Court Opinion

ID: 9946210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 16:02:54.042308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:30.717865
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-2068    Document: 16     Page: 1   Filed: 02/13/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                PATRICK N. ANDERSON,
                   Claimant-Appellant

                             v.

       DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
              VETERANS AFFAIRS,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                        2023-2068
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 22-4128, Judge Joseph L. Falvey,
 Jr.
                 ______________________

                Decided: February 13, 2024
                 ______________________

    PATRICK N. ANDERSON, Mobile, AL, pro se.

     BRYAN MICHAEL BYRD, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY; BENJAMIN ISAAC HERSKOVITZ, Y. KEN LEE,
Case: 23-2068      Document: 16      Page: 2     Filed: 02/13/2024

 2                                     ANDERSON v. MCDONOUGH

 Office of General Counsel, United States Department of
 Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
                    ______________________
  Before REYNA, MAYER, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
     Patrick N. Anderson appeals the judgment of the
 United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Vet-
 erans Court”) remanding his claim for special monthly
 compensation (“SMC”) to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
 (“board”) and affirming the denial of his claims related to
 right ankle arthritis and right hip bursitis. For the reasons
 discussed below, we dismiss his appeal.
                        I. BACKGROUND
      Anderson has been granted service connection for a
 number of conditions, including a right ankle fracture,
 right ankle arthritis, right hip trochanter bursitis, cold in-
 jury residuals for both of his lower extremities, and depres-
 sive disorder. Appx. 11, 10–34. * In August 2014, he was
 awarded total disability based on individual unemployabil-
 ity (“TDIU”) benefits. Appx. 15.
      On July 22, 2021, the board denied Anderson’s claims
 for: (1) an initial disability rating in excess of 10 percent for
 his service-connected right ankle arthritis; (2) an initial
 disability rating in excess of 20 percent for his service-con-
 nected right hip trochanter bursitis, limitation of flexion;
 (3) an initial disability rating in excess of 10 percent for his
 service-connected right hip trochanter bursitis, impair-
 ment of the thigh; (4) an initial compensable disability rat-
 ing for his service-connected right hip trochanter bursitis,
 limitation of extension; (5) TDIU for the period on appeal

     * “Appx.” refers to the appendix filed with the gov-
 ernment’s informal brief.
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 ANDERSON v. MCDONOUGH                                        3

 prior to October 17, 2001; and (6) SMC. See Appx. 10–12,
 33–36. On appeal, the Veterans Court affirmed all aspects
 of the board’s decision, except for the portion of the decision
 denying Anderson’s claim for SMC. In remanding the SMC
 issue, the Veterans Court noted that the Secretary of Vet-
 erans Affairs had conceded that the issue had not been ad-
 equately addressed by the board. Appx. 2–3. The court
 explained, moreover, that remand was appropriate because
 the board erred in failing to adequately assess whether any
 one of Anderson’s disabilities, considered alone, could war-
 rant TDIU, thereby potentially satisfying the eligibility re-
 quirements for SMC. See Appx. 3; see also Guerra v.
 Shinseki, 642 F.3d 1046, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining
 that a veteran may qualify for SMC if he has “a single dis-
 ability with a 100% rating”). Anderson then filed a timely
 appeal with this court.
                        II. DISCUSSION
     Our jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court
 is circumscribed by statute. See Dixon v. Shinseki, 741
 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Wanless v. Shinseki, 618
 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We are vested with au-
 thority to “decide all relevant questions of law, including
 interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.” 38
 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). Absent a constitutional issue, how-
 ever, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual deter-
 mination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as
 applied to the facts of a particular case.” Id. § 7292(d)(2).
     On appeal, Anderson argues that the Veterans Court
 should have directly awarded him SMC rather than re-
 manding the issue of his entitlement to this form of com-
 pensation to the board. See Appellant’s Inf. Br. 8–11, 33.
 As a general rule, however, this court will not review re-
 mand orders issued by the Veterans Court because they are
 not final judgments. See, e.g., Deloach v. Shinseki, 704
 F.3d 1370, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Generally, we decline
 to review remand orders of the [Veterans Court] because
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 4                                  ANDERSON v. MCDONOUGH

