Court Opinion

ID: 9516944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:57:09.174894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:35.867035
License: Public Domain

Jones, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the orders of the Appellate Division. Both trial courts erred in not instructing the jury to make a finding that the persons who “aided” and were “actually present” had any degree of mental culpability. In my view, the gang assault statutes, sections 120.06 and 120.07 of the Penal Law, require that all members involved in the assault have the specific intent to cause physical injury—the lowest degree of mental culpability applicable to the crime of assault in any degree (see Penal Law art 120).
The gang assault statutes, which were added by the Laws of 1996, specifically recognize the danger posed by group assaults. The stated purpose of this legislation was “to enhance public safety by creating two assault crimes, gang assault in the first and second degrees, in recognition of the severity of assaults committed by gangs” (Senate Introducer’s Mem in Support, at 1, Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 647, at 6). Penal Law §§ 120.06 and 120.07 created more severe penalties, class B and C violent felonies, when assaults were committed by a person while “aided by two or more other persons actually present.”
There is no dispute that an enhanced punishment is warranted because of the greater potential for harm and fear engendered by a group assault. Nevertheless, I do not agree that this crime is committed by a defendant when the persons who aided in the offense have no criminal intent—the position taken by the majority and the prosecution. My view is supported by the legislative history of the statutes (Governor’s Program Bill Mem, at 2, Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 647, at 7, 1996 NY Legis Ann, at 476 [In the bill sponsor’s statement in support, it was noted that gang assaults are serious crimes, warranting enhanced punishment, because the “joint (or ‘shared’) action of numerous assailants is not only terrifying to victims but tends to increase the likelihood that severe or lethal injuries will be inflicted”]).
*569Moreover, the crime of gang assault must adhere to the basic principles of culpability defined in Penal Law § 15.05. It is axiomatic that culpable mental states must be proven together with an “actus reus” in order to constitute a crime. Further, the statutory mandate of Penal Law § 15.05 cannot be ignored by implication. In order to negate the requirement of mental culpability the Legislature would have to specifically include language in the statute and so declare (see e.g. Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199, 204 [1987]).
Thus, the culpable mental states provided under the Penal Law cannot be presumed to have been written out of the gang assault statutes. To hold otherwise would subject a defendant to the enhanced level of assault without proof that the two or more other persons committed any act or had the appropriate mens rea to be convicted of any criminal offense. In other words, a defendant could be convicted of gang assault merely because there were uninvolved bystanders in the area or unwitting aiders.
Relying on the Appellate Division decision in People v Green (126 AD2d 105 [2d Dept 1987], affd on other grounds 71 NY2d 1006 [1988]), the majority takes the position that a person can be found guilty of gang assault when aided by another actually present even though that other person lacked any mental culpability. Green relies on the 1965 amendment to the robbery in the second degree statute in which the requirement that the aider be an “accomplice” (i.e., one with the same mental culpability as the primary actor) was replaced with the language “another person actually present” (Penal Law § 160.10 [l]).1 The majority seems to conclude that the change in statutory language did away with the requirement that those charged with aiding need not have any mental culpability. In other words, if the primary actor had the necessary mental culpability it does not matter that a person alleged to be aiding and actually present had no culpable mental state. In discussing the statutory revision, however, the Green court stated as follows: “We find this revision significant and believe that it reflects an intention by the Legislature to permit a much lesser degree of mental culpability to constitute aid under this robbery statute” (Green, 126 AD2d at 110 [emphasis added]). By this language *570the court did not eliminate the requirement of a culpable mental state. Indeed, the court points out that all of the parties need not have the same degree of mental culpability, but should have the mental culpability appropriate to the commission of the underlying crime. In this respect, Green is not inconsistent with my position.
To the extent that Green suggests that the minimum culpable mental state required of an aider should be that of a person who commits criminal facilitation in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 115.00 [1]), I disagree. Criminal facilitation “is addressed to a kind of accessorial conduct in which the actor aids the commission of a crime with knowledge that he is doing so but wdthout any specific intent to participate therein or to benefit therefrom” (Staff Notes of Temp St Commn on Rev of Penal Law and Grim Code, 1964 Proposed NY Penal Law [Study Bill, 1964 Senate Intro 3918, Assembly Intro 5376] art 115, at 328). Such conduct is generally “confined to preparation so attenuated from the final stages that the role of the facilitator is only remotely related as a cause or contributor to the ultimate crime” (People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371, 377 [1973]). Thus, contrary to the presence requirement of the aiders under the gang assault statutes, most persons charged with criminal facilitation are not present at the scene of the crime being facilitated. This point alone renders the offense of criminal facilitation inapplicable to the questions now before this Court. Based on the foregoing, the majority’s and concurrence’s reliance on Green is misplaced.2
