Court Opinion

ID: 9713139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:09:12.17367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.692919
License: Public Domain

Brown, J.
(dissenting). This case is before the court upon certiorari. In Kuehnel v. Registration Board of Architects (1943), 243 Wis. 188, 195, 9 N. W. (2d) 630, Mr. Justice Fritz stated the function of the court in certiorari proceedings thus:
“. . . certiorari proceedings . . . are uniformly considered to be only issues of law, because of which there is nothing involved but a review of the record to determine whether the board acted lawfully {i.e., within the scope of powers granted) and reasonably {i.e., whether there was evidence to support its findings).”
My principal disagreement with the court, and which impels me to dissent, seems to me a disregard or lack of appreciation by the majority of the nature of this proceeding. There are many propositions raised by the majority opinion with which I could agree or, at least, with which I would not dissent if we were concerned with some other form of review. But this case is on certiorari and I think the court has not distinguished issues of law from facts which only pertain to the merits or with procedure which does not contravene sec. 37.31 (1), Stats., under which the board must act.
The conclusions of the majority constantly refer to and rely on subdivisions of ch. 227, Stats.
Ch. 227, Stats., dictates procedure for the review of decisions of administrative agencies. No doubt this Board of Regents is an administrative agency of the state. But to have a review under ch. 227, Stats., certain prescribed procedures by the aggrieved person are required for commencing and *215completing the review. No effort to comply with those was attempted. For reasons which to Dr. Ball and his counsel seemed good they did not seek or follow the relief afforded by ch. 227, Stats. Instead they sought relief by a writ of certiorari. In my opinion, then, the rules and only the rules which apply in certiorari actions may be invoked and provisions such as sec. 227.13, Stats., may not be lifted piecemeal from ch. 227, Stats., to produce a decision in a certiorari case.
The scope of review in certiorari in the Wisconsin decisions cited by the majority does not seem to me to have the effect of changing our well-established principles. I may freely concede that the Indiana case of School City of Peru v. State ex rel. Youngblood (1937), 212 Ind. 255, 7 N. E. (2d) 176, cited by the majority, holds that substantial evidence must be brought to support an administrative decision. It is not the Wisconsin rule in certiorari. It is the rule in our Administrative Procedure Act, sec. 227.20 (1) (d), Stats., but it has no business in certiorari. The correct rule, so recently stated, in State ex rel. Dane County Title Co. v. Board (1957), 2 Wis. (2d) 51, 63, 85 N. W. (2d) 864, is:
“If on any reasonable view of the evidence, it will support the conclusion arrived at, the board had jurisdiction to decide as it did. [Cases cited.]”
Also,—
“ ‘The case is certiorari. When certiorari is invoked to review the action of an administrative board, the findings of the board upon the facts before it are conclusive if in any reasonable view the evidence sustains them.’ ” State ex rel. Hynek Co. v. Board (1954), 267 Wis. 309, 315d, rehearing; State ex rel. Morehouse v. Hunt (1940), 235 Wis. 358, 367, 291 N. W. 745 ; Wisconsin L. R. Board v. Fred Rueping L. Co. (1938), 228 Wis. 473, 493, 279 N. W. 673.
Dr. Ball may be discharged only for inefficiency or bad behavior, so provided in sec. 37.31 (1), Stats. The same *216section requires the regents to hear and determine the charges. The majority of the court holds that as a prerequisite of discharge the board must make findings specifying in detail those items of inefficiency and bad behavior which were proved. Sec. 37.31 (1) makes no requirement of findings by the board. If findings are necessary, or desirable, under certiorari that necessity is satisfied by the board’s resolution made on the record that charges have been sustained, as the board did resolve. This is exactly the case that was presented in State ex rel. Heffernan v. Board (1945), 247 Wis. 77, 18 N. W. (2d) 461. The opinion, page 85, is in point now:
“The twenty-two separate acts by Heffernan which constituted the charges are evidentiary. The ultimate fact is his guilt or innocence of conduct subversive to the good order and discipline of the department of police, and this is a conclusion of fact and not one of law; it is arrived at by a judgment whether such of the specific acts as were committed did in fact tend to undermine the good order and discipline of the department.”
There we held that the decision of the finding of the ultimate fact of guilt or innocence satisfied- the requirements of certiorari where no specific findings are required by statute, just as sec. 37.31 (1), Stats., does not require them.
The majority opinion avoids the Heffernan Case, supra, by pointing out that in Heffernan there was involved only a municipal, not a state agency. It implies that the provisions of review of state agencies (the regents) are subject to ch. 227, Stats., whereas municipal agencies are not. Of course it is fundamental to my dissent that when review is conducted in certiorari and the relief was not sought by administrative review, ch. 227, Stats., the provisions of that chapter do not apply here any more than they applied in the Heffernan Case, supra. Neither Heffernan nor the case at bar are administrative review cases. Both cases are certiorari proceedings. What this court said in Heffernan respecting find*217ings applies precisely to the necessity, or lack thereof, to the case now before us.
In a review under the provisions of ch. 227, Stats., sec. 227.13, Stats., requires findings of fact upon each contested issue. This is what the majority now demands, — findings on what the Heffernan Case, supra, calls evidentiary facts. Again, I consider that to be improperly imported from ch. 227, Stats., into certiorari and now determined to be jurisdictional error for the lack of such findings.
