Court Opinion

ID: 9900493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:24:02.573178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:09.060768
License: Public Domain

E-FILED
                                                     CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                     E-filed: Jun 14 2023 05:06PM
                                                     Clerk Review: Jun 14 2023 05:07PM
                                                     Filing ID: 70194179
                                                     Case No.: 2023-SCC-0005-PHV
                                                     NoraV Borja

                         IN THE
                   Supreme Court
                         OF THE

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

  IN RE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION OF JAMES ROBERT KINGMAN.

           Supreme Court No. 2023-SCC-0005-PHV

     ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

                   Cite as: 2023 MP 6

                  Decided June 14, 2023

           CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
           ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
             ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PERRY B. INOS
                            In re Kingman, 2023 MP 6

PER CURIAM:
¶1      Ralph DLG. Torres (“Torres”) moves for reconsideration of our Order
 admitting James Robert Kingman (“Kingman”) pro hac vice. We find no material
 deficiencies in the application which warrant revoking Kingman’s admission to
 practice pro hac vice. We DENY the motion.
                     I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2      In March 2023, Chief Solicitor J. Robert Glass, Jr. (“Glass”) applied for
 Kingman’s pro hac vice admission to act as a special prosecutor in
 Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. Ralph Anthony Deleon
 Guerrero Torres, Superior Court Case Number 22-0050-CR. The application
 explained that Kingman “is a practitioner in Texas with a long history of
 prosecutorial experience, including public corruption and white-collar crime”
 and stated he would serve as a special prosecutor. The application also contained
 Kingman’s certificate of good standing in Texas and indicated that he would
 associate with the Office of the Attorney General as local counsel.
¶3      On March 6, we issued an Order admitting Kingman pro hac vice. Torres
 learned of the admission through media reports and filed an Open Government
 Act request with the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) for documents
 related to Kingman.
¶4      OAG responded to Torres’ request and made documents pertaining to
 Kingman’s pro hac vice admission available for inspection. An employee of a
 law firm representing Torres inspected the documents and received a copy of the
 Order. On April 26, Torres filed a Motion to Reconsider the Order admitting
 Kingman.
                               II. JURISDICTION
¶5     The Supreme Court “has plenary control over who may practice law in the
 Commonwealth.” In re David York, 2010 MP 11 ¶ 11. NMI CONST. art. IV, § 9
 gives us the authority to propose rules “governing . . . admission to and
 governance of the bar of the Commonwealth.” In addition, NMI CONST. art. IV,
 § 3 provides that the Supreme Court has “all inherent powers,” one of which is
 the power to admit and suspend attorneys. See Enquire Printing & Pub. Co. v.
 O’Reilly, 477 A.2d 648, 650 (Conn. 1984) (“state courts possess the inherent
 power to regulate admission to the bar.”); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6
 (1985) (“Federal courts admit and suspend attorneys as an exercise of their
 inherent power.”). We have heard challenges to pro hac vice applications. See In
 re David York, 2010 MP 11 ¶ 2.
                 III. ISSUES RAISED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6      We review motions to reconsider for an intervening change of controlling
 law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or
 prevent manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Guerrero, 2014 MP 4 ¶ 2. Torres
 raises four grounds for revoking Kingman’s admission:
                              In re Kingman, 2023 MP 6

