Court Opinion

ID: 9917440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 15:03:09.641313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:46.894312
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                   STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D22-0703
                 LT Case Nos. 2020-CF-001354-A
                              2020-CF-001355
                              2020-CF-001390
                  _____________________________

MYKEL ANTHONY NELSON,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County.
Richard A. Howard, Judge.

Victoria E. Hatfield, of O’Brien Hatfield Reese, P.A., Tampa, for
Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kaylee D.
Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

                        January 12, 2024

PRATT, J.

     This appeal presents the question whether a trial court may
rely on a defendant’s lawful firearm possession in sentencing him.
We conclude that it may not. Courts deprive defendants of due
process when they rely on uncharged and unproven conduct during
sentencing, and this principle holds especially true where the
uncharged conduct is the lawful exercise of a constitutional right.

                                 I.

     On November 3, 2020, a confidential informant bought
approximately four ounces of cannabis from Mykel Anthony
Nelson in exchange for $500. About a month later, the same
confidential informant paid Nelson $1,500 for a pound of the drug.
During both transactions, Nelson used his name and his personal
cellphone, and the transactions took place at his residence.

     The confidential informant then negotiated a third, larger
transaction for 28 pounds of cannabis, with the purchase to occur
on December 10, 2020. That buy never happened. Instead, law
enforcement executed a search warrant at the residence and
arrested Nelson, who cooperated by informing the officers that
they would find cannabis. Officers found 28.998 pounds of the drug
in the home.

     Nelson’s arrest resulted in three criminal cases against him.
In total, the State charged him with the following offenses: sale or
possession of cannabis with intent to sell, a third-degree felony;
unlawful use of a two-way communications device, a third-degree
felony; trafficking in cannabis in excess of twenty-five pounds but
less than 2,000 pounds, a second-degree felony; possession of a
place for trafficking, a third-degree felony; and possession of drug
paraphernalia, a first-degree misdemeanor. Nelson, who had no
prior criminal convictions, pled no contest to all the charges. He
and the State agreed that the State would not waive the three-year
minimum mandatory prison sentence applicable to the trafficking
charge, and that Nelson’s sentence would be capped at 87.23
months, which included the discretionary trafficking enhancement
that the court might choose to impose. Thus, the sentencing range
with the agreed-upon cap would be between 36 and 87.23 months
of incarceration.

    At the sentencing hearing, the court entertained argument
from both Nelson and the State, with Nelson urging the court to
impose 36 months, and the State urging the court to impose 87.23

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months. During its argument, the State presented two photos of
firearms found in Nelson’s home, noting that “a possible murder a
couple of months ago that was probably related to the sale of
cannabis” had occurred in Citrus County. However, the State did
not argue that Nelson himself was in any way connected to the
murder, and it conceded that it did not bring any firearm-related
charges against him.

     After hearing a brief rebuttal argument from Nelson’s
counsel, the court announced his sentence. The court applied the
discretionary trafficking enhancement and sentenced Nelson to
87.23 months of incarceration on counts 1 and 2 (to run
concurrently). Immediately after pronouncing this sentence, the
court stated: “And what hurts you the most, Mr. Nelson, was . . .
the photographs of the guns. They did not charge with those. I did
not take that into account; but why you did this, I do not know.”
The court then imposed three-year sentences on the remaining
felony counts, with the sentences to run concurrently with the
concurrent 87.23-month sentences.

    Nelson has appealed his sentences. We have jurisdiction.

                                II.

     Nelson argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing before a
different judge because the trial court committed two fundamental
errors. First, Nelson argues that the trial court fundamentally
erred by failing to properly consider and address his request for a
downward departure. Second, he argues that the trial court
fundamentally erred when it relied upon his uncharged, lawful
firearm possession in pronouncing his sentence. We need only
consider Nelson’s second argument, and we agree that he is
entitled to the relief that he seeks.

    Trial courts generally enjoy wide discretion in sentencing
convicted defendants within the range of sentences established by
the Legislature. See Nusspickel v. State, 966 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla.
2d DCA 2007). However, “an exception exists, when the trial court
considers constitutionally impermissible factors in imposing a
sentence.” Kenner v. State, 208 So. 3d 271, 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)
(quotation marks omitted). Reliance on constitutionally
impermissible factors deprives a defendant of due process and

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therefore constitutes fundamental error. See Shelko v. State, 268
So. 3d 1003, 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). As relevant here, “[a] trial
court’s consideration of unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct
in sentencing constitutes a due process violation.” Petit-Homme v.
State, 284 So. 3d 1126, 1128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). In short, just as
“[d]ue process prohibits an individual from being convicted of an
uncharged crime,” Morgan v. State, 146 So. 3d 508, 512 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2014) (emphasis added), it also prohibits him from being
sentenced for one based on “unsubstantiated allegations,” Shelko,
268 So. 3d at 1005.

