Court Opinion

ID: 9547684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:50:24.511939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:56.806973
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the court’s conclusion that Judge Stewart was clearly mistaken because he failed to require Jane Doe to serve additional1 time in jail as a condition of her suspended imposition of sentence. Having independently reviewed the entirety of the sentencing record, I cannot say that Judge Stewart was clearly mistaken in concluding that a jail sentence was not appropriate for Mrs. Doe.
Judge Stewart held extensive evidentiary hearings regarding the events that provided the basis of Mrs. Doe’s conviction, the circumstances of her marriage to John Doe, her psychological status and social background, and the difficulties that she experienced in dealing with her situation and accepting responsibility for her conduct. Much evidence was also adduced with respect to the background of Mrs. Doe’s three children, their situation at the time of sentencing, their future needs, and the potential for their gradual reintegration into a healthy, parent-child relationship with their mother.
The picture of Mrs. Doe that emerges from the record is one of a woman whose own insecurity and lack of self-esteem led to an unhealthy and almost total dependence upon her husband. Her marital relationship led Mrs. Doe into a blind willingness to ignore, to rationalize and, in a very limited number of instances, to abet actively her husband’s aberrant and pathological sexual relationship with the children. Mrs. Doe herself was at most a reluctant participant, never engaging in sexual conduct with her children for her personal gratification, but only in response to her husband’s desires; she was a woman torn between accommodating her husband’s demands and protecting the interests of her children. She opted for her husband, who was obviously the dominant force in her life. However, she never completely failed to appreciate her duty towards her children; over the years preceding her arrest, Mrs. Doe made several ineffectual efforts to obtain assistance for her children and her husband.
John Doe, Jane Doe’s husband, was unequivocally the principal instigator and participant in the protracted series of sexual activities among the family members. Mr. Doe was an unusually persuasive man, one who was attuned to the emotional and psychological weaknesses of his wife and who controlled and exploited those weaknesses in order to further his abuse of the children.
In this sense Jane Doe was the subject of her husband’s abuse in much the same way as were her children. While there can be no question that Mrs. Doe was legally responsible for her acts of criminal misconduct, the record, as. I read it, establishes that Jane Doe was driven by the need to accommodate and placate her husband and to preserve intact, at virtually any cost, the outward semblance of normality and stabili*1112ty in her family’s life. She believed obedience to her husband’s demands to be her only means of achieving this end, and she maintained a persistent, naive faith that their situation would improve.2
Judge Stewart thoroughly and thoughtfully analyzed the totality of the information before him in light of the sentencing goals mandated by State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970).3 The judge specifically noted the role played by Mrs. Doe as compared to that of her husband, the progress that she had made toward rehabilitation, and especially the long-term needs of her children. Judge Stewart concluded that Mrs. Doe did not pose a further danger or threat to her children or to others in the community and that a jail sentence was unnecessary to deter similar conduct on her part. In light of the highly unusual circumstances of the offense, the judge also concluded that incarceration of Mrs. Doe would not realistically accomplish the goal of deterring other, similarly situated, potential offenders. Additionally, the judge concluded that a jail sentence was not needed to further Mrs. Doe’s rehabilitation. The prosecution did not challenge these findings below, nor does it challenge them on appeal.
The sole issue raised by the state pertains to the last sentencing goal enunciated in State v. Chaney: whether a sentence of incarceration is necessary here for the purpose of community condemnation, or the reaffirmation of societal norms. On this score, Judge Stewart concluded that despite the seriousness of Mrs. Doe’s crimes incarceration was not necessary because community condemnation could adequately and effectively be expressed in the sentencing of Mr. Doe. Furthermore, Judge Stewart took the position that the goal of community condemnation was offset in the present case by the overriding need to provide for the long-term welfare of Mrs. Doe’s children. The judge had before him convincing evidence indicating that the best potential for reducing the trauma suffered by the children lay in reestablishing normal ties with their mother. The majority of the court is correct in noting that the possibility of accomplishing this goal was speculative, at best. Given the overriding importance of this goal, however, I believe that Judge Stewart properly took steps to assure that it was not unnecessarily jeopardized. Moreover, the record permits an inference that the key to Mrs. Doe’s own rehabilitation— to her ability to understand fully the extent of her culpability and to accept responsibility for her conduct — lies in rebuilding a healthy parental relationship with her children.4 In short, from my review of the record, I find it difficult to fault Judge Stewart for recognizing and emphasizing, through his sentence, the significance of attempting to restore the parent-child relationship between Mrs. Doe and her children.5
Moreover, I believe entirely defensible Judge Stewart’s conclusion that the highly unusual aspects of Mrs. Doe’s involvement in this case rendered the prospect of deterrence to other similarly situated offenders insignificant. As a practical matter, given *1113the psychological realities of her situation, Mrs. Doe failed to perceive that she had any choice in the nature and extent of her involvement with her husband’s crimes. I find it difficult to believe that other persons similarly situated would in fact be influenced or deterred by Mrs. Doe’s incarceration.
If, indeed, the acts committed by Mrs. Doe were so serious as to require incarceration for the sole purpose of expressing community condemnation, then it seems paradoxical that a ninety-day period of incarceration would suffice to satisfy this goal. Both the state and the majority seem to acknowledge that a lengthy sentence of imprisonment was not mandated for Mrs. Doe under the unusual facts of this case. Yet it seems to me that a short jail sentence would only tend to create the appearance that Mrs. Doe’s offense was insignificant. Thus, I think that a relatively short sentence in this case would impede the goal of community condemnation, rather than promoting it.
Imposing a sentence in a case as sensitive, unusual and controversial as the present case poses a formidable task for a trial judge. I am highly disinclined to express disapproval under such circumstances based on a hindsight evaluation of an equivocal record. It seems to me that, by suspending the imposition of Mrs. Doe’s sentence and imposing strict and appropriate conditions of probation for an extended period of time, Judge Stewart appropriately carried out his duty to impose a rational sentence based upon the Chaney goals, while still preserving, for the future, the option of assuring a substantial sentence of incarceration in the event that Mrs. Doe’s performance on probation did not conform to the court’s expectations.
Since I cannot conclude that Judge Stewart was clearly mistaken in the sentencing decision that he made in this case, I respectfully dissent.

. Jane Doe was arrested upon being indicted and served a relatively short period of incarceration before being released on bail.

. The record concerning the extent of willfulness on the part of Jane Doe was not uncontra-dicted. The prosecution presented evidence and argued that Mrs. Doe was a considerably more willing participant in her husband’s ongoing abuse of the children than she purported to be. However, the sentencing judge seems to have rejected the state’s interpretation of the evidence presented at sentencing. I do not believe that Judge Stewart was clearly mistaken in rejecting the state’s view of the record.

. See also AS 12.55.005 and 12.55.015.

. Because Mrs. Doe’s own rehabilitation was integrally related to the possibility of being reunited with her children, I believe that it was proper for the sentencing court, and well within the scope of the Chaney criteria, to take into consideration the fact that the best interests of the children included the restoration of a normal and healthy relationship with their mother.

.Although at the time of sentencing Mrs. Doe’s two elder children indicated their desire not to resume living with their mother, neither child precluded this possibility in the future, and both expressed the opinion that their mother should not be incarcerated for her conduct. Mrs. Doe’s youngest child, who was too young to understand why he had been separated from his mother, desired to be returned to her custody. All three children indicated dissatisfaction with their custodial placement by the state.