Court Opinion

ID: 9686305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:40:59.675522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:17.498826
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with Justice Brickley’s finding of evidentiary error in these cases, and the utilization of the “highly probable” test to determine that error’s harmlessness, I disagree with the application of that test to the facts of these cases. I find that Justice Brickley’s opinion has not adequately considered the facts in relation to the inferences that were erroneously placed before the jury. I believe that, when the *208weight of these inferences is fully considered, it cannot be said to be highly probable that the tainted evidence did not contribute to the verdicts and, hence, that reversal is required. I, therefore, concur in parts n, iv, and in a portion of part v of Justice Brickley’s opinion, but dissent from part I and a portion of part v. My conclusion in this matter gives me no cause to reach the constitutional issue raised in part m, and, hence, I express no view with respect to the matters addressed by Justice Brickley in part m of his opinion.
i
In examining this case, I look first to possible evidentiary error, because such a finding, warranting relief, would preclude the need for constitutional review. People v Giacalone, 399 Mich 642, 645-646, n 6; 250 NW2d 492 (1977). I concur with part iv of Justice Brickley’s opinion that in both cases evidentiary error occurred for the reasons stated therein.1 I *209further concur with the utilization of the “highly probable” test, again for the reasons cited by Justice Brickley. It is in the application of this test to the instant facts that I part company.
n
A. GEARNS
Defendant Gearns was convicted of second-degree murder.2 An analysis of the facts offered into evidence indicates that the prosecution’s case was primarily circumstantial. While there was ample circumstantial evidence tying the defendant to the victim, there was no evidence offered regarding how the victim came to be shot to death. Indeed, it seems that even a coherent prosecution theory of the crime was lacking. The evidence tended to show that the defendant and the victim became acquainted at a bar, that they left the bar together, that the victim died at the defendant’s house, and that the defendant did not recall the events.3
*210Defendant shared his house with his brother, Gregory Geams. Gregory was present in the house when it was searched and may have been participating in efforts to clean it. The prosecution wanted to call Gregory Geams as a witness, and offered him immunity from prosecution as an accessory after the fact.4 Gregory Geams, not surprisingly, also had counsel representing him during the proceedings.
When the prosecution attempted to call Gregory Geams, there was an extended discussion between the trial court and the attorneys, including, primarily, the attorney representing Gregory Geams. Counsel advised the court that he believed the immunity offered was insufficient to protect his client from having his testimony used against him. Counsel therefore advised the court that the witness intended to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. Eventually, it became clear that the prosecution would offer no further immunity and that the witness would continue to assert the privilege. The court then found the privilege to be invalid, and ordered the witness to testify or face contempt charges. Significantly, the focus of *211the court and the prosecution was on the potential charge of accessory after the fact, despite counsel’s insistence that immunity from such a charge was not sufficient to protect the witness.5
While these proceedings took place, appropriately, outside the presence of the jury, the witness was later called to the stand in front of the jury, apparently to assert the privilege and be held in contempt. (Counsel for the witness had argued that the court could not find the witness in contempt until he actually was placed on the stand and refused to testify.) Defendant’s counsel objected to this procedure.6 In view of this, it is readily apparent that no one actually expected that Gregory Gearns would testify. Indeed, he stated his name and address, and then refused to answer a question about with whom he resided. Following the trial court’s overruling of an objection from the witness’ counsel, and with the jury still present, the prosecution asked the witness whether he *212had received immunity. No mention whatsoever was made of the limited scope of the immunity.
B
In Giacalone, the witness also was asked two questions, and likewise asserted the privilege in response to the second question. After stating his name, the witness in Giacalone, Loren Jolly, refused to answer a question regarding whether he recalled a specific date. The date in question was the date of the offense. We noted:
