Court Opinion

ID: 9890294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 18:09:23.037223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:16.462806
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Watson v. Watson, 2023-Ohio-3719.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                 TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Adam T. Watson,                                  :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,              :            No. 22AP-729
                                                            (C.P.C. No. 16DR-3264)
v.                                               :
                                                        (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Jesse L. Watson (nka Lee),                       :

                Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                          D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on October 12, 2023

                On brief: Dougherty, Hanneman & Piccin, LLC, and
                Douglas B. Dougherty, for appellee. Argued: Douglas B.
                Dougherty.

                On brief: Grossman Law Offices, Tracy A. Younkin, and
                John H. Cousins, IV, for appellant. Argued: Tracy A.
                Younkin.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
                             Division of Domestic Relations

DORRIAN, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jesse L. Watson, now known as Jesse L. Lee (“Lee”),
appeals from the November 4, 2022 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, ruling on objections filed by Lee and plaintiff-
appellee, Adam T. Watson (“Watson”), to a magistrate’s decision resolving motions filed by
the parties. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} Watson and Lee were married on August 23, 2003 and had three children
together. On August 24, 2016, Watson filed a complaint for divorce; Lee filed an answer
No. 22AP-729                                                                               2

and counterclaim for divorce on October 14, 2016. On March 12, 2018, Lee and Watson
filed an agreed shared parenting plan. The following day, the trial court issued an agreed
judgment entry granting a decree of divorce and a judgment entry adopting the agreed
shared parenting plan.
A. Relevant details of the shared parenting plan
       {¶ 3} The shared parenting plan designated both Lee and Watson as the residential
parent and legal custodian of the children, and designated Lee as the residential parent for
school placement purposes. It contained a detailed parenting time schedule, including
specific provisions for the two older children and the youngest child, who was 19 months
old when the plan was adopted, as well as detailed provisions regarding parenting time on
holidays and birthdays, and for vacations and other special days.
       {¶ 4} As relevant to this appeal, the shared parenting plan provided that Lee and
Watson would discuss major decisions and share information regarding the children,
including the children’s medical care and activities. The children were to continue to be
treated by their existing pediatrician and the parties were to mutually select any additional
healthcare providers. Lee was given responsibility for scheduling routine appointments
and informing Watson of those appointments. The plan also provided the parties would
mutually select the children’s extracurricular activities and that Lee would enroll the
children in such activities. In the event of a disagreement about a major decision involving
the children, including decisions regarding medical care and extracurricular activities, the
plan provided the parties would work together to resolve the dispute; if they were unable to
resolve the dispute the plan required them to “follow the recommendation of the respective
professional involved in the decision, i.e., the children’s pediatrician, the children’s
teachers, etc.” (Shared Parenting Plan at 6.)
       {¶ 5} Watson was ordered to pay child support of $1,314 per month until August 31,
2019, and then to pay $1,291 per month beginning September 1, 2019. The plan further
provided that Watson would pay 55 percent of the children’s extracurricular activity
expenses and Lee would pay 45 percent of those expenses.
B. Post-decree motions filed by the parties
       {¶ 6} On December 17, 2018, Watson moved to reallocate parental rights and
responsibilities, seeking modifications to the shared parenting plan. On February 8, 2019,
No. 22AP-729                                                                                                  3

