Court Opinion

ID: 9919079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 15:07:19.592761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:22.526950
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2616-21

J.P.,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

J.N.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
________________________

                   Submitted December 12, 2023 – Decided January 17, 2024

                   Before Judges Whipple, Mayer, and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-9584-21.

                   J.P., appellant pro se.

                   Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, PA, attorneys for
                   respondent (John Edmund Hogan, Jr. and Pierre
                   Chwang, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
        Plaintiff J.P.1 appeals from a March 18, 2022 order dismissing his

complaint with prejudice and denying his cross-motion for summary judgment

against defendant J.N. We affirm.

                                          I.

        We glean the facts from the motion record. Plaintiff is defendant's son.

In 2015, plaintiff filed a Law Division complaint against defendant, asserting

various tort claims (underlying litigation).         Following the exchange of

discovery, including expert reports, the parties engaged in settlement

negotiations through counsel.

        On September 14, 2017, as the underlying litigation continued, defendant

purchased a condominium in Spring Lake, with a $68,250 down payment and a

$174,250 mortgage. 2 The deed to the condominium was recorded on October

10, 2017, and titled in the name of defendant, his wife, and son, with defendant

and his wife each holding a 49.5% interest in the property, and defendant's son

owning the remaining 1% interest.

1
    Because the record is sealed, we use the parties' initials. R. 1:38-11.
2
   Plaintiff mistakenly claims defendant purchased the condominium on
September 29, 2017.
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                                          2
      The record reflects the parties and their counsel attended a settlement

conference before Judge Mayra V. Tarantino on October 4, 2017, but were

unable to resolve the matter.      Further, the record shows the parties were

scheduled to proceed to a Lopez hearing3 on July 16, 2018. According to an

October 9, 2018 certification filed by plaintiff's former counsel in the underlying

litigation, "[s]everal weeks before the [Lopez] hearing[,] the case [was]

conferenced by Judge Tarantino," who attempted "[t]o address the gap between

[p]laintiff's settlement demand and [d]efendant's [then settlement] offer."

      Plaintiff's former counsel also stated in his October 9 certification that

during that 2018 conference, Judge Tarantino "recommended . . . [d]efendant

provide [p]laintiff's attorney with a schedule of assets and liabilities for

attorney's eyes only . . . . to substantiate [d]efendant's claim that his ability to

settle was limited by his assets." In the same certification, plaintiff's former

attorney stated, "[d]efendant previously sent me a financial statement listing

[d]efendant's assets and liabilities for my eyes only. I have not shared it with

my client."     Counsel also certified that based on additional settlement

3
  A Lopez hearing is meant to provide an opportunity for the "equitable claims
of opposing parties [to] be identified, evaluated and weighed" by the trial court
before determining the date upon which a plaintiff became aware of the facts
giving rise to the cause of action. Lopez v. Sawyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274 (1973).
                                                                              A-2616-21
                                         3
discussions on July 11, 2018 between himself and defendant's then attorney,4

they "communicated to the [c]ourt . . . the case was resolved[,] and the Lopez

hearing was adjourned."

      The parties were unable to finalize the terms of a settlement until the

following year, although defendant's attorney provided plaintiff's former

counsel with a draft settlement agreement in August 2018.              Then, with no

admission of liability by defendant, the parties fully executed a confidential

settlement agreement (CSA) on November 26, 2019.

      Under the CSA, defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $225,000, in

three installments over the course of two years. The first payment of $120,000

was due five days after the CSA was executed; the second installment of $52,500

was due one year later; and the final payment of $52,500 was due in November

2021. The CSA also provided:

            [Defendant] shall maintain a Last Will and Testament
            (Will) which shall provide that [plaintiff] shall be
            entitled to inherit one-third (1/3 or 33.334%) of
            [defendant]'s probated estate as valued as of the time
            that said Will is filed for probate . . . . In the event . . .
            that any Will . . . fails to contain the aforementioned
            term[,] . . . the executor or administrator of the estate
            shall take the necessary measures to enforce the
            requirements of this [CSA]. . . . It is understood that

4
  Defendant's counsel during the underlying litigation also represents defendant
on the current appeal.
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                                          4
           any . . . expenditures, . . . or actions by [defendant]
           done prior to the [effective date of the CSA] shall not
           be a basis to contest the value of [defendant's] probated
           estate.

