Court Opinion

ID: 9772348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:07.394228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:10.712325
License: Public Domain

J-S18041-23

                                   2023 PA Super 158

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LANCELOT FORTUNE                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2687 EDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 29, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-45-CR-0000495-2018

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                            FILED AUGUST 29, 2023

       Appellant Lancelot Fortune appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County after a jury convicted

Appellant of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of tampering

with/fabricating evidence. Appellant claims the trial court erred in precluding

him from offering an insanity defense and in denying the public defender’s

request to withdraw due to an alleged conflict of interest. We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the factual background of this case:

              On January 15, 2018, Pocono Township Police Department
       officers were dispatched to conduct a welfare call at a residence
       located at 145 Marcelle Terrace, Pocono Township. Upon arrival,
       officers discovered one deceased male, identified as Richard B.
       Fells, in the garage and one deceased female, identified as Sharon
       Fortune Fells (hereinafter “Victims”), inside the residence on a
       couch. Both Victims appeared to have suffered multiple stab
       wounds.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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            Upon speaking with the Victim’s daughter, Selina Taylor,
     officers learned that [Appellant] lived at the Victims’ residence on-
     and-off for years. Taylor stated that [Appellant] had not lived at
     the residence for approximately one year, but still frequented the
     residence. In addition, Taylor stated that [Appellant] resided at
     814 Sarah Street in Stroudsburg.

           On January 15, 2018, a search warrant was executed at 145
     Marcelle Terrace and the curtilage. Passive blood drops were
     observed throughout the first floor of the residence. In addition,
     several kitchen knives with apparent blood transfer on them were
     observed on the kitchen counter. Further, bloody shoe print
     impressions were observed on the garage floor leading away from
     the male victim. Finally, on a piece of board located on the
     stairway leading to the house from the garage, a fingerprint in
     apparent dried blood was recovered. That same day, the
     fingerprint was preliminarily identified as matching the right
     middle finger of [Appellant].

           Following the fingerprint identification, officers went to
     [Appellant’s] residence at 814 Sarah Street and encountered
     [Appellant], who presented with several small scratches on his
     face. A search warrant was executed on [Appellant’s] residence
     and uncovered blood on the interior of the entrance, a bloody shirt
     from the bedroom, and a pair of black sneakers containing a tread
     pattern consistent with those observed in the Victims’ garage. As
     a result, [Appellant] was detained and transported to the PSP
     Stroudsburg barracks.

           While in custody, [Appellant] was provided a Miranda
     Rights Warning and Waiver. [Appellant] waived his Miranda
     rights and related that he had stabbed Sharon Fortune Fells
     multiple times in the throat while she rested on the living room
     couch. In addition, [Appellant] related that he knew Richard Fells
     would be returning shortly and waited in hiding behind the door
     leading to the garage. Upon Richard Fells’ return, [Appellant]
     related that he stabbed the Victim multiple times in the neck and
     body.

           After killing the Victims, [Appellant] admitted to taking the
     Victims’ Lincoln Navigator and leaving the scene. [Appellant]
     related that he drove to his apartment, changed clothes, then
     drove to the Philadelphia area where he watched the movie
     Jumanji at a movie theater in King of Prussia and stayed overnight
     at a hotel. In addition, [Appellant] related that he threw the

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      murder weapon into the river at Penn’s Landing and discarded
      clothing in the surrounding area. Following this trip to the
      Philadelphia area, [Appellant] returned to the scene, left the
      Victims’ vehicle in the driveway, and returned to his apartment.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 11/14/22, at 2-3.

      Appellant was charged with the aforementioned offenses in connection

with the Victims’ deaths. Thereafter, Appellant submitted to competency

evaluations by both parties. On November 20, 2018, the trial court held a

hearing pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”) at which it

found Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. The trial court cited to the

expert report of Dr. Robert Morrow, M.D., who diagnosed Appellant with

paranoid schizophrenia and indicated that Appellant “continues to be grossly

psychotic.” Order, 11/20/18, at 1. Based on Dr. Morrow’s recommendation,

the trial court directed that Appellant be committed to a state hospital.

