Court Opinion

ID: 9733168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:55:54.362237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:39.003548
License: Public Domain

KELLEHER, Justice,
concurring.
I have no quarrel with my colleagues’ conclusion that Forte can proceed against Allen pursuant to the negligence count lodged against the site engineer. However, I am somewhat dubious that Allen, as a “site engineer,” should also be considered a “supervising architect.” In its affidavit in support of a motion to dismiss Forte’s claim against it, Allen refers to itself as the *1304“site engineer.” The sole reference to Allen as a “supervising architect” can be found in the affidavit filed by a registered land surveyor who was apparently employed at the site by Forte and who at various times describes one of Allen’s employees as a “site engineer” or a “supervising engineer” or an “architect.”
I see no need to adopt in this controversy the rationale found in the architect-contractor cases relied on by my colleagues. Forte has always been free to proceed against Allen by invoking the well-settled general principle that holds that a person who acts as an acknowledged agent for a disclosed principal is independently liable for his own acts of negligence, despite the fact that these acts are committed in the course and scope of the agency and in furtherance of the disclosed principal’s business. See Inter-Ocean (Free Zone), Inc. v. Manaure Lines, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
I do have some concern that there may be those who might believe that our subjecting Allen to Forte’s negligence claim is somewhat at odds with what was said in Alterio v. Biltmore Construction Corp., 119 R.I. 307, 377 A.2d 237 (1977) and earlier in Cardente v. Maggiacomo Insurance Agency, Inc., 108 R.I. 71, 272 A.2d 155 (1971). In Alterio, a building-contract dispute that involved alleged defective construction, a judgment entered against the president of the corporate-defendant contractor was vacated because the president was acting on behalf of a disclosed principal. However, there the homeowners’ suit was based upon a breach of contract rather than a claim of negligence.
Cárdente sold building materials and supplies at locations throughout the state. His suit was based upon the agency’s failure to notify the insurers it represented that Cárdente had closed out one of his branches and had consolidated it with another branch at another location. The disclosed-principal rule exonerated the insurance agency from liability because the insurers were responsible for the agency’s negligence. Foreign insurance companies are barred from entering into contracts in Rhode Island except through duly authorized agents. G.L. 1956 (1979 Reenactment) § 27-2-3, as amended by P.L. 1984, ch. 45, § 1. The insurers in the Cár-dente dispute were “foreigners” who were powerless to issue, on their own, a policy of insurance in this state without the assistance of a registered agent. The Cárdente rationale, which could be considered an exception to the general rule, finds support in 16A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 8832 at 30-33 (1981). In a somewhat similar situation, Austin v. Fulton Insurance Co., 498 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1972), an insurance agent was held personally liable for his failure to effectuate a change in coverage but there was a denial that the agent was authorized to act in the manner alleged by the claimant.