Court Opinion

ID: 9410379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 05:07:02.150037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:57.302036
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                         STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

JUSTIN THOMAS,                                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                  July 20, 2023
              Plaintiff-Appellee,
and

ANESTHESIA SERVICES AFFILIATES,
MICHIGAN AMBULATORY SURGICAL
CENTER, PHASE ONE REHAB, LLC, SPINE
SPECIALISTS OF MICHIGAN, PC,
LABORATORY SPECIALIST OF MICHIGAN,
LLC, and AQUATIC SOLUTIONS PHYSICAL
THERAPY,

              Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                                 No. 360898
                                                                  Wayne Circuit Court
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE GROUP and IAT                              LC No. 20-000668-NF
INSURANCE GROUP,

              Defendants,
and

TRANSGUARD INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,

              Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and JANSEN and K. F. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant, Transguard Insurance Company of America (Transguard), appeals by delayed
leave granted the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary disposition brought under

                                              -1-
MCR 2.116(C)(10).1 Plaintiff, Justin Thomas, was operating a truck in Wisconsin when the truck
overturned after plaintiff failed to successfully negotiate a curve; no other motor vehicles were
involved in the accident. The crash allegedly occurred during plaintiff’s course of employment as
a mover. Plaintiff sought no-fault benefits for his accident-related injuries under an insurance
policy issued by Transguard. The numerous intervening plaintiffs provided medical care,
treatment, and services to plaintiff in connection with his injuries suffered in the truck accident.
The trial court ruled that a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether the insurance
policy was effectively a no-fault policy that covered plaintiff’s injuries. We conclude that a factual
issue exists with respect to whether plaintiff is entitled to medical payments under the
“occupational accident” coverage found in the insurance policy. Accordingly, we affirm.

                         I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        In a first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was in a motor vehicle accident on
January 17, 2019, and that as a result he suffered physical injuries to his neck, back, shoulders,
arms, hip, knees, Achilles tendon, ankle, and foot. He further asserted that he incurred a traumatic
brain injury. Plaintiff alleged that he required medical treatment and rehabilitation, attendant care,
and replacement services. He contended that he was entitled to personal protection insurance (PIP)
benefits under an insurance policy issued by Transguard and as mandated by the no-fault act, MCL
500.3101 et seq. Plaintiff additionally maintained that he submitted a claim to Transguard seeking
coverage for his damages but that Transguard refused to compensate plaintiff for his losses.2

        In his deposition, plaintiff displayed a lack of memory and confusion on many matters,
ostensibly resulting from the traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff claimed that he suffered the head
injury in the accident, but he could not recall the exact diagnosis, the name of the doctors who
treated him, or the type of doctors from whom he received services. Plaintiff testified that he did
not own a vehicle, that he could not recall the last time that he owned a vehicle, that he did not
remember if he owned a vehicle on the day of the accident, and that he had no specific memory
regarding whether he had ever owned a vehicle. Plaintiff was asked if he was employed at the
time of the accident, and he responded that he worked for “Palmer.” He was then queried
concerning whether he had ever worked for Morse Moving & Storage (Morse). Plaintiff
responded, “I worked for Palmer.” He subsequently reiterated and confirmed that he had worked
moving furniture for “Palmer Moving & Storage” and not Morse. But plaintiff could not recall
when he had been employed by Palmer.

       Plaintiff next testified that the accident occurred in Wisconsin, although he could not
remember the name of the city or town in which the accident happened. He could not recall why
he was in Wisconsin or the type of vehicle that he was driving. Plaintiff essentially asserted that

1
 Thomas v Old Republic Ins Group, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August
11, 2022 (Docket No. 360898).
2
  Plaintiff made identical claims against defendants Old Republic Insurance Group and IAT
Insurance Group. Transguard was a member of IAT, and the claims against IAT were dismissed.
A default was entered against Old Republic. IAT and Old Republic are not involved in this appeal.

                                                 -2-
he could not remember anything about events immediately preceding the accident, the accident
itself, and the immediate aftermath of the accident. Plaintiff later testified that due to the brain
injury he “just cannot retain information.” He then confirmed that he could not recall whether he
was working at the time of the accident.

        A Wisconsin motor vehicle crash report explained and detailed the nature of the accident.
The crash report also indicated that the truck was “in transit”3 when the accident occurred, that the
crash took place in the town of Union, that the vehicle was a “box truck,” that Ryder Truck Rental,
Inc., owned the truck, that Ryder held an insurance policy with Old Republic, that the interstate
carrier was “Morse Moving and Storage,” that plaintiff was the driver, that he resided in Michigan,
and that plaintiff was “driving too fast for conditions.”

