Court Opinion

ID: 9831037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:44:43.463795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:29.915153
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Eor the reason stated in opinion this day handed down by Justice Higgins in the companion case of Bates, Administrator, v. Crane County (Tex. Civ. App.) 55 S.W.(2d) 610, No. 2709, we are of the opinion we erred in our original opinion holding that the sureties were not liable to appellee because the breach of the bond occurred after the two-year and sixty-day period.
The bond in this case covers common school district funds and is governed by article 2S29, R. S. 1925, which provides that the bond “shall be conditioned that the depository will faithfully perform its duties under this title, and shall safely keep and faithfully disburse the school fund according to law, and pay such warrants as may be drawn on said fund by competent authority.”
AVhile the statutory condition is different from the one in cause No. 2709, we think it is broad enough to impose upon the depository and its sureties the obligation to pay all moneys deposited during the two-year and sixty-day period.
Appellee also insists that since the capacity of Crane county to maintain the suit is not questioned by plea in abatement, we erred in holding the county could not maintain the suit. The question involves no want of capacity to sue, but rather a failure to show a cause of action vested in Crane county. The county is not the obligee in the bond. The funds in controversy as shown by the court’s findings belong to the Crane county common school district available fund and sinking fund. Those funds belong to the common school district and not to Crane county. As to this phase of the case, however, there may be some doubt, and for this reason we will set aside our judgment finally disposing of the case and will remand it for further proceedings. If Crane county can properly sue for these funds, it should do so for the use and benefit of the common school district. See opinion in Watson Case (Tex. Civ. App.) 202 S. W. 126, 127, where this court in passing upon the right of El Paso county to recover upon a tax collector’s bond, funds belonging to drainage districts, said: “However, such recovery cannot be had upon an allegation that such funds belonged to, and had been collected for, the county.” See, also, Steusoff v. Liberty County (Tex. Civ. App.) 34 S.W.(2d) 643, at page 648.
Upon remand the common school district can join in the suit as a party plaintiff and Crane county can also amend its pleadings so as to show it sues for the use and benefit of the common school district.
By such procedure the proper parties plaintiff will certainly be before the court and this question in the case eliminated.
The sureties whose appeals were dismissed insist that since the judgment against Bates was reversed the same should be reversed also as to them. This insistence we think is correct.
The authorities support the view that when a reversal as to one defendant is ordered and the manifest justice of the case requires that the judgment appealed from be treated as an entirety, and the judgment reversed as to all defendants, such course will be followed. Hamilton v. Prescott, 73 Tex. 566, 11 S. W. 548; Reeves v. McCracken, 103 Tex. 416, 128 S. W. 895; Thompson v. Kelley, 100 Tex. 536, 101 S. W. 1074; Valee v. Joiner (Tex. Com. App.) 44 S.W.(2d) 983; Leonard v. Prater (Tex. Com. App.) 36 S.W.(2d) 216; Wallace v. Dockery (Tex. Civ. App.) 284 S. W. 258; Mosler Safe Company v. Atascosa County (Tex. Civ. App.) 184 S. W. 324; Ferguson v. Dickinson (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 221; Lipshitz v. Lindsay Nat. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S.W.(2d) 874; Thomas v. Basden & Carrell (Tex. Civ. App.) 4 S.W.(2d) 336; Mergenthaler L. Co. v. McClure (Tex. Civ. App.) 9 S.W.(2d) 198; Id. (Tex. Com. App.) 16 S.W.(2d) 280; Irwin v. Auto F. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 40 S.W.(2d) 871.
In accordance with the views expressed in this opinion, our former judgment of dismissal as to certain defendants and reversal and rendition in favor of Bates is set aside, and it is now ordered that the judgment of the lower court is reversed as to all defendants and remanded for retrial.