Court Opinion

ID: 2964987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:33:49.624821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:02.627251
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 97-1396

                       IN RE: MARISOL MARTINEZ-CATALA, ET AL.,

                                     Petitioners.

                                 ____________________

                           ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                          Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges,
                                            ______________

                             and Keeton,* District Judge.
                                          ______________

                                 ____________________

            Carlos Del Valle Cruz for petitioners.
            _____________________
            Arlene De La Matta with  whom Jose R. Gaztambide was on memorandum
            __________________            __________________
        in  support of  opposition to  application  for writ  of mandamus  and
        addendum for respondents Honorable Maria D. Guzman Cardona, et al.

                                 ____________________

                                  November 12, 1997

                                 ____________________

                            
        ____________________

        *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                 BOUDIN, Circuit  Judge.    This  case  comes  to  us  on
                         ______________

            petition for writ of mandamus directing the district judge to

            recuse himself in  this case.  The district  judge denied the

            motion  to recuse  without  an  evidentiary  hearing  or  any

            detailed  submission by the opposing parties.   Thus, the raw

            facts set forth below, and assumed to be true for purposes of

            this  opinion,  are  largely  drawn  from  the  petition  for

            mandamus and related filings by petitioners.  

                                    I.  BACKGROUND

                 After  the 1992 municipal  elections in  Florida, Puerto

            Rico, the candidate for mayor  of Florida affiliated with the

            New  Progressive Party unseated  the incumbent mayor  who was

            affiliated with the  Popular Democratic Party.   According to

            the  complaint later filed by petitioners, who are plaintiffs

            in  the district  court, all  14  of them  were dismissed  or

            demoted in  early January 1993.   Some of the  plaintiffs had

            served  as assistants  to  the  mayor  and  others  had  been

            employees of Florida's elder community center.  

                 The suit was  brought as a civil rights  action under 42

            U.S.C.   1983.  Plaintiffs charged that their firing violated

            their constitutional free speech rights under Elrod v. Burns,
                                                          _____    _____

            427 U.S. 347  (1976), Branti v. Finkel, 445  U.S. 507 (1980),
                                  ______    ______

            and Rutan  v. Republican  Party, 497 U.S.  62 (1990).   These
                _____     _________________

            cases  limit,  although  they do  not  wholly  eliminate, the

            ability   of  a  new  administration  to  dismiss  or  demote

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            employees  of  the  old administration  on  account  of party

            affiliation.  Plaintiffs sought damages and reinstatement.

                 In  November 1995,  a motion  for  summary judgment  was

            filed on  behalf of defendants,  who included the  new mayor,

            the municipality  and others.   The  summary judgment  motion

            urged  that the  former mayoral  assistants  had confidential

            positions  that excepted  them from  the  limit on  political

            firings and also asserted that in other cases, the assistants

            had been hired  illegally.  Defendants  said that the  former

            workers at the elder community center had been discharged due

            to lack of funds.

                 On June  13, 1996, in  an effort to reach  a settlement,

            the district  judge met  in chambers  with counsel  from both

            sides, with the  defendant mayor, and with  Florida's interim

            director  of human  resources.   Then  the judge,  apparently

            without   objection,   met   separately  with   both   sides.

            Plaintiffs'  counsel  was  Carlos  Del  Valle  Cruz;  defense

            counsel  included Jose Gaztambide,  who at some  earlier time

            had served as a law clerk to the district judge.  

                 Following  their  separate  meetings  with  the   judge,

            counsel for both  sides met privately to  discuss settlement.

            Del  Valle later  filed  an  unsworn  statement,  made  under

            penalty of perjury,  describing his  meeting with  Gaztambide

            and  with  Luis  Plaza, another  defense  attorney.   Crucial

            language from the unsworn statement follows:

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                 In  said conference,  they [the  defense attorneys]
                 made a settlement  offer on the  basis on (sic)  of
                 the Court's  prospective ruling on  their [defense]
                 motion  for summary  judgment.   Counsel Gaztambide
                 stated  that the Court would be dismissing the case
                 as to five (5) of the plaintiffs, was yet unsure of
                 his decision as to three (3) of the plaintiffs, and
                 would  deny the motion  for summary judgment  as to
                 the remaining six (6) plaintiffs.

