Court Opinion

ID: 9839238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 17:05:13.786312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:48.660181
License: Public Domain

IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                              DIVISION ONE

                FRANCIS A. COCCHIA, Plaintiff/Appellant,

                                       v.

        ROBERT J. TESTA, TRUSTEE OF THE KAREN M. TESTA
          SEPARATE PROPERTY TRUST, Defendant/Appellee.1

                           No. 1 CA-CV 22-0571
                             FILED 9-12-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                          No. CV2019-013395
          The Honorable Mary Collins Cronin, Judge pro tempore

                                VACATED

                                COUNSEL

David T. Bonfiglio, P.C., Scottsdale
By David T. Bonfiglio
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Maynard Cronin Erickson Curran & Reiter, P.L.C., Phoenix
By Douglas C. Erickson
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

1      It is ordered amending the caption as reflected above. This caption
shall be used on all further documents filed in this appeal.
                         COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                           Opinion of the Court

                                 OPINION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined and Judge Michael J. Brown
specially concurred.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1            This case involves two anxiety-causing topics for civil
procedure students: preclusion and personal jurisdiction. Francis A.
Cocchia (“Judgment Creditor”) brought a Connecticut judgment to Arizona
for enforcement against Robert J. Testa (“Trustee”), in his capacity as trustee
of the Karen M. Testa Separate Property Trust (the “Trust”). Trustee moved
to preclude enforcement, claiming Connecticut lacked personal
jurisdiction. Judgment Creditor responded, in part, that Trustee was
precluded from disputing personal jurisdiction because he litigated that
issue in Connecticut and lost. Trustee replied that, while he unsuccessfully
litigated service of process in Connecticut, he had not litigated minimum
contacts (what he calls “substantive personal jurisdiction”) and thus that
issue remained fair game. The superior court agreed with Trustee and
deemed the Connecticut judgment unenforceable.

¶2            We view things differently. We first explain why the doctrine
of issue preclusion, and not claim preclusion, governs whether Trustee is
foreclosed from further litigating personal jurisdiction.         Applying
Connecticut law, we then conclude that issue preclusion bars Trustee from
further disputing personal jurisdiction. While Trustee could have litigated
Connecticut’s personal jurisdiction entirely in Arizona, once Trustee
showed up in Connecticut to challenge personal jurisdiction on one ground,
he had to challenge personal jurisdiction on all grounds—in for a penny, in
for a pound. We, therefore, vacate the superior court’s order finding the
Connecticut judgment unenforceable.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3            Bouncing back and forth between the Connecticut and
Arizona judicial systems, this case has a tortuous history. We recount only
those facts pertinent to our present purposes, but additional detail is
available elsewhere. See Cocchia v. Testa, 2021 WL 922435 (Ariz. App. Mar.

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11, 2021) (mem. decision) (Cocchia I); Cocchia v. Testa, 261 A.3d 90, 94–97
(Conn. App. Ct. 2021) (Cocchia II).

¶4            We begin in Connecticut in 2016. Judgment Creditor filed a
breach of contract claim in Connecticut superior court against Trustee’s
father. Tragically, a year later, Trustee’s parents passed away. Trustee then
became trustee of the Trust. Ten months later, Judgment Creditor sought
to amend the Connecticut complaint to allege Trustee’s father had
fraudulently conveyed an Arizona residence to the Trust.

¶5            Meanwhile, here in Arizona, Judgment Creditor filed a new
action in Maricopa County Superior Court against, among others, the Trust
for breach of contract and fraudulent conveyance. With the litigation still
pending in Connecticut, however, the parties stipulated to stay the Arizona
action.

¶6            About the same time, Judgment Creditor asked the
Connecticut superior court to substitute Trustee as a party. The
Connecticut court agreed, and Judgment Creditor filed an amended
complaint to add a fraudulent conveyance claim against Trustee. The
Connecticut court then found Trustee failed to appear and “a default for
failure to appear was entered.” The court entered judgment for Judgment
Creditor, awarding him $206,348 and finding the transfer of the Arizona
residence to the Trust “was fraudulent as to [Judgment Creditor].”

¶7             Judgment Creditor then brought the Connecticut judgment to
Arizona and sought domestication and enforcement. Trustee responded
with a motion to set aside the judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The superior court denied Trustee’s motion; he appealed. See Cocchia I, 2021
WL 922435 at *2. This Court vacated the superior court’s order and
remanded for “further proceedings following final resolution of the
Connecticut appeal.” Id. at *3 ¶¶ 20–21. Anticipating the issues we now
confront, this Court explained that “[i]t will be for the superior court in the
first instance to determine the extent to which [Trustee] and the Trust have
litigated jurisdiction in Connecticut and the impact, if any, of res judicata in
this case.” Id.

¶8           Back in Connecticut, Trustee challenged the judgment there
on two fronts. Trustee filed (1) a motion to open, set aside and vacate
judgment, and (2) a motion to dismiss. Trustee argued, in part, that
Connecticut lacked personal jurisdiction because he was improperly added
to the case and not properly served. Trustee specifically argued in the
motion to dismiss that Judgment Creditor “never established personal

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                          COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                            Opinion of the Court

jurisdiction . . . over [Trustee]” and “the Court lacks . . . personal jurisdiction
and this action must be dismissed.” The Connecticut court denied the
motions, explaining that substituting Trustee as a party was appropriate,
Trustee was properly served in Arizona, and entry of the default judgment
against Trustee was sound.

¶9             Trustee appealed to the Connecticut Court of Appeals.
Trustee’s only argument on appeal was that “the trial court erred when it
improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the court
never had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” The Connecticut
Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that “[b]ecause the [superior] court
granted that motion and the trustee was subsequently served with the
operative complaint, the court had personal jurisdiction over him.” Cocchia
II, 261 A.3d at 97.

¶10           Back to Arizona one last time. In the wake of his unsuccessful
appeal in Connecticut, Trustee filed a new motion to set aside the
Connecticut judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60. Trustee
asserted that the Connecticut judgment was void for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Trustee claimed he could still object on that ground because
the Connecticut courts “did not decide substantive or constitutional
personal jurisdiction,” which he elected to challenge in Arizona instead.
Judgment Creditor objected that Trustee could no longer collaterally attack
the judgment following the Connecticut courts’ rejection of Trustee’s
personal jurisdiction defense.

¶11           The superior court granted Trustee’s Rule 60 motion. The
court concluded the Connecticut judgment was void because Connecticut’s
long-arm statute did not authorize personal jurisdiction over Trustee. Even
if the long-arm statute authorized personal jurisdiction, the court thought
Connecticut’s exercise of such jurisdiction “would violate constitutional
principles of due process.” And the court believed personal jurisdiction,
based on those grounds, was not litigated in Connecticut.

¶12           Judgment Creditor timely appealed. We have jurisdiction.
See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

                                 DISCUSSION

¶13           Judgment Creditor argues Arizona courts must recognize the
Connecticut judgment because Trustee unsuccessfully litigated his
personal jurisdiction defense in Connecticut. We review a court’s Rule 60
ruling on a motion to set aside a foreign judgment and preclude its
enforcement for an abuse of discretion. See City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144

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Ariz. 323, 328 (1985). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court
misapplies the law. Id. at 328–29. We review the application of full faith
and credit and preclusion principles de novo. Grynberg v. Shaffer, 216 Ariz.
256, 257 ¶ 5 (App. 2007) (reviewing full faith and credit issue de novo);
Banner Univ. Med. Ctr. Tucson Campus, LLC v. Gordon, 252 Ariz. 264, 266 ¶ 8
(2022) (reviewing issue and claim preclusion issues de novo).

                                       I.

¶14           The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution provides in pertinent part: “Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. The Clause “obliges the states
to respect and enforce judgments rendered in the courts of their sister
states[.]” Oyakawa v. Gillett, 175 Ariz. 226, 228 (App. 1993). The Clause also
provides that “Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Since 1790, Congress has directed, with
only minor revision, that judgments “shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory or Possession from which they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738.

¶15            The Arizona legislature also plays a role in carrying out the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. In 1971, the legislature adopted, in its entirety,
§ 2 of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Codified at
A.R.S. § 12-1702, the statute provides that an authenticated copy of a foreign
judgment (i.e., from a non-Arizona court) may be filed with the clerk of the
court in any county. Once that occurs, “[t]he clerk shall treat the foreign
judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the superior court of this
state.” A.R.S. § 12-1702. And the statute emphasizes that it means what it
says about requiring the same treatment: “A judgment so filed has the same
effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for
reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a superior court of this
state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.” Id.

                                      A.

¶16            The Full Faith and Credit Clause “obliges the states to respect
and enforce judgments rendered in the courts of their sister states[.]”
Oyakawa, 175 Ariz. at 228. This Court once explained that “the Clause was
intended to nationalize the law of res judicata.” Giehrl v. Royal Aloha Vacation
Club, Inc., 188 Ariz. 456, 457 (App. 1997).

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¶17           The term res judicata, however, has confusingly been used in
more than one sense. Sometimes “[r]es judicata was used to mean an
adjudication that bars any further litigation on a claim.” Circle K Corp. v.
Indus. Comm’n, 179 Ariz. 422, 426 (App. 1993). In more modern parlance,
this use of res judicata refers to claim preclusion. Other times res judicata
was used more broadly to also “refer to the resolution of an issue, a facet of
a claim, which bars further litigation of that issue.” Id. This concept is now
referred to as issue preclusion. Using res judicata in two different ways
“blurred the distinction between issue and claim preclusion when . . .
preclusion is sought on an issue essential to a prior claim which was
resolved by default, not litigation.” Id.

¶18            When Giehrl and other cases addressing the Full Faith and
Credit Clause talk about nationalizing res judicata, it seems they are
referring to res judicata in the broad sense—the sense that includes claim and
issue preclusion. In any event, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is “an
adjunct of the law of res judicata.” State v. Forteson, 8 Ariz. App. 468, 472
(1968). And the Arizona Supreme Court has held that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause also federalizes collateral estoppel when a litigant seeks to
enforce a sister state’s judgment. Fremont Indem. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 144
Ariz. 339, 342 (1985) (“Although the Court of Appeals correctly noted that
the issue in this case is really one of collateral estoppel, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause also encompasses that doctrine.”); In re Macartney, 163 Ariz.
116, 118 (1990) (“The effect of the full faith and credit clause is to nationalize
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.”). We will refer herein,
however, to claim preclusion (instead of res judicata) and issue preclusion
(instead of collateral estoppel). See Circle K Corp., 179 Ariz. at 645
(endorsing “the use of the descriptive terms ‘claim preclusion’ and ‘issue
preclusion’ instead of the archaic phrases ‘res judicata’ and ‘collateral
estoppel.’”).

                                       B.

¶19            Although the default rule is that a state should respect and
enforce judgments from sister states, there are exceptions. As Justice Robert
Jackson explained, “A money judgment in the usual civil action, if it
survives inquiry into jurisdiction of the rendering tribunal, is
unimpeachable in a sister state, either as a basis for a judgment of its courts
or as a shield against further litigation of the same issues by the same
parties.” Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the
Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1945). Justice Jackson acknowledged,
“Exceptions there are, but they are few and affect only a small number of
judgments[.]” Id. As Justice Jackson’s statement implies, one ground upon

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which a party may challenge the enforceability of a foreign judgment is lack
of jurisdiction. See id. (“if it survives inquiry into jurisdiction of the
rendering tribunal”); see also Phares v. Nutter, 125 Ariz. 291, 294 (1980)
(“[T]he Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution does
not prevent a judgment debtor from collaterally attacking a foreign
judgment on the grounds of fraud or want of jurisdiction.”).

¶20             More specifically, “a sister state need not give effect to a
judgment that was rendered without jurisdiction over the defendant.”
Giehrl, 188 Ariz. at 457. Thus, one seeking to avoid enforcement of a foreign
judgment in Arizona can do so by convincing the superior court that the
issuing state lacked personal jurisdiction. “A duly authenticated judgment
of a sister state is prima facie evidence of that state’s jurisdiction to render
it and of the right which it purports to adjudicate.” Oyakawa, 175 Ariz. at
229. Thus, a party challenging the validity of the foreign judgment bears
the burden of proof. Id. “If the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction the
court has no . . . discretion but must vacate the judgment.” Preston v.
Denkins, 94 Ariz. 214, 219 (1963).