Lee also moved to modify the shared parenting plan. On October 31, 2019, Lee moved to
modify child support and moved for an award of attorney fees and expenses. On January 2,
2020, Watson voluntarily dismissed his December 17, 2018 motion to reallocate parental
rights and responsibilities; the same day Watson again moved to reallocate parental rights
and responsibilities, seeking modifications to the shared parenting plan. On January 3,
2020, Lee voluntarily dismissed her February 8, 2019 motion to modify the shared
parenting plan. Then, on January 13, 2020, Lee again moved to modify the shared
parenting plan. On May 5, 2020, Watson moved for contempt, asserting Lee violated the
shared parenting plan with respect to parenting time on the weekend of May 1, 2020.
        {¶ 7} The trial court appointed Eimear Bahnson as guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for
the children; Bahnson had previously served as GAL during the divorce proceedings. The
GAL issued a report recommending certain modifications to the shared parenting plan.
The trial court also appointed Dr. Farshid Afsarifard to conduct psychological examinations
of Lee and Watson for purposes of custody evaluation. Dr. Afsarifard issued a report
recommending that shared parenting continue on a modified schedule.
C. Hearing on post-decree motions
        {¶ 8} On August 4 through 6, 2021, a magistrate of the trial court conducted a
hearing on Lee’s October 31, 2019 motions to modify child support and for attorney fees
and litigation expenses, Watson’s January 2, 2020 motion to modify parental rights and
responsibilities, Lee’s January 13, 2020 motion to modify the shared parenting plan, and
Watson’s May 5, 2020 motion for contempt. The magistrate heard testimony from Lee,
Watson, and Watson’s new wife.1 The magistrate also heard testimony from the GAL, Dr.
Afsarifard, Lee’s former counselor, Lee’s current psychologist, and a counselor who
previously worked with the children. Following the hearing, the parties submitted written
closing arguments.
D. Magistrate’s decision
        {¶ 9} Following the hearing, the magistrate issued a decision addressing the five
motions. The magistrate noted that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions
of law. With regard to Watson’s motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities and

1 There was a substantial amount of testimony and evidence at the hearing that was not directly related to the

assignments of error Lee asserts in this appeal. For purposes of resolving the appeal, we will confine our focus
to the evidence relevant to Lee’s arguments.
  No. 22AP-729                                                                                            4

  Lee’s motion to modify the shared parenting plan, the magistrate considered the relevant
  factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and (2) for determining the best interest of the
  children. The magistrate granted in part both of the motions and modified certain
  provisions of the shared parenting plan. The magistrate adopted the GAL’s
  recommendations related to decision-making regarding the children’s healthcare needs,
  schooling, extracurricular activities, and work-related daycare.                 The magistrate also
  adopted the GAL’s proposed parenting-time schedule for the school year.
          {¶ 10} The magistrate granted in part Lee’s motion to modify child support and
  increased the child support award. Using Watson’s 2020 income and Lee’s 2021 monthly
  income, the magistrate calculated Watson’s child support obligation as of March 30, 2021
  to be $1,749.52 per month.2 The magistrate noted that despite their combined income
  exceeding the maximum annual income listed on the basic child support schedule, the
  parties did not adjust the original child support calculation based on excess income. The
  magistrate further noted that neither party argued for such an adjustment. Therefore, the
  magistrate found the child support amount calculated based on the guideline worksheet
  was in the best interests of the children and the parties. The magistrate further found it was
  not in the children’s best interest to modify the allocation of child-related expenses from
  the 55-45 percent ratio contained in the shared parenting plan.
          {¶ 11} The magistrate denied Watson’s motion for contempt, finding he failed to
  prove his contempt claim by clear and convincing evidence. The magistrate also denied
  Lee’s motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses, concluding neither party acted in
  bad faith and that certain changes to the shared parenting plan were necessary.
E. Objections to the magistrate’s decision and trial court’s decision on
   objections

          {¶ 12} Both Lee and Watson filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The trial
  court conducted a hearing on the objections on October 17, 2022. Following the hearing,
  on November 4, 2022, the trial court issued a decision fully granting some of the objections,
  granting in part other objections, and denying the remaining objections. As relevant to this
  appeal, the trial court denied Lee’s objection that the magistrate erred in determining how

  2 Although the magistrate indicated the child support calculation was based on the guideline worksheet, no

  worksheet was attached to the magistrate’s decision.
No. 22AP-729                                                                                 5

