Court Opinion

ID: 9893500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 15:00:32.574902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:21.346798
License: Public Domain

22-1095-cr
    United States v. Delaney

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
    the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 27th day of October, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
                MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
                      Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    United States of America,
                         Appellee,

                       v.                                                   22-1095-cr

    Jacob Delaney,
                      Defendant-Appellant.
    _____________________________________

    FOR APPELLEE:                                  STEVEN D. CLYMER (Richard D. Belliss, Carina
                                                   H. Schoenberger, on the brief), Assistant United
                                                   States Attorneys, for Carla B. Freedman, United
                                                   States Attorney for the Northern District of New
                                                   York, Syracuse, NY.

    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:                       RICHARD D. WILLSTATTER (Theodore S. Green,
                                                   on the brief), Green & Willstatter, White Plains,
                                                   NY.
       Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of

New York (McAvoy, J.).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

      Defendant-appellant Jacob Delaney appeals from the district court’s judgment of

conviction, entered on May 13, 2022, on one count of receipt of child pornography in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1), and three counts of possession of child pornography in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). On appeal, Delaney challenges the district

court’s: (1) denial of his motion to suppress and (2) imposition of two special conditions of

supervised release at sentencing that restrict his interaction with minors. We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer

only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

          I.   Background

      On December 10, 2019, a federal magistrate judge approved a no-knock warrant to search

Delaney’s residence for evidence of child pornography-related offenses. In support of the warrant

application, the government submitted a thirty-seven page sworn affidavit from FBI Special Agent

David Fallon, which alleged that a “user of the Internet account at [Delaney’s residence] ha[d]

been linked to an online community of individuals who regularly send and receive child

pornography via a website that operated on the Tor anonymity network.” Appellant App’x at 76.

The Tor network is “a computer network available to Internet users that is designed specifically to

facilitate anonymous communication over the Internet.” Id. It anonymizes communications by

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routing user communications through a global relay of intermediary computers along randomly

assigned paths. “Because a Tor user’s communications are routed through multiple nodes before

reaching their destination, when a Tor user accesses an Internet website, only the IP address of the

last relay computer (the ‘exit node’), as opposed to the Tor user’s actual IP address, appears on

that website’s IP address log.” Id. at 77. This routing makes it so that law enforcement cannot

“use public lookups or ordinary investigative means to determine the true IP address – and therefore

the location – of a computer server that hosts a hidden service.” Id. at 79.

       The affidavit asserted that, in August 2019, the FBI received a tip from a foreign law

enforcement agency (“FLA”) in a country with “an established rule of law.” Id. at 82. The

affidavit also attested that the FLA had provided reliable and accurate information to U.S. law

enforcement in the past. According to the affidavit, the FLA determined that a user of an IP address

“accessed online child sexual abuse and exploitation material via a website” on April 22, 2019. 1

Id. at 81. The FLA stated: “Users were able to view some material without creating an account.

However, an account was required to post and access all content.” Id. The affidavit did not define

the terms “material” and “accessed.” The affidavit described the “Tor-network-based website” as

“an active online forum” that was “dedicated to the sexual exploitation of minor and/or

prepubescent males.” Id. at 79. The site allowed “users” to communicate with other “users, either

within forums that were openly accessible to any user of the site, within forums only accessible to

particular users, or in one-to-one private message chats between users.” Id. “Child pornography

1
  The affidavit did not name the website, but it informed the court that the FLA had referred to the website
by its actual name when relaying its tip to the FBI.

                                                     3
images and videos were trafficked through this chat site via the posting of web links within forum

messages.” Id. at 80. 2 The affidavit stated that accessing the website “required numerous

affirmative steps by the user,” including downloading Tor software and finding the site’s 16- or

56-character web address, which was not readily accessible through a search engine. Id. at 84.

       The affidavit went on to assert that publicly available information indicated that the user’s

IP address was registered to Charter Communications. In November 2019, an administrative

subpoena was issued to Charter Communications, the results of which linked the IP address to

Delaney.     The affidavit reported that further investigation, including physical surveillance,

confirmed the location of Delaney’s residence. Agent Fallon asserted that, in his experience,

individuals who have a sexual interest in children “often maintain their child pornography images

in a digital or electronic format in a safe, secure and private environment, such as a computer and

surrounding area” and that these images “are often maintained for several years.” Id. at 90.

