Court Opinion

ID: 9852444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:30:25.356611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:27.773944
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, J.,
specially concurring.
The majority opinion appears to proceed upon the assumption that in the voir dire examination counsel for the plaintiff always has the burden of showing *10lack of bias and that if he makes inquiry of a juror to discover bias without first obtaining leave of court he runs the risk of a mistrial. According to this reasoning it would make no difference whether counsel had a well-founded suspicion of bias on the part of a juror — the inquiry as to bias is improper unless first cleared by the trial court if the inquiry might create prejudice against the defendant. But, the reasoning continues, an inquiry not cleared with the court may nevertheless be excused if, under all the circumstances of the case, the defendant is not seriously prejudiced.
The requirement that counsel make, in effect, an offer of proof in such cases may be a salutary innovation in the procedure on voir dire. But it affords no help in the solution of cases such as the one before us where consent to the inquiry was not obtained. Where consent is not obtained, upon what basis does the trial court decide whether a motion for mistrial is to be granted? The majority say that the trial court is to exercise its discretion in determining the prejudicial effect of the inquiry. What does the trial court’s discretion play upon to make this determination? The court says, “The trial judge was in a good position to sense the subjective elements that made up the atmosphere of that particular jury trial.” What are these “subjective elements” having any relevancy to the quantum of prejudice? The opinion states that “Jurors sophisticated enough to read insurance into the case were no doubt already aware of its existence in the vast majority of automobile cases.” If this means that most jurors assume that there is insurance coverage in the automobile cases, there would seem to be no reason for the nondisclosure rule. If that is not the court’s meaning, how does the trial *11judge know whether the particular jury does or does not make the assumption?
Turning to the present case, there were no circumstances which would indicate to the trial court one way or the other whether the question put to the juror had a prejudicial effect. This is another instance, among many, where an appellate court escapes the burden of a problem presented to it by casting the problem in terms of the trial court’s discretion without defining the area within which discretionary power is to be exercised.
The question in the present case is not whether there was prejudice to the defendant, but whether the prejudice to defendant resulting from counsel’s statement (accepting the hypothesis of the nondisclosure rule) is outweighed by the harm which could result to plaintiff if, by denying him the right to inquire into a prospective juror’s interest, a biased juror is selected. In the instant case the trial judge did not proceed upon this basis. The motion for mistrial was denied in the first instance because the trial judge concluded that plaintiff’s counsel did not have an evil motive in making the indirect reference to insurance. Although it must be admitted that our previous cases have deemed counsel’s motive as a crucial element to be considered by the trial judge in deciding whether to call a mistrial, I am unable to see how counsel’s state of mind has any relevancy to the solution of this class of cases.1 A reference to insurance made *12in good faith can be as prejudicial to defendant as a reference made with “evil motive,” (whatever “evil motive” may mean in this context).
When, at a later stage in the trial, defendant again moved for a mistrial the trial judge regarded the indirect reference to insurance as nonpréjudicial because, considering the severity of the injuries, it appeared to him that the amount of the verdict was within normal limits and he therefore assumed that counsel’s comment had no appreciable effect on the jury. I also question this process of judging the prejudicial effect of a statement. I do not think that the equation between injury and the money recovery can be described with sufficient certainty to state that no part of recovery was influenced by prejudice.
If the trial judge’s discretion has any part to play in cases involving the alleged disclosure of insurance, it is in determining whether the questions directly or indirectly eliciting information concerning insurance were necessary under the circumstances. Of course, if we should say that plaintiff is always entitled to question freely the prospective juror’s possible bias as a result of his interest in the welfare of an insurance company, then there is nothing for the trial judge to decide.2
Similarly, no problem would be presented if we should adopt the converse rule absolutely excluding all inquiry with respect to the prospective juror’s possible bias in this respect.
But neither extreme is suggested and it is assumed that in -some cases plaintiff may legitimately make such inquiry and in some cases he may not. The trial *13judge must decide whether the circumstances are such that the possible prejudice to the defendant outweighs the necessity of plaintiff’s inquiry as to possible bias and, more important, the necessity for framing the inquiry in the manner in which plaintiff frames it. If there is no reason to believe that the prospective juror has any interest in or connection with an insurance company, it would not be proper to open the questioning by asking him if he held stock in a particular insurance company (e.g., defendant’s insurer).3 It would seem reasonable in such circumstances to require counsel to ask preliminary questions of a more general nature not relating to insurance.4
It must be admitted that thus limiting plaintiff in the manner of his inquiry provides him with an imperfect method of discovering possible undisclosed bias. But if the nondisclosure rule is to be maintained it can be done only at the risk of adversely affecting plaintiff’s chances of a full disclosure of bias in favor of the defendant. If free inquiry on voir dire were permitted, the nondisclosure rule might just as well be discarded because any reference to insurance thereafter would be inconsequential in assessing its prejudicial effect on the jury. It may be that the solution to the problem is to be found in some device by which jurors can be examined prior to voir dire as to interests which might create bias.5
*14Our immediate task is to decide whether there was sufficient necessity for plaintiff to make the inquiry in question and whether it was put in proper form. As I have already pointed out, plaintiff’s need to inquire as to Mas must be weighed against the probability that the inquiry would prejudice defendant.
