Court Opinion

ID: 9943108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:10:50.313409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:04.578162
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Cartwright, 2024-Ohio-662.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                        :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :
                                                               No. 112685
                 v.                                   :

TAYLON L. CARTWRIGHT,                                 :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                 :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 22, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-22-675929-A

                                                Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Chauncey Keller, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Robert McCaleb, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                   Taylon Cartwright appeals his conviction for substantial impairment

rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), which resulted in a 5-year stated

minimum term of imprisonment imposed under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and a
maximum term of 7.5 years as calculated under R.C. 2929.144(B)(1). For the

following reasons, we affirm.

               Cartwright and the victim were friends, having met through their

shared employment. Unlike the victim, Cartwright harbored some romantic feelings

toward the victim extending beyond friendship. On the victim’s day off from work,

she dropped her children off at day care and called Cartwright and two other friends

(who also worked with Cartwright and the victim) to meet at the victim’s apartment

to socialize. The victim testified to arriving at the day-care facility between nine and

nine thirty. The victim’s friends had to be at work at 11:00 a.m., however, and they

declined the invitation but said they would stop by on their way to work. Cartwright

lived near the day-care facility and agreed to meet the victim. The victim picked him

up and the two drove back to the victim’s home. The victim’s timeline of events

differs from Cartwright’s and that of the victim’s friend who testified at trial.

               The victim admittedly “chugged” a couple large glasses of wine and

“passed out” after returning home. She described “passing out” as feeling the effects

of the alcohol and not intending to fall asleep. According to Cartwright’s Mirandized

statement to the investigating officers, the victim was already intoxicated when she

arrived at Cartwright’s home. He drove her home at around 9:00 a.m. that morning.

After the victim passed out (his words), Cartwright took a photograph of the victim

depicting her asleep on a pile of clothes. Between 9:30 and 11:00 a.m., Cartwright

drove to their place of employment because he was supposed to work a day shift.

Upon arriving, he showed the photograph of the victim to another employee, who
then shared it with one of the managers. Cartwright claimed that he went to work

to tell his supervisor that he was unable to work his first shift because he had the

victim’s car, which he needed to return, and he was taking care of the victim in her

intoxicated state. Sometime before 11:00 a.m., Cartwright returned to the victim’s

home.

              According to Cartwright, the victim woke up and they engaged in

sexual conduct, but it was not a long encounter, according to his statement, because

he did not feel right engaging in sex with the victim in her state of inebriation. He

nonetheless confirmed that penetration occurred, and he maintained that she

repeatedly consented to the sexual conduct. Implicitly, he subjectively believed her

capable of providing that consent. Fifteen minutes after the sexual conduct, still

according to Cartwright, the victim’s two friends arrived to check on the victim, who

had not been responding to text messages despite their plans to visit. Cartwright let

the friends into the apartment.

              According to one of the friends, the one who testified at trial, they

arrived slightly before 11:00 a.m. and found the victim passed out prostrate on the

floor of her children’s room having just urinated on herself. They helped the victim

to her feet and changed her soiled clothes. At the time, the victim was unable to

stand without “wobbling.” She fell into her television. After the victim woke up a

bit, she sat on the couch. Her friend brought her some food. The victim was heavily

flirting with Cartwright, who was by then denying her advances. The friends left

because they were both late for work.
              The victim testified to returning to her apartment between 10:45 and

11:15 a.m. after picking up Cartwright. According to the victim, she remembered

“chugging” a large glass of wine or two after returning home. She sat on the couch

and “passed out” while waiting for her friends to arrive. She did not remember

anything else until around 4:00 p.m., when she awoke and discovered that she was

“barely dressed.” Her pants were pulled down and her shirt was not entirely on. It

is not clear whether those clothes were the same as the clothes that the victim’s

friends had changed her into during their brief visit. The victim recalls seeing

unexplained marks on her thighs and feeling soreness in her genital area.

              She drove Cartwright to work that evening so that he could work the

second of his assigned shifts that day. According to the victim, Cartwright was acting

strangely but would not give her a straight answer as to why. Upon further

questioning Cartwright about why he felt bad, she asked why he would “do that,”

having guessed at what occurred. The victim testified to Cartwright’s stating he felt

bad because she was asleep and drunk during the sexual encounter.

