Court Opinion

ID: 9761640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:48:43.125698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:40.003937
License: Public Domain

McCLOSKEY Senior Judge,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As noted by the majority, Article III of the Driver’s License Compact of 1961 (the Compact) requires the “licensing authority of a party state” to “report each conviction of a person from another state .... to the licensing authority of the home state of the licensee.”1 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581. Section 6501(a) of our Vehicle Code provides a more specific definition of conviction, stating that the same “includes a plea of guilty, a plea of nolo contendere, a finding of guilty by a court....” 75 Pa.C.S. § 6501(a). In this case, Michael Brian Lueth (Licensee) was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) in violation of Maryland law and was subsequently convicted of that offense by the District Court of Maryland for Carroll County. In accordance with the Compact, Maryland reported this conviction to authorities within this Commonwealth. Such conviction is sufficient to warrant a suspension of Licensee’s operating privileges within this Commonwealth.
Following his conviction and Maryland’s report to Commonwealth authorities, Licensee applied for and was granted admittance into Maryland’s “probation before judgment” program. Admittedly, as noted by the majority, authorities in Maryland do not recognize such admittance as a “conviction” and we must give full faith and credit to Maryland law. See Jones v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 326 Md. 480, 606 A.2d 214 (1992); Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this Commonwealth should be bound by the subsequent manner in which Maryland chooses to treat a person found guilty of DWI.2 As we previously noted in Bourdeev v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 755 A.2d 59 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), the Full Faith and Credit Clause:
[D]oes not require a State to subordinate its public policy with respect to persons and their actions within its borders to the laws of any other State, where the enforcement of the right conferred elsewhere would be obnoxious to the public policy of the forum.
Bourdeev, 755 A.2d at 62 (citing Rigney v. Edgar, 135 Ill.App.3d 893, 90 Ill.Dec. 548, 482 N.E.2d 367, 372 (1985)).
Moreover, I note that Maryland’s “probation before judgment” program is significantly different from the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program in this Commonwealth. Under Maryland’s program, the party can apply for the same following a finding of guilt. See Md.Code, Crimes and Punishment, Article 27, *139§ 641(a)(l)(i)(l). However, under our ARD program, a party applies for the same prior to trial or any finding of guilt. See Pa. R.Crim. P. 176-181; Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Pa.Super. 346, 673 A.2d 975 (1996), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 545 Pa. 675, 682 A.2d 306 (1996) (ARD is a pretrial type disposition without verdict); Commonwealth v. Becker, 366 Pa.Super. 54, 530 A.2d 888 (1987), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 520 Pa. 586, 551 A.2d 213 (1988) (ARD offers the accused a unique opportunity to earn dismissal of charges). Once a party is found guilty in this Commonwealth, he or she is not eligible for ARD; whereas, the Maryland statute essentially provides for an expungement of a finding of guilt.
For the reasons stated above, I would affirm the order of the trial court.

. Article II of the Compact defines "conviction” as "[a] conviction of any offense related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle."

. Further, I believe that the majority’s reliance on Laughlin v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 719 A.2d 850 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) is misplaced, as Laughlin is distinguishable from this case. In Laughlin, the lower court deferred its decision to allow Laughlin to complete a Navy drug and alcohol program, after which authorities in Maryland agreed to amend his sentence and grant him "probation before judgment.” Laughlin completed the program and his record was expunged in Maryland. The lower court was notified of this expungement and subsequently entered an order sustaining his appeal. We thereafter affirmed the decision of the lower court. In this case, as of the date of Licensee’s appeal to this Court, Licensee had not yet completed the terms of his "probation before judgment” program. Hence, the authorities in Maryland could not, and have not, notified the authorities in this Commonwealth' that Licensee’s record has been expunged.