Court Opinion

ID: 9561640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:13:29.127162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:05.293525
License: Public Domain

Justice LOHR
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
This case presents the question of whether a trial court adequately advised a criminal defendant regarding his constitutional right to testify in his own defense. The defendant, Marvin Gray, was convicted of aggravated robbery1 and attempted aggravated robbery,2 and was sentenced as a habitual offender3 to concurrent life sentences. Gray did not testify in his own defense during the trial. The court of appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court did not adequately advise Gray concerning his right to testify. People v. Gray, 899 P.2d 290, 291 (Colo.App.1994).
On certiorari review in this court, the majority reaffirms our decision in People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo.1984), that a defendant must be advised by the trial court concerning his constitutional right to testify. *794Maj. op. at 793. Contrary to the court of appeals’ decision however, Gray, 899 P.2d at 293, the majority also holds that the Curtis advisement need not be expanded to explain its practical effect in the habitual criminal context. Maj. op. at 792-93. The majority then reverses the court of appeals and holds that the trial court’s advisement in this case satisfied the Curtis advisement requirements. Maj. op. at 791-92, 793. I agree with the majority’s reaffirmation of Curtis and with its holding that the Curtis advisement need not be expanded in habitual criminal eases. However, the trial court’s advisement in this case did not include an essential element of the advisement outlined in Curtis: that the defendant’s testimony concerning prior felony convictions could be considered by the jury only with regard to credibility. This element is particularly critical in a habitual criminal case, where the prosecution has a continuing burden in the habitual criminal phase of the trial to prove a defendant’s prior convictions with evidence independent of the defendant’s testimony that was elicited on cross-examination. I therefore respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that the advisement was adequate and agree with the court of appeals that Gray’s convictions should be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. See Gray, 899 P.2d at 291.
I.
After the prosecution rested its case, the trial court orally advised Gray regarding his right to testify. The trial court began its advisement by informing Gray that “all [Curtis] really means is I have to talk to you about whether you want to testify or not.” The trial court then advised Gray regarding some of the implications of testifying, noting in relevant part:
Now, if you do testify you should note that the District Attorney will be able to cross-examine you about the facts of this particular ease, and if you’ve been previously convicted of a felony, the District Attorney will be entitled to ask you about your previous convictions.
I understand from my review of the file that there is some issue as to whether or not you have been convicted of six prior felonies, at least that’s the allegation with respect to the other part of this case. As a result of that, I anticipate that if you testify the District Attorney will inquire of you as you are testifying about the existence of these six prior felonies.
The six prior felonies would be admissible with respect to credibility. The District Attorney can in fact talk about them.
In response to the court’s inquiries, Gray told the judge that he had no questions regarding the advisement and acknowledged that the advisement was consistent with what his attorney had explained.
II.
The majority reaffirms today that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to testify in their own defense pursuant to the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; the Compulsory Process Clause, U.S. Const, amend. VI; and the privilege against self-incrimination, U.S. Const, amend. V.4 See maj. op. at 790 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708-09, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n. 15, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975))); see also Curtis, 681 P.2d at 509-11 & n. 7. A criminal defendant’s right to testify is “of such compelling importance that it is excluded from the group of constitutionally based rights that defense counsel can elect to exercise or waive on the behalf of the accused.” Curtis, 681 P.2d at 512 (footnote omitted). Instead, a defendant’s waiver of the right to testify “must be voluntary, knowing and intentional,” and courts must “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.” Id. at 514.
In People v. Curtis, we sought to ensure that criminal defendants’ waivers of the right *795to testify were voluntary, knowing, and intentional by describing the essential elements for an adequate trial court advisement concerning the right to testify. Id. at 514. In relevant part, we required a trial court to emphasize to a criminal defendant that any evidence of prior convictions elicited on cross-examination could be considered by the jury only with regard to the defendant’s credibility:
