Court Opinion

ID: 9861252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:50:37.28287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:50.686355
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: The Illinois Constitution provides that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches are separate and that no branch shall "exercise powers properly belonging to another.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1.) This provision does not forbid every exercise by one branch of government of functions that are conventionally exercised by another branch. Rather, the thrust of the separation of powers philosophy " 'is that each department of government must be kept free from the control or coercive influence of the other departments.’ ” City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 170, 175, quoting 1 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 16 (1965). Consistent with this philosophy, we have held that the separation of powers created by our constitution is designed to prevent one branch of government from " 'arrogating] to itself any control over either one of the other [branches] in matters which have been solely confided by the constitution to such other [branch].’ ” (People ex rel. Hansen v. Phelan (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 445, 451, quoting Fergus v. Marks (1926), 321 Ill. 510, 514.) Accordingly, the doctrine comes into play when one branch seeks to exert a substantial power belonging to another. (People v. O’Donnell (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 517, 527.) The judiciary, for example, may not usurp or encroach upon the legislature’s powers or the legislative function. (American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Village of Arlington Heights (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 399, 420 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).) Conversely, the General Assembly is prohibited from enacting legislation that encroaches upon the inherent powers of the judiciary. Strukoff v. Strukoff (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 53, 59. In the case before us, none of these concerns are present. There is no encroachment by one branch of government upon the powers of another. If anything, the legislation at issue here operates only to confer power on the judiciary. It takes nothing away from it. The right of the General Assembly to cede authority to other branches of government is not without limitation. The power to make the laws for this State is vested in the legislature alone. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 1.) Our court has long recognized, both as a matter of common law and constitutional law, that the General Assembly cannot delegate to any other body, authority or person its general legislative power to determine what the law shall be. (People v. Tibbitts (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 56, 58-59; Hill v. Relyea (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 552, 555.) Under the statute at issue here, however, that has not been done. The Motor Vehicle Franchise Act merely grants to the courts responsibility for applying facts adduced by the parties to legal standards promulgated by the General Assembly. This is a quintessential judicial function. People ex rel. Royal v. Cain (1951), 410 Ill. 39, 49. Ultimately, the majority rules as it does on the theory that the "good cause” standard created by the statute is too ill-defined to withstand constitutional scrutiny. This contention is untenable. Although a law vesting discretionary power in administrative officials may be void as an unlawful delegation of legislative power if it does not properly define the terms under which discretion is to be exercised (Krol v. County of Will (1968), 38 Ill. 2d 587, 593), the legislature may delegate authority "if the authority thus granted is delimited by intelligible standards” (Hoogasian v. Regional Transportation Authority (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 117, 130). The preciseness of the standards required depends on the complexity of the subject matter and the ultimate objective of the act in question. (Hoogasian, 58 Ill. 2d at 130.) In the situation before us here, it is difficult to see how any greater specificity would be practical or why it would be necessary. We are dealing, after all, not with decisionmaking by administrative agencies, but with the judgment of courts. "Good cause” is a matter which our courts are routinely called upon to assess in a wide variety of contexts. See, e.g., 705 ILCS 405/2 — 4 (West 1992); 735 ILCS 5/15 — 1701(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 1992); 755 ILCS 5/28 — 4(a)(1) (West 1992); 820 ILCS 405/60KA) (West 1992); 134 Ill. 2d Rules 104(c), 105(a), 183, 201(d), 224(b), 306(e), 306(f), 311, 343(c), 374(a), 609(b), 609(c), 776(c); 145 Ill. 2d Rules 222(c), 713(h). Although these examples provide no specific guidelines for determining when "good cause” has been shown, application of the law has not been overly difficult. I therefore fail to share the concerns expressed by my colleagues here. In contrast to the examples I have just cited, section 12(c) pf the Act (815 ILCS 710/ 12(c) (West 1992)) is a model of precision. It delineates no fewer than 11 separate factors that may be taken into account in assessing whether "good cause” exists. Although this list is neither exclusive nor binding, it cannot be without unduly restricting the ability of the courts to make a fair assessment based on the particular circumstances in a given case. Flexibility gives vitality to this statute. It does not render it invalid. Among the statutory factors a court may consider in determining "good cause” are whether the proposed action by the franchiser would be injurious to "the public welfare” (815 ILCS 710/12(c)(5) (West 1992)) and whether it would be in "the public interest” (815 ILCS 710/12(c)(8) (West 1992)). The majority objects to these provisions on the grounds that they involve the determination of public policy. This renders the statutory scheme invalid, according to my colleagues, because the determination of public policy is a matter within the exclusive domain of the legislature. Such is not the case. Although the majority has located precedent from other jurisdictions to support its position (163 Ill. 2d at 478-79), the law in Illinois is to the contrary. Here, courts are unquestionably involved in determining public policy. That this is so is demonstrated by our consistent recognition that public policy is reflected not only in the constitution and statutes of this State, but in its judicial opinions as well. O’Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld & Kempster (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 333, 341. Stated generally, "public policy” is a legal principle that holds that "no one may lawfully do that which has a tendency to injure the public welfare.” (O’Hara, 127 Ill. 2d at 341.) The courts identify and weigh public policy considerations whenever they are asked to recognize a new cause of action. (See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 181-85; Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619.) Similarly, the question of whether a contract, agreement or award offends public policy is a matter that the courts routinely address. See, e.g., O’Hara, 127 Ill. 2d at 341-47; American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. State (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 246, 259-65; Laughlin v. France (1993), 241 Ill. App. 3d 185, 197; In re Estate of Braun (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 178, 182-83. There is nothing unique about car dealerships that requires different treatment here. The determination as to whether a proposed change in dealerships contravenes public policy may depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and it may require an assessment of whether the public interest would be harmed, but that is so whenever a contract or agreement is challenged on the grounds that it contravenes public policy. (O’Hara, 127 Ill. 2d at 341-42.) If the courts are capable of assessing public policy and the public interest in those other situations, I fail to see why they cannot do so here. The task may not be an easy one, but that is scarcely justification for nullifying a presumptively valid legislative enactment. The judgments of the circuit courts should therefore be reversed. JUSTICE NICKELS joins in this dissent.