Court Opinion

ID: 9626846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:25:24.340787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:34.448251
License: Public Domain

*287McFADDEN, Justice, Pro Tem.,
dissenting.
It is my conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to state and prove a claim against Alcoa, and further that in any event the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the issue of punitive damages. At the outset it must be pointed out that ultimately the only claim against Alcoa was based on the theory that it had failed to give any warning to the consumer of the potential danger of a bottle cap injuring the consumer when attempting to remove the cap.1 The issues on this appeal must be considered in light of the fact that Alcoa is only one link in the chain of manufacturing and distributing of a product, i.e., a two-liter bottle of 7-Up. The liabilities of other members of this chain of manufacturing and distribution, that is the bottler, distributor, and retail store, are not before the Court in this appeal.
The majority recognizes that the issue of when a manufacturer of a component part has the duty to warn of risks associated with it is one of first impression before this Court. Relying upon the case of Alm v. Aluminum Company of America, 717 S.W.2d 588 (1986), to sustain the judgment in this action, the majority holds that the position of Alcoa in contending that the misuse of the product by Mrs. Sliman was not foreseeable, is untenable for such is a factual issue for jury resolution. With this position I disagree, for the reason that considering the multitude of caps manufactured by Alcoa, as compared to the number of incidents of injuries from these caps, it can be said as a matter of law that Alcoa could not foresee the manner in which Mrs. Sliman opened the bottle of 7-Up. The key inquiry is whether the intervening act of Mrs. Sliman is foreseeable. “Ordinarily, the question of foreseeability is a question of fact. ... However, when the undisputed facts can lead to only one reasonable conclusion, the court may rule upon the issue of foreseeability as a matter of law.” LaChance v. Ross Machine and Mill Supply, Inc., 102 Idaho 505 at 507, 633 P.2d 570 at 572 (1981).
Part I of the majority opinion upholds the decision of the district court that Alcoa had a duty to warn the ultimate consumer, Mrs. Sliman, even though Alcoa had no prior notice of the specific type of accident she suffered. The majority cites cases such as Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho Equipment Co., 94 Idaho 819, 498 P.2d 1292 (1973). In this regard I believe the majority erred, because in Robinson the Court went on to state:
If the danger is not obvious or actually known, the warning given must adequately communicate to the user the information in the supplier’s possession which is necessary to avoid unsafe use of the product. While the warning need not be the best possible, it must be reasonable under the circumstances, for an inadequate warning is viewed as no warning at all. The reasonableness of the warning, like the reasonableness of conduct in any negligence context, is related to the risk and extent of the foreseeable harm. The protection afforded through the warning must be reasonably coextensive with the danger, in light of the user’s experience with the product.
Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho Equipment Co., supra, at 827, 498 P.2d at 1300.
The trial record shows that Alcoa warned the bottlers licensed by Alcoa of the problem created by misapplied caps. No other incident involving the ripping of the threads of the cap with a tool, as occurred here, was shown by the record. The plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Greene, even admitted that this was a unique accident:
Q. At Line 8 you were asked, and I believe this was Mr. Racine, “Q. Have you ever testified in a case where they’ve attempted to tear off the cap, lid or pilfer-proof band, either one, with a tool?”
*288What was your answer there?
A. It was, “No, sir.”
Q. Do you know of any other situation, other than this, where someone was injured, or a cap was actually torn causing the cap to blow off?.
A. Well, I’m sorry, I confused your question. Many times a tool is used to open it, but where the tearing is exactly like this tearing, I don’t know of another case.
But that’s true, generally the tool is used to open the cap, but not necessarily tearing the cap like that.
* In fact, the entire record discloses no other prior incidents where someone ripped the threads with a tool. The record reflects that Alcoa had no knowledge of this type of incident, and took the only reasonable step under the circumstances, that of warning its licensed bottlers of the hazards of misapplied caps.
