Court Opinion

ID: 9947321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 17:00:26.751699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:21.331961
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SALINA B. NORTON,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        SF-0752-19-0348-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: March 1, 2024
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Salina B. Norton , Portland, Oregon, pro se.

           Chelsea Miller , Portland, Oregon, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her alleged involuntary retirement appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,
     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Western Regional
     Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was a Medical Support Assistant for the agency.           Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 12.      In February 2018, the agency proposed her
     removal for alleged misconduct. IAF, Tab 6 at 12-13. Before the agency issued a
     decision on the proposed removal, the appellant retired on February 14, 2018, to
     be effective on February 28, 2018. Id. at 9, 11.
¶3         Shortly after receiving her proposed removal, the appellant appears to have
     filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). IAF, Tab 1 at 10-12.
     Moreover, the appellant filed several formal equal employment opportunity
     (EEO) complaints, including one in which she alleged that the agency forced her
     to retire.   Id. at 18-19.   The agency issued a Final Agency Decision (FAD)
     denying the appellant’s EEO complaints on March 6, 2019. Id. at 17-27. The
     FAD did not include notice of the appellant’s right to file a claim with OSC but
     did advise the appellant that she could file an appeal with the Board. Id. at 24-27.
¶4         The appellant subsequently filed a Board appeal alleging that her retirement
     was involuntary and that she was subjected to employment discrimination and
     harassment. Id. at 2. With her appeal, she submitted a copy of an email from
     OSC acknowledging her complaint. Id. at 10-13. The administrative judge gave
     the appellant notice of the elements and burdens of establishing jurisdiction over
     her alleged involuntary retirement but did not address her claim as a potential
     individual right of action (IRA) appeal. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-4.
¶5         The appellant responded to the jurisdictional notice.     IAF, Tab 4.     The
     agency moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 6 at 4-6.
     The appellant responded to the motion. IAF, Tab 10. The administrative judge
     determined that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she
     was subjected to race discrimination or general working conditions that were so
     pervasive that they forced her to retire.     IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID)
     at 8-11. She further found that, because the Board lacked jurisdiction over her
     voluntary retirement, it also lacked jurisdiction over her allegations of
                                                                                          3

     discrimination.   ID at 11.    Thus, she dismissed the appeal for lack of Board
     jurisdiction without holding the appellant’s requested hearing. Id.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review.       Petition for Review File,
     Tab 1.    She attaches various documents that were not submitted below,
     predominantly involving the merits of the various personnel actions she faced
     prior to her retirement. Id. at 2-3, 5-30. She also asserts a second instance of
     being called a racial slur, on this occasion by her supervisor.          Id. at 3, 25.
     According to the appellant, she misfiled these documents and discovered them
     after the initial decision was issued. 2    Id. at 3.   She further asserts that the
     administrative judge failed to consider all of the relevant facts and evidence
     submitted below, and challenges the merits of various disciplinary actions,
     including the February 2018 proposed removal for AWOL. Id. at 3-4. Finally,
     she reiterates her claims of retaliation, hostile work environment, and
     “constructive retirement.”     Id. at 5.   The agency has not responded to the
     appellant’s petition for review.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

     The appeal must be remanded for the appellant to make a knowing and informed
     election of remedies.
¶7         Under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g), an appellant who has been subjected to an action
     appealable to the Board, and who alleges that she has been affected by a
     prohibited personnel practice other than a claim of discrimination under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(1), such as a claim for whistleblower reprisal, may elect one, and only
     one, of the following remedies:       (1) an appeal to the Board under 5 U.S.C.
     § 7701; (2) a grievance filed under the provisions of a negotiated grievance
     procedure; or (3) an OSC complaint, potentially followed by an IRA appeal.
     Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security , 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 15 (2016),
     2
       The issue of jurisdiction over an appeal is always before the Board and may be raised
     at any time. Campbell v. Office of Personnel Management, 90 M.S.P.R. 68, ¶ 8 (2001).
     As such, we consider these documents submitted for the first time on review, to the
     extent that they implicate the Board’s jurisdiction.
                                                                                        4

     overruled on other grounds by Requena v. Department of Homeland Security ,
     2022 MSPB 39. An election under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) is binding only if it was
     knowing and informed. Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 17. An agency’s failure to
     inform an employee fully of her potential appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g)
     and any limitation on those rights precludes a finding that the appellant made a
     knowing and informed election of remedies under that provision. Id. Here, the
     agency did not issue a letter of decision regarding the appellant’s retirement, and
     the February 2018 proposed removal which prompted her retirement did not
     include notice of her right to elect a remedy. IAF, Tab 6 at 12-14. Further, there
     is no indication that she was informed through other means such as the agency’s
     FAD on her EEO complaint. IAF, Tab 1 at 17-27.
¶8        Although the agency’s FAD informed the appellant of her right to appeal
     the FAD to the Board, this is not the same as receiving notice of her right to elect
     a remedy, as the appeal rights noted in the FAD do not reference appealing to
     OSC or how an election would limit other avenues of recourse.         See Corthell,
     123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 17 (finding an agency’s failure to inform an employee fully
     of his potential appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g) and any limitation on
     those rights precludes a finding that the election of remedies was knowing and
     informed). Thus, we must remand the appeal for the appellant to make a knowing
     and informed election of remedies.          See id., ¶¶ 17-18 (remanding for an
     administrative judge to allow an appellant to make a knowing and informed
     election of his remedies because he had not received notice of his option to file an
     adverse action appeal).    On remand, if the appellant elects to pursue an IRA
     appeal, the administrative judge should provide her with notice of her
     jurisdictional burden and an opportunity to establish jurisdiction over such an
     appeal. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed.
     Cir. 1985) (explaining that an appellant must receive explicit information on what
     is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue).
                                                                                           5

