Court Opinion

ID: 9790367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:52:14.662334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.244875
License: Public Domain

GRABER, J.
pro tempore, dissenting.
I do not agree with the majority that either ORS 161.067(1) or (2) precludes the merger of defendant’s convictions. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly notes that an attempted theft, as well as a completed one, can be the predicate for a robbery conviction. ORS 164.395(1). It does not follow, however, that the theft statute requires proof of an element, a completed taking, that the robbery statute does not and that merger is, therefore, foreclosed by ORS 161.067(1).
This case is different from State v. Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 779 P2d 600 (1989), and State v. Atkinson, 98 Or App 48, 777 P2d 1010 (1989), on which the majority relies. The offenses in those cases necessarily and invariably involved elements that were not common to one another. Here, in contrast, the robbery statute expressly makes both theft and attempted theft included offenses of robbery. The only support that the majority has for its conclusion is that, sometimes, robbery can be proved by establishing an attempted theft rather than a completed theft. That does not alter the fact that when, as here, a completed theft occurred and is proved, it has no element that is not common to the ensuing robbery. The theoretical possibility that the state could have proven a different included offense is irrelevant to the analysis.
Moreover, had the state proven only attempted theft, it would be beyond question that all of the elements of that offense would necessarily be common to robbery and that the robbery and the attempted theft would merge. The majority’s reasoning thus leads to a nonsensical result: There are two crimes that, by statute, are both included offenses of robbery; one would merge with robbery, but the other would not. I do not believe that ORS 161.067(1) was meant to have that absurd effect.
State v. Cheney, 92 Or App 633, 759 P2d 1119 (1988), on which the majority also relies, helps it even less. Cheney *454holds simply that the special provision in ORS 161.062, under which theft and burglary would merge notwithstanding their different elements, was impliedly repealed by ORS 161.067, which was enacted later and omits that provision. However, theft and burglary never have common elements under the defining statutes: Theft requires proof of a taking, while the intent to take is the comparable element of burglary. The robbery statute provides that a completed theft, along with additional elements, constitutes robbery. In other words, theft cannot be an included offense of burglary, but it is an included offense of robbery. That is the precise reason why the merger of theft and robbery is permitted by ORS 161.067(1).
ORS 161.067(2) presents a closer question. Again, however, I cannot agree with the majority’s application of the statute. It is correct, as the majority notes, that there were separate victims of defendant’s violations of two statutes. Nevertheless, the majority dances around the fact that there were two statutes violated. ORS 161.067(2) is very clearly limited to circumstances where the defendant’s conduct violates only one statutory provision. The majority reasons that, if defendant’s two convictions merge for purposes of subsection (1), then he is stuck with only one offense for purposes of subsection (2). The majority’s footwork is fancy, but it does not succeed. The statute plainly refers and applies only to “conduct * * * violating only one statutory provision,” not to the number of convictions that result from that conduct.
The majority seeks to bolster its reading of the statute by quoting the dictum in State v. Crotsley, supra, that describes various situations, including those in which a “single criminal episode involves multiple victims.” 308 Or at 276. The majority reasons that, because the dictum does not go on to say anything about a single statutory provision, it is contrary to my view that ORS 161.067(2) applies only when there are multiple victims of a defendant’s violation of a single provision. The problem with the majority’s reliance is that it misunderstands the dictum as referring to what “the statute was intended to address.” (102 Or App at 452, n 5; emphasis supplied.) The dictum says nothing about the statute. Its context is:
“Prior to enactment of ORS 161.062, and in the absence of clear statutory guidance, the courts fashioned judicial rules to *455address circumstances in which a single criminal episode provides grounds for multiple convictions and sentences. These include situations [among them, the one quoted by the majority].” 308 Or at 276.
In short, the dictum does not purport to interpret ORS 161.067 or its predecessor, ORS 161.062. It simply describes, in general terms, one of the multiple offense/multiple victim problems that the courts had attempted to resolve before the legislature and the people tried their hands through ORS 161.062 and ORS 161.067, respectively. The majority’s resort to Crotsley thus does not aid its attempt to read the words “though violating only one statutory provision” out of the statute or to construe the words as not meaning what they plainly say.
Having disposed of the words of the statute, the majority closes by discussing the statutory purpose and intent. I might agree that, to whatever extent the intent behind an initiative measure can be discerned, ORS 161.067(2) was meant to cover situations like this one. Nevertheless, neither the majority nor I find any authority for the proposition that, in construing popularly enacted legislation, the courts may do what they cannot do in interpreting the legislature’s acts, i.e., replace the plain words of the statute with some perceived legislative intent that is contrary to what the statute says.
Defendant’s crimes do not come within the merger preclusions of ORS 161.067(1) or (2), and the trial court erred by not merging the convictions.1
I dissent.
*456Joseph, Chief Judge, joins in this dissent.

 ORS 161.067(1) and (2) do not foreclose merger. The next question is the effect of the non-application of the statute. It may be argued that, if defendant’s crimes do not meet one of the statutory tests, then there cannot be separately punishable offenses. On the other hand, in that situation, we might next look at the cases that predate the enactment of the statute, to determine whether there are separately punishable offenses. See State v. Crotsley, supra, 308 Or at 278. We need not decide in this case which approach is correct, because they lead to the same result here. Under prior law, as we have stated:
“A person cannot be separately convicted and sentenced for robbery based on taking the victim’s property and theft based on taking the same property.” State v. Applegate, 39 Or App 17, 24, 591 P2d 371, rev den 287 Or 301 (1979).
See also State v. McNamer, 80 Or App 418, 722 P2d 51 (1986); State v. Atkinson, 80 Or App 54, 722 P2d 9, rev den 302 Or 36 (1986); State v. Papineau, 53 Or App 33, 37 n 5, 630 P2d 904, rev den 291 Or 662 (1981).