Court Opinion

ID: 9396334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 07:09:00.814762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:16.185449
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued May 18, 2023

                                         In The

                                 Court of Appeals
                                        For The

                            First District of Texas
                               ————————————
                                 NO. 01-22-00870-CV
                              ———————————
                    IN THE INTEREST OF D.J.G., A CHILD

                     On Appeal from the 315th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2021-01520J

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this accelerated appeal,1 appellant, father, challenges the trial court’s order,

entered after a bench trial, terminating his parental rights to his minor child, D.J.G.,2

1
      See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4.
2
      D.J.G. was one-year old when the trial court signed its order terminating father’s
      parental rights. The trial court also terminated the parental rights of D.J.G.’s mother
      (“mother”), but she is not a party to this appeal.
and awarding the Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”) sole

managing conservatorship of D.J.G. In five issues, father contends that the trial

court erred in not appointing father as a possessory conservator of D.J.G., the

evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that

father knowingly placed, or knowingly allowed D.J.G. to remain, in conditions or

surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being,3 engaged, or

knowingly placed D.J.G. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered his

physical and emotional well-being,4 and failed to comply with the provisions of a

court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the

return of D.J.G.,5 and the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s

finding that termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interest of D.J.G.6

      We affirm.

                                     Background

      On September 29, 2021, DFPS filed a petition seeking termination of father’s

parental rights to D.J.G. and managing conservatorship of D.J.G.

3
      See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D).
4
      See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
5
      See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).
6
      See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

                                            2
      Removal Affidavit

      At trial, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the affidavit of DFPS

investigator Kimberly Turknett. Turknett testified that on July 16, 2021, DFPS

received a referral alleging neglectful supervision of D.J.G., who was born on July

12, 2021. The referral alleged that mother had “a history of substance abuse[,]

including heroin” use, and she had used narcotics while pregnant with D.J.G. D.J.G.

was born prematurely at “[seven] months gestation” and was diagnosed with

neonatal abstinence syndrome7 because of mother’s use of “an opioid dependence

medication” during pregnancy.      D.J.G., upon birth, “experience[d] withdrawal

symptoms” and needed to be weaned off the opioid dependence medication, which

“required morphine to manage his [withdrawal] symptoms and [for] comfort.” The

referral also alleged that mother had a history of “chronic homelessness” and not

“living in a stable environment,” and she had been “engaging in prostitution to make

money.” Mother had previously had her parental rights to four of her other children

terminated.

      Following the referral and as part of her investigation, Turknett spoke with a

DFPS caseworker involved in the case related to the termination of mother’s parental

7
      See In re M.T., No. 14-22-00198-CV, 2022 WL 3204819, at *7 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (neonatal abstinence
      syndrome “refers to the collection of symptoms a child exhibits if the child was
      exposed to opiate drugs in utero”).

                                          3
rights to her other four children. That DFPS caseworker reported that father had

called her to inform her that mother had given birth to D.J.G. and he believed that

he was the father of D.J.G. Father stated that mother “[was] a prostitute in the area

and [was] living in and out of hotels.” According to father, mother “had a drug

problem,” and he was concerned that mother had been using narcotics while

pregnant. Turknett was not able to speak to father during her investigation, and his

location was unknown.

      Ultimately, from her investigation, Turknett concluded that mother had

displayed a history of failing to remain narcotics-free, a continuous pattern of

narcotics-use, and chronic homelessness.       Despite having knowledge of her

pregnancy with D.J.G., mother continued using narcotics, which caused D.J.G. to be

born prematurely, be diagnosed with neonatal abstinence syndrome, experience

narcotics withdrawal symptoms, and require morphine to manage his symptoms and

for comfort. Mother was “believed to be homeless and prostituting throughout the

Houston area in order to make money.” And she had been “observed to be extremely

dirty, unkept and smelling strongly of odor and smoke.” D.J.G. spent a couple

months in the hospital following his birth.

      DFPS Caseworker Jones

      DFPS caseworker Maci Jones testified that, at the time of trial, D.J.G. was

about one-year old. D.J.G. entered DFPS’s care after he was born prematurely, as a

                                          4
result of mother’s narcotics use while pregnant. At the time of D.J.G.’s birth, mother

tested positive for an “opioid dependence medication.” D.J.G. also tested positive

for the opioid dependence medication and was diagnosed with neonatal abstinence

syndrome. He experienced “opiate withdrawals.” According to Jones, mother had

a history of substance abuse and had previously had her parental rights to her four

other children terminated.8

      When someone from DFPS spoke to mother following D.J.G.’s birth, mother

admitted to using methamphetamine and marijuana while she was pregnant with

D.J.G. According to Jones, this was concerning because mother’s narcotics use

while pregnant could have caused “several health issues and harm” to D.J.G.

Mother’s narcotics use “directly place[d] [D.J.G.] in danger.” According to Jones,

mother had displayed a blatant disregard for D.J.G.’s health when she used narcotics

while pregnant with him.

      As to mother’s narcotics use, Jones testified that mother had been using

narcotics for multiple years, which was indicative of a pattern. Further, mother

tested positive for “opiates and heroin” on August 12, 2021—about a month after

D.J.G.’s birth. Mother had also “no-show[ed]” for other required narcotics-use

8
      Jones stated that mother’s parental rights to her other four children had been
      terminated partly due to her continuing narcotics use. DFPS received a referral
      related to mother’s four other children in July 2019, and it received a referral related
      to D.J.G. in July 2021.

                                             5
testing during the pendency of the case. Mother’s visitation with D.J.G. was

suspended in February 2022 because she had refused to participate in the required

narcotics-use testing.

      As to father, Jones stated that DFPS could not locate him following D.J.G.’s

birth. Eventually, father contacted DFPS, and his paternity as to D.J.G. was

established. According to Jones, mother and father had been in a dating relationship,

at least since 2018, and because of that relationship, father was aware of mother’s

lifestyle—which included narcotics use and prostitution. Jones described father and

mother’s relationship as “extremely violent.” When father found out that mother

was pregnant with D.J.G., he assaulted her.

      Jones further explained that father had previously been convicted of the

offense of assault of a family member,9 stemming from an incident between mother

and father in 2018. And at the time of trial, he was charged with the offense of

aggravated assault of a family member,10 stemming from an incident between

mother and father in 2021.

9
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1); see also id. § 12.21 (“An individual
      adjudged guilty of a [c]lass A misdemeanor [offense] shall be punished by: (1) a
      fine not to exceed $4,000; (2) confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year;
      or (3) both such fine and confinement.”).
10
      See id. §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(1); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
      § 71.0021(b); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32 (“An individual adjudged guilty of
      a felony of the first degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas
      Department of Criminal Justice for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or
      less than 5 years [and] . . . a fine not to exceed $10,000.”).

                                            6
      As to father’s commission of the 2018 assault-of-a-family-member offense,

Jones testified that mother was the complainant, and father had “struck her with his

hand.” Father was found guilty of the offense of assault of a family member and

sentenced to confinement for 300 days. As to the 2021 aggravated assault of a family

member, with which father was charged, Jones stated that the offense occurred on

April 3, 2021, and mother was the complainant.           At the time, mother was

five-months pregnant with D.J.G., which father knew. Related to that offense, father

hit mother’s car in “a head-on collision” with his car, and then pulled a man, who

was in mother’s car, out of her car and “assaulted him.” Father hit mother’s car “so

hard” with his car “that there was actual front-end damage to both” cars. Jones noted

that such behavior by father constituted “endangering conduct” because father

“knew that [mother] was pregnant and he used a [car] as a weapon to harm not only

her but also [D.J.G.,] his unborn child.”

      Jones stated that father’s charge for the 2021 offense of aggravated assault of

a family member was still pending at the time of trial, and related to that pending

criminal charge, father was subject to certain “bond conditions.” As part of his bond

conditions, father was supposed to stay away from mother and was supposed to

refrain from alcohol and narcotics use. Jones testified that father had violated those

bond conditions during the pendency of this case. According to Jones, father’s

failure to comply with his bond conditions was concerning because if his “bond

                                            7
[was] revoked,” “he would go back to jail.” Further, if father was convicted of the

offense   of   aggravated     assault   of       a   family   member,   father   would

“face a significant [amount of] time in jail.” And if father went to jail, “where [was

D.J.G.] going to go?”

      Jones also testified that father was given a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) that

he was ordered to complete. As part of his FSP, father was required to provide proof

of stable housing and stable income, complete a psychosocial assessment, a domestic

violence assessment, and a substance abuse assessment, and participate in

narcotics-use testing. Prior to trial, father had not completed the requirements of his

FSP, and according to Jones, father’s failure to complete his FSP showed an

inconsistency in his life and a lack of a desire to address why D.J.G. had entered

DFPS’s care.

      Jones explained that father had not provided proof of stable housing, and

father had only provided “sporadic pay stubs,” which did not show a “stability of

income.” As to father’s income, Jones noted that father had not provided any

“paycheck stubs” related to the limousine company where he purportedly worked.

And although father had told DFPS that he did “car repairs as kind of a side job,” he

had not provided any verifiable invoices or bank statements to “prove that income

[was] consistently coming in.” Another DFPS caseworker had previously explained

                                             8
to father that she would not be able to verify his income based on the invoices that

he had provided.

      Jones further testified that father had completed his psychosocial assessment,

and it recommended that father participate in a psychological evaluation, individual

counseling, anger management classes, and a domestic violence treatment program.

But father did not complete his psychological evaluation. Father did complete his

substance abuse assessment, and he participated in individual counseling. And he

completed his anger management classes. Father had completed six or seven

individual “substance abuse therapy” classes from June 2022 to July 2022, but Jones

stated that father needed more treatment because of his substantial history of

narcotics use. Father also had not participated in “group therapy for substance

abuse” which was required.11 And he had not completed a domestic violence

treatment program. It appeared to Jones that father was attempting to rush to

complete the requirements of his FSP at the last minute before trial.

      As to father’s narcotics use, Jones testified that on October 14, 2021, father

tested positive for benzodiazepines. In November 2021, father tested negative for

narcotics use. But on December 20, 2021, father tested positive for oxymorphone

11
      Jones noted that father purportedly participated in an “inpatient [substance abuse]
      treatment program” in March 2022, but father had not “sign[ed] a release of
      information with” that program so that DFPS could “receive any notes or anything”
      from the program related to father.

                                           9
and oxycodone.      On February 28, 2022, father tested positive for cocaine,

oxymorphone, and oxycodone. In May 2022, father tested positive for oxycodone.

Father tested negative for narcotics use in July and August 2022. According to

Jones, father’s narcotics-use testing showed an increase in narcotics-use over time.

And father’s pattern of narcotics use during the pendency of this case constituted

endangering conduct. Although father’s most recent narcotics-use test was negative,

that was not enough to show sobriety.

      During her testimony, Jones expressed concerns about father’s parental

abilities. Jones noted that father and D.J.G. appeared bonded at visits, and father

had brought food and clothes to a visit. But at some of his visits with D.J.G., father

appeared intoxicated. He was slurring his words, stumbling, and could not keep his

balance. These visits were terminated early because of father’s behavior. Jones also

explained that father had brought mother, who waited in the car, to one of his visits

with D.J.G., even though mother’s visits with D.J.G. had been suspended by the trial

court and father, as part of his bond conditions related to his pending charge for the

offense of aggravated assault of a family member, was not supposed to be near

mother. Jones noted that mother’s presence with father at the visit indicated the

possibility of “a continued relationship” between mother and father and that mother

may have access to D.J.G. if he was placed in father’s care. It would be detrimental

                                         10
for mother to have access to D.J.G. because of her significant history of narcotics

use12 and her complete failure to participate in the pending case.

