Court Opinion

ID: 9858478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:25:27.153234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:37.811320
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
McCORMICK, Presiding Judge.
Appellee was charged by information with criminal trespass. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 30.05(a)(2). Appellee filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it failed to state an offense under the Penal Code. The trial court granted appellee’s motion and ordered the information set aside. On direct appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the information. State v. Kinsey, 839 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1992). We granted the State’s petition to review whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that an allegation of a specific complainant and the term “owner thereof,” rather than the precise statutory term of “another,” does not sufficiently *384state the offense of criminal trespass. We will reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The relevant portion of the information in this case alleged that the appellee:
"... on or about the 28th day of January 1991, did heretofore then and there intentionally and knowingly remain on the property, without the effective consent of Norman Whitlock, the owner thereof, and the said defendant had notice to depart but failed to do so.” (Emphasis added).
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 30.05(a)(2), defines “criminal trespass” as:
“A person commits an offense if he enters or remains on property or in a building of another without effective consent and he received notice to depart but failed to do so.” (Emphasis added).
The trial court found that by substituting the phrasé “Norman Whitlock, the owner thereof’ for the phrase “of another,” the information failed to state the offense of criminal trespass and quashed the information. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court acted properly, relying on a similar holding by the Houston Court of Appeals. State v. Staley, 814 S.W.2d 534 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1991, pet. refd). This Court has not yet ruled on this question, and there is conflicting case law on the specific question as to whether such a substitution in a charging instrument will render the instrument insufficient to state an offense.
Appellee argues that by not alleging that the trespass was on the property “of another,” the allegation failed because it omitted an element of the offense, and the information did not plead in other words that carry the same meaning. Appellee contends that, if statutory words have a technical meaning, they cannot be replaced by other words. See Chance v. State, 563 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (opinion on reh’g). Appellee is correct, and this was explicitly stated in Chance, but the rule was restricted by accompanying dicta, allowing that if the words equivalent to the “common everyday usage” of the technical term were equivalent to the technical definition found in the Penal Code, substitution would be allowed. See Chance, 563 S.W.2d at 815-16. Chance clearly states that “it is not necessary to use the exact language of the statute, ... but... the substituted words must convey the same meaning or include the sense of the statutory word.” Id. See also Article 21.17, V.A.C.C.P.
The statutory term “another” is defined at V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.07(a)(4), as “a person other than the actor.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1981) defines “another” as “different or distinct from the one first considered.” Clearly, the statutory definition of the term “another” is equivalent, that is, “like in signification or import,” to the common, everyday usage of that term. Therefore, a substitution of terms that conveys the same meaning will be allowed.
In comparing the term “of another” with the phrase “Norman Whitlock, the owner thereof,” common sense dictates that the latter is merely descriptive of the former. Therefore, the substituted phrase “Norman Whitlock, the owner thereof’ “convey[s] the same meaning or includefs] the sense of the statutory word,” “another.” This conclusion squares with the holding of the Dallas Court of Appeals in Proctor v. State, 767 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, no pet.). In Proctor, the Court of Appeals held that the indictment sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle, even though it did not explicitly allege that the vehicle was “another’s,” where it alleged that defendant’s use was without effective consent of the person described as the “owner thereof.” Procter, 767 S.W.2d at 476.
Appellee argued and the Court of Appeals held that the information in this case would allow the State to convict appellee on lesser proof than is statutorily allowed. The Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory definition of “owner,” which encompasses the meaning of having a “greater right to possession of the property than the actor.” Applying this definition, the Court of Appeals reasoned that, on the information filed, the State might be able to convict appellee even if she had lesser title to the property, which they would not be able to do if the information *385had pled “of another.” Kinsey, 839 S.W.2d at 170. This Court has specifically reserved the question of whether a defendant can trespass on property to which they have lesser title to than a complainant. Langston v. State, 855 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1993). Since that is not the question before us for review today, we will not decide it.
In Langston, another criminal trespass case, the information charged that appellant:
“... did then and there unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly enter and, after receiving notice to depart, remain ON PROPERTY owned by KAREN JONES, hereinafter styled the Complainant, without the effective consent of the Complainant.” (Emphasis added).
This Court affirmed the Houston Court of Appeals’ decision that the evidence was insufficient to support appellant’s conviction. The Court held that since the State had pled that the property was owned by Complainant, even though ownership was not an element of criminal trespass, the State assumed the burden of proving it.1 Indeed, this Court went even further, stating that pleading that the Complainant was the owner of the property was an “unnecessarily specific allegation.” Requiring the State to prove this specific allegation increases the prosecution’s burden of proof, rather than decreasing it. Appel-lee’s argument that pleading “Norman Whit-lock, the owner thereof’ lessens the State’s burden of proof therefore fails.
We hold that the information in this case sufficiently states the offense of criminal trespass, and we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.2
MEYERS, J., not participating.

. We note the State is not required to negate in its pleadings a defense. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sections 2.03(b) and 2.04(b).

. Since this ground is dispositive of the case, we need not reach the merits of the State’s second and third grounds for review.