Court Opinion

ID: 9513540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:37:23.916157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:53.991537
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 40] Because the majority misapprehends the history of gambling in North Dakota and the working of our gambling laws, and misstates the public policy of our state, I respectfully dissent.
I
[¶ 41] Although a quarter of a century ago, a credible argument might have been made that the public policy of North Dakota opposed the enforcement of a contract relating to gambling, no such argument can prevail today.
[¶ 42] The early years of our statehood were shaped by the corruption of the Louisiana Lottery, the last of the so-called “great national lotteries.” So corrupt that it was kicked out of Louisiana, the lottery company, seeking to establish the state as its new base of operations, came to “buy” the North Dakota legislature during its first session. Elwyn B. Robinson, History of North Dakota 219-20 (1969); see also Report of Investigating Committee, Senate Journal 1019-94, 1st N.D. Legis. Sess. (1889-1890) (detailing the Senate’s investigation of the corruption). The report of the Pinkerton detectives would establish there was good reason to believe the legislature was for sale. Report of the Pinkerton Detective Agency Made to Governor John Miller on the Effort Made to Legalize the Louisiana Lottery During the Session of the First Legislative Assembly in North Dakota (1890). Governor John Miller, and others of great integrity, had secretly hired the Pinkerton Detectives to document the buying of votes at $500 per vote. Senate Bill 167 was introduced to permit lotteries. See Senate Journal 842-46, 1st N.D. Legis. Sess. (1889-1890) (detailing the bill). While the bill passed the Senate, Senate Journal 448-49, 1st N.D. Legis. Sess. (1889-1890), when the investigation of the Pinkerton Detectives was revealed, the reaction was so strong that the bill was indefinitely postponed in the House. House Journal 688, 1st N.D. Leg-is. Sess. (1889-1890); see also Senate Journal 486, 1st N.D. Legis. Sess. (1889-1890) (reporting indefinite postponement). The people sent virtually a whole new legislature to Bismarck for the Second Legislative Assembly and proceeded as rapidly as the cumbersome procedures of the day would permit to adopt the First Amendment to the North Dakota Constitution, prohibiting all “lottery, or gift enterprises.” 2 See North Dakota Centennial Blue Book 1889-1989 229-31, 432 (1987).
[¶ 43] Over the next 85 years, North Dakota had a rather mixed history on gambling, ranging from Attorney General Neis Johnson, 1945-48, driving the slot machines out of the state, to Elmo Chris-tiansen, in 1954, being convicted of conspiracy to bring illegal gambling into the *273state. Attorney General of North Dakota, Gambling in North Dakota: A Historical and Legal Perspective (1976). In 1964 and 1968, constitutional amendments to permit parimutuel betting on horse and dog races were defeated. Id. at 6; see also 1965 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 478; 1969 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 587. In 1972, the text of the First Amendment to the North Dakota Constitution was submitted separately to the voters considering a new state constitution. The gambling provision failed to get the majority vote needed for inclusion in the new constitution and therefore would have been omitted had the new constitution been adopted. Id.
[¶ 44] The 1973 legislature, in adopting the New Criminal Code to be effective July 1, 1975, greatly increased the penalties for gambling — from misdemeanors to mostly felonies. 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 116, § 27; see also N.D.C.C. § 12.1-28-02 (1973) (identifying the offense classification scheme).
[¶ 45] The 1975 legislature, at the urging of then-Attorney General Allen I. Olson, proposed a constitutional amendment to legalize gambling for charitable purposes. 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 616. The aftermath of Watergate and the resignation of President Richard Nixon emphasized the importance of obeying the law and changing, rather than violating, laws with which the people did not agree. Olson cracked down on widespread illegal gambling and urged the people to speak with their ballots. Allen I. Olson, Guest Editorial, Gambling a Controversial Issue, Grand Forks Herald, March 14, 1976, at 4.
[¶ 46] After the 1976 approval of the constitutional amendment, the 1977 legislature legalized charitable gambling, requiring the entire net proceeds go to “[n]onprofit veterans, charitable, educational, religious, and fraternal organizations, civic and service clubs, and public-spirited organizations.” 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 473, § 2.