        The Transguard insurance policy at the center of this dispute was issued in Illinois. The
insurance policy was a “Group Vehicle Master Policy.” According to the declarations page, the
named insured was the “National Association of Independent Truckers, LLC” (NAIT), which was
listed as having its address in Naperville, Illinois. The insurance policy’s declarations page also
provided that “[t]he insurance afforded is only with respect to the Coverage Parts for which a
premium is shown below AND a Certificate indicating such coverage has been issued.” The
coverage chart that followed revealed that a “basic vehicle policy” included liability insurance,
physical-damage insurance (comprehensive and collision), uninsured/underinsured motorists
insurance, and “medical payments” insurance. The “medical payments” section identified two
types of benefits that were generally available, which consisted of “Occupational Accident
Extended” and “Occupational Compensation Extended.” A “description of owned vehicles”
stated: “Symbol 7: Specifically Described Autos – As Per Certificates.”

       A Transguard “evidence of coverage” document specifically identified plaintiff, a
Michigan resident, as a certificate holder and certified that during the relevant period he had the
following types of coverage: “non-trucking liability,” “non-occupational accident,” “personal
contents,” “occupational compensation,” “extended liability,” “physical damage,” and
“occupational accident.”4 With respect to the “occupational accident” coverage, the certificate
provided:

              This is not Workers’ Compensation Coverage. This is an Occupational
       Accident Plan and does not provide coverage for sickness. This policy provides
       coverage while under dispatch and on duty. Includes Contract Liability.

3
 All the language in the crash report was in capitalization, but we shall use lowercase letters when
quoting the language of the report. When we later discuss the insurance policy, our quotations
will similarly disregard capitalization of certain letters.
4
  The “evidence of coverage” constituted plaintiff’s “certificate” of insurance. We shall use the
terms “evidence of coverage” and “certificate” interchangeably for the remainder of this opinion.

                                                -3-
The “limit of liability” relative to the “occupational accident” coverage stated: “See Coverage
Summary: Plan O.”5 The “evidence of coverage” identified just one piece of “equipment,” listing
a 2001 international box truck, with a VIN ending in 7988.6 The certificate further provided that
NAIT was the group policyholder, that the lien holder/loss payee was ME Leasing, Inc., of
Romulus, Michigan, and that the “motor carrier[s]” were “Morse Moving & Storage,” which was
headquartered in Romulus, Michigan, and “Allied Van Lines, Inc.,” which was headquartered in
Illinois. The “terms and conditions” associated with the “evidence of coverage” and expressly
pertaining to “occupational accident” coverage required plaintiff’s agreement that he was an
independent contractor, that he was not and would not become “an employee of any motor carrier
while this coverage is in force,” and that he would reject and not file a claim for workers’
compensation benefits.

       In the body of the insurance policy itself, there was a part covering “medical payments –
occupational accident extended coverage.” Section V of this coverage part provided, in pertinent
part:

              If an insured person incurs covered expenses resulting from an accident
       which caused an injury while insured under this coverage part, we will pay the
       reasonable and customary charge of such covered expenses incurred within the
       medical accumulation period, but not more than the maximum benefit, while
       insured, for Accident Medical . . . Expense shown in the SCHEDULE OF
       BENEFITS for the Plan indicated on your certificate.

                                              ***

              We will issue payments for a covered expense on behalf of the insured
       person directly to the physician, hospital or medical service provider who provided
       such service or supply. If the insured person provides us with proof that he has
       already paid for the covered expense, we will issue payment to the insured person.
       [Quotation marks omitted.]

Section V also contained the following language that had to be satisfied before benefits could be
recovered:

              The benefits for the coverage provided under this coverage part are
       described in the following benefit provisions. We will pay the benefits set forth
       below when we receive due proof that:

5
 Plan O—found in the body of the insurance policy—indicated that the maximum medical benefit
was $5 million and that the maximum medical accumulation period was 104 weeks.
6
 The police report indicated that plaintiff had been operating a 2018 box truck with a VIN that
ended in 4131.

