Court Opinion

ID: 9499347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:45:25.466311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:26.379961
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to more fully explicate Plaintiffs standing to challenge Michigan’s Recusal Rule. In my view, Plaintiff has established standing to sue both in his own right, and on behalf of his present and future clients.
Three elements comprise the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressibility. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). A plaintiff can establish injury in fact by showing that he suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Where a plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment, he must demonstrate “a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff contends that the Rule violates his own due process rights inasmuch as he *647stands to suffer the deprivation of his property interest in fees and in his client base, and of his liberty interest in practicing his chosen profession, absent any prior procedural review. (See Pl.’s Br. at 30 (alleging “significant possibility of future harm” in the form of “loss of substantial income”); Compl. at ¶ 10; J.A. at 9 (claiming violation of his right “to pursue his chosen profession ... free from reprisal for exercising his First Amendment rights”)) This doubtless constitutes a cognizable injury to legally protected interests. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-13, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (loss of income constitutes injury in fact to physicians); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291-92, 119 S.Ct. 1292, 143 L.Ed.2d 399 (1999) (acknowledging “that the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes some generalized due process right to choose one’s field of private employment”). A substantial controversy exists in this case, characterized by the “significant possibility” of harm to Plaintiffs economic and professional interests in the future. See Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir.1998).
The significant possibility of future harm here is born of the Justices’ past construction and application of the Michigan Recusal Rule. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974) (“[P]ast wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.”); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (“It is the reality of the threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiffs subjective apprehensions.”). The immediacy and reality of the threat of future harm flow from the fact that many of Plaintiffs cases have been appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, and that notwithstanding the “acrimonious and well-publicized dialogue” between Plaintiff and the Justices, the Justices have declined to recuse themselves from consideration of those appeals. Additionally, Plaintiff continues to represent clients before Michigan’s tribunals, and to undertake representation of new clients. Cf. Zwickler, 394 U.S. at 109, 89 S.Ct. 956 (finding no controversy of “sufficient immediacy and reality” in a challenge to a law criminalizing distribution of anonymous handbills given the low likelihood that the targeted “Congressman would again be a candidate” for office). The State of Michigan itself has licensed Plaintiff in this regard, and he engages in the endeavor of legal representation as a profession. He therefore demonstrates a “realistic threat” of being subject to a forum in which he asserts the Rule should apply. Thus, Plaintiff asserts a cognizable injury for purposes of standing.
A causal connection must also exist “between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). That is, the injury must “be fairly traceable to the challenged action.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 180, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315. Plaintiff asserts that the Michigan Recusal Rule either applies to the Michigan Supreme Court, or violates his due process rights both facially and as-applied. The injuries alleged to Plaintiffs economic and professional interests flow directly from the Rule inasmuch as the Justices interpret the Rule to apply only to Michigan’s lower courts and court of appeals. See Fieger v. Ferry, No. 04-60089, Slip Op. at 3 (E.D.Mich. Jan. 13, 2005) (noting that “recent practice of the Michigan Supreme Court indicates that, al*648though the court does entertain motions for recusal or disqualification, it does not follow the procedures set forth in MCR 2.003”). These injuries do not “result[] from the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 757, 104 S.Ct. 3315 (citations omitted). Rather, the deprivation alleged is “fairly traceable” to the Rule which, as interpreted by the Justices, provides no mechanism for review and requires no statement on the record of the rationale supporting the Justices recusal decisions.
Further, “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citations omitted); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315. Here, the Court looks to “the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 3315. A favorable decision in this case would redress the injury advanced. On remand, the district court is capable of providing relief sufficient to redress the injury Plaintiff asserts. Should the district court determine, after consideration on the merits, that such relief is warranted, declaratory judgment would redress Plaintiffs alleged injuries either by requiring the Justices to follow the Michigan Recusal Rule as written, or by effectively requiring amendments to that Rule.1 Thus, Plaintiff has established standing to assert his own due process rights.
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts his present and future clients’ due process rights to a “fair hearing before an impartial and independent tribunal.” Plaintiff maintains his clients will likely suffer injury absent some procedure for reviewing the Justices’ recu-sal decisions in future cases on appeal from his lower court victories and losses. (Compl. at ¶ 19; J.A. at 13) To secure adjudication on the merits of his clients’ rights, Plaintiff must first overcome the Supreme Court’s prudential limitation on third party standing.
As a general matter, a plaintiff “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (citations omitted). However, the Supreme Court has delineated exceptions to its prudential limitation on third party standing, and has allowed plaintiffs to assert the rights of a third party “[wjhere practical obstacles prevent a party from asserting rights on behalf of itself.” Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 956, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). To fit within this exception, a plaintiff must show three elements: first, injury in fact; second, a close relationship with the third party whose rights he asserts; and third, that the third party has no forum to protect its own interests. Id.; Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 130, 125 S.Ct. 564, *649160 L.Ed.2d 519 (2004); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114-16, 96 S.Ct. 2868; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972).
