Court Opinion

ID: 9720497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:33:07.269352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:18.769262
License: Public Domain

FOLEY, J.
(dissenting). My two colleagues consider this case to be controlled by Ferris v. State ex rel. Maass, 75 Wis.2d 542, 249 N.W.2d 789 (1977). I disagree.
While the holding in Ferris, when quoted out of context, seemingly establishes a broad rule, I believe it Was meant instead to be limited to the specific issue considered in the case. The issue was “whether an indigent is entitled to court-appointed counsel at public expense when a state agency (Department of Natural Resources) seeks to enforce its orders through the coercion of imprisonment for contempt.” 75 Wis.2d at 542-43, 249 N.W.2d at 789-90. So carefully limited a statement of the issue would have been unnecessary had the court intended the broad interpretation applied by the other members of this panel. Also, if the court had intended to extend the impact of the decision beyond the facts Of the case, there would have been an indication of this intent in the opinion. Not only was there no such indication, *341the court did not even expressly state the precise basis for the decision.
In addition to rejecting Ferris as controlling precedent in this case, I also reject its application by analogy. It is not necessary to inflexibly require appointed counsel in civil contempt proceedings for collection of support arrearages in divorce judgments, even when the state has become an interested party. Ferris involved the state’s direct attempt to enforce an order of a state agency. Proceedings to collect support arrearages in divorce judgments involve the state only as assignee, and the relief requested is that the court exercise its traditional inherent power to enforce its own judgment. To this extent, even the power being exercised can be distinguished from the police power exercised in Ferris.
I find persuasive the approach recommended in the concurring opinion in Sword v. Sword, 399 Mich. 367, 249 N.W.2d 88 (1976). Noting that the issues often vary in complexity in nonsupport cases, the concurring justices suggested a discretionary case-by-case approach to the appointment of counsel as applied by the Supreme Court to probation revocation cases in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). I agree with the recommended approach and also agree with the concurring justices in Sword that the imbalance of forces between the individual and the state should be considered in deciding whether to appoint counsel. I dissent in this case, however, because I do not believe the imbalance always requires appointment of counsel. Rather than reverse, I would remand to the trial court for its consideration of such factors as discussed in both the majority and concurring opinions in Sword.
Finally, I suggest that if the alleged contemnor is found to have no present ability to pay the support arrearages, but a finding of contempt is still pursued, an appointment of counsel is then probably necessary. As *342stated in State v. King, 82 Wis.2d 124, 137, 262 N.W.2d 80, 86 (1978), “[a] civil contemnor in Wisconsin who is fined or imprisoned for purely punitive reasons and does not have the ability to purge probably can make a good case for reversal on the grounds that he is entitled to the constitutional safeguards of the criminal contempt procedure.”