Court Opinion

ID: 9535575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:50:59.376595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:17.027956
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the trial court’s denial of the defendant-appellants’ motions for summary judgment was erroneous because Mary Wallace was not appointed as the personal representative within the two year condition precedent to recovery contained in Ind.Code 34-1-1-2.1
The majority opinion correctly points out that the right to maintain an action for wrongful death is purely statutory and did not exist at common law. Bocek v. Inter-Insurance Exchange of Chicago Motor Club, (1977) Ind.App., 369 N.E.2d 1093. There is only one proper plaintiff to bring a wrongful death action and that plaintiff is the personal representative. IC 34-1 — 1-2. The requirement that the action be brought by the personal representative is a condition precedent to recovery. Failure to satisfy this condition precedent results in the loss of the right to maintain an action for wrongful death. General Motors Corporation v. Arnett, (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 546.
The Arnett decision did not involve a medical malpractice claim and therefore is distinguishable. I believe the provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act are controlling. I further believe that IC 16-9.5-1-6 authorizes the “representative” as defined in IC 16-9.5 — 1—1(f) to bring an action on account of death.
The Medical Malpractice Act was enacted to control the high cost of medical malpractice insurance and thus, to guarantee medical services throughout the state. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., (1980) Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585. The Act has specific provisions which alter a claimant’s traditional recourse. The Act provides for the voluntary participation of health care providers which assures them of obtaining malpractice liability insurance. It establishes a Patient’s Compensation Fund to assure complete compensation for any victim.
The Act also alters the pre-litigation procedures by requiring that a complaint be filed with the Indiana Insurance Commissioner. Upon such a filing, the statute of limitations is tolled pending the appointment of a medical review panel which issues a pre-ligation liability determination. After this determination has been rendered, the plaintiff may proceed to litigate his claim, including the right to trial by jury. The report of the medical review panel is admissible at trial and any party can call a member of the panel as a witness at trial. The Act also establishes a limitation on damages and regulates attorneys fees. See, Hines v. Elkhart General Hospital, (N.D.Ind.1979) 465 F.Supp. 421.
Wallace filed her complaint for death caused by medical malpractice with the Indiana Insurance Commission pursuant to provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act. The filing of a medical malpractice claim is governed by IC 16-9.5-1-6, which provides:
Subject to chapter 9[16-9.5-9-l — 16-9.5-9-10], a patient or his representative having a claim under this article for bodily injury or death on account of malpractice may file a complaint in any court of law having requisite jurisdiction and demand right of trial by jury. No dollar amount or figure shall be included in the demand *272in any malpractice complaint, but the prayer shall be for such damages as are reasonable in the premises. (Emphasis added).
The term “representative” is defined in IC 16-9.5-l-l(f) as follows:
“Representative” means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney or other legal agent of the patient.
The Act also contains a time limitation for filing a claim, IC 16-9.5-3-1 provides:
No claim, whether in contract or tort, may be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care rendered or which should have been rendered unless filed within two [2] years from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect except that a minor under the full age of six [6] years shall have until his eighth birthday in which to file. This section applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability.
I believe that language of IC 16-9.5 — 1-6 clearly authorizes Mary Wallace to maintain an action for wrongful death. The language provides that a “patient or his representative having a claim under this article for bodily injury or death” to file a complaint subject to the provisions of chapter nine.2 Mary Wallace is a “representative” within the definition of IC 16-9.5-1-1(f) by the nature of her marital relationship with the deceased. I do not accept the idea that the Legislature did not intend, the provisions of Medical Malpractice Act to apply where the patient died as a result of the alleged malpractice. The express use of the language “bodily injury or death” evidences an intent by the Legislature that IC 16-9.5-1-6 should apply when the patient dies. The majority opinion ignores the rule of statutory construction that, if possible, effect and meaning must be given to each word and that no part of a statute is to be held meaningless if that part can be reconciled with the rest of the statute. Foremost Life Insurance Co. v. Department of Insurance, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 1092.
The majority opinion does not believe that the Legislature intended to create a new right of action by enacting the Medical Malpractice Act. The majority opinion correctly notes that the purpose of the Act was to protect health care providers from malpractice claims and not create new claims of action. To achieve this purpose, the Act attempted to regulate all malpractice claims by bringing all claims, whether based on contract or tort, under the purview of the Act. Failure to submit a claim to the provisions of the Act is grounds for dismissal. See, Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., supra. In Sue Yee Lee v. Lafayette Home Hospital, Inc., (1980) Ind.App., 410 N.E.2d 1319, we addressed the issue of whether the claim of the parents’ of a child patient for loss of services and medical expenses was subject to the Act, and stated:
