Court Opinion

ID: 9931244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 18:02:51.717404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:36.930838
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
               CALIFORNIA

              BRIANNA MCKEE HAGGERTY,
                  Plaintiff and Appellant,
                              v.
               NANCY F. THORNTON et al.,
               Defendants and Respondents.

                           S271483

           Fourth Appellate District, Division One
                         D078049

              San Diego County Superior Court
               37-2019-00028694-PR-TR-CTL

                       February 8, 2024

Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Acting
Chief Justice Kruger and Justices Corrigan, Groban, Jenkins,
Evans, and Poochigian* concurred.

*
      Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
                 HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                            S271483

                 Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

     This case concerns the methods for modifying a revocable
trust. Section 15402 of the Probate Code states that “[u]nless
the trust instrument provides otherwise, . . . the settlor may
modify the trust by the procedure for revocation.” (Prob. Code,
§ 15402; all undesignated statutory references are to this code.)
Section 15401 sets out the procedures for revocation: Trusts
may be revoked by complying with any method provided in the
trust instrument.        (§ 15401, subd. (a)(1).)  If the trust
instrument explicitly makes that method exclusive, then the
trust may be revoked only in that manner.               (§ 15401,
subd. (a)(2).) If not, then the trust may also be revoked by the
statutory method — “a writing, other than a will, signed by the
settlor or any other person holding the power of revocation and
delivered to the trustee during the lifetime of the settlor or the
person holding the power of revocation.” (Ibid.)
      It is undisputed that if the trust instrument is silent on
modification, the trust may be modified in the same manner in
which it could be revoked, either via the statutory method or via
any revocation method provided in the trust instrument. In this
case, we consider the circumstances under which the statutory
method is available for modification if the trust instrument
specifies a method for modification. We hold that under section
15402, a trust may be modified via the section 15401 procedures
for revocation, including the statutory method, unless the trust
instrument provides a method of modification and explicitly

                                1
                   HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                   Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

makes it exclusive, or otherwise expressly precludes the use of
revocation procedures for modification.
                                 I.
     Brianna McKee Haggerty appeals an order of the probate
court finding a trust agreement was validly amended, thereby
excluding her from distribution. Haggerty’s aunt, Jeane M.
Bertsch, created a trust in 2015. The trust agreement included
a provision reserving “[t]he right by an acknowledged
instrument in writing to revoke or amend this Agreement or any
trust hereunder.” In 2016, Bertsch drafted an amendment
providing for a distribution to Haggerty. The amendment was
signed by Bertsch and notarized.
     In 2018, Bertsch drafted an amendment providing that half
of her assets would go to various beneficiaries upon her death,
including the Union of Concerned Scientists, Patricia Galligan,
and Racquel Kolsrud, who are respondents in this case.
Haggerty was not listed as one of the beneficiaries. The 2018
amendment was signed by Bertsch but not notarized. Thus, the
2018 amendment was compliant with the statutory method but
not with the method of modification specified in the trust
instrument.
       After Bertsch’s death, Haggerty filed a petition to
determine the validity of the 2018 amendment. Haggerty
argued that the amendment does not qualify as an
“acknowledged instrument” because it was not notarized and
therefore was not modified pursuant to the method of
modification specified in the trust instrument. In a minute
order, the probate court held that the 2018 amendment was
valid.

