Court Opinion

ID: 9797956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:33:06.415666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:55.054001
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, J.:
concur in part/ dissent in
part.
{1 I concur in the Court's decision to affirm the judgment and sentence in Count II (Conspiracy to Commit Robbery with a *598Dangerous Weapon AFCF), and the analysis concerning the law relating to accomplice testimony being controlled by Section 742 of Title 22, while the law concerning the testimony of co-conspirators is defined by judicial precedence. However, I disagree with the manner in which the Court has applied the law of accomplice to the facts of this case, and must dissent to the decision to reverse and dismiss the conviction in Count I.
2 I believe a part of the problem with the Court's application, and the results reached, is the sequence in which the Court began its analysis. Rather than following the natural sequence of events as they unfolded in the commission of the erimes, and thus applying the law in that same sequence, the Court works backwards to make the beginning of the case fit the final pre-determined result.
T3 This case starts with the formation of the conspiracy to commit the robbery. As Judge Chapel previously recognized and wrote in Hackney v. State, 874 P.2d 810, 813 (Okl.Cr.1994), "[In Johns v. State, 742 P.2d 1142, 1146-47 (Okl.Cr.1987), this Court held that independent evidence is not necessary where co-conspirator statements are admitted through direct trial testimony subject to cross-examination, because the direct testimony of co-conspirators is not hearsay. A co-conspirator may testify concerning his own participation and his observation of a co-conspirators' conduct."
4 In Huckaby v. State, 804 P.2d 447, 451 (Okl.Cr.1990), this Court cites Johns in holding that the Laske and Harjo rule requiring independent evidence before the admission of a co-conspirator's statements does not apply to the direct in-court testimony of a co-conspirator. Euckaby held that a co-conspirator's in-court direct testimony was sufficient independent evidence of a conspiracy and of the co-defendant's participation in it. Id.
T5, In the case at bar, our case law does not require any corroboration of the co-conspirator's testimony. However, the State presented both direct and cireamstantial evi-denee at trial that corroborated the co-conspirator's testimony. My reference to the evidence is for illustration purposes only and should not be construed in any way to mean that corroborating evidence of a co-conspirator's testimony is necessary.
T6 The decision today accurately reflects that the law of conspiracy requires evidence of the conspiracy in accordance with the requirements set forth in Omalza v. State, 911 P.2d 286 (Okl.Cr.1995) and Harjo v. State 797 P.2d 338 (Okl.Cr.1990), prior to the admission of the statements of a co-conspirator, but not independent corroboration of that statement prior to its admission. A conspiracy may be proven by cireumstantial evidence "from which the existence of a conspiracy may be inferred." Hackney, 874 P.2d at 813. Therefore, evidence of the conspiracy need not be direct but may consist of only cireum-stantial evidence. Furthermore, onee evidence of the conspiracy has been offered, those statements are admissible as substantive evidence of a co-conspirator's guilt.
"T7 Accomplice testimony is analyzed differently than co-conspirator testimony as one requires corroboration and the other does not. In Jemison v. State, 633 P.2d 753, 755 (Okl.Cr.1981), the Court held that in-court accomplice testimony, corroborated in part by some other evidence, was sufficient independent evidence to connect the defendant to the crime. "The law prescribes no standard for the strength of the corroborating evidence, and there is a failure to corroborate only if there be no evidence legitimately having that effect." Glaze v. State, 565 P.2d 710, 712 (Okl.Cr.1977) (citing Hathcoat v. State, 71 Okla.Crim. 5, 107 P.2d 825 (1940)) (emphasis added). Corroborating evidence may consist of only circumstantial evidence. Id. -
T8 Repeatedly, this Court has stated that we will take "the strongest view of the corroborating testimony that such testimony will warrant where the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence is challenged." Barber v. State, 388 P.2d 320, 325-26 (Okl.Cr.1963). See also Glaze, 565 P.2d at 712; Eaton v. State, 404 P.2d 50, 53 (Okl.Cr.1965); Barrett v. State, 357 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Okl.Cr.1960).
I 9 The primary purpose of the accomplice statute (21 0.8.2001 $ 742) requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony is to assure that no person is convicted of a crime solely on the testimony of an accomplice whose *599motive for testifying might be questionable. Glaze, 565 P.2d at 712. Accomplices "are motivated by the need to point the finger of guilt at the others involved in order to minimize the appearance of their participation in the felony" Faulkner v. State, 646 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Okl.Cr.1982). In this case, the witnesses had no motive for testifying against the Appellant as all of the defendants, with the exception of one, had been charged as a co-conspirator and for armed robbery.
