Court Opinion

ID: 9649500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:56:33.194093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:36.459937
License: Public Domain

O’HERN, J.,
concurring in Parts I, II, and IV-XII and dissenting in Parts III and XIII.
I concur in the opinion of the Court except with respect to Part III, in which the Court concludes that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in rejecting defendant’s application to withdraw his guilty plea. By posing the wrong question, the Court has reached the wrong conclusion. The real question is whether the trial court should have accepted the plea in the first place.
I
Rule 3:9-2 imposes a non-delegable duty on a court accepting a guilty plea to satisfy itself independently “that there is a factual basis for the plea and that the plea is made voluntarily, not as the result of any threats or of any promises or inducements not *486disclosed on the record, and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.” (Emphasis added.) The federal counterpart, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, mirrors our rule’s requirements for the acceptance of guilty pleas. Such rules have their genesis in the nature of a guilty plea. Chief Justice Warren has explained:
A defendant who enters such a [guilty] plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 58 S.Ct. 1019 [,1023], 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938). Consequently, if a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.
[McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, 425 (1969) (footnotes omitted).]
Our law is the same. “A guilty plea violates due process and is, thus, constitutionally defective if it is not voluntary and knowing.” State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 421 n. 1, 558 A.2d 1303 (1989) (citing McCarthy, supra, 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. at 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d at 425). A court’s acceptance of a guilty plea is “explicitly contingent on the trial court’s independent evaluation of voluntariness----” State v. Ford, 125 Wash.2d 919, 891 P.2d 712, 715 (1995).
Although the record discloses that the trial court engaged in a colloquy with defendant, the court did not discharge its independent obligation to assure that the plea was in fact voluntary. The record must “instill confidence” that a waiver of constitutional rights was voluntary. United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir.1996). Defendant Robert Simon was permitted to play a cat-and-mouse game with the court that undermined the court’s independent obligation to determine if the plea was voluntary. The trial court “failed to put these matters to rest,” and failed to “deal with these ambiguities” in Simon’s answers. People v. Jenkins, 72 A.D.2d 876, 421 N.Y.S.2d 934, 935 (1979).
“Even if a defendant wishe[s] to plead guilty to a crime he or she did not commit, he or she may not do so.” State v. Smullen, *487118 N.J. 408, 415, 571 A.2d 1305 (1990). The most conclusive evidence bearing on the voluntariness of the plea appears in the transcript of the in camera hearing involving the court, the defendant, and his public defender attorneys. The defendant’s attorneys had learned from co-counsel, not from Simon, that Simon intended to plead guilty on the first day of trial. Counsel for co-defendant Charles Staples had informed Simon’s attorneys that, anticipating that Simon would plead, he did not expect to be in Burlington County for more than one day.
Simon and Staples were both members of the Warlocks motorcycle gang. Staples was the president of the South Jersey chapter. Staples had taken Simon under his wing when Simon was released from prison three months before the offense at issue.
Simon announced his decision to plead guilty after the intervention of gang members. Defense counsel asked the court not to accept Simon’s plea. The court asked Simon whether, after he had telephoned the leader of the gang, ‘Was it something that has caused you to change your mind about pleading guilty?” Simon answered, “Of course it was,” but added, “I’m not saying no more about it, Your Honor.” Simon also stated that he did not want to plead guilty, but could not reveal why he was going to plead guilty anyway. When the court asked him to explain why he was giving up his right to trial by jury when he believed he might not be convicted of capital murder, Simon replied, “It’s just something I got to do.”
Such a record does not establish a voluntary plea to a capital crime. During the in camera proceedings, the defendant refused to state for the court what had made him plead guilty. The court had an independent obligation not to accept a plea that was on its face involuntary. That was not done because the court permitted Simon to withhold the underlying facts.
The majority finds it significant that when Simon made his later motion to withdraw the plea, he failed to prove that threats had been made sufficient to establish duress. Ante at 447, 737 A.2d at 17. Does that make an invalid plea valid? Of course not. Judge *488Douglas Ginsburg of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth the correct analysis of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea — look first at the plea itself. If the plea taken did not conform to the rule, the plea must be vacated.