                                               -4-
               1.      the insured person sustained an injury in an accident; and

              2.       the injury occurred while performing the usual and customary duties
       of his occupation while on duty, under dispatch for and under contract to his
       contract carrier. [Quotation marks omitted.7]

         Transguard moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Transguard argued
that it did not provide a no-fault policy; rather, it issued an occupational insurance policy. At most,
according to Transguard, plaintiff would be entitled to benefits capped at the maximum allowed
under Michigan’s Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq.
Transguard further contended that the insurance policy limited the maximum period for medical
benefits to 104 weeks. And plaintiff had selected a version of the policy that subordinated
Transguard’s liability to any no-fault insurer.8 Transguard maintained that defendant Old Republic
was the applicable no-fault insurer. Thus, Transguard was not the primary insurer responsible for
medical benefits. Transguard further argued that for it to even be potentially liable, plaintiff had
to demonstrate that he was in the course of his employment at the time of the accident. But plaintiff
had presented no evidence establishing that he had been driving the truck in the course of his
employment. Indeed, plaintiff testified that he was not working for the carrier contractor listed in
the insurance policy, Morse, at the time of the accident.

      Plaintiff responded by explaining that he was in fact working within the scope of his
employment for Morse when the accident occurred. In the response to the motion for summary

7
  “On duty” is defined in the policy as meaning on-duty time as defined in 49 CFR 395.2 in relation
“to the completion of drivers’ logs.” And 49 CFR 395.2 provides, in relevant part, that “[o]n-duty
time means all time from the time a driver begins to work or is required to be in readiness to work
until the time the driver is relieved from work and all responsibility for performing work.” The
language “under dispatch” is defined as “the period of time during which an insured person
performs services on behalf of his contract carrier while:
       1.     being en route to pick up a load or a trailer needed to pick up a load by the
       most direct route without deviation;

       2.      picking up a load;

       3.      en route to deliver a load by the most direct route without deviation;

       4.      unloading a load, [;] or

       5.      en route returning from delivering a load by the most direct route without
       deviation, to the place where the vehicle is normally garaged.” [Quotation marks
       omitted.]
8
  Transguard did not cite any provision in the insurance policy or any other source in support of
this proposition.

                                                 -5-
disposition, plaintiff claimed that he lost control of the truck while driving on a curve, that the
truck flipped over, that he was seriously injured, and that he personally could not recall this
information due to his brain injury. Plaintiff argued that the following language in the Transguard
“evidence of coverage” or certificate provided him with Michigan no-fault benefits under MCL
500.3101(1) and (4):9

                [Plaintiff] acknowledges that NAIT, as group policyholder, has elected
         Uninsured Motorist limits of $25,000 per person/$25,000 per occurrence, the
         minimum established by the state of Illinois, to apply to the group policy; and
         accepts that only in the event that another state is determined to have jurisdiction,
         the maximum limits that will apply are the minimum limits (including rejection of
         coverage) permitted by that state for uninsured motorist, underinsured motorist, and
         personal injury protection coverage(s).[10]

        Plaintiff did not specifically explain how this language allowed him to obtain no-fault
benefits under the policy for an accident that took place in Wisconsin. Rather, plaintiff simply
asserted that the quoted language provided no-fault coverage and that at the very least there was a
factual question on the issue. With respect to whether plaintiff was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident, plaintiff argued that it was clear that he could not
remember the relevant facts at his deposition due to his brain injury. Plaintiff contended that
Transguard attempted to improperly inflate his lack of memory to mean that he was not working
within the scope of his employment when the accident transpired. Plaintiff maintained that

9
    MCL 500.3101 provides, in pertinent part:
                 (1) Except as provided in sections 3107d and 3109a, the owner or registrant
         of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for
         payment of benefits under personal protection insurance and property protection
         insurance as required under this chapter, and residual liability insurance. Security
         is only required to be in effect during the period the motor vehicle is driven or
         moved on a highway.

                                                 ***

                 (4) Security required by subsection (1) may be provided under a policy
         issued by an authorized insurer that affords insurance for the payment of benefits
         described in subsection (1). A policy of insurance represented or sold as providing
         security is considered to provide insurance for the payment of the benefits.
10
  We note that this provision was contained in the “terms and conditions” portion of the certificate
and pertained to the “commercial business auto” coverage found in the policy. We further note
that there appeared to be two different versions of the “terms and conditions” in the record, one of
which did not contain the sentence following the semicolon in the language quoted by plaintiff.
Regardless, the certificate or “evidence of coverage” relating to plaintiff did not show that he even
had “commercial business auto” coverage. Accordingly, the provision cited by plaintiff was
ultimately irrelevant.

