Court Opinion

ID: 9403720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 16:04:57.657314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:08.984641
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (3d) 210058

                                  Opinion filed June 21, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                      IN THE

                                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                                THIRD DISTRICT

                                                       2023

      EDGAR COUNTY WATCHDOGS,                             )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                          )       of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )       Will County, Illinois.
                                                          )
                 v.                                       )       Appeal No. 3-21-0058
                                                          )       Circuit No. 19-CH-1583
      THE WILL COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,                   )
                                                          )       Honorable John C. Anderson,
                 Defendant-Appellant.                     )       Judge, Presiding.

      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
            Justice Albrecht ∗ concurred in the judgment and opinion.
            Justice McDade concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   OPINION

¶1           Plaintiff, Edgar County Watchdogs (ECW), brought a complaint against defendant, Will

     County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff’s Office), seeking equitable relief under the Freedom of

     Information Act (FOIA or Act) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2018)). The parties filed cross-motions

     for summary judgment. In relevant part, the court entered summary judgment in favor of ECW as

             ∗
             Justice Albrecht was substituted for Justice Daugherity upon Justice Daugherity’s retirement and
     upon Justice Albrecht’s assignment to the Third District Appellate Court, effective December 12, 2022.
     to its requests for disclosure of certain 911 recordings. The Sheriff’s Office appeals. It argues that

     the trial court erred when it found that the 911 recordings were not exempt from disclosure.

     Alternatively, the Sheriff’s Office contends that the trial court erred when it required the Sheriff’s

     Office to either produce the recordings using computer software to mask the caller’s voice or create

     a transcript of the calls. We reverse.

¶2                                            I. BACKGROUND

¶3          ECW filed two separate FOIA requests to the Sheriff’s Office, which are the subject of this

     appeal. On August 7, 2019, ECW made its first request. ECW made its second request on August 8,

     2019. ECW ultimately filed a complaint in the circuit court challenging the Sheriff’s Office’s

     response to its requests.

¶4                                       A. August 7, 2019, Request

¶5          On August 7, 2019, ECW submitted a FOIA request to the Sheriff’s Office requesting:

                         “1. Copy of any 911 calls or any call made for help/assistance from

                    an officer or police presence for wellness checks, disturbance or theft, at

                    the Wesley Rivals Township Park for June 1 through June 30, 2019 ***.

                         2. Copy of any 911 calls or any other call made for help/assistance

                    relating to anything at Rivals Park on August 6, 2019.

                         3. Copy of any reports, notes, statements, etc. relating to anything at

                    Wesley Township and/or Rivals Park for/on August 6, 2019.”

¶6          On August 13, 2019, the Sheriff’s Office granted the request in part and denied it in part.

     The Sheriff’s Office provided activity reports and a police report. The Sheriff’s Office redacted

     the majority of the victim statement in the police report. The Sheriff’s Office denied the request

     for all 911 calls relating to anything at Wesley Rivals Township Park on August 6, 2019.

                                                     -2-
¶7            On August 13, 2019, ECW sent a letter to the Sheriff’s Office, narrowing its request to

       only those 911 calls relating to seven specific incidents. Five of those incidents occurred in June

       2019 and two occurred in August 2019. The Sheriff’s Office also denied that request.

¶8                                         B. August 8, 2019, Request

¶9            On August 8, 2019, ECW submitted a separate request to the Sheriff’s Office seeking 911

       calls or other calls, as well as reports, notes, and statements for the park or Wesley Township.

¶ 10           The Sheriff’s Office provided ECW with an “Address Activity Report” and a copy of the

       incident report. The report included a redaction of the majority of the narrative section of the report.

       The Sheriff’s Office denied ECW’s request for 911 calls in its entirety.

¶ 11                                       C. ECW Files Its Complaint

¶ 12          ECW filed a six-count complaint against the Sheriff’s Office, claiming it wrongfully denied

       ECW’s requests for documents pursuant to the FOIA. ECW challenged the Sheriff’s Office’s

       denial of its requests to produce the 911 calls and sought unredacted copies of the statements

       included in the police reports produced by the Sheriff’s Office. The complaint included claims that

       the Sheriff’s Office failed to conduct an adequate search and willfully and intentionally violated

       the FOIA request. The complaint also sought attorney fees and costs.

