Court Opinion

ID: 9569492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:14:21.206411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:00:43.930402
License: Public Domain

Pearson, C.J.
(dissenting) — I believe that when an appellate court upholds only one of four substantial reasons listed by the trial court as basis for sentencing outside the presumptive range, the appellate court's duty is to remand for resentencing. I therefore dissent from the majority's resolution of this action.
No Washington case has considered the proper disposition of a cause after determining that some of several "substantial and compelling" reasons given by the trial court to justify an exceptional sentence fail as a matter of law. Rather, because the issue has never before been raised, after resolving substantive issues appellate courts appear to dispose of cases without addressing whether a case should be remanded, reversed or affirmed. E.g., compare State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 723 P.2d 1117 (1986) (two of several reasons listed by the trial court upheld; court deemed that those reasons alone justified the exceptional sentence imposed and thus enforced the sentence) and State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547, 723 P.2d 1111 (1986) (two of four reasons listed by the trial court justify an exceptional sentence; appellate court enforced the sentence imposed) with State v. Harp, 43 Wn. App. 340, 717 P.2d 282 (1986) (one of four reasons listed by the trial court failed; court *431remanded for resentencing). Even our discussions on the proper appellate standard of review establishing the abuse of discretion test pertain only to whether each reason listed by the trial court constituted a "substantial and compelling" reason justifying an exceptional sentence, and do not squarely address the proper appellate posture once one or more reasons listed by the trial court fail. Appellate courts appear to be acting as primary sentencing courts, exercising their own discretion to affirm a sentence even after deciding as a matter of law that the trial court improperly considered one or more factors as justification for an exceptional sentence. I believe this court should squelch all future exercises of appellate discretion under the sentencing reform act.
A reasonable reading of the sentencing reform act requires the appellate court to remand a case for resentencing after determining as a matter of law that aggravating circumstances upon which the trial court's original exercise of discretion was based have failed. The appellate court should affirm the original trial court sentence only in the unique situation when the appellate court determines as a matter of law that no reasonable trial court could impose any sentence but the one actually imposed, given the aggravating factors upheld on review.
The scheme of the sentencing reform act calls for the trial court to exercise its discretion in light of the unique facts of each case. RCW 9.94A.120(2) and .390 provide that the sentencing court may, in its discretion, impose an exceptional sentence if it finds substantial and compelling reasons, and RCW 9.94A.010 evinces that the purpose of the sentencing reform act is to retain the sentencing court's discretionary ability to tailor punishment to individual situations. The job of the Court of Appeals, by contrast, is to develop sentencing policies and determine whether the trial court properly considered certain aggravating circumstances in the exercise of its discretionary decision to impose an exceptional sentence. RCW 9.94A.210(4), (6). In no terms does the sentencing reform act divest trial courts of their *432power to apply the unique facts of each case to the law as outlined by courts of appeal.8 In fact, the act was designed so that trial courts could address each case individually and in light of its unique circumstances, basing their decisions on uniform standards. D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington §§ 9.2, 9.5 (1985).
Also, appellate courts simply cannot and should not predict the weight actually given by the trial court to each listed reason for going outside the standard range. The trial court should be given the opportunity to reconsider the exceptional sentence imposed, given the aggravating factors that the appellate court determines the sentencing court may weigh in light of the unique facts of that particular case. To uphold a sentence originally imposed on the basis of illegal reasons undercuts the sentencing reform act policy of promoting equitable distribution of punishment and uniformity of sentencing for similar crimes and situations.
I would therefore remand this action to the trial judge for resentencing so that discretion may be exercised in light of the one aggravating factor we have upheld and the unique facts of this case.
Utter and Dore, JJ., concur with Pearson, C.J.
Reconsideration denied September 15, 1987.

In fact, this is one area in which the Legislature did not follow Minnesota law when composing the sentencing reform act; the Minnesota Supreme Court has power to "direct entry of an appropriate sentence". Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244.11 (Supp. 1987). See State v. Nordby, 106 Wn.2d 514, 521 n.5, 723 P.2d 1117 (1986) (Utter, J., dissenting).