      As to D.J.G., Jones testified that D.J.G. had been in the same two-parent foster

home since he had entered DFPS’s care in 2021. D.J.G.’s foster parents wanted to

adopt D.J.G. D.J.G.’s foster parents were aware that D.J.G. had biological siblings,

and they were willing to ensure that he remained in contact with those siblings as

much as possible.

      Jones also testified that D.J.G. was thriving in his placement with his foster

parents, and his foster parents were meeting his physical and emotional needs. While

in his foster parents’ care, D.J.G. had received a dental examination and his

“one-year-old [medical] checkup.” D.J.G. was “a little delayed” developmentally.

He had only recently started crawling, despite already being one-year old. He

received occupational therapy and physical therapy to help with his development.

D.J.G. had been making progress developmentally through his therapies. And Jones

noted that therapies, including speech therapy, occupational therapy, and physical

therapy, were planned for D.J.G. in the future.

      According to Jones, D.J.G. was a young, vulnerable, and fragile child, who

needed a nurturing, protective, and safe environment in which to live. D.J.G.’s foster

12
      Jones recalled that mother had admitted to using methamphetamine and marijuana
      while pregnant with D.J.G. And mother tested positive for heroin use after D.J.G.’s
      birth. Mother’s narcotics use contributed to D.J.G.’s premature birth.

                                          11
parents had been providing such an environment for him and would continue to do

so. In Jones’s opinion, D.J.G.’s foster parents were able to meet his needs now and

in the future.

       In contrast, for father to establish that he could provide a safe and stable

environment for D.J.G., father would need to show that his home was a

narcotics-free environment, he was remaining narcotics-free, he was not engaging

in criminal activity, he was continuing to seek treatment for his narcotics use, and

he had a consistent income. And at the time of trial, father had not been able to

establish those things. As to father’s housing, Jones testified that father had not

provided an actual lease agreement for the place where he lived; there was no contact

information for his landlord on the document father had given to DFPS.13 The

document that father had provided was not sufficient to establish stable housing.

And Jones believed that when another DFPS caseworker had tried to visit father’s

home, father was unavailable.

       Child Advocates Representative Andrews

       Child Advocates, Inc. (“Child Advocates”) representative Sarah Andrews

testified that D.J.G. was a happy child. His foster parents were highly supportive of

13
       Jones explained, as to the document that father had given to DFPS: “[I]t’s not like
       your average lease where you either have a landlord or . . . you have an apartment
       complex and it’s through management that has the address, the name, the length of
       stay, all the different addendums and whoever is renting it out to you, their contact
       information. . . . [T]hat’s what it was lacking.”

                                            12
him and were facilitating his developmental needs through therapy. D.J.G.’s foster

parents had a loving home and other young children in the home. They were meeting

D.J.G.’s needs and would be able to meet his needs in the future.

      As to mother, Andrews testified that she was unable to provide a safe and

stable environment for D.J.G. Mother had wholly failed to respond to DFPS during

the pendency of the case.

      As to father, Andrews expressed concern about father’s pending charge for

the offense of aggravated assault of a family member because father’s behavior

related to that offense endangered both mother and D.J.G. Andrews also expressed

concern about father’s history of narcotics use and noted that Child Advocates

wanted father to engage in an intensive sobriety program, such as a “relapse

prevention program” that included “a sponsor.” And she explained that a longer

period of negative narcotics-use testing by father was necessary to show that father

could provide a safe and stable environment for D.J.G. Neither father’s criminal

history nor his history of narcotics use showed that he was capable of providing a

safe and stable environment for D.J.G. According to Andrews, father tested positive

for narcotics use in May 2022—about four months before trial.

      Andrews also testified that she had observed some of father’s visits with

D.J.G. and D.J.G. was comfortable with father at visits. Father interacted with

D.J.G. at his visits with the child.

                                        13
      Andrews believed that father’s parental rights to D.J.G. should be terminated

because he had not had a long history of “clean drug tests and sobriety.” Child

Advocates was only given information about father’s housing seven days before

trial, which made it hard to visit his home. And there were concerns about father’s

potential ongoing relationship with mother, and mother’s access to D.J.G. if he was

placed in father’s care. Although mother’s visits with D.J.G. were suspended in the

case, mother had accompanied father to one of father’s visits with D.J.G., and she

waited in the car for the visit to be completed.

      Foster Mother

      D.J.G.’s foster mother testified that D.J.G. was placed in her home on October

4, 2021. D.J.G. had developmental delays and was behind “on typical milestones.”

He was not rolling over or crawling at one-year old, and he was “apprehensive to

eating.” D.J.G. was mostly formula fed. With occupational therapy and physical

therapy, D.J.G. had made significant improvements. Within the last four to six

weeks before trial, D.J.G.’s foster mother had seen progression with D.J.G.’s

crawling and standing up around furniture. D.J.G. attended occupational therapy

and physical therapy on a weekly basis. D.J.G. was also seeing an eating specialist

to aid him with his food progression, and he was going to start speech therapy soon.

The speech therapy was for “early intervention” and was also going to work with

him on eating.

                                          14
      D.J.G.’s foster mother noted that after D.J.G. came to live with her family,

she and her husband also sought to have one of mother’s older children—D.J.G.’s

older brother—come live with them to try to “keep a bio sibling group together.” At

first, the older brother got along well with D.J.G., but this was before the foster

parents were given clearance to tell the older brother that D.J.G. was his biological

sibling. After receiving clearance and telling the older brother that D.J.G. was his

biological sibling and “who [D.J.G.’s] father was,” the older brother would not go

near D.J.G. The older brother, although he tried, was unable to interact with D.J.G.

“in a healthy way.”

      D.J.G.’s foster mother noted that when the older brother found out that father

was D.J.G.’s father, he became physically upset. The older brother told the foster

mother that D.J.G. “was just a constant reminder of . . . mother and of [father] and it

brought back a lot of bad memories for him and he just couldn’t disconnect and

accept [D.J.G.] as his biological sibling.” While previously living with mother, the

older brother had witnessed domestic violence between mother and father. He told

D.J.G.’s foster mother that mother and father’s relationship had been “very physical”

and it contained “a lot of violence,” “a lot of drug use,” and “a lot of sexual activity

in front of” the older brother and his siblings. The older brother often saw mother

“pretty much comatose[] on opioids.” And he stated that he saw mother “get beat

down and busted up” by father; “it was just almost nonstop.” Mother and father’s

                                          15
relationship had traumatized the older brother, and the older brother displayed

similar violent behaviors while in D.J.G.’s foster mother’s home, which the foster

mother believed had been learned while in the care of mother. Eventually, the older

brother was placed in another foster home and D.J.G. remained with his foster

parents. Given what she had learned from D.J.G.’s older brother and the behaviors

he displayed, D.J.G.’s foster mother stated that she believed it would be detrimental

for D.J.G. to be placed in father’s care.

      D.J.G.’s foster mother further testified that she and her husband wanted to

adopt D.J.G. D.J.G.’s foster parents had also adopted twins, so D.J.G. had siblings

in the home. D.J.G.’s foster mother noted that she had facilitated “FaceTime

visits”14 with one of D.J.G.’s biological sisters, and D.J.G. had “in-person visits with

all of [his biological] siblings.” D.J.G.’s foster parents were open and supportive of

D.J.G. having contact with his biological siblings.

      According to D.J.G.’s foster mother, D.J.G. was going to need “therapeutic

services for several years to kind of catch up” developmentally and she and her

husband were willing to provide that for him as long as he needed it.

14
      “Facetime is a[] [cellular telephone] application that allows individuals to make
      video calls from telephones. FaceTime also may run from other electronic devices.”
      Oballe v. State, No. 01-20-00075-CR, 2020 WL 6494191, at *3 n.4 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
      (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).

                                            16
      Father

      Father testified that he was D.J.G.’s father. Father stated that he lived in a

“unit” that he was leasing from an individual person. He provided the DFPS

caseworker with “a lease.” Father worked for a limousine company, and the last

time he had given the DFPS caseworker a paycheck stub was in July 2022.

According to father, his work with the limousine company was slow, so he had a

side business “picking up customers and customers calling [him] to do work on their

vehicles.” He had provided the DFPS caseworker with “invoices” related to his side

business. He did not have a bank account so he could not provide bank statements

to show his income.

      Father testified that his income was about $3,500 or $4,000 a month. He paid

$800 a month for rent. In total, the amount of his bills each month was less than

$2,000.

      As to his narcotics use, father stated that he began using opiates in 2020 and

he previously used oxycodone. He “went into rehab” in the spring of 2022 “to get

help to get [himself] away from painkillers.” According to father, he was at a detox

center for thirty days. While there, father attended counseling three times a week.

He was discharged from the detox center on April 2, 2022. Father stated that he sent

a DFPS caseworker “a text [message] with images that [he] was discharged” and he

signed “a release for her to get all . . . [the] information she needed” from the detox

                                          17
center. Father did not have a sponsor, but he was participating in a “higher power

program.”

      As to his FSP, father testified that he received his FSP in November 2021.

But, he did not start working on the requirements of his FSP until thirty days after

he left the detox center. Father noted that before entering the detox center, he did

not complete any of the requirements of his FSP because his father “caught

COVID-19”15 in January 2022 and died in February 2022. And during the thirty

days after leaving the detox center, father “took . . . [thirty] days not to do anything”

before “start[ing] [the] things [he] needed to do.”

      As to completing the requirements of his FSP, father stated that he had

participated in individual counseling and was successfully discharged. Although he

had been required to participate in a domestic violence treatment program, he had

not completed that requirement yet because he had “login problems.” Father also

had not completed his psychological evaluation. Father admitted that he had not

completed all of the requirements of his FSP.

      As to mother, father stated that he did not have contact with her. But the last

time that he saw her, mother gave him a ride to his visit with D.J.G. during the

pendency of the case. Father admitted that having contact with mother at that time

15
      See generally Kim v. Ramos, 632 S.W.3d 258, 261 n.5, 266 n.13 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (discussing COVID-19 pandemic).

                                           18
violated his “bond condition[s].” But his car was not working, and mother “was

there,” so he asked her for a ride.

      If D.J.G. was placed in his care, father planned to “show him life that [he]

showed for [his] other children.” They would have “time to bond,” and father would

“take him on trips,” “watch him grow,” love him, and care for him. Father had three

other children who were adults. Father’s adult children would be his support system

as well as his mother and his two sisters.

      Father’s FSP

      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of father’s FSP. The FSP states

that DFPS wanted D.J.G. to have a safe, healthy, and permanent home that was free

from narcotics and violence.

      As to D.J.G., the FSP states that he was born prematurely at “[seven] months

gestation.” He was diagnosed with neonatal abstinence syndrome because of

mother’s use of “an opioid dependence medication,” which caused D.J.G. “to

experience withdrawal symptoms” following his birth. D.J.G. needed morphine to

manage his symptoms. D.J.G. experienced difficulty with feeding, which was

common for babies who had been exposed to narcotics during pregnancy.

      As to father, the FSP states that father reported that he lived in an apartment

and he worked two jobs. Father reported that he had previously raised children and

his support system consisted of his adult children and his parents. Father reported

                                             19
that he had not completed high school and did not want “any educational assistance

at this point in his life.” Father stated that he did not have “substance abuse issues”

and he did not engage in domestic violence in his previous relationship. But the

report notes that father tested positive for marijuana use, and mother had reported

that father had “beat her up.”

      Under his FSP, father was required to, among other things: (1) maintain stable

housing for more than six months and provide a lease agreement to DFPS;

(2) maintain employment for six months and provide paycheck stubs to DFPS;

(3) complete a substance abuse assessment and follow its recommendations;

(4) participate in random narcotics-use testing and test negative at all times; and

(5) complete a psychosocial assessment and follow its recommendations.

