Court Opinion

ID: 9399068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 20:01:06.044131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:38.581448
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                      File Name: 23a0115p.06

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                            ┐
 MATTHEW DICKSON, on behalf of himself and others
                                                            │
 similarly situated,
                                                            │
                               Plaintiff-Appellant,          >        No. 22-3394
                                                            │
                                                            │
       v.                                                   │
                                                            │
 DIRECT ENERGY, LP; TOTAL MARKETING CONCEPTS,               │
 INC.; SILVERMAN ENTERPRISES, LLC,                          │
                              Defendants-Appellees.         │
                                                            ┘

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.
                    No. 5:18-cv-00182—John R. Adams, District Judge.

                                  Argued: January 17, 2023

                               Decided and Filed: June 1, 2023

              Before: BATCHELDER, STRANCH, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

                                     _________________

                                           COUNSEL

ARGUED: Brian K. Murphy, MURRAY MURPHY MOUL + BASIL LLP, Columbus, Ohio,
for Appellant. Michael D. Matthews, Jr., MCDOWELL HETHERINGTON LLP, Houston,
Texas, for Appellee Direct Energy, LP. ON BRIEF: Brian K. Murphy, Jonathan P. Misny,
MURRAY MURPHY MOUL + BASIL LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael D.
Matthews, Jr., William B. Thomas, Diane S. Wizig, David L. Villarreal, MCDOWELL
HETHERINGTON LLP, Houston, Texas, James M. Chambers, MCDOWELL
HETHERINGTON LLP, Arlington, Texas, for Appellee Direct Energy, LP.
 No. 22-3394                     Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                      Page 2

                                       _________________

                                            OPINION
                                       _________________

       DAVIS, Circuit Judge.       Matthew Dickson brought this action under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, alleging that Direct Energy, LP
sent him multiple ringless voicemails (“RVMs”). The district court determined that Dickson
received only one RVM and dismissed the suit, finding that Dickson suffered no concrete harm
and therefore lacked standing.     Dickson now appeals the order dismissing his claim.         We
conclude that, regardless of the number of RVMs Dickson received, his asserted injury bears a
close relationship to one recognized at common law. We further find that Direct Energy caused
Dickson precisely the type of harm Congress sought to address through the TCPA. Accordingly,
Dickson suffered a concrete injury for purposes of Article III standing.            We therefore
REVERSE the order of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.

                                                 I

       The TCPA is the product of public outrage over abusive telephone marketing practices.
Pub. L. 102-243 § 2, ¶ 6 (1991). By the time it was enacted in 1991, companies had begun to
use technology that could automatically dial telephone numbers and deliver prerecorded voice
messages to potential consumers en masse—reportedly to more than 18 million Americans each
day. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3; see also S. Rep. No. 102–178, at 2 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1968, 1970 (describing industry developments which expanded the use of robocalls). Many
complained that these unsolicited calls tied up phone lines, crowded answering machines,
imposed financial burdens, and disrupted public safety services. Pub. L. 102-243 § 2, ¶¶ 5, 9,
14; S. Rep. No. 102–178, at 1–2, as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1969. Consumers
more generally criticized these robocalls as invasions of privacy “regardless of the content or the
initiator of the message.” Pub. L. 102-243 § 2, ¶ 10. Congress agreed. It found that unrestricted
telemarketing can be “an intrusive invasion of privacy.” Id. ¶ 5. Congress thus enacted the
TCPA with individual privacy interests among its primary concerns. Id. ¶¶ 5, 9–10, 12; see Barr
v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2348 (2020); S. Rep. No. 102–178, at 1–
2, 4–5, 9, as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1968–69, 1972–73, 1976.
 No. 22-3394                          Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                                 Page 3

