Court Opinion

ID: 9604437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:21:52.251366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:41.941984
License: Public Domain

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318(g), as amended in 1999, requires the trial court to enter written findings. Therefore, I would reverse and remand the case with instructions to do so. By Act 1192 of 1999, the General Assembly substantially changed the juvenile code and statutes governing juvenile jurisdiction and proceedings. Act 1192 contained no emergency clause and became effective on July 30, 1999. One statute affected by the 1999 changes is Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318, which governs the procedure for transferring cases between circuit and juvenile courts. Subsection (g) mandates that when a court makes a decision to retain or transfer a case, the court shall make written findings and consider ten enumerated factors.1 If the court finds that clear and convincing evidence supports trying a juvenile as an adult, it must enter an order to that effect. In an analogous situation, Rule 33.1, which governs motions for directed verdict and motions for dismissal was amended, effective immediately, in 1999. This court held in Trammell v. State, 70 Ark. App. 210, 214, 16 S.W.3d 564, 567 (2000) that even though the incident leading to the proceeding occurred before the effective date of the amendment, the fact that the amendment did not criminalize conduct that was previously noncriminal, increase the severity or harshness of the offense, or deprive the juvenile of an available defense, mandated that the trial court follow the rule in effect at the time of the proceeding. In Trammell, the defense failed to renew its motion for directed verdict at the close of a bench trial as required by the amended version of Rule 33.1, which had been in effect less than thirty days before the proceeding took place. Although the majority disagrees, I am firmly convinced that we should follow our decision and rationale in Trammel. Section 9-27-318, as amended, was in effect at the time of the proceeding, even though the incident giving rise to the proceeding took place prior to the act becoming effective. Also, section 9-27-318 is entirely procedural in nature. The fact that the amendment does not criminalize conduct that was previously legal, does not increase the severity or harshness of punishment for the offense, and does not deprive a juvenile of a previously available defense mandates that the trial court follow the rule in effect at the time of the proceeding. In the instant case, appellant was charged with committing the offenses of rape, residential burglary and terroristic threatening on June 3, 1999, less than sixty days before the amended version of section 9-27-318 took effect. However, the transfer hearing took place on August 23, 1999, after the amended version of section 9-27-318 became effective. Thus, section 9-27-318, as amended in 1999, applies to the instant case. The majority correctly observes that although Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-310 (b)(5) (Repl. 1997) requires a trial court to prepare and furnish a written statement of the evidence relied upon to the defendant, our court has affirmed probation revocations when the appellant failed to show prejudice as a result of the trial court’s failure to provide a written statement. See Phillips v. State, 25 Ark. App. 102, 752 S.W.2d 301 (1988). We observed in Phillips that one of the reasons for the written statement was to allow a defendant to know the precise basis for the trial court’s decision in order for the defendant to assert an intelligent appeal. See id., 752 S.W.2d 301. Probation revocations are materially different from deciding to transfer from circuit court to juvenile court. Probation revocations put into execution a sentence for which a person’s guilt has already been determined. That person, by definition, has been tried and convicted as an adult. But Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318(g), which mandates a trial court to make written findings when deciding whether to retain or transfer jurisdiction, addresses the more fundamental question of where the charges will be adjudicated and whether the accused will be tried as a juvenile or as an adult. The accused in this situation cannot possibly know why the court decided as it did absent written findings mandated by the statute. That is a far cry from a probation revocation where the conduct upon which the revocation is based will often have an underlying criminal charge for which the accused may have been convicted. And even where that is not the case, probation revocation proceedings are themselves a trial on the merits of the allegations of the probation revocation petition. This is not true in transfer decisions. At the close of the hearing in the instant matter, the trial judge announced he would issue a ruling on the motion to transfer. The ruling was issued in the form of a written order, which is the subject of this appeal. As the present case indicates, a trial judge deciding a transfer case will often announce that a ruling on the motion will be issued at a later time. Thus, the accused cannot know whether the judge will comply with the statutory requirement for written findings until the court issues the ruling. Once the ruling is issued, the only recourse available to the accused is an appeal. Thus, I disagree with the State that appellant failed to preserve his argument that the trial court failed to comply with section 9-27-318. The order entered by the trial court summarily states “[cjoncurrent jurisdiction (sic) exists because Defendant is at least 16 years of age and the charged (sic) is a felony. This court has considered the seriousness of the offense, that this offense is a repetitive pattern of violence towards persons, the prior battery, mental maturity and character traits.” Because the order does not make specific findings of fact, we can only guess whether the trial court considered the statutory factors.   Section 9-27-318 lists the factors as follows: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of society requires prosecution as an extended juvenile jurisdiction offender or in circuit court; (2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; (3) whether the offense was against a person or property, with greater weight being given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted; (4) the culpability of the juvenile, including the level of planning and participation in the alleged offense; (5) the previous history of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile had been adjudicated a juvenile offender and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons or property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical violence; (6) the sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of the juvenile’s home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living, or desire to be treated like an adult; (7) whether there are facilities or programs available to the court which are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile prior to the expiration of the court’s jurisdiction; (8) whether the juvenile acted alone or was part of a group in the commission of the alleged offense; (9) written reports an other materials relating to the juvenile’s mental, physical, educational and social history; and (10) any other factors deemed relevant by the court. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318 (Supp. 1999).