Court Opinion

ID: 9928857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 08:12:43.510673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:51.562819
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                          EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                               EL PASO, TEXAS

    THERESA RUEBBLING, Individually and                        §
    as Heir of VICTORIA RANGEL, Deceased,                                           No. 08-23-00054-CV
                                                               §
                                         Appellant,                                       Appeal from
                                                               §
    v.                                                                          421st Judicial District Court
                                                               §
    FOREMOST COUNTY MUTUAL                                                       of Caldwell County, Texas
    INSURANCE COMPANY,                                         §
                                                                                       (TC# 21-O-421)
                                         Appellee.             §

                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

           Theresa Ruebbling appeals the trial court’s summary judgment determination that

Foremost County Mutual Insurance Company (Foremost) is entitled to bring an interpleader action

in Caldwell County, Texas.1 Theresa claims that the trial court erred in exercising subject matter

jurisdiction, determining venue was proper, and granting summary judgment.2 We affirm.

1
  This case was transferred from the Austin Court of Appeals pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket
equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We follow the precedent of that court to the extent it might
conflict with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
    Because several parties in this case share a last name, we use their first names for clarity.
                                         BACKGROUND

       On February 19, 2021, Damian Garza was driving his mother Ericka Ruebbling’s vehicle

in Travis County when he collided with a freightliner. Both Damian and his passenger, Victoria

Rangel, died in the accident. Victoria is survived by her mother, Theresa Ruebbling, and her father,

Jorge Rangel.

       Ericka’s vehicle was insured by a Foremost policy that includes $100,000 in bodily injury

liability coverage. After the accident, Theresa and Jorge agreed to settle their liability claims

against Damian’s estate and Ericka in exchange for Foremost’s $100,000 policy limit.

       Foremost prepared a release of liability (the Release), then sent it to Theresa and Jorge for

their signatures. Theresa’s attorney, Ronnie Jones, returned a copy of the Release bearing

Theresa’s signature to Foremost and explained that he was not representing Jorge. Jones asked

Foremost to obtain Jorge’s signature and issue the insurance proceeds check jointly to Theresa,

Jorge, and Jones’s law firm.

       Foremost obtained Jorge’s signature on the Release and notified Jones that Jorge requested

separate checks. Jones responded that Theresa would “not allow Jorge to profit from his daughter’s

death,” would “not agree to two separate checks or any split with Jorge under the bodily injury

portion of the claim,” and would “take him to court for his unconscionable conduct.” Taking aim

at Foremost, Jones said, “your insurance company does not need to get directly involved in this

civil matter between [Theresa] and Jorge. Therefore, I respectfully request that you . . . make the

check payable to [Theresa] and Jorge and me . . . .” Jones gave Foremost a deadline within which

to tender the check to “avoid unnecessary litigation.”

       In response, Foremost issued a $100,000 check payable to Theresa, Jorge, and Jones’s law

firm. A few days later, Jones returned the check, requesting instead that Foremost issue a check

                                                 2
solely payable to Victoria’s estate, by and through her mother, Theresa. Shortly thereafter, Jorge

retained counsel who notified Foremost that issuing a payment solely to Theresa would result in

litigation.

          Based on its doubt about how to disburse the settlement proceeds, Foremost filed an

interpleader petition in Caldwell County against Theresa and Jorge, noting it was “ready, willing

and able” to “unconditionally tender[]” the full $100,000 into the court’s registry upon the court’s

order. Theresa responded by filing a combined answer, plea to the jurisdiction, plea in abatement,

motion to transfer venue, and counterclaims. She stated she had previously filed a pending

wrongful death lawsuit in Travis County against Damian’s estate, Ericka, and Roberto Martinez.3

Theresa asserted that Foremost lacked standing to bring an interpleader action, and alternatively,

that the Travis County court had dominant jurisdiction. Jorge answered, affirming the settlement

and the propriety of the interpleader, and asserted a claim for a share of the insurance proceeds.

          Foremost moved for summary judgment on its entitlement to interpleader and on Theresa’s

defenses and counterclaims. The trial court held a hearing on Theresa’s combined plea to the

jurisdiction, plea in abatement, and motion to transfer, and on Foremost’s motion for summary

judgment. On February 16, 2022, the trial court rendered summary judgment and entered three

separate orders on Theresa’s motions. First, it granted Foremost’s summary judgment approving

its interpleader action. The summary judgment found Foremost was entitled to an allowance

against the $100,000 in the amount of $13,354 for attorney’s fees, plus $6,600 in fees in the event

of an appeal, and it ordered Foremost to deposit $86,646 into the court’s registry. Second, in three

3
    Martinez owns the freightliner into which Damian collided.

                                                          3
individual orders, it denied Theresa’s plea to jurisdiction, plea in abatement, and motion to transfer.

Theresa contested all four rulings in a motion for new trial, which was denied.