        1. The Commonwealth did not serve Torres with notice of the
           pro hac vice application as mandated in NMI SUP. CT. R. 21-
           1;
        2. The application fails to articulate “why the client requires the
           attorney’s representation before the Commonwealth courts,”
           as required by NMI SUP. CT. R. 73-1(b);
        3. The application fails to comply with the sworn affidavit
           requirement of NMI SUP. CT. R. 73-1(e); and
        4. Pro Hac Vice is not the appropriate admissions rule for a
           special prosecutor in a criminal case.
                                     IV. DISCUSSION
         A. Whether Torres Has Standing to Contest Kingman’s Admission
¶7      The Commonwealth argues that Torres lacks standing to challenge
 Kingman’s admission under In re Estate of Moteisou, 2023 MP 3 ¶ 12. In
 Moteisou, we held that someone without an interest in an estate did not have
 standing to initiate probate of that estate. Id. at ¶ 1. However, the standing
 discussion in Moteisou is concerned with whether a person has an interest in a
 matter that is sufficient to initiate litigation and thereby invoke the subject matter
 jurisdiction of the superior court. Id. ¶¶ 10–11; see also NMI CONST. art. IV, §
 2. By contrast, our jurisdiction over attorney admissions flows from Sections 3
 and 9 of Article IV of the NMI Constitution. See supra ¶ 6. The issue of whether
 Torres has standing is not one affecting our jurisdiction over this matter.
¶8      In addition, we, along with other courts, have permitted opposing parties
 to challenge pro hac vice admissions. In re David York, 2010 MP 11; United
 States v. Howell, 936 F. Supp. 767, 768 (D. Kan. 1996); Cont’l Cas. Co. v.
 Compass Bank, No. CA 04-0766-CB-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53224, at *1
 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2005); In re De Luna, 60 V.I. 683, 684 (V.I. 2014). It is sound
 policy to permit opposing litigants to inform us of problems with a pro hac vice
 admission that were not visible on the face on the application. We reject
 contention that the Motion to Reconsider should be dismissed for lack of
 standing.
        B. Commonwealth’s Opposition to Torres’ Motion to Reconsider
¶9     Torres asserts that we should deem the Motion to Reconsider unopposed
 because it was the Commonwealth, not Kingman himself, that filed an
 opposition. He requests that we disregard the Commonwealth’s opposition
 because it does not assert that it represents Kingman in connection with the pro
 hac vice admission and does not offer any authority or argument that it can
 represent a Commonwealth contractor in litigation.
¶ 10     We decline to grant the Motion as unopposed. Torres does not identify any
  caselaw, court rule, or statute standing for the proposition that a response to a
  challenge to a pro hac vice admission can be filed only by the attorney in his or
  her personal capacity. Even if the Commonwealth remained silent, we still would
                                 In re Kingman, 2023 MP 6

    not grant the Motion summarily simply because it was not opposed. “The fact
    that [the] Motion for Reconsideration was unopposed when decided is inapt . . .
    the court is not required to grant every unopposed motion.” Edward H. Bohlin
    Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355–56 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Nunez v. Nunez,
    196 B.R. 150, 156 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (“The granting of an uncontested
    motion is not an empty exercise but requires that the court find merit to the
    motion.”); In re Bunge, No. 17-44245, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 1153, at *5 (Bankr.
    W.D. Wash Apr. 16, 2018) (“A court’s exercise of its discretion to refuse to
    sustain an unopposed motion is to find that the relief requested has no basis in
    the applicable law.”). The fact that Kingman himself did not file an opposition is
    irrelevant; we will consider the Commonwealth’s arguments.
                                   C. Timeliness
¶ 11     The Commonwealth contends the Motion for Reconsideration is untimely.
  NMI Supreme Court Rule 27-2(d)(1) permits a motion for reconsideration
  “within 10 days after being served with a copy of the order.” Here, the Order
  admitting Kingman was issued on March 6, and Torres’ Motion was not filed
  until April 26—well outside the 10-day window. However, Torres contends that
  the 10-day period does not bar his Motion because he was never served with the
  Order.
¶ 12     Service of Supreme Court orders is governed by NMI Supreme Court Rule
  45(c), which provides that “[u]pon the entry of an order or judgment, the Clerk
  must immediately serve a notice of entry on each party, with a copy of any
  applicable opinion, and must note the date of service on the docket.” However,
  when the order admitting Kingman was issued on March 6, Torres was not a
  party to the admission proceeding. Accordingly, the Clerk of the Supreme Court
  was not under a duty to serve Torres with the Order, and Torres’ motion is not
  barred by Rule 27-2(d)(1).
                                        D. Service
¶ 13     We next consider whether the application was materially deficient because
  it was never served on Torres. Pro hac vice applications are governed by Supreme
  Court Rule 73-1. Under this Rule, an application must demonstrate the attorney’s
  eligibility, provide a certificate of good standing, and designate a local attorney
  for association, among other requirements. However, Rule 73-1 is silent
  regarding service of applications.1 Because no duty to serve exists in our Rules,
  we decline to create one by Order.
¶ 14   We disagree with Torres’ claim that NMI Supreme Court Rule 21-1
  mandates service. Rule 21-1 is titled “Original Actions.” It provides:
          An application to this Court seeking consideration of any matter
          over which it has original jurisdiction, such as an action pursuant to

