Court Opinion

ID: 9926616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 15:05:41.826551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:48.399404
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2865-21

NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

K.N.,

          Defendant-Appellant,

and

BIOLOGICAL FATHER OF E.N.,
WHOMSOEVER HE MAY BE,

     Defendant.
____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF E.N.,
a minor.
____________________________

                   Submitted January 16, 2024 — Decided January 25, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla, Chase, and Vinci.
            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
            Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
            Docket No. FN-12-0092-21.

            Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
            appellant (John Andrew Albright, Assistant Deputy
            Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

            Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
            respondent (Renee Greenberg, Deputy Attorney
            General, on the statement in lieu of brief).

            Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
            attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy
            Public Defender, of counsel; Noel Christian Devlin,
            Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
            the briefs).

PER CURIAM

      Appellant K.N. appeals from a June 10, 2021 order entered following a

fact-finding hearing, in which the trial court concluded she abused or neglected

her son, E.N. She also challenges an April 8, 2022 order terminating the abuse

or neglect litigation. Further, K.N. appeals from a July 26, 2023 order entered

following a limited remand, in which we directed the trial court to make findings

whether K.N. received adequate notice of an April 23, 2021 proceeding at which

her defense attorney was relieved, and whether she received notice of the fact-

finding hearing itself. We vacate the June 10, 2021 and April 8, 2022 orders,

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                                       2
and reverse and remand the July 26, 2023 order for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

      E.N. was born in November 2020. A relative learned of E.N.'s birth and

called the Division of Child Protection and Permanency's (Division) with

concerns about K.N.'s substance use. Clore Brown, a Division caseworker,

called the hospital and spoke to a social worker, who reported K.N.'s urine tested

positive for cocaine. E.N.'s meconium1 test was pending but hospital staff

reported he was suffering from "mild tremors, increased tone and . . . agitation."

Staff also reported K.N. stated she was experiencing heroin withdrawal and was

being treated for it.

      Brown went to the hospital and attempted to speak with K.N. several

times, but she refused to speak with him. K.N.'s nurse told Brown E.N.'s Apgar2

1
          A      baby's    first      stool.         MedlinePlus, Meconium,
https://medlineplus.gov/ency/imagepages/9616.htm. E.N.'s was eventually
collected and tested negative for illicit substances.
2
  A test performed immediately after a baby's birth to determine how well the
baby tolerated the birthing process by measuring multiple biological functions
such as breathing effort, heart rate, muscle tone, reflexes, and skin color.
MedlinePlus, Apgar Score, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/003402.htm.

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                                        3
and NAS3 scores were within the normal range. K.N. eventually spoke with

Brown, told him to contact her parents, and left the hospital against the doctor's

orders.

      Brown had little contact with K.N. throughout the course of his

investigation. He testified she would respond to text messages and calls but

"they were very brief conversations."        Brown reported "[t]he calls ended

abruptly on [K.N.'s] end. [He] was not able to fully interview her, as per

protocol . . . despite [his] multiple attempts."

      K.N. had a history with the Division. Two previous pregnancies in 2015

and 2018 resulted in children born exhibiting symptoms of withdrawal. K.N.'s

parental rights to those children were terminated, and they were adopted by their

maternal grandmother.

      E.N. was placed with the maternal grandmother during these proceedings

and K.N.'s sister visited regularly to help care for him. K.N.'s sister expressed

interest in adopting E.N.

      The Division filed a complaint and order to show cause for custody, which

the court heard virtually on December 9, 2020. An attorney from the Office of

3
  Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome is a group of health problems that affect a
baby if it is exposed to opioids during fetal development. MedlinePlus, Neonatal
Abstinence Syndrome, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/007313.htm.
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                                         4
the Public Defender's (OPD's) Office of Parental Representation (OPR)

appeared provisionally on behalf of K.N. K.N. did not appear.

      Through defense counsel, K.N. consented to E.N.'s removal and

placement with his maternal grandmother. K.N. also consented to a substance

evaluation and agreed to follow recommendations from that evaluation and

agreed to supervised visitation.

