Court Opinion

ID: 9861231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:49:55.767272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:49.068274
License: Public Domain

DICKSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The partial reversal of judgment by the Court of Appeals did not require or contemplate a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the division of the marital estate because it was inconsistent with the trial court's own finding that the property should be equally divided and because the ordered division was partially based upon a clearly erroneous finding that the respondent/wife was the owner of an annuity contract, despite undisputed contrary evidence. Correction of this error does not require further hearing for the receipt of additional evidence, but instead only a reformulation of the final order dividing the marital estate to achieve the intended equal division.
The Court of Appeals found further error in the trial court's evaluation of household goods and a Peterbilt truck. As to the household goods, the evidence valued the goods from a low of $1,697.00 to a high of $7,448.00. Finding the household goods to have "negligible value," the trial court did not assign any value to the goods in the final division of property. Because of this failure to attribute value, the Court of Appeals remanded so that the final division of property would include a value for the household goods. However, there remains no need for receipt of further evidence. The trial court may comply with the mandate of the Court of Appeals by simply adjusting the final property distribution accordingly.
The final aspect of the remand from the Court of Appeals was to correct an error in determining the value of the Peterbilt truck. The trial court's finding as to the truck's "equity value" was determined to be' inconsistent with the evidence. Just as in the previous issues, the trial court may fully comply with the remand order by correctly valuing the truck consistent with the evidence already presented.
Because the remand from the Court of Appeals does not necessitate further hearing and receipt of evidence, I would find that a change of judge pursuant to Ind.Trial Rule 76(5) is not required.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.