¶21           A defendant named in a foreign lawsuit who believes the
forum state lacks personal jurisdiction faces a choice. The defendant may
appear in the litigation in the foreign state and challenge the court’s
jurisdiction. See Giehrl, 188 Ariz. at 458. If the defendant does so and loses,
the defendant does not get a second bite by again challenging jurisdiction
when the plaintiff later attempts to enforce the judgment. Id. As the U.S.
Supreme Court has explained, “[A] judgment is entitled to full faith and
credit—even as to questions of jurisdiction—when the second court’s
inquiry discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated
and finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.”
Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Acc. & Health Ins. Guaranty
Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 706 (1982) (citation omitted). Full faith and credit will
lie even where the issue of jurisdiction “may have been determined
incorrectly.” Giehrl, 188 Ariz. at 458.

¶22           Alternatively, the defendant can ignore the foreign lawsuit
and let default judgment enter. Id. at 458. Then, when the plaintiff comes
to enforce the judgment in Arizona, full faith and credit likely will stop the
defendant from re-litigating the underlying merits of the claims, but it will
not stop the defendant from questioning the issuing court’s personal
jurisdiction or the superior court from concluding the judgment is void for
lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.

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                         COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
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                                      C.

¶23           Saying a defendant can appear and challenge a foreign court’s
jurisdiction (option 1) or make that challenge later upon attempted
enforcement of a default judgment (option 2) gets us only part of the way
home. We must also determine whether, when a defendant chooses option
1 and the court finds personal jurisdiction, that determination is subject to
claim or issue preclusion. We conclude issue preclusion applies.

¶24            As this Court has explained, “[c]laim preclusion, as
traditionally applied in civil litigation, means that ‘a final judgment on the
merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a
second suit based on the same claim.’” Lawrence T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
246 Ariz. 260, 261 ¶ 8 (App. 2019). Claim preclusion requires “(1) an
identity of claims in the suit in which a judgment was entered and the
current litigation, (2) a final judgment on the merits in the previous
litigation, and (3) identity or privity between parties in the two suits.” In re
Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 212
Ariz. 64, 69–70 ¶ 14 (2006) (“In re Gila River Adjudication”). “A final
judgment on the merits for the purpose of claim preclusion is one that is not
tentative, provisional, or contingent and represents the completion of all
steps in the adjudication of the claim by the court.” Lawrence T., 246 Ariz.
at 262 ¶ 11. Claim preclusion, unlike issue preclusion, does not require
actual litigation. Circle K Corp., 179 Ariz. at 425 (“Issue preclusion requires
actual litigation. Claim preclusion does not.”).

¶25            “Issue preclusion is a judicial doctrine that prevents a party
from relitigating issues of fact or law.” Legacy Found. Action Fund v. Citizens
Clean Elections Comm’n, 254 Ariz. 485, __ ¶ 24 (2023). A party using
defensive issue preclusion must satisfy four requirements: “(1) the issue at
stake is the same in both proceedings; (2) the issue was actually litigated
and determined in a valid and final judgment issued by a tribunal with
competent jurisdiction; (3) the opposing party had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue and actually did so; and (4) the issue was
essential to the judgment.” Id. Issue preclusion, therefore, does not apply
“[i]n the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or default”
because there “none of the issues [are] actually litigated.” In re Gila River
Adjudication, 212 Ariz. at 70 ¶ 14 n.8 (quoting Arizona v. California, 530 U.S.
392, 414 (2000)).

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                          COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
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                                        D.

¶26            Deciding where a determination of personal jurisdiction fits
into the picture requires us to explain the basics of that doctrine as well. For
a court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, there first must be
valid service of process. See MCA Fin. Grp., Ltd. v. Enter. Bank & Trust, 236
Ariz. 490, 497 ¶ 19 n.10 (App. 2014) (“[S]ervice of process is the mechanism
by which the court acquires the power to enforce a judgment.”). Even with
proper service, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
limits state courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants served out of state. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1877).
The modern formulation of specific personal jurisdiction—jurisdiction over
a particular claim or claims—allows state courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if the defendant has “sufficient
contacts” with the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Specific personal
jurisdiction requires “(1) purposeful conduct by the defendant targeting the
forum, rather than accidental or casual contacts or those brought about by
the plaintiff’s unilateral acts, (2) a nexus between those contacts and the
claim asserted, and (3) that exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable.”
Beverage v. Pullman & Comley, LLC, 232 Ariz. 414, 417 ¶ 9 (App. 2013).

                                        E.

¶27            For several reasons, a prior court’s determination regarding
personal jurisdiction is subject to issue preclusion, not claim preclusion. To
begin, personal jurisdiction is not a cause of action one asserts to obtain
relief. One cannot bring a claim against another for personal jurisdiction.
Instead, in most, if not all, cases, lack of personal jurisdiction is an issue that
a party injects in defense of a claim asserted by another. Admittedly, claims
for relief come in many shapes and sizes, including requests for declaratory
relief to resolve what in other cases would be a defense (e.g., the
government official who seeks a declaratory judgment that her actions are
constitutional). But personal jurisdiction is not an issue a party tees up
through a declaratory judgment action—it would be unheard of to ask a
court to affirmatively exercise jurisdiction only to determine whether it has
jurisdiction. Thus, it is more natural to treat personal jurisdiction as a
subsidiary issue subject to issue preclusion.

¶28            Applying issue preclusion is also most consistent with how
courts treat that issue in the specific context of a foreign default judgment.
As explained, a defendant served with a foreign lawsuit can pursue the

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ostrich’s strategy, hiding his head in the sand and allowing default
judgment to enter. But the defendant may still defend based on lack of
personal jurisdiction when his adversary comes calling with the judgment.

¶29            The only way that framework makes sense is if personal
jurisdiction is subject to issue preclusion. If personal jurisdiction is subject
to claim preclusion, then re-litigation of personal jurisdiction would be
impermissible because claim preclusion does not require actual litigation,
instead applying to every issue that could have been litigated. Aldrich v.
Indus. Comm’n, 176 Ariz. 301, 306 (App. 1993) (“Claim preclusion, on the
other hand, applies to issues that could have been litigated.”). Personal
jurisdiction, like every issue bound up in a judgment obtained by default,
could have been litigated had the defendant appeared and defended, and
thus if claim preclusion applies, a defaulting defendant can no longer argue
personal jurisdiction. If personal jurisdiction is instead subject to issue
preclusion, then litigation over personal jurisdiction is permitted after
default because “[i]ssue preclusion applies only if an issue was previously
litigated.” Id. Thus, because case law establishes that litigation of personal
jurisdiction is permitted after default, see Giehrl, 188 Ariz. at 458, issue
preclusion applies to personal jurisdiction.