      Brown's supervisor testified at the initial order to show cause hearing and

stated the Division did not know K.N.'s whereabouts. K.N. provided a physical

address, but when a caseworker went there, they discovered she had never lived

there. Further, K.N. texted the Division that she would join the hearing by

telephone but did not do so.

      K.N. did appear by telephone at the virtual return order to show cause

hearing on January 12, 2021. OPR represented her on a provisional basis. The

court learned K.N. had tested positive for COVID-19, which delayed her

substance abuse evaluation and treatment.        K.N. told the court she was

considering surrendering her parental rights to her sister and brother-in-law.

Pending an interstate evaluation, the Division agreed the sister would likely be

the best placement for E.N. K.N. stated she would likely not participate in the

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                                       5
substance abuse evaluation and treatment if she were able to make an identified

surrender of parental rights to her sister.

      The court held a virtual case management conference on March 23, 2021.

Defense counsel indicated she was appearing provisionally and was unsure if

K.N. had completed a 5A form to determine if she was qualified for public

defender representation.       The Division advised its investigation had

substantiated K.N. for abuse or neglect. K.N. attended the hearing and stated

she did not complete a 5A form and needed another copy. The court noted one

had been provided with the complaint but directed the Division to email K.N.

another form. K.N. stated she could print the form when she received it. The

court advised her, "it is very important to do this . . . [s]o that way you can be

assured of having [counsel] represent you."

      On March 30, 2021, the caseworker called K.N. and left a message,

reminding her to complete the 5A and email it back to the worker. K.N. never

complied with these instructions.

      The court held another virtual hearing on April 12, 2021. K.N. did not

appear, but new defense counsel was provisionally appointed for her. The court

stated K.N. needed to confirm whether she wanted representation, otherwise

counsel would be unable to appear at the fact-finding hearing. When the court

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                                         6
inquired if defense counsel had any communication with K.N., the following

colloquy ensued:

           [THE COURT: D]o you have any idea . . . if [K.N.] is
           interested in filling out a 5A[?] Or is she even in the
           State of New Jersey or, you know, what the story is? I
           am not looking to get involved in your client
           communication. I just want to find out if [K.N.] wants
           to have you represent her. To fill out the 5A.

           [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, as far as I know right
           now, I am not able to elaborate on any of that.

                   ....

           THE COURT: Are you in communication with her? I
           am not asking you what the communication is. I am
           just saying do you have the ability to contact her?

           [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have the ability to use an
           investigator at this point to . . . try to provide her with
           the 5A. That's as much as I can say, [j]udge. . . .
           [U]nfortunately, I was[ not] able to speak with
           [previous defense counsel], because she was out on
           vacation . . . and so now that she has returned, I
           can . . . try again to communicate with [her] and find
           out.

                   ....

           THE COURT: Okay.

           [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: — that's all I can say.

           THE COURT: Listen, I am just going to issue an
           order . . . that provides that [K.N.] has to . . . complete
           and return a 5A to the Division within [ten] days.

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                                       7
             And . . . if you can communicate with her, because the
             alternative for that is that she doesn't have a lawyer . . . .

      Defense counsel then objected to the Division's proposed expert testimony

because the expert's report was issued four months after E.N.'s birth, which was

not within a reasonable time frame. Further, the report was based upon medical

records that were, "themselves, not made to verify [the expert's] medical

review." The court did not rule on the objection.

      On April 16, 2021, defense counsel emailed the court and the Division the

following:

             I have not received discovery—it is due today. . . . We
             still do not know if the [c]ourt is going to order [me] to
             represent [K.N.] at the fact-finding[] or whether the
             [c]ourt is going to have [her] appear pro-se. I believe
             caselaw supports that the [c]ourt will have to address
             whether [K.N.] has [the] ability to represent herself pro-
             se.

Counsel argued if the court decided to have K.N. represent herself, the Division

had to submit proof that K.N. was provided discovery pursuant to the court rules.

