Court Opinion

ID: 9685296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:29:30.1387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:04.358740
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Dissenting.
In California, it is a misdemeanor to practice law when one is not a member of the State Bar. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6125, 6126, subd. (a).) In this case, New York lawyers who were not members of the California Bar traveled to this state on several occasions, attempting to resolve a contract dispute between their clients and another corporation through negotiation and private arbitration. Their clients included a New York corporation and a sister corporation incorporated in California; the lawyers had in previous years represented the principal owners of these corporations. The majority holds that the New York lawyers’ activities in California constituted the unauthorized practice of law. I disagree.
The majority focuses its attention on the question of whether the New York lawyers had engaged in the practice of law in California, giving scant consideration to a decisive preliminary inquiry; whether, through their activities here, the New York lawyers had engaged in the practice of law at all. In my view, the record does not show that they did. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority relies on an overbroad definition of the term “practice of law.” I would adhere to this court’s decision in Baron v. City of *141Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 535 [86 Cal.Rptr. 673, 469 P.2d 353, 42 A.L.R.3d 1036], more narrowly defining the practice of law as the representation of another in a judicial proceeding or an activity requiring the application of that degree of legal knowledge and technique possessed only by a trained legal mind. Under this definition, this case presents a triable issue of material fact as to whether the New York lawyers’ California activities constituted the practice of law.
I
Defendant Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. (hereafter Birbrower) is a New York law firm. Its lawyers are not licensed to practice law in California.
Kamal Sandhu was the sole shareholder of ESQ Business Services Inc., a New York corporation (hereafter ESQ-NY), of which his brother Iqbal Sandhu was the vice-president. Beginning in 1986, Birbrower lawyers represented the Sandhu family in various business matters. In 1990, Kamal Sandhu asked Birbrower lawyer Kevin Hobbs to review a proposed software development and marketing agreement between ESQ-NY and Tandem Computers Incorporated (hereafter Tandem). The agreement granted Tandem worldwide distribution rights to computer software created by ESQ-NY. The agreement also provided that it would be governed by California law and that, according to Birbrower’s undisputed assertion, disputes were to be resolved by arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. ESQ-NY and Tandem signed the agreement.
Thereafter, a second corporation, also named ESQ Business Services, Inc. (hereafter ESQ-CAL), was incorporated in California, with Iqbal Sandhu as a principal shareholder. In 1991, ESQ-CAL consulted Birbrower lawyers concerning Tandem’s performance under the agreement. In 1992, ESQ-NY and ESQ-CAL jointly hired Birbrower to resolve the dispute with Tandem, including the investigation and prosecution of claims against Tandem if necessary. ESQ-NY and ESQ-CAL entered into a contingency fee agreement with Birbrower; this agreement was executed in New York but was later modified to a fixed fee agreement in California.
The efforts of the Birbrower lawyers to resolve the dispute with Tandem included several brief trips to California. On these trips, Birbrower lawyers met with officers of both ESQ-NY and ESQ-CAL and with representatives of Tandem; they also interviewed arbitrators and participated in negotiating the settlement of the dispute with Tandem. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 125.) On February 12, 1993, Birbrower initiated an arbitration proceeding against *142Tandem, on behalf of both ESQ-NY and ESQ-CAL, by filing a claim with the American Arbitration Association in San Francisco, California. Before an arbitration hearing was held, the dispute with Tandem was settled.
In January 1994, ESQ-CAL and Iqbal Sandhu, the principal shareholder, sued Birbrower for malpractice. Birbrower cross-complained to recover its fees under the fee agreement. Plaintiffs ESQ-CAL and Iqbal Sandhu thereafter amended their complaint to add ESQ-NY as a plaintiff. Plaintiffs moved for summary adjudication, asserting the fee agreement was unenforceable because the Birbrower lawyers had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in California. The trial court agreed, and granted plaintiffs’ motion. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s ruling, as does a majority of this court today.
