Court Opinion

ID: 9445458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:29:23.437199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:25:14.550442
License: Public Domain

KALODNER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I disagree with the majority’s view that the trial judge was acting within his discretionary power when he made ref*581erence in his charge to “ * * widows and orphans who may be receiving dividends or interest from the defendant company and who may need that income for themselves and for their families "• *
In my opinion the injection into the case of the pecuniary interest of widows and orphans dependent upon income from their investment in the defendant railroad company’s securities constituted prejudicial error requiring reversal.
Two wrongs don’t make a right.
Plaintiff’s counsel was clearly out of bounds when he injected into the case the fact that the plaintiff had raised two foundlings (long since grown up) as her own and at least inferenti ally appealed for a verdict which would permit further such philanthropy on her part. His conduct warranted withdrawal of a juror or at the very least a vigorous caution to the jury to disregard this unjustifiable attempt to invoke its sympathy. The trial judge chose to take neither one of these available steps but on the other hand, no doubt unwittingly, chose, as the majority put it, “to neutralize any possible prejudice resulting from this appeal on behalf of nonexistent ‘little children.’ ”1
I fully subscribe to the majority’s view as to the trial judge’s motive but we cannot give judicial sanction to fighting fire with fire. Here the trial judge sought to extinguish the flame of sympathy for foundlings ignited by plaintiff’s counsel with a countering flame of sympathy for widows and orphans. Neither the foundlings nor the widows and orphans were parties to this litigation and their injection into the case was violative of the rights of the respective parties and constituted reversible prejudicial error. Cf. Knight v. Allegheny County, 1954, 377 Pa. 502, 105 A.2d 141 and Narciso v. Mauch Chunk Township, 1952, 369 Pa. 549, 87 A.2d 233, 33 A.L.R.2d 438.
As to the trial judge’s instructions with respect to the plaintiff’s burden of proof:
In the first two portions of the trial judge’s charge which the majority quotes he twice instructed the jury that it must find for the defendant if it had “no conviction” and also twice instructed it that it must be “convinced” of the defendant railroad’s negligence supplementing those instructions with the admonition that “If there is just a doubt in your mind, you must bring in a verdict for the defendant * * * ”
I disagree with the majority’s view that the instructions stated did not constitute prejudicial error.
As was stated by Judge Frank in Larson v. Jo Ann Cab Corp., 2 Cir., 1954, 209 F.2d 929, 930, 935:
“Courts and commentators have said that, in the ordinary civil suit, usually a judge commits reversible error if he instructs the jury that the plaintiff cannot recover unless he ‘convinces’ them (or the like). Such a charge, it is maintained, indicates something midway between a ‘preponderance’ and ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ and should therefore be reserved for certain exceptional sorts of civil cases where more than a ‘preponderance’ is required. * * Nevertheless * * * we think we should adhere to the ruling that, in an ordinary civil suit * * * words like ‘convince’ and ‘conviction’ should be shunned in a jury charge.”2
*582In common parlance “conviction” is synonymous with “certainty” and “convince” is “to cause to feel certain.”3
In instructing the jury that it must find for the defendant if it had “no conviction” and that plaintiff had the burden “to convince” it that defendant was negligent, the trial judge imposed a burden of proof on plaintiff far in excess of that imposed by the “preponderance of the evidence” rule.
In Nelson v. Lee, 1947, 249 Ala. 549, 32 So.2d 22, 24 the Supreme Court of Alabama held that reversible error was committed by the trial judge in giving the following instruction:
“ T charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that if after a consideration of all the evidence in this ease your minds are left in a state of doubt and uncertainty so that you are not reasonably satisfied from the evidence that on the occasion complained of the defendant was guilty of negligence in and about the transportation, handling or removal of the rifle in question you cannot return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.’ ”
In doing so it stated that “ * * * this charge placed too high a degree of proof upon the plaintiff.”
The same court in the recent case of Hill Grocery Co. v. Wilson, Ala., 89 So.2d 687, 688, ruled that the trial judge had correctly, on a motion for a new trial, held that he had committed prejudicial error when he had given the following instruction to the jury:
“<« * * Where the evidence leaves it uncertain as to whether the cause of the injury was something for which the defendant was responsible, or something for which the defendant was not responsible, there is a failure of proof, and unless you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that the negligence of the defendant, if any, was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Mrs. Wilson, you cannot return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.’ ”
In ruling that the trial judge had acted correctly in granting a new trial the Supreme Court of Alabama said of the instructions which had been held to be prejudicial error:
“ * * * if the jury had the slightest uncertainty as to whether the defendant was responsible for the injury, they were required to find that there was failure of proof as to such fact. The effect of the charge is to place the burden upon the plaintiff to show beyond all uncertainty that the defendant was responsible for the injury sustained by the plaintiff. As pointed out in the foregoing authorities, the charge places too high a degree of proof upon the plaintiff.”
