Court Opinion

ID: 9498925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:32:37.003482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:10.226966
License: Public Domain

LEVAL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
This case presents a very difficult question: Whether § 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, confers authority on a district court to enforce a preliminary order of reinstatement. I find it unnecessary to answer this question. Even if § 806 authorizes a district court to enforce a preliminary order of reinstatement issued in compliance with the obligations of due process, the preliminary order in this case is not enforceable, in my view, because the Secretary’s disclosures to CTI during its investigation of Bechtel’s allegations did not satisfy the due process requirements of Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 107 S.Ct. 1740, 95 L.Ed.2d 239 (1987).
I.
Complaints filed with the Secretary of Labor concerning violations of the whistle-blower-protection provisions of § 806 are governed by provisions of AIR21(b), 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b). 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A). Under paragraph (5) and subparagraph (6)(A) of AIR21(b), a district court is authorized to enforce an order of the Secretary of Labor “issued under paragraph (3).” Paragraph (3), entitled “Final order,” provides in relevant part that if the Secretary of Labor makes a final determination that a violation has occurred, the Secretary “shall order the person who committed such violation to ... reinstate the complainant to his or her former position together with the compensation (including back pay) and restore the terms, conditions, and privileges associated with his or her employment.” 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(3)(B). Thus, a district court is clearly authorized to enforce a final reinstatement order issued under paragraph (3).
In this case, however, we are asked to decide whether a district court has authority to enforce a preliminary reinstatement order. Under paragraph (2) of AIR21(b), entitled “Investigation; preliminary order,” if the Secretary determines that “there is reasonable cause to believe that the complaint has merit,” then the Secretary must make written findings and accompany those findings with “a preliminary order providing the relief prescribed by paragraph (3)(B).” 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(A). Within thirty days, either party “may file objections to the findings or preliminary order, or both, and request a hearing on the record.” Id. The statute provides that “the filing of such objections shall not operate to stay any reinstatement remedy contained in the preliminary order.” Id.
The plaintiff and the Secretary contend that such a preliminary order of reinstatement qualifies as an enforceable order “issued under paragraph (3)” because it provides the relief prescribed by paragraph (3)(B). The defendant contends that such a preliminary order is issued under paragraph (2), even though it provides for the kind of relief prescribed by paragraph (3).
*477The statute, no matter how it is read, does not make complete sense. As I read the opposing arguments of my colleagues, certain provisions of the statute favor each of their arguments, while other provisions disfavor them.
As Judge Jacobs argues, the fact that a preliminary order authorized by paragraph (2) “provides] the relief prescribed by paragraph (3)(B)” does not mean that the preliminary order is an order “issued under paragraph (3).” The source of the authority for a preliminary order of reinstatement is paragraph (2), not paragraph (3). Such an order therefore appears to be “issued under” paragraph (2). The references in paragraph (5) and subpara-graph (6)(A) to the enforcement of an order issued under paragraph (3) do not seem to apply to such an order. See Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d 1, 16 n. 16, 17 (1st Cir.2006) (stating in dictum that paragraph (5) and subpara-graph (6)(A) authorize district court enforcement of the Secretary’s “final order”). Moreover, paragraph (5) provides that the civil action of the Secretary seeking enforcement of the order “issued under paragraph (3)” may be filed “in the United States district court for the district in which the violation was found to occur.” (emphasis added). A violation, however, has not been “found to occur” until the Secretary issues a final order; the preliminary order is based only on reasonable cause, not on a finding that the violation has occurred.
Further support for this reading of the statute is found in subparagraph (4)(A), which states that “[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order issued under paragraph (3) may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals.” In Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778, 103 S.Ct. 2187, 76 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983), the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he strong presumption is that judicial review [of agency decisions] will become available only when agency action becomes final.” That presumption supports the proposition that “an order issued under paragraph (3),” which is subject to immediate review in the court of appeals, does not include a preliminary order of reinstatement. See Camero, 433 F.3d at 16 n. 16 (stating in dictum that AIR21 provides for “appellate court review of the Secretary’s final order”); Stone v. Duke Energy Corp., 432 F.3d 320 (4th Cir.2005) (assuming that only a final order is appealable under paragraph (4)).
On the other hand, as Judge Straub observes, AIR21 states that a preliminary order of reinstatement is not stayed pending the final order of the Secretary. The absence of a stay presumably makes some difference in the regulatory scheme. Yet if the preliminary order is not enforceable, an employer, as in this case, is free to refuse to reinstate the employee. It is as if the preliminary order of reinstatement were stayed pending a final order. Judge Jacobs’ reading of the statute, which follows from the plain meaning of paragraph (5) and subparagraph (6)(A) and the presumption against review of non-final agency orders, is not easily reconciled with the provision that there is no stay of a preliminary order of reinstatement. Judge Straub’s reading of the statute, which makes better sense of the statute’s express denial of a stay of a preliminary order of reinstatement, is difficult to reconcile with the stated scope of enforcement under AIR21 and is counter to the presumption against review of non-final agency orders.
