Court Opinion

ID: 9650580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:45:06.879068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:37.800938
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring.
I agree that the wrongful death and survival actions should have been dismissed. However, I would look to whether an injury had been alleged sufficient to support a cause of action prior to considering the viability of the fetus as an element of recovery.
These actions had been consolidated for trial prior to this appeal. The defendants had filed preliminary objections challenging the adequacy of the complaints with respect to the alleged negligence, injury and the specifics of each. In each case, the objections were overruled. I recognize that the earlier orders overruling the preliminary objections are interlocutory and not directly before us on this appeal. Rosenwald v. Barbieri, 501 Pa. 563, 462 A.2d 644 (1983). Nevertheless, we have been invited to review the order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss — final and appealable as to three of the named plaintiffs — upon the representation that this appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter, see Pa.R.A.P. 1312(a)(5). *22Since I believe that the complaints fail to allege an injury cognizable in a trespass action, I would affirm the trial court without reaching the issue which my colleagues so ably have addressed.
The complaints filed at Nos. 83-02248 and 84-01045 in the trial court are virtually identical. Each Paragraph 8 avers:
8. As a result of the carelessness, negligence, gross negligence and recklessness of the defendants]____ Joseph Hudak and David Hudak were caused to sustain injuries resulting in their deaths on April 11, 1983, and Michael Hudak was caused to sustain injuries which resulted in his death on April 12, 1983.
The only other reference to the alleged injuries to the fetuses appears in Paragraph 20, under Count III of each Complaint, where it is averred:
20. Solely by reason of the carelessness, negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness of defendants]____ Joseph Hudak, deceased, David Hudak, deceased, and Michael Hudak, deceased, were born prematurely and sustained severe and disabling injuries which caused the deaths of Joseph and David Hudak on April 11, 1983, and the death of Michael Hudak on April 12, 1983, after each had undergone great pain and suffering.
A Joint Stipulation of Facts for Purpose of Appeal was filed by the parties on October 25,1988. From this stipulation, we learn that Ann H. Hudak, the plaintiff/mother, had been treated by the defendants for infertility, that the “due date” for delivery of the triplets was August 1, 1983, and that the delivery by Caesarian section occurred on April 11, 1983. The parties further stipulated that the three fetuses, because of their immaturity, were not capable of living outside the womb.
The defendants propounded a first set of interrogatories to the plaintiffs. Interrogatories numbered 52, 57, 58, and 59 all sought information relating to the injuries allegedly sustained by the fetuses. Interrogatory No. 59 sets forth:
*2359. Describe separately and in detail all injuries sustained by the decedent as a result of the treatment, surgery or examination upon which this action is based.
The Answer set forth immediately below the Interrogatory is:
See Williamsport Hospital and Geisinger Medical Records. Neither hospital records are attached to the Answers to Interrogatories or otherwise included in the certified record before this court.
To state a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must plead a legal duty, a breach of that duty, proximate or legal cause, and actual damage or injury. Boyce v. United States Steel Corporation, 446 Pa. 226, 285 A.2d 459 (1971); Whitner v. Lojeski, 437 Pa. 448, 263 A.2d 889 (1970); Kirby v. Carlisle, 178 Pa.Super. 389, 116 A.2d 220 (1955). An action for negligence lies only if injury or damage is caused thereby. Jeloszewski v. Sloan, 375 Pa. 360, 100 A.2d 480 (1953); Kirby v. Carlisle, supra.
I am unable to extract anything from the Complaints, Answers to Interrogatories, the Stipulation or other pleadings which would even remotely suggest any injury or trauma to any of the three fetuses as a direct result of any action, or failure to act, by the defendant obstetricians. In response to Interrogatory 2(a), requesting that the plaintiff/mother state in detail what injuries were sustained by her as a result of the treatment upon which this action was based, plaintiff Ann H. Hudak responded:
(a) When premature birth of the decedents was imminent, Ann underwent a Caesarian section to improve the chances for survival of the babies. This abdominal surgery resulted in pain, hospitalization, incapacitation, a long recuperative period and scarring.
There is absolutely no suggestion that the Caesarian section procedure was anything but normal, or that the fetuses suffered injury as a result of that procedure.
It is noteworthy that all of the cases reviewed by my distinguished colleagues involve prepartum trauma or injury alleged to have been sustained by the fetus while in the *24womb of the mother. Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985) (injuries received in the womb of the mother); Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981) (mother involved in head-on auto collision, fetus died in útero)', Marko v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966) (electricity passed through body of mother, fetus killed while in womb of the mother); Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964) (direct trauma inflicted by physician, fetus destroyed in útero), Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) (mother involved in rear-end collision, fetus born Mongoloid).
Prior to this appeal, all of the cases dealt with the right of a child, or the estate of a child, to institute an action, often a survival and wrongful death action, for injuries suffered while in the womb of the mother. Cf. Amadio v. Levin, supra, 509 Pa. at 207, 501 A.2d at 1089, Opinion of the Court, Papadakos, J. None of the earlier cases presented the threshold issue which I discern on this appeal. Nor have the appellants referred this court to any cases in which, on similar facts, the issue of injury and damage was glossed over.
The parties have stipulated that the three fetuses, because of their immaturity, were not capable of living outside the womb. This being the case, I do not believe that the general allegation of negligence contained in Paragraph 20 of each Complaint is sufficient to plead a cause of action. I do not understand how the “severe and disabling injuries” referred to in Paragraph 20 could have “caused the deaths of Joseph and David Hudak ... and ... Michael Hudak”, where such “injuries” are not further referred to anywhere in the Complaint and the parties have agreed that life was not possible outside the womb.
Since I reach the same conclusion as my esteemed colleagues which would affirm the order dismissing the survival and wrongful death actions, albeit by different reasoning, I concur in the result.