Court Opinion

ID: 9386406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:04:03.105621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.266040
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                       JUAN CRESENCIO MATOS,
                              Appellant,

                                      v.

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,
                                Appellee.

                               No. 4D22-775

                              [April 12, 2023]

   Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth
Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Daliah H. Weiss, Judge; L.T. Case
No. 50-2019-CF-002928-AXXX-MB.

   Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Robert Porter, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alexandra A. Folley,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

WARNER, J.

   Appellant challenges his conviction for human trafficking of a child
under the age of eighteen for commercial sexual activity in violation of
section 787.06(3)(g), Florida Statutes (2018). He contends that a judgment
of acquittal should have been granted as to human trafficking, because
the State failed to prove that he knowingly engaged in human trafficking.
He argues that his offense amounted to misdemeanor prostitution with the
minor victim. The State cross-appeals the appellant’s forty-year sentence,
contending that the applicable statute requires a life sentence. We affirm
appellant’s conviction, as appellant’s conduct satisfied the elements of
human trafficking under the statute. We reverse the sentence, as the
statute requires a life sentence.

   The victim, a fifteen-year-old girl, lived in a car with Christopher Proby.
Proby used the victim’s phone to text and set up prostitution dates for the
victim. Appellant was one of the individuals with whom Proby set the
victim up for a “date.”
   Forty-nine messages in total were sent between the victim and
appellant. Text messages show that appellant contacted whom he believed
to be the victim about performing various sex acts on two different days.

   On the first day appellant texted, appellant picked her up and drove
her to a parking lot. Appellant parked his pickup truck in a deserted area.
Appellant then digitally penetrated the victim’s vagina and afterwards gave
her money. Appellant dropped the victim back off in the general area of
Proby’s car. The victim gave Proby the money that appellant gave her.

   About two weeks later, appellant and the victim had contact again. The
appellant’s text messages included two photographs of himself, and the
victim sent four photos of herself. The phone also showed a four-minute
phone call between the victim’s phone and appellant’s phone.

   During an investigation of Proby and after searching the victim’s phone,
investigators discovered appellant. Appellant was charged with human
trafficking of a child under the age of eighteen (count 1), two counts of
lewd or lascivious battery on a person twelve years of age or older, but less
than sixteen years of age (counts 2 and 3), lewd or lascivious conduct on
a person under sixteen years of age (count 4), and unlawful use of two-
way communications device (count 5). As to the human trafficking charge,
the amended information stated:

      COUNT 1: JUAN CRESENCIO MATOS on one or more
      occasions, on or between June 29, 2018 and July 13, 2018,
      in the County of Palm Beach and State of Florida, did
      knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the facts, engage, or
      attempt to engage in the human trafficking of [ ], a child
      under the age of eighteen, or benefited financially by receiving
      anything of value from participating in a venture that has
      subjected [ ], a child under the age of eighteen, to human
      trafficking, for commercial sexual activity, contrary to Florida
      Statute 787.06(3)(g). (LIFE FEL)

    The court granted a judgment of acquittal as to count 2, one of the lewd
or lascivious battery counts. Appellant moved for a directed verdict as to
the human trafficking charge, contending that the State had failed to prove
trafficking and at most appellant was guilty of misdemeanor prostitution.
The trial court denied the motions, and appellant was found guilty of all
the remaining counts by jury verdict. The court adjudicated appellant
guilty on the charges, including sentencing him to forty years in prison on

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the human trafficking charge over the State’s objection that the statute
provided a life sentence. Appellant received lesser sentences on the other
charges, none of which are the subject of this appeal.

   From the conviction and sentence, appellant has taken this appeal of
his conviction for human trafficking, and the State has cross-appealed the
sentence for that crime.

   Appellant contends that the State offered no evidence that he knew or
was in reckless disregard of the fact that the victim was being exploited,
which the statute does not define. As appellant states in his brief, “Merely
engaging in prostitution, without more, should not impute knowledge of
human trafficking to Appellant.” The State argues that the statute covers
the activity in which appellant engaged, and the evidence presented a
question for the jury as to whether appellant knowingly or in reckless
disregard of the facts engaged in human trafficking with the minor victim.
We agree with the State.

                              Analysis
                       Human Trafficking Statute

   The human trafficking statute, section 787.06, Florida Statutes (2018),
provides:

      (3) Any person who knowingly, or in reckless disregard of the
      facts, engages in human trafficking, or attempts to engage in
      human trafficking, or benefits financially by receiving
      anything of value from participation in a venture that has
      subjected a person to human trafficking:

         ....

      (g) For commercial sexual activity in which any child younger
      than 18 years of age . . . is involved commits a life felony,
      punishable as provided in s. 775.082(3)(a) 6., s. 775.083, or
      s. 775.084.

§ 787.06(3)(g), Fla. Stat. (2018). Section 787.06 defines human trafficking
as “transporting, soliciting, recruiting, harboring, providing, enticing,
maintaining, or obtaining another person for the purpose of exploitation
of that person.” § 787.06(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2018). “Commercial sexual
activity” means “any violation of Chapter 796 or an attempt to commit
any such offense[.]” § 787.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis supplied).

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Chapter 796 includes section 796.07, Florida Statutes (2018), which
prohibits prostitution and related acts.

    “Exploitation” is not defined in the section 787.06. Where a term is not
defined, the courts look to the plain ordinary meaning of the word. Debaun
v. State, 213 So. 3d 747, 751 (Fla. 2017). Merriam Webster’s online
dictionary defines the verb exploit as “to make use of meanly or unfairly
for one’s advantage.”     Exploit, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/exploit (last visited March 22, 2023); see also
Exploitation, Cambridge Dictionary Online, https://dictionary.cambridge.
org/us/dictionary/english/exploitation (last visited March 22, 2023)
(defining exploitation as “the use of something in order to get an advantage
from it”). Also, in Florida Statutes, Chapter 39, regarding proceedings
“relating to children,” the Legislature defined “the sexual exploitation of a
child,” to include “the act of a child offering to engage in or engaging in
prostitution, or the act of allowing, encouraging, or forcing a child to: 1.
Solicit for or engage in prostitution; . . . or 3. Participate in the trade of
human trafficking as provided in s. 787.06(3)(g).” See § 39.01(77)(g), Fla.
Stat. (2018). 1

    Moreover, section 787.06 provides a definition for exploitation, by the
examples of human trafficking that are prohibited in section 787.06(3)(a)
through subsection (3)(g), which include coerced labor, coerced services,
and sexual exploitation. Soliciting a child for prostitution is included
within the meaning of “exploitation” by section 787.06(3)(g). Thus, we
conclude the statute does include prostitution of a child within the
definition of human trafficking. A person who “knowingly or recklessly in
disregard of the facts” engages in human trafficking by soliciting a child
for commercial sexual activity violates the statute. Such activity includes
any violation of Chapter 796, prohibiting prostitution and related acts. See
§ 787.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018).

    While appellant maintains that the Legislature could not have intended
to include “merely engaging in prostitution” with a child within the ambit
of human trafficking, an amendment to Chapter 296 in the 2014 creation
of the human trafficking statute shows otherwise. See Laws of Florida, c.
2014-160, §9 (Oct. 1, 2014). In that Act, the Florida Legislature created
section 796.001, Florida Statutes (2018), which provides:

1The definition is offered in the context of defining “[s]exual abuse of a child” “for
purposes of finding a child to be dependent[.]” § 39.01(77)(g), Fla. Stat. (2018).

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      It is the intent of the Legislature that adults who involve
      minors in any behavior prohibited under this chapter be
      prosecuted under other laws of this state, such as, but not
      limited to, s. 787.06, chapter 794, chapter 800, s. 810.145,
      chapter 827, and chapter 847. The Legislature finds that
      prosecution of such adults under this chapter is inappropriate
      since a minor is unable to consent to such behavior.

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Legislature specifically directed that
prostitution of minors be prosecuted under the human trafficking statutes
and not as misdemeanors under Chapter 796.

   Appellant admits he engaged in an act of prostitution with the victim,
who was a minor. Section 787.06(9) provides that the “defendant’s
ignorance of the victim’s age, the victim’s misrepresentation of his or her
age, or the defendant’s bona fide belief of the victim’s age cannot be raised
as a defense.” § 787.06(9), Fla. Stat. (2018). Consequently, because
appellant knowingly engaged in prostitution, the court did not err in
denying his motion for directed verdict, and the case was properly
submitted to the jury.

   As a second issue, appellant contends that he was entitled to be tried
by a twelve-person jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. We
have previously rejected this challenge. See Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d
72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (noting that the Supreme Court in Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 (1970) held that six-person juries were
constitutionally permissible, and noting that the Court does not overturn
earlier authority sub silentio); Hall v. State, 355 So. 3d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA
2023); Ciriello v. State, 355 So. 3d 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). We reject the
argument again.

   Finally, appellant contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court
imposed $200 in costs without the State requesting or offering proof of this
cost which was higher than the statutory maximum of $100. See §
938.27(8), Fla. Stat. (2018). The State bore the burden to prove the higher
fees, and the court was required to make factual findings to support the
higher fees, neither of which were done. Accordingly, the trial court erred
in imposing the $200 in costs. See Jenkins v. State, 332 So. 3d 1013,
1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). We remand for the trial court to reduce the
cost to the statutory minimum of $100, or to reimpose the amount if
sufficient findings are made. See Bartolone v. State, 327 So. 3d 331, 336
(Fla. 4th DCA 2021).

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                              Cross-Appeal
                  Life Penalty for Violation of Statute

   The State cross-appeals the trial court’s sentence of forty years in
prison for appellant’s conviction on human trafficking. The State argues
that section 787.06 requires a mandatory life sentence, while appellant
contends that the trial court had discretion to impose a lesser sentence.

   “The legality of a criminal sentence is reviewed de novo.” Davis v. State,
218 So. 3d. 890, 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). “Likewise, issues of statutory
interpretation are reviewed de novo.” Id.

   Section 787.06(3)(g), with which appellant was charged, states that any
person committing that offense “commits a life felony.” Appellant and the
State agree that appellant was to be sentenced based on section
775.082(3)(a)6., Florida Statutes (2018), which states:

      (3) A person who has been convicted of any other designated
      felony may be punished as follows:

          ....

      (a) . . .

      6. For a life felony committed on or after October 1, 2014,
      which is a violation of s. 787.06(3)(g), by a term of
      imprisonment for life.”

Id. (emphasis added).

   The trial court was persuaded that the statute did not require a
mandatory life sentence because of the use of “may” in the beginning
section of the statute. But the use of the word “may” in the beginning of
the subsection does not provide the trial court with discretion as to what
sentence to impose where the Legislature has mandated a specific
sentence. See Myles v. State, 602 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Fla.1992) (“[I]t is
settled that the word ‘may’ is not always permissive, but may be a word of
mandate in an appropriate context.”); Sloban v. Fla. Bd. of Pharmacy, 982
So. 2d 26, 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“[I]f reading ‘may’ as permissive leads
to an unreasonable result or one contrary to legislative intent, courts may
look to the context in which ‘may’ is used and the legislature’s intent to
determine whether ‘may’ should be read as a mandatory term.”).

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    The plain text of section 775.082(3)(a)6. has only one sentencing option
for a defendant convicted of human trafficking of a minor for commercial
sexual activity under section 787.06(3)(g), an “imprisonment for a term of
life.” The subsection does not suggest a sentencing range is available to
the court to vary the sentence. The Legislature could have authorized
punishment “by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life
imprisonment”, as stated in other subsections of section 775.082(3). See,
e.g., § 775.082(3)4.a., Fla. Stat. (2018) (providing for either “(I) A term of
imprisonment for life; or (II) A split sentence that is at term of at least 25
years . . . and not exceeding life imprisonment, . . .”); § 775.082(3)(b), Fla.
Stat. (2018) (stating “For a felony of the first degree, by a term of
imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by
statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life
imprisonment”); § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2018) (stating “For a felony of
the second degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years”); §
775.082(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2018) (stating “For a felony of the third degree, by
a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years”). The Legislature did not.
Life is the only sentence provided for the crime of which appellant was
convicted.

    Rochester v. State, 140 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2014), is similar and applies
here to require the trial court to impose the mandatory life term. In
Rochester, the defendant was convicted of lewd or lascivious molestation
of a child under the age of twelve. Id. at 973. The trial court decided that
it lacked discretion to sentence the defendant for less than a mandatory
minimum of twenty-five years pursuant to section 775.082(3)(a)4. for the
violation of section 800.04(5)(b). Pursuant to section 775.082(3)(a)4.a.,
the trial court had two choices—either life imprisonment or a split
sentence with not less than twenty-five years in prison followed by
probation or community control for the remainder of the defendant’s
natural life. The supreme court held that the use of “may” meant that the
trial court could only choose between the two sentencing alternatives in
the statute. Id. at 975. Thus, “while the statute does give the trial court
some discretion in which sentence it chooses to impose for violations of
section 800.04(5)(b), under the plain meaning of the statutory language
the trial court does not have the discretion to impose a sentence below the
twenty-five year minimum set forth in section 775.082(3)(a) 4.a(II).” Id.

   With respect to the sentence for human trafficking of a child, the statute
provides only one sentence—life imprisonment. The trial court erred by
imposing the forty-year sentence, as that was not an alternative allowed
by statute. We thus reverse and remand for the trial court to impose a life
sentence. While this sentence may appear exceedingly harsh compared to

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other offenses, such as lewd and lascivious battery of a child, which would
be a second-degree felony, see section 800.04(4)(b), Florida Statutes
(2022), the Legislature has clearly designated the commercial exploitation
of a child through human trafficking as a particularly egregious crime
which it intends for the State to prosecute to the fullest extent. 2 See §
787.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2018).

                                  Conclusion

   Section 787.07(3)(g), Florida Statutes (2018), penalizes the human
trafficking of a child for the purposes of commercial sexual activity. This
includes the act of prostitution of a child.         Appellant engaged in
prostitution with the victim, a child, and the jury found him guilty of that
crime. We affirm his conviction. We reverse his forty-year sentence for
human trafficking, as the statute mandates a life sentence. We also
reverse the assessment of costs. We remand for the court to resentence
appellant to a life term.

    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

GERBER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

                              *         *         *

    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

2 Similarly, the United States Congress has designated purchasers of sex acts
from a child as human traffickers with severe penalties. See Mary Graw Leary,
Dear John, You are a Human Trafficker, 68 S. C. L. Rev. 413, 418 (2017)
(“Congress explicitly recognized what was already in the law: people who
purchase others for sex can be considered human traffickers themselves.
Consequently, such individuals face significant penalties, and purchasers, whose
role has historically been minimized, are recognized as the cause of much of this
victimization.”) (footnotes omitted) (citing Trafficking Victims Protection Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1487 (2012 & Supp. 2015) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1591)).

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