Court Opinion

ID: 9718970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:39:10.605379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:35.752800
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREIMAN, dissenting: The majority appears to be correct in its conclusion that the “writ” of mandamus does not lie because, although the label of this extraordinary remedy has changed, mandamus is only used to compel a public official to exercise an act over which he has no discretion. Section 3 — 6—3 of the Unified Code of Corrections clearly provides the Director with discretion to adopt appropriate rules and regulations for early release and thereafter to exercise discretion in granting such early out. This is a liberty issue! Here we are called upon to determine whether the discretion granted to the Director of the Department of Corrections has resulted in a plan that discriminates against convicted defendants who were unable to make bail during the pendency of their criminal case. The language of any regulations adopted in this regard must be stated in terms that provide for equal treatment of all like prisoners. But it is not enough that the terms of the regulation be facially equal. They must also be equal in their application as well. Rarely has the old remark, “I’ve been rich and I’ve been poor and, believe me, rich is better” been more apropos. The defendant here served a term 55% longer than he might have, had he been able to make bail. Make no mistake, I do not suggest that the Director has concocted some cunning plan to hold convicts with short-term sentences. Rather, there has been a bureaucratic failure to discern the impact of the plan on those prisoners unable to make bail after they are charged. I believe, as did the courts in Hampton v. Rowe, 88 Ill. App. 3d 352 (1980), and Freeman v. Lane, 129 Ill. App. 3d 1061 (1985), that where the process established by the public official denies a citizen equal protection, the acts of the public official are no longer discretionary. Our system does not countenance the exercise of discretion that violates another’s constitutional rights. Let us examine the critical dates in the life of this 18-year-old defendant and compare the difference making bail would have meant for him: [[Image here]] I recognize that while the defendant without bail will serve 100 additional days as a result of his being unable to make bond, he would have served at least 40 of those days in any event because of length of his pretrial incarceration. It has not been clear that what appears to be a discretionary charge to the Director will always be so treated. Although the majority dismisses Freeman, the court there held that what appeared to be discretionary in nature could become a de facto nondiscretionary policy in awarding good-time credit. In Freeman, the court returned the matter to the trial court to determine whether the Director had established an appropriate policy for the awarding of good-time meritorious credit. Implicit in this finding is the obligation to create a system that will not violate the convict’s right to equal protection under both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution. In Hampton the issue was precisely whether the Director’s rules regarding meritorious good time denied equal protection of law to those who served part of their sentence in the county jail because of their inability to make bail during the pendency of his case. In Hampton, as here, the Director classified the defendant in a manner that violated his equal protection of the law. As in Hampton, the Director seeks to introduce evidence based upon “bureaucratic babble” concerning the insurmountable difficulties that the Department of Corrections must face in making the proper evaluation. The majority gleans from the Department witnesses that the factors to be considered are the “length of sentence, behavior, nature of the sentence, criminal background and nature of the offense.” Can it be that the prisoner appears at the institution’s door without any paperwork? Certainly, the prison officials who are to make the decision have everything except his “behavior” on paper. Why the 61-day wait? Why do we have to find out what kind of a prisoner he will be when it is clear that he will not be a prisoner very long? The majority also provides us with statistical evidence that not all prisoners receive the meritorious good-time credit and that some receive less than the 90 days. These are, of course, meaningless statistics since we are not told whether the convicts are denied this time because they are smuggling dope into the institution, have attacked a guard with a shiv or are like our defendant who will also receive less than the 90 days because he will be serving more time than required by his sentence when computed in contemplation of day-for-day good time and meritorious good time. They do not furnish us with the startling statistic that the defendant will serve 55% more time than if he had made bail. The Director could waive the 60-day rule for defendants who have served most of their time in county jail or could adopt a rule that requires immediate consideration of a convict’s case when he is transferred to the institution with little of his sentence left to be served. I would affirm the trial court and hope that the Director would institute new procedures that would not make his rules and regulations unconstitutional as applied.