Court Opinion

ID: 9615984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:42:27.681563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:28.573823
License: Public Domain

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result the majority reaches, and in most of the reasoning. I respectfully disagree as to the matters discussed below.
The majority correctly points out that Biagon (1) had a constitutional right to allocution, (2) he exercised it, (3) he did not say that he had more that he wanted to say if he could speak in a closed courtroom, and (4) the judge did not abuse his discretion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 in denying his lawyer’s request at the commencement of the sentencing hearing to close the courtroom to the public or move the hearing to when everyone else (probably lawyers and defendants in other cases) would be gone. That is all that Biagon’s brief puts before us.
Defense counsel did not want the public proceeding to reveal Biagon’s cooperation with the government. His cooperation was the reason urged for lenience in sentencing. The judge said he was familiar with this “elephant in the room” and would consider it, so closing the courtroom in order to bring the “elephant” to his attention was unnecessary. The court’s decision was within its discretion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(C), because the “good cause” shown for in camera proceedings did not outweigh the interest in an open courtroom.1
That is all we needed to say to decide the case. The majority has said it.
I do not agree with the majority’s holding that “Biagon did not make a motion.” There is no requirement in the rule that a written motion be filed. Counsel’s request was clear. Counsel often phrase oral motions as “requests.” A “motion” is nothing more than a word lawyers use to refer to requests made of the court. There is no support for requiring more than what counsel did to invoke the court’s discretion under Rule 32(i)(4)(C) to seal the courtroom.
The majority goes on to say, in error, that “[a] notice to the public is required before a court may close court proceedings to which a qualified right of access exists.” That proposition is mistaken. The precedents the majority cites are Oregonian Publishing Company v. United States District Court2 and Phoenix Newspapers Inc. v. United States District Court.3 Neither is on point. Both cases are petitions for *850mandamus by newspapers for access to documents. In Oregonian Publishing, the newspaper wanted access to the plea agreement and related documents filed under seal.4 In Phoenix Newspapers, we carefully restricted the reach of our opinion by saying that “[t]he issue to which our attention is directed is post-trial transcript access.”5 Neither case involves a defendant’s request to conduct proceedings in camera, and neither case involves the right of the press or the public to be physically present in the courtroom during a sentencing hearing or any other kind of hearing.
I do not see a good reason to turn this easy case affirming denial of a defendant’s motion to seal the courtroom into a case about an entirely different subject not raised by appellant’s brief, a new press right to be present during sentencing hearings.
Generally courtrooms ought to be open and ordinarily sentencing hearings ought to be open, as this one quite properly was. In criminal prosecutions, the right to a “public trial” is protected by the Sixth Amendment. The public and whatever press have any interest, including newspapers, freelance writers, bloggers and anyone else, ought generally to be able to see what is going on in courtrooms, including sentencing hearings. But occasionally there is a good reason to hold sentencing proceedings, at least partially, in camera.
The most common reason for in camera proceedings during sentencing arises when a defendant has cooperated with the government. The purpose is to protect him or her from being murdered by individuals not sharing the defendant’s interest, or fellow prisoners who find out that he was a “snitch.” Many criminals have strong feelings about people they call “snitches,” even where their own cases were not affected. It is one thing to send a defendant to jail or prison and quite another to set him up to be hurt or killed there.
Another commonly arising reason for in camera proceedings is where details of sexual matters will be exposed, such as where children and others testify about the consequences of being molested. Sometimes embarrassing medical information has to be brought before the court. Sometimes the victim of a financial crime does not want the public to know just how precarious his or her business or charity is on account of the defendant’s fraud or embezzlement, because exposure will complete the destruction the defendant started. Sometimes the government has to bring out matters of national security. These are only some of the many legitimate “good cause” considerations that the court should weigh when it exercises its discretion under Rule 32(i)(4)(C).
An oral request without prior notice has been consistent with the law, at least until this case. Rule 32(i)(4)(C), Phoenix Newspapers, and Oregonian Publishing say nothing to the contrary. Where last minute oral notice unduly risks the public interest in access, the court has discretion to require that a written motion be filed, and may continue the proceeding so that the press or other public interests in openness can be heard and considered. There is no basis in the rule or the cases the majority relies on for denying the court this discretion. Sometimes the court will require a written motion or issue a continuance on a party’s motion or on its own motion. Judges read newspapers, look at blogs, and notice crowds in the spectator seats, so they have some sense of what cases have attracted public interest. Sometimes the court may reasonably proceed immediately on an oral motion with an in camera proceeding, where, for exam-*851pie, a public proceeding might get someone killed or cause needless embarrassment in a matter of no apparent public concern, or a reluctant victim or witness has just agreed to testify.
We ought not use this case as a vehicle to develop a new rule unnecessary to a decision that may sacrifice other important public interests to the interest in press access.

.Fed R.Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(C) ("In Camera Proceedings. Upon a party’s motion and for good cause, the court may hear in camera any statement made under Rule 32(i)(4).”).

. Oregonian Publishing Company v. United States District Court, 920 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir.1990).

. Phoenix Newspapers Inc. v. United States District Court, 156 F.3d 940 (9th Cir.1998).

. Oregonian Publishing, 920 F.2d at 1464.

. Phoenix Newspapers, 156 F.3d at 947.