Court Opinion

ID: 9906803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 14:24:45.139707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:13.525189
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Fulton
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued by videoconference

              JOHN WALLACE BLANCHARD
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1504-22-3                                    JUDGE JUNIUS P. FULTON, III
                                                                                 DECEMBER 5, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
                                              David B. Carson, Judge

                              John S. Edwards (Edwards Law Firm, on briefs), for appellant.

                              Jason D. Reed, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a jury trial, the Circuit Court for the City of Roanoke convicted John Wallace

              Blanchard of taking indecent liberties with a minor, in violation of Code § 18.2-370. On appeal,

              Blanchard contends that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing the complaining witness to testify to

              events that occurred outside the scope of the indictment, (2) admitting evidence outside the scope of

              the indictment that caused a fatal variance between the charge and the evidence, (3) admitting text

              messages the complaining witness sent to her mother over Facebook Messenger, (4) admitting prior

              consistent statements made by the complaining witness, (5) admitting uncharged “bad acts”

              evidence, and (6) failing to answer a jury question regarding jury instructions. For the following

              reasons we disagree with Blanchard and affirm the trial court.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                                          BACKGROUND

       “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party [below].” Poole v. Commonwealth,

73 Va. App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)). This

standard requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the

Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all

fair inferences to be drawn” therefrom. Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 26 (2021)

(quoting Cooper v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 558, 562 (2009)).

       In March 2021, R.B. was 17 years old and lived in Roanoke with her father, Blanchard, her

stepmother, known by the nickname Blue, and her siblings. R.B.’s mother lived in Washington

State. Blanchard and Blue were “very authoritative” parents, and R.B. often felt unwelcome in the

family home. During her senior year, R.B. attended school remotely, which led to an improvement

in her academics. She was therefore allowed to stay up later than her usual 8:00 p.m. bedtime, and

she secured a part-time job at an area restaurant. She also began to spend more time with Blanchard

and felt that their relationship was improving. One night after working all day, R.B. asked

Blanchard for a massage because her shoulders hurt. R.B. sat in front of Blanchard on the living

room couch and leaned back against his chest as Blanchard began to massage her down the base of

her neck, shoulders, and back. Blanchard then slid his hands through the neck of her shirt, went

underneath the cup of her bra, and touched her bare breast. Blanchard did not say anything as he

massaged and pinched her nipples, and, out of fear, R.B. remained silent. R.B. later posted a video

on TikTok explaining that Blanchard touched her “boobs” after she asked for a back rub.

       Blanchard touched R.B. in a similar manner several additional times while she was still 17

and living at home. On one occasion, Blanchard whispered in her ear, asking if what he was doing

was okay. When R.B. shook her head no, he re-adjusted her bra, straightened her shirt, and

                                                 -2-
apologized. During another incident, Blanchard approached R.B. from behind as she stood at her

desk and put his hand under her shirt to touch her chest. R.B. could feel his erect penis pressed

against her buttocks through their clothes. On another occasion, Blanchard’s hand travelled down

to R.B.’s waistband, but she put her arm across the waistband to stop him from going further.

        Shortly after R.B. turned 18 and graduated from high school, Blanchard again massaged her

back, unclasped her bra, and massaged the sides of her chest. On that occasion, R.B. was lying face

down on her bed. Finally, on August 14, 2021 (the “kitchen incident”), R.B. was doing dishes when

Blanchard entered the kitchen and approached her from behind. He thanked her for doing the

dishes and then started to rub her chest with his hands underneath her sports bra. R.B. felt

Blanchard’s erect penis between her legs. R.B. was scared because Blanchard’s behavior was

escalating and she “didn’t know how far he would try to push it.” That night, R.B. texted her

mother and a boyfriend asking for advice about what to do. She moved out of the house the next

day. Blanchard then left R.B. a voicemail message, stating,

                Hey, [R.B.], its dad, I am just calling to say I’m sorry to make
                amends for what, for breaking your trust and I want you to know
                that when you are ready I would like to apologize in person. I
                know that may be a while but I am sorry I hurt you. I love you.

Blanchard also sent a text message saying, “I called to make amends and tell you I am sorry. I

understand I have broken your trust it was never my intention.”

