Court Opinion

ID: 9440332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 16:07:46.42318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.208760
License: Public Domain

J-S18001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: T.P., A MINOR   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: V.P., MOTHER             :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :   No. 179 EDA 2023

           Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2022
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
          Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000946-2019

 IN THE INTEREST OF: T.L.-A.P.-A., A :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: V.P., MOTHER             :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :   No. 180 EDA 2023

          Appeal from the Decree Entered December 16, 2022
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
          Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000009-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: T.R., A MINOR :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                   :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                   :
 APPEAL OF: V.P., MOTHER           :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :     No. 181 EDA 2023

           Appeal from the Order Entered December 14, 2022
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
          Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000947-2019

 IN THE INTEREST OF: T.R., A MINOR :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                   :          PENNSYLVANIA
J-S18001-23

                                               :
  APPEAL OF: V.P., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 182 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered December 14, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000010-2022

  IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M.P., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: V.P., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 184 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered December 16, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000011-2022

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                           FILED AUGUST 03, 2023

       In this consolidated appeal, V.P. (“Mother”) appeals the Philadelphia

Court of Common Pleas’ decrees terminating her parental rights to her minor

children, T.P., T.R. and L.P, and the court’s orders changing T.P.’s and T.R.’s

permanency placement goal from reunification to adoption. Appointed counsel

has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

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an application to withdraw from representation. We grant counsel’s application

to withdraw, and affirm the orphans’ court’s orders.

       Mother has at least six children; however, this appeal concerns only

three of Mother’s children, T.R. (born in 2017), L.P. (born in 2019) and T.P.

(born in 2011).1 T.P. and L.P. are both placed in the same pre-adoptive foster

home. T.R. is placed with a separate foster family, though two of his other

siblings also live in that pre-adoptive home.

       In 2016, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”)

received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report after Mother was late

picking up one of her children from daycare and appeared intoxicated when

she did arrive. Then, in February 2017, DHS received another GPS report after

Mother gave birth to T.R. At that time, T.R. tested positive for cocaine and

Mother tested positive for, among other substances, alcohol. DHS began in-

home services through a Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”).

       In May 2019, Mother once again failed to pick up her children, including

T.P. and T.R., from daycare. CUA implemented safety plans for the children,

and they were placed with either their material aunt or maternal grandmother.

The children, including T.P. and T.R., were eventually reunited with Mother.

       Mother gave birth to L.P. in December 2019, and DHS received another

GPS report that same day. Mother admitted to using cocaine and alcohol

____________________________________________

1 T.R., T.P. and L.P. have different biological fathers, and none of the fathers

are parties to this appeal.

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during her pregnancy with L.P. DHS once again developed a safety plan for

the children and eventually obtained an Order for Protective Custody for the

children, including T.R., T.P. and L.P., and they were placed in foster care.

      DHS filed dependency petitions for the children, and on March 12, 2020,

T.R., T.P. and L.P. were adjudicated dependent and committed to the custody

of DHS. Mother was given line-of-sight and line-of-hearing supervised

visitation, and ordered, among other things, to undergo random drug and

alcohol screens and was referred for mental health and substance abuse

treatment and parenting education.

      After a permanency review hearing in September 2020, the court found

Mother had missed nine out of ten visits with her children. Mother continued

to cancel or miss her visits, and the court found after a November 2021

permanency review hearing that Mother had been minimally compliant with

the permanency plan.

      CUA also revised Mother’s single case plan in November 2021, outlining

several objectives for Mother, including that she participate in CUA services,

participate in outpatient mental health and substance abuse treatment, and

attend the supervised visits with her children. Mother continued to fail to meet

her objectives.

      On January 5, 2022, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

Mother’s parental rights to T.R. The orphans’ court held a hearing on

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September 28, 2022, which Mother did not attend.2 At the hearing, Crystal

Atkins, the CUA supervisor for the family, testified. She explained that DHS

initially became involved with Mother and the children because there were

parental capacity and substance abuse concerns with Mother. See N.T.,

9/28/2022, at 9. Atkins reported Mother’s visitation with her children,

including T.R., had been inconsistent at best, with Mother frequently canceling

the scheduled visits. See id. at 16-17, 19. In fact, Atkins recounted that

Mother had not visited with the children, including T.R., since May 2022. See

id. at 20.

