Court Opinion

ID: 9880908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 23:03:28.556859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:01.254948
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/28/23 In re M.G. CA1/4
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 In re M.G et al., Persons Coming
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 J.W. et al.,
           Petitioners,
 v.                                                                     A167995
 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                                        (Contra Costa County
 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,
                                                                        Super. Ct. Nos.
           Respondent,                                                  J2100203, J2100204,
                                                                        J2100205 & J2100206)
 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES BUREAU et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest.

          J.G. (Mother) petitions for an extraordinary writ (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.452) in the juvenile dependency cases for
her four children, M.G., B.G., L.G., and C.W. She challenges the
juvenile court’s order after a contested 18-month review hearing
wherein the court terminated family reunification services and

                                                      1
set a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing.
Mother asserts that the court erred because there was
insufficient evidence that the children would be at a substantial
risk of physical or emotional detriment in her care; she was not
offered reasonable services during the review period; the court
abused its discretion by limiting her educational rights for M.G.,
B.G., and L.G.; and the court abused its discretion with respect to
its visitation order.
      J.W., the father of C.W., also petitions for an extraordinary
writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) commanding the trial court
to set aside its order reducing his visitation with his daughter.
      We find no error in the juvenile court’s orders and deny the
petitions.
                        BACKGROUND2
      The Bureau initially received referrals in this case alleging
that Mother physically abused the children, engaged in domestic
violence, abused drugs and alcohol, and Mother and J.W. had
engaged in domestic violence in front of the children. When
interviewed, M.G., B.G., and L.G. (collectively, the G. children)
all articulated to the Bureau that Mother had substance abuse

      1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare &

Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
      2 As the parties are familiar with the factual and

procedural history of the case, and this opinion does not warrant
publication, we need not recite the full history. (People v. Garcia
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) We instead summarize as
necessary the parts of that history relevant to the issues raised
by the petitions in light of our standards of review.

                                 2
and violence problems, she hit them, and she had engaged in
domestic violence with partners in their presence, including J.W.
      On May 3, 2021, the Bureau filed section 300 petitions on
behalf of M.G. (age 11), B.G. (age 10), L.G. (age 9), and C.W. (age
3). On May 5, 2021, the court detained the children.
      At the jurisdictional hearing, Mother pleaded no contest to
amended counts in all cases, and J.W. pleaded no contest to an
amended petition in C.W.’s case. For Mother, the sustained
allegations for the G. children under section 300, subdivision (a)
were that each was at risk of physical harm because Mother had
hit each child. The sustained allegations for the G. children
under section 300, subdivision (b) were that Mother failed to
protect the children in that she had a chronic polysubstance
abuse problem that impaired her ability to provide a safe, stable
living environment and adequate supervision, and she placed the
children at ongoing risk of physical harm by engaging in acts of
interpersonal domestic violence in the children’s presence. For
C.W., the sustained allegations under section 300, subdivision (b)
were that Mother failed to protect C.W. in that she had a chronic
polysubstance abuse problem that impaired her ability to provide
a safe, stable living environment and adequate supervision, and
she placed C.W. at ongoing risk of physical harm by engaging in
acts of interpersonal domestic violence in her presence.
      For J.W., the court sustained allegations under section 300,
subdivision (b) that he failed to protect C.W. from Mother’s
ongoing polysubstance abuse, thus placing C.W. at serious risk of

                                 3
harm and neglect, and he placed C.W. at ongoing risk of physical
harm by engaging in acts of domestic violence.
      At the dispositional hearing, Mother received family
reunification services, and the court bypassed services for J.W.
because of his prior conviction for a violent felony and court-
required registration on a sex offender registry (§ 361.5,
subds. (b)(12), (16)).3 At the six-month review hearing, the
Bureau expressed significant concerns with Mother’s sobriety,
her failure to participate in a substance abuse treatment
program, her continued relationship with J.W., and her no-show
to 13 of 16 random drug tests, but Mother’s family reunification
services were continued.
      As of the 12-month review hearing on July 27, 2022,
Mother had made significant progress with her case plan. She
completed counseling and a domestic violence and anger
management course. She began a substance abuse treatment
program in May 2022 and finished it in July 2022, she was
attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, she was working
with her AA sponsor on a 12-step program, and she tested
negative on 21 of 21 random drug tests. At the time, the Bureau
believed that Mother could reunify with her children, and the
court ordered another six months of reunification services. The
18-month review hearing was set for October 19, 2022.

