Court Opinion

ID: 9505600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:07:08.998986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:38.484012
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
It has long been bedrock law that the sentence for a crime is the sentence in existence when the crime was committed, unless it is apparent that the legislature intended to ameliorate the criminal law and give perpetrators a retroactive benefit. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1112 (Ind.1997). As the majority indicates, the General Assembly expressly precluded application of the 1977 sentencing scheme to persons who committed crimes before October 1,1977. Op. at 124.
In Landaw v. State, 258 Ind. 67, 68, 279 N.E.2d 230, 231 (1972) we held that “[i]t is clearly within the sole power of the Legislature to fix the punishment for crimes, and this Court has no power to alter that legislative determination.” We have specifically upheld the constitutional authority of the legislature to make sentencing changes prospective only. Parsley v. State, 273 Ind. 46, 401 N.E.2d 1360 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862, 101 S.Ct. 166, 66 L.Ed.2d 79 (1980).
I conclude that the trial court therefore had no authority to modify Dobeski’s sentence in a manner that ignored the legislature’s decision to make the 1977 sentencing scheme prospective only. The fact that the court acted upon an agreement of the parties seems to me not to affect the court’s power. In effect, the trial court granted parole, but, of course, parole is not within a court’s domain.
I think today’s decision both impinges on the distribution of powers dictated by the Indiana Constitution and untethers us from long-established law. I am concerned about where this arrow, once shot in the air, may come to ground.