Court Opinion

ID: 9925299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 14:06:39.564185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:02.947997
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Holbert, 2024-Ohio-175.]

                                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                     :
                                                   :
       Appellee                                    :   C.A. No. 29704
                                                   :
 v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 01799/1
                                                   :
 ALBERT DAVID HOLBERT                              :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                   :   Court)
       Appellant                                   :
                                                   :

                                              ...........

                                              OPINION

                                      Rendered on January 19, 2024

                                              ...........

CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY, Attorney for Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee

                                             .............

WELBAUM, J.

        {¶ 1} Albert David Holbert appeals from his conviction, following a plea of no

contest, of one count of felonious assault. The State concedes that the trial court failed

to properly advise Holbert at sentencing pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act and regarding

post-release control (“PRC”). The judgment entry of conviction also erroneously states
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that Holbert pled guilty. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed in part

and remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      {¶ 2} On July 11, 2022, Holbert was indicted on one count of felonious assault

(serious physical harm) and one count of felonious assault (deadly weapon). Holbert

entered a no contest plea on December 22, 2022, to one count of felonious assault

(serious physical harm), a felony of the second degree, in exchange for which the other

count was dismissed. On January 19, 2023, the trial court sentenced Holbert to an

indefinite term of a minimum of three years to a maximum of four and a half years in

prison.

      {¶ 3} Holbert’s first appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 US. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). On September 13, 2023, we struck

the Anders brief and appointed new appellate counsel. 1 Holbert now raises two

assignments of error.

                     ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR AND ANALYSIS

      {¶ 4} Holbert asserts two assignments of errors, which we will consider together:

             THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY ADVISE HOLBERT

      OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE RE[A]GAN TOKES ACT AS REQUIRED BY

      R.C. 2929.19,

             THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY ADVISE HOLBERT

1
 We “no longer permit counsel to withdraw on the basis that an appeal is frivolous or
accept briefs filed pursuant to Anders.” State v. Holbert, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29704,
2023-Ohio-3272, ¶ 26.
                                                                                             -3-

        OF THE CONDITIONS OF PRC AT SENTENCING.

        {¶ 5} In his first assignment, Holbert argues that the trial court failed to comply with

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) at the sentencing hearing by providing certain advisements,

although he acknowledges that the judgment entry of conviction properly set forth the

necessary advisements. In his second assignment of error, Holbert argues that the trial

court failed to properly advise him of the conditions of PRC at the sentencing hearing,

although again he acknowledges that he was properly advised about PRC during the plea

colloquy and in the judgment entry of conviction. The State concedes both errors by the

trial court.

        {¶ 6} Regarding the first issue, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) states that, if the sentencing

court finds at disposition that a prison term is necessary or required, it must do all of the

seven enumerated actions set forth in that subsection. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) requires

the court to notify an offender, sentenced to a non-life indefinite prison term, of the

following pertaining to the offender’s minimum and maximum prison terms and to the

operation of a rebuttable presumption of release from service of the sentence upon the

expiration of minimum term. That section provides:

        (i) That it is rebuttably presumed that the offender will be released from

        service of the sentence on the expiration of the minimum prison term

        imposed as part of the sentence or on the offender's presumptive earned

        early release date, as defined in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code,

        whichever is earlier;

        (ii) That the department of rehabilitation and correction may rebut the
                                                                                         -4-

       presumption described in division (B)(2)(c)(i) of this section if, at a hearing

       held under section 2967.271 of the Revised Code, the department makes

       specified determinations regarding the offender's conduct while confined,

       the offender's rehabilitation, the offender's threat to society, the offender's

       restrictive housing, if any, while confined, and the offender's security

       classification;

       (iii) That if, as described in division (B)(2)(c)(ii) of this section, the

       department at the hearing makes the specified determinations and rebuts

       the presumption, the department may maintain the offender's incarceration

       after the expiration of that minimum term or after that presumptive earned

       early release date for the length of time the department determines to be

       reasonable, subject to the limitation specified in section 2967.271 of the

       Revised Code;

       (iv) That the department may make the specified determinations and

       maintain the offender's incarceration under the provisions described in

       divisions (B)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of this section more than one time, subject to

       the limitation specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code;

       (v) That if the offender has not been released prior to the expiration of the

       offender's maximum prison term imposed as part of the sentence, the

       offender must be released upon the expiration of that term.