When Jolly declined to answer whether he recalled “the date of August 15, 1967,” the date of the offense, on the ground that his answer “may tend to incriminate me” the jury may have inferred that the answer if given would have been favorable to the prosecution. The jurors were informed through Kinsman’s [an accomplice who became a prosecution witness] testimony that Jolly and Giacalone had committed the offense. Jolly was thus connected to Giacalone. An adverse inference from Jolly’s refusal to answer may have carried over to Giacalone. [Giacalone, 399 Mich 646-647.]
Returning to Geams, the witness likewise refused to answer a question that by itself might seem as harmless as asking about a particular date, but, when taken in the context of the trial, pointed directly to a material and important fact. The prosecution contends that the question was peripheral and, hence, the inference to be drawn by the jury was minimal at most. I disagree. The question, while purporting to deal with an initial matter, pointed directly to the witness’ importance, that he was the defendant’s roommate. Likewise, the prosecution’s (correct) assertion that this fact was already before the jury does not compel a finding of harmlessness. Certainly, in Gia*213caloñe, the accomplice had already testified regarding the date of the crime, as had, most likely, the victim and the police. Giacalone teaches that it is not the establishment of the fact that would follow in response to the question that matters, but rather the negative inference the jury may draw from the refusal to answer that question. Most often, they are not the same, as demonstrated in Giacalone, where the actual answer to the question would only have determined whether or not the witness recalled a particular day.7
While this case does not involve the testimony of another accomplice, there certainly were sufficient facts to connect the witness to the defendant. In addition to being brothers, the witness and the defendant lived together. The jury already knew this. Any adverse inference to be drawn from the witness’ refusal to testify naturally would be “carried over” to the defendant.
An additional component of this case, which actually makes the situation far worse than the one we *214addressed in Giacalone, is the tainting of the jury with the knowledge that the witness had “immunity.” No discussion was made of the limited scope of this immunity. Therefore, not only was the jury able to draw the inference feared in Giacalone, i.e., that the witness was involved in a crime, was connected to the defendant, and, thus, the defendant likely was involved too, but a more ominous inference was placed before the jury. Faced with a witness who resided at the scene of the crime, was intimately connected with the defendant, and refused to testify, despite having “immunity,” another logical inference does not even apply with respect to the witness, as in Giacalone, but rather points directly to the defendant, i.e., if the witness is guilty, immunity would protect him, but because he will not testify, he must know what happened and be protecting his guilty brother.8 Not only is the error in this case not harmless, it is in fact far more prejudicial than the error we found to warrant relief in Giacalone. On these facts, and faced with these inferences improperly placed before the jury, I cannot say that it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict, and hence would find reversal to be required.
m
A. THOMAS
Defendant Thomas was charged with second-*215degree murder9 and related firearm charges as a result of his participation in an apparent gang-related gunfight following a party. The prosecution’s theory was that the defendant accidentally shot the victim, Curtis Madison, his friend, in the course of exchanging gunfire with rival gang members in a passing truck. Tarkeus Gee, a witness, was another friend of both the victim and the defendant.
As these persons, along with several others, were entering their respective vehicles, a truck drove by, firing shots at the group. At least two persons, the defendant and a Robert Jamerson, returned fire. Some testimony raised questions regarding whether one of the other members of the group, Demarcus Wesby, who was riding with Gee, might have been armed. Other testimony raised a question regarding the possibility of additional shots being fired from the area of a nearby building.
Of the many shots exchanged, ballistics evidence indicated that the shot that killed the victim came from the direction of the party, rather than the truck. The defendant was in line with the position from which the shot was fired, although the expert testimony could not rule out other potential sources, including the area of the nearby building. Jamerson’s gun was of a different caliber and not the source of the fatal bullet. Defendant’s gun was never recovered. There was no testimony to indicate that Gee had an active role in the gunfight.
Before the trial, the prosecutor and a detective visited Gee in jail, where he was incarcerated on unre*216lated charges. Gee made it clear to the prosecutor and the detective that, given his current circumstances, he saw no reason to testify and would not help them in making their case against defendant.10 In making this point, Gee was so enthusiastic that the prosecutor later advised the trial court that the detective had to “restrain” him during the discussion.
In the course of the trial, Gee was brought to court to testify. Beginning with a court officer, he proceeded to make it clear to everyone he spoke to that he would not, in fact, testify. Eventually, this came to light, and, outside the presence of the jury, the court addressed the matter. The prosecutor felt it necessary to call Gee, while defense counsel suggested that Gee be advised of his rights and have counsel appointed. The court suggested a grant of immunity, with which the prosecutor agreed, as the easiest solution. The court then stated, despite a specific objection of defense counsel, citing People v Poma, 96 Mich App 726; 294 NW2d 221 (1980),11 that, should Gee still refuse, the prosecutor would be allowed to call him.
The trial court called Gee to the stand, still outside the jury’s presence, and Gee refused to testify. When the court attempted to clarify that it was a Fifth Amendment privilege being asserted, Gee agreed. The *217court informed Gee of the immunity.12 Gee continued to make it clear that he would not be testifying.13
Despite defense counsel’s frequent citation of Poma, the court recalled the jury and allowed the prosecutor’s questioning of Gee to proceed. It did not get far. In response to being asked his name, Gee answered, “Well, I’m making sure — I want — I’m refusing to say anything until I get a legal representative.” Other than once repeating that he was refusing to say anything, that was the extent of Gee’s testimony before the jury.
B
I now turn to the analysis of harmlessness in this case under the highly probable standard the Court enunciates today. I begin by noting what is not present in this case that was in Gearns. This case differs *218in that there seems to be no real question regarding Gee’s culpability in the crime. It appears he was merely a passive observer. Nonetheless, the inquiry cannot end there. Recall that the jury was unaware of Gee’s role, or lack of it, in the crime, and to them Gee was merely a witness related to the defendant, as seen below.
Giacalone focused on the connection between the defendant and the witness and the inherent flow of a negative inference drawn from one to the other. Poma also noticed the importance of this connection, hence its focus on “intimate” witnesses. In this case, the witness and the defendant were friends and members of the same group. While that alone, depending on the circumstances, might be sufficient to connect them in a way that a negative inference drawn from the witness could “spill over” to the defendant,14 there is more involved in this case.
The context of this shooting was a gang-related dispute. Gang violence is laden with certain images, perhaps the most clear being, quite obviously, that a group enterprise is involved. The connection between gang members is quite similar to the accomplice connection of Giacalone, in perception even when not in fact, and hence it seems the testimony of Gee could well have spilled over to taint the jury’s view of the defendant.
Additionally, the defendant notes, correctly, that certain imagery is inherent in society’s perception of *219gang violence. Perhaps the strongest and most feared is that the gang members “stick together” in the face of law, violence, or anything else. It is possible, if not likely, that Gee’s refusal, particularly given his disrespectful manner, could have fed those perceptions among the jurors. Even worse, the likely negative inferences would go beyond the initial inference, i.e., that Gee, a gang brother of the defendant, was involved and, hence, most likely so was the defendant, which alone was sufficient to support our decision in Giacalone.15 Here the witness’ stance, combined with his status as a fellow gang member, might well have elicited an “us versus them” inference in the jury, i.e., the witness will not help convict a gang brother, and because he knows that the defendant did it, he just will not testify at all, even if they put him back in jail. While there was no relevant testimony elicited from Gee’s appearance, the potential prejudice to the defendant, as seen above, was extreme.