         Theresa moved for a new trial, and Foremost asked the trial court to disburse $6,600 for its

attorney’s fees. The trial court granted Foremost’s motion and ordered the clerk to disburse the

requested funds. On December 7, 2022, the trial court severed the claims against Foremost, making

the February 16 orders final and appealable.4

                                                   DISCUSSION

         Theresa brings eleven issues on appeal. In her first three issues, Theresa claims the trial

court erred in allowing Foremost’s interpleader to proceed in Caldwell County, as Foremost did

not have standing to bring it; however, if it did, she asserted the venue had to be in Travis County,

where she previously filed the wrongful death suit. In her remaining eight issues, Theresa asserts

the trial court erred in granting Foremost’s motion for summary judgment and request for

attorney’s fees.

         A. Preliminary evidentiary considerations

         We first address an evidentiary point that impacts several issues on appeal. “In reviewing

whether a summary judgment was properly granted, we are precluded from considering arguments

on appeal that refer to evidence the trial court has excluded, unless the appealing party also

challenges the ruling that excluded that evidence.” Brown v. Hensley, 515 S.W.3d 442, 446

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (collecting cases).

4
  Before moving to sever the Foremost claims, Theresa attempted to appeal the trial court’s February 16 orders;
however, this Court dismissed her appeal for want of jurisdiction because those orders were interlocutory at that point,
and no statute permitted such an interlocutory appeal. Ruebbling v. Foremost Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 658 S.W.3d 611,
612–13 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.). Theresa also filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Third Court
of Appeals, which was denied. In re Ruebbling, No. 03-22-00445-CV, 2022 WL 3006785, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
July 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                                           4
       In response to Foremost’s motion for summary judgment, Theresa objected to its appended

evidence and offered seven exhibits of her own, including a copy of the Release and her own

affidavit. In reply, Foremost raised extensive objections to Theresa’s evidence, excepting only the

Release.

       The trial court overruled Theresa’s objections to Foremost’s exhibits and sustained

Foremost’s objections to Theresa’s exhibits. In its summary judgment order, the trial court found

that no evidence supported any of Theresa’s affirmative defenses or counterclaims. The trial court

further found that the summary judgment evidence conclusively established that Jorge and Theresa

had settled their liability claims against Foremost’s insureds (i.e., Damian’s estate and Ericka), and

Foremost established the elements of its interpleader action and its entitlement to attorney’s fees.

       On appeal, Theresa does not challenge the trial court’s ruling sustaining Foremost’s

objections to her summary-judgment evidence. Accordingly, that evidence is not part of the record

before us, and we are precluded from considering arguments founded upon the same. Id.

       B. Issues related to jurisdiction and venue

            (1) Standard of review and applicable law

       We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Grossman v. Wolfe,

578 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied). “A plea to the jurisdiction is a

dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Univ. of Texas

Med. Branch at Galveston v. Kai Hui Qi, 402 S.W.3d 374, 379 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2013, no pet.)). The plaintiff has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the trial court’s

jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). A party’s standing

to bring suit is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548

S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex. 2018).

                                                  5
       We review a trial court’s ruling on a plea in abatement for an abuse of discretion. Davis v.

State, No. 03-14-00546-CV, 2016 WL 1084177, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 17, 2016,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Dolenz v. Cont’l Nat’l Bank of Fort Worth, 620 S.W.2d 572, 575

(Tex. 1981)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision is made without reference

to any guiding rules and principles or is arbitrary or unreasonable.” Ermisch v. HSBC Bank USA,

No. 03-16-00080-CV, 2016 WL 6575232, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 4, 2016, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (citing Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985)).

       We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to transfer venue de novo under the general

venue rule. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013,

pet. dism’d).

            (2) Analysis

       In her first three issues, Theresa claims the trial court erred in denying her plea to the

jurisdiction because a Travis County court had dominant jurisdiction, Foremost did not have

standing to bring its interpleader action, and venue was mandatory in Travis County and improper

in Caldwell County.

       Theresa’s first and third issues implicate the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction, while her

second issue complains of Foremost’s standing to bring its interpleader action. The doctrine of

dominant jurisdiction is “more of a venue issue than a true jurisdictional one.” See 1 ROY W.

MCDONALD & ELAINE A. GRAFTON CARLSON, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 3:13 (2d ed. 2022).

Standing, on the other hand, is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, without which a court

cannot address the merits of the case. RSL Funding, LLC v. Pippins, 499 S.W.3d 423, 429

(Tex. 2016). Thus, we first address Theresa’s issue regarding standing then turn to her first and

third issues regarding dominant jurisdiction.

                                                6
                (a) Foremost established its right to bring an interpleader action.

       Theresa asserts that because Foremost was not a party to the Release, it did not have

standing to enforce its terms and conditions through the interpleader action. Foremost responds

that contract law does not apply here; instead, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 43 authorizes it to

bring an interpleader action. Foremost is correct.

       “Texas has long recognized the equitable remedy of interpleader.” Clayton v. Mony Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 284 S.W.3d 398, 401 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.) (citing Williams v.

