Court Opinion

ID: 9744247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:57:55.631384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:47.856995
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Emmert, C. J.
The appellant, Edmond Johnson, was charged in the State of Arizona with neglect of his wife. The affidavit, omitting the formal parts, was as follows:
“Personally appeared before me this 10th day of January, 1956, Cleo Johnson, who being duly sworn, complains and says that one: Edmond Johnson on or about the 15th day of February, 1955, at Precinct No. one, County and State aforesaid, committed a felony as follows, to-wit:
NEGLECT OF WIFE
That the said Edmond Johnson, being the husband of Cleo Johnson, and being able to provide for her support, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully neglect and refuse to provide said Cleo Johnson with the necessary food, clothing, shelter and medical attendance, he not being justified by any misconduct on her part in so doing, all in violation of R. S. A. Section 13-803.
All of which is contrary to the form of statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Arizona.”
*13Raul H. Castro, County Attorney for the County of Pima, State of Arizona, filed a certificate with the Governor of Arizona, among other things alleging:
“Seventh: That the offense charged was committed on or about the 15th day of February, 1955, in Pima County, State of Arizona.”
“Tenth: That the fugitive was within the State of Arizona at the time of the commission of the offense charged.”
The warrant of Governor Craig of Indiana recited that the requisition of Ernest W. McFarland, Governor of the State of Arizona, dated April 2, 1956, demanded that appellant “be arrested as a fugitive from justice of the State of Arizona aforesaid.”
These facts appear in the record without dispute, and at the hearing on the complaint for a writ of habeas corpus appellant, by counsel, properly offered to prove “That he has not been within the State of Arizona since the year 1951; that he has not fled from justice from the State of Arizona, or from any other State, and that at the time of the alleged offense committed in the State of Arizona, the petitioner was in the State of Indiana.” He was charged with having committed the offense in the State of Arizona on or about the date named in the affidavit by his wife. He was not charged with having committed an act in Indiana or another state intentionally resulting in a crime in Arizona, and it was not alleged he was not in Arizona at the time of the commission of the crime and that he had not fled therefrom. When we affirm the judgment of the trial court for the appellee, we are condemning him on a charge not made, which under the Indiana cases is contrary to law, and, under the federal cases, is a denial of due process of law.
But aside from that I fail to see how we can escape *14the conclusion that §6 and §20 of the 1935 Uniform Criminal Extradition Act offend the federal Constitution.
It is well settled that the rules on international extradition do not apply to interstate extradition. Knox v. State (1905), 164 Ind. 226, 73 N. E. 255, and cases therein cited. The federal Constitution makes provision for extradition as follows: “A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.” (Italics added.) Article 4, §2, Clause 2, Constitution of the United States.
The federal extradition act (February 12, 1793) was set out in full in Hyatt v. New York ex rel. Corkran (1903), 188 U. S. 691, 23 S. Ct. 456, 47 L. Ed. 657, 660. The present federal extradition act (June 25, 1948), Title 18, §3182, U. S. C. A., is almost the same as the 1793 Act with the exception the latter Act applies to a District or Territory, that a defendant is entitled to a discharge within thirty days if the agent from the demanding state does not appear, and the section makes no provision for the payment of costs. It is set out in full in the note.1
*15The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on interstate extradition are binding upon each of the states.
“ . . . And it was the duty of that court [North Carolina court] to administer the law prescribed by the Constitution and statute of the United States, as construed by this Court. Second Employers’ Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 55, 56 L. ed. 327, 348, 32 S. Ct. 169, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44, 1 N. C. C. A. 75; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, 326, 60 L. ed. 1022, 1025, 36 S. Ct. 555, L. R. A. 1917A, 265.” South Carolina v. Bailey (1932), 289 U. S. 412, 420, 53 S. Ct. 667, 77 L. Ed. 1292, 1296.
We have no authority to overrule the latest decision of the Supreme Count of the United States on interstate extradition, nor can the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act or the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act do that.
There is nothing sacrosanct about a uniform act that may be enacted by the General Assembly. It is true we indulge the presumption that it is prima facie constitutional, but the presumption in favor of a uniform act is no greater than the presumption for any other statute, regardless of the agency which may- have drafted it. Our experience with the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways clearly proves a uniform act can be defective just the same as any other , act not properly drafted may be defective. Kelley v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 294, 119 N. E. 2d 322; McClanahan v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 567, 112 N. E. 2d 575.