¶30            The U.S. Supreme Court, while interpreting the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, has applied issue preclusion to bind one state court (in North
Carolina) to the personal jurisdiction determination from another state
court (in Indiana), explaining “[e]rroneous or not . . . this jurisdictional issue
was fully and fairly litigated and finally determined by [an Indiana court].”
Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co., 455 U.S. at 714. Arguably, that
interpretation is binding in this case, which also involves application of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. See Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 287–88 (1939)
(exercising jurisdiction over a state court’s Full Faith and Credit
determination). Less directly, the Court has acknowledged in other
contexts that a decision on personal jurisdiction may have preclusive
consequences because of issue preclusion. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil,
526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) (“If a federal court dismisses a removed case for
want of personal jurisdiction, that determination may preclude the parties
from relitigating the very same personal jurisdiction issue in state court.”);
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 524–27 (1931)
(personal jurisdiction ruling has issue-preclusive effect).

¶31           Lastly, this Court has previously applied issue preclusion to
the issue of personal jurisdiction. In Tash v. Saunders, the plaintiffs sued
defendants for intentional interference with a contract. See 153 Ariz. 322,
324 (App. 1987). The superior court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of

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personal jurisdiction. Undeterred, the plaintiffs again sued the defendants
in superior court for intentional interference with a contract. See id. The
defendants again moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal
jurisdiction and the superior court again obliged. See id. On appeal, this
Court noted that “the dismissal in the first lawsuit determined” the
personal jurisdiction issue, “and no appeal was taken from that judgment.”
Id. at 325. The issue presented, therefore, was “whether [the plaintiffs], by
filing a new action 42 days later, can relitigate the same issue previously
decided against them.” Id. This Court, applying issue preclusion, held they
could not. Id. Although this Court acknowledged a dearth of Arizona cases
on point, there was “authority from other jurisdictions to the effect that a
finding of lack of personal jurisdiction serves to preclude raising the issue
in another lawsuit.” Id. at 325–26 (citing cases and the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 27 (1980)); see also Singer v. Palmer, 2019 WL 5444792, at *2 ¶
10 (Ariz. App. Oct. 24, 2019) (applying issue preclusion to bar re-litigation
of personal jurisdiction).

                                      F.

¶32           The judgment at issue hails from Connecticut, not Arizona.
“The law of the jurisdiction of the court from which the underlying initial
judgment issues determines whether that judgment has preclusive effect.”
Hancock v. O’Neil, 253 Ariz. 509, 512 ¶ 11 (2022). We must, therefore,
determine whether there is any relevant conflict between Arizona and
Connecticut law on issue preclusion and how it applies to personal
jurisdiction.

¶33            In every sense relevant to this appeal, Connecticut law on
preclusion is consistent with Arizona law. Like in Arizona, a prior
judgment has preclusive effect in Connecticut based on principles of claim
and issue preclusion. See Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., 922 A.2d 1073, 1078
(Conn. 2007). “[I]ssue preclusion … prohibits the relitigation of an issue
when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior
action between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a
different claim.” Id. Thus, a judgment obtained by default does not have
preclusive effect when it comes to jurisdictional issues because those issues
are not actually litigated. See Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, 570 A.2d 687,
690 (Conn. 1990) (personal jurisdiction defense may be raised “unless the
jurisdictional issue was fully litigated before the rendering court”).
Connecticut allows the same two options as Arizona in dealing with
personal jurisdiction and foreign judgments—the defendant may appear in
the issuing state court and assert a personal jurisdiction defense (again,
option 1) or allow entry of default and challenge personal jurisdiction upon

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attempted enforcement (again, option 2). See J. Corda Const., Inc. v. Zaleski
Corp., 911 A.2d 309, 314 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (explaining that
Connecticut’s “full faith and credit jurisprudence” allows a party to “raise
lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense to challenge the validity of a
foreign court’s judgment”).

¶34           Issue preclusion, therefore, applies to determine whether any
prior adjudication of personal jurisdiction by the Connecticut courts
forecloses Trustee from litigating that issue here.

                                     II.

¶35           Recall that after the Connecticut superior court entered
default judgment against Trustee, he appeared and challenged that
judgment by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing Connecticut lacked
personal jurisdiction because Judgment Creditor never completed proper
service of process. Trustee argued that, because of improper service, “the
Court lacks . . . personal jurisdiction and this action must be dismissed.”
The superior court denied the motion to dismiss. Then, on appeal, Trustee’s
primary argument was that “the trial court erred when it improperly
denied [Trustee’s] motion to dismiss because the court never had personal
jurisdiction over [Trustee].” The Connecticut Court of Appeals disagreed,
affirming the default judgment while concluding that “[b]ecause the
[superior] court granted that motion and the trustee was subsequently
served with the operative complaint, the court had personal jurisdiction
over him.” Cocchia II, 261 A.3d at 97.

¶36            Judgment Creditor argues Trustee litigated the personal
jurisdiction issue in Connecticut and lost, and thus he cannot re-litigate the
issue in Arizona. While acknowledging that he litigated personal
jurisdiction in Connecticut, Trustee claims he did not challenge
“substantive personal jurisdiction” in Connecticut. In other words, Trustee
challenged personal jurisdiction on one ground—service of process—and
not others—minimum contacts, for example—so he is still permitted to
assert those challenges in Arizona. We agree with Judgment Creditor that
re-litigation of personal jurisdiction is not permitted.

¶37            Trustee followed option 1 in Connecticut—he appeared
(albeit late) and objected to personal jurisdiction. The Connecticut courts
rejected his defense and affirmed the judgment. In Connecticut, “[t]he
general rule of issue preclusion is that [w]hen an issue of fact or law is
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive

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in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a
different claim[.]” Torres v. Waterbury, 733 A.2d 817, 831 (Conn. 1999).

¶38           Each of the elements for issue preclusion is met. Both Trustee
and Judgment Creditor were parties in the Connecticut litigation, and they
are parties here. Once Trustee’s personal jurisdiction defense failed on
appeal, the issue of personal jurisdiction was determined by a valid and
final judgment in Connecticut—the Appellate Court of Connecticut
unequivocally held that “the court had personal jurisdiction over
[Trustee].” Cocchia II, 261 A.3d at 97. Determining whether the Connecticut
superior court had personal jurisdiction was essential to disposing of
Trustee’s motion to dismiss and his subsequent appeal—personal
jurisdiction was the primary (if not only) issue Trustee raised on appeal.