Judge Jacobs offers several explanations as to why the absence of enforcement of the preliminary order makes sense in light of various features of the statutory scheme-the complainant may bring an action in the district court if the Secretary *478has not issued a final order after 180 days, the preliminary order is based on a reasonable cause determination, and it is subject to being overturned at multiple stages of review. I believe Judge Straub demonstrates that these arguments are overstated. See Dissenting Op. at 487. And even if Judge Jacobs is correct that there are good reasons why a preliminary order should not be enforced, these considerations do not explain why Congress would provide that a preliminary order is not stayed if despite the statute’s denial of a stay, the employer without adverse consequence may effectively stay the order simply by declining to obey it.
Judge Straub argues that his reading of the statute is supported by the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley. Dissenting Op. at 485-86. The legislative history undoubtedly shows an intent to protect whistleblowers. But Judge Straub points to no language in the legislative history which addresses in any way the enforceability of a preliminary order of reinstatement.
Judge Straub rests his argument in part on a regulation promulgated by the Secretary, 29 C.F.R. § 1980.113, which states:
Whenever any person has failed to comply with a preliminary order of reinstatement or a final order or the terms of a settlement agreement, the Secretary or a person on whose behalf the order was issued may file a civil action seeking enforcement of the order in the United States district court for the district in which the violation was found to have occurred.
In this regulation, the Secretary interprets paragraph (5) and subparagraph (6)(A) to provide for enforcement of a preliminary order. However, because the statutory interpretation at issue concerns the scope of federal court jurisdiction, it is not a proper subject of deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). See Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Global Naps, Inc., 377 F.3d 355, 383 (4th Cir.2004) (“Chevron deference is not required when the ultimate question is about federal jurisdiction. Analogous to our obligation to inquire sua sponte whenever federal jurisdiction is in doubt, a federal court must interpret statutory grants of jurisdiction for itself.” (citation omitted)); Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 478 (D.C.Cir.2001) (“Chevron does not apply to statutes that ... confer juiisdiction on the federal courts. It is well established that [interpreting statutes granting jurisdiction to Article III courts is exclusively the province of the courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir.2000) (“[T]he fact that courts defer to the INS’s construction of its statutory powers of deportation does not mean that similar deference is warranted with respect to the enforcement of this court’s jurisdictional limitations. The former may trigger deference, but the determination of our jurisdiction is exclusively for the court to decide.”); see generally Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50, 110 S.Ct. 1384, 108 L.Ed.2d 585 (1990).
Judge Straub argues that the Secretary’s interpretation is entitled to “some minimal deference” under United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 234-35, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). Dissenting Op. at 487. The Mead Court, citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944), held that even when an administrative agency’s statutory interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference because there is “no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law,” that statutory interpretation “is eligible to claim respect *479according to its persuasiveness.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 221, 121 S.Ct. 2164; see Skid-more, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161 (“The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). I do not find the Secretary’s interpretation to have persuasive force. The regulations implementing § 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley result in an inconsistent reading of the words “order issued under paragraph (3)” in AIR21. Section 1980.112 of the regulations, entitled “Judicial review,” provides in paragraph (a) that
[wjithin 60 days after the issuance of a final order by the Board (Secretary) under § 1980.110, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by the order may file a petition for review of the order in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation allegedly occurred or the circuit in which the complainant resided, on the date of the violation. A final order of the Board is not subject to judicial review in any criminal or other civil proceeding.
29 C.F.R. § 1980.112(a). The regulation seems to interpret paragraph (4) of AIR21(b), which provides for review of “an order issued under paragraph (3),” to apply only to review of a final agency order; the regulations contain no provision for immediate review of a preliminary order in the Court of Appeals. Thus, according to the Secretary’s reading of AIR21, a preliminary order of reinstatement is an order issued under paragraph (3) for purposes of judicial enforcement but is not an order issued under paragraph (3) for purposes of judicial review. I do not find so inconsistent an interpretation of AIR21 to be persuasive.
II.
I find it unnecessary in this case to resolve the very difficult question of enforceability under a statute which contains apparently inconsistent provisions. This is because, in my view, the Secretary’s disclosures to CTI prior to the issuance of the preliminary order did not meet the due process requirements of Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 107 S.Ct. 1740, 95 L.Ed.2d 239 (1987). Regardless of whether a preliminary order of reinstatement under § 806 is generally enforceable by a federal court, this preliminary order is not enforceable. Even if I agreed with Judge Straub that AIR21 authorizes judicial enforcement of a preliminary order of reinstatement (and that therefore § 806 does the same), this conclusion would, in my view, have no effect on the outcome of this case. Rather than unnecessarily reaching a thorny question of statutory interpretation, I leave the resolution of this problem to a future case in which the outcome depends on the resolution of that problem.1
