Court Opinion

ID: 9482773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:59:53.765378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:11.292257
License: Public Domain

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I agree with Judge Clark that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence regarding the September transaction, and thus disagree with the majority that evidence of the September transaction was admissible under Rule 404(b). I write separately, however, because I believe that the error was ultimately harmless.
The majority “concludefs] that the similarity of the two offenses in this case is sufficient to mark the offenses as the handiwork of the accused.” Majority op. at 1539. But there are as many differences as similarities in the two transactions. During the January transaction, Miller drove a Pontiac Grand Am, but in September he was driving a Monte Carlo. Miller was alone during the first drug purchase; during the second, he was accompanied by Nathan Collins.
The similarities between the two crimes, however, were primarily the handiwork of the government: The government directed Lyons to beep Miller, and the government directed that the transaction occur at Lyons’ mother’s house. The independent similarities are simply that both times Miller arrived in a blue car, picked up Lyons in front of his mother’s house, drove him around the block, and gave him cocaine in exchange for money. That is the modus operandi of every drug dealer.
The majority goes to great lengths to show that the evidence demonstrated that Miller was in fact the supplier in both instances, but this reasoning misses the point. Rule 404(b) limits the admission of evidence of extrinsic acts, regardless of probativeness. Without the requirement of proving a distinctive modus operandi, all extrinsic evidence would be admitted whenever it was likely to prove guilt. It is not enough merely to show that Miller was the supplier in both transactions. The government must go further and demonstrate that “the physical similarity [is] such that it marks the offenses as the handiwork of the accused.” United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 912 n. 15 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979). The extrinsic act must be a “signature” crime, and the defendant must have used a modus operandi that is uniquely his. If the January and September transactions are considered a “signature,” it is not Miller’s signature, but a facsimile produced by the government. Thus, in my view, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to admit the evidence of the September transaction.
I would affirm Miller’s conviction, however, because I believe the jury had suffi-*1541dent evidence to convict Miller of the January offense even without the evidence of the September transaction. Agents Bled-soe and Harvey both identified Miller as the supplier in the January transaction. Agent Bledsoe had met Miller in 1986 during a prior drug investigation and recognized him when he drove up behind her. Lyons entered Miller’s car with money and exited with cocaine. Thus, although the district court abused its discretion in admitting the September transaction into evidence, in this case the error was harmless.