In Hyatt v. New York ex rel. Corkran (1903), 188 U. S. 691, 713, 23 S. Ct. 456, 47 L. Ed. 657, 662, supra, *16the relator was indicted in the state of Tennessee for the crime of grand larceny and false pretenses. It was conceded that he was not personally present in Tennessee at the time charged. The court held constructive presence within the demanding state was not sufficient under the federal Constitution and the enabling act, and reasoned as follows: “It is difficult to see how a person can be said to have fled from the state in which he is charged to have committed some act amounting to a crime against that state, when in fact he was not within the state at the time the act is said to have been committed. How can a person flee from a place that he was not in? He could avoid a place that he had not been in; he could omit to go to it; but how can it be said with accuracy that he has fled from a place in which he had not been present? This is neither a narrow, nor, as we think, an incorrect, interpretation of the statute. It has been in existence since 1793, and we have found no case decided by this court wherein it has been held that the statute covered a case where the party was not in the state at the time when the act is alleged to have been committed. We think the plain meaning of the act requires such presence, and that it was not intended to include, as a fugitive from justice of a state, one who had not been in the state at the time when, if ever, the offense was committed, and who had not, therefore, in fact, fled therefrom.”
It is not necessary that a defendant charged with crime in the demanding state should have left that state for the purpose of avoiding prosecution under the federal Constitution. Hogan v. O’Neill (1921), 255 U. S. 52, 56, 41 S. Ct. 222, 65 L. Ed. 497. But that is not a holding that a defendant does not have to flee from justice and be found in another state as required *17by the federal Constitution [Art. 4, §2, Clause 2, Constitution of the United States.] The court made that clear by the following language: “To be regarded as a fugitive from justice it is not necessary that one shall have left the state in which the crime is alleged to have been committed for the very purpose of avoiding prosecution, but simply that, having committed there an act which, by the law of the state, constitutes a crime, he afterwards has departed from its jurisdiction, and, when sought to be prosecuted, is found within the territory of another state. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95-97, 29 L. Ed. 544, 549, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 372-375, 49 L. Ed. 515-518, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 227, et seq., 51 L. Ed. 161, 163, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122, 7 Ann. Cas. 1073; Illinois ex rel. McNichols v. Pease, 207 U. S. 100, 108, 109, 52 L. Ed. 121, 124, 125, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58; Biddinger v. Police Comrs., 245 U. S. 128, 133, 134, 62 L. Ed. 193, 198, 199, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 41.” Hogan v. O’Neill (1921), 255 U. S. 52, 56, 41 S. Ct. 222, 65 L. Ed. 497, 500, supra.
The proponents of §6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, §9-424, Burns’ 1956 Replacement, rest their case on a mistake in the interpretation of the opinion in Innes v. Tobin (1916), 240 U. S. 127, 36 S. Ct. 290, 60 L. Ed. 562. See Constitutional Aspects of State Extradition Legislation, 28 Ind. L. Jl. 662; P. Warren Green, Duties of the Asylum State Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 30 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 295, 324. In Innes v. Tobin, supra, the accused was extradited from Oregon to Texas where she was charged with murder, and a conspiracy to commit murder. She was tried and acquitted in Texas, but the State of Georgia then made *18a demand for her delivery to an agent of the State of Georgia for removal there as a fugitive from justice. The court held she should be extradited to Georgia. It did not hold that constructive presence in Georgia was sufficient for extradition. The court assumed there had been a flight from Georgia. It stated specifically, “Coming in the light of these principles to apply the statute, it is not open to question that its provisions expressly or by necessary implication prohibited the surrender of a person in one state for removal as a fugitive to another where it clearly appears that the person was not and could not have been a fugitive from justice of the demanding state. [Italics added.] Ex Parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 29 L. Ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1148, 5 Am. Crim. Rep. 218; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 29 L. Ed. 544, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; Hyatt v. New York, 118 U. S. 691, 47 L. Ed. 657, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 311; Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 392, 52 L. Ed. 540, 543, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392, 13 Ann. Cas. 905.” The court specifically held, “The Constitution provides for the rendition to a state of a person who shall have fled from justice and be found in another state; that is, for the-surrender by the state in which the fugitive is found.” It did not hold that a statute broader than the constitutional limitations would be valid. The court, -by dicta, said the federal statute was not as broad as the Constitution and therefore the extradition to- Georgia -was proper since Congress had not legislated upon the matter. It is impossible to see how §6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, §9-424, Burns’ 1956 -Replacement,2 stating that an accused may be extradited-even though he was not in the demanding state at the time-of the commission of the . alleged- offense, -and had-, not fled *19therefrom* can be constitutional when extradition is only authorized for those “who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state” and “shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he has fled, be delivered up- . . .” Section 6 of the Act is a plain attempt to amend the federal Constitution by state statute. P. Warren Green, Duties of the Asylum State Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 30 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 295, 323, 324. Until and unless the Supreme Court of the United States overrules some of its prior decisions, constructive presence in a demanding state is not sufficient for interstate extradition no matter how desirable it may be to extradite husbands who, after many years’ absence, fail and neglect to support their wives in other states. If the problem is to be solved in a constitutional manner it should be by interstate compact by assent of Congress under Article 1, §10, Clause 3 of the Constitution. See Interstate Act on Parole and Probation, §9-3001, et seq., Burns’ 1958 Replacement.
