Court Opinion

ID: 9927603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 16:02:56.06492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.536776
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-9588    Document: 010110991093       Date Filed: 01/29/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        January 29, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  PEDRO VALLE-HERNANDEZ,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                         No. 22-9588
                                                         (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND,
  United States Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Pedro Valle-Hernandez petitions for review of a decision by the Board of

 Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen. Exercising jurisdiction

 under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny his petition for review.

 I.    Background

       Mr. Valle-Hernandez is a native and citizen of Mexico. In 2018, the

 Department of Homeland Security issued a notice to appear alleging that he was

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-9588    Document: 010110991093        Date Filed: 01/29/2024        Page: 2

 removable on the ground that he had not been admitted or paroled into the United

 States after inspection by an immigration officer. Mr. Valle-Hernandez conceded he

 was removable but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).

 An immigration judge (IJ) denied that relief, concluding that Mr. Valle-Hernandez

 did not demonstrate: (1) good moral character, see § 1229b(b)(1)(B); or (2) that

 his removal to Mexico would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

 to his qualifying relatives—at that time, his four United-States-citizen sons—see

 § 1229b(b)(1)(D).

       The BIA dismissed Mr. Valle-Hernandez’s appeal, concluding as follows:

              We acknowledge the aggregate hardship to [Mr. Valle-Hernandez’s]
       children if he is to be removed to Mexico, particularly if the children
       separate from their father and remain in the United States with their mother.
       However, [he] raises no arguments on appeal that persuade us to reverse the
       Immigration Judge’s decision with respect to his failure to satisfy the
       hardship standard for cancellation of removal. Thus, we need not reach the
       Immigration Judge’s finding that [Mr. Valle-Hernandez] did not
       demonstrate good moral character for purposes of cancellation of removal.

 R. at 89. Mr. Valle-Hernandez did not petition for review of the BIA’s dismissal of

 his appeal.

       Subsequent to his hearing before the IJ, Ana Martinez—who is

 Mr. Valle-Hernandez’s long-term partner and the mother of his four sons—adjusted

 her status to legal permanent resident. Mr. Valle-Hernandez and Ms. Martinez then

 married, after which he filed a timely motion to reopen with the BIA seeking further

 consideration of his application for cancellation of removal. He noted that

 Ms. Martinez was a newly qualifying relative, in addition to his children, for

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 purposes of cancellation of removal, and he submitted evidence of hardship to

 Ms. Martinez that would result from his removal.

          The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Mr. Valle-Hernandez’s new

 evidence did not alter its conclusion that he had not demonstrated a prima facie case

 of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives. It stated

 that, “[c]onsidering that the evidence supporting the motion is not likely to change

 the outcome of the proceedings, it does not warrant a new hearing.” Id. at 4.

 II.      Discussion

          The BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is “a final, separately appealable

 order,” and for purposes of a petition for review is “the functional equivalent of and

 analogous to” a final removal order. Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361, 1362

 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the BIA’s denial of a

 motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1362. “The BIA abuses its

 discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs

 from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or

 conclusory statements.” Id. (quotation omitted). The BIA also abuses its discretion

 by committing a legal error. See Qiu v. Sessions, 870 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir.

 2017).

          A.    Jurisdiction

          In his motion to reopen, Mr. Valle-Hernandez sought reopening and a remand

 to the IJ to reevaluate his eligibility for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1).

 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), this court lacks jurisdiction to review “any

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 judgment regarding the granting of relief under” § 1229b. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

 also precludes us from “review[ing] the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen because

 the alien still has failed to show the requisite hardship.” Alzainati v. Holder,

 568 F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 2009).

       But 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves our jurisdiction to review “questions

 of law” even when § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) otherwise precludes our jurisdiction. See

 Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1176, 1182 (10th Cir. 2020). A petitioner can

 raise a reviewable question of law “(1) by advancing a statutory-construction

 argument, or (2) by disputing the application of a legal standard to undisputed or

 established facts.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

       In his petition for review, Mr. Valle-Hernandez first argues that the BIA erred

 by requiring him to demonstrate a prima facie case for relief by presenting evidence

 that would likely change the outcome of the proceedings. He contends that this

 requirement has no statutory basis in, and conflicts with, the requirements of 8 U.S.C.

 § 1229a(c)(7), which governs motions to reopen, and also conflicts with BIA

 caselaw. Because his argument involves statutory construction and a challenge to the

 legal standard the BIA applied in denying his motion to reopen, we conclude it raises

 reviewable questions of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D). See Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d

 at 1182; id. at 1184 (holding that whether the BIA followed its own precedent

 presents a question of law).