      3 B.G., Sr. is the father of the G. childrenThe court
bypassed reunification services for B.G. Sr., due to a violent
felony conviction (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(12)), and B.G., Sr. is not a
party to this writ proceeding.

                                  4
      By the time of the 18-month review hearing, the Bureau
had changed its recommendation and asked the court to
terminate Mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26
hearing. The following transpired during the applicable review
period.
      In August and early September of 2022, the children’s
visits with Mother progressed to overnight visits. The Bureau
reported that C.W. enjoyed visits with J.W., the children enjoyed
their visits with Mother, and the G. children expressed their
desire to return to Mother’s care as long as she stayed sober and
J.W. was not around. Prior to the progression to overnight
visitation, in July 2022, the social worker spoke to Mother to
verify who was on Mother’s apartment lease, and Mother sent a
copy of the lease that listed only Mother. The social worker
verified this information with the leasing office at Mother’s
apartment complex.
      On September 16, 2022, the social worker spoke with J.W.’s
parole officer. The parole officer had significant contact with
Mother in the prior four months. In fact, the officer had spoken
to Mother the day before regarding her providing birth
certificates for C.W., B.G., and L.G. to get approval for J.W. to be
around the children. The officer was unaware of M.G.’s
existence, and her age of almost 13 concerned him because a
condition of J.W.’s parole was that he not be around children 13
to 17 who were not his own. Mother had insisted to the social
worker that she had not been around J.W. in the past months,
but the parole officer said he had met with J.W. inside Mother’s

                                 5
apartment once and outside on numerous occasions, Mother was
the contact for J.W.’s parole, and J.W. had been sleeping in
Mother’s car.
      The social worker discussed this new information with
Mother, and Mother claimed that she had no idea who the parole
officer was, did not know how J.W. got into her home, and she
had not told him where she lived. The Bureau cancelled
unsupervised and overnight visits. The next day, on September
28, 2022, Mother showed up intoxicated at the house of C.W.’s
caretaker, yelling that she wanted to kill the social worker.
Mother missed a random drug test the following day.
      In November 2022, the Bureau learned that Mother had
unauthorized visitation with all four children on Halloween.
Mother did not report this, despite meeting with the social
worker the day after Halloween and being told that the case was
where it was because of Mother’s dishonesty. When questioned
later about the Halloween visit, Mother was reluctant to answer
and told the social worker she could ask her questions in court.
Mother did, however, address what had happened with her
apartment lease. She explained that J.W. had been on her lease
because she needed his pay stubs as proof of income to secure the
apartment, but she had since received a raise at work and he was
no longer on her lease. Mother acknowledged that J.W. helped
her move items from shared storage into the apartment, but she
said he would not be around, and she would not answer the door
if he showed up. Mother started individual therapy at the social
worker’s suggestion. She also revealed that she had not

                                 6
connected with her AA sponsor in some time, but she continued
to test negative.
      At Mother’s request, the Bureau arranged for a special visit
with the G. children on Christmas Day, and it arranged for
Mother to pick up presents for the visit on December 20, 2022.
Mother did not show up to pick up the presents or to therapeutic
visitation that day, so the social worker went to her apartment
the next day to look for her. There were no sounds coming from
Mother’s apartment, so the social worker went to speak to the
property manager. The property manager reported that she had
not seen Mother in a couple of days, but, upon J.W.’s request, she
had let him into Mother’s apartment the day before. He was
drunk, but she let him in because he said he lost his keys, he
showed identification, and he was on the lease. The social worker
asked to see Mother’s lease and learned that J.W. was the
primary tenant. The social worker showed the property manger
a picture of the lease Mother previously sent to the Bureau, and
the property manager confirmed that the lease was false. J.W.’s
ankle monitor data showed that, in the past couple months, he
was at Mother’s apartment once and in the complex’s parking lot
once. When confronted with what the social worker had learned,
Mother feigned surprise and said the situation was “baffling.”
      In January 2023, Mother sent the social worker a confusing
text, and she also sent a confusing text to B.G. about letting C.W.
rejoin therapeutic visitation. When L.G. and B.G. learned that
J.W. had been at Mother’s apartment the month prior, they said
that they did not want to live with Mother. That same month,

