Court Opinion

ID: 9556027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 21:03:42.256032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:55.468518
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/15/23 P. v. Vaughn CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                  D080359

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. SCD287705)

 ANTON LAMAR VAUGHN,

            Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter L. Gallagher, Judge. Affirmed.
          Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                                        I
                               INTRODUCTION
      A jury found Anton Lamar Vaughn guilty of perpetrating multiple sex
crimes against his underage relative, including one count of oral copulation

with a person under 16 years of age (Pen. Code, § 287, subd. (b)(2); count 1),1
one count of oral copulation with a person under 18 years of age (id.,
subd. (b)(1); count 3), one count of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a
14- or 15-year-old child (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); count 2), and one misdemeanor
count of sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); count 4). The trial court
sentenced him to state prison for an aggregate term of 2 years 8 months.
      Vaughn appeals his judgment and argues reversal is required because:
(1) the victim made an incurably prejudicial volunteered statement about
Vaughn’s prior bad acts, which violated a pretrial in limine ruling and
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair; (2) the prosecutor committed
prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments by vouching for the
credibility of the victim and shifting the burden of proof to the defense; and
(3) cumulative errors violated his due process right to a fair trial. We affirm.
                                        II
                                BACKGROUND
    A. Prosecution Case
      When the following events occurred, victim Jane Doe was 15 and 16
years old. She lived in an apartment with her mother and siblings. Her
grandmother, Anna J., lived in a nearby house. Anna lived with her son,
Nicholas J., and her nephew, Vaughn. Vaughn is 12 years older than Doe
and he is first cousins with Doe’s mother, which makes Vaughn and Doe first
cousins once removed.

1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                        2
      During this timeframe, Doe sometimes went to Anna’s house to do
laundry. When Doe went to Anna’s house, she started her laundry upstairs
and either visited with Anna upstairs or worked on her homework in the
kitchen downstairs. Vaughn often watched television on the downstairs
couch while Doe was there.
      Initially, Vaughn and Doe engaged in small talk when she came to
Anna’s house. As time passed, she told him about school, friends, and other
events in her life. Sometimes, she told him about her acquaintances who
drank alcohol, did drugs, and had sex. At one point, Vaughn asked Doe
whether she had done anything sexual in nature and she said she had not,
apart from kissing.
      The conversations between Vaughn and Doe became more sexually
explicit and Vaughn hinted he wanted to “teach” her. During one
conversation, Vaughn learned Doe’s astrological sign was Virgo, and he told
her Virgos were “freaks when it comes to sexual activities.” Doe grew
uncomfortable with the sexual conversations and felt “at a loss for words.”
Doe and Vaughn discussed her sexual activities somewhere between three
and five times.
      Vaughn and Doe also exchanged social media messages with each
other, which Doe described as sexual in nature. One of their conversations
read as follows:
      • Vaughn: “Next time i see u ... we gone work in experience and
        dont act slow [emojis] ... yea or nah.”

      • Doe: “We’ll see kid.”

      • Vaughn: “Got all the opportunity ... and youll love it...i can
        guarantee. Too bad its gone be like a whole year til then.”

      • Doe: “Well idk about loving it [shrugging emoji].”

                                       3
      • Vaughn: “I think so ... i wanted to show u today ... but u was
        actin slow.”

      • Doe: “You could’ve just explained it.”

      • Vaughn: “Nope ... very simple. If u let me ill show u next time
        you come.”