It is also apparent from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that Taylor v. Smith (1938), 213 Ind. 640, 13 N. E. 2d 954, is in direct conflict with South Carolina v. Bailey (1933), 289 U. S. 412, 53 S. Ct. 667, 77 L. Ed. 1292, and it should be overruled. In the Taylor case, Smith stood charged by indictment in the County of King, State of New York, with the crimes of damaging a building or vessel by explosives —endangering life by maliciously placing explosives near a building — permitting and maintaining a public nuisance — and possession of stink bombs. This court, without discussing a single decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, held Smith was not entitled to show in a habeas corpus hearing that he was within the State of Indiana at the time of the commission of *20the charged offenses. The opinion was based upon §20 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which purported to limit the defenses to a showing that the person held was not the person charged with crime. This was error, and contravened the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In South Carolina v. Bailey (1933), 289 U. S. 412, 53 S. Ct. 667, 77 L. Ed. 1292, supra, Bailey was charged with murdering a police officer in Greenville, South Carolina. He was found in North Carolina, and on a habeas corpus hearing in North Carolina he introduced evidence showing he was not in South Carolina, but was in North Carolina on the day of the murder. The evidence at the hearing was conflicting on this issue and the court held, “he should not have been released unless it appeared beyond reasonable doubt that he was without the State of South Carolina when the alleged offense was committed and, consequently, could not be a fugitive from her justice.” (Page 1297 of 77 L. Ed.)
It is beyond the power of any state to prevent an accused from proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not within the demanding state at the time of the offense, and therefore under the Constitution could not have been a fugitive from justice. Necessarily this involves the alleged guilt of the accused, and §20 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, §9-438, Burns’ 1956 Replacement, is unconstitutional to the extent that it attempts to prohibit an accused from showing that he was not in the demanding state at the time of the offense.
It is to be noted that the appellant is not charged in Arizona with having committed any act therein. He is charged there with an omission to act. Under the holding of the majority opinion an accused who was never in the state where his wife might presently re*21side could then be charged with her non-support and be extradited thereto without being able to show on a habeas corpus hearing that he never was within the state. A state extradition act which pretends to authorize such procedure is not implementing the federal Constitution; it is attempting to remake and enlarge the federal Constitution. A state decision which approves such state legislation can be no more than an attempt to authorize state legislative amendment of the federal Constitution, as well as overrule all the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that have construed the federal Constitution on interstate extradition.
Obviously, the effect of the precedent made by this court is not limited to non-support offenses. Under it, Arizona could enact a statute making it a misdemeanor for a son to fail to care for the grave of his father there buried. The son may never have been in Arizona since his father’s death so that the state could fasten the duty upon him, yet when the son is found in Indiana he could be extradited to Arizona without being entitled to show on a trial of a complaint for habeas corpus in Indiana, that he had never been in Arizona. No uniform act can stretch the police power of any state into an amendment of the federal Constitution, nor can it rewrite the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States on what an accused may prove on a habeas corpus hearing on extradition.
I would reverse the judgment.
Note.—Reported in 148 N. E. 2d 413.

. “Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. *15If no suck agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.” June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 822. Title 18, §3182, U. S. C. A.

. Nor is §3-3105, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, constitutional.