Court Opinion

ID: 9853612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:51:11.048632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:56.213344
License: Public Domain

Justice MEYER
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
As I understand the majority opinion, it holds that neither the repealed N.C.G.S. § 1-15(b) nor its successor N.C.G.S. § 1-52 (16) applies to occupational disease claims in general, and asbestosis claims in particular, in which the diagnosis was made prior to 1 October 1979 and, therefore, that there is no statute of repose applicable to those claims and that the statute of limitations applicable to all occupational disease claims, including asbestosis claims, is the usual three-year statute, N.C.G.S. § 1-52, which begins to run when the disease is “diagnosed.”
*563As to Part I of the majority opinion relating to Owens-Corning in particular, the evidence in plaintiffs forecast that would tend to show exposure to that manufacturer’s product is marginal at best but I would tend to agree with the majority that it is sufficient (though barely so) to survive a motion for summary judgment bottomed on that narrow basis.
I cannot concur in Part II of the majority opinion which concludes that our legislature did not intend that occupational disease cases in general and asbestosis in particular should be covered by the statute of repose contained in the then applicable but later repealed N.C.G.S. § l-15(b). With regard to legislative intent, the majority seems to ascribe to the members of the General Assembly an unawareness of developments in the legal arena in the early 1970s, when that statute was enacted, that I find naive. At that point in time, delayed manifestation injuries, together with the time-delayed product injuries, constituted a giant wave that was breaking upon the courts. Many legal writers say the crest of that wave has now passed us, but I disagree. These two categories of cases may well dominate tort litigation in our courts in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s.
There are an estimated 25,000 asbestosis related suits pending in the United States, with perhaps 1,500 to 2,000 of them pending in the courts of this State and the United States District Courts in North Carolina, and the asbestosis cases are just the tip of the iceberg. Agent Orange plaintiffs are estimated to number 50,000 or more. There are estimated to be over 1,000 DES suits pending, with many more to come as more of the estimated three million DES daughters bring suit. Add to these the so-called cigarette and smokeless tobacco cases, the toxic shock syndrome cases, the atomic veterans radiation cases, the Daikon Shield cases, the toxic waste cases, the formaldehyde cases, the microwave cases, and the cornucopia of other potential “occupational disease” cases; and the problems seem insurmountable.
The onslaught of these cases and the accompanying increase in the number and amount of jury awards are forcing some manufacturers into bankruptcy and resulting in raised insurance premiums of hundreds and even thousands of percent for others. The business and insurance worlds have been permeated by a feeling of crisis. As a result, a majority of state legislatures *564enacted statutes like the repealed N.C.G.S. § l-15(b) and its successor N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16), and federal legislation in the near future is not unlikely. To hold that our legislature intended that occupational disease cases (of all kinds and whatever that term may include) not be covered by the statute of repose if diagnosed prior to 1 October 1979 is nothing short of ludicrous.
Contrary to the majority, I conclude that our legislature specifically intended that the now repealed N.C.G.S. § 145(b) cover asbestosis claims in particular and occupational diseases claims in general. Beyond the inevitable recognition of the burgeoning problem as previously discussed, I find this affirmative expression in the words of the statute itself. The statute of repose then applicable, N.C.G.S. § 145(b) (Interim Supp. 1976, repealed 1979), provided, at all times pertinent to the present case, as follows:
(b) Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action, other than one for wrongful death or one for malpractice arising out of the performance or failure to perform professional services, having as an essential element bodily injury to the person or a defect in or damage to property which originated under circumstances making the injury, defect or damage not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin, is deemed to have accrued at the time the injury was discovered by the claimant, or ought reasonably to have been discovered by him, whichever event first occurs; provided that in such cases the period shall not exceed ten years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.
N.C.G.S. § 145(b) (Interim Supp. 1976).
I find the intent that occupational diseases should be covered in that (1) the statute specifically provided that it should apply “[e]xcept where otherwise provided by statute,” and no other statute provided otherwise for asbestosis claims in civil actions; and (2) the statute also specifically excluded two categories of cases, wrongful death actions and malpractice actions in which the damage or injury was not readily apparent at the time of its origin; thus, it is obvious that although the legislature knew how to exclude from the repose statute certain categories of cases, it *565did not exclude occupational disease claims in general or asbestosis claims in particular.
It is irrefutable that our legislature was well aware of the unique nature of asbestosis and silicosis claims as it had made specific provisions for their uniqueness in numerous parts of the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act. N.C.G.S. § 97-57 through 97-64. Indeed, N.C.G.S. § 97-58(a) specifically provides (with exceptions relating to death claims not pertinent here):
§ 97-58. Claims for certain diseases restricted; time limit for filing claims.
(a) . . . [A]n employer shall not be liable for any compensation for asbestosis unless disablement or death results within ten years of the last exposure to that disease ....
(At the time our legislature adopted the now repealed N.C.G.S. § l-15(b) allowing the filing of civil suits within ten years, the time period in N.C.G.S. § 97-58(a) was only two years from the last exposure.)
Under the majority holding, today, even under the present N.C.G.S. § 97-58(a), the employee covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act whose asbestosis was diagnosed prior to 1 October 1979 is barred after ten years from the last exposure; but the same worker, if not covered by the act, would not be barred by any statute of repose at all and could bring his action within three years of the diagnosis, though that diagnosis be made for the first time a half century or more after the last exposure. Our legislature could not have intended such an absurd result.
If my understanding of the majority opinion is correct, the majority has today removed any time bar whatsoever to a civil action on an asbestosis claim where the diagnosis was prior to 1 October 1979 so long as the claimant files his complaint within three years of the diagnosis. In such cases, the relationship between the claimant’s employment and the diagnosis of the disease is no longer of any importance though the employment relationship may have terminated a half century or more prior to the diagnosis. Nor does it any longer matter in those situations that a claimant’s last exposure was a half century or more prior to diagnosis. Nor that the claimant may have suffered severe respiratory problems for a half century or more — so long as his con*566dition had not been previously diagnosed as “asbestosis.” Nor that the asbestosis claimant has suffered and been treated for a half century, if his condition had been misdiagnosed through the years as another condition.
It should be noted that although the majority opinion restricts its holding to civil actions for asbestosis claims in which the diagnosis was made prior to 1 October 1979 (and those suits must have been filed by 2 October 1982), it applies to literally thousands of claims already in the judicial pipeline. Indeed, we have already identified the possibility of some 1,500 to 2,000 such suits pending in this State.
Having personally concluded that the statute of repose — former N.C.G.S. § 145(b) as written prior to its repeal on 1 October 1979 —is applicable to plaintiffs claim, I would vote to affirm the trial judge’s granting of summary judgment for all defendants. I would also vote to hold that N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16) is applicable to all occupational disease claims in which the diagnosis occurred subsequent to the effective date of 1 October 1979, a fact which the majority seems to concede but does not state.