Court Opinion

ID: 9353893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 01:00:19.33994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:09:25.509425
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-10588          Document: 00516608746             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023

               United States Court of Appeals
                    for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                                        FILED
                                                                                 January 12, 2023
                                          No. 21-10588                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                        Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                              versus

   Yassein Abdulfatah Said,

                                                                   Defendant—Appellant.

                       Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Northern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 4:20-CR-292-2

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Wiener and Willett, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
           Yassein Abdulfatah Said (“Yassein”) 1 was charged with three crimes
   stemming from his efforts to help his brother, Yaser Said (“Yaser”), evade

           *
               This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
           1
             To avoid confusion, this opinion will refer to Yassein and his relatives by their
   first names.
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                                          No. 21-10588

   arrest on a federal charge of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution. 2 A jury
   convicted Yassein on all three counts: (1) Conspiring to conceal a person
   from arrest in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1071, (2) concealing a person
   from arrest (and aiding and abetting the same) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
   1071 and 2, and (3) conspiring to obstruct an official proceeding in violation
   of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(k) and 1512(c)(2). The district court eventually
   sentenced Yassein to an above-guidelines sentence of 144 months of
   imprisonment and two years of supervised release.
             On appeal, Yassein contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to
   support his conviction for conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding, and
   (2) his above-guidelines sentence was procedurally and substantively
   unreasonable. He also claims that the district court erred by allowing hearsay
   testimony, although he concedes that the error does not merit reversal. 3 We
   affirm.
                                        I. Background
             On New Year’s Day 2008, Yaser murdered his teenage daughters
   because he was upset by their dating American men. On January 2, 2008,
   Yaser was charged in state court with two counts of Capital Murder and
   warrants were issued for his arrest. On August 21, 2008, he was charged in
   federal court with Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution, and a federal arrest
   warrant issued. In December of 2014, Yaser was added to the FBI’s Top Ten
   Most Wanted Fugitives list.

             2
             Yaser was indicted in Texas state court for capital murder arising from the deaths
   of his two teenage daughters.
             3
             Yassein’s opening brief also raised a multiplicity challenge to Counts 1 and 3, but
   he has since withdrawn that challenge.

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          FBI agents first interviewed Yassein in April 2009. He claimed that he
   had last seen Yaser two days prior to the murders. Yassein claimed that his
   nieces’ boyfriends had threatened Yaser and that those men were responsible
   for their deaths. Yassein also acknowledged that he had traveled to Dallas,
   picked up Yaser’s son, Islam, and sent him to Egypt. 4
          Yassein and his family relocated to the Dallas/Fort Worth area in
   2014. On September 23 of that year, FBI agents interviewed Yassein at his
   home. During the interview, Yassein complained at length about the FBI and
   its investigation, claiming it was causing problems for his family.
          In 2017, the FBI acted on a tip from a maintenance man and
   determined that Yaser had been staying in Islam’s apartment. But Yaser was
   able to flee hours before the FBI arrived. After the building issued a 24-hour
   notice to vacate the premises, Yassein took responsibility for the unit, argued
   with the property manager, and eventually cleared the apartment with a
   family member.
          In August 2020, the FBI was able to track Yaser to a home in Justin,
   Texas, owned by Yassein, albeit in one of his daughter’s names. After
   observing Yassein and Islam carrying trash away from the Justin home over
   the course of several days, the FBI moved in, capturing Yaser and eventually
   arresting Yassein and Islam.
                                 II. Charges and Trial
          In November 2020, Yassein and Islam were charged by way of a three-
   count superseding indictment. Count 1 alleged that, between August 2017
   and August 2020, Yassein and Islam conspired to conceal Yaser from arrest,

          4
           Islam would return to the United States in 2011, moving into a Bedford, Texas
   apartment.

                                            3
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                                          No. 21-10588

   in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1071. Count 2 alleged that Yassein and
   Islam concealed Yaser (and aided and abetted Yaser’s concealment), in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1071 and 2. Count 3 alleged that Yassein and Islam
   conspired to corruptly impede an official federal proceeding, in violation of
   18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(k) and 1512(c)(2). On February 1, 2021, a jury found
   Yassein guilty on all three counts.
                                        III. Sentencing
           The district court calculated Yassein’s total offense level as 17 and his
   criminal history category as I. Those calculations yielded a guideline
   imprisonment range of 24 to 30 months, a supervised release range of one to
   three years, and a fine range of $10,000 to $50,000. The district court
   ultimately varied upwards, imposing a total sentence of 144 months
   imprisonment, two years of supervised release, three special assessments of
   $100 each, but no fine. Yassein timely appealed. 5
                                  IV. Standard of Review
           When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
   supporting a conviction, we typically “review[] the record to determine
   whether, considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light
   most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
   the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 6 But when,
   as in this case, a defendant fails to preserve his sufficiency challenge, 7 we

