Court Opinion

ID: 9397895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 21:01:40.216428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:28.412777
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4573

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        DUSTIN BLAIR HENRY,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:20-cr-00038-FDW-DSC-1)

        Submitted: May 23, 2023                                           Decided: May 25, 2023

        Before AGEE, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Jeffrey W. Gillette, GILLETTE LAW FIRM, PLLC, Franklin, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
        OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Dustin Blair Henry pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500

        grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846,

        distribution and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of

        21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation

        of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2018). 1 The district court sentenced Henry to 235

        months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

        California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), conceding that there are no meritorious issues for appeal

        but questioning whether Henry’s plea was coerced and whether the district court erred in

        relying on uncharged conduct in applying two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements.

        Although notified of his right to do so, Henry has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. We

        affirm the district court’s judgment.

               Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy during

        which it must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the

        rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to which he is pleading, and the

        maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The

        court also must ensure that the plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or

               1
                 Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g)
        convictions; the new penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) sets forth a statutory
        maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a § 922(g) offense. See Bipartisan Safer
        Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The 15-
        year statutory maximum does not apply in this case, however, because Henry committed
        his offense before the June 25, 2022, amendment of the statute.

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        promises not contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and that a factual

        basis supports the plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).

               Because Henry did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, 2 we review the adequacy

        of the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th

        Cir. 2016). “Under the plain error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error if (1)

        an error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the

        error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

        United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). The record demonstrates that Henry’s dissatisfaction with his plea resulted not

        from coercion, but from his displeasure with his Guidelines range and counsel’s refusal to

        take steps that were not factually or legally supported. We therefore affirm Henry’s

        convictions.

               We review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

        standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Under the Gall standard, a

        sentence is reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. In

        determining procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district court properly

        calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to

        argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and

        sufficiently explained the selected sentence.       Id. at 49-51.    If a sentence is free of

               2
                Although Henry filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he withdrew his motion
        before the court ruled on it.

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        “significant procedural error,” then we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing]

        into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. We “apply a presumption of

        reasonableness to a sentence within or below a properly calculated [G]uidelines range.”

        United States v. Vinson, 852 F.3d 333, 357 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks

        omitted).   This “presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is

        unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 357-58

        (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “[A] sentencing court may consider uncharged and acquitted conduct in determining

        a sentence, as long as that conduct is proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” United

        States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, 799 (4th Cir. 2009). The two Guidelines enhancements

        that counsel questions were based on conduct that Henry admitted in a statement to law

        enforcement, and thus the district court did not err in applying the enhancements. We

        discern no other procedural error in this case. We further conclude that Henry cannot

        overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded to his within-Guidelines sentence.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no meritorious issues for review. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

        This court requires that counsel inform Henry, in writing, of the right to petition the

        Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Henry requests that a petition be

        filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move

        in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that

        a copy thereof was served on Henry.

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              We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                  AFFIRMED

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