Court Opinion

ID: 9496187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:19:41.690192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:24.492230
License: Public Domain

GOULD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, believing that the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002), undermines our precedent in United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.2002), on which the majority incorrectly relies.
Ruiz involved a plea agreement requiring the defendant to waive her right to receive information from the prosecutors about evidence that could be used to impeach a witness at trial. The defendant argued that such waiver meant that her guilty plea was not “voluntary.” Ruiz held that “impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in *1077respect to whether a plea is voluntary (‘knowing,’ ‘intelligent,’ and ‘sufficiently aware’).” Id. at 629, 122 S.Ct. 2450 (emphasis in original). The Court explained that more information might help the defendant make a “wiser ... decision” about “the likely consequences of a plea,” but “the Constitution does not require the prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant.” Id. (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)). The Court added that a waiver is “knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right [that has been waived] and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances — even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.” Id. (emphasis in original). Finally, the Court explained that
the Constitution, in respect to a defendant’s awareness of relevant circumstances, does not require complete knowledge of the relevant circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S., at 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463 (defendant “misapprehended the quality of the State’s case”); ibid, (defendant misapprehended “the likely penalties”); ibid, (defendant failed to “anticipate a change in the law regarding” relevant “punishments”); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (counsel “misjudged the admissibility” of a “confession”); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (counsel failed to point out a potential defense); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) (counsel failed to find a potential constitutional infirmity in grand jury proceedings). It is difficult to distinguish, in terms of importance, (1) a defendant’s ignorance of grounds for impeachment of potential witnesses at a possible future trial from (2) the varying forms of ignorance at issue in these cases.
Id. at 630-31, 122 S.Ct. 2450.
Here, the defendant argues that his guilty plea was not “knowing” and “intelligent” because he misjudged the burden of proof that the government would have had to meet, with respect to drug quantity, if the case had gone to trial. The majority erroneously agrees, stating that Villalobos “could not properly evaluate the risks of entering the plea agreement.” Supra at 1075. The correct answer to defendant’s argument is to reject it based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz. The form of ignorance alleged here by Villalobos, like that in Ruiz, is entirely indistinguishable from a defendant’s ignorance about such relevant circumstances as the quality of the government’s case, the admissibility of a piece of evidence, or the credibility of the government’s witnesses. While a more complete understanding of the burden of proof might help the defendant make a “wiser ... decision” about the likely consequences of a plea, it is enough here that the defendant understood in general how the waiver of proof of drug quantity applied, even if he did not understand the specific detailed consequences of the waiver. I conclude that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz requires us to hold that even if a defendant does not know whether drug quantity must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that lack of knowledge does not prevent a plea from being “knowing” and “intelligent.” The record here demonstrates that the conviction rested upon a knowing and intelligent plea supported by sufficient *1078awareness to demonstrate that the plea was voluntary. For the majority to reheve Villalobos of his plea, and thus to force the government to release a person who has admitted his guilt, or now to try a stale case, is wrong.