Court Opinion

ID: 9909467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 16:02:35.359138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:24.915198
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                Before
                    HOLIFIELD, KIRKBY, and DALY
                       Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                      v.

                        Emmanuel NINA
               Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps
                             Appellant

                             No. 202200255

                        _________________________

                        Decided: 13 December 2023

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                             Military Judges:
                       J.P. Norman (arraignment)
                        Andrew L. Braden (trial)
               Yong J. Lee (post-trial Article 39(a) hearing)

 Sentence adjudged 3 August 2022 by a general court-martial convened
 at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, consisting of a mil-
 itary judge sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction
 to E-1, confinement for 12 months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
 and a bad-conduct discharge. 1

 1 Appellant was credited with having served 181 days of pretrial confinement.
                 United States v. Nina, NMCCA No. 202200255
                             Opinion of the Court

                                For Appellant:
                    Captain Brian L. Farrell, USMC Reserve

                                 For Appellee:
                  Lieutenant Colonel James A. Burkart, USMC
                        Major Candace G. White, USMC

                            _________________________

         This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
              may be cited as persuasive authority under
               NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                            _________________________

PER CURIAM:
    Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of
wrongful introduction of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute,
one specification of wrongful distribution of a controlled substance, one speci-
fication of wrongful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to dis-
tribute, and one specification of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance,
in violation of Articles 112a and 81, Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]. 2
   In his sole assignment of error, Appellant asserts supervisory trial counsel
committed unlawful influence by deciding not to submit a substantial assis-
tance letter for a case he did not prosecute and by copying the trial counsel who
did prosecute the case on his emails communicating that decision to civilian
defense counsel. We find no prejudice and affirm.

                                  I. BACKGROUND 3

    Between 1 February and 1 November 2020, Appellant wrongfully intro-
duced lysergic acid diethylamide [LSD] onto Marine Corps Base Camp Pend-
leton over twenty times. Appellant then sold the LSD to civilians and other
Marines.

   2 10 U.S.C. §§ 912a and 881.

   3 The facts below are taken from the Record, including, inter alia, a post-trial 39(a)

UCMJ, hearing at which trial counsel testified. They also reflect the military judge’s
findings of fact in his ruling on Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss or Other Appropriate
Relief (Unlawful Influence). Appellate Ex. XI at 2-6.

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                  United States v. Nina, NMCCA No. 202200255
                              Opinion of the Court

    After base law enforcement identified Appellant as a distributor of LSD,
agents of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS] interviewed him on
13 November 2020. During the interview, Appellant admitted to the wrongful
use, possession, distribution, and introduction of LSD, and identified a number
of Marines to whom he had sold LSD onboard Marine Corps Base Camp Pend-
leton.
    Appellant was interviewed a second time by NCIS agents on 7 January
2021. During that interview, Appellant detailed his process for purchasing il-
legal drugs from his civilian drug dealer and identified a fellow Marine, Lance
Corporal [LCpl] Fiallo, with whom he purchased the drugs. Appellant told in-
vestigators LCpl Fiallo also assisted him in the distribution of LSD.
    Appellant subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the Govern-
ment, agreeing to plead guilty to wrongful introduction of a controlled sub-
stance with the intent to distribute, wrongful distribution of a controlled sub-
stance, wrongful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distrib-
ute, and conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. Among its other pro-
visions, the plea agreement stipulated that Appellant’s sentence would in-
clude, at a minimum, a bad-conduct discharge, confinement between eight and
twelve months, reduction to paygrade E-1, and forfeitures as awarded by the
military judge. The plea agreement made no mention of substantial assistance.
Ultimately, Appellant received a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 12
months, a reduction to E-1, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances.
    After sentencing, civilian defense counsel approached trial counsel inquir-
ing about the possibility of trial counsel submitting a substantial assistance
recommendation letter, pursuant to R.C.M. 1109(e)(2), to the Convening Au-
thority on Appellant’s behalf. Trial counsel responded to the request with a
statement to the effect of, “Sounds good, I’ll route it up.” 4 Civilian defense coun-
sel followed up with trial counsel via email the following day, 4 August 2022,
seeking a “nominal reduction in confinement” in light of the fact Appellant
named several individuals, particularly LCpl Fiallo, and provided information
that was used “to press” them “to be more open in admitting their own miscon-
duct.” 5 Receiving no reply, civilian defense counsel followed up with another
email on 9 August 2022.
   Trial counsel responded the following day, apologizing “for letting this fall
through” and indicating he had taken seriously ill. 6 Civilian defense counsel