[10 In Glaze, there were two independent sources that described the make and model of the defendants' automobile. 565 P.2d at 713. This Court held that cireumstantial evidence that the defendant was apprehended in a car similar to the one described by the independent sources was sufficient corroborating evidence of the accomplice's testimony. Id.
{ 11 Accessory testimony, like co-conspirator testimony, and unlike accomplice testimony, does not require independent corroboration. Faulkner, 646 P.2d at 1308. This Court has not required corroborating evidence of accessory testimony because like a co-conspirator, "an accessory's testimony does not have the inherent unreliability found in an accomplice's testimony." Id.
T12 The Court's decision has parsed the facts into separate events and not chronologically applied the facts to the law. Applying the law to the facts as the testimony unfolded at trial, the judge was first presented with the issue of admissibility of the testimony of co-conspirators, testifying in person, directly identifying the Appellant and describing his role in the planning and execution of the robbery and distribution of the proceeds. This testimony met the Omalza and Harjo requirements and was admitted as substantive evidence of guilt of Appellant's actions. Therefore, no additional independent evidence was necessary to corroborate the co-conspirators' testimony. Onee the co-conspirators' testimony met the Omalzsa and Harjo requirements it was up to the jury to either accept or reject the testimony in their deliberations.
{13 The witnesses also testified regarding Appellant's acknowledgment he had someone on the inside supplying him information for the robbery. This fact was confirmed when Bowman called Yahola to report the robbery and Appellant reported he knew the robbery had been completed because of the report from Yahola to him. The opinion wants to dismiss this piece of direct and cireumstantial evidence as not being sufficient independent evidence to support accomplice testimony under § 742. Yet, the opinion does so in a vacuum without acknowledging what evidence had already been admitted as substantive evidence of guilt under the law of co-conspirator. Further, the opinion fails to recognize this is a jury question, not a law review article analysis.
14 This is a case that contains both direct and circumstantial evidence. We apply that long established rule of appellate review derived from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and adopted in Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202, 203-4 (Okl.Cr.1985) and more recently applied in Easlick v. State, 90 P.3d 556, 559 (Okl.Cr.2004) that requires this Court to determine if the evidence were "viewed in the light most favorable to the state would any rational trier of fact have found essential elements of crime beyond a reasonable doubt." I believe when the facts in the present case are viewed in sequence, and the law admitting the evidence applied in the same manner, the judgment of the jury in Count I is supported by sufficient evidence which establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the requirements of 21 0.8.2001, § 742. It is only when the facts and the law are parsed out of sequence that the case can be made that there is not compliance with the statutory requirements. Once the co-conspirators' statements are properly admitted as substantive evidence of guilt in this sequence of events, that evidence cannot then be withdrawn from the trial and dismissed as not relevant in determining the sufficiency of the evidence for the completed crime. Especially, when the co-conspirator and the accomplice are the same parties or individuals. I know of no logical, practical or legal reason to treat them differently in this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment and sentence of both counts.
*6001 15 I would also like to comment on the issue of the OUJI-CR and the Committee Comments. As the opinion points out, this Court must shoulder part of the blame for lack of clear guidance in the law to enable our OUJI-CR Committee to prepare clear, concise instructions on the law. Our failure to be diligent in the correct use of terminology in the appropriate context creates confusion for the Committee, the bench and the bar. Even when it might take a few extra words we should ensure we put the law and facts in context, and if required give historical context to our decisions. We should never paraphrase holdings from prior cases, and we should ensure when we cite holdings we have researched the validity of those cites and the law expressed. While at times we are overwhelmed with the volume of cases that cross our desk, the accuracy and historical correctness of our work must be paramount. Often we are required to take the time to write cases of this type to reset the plumb line to give perspective to both ourselves, and the practitioners who must apply this law in the courtrooms of our state on a daily basis. I believe each member of this Court is indebted to the members of the Instruction Committee for the hours of labor that has, and continues to go into the creating and updating of the OUJI-CR for the benefit of the courts of the State of Oklahoma. Thankfully, it is an ongoing process that allows for corrections when the need is brought to our attention in this manner. Members of the judiciary and practicing bar should be encouraged to notify the Committee if any difficulties with the uniform instructions are experienced. It is only through that process they remain a viable tool for the administration of justice.