              After a day or two, the victim reported the rape to the police

department, and the investigation ensued.

              Upon that evidence, at a bench trial, the trial court found Cartwright

guilty of having engaged in sexual conduct with the victim, who was not his spouse,

when he knew or had reasonable cause to know that the victim’s ability to resist or

consent was substantially impaired due to the voluntary intoxication.
R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c). This timely appeal followed in which Cartwright advances

two assignments of error.

               In the first assignment of error, Cartwright claims that the trial court

“erred in excluding admissible lay opinion evidence concerning [the victim’s] level

of intoxication.” During the victim’s friend’s testimony, defense counsel asked, “[I]n

your lay opinion, what degree of intoxication would you say she was at?” The trial

court sustained the state’s objection to the question. No clarification for the ruling

was requested.

               “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the

sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343

(1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. In addition, the admission or exclusion of the

evidence must affect the defendant’s substantial right. Evid.R. 103. As a result, the

defendant must demonstrate that he was “materially prejudiced” by the evidentiary

misstep. State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 532, 634 N.E.2d 616 (1994), citing State

v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984).

               Cartwright’s argument is based entirely on Evid.R. 701, which

provides that “[i]f the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’[s] testimony

in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which

are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear

understanding of the witness’[s] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.”

According to Cartwright, “[l]ay testimony concerning another person’s state of

intoxication is admissible so long as the appropriate foundation is laid,” citing State
v. Wargo, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 96-T-5528, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4846 (Oct. 21,

1997), and Mayfield Hts. v. Molk, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84703, 2005-Ohio-1176,

¶ 31; see also State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79, 83, 2004-Ohio-37, 801 N.E.2d 446.

               Cartwright’s reliance on Evid.R. 701 and the above-cited material is

misplaced. The trial court permitted the friend to testify as to the extent of the

victim’s inebriation at length, which is permitted under Evid.R. 701 and the

authority provided by Cartwright. The argument being presented is not the correct

framing of the issue. It appears the primary issue with the state’s sustained

objection was the inartful phrasing and Cartwright’s attempt to have the friend

articulate a specific gradation to describe the victim’s level of intoxication.

               Cartwright thus assumes that the trial court’s decision to sustain the

state’s objection was based on Evid.R. 701, but that assumption is not self-evident.

See, e.g., State v. Baldwin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112440, 2023-Ohio-3795, ¶ 15

(defendant’s appellate argument, based on the general rule that a defendant may

impeach a witness, was overruled because the exclusion of the testimony was based

on another evidentiary rule that precluded the introduction of extrinsic evidence to

impeach a witness through a third party). Although the trial court precluded

Cartwright from attempting to have the witness assign a specific gradation to

describe the level of the victim’s intoxication, the court permitted, and even solicited,

evidence of the victim’s level of intoxication from the friend:

      Q. Was she that intoxicated that she was falling down drunk?
      A. She was wobbly. Yeah.
      Q. And she wasn’t falling down drunk to the point of passing out?
      A. Not passing out. Not that I’ve seen. Because when I was talking to
      her, she was able to respond.

      ***

      THE COURT: So, * * * when you arrived, you had the sense that [the
      victim] was to some degree, whether buzzed, drunk, or smashed,
      whatever word you want to use, but was to some degree intoxicated?

      THE WITNESS: She was very intoxicated.

Tr. 127:15-21, 130:21-131:1. Further, defense counsel was permitted to question the

friend about the victim’s physical capabilities with respect to her level of intoxication

— telling the court that the victim was responsive to them before the friends left.

               Cartwright’s claim, limited to the proposition that the trial court’s

ruling prevented him from presenting relevant evidence, is not borne out by the

record. He presented evidence of the victim’s level of intoxication for the trial court’s

consideration in determining whether the victim was substantially impaired. The

single line of questioning seeking a specific, but undefined, gradation about the

specific level of the victim’s inebriation did not affect a substantial right. Since

Cartwright’s entire argument is based on Evid.R. 701, which does not appear to be

the basis of the trial court’s decision given the totality of the testimony at issue, the

first assignment of error is overruled.