However, the affidavit provided no information indicating that Delaney had any history of

inappropriate contact with children or with child pornography; the only evidence linking Delaney

to such material was the single instance of the IP address assigned to him accessing the target site.

       On December 12, 2019, law enforcement executed the search warrant at Delaney’s

residence and uncovered over 15,000 images and 290 videos involving minors engaged in sexually

explicit conduct on multiple electronic devices. At the time of the search, Delaney told law

enforcement that he used the Tor network to access child pornography.

2
 The affidavit suggested that the site functioned primarily as a forum for the sharing of links to other sites,
and did not necessarily host images or videos itself.

                                                      4
       Following Delaney’s arrest, a grand jury returned an indictment charging him with one

count of receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1), and

three counts of possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and

(b)(2). Delaney moved to suppress both the physical evidence seized during the search of his

residence and the statements he made to law enforcement during the search. In a decision dated

July 19, 2021, the district court denied the suppression motion.

       After the denial of his motion, Delaney pled guilty to all four counts in the indictment

pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, in which he reserved his right to appeal the district

court’s suppression decision. The district court then sentenced Delaney principally to concurrent

78-month terms of imprisonment on each count of conviction, to be followed by ten years of

supervised release, with certain special conditions. This appeal followed.

          II.    Motion to Suppress

       Delaney challenges the district court’s denial of his suppression motion, arguing that the

district court erred in determining both that the warrant application was supported by probable

cause and that the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applied. We

affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress based on the good faith exception,

without reaching the question of whether the warrant was supported by adequate probable cause. 3

3
  Delaney points to several aspects of the underlying affidavit supporting the issuance of a warrant for no-
knock entry into his home, which he argues, undermined any finding of probable cause in this case,
including that it: (1) was based on a single event that occurred more than seven months before the warrant
was signed; (2) used conclusory terms such as “accessed” and “material,” without defining them; and (3)
was internally inconsistent on important questions such as whether anyone who accessed the site, all
“users,” or only account holders, could access or view certain illegal material. We recognize that the lapse

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On appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we review legal

conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199,

208 (2d Cir. 2016) (en banc).

       It is well established that “[w]hen an officer genuinely believes that he has obtained a valid

warrant from a magistrate [judge] and executes that warrant in good faith,” the good faith exception

applies, and evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should not be suppressed. United States v.

Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 118 (2d Cir. 2015). “[H]owever, the officer’s reliance on the duly issued

warrant ‘must be objectively reasonable.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922

(1984)). Accordingly, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply “in at least

four circumstances: (1) where the issuing magistrate has been knowingly misled; (2) where the

issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; (3) where the application is so lacking

in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable; and (4) where the warrant

is so facially deficient that reliance upon it is unreasonable.” United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95,

103 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Raymonda, 780 F.3d at 118). “The burden is on the government to

demonstrate the objective reasonableness of the officers’ good faith reliance” on the search warrant

at issue. See United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1992).

of time and the nature and extent of access to the website at issue are important considerations for a judge
in determining whether probable cause exists under the “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.” Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). At the same time, “probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat
set of legal rules”, id. at 232, and we do not attempt to do so here especially given the application of the
good faith exception.

                                                     6
       Delaney argues that the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that it was

unreasonable to rely on it. We find that argument unpersuasive. The affidavit was not so “bare

bones” that it was “totally devoid of factual circumstances to support conclusory allegations,”

which, as we have emphasized, is “a very difficult threshold to meet.” United States v. Jones, 43

F.4th 94, 112 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The affidavit relied

on a tip from the FLA, and provided context indicating that this source was reliable. The affidavit

also reasonably supported the view that the affirmative steps necessary to access the website were

inconsistent with what the district court described as “mere inadvertent access.” Appellant’s

App’x at 204; see also id. at 83 (affidavit asserting: “[I]t is much more difficult to perform a

Google-type search of hidden service websites than it is to search open Internet websites for

particular content of interest.”). Furthermore, the affidavit detailed the date the specific IP address

accessed the website, as well as the subsequent law enforcement process that linked the IP address

to Delaney. The affidavit acknowledged that the Tor network makes “traditional IP address-based

identification techniques . . . not effective,” and while it was deficient in not explaining how the

FLA obtained its information, the affidavit also clearly stated that the user of the IP address

identified in the FLA tip accessed the website at issue. Compare Appellant’s App’x at 76–77, with

id. at 81–82. In addition, the affidavit provided context, based on Agent Fallon’s asserted law

enforcement experience, suggesting a nexus between accessing a website dedicated to child

pornography and possessing that material. Therefore, the information in the affidavit was not so

“bare bones” to preclude application of the good faith exception. Jones, 43 F.4th at 112.