Wright, 20 Tex. 499, 500 (1857)). “When insurers receive notice of adverse bona fide claims,

Texas law does not require them ‘to act as judge and jury,’ or to pay one claim and risk liability

on the other.” State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 216 S.W.3d 799, 806 (Tex. 2007) (footnotes

omitted); Petro Source Partners, Ltd. v. 3-B Rattlesnake Ref. (1990), Ltd., 905 S.W.2d 371, 375

(Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, writ denied) (noting that interpleader party “was not required to

speculate at its peril as to the ultimate decision in the judicial process”). “Instead, if a reasonable

doubt exists in law or fact as to whom the proceeds belong, an insurer should interplead them and

let the courts decide.” Martinez, 216 S.W.3d at 806.

       “In an attempt to liberalize the remedy of interpleader and to encourage litigants to seek

the protections offered thereby, the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 43 as part of the initial

adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941.” Sav. & Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees

v. Stubbs, 734 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ). Rule 43 authorizes an

interpleader suit to afford disinterested stakeholders a method by which they may proceed when

subjected to conflicting claims and thus “exposed to double or multiple liability.” Fort Worth

Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 850 (Tex. 2018) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 43). This

process relieves the stakeholder from potential liability and litigation costs by placing the disputed

                                                  7
funds in the control of the court upon the court’s order for the court to decide ownership. Clayton,

284 S.W.3d at 401 (citing Martinez, 216 S.W.3d at 806–07).

        Interpleader generally involves two stages: in the first stage, the court determines whether

interpleader is appropriate and discharges the stakeholder from liability; in the second stage, the

rival claimants litigate their positions. Id. at 402. A party is entitled to interpleader relief when it

establishes that (1) it is subject to or has a reasonable basis to anticipate rival claims to the same

funds; (2) it has not unreasonably delayed filing its interpleader action; and (3) it has

unconditionally tendered the funds into the court’s registry. “[I]nterpleader jurisdiction is

determined at the time the interpleader complaint is filed.” Id. “[E]very reasonable doubt should

be resolved in favor of the stakeholder’s right to interplead.” Martinez, 216 S.W.3d at 806 (quoting

Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assurance Servs., N.A., 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. 1998)).

        In establishing the first element, Foremost showed that the funds in question are the

settlement proceeds, i.e., the $100,000 policy limits. The Release called for Foremost to pay these

funds to the “Releasing Parties,” which it defined as “Theresa Ruebbling and Jorge Rangel,

Individually and as Heirs of Victoria Rangel, Deceased” and “all others who may have any claim

by, through or under Theresa Ruebbling and Jorge Rangel, Heirs of Victoria Rangel, Deceased.”

Jones initially requested that the settlement check be made payable to Theresa, Jorge, and Jones’s

law firm. But after Foremost tendered the check in that fashion, Jones objected to Jorge’s name on

the check and directed Foremost to make the check payable to the estate by and through Theresa

as next of kin, without Jorge listed as a payee. Within days, Jorge’s attorney insisted that he be

included in the distribution and objected to only Theresa receiving the funds. Both attorneys

threatened Foremost with litigation if it did not comply with their instructions. Foremost thus had

reasonable grounds to anticipate rival claims to the insurance proceeds. See, e.g., Clayton, 284

                                                   8
S.W.3d at 402–03; Tri-State Pipe and Equip., Inc. v. S. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 8 S.W.3d 394, 402

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.); Petro Source Partners, 905 S.W.2d at 376; Stubbs, 734

S.W.2d at 77–79.

       In establishing the second element, Foremost presented evidence that it did not

unreasonably delay in its interpleader petition: Foremost filed it 28 days after receiving Jorge’s

attorney’s objection to having the settlement check made payable solely to Theresa. Whether a

delay is “unreasonable . . . depends on the facts of each case.” Martinez, 216 S.W.3d at 804

(insurers that interplead funds within 30 days are not generally found to have unreasonably delayed

interpleading proceeds). Id.

       In establishing the third element, Foremost stated in both its original and amended petitions

that it unconditionally tendered the settlement proceeds to the court and remained ready to deposit

the funds into the registry of the court upon order. This type of unconditional tender satisfies the

unconditional tender requirement of an interpleader action. See Heggy v. Am. Trading Emp. Ret.

Acct. Plan, 123 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

       Theresa attempted to dispute Foremost’s right to interpleader with her own affidavit and

Ericka’s responses to requests for admissions in the Travis County case, both of which were

excluded by the trial court, so her argument on this point fails.

       Based on the foregoing, Foremost has standing to bring an interpleader action. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 166a(c); Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 850. We overrule Theresa’s second issue.

                (b) Venue is proper in Caldwell County.

       In her first and third issues, Theresa challenges the trial court’s venue. She claims in her

first issue that the trial court erred in denying her plea to the jurisdiction because it refused to

follow the “clear mandate and order” regarding dominant jurisdiction found in In re J.B. Hunt

                                                  9
Transport, Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). She claims in her third issue that

the trial court erred in denying her motion to transfer venue because dominant jurisdiction trumps

the permissive venue provision upon which Foremost relied in filing its interpleader action in

Caldwell County.

         Following the court’s analysis in J.B. Hunt, we first ask whether an inherent interrelation

between the subject matter of the two pending lawsuits triggers a dominant jurisdiction question.

492 S.W.3d at 292. If that relationship exists, we then ask whether the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Theresa’s plea in abatement. Id.

