Court Opinion

ID: 9776119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:19:07.429738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:34.523234
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The obvious purpose of Missouri’s open meetings law is to ensure that the public’s business be done in public. The law, section 610.010 to 610.0281 is, as section 610.011 dictates, to be “liberally construed and their exceptions strictly construed.”
*266Unquestionably, the Fulton city council was doing the public’s business in the 13 meetings, that it closed to the public, which involved public financing for the acquisition and development of a golf course by private parties. The trial court accordingly was correct in concluding that the defendant council members violated the law. The trial court, however, did not find that the city council “purposely” violated the law; thus, under the trial court’s interpretation of the statute, the court did not consider civil fines or attorneys’ fees and costs.
I differ from the majority’s conclusions in two important respects:
(1) The statute allows the court to consider awarding costs and attorneys’ fees where defendants have violated the statute, whether “purposely” or not. The ease should be remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine what attorneys’ fees, if any, should be awarded to Spradlin because of defendants’ violations of the law.
(2) The case should also be remanded for the trial court to reconsider its conclusion that defendant council members did not “purposely” violate the open meetings law. I concur in the decision to uphold the
finding that the council members violated the open meetings law. But, because I believe the majority’s opinion misconstrues the statute’s words and, thereby, severely weakens meaningful enforcement of the state’s open meetings law, I respectfully dissent.
Attorneys’ Fees May Be Awarded Even If The Violation Was Not Purposeful.
The statutory standard here is not clearly written, but it is not ambiguous. Correct interpretation requires a careful reading, but the study of sentence structure taught in grade school, formerly known as grammar school, will suffice. Canons of statutory construction, taught in law school, also support a correct interpretation. The sentence in question is a compound sentence consisting of two independent clauses joined by the conjunctive “and:”
Upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a member of a public governmental body has purposely violated sections 610.010 to 610.027, the member may be subject to a civil fine in the amount of no more than five hundred dollars and
the court may order the payment by such member of all costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees to any party successfully establishing a violation of 610.010 to 610.026. (Spacing provided, for emphasis.)
Section 610.027(3)
The reference to “such member” is to the antecedent phrase “member of a public governmental body.” It does not include the rest of the first clause concerning the purposeful violator of the statute. “Such member” is properly read only to be an abbreviated reference to the longer descriptive phrase, “member of a public governmental body,” not to the entire first clause.
Moreover, the compound sentence should be read to avoid redundancy, and to give effect to each word and phrase in the statute, as the canons of statutory construction teach us. Union Electric v. Morris, 359 Mo. 564, 222 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Mo.1949). If we read the statute to require a purposeful violation in order to trigger potential liability for attorneys’ fees, then we render unnecessary the phrase “to any party successfully establishing a violation of sections 610.010 to 610.026.” To read the statute, as the trial court and this Court’s majority do, is to edit the section by ending the sentence after the word “fees.” We must, after all, give effect to the statute as written, McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. banc 1996), and not discard or ignore phrases that are inconsistent with the meaning we want. Even if the phrase has some utility (beyond re-stating the obvious) for determining which party in multi-party cases is to be awarded attorneys’ fees, the phrase does not limit the award of fees to “purposeful” violations, but rather specifies an award to “any party successfully establishing a violation of 610.010 to 610.026.” .
The correct interpretation of this statute is done here without reference to the “policy” expressed in section 610.011. This interpretation is based simply on the words of the statute themselves. However, the majority *267does pay homage to the policy expressed in the statute that it should be “liberally construed” with the exceptions to the statute “strictly construed” in order to “promote this public policy.” After paying homage to this policy, the majority then severely weakens the statute by depriving it in most cases of the most effective means of enforcement provided by the General Assembly, that is, the provision of attorneys’ fees.
The statute, as written, applies to a broadly defined category of entities under the term “public governmental body.” As set forth in the statute, the requirement of open meetings and open records applies to several thousand such public governmental bodies, including every conceivable form of state and local board, commission, agency, city council, school district, sewer district, or other governmental entity.