      Narcotics-Use Testing Records

      The trial court admitted into evidence copies of father’s narcotics-use testing

results.16 The testing results show that on October 14, 2021, father tested positive

for benzodiazepines by urinalysis. On November 30, 2021, father tested negative

for narcotics use. On December 20, 2021, father tested positive for oxycodone and

oxymorphone by urinalysis and positive for oxycodone by hair-follicle testing. On

16
      The trial court also admitted into evidence copies of mother’s narcotics-use testing
      results from 2019, 2020, and 2021. Mother tested positive for narcotics-use while
      pregnant with D.J.G. After D.J.G.’s birth, mother tested positive for heroin by
      hair-follicle testing. Mother stopped participating in narcotics-use testing in August
      2021.

                                            20
February 17, 2022, father failed to appear for narcotics-use testing as ordered by the

trial court.17 On February 28, 2022, father tested positive for benzodiazepines,

oxycodone, and oxymorphone by urinalysis and cocaine, oxycodone, and

oxymorphone by hair-follicle testing. On May 11, 2022, father tested negative for

narcotics use by urinalysis, but positive for oxycodone by hair-follicle testing. On

May 31, 2022, father tested negative for narcotics use by urinalysis, but positive for

oxycodone by hair-follicle testing.

      Criminal History

      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the indictment related to

appellant’s commission of the 2018 misdemeanor offense of assault of a family

member.     The indictment alleged that, on or about April 11, 2018, father

“intentionally and knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to [mother], a person with

whom [father] had a dating relationship, . . . by striking [mother] with his hand.”18

The trial court also admitted into evidence a copy of the judgment of conviction

showing that on May 2, 2019, father was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of

assault of a family member and was sentenced to confinement for 300 days. The

17
      A copy of the trial court’s February 17, 2022 order requiring father to immediately
      report to the National Screening Center to submit to narcotics-use testing was
      admitted into evidence at trial.
18
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1); see also id. § 12.21 (“An individual
      adjudged guilty of a [c]lass A misdemeanor [offense] shall be punished by: (1) a
      fine not to exceed $4,000; (2) confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year;
      or (3) both such fine and confinement.”).

                                           21
trial court then suspended father’s sentence, placed father on community supervision

for fifteen months, and assessed a fine of $100.

      The trial court further admitted into evidence a copy of the indictment related

to the 2021 felony offense of aggravated assault of a family member with which

appellant was charged at the time of trial. The indictment alleged that, on or about

April 3, 2021, father “unlawfully, intentionally[,] and knowingly threaten[ed]

[mother], . . . a person with whom [father] had a dating relationship, with imminent

bodily injury by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely a motor vehicle.”19

      Related to the charged felony offense of aggravated assault of a family

member, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of father’s bond conditions,

which required father, among other things, to have no contact with mother and to

refrain from using, possessing, or consuming alcohol, controlled substances,

“dangerous drug[s],” or marijuana unless prescribed by a medical doctor.

      September 2022 Permanency Report

      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a September 2022

permanency report filed by DFPS. As to D.J.G., the permanency report states that

he had been in his placement with his foster parents since September 30, 2021.

19
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(1); see also TEX. FAM.
      CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32 (“An individual
      adjudged guilty of a felony of the first degree shall be punished by imprisonment in
      the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life or for any term of not more than
      99 years or less than 5 years [and] . . . a fine not to exceed $10,000.”).

                                           22
D.J.G. was one year old, “nonverbal,” and could not walk or crawl. He had feeding

difficulties. D.J.G. was developmentally delayed, and he received occupational,

physical, and speech therapy. D.J.G.’s mental, social, physical, and medical needs

were being met in his foster home. D.J.G. loved his foster family, and he participated

in age-appropriate activities with his foster family. He was interested in playing

with toys and his foster siblings. D.J.G.’s foster parents “ensured that he [was] able

to live a normal life.”

      While in his foster parents’ care, D.J.G. had received medical and dental

checkups. It was recommended that D.J.G. continue with physical and occupational

therapy to address his developmental delays.

      As to father, the permanency report states that he had consistently visited

D.J.G. during the pendency of the case. And father had contact with mother. Father

tested positive for marijuana by hair-follicle testing on September 28, 2021, positive

for oxycodone by urinalysis and hair-follicle testing on December 20, 2021, positive

for cocaine, oxycodone, and oxymorphone by hair-follicle testing on February 28,

2022, and positive for oxycodone by hair-follicle testing on May 31, 2022. Father

tested negative for narcotics use by urinalysis on May 11, 2022, June 15, 2022, July

14, 2022, July 28, 2022, August 9, 2022, and August 25, 2022.

      As to father’s FSP, the permanency report states that father completed his

psychosocial evaluation on April 1, 2022, which recommended that father complete

                                         23
a psychological evaluation and participate in individual counseling, anger

management classes, domestic violence education, and substance abuse individual

and group therapy. The permanency report also states that father completed his

domestic violence assessment on April 1, 2022, which recommended that father

participate in individual counseling, complete a substance abuse assessment and

substance abuse treatment, and a psychological evaluation. Further, on April 1,

2022, father completed a substance abuse assessment, which recommended that

father participate in individual and group substance abuse counseling, complete a

psychological evaluation, participate in a domestic violence treatment program, and

participate in domestic violence education.

      Additionally, as to father’s FSP, the permanency report states that although

father had reported to DFPS that he had housing, he gave DFPS a new address on

September 5, 2022 and he had not provided a lease agreement related to this new

address. Father also told DFPS that he was employed, but he had not provided proof

of employment to the DFPS caseworker. Father had signed the required release of

information form for DFPS.

      The permanency report states that DFPS was recommending that father’s

parental rights be terminated and that D.J.G. remain in his placement with his foster

parents.

                                         24
                                Sufficiency of Evidence

      In his first, second and third issues, father argues that the trial court erred in

terminating his parental rights to D.J.G. because the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that father knowingly placed, or

knowingly allowed D.J.G. to remain, in conditions or surroundings which

endangered his physical or emotional well-being, engaged, or knowingly placed

D.J.G. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered his physical and

emotional well-being, and failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that

specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of D.J.G.20

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). In his fourth issue, father

argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights to D.J.G. because

20
      In its appellee’s brief, DFPS concedes that the evidence is legally insufficient to
      support the trial court’s finding that father knowingly placed, or knowingly allowed
      D.J.G. to remain, in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or
      emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Thus, we
      sustain the portion of father’s first issue in which he asserts that the that the evidence
      is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that father knowingly
      placed, or knowingly allowed D.J.G. to remain, in conditions or surroundings which
      endangered his physical or emotional well-being. See In re S.A.Y.W., No.
      14-16-00280-CV, 2016 WL 4705767, at *3, *5 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
      Dist.] Sept. 8, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (sustaining parent’s challenge to
      sufficiency of evidence supporting trial court’s finding under Texas Family Code
      section 161.001(b)(1)(K) and (N) because DFPS conceded evidence insufficient).
      But the sustaining of a portion of father’s first issue does not affect the ultimate
      disposition of the appeal as discussed below. See infra. We also need not address
      the remaining portion of father’s first issue in which he asserts that the evidence is
      factually insufficient to support trial court’s finding that father knowingly placed,
      or knowingly allowed D.J.G. to remain, in conditions or surroundings which
      endangered his physical or emotional well-being.
                                              25
the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that

termination of his parental rights was in the best interest of D.J.G.              See id.

§ 161.001(b)(2).

       A parent’s right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management” of

his child is a constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right.”

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). The

United States Supreme Court has emphasized that “the interest of [a] parent[] in the

care, custody, and control of [his] child[] . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental

liberty interests recognized by th[e] Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65

(2000). Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court has concluded that “[t]his natural

parental right” is “essential,” “a basic civil right of man,” and “far more precious

than property rights.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (internal

quotations omitted). Consequently, “[w]e strictly construe involuntary termination

statutes in favor of the parent.” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012).

       Because termination of parental rights is “complete, final, irrevocable and

divests for all time that natural right . . . , the evidence in support of termination must

be clear and convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights.”

Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree

of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction

as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

                                            26
§ 101.007; see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Because the

standard of proof is “clear and convincing evidence,” the Texas Supreme Court has

held that the traditional legal and factual standards of review are inadequate. In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264–68.

      In conducting a legal-sufficiency review in a termination-of-parental-rights

case, we must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the finding, is such that the fact finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief

or conviction about the truth of the matter on which DFPS bore the burden of proof.

Id. at 266. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we

“must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a

reasonable factfinder could do so,” and we “should disregard all evidence that a

reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” In

re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). However,

this does not mean that we must disregard all evidence that does not support the

finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Because of the heightened standard, we

must also be mindful of any undisputed evidence contrary to the finding and consider

that evidence in our analysis. Id. If we determine that no reasonable trier of fact

could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, we

must hold the evidence to be legally insufficient and render judgment in favor of the

parent. Id.

                                          27
      In conducting a factual-sufficiency review in a termination-of-parental-rights

case, we must determine whether, considering the entire record, including evidence

both supporting and contradicting the finding, a fact finder reasonably could have

formed a firm conviction or belief about the truth of the matter on which DFPS bore

the burden of proof. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We should

consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could

not have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96

S.W.3d at 266. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant

that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then

the evidence is factually insufficient.” In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex.

2006) (internal quotations omitted).

      In order to terminate the parent-child relationship, DFPS must establish, by

clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated in

Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination of parental rights is

in the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). Both

elements must be established, and termination may not be based solely on the best

interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. See id.; Tex. Dep’t of Human

Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). Notably though, “[o]nly one

predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a judgment

                                          28
of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best

interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).

A.    Endangerment

      In his second issue, father argues that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to D.J.G.

under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) because although evidence was

presented at trial about father’s narcotics use, domestic violence between mother and

father, father’s knowledge of mother’s narcotics use and criminal activity, and

father’s criminal history, the evidence did not constitute “clear and convincing”

evidence which was “required to terminate [father’s] parental rights.” See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

      A trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear

and convincing evidence that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly

placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the

physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Within this

context, endangerment encompasses “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or

the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment.” Boyd, 727 S.W.2d

at 533. Instead, “endanger” means to expose the child to loss or injury or to

jeopardize their emotional or physical health. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see

                                         29
also Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 616 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

      We must look at a parent’s conduct standing alone, including his actions and

omissions. In re J.W., 152 S.W.3d 200, 205 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied).

It is not necessary to establish that a parent intended to endanger the child. See In

re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1996); In re L.M.N., No. 01-18-00413-CV, 2018

WL 5831672, at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2018, pet. denied)

(mem. op.). But termination of parental rights requires “more than a single act or

omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is

required.” In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no

pet.); see also In re L.M.N., 2018 WL 5831672, at *14; In re J.W., 152 S.W.3d at

205. The specific danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred from parental

misconduct, even if the conduct is not directed at the child and the child suffers no

actual injury. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re L.M.N., 2018 WL 5831672, at

*14; In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

Courts may consider parental conduct that did not occur in the child’s presence,

including conduct that occurred after the child was removed by DFPS. In re L.M.N.,

2018 WL 5831672, at *14; In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

                                         30
      A parent’s narcotics use can qualify as a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious

course of conduct that endangers the child’s well-being.               In re T.S., No.

01-22-00054-CV, 2022 WL 4474277, at *30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept.

27, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 751 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2019, pet. denied); In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 361–62 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). And continued narcotics use after a child’s removal is

conduct that jeopardizes a parent’s parental rights and may be considered as

establishing an endangering course of conduct. In re T.S., 2022 WL 4474277, at

*30; In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 751; In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 361–62; see also

Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (considering conduct jeopardizing

parental rights as part of course of conduct endangering well-being of child). When

“a   parent   engages    in   [narcotics]        use   during   the   pendency   of   a

[termination-of-parental-rights case], when he knows he is at risk of losing his

child[], the evidence is legally sufficient to support a [trial court’s] finding of

endangerment.” In re D.D.M., No. 01-18-01033-CV, 2019 WL 2939259, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re T.S., 2022

WL 4474277, at *30; In re R.S., No. 01-20-00126-CV, 2020 WL 4289978, at *7

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Parental

[narcotics] use remains endangering conduct even if the child was not in the parent’s

                                            31
custody when the [narcotics] use occurred.”); In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (“Because the evidence showed that

the [parent] engaged in illegal [narcotics] use during the pendency of the termination

suit, when he knew he was at risk of losing his children, we hold that the evidence

is legally sufficient to support a finding of endangerment.”). Further, when the

evidence shows that the parent engaged in narcotics use during the pendency of the

termination suit, and no evidence directly contradicts that, the evidence is factually

sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment finding. See In re A.M., 495

S.W.3d at 580; see also In re D.D.M., 2019 WL 2939259, at *5.

      Father testified that he began using opiates in 2020 and he had previously used

oxycodone. The narcotics-use testing results admitted into evidence show that,

during the pendency of this case, father tested positive on October 14, 2021 for

benzodiazepines by urinalysis; positive on December 20, 2021 for oxycodone and

oxymorphone by urinalysis and positive for oxycodone by hair-follicle testing;

positive on February 28, 2022 for benzodiazepines, oxycodone, and oxymorphone

by urinalysis and positive for cocaine, oxycodone, and oxymorphone by hair-follicle

testing; positive on May 11, 2022 for oxycodone by hair-follicle testing; and positive

on May 31, 2022 for oxycodone by hair-follicle testing.21 Further, on February 17,

21
      Appellant, in his briefing, complains that no expert testified as “to provide any
      interpretation” of the narcotics-use testing results. However, appellant provides no
      authority to support his assertion that expert testimony was needed or required. See
                                           32
2022, father failed to appear for narcotics-use testing as ordered by the trial court.

See In re I.W., No. 14-15-00910-CV, 2016 WL 1533972, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] Apr. 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent’s “refusal to submit to the

drug test may be treated by the [fact finder] as if he had tested positive for drugs”);

see also In re C.A.B., 289 S.W.3d 874, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009,

no pet.) (fact finder could infer parent’s failure to submit to court-ordered

narcotics-use testing indicated she was avoiding testing because she was using

narcotics).

       Additionally, the permanency report states that father tested positive for

marijuana by urinalysis on September 28, 2021.22 And DFPS caseworker Jones

testified that father, during the pendency of this case, tested positive for narcotics

use on October 14, 2021, December 20, 2021, February 28, 2022, and May 2022.

From the evidence admitted at trial, the trial court could have reasonably inferred

that   father   engaged     in   narcotics    use   during    the   pendency     of   the

termination-of-parental-rights case. See In re D.D.M., 2019 WL 2939259, at *4–5;

       TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“[Appellant’s] brief must contain a clear and concise
       argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to
       the record.”). The failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue or cite
       appropriate authority waives a complaint on appeal. Marin Real Estate Partners,
       L.P. v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Huey v.
       Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).
22
       The permanency report also lists the other dates, identified by the narcotics-use
       testing results, when father tested positive for narcotics use.

                                             33
In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d at 580; see also In re D.L.W.W., 617 S.W.3d 64, 78–79 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (“[W]e have [previously] concluded that

illegal narcotics use may support termination under Texas Family Code section

161.001(b)(1)(E).”); In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 831–32 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (“[A] parent’s decision to engage in illegal drug use

during the pendency of a termination suit, when the parent is at risk of losing a child,

may support a finding that the parent engaged in conduct that endangered the child’s

physical or emotional well-being.” (alteration in original) (internal quotations

omitted)).

      We further note that “[a]s a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life

of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of

[the] child.” In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 739. And a parent’s abusive or violent

conduct can produce an environment that endangers the child’s well-being. In re

J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see

also D.N. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-15-00658-CV, 2016 WL

1407808, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 8, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[D]omestic

violence may constitute endangerment, even if the violence is not directed at the

child.”). While direct physical abuse clearly endangers a child, domestic violence,

want of self-control, and a propensity for violence may also be considered as

evidence of endangerment.            See In re J.S.B., Nos. 01-17-00480-CV,

                                          34
01-17-00481-CV, 01-17-00484-CV, 2017 WL 6520437, at *16 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 21, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d

at 845; see also In re B. J. B., 546 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1977,

writ ref’d n.r.e.) (considering parent’s lack of self-control and propensity for

violence and aggression).

      Moreover, courts have routinely considered evidence of parent-on-parent

physical abuse in termination cases without requiring evidence that the conduct

resulted in a criminal conviction. See In re A.K.T., No. 01-18-00647-CV, 2018 WL

6423381, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2018, pet. denied) (mem.

op.); In re W.S.M., 107 S.W.3d 772, 772 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.)

(parent physically abused child’s other parent); Spangler v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective

& Regulatory Servs., 962 S.W.2d 253, 260 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, no pet.); see

also In re DC, No. 01-11-00387-CV, 2012 WL 682289, at *9–10 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 1, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parent’s testimony other

parent physically and mentally abused her supported termination of other parent’s

parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E)); Jordan v.

Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)

(evidence of how parent treated another parent relevant). And evidence that a parent

has engaged in abusive or violent conduct in the past permits an inference that he

will continue his violent behavior in the future. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 724.

                                         35
      Here, the evidence shows that father was previously convicted of assaulting

mother. The indictment related to father’s commission of the 2018 offense of assault

of a family member alleged that, on or about April 11, 2018, father “intentionally

and knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to [mother], a person with whom [father] had

a dating relationship, . . . by striking [mother] with his hand.” See TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 22.01(a)(1); see also In re J.B.M., No. 04-18-00717-CV, 2019 WL 1139858,

at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Domestic

violence and a propensity for violence may be considered evidence of endangerment,

even if the endangering acts did not occur in the children’s presence, were not

directed at the children, or did not cause actual injury to the children.”). On May 2,

2019, appellant was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of assault of a family

member and was sentenced to confinement for 300 days. See TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 12.21 (“An individual adjudged guilty of a [c]lass A misdemeanor [offense]

shall be punished by: (1) a fine not to exceed $4,000; (2) confinement in jail for a

term not to exceed one year; or (3) both such fine and confinement.”). The trial court

then suspended father’s sentence, placed father on community supervision for fifteen

months, and assessed a fine of $100. Related to father’s commission of the 2018

offense of assault of a family member, Jones testified that father struck mother with

his hand and he had been found guilty of the offense. See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at

360–61 (“[E]vidence of criminal conduct, convictions, or imprisonment is relevant

                                         36
to a review of whether a parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the

well-being of [a] child.”); see also In re T.M., No. 14-14-00948-CV, 2015 WL

1778949, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(although incarceration alone will not support termination of parental rights,

evidence of criminal conduct, convictions, and imprisonment may support finding

of endangerment); In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d at 426–27 (criminal offenses

“significantly harm the parenting relationship” and “can constitute endangerment

even if the criminal conduct transpires outside the child’s presence”).

      Jones also testified that father had more recently been charged with the offense

of aggravated assault of a family member, stemming from an incident in 2021

between mother and father. As to that offense, Jones stated that the offense occurred

on April 3, 2021, when mother was five-months pregnant with D.J.G. Father hit

mother’s car in “a head-on collision” with his car, and he then pulled a man, who

was in mother’s car, out of her car and “assaulted him.” Father hit mother’s car “so

hard” with his car “that there was actual front-end damage to both” cars. Father

knew mother was pregnant at the time of the commission of the 2021

aggravated-assault-of-a-family-member offense.        And Jones stated that such

behavior by father constituted “endangering conduct” because father “knew that

[mother] was pregnant and he used a [car] as a weapon to harm not only her but also

his unborn child.” See In re J.B.M., 2019 WL 1139858, at *2 (“Domestic violence

                                         37
and a propensity for violence may be considered evidence of endangerment, even if

the endangering acts did not occur in the children’s presence, were not directed at

the children, or did not cause actual injury to the children.”). At the time of trial in

the instant case, father’s charge for the 2021 aggravated-assault-of-a-family-member

offense was still pending, but if father is convicted of that offense, Jones stated that

he would “face a significant [amount of] time in jail.” See In re S.D., 980 S.W.2d

758, 763 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (“An environment which

routinely subjects a child to the probability that she will be left alone because her

parent[] [is] once again jailed . . . endangers both the physical and emotional

well-being of [the] child.”); see also In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d at 426–27 (criminal

offenses “significantly harm the parenting relationship” and “can constitute

endangerment even if the criminal conduct transpires outside the child’s presence”).

      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the indictment related to the

2021 felony offense of aggravated assault of a family member with which appellant

was charged.23 The indictment alleged that, on or about April 3, 2021, father

23
      Father, in his briefing, in discussing the 2021 felony offense of aggravated assault
      of a family member, states that the trial court erroneously admitted “the [c]omplaint
      filed by the Harris County District Attorney,” which “contained a statement by a
      Houston Police Department officer regarding the alleged events giving rise to the
      charge.” Appellant did not raise as an issue on appeal whether the trial court erred
      in admitting Exhibit 33—the complaint related to father’s pending charge for the
      2021 offense of aggravated assault of a family member. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f)
      (requiring appellant’s brief to concisely state all issues presented for review); Jacobs
      v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655–56 (Tex. 2001) (failure to raise issue on appeal
      waives error). Nevertheless, we have not, and need not, consider Exhibit 33 in
                                             38
“unlawfully, intentionally[,] and knowingly threaten[ed] [mother], . . . a person with

whom [father] had a dating relationship, with imminent bodily injury by using and

exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely a motor vehicle.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(1); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b);

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32 (“An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the

first degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years

[and] . . . a fine not to exceed $10,000.”); see also In re J.B.M., 2019 WL 1139858,

at *2 (“Domestic violence and a propensity for violence may be considered evidence

of endangerment, even if the endangering acts did not occur in the children’s

presence, were not directed at the children, or did not cause actual injury to the

children.”). Notably, charged offenses themselves are relevant to the endangerment

analysis, even where no criminal conviction has yet resulted. See In re J.B., No.

02-22-00384-CV, 2023 WL 1859766, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2023,

pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also In re S.A., No. 12-22-00111-CV, --- S.W.3d ---,

2022 WL 16558456, at *5 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 31, 2022, pet. denied) (“Criminal

      addressing appellant’s complaint that the evidence is legally and factually
      insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that father engaged, or knowingly
      placed D.J.G. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered his physical
      and emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

                                          39
acts that also constitute domestic violence need not lead to indictment or conviction

in order to be considered under the family code.”)

      Finally, in general, as to mother and father’s relationship, Jones testified that

the relationship was “extremely violent,” and she stated that when father found out

that mother was pregnant with D.J.G., he assaulted her. D.J.G.’s foster mother also

testified that D.J.G.’s older brother, who lived with mother while she was in a

relationship with father, reported that he had witnessed domestic violence between

mother and father.24 He told D.J.G.’s foster mother that mother and father’s

relationship had been “very physical” and it contained “a lot of violence,” “a lot of

drug use,” and “a lot of sexual activity in front of” the older brother and his siblings.