                 Defense  counsel   then  reviewed   an  earlier   letter

            containing  settlement  offers  for   each  plaintiff.    The

            statement continues:   "Next to  the name of  each plaintiff,

            counsel Gaztambide made a downward slant  for all those cases

            which the  Court  would be  dismissing . . . an upward  slant

            next to the names of the cases  the Court was yet unsure of .

            . . and  a circle next to the names of those cases [in which]

            the Court would deny the motion for summary judgment . . . ."

                 Del Valle objected that  defense counsel had information

            about "a prospective dismissal" of certain of the cases.  All

            three  lawyers returned to  the judge  who continued  to urge

            settlement of the case.  When defense counsel Plaza said that

            Del Valle had an ethical obligation  to report the settlement

            offers to his  clients, Del Valle said that  his clients were

            in court "because they believed in the Constitution and their

            right to be made whole."

                 According to  Del Valle's statement, the  district judge

            then  intervened  "to  express  that the  undersigned  should

            `forget the Constitution,' because several of my clients were

            `political  sweet potatoes' that cared more about having some

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                                         -4-

            money  in  their  pockets  than  about  their  Constitutional

            rights."   The  judge then  proposed a  settlement figure  of

            approximately  $200,000 that "counsel  agreed to recommend to

            their clients."  Del Valle did meet with his clients, but the

            upshot  was  a  motion  by  Del  Valle,  accompanied  by  the

            statement just  described, requesting  the district judge  to

            recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C.    144, 455(a) and (b).

                 The motion for recusal was filed on June 17, 1996.  When

            no action  had been taken  on the motion after  eight months,

            plaintiffs, on February 26, 1997, filed a motion requesting a

            ruling.   When  again there  was no  response, plaintiffs  on

            April 19, 1997, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this

            court.  Ten days later, on April 29, 1997, the district court

            issued an opinion and order denying the motion for recusal.  

                 In the  28-page opinion  and order,  the district  court

            concluded that disqualification was not required under either

            section 144 or  section 455.  The district  judge stated that

            he  had, "as  is customary,  discussed  separately with  each

            party's counsel the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the

            case . . . ."   The opinion continued:  "The undersigned  did

            not  tell either party  definitively what his  decision would

            be--he merely gave both parties his preliminary impression of

            the possibilities for success as to each claim."

                 This  decision mooted plaintiffs'  request to us  for an

            order directing the district judge to rule.  But the mandamus

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                                         -5-

            petition  also requested that  this court order  the district

            judge to recuse himself.   Accordingly, on May 23, 1997, this

            court  asked the  parties to  file  memoranda addressing  the

            merits of  the recusal  claims and  the overhanging  question

            whether   review  by  mandamus  was  warranted.    Del  Valle

            complied;  defense  counsel  relied largely  on  the district

            judge's decision.

                 On June  6, 1997, the  district court issued  an opinion

            and partial  judgment disposing  of the  pending motions  for

            summary   judgment  filed  by  the  defendants.    The  court

            dismissed  certain claims  and, as  to  others, scheduled  an

            evidentiary hearing  for later  in June and  a trial  date in

            August 1997.   At the request of plaintiffs,  this court then

            granted a stay of further proceedings in the district court.

                                II.  DISCUSSION       

                 In this case, there is  no final judgment appealable  as

            of right.  Ordinarily,  a district judge's refusal to  recuse

            is  reviewable  only  on  appeal  of a  final  judgment;  the

            collateral order doctrine  does not apply.   Nevertheless, in

            unusual  situations,  interim  review of  such  a  refusal is

            available through writ of mandamus.  See In re Cargill, Inc.,
                                                 ___ ___________________

            66 F.3d 1256, 1260 (1st Cir. 1995),  cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
                                                 ____________

            1545 (1996) (collecting cases).

