Court Opinion

ID: 9954051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 17:01:07.341568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:46.324754
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 25 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-50311

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 2:21-cr-00426-PA-1

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
CHRISTOPHER AUGUSTUS, AKA
Michael,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 19, 2024**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Christopher Augustus appeals the sentence imposed by the district court

following his guilty plea for bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) and

access device fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5). We have jurisdiction

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.1

        1. Augustus argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32(i)(1)(C) when it relied on Federal Trade Commission (FTC) statistics

and unidentified news articles in imposing his sentence without notifying the

parties or providing them with a copy of the materials before sentencing. We reject

his argument.

        Rule 32 requires both that a district court at sentencing disclose “all relevant

factual information to the defendant for adversarial testing,” United States v. Warr,

530 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008), and provide defense counsel the opportunity

“to comment on the probation officer’s determinations” in the Presentence Report

“and other matters related to an appropriate sentence,” Fed. R. Crim. P.

32(i)(1)(C). Where, as here, a defendant does not object at sentencing to a district

court’s compliance with Rule 32, we review for plain error. United States v.

Kaplan, 839 F.3d 795, 803 (9th Cir. 2016). To establish plain error, a defendant

must show “(1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4)

that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005).

        Here, the district court sentenced Augustus to 40 months’ imprisonment—

above the Sentencing Guidelines range of 27–33 months in the Presentence Report.

1
    Appellant’s unopposed motion for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 24) is GRANTED.

                                            2
The district court justified its sentencing decision based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

sentencing factors, considering the needs of the public, the seriousness of the

offense, and the far-reaching adverse consequences of the offense upon the public.

The district court also considered Augustus’s history and characteristics, including

his family support and recent work history. The record demonstrates that the

district court cited the FTC statistics and mentioned the news articles to support the

proposition that there are “serious consequences for defrauding people” and that

Augustus’s “sentence must reflect the seriousness of this offense, promote respect

for the law, deter abuse, and protect the public.”2 That Augustus was not given an

opportunity to contest the statistics or news articles did not substantially affect his

rights given the district court’s reliance on other sentencing factors that would

justify an upward variance. See Warr, 530 F.3d at 1163. As such, the district

court’s failure to provide advance notice that it intended to rely upon this

information did not constitute plain error.

      2. Augustus also argues that the 40-month sentence imposed by the district

court is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to satisfy

the goals of sentencing. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for

abuse of discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances. See Gall v.

2
  The government concedes that the district court should not have cited the FTC
statistics.

                                           3
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We may not reverse simply because we

believe that a different sentence would be appropriate. See United States v. Carty,

520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

        Augustus’s claim that the district court’s sentencing decision of 40 months’

imprisonment was “at best, an afterthought” is belied by the record, which reflects

that the district court properly considered and weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

sentencing factors. Given its “superior position to find facts and judge their import

under § 3553(a),” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, the district court did not abuse its broad

sentencing discretion in concluding that an above-Guidelines sentence was

appropriate.

        AFFIRMED.3

3
    Appellant’s motion to expedite (Dkt. No. 38) is DENIED as moot.

                                          4