Court Opinion

ID: 9373405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:48.05952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:41.377633
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     HOMER PATRICK GONZALEZ,                         DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-0752-15-0228-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: September 21, 2022
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Homer Patrick Gonzalez, Summerville, South Carolina, pro se.

           Stephen M. Rodgers, Yorktown, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                           2

     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.          Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).               After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 2 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2         On October 1, 2014, the agency proposed to remove the appellant from his
     Materials Handler Inspector position at the Navy Munitions Command Unit on
     the basis of three charges: (1) failure to follow instructions (3 specifications);
     (2) failure to maintain a condition of employment (2 specifications); and
     (3) leaving his job during working hours without proper authorization (absent
     without leave).    Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 29-36.        The first charge
     alleged that, on May 28, 2014, the appellant failed to perform an assigned task
     (retrieving caulk from a paint locker) and instead switched the brake lines to the
     reverse position on an explosives-hauling truck. Id. at 31-32. The second charge
     alleged that, because the appellant’s explosives certification was decertified and
     later revoked, he failed to meet a condition of his employment and was unable to

     2
       The appellant also filed a motion for leave to file additional pleadings. Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tab 6. In this motion, the appellant is seeking leave to submit a
     letter describing documents already contained in the record and is asking that the Board
     review the described documents. Id. at 4. The appellant has failed to explain how the
     additional evidence is new because evidence that is already a part of the record is not
     new. Meier v. Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980). Accordingly,
     the appellant’s motion for leave to submit additional evidence is denied.
                                                                                           3

     perform his duties. Id. at 32-33. The third charge alleged that, on August 5,
     2014, the appellant left work early without proper authorization. Id. at 33. The
     appellant responded to the proposed removal orally and in writin g, arguing,
     among other things, that he had “never done an unsafe act” and that switching of
     brake lines was not “unsafe” under the standard operating procedures because “a
     properly operating spring brake chassis . . . will not move with the lines crossed. ”
     Id. at 24-28. The deciding official imposed the removal effective November 24,
     2014. Id. at 20-23.
¶3         The appellant filed a timely Board appeal challenging his removal. IAF,
     Tab 1. In an order and summary of the prehearing conference, the administrative
     judge set forth the law and burdens of proof applicable to a chapter 75 removal
     appeal and indicated that the only affirmative defenses raised by the appellant
     were harmful procedural error and disparate penalties. 3 IAF, Tab 20 at 2-4, 6.
     The administrative judge ordered the parties to submit any objections or
     exceptions to the summary within 7 days of the order. Id. at 1. Neither party
     objected to the summary.
¶4         After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision sustaining the charges of failure to follow instructions
     and failure to maintain a condition of employment and finding nexus between the
     charges and the efficiency of the service.       IAF, Tab 32, Initial Decision (ID)
     at 3-19. The administrative judge did not sustain the absent without leave charge
     but found that the deciding official would have imposed the removal penalty on

     3
       In an April 30, 2015 order, the administrative judge observed that the appellant
     appeared to raise a number of affirmative defenses, including racial discrimination,
     gender discrimination, equal employment opportunity retaliation, and whistleblower
     retaliation, and ordered him to clarify his affirmative defenses no later than the
     prehearing conference. IAF, Tab 10 at 2-3. In the prehearing conference order and
     summary, the administrative judge stated that, during the prehearing conference, the
     appellant confirmed that he did not intend to raise an affirmative defense of
     whistleblower retaliation or discrimination and that he only intended to raise disparate
     penalty and harmful error affirmative defenses. IAF, Tab 20 at 5-6. The appellant did
     not object to this finding below and does not challenge it on review. PFR File, Tab 1.
                                                                                           4

