Court Opinion

ID: 9369489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 20:09:07.288239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:15.523842
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Reese v. Reese, 2023-Ohio-360.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

George L. Reese,                                 :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,            :
                                                             No. 22AP-309
v.                                               :       (C.P.C. No. 13DR-4112)

Acrila L. Reese,                                 :    (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellee.             :

                                           D E C I S I O N

                                    Rendered on February 7, 2023

                 On brief: Thomas M. McCash, for appellant. Argued:
                 Thomas M. McCash.

                 On brief: Acrila L. Reese, pro se.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
                              Division of Domestic Relations
DORRIAN, J.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, George L. Reese, appeals the May 2, 2022 decision and
entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,
granting in part Acrila L. Reese's, defendant-appellee, objections to the decision of the
magistrate filed April 1, 2021, and denying appellant's motion to modify the shared
parenting plan. Because we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} Appellant and appellee were married on July 12, 2003 and had one child born
on April 25, 2009. On November 5, 2013, appellant filed a complaint for divorce from
appellee. On June 17, 2014, the parties filed a Shared Parenting Plan ("2014 Shared
Parenting Plan") for the care and custody of their child. The trial court issued a judgment
entry-decree of divorce ("Divorce Decree") on September 5, 2014, which adopted the 2014
No. 22AP-309                                                                              2

Shared Parenting Plan. At the time of the trial court's Divorce Decree, both parties resided
in Franklin County; however, the trial court noted in the Divorce Decree that appellee
planned to move to Chicago. The 2014 Shared Parenting Plan designated appellee as the
primary residential parent for school purposes. Additionally, appellant agreed to "assume
all expenses related to the transportation of the child back and forth between Chicago, IL
and Columbus, OH." (Divorce Decree at 8.) Upon agreement by both parties, the child
relocated to Chicago, Illinois with appellee. On May 17, 2017, appellant filed a motion to
modify child support. In addition to requesting a change in the private health insurance
orders of the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan, appellant requested his child support be changed
to $0 based on the costs he incurred traveling back and forth from Columbus to Chicago.
The motion was referred to a magistrate who found, based on appellant's testimony, a
change of circumstances warranted a modification of the child support orders.           On
February 16, 2018, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision and granted appellant's
motion and ordered appellant be reimbursed by appellee for one-half of his travel expenses
necessary to exercise parenting time each month, not to exceed $100 per month.
       {¶ 3} Subsequently, on August 6, 2019, appellant filed a motion for emergency
custody following an incident in the Bahamas which occurred while appellee and the child
were on vacation. Appellee was detained by Bahamian law enforcement authorities for use
of corporal punishment against the child who was aged ten at the time. The Bahamas
Department of Social Services contacted appellant, who retrieved the child from the
Bahamas. On August 8, 2019, appellant filed a motion to modify the 2014 Shared Parenting
Plan. On August 9, 2019, the trial court filed an interim order which granted appellant's
emergency custody order and made him the child's temporary residential parent and legal
custodian. Attorney Necol Russell Washington, who previously had been appointed as the
child's guardian ad litem ("GAL"), was re-appointed as the child's GAL on August 23, 2019.
On February 26, 2020, the GAL submitted his report which recommended what essentially
amounted to a role reversal of the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan, to designate appellant as
the primary residential parent.
       {¶ 4} The motion to modify the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan was referred to a
magistrate and the magistrate held a hearing. The magistrate also conducted an in-camera
interview of the child. On April 1, 2021, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision
which granted appellant's motion to modify the shared parenting plan. The magistrate
No. 22AP-309                                                                                3

determined the incident in the Bahamas amounted to abuse and, as such, constituted a
change of circumstance.      The magistrate's decision designated appellant as primary
residential parent. Appellee filed timely objections to the decision of the magistrate on
April 14, 2021.
       {¶ 5} The trial court held a hearing on the objections on January 12, 2022.
Subsequently, the trial court conducted an in camera interview of the child on January 18,
2022 in the presence of the GAL. On May 2, 2022, the trial court filed a decision and entry
which granted in part appellee's objections to the decision of the magistrate and denied
appellant's motion to modify the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan.
II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 6} Appellant appeals and assigns the following three assignments of error for
our review:
              [I.] THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
              OVERTURNING THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION OF
              APRIL 1, 2021 IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ABUSE OF
              DISCRETION AND IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY OR
              UNCONSCIONABLE AS THE COURT IGNORED ALL THE
              FACTORS OF R.C. 3109.04, DETERMINED THAT THE
              MAGISTRATE PROPERLY DETERMINED FACTUAL
              ISSUES AND APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE LAW, AND
              SUBSEQUENTLY SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN JUDGMENT
              FOR THAT OF THE MAGISTRATE SOLELY ON THE
              WISHES OF THE CHILD.

