Court Opinion

ID: 9406739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-03 17:01:01.490655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:32.888128
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                     FILED
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     JUL 3 2023
                                                                    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                     U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTELMO VELASQUEZ,                               No.   21-469

                 Petitioner,                     Agency No. A075-624-696

    v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                 Respondent.

                      On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals

                                Submitted June 29, 2023**
                                  Pasadena, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

         Petitioner Antelmo Velasquez seeks review of a Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ)

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
   The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
denying asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

      Where, as here, “the BIA issues its own decision but relies in part on the

immigration judge’s reasoning, we review both decisions.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v.

Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685

F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2012)). We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo

and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25

F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). To overturn the agency’s factual findings, a

petitioner must show that “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Zehatye v. Gonzales,

453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

      First, Velasquez contends that the IJ erred in noting that Velasquez failed to

supply a declaration from his father. But “[b]ecause the BIA did not reach this

ground, we do not consider it here.” Guan v. Barr, 925 F.3d 1022, 1030 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2019).

1
 Although Velasquez appealed the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal to the BIA,
he abandons that claim here. See Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1125 n.1 (9th Cir.
2015). Even assuming Velasquez had not abandoned the claim, his withholding
claim would still fail in light of our denial of his petition for review of asylum, which
aside from the nexus context sets a lower bar for relief than withholding of removal.
See Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1995).

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      Second, Velasquez contends that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of

his asylum claim. To establish eligibility for asylum, Velasquez must show that he

has a “well-founded fear of future persecution” on account of a protected ground.

Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). The BIA affirmed the denial of asylum because it found no clear

error in either the IJ’s finding that Velasquez did not suffer past persecution or that

Velasquez lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution. Velasquez has not

shown that the BIA erred.

      Velasquez argues that he suffered past persecution because he was robbed in

June 2012. Although his testimony was less than precise regarding who committed

the robbery, it suggests that he believed the robbery was committed by “corrupt

police” operating on behalf of Velasquez’s political “rivals.” Velasquez testified

that in this robbery his money was stolen, his credentials were ripped up, and he was

threatened with “disappear[ance]” if he reported the robbery or if they saw him

“there.” Velasquez does not argue that he suffered any physical harm from the

robbery. And although he gestures at a connection between this 2012 robbery and

physical attacks his father suffered in 1989, he fails to show that his robbery was

anything more than an isolated incident. See Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172,

1174, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2004). Nor do the vague threats issued against Velasquez

transform his robbery into past persecution. See Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th

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Cir. 2000). Velasquez thus fails to show the BIA erred in determining that he did

not suffer past persecution. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir.

2009) (“Persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of

treatment our society regards as offensive.” (cleaned up)).

      Velasquez also argues that, even if he did not experience past persecution, he

has a well-founded fear of future persecution. To show a well-founded fear of future

persecution, Velasquez must show “that he has a good reason to fear future

persecution by adducing credible, direct, and specific evidence … that would

support a reasonable fear of persecution.” Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 673

(9th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up).

      Velasquez contends that he has a reasonable fear of persecution because the

police in Mexico are corrupt and, more specifically, that they are loyal to the

Revolutionary Political Party (PRI), which Velasquez testified is a rival party to his

own political party, the Morena Party. The country conditions evidence indicates

that Mexico’s police suffer from corruption, but that does not compel the conclusion

that Velasquez himself faces a particular risk of persecution upon return to Mexico.

See Prasad, 47 F.3d at 340. Nor does the country conditions evidence indicate that

the police are loyal to the PRI. And although Velasquez testified that the police and

the PRI are the “same corrupt group,” that the PRI pays the police, and that the

robbery he suffered was inflicted by the police on behalf of the PRI, the BIA found

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that Velasquez did not provide any “persuasive evidence that his political rivals

remain interested in him after the June 2012 encounter.” Velasquez has not shown

this finding lacks substantial evidence. Thus, even assuming that Velasquez is right

that the police are loyal to the PRI, he has not shown that the PRI poses a threat to

him. See id. at 339.

      Velasquez also relies on an attack against his father that occurred in 1989 as

evidence that he has a reasonable fear of persecution. But as the BIA found, the

attacks against his father were “too distant in time” to give rise to a reasonable fear

of harm against Velasquez. See Belayneh v. INS, 213 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 2000).

      Third, Velasquez contends that the BIA erred in affirming the denial of his

application for CAT relief. “For CAT relief, the alien must prove that it is ‘more

likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country.’”

Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 361 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.16(c)(2)). Velasquez argues that he will more likely than not be tortured upon

his return to Mexico because of corruption in the Mexican “police forces,” the fact

that the Mexican police have engaged in torture, and the low success rate of

prosecutions for torture. He does not argue that he suffered past torture. Because

none of his evidence—viewed individually or together—compels the conclusion that

Velasquez “faces a particularized, ongoing risk of future torture,” Velasquez has not

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shown the agency’s CAT conclusion merits reversal. Tzompantzi-Salazar, 32 F.4th

at 706–07.

      PETITION DENIED.

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