Court Opinion

ID: 9550744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:41:41.516073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:17.606646
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.,
dissenting: I must respectfully dissent because in my opinion, the subject of civil rights in employment practices has *322been preempted at the state level by the Kansas Act Against Discrimination (K. S. A. 44-1001, et seq.), thereby precluding cities from entering the field by the enactment of local ordinances under the Home Rule Amendment.
The matters of fair employment practices and civil rights are matters of statewide and not local concern. Chapter 44 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated applies to labor and industries in Kansas and discloses that this state by its legislature has extensively entered the field of labor. Article 1, relates to protection of employees; Article 2, eight hour day on public work; Article 3, payment of wages; Article 4, employment offices, agencies and committees; Article 5, workmen s compensation; Article 5a, occupational diseases; Article 6, regulation of labor and industry; Aricle 7, employment security law; Article 8, employer and employee relations; Article 9, boiler inspection; and Article 10, Kansas Act Against Discrimination.
Cities now receive their authority to legislate from the constitution (Article 12 § 5, Cities’ powers of home rule). The home rule power of cities under the constitution was the subject of consideration in Claflin v. Walsh, 212 Kan. 1, 509 P. 2d 1130. While the court in its opinion cites Claflin and quotes one paragraph, the reader is given the impression that the home rule power of cities is absolute unless the legislature has specifically written language into an enactment which preempts the field, thereby precluding action on the part of a city. This is not a proper construction of the opinion in Claflin.
In Claflin the court said:
“The home rule power of cities is not absolute. It is subject to the power of the legislature to act in certain areas — exclusively in some, optionally in, others. These limitations on city power are expressly set forth in the home rule amendment. Section 5 (a) of the constitutional provision cited in full above vests absolute and exclusive power in the legislature in regard to the procedure for incorporating cities, the methods of altering boundaries, the methods by which cities may be merged or consolidated, and the methods by which cities may be dissolved. Statutory enactments in these areas are not subject to the exercise of home rule power by charter ordinance.
“The optional powers of the legislature are set forth in Section 5 (b) as limitations or exceptions to the exercise of home rule power by cities. The home rule power is subject to optional control by legislative action in four specific areas-.
“(I) Enactments of statewide concern which are applicable uniformly to all cities.
“(2) Other enactments of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities.
“(3) Enactments applicable uniformly to all cities of the same class *323limiting or prohibiting the levying of any tax, excise, fee, charge or other exaction.
“(4) Enactments of the legislature prescribing limits of indebtedness.” (p. 7.) (Emphasis added.)
The court, after discussing Section 5 (d) of Article 12 requiring a liberal construction of the powers and authority granted cities for the purpose of giving to cities the largest measure of self-government (quoted by the court in its opinion), went on to review cases where the legislative intention was made clear and unequivocal. The court then said:
“The difficulty is that in many statutes the legislative intention to have uniformity throughout the state is not expressly stated. In that situation courts are required to glean legislative intent by applying established rules of statutory construction. In order to ascertain the legislative intent, courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act but are required to consider and construe together all parts thereof in pari materia. When the interpretation of some one section of an act according to the exact and literal import of its words would contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature, the entire act should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding so far as may be necessary the strict letter of the law. (Gnadt v. Durr, 208 Kan. 783, 494 P. 2d 1219.) In addition, to be in pari materia statutes need not have been enacted at the same time. Statutes relating to the same subject, although enacted at different times, are in pari materia and should be construed together. (Flowers, Administratrix v. Marshall, Administrator, 208 Kan. 900, 494 P. 2d 1184.)
“These rules of construction require us to consider all statutes relating to the same subject together in determining legislative intent. We should follow these rules in determining whether the legislature intended to have a statute applied ‘uniformly to all cities/” (p. 8.) (Emphasis' added.)
On the authority of Claflin then we must look to the Kansas Act Against Discrimination to ascertain whether the legislature intended to preempt the field.
The ordinance of the City of Hutchinson here in question is an ordinary ordinance to provide a “civil rights commission” and legislate upon employment practices within the city. Even by charter ordinance the city could not set aside the State’s Civil Rights Laws and pass such a charter ordinance. The Kansas Act Against Discrimination (K. S. A. 1972 Sup-p. 44-1001) describes reprehensible conduct in employment relations in these words:
“. . . This act shall be known as the Kansas act against distrimination. It shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare, safety, health and peace of the people of this state. The practice or policy of discrimination against individuals in employment relations, in relation to free and public accommodations or in housing by *324reason of race, religion, color, sex, national origin or ancestry is a matter of concern to the state, since such discrimination threatens not only the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the state of Kansas but menaces the institutions and foundations of a free democratic state. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Kansas to eliminate and prevent discrimination in all employment relations, to eliminate and prevent discrimination, segregation, or separation in all places of public accommodations covered by this act, and to eliminate and prevent discrimination, segregation or separation in housing.