¶ 13           The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In relevant part, the Sheriff’s Office

       argued that disclosure of the 911 audio recordings was exempt under the confidentiality provisions

       of section 7(1)(d)(iv) of the FOIA (id. § 7(1)(d)(iv)). Specifically, the Sheriff’s Office claimed the

       recordings were confidential statements made by individuals who file complaints with or provide

       information to law enforcement. The calls could not be altered or redacted to protect the speaker’s

       identity. According to the Sheriff’s Office, the content of the statement and the tonal qualities of

       the speaker’s voice would reveal his or her identity. The Sheriff’s Office attached the affidavit of

                                                        -3-
       Shannon Wahl, the Sheriff’s Office’s FOIA administrator. Wahl reviewed the requested records

       and determined that the records were exempt because the recordings revealed the identity of the

       callers. Wahl based her opinion on the fact that Wesley Township had a small population. The

       Sheriff’s Office also attached the affidavit of an employee of its information technology

       department. The employee averred that the Sheriff’s Office did not have computer software

       capable of masking the caller’s voice in the 911 recordings.

¶ 14           The court performed an in camera review of the recordings. It entered a written order in

       which it found “the substantive content of the material does not fall under FOIA exemptions for

       material that is personal, private, or confidential.” However, the court accepted the Sheriff’s

       Office’s argument that “the voice qualities are exempt” and determined that ECW was entitled to

       either an altered audio recording (to hide the caller’s identity) or transcripts of the 911 calls. The

       court also granted ECW’s motion for summary judgment and required the Sheriff’s Office to

       provide ECW with unredacted versions of the victim statements contained in the written police

       reports corresponding to the 911 calls. The Sheriff’s Office does not challenge that decision in this

       appeal. The court, however, granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff’s Office as to the

       claims of failure to conduct an adequate search and willful and intentional violation of the FOIA.

       The court did not resolve ECW’s request for attorney fees, but it did allow ECW to file a petition

       for fees.

¶ 15           The Sheriff’s Office appeals.

¶ 16                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17           At the outset, we must consider our jurisdiction to consider this appeal. At oral arguments,

       counsel for ECW noted that the order appealed from may not be final in light of the fact that its

       request for attorney fees remains pending in the trial court. We find that we have jurisdiction

                                                       -4-
       pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). The order appealed from

       compels the Sheriff’s Office to provide ECW with the requested 911 calls. The order is in the form

       of an injunction and may be appealed under Rule 307(a)(1).

¶ 18          Turning to the merits, the Sheriff’s Office contends that the trial court erred in granting

       summary judgment in favor of ECW as to the disclosure of the 911 recordings. Summary judgment

       is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

       judgment as a matter of law. Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 2016 IL 120041, ¶ 48.

       Normally, when parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that only a question

       of law is involved and invite the court to decide the issues based on the record. Pielet v. Pielet,

       2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28. We usually review de novo an order granting summary judgment. State

       Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 2015 IL App (1st)

       140447, ¶ 63. However, the circumstances here are unique in that the trial court performed an in

       camera inspection of the recordings in question, considered the Sheriff’s Office’s affidavits, and

       made a factual determination as to whether the recordings were exempt. Where the trial court

       conducts an evidentiary hearing (like the in camera inspection here) and makes factual findings,

       we review whether the trial court’s factual findings were against the manifest weight of the

       evidence, while still reviewing questions of law de novo. See Hites v. Waubonsee Community

       College, 2018 IL App (2d) 170617, ¶ 51. Therefore, we apply a mixed standard of review.

¶ 19          The Sheriff’s Office raises two alternative arguments on appeal. First, the Sheriff’s Office

       contends that the 911 recordings (in any form) should be exempt from disclosure because the

       content of the call reveals the caller’s identity. Alternatively, it argues that masking the audio or

       creating a transcript of the recording constitutes the creation of a new record, which it is not

       required to do under the Act. We discuss each argument in turn.

