Court Opinion

ID: 9698134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:42:44.175942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:38.630449
License: Public Domain

Coneokd, P. J. A. D.,
Temporarily Assigned (concurring). I concur fully in Point I of the Court’s opinion and in the conclusion of compensability arrived at in Point II.
The principle of compensability under the odd-lot doctrine was firmly embraced by this Court in Zanchi v. S & K Const. Co., 63 N. J. 331 (1973), adopting the findings and conclusions in the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Wood for the Union County Court, reported in 124 N. J. Super. 405 (1971). The Appellate Division had long theretofore held the same view. Rodriquez v. Michael A. Scatuorchio, Inc., 42 N. J. Super. 341 (App. Div. 1956), certif. den. 23 N. J. 140 .(1957); Lightner v. Cohn, 76 N. J. Super. 461 (App. Div. 1962), certif. den. 38 N. J. 611 (1962); and see Quiles v. N. J. Metals Co., 37 N. J. 91, 101 (1962) ; 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation (1970) § 57.51, p. 82 et seq.
Thus, the issue here is not the present viability of the odd-lot doctrine but the justification for its rejection as inapplicable in this case by the Judge in Compensation and the county court, and for the determination by the Appellate Division that the finding by those tribunals that petitioner *535“is not really unemployable” was supported by substantial credible evidence in the record..
A review of the reasons for disallowance by the tribunals below of petitioner’s claim of total disability under the odd-lot doctrine suggests that he was barred on two broad grounds. (1) Petitioner’s physical condition and attendant personal circumstances did not equate with a conclusion of unemployability; stress was laid on his not seeking employment; (2) If he was unemployable this was primarily attributable to his age, and in such case compensation does not attach as the act was not “intended to be a pension or retirement plan for older but no longer employed workers” (compensation decision). Both conclusions aré also undergirded by the compensation judge’s impression that petitioner did not “inspire a feeling of total candor”. As to the last factor, in the absence of specific findings as to material operative facts, a generalized trial impression as to credibility of a witness is of slight use to an appellate court. See Congleton v. Pura-Tex Stone Corp., 53 N. J. Super. 282, 286-287 (App. Div. 1958).
On the issue of unemployability in a “reasonably stable [job] market” for such a person as petitioner, see Larson, op. tit., § 57.51, p. 82, we have a 60 year old victim of two coronary attacks, the last one, work-connected, of moderate severity, with a worse-than-average recovery, according to the treating physician. He had not completed the sixth grade and had difficulity reading. His intelligence is “low normal”. His work experience in the past has always involved heavy manual labor. He had no training in any trade. The treating physician had proscribed heavy labor but said petitioner could do “desk work”.
Direct evidence of petitioner’s capacity to find and do work suitable to his condition and abilities on a continuous basis was not presented because petitioner had not tried to find work nor respondent to prove there was work available for such a person. But there was indirect evidence in the testimony of the petitioner’s expert that there was no work *536for one like him in the existing job market; and also in the proof that after petitioner had his first heart attack seven years previously he tried but could not find no light work, but only heavy labor, which at that time he was able to manage. The settled pertinent rule is that if the petitioner prima facie fits the odd-lot category the burden of proof on the issue of availability of work for such a person passes to the employer. Zanchi v. S & K Const. Co., supra (124 N. J. Super, at 411); Lightner v. Cohn, supra (76 N. J. Super. at 468).
True, petitioner here owned a home, had $200 a month in social security benefits and adult children contributing to the home support. He thus had less motivation to seek work than others less fortunate. This seemed to weigh heavily in the judgment of the compensation judge. However, these facts are irrelevant if, in a case calling for it, the employer has not offered proof that work is available for the workman. The criteria for the odd-lot doctrine are objective, not subjective. See Deaton v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 509 P. 2d 1215, 1218 (Or. App. 1973).
Petitioner’s situation clearly met the criteria for prima facie application of the odd-lot doctrine. His case is hardly distinguishable factually from that of the petitioner in Zanchi, supra, where we held the doctrine controlling under the facts (In fairness to the tribunals below, Zanchi was decided after the Appellate Division decision herein). Each case involves a laborer of about 60 with a substantial cardiac disability and limited education and skills. Zanchi was held an odd-lot case, and a denial of 100% disability was reversed notwithstanding petitioner had not made affirmative efforts to secure employment, the employer not having undertaken to show employment was available for him. The Zanchi precedent calls for the same conclusion here, as do the general views held elsewhere on the subject of burden of proof in this area. See Larson, op. cil., § 57.61, p. 88.13 et seq.; Army and Air Force Exchange Service v. Neuman, 278 F. *537Supp. 865, 867 (W. D. La. 1967); Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 82 N. M. 424, 483 P. 2d 305 (App. 1970).
There is no tenable basis for the views of the compensation and county courts that because petitioner’s age is the primary cause of his unemployability, the compensation act is not a vehicle for his relief. One may pass the question whether age was a more significant contributor to petitioner’s assumed unemployability than his employment-connected heart condition. It may be noted that were it not for the latter, he would presumably still be working at heavy labor. But of controlling importance is the principle that the employer takes the employee as he finds him, Belth v. Anthony Ferrante & Son, Inc., 47 N. J. 38 (1966), and here he took him at his then age. If the work-connected injury, operating on the whole person, produces total disability (meaning, in the odd-lot area, unemployability) the employer is responsible for the whole result, Ibid., notwithstanding that also contributory to the end result are the petitioner’s other disadvantages, including age. The cases are legion in which the odd-lot doctrine was applied notwithstanding age was a significant factor in the picture of unemployability. Eor present purposes it suffices to cite Zanchi and Lightner v. Cohn, both supra, both involving men in their 60’s.
The determinations of the lower tribunals denying total disability in this case being insupportable on this record either in law or fact, they are properly reversed by the court.
Justice Hall joins in this opinion.