Court Opinion

ID: 2964936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:33:11.741133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:26.401280
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 97-1176

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               MANUEL CABRERA-ROSARIO,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                   [Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                              _________________________

               Juan P. Rivera Rom n on brief for appellant.
               ____________________
               Guillermo  Gil,  United  States Attorney,  Jos   A.  Quiles-
               ______________                             _________________
          Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Aixa Maldonado-Qui ones,
          ________                                 _______________________
          Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

                              __________________________

                                   October 17, 1997
                             __________________________ 

                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.     Defendant-appellant  Manuel
                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.
                            ______________

          Cabrera-Rosario (Cabrera) invites  us to vacate his  sentence and

          set aside his guilty plea.  For the reasons elucidated  below, we

          decline the invitation.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    A grand jury  sitting in  the District  of Puerto  Rico

          returned a two-count  indictment against the appellant.   Count 1

          charged  that Cabrera,  a  convicted  felon,  knowingly  received

          and/or possessed  a number of firearms that  had been transported

          in  commerce in  violation  of  18 U.S.C.      922(g) and  924(e)

          (1994).  Count 2 charged him with obliterating the manufacturer's

          serial numbers on two of these weapons   both Cobray machine guns

            in violation of 18 U.S.C.   922(k) & (o) (1994).

                    The  appellant originally pleaded  not guilty.   On May

          28,  1996, he  changed course  and  signed a  so-called Plea  and

          Cooperation  Agreement (the Agreement)  that set forth  the terms

          and conditions  appertaining to a  nonbinding plea bargain.   See
                                                                        ___

          Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(B).

                    The Agreement    each page  of which was  initialled by

          the appellant  and his attorney    provided, inter alia,  that if

          Cabrera cooperated  fully and  truthfully,  the government  would

          stipulate  to a particular set of guideline calculations designed

          to yield  a guideline sentencing range (GSR) of 188 to 235 months

          (adjusted offense level  31; criminal history  category VI).   It

          clearly indicated  Cabrera's awareness that,  notwithstanding the

          stipulation,  "the  defendant's  sentence  is  within  the  sound

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          discretion of the sentencing judge," Agreement,   6; and that, if

          the court were to impose a sentence in excess of 235 months, "the

          defendant  [could] not,  for that  reason  alone, withdraw  [his]

          guilty  plea,"  id.    The   Agreement  also  implied  that   the
                          ___

          government, unless  it moved for  a downward departure,  see USSG
                                                                   ___

           5K1.1  (1995)    a matter  left wholly  within its  discretion  

          would recommend  that the  court impose a  sentence within  those

          parameters.

                    Cabrera thereupon completed a 13-page Petition to Enter

          a Plea  of Guilty (the  Petition) that reinforced  the sentencing

          message contained  in the Agreement.   The  Petition included  an

          extensive questionnaire.  In addition to answering the questions,

          Cabrera initialled each of the 13 pages, as did his attorney.

                    A change-of-plea hearing  ensued.  Judge  Casellas told

          the appellant the purpose of the  proceeding and interrogated him

          at some length.   The appellant stated unequivocally, in response

          to direct  questions, that he  had read and  completed truthfully

          all  13  pages;  that  he  had  conferred  sufficiently  with his

          counsel;  and  that  he  understood  that  his  guilty  plea,  if

          accepted, would effectively  waive a long list  of constitutional

          rights.     Judge  Casellas  then  requested  the  prosecutor  to

          summarize the terms of the Agreement.1  The court made it crystal
                              
          ____________________

               1The  prosecutor's summary was  accurate for the  most part,
          but he misstated  the projected GSR, describing it as  188 to 208
          months.  Given  the express provisions of both  the Agreement and
          the  Petition, and  the fact  that the  appellant and  his lawyer
          vouchsafed the prosecutor's  summary of the Agreement,  we attach
          no  decretory significance  to  this lapsus  linguae.   We  note,
                                               ______  _______
          moreover, that  the presentence investigation report,  which both

                                          3

          clear  that  the sentence  to  be  imposed  was within  its  sole

          discretion,  subject only  to  the  limits set  by  law, and  the

          appellant acknowledged that he understood as much.