         Generally, a court must grant a plea in abatement in a later-filed suit when “an inherent

interrelation of the subject matter exists in two pending lawsuits.”5 Id. at 292; see In re Red Dot

Bldg. Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Tex. 2016); see also Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267

(Tex. 1974) (“Any subsequent suit involving the same parties and the same controversy must be

dismissed if a party to that suit calls the second court’s attention to the pendency of the prior suit

by a plea of abatement.”). “This first-filed rule flows from ‘principles of comity, convenience, and

the necessity for an orderly procedure in the trial of contested issues.’” J.B. Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at

294 (quoting Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988), overruled in part

on other grounds by J.B. Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 292 (modifying Wyatt’s statement of the

compulsory-counterclaim rule)). However, if no inherent interrelation exists, both suits may

proceed in the respective courts. See id.; Comp-E-Ware Tech. Assocs., Inc. v. Mushkin, Inc., 629

S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied).

5
  There are two exceptions to the general rule—inequitable conduct by the first-filer to delay the second filing, and
lack of intent and diligence on the part of the first-filer to prosecute the first suit—neither of which applies here. See
J.B. Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 294.

                                                           10
          “It is not required that the exact issues and all the parties be included in the first action

before the second is filed, provided that the claim in the first suit may be amended to bring in all

necessary and proper parties and issues.” Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 247. “[I]n determining whether an

inherent interrelationship exists, courts should be guided by the rule governing persons to be joined

if feasible and the compulsory counterclaim rule.” Id.; see also J.B. Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 294.

          Rule 97(a), the compulsory counterclaim rule, provides in part:

          A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim within the jurisdiction of the
          court, not the subject of a pending action, which at the time of filing the pleading
          the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
          occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not
          require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
          acquire jurisdiction[.] TEX. R. CIV. P. 97(a).

In addition to these requirements, “a counterclaim is compulsory if . . . it was not the subject of a

pending action when the original suit was commenced.” J.B. Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 293. However,

Rule 97(a) does not require anyone who is not already a party to a lawsuit to intervene in the

lawsuit and bring forth related claims. Price v. Couch, 462 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. 1970).

          Dominant jurisdiction may still apply “if the claims in the first filed suit may be amended

to bring in all necessary and proper parties and issues.” Comp-E-Ware Tech., 629 S.W.3d at 555

(citing Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 247). “Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 governs the joinder of

indispensable parties.” Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 34 (Tex. 2017). “A person must be joined

as a party if ‘in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties.’” Id.

(quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(a)(1)). “If a necessary party cannot be joined, the court must determine

‘whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed.’” Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P.

39(b)).

          Theresa argues it is “indisputable” that the two lawsuits are inherently interrelated because

they involve the same subject matter. Foremost responds that Theresa failed to address the

                                                   11
standards by which an inherent interrelationship is determined, and in any event, she did not

provide the trial court with a copy of the wrongful death petition (i.e., the Travis County lawsuit)

to compare the parties and issues in each case. It also contends that the two cases involve different

parties and issues, and the two cases are not inherently interrelated since Theresa lacks standing to

join Foremost as a party in the wrongful death suit. Further, Foremost argues that because

Foremost unconditionally tendered the $100,000 policy proceeds to the Caldwell County court,

that court retained quasi in rem jurisdiction over those funds, such that the Travis County court

could not adjudicate Theresa and Jorge’s rival claims to those funds.

       The two lawsuits at issue here are not inherently interrelated because Foremost’s

interpleader action is not a compulsory counterclaim to Theresa’s wrongful death claim, and

Foremost is not—and cannot be—a party in that suit. Foremost is not a party in the wrongful death

action, so Rule 97(a) does not require it to intervene in the Travis County suit and bring its

interpleader action there. See Price, 462 S.W.2d at 558; TEX. R. CIV. P. 97(a). Further, dominant

jurisdiction does not apply because Theresa cannot amend her Travis County suit to add Foremost

as a party: “[u]nder Texas law, a tort plaintiff generally has no standing to join a tortfeasor’s

liability insurer directly in the tort action.” Jones v. CGU Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 626, 629

(Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (collecting cases). Thus, Foremost is not a “necessary and

proper part[y]” to the wrongful death suit. Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 247; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 39.

       We conclude that the Travis County wrongful death suit and the Caldwell County

interpleader action were not inherently interrelated. See Wyatt, 760 S.W.2d at 247. Dominant

jurisdiction is thus not applicable in this case. See J.B. Hunt, 492 S.W.3d at 292. The trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Theresa’s motion for abatement based on dominant

jurisdiction. We overrule Theresa’s first issue.

                                                   12
       In her third issue, Theresa argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to transfer

venue because (1) Caldwell County was not a proper county, and (2) Travis County’s dominant

jurisdiction meant venue there was mandatory and prescribed over a county selected under a

permissive venue statute. But Theresa acknowledges that because Jorge resides in Caldwell

County, it is a proper permissive venue choice. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 15.002(a)(2). She does not offer any argument or authority indicating that Caldwell County is

not a permissive venue choice. Because we have already concluded dominant jurisdiction is

inapplicable here, venue is proper in Caldwell County. The trial court did not err in denying

Theresa’s motion to transfer venue to Travis County. We overrule Theresa’s third issue.

