Court Opinion

ID: 9777096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:56:20.242951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:48.355783
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
(dissenting).
I agree, and concur with my brethren, that the prima facie case made by the executive warrant, or the presumption arising thereunder, may be overturned by any competent evidence, including that of the accused or person sought to be extradited.
I do not agree that in order to overcome such prima facie case or presumption, however, it is necessary that the accused —or relator — introduce evidence in order to raise the issue of his identity as the person charged in the demanding state.
It is my conclusion that when the right to extradite under the executive warrant is challenged by the writ of habeas corpus the issue of identity is drawn and presented, because when the-writ of habeas corpus is issued the burden of proof rests primarily upon the respondent to show the lawfulness of the arrest or detention, and until that burden has been met the arrest or detention of the relator is not authorized.
In addition to the legal proposition just asserted, there is another very good and sufficient reason why the executive warrant can not and should not cast upon the arrested person the burden of showing that he has not been lawfully arrested or detained for the purpose of extradition or that he is not the person charged with crime in the demanding state. In support of that proposition, I call attention to the fact that in issuing his *59executive warrant in extradition cases the Governor of this state does so upon his own independent idea and notion. Thé person sought to be extradited has no right to be present or to be heard anterior to the granting of the demand for extradition and the issuance of the executive warrant, and the Governor of this state is in no event bound or required to grant a hearing before issuing his executive warrant. Ex parte Wagner, 158 Texas Cr. Rep. 444, 256 S.W. 2d 98, and Ex parte Moore, 158 Texas Cr. Rep. 407, 256 S.W. 2d 103.
Indeed, in determining whether the demand should be recognized and extradition awarded, the Governor of this state is not required to follow any rules of evidence and may consider and reach his conclusion by any means or methods he chooses. Ex parte Gibson, 149 Texas Cr. Rep. 543, 197 S.W. 2d 109. All of this is said in order to demonstrate that the issuance of the executive warrant by the governor is nothing more or less than a certificate of the chief executive. It is not an adjudication of any fact.
The executive warrant which is here relied upon is addressed to “All and Singular the Sheriffs, Constables, and other Civil Officers of said State.” It directed that “Mike Kaufman” be arrested and delivered to the designated agents of the demanding state for extradition.
Under that warrant, each and every peace officer in this state was directed to arrest every “Mike Kaufman” or person bearing that name found anywhere in the state. In his demand, however, the Governor of the demanding state did not ask that each and every “Mike Kaufman” found in the state be arrested and extradited. He asked only for the arrest and extradition of the “Mike Kaufman” who was charged with having committed a certain crime in the demanding state. Thus, a description of the “Mike Kaufman” charged and wanted in that state was contained in the demanding papers.
But the executive warrant did not limit its application to that “Mike Kaufman.” Therefore there is nothing in the executive warrant whereby it can be said that the “Mike Kaufman” arrested thereunder was the “Mike Kaufman” described in the demanding papers. In order, then, for the arrest under the executive warrant to be authorized it must be shown that the person arrested was the person who was charged in the demanding state.
*60When the arrest under the executive warrant was challenged by the writ of habeas corpus, the identity of the person arrested as being the person charged in the demanding state was definitely raised.
The executive warrant furnished no basis or means for determining that the “Mike Kaufman” under arrest was the “Mike Kaufman” wanted in the demanding state.
The issue of identity was made when the writ of habeas corpus was issued. The burden was upon the respondent, upon the hearing under the writ of habeas corpus, to discharge that duty by some legal evidence identifying the appellant as the “Mike Kaufman” under accusation in the demanding state. The executive warrant did not so show and could not be looked to, therefore, to supply that evidence.
Inasmuch as the respondent made no effort to discharge such burden, the judgment remanding appellant should be reversed.
I maintain, as basic, sound, and fair, that no citizen of this state ought to be arrested and extradited against his will to another state unless and until some witness points the accusing finger at him and says: “That is the man who is charged in the demanding state with crime.”
If the demanding state can send agents to return the arrested person to the demanding state it can send some witness who can identify him as being the one charged with crime in the demanding state. ,
I dissent to the affirmance of this case.