      The Division sent defense counsel the discovery excluding the medical

records two minutes later.         Defense counsel responded stating she was

"objecting to the expert testifying without the actual medical records being in

evidence . . . ." Because "the medical records are not part of [the Division's]

discovery" counsel requested an adjournment to subpoena the medical records

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                                           8
and retain a defense expert. Counsel also objected to the fact-finding proceeding

by way of Zoom or telephone and as it regards to K.N.'s representation, stating:

                  The [c]ourt also indicated it needs a[] 5A filled
            out, even though [K.N.] has already indicated to this
            [c]ourt that she wants OPD representation. Further it
            should be noted that no one is disputing [K.N.'s]
            qualifications for [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel by OPD.

                  If [K.N.] is to proceed without counsel, caselaw
            supports that the [c]ourt will have to inquire whether
            she can continue pro-se. The [c]ourt will also have to
            ensure she is provided [d]iscovery.

                  For all these reasons, I'm requesting an
            adjournment date for June.

      The Division objected to the adjournment request. The court ordered

"[K.N.] shall be provided with the 5A application within [ten] days of this

order." The order noted if K.N. "fails to complete a 5A, and is therefore without

counsel, discovery will be provided to her consistent with the court rules."

      On April 23, 2021, another virtual hearing was held to determine whether

OPR could represent K.N. The record reflects K.N. was not present and was

"not noticed" for this hearing. The court asked defense counsel if she believed

she could continue representing K.N., and counsel replied

            [A]t this point I believe that the court can continue the
            provisional representation if it finds that . . . my
            presence is essentially necessary. I do not . . . have a
            position . . . because I believe that's really the court's

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                                        9
            determination. My job at this point is really to . . .
            ensure that her wishes are met[,] and my understanding
            is that she indicated . . . to [previous defense counsel]
            that she wanted our representation. . . . [W]ith that said
            I had put forward that she have due process with regards
            to the discovery and the complaint and . . . proper
            notice, which is my job at this point. . . . I have done
            that to the best of my ability. . . . [A]t this point,
            [j]udge, I believe I have to submit to the court whether
            the court wants me to assist her in this fact[-]finding . . .
            or I believe the court can . . . have [K.N.] appear pro se.

            [(Emphasis added).]

      The Division responded that the court should relieve OPR. It noted K.N.

was served with the complaint, order to show cause, and a 5A form. The court

also ordered "multiple 5As" be provided to K.N., yet she failed to complete the

form. The Division argued that contrary to her representations, K.N.'s actions

clearly indicated she did not want counsel. The Division noted OPR's policy

was that it "cannot remain on a case provisionally if the client has not taken the

affirmative step of filling out a 5A application." The Law Guardian concurred

with the Division.

      The court relieved OPR from representing K.N. Referencing the April 16,

2021 order, the court asked the Division if discovery had been provided to K.N.

The Division confirmed discovery was served upon defense counsel, but without

a valid address or fax number—and without verbal confirmation from K.N. that

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                                        10
she could open a secured email—the Division could not confirm K.N. would

receive discovery. The caseworker advised that as recently as the day before

the hearing, K.N. was not responding to email or phone outreach. The Division

advised "we have yet to have any contact with [K.N.] since the last court hearing

if not before that."

      The court concluded "without a 5A" and "without the proof of [K.N.'s]

indigent status" it could not appoint counsel for her. The following colloquy

then occurred between the court and the Division to conclude the hearing: "THE

COURT: . . . I would hope . . . that you are able to communicate in some

fashion . . . with [K.N.] because we do have the fact[-]finding scheduled on

Thursday. [THE DIVISION]: Yes."

      The fact-finding trial was held on April 29, 2021. K.N. did not appear

and she was not represented by counsel. The Division advised it emailed K.N.

notice of the date and time of trial, along with discovery and exhibits, but never

received a response. The Division stated defense counsel last had contact with

K.N. prior to the April 23 hearing and the caseworker "has not had any contact

either by phone or text message" with K.N. However, a Division contact sheet

indicated K.N. contacted the caseworker for help enrolling in an inpatient

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                                       11
facility on April 28, 2021. Nothing in the contact sheet indicated K.N. was

informed of the upcoming hearing or told that her counsel was dismissed.

