Court Opinion

ID: 9394762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 14:01:51.998187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.600254
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1915    Document: 75    Page: 1   Filed: 05/16/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                LEONARD COOPERMAN,
                      Petitioner

                            v.

       SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
                     Respondent
               ______________________

                       2022-1915
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. CB-7521-16-0001-T-1.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: May 16, 2023
                 ______________________

    LENNY COOPERMAN, Feeding Hills, MA, pro se.

     JASON HAMILTON, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.

     SOMMATTIE RAMRUP, Association of Administrative
 Law Judges/IFPTE, Purchase, NY, for amicus curiae Asso-
 ciation of Administrative Law Judges/IFPTE.
                  ______________________
Case: 22-1915    Document: 75     Page: 2    Filed: 05/16/2023

 2                                          COOPERMAN   v. SSA

     Before LOURIE, HUGHES, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
      Leonard Cooperman appeals a decision of the Merit
 Systems Protection Board finding good cause to remove Mr.
 Cooperman from his position as an administrative law
 judge at the Social Security Administration. Because the
 Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and
 because the Board did not otherwise err in its analysis, we
 affirm.
                              I
                             A
     Administrative law judges with the Social Security
 Administration (SSA) review claims for disability benefits.
 One type of disability benefit is for a closed period of
 disability (CPOD). To be eligible for CPOD benefits, a
 claimant must show that they were temporarily disabled,
 but later experienced a medical improvement that allowed
 them to work again. A claimant who receives CPOD
 benefits will receive a lump-sum disability payment
 without having to go through the full hearing process, but
 those claimants might forgo ongoing disability benefits for
 which they might have qualified. Agency regulations
 require that a finding of medical improvement be based
 upon more than a claimant’s own assertion that their
 condition has improved. Instead, a finding of medical
 improvement “must be based on the changes in the
 symptoms, signs, and/or laboratory findings associated
 with [the] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1).
     Along with the relevant statutes and regulations,
 administrative law judges also reference two agency
 manuals for guidance when issuing disability decisions.
 Administrative law judges must follow the policies laid out
 in the agency’s Hearings Appeals and Litigation Law
 Manual (HALLEX), which is binding on all administrative
 law judges employed by the SSA. In relevant part, the
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 COOPERMAN   v. SSA                                         3

 HALLEX requires administrative law judges to make a
 complete record of all hearing proceedings, which includes
 summarizing the content and conclusion of any off-the-
 record proceedings on the record. The HALLEX also
 requires administrative law judges to provide “an
 explanation of the finding(s) on each issue that leads to the
 ultimate conclusion, including citing and discussing
 supporting evidence.” SAppx 13 (quoting HALLEX I-2-8-
 25).
     Administrative law judges may also reference the
 Program Operations Manual System (POMS) for more
 guidance. But the POMS is not a primary source of policy,
 nor are its provisions binding on administrative law
 judges. In relevant part, the POMS states that an
 “improvement in symptoms alone, without associated
 changes in signs or laboratory findings, may, however,
 support finding [medical improvement].” POMS DI
 28010.015(C)(2).
                              B
     Mr. Cooperman was an administrative law judge
 appointed by the SSA in June 2005 and assigned to work
 in the Office of Disability Adjudication Review (ODAR) in
 Springfield, MA. During his employment, Mr. Cooperman
 issued CPOD decisions. Beginning in 2010, claimants
 began filing complaints that Mr. Cooperman was
 pressuring them to accept a CPOD determination in lieu of
 conducting a full disability hearing. Some of these
 claimants immediately re-applied for disability benefits
 after receiving a CPOD decision, increasing the workload
 for ODAR. After approximately 35 of Mr. Cooperman’s
 decisions were found “questionable” for failing to state the
 evidentiary basis for the CPOD determination, Mr.
 Cooperman was offered re-training.
      In January 2011, a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Dis-
 trict of Massachusetts remanded one of Mr. Cooperman’s
 cases, noting that “contrary to the directives of the
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 4                                          COOPERMAN   v. SSA