1
     By contrast, California and Guam explicitly require service of pro hac vice applications.
     See California Rule of Court 9.40(a); Guam Rule of Admission 8.01(d)(1).
                                In re Kingman, 2023 MP 6

         Article II, Section 4(b) of the NMI Constitution, must be made by
         filing a petition with the Clerk with proof of service on the
         respondents. Proceedings on the application must conform, so far
         as is practicable, to the procedures prescribed in Rule 21(a), (b), and
         (d).
¶ 15     Under Rule 21-1, certain applications to the Supreme Court must be served
  on “respondents.” The term “respondents” is not addressed in the definition
  section of our Supreme Court Rules. See NMI SUP. CT. R. 1-1. However, the
  term appears only in Rule 21-1 and in Rule 21, which addresses writs of
  mandamus, prohibition, and other extraordinary writs. Under Rule 21(a)(1),
  “[a]ll parties in the Superior Court proceeding other than the petitioner are
  respondents for all purposes.” This rule means that, when a petitioner seeks an
  extraordinary writ pursuant to Rule 21, the petitioner must serve the petition on
  the other parties to the Superior Court proceeding.
¶ 16     Our Supreme Court Rules do not designate opposing parties in cases for
  which a pro hac vice attorney is sought as “respondents.” Accordingly, Rule 21-
  1’s requirement to serve some applications on “respondents” creates no duty to
  serve a pro hac vice application on other parties. In addition, a pro hac vice
  application is not a petition for an extraordinary writ to which Rules 21 and 21-
  1 apply. A pro hac vice admission proceeding is an administrative matter with no
  direct effect on the rights or obligations of other parties, and it is more akin to a
  motion than an action. See In re David York, 2010 MP 11 ¶ 1 (“York, an attorney
  licensed to practice in five U.S. jurisdictions, applied for admission pro hac vice
  by motion to this Court on July 18, 2007.”); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441
  (1979) (“the practice of courts in most States is to allow an out-of-state lawyer
  the privilege of appearing upon motion”).2 We find that Rule 21-1 does not apply
  to pro hac vice applications and hold that service of pro hac applications upon
  the opposing party is not required.
                       E. Statement of Need for Representation
¶ 17     We next consider whether the application complies with Supreme Court
  Rule 73-1(b). This rule requires applications to “describe the reasons the client
  requires the attorney’s representation before the Commonwealth courts.”
¶ 18     Torres contends:
         the application does not describe or set forth any reasons why the
         Commonwealth needs the applicant to represent it in the criminal
         prosecution as required by NMI SUP. CT. R. 73-1(b). Id. The
         application claims, without any supporting documentation

2
    While the NMI Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable here, it is worth noting that
    NMI R. CIV. P. 5(a)(1)(D) says that “a written motion . . . that may be heard ex parte”
    is exempt from the normal requirement of being “served on every party.” The same
    logic behind not requiring service of such motions in the Superior Court also applies in
    this Court.
                                 In re Kingman, 2023 MP 6

