Court Opinion

ID: 9633030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:31:48.65229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:27.505101
License: Public Domain

*443Judge JONES
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, reward money is not encompassed by the statute authorizing restitution; therefore, I agree with the defendant that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution as a condition of probation in the amount of a reward arbitrarily established and paid by the victim.
The trial court’s authority to set the terms and conditions of probation is statutory. Cumhuriyet v. People, 200 Colo. 466, 616 P.2d 724 (1980). Section 16-11-204.5(1), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) authorizes a court to order restitution pursuant to the following provisions:
As a condition of every sentence to probation, the court shall provide that the defendant make restitution to the victim of his conduct or to a member of the victim’s immediate family for the actual damages which were sustained. Such restitution shall be ordered by the court as a condition of probation. The amount of such restitution shall be based on the actual, pecuniary damages sustained by the victim, the ability of the defendant to pay, and the defendant’s obligations to support his dependents and to meet other family obligations. The court shall fix the manner and time of performance....
The purpose of an order for restitution is to make the victim whole, meaning that “a defendant should not be forced to repay a victim when there has been no indication that the damage or injury sustained by the victim was inflicted by the defendant.” Cumhuri-yet v. People, supra, 615 P.2d at 726. Hence, payment of restitution is authorized “only for the actual pecuniary damage the victim sustained as a direct result of the defendant’s conduct.” People v. Deadmond, 688 P.2d 763, 774 (Colo.1984) (emphasis added).
In contrast to other cases in which restitution has been approved for expenses undertaken by a victim for damages inflicted by a defendant, cf. People v. Valenzuela, 874 P.2d 420 (Colo.App.1993); People v. Courtney, 868 P.2d 1126 (Colo.App.1993); People v. Acosta, 860 P.2d 1376 (Colo.App.1993); People v. Engel, 746 P.2d 60 (Colo.App.1987); People v. Cheek, 734 P.2d 654 (Colo.App.1986), restitution may not be authorized with respect to the reward money here because the payment was a voluntary act by the victim subsequent to infliction of the damage by the victim and was not, therefore, a direct result of the defendant’s actions.
Additionally, I view the majority opinion as being in contravention of § 16-11-204.5. While the focus of the statute is to narrow the restitution to that amount which will make the victim whole, the opinion sanctions any amount which a victim decides, with no relation to reason, common sense, or economic reality, to spend in the case. I do not believe that the General Assembly intended that result.
Accordingly, I would vacate the order of restitution and remand for entry of an order of restitution which does not encompass the $1,000 which the victim arbitrarily established and expended as a reward.