Court Opinion

ID: 9819530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:27:07.005701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:23.572857
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s finding that respondent forfeited her right to raise her objection to the State’s petition on appeal because she failed to object to the State’s petition in the trial court. I would have ended the analysis there. However, I concur in the majority’s result, but specially concur to attempt to reconcile the majority’s holding with the section of the statute under which respondent was found unfit. The trial court found respondent unfit under section 1(D) (q) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(q) (West 2000)), which provides that a parent is unfit if: “[t]he parent has been criminally convicted of aggravated battery, heinous battery, or attempted murder of any child.” 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(q) (West 2000). In the present case, respondent was convicted of first degree murder of J.R. The legislature did not specifically list first degree murder in this section of the statute. It is logical to infer, however, that if a parent is criminally convicted of a greater offense — i.e., first degree murder — that offense would naturally encompass the lesser offenses enumerated. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “aggravated battery” as “[a] criminal battery accompanied by circumstances that make it more severe, such as the use of a deadly weapon or the fact that the battery resulted in serious bodily harm.” Black’s Law Dictionary 146 (7th ed. 1999). Certainly first degree murder meets that definition and was intended by the legislature to fall within the purview of this section of the statute as a basis for a finding of unfitness.