Court Opinion

ID: 9520123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:31:41.928857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:34.788229
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In my view, the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to recharacterize the defendant’s pro se petition as a postconviction petition. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the circuit court dismissing the defendant’s petition and remand this cause with directions that the court recharacterize the petition, appoint counsel, and otherwise proceed with this matter under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Prior to the adoption of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act), an Illinois petitioner could attack his conviction by a writ of error, habeas corpus, and coram nobis. People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278, 284, 235 N.E.2d 566, 569 (1968); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, par. 122 — 1 et seq. (now 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 2006)). The United States Supreme Court was particularly troubled by the procedures available to obtain postconviction relief in Illinois. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 92 L. Ed. 170, 68 S. Ct. 240 (1947). In a concurring opinion for three members of the Court, Justice Rutledge wrote: “The trouble with Illinois is not that it offers no procedure. It is that it offers too many, and makes them so intricate and ineffective that in practical effect they amount to none. The possibility of securing effective determination on the merits is substantially foreclosed by the probability, indeed the all but mathematical certainty, that the case will go off on the procedural ruling that the wrong one of several possible remedies has been followed. ^ ^ *** If the federal guarantee of due process in a criminal trial is to have real significance in Illinois, it is imperative that men convicted in violation of their constitutional rights have an adequate opportunity to be heard in court. This opportunity is not adequate so long as they are required to ride the Illinois merry-go-round of habeas corpus, coram nobis, and writ of error before getting a hearing in a federal court.” Marino, 332 U.S. at 565-70, 92 L. Ed. at 174-76, 68 S. Ct. at 243-45 (Rutledge, J., concurring, joined by Douglas and Murphy, JJ.). More than 60 years later we are still expending substantial time and effort determining whether a prisoner has pursued the correct remedy, rather than simply determining his claim on its merits. In response to the Supreme Court’s criticism, the Illinois General Assembly enacted a statutory postconviction remedy that later became the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d at 284, 235 N.E.2d at 569; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, ch. 38, pars. 826-32. The Act provides a criminal defendant with a procedural mechanism allowing the court to examine constitutional issues involved in the original conviction that escaped earlier review. People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 447, 831 N.E.2d 604, 617 (2005). It “was designed to provide a means whereby a prisoner could easily assert his challenge.” People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 45, 495 N.E.2d 501, 505 (1986). The Illinois Supreme Court, in People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 Ill. 2d 479, 292 N.E.2d 379 (1973), held that because a lack of legal knowledge might cause a prisoner to draft an inadequate postconviction petition and might cause him to select the wrong method of attacking his conviction, the circuit court, consistent with the intent of the Act, should recharacterize pro se petitions that allege rights cognizable under the Act, no matter how inartfully drafted or incorrectly labeled. Palmer, 53 Ill. 2d at 484, 292 N.E.2d at 382. In People v. Johnson, 352 Ill. App. 3d 442, 816 N.E.2d 636 (2004), the court interpreted section 122 — 1(d) of the Act in conjunction with prior court decisions and held, “As the supreme court held in Palmer, a trial court should treat a pro se petition, however labeled, as a post-conviction petition when it raises constitutional issues cognizable under the Act.” Johnson, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 446, 816 N.E.2d at 640. The rationale behind this is to benefit defendants who, due to their lack of legal skill, seek relief through a procedure that cannot grant relief. People v. Anderson, 352 Ill. App. 3d 934, 939, 817 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (2004). My colleague, Justice Welch, in his majority opinion, asserts that the decision of a circuit court is not reviewable under section 122— 1(d) of the Act. “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d 176, 179, 824 N.E.2d 232, 234 (2005). The statute’s language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indicator of legislative intent. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d at 179, 824 N.E.2d at 234. If the statutory language is ambiguous regarding whether the legislature intended an obligation to be mandatory, the court looks to the purpose of the statute. People v. Gray, 363 Ill. App. 3d 897, 902, 845 N.E.2d 113, 117 (2006). The Act provides as follows: “A person seeking relief by filing a petition under this Section must specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section. A trial court that has received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this Section need not evaluate the petition to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under this Article.” 