By agreement between Alcoa and the bottlers licensed to use Alcoa’s process, once the caps left Alcoa’s possession, Alcoa had no control over the labeling, bottling, or distribution of the ultimate product. Alcoa stands in the position of a supplier of a component part. The record discloses that Alcoa supplied the blank caps and that the bottlers filled the bottles and affixed the blank caps by a process developed by Alcoa.2 It is my conclusion that the majority’s reliance on § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is misplaced. The Restatement (Second) leaves its position on the issue of the responsibility of the supplier of a component part completely open for resolution when:
[T]he seller sells a product which is not intended to reach the consumer in about the same condition as it left, but is expected to be “processed or otherwise substantially changed” before it reaches him.
Walker v. Stauffer Chemical Corp., 19 Cal.App.3d [669] 671 at 674, 96 Cal.Rptr. 803 at 806 (Cal.D.Ct.App.1971) (quoting Witkin, Summary of California Law, 1969 Supp. 766 at 768). See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A caveat (2) and comment p.
Several states have held that no duty to warn the ultimate consumer attaches in such a situation. In Blackburn v. Johnson Chemical Co., Inc., 490 N.Y.S.2d 452, 128 Misc.2d 623 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1985), the court held that a manufacturer of a can sold to a company who manufactured an aerosol insecticide which later exploded, had no duty to warn because the company had no control over the labeling or the marketing of the product.
In Shell Oil Co. v. Harrison, 425 So.2d 67 (Fla.D.Ct.App.1982), the court held Shell had no duty to warn the ultimate consumer. Here, Shell supplied a lawn chemical, Nemagon, to Kerr-McGee who then diluted the substance and marketed it. Shell knew of the dangers and informed Kerr-McGee. Shell had fulfilled its duty because it no longer had any control over the product even though the product was an inherently dangerous substance.
In Hill v. Wilmington Chemical Corp., 156 N.W.2d 898 (Minn.1968), Shell supplied a solvent to Wilmington, who mixed it with a product of DuPont to make a waterproofing paint. Shell warned Wilmington of the flammability of its product and the enactment of a federal act concerning the labeling of hazardous substances. Since Shell had no control over the labeling, packaging, or manufacture of the end product, the court held that Shell had no duty to warn the ultimate consumer.
In Walker v. Stauffer Chemical Corporation, 19 Cal.App.3d 669, 96 Cal.Rptr. 803 (1971), Stauffer Chemical was the manufacturer of sulphuric acid which was supplied to a manufacturer of a drain cleaner. The *289plaintiff was injured when a can of drain cleaner exploded. The court refused to hold Stauffer liable because the company had no control over the packaging, labeling, or marketing of the drain cleaner.
In Lee v. Butcher Boy, 169 Cal.App.3d 375, 215 Cal.Rptr. 195 (1985), the plaintiff was injured by a meat grinder manufactured by Butcher Boy. The plaintiff tried to recover from the manufacturer of the electric motor. The court held that the motor was not defective and the manufacturer had no control over the manufacture of the finished grinder. Therefore, the manufacturer had no duty to warn.
All the cases cited above involve a product that was not defective. Further, the product was incorporated into a finished consumer item over which the defendant had no control in the labeling, manufacturing, and marketing. In the instant case no claim was ever made that the cap was defective in design or manufacture. Alcoa had no control over the labeling, bottling, or marketing of the finished product. Somehow, the majority upholds a duty to warn of the danger of tom threads when such a thing had never happened before, and Alcoa had warned the bottlers of the known danger of misapplication. The majority relies heavily on the recent Texas case of Alm v. Aluminum Company of America, 717 S.W.2d 588 (Tex.1986). I find the reasoning in the dissenting opinion of Justice Gonzalez to be more persuasive in this case:
Alcoa’s position, as a remote manufacturer, is relevant to the duty it owed customers because it affects the extent of Alcoa's duty to warn and its ability to effectively distribute a warning. Significantly, Alcoa is the manufacturer of one product, the capping machine, while J.F.W. is the assembler of the injury producing product, the 7-Up bottle. Alcoa sold the capping machine to J.F.W. whose employees operated and maintained the machine. Alm was injured by a misapplied bottle cap which resulted from allowing the capping machine to get out of adjustment. J.F.W., an intermediate assembler, controlled the entire bottling process.
