Court Opinion

ID: 9403490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 14:09:03.864858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:07.483285
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

                  In The Supreme Court

   The State, Respondent,

   v.

   Jon Smart, Petitioner.

   Appellate Case No. 2021-000987

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

               Appeal from Clarendon County
             D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge

                    Opinion No. 28161
        Heard November 16, 2022 – Filed June 21, 2023

                            AFFIRMED

   Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
   Columbia, for Petitioner.

   Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy W.
   Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney General Donald J.
   Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General
   Melody Jane Brown, Assistant Attorney General Tommy
   Evans Jr., of Columbia; Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney
   III, of Sumter, all for Respondent.
JUSTICE FEW: Today we address whether a juvenile sentenced to life in prison
bears any burden of proof or persuasion when seeking resentencing under Aiken v.
Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). We hold there is no such burden—on
either party—and the resentencing court did not impose such a burden. We affirm
the decision of the resentencing court imposing a life sentence.

      I.     Facts and Procedural History

Smart and his co-defendant, Stephen Hutto, were in custody at a Department of
Juvenile Justice detention facility near Rimini in Clarendon County in August 1999
when they brutally murdered a citizen volunteer who graciously allowed the boys to
work on his family farm under his supervision as a part of their rehabilitation. Smart
and Hutto then stole the man's truck and drove it on a violent crime spree starting in
Rimini, to the town of Bamberg, and continuing to Myrtle Beach. After Horry
County Police officers stopped them for a traffic violation and discovered the truck
was stolen, Smart and Hutto led officers on a thirty-mile high-speed chase during
which Smart fired shots at pursuing law enforcement vehicles. Smart was sixteen
years old. For a more complete presentation of the facts, see State v. Smart (Smart
II), 433 S.C. 651, 655-57, 861 S.E.2d 383, 385-86 (Ct. App. 2021); State v. Hutto,
356 S.C. 384, 386-87, 589 S.E.2d 202, 203 (Ct. App. 2003).

Smart pled guilty in 2001 to murder, armed robbery, grand larceny, criminal
conspiracy, and escape. The plea court sentenced him to life in prison for the
murder. Under subsection 16-3-20(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 1999),
Smart was not eligible for parole. In 2016, Smart sought resentencing pursuant to
Aiken. Smart v. State, 416 S.C. 583, 583, 787 S.E.2d 845, 845 (2016). A different
circuit court again sentenced him to life without parole. Smart appealed the sentence
on multiple grounds, including his claim the resentencing court erred by requiring
him to show life without parole was inappropriate. The court of appeals affirmed.
Smart II, 433 S.C. at 666, 861 S.E.2d at 391. We granted Smart's petition for a writ
of certiorari to address his arguments the resentencing court improperly placed on
him a burden of proof or persuasion and should have placed the burden on the State.

      II.    Aiken v. Byars

In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States held the Eighth Amendment
prohibits mandatory life without parole sentences for homicides committed by a
person under the age of eighteen. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2475, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 430 (2012). In Aiken, this Court applied the
reasoning of Miller retroactively and extended it to South Carolina's discretionary
life without parole sentences. See 410 S.C. at 540-44, 765 S.E.2d at 575-77 (lead
opinion); 410 S.C. at 545-46, 765 S.E.2d at 578 (Pleicones, J., concurring) ("While
. . . the majority exceeds the scope of current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in
ordering relief under Miller, I would reach the same result under S.C. Const. art. I,
§ 15."). The Court emphasized the constitutional significance of youth, noting
"Miller requires the sentencing authority 'take into account how children are
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to
a lifetime in prison.'" 410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S.
at 480, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424). We identified five factors from
Miller that a circuit court must consider before sentencing a juvenile to life without
parole. Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78, 132 S. Ct. at 2468, 183 L. Ed. 2d at
423).

      III.   Resentencing Procedure

In Aiken, we effectively granted every motion for resentencing for any juvenile
sentenced to life without parole prior to Miller and Aiken. We addressed the
"Appropriate Procedure" in Aiken itself, 410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577, and
required "the following procedures shall be followed" in a subsequent administrative
order, In re Admin. Ord., 415 S.C. 460, 460-61, 783 S.E.2d 534, 534 (2016). We
now clarify that in an Aiken resentencing hearing—as with almost any other
sentencing proceeding 1—there is no burden of proof or persuasion placed on either
party and there is no presumption for or against any sentence. Instead, both the State
and the defendant have a mutual burden of production to provide the resentencing
court with any evidence and arguments they believe bear on the Aiken factors or
otherwise relate to what should be the appropriate sentence. The sentence to be
imposed is within the discretion of the resentencing court. See State v. Bolin, 209
S.C. 108, 111, 39 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1946) ("The length of the prison sentence rests
in the sound discretion of the trial Court . . . ." (quoting State v. Johnson, 159 S.C.
165, 170, 156 S.E. 353, 354 (1930))). In exercising this discretion, the resentencing
court may give no deference to the prior sentencing court's decision to impose life
without parole. The resentencing court must consider all the evidence and

1
  But see S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (B) (2015) (providing that "a statutory
aggravating circumstance" must be found beyond a reasonable doubt before
imposing the death penalty); State v. Grooms, 343 S.C. 248, 253-55, 540 S.E.2d 99,
101-02 (2000) (discussing a burden of persuasion in certain domestic violence cases
under section 16-25-90 of the South Carolina Code (2015)).
arguments presented at the resentencing hearing and impose an appropriate sentence
without any regard to the prior sentencing court's thought process or decision.