      The court noted K.N. was twice provided with a 5A form but did not return

it to the Division or court, and "there was never even a request for an

adjournment by [K.N.]." The court proceeded with the fact-finding hearing.

      Dr. Gladibel Medina testified as the Division's expert in pediatric

medicine. Dr. Medina based her testimony on a review of the medical records.

She testified K.N. admitted using cocaine and opioids, and that K.N. and E.N.

tested positive for cocaine. The hospital notes stated E.N. had "increased tone,

high pitched cry . . . [and] tremors," which Dr. Medina testified were indicative

of withdrawal symptoms. She explained doctors used "the Finnigan's Foreign

Tool, which is the medical tool . . . to score symptoms that the baby might

present, once a history of substance [use] is provided by the caregiver or

someone else." E.N.'s score was twelve, which is the highest on the scale. Dr.

Medina explained persistent scores above eight require treatment. She testified

E.N. was treated with morphine, which improved his condition. He was weaned

off morphine and his treatment ended altogether after three weeks. Although

E.N.'s symptoms persisted, Dr. Medina testified it was not enough to warrant

continued treatment.

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                                      12
      Dr. Medina did not diagnose E.N. with NAS, but his symptoms were

indicative of it and consistent with in utero heroin exposure. She explained that

even though neither K.N. nor E.N. tested positive for heroin, the drug has a short

half-life, and it is possible for an infant to suffer its effects despite the lack of a

positive test in either mother or child at the time of birth.

      Brown was the Division's second witness. He explained his observations

in the hospital, his subsequent attempts to contact K.N., and that the Division

substantiated K.N. "[b]ecause [E.N.] experienced withdrawal for several weeks

because of the drug use during [K.N.'s] pregnancy."

      On May 21, 2021, the Division produced a court report that chronicled the

caseworker's various unsuccessful attempts to contact K.N. and connect her with

services. Notably, the report stated:

                    On April 29, 2021, the Division referred [K.N.]
             for a second time to Catholic Charities for a substance
             abuse evaluation. They were not able to make contact
             with her.

                   The Division assisted [K.N.] in scheduling an
             appointment for May 6, 2021 with Catholic Charities.
             She did not attend the virtual appointment.

                   The Division assisted Catholic Charities in
             rescheduling [K.N.] for May 17, 2021, she did not
             attend the virtual appointment.

                    ....

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                                         13
                  The Division continues to reach out to [K.N.] but
            she is not consistent with answering phone calls and
            does not return missed calls to [case]worker either.

The report also noted K.N. was not exercising visitation, despite a court order

permitting it three times per week. K.N. told the caseworker "she does not want

to see any of [her] children because it is a reminder to her that she has chosen

drugs over her children."

      On June 10, 2021, the court entered an order and made written findings

that the Division proved K.N. abused or neglected E.N. The court found Dr.

Medina's testimony "highly credible" and "straightforward." It noted she not

only reviewed the medical records, but "other documents from the Division." In

addition to the medical evidence, E.N.'s "diagnosis was based on the information

that [K.N.] provided." The court concluded "Dr. Medina's findings were also

consistent with the diagnosis of the treating physician."

      The court also credited Brown's testimony. It noted he testified largely

from memory, and his testimony was consistent with the Division's investigative

summary.

      The court found K.N. committed abuse or neglect by failing to exercise a

minimum degree of care and acting with "reckless disregard for [E.N.'s] safety

when she used heroin daily during her pregnancy, which resulted in [E.N.]

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                                       14
suffering actual harm for, at a minimum, the first three weeks of his life." The

court concluded K.N. could have prevented the harm by seeking substance abuse

treatment but failed to do so.

