Court Opinion

ID: 9721000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:46:18.754043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.762740
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant did not raise the claim in his direct appeal that his trial defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. However, appellant did make that claim against his trial counsel and his counsel for his direct appeal in his first post-conviction petition, citing numerous alleged errors and omissions by them. The claim was litigated and decided adversely to appellant by the trial court, and this decision was affirmed after full consideration by this Court.
Thereafter, represented by new counsel, appellant filed his second post-conviction petition, making the claim which, in legal effect, amounts to a repetition of his first post-conviction claim against trial counsel and counsel for his direct appeal, but which adds new and additional alleged errors and omissions by them.
Whether or not appellant should be permitted to relitigate this issue in his second post-conviction petition is governed by P.C. Rule 1, § 8. In pertinent part that section provides:
All grounds for relief available to a petitioner under this rule must be raised in his original petition. Any ground finally adjudicated on the merits ... may not be the basis for a subsequent petition, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original petition.
In denying this second petition, Judge Comer ruled that since the claim calling into question the effectiveness of trial counsel and direct appeal counsel had been litigated and decided in the first post-conviction proceeding and in direct appeal to this Court, it could not again be raised, i.e., that it was res judicata. This decision is erroneous because it does not apply the correct legal standard set in the rule.
In these circumstances, where a claim is not a new one, in order to properly dismiss the repeated claim, the court must rule that such claim in the first petition for post-conviction relief was not “inadequately raised.” The rational approach to making this type of decision would be to place the burden upon the petitioner to justify the repetition of the claim and to hear evidence and argument of counsel on the question. I would reverse this judgment, stay the execution of appellant, and remand for new consideration of this second post-conviction petition in light of the standards dictated by P.C.Rule 1, § 8.