Court Opinion

ID: 9722532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:38:17.524499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:36.723101
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Acting P. J.
I dissent. My disagreement with the majority opinion is directed to the conclusion that the use of a “non-Mirandized” statement for purposes of impeachment is reversible error. I view the essence of the majority conclusion, that use of a non-Mirandized statement falls within the statutory privilege exception to California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (d), and survives the enactment of Proposition 8, as totally unsupportable in reason or law.
California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (d),1 is couched in clear, concise, unambiguous, and direct language. It states, “Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press.” The statutory privileges referred to in subdivision (d) are found in Evidence Code sections 930 and 940. Section 930 dealing with compelled testimony is not implicated in the proceeding under consideration. Section 940 forms the basis for the conclusion of the majority opinion. That section provides, “To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.”
Although section 940 appears to be a straightforward privilege, limited to incriminating evidence, the California Supreme Court in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272], fearful that the federal constitutional standard for the introduction of relevant evidence enunciated in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [28 L.Ed.2d 1, 91 S.Ct. 643], would encourage police misconduct, rejected Harris on state constitutional grounds finding that California Constitution, article I, section 15, protection against self-incrimination includes impeachment, and over*896ruled People v. Nudd (1974) 12 Cal.3d 204, 208 [115 Cal.Rptr. 372, 524 P.2d 844], which had previously been decided consistent with Harris. (Id., at p. 113.)
In my view, the provisions of article I, section 28, subdivision (d), enacted by the voters as Proposition 8, constitutionally reestablished the federal standard as the basis for the introduction of relevant evidence, and effectively overruled that portion of Disbrow dealing with impeachment.
In part I arrive at that conclusion after examination of available evidence relative to the intent of the voters. Prior to the initiative election, Proposition 8 received widespread publicity; newspaper, radio, and television editorials focused on the provisions, and extensive public debate followed describing the various aspects and effects of the constitutional amendment. The voters were provided an election pamphlet containing the title and the summary prepared by the Attorney General; a detailed analysis was also prepared and made available by the legislative analyst.
The legislative analyst pointed out that under California decisional authority, certain evidence was not “permitted to be presented in a criminal trial or hearing.” The analysis went on to advise that the measure would change that and permit all relevant evidence that did not violate federal constitutional standards.
The Attorney General’s argument in favor of the ballot measure pointed out that “higher courts of this state have created additional rights for the criminally accused and placed more restrictions on law enforcement officers.” His statement further advised “This proposition will overcome some of the adverse decisions by our higher courts.”
In a judicial review of an amendment to the organic law of California, we should not likely presume that voters were unaware of the consequences of their action in approving Proposition 8. Rather, we should assume that in approving the constitutional amendment, the voters voted intelligently and considered each aspect of the law which was supplied to them for consideration. (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 243-244 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].)
In this instance, it seems clear to me the voters intended to curtail the sometime practice of the higher California courts of interpreting California constitutional provisions as additional restrictions on the use of evidence in criminal prosecutions.
*897The Supreme Court did that in People v. Disbrow, supra, 16 Cal.3d 101, and expressly rejected the United States Supreme Court decision in Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. 222 [28 L.Ed.2d 1]; it held that “the privilege against self-incrimination of article I, section 15, of the California Constitution precludes use by the prosecution of any extrajudicial statement by the defendant, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, either as affirmative evidence or for purposes of impeachment, obtained during custodial interrogation in violation of the standards declared in Miranda and its California progeny. Accordingly, we overrule Nudd and declare that Harris is not persuasive ... in California.” (16 Cal.3d at p. 113.) It is interesting to note that in People v. Nudd, supra, a 1974 case, in a four-to-three decision, the majority of the then Supreme Court adopted the rationale of the Harris case as falling within the ambit of both the California Constitution as well as the United States Constitution. (12 Cal.3d 204.) In Harris v. New York, supra, the United States Supreme Court, in concluding that the use of “nonMirandized” statements for purposes of impeaching a defendant under cross-examination is not violative of the constitutional provisions against self-incrimination, stated that “Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. [Citations.] Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. Had inconsistent statements been made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly be contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury by way of cross-examination and impeachment.
