Court Opinion

ID: 9931369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 20:08:10.39862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:30.813717
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Cobb, 2024-Ohio-458.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                  :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,            :
                                                             No. 112785
                 v.                             :

JOHN COBB, JR.,                                 :

                 Defendant-Appellant.           :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; SENTENCE VACATED
                           IN PART; AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 8, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-22-670729-B

                                          Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Benjamin Fuchs, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Christopher M. Kelley, for appellant.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                   Appellant John Cobb, Jr. (“appellant”), appeals his convictions and

sentence in this case. Upon review, we vacate the sentence imposed upon Counts 1,

2, 3, and 4, which involve allied offenses of similar import, and we remand with
instructions for merger and resentencing. We otherwise affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

               In June 2022, appellant was charged along with a codefendant,

Chaz A. Belton, under a seven-count indictment with two counts of trafficking

(Counts 1 and 3), four counts of drug possession (Counts 2, 4, 5, and 6), and

possessing criminal tools (Count 7). Each count included forfeiture specifications.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Counts 3 and 4 were amended during trial to

change the amount of the drug and degree of the offense.

               The testimony at trial revealed that on May 19, 2022, police detectives

were conducting surveillance near Craven Avenue and East 118th Street in Cleveland

for possible drug activity. Detective Daniel Hourihan, who was in an undercover

car, observed a white vehicle that was backed into a driveway and saw multiple

individuals approach the driver’s window and engage in suspected hand-to-hand

drug transactions. At one point, he saw the driver exit the white vehicle and have a

brief interaction at the driver’s side of another vehicle.

               After a zone car was contacted to initiate a stop, Detective Matthew

Pollak approached the white vehicle and observed Belton standing outside of the

driver’s door and appellant in the passenger’s seat. Detective Pollak smelled a strong

odor of marijuana. In the vehicle, the detective found a large bag containing

suspected marijuana, an orange pill bottle with the name ripped off the label

containing 5 mg tablets of oxycodone, and a digital scale with THC residue. The

detective testified that drug traffickers will typically have scales to weigh their
product and ensure they are selling proper amounts. Two cell phones were also

seized, which the detective testified are also common among drug traffickers.

               Detective Pollak searched Belton’s person and found $9,882 in cash,

the majority of which was rubber banded together, and a container with marijuana

dipped in THC wax.

               Detective Cody Sheets searched Cobb’s person. Detective Sheets

noticed Cobb had a knife on a chain around his neck and, upon patting down Cobb,

he found a knife in Cobb’s pocket and a bag in the waistband of Cobb’s underwear

containing smaller bags that contained an aggregate total of 15.14 grams of

methamphetamine, which is typically sold as ecstasy. The detective testified that

having the smaller bags of drugs inside the larger bag was common among drug

traffickers for quicker transactions. Detective Sheets also found on Cobb a pill bottle

with the name ripped off the label containing 60 mg capsules of Vyvanse (30-unit

doses of lisdexamphetamine), a small bag containing 1.17 grams of cocaine

hydrochloride, $27 cash, and a 100-gram weight, which is commonly used by drug

traffickers to calibrate the scale.

               Edgar Andrus, a forensic scientist from the Cuyahoga County

Regional Forensic Laboratory, testified to the lab results and the weight of the drugs

recovered. Other testimony and evidence were presented, which this court has

reviewed.

               The jury found appellant guilty as to Counts 1-5, but not guilty on the

forfeiture specifications accompanying each count. The jury found appellant not
guilty on Counts 6 and 7. The trial court sentenced appellant on each of Counts 1-5

to be served concurrent to each other as well as to sentences imposed in other

matters. The total aggregate prison sentence in the case was six to nine years. The

trial court also imposed a $7,500 fine on Count 1.

              Appellant timely filed this appeal. He raises four assignments of error

for our review.

              Under his first assignment of error, appellant claims his convictions

are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

              When reviewing whether a judgment is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, an appellate court reviews the entire record and “‘weighs the

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485

N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). Reversing a conviction based upon the weight of the

evidence should occur “‘only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.’” Id., quoting Martin at 175.