       Atkins testified Mother failed to attend her random substance screens,

and she suspected Mother attended visits with her children while high. See

id. at 21-22. Atkins also stated she had seen Mother actively using drugs. See

id. She reported that, to her knowledge, Mother was not currently enrolled in

nor had she completed any drug or alcohol or mental health treatment

program. See id. at 22-23, 24.

       Atkins rated Mother’s compliance with her single case plan objectives as

“none” and rated her progress towards alleviating the circumstances which

brought T.R. into care as “none.” See id. at 29. Atkins testified T.R. does not

ask to see Mother, and would not, in her opinion, suffer irreparable harm

____________________________________________

2 We point out that the notes of testimony from this hearing were not included

in the certified record originally sent to this Court. However, upon informal
inquiry, our Prothonotary was able to obtain the notes of testimony, and
subsequently placed them in the certified record.

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should termination occur as Mother and T.R. do not have a parent-child bond.

See id. at 30, 45.

       At the end of the hearing, the court found Mother had not “demonstrated

any willingness to comply with her single case plan objectives in any

meaningful way.” Id. at 76. The court further found DHS had presented clear

and convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights to T.R. should be

terminated pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8)

and (b). However, the court held the best interest analysis pursuant to Section

2511(b) in abeyance to see if it was possible to discern T.R.’s wishes regarding

adoption.

       The court then held another hearing on December 14, 2022, to

determine whether termination was in the best interests of T.R. The court

heard testimony from Atkins3 that T.R. was doing well in his pre-adoptive

foster home, where his needs were being met and he had a loving relationship

with his foster father. See N.T., 12/14/2022, at 6-7.

       Roya Paller, the family’s caseworker, also testified. According to Paller,

given Mother’s inconsistent visitation, there is “nothing to cut off” as far as a

bond between Mother and T.R. See id. at 14, 15. Paller reported T.R. is happy

in his current foster home, where his needs are being met and where two of

his siblings live. See id. at 12-13; id. at 13 (Paller stating, “He’s so excited to

____________________________________________

3 The notes of testimony from this hearing mistakenly spell Atkins’s last name

as “Adkins.”

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be with his sisters.”). In addition, Paller stated that T.R. called his foster father

“Dad.” See id. at 13.

       Paller informed the court she had spoken to T.R. about adoption.

Although T.R. was only five years old and had an educational IEP, Paller

testified T.R. was nonetheless “able to clearly identify who he wanted to be

with.” Id. He expressed that he wanted to remain with his foster father and

siblings and wanted his foster home to be his “forever” home. See id. at 13,

14; Id. at 15 (Paller agreeing that T.R.’s “whole world is right there” with his

foster dad and siblings). Paller testified the foster father wishes to adopt T.R.,

as well as the two siblings. See id. at 14.

       The orphans’ court reiterated it had previously found DHS had proven

four statutory grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a). The court

then also found it was in the best interests to terminate Mother’s parental

rights to T.R. In support, the court noted that T.R. had no parental relationship

with Mother. See id. at 18. Instead, he looked to his foster father, whom he

called “Dad,” to meet his needs, and the foster father was meeting all of those

needs in his “loving pre-adoptive home.” Id. The court entered a decree

terminating Mother’s parental rights to T.R. that same day, on December 14,

2022.4 It also entered an order changing T.R.'s permanency placement goal

to adoption.

____________________________________________

4 The court also involuntarily terminated T.R.’s biological father’s parental
rights.

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      DHS also filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental

rights to T.P. and another petition to terminate her parental rights to L.P. on

January 5, 2022. The court held a hearing on these petitions two days after it

terminated Mother’s parental rights to T.R., on December 16, 2022.