 regulations and the HALLEX manual, the record does not
 reflect what was discussed off the record prior to the hear-
 ing regarding a ‘proposal’ Plaintiff apparently felt pres-
 sured to ‘accept’ in lieu of a ‘full hearing.’” SAppx 19
 (quoting Betancourt v. Astrue, 824 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216–17
 (D. Mass. 2011)). After the remand, Mr. Cooperman was
 once again offered re-training, including specific instruc-
 tions for explaining the basis for a CPOD determination, as
 well as instructions for memorializing off-the-record dis-
 cussions. But throughout 2011, Mr. Cooperman’s CPOD
 decisions continued to draw complaints from claimants and
 increased scrutiny from the agency, resulting in
 Mr. Cooperman receiving a directive in December 2011 to
 comply with the requirements for issuing CPOD determi-
 nations and for memorializing off-the-record discussions.
 Even after receiving this directive, claimants continued to
 complain about Mr. Cooperman’s decisions, causing the
 agency to conduct interviews with Mr. Cooperman in Octo-
 ber 2012 and in March 2013. After both interviews, the
 agency concluded that Mr. Cooperman was continuing to
 have off-the-record conversations with claimants and their
 counsel without appropriately memorializing those conver-
 sations and was still failing to adequately support his
 CPOD determinations.
     In September 2013, the agency conducted a focused
 review of Mr. Cooperman’s decisions and found a pattern
 of deficiencies. This included “[CPOD] decisions that were
 not supported by the evidence of record; off-the-record
 discussions . . . that were not adequately summarized on
 the record; and unsecured email communications between
 [Mr. Cooperman] and claimants or claimants’
 representatives that contained [personally identifiable
 information] belonging to the claimants.” SAppx 26. This
 led the agency to make a referral to the Office of the
 Inspector General (OIG) for an investigation into the
 “possibility of fraud, waste and abuse, or mismanagement
 by ALJ Cooperman or the representatives appearing before
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 COOPERMAN   v. SSA                                          5

 him.” SAppx 26. The OIG’s report found no evidence of
 criminal wrongdoing but found that Mr. Cooperman’s
 decisions “lacked sufficient reference to medical evidence
 to support” those decisions, and that Mr. Cooperman had
 sent    “emails      containing   [personally     identifiable
 information] that were not encrypted or password
 protected . . . .” SAppx 27. At this point, the agency began
 to seriously consider removing Mr. Cooperman from his
 position.
                               C
      In October 2015, the agency filed a complaint with the
 Merit Systems Protection Board to remove Mr. Cooperman
 from his position for good cause based on two charges:
 neglect of duties and conduct unbecoming. The neglect of
 duty charge included specifications directed at Mr.
 Cooperman’s failure to provide the evidentiary rationale
 behind his CPOD determinations, his failure to
 memorialize off-the-record conversations, and his
 mishandling of claimants’ personally identifiable
 information. The conduct unbecoming charge included 16
 specifications directed at Mr. Cooperman’s email
 communications with various legal representatives that
 potentially gave rise to a perception of partiality. The
 initial decision sustained both charges but found that a
 180-day suspension was the appropriate penalty, rather
 than removal. After both the agency and Mr. Cooperman
 appealed the initial decision to the full Board, the Board
 upheld the initial finding sustaining both charges and
 found good cause to remove Mr. Cooperman from his
 position. The Board found that the initial decision did not
 properly evaluate the Douglas factors 1 regarding the

     1  The Douglas factors are the twelve factors set forth
 in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313, 5
 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981), for an agency to consider when deter-
 mining whether a penalty is appropriate.
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 6                                            COOPERMAN   v. SSA

 notoriety of Mr. Cooperman’s offenses or the potential for
 rehabilitation, and that an appropriate evaluation
 rendered removal the appropriate outcome.
     Mr. Cooperman now appeals.
                               II
      Our review of Board decisions is limited. Whiteman v.
 Dep’t of Transp., 688 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A
 final decision of the Board must be affirmed unless it is “(1)
 arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
 not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without
 procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
 followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5
 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see also Potter v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,
 949 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
                              III
     Mr. Cooperman raises three arguments on appeal.
 First, Mr. Cooperman argues that the Board’s decision to
 remove him for the neglect of duties charge was arbitrary
 and capricious. Second, Mr. Cooperman argues that the
 Board denied him due process, specifically because
 “conduct unbecoming” is impermissibly vague and because
 the Board did not allow him to supplement the evidentiary
 record after the close of evidence. And third, Mr.
 Cooperman argues that the Board incorrectly held that
 removal was the appropriate remedy. We address each of
 these arguments in turn.
                               A
     Mr. Cooperman argues that the neglect of duties
 finding should be reversed for three reasons: first, because
 he was allowed to make CPOD decisions based solely on a
 claimant’s assertion that their medical condition had
 improved; second, because the standard for “adequately”
 summarizing his off-the-record proceedings was vague;
 and third, because he eventually corrected how he handled
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 COOPERMAN   v. SSA                                        7

 claimants’ personally identifiable information. Pet. Br. 12–
 17, 25–29. None of these arguments is persuasive.
     Mr. Cooperman relies on POMS DI 28010.015(C)(2) 2,
 which says that [“i]mprovement in symptoms alone,
 without associated changes in signs or laboratory findings,
 may, however, support finding [medical improvement]”
 (emphasis added), to argue that a claimant’s assertions
 about her symptoms alone can constitute sufficient
 evidence to decide a CPOD claim. We do not agree, because
 doing so would require us to give more authority to an
 internal guidance document than the statutory or
 regulatory frameworks that bind administrative law
 judges. This sentence from the POMS—which is merely an
 internal manual with no binding authority—cannot
 supersede the statutory and regulatory framework that
 administrative law judges are required to follow. Courts
 have recognized that the POMS is merely a document to
 guide administrative law judges and does not replace or
 supersede any corresponding regulations. See e.g., Wash.
 State Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Est.
 of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003) (noting that POMS are
 just “the publicly available operating instructions for
 processing Social Security claims”).
     The parties dispute whether there is a direct conflict
 between the POMS, which, as we have noted, provides that
 [“i]mprovement in symptoms alone, without associated
 changes in signs or laboratory findings, may, however,
 support finding [medical improvement],” and the
 applicable regulations, which require that any decision
 finding medical improvement “must be based on
 improvement in the symptoms, signs, and/or laboratory
 findings associated with [the] impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R.

    2    Mr. Cooperman actually cites to POMS DI
 28010.015(A)(2), but the current version with this lan-
 guage is found at 28010.015(C)(2).
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 8                                           COOPERMAN   v. SSA

 § 404.1594(b)(1)      (emphasis     added);    20    C.F.R.
 § 416.994(b)(1)(i) (containing identical language). We need
 not resolve this dispute. Whether or not there is a conflict,
 the regulations are governing while the POMS is not.
 Moreover, Mr. Cooperman was repeatedly instructed he
 could not base CPOD decisions solely on a claimant’s word,
 and his failure to comply with that direction provides
 substantial evidence for the Board’s decision, regardless of
 whether the POMS and the regulations conflict with one
 another.
      For his summary of off-the-record proceedings,
 Mr. Cooperman claims that the standard for appropriate
 summaries was impermissibly vague. But Mr. Cooperman
 does not explain why the standard is vague, especially
 given how much training he received about memorializing
 off-the-record proceedings and the specific directive he was
 given. Mr. Cooperman makes general arguments that his
 summaries were adequate and that the agency only looked
 at a small sample of his decisions, but he does not argue
 why the Board’s findings regarding his summaries were
 unsupported by substantial evidence. Mr. Cooperman does
 not deny that he received multiple trainings on how to
 appropriately memorialize off-the-record conversations on
 the record. Because Mr. Cooperman has not explained how
 the Board’s decision lacks substantial evidence or contains
 any legal error, we see no basis to disturb the Board’s
 findings.
     Finally, as for Mr. Cooperman’s handling of claimants’
 personally identifiable information, Mr. Cooperman
 merely argues that he eventually corrected his conduct.
 Pet. Br. 26. Mr. Cooperman relies on the Board’s decision
 in Adamek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 11 M.S.P.B. 482 (1982),
 where the Board held that the agency is barred from
 combining two actions for which there was already an
 adverse action taken, into a new charge to take a more
 severe adverse action. We agree with the Board’s
 conclusion that Adamek does not apply here because
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 COOPERMAN   v. SSA                                          9

