Court Opinion

ID: 9612659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:10:30.959127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:48.090349
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the portions of the majority’s opinion addressing the telephone conversation between defendant and Banks, the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the requested jury instructions. I disagree, however, that the trial court properly denied defendant’s request for a recess of fifteen minutes in which to decide whether or not to present evidence in his trial for first degree murder. I would hold defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Defendant’s trial began on 28 June 2004. The State rested its case shortly after four o’clock in the afternoon of 29 June 2004. The trial court then sent the jurors from the courtroom, at which point defendant’s attorney requested the trial court “adjourn for the day or at least give us some time to make a decision to offer any evidence at all. We have talked about this, family has talked about this but couldn’t make a decision until we heard everything. We just heard everything.” The trial court denied defendant’s request for an adjournment and informed him he had “five minutes.” Defense counsel then asked, “[c]an you give me 15 minutes?” The trial court responded, “[n]o. No, sir. You’ve got five minutes. You knew we’d be at this point.” Defense counsel stated, “Judge, I did but we truly didn’t know what all the evi*649dence would be.” The trial court reiterated that defense counsel had “five minutes.” Defense counsel subsequently conferred with defendant and his family, after which defendant decided not to offer evidence. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and discharging a weapon into occupied property, whereupon the trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole, and to twenty-nine to forty-four months’ imprisonment for his discharging a weapon into occupied property conviction.
Procedural matters relating to the conduct of a criminal trial are left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge as long as the defendant’s rights are “scrupulously afforded him.” State v. Goode, 300 N.C. 726, 729, 268 S.E.2d 82, 84 (1980). Such discretion is not unlimited, however, and, when abused, is subject to reversal by the appellate courts. Id.
“It is generally recognized, by Bench and Bar alike, that the decision whether a defendant in a criminal case will present evidence or will testify in his own behalf is a matter of paramount importance.” Id. at 730, 268 S.E.2d at 84 (emphasis added). “Such matters can and should be discussed generally prior to trial, but the actual decision cannot intelligently be made until the close of the State’s evidence.” Id. Appropriate recesses at the close of the State’s evidence are
deeply ingrained in the course and practice of our courts and, when requested, have been granted as a matter of course so long that “the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.” The recess enables defendant and his counsel to evaluate their position. If the evidence offered by the State has made a strong case against defendant, he may decide to “throw in the towel” and tender a plea. If the State’s case is weak, he may decide to rest and rely on that weakness for a verdict of acquittal. If defendant has a strong defense and credible witnesses, he may well decide to offer his evidence regardless of the strength of the State’s case.

Id.

