Court Opinion

ID: 9455611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:27:12.826858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:39.552975
License: Public Domain

SKELTON, Judge,
concurring:
I concur with the reasoning and the result reached by the court in this case. However, there are a number of other issues in the case that I feel should have been discussed because of their importance. Accordingly, I would add the following :
I

The Discharge of the Plaintiff Without a Hearing Denied Him Due Process

The agency followed the usual practice of government departments by serving notice of charges on the plaintiff, allowing him to make on oral reply, and then summarily discharging him from his job without a hearing (notwithstanding his 24 years of government service). The government says this procedure was authorized by the regulations. This may be true, but in my opinion to deny an employee of the government who has civil service rights his job without a hearing, in the absence of a national emergency or government security problem, is to deny him his constitutional rights of due process. I can see no meaningful difference between this situation and that which existed in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1970). There the state officials of New York were attempting to cut off welfare payments to plaintiffs without a hearing. There was no requirement for a preliminary hearing just as there is none in the case before us.1 The Supreme Court said in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan:
* * * But we agree with the District Court that when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337 [89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349] (1969). * * * [at 264, 90 S.Ct. at 1018.]
While the Court in that case did indicate there might be a difference between a welfare recipient whose aid has been cut off without a hearing and a discharged government employee who has been fired without a hearing, it was *1257speaking from an economic standpoint rather than a legal one. The Court said:
* * * For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care. * * * [T]erminajtion of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy, fat 264, 90 S.Ct. at 1018.]
All of the foregoing could be, and probably should be, applied to most discharged government employees. New of them earn more than enough to pay their living expenses from month to month, and when their salaries are cut off they may be in the same destitute circumstances as a welfare recipient whose aid has been discontinued. In any event, if there is any difference, it is only a matter of degree.
Consequently, I think that when the plaintiff was discharged without a hearing in our case, his property (his job) was taken from him without due process of law, notwithstanding any regulation or lack of one to the contrary.2 A hearing for an employee who has already been discharged could hardly be a meaningful one because it is a proceeding after the fact.
II

The Burden of Proof was Erroneously Placed on the Plaintiff

At the hearing in this case (if we can dignify it by calling it a hearing), the examiner required the plaintiff to put on his evidence first. The defendnt says this was authorized by the regulations. This is not too clear, as the Internal Revenue Manual, Section 19(14)3.63(1) of December 31, 1964, merely refers to what is known as the Treasury Department Guide For Suggested Procedures on Conducting Hearings on Employee Appeals. This latter document states the employee will present his evidence first. I do not believe the Treasury Department Guide had the status of a regulation. Furthermore, its contents were merely suggestions and advice to the examiner.
In any event, at the time plaintiff was required to put on his evidence, no evidence had been offered against him. There was nothing at the hearing for him to rebut or overcome. The defendant has the burden of proof on the whole case to show that plaintiff should be discharged for the good of the service. If no evidence had been offered by either party, the decision would necessarily have been rendered for the plaintiff because the defendant would have failed to prove its charges against him. This is the test as to who has the burden of proof. See Selma, Rome & Dalton RR v. United States, 139 U.S. 560, 11 S.Ct. 638, 35 L.Ed. 266 (1891); Fleming v. Harrison, 162 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1947). To require the plaintiff to introduce his evidence first is like requiring an accused in a criminal trial to prove his innocence. In my opinion, this was an unauthorized shifting of the burden of proof and amounted to a denial of due process.3
Ill

