Court Opinion

ID: 9703397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:54:22.944299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:48.385972
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 46. (concurring). Given the odd procedural posture of this case, I write separately to underscore what the majority repeatedly notes: the holding of this case is limited to the facts of this case. See, e.g., Majority op., ¶¶ 32, 42, 45. I also write separately to discuss the intersection between the collateral source rule and subrogation, which is critical to the outcome of this case.
¶ 47. Under the collateral source rule, a plaintiffs recovery from a tortfeasor cannot be reduced by payments or benefits that the plaintiff receives from other sources. Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 29, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201. The collateral source rule was developed not to provide the injured party with a windfall, but instead to prevent tortfeasors from escaping their obligations to compensate an injured party merely because a collateral source also compensated the injured party. Id., ¶ 29 (citing Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 2000 WI 63, ¶ 7, 235 Wis. 2d 678, 611 N.W.2d 764).
¶ 48. The collateral source rule is grounded in the policy that "should a windfall arise as a consequence of an outside payment, the party to profit from that collateral source is 'the person who has been injured, not the one whose wrongful acts caused the injury.'" Koffman, 246 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 29 (citations omitted).
¶ 49. Under principles of subrogation, a' subro-gated party, by virtue and to the extent of payments *542made on behalf of another, obtains a right of recovery in an action against a third-party tortfeasor and is a necessary party in an action against such a tortfeasor. Id., ¶ 33. Subrogation affects the extent to which the collateral source rule applies. Lambert v. Wrensch, 135 Wis. 2d 105, 113-121, 399 N.W.2d 369 (1987).
¶ 50. In Lambert, the subrogated insurer had paid the entirety of the medical expenses that the plaintiff sought from the defendant. The insurer was unable to exercise its subrogation rights because the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 118-119.
¶ 51. Relying upon Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 124-25, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973), the Lambert court concluded that the plaintiff could not recover the amount that was subject to the subrogation claim. Lambert, 135 Wis. 2d at 118-119. In doing so, it stated: "[W]here subrogation is present, as here, the collateral source rule is inapplicable." Id. at 121.
¶ 52. As noted by the majority, this court had the opportunity to discuss and clarify Lambert in Koffman. Majority op., ¶ 31. Citing Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis. 2d 726, 732, 512 N.W.2d 749 (1994), the Koffman court recognized that Lambert is "properly characterized . . . as holding that 'where the insurer is barred from pursuing a claim [of subrogation], the tortfeasor is entitled to a reduction in judgment for the amount of that claim." Koffman, 246 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 39.
¶ 53. Consistent with that narrow reading of Lambert, the Koffman court clarified that where "the risk for double recovery on the part of the plaintiff-insured does not exist because the insurer is not barred from pursuing its subrogation rights, there is no justification for nullifying the collateral source rule." Id., ¶ 40. We emphasized that in the ordinary case, the *543"collateral source rule and the principles of subrogation work in tandem to further the goals of both parties." Id.
¶ 54. As the majority notes, the interaction of the principles of subrogation and the collateral source rule is dependent on the specific facts of this case. Here, the parties altered the facts of this case which were presented in the circuit court and the court of appeals, when they entered into a settlement agreement after the petition for review had been filed in this court. Based on the facts now before us, I agree with the analysis and conclusion of the majority opinion. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.