Court Opinion

ID: 9856007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:36:19.758546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:53.815408
License: Public Domain

HARSHBARGER, Justice,
dissenting:
The State’s case was entirely circumstantial. No one testified that defendant was at the scene of the crime, no murder weap*257on was produced; there was evidence that two people were involved in the transaction, but the prosecution did not present any other person. The only evidence implicating Meadows was his earlier argument with the victim, and Ms. Dillon’s observation of a large, dark car with a C.B. antenna on the trunk, a car later identified by its license number to belong to Ms. Finney, loaned to Meadows that night; and his possession of keys to Hairston’s car and the absence of such keys in her car or among her effects.
Circumstantial evidence will not support a guilty verdict, unless the fact of guilt is proved to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; and circumstances which create only a suspicion of guilt but do not prove the actual commission of the crime charged, are not sufficient to sustain a conviction. Syllabus Point 2, State v. Dobbs, 163 W.Va. 630, 259 S.E.2d 829 (1979).
See also State v. Noe, 160 W.Va. 10, 230 S.E.2d 826 (1976); State v. Allen, 139 W.Va. 818, 82 S.E.2d 423 (1954); State v. Clay, 135 W.Va. 618, 64 S.E.2d 117 (1951); State v. Cutlip, 131 W.Va. 141, 46 S.E.2d 454 (1948); State v. Hudson, 128 W.Va. 655, 37 S.E.2d 553 (1946); State v. Kapp, 109 W.Va. 487, 155 S.E. 537 (1930); State v. Bennett, 93 W.Va. 548, 117 S.E. 371 (1923).
In State v. Clay, supra, Clay had highly over-insured his property, which soon thereafter burned. We stated in Clay, 135 W.Va. at 626-627, 64 S.E.2d, at 122:
Here we have nothing but proof of his fraudulent manipulations in obtaining the insurance policies, and the fact that shortly thereafter the property insured was destroyed by fire. No ‘witness places him at or near the scene of the crime within twenty-four hours of its commission, and the testimony of the witnesses who placed him elsewhere is not attempted to be disproved. Only suspicion remains, and this Court cannot act solely on suspicion. Suspicion must be upheld by testimony on clear circumstances which leave no hypothesis but that of guilt. The justified suspicion which the jury must have had, and which, by its verdict, it converted into a belief that the defendant was guilty of the crime alleged against him beyond all reasonable doubt, cannot be accepted by this Court as sufficient to uphold the verdict returned by it. We cannot say that the evidence in this case excludes every reasonable hypothesis that the burning was not committed by some one other than defendant, or by accidental means; and the proof, such as there is, being wholly circumstantial, does not rise to the exclusive nature required for a conviction. (My emphasis).
In State v. Dobbs, supra, 163 W.Va. at 635, 259 S.E.2d, at 832, we emphasized that “the State must prove that the defendant was present at the place and time a crime was committed, if personal presence is essential to proof of the act.”
We reversed the conviction of Seymour Smith for the murder of his fiancee’s father in State v. McKenzie, 108 W.Va. 208, 150 S.E. 602, 605 (1929), stating:
Even though it should be determined that the evidence sufficiently points to Smith as a perpetrator of this heinous crime, yet, there is nothing to connect the defendant with its commission, except certain facts and circumstances which, as noted above, while casting a strong suspicion upon the defendant, do not, to a moral certainty, exclude every hypothesis inconsistent with her innocence. State v. Gilfillen, 96 W.Va. 660, 123 S.E. 578; State v. Dudley, 96 W.Va. 481, 123 S.E. 241.
It is one of the fundamental rules that circumstantial evidence should always be scanned with great caution; and to convict on circumstantial evidence alone it should to a moral certainty exclude every other hypothesis except that of guilt. Every single circumstance essential to the conclusion of guilt must be proven in the same manner and to the same extent as if the whole issue had rested upon the proof of each individual and particular circumstance.” State v. Dudley, supra.
In State v. Bailey, supra, for example, circumstantial evidence was held sufficient *258to sustain a conviction, the evidence being that Bailey was present at the time of the murder, and that she had a gun.
Hairston was shot with a twelve-gauge shotgun, but it was never found, and no evidence was introduced that Meadows has or ever had one. Ms. Dillon testified that the person she saw at the scene was taller than defendant’s attorney who in turn is several inches taller than defendant; and Mr. Dillon said that the man he saw was a “fairly big guy”. Ms. Dillon could only say that she saw a dark car, and she could not name its color. Meadows’ alibi was provided by Ms. Finney, a prosecution witness.
Even though Meadows and Hairston had had an argument, and he told conflicting stories about locating her car after she disappeared, and had keys to her car and none were found in it or in her effects or at the crime scene, that was insufficient evidence on which to convict him, in my opinion.
The court instructed the jury about facts the State must prove, including its duty to put Meadows at the crime scene; and instructed that if there was failure of proof of any of the elements, then the jury must find him not guilty. The court did instruct that any material fact necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and gave an alibi instruction offered by Meadows.* However, the instructions were infirm because that particular alibi instruction has been found to impermissibly shift the burden of proof to a defendant. State ex rel. Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 517 F.Supp. 390 (S.D.W.Va.), affirmed, 674 F.2d 279, 282 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853, 103 S.Ct. 119, 74 L.Ed.2d 104 (1982). Also, Adkins held that West Virginia’s former burden-shifting approach to alibi defenses could not be harmless error. Id., 517 F.Supp. at 399-400.
We should reverse Meadows’ conviction because there was insufficient evidence to convict. We should also advise our trial judges that giving the alibi instruction in Alexander is reversible error. Also, when an alibi defense is presented, it would be wise to specifically instruct about the State’s burden of proving defendant’s presence at the scene.

 Defendant’s Instruction No. 16:
“The Court instructs the jury that while the burden of proving an alibi is on the defendant, on account of its affirmative nature, this does not dispense with the necessity of the state proving the actual presence of the defendant at the place where, and at the time when, the crime was committed, and if from the evidence the jury has a reasonable doubt as to the presence of the defendant at the place where, and at the time when, the offense was committed, they should acquit him."
This instruction meets the criteria in Syllabus Point 2, State v. Alexander, 161 W.Va. 776, 245 S.E.2d 633 (1978):
"An instruction is proper that says that where the state has established a prima facie case and a defendant relies upon the defense of alibi, the burden is upon him to prove it, not beyond a reasonable doubt, nor by a preponderance of the evidence, but by such evidence, and to such a degree of certainty, as will, when the whole evidence is considered, create and leave in the mind of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.”