Court Opinion

ID: 9409778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 15:01:37.158567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:53.422497
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11602     Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 07/19/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 22-11602
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       FELICIA H. WATKINS,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       ANN WILLIS,
       in her individual and oﬃcial capacities,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00745-MHH
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11602

                            ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Felicia H. Watkins, pro se, appeals the district court’s order
       dismissing her pro se complaint contesting the government’s levy
       of her wages―as facilitated by Internal Revenue Services (“IRS”)
       Operations Manager, Ann Willis―for lack of subject-matter juris-
       diction on the basis of sovereign immunity. On appeal, Watkins
       argues that the district court erred because the following federal
       laws waived the government’s right to sovereign immunity or oth-
       erwise provided a source of subject matter jurisdiction: 28 U.S.C.
       §§ 1331, 1343, and 1361; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Fourth Amendment;
       the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); and Larson v. Domestic
       & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). For the following
       reasons, we affirm.
                                         I.
               Although this appeal arises out of the dismissal of Watkins’s
       civil action in 2022, we briefly summarize the events leading to that
       dismissal.
               Court filings in another case filed by Watkins, see Watkins v.
       Willis (Watkins I), No. 2:18-cv-02021 (N.D. Ala. June 18, 2019), sug-
       gest that Watkins, a taxpayer, failed to pay the proper amount of
       taxes to the IRS at some point. According to one of Watkins’s fil-
       ings in that case, the IRS concluded that Watkins owed a tax defi-
       ciency, and, after the IRS determined the amount due, it undertook
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       22-11602               Opinion of the Court                         3

       efforts to collect that amount, as well any other sums then due,
       from Watkins. Watkins alleged that Willis was involved in that
       effort. In November 2018, Watkins, an employee for the City of
       Birmingham’s Police Department, learned that the IRS had levied
       and garnished her wages to collect the aforementioned indebted-
       ness, without first obtaining a judgment against her. She then filed
       a pro se civil suit in Watkins I against Willis and another individual
       to stop the garnishment. The government responded by moving
       to dismiss that case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The dis-
       trict court agreed and dismissed the suit without prejudice in 2019.
       See id. Watkins did not appeal this ruling.
              On May 28, 2021, Watkins, proceeding pro se, filed the in-
       stant action against Willis for levying her wages. In her complaint,
       she referred to Watkins I and reiterated that the IRS had not ob-
       tained a judgment against her, so it could not garnish her wages.
       Watkins relayed how the IRS, through Willis, had levied her wages
       and collected $461.54 and contended that she “did not consent” to
       the levy, and the IRS was “without the administrative authority of
       [the] IRS to levy.” She also argued that because Alabama’s proce-
       dure for garnishing wages required a filing and judgment with the
       court beforehand, the IRS levy violated her rights under the Fourth
       Amendment because it constituted an unlawful seizure of prop-
       erty.
             Watkins asserted that the district court had jurisdiction pur-
       suant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the
       Fourth Amendment. She named Willis as a defendant in her
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11602

       “individual and official capacities” and requested: (1) a declaratory
       judgment that the levy violated the Fourth Amendment because it
       failed to comply with Alabama state garnishment procedures; (2)
       injunctive relief against the enforcement of the levy; and (3) an or-
       der that the levy against her was “Null and Void.” In support of
       her complaint, she attached a copy of the levy, the email she was
       sent that calculated the amount of her wages withheld, and her re-
       sponse to that email.
              The United States government, on behalf of Willis, re-
       sponded by moving to dismiss Watkins’s suit, in part, for lack of
       subject matter jurisdiction. The government stated that it was the
       proper party for the suit because the conduct at issue―the
       levy―was carried out by Willis in her official capacity, that Willis
       was performing a duty expressly authorized by federal law, and
       that Watkins’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The
       government also denied waiving sovereign immunity, explaining
       that §§ 1331 and 1343 did not constitute waivers of sovereign im-
       munity under this Court’s precedent, that § 1983 did not apply be-
       cause Watkins’s action was based on federal law, not state law, and
       that § 1983 did not otherwise expressly waive sovereign immunity.
       The government further contended that the Anti-Injunction Act
       barred courts from granting injunctive relief in the form of restrain-
       ing the collection of taxes. And the government asserted that the
       Declaratory Judgment Act prohibited courts from granting declar-
       atory relief related to the collection of federal taxes, which pre-
       vented Watkins’s request for declaratory relief.
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       22-11602               Opinion of the Court                        5

              Watkins opposed the government’s motion, arguing that
       sovereign immunity as to Willis was waived by the Federal Tort
       Claims Act (“FTCA”) and that the court had subject matter juris-
       diction under §§ 1331 and 1343, § 1983, and the Fourth Amend-
       ment. She further asserted that the form Willis used to garnish her
       wages was not authorized by federal law and that the Anti-Injunc-
       tion Act and Declaratory Judgment Act did not apply to her claims.
               The district court granted the government’s motion to dis-
       miss. The court first explained that it could not consider the merits
       of Watkins’s claims unless it had jurisdiction over those claims.
       The court found that her request for injunctive relief made clear
       that Watkins was attempting to enjoin the IRS’s levy on her wages
       and that this implicated sovereign immunity. The court reasoned
       that, in cases requesting injunctive relief, sovereign immunity pre-
       vents awarding relief against a federal officer when such relief
       would, in effect, be against the sovereign.
              The district court then found that the government did not
       waive sovereign immunity because it could only do so if it une-
       quivocally expressed such an intention, and Watkins’s contention
       that her due process rights were violated did not constitute a
       waiver. The court explained that none of the statutes Watkins
       cited to amounted to a waiver for the following reasons: (1) §§ 1331
       and 1343 could not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity; (2)
       § 1983 was not applicable because federal law, not state law, was at
       issue; and (3) 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) concerned money damages,
       not injunctive relief, and 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) indicated that
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11602

       § 1346(b)(1) did not apply to claims arising out of the collection of
       taxes. And the court declined to reach the arguments concerning
       the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act because it
       lacked jurisdiction over Watkins’s claims.
              Accordingly, the district court dismissed Watkins’s action
       for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Watkins timely appealed.
                                         II.
              In reviewing a district court's dismissal of a complaint under
       Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
       jurisdiction, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo.
       Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir.
       2013). The plaintiff has the burden of proving that jurisdiction ex-
       ists. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
       (1994).
              We may consider issues of subject-matter jurisdiction sua
       sponte, as parties cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction. Scarfo v.
       Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960 (11th Cir. 1999). But we will generally
       not consider non-jurisdictional arguments that are forfeited on ap-
       peal. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en
       banc). Specifically, any “issue that an appellant wants the Court to
       address should be specifically and clearly identified in the brief,” as
       “[o]therwise, the issue . . . will be considered abandoned.” Access
       Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004)
       (quoting United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir.
       2003)). An appellant fails to adequately brief a claim when she does
       not “plainly and prominently raise it.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian
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       22-11602                  Opinion of the Court                                7

       Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cole v. U.S. Att’y
       Gen., 712 F.3d 517, 530 (11th Cir. 2013)).
             Finally, we construe pro se pleadings liberally. See Albra v.
       Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
                                             III.
              “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal
       Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
       471, 475 (1994). “Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.”
       Id. A waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity must be
       “unequivocally expressed.” United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S.
       30, 33 (1992) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 95
       (1990)).
              We begin by setting forth the bases for subject matter juris-
       diction that Watkins has asserted for her claims. Under 28 U.S.C.
       § 1331, federal district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over
       actions arising under federal law. Section 1331, however, “may not
       be construed to constitute [a] waiver[] of the federal government’s
       defense of sovereign immunity.” Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133,
       1138 (5th Cir. 1972). 1
              The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people
       to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
       unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Title

       1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
       this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
       cuit handed down before the close of business on September 30, 1981.
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       8                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11602

       42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private cause of action against any person
       who deprives an individual of federal rights under color of state
       law. Additionally, a district court may also have subject-matter ju-
       risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 for suits alleging conspiracies to
       deprive individuals of certain civil rights or constitutional viola-
       tions. Neither §§ 1983 or 1341, however, apply to issues relating to
       an IRS tax levy because “these statutes provide a remedy for depri-
       vation of rights under color of state law and do not apply when the
       defendants are acting under color of federal law.” Mack v. Alexan-
       der, 575 F.2d 488, 489 (5th Cir. 1978); accord Carman v. Parsons, 789
       F.2d 1532, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986); Beale, 461 F.2d at 1138.
              Under the FTCA, the United States is subject to liability in a
       tort action in the same manner, and to the same extent, that a pri-
       vate individual would be under the law of the place where the tort
       occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). While the FTCA serves as a
       waiver to sovereign immunity on state tort claims, see Zelaya v.
       United States, 781 F.3d 1315, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015), however, the
       FTCA does not apply to “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the as-
       sessment or collection of any tax,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).
               Additionally, the APA generally authorizes judicial review
       of a final agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 702; Perez v. U.S. Bureau of Citi-
       zenship & Immigr. Servs., 774 F.3d 960, 965 (11th Cir. 2014). “The
       defense of sovereign immunity is waived in actions against federal
       government agencies seeking nonmonetary relief if the agency con-
       duct is itself subject to judicial review.” Panola Land Buyers Ass’n v. Shu-
       man, 762 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
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       22-11602               Opinion of the Court                          9

       Further, the Supreme Court has recognized that a plaintiff may be
       able to obtain injunctive relief against an individual officer or agent
       of the United States in his official capacity for acts beyond his stat-
       utory or constitutional authority, because such actions “are consid-
       ered individual and not sovereign actions.” Larson, 337 U.S. at 689.
       If, however, a suit which is nominally directed against an individual
       officer is in substance a suit against the government, sovereign im-
       munity applies. Id. at 688. Finally, 26 U.S.C. § 6331 provides that
       the IRS may levy property belonging to a taxpayer if the taxpayer
       is liable to pay a tax and neglects or refuses to pay the tax.
              Here, we conclude that the district court did not err in de-
       termining that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Watkins’s
       claim because Willis was operating within her official capacity
       within the government and thus was protected by sovereign im-
       munity. Further, none of the provisions that Watkins points to
       constitute a waiver of the sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we
       affirm the district court’s dismissal order.
              AFFIRMED.