The older brother often saw mother “pretty much comatose[] on opioids.” And he

stated that he saw mother “get beat down and busted up” by father; “it was just

almost nonstop.” Mother and father’s relationship traumatized the older brother who

could not be around D.J.G. because D.J.G. “was just a constant reminder

of . . . mother and of [father] and it brought back a lot of bad memories for him and

he just couldn’t disconnect and accept [D.J.G.] as his biological sibling.” See In re

J.S.B., 2017 WL 6520437, at *16 (domestic violence, want of self-control, and

propensity for violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment); D.N.,

24
      Father acknowledged in his briefing that the foster mother’s testimony about what
      D.J.G.’s older brother told her was “unobjected-to.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

                                           40
2016 WL 1407808, at *2 (“[D]omestic violence may constitute endangerment, even

if the violence is not directed at the child.”); In re A.V.M., No. 13-12-00684-CV,

2013 WL 1932887, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 9, 2013, pet.

denied) (mem. op.) (“It is self[-]evident that parents perpetrating violence towards

certain [other] members of the family threaten the emotional developmental and

well-being of any child.”).

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding,

we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that

father engaged, or knowingly placed D.J.G. with persons who engaged, in conduct

that endangered D.J.G.’s physical and emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). And, viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude

that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that father

engaged, or knowingly placed D.J.G. with persons who engaged, in conduct that

endangered D.J.G.’s physical and emotional well-being. See id. Further, we

conclude that the trial court could have reconciled any disputed evidence in favor of

finding that father engaged, or knowingly placed D.J.G. with persons who engaged,

in conduct that endangered D.J.G.’s physical and emotional well-being or any

disputed evidence was not so significant that a fact finder could not have reasonably

formed a firm belief or conviction that father engaged, or knowingly placed D.J.G.

                                          41
with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered D.J.G.’s physical and

emotional well-being. See id.

      Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that father engaged, or knowingly placed D.J.G. with

persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered D.J.G.’s physical and emotional

well-being. See id.

      We overrule father’s second issue.

      As previously noted, only one predicate finding under Texas Family Code

section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support termination of father’s parental rights

to D.J.G. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362. Accordingly, having held that the

evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding, under

Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E)—that father engaged, or knowingly

placed D.J.G. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered D.J.G.’s

physical and emotional well-being—we need not address father’s third issue in

which he argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the

trial court’s finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O) that father

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the

actions necessary for him to obtain the return of D.J.G. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(O); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362; Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 618; see

also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                          42
B.    Best Interest

      In his fourth issue, father argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best

interest of D.J.G. because D.J.G. was “equally happy with both [his] foster parents

and [f]ather,” there was no evidence that father could not meet D.J.G.’s needs, father

was not in an “ongoing relationship” with mother, father did not have a “deficit in

parenting skills,” father had a support system, there was no evidence that father was

unable to provide a stable environment for D.J.G., and father completed “the vast

majority of” the requirements of his FSP.

      The best-interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the child. See In re

M.A.A., No. 01-20-00709-CV, 2021 WL 1134308, at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). It is presumed that the prompt and permanent

placement of the child in a safe environment is in his best interest. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 263.307(a); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d at 383.

      There is also a strong presumption that the child’s best interest is served by

maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Thus, we strictly scrutinize termination

proceedings in favor of the parent. See In re M.A.A., 2021 WL 1134308, at *20; In

re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.).

                                           43
        In determining whether the termination of father’s parental rights was in the

best interest of D.J.G. we may consider several factors, including: (1) the desires of

D.J.G.; (2) the current and future physical and emotional needs of D.J.G.; (3) the

current and future emotional and physical danger to D.J.G.; (4) the parental abilities

of the parties seeking custody; (5) whether programs are available to assist those

parties; (6) plans for D.J.G. by the parties seeking custody; (7) the stability of the

proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate that the

parent-child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or

omissions. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); In re L.M.,

104 S.W.3d at 647. We may also consider the statutory factors set forth in Texas

Family Code section 263.307. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307; In re A.C., 560

S.W.3d 624, 631 n.29 (Tex. 2018); In re C.A.G., No. 01-11-01094-CV, 2012 WL

2922544, at *6 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem.

op.).

        These factors are not exhaustive, and there is no requirement that DFPS prove

all factors as a condition precedent to the termination of parental rights. See In re

C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; see also In re C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Tex. App.—

Tyler 2003, no pet.) (“[T]he best interest of the child does not require proof of any

unique set of factors nor limit proof to any specific factors.”). The absence of

evidence about some of the factors does not preclude a fact finder from reasonably

                                          44
forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest.

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d 101, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).

      The same evidence of acts and omissions used to establish grounds for

termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) may also be relevant to

determining the best interest of the child. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; In re

L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647. The trial court is given wide latitude in determining the

best interest of the child. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982);

see also Cuellar v. Flores, 238 S.W.2d 991, 992 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1951, no

writ) (trial court “faces the parties and the witnesses, observes their demeanor and

personality, and feels the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by

merely reading the record”).

      1.     Child’s Desires

      When father’s parental rights were terminated, D.J.G. was about one-year old,

and as such, he could not directly express a desire as to whether he wished to be

placed in father’s care or remain in the care of his foster parents.

      When there is no specific evidence of a child’s desires and a child is too young

to express those desires, a fact finder may consider evidence that the child is bonded

with his foster family and receives good care in his current placement. See In re

L.W., No. 01-18-01025-CV, 2019 WL 1523124, at *18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

                                          45
Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re L.M.N., 2018 WL 5831672, at

*20. DFPS caseworker Jones testified that D.J.G. had been in the same two-parent

foster home since he had entered DFPS’s care in 2021. D.J.G.’s foster parents

wanted to adopt him. D.J.G. was thriving in his placement, and his foster parents

were meeting his physical and emotional needs. While in his foster parents’ care,

D.J.G. had received a dental examination and his “one-year-old [medical] checkup.”

Because of his developmental delays, he received occupational and physical therapy.

D.J.G.’s foster parents were providing D.J.G. with a nurturing, protective, and safe

environment.

      Child Advocates representative Andrews similarly testified that D.J.G. was a

happy child and his foster parents were highly supportive of him and were

facilitating his developmental needs through therapy. D.J.G.’s foster parents had a

loving home and other young children in the home. D.J.G.’s foster parents were

meeting his needs and would be able to meet his needs in the future.

      D.J.G.’s foster mother testified that she and her husband wanted to adopt

D.J.G. D.J.G.’s foster parents had also adopted twins, so D.J.G. had siblings in the

home. According to D.J.G.’s foster mother, D.J.G. was going to need “therapeutic

services for several years to kind of catch up” developmentally and she and her

husband were willing to provide that for him as long as he needed it.

                                        46
      D.J.G.’s foster mother also testified that D.J.G. was placed in her home on

October 4, 2021 and had developmental delays and was behind “on typical

milestones.” He was not rolling over or crawling at one-year old, and he was

“apprehensive to eating.” D.J.G. was mostly formula fed. With occupational

therapy and physical therapy, D.J.G. had made significant improvements. Within

the last four to six weeks before trial, D.J.G.’s foster mother had seen progression

with D.J.G.’s crawling and standing up around furniture.              D.J.G. attended

occupational therapy and physical therapy on a weekly basis. D.J.G. was also seeing

an eating specialist to aid him with his food progression, and he was going to start

speech therapy soon. The speech therapy was for “early intervention” and was also

going to work with him on eating.

      According to DFPS’s September 2022 permanency report, D.J.G.’s mental,

social, physical, and medical needs were being met in his foster home. D.J.G. loved

his foster family, and he participated in age-appropriate activities with his foster

family. He was interested in playing with toys and his foster siblings. D.J.G.’s foster

parents “ensured that he [was] able to live a normal life.” While in his foster parents’

care, D.J.G. had received medical and dental checkups.              He also received

occupational, physical, and speech therapy. See In re L.M.N., 2018 WL 5831672, at

*20 (considering evidence children doing well in placement with foster parents, who

were meeting children’s needs); In re M.L.R-U., Jr., 517 S.W.3d 228, 238 (Tex.

                                          47
App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (considering evidence foster family provided safe

and healthy environment when determining children’s desires).

       There is also evidence that D.J.G. appeared bonded with father at visits.

However, at some of his visits with D.J.G., father appeared intoxicated. He was

slurring his words, stumbling, and could not keep his balance, and the visits were

terminated early because of father’s behavior. We note that even when a child is

attached to a parent, his desire to be returned to the parent’s care is not dispositive

of the best-interest analysis. See In re D.R.L., No. 01-15-00733-CV, 2016 WL

672664, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 18, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.);

see also In re J.H., No. 01-22-00629-CV, 2023 WL 2169952, at *18 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 23, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); In re K.S.O.B., No.

01-18-00860-CV, 2019 WL 1246348, at *19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.

19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (even though children appeared happy to see parent at

visits, that is not dispositive of best-interest analysis).

       2.     Current and Future Physical and Emotional Needs and Current
              and Future Physical and Emotional Danger

              a.     D.J.G.’s Needs

       DFPS caseworker Jones testified that D.J.G. was born prematurely because of

mother’s narcotics use while pregnant.25 At the time of birth, mother and D.J.G.

25
       Mother admitted to using methamphetamine and marijuana while pregnant with
       D.J.G., and she tested positive for heroin shortly after D.J.G.’s birth.

                                            48
both tested positive for an “opioid dependence medication,” and D.J.G. was

diagnosed with neonatal abstinence syndrome.26               He experienced “opiate

withdrawals” after birth.

      Father’s FSP similarly explained that D.J.G. was born prematurely at “[seven]

months gestation.” And he was diagnosed with neonatal abstinence syndrome

because of mother’s use of “an opioid dependence medication,” which caused D.J.G.

“to experience withdrawal symptoms” following his birth. D.J.G. needed morphine

to manage his symptoms. D.J.G. experienced difficulty with feeding, which was

common for babies who had been exposed to narcotics during pregnancy.

      DFPS’s September 2022 permanency report states that at one-year old, D.J.G.

was “nonverbal” and could not walk or crawl and he had feeding difficulties. D.J.G.

was developmentally delayed, and he received occupational, physical, and speech

therapy.

      As to D.J.G.’s development, Jones testified that D.J.G. was “a little delayed”

developmentally. He did not begin crawling until after he turned one-year old. He

received occupational therapy and physical therapy to help with his development.

D.J.G. had been making progress developmentally through his therapies. And Jones

noted that certain therapies, including speech therapy, occupational therapy, and

26
      See In re M.T., 2022 WL 3204819, at *7 (neonatal abstinence syndrome “refers to
      the collection of symptoms a child exhibits if the child was exposed to opiate drugs
      in utero”).

                                           49
physical therapy, were planned for D.J.G. in the future. According to Jones, D.J.G.

was a young, vulnerable, and fragile child, who needed a nurturing, protective, and

safe environment in which to live.

      D.J.G.’s foster mother testified that D.J.G. had developmental delays and was

behind “on typical milestones.” He was not rolling over or crawling at one-year old,

and he was “apprehensive to eating.” D.J.G. was mostly formula fed. But with

occupational therapy and physical therapy, D.J.G. had made significant

improvements. Within the last four to six weeks before trial, D.J.G.’s foster mother

had seen progression with D.J.G.’s crawling and standing up around furniture.

D.J.G. attended occupational therapy and physical therapy on a weekly basis. D.J.G.

was also seeing an eating specialist to aid him with his food progression, and he was

going to start speech therapy soon. The speech therapy was for “early intervention”

and was also going to work with him on eating. According to D.J.G.’s foster mother,

D.J.G. was going to need “therapeutic services for several years to kind of catch up”

developmentally.

