Court Opinion

ID: 9926828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 18:10:18.882665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:45.817610
License: Public Domain

01/25/2024

                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                                 AT JACKSON
                                     November 28, 2023 Session

                                          IN RE NATION F.

                      Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Carroll County
                        No. 20JV8452      John W. Whitworth, Judge
                          ___________________________________

                                 No. W2023-00510-COA-R3-PT
                             ___________________________________

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, and on its finding that
termination was in the child’s best interest. The trial court also terminated Father’s rights
on the additional ground that he was sentenced to incarceration for more than ten years
when the child was under eight years of age. Mother and Father appeal. Discerning no
error, we affirm.

          Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court
                                Affirmed and Remanded

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD,
P.J., W.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Jasmine McMackins Hatcher, McKenzie, Tennessee, for the appellant Brittany F.1

Samuel W. Hinson, Lexington, Tennessee, for the appellant Zachary F.2

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Carrie A. Perras, Assistant
Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

1
  In cases involving minor children, it is the policy of this Court to redact the parties’ names to protect their
identities.

2
    Father waived oral argument before this Court.
                                              OPINION

                            I. Background and Procedural History

        Brittany F. (“Mother”) and Zachary F. (“Father,” and together with Mother,
“Appellants,” or “Parents”) are the biological Parents of Nation F. (the “Child”), who was
born in February 2016. In August 2019, Nation, who was three years old at the time, was
found playing outdoors unsupervised.3 Mother was found asleep, was difficult to arouse,
and tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and buprenorphine. She was
arrested and charged with child endangerment and possession of a controlled substance.
Additionally, two handguns and a rifle were found in the home, and Father, a convicted
felon, was arrested and charged with three counts of possession of a weapon and possession
of a stolen weapon. Further, Father admitted to taking Mother’s prescription for suboxone.
Nation, who tested positive for methamphetamines, was removed to Appellee Department
of Children’s Services’ (“DCS”) custody. In October 2021, Father was convicted of
unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was sentenced to 12-years
incarceration.4

        In December 2019, the Juvenile Court for Carroll County (“trial court”) adjudicated
Nation dependent and neglected and the victim of severe child abuse.5 On July 7, 2020,
DCS filed a petition to terminate Appellants’ parental rights. As grounds, DCS averred
failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans,
persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse. On February 8, 2022, DCS filed an
amended petition to add an additional ground for termination of Father’s parental rights
based on the fact that he had been sentenced to incarceration for a period of ten or more
years. DCS also averred that termination of Parents’ rights was in the Child’s best interest.

3
 Mother has six children. She testified that her older children, including two who were removed from her
care in August 2019 along with Nation, were living with their fathers when this matter was heard in 2023.
Nation is the only child at issue in this case.

4
  In June 2022, Mother was convicted of attempted child endangerment stemming from the events leading
to the removal of the Child. According to Mother’s testimony, she was sentenced to four years of
“community correction,” including one year of outpatient rehabilitation. Mother testified that she was on
probation at the time of trial.

5
  Parents appealed the adjudication, and the matter was heard de novo by the Circuit Court. By order of
July 16, 2021, the Circuit Court found the Child to be dependent and neglected and the victim of severe
abuse because he had methamphetamine in his system, which the court attributed to Parents’ actions. As
the Circuit Court noted, Parents periodically refused court-appointed counsel, and filed numerous pro se
motions, which were all subsequently abandoned.

                                                  -2-
        The trial court conducted a hearing on February 10 and 14, 2023. At the beginning
of trial, DCS announced that it would proceed on only two grounds: severe child abuse
with respect to both Parents, and incarceration for ten or more years with respect to Father.
On March 28, 2023, the trial court entered its final order, wherein it terminated both
Parents’ rights on the ground of severe child abuse. The trial court also terminated Father’s
parental rights on the additional ground that he was sentenced to incarceration for ten or
more years. The trial court also determined that termination of Parents’ rights was in
Nation’s best interest. Parents appeal.

                                    II. Issues Presented

       Mother presents the following issues for review, as stated in her brief:

       1. Whether the trial court used the incorrect best interest factors in the
       analysis to terminate the Mother’s parental rights.

