Court Opinion

ID: 9412564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-31 20:04:42.476806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:39.234542
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/31/23 P. v. Wahlert CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079621

 v.                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. RIF095477)

 JOSHUA BLAINE WAHLERT,                                                  OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

         Alissa Bjerkhoel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Donald

W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
                                               I.

                                      INTRODUCTION

       Defendant and appellant Joshua Blaine Wahlert appeals the trial court’s order

denying his petition to vacate his 2003 murder conviction and for resentencing under
             1                                            2
Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95). The trial court relied on the

jury’s robbery-kidnapping-murder special-circumstances findings to deny relief at the

prima facie review stage. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying

his petition at the prima facie stage because the court failed to adhere to the procedures

articulated in section 1172.6, misapplied the law and failed to appropriately specify the

reasons for the denial. The People agree the order denying the petition should be

reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). We also agree. Accordingly, we

reverse the trial court’s order denying the petition and remand the matter for further

proceedings pursuant to section 1172.6.

       1
           All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.
       2
         Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section
1172.6, with no substantive change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section
1172.6 for ease of reference unless otherwise indicated.

                                               2
                                             II.
                                                               3
                           PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On November 3, 2003, a third amended information was filed charging defendant

with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), being a felon in possession of a

firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 2;), being a felon in possession of ammunition
                                                                                             4
(§ 12316, subd. (b)(1); count 3), and brandishing a firearm (§ 417, subd. (a)(2); count 4).

As to the murder offense, the information alleged two special circumstances that

defendant committed the murder while engaged in the commission of a robbery and

kidnapping (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A), (B)). Further, in connection with the murder, the

information alleged that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily

injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and personally used a knife (§ 12022, subd.

(b)(1)).

       On December 9, 2003, a jury found defendant guilty as charged on all counts and

found true all enhancement allegations. He was sentenced to life without possibility of

parole on count 1, plus a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life for the gun enhancement

and an additional one year on the arming enhancement.

       3
         Because the factual background is not relevant to the legal issues raised in this
appeal, we will not recount the details of defendant’s underlying offenses. Those details
can be found in our partially published opinion from defendant’s direct prior appeal.
(See People v. Wahlert, et al. (2005) 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 603; previously published at 130
Cal.App.4th 709.)
       4
        The information also contained allegations against defendant’s codefendant,
Tracey Garrison. Those allegations are omitted here.

                                             3
       On June 24, 2005, we affirmed defendant’s convictions in a partially published

opinion in People v. Wahlert, et al., supra, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 603, but modified defendant’s

sentence on counts 2, 3 and 4 by directing the trial court to stay defendant’s sentence on

counts 3 and 4 pursuant to section 654. We also directed the court to correct certain

clerical errors and ordered victim restitution to be paid jointly and severally. (Ibid.)

       On March 7, 2022, defendant in propria persona filed a petition to vacate his

murder conviction and for resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95.

       The trial court appointed counsel for defendant and heard the petition on August

19, 2022. The prosecutor argued the petition should be denied due to the robbery-

kidnapping-murder special circumstances findings and also pointed out that defendant

was the actual killer who admitted shooting the victim in the head and slitting his throat.

Defense counsel conceded but made an objection for the record. The trial court denied

the petition based on the special circumstances findings. Defendant timely appealed.

                                             III.

                                       DISCUSSION

       Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie

stage because the court failed to adhere to the procedures articulated in section 1172.6

and misapplied the law. The People agree that under Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698 the

court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage should

be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Because his conviction

predates our Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788

                                              4
(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), we concur that the trial court

erred in denying defendant’s petition at the prima facie stage and remand for further
             5
proceedings.

       A. Legal Background

       In 2015 and 2016, our Supreme Court decided Banks and Clark, respectively,

which discuss when section 190.2 authorizes a special circumstance life without parole

sentence for a felony-murder defendant convicted as an aider and abettor. (Banks, supra,

61 Cal.4th at p. 794; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 609-610.) Those decisions held that

participation in an armed robbery, on its own, is insufficient to support a finding the

defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. Instead, the factfinder must

consider “the defendant’s personal role in the crimes leading to the victim’s death and

weigh the defendant’s individual responsibility for the loss of life, not just his or her

vicarious responsibility for the underlying crime.” (Banks, supra, at p. 801, italics

omitted.) “The defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner

in which the particular offense is committed,” thereby “demonstrating reckless

indifference to the significant risk of death his or her actions create.” (Ibid., italics

added.) Banks provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when determining

whether the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony. (Id. at p. 803.)

       5
         Since we are remanding the matter for further proceedings pursuant to section
1172.6 in light of Strong, we need not address defendant’s specific contentions.

                                               5
And Clark offered a similar list for determining whether the defendant acted with

reckless indifference to human life. (Clark, supra, at pp. 619-623.)

       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 “‘to amend

the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to

murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual

killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying

felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10

Cal.5th 830, 846-847; see Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The Legislature

accomplished this by amending sections 188 and 189. Effective January 1, 2022, Senate

Bill No. 775 expanded the scope of those changes to encompass, among other things,

murder convictions “under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other

theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s

participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)

       Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedure for offenders previously convicted

of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek

retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted of murder under the new law.

