Court Opinion

ID: 9628251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:14:18.984946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:01.954539
License: Public Domain

PETERS, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting. — I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that holds that when a motion for new trial is made on several grounds, including insufficiency of the evidence, and is granted on “all issues” or “as to all the issues made by the pleadings,” such order does not adequately specify insufficiency of the evidence. I concur with all other portions of the majority opinion.
In reaching the conclusion that an order granting a new trial in the form above described does not include insufficiency of the evidence, the majority opinion frankly concedes that its conclusion is contrary to the existing case law on this subject, and finds it necessary to overrule that case law. The cases thus specifically overruled are Legg v. Mutual Benefit H. & A. of Omaha, 136 Cal.App.2d 887 [289 P.2d 550, 290 P.2d 87]; Bayley v. Souza, 42 Cal.App.2d 166 [108 P.2d 725]; Lucerne Country Club v. Beal, 21 Cal.App.2d 121 [68 P.2d 408]; and Piru Citrus Assn. v. Williams, 95 Cal.App.2d 911 [214 P.2d 426]. The earliest of these cases was decided in 1937, and the latest in 1955, In two of the four cases — the Legg and Bayley cases — hearings were denied by this court. In the Bayley case there was a dissent, fully setting forth the arguments now approved by the majority, but nevertheless this court denied a hearing, with two justices voting for a hearing.
Thus, the point overruled is not a new or novel one, but tó the contrary has been the announced law of California at least since 1937, a period of 24 years. No case has been found containing the interpretation approved in the majority opinion. Certainly the majority cites no such case, and I have found none. Thus, the rule announced by the four overruled cases is well settled and presumably is well known to and has been followed by trial judges and lawyers in this state. In frank acknowledgment of this fact, the majority takes the highly unusual position that the old overruled rule shall be applied to the instant case and that the new rule shall be applied prospectively only. Under the circumstances of this case, that amounts, practically, to conceding that the *587new rule is an exercise of the legislative rather than the judicial function.
There is no doubt, of course, that this court possesses the power to overrule prior eases, and also, in proper cases, possesses the power to make its decisions operate only prospectively. But these powers should be exercised sparingly, and only when there exist compelling reasons of policy, logic or law that require their exercise. No such reasons are announced by the majority. In fact, in my opinion, they do not exist.
Certainly, it can be said, that the rule announced in the overruled eases is not only a possible but is a reasonable interpretation of section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Bayley v. Souza, supra, 42 Cal.App.2d 166, after discussing and analyzing several cases where either the precise or related points were involved, the appellate court stated (p. 170) : “These cases demonstrate that the order here involved, granting the new trial ‘on all issues,’ is susceptible of the reasonable interpretation that the trial court intended by that language to include insufficiency of the evidence. What else can the expression ‘on all issues’ mean? It must mean either all issues presented by the pleadings, which would include the issues of negligence of appellant and contributory negligence of respondent, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the implied finding of the jury on these issues, or it must mean all issues presented by the motion for a new trial, one of which was the sufficiency of the evidence. In either event, under the cases cited, such order is not a general order, but must be interpreted as including a reference to insufficiency of the evidence within the meaning of section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” This reasoning was sound when written, and is sound now.
The majority opinion seems to recognize the correctness of the well-settled rule that a general order granting a new trial on the issues of excessiveness or inadequacy of damages constitutes a proper specification of insufficiency of the evidence. At least one fairly recent Supreme Court case and four appellate court cases are cited as announcing such a rule. If such a specification “necessarily” includes a specification of insufficiency, so does the specification of “all issues” necessarily and inevitably include insufficiency as one of its grounds.
Under these circumstances it is my opinion that we should not overrule the existent well-settled rule, and certainly should *588not exercise the extraordinary and unusual power of making the newly adopted rule prospective only in its operation.
For these reasons I dissent as to the one issue discussed. On all other issues I am in hearty accord with the opinion as written.
Schauer, J., concurred.