A trial court exercising appropriate judicial concern for the constitutional right to testify should seek to assure that waiver is voluntary, knowing and intentional by advising the defendant outside the presence of the jury that he has a right to testify... and that if [a prior] felony conviction is disclosed to the jury [on cross-examination] then the jury can be instructed to consider it only as it bears upon his credibility.
Id. (emphasis added and footnote omitted). We have reiterated the essential elements of an adequate advisement, as outlined in Curtis, on numerous occasions. People v. Milton, 864 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Colo.1993) (quoting Curtis, 681 P.2d at 514); People v. Chavez (Chavez II), 853 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Colo.1993) (same); Tyler v. People, 847 P.2d 140, 142 (Colo.1993) (same); Roelker v. People, 804 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Colo.1991) (same); People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 122 (Colo.1986) (same); see also Milton, 864 P.2d at 1101 (“[A criminal defendant] is also to be advised, however, that the jury can be instructed to consider any such felonies only for purposes of impeachment.” (emphasis added)).
We applied the Curtis advisement requirements in Chavez II. In Chavez II, we noted that the trial court “told the defendant that the prosecution would be allowed to cross-examine him, and that his four prior felony convictions could be disclosed to the jury if he chose to testify,” but “[n]o explanation was given [the defendant] of the limited purpose for which such felonies could be admitted.” 853 P.2d at 1152. We held that the advisement was inadequate to support a voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver of the defendant’s constitutional right to testify:
[The defendant] was not informed that, if he testified, his prior felony convictions could be considered only to impeach his credibility. By its silence, the trial court left the impression that the prior convictions could be used as substantive proof for the habitual criminal phase of the trial. Clearly the inference raised by the trial court’s incomplete advisement is wrong. If [the defendant] chose to testify, he would be entitled to an instruction explaining to the jury that evidence of his prior felonies was admitted only for the limited purpose of impeaching his credibility. Further, the prosecution at all times had the burden to prove the defendant’s prior felonies at the habitual criminal phase of the trial. Since the trial court gave the defendant no explanation of these important, but technical, legal concepts, [the defendant] reasonably could have inferred that the prosecution would be relieved of its burden to prove his prior felonies if he testified and were forced to acknowledge his prior felony convictions. The inadequate advisement denied [the defendant] of an opportunity to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to testify.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, the trial court erred by failing to inform the defendant that any information regarding the defendant’s prior-convictions that would be elicited if the defendant chose to testify could be used only for impeachment purposes. By omitting the instruction on the limited permissible use of such information, the court left the defendant with the incorrect impression that the defendant’s testimony regarding prior convictions could be used as substantive proof in the habitual criminal phase of the trial. Id. The omitted limited-use instruction, and resultant impression that the defendant’s testimony regarding prior convictions could be used for purposes other than impeachment, jeopardized the defendant’s understanding of his constitutional right to testify and prevented a voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver of that right. Id.
Although Curtis does not require trial courts to read the preferred advisement in that opinion to defendants verbatim, the majority is incorrect in determining that Curtis *796does not create a “fixed advisement” because “we have never precisely articulated the minimum requirements of an effective Curtis waiver.” Maj. op. at 790 (citing Milton, 864 P.2d at 1102 (Vollack, J., dissenting)). First, our opinion in Curtis does outline the minimum elements of an adequate advisement regarding a defendant’s right to testify. 681 P.2d at 514. The majority cites Chavez II, Milton, and Roelker for the proposition that “‘there is no prescribed litany or formula which must be followed in advising the defendant of his right to testify.’ ” Maj. op. at 790 (quoting Chavez II, 853 P.2d at 1152). In fact, we held in Chavez II:
[Tjhere is no prescribed litany or formula which must be followed in advising the defendant of his right to testify. However, the advisement given must include the Curtis elements and avoid misleading a defendant about the consequences of a decision not to testify.
