Court Opinion

ID: 9579365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:54:23.576888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:28.556082
License: Public Domain

YETKA, Justice
(concurring specially).
Although I must concur in the result reached in this case, I believe that it contributes to the still unresolved problems which are the product of shifting Federal policies towards Indian tribes. I am particularly concerned with the specific result in the present case, because there is no accurate estimate of the number of titles and amount of land affected. The attempt to limit this decision narrowly to its facts cannot be wholly successful. Its reasoning is bound to be persuasive in cases involving other land titles, even where title has already been quieted. This possibility raises serious due process considerations which were not before us in the present case but are just below the surface.
In Bryan v. Itasca County, 303 Minn. 395, 406, 228 N.W.2d 249, 256 (1975), reversed, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976), we expressed misgivings about the twists and turns of Federal policy toward Indians as follows:
“It has been the Federal government, though its vacillation in determining the best course to follow for over 100 years, *590that has led to the present confusion, including the issues raised by this lawsuit. The government first appears to move toward termination and assimilation, then to retreat from those objectives, and retrenches, this indecision has resulted in a great deal of confusion.”
The fact that the statutory interpretation espoused by this court was ultimately incorrect only serves to highlight those misgivings.
The passage in 1953 of Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 583,1 as amended, 18 U.S.C.A., § 1162, and 28 U.S.C.A., § 1360, marked the beginning of the most recent assimilation policy toward Indians, but as suggested in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 387, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2111, 48 L.Ed.2d 710, 720 (1976), that policy is not as strong today, if it ever was a total assimilationist policy.2 It appears now that the Federal government wishes to preserve Indian culture and strengthen tribal self-government.
The state’s dilemma in the present situation is clear from an examination of Public Law 280 and the present case. Since jurisdiction has been asserted by the state over criminal and civil matters on most reservations, there is an increased need for services and personnel. However, removal of additional lands from taxation, as in the present case, shrinks the tax base which provides funds for the services. If, as suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Bryan, extension of state taxing power would cripple tribal self-government, and if as suggested by the present opinion state and local power to tax Indian-owned lands is more restricted than previously supposed, the state and local tax burdens will be even greater. If Federal policy contemplates strengthened tribal government (cf. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388, note 14, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2111, 48 L.Ed.2d 710, 721) with reliance on state and local governments to provide services that would otherwise be unavailable, then the Federal government must accept the financial responsibility for providing the services.3 If states cannot tax tribal property on the reservation or lands allotted to individual Indians, they must be reimbursed for providing services on the reservations. The existence of this dilemma has been recognized since the passage of Public Law 280 (see, colloquy between Congressman Young and Chief Counsel Sellery of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, quoted in Bryan, 426 U.S. 381, 96 S.Ct. 2108, 48 L.Ed.2d 717).
Taxation is not the only area of uncertainty in Federal Indian policy. One commentator has noted generally with regard to the status of all Indian treaty rights the following:
“Unfortunately, the body of law protecting basic Indian treaty rights is in evident disarray. There are so many tests for determining whether an abrogation has been effected, and most of them are so vague, that a court has little recourse but to arrive at an ad hoc, almost arbitrary decision when faced with the question of whether a particular treaty guarantee has been abrogated by Congress.” Wilkinson and Volkman, “Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: 'As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth’—How Long a Time Is That?” 63 Calif.L.Rev. 601, 608.
The basic point is the same as in the present case primarily because of the lack of coherent or consistent Federal policy.
The continuing uncertainty about the status of Indian tribes and land holdings can only serve to exacerbate tensions between the white and Indian communities. While property tax exemption is viewed by Indi*591ans as a right deriving from special historical status and a means of strengthening cultural identity, it is viewed by whites as a privilege and a lack of fundamental fairness. This kind of problem could be solved by a consistent Federal policy exercised with more concern for its long range effects.
The Federal government has exclusive and plenary power to legislate for Indian tribes. This power is derived from several sources. U.S.Const. art. 1, § 8, provides in part that:
“The Congress shall have Power: * * To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”
The other constitutional source from which the Federal government derives its power over Indian tribes is the treaty power found in U.S.Const. art. 2, § 2, which provides in part that:
“[The president] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties * * *.”
See, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974). Because of the breadth given this power by the courts the Federal government may treat Indian tribes as “wards” with special status, despite the constitutional requirement that all who are citizens be treated equally.4 The breadth of the Federal power over Indian tribes and its resulting conflicts with equal protection theory require that the power be exercised with regard to its effect on non-Indians as well as Indians.5
KELLY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
WAHL, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

. Subsequently amended by 69 Stat. 795, 72 Stat. 545, and 84 Stat. 1358.

. The General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U.S.C.A., §§ 331 to 358, was part of an earlier Federal assimilation policy which ended in 1934. See, discussion in Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 82 S.Ct. 562, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962).

.The Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C.A., § 1451 to § 1543, and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 88 Stat. 2203, 25 U.S.C.A., § 450, et seq., provide funds for internal tribal development. The missing ingredient is aid for states providing services.

. The Fifth Amendment due process clause requires that the Federal government treat citizens equally, just as the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states give all citizens equal protection of the laws. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954). Even though the United States Supreme Court has held that equal protection and Indian preference are not incompatible, the problems underlying such conflicts still exist. See, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974); cf. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977).

. One possible alternative is retrocession of jurisdiction to the Federal government under 25 U.S.C.A., § 1323. The result of this, however, can lead to unequal treatment of Indians and whites which nonetheless is not vulnerable to equal protection and due process attack. Retrocession would be consistent with current Federal policy and would serve to alleviate some of the financial burdens on local government. The state has taken advantage of this law in one limited instance. See, L. 1973, c. 625.