Court Opinion

ID: 9928171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:24.756665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:32.950799
License: Public Domain

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    ROBERTO ALVES v. JANICE GIEGLER ET AL.
                 (SC 20907)
                 (SC 20908)
  Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

                                   Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 9-461), ‘‘[n]ot later than the seventh day following
   the date set for the primary for nomination at any election at which a
   municipal office is to be filled, the clerk of the municipality in which
   such election is to be held shall file with the Secretary of the State a
   list of the candidates of each party for the municipal offices to be filled
   at such election nominated in accordance with the provisions of [the]
   chapter [of the General Statutes governing nominations to public office
   and political parties].’’
Pursuant further to statute (§ 9-452a), ‘‘[n]ot later than five days before a
   minor party holds a party meeting to nominate a candidate for public
   office, the presiding officer of such meeting shall give written notice of
   the date, time, location and purpose of the meeting to, in the case of a
   municipal office, the town clerk of the municipality served by such
   office,’’ and, ‘‘[c]oncomitantly, the presiding officer of such meeting
   shall cause the written notice of such meeting to be published in a
   newspaper with a general circulation in the applicable town for such
   office.’’

The plaintiff, who was a candidate for mayor of the city of Danbury in the
   November, 2023 municipal election, brought this action in the trial court,
   pursuant to statute (§ 9-328), seeking certain injunctive and declaratory
   relief in connection with the decision of the named defendant, G, the
   Danbury town clerk, to submit to the Secretary of the State (secretary),
   pursuant to § 9-461, one of two competing slates of candidates for various
   municipal offices, each purporting to be the endorsed slate of the Inde-
   pendent Party of Danbury (Independent Party). The first slate filed with
   the Danbury town clerk’s office consisted of candidates, including the
   plaintiff, who were supported by the Danbury Democratic Town Com-
   mittee and who were selected at an endorsement meeting held by the
   Independent Party on August 11, 2023. Notice of that meeting had been
   published in a local newspaper seven days in advance, and a copy of
   the newspaper notice was on file in the Danbury town clerk’s office.
   The second slate filed with the Danbury town clerk’s office consisted
   of candidates who were supported by the Danbury Republican Town
   Committee and who were selected at an endorsement meeting of the
   Independent Party held on August 21, 2023. When the defendant R, the
   chairperson of the Independent Party, filed the second slate of candi-
   dates with the Danbury town clerk’s office, he included a cover letter,
   on Independent Party letterhead, explaining that the submission repre-
   sented the party’s ‘‘official endorsements’’ and that, although he was
   aware of the prior submission of an ‘‘unofficial’’ slate of candidates, the
   Independent Party’s executive board had vetoed that slate and deemed
   it invalid in accordance with party rules. Although both slates were
   accepted by G, she ultimately submitted to the secretary, pursuant to
   § 9-461, only the second slate of candidates, and not the previously filed
   slate that included the plaintiff. After a trial to the court, the trial court
   ordered G to remove from the Independent Party line on the November,
   2023 ballot those names that she had submitted to the secretary, exclud-
   ing four candidates for offices that the parties stipulated were unaffected
   by G’s decision. In its memorandum of decision, the court explained
   that placing either slate of candidates on the Independent Party line
   would be improper. With respect to the August 21, 2023 slate, the court
   concluded that that slate did not comply with the statute (§ 9-452) that
   governs the submission of a minor party’s list of nominees for municipal
   office to a town clerk because it was not ‘‘certified,’’ as that statute
   required. With respect to the August 11, 2023 slate, the court concluded
   that, although G had exceeded her authority by failing to file that slate
   with the secretary pursuant to § 9-461, that slate was invalid because
    it was the product of a meeting that did not comply with the requirements
    of § 9-452a, insofar as the presiding officer had not provided the Danbury
    town clerk with notice of the meeting. Thereafter, the trial court certified
    certain questions of law to this court for review pursuant to statute (§ 9-
    325). G and R also filed separate appeals, and the plaintiff filed cross
    appeals, from the trial court’s judgment.

