Court Opinion

ID: 9384876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 15:00:48.685746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.009849
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2320   Document: 48     Page: 1   Filed: 04/05/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                   JOE A. SALAZAR,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

 AT&T MOBILITY LLC, SPRINT UNITED MANAGE-
 MENT COMPANY, T-MOBILE USA, INC., CELLCO
  PARTNERSHIP INC., DBA VERIZON WIRELESS,
                     INC.,
          Defendants-Cross-Appellants

     HTC CORPORATION, HTC AMERICA, INC.,
                   Defendants
             ______________________

                  2021-2320, 2021-2376
                 ______________________

    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
 Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:20-cv-00004-JRG, Chief
 Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap.
                  ______________________

                 Decided: April 5, 2023
                 ______________________

    DARIUSH KEYHANI, Keyhani LLC, Washington, DC, ar-
 gued for plaintiff-appellant.

    TODD ERIC LANDIS, Williams Simons & Landis PLLC,
 Dallas, TX, argued for defendants-cross-appellants. Also
Case: 21-2320    Document: 48      Page: 2    Filed: 04/05/2023

 2                              SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC

 represented by FRED WILLIAMS, Austin, TX; JOHN WITTEN-
 ZELLNER, Philadelphia, PA.
                 ______________________

     Before STOLL, SCHALL, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 STOLL, Circuit Judge.
      Joe Salazar appeals the United States District Court
 for the Eastern District of Texas’s judgment of noninfringe-
 ment, challenging the court’s claim construction. Mr. Sal-
 azar contends that the court erroneously construed “a
 microprocessor” to mean one microprocessor, contrary to
 this court’s precedent. AT&T Mobility LLC, Sprint United
 Management Company, T-Mobile USA, Inc., and Cellco
 Partnership Inc., dba Verizon Wireless, Inc. (collectively,
 “AT&T”) cross-appeal the district court’s ruling that
 Mr. Salazar’s claims were not precluded based on prior lit-
 igation and challenge the judgment that the asserted
 claims are not invalid as anticipated. Because we agree
 with the district court’s claim construction, we affirm the
 judgment of noninfringement. Having affirmed the judg-
 ment of noninfringement, we do not reach AT&T’s preclu-
 sion arguments. Finally, we hold that AT&T waived its
 challenge to the jury’s verdict on anticipation by failing to
 move for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
                         BACKGROUND
      Mr. Salazar owns U.S. Patent No. 5,802,467. The
 ’467 patent describes technology for wireless and wired
 communications, including command, control, and sensing
 for two-way communication of sound, voice, and data “with
 any appliance and/or apparatus capable of transmitting
 and/or receiving compatible sound, voice and data signals.”
 ’467 patent col. 1 ll. 8–13. The ’467 patent expired on Sep-
 tember 28, 2015.
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 SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC                              3

     Independent claim 1, one of several claims that contain
 the terms at issue, recites:
     1. A communications, command, control and sens-
     ing system for communicating with a plurality of
     external devices comprising:
     a microprocessor for generating a plurality of con-
     trol signals used to operate said system, said mi-
     croprocessor     creating     a     plurality    of
     reprogrammable communication protocols, for
     transmission to said external devices wherein each
     communication protocol includes a command code
     set that defines the signals that are employed to
     communicate with each one of said external de-
     vices;
     a memory device coupled to said microprocessor
     configured to store a plurality of parameter sets re-
     trieved by said microprocessor so as to recreate a
     desired command code set, such that the memory
     space required to store said parameters is smaller
     than the memory space required to store said com-
     mand code sets;
     a user interface coupled to said microprocessor for
     sending a plurality of signals corresponding to user
     selections to said microprocessor and displaying a
     plurality of menu selections available for the user’s
     choice, said microprocessor generating a communi-
     cation protocol in response to said user selections;
     and
     an infra-red frequency transceiver coupled to said
     microprocessor for transmitting to said external
     devices and receiving from said external devices,
     infra-red frequency signals in accordance with said
     communications protocols.
 Id. at col. 25 l. 57–col. 26 l. 17 (emphasis added).
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 4                               SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC

     In 2016, Mr. Salazar sued HTC Corp., alleging HTC
 Corp. infringed the ’467 patent by selling certain HTC One
 phones that allegedly embodied the asserted claims. See
 Compl., Salazar v. HTC Corp., No. 2:16-cv-01096, 2016 WL
 11577368 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2016) (“Salazar I”). HTC Corp.
 raised two defenses: (1) that it did not commit any infring-
 ing acts in the United States; and (2) in any event, the ac-
 cused phones did not infringe.         See Salazar I Trial
 Tr. 21:21–22:2. A jury ultimately returned a verdict find-
 ing HTC Corp. did not infringe the ’467 patent. The jury
 did not decide whether the ’467 patent was valid, however,
 instead leaving that portion of the verdict form blank.
 J.A. 2201.
     In 2019, Mr. Salazar sued AT&T, again asserting the
 ’467 patent against the same products he challenged in
 Salazar I. HTC Corp. and HTC America, Inc. (collectively
 “HTC”) intervened, requesting a declaratory judgment that
 the accused products did not infringe. The district court
 severed HTC’s claims and stayed that portion of the case.
     At claim construction, the parties disputed limitations
 present in multiple asserted claims, which required: “a mi-
 croprocessor for generating . . . , said microprocessor creat-
 ing . . . , a plurality of parameter sets retrieved by said
 microprocessor . . . , [and] said microprocessor generat-
 ing . . . .” The district court characterized the dispute be-
 tween the parties as coming down to “whether the claims
 require one microprocessor that is capable of performing
 the recited ‘generating,’ ‘creating,’ ‘retrieving,’ and ‘gener-
 ating’ functions.” Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 2:20-
 cv-00004, 2020 WL 5608640, at *17 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18,
 2020) (Claim Construction Op.). The district court an-
 swered this question in the affirmative and construed the
 term to mean “one or more microprocessors, at least one of
 which is configured to perform the generating, creating, re-
 trieving, and generating functions.” Id. at *19. Relying in
 part on our decisions in Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer
 Corp., 812 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and In re Varma, 816
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 SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC                             5

 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the district court explained that
 the claim term provided certain functions that the “said mi-
 croprocessor” must be “necessarily configured to perform as
 well as the structural relationship between ‘said micropro-
 cessor’ and other structural elements.” Claim Construction
 Op., 2020 WL 5608640, at *19. Thus, the district court rea-
 soned, “at least one microprocessor must satisfy all the
 functional (and relational) limitations recited for ‘said mi-
 croprocessor.’” Id. at *18.
     Prior to trial, AT&T moved for summary judgment, ar-
 guing that Mr. Salazar’s claims were barred under claim
 preclusion and the Supreme Court’s decision in Kessler
 v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907), which prevents harassment
 of customers of an adjudged noninfringer in specific cir-
 cumstances. The district court denied that motion.
      At trial, AT&T’s technical expert opined that the as-
 serted claims were anticipated by Goldstein, a prior art ref-
 erence that was not considered by the U.S. Patent Office
 during prosecution. J.A. 1256–92 (Trial Tr. 91:18–127:7).
 At the conclusion of trial, AT&T moved for judgment as a
 matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 re-
 garding “infringement, damages, and preclusion,” but not
 regarding invalidity. J.A. 1572 (Trial Tr. 198:16–19). The
 district court confirmed with AT&T’s counsel that it was
 not moving for judgment as a matter of law regarding an-
 ticipation. Id. (Trial Tr. 198:20–22). The jury thereafter
 returned its verdict, finding that the accused products did
 not infringe the ’467 patent and that the patent was not
 invalid. J.A. 397–98. The district court entered final judg-
 ment reflecting the jury’s verdict.
     Mr. Salazar and AT&T both appeal. We have jurisdic-
 tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                          DISCUSSION
     We start by addressing Mr. Salazar’s challenge to the
 district court’s claim construction. We then turn to AT&T’s
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 6                                 SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC

 cross-appeal, in which it argues that the district court
 erred both by (1) denying AT&T’s motion for summary
 judgment that Mr. Salazar’s claims were barred by collat-
 eral estoppel and the Kessler doctrine and (2) finding that
 claims 1–7, 27–30, and 34 were not anticipated.
                               I
     On appeal, Mr. Salazar argues that he is entitled to a
 new jury trial because the court erred in construing “a” mi-
 croprocessor and “said” microprocessor. Appellant’s Br. 39.
 According to Mr. Salazar, the court should have inter-
 preted the claim terms to require one or more microproces-
 sors, any one of which may be capable of performing each
 of the “generating,” “creating,” and “retrieving” functions
 recited in the claims. Id. at 11–12, 32–33. Put another
 way, in Mr. Salazar’s view, a correct claim construction
 would encompass one microprocessor capable of perform-
 ing one claimed function and another microprocessor capa-
 ble of performing a different claimed function, even if no
 one microprocessor could perform all of the recited func-
 tions. Mr. Salazar maintains that the district court erred
 by interpreting “a” microprocessor as a single microproces-
 sor that is capable of performing all of the later recited
 “generating,” “creating,” and “retrieving” functions. Id.
 at 31.
      We review a district court’s claim construction de novo
 where, as here, it is decided only on the intrinsic evidence.
 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 331
 (2015). We begin, as we must, with the claim language it-
 self. Immunex Corp. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 977 F.3d
 1212, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The words of a claim are gen-
 erally given their ordinary meaning, which is “the meaning
 that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in
 the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips
 v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
 banc).
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 SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC                               7

       At issue in this appeal is the proper construction of the
 articles “a” and “said.” We have explained that the indefi-
 nite article “a” means “‘one or more’ in open-ended claims
 containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’” Convolve,
 812 F.3d at 1321 (quoting KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts,
 Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). “An exception
 to the general rule that ‘a’ . . . means more than one only
 arises where the language of the claims themselves, the
 specification, or the prosecution history necessitate a de-
 parture from the rule.” Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc.
 v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
 We have also explained that “[t]he use of the term ‘said’
 indicates that this portion of the claim limitation is a ref-
 erence back to the previously claimed” term. Summit 6,
 LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
 2015); see Baldwin, 512 F.3d at 1343 (the claim term “said”
 is an “anaphoric phrase[], referring to the initial anteced-
 ent phrase”). “The subsequent use of [the] definite article[]
 . . . ‘said’ in a claim to refer back to the same claim term
 does not change the general plural rule, but simply rein-
 vokes that non-singular meaning.” Baldwin, 512 F.3d
 at 1342.
     In Baldwin, for example, we considered a patent de-
 scribing systems for cleaning the cylinder of a printing
 press using cleaning fabric. 1 Id. at 1340. There, the claim

     1     The claim at issue in Baldwin recited in relevant
 part:
     A pre-packaged, pre-soaked cleaning system for
     use to clean the cylinder of printing machines com-
     prising in combination:
     (1) a pre-soaked fabric roll saturated to equilibrium
     with cleaning solvent disposed around a core, said
     fabric roll having a sealed sleeve which can be
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 8                               SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC

 recited “a pre-soaked fabric roll” and subsequently recited
 “said fabric roll.” Id. We held that “a pre-soaked fabric
 roll” meant “one or more” pre-soaked fabric rolls, and that
 the subsequent “said fabric roll” maintained that non-sin-
 gular meaning. Id. at 1342–43. But we did not hold in
 Baldwin that using an indefinite article somehow displaces
 the antecedent basis rule, as to require “said fabric roll” to
 refer to something other than the same earlier referenced
 “pre-soaked fabric roll.” See id. at 1343 (stating that the
 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure “describes the
 need, in most cases, for claim terms to have proper ante-
 cedent bases”). In other words, in Baldwin, the “said fabric
 roll” was the same “one or more” pre-soaked fabric rolls
 that were referred to earlier in the claim.
     We considered a similar claim construction dispute in
 Harari v. Lee, 656 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011), a case involv-
 ing rewritable memory chips. There, the parties disputed
 the terms “a bit line” and “said bit line.” 2 The relevant

     opened or removed from said fabric roll for use of
     said fabric roll, . . . and said system including
     (2) means for locating said fabric roll adjacent to
     and operatively associated with a cylinder to be
     cleaned.
 512 F.3d at 1340 (emphasis added).
     2  The claim at issue in Harari recited in relevant
 part:
     A method of treating at least one erased EEprom
     cell, comprising:
     [(1)] accessing a number of control gates and ac-
     cessing a bit line, thereby activating a number of
     memory cells, . . . ; [and]
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 SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC                                   9

 claim recited a method comprising accessing a number of
 control gates and “a bit line” to activate a number of cells.
 Id. at 1341. Noting that “Baldwin . . . does not set a hard
 and fast rule that ‘a’ always means one or more than one,”
 we determined that “[t]he plain language of the claim
 clearly indicates that only a single bit line is used when
 accessing a number of cells.” Id. We thus concluded that
 “the correct and only reasonable construction of the claim
 terms ‘a bit line’ and ‘said bit line’ . . . requires that a single
 bit line activates multiple memory cells.” Id. at 1342.
 Stated otherwise, “said bit line” later in the claim must be
 the same, singular bit line as “a bit line” earlier in the
 claim.
      We followed similar reasoning in Convolve, which in-
 volved a claim element introduced with the indefinite arti-
 cle “a” and further defined by certain recited
 characteristics. 812 F.3d at 1321. Specifically, we inter-
 preted “[u]ser interface for . . . working with a processor . . .
 comprising” in claims 1, 3, and 5 to require “a single pro-
 cessor” having all of the subsequently recited characteris-
 tics. Id. (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, we
 considered the subsequent references to the initial proces-
 sor:
     Specifically, claim 1 recites “a processor” in the pre-
     amble before recitation of “comprising,” and the
     claim body uses the definite article “the” to refer to
     the “processor.” This reference to “the processor,”
     referring back to the “a processor” recited in [the]
     preamble, supports a conclusion that the recited
     user interface is “operatively working with” the

     [(2)] subsequent to accessing said bit line, sensing
     the presence of at least one activated cell from said
     number of memory cells . . .
 Harari, 626 F.3d at 1340 (emphasis added).
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 10                              SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC

      same processor to perform all of the recited steps.
      In other words, the claim language requires a pro-
      cessor associated with the user interface to issue
      the shaped commands of the claims. Given this
      claim language, which contrasts with the claims
      described above that allow for multiple processors,
      we conclude that claims 1, 3, and 5 require the user
      interface to work with a single processor in per-
      forming all of the claim steps.
 Id. at 1321.
     Claim 9, however, had no subsequent reference to “the”
 or “said” processor. Because that claim did not reference a
 single processor, we interpreted “a processor” to mean “one
 or more processors” in the context of that claim. See id.
     Finally, in Varma, we considered claims directed to
 performing statistical analyses of investment data.
 816 F.3d at 1355. There, the disputed claim limitation was
 “a statistical analysis request corresponding to two or more
 selected investments.” Id. at 1362. The Patent Trial and
 Appeal Board held that the limitation could be satisfied
 even if two statistical analysis requests were required to
 analyze the “two or more selected investments.” Id. We
 reversed the Board’s decision, explaining that:
      [T]he question is not whether there can be more
      than one request in a claim-covered system: there
      can. Rather, the question is whether “a” can serve
      to negate what is required by the language follow-
      ing “a”: a “request” (a singular term) that “corre-
      spond[s]” to “two or more selected investments.” It
      cannot. For a dog owner to have “a dog that rolls
      over and fetches sticks,” it does not suffice that he
      have two dogs, each able to perform just one of the
      tasks. In the present case, no matter how many
      requests there may be, no matter the variety of the
      requests the system may receive, the system must
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 SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC                              11