                                 7
Mother missed four out of six drug tests. B.G. also suspected
that Mother was drunk with a black eye at a therapeutic visit at
the end of the month, but the therapist did not make the same
observation.
      The following month, the court ordered no phone contact
between Mother and the children as a result of her January texts,
but Mother continued to text the children and the social worker
had to remind Mother of the court’s order. Mother missed a
therapeutic visit on L.G.’s birthday, and she was caught
recording C.W.’s responses to questions Mother asked about the
Bureau’s staff during a visit. At a check-in meeting, Mother told
the social worker that she was still attending AA/Narcotics
Anonymous (NA) meetings “here and there.” She reported
needing to find a new AA sponsor because hers had relapsed.
      The 18-month hearing was set for a contest, and the court
heard the matter on multiple days over the course of many
months, concluding on May 31, 2023. The court heard testimony
from social workers Drenik and Thomas, who were assigned to
the case at various times, Mother, and J.W.4 The documentary
evidence admitted included exhibits from Mother; the Bureau’s
October 19, 2022 18-month review report; and the Bureau’s
update memoranda from December 2, 2022, January 26, 2022,
and February 23, 2023.
      The juvenile court rendered an oral statement of decision.
It recited numerous instances in the review period where Mother
deceived the Bureau, found the social workers’ testimonies

      4 J.W. testified as to C.W.’s case only.

                                  8
credible, and found the testimonies of J.W. and Mother to be
overall not credible. The court concluded that reasonable services
had been provided to Mother and return of the children to
Mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to
their safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being. The
court reduced visitation, limited Mother’s educational rights for
the G. children, and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.
          Mother and J.W. filed petitions for extraordinary writ
relief. We stayed the section 366.26 hearing pending disposition
of the petitions.
                             DISCUSSION
I.        The Substantial Risk of Detriment Finding
     A.    Governing Law
          Until reunification services are terminated, there is a
statutory presumption that a dependent child will be returned to
parental custody. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308.)
At the 18-month review hearing, the court must return the child
to the custody of the parent unless it determines, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that return of the child “would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22,
subd. (a).)
          “In determining whether it would be detrimental to return
the child . . . the court must consider whether the parent
participated regularly in any treatment program set forth by the
plan, the ‘efforts or progress’ of the parent, and the ‘extent’ to
which the parent ‘cooperated and availed himself or herself of

                                     9
services provided.’ (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)” (Blanca P. v. Superior
Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748.) Thus, it is insufficient
for the juvenile court to consider “the mere completion of the
technical requirements of the reunification plan.” (In re Dustin
R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1141.) However, the detriment
standard is “ ‘a fairly high one. It cannot mean merely that the
parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit from the
reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems
less capable than an available foster parent or other family
member.’ It must mean what it says: that return presents a
substantial risk of detriment to the child.” (Rita L. v. Superior
Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 495, 505.) “We are looking for
passing grades here, not straight A’s.” (David B. v. Superior
Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 790.)
      “[T]he easy cases are ones where there is a clear failure by
the parent to comply with material aspects of the service
plan[,] . . . for example, a mother continued to test positive for
illegal drug use, continued to move from place to place, failed to
‘regularly’ attend therapy, and failed to complete her parenting
class. This was obviously enough to support a finding of
detriment. [¶] The harder cases are . . . where the parent has
complied with the service plan, but for some reason has not
convinced a psychologist or social worker that it would be safe to
return the child to the parent. The problem is not, as it were,
quantitative (that is, showing up for counseling or therapy or
parenting classes, or what have you) but qualitative (that is,
whether the counseling, therapy or parenting classes are doing

                                 10
any good). These are sensitive cases, fraught with emotional
overtones, because they invariably deal with an evaluation of the
personality, character and attitudes of the parent.” (Blanca P.,
supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1748, italics omitted.)
        In all cases, the Bureau has the burden of establishing
there is a substantial risk of detriment. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) The
reviewing court considers the entire record to determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
conclusions. The reviewing court reviews the record in a light
“most favorable to the court’s order and we indulge every
inference in favor of the court’s decision so long as those
inferences . . . ‘ “rest on the evidence” [citation]’ not ‘mere
speculation or conjecture.’ ” (In re R.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th
986, 988–989.)
   B.    Analysis
        The pertinent question is whether substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that the Bureau
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that returning
the children to Mother would “create a substantial risk of
detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-
being of the [children].” (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) The answer is yes.
        Regarding Mother’s substance abuse problems, the
evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mother did not
get “passing grades” with her case plan. The sustained
allegations here established that Mother had a substance abuse
problem, and Mother herself attributed her violence to her
alcohol abuse. Mother was ordered to attend a substance abuse

