Court Opinion

ID: 9957049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 16:01:40.110994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:05.341852
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USCA11 Case: 22-13883    Document: 47-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024   Page: 1 of 17

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13883
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        MARK MANUEL ANGELES MARINO,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cr-00094-TJC-LLL-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13883

        Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Mark Manuel Angeles Marino appeals his convictions and
        sentences for attempting to entice a child to engage in a commer-
        cial sex act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1) and 1594(a), en-
        ticing a child to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose
        of producing visual depictions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)
        and (e), receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1), and possessing child pornography, in viola-
        tion of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2).
               He argues that the district court erred in denying his sup-
        pression motion because the affidavit used to obtain a search war-
        rant for his residence lacked probable cause. First, he argues that
        the affidavit’s reliance on his Bitcoin payment of $56 for “5pics” to
        an account linked to another account known to deal in child por-
        nography was too tenuous to support a finding of probable cause
        that child pornography would be found in his residence. Second,
        he argues that certain challenged statements and omissions in the
        affidavit relating to the undercover investigation and the nature of
        child pornographers precluded a finding of cause. Third, he argues
        that the evidence of his Bitcoin payment was stale, given the ap-
        proximate seven-month delay between when he made the pay-
        ment and when law enforcement ultimately sought a search war-
        rant. Alternatively, he argues that no good-faith exception could
        rehabilitate the defective search warrant. Separately, he argues
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        22-13883                Opinion of the Court                           3

        that the court erred at sentencing by holding his silence against him
        when he declined to allocute. We address each argument in turn.
                            I. SUPPRESSION MOTION
        A. The Affidavit’s Reliance on the Bitcoin Payment
                The district court’s denial of a motion to suppress presents a
        mixed question of law and fact, and we review its findings of fact
        for clear error, “considering all the evidence in the light most fa-
        vorable to the prevailing party,” and its application of the law to
        those facts de novo. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 870 (11th
        Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022). Whether an affidavit
        establishes probable cause is reviewed de novo, and we give “due
        weight to inferences drawn from those facts [recited in the affida-
        vit] by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” United
        States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation
        marks omitted).
                  “[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
        ported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable
        cause exists if, ‘given all the circumstances set forth in the affida-
        vit . . . , there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
        crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Trader,
        981 F.3d 961, 969 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
        213, 238 (1983)). “To establish probable cause to search a home, a
        warrant affidavit must establish a connection between the defend-
        ant and the residence to be searched and a link between the resi-
        dence and any criminal activity.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
        “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13883

        probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even
        usefully, reduced to a clear set of legal rules.” Gates, 462 U.S. at
        232.
                In determining probable cause, a court may consider only
        the information presented to the issuing judge. United States v.
        Lockett, 674 F.2d 843, 845 (11th Cir. 1982). “Opinions and conclu-
        sions of an experienced agent regarding a set of facts are properly a
        factor in the probable cause equation for issuing a warrant.” United
        States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1331 n.9 (11th Cir. 1995) (quotation
        marks omitted, alteration adopted). A district court’s determina-
        tion of probable cause is given great deference, Trader, 981 F.3d at
        966, and affidavits supporting a search warrant are presumptively
        valid, United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1010 (11th Cir. 2012).
               Here, the district court did not err in concluding that the
        search warrant was supported by probable cause and in denying
        Marino’s suppression motion. First, on October 29, 2019, Marino
        (or someone at his address) sent $56.38 to an email address con-
        trolled by a person who had previously sent child pornography to
        HSI investigators.
               Second, the affidavit also contained sufficient evidence to es-
        tablish probable cause that Marino’s Bitcoin payment on October
        29, 2019, was sent in exchange for child pornography. The search
        warrant affidavit states (and Marino does not dispute) that the pay-
        ment was for “5pics,” and referenced an email address with the
        same domain as that of the email address HSI investigators were
        communicating with—“secmail.pro”—“an anonymous email
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        22-13883               Opinion of the Court                        5