Held that the trial court’s ultimate determination that neither slate of candi-
   dates should be placed on the Independent Party line on the November,
   2023 ballot was correct, albeit for reasons different from those stated
   in its memorandum of decision, and, accordingly, this court affirmed
   the trial court’s judgment:

1. This court clarified the extent to which, under § 9-461, a town clerk has
    the discretion to accept or reject a minor party’s filing of its endorsement
    of candidates:

   Under § 9-461, which governs the town clerk’s responsibilities in filing
   a party’s list of candidates with the secretary, the town clerk has the
   ministerial obligation to accept and file with the secretary lists of minor
   party candidates that are facially valid under the terms of § 9-452, and,
   to be facially valid under § 9-452, the list must be (1) timely filed at least
   sixty-two days before the election, (2) certified by the presiding officer
   of the committee, meeting or other authority making such nomination,
   and (3) in the prescribed format with respect to the certification of the
   candidates’ names, signatures, addresses, and the title and district of
   the office for which each candidate is nominated.

   Moreover, the town clerk’s function is limited to assessing the presence
   or absence of the facial requirements under § 9-452, and the town clerk
   has no discretion to consider the validity of the nominations or otherwise
   to determine whether a minor party has complied with the statutory
   scheme beyond the facial items.

2. G exceeded her authority under § 9-461 by failing to file with the secretary
    the slate of candidates approved at the Independent Party’s August 11,
    2023 meeting, and the trial court, having incorrectly determined that
    that slate was invalid for failing to comply with the notice requirements
    of § 9-452a, should have exercised its equitable authority to order G to
    forward that slate to the secretary:

   The plain and unambiguous language of § 9-452a, and especially the
   statute’s use of the word ‘‘concomitantly,’’ requires that the presiding
   officer of a minor party’s nominating meeting give two separate forms
   of written notice of that meeting, namely, notice to the town clerk and
   notice published in a suitable newspaper, and those two forms of written
   notice were an integral part of § 9-452a such that constructive or actual
   notice could not substitute for the written notice required by that statute.

   Contrary to R and G’s argument that the first slate did not comply with
   the requirements of § 9-452a because no separate notice of the August
   11, 2023 meeting was given to the town clerk, this court concluded that
   a timely filed copy of the newspaper notice was sufficient to satisfy § 9-
   452a, as there was no claim that the content of that notice itself, which
   included the date, time, location, and purpose of the August 11, 2023
   meeting, substantively would not satisfy § 9-452a if it was separately
   filed with the town clerk in a timely manner.

   Moreover, the record did not establish as a matter of law that the copy
   of the newspaper notice was not timely filed with the Danbury town
   clerk’s office, insofar as it lacked a date and time stamp indicating when
   it was received and the record was otherwise silent as to when it was
   filed, the trial court did not make a specific finding regarding whether
   the notice to the town clerk was timely, and, because the issue of whether
   a filing was timely filed ordinarily is a finding of fact to be made by the
   trial court in the first instance, and because § 9-325 specifically limits
   the jurisdiction of this court to questions of law, this court was precluded
   from considering that factual issue in the first instance on appeal.

3. G properly filed with the secretary, pursuant to § 9-461, the slate of
    candidates approved at the Independent Party’s August 21, 2023 meeting
    because, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, R’s submission
    of that slate complied with the certification requirement of § 9-452:

   The term ‘‘certify,’’ as used in § 9-452, was not defined by the statutory
  scheme, and, upon review of dictionary definitions of that term, this
  court concluded that its plain meaning was ambiguous as to whether it
  required a specific attestation of truth, veracity, or correctness, as the
  plaintiff argued, or whether the cover letter bearing R’s signature and
  purporting to offer the Independent Party’s ‘‘official endorsements’’ was
  sufficient to satisfy the certification requirement, as G and R argued.

  In resolving that ambiguity, this court declined to hold that the absence
  of the word ‘‘certification’’ renders a filing defective as a matter of law
  for purposes of § 9-452, as that statute does not prescribe any particular
  manner or form of certification, and reading additional requirements
  into the statute’s language would conflict with both the rule of statutory
  construction that courts are not permitted to supply statutory language
  that the legislature may have chosen to omit, as well as the maxim that
  ambiguities in election laws are to be construed to allow the greatest
  scope for public participation in the electoral process, to allow candidates
  to get on the ballot, to allow parties to put their candidates on the ballot,
  and, most important, to allow the voters a choice on election day.

  In the present case, R’s cover letter, printed on Independent Party letter-
  head and signed by R in his capacity as chairperson, indicated that the
  party was filing its ‘‘official endorsements,’’ that degree of formality
  met the dictionary definition of ‘‘certify’’ because the filing involved the
  presentation of a formal communication and a confirmation that the
  endorsements met a standard, and, accordingly, R’s letter constituted
  the voucher necessary to comply with the certification requirement under
  § 9-452, rendering the slate of candidates selected at the August 21, 2023
  meeting validly filed.

  Accordingly, in light of her ministerial role as town clerk, G was required
  to accept and transmit to the secretary the Independent Party’s two
  slates of endorsements, from both the August 11 and 21, 2023 meetings,
  insofar as both were facially compliant with the governing statutes, and,
  because it was undisputed that the presence of two facially valid slates
  had the effect of creating an over endorsement by the Independent Party,
  there was functionally no endorsement with respect to the affected
  offices by operation of statute (§ 9-414), and the trial court’s ultimate
  determination that neither set of endorsements should have been placed
  on the ballot was, therefore, correct.

  Furthermore, to the extent that the Independent Party was deprived of
  its first amendment rights to identify the people who constitute the
  association and to select a standard bearer, its remedy was within its
  own bylaws and any dispute resolution mechanism provided therein,
  coupled with judicial enforcement of the party’s internal resolution of
  that dispute, and there was no record establishing how the Independent
  Party resolved the two competing slates in accordance with its own
  intraparty dispute resolution procedures, or any request for a court order
  challenging or enforcing that resolution, such that neither the trial court
  nor this court was positioned to enforce that result via an order to the
  town clerk.
    Argued October 20, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

                            Procedural History

   Action for a judgment declaring that the named defen-
dant exceeded her statutory authority as town clerk in
determining which slate of candidates had been nomi-
nated by the Independent Party of Danbury in connec-
tion with the 2023 Danbury municipal election for
mayor, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Danbury and tried to
the court, Medina, J., which rendered judgment for the
plaintiff and ordered the named defendant to remove
the names of certain candidates from the Independent
Party of Danbury line on the ballot that the named defen-
dant had submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
the State; thereafter, the named defendant and the
defendant Veasna Rouen filed separate appeals with
this court; subsequently, the court, Medina, J., certified
certain questions of law to the Chief Justice pursuant
to General Statutes § 9-325, the named defendant and
the defendant Veasna Rouen filed amended appeals,
and the plaintiff filed cross appeals; thereafter, this court
consolidated the appeals and cross appeals. Affirmed.
  Proloy K. Das, with whom was Candace V. Fay, assis-
tant corporation counsel, for the appellant-cross appel-
lee in SC 20907 and the appellee in SC 20908 (named
defendant).
  Eugene E. Glouzgal, for the appellant-cross appellee
in SC 20908 and the appellee in SC 20907 (defendant
Veasna Rouen).
  Christopher M. Mattei, with whom were Colin S.
Antaya and Luke Reynolds, for the appellee-cross
appellant in SC 20907 and SC 20908 (plaintiff).
                           Opinion

   ROBINSON, C. J. This election appeal, which arises
from a dispute over two slates of candidates each pur-
porting to be the endorsed slate of the Independent
Party of Danbury (Independent Party) for various
municipal offices in the city of Danbury (city), raises
two issues under the statutes governing nominations
to municipal office by minor political parties in our
state, namely, (1) the nature of the ‘‘certification’’
required by General Statutes § 9-452, which governs the
submission of a party’s list of nominees for municipal
office to a town clerk, and (2) the form that notice to
a town clerk of a party’s meeting or caucus to nominate
candidates for municipal office must take under Gen-
eral Statutes § 9-452a. The plaintiff, Roberto Alves, a
candidate for election as mayor of the city, brought this
action pursuant to General Statutes § 9-328 against the
defendants, Janice Giegler, the city’s town clerk, Dean
Esposito, the city’s incumbent mayor who is seeking
reelection to that office, and Veasna Rouen, the chair-
person of the Independent Party, challenging Giegler’s
decision on September 18, 2023, to file with the secre-
tary of the state (secretary), pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 9-461, a slate of candidates purporting to be the
Independent Party’s nominations of candidates for
municipal office.1 The challenged Independent Party
slate consisted of candidates supported by the Danbury
Republican Town Committee, including Esposito and
Giegler (Esposito slate); Giegler did not file with the
secretary a previously submitted Independent Party
slate consisting of candidates supported by the Danbury
Democratic Town Committee, including the plaintiff
(Alves slate). After a three day court trial, the trial court,
Medina, J., issued an order on October 12, 2023, which,
pursuant to General Statutes § 9-329b, directed Giegler
to remove the Esposito slate that she had submitted to
the secretary from the ballot (October 12 order).2
   The parties sought review of numerous questions of
law by this court pursuant to General Statutes § 9-325,
and they also filed appeals and cross appeals3 from
the judgment of the trial court. After reviewing these
questions and the trial court’s October 16, 2023 memo-
randum of decision, which questions the trial court
certified to the Chief Justice pursuant to § 9-325, we
issued an order on October 17, 2023, modifying the
questions. First, with respect to the notice issue under
§ 9-452a, did Giegler ‘‘[exceed] her statutory authority
by failing to file with the secretary . . . pursuant to
. . . § 9-461, the [Alves] slate . . . approved at the
[Independent Party’s] August 11, 2023 caucus?’’ Second,
did Giegler ‘‘improperly [file] with the secretary . . .
pursuant to . . . § 9-461, the [Esposito] slate . . .
approved at the [Independent Party’s] August 21, 2023
caucus on the ground that the filing with the Danbury
town clerk’s office failed to comply with . . . § 9-452
because it was not certified?’’ Following expedited
briefing on these certified questions, we heard oral argu-
ment on October 20, 2023.4 We conclude that the answer
to the first certified question is ‘‘yes,’’ and the answer
to the second certified question is ‘‘no.’’ Consistent with
these answers to the certified questions, after oral argu-
ment, we issued an order, which we announced from
the bench, affirming the judgment of the trial court and
indicating that a written opinion would follow.5 This is
that opinion.
   The record reveals the following facts, as found by
the trial court, and procedural history. On August 4,
2023, Rouen had notice published in the Danbury News-
Times (News-Times) of an ‘‘[e]ndorsement [m]eeting’’
of the Independent Party to be held at 6:30 p.m. on
August 11, 2023, at the Maron Hotel. Although a copy
of that notice, as published in the News-Times, is on
file in the Danbury town clerk’s office (town clerk),
and Giegler attended the meeting personally, the trial
court found that ‘‘no separate letter or other notification
to the town clerk was sent by Rouen or anyone else.’’
   The Independent Party held its first endorsement
meeting on August 11, 2023. Minutes of that meeting
prepared by Jennifer Dorin, the Independent Party’s
secretary and treasurer, indicate that Rouen called that
meeting to order at 6:42 p.m. and adjourned it at 6:46
p.m. Dorin’s minutes also indicate that, at that meeting,
Justin Chan, a new member of the party, challenged
Rouen with respect to whom would be permitted to
vote at the meeting, causing ‘‘chaos’’ to ensue and the
‘‘room [to become] unruly’’ as Rouen announced that
the party ‘‘would need legal counsel to clarify who is
allowed to vote.’’ At that point, Rouen and the deputy
treasurer moved to adjourn the meeting, Dorin seconded
the motion, and the ‘‘[e]xecutive [b]oard made the unan-
imous decision to adjourn the meeting.’’ There subse-
quently was some disagreement about whether the meet-
ing had been properly adjourned, and a set of minutes
prepared by Gretchen Lombardi, a party member, indi-
cate that those remaining in attendance nevertheless
held a caucus and proceeded to nominate, by unanimous
vote, the Alves slate as the nominees of the Independent
Party.6 Chan served as presiding officer of that caucus.
  Subsequently, on August 15, 2023, Rouen sent a letter
informing the town clerk of a ‘‘caucus’’ to be held at
the Maron Hotel at 6:30 p.m. on August 21, 2023, ‘‘to
nominate a slate of candidates on the Independent
[Party] line for the 2023 Danbury municipal election.’’
On August 16, 2023, notice to that effect was published
in the News-Times.
   On August 16, 2023, Lombardi, accompanied by an
attorney, attempted to file with the town clerk a docu-
ment consisting of the Alves slate of candidates, a copy
of the August 4, 2023 published notice of the August
11, 2023 meeting, and a page captioned ‘‘CERTIFICA-
TION OF PARTY NOMINATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL
OFFICE,’’ stating that ‘‘it is hereby certified that at the
Independent Party [c]aucus called for that purpose,
held on August 11, 2023 . . . by a majority vote, the
persons listed on the attached sheets were nominated
as candidates for election . . . .’’ Chan signed that fil-
ing as caucus chair. The town clerk received, but ini-
tially rejected, that filing on August 16, 2023. That deci-
sion was based on Giegler’s understanding that the
endorsements might not be valid, in light of her personal
knowledge of what had transpired at the August 11,
2023 meeting, along with the fact that Rouen had already
noticed a second Independent Party caucus to take place
on August 21, 2023.
   The next day, August 17, 2023, Giegler reconsidered
the rejection of the Alves slate and agreed to accept
that filing based on legal advice that she had obtained
from the secretary’s office, despite her continued
doubts as to its validity.7 Giegler declined, however, to
follow advice from the secretary’s office that she con-
tact the interested parties to inform them of the poten-
tial over endorsement issues. Giegler believed that
instance to be the first time she had not followed legal
advice from the secretary’s office.
   Subsequently, the Independent Party held a caucus
on August 21, 2023, which resulted in a vote awarding
the party’s endorsement to the Esposito slate. On August
22, 2023, Rouen submitted the Esposito slate to the
town clerk’s office, with a cover letter providing: ‘‘As
[c]hairman of the Independent Party . . . I hereby sub-
mit the [p]arty’s official endorsements of candidates
for the November 7, 2023 municipal elections. The nomi-
nation meeting was conducted on August 21, 2023, as
advertised in the . . . News-Times.’’ The cover letter
further stated that the ‘‘Independent Party . . . is
aware of a submission of an unofficial slate, which
was never recognized or approved by the [e]xecutive
[b]oard, and out of caution, has been vetoed and deemed
invalid in accordance with the rules of the Independent
Party . . . .’’ The town clerk’s office stamped that doc-
ument as ‘‘received for record’’ on August 23, 2023.
   Attached to Rouen’s cover letter was the document
containing the Esposito slate; that document listed the
names of the Esposito slate candidates under the head-
ing ‘‘INDEPENDENT PARTY OF DANBURY: CANDI-
DATES’ STATEMENT OF CONSENT.’’ The trial court
observed that ‘‘the individual proposed candidates all
signed the sheet on which their names appeared weeks
before the August 21, 2023 caucus.’’ (Emphasis added.)
  The ‘‘fifth page of the [document], over the signatures
of Rouen as chairman and Dorin as secretary, recites
that the events occurred ‘[a]t a [s]pecial [m]eeting of
the Danbury Republican Town Committee . . . .’ ’’8
Thereafter, on September 18, 2023, Giegler submitted
only the Esposito slate to the secretary pursuant to
§ 9-461.
   On September 27, 2023, the plaintiff brought this
action pursuant to § 9-328. The plaintiff sought (1) a
judgment declaring that ‘‘Giegler acted without lawful
authority when she determined which slate of candi-
dates had been nominated by the Independent Party
. . . and that, under [General Statutes] § 9-414, no such
endorsement by the Independent Party . . . ha[d]
occurred,’’ (2) injunctive relief ‘‘compelling [Giegler]
and the secretary . . . not to identify the [Esposito
slate] candidates, including . . . Esposito, as nomin-
ees of the Independent Party . . . on ballots to be used
in connection with Danbury municipal elections sched-
uled for November 7, 2023,’’ and (3) ‘‘[s]uch other relief
to which the plaintiff is entitled at law or in equity.’’
Following a three day court trial, the court issued the
October 12 order that, subject to the parties’ stipulation
as to four unaffected offices; see footnote 2 of this
opinion; required Giegler ‘‘to remove from the Novem-
ber 7, 2023 ballot those names submitted by her on
September 18, 2023, to the [secretary] consisting of
candidates on the line assigned to the Independent
Party . . . .’’
   The trial court subsequently issued a memorandum
of decision expanding on the October 12 order. With
respect to the questions certified for this appeal pursu-
ant to § 9-325,9 the trial court determined that whether
Giegler properly had determined the Esposito slate to
be ‘‘certif[ied]’’ for purposes of § 9-452 presented a ques-
tion of statutory construction.10 The court concluded
that the Esposito slate ‘‘was not certified and, therefore,
did not comply with § 9-452’’ because ‘‘[c]ertification
must mean more than just using the words ‘official
endorsements.’ At a minimum, it is a warranty by the
issuer with consequences.’’ Considering the ‘‘totality of
the evidence,’’ the court concluded that the Esposito
slate was not ‘‘certified’’ because the signatures had
been affixed weeks prior to the date of the caucus, and
‘‘the signature page clearly states [that] it came from
a special meeting of the Danbury Republican Town
Committee.’’
   The trial court next turned to the Alves slate. Although
the court concluded that Giegler had exceeded her min-
isterial authority by failing to file that slate with the
secretary, the court nevertheless determined that the
Alves slate was invalid because it was the product of
a meeting that did not comply with § 9-452a, insofar as
the presiding officer of the caucus had not provided the
town clerk with notice of the August 11, 2023 meeting
at least five days in advance. Observing that § 9-452a
‘‘requires such notice and, ‘concomitantly,’ legal publi-
cation in a newspaper of the meeting notice,’’ the court
rejected both the plaintiff’s argument that Giegler’s
presence at the August 11, 2023 meeting was ‘‘enough
to infer [that] she received notice’’ and the plaintiff’s
reliance on ‘‘the alleged lack of prejudice from any
noncompliance, as well as the newspaper publication as
sufficient compliance.’’ The court ‘‘agree[d] with Giegler
and, on the evidence produced at trial, conclude[d]
[that] the Alves slate did not satisfy § 9-452a.’’
   Ultimately, the trial court concluded that ‘‘placement
of the Esposito slate on the Independent Party . . .
line would be improper’’ and that ‘‘placement of the
Alves slate on the line of the Independent Party . . .
would be equally improper.’’11 Accordingly, the court
acted pursuant to § 9-329b and ordered Giegler ‘‘to
remove from the Independent Party line those names
submitted by her to the [secretary] on September 18,
2023, excluding only those four candidates set forth in
the parties’ October 10, 2023 stipulation . . . .’’12 (Cita-
tion omitted.) This expedited appeal followed in accor-
dance with § 9-325.13 See footnotes 3 through 5 of this
opinion and accompanying text.
   At the outset, we set forth the standard of review. It
is undisputed that the parties’ claims on appeal concern-
ing the various statutes governing the endorsement of
candidates by minor parties, and the extent to which
town clerks have discretion to administer those stat-
utes, present questions of statutory interpretation guided
by General Statutes § 1-2z and involve application of
law to fact over which we exercise plenary review. See,