       2. Whether the trial court erred in finding best interest to terminate the
       parental rights of the Mother . . . who was free of substance abuse,
       maintaining visitation and a relationship with the child, employed, and with
       suitable housing at the time of the hearing?

       Father raises the following issue in his brief:

       Whether the trial court erred in finding that it was in the best interest of the
       minor [Child] to terminate [Father’s] parental rights?

       Although neither Mother nor Father raises a specific issue concerning the grounds
for termination of their respective parental rights, this Court is obligated to review the
grounds pursuant to the directive of the Tennessee Supreme Court as set out in In re
Carrington H., which states that “the Court of Appeals must review the trial court’s
findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is in the child’s
best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these findings on appeal.”
In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 525-26 (Tenn. 2016) (emphasis added).

                                  III. Standard of Review

       It is well-settled that:

       A parent’s right to the care and custody of [his or] her child is among the
       oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected by
       the Due Process Clause of the federal and state constitutions. Troxel v.
                                             -3-
       Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
       (1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); In re Adoption
       of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk,
       855 S.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Tenn. 1993). But parental rights, although
       fundamental and constitutionally protected, are not absolute. In re Angela
       E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. “‘[T]he [S]tate as parens patriae has a special duty
       to protect minors. . . .’ Tennessee law, thus, upholds the [S]tate’s authority
       as parens patriae when interference with parenting is necessary to prevent
       serious harm to a child.” Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting In re Hamilton,
       657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Santosky v. Kramer,
       455 U.S. 745 (1982); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 522-23 (Tenn. 2016) (footnote omitted).

       Termination of parental rights proceedings are governed by statute in Tennessee, In
re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 541 (Tenn. 2015), and the statutes identify “those situations
in which the state’s interest in the welfare of a child justifies interference with a parent’s
constitutional rights by setting forth grounds on which termination proceedings can be
brought.” In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re
W.B., Nos. M2004-00999-COA-R3-PT, M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618,
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g))) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

       Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113 governs the termination of parental
rights. It provides, in pertinent part:

       (c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:

       (1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds
       for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and

       (2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests
       of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c). Therefore, every termination of parental rights case
requires the trial court “to determine whether the parent has engaged in a course of action
or inaction that constitutes one of the statutory grounds for termination[,]” and whether
termination of the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest. In re Donna E.W., No.
M2013-02856-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 2918107, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2014).
“Because the stakes are so profoundly high[ ]” in a termination of parental rights case, the
statute “requires persons seeking to terminate a . . . parent’s parental rights to prove the
statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Audrey S., 182
                                            -4-
S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). This Court has observed that “[t]his heightened
burden of proof minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions.” Id. (citations omitted).

        If the trial court determines that clear and convincing evidence supports grounds for
termination in light of its factual findings, the court “should then consider the combined
weight of those facts to determine whether they amount to clear and convincing evidence
that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555. The
party petitioning for the termination of parental rights bears the burden of demonstrating
that termination is in the best interest of the child by clear and convincing evidence. In re
Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010).

        We review the trial court’s findings of fact de novo on the record with a presumption
of correctness. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524 (citations
omitted). However, “[i]n light of the heightened burden of proof in termination
proceedings . . . [we] must make [our] own determination as to whether the facts, either as
found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear
and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.” Id.
(citation omitted). A trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports
termination of parental rights is a conclusion of law that we review de novo with no
presumption of correctness. Id. (citation omitted). “This standard of review is consistent
with the standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact.” In re Taylor B.W., 397
S.W.3d at 112-13 (citing Starr v. Hill, 353 S.W.3d 478, 481-82 (Tenn. 2011)) (“Although
a presumption of correctness attaches to the trial court’s findings of fact, we are not bound
by the trial court’s determination of the legal effect of its factual findings[.]”).

