Court Opinion

ID: 9952564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 07:17:17.182665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:10.426375
License: Public Domain

Modified and Affirmed and Opinion Filed March 18, 2024

                                     In The
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                              No. 05-23-00163-CR

                    A SHAHEED ABDULLAH, Appellant
                                 V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F22-76156-Q

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before Justices Nowell, Miskel, and Kennedy
                           Opinion by Justice Nowell
      A jury convicted appellant A. Shadeed Abdullah of robbery and sentenced

him to fifteen years’ confinement. On appeal, he argues the trial court denied his

right to confrontation by admitting a 9-1-1 recording containing inadmissible

hearsay and the evidence contributed to his lengthy sentence. The State raises a

cross-issue seeking several modifications of the judgment. As modified, we affirm.
                                        Background

       Candie Thomas and appellant dated for approximately five years. The

relationship started “great,” but later shifted such that the two engaged in verbal and

physical altercations. In May 2022, her relationship with appellant was “off and on.”

       On May 27, 2022, appellant and his new girlfriend drove to Candie’s

apartment. He left his car and girlfriend at Candie’s apartment while he and Candie

drove Candie’s car to a friend’s wedding in Rockwall. Candie and appellant enjoyed

the wedding and returned to the apartment. A fight ensued when Candie refused to

allow appellant to borrow her car. He began “screaming, and then he swung” his

fists at Candie. He reached into her bra to retrieve her keys, ID, and debit card,

struck her in the head, and pushed her into the bushes near the stairs to her apartment.

       As they continued arguing, appellant helped Candie out of the bushes, and

they proceeded up the stairs to her third-floor apartment. While walking up the

stairs, he pulled out a gun1 and shot towards her. She stepped back, and the bullet

hit the wall. She recalled appellant firing the gun twice: once in the air outside the

front door and once in the apartment. To prevent appellant from taking her car,

Candie grabbed a knife from the kitchen, followed appellant out of the apartment,

and slashed both appellant’s tires and the tires on her own car. Appellant and his

girlfriend still drove off in Candie’s car.

   1
     Candie owned a 9mm firearm. At some point prior to May 27, 2022, appellant came to possess
Candie’s firearm and did not return it to her.
                                             –2–
      Kameron Murphy, the nighttime apartment manager and security guard,

testified he heard three or four gunshots while sitting in his truck by the front office.

He drove in the direction of the gunshots and saw a black vehicle speeding off. He

recognized the vehicle as Candie’s car. He also observed shell casings on the ground

where Candie’s car was previously parked. He called 9-1-1, told the dispatcher he

needed police, and gave a brief description of the events. Candie then joined the

call, described the confrontation, and answered the dispatcher’s questions. The call

lasted approximately five and a half minutes.

      Officer Sisto Rodriquez responded to the scene and talked to Candie. Based

on Candie’s description of the events, Officer Rodriquez looked for bullet holes and

shell casings. Officers found shell casings in the parking lot but found no casings or

bullet holes inside the apartment.

      Appellant returned Candie’s car and other stolen items a few days later. On

July 8, 2022, he was arrested and indicted for aggravated robbery. Following his

arrest, appellant repeatedly called Candie from jail. The jury heard jail phone

recordings between Candie and appellant where he asked her to lie, say his girlfriend

hit her, and sign an affidavit of nonprosecution. Appellant offered to pay her as

much as $15,000 to do so, but she refused.

      The jury found appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense of robbery.

After hearing punishment evidence, the jury found true the enhancement paragraph

                                          –3–
regarding a prior felony conviction and sentenced appellant to fifteen years’

imprisonment. This appeal followed.

                              Admission of 9-1-1 Call

      In a single issue, appellant challenges the admission of State’s Exhibit 6, the

9-1-1 call, because it was inadmissible hearsay and denied his right to confrontation.

      Appellant first argues Candie’s statements during the call do not fall within

the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(2)

(defined as a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the

declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition). The

State contends appellant’s issue is not preserved, or alternatively, the statements fall

within both the “excited utterance” and “present-sense-impression” hearsay

exceptions.

      Whether a party’s particular complaint is preserved depends on whether the

complaint on appeal comports with the complaint made at trial. Pena v. State, 285

S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The trial court overruled appellant’s

objection “to the security guard’s voices [sic] on there as hearsay” and the 9-1-1 tape

“as a violation of his right to confrontation.” Appellant’s hearsay objection at trial

pertained to Murphy’s statements, not Candie’s statements. Thus, his complaint on

appeal regarding Candie’s statements on the 9-1-1 tape are not preserved for review.

