Court Opinion

ID: 9899542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 21:00:57.603507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:36.349575
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4079      Doc: 50         Filed: 11/15/2023    Pg: 1 of 5

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-4079

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        AUBREY HECKSTALL,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
        Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. (1:18-cr-00587-RDB-1)

        Submitted: October 13, 2023                                 Decided: November 15, 2023

        Before AGEE and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Justin Eisele, SEDDIQ LAW FIRM, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant.
        Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, Jason D. Medinger, Assistant United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for
        Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4079      Doc: 50         Filed: 11/15/2023     Pg: 2 of 5

        PER CURIAM:

               Aubrey Heckstall appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised

        release and sentencing him to eight months’ imprisonment, followed by one year of

        supervised release. At the revocation hearing, Heckstall admitted to Violation 1, which

        charged him with absconding from supervision, in violation of the supervised release

        conditions requiring that he “report to the probation officer in a manner and frequency

        directed by the court or probation officer” and “notify the probation officer ten days prior

        to any change of residence or employment.” On appeal, Heckstall raises a new argument:

        he claims that these conditions were not adequately orally pronounced during his original

        sentencing hearing, as required by United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020).

        He therefore contends that the district court lacked the authority to revoke his supervised

        release based on violations of these conditions because they were, in fact, “a nullity.” See

        United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2021).

               In response, the Government alternatively contends this argument is time-barred

        under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b); it is foreclosed by our precedent, including United States v.

        Sanchez, 891 F.3d 535, 538 (4th Cir. 2018), and United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 115,

        117-18 (4th Cir. 1998); Heckstall waived his argument by failing to raise it at any point

        prior to the instant appeal; and the claim fails on the merits. Assuming, without deciding,

        that Heckstall’s argument is properly before us in this appeal, no Rogers error occurred

        because the district court incorporated the challenged supervised release conditions by

        reference. We therefore affirm.

                                                     2
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4079      Doc: 50          Filed: 11/15/2023     Pg: 3 of 5

               Heckstall asserts that we should conduct a de novo review of his claim, as we

        generally do when a defendant challenges the consistency of their oral sentence and the

        written judgment. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 295 (explaining that “[t]he plain-error standard [for

        reviewing unpreserved arguments] applies only if a defendant has an opportunity to object

        in the trial court”). However, as the Government emphasizes, at the time of the revocation

        hearing, the conditions of supervision had been included in Heckstall’s written judgment

        for over three years, and Rogers had been decided over two years prior. Despite this, rather

        than arguing in the district court that the conditions he had allegedly violated were not part

        of his sentence, Heckstall instead admitted to Violation 1 and repeatedly acknowledged the

        need for “consequences” for the violation. Because the argument Heckstall raises on

        appeal was readily available to him at the time of his revocation proceedings, we review

        his claim for plain error only. To establish plain error, Heckstall must show (1) error,

        (2) that “is clear and obvious,” and (3) that “affected his substantial rights.” United

        States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 669 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). If

        a defendant makes this showing, we may correct the error only if it “seriously affects the

        fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up).

               “[A] district court may satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary

        conditions through incorporation—by incorporating, for instance, all Guidelines ‘standard’

        conditions when it pronounces a supervised-release sentence, and then detailing those

        conditions in the written judgment.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299. In United States v. Cisson,

        the defendant argued that the district court’s statement that “it would impose the mandatory

        and standard conditions of supervised release . . . failed to adequately announce [the]

                                                      3
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4079         Doc: 50          Filed: 11/15/2023      Pg: 4 of 5

        discretionary conditions” governing his supervised release. 33 F.4th 185, 194 (4th Cir.

        2022) (cleaned up). In rejecting this argument, we explained that because “[t]he District

        of South Carolina [had] no standing order listing its own ‘standard’ conditions that differs

        from the Guidelines list of standard conditions found at [U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

        Manual] § 5D1.3(c), . . . there is no other set of ‘standard’ conditions to which the court

        could have been referring other than the Guidelines ‘standard’ conditions.” Id. (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               Here, like in Cisson, the district court announced at Heckstall’s original sentencing

        that it was imposing, inter alia, “the mandatory and standard conditions of supervision.”

        (J.A. 89). * As Heckstall acknowledges, at the time of his sentencing, the District of

        Maryland did not have a standing order establishing standard conditions of supervised

        release. Therefore, by announcing that the “standard conditions of supervision” would

        govern Heckstall’s supervised release, the district court sufficiently incorporated by

        reference the standard conditions outlined in USSG § 5D1.3(c). See Cisson, 33 F.4th at

        194; see also United States v. Elbaz, 52 F.4th 593, 612 (4th Cir. 2022) (finding, on plain

        error review, that district court sufficiently incorporated standard conditions because

        although defendant “raise[d] a few possible alternative meanings of ‘standard and statutory

        conditions,’ the Guidelines conditions are the most obvious meaning in context”), cert.

        denied, No. 22-1055, 2023 WL 6558396 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2023). And the conditions that

        Heckstall admitted violating by absconding his supervision—that he “shall report to the

               *
                   “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

                                                         4
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4079      Doc: 50         Filed: 11/15/2023     Pg: 5 of 5

        probation officer in a manner and frequency directed by the court or probation officer” and

        “shall notify the probation officer ten days prior to any change of residence or

        employment”—are included in these standard conditions. See USSG § 5D1.3(c)(2), (5).

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

                                                    5