Court Opinion

ID: 9963559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 19:01:50.585081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:52.573818
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12305   Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 04/25/2024    Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12305
                          ____________________

       DARWIN LOPEZ-SERRANO,
                                                               Petitioner,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                              Respondent.

                          ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A074-729-481
                          ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12305

       PER CURIAM:
              Darwin Lopez-Serrano petitions this Court to review a prec-
       edential decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”)
       aﬃrming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for with-
       holding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and for protection
       under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Matter of D-L-S-,
       28 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 2022). The Board denied Lopez-Serrano’s
       application based on its interpretation of a phrase in the “particu-
       larly serious crime” bar to withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C.
       § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Id. Lopez-Serrano challenges the Board’s inter-
       pretation of this statutory language and its application to his case.
       After careful review of the record and the law and with the beneﬁt
       of oral argument, we deny Lopez-Serrano’s petition.
                                 I.    Background
              Lopez-Serrano is a citizen of Mexico who ﬁrst entered the
       United States in 1996 without inspection. He returned to Mexico
       in May 2009 after an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted him volun-
       tary departure. But three months later, he reentered the United
       States, again without inspection. The Department of Homeland
       Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings in October 2013.
                               A. Factual Background
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       22-12305                   Opinion of the Court                           3

              In 1999, Lopez-Serrano was arrested following a violent con-
       frontation with a coworker at a gas station. He pled nolo contendere
       to felony battery, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.041, on January 31, 2001. 1
              That same day, the Florida state court placed Lopez-Serrano
       on probation for ﬁve years with conditions; assessed ﬁnes, costs,
       and restitution; and ordered him not to contact the victim. That
       court also deferred, or withheld, the adjudication of his guilt.2
              As far as we know, Lopez-Serrano never appealed his de-
       ferred adjudication, probation, ﬁne, costs, restitution, or no-con-
       tact order.
                                    B. Procedural History
               In October 2013, DHS charged Lopez-Serrano with remov-
       ability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as a non-citizen present in
       the United States without being admitted or paroled, and under 8
       U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as a non-citizen not in possession of a
       valid entry document.
             Lopez-Serrano responded by ﬁling an I-589 Application for
       withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and for protec-
       tion under the CAT. DHS moved to terminate his application on
       the ground that he had been “convicted of a particularly serious
       crime.” Under this provision of the Immigration and Nationality

       1 Like the parties and the Board, we presume Lopez-Serrano pled nolo conten-

       dere to felony battery under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.041.
       2 Like the parties and the Board, we presume the state court withheld Lopez-

       Serrano’s adjudication under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 948.01(2).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12305

       Act (“INA”), an applicant is ineligible for withholding of removal if,
       “having been convicted by a ﬁnal judgment of a particularly serious
       crime[, he] is a danger to the community of the United States.” 8
       U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
               In an oral decision, the IJ sustained both charges of remova-
       bility and denied Lopez-Serrano’s application for withholding of
       removal and for protection under the CAT. In relevant part, the IJ
       concluded that Lopez-Serrano’s withheld adjudication for felony
       battery constitutes a “convict[ion] by a ﬁnal judgment of a partic-
       ularly serious crime.”
              Lopez-Serrano appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board—spe-
       ciﬁcally, the IJ’s determination that he had been convicted by a ﬁnal
       judgment of a “particularly serious crime.” But the Board dis-
       missed Lopez-Serrano’s appeal in a single-member decision. That
       decision held that Lopez-Serrano’s withheld adjudication for felony
       battery constitutes “a particularly serious crime based upon its ele-
       ments.”
              Lopez-Serrano timely petitioned this Court for review. But
       the Government asked us to remand to allow the Board to consider
       further the “particularly serious crime” bar. Lopez-Serrano didn’t
       oppose remand. So we remanded the case to the Board on March
       30, 2017.
              On remand, the Board reviewed de novo and dismissed
       Lopez-Serrano’s appeal for a second time, this time in a published
       decision. Matter of D-L-S-, 28 I&N Dec. at 578. It reviewed the
       statutory language of the “particularly serious crime” bar and
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       22-12305                Opinion of the Court                           5

       determined that, given his withheld adjudication for felony battery,
       Lopez-Serrano has been “convicted by a ﬁnal judgment” of a “par-
       ticularly serious crime.” Id. at 570–78.
             Lopez-Serrano timely petitioned this Court for review a sec-
       ond time.
                              II.     Standard of Review
              We review de novo the Board’s legal determinations. Ayala v.
       U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Silva v. U.S.
       Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006)).
                                    III.   Discussion
              Lopez-Serrano asserts that his deferred adjudication wasn’t
       a “convict[ion] by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime”
       that renders him ineligible for withholding of removal.
               Under the “particularly serious crime” bar, an applicant is
       ineligible for withholding of removal if, “having been convicted by
       a final judgment of a particularly serious crime[, he] is a danger to
       the community of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
               Lopez-Serrano argues that the phrase “convicted by a final
       judgment” unambiguously imposes a finality requirement. That
       is, he reads the “particularly serious crime” bar to apply only if an
       applicant has exhausted or forfeited all of his appeals for his convic-
       tion. Because the Board’s interpretation of “convicted by a final
       judgment” doesn’t impose that type of finality requirement, he
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       6                           Opinion of the Court                         22-12305

       claims that the Board has effectively rewritten the statute to redun-
       dantly bar any applicant “convicted by a conviction.” 3
              For us to reach this same conclusion, Lopez-Serrano sug-
       gests our analysis follow one of three alternative avenues. First, he
       asserts that we may determine that the Board’s interpretation
       doesn’t merit deference, under either Chevron4 or Skidmore, 5 and

       3 Lopez-Serrano also argues that a Florida deferred adjudication can never be a

       conviction by a final judgment because it is not a conviction, and does not
       impose a sentence, under Florida law -- and that we should use Florida, and
       not federal, law to interpret the phrase “convicted by a final judgment.” But
       we have unequivocally said that terms in the INA are interpreted under federal
       law, not state law. See Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 629 F.3d
       1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2011); see also NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600,
       603 (1971) (“[I]n the absence of a plain indication to the contrary . . . it is to be
       assumed when Congress enacts a statute that it does not intend to make its
       application dependent on state law.” (citation omitted)). That Florida might
       not consider Lopez-Serrano to have been adjudicated, convicted, or sen-
       tenced, is not relevant to the federal government’s interpretation of those
       terms for immigration purposes under the INA.
       4 Under Chevron deference, we must accept an agency’s reasonable interpreta-

       tion of an ambiguous statute. See Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301,
       1306 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
       467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984)). We apply Chevron deference only if the statute is
       ambiguous, “Congress explicitly or implicitly ‘expect[s] the agency’” to inter-
       pret a statute, and the agency “acts in line with that expectation.” Martin v.
       Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 903 F.3d 1154, 1159 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United
       States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)).
       5 When Chevron deference is inappropriate, we may instead apply a lesser de-

       gree of deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Mar-
       tin, 903 F.3d at 1160. Under Skidmore deference, an agency’s interpretation
       “carries a weight” that depends on “‘the thoroughness evident in its consider-
       ation, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
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       22-12305                   Opinion of the Court                               7

       instead adopt his reading of the statute. Second, he contends that
       we may apply the Chevron framework but refuse to defer to the
       Board’s interpretation on the ground that Congress unambigu-
       ously intended a finality requirement. Or third, he argues that we
       may apply the Chevron framework but refuse to defer to the Board’s
       interpretation as an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the
       statute.
               But we do not reach the merits of this question. Even if we
       adopted his interpretation, Lopez-Serrano has been “convicted by
       a final judgment” of a particularly serious crime.6 He pled nolo con-
       tendere to felony battery, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.041, on January 31,
       2001. That same day, the state court withheld his adjudication of
       guilt; imposed five years of supervised release; assessed fees, costs,
       and restitution; and imposed a no-contact order. Lopez-Serrano
       therefore was “convicted,” as the INA defines the term, on January
       31, 2001. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). 7

       pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lack-
       ing power to control.’” Quinchia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th
       Cir. 2008) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
       6 The Board concluded—and Lopez-Serrano does not challenge—that felony

       battery is a “particularly serious crime.”
       7 As relevant here, the INA defines “conviction” as a withheld adjudication of

       guilt, where the non-citizen has “entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or
       has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt” and “the judge has
       ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty
       to be imposed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). This definition governs all uses of
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       8                         Opinion of the Court                      22-12305

              And his conviction has been final, according to Lopez-Ser-
       rano’s definition of the term, since March 2, 2001, at the latest. The
       date depends on whether he expressly reserved his right to appeal
       when he pled nolo contendere. Here, the record indicates no such
       reservation. If he failed to expressly reserve his right to appeal, his
       conviction became final on January 31, 2001. Fla. Stat. Ann.
       § 924.051(4) (“If a defendant pleads nolo contendere without ex-
       pressly reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue, . . .
       the defendant may not appeal the judgment or sentence.”). But
       even if Lopez-Serrano did expressly reserve his right to appeal, his
       conviction became final 30 days later, on March 2, 2001. Id.
       § 924.09; Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3).
               Either way, Lopez-Serrano had no appellate rights twelve
       years later, when DHS initiated his 2013 removal proceedings. And
       even if we considered Lopez-Serrano’s case to somehow remain
       open during the pendency of his probationary period imposed in
       connection with his nolo contendere plea, that period also ended
       years before DHS sought to remove Lopez-Serrano. So any appel-
       late rights Lopez-Serrano may have had relating to that conviction
       unambiguously expired long before the 2013 removal proceedings
       began. In short, even assuming without deciding that Lopez-Ser-
       rano is correct that the phrase “convicted by a final judgment” im-
       poses a finality requirement, he cannot escape the Board’s

       the term “conviction” in Chapter 12 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code, which includes
       the “particularly serious crime” bar. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a).
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       22-12305              Opinion of the Court                      9

       determination that he has been “convicted by a final judgment of a
       particularly serious crime.”
                                IV.   Conclusion
              For the reasons we have explained, we deny Lopez-Ser-
       rano’s petition.
             PETITION DENIED.