     the basis of the two sustained charges and that removal was not an excessive
     penalty for those charges. ID at 20-21. The administrative judge further found
     that the appellant failed to establish his disparate penalty claim and failed to
     prove that the agency committed harmful procedural error concerning the charges
     or the penalty. ID at 21-25. Accordingly, the administrative judge affirmed the
     appellant’s removal. ID at 26.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision , and the
     agency has responded in opposition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.
     On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s findings regarding
     the failure to follow instructions charge and submits new evidence purportedly
     showing that the factual allegations underlying that charge are untrue. PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 3-4. The appellant further argues that the agency failed to produce scan
     sheets, which he argues also would show that the agency’s allegations underlying
     the failure to follow instructions charge are untrue. Id. at 3-9.
¶6         As noted above, the first charge of failure to follow instructions is
     supported by three specifications arising from an alleged incident on May 28,
     2014. IAF, Tab 5 at 29, 31-32. The first specification alleges that on that date,
     the appellant was assigned to work in Bay 1 with Work Leader F.C. but that he
     failed to follow F.C.’s instruction to obtain caulk from a paint locker located near
     another   bay   and   instead    was   seen   switching   the   brake   lines   on   an
     explosives-hauling truck. Id. The second specification alleges that, by switching
     the brake lines to the reverse position, the appellant made it unsafe for the truck
     to transport the explosives and that he violated Navy rules by switching the brake
     lines when he was not tasked to do so and had no reason to be on, near, or
     performing any maintenance on the trucks. Id. at 32. The third specification
     alleges again that the appellant had no reason to be on, near, or in the truck in
     question and that his actions violated safety protocols. Id.
¶7         At the hearing, the appellant testified that he did not switch the brake lines
     as alleged in the first charge.    IAF, Tab 28, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) 4
                                                                                       5

     (testimony of the appellant).    He also argued that F.C. fabricated the factual
     allegations underlying the charge and that he was not even assigned to work with
     F.C. in Bay 1 on the date of the alleged brake-switching incident.        Id.; IAF,
     Tab 16 at 25-26.    Rather, he asserted that he had worked with another Work
     Leader, M.M., in Bay 2.      IAF, Tab 16 at 25-26; HCD 4 (testimony of the
     appellant). To support this contention, the appellant submitted a signed statement
     by his supervisor, dated January 13, 2015, asserting that the appellant “did not
     report to Team Leader [F.C.] on May 28, 2014,” and that, “since the week of
     May 19th, 2014, [the appellant] was reassigned to Bay 2 from Bay 1 at building
     940.” IAF, Tab 9 at 5.
¶8        In the initial decision, the administrative judge considered the hearing
     testimony and record evidence and concluded that the agency proved the factual
     allegations as set forth in the failure to follow instructions charge, including its
     allegation that the appellant was assigned to work with F.C. in Bay 1 on May 28,
     2014. ID at 3-16. In reaching this determination, the administrative judge found
     that F.C.’s testimony that the appellant was assigned to work with him on the day
     in question was more credible than the appellant’s denial, explaining that F.C .’s
     testimony was very detailed and consistent with his prior contemporaneous
     statement, while the appellant’s testimony about where he was wo rking that day
     was “notably vague.” ID at 9 (citing IAF, Tab 12 at 19). The administrative
     judge also found that F.C.’s version of events was corroborated by an April 29,
     2015 statement written by the appellant’s supervisor, in which he stated that he
     had assigned the appellant to work with F.C. in Bay 1 on May 28, 2014, because
     F.C.’s regular work partner was having a “Phase II (physical)” on that day. Id.;
     IAF, Tab 12 at 47. The administrative judge further found probative the fact that
     the appellant declined to call his supervisor as a witness to challenge his
     statement that he assigned the appellant to Bay 1 on May 28, 2014, and observed
     that the appellant’s lengthy cross-examination of F.C. did not erode F.C.’s
     certainty that the appellant was assigned to work with him that day. ID at 9. The
                                                                                            6