In Botta v. Brunner, 1956, 42 N.J.Super. 95, 126 A.2d 32, 37, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey held that the trial judge had committed prejudicial error when he charged the jury that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff “ ‘ * * * to prove by clear, convincing evidence that her injuries were the result of this accident,’ ” and that “ ‘The evidence must establish with reasonable certainty that the injuries and losses for which you award any damages are properly attributable to the accident.’ ” With respect to these instructions the Court stated:
“There can be no doubt that the court’s imposition upon plaintiff of the burden of producing ‘clear, convincing’ evidence that her claimed ‘injuries,’ easily to be understood by the jury in the added sense of disabilities, were the result of the accident, assessed her with a probative burden exceeding what the law calls for in an ordinary civil action.”
In Johnson v. Erie Railroad Co., 2 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 352, 354, 355, after correctly charging the jury with respect to *583the burden of proof the trial judge went on to say:
“ ‘It is up to you ladies and gentlemen to determine whether the evidence adduced before you shows with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff’s alleged injury or future disability, if you find he has any, resulted from the aggravation of the previous condition, or, rather from the previous condition itself, in order to warrant a recovery of damages in this case.’ ”
The Appellate Court held that the instruction given was erroneous, stating:
“•» * * At least as to injuries actually suffered prior to the trial, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to prove a causal connection with the defendant’s negligence only by a fair preponderance of the evidence: to require proof to ‘a reasonable certainty’ imposed an excessive burden.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court also held erroneous the following instruction:
“ ‘ * * * I don’t want to review that evidence, but it is up to you to decide whether you want to believe one or the other, because if you have any doubt about it then he [the plaintiff] has not sustained the burden of proof which the law imposes upon him.’ ”
Said the Court of that instruction:
“That statement was erroneous. Notwithstanding a doubt thus engendered a jury might yet properly find that the plaintiff had sustained the burden under which he labored.”
In the third and fourth portions of the trial judge’s instruction relating to plaintiff’s burden of proof, quoted by the majority the jury was thrice told that plaintiff must sustain “ ‘the burden of proving’ ” the defendant’s negligence. That of course was reversible error since the instructions omitted any reference to a “ ‘fair preponderance of the evidence.’ ”
In Se-Ling Hosiery, Inc., v. Margulies, 1950, 364 Pa. 45, 70 A.2d 854, 856, the trial judge instructed the jury in a civil action that the plaintiff “ ‘had the burden of proof’ ” and did not add the phrase “ ‘by the fair preponderance of the evidence.’ ” Said the Court, 364 Pa. at page 50, 70 A.2d at page 857:
“ * * * jf a trial jU(jge in a civil case instructs the jury that plaintiff ‘has the burden of proof’ the defendant has no cause for complaint, because of what is implicit in that phrase when it stands alone. However, a plaintiff would have grounds for complaint because if the jury was not instructed that ‘burden of proof’ in a civil case meant only 'by the fair preponderance of the evidence’ the members of the jury might have the idea that the phrase ‘burden of proof meant some higher degree of proof than mere preponderating evidence. Therefore, the omission of the phrase ‘by the fair preponderance of the evidence’ in the judge’s charge in the instant case was something of which the plaintiff could have justly complained * * (Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the sum total of the instructions as to burden of proof, above discussed, the following statement made in Johnson v. Erie Railroad Co., supra, 236 F.2d at page 356 is particularly appropriate :
“We need not consider how far separately each of the statements referred to would require reversal, since the cumulative effect of the several references is such as to make the possibility oí confusion too great to disregard. We think the plaintiff entitled to a new trial.”
Because of the view expressed that a new trial should be granted because of the trial judge’s erroneous and confusing instructions relating to the plaintiff’s burden of proof, it is unnecessary to dwell at length on her contention respecting the trial judge’s instruction that
“ * * * If you find that the injury resulted from an accidental slip on one of a few pebbles, neither the defendant nor the plaintiff could be said to be negligent, and you must find a verdict for the defendant.”
*584I subscribe to the plaintiff’s contention that this instruction was erroneous because it inferentially ruled that there was no absolute duty on the part of the defendant to provide plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work and operated in effect to remove from the jury’s consideration the “safe place to work” issue.

. The trial judge put it this way in his opinion reported at D.C.E.D.Pa.3.956, 140 F.Supp. 386, at page 151:
“In view of this emphasis on those ‘little children’ and the plaintiff having something to leave to those ‘who are near and dear to her,’ the trial judge felt it was his duty to neutralize any possible prejudice by including in his charge a sentence indicating that there might be those interested in the defendant who were also in need and included the following paragraph in his charge:”

. In that case no exception was taken to charge as made and the Court held it was not adequately reserved for review.

. Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Bd. 1956.