[W]e will likely achieve greater economy and perhaps also clarity if we begin our analysis in such cases by assessing whether the defendant’s plea was taken in compliance with Rule 11. If we determine that there was no error in the taking of the defendant’s plea, we will be extremely reluctant to reverse the district court, even if the defendant makes out a legally cognizable defense to the charges against him. That is, a defendant who fails to show some error under Rule 11 has to shoulder an extremely heavy burden if he is ultimately to prevail.
This more structured inquiry — focusing first on the most important, indeed, the determinative factor in all our decisions to date — will both conserve the resources of the bench and provide better guidance to the bar, and we adopt it today as the presumptive framework for analyzing a district court’s denial of a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 32(d). It will conserve resources because the court will not need exhaustively to examine all three issues in every case. As a result, our decisions will inform the bar of what is required to make out each element on appeal, without confusing matters by implying that there are simple trade-offs to be made among them. This sequential inquiry will properly focus the efforts of defense counsel and the Government upon the key issue raised by the appeal of an order denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea: Has a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to meet the charges brought against him?
[United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1208 (D.C.Cir.1995).]
There is lingering resentment — and justifiably so — that defendant was playing games with the court and hoodwinked the State into trying Staples first. The problem is that we do not execute people because they play games. Because we respect life, we do not permit anyone, prosecution or defense, to inject the irrational into the capital-sentencing process. “The death penalty is unique, in result and in procedure.” State v. Kiett, 121 N.J. 483, 499, 582 A.2d 630 (1990); see also State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 329-30, 548 A.2d 939 (1988) (holding that defendant in capital ease may not waive right to present mitigating evidence during penalty phase), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L.Ed.2d 803 (1989), appeal after remand, 118 N.J. 513, 572 A.2d 622 (1990). On its face, Simon’s plea did not comply with Rule 3:9-2. The *489“unique” procedures applicable to death penalty cases do not allow for an exception.1
II
The totality of the information before the court at the time of Simon’s plea required a rejection of the plea. Contrary to the Court’s treatment of this issue as involving a review of an exercise of discretion, our jurisdiction in this respect is plenary. State v. Perez, 122 Idaho 1, 830 P.2d 1, 2 (App.1992); LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 750 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958, 109 S.Ct. 397, 102 L.Ed.2d 386 (1988). The record failed to describe the underlying facts that led to Simon’s plea. Among the factors relied upon by defendant to show that the totality of the information before the trial court was counter indicative of voluntariness are the facts that follow.
Simon decided to plead guilty to the murder indictment on the same day that jury selection was scheduled to begin in the joint-capital murder trial of Simon and Staples. On the preceding Friday, October 4, 1996, the local and national presidents of the Warlocks had appeared in court. That same day, Staples passed on to Simon a slip of paper containing the telephone number of the local president of the Warlocks. On Saturday, October 5, a local newspaper reported that members of the Warlocks were pressing Simon to plead guilty. On Monday, October 7, Simon announced *490his intention to plead guilty. Counsel urged Simon to delay entry of the plea until they could appeal to this Court on the issue of severing Simon’s trial from Staples’s trial. Counsel told the court that Simon answered, “what good would it do. It wouldn’t make any difference. I’d be in prison and get a shiv in the back____” At the colloquy between the court and Simon, the following exchanged occurred:
THE COURT: What is this thing about the shiv in the back? You said it was out of context.
SIMON: I was making a comment to him [counsel] that if — if I’m wrong, tell the Judge. I said, like I could go to court and we could beat this whole thing or do whatever we’re going to do and then two minutes after I walk out of the courtroom and I’m back in prison somebody could stab me in the back. That’s the way life is.
You know, it wasn’t like somebody was threatening me that they were going to stab me in the back. I love threats, your Honor. I’m telling you the truth. I love them cause then I know some a’s going to try something. That’s the type of person to threaten somebody.
THE COURT: Did you say to your attorneys that you didn’t know about it [that he would plead guilty] until Friday yourself?
SIMON: That’s right.
THE COURT: What did that mean?
SIMON: I can’t tell you. Really, if it means anything to you or to them, but I just can’t tell you.
