Court Opinion

ID: 9897428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:26.282121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:46.137304
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Apr 12 2023, 9:04 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Edward F. Harney, Jr.                                       Terry Noffsinger
Nicholas C. Naum                                            Kyle Noffsinger
HUME SMITH GEDDES GREEN &                                   KOOI Law Firm, LLC
SIMMONS, LLP                                                Noblesville, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana                                       S. Anthony Long
                                                            Long Law Office, PC
                                                            Boonville, Indiana

                                             IN THE

    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Superior Oil Company, Inc.,                                 April 12, 2023
d/b/a Superior Solvents and                                 Court of Appeals Case No.
Chemicals, Inc.,                                            22A-CT-1595
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Interlocutory Appeal from the
                                                            Vanderburgh Circuit Court
        v.                                                  The Hon. David D. Kiely, Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
Samantha M. Labno-Fritchley,                                82C01-1901-CT-338
individually; as next friend of
Penelope Rose Fritchley, a
minor; and as personal
representative of the estate of
John Henry Fritchley II,
deceased,
Appellees-Plaintiffs.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023                               Page 1 of 15
                                        Opinion by Judge Bradford.
                                     Judges May and Mathias concur.

      Bradford, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   In February of 2018, Boonville resident John Fritchley II attempted to remove

      the top of an empty fifty-five-gallon, metal drum (in particular, “the Drum,”

      generally, “drums”) with a cutting torch when it exploded, blowing the top off

      of the Drum and killing him instantly. The top of the Drum—down at which

      John had to have been looking as he cut—bore a warning label, which included

      a red pictogram of a flame with the words “FLAMMABLE LIQUID” and also

      provided, inter alia, “Do not flame cut, braze or weld empty container.”

      Investigation of the incident revealed that the Drum had previously been in the

      possession of Superior Oil Company, Inc., d/b/a Superior Solvents and

      Chemicals, Inc. (“Superior”), who had filled it with a flammable brake-cleaning

      solution called S-1693.

[2]   In December of 2018, Samantha M. Labno-Fritchley, John’s widow, filed suit

      against Superior (and two other parties) on her behalf, as next friend of her and

      John’s daughter, and as personal representative of John’s estate (collectively,

      “Samantha”). Samantha’s suit included allegations of negligence, violations of

      the Indiana Products Liability Act (“the Act”), negligent infliction of emotional

      distress, and wrongful death. Superior moved for summary judgment, which

      motion the trial court denied. Superior contends that the trial court erred in

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023       Page 2 of 15
      denying its motion for summary judgment, arguing that the designated evidence

      establishes three statutory affirmative defenses to a claim made pursuant to the

      Act. Because we agree with Superior that the designated evidence establishes

      two of the affirmative defenses, we reverse and remand with instructions.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   Superior manufactures a product called S-1693, which is a mixture of eight

      percent isopropanol and ninety-two percent heptane. S-1693 is used as an

      automotive brake cleaner. S-1693 is flammable and will easily burn if exposed

      to flame. After producing S-1693, Superior packages it into drums, which are

      specifically designed to handle flammable liquid. Pursuant to federal

      regulations, Superior affixes a warning label on the top of each drum of S-1693

      that it sells. The label is affixed to the top of each drum, measures

      approximately eight by twelve inches, and is reproduced below.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023      Page 3 of 15
      Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 36.

[4]   The warning label, inter alia, warns of the dangers of an empty metal drum and

      provides certain specific instructions, including “[d]o not flame cut, braze, or

      weld empty container.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 36. The warning label

      also includes a red pictogram of a flame over the words “FLAMMABLE

      LIQUID[;]” two orange-bordered diamonds, one containing a flame and the

      other an exclamation point; a list entitled “DANGER” that includes “[h]ighly

      flammable liquid and vapor[;]” and an instruction to “[k]eep away from

      heat/sparks/open flames/hot surfaces.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 36.

[5]   After manufacturing the S-1693, Superior typically sells the product in drums to

      distributors. Superior ships a material safety data sheet for the S-1693 to every

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023        Page 4 of 15
      new customer to further warn customers of the hazards associated with it.

      Distributors are required to forward the safety data sheet to their customers.

[6]   We will assume, without deciding, that Fritchley had obtained the Drum from

      non-party Paul Rhoades, who had obtained it from an automobile dealership,

      who had purchased it from one of Superior’s distributors. After obtaining the

      Drum from Rhoades, Fritchley took it home, where he attempted to remove the

      top of the Drum with a gas cutting torch. At the time Fritchley purchased the

      Drum from Rhoads, Superior’s warning label was still affixed to its top.