           [(Emphasis added).]

     Additionally, under the CSA, plaintiff agreed to "release[] and

discharge[]" defendant

           from all known and unknown charges, complaints,
           claims, grievances, liabilities, . . . damages, actions,
           causes of action, . . . and punitive damages, of any
           nature whatsoever, . . . which [plaintiff] has, or may
           have had, against [defendant], whether or not apparent
           or yet to be discovered, or which may hereafter
           develop, for any acts or omissions related to or arising
           from . . . [the underlying litigation] between [the
           parties] during their lifetime up to and including the
           [e]ffective [d]ate [of the CSA,] but for breach or fraud
           relative to this settlement.

           [(Emphasis added).]

     Claims were defined under the CSA, in part, as:

           [A]ny and all actual . . . or alleged past or present claim,
           action, . . . cause of action and any other assertion of
           liability of any kind, . . . whether currently known or
           unknown, . . . and whether sounding in tort, . . . or
           common law cause of action of any sort. Without
           limiting the generality of the foregoing, ["]Claim["] shall
           include any past or current claim in law, equity,
           contract, tort, . . . or any other claim . . . whether known
           or unknown, which [plaintiff] . . . may hold arising from
           any and all allegations between the [parties] from the

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                                        5
            beginning of time through the effective date [of the
            CSA] . . . which might not yet have accrued.

            [(Emphasis added).]

      Finally, the CSA confirmed defendant provided a list of assets and

liabilities to plaintiff's former counsel "for [counsel's] eyes only" before the

parties executed the CSA. Specifically, the CSA stated:

            In entering into this [CSA], the [p]arties acknowledge
            that they have relied upon the legal advice of their
            respective attorneys, . . . that [the CSA's] terms are fully
            understood and voluntarily accepted by them, and that,
            other than the consideration set forth herein, no
            promises or representations of any kind have been made
            to them by the other [p]arty. The [p]arties represent and
            acknowledge that in executing this [CSA,] they did not
            rely, and have not relied, upon any representation or
            statement, whether oral or written, made by the other
            [p]arty or by that other [p]arty's . . . attorneys with
            regard to . . . this [CSA] or otherwise but for the
            provision of [defendant's] balance sheet to . . .
            [plaintiff's attorney] for his eye's only, at the
            recommendation and advice of the [c]ourt, which was
            provided . . . to enable [plaintiff] to discern
            [defendant's] liquidity and ability to pay a settlement.

            [(Emphasis added).]

      Consistent with the CSA, defendant made his last settlement payment to

plaintiff on November 19, 2021. Less than a month later, plaintiff filed a

complaint against defendant, alleging defendant "perpetrated a fraudulent

conveyance" by purchasing the Spring Lake condominium in September 2017

                                                                           A-2616-21
                                         6
"in clear anticipation of the [October 4, 2017] settlement conference with Judge

Tarantino," knowing the judge "previously requested that . . . [d]efendant

produce his balance sheet for the conference." Plaintiff also alleged defendant

bought the condominium, knowing "his liquidity for paying a settlement could

be determined" at the October 4 conference. Further, plaintiff claimed that given

the   timing    of    defendant's    purchase,    "[a]ny    reasonable    person

would agree[ defendant] did this to appear less liquid to pay a higher settlement

amount" to plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff asserted, "[b]ased on the financial

information[ defendant provided to plaintiff's attorney, p]laintiff lowered his

demand" for settlement, and "was deceived into a deficient settlement." Finally,

plaintiff alleged defendant "breached the terms of the [CSA] by not providing

proof that he created, and [wa]s maintaining a Last Will [and] Testament."

      Defendant disputed plaintiff's recollection of when Judge Tarantino

recommended that defendant disclose his financial circumstances, claiming

Judge Tarantino made this recommendation in June 2018, weeks before the July

2018 Lopez hearing was scheduled to proceed, and several months after

defendant bought the condominium.5

5
  On appeal, defendant contends plaintiff's own attorney confirmed in his
October 9, 2018 certification that Judge Tarantino "suggested [the] financial

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                                       7
      In January 2022, defendant's attorneys sent a "frivolous litigation letter"

to plaintiff's counsel, per Rule 1:4-8(b), asking that plaintiff withdraw his

complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff declined the request. The next month,

defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).6

Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment against defendant, arguing

plaintiff was fraudulently induced to enter into the CSA.

