Court Opinion

ID: 9942599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 16:06:19.912376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:16.712156
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                            FOURTH DISTRICT

                           ALANA KOERBER,
                              Appellant,

                                    v.

                         STATE OF FLORIDA,
                              Appellee.

                            No. 4D2022-3025

                          [February 21, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; John J. Murphy, III, Judge; L.T. Case No. 16-
10937CF10A.

  Jason T. Forman of the Law Offices of Jason T. Forman, P.A., Fort
Lauderdale, for appellant.

  Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine M.
Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

    Alana Koerber (“Defendant”) challenges her convictions and sentences
for: 1) violating the Florida Money Laundering Act; 2) criminal use of
personal identification information; 3) grand theft; and 4) defrauding a
financial institution. Defendant claims the trial court committed multiple
reversible errors during trial.

   Defendant argues her convictions for both grand theft and defrauding
a financial institution violate double jeopardy principles. See Pizzo v.
State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1207 (Fla. 2006) (holding that grand theft is a
lesser included offense of organized fraud for double jeopardy purposes).
We agree and reverse the conviction and sentence for grand theft and
remand for resentencing on the remaining charges for which Defendant
was convicted.

  We affirm on the remaining issues raised on appeal and write only to
address whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting
surveillance photographs from the financial institution’s security cameras
showing Defendant depositing an altered check.           The surveillance
photographs were crucial to Defendant’s convictions, and Defendant
argues the State did not lay a proper foundation before introducing them.

    Photographs and videos from unmanned cameras, such as the
surveillance photographs at issue here, are tested for admissibility under
the “silent witness” theory, which provides that “photographic evidence
may be admitted upon proof of the reliability of the process which
produced the photograph or videotape.” Wagner v. State, 707 So. 2d 827,
830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). In Wagner, the First District set forth five factors
for a trial court to consider in determining whether evidence is admissible
under the “silent witness” theory:

       (1) evidence establishing      the   time   and    date    of   the
       photographic evidence;

       (2) any evidence of editing or tampering;

       (3) the operating condition and capability of the equipment
       producing the photographic evidence as it relates to the
       accuracy and reliability of the photographic product;

       (4) the procedure employed as it relates to the preparation,
       testing, operation, and security of the equipment used to
       produce the photographic product, including the security of
       the product itself; and

       (5) testimony identifying the relevant participants depicted in
       the photographic evidence.

Id. at 831. 1

   In order to authenticate the photographs, the State presented
testimony of the branch manager at the financial institution where the
check was deposited. The manager testified that he “assist[s] in the
process” of maintaining the security cameras from which the photographs
were generated, and described the process that the staff performs for
testing the accuracy of the time stamps. While the manager did not
personally pull the surveillance footage, he testified that the footage is

1 This Court cited Wagner with approval in Cirillo v. Davis, 732 So. 2d 387, 388

(Fla. 4th DCA 1999), and Dolan v. State, 743 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

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made in the normal course of business and the employee who normally
pulls the footage did so in this case. Finally, the manager testified the
footage accurately represented the financial institution’s branch location
on the date the time stamps indicated. As for the time stamps’ accuracy,
the staff regularly tests the cameras to make sure the time stamps are
accurate.

   Applying the Wagner factors, the State established: evidence of the
photographs’ time and place via the time stamps; no evidence of
tampering; the cameras’ accuracy; and normal procedures were followed
in pulling the footage. See Wagner, 707 So. 2d at 831. Accordingly, we
hold the court properly admitted the surveillance photographs showing
Defendant depositing the altered check.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new sentencing
hearing.

FORST, J., concurs.
WARNER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.

WARNER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

   Defendant was charged and convicted of an elaborate scheme, in which
a substantial check was altered and deposited at a bank and then most of
that money was transferred into Defendant’s various accounts. A few
surveillance photos from the bank’s video system admitted into evidence
were crucial to the State’s case because the photographs purported to
show Defendant at the teller window when the altered check was
deposited. Defendant objected to the still photos’ admission, arguing that
the State failed to sufficiently authenticate the photos. I agree and would
reverse for lack of proper authentication.

    “Authentication or identification of evidence is required as a condition
precedent to its admissibility.”      § 90.901, Fla. Stat. (2021).       For
photographs and video evidence, two methods are used to establish
authenticity. The first method is through testimony of a person with
knowledge that the photograph fairly and accurately depicts what is
reflected in it. The second method is the “silent witness” theory, under
which “photographic evidence may be admitted upon proof of the reliability
of the process which produced the photograph or videotape.” Wagner, 707
So. 2d 827, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).

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   In Wagner, the court reviewed case law across the country to determine
the factors that a trial court should evaluate in determining whether a
videotape or photograph is admissible, and held that “relevant
photographic evidence may be admitted into evidence on the ‘silent
witness’ theory when the trial judge determines it to be reliable, after
having considered the following:”

      (1) evidence establishing    the   time     and   date   of   the
      photographic evidence;

      (2) any evidence of editing or tampering;

      (3) the operating condition and capability of the equipment
      producing the photographic evidence as it relates to the
      accuracy and reliability of the photographic product;

      (4) the procedure employed as it relates to the preparation,
      testing, operation, and security of the equipment used to
      produce the photographic product, including the security of
      the product itself; and

      (5) testimony identifying the relevant participants depicted in
      the photographic evidence.