                                 2
                     HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

      The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Bertsch’s 2018
amendment was a valid modification pursuant to the statutory
method. (Haggerty v. Thornton (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1003,
1012 (Haggerty); see §§ 15401, subd. (a)(2), 15402.) The court
concluded that the statutory method was available for
modification because Bertsch’s trust agreement “does not
distinguish between revocation and modification” and because
“the method of revocation and modification described in the
trust agreement is not explicitly exclusive.” (Haggerty, at
p. 1012.)
      We granted review to resolve a split of authority regarding
the circumstances under which the statutory method is
available for modification when a method of modification is
specified in the trust instrument.
                                 II.
      Assembly Bill No. 2652 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) enacted
sections 15401 and 15402 in 1986 as part of a general
reorganization of trust laws recommended by the California
Law Revision Commission (Commission). (See Huscher v. Wells
Fargo Bank (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 956, 960, fn. 2 (Huscher);
Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law (Dec. 1985) 18 Cal.
Law Revision Com. Rep. (1986) pp. 567–569 (Recommendation
Proposing the Trust Law).) Revocation was previously governed
by Civil Code former section 2280. (Huscher, at p. 961.) No
statute specifically addressed modification. Rather, courts held
that, in general, the power of revocation implied the power of
modification, and they applied the rules governing trust
revocation to trust modification. (Id., at p. 962, fn. 5; see Estate
of Lindstrom (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 375, 385, fn. 11
[“[R]evocation and amendment are fungible. ‘The unrestricted

                                  3
                     HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

power to revoke implies a power to amend without revoking; i.e.,
it is unnecessary for the trustor to take the circuitous steps of
complete revocation and creation of a new trust with the desired
changes.’ ”].)
     Since 1986, two separate statutory provisions have
governed trust revocation and modification. Section 15401
governs the procedures for revocation. Under this provision, a
revocable trust “may be revoked in whole or in part by any of the
following methods: [¶] (1) By compliance with any method of
revocation provided in the trust instrument. [¶] (2) By a writing,
other than a will, signed by the settlor or any other person
holding the power of revocation and delivered to the trustee
during the lifetime of the settlor or the person holding the power
of revocation.” (§ 15401, subd. (a)(1)–(2).) We will refer to the
second method as the statutory method. Section 15401 further
provides: “If the trust instrument explicitly makes the method
of revocation provided in the trust instrument the exclusive
method of revocation, the trust may not be revoked pursuant to
[the statutory method].” (§ 15401, subd. (a)(2).)
      Section 15402 governs the procedures for modification. It
provides: “Unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, if a
trust is revocable by the settlor, the settlor may modify the trust
by the procedure for revocation.” (§ 15402.) “Thus, if the trust
instrument is silent on modification, the trust may be modified
in the same manner in which it could be revoked,” either via the
statutory method or via the revocation method provided in the
trust instrument. (King v. Lynch (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1186,
1192 (King); accord, Diaz v. Zuniga (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 916,
922 (Diaz); Balistreri v. Balistreri (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 511,
516 (Balistreri); Pena v. Dey (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 546 (Pena).)
But a revocable trust may not be modified “by the procedure for
                                  4
                    HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                   Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

revocation” where the trust instrument “provides otherwise.”
(§ 15402.) This case turns on the meaning of “provides
otherwise.”
       The Courts of Appeal have put forward three
interpretations. One interpretation, advanced by King, is that
“ ‘[u]nless the trust instrument provides otherwise’ indicates
that if any modification method is specified in the trust, that
method must be used to amend the trust.” (King, supra, 204
Cal.App.4th at p. 1193; accord, Diaz, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 924 [following King]; Balistreri, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 518 [same]; Pena, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 552 [same]; see
also Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1334
(Irvine). ) A second interpretation, put forward by Huscher and
adopted by the King dissent and by the Court of Appeal in this
case, is that “unless the trust instrument provides otherwise”
means “unless the trust provides a modification procedure and
explicitly makes that method exclusive.” (Huscher, supra,
121 Cal.App.4th at p. 967; see Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1012; King, at p. 1197 (dis. opn. of Detjen, J.).) The Court
of Appeal here also advanced a third interpretation: that
“ ‘[u]nless the trust instrument provides otherwise’ ” also means
“unless the trust instrument distinguishes between revocation
and modification.” (Haggerty, at p. 1011.)
                                 A.
      To resolve this issue, we begin with the text of section
15402. As noted, the phrase “[u]nless the trust instrument
provides otherwise” qualifies the provision that follows it, i.e.,
that the settlor of a revocable trust “may modify the trust by the
procedure for revocation.” (§ 15402.) The most natural reading
of this sentence is that the settlor may modify the trust using