         whatsoever, that the applicant has “a long history of prosecutorial
         experience, including public corruption and white-collar crime.” Id.
         This assertion is unsubstantiated, and was not made in an affidavit,
         a declaration or subject to the penalty of perjury. Id. Regardless, no
         reason or explanation is given articulating how or why the
         applicant’s particular experience is now needed in the criminal case
         which had been charged and pending for over eleven (11) months
         prior to filing of the pro hac vice application.
         Mot. Reconsideration at 4–5 (emphasis removed).
¶ 19     This argument is without merit. Kingman’s application explains the reason
  for his pro hac vice application is to serve as a special prosecutor in the case
  against Torres and that he has relevant experience. Torres fails to explain why
  Kingman’s statement needed to have been made under penalty of perjury or why
  “supporting documentation” of Kingman’s experience is required. Id. at 4.
¶ 20      Cases from other jurisdictions make clear that some deference is afforded
  to a litigant’s statement of need for a pro hac vice attorney. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
  Johnston, 701 F.2d 337, 351 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that pro hac vice
  applications cannot “be rejected simply because” the court feels additional
  counsel is unnecessary and that the court “cannot substitute its judgment for that
  of the litigant in the choice or number of counsel that the litigant may feel is
  required to properly represent his interests.”); Herrmann v. Summer Plaza Corp.,
  513 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Conn. 1986) (“a court should reluctantly deny an
  application to appear pro hac vice. A litigant’s request to be represented by
  counsel of his choice, when freely made, should be respected by the court, unless
  some legitimate state interest is thwarted by admission of the out-of-state
  attorney.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).3 We hold that Kingman’s
  application adequately explained why his admission was required.
                                   F. Declaration
¶ 21    The third alleged flaw with Kingman’s application concerns Glass’
  declaration. Rule 73-1(e) reads:
         An attorney applying for pro hac vice admission under this Rule is
         required to associate with an attorney who is admitted to practice
         law in the Commonwealth, who is a member of the Bar, who is in
         good standing, and who maintains an office in the Commonwealth.
         A sworn affidavit from the local attorney attesting to compliance
         with these requirements shall be attached to the application.
¶ 22     Instead of filing an affidavit, Glass submitted a declaration under penalty
  of perjury. This is permissible under 7 CMC § 3305, which allows for a signed

3
    This case makes clear that this deference is not unlimited: “the mere fact that a client
    desires out-of-state counsel to represent him in the courts of this state is not sufficient
    reason, in and of itself, to warrant granting such permission.” Herrmann, 513 A.2d at
    1214.
                                In re Kingman, 2023 MP 6

    declaration in place of an affidavit. It provides that the declaration “may be in
    substantially the following form: I declare under penalty of perjury that the
    foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on _____ at
    _____, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.”
¶ 23     Torres acknowledges this law but argues Glass’ declaration fails to fulfill
  its requirements because it “does not state the location where it was executed”
  and “it is unknown if the declaration was signed inside or outside of the
  Commonwealth.” Mot. Reconsideration at 5–6.4
¶ 24    As required by Rule 73-1(e), Glass verified that he is a member of the
  CNMI Bar Association in good standing with an office in the Commonwealth.
  He declared under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information is true and
  correct, provided the date he executed the declaration, typed out his name, and
  provided a signature.
¶ 25     Torres is correct that the declaration does not explicitly state the location
  within the Commonwealth where it was executed. However, it does so implicitly.
  The declaration first states that Glass is “a resident of Saipan” and second states
  that he “maintains [his] office at the Office of the Attorney General in Saipan,
  CNMI.” One can infer that Glass most likely executed the declaration in Saipan,
  the location where he lives and works. More importantly, it is baseless
  speculation that Glass was not in the Commonwealth when he executed the
  declaration. While it would have been best had the declaration explicitly stated
  the location of its execution, we hold that this deficiency is not material and does
  not warrant revoking Kingman’s admission.5
            G. Pro Hac Vice for Special Prosecutors in Criminal Cases
¶ 26    Finally, we address whether special prosecutors in criminal cases cannot
  be admitted pro hac vice. Torres contends special prosecutors can be admitted
  only under Supreme Court Rule 73-3, which is titled “Other Admissions,” as
  opposed to Rule 73-1, which concerns pro hac vice admissions. Specifically,
  Torres claims the appropriate rule is 73-3(c), which is titled “Special Ethics
  Prosecutor or Other Limited Purpose Attorney.” This rule reads:
          [a]ny attorney the Board deems necessary for the prosecution of
          ethics matters or for other limited purposes, and who the Board

