Court Opinion

ID: 9517883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:35:58.176701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:12.744951
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 62. (concurring). I agree with the majority that this is not a case in which the four corners rule is applicable. The majority aptly explains why this case does not present the issue of whether there are exceptions to the four corners rule.
¶ 63. I also agree with the majority that the conduct here does not constitute an accident or occurrence within the meaning of the Matthews' insurance policy. I write separately because of the majority's mixed analysis of "accident," and my belief that we should interpret "accident" as would the reasonable insured.
¶ 64. The majority fails to provide a clear statement of why Jeffrey's action does not constitute an accident, and hence an occurrence, within the meaning *577of the Matthews' insurance policy. Instead, it offers mixed rationales that lead to confusion rather than clarity. Ultimately, the majority proffers an understanding of "accident" that does not comport with the understanding of the reasonable insured.
¶ 65. The focus of this case is the conduct alleged in count 3 of the complaint, and supplemented by deposition testimony. See majority op., ¶¶ 50-51. Count 3 alleges that Jeffrey "committed battery without provocation by intentionally causing bodily harm . . . ." Specifically, Jeffrey punched Sustache in the face.
¶ 66. In determining that this case does not involve an accident, the majority offers shifting rationales. The first rationale it offers is that Jeffrey intentionally caused bodily harm to Sustache. Id., ¶ 52. In other words, the intent to harm, rather than intent to perform the action that caused the harm, is the focus.
¶ 67. The majority's second rationale is that Jeffrey "intended the punch" that caused Sustache's injury and death. Id., ¶ 53. Stating that an accident requires that the cause of damages be unintended, the majority reasons that damages due to an intended punch cannot be an accident. The action which caused the damage is the focus of the second rationale.
¶ 68. The majority's third rationale is that "Jeffrey voluntarily traveled to Sustache's location... to confront him and intentionally punched Sustache . . . ." Majority op., ¶ 54. According to the majority, this constitutes "apattern of volitional action." Id. (emphasis added). The majority states that the actions here "evince a degree of volition inconsistent with the term 'accident.'" Id. (emphasis in original). A "pattern of volitional action" is the focus of the third rationale.
¶ 69. My view is that we should stick with this court's longstanding doctrine in interpreting insurance *578policies. Language in an insurance policy should be construed as understood by a reasonable person in the position of the insured. Frost v. Whitbeck, 2002 WI 129, ¶ 20, 257 Wis. 2d 80, 654 N.W.2d 225. As I have stated elsewhere, in determining whether there is an accident, the focus should be on the injury or damages, not on whether the action that caused the damages was intended. Stuart v. Weisflog, 2008 WI 86, ¶ 4 & n.1, 311 Wis. 2d 492, 753 N.W.2d 448 (Bradley, J., concurring) (Stuart IT). Such a view comports with the understanding of the reasonable insured.
¶ 70. Thus, the majority's first rationale, the fact that Jeffrey intended harm to Sustache when he threw the punch, is sufficient to determine that there is no accident here. The analysis should end right there.
¶ 71. Accordingly, because of the majority's mixed analysis of "accident," and for the reasons set forth more fully in my concurrence in Stuart II, I respectfully concur.