Court Opinion

ID: 9411476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 20:01:13.064034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:06.920415
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10805    Document: 15-1     Date Filed: 07/26/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10805
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MICKEY PUBIEN,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:06-cr-60350-JIC-3
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10805

       Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Mickey Pubien, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
       denial of his motion for reconsideration as to the court’s previous
       denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step
       Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222
       (“First Step Act”). The government, in turn, has moved for sum-
       mary affirmance.
               Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
       the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is-
       sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”
       or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat-
       ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out-
       come of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the ap-
       peal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,
       1161-62 (5th Cir. 1969).
               We review a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsid-
       eration for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Llewlyn, 879 F.3d
       1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018). A district court abuses its discretion if
       it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures
       in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are
       clearly erroneous. United States v. Khan, 794 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th
       Cir. 2015). Whether a court complied with a mandate is an issue
       of law that we review de novo. See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert,
       906 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018) (reviewing the district court’s
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       23-10805               Opinion of the Court                         3

       interpretation and application of this Court’s mandate in an earlier
       appeal).
               Under the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court’s find-
       ings of fact and conclusions of law are generally binding in all sub-
       sequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later
       appeal. This That & the Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb Cty., 439
       F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006). The mandate rule, which is a spe-
       cific application of the law of the case, binds a lower court to exe-
       cute the mandate of the higher court without examination or vari-
       ance. Albert, 906 F.3d at 1299. A court “may not alter, amend, or
       examine the mandate, or give any further relief or review, but must
       enter an order in strict compliance with the mandate.” Piambino
       v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1119 (11th Cir. 1985). There are only three
       exceptions to the mandate rule: “(1) the evidence on a subsequent
       trial was substantially different, (2) controlling authority has since
       made a contrary decision of the law applicable to the issue, or
       (3) the previous decision was clearly erroneous and would work a
       manifest injustice.” United States v. Stein, 964 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th
       Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).
              The Fair Sentencing Act, enacted on August 3, 2010,
       amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) to reduce the sentencing disparity
       between crack and powder cocaine. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
       Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372; see Dorsey v. United States, 567
       U.S. 260, 268-69 (2012) (detailing the history that led to the enact-
       ment of the Fair Sentencing Act, including the Sentencing Com-
       mission’s criticisms that the disparity between crack and powder
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10805

       cocaine offenses was disproportional and reflected race-based dif-
       ferences). Specifically, § 2(a)(1) raised the quantity of crack cocaine
       necessary to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence from
       50 to 280 grams, and § 2(a)(2) raised the quantity threshold to trig-
       ger a 5-year mandatory minimum from 5 grams to 28 grams. Fair
       Sentencing Act § 2(a)(1)-(2); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii).
       These amendments were not made retroactive to defendants who
       were sentenced before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act.
       United States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374, 377 (11th Cir. 2012).
               In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made
       retroactive for “covered offenses” the statutory penalties enacted
       under the Fair Sentencing Act. See First Step Act § 404. Under
       § 404(b) of the First Step Act, “[a] court that imposed a sentence for
       a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections
       2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the
       covered offense was committed.” Id. § 404(b). The statute defines
       “covered offense” as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the
       statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the
       Fair Sentencing Act . . . that was committed before August 3,
       2010.” Id. § 404(a). We have explained that crack-cocaine offenses
       are “covered offenses” because the Fair Sentencing Act modified
       their penalties, while powder-cocaine offenses are not “covered of-
       fenses.” United States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920, 922 (11th Cir. 2023). The
       First Step Act adds that “[n]o court shall entertain a motion” under
       § 404 for a sentence that “was previously imposed or previously re-
       duced in accordance with” sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing
       Act, or “if a previous motion made under this
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       23-10805               Opinion of the Court                          5

       section . . . was . . . denied after a complete review of the motion
       on the merits.” Id. § 404(c).
               In Denson, we, as our main holding, concluded “that the First
       Step Act does not require district courts to hold a hearing with the
       defendant present before ruling on a defendant’s motion for a re-
       duced sentence under the Act.” 963 F.3d at 1082. As an alternate
       and independent holding, we concluded that a sentencing modifi-
       cation under the First Step Act is not a critical stage in the proceed-
       ings under the two-part test in United States v. Brown, 879 F.3d 1231
       (11th Cir. 2018), contrary to Denson’s arguments on appeal. Id. at
       1088-89. We concluded that the First Step Act does not authorize
       a plenary resentencing and instead “is a limited remedy.” Id. at
       1089. In so concluding, we reasoned that a district court may “re-
       duce a defendant’s sentence only on a covered offense and only as
       if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect when
       he committed the covered offense.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
       We also reasoned that a district court is not free to: (1) recalculate
       the defendant’s original Guidelines calculations unaffected by sec-
       tions 2 and 3; (2) reduce the defendant’s sentence on the covered
       offense based on other changes in the law; or (3) reduce the defend-
       ant’s sentences on non-covered offenses. Id. We also referenced
       the idea that a § 404(b) motion was a § 3582(c)(1)(B) proceeding.
       Id. at 1088.
              Under the prior panel precedent rule, “a prior panel’s hold-
       ing is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is over-
       ruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10805

       Court or this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th
       1249, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). However,
       the “prior panel precedent rule applies only to holdings, not dicta
       in our prior opinions.” United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198
       (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). “The
       holding of a case comprises both the result of the case and those
       portions of the opinion necessary to that result.” Id. (quotation
       marks omitted). No matter what an opinion says, “the decision can
       hold nothing beyond the facts of that case.” Id. (quotation marks
       omitted). On the other hand, “dicta is a statement that neither con-
       stitutes the holding of a case, nor arises from a part of the opinion
       that is necessary to the holding of the case.” Id. (quotation marks
       omitted, emphasis added). In other words, “dicta is defined as those
       portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case
       then before us.” Id. (quotation marks omitted, emphasis added).
       Further, “in this circuit additional or alternative holdings are not
       dicta, but instead are as binding as solitary holdings.” Bravo v.
       United States, 532 F.3d 1154, 1162 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).
               In Files, we clarified that Denson’s determination that a dis-
       trict court may reduce a defendant’s sentence under § 404(b) only
       on a “covered offense” and may not change the defendant’s sen-
       tences on counts that are not “covered offenses” was a holding and
       that this holding was not overruled or undermined to the point of
       abrogation by Concepcion. Files, 63 F.4th at 930-31.
              Here, we grant summary affirmance as to the district court’s
       denial of Pubien’s motion for reconsideration. The court properly
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       23-10805              Opinion of the Court                       7

       determined that it was bound by the mandate rule, as Pubien’s mo-
       tion sought to revisit issues that we had previously decided. More-
       over, despite Pubien’s erroneous assertion to the contrary, Concep-
       cion did not abrogate Denson’s holding that a court may not change
       a defendant’s sentence on counts that are not “covered offenses,”
       and therefore no exception to the mandate rule applied.
             Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion for sum-
       mary aﬃrmance.
             AFFIRMED.