Court Opinion

ID: 9387561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 15:00:25.809109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.372618
License: Public Domain

21-6093
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Poczter, IJ
                                                                           A205 833 485

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of April, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              MICHAEL H. PARK,
 8              STEVEN J. MENASHI,
 9              ALISON J. NATHAN,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   PAWANDEEP SINGH,
14          Petitioner,
15
16                      v.                                       21-6093
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                     Suraj Raj Singh, Esq., Richmond Hill, NY.
 2
 3   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 4                                       General; Holly M. Smith, Assistant Director;
 5                                       Christin M. Whitacre, Trial Attorney, Office
 6                                       of Immigration Litigation, United States
 7                                       Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
 8
 9         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

10   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

11   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

12         Petitioner Pawandeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a

13   January 29, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming a July 13, 2018 decision of an

14   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

15   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).            In re

16   Pawandeep Singh, No. A205 833 485 (B.I.A. Jan. 29, 2021), aff’g No. A205 833 485

17   (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. July 13, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

18   underlying facts and procedural history.

19         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the

20   specific findings that the BIA declined to rely on. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t

21   of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). “We review . . . adverse credibility

22   findings[] under the substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891

                                             2
 1   F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive

 2   unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

 3   contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 4         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

 5   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

 6   the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and

 7   whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the

 8   statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the

 9   consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any

10   inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an

11   inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim,

12   or any other relevant factor.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s

13   credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain

14   that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu

15   Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at

16   76. Singh asserted that he is Sikh and a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal

17   Amritsar political party and that the police and members of the Congress Party

18   first threatened him in February 2011, and then abducted and beat him in June

                                               3
 1   2011 because of his political activities. Substantial evidence supports the adverse

 2   credibility determination.

 3         The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony and

 4   between his testimony and application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh

 5   gave inconsistent descriptions of the alleged abduction: his written statement

 6   provided that he recognized his abductors as members of the Congress Party; but

 7   he testified that he was abducted by people in police uniforms. The agency did

 8   not err in concluding that the fact that his abductors wore police uniforms is a fact

 9   that an applicant would likely include in an application, particularly where, as

10   here, Singh noted at the end of his written statement that he believed the police

11   and Congress Party were “involved together.” See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78

12   (“[T]he probative value of a witness’s prior silence on particular facts depends on

13   whether those facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been expected to

14   disclose.”). The agency was not required to accept Singh’s explanation that he

15   mentioned some connection between the Congress Party and the police even if his

16   written statement did not identify his abductors as police. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

17   430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible

18   explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate

                                              4
 1   that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.”

 2   (quotation marks omitted)). The agency also reasonably relied on an inconsistency

 3   regarding the threats Singh received: Singh’s written statement reported threats in

 4   February 2011, and stated that months passed without incident before his

 5   abduction in June; but he testified about receiving threats in March and May of

 6   that year.

 7         The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Singh’s

 8   statements and his supporting documents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh

 9   submitted two versions of supporting letters from his mother and best friend,

10   which were inconsistent as to (1) the number of times he was threatened and

11   attacked; (2) when he joined his political party; and (3) whether he sought help

12   from the police after he was attacked.        The IJ reasonably rejected Singh’s

13   explanation that the original letters were not read back to their authors in their

14   best language because both letters contain signed verifications that the contents

15   were true and correct to the best of the declarants’ knowledge. See Majidi, 430 F.3d

16   at 80. The agency is permitted to rely on inconsistencies between an applicant’s

17   statement and statements of his witnesses, particularly when, as here, there are

18   direct inconsistencies in those statements. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78.

                                              5
 1         The agency also relied on Singh’s failure to provide reliable corroborating

 2   evidence. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on

 3   credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant

 4   unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao

 5   Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency did not err because

 6   the original letters from Singh’s mother, friend, and the head of his village were

 7   inconsistent with his own statements, and the IJ was not required to credit the

 8   amended letters. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally

 9   defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s

10   documentary evidence.”). Additionally, the letter from Singh’s political party did

11   not mention the past harm he alleged.

12         In sum, taken together the inconsistencies and omissions and the lack of

13   reliable corroboration provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility

14   determination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a

15   single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was

16   compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even

17   more forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Although the BIA concluded that

18   Singh waived withholding of removal and CAT relief by not arguing those claims

                                              6
 1   on appeal, the IJ denied all relief based on the adverse credibility determination,

 2   which Singh did challenge on appeal. There was no independent basis for the

 3   denial of his withholding and CAT claims that he could have raised before the

 4   BIA. However, remand is not warranted to correct this error because the adverse

 5   credibility determination is dispositive given that Singh’s claims for asylum,

 6   withholding of removal, and CAT relief were all based on the same factual

 7   predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

 8         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

 9   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

10                                          FOR THE COURT:
11                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
12                                          Clerk of Court

                                              7