Court Opinion

ID: 9687815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:49:55.201929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:32.098046
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 57. (concurring). I concur with the majority only because I agree that the issue before us is moot. I write separately, however, because I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 806.07(l)(h) was used appropriately here to consider a person's supervised release status when that person has not as yet *328been released. I would not overrule or distinguish State v. Sprosty (Sprosty III), 2001 WI App 231, 248 Wis. 2d 480, 636 N.W.2d 213, State v. Brown, 215 Wis. 2d 716, 573 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1997), and State v. Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d 599, 556 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996). Rather, I would follow and apply such precedent in this case.
¶ 58. I am persuaded that the protections for such persons that are contained within Wis. Stat. ch. 980 are applicable when Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is used. Here, however, the majority robs local district attorneys and circuit judges of a necessary tool for review of a supervised release order where extraordinary circumstances exist and protection of the public requires swift action.
¶ 59. Although the majority overrules Castillo, I would not do so, since Castillo accurately points out that Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) refers only to released persons. Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d at 609. To hold that sec. 980.08(6m) is applicable to persons who have not yet been released ignores the plain language of the statute. Thus, sec. 980.08(6m) cannot be used where a supervised release order is reviewed in regard to a person who continues to be institutionalized, nor can it be used by a district attorney or a judge who is concerned for the public's safety.
¶ 60. The reasoning in Brown is also applicable to this case. In Brown, the court of appeals observed that Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2) provided that Wis. Stat. chs. 801-847 apply to all civil proceedings, unless otherwise indicated by statute. Brown, 215 Wis. 2d at 721. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 980 does not contain statutory language mandating that a procedure other than Wis. Stat. § 806.07(l)(h) be used in circumstances such as those presented here. A proceeding under ch. 980 is a civil proceeding and does not contain language to the con*329trary. Thus, I am satisfied that sec. 806.07(l)(h) may be used in proceedings such as the one we are reviewing here.
¶ 61. Moreover, in Sprosty III, the court of appeals determined that Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) (h) could be used in Wis. Stat. ch. 980 proceedings. Sprosty III, 248 Wis. 2d 480, ¶ 2. I agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the requirement that extraordinary circumstances be present before relief is granted under sec. 806.07(1)(h) sufficiently guards against the haphazard use of this provision. Id., ¶ 16.
¶ 62. With respect to Morford's proceedings, Wis. Stat. § 806.07(l)(h) was used appropriately to review and grant relief from the supervised release order. After conducting the evidentiary hearings, the circuit court found that the State presented new evidence that demonstrated that Morford was still a sexually violent person. The circuit court applied Wis. Stat. ch. 980 standards in rendering its decision as to whether the State's motion, pursuant to sec. 806.07(l)(h), should be granted.
¶ 63. Further, according to Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m), the appropriate burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence. Where Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is used to review and grant relief from an order granting supervised release, I conclude that, consistent with sec. 980.08(6m), the State must prove "by clear and convincing evidence that any rule or condition of release has been violated, or that the safety of others requires that supervised release be revoked." Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m). The circuit court applied the clear and convincing evidence burden in deciding the State's motion here.
¶ 64. In the past, this court has concluded that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 provides sufficient safeguards for *330committing sexually violent persons and does not violate due process rights. In State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 293-94, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995), we held that ch. 980 did not violate the substantive due process guarantees of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.1 We rejected the respondents' arguments that a finding of a mental disorder, as required by ch. 980, was not narrowly tailored to comply with strict scrutiny. Id. at 307. We concluded that ch. 980, as drafted, ensures that only dangerous sexual predators with predispositions to reoffend are committed as sexually violent persons. Id. Moreover, we concluded that treatment was a legitimate goal under ch. 980. Id. at 311. We also rejected the respondents' arguments that ch. 980's definition of dangerousness was unconstitutional. Id. at 312. We stated that the Wisconsin Legislature's framework for discerning whether a person was predisposed to commit sexually violent acts was constitutionally sound. Id. at 312-13. Finally, we concluded that ch. 980 comported with due process regarding concerns of nature and duration of commitment. Id. at 316.
¶ 65. In State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶ 68, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762, we held that, as amended, Wis. Stat. ch. 980 continued to comport with substantive due process requirements. We noted that, simply because a sexually violent person's access to supervised release was curtailed, ch. 980 did not violate due process. Id., ¶ 66. We concluded that the intent of ch. 980 was satisfied where proceedings could be initiated *331to determine whether the dangerousness of the individual was commensurate with the level of physical confinement imposed. Id.
