Court Opinion

ID: 9729873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:51:11.776164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:01.881031
License: Public Domain

*131HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
The Commonwealth appeals from the lower court’s order suppressing evidence of a blood sample taken from appellee and of a chemical analysis of that sample. I believe that we should quash the Commonwealth’s appeal because the suppression order does not effectively terminate or substantially handicap the Commonwealth’s case against appellee.
Allegheny County officials charged appellee with driving under the influence of liquor,1 involuntary manslaughter,2 and failure to stop and give identification after an accident.3 Appellee filed an application to suppress evidence of a blood sample removed from his body and of a chemical analysis of that sample.4 On February 23, 1976, the lower court conducted a hearing on appellee’s application, and on March 10, 1976, the lower court entered an order suppressing the blood sample and the chemical analysis. The Commonwealth then filed this appeal.
The Majority reaches the merits in the instant case, but I believe that the Commonwealth is not entitled to appeal the lower court’s suppression order. In Commonwealth v. DeFelice, 248 Pa.Super. 516, 375 A.2d 360 (1977), our Court today articulates the rules governing appellate court jurisdiction when the Commonwealth appeals from a lower court’s suppression order: “The Commonwealth may only appeal from a pre-trial order if it involves a pure question of law and if it effectively terminates or substantially handicaps a prosecution.” See also Commonwealth v. Barnett, 471 Pa. 34, 369 A.2d 1180 (1977); Commonwealth v. Ray, 448 Pa. 307, 292 A.2d 410 (1972); Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). In DeFelice, the lower court suppressed an out-of-court identification of appellee. However, the Commonwealth still could introduce *132appellee’s confession, possible in-court identification by two eyewitnesses, and the fruits of the robbery. Therefore, a Majority of our Court quashes the Commonwealth appeal because the lower court’s suppression order did not effectively terminate or substantially hamper the prosecution.
In Commonwealth v. Kloch, 221 Pa.Super. 324, 292 A.2d 479 (1972), the Commonwealth charged appellee with driving under the influence of liquor. The lower court suppressed the results of a blood alcohol test. However, the Commonwealth still had ample evidence to convict appellee of driving while intoxicated. A police officer found appellee asleep or unconscious in his car which was stopped on the shoulder of the road with the motor running. He noted a strong odor of alcohol emanating from appellee. Moreover, appellee had difficulty producing his vehicle registration and failed certain field sobriety tests. Because the Commonwealth’s prosecution was not effectively terminated or substantially hampered by the lower court’s suppression order, we quashed the appeal.
In the instant case, the Commonwealth can still marshall the following evidence in order to prove that appellee drove while intoxicated and that he hit and killed the victim. The police officer who first arrived on the accident scene testified at the suppression hearing that: “From my point of view, his speech was slurred. I could smell the content of alcohol all over. He was staggering, . . . ” Appellee admitted to this police officer that he drove the car that hit the victim; a hitchhiking companion of the deceased confirmed appellee’s admission.
Another police officer testified that he arrived at the scene shortly after the accident. He asserted that appellee’s appearance was somewhat disheveled, his walk unsteady, and his speech slurred. Moreover, the police officer “could smell the impurities of alcohol” on appellee’s breath. As a police officer with several years experience, he opined that appellee was under the influence of alcohol. When this police officer examined appellee’s vehicle, he found blood on *133top of the car and dripping down the back windshield; the front of the car was severely damaged. The police officer also discovered twelve empty Rolling Rock beer cans in appellee’s car. When this police officer asked appellee how much he had had to drink, appellee responded that he guessed that he had imbibed too much. Finally, when the police officer asked appellee if he would submit to a blood alcohol test or a breathalyzer test, appellee refused to take either. After the police transported appellee to a nearby hospital for purposes of withdrawing a sample of his blood, appellee reiterated his objection to having his blood removed. The Commonwealth could introduce evidence of appellee’s refusal to submit to this test at a criminal trial.5
I believe that the Majority’s holding in the case at bar is, quite simply, irreconcilable with our Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. DeFelice, decided today, and Commonwealth v. Kloch, supra.6 The Commonwealth can still ad*134duce abundant evidence of appellant’s intoxication including appellant’s own admission that he had had too much to drink, his refusal to take a blood alcohol or breathalyzer test, the discovery of twelve empty beer cans in appellee’s car, and the observations of two police officers who asserted that appellee smelled of alcohol, staggered and slurred his words.7 I do not believe that the lower court’s suppression order effectively terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution of appellee’s case. Therefore, I would quash this appeal.
SPAETH, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, § 1037; 75 P.S. § 1037.

. The Crimes Code, Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, eff. June 6, 1973; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504.

. Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, § 1027; 75 P.S. § 1027.

. Rule 323, Pa.R.Crim.P.; 19 P.S. Appendix.

. Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58, § 624.1, added 1961, July 28, P.L. 918, § 1, as amended 1968, July 31, P.L. 758, No. 237, § 1; 1969, Dec. 22, P.L. 392, § 1; 75 P.S. § 624.1(h). 75 P.S. § 624.1(h) provides: “The refusal to submit to a chemical test may be admitted into evidence as a factor to be considered in determining innocence or guilt.”

. I do not agree with the Majority that Commonwealth v. Deren, 233 Pa.Super. 373, 337 A.2d 600 (1975), governs this case. Deren stands for the proposition that we will not quash an appeal sua sponte simply because the Commonwealth has not certified that it will be “substantially handicapped” if we can determine from a review of the evidence available to the Commonwealth that its prosecution will indeed be substantially hampered. In the instant case, it is clear that the Commonwealth will not be substantially handicapped. Commonwealth v. Barkley, 234 Pa.Super. 503, 341 A.2d 192 (1975), is also distinguishable. In Barkley, a police officer observed appellee “weaving” on the Pennsylvania Turnpike. The police officer directed appellee to pull his car off the road. When the police officer attempted to interview appellee, he noticed that appellee’s breath smelled of alcohol, that he had slurred speech, that his eyes were glassy and that he staggered when asked to walk. The officer then arrested appellee for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Subsequently, a breathalyzer test was administered. The lower court suppressed all evidence obtained after the police officer directed appellee to pull his car off the road. Consequently, the Commonwealth could only introduce evidence that appellee “weaved” on the Pennsylvania Turnpike; the lower court’s suppression order effectively terminated the prosecution.

. I note that the Commonwealth traditionally had little difficulty in obtaining convictions for driving under the influence of liquor prior to the relatively recent use of breathalyzer and blood alcohol tests.