Court Opinion

ID: 9952061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 17:02:21.89162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:47.085723
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

            SUNSTATE ACQUISITIONS, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,

                                         v.

                    SCOTT ELFLEIN, Defendant/Appellant.

                              No. 1 CA-CV 23-0347
                                FILED 3-19-2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. CV2023-006719
           The Honorable Richard F. Albrecht, Judge Pro Tempore

    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

                                APPEARANCES

Zona Law Group, P.C., Scottsdale
By Scott E. Williams, Amy N. Topel
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Scott Elflein, Phoenix
Defendant/Appellant
                         SUNSTATE v. ELFLEIN
                          Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1            Scott Elflein appeals the superior court’s eviction judgment in
favor of Sunstate Acquisitions. For the following reasons, we affirm in part
and vacate and remand in part.

                             BACKGROUND

¶2            In June 2022, a Utah-based limited liability company
purchased Elflein’s home (“Property) at a sheriff’s sale. That company
transferred the Property to Sunstate on April 20, 2023, and the deed was
recorded the following day. Six days later Sunstate purportedly served
Elflein with a demand for possession, and then filed a forcible entry and
detainer action, seeking immediate possession of the Property, a writ of
restitution, unpaid rent dating back to June 2022, and attorneys’ fees and
costs.

¶3            Shortly after Sunstate served Elflein with the summons and
complaint, the superior court held a hearing and entered judgment in favor
of Sunstate, awarding immediate possession of the Property, back rent
totaling $24,000, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Elflein timely appealed, and
we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-1182 and 12-2101(A)(1).

                              DISCUSSION

¶4             Elflein’s opening brief does not comply with Arizona Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13(a)(5)–(7), which requires an
appellant to include a statement of facts, a statement of issues for review,
and citations to both the record and to legal authority. ARCAP 13(a).
Elflein’s brief contains none of these features. But given our general
preference to resolve cases on their merits, in our discretion, we decline to
dismiss Elflein’s appeal for his noncompliance with those procedural
requirements. See Clemens v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 (1966); Ramos v.
Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 523, ¶ 10 (App. 2022). To the extent we can fairly
discern the nature of Elflein’s challenge to the judgment, we address those

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                           SUNSTATE v. ELFLEIN
                            Decision of the Court

issues. Because Elflein has not provided a transcript of the eviction hearing,
however, we presume that the evidence presented at the hearing supports
the judgment. See ARCAP 11(c) (placing the burden on the appellant to
order transcripts necessary to consider issues on appeal); Blair v. Burgener,
226 Ariz. 213, 217, ¶ 9 (App. 2010).

       A.     Demand for Possession

¶5              Elflein challenges Sunstate’s service of process. A valid
demand for possession is a prerequisite to commencing a forcible entry and
detainer action. Alton v. Tower Cap. Co., 123 Ariz. 602, 604 (1979). A person
is guilty of forcible detainer if they “[w]ilfully and without force hold[] over
any . . . real property after termination of the time for which such . . . real
property were let to [them] . . . after demand made in writing for the possession
thereof by the person entitled to such possession.” A.R.S. § 12-1171(A)(3)
(emphasis added); see also A.R.S. § 12-1173(1) (“There is a forcible detainer
if [a] tenant [] by sufferance . . . retains possession . . . after he receives
written demand of possession by the landlord.”).

¶6             Elflein contends that he was not properly served with various
legal documents, and that, instead, they were delivered to a neighbor
named “David Doe” with a similar address. The demand for possession
and corresponding declaration of service (purportedly served on April 27)
list Elflein’s correct address, but the documents also state they were
delivered to a “David Doe.” Although the record is not clear as to whether
Elflein was served with the demand for possession on April 27, Sunstate’s
declaration of service for the complaint and summons (served on May 3)
also included a copy of the demand for possession. The declaration of
service for the latter group of documents identifies Elflein, rather than Doe,
as the recipient of the documents. Moreover, Elflein never denied receiving
the demand for possession before the hearing. On this record, Elflein has
not shown that service was improper.