Section 610.027 permits a public governmental body that has doubts about the legality of closing a public meeting or record or vote to request an attorney general’s opinion, and the statute likewise empowers an action for enforcement to be brought by the attorney general or prosecuting attorney. But no legislative body has appropriated public funds to enforce the statute. By and large, enforcement of the statute is left to actions to be brought by “any aggrieved person, taxpayer to, or citizen of, this state, ....” Id. Thus, the effectiveness of the statute is almost entirely dependent upon suits by private parties, which, in turn, depend upon the availability of attorneys’ fees where violations of the statute are proved. The majority’s reading of the statute precludes consideration of attorneys’ fees for all but the most egregious violations of the statute. Without the availability of attorneys’ fees for those who prove violations of the statute, enforcement of the statute is left to wealthy gadflies and media owners who care enough to bring suit to vindicate the public’s right to know.
Because there is a relative shortage of wealthy gadflies and caring media barons, the statute— mostly bereft of its principal enforcement tool— may safely be ignored by those public governmental bodies that would prefer to do the public’s business in private.
I began this section by noting that the General Assembly has given us a statute that is not clearly written. That is certainly not unprecedented. In fact the lack of clarity may have been deliberate in order to make peace between contending factions and to get the legislation passed. The “sunshine side” could believe it was getting a strong law that protects the public’s right to know about the conduct of the public’s business. And the faction that wanted a weak, barely enforceable law— what we might call “the dark side”2— could see what it wanted in the legislation. The true meaning of the law, ultimately, is left to the court.
But the General Assembly can, if it wishes, have a strong sunshine law. The legislature can simply amend the provision quoted here to make it clear enough for everyone to understand that courts may award attorneys’ fees where there are violations of the law, whether purposeful or not.
Or, if the General Assembly is satisfied with a weak law that remains after the result in this Court, it can leave the statute alone.
There is one aspect of the majority’s reading of the statute that is likely to cause unintended mischief — that is, the majority’s reading of attorneys’ fees as penal in nature. Depending upon the context, an award of attorneys’ fees can be viewed as punishment, for example, Rule 55.03(c)(2), for violation of this Court’s rule against frivolous pleadings and motions. But in other contexts, attorneys’ fees provisions simply involve the shifting of responsibility for fees and costs to a party more appropriately positioned to pay them, as in divorce litigation, for example, or to further the public policy of enforcement of particular statutory or constitutional rights, as in the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fee Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1988. Neither of the latter examples is considered penal or punitive, but simply a furtherance of public policy.
To limit attorneys’ fees to situations where there are purposeful violations, and to label such fees as penal, is virtually to assure that the members of the public bodies personally *268will bear the burden of such fees. If such fees are penal in nature, it may be against public policy for them to be borne by anyone other than the wrongdoer. Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17,23 (Mo.App.1964). See also Colson v. Lloyd’s of London, 435 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Mo.App.1968) (potential chilling effect of public policy against insurance for punitive damages on law enforcement officers). On the other hand, to treat the statute simply as a fee shifting statute leaves open the possibility that the governmental entity itself could indemnify its members who' are subjected to liability for attorneys’ fees for violations of the statute. Cf. State ex rel. Lack v. Melton, 692 S.W.2d 302 (Mo.1985) (county commission entitled to use county funds to compensate outside counsel who represented it where county commission members were sued in their official as well as individual capacity), and Dixon v. Holden, 963 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Mo.App. W.D.1997) (state legal expense fund, which is used for payment of claims against state, state agency, or officer or employee of state or state agency, covers state employees in 42 U.S.C.A. sec.1983 suits and award of attorneys fees under sec.1988). The majority’s interpretation of the attorneys’ fees provision makes the possibility of being subjected to liability for attorneys’ fees about as likely as being struck by lightning, but if the member of a public body is so struck, he or she is likely to bear the full brunt of the charge.
We should note that section 610.027 provides that the court “may” award attorneys’ fees. Cf, Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). The determination of attorneys’ fees and the proper amount is left to the discretion of the court, as is the amount “up to $500” in civil fines for purposeful violations. The fear of imposing burdensome liabilities for attorneys’ fees on the part of individual members of public governmental bodies will, I believe, greatly diminish the use of attorneys’ fees for encouraging remedial actions under the statute.
Did the City Council Act Purposely?
