Court Opinion

ID: 9420691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:55:42.731214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:26.634471
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Frankfurter,
whom Mr. Justice Burton joins, dissénting.'
If the Attorney General, after the Internal Security Act, had made a general ruling that thereafter he would not allow bail to any alien against whom deportation proceedings were started and who was then a member of the Communist Party — an 'undiscriminating,, unindividualized class determination — it would disregard the clear direction of Congress for this Court not to hold that the Attorney Géneral had exceeded the limits of his discretion. It would wilfully disregard the adjudications on bail in deportation cases which preceded the Act and the unambigu-. ous legislative history of the law based upon this, judicial history. Congress unequivocally chose not to give non-reviewable discretionary power to the Attorney General to deny bail. In substance though ¿at formally he has made such a general ruling. The records before us disclose that since the Internal Security Act the Attorney *559General has in fact followed the general practice of denying bail to all active Communists. Such blanket exercise of the power granted him by the Act calls for review and cannot stand.
The controlling questions in this case are: What standards of discretion does the Internal Security Act of 19501 impose upon the Attorney General in granting or denying bail to persons arrested for deportation proceedings; and has the Attorney General here observed those standards? The Government concedes that Congress made reviewable the discretion of the Attorney General on the bail question. This subjection of the Attorney General’s action to judicial scrutiny is not to be formally or lightly exercised. The bill which ultimately became § 23 of the Internal Security Act Was initially passed by the House with a provision making absolute and unreviewable the Attorney General’s action.2 The bill as enacted, however, omitted the finality clause; the Attorney General’s authority was thus defined: “Pending final determination of the deportability of any alien . . . [he] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General (1) be continued in custody; or (2) be released under bond in the amount of not less than $500, with security approved by the Attorney General; or *560(3) be released on conditional parole.” 3 Before the passage of the Act Congress had before it conflicting views of Courts of Appeals: according to Prentis v. Manoogian, 16 F. 2d 422 (C. A. 6th Cir.), bail was a matter of the alien’s right; the Second Circuit ruled that it was a matter within the Attorney General’s discretion subject to judicial re-, view. United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F. 2d 747 (C. A. 2d Cir.).4 Congress chose the latter view. It deserves emphasis that it was discretion that was given the Attorney General, not power to decide arbitrarily.5
*561' In granting the Attorney General discretion subject to judicial review, Congress legislated against a historical background which gives meaning to bail provisions. Only the other day this Court restated the concept of bail traditional in American thought and reflected in the Constitution:
“This traditional right to freedom before conviction [or before order for deportation] permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the iiifliction of punishment prior to conviction. . . . Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards, relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant. ... To infer from the fact .of indictment [or warrant for deportation] alone a need for bail in an unusually high amount is an arbitrary act.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 4, 5, 6.
“The practice of admission to bail, as it has evolved in Anglo-American law, is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial. On the contrary., the spirit of the procedure is to enable them to stay. out of jail until a trial has found them guilty. ... Each defendant stands before the bar of justice as an individual. . . . Each accused is entitled to any benefits due to his good record, and misdeeds or a bad record should prejudice only those who are guilty of them.” Id., at 7, 8, 9 (concurring opinion).
*562This historical meaning of “bail,” familiar even to laymen, must infuse our interpretation of the words of a Congress of. whom, in fact, a majority were lawyers. When Congress provided for bail, within the Attorney General’s discretion, for persons arrested for deportation proceedings, it was extending to resident aliens still lawfully in our midst the same privileges that are granted as a'matter of course to dangerous criminals. The factors relevant to the exercise of discretion are factors that pertain to each individual as an individual. “Discretion is only to be respected when it is conscious of the traditions which surround it and of the limits which an informed conscience sets to its exercise.” 6