                 The  usual first requirement  for mandamus in  a recusal

            matter is that the party  seeking the writ show a "clear  and

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                                         -6-

            indisputable"  entitlement to relief.   In re  United States,
                                                    ____________________

            666 F.2d  690, 695  (1st Cir.  1981); see  13A C. Wright,  A.
                                                  ___

            Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure   3553, at
                                ______________________________

            661   (2d  ed.  1984).    Interlocutory  review,  after  all,

            interferes with the  ordinary processes of trial  and appeal;

            and absent interlocutory  review, many issues wash  out along

            the way.  But over  the years, appeals courts have  held that

            given  a clear  error by  the district  judge in  refusing to
                     _____

            recuse,  a stronger argument  exists for immediate  review by

            mandamus.

                 Mandamus is  a discretionary  writ and,  even where  the

            merits clearly favor  the petitioner, relief may  be withheld

            for  lack of  irreparable injury  or  based on  a balance  of

            equities.  These are malleable concepts and often  matters of

            degree.  Some  opinions suggest that  a clear entitlement  to
                                                    _____

            recusal  may  itself  warrant  immediate  relief,  absent  an

            equitable bar, because    public confidence is enhanced where

            a clearly disqualified judge is removed  swiftly.  See, e.g.,
                                                               _________

            In re United States, 666 F.2d at 694.
            ____________ ______

                 In  all events,  in recusal  cases,  mandamus is  almost

            always withheld--we do not  say always--unless the petitioner

            demonstrates that  it is "clearly"  entitled to relief.   See
                                                                      ___

            Cargill, 66 F.3d at 1262.   Here, the plaintiffs have invoked
            _______

            two separate  bases  for disqualification,  sections 144  and

                                         -7-
                                         -7-

            455, whose procedural  incidents differ widely.   We consider

            them separately and in order.  

                 Section  144.   This provision begins  with a  core one-
                 ____________

            sentence paragraph:

                      Whenever  a  party  to  any  proceeding  in  a
                 district  court  makes  and  files   a  timely  and
                 sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
                 matter  is pending has a personal bias or prejudice
                 either  against  him  or in  favor  of  any adverse
                 party, such judge shall proceed no further therein,
                 but  another judge shall  be assigned to  hear such
                 proceeding.

            A second paragraph  sets forth a timeliness  requirement (not

            here in dispute),  provides that the party can  only file one

            such affidavit  in any case,  and  requires a  certificate of

            counsel of record that the affidavit is made in good faith.

                 Section  144 is  unusual because  it  requires that  the

            district  judge accept the  affidavit as true  even though it

            may contain averments that are false  and may be known to  be

            so to the judge.  See United  States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884,
                              ___ ______________    ______

            889 (1st Cir. 1983).   However, penalties for perjury and the

            certificate of counsel tend to discourage outright falsehood.

            And  the possibility remains,  although not developed  in the

            statute,  that the  transferee judge  might  hold a  hearing,

            conclude that the affidavit was false and transfer the action

            back to the original judge.

                 Nevertheless,  courts have  responded  to the  draconian

            procedure--automatic transfer  based  solely  on  one  side's

            affidavit--by  insisting on a  firm showing in  the affidavit

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                                         -8-

            that the judge does have  a personal bias or prejudice toward

            a party, and also by  insisting on strict compliance with the

            procedural  requirements of the  section.1  And,  while there

            are various bases  at law for recusal, the  only one governed

            by  section 144 and subject to  its procedural advantages for

            the recusing party are "personal bias or prejudice."  

                 We start with  procedural issues.  Section  144's second

            paragraph requires the  affidavit of "a party"  setting forth

            "the  facts and  the  reasons  for the  belief  that bias  or

            prejudice exists" and  a separate "certificate of  counsel of

            record  stating  that it  [the  affidavit]  is made  in  good

            faith."  Here, there was neither an affidavit of a party  nor

            a  certificate of counsel--only a single unsworn statement of

            counsel setting  forth facts under  penalty of perjury.   The

            papers are thus doubly defective.

