Court Opinion

ID: 9840585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 15:08:29.424484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:36:00.814998
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-979

                               BOYLSTON CP, LLC

                                       vs.

           WORCESTER SAND AND GRAVEL COMPANY, INCORPORATED.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       After a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court, judgment

 entered in favor of the defendant, Worcester Sand and Gravel

 Company, Incorporated (WSG), on its breach of contract

 counterclaim.     The plaintiff, Boylston CP, LLC (Boylston),

 appeals, claiming that the judge's finding that a "handshake

 deal" between the parties' principals regarding Boylston's

 removal of "surplus materials" 1 from a construction site did not

 bind WSG was clearly erroneous.          We affirm.

       Background.     In 2005, WSG sold a parcel of land (property)

 in Boylston to Compass Pointe Estates, LLC (Compass).               In

 connection with the sale, WSG and Compass executed and recorded

 1 In context, "surplus materials" refers to excess gravel and
 landfill produced by excavation of a residential construction
 site.
a purchase and sale agreement and a notice of contract that

included a provision to reserve WSG's rights to all surplus

materials generated by development of the property.   In August,

2015, Boylston purchased the property at a foreclosure sale.

     Prior to the purchase, Boylston's principal, James C.

Haynes, Sr., learned that Compass had removed significant

amounts of surplus materials from the property for use at other

development projects, despite the notice of contract.   Haynes

contacted WSG's principal, Michael Trotto, Sr., whom he knew

"very well," to discuss a similar use of surplus materials at

other sites owned by Haynes in the event he bought the property.

As a result of their conversations, Haynes and Trotto, Sr.

orally agreed that Trotto, Sr. would waive the term in the

notice of contract regarding WSG's entitlement to surplus

materials (thus permitting Boylston to remove them) in exchange

for Haynes using WSG for all his future materials needs. 2   Based

on the oral agreement, Boylston purchased the property subject

to the written notice of contract.

     In spring of 2016, WSG employees, including Michael Trotto,

Jr., came to the property and demanded that Boylston stop

removing surplus materials, claiming they belonged to WSG and

2 The agreement to purchase materials from WSG extended to the
numerous entities owned by Haynes, including Craig LLC, CJ and J
LLC, Goldthwaite LLC, Boylston CP, LLC, and an LLC for a
property on Malden Street in Holden.

                                2
Boylston CP was violating the notice of contract.   On April 6,

2016, Boylston filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking a

declaratory judgment that WSG's contract rights had terminated

in 2015.   WSG counterclaimed that Boylston had breached the

contract by taking surplus materials in violation of the notice

of contract.   The parties agreed to proceed without a jury under

rule 20(2)(h) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2018) and to

waive detailed written findings of fact.   Following a bench

trial in November and December, 2021, the judge returned a

special verdict slip and issued brief written findings,

concluding that (1) Boylston was not entitled to termination of

the notice of contract, (2) Boylston violated the notice of

contract by removing surplus materials from the property, and

(3) WSG was entitled to damages for Boylston's removal of

surplus materials from the date that Trotto, Jr. "made [Haynes]

aware that WSG would enforce the terms of the Notice of

Contract."

     Discussion.   "Where a judge makes findings of fact in a

bench trial, we review them for clear error."   H1 Lincoln, Inc.

v. South Washington St., LLC, 489 Mass. 1, 13 (2022).   "A trial

judge's finding is clearly erroneous only when, although there

is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

                                 3
mistake has been committed" (quotation and citation omitted).

Id. 3

        The judge found that the oral agreement to waive the

surplus materials term in the notice of contract in exchange for

Haynes's future business was made between Trotto, Sr. and Haynes

as individuals and did not bind WSG and Boylston as entities.

Because Trotto, Sr. was deceased at the time of trial, the judge

heard only from Haynes on this issue.

        According to Haynes, he and Trotto, Sr. had known each

other for ten to fifteen years and had many informal discussions

about the notice of contract until "it came to a point where we

believed we had an agreement."     He testified that the agreement

was never reduced to writing because "[w]e both gave each other

our words that we would follow through with our agreement . . .

[w]e had talked about it, but it was just an agreement that we

made between each other."     Based on Haynes's testimony, we

3 When the parties waive detailed written findings of fact,
however, "appellate review of the court's decision and of the
judgment entered shall be according to the standard of review
that would apply to a verdict by a jury in a case tried to a
jury and to the judgment entered thereon." Rule 20(8)(b) of the
Rules of the Superior Court (2018). "We must uphold [a] jury
verdict as long as anywhere in the evidence, from whatever
source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found
from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the
plaintiff" (quotation and citation omitted). Rabassa v.
Cerasuolo, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 809, 814 (2020). This standard of
review is arguably more deferential to the trier of fact than
the clear error standard.

                                   4
conclude that there was evidence to support the judge's

inference that the agreement regarding surplus materials was

between Trotto, Sr. and Haynes as individuals, backed by each

person’s individual assurance that he would follow through.      See

Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 445

Mass. 411, 420 (2005) (finder of fact determines terms of oral

agreement from conversation and conduct of parties).

     Nor are we persuaded by Boylston's more specific argument

that the judge's conclusion that the waiver did not bind WSG was

based on a clearly erroneous factual finding that "Trotto, Sr.

refused to reduce the waiver to writing."   There was evidence

that as early as the fall of 2015, Trotto, Sr. was upset based

on his "mistaken belief" that Boylston was selling surplus

materials in violation of the notice of contract.    Haynes also

testified that he called Trotto, Sr. in the spring of 2016,

after Trotto, Jr. and other WSG employees demanded that Boylston

stop removing surplus materials from the property.    Haynes

learned that Trotto, Sr. was ill, but he expressly asked Trotto,

Sr. "if he would be willing to put our agreement in writing" and

whether Haynes could "meet with him at his house" to sign an

agreement.   Trotto, Sr. said he would call Haynes back.   In

December 2016, approximately eight months after Haynes's

telephone call, Trotto, Sr. died without contacting Haynes in

the interim or reducing their agreement to writing.    On this

                                 5
record, we discern no clear error in the judge's determination

that Trotto, Sr.'s lack of response amounted to a refusal to put

the waiver of the notice of contract in writing, from which it

could reasonably be inferred that Trotto, Sr. never intended for

the oral agreement to bind WSG. 4

     In sum, based on the evidence, we are not "left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed"

(citation omitted).   H1 Lincoln, Inc., 489 Mass. at 13.   We

conclude that Boylston has not shown clear error in the judge's

finding that, as a matter of fact, Trotto, Sr.'s waiver of the

surplus materials term in the notice of contract was not binding

4 Boylston also challenges the judge's subsidiary findings,
including that "in effect [Trotto, Sr.] was shielding the waiver
from third parties as a manner of hedging his bets, for example,
if the plaintiff went bankrupt or otherwise could not complete
the development (as was the case with [Compass])" and
"successors at WSG did not know of the waiver or conclude that
WSG was bound by it." Because these findings were not essential
to the judge's ultimate conclusion, we need not address each one
individually.

                                    6
on WSG.    See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 74

Mass. App. Ct. 725, 730 (2009) (appellant's burden to show

finding is clearly erroneous).

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Massing,
                                        Grant & Brennan, JJ. 5),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    September 19, 2023.

5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  7