              [II.] THE TRIAL COURT IN OVERTURNING THE
              MAGISTRATE'S DECISION REINSTATED THE ORIGINAL
              SHARED PARENTING PLAN AND IGNORED THE
              MODIFICATION THAT WAS ISSUED ON FEBRUARY 16,
              2018.

              [III.] DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL ARGUED FOR THE COURT
              TO ESSENTIALLY TO INVOKE THE TENDER YEARS
              DOCTRINE AS A BASIS FOR OVERTURNING THE
              MAGISTRATE'S DECISION.

III.   Role of the Trial Court in Considering Objections to a Magistrate's
       Decision

       {¶ 7} We begin our discussion focusing on the role of the trial court when
objections are filed to a magistrate's decision. Civ.R. 53(D)(4) states in relevant part:
No. 22AP-309                                                                                    4

               (a) Action of court required. A magistrate's decision is not
               effective unless adopted by the court.

               (b) Action on magistrate's decision. Whether or not
               objections are timely filed, a court may adopt or reject a
               magistrate's decision in whole or in part, with or without
               modification. A court may hear a previously-referred matter,
               take additional evidence, or return a matter to a magistrate.

               ***

               (d) Action on objections. If one or more objections to a
               magistrate's decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on
               those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall
               undertake an independent review as to the objected matters
               to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the
               factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Before so
               ruling, the court may hear additional evidence but may refuse
               to do so unless the objecting party demonstrates that the party
               could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that
               evidence for consideration by the magistrate.

IV. Standard of Review
       {¶ 8} "When reviewing the propriety of a trial court's determination in a domestic
relations case, an abuse of discretion standard is used." Pallone v. Pallone, 10th Dist. No.
17AP-409, 2017-Ohio-9324, ¶ 10. "A trial judge's determination under R.C. 3109.04 that
warrants a change of custody should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."
Williams v. Sardari, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-761, 2015-Ohio-2495, ¶ 8, citing Davis v.
Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415 (1997). "The discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody
matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the
impact the court's determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned." Miller v.
Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). "Modifications to a shared parenting plan are likewise
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Rankin at ¶ 11.
        {¶ 9} " 'The term "abuse of discretion" * * * implies that the court's attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.' " Williams at ¶ 9, quoting Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
V. Analysis
       {¶ 10} Appellant's first and third assignments of error allege the trial court abused
its discretion in its allocation of parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the minor
No. 22AP-309                                                                               5

child. R.C. 3109.04(E) governs cases where a party is requesting to modify the terms of the
parties' shared parenting plan. Rankin at ¶ 13.
       {¶ 11} R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) states in relevant part:
              The court shall not modify a prior decree allocating parental
              rights and responsibilities for the care of children unless it
              finds, based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree or
              that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree,
              that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child,
              the child's residential parent, or either of the parents subject to
              a shared parenting decree, and that the modification is
              necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In applying
              these standards, the court shall retain the residential parent
              designated by the prior decree or the prior shared parenting
              decree, unless a modification is in the best interest of the child
              and one of the following applies:

              ***

              (iii) The harm likely to be caused by a change of environment
              is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment
              to the child.

       {¶ 12} "[The] modification of the designation of residential parent and legal
custodian in a shared-parenting plan is a modification of the decree allocating parental
rights and responsibilities, which requires a change-in-circumstances finding under R.C.
3109.04(E)(1)(a)." Bruns v. Green, 163 Ohio St.3d 43, 2020-Ohio-4787, ¶ 19, citing Fisher
v. Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, ¶ 26. Furthermore, the party seeking
modification bears the burden of proof in showing the modification is in the child's best
interest. Johnson-Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 10th Dist. No. 00AP-1073 (July 26, 2001).
" 'The legislature, through R.C. 3109.04, concerning the allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities for the care of children, or "shared parenting," seems to instruct that once
allocation is established, whether by decree (declaring that shared parenting shall occur) or
according to a plan (implementing the decree or order), changing it is presumed to be ill-
advised unless it can be established foremost that the change will be in the best interest of
the children.' " Rankin at ¶ 27, quoting Myers v. Wade, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-667, 2017-
Ohio-8833, ¶ 10. In such cases, the best-interest standard applies, requiring the
examination of circumstance as guided by the non-exclusive best interest factors
articulated in R.C. 3109.04(F). See Rankin at ¶ 15. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) states:
No. 22AP-309                                                                   6

