Court Opinion

ID: 9606688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:51:42.292631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:35.195406
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ROVIRA
specially concurring:
The majority concludes that a “warrant-less search is not invalid merely because of a reasonable good-faith mistake of fact by the officers concerning the authority of the party consenting to the search.” Op. at 472. Because the majority opinion is a correct interpretation of federal constitutional law, I join in its analysis and conclusion. I write separately only to express my belief that the analysis under article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution is identical to that required by federal constitutional law as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990).1 Thus, a warrantless search based on the consent of a third person whom the police reasonably believe has authority to consent to the search is not “unreasonable” under the Colorado Constitution.
I
Article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution, like the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Our jurisprudence under article II, section 7, for determining whether an intrusion into an individual’s privacy amounts to an unconstitutional search or seizure requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the intrusion was a search; and (2) if the intrusion amounts to a search, whether the intrusion was reasonable. People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Colo.1992).
In determining whether an intrusion is a search under article II, section 7, we have occasionally diverged from the United States Supreme Court. See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811 (Colo.1985); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo.1983); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980). But see Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271. I have repeatedly noted my disagreement with the development of different standards in this area. See, e.g., Oates, 698 P.2d 811 (Rovira, J., dissenting); Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Rovira, J., dissenting). However, the question before us is not whether the intrusion was a search, but whether, assuming the intrusion was a search, it was reasonable. Clearly, the standard by which the reasonableness of a search is tested is the same under the Fourth Amendment and the Colorado Constitution.
In interpreting the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment the Supreme Court in Rodriguez explained that
in order to satisfy the “reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government — whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer executing a warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement— is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185-86, 110 S.Ct. at 2800. The consent of an interested party renders a search “reasonable” under article II, section 7, whether that person is the individual whose property is searched, see People v. Drake, 785 P.2d 1257, 1265 (Colo.*4751984), or possesses common authority over the premises, see People v. Savage, 630 P.2d 1070, 1073-74 (Colo.1981). Although Drumm did not have “joint access or control” of the cabin, and thus was unable to give valid consent to the search under Savage, 630 P.2d at 1073-74, he may have “possessed the ‘necessary appearance of authority ... ’ to consent to the search.” People v. Berow, 688 P.2d 1123,1127 (Colo.1984).
In Berow, although we held the search at issue was warranted by exigent circumstances, we also recognized that the reasonable reliance on the authority of a third party could be sufficient to validate a war-rantless search. Id. at 1126-27. Such a conclusion is eminently sound. In the words of one commentator:
[I]f it is accepted that the making of searches by consent should not occupy second-class status in the hierarchy of law enforcement practices, then certainly the search should not be undone by reasonable good-faith mistakes of fact concerning the authority of the consenting party....
... [TJhere is no apparent reason to disfavor consent searches, for — whether or not there would be a basis for making the search later pursuant to a warrant— such searches are both an important investigative tool and a useful means by which persons (both guilty and innocent) can beneficially manifest their cooperation with investigation into suspected criminal activity.
3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.3 at 62 (1993 Supp.).
Article II, section 7, requires that a search be “reasonable,” not that the judgment of the officer be correct concerning the authority of the person who gives consent.

. Article II, section 7 was relied upon by the defendant in his motion to suppress in the trial court. See Op. at 469.