Court Opinion

ID: 9781872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:34:31.520889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:40.823043
License: Public Domain

Beier, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s ruling on the issue of whether the adoption decree may be void and, thus, from the majority’s result in this case.
First, I do not view my differences from the majority as arising out of a disagreement over facts or, more specifically, over factual findings of the district court judge. Although it is a fact that M.P. was suspicious, it is not a fact that he should have known N.T. was still pregnant and gave birth to his child. N.T. did everything in her power short of muzzling her mother to prevent M.P. from knowing the true state of affairs until A.A.T. was 6 months old. M.P. may have been less than perfect, but a ruling on whether he ever had parental rights worthy of protection cannot turn on his lack of clairvoyance.
Second, I cannot help but observe that the majority’s decision builds a bias into the law that will favor the wealthy or well-fi*656nanced. The majority says it agrees with the district court that M.P. took “no action” to protect his parental rights, that acting on his suspicions “would have required little effort,” and that he could have determined where N.T. was and learned of her continued pregnancy. See 287 Kan. at 600. The undisputed facts, however, demonstrate that M.P. sent N.T. a small amount of money, that he persisted in questioning her, and that he promptly and doggedly pursued access to and a relationship with his child as soon as he learned of N.T.’s multiple lies. I do not accept that the United States Constitution or the adoption law of Kansas require him to hire a private investigator, as was suggested at oral argument, or to incur the expense to come to Kansas personally to challenge N.T.’s story. Although the record indicates that this particular natural father may have had the resources to undertake such efforts, surely that will not be true of all men in his position.
I agree with the majority that the United States Supreme Court precedents it discusses have customarily emphasized the importance of an actual relationship of parental responsibility, as distinguished from a mere biological relationship, in cases involving constitutional protection for parental rights. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972) (parents have protected liberty interest in controlling their children’s religious upbringing); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925) (parents have protected liberty interest in the way they choose to educate their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923) (parents have protected liberty interest in controlling their children’s education). And this unmistakable theme has continued in die series of cases particularly addressing the parental rights of unwed fathers. None of the decisions, so far limited to factual situations involving older children rather than newborns, has recognized a putative father’s absolute right to notice and an opportunity to be heard in adoption proceedings.
However, if a known natural fadier has made sufficient efforts to become a responsible parent, thus giving rise to substantive due process rights or a liberty interest under the federal Constitution, die Kansas Adoption and Relinquishment Act generally requires *657consent or relinquishment of his rights before an adoption can be finalized. This is the baseline. Specific statutory requirements must be met to move beyond it.
K.S.A. 59-2136(e) does not provide “several mechanisms within a man’s control which, if exercised, entitle him to notice of adoption proceedings.” The statute is directed at the grounds and procedures the court should employ to determine a natural father’s identity. It is not directed at natural fathers whose identities mothers have concealed or never known. In this case, an inaccurate affidavit, produced and submitted under K.S.A. 59-2136(e), led to a false identification of A.A.T.’s putative father and the undisputed lack of actual notice to M.P. of the adoption proceeding. In short, N.T.’s deceitful manipulation of K.S.A. 59-2136(e) does nothing to demonstrate M.P.’s failure to diligently or promptly protect any parental rights that might have arisen and attached to him.
The majority further asserts that K.S.A. 59-2136(h) is not at issue in this appeal. To the extent this may be literally correct, it fails to recognize that the reason this statute is not in issue is the district court’s error in ignoring it. This error is addressed further below. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that K.S.A. 59-2136(h) lists exceptions to the general rule requiring consent or relinquishment before a natural father’s parental rights can be terminated. It reads:
“(h) When a father or alleged father appears and asserts parental rights, the court shall determine parentage, if necessary pursuant to the Kansas parentage act. If a father desires but is financially unable to employ an attorney, the court shall appoint an attorney for the father. Thereafter, the court may order that parental rights be terminated, upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence, of any of the following:
(1) The father abandoned or neglected the child after having knowledge of the child’s birth;
(2) the father is unfit as a parent or incapable of giving consent;
(3) the father has made no reasonable efforts to support or communicate with the child after having knowledge of the child’s birth;
(4) the father, after having knowledge of the pregnancy, failed without reasonable cause to provide support for the mother during the six months prior to the child’s birth;
(5) the father abandoned the mother after having knowledge of the pregnancy;
(6) the birth of the child was the result of rape of the mother; or
*658(7) the father has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years next preceding the filing of the petition.”