           5
             The record does not include a copy of Yassein’s notice of appeal, but an entry for
   it appears on the district court’s docket sheet.
           6
             United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
   (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
           7
             Yassein moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the government’s case-
   in-chief, but he did not renew his motion at the close of all the evidence. This omission

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   “apply plain-error review.” 8 To succeed notwithstanding this difficult
   standard, Yassein must show a clear or obvious error affecting his substantial
   rights. 9 We will only correct such an error if it “seriously affects the fairness,
   integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 10 A sufficiency
   challenge will only be deemed clear or obvious if there was “‘a manifest
   miscarriage of justice,’ which occurs only [when] ‘the record is devoid of
   evidence pointing to guilt’ or the evidence is so tenuous that a conviction
   would be ‘shocking.’” 11
           A challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence is typically reviewed
   for abuse of discretion. 12 However, an unpreserved claim of procedural
   unreasonableness is reviewed for plain error. 13
           “Any error in admitting . . . evidence is subject to harmless error
   review.” 14 “Unless there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly
   admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, reversal is not required.” 15

   means his sufficiency challenge is unpreserved. United States v. Smith, 878 F.3d 498, 502–
   03 (5th Cir. 2017).
           8
                Smith, 878 F.3d at 503.
           9
                Id.
           10
                Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
           11
              Id. (quoting United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 329–31 (5th Cir. 2012) (en
   banc) (citations omitted)).
           12
              Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d
   370, 375 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying that standard to claims of both procedural and substantive
   unreasonableness).
           13
              See United States v. Castillo-Rubio, 34 F.4th 404, 411 (5th Cir. 2022); United
   States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009).
           14
              United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d 121, 127 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United
   States v. Williams, 957 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1992)).
           15
                Id. (quoting Williams, 957 F.2d at 1242) (cleaned up).

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                                 V. Discussion and Analysis
          On appeal, Yassein challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence
   supporting his conviction on Count 3, (2) the procedural and substantive
   reasonableness of his sentence, and (3) the district court’s resolution of
   particular evidentiary objections at trial, even though, as noted, he concedes
   that the third challenge cannot succeed. We address each challenge in turn.
                                         A. Conviction
                                1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
          Yassein contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
   conviction       for     conspiring    to    obstruct     justice,    in   violation   of
   18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(k) and (c)(2). He contends that “the evidence [does] not
   show that [he] knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert
   or undermine the due administration of justice[,] mislead agents in their
   search for Yaser.”
          As noted, we review this contention for plain error. 16 We conclude
   that there is more than enough evidence to affirm the conviction under that
   standard.
          Count Three charged Yassein with a conspiracy in violation of
   18 U.S.C. § 1512(k), the object of which was obstruction of justice in violation
   of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). Albeit in unpublished opinions, we have previously
   identified the elements of a § 1512(k) conspiracy as: (1) an agreement
   between the defendant and at least one other person to pursue the object of
   the conspiracy, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the

          16
               See Smith, 878 F.3d at 502–03.

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                                          No. 21-10588

   agreement, and (3) that an overt act was taken by one of the conspirators
   toward carrying out the object of the conspiracy. 17
           Conspiracy to commit a particular substantive offense requires the
   degree of criminal intent necessary to commit the substantive offense itself.18
   18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) criminalizes the act of “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing],
   influenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding.” Therefore, the
   government must also demonstrate that Yassein acted ‘corruptly.’ A
   defendant “acts ‘corruptly’ under the statute when [he] act[s] ‘knowingly
   and dishonestly, with specific intent to subvert or undermine the due
   administration of justice.’” 19
           Yassein contends that the government must also demonstrate that he
   knew the proceeding he was disrupting was a federal investigation—as
   opposed to any official proceeding—because the indictment charged him
   with doing so. He acknowledges, however, that “[t]his Court and the
   Supreme Court have not answered whether a sufficiency challenge ‘must be
   judged by reference to the elements charged in the indictment, even if the

