Court Opinion

ID: 9623920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:46:08.537555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:38.429123
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe the superior court properly excluded Dr. Currie’s affidavit from consideration on the causation issue with regard to the Morrises’ personal injury claims. The superior court determined that while Dr. Currie was qualified, on the basis of his Ph.D in psychology, to state from which mental dysfunction plaintiffs were suffering, he was not competent to testify to causation since he was not a medical doctor. This conclusion was well founded.
Dr. Currie’s speciality is clinical neuropsychology, which he described in his affidavit as “that branch of psychology which deals with the behavioral expressions of brain functions and dysfunctions, including information reception, processing, judgment, retention, acces*820sing and expression, and the ability of people to master new and novel learning situations and material.” His qualifications authorized him to conclude that the Morrises suffered from organic or physical damage to the brain. It does not follow that he was authorized to testify as to the medical causation of such damage.
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that Dr. Currie has had any medical training, experience or background. Whether or not the Morrises’ alleged contact with, or inhalation of, Aldrin was a causal factor in their alleged physical condition is a medical question as to which expert medical testimony was necessary. See generally Cherokee County Hosp. Auth. v. Beaver, 179 Ga. App. 200, 204 (2) (345 SE2d 904) (1986); Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 181 Ga. App. 516 (352 SE2d 832) (1987). This question of medical causation is not a subject within the scope of psychological expertise. “The diagnosis and the causes and effects of diseases and other kindred matters of medical practice form an important field of expert testimony. Except to the extent that the physical condition of a person is open to ordinary observation by persons of common experience, opinion evidence in this field is limited to the opinions of experts — that is, of physicians.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Hyde v. State, 189 Ga. App. 727, 730 (377 SE2d 187) (1988) (special concurrence); see also Georgia Cas. &c. Co. v. Jernigan, 166 Ga. App. 872 (305 SE2d 611) (1983).
It is proper for a psychologist to be allowed to testify to the cause of the plaintiff’s mental disorder, when that cause is within the psychologist’s expertise. See generally Jacobs v. Pilgrim, 186 Ga. App. 260 (367 SE2d 49) (1988); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Whipple, 182 Ga. App. 195 (355 SE2d 83) (1987). Therefore, if a patient suffers a mental disorder, a psychologist may testify regarding the specific cause if that cause is psychological. If a patient’s mental disorder is of organic etiology, because the psychologist’s training does not include the medical causes of these physical problems, he should not be allowed to testify thereon. In that situation, a psychologist may opine that the psychological state is organic in nature, but any opinion regarding the cause of the physical problem would be outside of the scope of his expertise. See generally Will v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 647 FSupp. 544 (S.D. Ga. 1986). Here, the alleged cause, of the Morrises’ condition was not a matter shown to be within Dr. Currie’s psychological expertise and the portions of Dr. Currie’s affidavit regarding causation were properly stricken. See generally Kriewitz v. Savoy Heating & Air Cond. Co., 396 S2d 49 (Ala. 1981); GIW Southern Valve Co. v. Smith, 471 S2d 81 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1985).
I believe that the superior court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the affidavit. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., supra; Anderson v. State, 178 Ga. App. 355 (3) (343 SE2d 411) (1986). With*821out Dr. Currie’s testimony on the issue of causation, the plaintiffs’ claim for personal injury failed, as did all of the property damage claims based on the potential injury to humans.
Decided July 15, 1991
Reconsideration denied July 31, 1991
Wilson, Strickland & Benson, Warner R. Wilson, Jr., Samuel T. Brannan III, for appellants.
Richard B. Eason, Jr., for appellees.
Turning to the remainder of plaintiffs’ claims, which are traditional property damage claims, I believe that summary judgment was proper only with respect to Susan Morris’ property damage claim. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from that portion of Division 2 of the majority opinion which addresses the release Susan Morris signed.
In my opinion, any claim that Mrs. Morris had for property damage, which is not barred for the reasons stated above, was barred by the release she signed. From my review of the record, I find no evidence of artifice, fraud, or trick such as would void the release and therefore it was binding on Mrs. Morris. The record showed that Mrs. Morris was well educated and that she had ample opportunity to examine the document she signed and that no reason exists for ignoring the effect of such document. See Hudson v. Montcalm Pub. Corp., 190 Ga. App. 629 (1) (379 SE2d 572) (1989); McMullan v. Nichols, 162 Ga. App. 865 (292 SE2d 568) (1982); Riker v. McKneely, 153 Ga. App. 773 (266 SE2d 553) (1980). Further, I find no clear, unequivocal or decisive evidence that there was a mutual mistake here so as to void the release. Compare Fulghum v. Kelly, 255 Ga. 652 (340 SE2d 589) (1986). The release effectively barred all of Mrs. Morris’ claims against Chandler Exterminators, Inc. and its. agents, the other defendants here. See Driscoll v. Schuttler, 697 FSupp. 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
Although I believe that summary judgment on all of Mrs. Morris’ claims was proper, I agree with the majority that a factual issue existed as to whether the release she signed operated to bar the claims of her children and husband and as to whether they had ratified her act. See Rowland v. Lewis, 109 Ga. App. 755 (137 SE2d 387) (1964).
In conclusion, I would affirm the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, except with respect to the claims of traditional property damage of Mr. Morris and the Morris children.
I am authorized to state that Judge Carley joins in this dissent.