853 P.2d at 1152 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1151 (“a trial court must advise a criminal defendant” of the Curtis advisement elements (emphasis added) (quoting Curtis, 681 P.2d at 514)). Similarly, we held in Milton:
Curtis does not prescribe a “litany or formula which must be followed in advising the defendant of his right to testify.” The advisement, nevertheless, must include the Curtis elements.
864 P.2d at 1099 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Chavez II, 853 P.2d at 1152). If any doubt remained, we clarified our intentions later in Milton:
Although Curtis prescribes no formula, it does specifically identify the elements of the requisite advisement. And, as earlier noted, we have repeatedly stated that the advisement contemplated by Curtis is required.
Id. at 1100 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added); accord Roelker, 804 P.2d at 1338 (“Curtis requires that the trial court advise the defendant” of the Curtis advisement elements (emphasis added) (citing Curtis, 681 P.2d at 514)); Tyler, 847 P.2d at 142 (same).
Second, the majority misapprehends the distinction between minimum requirements for an adequate trial court advisement and the essential elements for an effective waiver by the defendant. Both Roelker and Tyler centered around whether our opinion in Curtis mandated minimum requirements for an effective defendant’s waiver, and neither case questioned the principle that our opinion in Curtis outlined the essential elements for a proper trial court advisement regarding a defendant’s right to testify. Tyler, 847 P.2d at 142-43; Roelker, 804 P.2d at 1338-39. Obviously, a trial court could issue a perfect advisement under Curtis and yet a defendant’s waiver would be inadequate if, for example, the defendant responded to the court’s advisement in a manner demonstrating a lack of understanding of some essential element of the advisement. The majority confuses the two issues of a defendant’s waiver and a trial court’s advisement, and then merges the two concepts to determine that this court has never declared the minimum requirements for an effective trial court advisement regarding a defendant’s right to testify. See maj. op. at 790-91. In doing so, the majority does not recognize the essential requirements for an adequate trial court advisement that we first outlined in Curtis, 681 P.2d at 514, and subsequently reaffirmed without qualification in Mozee, 723 P.2d at 122, Roelker, 804 P.2d at 1338, Tyler, 847 P.2d at 142, Chavez II, 853 P.2d at 1151, 1152, and Milton, 864 P.2d at 1099, 1100.
III.
The trial court’s Curtis advisement was inadequate in this case because the trial court failed to advise Gray that testimony elicited on cross-examination regarding Gray’s prior felony convictions would be admissible only5 with regard to credibility, and *797thus did not inform Gray of one of the essential elements of an adequate Curtis advisement. Curtis, 681 P.2d at 514; accord Milton, 864 P.2d at 1099, 1100; Chavez II, 853 P.2d at 1151, 1152; Tyler, 847 P.2d at 142; Roelker, 804 P.2d at 1338; Mozee, 723 P.2d at 122. The majority notes that “[i]n Chavez II and Milton, the defendants were not informed that their prior felony convictions could be considered for the limited purpose of impeaching their credibility,” and approves of those holdings because the advise-ments “did not inform the defendant that the use of his testimony regarding prior convictions was limited to impeachment.” See maj. op. at 791 (emphasis added). The majority then reaffirms that a “satisfactory Curtis advisement should inform the defendant [of] ... the limited purpose for which such prior felony convictions would be admitted,” because “[ujnder Curtis, a defendant must be informed that his or her prior convictions may be considered only to impeach his or her credibility.” Maj. op. at 791, 792 (emphasis added). In this case, the trial court failed to instruct Gray that information regarding felony convictions elicited on cross-examination could be used only for impeachment purposes. This deficiency was exacerbated by the trial court’s statement to Gray that the district attorney could “in fact talk about” the prior convictions.
Although the majority agrees that a “better advisement would have stated [that Gray’s] ‘prior felony convictions would be admissible only for purposes of impeachment,’” maj. op. at 791 (quoting Gray, 899 P.2d at 291), the majority concludes that this case is unlike Chavez II “where ‘[n]o explanation was given ... [the defendant] of the limited purpose for which such felonies could be admitted,’ ” maj. op. at 791 (quoting Chavez II, 853 P.2d at 1152). However, the advisement given to Gray that “felonies would be admissible with respect to credibility provided him with no more information about other possible uses of his testimony than did the trial court’s silence on permissible use in Chavez II.