                                 5
                     HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

any procedure for revocation unless the trust instrument says
that the settlor may not (i.e., “provides otherwise”). This is
supported by the plain meaning of the term “otherwise.” (See,
e.g., Marx v. General Revenue Corp. (2013) 568 U.S. 371, 377 [“A
statute ‘provides otherwise’ than Rule 54(d)(1) if it is ‘contrary’
to the Rule.”].) A trust term would be contrary to the
authorization provided in section 15402 if it were to preclude the
use of any of the section 15401 revocation procedures for
modification. It could do so by specifying an exclusive method
of modification in the trust instrument (Haggerty, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at p. 1012; King, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1196 (dis.
opn. of Detjen, J.); Huscher, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 967) or
by otherwise precluding modification via the revocation
procedures provided in section 15401. But a trust instrument
that merely specifies a method of modification without limiting
settlors to the use of that method does not preclude the use of
the revocation procedures and therefore does not “provide[]
otherwise” from the general rule. (§ 15402.)
      This interpretation is consistent with the Third
Restatement of Trust Laws. (See Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55
Cal.4th 1058, 1072 [“California courts have considered the
Restatement of Trusts in interpreting California trust law.”].)
The Restatement provides: “If the terms of the trust reserve to
the settlor a power to . . . amend the trust exclusively by a
particular procedure, the settlor can exercise the power only by
substantial compliance with the method prescribed.” (Rest.3d
Trusts, § 63, com. i.) However, if “the terms of the trust provide
a method for . . . amendment” but “do not make that method
exclusive, . . . the settlor’s [modification] power can be exercised
either in the specified manner or by a method [that is available

                                  6
                    HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                   Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

when no modification method is specified in the trust
instrument].” (Id., § 63, com. i; id., § 63, com. h.)
       In this case, the Court of Appeal held that a trust
instrument may preclude the use of revocation procedures for
modification by “distinguish[ing] between revocation and
modification.” (Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011.) On
this view, by treating revocation and modification differently —
such as by specifying different procedures for revocation and
modification or by specifying a method for modification but not
for revocation — the settlor “provides otherwise” from the
general rule that a settlor “may modify the trust by the
procedure for revocation.” (§ 15402.) The court reasoned that
distinguishing between revocation and modification is
“ ‘ “contrary” ’ ” to the general rule that the method of
modification is the same as the method of revocation. (Haggerty,
at p. 1011.)
        In King, the court held that a trust instrument “provides
otherwise” from the general rule if any modification method is
specified in the trust, regardless of whether that method is made
exclusive. (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193; accord,
Diaz, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 924; Balistreri, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 518; Pena, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 552.)
“[W]hen the Legislature enacted sections 15401 and 15402, it
differentiated between trust revocations and modifications.
This indicates that the Legislature no longer intended the same
rules to apply to both revocation and modification. [¶] If we were
to . . . hold that a trust may be modified by the revocation
procedures set forth in section 15401 unless the trust explicitly
provides that the stated modification method is exclusive,
section 15402 would become surplusage. Rather than enacting
section 15402, the Legislature could have combined revocation
                                 7
                    HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

and modification into one statute. Moreover, . . . the Legislature
knew how to limit the exclusivity of a revocation method
provided in a trust and chose not to impose such a limitation on
modifications in section 15402.” (King, at p. 1193.)
                                  B.
      Despite this natural reading of the word “otherwise,”
several Courts of Appeal have interpreted section 15402
differently. Even if the text is susceptible to more than one
reasonable construction, legislative history supports the
interpretation above. The Legislature intended section 15402 to
codify the preexisting rule that the power of revocation implies
the power of modification and to expand the availability of the
statutory method for both revocation and modification.
      Assembly Bill No. 2652 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) was
enacted “to effectuate recommendations of the California Law
Revision Commission.” (Exec. Sect. John H. DeMoully, letter to
Chief Clerk James D. Driscoll (May 2, 1986) 4 Assem. J. (1985–
1986 Reg. Sess.) p. 7308.) The Legislature thus relied on the
intent and commentary of the Commission in passing the bill.
(See e.g., Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No.
2652 (1985–1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 10, 1986, p. 7
[describing the “[n]eed for legislation” in terms of what “[t]he
Commission believes” (underscoring omitted)]; ibid. [“This bill
is a result of extensive study and recommendations by the
California [L]aw Revision Commission.”].)
      In explaining its decision to recommend codifying section
15402, the Commission said: “Under general principles the
settlor, or other person holding the power to revoke, may modify
as well as terminate a revocable trust. [Fn. omitted.] The
proposed law codifies this rule and also makes clear that the