[¶ 47] The 1981 legislature made North Dakota only the third state in the nation— following Nevada and New Jersey — to legalize “Blackjack” or “Twenty-one.” 1981 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 514, § 7 (identifying twenty-one as a permissible game of chance); see also Gambling at a Crossroads, Grand Forks Herald, November 3, 1991 (identifying North Dakota as the third state to legalize blackjack). North Dakota became the third state with casinos — this before state lotteries became widespread, before modern riverboat gambling, and before the rise of Indian gambling. See First Interim Report of the Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling (1975); Melinda Beck and Sylvester Monroe, Reno on the Red River, Newsweek, May 17, 1982, at 56.
[¶ 48] In 1993, after the rise of modern state lotteries, the North Dakota legislature repealed the ban on lottery advertising — as long as the lottery was legal where it was conducted. 1993 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 124; N.D.C.C. § 12.1-28-02(2)(b). North Dakota’s legalization of advertising of out-of-state lotteries cannot be reconciled with the majority’s claimed public policy against them.
II
[¶ 49] The majority misperceives the meaning of “lotteries and gift enterprises” as used in the First Amendment to North Dakota’s Constitution and now in the current N.D. Const, art. XI, § 25. The term is very broad. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a lottery as:
A chance for a prize for a price. A scheme for the distribution of a prize or prizes by lot or chance, the number and value of which is determined by the operator of the lottery. Essential ele-*274merits of a lottery are consideration, prize and chance and any scheme or device by which a person for a consideration is permitted to receive a prize or nothing as may be determined predominately by chance.
Black’s Law Dictionary 947 (6th ed.1990) (citations omitted).
[¶ 50] The meaning of lottery as intended in the First Amendment to the North Dakota Constitution is consistent with the general definition. The definition was established in the Territorial Code of 1877 and incorporated into North Dakota law at statehood.
Lottery defined. A lottery is any scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by chance among persons who have paid, or promised or agreed to pay, any valuable consideration for the chance of obtaining such property, or a portion of it, or for any share of or interest in such property, upon any agreement, understanding, or expectation that it is to be distributed or disposed of by lot or chance, whether called a lottery, a raffle, or a gift enterprise, or by whatever name the same may be known.
Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota, Penal Code, § 373 (1877). With the exception of slight changes in punctuation, the 1877 definition remained the same when incorporated into North Dakota law. See N.D.R.C. Ch. 36, § 7217 (1895).
[¶ 51] The majority’s analysis is seriously flawed by its misunderstanding of the meaning of “lottery, or gift enterprises” as used in our constitution.
[¶ 52] The majority’s analysis is further flawed by its misperception of recent state lottery proposals. The campaigns in opposition to state lotteries in 1986, 1988, and 1996 focused not on the evils of lotteries as opposed to “other forms of gambling,” but on the evils of all forms of gambling and on the State entering into gambling competition with private charities. See, e.g., King: Lotteries Won’t Hurt Charitable Gaming, Grand Forks Herald, May 26,1988 (identifying Gorman King Sr. as a “lottery backer,” and attributing statements to him that a lottery would not reduce profits of existing charitable gaming); Lottery Could Wipe Out Many Charities, Grand Forks Herald, June 9, 1988 (suggesting charities would be devastated by a lottery).
Ill
[¶ 53] The majority, at ¶ 1, holds “the public policy of the state of North Dakota would not allow our courts to enforce an alleged contract to share proceeds of a winning lottery ticket.” The majority misstates the public policy of this State. In the context of contract enforcement, the concept of public policy “is vague and variable.” 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 258 (1991). Public policy related to contract enforcement is fluid, flexible, and ever-changing:
Public policy has been described as the will-o’-the-wisp of the law which varies and changes with the interests, habits, needs, sentiments, and fashions of the day; the public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another. Thus, the very reverse of that which is public policy at one time may become public policy at another time.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
A
[¶ 54] North Dakota public policy does not forbid gambling, but North Dakota does have a public policy against the undue influence and illicit activity that may accompany it. The North Dakota criminal code, substantially revised and effective July 1, 1975, increased the severity of pun*275ishment for gambling offenses. Although once wholly prohibited, after the adoption of a constitutional amendment in 1976, limited gambling became lawful in North Dakota. With the addition of gaming on Indian reservations in North Dakota, games of chance are now commonplace in this State. Although lawful, gambling remains highly regulated. See N.D.C.C. ch. 53-06.1 (the regulatory system for gambling in North Dakota). The majority is correct that lotteries remain unlawful in North Dakota. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-28-02(2). North Dakota’s public policy permits gambling, and North Dakota’s law establishes a regulatory system.