                    Judge Casellas then reviewed the allegations of count 1

          with  the appellant  and  informed him  of  the maximum  possible

          penalty.  However, the judge failed to mention that the appellant

          could not withdraw his  guilty plea if the  court decided not  to

          follow the sentencing recommendation contained in the Agreement.

                    The district court convened  the disposition hearing on

          December  3,  1996.    At the  outset,  the  appellant's  counsel

          confirmed  that both he and his  client had read and reviewed the

          presentence investigation report, that the report  was "accurate"

          and  "fair-minded,"  and  that  they  had  no  objection  to  its

          contents.   In  his  allocution,  the  appellant  importuned  the

          court's forgiveness.   For its  part, the  government did  little

          more  than stand by the Agreement and the sentencing calculations

          contained therein.

                    In  pronouncing  sentence,  Judge  Casellas  in  effect

          accepted  the parties' earlier  stipulation, determining that the

          applicable GSR was 188 to 235 months.  He sentenced the appellant

          at the apex of the range, but within it.  This appeal ensued.

          II.  ANALYSIS
          II.  ANALYSIS

                    The  appellant's central thesis is that his guilty plea

          was involuntary because  he was unaware of its  consequences.  He
                              
          ____________________

          the appellant and  his attorney read and pronounced "accurate" in
          advance of sentencing, tracked the  Agreement and the Petition in
          describing the GSR as 188 to 235 months.

                                          4

          supports this  thesis in  two ways.   First, he  claims that  the

          presiding judge failed to warn him that he could not withdraw his

          guilty plea  if the judge  decided not to adopt  the government's

          sentencing  recommendation.    Second,  he asseverates  that  the

          government breached the Agreement.  We turn first to the question

          of appealability and then consider the appellant's arguments.

                                  A.  Appealability.
                                  A.  Appealability.
                                      _____________

                    Rule 11 exists as a means of safeguarding the fairness,

          integrity,  and public reputation  of judicial proceedings.   See
                                                                        ___

          United States v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 1991).
          _____________    ____________

          Among  other  things, the  rule  is  intended  to ensure  that  a

          defendant who pleads guilty does so with an "understanding of the

          nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea."  McCarthy
                                                                   ________

          v. United  States, 394  U.S.  459, 467  (1969).   Because of  the
             ______________

          importance of the interests  that Rule 11 protects,  we sometimes

          will entertain on  direct appeal a Rule 11  challenge even though

          the  essence of the  challenge was not  raised in the  nisi prius

          court.  See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 121 F.3d 7, 10 (1st
                  ___  ____  _____________    ________

          Cir. 1997); Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d at 593.  This is such a case.
                      ____________

                                B.  The Plea Colloquy.
                                B.  The Plea Colloquy.
                                    _________________

                    Fed. R. Crim.  P. 11(e)(2) specifically  provides, with

          respect to  nonbinding plea  agreements,2 that  "the court  shall

                              
          ____________________

               2The plea agreement at issue here is of this stripe, drawing
          its essence  from  Fed. R.  Crim.  P. 11(e)(1)(B).   In  it,  the
          prosecutor  effectively  agreed  to  take  a  position  vis- -vis
          sentencing (i.e., not  opposing a sentence within  the stipulated
          GSR), with the understanding that this "recommendation" would not
          bind the court.

                                          5

          advise  the defendant  that  if  the court  does  not accept  the

          [sentencing] recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless

          has  no  right to  withdraw  the plea."    In this  instance, the

          district judge conducted a painstaking Rule 11  colloquy in which

          he inquired about the  Agreement and reminded the appellant  that

          the government's sentencing recommendation was not binding on the

          court.   There was,  however, a flaw:   the judge  never told the

          appellant explicitly that he would be unable to withdraw his plea

          should  the court  fail  to  act in  accordance  with the  agreed

          disposition.