      Doe testified about two sexual incidents involving Vaughn and
herself—one when she was 15 years old and one when she was 16 years old.
      During the first incident, Doe went to Anna’s house, started a load of
laundry, and set up in the kitchen to do her homework. Vaughn, who was on
the couch, engaged Doe in a conversation that turned sexual. At one point,
Doe started walking upstairs to speak to Anna or move her clothes into the
dryer, and Vaughn slapped her on her buttocks. She felt “violated” and
“shocked,” and she walked backwards up the stairs so her backside was no
longer facing him. After Doe returned downstairs, she sat on the couch.
Vaughn pulled down her shorts and underwear, separated her legs with his
hands, placed one of his hands on her bare breast, and stuck his tongue
inside her vagina for more than a minute. Doe tried to close her thighs and
told him multiple times to stop, but he did not stop. Eventually, they heard
someone open a door upstairs, which prompted Vaughn to stop and Doe to
pull up her clothing. Nicholas walked downstairs shortly after, but Doe did
not tell him what happened.
      The second incident occurred a few weeks later, after Doe turned
16 years old. It was “very similar” to the first incident. Doe went to Anna’s
house, started a load of laundry, and sat on the downstairs couch, where
Vaughn was seated. Doe took off her own shorts and underwear this time
because she felt “more uncomfortable with him doing it than [her] doing it,”
and she thought it would take longer if he undressed her. Vaughn took off
his shoes and hat, placed his hand on her breast over her bra, moved her
                                       4
thighs apart, and put his tongue inside her vagina for more than a minute.
According to Doe, Vaughn pulled out his erect penis as well. Doe prayed,
clenched her hands into fists, and raised her hands above her head during
the encounter. Like the first incident, the second incident ended when
Vaughn and Doe heard footsteps and a door open upstairs, followed by
Nicholas coming downstairs. Again, Doe did not tell him what happened.
      After one of the incidents, Vaughn sent Doe private messages on social
media. His messages read, “I wanted a 2nd turn. [Emoji.] Especially when
big draws came down.” Doe testified the statement, “I wanted a second turn,”
meant Vaughn wanted “to perform oral sex again.” She testified the term,
“big draws,” referred to Nicholas because he was a “big man.”
      Doe blamed herself for the sexual incidents with Vaughn because she
did not scream, yell, or act to prevent them. The incidents affected her
emotionally and mentally. Shortly after the second encounter, she tried to
kill herself by swallowing pain relief pills and pain relief liquid. However,
her mother intervened and Doe drank water, vomited, and slept it off. Doe
also had nightmares about intruders, missed school, fell behind in her
classes, lost her determination, and generally became numb. Both her
mother and Anna noticed she was not acting like herself and she did not
want to go to school or socialize with her friends.
      A few months after the second incident, Doe disclosed the incidents to
her best friends and they convinced her to tell her mother. She disclosed the
incidents to her mother and, later on, to other family members. When Anna
learned of the incidents, she confronted Vaughn. He denied the accusations,
but Anna believed Doe. Anna told Vaughn to leave her house and he moved
out a few days later.

                                        5
      During the cross-examination of Doe, defense counsel asked Doe about
her preliminary hearing testimony in an attempt to establish inconsistencies
with her trial testimony. Defense counsel asked Doe whether she had
testified at the preliminary hearing that Vaughn exposed his penis during
their sexual encounters. Doe admitted she did not testify about this fact at
the preliminary hearing, but stated she was “really nervous” at the
preliminary hearing and Vaughn’s exposure “slipped [her] mind.”
      In a further attempt to establish inconsistencies in Doe’s version of
events, defense counsel questioned Doe about her reporting of the incidents to
the officer and the detective who investigated the incidents. The officer and
the detective both prepared incident reports, but neither of them indicated
that Doe had reported Vaughn’s exposure of his penis. When questioned
about the reports, Doe testified that she had described Vaughn’s exposure to
law enforcement, but the written reports were “paraphrased” versions of her
accounts and they were missing details she shared with law enforcement. On
redirect, Doe again testified that the detective’s report and the officer’s report
were paraphrased summaries of her conversations with law enforcement.
   B. Defense Case
      When Doe came over to Anna’s house to do laundry, Nicholas did not
notice any red flags concerning Doe and Vaughn. Nicholas never saw Doe or
Vaughn adjusting their clothing, whispering, shushing each other, or doing
anything out of the ordinary.
      Vaughn testified in his own defense. He saw Doe at Anna’s house nine
or ten times. When she came over, they talked about her friends, school,
dance routine, and boyfriends. Vaughn denied asking Doe to participate in
sexual acts with him, experimenting with things like oral copulation,
suggesting he would participate in sexual acts with her, or engaging in the