[7]   Prior to the incident, Fritchley had worked at ALCOA Warrick Operations

      (“ALCOA”) in Newburgh, Indiana, for seventeen years. Fritchley started

      working at ALCOA in 2001, and held numerous positions throughout his

      ALCOA employment, including Potroom Crew Leader, Facilities Maintenance

      Crew Leader, Maintenance Technical Assistant, Maintenance Supervisor, and

      Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor. Fritchley also participated in numerous

      training presentations, many of which he repeated during the course of his

      employment. ALCOA training records show that Fritchley attended training

      presentations including “Critical Risk Management[,]” “Fire Prevention,

      Protection & Extinguishers[,]” “Workplace Critical Hazard Refresher

      Training[,]” “Hazard Communication[,]” and “Performing Hot Works and Hot

      Work Permit Refresher Module[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 180.

[8]   The ALCOA Fire Prevention, Protection, and Extinguishers Training

      presentation contained information on fire safety, how fires start, and ignition

      sources of the fires. Fritchley attended this particular training presentation on

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023        Page 5 of 15
      twenty-two separate occasions. Of particular note, a slide entitled “Class B

      Fires” contains specific examples of liquids that can be flammable, including

      gasoline, coatings/solvents, mill sludge, hydraulic oils, and lubricating oils.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 169. The training presentation includes examples

      of ignition sources, such as smoking, combining spontaneously combustible

      materials together, welding, and cutting. Underscoring the hazards with spark

      or flame producing operations, the training presentation also advised employees

      of the requirement to obtain a hot-work permit before performing spark or

      flame producing operations, such as welding, cutting with a torch, and

      soldering.

[9]   The ALCOA Hazard Communication presentation examined container labels

      such as the label on the empty S-1693 barrel. One of the training objectives of

      this presentation was for individuals to “[u]nderstand the information provided

      on hazardous material labels and the Warrick labeling requirements[.]”

      Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 207. This presentation discussed the difference

      between a product identifier, which identifies the hazardous material inside a

      container; a hazard statement, which describes the “nature and degree of

      hazard[;]” pictograms describing different hazards, such as flammable

      materials; and precautionary statements, such as “keep away from

      heat/sparks/open flame[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 213, 214. Fritchley

      participated in this hazard-communication presentation on five separate

      occasions.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023        Page 6 of 15
[10]   Fritchley attended the “Hot Works Awareness and Permit Refresher” on five

       occasions, as well as attending the initial “Hot Work Permit Training Initial[.]”

       Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 140. These training modules contained educational

       materials regarding use and operation of welding, torch cutting, and soldering.

       The training module also apprised the participant as to proper uses of hot work,

       including keeping combustible material away from using flame or spark

       producing tools and the recommendation to find alternative methods such as

       cold cutting which cut materials without creating flame or sparks.

[11]   The Hot Works training module also had a specific slide dedicated to working

       with piping and tanks, stating “[h]ot work performed on piping, tanks, vessels,

       containers, and confined spaces that contain or have previously contained a

       hazardous, flammable, or combustible liquids can explode. Piping, tanks and

       vessels can explode!!!!!!” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 229 (first emphasis added,

       second emphasis in original). The slide also stated: “Never cut or weld on a

       drum[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 229.

[12]   On December 16, 2018, Samantha filed suit against Superior and two other

       parties, making claims of negligence, violations of the Act, negligent infliction

       of emotional distress, and wrongful death. Superior asserted numerous

       affirmative defenses in response to the complaint, including three affirmative

       defenses authorized by the Act. Specifically, Superior alleged

               [a] cause of the physical harm was a misuse of the product by the
               Decedent not reasonably expected by the seller at the time the
               seller sold or otherwise conveyed the product to another party[,]
               [a] cause of the physical harm was a modification or alteration of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023         Page 7 of 15
               the product made by any person after the product’s delivery to the
               initial user or consumer and the modification or alteration was the
               proximate cause of physical harm[, and] Decedent incurred the
               risk of harm by his actions.”
       Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 20–21.

[13]   On November 8, 2021, Superior moved for summary judgment, arguing that all

       of the Estate’s claims arising from the metal drum explosion are governed by

       the Act and subject to all three affirmative defenses provided therein. On April

       6, 2022, the trial court denied Superior’s motion for summary judgment. The

       trial court certified the matter for interlocutory appeal, and we accepted

       jurisdiction.