Kansas adoption statutes are strictly construed in favor of maintaining the rights of natural parents in controversies over termination of their rights. This is certainly true when a claim is made that a natural father has failed to fulfill his statutory obligations and thus that his consent to an adoption is unnecessary. In re Adoption of Harrington, 228 Kan. 636, 638, 620 P.2d 315 (1980); In re Sharp, 197 Kan. 502, 504, 419 P.2d 812 (1966). This approach is reflected in part by the statute’s requirement that evidence supporting a court’s choice to dispense with a father’s consent be clear and convincing. See K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l).
In In re Adoption of Baby Boy B., 254 Kan. 454, 456, 866 P.2d 1029 (1994), this court affirmed a district court order denying a petition for adoption. The child’s natural father, not married to the mother, had opposed the petition; and the adoptive parents argued his parental rights should be terminated because they believed he had failed without reasonable cause to provide support to the mother during the 6 months before the child’s birth.
We stated that the legislature had limited the circumstances in which an adoption could be granted without the consent of the father to the seven listed in the statute and were concerned only with whether substantial competent evidence existed to support the district judge’s findings and decision under that provision. Baby Boy B., 254 Kan. at 460-61. On the limited issue of whether support had been provided to the mother in the 6 months before the child’s birth, we considered the mother’s refusal to accept assistance from the father relevant; we considered neither the father’s fitness as a parent nor the best interests of the child relevant. 254 Kan. at 464-65.
In this court’s earlier decision in In re Adoption of F.A.R., 242 Kan. 231, 747 P.2d 145 (1987), Justice Holmes, writing for a five-member majority, made a similar observation regarding the influence of the best interests of the child standard when a natural father who had once been married to two young boys’ mother was incarcerated and an allegation was made that he therefore failed *659to assume the duties of fatherhood. The natural father refused to consent to the boys’ adoption by a stepfather:
“It should also be noted that the best interests of the child, which is the paramount consideration in custody matters, is not controlling in determining the statutory issue of whether a natural parent has failed to assume parental duties. We have no doubt that the best interests of the children in this case weigh[] heavily in favor of the adoption. It is unfortunate that this father apparently has little concern for the children’s welfare and, instead, has chosen to stand upon his legal rights, but under our statutory scheme of adoption he has that choice.
‘We also note that the fitness of [the natural father] as a parent is not a controlling factor ... as it would be in a proceeding to sever parental rights [in a child in need of care proceeding]. [Citations omitted.]” In re Adoption of F.A.R., 242 Kan. at 235.
This court also recognized in In re Adoption of F.A.R. that the evidence supported the district judge’s finding of maternal interference with the natural father’s rights to maintain contact with his children. Although it expressed understanding of any reluctance to force the children to visit their natural father in prison, the court ultimately ruled that his rights could not be terminated and that the adoption could not go forward. It acknowledged that “individual members of the court might have reached a contrary result if sitting at the trial level.” 242 Kan. at 237, 239-40.
Several cases from our Court of Appeals dealing with the parental rights claims of unwed natural fathers also should inform our understanding and application of Kansas law.
