Court Opinion

ID: 9834028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:14:36.193426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.017506
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The complaint is urged again that it was fundamental error in affirming the judgment that the value of the rent of said premises was equal to the board and maintenance of John O. Peek, deceased, furnished him by appellants, because there was no evidence introduced on the trial as to the value of the board and maintenance.
The appellee tendered an issue as to the value of the use of the property, and Mr. Storms testified without objection, as follows:
“I am acquainted with the annual rental value of such land as that in that vicinity; land rents for one-third of the corn and one-fourth of the cotton, the way I used to rent mine there, and I have rented land in patches to cultivate that way at $3 an acre. I think that is about what it would be, $3 an acre, money rent, and pasture land leased for about 35 or 40 cents an acre. I consider that the market rental value. That was the custom over there. I think that makes it the market value, I reckon.”
He also testified there were 140 acres of the market value of $40 per acre and 60 acres in cultivation.
No claim was made by appellant because of the support of Mr. Peek. The value of personal services performed, board, and maintenance, was peculiarly within the knowledge of appellant, and it was not incumbent upon appellee to either pay more than was due or prove such matters. There was no property or money received by appellee that he could be required to return as a condition to this recovery. They were willing to so far do equity as to waive any claim for the use and value of the land in rents and let them be set off by appellants’ use, occupation, support, and maintenance of Mr. Peek.
Appellant never met the issue tendered. He did not ask for reimbursement for the value of his improvements, if any made, services, board, and support,' for caring for Mr. Peek, if worth more than appellee alleged. On the contrary, he stood purely on a legal defense, such as general demurrer, plea of not guilty, and plea of limitations. He filed a general exception 'to the petition, but secured no ruling on it. He offered no proof whatever on issue of rental value, or to any services performed. He presented no request for any charge to the jury on such issue. We can see no fundamental error in the action of the court in entering the judgment.
It makes no difference whether the fraud committed was because of the defect in the mental powers of Peek that he was not able to contract, or because of his weak intellect he was induced to make this deed; the appellants were entitled to the judgment in this case, and there was no necessity for the ap-pellee, as a condition precedent to recover, to make any offer to return the benefits, if any, said Peek received. As said in Smith v. Ryan, 191 N. Y. 452, 84 N. E. 402, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461, 123 Am. St. Rep. 609, 14 Ann. Cas. 505:
“The ground on which such deeds are avoided in case of fraud is that the party has been misled by deception, and has never assented to the contract. The ground on which the deed of an incompetent is avoided is that by infirmity of intellect he is incapable of giving assent. The element that avoids the deed is the same in the two cases — lack of assent — and it is not material whether it exists through deceit, or through imbecility.”
Where parties have dealt with minors and paid consideration for the land, and the minor has wasted it, he will not be required to tender it back or suffer it to be a charge upon his property, and under no circumstances in such a ease required to pay the money back before recovering the land. Bullock v. Sprowls, 93 Tex. 191, 54 S. W. 661, 47 L. R. A. 326, 77 Am. St. Rep. 849.
This case was followed and cited with approval in Williams, Guardian, v. Sapieha, 94 Tex. 436, 61 S. W. 115. In this case the .court holds there is no difference in principle between a deed made by a minor and one by a lunatic. They are neither void, but voidable only. In neither case can they be required to return the money not on hand. The court said:
“We answer the second question that the facts stated in connection with the certificate do not show that the lunatic still had in his possession any of the money paid for the land or any property acquired with it, nor that it had been expended for him or by him in the purchase of necessaries. In the absence of such proof, he would not be required to return the consideration received. Bullock v. Sprowls, 93 Tex. 188 [54 S. W. 661, 47 L. R. A. 326, 77 Am. St. Rep. 849].”
The rule established in this and other states seems to be, when a party dealing with *214an insane person acts in good faith and without Knowledge of such insanity, consideration received in the bargain must be returned in specie if possible. First Nat. Bank v. Skinner, 10 Kan. App. 517, 62 Pac. 705; Jamison v. Culligan et ux., 151 Mo. 410, 52 S. W. 224; Creekmore et al. v. Baxter et al., 121 N. C. 31, 27 S. E. 994; Miller v. Barber et al., 73 N. J. Law, 38, 62 Atl. 276. It is held in Wager v. Wagoner, 53 Neb. 511, 73 N. W. 937:
“Finally it is contended that Wager should receive restitution of the consideration by him paid. This, in the case of an insane person, is not essential as a condition of granting relief. Dewey v. Allgire, supra [37 Neb. 6, 55 N. W. 276, 40 Am. St. Rep. 468]; Rea v. Bishop, 41 Neb. 202, 59 N. W. 555. It did not appear that the ability existed to restore the consideration in specie. The right to recover it back as money had and received, or otherwise, • was not a question involved in the case, and is not now open to consideration.”