        Before trial, Blanchard filed motions seeking to exclude R.B.’s testimony regarding the

kitchen incident, the text messages she sent to her mother following that incident, and the voicemail

message Blanchard left on August 15. The trial court took the motions under advisement and stated

that it would consider the admissibility of the evidence at trial. The trial court specifically stated

that it would hear R.B.’s testimony concerning the kitchen incident separately before her expected

testimony before the jury, but explained that it was inclined to admit the evidence. At trial, when

R.B. started to testify about the kitchen incident, Blanchard renewed his objection to the testimony
                                                  -3-
and argued that the evidence was outside the indictment and occurred after R.B. turned 18. Instead

of hearing R.B.’s testimony separately as the trial court previously indicated, the trial court

overruled the objection and allowed R.B. to testify about the erection she felt during the kitchen

incident.

        R.B.’s mother, Heather Krona, verified that she and R.B. exchanged texts in which R.B.

disclosed that Blanchard had been touching her inappropriately “for a while.” Krona testified that

R.B. specifically said that Blanchard “had been touching her breasts” and that his behavior “had

escalated.” Blanchard objected to this line of testimony, arguing that “while [R.B.’s] complaint

itself certainly can be admitted,” the “details describing the events” themselves were inadmissible.

The trial court allowed Krona to testify to the “recent complaint” and gave “a little latitude in terms

of context but to the extent it gets into significant details,” sustained the objection. Without any

further objection, Krona testified that R.B. said Blanchard “had pinned her against a counter top

with a full erection, pressed into her back.” On cross-examination, Blanchard inquired about a

statement Krona made on one of the pages of the texts that suggested Blanchard was just testing

how sexually experienced R.B. had become. Following Krona’s testimony, the Commonwealth

moved to admit four pages of text messages which included details of the alleged offense.

Blanchard objected to the trial court’s admission of the text messages and argued that it was merely

the Commonwealth’s attempt to “get more context in.” The trial court ruled that since Blanchard

asked about Krona’s statements, the rest of the text messages were admissible for context.1

        Karen Blanchard, R.B.’s distant cousin by marriage, testified that she never observed any

affectionate behavior or a “loving, nurturing parenting style” between Blanchard and R.B. In

August 2021, R.B. contacted Karen, clearly upset. Karen immediately drove to R.B.’s work

        The Commonwealth’s exhibit did not include the page from the text messages that
        1

Blanchard had inquired about.
                                          -4-
location and noticed that R.B. was “physically upset,” puffy and teary-eyed. R.B. wrote about what

happened on a tablet and showed it to Karen. Karen testified that the note said that Blanchard had

been physically touching her inappropriately on more than one occasion and that she had an

incident the night before where she felt extremely unsafe and “she didn’t know what to do or where

to go.” Karen told R.B. that she could not return home and offered to let R.B. stay with her.

        Roanoke Police Officer Devin Moore Irwin (“Officer Irwin”) responded to R.B.’s allegation

of sexual assault. Over Blanchard’s objection, Officer Irwin testified that R.B. said Blanchard had

“ran his hands over her breasts without a bra on” in March 2021 and that he repeated similar actions

“around ten times” before coming up behind her in August 2021 and pushing an erection up against

her while touching her breasts. Officer Irwin admitted that R.B. did not wish to press formal

charges and that she did not seek a protective order. Rather, R.B. called the police for assistance in

retrieving her personal property from Blanchard’s house.

        After the Commonwealth rested its case, Blanchard moved to strike the evidence, arguing

that it failed to prove the requisite “lascivious intent” element of the offense. The trial court denied

the motion to strike.

