Court Opinion

ID: 9533114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:28:30.494984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:54.997770
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McLAREN, dissenting: While I recognize the importance of protecting our children from drug dealers, this court is not at liberty to ignore well-established tenets of statutory construction. The majority correctly notes that, when construing statutes, we must "ascertain legislative intent and give it effect.” (People v. Scharlau (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 180, 192.) However, I disagree with the majority’s method of ascertaining the legislative intent of section 5 — 4(7)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5 — 4(7)(a) (West 1994)). Our supreme court tells us that the first step in ascertaining the meaning of a statute is to look to the language of the statute, which is the best indication of the legislature’s intent. (First of America Bank v. Netsch (1995), 166 Ill. 2d 165, 181.) If the statutory language is clear, our inquiry is complete, and we must give the language effect without resorting to other aids of construction. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum (1994), 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479. The minor in the instant case was charged with violating the Illinois Controlled Substances Act because he allegedly sold a controlled substance at a gas station located within 1,000 feet of a school. The Juvenile Court Act provides that, when a minor commits an offense under section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act while "on a public way” within 1,000 feet of a school, the minor will be subject to criminal prosecution. (705 ILCS 405/5 — 4(7)(a) (West 1994).) Therefore, we must determine whether a gas station is a "pub-lie way.” Our supreme court tells us that a "public way” is a "public highway.” (Mammina v. Alexander Auto Service Co. (1928), 333 Ill. 158, 167 ("[t]he term 'public highway’ includes public ways of every description”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1233 (6th ed. 1990) (the entry under "public way” states, "See Highway (Public highway)”).) Our supreme court defines "public highway” as a "passageway, road or street which every citizen has a right to use,” and states, "[t]he fundamental idea of a highway is that it is a place for uninterrupted passage by men, animals or vehicles.” (Mammina, 333 Ill. at 167.) Moreover, in interpreting the definition of "highway” under the Illinois Vehicle Code, this court has focused on whether the alleged highway is publicly maintained. (People v. Culbertson (1994), 258 Ill. App. 3d 294, 296-97; 625 ILCS 5/1 — 126 (West 1994).) Because a privately owned gas station is not a passageway, road, or street, nor maintained by the public, I conclude that a gas station is not a "public way.” The majority ignores the plain meaning of the clear and unambiguous language of the Juvenile Court Act and erroneously expands the scope of the provision at issue. The majority applies case law which interprets the broader language of the aggravated battery provision to the less inclusive language of the Juvenile Court Act. The majority cites People v. Pugh (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 1030, People v. Williams (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 613, and People v. Ward (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 283, to support its interpretation. However, the courts in these cases construed the meaning of "public way, public property or public place of accommodation or amusement.” I agree that a privately maintained parking lot, for purposes of the aggravated battery statute, is properly considered a "public place of accommodation.” (People v. Lee (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1036; but see People v. Pennington (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 641, 644-45 (erroneously citing Lee for the proposition that a parking lot is a "public way”).) However, in the present case, this court is asked to interpret the language of the Juvenile Court Act, not the more expansive language of the aggravated battery statute. Thus, the task before us is only to interpret the meaning of "public way,” for the legislature limited the Juvenile Court Act to this term (705 ILCS 405/5 — 4(7)(a) (West 1994)). Our task is not to determine whether a gas station is a "public way, public property or public place of accommodation or amusement,” as the majority does by analogizing this case to cases involving aggravated battery. (Emphasis added.) (720 ILCS 5/12 — 4(b)(8) (West 1994) (the aggravated battery statute).) In addition, the majority’s method of statutory construction violates the maxim "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. (See Rochelle Disposal Service, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board (1994), 266 Ill. App. 3d 192, 201 ("the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other”); Bank of Waukegan v. Kischer (1993), 246 Ill. App. 3d 616, 620.) The legislature was aware of the broader language in the aggravated battery statute, yet chose to use less inclusive language in the Juvenile Court Act. Our legislature specifically excluded the terms "public property,” "public place of accommodation,” and "public amusement” from the Juvenile Court Act. This court should not insert words into an enactment (Auto Owners Insurance v. Berkshire (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 695, 698) and should, instead, enforce the clear terms of the Juvenile Court Act as written (Illinois Graphics Co., 159 Ill. 2d at 479). I can readily accept that the legislature, by using the term "public way,” proscribed streets, alleys, roads, parkways, highways, and sidewalks as places where drug trafficking would result in stiffer penalties. If the legislature desired to include public property, public accommodation, or public amusement in the proscription in the Juvenile Court Act, it could easily have inserted these terms. The legislature did not do so. This court may not do so. Therefore, I dissent.