                 IV. Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights

                                  A. Severe Child Abuse

       Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4), the trial court
terminated Parents’ rights on the ground of severe child abuse. Tennessee Code Annotated
section 37-1-102(b)(27) defines “severe child abuse,” in relevant part as:

       (E) Knowingly or with gross negligence allowing a child under eight (8)
       years of age to ingest an illegal substance or a controlled substance that
       results in the child testing positive on a drug screen, except as legally
       prescribed to the child; or

       (F) Knowingly allowing a child to be within a structure where any of the
       following controlled substances are present and accessible to the child:

                                            -5-
           (i) Any Schedule I controlled substance listed in § 39-17-406;
           (ii) Cocaine;
           (iii) Methamphetamine; or
           (iv) Fentanyl;

       When DCS became involved with Nation in 2019, Mother admitted to using
methamphetamine and opioids, and she tested positive for methamphetamine,
amphetamine, and buprenorphine. In 2018, Mother began treatment at a suboxone clinic
for her addiction to opioids. Father admitted to using methamphetamine and to taking
Mother’s suboxone prescription. Parents do not dispute that they have an extensive history
of drug abuse. It also is undisputed that Nation tested positive for methamphetamine while
he was in the care and custody of Parents. Based on these undisputed facts, there is clear
and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s termination of Parents’ rights on the
ground of severe child abuse.

                                B. Father’s Incarceration

      The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 36-1-
113(g)(6), which provides that parental rights may be terminated if:

       (6)(A) The parent has been confined in a correctional or detention facility of
       any type, by order of the court as a result of a criminal act, under a sentence
       of ten (10) or more years, and the child is under eight (8) years of age at the
       time the sentence is entered by the court; or

       (B) The parent has been confined in a correctional or detention facility of any
       type, by order of the court as a result of one (1) or more criminal acts, under
       a sentence of six (6) or more years, and one (1) or more other grounds within
       this subsection (g) have been satisfied[.]

       Here, the trial court found that

       [t]he respondent [Father] was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon
       while having a prior felony conviction and sentenced on October 25, 2021,
       to 12 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction[]. Judgment filed as
       trial exhibit 1-24. At the time of removal, the minor child Nation [] was less
       than 8 years of age and therefore the Department of Children’s Services has
       proven Ground 5 10-year sentence as a basis of the Termination of the
       Parental Rights of the respondent [Father].

The fact of Father’s 12-year incarceration is undisputed and supported by the record. It is
also undisputed that Nation was “less than 8 years of age” at the time of Father’s
                                            -6-
incarceration. As such, there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s
termination of Father’s parental rights on this additional ground.

       Having concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s
determination with respect to the grounds for termination of Parents’ rights, we turn to
review the trial court’s determination that termination of Parents’ rights is in Nation’s best
interest.

                                      V. Best Interest

       If the trial court determines that clear and convincing evidence supports grounds for
termination of parental rights, the court must then determine whether termination is in the
child’s best interest. In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555. Tennessee Code Annotated
section 36-1-113(i)(1) contains a non-exclusive list of factors applicable to the court’s best-
interests analysis. The statute provides:

       (i)(1) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights
       is in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider all relevant and
       child-centered factors applicable to the particular case before the court.

       The statutes recognize that, notwithstanding clear and convincing evidence of
grounds, termination of parental rights is not always in the child’s best interest. In re
I.E.A., 511 S.W.3d 507, 517 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). Whether termination is in the child’s
best interest must be “‘viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.’” In
re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d
at 878). “[W]hen the best interests of the child and those of the adults are in conflict, such
conflict shall always be resolved to favor the rights and the best interests of the child[.]”
Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017)). The court’s “‘focus on the
perspective of the child is the common theme’ evident in all of the statutory factors.” In
re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 679 (Tenn. 2020) (quoting In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d
at 878).

        The best-interest analysis requires “more than a ‘rote examination’ of the statutory
factors.” Id. at 682 (quoting In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878). Further, it “consists of
more than tallying the number of statutory factors weighing in favor of or against
termination.” Id. Although the trial court must consider all the statutory factors and other
relevant proof, one factor may be determinative of the best-interest analysis in light of the
circumstances surrounding the particular child and parent. Id. The trial court’s factual
findings relevant to the best-interest analysis must be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555. The trial court must also determine
whether the combined weight of the facts amounts to clear and convincing evidence that it
is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights. Id.
                                              -7-
      The Tennessee General Assembly amended the statutory best-interest factors in
2021. See 2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 190 § 1 (S.B. 205), eff. Apr. 22, 2021. These factors
now include:

