Court Opinion

ID: 9734591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:38:45.285105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:49.293159
License: Public Domain

DONALD L. Corbin, Justice, concurring in part; dissenting spart. tice, I believe that the chancellor faded to properly balance the equities in dividing the parties’ marital property. The facts of this case demonstrate that during Roy Skelton’s twenty-three-year employment with the Fayetteville Fire Department, he was required to and did contribute to the Fireman’s Relief and Pension Fund established by the City of Fayetteville. The chancellor specifically found that Roy’s contribution to the pension fund was in lieu of social security. The chancellor found further that Roy never made contributions to social security and is thus not entitled to receive social security benefits as a result of his employment with the city. In other words, Roy was essentially forced to give up his rights to collect social security benefits in exchange for his employment as a Fayetteville fireman, an arrangement that undoubtedly benefitted the city. Despite the foregoing findings, the chancellor ruled that the entire pension, minus that earned prior to the marriage, was marital property. In so ruling, the chancellor refused to inquire whether and to what extent Kathy Skelton is entitled to receive social security benefits. In my opinion, this was error. Although this is an issue of first impression, I believe that this court should adopt the approach used by the courts in Pennsylvania and Ohio. See Neel v. Neel, 680 N.E.2d 207 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1996); Cohenour v. Cohenour, 696 A.2d 201 (Pa. Super. 1997); Schneeman v. Schneeman, 615 A.2d 1369 (Pa. Super. 1992); Endy v. Endy, 603 A.2d 641 (Pa. Super. 1992); Cornbleth v. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d 369 (Pa. Super. 1990). Collectively, those cases hold that because social security benefits are exempted from marital property, a spouse who receives a pension but no social security benefits may be entitled to have exempted from the marital property that portion of the spouse’s pension that might figuratively be considered in place of social. security benefits. The rationale for this position is best stated in Cornbleth: One of our goals with regard to equitable distribution must be to treat different individuals with differing circumstances in a fashion so as to equate them to one another as nearly as possible, thus, eliminating a bias in favor of, or against, a class of individuals. To the extent individuals with Social Security benefits enjoy an exemption of that “asset” from equitable distribution we believe those individuals participating in the [civil service retirement programs] must, likewise, be so positioned. Consider for example an individual being divorced at approximately age fifty. Assuming a normal work history, that person will likely have accrued a substantial pension as well as a right to Social Security. When the pension is divided in equitable distribution there will be a diminution of the expected retirement income. However, the presence of Social Security will help offset the diminution. In contrast, an individual who was a civil service participant for many years will, if the trial court’s approach is approved, be dealt a double blow of sorts. The pension will become part of the marital estate and, thus, divided, yet there will be no Social Security benefit waiting to cushion this financial pitfall. 580 A.2d at 371-72 (emphasis added). Thus, in order to reach an equitable distribution of marital property, it is necessary to consider the individual spouses’ eligibility for social security benefits. This does not, however, require the chancellor to automatically exempt the figurative social security benefits. Rather, it requires the chancellor to conduct an inquiry to determine whether such an exemption is equitable under the circumstances. See McClain v. McClain, 693 A.2d 1355 (Pa. Super. 1997) (holding that the husband was not entitled to set aside part of 'his federal pension benefits in lieu of social security benefits because the wife had no appreciable social security benefits of her own to balance against such a credit). Chancery courts are courts of equity. The chancellor clearly has the power to divide marital property other than one-half to .each party when it is equitable to do so. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a)(l)(A) (Repl. 1998); Brown v. Brown, 332 Ark. 235, 962 S.W.2d 810 (1998); Askins v. Askins, 288 Ark. 333, 704 S.W.2d 632 (1986). Indeed, section 9-12-315(a)(l)(A)(iv) specifically allows the chancellor to consider the amount and sources of income for each party. In my opinion, this court should remand this case to the chancellor to determine the extent of Kathy’s-entitlement to social security benefits from her current full-time employment at Wal.Mart, as well as from any previous jobs she has held. Once that determination is made, the chancellor should fashion an equitable distribution of Roy’s pension. To allow the chancellor to blindly view the entire pension as marital property is patently inequitable. For this reason, I dissent. Additionally, I concur with the majority’s holding that section 9-12-315 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause; however, I disagree with the analysis used to reach that conclusion. In my opinion, section 9-12-315 is not unconstitutional because it does not distinguish between those persons receiving social security retirement benefits and those receiving a retirement pension in lieu of social security benefits. In fact, the statute does not, on its face, exempt social security retirement benefits from marital property; rather, only those social security benefits paid for permanent disabilities and future medical expenses are exempted. This is evident from the language of the statute, which provides in pertinent part: (b) For the purpose of this section, “marital property” means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except: (6) Benefits received or to be received from a workers’ compensation claim, personal injury claim, or social security claim when those benefits are for any degree of permanent disability or future medical expenses[.] [Emphasis added.] Because there is no differential treatment of the two classes of persons, there can be no equal-protection violation. Moreover, Roy’s disability benefits were exempted from the marital property by the chancellor. Thus, he cannot argue that he is being treated differently under the statute. Roy also argues that section 9-12-315 in combination with this court’s Administrative Order No. 10 is unconstitutional because his pension is deemed both marital property and income for purposes of child support. Though this argument is somewhat confusing, it appears to be premised on the notion that it is unfair to consider his pension benefits as both marital property and income. In this respect, the argument appears to be a duplication of that raised in the first point. If, however, Roy is arguing that the statute and administrative order exempt from the definition of income social security benefits, but not pension benefits, the argument is without merit. Both types of benefits are properly considered as income for purposes of determining child support. See Gentry v. Gentry, 327 Ark. 266, 938 S.W.2d 231 (1997) (recognizing that federal law allows social security benefits to be reached by a former spouse for alimony or child support, but not for property division). Thus, true social security benefits are not any more exempt than pension benefits from the definition of income in determining child support. In sum, section 9-12-315 does not afford protection to either “class” of persons, i.e, those receiving social security retirement benefits and those receiving pension benefits. As such, Roy’s equal-protection argument is without merit. Moreover, section 9-12-315 and Administrative Order No. 10 are not unconstitutional, as they do not differentiate between those persons receiving true social security benefits and those receiving pension benefits in lieu of social security. Both classes of benefits may be viewed as income for purposes of determining child support. Accordingly, for the reasons herein stated, I concur in the result reached by the majority on this issue. Concurring in part; dissenting in part.