      Atkins, the family’s CUA supervisor, also testified at this hearing. She

reported Mother had stopped cooperating with CUA around May 2022. See

N.T., 12/16/2022, at 14. According to Atkins, Mother had also not visited T.P.

or L.P. since May 2022 and her visits were inconsistent before that. See id.

at 14, 16, 18. Like she had at the termination hearing for T.R., Atkins testified

she had concerns Mother was under the influence of substances when she did

visit the children, and that she was aware Mother was currently using drugs.

See id. at 20. Atkins reported Mother had never provided documentation that

she had completed any drug and alcohol treatment, or provided any clean

drug or alcohol screens. See id. at 20, 21.

      Atkins once again rated Mother’s compliance with her single case plan

objectives as “none,” and rated her progress towards alleviating the

circumstances that led to placement of T.P. and L.P. as “none.” Id. at 25-26.

      Atkins further testified that T.P., who was in the fifth grade at the time,

was happy and doing well in her foster home and called her foster mother

“Mom.” See id. at 31-32. Atkins believed it was in the best interests of T.P.

to be adopted. See id. at 31. Atkins stated she would rule out reunification,

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and that although T.P. was “aware” of Mother, she wanted to be adopted by

her foster mother. See id. at 26.

      Caseworker Paller also testified at this hearing. She reported T.P. “very

much wanted to be adopted.” Id. at 35. Paller did not have any doubts that

T.P. should be adopted by her foster mother, who is “absolutely willing” to

adopt T.P. Id. at 38.

      As for L.P., Atkins noted that L.P., who was three years old, had been

in care since he was only a few weeks old. See id. at 85. Atkins stated that

L.P. looked to his foster mother for all of his needs, and called her “Mom.” See

id. at 81, 82. The foster home “is all that he knows.” Id. at 26. In her opinion,

L.P. would not suffer any harm if Mother’s rights to him were terminated as

the two had no bond. See id. at 26, 80-81. Paller essentially echoed this

testimony, adding that when she spoke with L.P. about adoption, it was clear

he identified his foster mother as his mom and this was the home he wanted

to be in as it was the only home he had ever known. See id. at 92-93.

      Mother appeared in the middle of the hearing and acted disruptive

throughout the rest of the hearing. She did testify. She admitted she had not

visited her children since at least July 2022. See id. at 43. She conceded she

was no longer participating in mental health treatment, nor was she actively

engaged in drug and alcohol treatment. See id. at 45-46, 58. She also told

the court she was pregnant, but had nonetheless continued drinking and had

consumed alcohol as recently as the day before the hearing. See id. at 50,

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58, 64. She testified she tried to have L.P. see her as a friend, and had not

seen L.P. since “springtime” or “March.” See id. at 96-97. She offered a wide

variety of reasons for her noncompliance with her objectives throughout her

testimony.

       Following the close of testimony, the court found DHS had proven

Mother’s conduct warranted termination of her parental rights to T.P. pursuant

to Section 2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8) and (b), and it entered an

order to that effect the same day.5 In addition, the court entered an order

changing T.P.’s permanency placement goal to adoption.

       As for L.P., the court entered another order terminating Mother’s

parental rights to L.P., also pursuant to Section 2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5)

and (a)(8) and (b). The court, however, retained L.P.’s placement goal as

“return to guardian” so that CUA could engage in outreach with L.P.’s biological

father, who was incarcerated. See Permanency Review Order, 12/16/2022, at

2.

       Mother filed a notice of appeal from each of the orders terminating her

parental rights to T.R., T.P. and L.P., as well as from the orders changing T.R.

and T.P.’s permanency placement goal to adoption. Mother attached her

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement to each of the orders. In response, the court

issued three separate Rule 1925(a) opinions, one each for T.R., T.P. and L.P.,

____________________________________________

5 The court also entered an order terminating T.P.’s biological father’s parental

rights to her.

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referring this Court to the statements it made on the record at the termination

hearings to support its rulings.

       This Court subsequently entered an order consolidating the matters.

Counsel filed an application to withdraw, as well as an Anders brief, asserting

that Mother did not have any non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal.