      It is undisputed that D.J.G.’s foster parents were meeting his physical and

emotional needs and could do so in the future. They ensured that he received

medical and dental checkups and participated in the necessary therapies. See In re

M.A.A., 2021 WL 1134308, at *23 (child’s basic needs include medical and dental

care); In re A.S., No. 02-19-00429-CV, 2020 WL 2071944, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—

                                         50
Fort Worth Apr. 30, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering child had benefitted

while in placement with foster parents because child had been able to access

necessary physical therapy on regular basis). For instance, Child Advocates

representative Andrews explained that D.J.G.’s foster parents were highly

supportive of him and were facilitating his developmental needs through therapy.

And DFPS’s September 2022 permanency report explained that D.J.G.’s mental,

social, physical, and medical needs were being met in his foster home. D.J.G. loved

his foster family, and he participated in age-appropriate activities with his foster

family. He was interested in playing with toys and his foster siblings. D.J.G.’s foster

parents “ensured that he [was] able to live a normal life.” D.J.G.’s foster mother

testified that she and her husband would be willing to ensure that D.J.G. received

therapeutic services for as long as he needed them. See K. N. M. v. Tex. Dep’t of

Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-18-00284-CV, 2018 WL 4087730, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Austin Aug. 28, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering evidence showed

foster parents could provide for child’s emotional and physical needs, along with her

challenging medical needs).

      In contrast, when father was asked at trial, “If [D.J.G. was] to be returned

home to you, what is your plan for him?,” father did not specifically express a desire

to continue addressing D.J.G.’s therapeutic needs. Instead, father generally stated

that he planned to “show him life that [he] showed for [his] other children.” And

                                          51
father would “take him on trips,” “watch him grow,” love him, and care for him.

There was no evidence presented at trial that D.J.G.’s developmental delays and

extensive therapeutic needs would be met if he was placed in father’s care. See In

re A.S., No. 02-19-00422-CV, 2020 WL 990028, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar.

2, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding there was no evidence parent could provide

therapies, structure, and permanence child needed where parent generally testified

his “parenting plan” was “being there for [his] child” “for the fullest” “extent

possible” (internal quotations omitted)); see also In re A.J.A.D., No.

01-22-00521-CV, 2022 WL 17813763, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.

20, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (“The evidence shows that [DFPS] has seen to it that

the children have a stable foster placement at present and that only [DFPS] has a

meaningful plan for the children’s future . . . .”).

             b.     Violence and Criminal Conduct

      Violence in the home undermines the safety of the home environment and is

relevant when considering the best interest of the child. See In re L.W., 2019 WL

1523124, at *19; In re A.K., Nos. 07-17-00353-CV, 07-17-00354-CV, 2018 WL

912703, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 15, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). And

evidence of a parent’s past misconduct can be used to measure a parent’s future

conduct. In re A.M., 385 S.W.3d 74, 82 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denied);

Banargent v. Brent, No. 14-05-00574-CV, 2006 WL 462268, at *2 (Tex. App.—

                                           52
Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 28, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op) (past violence can support a

finding of likely future violence); see also Schaban-Maurer v. Maurer-Schaban, 238

S.W.3d 815, 824 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (“[T]rial courts [have]

relied on evidence of past violence as an indicator of future behavior in parental

termination and child custody cases.”).

      Further, a parent’s criminal history is relevant in analyzing the present and

future emotional and physical danger to a child and whether a parent is capable of

providing a safe and stable home for his child. See In re J.S.B., 2017 WL 6520437,

at *18–19; In re T.L.S., No. 01-12-00434-CV, 2012 WL 6213515, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence of parent’s

criminal history may support trial court’s finding termination of parental rights in

children’s best interest). Notably, “[a]s a general rule, conduct that subjects a child

to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional

well-being of [the] child.” In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 739.

      DFPS caseworker Jones testified that father had previously been convicted of

the offense of assault of a family member,27 stemming from an incident between

mother and father in 2018.             As to father’s commission of the 2018

27
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1); see also id. § 12.21 (“An individual
      adjudged guilty of a [c]lass A misdemeanor [offense] shall be punished by: (1) a
      fine not to exceed $4,000; (2) confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year;
      or (3) both such fine and confinement.”).

                                           53
assault-of-a-family-member offense, Jones testified that mother was the

complainant, and father had “struck her with his hand.” Father was found guilty of

the offense of assault of a family member and sentenced to confinement for 300

days.

        The indictment related to appellant’s commission of the 2018 offense of

assault of a family member alleged that, on or about April 11, 2018, father

“intentionally and knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to [mother], a person with

whom [father] had a dating relationship, . . . by striking [mother] with his hand.”

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1); see also id. § 12.21 (“An individual

adjudged guilty of a [c]lass A misdemeanor [offense] shall be punished by: (1) a fine

not to exceed $4,000; (2) confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year; or

(3) both such fine and confinement.”). On May 2, 2019, father was convicted of the

misdemeanor offense of assault of a family member and was sentenced to

confinement for 300 days. The trial court then suspended father’s sentence, placed

father on community supervision for fifteen months, and assessed a fine of $100.

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(7) (in determining whether parent able to

provide child with safe environment, considering history of abusive and assaultive

conduct by child’s family and others with access to child’s home); In re A.K.T., 2018

WL 6423381, at *12, *16 (considering evidence of parent’s history of engaging in

violent and abusive conduct in analyzing current and future emotional danger to

                                         54
child; parent’s lack of self-control and propensity for violence may be considered as

evidence of endangerment); Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.) (in termination-of-parental-rights cases,

evidence parent engaged in abusive conduct in past permits inference parent will

continue behavior in future); see also In re K.J.G., No. 04-19-00102-CV, 2019 WL

3937278, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (in

determining whether parental conduct endangered child’s physical and emotional

well-being, trial court may consider conduct that did not occur in child’s presence);

In re J.B.M., 2019 WL 1139858, at *2 (“Domestic violence and a propensity for

violence may be considered evidence of endangerment, even if the endangering acts

did not occur in the children’s presence, were not directed at the children, or did not

cause actual injury to the children.”).

      Jones also testified that at the time of trial father was charged with the offense

of aggravated assault of a family member,28 stemming from an incident between

mother and father in 2021, while mother was pregnant with D.J.G. Jones stated that

the offense occurred on April 3, 2021, and mother was the complainant. Father knew

mother was five-months pregnant with D.J.G. at the time, but he hit mother’s car in

28
      See id. §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(1); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
      § 71.0021(b); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32 (“An individual adjudged guilty of
      a felony of the first degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas
      Department of Criminal Justice for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or
      less than 5 years [and] . . . a fine not to exceed $10,000.”).

                                           55
“a head-on collision” with his car, and then pulled a man, who was in mother’s car,

out of her car and “assaulted him.” Father hit mother’s car “so hard” with his car

“that there was actual front-end damage to both” cars. Jones noted that such

behavior by father constituted “endangering conduct” because father “knew that

[mother] was pregnant and he used a [car] as a weapon to harm not only her but also

[D.J.G.,] his unborn child.”     See In re E.T., No. 02-22-00299-CV, 2022 WL

17172492, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(parent’s domestic abuse of mother, including while mother was pregnant with child,

endangered child’s physical safety and parent’s pattern of abusive behavior created

presumption that similar conduct could recur); In re S.L.W., 529 S.W.3d 601, 613–

14 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. denied) (trial court, as fact finder, could have

reasonably inferred parent presented danger to child’s well-being where parent

assaulted mother while pregnant with child and while mother was pregnant with

child’s sibling). According to Jones, if father was convicted of the offense of

aggravated assault of a family member, father would “face a significant [amount of]

time in jail.” And if father went to jail, “where [was D.J.G.] going to go?”

      The indictment related to the 2021 felony offense of aggravated assault of a

family member with which appellant was charged alleged that, on or about April 3,

2021, father “unlawfully, intentionally[,] and knowingly threaten[ed] [mother], . . . a

person with whom [father] had a dating relationship, with imminent bodily injury by

                                          56
using and exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely a motor vehicle.” See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(1); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§§ 71.0021(b), 263.307(b)(7); In re K.J.G., 2019 WL 3937278, at *4; In re J.B.M.,

2019 WL 1139858, at *2; In re A.K.T., 2018 WL 6423381, at *12, *16; Clements,

251 S.W.3d at 87. If father is convicted of the felony offense of aggravated assault

of a family member, his punishment may be assessed at “imprisonment in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or

less than 5 years [and] . . . a fine not to exceed $10,000.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 12.32; see also E. B. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No.

03-18-00427-CV, 2018 WL 6056959, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 20, 2018, pet.

denied) (mem. op.) (“A parent’s current and future incarceration is relevant to his

ability to meet the child’s present and future physical and emotional needs . . . .”);

In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.)

(“[W]hen a parent is incarcerated, he or she is absent from the child’s daily life and

unable to provide support to the child, negatively impacting the child’s living

environment and emotional well-being.”).

      Criminal activity that exposes a parent to the potential for incarceration is

relevant to the trial court’s best-interest determination. See In re M.A.A., 2021 WL

1134308, at *26; see also C.M.M. v. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., Nos.

14-21-00702-CV, 14-21-00730-CV, 2022 WL 1789925, at *16 (Tex. App.—

                                         57
Houston [14th Dist.] June 2, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (criminal activity

contributes to instability in home). And here father has a pending charge against

him which involves assaulting mother while father knew that she was pregnant with

D.J.G. See In re S.H., No. 01-22-00255-CV, 2022 WL 17254956, at *17–18 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding evidence

sufficient to support trial court’s best-interest finding where parent had pending

criminal case against him which involved assaulting mother of parent’s other child);

In re E.T., 2022 WL 17172492, at *7 (parent’s domestic abuse of mother, including

while mother was pregnant with child, endangered child’s physical safety).

      Further, we note that related to father’s charge for the felony offense of

aggravated assault of a family member, father was subject to bond conditions, which

required father, among other things, to have no contact with mother and to refrain

from using, possessing, or consuming alcohol, controlled substances, “dangerous

drug[s],” or marijuana unless prescribed by a medical doctor. Yet, father tested

positive for narcotics use multiple times during the pendency of this case and father

admittedly had contact with mother in violation of his bond conditions. Jones

testified that father had violated his bond conditions during the pendency of this

case, and according to Jones, father’s failure to comply with his bond conditions was

concerning because if his “bond [was] revoked,” “he would go back to jail.” See In

re E.T., 2022 WL 17172492, at *7 (parent’s bond violations demonstrated pattern of

                                         58
lawbreaking that created instability and looming threat of incarceration); In re A.O.,

No. 02-21-00376-CV, 2022 WL 1257384, at *15–16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr.

28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (evidence supported trial court’s best-interest

finding where parent “violated the [Texas] Penal Code,” “violated her community

supervision,” and “violated the conditions of her bond”); see also In re T.D., No.

02-22-00215-CV, 2022 WL 11483054, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 20,

2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (in analyzing emotional and physical danger to child,

considering parent had violated bond conditions).

      Finally, Jones testified that mother and father had been in a dating

relationship, at least since 2018.29     And father and mother’s relationship was

“extremely violent.” When father found out that mother was pregnant with D.J.G.,

he assaulted her. See In re E.T., 2022 WL 17172492, at *7 (parent’s domestic abuse

of mother, including while mother was pregnant with child, endangered child’s

physical safety and parent’s pattern of abusive behavior created presumption that

similar conduct could recur); In re S.L.W., 529 S.W.3d at 613–14 (trial court, as fact

finder, could have reasonably inferred parent presented danger to child’s well-being

where parent assaulted mother while pregnant with child and while mother was

29
      Father testified that at the time of trial he had no contact with mother, but he also
      admitted to having contact with mother during the pendency of the case, explaining
      that he asked her for a ride to one of his visits with D.J.G. because his car was not
      working and she “was there.”

