Court Opinion

ID: 9756089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:06:37.105027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:14.609068
License: Public Domain

Billings, J.,
concurring. I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case, but I do so on different grounds than those of the majority opinion. My reading of Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), which held that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not guarantee public access to certain pretrial hearings where the defendant, prosecution and court concur in closure, and the cases of Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), has been that the Supreme Court would be inclined to hold in the proper case that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees such access. I find support for this inclination in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 380, 383, 385, 391-94, 397-403 (Powell, J., concurring); 411, 413 n.2, 418-48 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting), although the issue was not decided there, id. at 411. My view has been confirmed in part by the recent case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court held that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, although not absolutely, public access to criminal trials. Id. at 2830. While the plurality opinion of the Chief Justice in Richmond Newspapers appears to invoke “a veritable potpourri” of constitutional sources for the holding, including the free speech, free press, and assembly clauses of the First Amendment and the Ninth Amendment, id. at 2842 (Black-*536mun, J., concurring), I find the succinct invocation by Justice Brennan of the free speech clause and its historical background and role in a republican system of self-government fully adequate for the disposition of this case. It is clear to me that the structural role of the clause is the safeguarding of vigorous public debate on issues of public importance, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at 270, and that such a safeguard carries with it the requirement that the public be permitted access to information on matters of public concern. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, 100 S. Ct. at 2832 (Brennan, J., concurring). Certainly, the application at a pretrial hearing of the Constitution to evidence admissible in a criminal trial is a subject of public concern, for it concerns the relationship of the state and individual, and the nature of the judicial process — issues of preeminent significance in the debate which ensures the vitality of our society and government.
While it may be suggested that Richmond Newspapers does not extend its rule to pretrial hearings, to which Gannett held the public is not guaranteed access under the Sixth Amendment, I find this most unlikely. Although the Chief Justice has attempted to distinguish Richmond Newspapers from Gannett on the ground that the latter applied only to pretrial hearings, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, 100 S. Ct. at 2821, such a distinction is facile, see id. at 2840 (Blackmun, J., concurring). After Richmond Newspapers, the “ultimate ruling in Gannett ... is now to the effect that there is no Sixth Amendment right on the part of the public — or the press — to an open hearing on a motion to suppress.” Id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
It is inconsistent with Richmond Newspapers and not required by Gannett to conclude in the instant case that there is or may not be a First Amendment right of public access to pretrial motions hearings. The court below having found no facts giving rise to any basis for qualifying the public’s right of access, the court’s order closing the hearing and record was clear error.