       As a threshold matter, we have reviewed counsel’s brief and application

and conclude that they meet the requirements set forth for counsel seeking

to withdraw from representation in involuntary termination matters. See

Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 879-880 (Pa. Super. 2014); In

re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders briefing

criteria to first appeals by indigent parents represented by court-appointed

counsel in involuntary termination matters).6 Accordingly, we turn to our own

review    of   the   appeal    to   determine      if   it   is   wholly   frivolous.   See

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating

____________________________________________

6 Specifically, counsel seeking to withdraw from representation under Anders

must file a brief that: 1) provides a summary of the procedural history and
facts; 2) refers to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
supports the appeal; and 3) sets forth counsel’s conclusions that the appeal
is frivolous, and the reasons for that conclusion. See id. Counsel must also
provide a copy of the Anders brief to her client, with an accompanying letter
that advises the client of her right to: 1) retain new counsel to pursue the
appeal; 2) proceed pro se; or 3) raise additional points deemed worthy of the
Court’s attention. See Orellana, 86 A.3d at 880. Mother’s counsel’s original
letter was insufficient, and this Court entered an order on April 21, 2023
directing counsel to send a new letter to Mother complying with the
requirements of Anders, along with a copy of the Anders brief and a copy of
counsel’s application to withdraw. Counsel responded to the Court’s order on
April 27, 2023, and the response substantially complies with the Court’s order.

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that once this Court determines that counsel's application and brief satisfy

Anders, the Court must then conduct its own review of the appeal to

determine if it is wholly frivolous).

      In doing so, we agree with Mother’s counsel that there are no non-

frivolous issues to raise on appeal. In her Anders brief, counsel identified two

potential issues for appeal, essentially that the orphans’ court erred by finding

that DHS had presented sufficient evidence to support four of the statutory

grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) and had erred by finding that

termination and a goal change was in the children’s best interests.

      When this Court reviews an order of an orphans’ court terminating

parental rights, we must accept the findings of fact and credibility

determinations of the court as long as the record supports them. See In the

Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 911 (Pa. Super. 2020). If the findings of

fact are supported by the record, this Court may only reverse the order if the

orphans’ court made an error of law or abused its discretion. See id.

      Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. Under Section 2511, the orphans’

court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.

See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). Initially, the court must

find that the party seeking termination has proven by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies any one of the eleven statutory

grounds set forth for termination under Section 2511 (a). See id.; 23 Pa.

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C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(1-11). If the orphans’ court finds that one of those

subsections has been satisfied, it must then, pursuant to Section 2511(b),

make a determination of the needs and the welfare of the child under the best

interests of the child standard. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511; 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(b).

      Here, regarding the first prong of the analysis, the orphans' court found

DHS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s conduct met

the grounds for termination of her parental rights to T.R., T.P. and L.P. under

Section 2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8). This Court need only agree

with the orphans’ court that DHS met its burden as to any one subsection in

order to affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we conclude the orphans’ court

correctly determined DHS met its burden pursuant to Section 2511 (a)(8),

which provides that parental rights may involuntarily be terminated on the

grounds that:

             The child has been removed from the care of the
             parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
             with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
             the date of removal or placement, the conditions
             which led to the removal or placement of the child
             continue to exist and termination of parental rights
             would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

      Under Section 2511(a)(8), then, DHS was required to produce clear and

convincing evidence that: (1) T.R., T.P. and L.P. had been removed from

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Mother’s care for at least 12 months; (2) the conditions which led to the

removal of T.R., T.P. and L.P. continue to exist; and (3) the termination of

Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of T.R., T.P.

and L.P. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa.

Super. 2003). We have explained that:

     Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to
     remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the
     court. Once the 12-month period has been established, the court
     must next determine whether the conditions that led to the
     [children’s] removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable
     good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time
     period. Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require
     the court to evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to
     remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the
     availability or efficacy of Agency services.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations and quotation

marks omitted).

     Here, the orphans’ court noted that T.R., T.P. and L.P. had been

removed from Mother’s care for well over twelve months, given that they were

removed from her care in January 2020 and the termination hearings took

place in September and December 2022. As to whether the conditions that led

to their removal continued to exist, the court noted that Mother had

completely stopped visiting the children on the heels of what had been very

inconsistent visitation, continued to drink and had continued substance abuse

concerns despite being pregnant, and failed to engage in her case plan

objectives in any meaningful way.

