Court Opinion

ID: 9895248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 16:02:05.293364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:46.576299
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10813    Document: 40-1     Date Filed: 11/06/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10813
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JULIUS DWIGHT MOZIE,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20256-BB-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10813      Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 11/06/2023     Page: 2 of 7

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10813

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, AND LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Julius Dwight Mozie appeals his total sentence of 300
       months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit sex traﬃcking, in
       violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c), and sex traﬃcking of a minor by
       force or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1).
       On appeal, he argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasona-
       ble because his crimes of conviction incorporate the use of a com-
       puter and the commission of a sex act, such that sentencing en-
       hancements for using a computer and the commission of a sex act
       were impermissible double counting. He also argues that his sen-
       tence is substantively unreasonable based on statistical disparities
       and his life expectancy. For the reasons discussed below, we aﬃrm.
                                         I.
               Ordinarily, we review claims of double counting de novo.
       United States v. Aimufua, 935 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1991). How-
       ever, plain-error review applies when an appellant does not bring
       an argument to the district court’s attention. Rosales-Mireles v.
       United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904 (2018). An appellant’s argument
       survives plain-error review only when (1) an error has occurred, (2)
       the error was plain, (3) the error aﬀected the defendant’s substan-
       tial rights, and (4) the error seriously aﬀected the fairness of the
       judicial proceedings. Id. at 1904–05. An error is plain if the explicit
       language of a statute or rule or precedent from the Supreme Court
USCA11 Case: 22-10813      Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 11/06/2023     Page: 3 of 7

       22-10813               Opinion of the Court                          3

       or this Court directly resolves the issue. United States v. Hesser, 800
       F.3d 1310, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015).
               “Impermissible double counting occurs only when one part
       of the [U.S. Sentencing] Guidelines is applied to increase a defend-
       ant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already
       been fully accounted for by application of another part of the
       Guidelines.” United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221, 1226–27 (11th
       Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300,
       1309 (11th Cir. 1999)). When adjustments to a sentence are based
       on sections of the Guidelines that address “diﬀerent sentencing
       considerations,” such as one section addressing the conviction for
       the base oﬀense and another addressing an aggravating factor that
       is not an element of the underlying conviction, it is not double
       counting. See United States v. Suarez, 893 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir.
       2018).
              Section 1591(a) criminalizes knowingly recruiting, enticing,
       advertising, or soliciting by any means a person while knowing, or
       in reckless disregard of the fact, that the person has not attained
       the age of eighteen years and will be caused to engage in a com-
       mercial sex act. § 1591(a)(1). If the oﬀense was perpetrated by
       means of force, threats of force, coercion, or a combination of such
       means, a statutory minimum term of ﬁfteen years applies.
       § 1591(b)(1).
              A base oﬀense level of 34 applies to a conviction under 18
       U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(1). If the § 1591 oﬀense in-
       volved the use of a computer or interactive computer service to
USCA11 Case: 22-10813      Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 11/06/2023     Page: 4 of 7

       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10813

       entice, encourage, oﬀer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited
       sexual conduct with a minor, a sentence enhancement of two levels
       shall be applied. Id. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B). Another two levels shall be
       applied if the oﬀense involved the commission of a sex act or sexual
       contact.     Id. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A).        We have held that the
       § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement applies where a sex act or sexual
       conduct actually did occur, while criminal liability attaches under
       § 1591 if the defendant “put the victim in a position where a sex act
       could occur, regardless of whether a sex act eventually did occur.”
       United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 977 (11th Cir. 2017) (emphasis in
       original).
              Because Mozie did not object to the procedural reasonable-
       ness of his sentence or the application of either enhancement at
       the district court, the proper standard of review is plain error.
       Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904. We conclude that the district
       court did not commit error, much less plain error, in applying the
       computer and sex act enhancements because the crime from which
       his base oﬀense level was calculated did not require the use of a
       computer or the commission of a sex act. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a),
       (b)(1). His base oﬀense level and the enhancements therefore ac-
       counted for diﬀerent harms and do not constitute impermissible
       double counting. See Dudley, 463 F.3d at 1226-27; Suarez, 893 F.3d
       at 1337. Accordingly, we aﬃrm as to this issue.
                                         II.
             We evaluate the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for
       abuse of discretion, including whether the statutory factors in 18
USCA11 Case: 22-10813      Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 11/06/2023     Page: 5 of 7

       22-10813               Opinion of the Court                          5

       U.S.C. § 3553(a) support the sentence in question. United States v.
       Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). “In reviewing
       the reasonableness of a sentence, we must, as the Supreme Court
       has instructed us, consider the totality of the facts and circum-
       stances.” Id. at 1189. “A district court abuses its discretion when it
       (1) fails to aﬀord consideration to relevant factors that were due
       signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight to an improper or
       irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in con-
       sidering the proper factors.” Id. at 1189 (quoting United States v.
       Campa, 459 F.3 1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). Further, alt-
       hough we do not automatically presume that a sentence within the
       guideline range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence
       to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.
       2008).
               Traditionally, we will vacate a sentence “only if ‘we are left
       with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that the district court com-
       mitted a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
       by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
       sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’” United States v. Wood-
       son, 30 F.4th 1295, 1308 (11th Cir.) (quoting Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190),
       cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 412 (2022). We have stated that “[t]he weight
       to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to
       the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Clay, 483
       F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Williams, 456
       F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2006)). The district court may “attach
       ‘great weight’” to any single factor or combination of factors.
USCA11 Case: 22-10813      Document: 40-1       Date Filed: 11/06/2023     Page: 6 of 7

       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10813

       United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting
       United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009)).
               One of the purposes of the Guidelines is to provide certainty
       and fairness in sentencing, with the goal of “avoiding unwarranted
       sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
       have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct.” United States
       v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
       § 991(b)(1)(B)). The Supreme Court has stated that the “avoidance
       of unwarranted disparities was clearly considered by the Sentenc-
       ing Commission when setting the Guidelines ranges.” Gall v. United
       States, 552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007). When a district court correctly calcu-
       lates and carefully reviews the Guidelines range, the court has “nec-
       essarily [given] signiﬁcant weight and consideration to the need to
       avoid unwarranted disparities.” Id.
              Here, the district court appropriately considered the victims’
       in-court statements and the dehumanizing nature of Mozie’s ac-
       tions in imposing a substantively reasonable sentence. The district
       court recognized Mozie’s diﬃcult childhood and the time he spent
       in ﬁfteen diﬀerent foster homes, but it also recognized the degree
       of abuse Mozie committed and his statement during sentencing
       that he had not believed he was doing bad things. We thus con-
       clude that the district court properly exercised its discretion in con-
       sidering all of the relevant factors and weighing the seriousness of
       the oﬀense conduct more heavily than the mitigating factors Mozie
       highlighted. Further, by correctly calculating and carefully review-
       ing the guideline range, the district court necessarily gave
USCA11 Case: 22-10813    Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 11/06/2023   Page: 7 of 7

       22-10813              Opinion of the Court                      7

       signiﬁcant weight and consideration to the need to avoid unwar-
       ranted disparities. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 54. Accordingly, we aﬃrm
       as to this issue.
                                      III.
             For the reasons stated, we aﬃrm Mozie’s sentence.
             AFFIRMED.