Court Opinion

ID: 9602658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:58:21.203002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:10:06.331830
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
Araiza argued at trial that the prosecution peremptorily disqualified two potential jurors because of their race. The prosecution responded by advancing purportedly race neutral reasons in justification of those peremptory challenges: 1) that the African-American woman did not have suf*96ficient community contacts, and 2) that the Hispanic woman did not have sufficient life experiences to make her a suitable juror. Araiza, in turn, argued that the prosecutor had allowed to remain on the jury Cauca-sions who lacked community contacts or had the same lack of life experiences as the minorities excluded by the prosecution. Without pausing to address the defense comparability argument, the court summarily denied the defense motion to strike the panel, observing in passing that the reasons given by the prosecutor were, in fact, racially neutral and that the court had never heard of the Ada County Prosecutor being accused of or having sought to systematically exclude minorities from jury panels. Based on that reasoning, the court concluded that Araiza had not sufficiently established that the prosecution’s challenges were racially motivated.
The majority opinion as written is founded on the bare assumption, as per the recitals in the preceding paragraph, that the district court gave proper consideration to the comparison argument made by the defense. That is an assumption which I am not able to make because of the fact that there is not one iota of evidence in the record to justify it.
Not only does the trial court fail to address Araiza’s argument, its conclusion is logically deficient. The fact that the trial court had never heard of the prosecutor’s office being accused of racial discrimination carries very little weight, if any, and is of no import. For certain it does not establish that the prosecutor was not discriminating in the case at bar. Further, the fact the prosecutor gave race neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges does not mean those reasons are sufficiently valid. Anyone with a facile mind can concoct an apparent racially neutral reason in order to mask purposeful discrimination. In fact, Araiza argued that the comparison evidence proved the prosecutor’s reasons were a pretext. In short, the trial court’s stated conclusion does not follow its stated premises.
Criminal trials such as this require of the trial court that its determination of a challenge be made on the record in open court. In that manner the court hears the race neutral explanations advanced by the prosecution as grounds for excluding the jurors and determines their verity as an acceptable basis for what otherwise will have all of the appearances of being a discriminatory peremptory challenge. Such determination necessarily involves comparing the characteristics of the challenged jurors with the characteristics of those who were not challenged. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has evaluated such a circumstance:
What constitutes a neutral explanation is a question of comparability. Essentially, one must compare the characteristics of the individual which prompted the Government’s strike with the characteristics of those not struck by the Government. In order to have a neutral explanation, the characteristics of the struck individual cannot be present in those white panel members not struck by the government. For example, if the Government strikes one prospective black juror because of the cut of his or her clothing, this peremptory challenge will be suspect if the Government allows white panel members with a similar cut of cloth to remain on the panel.
United States v. Wilson, 853 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir.1988), aff'd en banc 884 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir.1989); see United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir.1987) (defense counsel’s presence at Bat-son 1 hearing is required because counsel may be “able to point out that the [prosecutor’s] stated reasons were pretextual because others similarly situated were allowed to serve.”). Because the trial court here gives no indication of having engaged in an analysis of the attendant circumstances, i.e., particularly Araiza's comparison argument, the judgment entered below should be vacated and remanded for reconsideration.
Notwithstanding the necessity for the foregoing dissent, this is clearly the oppor*97tune time to endorse the caution expressed in the majority opinion which advises,
To eliminate the need for an appellate court to rely on the assumption that comparison evidence was considered, trial courts should in future cases make specific findings concerning the effect of the evidence on the trial court’s decision. This will ensure that the trial court considered comparison evidence offered to establish pretext.
Op. at 88, 856 P.2d at 878 (emphasis added).

. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).