       B.     Continuance

¶7           Elflein argues the superior court should have granted a
continuance, which he requested at the eviction hearing, and that without
such he was left without counsel. However, “a motion for continuance is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not
be disturbed unless that discretion has been abused.” Yates v. Superior
Court, 120 Ariz. 436, 437 (App. 1978). And though these proceedings
developed quickly, forcible entry and detainer actions are meant to provide
a “summary, speedy[,] and adequate remedy for obtaining possession” of

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                          SUNSTATE v. ELFLEIN
                           Decision of the Court

property one has a right to. United Effort Plan Tr. v. Holm, 209 Ariz. 347, 351,
¶ 21 (App. 2004); see also Old Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz. 199,
204–05 (1946) (noting that forcible entry and detainer actions are limited in
the issues that may be raised to keep such actions summary and speedy).
Elflein does not point to any portion of the record showing that he was
precluded from securing counsel due to time constraints. Thus, he has
failed to show the court abused its discretion in declining to grant a
continuance.

       C.     Unpaid Rent

¶8            Elflein argues he never received notice that he or the Property
were subject to a rental agreement and thus suggests the court erred in
awarding Sunstate $24,000 in unpaid rent. However, because the Property
had been sold at the sheriff’s sale, by remaining in the home after losing
title, he became a “tenant at sufferance.” See Grady v. Barth, 233 Ariz. 318,
321, ¶ 12 (App. 2013); Andreola v. Ariz. Bank, 26 Ariz. App. 556, 558 (App.
1976). The concept of a “tenant” in this context is a misnomer as this is not
a true landlord-tenant relationship; it does not arise from a rental
agreement, but from Elflein remaining on the Property without legal right.
Grady, 233 Ariz. at 321, ¶ 12. Likewise, the “rent” in this judgment does not
reflect an amount owed by way of a rental agreement—it consists of
damages incurred by Sunstate for Elflein’s possession of the Property
without legal right. See A.R.S. § 12-1178(A); Merrifield v. Merrifield, 95 Ariz.
152, 154 (1963); Montano v. Luff, 250 Ariz. 401, 404, ¶ 9 (App. 2020).

¶9             Elflein questions the court’s decision to award past due rent
back to June 2022, asserting Sunstate was only eligible for such an award
after it became the owner of the Property, which occurred on April 20, 2023.
The court awarded Sunstate $24,000 in back rent, which tracks the
allegation in Sunstate’s complaint that it was owed unpaid rent at a rate of
$2,000 per month dating back to June 9, 2022. But the documents attached
to the complaint confirm that Sunstate did not acquire the Property until
April 20, 2023. Thus, absent more, it could not properly claim damages for
unpaid rent that accrued before that date. See Montano, 250 Ariz. at 405,
¶ 11 (affirming an award of rent in a forcible entry and detainer action that
commenced from the date the new purchaser recorded his deed).

¶10          In its answering brief, Sunstate contends that “substantial
evidence” supported the court’s decision, but does so in the context of
ownership, service, and entitlement to a judgment and does not identify
any specific evidence. Moreover, nothing in the record reveals that
Sunstate made any claim that other entities or persons who had title to the

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                          SUNSTATE v. ELFLEIN
                           Decision of the Court

property before April 20, 2023 assigned those claims to Sunstate. And
though we assume evidence at the hearing supported the court’s judgment
due to the lack of a transcript, the court’s minute entry states that only
Elflein (who would have no knowledge of such an assignment) testified.
The record, which plainly shows that Sunstate owned the property for only
a few weeks before obtaining the judgment, does not support an unpaid
rent award of $24,000.

       D.     Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶11            Sunstate requests its attorneys’ fees on appeal, citing only
ARCAP 21. That rule, however, requires the party requesting fees to
“specifically state the statute, rule, decisional law, contract, or other
authority for an award of attorneys’ fees.” ARCAP 21(a)(2). The rule “does
not create any substantive right to [attorneys’ fees];” it merely provides the
procedure by which to make such a request. ARCAP 21(a)(2). We therefore
deny Sunstate’s fee request. Because Elflein is the successful party under
A.R.S. § 12-342 (addressing costs on appeal), he is awarded taxable costs
subject to his compliance with ARCAP 21.

                               CONCLUSION

¶12          We vacate the court’s damages award for unpaid rent and
remand for calculation of an amount that is consistent with Sunstate’s
ownership of the Property. We affirm the remainder of the judgment.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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