In In re Adoption of Baby Girl S., 29 Kan. App. 2d 644, 29 P.3d 466 (2001), aff'd 273 Kan. 71, 41 P.3d 287 (2002) (adopting Court of Appeals opinion), the panel examined a district court’s ruling that an unwed father’s efforts to support his child’s mother during her pregnancy prevented termination of his rights and, thus, adoption. The panel stated that the instances set out in K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l)-(7) were examples of “situations in which the relationship of a natural father is htde more than biological.” 29 Kan. App. 2d at 667.
The panel decided that substantial efforts by an unwed father to support his child’s mother during her pregnancy and up to the child’s birth were necessary; and it reversed the district court’s decision as unsupported by substantial competent evidence. 29 *660Kan. App. 2d at 671. It saw “no evidence” that the father had provided support or that the mother had refused it, despite the district judge’s observation that the mother had “blocked” the father “out of any opportunity to provide support.” 29 Kan. App. 2d at 666, 671. “Support” under the statute, the panel said, did not require the father to provide total support for the mother; however, support that was incidental or inconsequential in nature would not be sufficient. Rather, it must be reasonable under all of the circumstances. 29 Kan. App. 2d at 667; see also In re Adoption of D.M.M., 24 Kan. App. 2d 783, 788, 955 P.2d 618 (1997) (reasonable support efforts by father required).
In In re Lathrop, 2 Kan. App. 2d 90, 575 P.2d 894 (1978), which predated passage of K.S.A. 59-2136(h), an unmarried mother placed her child with adoptive parents 2 days after birth. The natural father was not originally notified of the filing of the adoption petition, nor was his consent to the adoption obtained. Although the record did not explain the circumstances, the father learned of the adoption proceeding, and he appeared and objected. He sought custody of the child, asserting that he had paid support to die mother and any medical expenses made known to him.
By the time the Court of Appeals panel decided the father’s custody claim, the child had lived in an adoptive home for more than 18 months. The panel nevertheless held that the father had “parental rights to the custody of his child and . . . that those rights must be given preference and will prevail over those of the adoptive parents due to the parental preference rule.” 2 Kan. App. 2d at 95. The panel did not fault the father for failure to fulfill parental responsibilities when outside agencies or adoptive parents had posed obstacles to his involvement. Due process required that “a putative father who appears and asserts his desire to care for his child has rights paramount to those of non-parents,” unless proved otherwise unfit. 2 Kan. App. 2d at 96.
After enactment of the language now in K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l)-(7), the Court of Appeals took up a due process challenge to its constitutionality in In re Baby Boy N., 19 Kan. App. 2d 574, 874 P.2d 680, rev. denied 255 Kan. 1001 (1994). In that case, an unwed father argued that his parental rights could not be terminated ab*661sent a specific finding that he was unfit, and the Kansas Adoption and Relinquishment Act (Act), K.S.A. 59-2111 et seq., improperly permitted termination in other circumstances. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 579. The Court of Appeals, relying on the Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban decisions, disagreed. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511, 98 S. Ct. 549, reh. denied 435 U.S. 918 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 60 L. Ed. 2d 297, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979). It held that the degree of protection afforded parental rights under due process depended upon the extent and nature of the parent-child relationship. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 584-85; but see In re Adoption of A.P., 26 Kan. App. 2d 210, 216, 982 P.2d 985, rev. denied 268 Kan. 886 (1999) (relying on apparently unwed father s unfitness).
Because of this limitation on the extent of the unwed father’s substantive due process right, clear and convincing proof of any of the seven circumstances enumerated in the statute would permit a court to dispense with the father’s consent constitutionally. Baby Boy N., 19 Kan. App. 2d at 585. The panel held that the process provided under the Act was all that was due; it was sufficient to guarantee die father timely and meaningful notice and opportunity to be heai'd, as well as appointed counsel, if necessary. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 585. It is especially significant for our purposes here, however, that the panel stated: “[w]here a trial court finds that a father’s reasonable efforts to provide for his child’s welfare failed because of interference by the mother, adoption agency, or adoptive parents,” then “the statute should not operate to terminate [the unwed father’s] parental rights.” 19 Kan. App. 2d at 585.