If these aliens, instead of awaiting deportation proceedings, were held for trial under a Smith Act indictment, they could not be denied bail merely because of the indictment. Stack v. Boyle, supra. Membership in the Communist Party — the charge which is the foundation for the deportation proceedings — is surely not as great a danger as a leading share in a conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the Government by force, which was the essence of the indictment in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494. And the opportunity for “the unhampered preparation of a defense” is quite as important to the alien arrested for deportation proceedings as it is to the Smith Act defendant. We would hesitate to impute to. Congress, in the absence of some more explicit command, an intent to make bail more readily available to those held on a serious criminal charge than to those awaiting proceedings to determine the question of deportability. Congress made no such distinction. Instead, it cast the Attorney General’s authority in terms descriptive of the *563customary power of commissioners or district judges in admitting to bail.
The factors stated by the Second Circuit in the Potash case, supra, at 751, which guided the enactment, are presumably the standards which Congress expected to be observed: “The discretion of the Attorney General . . . is to be reasonably exercised upon a consideration of such factors, among others, as the probability of the alien being found deportable, the seriousness of the charge against him, if proved, the danger to the public safety of his presence within the community, and the alien’s availability for subsequent proceedings if enlarged on bail.”
Congress thus made provision for a fair assurance of each alien’s availability in the event he is eventually ordered deported. There is, however, not the slightest indication in the Government’s returns or in the records before us that each petitioner’s ties to family and community and each one’s behavior under an earlier warrant against him do not assure his presence throughout the deportation proceedings and thereafter. The records affirmatively indicate the contrary. Moreover, in deportation cases — as compared, for example, with prosecutions under the Smith Act — the consideration that the individuals concerned may , depart from the country is minimized in significance, first, because compulsory departure from the United States is just what they are contesting, and secondly, if they do depart, the purpose of the deportation proceedings is realized.
It would be unfair to Congress to deny that it followed the traditional concept of bail by making “the danger to the public safety of his presence within the .community” a criterion , for bailability. No less must it be presumed that Congress required that each criterion should •be applied in the traditional manner, that is, by individualized application to each alien. In each case, the alien’s anticipated personal conduct — and that alone— *564must be considered. Also, how expeditiously each deportation proceeding can be concluded, and therefore how long the bail in each case need be in effect, are relevant considerations.
But it is argued that, since an introductory section of the Internal Security Act makes a “legislative finding” of the threat represented by the Party,7 Congress intended membership in the Communist Party alone to serve as a reasonable basis for believing individual aliens too dangerous to leave at large. Such an interpretation renders meaningless the discretion granted the Attorney General wherever the deportation charge is membership in the Communist Party. The argument means that he may exercise discretion as to bail only to deny bail. Congress did not write such a Hobson’s choice into law. True, the bail provisions apply to deportation proceedings brought on other grounds. However, the absorbing concern of Congress in the Internal Security Act was with' the problem of the Communist Party; that Act for the first time explicitly made membership in the Communist Party a ground for deportation.8 It puts Congress in a stultifying position to suggest that it gave with one hand only to take away with the other.
