Court Opinion

ID: 9626006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:59:02.465484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:19.215249
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frantz
concurring:
Although I concur in every respect with the majority opinion, I believe it would not be amiss to make what I consider to be some germane observations concerning the standard of care declared to be applicable to the facts of this case in that opinion. In so doing, I would hope to throw some light on the reason why there is division of opinion on this issue of the case.
Disagreement on this issue arises, in part, from a difference in the placement of emphasis on language used in a dictum appearing in the case of Hook v. Lakeside Park, 142 Colo. 277, 351 P.2d 261, 86 A.L.R.2d 339. It is true that the dictum is couched in somewhat equivocal terms. But, as I view it, there are clues contained in the dictum which lead with certainty to my theory of what was meant by the language employed.
The language in question is as follows:
“The legal standard applicable to liability for injuries incurred on an amusement device is that of reasonable precautions to avoid injury, or as it is sometimes called, that of ordinary care. The circumstances which attend an activity such as the present one being extremely and intrinsically hazardous, demand a degree of care commensurate with the risk. Consequently a slight deviation from the standard (where, as here, the circumstances require great care) resulting in personal injury will render the actor liable.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*70Did we announce in the Hook case a rule applying a standard of ordinary care, or a standard of great care? Here is the point of divergence. If a dictum is susceptible of two interpretations, we are free to adopt that interpretation most appealing to us as founded upon sound reason when the question is first presented to us for resolution. See Everts v. Barker, 58 Utah 519, 200 Pac. 473.
And since the only question confronting us in the Hook case concerned the sufficiency of the evidence to justify its submission to the jury, we are for the first time actually called upon to answer the question of the degree of care required in this character of case.
It is my conviction that the dictum of the Hook case is not so equivocal that the standard of great care, as applicable, cannot be garnered from that opinion. The majority spoke of “circumstances” “present” in that case which demanded “a degree of care commensurate with the risk.” “Consequently,” the majority said, “a slight deviation from the standard (where, as here, the circumstances require great care)” would subject the actor to liability.
A further clue to the purport of the dictum is the citation of authority appearing in the Hook case. Illustrative of this matter is Denver Cons. Elec. Co. v. Simpson, 21 Colo. 371, 41 Pac. 499, cited by this Court as supporting the applicable rule of care in the Hook case. What would the reasonably prudent and cautious person do? The cited case, in part, answered the question as follows:
“ * * * Under the facts of the case, the law required of the defendant, conducting, as it did, a business so dangerous to the public, the highest degree of care which skill and foresight can attain, consistent with the practical conduct of its business under the known methods and the present state of the particular art.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*71This Court again applied the rule of high degree of care in the case of Blankette v. Public Service Co., 90 Colo. 456, 10 P.2d 327, the other authority from this state relied upon by the majority to support its statement of the standard of care to be applied in the Hook case.
For the reasons stated above, I believe we are following the dictum appearing in the Hook case and that the majority opinion is correct in its pronouncement of what constitutes the standard of care in this character of case.