        Blue testified for the defense. Blue acknowledged that she and Blanchard had a “very

defined [parenting] structure” and “high standards for personal accountability and self respect and

academic commitment.” Blue recalled being summoned to Karen’s house and given an iPad on

which R.B. had written about the alleged assaultive behaviors. Blue read several lines and then

became “so overwhelmed with disbelief that [she] had to set it down.” Blue asked R.B., “do you

just want to move out,” and R.B. answered, “well yeah.” Blue and R.B. had been discussing R.B.’s

future and whether R.B. could move out and start her own life. Blue did not notice any change in

R.B.’s behavior between March and August 2021, except that R.B. seemed to have “developed a

relationship with [Blanchard].” After the meeting at Karen’s, Blue returned home to speak with

                                                  -5-
Blanchard. Blanchard admitted to giving R.B. back rubs, but he denied touching her breasts or

removing her bra. At trial, Blanchard objected to the admission of the note R.B. wrote on the iPad

in its entirety because Blue only read the first few lines of it. He argued that the rest of the note was

a prior consistent statement used merely to bolster R.B.’s testimony. The trial court sustained

Blanchard’s objection.

        Blanchard testified that he gave R.B. a number of back rubs during her senior year in high

school, but only upon her request. He admitted that during two separate back massages his hands

accidentally brushed R.B.’s breasts. He also admitted to standing behind R.B. in the kitchen while

she was doing dishes. However, he denied unclasping R.B’s bra on any occasion and he denied

ever feeling or exhibiting any sexual arousal around R.B.

        Following the presentation of all the evidence, Blanchard renewed his motion to strike and

additionally argued that the testimony pertaining to the kitchen incident was irrelevant, as it was

outside the scope of the indictment and occurred after R.B. turned 18. The trial court denied the

motion. The trial court then instructed the jury and, following closing arguments, released it for

deliberations. During jury deliberations, the jury inquired of the court: “[w]hat do we do if we agree

he committed the crime but we don’t see evidence of intent?” The trial court responded, “I cannot

answer the question as phrased. The elements of the alleged offense are set forth in the jury

instructions, and it is for the jury to determine if the Commonwealth has carried its burden of

proving all the elements by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.” Then, on the record, outside the

presence of the jury, the trial court explained: “there was a single question from the jury. I reviewed

it with counsel. I prepared a response, sent that question with the court’s response back to the

jurors. A copy of that question and the answer have been made a part of the file.” The record does

not reflect that Blanchard ever objected to the trial court’s response prior to his motion to set aside

the verdict. The jury convicted Blanchard of taking indecent liberties with a minor.

                                                  -6-
        Blanchard filed a written motion to set aside the verdict, and the trial court held a hearing on

the motion before sentencing. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the verdict and

sentenced him to three years in prison, all suspended except the time he served in jail awaiting

sentencing. Blanchard noted this appeal.

                                               ANALYSIS

        Blanchard’s first five assignments of error address two separate evidentiary rulings made by

the trial court; specifically, (1) that the trial court allowed R.B. to testify about the kitchen incident,

which occurred after she turned 18, and (2) that the trial court admitted a portion of the text

messages R.B. sent to her mother following the kitchen incident. For the following reasons, we

affirm the evidentiary rulings made by the court below.

                                           Standard of Review

        “Decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence ‘lie within the trial court’s sound

discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.’” Blankenship v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 692, 697 (2019) (quoting Michels v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App.

461, 465 (2006)). “This bell-shaped curve of reasonability” guiding appellate review “rests on the

venerable belief that the judge closest to the contest is the judge best able to discern where the

equities lie.” Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting Sauder v.

Ferguson, 289 Va. 449, 459 (2015)). A reviewing court can conclude that “an abuse of discretion

has occurred” only when “reasonable jurists could not differ” about the correct result.

Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 197 (2015) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va.

602, 620 (2009)).

        Generally, absent other constraints, evidence is admissible as long as it is relevant.

Va. R. Evid. 2:402. “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact in issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

                                                    -7-
Va. R. Evid. 2:401. “The scope of relevant evidence in Virginia is quite broad.” Commonwealth v.

Proffitt, 292 Va. 626, 634 (2016). In order to be admissible as relevant, “evidence [must] tend[ ] to

prove a matter that is properly at issue in the case.” Id. at 635 (alterations in original) (quoting

Brugh v. Jones, 265 Va. 136, 139 (2003)).

                                                     I.

                    Admissibility of R.B.’s Testimony About the Kitchen Incident

        Blanchard asserts that the trial court erred in allowing R.B. to testify about the kitchen

incident for three reasons: (1) the testimony gave rise to a fatal variance between the indictment and

the proof offered at trial, (2) the testimony was impermissible “uncharged bad acts” evidence, and

(3) the court disregarded its own ruling on Blanchard’s motion in limine. Disagreeing with these

contentions, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

                                           A. Fatal Variance

        “An indictment is a written accusation of a crime and is intended to inform the accused of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him.” Scott v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 68, 73

(2006) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 211, 213 (1986)). “The point of an

indictment ‘is to give an accused notice of the nature and character of the accusations against him in

order that he can adequately prepare to defend against his accuser.’” Purvy v. Commonwealth, 59

Va. App. 260, 265-66 (2011) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 193, 198 (2003)).

Thus, “[t]he accused cannot be convicted unless the evidence brings him within the offense charged

in his indictment. . . . [T]he indictment must charge the very offense for which a conviction is

asked.” Scott, 49 Va. App. at 73 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Williams v.

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 336, 341 (1989)). “A conviction for a crime other than the one charged

in the indictment is plainly reversible.” Commonwealth v. Bass, 292 Va. 19, 28 (2016).

                                                     -8-
        While it is true that “[a] fatal variance occurs when the criminal pleadings charge one

offense and the evidence proves another,” id. at 27, a variance is only fatal “when the proof is

different [from] and irrelevant to the crime defined in the indictment and is, therefore, insufficient to

prove the commission of the crime charged,” Scott, 49 Va. App. at 73 (alteration in original)

(quoting Griffin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 409, 411 (1991)). That is, “[n]ot every variance is

fatal. A ‘non-fatal’ variance is one that does not undermine the integrity of the trial and, thus, does

not warrant a reversal on appeal.” Purvy, 59 Va. App. at 266.

        In this case, there does not exist any variance, much less a fatal one, between the indictment

and the proof obtained at trial. Blanchard was charged with one felony count of taking indecent

liberties with a minor in violation of Code § 18.2-370.2 The indictment included the specific statute

under which he was charged, the initials of the alleged victim, her age at the time of the offense, and

the assertion that Blanchard “did unlawfully and feloniously knowingly and intentionally with

lascivious intent, commit a violation of either this section or clause (v) or (vi) of subsection A of

18.2-370.1.”3 At trial, R.B. testified that when she was still 17 years old, Blanchard repeatedly put

his hands underneath her bra and fondled her breasts. R.B. also testified that on one occasion while

she was still 17, Blanchard stood behind her and she felt his erection. In the text message she sent

        2
          “Any parent . . . who commits a violation of either this section or clause (v) or (vi) of
subsection A of § 18.2-370.1 (i) upon his child . . . who is at least 15 but less than 18 years of age
is guilty of a Class 5 felony.” Code § 18.2-370(D).
        3
                Any person 18 years of age or older who, . . . maintains a custodial
                or supervisory relationship over a child under the age of 18 and is
                not legally married to such child and such child is not emancipated
                who, with lascivious intent, knowingly and intentionally . . . (vi)
                sexually abuses the child as defined in subdivision 6 of
                § 18.2-67.10 is guilty of a Class 6 felony.

Code § 18.2-370.1. “‘Sexual abuse’” means an act committed with the intent to sexually molest,
arouse, or gratify any person, where: a. The accused intentionally touches the complaining
witness’s intimate parts or material directly covering such intimate parts.” Code
§ 18.2-67.10(6)(a).
                                                -9-
to her mother after the kitchen incident, she again mentioned that earlier incident. Thus, the

evidence at trial proved Blanchard was convicted of the same offense for which he was indicted,

upon proof that he committed that particular offense. The evidence related to the kitchen incident

was not the actus reus for the conviction; it was simply relevant evidence that was probative in

proving that conviction. There was no variance between the indictment and the evidence. The mere

fact that Blanchard also committed a misdemeanor offense against R.B. after she turned 18 does not

alter the fact that he committed the felony upon her when she was 17.

                                      B. Uncharged Bad Acts

       Blanchard also alleges that in allowing R.B. to testify about the kitchen incident, which

occurred after she turned 18, the trial court admitted impermissible “bad acts” evidence. We

disagree.