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843; People v. Lewis

(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis); Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) “[T]he process

begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for

eligibility are met [citation], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be

convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to . . . [s]ection 188 or 189

                                               6
made effective January 1, 2019’ . . . .” (Strong, supra, at p. 708.) “When the trial court

receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and other required information,

the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima

facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition and record in the case establish

conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the

petition.” (Ibid.)

       In Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, our Supreme Court explained the trial court’s role

when faced with a section 1172.6 petition: Petitioners who request counsel “are entitled

to the appointment of counsel upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition . . . .” (Id. at

p. 957.) “[O]nly after the appointment of counsel and the opportunity for briefing may

the superior court consider the record of conviction to determine whether ‘the petitioner

makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief.’” (Ibid., italics omitted;

see id. at p. 966 [“a complying petition is filed; the court appoints counsel, if requested;

the issue is briefed; and then the court makes [its] prima facie determination”].) The

court’s “prima facie inquiry . . . is limited. . . . ‘“[T]he court takes petitioner’s factual

allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner

would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court

must issue an order to show cause.”’ [Citation.] ‘[A] court should not reject the

petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an

evidentiary hearing.’” (Id. at p. 971.) Importantly, “[i]n reviewing any part of the record

of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding

                                                7
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at p. 972.) “[T]he

‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’” (Ibid.)

       If a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, “‘the court

shall issue an order to show cause.’” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Once the

court determines that a defendant has made a prima facie showing, it “must [then] hold an

evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving, ‘beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder’ under state

law as amended by Senate Bill [No.] 1437. [Citation.] ‘A finding that there is substantial

evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is

insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for

resentencing.’ [Citation.] ‘If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior

conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be

vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.’” (Strong,

supra, at p. 709; accord, Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) “Senate Bill [No.] 1437

relief is unavailable if the defendant was either the actual killer, acted with the intent to

kill, or ‘was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless

indifference to human life . . . .’” (Strong, supra, at p. 710.)

       In Senate Bill No. 775, the Legislature amended the language of section 1172.6,

codifying Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, expanding the scope of the petitioning process

and clarifying some of the procedural requirements. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)

                                               8
       B. Standard of Review

       In this case, the trial court denied defendant’s petition at the prima facie review

stage under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). A denial at this stage is appropriate only if

the record of conviction demonstrates that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter

of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) This is a purely legal conclusion, which we

review de novo. (See id. at p. 961.)

       C. Analysis

       Our Supreme Court recently made clear that when, as here, a defendant’s case

“was tried before both Banks and Clark, the special circumstance findings do not

preclude him from making out a prima facie case for resentencing under section 1172.6.”

(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 721.) “This is true even if the trial evidence would have

been sufficient to support the findings under Banks and Clark.” (Id. at p. 710.) The

Strong court noted that the Banks and Clark cases “both substantially clarified the law

governing findings under . . . section 190.2, subdivision (d).” (Strong, supra, at p. 706.)

The court explained that a pre-Banks and Clark special circumstance finding does not

negate the showing that the petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or

attempted murder because of changes to section 188 or 189 “because the finding alone

does not establish that the petitioner is in a class of defendants who would still be viewed

as liable for murder under the current understanding of the major participant and reckless

indifference requirements.” (Strong, supra, at pp. 717-718.)

                                              9
        Noting the differences between pre- and post-Banks and Clark special

circumstance requirements, the Supreme Court observed the changes may “have altered

what evidence defense counsel would have sought to introduce[,] . . . might have

fundamentally altered trial strategies,” and may have affected what jury instructions were

requested or given. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 719.) “An after-the-fact court review

of a pre-Banks and Clark record does not account for all these differences. . . . And as

the Legislature has made explicit in a recent amendment to the predecessor to section

1172.6, a court determination that substantial evidence supports a homicide conviction is

not a basis for denying resentencing after an evidentiary hearing. [Citation.] Nor, then,

is it a basis for denying a petitioner the opportunity to have an evidentiary hearing in the

first place.” (Id. at p. 720.) Thus, neither “the jury’s pre-Banks and Clark findings nor a

court’s later sufficiency of the evidence review amounts to the determination section

1172.6 requires, and neither set of findings supplies a basis to reject an otherwise

adequate prima facie showing and deny issuance of an order to show cause.” (Id. at p.

720.)

        Here, the jury’s felony-murder special circumstances findings were made before

our high court decided Banks and Clark. And the trial court found defendant ineligible

for relief based on the attendant special circumstances findings that the murder was

committed in the commission of a robbery and kidnapping. Under Strong, the finding

does not categorically render defendant ineligible for resentencing. (Strong, supra, 13

Cal.5th at p. 720.) Furthermore, a defendant’s prima facie case is not barred even if the

                                             10
trial evidence was sufficient to support the special circumstances findings after Banks and

Clark. (Strong, supra, at p. 710; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) We therefore vacate

the trial court’s order and remand the matter for further proceedings.

                                            IV.

                                      DISPOSITION

       The trial court’s order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is reversed.

The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with Strong, Lewis, and section

1172.6.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                               CODRINGTON
                                                                                          J.

We concur:

MILLER
                Acting P. J.

FIELDS
                          J.

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