Court Opinion

ID: 9544819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:02:04.222967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:41.319075
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I disagree with the court’s conclusion that the evidence of Vessell’s bad acts in the Food Pantry was properly admitted in the absence of any attempted robbery charge based on these acts.
The court asserts that the subsequent attempted robbery tended to establish both opportunity and a method of operation that were similar in the two cases. The opportunity point stemmed from Vessell’s argument that he could not have traveled from the Quick-Stop to the Food Pantry, where he was arrested, in the short period of time that was available. The state contends that “[t]he answer lies in Paulette Gordon’s car, which Vessell left running at the side of the Food Pantry when he entered the store.” I agree, but I see no basis on which it can be said that Vessell’s misconduct in the Food Pantry itself expanded or affected this opportunity at all. Evidence of the car could have been admitted without reference to Vessell’s attempted robbery of the Food Pantry.
We have established the “signature” standard for admission of modus operandi evidence, which requires that “the prior crime [be] so nearly identical in method with the crime in question that it indicates the same person committed both crimes.” Galauska v. State, 527 P.2d 459, 467 (Alaska 1974), modified on other grounds, 532 P.2d 1017 (Alaska 1975). Although the use of a scarf, gun and car to accomplish each crime does reveal some similarity between the two crimes, these elements are not so uncommon or distinctive as to constitute a signature.
The state argues a third point: that the testimony is needed for testimonial completeness, as Vessell’s sudden departure from the Food Pantry, and his adjustment of his scarf as he left, make little sense unless viewed in the context of his robbery attempt and the arrival of the police. I do not accept the contention that these actions make little sense; one who had just robbed a small store moments before would be likely, upon seeing the police pulling into the parking lot of a different small store, to make an abrupt exit.
Thus, I find that the grounds asserted for the probative value of the evidence are minimally persuasive at best, and its prejudicial effect was obvious. One who has been shown to be generally disposed to rob small stores is much more likely to be found to have robbed this particular small store, and this is precisely the sort of inference the law prohibits.
However, the remaining evidence against Vessell was so strong that I must conclude that the admission of this evidence did not substantially influence the result and that therefore any error in admitting the evidence was harmless. Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 629-32 (Alaska 1969). Thus, I concur with the court in affirming the conviction.