Court Opinion

ID: 9850046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:51:30.675737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.877007
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.,
dissenting.
The issue in this case is whether the search warrant affidavit contains information that supports the issuing magistrate’s determination that probable cause exists to search the buildings on the property where the growing marijuana was observed. The issue is not whether the affidavit states facts which prove that the defendants possessed the growing marijuana. The majority’s rejection of this search warrant and its analysis of what facts are necessary seems to address the latter issue. I conclude that the affidavit and the warrant are sufficient and therefore dissent.
In analyzing the sufficiency of a search warrant, it is well to reiterate some fundamental precepts of the analysis. In United States v. Ventresca, 380 US 102, 85 S Ct 741, 13 L Ed 2d 684 (1965), the Court said:
“* * * [T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. * * *” 380 US at 109.
*173See also State v. Tacker, 241 Or 597, 407 P2d 851 (1965). A second important precept was reiterated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213, 103 S Ct 2317, 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983):
“* * * A magistrate’s ‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.’ * * * ‘A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants,’ * * * is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; ‘courts should not invalidate warrants] by interpreting affidavits] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense manner.’ ” 462 US at 236. (Citations omitted.)
The third ingredient of the analysis concerns the meaning of the term “probable cause” as it relates to search warrants. We have often used the term “well warranted suspicion” as synonymous with probable cause. State v. Schroeder, 62 Or App 331, 661 P2d 111, rev den 295 Or 161 (1983); State v. Harp, 48 Or App 185, 616 P2d 564, rev den 290 Or 171 (1980); State v. Willis, 24 Or App 409, 545 P2d 1392, rev den (1976); State v. Keith, 2 Or App 133, 465 P2d 724, rev den (1970). In the light of the Supreme Court’s admonition in State v. Verdine, 290 Or 553, 624 P2d 580 (1981), the “well warranted suspicion” formulation may not be appropriate, because it focuses on suspicion rather than inferences from fact.
It is probably fruitless to pursue a search for a series of words that defines probable cause for all search questions. It is fruitful to put the phrase in context by delineating what the phrase does not entail.
ORS 131.005(11) provides:
“ ‘Probable cause’ means that there is a substantial objective basis for believing that more likely than not an offense has been committed and a person to be arrested has committed it.”
The definition of probable cause contained in ORS 131.005(11) relates to the basis for a lawful arrest. That definition is not readily transferrable to search warrant analysis. Equating the probable cause necessary for a valid search warrant with the concept of “more likely or more probable than not” makes probable cause akin to the standard of proof *174necessary in formal legal proceedings. In United States v. Hendershot, 614 F2d 648 (9th Cir 1980), the court said:
“* * * [T]he ‘more-likely-than-not’ standard is improper. It is only necessary that the affidavit enable the magistrate to conclude that it would be reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated by the affidavit. * * *” 614 F2d at 654.
In an extensive analysis of the probable cause construct, the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, supra, said:
«* * * More recently, we said that ‘the quanta... of proof appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. Brinegar [v. United States, 338 US 160, 173, 69 S Ct 1302, 93 L Ed 2d 1879 (1949)]. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate’s decision. While an effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty corresponding to ‘probable cause’ may not be helpful, it is clear that ‘only a probability, and not a prima facia showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’ * * *” 462 US at 235.
The cases here under review are factually indistinguishable from State v. Eaton, 60 Or App 176, 653 P2d 250 (1982), rev den 294 Or 460 (1983); State v. Harp, supra. The majority recognizes those precedents but overrules Harp. If Harp is rejected as binding precedent, then presumably Eaton was incorrectly decided. The impetus for the majority’s analysis of precedent is State v. Melendy, 49 Or App 441, 619 P2d 952 (1980). The majority concludes that Harp and Eaton are reasonably consistent but are inconsistent with Melendy. It concludes that Melendy is the more correct formulation and proceeds to expand the rationale for that case.
There is no inconsistency between Harp and Eaton on the one hand and Melendy on the other. As noted in Melendy, there were no facts recited in the affidavit on which to base a conclusion that evidence related to marijuana growing would be found in the residence. In contrast, the affidavits in both Harp and Eaton stated that, in the affiants’ experience persons who grow marijuana on their property have evidence of this enterprise in their residences or other buildings. Those additional allegations were deemed sufficient to base a reasonable conclusion that relevant evidence would be found in buildings on the property.
*175If any of the three cases was incorrectly decided, it was Melendy. The issuing magistrate in that case could reasonably have concluded that the marijuana was tended by human agency and could reasonably have concluded that persons who grow and tended marijuana would utilize their residence or outbuildings in carrying on the growing and processing of the crop.
The majority, after emasculating precedent, sets forth an analytical approach and factual examples that a reviewing court would find acceptable in this type of enforcement activity. There are now two requirements. First, the affidavit must set forth “objective observations” to show that the residents on the property have some relationship to the plants. The opinion then sets forth types of “objective observations” that are necessary; for example, that the plants are set out in rows, or that the ground is tilled, or that plants show indications of watering or fertilizing. By setting out that nonexhaustive catalog of facts, the majority has indicated to magistrates what is minimally sufficient to permit an inference that the plants are tended by human beings. It also has drawn a blueprint for persons engaged in that illicit enterprise to grow marijuana and insulate their residences from search. Each affidavit must be judged on the basis of the facts set forth, not on the basis of what a reviewing court would like to see.
Although reviewing courts may feel more secure in inferring a connection between the plants and the residents if there is objective evidence of human activity, the fact that no such activity is observed near the plants does not necessarily detract from the magistrate’s conclusion that the marijuana is related to the residents. The existence of growing marijuana plants on a single piece of property containing one residence may not be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the residents knowingly possessed or manufactured the drugs, but it does not defy common sense to conclude that there is a probability that the plants and residents are connected.
The term “cultivated” cropped up in many of our opinions regarding searches based on growing marijuana. It is in reality a short-hand method of indicating that the plants are there and maturing by human agency. The majority gives that term prime significance in the analysis: it is necessary to *176show cultivation, and cultivation can be shown by observation of relatively common agricultural techniques. But cultivation is not the relevant inquiry. It is whether the affidavit shows a probability that the plants are in some way connected with the residents of the property.
In requiring “objectively observable” facts, the majority apparently rejects as pertinent the experiences of the affiant as to how this type of illegal enterprise is carried on. Apparently, even if the majority were satisfied that the marijuana was “cultivated,” there would be no “objectively observable” facts indicating that evidence of growing, processing, packaging and selling is in the buildings on the property; the second part of the majority’s two-part test. The affiant’s “subjective” conclusions as to what evidence probably is in the residence and outbuildings would be insufficient, according to the majority’s construct. That analysis insulates the residence from search because the officers would rarely be able objectively to observe what was in the buildings from a vantage point where the marijuana plants could lawfully be seen. The experiences of the affiant as to how this type of farming is carried on is a fact and supports an inference that in this particular instance there is a probability that the residents follow the common practice. Rejecting such evidence as subjective non-fact is not supportable in reviewing a search warrant affidavit.
I agree with the majority that defendants’ motions to contravert the affidavit were properly denied. I disagree with the conclusion that the affidavit is insufficient to support a search of the buildings on the property. I would leave our precedents intact and follow them; therefore, I would reverse the order suppressing evidence and remand for trial.
Van Hoomissen, J., joins in this dissent.