       {¶ 7} “We have previously held that an indefinite prison sentence under the

Reagan Tokes Act is contrary to law when the trial court fails to notify the offender at the
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sentencing hearing of the information set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).” State v. Greene,

2d Dist. Clark No. 2021-CA-65, 2022-Ohio-4113, ¶ 8. Moreover, we have rejected the

“argument that the trial court sufficiently notified the offender of all the information in R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c) by simply including the information in the judgment entry of conviction.”

Id., citing State v. Massie, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-50, 2021-Ohio-3376.

       {¶ 8} The transcript reflects, and the State concedes, that the trial court failed to

advise Holbert as required by the Reagan Tokes Act at sentencing.                 Accordingly,

Holbert’s first assignment of error is sustained.

       {¶ 9} In his second assignment, Holbert asserts that the trial court failed to advise

him at the sentencing hearing “whether PRC was mandatory, that it would be monitored

by the Adult Probation Authority, or of any of the possible consequences of failure to

comply with PRC,” although it did so during the plea hearing and in the judgment entry;

the trial court merely advised Holbert at sentencing: “Upon your release from prison you

will be placed on post-release control for not less than 18 months, but it could be up to

three years.” The State concedes the error and that the matter should be remanded to

the trial court for the trial court to provide the proper notifications.

       {¶ 10} With regard to a trial court’s obligation to notify a defendant about post-

release control, we have stated:

               * * * “It is settled that ‘a trial court has a statutory duty to provide

       notice of post[-]release control at the sentencing hearing’ and that ‘any

       sentence imposed without such notification is contrary to law.’ ” State v.

       Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 8, quoting
                                                                                          -6-

      State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23,

      overruled on other grounds, State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-

      Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248. Accord State v. Bates, Ohio Slip Opinion No.

      2022-Ohio-475, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 11.

             Per its statutory duty, “[t]he trial court must advise the offender at the

      sentencing hearing of the term of [post-release control] supervision,

      whether post-release control is discretionary or mandatory, and the

      consequences of violating post-release control.” Bates at ¶ 11, citing

      Grimes at ¶ 11. Accord State v. Hall, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28882,

      2021-Ohio-1894, ¶ 13.        “Among other consequences, an offender's

      violation of a postrelease-control sanction or condition may result in the

      [Adult Parole Authority's] imposing a prison term on the offender.” Bates

      at ¶ 11, citing R.C. 2967.28(F)(3). “However, the maximum cumulative

      prison term for all violations under R.C. 2967.28(F)(3) ‘shall not exceed one-

      half’ of the stated prison term originally imposed.” Id. Therefore, “at the

      sentencing hearing, the court must notify the offender that if he or she

      ‘violates [post-release control] * * *, the parole board may impose a prison

      term, as part of the sentence, of up to one-half of the stated prison term

      originally imposed upon the offender.’ ” Grimes at ¶ 9, quoting former R.C.

      2929.19(B)(2)(e); R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f); State v. Fields, 2d Dist. Clark No.

      2020-CA-19, 2021-Ohio-3845, ¶ 10-11.

State v. Heinzen, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-CA-65, 2022-Ohio-1341, ¶ 24-25.
                                                                                         -7-

       {¶ 11} Here, the trial court failed to properly advise Holbert regarding post-release

control at sentencing. Holbert’s second assignment of error is sustained.

       {¶ 12} Finally, we note that although Holbert entered a plea of no contest, the

judgment entry of conviction erroneously states that he entered a guilty plea.

       {¶ 13} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is reversed in part

and remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion, including the issuance of a

judgment entry properly reflecting the plea entered. In all other respects, the judgment

is affirmed.

                                     .............

TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.