       Mr. Valle-Hernandez’s second contention is that the BIA failed to consider the

 aggregate and cumulative hardship to his wife and children, contrary to its own

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 caselaw. This, too, raises a reviewable question of law. See id. at 1184. We

 therefore conclude that we have jurisdiction to review both propositions raised in

 Mr. Valle-Hernandez’s petition for review.

       B.     Failure to Exhaust First Proposition

       The government argues that Mr. Valle-Hernandez did not exhaust before the

 BIA his first proposition—that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard in denying

 his motion to reopen. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), “[a] court may review a final

 order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies

 available to the alien as of right.”1 “It is a fundamental principle of administrative

 law that an agency must have the opportunity to rule on a challenger’s arguments

 before the challenger may bring those arguments to court.” Garcia-Carbajal v.

 Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by

 Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 413 (2023). In the immigration context,

 “[i]t is not enough to go through the procedural motions of a BIA appeal, or to make

 general statements in the notice of appeal to the BIA, or to level broad assertions in a

 filing before the Board.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[t]o satisfy

 § 1252(d)(1), an alien must present the same specific legal theory to the BIA before

 he or she may advance it in court.” Id.

       In his motion to reopen, Mr. Valle-Hernandez set forth the law governing

 motions to reopen. R. at 14-16. He quoted the provisions governing such motions in

       1
         Mr. Valle-Hernandez does not contest the applicability of the statutory
 exhaustion requirement in § 1252(d)(1) to his motion to reopen filed with the BIA.
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 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). R. at 14-15. And he cited INS v.

 Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988), Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 472

 (B.I.A. 1992), and this court’s decision in Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1162

 (10th Cir. 2003), as defining the three grounds on which the BIA can reasonably deny

 a motion to reopen, including the failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief

 sought. R. at 15-16. Mr. Valle-Hernandez stated that, although Coelho was decided

 before Congress enacted § 1229a(c)(7), “these three grounds for denial remain the

 relevant considerations.” Id. He did not assert any conflict between § 1229a(c)(7)

 and Abudu, Coelho, or Mickeviciute.

       Mr. Valle-Hernandez now argues that the BIA erred by denying his motion

 based upon outdated legal standards—in particular the requirement to demonstrate a

 prima facie case for relief—that conflict with the subsequently enacted statutory

 language governing motions to reopen. He maintains that, to obtain reopening, he

 was only required to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing, supported by

 material evidence that was not previously available or discoverable. See 8 U.S.C.

 § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Mr. Valle-Hernandez did not exhaust

 this contention in his motion to reopen filed with the BIA. Rather, he acknowledged

 that Coelho’s three grounds for denial of such a motion—including demonstrating a

 prima facie case for relief—“remain the relevant considerations.” R. at 16.

       Mr. Valle-Hernandez also contends that the standard the BIA applied in

 denying his motion conflicts with the BIA’s own caselaw. He asserts that the BIA

 erred by requiring him “to conclusively establish” that the new facts he alleged

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 would change the outcome in his case. Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 8 (citing R. at 4). The

 BIA did not use this terminology. It concluded that “the evidence supporting the

 motion is not likely to change the outcome of the proceedings.” R. at 4 (emphasis

 added). Mr. Valle-Hernandez argues the BIA erred in relying on Matter of F-S-N-,

 28 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (B.I.A. 2020), for this standard, see R. at 4, because that case

 relied on the “outdated” decisions in Abudu and Coehlo, Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 16.

 But as noted, he did not argue in his motion to reopen that the standards set forth in

 Abudu and Coelho are no longer applicable to such motions.

       Mr. Valle-Hernandez further contends that to demonstrate a prima facie case

 for relief he was only required to satisfy the standard in In re L-O-G-, 21 I. & N. Dec.

 413, 418-19 (B.I.A. 1996) (en banc), in which the BIA noted it had “been willing to

 reopen where the new facts alleged, when coupled with the facts already of record,

 satisfy us that it would be worthwhile to develop the issues further at a plenary

 hearing on reopening,” id. at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA stated

 that “[b]y finding that an alien has made out a prima facie case of . . . hardship,”

 it was “deciding only that there is a reasonable likelihood that the statutory

 requirements for the relief sought have been satisfied, and that there is a reasonable

 likelihood that relief will be granted in the exercise of discretion.” Id.

       Mr. Valle-Hernandez did not cite L-O-G- or this reasonable-likelihood

 standard in his motion to reopen. He asserts in his reply brief that, while he knew he

 was required to establish a prima facie case for relief, he neither knew nor should

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 have known that the BIA would require him to demonstrate that his new evidence

 was likely to change the outcome of his proceedings. We are not persuaded.