*480In Brock, the Supreme Court considered whether Roadway Express, an interstate trucking company, was denied due process when a terminated employee was reinstated pursuant to a preliminary reinstatement order under § 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (“STAA”). The employee alleged that he had been improperly terminated for complaining of safety violations. The STAA provided that if the Secretary of Labor found that the employee’s claim was supported by reasonable cause, the Secretary was to issue a preliminary order reinstating him. Prior to the preliminary reinstatement order, Roadway was informed of the allegations in the employee’s complaint, given the opportunity to meet with an investigator from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), and submitted a written statement explaining that the employee had not been discharged for whistleblowing activities. Roadway was not provided with the names of witnesses supporting the employee’s claim or the substance of their statements. Id. at 255-56, 107 S.Ct. 1740. Roadway sought an injunction against enforcement of the preliminary order of reinstatement, arguing that due process required that the Secretary conduct an evidentiary hearing before granting a preliminary order of reinstatement.
In Brock, a majority of the Justices held that due process did not require an eviden-tiary hearing prior to the preliminary reinstatement order. However, a different majority held that Roadway’s due process rights had been violated because it was not informed, prior to the preliminary reinstatement order, what evidence had been submitted to the Secretary in support of the employee’s allegations. Justice Marshall, joined by three other justices, wrote that “minimum due process for the employer in this context requires notice of the employee’s allegations, notice of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence, an opportunity to submit a written response, and an opportunity to meet with the investigator and present statements from rebuttal witnesses.” Id. at 264, 107 S.Ct. 1740 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed that due process required the Secretary of Labor to inform the em*481ployer of the “substance of the evidence” supporting the employee’s allegations. Id. at 269,107 S.Ct. 1740 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The record in this case demonstrates that the Secretary gave CTI a copy of Bechtel’s initial complaint, a description of the allegations, and opportunities to submit written responses to those allegations and to present statements from rebuttal witnesses. An OSHA investigator also met with CTI’s counsel on at least two occasions. However, based on the record before us, CTI was not given reasonable notice of the evidence against it. CTI repeatedly asked OSHA to provide it with copies of statements by Bechtel or witness statements that supported Bechtel’s allegations. On July 2, 2004, CTI was provided with a two-page purported summary of witness statements. The document, however, does not name any of the witnesses against CTI. Nor does it mention the undisclosed oral revenue-sharing agreements or whistleblowing regarding those agreements-the very grounds for the preliminary order of reinstatement. Most important, the “summary” is not a summary at all, but a mishmash of disconnected sentences that does not provide a coherent or comprehensible picture of the evidence against CTI.2 Furthermore, Bechtel subsequently submitted additional statements to the Secretary in August and December of 2004. No summary of these statements was ever provided to CTI in any form.
Determining whether an employer has been provided with notice of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry, and I do not suggest that there is some precise quantum of information that must be provided to an employer in every case. But in this case, I think it is clear that CTI was not afforded reasonable notice of the evi*482dence against it. I conclude that its due process rights were violated.3
In her brief to this Court, the Secretary claims that OSHA’s June 24, 2004 letter to CTI provided it with the “substance of the evidence that it had collected.” Mthough the letter states that it provides “notice of the substance of the relevant evidence” against CTI, in fact it provides notice of the allegations against CTI, not the evidence supporting these allegations. As Brock clearly states, notice of the allegations is not enough to satisfy due process; notice of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence must be provided to the employer as well. It is only with an awareness of the evidence against it that the employer can respond and attempt to rebut that evidence. Moreover, even if the June 24, 2004 letter had provided notice of the evidence against CTI gathered until that point, the Secretary would still have been obligated to provide CTI with notice of the substance of the additional statements provided by Bechtel in August and December 2004. The Secretary does not even claim to have provided CTI with such notice. Thus, the June 24 letter and the July 2 “summary” were insufficient to satisfy the Secretary’s obligation under Brock.4
This conclusion does not call into question the procedures generally followed by the Secretary when investigating whistle-blower allegations under Sarbanes-Oxley. In fact, in this case the Secretary violated Department of Labor regulations. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(e) the Secretary was required, “[pjrior to the issuance of findings and a preliminary order,” to provide CTI with
notice of the substance of the relevant evidence supporting the complainant’s allegations as developed during the course of the investigation. This evidence includes any witness statements, which will be redacted to protect the identity of confidential informants where statements were given in confidence; if the statements cannot be redacted without revealing the identity of confidential informants, summaries of their contents will be provided.
For whatever reason, the Secretary did not provide CTI with any witness statements, redacted or otherwise.5 It may be-*483though I express no view on this question-that summaries of witness statements, redacted to maintain the confidentiality of witnesses’ identities, are consistent with Brock’s requirements. But even assuming this to be the case, the summaries must be sufficient to provide an employer with reasonable notice of the evidence against it-a standard that was not satisfied here. Moreover, confidentiality interests cannot explain the Secretary’s failure to provide CTI with copies, or even coherent summaries, of Bechtel’s own statements, as his identity as a source of complaints about his employer was known.
While I agree with Judge Straub that violation of agency regulations does not, in and of itself, suffice to establish a due process violation, in this case the Secretary’s failure to follow its own regulations resulted in a process that did not meet the requirements of Brock.6 Accordingly, I join Judge Jacobs, although for different reasons, in voting to vacate the preliminary injunction and remand to the district court for an order of dismissal.