The majority says that the lack of such detailed findings compels the court to grope around in the dark to ascertain if there is evidence to sustain any of the 28 specifications. Presumably the party bringing the charges should be able to point quickly to the evidence but at any rate this evidence does not require much groping.
To support the charge of inefficiency Dr. Rector, registrar of the college and assistant dean, testified: As adviser to 12 students in the graduating class of 1956 Dr. Ball was responsible for arranging their course programs. Eleven of these failed to have completed the required curriculum, due to being put in courses by Dr. Ball where sufficient credits could not be earned.
As registrar and dean, Dr. Rector has the authority and responsibilities usual to his titles. Dr. Ball strongly disagreed with some of Dr. Rector’s positions. Ball expressed his displeasure, following a meeting in which they disagreed, by this threat to him, or promise, affecting his actions as an administrative officer of the college:
“ ‘You think you are riding high and mighty now, but we’ll pull you off that high horse. We’ll get your job when we get your star-plated boss.’ ” (Referring to President Hill, a retired major general.)
Without groping farther it seems to me that this testimony of these two instances evidences inefficiency and bad be*218havior within the terms of sec. 37.31 (1), Stats., which permits discharge for cause.
The majority considers that there was a denial to Dr. Ball of a fair hearing. If so, it was a grievous fault, but I do not find the record bears this out.
The majority infers, if not directly holds, that the transcript of the Superior record should not have been introduced in its entirety. The proceeding in this regard is completely stated by Mr. Metzner, counsel for Dr. Ball, as set out in the majority opinion. Mr. Metzner approved the procedure, and so do I.
Then Mr. Metzner, referring to the Superior record, said that hearsay and opinions contained in that record should not be admitted. Regent Magnusen, who conducted the hearing for the board, agreed and ruled that hearsay and opinions would not be considered by the board.
Our majority concludes that Mr. Magnusen committed jurisdictional error in not going through the record and throwing out what hearsay and opinion evidence he found there. Ball’s counsel had objected generally. The chairman ruled, sustaining the objection generally. If counsel wanted rulings more specifically to specific evidence he should have made more-specific objections. In the absence of such a request I cannot find a denial by the board of any right due Ball. Nor can I assume, as the majority does, any warrant for the conclusion that the board considered the hearsay and opinions all of which the chairman had directed the board would not consider.
When the majority searched for authority convenient or necessary in the provisions of ch. 227, Stats., it is too bad that inadvertently they missed sec. 227.10 (1), Stats., which reads:
“In contested cases:
“(1) Agencies shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence. They shall admit all testimony *219having reasonable probative value, but shall exclude immaterial, irrelevant, or unduly repetitious testimony. . . .”
This subsection which makes hearsay legitimate would have saved the court all the trouble in their consideration of the hearsay problem if, of course, the court really had much confidence in the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 227, Stats.
The majority considers that Dr. Ball was denied a fair hearing because in the Superior investigation two volunteers appeared who presumably would give information either favorable to Dr. Ball or derogatory to President Hill. Before divulging information the two asked the committee for protection, because of what they might say, against any consequences adversely affecting their status or future salaries. The committee refused to grant such a blanket immunity. These were not the usual witnesses given immunity in exchange for information given under oath. I think the committee went as far as it was proper at the Superior investigation when it told the volunteers that the tenure statute and an appeal to the board, if unjust discrimination was practiced against them, was all the committee could offer. I do not think that the refusal of immunity in the investigation impairs the fairness of the later hearing before the board. Also, as the opinion quotes Dr. Loop, it appears that Dr. Loop was a brave man and determined to talk without promise of immunity beyond what had been offered. There is no offer of proof concerning what additional information would have been divulged under oath at Madison if immunity had been given. There is no showing that Dr. Ball had been prejudiced by the committee’s action and no unfairness resulted.
I cannot treat seriously the difference in treatment of exhibits. President Hill made the charges and was prepared to sustain them by exhibits in what he considered an effective manner. He chose to put in his case that way. Ball did it *220otherwise. I am unable to ascertain that Ball’s method prejudiced him in any respect. At any rate, if so, the fault was not Hill’s nor the board’s. At least, Ball was present by two counsel to look after his interests. Hill had none.
Nor do I find that Magnusen improperly conducted the hearing. This was a hearing by the board, sec. 37.31 (1), Stats., brought to elicit the facts pertaining to Hill’s charges. Magnusen was appointed to run the hearing. He brought out the facts respecting Hill’s charges. Ball had two counsel bringing out those to his advantage. Sometimes by statute other procedures are designated, — the majority refers to the Taft-Hartley Act, — but the legislature has not made any such provision in sec. 37.31. In the absence of such prescribed other method I consider that the board, sticking close to the statute by which it was governed, cannot be charged with jurisdictional error.
I would reverse the trial court. There was a wealth of evidence to sustain the inefficiency of Dr. Ball as a teacher and a failure as such to maintain good behavior. The board should be sustained.
Mr. Chief Justice Martin and Mr. Justice Broadfoot respectfully join in this dissent.