¶39            The only remaining question is whether personal jurisdiction
was actually litigated in Connecticut. Trustee is hard pressed to say no
considering the parties litigated personal jurisdiction in the Connecticut
superior and appellate courts. But Trustee argues the personal jurisdiction
argument he makes in Arizona was not litigated because he did not argue
a lack of minimum contacts in Connecticut (he only argued a lack of
service). Trustee’s argument runs headlong into the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 27. See Powell, 922 A.2d at 1078 (relying on comments to
Restatement (Second) Judgments § 27); Dowling v. Finley Assocs., Inc., 727
A.2d 1245, 1253 (Conn. 1999) (same). Comment c. to § 27 explains that “[a]n
issue on which relitigation is foreclosed may be one of evidentiary fact, of
‘ultimate fact’ (i.e., the application of law to fact), or of law.” If a party
suffers an adverse determination on an ultimate fact, “new evidentiary facts
may not be brought forward to obtain a different determination of that
ultimate fact.” Restatement (Second) Judgments § 27 cmt. c. The same goes
for an issue of law: “[I]f the issue was one of law, new arguments may not
be presented to obtain a different determination of that issue.” Id.
Comment c relies on an illustration stating that a party who loses in one
action on a statute of frauds defense because “an oral contract of the kind
sued upon is enforceable” cannot in a second action re-assert a statute of
frauds defense, “whether or not on the basis of arguments made in the prior
action[.]” Id. cmt. c illus. 6.

¶40           Applying those concepts here, Trustee lost on a personal
jurisdiction defense in the Connecticut action because of sufficient service
of process. Thus, he cannot here re-assert a personal jurisdiction defense,
“whether or not on the basis of arguments made in the [Connecticut]
action.” Restatement (Second) Judgments § 27 cmt. c; accord Barassi v.
Matison, 134 Ariz. 338, 341 (App. 1982) (explaining that issue preclusion

                                     13
                          COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                            Opinion of the Court

applies even if “legal arguments which could have been presented were
not”). Trustee cannot write off his personal jurisdiction loss in Connecticut
on grounds that he made a different subsidiary argument. If the
Connecticut judgment is unenforceable in Arizona, it cannot be because the
Connecticut courts lacked personal jurisdiction.

¶41            Trustee’s argument is inconsistent with the interest in finality
that issue preclusion serves. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599
(1948) (issue preclusion “is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits over
matters which have once been decided”). Adopting Trustee’s argument
would allow him to re-argue personal jurisdiction based on a lack of
minimum contacts. But what if Trustee loses that argument in Arizona? If
Judgment Creditor decides to enforce the Connecticut judgment in
California, could Trustee again defend against enforcement on grounds that
he never litigated the fairness prong of personal jurisdiction in Arizona? Or
could Trustee argue in California that a new declaration filed in support of
his personal jurisdiction defense contains many new details? Those are the
possibilities Trustee would have us create. But that is not the way issue
preclusion works, and we refuse Trustee’s invitation to follow his new path.
See Giehrl, 188 Ariz. at 458 (“The trial court’s decision that ‘[e]ach court has
the right to decide the issue of jurisdiction’ fails to implement the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and could lead to many inconsistent findings.”). Having
actually litigated personal jurisdiction in Connecticut, Trustee may not do
so again in Arizona (even on different grounds).

                                       III.

¶42           The special concurrence agrees the Connecticut judgment
gets Full Faith and Credit. And the special concurrence agrees Trustee is
precluded under Connecticut law from re-arguing personal jurisdiction
because that issue was litigated in Connecticut.

¶43            The special concurrence parts ways with us in two respects.
First, the special concurrence criticizes our discussion of issue preclusion,
claiming we have unilaterally injected the issue on appeal. The record
belies that assertion.

¶44             While this Court’s prior unpublished memorandum decision
in this litigation referred to “res judicata,” there is no indication therein that
the panel decided that res judicata (in the narrow sense) was solely
applicable moving forward—the panel instead remanded based on the
appellate proceedings pending in Connecticut. It is, moreover, unclear how

                                       14
                        COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                          Opinion of the Court

this Court’s passing reference to “res judicata” could have bound the trial
court in advance of the conclusion of the Connecticut litigation.

¶45            It is also not clear, contrary to the special concurrence’s
position, that the trial court proceedings focused on claim preclusion.
Instead, in his motion to set aside the Connecticut judgment, Trustee left
things more open-ended. Trustee dedicated two paragraphs to the issue of
whether personal jurisdiction had been litigated in Connecticut, arguing
broadly that “[t]he parties did not litigate, and therefore, the Connecticut
court did not decide substantive or constitutional personal jurisdiction[.]”
Judgment Creditor took a similar approach, arguing succinctly but broadly
that the issue of personal jurisdiction had been litigated in Connecticut.

¶46           Unsurprisingly, based on the parties’ broad arguments, the
superior court did not focus on claim preclusion to the exclusion of issue
preclusion. The trial court, instead, determined whether personal
jurisdiction was litigated—finding that “[t]his issue was not litigated”—
and whether personal jurisdiction was precluded—concluding that “[s]ince
this issue was never addressed, the Defendants are not precluded from
raising it now.” If anything, the trial court’s repeated reference to personal
jurisdiction as an “issue” and not a “claim” is more consistent with
applying issue preclusion.

¶47           The parties’ appellate briefing is similarly open-ended as to
the applicable preclusion doctrine. Judgment Creditor’s opening brief
argues broadly that Trustee fully and fairly litigated personal jurisdiction.
He begins his argument with a quote from the U.S. Supreme Court defining
the phrase “fully and fairly litigated.” What opinion does he quote?
Underwriters National Assurance Co., which we rely upon above (see supra ¶
30) and which held that, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, personal
jurisdiction determinations are subject to issue preclusion. 455 U.S. at 714.
To be sure, Judgment Creditor relies upon cases applying claim preclusion,
but he also relies upon cases applying issue preclusion or both. Trustee
similarly understood that both doctrines are in play. In the answering brief,
Trustee repeatedly refers to both preclusion doctrines—he refers to
“preclusion doctrines,” “issue preclusion and claim preclusion,”
“[w]hether to apply the doctrines,” “the doctrines of preclusion,” and “for
a preclusion doctrine to bar [Trustee’s] defenses.”