                 Still, an unsworn statement under penalty of perjury has

            the  same effect  as an affidavit.   28  U.S.C.   1746.   The

            missing  certificate   of  counsel  may   also  be  redundant

            (although it still should have been supplied) where, as here,

            the motion and unsworn statement  are both signed by counsel,

            making counsel  subject to the good faith  strictures of Fed.

            R. Civ. P. 11.  One might be more concerned about the lack of

                                
            ____________________

                 1See,  e.g., Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1267 (10th
                  __________  _____    _______
            Cir.  1988);  Walberg v.  Israel,  766 F.2d  1071,  1077 (7th
                          _______     ______
            Cir.), cert. denied,  474 U.S. 1013 (1985);  United States v.
                   ____________                          _____________
            Womack, 454 F.2d 1337, 1341 (5th Cir. 1972). 
            ______

                                         -9-
                                         -9-

            any affidavit or statement from "a party," especially in view

            of the tradition of construing  section 144 strictly in light

            of its drastic consequences.

                 But probably the  drafters of the statute  expected that

            "a  party" would possess the necessary knowledge showing (for

            example)  personal hostility of the judge against that party.

            In  this case, plaintiffs'  counsel was much  closer than his

            clients to being a firsthand witness to the events.  It seems

            to  us  to  satisfy the  underlying  purpose  of the  recusal

            statute to  allow  Del Valle  to  make the  necessary  filing

            rather than to  insist that the plaintiffs  themselves repeat

            the same facts on a hearsay basis.

                 Starting with defense counsel's alleged inside knowledge

            of the judge's intentions, the problem is not one of ex parte
                                                                 ________

            contacts as  such; absent objection, separate  discussions in

            the context of settlement agreements  are common occurrences.

            And,  in pressing each side to  take a reasonable view of its

            situation,  judges   often  give  the   parties  the  court's

            impression of apparent  strengths and weaknesses.   There are

            dangers in  this practice, of  course, but clients  are often

            well served by settlements, and settlements often result from

            realistic appraisals of strengths and weaknesses.

                 Rather,  the claim  of  bias  or  prejudice  here  rests

            primarily on  the  inference, drawn  by plaintiffs'  counsel,

            that the judge told defense counsel more or less definitively
                           ____

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            how the judge planned to rule on the summary judgment motions

            and  on  the  implication  that the  judge  gave  no  similar

            information  to plaintiffs'  counsel.    If  so,  this  would

            obviously   give  one   side   a  substantial   advantage  in

            negotiations.    We   will  assume  arguendo  that   such  an
                                                ________

            indiscretion  could  at  least  arguably  be  grounds  for  a

            reasonable  inference of  bias  or  prejudice toward  someone

            (whether  toward a  party or  counsel  might require  further

            information).

                 Under  section 144, recusal must be based upon the facts

            alleged  in  the  affidavit,  so we  have  to  disregard  the

            district judge's own  later denial that  he revealed how  the

            motions were  to be  decided.   See Kelly,  712 F.2d at  889.
                                            ___ _____

            But, by the same token,  automatic removal of the judge under

            that  section requires  averment of  facts  showing that  the

            judge "has" a personal bias  or prejudice, not that the judge

            might have such a bias or prejudice or that grounds exist for

            further  inquiry.  As  explained below, "mights"  and further

            inquiries can  always be  pursued  under section  455--where,

            however, the affidavit itself can be challenged.

                 The  difficulty with  Del Valle's  unsworn statement  is

            that it  does not show  that the district judge  revealed his
                          ___

            intended disposition of  any of the summary  judgment motions

            to defense  counsel.   The statement does  not even  say that

            defense counsel  made  such a  claim.   Instead, the  remarks

                                         -11-
                                         -11-

            attributed to  defense counsel--the pertinent ones  have been

            quoted in full  above--show only that defense  counsel sought

            to convey  the impression  that he knew  how the  judge would

            rule, while carefully refraining from explaining how he knew.