      (A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s critical
      need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s
      minority;
      (B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to
      have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition;
      (C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting
      the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;
      (D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental
      attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the
      parent can create such attachment;
      (E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with
      the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive
      relationship with the child;
      (F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;
      (G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household
      trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-traumatic
      symptoms;
      (H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with another
      person or persons in the absence of the parent;
      (I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons
      other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and
      the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and
      the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage;
      (J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of
      circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the
      child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there
      is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol,
      controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render
      the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable
      manner;
      (K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, services,
      or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of
      circumstances, conduct, or conditions;
       (L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent
      in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of
      the department;
      (M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing
      paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the
                                            -8-
       circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe
       and not in the child’s best interest;

                                             ***

        (O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child
       or any other child;
       (P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and
       specific needs required for the child to thrive;
       (Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to
       creating and maintaining a home that meets the child's basic and specific
       needs and in which the child can thrive;
       (R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and
       safe for the child;
       (S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial
       support for the child; and
       (T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be
       detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and
       effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) (2022).

        Because DCS filed the petition to terminate Appellants’ parental rights on July 7,
2020, Mother argues that the trial court erred in using the foregoing amended best-interest
factors applicable to petitions to terminate parental rights filed on or after April 22, 2021.
She argues that if the trial court had applied the statutory factors applicable to DCS’s July
2020 petition, it would not have determined that termination of her parental rights is in
Nation’s best interest. Here, however, DCS filed an amended petition on February 8, 2022.
As in the instant case, in In re Skylith F., et al., No. M2022-01231-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL
6546538, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2023), “[b]etween the filing of the initial petition
and the amended petition, the statutory best interest factors underwent revision.” Id. at
*17. In Skylith F., we upheld the trial court’s use of the revised best interest factors even
though the older version was in effect at the time of the filing of the original petition. Id.
However, even allowing, arguendo, that the trial court should have applied the previous
iteration of the best interest factors, this Court has held that there is no reversible error
when the trial court relies on the wrong best-interest factors because the old factors are
essentially contained within the new factors. See In re Da’Moni J., No. E2021-00477-
COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 214712, at *23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2022), perm. app. denied
(Tenn. Apr. 1, 2022) (“We agree with the Juvenile Court that the best interest factors
relevant to this case are included in the new version of factors that went into effect in April
2021.”); see also In re Bralynn A., M2021-01188-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 2826850, at *9
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2022). As the Tennessee
                                               -9-
Supreme Court has observed, the statutory factors contained in both the current and the
former iterations of section 36-1-113(i) are not exclusive. In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d
at 681. Rather, the factors are “illustrative . . . and any party to the termination proceeding
is free to offer any other factor relevant to the best interest analysis.” Id.; see also In re
Emarie E., No. E2022-01015-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 3619594, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May
24, 2023). Additionally, this Court has noted that a trial court’s application of the previous
factors together with the new factors is not error if the factors considered are relevant to
the facts presented by the case. In re Mitchell B., No. M2022-01285-COA-R3-PT, 2023
WL 3619561, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2023). Because the statutory factors are not
exclusive, regardless of which version of the statute is applicable, if the trial court’s
findings are sufficient to allow us to “make a meaningful review” of its best-interest
determination, then remand is unnecessary. Id. That is the case here where the trial court
made detailed findings that permit meaningful review of its conclusion. Specifically, in its
March 14, 2023 order, the trial court made the following findings concerning Nation’s best
interest:

