Court Opinion

ID: 9469685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:46:29.235976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:30.582773
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring 1 and dissenting.
With respect to Arthester McCruiston, I respectfully dissent. This conviction should be reversed because the defendant did not receive a fair trial. Though probably guilty of the crime of which he was charged, Arthester McCruiston nonetheless was entitled to the constitutional protections that are guaranteed to every person charged with criminal activity. Those protections are extended to the guilty as well as the innocent.
The conviction is flawed in two areas: the selection of the jury and the ruling on a defense motion to exclude certain evidence.
I
Defendant McCruiston filed a motion for a “Comprehensive Jury Selection Plan.” The motion stated that the case had received extensive local media publicity, that the local community viewed drug traffic with great disapprobation, and that the defendants were black. The motion was supported by factual material and expert opinion. With respect to the extensive publicity, it was alleged that:
1. The Gary Post Tribune published an article on the front page with a picture of Haywood Turnipseed and the headline “Narcotics” on continuation, and
2. The Hammond Times published an article with the headline “3 Held on Drug Charges.”
On September 30, 1980:
1. The Gary Post Tribune published an article entitled “High Bond Set .... ” and
2. The Chicago Sun-Times published an article about the arrest with the headline “Large Northwest Indiana Drug Ring Broken.”
On October 8, 1980, the Gary Post Tribune published a follow-up article on the arrest.
McCruiston’s motion sought allowance to supplement the trial judge’s voir dire by questions posed either by defense counsel or by the judge on suggestion. The judge’s cryptic ruling was, “The motion will be denied.”
The voir dire examination of the trial judge was woefully inadequate. For example, despite the extensive pretrial publicity surrounding the case, the judge, after reading the indictment, posed only a single question of the venire as a whole:
Have you heard about it in the newspapers, or talked to anyone about it, heard about it on the radio or any other way?
Further, despite the fact that a great majority of the venire were white, the judge’s *980inquiry was limited to a single question about racial prejudice again directed to the venire as a whole:2
[Tjhis is a court of law, and prejudices or feelings as a result of race or religion, anything of that nature, have no place in a court of law. Do you all agree with that proposition that the guilt or innocence of any defendant should rest solely upon whether or not he is guilty under the law and the facts as produced, and on nothing else?
The trial judge also asked only a single general question to the entire venire concerning possible drug problems in the prospective jurors’ families and prior experiences as witnesses in a criminal case.
The judge refused almost all of the follow-up questions requested by the defendant such as the occupation of children not living at home, whether jurors had ever been a victim of a crime, the jurors’ views on credibility of law enforcement officers and whether a woman with teenage daughters had any drug-related problems in her family.3
The trial judge asked only three questions directed to the prospective jurors individually: marital status (and whether there were any children of a marriage), address, and occupation. When the judge questioned the venire as a group, the record does not reflect any response either individually or as a group. The trial judge overruled the defense’s objection to this method of question and answer.
A trial judge may at some point abuse his discretion in not asking individually of the jurors on certain subjects. In the instant case, the need for individual questioning was paramount. Three sensitive issues confronted the jury: pretrial publicity, narcotics, and racial prejudice.
As Judge Pell said in United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 1972):
Prejudice and bias are deep running streams more often than not concealed by the calm surface stemming from an awareness of societal distaste for their existence. Extended and trial-delaying interrogation may not pierce the veil, yet a few specific associational questions as a maieutic process may indicate the dormant seeds of prejudice, preconceived and unalterable concepts or other non-fairness disqualifications. The result may not reach the stage of being a basis for cause challenge but could well, because of an abundance of counsel caution, bring about a peremptory challenge which an omniscient eye would have known should have been exercised. $ $ $ * J; ^
At some happy mesne point, there must be permitted sufficient questioning to produce, in the light of the factual situa*981tion involved in the particular trial, some basis for a reasonably knowledgeable exercise of the right of challenge.
The questions asked by the trial judge in this case called for affirmative responses. McCruiston was required to base his peremptory challenges on the way jurors nodded their heads or raised their hands, if they responded at all. Assuming a juror chose to conceal his prejudice, McCruiston would have nothing on which to base a challenge. Individual questioning with verbal responses would have alleviated these problems. It would have allowed McCruiston’s attorney to concentrate on each individual juror, to observe a juror’s demeanor and listen to the intonation of his or her response. These are the clues to the “dormant seeds of prejudice.” I concede that group questioning and questions that require affirmative responses may be acceptable in some situations, but not in this case.
The majority relies on United States v. Dixon, 596 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1979), to support its conclusion that a question necessitating an affirmative response from jurors who think themselves prejudiced is sufficient. In Dixon, however, the judge asked six probing questions. Not only did Dixon’s attorney have a greater opportunity to observe the jurors and their responses, but the nature and the number of the questions went a long way toward dissolving any latent prejudice. Here, the nature and the number of questions precluded such a favorable result.