                 The unsworn statement itself shows that both plaintiffs'

            counsel and defense counsel had come from separate settlement

            conferences where (in common experience) judges often discuss

            the strengths and weaknesses of the claims.  There is nothing

            in the unsworn statement to indicate that defense counsel was

            doing more  than  making an  intelligent prediction,  perhaps

            puffing a bit to enhance  his bargaining position.  This does

            not prove that the judge  revealed to defense counsel how the
                               _____

            judge intended to rule on the pending motions.

                 We turn next to the judge's alleged statement  that some

            of  the plaintiffs  were  "political  sweet  potatoes."    We

            understand this term  to mean political hack,  see Rodriguez-
                                                           ___ __________

            Garcia  v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90,  100 n.10 (1st Cir. 1990), or
            ______     ______

            as the district  judge put  it in  another instance,  "people

            appointed  to more or less useless jobs as political favors,"

            see  Rodriguez-Garcia v. Davila, No. 87-1411, 1988 WL 124046,
            ___  ________________    ______

            *2 (D.P.R.  Nov. 9, 1988).   Under section 144,  the question

            again  is whether  such a  reference shows  personal bias  or

            prejudice.

                 Assuming that the statement does show  a predisposition,

            there  is no  evidence that  the statement  was improper.   A

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                                         -12-

            judge is  ordinarily entitled to  form a view of  the parties

            that is favorable or unfavorable,  so long as it derives from

            information in the case; there may be exceptions but they are

            "rare" indeed.   See Liteky  v. United States, 510  U.S. 540,
                             ___ ______     _____________

            554  (1994).   Here, the  district judge  had before  him the

            summary judgment  filing in  which the defendants  challenged

            the bona fides of various plaintiffs.  There is no indication

            that  the judge  knew  the  individual  plaintiffs  from  any

            context other than the current judicial proceedings.

                Judges   constantly   form   personal   opinions   during

            proceedings.  It may be wiser not  to express such views, and

            almost always prudent to avoid epithets, but disqualification

            is almost never required where the judge's opinions are based

            on  the  proceedings.   Inaccurate  findings  based  on those

            opinions may lead  to reversal on appeal but  not to recusal.

            Whether the words  used by the district judge  suggest a lack

            of impartiality  is  a different  question,  properly  raised

            under the  objective standard  of section  455 and  addressed

            below.

                 There is even less to the claim that the judge  showed a

            personal bias or  prejudice when he said, if he did say, that

            the  plaintiffs should  "forget the  Constitution."   However

            dramatic the phrase may sound  in the abstract, in context it

            was  here used as part  of a perfectly permissible suggestion

            by the district judge, namely,  that counsel ask his  clients

                                         -13-
                                         -13-

            whether  they were more  interested in a  monetary settlement

            than  in an  opportunity to  express principle.   Judges  say

            something of the sort in many settlement conferences.   

                 Section 455.  In its  present version section 455 is the
                 ___________

            more  modern and complete recusal statute  and applies to all

            federal  judges.   There is  no threshold  requirement  of an

            affidavit  or any other  format for raising  a recusal issue.

            In fact,  the judge is  expected to recuse sua  sponte, where
                                                       ___________

            necessary, even  if no party has requested  it.  Nor is there

            anything  to prevent the party seeking recusal from trying to

            engage  in discovery incident  to a recusal  motion, although

            the  allowance  of   such  discovery  is  within   the  sound

            discretion  of the  court.   See, e.g.,  Cheeves v.  Southern
                                         _________   _______     ________

            Clays, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1570, 1580 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
            ___________

                 On the  other hand,  under section 455,  a judge  is not

            compelled  automatically  to accept  as true  the allegations

            made by the party seeking recusal.  To the  extent that facts

            are in dispute, factual determinations are  made by the judge

            whose recusal is in question, and the same judge also decides

            whether the facts trigger disqualification, subject always to

            review  on appeal,  normally for abuse  of discretion.   See,
                                                                     ____

            e.g.,  Town  of  Norfolk  v.  United  States  Army  Corps  of
            ____   _________________      _______________________________

            Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438, 1460 (1st Cir. 1992).
            _________

                 It might seem  odd that recusal issues should be decided

            by  the very judge  whose recusal is in  question.  But there

                                         -14-
                                         -14-

            are  other considerations  at work,  including  a desire  for

            expedition and  a concern to  discourage judge shopping.   In

            addition, one of the grounds for recusal under section 455 is

            the far-reaching direction  that the judge recuse  himself or

            herself "in any proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality

            might reasonably be questioned."   28 U.S.C.   455(a).  Thus,

            taken together, the provisions of section 455  tend to strike

            a reasonable balance.

                 In  our case, the  plaintiffs have invoked  both section

            455(a)  and section  455(b)(1), which  repeats  the bias  and

            prejudice language of section 144.   For present purposes, we

            focus  on the impartiality language of section 455(a) because

            it covers the same ground  and reaches even further.  Section

            455(a) is in  no way limited to "personal"  bias or prejudice

            "concerning a party" and--unlike sections 144 and 455(b)(1)--

            does  not  require  that  bias   or  prejudice  in  fact   be
                                                            ________

            established.  United States  v. Chantel, 902 F.2d 1018,  1023
                          _____________     _______

            (1st Cir. 1990).

                      Rather,  section 455(a)  requires recusal  wherever

            the   objective  circumstances   create   an  appearance   of
                                                          __________

            partiality.  This does not  mean that required recusal can be

            based  on  an  "unsupported, irrational,  or  highly  tenuous

            speculation."  In re United States, 666 F.2d at 694.  It does
                           ___________________

            mean  that where the appearance of partiality exists, recusal

            is  required regardless of  the judge's own  inner conviction

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                                         -15-

            that  he  or she  can  decide  the  case fairly  despite  the

            circumstances.   See  Chantel, 902  F.2d at  1023.   See also
                             ___  _______                        ________

            Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548; Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217,
            ______                   _______    _________

            1220 (1st Cir. 1979).

                 With  this  gloss,  we  revisit  plaintiffs'  first  and

            sharpest  claim, namely, that the  judge told the defense but

            not  the plaintiffs  how he  planned to  rule on  the pending

            summary judgment  motions.   As we  have  said, section  455,

            unlike section  144, is  not limited to  facts alleged  in an

            affidavit.  But Del Valle's statement was itself insufficient

            to show that  the judge made the alleged  disclosure; and the

            only  additional pertinent fact  beyond the statement  is the

            judge's  denial  that  he  did  so, hardly  of  help  to  the
                     ______

            plaintiff.

                 Plaintiffs now attack the judge's statement that he gave

            both sides a preliminary appraisal:   Del Valle now claims in

            his mandamus  memorandum  that in  the settlement  conference

            with  the  judge he  was  told virtually  nothing  even about

            likely outcomes.   But new  assertions of fact by  counsel in

            appellate briefs  come too  late, see  Hurney v.  Carver, 602
                                              ___  ______     ______

            F.2d 993, 996 (1st Cir. 1979); Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d
                                           _________    _______

            1040, 1049 n.12 (7th Cir.  1990), and plaintiffs have made no

            effort  to prove  what  defense counsel  was  told.   Without
                                    _______

            knowing both, any comparison is hopeless.

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                 We  return now, under the standard of section 455(a), to

            the   district  court's  alleged  remark  that  some  of  the

            plaintiffs  were  "political  sweet  potatoes."   As  already

            noted, a  judge is  normally free to  develop views  from the

            record as  the case  proceeds, and there  is no  showing here

            that  the  judge's  assessment came  from  any  other source.

            Further,  the  judge's  supposed  comment--like  his  alleged

            admonition  to  "forget  the  Constitution"--was  in  context

            little  more than  a warning  to  plaintiffs' counsel,  quite

            relevant to the settlement then being urged, that some of his

            clients might do better by compromise than at trial.  

