Court Opinion

ID: 9371025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 07:10:16.170042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:24.900149
License: Public Domain

DISMISS and Opinion Filed February 8, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00823-CR

                     PETTIS LAMOND GAGE, Appellant
                                  V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F18-75773-T

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
              Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Smith, and Breedlove
                             Opinion by Justice Smith
      Pettis Lamond Gage appeals his conviction for murder. This Court lacks

jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

      Appellant was indicted for murder. Appellant was represented by counsel in

the trial court. On June 22, 2022, appellant signed a judicial confession and a plea

agreement. The plea agreement, which was signed by appellant, his attorney, the

prosecutor, and the trial court, provided appellant would plead guilty and receive a

sentence of confinement in the penitentiary for twenty years. The plea agreement

included a waiver of the right of appeal: “I understand that I have a right to appeal
to the Court of Appeals.       After consulting with my attorney, I do expressly,

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently give up and waive my right to any appeal

if the Court follows the terms of the State’s recommendation as to sentencing.” In

the hearing before the trial court, appellant acknowledged signing the papers and

stated that he understood them. The trial court told appellant, “if the Court does

follow the plea bargain, . . . you’re going to lose your right to appeal [except] for a

written motion to not [sic] already filed.” The trial court followed the plea agreement

and sentenced appellant to twenty years’ imprisonment.                The trial court’s

certification of appellant’s right of appeal states the court “certif[ies] this criminal

case is a plea-bargain case and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” The

certification is signed by the trial court, appellant, and appellant’s trial counsel.

      A defendant in a criminal case has the right of appeal as set out in the Code

of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 44.02. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a) Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2

provides that in “a plea-bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was

guilty . . . and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the

prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant,” a defendant may appeal only “those

matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial,” “after

getting the trial court’s permission to appeal,” or “where the specific appeal is

expressly authorized by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). When an appellant

waives his right to appeal as part of his plea bargain agreement with the State, a

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subsequent notice of appeal filed by him fails to “initiate the appellate process,”

thereby depriving this Court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Lundgren v. State, 434

S.W.3d 594, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

      In this case, appellant and the State entered into a plea agreement in which

appellant agreed to plead guilty to the charge of murder, the State and appellant

agreed to waive their rights to a jury trial, and both the State and appellant agreed to

appellant receiving a sentence of “confinement in penitentiary for 20 years.” The

documents appellant signed contained multiple admonishments that appellant

waived his right of appeal. The clerk’s record contains no written motions filed by

appellant that were ruled on before trial. Appellant did not receive the trial court’s

permission to appeal, and there is no specific statutory authorization that would

authorize an appeal in this case. Under these circumstances, we must dismiss the

appeal without further action. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State, 183

S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

      We requested appellant and the State to file letter briefs addressing the

jurisdictional issue. Appellant argues he did not waive his right of appeal and that

his timely notice of appeal established this Court’s jurisdiction, citing and quoting

Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019). Garza concerned whether an attorney

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not filing a notice of appeal when told

to do so by the defendant even though the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a

plea bargain that included waiver of some—but not all—rights of appeal. Id. at 744–

                                          –3–
46. The Supreme Court concluded that counsel was ineffective for not following the

defendant’s clear requests to file the appeal. Id. at 746 (“Where, as here, a defendant

has expressly requested an appeal, counsel performs deficiently by disregarding the

defendant’s instructions.”). In the case before us, appellant did not lack effective

assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal because

appellant’s counsel filed a notice of appeal. Also in Garza, the appellant “retained

a right to appeal at least some issues despite the waivers he signed,” which counsel

forfeited by not filing a notice of appeal. Id. at 747. In this case, appellant had no

right of appeal because the appeal was from a plea bargain, the record does not show

there were any pretrial motions ruled on before trial, and the trial court did not grant

appellant permission to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a). Garza does not address

appellate jurisdiction, and it does not hold that appellate jurisdiction exists when a

statute and rule provide there is no jurisdiction in an appeal from a judgment that

follows the terms of a plea bargain. We conclude Garza does not demonstrate that

this Court has jurisdiction over appellant’s appeal.

      We dismiss appellant’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

                                            /Craig Smith/
                                            CRAIG SMITH
Do Not Publish                              JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
220823F.U05

                                          –4–
                                 S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                JUDGMENT

PETTIS LAMOND GAGE,                         On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial
Appellant                                   District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                            Trial Court Cause No. F18-75773-T.
No. 05-22-00823-CR         V.               Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
                                            Justices Partida-Kipness and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                Breedlove participating.

      Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED for
want of jurisdiction.

Judgment entered February 8, 2023

                                      –5–