              Appellant challenges his convictions on the two counts of trafficking

under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and three counts of drug possession under

R.C. 2925.11(A).
               First, appellant argues that the evidence in this case was unreliable

because he claims the state failed to show the proper chain of custody was followed

or to show that the equipment and instruments used to test the drugs were properly

calibrated. Appellant argues that the record fails to show how the alleged drugs got

from the crime scene to the forensic laboratory to be tested and that the individual

who delivered the evidence to the lab did not have his name written on the evidence.

He also maintains that the testimony of Edgar Angus did not establish with

reasonable certainty that the instruments used to test the drugs were properly

calibrated.

               “As a general matter, ‘the state [is] not required to prove a perfect,

unbroken chain of custody.’” State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524,

776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 57, quoting State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 662, 693 N.E.2d

246 (1998). Any break in the chain of custody goes to the weight, rather than the

admissibility, of evidence. State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776

N.E.2d 26, ¶ 43, citing State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 360, 595 N.E.2d 915

(1992). “‘The state need only establish that it is reasonably certain that substitution,

alteration or tampering did not occur.’” State v. Sims, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

89261, 2007-Ohio-6821, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Blevins, 36 Ohio App.3d 147, 150, 521

N.E.2d 1105 (10th Dist.1987).

               Our review of the transcript reflects that Detective Sheets testified to

his recovery of the drugs and to his name being on the evidence bags. Although he

did not know who delivered the evidence to the forensic laboratory, he testified that
the evidence “was sealed, marked, tagged and entered” and that the process for

preserving the integrity of the evidence was followed. He also recognized the

exhibits shown at trial were the same drugs that were in fact recovered. Edgar

Andrus, the forensic scientist, testified to the forensic laboratory’s chain-of-custody

procedure.    He testified that the police have potential controlled substances

packaged when brought to the lab, and he testified that in this case, all the bags had

the last name and badge number of Detective Sheets on them. Mr. Andrus further

indicated that there are identifiers assigned to the evidence by the lab, and he

testified to sealing the bags after testing to maintain the integrity of the evidence.

Additionally, Mr. Andrus testified that the lab instruments are checked with a test

mix daily to make sure they are detecting substances in the expected manner and an

evaluation is run to ensure the instruments are within specifications. Mr. Andrus

also testified to his qualifications and to the testing he performed. This testimony

effectively established a proper chain of custody and the reliability of the testing

process and results.

               Next, appellant argues the evidence failed to show any drug

trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant was convicted on Counts 1 and 3

of trafficking under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2). Appellant argues the evidence at trial

suggested he merely possessed the alleged drugs, not that he trafficked them. He

further argues that he was not complicit in any of Belton’s offenses. We are not

persuaded by his arguments.
              In this case, the detectives testified, based upon their observation and

experience, to the circumstances being indicative of drug trafficking. The detectives

were investigating the area for drug activity, appellant and Belton were in a vehicle

backed into a driveway, several suspected hand-to-hand transactions were observed

with various individuals, a bag with multiple smaller bags of drugs was found in

appellant’s waistband, vials of drugs with the names ripped off the label and a 100-

gram weight were found, a large amount of money was found on Belton, and a scale

and cell phones were found in the vehicle. As this court has previously stated, “It

has long been established that otherwise innocuous objects such as bags, money, or

cell phones can be used as criminal tools in drug trafficking and these items may

constitute circumstantial evidence for drug trafficking.” State v. Hawthorne, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102689, 2016-Ohio-203, ¶ 21, citing State v. Bowling, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 93052, 2010-Ohio-3595, ¶ 60. Furthermore, in that the detectives

found the majority of the money on Belton, while they found the majority of the

drugs on Cobb, Detective Pollack testified it is common to find a separation of money

and drugs when the people are working in tandem, which is sort of a risk-mitigation

tactic in the event of police interdiction. The circumstantial evidence in this case

established appellant not only possessed the drugs, but he trafficked them and was

complicit with Belton.

              After reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, and considering the credibility of the witnesses, we do not

find the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
justice that the adjudication must be reversed. This is not the exceptional case in

which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. The first assignment of

error is overruled.

               Under his second assignment of error, appellant claims his

convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. When reviewing a sufficiency

challenge, “the inquiry is, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259, 273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319,

99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

               R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), trafficking in drugs, provides:

      No person shall knowingly * * * [p]repare for shipment, ship, transport,
      deliver, prepare for distribution, or distribute a controlled substance,
      when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
      controlled substance is intended for sale or resale by the offender or
      another person.

