Court Opinion

ID: 9448477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:36:58.079177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:26.789193
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The court below says in its decision which the majority opinion reverses:
“In Ryan and progeny the accidents or injuries were aboard ship and the federal compensation act, ,• applied. Here the injury was sustained on a dock. * * * I do not believe the Supreme Court held in Ryan and related cases that Congress, in passing the federal compensation act to fill a gap in compensation coverage, intended at the same time to limit valid state compensation coverage in any manner. As I understand Ryan, there is an implied contract to stevedore properly, the breach of which is actionable if, and only if, the applicable compensation act does not prevent it. True, the Court’s thinking as to why the federal act does not bar recovery could be applied as well to the Texas act with the same result, but Texas courts have not chosen to follow this thinking. Apparently convinced legislative policy so compels, Texas courts hold compliance by employer with the Texas Compensation Act terminates all liability of employer arising out of covered . injuries to employees. West Texas Utilities v. Renner, 32 S.W. 264 (Ct.Civ.Apps.1930), 53 S.W.2d 451 (Com.Apps.1932); Westfall v. Lorenzo Gin Company, 287 S.W.2d 551 (Ct.Civ.Apps.1956, no writ history) ; McCormick v. United States, 134 F.Supp. 243 (S.D.Tex.1955).
“In short I believe that when the federal law filled a gap in workmen’s compensation coverage and allowed indemnity recovery it did not oust state law where validity in force; neither did it limit the force of this valid state law in any maniier. States differ as to allowance of indemnity actions but Texas says no.”
On the basis of this statement, which I believe is an accurate statement of the law of Texas and which we, sitting as a Texas court,, ought, I think, to follow; and of our recent decision in Kent v. Shell Oil Co., 5 Cir., 286 F.2d 746 (1961), I respectfully dissent.