Court Opinion

ID: 9757350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:35:25.908824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:38.559229
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen:
I concur in the result for only one reason — I believe that plaintiffs should be permitted to present their case for trial pursuant to the conflict of laws rule of Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A. 2d 796 (1964), whereby the negligence law of Pennsylvania must be applied to this case.
*628My concurrence in no way indicates my approval of the qualifications of plaintiffs’ expert witness who, as a safety officer in the Air National Guard, testified that the accident was caused by pilot error. This so-called expert had previously investigated only two accidents, in neither of which was pilot error the official cause of accident, and based his opinions solely on the depositions and testimony of prior witnesses, because he never viewed the crash scene first-hand.
Nor does my concurrence indicate acceptance of the expert opinions expressed by plaintiffs’ meteorologist. I believe that opinion evidence of the weather conditions at the time of the crash is inadmissible as a violation of the best evidence rule, inasmuch as plaintiffs did not establish that there were no witnesses in the immediate vicinity of the wreckage who could testify from personal knowledge as to the weather conditions. Furthermore, in view of the testimony of the only eyewitness produced by any of the parties that the weather was not cloudy or rainy at the accident locale, little weight may be given to the meteorologist’s testimony, because expert opinion evidence cannot prevail against direct factual credible evidence. Kadilalc Will, 405 Pa. 238, 174 A. 2d 870 (1961).
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s implied acceptance of the tactics of plaintiffs’ counsel in questioning the propriety of certain remarks of the defense attorney. Hardly a more improper procedure by which to object to the closing remarks of opposing counsel can be cited than that demonstrated by counsel in this case, who interrupted the closing statement of defense counsel five times and not once requested that a juror be withdrawn, and who later, having a stenographic transcript of the closing arguments, apparently culled those pages seeking bases for a new trial, after his opportunity to object had long passed. Commonwealth v. Gomino, 200 Pa. Superior Ct. 160, 175, 188 A. 2d *629784, 791 (1963). The practice is clear, and both this Court and the Superior Court have declared on numerous occasions that the party objecting to the remarks of counsel should request the withdrawal of a juror and that the trial judge place upon the record the remarks as the court understood them, or, failing this, counsel may place them on record by affidavit. Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 112 Pa. Superior Ct. 240, 170 Atl. 455 (1934), aff’d per curiam 316 Pa. 129, 173 Atl. 653 (1934); Commonwealth v. Kerr, 171 Pa. Superior Ct. 131, 89 A. 2d 889 (1952). In either event, the objection and request for withdrawal of a juror must be made immediately after the objectionable remark has been uttered, and this rule is in no way changed or modified because the court stenographer has been directed to transcribe the remarks of counsel. That transcription is not part of the record. The only remarks that become part of the trial record are those which are made part thereof by the court or by affidavit of counsel, after the appropriate objection and request have been made.