                                  8
                     HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

method of modification is the same as the method of
termination, barring a contrary provision in the trust.”
(Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at p. 568;
see also id. at p. 636 [“Power to revoke includes power to modify”
(boldface omitted)]; ibid. [“Section 15402 . . . codifies the general
rule that a power of revocation implies the power of
modification”].) The Commission’s commentary makes clear
that section 15402 was enacted to codify the preexisting rule
that the power of revocation includes the power of modification,
and thus an available method of revocation is also an available
method of modification unless a trust term precludes the use of
any method of revocation for modification. (Recommendation
Proposing the Trust Law, at p. 568.) Section 15402 was not
added, as King contends, to establish a different rule from
section 15401. (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1193.)
Nothing in the Commission’s statements proposed treating
modification differently from revocation or changing the
preexisting rule. In fact, all of the Commission’s statements
about modification indicate that modification should be
governed by the procedures for revocation unless the settlor
makes clear an intention to establish a different rule.
      King contends that if section 15402 merely incorporated
the procedures of section 15401 for modifications, then section
15402 would be surplusage. (King, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1193.) But the Legislature had reason to accept the
Commission’s recommendation and codify the common law rule
that revocation procedures can be used for modification. An
appellate court had expressed uncertainty about the legal
underpinnings of the rule. (See Heifetz v. Bank of America
(1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 776, 781 [“ ‘Does power to revoke include
power to amend? It has been held that it does not where the

                                  9
                     HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

only power reserved is to revoke the trust in its entirety. Where
the terms of the trust are less explicit, the answer is more
doubtful. The Restatement [of Trusts] (§ 331[, com.] g) is
favorable to the view that the power to amend is included in the
power to revoke. The authorities upon the point do not seem to
be numerous. As a practical proposition, the principle referred
to, if it exists, is too uncertain, too dependent on language
furnishing only disputable evidence of intent, to provide a safe
working rule.’ ”].) In the Commission’s reports recommending
that the Legislature enact section 15402, it cited Heifetz,
suggesting that the legal uncertainty Heifetz identified may
have contributed to its decision to recommend formalizing the
common law rule. (See, e.g., Recommendation Proposing the
Trust Law, supra, at pp. 568, fn. 253, 636.)
      A later amendment to section 15401 underscores that the
Legislature intended revocation procedures to govern
modification. In 1988, in response to a proposal by the
Commission, the Legislature enacted a change to what is now
subdivision (c) of section 15401 relating to attorneys in fact. The
relevant statutory provision previously stated that “[a] trust
may not be revoked by an attorney.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 820, § 40,
p. 2756, italics added.) The Legislature amended the statute to
state that “[a] trust may not be modified or revoked by an
attorney.” (Stats. 1988, ch. 113, § 19, p. 481, italics added.) In
proposing this change, the Commission explained that its goal
was “to make clear that the rule applicable to revocation by an
attorney in fact applies to modification,” which “is consistent
with the rule provided in section 15402.” (Recommendations
Relating to Probate Law (Dec. 1987) 19 Cal. Law Revision Com.
Rep. (1988) p. 1097.) There is no evidence that the Legislature
intended to depart from this goal in enacting the amendment.

