Court Opinion

ID: 9755083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:24:16.736299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:02.406349
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge McCLOSKEY.
I respectfully dissent as I disagree with the majority’s findings that the rights of a school district to conduct an in-state evaluation outweigh the rights of a child not to suffer further emotional trauma.
I initially wish to stress that the present case is one of evaluation and not one of *323placement.1 Further, I believe that the majority’s opinion loses sight of the fact that this is a case of a child’s right to a “free appropriate public education,” including the right/need to special educational services, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 — 1490o. Instead, the majority focuses upon the removal of Sean M. (hereafter Sean) from the Great Valley School District (the District) by his parents, which removal the majority finds to have terminated the District’s burden to evaluate a special needs child and develop an Individual Education Plan (IEP). See 20 U.S.C. § 1414. Further, the majority opinion essentially holds that parents are required to maintain a child in the appropriate school district, despite even the most dire of circumstances.
In that regard, a brief recitation of the facts in this case is necessary. Personnel from the District became aware of Sean’s rape during his ninth grade school year. Sean received psychiatric therapy arranged by his parents. Nevertheless, the District did not seek to evaluate him at this time. Between Thanksgiving and mid-December of his tenth grade year, Sean made three suicide attempts. He was thereafter placed in the Horsham Clinic.2 Following discharge, Sean was placed in a therapeutic wilderness program in Idaho and, ultimately, he moved to a private residential high school in Running Springs, California. Obviously, Sean’s parents were under a great deal of distress during this period of time and were forced to make critical decisions rapidly which they felt were in their child’s best interests.
After Sean’s parents signed the permission to evaluate form, they requested that the District evaluate Sean in California. The District refused and Sean’s parents requested a due process hearing before a Special Education Hearing Officer. At this hearing, Sean’s parents presented the testimony of Dr. Saeed Soltani, Sean’s treating psychiatrist in California. Dr. Soltani specifically testified that Sean’s mental state was fragile, that he engages in self-mutilation, that he has unpredictable mood shifts, that he engages in binging and purging and that his lingering paranoia leaves him vulnerable to an exacerbation of his problems. The Hearing Officer relied upon this testimony in concluding that the District was required to evaluate Sean without returning him to this Commonwealth.
The District filed exceptions and the case proceeded to the Department of Education’s Special Education Due Process Appeals Review Panel (Panel). The Panel denied the exceptions and affirmed the decision of the Hearing Officer based upon “the imminent life-threatening condition presented by Sean’s mental and emotional state.” (C.R., Item No. 5, p. 12). The Panel expressly noted the limited set of circumstances in this case, such as Sean’s prior suicide attempts and his fragile emotional state, as testified to by Dr. Soltani. This Court is faced with the unrebutted testimony of the psychiatrist of the dangers to Sean, which I believe is sufficient to support the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Panel.
Additionally, I believe that requiring parents of a suicidal child to keep that *324child in the District, as the majority would so hold,3 thereby ignoring the immediate needs of that child and the advice of treating medical. professionals, is both incomprehensible and inappropriate. Furthermore, to require Sean’s parents to return him to this Commonwealth in order to undergo an evaluation, even after his treating psychiatrist opined that it would be dangerous to do so, would place the parents in a position that is especially inconceivable.
We must remain cognizant of the fact that it is the child’s right to education at issue in this case. In seeking out treatment for their son, Sean’s parents were undoubtedly acting in a manner to protect their child’s well being. I do not believe that their actions in this regard relieved the District of its burden to undertake an appropriate evaluation. Nor do I believe that, under the limited set of circumstances presented in this case, it was unreasonable to require the District to perform this evaluation outside of the" Commonwealth. I believe the right to an appropriate education belongs strictly to the child and, therefore, I believe it is the duty of the school district to perform an evaluation.
Sean’s parents based their decisions on the protection and welfare of their child. This Court should do no less.
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision and order of the Panel.

. Under the latter situation, in cases of unilateral placement, reimbursement by a school district is not be required. See, e.g., Patricia P. v. Board of Education of Oak Park, 203 F.3d 462 (7th Cir.2000).

. Prior to Sean’s placement in this clinic, his private psychologist informed the District of Sean’s parents’ consideration of placing him in a high school in California. Only then did the District forward a permission to evaluate form to Sean’s parents.

. In its opinion, the majority cites to the so-called "stay put” provision at Section 1415(j) of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).