Court Opinion

ID: 9963350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 07:13:23.213135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:46.773416
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                     EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                          EL PASO, TEXAS

    MARGARET ELIZABETH WESTON,                              §               No. 08-23-00235-CV

                                    Appellant,              §                     Appeal from

    v.                                                      §                Probate Court No. 1

    JONATHAN      BALLENGER       CLUCK, §                                 of Bexar County, Texas
    Independent Executor of the Estate of
    MARGARET       BALLENGER      CLUCK, §                                   (TC# 2023PC00681)
    Deceased,
                                          §
                            Appellee.
                                          §

                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

         Appellant Margaret Elizabeth Weston challenges the probate court’s order appointing her

brother, Appellee Jonathan Ballenger Cluck, as executor of their mother’s estate and admitting her

will to probate. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                                              BACKGROUND

         After Margaret Ballenger Cluck died in February 2023, Mr. Cluck filed an application for

probate of her will and requested letters testamentary in Bexar County probate court.1 Ms. Cluck’s

will appointed her son to serve as a co-executor of her estate, and the other named co-executor

1
 This case was transferred pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
§ 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Fourth Court of Appeals to the extent it might conflict with our own. See
Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.

                                                        1
declined to serve. The application represented that Mr. Cluck was not disqualified from serving as

executor or from accepting letters testamentary, and it attached Ms. Cluck’s will and its self-

proving affidavit.

       Soon after, Ms. Weston filed an opposition to Mr. Cluck’s application, contending

Mr. Cluck was disqualified from being appointed executor and receiving letters testamentary under

the Estates Code. See Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 304.003(a)(5). She stated that the will proffered by

Mr. Cluck “needs to be verified as authentic and that no others are unaccounted for,” noting that

even if the will is admitted, she “reserves her right to challenge it including for undue influence or

revocation.” Ms. Weston also requested a jury trial to determine “disputed material facts”

regarding whether Mr. Cluck was disqualified to serve as the independent executor of Ms. Cluck’s

estate and “whether the Will produced is valid.” Finally, she requested a finding that the estate

needs to be administered and included her counterapplication for letters of administration.

       Several hearings occurred before the application to admit the will to probate. On April 11,

2023, the probate court considered Mr. Cluck’s motion for sanctions and to enforce the order

designating him as the person who had the authority to control the disposition of his mother’s

remains. He filed that motion after Ms. Weston opposed cremation and requested to perform an

autopsy but failed to take steps to accomplish one in the timeframe agreed to by the parties. The

court first considered Lamar Treadwell’s motion to withdraw as Ms. Weston’s attorney, which he

filed after she “terminated [his] representation.” Ms. Weston confirmed at the hearing that she

fired Treadwell then requested a continuance because she “just . . . lost [her] attorney.” The probate

court thoroughly and repeatedly admonished Ms. Weston of the consequences of proceeding

without her attorney, including that her request for a continuance would not be granted given

                                                  2
Mr. Cluck’s opposition and the time-sensitive nature of the issues.2 And the court postponed ruling

on the withdrawal motion, so Ms. Weston could continue to confer and seek advice or

representation from Treadwell throughout the hearing if she so chose. The hearing concluded with

the court setting a final deadline for the autopsy and urging Ms. Weston to hire a lawyer.

        On April 25, the parties convened for a status conference. The court first discharged

Treadwell, as Ms. Weston’s newly hired attorney, Kevin Sralla, was present. After discussing the

autopsy and cremation, the parties turned to setting a date for Mr. Cluck’s application to probate

the will. Sralla confirmed that “[t]here’s not a competing will offered yet,” though he requested

time for discovery “to flush that out.” Counsel for both parties then agreed to a setting before the

probate court judge on May 19 to admit the offered will to probate.

        On May 16, Sralla moved for leave to withdraw as Ms. Weston’s attorney based on his

inability to “effectively communicate” with Ms. Weston, as well as their “fundamental

disagreement” about the direction of his representation. After Ms. Weston received Sralla’s motion

to withdraw, she sent him an email terminating his services. Acting pro se, Ms. Weston filed a

motion for a continuance just before the May 19 hearing to “have the opportunity to retain Board

Certified Counsel in this matter.”

        At the May 19 hearing, Mr. Cluck objected to the continuance based on a lack of notice.

The probate court again thoroughly warned Ms. Weston about the consequences of proceeding pro

se and suggested at least keeping Sralla as her attorney through the hearing, but she insisted that

“Mr. Sralla is fired.” The court thus granted Sralla’s withdrawal in accordance with the termination

of services, excused Sralla from the hearing, and denied Ms. Weston’s motion for continuance.