In Baby Boy N., the Court of Appeals panel also reconciled the Act and Kansas’ historical attachment to the parental preference doctrine: The doctrine is “nothing more than a rule of law designed to protect the constitutional due process rights of a natural parent to the custody of his or her children. The protections incorporated within K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 59-2136(h) provide the same, if not better, protection of a parent’s constitutional rights.” 19 Kan. App. 2d at 585-86. The panel observed that statutes such as K.S.A. 59-2136(h) had been construed to incorporate the doctrine through *662their protection of due process rights and the “clear and convincing” standard of proof required for termination. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 585.
The following year, another Court of Appeals panel ruled in favor of an unwed father in In re K.D.O., 20 Kan. App. 2d 559, 562, 889 P.2d 1158 (1995), excusing his failure to provide support to the mother of his child for reasonable cause.
In K.D.O., the father had offered to give the mother money, to allow the mother the use of his car, to obtain items for the baby, and to drive the mother to the hospital for delivery. The father contacted the mother throughout the pregnancy, except for a period when the mother’s telephone was disconnected. According to the father’s testimony, at some point the mother refused to see him and rebuffed all offers of support. The mother admitted that the father had made offers of support. She said she “did not want to be bothered by his offers,” admitting she “ ‘shut him out.’ ” 20 Kan. App. 2d at 561.
Under these circumstances, the panel cited Baby Boy N., 19 Kan. App. 2d at 585, and held: “Where a trial court finds that a father’s reasonable efforts to provide support for the mother during the six months prior to the child’s birth have failed because of interference by the mother, an adoption agency, or the adoptive parents, K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(4) should not operate to terminate his parental rights.” In re K.D.O., 20 Kan. App. 2d at 562; see also In re Adoption of Baby Boy B., 254 Kan. at 465 (“district court properly considered mother’s refusal as factor in determining if father provided support”).
A Court of Appeals panel again considered the issue of an unwed father’s rights to due process before termination of parental rights in In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 22 Kan. App. 2d 119, 912 P.2d 761, rev. denied 260 Kan. 929, cert. denied 519 U.S. 870 (1996), and reached an opposite conclusion.
In th at case, the father learned through an adoption agency that the mother intended to place his child for adoption. He called the agency to voice his opposition to the adoption, but he did not tell the agency he was willing to support the mother during the pregnancy. He did not “ask for [the mother’s] address, nor did he ask *663the agency to convey any message offering support. He did not contact [the mother s] family or any of her known friends to offer financial support or to express his opposition to the adoption.” 22 Kan. App. 2d at 122. The child was placed with adoptive parents immediately after birth. The panel, citing Baby Boy N., affirmed the district judge’s K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l)(D) termination of the father’s parental rights for failing to support the mother without reasonable cause during the 6 months before the child’s birth. Baby Boy S., 22 Kan. App. 2d at 126-29.
In this case, adoptive parents directed our attention to two Idaho cases dealing with situations in which a mother was less than forthright about a father’s role in a child’s conception. Petition of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942 (1986), and Doe v. Roe, 142 Idaho 202, 127 P.3d 105 (2005).
Among the cases from sister states cited by the majority, I regard the facts of Doe v. Queen, 347 S.C. 4, 552 S.E.2d 761 (2001), as the most similar to those before us here. In it, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an unwed father’s consent was required for an adoption. The mother in Queen had informed the father that she was pregnant and wanted an abortion; he tried to persuade her to carry the pregnancy to term. The two ended their relationship, and the mother falsely informed the father that she had followed through with an abortion. The mother and her new boyfriend then facilitated a criminal warrant against the father for assault with a deadly weapon; as a condition of bond, the natural father was ordered to have no contact with the mother for 1 year.
