Court Opinion

ID: 9559581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:31:50.130689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:38.420644
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.
I fully concur in the determination, long overdue, to overrule People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510 [199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303, 50 A.L.R.4th 1055] (Geiger) for all the reasons cogently articulated in the majority opinion. In addition to the deficiencies already noted, Geiger is flawed in other respects.
First, other than making a superficial comparison to the lesser included offense instruction rule, the Geiger court provided no real analysis for its conclusion that the state constitutional right to due process compelled a lesser related offense instruction rule. (See Geiger, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. *140518-520.) Only two cases were cited, neither of which purported to define the scope of due process in a criminal proceeding. (See Salas v. Cortez (1979) 24 Cal.3d 22 [154 Cal.Rptr. 529, 593 P.2d 226] [indigent putative fathers entitled to appointment of counsel in paternity actions brought by the state]; In re Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 921 [141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 569 P.2d 1286] [14-year-old minor cannot be placed in mental hospital without due process determination of mental illness or disorder].) At best, these authorities stand for the generic proposition “that an individual may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law” (Salas v. Cortez, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 26-27), hardly a self-executing principle in any context. Nor did the Geiger court attempt to explain why state due process should exceed federal due process; it simply made the implied finding ipse dixit. (Cf. Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 353 [276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077].)
Second, without explanation the Geiger majority inverted “the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions [citation], which we have applied in many varying contexts.” (Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 206 [107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed.2d 176], and cases cited therein; People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 426 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 886 P.2d 1193].) The United States Supreme Court has recognized a “narrow exception” only when “ ‘the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored[, as] . . . where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant... are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. . . .’ ” (Richardson v. Marsh, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 207 [107 S.Ct. at p. 1707], quoting Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 135-136 [88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627-1628, 20 L.Ed.2d 476].) No comparable risk arises when the jury is properly instructed it must find all the elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt before adjudging the defendant guilty.
Finally, in a related vein, the Geiger majority’s concern that the lack of instruction on lesser related offenses would compromise the “reliability of the fact finding process” was misplaced. (Geiger, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 520.) If the evidence is insufficient to establish the crime charged, the defendant may move the trial court for the entry of a judgment of acquittal. (Pen. Code, § 1118.1.) Indeed, the trial court may enter such a judgment on its own motion. (Ibid.) If both of these safeguards fail, and a jury convicts notwithstanding insufficiency of the evidence, the defendant can pursue the issue on direct appeal. (See People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-578 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255].) The court applies the *141same standard regardless of when the issue is raised (see People v. Blair (1979) 25 Cal.3d 640, 666 [159 Cal.Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738]), and must determine that the evidence “is reasonable, credible, and of solid value— such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” before sending the matter to the jury or upholding the conviction. (People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578.) If the evidence meets this standard, the verdict is inherently reliable because the jury justifiably convicts the defendant. If it does not, any unreliability in the factfinding process is checked by the court.
In short, Geiger attempted to solve a nonexistent problem by imposing a requirement that was “not only unprecedented, but also unworkable.” (Hopkins v. Reeves (1998) 524 U.S. 88, __ [118 S.Ct. 1895, 1901, 141 L.Ed.2d 76]; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 131 [citing more than a dozen examples of the confusion wrought by the Geiger rule].) In practice, Geiger probably did more to jeopardize the “reliability of the fact finding process” (Geiger, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 520) than to protect it. (Id. at p. 534 (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.) [predicting the Geiger rule would lead to “unsound compromise verdicts”]; see also Hopkins v. Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. at p. __ [118 S.Ct. at p. 1902] [requiring instructions on lesser related offenses “ ‘detracts from, rather than enhances, the rationality of the process.’ [Citation.]”].)
Although I agree with the analysis and holding in this case, for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 195-202 [77 Cal.Rptr. 870, 960 P.2d 1094], I do not subscribe to those portions of the majority opinion discussing the trial court’s sua sponte instructional obligations on lesser included offenses. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 112, 118-119.) In my view, this discussion is unnecessary to justify overruling Geiger. Its obsequies should be brief: good riddance.