   4 R. at 152.

   5 Appellate Ex. VII at 3.

   6 Appellate Ex. VII at 5.

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                United States v. Nina, NMCCA No. 202200255
                            Opinion of the Court

responded, indicating that the submission deadline had not yet passed and
that an extension could be sought if needed. Trial counsel replied, saying he
had “a short submission drafted and ready” and was “pending a response back
from the [senior trial counsel/regional trial counsel] on this.” 7 Trial counsel
added he was waiting “pending approval/denial to submit anything [in accord-
ance with regional trial counsel] policy.” 8 However, when trial counsel sent this
email to civilian defense counsel, no such policy existed regarding R.C.M 1109
letters. 9
    The following week, trial counsel met with his supervisory counsel, Major
[Maj] Alpha, 10 to discuss the Defense’s request for a substantial assistance rec-
ommendation letter and to seek clarification on what level of assistance would
warrant such a letter. After receiving Maj Alpha’s opinion that Appellant’s
statements during his NCIS interviews did not constitute substantial assis-
tance, trial counsel re-reviewed Appellant’s actions and concluded that Appel-
lant’s actions did not justify a letter. Since trial counsel was dealing with other
issues after his week-long illness, Maj Alpha offered to respond to civilian de-
fense counsel regarding the letter request. 11
    On 24 August 2022, Maj Alpha emailed civilian defense counsel stating,
“[t]here is no substantial assistance letter pursuant to Art. 53a(c)(2) in this
case. I made the decision as [senior trial counsel] not to move forward and I am
responsible for any misunderstanding between counsel.” 12 In a subsequent
email, civilian defense counsel asked Maj Alpha: “was it you that put the
brakes on the assistance letter going to the [General Court Martial Convening
Authority]?” 13 Maj Alpha replied: “Yes, it was my decision.” 14
   Based on these emails, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging Maj
Alpha committed unlawful influence as he “prevented” trial counsel from sub-
mitting a substantial assistance letter—in violation of R.C.M. 1109(e)(2). 15 In

   7 Appellate Ex. VII at 8.

   8 Appellate Ex. VII at 8.

   9 Appellate Ex. XI at 4.

   10 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, his co-conspirator, the

judges, and appellate counsel, are pseudonyms.
   11 Appellate Ex. XI at 5.

   12 Appellate Ex. VII at 12.

   13 Appellate Ex. VII at 17.

   14 Appellate Ex. VII at 18.

   15 Appellate Ex. VI at 1.

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                 United States v. Nina, NMCCA No. 202200255
                             Opinion of the Court

its response to the motion, the Government acknowledged that trial counsel
“received advice” from Maj Alpha, but “not direction.” 16 Ultimately, the Gov-
ernment argued, it was trial counsel who made the decision not to submit the
letter. 17 To support this, trial counsel noted that his initial draft of the sub-
stantial assistance letter did not recommend a reduction of Appellant‘s sen-
tence. 18
    At a post-trial Article 39(a), UCMJ, hearing, the military judge denied the
motion. In his ruling, the military judge found that neither trial counsel nor
Maj Alpha fully understood the rules applicable to substantial assistance let-
ters. 19 He also found that trial counsel’s responses to the civilian defense coun-
sel had led the latter to believe trial counsel supported the request when, in
fact, trial counsel had not made a decision to do so. 20 Furthermore, the military
judge found that trial counsel’s and Maj Alpha’s “actions and inactions in com-
municating with the [civilian defense counsel] exacerbated the misunderstand-
ing in this case.” 21
   Additional facts necessary for our analysis are provided below.

