Court Opinion

ID: 9622467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:18:04.66681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:27:33.255428
License: Public Domain

Thompson, Justice.
Testator Marion E. Peterson died in 2008. She was survived by her two siblings, Arvin Peterson and Carolyn Peterson Basner (caveators). After testator’s death, Vasta Lucas, testator’s longtime companion and executor of testator’s estate, filed a petition to probate testator’s will in solemn form. Lucas died during the pendency of this appeal, and appellee Richard Harrell was appointed as successor executor and trustee for the estate. Caveators filed a caveat to the petition to probate alleging the will was not properly executed or had been revoked due to obliterations. The trial court admitted the will to probate and caveators appealed. We affirm.
1. OCGA § 53-4-20 (b) of the Revised Probate Code of 1998 provides that “[a] will shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by two or more competent witnesses.” The record evidence in this case establishes that testator executed a will on June 9, 1976. The will was witnessed by two subscribing witnesses, only one of whom was living at the time of trial. Having been provided a copy of testator’s will, the surviving witness testified to its due execution by deposition testimony presented at trial and via written interrogatories filed with the court. See OCGA § 53-5-23 (methods of examining witnesses to a will). Caveators presented no evidence challenging either the validity of the signatures on the will or testator’s capacity at the time the will was executed. Accordingly, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the will was duly executed. OCGA § 53-4-20 (b).
2. The will contained a bequest to Lucas in the form of a trust and provided that upon Lucas’ death the trustee shall distribute any remaining assets to four beneficiaries, including caveators. Some time after the will was executed, testator struck through with an ink pen the names of all successor beneficiaries of the trust estate, as well as language in the will nominating Richard Harrell as successor executor and trustee. None of the strike-throughs were witnessed or attested to. Near the end of the will, testator wrote, “My executrix is *547Julie Peterson.”1 Caveators contend these alterations constitute material cancellations that effect a revocation of the will.
To effect a revocation of a will by obliteration, caveators must show that testator made material obliterations to her will or directed another to do so and that testator intended for this act to revoke the will. See OCGA §§ 53-4-41, 53-4-44. Joint operation of act and intention is necessary to revoke a will. Lovell v. Anderson, 272 Ga. 675, 676 (533 SE2d 64) (2000). The intent to revoke the will in its entirety shall be presumed from the obliteration or cancellation of a material portion of the will, but such presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. OCGA § 53-4-44. See Hartz v. Sobel, 136 Ga. 565 (71 SE 995) (1911) (cancellation of material portion of will raises presumption of intention to revoke the whole). “Revocation pro tanto by obliteration, canceling, or destroying such part is not authorized in Georgia.” Price v. Hill, 184 Ga. 191, 195 (190 SE 575) (1937); Hartz, supra.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the alterations to testator’s will constituted a material cancellation within the meaning of OCGA § 53-4-44, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that testator did not intend to revoke her entire will. The record supports the trial court’s findings that caveators had no knowledge of the circumstances surrounding what they allege to be the revocation of the will, that testator never discussed revoking her will with cave-ators, and that caveators were not present when testator made the alterations to the will. Caveators presented no evidence of testator’s intent other than the alterations themselves, and they satisfied their initial burden only by proving that testator made alterations to the will.
The record also shows, however, that the will was found in good condition on testator’s desk among her personal papers. It bore the signatures of both testator and her subscribing witnesses and set out a primary bequest to Lucas which remained intact. Handwritten alterations crossing out the names of the successor beneficiaries with a single line were initialed by testator and she added language to the will indicating her desire to substitute Julie Peterson as her executrix. As found by the trial court, this evidence clearly indicates testator’s intent to cancel only certain provisions of the will, not an intent to revoke the will in its entirety as required for revocation under OCGA § 53-4-44.
We have found similar evidence of a testator’s intent to cancel certain provisions of a will sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption of intent. Morris v. Bullock, 185 Ga. 12 (194 SE 201) *548(1937). In Morris, the testator made handwritten alterations to her will, including the addition of a marginal notation stating, “I do not give High Museum anything,” which language contradicted the will’s specific devise of property to the High Museum of Art in Atlanta. Recognizing that the issue of whether obliterations are made with the intent to revoke a will in its entirety “finally turns upon the intention of the testator,” and that “no mere presumption can be allowed to defeat this intention when it has been made to appear,” id. at 24 (quoting McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67 (47 SE 501) (1904)), we held that the notation eliminating a particular devise and the fact that the will was found in a safety deposit box with testator’s other personal effects clearly demonstrated her intention to revoke only one item of the will. Morris, supra at 25-26. Because the evidence showed only an intent to effect a revocation in part, which is not allowed in Georgia by obliteration or cancellation, we concluded that the will was properly admitted to probate. Id. at 26. See also Carter v. First United Methodist Church, 246 Ga. 352 (2) (271 SE2d 493) (1980) (pencil marks crossing out property disposition in will); Cornelius v. Crosby, 243 Ga. 26 (6) (252 SE2d 455) (1979) (unsigned, unattested, handwritten alteration of no effect to validity or construction of will).
As in Morris, the record here demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence testator’s intent to cancel or amend only certain provisions of her will. Caveators thus failed to prove a cancellation by obliteration under OCGA § 53-4-44, and the petition to probate in solemn form was properly granted.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, C. J., and Carley, P. J., who dissent.

 The parties do not dispute that these handwritten alterations were made by testator.