. In order to secure judicial enforcement of the Secretary’s preliminary order of reinstatement, Bechtel must satisfy several elements, which include that Congress has provided statutory authority for judicial enforcement of such an order and that the order was issued in compliance with law. Because I find the Secretary’s order was not issued in compliance with the requirements prescribed in Brock, I conclude Bechtel has failed to show entitlement to enforcement regardless of whether Congress authorized such judicial enforcement. Such a ruling is sometimes called an exercise of “hypothetical jurisdiction." As our ruling does not purport to adjudicate ultimate rights as between the parties, but only the enforceability of an interim order, it is not so clear that the concept of assertion of hypothetical jurisdiction is apt. In any event, while Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), severely re*480stricts our ability to exercise hypothetical Article III jurisdiction over a dispute that does not come within the scope of constitutional "Cases” or "Controversies,” that precedent does not restrict our authority to dismiss on the merits cases that come within our constitutional jurisdiction, notwithstanding doubts as to whether we have statutory jurisdiction. This court has repeatedly exercised such hypothetical statutory jurisdiction. See, e.g., Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 132 n. 10 (2d Cir.2005); Marquez-Almanzar v. INS, 418 F.3d 210, 216 n. 7 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Miller, 263 F.3d 1, 4 n. 2 (2d Cir.2001); Fama v. Comm’r of Corr. Srvs., 235 F.3d 804, 817 n. 11 (2d Cir.2000). In this case, the district court certainly had Article III jurisdiction, and therefore hypothetical jurisdiction is not precluded by Steel Co. I would also observe that the phrase "hypothetical jurisdiction” is something of a misnomer. Courts regularly decide cases on the basis of certain dispositive issues, while leaving other issues unresolved. When a court decides a case by going immediately to a merits question, the unanswered question whether the claims arises at the time or is of the type consigned by the governing statute for adjudication is like any other merits issue that need not be resolved in that case. See Fry v. UAL Corp., 84 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir.1996) (Posner, C.J.) ("It is true that when Congress makes clear that a statute is not intended to confer rights on a particular class of persons, a suit under the statute by a member of that class does not engage the jurisdiction of the federal courts .... But if the scope of the statute is unclear, the question whether a particular class is protected by it becomes just another issue concerning the merits of the suit and therefore one that the court need not decide if ... another issue is truly disposi-tive.”).