Only once in 13 meetings was the prospect of a lease of the golf course to the city— as part of a public financing scheme— even mentioned. The council cited section 610.021(2) without, apparently, any advice of counsel or any serious attempt to justify the closure under the statutory exception.
The transactions discussed in the counsel’s closed sessions are precisely the kind that need the disinfecting effects of “sunshine” mandated by the open meetings law. After the city’s voters rejected a bond issue for a golf course, private developers proposed the use of the city’s bonding authority in the establishment of a “Fulton Golf Course Neighborhood Improvement District” to finance the development. A lease of the golf course to the city, where the course was to be operated by the private parties for their own benefit, was simply part of the financing arrangement. The contemplated lease of the golf course to the city in no way qualified for the statutory exception: there was no showing; as the trial court found, that public knowledge would adversely affect the price of the real estate. Most of the closed council meetings did not involve lease, purchase, or sale of real estate by the city of Fulton, but by a private party. The part that affected the city and concerned plaintiff Spradlin was the proposal to use public bonds for financing the golf course development.
The obvious fear is not that .the lease price will be affected by public knowledge of the impending deal, but that public exposure would enrage the citizenry and thus kill the deal.
That is precisely why we have a sunshine law.
I agree with the principal opinion that “purposely,” when used in its ordinary and usual sense, means more than a mere intent to engage in conduct that violates the open meetings law, and that a member of a public governmental body “must exhibit a ‘conscious design, intent or plan’ to violate the Act and do so ‘with awareness of the probable consequences.’ ” (principal opinion, p. 14). (Emphasis added.) The trial court thus must judge defendants’ purpose by what they did, not by a “pure heart, empty head” standard of what they said.
*269To invoke the exception to the open meetings law for a lease, the statute states the requirement as follows:
Except to the extent disclosure is otherwise required by law, a public governmental body is authorized to close meetings, records and votes, to the extent they relate to the following:
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(2) Leasing, purchase or sale of real estate by a public governmental body where public knowledge of the transaction might adversely affect the legal consideration therefor. (Emphasis added.)
The statute unequivocally requires not just that the discussion “relate to” the leasing of real estate, but also that public knowledge of the transaction might adversely affect the legal consideration. The lease contemplated by this transaction is a lease to the city by the private developers of a golf course being developed with public bond financing. There appears to be no way public disclosure could affect the “legal consideration” for the lease; the lease was part of the overall financing deal involving the proposed lessor and lessee. The parties to the proposed lease were in the deal together behind closed doors. There was no market for the lease to be affected by public disclosure, for there would only be one eligible lessor, the developer, and one eligible lessee, the city.3
The inapplicability of the statutory exception seems to be obvious. In Kansas City Star Company v. Shields, 771 S.W.2d 101 (Mo.App.1989) the court upheld a finding of a purposeful violation of the statute where there was no statutory exemption applicable, and in Charlier v. Corum, 794 S.W.2d 676 (Mo.App.1990), the court upheld a finding of purposeful conduct even though the defendant had obtained legal advice that his office was not a public governmental body. See also, Deaton v. Kidd 932 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Mo.App.1996) (a “good faith belief’ does not negate liability for a purposeful violation). Even if the city council in this case had obtained legal advice to justify its conduct, it would be difficult not to find that its members acted purposely, because the statute is so clear: the section requires showing that public disclosure could adversely affect price, and I can find no evidence that “legal consideration” for the lease would be affected. However, the determination of whether defendants’ conduct is purposeful is a question of fact that should be left to the trial judge upon remand, guided by the principles set forth here.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s conclusion that attorneys’ fees cannot be awarded and would remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine what attorneys’ fees should be awarded to Spradlin because of defendants’ violations of the open meetings law. I would also remand for the trial court to determine whether defendants’ conduct was purposeful, and, if so, for consideration of civil fines under section 610.027.3.

. All references are to RSMo.1994 unless otherwise indicated.

. With no disrespect intended. See, George Lucas, "Star Wars" (Lucasfilm, Ltd.).

. Perhaps it may be contended that the price of the land to be paid by the developers would be affected by public disclosure of the project, but the exception does not exist to protect private business. Private parties who do deals with government, and seek public financing, should know that public business is done in the sunshine.