Court Opinion

ID: 9757215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:25:46.707415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:36.466025
License: Public Domain

O’HERN, J.,
dissenting.
In the circumstances of this case, after six years and two trials, we should not reverse a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of evidence. I recognize that the law of the case doctrine is not an inexorable mandate to such a conclusion. Still I believe, as does the majority, that the doctrine expresses public policy concerns that should guide a court’s discretion. We differ on the application of those policies to the case.
All agree that swift and certain punishment of crime is the single most important feature of a criminal justice system that seeks to act as an effective deterrent to crime. Victims and families of victims have equal interest in that certainty and finality. The families of crime victims relive the tragedy each time that the case is tried. Revision of pretrial rulings with attendant appeals adds to that delay and uncertainty.
Generally speaking, the phrase “law of the case,” in the words of Justice Holmes, “merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided----” Messinger v. Anderson, 225 US. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152, 1156 (1912). As employed by courts, the doctrine dispenses with the need of considering again what has been previously decided in the same suit. Thus, “[t]he ‘law of the case’ rule ordinarily precludes a court from re-examining an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher appellate court, in the same case.” United States v. Maybusher, 735 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir.1984), cert, den., — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 790, 83 L.Ed.2d 783 (1985) (quoting Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 833 (9th Cir.1982)). The circumstances under which that re-examination takes place are not left, however, to standardless discretion. The doctrine generally requires that a decision on a former appeal be followed in any subsequent proceedings unless evidence subsequently in*209troduced is substantially different or the decision is “clearly erroneous and works manifest injustice.” Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. American Bonding Co., 630 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir.1980), cited in United States v. Unger, 700 F.2d 445, 450 n. 10 (8th Cir.), cert, den., 464 US. 934, 104 S.Ct. 339, 78 L.Ed.2d 308 (1983).
Defendants do not get multiple chances to retry issues. When a pretrial motion to suppress has been heard and decided, that decision becomes the law of the case. “Only if new grounds, including new facts, are advanced which the defendant could not reasonably have been aware of may a trial judge entertain a renewed motion to suppress.” Smith v. United States, 406 A.2d 1262, 1263 (D.C.App.1979) (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 284 A.2d 460, 463-64 (D.C.App.1971)).
Underlying the rule are principles similar to collateral estoppel that give credence to “any prior adjudication of an issue in another action between the parties that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” United States ex rel. DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 1262, 1265 (2nd Cir.1975), cert. den. sub nom. DiGiangiemo v. Olgiatti, 426 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 3172, 49 L.Ed.2d 1187 (1976); see also State v. Scott, 68 Or.App. 386, 681 P.2d 1188 (1984) (change in law of pretrial identification warrants reconsideration of pretrial ruling after appeal).
Our decisional law has generally followed this approach. See State v. Clarke, 198 N.J.Super. 219 (App.Div.1985) (record made at first pretrial motion to suppress shall obtain on retrial and requires suppression); State v. Fioravanti, 78 N.J.Super. 253 (App.Div.1963) (renewed motion to suppress before second trial denied on law of the case doctrine); State v. Roccasecca, 130 N.J.Super. 585 (Law Div.1974) (discovery of new evidence warrants renewal of suppression motion); see also State v. Lopez, 166 N.J.Super. 301 (App.Div.), certif. den., 81 N.J. 287 (1979) (Miranda ruling need not be reconsidered at second trial).
*210Barring, then, significant changes in legal doctrine or facts, ordinarily the criminal justice system should seek to resolve pretrial issues with respect to the admissibility of evidence in as expeditious a manner as possible before trial. Our rules contemplate this. R. 3:5-7; R. 3:13 — 1(b).1 Under the majority principle each retrial invites prosecution and defense to renew their pretrial motions with attendant appeals. We believe that the better rule for the criminal justice system is that a decision on a former appeal be followed in any subsequent proceedings unless later evidence or legal precedent is substantially different or the decision is “clearly erroneous and works manifest injustice.” Ante at 191. We do not find those factors present here.
The crimes of murder were committed in October 1975. The search took place on November 1, 1975. The first motion to suppress was presented to the trial court in May 1979.2 The motion addressed the single question whether the seizure of hair samples linking the defendant to the murder of these two victims was within the scope of the warrant issued by the municipal magistrate. That warrant was issued to search for evidence of crimes of breaking and entering and larceny in Norwood and Closter. The question came down to whether the search was within the scope of the warrant.
Both the Federal and State Constitutions are express in their recognition that general warrants are prohibited and that warrants issued upon probable cause shall particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. US. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. (1947) art. I, para. 7. There can be no *211doubt here that the officers were lawfully authorized to search for any and all of the items particularly described in the warrant. The question is whether the warrant authorized them to search for the hair samples that were not described in the warrant. The controlling constitutional principle was set forth by the Supreme Court over fifty years ago:
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. [Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231, 237 (1927), quoted in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1251, 22 L.Ed.2d 542, 553 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring).]
