Court Opinion

ID: 9642739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:08:05.609933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:57.658897
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I dissent because I am convinced there is adequate class representation in this case. Our rules provide, as a prerequisite to a class action, that “(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (2005). Our case law has defined what this adequacy requirement means: The elements of the requirement are: (1) the representative counsel must be qualified, experienced and generally able to conduct the litigation; (2) that there be no evidence of collusion or conflicting interest between the representative and the class; and (3) the representative must display some minimal level of interest in the action, familiarity with the practices challenged, and ability to assist in decision making as to the conduct of the litigation. Direct General Ins. Co. v. Lane, 328 Ark. 476, 485, 944 S.W.2d 528, 531 (1997). In Ballard v. Martin, 349 Ark. 564, 79 S.W.3d 838 (2002), this court applied these requirements when it examined a challenge to Ms. Martin’s adequacy as a representative in a check-cashing class action. In finding that she was an adequate representative, we observed that Ms. Martin: testified at the fairness hearing that she was pleased with the legal representation provided to her and that her attorneys had kept her informed of what was going on in the case. She also stated that her goal in suing the defendants was to put an end to the check-cashing practices of the Westark appellees. She testified that she talks to her attorneys regularly and is kept abreast of the proceedings. Based on this testimony, we fail to discern any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that Martin is an adequate class representative. 349 Ark. at 584, 79 S.W.3d at 850. The same can be said for Katrina Valley and Meranda Valley in the instant case. Katrina Valley testified in her deposition: • She filed the lawsuit for herself and other people because of “the feeling of being evacuated, the fear, the known and unknown things.” • She is representing other people in trying to get money for them from the defendants. • The class is made up of those who had to evacuate and she knows about twenty people in the class personally. • She had to check into a motel with her family because of the evacuation. The second class representative, Meranda Valley, testified: • She is making claims for her children. • They had to evacuate and stay in a motel. There is no question but that these two class representatives had experienced and qualified attorneys representing them. There is no question but that they experienced the evacuation and incurred expense either for themselves, their children, or both. There is no question but that their claims are typical of the class. Though two of Meranda’s children had reached their majority, the third, Omarrian, had not. This renders Meranda the natural guardian to prosecute this action on Omarrian’s behalf.1 Katrina testified to her goal in the litigation and her familiarity with the basis of the class’s claims. Meranda also testified to her experiences and those of her children which serve as the basis for her claims and the similar claims of the class. In addition, the two Valleys are related to class counsel, who again are qualified and experienced. Due to their familial relationship, it seems they will most certainly be kept apprised of the litigation. I see no viable reason why the representatives do not meet the requirement of having a “minimal” interest in the litigation. Indeed, the leading treatise on class actions is in agreement when it states that class representatives must be “capable of understanding their obligations, the nature of the suit, and be free of such physical or mental disabilities which would render them incapable of carrying out their responsibilities.” 5 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 17:12 (4th ed. 2005). Moreover, the majority does not cite a case where this court has denied class status for this reason. Certainly we did not do so in Summons where the facts closely approximate the facts of this case and the class representatives were making similar claims. See Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 813 S.W.2d 240 (1991). Our decision today breaks new ground, all to the disadvantage of this class. I respectfully dissent. Imber, J., joins this dissent.   The trial court appeared to overlook the fact that MerandaValley did have a son who was still a minor. Counsel for the appellees acknowledged this oversight at oral argument.