Court Opinion

ID: 9543028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:41:26.341469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:34.644200
License: Public Domain

PRATT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I believe that we should not overlook the terms of this release in considering the question of whether or not it was entered into under a mutual mistake of fact. As there is no claim in this case of a signing of the release as the result of fraud or any unfair advantage taken of plaintiff by the defendant or any of its agents, we are presented with a written instrument that has in it certain statements indicative of a realization that the physical condition of the plaintiff was not free from doubt — an instrument containing these two statements:
“I have read the foregoing release and fully understand the same.”
“* * * an(j fully understand that I can make no further claim against said Railroad Company even though said injuries are more serious or different than I now know or understand them to he.”
The first statement, of course, is important only as ex*36pressive of plaintiff’s familiarity with what he was doing. The second statement is the important one.
Let it be conceded that, even though a plaintiff waives all claims he may have arising out of an injury, and does so believing that he will never have any other claims than the one settled, he will not be held to his release if it develops that he and the other contracting party were acting upon the erroneous belief as to the serious nature of his injury. This, of course, is founded upon the idea that the minds of the parties have not met, in arriving at their contractual purpose, because they acted upon a condition of fact that was not true.
But what if they recognize that their then understanding of the fact may be doubtful or may be erroneous? Certainly they may, if they desire, contract to cover such a contingency. If they, in effect say to each other: If however we are mistaken as to the seriousness of this injury, it is to be understood that this consideration will settle the dispute anyway, their minds have met. The factual foundation for that meeting of minds in the alternative— either that the injury is not serious, in fact; or that if serious, it is covered by the release anyway. Are these alternatives, then, not the implication of the second quotation above? Under such circumstances proof of the actual serious character of the injury is not proof of a mistake of fact and thus proof of an erroneous foundation of contractual relationship. It would merely shift the support in the foundation from one contingency to the other, both of which were within the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the contract. From the standpoint of material mistake of fact, there would be a failure of proof.
I realize, of course, that many times the layman signs papers without watching too closely what is included as terms; but, after all, the principle of mutual mistake of *37fact is not intended as a panacea for improvident, careless nor indifferent action. One may just as strongly evidence his intentions by what he accepts in the writings he signs, as he may by other acts. In fact, intentions evidenced by writings are not subject to the “uncertainty of slippery memory.”