           In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this
           section, whether on an original decree allocating parental
           rights and responsibilities for the care of children or a
           modification of a decree allocating those rights and
           responsibilities, the court shall consider all relevant factors,
           including, but not limited to:

           (a) The wishes of the child's parents regarding the child's care;

           (b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers
           pursuant to division (B) of this section regarding the child's
           wishes and concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and
           responsibilities concerning the child, the wishes and concerns
           of the child, as expressed to the court;

           (c) The child's interaction and interrelationship with the
           child's parents, siblings, and any other person who may
           significantly affect the child's best interest;

           (d) The child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and
           community;

           (e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in
           the situation;

           (f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-
           approved parenting time rights or visitation and
           companionship rights;

           (g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support
           payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that
           parent pursuant to a child support order under which that
           parent is an obligor;

           (h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of
           either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded
           guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted
           in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether
           either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated
           an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been
           determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful
           act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent
           or any member of the household of either parent previously
           has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section
           2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense
           involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the
           offense was a member of the family or household that is the
No. 22AP-309                                                                                7

              subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent or
              any member of the household of either parent previously has
              been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense involving a
              victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a
              member of the family or household that is the subject of the
              current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in
              the commission of the offense; and whether there is reason to
              believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a
              child being an abused child or a neglected child;

              (i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents
              subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and
              willfully denied the other parent's right to parenting time in
              accordance with an order of the court;

              (j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is
              planning to establish a residence, outside this state.

       {¶ 13} In applying R.C. 3109.04(E)(1) and (F)(1), the trial court noted that it largely
agreed with the magistrate's recitation of the facts, except as to several pertinent findings
of the magistrates. The trial court did not agree and did not adopt the magistrate's findings
that the Bahamas incident was tantamount to abuse and exceeded reasonable corporal
punishment. The court did not adopt the magistrate's finding that the Bahamas incident
was not the first incident of abuse. Rather, the court noted that in its own in camera
interview with the child, she indicated she remembered very little about the incident,
"nobody got slapped, hit or anything," that other passengers overreacted, and she was more
upset by being separated from her mother by the authorities and having to spend the night
in a Bahamian group home. (Decision at 8.) The trial court did not adopt the magistrate's
findings that the child expressed only a "slight" preference for residing with her mother.
(Decision at 10.) Rather, the court noted that its review of the transcript from the
magistrate's in camera interview with the child revealed the child's clear preference for
living with her mother and the child expressed she felt "equally safe" with both parents.
(Decision at 6.) The court further noted that in its own in camera interview with the child,
the child expressed she wished to return to live primarily with her mother. The court noted
the child expressed that her relationship with her father was fine and they have many "good
times" together. (Decision at 9.) However, father is now remarried and the household in
which the child resides with father has expanded with step-mother, step-grandmother, and
two half-siblings.
No. 22AP-309                                                                                  8

       {¶ 14} Ultimately, the trial court could not conclude that the Bahamas incident
represented a change in circumstances. Also, taking into consideration the new living
situation after father's remarriage, the trial court could not conclude that having the child
permanently live with father was in her best interest. Finally, the court could not conclude
that "any harm likely to befall [the child] override[s] [her father] continuing to so serve [as
residential parent]." (Decision at 10.) The court found that "the totality of the circumstances
in this case in addition to the best interests of the minor child support the conclusion that
the child should principally reside with her mother ([appellee]) in Chicago and [appellant]
shall enjoy parenting time pursuant to the June 17, 2014 Agreed Shared Parenting Time,
which the Court reinstates, except as modified by the April 1, 2021 Magistrate Decision to
the extent outlined herein." (Decision at 11.)
       {¶ 15} Appellant argues the trial court ignored the factors of R.C. 3109.04 in its
decision. However, appellant does not specifically challenge the trial court's determination
that the incident in the Bahamas did not qualify as a change of circumstance such that the
trial court could modify the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan incorporated into the Divorce
Decree. As such, this court need not determine whether the trial court properly considered
the change of circumstance factor in its decision.
       {¶ 16} Instead, appellant's argument focuses on the trial court's analysis of the
child's best interest as the basis of his assertion of abuse of discretion. Appellant claims the
trial court erred by "substitut[ing] its own judgment" for that of the magistrate.
(Appellant's Brief at 9.) However, appellant relies on an incorrect understanding of the
trial court's role in this matter. By independently reviewing the magistrate's decision and
exercising independent judgment, the trial court acted as directed by Civ.R. 53.
       {¶ 17} Appellant argues the trial court did not afford proper deference to the
decision of the magistrate. However, the trial court is the trier of fact in the determination
of parental rights and obligations. See Williams, 2015-Ohio-2495, at ¶ 8. As noted
previously, "[i]f one or more objections to a magistrate's decision are timely filed, the court
shall rule on those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an
independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly
determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law." (Emphasis added.)
Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). In fact, this court "has * * * rejected the argument that the trial court
should act as a deferential reviewing court in addressing objections." Holland v. Holland,
No. 22AP-309                                                                                  9