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       We also find unavailing Delany’s contention that Agent Fallon’s affidavit was unreasonably

deficient under our decisions in United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) and

Raymonda—two cases in which we concluded that the warrants lacked probable cause but that the

good faith exception applied. At the outset, we note that where the facts underlying a search

warrant affidavit may “create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the

existence of probable cause,” that does not render reliance on the warrant unreasonable. Leon, 468

U.S. at 926; see also United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that

“the exclusionary rule cannot be used to penalize law enforcement officers for” an error by the

magistrate judge in issuing the warrant). In any event, neither Falso nor Raymonda supports the

argument that it was unreasonable for Agent Fallon to rely on the warrant once it had issued. In

Falso, we found that an affidavit failed to establish probable cause where “it was alleged only that

[the defendant] ‘appeared’ to ‘have gained or attempted to gain’ access to a site that contained

approximately eleven images of child pornography” on the Internet. 544 F.3d at 113 (emphases

in original). We emphasized that the affidavit lacked any allegation that the defendant “in fact

accessed the website at issue” or “accessed, viewed or downloaded child pornography.” Id. at 113,

121. Some years later, in Raymonda, we similarly found deficient an affidavit that had “no

evidence suggesting that the user had deliberately sought to view” child pornography on the open

Internet and contained other information that suggested that the website could have been accessed

through an “innocuous link.” 780 F.3d at 117. Yet, in both cases, we found that the good faith

exception applied, and the evidence should not be suppressed. The same result is appropriate here.

                                                 8
       Delaney’s argument that application of the good faith exception is inappropriate because

the affidavit was designed to mislead the magistrate judge also fails. He contends that the affidavit

failed to disclose that he had no prior criminal history, was not a registered sex offender, and that

FBI database searches “did not identify any derogatory information” about him. Appellant’s

App’x at 64. He also points to the fact that an internal FBI memorandum recommended an

additional investigative step that the agency declined to pursue.         However, our precedent

establishes that an omission makes an officer’s reliance on an affidavit unreasonable only where

the “omitted information was clearly critical to assessing the legality of a search.” United States

v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1280 (2d Cir. 1996), aff’d on reh’g, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, nothing suggests that these facts were

critical to the probable cause determination. At most, such information would have suggested that

Delaney was a possible first-time offender. As we have explained, we “expect that when a

magistrate [judge], mindful of the government’s burden to demonstrate probable cause, reviews a

warrant application that does not report a prior conviction for a particular crime, the magistrate

[judge] assumes for purposes of determining whether the government has carried its burden that

no such conviction exists.” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 161 (2d Cir. 2007). In short, Delaney

points to no omitted information that was critical to the probable cause determination.

       Finally, there is no evidence that the magistrate judge was not “independent of the police

and prosecution” or that he abandoned his “judicial neutrality and detachment” when he approved

the warrant. Clark, 638 F.3d at 101.

                                                 9
       Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that the good faith exception to the

exclusionary rule applied and, thus, did not err in denying Delaney’s motion to suppress.

        III.    Special Conditions

       Delaney also challenges the district court’s imposition of Special Conditions 1 and 3 during

his supervised release term. Special Condition 1 prevents Delaney from having “direct contact”

with anyone under the age of 18 without the permission of a probation officer but does not prohibit

“incidental contact during ordinary daily activities in public places.” Appellant’s App’x at 324.

Along similar lines, Special Condition 3 provides that Delaney “shall not go to, or remain at, a

place for the primary purpose of observing or contacting children under the age of 18.” Id.

