Court Opinion

ID: 9706587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:47:02.039139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:23.789270
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Emmert, J.
In view of the statutory provisions concerning the annexation and disannexation of territory to cities, I do not believe this court is warranted in holding that the City of Aurora had implied authority to repeal an ordinance of annexation when the matter was pending on appeal in the circuit court.
In City of Peru v. Bearss (1877), 55 Ind. 576, 581, 582, this court correctly held, “the entire proceedings for the annexation of contiguous territory to incorporated cities are statutory proceedings; and to make them operative and give them validity, it is essentially necessary that all the proceedings should be in strict conformity with the provisions and requirements of the statute.”1 See also Windman v. City of Vincennes (1877), 58 Ind. 480, 484. In annexation proceedings the method provided by the statutes shall be followed and no other. City of Delphi v. Startzman (1885), 104 Ind. 343, 346, 3 N. E. 937. “The rule is that where the legislature creates a right and prescribes a remedy, *638or method whereby the right may be enforced, the statutory remedy is exclusive. Victory v. Fitzpatrick (1856), 8 Ind. 281; McCormack v. Terre Haute, etc., R.Co. (1857), 9 Ind. 284; Board, etc. v. Murphy (1885), 100 Ind. 570; Ryan v. Ray (1886), 105 Ind. 101, 4 N. E. 214; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Zumbaugh (1894), 12 Ind. App. 272, 39 N. E. 1058; Boyd, Admr., v. Brazil, etc., Co. (1898), 25 Ind. App. 157, 57 N. E. 732; Wehmeier v. Mercantile, etc., Co. (1912), 49 Ind. App. 454, 97 N. E. 558; Carlisle v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (1902), 168 Mo. 652, 68 S. W. 898; Snyder v. Marks (1883), 109 U. S. 189, 3 Sup. Ct. 157, 27 L. Ed. 901.” Board, etc. v. Adler (1922), 77 Ind. App. 296, 300, 301. This rule was reaffirmed in Bd. of Commrs. v. Millikan (1934), 207 Ind. 142, 149, 190 N. E. 185.
“It is also fundamental that when one seeks the benefit of a statute, or seeks to enforce a statutory right, or liability, he must, by allegation and proof, bring himself clearly within its provisions. Woodward v. State (1910), 174 Ind. 743. Indianapolis etc. Transit Co. v. Foreman (1904), 162 Ind. 85.” City of Indianapolis v. Evans (1940), 216 Ind. 555, 564, 565, 24 N. E. 2d 776.
In determining the legislative intent of a statute, the courts will look to other statutes on the same subject matter and to the evils and the mischiefs to be remedied. Dreves, Inc. v. Oslo School Twp. of Elkhart (1940), 217 Ind. 388, 395, 28 N. E. 2d 252; Bd. of Commrs. v. Millikan (1934), 207 Ind. 142, 152, 190 N. E. 185, supra; Chicago & Calumet District Transit Co., Inc. v. Mueller (1938), 213 Ind. 530, 12 N. E. 2d 247.
Section 48-702, Burns’ 1950 Replacement, which is amended §243, of the municipal corporations Act of 1905, (Acts 1905, ch. 129, §243, pp. 388, 389; 1935, ch. 153, §1, p. 550; 1949, ch. 216, §2, p. 701), should be *639construed according to these well settled rules. The material parts of this act provide:
“Whenever such territory is annexed to such city as provided in the foregoing sections, whether by general ordinance defining the city boundaries, or by special ordinance for the purpose of annexing territory, an appeal may be taken from such annexation by one [1] or more persons deeming himself or themselves aggrieved or injuriously affected, filing their remonstrances in writing against such annexation, together with a copy of such ordinance, in the circuit or superior courts of the county where such territory is situated within thirty [30] days after the last publication provided for in the preceding section; such turitten remonstrance or complaint shall state the reason why such annexation ought not in justice take place. . . . The court shall thereupon proceed to hear and determine stick appeal without the intervention of a jury, and shall give judgment upon the question of such annexation according to the evidence which either party may introduce relevant to the issue. . . . Pending such appeal, and during the time within which such appeal may be taken, such territory sought to be annexed shall not be deemed a part of the annexing city. Upon the determination of such appeal, the judgment shall particularly describe the ordinance upon which the appeal is based, and it shall be the duty of the county clerk to forthwith deliver a certified copy of such judgment to the clerk of such city, who shall record the same in the ordinance record, and make a cross-reference to the page thereof upon the margin where such original ordinance was recorded. In case the decision is adverse to such annexation, no further annexation proceedings for such territory shall be lawful for two [£] years after the rendition of such judgment: . . .” (Italics supplied.)