If the appellant was entitled to more relief than plaintiff tendered in his pleading, there was no pleading suggesting it, or request made to submit it to the jury.
No money or other property was paid for the land. The consideration was not in specie, but in support and maintenance, which of course was of value; but it did not devolve upon appellee to set that out, while appellant only claimed the land by way of plea of not guilty and limitations. There was no plea for any improvements made in good faith, nor any prayer over for any other relief.
As appellant so urgently insists we. have erred, we have gone over and re-examined the case and all the authorities cited by him, and we specially have examined the following cases cited in the supplemental motion, to wit: Jamison v. Culligan et ux., 151 Mo. 410, 52 S. W. 224; Gilgallon v. Bishop, 46 App. Div. 350, 61 N. Y. Supp. 467; Am. Digest, Dec. Ed., vol. 10, Insane Persons, § 66 — and have examined not only the cases cited in the briefs, but many more besides. They all seem in harmony with the views expressed by us to the general effect there should always be tendered back what was left of any consideration received as a condition precedent to having conveyances of such incompetents vacated. Jefferson v. Rust, 149 Iowa, 594, 128 N. W. 954.
It is largely a question here of pleading and proof. If we should treat the rights of appellant as coming under the head of necessaries furnished, we find no pleading or proof to justify us presented in this record. The pleading of plaintiff was sufficient to tender the issue in the following language:
“That the said Wisdom and wife have been occupying the promises aforesaid since about the first of February, 1916, and first became occupants of said premises under a contract to pay $100 for the use of said premises for the year 1916 and in pursuance thereof pay the sum of $25, but have refused and failed to pay any thing since. That the 'rental value of said promises for the period of one year and two months would have been adequate compensation to the said Wisdom for the.support and maintenance of the said Peek during the same period.”
It was not excepted to specially as insufficient. There was a general exception to the petition, but no ruling on it. If the services performed and money expended for him to purchase necessaries amount to more than the value alleged by plaintiff, such amounts were peculiarly within the knowledge of appellant, was not incumbent upon appellee to allege, but was incumbent both upon appellant to allege and prove.
Having nothing before us on the subject other than plaintiff’s pleading, the facts proven, and the judgment of the court thereon; we are not permitted to say there was error.
If the appellee was entitled to more, and to have a judgment fixing a lien on the property to secure it, in the absence of any pleading and issue of fact that should have been submitted to the jury, other than presented by appellee on the subject, it was not presented, below, and in the state of this record cannot be considered here. In the absence of pleading and proof as to the value of the board and care furnished, we cannot, as was done in the cited case of Gilgallon v. Bishop, 46 App. Div. 350, 61 N. Y. Supp. 467, adjudge any amount to be paid by appellee.
The plaintiff having pleaded that the rentals equalled any benefits he received, showed a prima facie case entitling him to rescind without restoring the value of benefits. This was certainly equivalent to the ordinary case in which plaintiff offers to restore benefits received. It is the duty of the defendant to plead specifically such sums as he contends should be paid him if rescission is granted. Black on Rescission and Cancellation, § 674. In this case the defendant failed to plead any such claims, and failed to introduce evidence of the value of the necessaries furnished plaintiff. He now stands upon the proposition, which, if applicable in this case, would be applicable in all, that the burden was upon plaintiff to prove the extent of defendant’s claim, before he would be entitled to rescission.
The plaintiff proved the value of the rents,' and the defendant introduced no evidence of the value of the necessaries furnished. When a court of equity has obtained jurisdiction of a bill for rescission, and a decree in accordance with the prayer is warranted, it will retain jurisdiction for the purpose of adjusting all the rights and claims of the parties, growing out of the transaction complained of, so as to do complete equity and leave nothing for future litigation, which it can dispose of in the exercise of its equitable powers upon the parties before it. Black on Rescission and Cancellation,.! 689. If the defendant refuses to set up or prove any equi*215ties, it must be assumed that he does not contend that he is entitled to any, if the court decrees a cancellation. Such failure on his part could not be ground for refusing a cancellation, nor could it be ground for providing in the judgment that the cancellation was decreed without prejudice to any claim of equities which the defendant could have urged but failed to plead.
The motion for a rehearing is overruled.