Court Opinion

ID: 9881288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 22:04:08.2665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:11:41.316763
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 Stahl v. Brannon CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 WILLIAM STAHL,

           Petitioner and Appellant,                                    A161831
 v.
                                                                        (Solano County Super Ct.
 KATHERINE BRANNON,                                                     No. FPR049636)
           Trustee and Respondent.

         Appellant William Stahl challenges two orders awarding attorney fees
to respondent Katherine Brannon, who has moved this court to sanction
appellant for filing a frivolous appeal. The first order, issued on February 26,
2020,1 accompanied the granting of respondent’s motion to expunge a lis
pendens pursuant to section 405.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
second order, issued on October 5, followed the denial of appellant’s petition
under Probate Code sections 16420, subdivision (a), and 17200, subdivision
(b)(12). We affirm both orders because the first is not appealable and the
probate court acted within its discretion with respect to the second. However,
we decline to impose sanctions on appellant, whose arguments are not so
unreasonable as to be frivolous.

         1 All subsequent dates refer to the year 2020.

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                              I. BACKGROUND
      Respondent is the trustee of the Edward Stahl and Dolores M. Stahl
Revocable Trust, whose beneficiaries include her brother, appellant. The
trust owns two parcels of real property located on neighboring lots in
Vacaville. The legal dispute began when appellant filed a self-styled “petition
for enforcement of the terms of the trust, appointment of alternative trustee,
appointment of temporary trustee, instructions to trustee, breach of trust,
[and] breach of fiduciary duty.” (Capitalization omitted.) In that petition, he
alleges that respondent had pursued a scheme to sell the real property to her
son at a discounted price, thereby breaching her fiduciary duty as a trustee
and endangering the interests of the trust’s beneficiaries.
      Next, appellant recorded a lis pendens against the property.
Respondent moved to expunge the lis pendens and, “in accordance with” Code
of Civil Procedure section 405.38, requested that “the court award [her]
reasonable attorney fees” and costs in the amounts of $3,150.00 and $130.00,
respectively. (Capitalization omitted.) On February 26, the probate court
granted respondent’s motion to expunge the lis pendens and awarded
attorney fees as requested.
      Between February 26 and October 5, in addition to several
declarations, petitioner filed the following four motions: (1) a cross-motion to
appoint an agent, a professional fiduciary, receiver or temporary trustee to
substitute for the trustee to sell the property; (2) an amended and restated
petition for relief from breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty by trustee
(Prob. Code, §§ 16420, subd. (a), 17200, subd. (b)(12)); (3) a request for a
declaration of a common fund and a finding of breach of a fiduciary duty due
to self-dealing; and (4) a motion to instruct the trustee and enforce the terms

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of the trust. All four motions were based on the “discounted sale” scheme
appellant had alleged in his initial filing.
      In turn, respondent filed on September 28 a declaration “summarily
and categorically” denying the allegations against her. The declaration
further catalogues the various hearings appellant had scheduled or
attempted to schedule, notes the delay and expense occasioned by appellant’s
various motions and petitions, and argues that appellant’s allegations
concerning a potential “discounted sale” have been rendered moot by the
completed sale of the property to disinterested third parties. Finally, the
declaration requests an award of $14,641.90 in attorney fees and costs
“incurred because of the unnecessary and inappropriate actions of” appellant.
      After a contested hearing held on October 5, the probate court denied
appellant’s amended and restated petition, on “substantive as well as
procedural” grounds. The court explained to appellant: “Even if you can
overcome the procedural hurdles, that are considerable in this litigation, your
pleadings are inadequate to support the relief that you're requesting in your
petition. And on that basis your petition is denied.” Respondent’s request for
attorney fees and costs was granted in full.
      This appeal followed.
                                 II. DISCUSSION
      A. The First Order
      Appellant argues that the probate court erred in awarding attorney
fees to respondent under Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38, in
connection with respondent’s successful motion to expunge a lis pendens
appellant had recorded against trust-owned real property. However, as
respondent observes, such an order may be reviewed only “by way of a
petition for writ of mandate.” (Shah v. McMahon (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th

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526, 529.) Thus, the issue is not properly raised here, and we affirm on that
procedural ground.2
      B. The Second Order
      Appellant argues that the probate court erred in its October 5 order
granting respondent’s September 28 request for attorney fees, which was
filed in response to appellant’s amended and restated petition under Probate
Code sections 16420, subdivision (a), and 17200, subdivision (b)(12). We
disagree.
               1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      “[W]hen a trust beneficiary instigates an unfounded proceeding against
the trust in bad faith, a probate court has the equitable power to charge the
reasonable and necessary fees incurred by the trustee in opposing the
proceeding against that beneficiary’s share of the trust estate.” (Rudnick v.
Rudnick (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1335 (Rudnick).) “In fashioning an
equitable remedy, the trial court is in the best position to determine whether
the criteria for a fee award have been met. We will not disturb its judgment
on this issue unless we are convinced the court abused its discretion.
[Citation.] A trial court abuses its discretion only where its action is clearly
wrong and without reasonable basis.” (Powell v. Tagami (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 219, 236–237, quoting Pipefitters Local No. 636 Defined Benefit
Plan v. Oakley, Inc. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1547–1548.)

      2 Appellant argues that this rule does not apply when such an order is

made by a probate court, but he cites no caselaw supporting that contention.
Moreover, the order awarding attorney fees cites the lis pendens provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure six times, making no reference to any other code.
In short, there is no reason to imagine that the appealability of the order is
controlled by any other authority.