               In the second and final assignment of error, Cartright claims that his

conviction is based on insufficient evidence because the state failed to present

evidence that the victim was substantially impaired at the time of the incident; that

Cartright knew or had reason to believe that the victim was incapable of consenting;
or that the victim and Cartwright were unmarried. None of those arguments have

merit.

                Cartwright   was    convicted    of   rape   in   violation   of   R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(c), which provides that “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct

with another who is not the spouse of the offender * * *, when” the victim’s “ability

to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a mental or physical

condition * * *, and the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the

other person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired * * *.” “In

reviewing a record for sufficiency, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing

the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, 114 N.E.3d 1092, ¶ 156,

quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of

the syllabus.

                It is undisputed in this case that voluntary intoxication or impairment

may constitute a “mental or physical condition” as used in R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c).

State v. Doss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88443, 2008-Ohio-449, ¶ 15, citing In re King,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 79830 and 79755, 2002-Ohio-2313.                  The phrase

“substantially impaired” is not statutorily defined. In State v. Zeh, 31 Ohio St.3d 99,

103, 509 N.E.2d 414 (1987), the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that it “must be

given the meaning generally understood in common usage.” Id.; see also State v.

Virostek, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110592, 2022-Ohio-1397, ¶ 41. It is sufficient for
the state to establish substantial impairment by establishing a then-present

reduction or decrease in the victim’s ability to act or think. Zeh at 103-104.

“Substantial impairment does not have to be proven by expert medical testimony;

rather, it can be shown to exist by the testimony of people who have interacted with

the victim * * *” or the victim herself. State v. Brady, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87854,

2007-Ohio-1453, ¶ 78; State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111870,

2023-Ohio-1670, ¶ 19.

               As the trial court expressly acknowledged in rendering its verdict,

R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) was not intended to criminalize sexual conduct as the result

of an alcohol or drug-induced state of lowered inhibitions. “A person’s conduct

becomes criminal under this section only when engaging in sexual conduct with an

intoxicated victim when the individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe that

the victim’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of voluntary

intoxication.” Doss at ¶ 15.

      [T]here can be a fine, fuzzy, and subjective line between intoxication
      and impairment. Every alcohol consumption does not lead to a
      substantial impairment. Additionally, the waters become even murkier
      when reviewing whether a defendant knew, or should have known, that
      someone was impaired rather than merely intoxicated. Of course, there
      are times when it would be apparent to all onlookers that an individual
      is substantially impaired, such as intoxication to the point of
      unconsciousness. On the other hand, “a person who is experiencing [an
      alcohol induced] blackout may walk, talk, and fully perform ordinary
      functions without others being able to tell that he is ‘blacked out.’”

Id. at ¶ 18, quoting Westin, Egelhoff Again, 36 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 1203, 1231 (1999).

As a result, there is a continuum between impairment and unconsciousness, with
somewhere in between defining what is legally sufficient to establish substantial

impairment and the defendant’s knowledge of that impairment.

              On that point, and as the argument is framed by Cartwright, Doss

remains instructive. In that case, the victim consumed excessive amounts of alcohol

during the course of one New Year’s Eve celebration. She testified to blacking out

around midnight and not remembering anything until the next morning.               A

bartender testified that the victim was only served water after midnight because she

was severely intoxicated, slumping over while sitting at tables, but by all outward

appearances, the victim was carrying on conversations, sitting, standing, and

dancing with the defendant, impacting the evidence demonstrating the defendant’s

knowledge of the incapacity. Id. In reversing the conviction, the Doss Court held

that the bartender’s statements about the victim “does not give rise to the inference

that appellant knew, or should have known, about such impairment.” Id. at ¶ 22;

see also State v. Schmidt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88772, 2007-Ohio-4439 (noting

the victim walked and talked normally prior to the sexual encounter and only

“passed out” momentarily before the vaginal penetration for which she did not

consent).