The father was notified of the birth of the child 2 months after it occurred. He obtained an attorney, began saving money, prepared a nursery, and arranged for medical insurance for the child. The South Carolina Supreme Court stated:
“Initially, we find [the father] should not be penalized for his actions, or lack thereof, prior to [the child’s] birth. Mother left their apartment when she was approximately 8-10 weeks pregnant, telling [the father] she intended to have an abortion. She thereafter lied, telling him she had, in fact, had an abortion in Atlanta. She then made every attempt to conceal from [the father] the fact that she had not had an abortion, effectively isolating herself from him and, through court orders, ensuring that [the father] could have no contact with her until well after the baby’s birth.” 347 S.C. at 8-9.
*664Like the natural father in Queen, M.P.’s behavior in this case should not have disqualified him from receiving minimal procedural due process, i.e., timely notice and an opportunity to be heard, on whether his substantive due process right or liberty interest in parenting A.A.T. should be terminated without his consent or relinquishment. Under the majority’s formula, M.P. was diligent and prompt enough to be deserving of a day in court.
I note in this regard that the district judge concluded that M.P. did not abandon N.T. during her pregnancy. In contrast, N.T. actively concealed her continued pregnancy and A.A.T.’s birth and adoption, both nonverbally and verbally. She moved half a broad nation away from M.P. She did not give him her new address. She concocted the abortion story, as it happens, a little more than 5 months before A.A.T. was bom, i.e., near the beginning of the time period when M.P. might have solidified his claim to parent A.A.T. by providing financial and emotional support to N.T. under K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(4). When A.A.T. was bom, N.T. came up with an additional story of the baby’s death at deliveiy, knowing that otherwise M.P. could still learn the truth through a question posed to her mother. She authorized virtually immediate transfer of A.A.T.’s custody to the adoptive parents. She gave a false surname for M.P. and withheld information about his location when contributing to tire affidavit required for the adoption proceeding. She lied about whether M.P. was willing to help her or the baby. For 6 months after A.A.T. was bom, N.T. continued her charade. When M.P. became too insistent about his doubts, telephone contact between her and M.P. temporarily ceased.
As soon as N.T. told M.P. the truth about A.A.T., M.P. launched his effort to determine and assert his legal right to be a father. He found a lawyer in Wichita and filed this action. He has since persevered in prosecuting it, presumably at substantial financial, time, and energy expense. Adoptive parents have chosen to resist M.P.’s effort, and it was their prerogative to do so. I do not question their motives or their affection or concern for the newborn who has grown into a preschooler in their care. But, by the same token, I do not question M.P.’s motives or sincerity.
*665I simply cannot agree with the district judge or with the majority, who apparently would force M.P. to meet what I consider a nearly impossible standard, depriving him of his right to parent A.A.T. because he failed to uncover the nature, extent, and effect of N.T.’s lies at some earlier date. I see such a rule as inconsistent with the historical parental preference rule of Kansas common law and our legislature’s carefully designed codification of its modern incarnation. I would hold, consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent on unwed fathers and the statutes and cases of this jurisdiction, that M.P.’s “inchoate interest” ripened into a constitutionally protected, substantive due process right not to be deprived of the companionship, care, custody, and management of his child. In the absence of his consent or relinquishment with appropriate notice he would have appeared and objected to A.A.T.’s adoption, and the process due him was that outlined by our legislature in K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l)-(7). The district court judge should have heard evidence and made factual findings and drawn conclusions of law as to whether any of the seven scenarios set out in that statute applied at the time the termination of M.P.’s parental rights and the adoption were being considered.
