Court Opinion

ID: 9737251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:20:02.342657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:57.582538
License: Public Domain

*193PIERCE, P. J.
I concur. I recoil, however, against the perpetuation of the rule that in every sex crime the trial court must instruct (in the language of CALJIC No. 527) “a charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is one which, generally speaking, is easily made, and, once made, difficult to disprove” and that the failure so to instruct sua sponte in every case is error. I have no quarrel with the rule that the instruction must be given sua sponte when as a matter of fact “the only available direct witnesses are . . . the complaining witness and the defendant, and hence the charge is easy to make and difficult to disprove” or where it is true that the “charge can be made to satisfy spite, vengeance, vindictiveness and other base motives.” These are two of the three reasons for the mandatory rule expressed in People v. Merriam (1967) 66 Cal.2d 390, 394 [58 Cal.Rptr. 1, 426 P.2d 161], Merriam did not say the instruction must be given in every prosecution for a sex offense. It speaks of a requirement that it be given in “many” such prosecutions. It does cite People v. Sutton (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 708 [37 Cal.Rptr. 23], which was an incest case. (There it was held the error was not prejudicial.) It is my belief it should not be deemed error when the reasons for giving the instruction are inapplicable. The reasons are inapplicable here. The daughter was not the complaining witness. Her aunt and a family friend were. The daughter had reluctantly reported the incestuous acts. Evidence of guilt, other than the testimony of the two actors, was, as the majority opinion points out, overwhelming. To rule under such circumstances that a trial judge commits error—even harmless error—in omitting a cautionary instruction (given on his own motion) seems unrealistic.
The People of the State of California collectively also have rights. I conceive those rights to extend to impartial rulings and instructions by a trial judge in a criminal case. In the opposite context it has frequently been pointed out that a jury naturally attaches great importance to every statement by the judge during a trial. Just as a trial judge must be careful not to say anything that might be construed as a superimposition of his beliefs of guilt upon the beliefs of the jury, the People have the same right to strict neutrality. The statement under discussion is one which carries a built-in connotation that the jury must more carefully scrutinize the victim’s testimony than it does the defendant’s. Within the reasons expressed in Merriam and the other cases cited in the *194majority opinion the cantionary instruction is a necessary safeguard to preserve the constitutional rights of an accused. When the reasons fail, the rule should fall.
To require the cautionary instruction in every sex case regardless of the facts, and then back up under the cloak of article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution is anachronistic. It is also to demean our trial bench. Effectually, it is the reviewing court speaking to the trial judge and saying: We do not trust you, notwithstanding the fact that you have listened to and have observed all of the witnesses, to make any judgment whatever on the necessity of the cautionary instruction. Therefore, regardless of the facts, we declare the omission of the instruction to be automatic error. If later, in our superior wisdom, we find the instruction not to have been necessary we will still call it error, but via the “miscarriage of justice ’ ’ route, denominate it harmless error.
I find no instance in which the California Supreme Court has made the dogmatic ruling that in every sex-offense trial, regardless of the facts, the requirement of the cautionary instruction is absolute and automatic, although other Court of Appeal decisions seem so to regard it. I do not believe it should be so ruled here.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 2, 1968, and appellant's petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 30, 1968. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.