Court Opinion

ID: 9473352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:27:26.406629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:28.746294
License: Public Domain

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s disposition of Sparks’ appeal and join in its opinion in that respect. I dissent, however, from the majority’s disposition of O’Hara’s appeal because I believe it takes too narrow a view of the effect of a guilty plea on subsequent civil litigation.
Preliminarily, if the restatements dispositively provided that a guilty plea could not be given preclusive effect in subsequent civil litigation, we would not be free to rule otherwise, no matter how persuasive we found the contrary reasoning. See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 4 (1967). However, section 27 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, upon which the majority relies, merely deals with one basis for preclusion, that existing when an issue is actually litigated. A different section of that Restatement is addressed to the effect to be given a criminal judgment in a subsequent civil action, and the comment to that section expressly leaves open the possibility that a defendant who pleads guilty may be es-topped in subsequent civil litigation. It states, in part,
*1128The rule of this Section presupposes that the issue in question was actually litigated in the criminal prosecution. See § 27, Comment e ... A defendant who pleads guilty may be held to be estopped in subsequent civil litigation from contesting facts representing the elements of the offense. However, under the terms of this Restatement such an estoppel is not a matter of issue preclusion, because the issue has not actually been litigated, but is a matter of- the law of evidence beyond the scope of this Restatement.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85 comment b (1982) (emphasis added). Clearly, then, the Restatement does not purport to exclude application of such a rule.
The theory for finding preclusion by a guilty plea may be a more flexible one than the principle of estoppel in pais, referred to in comment e to section 27, with its concomitant prerequisite of reliance. Significantly, the Introduction to the Restatement does not limit the basis for finding preclusion to estoppel in pais. It states:
[A]n accused in a criminal case may plead guilty or make a confession or admission in court concerning the facts upon which the charge is based. The problem then can arise whether the matter so admitted may be disputed if it arises in a subsequent action. Many cases hold that an allegation admitted under such circumstances may not be controverted in subsequent litigation. In some decisions the admission is treated as conclusive; in others it is treated as tantamount to prima facie evidence or a rebuttable presumption of the truth of the proposition in question____ Here, too, the results may be justified, but they flow from the conduct of the party and not from a decision of the matter by a court. The conditions under which such an estoppel may be imposed, and whether the effect of the admission should be conclusive or merely evidential, are beyond the scope of this Restatement.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments Introduction at 4-5 (1982) (emphasis added). In fact, the Reporter’s Note to the applicable section of the Restatement expressly distinguished between the doctrine of “issue preclusion,” covered in the Restatement text, and “estoppel,” which forms the basis of the developing common law. He stated,
Preclusion has also been applied when the conviction was obtained by a guilty plea, e.g., Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.1972), a result that may be correct but which, in the analysis of this Restatement, is properly explained as a matter of estoppel rather than issue preclusion.
Id. Reporter’s Note on § 85 comment b. Indeed, as Professor Shapiro himself stated, “some other nosegay may be available to prevent litigation of an issue previously admitted, but that is not the Restatement’s concern.” Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 Iowa L.Rev. 27, 29 (1984).
In the absence of any dispositive provision in the Restatement, we are free to look to the common law as generally understood in the United States. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 1985); Lockhart v. Holiday Homes of St. John, Inc., 678 F.2d 1176, 1180 n. 3 (3d Cir.1982). When, as in this case, the law as generally applied in the United States is in the process of evolution, I do not believe that we are foreclosed from selecting the rule that most of the modern decisions have adopted as more persuasive and rational.
Turning then to the recent cases, there seems to be almost no deviation from the general principle that when a defendant has pled guilty in a federal criminal action the defendant will be estopped in a subsequent civil suit by or against the United States government or its agencies from contesting issues encompassed by the prior guilty plea. See Fontneau v. United States, 654 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1981); United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir.1978); Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 299, 305-06 (7th Cir.1972); United States v. Guzzone, 273 F.2d 121, 123 (2d *1129Cir.1959); United States v. Cripps, 460 F.Supp. 969, 975 (E.D.Mich.1978); United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 127 F.Supp. 907, 909-10 (D.N.J.1955); United States v. Accardo, 113 F.Supp. 783, 786-87 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam, 208 F.2d 632 (3d Cir.1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 952, 74 S.Ct. 677, 98 L.Ed. 1098 (1954). That principle was expressly adopted by this court in DeCavalcante v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 23, 26-27 n. 9 (3d Cir.1980).
Moreover, since mutuality of parties is no longer a prerequisite for estoppel, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327-28, 332-37, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649-50, 652-55, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 349-50, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1453-54, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971); Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 29, 85(2), a defendant who pled guilty in an earlier criminal action has been estopped in subsequent civil actions against other parties from contesting the facts that were essential elements in the criminal action. See, e.g., Raiford v. Abney (In re Raiford), 695 F.2d 521, 523-24 (11th Cir.1983); Nathan v. Tenna Corp., 560 F.2d 761, 763-64 (7th Cir.1977); Mayberry v. Somner, 480 F.Supp. 833, 838 (E.D.Pa.1979).