Section 245 of the municipal corporations Act of 1905, (Ch. 129, 1905 Acts) provided:
“The common council shall have power by ordinance to disannex and throw out any territory forming a part of the corporate limits of such city *640upon a petition of a majority of the owners of real estate therein, . .
This section was superseded by §48-907, Burns’ 1950 Replacement (Acts 1907, ch. 279, §7, p. 617), which was more specific as to the procedure for disannexation. The next section of the 1907 Act, §48-908, Burns’ 1950 Replacement (Acts 1907, ch. 279, §8, p. 617), provided that:
“No proceedings for disannexation or vacation shall be brought under this act, after the termination of a prior proceeding hereunder, affecting the same property, in which the same relief has been asked, until after the lapse of two [2] years from the termination of the prior proceedings.”
It is quite evident that the General Assembly regarded instability of the jurisdiction by local government over territory in and near cities as a mischief to be avoided, and sought to provide a two year period when the status of such lands would not be disturbed. This was for the benefit of the political subdivisions, as well as the property owners. Both annexation and disannexation proceedings were limited to two-year periods, but the effect of the majority opinion is to thwart this definite legislative policy.
In Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. City of Anderson (1911), 176 Ind. 16, 18, 95 N. E. 363, this court held that lands could only be disannexed in strict compliance with the statute, and said:
“In this State, municipal corporations possess and can exercise only such powers as are granted by the legislature in express words, and such powers as are fairly implied or incident to the powers expressly granted, and those essential to the declared objects and purposes of such corporations. Doubtful claims to power as well as any ' doubt or ambiguity in the terms used by the legislature, are resolved against the corporation. Pitts*641burgh, etc., R. Co. v. Town of Crown Point (1896), 146 Ind. 421, 422, 35 L. R. A. 684, and authorities cited.
“The municipal authorities can in no case alter the boundaries unless the power so to do is conferred upon them by the legislature, _ and such power, when conferred, must be exercised under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed. 20 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.) 1151; 28 Cyc. 194-200.” (Italics supplied.)
The City of Aurora relies upon the decision in Mahuron v. City of Salem (1950), 120 Ind. App. 247, 91 N. E. 2d 648, to sustain the action of the trial court in dismissing the appeal' as moot. The exact state of the record in the Mahuron case, swpra, is none too clear. Apparently what the court decided was that a finding was contrary to- law which included therein territory not embraced in an annexing ordinance, as amended by another ordinance passed when the appeal was pending. The reasoning of the court on the power of cities to enact and repeal ordinances was correct as far as it went, but the important exception was omitted, and it is the exception which should govern this appeal at bar.
In Simpson v. State, ex rel. (1912), 179 Ind. 196, 201, 202, 99 N. E. 980, this court recognized the general implied right to repeal, but said:
“But like most general rules there are exceptions to it. It applies ordinarily, of course, to all ordinances which have been passed pursuant to a general grant of discretionary or regulatory authority over the subject of the grant. It will not apply where the ordinance has been enacted under a narrow, limited grant of authority to do a single designated thing in the manner and ■ at the time fixed by the legislature, and which excluded the implication that the common council was given any further authority over the subject than to do the one act." (Italics supplied.)
*642The General Assembly was very specific in providing the procedure for annexation and disannexation. The statutes at no place granted the city the right to repeal the ordinance when the appeal was pending. Section 48-702, Burns’ 1950 Replacement, requires the trial court to enter a judgment on the merits of the appeal. If the City of Aurora can repeal this annexation ordinance after the trial court acquired jurisdiction, and thus make the appeal moot, it can enact another ordinance to annex this territory, and before another appeal is ready for trial, repeal it, and so repeat the process ad infinitum until the annexation is accomplished through the exhaustion of the time and money of the property owners of the territory involved. The legislature never intended such instability in the status of lands in or near cities. The judgment should be reversed.
Note. — Reported in 115 N. E. 2d 734.

. “In 43 C. J. 112, §66, it is stated: ‘A board or body other than the legislature may exercise powers with respect to_ the annexation of territory only when such powers are vested in it by the legislature, and then only to the extent of the powers expressly granted by the legislature; a municipality or its corporate authorities can in no case annex territory without authority conferred by statute or constitutional provision.’ (Our emphasis.)
“In 27 Am. Jur. 640, §24, the rule is stated as follows: ‘A municipal corporation or its corporate authorities have no power to extend its boundaries otherwise than provided for by legislative enactment or constitutional provision. Such power may be validly delegated to municipal corporations by the legislature, and when so conferred must be exercised in strict accord with the statute conferring it.’ (Our emphasis.)” Bradford v. City of Columbus (1948), 118 Ind. App. 408, 412, 78 N. E. 2d 457.