II
Business and Professions Code section 6125 states: “No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar.” The Legislature, however, has not defined what constitutes the practice of law.
Pursuant to its inherent authority to define and regulate the practice of law (see, e.g., Merco Constr. Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 728 [147 Cal.Rptr. 631, 581 P.2d 636]; In re Lavine (1935) 2 Cal.2d 324, 328; People v. Turner (1850) 1 Cal. 143, 150), this court in 1922 defined the practice of law as follows: “ ‘[A]s the term is generally understood, the practice of the law is the doing and performing services in a court of justice in any matter depending therein throughout its various stages and in conformity with the adopted rules of procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which the legal rights are secured although such matter may or may not be depending in a court.’ ” (People v. Merchants Protective Corp. (1922) 189 Cal. 531, 535 [209 P. 363] (Merchants).) The Merchants court adopted this definition verbatim from a decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals, Eley v. Miller (1893) 7 Ind.App. 529 [34 N.E. 836, 837-838]. (Merchants, supra, at p. 535.)
In 1970, in Baron v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 2 Cal.3d 535, 542 (Baron), this court reiterated the Merchants court’s definition of the term “practice of law.” We were quick to point out in Baron, however, that “ascertaining whether a particular activity falls within this general definition may be a formidable endeavor.” (Id. at p. 543.) Baron emphasized “that it is not the whole spectrum of professional services of lawyers with which the State Bar *143Act is most concerned, but rather it is the smaller area of activities defined as the ‘practice of law.’ ” {Ibid.) It then observed: “In close cases, the courts have determined that the resolution of legal questions for another by advice and action is practicing law ‘if difficult or doubtful legal questions are involved which, to safeguard the public, reasonably demand the application of a trained legal mind.’ [Citations.]” {Ibid., italics added.) Baron added that “if the application of legal knowledge and technique is required, the activity constitutes the practice of law . . . .” {Ibid., italics added.) This definition is quite similar to that proposed by Cornell Law School Professor Charles Wolfram, the chief reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: “The correct form of the test [for the practice of law] should inquire whether the matter handled was of such complexity that only a person trained as a lawyer should be permitted to deal with it.” (Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics (1986) p. 836.)
The majority asserts that the definition of practice of law I have stated above misreads this court’s opinion in Baron. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 129.) But what the majority characterizes as “the dissent’s fanciful interpretation of the [Baron court’s] thoughtful guidelines” {ibid.) consists of language I have quoted directly from Baron.
The majority also charges that the narrowing constmction of the term “practice of law” that this court adopted in Baron “effectively limitfs] section 6125’s application to those cases in which nonlicensed out-of-state lawyers appeared in a California courtroom without permission.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 129.) Fiddlesticks. Because the Baron definition encompasses all activities that “ ‘reasonably demand application of a trained legal mind’ ” (Baron, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 543), the majority’s assertion would be true only if there were no activities, apart from court appearances, requiring application of a trained legal mind. Many attorneys would no doubt be surprised to learn that, for example, drafting testamentary documents for large estates, preparing merger agreements for multinational corporations, or researching complex legal issues are not activities that require a trained legal mind.
According to the majority, use of the Baron definition I have quoted would undermine protection of the public from incompetent legal practitioners. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 129.) The Baron definition provides ample protection from incompetent legal practitioners without infringing upon the public’s interest in obtaining advice and representation from other professionals, such as accountants and real estate brokers, whose skills in specialized areas may overlap with those of lawyers. This allows the public the freedom to choose professionals who may be able to provide the public with *144needed services at a more affordable cost. (See Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, supra, at p. 831; Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions (1981) 34 Stan.L.Rev. 1, 97-98; Weckstein, Limitations on the Right to Counsel: The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 1978 Utah L.Rev. 649, 650.) As this court has recognized, there are proceedings in which nonattomeys “are competent” to represent others without undermining the protection of the public interest. (Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 913-914 [160 Cal.Rptr. 124, 603 P.2d 41].)