                                  II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and the Law
   We review claims of unlawful influence de novo. 22 When assessing a mili-
tary judge’s findings of fact related to this issue, we apply a “clearly erroneous”
standard. 23 Thus, “where a military judge made detailed findings of fact . . .
and these findings are clearly supported by the record, we adopt them for our
analysis.” 24
   The prohibition against unlawful influence derives from a statutory man-
date:

   16 Appellate Ex. VIII at 4.

   17 Appellate Ex. VIII at 4.

   18 Appellate Ex. VIII at 5.

   19 Appellate Ex. XI at 2-3.

   20 Appellate Ex. XI at 4.

   21 Appellate Ex. XI at 5.

   22 United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70, 77 (C.A.A.F. 2018).

   23 Id. (citing United States v. Villareal, 52 M.J. 27, 30 (C.A.A.F. 1999)).

   24 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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                    United States v. Nina, NMCCA No. 202200255
                                Opinion of the Court

       No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by
       any unauthorized means, attempt to influence the action of a
       court-martial or any other military tribunal or any member
       thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or the
       action of any convening, approving, or reviewing authority or
       preliminary hearing officer with respect to such acts taken pur-
       suant to this chapter as prescribed by the President. 25
Unlawful influence occurs “when there is an improper manipulation of the
criminal justice process which negatively affects the fair handling and/or dis-
position of a case.” 26 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces [CAAF] has
held that “protect[ing] the court-martial processes from improper command in-
fluence” is “fundamental to fostering public confidence in the actual and ap-
parent fairness of our system of justice.” 27
  This obligation likewise applies to “preventing interference from non-com-
mand sources.” 28 The person exerting the unlawful influence need not wear
“the mantle of command authority,” as “Article 37(a) prohibits unlawful influ-
ence by all persons subject to the UCMJ.” 29 Accordingly, the CAAF has held
that, when examining more generalized allegations of unlawful influence,
there is “no reason to deviate from the test . . . established to evaluate unlawful
command influence.” 30
  “To raise the issue, [Appellant] must (1) show facts which, if true, constitute
unlawful command influence; (2) show that the proceedings were unfair; and
(3) show that unlawful command influence was the cause of the unfairness.” 31
Once the issue is raised, “the Government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt: (1) that the predicate facts do not exist; or (2) that the facts do not con-
stitute unlawful command influence; or (3) that the unlawful command influ-
ence will not prejudice the proceedings or did not affect the findings and sen-
tence.” 32

   25 UCMJ art. 37(a)(3).

   26 United States v. Boyce, 76 M.J. 242, 247 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (citations omitted).

   27 Barry, 78 M.J. at 76 (citations omitted).

   28 Id.

   29 Id. (citing United States v. Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 178 (C.A.A.F. 2004)) (emphasis

omitted).
   30 Id. at 76-77.

   31 United States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 150 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

   32 Id. at 151.

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                  United States v. Nina, NMCCA No. 202200255
                              Opinion of the Court

B. Supervisory Trial Counsel did not commit Unlawful Influence as
Trial Counsel Independently Decided not to Submit a Substantial As-
sistance Recommendation Letter.
   Appellant argues Maj Alpha committed unlawful influence by violating
R.C.M. 1109(e)(2), which states:
        A convening authority may reduce the sentence of an accused
        under this subsection only upon the recommendation of trial
        counsel who prosecuted the accused . . . The recommendation of
        trial counsel is the decision of trial counsel alone. No person may
        direct trial counsel to make or not make such a recommendation.
Appellant claims that, although Maj Alpha was not the trial counsel of record,
he either (a) personally made the decision not to submit a substantial assis-
tance letter recommending a reduction in sentence or (b) improperly influenced
trial counsel’s decision by copying the junior attorney on the email to civilian
defense counsel in which Maj Alpha made clear his opposition to such a letter.
    Assuming arguendo that Appellant has met his burden for raising unlawful
influence, we conclude the Government has shown that there was, in fact, no
unlawful influence. 33 In reaching this conclusion, we adopt the military judge’s
detailed findings of fact, as they are supported by the record and not clearly
erroneous. 34
    At the time when civilian defense counsel first requested the letter, trial
counsel did not understand the distinction between substantial assistance pro-
visions in plea agreements pursuant to Article 53a(c)(2), UCMJ, and post-trial
substantial assistance recommendations under R.C.M. 1109(e)(2). 35 Prior to
the request, trial counsel had no experience with such letters. When trial coun-
sel initially said, “Sounds good, I’ll route it up,” he meant he would consider
civilian defense counsel’s request and discuss it with his supervisory attorney
before deciding whether to support the request. 36

