Court Opinion

ID: 9848120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:13:12.083918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:02.844793
License: Public Domain

Ingram, Justice,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent to the judgment affirming the conviction in this case solely on the basis of the majority opinion’s reliance on the holding of this court in Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 518 (192 SE2d 350) to decide that this defendant was not compelled to give evidence against himself. It should be perfectly obvious that an unconscious man is not in a position to protect his constitutional rights. The appellant did not even have the same right extended to a conscious person to take either a breath test or blood test or lose his driver’s license. He was given no choice at all. If the law regards a choice important to a man who may be charged only with driving under the influence, or the loss of a license, it would seem even more important for a person who may be charged with murder to have such a choice.
But all this is minuscule compared to the use against the defendant of his own blood as evidence to convict him. I realize that in the federal courts and in many state courts the privilege against self-incrimination extends only to testimony and documents. (E. g., *520see Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (31 SC 2, 54 LE 1021); People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal. 2d 105 (194 P2d 681); State v. Sturtevant, 96 N. H. 99 (70 A2d 909); State v. Blair, 45 N. J. 43 (211 A2d 196); and Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (41 SC 261, 65 LE 647). But whatever the related rule might be in other jurisdictions, I have always considered that Georiga was more jealous of the rights of its citizens than most others. Until this court decided the Creamer case, it has been fairly common knowledge in Georgia legal circles, acknowledged in courtroom and seminar "shoptalk” alike, that our law against self-incrimination was not so limited as to cover only testimony. Our statute (Code Ann. § 38-416) states unequivocally that no person shall be compelled to "give evidence” (not just testimony) against himself. Any trial lawyer knows that the word "evidence” includes more than testimony. The statute is too plain to be misunderstood.
I cannot conclude that the rule of stare decisis compels me to hold that it is lawful to take blood from an unconscious person and use it to convict him of murder over his objection, while it is unlawful to require the driver of a truck to drive onto scales to determine if the truck is overweight, as in Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132 (137 SE2d 463). To distinguish the holding in the present case from Aldrich by observing that this defendant was not required to remove the blood himself is an insufficient distinction.
Finally, it must be noted that in Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, supra, this court stated on motion for rehearing (p. 527) that "while the bullet may incriminate the defendant when removed, the question as to its safe removal is a distinct issue which in no wise incriminates him, . . .” Thus, the precise question of whether the bullet after removal could be used as evidence against Creamer in a subsequent trial was not faced or answered by this court. But it is a question which has been faced here and I dissent to the holding in this case which extends the Creamer decision to permit the use of "tainted” blood to convict. Settled Georgia law since 1866 leads me to a different conclusion from the majority.
I am authorized to state Mr. Justice Gunter joins in this dissent.