                                                       -5-
¶ 20          The purpose of the Act is:

                      “that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the

                      affairs of government and the official acts and policies of those who

                      represent them as public officials and public employees consistent with the

                      terms of this Act. Such access is necessary to enable the people to fulfill

                      their duties of discussing public issues fully and freely, making informed

                      political judgments and monitoring government to ensure that it is being

                      conducted in the public interest.” 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2018).

       An individual who has been denied access to records may file an action in the circuit court for

       injunctive or declaratory relief. Chicago Tribune Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional

       Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 23 (citing 5 ILCS 140/11(a) (West 2010)). The public

       body has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the requested records fall

       within an exemption. 5 ILCS 140/11(f) (West 2018). This burden is met when the public agency

       “ ‘provide[s] a detailed justification for its claim of exemption, addressing the requested

       documents specifically and in a manner allowing for adequate adversary testing.’ ” (Emphasis

       omitted.) Illinois Education Ass’n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 464 (2003)

       (quoting Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 537 (1989)). Section 11(f) of the

       Act (5 ILCS 140/11(f) (West 2018)) requires the circuit court to review the request for documents

       de novo and conduct an in camera examination of the requested records as it finds appropriate to

       determine if the records, or any part thereof, may be withheld under any provision of the Act.

       Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 418 (2006).

¶ 21          Public records are presumed to be open and accessible under the Act, and section 3(a) of

       the Act provides that a public body must comply with a request for such records unless one of the

                                                      -6-
       Act’s exemptions applies. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union 130, U.A. v. Department

       of Public Health, 327 Ill. App. 3d 192, 195 (2001); 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2018). “The exemptions

       are set forth in section 7 of the Act [citation].” Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois

       University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 408 (1997). If a public body denies a request and the requesting party

       challenges the denial in the circuit court, “the public body has the burden of proving that the

       records in question fall within the exemption it has claimed.” Id.

¶ 22          In this case, the Sheriff’s Office claimed the 911 recordings were exempt under section

       7(1)(d)(iv) of the Act. This section provides that records of the public body are exempt from FOIA

       requests where they “unavoidably disclose the identity of *** persons who file complaints with or

       provide information to administrative, investigative, law enforcement, or penal agencies.” 5 ILCS

       140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2018). There is no question that the 911 calls in this case qualify as records

       of persons who file complaints with or provide information to law enforcement agencies. However,

       such records are exempt from disclosure only to the extent that disclosure would unavoidably

       disclose the identity of the person who filed the complaint or provided the information to the

       agency. The agency is required to disclose any record or part thereof that does not “unavoidably

       disclose the identity” of the person who files complaints with or provides information to law

       enforcement agencies. Id.The Act plainly attempts to strike a balance between disclosing “full and

       complete information regarding the affairs of government” with protecting the privacy and identity

       of the victims and witnesses who report crimes or other events to law enforcement. Id. § 1.

¶ 23          The trial court exercised its authority and performed an in camera inspection of the 911

       recordings to determine whether disclosure was required. The Act authorizes the trial court to

       conduct an “in camera examination of the requested records *** to determine if such records or

       any part thereof may be withheld under any provision of this Act.” (Emphasis added.) See id.

                                                      -7-
       § 11(f). An “in camera review is the most effective way for the public body to objectively

       demonstrate that the exemption claimed does, in fact, apply.” National Ass’n of Criminal Defense

       Lawyers v. Chicago Police Department, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13 (2010). Following its review, the

       court concluded that the tonal qualities of the speaker were exempt given that the sound of the

       caller’s voice may reveal their identity. However, the court concluded “the substantive content of

       the material does not fall under FOIA exemptions for material that is personal, private, or

       confidential.”

¶ 24          We cannot say the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       The 911 calls, which the trial court reviewed in camera, are not included in the record on appeal.

       As a result, our ability to review the issue is rendered impossible, as we are unable to determine

       whether the trial court’s finding that the recordings would not unavoidably disclose the caller’s

       identity was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellant could have—but did not—

       include the recordings in the record on appeal. An incomplete record must be construed against

       the appellant where the lack of record hinders our review. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392

       (1984). Consequently, we must defer to the trial court’s factual findings. Therefore, we cannot find

       the trial court’s factual findings regarding the recordings were against the manifest weight of the

       evidence.