                                                  -6-
Transguard had not satisfied its initial burden to support its position for purposes of summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Most of the intervening plaintiffs concurred in plaintiff’s
response.

       There was no hearing held on Transguard’s motion for summary disposition. The trial
court denied the motion in a praecipe order, indicating that the motion was denied “[p]ursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10) as there are questions of fact regarding the extent of [Transguard’s] liability to
pay medical bills on behalf of the Plaintiff for injuries sustained in the automobile accident.”

         Transguard filed a late motion for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court neglected to
decide whether the Transguard policy was an occupational accident policy, or rather, a no-fault
policy. Transguard contended that its policy simply was not a no-fault policy; therefore, it could
not be required to pay no-fault benefits. The trial court ordered oral arguments on the motion and
authorized plaintiff to file a response. Plaintiff filed an answer to the motion, claiming that
Transguard was seeking to cast its policy as a worker’s compensation policy and limit benefits to
those that would be available under such a policy. But, according to plaintiff, the insurance policy
itself stated it was not a worker’s compensation policy. Plaintiff now pointed to language in the
policy addressing coverage that would be provided when a covered auto is away from the state
where it is licensed:

               b. Out-of-state Coverage Extensions

               While a covered “auto” is away from the state where it is licensed we will:

               (1) Increase the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage to meet the limits
       specified by a compulsory or financial responsibility law of the jurisdiction where
       the covered “auto” is being used. This extension does not apply to the limit or limits
       specified by any law governing motor carriers of passengers or property.

                (2) Provide the minimum amounts and types of other coverages, such as no-
       fault, required of out-of-state vehicles by the jurisdiction where the covered “auto”
       is being used.

              We will not pay anyone more than once for the same elements of loss
       because of these extensions.[11]

        Plaintiff argued that this provision provided Michigan no-fault coverage because, although
the accident occurred in Wisconsin, the truck was being used by Morse, a Michigan corporation
based in Romulus, and by plaintiff, who was a Michigan resident and working as an independent
contractor for Morse at the time of the accident. As support, plaintiff offered a copy of the police
report regarding the accident.

11
  We note that this provision was contained in a part of the insurance policy regarding extensions
of “business auto” coverage, which was not a listed coverage identified in plaintiff’s certificate.
Accordingly, this provision was entirely irrelevant.

                                                 -7-
       At the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the trial court, ruling from the bench,
denied the motion. The trial court reasoned:

                I did read everything and I’m looking at my notes here, that’s where I was
       hanging my head too. Like the policy provides for an exception when there’s an
       out-of-state accident and then it reverts to become [a] Michigan no-fault policy. So
       it’s not a worker’s comp, it can’t get worker’s comp rates, I agree with Plaintiff in
       this case.

      In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court stated “that the
occupational accident policy of Transguard does not meet the minimum statutory requirements
and must be converted to Personal Injury Protection benefits policy under Michigan’s No-Fault
Law.” (Emphasis added.)

       Transguard appeals by delayed leave granted.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

                                 A. APPELLATE ARGUMENTS

        Transguard argues that the trial court erred by holding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding the extent of Transguard’s liability to pay medical bills on behalf of plaintiff
relative to injuries sustained in the truck accident. Transguard contends that plaintiff failed to
create an issue of fact with respect to whether he was employed by Morse at the time of the
accident. Transguard further maintains that regardless whether plaintiff was employed by Morse
when the accident occurred, the Transguard insurance policy did not afford insurance coverage for
the particular vehicle involved in the crash. Additionally, Transguard asserts that the trial court
erred by holding that plaintiff was entitled to no-fault benefits under the occupational accidental
injury coverage provided by Transguard. Transguard also claims that plaintiff was not afforded
“business auto” coverage under the Transguard insurance policy. Finally, Transguard argues that
even assuming that plaintiff was afforded “business auto” coverage under the insurance policy, the
coverage did not permit the recovery of no-fault benefits by plaintiff.

        Plaintiff argues that his mere lack of memory did not suffice to support Transguard’s
contention that plaintiff was not working within the scope and capacity of his employment at the
time of the accident. Plaintiff asserts that Transguard essentially conceded this point in their
motion for reconsideration, focusing instead on whether the language of the insurance policy
provided no-fault coverage to plaintiff. Plaintiff further contends that the police report concerning
the accident revealed that the vehicle being driven by plaintiff was owned and insured by Morse,
a moving company, that the truck was in transit carrying goods when the accident occurred, and
that plaintiff was a named insured. In other words, the information in the police report established
that plaintiff was working for Morse when the accident took place. Plaintiff additionally maintains
that the trial court never found that Transguard submitted evidence sufficient to support its burden
to demonstrate a triable fact; therefore, plaintiff was not even obligated to come forth with
documentary evidence regarding his employment for purposes of a (C)(10) motion.

