Court Opinion

ID: 9745288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:46:40.403647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:47.540166
License: Public Domain

*933WALLIN, J.,
Dissenting.—In January 1992, the decedent, Bruce G. Saville, purchased a new Mitsubishi Montero and financed it through real party, VW Credit, Inc. At the time of Saville’s death the loan balance was approximately $8,700. Letters of administration were issued to the executor, Michael Gertner, on September 1, 1992. On January 13, 1993, a one-page probate court form notice to creditors was mailed to VW Credit at a post office box in Palatine, Illinois. The record establishes the post office box is actually a bank lock box used to gather and apply installment payments. It is not VW Credit’s business premises. The form did not refer to an account number or provide any identifying information other than Saville’s name. This led to some delay in processing so that the form was not received by VW Credit at its corporate office until February 9, 1993. VW Credit had no previous knowledge, actual or otherwise, of the administration of the estate. On that date the form was forwarded to VW Credit’s attorneys in Orange County who filed a petition for an order allowing a late claim on March 9, 1993. Following a hearing in probate court before Judge John C. Woolley, the petition was granted. According to the executor’s petition to this court and the order, Judge Woolley concluded the delay was excusable and the executor was partially responsible for failing to ascertain the proper address for serving VW Credit.
One of our state’s most esteemed trial judges concluded that an obviously indisputable debt should be allowed even though the creditor’s claim was, at most, 26 days late. This rather routine discretionary call in favor of an out-of-state creditor has somehow been transformed by the majority into an abuse of discretion. In a footnote the majority disclaims any intention to overturn an exercise of discretion. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 930, fn. 2.) But the footnote is attached to a sentence which begins, “We conclude, based on the facts of this case, . . .” and the balance of the paragraph discusses those facts. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 930, italics added.) The majority simply disagrees with the trial court’s finding that the address did not provide actual knowledge and that the executor partially caused the problem by not obtaining a better address. The decision sends a chilling message to the financial community and grants a windfall to the estate. I also respectfully disagree with the majority’s suggestion that upholding the trial court prolongs the delay in the closing of estates. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 932, fn. 3.) If the trial court believes a late claimant caused its own problem with sloppy operating procedures, I am confident any late claim will, again in the exercise of discretion, be denied. Probate Code section 9103, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) also answer this concern by not allowing claims to be filed after final distribution, or the passage of one year from the issuance of letters of administration. Finally the court may condition any relief “on terms that are just and equitable.” The majority’s conclusion also undermines the whole *934concept of trial court discretion and the principle that discretion exercised to allow a claim to be determined on the merits should be upheld whenever possible.
Late claims are governed by Probate Code section 9103, subdivision (a) which reads: “Upon petition by a creditor and notice of hearing given as provided in Section 1220, the court may allow a claim to be filed after expiration of the time for filing a claim if the creditor establishes that either of the following conditions is satisfied: [fl] (1) Neither the creditor nor the attorney representing the creditor in the matter had actual knowledge of the administration of the estate more than 15 days before expiration of the time provided in Section 9100, and the creditor’s petition was filed within 30 days after either the creditor or the creditor’s attorney had actual knowledge of the administration whichever occurred first, [f] (2) Neither the creditor nor the attorney representing the creditor in the matter had knowledge of the existence of the claim more than 15 days before expiration of the time provided in Section 9100, and the creditor’s petition was filed within 30 days after either the creditor or the creditor’s attorney had knowledge of the existence of the claim whichever occurred first.”
The time provided in Probate Code section 9100 refers to the 30-day period following the mailing of the notice to creditors. The notice was mailed to the bank lock box on January 18 so that any claim filed by February 17 would be timely. The trial judge found, however, based on the undisputed evidence presented, that “actual knowledge of the administration of the estate” was not obtained by VW Credit until February 9 when the notice was received at its corporate office. Since February 9 is less than 15 days from February 17, the statute extended the deadline until March 10 and, under the facts accepted by the court, VW Credit’s March 9 petition was timely. The majority simply disagrees with the trial court’s factual determination that the notice sent to the bank lock box did not result in actual knowledge.
Although this particular creditor may not be harmed because the executor concedes its claim is secured by the vehicle, the majority’s conclusion ignores the effect of its decision on the financial services industry. Many financial institutions engaged in consumer lending or issuing credit cards direct borrowers to send payments to a bank or post office where a few clerks, aided by mail handling equipment and computers, process them to post the payments as promptly as possible. It is hardly surprising that a California notice form included within the usual mailbags of payments was not immediately sorted out and sent from the bank lock box to VW Credit’s offices. And the trial court’s decision to grant relief to a creditor located
*935nearly 2,000 miles away whose only sin was to file a claim 26 days late when there was no prejudice to the estate should not be disturbed.
I would deny the peremptory writ.
On December 30, 1993, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.