Court Opinion

ID: 9958892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 14:03:24.365005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:55.209521
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                  STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                        No. 1D2022-3114
                 _____________________________

LAURA R. CARROLL,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Coleman L. Robinson, Judge.

                          April 10, 2024

ROWE, J.

      When the results of Tate High School’s 2020 homecoming
queen election came in, Laura Carroll’s daughter appeared to have
won convincingly. But not everyone was convinced. The teacher
responsible for administering the election reported to school
officials that many votes in the election had been flagged by the
election application software—and that every flagged vote had
been cast for Carroll’s daughter. At the time, Carroll was an
assistant principal at Bellview Elementary School, with district-
wide access to all student accounts in the school district’s FOCUS
portal. It was suspected by some that Carroll’s daughter had access
to her mother’s credentials to the FOCUS portal and had used that
access to acquire confidential student information. Information
that she then used to cast votes for herself in the homecoming
queen election. The school district appointed Gary Marsh to
investigate the report. Marsh concluded that the suspicions
linking Carroll to the improperly cast votes were well-founded.

     Tate High School allowed students to vote for homecoming
queen through an application called Election Runner. On election
day, Election Runner administrators reported to the school district
that one hundred seventeen votes had been flagged as “false.” To
cast votes in the election, students had to verify their identity
using their student identification number and their date of birth.
This information was available in FOCUS. All the votes flagged by
Election Runner were from students whose records had been
accessed from Carroll’s FOCUS account in the thirty days before
the election. And every flagged vote was cast for Carroll’s
daughter.

     As an assistant principal at Belleview with administrator
access, Carroll could use FOCUS to review confidential
information for any student in the school district, including grades,
attendance, and mental health records. Marsh reviewed a report
from the school’s information management system and confirmed
that Carroll’s FOCUS credentials were used to view confidential
information of two hundred twelve Tate High School students in
the thirty days before the homecoming queen election. And in the
year before the election, confidential records of three hundred
thirty-nine students at Tate were accessed with Carroll’s
credentials. As Carroll worked at the elementary school, it was
unclear why she would have needed to access records of students
at Tate.

     District officials decided to question Carroll to see if she had
an explanation for accessing so many high school student records.
Marsh went to Belleview to speak with Carroll, but she refused to
talk to him. Marsh then asked Carroll to come to the school
district’s office for a formal interview.

     When Carroll arrived, she was questioned for an hour by
Marsh, with another school district official present—the
information technology security manager. Carroll sat close to the
door in the conference room where she was questioned. Marsh
confirmed to Carroll that she was free to leave at any time. Carroll

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answered some questions but she refused to answer others. At
times, she stated: “Well, I’m not going to tell you that,” and “I’m
not going to tell you.” She did admit that she had provided her
daughter with access to her FOCUS credentials in the past.

     When the school district’s investigation concluded, Marsh
reported the data breach to the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement. FDLE investigated and verified that someone using
Carroll’s credentials illegally accessed confidential records of Tate
High School students in FOCUS. FDLE confirmed that one
hundred seventeen votes in the homecoming queen election
originated from a single Internet Protocol (IP) address. FDLE
traced the IP address to Verizon and back to Carroll’s cell phone
number.

     FDLE also obtained nine written statements from Tate High
School students and one teacher who attested that they had
witnessed Carroll’s daughter using her mother’s FOCUS
credentials or that the daughter had spoken with them about such
use. One student reported that Carroll’s daughter had bragged
about using her mother’s FOCUS credentials for the past four
years, from the time she was a freshman at Tate. FDLE learned
that FOCUS users had to change their passwords every forty-five
days—meaning that Carroll’s daughter would have needed to
regularly obtain or discover Carroll’s new passwords. FDLE also
reviewed a written statement provided by Carroll’s daughter,
admitting that she had access to Carroll’s FOCUS account.

     FDLE also obtained records of the administrative hearing on
the expulsion of Carroll’s daughter from school. During the
hearing, Carroll submitted a letter to the hearing officer, stating
that her daughter was guilty of accessing information from
Carroll’s FOCUS account. Carroll admitted that she herself had
viewed the records of hundreds of students at Tate by using her
district administrator access.