Further, the trial court ordered that all proceedings be stayed as long as

Appellant’s incompetency persisted.

      Nearly one year later, on September 4, 2019, at a subsequent MHPA

hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had regained competency

to stand trial. The trial court based its decision on the testimony of Dr. William

Hoctor, Jr., M.D., who attributed the improvement to Appellant’s consistent

treatment and medication. Appellant was transferred to the Monroe County

Correctional Facility.

      Prior to trial, Appellant filed notice of his intent to seek an insanity

defense pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 568. Appellant provided that he would offer

the expert testimony of Dr. Morrow, who would testify that Appellant suffered

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from a mental disease, namely paranoid schizophrenia. In addition, Appellant

indicated that he planned to call numerous lay witnesses to testify as to

Appellant’s general mental health and their observations of Appellant near the

time of the Victims’ murders.

      On May 25, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a Motion In Limine to

Preclude Insufficient Insanity Defense, emphasizing that Dr. Morrow authored

an expert report indicating that while Appellant suffered from paranoid

schizophrenia, Dr. Morrow opined that Appellant did not meet the legal

standard for insanity as there was evidence showing that Appellant had

volitional control over his actions and knew what he did was wrong.

      On June 15, 2021, the trial court entered an order and opinion granting

the Commonwealth’s motion in limine and specifically providing that Appellant

was “precluded from raising a defense of insanity at trial.” Order, 6/15/21, at

1. The trial court concluded that Appellant could not, as a matter of law,

establish an insanity defense without presenting expert testimony concluding

that Appellant was legally insane.

      Appellant proceeded to a jury trial at which he was convicted of two

counts of first-degree murder and one count of tampering with/fabricating

evidence. Thereafter, on September 29, 2022, Appellant was sentenced to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant filed a timely notice

of appeal and complied with the trial court’s direction to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

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      I.    Did the court commit an error of law in prohibiting
            [Appellant] to testify in order to establish the defense of
            insanity?

      II.   Did the court abuse its discretion by denying the Monroe
            County Public Defender’s [Motion] to Withdraw from the
            case due to a conflict of interest?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      First, Appellant claims the trial court committed an error of law in

precluding him from raising an insanity defense. Although Appellant concedes

that his expert witness concluded that he was not legally insane, Appellant

asserts that he should have been permitted to present an insanity defense for

the jury’s consideration based on the testimony of his expert and several lay

witnesses as well as his own testimony.

      To evaluate Appellant’s specific argument, it is helpful to set forth the

law applicable to an insanity defense. It is well-established that “criminal

defendants may be presumed sane for purposes of determining their criminal

liability.” Commonwealth v. Rabold, 951 A.2d 329, 341 (Pa. 2008) (quoting

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006)). As a result, a defendant has

the burden of proving an insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315(a) (“[t]he mental soundness of an actor engaged in

conduct charged to constitute an offense shall only be a defense to the

charged offense when the actor proves by a preponderance of evidence that

the actor was legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense”).

      Section 315 of the Crimes Code contains the following definition of legal

insanity:

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       (b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the phrase “legally
       insane” means that, at the time of the commission of the offense,
       the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
       of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
       was doing or, if the actor did know the quality of the act, that he
       did not know that what he was doing was wrong.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315. This definition of legal insanity (often referred to as the

“M’Naghten rule”) is derived from the common law principle set forth in the

seminal case of Regina v. M’Naghten, 9 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843). See Rabold,

951 A.2d at 348 n.1.1 Our courts have provided that:

       [t]o plead the defense of insanity suggests that the defendant
       committed the act, but was not legally culpable. Commonwealth
       v. Mizell, 493 Pa. 161, 164, 425 A.2d 424, 426 (1981). An
       insanity defense focuses upon a defendant's capacity, at the time
       of the offense, to understand the nature and quality of his actions
       or whether he knew that his actions were wrong.
       Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 319 n. 29, 865 A.2d
       761, 788 n. 29 (2004).

Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957 A.2d 734, 738–39 (Pa.Super. 2008).

       Further, this Court has clarified that:

       The rule sets forth two separate and distinct aspects of the
       defense in Pennsylvania: a cognitive incapacity prong and a moral
       incapacity provision. Where the defendant alleges that he did not
       know what he was doing, he is presenting a cognitive incapacity
       insanity defense. On the other hand, if the defendant submits that
       he did not understand that what he was doing was wrong, he is
       advancing a moral incapacity defense.

Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951, 958–59 (Pa.Super. 2011).

____________________________________________

1 See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314(d) (“Nothing in this section shall be deemed to

repeal or otherwise abrogate the common law defense of insanity
(M’Naghten’s Rule) in effect in this Commonwealth on the effective date of
this section”).

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      Appellant claims the trial court should have allowed him to present an

insanity defense through the testimony of his expert, Dr. Morrow, as well as

multiple lay witnesses. Appellant desired to offer Dr. Morrow to testify to

Appellant’s schizophrenia diagnosis to establish that Appellant was laboring

under a “disease of the mind” as set forth in Section 315.

      Appellant also indicated that he intended to offer the testimony of

numerous lay witnesses in support of his insanity defense. Appellant’s

proposed lay witnesses included five troopers who spoke with and observed

Appellant on the day of his arrest, Appellant’s father to testify as to the

timeline of events that led up to the Appellant’s diagnosis of schizophrenia as

well as the Victims’ murders, several family members to testify about their

observations of Appellant three weeks prior to the Victim’s murder, and a

neighbor to testify that he observed Appellant three hours before the murder.

      The Commonwealth has argued that Appellant is not entitled to raise an

insanity defense as a matter of law as his expert witness, Dr. Morrow, opined

that while Appellant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, he does not meet

the legal standard for insanity in light of the evidence of record. Dr. Morrow

provided the following in his expert report:

      [Appellant’s] past psychiatric history [is consistent] with a
      diagnosis of Paranoid Schizophrenia … As to whether [Appellant]
      might be considered criminally insane at the time of the alleged
      incident, I generally use the [M’Naghten] rule for assessment
      purposes. As the Court is aware, the [M’Naghten] rule states that
      a criminal defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if at the
      time of the alleged criminal act, the defendant was so deranged
      that he did not know the nature or quality of his actions, or if he
      knew the nature and quality of his actions, he was so deranged

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      that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. There are
      multiple citations on the typed and recorded transcript indicating
      that [Appellant] knew his actions were wrong as evidenced by his
      hiding and disposing of the evidence of his crimes. And, although
      he was psychotic, he had some volitional control over his actions,
      as even though he admits murdering his aunt and uncle, he chose
      not to murder his father when he had the opportunity when he
      went to his house.

Addendum to Dr. Morrow’s Psychiatric Evaluation, 2/17/20, at 4.

      Therefore, Dr. Morrow made the following conclusions:

      With regard to the extent to which [Appellant’s] mental illness
      impacts on his degree of criminal responsibility, it is my
      psychiatric opinion that he does not meet all the criteria to justify
      rendering a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, which
      generally states that the person is not held responsible for his
      actions because the severity of his mental disorder rendered him
      incapable of distinguishing right from wrong … his actions
      following the alleged murders document that he had some
      awareness of the wrongfulness of his actions as he attempted to
      destroy or dispose of evidence of his acts, and had some volitional
      control over his actions at the time of the alleged criminal acts. I
      can state with a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric
      certainty that at the time of the alleged murders, [Appellant] was
      in the throes of a severe paranoid delusional psychosis that
      diminished his ability to act in a rational and lawful manner.
      Therefore I believe it is appropriate to consider rendering a verdict
      of guilty but mentally ill.

Addendum to Dr. Morrow’s Psychiatric Evaluation, 2/17/20, at 4.