“The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. We hold, therefore, that petitioner’s credibility was appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements.” (Fn. omitted; id., 401 U.S. at pp. 225-226 [28 L.Ed.2d at pp. 4-5].)
Through Proposition 8, the federal standard for the admission of relevant evidence and particularly the conclusion and rationale of Harris on the use of non-Mirandized prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes has been reestablished as the California standard, and removed from California Constitution, article I, section 15, and Evidence Code section 940 the judicially decreed implication that impeachment was a part of the California constitutional protection against self-incrimination. Article I, section 15, appears to be couched in language not subject to judicial interpretation. It provides in pertinent part, “Persons may not ... be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against themselves, . . .’’It strains judicial *898credulity to include the challenge to a witness’ veracity as a part of the prohibition against compelled incrimination.
The evidence of prior inconsistent statements is relevant and does not violate any statutory privilege. Section 940 precludes only forced testimony that would incriminate. It, like article I, section 15, does not speak to impeachment.
Incriminate is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary as “to furnish evidence or proof of circumstances tending to show . . . guilt.” ((1980) p. 1146, col. 1.) Impeach, on the other hand, is defined as “to challenge, impugn, or charge as having some . . . [bias] . . . not credible, [impeach] the accuracy of his memory.” (Id., p. 1132, col. 2.) More importantly, constitutional provisions adopted by the People are to be interpreted so as to effectuate the intent of the enactment. If the intent of such provision is clear from the language used, there is no room for judicial interpretation. (Kaiser v. Hopkins (1936) 6 Cal.2d 537, 538 [58 P.2d 1278]; Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980) 27 Cal.3d 855 [167 Cal.Rptr. 820, 616 P.2d 802]; Skivers v. State of California (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 652, 655 [91 Cal.Rptr. 707].) Subdivision (d) appears to be unambiguously clear in its provisions stating that “relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding” unless barred by existing statutory rules pertaining among other things to privilege.
In this instance, the truthfulness of defendant’s testimony is relevant. As the Harris court stated, the shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of defense, free from the risk of confrontation of prior inconsistent statements. Such statements do not incriminate; they merely challenge the defendant’s veracity—the most relevant evidential course.
The majority opinion apparently chooses to ignore recent decisions of the California Supreme Court holding that the right to “Truth-in-Evidence” provisions of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d)) abrogate California’s independent exclusionary rule and the exclusion of evidence is not required unless its use would violate some provision of the federal Constitution or existing statutory privileges. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744]; People v. Ruggles (1985) 39 Cal.3d 1 [216 Cal.Rptr. 88, 702 P.2d 170].) The portion of Disbrow, which implicated impeachment of a defendant-witness into California Constitution, article I, section 15 (self-incrimination) in order to exclude the use of non-Mirandized statements for impeachment, as prohibited by Harris, was annulled by Proposition 8 (art. I, § 28, subd. (d)).
*899As a consequence, Evidence Code section 940 now speaks only to self-incrimination and does not include by implication impeachment. The privilege involved in this proceeding and referred to in article I, section 28, subdivision (d), is that privilege which protects against self-incrimination as specified in Evidence Code section 940. The effect of Proposition 8 on article I, section 15, limits the privilege against self-incrimination to just that.
I agree with the Supreme Court decisions in In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d 873, and People v. Ruggles, supra, 39 Cal.3d 1, and would conclude that article I, section 28, subdivision (d), of the California Constitution as enacted by the voters by Proposition 8 in 1982 reestablishes the federal rule as the California standard for the admission of relevant evidence in criminal proceedings.
I would affirm the judgment.

 All further references to this constitutional provision will be directed to section 28, subdivision (d), of article I of the California Constitution, unless otherwise indicated.