      administrative judge noted, moreover, that none of the appellant’s witnesses were
      able to recall where the appellant had worked on the day in question or otherwise
      discredit F.C.’s testimony on that point.       Id.   Thus, the administrative judge
      concluded that the appellant was assigned to work with F.C. in Bay 1 on May 28,
      2014. ID at 9-10.
¶9          On review, the appellant challenges this finding and submits new evidence
      to support his contention that he was not assigned to Bay 1 with F.C. on May 28,
      2014. PFR File, Tab 1. Specifically, he has provided: (1) an unsworn, signed
      statement by a now-retired individual named M.M. stating that he was the
      appellant’s assigned Work Leader on May 28, 2014; and (2) two screenshots
      showing the results of searches on the Department of Transportation (DOT)
      website for DOT-certified physicians within 25 miles of the agency’s facility. 4
      Id. at 7-9.
¶10         The Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time
      on review absent a showing that:          (1) the documents and the information
      contained in the documents were unavailable before the record closed despite due
      diligence; and (2) the evidence is of sufficient weight to warrant an outc ome
      different from that of the initial decision.     Cleaton v. Department of Justice,
      122 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 7 (2015); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). Here, although M.M.’s
      statement and the screenshots postdate the close of the record below, the

      4
        According to the appellant, the screenshots prove that his supervisor’s April 29, 2015
      statement is false. As noted above, the parties submitted contradictory unsworn
      statements by the appellant’s supervisor. IAF, Tab 9 at 5, Tab 12 at 47. The
      supervisor’s first statement, dated January 13, 2015, states that the appellant did not
      report to F.C. on May 28, 2014. IAF, Tab 9 at 5. His second statement, dated April 29,
      2015, states that he assigned the appellant to work with F.C. in Bay 1 on May 28, 2014,
      because F.C.’s regular work partner was out that day having a phase II physical. IAF,
      Tab 12 at 47. The appellant contends that the screenshots establish that the only
      DOT-certified physician who could have performed a phase II physical on F.C.’s
      regular work partner was Dr. Combs but that, because Dr. Combs only worked on
      Tuesdays, it was impossible that F.C.’s regular work partner received a phase II
      physical on May 28, 2014—a Wednesday. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 8-9; IAF, Tab 23 at 8.
                                                                                               7

      information contained in both documents was clearly ava ilable before the record
      closed. The appellant asserts, however, that he could not have provided M.M.’s
      statement below because “many employees at the time of discovery feared losing
      their jobs and did not want to give a statement on my behalf.” PFR File, Tab 1
      at 4-6. Regarding the screenshots of the DOT-certified physician search results,
      the appellant contends that he was “unaware of the DOT website at the time of
      the hearing.”    Id. at 4.    The appellant has failed to show, however, that he
      undertook any efforts below, much less exercised due diligence, to obtain the
      information presented for the first time on review.           His mere assertions that
      employees were too fearful to provide statements in support of his appeal and that
      he was unaware of a Government website containing publicly available
      information are insufficient to meet his burden of showing that he exercised due
      diligence.   In addition, the appellant specifically withdrew his request for his
      supervisor and M.M. to testify at the hearing. IAF, Tab 20 at 5. Accordingly, we
      decline to consider this evidence presented for the first time on review. 5
¶11         The appellant also argues on review that the agency failed to produce all of
      the May 28, 2014 scan sheets for Building 940 during discovery and that these

      5
        The appellant’s new evidence is also insufficient to warrant an outcome different than
      that of the initial decision. See Cleaton, 122 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 7. The screenshots, one
      of which is partially covered by a post-it note that obscures the search criteria, do not
      prove that F.C.’s regular work partner could not have obtained a phase II physical on
      the day in question from someone other than Dr. Combs. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-9. The
      screenshots also do not preclude the possibility that Dr. Combs was available on the day
      in question, even though he typically did not work on Wednesdays. Id. Furthermore,
      even if the appellant proved that F.C.’s regular work partner did not obtain a phase II
      physical on the day in question, that detail on its own would be insufficie nt to warrant a
      different finding than that reached by the administrative judge on the dispositive issues.
      Likewise, M.M.’s unsworn statement, which conflicts with the other evidence of record
      and hearing testimony found to be credible by the administrative judge, does not
      warrant a different outcome than that of the initial decision. See Haebe v. Department
      of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board must defer to
      an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based on observing
      the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing unless there are “sufficiently sound”
      reasons to overturn such determinations).
                                                                                        8