"It is also declared to be the policy of this state to assure equal opportunities and encouragement to every citizen regardless of race, religion, color, sex, national origin or ancestry, in securing and holding, without discrimination, employment in any field of work or labor for which he is properly qualfied, to assure equal opportunties to all persons within this state to full and equal public accommodations, and to assure equal opportunities in housing without distinction on account of race, religion, color, sex, national origin or ancestry. It is further declared that the opportunity to secure and to hold employment, the opportunity for full and equal public accommodations as covered by this act and the opportunity for full and equal housing are civil rights of every citizen.
"To protect these rights, it is hereby declared to be the purpose of this act to establish and to provide a state commission having power to eliminate and prevent segregation and discrimination, or separation in employment, in all places of public accommodations covered by this act, and in housing because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin or ancestry, either by employers, labor organizations, employment agencies, realtors, financial institutions or other persons as hereinafter provided.” (Emphasis added.)
Under the provisions of K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 44-1004, the Kansas Act Against Discrimination creates the commission on civil rights and grants statewide-.

“. . . [Ffunctions, powers and duties:

“(1) To establish and maintain its principal office in the city of Topeka, and such other offices elsewhere within the state as it may deem necessary.
“(2) To meet and function at any place within the state.
“(3) To adopt, promulgate, amend and rescind suitable rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this act, and the policies and practices of the commission in connection therewith.
“(4) To receive, initiate, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging discrimination in employment, public accommodations and housing because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin or ancestry.
“(5) To subpoena witnesses, compel their appearance, require the production for examination of records, documents and other evidence or possible sources of evidence . . .
“(6) To include any term in a conciliation agreement as could be included in a final order under this act.
“(7) To apply to the district court of the county where the respondent resides or transacts business for enforcement of any conciliation agreement by seeking specific performance of such agreement.
*325“(8) To issue such final orders after a public hearing as may remedy any existing situation found to violate this act and prevent its recurrence.
e # « # at
“(10) To create such advisory agencies and conciliation councils, local, regional, or statewide, as in its judgment will aid in effectuating the purpose of this act, to study the problem of discrimination in all or specific fields or instances of discrimination because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin or ancestry; to foster, through community effort or otherwise, good will, cooperation and conciliation among the groups and elements of the population of this state, and to make recommendations to the commission for the development of policies and procedures, and for programs of formal and informal education, which the commission may recommend to the appropriate state agency. Such advisory agencies and conciliation counils shall be composed of representative citizens serving without pay. The commission may itself make the studies and perform the acts authorized by this paragraph. It may, by voluntary conferences with parties in interest, endeavor by conciliation and persuasion to eliminate discrimination in all the stated fields and to foster good will and cooperation among all elements of the population of the state.” {Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing it is apparent the state commission has the duty to create such advisory agencies and conciliation councils at the local levels of our government as in its judgment will aid in effectuating the purposes of the act. Therefore if a local agency at Hutchinson in the judgment of the state commission would aid in effectuating the purposes of the act (heretofore set out), it would have the duty to create such agency in the City of Hutchinson, as an arm of the state commission, to serve as an advisory agency and conciliation council.
The act supplementing the Kansas Act Against Discrimination (Laws of 1970, Chapter 193) concerning “discriminatory housing practices” refers to city ordinances that protect fair housing, and it permits the commission on civil rights to cooperate with local fair housing agencies. These sections now appear as K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 44-1024 and 44-1025. Nothing appears, however, in the Kansas Act Against Discrimination as it applies to discrimination in employment practices (K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 44-1001 to K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 44-1013) about cooperation with local “fair employment agencies.” Had the legislature thought it advisable, it would have included references to ‘local fair employment agencies” but instead the legislature chose the lánguage in 44-1004 (10), supra, to create local advisory agencies in fair employment matters. The legislature thereby retained for the Kansas Commission on Civil *326Rights exclusive statewide jurisdiction issues of discrimination in employment relations, even at the local level.