On at least four occasions, the'Supreme Court has considered the propriety of permitting lawyers to assert the constitutional rights of their clients. Two times, the lawyers met the strictures of prudential standing and the Court proceeded to consideration on the merits. See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2646; Triplett, 494 U.S. at 721, 110 S.Ct. 1428. In Caplin & Drysdale, the limitation on third party standing did not prevent the litigant law firm from asserting its client’s Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in a challenge to the asset forfeiture provision of the continuing criminal enterprise statute. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2646. The Court found third party standing appropriate even though it concluded the criminal defendant faced no significant hurdles in personally asserting the right. Id. In the Court’s view, the law firm properly relied on its client’s constitutional rights because “[t]he attorney-client relationship ... is one of special consequence,” and the challenged provision “may ‘materially impair the ability of third persons in [the client’s] position to exercise their constitutional rights.” Id.
In Triplett, the Supreme Court found an attorney had third party standing to advance his clients’ Fifth Amendment - due process rights to legal representation in a challenge to the Black Lung Benefits Act, which limited attorneys’ fees to those approved by the Department of Labor. Triplett, 494 U.S. at 720-21, 110 S.Ct. 1428. The lawyer there agreed to represent black lung claimants for a contingent fee. Id. at 718, 110 S.Ct. 1428. As a result, a committee of the state bar recommended sanctions against him and filed a complaint to enforce them. Id. The state’s highest court denied enforcement, finding the Act violated due process in “ ‘effectively denfying] claimants necessary access to counsel.’ ” Id. at 718-19, 110 S.Ct. 1428.
In defense to the disciplinary charges, the lawyer in Triplett challenged the fee scheme set forth in the Act, alleging it violated his clients’ interests. Id. at 720, 110 S.Ct. 1428. Finding third party standing appropriate, the Court noted that “enforcement of [the] restriction against the litigant prevents a third party from entering into a relationship with the litigant (typically a contractual relationship), to which relationship the third party has a legal entitlement (typically a constitutional entitlement).” Id. Additionally, the Court observed that the due process rights of existing claimants were at issue since, in the same action, the government sought to recover fees improperly paid. Id. at 721, 110 S.Ct. 1428.
On two occasions, the Supreme Court denied third party standing to lawyers pressing their clients’ rights. See Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 292-93, 119 S.Ct. 1292; Tesmer, 543 U.S. at 134, 125 S.Ct. 564. In Gabbert, the Court declined third party standing for a lawyer to assert his client’s purported right to have counsel present during her grand jury testimony. Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 292, 119 S.Ct. 1292. There, the client could ostensibly have brought a § 1983 claim in her own right. Most recently, in Kowalski v. Tesmer, two attorneys challenged a law prohibiting the appointment of appellate counsel to represent indigents who pled guilty. Tesmer, 543 U.S. at 127, 125 S.Ct. 564. The Tes-mer court concluded that the attorneys’ relationship with “as yet unascertained Michigan criminal defendants” was not sufficiently close, characterizing it as a *650“hypothetical” relationship with unknown claimants and observing that the alleged violation did not result from enforcement of the law against the litigant lawyers. Id. at 131, 125 S.Ct. 564. Additionally, the Court found no hindrance to the indigent defendants’ ability to personally challenge the law either on direct appeal or in state or federal collateral proceedings. Id. at 131-32, 125 S.Ct. 564. Denying standing, the Court relied in part on the “fair inference” that the plaintiff attorneys “wanted a federal court to short-circuit the State’s adjudication of th[e] constitutional question.” Id. at 132-33, 125 S.Ct. 564. Accordingly, in both Gabbert and Tesmer, the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of prudential standing.
In my view, Plaintiffs challenge on behalf of his clients fits neatly within the exceptions established in the Court’s third party standing jurisprudence. First, as previously discussed, Plaintiff alleges adequate injury in fact. He “can be expected satisfactorily to frame the issues” here, see Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. at 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839, because of his personal stake in the matter. Second, Plaintiff has established a close relationship with his current and future clients.
An attorney’s relationship with his clients is undeniably a close one, and the Supreme Court has recognized the “special consequence” of that relationship. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2646; see also Triplett, 494 U.S. at 721, 110 S.Ct. 1428; but see Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 292-93, 119 S.Ct. 1292; Tesmer, 543 U.S. at 131-32, 125 S.Ct. 564. Here, Plaintiff asserts the rights of both existing and future clients. At the trial level, Plaintiff currently represents clients whose cases may progress to the highest state level of appeal, and he continues to undertake new representation. Plaintiffs current clients form an ascertainable class, and any and all individuals who retain him share the same interests as that class. In Triplett, the lawyer had standing to broadly challenge the Black Lung Benefits Act due to his relationship with certain existing clients. See Triplett, 494 U.S. at 721, 110 S.Ct. 1428. There, the lawyer predicated his challenge on rights not actually violated but capable of violation with respect to future clients, since his existing clients already had the benefit of his representation. Id. at 718, 110 S.Ct. 1428. Similarly, Plaintiffs relationship with current clients suffices to support his broad-based challenge to the Michigan Recusal Rule, a challenge designed to protect the rights and interests of future clients.
