Court Opinion

ID: 9562538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:31:08.09057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:23.669276
License: Public Domain

HERNANDEZ, Judge (specially concurring). The plaintiff’s sole point of error is that the trial court erred in allowing the defendants’ credit for wages paid plaintiff toward the award of compensation benefits. I agree. This matter is governed by the decision of our Supreme Court in Roybal v. County of Santa Fe, 79 N.M. 99, 440 P.2d 291 (1968): We are of the opinion that the allowance of credit is dependent on the employer’s intention, and that in determining intention, “wages” and “compensation” are to be considered in accordance with the following usage of those terms: “. . . ‘Compensation’ of an employee in the form of wages or salary for services performed, does not have the same meaning as the word ‘compensation’ in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The former is remuneration for work done; the latter is indemnification for injury sustained. . . [Citations omitted.] The question is one of determining whether the wages here were paid in lieu of disability payments. In arriving at an answer, it is necessary to characterize payments made during the period of employment subsequent to the injury. This characterization turns on the facts of each case. [Citations omitted.] We think the following criteria for such characterization, suggested in 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, are sound: “If the payment of wages was intended to be in lieu of compensation, credit for the wages is allowed. However, since there is seldom any direct evidence on whether such an intention lay behind the payment, it must be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the payment.” Sec. 57.41, p. 18. “The most important of these circumstances seems to be the question whether the injured man really earned his wages. If he is paid his regular wage although he does no work at all, it is a reasonable inference that the allowance is in lieu of compensation. An occasional court will say that such a payment is to be deemed a gratuity, but this, in the absence of special facts indicating a charitable motive, is unrealistic. . “The same principle applies when the employee is given light or reduced work at his old pay. If that rate of pay is not ordinarily offered to workers performing those duties, the expenditure can only be explained as provision of regular financial benefits to a work-injured man — in other words, workmen’s compensation. “By contrast, if the man is giving a dollar’s worth of labor for every dollar he is paid, the intention of the employer cannot be said to be that of supplying a substitute for workmen’s compensation; it is simply to purchase these services from this man on the same terms as from any other man. Therefore credit is usually disallowed when it can be shown that the claimant earned the wages he was paid during the period in question. . . ” Sec. 57.42, pp. 18-20. The testimony of the plaintiff and that of Mr. Kenneth R. Warinner, general superintendent of the defendant, United Nuclear Corporation, was in complete unanimity that the plaintiff “really earned his wages.” There was no other evidence to the contrary. The trial court erred in giving the defendants credit for the wages earned by plaintiff. The defendants and cross-appellants raised two points of error: (1) that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled from performing work for which he was fitted; & (2) that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees should be reduced or eliminated. The defendants’ first point of error has merit. The trial court’s fourth finding was that the plaintiff was wholly unable to perform any work for which he was fitted by age, education, training, general physical and mental capacity, and previous work experience. “Findings of fact, which are properly attacked, will not be sustained on appeal if unsupported by substantial evidence.” Cantrell v. Lawyers Title Insurance Company, 84 N.M. 584, 506 P.2d 90 (1973). The record reveals no substantial evidentiary support for such a finding. The record does show that the plaintiff was performing his work as a supervisor in a very satisfactory manner albeit he continued to experience some pain. Section 52-1-24, N.M.S.A.1978 provides in pertinent part: “ ‘total disability’ means a condition whereby a workman, by reason of an injury . . .is wholly unable to perform any work for which he is fitted by age, education, training, general physical and mental capacity and previous work experience.” [Emphasis added.] Defendants’ second point of error is that the award of attorney fees should be reduced or eliminated. I agree with the majority that the trial, on remand of this case, should reconsider the matter of attorney fees in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Fryar v. Johnsen, supra.