       Generally, “evidence which shows or tends to show that the accused is guilty of other

crimes and offenses at other times, even though they are of the same nature as the one charged in

the indictment, is not admissible to show the accused’s commission of the particular crime

charged.” Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705, 714 (2008). However, this general rule “must

sometimes yield to society’s interest in the truth-finding process, and numerous exceptions allow

evidence of prior misconduct whenever the legitimate probative value outweighs the incidental

prejudice to the accused.” Conley v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 658, 670 (2022) (quoting

Gonzales v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 375, 381 (2005)). Specifically, as our Supreme Court

recently reaffirmed:

               other crimes evidence is admissible when it “shows the conduct or
               attitude of the accused toward his victim[;] establishes the
               relationship between the parties[;] or negates the possibility of
               accident or mistake[;]” or shows motive, method, intent, plan or
               scheme, or any other relevant element of the offense on trial.

                                                - 10 -
Kenner v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 414, 424 (2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Ortiz, 276 Va.

at 714).

           Moreover, in cases involving incest, it is well-established that

                   evidence of acts of incestuous intercourse between the parties other
                   than those charged in the indictment or information, whether prior or
                   subsequent thereto, is, if not too remote in point of time, admissible
                   for the purpose of throwing light upon the relations of the parties and
                   the incestuous disposition of the defendant toward the other party,
                   and to corroborate the proof of the act relied upon for conviction.

Moore v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 72, 77 (1981) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512,

516-17 (1968)).

           “Once the Court has determined that the ‘prior bad acts’ evidence is relevant, and not mere

‘propensity evidence,’ the Court must still determine whether the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs

the probative value of the evidence.” Conley, 74 Va. App. at 671. “Relevant evidence may be

excluded if . . . the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by (i) the danger of

unfair prejudice, or (ii) its likelihood of confusing or misleading the trier of fact.” Va. R. Evid.

2:403. “Rule 2:403’s requirement that only unfair prejudice may be considered as grounds for

non-admission ‘reflects the fact that all probative direct evidence generally has a prejudicial effect

to the opposing party.’” Fields v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 652, 673 (2021) (quoting Lee v.

Spoden, 290 Va. 235, 251 (2015)). “‘[U]nfair prejudice’ refers to the tendency of some proof to

inflame the passions of the trier of fact, or to invite decision based upon a factor unrelated to the

elements of the claims and defenses in the pending case.” Lee, 290 Va. at 251. In fact, “[a]ll

evidence tending to prove guilt is prejudicial to an accused, but the mere fact that such evidence is

powerful because it accurately depicts the gravity and atrociousness of the crime or the callous

nature of the defendant does not thereby render it inadmissible.” Fields, 73 Va. App. at 672-73

(quoting Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 141 (2004)). “The responsibility for balancing the

                                                    - 11 -
probative value versus the prejudicial effect rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Kenner,

299 Va. at 424.

        In this case, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Blanchard touched R.B. “with

lascivious intent.” Code § 18.2-370. R.B. testified that while she was still 17 years old, Blanchard

began to touch and fondle her breasts and, on at least one occasion, attempted to put his hands in her

pants. She became concerned enough after the kitchen incident to move out of the house, as she

perceived that his behavior was escalating and she did not know how far he would go. There is no

dispute that Blanchard touched R.B.’s breasts during the back massages. He simply claims that any

touching was accidental, rather than lascivious. Thus, evidence that he developed an erection while

standing behind R.B. and fondling her breasts during the kitchen incident was admissible and

relevant to prove that he did so with lascivious intent and it supported the Commonwealth’s

contention that his prior acts of touching were inspired by the same purpose. Moore, 222 Va. at 77.

        “[T]he Commonwealth is required to prove every element of its case.” Kenner, 299 Va. at

426. “It is entitled to do so by presenting relevant evidence in support of the offense charged. The

Commonwealth cannot have its evidence barred or ‘sanitized’ simply because the defendant takes

the position that the offense did not occur and therefore intent is not genuinely in dispute.” Id.

Here, the evidence of what occurred in the kitchen after R.B. turned 18 was relevant to show

Blanchard’s conduct or attitude towards R.B., along with his motive, method, and intent. We find

no error in the trial court’s decision to allow R.B. to testify about the incident in the kitchen.

                                          C. Motion in Limine

        Blanchard complains that the trial court changed its ruling on the motion in limine.

