Court Opinion

ID: 9514613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:44.727695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:19.392564
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 15.] Because I find the language of SDCL 40-28-20 to be unambiguous, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court’s denial of Schaefers’ motion for summary judgment.
*554[¶ 16.] Although the majority opinion correctly sets forth the rules of statutory construction, I believe it fails in its application of such rules to SDCL 40-28-20. “ ‘The purpose of statutory’ construction is to discover the true intention of the law[.]’ ” See Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d 535, 539 (quoting Moss v. Guttormson, 1996 SD 76, ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d 14, 17 (citations omitted)). When determining the true intention, this Court must look to “ ‘what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confíne itself to the language used.’ ” Id. Thus, our interpretation of SDCL 40-28-20 is confined to the following language:
Any person seeking to recover damages pursuant to § 40-28-18 shall file suit no later than one year after the trespass occurred or six months after he knew or should have known of the injury resulting from the trespass.
[¶ 17.] I believe this language is clear, certain, and unambiguous and not, as the majority suggests, susceptible to alternate interpretations. Therefore, when interpreting the statute, we need look no further than the language itself. See Minnesota Crane v. South Dakota Dep’t of Revenue, 1998 SD 127, ¶ 13, 587 N.W.2d 453, 455 (citations omitted) (stating that “[w]hen the language in the statute is clear, certain and unambiguous ... the Court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed”).
[¶ 18.] SDCL 40-28-20 clearly sets forth the time frame in which Zoss’s action to recover damages pursuant to SDCL 40-28-18 must have been brought. The parties agree that Zoss knew of the injury resulting from the trespass at least by September 1996. According to the clear language of the statute, he then had six months from that date to bring an action to recover damages for 'such injury. He failed to do so. Therefore, I believe that he was barred from filing suit nearly a year after the injury occurred. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Schae-fers’ motion for summary judgment.