Court Opinion

ID: 9679641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:01:13.387119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:17.290288
License: Public Domain

*513BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring.
I believe that the trial judge trod close to the line in overruling the defendant’s challenges for cause directed at venirepersons Blair, Davison and Jaynes. All three responded to defense counsel’s interrogation in such a way that the use of peremptory challenges was virtually compelled when the jurors were- not removed for cause. Defense counsel’s questions were entirely clear and entirely proper. Counsel was not trying to secure an improper commitment, but rather was attempting to determine whether the jurors were irreversibly committed to a position adverse to his client. A mere question about whether a prospective juror could “follow the instructions of the court” would not yield the desired information.
After defense counsel concluded his questioning the prosecutor, apparently fearing the loss of promising jurors or wanting to limit the defense’s discretion in exercising peremptories, sought to rehabilitate the three by leading questions, continuing until the jurors confirmed the answers he sought. I strongly suspect that the earlier answers gave better indication of their true sentiments, and that they obliged the prosecutor when they sensed the response he desired.
In State v. Hopkins, 687 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. banc 1985), we held that trial judges should freely excuse jurors whose responses gave substantial indication of bias. This suggestion is all the more appropriate in a death penalty case. I doubt very much that the trial judge, by looking at or listening to the jurors as they responded to the prosecutors’ questions, could discern anything which would dispel the initial indication of a fixed position on the death penalty for deliberate homicide.
The point is all the more important in the light of the Court’s opinion in State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. banc 1988), which gives the jury in a case in which the death penalty is sought the unrestricted right to cop out at the penalty phase by announcing that it is unable to agree on the punishment, so that the trial judge must then make the decision as to life or death. By virtue of this holding a single juror may keep this jury from deciding the punishment. Our trial judges have been rather free in sustaining challenges to jurors who indicate that they may not be able to consider the death sentence. See State v. Jones, 749 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. banc 1988). Yet defense counsel find it difficult to get challenges for cause sustained against jurors who indicate strong bias in favor of the death sentence.
Here, however, each juror gave a “bottom line” answer which indicated willingness to consider both death and life imprisonment. I wish that the trial judge had not presented us with the problem, but I cannot find legal error in his ruling.
I concur in the principal opinion.