       The IJ and the BIA apply the law of the circuit in which the IJ sits. See

 Ballesteros v. Ashcroft, 452 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006), adhered to in relevant

 part on reh’g, 482 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2007). This court has not decided in a

 published decision whether L-O-G-’s reasonable-likelihood standard applies to a

 prima facie case for relief in all motions to reopen. Our authoritative caselaw states

 that “[t]o merit reopening” the movant’s “new facts . . . must demonstrate that ‘if

 proceedings before the IJ were reopened, with all the attendant delays, the new

 evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.’” Maatougui v. Holder,

 738 F.3d 1230, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting Coehlo,

 20 I. & N. Dec. at 473). Thus, Mr. Valle-Hernandez had reason to know that the BIA

 would apply that standard in deciding his motion to reopen—and reason to challenge

 that standard if he believed it was erroneous. Moreover, the BIA has not clarified

 when the reasonable-likelihood standard applies, and our sister circuits are not in

 agreement on the issue.2 Consequently, there is all the more reason why this court

       2
          See, e.g., Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1178-79 (9th Cir.
 2023) (clarifying confusion in caselaw; holding reasonable-likelihood standard
 applies when addressing prima facie grounds for relief); Parada-Orellana v.
 Garland, 21 F.4th 887, 893-94 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding agency correctly applied
 reasonable-likelihood standard in assessing prima face case for relief);
 Caballero-Martinez v. Barr, 920 F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 2019) (construing L-O-G- as
 holding that Coehlo’s likely-change-the-result standard applies to a motion to reopen
 based on new evidence where noncitizen had previous opportunity to litigate request
 for relief before the IJ); Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 319-21 (6th Cir.
                                                                            (continued)
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 should not deprive the agency of an opportunity to apply its expertise in considering

 and ruling on the issue. See Garcia-Carbajal, 625 F.3d at 1237.

       In sum, we decline to consider Mr. Valle-Hernandez’s first proposition

 because he did not exhaust it before the BIA in his motion to reopen.

       C.     Aggregate Hardship

       Mr. Valle-Hernandez also argues the BIA failed to consider the aggregate

 hardship to his wife and children, contrary to its own caselaw. See In re

 Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 64 (B.I.A. 2001) (en banc) (“[A]ll hardship

 factors should be considered in the aggregate when assessing exceptional and

 extremely unusual hardship.”). He notes that, in denying his motion to reopen, the

 BIA did not discuss the evidence of hardship to his children. Mr. Valle-Hernandez

 therefore asserts that the BIA focused its analysis exclusively on the new evidence of

 hardship to his wife.

       The record does not support this contention. The BIA concluded that

 Mr. Valle-Hernandez’s new evidence did not alter its previous conclusion that he had

 “not demonstrated a prima facie case of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

 2018) (appearing to equate reasonable-likelihood standard with Coehlo’s
 likely-change-the-result standard); Perez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir. 2014)
 (rejecting contention BIA conflated the reasonable-likelihood and
 likely-change-the-result standards where demonstrating materiality required latter
 showing); Kay v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the
 reasonable-likelihood standard applies to a motion to reopen seeking previously
 unavailable relief); Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 173 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying
 reasonable-likelihood standard to prima facie case for reopening).

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  to his qualifying relatives.” R. at 3 (emphasis added). Citing Monreal-Aguinaga, the

  BIA concluded that “[t]he alleged potential economic hardship [was] not dissimilar

  from the hardship families generally experience when a noncitizen is removed.” Id.

  (emphasis added). It also acknowledged Mr. Valle-Hernandez’s “concern for his wife

  and children,” and specifically stated it had “consider[ed] all relevant factors in the

  aggregate,” again citing Monreal-Aguinaga. Id. (emphasis added). That the BIA did

  not discuss all of the hardship evidence does not demonstrate that it failed to consider

  it. See Maatougui, 738 F.3d at 1242 (noting the brevity of an order did not

  demonstrate a failure to review the facts in the case). Mr. Valle-Hernandez fails to

  show that, contrary to its own caselaw, the BIA did not assess the aggregate evidence

  of hardship to all of his qualifying relatives.3

  III.   Conclusion

         We deny Mr. Valle-Hernandez’s petition for review.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Jerome A. Holmes
                                               Chief Judge

         3
           Mr. Valle-Hernandez also argues that the BIA engaged in de novo
  fact-finding contrary to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). To the extent this contention is
  not tethered to his unexhausted first proposition and we therefore may address it, we
  hold that he fails to sufficiently develop the argument. See Holmes v. Colo. Coal. for
  Homeless Long Term Disability Plan, 762 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014)
  (declining to consider contentions not adequately developed in opening brief).
  Although Mr. Valle-Hernandez asserts that fact-finding by the BIA was
  “inevitabl[e],” Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 22, he fails to point to any de novo fact-finding
  in its decision.
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