Court Opinion

ID: 9884361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:54:00.088555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.914334
License: Public Domain

TOMLJANOVICH, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated when the trial court refused to permit cross-examination of Ms. Rogers and Officer Seguilia as to whether a romantic relationship had developed between them after Ms. Rogers reported the assault.
The trial judge ruled that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. Before we get to that balancing, however, our first inquiry must be whether the evidence was relevant. ‘“Relevant evid'^ce’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn.R.Evid. 401.
The defense theory presented to the jury in final argument was that Ms. Rogers wanted to “get close” to an officer and the report of the assault was “a way to facilitate further contact with [Officer Seguilia].” Hence, her credibility was subject to attack. Perhaps I have been away from the dating game for too many years, but surely there are more enticing ways to “get close” to an officer or to facilitate further romantic contact than to report an alleged sexual assault.
The jury was fully apprised of the relationship between Ms. Rogers and Officer Segui-lia at the time she made the initial report of the sexual assault. What may or may not have developed between them later does not have a tendency to make existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable. The subsequent relationship is simply of no consequence.
I heartily agree with the majority that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination, but surely the Confrontation Clause does not require cross-examination to support any theory no matter how far fetched.
It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. And as we observed earlier this Term, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original)).
I would affirm the court of appeals.