Court Opinion

ID: 9378520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 19:00:47.232278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.825872
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ______________

                                      No. 22-1806
                                    ______________

                             SARA ESTER MENDIZABAL,
                                                Petitioner

                                            v.

              ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                            ______________

                      On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the
                             Board of Immigration Appeals
                               (Agency No. A095-137-536)
                          Immigration Judge: Dinesh C. Verma
                                    _______________
                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                  on March 9, 2023
                                  ______________

               Before: SHWARTZ, BIBAS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges.

                                 (Filed: March 10, 2023)
                                    ______________

                                       OPINION ∗
                                    ______________
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

    Sara Mendizabal is a native and citizen of El Salvador. Starting around 1995, her then-

stepfather began threatening her family, demanding money that they allegedly owed him.

∗
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
She was also harassed by gangs. So in 1999, at age fourteen, she came to the United States

illegally. She has not seen her ex-stepfather since then and has not heard from him in about

seven years; she doubts that he is still alive.

   The U.S. government gave Mendizabal temporary protected status in 2004. But after

she was convicted of food-stamp fraud as well as shoplifting, it revoked that status in March

2014. It then began removal proceedings. In 2017, Mendizabal conceded removability but

sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture.

   The immigration judge denied all claims for relief. Her asylum claim, he held, was

untimely and not excused by extraordinary circumstances. Her withholding claim also

failed because she had not suffered past persecution and had not shown that her fear of

future persecution was objectively reasonable. And her Convention claim failed because

she had not been tortured and was not more likely than not to be tortured if she returned.

The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed and dismissed her appeal.

   Mendizabal now petitions for review. We review not only the Board’s decision but also

the parts of the immigration judge’s decision to which the Board deferred. Chavarria v.

Gonzales, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006). We lack jurisdiction to review some factual

findings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3), 1252(a)(2)(C). Others we review for substantial

evidence, deferring to them “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to”

reject them. § 1252(b)(4). We review issues of law and constitutional claims de novo. Myrie

v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017).

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   Mendizabal did not seek asylum until November 2017. That was well beyond the one-

year deadline for seeking asylum and more than three years after the government revoked

her temporary protected status, which she did not appeal. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). She

claims that “extraordinary circumstances” excused her delay. § 1158(a)(2)(D). But the

immigration judge and Board rejected that excuse on the facts. And we need not decide

whether Mendizabal’s argument presents a legal or factual question because her argument

lacks merit regardless. See Sukwanputra v. Gonzalez, 434 F.3d 627, 634–35 (3d Cir. 2006).

Although the benefits of temporary protected status can extend during the appeal of a

withdrawal determination, Mendizabal never appealed when her status was withdrawn. See

8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(iv). So her status ended in 2014.

   We likewise lack jurisdiction to review Mendizabal’s withholding-of-removal claim.

She conceded removability because she had been convicted for crimes involving moral

turpitude. The judge found that she would not likely face persecution in El Salvador, and

the Board affirmed. Though she now challenges how they weighed the evidence and labels

her challenge legal, it is factual. So the statute bars our review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).

   Finally, the judge and Board reasonably rejected Mendizabal’s claim that, if removed

to El Salvador, she would more likely than not be tortured. She has not seen her ex-

stepfather in more than two decades and has not heard from him in seven years; he has not

visited any of her family members back in El Salvador either. Indeed, Mendizabal thinks

he is dead. As for the gangs, they never threatened to harm her, and it has been almost three

decades since they harassed her. The judge and Board reasonably relied on this substantial

evidence in rejecting her claim. Though there is country-conditions evidence showing that

                                              3
El Salvador is dangerous in general, none of it proves that she herself is more likely than

not to be tortured. We will thus dismiss her petition to review the denial of her withholding

claim and deny it as to her asylum and Convention claims.

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