      On March 18, 2022, Judge Robert H. Gardner heard argument on the

parties' cross-applications after briefly summarizing the facts of the case. The

judge noted the underlying litigation was resolved under a "confidential

agreement . . . in November of 2019. . . . [and] the last payment [due under the

CSA] was made . . . [i]n November of 2021." The judge continued:

                  The allegations in this case indicate that . . .
            defendant purchased a condo[minium] on [September
            14, 2017]. . . . [P]laintiff claims it was . . . bought with
            money that could have been used in settlement in the

disclosure[] a few weeks prior to the July 16, 2018" Lopez hearing, and
"[i]ndeed, the disclosure was made in June 2018, not 2017[,] as pled by
[p]laintiff." Defendant also argues plaintiff mistakenly relies on a "supposed
April 11, 2019 draft brief prepared by former counsel for [p]laintiff" to support
his faulty argument that Judge Tarantino made the recommendation in 2017 in
anticipation of the October 4, 2017 settlement conference.
6
 This Rule allows for dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted." R. 4:6-2(e).

                                                                           A-2616-21
                                         8
            [20]15 case, and it was, apparently . . . not disclosed
            during the pendency of the 2015 case.

                    Defense disputes this. In fact, [defendant]
            indicates [the Spring Lake] condo[minium] was
            disclosed as part of the . . . June 2018 disclosure made
            on the balance sheet as a result of . . . Judge Tarantino
            . . . trying to [effectuate] . . . settlement negotiations
            that apparently occurred, and . . . the condo[minium]
            was disclosed . . . months post-purchase of the
            condo[minium].

      Defendant's counsel responded to the judge's summary, stating, "I would

like to correct [the record] that . . . plaintiff does not dispute . . . that we

accurately disclosed the condo[minium]. If we go to [plaintiff's] opposition

brief, . . . they say . . . defendant represented that he did own a condo[minium]

that was valued at a dollar amount.         So that disclosure was accurate."

Defendant's attorney highlighted this position again during argument, asserting

defendant's Spring Lake condominium was "accurately disclosed on

[defendant's] balance sheet" and "[t]here[ were] no allegations in any of the

[parties' submissions] that anything was hidden."

      Plaintiff's current counsel countered that "[w]hether the condo[minium]

was disclosed [to plaintiff's former counsel] or not [before entering into the CSA

wa]s irrelevant." Counsel further argued, "[t]he date of the acquisition" of the

condominium "[a]nd the fact that there were nondisclosures of information"

                                                                            A-2616-21
                                        9
from defendant "unfairly and unduly pushed . . . plaintiff into a direction where

he never would have settled if . . . there were full disclosure[s]."

      Judge Gardner challenged plaintiff's argument, stating the condominium

"was on the balance sheet at the time that the underlying case was settled," and

"whether it was a liquid . . . asset, or in this case not . . .a liquid asset," "it was

disclosed, so what's [plaintiff's] point?"          Plaintiff's counsel responded,

"disclosure is one thing, but the . . . actual value of the disclos[ed asset], . . . is

really what we're talking about here," adding, "the date of the purchase was not

disclosed, and that's significant," and "[t]he location was not disclosed either."

      Judge Gardner disagreed, stating, "[i]t doesn't matter because [the

condominium] was listed as an asset." Further, the judge noted plaintiff's former

counsel could have conducted "an asset check to see whether . . . the defense

ha[d] anything worth executing against, right?" The judge also highlighted this

point, rhetorically asking whether plaintiff's former counsel "ha[d] an obligation

to say, [']wait, where is that [condominium] located and what's the address so I

can do an asset check, ['] so [plaintiff could] figure out what [the] value . . .

[wa]s?" Additionally, Judge Gardner observed the condominium could have

been "a million-dollar home . . . with no equity in" it, so it would "fall[] upon . . .

plaintiff to do . . . due diligence before . . . agree[ing] to settle a case."

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                                          10
      After noting the parties' litigation started in 2015 but did not end until

2019, the judge concluded "[t]he onus [wa]s on . . . [plaintiff's] lawyer to have

done what they should have done," by determining "the value of how much . . .

defendant [wa]s worth so they c[ould] figure out [a settlement] payment."

