Court Opinion

ID: 9930408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 20:03:05.323473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:14:58.766256
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/6/24 P. v. Prieto CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B327387

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. 2PHO4976)
           v.

 JEFFREY PRIETO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert Kawahara, Temporary Judge.
(Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
      Megan Denkers Baca, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        INTRODUCTION

      After serving more than 30 years in prison for murder,
Jeffrey Prieto was released on parole, subject to various terms
and conditions, including that he report to his parole agent as
required and that he enroll in and complete a substance abuse
program. After failing to comply with these terms, the trial court
revoked Prieto’s parole and remanded him back to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Board of
Parole Hearings. Prieto appeals, and we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     Prieto Is Convicted of Murder, Released on Parole,
             and Expelled from His Drug Program
      In 1988 a jury convicted Prieto of second degree murder,
and the trial court sentenced him to prison for 15 years to life.
He was released on parole in April 2018. Because Prieto had a
history of substance abuse, the terms and conditions of parole
required him to enroll in and complete a substance abuse
program. He also had to comply with all directions and
instructions of his parole agent and to inform his agent of any
change in residence within 72 hours.
      Prieto’s parole agent was Tony Manzanares.
Agent Manzanares saw Prieto semimonthly from April 2018 until
June 2022. He referred Prieto to substance abuse and housing
programs multiple times, including programs in San Fernando,
Hollywood, and Van Nuys. Prieto, however, did not enroll in

                                2
most of those programs and, when did enroll, he refused to
participate voluntarily and left after a month or so. In all, Prieto
was charged five times with violating the terms and conditions of
his parole, including for absconding from parole supervision,
failing to participate in a housing program, and using controlled
substances (methamphetamine).1
       After the last parole violation charge, the court referred
Prieto to a residential substance abuse program called God’s
Property Sober Living Foundation and dismissed the petition
alleging the violation. On May 20, 2022 Prieto enrolled in the
program, which required a “30-day blackout” period where Prieto
could not leave the facility and a 90-day period where he had “to
attend all meetings, all groups, [and] all classes.” Within a few
weeks, however, God’s Property asked Prieto to leave because he
violated the program’s no-tolerance policy against disrespecting
staff and he refused to attend mandatory meetings. On several
occasions he swore at staff members in front of other patients and
said, “I’m not going to listen to you faggots.” On another
occasion, Prieto stayed in bed and refused to participate in
mandatory substance abuse counseling meetings.2 After giving
Prieto warnings and “multiple write-ups” for “cursing out staff,”

1     Prieto testified this incident was the only time he used a
controlled substance in the last 10 years.
2     Prieto denied that he made these comments or that he
disrespected staff. He said the program immediately discharged
him one day when he did not go to a meeting because he was not
feeling well. He told his clinical social worker at the public
defender’s office the same thing. Prieto said he participated in
every group meeting and gave his “best effort not to be kicked out
of that house.”

                                 3
God’s Property on June 7, 2022 asked Prieto to leave the facility,
discharged him from the program, and notified the referring
agent or the court he had been discharged.3

      B.     Prieto Absconds from Parole Supervision and Cannot
             Be Found
       Agent Manzanares called the facility when he learned
Prieto had been discharged on June 7, 2022. Agent Manzanares
first tried unsuccessfully to reach Pietro by phone. He then tried
to find Prieto by driving around Los Angeles and looking in
locations he had seen Prieto in the past, including the
neighborhood near the God’s Property facility, an alley behind
the residence of Prieto’s sister, and a park. Agent Manzanares
also checked law enforcement databases, the coroner’s office, and
a local hospital, but he could not find Prieto. Agent Manzanares
also confirmed Prieto had not reported or been in contact with the
parole office.
       Agent Manzanares was unable to find Prieto and never
heard from him. Prieto had Agent Manzanares’s cell phone
number, his direct office line number, and the parole office main
number, but, according to Agent Manzanares, he had no
communication with Prieto after June 7, 2022.

