Court Opinion

ID: 9703164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:43:21.226929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:22.753317
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
I agree that the default judgment taken against appellant should be stricken. I write separately to explain why I agree and to state what I believe should be the effect of our decision in this case on the many other judgments taken over the years under Philadelphia Civil Rule 145. At one time our consideration might have begun and ended with the statement that judgments obtained under an invalid rule were void and of no effect for any purpose. However, I believe that a consideration of how the law has evolved should lead to a much narrower holding.
-1-
What does it mean to say that a judgment is “void”? Many older cases say that it means that the judgment is of no effect, at any time, for any purpose. Sometimes this is said quite colorfully, as, for example, that a void judgment “is a mere blur on the record . . . which it is the duty of a court of its own motion to strike off, whenever its attention is called to it.” Romberger v. Romberger, 290 Pa. 454, 457, 139 A. 159, 160 (1927). See also, Haverford Township School District v. Herzog, 314 Pa. 161, 171 A. 455 (1934); Bryn Mawr National Bank v. James, 152 Pa. 364, 25 A. 823 (1893); *229Sterling Electric & Furniture Co. v. Irey, 189 Pa.Super. 450, 150 A.2d 363 (1959); Samango v. Hobbs, 167 Pa.Super. 399, 75 A.2d 17 (1950); Peoples National Bank v. D. & M. Coal Company, 124 Pa.Super. 21, 187 A. 452 (1936). Such statements, however, must be regarded with some reserve, for in every one of the cases just cited, including Romberger, a petition to strike the judgment had been filed. Thus the suggestion that an appellate court has the duty to strike a void judgment sua sponte has been dictum.
In a related field of the law, courts have been concerned with the effect to be given action taken under a statute later held to be unconstitutional. In keeping with traditional notions of “voidness,” the United States Supreme Court in Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 1125, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886), held that an unconstitutional law “confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.” This view, however, has since been severely limited. In 1940 Chief Justice HUGHES wrote for a unanimous court, referring to Norton, that the prior existence of a law “is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.” Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 S.Ct. 329 (1940). See also, Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 140, 54 L.Ed. 228 (1910). Recently, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, in the Introductory Note to Chapter 2, “Validity of Judgments,” Restatement (Second) of Judgments (Tent. Draft No. 5, March 10, 1978), have adopted the point of view expressed by Chief Justice HUGHES in Chicot. After characterizing the first Restatement, in terms that echo Norton, as having adopted the view that if the requirements for validity are not met, a judgment is a nullity for all purposes, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) express the opinion that if the requirements for validity are not met, a judgment may be subject to avoidance, not, however, as an automatic consequence, but depending on the nature of the defect, the opportunity of the complaining party to chai*230lenge the defect, and on whether there has been reliance on the judgment. Id. at 4-5.
These developments in the law should encourage us to take the view of the Restatement (Second); we should decide whether the judgment should be stricken only after examining every aspect of the particular context in which the attack on the judgment is made.
-2-
Instead of asking, “What effect does a ‘void’ judgment have?,” we should ask, “Do we want our decision in Gonzales v. Procaccio Bros. Trucking Co., 268 Pa.Super. 245, 407 A.2d 1338 (1979), to be applied retroactively?” By stating the problem before us as a problem of retroactivity, we may escape the tyranny of the label “void.”
To be sure, a court was not always free thus to restate the problem. At common law, there could be no problem of retroactivity. The notion was that courts did not make the law, they found it. When a court overruled a decision, the new, overruling, decision was not new law but the true law, now discovered; the old, overruled, decision represented an unsuccessful attempt to discover the true law, from which it followed that the old decision had never been the law. It is this sort of thinking that underlies such cases as Norton v. Shelby County, supra. It is now established, however, that a court may hold that a legal principle is valid so far as the past is concerned, even though from now on it will not be valid. Thus a court may even decline to apply a decision to the case before it, making the decision prospective only. Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932) (CARDOZO, J.) (to avoid injustice and hardship, courts may say that decisions though later overruled “are law none the less for intermediate transactions,” id. at 364, 53 S.Ct. at 148).