10th Dist. No. 97APF08-974 (Jan. 29, 1998). Here, appellant's argument that the trial court
was "essentially the reviewing court" is inaccurate as it relates to the trial court's role.
(Appellant's Brief at 21.) The trial court is not an appellate court and is therefore not held
to the more deferential standard of abuse of discretion.             Instead, the trial court
independently reviews magistrate decisions. " 'Civ.R. 53 contemplates a trial court's
making an independent analysis of the underlying issues in the [magistrate's decision].
Thus, the trial court must undertake the equivalent of a de novo determination, in light of
any filed objections, when independently assessing the facts and conclusions contained in
the [magistrate's decision].' " Holland, quoting DeSantis v. Soller, 10th Dist. No. 89AP-
1374 (Nov. 8, 1990). Here, the trial court agreed with and disagreed with some of the
magistrate's findings and conclusions.       Notably, as to the magistrate's findings and
conclusions with which the trial court disagreed and did not adopt, the trial court
determined the facts presented did not show that the incident in the Bahamas indicated a
change in circumstance, nor would the appointment of appellant as the primary residential
parent summarily be in the best interest of the child.
       {¶ 18} In mischaracterizing the trial court's role, appellant erroneously asserts the
magistrate was better situated to make factual findings. However, as the ultimate trier of
fact, the trial court can fully rely on the record and all evidence, including transcripts, when
determining judgment. The trial court can also hear additional evidence. "Whether or not
objections are timely filed, a court may adopt or reject a magistrate's decision in whole or
in part, with or without modification. A court may hear a previously-referred matter, take
additional evidence, or return a matter to a magistrate." Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b). In fact, the
trial court in the present case did hear additional evidence, having conducted an evidentiary
hearing and another in camera interview of the minor child prior to issuing its decision.
       {¶ 19} The trial court indicated that in addition to applying R.C. 3109.04(E)(1) and
(F)(1), it applied R.C. 3109.051. R.C. 3109.051(C) states in relevant part:
              In * * * resolving any issues related to the making of any
              determination with respect to parenting time or visitation
              rights or the establishment of any specific parenting time or
              visitation schedule, the court, in its discretion, may interview
              in chambers any or all involved children regarding their
              wishes and concerns.

 Furthermore, R.C. 3109.04(B)(1) states in relevant part:
No. 22AP-309                                                                                                 10

                 When making the allocation of the parental rights and
                 responsibilities for the care of the children under this section
                 in an original proceeding or in any proceeding for
                 modification of a prior order of the court making the
                 allocation, the court shall take into account that which would
                 be in the best interest of the children. In determining the
                 child's best interest for purposes of making its allocation of
                 the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the child
                 and for purposes of resolving any issues related to the making
                 of that allocation, the court, in its discretion, may and, upon
                 the request of either party, shall interview in chambers any or
                 all of the involved children regarding their wishes and
                 concerns with respect to the allocation.

The trial court here independently reviewed the transcript from the magistrate's in camera
interview with the child and also conducted its own in camera interview with the child on
January 18, 2022, 14 months after the magistrate conducted his in camera interview on
November 20, 2020. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by making an independent
determination as to whether modifying the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan was in the child's
best interest.
        {¶ 20} Appellant's third assignment of error contends appellee erred in urging the
trial court to rely on the "tender years doctrine." (Appellant's Brief at 24.) The assignment
of error itself focuses on the arguments made by appellee's counsel, but does not allege the
trial court relied on the tender years doctrine in making its decision. Rather, appellant
argues the trial court erred by relying too heavily on the child's word when determining
what would be in the child's best interest. Appellant argues "[the trial court] concentrates
primarily on the choice of the minor child and substitutes [its] opinion that a minor child,
a female, should be raised by her Mother because of the minor child[']s current choice and
that such choice outweighs all other factors, testimony and evidence presented [in] this
case."1 (Appellant's Brief at 25.) This assignment of error serves simply to elaborate on the
first assignment of error alleging again that the trial court abused its discretion.