      documents would show that he scanned material in Bay 2 on May 28, 2014, and
      prove that he was not assigned to Bay 1 on that date, as alleged by the agency.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 3, 5. As noted by the agency, the appellant raised this same
      argument in his June 10, 2015 motion for sanctions. PFR File, Tab 3 at 7; IAF,
      Tab 21. The agency responded to the appellant’s motion for sanctions below ,
      asserting that it had provided the appellant with copies of all of the scan sheets
      for Building 940 from May 28, 2014, and attaching copies of those documents,
      which became part of the record.        IAF, Tab 22.     During the hearing, the
      administrative judge denied the appellant’s motion for sanctions, finding that the
      agency had not failed to produce discoverable scan she ets. HCD 4 (ruling of the
      administrative judge). In so finding, the administrative judge credited the hearing
      testimony of J.H., the Ordnance Operations Manager, who testified that the
      agency had produced all of the scan sheets from Bay 1, Bay 2, and Bay 3 of
      Building 940 that were created on May 28, 2014, and explained their contents.
      HCD 4 (testimony of J.H.); IAF, Tab 30 at 74-92, 103.           The appellant has
      provided no reason on review to disturb the administrative judge’s decision to
      deny his motion for sanctions or his finding that the agency produced the
      discoverable scan sheets. Defense Intelligence Agency v. Department of Defense,
      122 M.S.P.R. 444, ¶ 16 (2015) (stating that administrative judges have broad
      discretion to regulate the proceedings before them, including the authority to rule
      on discovery motions and to impose sanctions as necessary to serve the ends of
      justice); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(a).
¶12        Furthermore, contrary to the appellant’s argument below and on review that
      the purported additional scan sheets would provide information regarding which
      bay and work leader he was assigned to on May 28, 2014, both F.C. and J.H.
      testified that scan sheets do not contain that type of information.        HCD 4
      (testimony of F.C. and J.H.); IAF, Tab 30 at 55, 103.        As noted above, the
      administrative judge found both of these agency witnesses to be credible , and the
      appellant has provided no reason to disturb this finding or to suspect that there
                                                                                             9

      are additional scan sheets with information different than those already provided
      by the agency. See Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301; ID at 9; HCD 4.
¶13         The appellant’s remaining arguments concerning the administrative judge’s
      findings regarding the failure to follow instructions and failure to maintain a
      condition of employment charges constitute mere disagreement with the
      administrative judge’s well-reasoned findings and credibility determinations and
      provide no basis to disturb the initial decision. See Forte v. Department of the
      Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 124, ¶ 16 (2016) (finding that mere disagreement with the
      administrative judge’s implied credibility findings provides no basis for
      disturbing the initial decision); Davison v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      115 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 9 (2011) (finding that mere disagreement with an
      administrative judge’s explained findings is not a basis to grant a petition for
      review).
¶14         Finally, the appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s findings
      regarding nexus between the sustained charges and the efficiency of the service ,
      the reasonableness of the penalty, or the appellant’s affirmative defenses,
      PFR File, Tab 1, and we discern no reason to disturb them. 6 See Crosby v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106-07 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
      drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of
      credibility).

      6
        In finding that the penalty was reasonable, the administrative judge determined that
      the appellant failed to prove his disparate penalties claim. ID at 21-23. Our decision in
      Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶¶ 10, 13-14, issued after the initial
      decision in this appeal, clarifies that, in assessing a claim of disparate penalty, the
      relevant inquiry is whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated employees
      who engaged in the same or similar offenses differently. There is no evidence in the
      record to indicate that the agency did so in this case.
                                                                                       10

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   th e
following address:

7
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                    11

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.g ov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
                                                                                12

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Boar d’s
                                                                                     13

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 8   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit ou r website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       14

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.