                                           59
pregnant with child’s sibling). Father’s FSP also noted that mother had reported to

DFPS that father had previously “beat her up.”

      Further, D.J.G.’s foster mother testified that D.J.G.’s older brother told her

that, while living with mother, he had witnessed domestic violence between mother

and father. See In re H.L.F., No. 12-11-00243-CV, 2012 WL 5993726, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Tyler Nov. 30, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (conduct toward other children

relevant consideration); Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 724. He told D.J.G.’s foster mother

that mother and father’s relationship had been “very physical” and it contained “a

lot of violence,” “a lot of drug use,” and “a lot of sexual activity in front of” the older

brother and his siblings. The older brother often saw mother “get beat down and

busted up” by father and “it was just almost nonstop.”             Mother and father’s

relationship had traumatized the older brother, and the older brother displayed

similar violent behaviors while in D.J.G.’s foster mother’s home, which the foster

mother believed had been learned while in the care of mother. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 263.307(b)(7) (in determining whether parent able to provide child with safe

environment, considering history of abusive and assaultive conduct by child’s family

and others with access to child’s home); In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d at 835 (history of

domestic violence supports trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights in

child’s best interest); In re J.S.–A, No. 01-17-00491-CV, 2018 WL 891236, at *8

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 15, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (evidence

                                            60
of violence in home supports finding placement of children with parent likely to

subject them to emotional and physical danger now and in future); see also In re

O.L.S., No. 04-22-00041-CV, 2022 WL 2334551, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

June 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence of violence in parent’s relationships,

even when child not in parent’s care, supported trial court’s finding that termination

of parental rights in child’s best interest); In re A.E., Jr., No. 04-14-00092-CV, 2014

WL 3013210, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 2, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (in

holding evidence sufficient to support trial court’s best-interest finding, noting

parent had engaged in domestic or family violence in separate relationship with

person that was not child’s parent).

      Notably, a child’s need for a safe and stable home is the paramount

consideration in assessing the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.307(a) (prompt and permanent placement of child in safe environment

presumed to be in child’s best interest); In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46, 60 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14 Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (parent who lacks ability to provide child

with safe and stable home is unable to provide for child’s emotional and physical

needs). But domestic violence, want of self-control, and a propensity for violence

constitute evidence of endangerment. In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d at 845; see also In

re J.B.M., 2019 WL 1139858, at *2 (“Domestic violence and a propensity for

violence may be considered evidence of endangerment, even if the endangering acts

                                          61
did not occur in the children’s presence, were not directed at the children, or did not

cause actual injury to the children.”) In re A.V.M., 2013 WL 1932887, at *5 (“It is

self[-]evident that parents perpetrating violence towards certain [other] members of

the family threaten the emotional developmental and well-being of any child.”);

Schaban-Maurer, 238 S.W.3d at 824 (“[T]rial courts [have] relied on evidence of

past violence as an indicator of future behavior in parental termination and child

custody cases.”). Here, Jones testified, and father admitted, that father had not

completed the domestic violence treatment program that was required by his FSP.

                       c. Narcotics Use

      Illegal narcotics use by a parent may constitute evidence of current and future

danger to a child. See In re O.J.P., No. 01-21-00163-CV, 2021 WL 4269175, at

*19–21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(considering evidence of parent’s narcotics use in determining current and future

danger to child); see also In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (stating “a

parent’s use of narcotics and its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify as

an endangering course of conduct”); In re S.R.H., No. 01-15-0714-CV, 2016 WL

430462, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (parent’s past narcotics use is indicative of instability in home environment);

Cervantes-Peterson, 221 S.W.3d at 254–55 (illegal narcotics use while parental

                                          62
rights are in jeopardy may be considered endangering course of conduct critical to

finding that termination is in child’s best interest).

      Father testified that he began using opiates in 2020 and he had previously used

oxycodone. According to father, he “went into rehab” in the spring of 2022 “to get

help to get [himself] away from painkillers.” He was at a detox center for thirty days

and was discharged on April 2, 2022. Father did not have a sponsor but was

participating in a “higher power program.”

      Jones testified that father had a substantial history of narcotics use. Jones

stated that on October 14, 2021, father tested positive for benzodiazepines. In

November 2021, father tested negative for narcotics use. But on December 20, 2021,

father tested positive for oxymorphone and oxycodone. On February 28, 2022,

father tested positive for cocaine, oxymorphone, and oxycodone. In May 2022,

father tested positive for oxycodone. Father tested negative for narcotics use in July

and August 2022. According to Jones, father’s narcotics-use testing during the

pendency of the case showed an increase in narcotics-use over time. And father’s

pattern of narcotics use during the pendency of this case constituted endangering

conduct. Although father’s most recent narcotics-use test was negative that was not

enough to show sobriety. Further, Jones noted that father’s narcotics use during the

pendency of the case violated his bond conditions related to the 2021

                                           63
aggravated-assault-of-a-family-member offense with which he was charged and

subjected him to the possibility of “go[ing] back to jail.”

      Copies of father’s narcotics-use testing results show that on October 14, 2021,

father tested positive for benzodiazepines by urinalysis.30 On November 30, 2021,

father tested negative for narcotics use. On December 20, 2021, father tested

positive for oxycodone and oxymorphone by urinalysis and positive for oxycodone

by hair-follicle testing.   On February 17, 2022, father failed to appear for

narcotics-use testing as ordered by the trial court. See In re C.A.B., 289 S.W.3d at

885 (fact finder could infer that parent’s failure to submit to court-ordered

narcotics-use testing indicated that she was avoiding testing because she was using

narcotics); see also In re T.L.S., 2012 WL 6213515, at *6 (considering evidence of

parent’s refusal to take court-ordered narcotics-use test in determining best interest

of child).   On February 28, 2022, father tested positive for benzodiazepines,

oxycodone, and oxymorphone by urinalysis and cocaine, oxycodone, and

oxymorphone by hair-follicle testing. On May 11, 2022, father tested negative for

narcotics use by urinalysis, but positive for oxycodone by hair-follicle testing. On

May 31, 2022, father tested negative for narcotics use by urinalysis, but positive for

oxycodone by hair-follicle testing. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (parent’s use

30
      DFPS’s September 2022 permanency report also states that father tested positive
      for marijuana by hair-follicle testing on September 28, 2021.

                                          64
of narcotics and its effect on her ability to parent qualifies as endangering conduct);

In re M.R.R., No. 10-15-00303-CV, 2016 WL 192583, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan.

14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A parent’s continued drug use demonstrates an

inability to provide for the child’s emotional and physical needs and to provide a

stable environment for the child.”); In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d at 426 (“Illegal drug

use creates the possibility that the parent will be impaired or imprisoned and thus

incapable of parenting.”); see also In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 471–72 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (fact finder can infer future endangering conduct

based on parent’s past conduct when assessing child’s best interest).

       D.J.G.’s foster mother also testified that D.J.G.’s older brother reported to her

that father and mother’s relationship had consisted of “a lot of drug use” and D.J.G.’s

older brother often saw mother “pretty much comatose[] on opioids.” See In re

S.R.H., 2016 WL 430462, at *10–11 (parent’s past narcotics use is indicative of

instability in home environment); In re Z.C., 280 S.W.3d 470, 477–78 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (considering parent exposed other children to illegal

narcotics use in analyzing best interest); see also In re H.L.F., 2012 WL 5993726,

at *7 (conduct toward other children relevant consideration); Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at

724.

       We note that DFPS’s September 2022 Permanency Report notes that father

tested negative for narcotics use by urinalysis on June 15, 2022, July 14, 2022, July

                                          65
28, 2022, August 9, 2022, and August 25, 2022. But evidence “of a recent

turn-around with respect to substance abuse does not . . . necessarily make a trial

court’s best interest finding . . . insufficient.” In re S.V.H., No. 01-19-01003-CV,

2020 WL 2988567, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 4, 2020, pet. denied)

(mem. op.). And evidence of a recent improvement does not absolve a parent of a

history of narcotics use and irresponsible choices.          See In re J.H.G., No.

01-16-01006-CV, 2017 WL 2378141, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 1,

2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“A factfinder . . . is not required to ignore a history

of narcotics use merely because it abates as trial approaches.”); In re O.R.F., 417

S.W.3d 24, 40 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied); see also

Cervantes-Peterson, 221 S.W.3d at 254 (concluding despite parent’s assertion that

she had stopped using cocaine and marijuana, trial court was not required to ignore

her history of narcotics use merely because she testified that it had abated before

trial). Further, father repeatedly tested positive for narcotics use during the pendency

of the case when he knew that his parental rights were in jeopardy. See In re

M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied)

(stability and permanence are of paramount importance in termination case, and

parent’s decision to use narcotics during pendency of termination proceeding, when

parent is at risk of losing child, supports finding that parent engaged in conduct that

endangered child’s well-being); see also In re I.L., No. 02-18-00206-CV, 2018 WL

                                          66
5668813, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (fact

finder could have based its best-interest finding on parents’ narcotics use before and

during pendency of case and could have found that such acts reflected poorly on

parents’ parental abilities and forecasted their inability to meet child’s needs).

      Additionally, Jones testified that father had not completed all of the

requirements of his FSP related to his substance abuse issues. Father had completed

six or seven individual “substance abuse therapy” classes from June 2022 to July

2022, but Jones stated that father needed more treatment because of his substantial

history of narcotics use. Father also had not participated in “group therapy for

substance abuse” which was required. Child Advocates representative Andrews also

explained that based on father’s history of narcotics use Child Advocates wanted

father to engage in an intensive sobriety program, such as a “relapse prevention

program” that included “a sponsor.” And she explained that a longer period of

negative narcotics-use testing by father was necessary to show that father could

provide a safe and stable environment for D.J.G.

                                          67
      3.     Parental Abilities, Plans for Child, Stability of Proposed
             Placement, and Availability of Assistance31

                    a.     Father

      DFPS caseworker Jones testified that D.J.G., who was young and vulnerable,

and needed a nurturing, protective, and safe environment in which to live. See In re

A.J.B., No. 10-18-00274-CV, 2018 WL 6684808, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 19,

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[Y]oung children are particularly vulnerable if left in the

custody of a parent who is unable or unwilling to protect them or attend to their

needs because they have no ability to protect themselves.”). And, according to

Jones, for father to establish that he could provide a safe and stable environment for

D.J.G., he would need to show that his home was a narcotics-free environment, he

was remaining narcotics-free, he was not engaging in criminal activity, he was

continuing to seek treatment for his narcotics use, and he had a consistent income.

But at the time of trial, father had not been able to establish those things.

      As to father’s income, Jones noted that father had not provided any “paycheck

stubs” related to the limousine company where he purportedly worked.                   And

although father had told DFPS that he did “car repairs as kind of a side job,” he had

not provided any verifiable invoices or bank statements to “prove that income [was]

31
      Much of the evidence discussed above is also relevant to father’s parental abilities,
      father’s plans for D.J.G., and the stability of the proposed placements for D.J.G. See
      TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                            68
consistently coming in.” Another DFPS caseworker had previously explained to

father that she would not be able to verify his income based on the invoices that he

had provided. Essentially, father had not shown a stable income during the pendency

of the case.

      As to father’s housing, Jones testified that father had not provided an actual

lease agreement for the place where he was living; there was no contact information

for his landlord on the document that father provided to DFPS.32 The document that

father provided to DFPS was not sufficient to establish stable housing.

