Court Opinion

ID: 9943821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 14:46:23.561247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:28.886599
License: Public Domain

I concur in the judgment of the majority opinion but write separately to express dissatisfaction with the reasoning contained therein with respect to the construction of the language in Code of Civil Procedure section1 128.5. In patently frivolous actions, the majority interprets that section as requiring two findings before sanctions can properly be imposed by a trial court: (1) bad faith actions; and (2) tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.
If, the majority opines, the actions or tactics are objectively "frivolous" as that term is defined in the section 128.5, subdivision (b)(2), i.e., "totally and *Page 1508 
completely without merit or . . . for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party," the analysis is incomplete unless there is an additional finding of "bad faith." In other words, the majority requires a subjective standard of bad faith to be superimposed even though objectively the actions or tactics are utterly lacking in merit. I read the statute as permitting imposition of sanctions when either the subjective or the objective criteria are present. If the Legislature intended otherwise, it would have utilized the conjunctive word "and" in the statute and would not have seasoned the statute so many times with the disjunctive word "or."
In On v. Cow Hollow Properties (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1568, 1575 [272 Cal.Rptr. 535], the Court of Appeal reviewed a finding of the trial court which found the statute to be in thedisjunctive. In On, the issue on appeal was the reverse of the issue presented in this case. The Court of Appeal considered and permitted sanctions under section 128.5 for subjective "bad faith" actions without requiring an additional finding of objective frivolity since the statute was in the disjunctive.
The On court stated:
"In a further assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in basing the award of attorneys' fees alternatively on section 128.5 The question has some practical importance because the court relied on section 128.5 to include in the award certain costs lying outside the scope of Civil Code section 1717
"As amended in 1985, section 128.5, subdivision (a) provides: `Every trial court may order a party, the party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.' The trial court found: `Clearly, defendants attorneys' fees are awardable as reasonable expenses which were included as a result of plaintiff On's filing of the complaint in bad faith. Grounds for such bad faith are detailed in this court's Statement of Intended Decision.' Pointing out that the statute applied disjunctively to either bad faith actions orfrivolous tactics, the court concluded that it need not consider the further question whether appellant engaged in such frivolous tactics.
". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"Secondly, he complains that the court erred in basing sanctions solely on a finding that the action was in bad faith. But the use of the disjunctive in section 128.5, we think, clearly indicates that sanctions can be based either on a finding of a bad faith action or `tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.' In any event, the facts of the case as *Page 1509 
described in the statement of decision bring it within the category of a `frivolous action' as defined in such decisions as. . . ." (222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1575, italics added.)
Neither On nor the other cases relied on by the majority to advance the theory that frivolous actions or tactics, although objectively extant, are protected by the additional safety net requirement of the presence of subjective bad faith before sanctions can be imposed, discuss policy. Nor does the majority opinion undertake a discussion of policy but is satisfied to ground the opinion on a superficial discussion of legislative intent.
In my view, to impose such a double requirement is to make more difficult the imposition of sanctions. Such detractions are counterproductive to the expressed policy of the Legislature as pronounced in Government Code section 68608, subdivision (b),2 obviously favoring the imposition of sanctions. The section states: "Judges shall have all the powers to impose sanctions authorized by law, including the power to dismiss actions or strike pleadings, if it appears that less severe sanctions would not be effective after taking into account the effect of previous sanctions or previous lack of compliance in the case. Judges are encouraged to impose sanctions to achieve the purpose of this article."
I view the policy behind Government Code section 68608, subdivision (b) and section 128.5 to be to encourage the purging of nonmeritorious cases from our court system so that cases having merit can be brought speedily to trial. The majority's interpretation of section 128.5, in my view, is in derogation of this perceived policy.
However, under either the objective or subjective standard, or both, I find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying sanctions in this case, and I therefore concur in the judgment. I would respectfully encourage the Supreme Court to review and declare the proper interpretation of this very important provision in the Code of Civil Procedure.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2 This section became effective July 1, 1992. Government Code former section 68609, subdivision (d), which was repealed effective July 1, 1992, contained a similar provision. (See Historical Notes, Deering's Ann. Gov. Code, §§ 68608 and 68609 (1994 pocket supp.) p. 90.) *Page 1510