 Mr. Cooperman was not subject to an adverse action
 regarding his mishandling of personally identifiable
 information. Mr. Cooperman admitted that he failed to
 encrypt emails containing personally identifiable
 information and has not explained why the Board’s finding
 on that admission was unsupported by substantial
 evidence.
     As a result, we are unpersuaded by Mr. Cooperman’s
 arguments regarding his neglect of duties charge, and we
 find that the Board’s determination for that charge is
 supported by substantial evidence.
                               B
     Next, Mr. Cooperman argues that he was denied due
 process for two reasons: first, because the charge of
 “conduct unbecoming” is impermissibly vague; and second,
 because the Board did not allow him to submit additional
 evidence after the record was closed. Pet. Br. 18–25. We
 disagree with Mr. Cooperman on both counts.
     The specifications underlying Mr. Cooperman’s
 conduct unbecoming charge fall into two categories in 5
 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b): breach of duty of impartiality at (b)(8)
 and breach of duty to avoid creating the appearance of a
 violation of a law or ethical standard at (b)(14).
 Mr. Cooperman does not specifically challenge any of the
 specifications underlying this charge, nor does Mr.
 Cooperman deny the content of any of the emails that led
 to this charge. Instead, Mr. Cooperman invites us to create
 a new standard by which administrative law judges are
 “only subject to discipline for a violation of any Federal or
 State Law, or any written policy expressly and specifically
 defining what constitutes a violation.” Pet. Br. 24.
 Mr. Cooperman does not provide any legal reasoning or
 support for this request, and we decline his invitation.
 Furthermore, Mr. Cooperman asks us to overturn two of
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 10                                         COOPERMAN   v. SSA

 our cases 3 upholding the removal of administrative law
 judges for conduct unbecoming charges, but again does not
 provide any rationale for us doing so. Thus, Mr. Cooperman
 has not persuasively explained why his “conduct
 unbecoming” charge is impermissibly vague.
     As for his efforts to supplement the closed record,
 Mr. Cooperman argues that the Board abused its
 discretion by refusing to supplement the closed record with
 more emails he gathered supporting his argument that
 administrative law judges could follow guidance in the
 POMS. Pet. Br. 19–20. But the Board need not accept any
 additional evidence or argument after the record closes
 unless it is new and material. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(k).
 Mr. Cooperman has not explained how any of the emails he
 sought to add to the record contained “new” or “material”
 information—in fact, the record already contained
 evidence that administrative law judges could consider
 guidance in the POMS, but could not use it to replace or
 supersede regulations. Thus, we are unpersuaded that the
 Board abused its discretion by declining to accept this
 additional evidence after the record closed.
     Because both of Mr. Cooperman’s arguments regarding
 his due process rights are unavailing, we hold that the
 Board did not violate any of Mr. Cooperman’s due process
 rights while handling his removal case.
                             C
    Finally, Mr. Cooperman argues that even if both
 charges could be sustained, removal was not the
 appropriate remedy. Pet. Br. 28. Beyond reiterating
 arguments that we have already rejected in previous

      3  Mr. Cooperman asks us to overturn Long v. Social
 Security Administration, 635 F.3d 526 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and
 Abruzzo v. Social Security Administration, 489 Fed. App’x
 449 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (non-precedential).
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 COOPERMAN   v. SSA                                       11

 sections, Mr. Cooperman does not identify any errors with
 the Board’s decision to remove him, nor does he challenge
 the Board’s analysis of the Douglas factors. Here, we see no
 reason to disturb the Board’s determination that removal
 was an appropriate remedy considering the severity of
 Mr. Cooperman’s conduct. The Board sustained both
 charges underlying the agency’s request to remove
 Mr. Cooperman from his position, and nothing in the
 record requires a re-evaluation of the Douglas factors or
 the Board’s conclusion to remove Mr. Cooperman from his
 position. Thus, we hold that the Board’s decision removing
 Mr. Cooperman from his position was supported by
 substantial evidence.
                             IV
      We have considered Mr. Cooperman’s remaining
 arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we
 affirm the Board’s decision granting the agency’s request
 to remove Mr. Cooperman from his position as an
 administrative law judge.
                        AFFIRMED