Court Opinion

ID: 9954562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 16:11:19.954705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:59.853520
License: Public Domain

J-S40009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ERIC ROGERS                                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 518 EDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 3, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-1231721-1989

BEFORE:       NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED MARCH 26, 2024

       Appellant Eric Rogers appeals pro se from the order dismissing his serial

Post-Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition as untimely. Appellant argues that

he met the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar. We affirm.

       A prior panel of this Court summarized the relevant facts of this matter

as follows:

       Appellant worked for a man named Craig Haynes and received a
       salary of $600 a week to watch over Haynes’ drug houses. In the
       spring of 1989, the Haynes group and the Junior Black Mafia (JBM)
       became engaged in a “war.” The JBM was a rival group that
       conducted the same business as Haynes. Appellant’s conviction
       arose out of an incident that occurred on June 29, 1989. On that
       date, a crowd had gathered to watch a basketball game at Fourth
       Street and Washington Avenue. After consulting with Haynes,
       Byron Massey Lawrence informed Appellant that two men sitting

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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      in a parked car were JBM members and that they were to “hit”
      them.

      The victims, Anthony Fletcher and Eric Hurst, were sitting in
      Fletcher’s gold BMW parked on Fourth Street beside the
      playground. Appellant was armed with a .45 caliber automatic
      which was given to him by Haynes two days prior to the shooting.
      Lawrence was armed with a .32 caliber automatic. Appellant
      repeatedly fired at the car from the rear while Lawrence shot from
      the front. Eric Hurst, who was shot from behind in the head and
      chest, fell to the ground and died as he tried to get out of the car.
      Fletcher ultimately recovered from the gunshot wounds.
      Raymond Adams, who was familiar with Appellant and his
      accomplice, was an eyewitness to this [shooting, which] occurred
      at approximately 7:15 P.M.

      On November 21, 1989, Appellant was arrested and gave a
      voluntary inculpatory statement. At a hearing on March 22, 1991,
      Appellant was unsuccessful in having that statement suppressed.
      After a jury trial on April 4, 1991, Appellant was convicted of
      murder in the first degree, criminal conspiracy, aggravated
      assault, and possession of an instrument of crime. Appellant
      received a sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder.

Commonwealth v. Rogers, 615 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa. Super. 1992) (Rogers I)

(citations omitted and some formatting altered).

      This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on October 1,

1992. Id. at 65. Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

      Another panel of this Court summarized the subsequent procedural

history of this, and a related matter, as follows:

      More than seven years later, on December 6, 1999, [Appellant]
      filed his first [pro se] petition pursuant to the PCRA.[fn2] The PCRA
      court appointed counsel to represent [Appellant]. Appointed
      counsel subsequently filed a petition to withdraw and a
      Turner/Finley[fn3] no-merit letter asserting that [Appellant’s]
      petition was untimely filed and without merit. On July 14, 2000,
      the PCRA court entered an order granting counsel’s petition to

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       withdraw, and dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition. This Court
       affirmed the order of the PCRA court. Since that time, [Appellant]
       has filed multiple PCRA petitions challenging his conviction in
       [this] case, all of which were unsuccessful before the PCRA court
       and on appeal. [See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rogers, 326 EDA
       2003 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 21, 2004) (Rogers IV) (unpublished
       mem.).]
            [fn2] [Appellant’s] first PCRA petition did not fall within the

            60-day “grace period” established by the 1995 amendments
            to the PCRA, which required [Appellant] to file his first
            petition or before January 16, 1997.

                See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
            [fn3]

            1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.
            Super. 1988) (en banc).

       In a separate case, docketed at number CP-51-CR-0509222-1991
       (“the Guilty Plea Case”), on October 31, 1991, [Appellant] pled
       guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance,
       criminal conspiracy, and corrupt organizations. On December 3,
       1991, the trial court sentenced [Appellant] to a prison term of ten
       to twenty years for his conviction of corrupt organizations, a
       prison term of five to ten years for his conviction of criminal
       conspiracy, and a prison term of one to two years for his narcotics
       offense. [Appellant] did not file a direct appeal of his judgment of
       sentence in the Guilty Plea Case. . . .

Commonwealth v. Rogers, 2051 EDA 2012, at 1-3 (Pa. Super. filed May 16,

2013) (Rogers VII) (unpublished mem.) (citation and some formatting

altered).

       On February 13, 2017, the Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg of the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted

Appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered that the

Commonwealth vacate Appellant’s conviction for corrupt organizations2 in the
____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 911(b).