      The trial court found that the facts of this case presented an issue of

first impression: “whether a defendant, may as a matter of law, offer an

insanity defense where: (1) [the] defendant’s sole mental health expert opines

that the defendant suffered from a mental disease – here, schizophrenia – but

concludes that the mental disease did not cause [the] defendant’s inability to

know what he was doing or judge its wrongfulness under M’Naghten; and

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(2) [the] defendant seeks to establish the requisite causation between the

diagnosed mental disease and his alleged inability to know what he was doing

or judge its wrongfulness based solely on lay testimony.” T.C.O. at 8-9.

       Our Supreme Court has established that where a defense expert opines

that the defendant suffers from a mental disease but determines that such

mental disease did not cause the defendant to be unable to know the nature

and quality of his actions or judge the wrongfulness of his actions, this expert

testimony is not relevant to a determination of whether the defendant was

legally insane. Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 595 A.2d 28, 36 (Pa. 1991).

       In that case, Faulkner filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from

his two death sentences after a jury convicted him of two counts of first-

degree murder and related offenses. Faulkner challenged the trial court’s

decision to grant the prosecution’s motion in limine to preclude the testimony

of defense experts, who opined that Faulkner “was probably psychotic” and

“may have been delusional” at the time of his crimes, but concluded that

Faulkner knew the nature and quality of his acts and knew what he was doing

was wrong. Id. at 36. The trial court determined that this expert testimony

was insufficient to establish that Faulkner was M’Naghten insane, but “would

only permit the jury to find [Faulkner] ‘guilty, but mentally ill;’ a designation

that would not affect a jury’s verdict of guilt. Id. at 35.2

____________________________________________

2“A person who timely offers a defense of insanity in accordance with the
Rules of Criminal Procedure may be found ‘guilty but mentally ill’ at trial if the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, stating

that “[t]estimony from psychiatric experts is relevant if it can establish that

the defendant was insane under the M’Naghten standard … or to negate

specific intent to commit first degree murder.” Id. at 36. Given the defense

experts had determined that Faulkner was aware of the nature and quality of

his behavior and knew what he was doing was wrong, the Supreme Court

concluded that the expert testimony “was not relevant to a determination of

whether [Faulkner] was ‘M’Naghten insane’ and was properly excluded by

the trial judge” from the guilt phase of the capital murder trial. Id.

       Likewise, in this case, the testimony of Appellant’s expert, Dr. Morrow,

was not relevant to a determination of whether Appellant was legally insane

____________________________________________

trier of facts finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is guilty of an
offense, was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense and was
not legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 314(a). Section 314 defines “mentally ill” as “[o]ne who as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314(c). We also note that:

       [a] defendant found guilty but mentally ill or whose plea of guilty
       but mentally ill is accepted under the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. §
       314 (relating to guilty but mentally ill) may have any sentence
       imposed on him which may lawfully be imposed on any defendant
       convicted of the same offense. Before imposing sentence, the
       court shall hear testimony and make a finding on the issue of
       whether the defendant at the time of sentencing is severely
       mentally disabled and in need of treatment pursuant to the
       provisions of … the Mental Health Procedures Act [(50 P.S. § 7101
       et seq)].

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9727.

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as Dr. Morrow expressly opined that Appellant knew the nature and quality of

his actions in killing the victims and knew what he did was wrong, as evidenced

by his attempts to dispose of evidence of the murders and his display of

volitional control over his actions. See Pa.R.E. 401-402 (evidence is relevant

if it makes a fact more or less probable, irrelevant evidence is not admissible).

      Not only did Appellant fail to offer a qualified expert opinion in support

of his insanity defense, we emphasize that Appellant’s sole expert witness

provided an opinion that contradicted his insanity defense. The opinion of a

defense expert who concludes that the accused suffered from mental illness,

but was not legally insane, is not sufficient to rise to the level of an insanity

defense under the M’Naghten rule. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 329

A.2d 212, 215 (Pa. 1974) (finding that “the presence of a psychosis, albeit a

severe mental disease, is not necessarily tantamount to ‘insanity’ under

M'Naghten”).