Rather than "now . . . turn[ing] around and say[ing] somehow[, ']we didn't know

the value of [the condominium']." The judge also reiterated plaintiff's former

counsel was "under an obligation to do what they should have done with regard

to . . . plaintiff and the [net worth] of . . . defendant," adding, "I did professional

malpractice work, [as a] defense attorney, so . . . I understand the issues."

      Next, the judge found plaintiff "could have [opted] not [to] settle[] the

case either and gone to judgment . . . [but he] didn't do it." This remark prompted

the following exchange:

                  [Plaintiff's Counsel]: Your Honor, we could talk
             about the conveyance now. . . . [T]his is another
             example of the defendant hiding assets.          The
             conveyance was done—let me get the date.

                   [Judge Gardner]: The [condominium] property
             was bought on [September 14, 2017], at least according
             to what was provided to me, which was before the
             settlement conference of the 2015 case. That . . .
             disclosure was part of a balance sheet that was made
             and was given to the plaintiff['s attorney i]n . . . June of
             2018, . . . post-purchase of the condo[minium].

                                                                                A-2616-21
                                         11
                  [Plaintiff's Counsel]: Right, Judge, so the . . .
            issue here is the money[,] or some of the money could
            have come to . . . plaintiff at that date of conveyance,
            [September 14, 2017,] if it were disclosed . . . . And . . .
            not disclosing it, it obviously [was] defendant hiding
            assets for the purpose of lowering his . . . gross assets
            to get a lower settlement . . . . But that's all part and
            parcel of the mentality of . . . defendant in evading the
            true value of his estate, . . . and that's really what we're
            talking about.

            [(Emphasis added).]

Plaintiff's counsel also asserted that instead of "get[ting] a loan to pay . . .

plaintiff," defendant "got a loan to buy a piece of real estate."

      At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Gardner stated, "I don't find that

there's a breach [of the CSA] or fraud related to the settlement." The judge also

found "plaintiff [wa]s not a creditor" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act

(UFTA), N.J.S.A. 25:2-20 to -34.7          The judge reasoned, "[a]ll settlement

payments were made to . . . plaintiff."

7
  The UFTA was amended and renamed the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act
(UVTA), N.J.S.A. 25:2-20 to -36, effective August 10, 2021. See L. 2021, c. 92
§1. Thus, although the UFTA was in effect when defendant purchased his
condominium in 2017, the parties' cross-applications were decided after the
enactment of the amended statute. Accordingly, we rely on the amended statute
for our legal analysis, despite any references to the UFTA in the parties' briefs,
or by the judge in his March 18, 2022 oral opinion. We also use the term,
"UFTA," interchangeably with the term, "UVTA," solely for the purpose of this
opinion, given the parties' repeated use of the former term.

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                                          12
      Additionally, the judge concluded plaintiff's fraudulent transfer claim

under the UFTA was barred by the statute of limitations, 8 explaining defendant

purchased the condominium in September 2017, disclosed the purchase "on the

balance sheet at the time that the [2015] case was settled," and then plaintiff

waited until December 2021 to allege defendant "perpetrated a fraudulent

conveyance" by purchasing the condominium. Judge Gardner also rejected

plaintiff's fraudulent inducement claim, explaining that for plaintiff to prevail

on this claim,

            there ha[d] to be a material misrepresentation of known
            facts, with knowledge that the fact [wa]s false, with the
            intention to get the [other] person to rely on that fact,
            [and] with damages caused by the . . . person [making
            the material misrepresentation]. The property was
            disclosed in this particular case. The fact that [the
            condominium] was[ not] disclosed with specificity
            is . . . neither here nor there. That[ is] on the onus of
            the . . . plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel to do their
            appropriate due diligence.

                  . . . [T]hey ha[d] an obligation to go out and
            verify . . . what the defendant[] was claiming was the
            value of the . . . [Spring Lake] property. [As] I said, it
            could . . . be a million-dollar piece of property with a
            [$]999,999 mortgage on it. It could have no equity at

8
  The statute of limitations for a fraudulent transfer is "not later than four years
after the transfer was made . . . or, if later, not later than one year after the
transfer . . . was discovered by the claimant." N.J.S.A. 25:2-31(a).