        The TCPA accordingly restricts certain telemarketing practices. Among other things, it
prohibits making any call, to any telephone number, “using any automatic telephone dialing
system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” absent an emergency or the recipient’s prior express
consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). It similarly proscribes the use of robocalls to deliver
unsolicited messages.         Id. § 227(b)(1)(B).          Congress delegated authority to the Federal
Communications Commission to craft exceptions to the law, provided that those exceptions did
not “adversely affect the privacy rights that [it] is intended to protect.” Id. § 227(b)(2)(B)(ii)(I)
(referring to subsection (b)(1)(B)); see also id. § 227(b)(2)(C) (stating essentially same in
reference to subsection (b)(1)(A)(iii)). The TCPA includes a private right of action to enforce its
provisions. Id. § 227(b)(3). The law contemplates both injunctive and monetary relief, allowing
for an award of $500 for each violation of the statute with the possibility of recovering treble
damages. Id.

                                                         II

        This case arises from unauthorized prerecorded messages allegedly sent to Dickson by
Direct Energy. Specifically, Dickson alleges that Direct Energy delivered multiple RVMs to his
cell phone in 2017 advertising its services. RVM technology makes it possible to “deposit[]
voicemails directly into a recipient’s voicemail box, without placing a traditional call to the
recipient’s wireless phone.” One RVM placed on November 3, 2017, explicitly stated that the
call was from “Nancy Brown with Direct Energy.” Dickson never consented to receiving these
communications. He thus filed suit individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
alleging that Direct Energy violated the TCPA’s automated calling prohibitions under 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1) by sending RVMs.1 Dickson claims that he was harmed by these communications
because they tied up his phone line, cost him money, and were generally a nuisance. He also
maintains that the calls disturbed his solitude and invaded his privacy.

        1Whether   an RVM is a prohibited “call” under this section is not at issue here. But the magistrate judge in
this case found that RVMs are “calls,” explaining that “to hold otherwise ‘would elevate form over substance,
thwart Congressional intent that evolving technologies not deprive mobile consumers of the TCPA’s protections,
and potentially open a floodgate of unwanted voicemail messages to wireless consumers.’” In addition, the Federal
Communications Commission recently issued a Declaratory Ruling and Order finding the same. In re Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 Petition for Declaratory Ruling of All
About the Message, LLC, No. 02-278, 2022 WL 17225556, at *1 ¶ 1, *3 ¶ 10, *4 ¶ 14 (Nov. 21, 2022).
 No. 22-3394                     Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                         Page 4

       Dickson’s lawsuit proceeded to discovery. At his deposition, Dickson testified that he
received eleven RVMs from Direct Energy and reiterated that they invaded his privacy.
Regarding the November 3 RVM in particular, Dickson explained that he realized the voicemail
was on his phone just a few minutes after receiving it. While he could not remember precisely
what he was doing when he received that message, he was “sure it interrupted something” in his
routine. Dickson also testified that he generally listened to every voicemail message he received
from Direct Energy in its entirety.       Direct Energy retained an expert witness to analyze
Dickson’s phone records. The expert concluded that of the eleven voicemails Dickson produced
in discovery, only the one he received on November 3, 2017, was from Direct Energy.

       Armed with this information, Direct Energy moved to dismiss Dickson’s complaint for
lack of standing, arguing that Dickson had suffered no concrete injury. In granting the motion,
the district court stated that Dickson received only one RVM—seemingly in reference to the
November 3 voicemail. The court held that Dickson’s receipt of a single RVM did not constitute
a concrete harm sufficient for Article III purposes because (a) he could not recall what he was
doing when he received the RVM, (b) he was not charged for the RVM, (c) the RVM did not tie
up his phone line, and (d) he spent an exceedingly small amount of time reviewing the RVM.
Dickson now appeals, arguing that the district court made erroneous findings of fact and
misapplied the law.

                                                 III

       We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant Direct Energy’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Lindke v. Tomlinson, 31 F.4th 487, 490 (6th Cir.
2022) (quoting Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 2014)). For the reasons set
forth below, we conclude that the court erred in dismissing Dickson’s TCPA claim for lack of
standing.

                                                 A.

       Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual cases or
controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. An essential component of the case-or-controversy
requirement is the doctrine of standing, which “limits the category of litigants empowered to
 No. 22-3394                    Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                       Page 5

maintain a lawsuit in federal court to [those who] seek redress for a legal wrong.” Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). To establish standing, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing
(1) a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact which (2) is traceable to the defendant’s conduct
and (3) can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992); see also Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338 n.6.

       This court has not previously considered whether receipt of a single RVM for
commercial purposes presents a concrete harm sufficient to confer standing to make a claim
under the TCPA. Here, we find that Dickson’s claims satisfy the demands of Article III because
his alleged injury under the TCPA constitutes a concrete harm.

       A concrete harm is one that is real and not abstract—i.e., it “actually exist[s].” Spokeo,
578 U.S. at 340. A mere procedural violation of a statutory right does not amount to a concrete
injury. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) (quotation omitted). Courts
therefore must interrogate the concreteness requirement “even in the context of a[n alleged]
statutory violation.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341. Notably, an injury need not necessarily be
tangible (e.g., physical or monetary) to be concrete; intangible harms can create Article III
standing. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204; Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340. And Congress’s decision to
create a statutory cause of action may “elevate to the status of legally cognizable injuries
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law,” so long as those injuries
“‘exist’ in the real world.” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2205 (first quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at
341, then quoting Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir. 2018)).

       To determine whether an intangible harm—such as Dickson’s receipt of an unsolicited
RVM—rises to the level of a concrete injury, courts may look to (1) history and tradition and
(2) Congress’s judgment in enacting the law at issue. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204–05;
Spokeo, 578 U.S at 340. These considerations are addressed in turn below.

                                                B.

       We first consider whether Dickson’s asserted injury “has a close relationship to a harm
that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American
courts.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341 (citation omitted). The Court has clarified, however, that
 No. 22-3394                    Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                       Page 6

“Spokeo does not require an exact duplicate in American history and tradition.” TransUnion,
141 S. Ct. at 2204.

       Then-Judge Barrett’s opinion in Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, Inc. is instructive on this
requirement. 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2552 (2021). In Gadelhak,
the plaintiff brought suit under the TCPA after receiving five unwanted text messages from
AT&T, the defendant telephone company. Id. at 460. The court began by reviewing, in light of
Spokeo, whether the plaintiff had Article III standing to sue for this intangible harm. Id. at 461–
63. In analyzing whether sending unwanted texts resembled a tort at common law, the court
looked to the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion—a cause of action aimed at
“defendants who invade[] the private solitude of another.”        Id. at 462 (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 652B (Am. L. Inst. 1977) [hereinafter Restatement]); see also Restatement §
652A(2)(a) (noting in part that intrusion-upon-seclusion claims vindicate people’s “right to be let
alone”). The court observed that this common law cause of action historically helped to address
“irritating intrusions” into one’s privacy, “such as when ‘telephone calls are repeated with such
persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff.’” Gadelhak, 950
F.3d at 462 (citing Restatement § 652B cmt. d). The court reasoned that when AT&T sent
Gadelhak unsolicited text messages, it made a similar intrusion into his privacy or seclusion. Id.
It did not matter that “common law courts generally require a much more substantial
imposition—typically, many calls—to support liability for intrusion upon seclusion,” because:

       when Spokeo instructs us to analogize to harms recognized by the common law,
       we are meant to look for a “close relationship” in kind, not degree. In other
       words, while the common law offers guidance, it does not stake out the limits of
       Congress’s power to identify harms deserving a remedy. Congress’s power is
       greater than that: it may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries
       concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” A few
       unwanted automated text messages may be too minor an annoyance to be
       actionable at common law. But such texts nevertheless pose the same kind of
       harm that common law courts recognize—a concrete harm that Congress has
       chosen to make legally cognizable.

Id. at 462–63 (first emphasis added) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341); see also id. at 463 n.2
(further explaining, in this same vein, that even a single TCPA violation, such as receipt of one
 No. 22-3394                           Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                                   Page 7

unwanted text, could suffice for Article III standing so long as that alleged harm fundamentally
resembled a common-law tort).

         Gadelhak’s approach is well-reasoned in view of the Supreme Court’s guidance in
Spokeo and TransUnion. We recently applied Gadelhak in a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
case where we determined that the plaintiff’s receipt of one unwanted voicemail “is injury
enough” to establish Article III standing because “[t]he intrusion caused by unwanted phone
calls bears a ‘close relationship’ to the kind of harm” protected by common-law intrusion upon
seclusion. See Ward v. NPAS, Inc., 63 F.4th 576, 580–81 (6th Cir. 2023). In a similar vein, we
recognized in Norton v. Beasley that “an intangible injury . . . generally suffices so long as it is
the type of injury traditionally recognized by American courts,” and that the relevant measure
here “is one of kind and not degree.” No. 21-6053, 2022 WL 17348385, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 1,
2022) (citations omitted). Other circuits apply similar (or identical) reasoning on this same
point. See, e.g., Perez v. McCreary, Veselka, Bragg & Allen, P.C., 45 F.4th 816, 822 (5th Cir.
2022) (courts should “focus[] on types of harms protected at common law, not the precise point
at which those harms become actionable” (citation omitted)); Krakauer v. Dish Network, LLC,
925 F.3d 643, 653–54 (4th Cir. 2019) (same); Persinger v. Sw. Credit Sys., L.P., 20 F.4th 1184,
1192 (7th Cir. 2021) (ruling plaintiff had standing because her claimed intangible harm
resembled a common-law intrusion upon seclusion, regardless of whether she would prevail on a
stand-alone claim for that common-law harm); Lupia v. Medicredit, Inc., 8 F.4th 1184, 1192
(10th Cir. 2021) (one unsolicited call similar in kind to a common-law intrusion upon seclusion
conferred standing); Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 351–52 (3d Cir. 2017)
(same); Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he relevant point is that
Congress has chosen to protect against a harm that is at least closely similar in kind to others that
have traditionally served as the basis for lawsuit.”).

         In this case, Dickson argues that his receipt of an unwanted RVM resembled the common
law tort of intrusion upon seclusion.2 As explained above, courts at common law recognized

         2Inhis reply brief, Dickson cursorily argues for the first time that Direct Energy’s conduct also parallels the
common-law tort of trespass to chattels. Because Dickson failed to appropriately develop this argument in his
opening brief, it will not be addressed here. Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 579 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Am. Trim,
 No. 22-3394                         Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                                Page 8

through this tort the “right to be let alone.” Restatement § 652A(2)(a), cmts. a–b; see also
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204 (citing Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462) (affirming that the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion is deeply rooted in the common law). And broadly speaking, unwanted
telephone communications can qualify as injuries under this common law doctrine. Restatement
§ 652B cmt d.

        The kind of harm vindicated by the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort is relatively broad.
Foundationally, there is a common-law right to privacy, which simply “reflects an individual’s
‘right to be let alone.’” Fultz v. Gilliam, 942 F.2d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Restatement
§ 652A cmt. A). The intrusion-upon-seclusion tort derives from this generalized privacy interest,
see Restatement § 652A & cmt. a, and it safeguards the right to be secluded from and
undisturbed by the public. Fultz, 942 F.2d at 401; Yahoo! Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 913 F.3d 923, 924 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Restatement § 652B. In other words, the
common law recognizes concrete harm where a defendant “intrude[s] into the private solitude of
another.” E.g., Lupia, 8 F.4th at 1191; see also Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462; L.A. Lakers, Inc. v.
Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 801–02 (9th Cir. 2017). This is the kind of harm with which the
intrusion-upon-seclusion tort is concerned, at its core—the right to maintain a sense of solitude
in one’s life and private affairs.