The Plaintiff was Denied the Right of Cross-Examination

The error of the greatest magnitude in the whole case that is complained of *1258by the plaintiff was the denial to the plaintiff of the right of cross-examination by the examiner. At the so-called hearing held after plaintiff had been discharged, the plaintiff was required to put on his evidence first, as discussed above, and then the government laid a file or folder containing various papers on the table and said “this is our case.” It did not prove up the papers in the folder in any way and did not call a single witness to testify about anything. The plaintiff demanded the right to cross-examine the witnesses of the government whose statements were alleged to be in the folder, but the defendant refused to produce them. Plaintiff’s counsel complained that he could not cross-examine the folder and that the government had not proved a case against the plaintiff. The government answered that it had proved its case when it discharged the plaintiff. Of course, such discharge occurred without a hearing, as mentioned above. If this reasoning and philosophy of the agency were followed, the plaintiff would not be entitled to a hearing at all. The folder which the defendant relied on contained the rankest kind of uncorroborated hearsay. It even contained a document that was derogatory of plaintiff that related to a previous investigation of plaintiff that had been closed five years earlier and which had nothing to do with the present charges. All of it was admitted into evidence and considered by the examiner in rendering his decision against the plaintiff. Any fair minded person would disapprove of this kind of procedure.
It must be borne in mind that the regulations in this case specifically gave the plaintiff the right of cross-examination of the government’s witnesses. This right was denied him despite his repeated demands that the regulations be complied with in this regard. The Supreme Court recognized and came to grips with this problem in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, when it held:
* * * [A] recipient [of welfare] is not permitted to present evidence * * * or to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses. These omissions are fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures. [Emphasis supplied.] [397 U.S. at 268, 90 S.Ct. at 1021.]
* * * * * *
In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. E. g., ICC v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93-94, 33 S.Ct. 185, 187-188, 57 L.Ed. 431 (1913); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-104, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 1180-1181, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963). What we said in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-497, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1377 (1959), is particularly pertinent here:
“Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurors or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment * * *. This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, * * * but also in all types of cases where administrative * * * actions were under scrutiny.” [Emphasis supplied.] [at 270, 90 S.Ct. at 1021.]
*1259This is the latest holding by the Supreme Court on this question and, as is seen from the above, is a decision of far-reaching importance in this area.
The case of Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959), cited by the Supreme Court was a case where the government was attempting to cancel a security clearance of the plaintiff who was working for a private company on government contracts and was handling classified and secret military information. The government contended he had associations and sympathies with communists. At the hearing, the plaintiff was denied the right of confrontation by his accusers and the right of cross-examination. In fact, he never learned the nature of the evidence against him which the examiners considered in revoking his security clearance. It appeared that the evidence consisted of hearsay reports of inspectors who had made an investigation, but the inspectors did not testify. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had the right to be confronted by his accusers and the right to cross-examine them and the denial of these rights was a denial of due process by which his property (his job) was taken from him. In so holding, the court said (in addition to the portion of its opinion quoted above):
* * * We decide only that in the absence of explicit authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination. [360 U.S. at 508, 79 S.Ct. at 1419-1420.]
It would seem that if a plaintiff in private industry who is alleged to have communist connections, and who has no civil service rights, is entitled to be confronted by his accusers and has the right to cross-examine them, the same rights should be afforded to a loyal government employee with 24 years government service who has civil service rights. This is especially true where, as here, the laws and regulations specifically give him the right of confrontation and cross-examination.
I think the time has come, and is in fact long overdue, for this court to hold that where the regulations of a governmental agency or department provide that an accused employee has the right to be confronted by his accusers and the right to cross-examine the agency’s witnesses and he demands these rights at the hearing on his discharge, the government should be required to produce the witnesses, absent a bona fide showing that they are dead, seriously ill, out of the country or otherwise unable to be present for some compelling and justifiable reason, and, if it fails to produce them or fails to make the required showing why they are absent, it should not be, allowed to introduce their ex parte hearsay statements into evidence. There is nothing harsh or unreasonable about such a rule. Even if the agency does not have subpoena powers, it could, with a little effort, arrange to have the witnesses present in most cases, and, if its efforts were unsuccessful, it could at least make the required showing why the witnesses were not present. It. seems to me that an agency should welcome such a rule. In most cases, it could be complied with easily, and, if its position prevailed at the hearing, which would no doubt be the result in practically all of the cases (judging by those that have come to my attention), its case against the employee would be all the more secure and binding. The employee would have little to complain about if this procedure were to be followed and he was given a fair and meaningful hearing.
IV

The Decision was not Supported by Substantial Evidence

In my opinion, the decision of the examiner against the plaintiff, which be*1260came the decision of the Commission, was not supported by substantial evidence. We said in Jacobowitz v. United States, 191 Ct.Cl. -, 424 F.2d 555 (April 1970):
* * * [I]t is clear that the hearsay evidence of the government was not substantial evidence, regardless of the definition or test that is used. It was uncorroborated hearsay and was objected to by the plaintiff; it was contradicted by direct, legal, and competent evidence at the hearing; and it was not such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. [191 Ct.Cl. at-, 424 F.2d at 562],
The holding in that case could be appropriately applied to this case.
V

The Plaintiff was not Given a Fair or Meaningful Hearing

The Supreme Court said in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra:
■x- ■x■ * The hearing must be “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 [85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed. 2d 62] (1965). [397 U.S. at 267, 90 S.Ct. at 1020.]
Implicit in this statement is the meaning that the hearing will be held at a proper time and place after notice, and that it will be conducted according to the rules and regulations, with each party having the opportunity to appear in person and by counsel and to present evidence and to question the witnesses of the other party. Above all, it must be a fair hearing for both parties.
In my opinion, there was no such hearing in this case. Actually, there was no hearing at all. The examiner went through a formality which was called a hearing, but it was not held in a “meaningful manner,” nor was it fair. As far as the plaintiff was concerned, it was an exercise in futility. The case was “cut and dried” against him in advance. The rules and regulations were not complied with except when their observance worked against him. The rights and privileges to which he was entitled under the law were denied him.
COLLINS, Judge, joins in the foregoing concurring opinion.

. The regulations were later changed to require a hearing before cutting off welfare payments.

. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551. 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956).

. I am informed that this rule has now been changed by this agency and the government is now required to introduce its evidence first. I do not know what the rules of other agencies provide in this regard, nor what their practices may be.