[¶ 55] Whether a contract or one of its provisions “is against public policy is generally provided for by statute or by the State Constitution.” Johnson v. Peterbilt of Fargo, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 162, 163 (N.D.1989) (footnote omitted). “It is primarily the prerogative of the legislature to declare what agreements and acts are contrary to public policy, and to forbid them.” 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 262 (1991) (footnote omitted). As reflected by legislation authorizing the advertisement in this state of out-of-state lotteries, an agreement to gamble or to share gambling proceeds in Canada is not contrary to our public policy.
[¶ 56] Our public policy applies neither extraterritorially, nor, as in this case, internationally. For example, this Court recently held that although common-law marriages cannot be lawfully entered in this State, we may still recognize a common-law marriage validly entered in Canada. Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, ¶ 8, 606 N.W.2d 128. We did not exalt our public policy against common-law marriages in Pearson. Without support, at ¶ 12 the majority states, “whether the alleged contract is contrary to express provision of law in North Dakota is essential to determining whether the contract is enforceable.” In Pearson, an opinion authored by Justice Kapsner, the Court stated that although our own statutes and public policy prohibit common-law marriages, a common-law marriage validly entered into in Canada may be entitled to recognition in North Dakota. Pearson, at ¶ 8. Also in Pearson, the majority declined to terminate spousal support because of an alleged violation of North Dakota public policy against cohabitation, concluding the practice was acceptable in Canada. Id. at ¶ 23. In this case, Canada has clearly authorized lotteries. A contract entered in Canada — that is permissible in Canada — is entitled to recognition here.
[¶ 57] The majority, at ¶ 15, citing N.D.C.C. § 12.1-28-02(2), places great emphasis on the fact that it is a class A misdemeanor to “Sell, purchase, receive, or transfer a chance to participate in a lottery, whether the lottery is drawn in state or out of state, and whether the lottery is lawful in the other state or country.” The majority, however, omits the crucial introductory clause, “Except as permitted by law.”
[¶ 58] In ¶ 11, the majority cites N.D.C.C. § 9-01-02, stating a lawful object is necessary for a valid contract. In fact, N.D.C.C. § 9-01-02 states, “there should be ... [a] lawful object” (emphasis added).
[¶ 59] The majority also cites § 9-05-04 in ¶ 11, stating a contract is void “if the consideration given for the contract is unlawful.” Illegal consideration is “any act or forbearance, or a promise to act or forbear, which is contrary to law or public policy.” 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 240 (1991). The parties do not dispute that the money, consideration, or promises exchanged by the parties in this case were wholly legal in Canada. The statutes cited by the majority apply to contracts and *276conduct in North Dakota, but not to the alleged agreement between the Meyers and the Hawkinsons. As demonstrated by the persuasive analysis of other courts interpreting this issue, all of these facts are immaterial. The important fact is the parties do not dispute that the alleged agreement was wholly lawful in Canada, where it was entered. Canada’s criminal code, Part VII — entitled Disorderly Houses, Gaming and Betting — at §§ 202-206 allows lotteries and private bets between individuals who are not in the business of betting.-
[¶ 60] The majority and concurring opinions seek to raise the specious argument of whether the alleged contract was valid in Canada. Whether the alleged agreement violated the law of Canada would likely involve questions of fact and law and therefore would not be suitable for summary judgment. More importantly, however, the plaintiffs argued the agreement was legal in Canada, and the defendants did not dispute the legality in Canada, but merely argued that the agreement violated North Dakota law. We have repeatedly held that issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Cermak v. Cermak, 1997 ND 187, ¶ 15, 569 N.W.2d 280. The issue was raised neither in the trial court nor on appeal. It is raised for the first time in the majority and concurring opinions here. In the plaintiffs’ brief responding to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argue:
it is clear that this hotly contested issue of whether or not there was an enforceable contract is a question of fact for the jury. Further, though lotteries are not legal in North Dakota, the contract was formed in Winnipeg, Canada, where the lottery is legal. Accordingly, this Court has the power and authority to enforce the binding and legal contract entered into between the parties regarding this legal activity of playing the lottery.
