Court Opinion

ID: 9556944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-19 17:10:44.853683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:35.345086
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00170-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

CHAUNCEY ROBIN SAUCEDO,                                                    Appellant,

                                              v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 105th District Court
                         of Kleberg County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                  Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

      Appellant Chauncey Robin Saucedo appeals a judgment revoking his community

supervision and imposing a sentence of eight years’ confinement for his theft conviction,

a state-jail felony enhanced for punishment to a third-degree felony by Saucedo’s two
prior state-jail felony convictions. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.425(a),

31.03(e)(4)(D). In one issue, Saucedo argues his sentence is grossly disproportionate to

the seriousness of the offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel

and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend VIII. We affirm.

                          I.     CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

A.    Standard of Review & Applicable Law

      The Eighth Amendment—made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment—prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments, which includes

extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Graham v. Florida, 560

U.S. 48, 58–60 (2010); see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); id.

amend. XIV. An allegation of excessive or disproportionate punishment is a legal claim

based on a “narrow principle that does not require strict proportionality between the crime

and the sentence.” State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). A successful

challenge to proportionality is exceedingly rare and requires a finding of “gross

disproportionality.” Id. at 322–23 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)). To

determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, “a court must judge the

severity of the sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim, the

culpability of the offender, and the offender’s prior adjudicated and unadjudicated

offenses.” Id. at 323 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60). “In the rare case in which this

threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, the court should

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then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders

in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other

jurisdictions.” Id. “If this comparative analysis validates an initial judgment that the

sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and unusual.” Id.

       “Only twice has the Supreme Court held that a non-capital sentence imposed on

an adult was constitutionally disproportionate.” Id. (citing United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d

1294, 1336–38 (11th Circ. 2010)); see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding that

life imprisonment without parole was a grossly disproportionate sentence for the crime of

uttering a no-account check for $100); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)

(holding that fifteen years punishment in a prison camp was grossly disproportionate to

the crime of falsifying a public record)). A trial court’s discretion to assess punishment

within the statutory range is essentially unfettered. Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320,

323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Generally, punishment assessed within the statutory limits is

not excessive, cruel, or unusual. See Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. ref’d).

B.     Preservation

       “[We] may not reverse a judgment of conviction without first addressing any issue

of error preservation.” Darcy v. State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 327–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(first citing Gipson v. State, 383 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); then citing

Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). To preserve a

complaint that a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must

present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds

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for the ruling desired. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Navarro v. State, 588 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2019, no pet.) (holding that to preserve a disproportionate-sentencing complaint, the

defendant must make a timely, specific objection in the trial court or raise the issue in a

motion for new trial); Toledo v. State, 519 S.W.3d 273, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (same).

C.     Analysis

       In the trial court, Saucedo did not object or file a motion for new trial on the basis

that his sentence was disproportionate to the charged offense or unconstitutional in any

manner. Furthermore, the eight-year sentence falls within the the statutory punishment

range for third-degree felony offenses, to which his sentence was enhanced for

punishment purposes. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34(a) (providing that punishment

for third-degree felonies may include “any term of not more than 10 years or less than 2

years”). Accordingly, we hold that Saucedo failed to preserve this complaint for our

review. See Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927–28 (“Because the sentence imposed is within

the punishment range and is not illegal, we conclude that the rights [appellant] asserts for

the first time on appeal are not so fundamental as to have relieved him of the necessity

of a timely, specific trial objection.”); see also Copeland v. State, No. 05-16-00293-CR,

2017 WL 3725729, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (holding that an eight-year sentence for theft was not cruel

and unusual punishment).

       Even if we were to address Saucedo’s Eighth Amendment claim and assume a

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threshold inference of disproportionality, he presented no evidence in the trial court, and

presents no argument on appeal, “compar[ing] [his] sentence with the sentences received

by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same

crime in other jurisdictions.” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. Absent this comparative

analysis, we are unable to conclude that the sentences are grossly disproportionate. See

id.; see also Esquivel v. State, No. 13-21-00179-CR, 2022 WL 17492274, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 8, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge where appellant offered no

comparative evidence of sentences received by other offenders). We overrule Saucedo’s

sole issue.

                                   II.    CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                              L. ARON PEÑA JR.
                                                              Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
17th day of August, 2023.

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