        service that uses private servers to provide its user protection for
        anonymous use.” Moreover, the search warrant affidavit states
        (and Marino does not dispute) that the four times that email ac-
        count sent Officer Gergar images or videos, child sexual abuse ma-
        terial was sent and the Officer received such material before remit-
        ting any form of payment. “Given all the circumstances set forth
        in the affidavit,” the district court correctly concluded that “there
        [was] a fair probability that” Marino had received child sexual
        abuse material from the user of the Email Account by transferring
        Bitcoin through an electronic device used to access the internet at
        his residence. Trader, 981 F.3d at 969.
               Finally, the affidavit also contained sufficient evidence to
        conclude that “it was likely that child sexual abuse material (or ev-
        idence thereof) would be found at the [r]esidence, whether or not
        the material had been previously deleted.” Doc. 64 at 45; Trader,
        981 F.3d at 969. The affidavit described the characteristics of col-
        lectors of child pornography, their tendency to hoard it, as well as
        the tendency of other possessors of child pornography and their
        tendency to delete it and, how, despite deleting such material,
        there were computer forensic techniques for recovering files that
        had “long been deleted” from a computer. These statements were
        based on Agent Luedke’s “experience, training, and conversations
        with other experienced agents who investigate cases involving the
        sexual exploitation of children.” Although Marino may contest the
        veracity of these statements, “[o]pinion and conclusions of an ex-
        perienced agent,” such as Agent Luedke, “regarding a set of facts,”
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13883

        are a proper factor to consider in the “probable cause equation.”
        Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1331 n.9.
                Although “probable cause is a fluid concept,” when viewing
        the foregoing facts in the light most favorable to the government—
        the prevailing party—the district court in its “assessment of proba-
        bilities” correctly concluded that there was a fair probability that
        child pornography would be found at Marino’s residence.
               For the foregoing reasons, we affirm as to this issue.
        B. Marino’s Challenge to Certain Statements and Omissions in the Affi-
        davit
               A search warrant is void if the affidavit supporting the war-
        rant contains statements that are “knowingly and intentionally”
        false or made “with reckless disregard for the truth,” and if, when
        such “false material [is] set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining
        content is insufficient to establish probable cause.” United States v.
        Franks, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
               “The reasoning in Franks also applies to information omitted
        from warrant affidavits.” Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1326
        (11th Cir. 1997). When a search-warrant affidavit “contains omis-
        sions made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the accu-
        racy of the affidavit,” a warrant may be invalidated. Id. at 1326-27
        (quotation marks omitted). If “facts omitted from the affidavit are
        clearly critical to a finding of probable cause,” then “recklessness
        may be inferred from proof of the omission itself.” Id. at 1327 (quo-
        tation marks omitted). However, “[o]missions that are not reck-
        less, but are instead negligent, or insignificant and immaterial, will
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        22-13883                  Opinion of the Court                               7

        not invalidate a warrant.” Id. (citation omitted). “Indeed, even in-
        tentional or reckless omissions will invalidate a warrant only if in-
        clusion of the omitted facts would have prevented a finding of
        probable cause.” Id.
                The principles boil down to “a two-part test to determine
        whether a misstatement in an officer’s warrant affidavit amounts
        to a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d
        1276, 1287 (11th Cir. 2019). “First, we ask whether there was an
        intentional or reckless misstatement or omission.” Id. Reckless-
        ness occurs when an officer “should have recognized the error, or
        at least harbored serious doubts” about the information. See United
        States v. Kirk, 781 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir. 1986). “Then, we ex-
        amine the materiality of the information by inquiring whether
        probable cause would be negated if the offending statement was
        removed or the omitted information included.” Paez, 915 F.3d at
        1287. If probable cause would not be negated, the warrant is still
        valid. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72.
              Here, the challenged statements and omissions, taken to-
        gether, do not negate probable cause. As to the omissions—which
        include (1) the undercover agent also receiving non-pornographic
        images, (2) the government’s test transfer amount in a nominal
        amount (which was sent to avoid receiving child pornography),1