THE COURT: Did someone inform you about something between Thursday and Friday [October 3 and 4] that you didn’t know Thursday, that you did learn of and, therefore, know about on Friday?
SIMON: Something like that. I mean, you can talk all around it and all day long. I’m not telling you what happened and, like, it’s nothing where it’s a threat toward me or anybody I know.
Simon believed that he could defeat the capital aspect of the case and offered no reason for risking his life by pleading to capital murder. The colloquy continued:
THE COURT: Did you tell your attorneys, as they reported to me, that you recognize, that you believe them, that they have a fail- shot, whether they said a good shot or real good shot, pretty good shot, but some reasonable shot at avoiding a death penalty phase, because—
SIMON: I told them that.
*491THE COURT: Because they think that it would be hard for the prosecutor to convince all twelve jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that you were the trigger man.
SIMON: I told them that.
THE COURT: Do you feel that way? Was that something that was the truth when you told them that, that you do really believe that?
SIMON: I believe that if we went to court I’d have a shot at not even getting a death penalty, but I don’t care. Like I said, I don’t care. I mean, like I don’t want to spend the rest of my life in prison. Okay? So, like if I get the death penalty, I get it. Who cares? I don’t care.
THE COURT: So, your reason for giving up the shot that you have, which you acknowledge is at least a reasonable shot at not having to face the death penalty, is you just don’t care?
SIMON: I don’t care.
Simon received no legal benefit in exchange for the plea. The only benefit of the plea was to Staples:
THE COURT: [I]s it your expressed desire to plead guilty, does it have to do with exonerating Staples from having to face the possibility of a death sentence on his part?
SIMON: That could help, but don’t use that against me. You know, I’d like to help Staples. I would. I can’t see, like I said in the beginning, I can’t see the both of us going down the tubes. No reason for that.
THE COURT: What do you think would happen if I didn’t accept your plea of guilty? What if you tried to put it through and I just reject it? What do you think would happen?
SIMON: I don’t know. I have no idea. I want to take some of the burden off of Shovel’s [Staples’s] family. You know, I think that would help them out cause they’re going to put — have to put out a whole bunch of money to this clown that’s representing Shovel.
THE COURT: Is that because — you tell me in your own mind why do you want to take this burden off Shovel and his family?
SIMON: Cause I think that would be the right thing to do.
THE COURT: Are you under any pressure from anyone else to do that?
SIMON: Not at all.
THE COURT: Either through Shovel or his family?
SIMON: No. I’m trying to be a nice guy here. Maybe that’s the last good gesture I’ll be able to do in my life, you know. 2
*492Simon’s lawyers believed that Simon was entering the plea under duress and urged the court not to accept the plea. They also requested that the court seal the proceedings to protect Simon and asked to be removed as counsel so that they could testify without a conflict of interest, should their replacement counsel find it necessary to offer their testimony at a future date. The court refused to remove them as counsel and took no testimony other than during the in camera hearing.
Finally, Simon himself indicated that he did not want to plead but had to plead and expressly told the court that he could not reveal his reason for doing so.
THE COURT: Was it something that has caused you to change your mind about pleading guilty?
SIMON: Of course it was. I did it.
THE COURT: Does it have something to do with Mr. Staples and his — whatever his outcome in this case might be?
SIMON: I told you, I’m not saying no more about it, your Honor. It was something personal and I can take care of whatever it is. I give you my word it’s nothing where I was threatened or I’m worried about anything. It’s just the way — it’s the way I’m going to do things.
At the in-court hearing on the plea, it was the court’s suggestions to defendant that furnished the reasons for the plea. Defendant was smart enough to realize that the court would accept the plea if he repeated the language suggested by the court. After defense counsel identified legal inconsistencies between Simon’s account and the elements of capital murder, the court subjected Simon to further questioning. Simon eventually stated that he had fired the gun with the intention of hitting the officer. Defense counsel then stated that “the forensics of this case are essentially inconsistent with the recitation that Mr. Simon just rendered to this court.”
