Court Opinion

ID: 9668841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:28:34.412924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:48.927307
License: Public Domain

McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting).
. Assuming., without necessarily conceding,1 -that. plaintiff has the right to tack to his- own possession his father’s adverse possession-of the 38 acres in contest, I -fail to perceive how, under the facts stated in the majority opinion, plaintiff has acquired more than an undivided JÍ2th interest in the land by the 30-year acquisitive prescription.
According to the facts, plaintiff’s father possessed adversely from 1920 until his death in 1937, or for 17 years. .Plaintiff succeeded to his father’s possession in 1937, but only to the extent of an undivided 142th interest as a coowner with his mother and brothers and sisters. This character of possession continued until 1945, during which year plaintiff acquired, - by donation from his mother and by purchase from his brothers and sisters, their outstanding interests in McManor Plantation. But this acquisition by donation and purchase did not transfer to plaintiff the right of adverse possession of his mother and brothers and sisters to the 38 acres -in dispute. This is because the instruments of transfer did not contain a description of the 38 acres and, therefore, under the well-settled jurisprudence, the adverse possession of the donor and vendors cannot be tacked to plaintiff’s *350possession to change or increase his adverse interest or possession from an undivided Vis,th to an exclusive possession of the whole. See Stutson v. McGee, 241 La. 646, 130 So.2d 403 and the many authorities there cited.
Thus, plaintiff’s adverse possession has never exceeded the undivided id2th interest in the right of possession he inherited from his father and, hy tacking his father’s possession to his own, he would be entitled at the most to be recognized as having acquired by the 30-year prescription an undivided %3th interest in the land in contest, if, and only if, one coowner-possessor may maintain an action of this sort without the joinder of the other coowners as parties plaintiff.
Whether or not this can be countenanced, I am not at all certain. However, the law is well established that a coowner in possession is a precarious possessor, as defined by Article 3490 of the Civil Code, and that one possessing in such quality cannot prescribe against his coowner. Liles v. Pitts, 145 La. 650, 82 So. 755; Hill v. Dees, 188 La. 708, 178 So. 250 and the cases there cited.
Indeed, it was held in Satcher v. Radesich, 153 La. 468, 96 So. 35, that the possession of a vendor, which was not ’ exclusively as owner, but for his co-heirs, could not be added to the possession of his vendees to establish prescription. Whether the reverse of that situation, which appears in this case, would be governed by the same rule I am not prepared to say at this time. However, one conclusion is perfectly evident and that is that plaintiff cannot tack his mother’s and brothers’ and sisters’ possession to his own 'so as to entitle him to a complete prescriptive title to the land in contest.
It is to be observed' that the majority opinion, in an apparent effort to take this matter out of the well-settled jurisprudence of the many cases involving tacking of possession, to which we strictly adhered in Stutson v. McGee, has construed the deeds herein under which plaintiff acquired the interests of his mother and his brothers and sisters as transferring to him a title to the 38 acres in contest as well as the acreage comprising McManor Plantation which is particularly described in the deeds. It is said that this is true because the deeds declare that the property conveyed is generally described as “A certain sugar plantation known as McManor Plantation * * * ” which necessarily included all acreage possessed by the donor- and vendors even though they had no title to part of the acreage.
In concluding thus the majority has completely overlooked the legal effect of the fact that the deeds contain a particular description of the lands conveyed which' de*352scription omits the property in dispute. The jurisprudence relative to the construction of such deeds is likewise well established. It is, of- course, the general rule that the particular description must prevail over the general description 'when there is a conflict between them.2 See Snelling v. Adair, 196 La. 624, 199 So. 782 and the many authorities there cited.
But, even if there is good reason to suppose that the donor and vendors in this case were attempting to transfer their possession of the 38 acres to plaintiff,, this does not suffice. For, under Civil Code Articles 3493 and 3494, a title to the land must be transferred, in. order for the vendee to tack the possession of his vendor to his own. If this is not so, then all the jurisprudence laid down in the past is meaningless. In one of the landmark cases on the subject, Sibley v. Pierson, 125 La. 478, 51 So. 502, the court put it thus in the syllabus it wrote:
“Where one possesses beyond his title, but sells according to his title, the vendee cannot, for the purposes of the prescription of 30 years, acquirendi causa, tack to his own possession that of his vendor of the property which is not included in the deed by which he acquires ; there being no privity between him and his vendor with respect to such possession.” 3
That is exactly this case. In my opinion, it is incorrect in law and in fact to conclude that the deeds herein evidence the conveyance of any sort of title by the vendors to the 38 acres, which are not included in the description. The law is well settled that a deed which does not include a particular description of the disputed property does not translate a title to such property which will serve as a basis for a plea of acquisitive prescription of ten years by adverse possession. Bendernagel v. Foret, 145 La. 115, 81 So. 869; Hunter v. Forrest, 195 La. 973, 197 So. 649; Pierce v. Hunter, 202 La. 900, 13 So.2d 259 and cases there cited.
The same rule applies as to tacking under Civil Code Articles 3493 and 3494. There must be a title translative of the property in order for the purchaser to tack the possession of his vendor.
*354I respectfully dissent.

. A literal reading of Articles 3493 and 3494, which are found under the heading “Of the Prescription of Ten Years” in our Civil . Code, indicates that it is essential for the claimant of acquisitive prescription' to have a title, in order for him to tack the possession of his author. The majority relies upon a quotation from- Planiol (Vol. 1, Part 2, No. 2673 and 2674, p. 584) to support the ruling that no sort of title is necessary, but . it- is to' be 'noted, that, this material is contained, in a section entitled “Special Rules that Apply to Prescription of Ten to Twenty Years”. Although Planiol enumerates an “acquisitive prescription” .of thirty years under French law (Vol. 1, Part 2, No. 2651, p. 574) an examination shows that the basis for such statement is Article 2262 of the Code Napoleon, now Article 3548 of our Civil Code, which deals with the liberative prescription of thirty years. Article 3499 of the Civil Code, with which we are here concerned, dealing with acquisitive prescription of thirty years,' has no counterpart in the Code Napoleon.

. There is actually no conflict between the general description and the particular description in this ease because the . 3S acres were never a part of MeManor Plantation until plaintiff’s father first purchased the plantation in 1914 and ex- . -ercis,ed acts, of possession over the 38 acres not included in his deed. However, the'decision herein provides unquestionably a conflict between the general and particular description and, therefore, the result reached is opposed to the general rule - that, in case of conflict between a general and particular description, the latter must prevail.

. See also comment “Tacking of possession for acquisitive prescription” by Hersehel N. Knight, 8 La.L.Rev. 105, 107.