       (A) Due to Nation’s autism and mental health diagnosis, he needs a
       structured routine which has been developed in the home of the foster
       parents. He has established counselors and needed stability in that home.
       Returning him to his natural [P]arents would have a detrimental effect to the
       child’s stability and continuity of placement.
       (B) Testimony of Nation’s counselor and caseworker all agree and the Court
       finds that a change of caretakers at this time would be devastating to Nation’s
       emotional and psychological condition.
       (C) [Father] has not demonstrated any willingness to provide Nation with his
       basic needs and while [Mother] has made great strides in putting herself in a
       position to provide for these needs, she has only done so in the last year while
       the foster parents have provided for these needs for the past 3 ½ years.
       (D) [Mother] has maintained contact with Nation [F.] as allowed but the
       Court finds that the relationship created was a friendship and not a Parental
       Bond that Nation needs for his development.
       (E) [Mother] has maintained regular visits with Nation F[.] as Ordered by the
       Court, and has developed a bond described as a friendship with him.
       (F) Due to Nation’s age at removal he has no memory of being in his
       [P]arents’ home and no fears of it.
       (G) Nation’s visits with his mother [Mother] triggered a reaction to past
       trauma in his life.
       (H) Nation F[.] has been in the home of the foster parents for 3 ½ years and
       has developed a close parental bond with them.
       (I) The foster parents have 3 older children that proof showed have also
       bonded with Nation and are important to his stability and development.
       (J) The court feels that [Mother] has made changes to her life that would
                                             - 10 -
       allow her to provide a home for Nation but that she did not make those
       changes until 3 years after Nation went into custody.
       (K) [Mother] has continuously refused to enter an in-house drug treatment
       program despite recommendations to do so. To the Court she appears to be
       clean from drugs except for the suboxone treatment program that she is in.
       (L) The Court finds that the Department of Children’s Services initially made
       reasonable efforts to reunite the [P]arents with their child Nation, but until
       recently the [P]arents fought those efforts and failed to take advantage of the
       drug and alcohol treatments that were necessary for their recovery. After the
       Department filed a Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of the [P]arents
       they ceased efforts to reunify Nation with his [P]arents and simply facilitated
       the visits Ordered by the Court. The Court finds that the Department did
       provide services in the home of the foster parents to bolster his development.
       (M) As discussed above the [P]arents failed to demonstrate any urgency in
       seeking return of Nation until [Father] was incarcerated and [Mother] began
       to work toward a return.

                                             ***

       (0) [Mother] may have had periods of caring for her children but testimony
       reflects that her 6 children have been removed from her home and none reside
       with her.
       (P) [Mother] has visited with Nation for more than a year and during visits
       has played with him but failed to realize the specific needs he has as a result
       of his mental and psychological condition.
       (Q) [Mother] has maintained a physical home that would be suitable for
       Nation’s needs.
       (R) [Mother’s] home now seems healthy and safe for Nation.
       (S) The $25.00 per month financial support provided by the [P]arents is only
       token and they have provided little extra.

       On appeal, Mother asserts that the trial court failed “to recognize the significance of
[her] progress.” She also argues that the trial court downplayed her relationship with
Nation and focused too heavily on the amount of time he has been in foster care. Father
argues that “there is still plenty of love between the [Child] and [Parents].” He asserts that
his abuse of illegal drugs and his current incarceration are “temporary struggles,” which
can be “overcome.”

       Turning to the record, it is undisputed that, when the Child was removed from
Parents’ care in 2019, he was 3 ½ years old and tested positive for methamphetamines. He
was placed in a therapeutic foster home and has been diagnosed with Autism, ADHD,
Anxiety Disorder, delayed speech and language, and PTSD. Nation has remained in the
                                           - 11 -
same therapeutic foster home since his removal from Parents’ custody. The record shows
that he has formed strong bonds with his foster parents and foster siblings. Furthermore,
the foster parents wish to adopt him. Nation’s foster parents ensure that he receives speech
and occupational therapy, behavioral counseling, and mental health counseling. The trial
court found that, although his behavior has improved in foster care, Nation “still requires
structured routines and consistency,” and “[v]ariations from [his] normal routine cause
increased hyper activity and anxiety.” The record supports these findings.

       The trial court also found that Father “has not demonstrated any willingness to
provide Nation with his basic needs.” Indeed, due to his incarceration and the fact that
Nation was so young when that occurred, there is no bond between the Child and Father.
Furthermore, Father’s predicament renders him unable to care for the Child, and it is
unlikely that Father will be able to do so at any early date.