               R.C. 2925.11(A), possession of drugs, provides:

      No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled
      substance or a controlled substance analog.

               In challenging his convictions for drug possession on Counts 2, 4, and

5, appellant again challenges the reliability of the evidence to establish the drugs

were illegal drugs and to establish the weight and amount of the drugs. Appellant

also challenges his convictions on Counts 1 and 3 for trafficking under

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), again claiming that the evidence simply showed he possessed

the alleged drugs and that the state failed to establish he was complicit with Belton.
               We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case. The state

presented testimony from the detectives to establish appellant’s involvement in the

commission of the crimes. Detective Sheets testified regarding the drugs he found

on appellant’s person, and the forensic scientist testified to the positive lab results

and the weight of the drugs. The testimony sufficiently established that the evidence

was reliable. Additionally, the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to

show appellant and Belton were engaging in drug trafficking when they were

apprehended. Upon our review, we find the state presented sufficient evidence to

show appellant not only committed the drug-possession offenses, but also that he

committed the trafficking offenses and was complicit with Belton. After viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find any reasonable trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. The second assignment of error is overruled.

               Under his third assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court

erred in providing a complicity instruction to the jury. He asserts the evidence at

trial was insufficient to warrant a jury instruction on complicity.

               “Requested jury instructions should ordinarily be given if they are

correct statements of law, if they are applicable to the facts in the case, and if

reasonable minds might reach the conclusion sought by the requested instruction.”

State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 240, citing

Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591, 575 N.E.2d 828 (1991). “To

support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to
R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted,

encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of

the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.” State

v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 240, 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001), syllabus. “Such intent

may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Id.

              Based on our review, we find the evidence was sufficient to show that

appellant was complicit in trafficking in the controlled substances. Because any

reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant

knowingly aided and abetted Belton in committing the trafficking offenses, the jury

instruction on complicity was warranted. Accordingly, we find the trial court did

not err in giving the jury instruction. The third assignment of error is overruled.

              Under his fourth assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court

committed plain error by failing to merge appellant’s convictions for drug trafficking

and drug possession as allied offenses of similar import. Specifically, he claims the

trial court committed plain error by failing to merge Counts 1 and 2, which involve

trafficking and possession of methamphetamine, and by failing to merge Counts 3

and 4, which involve trafficking and possession of lisdexamphetamine. He asserts

with respect to each particular type of drug that because he was found to have

trafficked and possessed the same drugs through the same act, they were allied

offenses of similar import and should have merged pursuant to R.C. 2941.25.

              “Ohio courts have long recognized that, in most instances, trafficking

and possession charges based on the same contraband are allied offenses requiring
merger.” State v. Mitchell, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-220155 and C-220156, 2022-

Ohio-4355, ¶ 24, citing State v. Murph, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150263,

2015-Ohio-5076, ¶ 7; State v. Fenderson, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-21-018,

2022-Ohio-1973, ¶ 86; see also State v. Martin, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230236,

2024-Ohio-10, ¶ 32-34 (finding a trial court should have merged trafficking in

marijuana and possession of marijuana counts). As stated in Martin, “‘By its nature,

a drug-trafficking offense under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), which requires that the

offender knowingly “[p]repare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for

distribution, or distribute a controlled substance,” necessarily includes some degree

of possession.’” Martin at ¶ 34, quoting Murph at ¶ 7.

               Upon the record before us, we agree that in this case the trial court

committed plain error in failing to merge the methamphetamine-related offenses

and by failing to merge the lisdexamphetamine-related offenses.          The fourth

assignment of error is sustained.

               In conclusion, we vacate the sentences imposed on Counts 1, 2, 3, and

4, and we remand the matter with instructions for the trial court to merge Counts 1

and 2, which are the offenses for trafficking in and possession of methamphetamine,

and to separately merge Counts 3 and 4, which are the offenses for trafficking in and

possession of lisdexamphetamine. The trial court shall permit the state to elect

which of the respective allied offenses to pursue for sentencing, and the trial court

shall resentence appellant on the counts elected by the state. The judgment is

affirmed in all other respects.
                 Judgment affirmed in part; sentence vacated in part. Case remanded

for merger and resentencing.

      It is ordered that appellant and appellee share costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Any bail pending appeal

is terminated.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR