Court Opinion

ID: 9592866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:17:36.649186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:34.676840
License: Public Domain

Fahrnbruch, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion. The thrust of that opinion is not whether Dr. Golden was equipped to testify as an expert on brain damage. The thrust of the majority opinion is that Dr. Golden’s opinion as stated in the offer of proof was inadmissible because it is couched in alternatives, one of which *502is no more than a “possibility” and does not meet the certainty required. I concur that Dr. Golden’s opinion set forth in the offer of proof was not admissible at trial.
On appeal, a trial judge’s reason for excluding expert testimony is not controlling. The issue is whether the trial judge’s ruling achieved a correct result. A correct result will not be reversed merely because a trial judge reached that correct result for an incorrect reason. Parker v. St. Elizabeth Comm. Health Ctr., 226 Neb. 526, 412 N.W.2d 469 (1987); Gordman Properties Co. v. Board of Equal., 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).
It should further be pointed out that Mary Sanchez, the plaintiff in this case, was permitted through the testimony of Dr. Golden to place before the jury substantial compensable damages.
Dr. Golden was permitted to testify before the jury as to plaintiff’s pain, behavior changes, the onset of headaches and pain in plaintiff’s back and left hand, numbness in her face, and a variety of other problems. Dr. Golden was asked if the plaintiff suffered from any disorders, to which he responded in the affirmative. He testified that in his opinion the plaintiff was suffering from a chronic pain syndrome; had pain in her neck, headaches that were very frequent and at times continuous, difficulties with anxiety and depression, weakness, and some weakness in her left hand; and that
her moods would swing from depression to being very happy to going back to depression again fairly unexpectedly and without — not easily predictable. And basically the diagnosis of the chronic pain syndrome means that she had a pain problem for more than six months that had not responded to medical treatment and that was not changing, was not going away.
Dr. Golden further testified that the plaintiff’s chronic pain syndrome was caused by the accident she had in April of 1982, the accident that has relevancy to this case.
Dr. Golden was permitted to testify over objection that he had an opinion as to whether the plaintiff’s condition he had described as a posttraumatic stress disorder and reaction to chronic pain in a previously marginal personality was a *503disabling condition. He then testified:
At the present time in terms of her capacity to work, we find that it is . . . 100% disabling; that in her current condition at that time as well as now, she would not be able to hold a job successfully. In terms of her overall life adjustment, the disability would be about 35%.
Dr. Golden was also permitted to testify that the cost of treatment for the plaintiff’s condition would be in the range of $25,000 to $50,000 and that the treatment would last up to 50 weeks. He also testified that the residual 35-percent disability in the future would last the rest of plaintiff’s life as a result “of this incident” if she did not receive proper treatment.
The issue decided by the majority opinion is not the competency of Dr. Golden to testify as to brain damage. I agree with the majority that Dr. Golden’s opinion as stated in the offer of proof is couched in alternatives, one of which is no more than a “possibility” and does not meet the certainty required.