Id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Appellant has not challenged or briefed any of

Murphy’s statements on the tape. Although the State, in an abundance of caution,

                                          –4–
responds that Murphy’s statements fall within the present-sense-impression hearsay

exception, we need not address the argument because appellant’s brief focused

solely on Candie’s statements. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. We overrule appellant’s

issue to the extent he challenged admission of the 9-1-1 tape based on improperly

admitted hearsay.

      We likewise conclude appellant has not adequately preserved his objection to

the violation of his right to confrontation. When evidence is admitted, a part of

which is admissible and a part of which is not, it is incumbent on the party objecting

to the admissibility of the evidence to specifically point out what part is inadmissible

to preserve the alleged error. Wilkinson v. State, 523 S.W.3d 818, 827 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). “Absent such a showing, appellant is not

entitled to relief.” Robinson v. State, No. 14-19-00934-CR, 2021 WL 388687, at *6

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 4, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication).

      Here, the call is approximately five and a half minutes long and contains

statements by Murphy, Candie, and the 9-1-1 operator. Appellant did not identify

which portions of the call violated his right to confrontation. Instead, he objected to

the entire recording in the trial court and has not specifically identified any

statements within the recording that violated his right to confrontation on appeal.

Thus, “[w]hile it might be conceded that appellant’s objection sufficiently stated

grounds for the objection, it did not identify what was objected to.” Hernandez v.

                                          –5–
State, 599 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on reh’g). Accordingly,

we conclude appellant failed to preserve error, if any, in the admissibility of

statements violating his right to confrontation contained within the recording. See,

e.g., Mason v. State, No. 03-18-00359-CR, 2019 WL 4065268, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Austin Aug. 29, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(concluding defendant failed to preserve Confrontation Clause objection at trial by

not identifying the inadmissible statements on the eight-minute long 9-1-1

recording); see also Matter of A.R.G., 612 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2020, pet. denied) (concluding global objections insufficient to make court aware of

which statements defendant believed violated Confrontation Clause); Sanchez v.

State, No. 05-14-00908-CR, 2015 WL 2400783, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 20,

2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding defendant

failed to preserve error by objecting to entire 9-1-1 recording and not specifically

pointing out to trial court objectionable portion).

        Regardless, assuming appellant preserved his argument and the trial court

abused its discretion by admitting the recording, the error does not warrant reversal.

The admission of a testimonial statement in violation of the Confrontation Clause is

subject to a constitutional harm analysis under rule of appellate procedure 44.2(a).2

    2
      The Confrontation Clause provides that the accused has the right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him in a criminal trial. U.S. CONT. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause bars out-of-court
testimonial statements unless the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had the
opportunity to cross-examine him. Ramjattansingh v. State, 587 S.W.3d 141, 159 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)). Generally, a statement

                                                  –6–
Id.; see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). In such a harm analysis, “the question for the

reviewing court is not whether the jury verdict was supported by the evidence.

Instead, the question is the likelihood that the constitutional error was actually a

contributing factor in the jury’s deliberations in arriving at that verdict—whether, in

other words, the error adversely affected the integrity of the process leading to the

conviction.” Small v. State, No. 01-22-00425-CR, 2023 WL 4239874, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (citing Scott v. State, 227 S.W.3d 670, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

        In applying a rule 44.2(a) harm analysis to erroneously admitted hearsay over

a Confrontation Clause objection, the court of criminal appeals has instructed that if

the verdict or punishment would have been the same absent the error, then the error

is harmless. See Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In our

review, we must consider the entire record. Id. at 904. This includes (1) the

importance of the hearsay evidence to the State’s case; (2) whether the hearsay

evidence was cumulative of other evidence; (3) the presence or absence of other

evidence corroborating or contradicting the hearsay evidence on material points; and

(4) the overall strength of the State’s case. Id. We must also consider any other

is testimonial “if a reasonable person would have understood that law enforcement officers were conducting
a criminal investigation and collecting evidence for the purpose of prosecution.” Id. Statements made
during a 911 call whose primary purpose is “to enable police assistance for an ongoing emergency” are not
considered testimonial. Small v. State, No. 01-22-00425-CR, 2023 WL 4239874, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
                                                  –7–
factor, as revealed by the record, that may shed light on the probable impact of the

trial court’s error on the minds of average jurors. Id.