       C. Foremost’s summary judgment motion was properly granted.

            (1) Standard of review

       “We review summary judgments de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-movant, crediting evidence favorable to the non-movant if reasonable jurors could, and

disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” Zive v. Sandberg, 644 S.W.3d

169, 173 (Tex. 2022). A movant seeking traditional summary judgment must state the specific

grounds for the motion, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and establish that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457

S.W.3d 70, 79 (Tex. 2015). If the movant satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant

to provide evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact to avoid summary judgment.

Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014).

       In a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant must allege that adequate time

for discovery has passed, and the respondent has failed to produce any evidence to support one or

more essential elements of a claim for which it would bear the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R.

                                                13
CIV. P. 166a(i). The trial court must grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment unless the

respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Id. We

review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s implicit determination that an adequate time for

discovery has passed before consideration of a no-evidence motion for summary judgment as well

as a trial court’s determination to admit or exclude evidence. McMillan v. Little City Invs., LLC,

No. 03-19-00430-CV, 2020 WL 5884291, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(adequate time for discovery); Stone v. Coronado, No. 03-11-00243-CV, 2012 WL 2076831, at *2

(Tex. App.—Austin June 6, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (evidentiary rulings).

            (2) Analysis

       In her remaining issues, Theresa appeals the trial court’s order granting Foremost’s motion

for summary judgment. In Theresa’s fourth, fifth, and eleventh issues, she contests Foremost’s

traditional summary judgment motion on its right to interpleader and accompanying attorney’s

fees. In Theresa’s sixth through tenth issue, she challenges Foremost’s combined traditional and

no-evidence motion for summary judgment on her defenses and counterclaims.

                   (a)   The trial court did not err in granting Foremost’s traditional summary
                         judgment motion regarding its right to interpleader and attorney’s
                         fees.

       Theresa complains the trial court erred in granting Foremost’s traditional motion for the

following reasons: Foremost did not meet its traditional summary judgment burden on its cause of

action; she raised a fact issue on her affirmative defenses; and Foremost was not entitled to

attorney’s fees.

       In her fourth issue, Theresa claims Foremost did not meet its burden under Rule 166a(c)

based on evidentiary issues. Specifically, she argues Foremost’s summary judgment evidence was

hearsay or hearsay within hearsay with no proper foundation laid for its admission. Theresa further

                                                14
contends the attorney’s fees statements Foremost submitted were not admissible because Foremost

had not pleaded or established a statutory or contractual basis for its attorney’s fees claim.

Foremost responds that the trial court properly overruled Theresa’s evidentiary objections because

all of its exhibits were admissible.

       Foremost’s summary judgment evidence consists of the following:

       •   Exhibit 1: Jorge’s affidavit, attaching a copy of the signed Release;

       •   Exhibit 2: Declaration of Monique Willis, a Foremost Senior Claims
           Representative assigned to this claim, with the following attachments:

           o A copy of the signed Release;

           o A series of emails exchanged among Jones, Misty Cunningham (Foremost’s
             assigned attorney to the claim), and Willis between June 21–28, 2021;

           o A series of emails exchanged among Jones, Cunningham, and Willis
             between June 21–29, 2021;

           o A copy of the June 30, 2021 letter sent to Jones by Willis, along with a copy
             of Foremost’s settlement check enclosed with that letter;

           o A copy of the July 2, 2021 letter sent to Willis by Jones, along with a copy
             of Foremost’s returned settlement check enclosed with that letter; and

           o A copy of the July 6, 2021 letter sent to Willis by Jorge’s counsel.

       •   Exhibit 3: Foremost’s certificate of authority to transact business from the
           Texas Department of Insurance;

       •   Exhibit 4: Affidavit of Meredythe Heaton, defense counsel for Damian’s estate
           and Ericka in the Travis County wrongful death suit, attaching a copy of
           Theresa’s first amended petition in that suit;

       •   Exhibit 5: Declaration of Kenneth Chambers, Foremost’s counsel in this case,
           attaching a copy of his time and billing records.

       The trial court did not err in overruling Theresa’s objections because each of the above

exhibits is admissible, either because it contains no hearsay or comes in as an exception to hearsay.

TEX. R. EVID. 801 (defining hearsay as “a statement that[] the declarant does not make while

                                                 15
testifying at the current trial or hearing” and that “a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of

the matter asserted in the statement”); Id. 803 (defining exceptions to the rule against hearsay).

Exhibits 1, 2, 4, and 5 are properly executed affidavits or unsworn declarations specifically

contemplated as proper summary-judgment evidence and contain no hearsay. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

166a(c); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 132.001.

       The signed Release (attached to both Exhibits 1 and 2) and the related correspondence

attached to Exhibit 2 are competent evidence to establish that Foremost reasonably anticipated

rival claims to the policy proceeds—i.e., the basis of its interpleader cause of action. See Guyaux

v. Mitchell, No. 03-20-00585-CV, 2021 WL 5855652, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 10, 2021,

no pet.) (concluding documents were not hearsay because their submission constituted a necessary

part of the claim and were thus operative facts); Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 722 n.9

(Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied) (concluding testimony was not hearsay “where the

utterance or writing is an operative fact”). Further, statements by Theresa and Jones are not

hearsay, as they are offered by Foremost against Theresa. TEX. R. EVID. 801(e)(2)(A), (C)

(statement by an opposing party or someone authorized to speak on their behalf is not hearsay

when offered against that party).

       Exhibit 3 is admissible as a public record hearsay exception, as Theresa has not attempted

to demonstrate that the source of the information or other circumstances indicate a lack of

trustworthiness. Id. 803(8). The copy of Theresa’s petition in the wrongful death suit appended to

Exhibit 4 is not hearsay, as it was offered to show only that the parties and the issues in the two

cases are different, not for the truth of any matter asserted. Id. 801. Finally, Chambers’s time and

billing records are admissible as hearsay exceptions because they are records of a regularly

conducted activity supported by an affidavit. Id. 803(6), 902(10).

                                                 16
       We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Foremost’s summary

judgment evidence. Foremost established its right to interplead policy proceeds based on properly

admitted evidence. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 850. We overrule

Theresa’s fourth issue.

       In her fifth issue, Theresa contends she presented sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue

on her “affirmative defenses,” referring to her purported disproval of the three requisite

interpleader elements as “affirmative defenses.” Disproving elements on which the opposing party

has the burden of proof is not the assertion of an affirmative defense but is instead a separate

ground on which the movant may be entitled to summary judgment. E.g., Frost Nat’l Bank v.

Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010). Because we have already addressed Foremost’s

establishment of its right to interpleader, we overrule Theresa’s fifth issue.

       In her eleventh issue, Theresa asserts the trial court erred by granting Foremost’s request

for attorney’s fees. She claims that no statute or contract authorizes attorney’s fees in an

interpleader action and, assuming attorney’s fees are authorized, Foremost has not met the

elements a party must establish when claiming attorney’s fees. Theresa states Foremost did not (1)

properly plead for attorney’s fees, (2) comply with the conditions precedent to recover them, (3)

establish that it incurred attorney’s fees, and (4) establish that the fees were reasonable and

necessary.

       “The Texas rule is that the innocent stakeholder in an interpleader is entitled to attorney’s

fees to be paid out of the interpleaded funds.” Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 850; see also FinServ

Cas. Corp. v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 523 S.W.3d 129, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2016, pet. denied) (“A disinterested stakeholder who has reasonable doubts as to the party entitled

to the funds in its possession and who in good faith interpleads the funds may recover its reasonable

                                                 17
attorney’s fees.” (citing U.S. v. Ray Thomas Gravel Co., 380 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. 1964)). In

determining whether a party was an “innocent, disinterested stakeholder” in an interpleader action,

the Texas Supreme Court has looked to Black’s Law Dictionary’s definitions of each of those

words—”free from legal fault[,]” “not having a pecuniary interest in the matter at hand[,]” and “[a]

disinterested third party who holds money or property, the right to which is disputed between two

or more other parties.” Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 852 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(10th ed. 2014)).

       Foremost presented evidence on the three requirements to recover attorney’s fees in an

interpleader action. It demonstrated it was a stakeholder in that it held the $100,000 settlement

proceeds in which Theresa and Jorge each claimed an interest. Foremost established it was free

from fault because it did not fail to perform its obligations under the Release, nor did it “create[]

its own predicament.” Union Gas Corp. v. Gisler, 129 S.W.3d 145, 153 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi 2003, no pet.); see also Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 851. Foremost presented evidence that

it promptly negotiated settlement of Theresa and Jorge’s wrongful death claims, obtaining an

executed Release approximately four months after the collision resulting in Victoria’s death, and

promptly issued a settlement check under the terms of the Release. See Martinez, 216 S.W.3d at

804. Finally, Foremost proved that it was disinterested, as it had no pecuniary interest in the matter,

seeking only its attorney’s fees and costs. See Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d at 850, 852; FinServ Cas.

Corp., 523 S.W.3d at 141.

       The record establishes that Foremost requested attorney’s fees and presented admissible

evidence substantiating its request, which reflects that the fees incurred were reasonable given

Theresa’s vigorous defense to the interpleader action. Specifically, Foremost’s counsel testified he

expended 60.7 hours working on this case, which when multiplied by his hourly rate, resulted in a

                                                  18
base lodestar figure of $13,354, and he appended a copy of his time and billing records on the case

which detail all performed services. That complies with the lodestar method Texas courts use to

prove the reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s fees.

       [A] claimant seeking an award of attorney’s fees must prove the attorney’s
       reasonable hours worked and reasonable rate by presenting sufficient evidence to
       support the fee award sought. Sufficient evidence includes, at a minimum, evidence
       of (1) particular services performed, (2) who performed those services, (3)
       approximately when the services were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of
       time required to perform the services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each
       person performing such services. (citations omitted)).

Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 501–02 (Tex. 2019).

