Court Opinion

ID: 9738592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:57:37.331319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:07.169499
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Justice
(dissenting).
I am satisfied from the evidence that the trial court elicited a factual basis for the two prior pleas as required by Spirit Track v. State, 272 N.W.2d 803 (S.D.1978), and State v. Doherty, 261 N.W.2d 677 (S.D. 1978). At this point, however, I part company with the majority. A review of the record establishes that both prior pleas were not entered voluntarily and intelligently as required and were therefore inadmissible in support of the third-offense charge. Accordingly, I dissent.
Judge Keller testified that in 1975 he individually questioned each defendant with regard to understanding the Boykin rights. Because of the increased caseload, however, this procedure had been abandoned when the 1977 conviction was obtained. The judge said he then merely watched all the defendants while their rights were explained and if a defendant appeared not to understand what was being said, he would pursue the matter further with that individual before a plea was entered.
In Crew v. Nelson, 88 S.D. 162, 216 N.W.2d 565 (1974), we applied the Boykin standards to misdemeanor guilty pleas and sanctioned the en masse advisement of constitutional rights to groups assembled for arraignment in misdemeanor cases. This was in recognition of the need for efficiency *860in high-volume courts. Accordingly, once those constitutional rights have been explained, whether individually or as a group, the court must, with both misdemeanor and felonies, examine each defendant individually to satisfy itself that the accused understands the nature of the charge and the consequences of a guilty plea and that there is a free and intelligent waiver of the three constitutional rights mentioned in Boykin.
Judge Keller specifically testified that his procedure at the time the 1977 conviction was obtained did not involve any individual canvassing of pleading defendants with respect to their understanding of the Boykin rights. The majority attempts to overcome this with transcripts of “a typical day in magistrate court” prepared from notes taken (at defendant’s request) by a speedwriter in Judge Keller’s court in December of 1978 and January of 1979. Such unofficial notes, however, do not refute the testimony of Judge Keller with regard to what he did by way of advising the accused of his constitutional rights in 1975 and 1977. What he did in 1978 or 1979 proves nothing. Nevertheless, since these transcripts form the basis for the majority opinion, they demand examination. The majority quotes a colloquy between the judge and one pleading defendant in 1978 and concludes therefrom that defendant Driver’s prior pleas must have been characterized by similar dialogue. This conclusion is absolutely untenable in light of the entire record. The 1978 transcript reveals that on the day the specimén plea was accepted, only two of three pleading defendants were canvassed by the court; there is no evidence of any colloquy with the first. More disturbing is the 1979 transcript, which reveals that none of the three defendants entering guilty pleas on that occasion were questioned by the judge with regard to their understanding of the Boykin rights and the consequences of their pleas. The majority completely ignores this fact, notwithstanding our statement in Nachtigall that: “[I]t is now settled as a principle of the constitutional law that a plea of guilty cannot stand unless the record in some manner indicates a free and intelligent waiver of the three constitutional rights mentioned in Boykin [.] ” 85 S.D. at 128, 178 N.W.2d at 201. While, as the majority opinion states, the trial court may quite properly consider collateral evidence where the record is silent, Boykin and Nachtigall require that such evidence affirmatively show that the pleas in question were entered voluntarily and intelligently. In the present case, there is an absolute lack of evidence of any kind that would demonstrate the validity of defendant’s pri- or pleas.
The majority, in similar fashion, also dispenses with defendant’s claim that he was not informed of the penal consequences of his pleas. It is clear from the record, however, that Judge Keller’s general procedure at the time of both prior pleas did not involve any discussion of either the mandatory minimum or the possible maximum sentence that could be imposed. A guilty plea is not knowing and voluntary in the constitutional sense unless the defendant has a reasonable apprehension of the range of possible sentences. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948); Lewellyn v. Wainwright, 593 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1979).