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(d) (West 2006). In selecting the phrase “need not evaluate the petition,” the legislature grants the trial court the option to recharacterize. Had the legislature chosen to preclude the trial court from recharacterizing petitions, it would have utilized words indicating a mandatory obligation such as “shall not.” Additionally, this interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent. The Act created procedures and remedies not provided for by the common law, in an effort “to give a convicted defendant a last-ditch opportunity to change the outcome of his criminal case.” People v. McKenzie, 323 Ill. App. 3d 592, 595, 752 N.E.2d 1256, 1260 (2001). Because a postconviction petition may be a defendant’s only remaining opportunity to pursue legitimate constitutional issues, the choice of the language “need not” enables the trial court to recharacterize a pleading to provide the defendant with this opportunity when, due to his lack of legal knowledge, he selected the wrong method to challenge his conviction. The Act gives the trial court the power to recharacterize petitions; therefore, every decision whether or not to recharacterize a pleading involves the exercise of discretion. The court chooses to either let the pleading stand as labeled or recharacterize it as a postconviction petition. “Implicit in a trial court’s sua sponte dismissal and failure to re-characterize a pro se petition is an exercise of its discretion, which is reviewable by this court.” People v. Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d 473, 477, 898 N.E.2d 119, 125 (2008), appeal denied, 231 Ill. 2d 650, 902 N.E.2d 1089 (2009). “[A] trial court’s decision regarding recharacterization is addressed to its sound discretion and will be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” People v. Holliday, 369 Ill. App. 3d 678, 682, 867 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (2007). Courts of review have traditionally reserved the abuse-of-discretion standard for lower court decisions deserving great deference on review. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1074 (1998). Aside from no review at all, the abuse-of-discretion standard is the most deferential standard of review. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 387, 701 N.E.2d at 1074. A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or fanciful or where no reasonable person would take the trial court’s view. People v. Anderson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 653, 664, 856 N.E.2d 29, 38 (2006). While the trial court may recharacterize a pro se pleading alleging the deprivation of a constitutional right cognizable under the Act as a postconviction petition, even when clearly labeled as another type of pleading, it does not have unlimited discretion to do so. Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 477-78, 898 N.E.2d at 125. In making the decision, the trial court should consider whether the pleading was cognizable in the form in which the defendant filed it. Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 478, 898 N.E.2d at 125; People v. Keller, 353 Ill. App. 3d 830, 832-33, 819 N.E.2d 1205, 1207-08 (2004) (the trial court erred in recharacterizing the defendant’s pleading, as it conformed in substance to the requirements of a complaint for a declaratory judgment far better than it did for a postconviction petition). Another critical aspect of the inquiry is the impact the recharacterization decision will have on the defendant’s constitutional rights. In Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d 473, 898 N.E.2d 119, this court found, “Because this pro se petition is the only posttrial motion filed by the defendant and because the only logical construction that would preserve the court’s jurisdiction over this petition was to recharacterize it as a postconviction petition, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to recharacterize it.” Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 479, 898 N.E.2d at 126; see also People v. Starks, 365 Ill. App. 3d 592, 597, 850 N.E.2d 206, 212 (2006) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in recharacterizing the motion because the motion raised constitutional issues, it was made after sentencing, and “[t]he only logical construction that would preserve the trial court’s jurisdiction of defendant’s motion following sentencing was to treat the inappropriately captioned motion as a postconviction petition”). This evaluation promotes sensible and effective judicial administration. Dismissing a pro se pleading because it was filed erroneously under the wrong statute often only results in the defendant filing it again as a postconviction petition, thereby wasting judicial resources. When appropriate, recharacterizing a pro se pleading allows for the resolution of the issues in an efficient and economical manner. Justice Welch asserts that trial courts have unfettered discretion to decline to consider whether a petition could qualify as one filed under the Act and unfettered discretion to refuse to recharacterize such a petition. After a careful review, I am unable to find any circumstance in which a trial court has unfettered discretion. Unbridled discretion is contrary to our system of legal justice, which provides for the review of lower court decisions to determine whether the lower court committed prejudicial error. Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Barrington Hills, 133 Ill. 2d 146, 156, 549 N.E.2d 578, 582 (1989). “As one court noted, ‘It was observed by Lord Camden, many years ago, that unfettered discretion of a judge is “the law of tyrants.” ’ ” People v. Stoffel, 389 Ill. App. 3d 238, 245 (2009), quoting Cassidy v. Triebel, 337 Ill. App. 117, 125, 85 N.E.2d 461, 465 (1948). The absurdity of allowing the trial court unfettered discretion, no matter how capricious or arbitrary its decision may be, is demonstrated by the facts in People v. Stoffel, 389 Ill. App. 3d 238 (2009). In that case, the trial court failed to recharacterize the defendant’s petition despite repeated requests by the defense counsel to do so and despite the court itself treating the petition as a postconviction petition during the initial hearings in the proceedings. Stoffel, 389 Ill. App. 3d 238. While this court found that the trial court abused its discretion, under the analysis of Justice Welch, the trial court’s decision to ignore the defendant’s requests to recharacterize his pro se petition erroneously filed under the wrong statute is not subject to review and could never constitute an abuse of discretion. This analysis conflicts with the purpose of the Act and forces a pro se defendant back onto a merry-go-round of the type the Act was adopted to end, on the whim of a trial judge who might capriciously choose not to recharacterize his petition no matter how compelling the circumstances. My colleague, Justice Spomer, in his special concurrence, asserts that in determining whether a failure to recharacterize a pro se petition is reviewable, the key question is whether there is evidence in the record that the judge evaluated the pleading to determine whether it should be recharacterized. He concludes that in the absence of proof that the judge conducted an evaluation, there can be no review of the judge’s action or inaction. In other words, if the trial judge made a docket entry stating that he considered whether to recharacterize a petition, decided not to do so, and then dismissed the petition, his decision not to recharacterize the petition would be reviewable under an abuse-of-discretion standard. On the other hand, if the same judge considered whether to recharacterize in his mind, but did not record his thoughts, so that the docket entry simply stated, “petition dismissed,” the judge’s decision would not be reviewable. This analysis would only lead to trial judges not making a record of their decision-making process, a circumstance that could only lead to their decision on recharacterization being affirmed. Clearly, better policy dictates that the implicit decision of a trial judge not to recharacterize a petition be equally subject to review. Further, since most of these determinations are made before counsel is appointed and in the absence of argument, they are, by nature, sua sponte decisions. I have great respect for my colleagues in this case, but I would review the failure of the trial court to sua sponte recharacterize the defendant’s petition to determine whether that failure constitutes an abuse of discretion. In the instant case, the defendant was not entitled to relief under section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and he concedes that point in his brief before this court. Because of his lack of legal knowledge, he sought relief through a procedure that could not grant relief. The question is, Did the defendant allege rights cognizable under the Act? At the first stage of postconviction hearings, the defendant need only present the gist of a constitutional claim. People v. Newbolds, 364 Ill. App. 3d 672, 678-79, 847 N.E.2d 614, 620-21 (2006). Because most petitions at this stage are drafted by petitioners with little legal knowledge or training, the threshold for the gist standard is low. People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 254, 882 N.E.2d 516, 519 (2008). The petitioner is only required to provide a limited amount of detail and need not make legal arguments or cite legal authority. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d at 254, 882 N.E.2d at 519-20. Supreme Court Rule 402(c) states, “The court shall not enter final judgment on a plea of guilty without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea.” 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(c). “The determination required by the rule is intended to protect those accused of crime by ensuring that they have not pleaded guilty by mistake or under a misapprehension, or been coerced or improperly advised to plead to crimes they did not commit.” People ex rel. Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d 26, 32, 490 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (1986). In People v. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d 837, 769 N.E.2d 1000 (2002), the defendant appealed from an order of the circuit court denying her petition for postconviction relief. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 838-39, 769 N.E.2d at 1002. The defendant argued that her conviction for a violation of a bail bond should be reversed because the circuit court did not forfeit her bond, a necessary precondition to the offense charged. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 839, 769 N.E.2d at 1002. The State asserted that the defendant waived the issue by pleading guilty. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 843, 769 N.E.2d at 1006. The factual basis was established through the State’s summary of testimony and evidence. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 843-44, 769 N.E.2d at 1006. The court found that, contrary to the factual basis provided by the State, the trial judge specifically stated, “ ‘no bond forfeiture, warrant to issue.’ ” Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 844, 769 N.E.2d at 1007. The court held that the trial court improperly found there was a factual basis to support the guilty plea and that, without a factual basis, there could be no guilty plea. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 844, 769 N.E.2d at 1007. The court stated that, while the general rule is that a voluntary plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional errors, including constitutional errors, waiver is a limitation on the parties and not the court. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 844, 769 N.E.2d at 1007. The court thus declined to extend the rule where the factual basis to support a plea is absent from the record. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 844, 769 N.E.2d at 1007. The court stated, “The constitutional error in this case is one of great magnitude, calling into question the integrity and fairness of our judicial system.” Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 844, 769 N.E.2d at 1007. The court held that because an element of the charge was missing, the State could not indict and the defendant could not plead guilty to the charge. Miranda, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 845, 769 N.E.2d at 1008. In the instant case, the State established the factual basis and, in doing so, stated that “Tramez Malone would state that he is the occupant of that residence.” In his pro se petition, the defendant alleged that the residence in question was an unoccupied apartment which was undergoing repairs and was owned by Mark Weber. The defendant asserted that Tramez Malone did not live in the apartment in question but resided in a different apartment in the building. Attached to his petition, the defendant included photos of the apartment that show an apartment devoid of any furniture, personal effects, or other signs of inhabitation. The record reveals that, at the preliminary hearing, Belleville police detective Karl Kraft testified that Tramez Malone, who lived in apartment No. 3, reported hearing noises coming from apartment No. 1. Detective Kraft further testified that the apartment that the defendant entered was the middle apartment, which was unoccupied because the building owner was rehabbing it. The defendant pled guilty to criminal trespass to a residence under circumstances in which he had reason to know another person was present (720 ILCS 5/19 — 4(a)(2) (West 2006)). It is the presence of another person in the residence that makes a violation of the statute a felony rather than a misdemeanor. Section 19 — 4(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides as follows: “For purposes of this Section, in the case of a multi[ ]unit residential building or complex, ‘residence’ shall only include the portion of the building or complex which is the actual dwelling place of any person and shall not include such places as common recreational areas or lobbies.” 720 ILCS 5/19 — 4(a)(3) (West 2006). A question exists whether the apartment into which the defendant trespassed was the actual dwelling of any person. Because the defendant asserted that his constitutional due process rights were violated due to an inaccurate factual basis, he stated the gist of a constitutional claim. In People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45, 833 N.E.2d 863 (2005), the supreme court examined the obstacles a defendant would face in filing successive postconviction petitions when a court sua sponte recharacterized his pro se pleading as a postconviction petition. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 55-56, 833 N.E.2d at 869-70. To safeguard the defendant’s rights, the supreme court held as follows: “[W]hen a circuit court is recharacterizing as a first postconviction petition a pleading that a pro se litigant has labeled as a different action cognizable under Illinois law, the circuit court must (1) notify the pro se litigant that the court intends to recharacterize the pleading, (2) warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent postconviction petition will be subject to the restrictions on successive postconviction petitions, and (3) provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the pleading or to amend it so that it contains all the claims appropriate to a postconviction petition that the litigant believes he or she has.” Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 57, 833 N.E.2d at 870. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County and would remand the cause to the circuit court with directions that the defendant, consistent with Shellstrom, be given the opportunity to withdraw his pro se pleading or, in the alternative, to amend it to include whatever postconviction claims he believes he has.