Court Opinion

ID: 9789321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:34:09.862346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:51.189295
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.,
dissenting.
The majority finds that appellant is unable to provide for her basic personal needs. I respectfully disagree. In my view, the state failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that appellant is unable to obtain a commodity or service necessary for her survival. It follows, therefore, that the trial court erred in ordering appellant to be committed to the custody of the Mental Health Division.
The majority quotes the mental health examiners, who describe appellant as having a “psychotic thought process” and “paranoid delusions,” and describes appellant’s *520erratic courtroom demeanor. It also discusses appellant’s diabetes and her special diet to control that condition. The majority fails to explain, however, how that evidence meets the test for a basic needs commitment.
To commit a person for being unable to meet her basic needs, the state must establish “by clear and convincing evidence that the individual, due to a mental disorder, is unable to obtain some commodity (e.g., food and water) or service (e.g., life-saving medical care) without which [she] cannot sustain life.” State v. Bunting, 112 Or App 143, 145, 826 P2d 1060 (1992). The state must also establish, again by clear and convincing evidence, that the person’s inability to obtain the particular commodity or service will result in a “likelihood that the person probably [will] not survive in the near future.” Id. at 146.
In finding that appellant is unable to provide for her basic needs, the majority mistakenly equates this case with State v. Johnson, 117 Or App 237, 843 P2d 985 (1992). In Johnson, the appellant had no money or source of income and was homeless, pregnant, and suffering from starvation. We rejected the sufficiency of the appellant’s proposed plan to live with her sister or to obtain housing at the local YWCA because she had not seen her sister for several years and had no money to pay for housing. Furthermore, we found that the appellant
“had no credible plan to acquire adequate nutrition in the future. Her history of failing to follow through with plans for her care demonstrates that she probably would not carry out a plan to obtain food if she had one.”
Id. at 240. We concluded that the appellant was unable to provide for her food and shelter and affirmed the trial court’s commitment order.
In contrast to Johnson, appellant in this case had housing at the time of the proceeding, was not pregnant, was not suffering from starvation, and was receiving an income through Social Security. The majority nevertheless argues that this case is similar to Johnson because appellant was about to be evicted from her residence and had no feasible plan for future housing. In Johnson, however, the appellant’s *521mental condition “impair[ed] her ability to recognize that shelter is a basic need.” Johnson, 117 Or App at 240. Here, in contrast, appellant fully realizes the importance of housing. She has lived in her current residence for nearly a year, and before that, she lived in a similar residence. The state presented no evidence to indicate that appellant has a history of being homeless or of being unable to find a place to live.
Appellant testified that she had a “good idea” where she was going to live next, and her testimony was corroborated by the precommitment investigator, who reported that appellant had “instructed her [mental health service] money manager to send an application fee to a building where she [had] found an apartment and wanted to move.” Despite that evidence, the majority concludes that “[t]here was no evidence that [appellant] had any place to go after she was evicted, nor was there any evidence that any place would accept her in her current condition.” 178 Or App at 518. The majority’s reasoning seems to suggest that the onus was on appellant to prove that she was able to secure housing rather than on the state to prove that she could not. Because appellant presented evidence that shows that she knows the importance of housing and has thé resources to procure it, I would find that the state failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that appellant is unable to provide for her housing needs.
The evidence also establishes that appellant is able to provide herself with food. In Johnson, the appellant became seriously malnourished whenever she was not under a doctor’s care, and the appellant’s pregnancy increased her nutritional needs. We were not persuaded that the appellant would be able to provide for her nutritional needs because of her history of failing to follow through with her care. Johnson, 117 Or App at 240. There is no comparable evidence in this case.
Appellant testified that she prepares meals in a microwave and does her shopping at Fred Meyer. She also testified that she was on a specialized diet to control her diabetic condition. The majority questions appellant’s ability to follow that diet, but that issue is irrelevant to whether appellant is able to provide for her basic needs. While medical care *522to forestall a life-threatening medical condition can be a basic need, State v. Brungard, 101 Or App 67, 71, 789 P2d 683, mod on recons 102 Or App 509, 794 P2d 1257 (1990), rev den 311 Or 427 (1991), there is no evidence that appellant’s life is threatened by her diabetic condition or that failing to follow the diet for her condition would threaten her life. Consequently, appellant’s diabetic condition has no bearing on her ability to provide for her basic needs.
In Johnson, the appellant’s life was threatened by starvation because of her inability to provide herself with food. Here, appellant is able to provide herself with food. Because the record indicates that appellant shops and cooks for herself, I would find that appellant is able to provide herself with food.
Appellant is able to provide herself with both food and shelter, and there is no evidence that she needs any lifesaving medical care. I would conclude, therefore, that the state failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that appellant is unable to provide for her basic needs. I dissent from the majority’s contrary conclusion.