      Nevertheless, Appellant indicates he would offer Dr. Morrow’s diagnosis

of paranoid schizophrenia in conjunction with the testimony of numerous lay

witnesses regarding Appellant’s general mental health as well as Appellant’s

acts, words, conversations, behavior, and appearance close to the time of the

alleged crime. Appellant also seems to suggest that he would offer his own

testimony in support of his insanity defense.

      However, Appellant cannot handpick select portions of his expert’s

testimony to show an alleged mental disease, elicit only that testimony, ignore

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his expert’s ultimate conclusion, and then attempt to substitute lay witness

testimony to attempt to establish his insanity defense.

      Lay witnesses may not offer an opinion about an accused’s “mental

capacity in relation to the ultimate determination to be made by the jury” but

may only testify as to their general opinion as to a defendant’s mental capacity

based on facts and observations. Commonwealth v. Knight, 364 A.2d 902,

909-10 (Pa. 1976).

      We agree with the trial court that “a lay juror may be tempted to conflate

mental illness with legal insanity when confronted with a parade of non-expert

lay witness testimony regarding [Appellant’s] mental state.” T.C.O. at 17.

Moreover, none of the lay witnesses would have been able to testify as to

Appellant’s state of mind at the time of the commission of the murders, but

would only state their observations of Appellant’s behavior and mental state

before and after the murders.

      The lay witness testimony as to Appellant’s behavior did not provide a

sufficient factual basis for the jury to find that Appellant was suffering “a defect

of reason” from a mental disease that caused Appellant to be incapable of

understanding the nature and quality of his act in killing the Victims and

incapable of understanding that what he was doing was wrong. See White v.

Commonwealth, 616 S.E.2d 49, 54 (Va.App. 2006), affirmed, 636 S.E.2d

353 (Va. 2006) (holding the trial court did not err in precluding White from

raising an insanity defense when the sole defense expert testified that White

was not legally insane and the proposed lay witnesses’ “recital of the

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defendant’s behavior did not provide a factual base from which a jury could

find that the defendant was suffering from a mental disorder or disease that

prevented him from distinguishing right from wrong”).3

       We agree with the trial court’s finding that a defendant must present

expert testimony finding him M’Naghten insane before he can introduce lay

testimony in support of his insanity defense.4 As noted above, Appellant’s sole

expert witness contradicted Appellant’s insanity defense and Appellant could

only offer testimony from lay witnesses as to their observations of Appellant’s

behavior, most of which occurred days, if not weeks, before or after the

Victims’ murders. This would allow the jury to speculate as to whether

Appellant lacked the cognitive and moral capacity to understand his actions of

murdering the Victims.

       As Appellant failed to provide a qualified witness to provide a factual

basis to allow the jury to find Appellant was legally insane, the trial court did

not err in precluding Appellant from raising an insanity defense.

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3 This Court may cite to the decisions of other states for persuasive authority.

See Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 679 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2016)
(noting that “the decisions of other states are not binding authority for this
Court, although they may be persuasive”) (citation omitted).
4 We recognize that this Court has held that the Commonwealth is not required

to present expert testimony to prove an accused’s sanity, but may offer lay
testimony to show the defendant knew the nature and quality of his or her
actions and knew the actions were wrong. Yasipour, 957 A.2d at 738–39
(finding the jury had the right to disbelieve the defendant's insanity defense
and credit the testimony of the prosecution’s eyewitnesses)). However, we
remind Appellant that the defense has the burden to prove the insanity
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

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      Appellant also claims the trial court erred in denying the Monroe County

Public Defender’s motion to withdraw from this case due to a conflict of

interest. We briefly summarize the facts related to this claim.