¶ 25          To the extent that the Sheriff’s Office suggests that this court should adopt a blanket rule

       and find that all 911 recordings should be exempt regardless of the substantive content of the calls,

       we disagree. 911 recordings are not automatically exempt from disclosure in their entirety. Those

       calls are only exempt to the extent that the recordings would unavoidably disclose the identity of

       the caller. 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(d)(iv) (West 2018). Not every statement in a 911 recording would

       unavoidably disclose the caller’s identity. For example, date, time, and location of reported

                                                       -8-
       incidents are not exempted under section 7(1)(d)(iv). This information is not inherently unique.

       Therefore, we decline the Sheriff’s Office’s invitation to adopt a blanket rule exempting all 911

       recordings from disclosure under the Act.

¶ 26          Next, the Sheriff’s Office contends that the trial court erred when it ordered the Sheriff’s

       Office to provide ECW with either an altered recording disguising the caller’s voice or to produce

       a transcript of the recordings. The Sheriff’s Office contends that this constitutes the creation of a

       new record, which it is not required to do under the FOIA. This is a question of law, which we

       review de novo. Nelson v. Kendall County, 2014 IL 116303, ¶ 22.

¶ 27          FOIA does not require a public body to create a new record. However, deleting information

       from a record does not create a new record, even if all but one or two items of information have

       been deleted. Family Life League v. Department of Public Aid, 112 Ill. 2d 449, 457-58 (1986).

       Similarly, scrambling a record does not lead to the creation of a new record. Bowie v. Evanston

       Community Consolidated School District No. 65, 128 Ill. 2d 373, 382 (1989). No new content is

       created, the existing document is simply altered to remove exempt information. However, the

       Sheriff’s Office attached an affidavit to its answer and affirmative defenses in which the director

       of the Sheriff’s Office’s IT department averred that the Sheriff’s Office “does not have the ability

       to scramble or disguise audio recordings so as to protect the identity of a speaker.” Therefore, the

       911 recordings in their only available form are exempt from disclosure. This is because the trial

       court found the tonal qualities may reveal the identity of the caller. The only evidence regarding

       the Sheriff’s ability to modify the voices in the recordings is the affidavit. See American

       Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO v. County of Cook,

       136 Ill. 2d 334, 343 (1990) (“[T]he provider of information is not required to prepare its records

       in a new format merely to accommodate a request for certain information.”).

                                                       -9-
¶ 28           Additionally, we find that producing a transcript of the recordings constitutes the creation

       of a new record. Preparing transcripts is not an alteration or redaction of the original document in

       the Sheriff’s Office’s possession. The Sheriff’s Office does not maintain transcripts of the 911

       calls in the ordinary course of business. Thus, producing a transcript would require preparing a

       record that does not already exist. Id. Consequently, the trial court erred when it required the

       Sheriff’s Office to either create a transcript of the 911 recordings or alter the audio recordings and

       then provide altered versions to ECW.

¶ 29           In sum, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment order in favor of ECW and its denial

       of summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Office.

¶ 30                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31           For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court of Will County is reversed.

¶ 32           Reversed.

¶ 33           JUSTICE McDADE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

¶ 34           The issue before us is whether the contents of seven identified 911 calls are exempted from

       disclosure under the Act. ECW initially filed two requests under the Act, seeking recordings of

       911 calls for assistance at the Wesley Rivals Township Park that were held in the possession of

       the Sheriff’s Office. The request was later modified to seek only the calls presently at issue. After

       conducting in camera inspections of the requested calls, the circuit court found section 7(1)(d)(iv)

       of the Act did not exempt the calls and ordered the Sheriff’s Office to produce the recordings with

       voice alterations or, if alterations were unduly burdensome or not feasible, to provide ECW with

       transcripts of the calls.

