Court Opinion

ID: 9709196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:42:33.394005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:46.901151
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent for these reasons:
1) There is no evidence of fraud. There is no evidence justifying the crossing over of the equitable threshold to overcome clear public policy barriers.
2) Actual notice was given to FCS before and during the administration of the estate through the exchange of correspondence with the attorney-agent of the personal representative. Inattention, lack of inquiry for over a year, and just plain negligence is the reason for the judgment of the trial court. I would affirm the judgment.
3) No equitable defense is available to a claimant who has slept on his rights and is guilty of laches.
4) The one year non-claim statute applies. Under these facts and circumstances, the efficient administration of estates would be grossly frustrated and the public policy of the legislature subverted.
Here, there was no showing of fraud. The public policy statutes established to assure an orderly and expeditious administration of a decedent’s estate were ignored by FCS. For over a year after learning of Decker’s death and that his estate would be opened, FCS exchanged correspondence with the attorney for the personal representative — never inquiring about the opening of the estate, never inquiring about their claim status, and never filing a claim. During the year of no inquiry and no filing of their claim, FCS exchanged correspondence about something with the attorney for the personal representative, perhaps *498the deficiency judgment FCS had been holding for seven years. Whatever this correspondence might reveal, there is no evidence that the personal representative’s agent-attorney indulged in fraud. There is no evidence that the personal representative or his agent did anything to keep FCS from filing a simple claim form with judgment attached.
Prior to the 1990 amendments of the Indiana Statutes, a creditor had only five months after the first publication of notice in administered estates to file a claim. If an estate had not been opened for administration, a creditor had only one year from the decedent’s death to have an estate opened and file his claim.1 .The self-executing one year statute was a non-claim statute. The one year period has been retained by the Indiana Legislature in its 1990 amendment. See Debra A. Falender, Notice to Creditors in Estate Proceedings: What Process is Due? 63 N.C.L.Rev. 659, 667-669 (1985).
After Tulsa Professional Collections Services, Inc. v. Pope (1988), 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565, notice solely by publication alone to creditors could not satisfy the due process test. Justice O’Connor writing for the majority stated that more was required: “... actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors.” Id. at 490, 108 S.Ct. at 1347. This additional notification requirement springs in part from Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Id. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657. See also Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams (1983), 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (Justice O’Connor dissenting).
In Mennonite, Justice O’Connor underscored what she meant when referring to the above passage from Mullane: “[w]e emphasized that notice is constitutionally adequate when ‘the practicalities and peculiarities of the case ... are reasonably met,’ ” Mennonite Board of Missions, supra, at 801, 103 S.Ct. at 2713 (citations omitted). In Pope, Justice O’Connor noted that “[w]e have repeatedly recognized that mail service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice.” Pope, supra, 485 U.S. at 490, 108 S.Ct. at 1347 (citations omitted).
In this appeal, actual notice was given as a practical matter under the circumstances. On September 25,-1990, eight days before the estate was opened for administration, the attorney for the personal representative sent a letter to FCS inquiring about a deficiency judgment held by FCS. The judgment allegedly resulted from the sale of Decker’s land. One day after the opening of Decker’s estate, FCS responded to the letter which advised FCS that Decker had died and that an estate would be opened. Thereafter, there were a number of letters exchanged between FCS and the attorney for the personal representative.
What is peculiar under these circumstances is the total inaction on the part of FCS to inquire of the attorney for the personal representative as to: the administration of the estate; the failure to contact an attorney to file its claim; the failure to inquire as to the time limitations on filing a claim in the estate; and the complete failure to do anything to protect the judgment which we will assume was a valid judgment.
Over a year expired after Decker’s death before FCS took any action to file a claim form and attach its judgment. IND.CODE 29 — 1—14—1(d) provides: “All claims barrable under subsection (a) shall be barred if not filed within one (1) year after the death of the decedent.” The most practical method to give actual notice to a known and ascer-*499tamable creditor has been accomplished by sending a letter. The letter notified FCS that Decker had died and that an estate would be opened. A letter from an attorney inquiring about a seven year old deficiency judgment is a strong, undeniable notice that someone is worried that he is going to be forced to pay your judgment and that you should make an inquiry. When the letter further indicates that an estate is going to be opened, a definite road map of action has been displayed. This should be enough, but certainly, an additional exchange of correspondence with the attorney for the personal representative would demand some protective action on the part of the holder of the judgment. Here, the record shows none. Actual notice and due process have been served. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. Kristin G. Fruehwald, Notice to Creditors— Publication is no Longer Enough, 24 Ind.L.Rev. 1045 (1991).