Court Opinion

ID: 9537825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:25:20.251805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:03.910701
License: Public Domain

DONOFRIO, Judge
(specially concurring).
I agree with the majority of this Court in its decision that the award of the Industrial Commission should be set aside. However the majority bases its decision on A.R.S. § 13-1653, subsection (A), stating that the petitioner’s “civil rights”, i. e., his rights to accident benefits and payments under the Workmen’s Compensation Act while in prison have not been suspended.
To reach its result the majority stated that A.R.S. § 13-1653, subsection (A), must be read in conjunction with the specific workmen’s compensation statutes, holding that since the Arizona Legislature enacted both A.R.S. § 13-1653 and the workmen’s compensation statutes, workmen’s compensation payments and benefits should be denied only where specifically mentioned in the workmen’s compensation statutes. Therefore, even though § 13-1653, subsection (A), specifically states, “A sentence of imprisonment in the state prison for any term less than life suspends the civil rights of the person so sentenced * * * ”, the majority concludes that the civil rights of the petitioner are not suspended because the Legislature in its workmen’s compensation statutes has nowhere suspended the civil rights of a claimant who is serving less than a life sentence.
It appears to me, however, that such an extensive analysis is not necessary to decide this case. It is my belief that A.R.S. § 13-1653, subsection (A), dealing with the suspension of civil rights is inapplicable to the instant case. Instead, the case should be determined by A.R.S. § 13-1653, subsection (E), which states:
“The conviction of a person for ctum. .shall not work forfeiture of any property, except where a forfeiture is expressly imposed by law. All forfeitures to the state, unless expressly imposed by law are abolished.” (emphasis added)
The subject matter of discussion is accident benefits and compensation to which the petitioner apparently is entitled. In no way can I equate accident benefits and compensation to civil rights. I believe these to be clearly property rights.
Arizona has long stated that compensation awarded under the Workmen’s Compensation Act “is in lieu of lost wages and not as damages for pain, suffering and monetary loss * * Sorenson v. Six Companies, Inc., 53 Ariz. 83, 90, 85 P.2d 980, 983 (1939). See also, Paramount Pictures, Etc., v. Ind. Com., 56 Ariz. 217, 106 P.2d 1024 (1940). In Sorenson the court also stated:
“ * * * Such being the case, the purpose to be accomplished by the compensation act is to provide for the injured employee, and those dependent upon him, a certain amount of compensation which is supposed to represent, in part at least, the wages which he would presumably have earned had he not been injured, (citation omitted).” 53 Ariz. at 90, 85 P.2d at 983.
The same reasoning can also be implied from the Arizona workmen’s compensation statutes themselves. A.R.S. § 23-1041 et seq.
If the benefits petitioner is seeking under the Workmen’s Compensation Act were *344determined to be payment for damages, then perhaps they could be considered a part of petitioner’s civil rights, i. e., his right to sue for damages. However, since our courts have held these payments to be in lieu of lost wages, I believe them to be logically his property, and more specifically a property right. Therefore, having determined that accident benefits and compensation are a property right under A.R.S. § 13-1653, subsec. E, and finding no forfeiture expressly imposed by workmen’s compensation law because of incarceration in the state prison, I believe petitioner to be entitled to workmen’s compensation payments for that period of time he was in prison.