Among a collection of shooters in a gang-related death, defendant faced charges on a fair amount of circumstantial evidence, but, again, little physical evidence. There was certainly some evidence to support a conviction, but likewise there was some that a jury could have found to support an acquittal. The improper inferences to be drawn from Gee’s refusal to testify ranged from incriminating to extremely prejudicial. Given that, in this case, I cannot say that it is highly probable that these inferences that may have been drawn by the jury from their improper exposure *220to Gee’s testimony did not affect the verdict. Accordingly, I would have to conclude that reversal was warranted on these facts.
IV
I agree with Justice Brickley’s opinion in regard to its adoption of the “highly probable” test, and hence reject the position advocated by Justice Weaver’s dissent. I disagree on the application of the “highly probable” test to these facts, given the underlying circumstances of the cases, and the ominous nature of the inferences that the jury may have impermissibly drawn, inferences that in both cases actually go beyond those that we initially feared in our decision in Giacalone.
It has been suggested by the dissents of Justices Weaver and Boyle that our decision in Giacalone was based solely on a “prosecutorial misconduct” basis.16 I *221disagree, noting that in Giacalone, 399 Mich 645-646, we recognized the additional basis of difficulty in cross-examination, analogizing to our hearsay rules, without needing to invoke a constitutional analysis. Furthermore, to the extent one would credit the views of Justices Weaver and Boyle, such inappropriate conduct existed here. This Court said in People v Dyer, 425 Mich 572, 576; 390 NW2d 645 (1986), “the rule of law remains the same; a lawyer may not knowingly offer inadmissable evidence or call a witness knowing that he will claim a valid privilege not to testify.” The law at the time of both these cases was stated in Poma. “When a judge determines at the evidentiary hearing that the intimate witness will *222either properly or improperly claim the protection against self-incrimination, he must not allow this witness to be called to the stand.” Id. at 733. The fact that this Court had not, until today, spoken definitively on the application of the rule to an invalid privilege hardly gives a prosecutor or trial judge carte blanche to ignore clearly established and longstanding precedent from our Court of Appeals. Despite being reminded of this very precedent, that was exactly what happened in both these cases.17
v
Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in Geams, and affirm the decision in Thomas. In both cases the trial court committed clear error, and in neither case was it harmless under the standard we enunciate today.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 I note as well that I agree with Justice Brickley that the validity or invalidity of the privilege asserted has no effect on analyzing the error resulting from its assertion before the jury. Nothing in our past decisions indicates that we considered the validity of the privilege to be crucial to the determination, and, furthermore, to do so would turn the focus away from the assertion of the privilege before the jury, which is the source of error, and toward an irrelevant determination that has absolutely no bearing on the inferences drawn by the jury.
Furthermore, given that the witness in Geams was represented by counsel who steadfastly maintained that the witness had a valid privilege (and also noting the witness’ later acquittal on contempt charges arising from his refusal to testify), I believe tire privilege in Geams was in fact valid, and the trial court likely erred in determining otherwise. As we noted in People v Dyer, 425 Mich 572, 579; 390 NW2d 645 (1986), “a trial court may compel a witness to answer a question only where the court can foresee, as a matter of law, that such testimony could not incriminate the witness.” In view of the position taken by the witness’ counsel, who alone had access to the witness’ account of his true role in this crime, I find that the trial court could not have properly met this standard, and, *209therefore, erred in ruling the privilege invalid. While the issue in Thomas is closer, given that the trial court did not appoint counsel and seek counsel’s assessment of the validity of the privilege until after immunity was granted to the witness, I do not find sufficient facts to exist to determine that the privilege initially was invalid there either, although the point did become moot once the prosecutor and the court agreed to a grant of immunity.
Lastly, when the United States Supreme Court was called on to consider this sort of error within a constitutional framework, it did not find it necessary to determine whether the claimed privilege was valid. Douglas v Alabama, 380 US 415, 420; 85 S Ct 1074; 13 L Ed 2d 934 (1965). While an evidentiary analysis theoretically could lead to a different conclusion, I see no reason why it should. For all these reasons, any focus on the validity of the privileges asserted in these cases, as urged in the dissents of Justices Boyle and Weaver, strikes me as misguided.

 MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549.

 Even among the circumstantial evidence, there was substantial evidence that did not conform to the prosecution’s theory. In particular, the *210trunk of the defendant’s car, allegedly used to transport the body to the wooded area where it was dumped, contained two types of blood stains. One, type 0, matched the defendant. The other, type A, matched neither the defendant nor the victim. The victim was type B, a type not found in the trunk, this despite the victim having been shot in the head at the residence, according to the prosecution’s theory. The victim also had blood under his fingernails, which the medical examiner testified was consistent with a struggle and which also did not match the defendant or the victim. Additionally, the medical examiner determined that when the victim’s body was found, he had been dead approximately three to four days. The body, in fact, was not found until six days after the defendant and the victim were last seen together.

 The prosecution theorized that the victim most likely was shot in defendant’s basement. There was testimony that the defendant was partially disabled. The implication appears to have been that defendant may have required assistance to carry the body up the stairs and into the car.

 As can be gathered from the previous notes, it seems that there was sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that it was possible that someone else, perhaps with type A blood, was involved in the crime, and may have struggled with the victim before his death. While such evidence is circumstantial, and hardly conclusive, it is noted simply to make the point that the witness’ counsel was not asserting a position that contradicted the evidence (i.e., if the witness was the other person involved in the crime, he might well be subject to liability greater than a charge of accessory after the fact, and, hence, would have a valid privilege despite the proffered immunity).

 Counsel for the witness also objected, apparently to the presence of the jury, on the basis of People v Poma, 96 Mich App 726; 294 NW2d 221 (1980). Poma followed Giacalone and Dyer, and specifically prohibited calling a witness to the stand in front of the jury, knowing that he would assert the privilege, regardless of its validity. The avenue taken in the dissents of Justices Boyle and Weaver wholly ignores what clearly has been settled law in Michigan for the past eighteen years, just as the trial court wholly ignored counsel’s repeated warnings, on the basis of the case law, of the impending error.

 It is here that I must specifically take issue with the dissent of Justice Boyle. Under her view, all that might be “implied” from the refusal to answer the question is an acknowledgment that the witness resided with the defendant. The dissent has confused the inference the jury might draw with the potential responses to the question. On occasion, they might be very similar (i.e., if the question were “did you help the defendant kill the victim”). Generally, however, this is not so.
In Giacalone, were we concerned about the “inference” solely as Justice Boyle defines it, we would have found only an unstated acknowledgment that the witness recalled a particular day, along with, given the intervening years before trial an implication that the day stood out in the witness’ mind, or perhaps, that he had a good memory. Instead, we focused on the fact that “Michigan case law recognizes the danger that an adverse inference may be drawn from a claim of testimonial privilege.” 399 Mich 646 (emphasis added). The inference is not of a particular positive answer to a single isolated question, but rather, as we noted, “ ‘the inference of defendant’s guilt.’ ” Id. at 648, n 8, quoting State v Vega, 85 NM 269, 272; 511 P2d 755 (Ct App, 1973).

 Note also that such an inference would deprive defense counsel of the opportunity to direct the jury’s attention to Gregory Geams as another likely culprit, an approach that otherwise could be within the range of sound trial tactics on these facts.

 MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549. Defendant was convicted of the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553, as well as two firearm charges.

 It is not at all clear exactly why the prosecution sought Gee’s testimony. Discounting the defendant and the victim, there were six other people near the cars when the shooting occurred. One, Jamerson, who originally had faced the same charges as the defendant, testified in conjunction with a plea to a reduced charge of carrying a concealed weapon. The prosecution has not offered the Court any insight into what, if any, facts might have been contained in Gee’s testimony that would not have been cumulative of testimony of other members of the group.

 See n 6.

 Defense counsel’s persistent objections continued, here focused on the lack of counsel for Gee.

 While the witness did cite the privilege, it could also be reasonably concluded from the record that some level of sheer obstinance was involved on the part of the witness, including a significant lack of respect for the court. Nonetheless, it is clear from the record that no one could have any real doubt of what Gee would be doing. This is precisely the sort of situation contemplated by Judge Riley in Poma.
If the court concludes that the witness has no legitimate privilege, it should consider contempt penalties or other alternative remedies against the witness. Yet, with respect to the defendant, the court must proceed to determine if the witness intends to assert that privilege, whether validly or invalidly, at trial. If the intimate witness intends to claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment at trial, there really is no way to prevent prejudice to the defendant absent barring that witness. As other jurisdictions have noted, a cautionary instruction that no negative inference is to be drawn from the witness’s taciturnity is ineffectual. [Id. at 732-733 (citations omitted; emphasis added).]
Again, the inappropriateness of focusing on whether the witness should testify, when it is obvious he will not, is clear from our past cases.