However, the fact that the trial court did not follow the evidentiary ruling it made after the hearing

on the limine motion is of no moment. “Trial judges are required to rule on issues as they develop

at trial.” Zook v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 560, 569 (2000) (quoting Bottoms v.

                                                  - 12 -
Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 378, 383 (1996)). “A trial court is empowered to change a legal

determination as long as it retains jurisdiction over the proceedings before it.” Id. (quoting Bottoms,

22 Va. App. at 384). Further, in this case, the trial court did not rule on the motion before trial as

Blanchard argues, but instead reserved ruling and said that it would hear R.B.’s testimony about the

kitchen incident before deciding on its admissibility at trial. When taking the motion under

advisement, the trial court indicated that it was inclined to admit the evidence. At trial, R.B.

testified at length about the offenses that occurred while she was 17, including an instance where

Blanchard had an erection, and the trial court was aware of the nature of her expected testimony

about the incident that occurred in the kitchen after she turned 18. Thus, its decision to allow her to

testify without further prodding by the parties was not error.

        For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing R.B. to testify about the

kitchen incident.

                                                   II.

            Admissibility of Text Messages R.B. Sent to Her Mother on August 14, 2021

        Blanchard next asserts that the trial court erred in admitting a portion of the text messages

R.B. sent to her mother following the kitchen incident. Blanchard argues that the text messages

were inadmissible hearsay because the details included in the messages were not admissible under

the “recent complaint” exception to the hearsay rule, that the messages contained “[h]earsay

[w]ithin [h]earsay,” and that the messages were not admissible as prior consistent statements to

rehabilitate R.B. Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred in admitting the text messages

into evidence, any error was harmless.

        Blanchard did not object to the text messages as containing “[h]earsay [w]ithin [h]earsay.”

The parties expressly stipulated that the Facebook Messenger conversations between R.B. and

Krona from August 14, 2021, were “fair and accurate representations of those conversations and are

                                                 - 13 -
authenticated.” Moreover, Blanchard did not object to the admission of the messages on the

specific “[h]earsay [w]ithin [h]earsay” basis when the Commonwealth sought to admit them. Thus,

Blanchard’s “[h]earsay [w]ithin [h]earsay” assertion is waived under Rule 5A:18 and we do not

consider it. “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an

objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling.” Rule 5A:18. Although

Blanchard included this assertion in his post-trial motion to set aside the verdict, the objection came

too late. The text messages were already admitted, and the jury had already considered them. Thus,

because Blanchard did not timely object to the admission of the text messages at trial on the specific

grounds he now alleges on appeal, we will not further address that specific assertion here.

        Blanchard also argues that the text messages from R.B. to Krona were not admissible under

any exception to the hearsay rule and claims that they were more prejudicial than probative and

confusing to the jury. While we agree that the messages were not admissible under the “recent

complaint” exception to the hearsay rule or as prior consistent statements for purposes of

rehabilitation, we note that the trial court did not admit the messages for either of those reasons, and,

in fact, the Commonwealth did not proffer the evidence on that basis. At trial, there was no

discussion about “prior consistent statements” as applied to the admission of these messages from

R.B. to Krona and the trial court sustained Blanchard’s objection to any testimony concerning the

details contained within them. Specifically, the trial court sustained Blanchard’s objection to

Krona’s testimony “to the extent it gets into significant details” and only allowed the

Commonwealth “a little bit of latitude” in eliciting Krona’s testimony about R.B.’s complaint. We

note, however, that Blanchard agreed at trial that the fact of R.B.’s subsequent complaint, itself,

could be received as evidence.

