Court Opinion

ID: 197403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2011-02-07 03:29:14+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:36.414251
License: Public Domain

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                        

No. 96-2113 

                      JOSEPH T. MUIGAI,
                 D/B/A C.M.S. CONSTRUCTION,

                    Plaintiff, Appellant,

                             v.

                 CITY OF PITTSFIELD, ET AL.,

                   Defendants, Appellees.

                                        

        APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]

                                        

                           Before

                   Torruella, Chief Judge,
               Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                 and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

                                        

Joseph T. Muigai on brief pro se.
Kathleen Alexander, City Solicitor, on brief for appellees.

                                        

                        June 5, 1997
                                        

     Per 
                    Curiam. 
                             
                             Appellant Joseph Muigai appeals the district

court  judgment dismissing  his  civil rights  complaint  and

denying 
                   his 
                       request 
                              for 
                                  injunctive relief.  Essentially for the

reasons given  by the district  court in  its memorandum  and

order, 
                  dated 
                        July 17, 1996, we find Muigai's claim for damages

and injunctive relief against the City of Pittsfield and  its

employees  in  their  official  capacity  barred  under   the

principles of res judicata.  Muigai's previous suit in  state

court against the City  of Pittsfield arose "out of the  same

nucleus of operative  facts as his present suit and  [sought]

redress 
                   for 
                       essentially the same basic wrong.  [Thus,] the two

suits [advanced] the same cause of action notwithstanding any

difference 
                      in 
                        remedies 
                                 sought or theories of recovery pleaded."

Kale
                
                v. 
                   Combi
                        ned Ins. Co. of America, 924 F.2d 1161, 1166 (1st

Cir.),  cert. denied,  502 U.S.  816 (1991).   Moreover,  the

employees, insofar as they were sued in an official capacity,

were 
                in 
                   privity with Pittsfield and thus also protected by the

principles 
                      of 
                        res
                            
                            judicat
                                   a.  See Seabrook v. New Hampshire, 738

F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 1984).  

     However, we question whether the bar applies as well  to

his 
               claims 
                      against the employees in their individual capacity.

Precedent suggests otherwise.  Roy v. Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517,

1522 
                (1st 
                     Cir. 1983) (prior suit against defendant in official

capacity does not  bar later suit  against same defendant  in

individual capacity); Gray  v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 404  (7th

                             -2-

Cir. 
                1989) 
                      (same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990); Headley

v. 
              Bacon
                   , 
                     828 F.2d 1272, 1279 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); see also

Frost v.  Thompson, 219 Mass. 360,  368, 106 N.E. 1009,  1011

(1914) 
                  (res
                       
                       j
                        udicata applies only if action is brought against

defendant  in same capacity  as in earlier  action).  In  any

event, the  district  court should  have dismissed  the  suit

against 
                   the 
                       employees in their individual capacity for lack of

personal  jurisdiction.  The  record  makes  clear  that  the

employees were never  properly served as required by Fed.  R.

Civ. 
                P. 
                   4. 
                       
                       Furthermore, since the defense of lack of personal

jurisdiction 
                        was 
                           raised 
                                  in defendants' first responsive motion,

it was not waived.  Absent proper service or waiver  thereof,

the district  court lacked  the authority  to adjudicate  the

claim.  General Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole  Inc.,

899 
               F.2d 
                    109, 114 (1st Cir. 1990).  This was true even though,

in  the  instant case,  the  judgment  was in  favor  of  the

defendants.  See Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. Global

Moving  & Storage, Inc.,  533 F.2d 320,  323 (6th Cir.  1976)

("[T]he trial court  erred in entering  judgment in favor  of

[defendants]  before determining  that it  had the  requisite

personal jurisdiction.").

     The 
                    district 
                             court judgment is affirmed as to the City of

Pittsfield 
                      and 
                         the 
                             employees in their official capacity.  It is

vacated as to the employees in their individual capacity  and

the 
               case 
                    is 
                       remanded
                               
                               to 
                                  the district court with instructions to

                             -3-

enter 
                 an 
                    order dismissing the complaint against these for lack

of personal jurisdiction.

                             -4-