                                        6
misconduct alleged against him. When questioned about his social media
conversation with Doe, Vaughn testified the messages referred to dance
routines he and Doe performed for each other—not sexual acts.
   C. Rebuttal
      The prosecution called Doe as a rebuttal witness. She denied she ever
danced with Vaughn, danced for him, or offered to show him dance moves,
and she denied he ever showed her dance moves.
                                        III
                                  DISCUSSION
   A. Character Evidence
      Vaughn argues we must reverse the judgment of conviction because
Doe testified on direct examination that one of her family members had
previously “accused [Vaughn] of doing something.” Thereafter, the
prosecutor asked Doe a series of questions about whether one of her family
members had ever accused “someone else” of sexual misconduct, whether her
family believed the accuser, and how the family’s response to the accusation
impacted Doe’s decision to disclose her own sexual abuse. According to
Vaughn, this exchange improperly conveyed to the jury that another family
member previously accused him of sexual abuse. He claims the testimony
violated a pretrial in limine ruling prohibiting the admission of his prior bad
acts and violated his due process right to a fair trial.
      We agree Doe’s testimony about the family member’s accusation
against Vaughn potentially violated the trial court’s pretrial in limine ruling,
but the trial court immediately struck the offending testimony and dispelled
any possible prejudice resulting from the testimony. Further, Doe
subsequently testified that the sexual misconduct accusation referenced
during her testimony concerned a different family member—not Vaughn.

                                         7
Because the trial court struck Doe’s testimony about the family member’s
accusation against Vaughn, and the remainder of her testimony concerned a
different family member altogether, any purported violation of the in limine
ruling was harmless, and it did not deprive Vaughn of a fair trial.
      1. Additional Background
      During the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor asked Doe why she did
not disclose her first sexual encounter with Vaughn immediately after it
occurred. She replied, “I was afraid that if I had told someone, they wouldn’t
believe me being that he’s part of the family. And there’s something else that
didn’t involve me, but where someone accused him of something, and they
didn’t believe the person. So I was afraid they wouldn’t believe me, and it
would just make it worse.”
      Thereafter, Vaughn moved in limine to exclude evidence of his prior
“bad acts.” Citing Doe’s testimony from the preliminary hearing, the motion
argued: “The defense has reason to believe that the prosecution may attempt
to elicit testimony in this trial from [Doe] and [Doe’s mother] about an alleged
sex related incident that occurred between Mr. Vaughn and another person
possibly a relative ....” It continued: “Upon further investigation, it appears
another family member, ‘Sherrell,’ made vague and unfounded allegations
about Mr. Vaughn—those allegations were not taken seriously by the family,
and were never investigated nor reported to law enforcement.” The motion
requested that the court exclude any evidence of Vaughn’s alleged prior “bad
acts,” which the motion argued was irrelevant evidence, inadmissible
character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), and
evidence subject to exclusion under Evidence Code section 352. The court
granted the motion, without specifying the legal basis for its ruling, and
stated, “We don’t have [prior bad acts] for Mr. Vaughn; so that is granted.”

                                       8
      At trial, the prosecutor questioned Doe on direct examination why she
did not disclose her first sexual encounter with Vaughn and she replied, in
part, “I still felt very embarrassed. I also—I know of a family member that
had also accused [Vaughn] of doing something.” Defense counsel interposed
an objection and stated, “[i]n limine motions,” after which the trial court
asked the People to rephrase the question. But, before the prosecutor could
pose another question to Doe, defense counsel moved to strike Doe’s response
and the court ordered the answer stricken.
      The prosecutor then questioned Doe whether she was aware that
“someone in [her] family had accused someone else of some kind of sexual
misconduct[.]” Doe responded, “[y]es,” and identified her aunt Shirell as the
accuser. The prosecutor asked whether the family believed Shirell and Doe
replied, “No, they didn’t.” According to Doe, this “made [her] want to keep
[her own abuse] to [herself] more. [She] didn’t want to say something and
then them not believe [her] and then [she would] have to go to family events
where [Vaughn would be] there.”
      The trial court called a recess after this exchange. During the recess,
outside the presence of the jury and the witnesses, defense counsel argued
Doe’s testimony was “improper propensity evidence.” The court stated
Shirell’s accusation was against a different family member, “not directed
towards” Vaughn. Defense counsel responded that Doe—in her now-stricken
testimony—said an “allegation [was] made against Mr. Vaughn.” (Italics
added.) The court proposed striking all of the testimony concerning Shirell,
but defense counsel stated that Shirell had indeed made an “allegation
against a separate family member,” and she wanted to question the witnesses
about that accusation. The court instructed the prosecutor to speak with Doe

