Court Opinion

ID: 9655799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:22:16.840515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:22.076877
License: Public Domain

Sharpe, J.
I am not in accord with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reid. The purpose of this suit is *88the construction of the will of deceased. In Kirsher v. Todd, 195 Mich 297, it was said:
“The primary rule of construction is to ascertain the true intention of the testator. That intention must be ascertained from a consideration of all the provisions of the will itself and in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testator at the time the will was made.”
See, also, Detroit Trust Co. v. Stoepel, 312 Mich 172, and In re Brown’s Estate, 324 Mich 264.
At the time the 1947 will was executed, deceased had no reason to believe that his so-called 1946 will was invalid by reason of a lack of sufficient subscribing witnesses. In that will he left his nephew and niece a substantial bequest in addition to certain bequests to others. The 1947 will is subject to more than one interpretation. “After * * * the will is read” may mean after the 1946 will is read, or it may mean after the 1947 will is read. “I hereby give the remainder of my assets to Irene O’Conner” may mean after the bequests in the 1946 will have been satisfied, or it may mean after the expenses of administration of the 1947 will have been paid. The 1946 will is inoperative for reasons above mentioned, but is useful as an indication of testator’s intentions when he executed the 1947 will. Testator’s intentions in 1946, as expressed by his attempted will, was not to bequeath anything to Irene O’Conner. The language used by testator in the 1947 will, his relationship to the parties mentioned in the 1946 instrument, the size of his estate (approximately $16,000), and his belief that the 1946 will was valid, leads to the conclusion that he did not intend Irene O’Conner to take his entire estate.
In Southgate v. Karp, 154 Mich 697, we said:
“The law is well established that the construction to be given should favor the heir who by another con*89struction would be deprived of an equal share in the distribution of the property.”
It clearly appears that the 1947 will was intended as a codicil to what testator thought was his 1946 will. For reasons already mentioned, the 1947 codicil ripened into a will. The result of this interpretation is a partial disposition of testator’s estate leaving the greater share as intestate property. While there is a general rule that intestacy of any part of the testator’s estate should be avoided, if possible, this rule is only a presumption, see In re Ives’ Estate, 182 Mich 699, and Townsend v. Gordon, 308 Mich 438 (151 ALR 1432), and may be rebutted by evidence. In the case at bar the evidence clearly shows that testator did not intend to bequeath to Irene O’Conner all of his estate. He intended that she should receive the remainder after certain bequests were disposed of.
A decree will be entered in accordance with this opinion, but without costs as neither party has fully prevailed.
Adams and Btjtzel, JJ., concurred with Sharpe, J.
Dethmers, C. J., and Btjshnell and Boyles, JJ., concurred in the result with Sharpe, J.