Court Opinion

ID: 9729205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:29:11.091674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:56.035948
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
dissenting with sepa-
rate opinion.
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion.
Indiana Code Section 35-33-8-8.2(a) is the bond statute for our state. It provides, in relevant part, that the court may "impose any other reasonable restrictions designed to assure the defendant's presence in Court. . .." The majority maintains that in this specific case with this defendant, the requirement that she submit to and pay for drug testing was made without a finding of a "individualized determination" that such testing was statutorily allowable.
The cultural phenomenon of illicit drug use in our society is well known and well documented. The majority opinion overlooks the fact that in this case, the defendant is formally charged with the crime of possession of a controlled substance. Common sense, common experience, and the statute allow the trial court to make a determination that, in a specific case, the danger of a failure to appear by a defendant escalates with the potential use of a *1029controlled substance. Cf. Tinsley v. State, 496 N.E.2d 1306 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (holding the condition of bail, that persons arrested at theatre for engaging in allegedly obscene performance could not go "on or about premises" of theatre, was improper because it was not related to assuring persons' appearances at future legal proceedings).
I am unable, given the broad discretion afforded to trial judges in L.C. § 35-33-8-3.2(a), to find that the imposition of this condition in this case with this charge pending is outside the purview of what the statute contemplates.