                                  10
                     HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

      It is also relevant that the Commission proposed to make
the statutory method more readily available for modification
and revocation. The Commission repeatedly indicated that the
power of revocation historically has implied the power of
modification and that the Commission’s intention was to codify
that rule. (See, e.g., Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law,
supra, at pp. 568, 636.) Further, the Commission expressly
stated its goal of expanding the availability of the statutory
method for revocation. (Id., at p. 568.) These statements
suggest that the Commission and, in turn, the Legislature
intended to expand the availability of the statutory method not
solely for revocation but also for modification, a process that the
Commission viewed as implicit in the power of revocation.
      In explaining its proposal to expand the availability of the
statutory method, the Commission said that under Civil Code
former section 2280, “California courts generally . . . held that
where the trust instrument prescribes a method of revocation,
the prescribed procedure must be followed rather than the
statutory method. [Fn. omitted.] This rule [was] defended on
the grounds that the settlor may wish to establish a more
complicated manner of revocation than that provided by statute
where there is a concern about ‘future senility or future undue
influence while in a weakened condition.’ ” (Recommendation
Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at pp. 567–568.) However, the
Commission pointed out, this prior “rule may be criticized as
defeating the clear intention of the settlor who attempts to
revoke a revocable trust by the statutory method, in
circumstances that do not involve undue influence or a lack of
capacity. In fact, the settlor may have forgotten about the
method provided in the trust, or may not be aware of the case-
law rule [that prescribing another procedure in the trust

                                  11
                    HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                   Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

instrument would displace the statutory method].”         (Id., at
p. 568.)
      Taking these competing concerns into account, the
Commission proposed section 15401, subdivision (a)(2), which
was adopted by the Legislature to prioritize the availability of
the statutory method while allowing settlors to bind themselves
to more onerous procedures if they desire. The Commission
explained, “The proposed law adopts a compromise position that
makes available the statutory method of revoking by delivery of
a written instrument to the trustee during the settlor’s lifetime
except where the trust instrument explicitly makes exclusive
the method of revocation specified in the trust. This allows a
settlor to establish a more protective revocation scheme, but also
honors the settlor’s intention where the intent to make the
scheme exclusive is not expressed in the trust instrument.”
(Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at p. 568.)
      The Court of Appeal in this case said that a trust
instrument precludes the use of revocation procedures for
modification when it “distinguishes between revocation and
modification.” (Haggerty, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011.)
However, the mere fact that a trust instrument distinguishes
between modification and revocation by authorizing certain
procedures for revocation and other procedures for modification
does not suffice to preclude the use of revocation procedures for
modification. The legislative history supports the view that the
settlor may modify the trust using any procedure for revocation
unless the trust instrument says the settlor may not. If a trust
were to provide that it “may only be modified by an
acknowledged instrument in writing,” then the trust would
preclude modification via any different method of revocation,
including the statutory method, regardless of whether the trust
                                 12
                    HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                   Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

distinguishes between revocation and modification. But if a
trust were to simply provide that it “may be modified by an
acknowledged instrument in writing,” then the trust would not
preclude modification via any method of revocation, again
regardless of whether the trust treats modification and
revocation differently.
      In sum, legislative history supports the view that the
statutory method is available for modification unless the trust
instrument “provides otherwise” by expressly precluding it or by
explicitly making a different procedure exclusive.
                                 C.
      Haggerty and amicus curiae argue that policy reasons
support making modification more difficult than revocation.
According to Haggerty, “[t]he Legislature had reason to make
modification presumptively more difficult than revocation. An
unscrupulous caretaker or counsel cannot usurp an elder’s
assets by inducing her to revoke the trust, because intestacy
laws would keep the estate within the family. Only if the trustor
modified the trust and selected a different beneficiary could the
usurper take her assets.” But, as respondents note, treating
modification more restrictively than revocation is not
necessarily more protective of settlors: “The [undue] influencer
could induce the settlor to simply revoke the trust and create a
new one, which has the same effect as modifying the trust. And
even without either revocation or modification, an influencer
can induce a settlor to transfer assets out of the trust and into
the influencer’s control.” Further, the influencer may well “be a
family member who would inherit if the trust is revoked.”
      In any event, although there are reasons why the
Legislature could have decided to treat modification more