In these cases the Attorney General has not exercised his discretion by applying the standards required of him. He evidently thought himself under compulsion of law and made an abstract, class determination, not an individualized judgment. . When the five aliens were arrested originally (one as late as June, 1950), all were released on bail, ranging from $5,000 for one to $1,000 for another; three were released on $2,000, bail. Much is made of the fact that the enactment of the Internal Security Act on *565September 22, 1950, intervened between the original grant of bail and the subsequent réarrest arid detention of the aliens. The only change in that Act relevant to these deportation proceedings was the provision making membership in the Communist Party specifically a basis for deportation.9 New warrants charging membership in the Communist Party at some time after entry were served on the rearrested aliens in Los Angeles, though not on Zydok in Detroit. The immigration authorities were by the Act relieved of proving — in order to make a prima facie case— that the Communist Party is an, “organization ... that believes in, advises, advocates, or teaches . . . the overthrow by force or violence of the Government.”10 But in the circumstances of today a legislative definition of the Communist Party as an organization advocating violent overthrow of government made little difference in the required proof.11 At any rate, a complete answer is that nowhere — either in his returns to the writs of habeas corpus or elsewhere — has the Attorney General made any assertion that the Internal Security Act eased the proof of deportability, indicating by his silence that such a factor did not influence his judgment.12 The returns in the Los Angeles cases supported the denial of bail solely by the statement, “said facts cause the said Acting Commis*566sioner to believe'that if the said petitioner^] were enlarged on bail [they] would engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, and would endanger the welfare and safety of the United States." The return in Zydok’s case stated no reasons for the Attorney General’s decision. The only evidence at the hearings was also directed solely to the Communist activities of the aliens.
The insubstantiality of the evidence for showing any danger in freeing each individual alien on bail raises ample doubt whether the'Attorney General exercised a discretion as instructed by statute. In Zydok’s case the claim is that he had been a member of the Communist Party and financial secretary of a Hamtramck, Michigan, section in 1949, a year before his réarrest and denial of bail on October 23, ,1950. From Zydok’s failure to deny present membership during his testimony, the District Court drew the conclusion that he was “knowingly and wilfully participating in the Communist movement." This was clearly a violation of Zydok’s privilege against self-incrimination, which he many times claimed.13 But assuming that the Attorney General had evidence before him that. Zydok was at present a member of the Communist Party, that alone is insufficient to show danger in freeing him on bail during the deportation proceeding.To deny bail, the Attorney General should have,a reasonable basis for believing that the circumstances ’attending Zydok present top hazardous a risk in leaving him at-large..
*567There is also no evidence on the activities of the other four aliens that is more recent than 1949 — a year before the issuance of the relevant warrants for deportation and the denials of bail here under review — with the exception of a newspaper article by Carlson published in late 1950. In fact, in the case of Carlisle and Stevenson the. Government had no evidence of activity or membership in the Communist Party more recent than the 1930’s. Since all these aliens when previously arrested were released on bail, we cannot escape the conclusion that the Attorney General after the enactment of the Internal Security Act. did not deny bail from an individualized estimate of “the danger to the public safety of [each person’s] presence within the community.”14
*568We are confirmed in this conclusion by the Attorney General’s practice. For we are advised by the Solicitor General that it has been the Government’s policy since the Internal Security Act to terminate bail for all aliens awaiting deportation proceedings whom it deems to be present active Communists, barring only those for whom special circumstances of physical condition or family situation compel an exception. The ordinary considerations of availability to respond to the final judgment of the . courts have apparently been ruled out by the Attorney General since the enactment of the Internal Security Act. All those whom the Government believes to be active Communists are considered unbailable without individualized consideration of risk from their continued freedom. It must therefore be inferred that the Attorney General acted on the assumption that, because he was convinced that the aliens here were present Communist Party members, they were not bailable. These persons should have the benefit of an exercise of discretion by the Attorney General, freed from any conception that Congress had made them in effect unbailable. We think that the California case should be returned to the District Court for discharge of the four persons detained unless the Attorney General within a reasonable time makes a new determination on the bail question using the standards here outlined. And if Zydok is rearrested under a new warrant, the Attorney General will have a fresh opportunity to exercise his discretion in setting bail.