¶ 35           I concur with the majority’s holding that the 911 recordings are not blanketly exempt and

       are proper subjects of production by the Sheriff’s Office. However, I write separately to express

                                                       - 10 -
       (1) my concerns regarding our exercise of jurisdiction in this case and (2) my disagreement with

       the majority’s conclusion that neither redacted recordings nor transcripts of the 911 calls need be

       produced by the Sheriff’s Office.

¶ 36                                            A. Appellate Jurisdiction

¶ 37           The Sheriff’s Office, as appellant, asserted jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule

       301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Jurisdiction is proper under Rule 301 as a matter of right for “[e]very final

       judgment of a circuit court in a civil case.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Both parties,

       however, agree that the order before us is not a final judgment, and the Sheriff’s Office has offered

       no amendment to its original jurisdictional statement to assert and support jurisdiction on any other

       basis. Acting sua sponte and finding, correctly, that the order is an injunction, the majority

       concludes that the order “may be appealed under Rule 307(a)(1).” I agree that it “may be;” my

       concern is whether it has been.

¶ 38           As a motion remains pending in the circuit court, I accept, as did the majority, the parties’

       agreed conclusion that the challenged order is not final for purposes of appeal, that the Sheriff’s

       Office has presented an inapplicable and erroneous basis for this court’s jurisdiction, 1 and that we

       do not have jurisdiction on the basis asserted in the jurisdictional statement in the opening brief of

       the Sheriff’s Office. For the reasons that follow, it is not clear to me that we either have or can

       properly exercise our jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals to consider the parties’ arguments

       and render a decision in this case.

               1
                 The only case I could find in which the supreme court addresses erroneous assertion of a
       jurisdictional rule is O’Banner v. McDonald’s Corp., 173 Ill. 2d 208, 210-11 (1996). However, the
       discussion of this issue appears to be dicta and it relates to the general notice of appeal in Rule 301, which
       the court notes does not require citation to a rule, and not, as here, to the notice of appeal required by Illinois
       Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Nov. 1, 2017), by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307 (eff. Nov. 1, 2017), or
       the jurisdictional statement, which clearly state precisely that requirement.

                                                             - 11 -
¶ 39          First, I am doubtful of the propriety of simply exercising appellate jurisdiction under an

       unasserted supreme court rule when the Sheriff’s Office has neither made a procedurally proper

       invocation in its notice of appeal or its jurisdictional statement nor complied with any of the

       requirements of the rules under which we now exercise jurisdiction. Rule 341(h)(4) requires a

       jurisdictional statement which presents:

                      “a brief, but precise statement or explanation under the heading

                      ‘Jurisdiction’ of the basis for appeal including the supreme court rule or

                      other law which confers jurisdiction upon the reviewing court; the facts of

                      the case which bring it within this rule or other law; and the date that the

                      order being appealed was entered and any other facts which are necessary

                      to demonstrate that the appeal is timely.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(4) (eff. Nov. 1,

                      2017).

       The Sheriff’s Office, as appellant, has not provided us with any of the requisite information in

       support of interlocutory jurisdiction as of right in this case. Rule 307(a) provides:

                               “(a) Orders Appealable; Time. An appeal may be taken to the

                      Appellate Court from an interlocutory order of court:

                                      (1) granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to

                          dissolve or modify an injunction;

                                                      ***

                      Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (d), the appeal must be perfected

                      within 30 days from the entry of the interlocutory order by filing a notice of

                      appeal designated “Notice of Interlocutory Appeal” conforming

                      substantially to the notice of appeal in other cases. A Rule 328 supporting

                                                       - 12 -
                       record must be filed in the Appellate Court within the same 30 days unless

                       the time for filing the Rule 328 supporting record is extended by the

                       Appellate Court or any judge thereof.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R.

                       307(a) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).

       The Sheriff’s Office’s notice of appeal and jurisdictional statement include none of that

       information. Nor have the parties complied with the expedited briefing schedule for interlocutory

       appeals set out in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(c) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).