      Following the fact-finding, the court conducted a virtual disposition

hearing on June 15, 2021. K.N. did not appear, but was represented by OPR

counsel, who indicated she received a completed 5A form from K.N. The

Division stated the caseworker had difficulty contacting K.N.

      On September 14, 2021, K.N. and her attorney appeared at the virtual

compliance hearing.     Defense counsel indicated K.N. was interested in an

identified surrender of her parental rights to her sister and brother -in-law. On

December 15, 2021, K.N. appeared in court with her attorney and executed the

identified surrender. After the court accepted the surrender, it relieved K.N.'s

counsel from representing her.

      After K.N. filed this appeal, and following the initial briefing, the

Attorney General moved for a temporary remand because K.N.'s brief asserted

she did not receive notice of either the April 23 conference or the April 29, 2021

fact-finding hearing. The Attorney General noted this argument was raised for

the first time on appeal and the "record is underdeveloped on this issue [because]

no formal testimony was taken on the efforts made to provide K.N. with notice,

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                                       15
and it remains unclear if and when she was made aware of either hearing." The

parties all agreed a remand was necessary to take additional testimony and

adduce evidence on the notice issue "and to permit the trial court to reassess the

fact-finding order in light of this evidence." Alternatively, the Attorney General

argued if we determined K.N. was not given proper notice, we should vacate the

fact-finding order and remand for further proceedings. We granted the motion.

      On July 12, 2023, the trial court heard testimony from Division

caseworker, Jalyn Rivas, about the attempts to contact K.N. in the lead up to the

fact-finding.   Rivas testified K.N. was difficult to reach and responded

sporadically to phone calls and text messages. She would try to remind K.N.

about court proceedings. Rivas said K.N. indicated she wanted to sign the 5A

form and Rivas emailed it to her and "gave her a few copies of it" but it took

K.N. four months to fill it out.

      Rivas testified she spoke with K.N. the day before the fact-finding

hearing. She explained as follows:

            I had texted her that we had—she had asked me if we
            had court the following day. So I called her and I
            confirmed that we did have court the following day.
            And she had expressed that she was feeling down and
            depressed. That she wanted to get help. We had
            scheduled to meet the following week so I could help
            get her into a substance program and then we had

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                                       16
            decided that we would speak the following day after the
            court hearing.

Rivas testified she did not mention the 5A form or details about the upcoming

fact-finding hearing when she spoke with K.N. the day before the hearing.

      Rivas did not speak with K.N. following the hearing because K.N. did not

answer her call. She "ended up going to [K.N.'s] job and helping her fill . . .

out" a 5A form. Then Rivas submitted the form for processing on behalf of K.N.

via email. She also testified that at no time did she believe K.N. did not know

what was going on, because K.N. told Rivas she was familiar with the process

because she went through it with her other two children.

      Rivas informed K.N. about the April 23 conference by "phone calls."

However, when the court asked Rivas to detail the number of times and dates

she called K.N. about the conference and asked if she advised her "there was

going to be a case management conference on April 23[], 2021[,]" Rivas

responded as follows: "Not that I can recall that's documented." The court

asked: "Did you make any telephone calls to [K.N.] advising her of the April

23rd case management conference that were not documented in a contact sheet

or otherwise? Rivas responded: "Not that I can remember." Rivas confirmed

she had neither texted nor sent a letter to K.N. about the April 23 conference

and had only texted her about the April 29 hearing. When the court asked if she

                                                                         A-2865-21
                                     17
had communicated with K.N. "in any way so that she would know about the

April 23[], 2021 case management conference[,]" Rivas responded: "Not that I

can remember. No." Rivas confirmed she spoke with K.N. about the April 29

hearing on the phone the day before and K.N. confirmed she knew about the

date.

        On July 26, 2023, the court issued a written opinion. The court found

Rivas testified credibly. It explained "[t]he point of the [April 23, 2021] hearing

was to consider whether, from a legal perspective, OPR could still represent

[K.N.] at the fact-finding hearing scheduled on April 29, 2021."