. Below is the entirety of the “summary” as it relates to Bechtel (references to Willie Jacques, who also brought a complaint against CTI and was a plaintiff in this case before settling with CTI, have been omitted):

Job Performance

• Mr. Bechtel closed one or two agreements with small returns.
• Mr. Bechtel brought in [no] significant revenues.

Relationship -with CEO John Nano

• CEO Nano pushed ... Mr. Bechtel to get the job done and bring in revenues.
• Beginning in March 2003 the relationship between CEO Nano ... and Mr. Bechtel became unprofessional and unproductive.

Disclosure Committee

• Mr. Bechtel [was] not [an] official member [] of the Disclosure Committee but [was] required to sign off on the SEC reports.
• Committee had to answer 59 questions on each quarterly report and review all agreements.
• Any questions that could not be answered at the meeting were assigned to a member for follow-up. The results of the follow-up were reported to the Audit Committee not to the person who raised the question.
• The sign-off letter was circulated for signatures following the meeting.
• An exception page could be attached to the sign-off letter if there were still reservations about signing off.
• Mr. Bechtel did not sign off on the procedure page.
• Mr. Bechtel initially did not sign off on the March, 2003 report.

Reasons for Termination

• Mr. Bechtel [was] let go for performance and financial reasons.
• Mr. Bechtel [was] terminated due to restructuring.
• Mr. Bechtel [was] terminated because [he was] coerced into signing something [he did not] want[ ] to sign.

Contractors

• CEO Nano hired contractors in summer of 2002 to produce revenue through sales.
• Contractors are easier to terminate than employees.
• No significant revenues have been brought in by contractors.
• 5 contractors have been hired as employees even though there has been no change in the Respondent’s financial picture.

.Judge Jacobs contends that under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance it is inappropriate for me to rule on a constitutional question when the dispute might be resolved by answering a non-constitutional question. Ante at 475 - 76. Without doubt the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is important in our jurisprudence. Nonetheless, there is a' difference between undertaking to establish a new constitutional standard and determining whether a set of facts satisfies a constitutional standard that has already been established by the Supreme Court. In this case, the relevant constitutional standard was established by the Court in Brock. My reasoning, which is that the Secretary failed to give CTI "notice of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence” against it, Brock, 481 U.S. at 264, 107 S.Ct. 1740, simply applies that standard. Where the choice is between resolving a statutory conundrum for which Congress has failed to provide any clear answer, and the application of a pre-existing constitutional standard to the facts of this case, I believe that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance plays a smaller role.

. Judge Straub asserts that the June 24 letter describes evidence which tends to rebut CTI's claim that Bechtel was fired for economic reasons. See Dissenting Op. at 489. I take no position as to whether in this letter the Secretary provided CTI with adequate notice of evidence on this particular point. Even if Judge Straub's assertion is correct, neither in this letter nor elsewhere did the Secretary provide CTI with notice, as Brock requires, of the evidence supporting Bechtel’s allegation that he was terminated for engaging in whist-leblowing activities.

. An OSHA supervisor ordered the investigator in the case to provide CTI with "complete statements from complainants.” The investigator did not do so.

. Bechtel argues that there cannot have been a due process violation because CTI has not been deprived of any property interest. A property interest under the Fifth Amendment is "created ... by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Such a property interest can be created, pursuant to state law, through an implied contract. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). However, just because a property right exists under state law does not mean that a denial of that right constitutes a due process violation. Rather, "federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause.” Ezekwo v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). .
In Brock, Roadway asserted a property interest deriving from the collective bargaining agreement with its employees' union, and a more general property interest in the "right to discharge an employee for cause.” Brock, 481 U.S. at 260, 107 S.Ct. 1740. There the Secretary conceded "that the contractual right to discharge an employee for cause constitutes a properly interest protected by the Fifth Amendment” and the Court "accept[ed] the Secretary's concession.” Id. at 261 & n. 2, 107 S.Ct. 1740. In United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 3 F.3d 634, 637 (2d Cir.1993), this court, relying on Brock, held that the right to discharge an employee for cause is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause,
CTI argues that under Connecticut law it had the right, derived from an implied contract of employment, to discharge Bechtel with or without cause, and that this constitutes a property interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. I agree. The Connecticut Supreme Court has explained that "all employer-employee relationships not governed by express contracts involve some type of implied 'contract' of employment” and when that employment relationship is for an indefinite term “an implied contract of employment does not limit the terminability of an employee's employment but merely includes terms specifying wages, working hours, job responsibilities and the like.” Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 234 Conn. 1, 13-14, 662 A.2d 89 (1995). Just as the right to discharge an employee for cause is a property interest protected under the Due Process Clause, the right to discharge an employee with or without cause is a protected property interest.