Court Opinion

ID: 9719969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:11:01.54166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:11.684693
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I concur with sections I, m, and iv of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from section n. In holding that the names of unknown patients *50are protected by the physician-patient privilege, the majority has disregarded the language of the statute, unduly broadening the privilege.
Michigan provides for expansive discovery, permitting parties to obtain discovery regarding any matter not privileged that is relevant to the subject matter involved in a pending action. MCR 2.302(B)(1). Among the exceptions recognized by the Legislature is the physician-patient privilege, which states, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a person duly authorized to practice medicine or surgery shall not disclose any information that the person has acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, if the information was necessary to enable the person to prescribe for the patient as a physician, or to do any act for the patient as a surgeon. [MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157 (emphasis added).]
The primary goal of interpreting a statutory provision, like the physician-patient privilege, is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). To accomplish this goal, we presume that every word in the statute has meaning and avoid any construction that renders any part surplusage. Altman v Meridian Twp, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW2d 155 (1992).
The statutory section cited here provides that information falls within the purview of the physician-patient privilege only if it was “necessary” to enable a physician1 *51“to prescribe” 2 for a patient. MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157. Nevertheless, the majority disregards this limitation, rendering the language of the statute surplusage.
The majority chooses to rely on dicta from Schechet v Kesten, 372 Mich 346, 351; 126 NW2d 718 (1964):
[The statute] protects, “within the veil of privilege,” whatever in order to enable the physician to prescribe, “was disclosed to any of his senses, and which in any way was brought to his knowledge for that purpose.” Such veil of privilege is the patient’s right. It prohibits the physician from disclosing, in the course of any action wherein his patient or patients are not involved and do not consent, even the names of such noninvolved[3] patients. [Citation omitted.]
The majority here concludes that the name of a “non-involved patient” is protected by the privilege. However, it fails to explain how the name is necessary to enable someone to prescribe for the patient as a phy*52sician.4 MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157. By concluding that patient names are within the purview of the privilege, this Court has ignored several fundamental principles of statutory construction: that every word should be given meaning, if possible, and that any construction that renders part of a statute surplusage should be avoided. Altman, supra at 635.
Consistent with Porter v Michigan Osteopathic Hosp Ass’n, Inc,5 information falls within the scope of the physician-patient privilege only if it is acquired by a physician in his professional character, and is “ ‘necessary to enable him to prescribe ... as a physician.’ ” In Porter, the Court of Appeals properly held that disclosure of names of unknown patients suspected of assaulting the plaintiff did not require disclosure of information “ ‘necessary to enable [a physician] to prescribe ... as a physician.’ ” Id. at 623.
The majority astutely notes that Porter also involved the psychiatrist-patient privilege, which “prevents the discovery of ‘a communication made to a psychiatrist or psychologist in connection with the examination, diagnosis, or treatment of a patient . . . .’ ” Id. However, in Porter, the Court of Appeals properly held that disclosure of names of unknown patients suspected of assaulting the plaintiff did not require disclosure of information “necessary for pur*53poses of examination, diagnosis and treatment.” Id.6 As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that the patient names were not protected by either privilege.
In this case, the majority disregards the plain language of the statute. Instead, it emphasizes that the purpose of the statute is to protect the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship and to encourage a full disclosure of symptoms and conditions. Domako v Rowe, 438 Mich 347, 354; 475 NW2d 30 (1991).
However, in Domako, this Court explained:
An attempt to use the privilege to control the timing of the release of information exceeds the purpose of the privilege and begins to erode the purpose of waiver by repressing evidence. Both consequences are anathema to the open discovery policy of our state. The statute and the court rule both allow waiver, thus striking an appropriate balance between encouraging confident disclosure to one’s physician and providing full access to relevant evidence should a charge of malpractice follow treatment. [Id. at 355.]
Like the waiver provision, the limitation on information provided by the physician-patient privilege strikes a balance “between encouraging confident disclosure” and “providing full access to relevant evidence.”7 See Domako, supra at 355. I believe that the *54majority has upset this balance by unduly broadening the physician-patient privilege.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and conclude that the unknown patient names are not protected by the physician-patient privilege.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 The majority disregards the fact that plaintiffs are requesting patient names that were provided to ahospital, as opposed to aphysician, essentially imputing the physician-patient privilege to the hospital. The majority seeks support for its decision from Massachusetts Mut Life Ins Co v Michigan Asylum for the Insane Bd of Trustees, 178 Mich 193, 204; 144 NW 538(1913). Itheld that “ ‘when [a] physician subsequently copies [a] privileged communication upon the record of the hospital, it stUl remains privileged.’ ” However, the *51majority fails to distinguish between information provided to aphysician that is copied to a hospital record, and information that is provided directly to the hospital.

 The majority concludes that “ ‘prescribe’ should be interpreted broadly enough to encompass any information acquired to allow the physician to order or recommend any treatment for a patient.” Ante at 37, n 5. It emphasizes that it “is necessary for a physician to obtain a patient’s name before a prescription can be written for the patient." However, the majority fails to explain the necessity of acquiring the name of a patient before a prescription is written or of a patient who is not issued a prescription.

 This dicta provides only that the names of “noninvolved” patients are protected by this privilege. However, the majority, without explanation, expands this protection to the name of the “involved” party sought by plaintiff Gregory.

 Unlike Schechet, in Swickard v Wayne Co Medical Examiner, 438 Mich 536, 561; 475 NW2d 304 (1991), this Court emphasized that the physician-patient privilege “provides that information is protected which is ‘necessary to enable the person to prescribe for the patient as a physician . . . .’’’In Swickard, this Court concluded that information acquired in the performance of an autopsy fell outside the scope of the privilege because it was not obtained to prescribe treatment.

 170 Mich App 619, 623; 428 NW2d 719 (1988).

 Given plaintiff Gregory sought the names of patients from a psychiatric ward, the names would not be protected by the psychiatrist-patient privilege unless they were necessary for purposes of “examination, diagnosis and treatment.” Id.

 The majority attempts to rationalize the protection of patient names under the physician-patient privilege by explaining that the “chilling of the patient’s desire to disclose would have a detrimental effect on the physician’s ability to provide effective and complete medical treatment . . . .” Ante at 39. Therefore, it concludes protection of patient names is neces*54sary to enable a physician to prescribe for a patient. However, this rationale is flawed because the physician-patient privilege already strikes a balance between confident disclosure and full access to relevant evidence. Id. Therefore, such an expansion of the privilege is not necessary to enable a physician to prescribe for a patient.