Under the doctrine of “express mention and implied exclusion” a rational interpretation of the Kansas Act Against Discrimination gives statewide uniformity to the protection of fair employment practices. In LeSueur v. LeSueur, 197 Kan. 495, 419 P. 2d 817 the court said:
“. . . The direct mention of this discretionary authority implies exclusion of any other implied authority. The general rule is thus stated in 82 C. J. S., Statutes, § 333a, p. 668:
“ ‘Under the general rule of express mention and implied exclusion, the express mention of one matter excludes other similar matters not mentioned; every positive direction in a statute contains an implication against everything contrary to it; the specification of one particular class excludes all other classes; and an affirmative description of powers granted implies a denial of nondescribed powers. . . .’” (p. 500.)
.Liquor cases upon which the court relies in its opinion are no help because the problems are not uniform throughout the state. The makeup of the population, the proximity to military establishments, even the size of a community may pose special liquor problems.
Employment relations applicable to the civil rights of a communities’ citizens remain fairly constant. The problems are the same for Hutchinson, Wichita, Topeka, Kansas City and other cities in Kansas. This sameness and the need for uniformity of decision and interpretation throughout the state results from the United States Constituion and congressional directives which spell out the basic precepts for universal fair play and equality in employment. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-8 (b) (1964) provides for cooperation between federal and state agencies.
The Kansas Act Against Discrimination expresses the policy of the state “to eliminate and prevent discrimination in all employment relations” (K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 44-1001) and “to assure equal opportunities and encouragement to every citizen regardless of race, religion, color, sex, national origin or ancestry, in seeming and holding, without discrimination, employment in any field of 'work or labor for which he is properly qualified.” To accomplish the purposes of the act it provides “a state commission having power to eliminate and prevent segregation and discrimination, or separation in employment.” The Kansas Act Against Discrimination extends the constitutionally protected rights to fair play and equality *327in employment uniformly to every part of the state. In employment relations the Kansas act occupies the entire field to the exclusion of the ordinance.
To determine whether a conflict exists one must identify and evaluate such policy considerations as the need for statewide uniformity, the strength of the municipal interest in autonomy, and the extent of any interference which the ordinance causes in the enforcement of the state legislative enactment.
The employment security division, administering the Kansas Employment Security Law (K. S. A. 44-701 et seq.) under federal and state direction, would be required to comply with different interpretations in job situations in each local office area. Such a municipal civil rights ordinance, as we have here, would be a hindrance and would interfere with the enforcement of the statute. In this connection see the factual situation presented in City of Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, Office of State Employment Service, 213 Kan. 399, 517 P. 2d 117. There, except for the fact that the wrong parties were sued, the Hutchinson Human Relations Commission acting through the city seeks to bring the Kansas State Employment Service, a state agency, to its knees, a situation in which the tail seeks to wag the dog.
Furthermore, questions of concurrent jurisdiction would make for prolific litigation. The City of Hutchinson’s Human Relations Commission is not equipped to carry local civil rights matters to a final conclusion. The local method of enforcing the ordinance would substantially interfere with state enforcement of the Kansas Act Against Discrimination.
By permitting the Hutchinson ordinance to stand it is given extraterritorial impact, subjecting state and federal governments in employment relations to municipal control. The city ordinance may be said to conflict with the statutory language itself. The city ordinance is also in conflict with the statute because the statute occupies the entire field. The city ordinance is in conflict with' the statute because it is not as strict. The city human relations commission may find a civil rights violation, yet it cannot itself correct the violation.
The Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska has held in Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 877, 131 N. W. 2d 609, that matters of fair employment practices and civil rights are matters of statewide and not of local concern.
*328Senate Bill No. 223 introduced in the 1973 session of the Kansas Legislature is an act relating to civil rights, and, if passed, it would have authorized cities to establish municipal human relations commissions, “prescribing the powers, duties and functions thereof.” This bill was not enacted into law by the 1973 session of the legislature. It is apparent from the bill that the legislature does not construe the Kansas Act Against Discrimination as authorizing the establishment by cities of local municipal human relations commissions to administer civil rights in employment relations.
It is noted the attorney general has joined in the brief amicus curiae of the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights, The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, The American G. I. Forum and The Kansas Human Relations Association. All of these have urged the court to uphold the constitutionality of the Hutchinson ordinance. The State Labor Commissioner, Darrell D. Carlton, has filed a brief amicus curiae urging the court to strike down the Hutchinson ordinance as unconstitutional.
It is respectfully submitted the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Fatzer, C. J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.