Court Opinion

ID: 9530952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:05:33.153289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:17.967688
License: Public Domain

SCHWAB, C. J.,
dissenting.
Since this case involves a warrantless seizure, the burden is on the state to establish its validity, State v. Elkins, 245 Or 279, 422 P2d 250 (1966), by “clear and convincing evidence,” State v. Douglas, 260 Or 60, 488 P2d 1366 (1971), cert denied 406 US 974 (1972). Whether the seizure was valid breaks down into two questions: (1) was the marihuana in plain view?; and (2) if so, was its seizure “inadvertent” within the rule of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, infra? I *50believe the state failed to sustain its burden on both of these questions.
Officer Koch testified at the suppression hearing that when he entered defendant’s living room there was a room divider on his right that went from the floor almost to the ceiling. The shelves were cluttered with books, stereo equipment, a large aquarium, a house plant, and other personal belongings. The only light in the living room came from a single overhead bulb near where Officer Koch entered; the other side of the room divider was in shadows.
The officer testified that as he walked across the living room he looked through the room divider and observed what he believed to be a baggie of marihuana. The trial judge did not believe this to have been possible.
While Officer Koch sat on a couch and talked with the defendant, he again looked through the room divider. His testimony about his observations is set out in the majority opinion. Although the officer chose to express himself in a vocabulary of assorted legal terms, he never once said that he saw marihuana.
As for Officer Koch’s prior training and experience, summarized by the majority, I would expect a witness with such a background to be more, not less, able to simply state that he saw marihuana, if such was the truth.
In short, as I read Officer Koch’s testimony, the most he ever said was that he saw a “baggie” which he had strong probable cause to believe contained marihuana. Since there was no evidence that the officer saw marihuana, I do not believe the trial court’s finding to the contrary is in any way binding on us.
*51Furthermore, even if Officer Koch did see marihuana in plain view before seizing it, I would hold it to be inadmissible under the authority of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 91 S Ct 2022, 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971), in which the United States Supreme Court held that under the Fourth Amendment evidence seized in plain view is inadmissible when the seizure was “not inadvertent.”① I read “not inadvertent” to mean the police had the necessary information and time to obtain a search warrant.② In other words, in a plain-view-seizure case, I believe Coolidge requires us to hold evidence seized to be inadmissible when the police had sufficient grounds and adequate opportunity to first obtain a search warrant.
At the suppression hearing Officer Koch testified he had been in defendant’s apartment “several times” during his undercover work. During all of these visits the officer had observed marihuana in the apartment. Officer Koch further testified to having at least once seen baggies of marihuana at the specific spot *52where he claims they were in plain view on December 12, 1969, and indicated that was the reason he examined that location on that occasion.
Assuming that Officer Koch’s observations were reasonably contemporaneous with December 12 (no dates appear in the record before us), the police had probable cause to obtain a warrant to search defendant’s apartment. An explanation of why they did not do so is indicated by Goolidge. If there was a sufficient explanation it was not produced by the state at the suppression hearing.
In addition, the entire method of effecting defendant’s arrest suggests the possibility the officers also planned to make a search. A total of five officers participated in the arrest, even though it took place at 3 a.m., and even though it was apparently known that defendant lived alone. After making the arrest, the five officers in fact proceeded to make a complete search of the apartment that lasted most of an hour.③
Based on this record I believe it is impossible to say that the state sustained its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the seizure in question was “inadvertent,” and I do not interpret the majority opinion as holding the contrary.
Bather, as I understand the majority’s reasoning, they hold Coolidge is not applicable to these facts because: (1) Coolidge applies to seizures of evidence, but not to seizures of contraband, and (2) Coolidge applies when police enter in uniform to make an arrest, *53but not when they enter by subterfuge pretending to be a friend of the potential arrestee’s.
I disagree that Coolidge is distinguishable on either of these grounds. It is true that the Coolidge opinion states that the facts of that case involve seizure of evidence, not contraband. But the court’s discussion of its prior decisions makes it clear to me they consider it a difference without a distinction. For example, the court describes Trupiano v. United States, 334 US 699, 68 S Ct 1229, 92 L Ed 1663 (1948), as a ease where the plain view seizure was not inadvertent and therefore invalid, and describes Ker v. California, 374 US 23, 83 S Ct 1623, 10 L Ed 2d 726 (1963), as a case where the plain view seizure was inadvertent and thus valid. Both of these cases involved seizure of contraband—in Trupiano a still, and in Ker marihuana. This makes it impossible for me to read Coolidge as limited to seizures of evidence, and not applying to seizures of contraband.
Second, the majority holds Coolidge does not apply “where the relationship is that of guest-host as distinguished from an intrusion upon privacy as with an arrest warrant or search warrant.” If the seizure of a car parked in a driveway was an intrusion on privacy, as Coolidge held, I fail to see how the seizure of items in defendant’s apartment was not at least as much of an intrusion on privacy.
Coolidge does not go so far as to say that a policeman in the course of making an investigation cannot seize what he sees while cloaked in anonymity as an undercover agent. Coolidge only holds that if a policeman, in uniform or civilian clothes, has probable cause to search and time to get a search warrant based on that probable cause, he must do so—it will not do for *54Mm under those circumstances to use subterfuge or an arrest warrant as a means of avoiding the necessity of obtaining a search warrant.
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.

The doctrine of “inadvertent” discovery of incriminating evidence is not new to Oregon. See, State v. Hawkins, 255 Or 39, 41-2, 463 P2d 858 (1970):
“It should be made clear that we are not here talking about a situation where an officer, while searching in a place and manner justified by the items listed in the warrant, inadvertently stumbles upon obvious evidence of the crime pursuant to which the warrant was issued * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.)

“Equating non-inadvertence with probable cause may be the most reasonable reading of Justice Stewart’s opinion. He admitted that his discussion of plain view corresponded with that given in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948) * * * in which the Court refused to apply the plain-view exception to the seizure of a still and liquor by raiding agents because the authorities had an abundance of time and probable cause to obtain a warrant * * The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv L Rev 38, 244, n 35 (1971).

As the majority observes, Coolidge involved a pre-planned intentional seizure of evidence. Even if the rule of Coolidge is limited to such situations, I doubt that on this record the state proved the seizure in this case was other than pre-planned and intentional.