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Thereafter, at page 13 of the Meyers’ brief in opposition to the Hawkinsons’ motion for summary judgment, the Meyers reiterate that the Hawkinsons based their argument on the proposition that the contract was illegal in North Dakota. In concluding their brief, the Meyers argued:
Further, there certainly was nothing illegal about any of the parties participating in the lottery or contracting with regard to the lottery at a time they were in Winnipeg, Canada, where the lottery is legal.
[¶ 61] The record reflects that the Hawkinsons never replied to the Meyers’ argument. Further, during the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the Hawkinsons maintained the contract was illegal in North Dakota, but they did not argue the contract was unlawful in Canada. Counsel for the Hawkinsons stated:
The two points in our brief that we made, of course, was number one, there was never a contract and number two that even if — under the facts as asserted by the plaintiffs there could be a contract. That it’s an illegal contract under North Dakota Law.
[¶ 62] The concurring opinion concludes that the contract was unlawful in Canada, an issue never raised below or on appeal.3 The concurring opinion presumes the agreement was unlawful, notwithstanding the factual questions that were undetermined because, as the concurrence ree-*277ognizes, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment based on a misconceived notion of public policy.
[¶ 63] Although North Dakota’s public policy may be demonstrated to a certain extent through the statutes cited by the majority, the clear intent of our public policy is to allow regulated gaming. Seeking to enforce a contract made in Canada to share proceeds of the Canadian lottery does not offend the public policy of this State.
B
[¶ 64] Courts, including this Court, increasingly decline to render contracts invalid on the basis of public policy. The court’s power “to declare a contract void as against public policy must be exercised with caution and only in cases that are free from doubt.” 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 264 (1991) (footnote omitted). As stated in Johnson, 438 N.W.2d at 164:
When a court is faced with deciding whether a contract is against public policy, it must also be mindful of an individual’s right to enter into a contract. “It is not the court’s function to curtail the liberty to contract by enabling parties to escape their valid contractual obligation on the ground of public policy unless the preservation of the general public welfare imperatively so demands.” Tschirgi v. Merchants National Bank of Cedar Rapids, 253 Iowa 682, 690, 113 N.W.2d 226, 231 (1962).
[¶ 65] The concept of not enforcing a contract on public policy grounds is based on the notion that enforcing such a contract would have “a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.” Johnson, 438 N.W.2d at 163 (citing Ness v. City of Fargo, 64 N.D. 231, 251 N.W. 843 (1933)). Regardless of whether the contract in this case is enforced, North Dakota’s public policy is not offended, because enforcement would neither encourage nor discourage this type of agreement. See Miller v. Radikopf, 394 Mich. 83, 228 N.W.2d 386, 388 (1975) (concluding enforcement of a contract similar to this one would not discourage people from buying or selling lottery tickets even though illegal in that state); see also Kaszuba v. Zientara, 506 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind.1987) (prohibiting use of the courts to enforce this type of contract does not serve the policy behind the state’s constitutional prohibition of lotteries). The majority, at ¶ 15, concludes, “Clearly, an alleged contract to share proceeds of a $1.2 million lottery would be illegal if entered into in North Dakota.”
[¶ 66] If the contract at issue here had been made in North Dakota, North Dakota’s public policy would apply. Because enforcement of this contract does not implicate our public policy or our laws, however, there is no “tendency” of enforcement of the contract “to be injurious to the public or against the public good.” Johnson, 438 N.W.2d at 163 (citation omitted).