On the score of necessity to make inquiry plaintiff points to the campaign waged by certain insurance companies to indoctrinate prospective jurors with the idea that high verdicts mean high insurance rates. Plaintiff’s concern in this respect is not without cause. The efforts made to influence future jurors has been the subject of judicial comment. Thus in Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal App2d 269, 275-277, 330 P2d 468, 473 (1958), it was said:
“* * * [Certain insurance companies in recent years have waged a campaign in the Saturday Evening Post and in Life magazine, designed to reach one out of three potential jurors (more than 70 million persons in all), urging them to be conservative in their verdicts when serving as jurors, —to carry into the jury room the thought of insurance and to consider the impact of large verdicts upon their own insurance premiums. We quote a few such passages taken from the opinion in People ex rel. Barton v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 132 Cal App2d 317, 282 P2d 559: ‘ “Next time you serve on a jury, remember this: When you are overly generous with an insurance company’s money, you help increase not only your own *15premiums, but also the cost of every article and service you buy.” ’ 132 Cal.App.2d at page 319, 282 P.2d at page 560. ‘ “ Your Insurance Premium is Being Determined Now. This could be any courtroom in the country — Behind the locked door, twelve men and women are reaching a verdict involving a defendant protected by a casualty insurance company. What they decide affects your pocketbook. * * Casualty insurance companies have been losing an average of $11 on every $100 of earned automobile liability premiums. More accidents are partly responsible. So are excessive jury awards, rendered by jurors who feel they can afford to be generous with the ‘rich’ insurance company’s money. Actually, jurors who are responsible for awards in excess of what is just and reasonable are soaking you by raising insurance rates.’” 132 Cal.App.2d at page 320, 282 P.2d at page 560.”6
Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that he made the inquiry in question because of the probability of this influence. It would be for the trial court, in the exercise of reasonable discretion, to decide whether there was such a probability considering the period of time which had elapsed since the advertisements appeared, the pervasiveness of the advertising, and other simi*16lar factors. The form in which counsel cast the question is unobjectionable. It is difficult to see how he could have disclosed bias arising out of the suspected influence by a question with less innuendo as to insurance coverage.
Looking now at the other side of the scale — the probability of prejudice to defendant resulting from plaintiff’s inquiry — can it be said that the inquiry had a prejudicial effect? There is substantial support in the adjudicated cases as well as in the texts and legal periodicals for the view that the mention of insurance has little effect upon the jury’s verdict. For example, in Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary and Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz 60, 378 P2d 741, 744 (1963), the court said “the prejudicial content of a reference to liability insurance is largely a thing of the past. And it has, in part, been made a thing of the past by the expenditure of vast sums of money by insurance companies to educate prospective jurors of the claimed relation between large verdicts and insurance rates.”
Even without the influence of such advertising it is likely that the average juror would, in most cases, assume that defendant was insured. Wigmore, in advocating the abolition of the nondisclosure rule makes note of this point as follows:
“In the second place, liability-insurance is made compulsory in many States and for certain classes of liability; hence, in such cases the fact of insurance is notorious under the law.
“In the third place, and apart from compulsory insurance, the general prevalence of liability insurance for automobile injuries, is known to the jurors; hence for the law to forbid any disclosure of it in the course of the trial seems to be merely a piece of hypocritical futility.” 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 282a at 146 (3d ed 1940).
*17This theme runs through a number of the cases criticizing the nondisclosure rule. Thus in Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal App2d 269, 276-278, 330 P2d 468, 472-473 (1958) the court states:
“It is time for a reappraisal of this insurance bugaboo. * * * This insurance rule, built upon the theory of prejudice against corporations and especially insurance corporations, has largely outlived its purpose and its justification.
* * * * *
“The only justification for the rule excluding (with limitations) evidence of the existence of insurance is the supposition that jurors will be led into excessive verdicts if they become aware of defendant’s insurance coverage. Today this is a naive conceit. The use of automobiles has increased so prodigiously since 1903 and compulsory liability insurance, or almost compulsory insurance, such as our own Financial Responsibility Law (Veh.Code, §§410-418.5) and Security Following Accident statute (Veh.Code, §§419-423.1), has become so common that jurors naturally assume as they enter the jury box that defendant is insured against liability. Years of trial experience have shown it to be commonplace, rather than exceptional, for some juror, when asked on voir dire if he or she had ever been a party to a claim for damages for personal injury or property damage growing out of an automobile accident, to say: ‘Yes, but nobody was injured and my insurance company took care of it,’ or: ‘Yes, but the insurance companies got together and settled the matter.’ 5 Stanford Law Review, at 144: ‘Even if there is no mention of insurance during the trial, the common knowledge of the jurors that most automobile owners are insured must be considered.’ ”7
*18I am not advocating that the nondisclosure rule be abolished; I refer to the criticism in the quotations set out above simply to show that the prejudice to defendant is not likely to be very great.
Weighing the competing interests of plaintiff and defendant involved in the disclosure of insurance, having in mind the possibility of bias and the importance to plaintiff of making inquiry to disclose it and considering the relatively slight prejudice to defendant (over and above that which already exists as a result of the jurors’ understanding that insurance ordinarily is involved), I believe that the question put by plaintiff’s counsel was proper.

