Court Opinion

ID: 9623246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:30:23.964169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:27.708627
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion to the extent that it applies the fireman’s rule to bar plaintiffs’ recovery in this case.
Generally speaking, the fireman’s rule “precludes recovery for injuries received by firefighters when they are injured as a result of the negligence that [originally] caused them to be called to the scene of the fire.” (Citation omitted.) Wilbanks v. Echols, 209 Ga. App. 210, 211 (433 SE2d 134) (1993). Although the trial court was correct in stating that the fireman’s rule has not yet been applied to police officers in Georgia, in Bycom Corp. v. White, 187 Ga. App. 759, 762 (1) (371 SE2d 233) (1988), we specifically stated that the rule was applicable to public safety employees. This includes both firemen and policemen. Id. Consequently, I agree with the majority’s determination that the fireman’s rule does apply to police officers. I do not, however, agree with the majority that that rule should be applied in this case.
Under the fireman’s rule, firemen and police officers are not “barred from recovery in all instances in which they are injured by negligent acts. The relevant inquiry is whether the negligently created risk which resulted in the fireman’s or policeman’s injury was the very reason for his presence on the scene in his professional capacity. If the answer is yes, then recovery is barred; if no, recovery may be had.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.
In this case, it is undisputed that Gaither had been directing traffic on Gilmer Street for 15 to 20 minutes before Martin arrived. Therefore, it cannot be said that the original reason for Gaither’s presence at the scene had anything to do with the negligence on Martin’s part. Moreover, even if Gaither was not considered “on the scene” until Martin actually stopped her car in the middle of the street in violation of OCGA § 40-6-203 (a) (1) (K), Martin’s initial act of negligence in stopping her car did not result in Gaither having to subject himself to the risk of walking out into the street. Instead, it *654was Martin’s subsequent wilful failure to obey Gaither’s instructions in violation of OCGA § 40-6-2 that caused Gaither to subject himself to possible injury. Although the majority concludes that Gaither failed to demonstrate that Martin’s refusal to obey his instructions amounted to reckless or wanton and wilful conduct, which admittedly would preclude application of the fireman’s rule, based on the evidence of record, such a determination is better left to a jury. Consequently, I believe that the fireman’s rule, and its underlying rationale (assumption of the risk), should not be applied to bar recovery here as a matter of law.
Decided December 5, 1995
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1995
Dennis, Corry, Porter & Gray, R. Clay Porter, Thomas D. Trask, for appellant.
Joe A. Weeks, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Judge Blackburn and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.