Court Opinion

ID: 9893212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 15:01:09.699496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:59.431455
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1518    Document: 26     Page: 1    Filed: 10/26/2023

           NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                  RICHARD HORNSBY,
                       Petitioner

                             v.

      FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY,
                   Respondent
             ______________________

                        2023-1518
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. DC-0752-15-0576-I-2.
                 ______________________

   Before DYK, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
                         ORDER
     Having considered the parties’ responses to this court’s
 March 20, 2023, show cause order, we agree with the par-
 ties that we lack jurisdiction and that this matter should
 be transferred back to the United States District Court for
 the District of Columbia.
     Richard Hornsby appealed to the Merit Systems Pro-
 tection Board (“Board”), arguing that his removal from the
 Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) was based, in
 part, on discriminatory retaliation. After the Board
Case: 23-1518     Document: 26     Page: 2    Filed: 10/26/2023

 2              HORNSBY v. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY

 affirmed the removal, Mr. Hornsby filed suit in the United
 States District Court for the District of Columbia, where he
 continued to pursue his argument that his removal from
 the agency was discriminatory retaliation.
     FHFA moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for sum-
 mary judgment, based on a failure to exhaust the discrim-
 inatory retaliation claim and a resulting lack of subject
 matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims. The district
 court largely agreed, dismissing the discriminatory retali-
 ation claim and concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over
 the remaining claims because dismissal of the discrimina-
 tory retaliation claim meant it was no longer a mixed case;
 instead of dismissing, however, the court transferred to
 this court. Hornsby v. Thompson, No. 1:22-cv-1472, Dkt.
 No. 14 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2023). Mr. Hornsby’s filings here
 again indicate that he continues to seek review of his dis-
 criminatory retaliation claim.
     In general, we have jurisdiction to review final Board
 decisions except in “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the
 provisions of [5 U.S.C. §] 7702,” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). See
 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). Those so-
 called “mixed cases” “shall be filed in district court.”
 Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 50 (2012); see 5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(b)(2); Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 582 U.S. 420, 432
 (2017). For a case to be a mixed case, and hence to fall
 outside of our review authority, there must be a complaint
 of an agency action that is appealable to the Board and at-
 tributed, in whole or in part, to covered discrimination.
 Perry, 582 U.S. at 422; see 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1). Here,
 there is no dispute that Mr. Hornsby’s allegations before
 the Board satisfy those requirements. Nor is there any
 question that Mr. Hornsby has continued to pursue his dis-
 criminatory retaliation claim at every stage of these pro-
 ceedings.
     The parties now agree (and so do we) that the district
 court’s dismissal of Mr. Hornsby’s discriminatory
Case: 23-1518    Document: 26      Page: 3    Filed: 10/26/2023

 HORNSBY v. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY                  3

 retaliation claim did not divest that court of jurisdiction
 over the remaining claims or otherwise convert this mixed
 case into one that we have jurisdiction to review. See ECF
 Nos. 24, 25. As we held in Williams v. Department of Army,
 “where jurisdiction lies in the district court under 5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(b)(2), the entire action falls within the jurisdiction
 of that court and this court has no jurisdiction.” 715 F.2d
 1485, 1491 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (en banc). See Dedrick v. Berry,
 573 F.3d 1278, 1281–82 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that
 transfer is appropriate because we lack jurisdiction even
 after the dismissal of a discrimination claim); see also
 Punch v. Bridenstine, 945 F.3d 322, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2019)
 (noting that “every court of appeals to consider the question
 has prohibited bifurcation”). Although “we are cognizant
 of the Supreme Court’s caution against engaging in ‘per-
 petual game[s] of jurisdictional ping-pong,’ Christianson v.
 Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988),”
 Dedrick, 573 F.3d at 1281 n.1, we agree with the parties
 that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, transfer back to the
 District Court for the District of Columbia is appropriate
 under the circumstances so that the court may conduct ap-
 propriate proceedings with respect to the remaining
 claims.
     Accordingly,
     IT IS ORDERED THAT:
    This matter and all of the filings are transmitted to the
 United States District Court for the District of Columbia
 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
                                        FOR THE COURT

 October 26, 2023                       /s/ Jarrett B. Perlow
      Date                              Jarrett B. Perlow
                                        Clerk of Court