              On the other end of the continuum, evidence of the defendant

admitting to the victim that he took advantage of the situation in engaging in sexual

conduct while the victim is “pretty drunk” is evidence establishing the defendant’s

knowledge of the victim’s substantial impairment. State v. Virostek, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 110592, 2022-Ohio-1397, ¶ 47-48. In Virostek, the victim and the
offender were friends but often engaged in sexual conduct throughout their

friendship. On one evening, the victim was described as being “loaded,” “wasted,”

and “pretty intoxicated.” Id. at ¶ 4. She went to the offender’s sister’s house to

retrieve something, and suffered a bout of vertigo, which causes dizziness,

imbalance, unsteadiness, or a very unsteady feeling — a condition exacerbated by

alcohol consumption. Id. at ¶ 5. While lying down to combat the condition, the

defendant engaged in sexual conduct with the victim, who was unable to resist due

to her inebriation and medical condition. After the encounter, the offender texted

the victim professing his remorse because he should have recognized the victim’s

condition at the time and he betrayed her trust and friendship. Id. at ¶ 20. Upon

that evidence, the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s substantial impairment was

deemed to be based on sufficient evidence.

              In this case, Cartwright’s statement to the investigating officers was

self-defeating. He admitted to the officers that he engaged in sexual conduct with

the victim 10 to 15 minutes before the victim’s friends arrived and found the victim

passed out prostrate on the floor, unable to control her bodily functions. The friends

testified to having to assist the victim in cleaning herself up and getting dressed

because of the level of her intoxication. Unlike in Doss, where the victim appeared

to act and converse normally with the defendant, there is no evidence that the victim

was functioning in any capacity 15 minutes before the friends found her in that state.

That evidence alone demonstrates the victim’s substantial impairment at the time

of the sexual conduct, and any issues as to her actual impairment 15 minutes earlier
is a question left to be weighed by the trier of fact. Cartwright has not included an

argument challenging the weight of the evidence.

              While Cartwright attempts to argue that there was no evidence

demonstrating that he was aware of or had cause to know of the victim’s substantial

impairment, he only offers his own opinion on that matter — through his statements

to the investigating officers. Like in Virostek, however, Cartwright made statements

to the victim regarding his remorse for engaging in sexual conduct while the victim

was intoxicated — reasonably implying that he understood her diminished capacity.

Coupled with the friend’s objective description of the victim’s inability to function

normally shortly after the sexual encounter, there is sufficient evidence

demonstrating that Cartwright at least had reasonable cause to know of the victim’s

substantial impairment. And further, he expressly told coworkers that he was

returning to the victim’s home because she needed looking after in light of her

intoxicated state — from which a reasonable inference could arise that the victim

was substantially impaired to the point of needing assistance shortly before the

sexual encounter. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107573, 2019-

Ohio-1780, ¶ 32. There is sufficient evidence demonstrating Cartwright’s knowledge

of the victim’s substantial impairment.

              And finally, Cartwright claims that the state must expressly ask the

victim whether she and the defendant are unmarried in order to present sufficient

evidence substantiating the element that the victim is not the spouse of the offender.

Although that is the better practice, as Cartwright concedes, “[w]hen the state fails
to affirmatively ask the victim whether she was the spouse of the offender, * * * the

trial court is permitted to infer from the testimony or circumstances, if sufficient,

that a defendant and his victim are not married.” State v. Brown, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 86577, 2006-Ohio-4584, ¶ 13, see also Virostek, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 110592, 2022-Ohio-1397, at ¶ 39 (evidence that the defendant and victim were

lifelong friends supports the reasonable inference that the parties were unmarried).

              In this case, when asked to describe their relationship, the victim

testified that she and Cartwright were merely friends and that she had no romantic

or sexual feelings for him. Cartwright further confirmed that their relationship did

not extend beyond friendship, having just met at their shared place of employment.

And further, Cartwright and the victim lived in separate homes. That is sufficient to

give rise to a reasonable inference that the parties are unmarried, and Cartwright

has not cited any evidence rebutting that presumption.

              The second and final assignment of error is overruled. The state

presented sufficient evidence of each and every element of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c)

when the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the state.

              With no other arguments to address, the conviction is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. The court

finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.           The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR