Court Opinion

ID: 9930655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 15:06:39.829421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:23:54.944039
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0209-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DANIELE G.
ROMEODISANTILLO,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

                   Submitted January 29, 2024 — Decided February 7, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla and Chase.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 15-12-2378.

                   The Pope and Hascup Law Group, PC (Anthony J.
                   Pope, of counsel and on the briefs).

                   Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief
                   Appellate Attorney, of counsel; William Kyle Meighan,
                   Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Daniele G. RomeoDiSantillo appeals from an August 15, 2022

order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.

      In State v. RomeoDiSantillo, No. A-4457-16 (App. Div. July 5, 2019) (slip

op. at 53), we affirmed defendant's convictions on several offenses, including

the first-degree murder of the victim, Peyman Sanandaji. "Defendant managed

Romeo's Pizza and Pasta Factory, a restaurant located on Romeo's Plaza in

Jackson.   His father owned the pizza parlor and several other businesses,

including Casanova's, a restaurant business closed for renovations located next

door to the pizza parlor where defendant worked." Id. at 3.

      Sanandaji went into business with defendant, and over the course of

several months during 2014, transferred money to defendant without receiving

returns from their business ventures.     This caused a financial strain on

Sanandaji's lifestyle and drained funds he and his girlfriend, Kadia Tavarez,

relied upon to meet their needs. The situation soon came to a head between

Sanandaji and defendant, which we described as follows:

                  On April 7, 2015, Sanandaji sent a text message
            to Tavarez, which read: "In [forty-eight] hours we will
            be okay again," with a dollar sign. She responded
            "[g]ood," to which he replied: "$$Very Good$$."

                 At 5:44 p.m. the previous day, however,
            defendant had sent a text message from his phone to an
            unidentified individual, saying: "But. He thinks. This.

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            Big. Payday is coming and it's not." [1] Ocean County
            Prosecutor's Office Detective David Brubaker reviewed
            defendant's cell phone data and testified that the entire
            text thread referred to Sanandaji.

            [Id. at 7 (alterations in original).]

      Two days later Sanandaji met defendant and co-defendant, Hector

Calderon, at Casanova's for dinner and Calderon shot and killed Sanandaji.

Based on the physical and circumstantial evidence the State gathered after the

shooting, a grand jury indicted defendant and Calderon for the murder and other

offenses.

      Among the witnesses presented on behalf of the defense at trial was

defendant's father, who testified he was unaware of any business relationship

between defendant and Sanandaji, but "[h]e understood that defendant and

Sanandaji were going to help Calderon with the purchase of the pizzeria." Id.

at 23-24. Defendant's father also testified he owned five strip malls and had an

estimated worth of $42 million. He stated Casanova's was being remodeled at

the time of the incident and confirmed the workers and defendant would wear

latex gloves on site, which police found following the murder. He testified

Calderon entered a contract with him to buy a pizzeria in Spotswood. However,

1
  For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to defendant's text to the
unknown individual as the "payday text."
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on cross-examination he admitted he told police he was not "aware of any

business relationship between [Calderon] and [defendant]" and was not "aware

of any business relationship between [Sanandaji] and defendant."              This

testimony countered the defense's theory defendant, Calderon, and Sanandaji

had a bona fide interest in purchasing two of his pizzerias.

      Defendant's PCR petition argued the court should grant him a new trial.

Alternatively, he sought an evidentiary hearing to address his claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on evidence outside the trial record.

      Relevant to this appeal, defendant claimed trial counsel's failure to prepare

for trial by reviewing all the text message evidence—including the payday

text—and calling defendant's father to testify, prejudiced the case. Counsel also

erred by not calling defendant as a witness to explain the text messages and

clarify his father's testimony. Additionally, counsel should have accepted the

trial court's proposal to give the jury a limiting instruction that it should not

speculate what the payday text was about.

      Defendant argued trial counsel was ineffective for calling his father as a

witness without preparing him to testify. He asserted his father's testimony

regarding whether defendant, Sanandaji, and Calderon had business dealings

was contradictory and hurt the defense. Further, trial counsel was ineffective

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for failing to have the court instruct the jury not to draw an adverse inference

regarding his decision not to testify.

      Judge Guy P. Ryan heard defendant's petition and issued a detailed written

opinion denying it. He found trial counsel was not ineffective for calling

defendant's father because he rebutted the State's theory that defendant paid

Calderon $8,000 to murder Sanandaji. Defendant's father testified he received

$8,000 from Calderon in installments of $5,000 and $3,000, which Calderon told

police he received from defendant as a down payment to purchase the

Spotswood pizzeria. As a result, the judge noted: "Ultimately, the jury found

the State did not prove the aggravating factor of paying Calderon for the

murder," and "trial counsel succeeded in preventing the State from obtaining a

mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole."

      Moreover, defendant's father "testified to the considerable financial

resources owned by the family and defendant's future as the owner of his father's

many businesses."     This rebutted the State's theory that defendant needed

Sanandaji's money.