        Concerning Mother, the trial court concluded that, “while [Mother] has made great
strides in putting herself in a position to provide for [the Child’s] needs, she has only done
so in the last year while the foster parents have provided for these needs for the past 3½
years.” Furthermore, the trial court found that although Mother exercised visitation, the
visits were more like “playdates” that consisted largely of playing video games on Mother’s
phone. More importantly, the trial court found that Nation’s “twice monthly visits with his
[M]other resulted in a worsening of his behaviors described as Nation becoming more
assertive and hyper after those visits.” As such, the court concluded that there is not a
“[p]arental [b]ond [with Mother] that Nation needs for his development.” Specifically, the
trial court determined that, after more than three years in foster care, Nation has no memory
of Parents’ home but his visits with Mother nevertheless “triggered a reaction to past
trauma in his life.” The trial court found that returning Nation to Mother’s care would have
a detrimental effect that “would be devastating to Nation’s emotional and psychological
condition.” The record supports these findings.

        Concerning the primary reason for the Child’s removal from Parents’ custody, i.e.,
Parents’ drug use and Nation’s exposure to same, the trial court noted that, although Mother
“appear[ed] to be clean from drugs except for the suboxone treatment program that she is
in[,]” she “continuously refused to enter an in-house drug treatment program despite
recommendations to do so.” In fact, the court found that Mother continued to use
methamphetamine until Father was incarcerated. The court noted that the “parents
cooperated with the Department to complete all of the requirements except for those
related to their drug use” (emphasis added). From our review, the record supports the
trial court’s determination that Parents were uncooperative with DCS’s requirement that
they submit to drug testing. Unfortunately, Parents’ drug use was the primary reason for
the Child’s removal, and there is insufficient proof to show that the problem has been
properly addressed. Indeed, Mother, who was 33 years old at the time of the hearing,
testified that she had been “clean” for only a year-and-a-half during the preceding 12 years.
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Mother explained that she should have been weaned off the suboxone and nyloxin she was
taking to treat her addiction, but admitted that:

       The initial plan was to start weaning me off like a year ago, but with my
       recovery status just being so all over the place, [Mother’s provider] was not
       comfortable with taking me off of [suboxone and nyloxin]. But I am in a spot,
       I have been clean for a year, no mess-ups . . . so [Mother’s provider] will be
       willing to give me the shot to start weaning me off of Suboxone. The only
       concern [Mother’s provider] has is the state of this case. He knows what a
       trigger it could be and how devastating it could be to lose my son. And with
       us being in this limbo for so long, . . . [Mother’s provider] couldn’t take the
       risk [of stopping the suboxone prescription].

Mother’s testimony supports the trial court’s finding that, although Mother “has made
strides in her own life,” she has “failed to demonstrate a sense of urgency immediately
following removal which might have allowed an early return to her custody.” In short, the
record supports the trial court’s finding that, at present, Mother’s sobriety is unproven.

        Meanwhile, as discussed above, Nation has found stability in his foster home. As
the trial court found:

       Nation only knows the foster parents as his parents and has developed that
       parental bond with them. All evidence points to the fact that his bond with
       his mother is more of an acquaintance or friend and not a parent and he has
       no bond with his father []. Removing Nation from the home of the foster
       parents at this time would have an adverse effect on his emotional and
       psychological condition and would cause a setback in the progress he has
       made. Nation has no memory of the parents’ home and visits with his mother
       trigger responses to traumas believed to have occurred earlier in that home,
       a return there would be detrimental.

These findings are supported by the record. Furthermore, based on the fact that Nation’s
interactions with Mother trigger negative responses, we agree with the trial court’s
determination that returning him to Mother’s custody would be emotionally and
psychologically “devastating.” This is especially so in view of Nation’s diagnoses of
Autism, ADHD, Anxiety Disorder, delayed speech and language, and PTSD, and his need
for safety and stability. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(2) (“When considering the [best
interest] factors set forth in subdivision (i)(1), the prompt and permanent placement of the
child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.”). Thus, when
considering the facts and the best-interest factors from the Child’s perspective, we conclude
that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s factual findings, and the
combined weight of the facts amounts to clear and convincing evidence that termination of
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Parents’ parental rights is in Nation’s best interest.

                                       VI. Conclusion

       The trial court’s order terminating Parents’ respective parental rights to Nation F. is
affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings as may be necessary and are
consistent with this Opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed one-half to appellant, Zachary
F., and one-half to appellant, Brittany F. Because both Appellants are proceeding in forma
pauperis in this appeal, execution for costs may issue if necessary.

                                                      S/ Kenny Armstrong
                                                      KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE

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