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      “It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that we presume that
a judgment or order is correct. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 836, 852[]; see generally 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997)
Appeal, § 349, pp. 394–395.) Moreover, it is the appellant’s burden of
providing a record that establishes error, and where the record is silent, we
must indulge all intendments and presumptions to support the challenged
ruling.” (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1271
(Laabs).) “From these principles, courts have developed the doctrine of
implied findings by which the appellate court is required to infer that the
trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the order or
judgment.”3 (Ibid.) In short, “even where there are no express findings, we
must review the trial court’s exercise of discretion based on implied findings
that are supported by substantial evidence.” (Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corp. v. La Conchita Ranch Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 856, 860.)
      Accordingly, we review the record for substantial evidence supporting
the probate court’s implied finding that appellant acted in bad faith with
respect to the proceedings that occasioned the attorney fees at issue here.
(Rudnick, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 1335; see also Laabs, supra, 163

      3 In his opposition to respondent’s motion for appellate sanctions,

appellant contends that the standard of review is better described as the
“presumption of correctness” than as the “ ‘doctrine of implied findings,’ ” a
term sometimes reserved for circumstances in which the parties may request
a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632, which
applies to trials rather than motions. That distinction, however, makes no
difference to our analysis because the “absence of a statement of decision [in
connection with the court’s denial of a motion] does not affect the standard of
review. We presume that the court's order is supported by the record; if there
is substantial evidence in the record to support the court's implied finding of
fact, the factual finding will be upheld.” (Fair v. Bakhtiari (2011) 195
Cal.App.4th 1135, 1148, italics omitted.)

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Cal.App.4th at p. 1272 [trial court made implied finding that plaintiff
brought action in good faith].)
            2. The Probate Court Acted Within Its Discretion
      Substantial evidence supports a finding of bad faith. Upon the
expungement of the lis pendens, the probate court warned appellant: “[T]his
is a case where I haven't heard any new facts, and I've heard the recitation of
the facts upon which you base your request repeatedly[.] Hearing after
hearing, you make the same representation. I don't find that they are good
cause to remove the trustee from the Trust . . . .” Rather than heed this
warning, appellant pursued for the next several months an amended and
restated petition for relief from breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty
by trustee, filed pursuant to Probate Code sections 16420, subdivision (a),
and 17200, subdivision (b)(12). Crucially, the principal factual basis for that
petition and appellant’s initial filing in this matter was the same, concerning
respondent’s alleged self-dealing attempt to sell trust-owned real property to
her son at a discount.
      As noted in the declaration respondent filed in anticipation of the
October 5 hearing on the latter petition, that hearing was the eleventh “either
scheduled or attempted to be scheduled by [appellant] since filing his original
Trust contest in this matter.” Respondent’s declaration then lists those 11
hearing dates and observes that appellant had not prevailed at any of them.
Appellant was thus forcing respondent to make her eleventh appearance,
notwithstanding the fact that “every request made by” appellant had “been
denied by the court.”
      Finally, respondent’s declaration notes that as of August 10, the trust
had already sold the real property featured in the appellant’s allegation of
self-dealing, thus rendering moot appellant’s arguments in that respect. A

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September 24 letter to appellant pointed out the mootness of his petition and
invited him to withdraw it, so as to avoid “expending unnecessary Trust
resources in litigation and attorney’s fees.” Nevertheless, the October 5
hearing went forward and the probate court predictably held that appellant’s
“pleadings [were] inadequate to support the relief” he requested.
      From this record, it is entirely reasonable to infer that appellant did
not expect to prevail on his amended petition, but rather, was pursuing that
petition in bad faith. Because substantial evidence supports that implied
finding, we conclude that the probate court acted within its discretion in
awarding attorney fees to respondent.
      C. Respondent’s Motion for Appellate Sanctions
      Respondent moves this court to sanction appellant under Rules of
Court, rule 8.276, which authorizes us to “impose sanctions, including the
award or denial of costs under rule 8.278, on a party or attorney for . . .
[t]aking a frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause delay.” “[A]n appeal
should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper
motive—to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse
judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) Importantly, “any definition [of frivolity] must be
read so as to avoid a serious chilling effect on the assertion of litigants’ rights
on appeal. Counsel and their clients have a right to present issues that are
arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win on
appeal.” (Ibid.)
      Here, respondent’s motion for sanctions asserts the appeal is frivolous.
We disagree. Neither respondent’s September 28 request for attorney fees
nor the probate court’s October 5 ruling granting that request contains any
express reference to “bad faith.” Thus, appellant is “arguably correct” in that

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a record devoid of the operative words, “bad faith,” might lead one to assume
that the probate court did not specifically consider this issue. Appellant
therefore has a right to present this matter on appeal. While this court
ultimately finds there was substantial evidence to support the probate court’s
finding of bad faith, the record, under the circumstances, cannot support a
conclusion that “any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is
totally and completely without merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31
Cal.3d at p. 650.)
      For that reason, we deny the motion for sanctions.4
                             III. DISPOSITION
      We affirm.

      4 Respondent’s motion for sanctions accompanied a motion to dismiss

appellant’s “late-filed and meritless Opening Brief.” Having previously
deferred ruling on both motions, we now deny the motion to dismiss because
our holding in the present opinion has rendered it moot.

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                                           _________________________
                                           Langhorne, J. *

We concur:

_________________________
Simons, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Burns, J.

Stahl v. Brannon / A161831

      * Judge of the Superior Court of Napa County, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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