Court Opinion

ID: 9485819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:30:44.219359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:22.584248
License: Public Domain

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in the majority’s disposition of each issue. I disagree, however, with its reading of Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir.1986). Palmerin does not support excusing Palmer from the need to make a contemporaneous objection. Because he did not preserve the post-arraignment statement issue for appeal by objecting at trial, we review for plain error, not abuse of discretion. See United States v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 570 (9th Cir.1986).
The majority misreads Palmerin by omitting a crucial part of our holding. We held that “where the substance of the objection has been thoroughly explored during a hearing on the motion in limine, and the trial court’s ruling permitting introduction of evidence, was explicit and definitive, no further action is required to preserve for appeal the issue of admissibility of that evidence.” Palmerin, 794 F.2d at 1413 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added).
In Palmerin, defendants sought unsuccessfully to exclude admission of evidence of their guilty pleas by a motion in limine. Id. at 1411. The district court rejected the motion, holding that the evidence was relevant and admissible. We held that them failure to object contemporaneously during trial to the admission of that evidence did not bar them from raising the issue on appeal. Id. We emphasized that
The substance of the objection to the admission of the guilty pleas was thoroughly explored during the hearing on the motion in limine, and the trial judge’s ruling was explicit and definitive. There was no hint that the ruling might be subject to reconsideration. Perhaps most important, there was nothing in the manner or context in which the guilty pleas were introduced at trial that was unforeseen or that cast any doubt on the applicability of the trial court’s in limine ruling.
Id. at 1413.
Before trial, Palmer objected to the introduction of any evidence of his prior conviction. Unlike in Palmerin, the district court declined to rule on the objection and required the prosecutor to request a bench conference if he chose to introduce such evidence. Only then would the court determine the admissibility of the evidence. The court did not suggest that reconsideration of the subject was foreclosed. Indeed, it did not even make an explicit ruling on admissibility. Therefore, Palmenn does not support excusing Palmer from the need to make a contemporaneous objection.