Court Opinion

ID: 9779607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:25:51.952611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:36.789189
License: Public Domain

Pigott, J. (dissenting).
There is no doubt that there are inadequacies in the delivery of indigent legal services in this state, as pointed out by the New York State Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services, convened by former Chief Judge Kaye. I respectfully dissent, however, because, despite this, in my view, the complaint here fails to state a claim, either under the theories proffered by plaintiffs—ineffective assistance of counsel and deprivation of the right to counsel at a critical stage (arraignment)—or under the “constructive denial” theory read into the complaint by the majority.
The majority rightly rejects plaintiffs’ ineffective assistance cause of action; such claims are limited to a case-by-case analysis and cannot be redressed in a civil proceeding. Rather than dismissing that claim, however, the majority replaces it with a “constructive denial” cause of action that, in my view, is nothing more than an ineffective assistance claim under another name.
The allegations in the complaint can be broken down into two categories: (1) the deprivation of “meaningful and effective assistance of counsel,” and (2) the deprivation of the right to counsel at a “critical stage” of the proceedings, i.e., the arraignment. The claims under the former category are many: lack of a sufficient opportunity to discuss the charges with their attorney
*28or participate in their defense; lack of preparation by counsel; denial of investigative services; lack of “vertical representation;”1 refusal of assigned counsel to return phone calls or accept collect calls; inability to leave messages on assigned counsel’s answering machine due to a full voicemail box, etc.
The majority rejects plaintiffs’ main claim that the complaint states a cause of action for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v Washington (466 US 668 [1984]),2 finding “a measure of merit” to defendants’ arguments that such claims are premised on trial counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance and do not form the basis for systemic relief (majority op at 17). I agree, and would affirm the Appellate Division’s determination in that regard, because the Strickland standard is limited to whether an individual has received the effective assistance of counsel and cannot be used to attack alleged systemic failures, and the allegations of the complaint support no broader reading.
Rather than stopping at its rejection of the Strickland standard with respect to these allegations, however, the majority advances a third theory, and reads the complaint as stating a claim for “constructive denial” of the right to counsel, i.e., that upon having counsel appointed, plaintiffs received only “nominal” representation, such that there is a question as to whether the counties were in compliance with the constitutional mandate of Gideon (majority op at 22-23).
In support of this rationale, the majority relies on United States v Cronic (466 US 648 [1984]), which recognizes a “narrow exception” to Strickland’s requirement that a defendant asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must demonstrate a deficient performance and prejudice (Florida v Nixon, 543 US 175, 190 [2004]). In other words, Cronic, too, is an ineffective assistance of counsel case—decided on the same day as Strickland—but one that allows the courts to find a Sixth Amendment violation “ ‘without inquiring into counsel’s actual performance or requiring the defendant to show the effect it had on the trial,’ when ‘circumstances [exist] that are so likely *29to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified’ ” (Wright v Van Patten, 552 US 120, 124 [2008] [citations omitted]).
Cronic’s “narrow exception” applies to individual cases where: (1) there has been a “complete denial of counsel”; i.e., the defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage of the trial; (2) “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing”; or (3) “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial” (466 US at 659-660).
Cronic’s holding is instructive, if only to point out that the Supreme Court was reaching the obvious conclusion that, in individual cases, the absence or inadequacy of counsel must generally fall within one of those three narrow exceptions.3 Constructive denial of counsel is a branch from the Strickland tree, with Cronic applying only when the appointed attorney’s representation is so egregious that it’s as if defendant had no attorney at all. Therefore, whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland or is entitled to a presumption of prejudice under Cronic is a determination that can only be made after the criminal proceeding has ended; neither approach lends itself to a proceeding like the one at bar where plaintiffs allege prospective violations of their Sixth Amendment rights.
The majority does not explain how it can conclude, on one hand, “that effective assistance is a judicial construct designed to do no more than protect an individual defendant’s right to fair adjudication” and “is not a concept capable of expansive application to remediate systemic deficiencies” (majority op at 17 [emphasis supplied]), and on the other hand that a “constructive denial” of counsel theory could potentially apply to this class of individuals who, when they commenced the action, had not reached a resolution of their criminal cases. Courts reviewing the rare constructive denial claims have done so by looking
*30at the particular egregious behavior of the attorney in the particular case after the representation has concluded (see e.g. Burdine v Johnson, 262 F3d 336 [5th Cir 2001], cert denied sub nom. Cockrell v Burdine, 535 US 1120 [2002] [defense counsel slept during capital trial]; Restrepo v Kelly, 178 F3d 634 [2d Cir 1999]; Rickman v Bell, 131 F3d 1150 [6th Cir 1997], cert denied 523 US 1133 [1998] [defense counsel acted as second prosecutor]; Tippins v Walker, 77 F3d 682, 686 [2d Cir 1996] [counsel slept through trial]; Harding v Davis, 878 F2d 1341 [11th Cir 1989] [constructive denial where counsel responded to defendant’s displeasure of his representation by remaining silent and inactive at trial until replaced by the pro se defendant]; Jenkins v Coombe, 821 F2d 158, 161 [2d Cir 1987], cert denied 484 US 1008 [1988] [filing cursory five-page brief on appeal]).
That is not to say that a claim of constructive denial could never apply to a class where the State effectively deprives indigent defendants of their right to counsel, only that the various claims asserted by plaintiffs here do not rise to that level. Here, plaintiffs’ complaint raises basic ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the nature of Strickland4 (i.e., counsel was unresponsive, waived important rights, failed to appear at hearings, and was unprepared at court proceedings) and not the egregious type of conduct found in Cronic. Plaintiffs’ mere lumping together of 20 generic ineffective assistance of counsel claims into one civil pleading does not ipso facto transform it into one alleging a systemic denial of the right to counsel.