       We conclude the trial court did not err in granting traditional summary judgment on

Foremost’s entitlement to interpleader and attorney’s fees. We overrule Theresa’s eleventh issue.

               (b)    The trial court did not err in granting Foremost’s combined traditional
                      and no-evidence summary judgment motion on Theresa’s defenses and
                      counterclaims.

       Theresa’s remaining issues assert the trial court erred in granting Foremost’s combined

traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment because she had viable counterclaims;

she should have been permitted to amend her pleadings; Foremost’s affirmative defenses to her

counterclaims were not supported by its pleadings; Foremost’s motion was not timely filed; and

Foremost’s motion was conclusory. We address the last two issues first, as they address only the

no-evidence portions of Foremost’s motion for summary judgment. See Ford Motor Co. v.

Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004).

       In her ninth issue, Theresa argues Foremost’s no-evidence motion was prematurely filed

because she did not have adequate time for discovery, making a no-evidence motion improper

under Rule 166a(i). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

                                                19
       “The pertinent date for determining whether a no-evidence motion is premature is not the

date on which the motion was filed but the final date on which the motion was presented to the

trial court for ruling.” McMillan, 2020 WL 5884291, at *3. “When a party contends that it has not

had an adequate opportunity for discovery before a summary judgment hearing, it must file either

an affidavit explaining the need for further discovery or a verified motion for continuance.”

Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i),

251, 252.

       Foremost filed suit on August 3, 2021, and Theresa filed her answer on August 13, 2021.

The trial court heard Foremost’s motion for summary judgment on January 31, 2022, some five-

and-a-half months after Theresa answered. Theresa did not file a verified motion for continuance

or an affidavit explaining her need for further discovery. As discussed above, the affidavits she

filed in support of her response to Foremost’s motion were struck by the trial court. On this record,

we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering Foremost’s no-evidence

motion for summary judgment. We overrule Theresa’s ninth issue.

       In her tenth issue, Theresa contends the trial court erred in granting Foremost’s no-evidence

motion for summary judgment because the motion is conclusory, as she argues the motion does

not challenge specific elements of her counterclaims or defenses.

       A no-evidence motion for summary judgment “must state the elements as to which there

is no evidence.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). “The motion must be specific in challenging the

evidentiary support for an element of a claim or defense; paragraph (i) does not authorize

conclusory motions or general no-evidence challenges to an opponent’s case.” Id. at Comment—

1997; Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). A no-evidence summary-

judgment motion must provide the opposing party with adequate information to oppose the motion,

                                                 20
akin to the fair-notice pleading requirements. Gish, 286 S.W.3d at 311 (citing Westchester Fire

Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 576 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. 1978)). “Thus, a no-evidence motion that lists each

element of the plaintiff’s claim and then asserts that the plaintiff has no evidence to support ‘one

or more’ or ‘any of’ those elements is insufficient to support summary judgment because this

language does not clearly identify which elements, whether some or all, are challenged.” Cmty.

Health Sys. Prof’l Services Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 695–96 (Tex. 2017).

       The no-evidence portion of Foremost’s combined no-evidence and traditional summary

judgment motion is not conclusory because it addresses the elements of Theresa’s claims or

defenses for which it claims she has no evidence. For example, in moving for no-evidence

summary judgment on Theresa’s mutual-mistake-of-fact defense, Foremost lists the three elements

for that defense, then states that it moves for summary judgment because there is no evidence of

each element. Because the no-evidence portion of Foremost’s motion clearly identifies which

elements of Theresa’s claims or defenses it challenges, it is not conclusory. See id. We overrule

Theresa’s tenth issue.

       In her sixth issue, Theresa maintains the trial court erred in granting Foremost’s motion for

summary judgment because she had viable breach-of-contract and declaratory judgment

counterclaims. Foremost moved for summary judgment on both traditional and no-evidence

grounds, alleging that Theresa had no evidence of some portions of her counterclaims, that it had

conclusively negated certain elements, or both.

       In her breach of contract counterclaim, Theresa asserted that Foremost breached the

Release by (1) neglecting or refusing to perform its contractual obligation to pay her $100,000 as

consideration for the Release; and (2) repudiating the performance of its contractual obligation to

pay her $100,000 as consideration for the Release. Foremost moved for no-evidence summary

                                                  21
judgment on both points and claimed the evidence conclusively established that the consideration

for the Release was $100,000 to be paid to Theresa, Jorge, and all others who claimed by or through

them. Foremost claimed the evidence also conclusively established that it promptly issued and

delivered a check for $100,000 payable to Theresa, Jorge, and Jones’s law firm, as Jones requested,

and that Jones received the check.

           The evidence before the trial court conclusively established the opposite of Theresa’s

breach claims: the Release did not require that Foremost pay $100,000 to Theresa alone, and it did

proffer those funds to Theresa, Jorge, and Jones, as Jones requested. Specifically, the Release

states:

           The Releasing Parties acknowledge[] that this Full & Final Release of Bodily Injury
           Liability Wrongful Death Claim & Compromise Settlement Agreement is
           supported by good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is
           acknowledged by the Releasing Parties. Specifically, the Releasing Parties
           acknowledge[] receipt of good and valuable consideration in the sum of
           $100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Dollars and 00/100) paid to the Releasing
           Parties in hand by Foremost County Mutual Insurance Company.6

Foremost tendered a $100,000 check to Theresa, Jorge, and Jones, and it appended a copy of that

check and its accompanying correspondence to its motion for summary judgment. Although

Theresa cites her own affidavit as supporting her contentions against these points, the trial court

struck that evidence. Thus, Foremost conclusively disproved Theresa’s breach of contract

counterclaim.

