Court Opinion

ID: 9630491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:12:07.710605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:38.999134
License: Public Domain

TOM GRAY, Chief Justice,
concurring.
The majority expressly acknowledges but refuses to follow precedent from the court of appeals from which this transferred case was received. For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Jau-bert v. State, which, incidentally, was also a case transferred to us by a docket equalization order from the same court of appeals, I would apply the transferring court’s precedent. See Jaubert v. State, 65 S.W.3d 73, 91 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000) (Gray, J., dissenting), rev’d on other grounds, 74 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). See also Andrew T. Solomon, A Simple Prescription for Texas’s Ailing Court System: Stronger Stare Decisis, 37 St. MaR^s L.J. 417, 463 (2006) (“The unfairness occurs when the appellate court receiving the transferred case ignores the binding precedent from the trial court’s ‘home’ appellate district after the trial court applied the rules of geographic vertical stare deci-sis and correctly followed the binding precedents from the two Texas high courts and that trial court’s ‘home’ appellate district.”).
Additionally, I see absolutely no need to berate another court of appeals for its analysis in a case in which the petition for review was refused. And there is certainly nothing improper about the State arguing that we should rely upon it. If the case can be distinguished, as the majority contends, then distinguish it and go on, but there is no need to “denounce” their decision. The fact that it is distinguishable highlights that the criticism of the case by the majority is merely irrelevant verbiage on an otherwise straightforward issue.
The remainder of the opinion is an unremarkable application of the Hawkins and Perez holdings. See Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Perez v. State, 187 S.W.3d 110 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, no pet. h.). I concur in the judgment.