¶ 40           Second, I would note that the procedure the majority apparently validates in this case shifts

       the burden of asserting and supporting jurisdiction from the appellant, where the supreme court

       signals in Rules 341(h)(4) and 307(a) it properly belongs, to this appellate panel. Certainly,

       accepting such a shifting of responsibility is not the usual practice in this court. Typically, if we

       find jurisdiction does not exist on the basis asserted in the jurisdictional statement, we dismiss the

       appeal; we do not comb the record in search of the information necessary to determine whether

       jurisdiction can be exercised on another basis.

¶ 41           Third, and finally, the supreme court rules establish procedures for carrying out the

       functions of the courts—presumably for a reason. Our jurisprudence is rife with circumstances

       where even the most fundamental of constitutional or legislative rights can be waived or forfeited

       for failure to comply with or fit within the appropriate procedures. 2 Finding we cannot exercise

       jurisdiction in this case because the appellant failed to comply with the procedures necessary to

       invoke it would merely be another instance, and by far not the most egregious, of procedural

       default.

               2
                For example, in Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022), the United States Supreme
       Court held that a death row inmate’s demonstrable claim of actual innocence of the crime for which he is
       scheduled to die cannot be reviewed if the court is technically procedurally barred from considering it and
       the innocent convict must remain on death row and subject to execution.
                                                         - 13 -
¶ 42           That said, as pointed out by the majority, this interlocutory order is certainly a matter we

       are authorized to address and resolve. I would think that in this case jurisdiction is available but

       has been waived by the Sheriff’s Office because it has not been invoked. Waiver is, however, a

       limitation on the parties, not the court (County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hagan, 298 Ill. App. 3d

       495, 507 (1998)), and we can excuse the Sheriff’s Office’s failure to comply with Rule 341. There

       is good cause to do so in this case because the Act expressly urges expeditious dispositions of

       FOIA requests.

¶ 43                                 B. Form and Nature of FOIA Disclosure

¶ 44           Turning to the merits, in the instant case, the circuit court, ruling on cross motions for

       summary judgment, ordered the Sheriff’s Office to produce the recordings of the 911 calls with

       voice alterations or to provide ECW with transcripts of the calls. The Sheriff’s Office argues that

       compliance with either of these options would require creating new records. The majority rejects

       this argument as to the substance of the recordings, concluding that production is not prohibited

       by an exemption, but agrees with the Sheriff’s Office that it need not produce either recordings or

       transcripts of the recordings in this case.

¶ 45           In our original decision in this case, we (1) affirmed the circuit court’s order requiring the

       Sheriff’s Office to produce the challenged recordings of 911 calls using voice alteration technology

       to prevent voice recognition of the caller(s), but (2) reversed the decision to require, as an

       alternative, the translation of the recordings to a transcript, finding that to be the creation of a new

       document. The Sheriff’s Office sought rehearing, alleging our order rested on a factually incorrect

       reading of an affidavit it had submitted. We granted rehearing and, following supplemental

       briefing by both parties, this new opinion will issue.

                                                        - 14 -
¶ 46           In this revised decision, we again reject the Sheriff’s claim that all 911 calls, in any form,

       should be exempt from disclosure because the content reveals the caller’s identity. Supra ¶ 25. I

       agree with that decision and concur on that issue.

¶ 47           The majority next considers the Sheriff’s Office’s argument that the requested production

       of the calls as either redacted recordings or in transcript form requires the creation of new records,

       which the statute expressly excuses it from doing.

¶ 48           Regarding the 911 tapes themselves, the majority reverses our earlier decision and finds

       the Sheriff is not required to produce them in redacted form because (1) the actual tapes are not in

       the record, (2) the trial court did not make a relevant factual finding, and (3) the affidavit submitted

       by the Sheriff represents the only evidence in the record of that office’s ability to produce suitably

       altered tapes. I do not agree with this decision because the first two of these reasons only have

       relevance if the third is controlling. Under the statute, it is not. The majority reiterates its finding

       that preparing a transcript would be creating a new record.