The general questions and affirmative responses might have been adequate in this case if the judge had simply allowed sufficient follow-up questioning. Proper formulation of the questions put to jurors requires special information regarding the issues, the parties, and the facts of the case. Often this knowledge is possessed by the accused’s attorney, not the judge. For McCruiston, the dangers of prejudice were heightened by the nature of the crime charged and pretrial publicity. It was error to deny individual questions and followup questions. Either would have rendered the voir dire fair.
The Eighth Circuit voiced similar views in United States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1974). There the defendant was an American Indian charged with larceny in connection with the killing of a calf on an Indian reservation. The defendant contended that the trial court failed to question the prospective jurors adequately on the possible effects of pretrial publicity concerning Indians in general. The court asked a single question on the subject of the entire venire.4 The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that there was not sufficient inquiry about any prejudice against Indians on the part of the prospective jurors. The court was concerned that the publicity of recent events (Wounded Knee) would heighten the possibility of racial prejudice. We are faced with an analogous situation in this appeal. The possibility of racial prejudice is heightened by the narcotics element of the crime. The combination of these two concerns should have prompted the trial judge to ask individual questions or allow more searching follow-up questions.5
*982The following quote expresses the view that this court should have adopted in the instant case:
As the first Mr. Justice Harlan said, speaking for a unanimous Court, the right to challenge is “one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused” and that “[a]ny system for the empanelling of a jury that prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right must be condemned.” In the instant case, the court’s single question concerning racial bias was not only general in scope but was made to the prospective veniremen as a group. The effect was more like a monologue by the court than a probing examination of the jurors. Although the use of general questions has been approved by this court, the better practice in a sensitive case is to direct probing questions touching areas of possible prejudice to each individual juror, with the questions to be asked by the trial judge or counsel. Individual questioning is particularly necessary when the overall circumstances and surroundings suggest the possibility of racial bias. . . . The use of general questions such as that employed by the court here was recently looked upon with disapproval by. the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Cochran v. State, 256 Ark. 99, 505 S.W.2d 520 (1974), where that court observed:
“.. . All trial lawyers, and all students of the science of jurisprudence, know that general questions directed to the jury panel, or to individual jurors, by a judge who at the beginning of the trial has no special information regarding the issues, or the relationship of the parties, or the attending circumstances, sometimes fail to elicit answers which may cause even the most conscientious juror to reveal an existing prejudicial status.”
Id. 505 S.W.2d at 521.
With this view, we agree.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant an “impartial jury.” Voir dire examination is the most effective way to fulfill that guaranty. The trial judge must not indulge in a pro forma performance. He must provide an adequate opportunity to expose any prejudice or bias whether acknowledged expressly or entertained latently. As Justice White said in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1964):
The voir dire in American trials tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a predicate for the exercise of peremptories, and the process of selecting a jury protected.
Directly contrary to this admonition, the trial judge here asked general, rhetorical questions that were totally insufficient.
II
The record fully supports defendant McCruiston’s contention that the trial judge did not complly with the requirements of United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922 (7th Cir. 1976). The entire proceeding concerning the defendant’s motion in limine to preclude the Government from introducing his four prior convictions relating to drugs follows:
Mr. Thomas [defense counsel]: The last matter I have is the Motion in Limine, which I ask leave to tender to the Court. This is a motion to exclude prior convictions of the defendant McCruiston. I learned, I believe it was the 25th or 26th of November that the government intended to introduce a 1973 conviction for possession of dangerous drugs, which the defendant entered a plea. It is our contention the government should be precluded from introducing that because it is an old conviction, it is seven years old. It is for a crime that is certainly similar to the one with which the defendant is now charged and I believe the prejudicial effect of admitting that would far outweigh any probative value, and would invite the jury to convict him as an habitual criminal, which would be improper. It does not have any direct bearing on credibility, particularly since the defendant did not testify in the earlier proceeding.
*983Also, if your Honor sees fit to allow that into evidence, I just don’t see how the defendant will be able to take the stand in this case, and this would certainly impair his ability to present a defense, particularly a defense of entrapment.
The Court: I will withhold that ruling on that. In any event we are not faced with it right at the moment. The Rule provides for ten years, as you know.
Mr. Thomas: Correct.
The Court: I understand your argument, and what you are saying to the Court, but there is no reason for me to rule at this time.
Mr. Thomas: Except, in order to present an opening statement, Judge, it would be helpful to know what the Court’s posture is.
The Court: My posture is that I will admit it, but I want to look into the matter further. There is a decision by Judge Swygert I want to go back and read.
It should be noted that the judge did not ask Government counsel to respond to the motion even though it is the Government’s burden to show the basis for the admission of a prior conviction when the issue is raised. Id., 537 F.2d at 929. Nor is there any indication in the record that the judge took into consideration the factors deemed essential by Mahone. No reason was given for his denial of the motion except the statement that, “The Rule provides for ten years.... ” This is a clear violation of Mahone. The majority escapes this conclusion by deciding that the trial judge did not rule on the motion in limine and McCruiston waived the issue by not raising it later in the trial. I disagree.
