Court Opinion

ID: 9952445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 20:01:42.772079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:39:20.833517
License: Public Domain

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                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-12414
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        ANDREW HORACE,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        ARIA,
        (Addiction Recovery Institute of America)
        C/O Shawn Leon,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee,

        EVERNIA HEALTH CENTER LLC, et al.,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12414

                                                                 Defendants.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cv-81766-AMC
                            ____________________

        Before BRASHER, ABUDU and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Andrew Horace appeals pro se the dismissal with prejudice
        of his amended complaint alleging claims of race and gender
        discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
        VII”) and the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) against his former
        employer Addiction Recovery Institute of America, LLC (“ARIA”).
        The district court dismissed Horace’s gender discrimination claims
        for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and his race
        discrimination claims for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
        of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
               After review, we affirm the dismissal of Horace’s gender
        discrimination claims for lack of exhaustion. As to Horace’s race
        discrimination claims, however, we conclude the district court
        erred in dismissing those claims at the pleading stage for failure to
        plead a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary
        framework. Here, Horace’s amended complaint states facially
        plausible claims of race discrimination under Title VII and the
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        23-12414              Opinion of the Court                       3

        FCRA, and thus we reverse the district court’s dismissal of those
        claims and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
        opinion.
                               I. BACKGROUND
        A.    Allegations in Amended Complaint
               According to the operative pro se amended complaint, from
        December 2021 until February 2022, Horace, who is black, worked
        at ARIA as a behavior health technician. Horace was fully qualified
        for his position and was praised by ARIA’s hiring manager and the
        lead technician for his work performance.
                Horace alleged that from the outset of his employment,
        ARIA treated black employees differently than non-black
        employees in similar situations as to “their wages” by “changing
        [black employees’] pay-rate multiple times.” One black employee,
        Yolanda, told Horace she “received disparate treatment in her
        wages.” Horace learned from another black employee, Tomasina,
        that other black employees had “voluntarily separated due to
        disparate treatment in wages performed by [ARIA].” Horace
        alleged that Tomasina’s statements were “proven true and correct,
        as it happened to [Horace]” as well.
              Specifically, the amended complaint alleged that ARIA twice
        changed Horace’s pay rate without his knowledge. As a result,
        Horace worked “at a final pay-rate change of 0.1875,” which was
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                      23-12414

        “significantly less than his non-black counterparts.” 1 Horace
        brought the payroll issue to the attention of ARIA’s hiring manager
        Jefferey Mann, its payroll director Cliff Churchill, and its owner
        Shaw Leon, and all three “refused to correct the issue at hand while
        [Horace] was physically employed.” ARIA’s payroll director
        allegedly lied to Horace, saying the “pay-roll issue [was] correct.”
        Horace had to retain an attorney “to get his wages back,” and ARIA
        “remained idle” until his attorney got involved.
               Meanwhile, white employees were not subjected to pay-rate
        changes without their consent or having to “jump through hoops
        in order to get their wages back.” As an example, Horace identified
        a “non-black employee,” Betsy Galicia, who never had her pay rate
        changed while working at ARIA. Horace alleged that the change
        in his pay rate was not merely a payroll error, but an “intentional
        act of disparate treatment towards black employees,” and that
        ARIA’s claims to the contrary were “dishonest” and “a pretextual
        defense.” Horace alleged that he “suffered adverse employment
        actions due to his race; resulting in changing his pay-rate twice
        without his knowledge.”

        1 It is not entirely clear from the pro se amended complaint what Horace means

        by “a pay-rate change of 0.1875,” as it does not further quantify the effect of
        this change. However, the amended complaint describes this pay rate as
        “disgraceful” and states that “no employee in America works at that rate!” On
        appeal, ARIA suggests Horace meant “a change to $0.1875 per hour.” At a
        minimum, these allegations, liberally construed, assert that Horace suffered a
        more than de minimis pay cut.
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        23-12414               Opinion of the Court                         5