3
      By the time of the probation violation hearing,
God’s Property was willing to take Prieto back into the program
(although at a different facility) because the director of the
program “believes that everybody deserves a second chance.”
God’s Property did not make this offer on June 7, 2022, however,
because Prieto gave no indication that he was sorry for his
behavior, that he wanted to stay, or that he wanted help.

                                 4
Agent Manzanares learned Prieto was arrested on August 25,
2022.4

       C.    The Trial Court Revokes Parole
       The Department’s Division of Adult Parole Operations filed
a petition to revoke Prieto’s parole. The petition alleged
God’s Property had terminated Prieto from the facility for “not
following the rules and requirements of the program” and “being
disrespectful to staff.” The petition also alleged Prieto had
violated the terms and conditions of his parole five times,
including by absconding from parole supervision, failing to
contact his parole agent, and failing “to successfully complete a
substance abuse program.” Agent Manzanares’s parole violation
report attached to the petition stated: “Alternative sanctions
have been considered . . . but deemed inappropriate due to
Prieto’s unwillingness to comply with his conditions of parole
imposed and a court order to enroll in and successfully complete a
drug treatment program. Prieto has an extensive history of non-
compliance with [Division of Adult Parole Operations] directives
and refuses to participate and successfully complete treatment.
This will be Prieto’s sixth parole violation to date including
six incidents related to drug use or absconding in the past year.
The fact that Prieto continually refuses to comply with multiple
conditions of his parole indicates an ongoing pattern of
criminality making him a threat to public safety. Prieto needs to

4     Pietro stated that he called Agent Manzanares and left him
a message, but that the battery in the phone he was using died.
Prieto also said that on June 8, 2022 he left a voicemail message
with his social worker, stating he had been expelled from God’s
Property and was “back on the street.” The social worker,
however, was unable to reach him, and he never called her back.

                                5
be held accountable for his actions to prevent further criminal
acts. The Division of Adult Parole Operations and the court
[have] attempted to maintain Prieto in the community with no
success. A return to custody is necessary to ensure his extensive
drug history and absconding does not result in a violent crime.”
While the parole violation report recommended returning Prieto
to custody, the Parole Violation Decision Making Instrument
(known by the initialism PVDMI)5 recommended “continue on
parole with remedial sanctions.”
      Prieto filed a demurrer to the petition. Citing People v.
Osorio (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1408, he argued that the petition
did not include a discussion of “present attempts made to find an
appropriate, less restrictive, remedial sanction, beyond the bare
mention” of certain programs and that he was “not accused of any
criminal activity in the current petition.” Prieto argued that
God’s Property was willing to accept him back into the program
and that counsel for Prieto “confirmed” the program would place
Prieto in a different location. Prieto asserted the Department
“could have identified and considered a host of appropriate
remedial sanctions before filing the petition, such as flash

5     “‘[The] PVDMI is “a standardized tool that provides ranges
of appropriate sanctions for parole violators given relevant case
factors, including, but not limited to, offense history, risk of
reoffense based on a validated risk assessment tool, need for
treatment services, the number and type of current and prior
parole violations, and other relevant statutory requirements.”
[Citation.] . . . [The] PVDMI “‘[i]dentifies the appropriate
response to each violation based on the offender’s risk level and
the severity of the violation.’” [Citation.] Parole agents may
recommend overriding the PVDMI-recommended response.’”
(People v. Williams (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1029, 1039, fn. 7.)