                                       9
and ask her follow-up questions clarifying that Shirell’s sexual misconduct
accusations were made against a different family member—not Vaughn.
      When Doe’s direct examination resumed, the prosecutor asked Doe
whether Shirell’s sexual misconduct accusations were against a “different
family member, not Mr. Vaughn,” and she replied, “Yes.” The prosecutor
then asked whether the accusations against the “different family member”
were the ones her family did not believe, and Doe replied, “Yes.”
      Defense counsel revisited the issue of Shirell’s sexual misconduct
accusations later in the case during the cross-examination of Doe’s mother.
Defense counsel asked Doe’s mother about Shirell’s sexual misconduct
accusation and she testified that Shirell made the sexual misconduct
accusation against a family member named Bruce.
      2. Analysis
      Vaughn moved in limine to exclude evidence of his prior bad acts
because it was irrelevant evidence, inadmissible character evidence, and
evidence subject to exclusion under Evidence Code section 352. As noted, the
court granted the motion without identifying the legal basis for its ruling.
But the parties assume in their appellate briefs that the court granted the
motion on grounds that evidence of Vaughn’s prior bad acts constituted
inadmissible character evidence. In general, “evidence of a person’s character
or a trait of his or her character ... is inadmissible when offered to prove his
or her conduct on a specified occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)
      Insofar as Doe testified that she knew “of a family member that had
also accused [Vaughn] of doing something,” a violation of the pretrial in
limine ruling arguably occurred. Doe’s testimony potentially suggested that
Vaughn engaged in a “bad act” prior to the sexual misconduct at issue, albeit
a nonspecific and unexplained act, or at minimum a family member accused

                                        10
him of such conduct. However, assuming for purposes of this appeal that
Doe’s testimony constituted improper character evidence, the error did not
prejudice Vaughn because it is not reasonably probable he would have
obtained a more favorable outcome but-for the error. (See People v. Samuels
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 113 [applying Watson prejudice standard to erroneous
admission of character evidence]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
      Doe’s testimony that a family member accused Vaughn of “doing
something” was fleeting and vague. Immediately after she made the
statement, defense counsel objected and the court ordered the testimony
stricken. Later, the court instructed the jury, “If I order[ed] testimony
stricken from the record, you must disregard it and must not consider that
testimony for any purpose.” “ ‘We presume that a jury follows the court’s
admonishments.’ ” (People v. Phillips (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 643, 692; see
People v. Franklin (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 955 [the “California Supreme
Court has consistently found vague and fleeting references to a defendant’s
past criminality to be curable by appropriate admonition to the jury”].)
      Further, the People’s subsequent questions to Doe did not prejudice
Vaughn. As noted, the court struck Doe’s testimony that a family member
accused Vaughn of “doing something,” and the People then asked Doe
whether “someone in [her] family had accused someone else” of sexual
misconduct and whether the family believed the accuser. Standing in
isolation, Doe’s statement that a family member accused “someone else” of
sexual misconduct did not implicate Vaughn. But, to the extent the jury
potentially might have inferred the family member levelled a sexual
misconduct accusation against Vaughn, Doe dispelled any such notion in her
subsequent testimony. After the exchange just discussed, the prosecutor
asked Doe whether the family member’s sexual misconduct accusation was