Although many of the courts holding that a judgment based on a guilty plea is “conclusive of all issues that would have been resolved by a conviction following a contested trial,” In re Raiford, 695 F.2d at 523, have done so under the theory of collateral estoppel, analytically they could have reached the same result applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Under that doctrine, “as a general proposition, a party to an action is estopped from assuming a position inconsistent with his assertion in a previous action, if his contention was successfully maintained”. Associated Hospital Service v. Pustilnik, 497 Pa. 221, 227, 439 A.2d 1149,1151 (1981). The doctrine of judicial estoppel has been recognized in various state courts, see Mecham v. City of Glendale, 15 Ariz.App. 402, 489 P.2d 65, 67 (1971); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wells, 557 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex.Civ.App.1977), writ of error refused, 566 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex. 1978) (per curiam), and has been applied in federal courts as well. See In re McCoy, 373 F.Supp. 870, 875 (W.D.Tex.1974); Holt v. Southern Ry. Co., 51 F.R.D. 296, 298-300 (E.D.Tenn.1969) (explaining and applying judicial estoppel theory).
In the Virgin Islands “the doctrine precluding the adoption of inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings” has also been accepted and applied to bar a party in one action from contesting his or her unequivocal contrary assertion in an earlier action. Lindquist v. Quinones, 79 F.R.D. 158, 162 (D.V.I.1978). A situation somewhat similar to that before us was presented in Van Cura v. Delgado, 18 V.1.127 (V.I. Territorial Ct.1982), where plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident, sought to estop the defendant from denying his negligence because he had been convicted on a guilty plea of the charge of negligent driving. The territorial court had “no doubt” that estoppel (there termed “collateral estoppel”) was available based on a guilty plea although it held it was inappropriate when there was no Rule 11 colloquy, and the plea was entered by counsel. Id. at 128-30.
There is now such pervasive acceptance of that principle in the almost routine holdings of the federal and state courts that we can confidently say that the common law as generally understood in the United States gives preclusive effect to a guilty plea, whatever the rubric used. See J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, IB Moore’s Federal Practice Ü 0.418[1]. Thus, in Nathan v. Tenna Corp., thé court stated:
In this Circuit, a criminal conviction based upon a guilty plea conclusively establishes for purposes of a subsequent civil proceeding that the defendant engaged in the criminal act for which he was Convicted. Plunkett v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 465 F.2d 299, 305-07 (7th Cir.1972). Accordingly, Nathan’s guilty plea to federal mail fraud charges for splitting commissions with Bryza conclusively establishes that his conduct was criminal, and Nathan *1130may not present evidence to the contrary in this civil proceeding. Hence, no material issue exists as to whether Nathan engaged in illegal conduct.
560 F.2d at 763-64.
State cases are to the same effect. In Cumberland Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blum, 69 A.D.2d 903, 415 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y.App. Div.1979), the court stated, “A conviction founded on a plea establishes guilt as surely as one that results from a jury verdict [citing New York cases]. A conviction is conclusive proof of the underlying facts upon which it rests and the defendant is estopped from relitigating those facts in any future proceeding.” 415 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (citations omitted). The Iowa Supreme Court, in a recent and particularly thoughtful opinion, reached the same result. After reviewing the controversy surrounding provisions in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and the recent development of case law, that court reversed its earlier holdings and held that one who pleads guilty may be precluded in a subsequent civil action from relitigating issues necessarily determined by the criminal conviction. Ideal Mutual Ins. Co. v. Winker, 319 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1982).
From a policy viewpoint, it is anomalous to permit a criminal defendant to have the choice as to the preclusive effect of his or her conviction, which is what the majority’s decision countenances. Indeed that may be one of the reasons why the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 makes no distinction between a guilty plea and conviction after trial in imposing an obligation of restitution on the defendant. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-80 (1982). Significantly, the Act also “estop[s] the defendant from denying the essential allegations of that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding or State civil proceeding, to the extent consistent with State law, brought by the victim.” 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e).1
The rationale underlying the theory of judicial estoppel applies equally in this situation. As one court has stated, “[A defendant] can hardly be heard now to say that he was unjustly convicted or that he was merely trifling with the course of justice when he pleaded guilty.” United States v. Bower, 95 F.Supp. 19, 22 (E.D. Tenn.1951). I regret that this court has chosen to take the contrary position, which places us almost alone in the wake of the burgeoning law.
Since the majority relies heavily on the writings of Professor Shapiro, who was one of the first Reporters of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, it is only fitting that I should counter with the contrary argument by another equally imposing academic figure, Professor Hazard, who served as Professor Shapiro’s successor as Reporter. He wrote, on this issue: *1131G. Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 Cornell L.Rev. 564, 577-78 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
*1130A good case can be made for saying that if a matter is distinctly put in issue and formally admitted, the party making the admission should be bound by it in subsequent litigation. This was the old formulation of the rule of “judicial estoppel,” as it was then called: “The former verdict is conclusive only as to facts directly and distinctly put in issue____” But how can a matter be “directly and distinctly put in issue”? Obviously, by actual litigation. Another way is through pleadings. In a pleading system where matters are “distinctly put in issue,” it makes sense to say that if a proposition is clearly asserted, and if a party is called upon solemnly to admit or deny the proposition, and if the stakes are high enough to assure that the party is serious in dealing with the issue, and if the party then admits or fails to deny the proposition, then he ought to be estopped from controverting it on some other occasion, particularly if that other occasion involves essentially the same transaction. The clearest case for such an estoppel is where a defendant pleads guilty to a substantial criminal charge and then seeks in civil litigation concerning the same transaction to assert that he did not commit the criminal act.
*1131For the reasons aptly stated by Professor Hazard, I respectfully dissent.

. Of course, nothing prevents the Virgin Islands legislature from legislating to provide that guilty pleas shall have a preclusive effect in subsequent civil litigation.