                                6
incarceration, anonymous meetings, a dual diagnosis treatment
program, and transitional housing with supportive outpatient
drug treatment and/or increased mental health services.”
       The trial court, recognizing it could “only consider what is
within the four corners of the petition, like it or not,”6 overruled
the demurrer. The court stated: “My obligation [or] duty at this
point is to just determine whether or not there was a reasonable
evaluation for intermediate sanctions and the [Department]
properly brought it before the court, and I am bound by the four
corners of the petition.” The court added: “I think that the
[Department] has reasonably considered [and] used alternate
programming to have Mr. Prieto comply and address the issues
he has, substance abuse and otherwise, and it’s just not working.”
       At the ensuing parole violation hearing, the trial court
acknowledged that, if it sustained the petition, the court had to
return Prieto, who was on parole for an indeterminate sentence
for murder, “to the Board of Parole Hearings for further parole
considerations.” After hearing the testimony of the witnesses
and the argument of counsel, the court found Prieto violated the
terms of his parole by failing to stay enrolled in and complete a
substance abuse program. The court credited the testimony of
the manager of God’s Property, who stated Prieto made
derogatory statements to staff members and “voluntarily refused
to go to the program.” The court also found Prieto absconded
from parole by not notifying his parole agent, whom the court
found “to be very credible,” when God’s Property terminated
Prieto from the program and by not contacting the agent from

6     The court stated: “You can have 20,000 letters of support
and all the great things, [but] I can’t consider that in a
demurrer.”

                                 7
June 7, 2022 to August 25, 2022, when Prieto was arrested. The
court described Prieto’s conduct as “the gravamen of absconding.”
After stating the court had given Prieto multiple opportunities to
continue under parole supervision, the court sustained both
counts in the petition (failing to complete a drug treatment
program and absconding) and remanded Prieto to the custody of
the Department and the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole
Hearings for further parole consideration. Prieto timely
appealed.

                         DISCUSSION

       Prieto argues the trial court erred in overruling his
demurrer because the report attached to the petition “did not
include a statement” by Prieto, as required by the rules governing
petitions to revoke parole, and instead stated, “‘Due to time
constraints, Prieto was not interviewed.’” He also argues
substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding
Prieto violated the terms and conditions of his parole. Both
arguments lack merit.

      A.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Overruling Prieto’s
            Demurrer to the Petition

            1.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      “When defendants convicted of certain offenses, including
murder, are released from prison, they are placed on parole under
the supervision of [the Department].” (People v. Williams (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 1029, 1038.) “If a parole violation occurs, [Penal

                                8
Code] section 3000.08, subdivision (d),[7] permits the supervising
parole agency to impose additional conditions of supervision and
‘intermediate sanctions’ without court intervention: ‘Upon review
of the alleged violation and a finding of good cause that the
parolee has committed a violation of law or violated his or her
conditions of parole, the supervising parole agency may impose
additional and appropriate conditions of supervision, including
rehabilitation and treatment services and appropriate incentives
for compliance, and impose immediate, structured, and
intermediate sanctions for parole violations, including flash
incarceration in a city or a county jail.” (People v. Zamudio
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 8, 13; see § 3000.08. subd. (e) [“‘Flash
incarceration’ is a period of detention in a city or a county jail due
to a violation of a parolee’s conditions of parole.”].)
       “Section 3000.08, subdivision (f), authorizes the supervising
parole agency to petition to revoke parole only after the agency
has determined that intermediate sanctions are not appropriate:
‘If the supervising parole agency has determined, following
application of its assessment processes, that intermediate
sanctions up to and including flash incarceration are not
appropriate, the supervising parole agency shall, pursuant to
Section 1203.2, petition . . . the court in the county in which the
parolee is being supervised . . . to revoke parole.’” (People v.
Zamudio, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) “Section 3000.08,
subdivision (f), requires a petition to revoke parole filed by the
supervising parole agency to include a written report containing
relevant information regarding the parolee and the
recommendation to revoke parole and directs the Judicial Council
to adopt forms and rules of court to implement it. [California