The majority, too, purports to apply the definition of the practice of law as articulated in Baron, supra, 2 Cal.3d 535. The majority, however, focuses only on Baron’s quotation of the general definition of the practice of law set forth in Merchants, supra, 189 Cal. 531, 535. The majority ignores both the ambiguity in the Merchants definition and the manner in which Baron resolved that ambiguity. The majority apparently views the practice of law as encompassing any “legal advice and legal instrument and contract preparation, whether or not these subjects were rendered in the course of litigation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 128.)
The majority’s overbroad definition would affect a host of common commercial activities. On point here are comments that Professor Deborah Rhode made in a 1981 article published in the Stanford Law Review: “For many individuals, most obviously accountants, bankers, real estate brokers, and insurance agents, it would be impossible to give intelligent counsel without reference to legal concerns that such statutes reserve as the exclusive province of attorneys. As one [American Bar Association] official active in unauthorized practice areas recently acknowledged, there is growing recognition that1 “all kinds of other professional people are practicing law almost out of necessity.” ’ Moreover, since most legislation does not exempt gratuitous activity, much advice commonly imparted by friends, employers, political organizers, and newspaper commentators constitutes unauthorized practice. For example, although the organized bar has not yet evinced any inclination to drag [nationally syndicated advice columnist] Ann Landers through the courts, she is plainly fair game under extant statutes [proscribing the unauthorized practice of law].” (Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, supra, 34 Stan.L.Rev. at p. 47, fns. omitted.)
Unlike the majority, I would for the reasons given above adhere to the more narrowly drawn definition of the practice of law that this court articulated in Baron, supra, 2 Cal.3d 535, 543: the representation of another in a judicial proceeding or an activity requiring the application of that degree *145of legal knowledge and technique possessed only by a trained legal mind. Applying that definition here, I conclude that the trial court should not have granted summary adjudication for plaintiffs based on the Birbrower lawyers’ California activities. That some or all of those activities related to arbitration does not necessarily establish that they constituted the practice of law, as I shall explain.
Ill
As I mentioned earlier, Birbrower’s clients had a software development and marketing agreement with Tandem. The agreement provided that its validity, interpretation, and enforcement were to be governed by California law. It also contained an arbitration provision. After a dispute arose pertaining to Tandem’s performance under the agreement, Birbrower initiated an arbitration on behalf of its clients by filing a claim with the American Arbitration Association in San Francisco, and held meetings in California to prepare for an arbitration hearing. Because the dispute with Tandem was settled, the arbitration hearing was never held.
As I explained in part II, ante, this court in Baron, supra, 2 Cal.3d 535, 543, defined the term “practice of law” in narrower terms than the court had done earlier in Merchants, supra, 189 Cal. 531, 535, which simply adopted verbatim the general definition set forth in an 1893 decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals. Under the narrower definition articulated in Baron, the practice of law is the representation of another in a judicial proceeding or an activity requiring the application of that degree of legal knowledge and technique possessed only by a trained legal mind.
Representing another in an arbitration proceeding does not invariably present difficult or doubtful legal questions that require a trained legal mind for their resolution. Under California law, arbitrators are “not ordinarily constrained to decide according to the rule of law . . . .” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 P.2d 899].) Thus, arbitrators, “ ‘unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have asserted in a judicial action.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 10-11.) They “ ‘are not bound to award on principles of dry law, but may decide on principles of equity and good conscience, and make their award ex aequo et bono [according to what is just and good].’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 11, original brackets.) For this reason, “the existence of an error of law apparent on the face of the [arbitration] award that causes substantial injustice does not provide grounds for judicial review.” (Id. at p. 33, italics added; contra, id. at pp. 33-40 (cone, and dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
*146Moreover, an arbitrator in California can award any remedy “arguably based” on “the contract’s general subject matter, framework or intent.” (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 381 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, 885. P.2d 994].) This means that “an arbitrator in a commercial contract dispute may award an essentially unlimited range of remedies, whether or not a court could award them if it decided the same dispute, so long as it can be said that the relief draws its ‘essence’ from the contract and not some other source.” (Id. at p. 391 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
To summarize, under this court’s decisions, arbitration proceedings are not governed or constrained by the rule of law; therefore, representation of another in an arbitration proceeding, including the activities necessary to prepare for the arbitration hearing, does not necessarily require a trained legal mind.