Our rule does not differ. State v. Seefeldt, 51 N.J. 472 (1968). In determining, then, what was within the scope of the warrant the trial court examined the record that was presented to the judge issuing the warrant. Our system reposes in that person the enormous responsibility to serve as “a neutral and detached magistrate” between citizen and state. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436, 440 (1948). In examining the record of the proceedings presented to the magistrate in that neutral and detached capacity, a court should consider the scope of the warrant to have been framed by the understanding communicated to the magistrate. See State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 592-93 (1971).
In this case, the police officers quite understandably were proceeding in their investigation on a step-by-step basis. At the stage when they presented the matter to the Closter magistrate, the investigating officers did not seek to obtain a warrant based on probable cause to believe that the defendant was a murder suspect or that the car contained evidence of the murders. The magistrate would have focused upon their request to search the car for evidence of the crimes of breaking and entering and larceny. The affidavit in support of the issuance of the warrant listed twenty-eight pieces of jewelry and valuables as the objects of the search. The warrant authorized a search for “certain property, to wit: see attached *212list,” with the list attached describing the jewelry. The trial court recognized that this was not a situation in which seemingly unrelated pieces of evidence would be related to the single crime described in the warrant. Compare Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2749, 49 L.Ed.2d 627, 643 (1976) (disparate bits of evidence form like a jigsaw puzzle the whole picture of fraudulent scheme with respect to one criminal transaction). Viewing the matter within the context of the affidavits presented to the magistrate and the warrant itself, the trial court ruled that the scope of the warrant was limited to the evidence of the crimes described in the warrant. It believed that to rule otherwise would convert “a seemingly precise and legal warrant” into a general warrant to search for all evidence of crime. Stanley v. Georgia, supra, 394 U.S. at 572, 89 S.Ct. at 1251, 22 L.Ed.2d at 553 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Hence, there is no disagreement with the majority’s view that searches are to be tested by an objective standard. In essence, the trial court analyzed the question in terms of objective reasonableness in relationship to the items and crimes particularly described in the warrant. In this sense its analysis was similar to that employed in State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210 (1983). This is not a case, as there, where agents, in the course of a lawful arrest, came upon criminal evidence in plain view. For the record makes clear that the materials in question could not be determined to be evidential by mere inspection. Nor is there anything “unworthy” about the materials that were seized that requires different principles of law to be invoked. Cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2171, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 592 (1982) (declining to distinguish between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers). This analysis of the scope of a search pursuant to a warrant is similar to our analysis of the scope of a warrantless search. Such a search is defined by the object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. See State v. Guerra, 93 N.J. 146, 150-51 (1983); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. *213211, 232 (1981). In such circumstances, the validity of a search is tested “on objective grounds.” State v. Guerra, supra, 93 N.J. at 152. Based on these principles it is not at all certain that the trial court’s 1979 ruling on the scope of the warrant was clearly erroneous.
We do not understand the majority to base its ruling on the theory that the search was valid as a warrantless search under the automobile exception. The premise of that conclusion would be that the officers had probable cause to believe that the automobile contained evidence of the crime of murder and were searching for such evidence of murder in a movable vehicle. See State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 507-08 (1983); State v. Martin, 87 N.J. 561, 567-68 (1981). That premise, however, is not present in the record of this case. It was never contended at the first suppression hearing that the officers were searching for such evidence. At that hearing, the assistant prosecutor was candid to advise the trial court that “the State had little or no knowledge inculpating this defendant in the murder case.” That court had no occasion then to consider the validity of the search as a warrantless automobile search.
At the second hearing, no officer who participated in the search testified to having probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of the murders, although the prosecutor made a legal argument to that effect. Compare State v. Sarto, 195 N.J.Super. 565, 574 (App.Div.1984) (“law of the case” doctrine would not preclude reconsideration of denial of suppression order but evidence showed that searching officer had probable cause to believe vehicle contained contraband and evidence was not suppressed).
We share the majority’s concern that all competent and reliable evidence be available to the factfinding process. We would also want other such crimes to be prosecuted swiftly and with certainty. We believe that goal is better served by concluding that, absent the defined special circumstances, pretrial *214rulings suppressing evidence before a first trial should obtain on a retrial.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK and GARIBALDI — 5.
For reversal — Justices CLIFFORD and O’HERN — 2.

 Of course, we recognize that there are certain evidentiary rulings that are part of the trial itself, which will vary from trial to trial and thus cannot be resolved before trial. See State v. Lopez, 188 N.J.Super. 170, 173-74 (App.Div. 1983).

 In the disposition that we would make, we would not have occasion to consider the second pretrial ruling, although that court’s concurrence with the 1979 ruling suggests that it was not clearly erroneous.