 they are viewed as non-final decisions.”); Adams v. Prin-
 cipi, 256 F.3d 1318, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In applying the
 statute that grants us jurisdiction over appeals from the
 Veterans Court, we have generally declined to review non-
 final orders of the Veterans Court.” (citation omitted)).
 This “requirement of finality serves to avoid ‘unnecessary
 piecemeal appellate review without precluding later appel-
 late review of the legal issue or any other determination
 made on a complete administrative record.’” Williams v.
 Principi, 275 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting
 Cabot Corp. v. United States, 788 F.2d 1539, 1543 (Fed. Cir.
 1986)).
     This court will “depart from the strict rule of finality”
 and review a remand order from the Veterans Court only if
 three conditions are satisfied:
     (1) [T]here must have been a clear and final deci-
     sion of a legal issue that (a) is separate from the
     remand proceedings, (b) will directly govern the re-
     mand proceedings or, (c) if reversed by this court,
     would render the remand proceedings unneces-
     sary; (2) the resolution of the legal issues must ad-
     versely affect the party seeking review; and, (3)
     there must be a substantial risk that the decision
     would not survive a remand, i.e., that the remand
     proceeding may moot the issue.
 Id. (footnotes omitted).
     These prerequisites are not met here. The Veterans
 Court, in its remand order, did not decide any legal ques-
 tion related to Anderson’s entitlement to SMC, but instead
 remanded his case to the board for further factual develop-
 ment. See Appx. 2–3. Nor is there any basis to conclude
 that the remand proceedings will moot any legal issue. See
 Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
 (“[O]ur jurisdiction over a veteran’s case is proper ‘when
 the remand disposes of an important legal issue that would
 be effectively unreviewable at a later stage of the
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 ANDERSON v. MCDONOUGH                                        5

 litigation.’” (quoting Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d 1156,
 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1997))). Accordingly, we decline to review
 the remand portion of the Veterans Court’s decision. See
 Appx. 2–3.
      Anderson also challenges various factual determina-
 tions made by the board, such as its determination that he
 is not entitled to a higher rating for his right ankle disabil-
 ities. Appellant’s Inf. Br. 28–33. As discussed previously,
 however, we lack jurisdiction to review the board’s factual
 determinations. See, e.g., Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330,
 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Anderson further asserts that the
 Veterans Court erred in determining that he failed to raise
 before the board the issue of whether certain medical rec-
 ords qualified as informal claims for disability benefits.
 See Appellant’s Inf. Br. 25–33. Because this determination
 involved the application of settled law to the facts of An-
 derson’s case, however, we are without authority to review
 it. See Beasley v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir.
 2013) (emphasizing that this court may “not interfere with
 the [Veterans Court’s] role as the final appellate arbiter of
 the facts underlying a veteran’s claim or the application of
 veterans’ benefits law to the particular facts of a veteran’s
 case”).
     In his informal brief, Anderson alleges that his due pro-
 cess rights have been violated because he has been denied
 a fair hearing on the question of whether he has a single
 disability which qualifies him for SMC. See Appellant’s
 Inf. Br. 20–23, 25–26. Additionally, relying on Brady v.
 Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), a criminal case, he as-
 serts that the board improperly suppressed evidence re-
 lated to his entitlement to SMC. See Appellant’s Inf. Br.
 11, 20–24.
     Anderson, however, points to nothing in the record sug-
 gesting that any evidence related to his entitlement to
 SMC has been suppressed or that the board or the Veter-
 ans Court failed to afford him an opportunity to present
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 6                                  ANDERSON v. MCDONOUGH

 arguments and evidence related to his entitlement to vari-
 ous forms of veterans’ disability benefits. Because the Vet-
 erans Court did not decide any constitutional issues and
 Anderson presents only bare assertions that his due pro-
 cess rights have been violated, we conclude that his chal-
 lenges are constitutional in name only. As such, these
 challenges are not reviewable by this court. See Flores v.
 Nicholson, 476 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining
 that a veteran’s mere characterization of an issue as con-
 stitutional in nature is insufficient to establish appellate
 jurisdiction in this court); Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332,
 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that “[t]o the extent
 that [a veteran] has simply put a ‘due process’ label on his
 contention that he should have prevailed . . . his claim is
 constitutional in name only”). We have considered Ander-
 son’s remaining arguments in support of jurisdiction but do
 not find them persuasive.
                      III. CONCLUSION
    Accordingly, the appeal from the judgment of the
 United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is dis-
 missed.
                       DISMISSED