Court Opinion

ID: 9634878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:27:19.535131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:31.383359
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Senior Judge Kalish:
I respectfully dissent.
Trial courts are vested with broad discretion in determining definitions of a class as based on commonality of the issues. Such a determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court failed to consider the requirements of the rules or abused its discretion in applying them. Klemow v. Time, Inc., 466 Pa. 189, 352 A.2d 12 (1976); Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 (1975).
The majority concludes that “[a]ppellants appear to presume erroneously that evidence of proximate causation, a critical element of a negligence theory, need not be demonstrated in the class action context.” It further states that “we do not believe that the critical issue of proximate cause has been sufficiently established as common to compel class certification in these cases,” and that “substantial unresolved questions of proximate causation remained and that these issues could only be determined on an individual basis for each aggrieved party.”
*237In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the appellants have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class action rules are met. These rules delineate the scope of inquiry to be exercised by the trial court in passing on a class action motion. I see nothing in the rules that requires the necessity or propriety of an inquiry into the merits. To do so would allow the trial court to turn the motion for a determination of a class action into a motion for summary judgment. Miller v. Mackey International, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (1971); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (1970).
The causal connection between appellants’ damages and injuries and appellees’ conduct should be established at trial. In order for a tort-feasor to be legally responsible for the consequences of a tortious act, the act, in addition to being the cause in fact of the harm complained of, must be the proximate or legal cause of the harm which is a substantial factor in causing the harm complained of. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §431 (1965); Wisniewski v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 574, 323 A.2d 744 (1974). The proximate cause need not be the sole cause. It is sufficient that it be a substantial contributing factor. Hoover v. Sackett, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 447, 292 A.2d 461 (1972).
Furthermore, throughout the class action, the court has extensive powers to insure the efficient conduct of the action, and it has the power to revoke, alter, or modify the certification order if later developments in the litigation reveal that some prerequisite to certification is not satisfied. Sec Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 1710, 1711, 1713.
I believe there was a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion for a class action.