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     FDLE applied for a warrant for Carroll’s arrest. Carroll * was
arrested and charged with (1) accessing a computer system
without authorization, (2) illegal use of personal identification
information, (3) unlawful use of a two-way communications device
to facilitate the commission of a felony, and (4) conspiracy to
commit a felony.

    Carroll moved to suppress the statements she made during
the meeting with Marsh. She argued that her statements were
coerced in violation of her right against self-incrimination because
she feared adverse employment consequences if she did not
cooperate with Marsh. The trial court denied the motion.

     Carroll then pleaded no contest to the use of a two-way
communications device to facilitate a felony in exchange for the
State dropping the other three charges. She reserved the right to
appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. The trial
court withheld adjudication and sentenced her to eighteen months
of probation. This timely appeal follows.

    A defendant may seek an appeal after entering a guilty or no
contest plea if the issue is expressly reserved and dispositive.
Massey v. State, 324 So. 3d 40, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). An issue is
dispositive if the State stipulates to dispositiveness or “if the
evidence that is the subject of the motion is necessary to obtain a
conviction.” Le Boss v. State, 359 So. 3d 436, 440–41 (Fla. 1st DCA
2023). The admission of Carroll’s statements to Marsh would have
been dispositive.

     This court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress under a mixed standard. Tyson v. State, 351 So. 3d 1184,
1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). The court’s factual findings must be
supported by competent, substantial evidence, and the court’s
legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id.

    * The State charged Carroll’s daughter with the same offenses.

After her successful completion of a pretrial intervention program,
the State dismissed the charges against the daughter.

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     Carroll argues that the trial court should have suppressed her
statements to Marsh because she was coerced into answering his
questions in violation of her privilege against self-incrimination.
She claims that she believed her job would be adversely affected if
she did not answer Marsh’s questions. Citing Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), Carroll argues that her coerced
incriminatory statements may not be used in a criminal proceeding
against her. As we will explain, the trial court correctly determined
that Garrity did not require suppression of Carroll’s statements.

     The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provide that no
person will be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. This prohibition not only allows a person to refuse
to testify against himself at a criminal trial when he is a defendant,
but also “privileges him not to answer official questions put to him
in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal
proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).

     In the context of government employment, if a government
employer coerces an employee to surrender her privilege against
self-incrimination by threatening the employee with an adverse
employment action for refusing to answer questions from the
employer, any incriminating statements may not be used in a
future criminal proceeding. Id. at 78–79. In Garrity, police officers
were questioned during an internal investigation about the alleged
fixing of traffic tickets. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494. Before
questioning, each officer was warned “(1) that anything he said
might be used against him in any state criminal proceeding; (2)
that he had the privilege to refuse to answer if the disclosure would
tend to incriminate him; but (3) that if he refused to answer he
would be subject to removal from office.” Id. Given the choice “to
forfeit their jobs or incriminate themselves,” the officers confessed,
and their statements were later used in a criminal prosecution. Id.
at 497.

     The Supreme Court held that the option of losing their jobs or
giving self-incriminating testimony was “the antithesis of free
choice to speak out or to remain silent.” Id. “Where the choice is
between the rock and the whirlpool, duress is inherent in deciding

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to waive one or the other.” Id. at 498 (quotations omitted). For this
reason, the Supreme Court held that “the protection of the
individual under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced
statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of
statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that
it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of
our body politic.” Id. at 500.

     The immunity recognized in Garrity extends not only to a
government employee’s incriminatory statements obtained during
questioning when the employer is a law enforcement agency but
also when other government employers question employees with a
threat of adverse employment action if they refuse to answer
questions. See Cropsey v. Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cnty., 19 So. 3d 351,
355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (considering Garrity immunity in the
context of statements made by a public school teacher to her school
board employer). This is because the privilege against self-
incrimination applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings,
wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal
responsibility him who gives it.” McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S.
34, 40 (1924).