                                                                              A-2616-21
                                        13
            all [i]n it. So[,] I'm not convinced. The fraudulent
            inducement [claim] does[ not] apply here.

      Lastly, Judge Gardner denied plaintiff's cross-motion for summary

judgment, stating, "[g]iven the . . . [CSA] as framed, I don't find there's a basis

for summary judgment to be granted . . . [to] plaintiff."

                                            II.

      On appeal, plaintiff, now self-represented, raises nine overlapping

arguments. First, he contends:

            [D]efendant committed fraud by transferring $75,000
            into a condominium, while transferring 50.5%
            ownership to his wife and other son, days prior to the
            [October 2017] settlement conference [and] then
            misrepresenting      the    condominium      as     solely
            [defendant's] on his balance sheet[,] to receive
            consideration for the full mortgage obligation . . . while
            deliberately increasing his debt[-]to[-]income ratio to
            minimize his credit availability for securing a loan to
            pay a settlement[, and] concealing the date of the
            transference and location, [then] waiting until [six]
            days after the settlement conference to record the deed
            and the mortgage.

      Next, plaintiff argues Judge Gardner erred in: (1) "not permitting

discovery to take place" before granting defendant's motion to dismiss; (2)

"failing to consider . . . defendant's intent to deceive" plaintiff; (3)

"disregard[ing] the entire premise of . . . plaintiff's argument concerning

defendant's misrepresentation, as well as concealment" and "erroneously

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                                       14
t[aking] the position that [because] the [condominium] was listed on . . .

defendant's balance sheet, . . . defendant made a full disclosure"; (4)

"disregard[ing] the fact . . . the date of the settlement conference was a fact in

dispute," and then "sid[ing] with the defense's version [of when Judge Tarantino

recommended defendant disclose his assets and liabilities] without . . . [a]

preponderance of evidence, or discovery"; (5) "admitting his bias as a former

defense attorney" when conducting oral argument on March 18, 2022; (6)

"suppress[ing] material communications in not permitting oral argument on

many of the issues" by "emphatically stating he 'read everything'"; (7) finding

"the [UFTA] did not apply"; and (8) "fail[ing] to adjudicate the breach of

contract cause of action alleged in [plaintiff's] complaint," considering

"[d]efendant ha[d] an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as it

relate[d] to the [CSA], in providing . . . plaintiff with a copy of his Will." 9

9
  Plaintiff raises additional arguments for the first time in his reply brief, which
we do not consider. "Raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief is
improper." Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng'rs, 337 N.J. Super.
590, 596 (App. Div. 2001) (citing State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 488 (1970)); see
also Pressler & Verniero, cmt. on R. 2:6-5 (2023) (noting the "impropriety of
using a reply brief to add issues not theretofore raised"); State v. Lenihan, 427
N.J. Super. 499, 504 n. 2, (App. Div. 2012) ("Rule 2:6-5 precludes the use of a
reply brief to add issues not previously raised in the formal brief.").

                                                                               A-2616-21
                                        15
      Based on our review of the record and the applicable principles of law, we

are satisfied plaintiff's arguments are without merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We

add the following comments.

      We review "Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted" de novo. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, 246

N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakoupolos v. Borrus Goldin, 237 N.J. 91, 108

(2019)). "A reviewing court must examine 'the legal sufficiency of the facts

alleged on the face of the complaint,' giving the plaintiff the benefit of 'every

reasonable inference of fact.'" Ibid. (quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107).

A court must search the complaint thoroughly "and with liberality to ascertain

whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure

statement of claim, opportunity being given to amend if necessary."           Ibid.

(quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746

(1989)). "[I]f the complaint states no claim that supports relief, and discovery

will not give rise to such a claim, the action should be dismissed." Ibid. (quoting

Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107). A motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2 is

limited to "the pleadings themselves."       Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107

(quoting Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010)).

                                                                             A-2616-21
                                       16
      "[A] dismissal with prejudice is 'mandated where the factual allegations

are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted,' or

if 'discovery will not give rise to such a claim.'" Mac Prop. Grp. LLC & The

Cake Boutique LLC v. Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 1, 17

(App. Div. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. 252 N.J. 258 (2022), and, 252 N.J. 261

(2022) (first quoting Rieder v. State, 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987),

then quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 107).