1 In his reply brief, appellant argues the court did not consider evidence of parental alienation. However, that
is not the allegation of error in the assignment of error. Nor was such alleged error raised in the merit brief.
"This court rules on assignments of error, not mere arguments." (Internal quotations omitted.) Jordan v.
Truelight Church of God in Christ, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-500, 2021-Ohio-2507, ¶ 9, quoting Huntington Natl.
Bank v. Burda, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-658, 2009-Ohio-1752, ¶ 21, quoting App.R. 12(A)(1)(b); Williams v.
Barrick, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-133, 2008-Ohio-4592, ¶ 28 (holding appellate courts "rule[] on assignments of
error only, and will not address mere arguments").
No. 22AP-309                                                                                11

       {¶ 21} In reviewing the trial court's best-interest determination and the factors on
which it relied, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion. To reiterate, the trial
court's charge was to review whether modifying the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan to
permanently, rather than on an emergency basis, assign appellant, rather than appellee, as
the primary residential parent was prompted by a change in circumstance that would be in
the best interest of the child. The trial court expressly considered in its decision the
Bahamas incident which prompted the emergency motion to modify, the expressed wishes
of the child made during in camera interviews with the magistrate and trial court, as well
as the child's new living situation with father as a result of his remarriage. We also note the
trial court stated "[f]ailure to mention a specific fact, testimony or evidence does not mean
it was not considered by the Court." (Decision at 5.)
       {¶ 22} The trial court's decision reveals the court's concern with the child's safety.
First, the trial court pointed out that the Bahamas incident occurred three years prior, in
2019. Second, the court pointed out that since that time, any restrictions on appellee's time
with the child had been loosened to the point of non-existence, indicating a lack of concern
over the child being in the unsupervised presence of appellee. The trial court also took the
child's age into consideration, concluding that at age 13, the child was able to self-protect
in case of any emergency. Finally, the trial court did not consider the Bahamas incident
ongoing, instead finding the emergency which had initiated appellant's motion to modify
the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan had "long since abated." (Decision at 9.)
       {¶ 23} Taking all this into consideration, we cannot find the trial court abused its
discretion in granting in part appellee's objection to the magistrate's decision and in
denying appellant's motion to modify the shared parenting plan. Accordingly, we overrule
the first and third assignments of error.
       {¶ 24} Appellant's second assignment of error asserts the trial court's decision
ignored a February 16, 2018 modification to the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan. This
argument is not well-taken for several reasons. First, the trial court expressly stated it was
vacating the magistrate's orders as to transportation costs. Second, the trial court's decision
explicitly states that "[a]ll prior Court orders not modified herein shall remain in full force
and effect." (Decision at 11.) Vacating the transportation provision in the magistrate's
No. 22AP-309                                                                             12

order does not modify or terminate a previous order of the trial court. Therefore, the
February 16, 2018 modification to the 2014 Shared Parenting Plan is still in full force and
effect:
                Reimbursement           for Travel Associated with
                Parenting Time. Father shall be reimbursed for one half of
                his travel expenses necessary to exercise parenting time each
                month, not to exceed $100.00 per month. Within 14 days of
                the completion of father's parenting time, father shall provide
                mother with receipts relating for his travel expenditures,
                including but not limited to airfare, gasoline expenses, lodging
                and food. Mother shall reimburse father for one half of his
                travel, not to exceed $100 per month, within 14 days of
                receipts of father's travel expenditures.

          {¶ 25} As such, there exists no reason to remand the case back to the trial court.
Taking all this into consideration, we find, as it pertained specifically to transportation
costs, that the trial court reinstated the original Shared Parenting Plan as modified on
February 16, 2018. Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.
VI. Conclusion
          {¶ 26} For the aforementioned reasons, appellant's three assignments of error are
overruled and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of
Domestic Relations, is affirmed.
                                                                         Judgment affirmed.
                  BEATTY BLUNT, P.J., and LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concur.