        1 Marino implies that his $56 Bitcoin payment—similar in amount to the in-

        vestigator’s $55 Bitcoin payment to the same seller—was also intended to
        avoid receiving child pornography, as was the officer’s. However, the officer’s
        $55 payment was a small amount of the asking price for a video to be custom-
        made for the officer. By contrast, Marino’s $56 payment was for “5 pics.” We
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        8                           Opinion of the Court                        22-13883

        and (3) the full content of the advertisement—even assuming this
        omitted information was included, considering these statements
        with the other evidence in the light most favorable to the prevail-
        ing party (the government) would not negate probable cause and
        were not intentionally omitted or otherwise recklessly omitted in
        disregard of the truth.
               Likewise, the challenged statements—consisting of state-
        ments about (1) the characteristics of collectors of child pornogra-
        phy, (2) the tendencies of child pornographers to hoard their col-
        lections, and (3) the ability to recover deleted data from electronic
        devices—were not knowingly false nor made with a reckless disre-
        gard of the truth, because the agent based these statements on his
        training, experience, and discussion with others. Although Marino
        may disagree with these statements, that does not mean they were
        deliberately false or made with a reckless disregard for the truth.
                Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
        C. Was Evidence of the Bitcoin Payment Stale?
               “The staleness doctrine . . . requires that the information
        supporting the government’s application for a warrant must show
        that probable cause exists at the time the warrant is issued.” United

        cannot conclude that the district court erred in rejecting Marino’s argument
        in this regard. In light of the totality of the other evidence, including especially
        the fact that this same seller sent child pornography to the HSI officers before
        the payment of any money, the $56 for five pornographic pictures is not so
        clearly unreasonable as to undermine the fair probability that Marino was pay-
        ing for child pornography.
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        22-13883                Opinion of the Court                           9

        States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation
        marks omitted, alteration in original). “[E]valuating staleness re-
        quires a fact-intensive inquiry based on the totality of the circum-
        stances, including the nature of the suspected crime . . . , habits of
        the accused, [and] character of the [information] sought.” United
        States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178, 1193 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation
        marks omitted, second and third alterations in original). Because
        of the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, “there is no particular
        rule or time limit for when information becomes stale. Touset, 890
        F.3d at 1238 (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted).
                In Touset, we considered the staleness doctrine as it relates
        specifically to child pornography appeals, and held that evidence of
        a defendant’s three separate low-money payments to an account
        known to deal in child pornography was not stale when those pay-
        ments had occurred about a year and a half before law enforcement
        obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s residence. 890 F.3d at
        1237-38. In so holding, we adopted the reasoning of sister circuits
        that had “repeatedly rejected staleness challenges in appeals involv-
        ing child pornography,” on the ground that “pedophiles rarely, if
        ever, dispose of child pornography.” Id. at 1238 (quotation marks
        omitted). This is especially true as it relates to “electronic child por-
        nography,” because probable cause “remains longer because de-
        leted files can remain on electronic devices.” Id. (quotation marks
        omitted, emphasis in original).
               Under the prior panel precedent rule, “a prior panel’s hold-
        ing is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13883

        overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Su-
        preme Court or this [C]ourt sitting en banc.” United States v. Dudley,
        5 F.4th 1249, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1476
        (2022) (quotation marks omitted).
                Here, Marino’s challenge to the staleness of the evidence—
        i.e., the use of his October 29, 2019, payment to obtain a warrant
        in June 2020, nearly eight months later—is foreclosed by our prec-
        edent. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
        D. The Good Faith Exception
               We review de novo whether the good-faith exception to the
        exclusionary rule applies, but we review the underlying facts on
        which that determination is based for clear error. United States v.
        McCall, 84 F.4th 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-
        6609, (Mar. 4, 2024). The government must prove whether the
        good-faith exception applies. Campbell, 26 F.4th at 870 n.5.
                “[T]he exclusionary rule . . . generally prohibits the govern-
        ment from relying on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
        Amendment,” and it applies “in only unusual cases,” because the
        remedy “almost always requires courts to ignore reliable, trustwor-
        thy evidence.” McCall, 84 F.4th at 1323 (quotation marks omitted).
        The rule is typically “limited to situations in which the threat of its
        application can deter future violations,” and generally applies “only
        if the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disre-
        gard for Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. (quotation marks omit-
        ted). “In doubtful or marginal cases, suppression is inappropriate.”
        Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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        22-13883                Opinion of the Court                         11