      On March 16, 2020, Appellant filed a “Motion to Represent Self” with the

assistance of his public defender, Frederick Cutaio, Esq. On April 20, 2020,

the trial court held a hearing at which Appellant testified that he “didn’t trust”

his counsel, made allegations that his counsel had lied to him, and expressed

suspicion that he was being “set up.” Notes of Testimony (N.T.), Hearing,

4/20/20, at 6-8. After conducting a thorough colloquy of Appellant, the trial

court denied Appellant’s request to represent himself, but ordered the Public

Defender’s Office to assign Appellant different counsel.

      On May 29, 2020, the Public Defender’s Office sought reconsideration of

the trial court’s April 20, 2020 order and requested that conflict counsel be

appointed. The Public Defender’s Office asserted that Appellant had “an

inherent conflict with any attorney in the office” as he “strongly disagree[d]”

with strategy shared by other attorneys in the office. Petition, 5/29/20, at ¶

15-16. After a second hearing, the trial court entered an order on June 23,

2020, denying the Public Defender’s petition and again directing that Appellant

be reassigned counsel from within the Public Defender’s Office. On July 7,

2020, Jason LaBar, Esq., entered his appearance as trial counsel.

      Our courts “review a trial court’s denial of counsel’s petition to withdraw

under the abuse of discretion standard.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203

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A.3d 1033, 1101 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Magee, 177

A.3d 315, 322-23 (Pa.Super. 2017)).

      Our rules of criminal procedure require that an attorney for a defendant

must seek leave of court in order to withdraw his or her appearance. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 120(b)(1). The comment to Rule 120 states in relevant part:

      The court must make a determination of the status of a case
      before permitting counsel to withdraw. Although there are many
      factors considered by the court in determining whether there is
      good cause to permit the withdrawal of counsel, when granting
      leave, the court should determine whether new counsel will be
      stepping in or the defendant is proceeding without counsel, and
      that the change in attorneys will not delay the proceedings or
      prejudice the defendant, particularly concerning time limits.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 120, cmt.

      This Court has provided that:

      [n]o brightline rules exist to determine whether a trial court has
      abused its discretion in denying a Petition to Withdraw as counsel.
      A balancing test must be utilized to weigh the interests of the
      client in a fair adjudication and the Commonwealth in the efficient
      administration of justice. Thus, a resolution of the problem turns
      upon a case by case analysis with particular attention to the
      reasons given by the trial court at the time the request for
      withdrawal is denied.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1102 (quoting Magee, 177 A.3d at 322-23).

      In this case, the Public Defender’s Office sought to withdraw from

Appellant’s case and requested that conflict counsel be appointed, based on

an alleged conflict of interest. Specifically, the Public Defender’s Office argued

that as Appellant “strongly disagree[d] with the strategy” as discussed by the

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attorneys in the office, Appellant would “have an inherent conflict with any

attorney in the office.” Petition to be Relieved as Counsel, 5/29/20, at 2.

      In his appellate brief, Appellant cites to Commonwealth v. Watson,

835 A.2d 786 (Pa.Super. 2003), in which this Court recognized that the Public

Defender’s Office is considered to be a single law office. Thus, Appellant

argues that any conflict he had with his assigned public defender would be

imputed to the entire Public Defender’s office and disqualify all of its attorneys

from representing Appellant.

      It is well established that “[t]o show an actual conflict of interest, the

appellant must demonstrate that: (1) counsel actively represented conflicting

interests; and (2) those conflicting interests adversely affected his lawyer's

performance.” Commonwealth v. Campbell, 260 A.3d 272, 278 (Pa.Super.

2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1147 (Pa.

2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our Supreme Court has specified

that a “‘material disagreement’ with respect to a course of action in the

representation does not constitute a conflict of interest.” Commonwealth v.

Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1247 n. 10 (Pa. 2013).

      In this case, the trial court was correct in finding that Appellant’s

disagreement with his public defender as to trial strategy was not a conflict of

interest. Further, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that, given

Appellant’s mental health issues, Appellant’s disagreement with his counsel

would likely not have been resolved by an assignment of new counsel from a

different office. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

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     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2023

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