filed a complaint in ejectment to which Appellants did not raise any

cognizable defenses.     Thus, it contended it was entitled to immediate

possession of the Property.

      The trial court issued a scheduling order for argument on the motion on

June 6, 2022. Per local rule, Appellee was required to serve the scheduling

order, along with its motion for summary judgment and brief, on Appellants

within three days.     See Westmoreland Civ. P. Rule W1035.2(a)(1)(d).

Appellants filed their response to the motion for summary judgment on June

24, 2022.   They argued that there was a gap in the chain of title for the

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Property and that Appellee had no standing to bring the ejectment action.

They also argued that the motion should be dismissed because Appellee did

not serve the scheduling order or file a certificate of service in violation of the

local rule. Appellee subsequently served the scheduling order on Appellants

on June 27, 2022, and filed a supplemental brief in response to Appellants’

arguments.

       Oral argument took place as scheduled in the order on August 31, 2022.

The following day, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment

and entered judgment for possession of the Property in favor of Appellee.

Appellants timely appealed and they and the trial court have complied with

Pa. R.A.P. 1925.1

       Appellants raise two issues on appeal.2 First, they contend that Appellee

has not established chain of title in the Property or standing to bring the action

____________________________________________

1  This Court’s scope of review of a trial court’s order granting summary
judgment is plenary and we apply the same standard for summary judgment
as does the trial court. [A]n appellate court may reverse a grant of summary
judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Weaver
v. Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., 926 A.2d 899, 902–03 (Pa. 2007) (internal
citations omitted). A de novo standard of review applies as to whether there
exists an issue of material fact, as this presents a pure question of law. Id.

2 Appellants’ brief fails to conform with Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(a),

requiring that the argument section be divided into as many sections as
questions presented, with each section including a discussion and citation of
pertinent authorities.     Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a); see also Pa. R.A.P. 2116
(Statement of Questions Involved). While Appellants raise four questions
presented in their brief, the argument is a single section that addresses two
overarching issues identified above. Because this noncompliance with our
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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against them. Second, they argue that the trial court was required to dismiss

the motion for summary judgment based on Appellee’s failure to comply with

the local rule regarding service of the scheduling order. No relief is due.

       “Summary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record

clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Atcovitz v.

Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. 2002); Pa. R.C.P.

No. 1035.2. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court

must construe all facts of record and make all reasonable inferences in the

light that most favors the non-moving party. See Toy v. Metro. Life Ins.

Co., 928 A.2d 186, 195 (Pa. 2007). Any question as to whether there is a

genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Id.

For the purposes of summary judgment, the record includes pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits and expert

reports. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1035.1, 1035.4.

       In their first claim, Appellants contend that a gap in Appellee’s chain of

title is fatal to its ejectment claim:

       [Appellee] has a gap in the chain of title. The mortgage was
       originally in the name of The CIT Group/Consumer Finance and
       was assigned to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems
____________________________________________

rules has not hampered our review, we decline to quash the appeal and will
address the merits of the claims presented in the argument section of
Appellants’ brief. Thompson v. Thompson, 187 A.3d 259, 263 n.1 (Pa.
Super. 2018), aff'd, 223 A.3d 1272 (Pa. 2020).

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       (hereinafter known as MERS). Then [Appellee] filed the Complaint
       in Mortgage Foreclosure, purchased the property at Sheriff’s Sale
       and filed the Complaint in Ejectment. No assignment was ever
       recorded from MERS to the Mortgage Company.

Appellants’ Brief at 6. The precise basis for Appellants’ argument is difficult

to discern, but, citing to non-binding precedent from myriad foreign

jurisdictions, they appear to argue that Appellee lacked standing to initiate

the action.3

       We have summarized the law governing ejectment actions as follows:

       Ejectment is an action filed by a plaintiff who does not possess the
       land but has a right to possess it, against a defendant who has
____________________________________________

3 To the extent that Appellants are arguing that Appellee lacked standing in

the initial foreclosure action, they have not established a basis to collaterally
attack that judgment.

       An ejectment action is a proceeding collateral to that under which
       the land was sold. Thus, where it is claimed that the underlying
       default judgment is merely voidable, that claim will not be
       entertained because such a judgment cannot be reached
       collaterally. However, in an ejectment action it may be alleged
       that the judgment is void. A void decree can be attacked at any
       time. Where a judgment is void, the sheriff’s sale which follows
       is a nullity. A judgment is void when the court had no jurisdiction
       over the parties, or the subject matter, or the court had no power
       or authority to render the particular judgment. A judgment which
       is void cannot support an ejectment action and may be asserted
       as a defense in the ejectment proceeding.

Dime Sav. Bank, FSB v. Greene, 813 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(citations omitted; emphasis added).         Challenges to standing are not
jurisdictional and are waivable. Grimm v. Grimm, 149 A.3d 77, 83 (Pa.
Super. 2016), disapproved of on other grounds by Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr.
Co., 288 A.3d 76 (Pa. 2023). Appellants have offered no evidence that they
challenged Appellee’s standing to initiate the foreclosure action at the earliest
possible time, i.e., during the foreclosure proceedings. As a result, such a
challenge is waived.

