Court Opinion

ID: 9731700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:55:06.666452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.522801
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REID, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: Although I concur in the majority’s conclusion that we must vacate defendant’s sentences and remand this case, I cannot concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s post-conviction petition; therefore, I dissent. Contrary to the majority opinion, I believe a review of the record in this case demonstrates that counsel’s representation of English at trial did indeed fall below the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). As we have seen, the standard of review of a postconviction petition that is dismissed at the early stage before an evidentiary hearing is very low. Namely, English’s burden was to demonstrate the gist of a constitutional claim. Ineffective assistance of counsel is such a constitutional claim. In failing to call Dr. Hoffa as a witness, I believe the assistance of counsel dipped below Strickland. “Although a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right, [the Illinois Supreme] [C]ourt has repeatedly stressed that a hearing is required whenever the petitioner makes a substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights.” People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998); see, e.g., People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998); People v. Gaines, 105 Ill. 2d 79, 91-92 (1984). “A post-conviction petition is considered frivolous or patently without merit only if the allegations in the petition, taken as true and liberally construed, fail to present the ‘gist of a constitutional claim.’ ” People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239 (2001), quoting People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996), citing People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 74 (1988). The “gist” standard is “a low threshold.” Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244, quoting Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418. “To set forth the ‘gist’ of a constitutional claim, the post-conviction petition ‘need only present a limited amount of detail’ (Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418) and hence need not set forth the claim in its entirety. Further, the petition need not include ‘legal arguments or [citations] to legal authority.’ ” Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244, quoting Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418. A “gist” of a claim is something less than a completely pled or fully stated claim. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 245. As the majority points out, in the affidavit attached to his pro se postconviction petition, English sought the opinion of Dr. Hoffa concerning the surgery recommended by doctors at Cook County Hospital. 334 Ill. App. 3d at 164. Dr. Hoffa expressed an opinion that English’s gunshot-related injuries were consistent with his theory that he was shot while lying down. 334 Ill. App. 3d at 164. Specifically, Dr. Hoffa indicated that English had no entrance wounds in his chest. From that, Dr. Hoffa deduced that all of English’s injuries traveled at an angled trajectory from the lower portion of his body toward the upper portion. 334 Ill. App. 3d at 164. Dr. Hoffa indicated a willingness to testify if he was properly subpoenaed. 334 Ill. App. 3d at 165. English claims he notified his attorney about both the conversation with Dr. Hoffa and his willingness to testify. English’s attorney apparently believed the State could not meet its burden of proving English guilty of attempted murder, so that Dr. Hoffa’s testimony was unnecessary. 334 Ill. App. 3d at 165. He was mistaken. English, in his petition, claimed that the testimony of Dr. Hoffa could have provided support for English’s defense that he neither pointed a gun at the police officers nor attempted to kill them. In his petition, English argues that the combination of his own testimony along with the testimony of Dr. Hoffa would have contradicted and impeached the testimony of the police officers who claimed that he pointed his gun at them while standing at the back door, facing the officers. Detective Wojcik testified that English was standing, pointing his gun in a threatening manner when Wojcik fired the first volley of shots. Wojcik testified that he fired because he feared for the life and safety of himself, his partner and Orlando Perez, the manager of Armitage Liquors. Wojcik repeated several times that English was in a standing position, facing him, brandishing the gun when it became necessary to shoot him. In describing how his bullets hit English’s body, Wojcik repeatedly testified that most of the bullets entered English’s chest. Wojcik also testified that, once English was on the ground but before Perez could open the security gate, English reached for the gun and again pointed it at him in a threatening manner. At that point, Wojcik claimed English’s conduct forced him to fire the second volley of bullets. On cross-examination, the issue of the position and condition of English’s body came up in context of a series of questions regarding bullet