Addressing plaintiffs’ second theory—deprivation of the right to counsel at the arraignment—the majority posits that plaintiffs have stated a cognizable claim because 10 of them were arraigned without counsel, and eight of those remained in custody because they could not meet the bail that was set (majority op at 19).
It is undisputed that a criminal defendant “ ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him’ ” (Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 345 [1963], quoting Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 69 [1932]). But the majority’s bare conclusion that any arraignment conducted without the presence of counsel renders the proceedings a violation of the Sixth Amendment flies in the face of reality.
*31The framework of CPL article 180 illustrates this point.5 That provision presupposes that a criminal defendant, upon arraignment, may not have yet retained counsel or, due to indigency, requires the appointment of one. CPL 180.10 mandates that, in addition to apprising him of, and furnishing him with, a copy of the charges against him (see CPL 180.10 [1]), the court must also inform an unrepresented defendant that he is entitled to, among other things, “an adjournment for the purpose of obtaining counsel” (CPL 180.10 [3] [a]) and the appointment of counsel by the court if “he is financially unable to obtain the same” (CPL 180.10 [3] [c]).6 The court must also give the defendant the opportunity to avail himself of those rights and “must itself take such affirmative action as is necessary to effectuate them” (CPL 180.10 [4]). This statute is a prophylactic one whose purpose is to protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights because, even in a situation where a defendant chooses to go forward without counsel, “the court must permit him to do so if it is satisfied that he made such decision with knowledge of the significance thereof’ and, in a situation where it is not so satisfied, may decide not to proceed until defendant obtains or is appointed counsel (CPL 180.10 [5]).
Giving plaintiffs the benefit of every favorable inference (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]), the complaint nevertheless fails to state a cause of action for the deprivation of the right to counsel at arraignment. One reason is that there is no allegation that the failure to have counsel at one’s first court appearance had an adverse effect on the criminal proceedings. The Second Circuit has rejected the assertion “that the absence of counsel upon arraignment is an inflexible, per se violation of
*32the Sixth Amendment” (United States ex rel. Caccio v Fay, 350 F2d 214, 215 [2d Cir 1965]). Where a criminal defendant is arraigned without the presence of counsel and pleads not guilty—or the court enters a not guilty plea on his behalf— there is no Sixth Amendment violation (see United States ex rel. Combs v Denno, 357 F2d 809, 812 [2d Cir 1966]; United States ex rel. Hussey v Fay, 220 F Supp 562 [SD NY 1963]; see also Holland v Allard, 2005 WL 2786909, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 46609 [ED NY 2005]). The explanation as to why this is so is simple:
“Under New York law, a defendant suffers no . . . prejudice [by the imposition of a not guilty plea on arraignment without benefit of counsel], for whatever counsel could have done upon arraignment on defendant’s behalf, counsel were free to do thereafter. There is nothing in New York law which in any way prevents counsel’s later taking advantage of every opportunity or defense which was originally available to a defendant upon his initial arraignment” (Hussey, 220 F Supp at 563, citing People v Combs, 19 AD2d 639 [2d Dept 1963]).
As pleaded, none of the 10 plaintiffs arraigned without counsel entered guilty pleas and, indeed, in compliance with the strictures of CPL 180.10, all met with counsel shortly after the arraignment. Nor is there any claim that the absence of counsel prejudiced these plaintiffs (cf. White v Maryland, 373 US 59 [1963] [petitioner, at initial proceeding without counsel, pleaded guilty without the knowledge that even if that plea was vacated after counsel was appointed, it was still admissible at trial, such that lack of counsel at initial proceeding required reversal of conviction]; Hamilton v Alabama, 368 US 52, 54 [1961] [denial of counsel at arraignment was reversible error where, under Alabama law, certain defenses had to be asserted during that proceeding or could have been “irretrievably lost”]).
The majority implies that the complaint pleads a Gideon violation because certain of the plaintiffs were not represented when the court arranged for the imposition of bail at the arraignment (see CPL 170.10 [7]; 180.10 [6]; 210.15 [6]).7 Quite often this initial appearance inures to the benefit of defendant who may *33be released on his own recognizance or on manageable bail within hours of arrest. The only substantive allegations plaintiffs make relative to bail is that assigned counsel failed to advocate for lower bail at the arraignment or move for a bail reduction post-arraignment. If anything, the complaint alleges a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under the federal or state standard, but the majority has rejected such a claim in this litigation (majority op at 17-19).
Finally, the majority notes that plaintiffs do not seek relief within the context of their own criminal cases, and therefore allowing plaintiffs to proceed on their claims “would [not] impede the orderly progress of [the] underlying criminal actions,” asserting that even if plaintiffs’ claims are found to be meritorious after trial they would not be entitled to a vacatur of their criminal convictions (majority op at 24 and 25 n 6). In my view, if plaintiffs are able to establish a violation of Gideon, they should not be foreclosed from seeking a remedy; if plaintiffs are willing to waive any remedy to which they may be entitled, as they are doing here, then I see no reason why the courts have any business adjudicating this matter.
While the perfect system of justice is beyond human attainment, plaintiffs’ frustration with the deficiencies in the present indigent defense system is understandable. Legal services for the indigent have routinely been underfunded, and appointed counsel are all too often overworked and confronted with excessive caseloads, which affects the amount of time counsel may spend with any given client. Many, if not all, of plaintiffs’ grievances have been acknowledged in the Kaye Commission Report, which is implicitly addressed—as it should be—to the Legislature, the proper forum for weighing proposals to enhance indigent defense services in New York. This complaint is, at heart, an attempt to convert what are properly policy questions for the Legislature into constitutional claims for the courts.
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo and Jones concur with Chief Judge Lippman; Judge Pigott dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judges Read and Smith concur.
Order modified, etc.