     be adapted to receive a request that itself corre-
     sponds to at least two investments.
 Id. at 1362–63.
     Varma thus dealt with claim language that introduces
 a claim element using an indefinite article and further de-
 fines the element with subsequently recited functionality.
 While this structure may allow for more than a single in-
 stance of the claim element, it may nonetheless require
 that a single instance of the element be capable of perform-
 ing all the recited functionality.
     With this precedent in mind, we agree that the district
 court correctly construed the claim term Mr. Salazar chal-
 lenges on appeal. Specifically, the district court properly
 interpreted “a microprocessor for generating . . . , said mi-
 croprocessor creating . . . , a plurality of parameter sets re-
 trieved by said microprocessor . . . , said microprocessor
 generating . . .” to mean “one or more microprocessors, at
 least one of which is configured to perform the generating,
 creating, retrieving, and generating functions.” Claim
 Construction Op., 2020 WL 5608640, at *19. We agree with
 the district court that while the claim term “a microproces-
 sor” does not require there be only one microprocessor, the
 subsequent limitations referring back to “said microproces-
 sor” require that at least one microprocessor be capable of
 performing each of the claimed functions. This approach is
 entirely consistent with our precedent.
     Like the claim language in Convolve and Varma, the
 claim language here requires a singular element—“a mi-
 croprocessor”—to be capable of performing all of the recited
 functionality. See Convolve, 812 F.3d at 1321 (requiring “a
 processor” and “the processor” in claims 1, 3, and 5 to “per-
 form all of the recited steps”); Varma, 816 F.3d at 1362–63
 (finding “a statistical analysis request corresponding to two
 or more selected investments” requires a single request to
 correspond to at least two investments where the subse-
 quent language “makes it unmistakable that at least two
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 12                                 SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC

 investments must be the subject of each statistical analy-
 sis”). This conclusion is bolstered when we consider Con-
 volve’s claim 9, which had no subsequent reference to “the”
 or “said” processor, and thus did not require a single pro-
 cessor. 812 F.3d at 1321. Here, the claim language “a mi-
 croprocessor,” read in the context of the full claim, aligns
 more closely with Convolve’s claims 1, 3, and 5—which re-
 quired “a processor” and “the processor” to perform the re-
 cited functionality—and, like those claims, should be
 construed to require at least one microprocessor capable of
 performing the recited functions.
     Mr. Salazar would have us read the phrase “one or
 more” in the district court’s claim construction to mean
 “any one of the one or more” when referring to the later-
 recited functions. Appellant’s Br. 35. We decline to do so.
 Although Mr. Salazar insists that the phrase “said micro-
 processor” “simply reinvokes th[e] non-singular meaning,”
 Id. at 22 (quoting Baldwin, 512 F.3d at 1342), the claim’s
 use of “said” does not negate what is required by the lan-
 guage that follows “said”: a “microprocessor” that “gen-
 erat[es],” “creat[es],” and “retriev[es].” As we stated in
 Varma, “[f]or a dog owner to have ‘a dog that rolls over and
 fetches sticks,’ it does not suffice that he have two dogs,
 each able to perform just one of the tasks.” 816 F.3d at
 1363. Here, it does not suffice to have multiple micropro-
 cessors, each able to perform just one of the recited func-
 tions; the claim language requires at least one
 microprocessor capable of performing each of the recited
 functions.
     Because we agree with the district court’s claim con-
 struction, we affirm its judgment of noninfringement.
                               II
      We now turn to AT&T’s cross-appeal challenging
 (1) the district court’s ruling that Mr. Salazar’s claims were
 not barred by claim preclusion or the Kessler doctrine; and
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 SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC                               13