Initially, the judge stated, “There is no reason for me to rule at this time.” Nevertheless, McCruiston’s attorney articulated an adequate reason for an immediate ruling: his defense strategy depended on whether he could put his client on the stand and he did not wish to do so if he would be faced with the impeaching convictions.6 The trial judge then made a ruling subject to subsequent change. It was reasonable for counsel to conclude that the motion was denied unless further research changed the judge’s mind. No such change was ever indicated. Under the circumstances, it was incumbent on the judge to make any further move, not on the defendant.
The majority’s reliance on United States v. Sternback, 402 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1968), is misconceived. The significant difference between Sternbaek and this appeal is apparent from what we said in Sternbaek:
At a recess during the government’s case, defense counsel informed the court of the conviction and asked for an expression by the court. He indicated that if the conviction were to be allowed in evidence, he “would seriously consider not putting him on the stand.”
A brief informal discussion between court and both counsel followed, and several decisions of this and other courts were referred to. The court indicated that there was a question in his mind whether a conviction is admissible if very old. Defense counsel interprets one statement by the court as a definitive ruling that the conviction would be admitted notwithstanding the court’s doubts. If it stood alone, the statement would so indicate. The court had, however, indicated uncertainty about the decisions on the point, had said, “We will check it out”, indicated he had not read the decisions cited, and (probably because defendant cited cases from another circuit) had twice said he would rule in accordance with the decisions of this court.
The district court was being asked for a ruling in advance. We think he made it sufficiently clear that he wanted to read the pertinent decisions of this court before making up his mind. Although the district court did not refer to the question again, defense counsel did not pursue the *984matter during the remainder of the trial, nor did he include this claim among the grounds on which he moved for a new trial.
No pretrial motion to exclude convictions was ever filed in Sternback. Because the district court was being asked for a ruling in advance and stated, “We will check it out,” it was not reasonable for counsel in Sternback to conclude that a ruling had been made. The situation is completely different in the instant case. McCruiston’s counsel filed a pretrial motion in limine and it was reasonable for him to expect it would be ruled on pretrial. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(e). The last words of the trial judge indicated that the motion was denied unless the judge changed his mind. If the judge did not intend to rule, he could have continued to say there was no reason to rule at that time. Given the pretrial motion, Rule 12(e), counsel’s articulated need for a ruling, and the judge’s final words, it was reasonable for counsel to conclude that the motion had been denied.
The majority opinion, in my view, also unfairly lays the blame solely on the defendant. The Government had an obligation also, and it ill-behooves the prosecution now to argue that the defendant waived his request to exclude the convictions by not renewing his motion. The burden of assuring a defendant a fair trial does not fall solely on defense counsel. In the instant case, I believe the prosecution and the judge should have been assigned a fair share of this burden and a new trial should have been awarded.
Ill
There is a deplorable tendency prevalent in our federal courts to overlook prejudicial procedural errors in criminal trials. We appellate judge are apt to adopt sophisticated and often sophistical rationales to provide excuses for such errors, all in the interest of affirmance of convictions. The unarticulated reason for affirmance, however, is the belief that the defendant is plainly guilty anyway and that he should not be set free by reason of procedural defects except under the grossest of circumstances. Behind this attitude is the public pressure generated by a perception that the courts are “soft on criminals.” Many people find it difficult, I am sure, to understand why obviously guilty felons should be afforded the niceties of procedural due process. . It is easy to imagine them thinking, “Why should courts go out of their way to find ways to upset criminal convictions of persons when there seems to be no question about their guilt?”
Technical, convoluted arguments are often advanced by the prosecution to save convictions which are in many instances flawed by the prosecutor’s ineptness or his obsessive “overkill” tactics. Unfortunately, these arguments often win the day. If legalistic constructs seem too transparent or unconvincing to advance to the reviewing court, the prosecution falls back on “harmless error.” Again, unfortunately, we judges are too often tempted to give the doctrine an expansive and unwarranted application.
The erosion of basic notions of procedural fairness undertaken to preserve the conviction of an obviously guilty defendant may not work an injustice in a particular case, but in the process we are paving the way for the subsequent conviction of an innocent man. It bears repeating that this Nation, two centuries ago, resolved that it was better that a guilty man go free than an innocent man be unjustly punished. An occasional retrial is a small price to pay for the preservation of this ideal.
Our federal judicial system was designed to resist the very public pressure to which I have alluded. Justice ought to be rendered under the rules of law and not according to public opinion. The tendency to forget this fundamental precept brings about debasing, debilitating effects. The criminal defense bar is apt to become disillusioned and cynical. This is dangerous because the defense bar is responsible not only for protecting the rights of their clients but for preserving a fair system of criminal justice for future generations. Defendants, who might be reconciled to their terms in prison if they *985thought they had been found guilty fairly and in accordance with the rules of procedure, are apt to become bitter and resist rehabilitative efforts. Above all, our mores embracing an immanent fairness to our fellow human beings are compromised and demeaned.

. Carl E. Banks did not appeal from the trial judge’s handling of the voir dire and I concur in the affirmance of his conviction.

. The judge asked one follow-up question concerning racial prejudice, indistinguishable substantively from the first, and again, the question was directed to the venire as a whole.

. The trial judge denied the motion to ask the woman with teenage daughters if she had drug-related problems in her family because he felt the question was “too personal.” I am disturbed by the judge’s conclusion that a juror’s interest in privacy surpasses an accused’s right to an impartial jury. The question was relevant and was not one which would embarrass a juror without cause.
The majority’s characterization of the question as “highly embarrassing” (maj. op. at 975) is inappropriate. The question would only be embarrassing if, in fact, there were drug problems in the woman’s family. The general question concerning drug problems posed to the venire as a whole would have made it easy for a juror to conceal an embarrassing problem. I am disturbed by the majority’s balancing of a juror’s sensitivity (the majority think it was inappropriate to ask the question because it “might have been suggestive that she had not responded truthfully.” Maj. op. at 975) against the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.
Further, I am puzzled by the majority’s conclusion that the trial judge “ordinarily” allowed follow-up questions. (Maj. op. at 974.) The judge allowed only four of McCruiston’s followup questions (on pp. 40, 51, 60, and 65 of the transcript) and none were as important or revealing as the questions he refused to ask.
Footnote 2 in the majority’s opinion refers to follow-up questions asked by both McCruiston’s and Banks’s attorneys. We are only concerned here with the questions asked by McCruiston’s attorney. The questions asked by Banks’s attorney did not address the issues that concerned McCruiston’s attorney.

. The question read:
American Indians are on trial here, that is, they are Indians and they are Americans. I wouldn’t care whether they are American Norwegians or Swedes. They are to be treated like men.
Now this can be cut both ways. Is there anyone here with a prejudice either way concerning American Indians to such an extent that these gentlemen could not get a fair and impartial trial before you; that is, does any one of you have a prejudice either way? The United States has a right to have a fair trial as well as the Defendants. So, whatever way it goes, if you feel you are going to be prejudiced either way I want to know about it right now.
Is there anyone that has such a prejudice or such a feeling?
502 F.2d at 910.

. The majority believes this case is factually distinguishable from Bear Runner because the trial judge in this case asked one follow-up question. As we pointed out in footnote 2, supra, this follow-up question was indistinguishable in substance or form from the original question asked by the judge. Repetition of an inadequate procedure does not cure an error.

. The defendant indicated prior to trial that his defense would be entrapment. Counsel changed his strategy after the ruling.