The defendant in Goode was charged with felonious breaking and entering a restaurant and felonious larceny of wine having a value of $108.00. At the close of the State’s evidence at trial, defendant’s counsel informed the trial court he had “ ‘motions,’ ” to which the trial court responded, “ ‘[t]hey are denied. Will there be evidence for the defense?’ ” Id. at 728, 268 S.E.2d at 83. Defense counsel then requested a “ ‘short recess’ ” to confer with his client on the question of *650whether to present evidence. The trial court denied defense counsel’s request. The defendant ultimately testified on his own behalf against the advice of his counsel. He was convicted by a jury on both counts and given consecutive sentences of eight to ten years on each count.
Upon review, our Supreme Court noted that “[n]o defendant is automatically entitled to a recess at the close of the State’s evidence because such motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 730, 268 S.E.2d at 84. However, the Court continued, “where, as here, the trial judge in the presence of the jury denies unnamed motions before they are made, and then immediately denies defense counsel’s request for a short recess to decide whether defendant would offer evidence, a clear abuse of discretion prejudicial to defendant’s cause is established.” Id.
In the present case, defendant was on trial for first degree murder and faced a potential sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Defendant’s decision whether to present evidence, in comparison to the potential sentence for breaking, entering, and larceny faced by the defendant in Goode, was therefore of far greater consequence. Although it is true, as the trial court indicated when it stated “[y]ou knew we’d be at this point[,]” that defendant’s right to present evidence was established at the beginning of the trial, “the actual decision [to present evidence] cannot intelligently be made until the close of the State’s evidence." Id. (emphasis added). The reality of this fact may be seen by defense counsel’s statement to the trial court that “[w]e have talked about this, family has talked about this but couldn’t make a decision until we heard everything. We just heard everything.”
The State here provided notice to defendant of twenty to thirty potential witnesses. At trial, twelve of the potential witnesses testified. Defendant needed time to evaluate these witnesses and their testimony in order to understand his position at the close of the State’s evidence. See Goode, 300 N.C. at 730, 268 S.E.2d at 84 (stating that “[t]he recess enables defendant and his counsel to evaluate their position”). Defense counsel explained to the court that they needed the time because they “truly didn’t know what all the evidence would be” until the State finished presenting its case. Even if defendant and trial counsel had considered only the State’s witnesses in the five minutes granted by the trial court, such consideration equates to a mere twenty-five seconds per witness. However, in addition to the State’s witnesses, defendant and his counsel needed time to consider the three witnesses the defense had subpoenaed. Defense counsel re*651quested fifteen minutes to confer with defendant and his family regarding a decision of “paramount importance,” to evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of the case presented by the State. Id. The trial court refused to grant defendant more than five minutes to make his decision.
Five minutes was inadequate time in which to make a reasoned and intelligent decision. Notwithstanding the majority’s assertion otherwise, I would not hold that denying defendant’s motion for a recess constituted prejudice per se, but rather that the trial court’s refusal here to allow defendant more than five minutes to determine whether to present evidence in his trial for first degree murder was prejudicial under the facts of this case and the law of this State. See id. (concluding that the defendant had established prejudicial abuse of discretion where the trial court denied defense counsel’s request for a short recess to decide whether the defendant would present evidence). Defendant subpoenaed three witnesses to testify on his behalf, but he had little time, if any, to consider the potential impact of that testimony in light of the evidence presented by the State. Ultimately, defendant presented no evidence, and it is impossible to ascertain what evidence, if any, defendant would have presented had he been given more time in which to make the decision. See id. at 730, 268 S.E.2d at 84 (holding that the defendant established clear abuse of discretion, and that such abuse was also prejudicial).
The majority cites the case of State v. Haywood, 144 N.C. App. 223, 550 S.E.2d 38, disc. review denied and appeal dismissed, 354 N.C. 72, 553 S.E.2d 206 (2001), in support of its argument. In Haywood, at the close of the State’s evidence and after the defendant’s motion to dismiss had been denied, at approximately 4:15 p.m., counsel for the defendant requested that the court recess until morning so that he could discuss with his client whether the defendant should take the stand in his own defense. The trial court denied the motion. Defense counsel did not request a shorter recess. The defendant subsequently presented evidence and was ultimately convicted of first degree rape, first degree sexual offense, and conspiracy to commit first degree rape. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 240 to 297 months on the first degree rape charge, 240 to 297 months on the first degree sexual offense charge, and to 151 to 191 months on the conspiracy charge.
Upon appeal, this Court found no prejudicial error, stating that “[ajssuming arguendo the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a recess to confer with his attorney, defendant has not *652shown that he was prejudiced by his decision to take the stand and present a witness in his behalf.” Id. at 233, 550 S.E.2d at 45. This was because “[i]t was only through defendant’s testimony that he was able to present evidence on the defense of necessity and evidence negating the charge of conspiracy.” Id. Further, the trial court had not permitted the State to cross-examine the defendant regarding prior convictions for communicating threats and assault on a female because these convictions had not been furnished to the defendant in discovery. Id. The Court also noted that, instead of a short recess as was requested in Goode, the Haywood defendant asked for an overnight recess. As such, the Court noted, “[w]e are unable to say that the trial court here would not have granted a recess of shorter duration if defendant had clearly asked for one.” Id.
Haywood is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. Unlike Haywood, defendant here renewed his request for a short recess after his request for an overnight recess was denied. Moreover, the Court in Haywood never answered the question of whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a recess; ráther, it held that, assuming there was error, the defendant had failed to establish prejudice because the evidence he presented was critical to his case. Here, defendant presented no evidence. Finally, unlike the defendant in Haywood, defendant here faced and received a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
In evaluating the facts of the present case in light of our case law precedent, the instant case more closely resembles Goode than Haywood. Like the case in Goode, there is no sound reason for the denial of defendant’s request for a reasonable amount of time to confer with counsel to make an intelligent and considered decision of “paramount importance.” See Goode, 300 N.C. at 730, 268 S.E.2d at 84 (stating that “[f]or reasons entirely obscure, the defendant in this case and his counsel had no opportunity to weigh these important matters together and reach a considered judgment”); compare State v. Barlowe, 157 N.C. App. 249, 258, 578 S.E.2d 660, 665 (holding, where the trial court denied the defendant’s request for a continuance in her trial for first degree murder, that “[g]iven the materiality of the issue on which defendant sought expert advice and testimony and the potential penalty faced by defendant if convicted, we can find no sound reason within the record for the denial of her motion for a continuance”), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 462, 586 S.E.2d 100 (2003). Our Supreme Court has stated:
*653[T]he decision whether a defendant in a criminal case will present evidence or will testify in his own behalf is a matter of paramount importance. Such matters can and should be discussed generally prior to trial, but the actual decision cannot intelligently be made until the close of the State’s evidence.
[S]uch recesses at the close of the State’s evidence are deeply ingrained in the course and practice of our courts and, when requested, have been granted as a matter of course so long that “the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.”
Goode, 300 N.C. at 730, 268 S.E.2d at 84. Defendant was entitled to a reasonable amount of time to make such a critical decision in his trial for first degree murder. He requested fifteen minutes. The trial court gave him five. I would hold defendant is entitled to a new trial. See id. I therefore respectfully dissent.