       Discussion and Decision
[14]   When reviewing the grant or denial of a summary-judgment motion, we apply

       the same standard as the trial court. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Simrell’s Sports Bar &

       Grill, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Summary judgment is

       appropriate only where the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of

       material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

       Id.; Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). To prevail on a summary-judgment motion, a party

       must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element

       of the other party’s claim. Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 741 N.E.2d at 386. Once the

       moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden shifts

       to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue does in fact exist. Id.

       The party appealing the summary judgment bears the burden of persuading us

       that the trial court erred. Id. “In determining whether there is a genuine issue

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023         Page 8 of 15
       of material fact precluding summary judgment, all doubts must be resolved

       against the moving party and the facts set forth by the party opposing the

       motion must be accepted as true.” Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435,

       438–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied.

[15]   Pursuant to the Act,

               a person who sells, leases, or otherwise puts into the stream of
               commerce any product in a defective condition unreasonably
               dangerous to any user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s
               property is subject to liability for physical harm caused by that
               product to the user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s
               property if:
                    (1) that user or consumer is in the class of persons that the seller
                        should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm
                        caused by the defective condition;
                    (2) the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product;
                        and
                    (3) the product is expected to and does reach the user or
                        consumer without substantial alteration in the condition in
                        which the product is sold by the person sought to be held
                        liable under this article.
       Ind. Code § 34-20-2-1. The Act imposes liability upon sellers and

       manufacturers of defective products. Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d

       806, 809 (Ind. 2007) (citing Morgen v. Ford Motor Co., 797 N.E.2d 1146, 1148

       (Ind. 2003)). The Act “governs all actions that are: (1) brought by a user or

       consumer; (2) against a manufacturer or seller; and (3) for physical harm caused

       by a product … regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon

       which the action is brought.” Id. at 810 (citing Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1) (ellipsis

       in Rushford).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023               Page 9 of 15
[16]   A product can be defective within the meaning of the Act because of a

       manufacturing flaw, a defective design, or a failure to warn of dangers while

       using the product. Baker v. Heye-Am., 799 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2003), trans denied. Indiana Code section 34-20-4-2 provides as follows:

               A product is defective under this article if the seller fails to:
                        (1) properly package or label the product to give reasonable
                        warnings of danger about the product; or
                        (2) give reasonably complete instructions on proper use of
                        the product;
               when the seller, by exercising reasonable diligence, could have
               made such warnings or instructions available to the user or
               consumer.
[17]   Moreover,

               [I]n an action based on an alleged design defect in the product or
               based on an alleged failure to provide adequate warnings or
               instructions regarding the use of the product, the party making the
               claim must establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to
               exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the
               product or in providing the warnings or instructions.
       Ind. Code § 34-20-2-2.

[18]   The Act provides three non-exclusive defenses to a products liability action:

       misuse of the product, modification or alteration of the product, and use of the

       product with knowledge of the defect and danger. Ind. Code §§ 34-20-6-3, -4, -

       5; see also Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson, 109 N.E.3d 953, 956 (Ind.

       2018). Superior correctly points out that all three defenses are complete

       affirmative defenses to a claim pursuant to the Act; if any one of them is

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023          Page 10 of 15
       established by the designated evidence as matter of law, Superior would be

       entitled to summary judgment on Samantha’s claims.

       I.      Misuse
[19]   Indiana Code section 34-20-6-4 provides as follows:

               It is a defense to an action under this article […] that a cause of the
               physical harm is a misuse of the product by the claimant or any
               other person not reasonably expected by the seller at the time the
               seller sold or otherwise conveyed the product to another party.
       Misuse “is established as a matter of law when the undisputed evidence proves

       that plaintiff used the product in direct contravention of the product’s warnings

       and instructions.” Campbell, 109 N.E.3d at 955. Moreover, as mentioned,

       misuse is a complete defense under the Act. Id. (“Accordingly, we hold that the

       misuse defense, like the alteration and incurred risk defenses, is a complete

       one.”).