                                       11
“against a different family member, not Mr. Vaughn,” and Doe said, “Yes.” In
short, Doe’s testimony that a family member accused someone other than
Vaughn of sexual misconduct did not prejudice Vaughn.
      In addition to arguing Doe’s testimony violated the in limine ruling,
Vaughn argues the testimony deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.
Vaughn suffered no prejudice from Doe’s testimony because the court struck
her cursory and generic statement that a family member “accused [him] of
doing something,” and admonished the jury to disregard the stricken
statement. Further, Doe’s testimony about a prior sexual misconduct
accusation involved a “different family member, not Mr. Vaughn ....” Doe’s
mere statement that a family member “accused [Vaughn] of doing
something”—a statement stricken from the record—did not deprive Vaughn
of a fundamentally fair trial. (See People v. Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 176
[witness’ testimony about defendant’s character did “not render the trial
fundamentally unfair or cause prejudice,” where testimony was brief and the
court ordered it stricken]; see also People v. Holmes, McClain & Newborn
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 789 [an “impropriety does not violate due process when
... an objection [is] sustained and followed by a curative instruction”].)
   B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
      Next, Vaughn claims the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
misconduct during closing arguments when he argued to the jury that the
defense had failed to call logical witnesses—specifically, the officers who
investigated Doe’s sexual misconduct claims—to show that Doe’s trial
testimony was inconsistent with the accounting of events she gave to the
officers. He argues the prosecutor’s comments impermissibly “vouched” for
Doe’s credibility and shifted the burden of proof to the defense. We disagree.

                                        12
The prosecutor’s statements were proper comments on the state of the

evidence, and they did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.2
      1. Additional Background
      During closing arguments, defense counsel commented on certain
alleged inconsistencies between Doe’s trial testimony, on the one hand, and
her preliminary hearing testimony and statements to law enforcement, on
the other hand, in an effort to undercut her credibility. As defense counsel
explained, Doe testified at trial that Vaughn exposed his penis to her, but she
did not testify about this fact during the preliminary hearing and,
furthermore, the officer report and the detective report of the incidents do not
reflect that Doe reported this fact to law enforcement.
      On redirect, the prosecutor accurately summarized Doe’s trial
testimony that the officer’s report and the detective’s report documenting the
incidents were paraphrased statements of the discussions she had with law
enforcement. Then, the prosecutor stated, “That’s the evidence. That’s the
status of the evidence. What is in those reports—the Defense can call—they
can call the officer ....” Defense counsel objected and stated, “Improper
argument.” The court instructed the prosecutor to “[r]ephrase.”
      The prosecutor continued: “The Defense—there’s an idea called failure
to call logical witnesses. Okay. So failure to call logical witnesses is—if
there’s some important part of your case and you don’t call that witness,
that’s something ....” Defense counsel stated, “Same objection.” The court
sustained the objection, ordered the prosecutor to move on, and stated, “The
foundation for failure to call logical witnesses has not been laid. Move on.”

2     The People argue Vaughn forfeited his prosecutorial misconduct
argument by failing to ask the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard
the prosecutor’s statements. We address the prosecutorial misconduct
argument on the merits to forestall an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
                                       13
      2. Analysis
      “Under state law, ‘ “[a] prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible
methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct ....” ’ [Citation.]
Prosecutorial misconduct violates the federal Constitution when it results in
a fundamentally unfair trial. [Citation.] When a claim of misconduct is
based on remarks to the jury, we consider whether there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an improper fashion.” (People v.
Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 350 (Steskal).) “We consider the remarks in
the context of the argument as a whole and ‘ “ ‘do not lightly infer’ that the
jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from
the prosecutor’s statements.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 353.)
      As noted, Vaughn argues the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
misconduct by commenting on the defense’s failure to call the investigating
officers as logical witnesses to establish inconsistencies between Doe’s trial
testimony and her prior accounts of the sexual misconduct incidents—before
the court sustained defense objections to his comments. According to
Vaughn, these partial comments improperly vouched for Doe’s credibility and
shifted the burden of proof to the defense. This argument does not warrant
reversal.
      The defense attempted to undercut Doe’s credibility as a witness by
convincing the jury she never disclosed to law enforcement officers the fact
that Vaughn pulled out his erect penis during the second sexual encounter.
The officer and the detective who interviewed Doe are two logical witnesses
one would expect to corroborate the defense’s story that Doe never reported
this important fact to law enforcement. The prosecutor’s commentary on the
defense’s failure to call these logical witnesses to support its version of events
was not impermissible witness vouching; it was an acceptable comment on

