Court Opinion

ID: 9827419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:32:11.424776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:31.111299
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[11] Our attention is called to the fact that the only exception made by appellant to paragraph 12 of the charge was as follows:
“Defendant excepts to paragraph 12 for the reason that the same does not charge the law raising the issue of assumed risk as developed by the evidence, as fully appears from special charges requested by defendant upon the issue.”
It is contended that this exception fails to point out the defects to the charge criticized in our opinion, and therefore such defects were waived; hence that the court was not required to give either of the special charges, the refusal to give which is set up as error in assignments 15 and 16, which were sustained by us. In this connection, it further appears that, in excepting to the failure to give the special charges, no reasons are set out which would have apprised the court of appellant’s theory concerning the general charge. We conclude that the objections stated by us to the general charge should have been named in the exception thereto, and, - not having been mentioned, were waived, and, that being the case, the court could see no necessity for giving, a' special charge on assumed risk. Having prepared a charge which was only excepted to in general terms, and being left to compare it with the special charges to ascertain if in fact it was defective, he cannot be held to have erred for failing to note and correct the defects, or for refusing to give special charges which might be regarded as unduly emphasizing the defense of assumed risk.
[12] This conclusion makes it necessary for us to decide whether there was misconduct of the jury such as requires a reversal of this case. The juror Reifel testified, and it is not contradicted, that he and Cohen were about the only jurors who were in favor of a very low amount; that it was discussed in the jury room that the |attomeys had a contract with the plaintiff and would get half of the amount of the verdict; that a few of them thought the attorneys had a contract with the man, and “they thought they would give the man enough to satisfy him; they thought the attorneys would get about half.” This juror’s testimony is not very satisfactory; in fact, it appears that he was very unwilling, or else did not understand the questions asked him. On cross-examination, being asked whether he considered any evidence at all except that admitted by the judge, he answered that he did not. Cohen was asked to state whether there was “any statement and consideration made by the jury as to the amount of attorneys’ fees or if any amount awarded would have to be paid to the attorneys, to which he replied: “Xes, sir; there *814was.” Being asked to state what it was, he said: “Well, several jurors remarked that probably he would have to give half of it to the lawyers, and the reason for giving him so much was on that account.” He was then asked:' “On that account?” To which he replied: “Tes, sir.” On cross-examination he testified that the jurors making the statements were just stating their opinions, and did not purport to state facts they knew. He also testified that he took an oath introduced upon the trial of the cause, and nothing influenced him, except the judge’s charge and the evidence. While the juror, upon cross-examination, made the general statement that he observed his oath, which was natural, his testimony shows clearly that he was influenced by the belief that the attorneys would get half. He was one of those in favor of a very low amount; he says the reason for giving plaintiff so much was on account of such belief. Many jurors do not realize the impropriety of taking such matters into consideration, and, after doing so, do not realize that they have not tried the case upon the evidence admitted by the court. This fact makes it difficult to get a trial such as the law contemplates; hence the appellate courts have been very reluctant to deprive plaintiff of his verdict, unless it clearly appears that the amount was influenced by the discussion and consideration of'improper matters. But when it clearly appears that matters have been considered and given weight, which, if permitted to be proved upon the trial, over objection by the other party, would reverse the case, regardless of any proof that they were giv.en weight by the jury, there remains no alternative, except to hold that a material error has occurred. The conviction forces itself upon our minds, upon reading the testimony of these jurors, and the others, that the matter of attorneys’ fees was considered by these two at least in arriving, at the amount of the verdict, and that the consideration thereof caused them to agree upon the large amount awarded in this case. As was said by Chief Justice Ely in the case of Traction Co. v. Casanova, 154 S. W. 1190, in speaking of denials by jurors of being influenced by discussions of the character indulged in:
“We see no particular force in such denial, because the influence of such discussions is so subtle, and appeals to human nature so strongly, that the influence might, in some instances, be exerted without the juror being aware of it.”
In this case Cohen admits that he took the probable attorneys’ fees into consideration, and also that, on account thereof, they gave plaintiff so much. By the side of these admissions, his conclusion, perhaps .in answer to a leading question, that he was influenced only by the evidence and charge of the court pales into significance. Our conviction from the testimony being that the misconduct of the jury was material, and that it affected the amount of the recovery, it becomes our plain duty to reverse the judgment, unless a remittitur be entered in such an amount as wall cure the harm done to appellant by such misconduct.
The first assignment of error is sustained; all others are overruled.
The motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment heretofore entered by us in this case is set aside. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed, provided a remittitur of one-half of the amount of such judgment is filed within 20 days; otherwise it will be reversed and the cause remanded.