Court Opinion

ID: 9963026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 15:01:02.694279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:15.655072
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1301     Document: 010111037305         Date Filed: 04/24/2024      Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                                April 24, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  DELMART E.J.M. VREELAND, II,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 23-1301
                                                      (D.C. No. 1:14-CV-02175-PAB)
  DAVID ZUPAN; THE ATTORNEY                                      (D. Colo.)
  GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
  COLORADO,

        Respondents - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, KELLY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        Delmart E.J.M. Vreeland, II, a Colorado prisoner, seeks a certificate of

 appealability (COA) to appeal from the dismissal of his motion under Rule 60(b)(6) of

 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the district court deemed to be an

 unauthorized second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application. We deny a COA and

 dismiss this matter.

        A Colorado jury convicted Mr. Vreeland of offenses including sexual exploitation

 of a child, sexual assault, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. After

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1301     Document: 010111037305        Date Filed: 04/24/2024     Page: 2

 unsuccessfully seeking relief from his conviction in the Colorado courts, he

 unsuccessfully pursued a federal habeas application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See

 Vreeland v. Zupan, 906 F.3d 866, 883 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1586

 (2019). Relevant to this case, Mr. Vreeland subsequently filed a motion in the district

 court under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking relief from

 judgment based on an allegation of extraordinary circumstances—namely, that the

 district court’s habeas proceedings had been corrupted by the absence of pleadings the

 state court had fraudulently omitted from the record. The district court determined the

 motion was an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 application and dismissed it.1

 He now seeks a COA to challenge the district court’s dismissal.

        This matter may not proceed unless we grant a COA, see 28 U.S.C.

 § 2253(c)(1)(A), and we may not do so unless Mr. Vreeland “ma[kes] a substantial

 showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” § 2253(c)(2). This means he “must

 demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the

 constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

 (2000). And, because the district court dismissed his Rule 60(b)(6) motion on

        1
           Mr. Vreeland also filed several other motions, including a Rule 60(b)(4) motion
 captioned “Motion for Relief and to Vacate Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)”;
 a motion for release on bail pending his Rule 60 motions; a motion to take judicial notice
 of certain evidence; and a “Motion for Release on Recognizance Bail.” App. 54. The
 district court denied each of these motions on their merits. His Opening Brief and request
 for a COA, however, are limited to the district court’s dismissal of his Rule 60(b)(6)
 motion.
                                             2
Appellate Case: 23-1301     Document: 010111037305          Date Filed: 04/24/2024      Page: 3

 procedural grounds, he must also show that “jurists of reason would find it debatable

 whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.

        In determining whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling that

 Mr. Vreeland’s motion is actually an unauthorized second or successive § 2254

 application, we look to Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005). In Gonzalez, the

 Supreme Court provided examples of Rule 60(b) motions that should be treated as second

 or successive § 2254 applications. These include motions “seek[ing] leave to present

 newly discovered evidence in support of a claim previously denied.” Id. at 531 (citation

 and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as Mr. Vreeland has argued, because of the

 missing pleadings he “did not have the evidence needed to raise viable arguments relating

 to jurisdiction in the habeas petition.” Opening Br. at 9. Because his own

 characterization of the motion confirms that he seeks to present newly discovered

 evidence in support of a previously denied claim, no reasonable jurist would debate the

 district court’s procedural determination that the motion was an unauthorized second or

 successive § 2254 application.

        Mr. Vreeland further argues, however, that because his motion alleges fraud it is a

 “true” Rule 60(b) motion, not an unauthorized § 2254 application. In Spitznas v. Boone,

 464 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2006), we acknowledged that a motion asserting fraud in the

 federal habeas proceeding “may . . . constitute a true [Rule] 60(b) motion.” Id. at 1216.

 But we also explained that such a motion “requires a more nuanced analysis” that turns

 on the type of fraud alleged. Id. “If the alleged fraud on the court relates solely to fraud

 perpetrated on the federal habeas court, then the motion will be considered a true 60(b)

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Appellate Case: 23-1301      Document: 010111037305          Date Filed: 04/24/2024      Page: 4

 motion.” Id. On the other hand, “[i]f the fraud on the habeas court includes (or

 necessarily implies) related fraud on the state court . . . then the motion will ordinarily be

 considered a second or successive petition because any ruling would inextricably

 challenge the underlying conviction proceeding.” Id. In Mr. Vreeland’s case, it is clear

 the alleged fraud does not relate solely to the proceedings before the federal habeas court.

 He asserts, for example, that on direct appeal his state appellate counsel did not receive

 the allegedly missing pleadings. Accordingly, Mr. Vreeland’s fraud allegations do not

 render his motion a true Rule 60(b) motion under Spitznas.

        Because Mr. Vreeland has not shown that reasonable jurists would find it

 debatable whether the district court was correct in its ruling that his Rule 60(b)(6) motion

 was an unauthorized second or successive § 2254 application, we deny a COA and

 dismiss this matter.

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

                                               4