¶48          Regardless, appellate courts are duty bound to get the law
right, even when the parties and the trial court do not. This is why parties
cannot stipulate to the applicable law and thereby bind appellate courts,
and why a legal error going to the foundation of the action may be reviewed

                                     15
                         COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                           Opinion of the Court

on appeal even when not raised in the trial court. See Word v. Motorola, Inc.,
135 Ariz. 517, 520 (1983); see also Advanced Prop. Tax Liens, Inc. v. Othon, 255
Ariz. 60, __ ¶¶ 17, 20 (2023) (considering whether a judgment was subject
to collateral attack despite that “[t]he trial court, court of appeals, and
parties have addressed the issue here as one of standing”). We should not
further confuse preclusion principles—as the special concurrence agrees,
they are already confusing enough (see supra ¶ 17 and infra ¶ 62)—by
relying on an incorrect doctrine, even if the parties and the superior court
did so first. Avoiding further confusion is especially paramount when our
analysis could impact another state’s law—it is one thing for Arizona
judges to muddle Arizona law; it is quite another for them to muddle
Arizona and Connecticut law.

¶49           The special concurrence also parts ways by maintaining that
claim preclusion applies. We need not re-hash the reasons why we think
that is incorrect as a legal matter. See supra ¶¶ 27–31. It is enough to
emphasize that applying claim preclusion is inconsistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s application of issue preclusion in Underwriters National
Assurance Co., which is likely binding on us. See 455 U.S. at 714. Applying
claim preclusion is also inconsistent with the option to allow default
judgment and still later challenge personal jurisdiction upon attempted
judgment enforcement. The special concurrence does not adequately
address either inconsistency.

                                      IV.

¶50           Arizona law authorizes a discretionary fee award to the
prevailing party in an action arising out of contract. See A.R.S. § 12-341.01.
Each party agrees that the fee-shifting provision applies, and each has
requested attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal under § 12-341.01. In our
discretion, we award reasonable attorneys’ fees to Judgment Creditor. As
the successful party on appeal, Judgment Creditor is also awarded taxable
costs. Both awards are subject to compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil
Appellate Procedure 21(a).

                               CONCLUSION

¶51           The Connecticut courts’ conclusion that Connecticut had
personal jurisdiction over Trustee binds Arizona courts; we, therefore,
vacate the superior court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings
consistent herewith.

                                      16
                         COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                       Brown, J. Specially Concurring

B R O W N, Judge, specially concurring:

¶52            As a general rule, Arizona’s appellate courts may affirm a trial
court’s ruling if it is correct for any reason supported by the record. See,
e.g., Forszt v. Rodriguez, 212 Ariz. 263, 265, ¶ 9 (App. 2006). But the
majority—in sua sponte raising collateral estoppel as the basis for reversal—
seems to take the view that appellate courts may also overturn a trial court’s
decision for any reason supported by the record. Because attorneys,
litigants, and trial judges should not be required to anticipate undisclosed
legal theories to avoid reversal on appeal, I write separately. In doing so, I
agree that the superior court’s decision must be vacated. Unlike the
majority, however, my justification for doing so is based on how
Connecticut courts view the doctrine of res judicata, the argument that
Judgment Creditor pressed in the superior court and now in this appeal.
Judgment Creditor has not defended its right to enforce the Connecticut
judgment on the theory of collateral estoppel. Preferring to address the
arguments actually made by the Judgment Creditor, I would reverse under
Connecticut’s well-established body of law governing res judicata.2

¶53            My alternative resolution of this case is supported by several
important principles. First, it seems clear to me that this court’s previous
mandate informed the superior court and the parties what the court’s task
on remand would be after the appeal in the Connecticut litigation was
finalized—to determine “the impact, if any, of res judicata in this case.” See
Cocchia I, 2021 WL 922435 at *3, ¶ 20. In the superior court, Judgment
Creditor defended its efforts to collect on the judgment by opposing
Trustee’s motion to set aside. Quoting this court’s memorandum decision,
Judgment Creditor asserted that a “defendant who appears in the
proceedings and litigates the jurisdictional issues is ‘bound on that issue by
the doctrine of res judicata.’” Id. at ¶ 17 (citation omitted). Judgment
Creditor also argued that “if personal jurisdiction was litigated in the
Connecticut courts [Trustee is] bound by their decisions,” and the “doctrine
of res judicata demands that the judgment remains in place.” At oral
argument on the motion, Trustee acknowledged that the issue before the
court is “to what extent was that jurisdiction litigated, and does it have any
res judicata effect.” (Emphasis added.) Given this court’s mandate, the
superior court would have exceeded the scope of remand by addressing
collateral estoppel. See Raimey v. Ditsworth, 227 Ariz. 552, 555, ¶ 6 (App.

2      Because the question before us turns on the application of
Connecticut law, and the appellate courts there generally use the terms res
judicata and collateral estoppel when analyzing preclusion doctrines, I
follow the same approach here. See infra, ¶ 63.

                                      17
                         COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                       Brown, J. Specially Concurring

2011) (recognizing that a “trial court does not have authority to transgress
upon the obvious intent of this court by contravening on remand a decision
and mandate previously issued”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

¶54           Second, “absent extraordinary circumstances, errors not
raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.” Trantor v. Fredrikson,
179 Ariz. 299, 300 (1994).

¶55           Third, issues that are not raised on appeal are considered
waived or abandoned. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz.
231, 234, ¶ 14 n.6 (App. 2011) (recognizing that the failure to develop an
argument on appeal usually results in abandonment and waiver of the
issue).

¶56           Fourth, Judgment Creditor has never raised collateral
estoppel, which is an affirmative defense and may be waived if not timely
asserted. See Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Doreus, 290 A.3d 921, 926 n.5
(Conn. App. Ct. 2023); see also Conn. Practice Book § 10–50 (“res judicata
must be specially pleaded” as a defense).

¶57            Finally, even assuming this case falls into the very rare
circumstance when it is appropriate to reverse a trial court’s decision on an
issue never previously raised, I would decline to do so here because “it
would be unfair to the parties to have the appellate court surprise them by
deciding their case on an issue they did not present.” See Childress Buick Co.
v. O’Connell, 198 Ariz. 454, 459, ¶ 29 (App. 2000); see also State v. Robertson,
249 Ariz 256, 258, ¶ 9 (2020) (appellate courts “should heed the principles
underlying the waiver doctrine”); Trantor, 179 Ariz. at 300. This is
particularly relevant here, where we are applying Connecticut law to
resolve the narrow issue before us. For that reason as well, it is unclear why
we are publishing given that the case involves a straightforward analysis of
the parties’ arguments (both made and waived) applying Connecticut’s
existing legal principles governing res judicata.3

3      For the most part, the majority ignores these principles, suggesting
that getting the law right supersedes all procedural requirements for
preserving and presenting appellate arguments. I agree our goal should be
to accurately analyze the law, but that exercise occurs within the context of
the legal arguments fairly presented in the case. We generally do not
deviate from the principles outlined above, except in extraordinary

                                      18
                         COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                       Brown, J. Specially Concurring

¶58           Citing Connecticut law, Judgment Creditor argues the
superior court erred because the Connecticut courts determined the issue
of personal jurisdiction over the Trustee and the Connecticut judgment is
not open to collateral attack in Arizona based on the doctrine of res judicata.
Judgment Creditor does not argue, or even suggest, that the court erred by
failing to apply collateral estoppel.