        The court stated because provisional OPR counsel attended the April 23,

2021 hearing, K.N.'s "interests were adequately represented . . . ." However,

the court concluded it was unclear if provisional counsel communicated to K.N.

that there was a conference occurring on April 23, 2021.

        The court found K.N. had adequate notice of the April 29, 2021 fact-

finding hearing based on Rivas's testimony and the court's April 16, 2021 order,

which stated: "[T]his matter shall return to court for a fact-finding hearing on

April 29, 2021, at 9:00 a.m." The order was issued while K.N. was represented

by provisional counsel. Additionally, the court noted there was an April 28,

2021 text "from . . . Rivas to K.N. stating 'we have court this week,' presumably

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                                       18
referring to the fact-finding scheduled on April 29, 2021." The court also cited

an April 28, 2021 contact sheet recording the conversation between Rivas and

K.N. in which "[K.N.] thanked [the case] worker and agreed to speak to [the]

worker [the following day] after the court session."

                                         I.

      On appeal, K.N. argues the trial court violated her constitutional and

statutory right to counsel and deprived her of due process when it failed to

ensure she had notice of the April 23 hearing and then relieved her attorney. She

claims her due process rights were further violated when the court effectively

compelled her to proceed pro se at the fact-finding six days later and then tried

the matter in absentia. She asserts she had a right to representation at the hearing

and there was no proof she voluntarily waived that right. K.N.'s supplemental

brief, filed following the remand proceedings, argues the court's inability to find

she had notice of the April 23 hearing at which her attorney was relieved

confirms she was deprived of her right to counsel and due process.

      K.N. also argues the court abused its discretion when it denied her an

adjournment to retain an expert to rebut Dr. Medina's testimony, which the

Division had disclosed only a few days before trial. She asserts the court's

finding of abuse or neglect was unsupported by substantial credible evidence

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                                        19
because there were no medical records or testimony by the treating physicians

presented to establish that E.N. suffered actual harm from NAS, or any other

harm connected to her drug use.

                                        II.

      "Due process requires adequate notice and a fair opportunity to be heard."

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.Y.J.P., 360 N.J. Super. 426, 464 (App.

Div. 2003) (internal citations omitted). "Although a family court's factual

findings are entitled to considerable deference . . . we do not pay special

deference to its interpretation of the law . . . ." D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 246

(2012) (internal citations omitted).

      An abused or neglected child is defined as:

            a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition
            has been impaired or is in imminent danger of
            becoming impaired as the result of the failure of [their]
            parent . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in
            providing the child with proper supervision or
            guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to
            be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, . . . or by
            any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the
            aid of the court . . . .

            [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).]

      Our courts have treated Title Nine prosecutions as "quasi-criminal" in

nature. In re Guardianship of G.S. III, 137 N.J. 168, 174 (1994). This is because

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                                       20
the ramifications for a party found liable for abuse or neglect are profound. We

detailed the litany of consequences of such a finding in New Jersey Division of

Child Protection and Permanency v. V.E., 448 N.J. Super. 374, (App. Div.

2017). They include listing the perpetrator's name on a child abuse directory;

disclosure of abuse or neglect records upon written request to designated persons

or entities, including for employment purposes, kinship care provider

applications, adoption, or application to serve as a child-care placement; and "an

abuse or neglect finding may provide a basis for an action to terminate a parent's

custodial rights to a child." Id. at 391-94.

      Viewed through this lens, we are constrained under the facts of this case

to vacate the abuse or neglect finding, and remand for a new trial. Although

K.N. was represented at the April 23 hearing, we are not convinced she knew

about that hearing, knew her counsel would be relieved, and that she would be

expected to mount a defense of the Division's case pro se, just six days later.

      Our decision does not turn on the right to counsel and whether K.N.

waived that right because, as the Division points out, Title Nine cases are not

counsel-mandatory. Instead, our concern is grounded in assuring K.N.'s due

process rights to notice of the April 23 hearing and the significant decisions that

would be made in her case that day.