        On cross-examination, Blanchard elicited testimony from Krona regarding certain

statements she made, herself, in response to R.B.’s complaint over Facebook Messenger. Then, on

                                                  - 14 -
re-direct examination, the Commonwealth sought to introduce the details of R.B.’s complaint, not to

bolster her credibility as a witness or corroborate her story, but to give context to Krona’s testimony

on cross-examination concerning her initial odd response to R.B. in which she suggested that

Blanchard was merely testing “how sexually experienced” R.B. had become. This line of

questioning during the cross-examination pointed to a potentially non-criminal rationale for

Blanchard’s behavior. The Commonwealth thereafter sought to introduce the surrounding context

of Krona’s statement in order to help the jury understand the criminal nature of Blanchard’s

conduct. Commonwealth’s Exhibit 8, reflecting the text messages, was admitted over Blanchard’s

objection because “aspects of it were referred to in cross-examination” and the trial court found that

“in fairness the context should be allowed.” Blanchard conceded that he asked Krona about her

response to the allegations, but he maintained that Commonwealth’s Exhibit 8 was “not relative to

that portion” of the specific text messages he inquired about and suggested that the messages would

only confuse the jury.

        Assuming without deciding that the admission of the text messages was error, we hold that

any error was harmless. A close review of the admitted text messages indicates that they mirrored

R.B.’s testimony in almost exacting detail and were, therefore, merely cumulative of evidence the

jury already heard. For that reason, we cannot conclude that their admission substantially affected

the outcome of the case.

                When it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at
                the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and
                substantial justice has been reached, no judgment shall be arrested or
                reversed . . . [f]or any . . . defect, imperfection, or omission in the
                record, or for any error committed on the trial.

Code § 8.01-678. “[I]n order to determine whether there has been ‘a fair trial on the merits’ and

whether ‘substantial justice has been reached,’” in a criminal case, “a reviewing court must decide

whether the alleged error substantially influenced the jury. If it did not, the error is harmless.” Clay

                                                 - 15 -
v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 259 (2001). In other words, “[i]f, when all is said and done, the

conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect, the verdict and the

judgment should stand.” Id. at 260 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)).

        In considering whether an error was harmless, the error must be considered “in the context

of the entire case.” Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 695, 704 (2010). Whether an

error is harmless depends on numerous factors, including “the importance of the witness’ testimony

in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of

evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent

of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s

case.” Perry v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 655, 672 (2011) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall,

475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)). Here, the trial court admitted a portion of the text messages R.B. sent to

Krona after the August 14, 2021 kitchen incident. The text message stated:

                Not sure if you’re awake or not but I need to tell someone. I know
                you’ve got a lot on your plate right now and I’m sorry for adding
                more but a few months ago I started staying up late at night. My dad
                and I would be alone downstairs in the living room. One night I
                asked for a massage because my shoulders were killing me. I can’t
                remember if it was that night or not but eventually he started getting
                handsy. He would lift up my shirt over my chest and massage my
                breasts. One night asked if that was okay and I shook my head no.
                He followed by lowering everything back down and apologized but a
                few nights later he did it again. Another time I remember he took me
                to his and blues room and had me lay on my stomach. He
                unclamped my bra, which I understand as it gets in the way of my
                back but he then started getting close to my chest again. By then I
                knew what he was doing so I would move myself to where it was
                (what I thought) was obvious I didn’t want him going there. It
                hadn’t happened recently since I’ve been out of the house and
                avoided being in the same room as him alone especially at night.
                Well tonight as I was doing the dishes, he came downstairs, helped
                me and when he had nothing to do, he started with the massages
                again. He pretty much pinned me against the sink. Not with force
                but I couldn’t get out from in front of him unless I shoved him out of
                the was [sic]. My back was to him and I could feel him getting hard.
                (Which isn’t the first time) I would try and move myself to where my
                butt wasn’t up against him but there really was no where for me to
                                                  - 16 -
                go. When he does this I can’t talk, I can’t move, I can’t get away.
                The only thing I can do is try and position myself to where it’s what I
                think obvious that I am uncomfortable. As I was finishing up, I was
                trying to keep myself busy and fill the pepper grinder and I had to
                reach up in the cabinet to get the pepper corn and I could feel him
                push himself against me harder. I moved away from him to get a
                stool to get the box and it was a full on erection. I haven’t told blue
                because how would she believe me. And I don’t know how I would
                bring it up to my dad.

                I don’t have enough money to move out, and I don't have any friends
                to love [sic] in with. And I’m not moving in with coby and I don’t
                wanna move out of the state, I don’t know where to go or what to do.

                I have to be at work at 6:30 tomorrow and I can’t sleep because the
                situation keeps replaying in my head[.]

