Court Opinion

ID: 9418186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:11:51.023898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:56.780415
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting.
The petitioner set up as a defense to these actions that the statute under which it was sued was such a burden on-commerce among the States as to violate § 8, Art. I, of the Constitution of the United States — a pure issue óf law. If in .order to try this issue intelligently it-was nee-essary to take evidence of facts, I think the court was bound to hear such evidence, even without any specific allegation of the facts that would -maintain it, as it is the court’s duty to know and to declare the law. But I *538leave that question on one side because the petitioners did not stop with the naked proposition, but alleged further that “it is impossible to observe said statute and carry the- mails as the defendant is required to carry them under the contract it has with the Government; and it is likewise impossible to do an interstate business, and at the same time comply with the terms of said -statute.” These aré pure allegations of fact. They mean on their face that the requirement that the engineer at every grade crossing should have his train under such control as to be able to stop if necessary to avoid running .down a man or wagon' crossing the track requires such delays as to, prevent or seriously to interfere with commerce among the States. They refer to physical conditions .and to physical facts; they can refer to nothing-else, I think it obvious that they mean that the crossings are so numerous as to make the requirement impracticable, since I can think of nothing but the number of them that would have that effect.
The statement may be called a conclusion, but it is a conclusion of fact, just as the statement that a -certain liquid was beer is a conclusion of fact from certain impressions of taste, smell and sight. If the objection to the pleading had been that more particulars were wanted, although, for my part, I think it would have been unnecessarily detailed and prolix pleading to set forth what and where the crossings were, the pleading should not have been rejected, but the details should have been required. The petitioner showed that it was ready to give them by its' offer of proof. But evidently the answer was not held bad on - that ground. Presumably at least, as stated by the counsel for the petitioner, it was held bad on the ground taken by the Supreme Court of that State, that althoúgh-the requirement was impracticable it was the law. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Hall, 109 Georgia, 367, 369. See 160 Fed. Rep. 332, 337; S. C., 87 C. C. A. *539284, 289. For it is to be observed further that the facts • involved were public facts, and that although the court might not take notice of the precise situation of particular crossings it well might take notice, as the Supreme Court of Georgia seems to have taken notice in the cáse just mentioned, that they were numerous. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 638, and for many cases Wigmore, Ev., §§ 2576, 2580. 16 Cyc. 862. 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 904; Again, if any merely technical objection had been thought fatal to the defense, the petitioner undoubtedly would have met it by a further amendment to its plea.
It seems to m.e a miscarriage of justice to sustain liability under a statute which possibly, and I think probably, is unconstitutional, until, the facts have been heard which the petitioner alleged and offered to prove. I think that the judgment should be .'reversed.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice White concurs in this dissent.