Court Opinion

ID: 9674242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:25:24.347891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:26.324553
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. This court has been assiduous in holding that we will only review final orders under Ark. R. App. P. 2(a). See, e.g., Kelly v. Kelly, 310 Ark. 244, 835 S.W.2d 869 (1992); Jackson v. Yowell, 307 Ark. 222, 818 S.W.2d 950 (1991). We have underscored consistently that unlike some of our sister states we will entertain only one appeal from a matter after it is finally decided. Here, the matter is not final. The chancellor’s order provides: IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that; 1) Within sixty (60) days, the plaintiffs execute and deliver to the defendant their Promissory Note, secured by a mortgage on the property at an interest rate and for a term consistent with the prevailing rate and terms offered by lending institutions in Columbia County; or, alternatively, 2) Within sixty (60) days, the plaintiffs have the option of paying the balance owed plus interest accrued from September 10, 1992 at 6% per annum to the defendant. The order clearly leaves several questions unanswered, assuming the chancellor’s order was affirmed: 1. How much of the sixty days remains for choosing Alternative 1 or Alternative 2? 2. Has the sixty days expired? 3. Is the amount of the promissory note under Alternative 1 to be the balance owed as of September 10, 1992, or is it to include accrued interest from that date? 4. When does the interest in the promissory note begin to run under Alternative 1? 5. What judgment amount will any post-judgment interest apply against? 6. What non-usurious post-judgment interest rate will apply under either alternative? There has been no Rule 54(b) certification in this case. And based on the above it is more than likely that additional matters will be resolved by the chancellor after this decision which could result in a subsequent appeal. Indeed, the judgment amount is not even known at this juncture. Factually, this case is akin to Kelly v. Kelly, supra. In Kelly, an appeal was taken from an intermediate order directing a party to execute a quitclaim deed. Still pending before the chancellor at the time the notice of appeal was filed was a motion to set aside the order. We said there: For a judgment to be final, it must dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in controversy. (Citations omitted.) To be final, an order must be of such a nature as to not only decide the rights of the parties, but to put the court’s directive into execution, ending the litigation or a separable part of it. 310 Ark. at 245, 835 S.W.2d at 871. Surely, the order appealed from in the instant case does not “put the court’s directive into execution ending the litigation.” The majority opinion seeks to distinguish the Kelly decision from the case at hand by stating that the chancellor’s order did not specifically “refer to the possibility of any further hearing or judicial intervention subsequent to the judgment.” Nevertheless, that order, as quoted above, most definitely contemplates further action by the court once an election of alternatives is made by the Mannings. The issues of the judgment amount and any assessment of post-judgment interest are the most glaring examples of matters left to be decided. The majority virtually admits this by remanding the case to the chancellor for imposition of non-usurious post-judgment interest under either alternative. Thus, a further hearing is contemplated. What is the practical distinction between this case and Kelly? With this case now as precedent, it will be difficult to gauge the “finality” of court orders. This is an area where the standard needs to be crystal clear and consistently applied. For that reason, I respectfully dissent. Glaze, J., joins.