Court Opinion

ID: 9554326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 17:12:47.117055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:44.024034
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUCINE TRIM, individually and on                No. 22-55517
behalf of all others similarly situated,
                                                  D.C. No.
                Plaintiff-Appellant,           2:20-cv-01027-
    v.                                            SVW-KS

REWARD ZONE USA LLC; DOES,
1-10 inclusive,                                   OPINION

                Defendants-Appellees.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
             for the Central District of California
         Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

                   Submitted June 28, 2023 *
                     Pasadena, California

                     Filed August 8, 2023

    Before: N. Randy Smith, Kenneth K. Lee, and Lawrence
                  VanDyke, Circuit Judges.

                   Opinion by Judge Smith

*
 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2                 TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC

                          SUMMARY **

            Telephone Consumer Protection Act

    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
Lucine Trim’s cause of action alleging a violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, when
Reward Zone USA, LLC, sent her at least three mass
marketing text messages that utilized “prerecorded
voice[s].”
    The panel held that the text messages did not use
prerecorded voices under the Act because they did not
include audible components. The panel relied on the
statutory context of the Act and the ordinary meaning of
voice, which showed that Congress used the word voice to
include only an audible sound, and not a more symbolic
definition such as an instrument or medium of expression.
   The panel addressed Trim’s appeal of the district court’s
dismissal of another cause of action under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act in a simultaneously-filed
memorandum disposition.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC                3

                        COUNSEL

Todd M. Friedman, Adrian R. Bacon, and Thomas E.
Wheeler, Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, Woodland
Hills, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Neil Asnen, Klein Moynihan Turco LLP, New York, New
York; Jay T. Ramsey, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton
LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

                        OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

    Plaintiff Lucine Trim (Trim) appeals from the district
court’s partial judgment granting a motion to dismiss in
favor of Defendant, Reward Zone USA, LLC (Reward
Zone), in a putative class action lawsuit brought under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). In Trim’s
second cause of action, which is the subject of this opinion,
Trim alleged a violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227,
because she received at least three mass marketing text
messages from Reward Zone which utilized “prerecorded
voice[s],” id. § 227(b)(1)(A). We hold that these text
messages did not use prerecorded voices under the TCPA,
because they did not include audible components. This
conclusion follows from the statutory context of the TCPA,
and the ordinary meaning of voice, which show that
Congress used the word voice to include only an audible
sound, and not a more symbolic definition such as an
instrument or medium of expression. Therefore, we affirm
the district court’s grant of Reward Zone’s motion to dismiss
the second cause of action.
4                  TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC

                                     I
    On or about April 14, 2020, Trim received a text message
from an unknown number stating: “Hiya Lucine, you are a
valuable customer. In these tough times, let us [] reimburse
[you] for your shopping needs.” The text then provided a
link directing Trim to a promotional website by Reward
Zone. On this website, Reward Zone entices consumers to
complete “Deals” in order to claim prizes. Although Trim
was never a customer of Reward Zone and never provided
her cell number to Reward Zone or its lead vendor, she
received at least two more similar text messages from
Reward Zone soliciting her to complete “Deals” within a 12-
month period.
                                    A
    Trim represents and is a member of a class of: “all
persons within the United States who received any
unsolicited text message[] sent using an [automatic
telephone dialing system (ATDS)] or an artificial or
prerecorded voice from [Reward Zone], which text message
was not made for emergency purposes or with the recipient’s
prior express consent within the four years prior to the filing
of the Complaint through the date of class certification.” In
Trim’s first cause of action, she alleged that the text
messages were sent using an ATDS and thus violated the
TCPA. 1 In her second cause of action, she alleged that the
text messages constituted “prerecorded voice messages”
and, therefore, also violated the TCPA on that ground. To
support this claim, Trim argued that, because one definition

