Court Opinion

ID: 9352710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 16:01:15.970465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:53.264634
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-1628
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                     Plaintiff - Appellee

                                       v.

                           Tyrone Lynn Merriweather

                                   Defendant - Appellant
                                 ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
              for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau
                                 ____________

                         Submitted: November 14, 2022
                            Filed: January 9, 2023
                                 [Unpublished]
                                ____________

Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
                         ____________

PER CURIAM.

      After Appellant Tyrone Merriweather committed numerous violations of the
terms of his supervised release, the district court 1 revoked Merriweather’s
supervised release and sentenced him to 30 months imprisonment with an additional

      1
       The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, then United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri, now Chief Judge.
12 months of supervised release. Merriweather appeals, asserting that the district
court erred in calculating his United States Sentencing Guidelines range and in
imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. Having jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       In 2005, Merriweather pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine base in the Southern District of Illinois. With respect to his original
sentence, the government filed notice, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, that
Merriweather was subject to a 240-month statutory minimum term of imprisonment
under 21 U.S.C. § 841 based on a previous “felony drug offense” conviction for
possession of cocaine under Illinois law. Bound by this provision, the district court
imposed a sentence of 240 months imprisonment, followed by 10 years of supervised
release. Following the passage of the First Step Act, which amended the mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment to 120 months, Merriweather filed a motion to
reduce his sentence. The government agreed Merriweather was entitled to relief
under the First Step Act and recommended jointly with Merriweather that
Merriweather’s sentence be reduced to 120 months imprisonment, with credit for
time served, and 8 years supervised release, which the district court adopted. In
February 2019, Merriweather was released and began serving supervised release. In
September 2020, Merriweather’s supervised release was transferred to the Eastern
District of Missouri. In February 2022, the United States Probation Office filed a
petition to revoke Merriweather’s supervised release based on several violations,
including a conviction for third-degree felony domestic assault in Missouri state
court, multiple failed alcohol tests, a location monitoring violation, and a violation
of an order of protection. At the final revocation hearing, Merriweather admitted
the violations. The district court calculated Merriweather’s Guidelines range as 30
to 37 months imprisonment, ultimately imposing a bottom-of-the-Guidelines range
sentence of 30 months followed by 12 months of supervised release.

     Merriweather first asserts that the district court erred in calculating his
Guidelines range, specifically arguing that the applicability of his mandatory
minimum sentence was impacted by a recent decision from this Court, United States
                                         -2-
v. Oliver, 987 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2021), which held that an Illinois statute regarding
cocaine offenses was overbroad and thus did not qualify as a “serious drug felony”
for the purposes of an enhanced sentence, impacted the statutory minimum term of
imprisonment for his original sentence. According to Merriweather, Oliver bars his
previous Illinois cocaine conviction from serving as a qualifying conviction for
purposes of the 21 U.S.C. § 851 enhancement he received, and without it, he would
have been subject to a significantly lower term of imprisonment. Merriweather
asserts that the district court should have taken this into account by recognizing the
resulting impact that an adjusted original sentence would have on the Guidelines
range for his revocation sentence.

       Because Merriweather did not raise any objection to the Guidelines
calculation at sentencing, we review for plain error only. See United States v.
Luedtke, 771 F.3d 453, 455 (8th Cir. 2014). To succeed on plain error review,
Merriweather “must show that ‘there was an error, the error is clear or obvious under
current law, the error affected the party’s substantial rights, and the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id.
(citation omitted). We find no error, much less one that is plain, in the district court’s
calculation of Merriweather’s Guidelines range. Although Merriweather asserts that
the district court erred in calculating the Guidelines range for his revocation
sentence, his argument is, in essence, an impermissible collateral attack on his
previous conviction and sentence. See United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 913
(8th Cir. 2009) (“A defendant may challenge the validity of his underlying
conviction and sentence through a direct appeal or a habeas corpus proceeding, not
through a collateral attack in a supervised-release revocation proceeding.”). Because
Merriweather argues nothing more than that his original sentence was incorrectly
calculated, we reject his appeal on this basis.

       Merriweather next asserts that the district court imposed a substantively
unreasonable sentence because it failed to appropriately consider the nature and
circumstances of Merriweather’s supervised release violations, failed to consider his
history and characteristics, and imposed a sentence greater than necessary to achieve
                                           -3-
the goals of sentencing. “We review revocation sentences ‘under the same
“reasonableness” standard that applies to initial sentencing proceedings.’ Thus, the
substantive reasonableness of a revocation sentence is reviewed ‘under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v. Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915, 917 (8th
Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). 2 “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1)
‘fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight’; (2)
‘gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor’; or (3) ‘considers only
the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of
judgment.’” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

       Merriweather’s argument is largely premised on his desire that the district
court place greater emphasis on the mitigating factors he identified—that he served
over 4 years more than his amended sentence, that he was on supervised release for
17 months before he committed any violations, and that he was improperly informed
by his counsel in his state court domestic violence case about the impact of a
conviction on his federal supervised release—than on the aggravating factors the
district court considered, including the number of violations Merriweather
committed. However, “[t]he district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a)
factors [as incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e),] in each case and assign some
factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United
States v. Stone, 873 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Merriweather’s
disagreement with the district court’s weighing of the mitigating and aggravating
factors does not warrant reversal. Finally, to the extent that Merriweather challenges
the district court’s explanation of the sentence, where, as here “a judge decides
simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily
require lengthy explanation.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007).

      2
       The government argues that we should review this argument for plain error
because Merriweather did not object at sentencing to the district court’s weighing of
mitigating and aggravating factors. However, this Court has held that “[a] defendant
need not object to preserve an attack on the substantive reasonableness of a
sentence.” United States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 2008). We
therefore review for abuse of discretion.
                                          -4-
In imposing the sentence, the district court specifically referenced Merriweather’s
violations, stated that he considered the arguments from Merriweather’s counsel,
and noted that he considered the policy statements in the Guidelines. This
explanation was sufficient to support the sentence imposed.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
                      ______________________________

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