Id. at 831.

   We have relied on Wagner in evaluating admissibility of video evidence.
See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 228 So. 3d 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). In
Richardson, the general manager of a donut shop was called to testify as
to a video from her store showing the suspect at the shop. Id. at 132. We
approved the video’s admission based upon Wagner, noting the facts
supporting authentication:

      Here, there is a date and time stamp that can be seen on the
      video. There was also no evidence of tampering, and to the
      contrary, the general manager testified that the video had not
      been altered, edited, or superimposed upon. She also stated
      that there was only one other person with access to the video,
      and although she did not “see with her own eyes” that the loss
      prevention employee did not give anyone else access to the
      video, to the best of her knowledge, it was only that employee
      that accessed the video. Importantly, the general manager

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      also testified that the recording could not be altered by the
      recording device.

      There was not much testimony regarding the condition and
      capability of the equipment in relation to accuracy and
      reliability, but the general manager did testify that she was
      never notified of any malfunction of the equipment. Finally,
      there was testimony that the video equipment was kept in a
      locked office, which only one manager, besides the witness,
      had access to enter. This establishes a level of security
      protecting the recording, as opposed to equipment in the open
      for anyone to have access.

Id. at 134.

   In this case, the State maintained that all it needed to show was that
the photos fairly and accurately depicted the scene. The State called the
bank’s manager as a witness, but he did not testify that he was present at
the time of the transaction. Instead, the manager testified that the photos
accurately depicted the bank on the date in question, and that the writing
on the same page as the photos was made in the normal course of
operations by persons with knowledge. That writing supplied data about
the check deposited and the digital video snapshot dates and time. The
State then moved the photos into evidence.

   At that point, the court allowed the defense to ask further questions
regarding authenticity. The manager testified that he was not responsible
for maintaining the video cameras but assisted in the process. He
explained, “[w]hen they’re setting up cameras we check time stamp
transactions, we do test interactions to make sure that cameras match
with the time transactions are completed.”            The manager also
acknowledged that he was not responsible for the video equipment. The
bank has an employee who can view and pull data but does not control
the equipment. Defense counsel then asked, “[s]ince this other employee
pulled the data and pulled it off the equipment you can’t swear as to when
how that was done?” At that point the State objected, and the question
was never answered. In a sidebar, the parties argued as to what was
required to admit the photographs. Defense counsel provided the court
with Lerner v. Halegua, 154 So. 3d 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), which relied
on the Wagner factors, but the court found Lerner factually
distinguishable. The court admitted the photos without considering the
Wagner criteria.

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    No evidence was offered on most of the Wagner factors. No date and
time stamp appears on the photos, only writing above the photos which
states the date, time, and teller number, as well as check information. The
manager did not testify as to the security of the video from which the
photos were pulled, or whether the video had been or could have been
edited or altered. The manager also did not provide any evidence as to the
equipment or its condition. Most importantly, the State presented minimal
evidence about the cameras’ accuracy, with the manager only testifying
about procedures to test the cameras’ time stamps when the cameras are
first set up. The State did not present any testimony about the regularity
of the testing. Not only did the State present minimal evidence of the
cameras’ accuracy, but the photograph itself disclaims it. At the top of the
page, the photograph states:

      This photograph has been processed and printed by Wells
      Fargo Bank using its best efforts to properly identify the
      photograph with the transaction in question. However, Wells
      Fargo makes no representation that the photograph is, beyond
      any doubt, a depiction of the person making the transaction in
      question. Wells Fargo assumes no responsibility for, or liability
      to, any person for the use or accuracy of this photograph.

    In this case, evidence of the Wagner factors is mostly non-existent and
woefully deficient, even when compared to the evidence in Richardson. The
trial court simply admitted the photos because the manager testified,
without evaluating the Wagner factors. Where the trial court simply fails
to apply the correct law on authentication, this constitutes a legal error to
be reviewed de novo.

      As a general rule, “[a] trial judge’s ruling on the admissibility
      of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
      discretion.” Blanco v. State, 452 So. 2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984).
      “However, a court’s discretion is limited by the evidence code
      and applicable case law. A court’s erroneous interpretation of
      these authorities is subject to de novo review.” McCray v.
      State, 919 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Pantoja v. State, 59 So. 3d 1092, 1095 (Fla. 2011).

   What was so important in this case was whether the person depicted
in the photos deposited the suspect check, which required matching the
time on the check’s deposit to the time on the video. The trial court’s error

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in admitting the photos which were lacking in authentication is not
harmless error.

   Because the trial court did not apply the correct law, and the evidence
did not support the admission of these photographs on the “silent witness”
theory, I would hold that the photographs’ admission was error and
reverse and remand for a new trial. I agree in all other respects with the
majority opinion.

                           *        *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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