Court Opinion

ID: 9405208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-27 19:05:42.56478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.455233
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/27/23 In re Isaiah G. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    In re ISAIAH G., JR., a Person Coming Under
    the Juvenile Court Law.

    FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF                                                              F085565
    SOCIAL SERVICES,
                                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 21CEJ300274-1)
           Plaintiff and Respondent,

                    v.                                                                    OPINION
    ISAIAH G.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Elizabeth Egan,
Judge.
         Carolyn S. Hurley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Ashley N. McGuire, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Franson, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Snauffer, J.
                                    INTRODUCTION
       S.A. (mother) and Isaiah G. (father) are the parents of son Isaiah G., Jr. (born
February 2021) (the child). Father appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his
parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 He contends
the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) and the juvenile court
failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law because certain extended
family members were not asked about the child’s possible Indian ancestry.2 The
department concedes error occurred at initial inquiry, but argues the error was not
prejudicial as neither parent gave reason to believe or know the child is an Indian child.
Alternatively, the department agrees to a limited remand for compliance with ICWA.
       For the reasons discussed herein, we accept the department’s concession of ICWA
error. Consistent with our decisions in In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 (K.H.) and
In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123 (E.C.), we conclude “the error is prejudicial
because neither the [department] nor the court gathered information sufficient to ensure a
reliable finding that ICWA does not apply and remanding for an adequate inquiry in the
first instance is the only meaningful way to safeguard the rights at issue. ([In re A.R.
(2021)] 11 Cal.5th [234,] 252–254 [(A.R.)].) Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion, as set forth herein.” (K.H., at p. 591; accord, E.C., at
pp. 157–158.)

1      All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2      “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

                                              2.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
Referral and Petition
       In July 2021, the department received a referral on behalf of the then
five-month-old child alleging general neglect by mother because she had left him with
paternal grandmother Maria G. for two months. The child was placed on a section 300
hold. Social workers interviewed mother, maternal grandmother Lucille R., and paternal
grandmother as part of their investigation. Thereafter, the department conducted a team
decision making meeting in which maternal grandmother, paternal great-grandmother
Deborah S., and maternal grandfather Alphonso R. participated.4 The department
determined the child would remain in out-of-home placement and a petition would be
filed. Father was incarcerated at the time, but was interviewed and denied having Indian
ancestry. Paternal grandmother also denied having Indian ancestry.
       On July 27, 2021, the department filed a petition on behalf of the child pursuant to
section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Father was listed as an alleged father. The petition
contained an “INDIAN CHILD INQUIRY ATTACHMENT” (ICWA-010(A)) form
stating mother and paternal grandmother gave no reason to believe the child was or could
be an Indian child.
Detention
       The detention report stated ICWA did not apply. Mother, father, and paternal
grandmother had reported they did not have Indian ancestry. Mother reported paternal
great-aunt Elizabeth C. and maternal aunt Danielle R. were interested in placement and
provided their contact information.

3      Because the sole issue on appeal concerns ICWA, we restrict our facts to those
bearing on that issue or helpful for clarity.
4     Maternal grandfather Alphonso is once referred to as maternal stepgrandfather
elsewhere in the record. Thus, his relation to the child is not entirely certain.

                                            3.
       On July 28, 2021, the juvenile court held a detention hearing and conducted
inquiries with mother and father.5 The court found a prima facie case had been
established, ordered the child detained, ordered mother be offered reunification services,
and set a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
       The jurisdiction and disposition report stated ICWA did not apply. It reiterated
mother, father, and paternal grandmother had reported they did not have Indian ancestry.
The child had been placed with Danielle. Maternal grandfather had contacted the
department and requested placement information.
       On August 25, 2021, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing. The court ordered father to participate in a DNA test. The court set
a settlement conference and set the matter for contest.
       On September 15, 2021, at the settlement conference, the juvenile court found
ICWA did not apply. The contested hearing was vacated. The court found the
allegations true, adjudged the child a dependent of the court, ordered mother to
participate in reunification services, and denied father reunification services due to his
alleged father status. The court set a six-month status review hearing.
Six-Month Status Review
       The six-month status review report stated ICWA did not apply. The child was still
in placement with Danielle. Maternal grandmother and maternal “step-grandfather” (who
was referred to as maternal grandfather everywhere else in the record) were also
interested in placement, but were not approved. Paternal cousin Ashlee D. also expressed
interest in placement and was provided with information. During this review period, the

5     The minute order does not reflect the outcome of the court’s inquiry and the record
does not include a transcript of the detention hearing.

                                              4.
department conducted two child and family team meetings in which Danielle, maternal
grandfather, maternal grandmother, and paternal grandmother participated.
       On March 9, 2022, the juvenile court held a six-month status review hearing and
elevated father’s status to biological father and set the matter for contest.
       On May 11, 2022, the juvenile court held a contested six-month status review
hearing, terminated mother’s reunification services, and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Request to Change Court Order
       On July 11, 2022, father filed a “Request to Change Court Order” (JV-180)
pursuant to section 388 requesting to be provided with reunification services as his status
had been elevated to biological father.
       On August 17, 2022, the juvenile court held a section 388 hearing at which
maternal grandfather and Danielle were present. The court denied the JV-180.
Section 366.26
       The section 366.26 report stated ICWA did not apply. The department had
inquired of mother and father twice, and both times they denied having Indian ancestry.
Paternal grandmother and paternal great-grandmother Deborah S. also denied having
Indian ancestry. The department requested the juvenile court continue to find ICWA
inapplicable. The child remained in placement with Danielle, who was willing to provide
a permanent plan of adoption for him.
       On August 31, 2022, the juvenile court held a section 366.26 hearing. Danielle
and maternal grandfather were present. The court set the matter for contest.
       On November 9, 2022, the juvenile court held a contested section 366.26 hearing.
Danielle, maternal grandfather, and maternal grandmother were present. The court
terminated parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan.
Request to Change Court Order
       On November 23, 2022, father filed a JV-180 requesting the juvenile court change
the order terminating parental rights, which the court denied.

                                              5.
       On January 9, 2023, father filed a notice of appeal.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     ICWA
       A.     Legal Principles
       “ ‘ICWA is a federal law giving Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state
court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation’
[citations], in furtherance of ‘federal policy “ ‘that, where possible, an Indian child should
remain in the Indian community’ ” ’ [citations]. ‘ICWA establishes minimum federal
standards, both procedural and substantive, governing the removal of Indian children
from their families’ [citations], and ‘[w]hen ICWA applies, the Indian tribe has a right to
intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th
566, 594, fn. omitted; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 138, fn. omitted.)
       “ ‘In 2006, California adopted various procedural and substantive provisions of
ICWA.’ [Citations.] The Legislature’s ‘primary objective … was to increase
compliance with ICWA. California Indian Legal Services (CILS), a proponent of the
bill, observed that courts and county agencies still had difficulty complying with ICWA
25 years after its enactment, and CILS believed codification of [ICWA’s] requirements
into state law would help alleviate the problem. [Citation.]’ ” (K.H., supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 595; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 138–139.)
       “ ‘In 2016, new federal regulations were adopted concerning ICWA compliance.
[Citation.] Following the enactment of the federal regulations, California made
conforming amendments to its statutes, including portions of the Welfare and Institutions
Code related to ICWA notice and inquiry requirements. [Citations.] Those changes
became effective January 1, 2019 .…’ [Citation.] Subsequently, the Legislature
amended section 224.2, subdivision (e), to define ‘reason to believe,’ effective
September 18, 2020.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 595–596, fn. omitted; accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 139.)

                                              6.
              1.     Summary of Duties of Inquiry and Notice
       “[W]hether a child is a member, or is eligible for membership, in a particular tribe
is a determination that rests exclusively with the tribe, and neither the [department] nor
the court plays any role in making that determination. [Citations.] ‘ “Because it typically
is not self-evident whether a child is an Indian child, both federal and state law mandate
certain inquiries to be made in each case.” ’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 596;
accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 139–140.)
       “In California, section 224.2 ‘codifies and elaborates on ICWA’s requirements of
notice to a child’s parents or legal guardian, Indian custodian, and Indian tribe, and to the
[Bureau of Indian Affairs].’ ” (In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 204.) California
law imposes “an affirmative and continuing duty [on the court and the county welfare
department] to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under [s]ection 300, … may
be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
       “The [state law] duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not
limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any
information that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “If a child is
placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to
[s]ection 306 … the county welfare department … has a duty to inquire whether that
child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents,
legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may
be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Additionally, “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party, the
court shall ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or
has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall instruct the parties to
inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know
the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)

                                              7.
       “If the initial inquiry provides ‘reason to believe’ that an Indian child is involved
in a proceeding—that is, if the court or social worker ‘has information suggesting that
either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe’—then the court or social worker ‘shall make further inquiry’ regarding
the child’s possible Indian status as soon as practicable.” (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 984, 999 (Ezequiel G.), citing § 224.2, subd. (e).) “Further inquiry
‘includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: [¶] (A) Interviewing the parents,
Indian custodian, and extended family members[;] [¶] (B) Contacting the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services[; and] [¶] (C) Contacting the
tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to have information
regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.’ ” (Ezequiel G., at
p. 999.)
       “If there is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child, the [department] shall
provide notice to the relevant tribes and agencies in accordance with section 224.3,
subdivision (a)(5).” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 999, citing § 224.2,
subd. (f).) “There is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child if any one of six statutory
criteria is met—i.e., if the court is advised that the child ‘is an Indian child,’ the child’s or
parent’s residence is on a reservation, the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court, or
either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or
citizenship in an Indian tribe.” (Ezequiel G., at p. 999, citing § 224.2, subd. (d).)
       County welfare departments “must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a
detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all
information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how
and when this information was provided to the relevant tribes. Whenever new

                                               8.
information is received, that information must be expeditiously provided to the tribes.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)6
       B.     Standard of Review
       “The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on
two elemental determinations, ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 142–143.) First, “[t]he court must find there is ‘no
reason to know whether the child is an Indian child,’ which is dependent upon whether
any of the six circumstances set forth in subdivision (d) of section 224.2 apply.” (K.H., at
p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., at p. 143.) Second, “[t]he juvenile
court must … find a ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence .…’ ” (Ibid.)
       Under the substantial evidence standard, “ ‘a reviewing court should “not reweigh
the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.”
[Citation.] The determinations should “be upheld if … supported by substantial
evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court
might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” ’ [Citations.] The
standard recognizes that ‘[t]rial courts “generally are in a better position to evaluate and
weigh the evidence” than appellate courts’ [citation], and ‘an appellate court should
accept a trial court’s factual findings if they are reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence in the record’ [citation]. ‘[I]f a court holds an evidentiary hearing, it may make
credibility determinations, to which an appellate court would generally defer.’ ” (K.H.,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.)
       The juvenile court’s finding on the second element, however, “is ultimately
discretionary because it requires the juvenile court to ‘engage in a delicate balancing of’
various factors in assessing whether the [department’s] inquiry was proper and adequate

6      All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

                                              9.
within the context of ICWA and California law, and whether the [department] acted with
due diligence.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid
standard and review the court’s determination for substantial evidence and abuse of
discretion. (Ibid.)
       “ ‘Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different [from review for substantial
evidence], focused not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal standard.
A court abuses its discretion only when “ ‘ “the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ”
[Citation.] But “ ‘ “[w]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial
court” ’ ” [Citations.] [¶] While each standard here fits a distinct type of determination
under review, the practical difference between the standards is not likely to be very
pronounced.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord, E.C., supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at pp. 143–144.)
       “Review of the juvenile court’s findings under the foregoing standards is
deferential, but ‘ “an appellate court [nevertheless] exercises its independent judgment to
determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” ’ [Citations.] Where the material
facts are undisputed, courts have applied independent review to determine whether
ICWA’s requirements were satisfied.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; accord,
E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.)
       C.     Analysis
              1.      Summary of ICWA Inquiry
       In the present case, the department conducted inquiries with mother, father,
paternal grandmother, and paternal great-grandmother, who all denied having Indian
ancestry. The juvenile court appears to have inquired of mother and father at the
detention hearing, but the outcome of the inquiry is unknown as the minute order does
not reflect their answers and the record does not contain a transcript of the hearing. The

                                              10.
record shows the department was in contact with several other family members at team
decision making and child and family team meetings and for placement purposes
including, maternal aunt Danielle, maternal grandmother, maternal grandfather, paternal
great-aunt Elizabeth, and paternal cousin Ashlee. Additionally, Danielle had placement
of the child for nearly the entire proceedings. Danielle, maternal grandfather, and
maternal grandmother also attended various hearings. However, the record does not
show that either the department or the juvenile court asked these family members about
the child’s Indian status. Nevertheless, the court found ICWA did not apply.
       In K.H. and E.C., we addressed ICWA error at the inquiry stage. There, we
explained our decision not to follow the approaches articulated by other appellate courts
for determining whether ICWA error requires reversal and concluded that the Supreme
Court’s decision in A.R. supplies the appropriate framework for assessing prejudice in
this context. (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 607–608, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at pp. 252–254; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) Applying the standards
we articulated in K.H. and E.C., as we will discuss below, we conclude that the
department’s error is prejudicial and remand for the department to conduct a proper,
adequate, and duly diligent inquiry is necessary.
              2.     Department and Juvenile Court Erred
       As previously mentioned, “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party, the
court shall ask each participant present in the hearing whether the participant knows or
has reason to know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall instruct the parties to
inform the court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know
the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) Moreover, when “a child is placed into
the temporary custody of a county welfare department …, the county welfare department
… has a duty to inquire whether [the] child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not
limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or