                 Two  other assertions  remain to be  addressed.   In his

            unsworn statement, plaintiffs' counsel  referred to the  fact

            that  one of  the defense  counsel had  once clerked  for the

            judge,  an issue  unrelated to  party bias  or  prejudice but
                                            _____

            perhaps  pertinent to  appearance  of  partiality.    And  on

            appeal, plaintiffs'  counsel  widens his  claims slightly  by

            saying  that  the  district  judge  had  once  been  actively

            connected  with  political  causes  opposed  by  the  Popular

            Democratic Party.  Neither ground  is expressly offered as an

            independent basis for recusal, and for good reason.

                 It is common knowledge in the profession that former law

            clerks  practice regularly before  judges for whom  they once

            clerked.  Courts  often have prophylactic rules that forbid a

            former law clerk from appearing  in that court for a year  or

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            more after the  clerkship, see, e.g., 1st Cir.  R. 46, but no
                                       _________

            such rule is claimed to have been violated in this case.  And

            any lawyer  who studies  a judge's past  rulings can  make an

            informed guess as to  how the judge is likely  to approach an

            issue.

                 So, too, appointees  to the bench  have sometimes had  a

            former  active connection with  a political party.   But many

            judges also  sit, usually  after a  self-imposed cooling  off

            period, on cases involving former clients (assuming always no

            current financial ties and that the judge did not work on the

            same  or  a  related  matter  while  in  practice).    Former
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            affiliations with  a party may  persuade a judge not  to sit;

            but  they are  rarely a  basis for  compelled recusal.   See,
                                                                     ____

            e.g., In re United States, 666 F.2d at  696; Matter of Mason,
            ____  ___________________                    _______________

            916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990).

                 All this being said, the whole is sometimes greater than

            the sum  of the parts.   The cumulative  effect of  a judge's

            individual  actions,  comments  and  past associations  could

            raise  some  question about  impartiality,  even though  none

            (taken alone) would require recusal.  And, while the abuse of

            discretion standard is a forgiving one, perhaps in an extreme

            case the cumulative  effect would warrant reversal  on direct

            appeal if the judge refused to recuse.  

                 But  the primary  condition  of  mandamus  is  that  the

            petitioner be clearly entitled to relief.   Judges may choose

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            to step aside  in close cases; the "duty  to sit" concept has

            been modified by amended section  455.  See Blizard, 601 F.2d
                                                    ___ _______

            at 1220-21; see also 13A  Wright, Miller & Cooper   3549,  at
                        ________

            611.   But mandamus requires  a case not  merely close to the

            line but clearly  over it; and the line  itself is especially

            blurred where no incident is  sufficient and the claim is one

            of cumulative effects.  This case is certainly not so clearly

            over the line as to justify the shortcut of mandamus.

                                   III.  CONCLUSION

                 When  this case returns  to the district  court, section

            144 will  be out  of the picture;  Del Valle's  statement was

            insufficient on  its face  to show bias  or prejudice,  so it

            fails  regardless of mandamus requirements, and only one such

            affidavit  may be  filed  in  an action.    The situation  is

            otherwise under section  455(a); our decision, resting  as it

            does   partly   upon   the   mandamus  standard,   does   not

            automatically prevent the further development of  the record,

            nor an appeal after a final judgment.

                 The possibility left  open may carry some  suggestion of

            reproof.   We therefore  note that as  yet no  showing exists

            that the district  judge gave any  improper advantage in  his

            disclosures to  defense counsel,  which is  the closest  that

            plaintiffs have come  to a specific and serious  charge.  Our

            only  present stricture  is that  a  district judge,  however

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            busy, ought not  let a recusal motion alleging  personal bias

            and prejudice sit dormant for eight months.

                 The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.  The stay
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            of proceedings in  the district court is vacated.   Each side
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            shall bear its own costs.

                 It is so ordered.
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