[¶ 67] Generally, a contract that violates a statute or a state’s constitution is illegal and void. But, “the rule that an agreement in violation of statute is illegal and void is not inflexible or inexorable.” 17A Am.Jur.2d. Contracts § 247 (1991). Even though the agreement may violate our statutes, the majority does not establish that our public policy is offended by enforcement of the obligation in question. As the court stated in Kaszuba, 506 N.E.2d at 2-3, in concluding enforcement of an Indiana agreement to share the proceeds of an Illinois lottery ticket was enforceable in Indiana courts:
There is no benefit to the citizens of this State in prohibiting an agreement of this nature. It will not shelter them from lotteries conducted in sister states. It will not deter people from purchasing *278lottery tickets in Illinois, Ohio or Michigan. Finding the agreement ... illegal and unenforceable as against public policy, rather than being of benefit to Indiana residents, would instead reward people who convert the property of others to their own use.
[¶ 68] The efficacy of our laws and the regulation of gambling in North Dakota would remain unaffected by enforcement of this agreement. It is infirm to refuse enforcement of this alleged contract, based on a purported North Dakota public policy that would not be implicated by enforcement of the agreement.
IV
[¶ 69] The majority, at ¶ 23, cites a few cases in which this Court declined to enforce contract provisions on the basis of public policy. In each of those cases, enforcement of the respective contracts would have offended the public policy of this State by contravening our own statutes. Any agreement between Meyer and Hawkinson was lawful in Canada. There is no support for the proposition that our contract law is to have extraterritorial or international application. The majority cites no law or case that would allow this Court to apply our laws or purported public policy extraterritorially.
A
[¶ 70] The two cases cited by the majority as support for the proposition that this alleged agreement cannot be enforced by our courts deserve little weight.
[¶ 71] Unlike the states in cases relied on by the majority, North Dakota does not specifically prohibit the enforcement of a gaming contract. See Dickerson v. Deno, 770 So.2d 63, 65 (Ala.2000) (Alabama Code § 8-1-150 prohibits enforcement of “payment for actual wagering or gambling”); Cole v. Hughes, 114 N.C.App. 424, 442 S.E.2d 86, 89 (1994) (N.C.G.S. § 16-1 renders gambling contracts void). Such a prohibition was established in the Dakota Territory Code of 1865, but repealed in 1877, and not reestablished in the Territory or this State. See Laws of Dakota 1862-1863 ch. 9, §§ 8-10 (“All notes, bills, bonds, mortgages, or other securities or conveyances” obtained in whole or in part by gaming consideration, “shall be void and of no effect”); Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota 805 § 2 (1877) (repealing the aforementioned provisions).
[¶ 72] In addition, in each of the cases cited by the majority at ¶¶ 25-26, an agreement to split proceeds was denied enforcement under facts clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case.
[¶ 73] In Dickerson v. Deno, 770 So.2d 63, 64 (Ala.2000), the Alabama Supreme Court denied enforcement of a contract made in Alabama to share the winnings of a Florida lottery ticket. In Dickerson, the court, citing Alabama law, concluded the contract was “founded ... on a gambling consideration” and was therefore void. Id. As noted in its dissenting opinion, Dickerson was decided on the basis of invalid consideration. Id. at 67 (John-stone, J., dissenting). In Dickerson, five restaurant employees agreed to share winnings of lottery tickets provided, apparently as a gratuity, by a regular customer. Id. at 64. The court concluded the employees’ mutual promises constituted unlawful consideration because the parties exchanged promises that were contingent upon the occurrence of the “uncertain event” that the winner of the “Florida lottery matched the numbers on one of the tickets held by the five individuals.” Id. at 66-67. In its opinion the Dickerson court stated “the facts in this ease show that there was no agreément to jointly purchase or to jointly hold the lottery tickets.” Id. at 66.
