Court Opinion

ID: 9761131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:32:17.134221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.313098
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON SECOND MOTION FOR REHEARING
On Appellant’s Second Motion for Rehearing, Leave to File the Second Motion for Rehearing is hereby granted, the Second Motion for Rehearing is hereby overruled, and the original opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court is herein reaffirmed. However, the following opinion is necessary due to the complexity of the problems presented by this Motion for Rehearing.
On July 12, 1984, this court rendered its opinion affirming the judgment of the trial court. On July 27, 1984, Appellant received leave to file and filed a Motion for Rehearing. On September 13, 1984, this court, without opinion, overruled Appellant’s first Motion for Rehearing and the clerk’s office sent notice to the attorneys for the three appellees. However, Appellant’s name was inadvertently removed from the clerk’s computerized mailing list, and Appellant received no notification that this court had overruled its Motion for Rehearing.
On November 5, 1984, in a telephone conversation with an attorney for one of the Appellees, Appellant was advised for the first time that his Motion for Rehearing had been overruled. On the following day, November 6, 1984, Appellant filed a Motion for Recall of Mandate and Second Motion for Rehearing, and Appellant later filed a Motion for Leave to File the Second Motion for Rehearing. In addition to the allegation that Appellant failed to receive notification by the clerk’s office that the court overruled its Motion for Rehearing, Appellant further alleges that he has been attorney of record for Appellant since the party’s original answer was filed in district court. Appellant’s attorney alleges that at all times his name has appeared on all legal instruments and briefs filed for or on behalf of Appellant in this court as well as in the trial court. No other attorney has at any time represented Appellant, nor was any other attorney at any time subject to notice of any actions taken by this court.
This court has investigated the allegations of the attorney for Appellant and find them to be true and correct. We have discovered no reason for the deletion of Appellant’s attorney’s name from the clerk’s mailing list, nor have we been able to determine the exact point in time at which his name was removed from said list.
At the time of the filing of Appellant’s Second Motion for Rehearing, fifty-three *202days had elapsed since entry of the court order overruling Appellant’s first Motion for Rehearing. The time for filing application for Writ of Error to the Supreme Court of Texas has therefore expired. Tex. R.Civ.P. 468. See also Reynolds v. Dallas County, 146 Tex. 372, 207 S.W.2d 362 (1948), for an example of refusal to expand time for filing writ of error even though good cause was shown.
We find that the loss of such a right was not occasioned by any mistake, neglect or fault on the part of Appellant or its attorney. We further find that Appellant will be greatly prejudiced and deprived of due process of law by the loss of his right to apply to the Supreme Court for a Writ of Error unless this court accepts the late filing of Appellant’s Second Motion for Rehearing.
An extension of time may be granted for the late filing of a motion for rehearing if the party seeking the extension files a motion reasonably explaining the need therefor within fifteen (15) days of the date the opinion was rendered. Tex.R.Civ.P. 21c and 458(a). See B.D. Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860 (Tex.1982), for a discussion of the applicability of Rule 21c. See also Tex.R.Civ.P. 5. We are aware that Rule 21c has been held inapplicable to a second motion to extend time for filing the statement of facts, using the rationale that the first motion to extend was made timely pursuant to Rule 21c and the court retained jurisdiction to consider the second motion to extend although it was not filed within fifteen (15) days of the time allowed by the first extension. Gibraltar Savings Association v. Hamilton Air Mart, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, no writ). We decline to apply this rationale to motions for rehearing.
A study of the notice requirement of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure reveals that Rule 456 imposes a duty on the clerk of each Court of Appeals to mail or deliver a copy of a decision of the court to the clerk of the trial court, the trial judge, and to one attorney for plaintiff and one attorney for defendant. It further provides:
If [sic] shall also be the duty of the clerks of said appellate courts, within ten days after rendition of a decision, to mail or deliver to one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs and one of the attorneys for the defendants a copy of the judgment as entered in the minutes of the appellate court.
Rule 456 was changed by Amendment; effective January 1,1976, to require clerks of appellate courts to mail or deliver copies of judgments as well as opinions to attorneys. Further, Rule 457 provides:
When the Court of Appeals renders judgment or grants or overrules a motion for rehearing, the clerk shall immediately give notice to the parties or their attorneys or record of the disposition made of the cause or of the motion, as the case may be. The notice shall be given by first-class mail and be so marked as to be returnable to the clerk in case of non delivery.
We have been unable to find any case history or any interpretation or application of Rule 456 or Rule 457. However, we believe the legislative intent was to prevent such an injustice as is presented to us in this case.
The trial courts have express power to protect a party from denial of due process by failure to receive notice of a final order. Tex.R.Civ.P. 306a(3), provides that the clerk of a court shall immediately give notice to the parties of the signing of any appealable order. And further, Tex.R. Civ.P. 306a(4), provides that when the clerk fails to notify a party adversely affected by the signing of an appealable order, the time for appealing or filing any motions or bonds in connection therewith shall begin on the date actual notice is received.
We believe this court has inherent power to prevent a denial of due process. We believe further that the failure to provide a tolling of appellate timetables, when the clerk fails to notify a party pursuant to Rules 456 and 457, is an oversight on the part of the persons who drafted and *203amended these rules, and was in no way intended as a hole in the appellate process through which the inherent rights of due process could fall and be forever lost.
We therefore hold that the provisions of Rule 456 and Rule 457 are mandatory and impose a duty upon the clerk of an appellate court to notify the attorney of record for each party of any action by the court in rendering judgment or granting or overruling a motion for rehearing. We further hold that in the event the clerk of a court of appeals fails to provide such notice to the attorney of a party prior to the expiration of the time period for the next step in the appellate process, the time for taking any further steps in the appellate process in relation to the action taken by the court shall be tolled until such time as the attorney for the party has actual knowledge of the said action of the court of appeals. All time for filing requirements thereafter shall commence to run from the date of actual knowledge of the said action taken by the court of appeals.
We further hold that Appellant’s Second Motion for Rehearing was timely filed following notice that this court had overruled Appellant’s first Motion for Rehearing. To hold otherwise would constitute a denial of Appellant’s constitutional right to due process of law.
Leave to File Appellant’s Second Motion for Rehearing is granted and this court’s mandate heretofore issued is hereby ordered to be recalled. Appellant’s Second Motion for Rehearing is overruled. The original opinion of this court which affirmed the judgment of the trial court is hereby reaffirmed.