Court Opinion

ID: 9809821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:29:07.411292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:37.926857
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
dissenting. The opinion of the court seems to be based entirely upon the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, with the burden of proof as to that issue resting, of course, upon the defendant. The plaintiff received the telegram at exactly the time when bis train was scheduled to leave, and at once asked bis partner to inquire by telephone at tire Southern station if the- train to Atlanta was on time. He was answered that it was on time. What more would a man of reasonable prudence have done ? Was it contributory negligence per se to depend upon a railroad schedule or upon an answer from a railroad office ? Surely railroad neg*729ligence has not gone so far as to raise snob a legal presumption.
The defendant asked for an instruction which practically charged the plaintiff out of court, and which I think was too favorable to the defendant even with the qualification added by bis Honor, to the effect that “any negligence of the defendant (plaintiff) might be also considered in connection with the information received by Pierce as to the movement of the train” (quoting from opinion). I think the qualification was entirely correct In applying the rule of “the prudent man” we must consider the condition of the plaintiff, with bis knowledge and sources of information. In bis distress, and having perhaps some necessary arrangements to, make, be asked bis partner to telephone to the Southern station. Although not stated in the record, it is evident that Pierce did as requested and that.the answer came from the .station. What more would ordinary prudence have dictated ? It is practically admitted in the opinion that the defendant was negligent. In view of its own negligence and the obvious nature of the telegram, how easy and reasonable it would have been for the defendant to have sent one of its messenger boys to find out whether the train was on time, and to have notified the plaintiff.
In Hollowell v. Ins. Co., 126 N. C., 398, the plaintiff had been in the habit of paying his premium by sending a check to the defendant by mail. One of these checks did not reach the defendant before the day of forfeiture. This court held that the defendant could not cancel the policy upon proof that the plaintiff deposited the letter containing the check in the postoffice in time to reach the defendant in due course of mail before the hour of forfeiture. The court says on page 404: “A remittance by mail or other method is at the risk' of the debtor.But the regularity of the mail, a public agency, is such that it is not negligence to rely upon *730it, especially when such method of transmission has been previously the course of dealings between the parties, and there was no express revocation of it.” It would seem difficult to entirely separate the regularity of the mails from the regularity of the trains that carry the mails.