      Child Advocates representative Andrews testified that father gave Child

Advocates information about his housing only seven days before trial, which made

it hard to visit his home.33

      Father testified that he lived in a “unit” that he was leasing from an individual

person. He provided the DFPS caseworker with “a lease.” Father worked for a

limousine company, and the last time he had given the DFPS caseworker a paycheck

32
      Jones explained, as to the document that father had given to DFPS: “[I]t’s not like
      your average lease where you either have a landlord or . . . you have an apartment
      complex and it’s through management that has the address, the name, the length of
      stay, all the different addendums and whoever is renting it out to you, their contact
      information. . . . [T]hat’s what it was lacking.”
33
      DFPS’s September 2022 permanency report similarly states that although father had
      reported to DFPS that he had housing, he gave DFPS a new address on September
      5, 2022 and he had not provided a lease agreement. Father had also reported to
      DFPS that he was employed, but he had not provided proof of employment to the
      DFPS caseworker.

                                           69
stub was in July 2022—a couple months before trial. According to father, his work

with the limousine company was slow, so he had a side business “picking up

customers and customers calling [him] to do work on their vehicles.” He had

provided the DFPS caseworker with “invoices” related to his side business. He did

not have a bank account so he could not provide bank statements to show his income.

Father testified that his income was about $3,500 or $4,000 a month. He paid $800

a month for rent. In total, the amount of his bills each month was less than $2,000.

       Father stated that his adult children would be his support system as well as his

mother and his two sisters if D.J.G. was placed in his care, but he did not explain

how they would help care for D.J.G. or state that any of those individuals would care

for D.J.G. should father be convicted of the felony offense of aggravated assault of

a family member and imprisoned. See In re I.L.G., 531 S.W.3d 346, 356 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (stability of proposed placement

important consideration in determining whether termination of parental rights in

children’s best interest); In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“The goal of establishing a stable, permanent home for a child

is a compelling . . . interest.”).

       Further, although it appears that father consistently visited D.J.G. throughout

the case and he and D.J.G. appeared bonded at visits, father also appeared intoxicated

at some visits. He was slurring his words, stumbling, and could not keep his balance.

                                          70
These visits were terminated early because of father’s behavior. Jones also testified

that father brought mother, who waited in the car, to one of his visits with D.J.G.,

even though mother’s visits with D.J.G. had been suspended by the trial court. See

In re R.W., 627 S.W.3d 501, 516–17 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (parent’s

poor judgment may be considered when looking at child’s best interest); In re N.J.H.,

575 S.W.3d at 835 (parent’s “exercise of poor judgment currently and in the past

demonstrates an inability to provide adequate care” for child (internal quotations

omitted)); Wischer v. Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., No.

03-12-00165-CV, 2012 WL 3793151, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2012, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (holding fact finder could have concluded parent “lack[ed] the

ability to provide adequate care by showing poor judgment currently and in the

past”). According to Jones, it would be detrimental for mother to have access to

D.J.G. because of her significant history of narcotics-use34 and her complete failure

to participate in the pending case.

                       b. Current Placement

      DFPS caseworker Jones testified that D.J.G. had been in the same two-parent

foster home since he had entered DFPS’s care in 2021. D.J.G.’s foster parents

wanted to adopt D.J.G. D.J.G.’s foster parents were aware that D.J.G. had biological

34
      Jones explained that mother had admitted to using methamphetamine and marijuana
      while pregnant with D.J.G. And mother tested positive for heroin use after D.J.G.’s
      birth. Mother’s narcotics use contributed to D.J.G.’s premature birth.

                                          71
siblings, and they were willing to ensure that he remained in contact with those

siblings as much as possible. Jones also testified that D.J.G. was thriving in his

placement with his foster parents, and his foster parents were meeting his physical

and emotional needs. While in his foster parents’ care, D.J.G. had received a dental

examination and his “one-year-old [medical] checkup.” According to Jones, D.J.G.

was a young, vulnerable, and fragile child, who needed a nurturing, protective, and

safe environment in which to live. D.J.G.’s foster parents had been providing such

an environment for him and would continue to do so. See In re J.M., 156 S.W.3d

696, 708 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient to support

trial court’s best-interest finding termination of parental rights in child’s best interest

where “[t]he evidence show[ed] the foster parents’ home [was] stable”).

      Child Advocates representative Andrews testified that D.J.G. was a happy

child and D.J.G.’s foster parents were highly supportive of him and were facilitating

his developmental needs through therapy. D.J.G.’s foster parents had a loving home

and other young children in the home. They were meeting D.J.G.’s needs and would

be able to meet his needs in the future.

      D.J.G.’s foster mother testified that D.J.G. was placed in her home on October

4, 2021. Although D.J.G. had developmental delays and was behind “on typical

milestones,” with occupational therapy and physical therapy, D.J.G. had made

significant improvements. Within the last four to six weeks before trial, D.J.G.’s

                                            72
foster mother had seen progression with D.J.G.’s crawling and standing up around

furniture. D.J.G.’s foster mother explained the different therapies that D.J.G. was

participating in while in her care and testified to his therapeutic needs in the future.

According to D.J.G.’s foster mother, D.J.G. was going to need “therapeutic services

for several years to kind of catch up” developmentally and she and her husband were

willing to provide that for him as long as he needed it. See J.D.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of

Fam. & Protective Servs., 458 S.W.3d 33, 44–45 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.)

(noting, in holding evidence was sufficient to support trial court’s finding

termination of parental rights in child’s best interest, that child was thriving in

placement and child was improving while in placement); see also In re P.G.D., No.

04-19-00896-CV, 2020 WL 2543310, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 20,

2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering children were in loving foster home that

was meeting their needs and children were making developmental progress).

      D.J.G.’s foster mother further testified that she and her husband wanted to

adopt D.J.G. See In re T.M.R., No. 13-21-00144-CV, 2021 WL 4998438, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A factfinder

may consider the consequences of [the] failure to terminate parental rights and may

also consider that the child’s best interest may be served by termination so that

adoption may occur.”); In re L.W., 2019 WL 1523124, at *23 (in holding evidence

sufficient to support trial court’s best-interest finding, considering children were

                                          73
placed in adoptive home with foster parents who wanted children to continue living

with them); see also In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118 (“The goal of establishing a stable,

permanent home for a child is a compelling . . . interest.”).

        D.J.G.’s foster parents had also adopted twins, so D.J.G. had siblings in the

home. D.J.G.’s foster mother noted that she had facilitated “FaceTime visits” with

one of D.J.G.’s biological sisters, and D.J.G. had “in-person visits with all of [his

biological] siblings.” D.J.G.’s foster parents were open and supportive of D.J.G.

having contact with his biological siblings.

      DFPS’s September 2022 permanency report notes that D.J.G.’s mental, social,

physical, and medical needs were being met in his foster home. D.J.G. loved his

foster family, and he participated in age-appropriate activities with his foster family.

He was interested in playing with toys and his foster siblings. D.J.G.’s foster parents

“ensured that he [was] able to live a normal life.” While in his foster parents’ care,

D.J.G. received medical and dental checkups. See In re A.A., No. 02-17-00307-CV,

2018 WL 771972, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(considering evidence foster parents took child to all her appointments and were

meeting her medical needs); see also In re S.H., 2022 WL 17254956, at *14 (“[A]

child’s bond with his placement family implies that the child’s desires would be

fulfilled by adoption by the placement family.”); In re G.J.A., No. 13-22-00209-CV,

2022 WL 3092177, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 4, 2022, no

                                          74
pet.) (mem. op.) (in holding sufficient evidence to support trial court’s finding

termination of parental rights in children’s best interest, considering evidence

showed that children were thriving in current placement, placement was meeting all

of the children’s needs, and children were bonded with foster family).

      Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude that a reasonable fact

finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of father’s

parental rights was in the best interest of D.J.G. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b)(2). We further conclude that the trial court could have reconciled any

disputed evidence in favor of finding that termination of father’s parental rights was

in D.J.G.’s best interest or any disputed evidence was not so significant that a fact

finder could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination

is in the best interest of D.J.G. See id.

      Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the

trial court’s finding that termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interest

of D.J.G. See id.

      We overrule father’s fourth issue.

                             Possessory Conservatorship

      In his fifth issue, father argues that the trial court erred in not appointing father

as D.J.G.’s possessory conservator because allowing father “access to [D.J.G.]

would not endanger the child.”

                                            75
      Conservatorship determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and

will be reversed only if the decision is arbitrary and unreasonable. In re J.A.J., 243

S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007); In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d 839, 856 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). An order terminating the parent-child

relationship divests a parent of legal rights and duties with respect to his child. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(b); see also In re A.L.J., No. 01-19-00251-CV,

2019 WL 4615826, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 24, 2019, no pet.)

(mem. op.).

      Here, father asserts that the trial court erred in not appointing him as a

possessory conservator for D.J.G. under Texas Family Code section 153.191.

      When a parent is not appointed as a sole or joint managing conservator of a

child, Texas Family Code section 153.191 requires the trial court to appoint the

parent as a possessory conservator of the child, “unless it finds that the appointment

is not in the best interest of the child and that parental possession or access would

endanger the physical or emotional welfare of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 153.191; see also In re E.S.T., No. 01-22-00404-CV, 2022 WL 17096713, at *20

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). But, section

153.191 only applies to a “[p]arent,” and father’s parental rights to D.J.G. were

terminated by the trial court. See In re E.S.T., 2022 WL 17096713, at *20; see also

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.024(a) (stating “parent,” as used in Texas Family Code,

                                          76
“does not include a parent as to whom the parent-child relationship has been

terminated” (internal quotations omitted)); Z.A.R. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective

Servs., No. 14-20-00511-CV, 2020 WL 7866800, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Dec. 31, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re H.M.P., No. 13-08-00643-CV,

2010 WL 40124, at *17 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 7, 2010, no pet.)

(mem. op.). Further, we have overruled father’s complaint that the trial court erred

in terminating his parental rights to D.J.G. Thus, the trial court’s order terminating

father’s parental rights divested father of his legal rights and duties to D.J.G., and he

is not considered a “parent” under the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.206(b); In re A.L.J., 2019 WL 4615826, at *9 (“Because we have

overruled [parent’s] challenge to the portion of the trial court’s order terminating her

parental rights, the order has divested [her] of her legal rights and duties related to

[the children].”); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.024(a) (stating “[p]arent,” as

used in Texas Family Code, “does not include a parent as to whom the parent-child

relationship has been terminated” (internal quotations omitted)). And, as such, we

cannot conclude that the trial court would have abused its discretion in not

appointing father, whose parental rights had been terminated, as D.J.G.’s possessory

conservator under Texas Family Code section 153.191. See In re E.S.T., 2022 WL

17096713, at *19–20 (overruling parent’s complaint trial court erred in not

appointing her as child’s possessory conservator under section 153.191 because her

                                           77
parental rights to child had been terminated); In re H.M.P., 2010 WL 40124, at *17

(holding trial court did not err in not appointing parent as possessory conservator

under section 153.191 where parent’s parental rights were terminated and appellate

court had determined evidence was sufficient to support trial court’s termination of

parental rights); see also In re K.P.M., Nos. 01-17-00327-CV to 01-17-00329-CV,

2017 WL 5353244, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 2017, pet.

denied) (mem. op.) (where parent asserted trial court erred in failing to appoint her

as possessory conservator, explaining because appellate court had “concluded that

legally and factually sufficient evidence support[ed] terminating [parent’s] parental

rights,” parent was “disqualifie[d]” from being “a conservator of her children”).

      Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in not appointing father

as D.J.G.’s possessory conservator.

      We overrule father’s fifth issue.

                                      Conclusion

      We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                Julie Countiss
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.

                                          78