       We review the imposition of special conditions for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 342–43 (2d Cir. 2008). “District courts possess broad discretion in imposing

conditions of supervised release.” United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018). “A

sentencing court may impose special conditions of supervised release that are reasonably related

to certain statutory factors governing sentencing[.]” United States v. Gill, 523 F.3d 107, 109 (2d

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). In

imposing special conditions, “[a] district court is required to make an individualized assessment .

. . , and to state on the record the reason for imposing it; the failure to do so is error.” Betts, 886

F.3d at 202. The district court’s explanation must be “adequately supported by the record.” United

States v. Eaglin, 913 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2019).

       Delaney contends that the district court did not adequately justify its imposition of Special

Conditions 1 and 3. We disagree. In imposing the special conditions, the district court determined

                                                  10
that they were necessary to “reasonably protect the public from further crimes of the defendant

and promote the rehabilitation of the defendant.” Appellant’s App’x at 311; see also id. (“These

special conditions are reasonably related to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U[.]S[.] Code

Section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2).”). The district court further explained that “[special] conditions 1 .

. . and 3 are necessary to protect the public from further crimes that [Delaney] may commit”

because some of the child pornography possessed by Delaney “involved prepubescent minors.”

Id. at 312. The district court also indicated its awareness that the special conditions should involve

“no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary,” as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d),

and noted that the conditions it imposed based on the record at the time of sentencing “are fluid

and will be assessed both upon [Delaney’s] release from imprisonment and throughout the term of

supervised release and may be supplemented, modified, or removed based upon risk and needs

that the defendant presents.” Appellant’s App’x at 311. In light of the district court’s articulation

of these considerations and its reasoning, we conclude that this is not a case where the court did

not fulfill its obligation to individually assess the facts of Delaney’s case and to “adequately

explain” why the conditions were necessary under the applicable legal standard. United States v.

Bleau, 930 F.3d 35, 43 (2d Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

       Delaney also argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the special

conditions based on the need to protect the public because the district court noted, in the context

of denying Delaney’s motion for bail pending appeal, that it “[didn’t] think [Delaney is] going to

go out and commit more crimes.” Appellant’s App’x at 315. However, that argument overlooks

that Delaney’s pretrial supervision included highly restrictive conditions designed to protect the

                                                 11
public, including home confinement, location monitoring, and a prohibition on unsupervised direct

or indirect contact with children. In short, the district court’s statements in connection with the

motion for bail pending appeal did not preclude the court from determining at sentencing, in its

discretion, that these special conditions were necessary upon Delaney’s release from imprisonment

based upon the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

       Moreover, to the extent Delaney suggests that the district court could not reasonably

impose these special conditions because “Delaney never contacted or attempted to contact any

minors,” we disagree. Appellant’s Brief at 58 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Notwithstanding the absence of evidence that Delaney had any physical contact with a minor, the

district court acted within its discretion in concluding that these restrictions were reasonably

necessary to protect the public and to aid Delaney’s rehabilitation because of Delaney’s particular

offense conduct, including the volume and nature of the images of child pornography he possessed.

Indeed, we have affirmed the imposition of similar special conditions for child pornography

offenses based upon a district court’s individualized assessment of the applicable Section 3553(a)

factors, even where there was no evidence in the record that the defendant had sexually abused a

child or attempted to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Skvarla, 847 F. App’x 76, 77 (2d Cir. 2021)

(summary order); United States v. Jenkins, 832 F. App’x 736, 739 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order);

United States v. Likens, 831 F. App’x 22, 24 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order); United States v.

Safford, 814 F. App’x 638, 642 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order).

       Finally, we find unpersuasive Delaney’s argument that Special Condition 3 is

unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. As we have determined in several summary orders,

                                                12
“[p]ersons of ordinary intelligence are capable of understanding that having the primary purpose

of observing children differs from engaging in activities where observation is merely incidental or

accidental.” Skvarla, 847 F. App’x at 78 (quoting Safford, 814 F. App’x at 643 and citing United

States v. Robinson, 815 F. App’x 583, 586 (2d Cir. 2020)). Although these summary orders are

non-binding, we find no basis to depart from the well-reasoned analysis contained in our prior

decisions.

                          *                     *                      *

        We have considered Delaney’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                             FOR THE COURT:
                                             Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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