                    Notwithstanding the importance of the prophylaxis  that

          Rule   11  prescribes,  the  detection   of  an  error  does  not

          necessarily require vacation of a defendant's plea.  The drafters

          of  Rule  11  made  it  pellucid  that  "any  variance  from  the

          procedures   required  by  this   rule  which  does   not  affect

          substantial rights  shall  be disregarded."    Fed. R.  Crim.  P.

          11(h).  Under this proviso,  "even an error implicating Rule 11's

          core  concerns will  not require  vacating a  guilty plea  if the

          error,  in context,  is harmless."    McDonald, 121  F.3d at  11.
                                                ________

          Thus, the question before us  reduces to the harmlessness vel non
                                                                    ___ ___

          of the judge's omission.3
                              
          ____________________

               3When a defendant moves in the district court to withdraw an
          earlier guilty  plea, we  customarily test  the district  court's
          resolution of  that motion through  a multi-faceted format.   See
                                                                        ___
          United States v.  Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d  19, 22-23 (1st  Cir.
          _____________     ________________
          1994); United  States v. Parrilla-Tirado,  22 F.3d 368,  371 (1st
                 ______________    _______________
          Cir. 1994).   We occasionally  have utilized this same  method of
          analysis in cases in which a defendant alleges for the first time
          on appeal that the sentencing court violated Rule 11.  See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____
          United States v. Lopez-Pineda, 55 F.3d 693, 696 (1st Cir.), cert.
          _____________    ____________                               _____

                                          6

                    To  be sure,  due  process  demands that  a  plea in  a

          criminal case "be made voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently, and

          with  an  awareness  of the  overall  circumstances  and probable

          consequences."  Id. (citing Boykin  v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243
                          ___         ______     _______

          n.5 (1969)).  In failing to  apprise the appellant of one of  the

          consequences that would flow from the  court's disapproval of the

          prosecutor's  sentencing   recommendation,  the   district  court

          blemished an  otherwise impeccable  plea colloquy, violated  Rule

          11, and precipitated  a due process  challenge.  Nonetheless,  in

          the idiosyncratic circumstances  of this case, the  court's error

          did not  impair the appellant's  substantial rights.   We explain

          briefly.

                    In  evaluating  incipient  Rule 11  violations,  courts

          should focus on the reality of events as reflected by  the record

          and take  care not  to elevate form  over substance.   See United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States v. Noriega-Mill n, 110 F.3d 162, 167 (1st Cir. 1997).  For
          ______    ______________

          purposes of this appeal, the pivotal datum is that the court  did

          not abandon the prosecutor's recommendation, but, rather, imposed

          a sentence of 235 months.  This sentence fell at the apex of, but

          within,  the agreed sentencing range.   The omitted warning would

          have served  to inform the  appellant of the consequences  of his

          plea should the court impose a sentence outside the agreed range;
                                                  _______

          that warning  would not  have added to  the appellant's  store of
                              
          ____________________

          denied,  116  S.  Ct.  259 (1995).    The  multi-part  test  is a
          ______
          diagnostic aid, not an obligatory ritual.  See McDonald, 121 F.3d
                                                     ___ ________
          at  10  n.2.    Here,  both  the  trial  court's  error  and  the
          harmlessness of that  error are manifest; consequently,  there is
          no need to resort to the multi-part test.

                                          7

          knowledge if  the court imposed a  sentence within the  GSR.  The
                                                      ______

          sentence actually  imposed fell in  the latter category,  not the

          former.   It follows  inexorably that,  since the contingency  of

          which the court failed to  apprise the appellant never arose, the

          court's error was benign.   See, e.g., McDonald, 121 F.3d  at 11;
                                      ___  ____  ________

          United States v. Chan, 97 F.3d 1582, 1584 (9th Cir. 1996).
          _____________    ____

                    This conclusion is  especially compelling on  the facts

          before us.  The record  offers every indication that, despite the

          court's lapse, the appellant had actual knowledge of the  omitted

          fact.   Indeed,  he acknowledged  as much  in the  Agreement, the

          Petition, and the  questionnaire that  accompanied the  Petition.

          Since there is no reasonable likelihood that the court's omission

          affected the appellant's  willingness to plead guilty,  a finding

          of  harmlessness is  appropriate.   See, e.g.,  Chan, 97  F.3d at
                                              ___  ____   ____

          1584; United States v. McCarthy,  97 F.3d 1562, 1575-76 (8th Cir.
                _____________    ________

          1996);  United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1223-24
                  _____________    _________________

          (1st Cir. 1995).

                               C.  The Plea Agreement.
                               C.  The Plea Agreement.
                                   __________________

                    In  his remaining argument,  the appellant asserts that

          the  government   should  have   done  more   to  highlight   his

          cooperation.  He  also asserts that  the government, in  exchange

          for his  guilty plea, agreed  to drop count 2  of the indictment,

          yet failed  to mention that count to the judge at the disposition

          hearing.  These assertions are not persuasive.

                    Passing  the  very   real  question   of  whether   the

          appellant's  assertions are procedurally defaulted   a claim that

                                          8

          a prosecutor breached  a plea agreement ordinarily  must make its

          debut in the district court, see  United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d
                                       ___  _____________    _____

          9, 11 (1st  Cir. 1995); United  States v. Giorgi, 840  F.2d 1022,
                                  ______________    ______

          1028 (1st Cir.  1988), and the assertions in  question are raised

          for the first time in this venue   it is plain that the Agreement

          did not require  the United States to dwell  in detail before the

          district  court   regarding  the   extent   of  the   appellant's

          cooperation.   Without an explicit  commitment to that  effect in

          the  agreement itself,  there is  no breach.   See,  e.g., United
                                                         ___   ____  ______

          States v. Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 829 (1st Cir. 1996); United States
          ______    ______                                    _____________

          v. Hogan, 862  F.2d 386, 388 (1st Cir. 1988).  This is especially
             _____

          true where, as here, the Agreement contains an integration clause

          that   expressly  disavows  commitments  not  set  forth  in  the

          Agreement's text.4

                    Insofar as count  2 is concerned,  the short answer  is

          that the district court docket  shows that the prosecutor filed a

          written motion to dismiss that count on the day of sentencing and

          the court granted the motion.  That ends the matter:  despite the

          fact that the prosecutor did not mention count  2 during his oral

          presentation  at the disposition hearing, the  count is no longer

                              
          ____________________

               4Paragraph 23 of the Agreement reads as follows:

                    This   written   agreement   constitutes  the
                    complete  Plea Agreement  between the  United
                    States,  the defendant,  and the  defendant's
                    counsel.   The  United  States  has  made  no
                    promises  or  representations except  as  set
                    forth in writing in  this plea agreement  and
                    deny  [sic] the existence  of any  other term
                    and conditions not stated herein.

                                          9

          zoetic and, therefore, the appellant received the full benefit of

          his bargain.

          III.  CONCLUSION
          III.  CONCLUSION

                    We need go  no further.  The purpose  of insisting that

          the judge inform a defendant that  he will not have the right  to

          withdraw his guilty  plea if the  court eschews the  prosecutor's

          sentencing  recommendation is to ensure that the defendant is not

          induced  to change  his plea  without being  aware of  a relevant

          contingency.  That purpose  was not in any way  frustrated by the

          omission  that   occurred  here   since  the   contingency  never

          materialized.   Thus, because the district  court's bevue did not

          harm  or  prejudice  the appellant,  and  because  the government

          abided by its Agreement, the appeal implodes.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

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