                                        14
the state of the evidence. (See People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 448
[“ ‘it is neither unusual nor improper to comment on the failure to call logical
witnesses’ ”]; People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 407 [“Comment on the
failure to call logical witnesses is legitimate.”]; People v. Wilson (2005) 36
Cal.4th 309, 338 [“ ‘[P]rosecutorial comment upon a defendant’s failure “to
introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses” is not improper.’ ”].)
      “Our cases also recognize that ‘[a] distinction clearly exists between the
permissible comment that a defendant has not produced any evidence, and ...
an improper statement that a defendant has a duty or burden to produce
evidence, or a duty or burden to prove his or her innocence.’ ” (Steskal, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 352.) The prosecutor’s comments in this case fall into the
former category. The prosecutor began to comment that the defense could
have called the officers as witnesses (“the Defense can call—they can call the
officer”). But he never stated, or implied, that the defense had a duty to
produce evidence, nor that it bore the burden of proof. Thus, it is not
reasonably likely the jury interpreted the prosecutor’s comment in an
improper manner. (See People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1305 [“There
is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have understood the prosecutor’s
remarks [about logical witnesses] to suggest that defendant had the burden
to establish his own whereabouts that evening.”]; People v. Ratliff (1986) 41
Cal.3d 675, 690–691 [prosecutor’s remark that defense failed to present alibi
testimony did not “suggest[] that defendant had a burden of proof which he
failed to carry”]; People v. Alaniz (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1, 7 [“in general, a
jury’s consideration of the defense’s failure to call logical witnesses is proper
and does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof”]; People v. Jasso (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369–1371 [prosecutor did not impermissibly shift
burden of proof by stating there was no evidence shooting was an accident].)

                                        15
      Even if the prosecutor’s observation could be considered misconduct, it
was harmless under any prejudice standard. While the prosecutor was mid-
sentence commenting on the defense’s failure to call the officers, the court
sustained a defense objection and instructed the prosecutor to “[m]ove on,”
which he did. Thus, the objection operated exactly as it was intended to
operate. The court also instructed the jury that lawyers’ remarks were not
evidence and it admonished the jury not to assume lawyers’ observations
were true. Further, it instructed the jury that the prosecution bore the
burden of proving Vaughn’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a sentiment
echoed by the prosecutor himself during closing arguments.
      In light of the order sustaining the defense objection to the prosecutor’s
comments, the court’s instructions to the jury, and the prosecutor’s own
statements that the People bore the burden of proving Vaughn’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, Vaughn suffered no prejudice from the prosecutor’s brief
and interrupted comment about logical witnesses. (See Steskal, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 353 [alleged prosecutorial misconduct based on prosecutor’s
comment to the jury about failure to call logical witnesses was harmless
because “the comment was brief, ‘defendant’s objection was immediately
sustained ... and the prosecutor did not return to the subject’ ”]; People v.
Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1275 [court cured any harm from
prosecutor’s allegedly improper comment on defense’s failure to call logical
witnesses by sustaining objection to comment and admonishing jury]; People
v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 210 [prosecutor’s speculation about what
logical witnesses would have said if they had testified was harmless because
the defense successfully made an “objection[,] [which] operated precisely as it
was supposed to, and the jury never heard the comment”].)

                                       16
   C. Cumulative Error
      Finally, Vaughn contends the alleged errors discussed above
cumulatively deprived him of his due process right to a fundamentally fair
trial. As discussed, Vaughn has shown, at most, a single fleeting violation of
an in limine ruling—a violation the court immediately remedied by striking
the offending testimony. This innocuous error did not deprive Vaughn of a
fair trial. (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 422 [no cumulative error
where defendant established one harmless error].)
                                      IV
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                           McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                                      17