Court Opinion

ID: 9618458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:12:49.754016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:07.901401
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge,
specially concurring.
I agree that the warrantless search in this case was supported by a valid consent. However, I write separately to express different reasons for reaching this conclusion.
As our Court often has noted, the threshold issue in a Fourth Amendment case is whether an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been infringed. This issue is governed by a twofold test:
The initial inquiry is whether the individual entertained a genuine expectation of privacy where the search occurred. The second question is whether the accused’s subjective expectation of privacy is one which society is willing to recognize as objectively reasonable.
State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 385, 707 P.2d 493, 496 (Ct.App.1985), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In *408this case Andrew Ham evidently had a subjective expectation of privacy in a room he subleased at his mother’s apartment. The critical inquiry is whether this expectation was objectively reasonable.
Concepts borrowed from property law are helpful, though not necessarily dispositive, in such an inquiry. Thus, if an individual maintains exclusive domain over a place, it is likely that his expectation of privacy will be deemed objectively reasonable. Conversely, if someone else has exclusive authority, any expectation of privacy is likely to be unreasonable. In cases where two persons share authority, a reasonable expectation of privacy is doubtful unless supported by additional specific facts showing the existence of a recognized privacy interest.
My colleagues treat this case as one in which Andrew’s mother enjoyed “superior” authority over the room that was searched. Andrew’s authority is characterized as “subservient.” These terms convey no definitive meaning in property law and they do not, in my view, clarify the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Moreover, I disagree with the characterization. The uncontroverted evidence discloses that Andrew and his mother established an informal but actual tenancy in regard to Andrew’s room. Andrew was a nineteen-year-old adult. He paid his mother at least one month’s rent. After a rental payment became overdue, his mother told him that he would be “evicted.” However, no eviction had occurred. Andrew kept the room locked when he and his minor brother were at home. These facts evince an agreement to accord Andrew a substantial measure of privacy in the bedroom.
However, it is equally clear that Andrew did not enjoy exclusive authority. He had no right to exclude his mother entirely. She respected the privacy of the boys’ activities while they were in the room, but she freely exercised a right to enter at other times. Thus, the real issue here is one of common authority. This type of authority does not arise in all landlord-tenant relationships, but it may exist upon the facts of a particular case. Compare State v. Swenningson, 297 N.W.2d 405 (N.D.1980) (defendant’s father, from whom defendant rented a room, had common authority to consent to search), with Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961) (commercial landlord had no authority to consent to search of house he had rented to another). See also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964) (hotel clerk could not validly consent to search of patron’s room).
The principle of common authority rests upon mutual use of property by persons having joint access or control for most purposes. Each person implicitly acknowledges that the others have a right to enter and inspect the premises. Accordingly, any of them might permit the area to be searched. State v. Swenningson, supra. Compare State v. Carsey, 295 Or. 32, 664 P.2d 1085 (1983) (grandparent had no authority to permit search where adult grandchild enjoyed a scrupulously observed privacy interest in rented room at grandparents’ home). In common authority cases, the greater the degree of the shared access and control, the less objectively reasonable is an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy.
In this case, the district court found a common right of access, if not of control. The finding is well supported by the evidence. As the judge noted, the mother “entered the room regularly to pick up dirty dishes and laundry.” She had free access when her sons were not at home. The judge further noted that the mother had an implicit right of access to the room for the purpose of exercising parental supervision over Andrew’s minor brother.
Upon this record, I would hold that the mother’s common access defeated Andrew’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by my colleagues — that a valid search was conducted with the mother’s consent.