           17
              United States v. Mitchell, 792 F.3d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); United
   States v. Coppin, 569 F. App’x 326, 332 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing United States v.
   Porter, 542 F.3d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 2008)).
            We recognize that our previous interpretations of § 1512(k) may be at odds with
   the Supreme Court’s conclusions that a number of similarly-worded statutes do not contain
   an overt-act requirement. See, e.g., Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 214 (2005)
   (gathering cases and explaining the relevant analysis). However, Yassein does not dispute
   the sufficiency of the evidence of an overt act, so we will leave this question for another
   day.
           18
             Fifth Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions, § 2.15(A), note (2019 ed.)
   (addressing conspiracies charged under 18 U.S.C. § 371); see Coppin, 569 F. App’x at 331–
   33 (addressing a § 1512(k) conspiracy).
           19
            United States v. Delgado, 984 F.3d 435, 452 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Coppin, 569
   F. App’x at 334).

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                                            No. 21-10588

   indictment charges one or more elements not required by statute.’”
   Musacchio “abrogated Fifth Circuit precedent to the extent it provided that
   ‘erroneously heightened jury instructions generally become the binding “law
   of the case” on appeal.’” 20 As Yassein notes, however, both Musacchio and
   Bedoy explicitly left open the question whether an ‘erroneously heightened’
   indictment obligates the government to prove additional elements. 21 We
   decline to resolve this issue today and instead accept Yassein’s contention
   arguendo.
           Yassein’s challenge apparently incorporates two theories. First, as
   noted above, Yassein suggests that he was unaware of the investigation’s
   federal nature. Second, he claims that there is no evidence that he acted
   corruptly. We reject both claims.
           First, the record is not devoid of evidence that Yassein was aware that
   the hunt for Yaser included a federal investigation. On the contrary, it
   contains ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict. As Yassein
   acknowledges in his brief, “the evidence established that [Laurie Gibbs, an
   FBI agent] spoke with him and told him that [she had] a federal warrant for
   Yaser’s arrest.” 22 This interview occurred in 2014, six years after the FBI
   first obtained a warrant and listed Yaser, and three years before the beginning
   of the timeframe for the conspiracy charged in Count Three of the
   superseding indictment. Agent Gibbs testified that, during the interview, she

           20
             United States v. Bedoy, 827 F.3d 495, 508–09 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Musacchio,
   577 U.S. at 243).
           21
                Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 244 n.2; Bedoy, 827 F.3d at 509.
           22
              Yassein describes the agent as an investigator with “the Collin County District
   Attorney’s Office.” Gibbs was an FBI agent at the time she interviewed Yassein; she
   transitioned to the District Attorney’s Office months later. Regardless, Yassein
   acknowledges that one of the investigators present during the interview, Mario Verna, was
   an FBI agent.

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   “presented [her FBI] credentials and told him who I was and who the other
   two individuals were that were with [her] and the purpose of . . . the
   interview.” Record evidence also indicates that Yassein knew his name was
   on FBI posters identifying his brother as a fugitive. The government
   introduced the two posters into evidence at trial and both identified Yassein’s
   name as one of Yaser’s potential aliases. The government also introduced at
   trial a notebook containing a draft of a note addressed to the FBI, purportedly
   authored by Yassein. That document identifies one of Yaser’s wanted
   posters by its NCIC number. A testifying FBI agent described the number as
   “quite specific” to the poster and warrant associated with it, and explained
   that a person “generally speaking, would not know that number unless” they
   read the poster. This evidence is more than enough to satisfy the very high
   “manifest miscarriage of justice” standard that is appropriate here.
          Yassein’s second claim is that the record is devoid of evidence that he
   acted corruptly. As noted, a defendant “acts ‘corruptly’ under the statute
   when [he] act[s] ‘knowingly and dishonestly, with specific intent to subvert
   or undermine the due administration of justice.’” 23 Yassein cites the Black’s
   Law Dictionary definition of dishonest as “not involving straightforward
   dealing; discreditable; underhanded; or fraudulent.” He goes on to contend
   that: “To claim that building a secret room or a ‘spider hole’ is ‘not
   straightforward dealing[,]’ is ‘discreditable[,]’ is ‘underhanded[,]’ is
   ‘fraudulent[,]’ or is ‘characterized by lack of truth, honesty, or
   trustworthiness’ is to misapply the word ‘dishonest.’” Yassein offers no
   precedent, however, to support his position. Neither does he develop his
   claim further by explaining why those definitions cannot be applied to his
   conduct. The best theory that may be inferred from Yassein’s briefing is that