               Because good-faith mistakes cannot be deterred—a goal of
        the exclusionary rule—an exception to the rule is the good-faith
        exception. Id. This exception prevents suppression of “reliable
        physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant
        issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.” United States v. Leon,
        468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984). The good-faith exception does not apply
        in four circumstances:
               (1) where the issuing judge was misled by infor-
               mation in an aﬃdavit that the aﬃant knew was false
               or would have known was false except for his reckless
               disregard of the truth; (2) where the issuing magis-
               trate wholly abandoned his judicial role; (3) where the
               aﬃdavit supporting the warrant is so lacking in indi-
               cia of probable cause as to render oﬃcial belief in its
               existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) where a war-
               rant is so facially deﬁcient[—i.e., in failing to particu-
               larize the place to be searched or the things to be
               seized—]that the executing oﬃcers cannot reasona-
               bly presume it to be valid.

        United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178, 1196 (11th Cir. 2021) (quo-
        tation marks omitted).
               “When law enforcement officers act in good faith and in rea-
        sonable reliance upon a judge’s order, exclusion is not warranted
        because there is no unlawful conduct to deter.” Id. When consid-
        ering an officer’s reliance on a district court’s probable cause deter-
        mination, it is “necessary to consider the objective reasonableness,
        not only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13883

        of the officers who originally obtained it or who provided infor-
        mation material to the probable-cause determination.” Leon, 468
        U.S. at 923 n.24. Our focus is “on [the] reasonably well-trained of-
        ficer and is based upon the totality of the circumstances,” which
        may naturally extend “beyond the four corners of the affidavit and
        search warrant” when determining whether an officers’ reliance on
        the warrant was reasonable. United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308,
        1318 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted); see United States v.
        Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867, 872-73 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that officer
        acted in objective good faith by (1) consulting a local district attor-
        ney before seeking a search warrant, (2) submitting the matter to a
        neutral magistrate, and (3) acting on reasonable suspicion when a
        suspect had consented to search his vehicle and then revoked it af-
        ter the officer focused on an item in the vehicle).
                Here, even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation oc-
        curred, we agree with the district court that suppression is not war-
        ranted because Agent Luedke reasonably and in good faith relied
        on a facially valid warrant issued by a detached and neutral magis-
        trate judge after he consulted with an Assistant U.S. Attorney who
        agreed that the affidavit contained sufficient facts to establish prob-
        able cause. The record establishes that Agent Luedke acted in ob-
        jective good faith, executing the warrant and providing infor-
        mation material to the probable-cause determination. Addition-
        ally, because none of the exceptions to the good-faith exception ap-
        ply, suppression would not be warranted.
               Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
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        22-13883               Opinion of the Court                         13

                              II. SENTENCING ISSUE
                No person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
        witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. A defendant re-
        tains this privilege through his sentencing. Mitchell v. United States,
        526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999).
               In Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court
        may not draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s silence, in
        determining the facts of the offense. Id. at 330. At sentencing,
        Mitchell declined to testify to the quantity of cocaine that she had
        distributed. Id. at 318-19. The district court ruled that she had no
        right to remain silent. Id. at 319. Based on her silence, the court
        attributed five kilograms of cocaine to her, applied the mandatory
        minimum term of imprisonment for distribution of that quantity,
        and in doing so stated that it “held it against [her] that she didn’t
        come forward,” and that she “should have come forward and ex-
        plained[ed] her side of th[e] issue.” Id.
                In holding that Mitchell had a right to remain silent at sen-
        tencing, the Supreme Court reasoned “the question in a criminal
        case is not whether the defendant committed the acts of which he
        is accused,” but “whether the Government has carried its burden
        to prove its allegations while respecting the defendant’s individual
        rights.” Id. at 330. “By holding [Mitchell’s] silence against her in
        determining the facts of the offense at the sentencing hearing, the
        District Court imposed an impermissible burden on the exercise of
        the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.” Id.
        To be clear, Mitchell’s holding is narrow, “leav[ing] open the
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13883

        possibility that some inferences might permissibly be drawn from
        a defendant’s penalty-phase silence.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S.
        415, 421 (2014); see also Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 330 (“Whether silence
        bears upon the determination of a lack of remorse, or upon ac-
        ceptance of responsibility for purposes of . . . [U.S.S.G.]
        § 3E1.1 . . . is not before us, and we express no view on it.”).
               In Barrington, this Court held that the district court did not
        plainly err during sentencing when it asked Barrington whether he
        still maintained that he had done nothing wrong, and Barrington
        declined to answer. United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1195
        (11th Cir. 2011). Barrington did not object to the question at sen-
        tencing and argued for the first time on appeal that the question
        infringed on his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
        Id. Because Barrington cited Mitchell, this Court “constru[ed] his
        contention to be that the district court impermissibly drew an ad-
        verse inference from [his] refusal to answer the question and con-
        sidered that inference in determining the appropriate sentence.”
        Id. This Court dismissed his contention as “entirely speculative,”
        reasoning that “[n]othing in the district court’s comments evinced
        an intent to impose a more severe sentence based on [his] failure
        to respond to [its] question.” Id. at 1197. Moreover, his assumption
        “that the district court relied on an adverse inference in view of the
        perceived harshness of his sentence,” was belied by “his low end
        Guidelines sentence.” Id.
                We review de novo constitutional sentencing issues. United
        States v. Joyner, 882 F.3d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 2018).
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        22-13883               Opinion of the Court                        15

               Here, to the extent that Marino cites Mitchell, he appears to
        contend that the court drew an adverse inference against him. Ac-
        cordingly, because Marino cites Mitchell, we follow Barrington’s
        lead and construe Marino’s “contention to be that the district court
        impermissibly drew an adverse inference from his [declining to al-
        locute] and considered that inference in determining the appropri-
        ate sentence.” See Barrington, 648 F.3d at 1195.
               We reject Marino’s contention that the district court drew
        an adverse inference from Marino’s silence. Even more so than in
        Barrington, it is untenable that the district court here drew an ad-
        verse inference on the basis of Marino’s silence. Unlike in Barring-
        ton—where this Court determined that Barrington’s contention
        that the district court drew an adverse inference from his silence
        was “entirely speculative”—here there is nothing to speculate
        about. See Barrington, 648 F.3d at 1197. After Marino’s objection
        to the court’s sentence, on the ground that his silence had been
        construed against him, the district court clarified that it “did not
        impose a higher sentence against [him] because he chose not to
        speak,” removing any potential for speculation about whether it
        had construed his silence against him. Cf. Barrington, 648 F.3d at
        1197.
               Even if the district court had not expressly stated that it did
        not construe Marino’s silence against him, “[n]othing in the district
        court’s comments evinced an intent to impose a more severe sen-
        tence based on [Marino’s declining to allocute].” See Barrington, 648
        F.3d at 1197. The court repeated throughout sentencing that it was
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13883

        Marino’s right to remain silent and appeared less concerned with
        condemning Marino and more concerned about the need to ensure
        his sentence adequately deterred his future conduct and protected
        the public from him. The court’s words here are far from the ex-
        press condemnation of the district court’s in Mitchell, which told
        Mitchell that, because she remained silent, it “held it against [her]
        that she didn’t come forward.” Cf. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 319. Addi-
        tionally, to the extent that Marino may be “assum[ing] that the dis-
        trict court relied on an adverse inference in view of the perceived
        harshness of his sentence,” any assumption is belied by the record,
        because the district court sentenced him to 660 months’ imprison-
        ment—a downward variance from the recommended advisory
        Guidelines sentence of life imprisonment. See Barrington, 648 F.3d
        at 1197. In considering deterrence and whether Marino “would not
        in the future engage in this same type of conduct,” the district court
        did consider “the absence of any information about Mr. Marino and
        why he conducted himself the way he did and what his current
        state of mind is.” However, the district court expressly disavowed
        drawing any adverse inference from Marino’s silence. Because the
        court did not construe Marino’s silence against him, it did not err
        procedurally.
                As noted above, the Supreme Court has expressly left open
        the issue of whether a sentencing court may properly draw an ad-
        verse inference from a defendant’s silence in considering lack of re-
        morse or acceptance of responsibility (i.e. sentencing considera-
        tions similar to the future dangerousness factor relevant here). Be-
        cause the record in this case is clear that the district court did not
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        22-13883              Opinion of the Court                      17

        draw an adverse inference from Marino’s silence, we need not, and
        do not, address that open issue in this case.
              For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
        is
              AFFIRMED.