        That said, the scope of liability for the actual tort of intrusion upon seclusion is more
circumscribed and confines liability to cases where a defendant’s conduct is “highly offensive to
the ordinary reasonable man.” Restatement § 652B cmt. d; see also Charvat v. NMP, LLC, 656
F.3d 440, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2011); In re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 291,
293 (3d Cir. 2016) (to state a legally cognizable claim for intrusion upon seclusion, one must
show that the intrusion was highly offensive to a reasonable person). A plaintiff’s claims at
common law thus may rise or fall based on the substantiality of the defendant’s intrusions.

        Here, Direct Energy placed an unsolicited call to Dickson’s phone (the RVM) to
publicize its services, interjecting itself into Dickson’s private sphere. This implicates Dickson’s
common-law right to seclusion—that is, his right to be left alone from others, including by

L.L.C. v. Oracle Corp., 383 F.3d 462, 477 (6th Cir. 2004)) (“We have consistently held . . . that arguments made to
us for the first time in a reply brief are waived.”).
 No. 22-3394                    Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                       Page 9

means of telephonic communications. Id. §§ 652A, 652B. From a lay perspective, we can see
why members of the public and Congress, through the TCPA, deemed such calls intrusive. Pub.
L. 102-243 § 2, ¶¶ 5–6, 10, 12. For example, some consider their phone number a matter of
private information in and of itself. People commonly exercise discretion in publicizing their
phone numbers, entrusting them only to their circle of friends, family, and select others on an as-
needed basis. It follows that they may not wish for strangers or unfamiliar businesses to directly
reach their personal phone lines. In addition, phone numbers are relatively fixed and attached to
the individual. In the ordinary course of things, they are seldom changed—which could make it
difficult to evade unwanted communications once one’s phone number is discovered. And
finally, receipt of unwanted voicemails (for example) to a personal telephone also undermines a
sense of privacy, because being prompted to consider such messages for review and then
disposal is disruptive of one’s personal time—particularly given that the recipient might forever
be prompted to do so until it is done. In these ways and others, telephones are logically part of
one’s private domain to which the right to be left alone extends. See Restatement § 652A cmt. a.

        This conclusion aligns with numerous decisions in which courts have found invasion-of-
privacy-like harms flowing from unwanted telephonic communications.              For example, in
Gadelhak, the court found that receipt of a small number of unwanted text messages (or even one
such text) is a “modern relative” of the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort. Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at
462, 463 n.2. In Susinno, the plaintiff similarly prevailed on evidence of a single prerecorded
call.   Susinno, 862 F.3d at 348, 351–52.        And in Van Patten, the court observed that
“[u]nsolicited . . . phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb
the solitude of their recipients.” Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043
(9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed that holding, explaining
that receipt of unsolicited phone calls closely resembles traditional claims for intrusion upon
seclusion.   Wakefield v. ViSalus, Inc., 51 F.4th 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2022).         Again, it is
immaterial that an independent common-law cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion
requires evidence of calls “repeated with such persistence and frequency” amounting to
“hounding” of the plaintiff. See Restatement § 652B cmt. d. That is because in measuring
concreteness, the inquiry centers on the kind of harm at issue rather than the degree of that harm.
E.g., Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462–63. And here, Dickson’s alleged injury—namely, that Direct
 No. 22-3394                         Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                              Page 10

Energy disturbed his right to be left alone—is closely related to the kind of harm protected at
common law by the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort. Thus, the first prong of the post-Spokeo and
TransUnion standing inquiry is satisfied.

        The district court here relied on Eleventh Circuit case law in granting Direct Energy’s
motion to dismiss. See Grigorian v. FCA US LLC, 838 F. App’x 390 (11th Cir. 2020); Salcedo
v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019). We diverge from those non-binding decisions. First,
both    cases     predate     TransUnion,       where      the    Court     clarified     Spokeo’s      standing
requirements. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204–07. And second, Grigorian and Salcedo do not
adequately address the historical-analogue prong.

        In Grigorian, the defendant allegedly violated the TCPA by transmitting one RVM to the
plaintiff’s cell phone.3 838 F. App’x at 391. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims for lack of Article III standing. Id. But Grigorian did not
conduct the standing inquiry required by Spokeo. Id. at 392–94; see 578 U.S. at 341 (instructing
courts to look to both history and the judgment of Congress to determine whether an intangible
harm is sufficiently concrete to constitute an injury in fact). This omission leaves a gap in
reasoning that greatly diminishes Grigorian’s persuasive value here.

        And in Salcedo, the court found the plaintiff lacked standing where he received an
unsolicited text in violation of the TCPA. 936 F.3d at 1165, 1172. But Salcedo seems to
misapply Spokeo in reasoning that intrusion upon seclusion requires evidence of a substantial
intrusion, and the plaintiff’s “isolated,” “momentary” injury fell short of that standard; therefore,
the plaintiff lacked a historical analogue to his claimed harm. Id. at 1171 (citing Restatement §
652B cmt. d). We do not agree that this approach is an appropriate measure of concreteness,
however, because it requires the plaintiff to show that his harms would suffice to state an
independent claim at common law—a prerequisite which TransUnion has since unequivocally
clarified is not the applicable standard. 141 S. Ct. at 2204 (“Spokeo does not require an exact
duplicate in American history and tradition.”). Instead, as Gadelhak and many other courts have
observed, Spokeo requires a close common-law analogue in kind, not degree. 950 F.3d at 462.

         3Grigorian appears to be the only circuit court decision to date addressing whether receipt of an RVM can
create Article III standing.
 No. 22-3394                    Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                      Page 11

       Salcedo also found that the plaintiff’s alleged injury was insufficient because,
traditionally, intrusions upon seclusion specifically entailed conduct like eavesdropping and
wiretapping. 936 F.3d at 1171 (citing Restatement § 652B cmt. b). It opined that these “severe
kinds of actively intermeddling intrusions” were nothing like Salcedo’s receipt of an unwanted
phone communication. Id. Yet the common-law tort does protect against invasive telephone
contacts. Restatement § 652B cmt. d. As a result, other courts have expressly declined to follow
Salcedo. See Cranor v. 5 Star Nutrition, L.L.C., 998 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir. 2021) (rejecting
Salcedo because its “focus on the substantiality of the harm in receiving a single text
misunderstands Spokeo”); Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462–63 (explaining same and adopting the
kind-versus-degree inquiry). We do the same.

       For its part, Direct Energy insists that any harm Dickson may have personally suffered is
insufficiently analogous to the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to state a claim. However, its
arguments are unpersuasive.      First, Direct Energy argues that “there is no evidence that
[Dickson] was in a private place [e.g., his home] or state of seclusion that could have been
intruded upon.” Thus, because he was “not then in seclusion” when he noticed the RVM, there
was no invasion of privacy. This argument is inapt. Intrusion upon seclusion occurs when
someone “intrude[s] into a private place.” Restatement § 652B cmt. c. Such an invasion of
privacy can occur even when the victim is physically present in a public place. Id. Indeed, even
outside the home, “there may be some matters about the plaintiff . . . that are not exhibited to the
public gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these
matters.” Id. Direct Energy similarly invaded Dickson’s private sphere when it placed an
unsolicited, prerecorded call to his cell phone. See, e.g., Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462; Susinno,
862 F.3d at 351–52. And cell phones are, by their nature, private—regardless of whether they
are carried in public places. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–97 (2014) (discussing the
“broad array” of private information stored on cell phones, including extensive records of phone
communications, photos, and other indicia of an individual’s “private interests [and] concerns”).

       Direct Energy offers no authority for its postulation that Dickson must present proof of
any further indicia of privacy (e.g., that he was at home when he received the RVM). Moreover,
other courts have determined that plaintiffs had standing to sue after receiving unsolicited
 No. 22-3394                     Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                  Page 12

communications to their cell phones by analogizing that harm to intrusion upon seclusion—
without requiring plaintiffs to be physically located in a special, private location when they
received those unwanted communications. See, e.g., Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462–63; Melito v.
Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2019); Susinno, 862 F.3d at 351–52. Nor
do the TCPA’s prohibitions appear to be so narrow. E.g., Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2343–44, 2344 n.1,
2356 (explaining that “Congress enacted a general restriction on robocalls to cell phones” and
that the TCPA “generally prohibits robocalls to cell phones and home phones” (emphasis
added)).   Direct Energy fails to grapple with these authorities, and we therefore reject its
suggestion to limit the scope of privacy.

       Second, Direct Energy contends that an intrusion upon seclusion occurs only when a
person’s “peace and quiet” is disturbed by an audible sound like a ringing phone, or when a
person’s attention is otherwise taken away from what they are doing. By this measure, it argues
that Dickson’s solitude was never intruded upon since the RVM was silently delivered to his
phone. That is to say: because Dickson’s phone never buzzed or emitted a sound upon receipt of
the RVM, and he did not notice it for several minutes, the RVM did not invade his privacy.
Direct Energy underscores that the RVM “sat unnoticed until Mr. Dickson voluntarily decided to
turn his attention away from what he was doing to review his notifications.” It maintains that
these facts are different in kind from the telephonic invasions of privacy recognized at common
law which involve the ringing of a landline phone that cannot be ignored. This reasoning closely
resembles the Salcedo court’s rationale that we reject here. 936 F.3d at 1172 (dismissing case
for lack of standing because plaintiff “ha[d] not alleged anything like enjoying dinner at home
with his family and having the domestic peace shattered by the ringing of the telephone”).
Ultimately, Direct Energy suggests that no intrusion upon seclusion occurred here because its
RVMs were relatively unobtrusive.

       Like the suggestion that one RVM is not enough to intrude upon one’s seclusion,
however, this argument also challenges the degree of Dickson’s harm.          As we previously
explained, and as counsel for Direct Energy conceded at oral argument, the decisive issue here is
whether Dickson’s claimed injury is similar in kind to one recognized at common law. We pause
to disentangle these concepts as they pertain to this case.
 No. 22-3394                    Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                      Page 13

       Direct Energy asserts that Dickson’s claim is unlike a tortious invasion of privacy
because his “peace and quiet was [not] shattered by ringing phones or dinging text notifications.”
Yet Dickson need not make out a claim for tortious invasion of privacy for purposes of our
analysis. Indeed, it could be that Dickson’s claims would fail at common law for the reason
Direct Energy offers, which is an issue we have no cause to decide. As pertinent here, the
indicia of harm Direct Energy seeks to challenge—i.e., how substantial or disruptive the
defendant’s conduct was—are matters of degree. They are irrelevant to the question of whether
Dickson’s claimed harm is similar in kind to an intrusion into his private affairs. Gadelhak, 950
F.3d at 462–63; see also, e.g., Perez, 45 F.4th at 822; Persinger, 20 F.4th at 1192; Lupia, 8 F.4th
at 1192; Cranor, 998 F.3d at 693; Krakauer, 925 F.3d at 654. Dickson suffered such a harm
when Direct Energy deposited an unsolicited RVM into his phone. Therefore, Direct Energy’s
argument fails.

       In conclusion, we find that Dickson has alleged an intangible harm that bears a
sufficiently close relationship to the traditional common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion.

                                                C.

       Next, we turn to Congress’s judgment. In Spokeo, the Supreme Court observed that
“Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III
requirements,” and so found its judgment “instructive and important” in determining whether an
intangible harm rises to an injury in fact. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341; see also TransUnion, 141 S.
Ct. at 2204–05 (adding that Congress is empowered to identify concrete harms that are
inadequate in law and recognize them, by statute, as legally cognizable injuries).          Courts
accordingly “afford due respect to Congress’s decision to impose a statutory prohibition or
obligation on a defendant, and to grant a plaintiff a cause of action to sue over the defendant’s
violation of that statutory prohibition or obligation.” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204 (citation
omitted). We thus review for whether a defendant’s alleged misconduct aligns with the conduct
Congress sought to regulate through federal law. E.g., Lupia, 8 F.4th at 1192 (Congressional-
judgment prong satisfied where defendant allegedly caused the specific kind of harm prohibited
by the relevant statute); Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462 (same where plaintiff claimed he suffered
“the very harm that the [TCPA] is designed to prevent”).
 No. 22-3394                    Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                    Page 14

       The parties did not develop arguments on this point, so it appears not to be in dispute. In
any event, Congress enacted the TCPA after finding that unrestricted telemarketing practices
harm consumers. Pub. L. 102-243 § 2, ¶ 5. The law is intended to protect from invasions of
privacy wrought by unauthorized automated and prerecorded calls. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12–14; see also,
e.g., Yahoo! Inc., 913 F.3d at 925 (“The TCPA’s explicit purpose ‘is to protect privacy rights.’”
(quoting L.A. Lakers, Inc., 869 F.3d at 803)); Cranor, 998 F.3d at 690; Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at
460; Krakauer, 925 F.3d at 650; Melito, 923 F.3d at 88; Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896 F.3d 728,
738–39 (6th Cir. 2018). Here, Dickson alleges that he received such an unsolicited marketing
call from Direct Energy: the November 3 RVM. He also validly maintains that receipt of this
message invaded his privacy. His injury therefore falls within the ambit of what Congress
deemed to be an actionable harm when it enacted the TCPA. See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462
(concluding same); Melito, 923 F.3d at 93 (same); Susinno, 862 F.3d at 351–52 (same).
Accordingly, Dickson satisfies the second prong of our standing inquiry.

                                               D.

       Both prongs of the standing analysis set forth in Spokeo and TransUnion are satisfied
here: Dickson’s receipt of an unsolicited RVM bears a close relationship to the kind of injury
protected by the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion; and his claimed harm directly
correlates with the protections enshrined by Congress in the TCPA. Therefore, Dickson suffered
a concrete injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing purposes. Because the district court
erred in dismissing Dickson’s suit for want of standing, we reverse its judgment and remand for
further consideration.

       We address a few final points. First, Dickson argues that dismissal was improper under
the law-of-the-case doctrine because the magistrate judge had previously found that RVMs are
considered “calls” within the meaning of the TCPA. This argument misses the mark. Law of the
case does not apply here because the magistrate judge’s order at issue did not rule on Article III
standing. Moreover, this doctrine has no applicability to rulings on subject-matter jurisdiction,
which courts may revisit at any time. Clark v. Adams, 300 F. App’x 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1983)). Second, because we find
that Dickson has standing regardless of the number of RVMs he received, we need not address
 No. 22-3394                     Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al.                       Page 15

his argument that the district court erred in finding that he received only one RVM from Direct
Energy. Whether he received one RVM or eleven (as he urges us to conclude), our standing
analysis remains the same.

       Finally, we decline Dickson’s request for reassignment to a different judge on remand.
This is another issue that was not properly presented to the court; it is raised for the first time in
Dickson’s reply brief. Sanborn, 629 F.3d at 579. In any case, Dickson failed to establish why
this extraordinary remedy would be appropriate here. United States ex rel. Williams v. Renal
Care Grp., Inc., 696 F.3d 518, 532–33 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Solomon v. United States, 467
F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2006)). He asserts that the district judge cannot fairly preside over these
claims because he construed “a situation in which literally millions of illegal telemarketing calls
were delivered to hundreds of thousands of putative class members” as “unworthy of having a
place on [his] docket.” The district court, however, properly inquired into Dickson’s standing to
bring suit based on the harms he claimed to have suffered. There is no reason to believe that the
district court will have “substantial difficulty” setting aside its previous finding (that Dickson
suffered no concrete harm) on remand and in keeping with our ruling here. Renal Care Grp.,
696 F.3d at 532–33 (quoting Solomon, 467 F.3d at 935).

                                                 IV

       For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Dickson’s suit
for failure to demonstrate an injury in fact and REMAND for further proceedings.