Ordinarily an appellate court will apply a decision announcing a change in the law to the case before the court. The new principle will then control other cases pending in the trial courts or adjudicated by the trial courts but pending on direct appeal. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 *231S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) (collecting cases and reviewing the development of the law). When a new principle is thus applied to a pending case, it may be said that there is no problem of “true retroactivity.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 232 Pa.Super. 339, 331 A.2d 875 (1974). A problem of true retroactivity arises only when a change in the law occurs after a case has been finally litigated—i. e., tried and not appealed, or appealed and appeal decided—and the attempt is then made to apply that change in a collateral proceeding, such as on a petition for habeas corpus. Id. When confronted with a problem of true retroactivity, a court must carefully balance all of the interests involved, before deciding whether the change in law should or should not be applied. The court will “look[ ] to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Linkletter v. Walker, supra 381 U.S. at 629, 85 S.Ct. at 1737. This is so whether the case is civil or criminal. Id. at 628, 85 S.Ct. at 1737.
This case is before us on direct appeal from the lower court’s order denying appellant’s motion to strike the default judgment. That is not the same as a direct appeal from the judgment itself. But neither is it collateral in the same sense that a habeas corpus petition is collateral. A motion to strike a judgment is difficult to characterize, because although “its immediate or direct object is to nullify the judgment ... it is made in an action separate from, and thus collateral to, the action in which the judgment was rendered.” Introductory Note to Chapter 5, “Relief From a Judgment,” Restatement (Second) of Judgments (Tent. Draft No. 6, February 10, 1979) at 5.
If we regard the appeal here as a direct appeal from a judgment, we are not faced with a case of true retroactivity, and no reason appears why we should not apply the change of law announced in Gonzales. If we regard the appeal as from an order entered in a proceeding collateral to the judgment, we are faced with a case of true retroactivity, and it becomes necessary to balance the interests involved. *232Doing so, I conclude that we should still apply Gonzales. Any reliance on the judgment has been limited; the judgment has not been satisfied; and appellee has been on notice that it was being objected to. Furthermore, if the judgment is stricken, appellee will not be out of court but will only have lost the benefit of an automatic sanction imposed on appellant for its failure to answer interrogatories. This failure, moreover, was not appellant’s own, but occurred because of the neglect of appellant’s counsel. See Tice v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 253 Pa.Super. 118, 123, 384 A.2d 1257, 1259 (1978). So far as appellant itself is concerned, it has pleaded a meritorious defense. Id., 253 Pa.Super. at 122, 384 A.2d at 1259. If, therefore, we were to refuse to apply Gonzales retroactively, and consequently hold that the judgment should not be stricken, we might do an injustice in the sense of enabling appellee to hold on to a victory that on the merits, or substantively, as distinguished from procedurally, was undeserved.
I do not mean to suggest that this case should turn on its peculiar facts, which we know only because the attack on the judgment here was started by a petition to open. Tice v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., supra. Those facts do lend weight to the conclusion that Gonzales should be applied, but I believe we may go further and say that Gonzales should be applied in any case pending on appeal when it was handed down. If such a case involves a problem of true retroactivity at all, still, I submit, justice is more likely to be achieved if Gonzales is applied, the judgment stricken, and the action permitted to proceed to a decision on the merits, than if Gonzales is not applied and the judgment permitted to stand.
-3-
The foregoing does not dispose of the case, for we must still consider the possible impact of the doctrine of waiver, which has developed concurrently with the doctrine of retro-activity. It may be that the two doctrines conflict. In other words, should we say that even though as a general rule Gonzales should be applied in any case pending on appeal *233when it was handed down, here appellant has waived its right to such application?
We know that the right to seek a determination that Rule 145 was invalid may be waived. In Doner v. Jowitt and Rodgers Co. 484 Pa. 496, 399 A.2d 402 (1979), the plaintiff-appellant wanted to make the very argument made to us in Gonzales—that Philadelphia Rule 145 was invalid because in conflict with Pa.R.C.P. 4019. The Supreme Court held, however, that it would not hear the argument because it had not been made before the lower court, our court, or in the petition for allowance of appeal. Four months later we handed down Gonzales.