*279[¶ 74] The majority, at ¶ 26, cites Cole v. Hughes, 114 N.C.App. 424, 442 S.E.2d 86 (1994), and Hughes v. Cole, 251 Va. 3, 465 S.E.2d 820 (1996), to support its conclusion. Both cases result from a lottery-tieket-buying-and-chance-sharing scheme by essentially the same parties. In both opinions, the courts refused to enforce an agreement made in North Carolina, by North Carolinians, to share proceeds from winning Virginia lottery tickets. North Carolina, like North Dakota, does not allow lotteries. Cole, 442 S.E.2d at 89; N.D.C.C. § 12.1-28-02(2). If, in the present case, the alleged agreement had been made in North Dakota instead of Canada, Cole and Hughes would be more analogous.
B
[¶ 75] The majority cites, but does not analyze, numerous cases in which courts have allowed enforcement of contracts similar to the alleged contract in this case. Perhaps most on point is Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex.1967). In Castilleja, two Texas families agreed “to jointly purchase a lottery ticket in the Mexican National Lottery.” Id. at 425. When one ticket won, the purchaser denied the existence of any proceed-sharing agreement. Id. The Texas Supreme Court stated:
The agreement ... to jointly purchase a ticket in the National Lottery of Mexico and to divide the proceeds, if any, was not an illegal contract. It neither violated nor aided in the violation of any gaming statute of Texas. The only other jurisdiction involved was Mexico. In Mexico, the purpose of the contract had the express approval of the Mexican government in that the Mexican government has a revenue interest in the lottery. Thus the agreement was to do a lawful thing — participate in the National Lottery of Mexico, in a lawful manner— by going to Mexico.
Id. at 426. The court held, “A contract which is made in one jurisdiction but which relates to and is performed in another jurisdiction is governed by the law of the place of performance.” Id. (citations omitted). Although the majority ignores the choice-of-law question, under our choice-of-law analysis, Canadian law would apply to this alleged contract. See Daley v. American States Preferred Ins. Co., 1998 ND 225, ¶¶ 13-17, 587 N.W.2d 159 (North Dakota’s choice-of-law test for contracts is one of significant contacts followed by choice-influencing considerations). Like the Castilleja agreement that “did not relate to or involve Texas law,” the alleged contract here does not involve North Dakota law. Castilleja, 414 S.W.2d at 427.
[¶ 76] The Castilleja court concluded Texas policies and interests were not “sufficiently involved to deny recognition of the right [to enforce the contract] by Texas courts.” Id. The court stated:
To justify a court in refusing to enforce a right of action which accrued under the laws of another state, because against the policy of our laws, it must appear that it is against good morals or natural justice, or that for some other reason the enforcement of it would be prejudicial to the general interests of our own citizens.
Id. The court concluded that although Texas public policy prohibited lotteries, conversion was more offensive and was the paramount act “contrary to natural justice.” Id. at 427-28.
[¶ 77] In Kaszuba v. Zientara, two residents of Indiana disputed ownership of the proceeds of an Illinois lottery ticket. 506 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.1987). Like North Dakota’s constitution, Indiana’s constitution prohibits lotteries. Id. at 2. The court was asked to decide “whether an Indiana *280agreement to purchase an Illinois Lotto ticket, in Illinois, is an illegal and immoral agreement and therefore unenforceable by Indiana courts.” Id. After first stating the purchase of a lottery ticket is illegal in Indiana, the court stated:
the agreement in question here was not for the purchase of a lottery ticket in Indiana. It was to effectuate the purchase of an Illinois Lotto ticket in Illinois. If [the defendant] had driven to Illinois himself and purchased the winning ticket, it would have been perfectly legal. While the law in Indiana may prohibit the resale of such a lottery ticket within the confines of this state, there is no law in Indiana prohibiting the possession of such a lottery ticket. Indeed the creation of such a prohibition would not serve the policy behind the constitutional proscription against lotteries.
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There is no benefit to the citizens of this State in prohibiting an agreement of this nature. It will not shelter them from lotteries conducted in sister states. It will not deter people from purchasing lottery tickets in Illinois, Ohio or Michigan. Finding the agreement ... illegal and unenforceable as against public policy, rather than being of benefit to Indiana residents, would instead reward people who convert the property of others to their own use.
There is nothing perceptibly evil, vicious, wicked, immoral or shocking to the prevailing moral sense in this agreement.