decisions related to the children’s medical care would be made. The trial court concluded
the magistrate did not err by adopting the GAL’s recommendation on this matter, which
placed final medical decision-making authority with Watson. The trial court granted in
part and denied in part Lee’s objection that the magistrate erred in determining how the
children were enrolled in extracurricular activities and how extracurricular expenses were
allocated. The trial court concluded the magistrate erred by adopting the GAL’s
recommendation as to extracurricular activity decision-making to the extent that the
recommendation required the parties to return to the court for a decision in the event of an
unresolvable disagreement. The court adopted a modified version of the GAL’s
recommendation, which provided that in the event of a disagreement about extracurricular
activities, each parent could enroll each child in one extracurricular activity, and that any
additional activities must be by agreement of both parents. If the parents could not agree
as to additional activities, the child could not be enrolled in them. The trial court concluded
the magistrate did not err by denying Lee’s request for a modification of the existing 55-45
percent ratio for extracurricular expenses.
       {¶ 13} The trial court granted Lee’s objection that the magistrate erred in calculating
the child support amount. Noting that the magistrate did not file a child support worksheet
with the decision, the trial court conducted its own calculation using the child support
worksheet and determined Watson’s child support obligation as of January 1, 2022 to be
$2,795.12 per month. Although the trial court recalculated the child support obligation, it
found the magistrate did not err by not extrapolating the child support award based on the
parties’ total income exceeding the maximum annual income listed on the basic child
support schedule. The trial court denied Lee’s objection that the magistrate erred by not
granting her request for attorney fees, concluding the magistrate considered the proper
factors in denying Lee’s request for attorney fees and litigation expenses.
II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 14} Lee appeals and assigns the following four assignments of error for our
review:
              [I.] The trial court erred, abused its discretion, and ruled
              against the manifest weight of the evidence to modify the
              existing agreed shared parenting plan with regard to medical
              decision-making authority for the parties’ minor children.
No. 22AP-729                                                                              6

              [II.] The trial court erred, abused its discretion, and ruled
              against the manifest weight of the evidence and not in the best
              interest of the children in determining how the children are
              enrolled in extracurricular activities and the allocation of
              extracurricular expenses between the parties.

              [III.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion and ruled
              against the manifest weight of the evidence in determining
              plaintiff-appellee’s income and not extrapolating for purposes
              of child support.

              [IV.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing
              to award attorney fees and litigation expenses.

III. Analysis
A. Standard of review
      {¶ 15} When ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision, a trial court must
“undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the
magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.”
Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). “ ‘The standard of review on appeal from a trial court judgment that
adopts a magistrate’s decision varies with the nature of the issues that were (1) preserved
for review through objections before the trial court and (2) raised on appeal by assignment
of error.’ ” McCarthy v. Johnson, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-961, 2020-Ohio-3429, ¶ 10, quoting
In re Guardianship of Schwarzbach, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-670, 2017-Ohio-7299, ¶ 14.
Generally, we review a trial court’s adoption, rejection, or modification of a magistrate’s
decision for abuse of discretion. Id., citing Lenoir v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th
Dist. No. 19AP-94, 2020-Ohio-387, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,
219 (1983). In the exercise of discretion, however, no court has the authority to commit an
error of law. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 38-39; State v.
Spirnak, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-261, 2020-Ohio-6838, ¶ 16.
B. Whether the trial court erred by modifying the shared parenting plan
   regarding medical decision-making and extracurricular activities

      {¶ 16} In her first assignment of error, Lee argues the trial court erred by modifying
the shared parenting plan with respect to final decision-making authority regarding the
children’s medical care. Similarly, in her second assignment of error, Lee argues the trial
No. 22AP-729                                                                                              7

court erred by modifying the shared parenting plan with respect to how the children would
be enrolled in extracurricular activities and by not modifying the shared parenting plan
with respect to the allocation of extracurricular expenses. Because both of these
assignments of error relate to modifications to the shared parenting plan, we will address
them together.
        {¶ 17} R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b) provides that a court may modify a shared parenting
plan on its own motion or by request of one or both parents “if the court determines that
the modifications are in the best interest of the children.” See also Bruns v. Green, 163
Ohio St.3d 43, 2020-Ohio-4787, ¶ 11 (“[R.C. 3109.04](E)(2)(b) authorizes the trial court—
on its own initiative or at the request of one or both parents—to modify the terms of a
shared-parenting plan when modification is found to be in the best interest of the child.”).
R.C. 3109.04(F) sets forth a non-exclusive list of factors the court must consider in
determining the best interest of a child. On appeal, we review a trial court’s decision on
modification of a shared parenting plan for abuse of discretion. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 10th
Dist. No. 13AP-840, 2014-Ohio-1921, ¶ 43.
        {¶ 18} The parties presented evidence at the hearing regarding the children’s
medical conditions, some of which developed or were diagnosed during and after the
divorce proceedings, and the parties’ management of those conditions. During the parties’
marriage and after the shared parenting plan was in place, Lee took the children to most of
their medical appointments and to all dental and orthodontic appointments.3 Watson
admitted he had not attended any medical appointments related to the oldest child’s
condition but asserted he had attended several appointments with the middle child.
        {¶ 19} The parties disagreed about aspects of the children’s mental health care,
particularly whether the children needed to continue in counseling after the divorce decree
and the appropriate counselor or therapist.               Lee testified the children’s pediatrician
recommended they be assessed and possibly treated by the practice’s in-house
psychologist. The children’s former counselor advised against changing the children to a
different therapist because the transition could have been difficult for them. Lee believed
that under the shared parenting plan the parties were required to follow the

3 The shared parenting plan expressly provided that Lee was responsible for scheduling all of the children’s

well-child appointments, including annual or periodic check-ups.
No. 22AP-729                                                                               8

recommendation of the children’s pediatrician in the event of an unresolvable dispute
regarding medical treatment, including a mental health issue. Watson disagreed with that
interpretation, asserting the children’s pediatrician was not the relevant professional to be
making determinations about counseling for the children. Watson was concerned that Lee
sought an unnecessary change to the children’s counselor and that it would be detrimental
to the children.
       {¶ 20} Watson claimed Lee sometimes manipulated the scheduling of the children’s
medical appointments to prevent them from occurring during his parenting time,
specifically testifying about a time that one of the children’s medical appointments was
scheduled during his parenting time and Lee rescheduled the appointment so it would be
during her parenting time. Watson asserted he felt he could not trust Lee’s decision-making
with regard to the children’s medical care. Lee testified she tried to accurately convey the
information she received from the children’s medical providers and introduced a sample of
the messages she had sent to Watson regarding the children’s medical appointments. Lee
believed Watson did not regularly review her messages about the children’s medical care.
Lee claimed that other than the disagreement about counseling she did not recall Watson
objecting to her decisions related to the children’s medical care. Lee contended she should
be the final decision-maker regarding the children’s medical care based on her history of
managing the children’s medical care if the court chose to modify the shared parenting plan.
       {¶ 21} The GAL testified that when speaking to the children’s medical providers
there was an “underlying theme” that Lee “had no issue undermining [Watson] in front of
the children at [medical] appointments.” (Aug. 6, 2021 Tr. at 581.) The GAL further
testified that she tended to receive different information from the medical providers than
she heard from Lee. The GAL was concerned that Lee misinterpreted recommendations
from professionals, although she believed Lee did not do so intentionally. Because the
children had “health issues that need to be communicated properly,” the GAL
recommended Watson be given final medical decision-making authority in the event of an
unresolvable dispute. (Aug. 6, 2021 Tr. at 581.)
       {¶ 22} With respect to extracurricular activities, there was evidence that each of the
children was involved in multiple activities, including team sports. Both Lee and Watson
testified about Lee’s frequent travel with the children to St. Albans, West Virginia, where
No. 22AP-729                                                                                             9

her family lived, and how that travel affected the children and their extracurricular
activities.4 In one instance, Lee enrolled the children in swimming lessons in West Virginia
and some of the lessons would have occurred during Watson’s parenting time. When
discussing options for transporting the children to the lessons, Lee did not initially advise
Watson that the lessons would occur in West Virginia. There was no specific evidence at
the hearing related to the cost burden of the children’s extracurricular activities but, as
discussed more fully below, there was evidence that both Lee and Watson had full-time
employment, and each earned six-figure incomes. The GAL recommended modifying the
shared parenting plan provisions related to the children’s extracurricular activities.
        {¶ 23} The magistrate’s decision adopted the GAL’s recommendations regarding the
children’s medical care, including that in the event of a dispute, each parent would have the
option to obtain a second opinion, and that if after obtaining a second opinion no decision
could be reached, Watson would have the final decision-making authority.                              The
magistrate’s decision also adopted the GAL’s recommendations regarding extracurricular
activities, including that neither parent could enroll a child in an activity without consent
of the other parent and that if the parents could not reach an agreement, either parent could
submit the issue to the court for a final decision. The magistrate’s decision did not modify
the existing provision for paying the costs of the children’s extracurricular activities, which
provided that Watson was responsible for 55 percent of the costs and Lee was responsible
for 45 percent of the costs.
        {¶ 24} The trial court denied Lee’s objection to the magistrate’s adoption of the
GAL’s recommendation regarding the children’s medical care, which gave Watson final
decision-making authority regarding the children’s medical care. The trial court granted in
part and denied in part Lee’s objection to the magistrate’s adoption of the GAL’s
recommendation regarding the children’s extracurricular activities. The trial court
modified the magistrate’s decision to provide that if the parties could not reach an
agreement, each parent could enroll a child in one extracurricular activity and any other
activities would have to be by mutual agreement or the child could not be enrolled. The
trial court retained the 55-45 percent division of extracurricular activity expenses.

4 Shortly after the divorce decree, Lee purchased a single-family home in West Virginia and raised the

possibility of moving to West Virginia. Lee asserted she abandoned that idea because Watson opposed it, but
Watson was concerned that Lee still intended to move the children to West Virginia.
No. 22AP-729                                                                              10

       {¶ 25} On appeal, Lee argues the evidence presented at the hearing established the
existing provisions in the shared parenting plan related to medical decision-making were
in the children’s best interest. Lee claims Watson had a history of non-involvement with
the children’s medical care and that she was primarily involved in the children’s medical
care. Lee asserts Watson failed to demonstrate he had been actively involved in the
children’s medical care or that she failed to appropriately manage their care. Lee claims
Watson only sought changes to the shared parenting plan as retaliation for her reporting
certain concerns to children services. Similarly, Lee argues the changes to the shared
parenting plan related to extracurricular activities are not in the children’s best interest
because Watson is not committed to ensuring the children’s participation in such activities.
Lee further argues she successfully managed the children’s activities under the existing
provisions of the shared parenting plan. Lee also asserts the 55-45 percent allocation of
extracurricular activity expenses was not in the children’s best interest because of the
disparity between the parties’ incomes.
       {¶ 26} Lee’s arguments on appeal are largely a reiteration of her arguments from the
hearing, asserting the evidence supports her claims and that Watson failed to support his
claims. However, as explained above, we review the trial court’s decision on the parties’
objections to the magistrate’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. “When
applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court.” Byers v. Robinson, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-204, 2008-
Ohio-4833, ¶ 61. “ ‘An abuse of discretion will not be found when the reviewing court
simply could maintain a different opinion were it deciding the issue de novo.’ ” Id., quoting
Peterson v. Crockett Constr., Inc., 7th Dist. No. 99-CO-2 (Dec. 7, 1999). In this case, the
magistrate considered the evidence presented at the hearing and addressed the appropriate
factors when determining the children’s best interests. Although Lee clearly disagrees with
the magistrate’s conclusions and the trial court’s adoption of those conclusions, she has
failed to demonstrate the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in
adopting the magistrate’s decision and modifying the shared parenting plan.
       {¶ 27} Accordingly, we overrule Lee’s first and second assignments of error.
No. 22AP-729                                                                                               11

 C. Whether the trial court erred by determining Watson’s income or by not
    extrapolating the child support obligation due to the parties’ high income

        {¶ 28} In her third assignment of error, Lee proffers two arguments. First, she
asserts the trial court erred in determining Watson’s income for purposes of calculating
child support. Second, she claims the trial court erred by not extrapolating the child
support obligation because the parties’ combined income exceeded the maximum amount
under the basic child support schedule.
        {¶ 29} Lee sought a modification of Watson’s child support obligation. Generally,
we review child support issues for abuse of discretion.5 Boone v. Holmes, 10th Dist. No.
14AP-449, 2015-Ohio-2242, ¶ 6. Accordingly, “[u]nless [a] trial court’s modification of its
original support award was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable, we will not overturn
its determination on appeal.” Id. See Bates v. Bates, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-137, 2005-Ohio-
3374, ¶ 20 (“A trial court’s modification of a prior child support order is within the broad
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”).
        {¶ 30} Watson testified he was employed as a veterinary radiologist at MedVet and
was paid on a production basis, rather than a salary or an hourly wage. Watson introduced
evidence of his income from his employment with MedVet and from a side business,
indicating he had total income of $481,036.00 in 2018, $484,700.00 in 2019, and
$574,077.00 in 2020. Lee introduced a copy of Watson’s paystub from June 30, 2021,
establishing Watson earned $343,874.00 from MedVet for the first half of that year. When
asked whether he expected to receive similar income in the second half of the year, Watson
testified it was hard to determine because his income was based on production and his
caseload fluctuated. Lee began working full-time as a medical data review manager in
March 2021, earning a fixed salary of $10,208.34 per month.
        {¶ 31} The magistrate’s decision noted that if Watson matched his year-to-date
income for the remainder of 2021, he would have a salary of $687,749.86 for the year.
Based on Watson’s testimony that he was paid based on production, however, the

5 We note that notwithstanding the trial court’s discretion in child support matters, this court has held that

“ ‘the court must literally and technically follow the statutory requirements in all material respects’ ” when
determining child support. Habtemariam v. Worku, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-47, 2020-Ohio-3044, ¶ 18, quoting
Wolf-Sabatino v. Sabatino, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1161, 2011-Ohio-6819, ¶ 88, citing Marker v. Grimm, 65 Ohio
St.3d 139 (1992), paragraph two of the syllabus.
No. 22AP-729                                                                                 12

magistrate concluded it would be too speculative to extrapolate Watson’s 2021 salary based
on the year-to-date amounts on his June paycheck. Instead, the magistrate found it
appropriate to rely on Watson’s 2020 income from all sources. Although the trial court
granted Lee’s objection to the magistrate’s child support calculation and ordered Watson
to pay an increased amount, the trial court also relied on Watson’s 2020 income in making
its child support calculation. On appeal, Lee argues the magistrate and the trial court acted
arbitrarily by relying on Watson’s 2020 income rather than projecting his year-to-date 2021
income for a full year.
          {¶ 32} For purposes of calculating child support, a fully employed parent’s income
is defined as gross income. R.C. 3119.01(C)(10). In this context, gross income is “the total
of all earned and unearned income from all sources during a calendar year,” including
income from salaries, wages, bonuses, and other sources. R.C. 3119.01(C)(13). Under R.C.
3119.05(H), when appropriate, the court may average income “over a reasonable period of
years.”
          {¶ 33} The trial court noted that Watson’s 2020 income was “substantially similar”
to the three-year average from 2018 through 2020. (Nov. 4, 2022 Jgmt. Entry on Objs. at
8.)   This suggests the trial court considered averaging Watson’s income under R.C.
3119.05(H), but ultimately elected to calculate child support based on his 2020 income,
which was the greatest full-year amount during that period. As explained above, Watson
testified that his income from MedVet was production based and varied based on how many
x-rays or MRIs he read. Watson expressly testified he did not know if his income in the
second half of 2021 would be consistent with his income from the first half of that year.
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err by using Watson’s 2020 income in its
child support calculation.
          {¶ 34} Lee further argues the trial court erred by not extrapolating the child support
obligation beyond the maximum amount contained in the basic child support schedule.
Under R.C. 3119.021(A), the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services must create a
basic child support schedule to be used in calculating child support unless the parents’
combined annual income is less than a specified minimum guideline income or greater than
a specified maximum guideline income. At the time of the trial court’s decision, the
maximum guideline income was $336,467.04. See R.C. 3119.021(B)(1)(c). When the
No. 22AP-729                                                                                13

parents’ combined annual income exceeds the maximum guideline income contained in the
basic child support schedule, the court must determine the child support obligation on a
case-by-case basis, considering the needs and the standard of living of the children and the
parents. R.C. 3119.04. In such cases, the court must compute a basic combined child
support obligation that is no less than it would have been for the maximum guideline
income on the basic child support schedule, unless it “determines that it would be unjust or
inappropriate and therefore not in the best interest of the child, obligor, or obligee to order
that amount.” R.C. 3119.04.
       {¶ 35} In this case, the trial court determined the parties had a combined adjusted
annual gross income of $691,559.08. Because this exceeded the maximum guideline
income amount under the basic child support schedule, the trial court was required to
compute a child support obligation no less than the maximum amount contained in the
basic child support schedule. In completing its child support worksheet, the trial court used
the combined child support obligation equal to the maximum amount under the basic child
support schedule for a family with three children (i.e., $40,760.00). Lee argues the trial
court erred by not extrapolating the child support obligation beyond the maximum amount
contained in the basic child support schedule.
       {¶ 36} This court recently explained the application of R.C. 3119.04 in cases where
the parents’ combined annual income exceeds the maximum annual income listed in the
basic child support schedule:
              The law * * * steers a trial court in setting child support levels
              for a child of higher income parents to make a calculation of the
              basic worksheet amount. That basic amount sets a preliminary
              floor for the support obligation, which may be adjusted
              downward only on a written determination, supported by
              findings, that such an amount would be “unjust or
              inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child,
              obligor, or oblige[e].” The preliminary floor is not a preliminary
              cap, however, and the court is to set the support level “on a
              case-by-case basis and shall consider the needs and the
              standard of living” of the child and the parents.

Moore v. Moore, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-276, 2022-Ohio-1862, ¶ 76, quoting former R.C.
3119.04(B). In Moore, the trial court completed the child support worksheet using the
combined adjusted annual gross income of the parties to that case (which was more than
No. 22AP-729                                                                              14

$6.8 million) and concluded it was required to order the father to pay the amount of child
support calculated under the worksheet (which was more than $37,000 per month). Id. at
¶ 78-79. On appeal, this court concluded the trial court erred because it misunderstood the
guideline amount under the statute and failed to consider the needs and standard of living
of the child and the parents. Id. at ¶ 80.
       {¶ 37} Unlike Moore, where the trial court effectively concluded it was required to
extrapolate the child support obligation based on the parties’ excess income, Lee asserts the
trial court erred in the present case because it did not extrapolate despite the parties
exceeding the maximum annual income amount.
       {¶ 38} The Moore decision warned against rote extrapolation in high-income cases,
citing an Eighth District Court of Appeals decision authored by then-Judge (now-Justice)
Stewart. Moore at ¶ 89. Rather than mechanically applying the percentages from the child
support schedule to the parents’ excess income, the trial court must engage in a case-by-
case determination based on the needs and standard of living of the children and parents.
Id.
       {¶ 39} The parties presented very little evidence at the hearing regarding the
children’s financial needs and standard of living, and the magistrate noted that Lee “made
no real mention of her motion for child support until her closing.” (Mag.’s Decision at 12.)
The magistrate further noted the parties did not adjust the child support amount upward
in the shared parenting plan based on excess income and concluded that applying the
maximum guideline amount when calculating child support was in the best interest of the
children and the parties.     The trial court found the magistrate did not err by not
extrapolating the child support obligation, thereby effectively adopting the magistrate’s
conclusion that it was not necessary to extrapolate to meet the needs and standard of living
of the children and the parties.
       {¶ 40} On appeal, Lee claims there is a great disparity of income between herself and
Watson. However, other than broadly asserting the children would experience a different
lifestyle in her home as compared to Watson’s home due to that disparity, Lee cites nothing
to establish that the trial court failed to consider the needs and standard of living of the
children or the parties when making its child support award. Moreover, in her own child
support worksheet, attached to her post-hearing brief, Lee did not extrapolate the child
No. 22AP-729                                                                              15

support obligation based on excess income. Lee’s child support worksheet used the same
combined total child support obligation that the trial court used in its worksheet (i.e.,
$40,760.00) and requested the trial court order Watson to pay $2,104.16 in child support.
The trial court’s modified child support award of $2,795.12 per month was more than
double the amount the parties originally agreed to under the shared parenting plan and was
greater than the amount Lee requested in her post-hearing brief. Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in determining the
child support award.
       {¶ 41} Accordingly, we overrule Lee’s third assignment of error.
D. Whether the trial court erred by denying Lee’s motion for attorney fees and
   litigation expenses

       {¶ 42} In her fourth assignment of error, Lee asserts the trial court erred by denying
her motion for attorney fees and litigation expenses.
       {¶ 43} Lee sought attorney fees and litigation expenses under R.C. 3105.73(B),
which provides that in any post-decree motion or proceeding arising out of a divorce action,
“the court may award all or part of reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to
either party if the court finds the award equitable.” When determining whether an award
of attorney fees and expenses is equitable, the court may consider the parties’ income,
conduct, and any other relevant factors it deems appropriate, but may not consider the
parties’ assets. R.C. 3105.73(B). An award of attorney fees under R.C. 3105.73(B) lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Roush v. Roush, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-246,
2019-Ohio-4777, ¶ 15; Roubanes v. Roubanes, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-183, 2014-Ohio-5163,
¶ 6. Therefore, we will not overturn a trial court’s decision on a motion for attorney fees
under R.C. 3105.73(B) absent an abuse of discretion.
       {¶ 44} At the hearing, Lee testified the proceedings had been a financial hardship on
her. She introduced evidence that she had incurred $122,692.78 in legal fees and expenses,
and testified she believed those fees and expenses to be reasonable and appropriate.
Watson stipulated that Lee’s attorney charged a reasonable rate and that the attorney fees
were reasonable and necessary. Watson also introduced evidence of his own attorney fees
and expenses, amounting to $81,101.98.
No. 22AP-729                                                                                   16

       {¶ 45} The magistrate found that some of the allegations made by the parties were
supported by the evidence while others were not and concluded that neither party acted in
bad faith in pursuing their claims. The magistrate further found that changes to the shared
parenting plan had been necessary to make it workable for the family. Based on a review
of the record and consideration of the relative incomes of the parties after exchange of
support, the magistrate concluded it was not appropriate to award attorney fees to either
party. In denying Lee’s objection to this part of the magistrate’s decision, the trial court
noted the magistrate applied the proper analysis by considering the factors under R.C.
3105.73(B) and neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law that would
have provided more detail on the magistrate’s reasoning.
       {¶ 46} On appeal, Lee contests the magistrate’s conclusion that neither party acted
in bad faith, alleging Watson sought to modify the shared parenting plan only nine months
after the divorce decree was entered. She claims Watson made unsupported allegations
against her during litigation. Lee also cites Watson’s income advantage and claims he used
his greater financial resources to extend the litigation.
       {¶ 47} Disparity in income is one factor the trial court may consider when
determining a motion for attorney fees under R.C. 3105.73(B), and this court has affirmed
attorney fee awards where the trial court found income disparity between the parties. See,
e.g., Darr v. Livingston, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-315, 2017-Ohio-841, ¶ 27; Epitropoulos v.
Epitropoulos, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-877, 2011-Ohio-3701, ¶ 44. Other factors, however, such
as the conduct of the parties, also may contribute to a trial court’s finding that it is equitable
to award attorney fees. See Darr at ¶ 26-27 (noting that both the disparity of income and
the appellant’s conduct weighed heavily in the trial court’s analysis of whether an award of
attorney fees was equitable); Epitropoulos at ¶ 45 (noting that trial court considered the
appellant’s conduct in discovery that increased appellee’s litigation expenses). Moreover,
a showing of income disparity alone is not necessarily dispositive, as demonstrated by this
court’s decision in Williams v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-739, 2016-Ohio-3344. In that
case, this court affirmed an order compelling the mother to pay some of the father’s
attorney fees despite his income being twice as much as hers, because the magistrate found
that both the mother and her attorney engaged in conduct that was detrimental to progress
in the case and discouraged settlement. Williams at ¶ 22-26.
No. 22AP-729                                                                               17

       {¶ 48} In this case, the magistrate’s decision indicates she considered the relevant
factors under the statute in denying Lee’s motion for attorney fees. As the trial court noted,
neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law that would have provided
more detail as to the magistrate’s reasoning. Lee argues that Watson moved to modify the
shared parenting plan less than one year after it was implemented, but the record
establishes that both parties were actively engaged in post-decree litigation and both parties
filed various motions seeking relief from the trial court. Under these circumstances, we
cannot find the trial court abused its discretion by denying Lee’s objection to the
magistrate’s denial of her motion for attorney fees. Accordingly, we overrule Lee’s fourth
assignment of error.
IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 49} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Lee’s four assignments of error and
affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic
Relations.
                                                                        Judgment affirmed.

                           BOGGS and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.