Court Opinion

ID: 9774033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:07:10.692427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:48.839422
License: Public Domain

OPINION
EVANS, Chief Justice.
A jury convicted the appellant of the offense of aggravated robbery and assessed his punishment at forty years imprisonment.
The security manager at Joske’s, a retail department store, testified that on October 30, 1979, he noticed the appellant taking boys’ jeans off a clothing rack and bending down to the floor. Observing the appellant place a plastic covering over the clothing and start to exit from the store without paying for the jeans, the security manager motioned to a store detective, and both men followed the appellant into the store’s parking lot and around the corner of a Roy Rogers food stand, at which point they were five or six feet away from the appellant. The security manager then confronted the appellant in front of a parked car, and the store detective went around to the rear of the automobile. Although the sequence of events at this point is a matter of contention, the record clearly reflects that upon being confronted by the security manager, the appellant threw the merchandise on the hood of the parked car, pulled an open knife, and began making slashing motions with it. He then turned and ran away, but he was overtaken by the security manager, who subdued him and gained possession of the knife.
The appellant was indicted under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02 (Vernon 1974), which provides:
(a) A person commits an offense if, in the course of committing theft as defined in Chapter 31 of this Code and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he:
(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or
(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death....
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.01 defines the term “in the course of committing theft” as meaning:
“conduct that occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission of theft.
In his first and second grounds of error, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove two essential elements of the offense of robbery, to-wit: (1) that the event occurred in the course of committing theft, and (2) that the event placed the complaining witness in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.
Under his first ground of error, the appellant argues that the evidence shows that he had totally relinquished control of the property prior to the time that he exhibited the knife. Thus, it is his position that even if there was evidence of violent conduct “in immediate flight after the attempt or commission of theft,” there was no showing that such violence occurred “in the course of committing theft .. . and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property.” (emphasis added)
The appellant argues that the testimony of the security manager shows that the appellant threw the clothes on the hood of the car when he was first confronted by the security manager, and that by his language, he indicated that he was relinquishing possession of the goods. The direct testimony of the security manager is subject to that interpretation. However, during cross-examination, the security manager testified that the appellant discarded the clothing after he was told to return to the store:
Q. All right. And that’s when you say you were going to take him back or said something to the effect you were going to take him back into the store?
A. I asked him to come back with us.
*534Q. This is when he threw down the merchandise on the hood of the car?
A. On the hood.
Q. All right. You say at this time he refused to come with you, and he pulled out State’s Exhibit No. 3, right, the knife?
A. Yes, sir, that’s correct.
The jury could reasonably have inferred from the testimony of the security manager, as well as that of the store detective, that the appellant’s action in pulling the knife occurred almost simultaneously with his throwing the merchandise on the hood of the car. Thus, the jury might have determined from the evidence that when the appellant was told to return to the store, he responded by throwing the clothing on the hood, saying “Take your shit, man,” and, in the same motion, pulling the open knife from his back pocket and refusing to surrender himself.
Furthermore, as indicated by the commentary to § 29.02 of the Penal Code, violent conduct accompanying immediate flight after the attempt or commission of theft is equally as dangerous as violent conduct during the commission of the act. When a party, during immediate flight from the scene of a theft, places another in fear of immediate bodily injury or death in order to assure his escape, the violent conduct aggravates the act of theft, notwithstanding that control over the stolen property is relinquished in the process of escaping. The relinquishment of the property does not lessen the danger of the situation, since the motive is still escape.
The security manager testified, without objection, that the appellant’s conduct placed him in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and although objection was made and sustained to his subsequent testimony to similar effect, no motion was made to strike this testimony. Under the court’s charge and the evidence in the record, the jury was justified in reaching a conclusion that the appellant placed the complaining witness in fear of imminent bodily injury or death during his immediate flight after the commission of theft. The first and second grounds of error are overruled.
In his third ground of error, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the knife was a deadly weapon. In support of this ground of error, the appellant relies principally upon Davidson v. State, 602 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), in which a store employee saw the defendant place some packages of camera film inside his pants and leave the store without paying for them. The employee and other employees followed the defendant into the parking lot, where the complaining witness tried to get the defendant to re-enter the store. The defendant then turned to the complaining witness, who was five or six feet distant from him, and with an open knife in his hand said “if you come any closer I’m going to cut you.” The complaining witness pulled a box cutter from his pocket to defend himself, and the defendant walked backward a short distance, turned, and ran. There was testimony that the blade of the knife was approximately two and one-half to three inches long, but the knife was never found and was not in evidence. Although the employee testified that he had been in fear of bodily injury or death, he further admitted that this was because a friend of his had been hurt previously in a parking lot with a screwdriver-wielding assailant. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant used or intended to use the knife so as to inflict serious bodily harm or death, noting that the State had not established possible potential harm through hypothetical questions to a weapons expert. 602 S.W.2d 272 at 274.
In Batro v. State, 635 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.App. [1st Dist.], 1982), this court stated:
Since a knife is not a deadly weapon per se, Harris v. State, 562 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), the State must prove in each case that the particular knife involved is capable of inflicting deadly wounds. There are several factors which a court may consider in determining whether a particular knife is a deadly *535weapon. They include: 1) injuries; 2) the manner in which the knife was used; 3) the length of the blade; 4) threats. Alvarez v. State, 566 S.W.2d 612 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Hart v. State, 581 S.W.2d 675 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
When, as in the instant case, serious bodily injury has not been shown, the court must discern the manner of the knife’s use or its intended use, its size and shape, and its capacity to produce death or serious bodily injury in determining whether a knife was a deadly weapon. Harris, supra. We also note that the absence of injuries does not preclude a finding that a particular knife is a deadly weapon. Denham v. State, 574 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
In the case at bar, the security manager testified that when the appellant pulled the knife from his back pocket, the two men were standing “headlight to headlight” in front of the parked car. He testified that the appellant “just started slashing” and said “I’m not going anywhere.” When the appellant pointed the knife at him, the security guard was placed in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. In addition to this testimony, a veteran police officer with six year’s service testified that he had investigated homicides, cuttings and stabbings on many occasions, and that based upon his investigations, the knife in question was capable of inflicting serious bodily injury or death.
Expert testimony is no longer required to establish the character of a particular knife as a deadly weapon, but it may provide additional evidence on that element of the proof. Batro, supra. In the instant case, the jury was entitled to infer from the evidence that the particular knife in question, used by the appellant in the manner shown by the complaining witness’s testimony, was capable of inflicting serious bodily injury or death. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the knife was a deadly weapon, and the third ground of error is overruled.
In his fourth ground of error, the appellant contends that the record reflects fundamental error because the court’s charge is at variance with the indictment.
Section 29.02 of the Penal Code states in part that:
(а) A person commits an offense if, in the course of committing theft as defined in Chapter 31 of this code and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he:
* * # * * *
(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.... (emphasis added)
The indictment contained allegations in the conjunctive “threaten and place,” and the court’s charge alleged in the disjunctive “threaten or place.” The appellant contends that the use of the word “or” lessened the State’s burden of proof from that alleged in the indictment, citing Williams v. State, 612 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
In Robinson v. State, 596 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), the court found no fundamental error where the indictment contained allegations in the conjunctive and the court’s charge alleged in the disjunctive. This ground of error is also overruled.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
DOYLE and STILLEY, JJ., also participating.
DOYLE, J., dissents.