Court Opinion

ID: 9905436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 16:01:40.795724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:28.791565
License: Public Domain

21-6354
     Alas Garcia v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                               Segal, IJ
                                                                           A209 842 416

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of November, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                    JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
 8                    BETH ROBINSON,
 9                    SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   CAROLINA GUADALUPE ALAS
14   GARCIA,
15           Petitioner,
16
17                    v.                                         21-6354
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21              Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                     Nicholas J. Mundy, Esq., Brooklyn, NY.
 2
 3   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Deputy Assistant Attorney
 4                                       General; Tim Ramnitz, Senior Litigation
 5                                       Counsel; Elizabeth R. Chapman, Trial
 6                                       Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
 7                                       United States Department of Justice,
 8                                       Washington, DC.

 9         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

10   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

11   AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

12         Petitioner Carolina Guadalupe Alas Garcia, a native and citizen of El

13   Salvador, seeks review of a June 7, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming an October

14   17, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for

15   asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

16   (“CAT”). In re Carolina Guadalupe Alas Garcia, No. A 209 842 416 (B.I.A. June 7,

17   2021), aff’g No. A 209 842 416 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Oct. 17, 2018). We assume the

18   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

19         We have considered the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan

20   Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).    We review factfinding for

21   substantial evidence and questions of law de novo. Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562

22   F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive
                                              2
 1   unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

 2   contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 3         I.     Jurisdiction

 4         The BIA did not err in denying termination based on the lack of a hearing

 5   time and date in the Notice to Appear (“NTA”). The Supreme Court has held that

 6   an NTA that omits the hearing information is not sufficient to stop the accrual of

 7   presence or residence required for cancellation of removal. See Pereira v. Sessions,

 8   138 S. Ct. 2105, 2115–16 (2018); Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1478–80

 9   (2021). But those decisions address the “stop-time” rule and are “not properly

10   read to void jurisdiction in cases in which an NTA omits a hearing time or place.”

11   Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original); see

12   also Chery v. Garland, 16 F.4th 980, 986–87 (2d Cir. 2021). Rather, an NTA “that

13   omits information regarding the time and date of the initial removal hearing is

14   nevertheless adequate to vest jurisdiction in the Immigration Court, at least so long

15   as a notice of hearing specifying this information is later sent to the” applicant.

16   Banegas Gomez, 922 F.3d at 112; see also Chery, 16 F.4th at 986–87. Alas Garcia

17   received hearing notices with the time and date of her hearings, and she attended

18   her hearings.

                                              3
 1         II.    Asylum and withholding of removal

 2         To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, Alas Garcia

 3   had to establish that “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

 4   group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for” her

 5   persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Quituizaca v.

 6   Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2022). Before the IJ, she asserted that a police

 7   officer targeted her on account of her membership in a particular social group of

 8   “victims of sexual abuse committed by the police who lack police protection.”

 9   Certified Admin. Rec. at 96. But she did not challenge the denial of relief on that

10   basis before the BIA and does not assert a social group claim here. Accordingly,

11   that basis for asylum and withholding of removal is both unexhausted and

12   waived.     See Ud Din v. Garland, 72 F.4th 411, 419–20 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2023)

13   (confirming that petitioner generally must exhaust issues before the BIA); Yueqing

14   Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (concluding that

15   petitioner had abandoned a claim by failing to address it in his brief).

16         Instead, Alas Garcia argues that the BIA erred in finding that she had not

17   raised a political opinion claim before the IJ. To demonstrate a well-founded fear

18   of persecution on account of political opinion, Alas Garcia had the burden to

                                               4
 1   establish, “through direct or circumstantial evidence,” that the officer’s motive in

 2   targeting her arose from her political beliefs, actual or imputed, rather than merely

 3   from the officer’s own opinion. Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 545; see also Hernandez-

 4   Chacon v. Barr, 948 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2020). A political opinion “must involve

 5   some support for or disagreement with the belief system, policies, or practices of

 6   a government and its instrumentalities.” Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d

 7   190, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).

 8         The BIA did not err in refusing to address political opinion as a basis for

 9   asylum and withholding of removal. On her application, Alas Garcia checked the

10   boxes for particular social group and political opinion, but before the IJ, she offered

11   no testimony or argument concerning a political opinion claim.           When the IJ

12   asked her counsel to identify the proposed social group or other ground, counsel

13   stated only: “Victims of sexual abuse committed by the police who lack police

14   protection.” Certified Admin. Rec. at 95–96. Because she did not argue political

15   opinion before the IJ, the BIA did not err in declining to address that ground on

16   appeal: “the BIA may refuse to consider an issue that could have been, but was

17   not, raised before an IJ.” Prabhudial v. Holder, 780 F.3d 553, 555 (2d Cir. 2015); see

18   also Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 190 (B.I.A. 2018) (same).

                                               5
 1         III.   CAT relief

2          Unlike asylum or withholding of removal, CAT relief does not require a

3    nexus to a protected ground, but instead requires the applicant to establish that

4    she will “more likely than not . . . be tortured if removed to the proposed country

5    of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). An applicant “will never be able to show

6    that [s]he faces a more likely than not chance of torture if one link in the chain

7    cannot be shown to be more likely than not to occur. It is the likelihood of all

8    necessary events coming together that must more likely than not lead to torture,

9    and a chain of events cannot be more likely than its least likely link.” Savchuck v.

10   Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Matter of J–F–F–, 23 I. & N. Dec.

11   912, 918 n.4 (A.G. 2006)).

12         The agency did not err in concluding that Alas Garcia failed to establish she

13   would “more likely than not” be tortured. She testified that the police officer

14   harassed her because of her youth and seeming lack of sexual experience and that

15   the officer left a 25-year-old waitress and other older hotel employees alone.

16   Thus, the IJ found that “[i]t is questionable whether this stage [Alas Garcia], who

17   is now 22 years old and has a child and is living with a companion, would still be

18   the object of affection by [that] particular police officer.” Certified Admin. Rec. at

                                               6
 1   34. The IJ also noted that “[s]he did not testify that she was the object of the

 2   affection of any other police officer or any other individual in El Salvador.” Id. at

 3   34–35. Given the speculative nature of Alas Garcia’s fear, the record does not

 4   compel a conclusion that she demonstrated that she would “more likely than not”

 5   be tortured if she returned to El Salvador. See Savchuck, 518 F.3d at 123–24; see

 6   also Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of

 7   solid support in the record . . . [an applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”).

 8

 9         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

10   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

11                                            FOR THE COURT:
12                                            Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
13                                            Clerk of Court

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