. Presumably this refers to the fact that in some jurisdictions, a defendant may be represented by one lawyer in the local criminal court and have a different lawyer assigned in superior court.

. Much of the focus of the majority is on the so-called Strickland standard, with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the “meaningful representation” standard obviously remains the standard to be applied in this state (see People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 [1981]).

. Even the defendant in Cronic was not entitled to rely on any of the exceptions delineated in that opinion, notwithstanding the fact that his retained counsel withdrew shortly before the trial date and, just 25 days before trial, the court appointed a young lawyer with a real estate practice to represent defendant in a mail fraud case that had taken the Government 4V2 years to investigate. Supreme Court held that any errors by counsel at trial were to be examined using the Strickland test.

. Nor, in my view, are such claims any different from the generic ineffective assistance of counsel claims routinely analyzed by state courts under this State’s “meaningful representation” standard as enunciated in Baldi.

. CPL 180.10 addresses the procedure to be followed at a defendant’s arraignment on a felony complaint and the defendant’s rights in that regard. Other provisions of the Criminal Procedural Law contain similar requirements. For instance, CPL 210.15 addresses the scenario where a defendant is arraigned on an indictment; however, in the latter scenario, the court’s duties and responsibilities to apprise a defendant of his rights when appearing without counsel are essentially the same. CPL 170.10 addresses arraignments relative to an information, simplified traffic information, prosecutor’s information or misdemeanor complaint, and sets forth the procedures the court must follow in apprising a defendant of his right to counsel and/or assignment of counsel.

. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has favorably cited to CPL 180.10 in support of its observation that New York is one of the 43 states that “take the first step toward appointing counsel ‘before, at or just after initial appearance’ ” (Rothgery v Gillespie County, 554 US 191, 204 and n 14 [2008]).

. The majority observes that a bail hearing is a critical stage of the criminal process (majority op at 20). While that may be a correct statement of the law, it has little application to these facts, as none of these plaintiffs asserts that they were forced to participate in a bail hearing without the aid of counsel.