      The judge concluded the decision to call defendant's father was strategic

and "designed to bolster certain key aspects of defendant's case-in-chief." Even

if defendant's assertion regarding the father's cross-examination was correct,

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counsel was not ineffective because the father's testimony "appears . . . to be the

reason defendant has some prospect of being released on parole in his lifetime."

      The judge rejected defendant's assertion trial counsel was ineffective for

not reviewing the text messages, noting that trial counsel advised the court he

received 15,000 text messages in discovery and performed a word search for

messages involving language relevant to the case. Further, defense counsel

opposed the admission of the payday text at the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing.

      Indeed, the State sought to admit the payday text, which in its original

form read as follows: "But he thinks this big[ ]pay day is coming and it's not[.]

[T]hat's w[h]ere this mo f***er is gonna end up having to shoot himself. I ain't

going back to [two] years ago koto f*** that." Defense counsel opposed the

State's motion and, although he conceded he did not see these specific texts, he

convinced the trial judge to omit everything except the first portion, which read:

"But he thinks this big[ ]pay day is coming and it's not[.]"

      Judge Ryan found trial counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to the

admissibility of the payday text because

            [t]he record makes clear, after the text message was
            admitted, trial counsel utilized it to support his theory
            defendant was being pressured by [Sanandaji] to pay
            back the money [Sanandaji] had invested in the
            partnership. Yet, because the partnership agreement
            did not allow for such a payment, [Sanandaji] got angry

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             and started a fight before Calderon ultimately shot and
             killed him.

The judge concluded defense counsel's stipulation of the text into evidence

"constituted trial strategy" and defendant's claim it was ineffective assistance of

counsel lacked merit.

       As a result, the judge also rejected defendant's argument trial counsel was

ineffective for not accepting the trial judge's invitation for a limiting instruction

because "such an instruction would go against the defense's theory of the case

that [Sanandaji] was demanding money he was not entitled to . . . [and] would

have contradicted the idea that defendant rightfully did not owe [Sanandji]

money from the partnership . . . ." This too was a strategic decision by trial

counsel and defendant's assertion the "decision affected the jury's interpretation

of the evidence against defendant is speculative and irrelevant" to whether

counsel was ineffective.

       The judge rejected defendant's assertion trial counsel was ineffective for

advising defendant not to testify. Defendant's certification in support of his PCR

petition noted counsel conducted a mock trial and ultimately advised him not to

testify.   The judge also noted defendant had given police three separate

statements and "would have been subject to extensive cross-examination on

those statements as well as his peculiar behavior on the night of the shooting."

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We previously detailed defendant's behavior the night of the murder.

RomeoDiSantillo, slip op. at 9, 11-13, 15-21. The judge found if defendant

testified and even slightly deviated from the statements he gave police, it would

"cause a substantial impact on his credibility before the jury."

      The judge concluded it was "abundantly clear trial counsel advised

defendant on the advantages and disadvantages of testifying." Moreover, he

noted the trial judge and trial counsel extensively voir dired defendant about his

right to testify and he clearly declined to do so.

      The judge rejected defendant's assertion counsel was ineffective for not

having the court instruct the jury regarding his election not to testify. He noted

the jury had been instructed during jury selection that

            [a] defendant in a criminal case has the absolute right
            to remain silent and has the absolute right not to testify.
            If a defendant chooses not to testify, the jury is
            prohibited from drawing any negative conclusions from
            that choice. The defendant is presumed innocent
            whether he testifies or not.

Following summations, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: "The

defendant in a criminal case has no obligation or duty to prove his or her

innocence or offer any proof relating to his or her innocence."

      Judge Ryan further noted "defendant's extensive statements to the police

were played for the jury throughout trial and were summarized again by trial

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counsel during summation."       Also, there was "no suggestion the State

improperly commented on defendant's decision not to testify."

      The judge concluded the decision not to request the instruction was "sound

trial strategy" because "counsel did not wish to draw attention to defendant's

decision not to testify and instead wanted the jurors to focus on defendant 's

recorded statements to the police which were played in their entirety at trial ."

Defendant's statements to police following the murder were consistent with the

defense theory of the case "that Calderon shot [Sanandaji] after a disagreement

arose between Calderon and [Sanandaji]."

      Defendant raises the following arguments on this appeal:

            I.   DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW
            TRIAL BECAUSE HIS ATTORNEY'S ERRORS
            THAT ARE EVIDENT IN THE RECORD
            ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT WAS DENIED
            EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN,
            WITH RESPECT TO A CRITICAL PIECE OF
            EVIDENCE,     DEFENDANT'S      ATTORNEY
            DECLINED THE TRIAL JUDGE'S OFFER TO LIMIT
            HOW THE JURY COULD CONSIDER THE
            EVIDENCE AND HE SUBSEQUENTLY FAILED TO
            REBUT THE PROSECUTION'S INTERPRETATION
            OF THE EVIDENCE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL DID
            NOT ENSURE THAT THE JURY WOULD RECEIVE
            AN INSTRUCTION RELATING TO DEFENDANT'S
            DECISION NOT TO TESTIFY.

                  A.    Defense Counsel's Trial Performance Was
                  Deficient Based On His Errors That Are Clear

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    From Evidence In The Record Because He Failed
    To Rebut The Prosecution's Interpretation Of A
    Critical Piece Of Evidence And He Failed To
    Ensure That Jurors Would Be Instructed Not To
    Draw Negative Inferences From Defendant's
    Silence.

    B.    Defendant Suffered Substantial Prejudice
    As A Result Of Defense Counsel's Deficient
    Performance At Trial In Ways That Are Clear
    From Evidence In The Record Because Of
    Defense Counsel's Failure To Rebut A Critical
    Piece Of Evidence And His Failure To Insist
    Upon A Jury Charge Instructing Jurors Not To
    Draw Negative Inferences From Defendant's
    Silence.

II. ASSUMING[]      ARGUENDO,      THAT
DEFENDANT    HAS     NOT    ESTABLISHED
ENTITLEMENT TO A NEW TRIAL, DEFENDANT
IS ENTITLED TO A FULL EVIDENTIARY
HEARING    BECAUSE    HIS    CLAIM   OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS
BASED ON EVIDENCE THAT LIES OUTSIDE OF
THE RECORD SUCH AS DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
ALLEGED INADEQUATE PREPARATION FOR
TRIAL THAT RESULTED IN HIS FOOLISH
DECISION TO CALL A WITNESS, HIS FAILURE
TO PROPERLY DEAL WITH EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT TRIAL, AND HIS POOR ADVICE
TO DEFENDANT REGARDING HIS RIGHT TO
TESTIFY.

    A.    Defense Counsel's Trial Performance Was
    Deficient Because He Failed To Familiarize
    Himself With A Critical Piece Of Evidence That
    Had Been Provided In Discovery, He Failed To
    Conduct The Necessary Preparation Prior To

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                   Calling A Key Witness, He Offered Faulty
                   Advice To Defendant Regarding His Right To
                   Testify, And He Failed To Request A Jury
                   Instruction Relating To The Defendant's Choice
                   To Exercise His Right To Remain Silent.

                   B.    Defense Counsel's Deficiencies At Trial
                   Caused Defendant To Suffer Prejudice Because
                   Defense Counsel's Lack Of Adequate Preparation
                   And Poor Judgement Resulted In Testimony
                   From A Defense Witness Who Predictably
                   Supported The State's Theory Of The Case, The
                   Jury Hearing Only The State's Interpretation Of
                   The Significance Of A Key Piece Of Evidence,
                   And Defendant Not Receiving The Benefit Of A
                   Jury Instruction To Not Draw A Negative
                   Inference From Defendant's Decision Not To
                   Testify.

                                         I.

      Ineffective assistance of counsel claims must satisfy the two-prong test

set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by

the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 57-58 (1987). The

Strickland test requires a petitioner to show: (1) the particular way counsel's

performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced their right to

a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.

      This is because there is a strong presumption counsel "rendered adequate

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Therefore, counsel's errors

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"even if professionally unreasonable" will not require setting aside a judgment

if they had no effect on the judgment. Id. at 691. Prejudice is not presumed,

Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, and a defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors of

counsel undermined the reliability" of the proceeding. United States v. Cronic,

466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984).

      Further, "complaints 'merely of matters of trial strategy' will not serve to

ground a constitutional claim of inadequacy . . . ." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 54 (quoting

State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 489 (1963)). "[A] defense attorney's decision

concerning which witnesses to call to the stand is 'an art[]' and a court's review

of such a decision should be 'highly deferential.'" State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307,

321 (2005) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 693).

The decision whether to call a witness is generally informed by the testimony

expected to be elicited and the possibility of impeachment. Ibid.

      A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if they present a prima

facie case supporting PCR, the court determines there are material issues of fact

that cannot be resolved based on the existing record, and the court finds an

evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims presented. R. 3:22-10(b);

see also State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)). When

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a PCR court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review is de novo. State

v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004).

      Pursuant to these principles and having conducted a de novo review of the

record, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Ryan's

thorough and well-written opinion. We add the following comments.

      Contrary to defendant's arguments on appeal, the record does not convince

us defense counsel was "blindsided" by the texts and simply acquiesced to their

admission. The opposite is true. Counsel opposed the State's motion and let in

evidence he could build the defense narrative around.

      Counsel's declination of the trial judge's offer to give the jury a limiting

instruction also was not ineffective assistance of counsel, as the judge proposed

to tell the jury to treat the texts as evidence that defendant knew he owed

Sanandaji money. This would only favor the State by compounding its narrative

and dispel the defense narrative that the business venture was not making money

and therefore Sanandaji was not owed money.

      To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on this appeal, it

is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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