Instead, the district judge in this case did not make extensive findings or draw complete conclusions as to each of the K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l)-(7) scenarios. M.P. had argued that none of the seven applied. The adoptive parents had argued that M.P. did not attempt to provide financial support to A.A.T. or to set aside the adoption decree until the DNA test confirmed that he was A.A.T.’s father, allowing termination of M.P.’s rights under K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(1) or (3). They also argued that he failed without reasonable cause to provide support to N.T. during the last 6 months of her pregnancy under 59-2136(h)(4). I read the judge’s limited findings and conclusions to stop well short of resolving these arguments. Because he believed that M.P. should have known earlier of N.T.’s deceit, he concluded that M.P.’s actions were insufficient to give him a substantive due process right to parent. Without that right, that full-blown liberty interest, there was nothing to protect with the procedural due process of 59-2136(h)(l)-(7); and the applicability of the seven scenarios did not have to be evaluated.
*666As fully discussed above, I would reach an opposite legal conclusion on the existence of M.P.’s liberty interest. Because of it, the district court was not free to dispense with actual notice to and consent or relinquishment by M.P., unless one of the scenarios in 59-2136(h)(l)-(7) was present at the time M.P.’s rights were terminated and the adoption finalized. I believe we are lacking factual findings that can only be made in the first instance by the district judge. I would therefore reverse and remand this case so that the district judge can arrive at more thorough findings of fact on the applicability or inapplicability of the seven scenarios as of August 24, 2004. If one of those scenarios existed and would have supported termination of M.P.’s parental rights despite his objection on that date, then either there was no harm from the violation of due process originally or any violation of it has been cured by the due process M.P. has received in this proceeding. In either event, the adoption decree would not need to be declared void under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4). If, on the other hand, none of the seven scenarios existed on August 24, 2004, then the decree would need to be declared void, a nullity; and M.P. would be entitled to sole care, custody, control and management of A.A.T. Given the passage of time, this admittedly pragmatic solution is appropriate.
The possibility that a child of A.A.T.’s age will be removed from the only home A.A.T. has ever known is extremely distressing. It is hard for me to imagine a set of facts that would bring the human and legal tensions between the arguments advanced by the parties and among the interests and issues analyzed by courts into sharper relief than that set before the court here. A natural father was deliberately deceived about the continuation of a pregnancy to term, denying him the practical possibility of choosing to support the mother up to delivery or the child after birth. A mother engaged in an elaborate scheme to prevent the father from discovering that she did not have an abortion and that she placed the child for adoption without his knowledge, consent, or choice to relinquish his rights, again denying him the practical possibility of choosing to support the child. Significant time passed before the father’s discovery of the mother’s lies; and far more significant time, particularly when measured in child time, passed before the *667case came before us for decision. In that later period, according to the record before us, the father and his counsel have diligently pursued development and protection of father s legal rights. The adoptive parents and their counsel, understandably, have exercised similar diligence to guard the finality of the adoption and the family to which it gave rise. I am fully aware of the psychological and legal merits of such finality. At this late date, however, it is clear that neither M.P. nor the adoptive parents are likely to volunteer to surrender their claim to exclusive companionship, care, custody, and management of A.A.T. so that the parameters of A.A.T.’s family can be adjusted and maximized to give all of the adults who want to be parents cooperative roles. Thus, in my view, this court is bound to deliver on the promise of the federal Constitution’s guarantee of due process to M.P., as that concept has been defined by our legislature. So too is the district judge. Neither this court nor the district court is permitted to default to a merely comfortable result.
I must also add two final points before leaving discussion of this issue.
First, the legislature has revised K.S.A. 59-2136 since the original adoption hearing in this case to make the best interests of the child a factor for consideration on termination of parental rights. See K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 59-2136(h)(2)(A). This amendment cannot be applied to M.P’s situation retroactively because of our rule that adoption statutes be construed in favor of maintaining his rights. Had M.P. received the timely notice and opportunity to be heard to which he was entitled, statutes and precedent existing at the time would have made the district judge’s findings under K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l)-(7) subject only to appellate review for substantial competent evidence to support them. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy B., 254 Kan. 454, 462, 866 P.2d 1029 (1994); In re Adoption of F.A.R, 242 Kan. 231, 235, 747 P.2d 145 (1987).