In Nachtigall, supra, we quoted with approval (as did the Supreme Court in Boy-kin) from Commonwealth v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 105, 237 A.2d 196, 197 (1968):
A majority of criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of guilty. If these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences, [emphasis supplied]
85 S.D. at 127, 178 N.W.2d at 200. Thereafter, in Crowe v. State, 86 S.D. 264, 268, 194 N.W.2d 234, 236 (1972), we noted that the defendant had not been advised by the court of the minimum and maximum penalties for the crime of first-degree rape, and said:
*861In effect, Boykin held that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the states as a matter of federal constitutional due process and that the record must show that the defendant had an understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea before a guilty plea can be sustained.
Crowe, however, was not decided under the Boykin rule because in Nachtigall we held that Boykin should be given prospective application only (to guilty pleas entered after June 2, 1969). We noted specifically that the plea in question in Crowe was entered in 1966, and we therein decided the issue under pre-Boykin rules. In Crowe, the Court concluded that “[notwithstanding the inexplicable failure of the trial court to advise petitioner of the minimum and maximum penalties for the charge against him and of his right against self-incrimination, we do not believe the petitioner has carried his burden of proof [under the totality of the circumstances rule applicable to pre-Boykin cases] of showing that his guilty plea was involuntary . . .” 86 S.D. at 271, 194 N.W.2d at 237 (emphasis supplied). Thus, Crowe clearly indicates that if the Boykin-Nachtigall rule were applied, our conclusion with respect to the validity of the plea in that case would have been the opposite.
In the present ease, Judge Keller, referring to his procedure in 1975 and 1977, testified: “I don’t spell out the penalties.” Rather, he simply informed pleading defendants that they would be subject to the penalties provided by law for the particular offense without stating the minimum or the maximum penalties. This procedure cannot be said to have satisfied constitutional requirements.* Moreover, of the six guilty pleas covered by the so-called 1978 and 1979 “transcripts”, four reveal no advisement of available penalties.
The majority further concludes that defendant must have known of the penal consequences of his pleas because the convictions were obviously the products of plea-bargains. This implies that his attorney must have advised him of his rights and the penalties involved and that any deficiency on the part of the court was thereby corrected. Such a presumption flies in the face of Nachtigall which expressly holds that: “South Dakota judges can’ no longer assume that an accused represented by counsel has been informed of such matters and the judge must actively participate by ‘canvassing the matter with the accused.’ ” 85 S.D. at 128, 178 N.W.2d at 201.
Boykin and Nachtigall require that the evidence affirmatively show that defendant’s 1975 and 1977 convictions (not subsequent specimen pleas) were obtained in compliance with the Constitution. The record in this case, including the collateral evidence considered by the court, contains nothing to indicate that defendant’s prior pleas were entered voluntarily and intelligently as required by law. In both instances, there is no evidence that defendant was advised of the minimum and maximum penalties for the offense. In addition, the 1977 plea was not preceded by any individual canvassing of the defendant by the court, except as to a factual basis for the plea. These deficiencies are not corrected by pre*862sumption nor by the fact that defendant was represented by counsel. Similarly, the conclusion of the trial judge that defendant understood and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights is inadequate. State v. Nachtigall, supra. The convictions based upon defendant’s prior guilty pleas are thus void and inadmissible either to support guilt or enhance punishment. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967); United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Megura, 394 F.Supp. 246 (D.Conn.1976).
The majority opinion in effect modifies and weakens what we explicitly said in Nachtigall in applying Boykin in South Dakota. The full thrust of Boykin, however, is necessarily binding on us as a state, with or without Nachtigall. In my opinion, the majority attempts- to depart from settled principles of constitutional law.
I am authorized to state that Justice HENDERSON joins in this dissent.

 A defendant need be advised of and understand only the direct penal ramifications of his plea as opposed to any collateral consequences. See, e. g., Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1975), holding that failure to inform a DWI defendant that a collateral consequence of his plea would be suspension of his driver’s license by the Department of Public Safety did not render his plea invalid where the defendant was apprised of and understood the fine and jail sentence to be imposed. See also: Armstrong v. Egeler, 563 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2nd Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840, 75 S.Ct. 46, 99 L.Ed. 663 (1954).
SDCL 23A-7-4 follows Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and specifically provides:
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere a court must address the defendant personally in open court, subject to the exception stated in § 23A-7-5, and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law[.]