          23
               Delgado, 984 F.3d at 452 (quoting Coppin, 569 F. App’x at 334).

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   a defendant cannot act dishonestly without lying or making a misleading
   statement.
          Yassein offers no reason for us to think that the jury’s verdict was a
   “manifest miscarriage of justice” in this respect. That alone is enough to
   doom his claim. But even if we were to interpret Yassein’s briefing as
   proposing a misleading-statement requirement, this court has previously
   affirmed § 1512(c)(2) convictions without relying on a lie or omission made
   directly to an official. In Delgado, for example, this court held that the
   evidence supported a jury’s verdict that a defendant acted corruptly when,
   “after learning that he might be the target of a federal investigation involving
   the sale of firewood, he sent [his co-conspirator] a text message stating that
   he needed to return” a bribe in an effort to hide his tracks. 24
          This court held similarly in Bedoy when it rejected a defendant’s
   argument that he had not acted corruptly by instructing a co-conspirator “not
   to let the FBI into her apartment to talk to her” because a rational jury could
   infer that he was “instructing her to lie about the illicit aspects of their
   relationship if asked.” 25
          Yassein has not identified any error, let alone a plain one. We
   therefore reject his sufficiency challenge.
                                  2. Evidentiary Objections
          Yassein also claims “that the district court erred in overruling [his]
   attorney’s objections to hearsay.” We need not delve into the merits of this
   claim, however, because he concedes that he “cannot argue that the errors .

          24
               Id.
          25
               827 F.3d at 510.

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   . . cause ‘harm’ sufficient to justify reversal.” This concession is
   dispositive. 26 We therefore affirm Yassein’s conviction.
                                             B. Sentence
           Yassein also challenges his sentence, claiming that it is both
   procedurally and substantively unreasonable. As noted, the district court
   calculated that the Sentencing Guidelines yielded an advisory guidelines
   range of 24 to 30 months of imprisonment. The government moved for an
   upward variance, and the district court ultimately varied upwards,
   sentencing Yassein to a term of 144 months of imprisonment and two years
   of supervised release.
           Our “inquiry [into the reasonableness of a sentence] involves two
   steps.” 27 “First, we must ‘ensure that the district court committed no
   significant procedural error.’” 28 “Second, if the district court’s sentencing
   decision is procedurally sound, we ‘consider the substantive reasonableness
   of the sentence imposed.’” 29
                                  1. Procedural Reasonableness
           As an initial matter, we review the procedural reasonableness of
   Yassein’s sentence for plain error. Yassein claims that an abuse-of-discretion
   standard is appropriate. But, as the government points out, Yassein only
   objected to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence at his sentencing

           26
             See Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d at 127 (citing United States v. Williams, 957 F.2d
   1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1992)).
           27
                United States v. Fraga, 704 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2013).
           28
                Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
           29
                Id.

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   hearing. An objection to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence does
   not, without more, preserve a claim of procedural unreasonableness. 30
           Yassein claims that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable
   because the district court failed to explain adequately its reasons for varying
   upwards from the guidelines sentence it had calculated. He concedes that the
   district court “provided some reasons to justify the upwards variance,” but
   nonetheless contends that the reasons were not “sufficient to justify the
   increase [in months of imprisonment] of 480 percent to 600 percent.” He
   claims that such reasons were inadequate to meet the “high standard”
   required for such a large upwards variance. Yassein also attacks portions of
   the district court’s reasoning as a litany of “rote statements” too vague to
   facilitate meaningful review. And Yassein also claims that the district court’s
   statement that it had balanced his health and age against the other factors it
   had considered was too vague to allow for meaningful appellate review.
           As noted, plain-error review requires a defendant to explain how the
   relevant error affected his substantial rights. 31 Therefore, when claiming that
   the inadequacy of a district court’s explanation of its sentence constitutes
   plain error, a defendant must demonstrate “that there is a reasonable
   probability that, but for the district court’s failure to explain the sentence
   adequately, [he] would have received a lesser sentence.” 32

           30
             Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d at 361; see, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 872 F.3d
   293, 303 (5th Cir. 2017) (similar).
           31
                See, e.g., Smith, 878 F.3d at 503.
           32
              United States v. Jackson, 594 F. App’x 232, 236 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing
   Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d at 364–65) (per curiam); see Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d
   at 365 (affirming sentence despite finding district court’s explanation of its sentence
   inadequate because defendant failed to “show that an explanation would have changed his
   sentence”).