      If the appellant elects to pursue her chapter 75 appeal, the administrative judge
      should hold a jurisdictional hearing.
¶9          The administrative judge found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the
      appellant’s alleged involuntary retirement because she failed to nonfrivolously
      allege that the race discrimination and general work conditions were so
      intolerable that a reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to
      retire. ID at 8-11. We disagree.
¶10         A retirement is presumed to be voluntary and outside of the Board’s
      jurisdiction.    Putnam v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 532,
      ¶ 21 (2014).      An involuntary retirement, however, is equivalent to a forced
      removal within the Board’s jurisdiction under chapter 75. Id. The touchstone of
      the voluntariness analysis and the common element in all Board cases involving
      alleged involuntary retirements is that factors have operated on the employee’s
      decision-making process that deprived her of freedom of choice.               Coufal v.
      Department of Justice, 98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 22 (2004).              The totality of the
      circumstances     is     examined   under   an   objective   standard   to   determine
      voluntariness.     Id.    Under that standard, the Board will find a retirement
      involuntary only if the employee demonstrates that under all the circumstances,
      working conditions were made so difficult by the agency that a reasonable person
      would have felt compelled to resign. Id.
¶11         An appellant is entitled to a hearing on the issue of Board jurisdiction over
      an appeal of an alleged involuntary retirement if she makes a nonfrivolous
      allegation casting doubt on the presumption of voluntariness.                Id., ¶ 23.
      A nonfrivolous allegation is an allegation of fact that, if proven, could establish a
      prima facie case that the Board has jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. Thus, to
      establish entitlement to a jurisdictional hearing, an appellant need not allege facts
      that, if proven, definitely would establish that the retirement was involuntary; she
      need only allege facts that, if proven, could establish such a claim. Id.
                                                                                         6

¶12        When, as here, allegations of discrimination and reprisal are alleged, such
      evidence may be addressed at the jurisdictional stage only insofar as it relates to
      the issue of voluntariness and not whether the evidence would establish
      discrimination or reprisal as an affirmative defense. Id., ¶ 24. Thus, evidence of
      discrimination and retaliation goes to the ultimate question of coercion. Id.
¶13        This appeal involves a number of actions that the appellant alleged created a
      hostile work environment and forced her to retire. A combination of workplace
      actions such as threatening removal and making negative remarks about the
      appellant to other department heads may be sufficient to meet the nonfrivolous
      pleading standard. Coufal, 98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶¶ 26-27.
¶14        The administrative judge found that the employee who was the source of the
      racial comments the appellant raised below left the agency years before the
      appellant retired. ID at 9. She found that there was no evidence or any further
      direct mention of the appellant’s race or ethnicity in the several years after this
      event. Id. Thus, she found the coworker’s alleged comments too remote to have
      been a motivating factor in the appellant’s decision to retire nearly 3 years later.
      Id. The administrative judge also found that the various personnel actions taken
      against the appellant warranted disciplinary action and that the appellant was
      afforded generous progressive discipline.      Id.   She therefore found that the
      appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that the race discrimination
      was so pervasive that it compelled her to retire. Id. This was erroneous, as the
      appellant need only make a nonfrivolous allegation casting doubt on the
      presumption of voluntariness to be entitled to a hearing on the issue of Board
      jurisdiction. Coufal, 98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 23.
¶15        The administrative judge additionally found the appellant’s allegations of a
      general hostile work environment were insufficient to amount to a pattern of
      harassment such that a reasonable person in the appellant’s position would have
      felt compelled to retire. ID at 9-10. Here, the appellant alleged that the agency
      took a number of punitive actions for 3 years culminating in her perception that
                                                                                           7

she had no choice but to retire. In sum, during this period, she alleges that the
agency   issued      her   three    written   counselings,     a   letter   of    reprimand,
three suspensions, twice proposed her removal, called her a racial slur on more
than one occasion, introduced her as the “office token,” made negative remarks
about her to other supervisors, and yelled and cursed at her. We find that, as
alleged, a reasonable person in the appellant’s position could have felt that the
agency’s actions left her no choice but to retire.           See Braun v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 50 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (concluding that an
appellant was entitled to a jurisdiction hearing when he nonfrivolously alleged
that his supervisor issued 11 unjustified disciplinary actions within 17 months,
resulting in his coerced resignation); Coufal, 98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶¶ 26-29 (finding
the totality of the circumstances alleged by the appellant, which included
examples such as elimination of key duties, requiring the appellant to work
additional   hours    without      compensation,   placing     her   on     a    performance
improvement plan, isolating her, excluding her from meetings, and making
negative comments, amounted to a nonfrivolous allegation of a constructive
discharge). The appellant has therefore made a nonfrivolous allegation that her
retirement was involuntary.        On remand, if the appellant chooses to elect her
chapter 75 remedy, the administrative judge shall convene a jurisdictional hearing
at which the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that her retirement
was involuntary.
                                                                                       8

                                          ORDER
¶16        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Western
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                           Gina K. Grippando
                                           Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.