    33 Given the unique role of supervisory trial counsel, we leave open the question of

whether supervisory trial counsel fall within R.C.M 1109(e)(2)‘s term “trial counsel
who prosecuted the accused” even when not specifically detailed to the case.
    34 The military judge’s findings of fact are contained in Appellate Ex. XI. We note

that the military judge specifically found that trial counsel’s testimony at the post-trial
hearing was “compelling” and “highly credible.” Appellate Ex. XI at 2.
    35 Appellate Ex. XI at 2.

    36 Appellate Ex. XI at 2.

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                    United States v. Nina, NMCCA No. 202200255
                                Opinion of the Court

    Trial counsel routinely consulted his chain of command on military justice
issues with which he lacked experience. 37 Here, when trial counsel met with
Maj Alpha, he was merely seeking training and advice regarding substantial
assistance letters; he had not yet decided whether he would provide such a
letter. 38 Trial counsel prepared the short draft letter—containing the facts of
the matter but no recommendation—solely to facilitate the discussion. 39
    At the post-trial hearing, trial counsel testified 40 that it was his “personal”
decision not to send the substantial assistance letter, repeatedly stating that
the decision was “[his] alone.” 41 Trial counsel told the military judge: “At no
point did I, in my capacity as trial counsel, support a substantial assistance
letter in this case.” 42 In fact, trial counsel had entered the conversation with
Maj Alpha “thinking this is not a case for substantial assistance.” 43 After the
conversation, trial counsel “felt affirmed that this was not a case for substan-
tial assistance.” 44 Accordingly, the military judge found that Maj Alpha did
neither “threaten nor direct” trial counsel to refrain from submitting the letter,
and that trial counsel made an “independent” decision not to provide the let-
ter. 45 As the military judge’s findings are clearly supported by the record, we
agree.
    Appellant points to the emails from trial counsel and Maj Alpha as evidence
to the contrary. But, based on a review of the entire record, we agree with the
military judge that trial counsel’s “failure to directly inform [civilian defense
counsel] of his independent decision not to support the [request], coupled with
[Maj Alpha’s] efforts to take care of the issue for [trial counsel] as supervisory
counsel, created an appearance that R.C.M. 1109(e)(2) was violated when in

    37 Appellate Ex. XI at 2-3.

    38 Appellate Ex. XI at 4.

    39 Appellate Ex. XI at 3.

    40 A senior trial counsel not previously involved in the matter detailed herself to

the case and called trial counsel to testify during the post-trial hearing.
    41 R. at 137-38.

    42 R. at 154.

    43 R. at 161.

    44 R. at 161.

    45 Appellate Ex. XI at 4.

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                 United States v. Nina, NMCCA No. 202200255
                             Opinion of the Court

reality it was not.” 46 In short, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
there was no unlawful influence. 47

                                III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and
that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights oc-
curred. 48
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                                   FOR THE COURT:

                                   MARK K. JAMISON
                                   Clerk of Court

   46 Appellate Ex. XI at 6 (emphasis added). In Appellate Ex. XI at 5, the military

judge also found that trial counsel and Maj Alpha “exacerbated the misunderstanding
in this case” through their “actions and inactions” concerning the email correspondence
with civilian defense counsel. We agree with this finding, as well.
   47 As we conclude there was no unlawful influence, we necessarily conclude there

was no prejudice to Appellant’s substantial rights thereby. And the mere appearance
that R.C.M. 1109(e)(2) was violated here is not enough to merit relief. See UCMJ art.
37(c).
   48 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

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