¶59           The United States Constitution provides that “Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. “A duly
authenticated judgment of a sister state is prima facie evidence of that
state’s jurisdiction to render it and of the right which it purports to
adjudicate.” Oyakawa, 175 Ariz. at 229. A party challenging the validity of
the foreign judgment bears the burden of proof. Id.

¶60            The full faith and credit clause restricts the authority of courts
“to decline to enforce an out-of-state money judgment.” Nastro v. D’Onofrio,
822 A.2d 286, 291 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). A judgment may be set aside “if it
is jurisdictionally flawed because the foreign court lacked subject matter or
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. ”Even as to questions of
jurisdiction, however, the principles of res judicata bar further inquiry if
‘those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in
the court which rendered the original judgment.’” Id. (citation omitted); see
also Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963) (“Full faith and credit thus
generally requires every State to give to a judgment at least the res judicata
effect which the judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered
it.”).

¶61           As the majority opinion acknowledges, supra ¶ 32, in deciding
the enforceability of a foreign judgment, the law of the issuing state
controls. See Hancock, 253 Ariz. at 512, ¶ 11. And because Connecticut is
the issuing state, Connecticut law controls.

¶62            The majority opinion correctly states that, historically,
substantial confusion has surrounded the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. So much, in fact, that in many courts those terms have

circumstances, which are not present here because the case can be resolved
based on the application of res judicata under Connecticut law, the only
issue raised in the superior court or on appeal throughout the entirety of
this litigation. Thus, I disagree with the majority’s decision to opine that
this case must be decided based on collateral estoppel when that issue is
not properly before us.

                                       19
                         COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                       Brown, J. Specially Concurring

been replaced with claim and issue preclusion. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg
The Work of Professor Allan Delker Vestal, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 13, 16 (1984) (“More
than any other writer, Professor Vestal is responsible for the increasing use
by courts and commentators of the precise, descriptive terms ‘claim
preclusion’ and ‘issue preclusion,’ in lieu of the less informative, sometimes
confusing traditional terminology, ‘res judicata’ and ‘collateral estoppel.’”).
But that confusion does not erase our need to look to Connecticut law to
resolve this appeal.

¶63            As a general observation, Connecticut courts continue to use
the term res judicata, which they define as meaning that “once a matter has
been fully and fairly litigated, and finally decided, it comes to rest” and
“bars the relitigation of claims actually made in the prior action as well as
any claims that might have been made there.” Peterson v. iCare Mgmt., LLC,
250 A.3d 720, 727 (Conn. App. Ct. 2021) (citation omitted). For the doctrine
to apply, “(1) the judgment must have been rendered on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the parties to the prior and subsequent
actions must be the same or in privity; (3) there must have been an adequate
opportunity to litigate the matter fully; and (4) the same underlying claim must
be at issue.” Id. (emphasis added). Res judicata may apply to claims that
“both might and should have been advanced in the first litigation.” Bruno
v. Geller, 46 A.3d 974, 986 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).

¶64            Here, elements one, two, and four are satisfied. Under the
first element, a court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction
“‘once it has been put in issue.’” See Connery v. Gieske, 147 A.3d 94, 100
(Conn. 2016) (citation omitted). At issue is a default judgment, which is
considered “on the merits” and therefore qualifies as a final judgment. See
Slattery v. Maykut, 405 A.2d 76, 82 (Conn. 1978); see also Indep. Party of CT-
State Cent. v. Merrill, 200 A.3d 1118, 1142–43 (Conn. 2019). Thus, the first
element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied because the parties are
the same in both actions. The fourth element is satisfied because
domestication of the judgment involves the same operative facts as the
claims in Connecticut. See Smith v. BL Companies, Inc., 198 A.3d 150, 158
(Conn. App. Ct. 2018) (noting that because “claims are the same for res
judicata purposes, this court has adopted the transactional test,” which
means that “res judicata extinguishes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or
series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose”).

¶65           Both in the superior court and on appeal, the Trustee has not
disputed that these elements were shown. Thus, it has effectively conceded
error. See McDowell Mountain Ranch Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Simons, 216 Ariz.

                                      20
                         COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                       Brown, J. Specially Concurring

266, 269, ¶ 13 (App. 2007) (noting that failure to respond to an argument on
appeal may be treated as a confession of error). In addition, the record on
appeal does not contain a complete record of the proceedings conducted by
the trial court in Connecticut, such as Judgment Creditor’s response to
Trustee’s motion to dismiss and hearing transcripts. We presume those
missing portions support the rulings made by the Connecticut courts. See
Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995) (“When a party fails to include
necessary items, we assume they would support the court’s findings and
conclusions.”).

¶66          Even without these procedural deficiencies, a generous view
of the Trustee’s briefing suggests his challenge is limited to res judicata’s
third element (adequate opportunity to fully litigate the matter). He
contends that personal jurisdiction based on Connecticut’s long arm statute
and minimum contacts under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945), was not “argued, litigated, or determined in Connecticut” and
that any objections he made to the default judgment in Connecticut were
only procedural. Trustee therefore asserts that because he did not challenge
personal jurisdiction on those specific grounds, he can now prevent
enforcement of the judgment by asserting them for the first time in Arizona.

¶67            In his motion to dismiss, Trustee argued in part that the
Connecticut Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction over Trustee and the Trust because he was improperly added
to the case, and there were other procedural defects. The Connecticut Court
denied his motion, and the Connecticut Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment, explaining the only argument Trustee raised on appeal was that
“the trial court improperly denied his postjudgment motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction because he was not properly cited in as a
defendant.” Cocchia II, 261 A.3d at 94–95.

