Court Opinion

ID: 9488510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:47:36.194052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:55.987312
License: Public Domain

PAUL R. MATIA, District Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s astounding holding that it is plain error for a trial court to instruct a jury that an essential element of a crime has been established when the defendant has stipulated to the facts that prove that element. In my opinion, such an instruction is not error at all, let alone plain error.
Most importantly, there is simply no judicial precedent for such a ruling. The cases *525cited by the majority do not involve a stipulation by the defendant. The case principally relied upon by the majority, United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.1988), was a bank robbery case in which one of the essential elements which had to be established by the government was that the bank was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Not only was there no stipulation by the defendant but the government’s FDIC evidence was admitted over defense counsel’s objection, and at the close of the government’s case, defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that the evidence failed to establish FDIC insurance. The trial court in Mentz nevertheless instructed the jury that the bank was insured by the FDIC. The Sixth Circuit quite properly held that the trial judge had actually determined the disputed fact of FDIC insurance and, therefore, reversed. Id. at 320. The court said in footnote 8 on page 320:
Since the government’s evidence on this issue consisted mainly of witness testimony, the trial judge replaced the jury by reaching a conclusion based on assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing the probative value of the evidence (citation omitted).
I am completely mystified as to how the Mentz case (both facts and reasoning) can be considered controlling precedent for the instant ease, in which the defendant and the government agreed on the stipulated fact, thus making the introduction of any evidence on that element unnecessary. All of the cases cited by the majority stand for the proposition (in various guises) that in criminal cases the court simply may not direct a verdict on any issue. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1323 (5th Cir.1983). Not a single case, however, involves a defendant’s stipulation to an element of the crime.
In United States v. Prujansky, 415 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir.1969), this Court said as follows:
We understand the general rule in a criminal case is that the court may not direct a verdict of guilty no matter how strong the evidence and that the Government must prove every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (citation omitted). It is better practice for a trial judge to charge on all elements of the alleged crime unless the parties otherwise stipulate.
Id. at 1048 (emphasis added). The majority opinion dismisses Prujansky on the ground that “Mentz and other appellate and Supreme Court cases, which are dispositive of this issue, were decided after this court’s decision in Prujansky.” Majority opinion at 522. The trouble is, Mentz and the other cases are simply not dispositive of this issue, as discussed above.
At least two other circuits have considered this issue. In United States v. Sims, 529 F.2d 10 (8th Cir.1976), the defendant entered into a stipulation that the substances alleged to have been sold contained derivatives of opium, heroin and cocaine. On appeal, he argued that the court committed error in instructing the jury that the substances were heroin and cocaine. The Eighth Circuit held that his stipulation was sufficient evidence and that the trial court did not err in so instructing the jury. Id. at 11. Accordingly, the Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit (1994 edition) § 2.03 offers the following charge:
The government and the defendants have stipulated — that is, they have agreed — that certain facts are as counsel have just stated. You should therefore treat these facts as having been proved.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Houston, 547 F.2d 104 (9th Cir.1976), held that “when parties have entered into stipulations as to material facts, those facts will be deemed to have been conclusively established.” Id. at 107. The defendant claimed that his stipulation that he had been previously convicted of a felony should not have been submitted to the jury (because that was a question of law). The court responded that “the stipulation related to an essential element of the crime, to be regarded by the jury as a fact conclusively proved.” Id. In the Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Ninth Circuit (1992 edition), the following instruction appears at § 2.04:
*526The parties have agreed to certain facts that have been stated to you. You should therefore treat these facts as having been proved.
The reasoning of Mentz and other cases cited by the majority simply has no applicability to stipulations by a defendant. If a defendant and the government agree that certain facts are as stated and that no additional evidence on such facts is needed, how can an instruction to the jury that it should treat those facts as having been proved be found to be a violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial? Surely if a defendant can give up the right to a jury trial of all the issues by entering a guilty plea or by waiving a jury (Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1452, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968)), he or she can give up the right to a jury finding on a single issue by entering into a stipulation of fact. To hold otherwise is to raise form over substance.
The practical effect of the majority’s ruling in this case could be profound. I cannot agree that “this holding should not cause the government concern that stipulations will become meaningless,” as the majority claims at page 523. Every attorney and trial judge should be concerned.
The stipulation of a fact at trial means that no evidence as to that fact need be introduced because the parties are agreeing for all purposes of the litigation that the stipulated fact is true. This allows the participants — parties, jurors and the trial judge — to concentrate on issues about which there is dispute. The result is more efficient administration of justice through shorter, less costly, and more focused trials.
If a jury is now to be allowed to ignore the parties’ stipulation of facts and instead substitute its own speculation (because, in the absence of any additional evidence on a stipulated fact, the jury could only speculate), it will be incumbent upon the government (the party principally impacted, since it has the burden of proof in a criminal case) to present every scrap of evidence to support conviction. Thus, for example, when a defendant is on trial on the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, it will no longer be sufficient for the government and the defendant to stipulate merely that the defendant was previously convicted of an offense punishable by a term of incarceration of at least one year. Under the rule announced by the majority today, the government will be forced to introduce into evidence every previous felony conviction a defendant has, lest the jury choose to “disbelieve” either a stipulation or any one such conviction the government might select. This will certainly be far more prejudicial to a defendant’s right to a fair trial than a stipulation of fact could ever be. I find it difficult to believe that such a result, ostensibly in the interest of preserving the right to a jury trial, will benefit defendants, the court system, or public respect for the law.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I must dissent.