Court Opinion

ID: 9542932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:40:30.840595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:17.166584
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the result reached by the court of appeals in Anaya v. People, 732 P.2d at 1241 (Colo.App.1986), but for somewhat different reasons. ■ The majority concludes that the court of appeals erred when it determined that the error in disqualifying counsel retained by the accused was to be measured by the harmless error standard. Crim.P. 52(a). I agree that the harmless error standard does not enter into the equation. But I also agree with the court of appeals analysis and conclusion that no substantial right of the defendant was prejudiced. Judge Babcock said:
Defendant makes no showing of hardship or prejudice as a result of his attorney’s disqualification, nor does he claim to have been denied effective assistance of counsel. On the contrary, defendant asserts only that the court unnecessarily deprived him of representation by the attorney of his choice. While the constitutional right to counsel is absolute, there is no right to a particular counsel.
Anaya, 732 P.2d at 1243 (citations omitted).
In my view, the sole error that was committed by the court of appeals was in applying the harmless error standard when the proper standard for a constitutional error is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In my view, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After the defendant’s *784first lawyer was disqualified on August 19, 1983, the defendant retained a second lawyer who prepared additional motions and had over a year to prepare for trial. Trial to a jury commenced on August 28, 1984, and resulted in a guilty verdict. The evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the sole issue was identification. Following a presentence investigation, the defendant was sentenced to a substantial period of confinement. Defense counsel raised the sixth amendment issue and asserted that defendant was denied the right to counsel of his own choice, but no timely objection was made prior to trial or before the case was submitted to the jury.1 No showing of prejudice was alleged or proved by the defendant. The defendant did not claim ineffective assistance by his trial counsel. Whether the county court and on appeal the district court erred in concluding that the defendant's original counsel should be disqualified is not before us in this certiora-ri proceeding.
We granted certiorari to review the sixth amendment issue relating to the erroneous disqualification of the first lawyer retained by the defendant. In my opinion, the record does not reflect that the defendant was prejudiced by the error. He did not object to going to trial with the second lawyer he retained and did not object to the case being submitted to the jury on the grounds that his first lawyer was erroneously disqualified. Under the facts in this case, a new trial is a -windfall to the defendant and a distortion of the magnitude of the error asserted. No claim has been made that the defendant’s trial counsel was denied adequate time to prepare for trial. No claim has been made that his second lawyer was not every bit as competent as his first lawyer. Both lawyers were selected by the defendant. Moreover, the defendant has not alleged that his trial counsel was incompetent or that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. See U.S. Const, amends. VI & XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16; Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17 (Colo.1985).
The facts in this case are not comparable to those in Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir.1978). In Gandy, reversal was required because of the obvious prejudice to the defendant that occurred when trial counsel moved for a continuance to participate in a civil trial and told the court that he would leave the court and have his associate try the ca.se if the continuance was denied. Even though his associate was unprepared and unfamiliar with the case, defense counsel carried out his threat and abandoned his client and let his associate try the case. The Fifth Circuit reversed and found that the defendant had been denied due process of law. The prejudice to the defendant in the Gandy case was apparent. Here, prejudice has not been shown and should not be presumed.
In my view, a defendant must demonstrate actual prejudice before being awarded a new trial after his retained counsel is erroneously disqualified. See United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737 (9th Cir.1977); Majeske v. United States, 266 F.2d 947 (9th Cir.1955). The majority relies on dicta in Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1983), and Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Roller, 472 U.S. 424, 105 S.Ct. 2757, 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985), in support of its holding that a showing of prejudice is not required to obtain reversal for erroneous disqualification of counsel. However, in Wheat v. United States, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to choose one’s own counsel is circumscribed and not absolute. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 1697. The Supreme Court characterized a defendant’s right to counsel of his choice as a “qualified” right, and not as an “absolute” right. The Court has not held that reversal is required where counsel has been erroneously disqualified in the absence of prejudice or a claim of ineffective *785assistance of counsel. We have held in considering a motion for disqualification that a defendant’s right to counsel of his own choice is not absolute, and is subject to a balancing test which takes into consideration the interests of a defendant to be represented by a particular lawyer and the public’s right to maintain integrity in the judicial process. Rodriguez v. District Court, 719 P.2d 699, 706 (Colo.1986).
Indigent defendants do not have a sixth amendment right to counsel of their own choice. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Williams v. District Court, 700 P.2d 549 (Colo.1985). Since indigent defendants do not have a right to counsel of their own choice, a person who has the financial means to employ an attorney should not be granted a supplemental right which guarantees him a new trial if the counsel he selects is erroneously denied the right to participate. There should be no difference between the defendant’s right when counsel is retained and not appointed. Standard 4-3.9 of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (1986), provides: “Once a lawyer has undertaken the representation of an accused, the duties and obligations are the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serving in a legal aid or defender program.” The majority opinion effectively creates a double standard based solely on a defendant’s financial ability to retain the counsel he desires.
The defendant objected to the removal of counsel more than a year before trial began, in the argument of a motion for a mistrial for the admission of similar transaction evidence, and again in a motion to withdraw after the case was submitted to the jury. He also raised the issue in a motion for a new trial. In my view, new trial should not be granted because of an error that did not affect the validity of the truth-finding process or prejudice the defendant’s rights. A trial judge should be afforded the right to correct an erroneous ruling on the disqualification of defense counsel. I believe a defendant’s right to seek appellate review for the disqualification of the lawyer he retained must be preserved by an objection prior to the commencement of trial, and again before the case is submitted to the jury. In the absence of timely objections and a showing of prejudice, or a demonstration of ineffective assistance of counsel, the error should not result in reversal and a new trial.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of conviction.
I am authorized to say that Justice RO-VIRA joins in this dissent.

. The record before us reflects that defense counsel sought to withdraw after the case was submitted to the jury on the ground that the disqualification of the defendant’s original counsel was error. The objection to disqualification of the defendant's original lawyer was also made during the trial in conjunction with a motion for a mistrial based upon the admission of similar acts or offenses. The only other reference is in the motion for a new trial.