Recall that the deceased officer, Sergeant Ippolito Gonzales, was found with Simon’s social security card and Staples’s driver’s *493license under his leg with a bullet hole through them. The automobile insurance and registration cards were found in the vehicle with a bullet hole through them. A forensic expert testified that one of the two shots was fired at a distance of perhaps twenty inches from the insurance card. There was evidence of “gun powder grains found on the insurance card of Mr. Staples, that was apparently in the hand of the police officer” when he was shot. Officer Kenneth Creseitelli, Sergeant William Clay, and a neighbor, John Lyman, all observed Officer Gonzalez talking to the driver at different times during the stop. No one saw the officer talking to the passenger.
Simon testified that he was sitting on the passenger side of the ear and had just stepped out of the car when he saw the officer reaching for his gun. Simon told the court, “I got out with the intent of trying to talk to him and I started to say something and as I did he started to go for his gun, so then I went for mine.” Simon testified that he fired two shots at a distance of about six feet from Sergeant Gonzalez. When pressed by the court, Simon answered, “He was about six foot from my body. Maybe when I held the gun out he might have been three foot from that.”
Because defense counsel was unwilling to help Simon further “improve” his plea, counsel declined the court’s offer to be more specific about his objections:
Well, I don’t intend to do that, your Honor, for this reason. We believe that this is a coerced plea and I believe that as soon as I begin to do that Mr. Simon -will then answer your Honor’s questions consistent with what he needs to get this plea through, just as when I explained to the court why ... the expert evaluation of the distance of the shooting [was inconsistent with defendant’s statement] ... and then Mr. Simon said, well, I thought it was six feet, but maybe it was a little closer. I’m not going to set him up for that.
I realize that it is difficult for society to accept that those who stand to be convicted of the shocking and heinous crime of killing a police officer should expect society to afford them the benefit of its laws. Society will not understand why we should insist that there be a “textbook ... inquiry”, Cray, supra, 47 F.3d at 1208, as to whether Simon’s plea was voluntary. He himself said, “So, like if I get the death penalty, I get it. Who cares? I don’t care.” *494Why should we care if he did not care? We can only recall what Justice Handler said on another occasion: “Although perhaps unwittingly, in failing to insist that death be imposed with the full measure of constitutional protection or not at all, we lose a significant and irredeemable part of our civilization built on the rule of law.” State v. Bey (Bey IV), 137 N.J. 334, 430, 645 A.2d 685 (1994) (Handler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1995).
A 1997 report of the Death Penalty Information Center stated that sixty-nine wrongful capital convictions have been documented in the United States since 1976. David E. Rovella, Illinois Expands Right to DNA Testing: Seven Men’s Release From Death Row in Three Years Spurs Bipartisan Support, Nat’l L. J., Aug. 11, 1997, at A6. Thus far in the administration of the death penalty, New Jersey has been spared the error of sentencing the wrong person to death. This is no doubt due to commitment by our system of criminal justice — the judiciary, the bar and law enforcement officials — to the observance “of those indispensable safeguards for the ascertainment of guilt.” State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 201, 716 A.2d 458 (1998). Among those indispensable safeguards for the ascertainment of guilt is the responsibility in a capital case to insure that a plea is voluntary. The record in this case failed to meet that requirement.
Simon, in effect, said to the court, “My plea is voluntary, Your Honor, but I have to do it.” That is like saying to the court, “I want to plead guilty to the crime, Your Honor, but I did not do it.” No court may accept such a plea.
HANDLER and STEIN, JJ., join in this opinion.

 We do allow an exception that a defendant in a capital case need not provide a factual basis for a plea. Rule 3:9-2 states in part:
When the defendant is charged with a crime punishable by death, no factual basis shall be required from the defendant before entiy of a plea of guilty to a capital offense or to a lesser included offense, provided the court is satisfied from the proofs presented that there is a factual basis for the plea.
"The rationale for this singular exception is that a defendant exposed to the death penalty should not be required to state anything that can support an aggravating factor; he need not aid in rendering his own death sentence." State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 285, 571 A.2d 914 (1990) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Comment, Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Procedure, reprinted in Pressler, Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, 533 (1989)).

 Even the prosecutor had difficulty believing that defendant was acting out of genuine concern for Staples. He later said: "Mr. Simon has a very unsavory *492criminal background and it’s perhaps uncomfortable to conclude that he would do something noble for a friend and colleague, but it’s not impossible.”