 (2) the district court’s finding that the asserted claims were
 not invalid as anticipated.
     At oral argument, AT&T agreed that we need not reach
 its preclusion arguments if we affirm the district court’s
 judgment of noninfringement. See Oral Arg. at 9:46–10:10,
 https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=21
 -2320_11072022.mp3. As explained above, we affirm the
 district court’s judgment and, accordingly, do not address
 this issue.
      Finally, we turn to AT&T’s anticipation argument. The
 jury found that the asserted claims were not anticipated,
 and the district court subsequently entered judgment con-
 sistent with that finding. On appeal, AT&T argues that
 “[i]t was reversible error for the district court to hold that
 asserted claims 1–7, 27–30, and 34[] are not anticipated”
 because AT&T “presented substantial, clear and convinc-
 ing evidence” that the asserted claims are anticipated.
 Cross-Appellants’ Br. 49–50. But AT&T failed to move for
 judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil
 Procedure 50. Its failure to do so dooms this argument.
      A party must make proper motions under Rule 50 in
 order to appeal an adverse verdict on grounds relating to
 the sufficiency of the evidence. See Retractable Techs., Inc.
 v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
 2011) (“Rule 50(a)(2) requires the moving party” to make
 its motion for judgment as a matter of law “to preserve the
 issue.”); Feld Motor Sports, Inc. v. Traxxas, L.P., 861 F.3d
 591, 596 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[T]his court has jurisdiction to
 hear an appeal of the district court’s legal conclusions . . . ,
 but only if it is sufficiently preserved in a Rule 50 motion.”).
 Here, AT&T did not move under Rule 50 regarding any va-
 lidity ground, including anticipation. As a result, it never
 challenged the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to
 anticipation before the district court, and it has therefore
 waived its anticipation challenge on appeal.
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 14                             SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC

     Hoping to correct its error, AT&T requests we “liberally
 constru[e]” Rule 50(a) to require parties to move under that
 Rule only if “‘the court [or opposing] attorneys needed any
 more enlightenment about [the appellant’s] position on
 those issues.’” Cross-Appellants’ Reply Br. 19–20 (quoting
 Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1380
 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). But AT&T’s reliance on Blackboard is
 misplaced. In Blackboard, the defendant made “cursory”
 Rule 50(a) motions regarding anticipation and obvious-
 ness, and the district court acknowledged those motions.
 574 F.3d at 1379. We held that “in light of the Fifth Cir-
 cuit’s practice of liberally construing the rule,” the cursory
 motions and “the district judge’s prompt statement that he
 would take both motions under advisement, made clear
 that no more was necessary to serve the purposes of
 Rule 50(a).” Id. at 1379–80.
      That was not the case here. In contrast to the defend-
 ant in Blackboard, AT&T explicitly expressed to the dis-
 trict court that it would not move under Rule 50(a)
 regarding anticipation:
      THE COURT: Let me hear from Defendants.
      What matters do Defendants seek relief on under
      Rule 50(a)?
      [COUNSEL FOR AT&T]: Your Honor, we intend
      to seek relief on issues of infringement, damages,
      and preclusion.
      THE COURT: Not          on    anticipation    under
      Rule 102?
      [COUNSEL FOR AT&T]: We are not moving un-
      der Rule 50(a) for anticipation.
 J.A. 1572 (Trial Tr. 198:16–22). In other words, AT&T
 clearly disavowed any intention to move for judgment as a
 matter of law regarding anticipation. Accordingly, even
 under the most liberal construction of the requirements of
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 SALAZAR   v. AT&T MOBILITY LLC                          15

 Rule 50(a), AT&T has nevertheless waived its anticipation
 argument.
                         CONCLUSION
      We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
 affirm the judgment of noninfringement.
                         AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.