¶ 66. In State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, ¶ 23, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784, we held that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 satisfied the requirements of due process because, implicit in the finding that an individual should be committed as a sexually violent person because he or she has a mental disorder and is dangerous, is the presumption that the individual has difficulty in controlling his or her behavior. Because ch. 980 distinguishes between recidivists, in general, and individuals whose mental disorder makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in sexually violent behavior, we concluded that ch. 980 is narrowly tailored and, thus, comports with due process. Id.
¶ 67. I am satisfied that due process requires that the protections embodied in Wis. Stat. ch. 980 remain applicable when Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is used to review and, perhaps, provide relief from an order granting supervised release. State v. VanBronkhorst, 2001 WI App 190, ¶ 7, 247 Wis. 2d 247, 633 N.W.2d 236. Sexually violent persons have a right to due process protections in ch. 980 revocation proceedings. Id. The court of appeals in VanBronkhorst stated that, in revocation proceedings under ch. 980, sexually violent persons are entitled to the same due process protections as those afforded to parolees and probationers. Id., ¶ 9. Simply because sec. 806.07(1)(h) is used to review and grant relief from an order for supervised release, it does not follow that sexually violent persons should be without the protections afforded by ch. 980.
¶ 68. Applying the protections of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) provides appropriate protection to the public and to a sexually violent person *332as well. With respect to public safety, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) allows the court to consider the safety of others when determining whether a person's supervised release should be revoked. Those same safety considerations should not be discarded simply because sec. 806.07(l)(h) is used to review a supervised release order.
¶ 69. Sexually violent persons are also protected under this framework. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 980 affords multiple protections to sexually violent persons, which will remain applicable when Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is used. Wisconsin Stat. § 980.03 outlines the rights persons have when the State files a ch. 980 petition against them. For example, under sec. 980.03(1), the person is guaranteed reasonable notice of the hearing. Further, the court of appeals has held that when a court acts on its own motion pursuant to sec. 806.07(1), parties must be given notice and be afforded the opportunity to be heard. In Gittel v. Abram, 2002 WI App 113, ¶ 27, 255 Wis. 2d 767, 649 N.W.2d 661, the court of appeals allowed a court, sua sponte, to initiate consideration under § 806.07(1). Id. In Morford's case, a motion was brought by the State, after the circuit court seemed to suggest that a review was necessary.
¶ 70. Under Wis. Stat. § 980.03(2), a person has the right to counsel,2 the right to remain silent,3 the right to present and cross-examine witnesses,4 and the right to have the hearing recorded by a court reporter.5 Section 980.03(4) provides that when a person is required to undergo an examination under Wis. Stat. ch. *333980, he or she is allowed to hire his or her own expert to conduct an examination. Section 980.03(4) further provides that the county will pay for a court appointed expert for indigent persons.
¶ 71. Considerations of due process require that sexually violent persons must be afforded the same protections when Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1) (h) is used, as would be applicable when Wis. Stat. ch. 980 is used for a review of a supervised release order or status.
¶ 72. The majority needlessly binds the hands of district attorneys and circuit judges, and vests all of the power in the hands of the Department of Health and Family Services. Both district attorneys and circuit judges should be permitted to use Wis. Stat. § 806.07(l)(h), when necessary where extraordinary circumstances exist, to consider prior supervised release orders. By placing the burden on DHFS entirely, the majority accepts the risk that sexually violent persons, who still pose a danger to others, will be released because DHFS did not move for review of the person's continuing violent tendencies, as occurred here.
¶ 73. In summary, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) provided authority for the circuit court's consideration of its prior supervised release order. Here, sec. 806.07(1)(h) was used appropriately to review Morford's supervised release status and to grant relief from the circuit court's previous order. Where such statutory section is used, however, the protections afforded by Wis. Stat. ch. 980 to a person previously found to be sexually violent are still applicable, in order to satisfy the requirements of due process. Such protections were afforded to. Morford in this case. These protections include the right to have reasonable notice of the hearing, the right to counsel, the right to remain *334silent, the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, the right to have the hearing recorded by a court reporter, and the use of the heightened burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 74. Rather than follow established precedent, the majority, in this case, tosses it out and, in doing so, robs local district attorneys and circuit judges of a necessary tool for review of a supervised release order where extraordinary circumstances exist, and protection of the public requires swift action.
¶ 75. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.
¶ 76. I am authorized to state that Justices JON E WILCOX and PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK join this concurrence.

 In State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 293-94, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995), we also held that Wis. Stat. ch. 980 did not violate the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.

 Wis. Stat. § 980.08(2)(a).

 Wis. Stat. § 980.08(2) (b).

 Wis. Stat. § 980.08(2)(c).

 Wis. Stat. § 980.08(2)(d).