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      The record supports these conclusions. Therefore, like Mother’s counsel,

we see no abuse of discretion or error of law in the orphans’ court’s conclusion

that T.R., T.P. and L.P. had been out of care for almost three years and

therefore way longer than the 12-month timeframe prescribed by Section

2511 (a)(8) and that the conditions which led to the placement of the three

children continue to exist. Accordingly, we agree the orphans’ court did not

err in concluding DHS had established the first two prongs of the Section

2511(a)(8) test.

      The third prong of the test under Section 2511(a)(8) required the

orphans’ court to determine that termination of Mother’s rights would best

serve the needs and welfare of T.R., T.P. and L.P. As noted above, Section

2511(b) also required the court to conduct a needs and welfare analysis of

T.R., T.P. and L.P.

      “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved

in the inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d

1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). In determining a child’s

needs and welfare, the orphans’ court is required to consider “whatever bonds

may exist between the children and [the natural parent], as well as the

emotional effect that termination will have upon the children.” In re Adoption

of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 229 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). At the

same time, the court should also consider the intangibles,

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such as the “love, comfort, security, and stability,” the child might have with

the foster parent. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 760 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted).

      Here, the orphans’ court found that there was no evidence to support a

finding that any parent-child bond existed between Mother and any of the

three children, T.R., T.P. or L.P. Mother had completely stopped visiting the

children months before the termination hearings took place and even told the

court she tried to have L.P. see her as a friend rather than a parent.

      Moreover, as the orphans’ court noted, there was testimony credited by

the orphans’ court that T.R., T.P. and L.P. were all doing well in their foster

home, and had bonded with their foster parent, with T.R. calling his foster

father “Dad” and T.P. and L.P. each calling their foster mother “Mom.” L.P.

viewed his foster home as his “forever home” and T.R. and T.P. both indicated

they wished to remain with, and be adopted by, their respective foster parent.

      Based on all of these factors, the orphans’ court found that it was in the

best interests of T.R., T.P. and L.P. to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

Again, we agree with Mother’s counsel that there is no abuse of discretion or

error in this conclusion, which is amply supported by the record.

      We also agree with Mother’s counsel to the extent she asserts in her

Anders brief that any claim Mother would raise that the orphans’ court erred

by changing T.R.’s and T.P.’s permanency placement goals to adoption would

not warrant any relief.

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      In considering a petition for goal change, a court shall consider: 1) the

continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; 2) the extent

of compliance with the single case plan objectives; 3) the extent of progress

made towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original

placement; 4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement

goal for the child; and 5) a likely date by which the goal of the child might be

achieved. See In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008); see also 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). The court must focus on the safety, permanency, and

well-being of the child, see In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 978 (citation omitted),

and the agency seeking the goal change, DHS in this case, must demonstrate

that changing the child’s goal to adoption would be in the best interests of the

child. See In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 573 (Pa. 2011).

      Here, for all of the reasons discussed above, we can discern no abuse

of discretion in the court’s conclusion that it was in the best interests of T.R.

and T.P. to change their permanency placement goal to adoption. See In re

A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 532-533 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that the appellate

court must employ an abuse of discretion standard of review when reviewing

an orphans’ court’s order changing a dependent child’s placement goal to

adoption). To recap in brief, the children were removed from Mother’s care for

almost three years and yet, the orphans’ court found Mother had made no

progress in alleviating the circumstances which led to their removal. In

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addition, both T.R. and T.P. are with loving foster parents who wish to adopt

them and give them the stability and permanency they deserve.

     In sum, we agree with Mother’s counsel that the record supports the

orphans’ court’s orders on appeal and there are no non-frivolous issues to

raise on appeal. We therefore grant counsel’s application to withdraw from

representation, and affirm the orders terminating Mother’s parental rights to

T.R., T.P. and L.P. and the orders changing T.R. and T.P.’s permanency

placement goal to adoption.

     Application to withdraw granted. Orders affirmed.

     President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins the memorandum.

     Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/3/2023

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