      We also recognize New Jersey has a strong public policy favoring the

settlement of litigation. Gere v. Louis, 209 N.J. 486, 500 (2012); Brundage v.

Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008) (stating "settlement of litigation

ranks high in our public policy"). "This policy rests on the recognition that

'parties to a dispute are in the best position to determine how to resolve a

contested matter in a way which is least disadvantageous to everyone.'" Gere,

209 N.J. at 500 (quoting Impink ex rel. Baldi v. Reynes, 396 N.J. Super. 553,

563 (App. Div. 2007)). "In furtherance of this policy, our courts 'strain to give

effect to the terms of a settlement wherever possible.'" Brundage, 195 N.J. at

601 (quoting Dep't of Pub. Advoc. v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 206 N.J. Super.

523, 528 (App. Div. 1985)). Moreover, a court must be careful not to make a

                                                                            A-2616-21
                                       17
better contract for the parties than the one they made for themselves. Kotkin v.

Aronson, 175 N.J. 453, 455 (2003).

      "A settlement agreement between parties to a lawsuit is a contract." Nolan

v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990). Thus, such agreements "will be honored

absent a demonstration of fraud or other compelling circumstances."

Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 438

(App. Div. 2016) (citation omitted).

      "[F]raud is never presumed but must be established by clear and

convincing evidence." Weil v. Express Container Corp., 360 N.J. Super. 599,

613 (App. Div. 2003). "A court may dismiss a complaint alleging fraud if 'the

allegations do not set forth with specificity, nor do they constitute as pleaded,

satisfaction of the elements of legal or equitable fraud.'"      State, Dep't of

Treasury, Div. of Inv. ex rel. McCormac v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 387 N.J.

Super. 469, 484-85 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Levinson v. D'Alfonso & Stein,

320 N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 1999)). To prove common-law fraud, a

party must demonstrate:     "(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently

existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the [person making the

statement] of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4)

reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages."

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                                       18
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Lajara, 222 N.J. 129, 147 (2015).

      Next, we are mindful "[t]he purpose of the [UFTA] is to prevent a debtor

from placing his or her property beyond a creditor's reach." Gilchinsky v. Nat'l

Westminster Bank, 159 N.J. 463, 475 (1999) (citing In re Wintz Cos., 230 B.R.

848, 859 (8th Cir. 1999)). "Underlying the Act is the notion that a debtor cannot

deliberately cheat a creditor by removing [the debtor's property] from the 'jaws

of execution.'" Ibid. (citing Klein v. Rossi, 251 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D.N.Y. 1966)).

"[F]raudulent conveyance claims . . . allow the creditor to undo the wrongful

transaction so as to bring the property within the ambit of collection." Ibid.

      N.J.S.A. 25:2-25 governs fraudulent transfers as to present or future

creditors and states, in part:

             a. A transfer made . . . by a debtor is voidable as to a
             creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or
             after the transfer was made[,] . . . if the debtor made the
             transfer or incurred the obligation:

                   (1) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
                   any creditor of the debtor; or

                   (2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent
                   value in exchange for the transfer or obligation,
                   and the debtor:

                          (a) Was engaged or was about to engage in
                          a business or a transaction for which the
                          remaining assets of the debtor were

                                                                           A-2616-21
                                        19
                         unreasonably small in relation to the
                         business or transaction; or

                         (b) Intended to incur, or believed . . . the
                         debtor would incur, debts beyond the
                         debtor's ability to pay as they become due.

            [N.J.S.A. 25:2-25(a).]

      "A creditor making a claim for relief under [N.J.S.A. 25:2-25(a)] has the

burden of proving the elements of the claim for relief by a preponderance of the

evidence." N.J.S.A. 2-25(b).

      N.J.S.A. 25:2-27 allows for a transfer or obligation to be voidable as to a

present creditor and provides, in part:

            a. A transfer made . . . by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
            creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was
            made . . . if the debtor made the transfer . . . without
            receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
            the transfer . . . and the debtor was insolvent at that time
            or . . . became insolvent as a result of the transfer . . . .

            b. A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
            creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was
            made if the transfer was made to an insider for an
            antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time,
            and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the
            debtor was insolvent.

            [N.J.S.A. 25:2-27 (a) and (b).]

