Court Opinion

ID: 9410983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 15:01:28.829335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.050138
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12789    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 07/25/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12789
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       DERRIUS DONAE GRIFFIN,
       a.k.a. Pie,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00157-KD-MU-1
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12789

                            ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Derrius Donae Griffin appeals his total 100-month sentence
       for two counts of forcibly resisting arrest with a deadly weapon—a
       vehicle. On appeal, he argues that his total sentence was procedur-
       ally unreasonable because the District Court applied U.S.S.G.
       § 2A2.2 to determine his base offense level, even though he did not
       commit aggravated assault and maintained throughout the District
       Court proceedings that he did not commit an assault.
              We normally review a district court’s interpretation of the
       Sentencing Guidelines de novo and accept its factual findings unless
       they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239,
       1247 (11th Cir. 2009). But we review arguments not raised before
       the district court for plain error. See United States v. McNair, 605
       F.3d 1152, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010).
               Plain error occurs where: (1) there is an error; (2) that is
       plain; (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that
       seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judi-
       cial proceedings. United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1237–38
       (11th Cir. 2018). On plain-error review, we may review the whole
       record when considering the effect of any error on the defendant’s
       substantial rights. See id. at 1239–40.
             To satisfy the plain error rule, an asserted error must be clear
       from the plain meaning of a statute or constitutional provision, or
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       22-12789                Opinion of the Court                           3

       from a holding of this Court or the Supreme Court. United States
       v. Morales, 987 F.3d 966, 976 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 500
       (2021). An error is plain if it is clearly contrary to settled law at the
       time of sentencing or at the time of appellate consideration. United
       States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005).
              A plain error affected a defendant’s substantial rights if it was
       prejudicial, meaning the error “actually made a difference” in the
       defendant’s sentence. Shelton, 400 F.3d at 1332 (quotation marks
       omitted). If the appellate court would have to speculate that the
       result would have been different, the defendant has not met the
       burden to show that his substantial rights have been affected.
       United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005).
                “To be upheld on appeal, a sentence must be . . . procedur-
       ally . . . reasonable.” United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945, 953 (11th
       Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1264
       (11th Cir. 2010)). In this respect, this Court must ensure that the
       District Court committed no significant procedural error, such as
       failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the guideline range.
       United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2016) (per cu-
       riam). We normally review the procedural reasonableness of a sen-
       tence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d
       1178, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, we will review a proce-
       dural error argument not raised before the district court for plain
       error. McNair, 605 F.3d at 1222.
              Enhanced penalties apply for forcible assaults against federal
       officers involving either the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12789

       or the infliction of bodily injury. See 18 U.S.C. § 111; see also United
       States v. Gutierrez, 745 F.3d 463, 467 (11th Cir. 2014). We have con-
       cluded that § 111 is a general intent statute, requiring only the in-
       tent to commit the underlying act. See United States v. Ettinger,
       344 F.3d 1149, 1153–60, 1161 (11th Cir. 2003).
               Section 2A2.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines applies when a
       defendant has committed an aggravated assault, and it establishes
       a base offense level of 14. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(a). The commentary
       defines an “aggravated assault” to mean “a felonious assault that
       involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury
       (i.e., not merely to frighten) with that weapon; (B) serious bodily
       injury; (C) strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or suf-
       focate; or (D) an intent to commit another felony.” Id. at
       § 2A2.2 cmt. 1 (emphases added). Alternatively, the Guideline pro-
       vision that addresses obstructing or impeding officers also makes
       clear that “[i]f the conduct constituted aggravated assault, apply
       § 2A2.2 (Aggravated Assault).” Id. at § 2A2.4(c)(1).
              In United States v. Park, 988 F.2d 107 (11th Cir. 1993), we up-
       held application of § 2A2.2 in a situation where a defendant with a
       metal pipe had swung it like a bat and threatened to “bash” individ-
       uals’ heads in if they did not comply with his demand. Id. at 109.
       Although he testified at sentencing that he did not intend to harm
       the individuals, the district court disagreed and applied § 2A2.2. Id.
       He appealed the district court’s application of § 2A2.2, but we af-
       firmed. Id. at 110.
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       22-12789                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

             We have not addressed in a published opinion whether
       § 2A2.2 requires proof of specific intent.
               As an initial matter, while Griffin objected to the calculation
       of the guideline range before the District Court, and he argued that
       he did not commit aggravated assault, he did not object to or raise
       a procedural reasonableness argument based on the application of
       § 2A2.2. The District Court even clarified—without objection—
       that the base offense level was not in dispute. 1 Further, at the close
       of the sentencing hearing the District Court asked if the defense
       had any further objections. Griffin’s attorney replied that she just
       wished to restate the objections previously made. The Court clar-
       ified that this objection referred to the six-level enhancement for
       assault of a law enforcement officer during the course of the offense
       or immediate flight therefrom, and Griffin’s attorney agreed. At
       no point in the sentencing memorandum or at the sentencing hear-
       ing did Griffin object to the use of § 2A2.2 to establish the base of-
       fense level. The only objection the District Court would have had
       notice of would have been the objection to the six-level

       1 The District Court said “[W]e have the base offense, the vehicle, the danger-
       ous weapon. That’s not in dispute. Then we have if the victim sustained bod-
       ily injury. Then you add three levels. You dispute that. And then if the de-
       fendant was convicted under [18 U.S.C. § ]111(b), you add two levels. And
       [§] 111(b) is because they are an officer, right? [Section] 111(b) is because they
       are a federal officer?” Griffin’s counsel responded: “Yes, Your Honor.” If
       Griffin’s argument was that § 2A2.2 was not the appropriate base offense,
       counsel should have corrected the District Court at that moment.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12789

       enhancement. Therefore, we review Griffin’s arguments for plain
       error. McNair, 605 F.3d at 1222.
              We conclude that Griffin’s challenge is meritless. First, we
       are not convinced that the District Court erred in applying § 2A2.2
       based on the record before us, which showed that Griffin put law
       enforcement officers in danger by intentionally driving the motor
       vehicle at and near them in order to escape. Second, even if we
       assume arguendo that there was error, Griffin does not cite, and re-
       search does not reveal, any published case holding that § 2A2.2 re-
       quires a district court to find specific intent to cause bodily injury
       or finding the application of § 2A2.2 incorrect under similar circum-
       stances. Therefore, even if the District Court did err by applying §
       2A2.2 instead of § 2A2.4, the error was not plain. Shelton, 400 F.3d
       at 1331.
             In light of the foregoing, we conclude it is unnecessary to
       address the remaining prongs of the plain error analysis. We con-
       clude that the District Court did not plainly err when it used
       § 2A2.2 to calculate the guidelines, so Griffin’s total sentence was
       not rendered procedurally unreasonable. Thus, we affirm.
              AFFIRMED.