           In her declaratory judgment counterclaim, Theresa sought several declarations, including

that the Release is not an enforceable contract but, in the alternative, Foremost breached the

Release and failed to timely pay settlement proceeds as required by the Prompt Payment Act,

Chapter 542, subchapter B, of the Insurance Code. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 542.051–.061.

6
    Capitalization and formatting omitted.

                                                   22
Foremost moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment on her declaratory judgment

claims, asserting, among other things, that the Release is an enforceable contract, Foremost did

not breach the Release, and the Prompt Payment Act does not apply in this case because Theresa

has a third-party—not a first-party—claim against Foremost.

       Theresa was not entitled to declaratory judgment on her first contention: that the Release

is not an enforceable contract. The existence of a valid contract requires an offer, acceptance,

mutual assent, consent to terms, and execution and delivery of the contract with the intent that it

be mutual and binding. USAA Texas Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 501 n.21

(Tex. 2018). “Evidence of mutual assent in written contracts generally consists of signatures of the

parties and delivery with the intent to bind.” Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen, 221 S.W.3d 632, 635

(Tex. 2007). The record contains a copy of the Release, which is signed by Theresa and outlines

the consideration for the settlement of claims as described above. The Release is an enforceable

contract.

       Theresa’s remaining declaratory judgment claim regarding the Release essentially restates

her breach of contract counterclaim: she sought a declaration that Foremost did not perform under

the Release; that Foremost breached the Release; and that Foremost’s breach caused her injury.

But as discussed above, Foremost conclusively established that it tendered the settlement proceeds;

thus, it did not breach the Release. Theresa was not entitled to her requested declaratory judgment

on her rights under the Release.

       Theresa’s desired declarations regarding the Insurance Code all pertain to the alleged

untimely payment of the settlement proceeds under the Prompt Payment Act. The Prompt Payment

Act governs the timeframe within which an insurer must pay certain claims. TEX. INS. CODE ANN.

§ 542.057. The Act applies only to a first-party claim—that is, a claim made by an insured,

                                                23
policyholder, or named beneficiary and paid by the insurer directly to the insured or beneficiary.

Id. § 542.051. “A first-party claim is one in which an insured seeks recovery for the insured’s own

loss.” Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 53 n.2 (Tex. 1997).

         However, the subject of the interpleader is the $100,000 settlement of Theresa and Jorge’s

third-party liability claims against Foremost’s insured (i.e., Ericka). The parties to the Release

agreed that the policy has a $100,000 bodily injury liability coverage limit and the Release did not

include any potential claims for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage or personal injury

protection coverage—meaning any potential first-party claims were expressly omitted from the

settlement. Foremost established that the Prompt Payment Act does not apply here. We overrule

Theresa’s sixth issue.7

         In her seventh issue, Theresa claims Foremost’s no-evidence motion was an improper

attempt to use summary judgment to attack defects in her pleadings. She claims her pleadings

should have first been challenged by special exceptions, and she should have been given the

opportunity to amend them.

         The caselaw Theresa cites in support of her argument is inapposite. See Sixth RMA

Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111 S.W.3d 46, 54–55 (Tex. 2003). Sibley involved the substitution of a

business’s legal name for its assumed name under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28. Id. at 48. In

discussing the attempted name change, the Court noted that the business’s use of supplemental

pleadings to substitute its correct legal name was improper but “was a defect in form,” not

substance. Id. at 54. Thus, the Court opined that “because the pleading defect could have been

cured by amendment, it would have been improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment

7
  In her eighth issue, Theresa claims the trial court erred in granting Foremost’s motion for summary judgment because
its affirmative defenses to her counterclaims were not supported by its pleadings. Because we conclude the trial court
did not err in granting summary judgment against Theresa’s counterclaims, we need not reach this issue.

                                                         24
without first sustaining a special exception and permitting [the business] an opportunity to cure

the defect.” Id. at 54–55.

       Here, Theresa’s pleadings have substantive defects, as discussed above, that are more than

mere “defect[s] in form.” Sibley is accordingly inapplicable to this issue. Further, Theresa has not

proposed any amendment, nor does she allege what defects amendment would cure. Thus, she has

waived any error on this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We overrule Theresa’s seventh issue.

       Having disposed of each of Theresa’s summary judgment issues, we conclude the trial

court did not err in granting Foremost’s summary judgment in its entirety.

                                         CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                              LISA J. SOTO, Justice

January 29, 2024

Before Palafox, and Soto, JJ., and Marion, C.J. (Ret.)
Marion, C.J. (Ret.), sitting by assignment
Palafox, J., dissenting

                                                25