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"[A] creditor making a claim for relief under . . . [N.J.S.A. 25:2-27] has the

burden of proving the elements of the claim for relief by a preponderance of the

evidence." N.J.S.A. 25:2-27(c).

      Under the plain language of the UFTA, a creditor is defined as "a person

who has a claim." N.J.S.A. 25:2-21. A debtor is defined as "a person who is

liable on a claim." Ibid. Claim is defined as "a right to payment." Ibid.

      "A court applying [the UFTA] must undertake a fact-sensitive inquiry,

analyzing the circumstances and the terms of the transfer at issue." Motorworld,

Inc. v. Benkendorf, 228 N.J. 311, 326 (2017). "Factors to be considered in

determining fraudulent intent, i.e. 'badges of fraud,' include whether . . . '[t]he

transfer . . . was disclosed or concealed.'" Jecker v. Hidden Valley, Inc., 422

N.J. Super. 155, 164 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting N.J.S.A. 25:2-26(c)).

      Governed by these standards, we discern no basis to disturb the March 18,

2022 order. Here, the parties settled their underlying litigation by entering into

a comprehensive CSA, with the benefit of counsel. Under the CSA, plaintiff

agreed he would be barred from pursuing any further claims against defendant

arising from the underlying litigation, "but for breach or fraud relative to" the

CSA. Based on the record before us, we agree with Judge Gardner that plaintiff

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failed to establish the elements of fraud or breach relative to the CSA. Thus, the

judge properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint.

      Indeed, the record reflects plaintiff advanced bare allegations of fraud and

fraudulent conveyance, rather than evidence for a reasonable fact finder to

determine by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's 2017 purchase of

the condominium was made "with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud"

plaintiff, or that the purchase was made "without receiving a reasonably

equivalent value in exchange for the transfer." N.J.S.A. 25:2-25. Moreover,

regardless of the parties' dispute as to when Judge Tarantino recommended —

versus ordered—defendant to provide a list of his assets and liabilities to

plaintiff's counsel, the record supports Judge Gardner's finding that defendant

provided such a list to plaintiff's counsel no later than June 2018, well before

the parties entered into the CSA. Further, as Judge Gardner pointed out, plaintiff

provided no explanation as to why plaintiff's counsel could not have exercised

due diligence to assess defendant's net worth after receiving defendant's list of

assets and liabilities more than a year before the parties executed the CSA.

      Moreover, the record supports Judge Gardner's finding that because

defendant bought the condominium in September 2017, disclosed the purchase

no later than June 2018, the parties entered into the CSA in November 2019, and

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plaintiff waited until December 2021, i.e., more than four years after the

condominium purchase, to file a complaint asserting a claim for a fraudulent

conveyance, plaintiff's UFTA claim was untimely under N.J.S.A. 25:2-31.

      Next, we are persuaded Judge Gardner correctly found plaintiff failed to

establish he was a creditor under the UFTA because plaintiff had no "right to

payment" from defendant when plaintiff filed the December 2021 complaint.

That is because defendant made each of the three payments due under the CSA.

      Finally, we agree with Judge Gardner that plaintiff failed to state a claim

for breach of contract. To prevail on a breach of contract claim,

            a plaintiff must prove four elements: "first, that the
            parties entered into a contract containing certain terms;
            second, that [the] plaintiff did what the contract
            required [the plaintiff] to do; third, that [the] defendant
            did not do what the contract required [the defendant] to
            do, defined as a breach of the contract; and fourth, that
            [the] defendant's breach, or failure to do what the
            contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiff."

            [Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J.
            501, 512 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Globe
            Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016)).]

      Here, despite plaintiff's argument to the contrary, the CSA could have, but

did not include a provision that defendant would provide a copy of his Will to

plaintiff. Instead, the CSA stated if the Will "fail[ed] to contain the . . . term"

that plaintiff was "entitled to inherit one-third . . . of [defendant's] probated

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estate," "the executor or administrator of the estate" was obligated to "take the

necessary measures to enforce the requirements of [the CSA]." Under these

circumstances, Judge Gardner properly declined to modify the parties' CSA to

include a term the parties failed to negotiate for themselves, and correctly found

plaintiff failed to establish defendant breached the CSA.

      To the extent we have not addressed plaintiff's remaining arguments, they

lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.        R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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