 Pub. L. No. 831, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 64 Stat. 987.

 H. R. 10, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. read in relevant part thus: “(g) No court shall have jurisdiction: to release on bond or otherwise any alien detained.under any provision of law relating to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens at any time prior to a decision of court in his favor which is not subject to further judicial reviews.” See 96 Cong. Rec. 10448-10460. H. R. Rep. No. 1192, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 had this comment: “The provision is designed to leave the question of .releasing an alien from custody in an immigration case entirely in the hands of the Attorney General .... It in no way denies the right of any alien to test the legality of his detention through the courts; it merely states that the alien cannot be released by the court until judiqjal proceedings have been finally terminated in the alien’s favor.”

 Internal Security Act of 1950, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010, 8 U. S. C. (Supp.IV) § 156 (a) (emphasis added).

 H. R. Rep. No. 1192, 81st Cong, 1st Sess. 5-6, commenting on H. R. 10, which made the Attorney General’s discretion unreviewable, yet gave “discretion” to the Attorney General, said:
“This [existing law] has often been found to be lacking in clarity and doubtful in purpose when questions have arisen concerning procedure following arrest of an alien, or during the interim between his a-rrest. and his hearing and decision on his case .... The committee believes that this bill will greatly simplify such details.”
A memorandum from a lawyers’ group which was read into the record urged that to make the decision of the Attorney General unreviewable “flouts the recent decision of the circuit court of appeals of the second circuit,” citing United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F. 2d 747. 96 Cong. Rec. 10454.

 Compare the language “in the discretion of the Attorney General” with the clause “Where the Controller has reasonable grounds to . believe,” which, the Privy Council had before it in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, [1951] A. C. 66. It was held, in the judgment of Lord Radcliffe, “that, there must in fact exist such reasonable grounds, - known to the Controller, before he can validly exercise the power” conferred. And for this reason: “After all, words such as these are commonly found when a legislature or law-making authority confers powers on a minister or official. However read, they must be intended to serve, in some sense as a condition limiting the exercise of an otherwise arbitrary power. But if the question whether the *561condition has been satisfied is to be conclusively decided by the man who wields' the power the value of the intended restraint is in effect nothing. No doubt he must not exercise the power in bad faith: but the field in which this kind of question arises is such that the reservation for the ease of bad faith is har.dly more than a formality.” Id., at 77.

 Professor Mark De Wolfe Howe in The Nation, Jan. 12, 1952, p. 30.

 Internal Security Act of 1950, § 2, 64 Stat. 987.

 Internal Security Act of 1950, § 22, 64 Stat. 987, 1006, 8 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) §§ 137, 137-3.

 Ibid.

 40 Stat. 1012, 8 U. S. C. § 137 (c).

 See Dennis v. United States, 341, U. S. 494, 510-511, and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 422.

 A radiogram to the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization. in Los Angeles from the Acting Commissioner in Washington compendiously justified holding the four Los Angeles aliens without bail thus:
“. .■. the instruction . . . was issued only after the cases had-been examined in the light of the Internal Security Act . . . and-the spirit and intention thereof and all of the factors concerning the *566likelihood of the deportability and the activities of said alien had been given careful consideration as well as the factors of undue hardship which continued detention might impose.” .
The radiograms, in October, 1950, to the District Director in Detroit ordering Zydok’s 'rearrest and detention without, bail gave no reasons for the action.

 See 20 Stat. 30, 18 U. S. C. § 3481; Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60,66. See also Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 159.

 In a case just decided, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found a not unreasonable exercise of discretion by the Attorney General in circumstances that are here wanting. An extract from the opinion of Judge A. N. Hand illumines the differences:
“In his petition for the writ, Young alleged' facts indicating that if released he would be available fpr any further proceedings at which his presence would be required. The return .to the writ, however, • contained allegations which, if accepted, established a. reasonable foundation for the denial of bail by the Attorney General. Thus the return, in addition to containing allegations of membership in the Communist party, alleged that Young had once before escaped from custody during earlier proceedings; that he had previously attempted to enter1 the United States by furnishing a false identity and with a fraudulent passport; and that during his present detention he refused to answer questions relating to prior identification, places of residence, .employment and home life. ’ Section 2248 of the. Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 2248, requires that the facts alleged in the return be taken as true unless impeached, and Young in his traverse to the return did not refute those statements, nor did he'in his motion for reargument, make any offer to prove the contrary, nor did he assert new facts, which under 28 U. S. C. § 2246 could have been accomplished by affidavit. As the Süpreme Court has recently said in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 4: ‘The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.’ ” United States ex rel. Young v. Shaughnessy, 194 F. 2d 474 (C. A. 2d Cir., February 13, 1952).