Court Opinion

ID: 9828776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:43:55.941824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:53.032874
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for appellee, Fortinberry, have filed a very able motion for rehearing in this cause, and therein, among other things, have strongly and vigorously insisted that this court erred in holding that:
“The act of 1919, now article 3082, was intended by the Legislature to comprehend and cover the entire subject-matter relative to the residential qualification of state, county, precinct, and municipal officers, and that it was intended that such act should and that it does comprehend the entire subject-matter, and that it was intended that it should be substituted for all prior statutes on that subject, and that it does operate as a repeal by reasonable implication of all statutes in so far as they are in conflict therewith.”
Literally interpreted, the statement that “it was intended by the Legislature to comprehend and cover the entire subject-matter relative to residential qualifications of state and county officers” may he said to include officers whose residential qualifications are prescribed by the Constitution, but we think that it is clear, when the statement is read as a whole, that it should be understood, as referring to the legislative enactments, statutory law, and not to constitutional provisions.
The Legislature had in mind, when it passed article 3082, as amended in 1919, that the residential qualifications of some officers were fixed by the Constitution, for they expressly declare in said article that, before any person can be elected to any of the offices named, he shall be eligible to hold such office under the Constitution. 'Certainly the Legislature, in providing that no person shall be eligible to any state, county, precinct, or municipal office unless he shall have resided in the state, county, precinct, or municipality for six months, did not intend to substitute such provisions for the provisions of the Constitution, fixing residential qualifications of officers. However, keeping in view the several general enactments of the Legislature, relative to the residential qualifications, it is clear, we think, that by the passing of the act in 1919 (article 3082) the Legislature did intend to substitute such act for all prior general statutory laws relative to the residential qualifications of state, county, and municipal officers.
In our original opinion, we stated:
“Article 792 was passed by the Legislature in 1875, and provides as follows: ‘No person shall be eligible to the office of mayor unless he possesses the qualifications of an elector, and shall have resided twelve months next preceding the election within the limits of the city.’ Prior to 1895 there was no law prescribing a limit of time of residence in this state as a qualification for holding office, but in that year the Legislature passed an act which was carried into the Revised Statutes of 1895 as article 1810a.”
What we meant to say was that, by article 792, passed in 1875, the Legislature provided that no person should be eligible to the office of mayor or alderman of any city unless he possessed the qualification of an elector and shall have resided twelve months next preceding the election within the limits of the city, and that prior to 1895 there was no general statutory law prescribing a limit of time of residence in this state as a qualification for holding office, except the general law (article 792) relating to mayor and alderman of cities, but in that year the Legislature passed an act which was carried into the Revised Statutes of 1895 as article 1810a. And again, on page 6 of our opinion, we stated that, prior to the act of 1895, fixing the residential qualifications for a given length of time in order to hold the state or county office, there was no law requiring such qualifications. We now modify that statement by stating that there was no “statutory” law requiring such qualifications.
The Legislature has from time to time passed special acts by which it created county courts at law in the counties of Harris, Dallas, Jefferson, El Paso, and other counties, and in such acts provided for the election of judges of such courts and provided that no person should be eligible to such judgeship unless he shall have resided in the county for two years next preceding the election at which he was elected.
We are not called upon to decide whether, by the passage of article 3082, those parts of said special acts fixing a residential qualification for judges, were repealed, but what we do decide is that, by the passage of said article 3082, article 792, a general law, was repealed.
We cannot sustain the contention of appellee that, as the plaintiff Myers had alleged that he was elected mayor of a town, incorporated under chapters 14 and 15 of title 22, he could not recover, in that it was shown by the undisputed evidence that such city or town was not incorporated under the statute named, but that it was incorporated under chapters 1 to 13, inclusive, of title 22. As we have already said, it is clearly made to appear from the allegations of the petition of the plaintiff that he sues for the office of mayor of the'city "or town of Goose Greek, *470and it was, we think, immaterial as to whether such city or town was incorporated under one statute or another.
Having made the corrections as above indicated, we overrule the motion.