               Based on these factual allegations, the amended complaint
        asserted claims of race discrimination in violation of Title VII and
        the FCRA (Counts 1 and 3) and gender discrimination in violation
        of Title VII and the FCRA (Counts 2 and 4). Among other things,
        Horace sought compensatory and punitive damages, and
        reinstatement “to the position at the rate of pay and with the full
        benefits [he] would have had” if ARIA had not discriminated
        against him, or “in lieu of reinstatement, [an] award [of] front pay.”
        B.    Motion to Dismiss
               ARIA filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for
        failure to state a claim of race discrimination. ARIA also argued
        that Horace’s gender discrimination claims were barred because
        they fell outside the scope of his charge of discrimination and
        attached a copy of that charge filed with the Palm Beach County
        Office of Equal Opportunity (“PBCOEO”).
                On June 16, 2023, the district court granted ARIA’s motion
        and dismissed Horace’s amended complaint. For Horace’s gender
        discrimination claims, the district court concluded Horace had
        failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as his discrimination
        charge, filed with the PBCOEO, was devoid of allegations of
        gender discrimination. The district court further found that
        because the alleged sex discrimination occurred in February 2022—
        the last date Horace alleged he worked at ARIA—which was “more
        than a year ago,” any attempt to file a charge for sex discrimination
        “would be time-barred.”
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                    23-12414

               For Horace’s race discrimination claims, the district court
        concluded that Horace’s amended complaint failed to establish two
        elements of the prima facie case for intentional race discrimination
        under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)—that
        he suffered an adverse employment action and that ARIA treated
        similarly situated employees of a different race more favorably.
              The district court dismissed the amended complaint with
        prejudice because it had already given Horace the opportunity to
        cure deficiencies in his original complaint but the amended
        complaint remained deficient. The district court further noted that
        a new action would be untimely.
            II. DISMISSAL OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
                Before filing an action in federal court, a Title VII plaintiff in
        a deferral state such as Florida must file an administrative charge of
        discrimination within 300 days after the alleged unlawful
        employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); EEOC v.
        Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2002). Similarly,
        a plaintiff seeking to file civil suit under the FCRA must file a
        complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations,
        another appropriate state entity, or the Equal Employment
        Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 365 days of the alleged
        FCRA violation. Fla. Stat. §§ 760.02(2), 760.11(1); Woodham v. Blue
        Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 894 (Fla. 2002).
               “Because of that exhaustion requirement, ‘a plaintiff’s
        judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation
        which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
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        23-12414               Opinion of the Court                         7

        discrimination.” Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1345 (11th
        Cir. 2022) (quoting Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277,
        1280 (11th Cir. 2004)). In “determining what can reasonably be
        expected to grow out of an EEOC charge,” the facts alleged in the
        charge matter more than the legal theory. Id. While “judicial
        claims are allowed if they amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus the
        allegations in the EEOC complaint, . . . allegations of new acts of
        discrimination are inappropriate.” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1279-80
        (quotation marks omitted). We review de novo the dismissal of a
        claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See id. at 1280.
               Here, the district court did not err in dismissing Horace’s
        gender discrimination claims under Title VII and the FCRA for
        failing to exhaust them administratively. In his charge of
        discrimination filed with the PBCOEO, Horace checked the box
        indicating that he was alleging discrimination based on race. And,
        in detailing the “particulars” in a separate box on the form, Horace
        stated he believed he was discriminated against based on his race
        because ARIA treated him and other black employees differently
        than Horace’s white co-worker as to the “terms and conditions of
        [ARIA’s] rules and regulation[s].” Horace’s charge made no
        mention of gender at all, much less allege gender discrimination.
               Further, Horace attached to his amended complaint: (1) an
        email from a manager at the state agency indicating that the agency
        was investigating Horace’s “allegation of discrimination based on
        race,” and (2) an email from Horace advising the manager that the
        “employee of a different race” referred to in his charge was a
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                23-12414

        behavior health technician named Betsy, but that he did not know
        her last name.
                Because Horace’s charge was limited to factual allegations
        of race discrimination, he was precluded from asserting claims of
        gender discrimination for the first time in his amended complaint.
        See id. at 1279-80. Additionally, these claims were properly
        dismissed with prejudice, as the time for filing a charge of gender
        discrimination under either Title VII or the FCRA, 300 days and
        365 days respectively, had long since expired by the time of the
        district court’s June 16, 2023 dismissal order.
            III. DISMISSAL OF RACE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
                Horace argues that the district court did not apply the
        correct legal standard when it dismissed his race discrimination
        claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and that,
        under the correct standard, his amended complaint pled sufficient
        facts to survive ARIA’s motion to dismiss.
                We review a district court’s order granting a motion to
        dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. EEOC v. STME, LLC,
        938 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019). Pro se pleadings are construed
        liberally and held to “less stringent standards” than counseled
        pleadings. Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020)
        (quotation marks omitted). “Nevertheless, we cannot act as de
        facto counsel or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to
        sustain an action.” Id.
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        23-12414                Opinion of the Court                            9

        A.     Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissals
               Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must
        include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
        pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Swierkiewicz
        v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The complaint must
        include factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above
        the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
        (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating that
        “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
        supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to state
        a claim for relief).
                In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must
        “take the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe
        them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” See Edwards v.
        Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). To survive a
        motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
        “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
        Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim is
        facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to allow
        the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
        liable for the alleged misconduct.” STME, LLC, 938 F.3d at 1313
        (quotation marks omitted). Plausible facts “raise a reasonable
        expectation that discovery could supply additional proof of [a
        defendant’s] liability.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,
        1337 (11th Cir. 2012).
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                       23-12414

        B.     Pleading Title VII Discrimination Claims
                Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or
        otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
        compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
        because of his race or sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, the
        FCRA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge . . . any
        individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
        respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
        employment, because of such individual’s race . . . [or] sex.” Fla.
        Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). Discrimination claims brought under Title VII
        and the FCRA are analyzed under the same framework. See, e.g.,
        Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 n.6 (11th Cir.
        2015).
               The Supreme Court has held that an employment
        discrimination plaintiff need not plead specific facts establishing a
        prima facie case under the burden-shifting framework established
        in McDonnell Douglas. 2 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508, 510-12.
        Applying Swierkiewicz, this Court explained in Surtain that:
               [t]o state a race-discrimination claim under Title VII,
               a complaint need only provide enough factual matter

        2 Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a Title VII plaintiff

        relying on circumstantial evidence to survive summary judgment must first
        present evidence of a prima facie case of racial discrimination, including that:
        (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) was qualified to do the job; (3) was
        subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) his employer treated
        similarly situated employees outside his class more favorably. Crawford v.
        Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970, 975-76 (11th Cir. 2008).
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        23-12414                  Opinion of the Court                               11

               (taken as true) to suggest intentional race
               discrimination. The complaint need not allege facts
               sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas
               prima facie case. This is because McDonnell Douglas’s
               burden-shifting framework is an evidentiary
               standard, not a pleading requirement.
        Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
                Nevertheless, a Title VII plaintiff, like any other plaintiff,
        must still satisfy the plausibility standard set forth in Twombly and
        Iqbal. See id. To do so, an employment discrimination complaint
        must provide enough factual allegations that, taken as true,
        “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff suffered an adverse
        employment action due to intentional racial discrimination.” Id. at
        1246. 3 The complaint must satisfy the plausible-on-its-face
        standard, and the allegations must be sufficient to raise a right to
        relief above the speculative level. See Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1301.
        C.     Dismissal of Horace’s Race Discrimination Claims
               Here, in the “Legal Standard” section of its dismissal order,
        the district court recited the correct general standard for Rule
        12(b)(6) dismissals under Twombly and Iqbal. In its analysis of
        Horace’s race discrimination claims, however, the district court
        recited the elements of a prima facie case of race discrimination

        3 An adverse employment action is “not only an           element of [McDonnell
        Douglas’s] prima facie case,” but also an element “of the claim itself.” Holland
        v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1056 (11th Cir. 2012). Therefore, a Title VII plaintiff
        must allege facts showing he suffered an adverse employment action to state
        a facially plausible disparate treatment claim of discrimination.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   23-12414

        under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and
        concluded that Horace’s amended complaint “fail[ed] to establish
        two of these elements.” The district court further explained that
        Horace had failed to allege facts from which the court could infer
        that he suffered an adverse employment action or that ARIA
        treated similarly situated employees more favorably than him.
               The district court determined Horace’s allegations that
        ARIA changed his pay rate did not establish an adverse
        employment action because ARIA eventually returned his lost
        wages. The district court noted Horace’s allegations that Betsy
        Galicia, a non-black employee, did not experience pay-rate
        changes. The district court concluded, however, that the amended
        complaint “provides no information from which the Court can
        infer that Ms. Galicia is similarly situated to Plaintiff in all material
        respects.” The district court cited Lewis v. City of Union City, a
        summary judgment case in which this Court addressed what “sorts
        of similarities” are needed to satisfy the “all-material-respects”
        standard of the fourth element of a prima facia case under
        McDonnell Douglas. 918 F.3d 1213, 1227-1229 (11th Cir. 2019).
               The district court erred by requiring Horace to plead
        specifically enough to establish a prima facie case of race
        discrimination under McDonnell Douglas. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S.
        at 508, 510-12; Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246. Instead, the district court
        should have evaluated whether the factual allegations in Horace’s
        pro se amended complaint, liberally construed and taken as true,
        “plausibly suggest that [Horace] suffered an adverse employment
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        23-12414                Opinion of the Court                           13

        action due to intentional race discrimination.” See Surtain, 789 F.3d
        at 1246.
               Horace’s amended complaint, liberally construed, alleged
        that: (1) ARIA changed and lowered the rate of pay of black
        employees, including Horace, without their knowledge or consent,
        but did not change the rate of pay for non-black employees, such
        as Betsy Galicia; (2) when Horace complained to ARIA’s managers
        about the changes to his rate of pay, they refused to correct his pay
        rate while he was employed there and falsely told him that his pay
        rate was correct; and (3) Horace was able to obtain the full wages
        he was due only after he voluntarily separated from ARIA and
        retained an attorney.
               These factual allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to
        suggest that Horace suffered an adverse employment action due to
        intentional race discrimination. To the extent the district court
        concluded Horace failed to allege an adverse employment action,
        both Title VII and the FCRA prohibit discrimination with respect
        to compensation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Fla. Stat.
        § 760.10(1)(a). This Court has said that adverse employment
        actions include actions that “affect continued employment or pay”
        including “pay raises or cuts.” Davis v. Legal Servs. Ala., Inc., 19 F.4th
        1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2021); Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d
        855, 860 (11th Cir. 2020). That Horace alleged that ARIA
        eventually repaid his lost wages after he resigned and hired a
        lawyer does not mean he did not suffer an adverse employment
        action. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973 (11th Cir. 2008)
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                23-12414

        (concluding that an employee who was temporarily deprived a
        merit pay increase suffered an adverse employment action and
        stating that “an employer cannot undo the harm its actions have
        caused, and thereby avoid liability, simply by attempting to make
        the employee whole retroactively”).
               Additionally, constructive discharge due to “an official act
        reflected in company records” such as “a reduction in
        compensation” may also constitute an adverse employment action
        under certain circumstances. See Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542
        U.S. 129, 134, 148 (2004) (acknowledging that “an extreme cut in
        pay” may provide the basis for alleging constructive discharge).
        Construed liberally, Horace’s amended complaint alleged that like
        other black ARIA employees, he had to voluntarily resign because
        ARIA repeatedly refused to fix his pay rate when he brought it to
        management’s attention and instead falsely told him his pay rate
        was correct. Thus, Horace has alleged two facially plausible
        adverse employment actions.
                Further, Horace’s amended complaint alleged that only
        black ARIA employees had their rate of pay changed and lowered
        multiple times and without notice, and it identified a “non-black”
        comparator, Betsy Galicia, whose rate of pay was never changed
        while she worked at ARIA. At the pleading stage, Horace was not
        required to allege facts showing that Galicia was similarly situated
        in all material respects. See Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246. Indeed, this
        Court has observed that a “plaintiff’s failure to produce a
        comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case,” even at
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        23-12414                 Opinion of the Court                             15

        later stages of the litigation. Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Justice, 88 F.4th
        939, 946-47 (11th Cir. 2023) (affirming denial of motion for
        judgment as a matter of law based on evidence of comparator
        employees who were not similarly situated in all material respects).
               Nonetheless, in an email attached to his amended
        complaint, Horace advised the state agency’s manager
        investigating his race discrimination charge that he and Galicia had
        the same title, behavior health technician. Further, in his amended
        complaint, Horace alleged, albeit with respect to his Title VII
        gender discrimination claim, that he complained to the lead
        technician, Faye, about the difference between his and Galicia’s
        pay. Thus, at a minimum, it appears Horace and Galicia held the
        same position and perhaps had the same supervisor.
               Even if the factual allegations in Horace’s amended
        complaint do not allege “a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie
        case” of race discrimination, they are adequate to “plausibly
        suggest that [Horace] suffered an adverse employment action due
        to intentional racial discrimination.” See Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246.
        Accordingly, Horace’s Title VII and FCRA race discrimination
        claims are plausible on their face and should not have been
        dismissed. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
                                  IV. CONCLUSION
              In sum, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Horace’s
        gender discrimination claims in Counts 2 and 4 with prejudice. We
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                     23-12414

        reverse the district court’s dismissal of Horace’s race discrimination
        claims in Counts 1 and 3 and remand for further proceedings.4
            AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
        REMANDED.

        4 In its appeal brief, ARIA argues that we lack appellate jurisdiction because

        Horace’s appeal was untimely. This Court already rejected this argument
        when it denied ARIA’s motion to dismiss the appeal.