7     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                  9
Rules of Court, r]ule 4.541(c),[8] in turn, describes the minimum
requirements for the written report included with the supervising
parole agency’s petition to revoke; and rule 4.451(e) provides, in
addition to those minimum contents, the petition “must include
the reasons for that agency’s determination that intermediate
sanctions without court intervention . . . are inappropriate
responses to the alleged violations.’” (Zamudio, at p. 14; see
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Superior Court
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1036.)
       Section 1203.2 “governs the procedure for revocation of
various forms of supervision, including both probation and
parole. . . . [S]ection 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes the
‘parole officer, or the district attorney’ to petition to modify or
revoke parole. That subdivision further provides, upon filing of a
petition, ‘[t]he court shall refer . . . the petition to the . . . parole
officer. After the receipt of a written report from the . . . parole
officer, the court shall read and consider the report and . . . the
petition and may modify [or] revoke’ parole supervision ‘if the
interests of justice so require.’” (People v. Zamudio, supra,
12 Cal.App.5th at p. 14; see People v. Williams, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1038-1039; People v. Perlas (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 826, 832-833; People v. Hronchak (2016)
2 Cal.App.5th 884, 890.)
       In most cases, “[i]f a parolee is found in violation of the
conditions of parole, a court is authorized to (1) return the
parolee to parole supervision with a modification of conditions, if
appropriate, including a period of incarceration in county jail of
up to 180 days for each revocation [citation]; (2) revoke parole
and order the person to confinement in the county jail for up to

8     Citations to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

                                   10
180 days [citation]; (3) refer the parolee to a reentry court
pursuant to section 3015 or other evidence-based program in the
court's discretion [citation]; or (4) place the parolee on electronic
monitoring as a condition of reinstatement on parole or as an
intermediate sanction in lieu of returning the parolee to custody.”
(People v. Zamudio, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) But where,
as here, the supervised person is a “lifetime parolee” who was
convicted of murder and received a sentence “with a maximum
term of life imprisonment,” (§ 3000.1) a “special rule applies.”
(Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Superior Court,
supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1036.) “‘[O]nce the court finds that a
lifetime parolee has violated parole, revocation is “mandatory.”’
[Citation.] This legislative mandate is codified in
section 3000.08[, subdivision] (h), which provides that,
‘[n]otwithstanding any other law,’ if the court determines a
lifetime parolee ‘has committed a violation of law or violated his
or her conditions of parole, the person on parole shall be
remanded to the custody of [the Department] and the jurisdiction
of the [Board of Parole Hearings] for the purpose of future parole
consideration.’” (Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, at
p. 1037; see People v. Williams, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040
[usual options for a parole violation “do not exist when the court
adjudicates a petition concerning a lifetime parolee”].)
       Finally, a “demurrer raises an issue of law as to the
sufficiency of the accusatory pleading, and it tests only those
defects appearing on the face of that pleading. On appeal, we
review the order overruling [a] defendant’s demurrer de novo.
We exercise our independent judgment as to whether, as a matter
of law, the petition alleged sufficient facts to justify revocation of
[a] defendant’s parole. We give the accusatory pleading a

                                 11
reasonable interpretation and read [it] as a whole with its parts
considered in their context. On appeal from a judgment entered
on demurrer, the allegations of the accusatory pleading must be
liberally construed and assumed to be true. . . . Moreover, [n]o
accusatory pleading is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or
other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or
imperfection in matter of form which does not prejudice a
substantial right of the defendant upon the merits.” (People v.
Perlas, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 832, cleaned up.)

             2.    The Petition Was Sufficient Under Rule 4.541
      Rule 4.541(c) lists the information a petition to revoke
parole supervision must include. (See § 3000.08, subd. (f).) In
addition to things like the supervised person’s custody status,
record of conviction, and (if requested by the court) risk of
recidivism (including “any validated risk-needs assessments”),
the rule requires the petition to include a report stating: “All
relevant terms and conditions of supervision and the
circumstances of the alleged violations, including a summary of
any statement made by the supervised person, and any victim
information, including statements and type and amount of loss.”
(Rule 4.541(c)(2).) Prieto argues the trial court erred in
overruling his demurrer because the petition did not include all
the information required by this rule. In particular, he
maintains the petition was defective because it did not include
any statement made by him. Without citing any authority, Prieto
asserts that rule 4.541(c) “required the agency to include a
statement from” him, that the Department’s “failure to do so
rendered the petition for revocation deficient as a matter of law,”
and that, “[a]bsent a supervised person’s statement contained

                                 12
within this record, the trial court is left without the full scope of
the circumstances surrounding the alleged violation.”
       Prieto, however, did not demur to the petition on this
ground. As discussed, he argued in the trial court the petition
was defective because it did not contain a discussion of attempts
to impose less restrictive and available remedial sanctions (an
argument he does not pursue on appeal), not because it did not
include a statement from him. Therefore, as the People argue, he
forfeited the argument. (See People v. Hronchak, supra,
2 Cal.App.5th at p. 892, fn. 5 [forfeiture generally applies in
parole revocation proceedings]; see also Truck Ins. Exchange v.
AMCO Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 619, 635 [“‘“a reviewing
court will ordinarily not consider claims made for the first time
on appeal which could have been but were not presented to the
trial court,”’” and such “‘arguments raised for the first time on
appeal are generally deemed forfeited’”].) Forfeiture is
particularly appropriate where, as here, the Department could
have cured any defect in the petition or the report by
amendment. (See People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589,
593 [the purpose of the forfeiture rule “‘“is to encourage parties to
bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may
be corrected,”’” and it “‘is both unfair and inefficient to permit a
claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of
the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided’”]; see
also People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 710 [the reason for
the forfeiture rule “is to allow the trial court to correct its errors
and ‘to prevent gamesmanship by the defense’”].)
       Forfeiture aside, Prieto misreads rule 4.541(c). The
petition included everything the rule requires, including Prieto’s
personal information, custody status, circumstances of arrest,

                                 13
pending cases, background, and criminal record; the terms and
conditions the Department was alleging he violated; and the facts
and circumstances surrounding his alleged violations of those
terms and conditions. (See rule 4.541(c)(1), (2).) The report
attached to the petition detailed the events at God’s Property
that caused the program to discharge Prieto, Prieto’s failure to
contact his parole agent and the agent’s exhaustive efforts to find
Prieto, and how the extensive efforts by the court and the
Department to try alternative sanctions had all failed and ended
in repeated parole violation proceedings. The report listed six
prior alleged parole violations (in December 2018, September
2019, November 2019, January 2020, February 2020, and
September 2021) that resulted in court orders continuing him on
parole or dismissing the petition with referrals to transition
housing or drug treatment programs.
       Contrary to Prieto’s contention, rule 4.541(c) does not
require the Department to seek out and obtain a statement by
the supervised person and include it in the report, any more than
it requires the Department to locate, interview, and obtain
statements from victims. The rule only requires the Department
to include in its report accompanying the petition statements by
the supervised person (or, for that matter, victims) if the
Department has “any.” Interpreting the rule not to require the
Department to go out and get a statement from the supervised
person makes sense because, as here, the Department may not
know where the supervised person is. Obtaining a statement
from an absconding supervised person may not be possible.
       Finally, any defect in the petition because it lacked a
statement by Prieto did not prejudice him. “A defendant’s right
to be informed of the charges against him or her is satisfied when

                                14
he or she is advised sufficiently to enable him or her to prepare
and present a defense and is not taken by surprise.” (People v.
Perlas, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 835.) The petition here
disclosed the recommendation generated by the PVDMI, the
contrary recommendation in Agent Manzanares’s parole violation
report, the seriousness of Prieto’s conduct, the failure of multiple
intermediate sanctions, and Prieto’s history of parole violations
and program failures. It is hard to see how including a statement
by Prieto in the report would have better prepared him to defend
the charges. (See ibid.) And Prieto had the opportunity to give,
and in fact gave, his version of the facts at the hearing. Thus, as
Prieto concedes, “had the agency interviewed” him to get a
statement for the report, “he would have given the same
statement as he attempted to give Agent Manzanares, as he gave
to his social worker, and to which he testified . . . .” To the extent
the trial court did not have at the pleading stage Prieto’s side of
the story and a “full scope of the circumstances” of the violation,
that was the purpose of the probation violation hearing, where
the trial court heard testimony from Prieto and the other
witnesses about all the facts and circumstances.9

9     Because the argument lacks merit, trial counsel for Prieto
did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to raise it. (See
People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463 [“Representation does
not become deficient for failing to make meritless objections.”];
People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 377 [“trial attorney’s failure
to assert a meritless defense does not demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel”].)

                                 15
      B.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Court’s Finding
            Prieto Violated the Terms and Conditions of His
            Parole

      Prieto argues the trial court erred in finding he violated the
condition of his parole that required him to maintain contact with
his parole agent because, rather than willfully absconding, Prieto
made efforts to contact his parole agent and social worker. Prieto
also argues that, because the condition requiring him to enroll in
and complete a substance abuse program did not require him to
complete the program by any particular date, and by the time of
the parole violation hearing God’s Property was willing to
re-admit him into the program, he did not violate that condition
either. Again, both arguments fail.

             1.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       “Parole revocation determinations shall be based upon a
preponderance of evidence.” (§ 3044, subd. (a)(5); see In re
Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 501; People v. Butcher (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318; In re Miller (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th
1228, 1234-1235.) We review the trial court’s findings for
substantial evidence. (People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766,
773; People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848.) On review
for substantial evidence, “great deference is accorded the trial
court’s decision, bearing in mind that ‘[p]robation is not a matter
of right but an act of clemency, the granting and revocation of
which are entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court.’”
(Urke, at p. 773; see Kurey, at pp. 848-849 [“our review is limited
to the determination of whether, upon review of the entire record,

                                16
there is substantial evidence of solid value, contradicted or
uncontradicted, which will support the trial court’s decision”];
see also People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198
[“Parole revocation and probation revocation after the imposition
of a sentence are constitutionally indistinguishable.”].)

            2.     Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial
                   Court’s Findings
       The trial court found Prieto violated the terms and
conditions of his parole by failing to maintain contact with his
parole agent and failing to inform his parole agent of a change in
his residence. Substantial evidence supported that finding. After
God’s Property expelled him from the program, Prieto did not call
or otherwise contact Agent Manzanares, even though they had
spoken by phone before. Although Prieto claimed he tried to
contact Agent Manzanares but was unsuccessful, the trial court
credited the agent’s contrary testimony. And even apart from
that factual dispute (which the trial court resolved against
Prieto), there was no dispute Prieto did not contact
Agent Manzanares, about a change in residence or otherwise,
from early June 2022 to late August 2022. Prieto even avoided
Agent Manzanares, or at least—despite the agent’s considerable
efforts—was not found at several locations throughout the city
where Agent Manzanares had previously seen Prieto.
       The trial court also found Prieto violated the terms and
conditions of parole by failing to stay enrolled in and complete a
substance abuse program. Substantial evidence supported that
finding too. God’s Property expelled Prieto from the program for
engaging in misconduct, violating the program’s rules, and
refusing to attend mandatory programming. Prieto denied the

                               17
misconduct and had an excuse for not attending classes. But
again, the trial court believed the manager of the program, not
Prieto. (See People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118
[“‘“[w]e do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s
credibility”’”]; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 984 [“[w]e do
not second-guess the trial court’s credibility findings”].)
       Prieto argues he did not violate the condition of his parole
requiring him to enroll in and complete a substance abuse
program because that condition did not require him to complete
the program “before any given date, or even within a reasonable
timeframe.” The trial court, however, could reasonably conclude
the terms and conditions of Prieto’s parole required him to
complete the program within a reasonable time. (See People
ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1117 [courts may
construe probation conditions to include terms that are “fairly
implied”]; People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 607 [probation
condition “must . . . be interpreted on the basis of what a
reasonable person would understand from the language of the
condition”].) The trial court could also reasonably infer, from
Prieto’s conduct at God’s Property and his history of leaving
substance abuse programs, Prieto did not intend to complete, or
even remain enrolled in, such a program. (See People v. Buell
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 687 [on appeal from an order revoking
mandatory supervision, reviewing courts “‘give great deference to
the trial court and resolve all inferences and intendments in
favor of the judgment’”].)

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                         DISPOSITION

     The order is affirmed.

                                       SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             FEUER, J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

                              19