Here, appellant, as has been mentioned, first attacked the judgment by petition to open. When we affirmed the lower court’s order denying that petition, Tice v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., supra, appellant filed a motion to strike the judgment. In that motion it argued that the rule of Strickler v. United Elevator Co. (Inc.), 248 Pa.Super. 258, 375 A.2d 86 (1977), should be applied; it did not argue that Philadelphia Rule 145 was invalid because in conflict with Pa.R.C.P. 4019; no doubt it did not because we had not yet handed down Gonzales and therefore the argument had not occurred to appellant. After the lower court denied the motion to strike, on the ground that because of the prior petition to open, Strickler could not be raised, and after appellant had appealed the denial, we handed down Gonzales. Only then, pending our decision on appeal, did appellant argue Gonzales. Query, was that too late? Should we hold that because appellant could have argued to the lower court—i. e., even though we had not handed down Gonzales, still, appellant could have thought of the argument—that Philadelphia Rule 145 was invalid, but did not, it may not so argue to us now?
As a general rule, when there has been a change in the law while a case is on appeal, prior failure to argue that there should have been that change has not been deemed a waiver. In Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966), the appellants were given the benefit on appeal of *234Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), which changed Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rules for tort cases. In Kuchinic the appellants were the administrators and survivors of Pennsylvania residents killed in the crash of a private airplane in Georgia while returning from a football game in Florida. The case had been tried below under the existing Pennsylvania law, which looked to the law of the place of the accident. The appellants had not challenged this choice of law principle, and indeed had tried unsuccessfully to demonstrate the existence of gross negligence, as required under Georgia law. In Griffith our Supreme Court rejected the existing rule that the law of the place of the accident controlled, and adopted instead the significant contacts test. In giving the appellants the benefit of Griffith on appeal the Court specifically rejected the argument that they had waived the issue by not objecting to the application of Georgia law in the lower court. Writing for the Court, Justice ROBERTS noted that “the rule espoused by appellee would compel counsel to urge upon the trial court every conceivable theory, on the mere chance that, before his case is finally concluded, one such theory might become the law.” 422 Pa. at 626, 222 A.2d at 900. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 95, 239 A.2d 793, 796 (1968), the Court held that “[i]t would be manifestly unfair to hold appellant to a waiver when this waiver is alleged to have occurred at a time when neither the defendant nor his attorney had any way of knowing there existed a right to be waived.”
However, since Kuchinic and Cheeks the Court has abandoned the rule that waiver will not be found in cases of “fundamental error.” Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974) (criminal cases); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974) (civil cases). Even errors of constitutional dimension may be waived. Commonwealth v. Romberger, 474 Pa. 190, 378 A.2d 283 (1977). These decisions require one to ask whether Kuchinic and Cheeks are still the law, or whether the doctrine of waiver should not be applied to bar an argument *235based on a change in the law that occurred while a direct appeal was pending, if that argument was not made to the lower court.
At least two members of the Court have indicated that they would find waiver in such a case, unless the change in the law established a right constitutionally required. Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 381 A.2d 1245 (1977) (opinion in support of affirmance by POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J.). See also Commonwealth v. Lynch, 477 Pa. 390, 383 A.2d 1263 (1978) (concurring opinion by POMEROY, J., joined by EAGEN, C. J.). However, in Ernst three justices joined an opinion sharply critical of any distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional decisions. After discussing cases in which a change in the law was applied on direct appeal, without regard either to the nature of the change or to waiver, Justice ROBERTS wrote, “[T]hese decisions rest upon the principle that it is unjust to require an appellant whose case is not yet final to endure the burden of a rule now recognized as offensive to our jurisprudence [footnote omitted].” 476 Pa. at 112, 381 A.2d at 1250 (opinion in support of reversal by ROBERTS, J., joined by O’BRIEN and MANDERINO, JJ).
The right before us—the right not to have a default judgment entered against one by the Prothonotary as an automatic sanction for failure to make discovery—is not based on either the United States or Pennsylvania Constitution, but rather on the principle that a local rule may not conflict with a Pennsylvania rule of civil procedure. Gonzales v. Procaccio Bros. Trucking Co., supra. Because we lack clear guidance from the Supreme Court on whether the benefit of a non-constitutional change in the law is waived and therefore may not be argued on direct appeal if the issue was not raised in the lower court, we must engage in our own analysis of the right before us.