      According to appellant, whether appellant shot at Candie was “the most hotly

contested issue at trial.” He argues the 9-1-1 recording is the only evidence, aside

from Candie’s testimony, of appellant shooting at Candie; therefore, the 9-1-1 call

bolstered Candie’s claim. He further contends the significance of the evidence at

trial is reflected in the jury’s assessment of a fifteen-year sentence.

      A review of the entire record refutes appellant’s claims. Murphy testified he

heard three or four gunshots while sitting in his truck by the front office. He drove

towards the direction of the gunshots and saw a black vehicle speeding off, which

he recognized as Candie’s car. As such, Murphy’s report of gunshots during the 9-

1-1 call, his trial testimony, and the presence of shell casings found in the parking

lot near the location where Candie’s car had been parked all served as evidence that

appellant shot at Candie.

      More importantly, the jury ultimately found appellant guilty of the lesser-

included offense of robbery, meaning the jury did not believe appellant used or

exhibited a deadly weapon during the robbery. Thus, the admission of the call did

not affect the integrity of the process leading to appellant’s conviction. Small, 2023

WL 4239874, at *7.

      Additionally, the 9-1-1 call did not impact appellant’s fifteen-year sentence.

The State alleged and the jury found true a single enhancement paragraph alleging a

                                          –8–
prior felony conviction. Thus, the applicable punishment range was for a first-

degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(b) (enhancing second degree

felony to punishment range for first degree felony). “An individual adjudged guilty

of a felony of the first degree shall be punished by imprisonment . . . for life or for

any term of not more than 99 years or less than five years. . . [and] a fine not to

exceed $10,000.” Id. § 12.32(a), (b).

      During closing argument, defense counsel encouraged the jury to “consider

something on the lower end of punishment because I think that’s what this case

deserves” because “[w]hat happened here was a fight in a rocky relationship that

resulted in fitting the fact pattern of the statute of robbery.” The State encouraged

the jury to consider not only this robbery, but also appellant’s separate pending

aggravated assault case involving Candie and his prior felony conviction. The State

suggested starting “at 15 because this is not his first go around,” but the prosecutor

also conceded, “I don’t think you need to go all the way up to the high end.” The

jury’s fifteen-year sentence fell within the lower end of the applicable punishment

range; therefore, the admission of the call was unlikely a contributing factor in the

jury’s deliberations in arriving at the sentence. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

                                 Judgment Modifications

      In a cross-issue, the State asserts the judgment should be modified to reflect

(1) appellant’s plea of not guilty, (2) his plea of not true to the enhancement

paragraph, and (3) the jury’s finding of true to the enhancement paragraph. Where

                                         –9–
the record contains the necessary information to do so, the court of appeals has

authority to modify the incorrect judgment. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State,

865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). The record supports the

State’s requested modifications. Accordingly, we sustain the State’s cross-issue and

modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect (1) appellant’s plea of not guilty to the

offense, (2) his plea of not true to the first enhancement paragraph, and (3) the jury’s

finding of true to the first enhancement paragraph. See Navarro v. State, No. 05-22-

00360-CR, 2023 WL 3220924, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 3, 2023, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying judgment to reflect not guilty

plea); see also Ray v. State, No. 05-22-01091-CR, 2023 WL 7294740, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Nov. 6, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(modifying judgment to reflect defendant pleaded “not true” to the enhancement

paragraph).

                                     Conclusion

      As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

230163f.u05                                 /Erin A. Nowell//
Do Not Publish                              ERIN A. NOWELL
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)                     JUSTICE

                                         –10–
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

A SHAHEED ABDULLAH,                          On Appeal from the 204th Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. F22-76156-Q.
No. 05-23-00163-CR          V.               Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
                                             Justices Miskel and Kennedy
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

       We DELETE “GUILTY” and REPLACE with “NOT GUILTY” under
Plea to Offense.

     We DELETE “N/A” and REPLACE with “NOT TRUE” under 1st
Enhancement Paragraph.

     We DELETE “N/A” and REPLACE with “TRUE” under Finding on1st
Enhancement Paragraph.

      In all other respects, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 18th day of March, 2024.

                                      –11–