Court Opinion

ID: 9649852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:11:17.169476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:15.270774
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). Litigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury. Conn. Const., art. first, § 19, amend. IV; Blados v. Blados, 151 Conn. 391, 396, 198 A.2d 213. Directed verdicts are therefore disfavored and should only be granted when the jury could not reasonably and legally reach any other conclusion. Pinto v. Spigner, 163 Conn. 191, 193, 198, 302 A.2d 266; Loukides v. United Illuminating Co., 160 Conn. 66, 68, 70, 273 A.2d 719. In testing a directed verdict for a defendant, the evidence, including legitimate and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence, must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Loukides v. United Illuminating Co., supra; Engengro v. New Haven Gas Co., 152 Conn. 513, 516, 209 A.2d 174. “The preferred procedure ... [is] for the trial court to submit the issues to the jury and consider the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion to set aside the verdict. Santor v. Balnis, 151 Conn. 434, 437, 199 A.2d 2.” Loukides v. United Illuminating Co., supra, 70.
The defendant’s records, introduced as exhibits by the plaintiffs, reveal that the plaintiffs’ decedent suffered a complete dislocation of her shoulder while being positioned for a barium enema in the x-ray room; that after that incident she complained of pain in her shoulder and arm; and that on different occasions she stated that a “nurse pulled . . . [her arm] in the x-ray room” and “they *11twisted . . . [my] arm in x-ray.” The decedent’s daughter also testified that after the incident in the x-ray room, the deceased complained to her that “they broke my arm in the x-ray room [;]... they yanked my arm and I screamed [;] I told them they broke my arm and they chuckled a little and that was it.” Furthermore, the parties stipulated that the individuals named in the complaint were “at all times mentioned in the complaint” the agents of the hospital acting in the course of their employment in the x-ray room.
Any ambiguity on the question of exactly who dislocated the decedent’s shoulder is academic, since this action is only against the defendant hospital as employer of the persons responsible. The decedent’s declarations that a “nurse” pulled her arm in the x-ray room and that “they” broke or twisted her arm in the x-ray room, combined with the stipulation that the individuals named in the complaint were “at all times mentioned in the complaint” agents of the hospital, would permit a strong inference that employees of the hospital were responsible for dislocating the decedent’s shoulder. Any ambiguity on that point must be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.
The declaration that “they yanked my arm” could reasonably be considered by the jury as a negligent breach of duty which the hospital’s employees owed to the decedent. Moreover, the “yanking” could also be considered by the jury as an assault and battery done under circumstances showing a reckless disregard of the consequences or a lack of exercise of due care. See Russo v. Porga, 141 Conn. 706, 708, 109 A.2d 585; Lentine v. McAvoy, 105 Conn. 528, 531, 136 A. 76.
*12With regard to the standard of care, it would have been preferable for the plaintiffs to produce expert medical testimony since certain technical procedures involved in the administration of a barium enema may not be within the comprehension of laymen. Under the facts of this case, however, expert evidence should not be strictly required, since the injury to the decedent’s shoulder was far removed from that part of the body involved in the administration of the enema. Our cases recognize that expert medical testimony is not required where there is such a gross want of care and skill as to afford an almost conclusive inference of negligence; Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 567, 574, 265 A.2d 70; Slimak v. Foster, 106 Conn. 366, 370, 138 A. 153; and numerous jurisdictions have held that expert evidence is not required to make out a case against a hospital for the injury or death of a patient where the negligence involved is such as to be within the comprehension of laymen, requiring only common knowledge and experience to understand and judge it. Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 515, 523, § 4, and cases cited therein. Of note is Davis v. Memorial Hospital, 58 Cal. 2d 815, 817, 376 P.2d 561, wherein it was held that it was common knowledge of laymen that the giving of an enema was not ordinarily harmful and that the “tearing” of the rectum by a nurse inserting a rubber tube could be considered as a negligent act without the testimony of an expert. A fortiori, the dislocation of a shoulder should not require expert evidence on the standard of care for administering a barium enema.
I would therefore find error in the granting of the motion for a directed verdict, set aside the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.