¶ 49           I would find the Sheriff is obligated—as the trial court found—to produce the 911 tapes to

       ECW in either modified audio form or as transcripts. The author suggests this position is a result

       of failing to read and heed the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. It is, however, that

       language that drives my conclusion. The statute opens by announcing the public policy and

       governmental obligations as follows: “[I]t is declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois

       that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government

       and the official acts and policies of those who represent them as public officials and public

       employees.” 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2018). Further, “[i]t is a fundamental obligation of government

       to operate openly and provide public records as expediently and efficiently as possible.” Id. It is

       not, however, the intent “to create an obligation on the part of any public body to maintain or

                                                        - 15 -
       prepare any public record which was not maintained or prepared by such public body at the time

       when this Act becomes effective.” Id. Nonetheless, any restraints on access are limited exceptions

       to the

                       “principle that the people of this State have a right to full disclosure of information

                       relating to the decisions, policies, procedures, rules, standards, and other aspects of

                       government activity that affect the conduct of government and the lives of any or

                       all of the people. The provisions of this Act shall be construed in accordance with

                       this principle.” Id.

       And finally:

                               “The General Assembly recognizes that this Act imposes fiscal obligations

                       on public bodies to provide adequate staff and equipment to comply with its

                       requirements. The General Assembly declares that providing records in compliance

                       with the requirements of this Act is a primary duty of public bodies to the people

                       of this State, and this Act should be construed to this end, fiscal obligations

                       notwithstanding.” Id.

¶ 50            Moving from the general provisions stating the legislative purpose and intent to more

       specific requirements of the statute, section 1.2 states the Act’s “Presumption” as “All records in

       the custody or possession of a public body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying.” Id.

       § 1.2. The Act provides two definitions directly pertinent to this presumption and to the specific

       issues in this case. Section 2(c) defines “public records” as “all records *** tapes, recordings ***

       and all other documentary materials pertaining to the transaction of public business, regardless of

       physical form or characteristics, having been prepared by or for, or having been or being used by,

       received by, in the possession of, or under the control of any public body.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

                                                       - 16 -
       § 2(c). This definition makes clear that a public record is not simply a tangible object; it is the

       content “pertaining to the transaction of public business.” In section 2(d), “the reproduction of any

       public record by means of any photographic, electronic, mechanical or other process, device or

       means now known or hereafter developed and available to the public body” is the definition of

       “copying,” not of creating a new record. (Emphasis added.) Id. § 2(d).

¶ 51          Regarding the tapes themselves, we have already decided that their substance is not

       protected by an exemption. The only obstacle to their production is the actual modification of the

       tapes to prevent recognition of the voices of the callers. The Sheriff submitted a sworn affidavit

       asserting that his office did not have the equipment to make such protective changes. The affidavit

       did not, however, aver that such equipment did not exist at that time or that the Sheriff did not

       have the ability to access either equipment or personnel to make the necessary modifications. As

       shown above (supra ¶ 49), the General Assembly “declare[d] that providing records in compliance

       with the requirements of this Act is a primary duty of public bodies to the people of this State, and

       this Act should be construed to this end, fiscal obligations notwithstanding.” (Internal quotation

       marks omitted.) The Sheriff acknowledged to the circuit court that such equipment exists; it is

       statutorily required to access and use it to produce the requested material, “fiscal obligations

       notwithstanding.”

¶ 52          Turning next to the option of a transcript, the Sheriff argues that production of the tapes in

       transcript form requires the creation of a new document. The majority agrees, but I would find that

       the Sheriff is wrong for two reasons. First, the statute precludes requiring the public body to

       produce a “new record”—not a new document—in response to a FOIA request. Case law strongly

       indicates that there is a distinction between a public “record” and a “document” that has not been

       lost on our courts. In Family Life League, the court explained that production of records requiring

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       only the deletion of exempt information does not amount to creating new records. Family Life

       League, 112 Ill. 2d at 457-58. The court expanded the reasoning of Family Life League in Bowie,

       128 Ill. 2d 373, and in Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill. 2d 49 (1989).

¶ 53          In Bowie, the plaintiff sought to obtain demographics and test scores on students from

       certain years. Bowie, 128 Ill. 2d at 376. The demographic request sought race and grade level of

       the students, but not their names or gender. Id. However, the defendants maintained the records

       with students sorted under a single-digit code capturing a particular student’s race and sex. Id. at

       380. For example, a white male was coded as “1,” a white female as “2,” and so forth through the

       spectrum of race and, in some cases, national origin. The defendants argued that to produce the

       record with only race (without sex) would require recoding the entries to reflect the change, thus

       requiring the creation of new records. Id. at 381. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 382.

