Court Opinion

ID: 9928694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 21:02:39.204608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:13.671785
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/31/24 Sarno v. City of Los Angeles CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

LISA SARNO,                                                       B321808

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                 Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. 21STCV33073
         v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

         Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark V. Mooney, Judge. Affirmed.
      Blair & Ramirez, Oscar Ramirez, Matthew P. Blair, Regina
Lotardo; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Stuart B. Esner and Kathleen J.
Becket for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, and Rebekah Young, Deputy City Attorney, for
Defendant and Respondent.
                      ____________________
       Lisa Sarno sued her former employer, the City of Los
Angeles, claiming the City retaliated against her for
whistleblowing in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 (section
1102.5). The City demurred, arguing Sarno had not complied
with the Government Code’s claim presentation requirement and
had filed an untimely government claim. We affirm the
judgment and order sustaining the demurrer without leave to
amend.
       We independently review the trial court’s ruling and apply
the familiar standard for demurrers. (See Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
       Sarno had several chances to plead viable claims against
the City. Her operative pleading is the second amended
complaint, which has one cause of action for whistleblower
retaliation under section 1102.5.
       According to this complaint, Sarno reported to staff at the
Mayor’s office and others that increased homelessness and the
establishment of a shelter near Sarno’s workplace—the El Pueblo
Historical Monument—led to more violent crime there. Sarno
maintains her reports amounted to protected activity under the
Labor Code, but the City terminated her in retaliation for voicing
her concerns. Sarno’s lawsuit claims the City’s acts caused her to
suffer “economic loss and damages, physical ailments, [and]
emotional distress[.]”
       The complaint says the City terminated Sarno on February
28, 2020, and Sarno submitted her government claim on
February 24, 2021. This claim identifies Sarno’s injuries as
“[l]oss of income, loss of future income, loss of benefits, emotional
distress.” Emotional distress comprised the bulk of the itemized
damages. Sarno itemized her damages in her claim as follows:

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Loss of income: $152,716.80; loss of future income: $1,069,017.60;
loss of benefits: $40,000; emotional distress: $5,000,000.
       The City denied Sarno’s claim as untimely.
       The City’s demurrer explained the untimeliness. It argued
the six-month deadline in Government Code section 911.2
(section 911.2) governed, and because Sarno filed her government
claim more than six months after her termination, her claim was
untimely and her suit was barred.
       The trial court sided with the City and sustained the
demurrer on this basis. The City also had argued Sarno failed to
plead facts showing she engaged in activity protected by section
1102.5; but the trial court did not rule on this ground.
       Our independent review shows the trial court was correct.
The court’s reasoning does not constrain us. (See Willis v. City of
Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1117 (Willis).)
       A plaintiff suing a public entity like the City for damages
must timely present a written claim to the entity before filing
suit. (Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 237, 246 (Le Mere).) With exceptions not relevant
here, this claim presentation requirement is an element of a valid
cause of action against a public entity. (Willis, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 1119.) Where, as here, the plaintiff does not
seek leave to file a late government claim, failure to present a
timely claim bars the suit. (See Le Mere, supra, at p. 246.)
       Section 911.2, subdivision (a), sets out two deadlines for
submitting a government claim: “A claim relating to a cause of
action for death or for injury to person or to personal property or
growing crops shall be presented . . . not later than six months
after the accrual of the cause of action. A claim relating to any
other cause of action shall be presented . . . not later than one

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year after the accrual of the cause of action.” The parties agree
Sarno’s claim accrued when the City terminated her. (See Willis,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1128 [whistleblower retaliation claim
accrues when the public entity takes adverse employment
action].)
      Several cases have addressed the timing for presenting a
section 1102.5 whistleblower retaliation claim, claims for
emotional distress, or both. These cases show the shorter, six-
month deadline applies here and bars Sarno’s suit. (See Willis,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1110, 1118 & fn. 9 [peace officer’s
whistleblower retaliation claim, which sought economic damages
and noneconomic damages for “mental pain and suffering and
emotional distress,” invoked the six-month deadline for filing a
government claim]; Colores v. Bd. of Trustees (2003) 105
Cal.App.4th 1293, 1300–1302, 1312–1313, 1319–1320 [suit
claiming constructive discharge in retaliation for whistleblowing
subject to six-month deadline]; Baillargeon v. Dept. of Water &
Power (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 670, 682 [§ 911.2’s shorter deadline
applied to plaintiff”s cause of action for infliction of emotional
distress]; see also Le Mere, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 245–246
[characterizing a § 1102.5 claim as a personal injury claim
subject to the six-month deadline].)
      The expansive definition of “injury” in the Government
Claims Act shows this result is correct. The Act defines “injury”
to mean “death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property,
or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person,
reputation, character, feelings or estate, of such nature that it
would be actionable if inflicted by a private person.” (Gov. Code,
§ 810.8; see also § 810.) Sarno claimed the City caused injuries,

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including “physical ailments” and “emotional distress,” that
easily meet this expansive definition.
       Sarno mentions neither this definition nor, besides Willis,
any of the cases we have just cited. Her attempts to nullify Willis
and to portray Smith v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 214
Cal.App.3d 266 as controlling are incorrect. Smith did not
concern a whistleblower retaliation claim—or any employment
claim. It involved homes destroyed by a landslide. (Id. at pp.
272–273.) In Smith, the County forfeited the claim presentation
issue by not raising it at the trial court, and the appellate court’s
discussion of the correct deadline for the plaintiffs’ nuisance
claim alleging emotional distress was gratuitous and relegated to
a two-sentence footnote. (Id. at pp. 280–281 & fn. 5.)
       Sarno cites statute of limitations cases that direct courts to
look at the substance of a cause of action and the nature of the
right violated. (See, e.g., Creditors Collection Service v. Castaldi
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1043.) We follow Willis on this point.
(See Willis, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1119–1120 & 1122–1123
[contrasting the claim presentation requirement and statutes of
limitations, and noting public policy supports a strict application
of the former].)
       The claim presentation statute is broad. Any claim relating
to a cause of action for personal injury must be presented within
six months. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) The statute does not say or
imply that the primary harm or the gist of the claim determines
the claim deadline.
       Sarno similarly directs us to case law about recovering
prejudgment interest on personal injury damages under Civil
Code section 3291. This argument is inventive but not on point.
(See § 3291, italics added [“In any action brought to recover

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damages for personal injury sustained by any person resulting
from or occasioned by the tort of any other person, . . . it is lawful
for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the damages
alleged as provided in this section”].)
      The trial court properly sustained the City’s demurrer
without leave to amend, for no amendment could change this
result.
                           DISPOSITION
      We affirm the judgment and award costs to the respondent.

                                            WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             GRIMES, J.

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