Court Opinion

ID: 9498931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:32:43.591163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:10.489513
License: Public Domain

SHEDD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I fully join parts I, III, and V of Judge Niemeyer’s opinion. With respect to part II, I would hold that our appellate jurisdiction arises solely out of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as Hartwell asserts. Therefore, to the extent that Judge Niemeyer holds in part that we have jurisdiction under § 1291, I agree with his analysis. However, I do not agree with Judge Niemeyer’s analysis that we also have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 3742. Judge Niemeyer relies on United States v. Pridgen, 64 F.3d 147 (4th Cir.1995), in concluding that our appellate jurisdiction arises under § 3742. I do not believe that Pridgen is controlling. That case revolves around Pridgen’s sentence, specifically the district court’s refusal to grant the government’s request for a downward departure. Hartwell is not asking this Court to review his otherwise final sentence or a decision by the district court affecting his sentence. Rather, he is appealing a final order that he believes erroneously interprets his plea agreement to allow the government to withdraw the Rule 35(b) motion. Thus, his claim, as Judge Niemeyer notes, ante at 713, amounts to a request for specific performance on the plea agreement.
As to part IV, I agree with Judge Niemeyer that Hartwell’s appeal is not precluded by the appeal waiver and that the government did not breach the plea agreement by moving to withdraw the Rule 35(b) motion. However, I cannot join in footnote 2, because I believe that the appeal waiver on its face only prevents Hartwell from appealing his sentence. Since I would find this appeal under § 1291 is not a challenge to Hartwell’s sentence, the appeal waiver is simply not *725applicable and, therefore, we need not address it further.