Court Opinion

ID: 9691039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:03:46.338939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:09.503011
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice MINTON.
I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Gerale-an Anderson lacked standing to contest the forfeiture of a motor vehicle of which she was the record title owner.
Under our controlled-substance-related forfeiture statute, “vehicles ... which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation” of illegal controlled substances are “subject to forfeiture....”1 And I agree with the majority that the Malibu in question was subject to forfeiture. But the Malibu — like any other vehicle — cannot be forfeited “by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted without his knowledge or consent... ,”2 This means that a so-called innocent otmer may thwart forfeiture of his or her vehicle by establishing that the act that led to the forfeiture proceedings occurred without that owner’s knowledge or consent. The paramount question in these types of innocent-owner forfeiture proceedings is, therefore, whether the owner has established that the act leading to the forfeiture actually occurred without the owner’s knowledge or consent. Before that question may be answered, however, a threshold question must be answered: who has standing to assert the innocent-owner defense? Unlike the majority, I believe the threshold question of standing is the only question we may properly address in this case.
It is clear to me that the overarching question of whether Anderson’s assertion of the innocent-owner defense would ultimately prove to be meritorious is not properly before us because the trial court merely found that Anderson lacked standing to assert an innocent-owner defense. Indeed, page two of the trial court’s opinion and order expressly finds that “a person cannot claim to be an ‘innocent owner’ *913and avoid forfeiture of a motor vehicle ... when the facts suggest that person was only a record owner....” So I strongly disagree with the majority’s criticism of the Court of Appeals’ failure to consider whether Anderson “had failed to make her case that she was an ‘innocent’ owner at the hearing.”
Unlike the majority, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the only question on appeal is a very narrow one: whether Anderson has standing to assert an innocent-owner defense. The question before us should not be whether Anderson’s assertion of the innocent-owner defense will ultimately prove to be successful. In fact, I believe the majority usurps the trial court’s fact-finding function by making a finding that Anderson will be unable to prevail on the merits of her innocent-owner defense.
Although the majority does not openly admit that it is ruling on the merits of Anderson’s innocent-owner defense, it does comment that Anderson “produced no evidence of treating the car as if it were hers, or in any way exercised the rights and obligations of ownership. In fact, the record indicates that she professed no knowledge as to why the vehicle had been titled in her name — until her brother got caught selling drugs in it.” The only reasonable interpretation of the majority’s comments would be that they address the sufficiency of Anderson’s innocent-owner defense, not whether she has the right to assert such a defense in the first place. I would insist that the trial court must first make a decision on the merits of Anderson’s innocent-owner defense before the merits, or lack thereof, of an innocent-owner defense can be the proper focus of appellate review. And on the subject of fact-finding, I also believe that the majority’s de facto ruling on the merits of Anderson’s innocent-owner defense is improper because neither it nor the trial court made the proper findings regarding the constitutional propriety of forfeiting the Malibu.3
In addition to disagreeing with the majority’s preemptive finding that Anderson’s attempted assertion of the innocent-owner defense should fail on its merits, I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Anderson lacks standing to assert the innocent-owner defense. She is, after all, the only registered owner of the Malibu.
Regrettably, the General Assembly has not provided a definition of owner in Chapter 218A of the KRS. But the General Assembly has defined owner elsewhere in the KRS. Specifically, the General Assembly defined owner in KRS 186.010(7)(a) as “a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle or a person who pursuant to a bona fide sale has received physical possession of the vehicle subject to any applicable security interest.” Although that definition does not specifically apply to KRS Chapter 218A, we recently applied it to situations outside the scope of Chapter *914186.4 I believe that in this case, we can, and should, logically apply the definition of owner as enacted by the legislature.
The majority acknowledges the existence of KRS 186.010(7)(a) but inexplicably chooses not to apply it. Instead, the majority engages in an unnecessary analysis of KRS 218A in order to liken the situation at hand to a constructive trust. Such an imaginative conclusion is wholly unnecessary because the General Assembly has already provided an express definition of the very term at issue, a definition that the majority has summarily rejected without showing that it could not, or should not, be applied to the case at hand. The sole issue in the case at hand is who qualifies as an owner of a motor vehicle in order to raise the innocent-owner defense in a motor vehicle forfeiture proceeding, so it appears perfectly logical to me that we should resolve this issue by using the definition of the term at issue already provided by the General Assembly.5
I believe it will come as a shock to the citizens of the Commonwealth that the registered owner of a vehicle may now be powerless to contest his or her vehicle’s forfeiture.6 Clearly, the Malibu could not have been sold or otherwise transferred without Anderson’s participation. And it appears that Anderson’s name may well have been listed as the policyholder of the insurance policy pertaining to the Malibu. So it is beyond debate that any person injured by operation of the Malibu could have filed a tort action against Anderson. It is quite a leap of logic, therefore, to find that Anderson may suffer the burdens attendant to motor vehicle ownership but may lack sufficient standing to raise an innocent-owner defense.7
I share the majority’s concern that savvy narcotics traffickers may transfer their legal interest in vehicles to other nominal owners, a/k/a straw men, in order to protect their vehicles from forfeiture. But I trust the trial courts of the Commonwealth will adhere to their duty to scrutinize all innocent-owner defenses in forfeiture proceedings. Such close scrutiny should greatly reduce, if not eliminate, straw men from succeeding on an innocent-owner defense because forfeiture will still be appropriate unless the record title owner can demonstrate that he or she truly had no knowledge of, nor had consented to, the transactions which gave rise to the forfeiture proceedings.
Of course, the General Assembly could, if it so desired, completely eliminate any *915possibility that a straw man could successfully raise the innocent-owner defense by enacting a statute similar to that already enacted by the United States Congress.8 However, as currently enacted, KRS 218A.410(l)(h)(2) merely refers to an owner, without specifically excluding nominal owners from the realm of who may be considered an owner. Because we are constrained to construe statutes as they are written without adding or deleting any terms from them,9 we simply lack the authority to declare by judicial fiat that the term owner, as used in KRS 218A.410(l)(h)(2), actually means true owner or any owner other than a nominal owner, regardless of how appealing such an amendment may appear to be.
In short, I believe the majority errs in finding that Anderson lacks standing to contest the forfeiture of the Malibu. I would affirm the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the Barren Circuit Court for determination on the record as to whether Anderson has met, or can meet, her burden under KRS 218A.410(l)(h)(2) to assert successfully the innocent-owner defense.
ABRAMSON, J., joins this dissent.

. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.410(l)(h).

. KRS 218A.410(l)(h)(2).

. See Commonwealth v. Fint, 940 S.W.2d 896, 897-98 (Ky.1997) (holding that courts should consider factors such as gravity of offense and sentence imposed on others in jurisdiction who commit similar crimes in determining whether forfeiture violates Eighth Amendment); Hinkle v. Commonwealth, 104 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Ky.App.2002) ("It is now well established that punitive forfeitures such as this one implicate the excessive-fines clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Not only must the trial court determine that the property is sufficiently tainted by the criminal act to be subject to forfeiture, it must also determine that the particular forfeiture is not grossly disproportionate to the particular offense. Among the factors relevant to this determination are the gravity of the offense, the potential penalties, the actual sentence, sentences imposed for similar crimes in this and other jurisdictions, and the effect of the forfeiture on innocent third parties.”) (footnotes omitted).

. See Gainsco Companies v. Gentry, 191 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Ky.2006) (applying definition of owner set forth in KRS 186.010(7)(a) to determine the owner of a vehicle for the purpose of insurance coverage).

. The mere fact that the definition of owner is set forth at a different section of the KRS than the one at issue is clearly not a sufficient reason to ignore the definition. Indeed, as stated previously, we have recently applied that definition in a broader context than mere vehicle licensure. See Gainsco Companies, supra.

. Under KRS 446.080(4), all words and phrases used in the Kentucky Revised Statutes "shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed according to such meaning.” Certainly, the record title owner of a vehicle would be considered to be an owner of the vehicle, as the term owner is commonly used and understood. Likewise, if the term owner is deemed to be one that has acquired a peculiar meaning in the law, we would be wise and on the safest footing if we construed the term using the definition already provided to us by the General Assembly.

.Obviously, Anderson’s brother may also have an equitable ownership interest in the Malibu.

. The federal civil forfeiture statute specifically provides that an owner of property subject to forfeiture does not include "a nominee who exercises no dominion or control over the property.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(6)(B)(iii).

. See, e.g., Hale v. Combs, 30 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Ky.2000) (holding that court must interpret statute as enacted, without adding or subtracting language, and may not surmise as to what was intended by legislature but was not expressed in enacted statute).