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            Yassein does not suggest that his sentence might have been different
   had the district court adequately explained its sentence. Neither does he
   reply to the government’s brief noting this requirement. These failures—
   combined with the reality that the record is entirely devoid of any indication
   that further explanation would have led the district court to a different
   sentencing decision—doom Yassein’s claim.
                                  2. Substantive Reasonableness
            We turn next to Yassein’s claim of substantive unreasonableness.
   This claim is properly preserved, so we review the substantive nature of the
   district court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. While it is undeniable that
   the district court imposed a significant upward variance, we see no abuse of
   discretion in its decision to do so.
            “Appellate review of the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is
   highly         deferential.” 33       “To       determine     whether      a     sentence
   is substantively reasonable, a district court should consider ‘the totality of
   the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines
   range.’” 34 “Even a significant variance from the Guidelines does not
   constitute an abuse of discretion if it is ‘commensurate with the
   individualized, case-specific reasons provided by the district court.’” 35
   Instead, “[a] non-Guidelines sentence unreasonably fails to reflect the
   statutory sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a) where it (1) does not
   account for a factor that should have received significant weight, (2) gives

            33
             United States v. Hudgens, 4 F.4th 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting
   United States v. Hoffman, 901 F.3d 523, 554 (5th Cir. 2018)).
            34
                 Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
            35
            United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
   McElwee, 646 F.3d 328, 338 (5th Cir. 2011)).

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   significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or (3) represents a clear
   error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors.” 36
          Yassein offers a few attacks to the district court’s sentencing decision,
   but none are compelling. He first contends that the district court erred by
   taking into account the fact that “Texas sought Yaser for capital murder”
   without conducting an individualized assessment whether “Yaser was a
   continuing threat to the public.” He claims that this led the district court to
   make “the erroneous though understandable conclusion that a fugitive
   charged with Capital Murder is necessarily a greater threat to society than a
   fugitive charged with a financial crime or other ‘white collar’ offense.” He
   suggests that “the balancing factor should be risk to the public and not the
   alleged offense.”
          First, there is no indication in the record that the court made such a
   sweeping conclusion about the nature of Capital Murder and white-collar
   crime. The court merely indicated that it took into account the fact that Yaser
   “was wanted for the double murder of two teenaged girls on a capital murder
   charge.” More importantly, that fact goes to the nature of Yassein’s offense,
   which the district court was obligated to consider. 37
          Yassein next suggests that his use of antisemitic slurs, while
   “indefensible,” cannot be the “basis for a 480 to 600 percent variance.”
   Yassein does not contend, however, that the district court could not consider
   his use of such slurs at all—or that they were the sole justification for the
   upwards variance. This claim is similarly unavailing. After noting a number
   of other facts it had considered, the district court explained that it took “into
   account the slurs that the defendant used during [the] investigation[,] which

          36
               Id. (citing Smith, 440 F.3d at 708).
          37
               18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

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   [it] believe[d] were used as an attempt to divert attention away from
   [Yassein’s] actions.” This too goes to the nature of the offense.
           Finally, Yassein takes issue with the district court’s focus on the
   resources expended during the hunt for Yaser, particularly in Egypt. 38 He
   does not challenge the district court’s factual findings, but claims the record
   suggests that the government’s expenditures were “hardly different than
   the[y would have been had they been investigating a] much more common
   escape to Mexico or Canada.” Assuming arguendo that this factual summary
   is correct, however, Yassein offers no reason whatsoever to question the
   district court’s judgment on this point.
           The upward variance applied in this case is undeniably significant. But
   sentencing is the province of the district court, and Yassein has not identified
   any error of the sort we enumerated in Diehl. And, we recently affirmed an
   upward variance of a similarly significant magnitude imposed on Yassein’s
   co-defendant, Islam, in United States v. Said, No. 21-10455, 2022 WL
   3097848, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2022) (unpublished). 39 “Although the degree
   of the variance is considerable and this court may have weighed the Section
   3553(a) favors differently, we are not permitted to reweigh the factors.” 40
                                           *        *         *
           AFFIRMED.

           38
                Yassein suggested to investigators in 2014 that the family had ties there.
           39
             In Said, we affirmed the district court’s upward variance from a 21- to 27-month
   guideline range to a 120-month sentence.
           40
                Id. (citing United States v. Brantley, 537 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2008)).

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