Court Opinion

ID: 9456825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:03:23.787492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:06.850240
License: Public Domain

WILKEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
Rule 43, Fed.R.Crim.P., provides that the defendant’s “voluntary absence after the trial has been commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to and including the return of the verdict.” This is interpreted by the majority primarily to ensure the defendant’s presence, not to permit the trial to proceed in his absence, but I submit that the rule says pretty plainly that the trial can continue if the defendant’s absence is voluntary. The test therefore turns upon whether the defendant here absented himself voluntarily.
I. Voluntariness
The appellant Wade absented himself after all the evidence was in, the jury instructed, and while the jury was deliberating. The majority opinion states, “we cannot conclude on this record that defendant’s absence was due to a desire not to be present at times when he knew he should be there.” On the record I think he had a clear and manifest desire not to be present, and that he knew that he should be there. One interesting set of facts not mentioned in the majority opinion is that this particular appellant was well on his way to being an old pro in the courtroom. The trial and conviction made the subject of this appeal began 11 May 1966. Prior thereto the appellant had received a March 1964 conviction for taking property without right, a June 1964 conviction for attempted unauthorized use of a vehicle, a December 1964 conviction for taking property without right, a March 1965 conviction for carrying a dangerous weapon, and an April 1965 conviction for receiving stolen property. I submit that this veteran of five very recent losing matches with the law—we are not told in how many encounters he was victorious—thus had enough previous experience to realize that while the jury was out he would only be sitting around the courtroom or the corridors, that there was nothing going to take place in which he could be of any help to his attorney, and so he simply went home. All of this is highly relevant to the voluntariness of appellant’s action.
In United States v. McPherson1 we held that the defendant had not waived “his constitutional right to testify and to confront the witnesses against him.” The defendant there was not apprised that the trial could be continued in his absence, and thus his absence might not be voluntary under Rule 43, in view of the fact that his absence resulted in his unknowingly foregoing clearly defined constitutional rights. McPherson absented himself while the prosecution case was being presented; furthermore, he was scheduled to be the only defense witness. Under those circumstances this court held that McPherson might not *1052have made “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of” his right to testify or to confront the witnesses against him. We thus under the facts of McPherson applied as the test of voluntariness the standard required by Johnson v. Zerbst2 for the waiver of a constitutional right—“an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” and remanded for a hearing to determine voluntariness.
But here the majority does not “probe the question” whether appellant Wade’s absence is to be tested by constitutional standards, merely saying that it “was not of the voluntary sort which under Rule 43 permitted the trial to continue as it did.” Presumably then we are to judge Wade by a lesser standard, and the strict constitutional waiver standard of McPherson does not govern this case.
Not only does the McPherson standard not compel the result reached by the majority in this case, but, as discussed above, on all the facts Wade’s absence should be deemed “voluntary” under Rule 43 by any reasonable standard, constitutional or otherwise. District Judge Keech so deemed it, both at the time of trial and on remand to determine that question.3
To my mind the circumstances here certainly would enable this court to “conclude on this record that defendant’s absence was due to a desire not to be present at times when he knew he should be there.” The appellant’s waiver here, as in contrast with McPherson, was simply of his right to be present in the courtroom while the jury deliberated and returned its verdict, not a waiver of a right to confront the witnesses or to testify himself. Given appellant Wade’s demonstrated experience, he knew what he was relinquishing and he relinquished it intentionally, i. e., a true, knowing waiver. This case is thus not governed by McPherson-, we can conclude on the facts of this case that appellant’s absence was voluntary and under Rule 43 permitted the trial to continue as it did.
II. Prejudice
The majority, after finding that there was error in the District Court’s determination that appellant’s absence was voluntary under Rule 43, then considers whether such error was prejudicial.4 The majority establishes “The standard by which to determine whether reversible error occurred, however, is not whether the accused was actually prejudiced, but where there is ‘any reasonable possibility of prejudice.’ ” Taking the correct standard, the majority then proceeds swiftly to the wrong conclusion: “To hold his absence harmless would be too speculative.” The majority does this on the reasoning that the disclaimer of both trial counsel and appellant as to anything which the appellant might have done if he had been present was not “sufficient to outweigh the possibilities of helpfulness to his case if present.” No one—neither culprit, counsel, nor court—has yet been able to suggest one single, solitary, specific “possibility of helpfulness” in appellant’s presence. This being true, it certainly would not be too speculative to hold harmless the appellant’s absence under the circumstances of this case.5
*1053On either or both of these grounds, then, (1) that appellant did in fact voluntarily absent himself and that in so doing he knowingly waived his right to be present at the trial, or (2) that, even if his absence be deemed not voluntary under Rule 43, no one yet has been able specifically to suggest any prejudice resulting to the appellant from such action, I would affirm the convictions on counts one and two.

. United States v. McPherson, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 192, 421 F.2d 1127 (1969).

. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).

. If the legal standard of voluntariness here is something less than the constitutional standard of waiver required in McPherson, then obviously the fact that McPherson was decided after the District Judge considered the remand of Wade is no ground for reversing, if the District Judge decided the issue of voluntariness reasonably under Rule 43.

. At the remand hearing District Judge Keech had stated: “I know of no prejudice which occurred in this case insofar as Defendant is concerned.”

. Appellant here committed his offenses on 14 September 1965. Official records show that he was committed to jail on 13 May 1966 after conviction. He was paroled in this case on 24 April 1970, but presently is again in custody on new charges of assault with a dangerous weapon and carrying a dangerous weapon. Whether these will result in revocation of parole is yet undetermined.
*1053The reversal of the instant convictions—because of an action taken by appellant himself, a chronic malefactor and veteran of numerous brushes with the law—means that appellant will be retried sometime in 1971, approximately 5% years after the crime. And, of course, if conviction results, there may be new grounds for appeal.