Court Opinion

ID: 9597416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:58:29.390699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:06:11.897801
License: Public Domain

BABCOCK, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority, but write separately to state my view that the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages is no longer a factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a punitive damage award. Indeed, in reliance on Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo.1984), this was our holding in Coale v. Dow Chemical Co., 701 P.2d 885 (Colo.App.1985) (cert. denied, September 23, 1985). The Supreme Court’s denial of *716certiorari indicates to me that Coale properly construed Palmer.
Although a claim for punitive damages under § 13-21-102, C.R.S., is ancillary to the underlying claim for actual damages, its function is punitive, and thus, its focus is upon the conduct of the wrongdoer. See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., supra. Consideration of (1) the nature of the act which caused the injury; (2) the economic status of the defendant; and (3) the deterent effect of the award on others permits full judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of an award of punitive damages consistent with the function and focus of the punitive damages statute. See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., supra; Coale v. Dow Chemical Co., supra. I would not regraft upon these three factors the archaic consideration of a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, which in my view, bears no rational relationship to the reasonableness of an award of punitive damages.