In my opinion, we should hold that appellant has not waived the right to argue Gonzales. The doctrine of waiver is supposed to make the courts work more efficiently. If a litigant is required to make all his arguments first to the *236lower court—at the peril of not being able to make them to the appellate court—the lower court will be given the opportunity to correct its errors, and an appeal may be avoided. Even if an appeal is not avoided, the appellate court will have the benefit of a full record, which will include whatever evidence was submitted bearing on the argument, and also the lower court’s response to the argument. See Commonwealth v. Throckmorton, 241 Pa.Super. 62, 68-69, 359 A.2d 444, 447 (1976). Here, as an appellate court we have lost nothing because appellant did not first argue to the lower court that Rule 145 was invalid. This is not a case where it may be said that if an argument had been made first to the lower court, evidence might have been offered and received by the lower court bearing on the argument. Here, once the default judgment had been entered under Rule 145, it was too late for the lower court to receive any evidence. The record before us is just as full as it would have been if appellant had argued the invalidity of Rule 145 to the lower court. It is true that because appellant did not so argue, we do not have the benefit of a lower court opinion in response to the argument, but here that fact in no way inconveniences us. The issue is purely one of law, and the controlling decision, Gonzales, is one that we have already handed down. Since, therefore, none of the objectives sought to be achieved by the doctrine of waiver would be achieved if the doctrine were applied, we should not apply it.
_4_
If we examine the cases regarding “void” judgments in light of the doctrines of retroactivity and waiver, we may conclude, I suggest, that the effect to be given Gonzales will vary, as follows:
First, suppose the judgment sought to be stricken has been satisfied. Rule 145 permitted two sorts of judgment: a judgment of non pros against a plaintiff, and a judgment of liability against a defendant. A judgment against a plaintiff may be regarded as “satisfied” if the applicable statute of limitations has run since the judgment was entered; a judgment against a defendant may be regarded as *237“satisfied” if damages have been assessed and paid. Once a judgment has been satisfied, it no longer exists, and hence is not subject to attack. Sanctis v. Checco, 195 Pa.Super. 193, 171 A.2d 542 (1961), following Lance v. Mann, 360 Pa. 26, 60 A.2d 35 (1948), and Federal Insurance Co. v. Robinson, 82 Pa. 357 (1876). Thus, a satisfied judgment should not be stricken on the basis of Gonzales.
Second, suppose a motion to strike a judgment entered under Rule 145, denial of the motion, and either no appeal or an unsuccessful appeal, all before Gonzales. In the interests of finality, the judgment should not be stricken on the basis of Gonzales. In Washington v. Liberi, 273 Pa.Super. 48, 416 A.2d 1082 (1979) (filed December 21, 1979), we refused to apply Gonzales retroactively in a case where a motion to strike, not raising the invalidity of Rule 145, had been made in 1977 and denial of the motion was not appealed. (The appellant had unsuccessfully petitioned the lower court for reconsideration of its denial, again without raising the invalidity issue.) I am not persuaded to a contrary result by broad language in older cases about an appellate court sua sponte striking a “void” judgment.
Third, suppose a motion to strike a judgment entered under Rule 145, on grounds other than the invalidity of the rule, denial of the motion, and an appeal pending when Gonzales was handed down. The present case is such a case. The judgment should be stricken on the basis of Gonzales.
Fourth, suppose a motion to strike a judgment entered under Rule 145, on grounds including the invalidity of the rule, denial of the motion, and an appeal pending before this court. Such a case presents no problem, either of retroactivity or waiver, and the judgment should be stricken on the basis of Gonzales.
Fifth, suppose a motion to strike a judgment entered under Rule 145, filed since Gonzales was handed down, and still before the lower court. In such a case, the doctrine of waiver should apply. The judgment should be stricken on the basis of Gonzales, if Gonzales is argued to the lower court. If Gonzales is not argued to the lower court, it may *238not on appeal be argued to us. Again, I am not persuaded to a contrary result by broad language in older cases.
Sixth, and finally, suppose a motion to strike a judgment entered under Rule 145 has never been filed, and the judgment is still unsatisfied. This court has so far not retreated from the bright-line rule that laches do not run against a “void” judgment. See, e. g., Strickler v. United Elevator Co., Inc., 257 Pa.Super. 542, 391 A.2d 614 (1978). It nevertheless appears to me that the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments implies some qualification of this broad rule. The length of time a “void” judgment has been on the books may affect both the opportunity to object to it and and the likelihood of reliance on it—two of the factors the Restatement suggests be considered in determining enforceability. In a case falling into this final category, I should use the approach of the Restatement to determine whether it would be in the interests of justice to grant a motion to strike on the basis of Gonzales.
For the foregoing reasons I concur in the order reversing the decision of the lower court.