Court Opinion

ID: 9588516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:35:03.183282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:39.392663
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COMPTON,
with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and JUSTICE RUSSELL join, dissenting.
*195In my opinion, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law for at least two reasons.
In the first place, the applicable statute provided that pedestrians “shall cross wherever possible only at intersections or marked crosswalks. Where any intersections of . . . streets contain no marked crosswalks pedestrians shall not be guilty of negligence as a matter of law for crossing at any such intersection or between intersections when crossing by the most direct route.” Former Code § 46.1-230(a) (1986 Repl. Vol.) (now § 46.2-923) (emphasis added).
In the present case, a marked crosswalk was available for the plaintiff’s use in crossing Warwick Boulevard. According to the statutory mandate, the plaintiff was required to proceed “only” within the crosswalk because it was “possible” for him to use the marked space for crossing the street. The mere fact that vehicles were temporarily blocking the crosswalk did not make it not “possible” to use the crosswalk, or give the plaintiff license to proceed outside the crosswalk and to venture through the maze of stop- and-go traffic. He had only to wait briefly for the crosswalk to clear. Instead, the plaintiff left a place of safety and impatiently attempted to cross the street in violation of law.
As this Court held in a case involving similar facts, where there was no marked crosswalk, just an unmarked intersection, “Pedestrians where possible are supposed to cross at an intersection. . . . The plaintiff in this case, although an intersection was available on either side, chose the course of crossing in the middle of the block, and in doing so . . . was guilty of negligence and that negligence . . . continued right up to the time of the accident.” Hodgson v. McCall, 197 Va. 52, 54, 87 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1955).
In the second place, even if somehow the plaintiff was free of negligence in crossing outside the marked crosswalk, nevertheless he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law for failing to keep a proper lookout as he walked in front of and past Hurdle’s van into the path of Cofield’s vehicle. When.a pedestrian undertakes to cross a street between intersections, he is required to exercise a greater degree of vigilance than is required when crossing at an intersection. Hopson v. Goolsby, 196 Va. 832, 838, 86 S.E.2d 149, 152-53 (1955).
Here, the plaintiff testified that he was walking “at a fast gait” when he moved across in front of the stopped van; that he “slowed down to a slow gait” as he reached the right side of the van; and, *196that he was “hit” by Cofield’s vehicle without seeing “anything” as he “was in a stepping position” and “turning to look.” Manifestly, the plaintiff did not stop, or even pause, to look before stepping directly into the path of Cofield’s moving vehicle. That vehicle would have been in plaintiffs plain view had he exercised a reasonable lookout. Being on foot, the plaintiff could have stopped instantly had he looked and seen the approaching vehicle, and the accident would not have occurred. A glance to his right would have warned the plaintiff of the danger of proceeding. There was nothing to keep him from looking, and there was every reason why he should look before he moved from his position of safety at the right front corner of the van. Id. at 838-39, 86 S.E.2d at 153. Indeed, the plaintiff testified that he “wasn’t standing at the corner peeking around the corner” to see oncoming traffic in the curb lane.
For these reasons, I would hold that the plaintiff is barred from recovery and would not reach the other issues presented in the appeal. Thus, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment for the defendants.