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                                       21
      K.N. was not the model of a cooperative litigant.               However, she

demonstrated some willingness to cooperate with services. Aside from the

problems caused by her addiction, the delay in her treatment was not all her own

making.     Having had her parental rights terminated twice before, she

acknowledged the gravity of the situation when she expressed a desire to execute

an identified surrender of her parental rights to E.N. Moreover, she clearly

benefitted by having counsel who, on her behalf, objected to the Division's

expert report.

      For these reasons, we reverse the July 26, 2023 order, and vacate the April

8, 2022 and June 10, 2021 orders. If the matter is re-tried, the court shall ensure

K.N. has received notice of all court events in accordance with the court rules

before proceeding.

                                         III.

      Given our ruling on the notice issue, we need not reach K.N.'s argument

that she was deprived of an adjournment to retain an expert. We only add that

if the matter is re-tried all parties shall be afforded adequate opportunity to retain

an expert. This is critical considering the ramifications of an abuse or neglect

finding as we have previously discussed.

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                                       IV.

      Finally, we reject K.N.'s argument the Division provided insufficient

evidence to meet the burden of proof by relying on Dr. Medina's report, which

was a net opinion. The Division bears the burden to prove abuse or neglect by

a preponderance of the evidence. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b).

      The Supreme Court has held, albeit within the context of a termination of

parental rights, that "[a] child born addicted to drugs and suffering from the

symptoms of drug withdrawal as a result of [their] mother's substance abuse

during pregnancy . . . has been harmed by the mother and that harm endangers

the child's health and development." In re Guardianship of K.H.O, 161 N.J. 337,

349 (1999). However, the Court has also noted "not every instance of drug use

by a parent during pregnancy, standing alone, will substantiate a finding of

abuse and neglect . . . . The proper focus is on the risk of substantial, imminent

harm to the child, not on the past use of drugs alone. N.J. Dep't. of Child. &

Fams. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 23 (2013). Therefore,

            [t]he Division can show that a newborn has been
            impaired in a number of ways. For example, proof that
            a child is suffering from withdrawal symptoms at birth
            could establish actual harm. . . . In addition, the
            Division can prove actual harm by showing evidence of
            respiratory distress, cardiovascular or central nervous
            system complications, low gestational age at birth, low
            birth weight, poor feeding patterns, weight loss through

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            an extended hospital stay, lethargy, convulsions, or
            tremors.

            [Id. at 22-23 (internal citations omitted).]

      N.J.R.E. 703 requires that expert opinion be grounded in "facts or data

derived from (1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at

the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible

in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts . . . ."

Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008) (quoting State v. Townsend,

186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006)). "The net opinion rule . . . 'forbids the admission into

evidence of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence

or other data.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 55-56 (2015) (quoting Polzo,

196 N.J. at 583).

      Pursuant to these principles, we conclude the court did not abuse its

discretion when it considered Dr. Medina's expert opinion and concluded the

Division met the burden of proof to establish abuse or neglect. As we recounted,

Dr. Medina did more than just review the medical records. Moreover, given her

testimony regarding the varying effects of drugs and their ability to be detected

in E.N.'s system over time, the fact she did not evaluate either E.N. or K.N. was

not dispositive. It was enough for Dr. Medina to consider the treatment records

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of mother and son from their stay at the hospital because that was the relevant

time-period.

      Dr. Medina's opinion was grounded in the objective evidence in the

record. She correlated the evidence with her medical knowledge regarding the

effects of drugs on newborns to draw the conclusion that E.N. had suffered due

to K.N.'s drug abuse.

      For these reasons, the court's conclusion K.N. abused or neglected E.N.

by using drugs and failing to obtain treatment was supported by the substantial

credible evidence in the record and was not a mistaken application of the law.

However, we hasten to add that the parties should not construe our opinion as

an expression of a preference on the outcome of the matter if it is re-tried and

appealed once more.

      Reversed, vacated, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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