Smart argues the resentencing court should have placed a burden of proof or
persuasion on the State. In Miller, the Supreme Court suggested it should be the
"rare juvenile" who is sentenced to life without parole. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80,
132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
573, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1197, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1, 24 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825, 841 (2010)). In Aiken—quoting
the same discussion from Miller—this Court stated "appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon." 410 S.C.
at 539, 765 S.E.2d at 575 (quoting 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed.
2d at 424). Smart relies on these statements and others to argue the State should
bear the burden of demonstrating that a life without parole sentence is proper. We
disagree. The Miller discussion related to "the great difficulty" sentencing courts
face in "distinguishing" between those juveniles who do not deserve such a sentence
and those who do. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at
424. The statements were not meant to suggest a presumption against life without
parole or that any burden must be placed on the State. 2 Today we stand by what was
essentially a prediction by this Court that when sentencing courts consider the Aiken
factors and all the evidence that relates to those factors, because of "children's
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change[,] . . . appropriate
occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be
uncommon." Aiken, 410 S.C. at 539, 765 S.E.2d at 575 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at
479, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424). The decision belongs to the
resentencing court, and this Court will not recognize any presumption nor impose
any burden of proof or persuasion. We trust our circuit judges are well-equipped to
make the right decision in each case.

2
  See Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1318-19, 209 L. Ed.
2d 390, 404 (2021) (holding "a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility
is not required before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a
murderer under 18").
      IV.    Smart's Resentencing

We acknowledge there is language in the resentencing court's oral ruling that could
be understood to support Smart's claim the court placed an improper burden on him. 3
After a careful review of the entire record, however, we are convinced the
resentencing court thoroughly considered Smart's background and history in light of
the Aiken factors. As Aiken requires, "the mitigating hallmark features of youth
[were] fully explored," 410 S.C. at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578, and the resentencing
court imposed its life sentence de novo without any burden of proof or persuasion
on Smart or any deference to the sentence previously imposed.

While we do not review the substance of the resentencing court's decision to impose
a life sentence, to explain our ruling the court followed the proper procedure under
Aiken, we summarize the thought process the court went through in making its
decision. We begin with a statement the resentencing court made at the conclusion
of the hearing, "I have methodically gone through each bit of information that's been
provided to me [and] made what I believe to be, not easy, not easy on my part, but
made what I believe to be the right decision in this case." The record supports the
court's statement. First, the court considered the transcript from and other evidence
surrounding the original guilty plea to murder. The court heard extensive testimony
from an expert psychologist who interviewed Smart several times and reviewed
thousands of pages of his records. The court also heard testimony from four other
witnesses the State and Smart presented regarding the circumstances of the crime
and Smart's personal background and history.

The court then heard arguments from the attorneys on both sides and analyzed the
Aiken factors in light of those arguments. As an example of this analysis, the court
compared Smart's sister's claim at the resentencing hearing that her parents ignored
the children and exposed them to drugs with Smart's father's testimony at a family
court juvenile delinquency proceeding before Smart was sent to Rimini. In light of
the father's testimony—particularly his efforts to get Smart drug treatment—the
sentencing court discounted the sister's testimony. Also, the court carefully
considered whether Smart and Hutto planned the murder in advance or acted
suddenly and impulsively. The State argued a map of their escape route

3
 For example, the circuit court concluded its ruling by saying, "It is with no pleasure
at all that I affirm so to speak, or deny your client's motion and impose a life
sentence." Based on the circuit court's in-depth consideration of the Miller factors,
we believe this was simply a misstatement by the court.
demonstrated the murder was planned in advance, but the court discounted the map
because—the court appears to have concluded—it just as easily could have been
made as part of their plans for after their eventual release. Ultimately, based on
testimony from other juveniles to whom Smart and Hutto spoke about planning the
murder, the court was convinced the boys planned the murder and escape in advance;
it was not a sudden or impulsive action. The court also found Smart appreciated the
consequences of his actions because he and Hutto hid the victim's body and
attempted to wash the blood away from the scene. The court considered Smart's
multiple statements to law enforcement officers, his interactions with solicitors, and
his conduct during the guilty plea, all as indicative Smart was competent to assist
counsel in his defense. After viewing autopsy photographs, the court noted the sheer
brutality of the murder. The resentencing court noted the plea court entered a
"negotiated sentence" of life in prison, as a result of which the plea court had no
choice but to accept the negotiation or reject the plea, but stated that on resentencing
the court was considering everything presented in the hearing in order to make its
own choice.

Finally, the resentencing court stated,

             I have taken all these factors into consideration, and I still
             believe it's the right decision. Will I lose sleep over it [?]
             . . . Probably so. . . . These decisions aren't easy.
             Certainly, I have tried. And I have told you all, I typed my
             own 30-page transcript in my review of all this stuff. I
             have tried to hit on each of these points in coming to this
             conclusion. Again that's not – it wasn't easy.

In sum, it is clear from the record the resentencing court carefully considered all of
the evidence presented at the resentencing hearing by both the State and Smart and
correctly treated the proceeding as a de novo sentencing hearing, with no burden of
proof or persuasion on Smart.

      V.     Conclusion

This Court's decision in Aiken requires juveniles "receive an individualized hearing
where the mitigating hallmark features of youth are fully explored" before being
sentenced to life without parole. 410 S.C. at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578. The
resentencing court in this case gave Smart just such an individualized hearing and
soundly exercised its sentencing discretion without placing any burden of proof or
persuasion on Smart nor giving any deference to the previously imposed sentence.
AFFIRMED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Kaye G. Hearn,
concur.