                                                  -8-
         Plaintiff next argues that regardless of his employment status, MCL 500.3111, as it existed
at the time of the accident, required Transguard to pay plaintiff no-fault benefits. In January 2019,
when the accident took place, MCL 500.3111 provided:

                 Personal protection insurance benefits are payable for accidental bodily
         injury suffered in an accident occurring out of this state, if the accident occurs
         within the United States, its territories and possessions or in Canada, and the person
         whose injury is the basis of the claim was at the time of the accident a named
         insured under a personal protection insurance policy, his spouse, a relative of either
         domiciled in the same household or an occupant of a vehicle involved in the
         accident whose owner or registrant was insured under a personal protection
         insurance policy or has provided security approved by the secretary of state under
         subsection (4) of section 3101. [1972 PA 294.12]

         Plaintiff also contends that the trial court properly ruled that he was entitled to no-fault
benefits under the occupational accident coverage provided by Transguard. Plaintiff discusses
other provisions in the insurance policy that he relied on in the lower court, arguing that they fully
support his position that he was entitled to no-fault benefits under the policy. We already noted
earlier in this opinion that those provisions in the policy, which we quoted, have no relevance to
resolving this appeal because they were not part of any coverage identified in the certificate or
evidence of coverage.

                                   B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. El-
Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). We also review
de novo the interpretation and application of an insurance policy. Cohen v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,
463 Mich 525, 528; 620 NW2d 840 (2001).

            C. SUMMARY DISPOSITION PRINCIPLES UNDER MCR 2.116(C)(10)

        MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides that summary disposition is appropriate when, “[e]xcept as to
the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” A motion brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a party’s action. Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Dells, 301
Mich App 368, 377; 836 NW2d 257 (2013). “Affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence in support of the grounds asserted in the motion are required . . . when
judgment is sought based on subrule (C)(10),” MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b), and such evidence, along
with the pleadings, must be considered by the court when ruling on the (C)(10) motion, MCR
2.116(G)(5). “When a motion under subrule (C)(10) is made and supported . . ., an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” MCR 2.116(G)(4).

12
     MCL 500.3111 was amended by 2119 PA 21 and 22.

                                                  -9-
        “A trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the
pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to
the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact.” Pioneer
State, 301 Mich App at 377. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the
benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable
minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). The
trial court is not permitted to assess credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes,
and if material evidence conflicts, it is not appropriate to grant a motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Pioneer State, 301 Mich App at 377. “Like the trial court’s inquiry,
when an appellate court reviews a motion for summary disposition, it makes all legitimate
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162; 516
NW2d 475 (1994). “[S]peculation is insufficient to create an issue of fact.” MEEMIC Ins Co v
DTE Energy Co, 292 Mich App 278, 282; 807 NW2d 407 (2011). A court may only consider
substantively admissible evidence actually proffered by the parties when ruling on the motion.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); see also MCR 2.116(G)(6).

     D. CONSTRUCTION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS – GENERAL PRINCIPLES

        In ascertaining the meaning of a contract such as an insurance policy, this Court gives the
words used in the contract their plain and ordinary meaning as would be apparent to a reader of
the instrument. Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 464; 703 NW2d 23 (2005). A
fundamental tenet of Michigan jurisprudence is that an unambiguous contract is not open to
judicial construction and must be enforced as written, thereby respecting the freedom of
individuals to arrange their affairs by contract. Id. at 468. In Hunt v Drielick, 496 Mich 366, 372-
373; 852 NW2d 562 (2014), our Supreme Court observed:

               An insurance policy is similar to any other contractual agreement, and, thus,
       the court’s role is to determine what the agreement was and effectuate the intent of
       the parties. We employ a two-part analysis to determine the parties’ intent. First, it
       must be determined whether the policy provides coverage to the insured, and,
       second, the court must ascertain whether that coverage is negated by an exclusion.
       While it is the insured’s burden to establish that his claim falls within the terms of
       the policy, the insurer should bear the burden of proving an absence of coverage.
       Additionally, exclusionary clauses in insurance policies are strictly construed in
       favor of the insured. . . . However, it is impossible to hold an insurance company
       liable for a risk it did not assume, and, thus, clear and specific exclusions must be
       enforced. [Quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted.]

                             E. DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION

       As reflected in our discussion of the various provisions in the “evidence of coverage” and
the body of the insurance policy, the only potential avenue of relief for plaintiff was the
“occupational accident” coverage afforded under the policy. The “occupational accident”
coverage encompassed the payment of medical bills associated with injuries incurred in an
accident. As we noted earlier, the other insurance policy provisions cited by plaintiff—the

                                               -10-
“commercial business auto” and “business auto” coverages—were not relevant given that they
pertained to coverages not held by plaintiff; they were not listed in his certificate.

        With respect to the “occupational accident” coverage, plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits
was dependent on whether his injuries “occurred while performing the usual and customary duties
of his occupation while on duty, under dispatch for and under contract to his contract carrier.”
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony certainly did not supply any of the information demanded by the
insurance policy for purposes of obtaining “occupational accident” benefits. Plaintiff’s lack of
recall can be explained by the traumatic brain injury. Plaintiff instead relies on the information
contained in the police report. Transguard argues that the police report is hearsay and inadmissible,
and thus it cannot be considered in the context of a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10). But in Latits v Phillips, 298 Mich App 109, 113-114; 826 NW2d 190 (2012), this
Court explained as follows:

                 We begin by noting that this passage addresses plaintiff’s argument that
       defendant’s motion for summary disposition cannot be supported by factual
       statements from police reports because police reports are inadmissible as evidence
       at trial. Plaintiff’s argument is flawed . . . . First, as the quotation alludes to, while
       a motion for summary disposition must be supported by admissible evidence, that
       evidence does not have to be in admissible form. In this case, defendant’s reliance
       on those reports was in reference to the officers’ personal observations, and those
       officers could have testified at trial to the substance of the material in the reports.

         In this case, we will take into consideration the assertions in the police report. As stated
earlier, the police crash report indicated that the truck was “in transit” when the accident occurred,
that the crash took place in the town of Union, that the vehicle was a “box truck,” that Ryder Truck
Rental, Inc., owned the truck, that Ryder held an insurance policy with Old Republic, that the
interstate carrier was “Morse Moving and Storage,” that plaintiff was the driver, that he resided in
Michigan, and that plaintiff was “driving too fast for conditions.” (Emphasis added.) Making all
legitimate inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Skinner, 445 Mich at 162, we conclude that
the crash-report information creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff, at
the time of the accident, was “performing the usual and customary duties of his occupation while
on duty, under dispatch for and under contract to his contract carrier.” Plaintiff was “in transit” in
a moving truck outside his state of residence when the accident occurred, with Morse being
specifically identified by the police officer as the interstate carrier. A juror could reasonably infer
from this evidence that plaintiff was on-the-job as a contractor for Morse at the time of the accident,
thereby triggering the “occupational accident” coverage and the right to recover medical
payments.13

13
  We acknowledge that the box truck identified in the police report did not match the year and the
VIN of the box truck identified in the insurance policy. But this issue first arose on appeal;
therefore, plaintiff did not have the opportunity below to counter the argument or to supply
documentary evidence on the matter. The parties are free to revisit this issue after remand.

                                                 -11-
        The trial court also determined that the Transguard policy had to be converted to a PIP
policy under the no-fault act. The trial court did not provide any reasoning in support of its ruling,
and we cannot ascertain from the record whether the court may have relied on coverages in the
insurance policy that were not applicable to plaintiff, as enumerated in this opinion. In light of the
fact that we are remanding this case on the issue concerning whether plaintiff is entitled to medical
payments under the “occupational accident” coverage, we direct the trial court, if necessary, to
reexamine the issue regarding the extent of that coverage, i.e., whether it is limited by the terms of
the insurance policy or by the terms of the no-fault act. Of course, that issue is only relevant should
it be determined that the “occupational accident” coverage applies in the first place.

                                        III. CONCLUSION

        We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether plaintiff is
entitled to medical payments under the “occupational accident” coverage found in the insurance
policy. Accordingly, we affirm, with the caveat that the court’s determination that the extent of
the coverage is governed by the no-fault act is to be reexamined on remand if necessary.

       We affirm. We decline to tax costs under MCR 7.219.

                                                               /s/ Jane E. Markey
                                                               /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                               /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

                                                 -12-