¶68            Allowing a party to hold back a portion of its jurisdictional
challenges for later assertion in a separate proceeding in a different
jurisdiction directly conflicts with the policies underlying the res judicata
doctrine. See Weiss v. Weiss, 998 A.2d 766, 779 (Conn. 2010) (noting “the
purposes of res judicata as promoting judicial economy, minimizing
repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments and providing
repose to parties”); Bruno, 46 A.3d at 986 (“[A] party should not be able to
relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate.”); see
also Underwriters Nat'l Assur. Co., 455 U.S. at 710 (“A party cannot escape
the requirements of full faith and credit and res judicata by asserting its
own failure to raise matters clearly within the scope of a prior
proceeding.”); Baldwin, 283 U.S. at 525–26 (explaining that public policy

                                      21
                          COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                        Brown, J. Specially Concurring

“dictates that there be an end of litigation,” and “where one voluntarily
appears, presents his case and is fully heard,” absent fraud, he should be
bound “by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his
cause”). When Trustee decided to challenge personal jurisdiction in the
Connecticut court, he needed to present all supporting facts and legal
theories. See Wheeler v. Beachcroft, LLC, 129 A.3d 677, 685 (Conn. 2016)
(“[R]es judicata prevents reassertion of the same claim ‘regardless of what
additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in
support of it.’”) (Citation omitted.). By failing to do so, Trustee acted at his
own peril.

¶69             Nothing prevented Trustee from challenging other aspects of
the Connecticut court’s jurisdiction over him in his December 2019 motion
to dismiss. He even admits it was his choice. The record confirms that
Trustee was fully aware of his alternative arguments because earlier that
month in the Arizona trial court he asserted that the Connecticut court had
no personal jurisdiction over him due to his lack of minimum contacts.
Trustee has made no meaningful argument that he lacked the opportunity
to fully litigate the issue of personal jurisdiction in the Connecticut lawsuit.

¶70            Trustee argues that “[e]ven at its extreme, res judicata can be
applied only to issues ‘raised by the record’” and that because the
Connecticut court did not explicitly show a “minimum contacts” analysis,
res judicata cannot apply to the issue of personal jurisdiction. The issue, for
purposes of evaluating whether res judicata applies, is simply whether
personal jurisdiction as a whole was litigated in Connecticut. See Bruno, 46
A.3d at 985 (“A judgment is final not only as to every matter which was
offered to sustain the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose.”); see also Fink v. Golenbock,
680 A.2d 1243, 1249 (Conn. 1996). Because Trustee argued lack of personal
jurisdiction and it was addressed in Connecticut at both the superior court
and appellate court levels, the issue of “personal jurisdiction” was plainly
“raised by the record.” Thus, based on application of res judicata to the
circumstances presented in this case, and not the hypothetical scenario on
which the majority frames its analysis, Connecticut law bars Trustee from
challenging the Connecticut judgment. See Nastro, 822 A.2d at 291 (“Even
as to questions of jurisdiction, however, the principles of res judicata bar
further inquiry if ‘those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and
finally decided in the court which rendered the original judgment.’”)
(quoting Underwriters Nat’l Assur. Co., 455 U.S. at 706); see also Cocchia I, 2021
WL 922435 at *3 (“A defendant who appears in the proceedings and litigates

                                       22
                        COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                      Brown, J. Specially Concurring

the jurisdictional issues is ‘bound on that issue by the doctrine of res
judicata.’”).4

¶71            Unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel requires a showing
that the issues were “identical” and “actually decided.” See Lyon v. Jones,
968 A.2d 416, 429 (Conn. 2009) (explaining that for purposes of collateral
estoppel, an “issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the
pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact
determined”) (citation omitted); Corcoran v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 859 A.2d
533, 540 (Conn. 2004) (“To invoke collateral estoppel the issues sought to be
litigated in the new proceeding must be identical to those considered in the
prior proceeding.”) (Citation omitted.). Because it is undisputed that
Trustee’s “minimum contacts” issue was not litigated in Connecticut,
where the default judgment was entered, applying res judicata avoids these
unargued and unbriefed issues. See, e.g., Cahaly v. Somers, 877 A.2d 837, 840
(Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (explaining that because defendants’ procedural due
process claim was “fully and fairly litigated in the Massachusetts courts,”
their claim “is barred by the doctrine of res judicata”); see also Lofts v.
Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cnty., 140 Ariz. 407, 410 (1984) (“When the
rendering court in a contested hearing determines it has jurisdiction, its
determination is res judicata on the jurisdictional issue and cannot be
relitigated in another state.”)

¶72            Finally, Trustee argues he was denied due process of law, the
judgment against him “was wrought with irregularities,” and justice would
best be served if we affirmed. Even assuming there were irregularities,
Trustee has failed to show he was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to
challenge the judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Given that
he failed to assert all legal theories supporting that challenge when he had

4      The majority’s analysis references to Underwriters National Assurance
Co., 455 U.S. at 714, are not necessarily dispositive on the nuances of
Connecticut law governing preclusion doctrines, given that the Supreme
Court never mentions issue preclusion/collateral estoppel in that case. See
id. at 694 (framing the issue as “whether, by refusing to treat the prior
Indiana court judgment as res judicata, the North Carolina court has
violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and its
implementing federal statute”). Also, because Judgment Creditor never
argued that the superior court’s ruling must be reversed based on collateral
estoppel, we do not know what arguments Trustee would have made
against application of that doctrine. In any event, my analysis focuses on
the only issue meaningfully raised by Judgment Creditor—res judicata.

                                     23
                        COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.
                      Brown, J. Specially Concurring

the opportunity, he was not denied due process. Thus, his attempts to
assert those theories in Arizona to stop enforcement of the judgment are
precluded by res judicata.

¶73            For all these reasons, I do not agree that the superior court
erred in failing to apply collateral estoppel, an argument not presented to
the superior court or to this court. As discussed above, the Trustee’s
attempt to stop enforcement of the foreign judgment is precluded by res
judicata under Connecticut law. If the majority disagrees with that analysis,
it should affirm the superior court’s ruling. Either the res judicata argument
presented by Judgment Creditor justifies vacating the court’s ruling, or it
does not. It is not our role, absent extraordinary circumstances, to tell the
superior court it erred when we base our reasoning on an issue we believe
should have been raised but was not.

¶74           Because res judicata precludes litigating personal jurisdiction
in Arizona’s courts, the superior court erred in granting the Trustee’s
motion to set aside. For that reason alone, I agree with vacating the court’s
ruling.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

                                       24