Viewed from the historical perspective we believe the conclusion is inescapable that our General Assembly intended that all actions the underlying basis for which is alleged medical malpractice are subject to the act. Since the obvious purpose of the act is to provide some measure of protection to health care providers from malpractice claims, and to preserve the availability of the professional services of physicians and other health care providers in the communities and thereby protect the public health and well-being, it is totally inconceivable that the legislature intended to extend this protection only to actions wherein the actual patient was the party plaintiff and to exclude other claims for medical malpractice wherein the plaintiff was not the actual patient, but one whose right of action was derived from the patient such as the parents’ claim here.
410 N.E.2d 1324.
Mary Wallace’s claim was derived from the death of her husband patient. It is likewise inconceivable to me that the requirements of IC 34-1-1-2 should act to release physi*273cians from liability because the patient died as a result of the alleged negligence.
The majority opinion construes the definition of “representative” contained in IC 16-9.5-l-l(f) to merely enumerate who can maintain an action under existing law predicated upon malpractice. The opinion holds that only the “other legal agent” can maintain the action for wrongful death. The Act does not support such a construction because IC 16-9.5 — 1-6 regulates the filing of complaints and IC 16-9.5-l-l(f) defines who, other than the patient, can bring the complaint on account of malpractice. There is nothing within either of those provisions to support the construction adopted by the majority.
The majority opinion strongly believes that the Legislature had no intent to create a new cause of action when it enacted the Medical Malpractice Act. Even if IC 16-9.-5-1-6 can be so construed, the trial court’s denial of summary judgment should be affirmed. At the very- least, the provisions of IC 34-1-1-2 conflict with IC 16-9.5-1-6 and IC 16 — 9.5-l-l(f) as to who may bring an action for death on account of malpractice. In order to resolve this conflict, it is necessary to resort to rules of statutory construction.
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no necessity for the application of the rules of construction other than the rule that words and phrases shall be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. State v. Bress, (1976) 169 Ind.App. 397, 349 N.E.2d 229. An appellate court is bound by the definitions set forth in the particular act, unless those definitions are inconsistent or repugnant to the legislative intent. Gilbert v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 155. Where there is a conflict between statutes, the more recent provision is controlling, and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter. Houtchens v. Lane, (1965) 246 Ind. 540, 206 N.E.2d 131.
In applying these rules of construction to the present case, I believe that the court is bound by the definition of representative as contained in IC 16-9.5-l-l(f) because it is neither inconsistent nor repugnant to the Medical Malpractice Act. Gilbert v. State, supra. The language of IC 16-9.5-1-6 is more recent and more specific than the language of IC 34r-l-l-2, and therefore is controlling. Houtchens v. Lane, supra. In construing the various provisions of the Act with IC 34 — 1—1—2, I believe that a representative as defined in IC 16-9.5-1 — 1(f) is authorized by IC 16-9.5-1-6 to bring an action for wrongful death pursuant to IC 34 — 1—1—2. Such a construction follows the rule that effect and meaning must be given to every word, if possible, and that no part of a statute is to be held meaningless if that part can be reconciled with the rest of the statute. Foremost Life Insurance Co. v. Department of Insurance, supra.
The majority opinion contends that this opinion would reward those health care providers who are not qualified health care providers under the Medical Malpractice Act. While it is true that a non-qualified health care provider would only be liable if the personal representative brought the action, and thus, may escape liability where the qualified provider may be liable, the majority opinion ignores the fact that the non-qualified provider would still face much greater risk exposure because there is no limitation of damages under IC 34-1-1-2.3
The majority opinion also points out that a deceased person cannot have an agent and that there is nothing within the Medical Malpractice Act illuminating which representative is authorized to bring the action or how to distribute any proceeds. Such problems can be easily resolved by the construction that a representative under the Act can maintain an action for wrongful death or by Legislative refinement.
I am compelled to dissent from the majority opinion because the provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act conflict with IC *27434-1-1-2 and thus, create a trap for the unwary. If Clarence Wallace had survived, Mary Wallace would be authorized to maintain this action. The majority opinion allows health care providers who are so negligent that their patient dies, to escape liability because the statutes are confusing. Such a holding contradicts public policy. The Medical Malpractice Act was enacted to insure health care service throughout the state and to maintain malpractice insurance by subjecting all malpractice claims to the provisions of the Act. I believe that Mary Wallace’s claim should not be defeated because of conflicting provisions in the statutes. The majority opinion resolves the ambiguity by further protecting those who were responsible for the legislation.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the motions for summary judgment should be granted. I concur in all other respects.

. In dissenting I am not expressing any view regarding the liability of the physicians, but rather that the present action is not appropriate for summary judgment.

. Chapter nine contains provisions concerning the submission of claims to the Department of Insurance and the establishment of medical review panel. There is no allegation that Mary Wallace has failed to comply with the provisions of this chapter.

. I seriously doubt that there exists sufficient number of non-qualified health care providers offering medical services to make any “unequal” exposure a serious danger to the popu-lus of our state.