 Examination of jurors: Vasquez v. Pettit, 74 Or 496, 145 P 1066, Ann Cas 1917A 439 (1915).
Examination of witnesses: Sherrick v. Landstrom, 229 Or 415, 367 P2d 432 (1961); Jones v. Imperial Garages, 174 Or 49, 145 P2d 469 (1944); Fogelsong v. Jarman, 168 Or 177, 121 P2d 924 (1942); Wells v. Morrison, 121 Or 604, 256 P 641 (1927); Jones v. Sinsheimer, 107 Or 491, 214 P 375 (1923).
Improper argument: McKay v. Pacific Building Materials Co., 156 Or 578, 68 P2d 127 (1937).

 In some states the plaintiff has this freedom of inquiry. Examples are cited in McCormick, Evidence, P. 357 at footnote 14 (1954).

 Putnam v. Pacific Monthly Co., 68 Or 36, 130 P 986, 136 P 835, 45 LRA(NS) 338 (1913).

 Note, 3 Or L Rev 236 (1924).

 It is suggested in 52 Harv L Rev 166 (1938) that the entire jury panel be examined under oath prior to the trial of any cases before the panel. The information thus obtained would be available to attorneys with cases before the panel and jurors *14displaying bias could be excluded without revealing to the remainder of the panel the presence of liability insurance. See also Nilles, The Right to Interrogate Jurors with Reference to Insurance in Negligence Cases, 3 Dak L Rev 406 (1931). The questionnaire device has been successfully used in Wayne Circuit Court in Detroit. See Slough, Relevancy Unraveled Part III, 5 Kan L Rev 675, footnote 495 at 717 (1957).

 The type of advertising employed by insurance companies is more specifically described in Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines, 176 Kan 101, 269 P2d 435 (1954), a case in which plaintiff brought a proceeding against two insurance companies for indirect contempt of court in causing the publication of advertisements in Life magazine and Saturday Evening Post to the effect that excessive verdicts increase insurance premium costs to the public. A similar proceeding was brought in People v. American Automobile Insurance Co., 132 Cal App2d 317, 282 P2d 559 (1955). In the latter case plaintiff produced evidence to show that more than one out of every three potential jurors would see at least one of the advertisements in Life or Saturday Evening Post. The effect of this type of advertising is commented upon in Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary and Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz 60, 378 P2d 741 (1963).

 “* * * * [T] oo much is made of the fact that parties to an automobile cojlision carry insurance. It is safe to assert that the *18majority of every jury, * * * comes from families owning cars carrying liability insurance. * * * So long as the insurance is not featured or made the basis at the trial for an appeal to increase or decrease the damages, the information would seem to be without prejudice.” Odegard v. Connolly, 211 Minn 342, 1 NW2d 137, 139 (1941).
“* * * [I]n view of the presumptive knowledge on the part of present day jurors that public liability insurance is required to be carried by persons engaged in certain lines of endeavor, as well as the knowledge on the part of jurors that persons of business prudence and discretion often carry such insurance, the present day tendency is towards the relaxation of the strictness of the rule * * Takoma Park Bank v. Abbott, 179 Md 249, 19 A2d 169, 176 (1941).
«* * * seems likely that if they do think of it, jurors assume in every automobile case that some financial responsibility exists over and above defendant’s ability to satisfy a judgment.
“ '* * * [W]hen we consider the ways in which the fact of insurance may be properly disclosed in evidence or suggested at the beginning of the trial upon the examination of jurors, and the fact that insurance has become usual rather than exceptional, it seems likely today that in nearly all cases the jury will either be informed of the fact of insurance or will consciously assume that defendant is so protected. * * * McCormick, Evidence, § 168, at p. 357 (1954).’” Runnacles v. Doddrell, 59 NJ Super 363, 367-368, 157 A2d 836 (1960).