     This basic principle of due process carries no less force when
the uncharged conduct is the lawful exercise of a constitutional
right. Both the Florida and federal constitutions guarantee the
fundamental, preexisting right to keep and bear arms. Amend. II,
U.S. Const.; Art. I, § 8(a), Fla. Const.; see McDonald v. Chicago,
561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008); Norman v. State, 215 So. 3d 18, 33–35, 42 (Fla. 2017)
(chronicling Florida’s right to arms and describing the right as
“fundamental”). This right belongs to “the people”—a term that
“unambiguously refers to all members of the political community,
not an unspecified subset.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 580. Moreover,
while the right is “not a right to keep and carry” arms “for
whatever purpose,” id. at 626, it is a right to keep and carry arms
“for a lawful purpose,” id. at 620 (emphasis added; quotation
marks omitted), including one’s “defense of hearth and home,” id.
at 635.

     At sentencing, the State presented no evidence to establish
that Nelson’s possession of firearms within his home contravened
the law. The State did not claim that any law prohibited Nelson
from possessing firearms at the time of his arrest, much less point
to such a law that would pass muster under the Second
Amendment. 1 Cf. Simpson v. State, 368 So. 3d 513, 525 (Fla. 5th

    1 We are aware that Florida law now prohibits Nelson from

possessing firearms due to his felony convictions. See §
790.23(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023). But the relevant question here is
whether Florida law dispossessed Nelson at the time of his arrest.
The State presented no such argument below or on appeal.

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DCA 2023) (Pratt, J., concurring, joined by Jay, J.). Nor did it
charge him with any firearm-related offense. The State introduced
no evidence establishing that Nelson possessed his firearms within
the home to further his illicit activities or for any other unlawful
purpose. Indeed, at sentencing, the State affirmatively conceded
that it had not charged Nelson with armed trafficking, as the
firearms were not found near the cannabis. Moreover, Nelson had
no prior convictions. In short, not only did the State decline to
charge Nelson with a firearm-related offense; the State failed to
argue, much less establish by evidence, that his firearm possession
constituted anything other than the lawful exercise of his
constitutional right to keep and bear arms “in defense of hearth
and home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.

     Rather than argue that the court could sentence Nelson based
on his lawful firearm possession, the State instead contends that
the court did no such thing. The State notes that it introduced only
two photographs showing firearms, and that following the court’s
statement that “[w]hat hurts you most, Mr. Nelson, was . . . the
photographs of the guns,” the court declared, “I did not take that
into account.” We are not persuaded. The question before us is not
whether the trial court in fact relied upon Nelson’s lawful firearm
possession. Instead, we ask only whether “the record reflects that
the trial judge may have relied upon impermissible considerations
in imposing sentence.” Shelko, 268 So. 3d at 1005 (emphasis
added). If the record so reflects, “the State bears the burden to
show from the record as a whole that the judge did not rely on such
considerations.” Id.

     The court’s statements indicate that it may have relied upon
Nelson’s lawful firearm possession in imposing his sentence, and
the State has failed to carry its burden to show otherwise. By
declaring that “the photographs of the guns” were “[w]hat hurts
[Nelson] most,” the court suggested that it weighed Nelson’s lawful
firearm possession against him. At best, the State has shown that
the court made two contradictory statements: one that it took the
firearm possession into account, and one that it did not. That
showing does not suffice. “[W]e cannot ignore the nature and
extent of the trial court’s discussion of irrelevant and
impermissible factors during the sentencing hearing.” Kenner, 208
So. 3d at 278. ‘‘Because the court’s comments could reasonably be

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construed as basing the sentence, at least in part, [on
impermissible factors], and because we cannot say that the
sentence would have been the same without the court’s
impermissible consideration of [that factor],” we must “vacate
appellant’s sentence and remand for resentencing before a
different judge.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 2

                                III.

     If due process prohibits a trial court from relying on
“uncharged and unproven crimes” when pronouncing a sentence,
Petit-Homme, 284 So. 3d at 1128 (emphasis added), then, a fortiori,
it prohibits a trial court from relying on the lawful exercise of a
constitutional right. The State has failed to carry its burden to
show that the sentencing court did not rely, at least in part, on
Nelson’s lawful exercise of his constitutional right to keep and bear
arms. Accordingly, we vacate Nelson’s sentences, remand these
cases for resentencing, and direct the Chief Judge of the Circuit
Court to reassign the cases to a different judge for the
resentencing.

    SENTENCES VACATED; CASES REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

EISNAUGLE and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

    2 Because, on this point, Nelson has demonstrated entitlement

to all the relief that he seeks, we need not and do not reach his
other assertion of error (namely, that the trial court failed to
properly consider and address his request for a downward
departure).

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