[20]   The Drum’s warning label, which would have been clearly visible to John as he

       prepared to cut, warns generally of the dangers of an empty metal drum that

       contains or has contained S-1693 and specifically instructs not to cut an empty

       drum with a flame:

                                        ATTENTION! This container
                                          hazardous when empty.
                Since empty container retains product residues, vapor or liquid, all
                 labeled hazardous precaution must be observed. Do not flame cut,
                braze, or weld empty container. Do not reuse empty package without
                  commercial cleaning or reconditioning. Store empty container
                                      away from heat and flame.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023         Page 11 of 15
       Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 36 (emphasis added). In addition to the empty

       container warnings and instructions in the paragraph above, the warning label

       includes a red pictogram of a flame over the words “FLAMMABLE

       LIQUID[;]” two orange-bordered diamonds, one containing a flame and the

       other an exclamation point; a list entitled “DANGER” that includes “[h]ighly

       flammable liquid and vapor[;]” and a warning to “[k]eep away from

       heat/sparks/open flames/hot surfaces.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 36.

[21]   Because the undisputed designated evidence establishes that the Drum was used

       in direct contravention of its label’s prominent and explicit warnings regarding

       flammability and instructions regarding flame cutting an empty drum and/or

       exposing it to heat, we conclude that the defense of misuse has been established

       as a matter of law. In light of the prominent and emphatic nature of the

       warning label on the Drum, Superior could not have reasonably expected that it

       would be misused in the way that it was.1

[22]   While the facts of this case are not on all fours with those in Campbell, the

       general question is the same: whether the particular misuse could have been

       reasonably expected. In that case, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that it

       was the number of warnings that were ignored (failure to use a safety guard,

       wear safety glasses, and use a cut-disc rated to 25,000 RPM) that could not have

       been reasonably expected, 109 N.E.3d at 960, while here, it was the nature of

       1
         While we conclude that the label was emphatic and prominent enough to convey the risk posed by the
       Drum to a person without special training, the misuse that occurred in this case—committed, as it was, by a
       person with John’s training and background—would have been particularly unforeseeable.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023                             Page 12 of 15
       the warning. Even though John ignored essentially only one warning, we have

       little trouble concluding that the nature of that warning was prominent and

       emphatic enough that Superior could not reasonably have expected any person

       to ignore it.2

       II. Incurred Risk
[23]   Indiana Code section 34-20-6-3 provides that

               It is a defense to an action under this article (or IC 33-1-1.5 before
               its repeal) that the user or consumer bringing the action:
                    (1) knew of the defect;
                    (2) was aware of the danger in the product; and
                    (3) nevertheless proceeded to make use of the product and was
                    injured.
       Samantha seems to argue that the Drum was a defective product both for

       posing an explosion risk and for failing to bear adequate warnings. Either way,

       the analysis, in large part, boils down to whether the warning label on the

       Drum was adequate, because, even if we assume that the Drum was inherently

       defective for being explosive, the question left would still be whether the

       warning label was adequate to trigger the incurred-risk defense.

[24]   For reasons similar to those that informed our conclusion that John misused the

       Drum as a matter of law, we conclude that the warning label was adequate to

       2
         Samantha focuses on her contention that the use of old drums as burn barrels is common enough that
       Superior could reasonably have expected the Drum to be made into one at some point, perhaps with the use
       a cutting torch. Samantha’s argument somewhat misses the point, however, as it not the foreseeability of the
       use that is the question, it is the foreseeability of the misuse.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023                             Page 13 of 15
       warn a person of the risks posed by the Drum. In summary, the large,

       prominent warning label on the top of Drum informed readers that the contents

       of the Drum were flammable and explosive and would remain so even when

       Drum was empty unless it had been reconditioned. The label also specifically

       informed readers in no uncertain terms not to cut the Drum with a flame even if

       empty, instructions which, if followed, would have avoided the danger posed by

       the Drum altogether. Put another way, the designated evidence establishes that

       the warning label gave reasonable warnings about the dangers posed by the

       Drum and reasonably complete instructions on how to avoid that danger,

       warnings and instructions that would almost certainly have meant more to a

       person like John in light of his extensive training and background with hot

       works, hazardous materials, fire prevention, and the interpretation of such

       labels. See Ind. Code § 34-20-4-2. Either way, if the question is whether the

       warnings were adequate to render the Drum non-defective as a matter of law or

       whether the warnings were adequate to trigger the incurred-risk defense, the

       result is the same: Superior is entitled to summary judgment on all of

       Samantha’s claims.3

[25]   We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings

       consistent with this opinion.

       3
         Because we conclude that the designated evidence establishes the defenses of misuse and incurred risk, we
       need not address Superior’s contention that the designated evidence also establishes the defense of alteration
       as a matter of law.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023                               Page 14 of 15
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1595 | April 12, 2023   Page 15 of 15