                                   11
treatment program, including a 12-step program, and to submit
to random drug tests. Mother had made substantial progress by
the 12-month review hearing, but she later became
noncompliant. Mother came intoxicated to C.W.’s caretaker’s
home on September 28, 2022, and threatened to kill the social
worker. Mother was a no-show to a random drug test on
September 29, 2022, which was considered a positive test under
her case plan. As of November 2022, Mother had not seen her AA
sponsor in a couple months, and she was not working on her 12-
step program. The social worker instructed Mother to reach out
to her sponsor or to find a new sponsor and report back. As of
March 2023, Mother’s prior sponsor had relapsed and Mother did
not have a new sponsor. In January 2023, Mother was a no-show
to 4 of 6 (67%) of her random drug tests. Mother testified that
she had been sober since January 2022, but the court found that
her testimony was not credible.
      Mother claims that she completed substance abuse
treatment, C.W.’s caretaker’s report of her intoxication should be
discounted, and her missed drug tests were insignificant. We are
unpersuaded. Mother’s drinking was a key issue from the
beginning of the case, and the evidence indicating her continued
drinking was of serious concern. Mother participated in services
and achieved substantial progress during the 6- to 12-month
review period, but she did not show she had reached her goal of
remaining free from alcohol use and dependency. The evidence of
ongoing instability in Mother’s life in this area during the
pertinent review period called into question her ability to keep

                                  12
the children safe and adequately supported the court’s detriment
finding.
        As to Mother’s ability to protect the children from domestic
violence, the court also found that Mother did not understand the
risk of danger posed by J.W. Mother testified that she
understood this risk, but the court concluded that she was not
credible. The court’s findings were supported by evidence
showing that, during the pertinent review period, Mother lied
about having no contact with J.W., she was in frequent contact
with his parole officer, and she discussed providing birth
certificates for C.W., L.G., and B.G. to get approval for J.W. to be
around them. While the Bureau did not believe that J.W. lived
with Mother, he was the primary tenant on her apartment lease,
he had access to her apartment, and Mother went to elaborate
lengths to conceal this. The court believed that Mother had a
financial reason for initially putting J.W. on the lease, but it also
found that her actions established that she did not understand
the risk posed to the children by J.W.’s legal access to the
apartment. The court found that J.W. intended to reengage with
Mother based on his statements to family members that they
could give C.W. back to Mother and him after court proceedings
ended, and it was undisputed that the G. children were terrified
of, and traumatized by, J.W. The record thus includes sufficient
evidence to support the finding that there would be a substantial
risk of detriment to the children if they were returned to Mother’s
care.

                                  13
      Mother relies on Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, to
argue that the Bureau’s opinion about her lack of insight into the
problems that led to removal is not substantial evidence, but
Blanca P. is distinguishable. The juvenile court there had erred
by assuming, without proof, that the father had engaged in child
molestation. (Id. at p. 1747.) Against that backdrop, the
appellate court found that the social worker’s subjective opinion
that the mother had failed to “ ‘internalize’ ” what she learned in
parenting classes because she refused to believe the father was a
child molester was insufficient to support a substantial risk of
detriment finding. (Id. at p. 1751.) Here, the court did not rely
on the Bureau’s speculative and subjective opinion. Instead,
evidence of Mother’s own actions served as a factual basis for the
court’s conclusion that she failed to appreciate the risk posed by
J.W., and hence there was a substantial risk of detriment.
      While Mother made progress on many aspects of her case
plan between the 6- and 12- month review period, that is not
enough to justify reversal of the court’s finding in this case.
Sufficient evidence from the pertinent review period supports the
court’s orders.
II.   Reasonable Services
      Mother next contends that the Bureau’s failure to offer her
reasonable reunification services during the pertinent review
period requires reversal of the court’s orders. The Bureau

                                 14
counters that the court’s reasonable services finding was
sufficiently supported. We agree with the Bureau.5
      “[At the 18-month review hearing,] [t]he court shall
determine by clear and convincing evidence whether reasonable
services have been offered or provided to the parent or legal
guardian.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) “The juvenile court’s finding
that reasonable services were provided is reviewed for
substantial evidence.” (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238, disapproved on other grounds in
Michael G. v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 631, fn. 8.)
“Substantial evidence is that which is reasonable, credible and of
solid value.” (T.J. v. Superior Court, at p. 1238.) In applying this
standard, we “bear in mind that clear and convincing evidence
was required in the trial court.” (Id. at p. 1239.)
      Reasonable services are “responsive to the unique needs of
each family, and the plan must be ‘ “ ‘specifically tailored to fit
the circumstances of each family’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘designed to eliminate
those conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
finding.’ ” ’ ” (Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016)

      5 Citing to section 352 and Michael G. v. Superior Court

(2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, Mother maintains that the juvenile court
had discretion to continue the section 366.26 hearing and to order
additional family reunification services. The Bureau argues that
additional family reunification services were not allowed in this
case because, at the time the court issued its orders, more than
24 months had passed since the children were removed from
Mother’s physical custody. Given our disposition, we need not
decide if a court can extend family reunification services when
more than 24 months have passed since the child was removed
from the parent’s physical custody.

                                  15
244 Cal.App.4th 397, 420.) “Specifically, the record must show
the agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody,
offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained
reasonable contact with the parents during the duration of the
service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents
when compliance was difficult.” (Ibid.) Nonetheless, the
“standard is not whether the services provided were the best that
might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services
were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R.
(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) Further, “[r]eunification services
are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent
parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.)
      Mother argues that services were unreasonable because the
Bureau failed to assist her with finding housing or obtaining a
restraining order against J.W. to allow her to stay in her
apartment, the Bureau failed to assist her with the creation of a
safety plan, it failed to provide adequate therapy services, and it
failed to re-refer her for substance abuse treatment. As set forth
below, these contentions lack merit.
      With respect to housing, Mother sought the Bureau’s
assistance with her case plan’s suitable housing requirement
during the 6- to 12-month review period. The Bureau provided
referrals, Mother obtained an apartment on her own, and the
court’s 12-month reasonable services finding stands
unchallenged. In this review period, Mother maintained her
apartment, and she never informed the Bureau that she needed
housing assistance because of finances. Instead, in November

                                 16
2022, Mother disclosed that J.W. had been on her apartment
lease initially for financial reasons, but she claimed she had since
received a raise and his name was off the lease. The Bureau did
not learn that J.W.’s name remained on the lease until the end of
December 2022. Mother moved sometime in January 2023, and
she told the Bureau that she would rent a house if the children
were coming back, but she did not want to pay for a bigger home
if they were not. Nothing in the record suggests that Mother’s
financial state after November 2022 was such that she required
assistance finding housing, or that the Bureau was aware of, and
ignored, a need with respect to housing during the review period.
      With respect to the safety plan, Mother contends that the
Bureau should have provided her with a sample plan when she
struggled to articulate her plan. But the Bureau’s concern was
not that Mother did not have a safety plan, it was that Mother
could not readily articulate the points in her plan and Mother did
not want to talk about her safety plan. The Bureau was not
tasked with forcing Mother to discuss and fully grasp her safety
plan. (In re Jonathan R., supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 1220
[“[r]eunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on
an unwilling or indifferent parent”].)
      Next, Mother’s contention that the Bureau should have
arranged for separate family therapy sessions with the G.
children and been quicker to initiate more sessions for C.W.
highlights, at most, that services were not perfect. “In almost all
cases it will be true that more services could have been provided
more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect.”

                                17
(In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) Family therapy
was part of Mother’s case plan, the Bureau provided referrals,
and the G. children had family therapy throughout the review
period. Social worker Drenik, who was on the case before going
on leave in July 2022, made a referral for C.W., and a clinician
was assigned. The services provider recommended combining the
therapeutic visits. C.W. participated in two group therapy
sessions, but Mother and the G. children requested that she stop
due to her disruptive behavior. The social worker did not
thereafter refer C.W. for more sessions until Mother asked for
services because of the therapist’s feedback that the G. children
had the bigger issues and her feedback about how sessions with
C.W. had gone. Considering the provider’s election to proceed
with group therapy and feedback, the court’s conclusion that
services were reasonable under the circumstances is sufficiently
supported.
      Mother’s final claim that the Bureau could have re-referred
her for an assessment when it became concerned about her
sobriety in January 2023 also highlights, at most, less than
perfect services. Mother had been given referrals for, and
completed, a substance abuse program. She maintained that she
was sober during this review period, she was connected with 12-
step program, and she randomly drug tested. The Bureau
monitored Mother’s drug tests, and it checked in with her on AA
compliance. When Mother disclosed that she had not seen her
sponsor for a while, the social worker counseled her to contact her
sponsor or seek out a new one if necessary. In January 2023,