The mere presence of J.F.W. as an intermediary does not necessarily relieve Alcoa, the original manufacturer, of its duty to warn. When the original manufacturer gives a warning to an intermediate manufacturer or assembler, however, it can be relieved of its liability for the intermediary’s failure to dissiminate the warning, (citations omitted.) In other words, when a manufacturer notifies an intermediary and the intermediary proceeds to sell the product anyway, the manufacturer is insulated from liability.
Alm, supra (Gonzalez, J. dissenting at p. 595).
After reviewing the numerous authorities on this subject, and recognizing the fact that there is a division of authority on the question of the liability of a component part for failure to give warning to the ultimate consumer, I am of the opinion that the line of authority I have cited including the dissent of Justice Gonzales in Alm, is the better rule and should be followed and adopted by this state. I would conclude, therefore, that the manufacturer of a component part, such as Alcoa, which has no control of the labeling, bottling, or distribution of the ultimate product, has no duty as a matter of law to warn the ultimate consumer.
In my opinion the issue of punitive damages should never have been submitted to the jury. In assessing punitive damages, relevant factors include:
[T]he prospective deterrent effect of such an award upon persons situated similarly to the defendant, the motives actuating the defendant’s conduct, the degree of calculation involved in the defendant’s conduct and the extent of the defendant’s disregard of the rights of others. Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 908, 453 P.2d 551, 557 (1969).
The award in this case can serve no deterrent effect. In footnote 6 the majority alludes to the Zapata patent as a safer design to alleviate the risks of blow-off. Alcoa’s engineer, Bing Welch, testified that *290Zapata had patented a safer design. He went on to say that Alcoa had no license to use this design and that the bottlers claimed that at the time (prior to October 6, 1979), it was not feasible to produce the new bottle finish essential for use of this design. He further testified that no design would have held the cap on in this case, as opposed to cases involving misapplication, and that no deviation from standards of the industry, much less an “extreme deviation” occurred simply because there are no standards. Alcoa in no way remained aloof from change which if made in all likelihood would have obviated its duty to warn.
Punitive damages are recoverable in a tort action only when it is shown that the defendant was in an extremely harmful state of mind, whether termed malice, oppression, fraud, gross negligence, or wantonness. Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inn Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983); Yacht Club Sales and Service, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of North Idaho, 101 Idaho 852, 623 P.2d 464 (1980); Linscott v. Rainier Nat. Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 606 P.2d 958 (1980). That degree of calculation involved in approaching malice, oppression, fraud, or gross negligence simply is not present to justify an award of punitive damages here. In the time period concerned, from 1967 to 1979, 229 claims were known. In any case, whether evidence of the 229 claims against Alcoa is admissible or not, the case put on by the plaintiff shows that during that period roughly 83 billion closures had been marketed. Testimony showed that accidents occurred at the rate of 3-8 accidents per billion closures. An accident such as the one at issue here had happened but once, or one per 83 billion closures. As stated before, Alcoa had taken reasonable and adequate measures to warn the bottlers of the danger of misapplication. To claim Alcoa was wanton and reckless and acted with gross negligence for an occurrence that happened once in the use of 83 billion caps borders on the absurd.
Finally, the plaintiffs expert testimony that Alcoa committed an extreme deviation from consumer industry standards is without merit. No foundation for this statement was ever laid. No industry standards were ever introduced in evidence. Punitive damages are not favored in the law. Certainly this case is not one for such damages. The trial court erred in submitted this issue to the jury.
SHEPARD, J. concurs.

. The only theory relied on by the plaintiffs for recovery against Alcoa was a failure to warn of a known danger. The record discloses that the plaintiffs presented no evidence to support recovery on the theory of either a defective product or defective design.

. With Alcoa’s process, no threads are present on the cap at all (called a "blank") when the cap is inserted on the bottle after filling. A machine grabs the bottle by a ridge just below the threads on the bottle (called the "finish”) and inserts the bottle into a piece called the headset. In the headset, rollers press on the blank and mash the malleable aluminum into the threads of the bottle finish, forming the thread in the cap that holds the cap on the bottle. Tr., p. 78.