Id. at 2-3. The court concluded, although unlawful in Indiana, the agreement was legal in Illinois and “therefore the underlying agreement is also legal and enforceable in Indiana courts.” Id. at 3.
[¶ 78] In Miller v. Radikopf the Supreme Court of Michigan concluded an agreement to share lottery proceeds is enforceable even though unlawful in the state where enforcement is sought. 394 Mich. 83, 228 N.W.2d 386 (1975). In Miller, an agreement to split money paid by the Irish Sweepstakes was enforced in Michigan, notwithstanding Michigan law making it a crime to sell, offer for sale, or have lottery tickets in possession with the intent to sell them. Id. at 387. Differentiating “illegal enterprises such as the illegal sale of narcotics and bank robberies,” the court concluded public policy was not offended by an agreement to share proceeds of the Irish Sweepstakes. Id. at 388.
[¶ 79] The Miller court stated:
Judicial nonenforcement of agreements deemed against public policy is considered a deterrent for those who might otherwise become involved in such transactions. While nonenforcement of [the plaintiffs] claim might tend to discourage people from agreeing to split their legal winnings, nonenforcement would not tend to discourage people from buying or selling Irish Sweepstakes tickets.
Id. at 388. The court concluded if the agreement were not enforced, “It could reward, without any corresponding benefit, promissory default.” Id. Enforcement of the agreement did not offend Michigan public policy. Id.
[¶ 80] In Talley v. Mathis, 265 Ga. 179, 453 S.E.2d 704, 705-06 (1995), the Georgia Supreme Court concluded an agreement to purchase a Kentucky lottery ticket and to share any proceeds could be enforced in a Georgia court. Although under Georgia law “[g]ambling contracts are void,” and although a “contract to do an immoral or illegal thing is void,” because “the lottery was legal in Kentucky and the purchase by a Georgia resident of a ticket in that lottery would not necessarily be an immoral or illegal act,” the contract was enforceable. Id. at 705. The court concluded *281Georgia public policy would not be violated by enforcement of the contract, stating:
The only agreement that is alleged to have been reached ... in Georgia was for the lawful purchase in Kentucky of a ticket in that state’s lottery. The consideration for this agreement was the joint contribution of the purchase price of the ticket and the exchange of mutual promises to share in any resulting proceeds. There is nothing unlawful in either the agreement or the consideration.
Id. at 706.
[¶ 81] Finally, in Pearsall v. Alexander, 572 A.2d 113, 116 (D.C.App.1990), the court concluded a lawful agreement to share the proceeds of the D.C. lottery was enforceable in D.C. courts. The court stated:
News accounts and personal observations reveal that it is common practice for friends, relatives, and coworkers to pool their resources and purchase large blocks of tickets on those occasions when various state lotteries present exceptionally large prizes. The approach taken by the trial court would make such arrangements perilous indeed, by permitting the unscrupulous holders of winning tickets to renege on their agreement and keep the winnings for themselves.
Id. at 117.
C
[¶ 82] There exists no case to support the majority’s belief that North Dakota’s purported public policy against lotteries can be used to deny enforcement of an obligation that was wholly legal where made. The majority’s lack of cited authority on point is telling. The majority ignores the persuasive analysis of the numerous courts that have considered this concept and have concluded the paramount public policy is enforcement of lawful obligations. I decline to join the majority’s effort to be the first to establish such a tenuous legal position.
V
[¶ 83] Because the majority misper-ceives our history, misunderstands our law, and misstates our public policy, I cannot concur. Because the majority ignores its duty to enforce lawful contracts, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 84] Dale Y. Sandstrom.

. At the time, constitutional amendment approval required passage of the proposed amendment by two successive legislative sessions plus ratification by the voters. See N.D. Const, art. XV, § 202 (1889) (detailing the procedure for constitutional amendments). The amendment, proposed in 1891, was approved in the 1893 legislative session. 1891 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 47; 1893 N.D. Sess. Laws 294.

. In addition to the general exceptions for private bets, the concurring opinion omits this provision of section 206 of the Canadian Criminal Code:
fs) This section does not apply to
(a) the division by lot or chance of any property by ... persons having joint interests in any such property....