4
     Were it made outside the NMI, the declaration would have to fulfill the requirements
     of a different statute, 7 CMC § 3307.
5
     We emphasize that, “While guideposts for determining an attorney’s fitness to practice
     do exist, such as the requirement to be a law school graduate and a member in good
     standing in other jurisdictions, admission to the Commonwealth bar is solely at the
     discretion of the Court.” In re David York, 2010 MP 11 ¶ 11. Although strict
     compliance with the relevant rules and statutes is a key consideration in deciding
     whether to admit pro hac vice applicants, it is not an absolute requirement. Admitting
     an attorney we believe competent to practice law in the Commonwealth, despite some
     technical flaws in their application, is well within our discretion .
                             In re Kingman, 2023 MP 6

        deems fit to practice law in the Commonwealth for the stated limited
        purposes, shall be admitted to the Bar at the Board’s approval to the
        extent necessary to carry out the specified limited purpose after a
        written request is made to the Board by the Bar or the Judiciary.
¶ 27     There is no caselaw on this rule, and Torres provides no authorities holding
  that special prosecutors in criminal cases cannot be admitted pro hac vice. He
  says:
        A plain language reading of NMI SUP. CT. R. 73-3(c) establishes
        that it applies to prosecutors for ethics and for other limited
        purposes. The phrase “for other limited purposes” reasonably
        includes a special prosecutor in a criminal case, since this Court
        equates an ethics prosecutor with a criminal prosecutor. See, e.g., In
        re Woodruff, 2014 MP 9 ¶¶ 7-13. In disqualifying the ethics
        prosecutor in Woodruff, this Court reasoned that the ethics
        prosecutor, like a criminal prosecutor, is a servant of the law “[who]
        must serve truth and justice first and foremost” and be free from a
        conflict of interest. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Jing Jin Xiao,
        2013 MP 12 ¶ 42).
        Mot. Reconsideration at 6.
¶ 28     Torres’ reliance on Woodruff is unavailing. While prosecutors in criminal
  cases and in attorney ethics cases have certain common ethical obligations, that
  hardly equates the two distinct types of proceedings. Moreover, Rule 73-3(c)
  involves scenarios where the Bar Association or judiciary makes a written
  request to the Board of Bar Examiners for admission of the attorney. It is, of
  course, the executive branch’s responsibility, not the Bar Association or
  judiciary, to initiate criminal cases and decide which attorney should represent
  the Commonwealth, making it obvious that Rule 73-3(c) has no relevance here.
  We hold that special prosecutors in criminal cases can be admitted pro hac vice.
               H. When Revoking a Pro Hac Admission is Appropriate
¶ 29     We note that circumstances warranting the revocation of a pro hac vice
  admission usually involve an act of wrongdoing by the admitted lawyer. For
  example, the Supreme Court of the U.S. Virgin Islands revoked an attorney’s
  admission after it emerged that she had held herself “out as a licensed Virgin
  Islands attorney” in communications with the opposing party despite her pro hac
  vice application still then pending approval. In re De Luna, 60 V.I. 683, 687 (V.I.
  2014). Similarly, the United States District Court for Kansas revoked the
  admission of a lawyer for failing to disclose disciplinary actions and expressing
  a “lack of candor.” United States v. Howell, 936 F. Supp. 767, 772–74 (D. Kan.
  1996).
¶ 30    Here, there is no evidence or allegations of misconduct by Kingman. The
  application included a certificate demonstrating Kingman is in good standing in
  Texas. We find no material deficiency warranting the revocation of Kingman’s
  admission. There has not been an intervening change of controlling law, new
                                In re Kingman, 2023 MP 6

 evidence, or any clear error or manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Guerrero,
 2014 MP 4 ¶ 2.
                                 V. CONCLUSION
¶ 31     For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the motion for reconsideration of our
  order admitting Kingman pro hac vice.

         SO ORDERED this 14th day of June, 2023.

/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Chief Justice

 /s/
JOHN A. MANGLOÑA
Associate Justice

/s/
PERRY B. INOS
Associate Justice

                                          COUNSEL
Victorino DLG Torres, Matthew J. Holley, Viola Alepuyo, and Anthony H. Aguon, Saipan,
MP, for Torres.
J. Robert Glass, Saipan, MP, for the Commonwealth.
                                           NOTICE
This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until certified, it is subject to revision or withdrawal. In any
event of discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for publication,
the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone (670) 236–9715,
fax (670) 236–9702, e–mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov.