Court Opinion

ID: 9702140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:56:30.262711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:33.985637
License: Public Domain

*84The opinion of the court was delivered by
Oliphant, J.
This appeal presents to us but a single question, namely whether or not R. S. 46:36 — 1 makes the contributory negligence of a bailee or lessee’s agent, servant or employee under the facts of the particular case a bar to plaintiff’s recovery.
This cause is before the court as the result of our having granted plaintiff’s petition for certification to review a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court which affirmed a judgment of the Passaic County District Court entered in favor of the defendant.
The plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation, filed a complaint on July 5, 1950, against the defendant for property damages sustained by it as the result of a collision between its automobile and that of the defendant in Upper Montclair, New Jersey. At the time of the accident plaintiff’s car was under lease by written instrument to Veeder-Root, Inc., and was in the possession of William T. Heydt, Sr., an employee of the lessee.
The record shows that the defendant here originally brought suit in the Essex County District Court against Heydt to recover for personal injuries and property damage suffered by her from the accident. There was a verdict of no cause for action, the court finding negligence on the part of both the defendant here and Heydt. The instant action was then brought and at the trial defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the judgment rendered in the Essex County District Court was res adjudicata because Heydt was not the agent of the plaintiff-bailor, and the court having found that both the defendant and Heydt were negligent and that the cause arose out of the same accident, plaintiff’s suit against her was barred, the negligence of Heydt being imputable to the plaintiff as bailor.
This motion to dismiss was denied on the ground that the judgment in the Essex County District Court was not res adjudicata, and the court declared the statute R. S. 46:36-1, pertaining to the contributory negligence of a bailee, his *85agents, servants or employees, which provides that such contributory negligence shall constitute a proper and valid defense to an action for damages to the goods and that it be a complete bar to recovery in the same manner as though the suit was brought by the bailee or his agents, servants or employees, was not applicable. Judgment was rendered for the defendant because of plaintiff’s failure to establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence.
On appeal to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court the judgment rendered below was affirmed. That court, however, determined that both the defendant and Heydt were negligent and that the judgment rendered in the Essex County District Court was not res adjudicóla of the instant action, but contra to the declaration of the Passaic County District Court held that R. S. 46:36-1 was applicable and that therefore the negligence of Heydt was imputable to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s attorney, after judgment was entered in the Passaic County District Court, for appeal purposes, served on defendant’s attorney a statement of evidence and proceedings in lieu of stenographic transcript, Buie 1:2-23, which was approved by defendant’s attorney. There appears therein the following:
“Plaintiff then produced William T. Heydt, Sr., who testified that he was at the time of the accident in the employ of VeederRoot, Inc., which had leased plaintiff’s automobile * *
A statement such as this is in the nature of a stipulation; it is to be taken most strongly against him who prepares it. An agreement as to certain facts in a case conclude the parties, so far as they go and is binding particularly on the party who makes it. Decker v. Smith & Co., 88 N. J. L. 630 (E. & A. 1915); R. E. Dudley Co., Inc., v. Aron et al., 106 N. J. L. 100 (E. & A. 1929).
But in the statement of evidence it is further said: “He (Heydt) further testified that he was taking his four children *86for haircuts * * and in the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared and filed by the court, Buie 7:13 — 3, appears the following: “The witness, Heydt, testified that at the time of the accident he was using the car on his own business, namely, for the purpose of taking his four children for a haircut.”
Were it not for this conflict of fact we could conclude the matter on the ground that Heydt, who was unable to recover because of his negligence, was at the time of the accident the employee of Veeder-Root, Inc., the lessee or bailee, his contributory negligence was imputable to them, and under the plain wording of the statute this contributory negligence of the agent of the bailee or the lessee is' a valid defense against an action by the bailor based on the same facts and circumstances.
R. S. 46:36-1 provides:
“Whenever a conditional vendor, bailor, or owner of the general property in goods or chattels or the assignee or assignees of said conditional vendor, bailor or owner of the general property in goods or chattels, shall institute suit for damages to said goods or chattels, while the same are in the custody, control or possession of the conditional vendee, bailee, or owner of the special property in said goods or chattels or the agents, servants, or employees of said conditional vendee, bailee, or owner of the special property in said goods and chattels, against a third party or parties, or against the agents, servants, or employees of said third party or parties, or both, based on the negligence of the said third party or parties, or the agents, servants, or employees of said third party or parties, the contributory negligence of the conditional vendee, bailee, or owner of the special property in said goods or chattels, or of the agents, servants, or employees of said conditional vendee, bailee or owner of the said special property in said goods or chattels, shall constitute a proper and valid defense to said action and be a complete bar to recovery in the same manner as though suit were brought by the conditional vendee, bailee, or owner of the special property in said goods or chattels or by the agents, servants or employees of the conditional vendee, bailee, or owner of the special property in said goods and chattels.”
Prior to the enactment of this statute in 1939 the negligence of a bailee was not imputable to his bailor unless he was acting as the bailor’s agent at the time of the accident, *87Commercial Credit Corp. v. Satterthwaite, 107 N. J. L. 17 (Sup. Ct. 1930), affirmed 108 N. J. L. 188 (E. & A. 1931), and an owner of a motor vehicle was not liable for his employee’s negligence, if at the time of the accident he was not engaged on his employer’s business, Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754 (E. & A. 1908). As a result, it frequently happened that one party to an accident was allowed the defense of contributory negligence against the bailee, his agents, servants or employees, but that party was denied that defense against the bailor or lessor in an action arising out of the same accident because his employee was not acting as his agent at the time of the accident. The act was passed to remedy this inequity.
The statute being remedial in nature as such should be liberally construed in order to remedy the mischief aimed at. Board of Conservation & Development v. Veeder, 89 N. J. L. 561 (E. & A. 1916). The obvious intention of the Legislature was to bar any recovery when both drivers were negligent by either the drivers themselves or the persons who gave them custody of the vehicles and permission to drive them.
The wording of the statute itself does not limit its application to agents, servants or employees who are acting within the scope of their agency or employment. Here the car was admittedly in the custody and control of Heydt because of his status as an employee of Yeeder-Root, Inc. The fact that he was taking his children for haircuts did not terminate his employment. If it was the intention of the Legislature to limit the operation of the statute to agents who were acting within the scope of their agency it could easily and would have said so. Since it failed to do this the act should not be construed as correcting only one small part of the injustice at which it was aimed. The wording “agents, servants or employees” should not be given a restricted meaning by the courts when the enacting body did not see fit to so restrict it. In construing statutes the inquiry is to determine the purpose and intent of the Legis*88lature and if the statute under consideration alters or amends the previous law or creates or abolishes types of actions it is important in discovering the intention of the Legislature to ascertain the old law, the mischief and the proposed remedy. Blackman v. Iles, 4 N. J. 82, 89 (1950).
The statute in terms and intent barring a recovery by the bailor under the facts exhibited, the judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.