Court Opinion

ID: 9733797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:17:30.610028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.068277
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I disagree the statute of limitations had run in this case. There was a question whether, under the facts of this case, Acceptance could take advantage of the vacancy provision which it had inserted into its policy. Acceptance filed a declaratory judgment action and Broadnax responded with a breach of contract action. The question was resolved when the trial court granted summary judgment to Acceptance on October 27, 1997. Two years from October 27, 1997, is October 27, 1999, and Broadnax timely filed the present action within that time, on September 1, 1999. The majority concludes that Broadnax knew of his injury on May 10, 1996, when Acceptance denied his claim and filed its declaratory judgment action. Why, however, was Broadnax required to assume that action would be resolved against him? If the policy had been held to provide coverage, any action against the agent for negligence in obtaining the policy would have been completely unnecessary. It could not be determined whether the agent was negligent until it was determined whether the vacancy provision controlled. The fact that Broadnax was put on inquiry before the declaratory judgment/breach of contract action was decided is not enough to start the running of the statute. See Guzman v. C.R. Epperson Construction, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 391, 397-98, 752 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (2001). Parties should not be compelled to file anticipatory claims which may later prove to be unnecessary, Guzman, 196 Ill. 2d at 400, 752 N.E.2d at 1075. The statute of limitations should not simply be construed to begin running at the earliest possible moment. “The purpose behind a statute of limitations is to prevent stale claims, not to preclude claims before they are ripe for adjudication.” Guzman, 196 Ill. 2d at 400, 752 N.E.2d at 1075-76.