The case that most accurately addresses the main issue before this Court is People v Coleman (5 AD3d 956, 958 [3d Dept 2004]). In Coleman, the court held that where a person is charged with robbery in the second degree, the person “aiding” must have “intent to aid . . . [in] stealing.” That is, there needs to be a “shared intent” by two persons when one is charged with second-degree robbery. Likewise, where a defendant is *571charged with gang assault, he/she must have a shared intent with the aiders. I now consider the cases before us.
In Sanchez, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
“[A] person is actually present when such person is in a position to render immediate assistance to a person participating in the assault and is ready, willing and able to do so irrespective of whether such person intended to cause physical injury.
“Because of this definition of actually present, even if you find an individual defendant not guilty of this crime, because the People have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the intent required for the commission of the crime, you can still find another defendant or defendants guilty if you find that the not guilty defendant was actually present as I defined that term and that all the elements of the crime are proven by the People beyond a reasonable doubt.”
These instructions were improper because under them, the jury could convict defendant of gang assault based solely on another defendant’s presence. Stated differently, the Sanchez court instructed the jury that it could find a defendant guilty even if the other persons charged in the gang assault were found not guilty by reason of having no mental culpability. Moreover, the trial court’s inclusion of the “ready, willing and able” language in the context of a criminal case is troubling in a number of respects. First, this language is typically used as a contract term, such as in a property conveyance. Second, and more significantly, using the “ready, willing and able” language to “instruct” a jury ensures a hopelessly indefinite charge because it contains no objective standard by which an alleged aider’s conduct can be assessed. Without an objective standard, absurd results may occur. Thus, the Sanchez court’s charge amounts to reversible error.
In Mynin, the trial court first instructed the jury on accomplice liability. The court stated: “To be criminally responsible as a person acting in concert with another person, the defendant must intentionally aid in the commission of the crime and act with the requisite culpable mental state for that offense.” The court then instructed the jury on gang assault in the second degree, informing the jury that the instruction on gang assault was separate from its charge on acting in concert. In particular, the trial court stated that (1) the third element of gang assault *572in the second degree is that defendant was aided by two or more persons actually present and (2) defendant could be convicted even if his aiders were found to have no mental culpability.
The Mynin court’s instructions were clearly improper. Not only did the court give an incorrect charge regarding the mental culpability of aiders in a gang assault case, the Mynin instructions were confusing and contradictory (as evidenced by the numerous jury notes seeking clarification on the number of participants, whether all participants must have “shared intent,” and what constitutes “aiding” versus “acting in concert”).
In short, the trial courts in both Sanchez and Mynin erred when, among other things, they instructed the jury that it could find a defendant guilty even if the other persons charged in the gang assault were found not guilty by reason of having no mental culpability.
Further, the acquittal of the codefendants in Mynin effectively eliminated the “aided” requirement of the gang assault statutes and made it impossible to convict the remaining defendant of gang assault. The statutes unequivocally provide that at least three persons be involved in a gang assault. Therefore, one person may not be found singularly guilty of a crime which requires the participation of at least three (see e.g. People v Palmer, 135 AD2d 1103 [4th Dept 1987]; People v Fallon, 78 AD2d 659 [2d Dept 1980]).
Finally, if the majority’s position is (1) they have not held “that no mens rea is required of an aider” and (2) they “have no occasion to define the exact intent needed” (majority op at 566), not only has the majority failed to provide guidance to the trial courts and bar as to the precise mental culpability of aiders in a gang assault context, they have not addressed the above stated deficiencies in the Sanchez and Mynin instructions.
For all of the foregoing reasons, both of these convictions should be reversed.
Judges Graffeo, Read and Smith concur with Judge Pigott; Judge Smith concurs in a separate concurring opinion; Judge Jones dissents and votes to reverse in another opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Ciparick concur.
In each case: Order affirmed.

. I agree that the gang assault statutes, and specifically the phrase “aided by two or more other persons actually present,” were modeled after the amended robbery in the second degree statute.

. People v Hedgeman (70 NY2d 533 [1987]) and People v Dennis (75 NY2d 821 [1990]), two cases upon which the majority relies, are distinguishable from the cases at bar and, in any event, of no moment. Both cases involved robbery in the second degree and define “actually present” at the scene. In Hedgeman, this Court held that the defendant was guilty only of robbery in the third degree because the accomplice was not in proximity to the scene of the robbery. In Dennis, the defendant’s conviction of robbery in the second degree was based upon the accomplice’s testimony and the getaway driver’s near presence at the robbery. On the contrary, the common issue in Sanchez and Mynin is what is the mental culpability of the aiders.