                                18
 Mother missed numerous drug tests. The continued 18-month
 review hearing began in February 2023. In an ideal world, the
 Bureau may have re-referred Mother after January 2023, but,
 given the services already provided and the timing, the Bureau’s
 actions in following up on Mother’s AA compliance and providing
 drug testing were reasonable.
       In sum, Mother’s claims regarding the court’s reasonable
 services finding lack merit. Furthermore, even assuming that
 the court could order additional family reunification services in
 this case, Mother does not establish entitlement to such services
 in light of the court’s unchallenged finding that additional
 reunification services were not in the best interests of the
 children. (See Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 634–635
 [before extending family reunification services beyond the
 presumptive 18-month maximum, court must find additional
 family reunification services are not contrary to child’s
 interests].)
III.   Educational Rights
       The trial court signed JV-535 orders limiting Mother’s right
 to make educational decisions for the G. children.6 Mother

       6 Mother notes an ambiguity in the record.   The court’s oral
 pronouncement at times mentions an educational rights
 limitation and at times refers to Mother’s rights to make
 educational and developmental services decisions. Boxes “1a.” on
 the first pages of the signed JV-535 orders, which indicate
 whether the orders implicate Mother’s right to make
 “educational” and/or “developmental services” decisions, are
 unchecked, however, the following pages in those orders confer
 authority upon the designated third parties for only educational
 decisions. The Bureau’s request was also limited to educational

                                  19
argues that the court abused its discretion when it limited her
educational rights on the facts of this case. We disagree, “bearing
in mind [that] ‘[t]he focus of dependency proceedings is on the
child, not the parent.’ ” (In re R.W. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268,
1277.)
      “Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in directing their children’s education. [Citations.] However,
when a child is a dependent . . . , a court may limit a parent’s
ability to make educational decisions on the child’s behalf.” (In re
R.W., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1276.) At every review
hearing in dependency proceedings, the juvenile court must
decide whether it is appropriate to limit the rights of the parent
to make educational decisions for the child. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.649(a).) The Bureau must provide the court with
information regarding the parent’s unwillingness or inability to
make educational decisions for the child. (§ 366.1, subd. (e).) A
court may limit a parent’s educational decision-making rights for
a dependent child “[i]f necessary to protect [the] child.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.649(a).) Any limitations on the parent’s
educational rights “shall be specifically addressed in the court
order. The limitations may not exceed those necessary to protect
the child.” (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).)

rights. Circumstances thus dictate that we deem the court’s
orders to limit only Mother’s educational rights and not her
rights with respect to developmental services. (Cf. In re Merrick
V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 249 [conflicts between reporter’s
and clerk’s transcripts are resolved in favor of reporter’s
transcript unless particular circumstances dictate otherwise].)

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      The court did not abuse its discretion. The G. children
needed active adult engagement in, and supervision of, their
academic progress. M.G. had a 504 plan, with a requested
reassessment for an Independent Education Plan (IEP) pending,
and B.G. had an IEP. Mother was unable to communicate with
the children on a daily basis given the court’s order of no phone
contact. Mother had missed some school meetings and failed to
schedule educational meetings and submit educational
paperwork expeditiously. Further, when the social worker
requested a copy of B.G.’s IEP for his new school, Mother referred
the social worker to her attorney and did not send the IEP. On
this record, the court could reasonably order the limitation of
Mother’s educational rights to ensure prompt and consistent
attention to the children’s educational needs.
      Mother argues the contrary—that there was no reasonable
basis to limit her control over the children’s education, and she is
capable of directing the children’s education. As the juvenile
court noted, there was evidence that Mother engaged in some of
the educational components of the children’s lives. While we
agree that there is evidence in the record that could support a
decision granting Mother continued control over the G. children’s
education, our review in this case is limited. The court found, on
balance, that Mother was unavailable, unwilling, or unable to
exercise educational rights for the children.7 Where, as here,

      7 In its statement of decision, the juvenile court referenced

section 319, which provides the legal standard applicable to
orders limiting a parent’s educational rights before the child is
adjudged a dependent. Section 361 governs thereafter. (§ 361,

                                 21
there is more than one reasonable inference that may be drawn
from the record before us, we have no authority to displace a
rational decision of the trial court. (In re Stephanie M. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 295, 319.)
      Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred in
issuing an overbroad order because shared educational rights
would be more appropriate. We disagree that the court acted
outside of the bounds of reason. In its statement of decision, the
court highlighted instances of Mother’s uncooperative attitude
with the social workers, and it was not unreasonable for the court
to impliedly conclude that shared rights, if even allowed by
statute, might engender additional conflict and would not be in
the best interests of the children.
IV.   Visitation
      Finally, Mother and J.W. claim that the court abused its
discretion with its visitation orders. J.W. had one-hour visits

subd. (a)(1).) Section 319 required the court to find that the
parent “is unavailable, unable, or unwilling to exercise
educational” rights, and the child’s educational needs “cannot be
met” without appointment of a responsible adult. (§ 319,
subd. (j)(1)(A)–(C).) Mother forfeited any claim that the court
used an incorrect legal standard by failing to raise the issue on
appeal. (See People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9.)
There would also be no reasonable probability of a more favorable
result had the court used the “necessary to protect” (§ 361, subd.
(a)) standard, considering the court’s express and implied
findings that Mother was unavailable, unwilling, or unable to
make educational decisions, and that the children’s needs could
not be met without the court’s order. (See In re Celine R. (2003)
31 Cal.4th 45, 59–60 [dependency judgments subject to harmless
error analysis].)

                                 22
with C.W. three times per month, and Mother had two-hour visits
with all children four times per month. For C.W., the court
reduced J.W.’s minimum visitation to a single one-hour visit,
once a month, and it reduced Mother’s minimum visitation to
one-hour visits, twice a month. For the G. children, the court
reduced Mother’s visitation to two-hour visits, twice a month.
The court also ordered the Bureau to consider the children’s
wishes, input from the children’s counsel, and input from the
children’s therapists in establishing the frequency, time, and
place of visits. Neither parent shows that the court abused its
discretion. (In re J.P. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1119
[visitation orders reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
      The parents contend that the court erred because the
evidence showed that their visits went well, and Mother argues
that the evidence shows that the children were bonded to her,
and meaningful visitation is pivotal to the parent-child
relationship, citing In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497,
1504. J.W. also appears to suggest that there must be a showing
of detriment to reduce visitation. Hunter S., however, involved
issuance of a visitation order that gave a child unfettered
discretion to prevent visitation by refusing to see his parent. The
court there recognized that the law required visitation to
continue even after family reunification services are terminated
unless the court finds that visitation would be detrimental to the
child. (Ibid., citing § 366.21, subd. (h).) Here, the court ordered
continued visitation, so there was no statutory violation.
(§§ 366.21, subd. (h), 366.22, subd. (a)(3).)

                                  23
      As for the frequency of visitation, the juvenile court has
“great discretion in deciding issues relating to parent-child
visitation,” the exercise of which “we will not disturb on appeal
unless the juvenile court has exceeded the bounds of reason.” (In
re S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557–1558.) When
reunification services end, “the parents’ interest in the care,
custody and companionship of the child [is] no longer
paramount,” and “ ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability.’ ” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th
at p. 317.)
      There was no abuse of discretion in the court’s visitation
orders. C.W.’s therapist recommended reduced visitation because
C.W. displayed anxiety on the day before, and dysregulated
behavior on the day of, visits with J.W. and Mother. C.W. told
the social worker that Mother asked her to keep the most secrets,
the social worker reported that Mother coached C.W. during
visits, and Mother was caught recording C.W.’s responses to
Mother’s questions about the Bureau during a visit. The social
worker testified that the Bureau considered the children’s needs
when making the visitation recommendation, and that frequent
visits make them think they are going home, giving them false
hope and preventing them from settling down. Mother had
missed some visits, and the G. children said they were okay with
some decreased visitation with Mother as long as they continued
to be able to see C.W. After the court decided to terminate
reunification services, it became appropriate to fashion a
visitation order that balanced the parents’ right to contact with

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the children’s interest in moving towards permanency. The court
reasonably reduced visitation here, and its orders allowed the
Bureau the flexibility necessary to accommodate the evolving
needs of the children.
                              DISPOSITION
       The petitions are denied on the merits. (See § 366.26,
subd. (l)(1)(C); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h).) This court’s
stay of the section 366.26 hearing (which was previously set for
September 13, 2023) is lifted. Our decision is final as to this
court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

                                            BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
HIRAMOTO, J.

In re M.G. et al. (A167996)

       
        Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of
Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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