Court Opinion

ID: 9899540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 21:00:55.254004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:32.738808
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4223

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        JUSTIN WHITAKER,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (7:19-cr-00129-BO-1)

        Submitted: October 24, 2023                                  Decided: November 15, 2023

        Before HARRIS, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

        Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Jennifer C. Leisten, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A.
        Bragdon, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Justin Whitaker appeals the 147-month sentence imposed on remand after we

        vacated his initial sentence under United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021),

        and United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020). Whitaker challenges the

        sufficiency of the district court’s explanation of its chosen sentence and the reasonableness

        of warrantless search and urinalysis discretionary conditions of supervised release. He also

        asserts that there is a Rogers error in the imposition of the warrantless search condition.

        Because we agree that there is a Rogers error, we again vacate Whitaker’s sentence and

        remand for resentencing.

               A district court must pronounce all discretionary conditions of supervised release at

        the sentencing hearing. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 300. We review de novo whether the district

        court satisfied its obligation to do so. Id. at 295-96; see also United States v. Cisson, 33

        F.4th 185, 192 (4th Cir. 2022). “[S]o long as the defendant is informed orally that a certain

        set of conditions will be imposed on his supervised release, . . . a later-issued written

        judgment that details those conditions may be construed fairly as a clarification of an

        otherwise vague oral pronouncement.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299 (internal quotation marks

        omitted).   But often the lack of a “match” between written and orally pronounced

        discretionary conditions of supervised release “is reversible Rogers error,” at least where

        the Government offers no explanation for the inconsistency. United States v. Jenkins, No.

        21-4003, 2022 WL 112069, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 2022); cf. Cisson, 33 F.4th at 193-94 &

        n.6 (rejecting defendant’s Jenkins-based argument of inconsistency between oral condition

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        and written condition when Government offered explanation suggesting there was no

        inconsistency present and defendant did not respond to proffered explanation).

              Here, the warrantless search condition as pronounced and as written in the criminal

        judgment do not match, and the Government has not explained the inconsistency. Further,

        the written judgment cannot “be construed fairly as a clarification” of the oral

        pronouncement, as the differences render the condition as written in the criminal judgment

        both broader and narrower than the one pronounced at sentencing. Rogers, 961 F.3d at

        299. The condition as pronounced subjected Whitaker to warrantless searches of his

        “person and premises, including any vehicle.” (J.A. 81-82). 1 However, the condition as

        written in the criminal judgment provides for warrantless searches of Whitaker’s “person

        and any property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic

        communication or data storage devices or media, and effects.” (J.A. 89). Further, the

        condition as pronounced did not mention reasonable suspicion, whereas the condition as

        written permitted warrantless searches “upon reasonable suspicion concerning a violation

        of a condition of supervised release.” (J.A. 89). The written judgment therefore did not

        clarify the court’s pronouncement; rather, it contained a materially different condition of

        supervised release.

               Accordingly, we conclude that the district court failed to pronounce a discretionary

        condition of supervised release, and we vacate Whitaker’s sentence and remand for

               1
                   “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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        resentencing. 2 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                   VACATED AND REMANDED

              2
                Because Whitaker’s entire sentence must be vacated in light of the Rogers error,
        we decline to address the other issues Whitaker raises on appeal. See Singletary, 984 F.3d
        at 346.

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