2
 While the parties disputed when and whether an autopsy would occur, Ms. Cluck’s body remained at the funeral
home for months after her death.

                                                     3
        Next, the court granted Mr. Cluck’s pending “motion in limine,” without opposition, ruling

that Ms. Weston could not put on evidence at the hearing because she failed to respond to four

different discovery requests or provide any disclosures. Mr. Cluck then proved up Ms. Cluck’s

will, and after cross-examination and presentation of argument by Ms. Weston (still acting pro se),

the probate court admitted the will to probate and appointed Mr. Cluck as its independent executor

to serve without bond. The court noted Ms. Weston is “not an heir” nor is she “an individual who

would rely, pursuant to the Will, on [Mr. Cluck’s] deeds as the Executor.” It also stated no “other

Will [has] been produced, nor is there any evidence of another Will in existence before this Court.”

        Ms. Weston filed a motion for new trial on June 19, which was overruled by operation of

law. She then appealed. See Estate of Allen, 658 S.W.3d 772, 776 n.6 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022,

no pet.) (“A probate court order determining who may serve as an independent executor is

appealable because it finally adjudicates a substantial right of the parties in an estate proceeding.”).

                                            DISCUSSION

        Ms. Weston raises four issues on appeal. She contends the probate court abused its

discretion by: (1) permitting Sralla to withdraw at the May 19 hearing; (2) denying her motion for

continuance to allow her time to find another attorney; (3) not holding a jury trial; (4) granting the

motion in limine. Because the first two issues involve related discretionary judgments, we consider

them together.

        A. The probate court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Sralla to withdraw
           or by denying Ms. Weston’s motion for continuance.

        Ms. Weston contends the probate court erred by granting Sralla’s withdrawal and denying

her motion for continuance based on lack of counsel. Specifically, she argues the court failed to

confirm Sralla complied with the professional responsibility rules regarding termination of

representation before granting his withdrawal.

                                                   4
           We review the granting of a motion to withdraw as counsel for abuse of discretion.

Harrison v. Harrison, 367 S.W.3d 822, 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 253 provides:

           [A]bsence of counsel will not be good cause for a continuance or postponement of
           the cause when called for trial, except it be allowed in the discretion of the court,
           upon cause shown or upon matters within the knowledge or information of the
           judge to be stated on the record.

           The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance lies within the trial court’s sound

discretion, and we will not disturb that decision unless the record shows a clear abuse of that

discretion. Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986). When a party seeks a continuance

based on withdrawal of counsel, “movants must show that the failure to be represented at trial was

not due to their own fault or negligence.” Id. “[W]hether the denial of a continuance is so arbitrary

as to violate due process depends on the circumstances in each case.” State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d

91, 95 (Tex. 1984). And in situations involving a trial judge’s discretion, the judge may consider

the entire procedural history of the case.3 Wilborn v. Life Ambulance Servs., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 271,

275 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied).

           A review of the reporter’s records in this case shows that the probate court did not abuse

its discretion in permitting Sralla’s withdrawal and denying Ms. Weston’s motion for continuance.

Despite the probate judge’s thorough admonishments about the consequences of representing

herself, Ms. Weston insisted that she wanted to fire Sralla immediately.4 In response to

Ms. Weston’s request that she have access to her case file, Sralla stated he emailed various

pleadings to her but did not have the entire case file with him at the moment.

3
  We previously granted Mr. Cluck’s motion for leave to supplement the record with reporter’s records from the
April 11 and April 25 hearings and invited the parties to submit letter briefs as to the relevance of those materials.
Because the probate judge could consider the entire procedural history of the case in exercising his discretion, these
records are relevant to our consideration of this case.
4
    Though Ms. Weston asserts that she fired Sralla “for cause,” this distinction is immaterial given the record.

                                                             5
         Ms. Weston failed to establish that her lack of representation at the May 19 hearing was

not due to her own fault. Villegas, 711 S.W.2d at 626. Indeed, the probate judge noted that

Ms. Weston’s firing her attorney then attempting to secure a continuance at the May 19 hearing

was the same method she attempted at the April 11 hearing. Noting that Ms. Weston’s request for

her case file at the hearing “could be used as a subterfuge each time at the midnight hour,” the

probate judge granted Sralla’s withdrawal based on his termination.5

         Given the circumstances presented and the procedural history of the case, we conclude the

court did not err in permitting Sralla’s withdrawal based on his termination and denying

Ms. Weston’s motion for continuance based on absence of counsel. Id.; Tex. R. Civ. P. 253.

         Issues one and two are overruled.