Commonly used arbitration rules further demonstrate that legal training is not essential to represent another in an arbitration proceeding. Here, for example, Birbrower’s clients agreed to resolve any dispute arising under their contract with Tandem using the American Arbitration Association’s rules, which allow any party to be “represented by counsel or other authorized representative.” (Am. Arbitration Assn., Com. Arbitration Rules (July 1, 1996) § 22, italics added.) Rules of other arbitration organizations also allow for representation by nonattorneys. For instance, the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission, article IV provides: “The parties may be represented or assisted by persons of their choice.” By federal law, this rule applies in all arbitrations between a United States citizen and a citizen of another signatory to the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, unless the arbitrating parties have expressly provided otherwise. (9 U.S.C. § 303(b); Inter-Am. Convention on International Com. Arbitration, art. 3.)
The American Arbitration Association and other major arbitration associations thus recognize that nonattorneys are often better suited than attorneys to represent parties in arbitration. The history of arbitration also reflects this reality, for in its beginnings arbitration was a dispute-resolution mechanism principally used in a few specific trades (such as construction, textiles, ship chartering, and international sales of goods) to resolve disputes among businesses that turned on factual issues uniquely within the expertise of members of the trade. In fact, “rules, of a few trade associations forbid representation by counsel in arbitration proceedings, because of their belief that it would complicate what might otherwise be simple proceedings.” (Grenig, Alternative Dispute Resolution (1997) § 5.2, p. 81.) The majority gives no adequate justification for its decision to deprive parties of their *147freedom of contract and to make it a crime for anyone but California lawyers to represent others in arbitrations in California.
In addressing an issue similar to that presented here, a federal court held that a firm of New Jersey lawyers not licensed to practice law in New York was entitled to recover payment for legal services rendered in a New York arbitration proceeding. (Williamson v. John D. Quinn Const. Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 537 F.Supp. 613 (Williamson).) In allowing recovery of fees, the court cited a report by the Association of the Bar of The City of New York: “The report states, ‘it should be noted that no support has to date been found in judicial decision, statute or ethical code for the proposition that representation of a party in any kind of arbitration amounts to the practice of law.’ The report concludes ‘[t]he Committee is of the opinion that representation of a party in an arbitration proceeding by a nonlawyer or a lawyer from another jurisdiction is not the unauthorized practice of law.’ ” (Id. at p. 616, quoting Com. Rep., Labor Arbitration and the Unauthorized Practice of Law (May/ June 1975) 30 Record of the Association of the Bar of The City of New York, No. 5/6, at pp. 422, 428.)
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Williamson, supra, 537 F.Supp. 613, from this case is unpersuasive. The majority points out that in Williamson, the lawyers of the New Jersey firm actually rendered services at the New York arbitration hearing, whereas here the New York lawyers never actually appeared at an arbitration hearing in California. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 133, 134, fn. 4.) The majority distinguishes Williamson on the ground that in this case no arbitration hearing occurred. Does the majority mean that an actual appearance at an arbitration hearing is not the practice of law, but that preparation for arbitration proceedings is?
In this case, plaintiffs have not identified any specific California activities by the New York lawyers of the Birbrower firm that meet the narrow definition of the term “practice of law” as articulated by this court in Baron, supra, 2 Cal.3d 535, 543. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and direct it to remand the matter to the trial court with directions to vacate its order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication and to enter a new order denying that motion.
On February 25, 1998, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.