     But before a government employee is entitled to Garrity
immunity for incriminatory statements provided to her employer,
she must show she was threatened with an adverse employment
action if she failed to answer her employer’s questions. See
Cropsey, 19 So. 3d at 355. The threat of an adverse employment
action may be direct or implied. See United States v. Vangates, 287
F.3d 1315, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2002).

     At issue here is whether there was an implied threat by the
school district. Carroll does not contend that Marsh directly
threatened to fire her or take any other adverse employment action
if she refused to answer his questions. Instead, she argues that she
believed that she would be terminated if she refused. But to be
entitled to suppression of her statements to Marsh, it was not
enough that Carroll subjectively believed that she would suffer an
adverse employment action if she refused to answer Marsh’s
questions. Rather, her belief had to be objectively reasonable. State
v. Socarras, 272 So. 3d 488, 495 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). An employee’s
subjective belief “will not be considered objectively reasonable if

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the state has played no role in creating the impression that the
refusal to give a statement will be met with termination of
employment.” Id. (quoting United States v. Camacho, 739 F. Supp.
1504, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1990)). A trial court must consider the
totality of the circumstances when determining whether an
employee’s belief is objectively reasonable. Vangates, 287 F.3d at
1322.

     Carroll argued that her belief that she would suffer adverse
consequences was objectively reasonable because (1) the school
district’s letter compelling her to appear for questioning was the
functional equivalent of a subpoena; (2) Marsh did not advise her
that she was not required to answer his questions; and (3) there
was an expectation that administrators would cooperate with
school district investigations. We disagree. Under the
circumstances of this case, Carroll’s subjective belief that she
would suffer an adverse employment action if she did not answer
Marsh’s questions was not objectively reasonable.

     First, the letter directing Carroll to appear for an interview at
the school district office provides, “You are to appear.” The letter
did not state that Carroll would be sanctioned for failing to appear
and did not tell her that she had to waive her Fifth Amendment
rights. Rather, the letter was more of a general directive to
cooperate. See Socarras, 272 So. 3d at 496–97 (explaining that a
directive to cooperate is not so coercive to create a reasonably
objective belief under Garrity).

     Second, Marsh may not have advised Carroll that she did not
have to speak with him, but Carroll’s interactions with Marsh
show that she did not feel compelled to answer his questions. When
Marsh approached her at Belleview, she refused to answer any of
his questions. And during the more formal interview at the school
district office, Carroll confirmed with Marsh that she was free to
leave the interview at any time. She was seated closest to the door
of the conference room. And there was nothing about the
questioning that signified that Carroll could not leave. Carroll also
refused to answer some of Marsh’s questions. Those refusals
contradict her claim that she felt compelled to answer Marsh and
that she believed her refusal to do so would subject her to adverse
employment actions. See Socarras, 272 So. 3d at 498 (“As in

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Murphy, Socarras ‘apparently felt no compunction about
adamantly denying’ he engaged in criminal activity, strongly
suggesting any subjective belief of employment sanctions ‘did not
overwhelm his resistance.’” (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465
U.S. 420, 438 (1984))).

    Finally, Carroll argues that there was an expectation that
administrators would cooperate with school district investigations.
But “the mere fact that an employee may have felt compelled to
make a statement to his colleagues and superiors as a normal part
of his duties is not sufficient to implicate Garrity.” Id. at 496
(quoting People v. Koverman, 38 P.3d 85, 89 (Colo. 2002)). Carroll
has identified no school district rule or policy that required her to
answer Marsh’s questions or face termination. Marsh told Carroll
that the school district expected administrators to cooperate with
investigations, but he never told her that she had to answer his
questions or that she would be subject to a sanction for failing to
do so. And even when faced with this information, Carroll still
refused to answer some of Marsh’s questions.

     On these facts, Carroll did not have an objectively reasonable
belief that she would be subject to adverse employment
consequences if she did not answer questions from her employer.
For this reason, the trial court did not err when it concluded that
Carroll’s incriminatory statements to Marsh should not be
suppressed on grounds of Garrity immunity.

    AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Luke Newman of Luke Newman, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

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Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren L. Shippy, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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