                I have no proof he did any of this either[.]

                It’s gross, I feel disgusting, I feel sick.

The trial court expressly admitted the text message to explain Krona’s response to this text

message—inquired about on cross-examination—and not to, as Blanchard suggested, bolster R.B.’s

testimony.

        In any case, if the trial court erred in admitting the text message, that error was harmless in

light of the other extensive evidence properly before the trial court. R.B. testified that, beginning in

March 2021, Blanchard embarked on a course of conduct in which he repeatedly touched her

breasts while giving her back massages. She posted a TikTok video in March 2021 stating as much

after the touching started. She testified at trial about several instances of touching, which

culminated in the final incident in the kitchen. Blanchard admitted to Blue that he gave R.B. back

massages and that he had touched her breasts, albeit accidentally. He also admitted at trial that he

was in the kitchen with R.B. on August 14, 2021, and that he had no option but to stand very close

to her. R.B. sought help from Karen and moved out of the house the next day. Karen testified that

R.B. appeared physically upset, puffy and teary-eyed. Furthermore, Blanchard left R.B. a voicemail

and sent a text, apologizing for breaking her trust and seeking to make amends. We emphasize
                                                    - 17 -
again that, while Blanchard objected to the details of the text coming into evidence, he did not

object to the fact of the complaint itself coming into evidence. Thus, the text message to Krona was

almost entirely cumulative of R.B.’s trial testimony and merely emphasized R.B.’s assertion that she

had had enough of Blanchard’s escalating sexual advances.

        In light of the considerable other evidence of Blanchard’s actions, we conclude that

admitting the text message had, at most, but slight effect on the jury and that substantial justice has

been reached. Accordingly, any error in admitting the text message was harmless.

                                                   III.

                                             Jury Question

        Blanchard’s final assignment of error touches upon the trial court’s refusal to explain

instructions to the jury when questioned about what they should do if they did not find intent. We

do not consider Blanchard’s argument because he has not preserved it for appellate review.

        “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection

was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to

enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. Accordingly, “this Court ‘will not

consider an argument on appeal [that] was not presented to the trial court.’” Farnsworth v.

Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 490, 500 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Ohree v.

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308 (1998)). Moreover, appellate courts “will not consider an

argument that differs from the specific argument presented to the trial court, even if it relates to the

same general issue.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 761 (2003) (en banc) (citing

Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 584 (1978)). “Specificity and timeliness undergird the

contemporaneous-objection rule [and] animate its highly practical purpose.” Bethea v.

Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019). “Not just any objection will do. It must be both specific

                                                  - 18 -
and timely — so that the trial judge would know the particular point being made in time to do

something about it.” Id. (quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 351, 356 (2011)).

        Here, the record shows that during deliberations, the jury sent a question to the trial court

inquiring what it should do if “we agree he committed the crime but we don’t see evidence of

intent?” The trial court returned an answer explaining that the elements of the offense “are set forth

in the jury instructions.” Indeed, the jury was instructed that it must find Blanchard “with lascivious

intent knowingly and intentionally sexually abused [R.B.].” It was further instructed that the term

“lascivious means a state of mind that is eager for sexual indulgence, desirous of inciting lust, or of

inciting sexual desire and appetite.” The trial court later stated for the record that it had reviewed

the jury’s question with counsel before preparing its response and inquired if there was “anything to

take up before we bring the jurors in?” Both Blanchard and the Commonwealth responded, “No,

Your Honor.” Moreover, the question asked by the jury, which was tendered in writing, and the

trial court’s written response to that question, both of which appear in the record, do not contain any

stated objection to the trial court’s response to the jury’s query. Thus, it is clear that Blanchard did

not timely object to the trial court’s response to the jury’s question or otherwise maintain, as he does

on appeal, that the trial court should have instructed the jury “that it should find [him] not guilty,

unless it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of ‘lascivious intent’ during the time

alleged in the indictment.” For that reason, Blanchard failed to preserve this assignment of error for

review.4 The trial court’s response to the jury’s question is, therefore, affirmed.

                                            CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                                                                Affirmed.

        4
        Blanchard has not invoked the good cause and ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18,
and we do not consider them sua sponte. Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761.
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