                                             11.
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents,
or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Extended family members
include adult grandparents, siblings, brothers- or sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces,
nephews, and first or second cousins. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)
       Here, the department inquired only of mother, father, paternal grandmother, and
paternal great-grandmother, when there were various other family members, including
maternal family members, it could have inquired of. This fell short of complying with
the plain language of section 224.2, subdivision (b), which required the department to
inquire of extended family members. There may be cases in which there is no one else to
ask, but if that is so, the record must be developed to reflect that fact and supported by
documentation. (Rule 5.481(a)(5).) “On a well-developed record, the court has relatively
broad discretion [in such cases] to determine [that] the [department’s] inquiry was proper,
adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.” (K.H., supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 589; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157.) Accordingly, the
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was not supported by substantial
evidence, and its contrary conclusion was an abuse of discretion. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
       Further, we note rule 5.481(a)(2)(C) requires the court to order the parent, if
available, to complete a “PARENTAL NOTIFICATION OF INDIAN STATUS”
(ICWA-020) form. However, the record here does not contain any ICWA-020 forms.
              3.     Prejudice
       “Where, as here, the deficiency lies with the [department’s] duty of […] inquiry
and a juvenile court’s related finding of ‘proper and adequate further inquiry and due
diligence’ (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)), the error is one of state law ([In re] Benjamin M., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742). Under the California Constitution, ‘[n]o judgment shall be set
aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of
the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of
pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of

                                             12.
the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 606; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 151.)
       “ ‘[T]o be entitled to relief on appeal from an alleged abuse of discretion, it must
clearly appear the resulting injury is sufficiently grave to manifest a miscarriage of
justice’ [citations], and California law generally interprets its constitutional miscarriage
of justice requirement ‘as permitting reversal only if the reviewing court finds it
reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable to the appealing party but
for the error.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 606–607; accord, E.C., supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at pp. 151–152.)
       However, in A.R., the Supreme Court “recognized that while we generally apply a
Watson[7] likelihood-of-success test to assess prejudice, a merits-based outcome-focused
test is not always appropriate because it cannot always adequately measure the relevant
harm. [Citation.] In other words, where the injury caused by the error is unrelated to an
outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of prejudice to such an outcome misplaces
the measure, at the expense of the rights the law in question was designed to protect.”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609, italics omitted.)
       As we explained in K.H., “ ‘ICWA compliance presents a unique situation .…’ ”
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 608.) “ICWA is not directed at reaching, or
protecting, a specific outcome on the merits.” (Id. at p. 609; accord, E.C., supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at p. 154.) Rather, “ ‘[t]he purpose of ICWA and related California statutes
is to provide notice to the tribe sufficient to allow it to determine whether the child is an
Indian child, and whether the tribe wishes to intervene in the proceedings’ [citation], and
an adequate initial inquiry facilitates the information gathering upon which the court’s
ICWA determination will rest.” (K.H., at p. 608; accord, E.C., at pp. 152–153.) Yet,

7      People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.

                                             13.
“while the appealing party is usually a parent, parents do not bear the burden of gathering
information in compliance with ICWA [citations], and parents may raise the claim of
error for the first time on appeal.” (K.H., at p. 608; accord, E.C., at p. 153.) Further, the
ultimate determination whether a child is an Indian child rests with the tribe, not with a
parent, the department, or the juvenile court. (K.H., at p. 590; accord, E.C., at pp. 139–
140.) “[W]here the opportunity to gather the relevant information critical to determining
whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost because there has not been adequate
inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is generally the only effective
safeguard.” (K.H., at p. 610, citing A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 252–254; accord, E.C.,
at p. 155.)
       Here, the department’s inquiry, limited only to mother, father, and two paternal
family members, “ ‘fell well short of that required to gather the information needed to
meaningfully safeguard the rights of the tribes, as intended under ICWA and California
law’ ” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 156, quoting K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 620), and “[a] finding of harmlessness on this record would necessarily require
speculation and ‘is at odds with the statutory protections that ICWA and California law
intend to afford Indian children and Indian tribes.’ ” (E.C., at p. 155, quoting K.H., at
p. 611.) Therefore, the error is prejudicial and reversal is required.
       Accordingly, the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is
conditionally reversed and the matter is remanded. The juvenile court is instructed to
ensure the department conducts “ ‘a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry under
section 224.2, subdivision (b), and document its inquiry in the record in compliance with
rule 5.481(a)(5).’ ” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157, quoting K.H., supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 621.) “ ‘This should not be interpreted as requiring an exhaustive
search for and questioning of every living relative of [I.G.]’ but ‘[w]e leave that
determination for the juvenile court in the first instance because it is better positioned to
evaluate the evidence provided by the [d]epartment. So long as the court ensures the

                                             14.
inquiry is reasonable and of sufficient reach to accomplish the legislative purpose
underlying ICWA and related California law, the court will have an adequate factual
foundation upon which to make its ICWA finding. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)’ ” (Ibid.)
                                      DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed,
and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order the department to
comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2,
subdivision (b), and rules 5.481(a)(5) and 5.481(a)(2)(C). The juvenile court is directed
to comply with the inquiry provisions of section 224.2, subdivision (c). If, after
determining that an adequate inquiry was made consistent with the reasoning in this
opinion, the court finds that ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its existing order and
proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law. If the court instead finds
that ICWA does not apply, its ICWA finding shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the
juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

                                            15.