Court Opinion

ID: 9617563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:57:52.956268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:11.803773
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree with the result reached by the majority but by a different route.
The trial court did not grant defendant’s motion in limine and motion to suppress entirely but did suppress “all reference to the field sobriety tests ... as well as the contents of all discussions between [the uniformed officer] and the defendant with the exception of the implied consent warnings and the defendant’s response thereto.” The basis was that defendant had not been advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). The State challenges the suppression.
The ruling as to “statements” could only have related to the defendant’s faulty performance of the alphabet field sobriety test, in which he could not recite the alphabet all the way through. There was no evidence of any other incriminating statement made by defendant. *674Barrier testified that the only thing defendant spoke was a challenge to Barner’s identity as a police officer and that he was going to leave. Littler did not testify about anything that defendant said other than what was expressly not suppressed and what defendant said in the alphabet test. So the question is reduced to whether the Miranda rights must be given before field sobriety tests are administered.
Not all in-custody statements are subject to Miranda. A volunteered statement, which is not the product of interrogation or its functional equivalent, would not be suppressible on this ground. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (100 SC 1682, 64 LE2d 297) (1980). Or a statement may not have been incriminating. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 485-487 (71 SC 814, 95 LE 1118) (1951); Axson v. Nat. Surety Corp., 254 Ga. 248, 250 (327 SE2d 732) (1985). The trial court would have had to know what the statement was and the circumstances under which it was made, to suppress it from introduction at trial. If some statement was in fact made but is not yet evidenced of record, then the ruling was premature.
As to the field sobriety tests, Officer Littler testified that in addition to the alphabet test, he gave several physical dexterity tests in which defendant was asked to perform specific movements using certain members of his body. Since he failed, these produced incriminating evidence.
As authority for his motions, defendant cited only Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420 (104 SC 3138, 82 LE2d 317) (1984). Thus his Miranda challenge was based on the federal constitution alone. It would not reach the field sobriety tests, because only statements, and not acts, are subject to the warnings in order to be admissible under Fifth Amendment standards. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 761 (86 SC 1826, 16 LE2d 908) (1966).
As to the “statement” made in response to Officer Littler’s request that he “recite the alphabet all the way from A through Z as clearly and plainly as possible,” an application of Berkemer leads to the conclusion that the federal right against self-incrimination was not violated. Although Berkemer dealt with roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop rather than the administration of a field sobriety test which involved speech, the rationale is fundamentally the same. It is the nature and the purpose of the detention and of the questions asked by the officer which primarily govern.
The Court stated; “It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ ” Supra at 440. The Court recognized the distinction between the period of detention after the initial stop and the point at which the person is “subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest.” *675Supra at 441. “[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Supra at 441. In determining that question, the Court noted that the police officer asked some questions and requested the suspect to perform a simple balancing test. Thus the fact that a field sobriety test is administered does not render the detention one of “custody” or arrest.
The Georgia Supreme Court relied on Berkemer in concluding that, under federal law, “roadside questioning at a routine stop does not constitute such a custodial situation [as to require Miranda warnings]” Lebrun v. State, 255 Ga. 406, 407 (3) (339 SE2d 227) (1986). In its analysis in VanLoo v. State, 187 Ga. App. 290 (370 SE2d 44) (1988), this Court regarded the field tests to have been performed prior to arrest. That is logical, since the field tests are an investigatory tool and their results may lead to a termination of the detention.
Under Georgia law, the affirmative acts requested of defendant as well as the alphabet statement would be subject to suppression if compelled. 1983 Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI; OCGA § 24-9-20. A proper application of these provisions and the cases construing and applying them would not lead to suppression here either. As analyzed in Montgomery v. State, 174 Ga. App. 95, 96 (1) (329 SE2d 166) (1985), “OCGA § 24-9-20 is inapplicable . . . because appellant was not a person charged in a criminal proceeding at the time he attempted to complete the [field sobriety tests].” Nor was there in Montgomery any violation of the state constitutional right against self-incrimination. The factors found wanting in that case are also absent here.
There was thus no basis in law to suppress the evidence.