Having acknowledged the inadequacy of the trial court’s Curtis advisement in this case, see maj. op. at 791-92, the majority is forced to rely on what is in effect a harmless error analysis by accepting at face value defense counsel’s assertion “that he had already counseled [Gray] concerning his right to testify” and defendant’s acknowledgment that he had been “so informed and advised by his attorney.” Maj. op. at 791. This analysis undermines our holding in Curtis that appellate courts can be certain that a defendant’s waiver of his right to testify was voluntary, knowing, and intentional only after reviewing an on-the-record advisement by the trial court containing certain essential elements. See 681 P.2d at 511-12, 514-15; see also, e.g., Mozee, 723 P.2d at 122, 124-25 (“[W]e perceive a real risk that without a judicial advisement [on the record], the truly personal considerations incident to a defendant’s decision not to testify will be unduly minimized by counsel in an effort to assure the best chance of acquittal.”). Furthermore, the majority’s apparent reliance on Gray’s statement that he was adequately “informed and advised by his attorney,” maj. op. at 791, is troubling considering that Curtis is premised on the likelihood that a criminal defendant does not understand the scope of the right to testify in his own defense or the consequences of asserting or waiving that right. Moreover, the majority’s apparent reliance on the representation made by Gray’s attorney to the trial court that he had counseled his client concerning his right to testify is questionable in view of Gray’s statement that the trial court’s inadequate advisement was consistent with his attorney’s explanation of a defendant’s right to testify under Curtis. See maj. op. at 789 n. 4 (colloquy between trial court and Gray). In sum, the Curtis advisement given to Gray was fatally defective because he was not explicitly told that the use of his testimony concerning pri- or felonies would be limited to impeachment.
IV.
In Part III of its opinion, the majority holds that in a habitual criminal case it is *798unnecessary to advise the defendant that the prosecution has a continuing obligation to prove the defendant’s prior felony convictions with independent evidence even if the defendant testifies and admits those convictions on cross-examination. Maj. op. at 792-93. The majority reasons, maj. op. at 793, that this information is adequately imparted to the defendant by the portion of the Curtis advisement specifying that if the defendant discloses felony convictions to the jury in the course of cross-examination during the guilt phase of the trial “then the jury can be instructed to consider it only as it bears upon his credibility.” Curtis, 681 P.2d at 514; see also Milton, 864 P.2d at 1101 (“One of the purposes of Curtis is to eliminate speculation as to what a particular defendant might believe to be the salient consequences of testifying and to provide accurate information concerning those consequences”). I agree. However, in the present case the defendant was not advised that evidence of prior felony convictions supplied by him on cross-examination could be used only in reference to his credibility. Our decision not to expand Curtis and require a more detailed explanation specifically tailored to habitual criminal cases should not obscure the absence of an essential element of the Curtis advisement in the present case, and serves to emphasize the central importance of the omitted word “only” in the advisement given to Gray.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent to the reversal of the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals. I would affirm that judgment reversing Gray's conviction based on an inadequate Curtis advisement and remanding the case for a new trial.
KIRSHBAUM and MULLARKEY, JJ., join in this concurrence and dissent.

.§ 18-4-302(l)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1986).

. § 18-2-101, 8B C.R.S. (1986); § 18^⅜-302, 8B C.R.S. (1986).

. § 16-13-101, 8A C.R.S. (1986).

. Counterparts of the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause, Compulsory Process Clause, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination are found, respectively, in Article II, § 25; Article II, § 16; and Article II, § 18, of the Colorado Constitution. We have relied on Colorado’s constitution as well as the federal constitution in recognizing a criminal defendant’s right to testify. Curtis, 681 P.2d at 510-11 n. 7.

. I do not mean to suggest that a limited-use instruction must necessarily include the word "only.” Other phrases could adequately communicate the same idea. For example, the trial court could inform the defendant that evidence of a prior felony conviction may be considered in determining the defendant’s credibility and for no other purpose. It is likely that the word only is used so frequently in cases interpreting Curtis because it is used in Curtis itself and because it is *797employed in the pattern jury instruction given on this issue. See Curtis, 681 P.2d at 514; CJI-Crim. 4:07.