Second, I would not accept the adoptive parents’ or the amicus American Academy of Adoption Attorneys’ arguments that A.A.T. has a constitutional right in this situation that trumps M.P.’s liberty interest in parenting. The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon the issue of a child’s liberty interest in preserving *668familial or “family-like” bonds. Although Justice Stevens has stated in dissent that, to the “extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests,” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting), his fellow justices have not yet weighed in on this question. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88-89 (question reserved for future case, citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91, 109 S. Ct. 2333 [1989]). There also is no Kansas authority on this point.
Finally, I also differ from the majority on the appropriate disposition of this case under M.P.’s second alternative argument. In my view, it appears the district judge effectively equated the due diligence standard under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2) to the standard M.P. must meet to establish a substantive due process right or liberty interest in parenting. The judge rejected M.P.’s due process claim, despite the undisputed absence of actual notice to him of the adoption proceeding, because M.P. “should have taken action to protect his parental rights.”
On the facts of this case, application of the two standards requires a similar, though not identical, calculus. The degree of effort M.P. was required to expend to grasp his opportunity to parent, to see that his inchoate interest ripened into a right accorded due process protection, is roughly equivalent to the degree of effort he had to expend for his diligence to be all that was due under 60-260(b)(2). However, the substantive due process inquiry looks at a broader time period — here, from M.P.’s knowledge of A.A.T.’s conception in October 2003 until today. The only period of time relevant to judgment of the adequacy of M.P.’s diligence under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2) extended from January 22, 2004, the day N.T. lied to him about having undergone an abortion, until December 24 or 25, 2004, the day she confessed that she had given birth to A.A.T. and facilitated the baby’s adoption. I also believe that the question under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2) is narrower in scope than the constitutional question. It is concerned only with whether M.P. did all that could reasonably be expected of him in the more limited time frame to discover that he had fathered a child. His actions *669after that point to claim and enforce his paternal right, although relevant to ripening of his inchoate interest, are not relevant to whether he should have discovered A.A.T.’s existence and thus his own paternity before the adoption was finalized in August 2004.
Although abuse of discretion is a less searching standard of appellate review tiran tire de novo standard applied to the constitutional question, I think this court also should set aside the adoption decree on the basis of newly discovered evidence under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2). The evidentiary value of the knowledge M.P. acquired on December 24 or 25, 2004, to a sound decision of the issues raised by the adoption was extremely high. Had he possessed that knowledge before the final decree issued, he could and would have interposed a timely objection to termination of his rights. The adoptive parents would have been put to their burden of proof under K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l)-(7). Knowing as much as I can glean from the current state of the appellate record, and without further findings from the district judge, it appears the evidence of N.T.’s deceit and its results would have been likely to produce a different result.
My evaluation of the adequacy of M.P.’s diligence is heavily influenced by the egregious nature of N.T.’s behavior. She bed repeatedly and obviously intentionally; she enlisted numerous unwitting accomplices to put and maintain both physical distance and information inequality between herself and M.P. — including the guardian ad litem, the adoption agency, and, for a few months, the court system. N.T. kept M.P. in the dark long enough that the adoption could be finalized without M.P.’s knowledge or involvement and, perhaps worst of all, until the notion of separating A.A.T. from his or her adoptive parents would be painful to contemplate. Although it is possible M.P. could have done more to expose N.T.’s lies before December 24 or 25, 2004, the standard for K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2) due diligence is not that he move heaven and earth. Reasonably assertive behavior is sufficient. He had suspicions; and he persisted in voicing them to the one person in near total control of his access to the facts that would confirm or alleviate those suspicions. Eventually, N.T. cracked.
*670Were this case to be reversed on the sole ground of newly discovered evidence, this second alternative argument from M.P., I believe the course of action would be the same. For the reasons I outlined above, the case would have to be remanded to the district judge for full development of the facts supporting the parties’ arguments under K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l)-(7) and legal conclusions drawn from those facts.