                                 13
                    HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                   Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

restrictively, the question here is what policy choices the
Legislature actually made, not what choices it reasonably could
have made. As noted (ante, at pp. 11–12), the Commission
considered the policy concern that more restrictive procedures
for revocation and modification might better protect settlors
from undue influence. After weighing the various policy
considerations, it proposed a “compromise position” that
preferences the availability of the statutory method unless the
settlor explicitly binds himself or herself to a different rule.
(Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law, supra, at p. 568.)
We presume that when the Legislature adopted this proposal, it
was mindful of existing protections against the dangers raised
by Haggerty and amicus curiae, including the tort principles of
undue influence and fraud. (See, e.g., Tuolumne Jobs & Small
Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1039
[“ ‘The Legislature is presumed to be aware of all laws in
existence when it passes or amends a statute.’ ”].)
      Alternative policy arguments regarding whether
modifications should be treated more restrictively than
revocations are best directed to the Legislature, which may
amend the trust laws if it chooses. Our task is to give effect to
the statute as we find it. Under the statute, the procedures for
revocation can be used for modification unless the trust
instrument provides a method of modification and makes it
exclusive, or otherwise expressly precludes the use of revocation
procedures for modification. We disapprove King v. Lynch,
supra, 204 Cal.App.4th 1186; Balistreri v. Balistreri, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th 511; Diaz v. Zuniga, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th 916;
Pena v. Dey, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th 546; Conservatorship of
Irvine, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th 1334; and Haggerty v. Thornton,

                                 14
                     HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                    Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 1003, to the extent that they are
inconsistent with this holding.
       Finally, Haggerty argues that our decision should apply
only prospectively and that King should control this case
because “it was the prevailing law when Ms. Bertsch devised her
trust.” But the court below was “ ‘not bound by an opinion of
another District Court of Appeal.’ ” (People v. Kim (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 836, 847.) Moreover, “ ‘judicial construction of a
statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant
before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that
construction.’ ” (Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Internat., Inc.
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 944, 951, quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express,
Inc. (1994) 511 U.S. 298, 312–313). This rule generally applies
absent narrow exceptions based on fairness and public policy.
(Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 858,
878.) Haggerty does not argue that any of those exceptions
apply here, and we see no reason to depart from the usual rule.

                                  15
                   HAGGERTY v. THORNTON
                   Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

                        CONCLUSION
      We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

                                             LIU, J.

We Concur:
KRUGER, Acting C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
POOCHIGIAN, J.*

*
      Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                 16
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Haggerty v. Thornton
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 68 Cal.App.5th 1003
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S271483
Date Filed: February 8, 2024
__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior
County: San Diego
Judge: Julia Craig Kelety
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Blut Law Group, Elliot S. Blut; Keiter Appellate Law and Mitchell
Keiter for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ragghianti Freitas and Paul B. Gruwell for Sal J. Balistreri as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Artiano Shinoff, Howard A. Kipnis, Steven J. Barnes; Spero Law Office
and Leah Spero for Defendant and Respondent Patricia Galligan.

Cross Law and Oleg Cross for Defendant and Respondent Racquel
Kolsrud.

Higgs Fletcher & Mack, John Morris, Roland H. Achtel, Scott J. Ingold
and Rachel M. Garrard for Defendant and Respondent Union of
Concerned Scientists.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents San Diego Humane
Society, Nancy F. Thornton, Jill Bousman, George Bousman, Jack
Hebert, Larry Guentherman, Gail Spielman and Dean Spielman.

Hartog, Baer, Zabronsky & Verriere, David W. Baer and Kevin P.
O’Brien for Mary A. Nivala Balistreri as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendants and Respondents.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

Mitchell Keiter
Keiter Appellate Law
424 South Beverly Drive
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
(310) 553-8533, ext. 145

Leah Spero
Spero Law Office
255 Kansas Street, Suite 340
San Francisco, CA 94103
(415) 565-9600

Roland H. Achtel
Higgs Fletcher & Mack LLP
401 West A Street, Suite 2600
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 236-1551