Court Opinion

ID: 9705639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:14:32.191083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:13.175035
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
Myers, C. J.
Petitioner, Junior Liford, has filed a petition in which he asserts that a judgment of the Grant Superior Court, which convicted him of second-degree burglary, was upheld and affirmed by this court on September 30, 1965 (see Liford v. State [1965], 247 Ind. 149, 210 N. E. 2d 366), but that the records are barren of any petition for rehearing *158having been filed. It is claimed in this petition that Junior Liford had no knowledge of the affirmation of the judgment until December 28, 1965, at which time he contacted his attorneys, who informed him that Supreme Court Rule 2-22 requires a petition for rehearing to be filed within twenty days of the rendition of the decision, stating concisely the reasons why the decision is thought to be erroneous.- He now asks that he be permitted to file a petition for rehearing because of his lack of knowledge of the law.
The record shows that petitioner was represented by counsel during the trial, other than those he has employed since then to file this petition. There is nothing to indicate that his counsel was incompetent or did not properly perform his duties. We have said that:
“* * * a client is bound by the acts or non-acts of his attorney, whether he be rich or poor, and he can not accept the benefits thereof and reject the undesirable acts or non-acts of his attorney. There are no allegations nor proof that the attorney in this case was incompetent.” In Re Lee (1964), 246 Ind. 7, 198 N. E. 2d 231, 232.
Petitioner is now attempting to set aside and hold for naught a Supreme Court Rule of which his counsel had knowledge. He does not accuse his former counsel of negligence in failing to file the petition for rehearing. He comes to this court long after the twenty days provided for in Rule 2-22, and asks for permission to file the petition through new counsel. If we are to follow this theory, the time limits on appeals and petitions for rehearing would be wholly superfluous. There would be no end to final determination of appeals and such interpretation could only lead- to chaos in the administration of justice.
The petition is denied.
Arterburn and Rakestraw, JJ., concur. Achor and Jackson, JJ., not participating.
Note. — Reported in 210 N. E. 2d 366. Rehearing denied in 213 N. E. 2d 704.