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Guilty Plea Case and resentence Appellant. See Rogers v. Mahally, 2017

WL 590268, at *1 (E.D. Pa. filed Feb. 13, 2017) (Federal Habeas Case).

       Meanwhile, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition in this case on May

13, 2016, in which he argued that his sentence for first-degree murder was

illegal.    See Pro se PCRA Pet., 5/13/16, at 1-7.   Although the PCRA court

issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition

without a hearing on March 1, 2017, the PCRA court did not dismiss that PCRA

petition.

       On April 4, 2017, while Appellant’s PCRA petition remained pending

before the PCRA court, Appellant filed another3 pro se PCRA petition arguing

that the outcome of his Federal Habeas Case satisfied the newly discovered

facts exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. Pro se PCRA Pet., 4/4/17,

at 3; Mem. of Law, 4/4/17, at 2-4. Appellant argued that the admission of

evidence related to his now-vacated corrupt organizations convictions at his

____________________________________________

3 The PCRA court treated Appellant’s April 4, 2017 filing as an amendment to

Appellant’s pending May 13, 2016 PCRA petition. See, e.g., PCRA Ct. Rule
907 Notice, 9/14/20, at 1 (unpaginated). However, Appellant consistently
argued that his April 4, 2017 filing was a separate petition from his May 13,
2016 petition. See, e.g., Appellant’s Reply Brief at 3, 5; Resp. to Rule 907
Notice, 9/24/20, at 1-3. A PCRA court may consider multiple PCRA petitions
relating to the same judgment of sentence simultaneously unless an appeal is
pending from one of the PCRA court’s orders. See Commonwealth v.
Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). For the
purposes of this appeal, we treat Appellant’s April 4, 2017 filing as a separate
PCRA petition and the PCRA court’s February 3, 2023 order as dismissing all
of Appellant’s outstanding PCRA petitions.

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murder trial violated his constitutional rights. Pro se PCRA Pet., 4/4/17, at 3;

Mem. of Law, 4/4/17, at 5, 14.

      Appellant filed several subsequent amendments and supplements to his

April 4, 2017 PCRA petition, including an amendment stating that he had

received new evidence of his innocence in the form of an affidavit by

Christopher Laster (Laster Affidavit). Am. PCRA Pet., 9/18/20, at 1-2. On

December 19, 2022, the PCRA court filed Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss

Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant filed a pro se response. On February 3,

2023, the PCRA court issued an opinion and order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA

petitions as untimely. See PCRA Ct. Op. & Order, 2/3/23, at 1-4.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The PCRA court did not order

Appellant to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court did not issue a

separate Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, which we reorder as

follows:

      1. Whether the PCRA court erroneously dismissed the instant
         PCRA petition as untimely filed?

      2. Whether the PCRA petition was filed within 60 days of the
         federal Judge Goldberg’s vacatur of the [corrupt organizations]
         charge/evidence that was used in the [Appellant’s] murder trial
         unconstitutionally?

      3. Whether [Appellant] deserves a remand to the PCRA court to
         determine if he was indeed egregiously neglected and
         abandoned in his initial — review process as stated in the prior
         Superior Court opinion, and whether it should be done in the
         interests of justice and fairness in light of the state not having
         an adequate mechanism in place for the petitioner to — enforce
         the state created right to effective PCRA counsel?

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      4. Whether the “sufficiency of evidence” claim should be reviewed
         in the [sic] new light due to the vacatur of the [corrupt
         organizations] evidence that was used in the murder trial?

      5. Whether the “newly discovered fact” affidavit[] from
         Christopher Laster fits within the hearsay exception against
         penal interest?

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (some formatting altered).

      In reviewing an order denying a PCRA petition, our standard of review

is well settled:

      [O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is
      limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is
      supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal
      error. . . . [W]e apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA
      court’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered). We may affirm the PCRA court on

any valid grounds. See Commonwealth v. Wiley, 966 A.2d 1153, 1157 (Pa.

Super. 2009) (stating this Court “may affirm the decision of the PCRA court if

there is any basis on the record to support the PCRA court’s action; this is so

even if we rely on a different basis in our decision to affirm” (citation omitted

and formatting altered)).

      The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a threshold jurisdictional question.

See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014); see

also Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(stating that “no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition”

(citation and emphasis omitted)). “A PCRA petition, including a second or

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subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s

judgment of sentence became final, unless he pleads and proves one of the

three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).” Commonwealth v.

Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16 (Pa. 2012) (citation and footnote omitted). A judgment

of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, or at the

expiration of time for seeking such review. See id. at 17.

       Courts may consider a PCRA petition filed more than one year after a

judgment of sentence becomes final only if the petitioner pleads and proves

one of the following three statutory exceptions:

       (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
       interference by government officials with the presentation of the
       claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
       or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

       (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
       the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
       of due diligence; or

       (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
       by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
       of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
       has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petitioner asserting one of these exceptions

must file a petition within sixty days of the date the claim could have first been

presented.     See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) (subsequently am. eff. Dec. 24,

2018).4    It is the petitioner’s “burden to allege and prove that one of the
____________________________________________

4 On October 24, 2018, the General Assembly amended Section 9545(b)(2)

and extended the time for filing a PCRA petition from sixty days to one year
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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timeliness exceptions applies.”         Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d

1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

       To establish the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar,

a petitioner must demonstrate that “he did not know the facts upon which he

based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the

exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176

(Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).            Due diligence requires that the

petitioner “take reasonable steps to protect his own interests.” Id. (citation

omitted) A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned these “new

facts” earlier with the exercise of due diligence.        Id.   The focus of this

exception is on newly discovered facts, not on newly discovered or newly

willing sources that merely corroborate previously known facts or previously

raised claims. See id.

       Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “the newly discovered

facts exception to the time limitations of the PCRA, as set forth in [S]ection

9545(b)(1)(ii), is distinct from the after-discovered evidence basis for relief

delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)[(vi)].” Commonwealth v. Burton,

158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (formatting altered).

____________________________________________

from the date the claim could have been presented.                    See 2018
Pa.Legis.Serv.Act 2018-146 (S.B. 915) (eff. Dec. 24, 2018). The amendment
applies only to claims arising one year before the effective date of this section,
December 24, 2017, or thereafter. Appellant filed his PCRA petition on April
4, 2017, therefore, it falls under the pre-amendment sixty-day requirement.

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       As stated previously, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of

sentence on October 1, 1992, and Appellant did not file a petition for allowance

of appeal with our Supreme Court.              Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of

sentence became final on November 2, 1992.5 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3)

(providing that “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking

the review.”); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (providing that an appellant has thirty days

to file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court). Accordingly,

Appellant’s instant PCRA petition, which was filed on April 4, 2017, is facially

untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

       Appellant argues that his PCRA petition is timely under the newly

discovered fact exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).        Specifically, Appellant

contends that the United States District Court’s order vacating his corrupt

organizations conviction and his prior PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness

constitute newly discovered facts. Appellant’s Brief at 7-10, 45-55.6

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5 October 31, 1992 was a Saturday. Accordingly, the last day on which
Appellant could have filed a petition for allowance of appeal was Monday,
November 2, 1992. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (excluding holidays and weekends
from time computations).

6 We note that while Appellant refers to the Laster Affidavit as a “newly
discovered fact,” it is clear that Appellant is actually raising a substantive claim
of after-discovered evidence on appeal, not the newly discovered facts
exception to the PCRA time bar See Appellant’s Brief at 35-36 (discussing the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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                                Federal Habeas Case

       First, Appellant argues that the United State District Court’s order

granting his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and vacating his corrupt

organizations conviction satisfies the newly discovered fact exception. Id. at

7-10. Specifically, Appellant contends that the Federal Habeas Case was a

new fact that he could not learned about until the federal court issued its

order. Id. Appellant asserts that he filed the instant PCRA petition within

sixty days of the date that District Court issued its order in the Federal Habeas

Case. Id. at 7, 9. Appellant argues that this Court should treat the Federal

Habeas Case as a newly discovered fact because it directly involves Appellant.

Id. at 7-9 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 988

(Pa. 2011) (Baer, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 2543 EDA

2018, 2020 WL 119655 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 10, 2020) (unpublished mem.)).7

____________________________________________

four-part test for an after-discovered evidence claim under 42 Pa.C.S. §
9543(a)(2)(vi)).

As noted previously, “the newly discovered facts exception to the time
limitations of the PCRA, as set forth in [S]ection 9545(b)(1)(ii), is distinct from
the after-discovered evidence basis for relief delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9543(a)(2)[(vi)].” Burton, 158 A.3d at 629 (formatting altered). To the
extent that Appellant claims that he is entitled to relief based on Section
9543(a)(2)(vi), we note that Section 9543(a)(2)(vi) is not an exception to the
PCRA time bar. See id. Accordingly, Appellant has failed to argue that the
Laster Affidavit satisfies any of the Section 9545(b)(1) exceptions to the PCRA
time bar.

7 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that unpublished non-precedential decisions

of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive
value).

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Appellant asserts that evidence8 related to his now-vacated corrupt

organizations conviction in the Guilty Plea Case was presented at his 1991

murder trial in this case. Id. at 8.

       Our Supreme Court has held that “judicial determinations do not satisfy

the newly discovered fact exception because an in-court ruling or published

judicial opinion is law, for it is simply the embodiment of abstract principles

applied to actual events.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1146

(Pa. 2020) (citations omitted and formatting altered); see also Watts, 23

A.3d at 986 (stating that “judicial determinations are not facts.”). However,

“[t]he events that prompted the analysis, which must be established by

presumption or evidence, are regarded as fact.”      Reid, 235 A.3d at 1146

(citations omitted and formatting altered). “[S]ubsequent decisional law does

not amount to a new fact under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA.” Id. at

1147 (citation omitted and formatting altered).

       In Lawson, the defendant had been convicted of multiple counts of

robbery, burglary, and conspiracy. Lawson, 2020 WL 119655, at *1. At the

____________________________________________

8 Appellant does not identify the evidence he claims was related to his corrupt

organizations conviction that was admitted at his murder trial in his argument
regarding that the Federal Habeas Case satisfies the newly discovered facts
exception.   However, in his argument regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence, Appellant contends that evidence related to his now-vacated corrupt
organizations conviction should have been excluded at his murder trial. In
support, he argues that the testimony of New Jersey State Trooper Patrick
Waninger should have been excluded in that it stated in part that Appellant
attempted to flee from the Trooper in a car, and that the Trooper confiscated
$20,000 in cash from Appellant, because the testimony inferred that Appellant
was engaged in a drug transaction. Appellant’s Brief at 13-14.

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time the defendant was sentenced, he was also serving a sentence for an

unrelated federal attempted murder conviction.       Id. After the defendant’s

federal conviction was vacated, he filed a PCRA petition arguing that the

reversal of his federal conviction was a newly discovered fact because the

Pennsylvania trial court considered the defendant’s federal conviction when

imposing sentence. Id. at *1-2. Ultimately, this Court agreed with the PCRA

court’s conclusion that the defendant had satisfied the newly discovered fact

exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Id. at *2. Therefore, the Lawson

Court remanded the matter for the PCRA court to determine if the defendant

was entitled to credit for time served for his robbery and related sentences

which he had been serving alongside the now-vacated federal sentence. Id.

at *3.

         Here, the PCRA court explained:

         [Appellant] has attempted to satisfy the newly-discovered fact
         exception, 42 [Pa.C.S.] § 9545(b)(1)(ii), by citing to a judicial
         decision where his Pennsylvania Corrupt Organizations Act . . .
         conviction was recently vacated. [See Rogers v. Mahally, 2017
         WL 590268, at *1 (E.D. Pa. filed Feb. 13, 2017)]. More precisely,
         it appears [Appellant] is averring that, in light of the [corrupt
         organizations] conviction being vacated, all the evidence
         associated with that case has been vacated, as well.[fn5] See PCRA
         Petition, 4/4/2017, at 3.
           [fn5]The fact that [Appellant’s corrupt organizations]
           conviction was vacated is irrelevant to his argument, as that
           charge stems from a subsequent case brought against him
           in 1991 that does not apply here.

         Preliminarily, judicial decisions do not qualify as previously-
         unknown facts for purposes of subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). See
         Commonwealth v. Watts, A.3d 980, 986 (Pa. 2011); see also
         Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124 (Pa. 2020) (Stating a

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       judicial opinion — even one which may establish a new theory or
       method of obtaining relief — does not amount to a new fact, within
       may establish a new theory or method of obtaining relief — does
       not amount to a new fact, within the meaning of the “newly
       discovered fact” exception to the limitations bar). Therefore,
       [Appellant] has failed to satisfactorily invoice any prong of
       subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii).

PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 2-3 (footnote omitted).

       Following our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court that

Appellant has failed to meet the newly discovered fact exception based on his

Federal Habeas Case because a judicial determination is not a “fact.” See

Blakeney, 193 A.3d at 361; see also Reid, 235 A.3d at 1146-47; Watts, 23

A.3d at 986-87.9

       Insofar as Appellant relies on Lawson, we note the facts of that case

are distinguishable. In Lawson, the defendant was convicted in federal court

before his sentencing in a Pennsylvania court, therefore the decision vacating

the defendant’s federal conviction was a newly discovered fact which affected

his subsequent Pennsylvania sentence. See Lawson, 2020 WL 119655, at

*1-3. Here, Appellant’s now-vacated conviction for corrupt organizations was

the result of a guilty plea he entered on October 31, 1991, almost seven

months after he was convicted of murder and related offenses in this matter.

____________________________________________

9 Appellant’s reliance on then-Justice (later Chief Justice) Baer’s concurring
opinion in Watts is misplaced. A decision of our Supreme Court “has binding
effect if a majority of the participating Justices joined the opinion.”
Commonwealth v. Kane, 188 A.3d 1217, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted). Only one of the six other justices joined Justice Baer’s concurrence
in Watts, see Watts, 23 A.3d at 988-89, therefore, it lacks precedential value
and is not binding on this Court. See Kane, 188 A.3d at 1227.

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Because Appellant’s vacated conviction is for a sentence imposed after the

sentence in the instant case, we conclude the facts of this case are

distinguishable from those of Lawson. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

                  Ineffective Assistance of PCRA Counsel

      Appellant also argues that his PCRA petition was timely filed because his

first PCRA counsel abandoned Appellant by failing to file a timely PCRA

petition.   Appellant’s Brief at 45-55.    Appellant notes that this Court has

acknowledged that prior PCRA counsel neglected and abandoned Appellant in

connection with his first PCRA petition. Id. at 46 (citing Rogers IV, 326 EDA

2003 (Beck, J., concurring)). Appellant contends that initial PCRA counsel’s

abandonment satisfies the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time

bar and that he first raised this claim in a motion to appeal nunc pro tunc that

he filed in 1999.       Id. at 47, 50-55 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v.

Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123 (Pa. 2018); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d

1264 (Pa. 2007)).

      Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not constitute a

“fact” for the purposes of invoking the newly discovered facts exception to the

PCRA time bar found in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).         See Commonwealth v.

Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 786 (Pa. 2000). In Bennett, our Supreme

Court recognized an exception to Gamboa-Taylor’s general rule and held that

counsel’s abandonment of a client on direct appeal can constitute a “fact” for

the purposes of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).        Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1274. The

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Bennett Court further explained that PCRA petitioner raising a claim of

abandonment by counsel to invoke Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) as an exception to

the PCRA’s time bar “must still prove that [counsel’s abandonment of the

petitioner] meets the requirements” of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), i.e., “the facts

were ‘unknown’ to [the petitioner] and that he could not uncover them with

the exercise of ‘due diligence.’” Id.; see also Brown, 111 A.3d at 176.

      Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Bennett

exception applies to instances “where PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness per se

completely forecloses review of collateral claims.”    Peterson, 192 A.3d at

1130. The Peterson Court explained:

      Abandonment, . . . is only one form of ineffectiveness per se, and
      our decision in Bennett did not limit its application to instances
      of attorney abandonment. To the contrary, in Bennett we
      emphasized that the important distinction for purposes of
      application of the subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception is whether
      counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness results in a partial deprivation of
      review (Gamboa-Taylor and its progeny) or instead completely
      deprives his client of review. See Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1272-74.

Id. at 1131.

      Here, in its opinion accompanying its order denying Appellant’s PCRA

petition, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant failed to establish the

timeliness exception for newly-recognized constitutional right under 42

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). See PCRA Ct. Op. & Order at 1-2. However, based

on our review of the record and the briefs, it is clear that Appellant is arguing

that his claim of abandonment by PCRA counsel satisfies the newly discovered

facts exception, not the exception for a newly-recognized constitutional right.

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See, e.g., Mem. of Law in Supp. of PCRA Pet., 5/19/20, at 1, 11-15; Mem. of

Law in Supp. of PCRA Pet., 11/6/18, at 1-8 (unpaginated).

      In any event, Appellant has failed to establish that he filed the instant

PCRA petition within sixty days of the date he could have first presented his

claim of abandonment by PCRA counsel.         See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2)

(subsequently am. eff. Dec. 24, 2018).         Further, Appellant’s attorney

abandonment claim has been previously litigated. Notably, Appellant admits

that he filed motions as far back as April of 1999 in which he claimed that he

had been abandoned by PCRA counsel.            See Appellant’s Brief at 47.

Additionally, Appellant has cited a concurring statement from one of his

previous appeals, issued on January 21, 2004, which discusses the issue of

PCRA counsel’s abandonment.      See Rogers IV, 326 EDA 2003 (Beck, J.,

concurring). We observe that Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on April

4, 2017, over thirteen years after the Honorable Phyllis W. Beck issued her

concurring statement in Rogers IV, and nearly eighteen years after Appellant

first filed a motion to appeal nunc pro tunc. Accordingly, Appellant cannot

rely on previously litigated PCRA attorney abandonment claims to establish

newly discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Therefore, although

we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant is not entitled to relief, we do so

for different reasons. See Wiley, 966 A.2d at 1157. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Date: 3/26/2024

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