 Recall for a moment the teaching of Giacalone regarding the certainty required concerning the “carrying over” of the negative inference from the witness to the defendant. “An adverse inference from Jolly’s refusal to answer may have carried over to Giacalone.” Id. at 647. We have never required a certainty that such an inference would result.

 Recall, again, that the jury lacked the knowledge, conceded to us by the parties, that Gee was not actively involved in this crime.

 Justice Weaver’s dissent attacks the “implication” of Justice Brickley’s opinion that the prosecutor cannot “rely on the trial court’s ruling regarding the validity of the privilege asserted.” Post at 224. While she correctly states that, of course, no higher authority is available at the time, and that we should not require prosecutors “to develop a precognitive sense of whether the appellate courts will disagree with the trial court’s ruling,” id., such hyperbole continues to miss the entire point.
While the prosecutor can rely on the trial court’s ruling as accurate, that is only half the picture. The other half is whether the witness will in fact comply with such a ruling and testify. In these cases, both witnesses, one through counsel (asserting a legal position with merit) and the other through sheer obstinance, made it abundantly clear that they would not be testifying. The prosecutors had no need to possess extraordinary gifts, nor to consult with psychic advisors, to understand frilly that the witnesses would not be testifying. To separate the reality of the witnesses’ noncompliance from the ruling of the trial court, and claim a sound basis on the latter, ignores the very prejudice to be inflicted, which this rule, beginning with Giacalone, has sought to avoid.
Justice Boyle’s dissent attacks this view as ignoring “the prosecutor’s ethical obligations as an officer of the court to put the truth before the jury.” Post at 228. Of course, I do not purport to impinge on such a duty at *221all. Nor, however, would I purport to involve it in support of a position where it is not the least bit endangered, as here.
In Thomas, Gee was but one of sixty-odd witnesses on the witness list. The prosecutor could advance only the same, unsupported, concern, as my sister, that the jury should hear from him, lest they retire to wonder, “What about Gee?” We have long since had instructions to alleviate such concerns, and, more importantly, even before this Court, the prosecutor has not offered the slightest indication that the absence of Gee would have prevented any part of the truth from coming before the jury. As noted, below, his testimony, if given, would have been cumulative of that of many other witnesses.
My sister offers the truism that “each man owes the court his evidence,” post at 229. While this is generally correct, the remedy for a violation of a witness’ duty to the court must lie against the witness, not the defendant. As to those reluctant witnesses whom Justice Boyle fears will be encouraged not to testily, the court has contempt remedies available. They were, of course, ineffective in Gearns, because the witness was (1) legitimately in fear of far worse penalties were he to incriminate himself, and (2) eventually acquitted of the contempt charges. As to the already incarcerated Gee in Thomas, I suppose, unfortunately, that other such witnesses, equally lacking in respect for our courts or fear of consequences, may appear before our courts. Given, however, that it took no such decision from our Court to so embolden Mr. Gee, I fail to see how the decision today will have any effect on either the conduct of witnesses or the consequences they may face. Our focus today rests, as did the focus of Judge Riley in Poma, on the consequences “with respect to the defendant.” Poma, 96 Mich App 732.

 I pause to note that, while the prosecution in these cases has argued a lack of knowledge that the witness would assert the privilege, they have failed to be at all convincing. The arguments here center on the possibility that the presence of the jury might somehow compel the witness to testify, despite his (or his counsel’s) repeated statements to the contrary that no such thing would occur. Gee made clear that the court could “give me some more years, it wouldn’t bother me.” Counsel for Gregory Geams made clear his client had a valid fear of incrimination and would continue to refuse to testify, despite the threat of contempt (the sanctions for which are substantially less than those for the crimes for which Gregory Geams was potentially exposed to liability).