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      actual possession. Ejectment is a possessory action only, and can
      succeed only if the plaintiff is out of possession, and the plaintiff
      has a present right to immediate possession. . . .

      Therefore, to prevail in an ejectment action, the plaintiff must
      show title at the commencement of the action and can recover, if
      at all, only on the strength of his own title, not because of
      weakness or deficiency of title in the defendant. If a plaintiff in
      ejectment has presented at trial prima facie evidence that it has
      title to the property at issue, the burden then shifts to the
      defendant, unless the plaintiff’s proof necessarily defeats the
      plaintiff’s claim of title. Conversely, if the plaintiff’s claimed chain
      of title is faulty, the plaintiff has not shown a prima facie case, and
      the plaintiff’s ejectment case fails.

Becker v. Wishard, 202 A.3d 718, 721-22 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations

omitted; cleaned up).      “This rule places upon the plaintiff the burden of

proving a prima facie title, which proof is sufficient until a better title is shown

in the adverse party.” Hallman v. Turns, 482 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super.

1984). An acknowledged and recorded deed from a sheriff’s sale establishes

a right of possession for the purchaser.      See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.

Long, 934 A.2d 76, 80 (Pa. Super. 2007) (collecting cases).

      Here, Appellee met its burden of establishing prima facie evidence of its

title to the Property and immediate right of possession through its properly

recorded deed obtained via sheriff’s sale following the mortgage foreclosure

proceedings. The deed was attached to the complaint in ejectment and the

motion for summary judgment.           Accordingly, the burden of disproving

Appellee’s right of possession shifted to Appellants.            Becker, supra.

Appellants have not carried this burden.           They provided no evidence,

documentary or otherwise, of a gap in the chain of title in any of their

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pleadings in the trial court. Rather, their response to Appellee’s motion for

summary judgment contained a bare allegation that such a gap existed.

These allegations are insufficient to rebut Appellee’s claim of title to the

Property as established by the sheriff’s deed, and the trial court did not err in

concluding no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Appellee’s right of

possession of the Property.

      Moreover, even if a gap in the chain of title existed, it is undisputed that

Appellants cannot establish their own title in the Property. Hallman, supra.

In their verified answer, they admitted to the allegation in Appellee’s

complaint that they occupy the Property “without right” and “without claim of

title.” See Answer to Complaint in Ejectment, 3/28/22, at ¶ 2; Complaint in

Ejectment, 2/9/22, at ¶ 2.      As a result, they cannot claim their right of

possession is superior to Appellee’s, as deedholder to the Property.

      Next, Appellants argue that the trial court was required to dismiss

Appellee’s motion based on its noncompliance with local rule W1035.2(a)

governing motions for summary judgment. The rule provides in relevant part:

      (d) Within three (3) days of receipt of the Scheduling Order from
      the judge assigned to the case, the moving party shall serve
      copies of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Scheduling Order
      and the Brief on every other party or attorney of record.

      (e) The moving party shall file with the Prothonotary a certificate
      of service of the Motion, Brief and Scheduling Order. A copy of
      the certificate of service shall be mailed or delivered to the judge
      assigned to the case.

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Westmoreland Civ. P. Rule W1035.2(a)(1)(d)-(e).          “Failure of the moving

party to comply with the requirements of this rule shall result in the dismissal

of the Motion.” Westmoreland Civ. P. Rule W1035.2(a)(3)(a).

      Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the language of the Rule, “[i]t

is axiomatic that if a local rule conflicts with a statewide rule of procedure, the

local rule is invalid.” Mariano v. Rhodes, 270 A.3d 521, 527 (Pa. Super.

2022) (citation omitted). This Court has invalidated strict applications of local

rules that conflict with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 126, which

provides that a “court at every stage of any such action or proceeding may

disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not affect the

substantial rights of the parties.” Pa. R. Civ. P. 126; see, e.g., Davison v.

John W. Harper, Inc., 493 A.2d 732, 734-35 (Pa. Super. 1985) (holding trial

court erred in dismissing post-trial motions because moving party did not file

accompanying order for transcripts of testimony, in violation of local rule).

      In denying relief on this claim, the trial court concluded that dismissal

of the motion was not warranted because Appellants were served with the

scheduling order two months in advance of the argument date, filed a

response to the motion prior to receiving the order, and had ample opportunity

to supplement their response in advance of the hearing and at the hearing

itself. Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 2-3. Appellants were not prejudiced

by the late service of the scheduling order and they have offered no further

argument on appeal that Appellee’s noncompliance with the local rule

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prejudiced them or affected their substantial rights. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 126.

Accordingly, we conclude that dismissing Appellee’s motion for minimal

noncompliance with the local rule would conflict with our state rules of civil

procedure. See Davison, supra. As a result, the trial court did not err in

declining to dismiss the motion on this basis. Mariano, supra.

      Order affirmed.

 11/9/2023

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