What is more, the Michigan Recusal Rule provides for disqualification where a “judge is personally biased ... against a party or attorney. ” MCR 2.003(B)(1) (emphasis added). That Rule further establishes a procedure for de novo review of recusal motions following a denial. MCR 2.003(C). As interpreted by the Justices, application of the Michigan Recusal Rule against Plaintiff could impair his current and future clients’ access to the type of fair and impartial tribunal secured under the Due Process Clause. See Triplett, 494 U.S. at 720, 110 S.Ct. 1428.
Additionally, courts have more readily found a sufficiently close relationship where the plaintiff and the third parties share a “congruence of interests.” Powers, 499 U.S. at 414, 111 S.Ct. 1364. In this case, “[t]he activity sought to be protected is at the heart of the business relationship between [Plaintiff] and [his] clients,” see Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. at 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839, who contract for Plaintiffs services and expect to receive adequate and meaningful representation. To be sure, Plaintiffs present and future clients seek and retain legal counsel to bolster their chances of prevailing at *651every stage of judicial proceedings. Absent an impartial and unbiased forum for appeals brought on their behalf, the assistance of counsel is much less meaningful to a litigant. By asserting his clients’ rights, Plaintiff seeks to insure that they enter the appellate forum on equal footing with their opponents. Plaintiffs unquestionable desire to protect his client base, as well as his personal pecuniary interest in preserving his clients’ jury awards, align his interests with those of his clients in such a way to insure that he will “properly ... frame the issues and present them with the necessary adversarial zeal.” See id. at 956, 104 S.Ct. 2839. Thus, Plaintiffs interests in raising a due process challenge to the Rule directly correlate with his clients’ interests.
Third, and most critically in this case, Plaintiffs clients have no viable avenue to personally challenge the constitutionality of the Michigan Recusal Rule. See Baird, 405 U.S. at 446, 92 S.Ct. 1029 (permitting physician to assert the rights of his patients to access contraceptives because they “are not themselves subject to prosecution and, to that extent, are denied a forum in which to assert their own rights”); see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953) (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925)). This is simply not a case where Plaintiff or his clients failed to utilize an alternate route to have their due process rights adjudicated. Although Plaintiffs clients could hypothetically challenge Michigan’s Recusal Rule in the first instance, they would lack standing to do so because they could not “demonstrate ... a significant possibility of future harm.” See Peoples Rights Org., Inc., 152 F.3d at 527. Nor could they prove actual present harm, until their cause — in effect — would be barred by the preclusive effects of collateral estoppel or the Younger doctrine. See Gilbert v. Ferry, 413 F.3d 578, 579, reh’g and vacating in part, 401 F.3d 411 (6th Cir.2005). Moreover, “normal processes of appellate review” provide no alternative. Cf. Cohn v. Brown, 161 Fed.Appx. 450, 455 (6th Cir.2005) (eschewing attorney’s challenge to the court’s method of calculating fees in bankruptcy proceedings when he could have directly appealed). Further, unlike the litigants in Tesmer, Plaintiff brought this § 1983 suit not because he “wanted a federal court to short-circuit the State’s adjudication of this constitutional question,” see 543 U.S. at 132-33, 125 S.Ct. 564, but because he wanted the question to be adjudicated at all. Plaintiffs cause falls squarely within the well-defined exception to the prudential limitation on third party standing.2 Consequently, in my view, Plaintiff has established standing to challenge the Michigan Recusal Rule to protect his clients’ due process rights, as well as his own.

. The district court on remand will consider the merits of Plaintiff’s twin due process challenges and this discussion of Plaintiff’s standing should in no way be construed as commentary on the merits of Plaintiff's claims. See, e.g., Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721, 726, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990) (finding third party standing to assert clients' due process rights, but later concluding there was no violation); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n. 3, 632-33, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989) (prudential limitation on third party standing not applicable, but Sixth Amendment claim fails on the merits). Most appropriately framed, the standing inquiry looks only to the existence of a case or controversy sufficient to insure the parties properly frame the issues and vigorously advocate their views.

. To be clear, by concluding that Plaintiff has standing to assert the due process rights of his clients, I do not advocate a more expansive view that lawyers should in all cases be permitted to "bring in court the claims of future unascertained clients.” Tesmer, 543 U.S. at 134, 125 S.Ct. 564 (quoting Tesmer v. Granholm, 333 F.3d 683, 709 (6th Cir.2003) (Rogers, J., dissenting in part), rev'd sub nom. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 125 S.Ct. 564, 160 L.Ed.2d 519 (2004)). Narrowly confined to Plaintiffs unique circumstance, I would permit third party standing in this case because the challenged Rule potentially impacts the due process rights of an ascertainable class comprised of current clients, and correspondingly any and all clients that retain Plaintiff.