1
  We address the appeal of the district court’s dismissal of the first cause
of action in a memorandum disposition to be filed simultaneously with
this opinion.
                   TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC                         5

of “voice” in Meriam Webster’s dictionary is “an instrument
or medium of expression,” the automatic messages sent to
Trim (which were drafted before being sent), constituted
“prerecorded voice[s]” as prohibited by 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1)(A). 2
                                   B
    The initial complaint was filed by Tracy Eggleston and
Monica Abboud in January 2020. Before Reward Zone filed
an answer, the complaint was amended twice. First, on April
20, 2020, Trim was added as an additional class
representative to the lawsuit in the Amended Complaint.
Next, the Second Amended Complaint was filed in June
2020. In that complaint, Eggleston and Abboud decided not
to pursue their claims, leaving only Trim as a class
representative. In September 2020, the parties filed a joint
stipulation to stay the case pending the Supreme Court’s
resolution of Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S.Ct. 1163
(2021), which the district court granted. In April 2021, about
a week after the Supreme Court decided Duguid, the district
court ordered Trim to show cause as to why the Second
Amended Complaint should not be dismissed in light of the
ruling. 3 Trim believed that an amendment would cure the
potential pleading deficiencies and requested leave to file a

2
  Trim also brought two more causes of action (three and four), where
she alleged that text messages were sent to those on the Do Not Call
registry and that, therefore, Reward Zone failed to implement reasonable
practices and procedures to effectively prevent “telephone solicitations”
in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). These causes of action are not the
subject of Trim’s appeal.
3
   The Supreme Court’s decision was only relevant to pleading
deficiencies in the two causes of action not before us, and we do not
discuss the decision.
6               TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC

Third Amended Complaint in November 2021, which the
district court granted. Trim then promptly filed the Third
Amended Complaint, and, in December 2021, Reward Zone
filed its motion to dismiss all of Trim’s claims given their
failures to state claims.
                              C
    The district court made a ruling on January 28, 2022. As
to the first cause of action (which alleged a violation of 47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) because Reward Zone’s text
messages used an ATDS), the district court held that Trim
failed to plead the use of an ATDS. As to the second cause
of action (which alleged a violation of § 227(b)(1)(A) on the
alternative ground that the text messages were “prerecorded
voice messages”), the district court held that the text
messages did not use voices and therefore did not violate the
applicable section of the statute. Because Reward Zone’s
text messages did not involve an ATDS or an artificial or
prerecorded voice, the district court dismissed the claims
under § 227(b) (causes of action one and two) with
prejudice. In contrast, the district court dismissed causes of
action three and four (which are not before us) with leave to
amend.
                              D
    In February 2022, Trim filed a Fourth Amended
Complaint. Later that same month, Reward Zone filed an
answer. Trim then filed an unopposed motion to certify for
appeal her § 227(b) claims (her first two causes of action)
pursuant to Rule of Federal Civil Procedure 54(b), which
allows a district court to certify an issue for immediate
appeal as a partial judgment when multiple claims or parties
are involved in a suit, a final decision as to one or more
claims has been rendered, and the court finds there is no just
                TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC                 7

reason for delay. The district court found that these factors
weighed in favor of allowing an immediate appeal of the first
two causes of action, granted Trim’s motion, and entered
partial judgment for Reward Zone on these causes of action.
Trim timely filed a notice of appeal to this court.
                              II
    Because the district court issued a partial judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See SEC v. Cap. Consultants LLC,
453 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). We
review de novo the district court’s decision to grant Reward
Zone’s motion to dismiss. See Outdoor Media Grp., Inc. v.
City of Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 899 (9th Cir. 2007). We
also review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the
TCPA. See Peck v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 535 F.3d 1053,
1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
                              A
    In 1991, when telemarketing became common, Congress
enacted the TCPA to “protect the privacy interests of
residential telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on
unsolicited, automated telephone calls.” S. Rep. No. 102–
178, at 1 (1991). The TCPA makes it unlawful to “make any
call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made
with the prior express consent of the called party) using any
automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to
a . . . cellular telephone service.”              47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, there are two ways to violate this
provision: using an ATDS or an “artificial or prerecorded
voice.” The TCPA defines an ATDS, but does not define
“artificial or prerecorded voice.” See id. § 227(a). We need
not define “artificial” or “prerecorded,” because both are
8               TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC

merely adjectives that modify the disputed term—“voice.”
See United States v. Mejias, 452 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.
1971) (declining to define the scope of a term when it was
not necessary to the disposition).
     Our first job is to determine whether congressional intent
regarding the definition of “voice” is clear because when the
meaning of a statute is clear, the “sole function of the courts”
is to “enforce [the statute] according to its terms.” Lamie v.
United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (citing Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530
U.S. 1, 6 (2000)). To determine whether the statute is clear,
we utilize “traditional tools of statutory construction.” NLRB
v. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 23, AFL-CIO,
484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987). One such tool is that we interpret
words consistent with their “ordinary meaning . . . at the time
Congress enacted the statute,” Perrin v. United States, 444
U.S. 37, 42 (1979), because absent contextual evidence that
Congress intended to depart from the ordinary meaning of
an undefined term, see Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd.,
566 U.S. 560, 574 (2012), the ordinary meaning of language
“expresses the legislative purpose,” FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
498 U.S. 52, 57 (1990). Therefore, “persuasive proof” of
congressional intent is required before we embrace an
“idiosyncratic definition.” Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2067, 2073 (2018).
     Another “fundamental canon of statutory construction
[is] that the words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of
Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)); see also Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference
                TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC                 9

to the language itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole.”). When analyzing the context, we apply the “the
elementary canon of construction that a statute should be
interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.”
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472
U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 392 (1979)).
    Most important, “[o]ur inquiry must cease if the statutory
language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent.’” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340
(quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 240 (1989)); see also Wilderness Soc’y v. United States
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that if using traditional means of determining
Congress’s intent reveals that Congress spoke clearly, our
inquiry is at an end).
                              B
   We hold that Congress clearly intended “voice” in 47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) to encompass only audible sounds,
because the ordinary meaning of voice and the statutory
context of the TCPA establish that voice refers to an audible
sound. We address the ordinary meaning and statutory
context in turn.
    The ordinary meaning of “voice” when the TCPA was
enacted, see Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42, was a “[s]ound formed
in or emitted from the human larynx in speaking,” Voice
(def. 1a), Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989)); see also
Voice (def. 1a), Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary
(1991) (“sound produced by vertebrates by means of lungs,
larynx, or syrinx”). Other definitions also show that the
ordinary meaning of voice relates only to audible sound. For
10              TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC

example, the primary definition of “vocalize” is “to give
voice to: UTTER; specif[ically]: SING.” Vocalize (def. 1),
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. To take
another example, “[v]iva voce” is Latin for “[w]ith the living
voice; by word of mouth.” Viva voce, Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). The phrase “is equivalent to
‘orally’” and “[a]s descriptive of a species of voting, it
signifies voting by speech or outcry.” Id.; see also Voice
vote, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (“a
parliamentary vote taken by calling for ayes and noes and
estimating which response is stronger”). To be sure, Trim
accurately notes that “voice” can also be used symbolically.
For example, “voice” can be defined as an “[u]tterance or
expression,” Voice (def. 1f), Oxford English Dictionary, or
as an “instrument or medium of expression,” Voice (def. 3),
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. However,
“[t]hat a definition is broad enough to encompass one sense
of a word does not establish that the word is ordinarily
understood in that sense.” Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 568
(emphasis in original). Such is the case here. The more
symbolic definitions are listed well after the primary ones in
the dictionaries. Moreover, the examples in the dictionary
illustrating a symbolic sense of “voice” that do not involve
an audible component only invoke inapplicable poetic or
literary settings: “the courage which gave Voice to its
creed”; “hero-worship, which found voice in song”; and “the
party [that] became the voice of the workers.” Voice (def.
1f), Oxford English Dictionary; Voice (def. 3), Webster’s
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. Trim fails to provide any
evidence that Congress intended an “idiosyncratic
definition,” see Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2073, and we
presume Congress intended to legislate the primary meaning
                  TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC                       11

of voice, see Holliday, 498 U.S. at 57, which requires an
audible component.
    The context of the statute bolsters that Congress did not
understand the meaning of voice to include a metaphorical
component such as medium of expression, see Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133, because the remainder of 47
U.S.C. § 227 confirms that Congress used “voice” in the
standard way. The TCPA defines “caller identification
information” as “information regarding the origination of[]
a call made using a voice service or a text message sent using
a text messaging service.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(8)(A)). If
voice calls encompassed text messages, the inclusion of the
term text message would be surplusage, and Congress would
have written the statute in a manner contrary to a basic canon
of statutory construction, that a statute should be interpreted
“so as not to render one part inoperative.” Pueblo, 472 U.S.
at 249.
    This canon is misunderstood by Trim, because she
alleges that, under the most natural reading of the word
voice, the “artificial or prerecorded voice” component of the
statute would be superfluous as applied to texts. Trim’s
appeal to the superfluity canon is unavailing, because, at a
minimum, “artificial or prerecorded” applies to voice calls.
See Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1247 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“Congress is presumed to have added these words for some
purpose.”) (emphasis added). 4 Likewise, Trim’s argument
that interpreting voice as involving an audible component

4
 In any event, as Reward Zone points out, Trim is wrong that defining
voice to require an audible sound would make the words “artificial or
prerecorded” inoperable as to text messages because a “text” call could
come via MMS (Multimedia Messaging Service), which could include
audio sound with an artificial or prerecorded voice.
12               TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC

would make the term “artificial” surplusage, fails because an
artificial voice is a sound resembling a human voice that is
originated by artificial intelligence.     See, e.g., MIT
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Karen Hao, AI voice actors
sound more human than ever—and they’re ready to hire,
(July 9, 2021). Because Trim’s arguments regarding the
statutory context fail to overcome plain meaning, our “sole
function” is to enforce the statute according to its clear
terms, under which no text message sent by Reward Zone to
Trim used a prerecorded voice in violation of 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(1)(A). See Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534.
                                C
    We are unpersuaded by Trim’s remaining arguments,
which we need not even consider on the merits. The statute
is not ambiguous after exhausting “traditional tools of
statutory construction.” United Food, 484 U.S. at 123. For
example, Trim argues that the legislative history of the
TCPA demonstrates that the artificial/prerecorded voice
prohibitions hinge on the fact that the calls are agentless, i.e.,
the lack of having a conversation with someone on the other
side who can respond to questions or frustration, and instead
receiving a static, one-sided message, and maintains that
because the TCPA is a remedial statute, it should be
construed broadly in her favor. However, these sorts of
arguments are only on the menu after finding ambiguity
based on the “language itself, the specific context in which
the language is used, and the broader context of the statute
as a whole.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341.
    Trim also argues that binding FCC rules preclude a
definition of voice that requires an audible component,
because the Ninth Circuit has deferred to the FCC’s
interpretation that a text message is a call under the TCPA.
                TRIM V. REWARD ZONE USA LLC               13

According to Trim, because the FCC has determined that a
text message is a call, it must have a voice. However, if the
statute “is unambiguous, we do not defer to the agency’s
interpretation.” Larson v. Saul, 967 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir.
2020); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). Indeed, in the
opinion Trim cites, we deferred to FCC reports and orders
only after finding ambiguity in the undefined term “call.”
See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 953
(9th Cir. 2009). Trim’s argument also fails for another
reason: while we have deferred to the FCC’s reasonable
interpretation that a text is a call under the TCPA, we have
nevertheless distinguished between “text calls” and “voice
calls,” id. at 953, thereby undermining Trim’s position that
“text calls” can use a “prerecorded voice.” Likewise, the
FCC has distinguished between “voice calls” and “text
calls,” see In Re Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel.
Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 14115
(2003), and “voice calls” and “text messages,” see 47 C.F.R.
§ 64.1200. Therefore, even if we deferred to the FCC
because the term voice were ambiguous, that would
undermine Trim’s position rather than support it.
                             III
    Because ordinary meaning and statutory context show
the term “voice” in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A) clearly
excludes a symbolic definition, Reward Zone’s text
messages to Trim could not have violated the prohibition on
“prerecorded voices” in that section, and we affirm the
district court’s grant of Reward Zone’s motion to dismiss in
relation to Trim’s second cause of action.
   AFFIRMED.