         B. The probate court did not abuse its discretion by declining to conduct a jury trial.

         Next, Ms. Weston contends the probate court abused its discretion by failing to hold a jury

trial on the “material fact issues” in Mr. Cluck’s application for admission of the will to probate

and appointment of himself as executor, pointing to her request for a jury trial in her opposition to

the same. We review the denial of a jury demand for abuse of discretion. Mercedes-Benz Credit

Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996).

         Ms. Weston’s relevant pleading on file was her opposition to Mr. Cluck’s application for

admission of the will to probate, in which she requested a jury trial under Texas Estates Code

§ 301.101. At the April 25 status conference, Sralla (while still representing Ms. Weston) did not

counter Mr. Cluck’s attorney’s representation of the case as “not a Will Contest,” and instead “a

challenge to the suitability of [Mr. Cluck] to be appointed as the Independent Executor.” Sralla

agreed that “[t]here’s not a competing Will offered yet” and requested time for discovery. Then,

5
 That is, the probate judge granted Sralla’s withdrawal based on Ms. Weston’s termination of his services, not for any
other voluntary withdrawal reason.

                                                          6
Sralla consented to a setting before the judge to probate the will, agreeing that “30 minutes is

reasonable” and coordinating with court staff on scheduling. Without addressing the issue of

whether Ms. Weston even had a jury-trial right at this juncture, the right to a jury trial may be

waived or withdrawn by agreeing to a bench trial. In re Montelongo, 586 S.W.3d 513, 518 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding). By agreeing to a bench setting, Ms. Weston

withdrew her prior request for a jury trial for this hearing.6 The probate court did not abuse its

discretion in proceeding with a bench trial for the May 19 hearing.

         Issue three is overruled.

         C. The probate court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.

         Finally, Ms. Weston contends the probate court abused its discretion by granting

Mr. Cluck’s motion in limine. She argues the probate court erroneously denied her a hearing on

the motion, treated the motion in limine as a motion to exclude evidence, and prohibited her from

offering evidence at the May 19 hearing. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion. U-Haul Int’l., Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 132 (Tex. 2012).

         A review of the record makes clear that the probate court did not abuse its discretion. The

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide trial courts with the authority to prohibit parties who fail

to comply with discovery requests from introducing evidence that was not timely disclosed. See,

e.g., Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6(a) (“A party who fails to make, amend, or supplement a discovery

response, including a required disclosure, in a timely manner may not introduce in evidence the

material or information that was not timely disclosed . . . .”); 215.2(b)(4) (“If a party . . . fails to

comply with proper discovery requests . . . the court in which the action is pending may, after

6
 To be clear, this has no bearing on Ms. Weston’s right to request a jury trial for any will contest she has the right to
bring, as applicable, within the limitations period. See Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 256.204.

                                                           7
notice and hearing, make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, . . . [including] an order

. . . prohibiting [the noncomplying party] from introducing designated matters in evidence[.]”).

        Here, Mr. Cluck served Ms. Weston with interrogatories and requests for production on

April 10, and served a second request for production on April 18. He sought discovery in part

based on Ms. Weston’s claims regarding undue influence, lack of testamentary capacity, and

Mr. Cluck’s purported unsuitability to serve as executor. Ms. Weston did not respond to these

requests, nor did she make the requisite initial disclosures. So Mr. Cluck filed a “motion in limine”

to exclude any evidence that would have been responsive to these requests.

        At the May 19 hearing, Mr. Cluck’s attorney noted that Ms. Weston had not filed any

opposition to the motion in limine and accordingly requested that the court prohibit her from

introducing evidence based on her failure to respond to discovery. When granting the motion in

limine, the court confirmed that Ms. Weston would not be permitted to “produce any evidence in

opposition, as she has not followed the appropriate Rules of Procedure”; however, it would still

“let her make argument.” Then, when Ms. Weston attempted to introduce evidence at the hearing,

Mr. Cluck’s attorney objected based on that ruling (and on other evidentiary objections, such as

hearsay).7 For example, Ms. Weston attempted to introduce an affidavit, which she tendered to

Mr. Cluck’s attorney, who objected to its admission based on the court’s ruling on the motion in

limine, hearsay, and relevance. The trial court then sustained Mr. Cluck’s attorney’s objections.

Thus, the record does not support Ms. Weston’s argument on appeal that the probate court

prohibited her from attempting to introduce evidence at the hearing. Ms. Weston has failed to

establish that the probate court abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.

7
  Ms. Weston attempted to introduce three affidavits by individuals who were specifically covered by Mr. Cluck’s
discovery requests.

                                                       8
       Issue four is overruled.

                                            CONCLUSION

       For the above reasons, we affirm the probate court’s order.

                                              LISA J. SOTO, Justice

April 22, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

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