       It reasoned that the disclosure was similar to “only being required to delete the exempt matter.”

       Id. “Deleting information from a record does not create a ‘new’ record, even if all but one or two

       items of information have been deleted.” Id. In Hamer, the supreme court held that compiling or

       scrambling information, although requiring additional steps, does not constitute creating new

       records. Hamer, 132 Ill. 2d at 56-57. In both cases, making the modifications authorized by the

       court would presumably require producing new paper documents, but the supreme court did not

       reject that possibility as “creating a new record.” Relying in part on Hamer, the First District

       recently explained that “[a] request for a listing or index of a database’s contents that seeks

       information about those contents, as opposed to the contents themselves, requests a new record.”

       Martinez v. Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, 2018 IL App (1st) 163153, ¶ 30. These

       precedents strongly support finding that so long as the modification does not involve the creation

       of new content not previously maintained by the agency, it does not create a new record.

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¶ 54             Producing transcripts of the 911 recordings only reproduces their exact content. In a

       courtroom where proceedings are captured on an electronic recording device, the later reduction

       of the recording to paper does not create a new record, it merely changes the form in which the

       original record is presented. The recordings would be reduced to paper verbatim, requiring—

       indeed, allowing—neither editing nor, as the Sheriff claims, discernment of meaning. This task

       imposes no function on the Sheriff’s Office different from that performed by the court reporter.

       Moreover, unlike the recordings, the transcripts would avoid all concerns about voice recognition

       in that they could easily be redacted by the Sheriff to exclude any legitimately exempt identifying

       information without requiring additional technology or significant cost.

¶ 55             The second reason for my belief that the Sheriff has to produce the tapes in transcript form

       is that, because we have determined the substance of the 911 recordings is not protected by an

       exemption, we presume, pursuant to the statute, that they are “open to inspection or copying.”

       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Supra ¶ 50. “Copying,” as defined in section 2(d), would

       include reproduction in the form of a transcript. While this could be accomplished by simply

       making the recordings available to ECW so that group can create transcripts, the Sheriff’s concern

       that some private information could be disclosed would suggest that the office itself should reduce

       the recordings to transcript form and make the appropriate redactions, “fiscal obligations

       notwithstanding.” This “copying” would not, by statutory definition, constitute creating a new

       record.

¶ 56             The majority also notes that the Sheriff’s Office “does not maintain transcripts of the 911

       calls in the ordinary course of business.” Supra ¶ 28. It, thus, concludes “that producing a transcript

       of the recordings constitutes the creation of a new record.” Supra ¶ 28. I disagree. The recordings

       and their contents are in the possession of or fully accessible to the Sheriff’s Office. This is the

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“records;” creation of the transcript does not change it. As previously noted, the Bowie court held

modifying the format, but not the content of recorded demographic information, to satisfy the Act’s

disclosure requirements did not constitute creating new records. Bowie, 128 Ill. 2d at 382. So long

as the transcripts contain nothing more than a verbatim rendition of the recordings and no

additional information is included in the recorded dialogs, no new record would be created. The

majority’s conclusion is tenable only if one reads the Act narrowly and construes the statutory

term “public records” only as the forms and formats in which the actual content is held. The Act

does not make such a distinction and nor does it countenance such a construction of its terms.

                                              - 20 -
    Edgar County Watchdogs v. Will County Sheriff’s Office, 2023 IL App (3d) 210058

Decision Under Review:      Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 19-CH-1583;
                            the Hon. John C. Anderson, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                   James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Kevin J. Meyers
for                         and Scott Pyles, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for
Appellant:                  appellant.

Attorneys                   Joshua Burday, Matthew Topic, Merrick Wayne, and Shelley
for                         Geiszler, of Loevy & Loevy, of Chicago, for appellee.
Appellee:

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