Court Opinion

ID: 9393927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 17:01:39.067992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.203525
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 11 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VERONICA MCCLUSKEY,                             No.    22-55124

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                2:21-cv-01188-MWF-MRW
 v.

WILLIAM HENDRICKS; ROXANNE                      MEMORANDUM*
HENDRICKS,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                 Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted April 19, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and KOH, Circuit Judges, and MCMAHON,*** District
Judge.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable Colleen McMahon, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
      Veronica McCluskey (“McCluskey”) appeals the dismissal of her action

against William and Roxanne Hendricks (the “Hendricks”). McCluskey filed a

complaint against the Hendricks after a conflict arose between the parties while

McCluskey was acting as the co-host for the Hendricks’s Airbnb rental property.

McCluskey’s initial complaint alleged that the Hendricks caused McCluskey’s

removal from the Airbnb platform. McCluskey later amended her complaint to

add claims based on allegations that the Hendricks illegally accessed her social

media accounts to gain an advantage in the ongoing state court litigation,

McCluskey v. Hendricks, Case No. BC671735 (the “State Court Action”). After

giving McCluskey numerous chances to amend her complaint, the district court

dismissed McCluskey’s action without leave to amend for failure to state a claim

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). We review an appeal of

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Friedman v. AARP Servs., Inc.,

855 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017). Exercising our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, we affirm.

      1. The district court properly dismissed McCluskey’s Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act claims. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), “[i]t

shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise

engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to

conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s

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affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.”

McCluskey fails to allege plausible facts to demonstrate that the Hendricks acted

as a separate enterprise, legitimate or illegitimate. See id. § 1961(4). Further,

McCluskey cannot sufficiently allege how the Hendricks’s conduct caused her to

suffer a “concrete financial loss.” Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083,

1087 (9th Cir. 2002). And finally, McCluskey does not allege facts to support a

RICO predicate act for (1) extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(2), or

under Iowa Criminal Code § 711.4; (2) honest services fraud and wire fraud, 18

U.S.C. § 1343; or (3) involuntary servitude, 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a).

      Because McCluskey fails to state a claim under RICO, we do not address

whether the district court erred in holding that collateral estoppel barred

McCluskey from relitigating the issue of whether the Hendricks caused

McCluskey’s damages resulting from her removal from the Airbnb platform. See

Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1076 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that an appellate

court may affirm a district court “on any ground raised below and fairly supported

by the record” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

      2. The district court also properly dismissed McCluskey’s claims for

stalking; invasion of privacy; and violations of the Stored Communications Act

(“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2701, and Cal. Penal Code § 502 et seq., in her amended

complaints.

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       McCluskey fails to state a claim for stalking. McCluskey must show that

(1) the Hendricks engaged in a pattern of conduct the intent of which was to

follow, alarm, or harass her; (2) as a result she reasonably feared for her safety; and

(3) the Hendricks made a credible threat. Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.7. Because

McCluskey has not plausibly alleged a credible threat or that her fear for her safety

was reasonable, the district court properly dismissed this claim.

      McCluskey fails to state a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion upon

seclusion. A claim for intrusion upon seclusion under California common law

requires McCluskey to plead that “(1) [the Hendricks] ‘intentionally intrude[d] into

a place, conversation, or matter as to which [McCluskey] has a reasonable

expectation of privacy[,]’ and (2) the intrusion ‘occur[red] in a manner highly

offensive to a reasonable person.’” In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.,

956 F.3d 589, 601 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 47 Cal.

4th 272, 286 (2009)). McCluskey makes only conclusory allegations that the

Hendricks used covert means to “hack” into her account. And she has not shown

that she has a justifiable expectation of privacy in her social media posts—many of

which were posted on a business social media page and liked by dozens to

hundreds of people.

      McCluskey fails to state a claim under the SCA. She cannot plausibly allege

that the Hendricks violated the SCA by “intentionally access[ing] without

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authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is

provided . . . while it [was] in electronic storage.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). Here,

none of the facts alleged in McCluskey’s complaints suggest that the Hendricks

illicitly accessed her accounts in an unauthorized manner, such as through cracking

her password or invading the servers of Facebook.

      McCluskey fails to state a claim under California Penal Code § 502(b),

which imposes liability on an individual who “[k]nowingly accesses and without

permission takes, copies, or makes use of any data from a computer, computer

system, or computer network.” Id. McCluskey does not allege facts to support the

Hendricks’s unauthorized use of information from her social media. And her

blanket allegation that the Hendricks used her information to gain an unfair

advantage in the litigation is not supported by facts.

      As the district court explained, McCluskey’s claims for stalking, invasion of

privacy, and violations of the SCA and § 502 are “attenuated from the real crux of

the dispute” and “are supported by allegations that are increasingly dubious.”

      3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of

publicly available documents from the State Court Action or by denying

McCluskey’s motion for reconsideration. We review a district court’s decision to

take judicial notice of state court records and to deny a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse

of discretion. United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cty.,

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547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008); Kerr v. Jewell, 836 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir.

2016). Courts may “consider certain materials” such as “matters of judicial

notice[,] without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the

only documents outside of the complaint that the district court considered were

properly judicially noticed. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its

discretion.

      Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by denying McCluskey’s

motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) because the motion simply restated

arguments and facts that the district court already considered and dismissed. See

C.D. Cal, Local Rule 7–18 (stating that “[n]o motion for reconsideration may in

any manner repeat any oral or written argument made in support of, or in

opposition to, the original motion”).

      Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of McCluskey’s

action in full. McCluskey’s request for judicial notice is DENIED AS MOOT.

      AFFIRMED.

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