Court Opinion

ID: 9916858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 18:11:09.037964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:03.669245
License: Public Domain

01/10/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                        Assigned on Briefs December 12, 2023

               BOBBY V. SUMMERS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
                No. 2018-B-885    Angelita Blackshear Dalton, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                           No. M2023-00103-CCA-R3-PC
                       ___________________________________

Bobby V. Summers, Petitioner, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of
his petition as time-barred. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the
judgment of the post-conviction court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY, JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Bobby V. Summers, Henning, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Jeffrey Jackson,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

       Petitioner was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony
murder, especially aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence. Pursuant to a
negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to facilitation of first degree
premeditated murder in exchange for an outside-of-range sentence of twenty years with
sixty percent release eligibility pursuant to State v. Hicks, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997).
The judgment of conviction was entered on August 21, 2019.

       On November 28, 2022, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(“the Petition”) claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his
conviction was based on an “unlawfully induced guilty plea or guilty plea involuntarily
entered without understanding of the nature and consequences of the plea.” The only
explanation provided by Petitioner in the Petition as to why the statute of limitation should
not bar his claim was: “My attorney never explained to me that I could appeal the illegal
sentence he convinced me to plead to. I wasn’t aware of the statute of limitations[,] and I
wasn’t aware of the meaning of facilitation to [first] degree murder.”

       On December 15, 2022, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the Petition,
finding:

              In the present case, because no appeal was taken, the judgement
       became final on September 20, 2019. Because more than one year has
       elapsed since the 2019 conviction in this case became final, and because the
       petition fails to assert an excepted claim pursuant to Tennessee Code
       Annotated § 40-30-102(b), this Court finds that the petition for post-
       conviction relief is untimely.

       Petitioner appealed.

                                        ANALYSIS

        On appeal, Petitioner claims that his “guilty plea was illegal and unconstitutional,”
that his “actual innocence” satisfies the tolling requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-30-102, and that trial counsel was ineffective “in challenging Petitioner’s actual
innocence and illegal and unconstitutional plea.” The State argues that the post-conviction
court properly dismissed the Petition. We agree with the State.

                                    Standard of Review

      This court reviews the summary dismissal of a post-conviction relief petition de
novo. See Burnett v. State, 92 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tenn. 2002); Odom v. State, No. M2022-
00252-CCA-R3-PC, 2022 WL 17261526, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 29, 2022).
Whether the post-conviction statute of limitations should be tolled is a mixed question of
law and fact that we also review de novo. Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tenn. 2014).

                                   Statute of Limitations

        The Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides relief “when the conviction or
sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgement of any right guaranteed by the
Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-30-103. “Time is of the essence of the right to file a petition for post-conviction
relief[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a). A petition for post-conviction relief must be
filed “within one (1) year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court
to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one (1) year of the date on
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which the judgment became final.” Id. There are, however, three statutory circumstances
that toll the running of the statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(b). The
supreme court described these statutory circumstances as:

              (1) claims based on a newly recognized constitutional right that
       applies retroactively, and that are filed within one year of the ruling
       recognizing that right;

              (2) claims based on new scientific evidence that proves that the
       prisoner is innocent of the offense; and

              (3) claims seeking relief from a sentence that was enhanced because
       of a previous conviction that was subsequently held to be invalid.

Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tenn. 2013).

        Although Petitioner argues in his brief that he is actually innocent of facilitation of
first degree murder, he does not claim that there is any new scientific evidence that proves
his innocence. Petitioner has not shown that any of these three statutory exceptional
circumstances apply in his case.

        Before the State “may terminate a claim for failure to comply with procedural
requirements such as statutes of limitations, due process requires that potential litigants be
provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992). For a petitioner
to be entitled to due process tolling, a petitioner must show “(1) that he or she has been
pursuing his or her rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in
his or her way and prevented timely filing.” Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 631. Our supreme
court has recognized three such extraordinary circumstances: (1) claims for relief that arise
after the statute of limitations has expired; (2) mental incompetence preventing a petitioner
from complying with statutory deadlines; or (3) attorney misconduct. See Williams v.
State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 470-71 (Tenn. 2001); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277-80 (Tenn.
2000). The court in Whitehead cautioned that due process tolling “must be reserved for
those rare instances where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct—it
would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross
injustice would result.” Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 631-32 (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson,
209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000)).

       Petitioner does not address why he waited more than three years from the date his
conviction became final to file the Petition and has not shown that he was pursuing his
rights diligently. Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was “illegal and unconstitutional”
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because he was indicted “as the principal not as an accessory or facilitator” and that the
State “never amended the indictment to charge him as a facilitator.” Facilitation of first
degree murder is a lesser-included offense of first degree murder. State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d
453, 470 (Tenn. 1999). A lesser-included offense is an offense that is “necessarily included
in the offense charged.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 31(d)(1)(A); State v. Myers, 581 S.W.3d 173,
181 (Tenn. 2019). No amendment to the indictment was required for Petitioner to plead
guilty to facilitation of first degree murder.

       Petitioner, citing Standefer v. U.S., 447 U.S. 10 (1980), also argues that his
conviction is illegal and void because he cannot be convicted of facilitation “without the
prior conviction of the principal offender.” That is not correct. In Standefer, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that a defendant accused of aiding and abetting in the
commission of a federal offense may still be convicted when the named principal has been
acquitted of that offense.

        Petitioner argues that his trial counsel “abandoned” his claim of actual innocence.
According to Petitioner, he pleaded guilty to facilitation of first degree murder “to avoid
the life-long prison-time.” The Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty signed by Petitioner stated
that Petitioner’s plea was entered intelligently and voluntarily. Petitioner chose to plead
guilty to a lesser-included offense to avoid the possibility of a life sentence.

        Petitioner has not shown that his claims for relief arose after the statute of limitations
expired; that mental incompetence prevented him from complying with the statutory
deadline; or that his failure to file a timely petition was due to attorney misconduct. See
Williams, 44 S.W.3d at 470-71. “In every case in which we have held the statute of
limitations is tolled, the pervasive theme is that circumstances beyond a petitioner’s control
prevented the petitioner from filing a petition for post-conviction relief within the statute
of limitations.” Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d at 358.

       Petitioner has failed to prove that he pursued his rights diligently and has failed to
prove that an “extraordinary circumstance” prevented the timely filing of the Petition. Due
process considerations do not require tolling of the statute of limitations.
                                          Conclusion

       The post-conviction court properly dismissed the Petition as time-barred.

                                                    _________________________________
                                                    ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE

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