trajectory. The following exchange took place: “[ENGLISH’S COUNSEL:] Well you know what, Detective, then, you tell us, according to the way you shot Mr. English, where should those bullets be entering and how should they be exiting? [THE STATE:] Judge, I object. THE COURT: Sustained as well. [THE STATE:] He’s not a doctor. [ENGLISH’S COUNSEL:] Mr. English, get up. Judge may he go into the courtroom. THE COURT: Yes, he may. Let the record reflect the defendant English is standing in the well of the courtroom. [ENGLISH’S COUNSEL:] Left [sic] up your shirt, Mr. English, unbutton your shirt. Stand back so the prosecutors can see you too. Stand right there. THE COURT: The State may approach the witness as well as Mr. Murphy. [THE STATE:] Thank you, Judge. * * * [ENGLISH’S COUNSEL:] Detective, do you know how many of these entry wounds were caused by you discharging your weapon into Mr. English? [THE STATE:] Again Judge, Objection, asked and answered. THE COURT: I’ll let him answer that. [ENGLISH’S COUNSEL:] Do you know? [DETECTIVE WOJCIK:] Do I know? [ENGLISH’S COUNSEL:] How many of these entry wounds were caused by you discharging your weapon into — turn sideways — into Mr. English’s body? [THE STATE:] I’m going to object, those have not all been identified as bullet entrances and or bullet wounds, the defendant also has a number of scars because of medical treatment that he received that day, so I object to counsel’s question and his pointing to the defendant at this time. THE COURT: Counsel, unless you’re prepared to establish that in fact those are entry wounds, I would sustain the objection. [ENGLISH’S COUNSEL:] Let me make a record then.” At this point in the proceedings, it becomes clear just how important a witness Dr. Hoffa was. Had Dr. Hoffa testified as English’s postconviction petition asserts he would have, he could have contested the story given by the police officers as to the first volley. Further, Dr. Hoffa’s testimony would have been consistent with English’s theory of defense, especially if none of the holes in English’s chest turned out to be entrance wounds. The conviction for attempted murder turns on whether English had the requisite criminal intent at the time of the shooting which, in turn, turns on how the shooting actually took place. The petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if he has made a substantial showing, based on the record and supporting affidavits, that his constitutional rights were violated. People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999). To fail to secure Dr. Hoffa as a witness amounts to ineffective assistance under these facts and circumstances. For the trial court to have dismissed English’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing was error. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act authorizes the appointment of counsel at the second stage who would have the opportunity to amend the petition itself in contemplation of an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 2000). Any questions remaining as to the sufficiency of the evidence and the existence of reasonable doubt would then be resolved at an evidentiary hearing. The majority correctly identifies the general rules when it comes to the failure to call witnesses. 334 Ill. App. 3d at 164. In sum, “[t]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must (1) show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 310 (1997), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). “Decisions concerning which witnesses to call at trial and what evidence to present on defendant’s behalf ultimately rest with trial counsel.” Reid, 179 Ill. 2d at 310, citing People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 148 (1997). “As matters of trial strategy, such decisions are generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Reid, 179 Ill. 2d at 310, citing Madej, 177 Ill. 2d at 148. “The only exception to this rule is when counsel’s chosen trial strategy is so unsound that counsel entirely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing.” (Emphasis added.) Reid, 179 Ill. 2d at 310, citing Madej, 177 Ill. 2d at 149.1 recognize that this is indeed a high standard and one that should not be treated lightly. But I also recognize that there are those cases where trial counsel, through inadvertence, carelessness, or just plain incompetence, can make a strategic choice that is, quite frankly, too unprofessional to ignore. Assuming for the moment that English’s version of the events was entirely correct and he was shot while lying on the ground, that would contradict the State’s interpretation of the threat posed by English to the police officers. Defendants make such claims all the time. They are evaluated by the trier of fact, whether a judge or a jury, and either accepted or rejected as the case may warrant. Here, however, the defendant presented his counsel with a witness whose expert testimony would seriously undermine both the credibility of the State’s witnesses and its case in chief. When confronted by this potential expert witness, counsel indicated that English’s case was so strong in other areas that the medical expert witness was not necessary. English, from his jail cell, argues otherwise and I find I must agree. Accordingly, I dissent.