e.g., Cohen v. Rossi, 346 Conn. 642, 662, 295 A.3d 75
(2023); see also id., 655–58 (discussing general princi-
ples governing court’s authority to provide relief under
§ 9-328, particularly as applied to authority to overturn
election results and to order new election); Bridgeport
v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 277 Conn. 268, 275, 890
A.2d 540 (2006) (whether party complied with statutory
notice requirements under General Statutes § 8-3 (a)
was mixed question of fact and law subject to plenary
review when facts were undisputed and dispute con-
cerned ‘‘the trial court’s application of § 8-3 (a) to those
facts’’). Particularly because challenges to the nomi-
nating process carry first amendment implications with
respect to political parties’ rights to choose their candi-
dates, we recognize that ‘‘a court should be very cau-
tious before exercising its power under the statute’’
in a manner that would vacate a party’s nominations.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Rossi,
supra, 655; see, e.g., Nielsen v. Kezer, 232 Conn. 65, 87,
652 A.2d 1013 (1995) (discussing political party’s first
amendment rights ‘‘to identify the people who consti-
tute the association . . . and to select a standard bearer
who best represents the party’s ideologies and prefer-
ences’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
   Before turning to the parties’ specific statutory claims,
we begin by addressing the extent to which a town clerk
has the discretion to accept or reject a minor party’s
filing of its endorsement of candidates. The town clerk’s
responsibilities are governed by § 9-461, which provides
in relevant part that, no later than seven days ‘‘following
the date set for the primary for nomination at any elec-
tion at which a municipal office is to be filled,’’ the
town clerk is required to file with the secretary ‘‘a list
of the candidates of each party for the municipal
offices to be filled at such election nominated in accor-
dance with the provisions of this chapter. . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) The town clerk’s responsibilities
under § 9-461 are intended to aid the creation of the
ballot, as the statute requires that the secretary provide
a form for the town clerk to use in creating that list
and that the town clerk include in the list ‘‘a statement
of the total number of candidates for which each elector
may vote for each office and term’’ and certify that he
or she ‘‘has compared the name of each such candidate
with the candidate’s name as the candidate authorizes
the candidate’s name to appear on the ballot . . . and
has verified and corrected the same.’’ General Statutes
§ 9-461; see also General Statutes § 9-461 (requiring
town clerk to ‘‘forthwith notify the [s]ecretary . . . of
any errors in such list or of any changes in such list
provided for in section 9-329a or 9-460’’).
   We agree with the plaintiff that the town clerk has
the ministerial obligation under § 9-461 to accept and
to file with the secretary lists of minor party candidates
that are facially valid under the terms of § 9-452. Under
the terms of § 9-452, a list is facially valid if it is (1)
timely filed at least sixty-two days before the election,
(2) ‘‘certified by the presiding officer of the committee,
meeting or other authority making such nomination,’’
and (3) in the prescribed format with respect to the
certification of the candidates’ names, addresses, signa-
tures, and office titles/districts. General Statutes § 9-
452. The town clerk’s function is limited to assessing
the presence or absence of these facial items, and the
town clerk has no discretion to consider the validity of
the nominations or otherwise to determine whether a
minor party has complied with the statutory scheme
beyond these facial items. See Butts v. Bysiewicz, 298
Conn. 665, 678–79, 682, 5 A.3d 932 (2010) (holding that
secretary lacked discretion to place probate judge can-
didate’s name on ballot because of noncompliance with
statutory deadline for receipt of party endorsements
set forth in General Statutes § 9-388, and emphasizing
that secretary’s office ‘‘is not an appropriate forum for
weighing evidence’’); see also Arciniega v. Feliciano,
329 Conn. 293, 309–10, 184 A.3d 1202 (2018) (town
clerk’s acceptance of petition to qualify slate of candi-
dates ‘‘bearing a purportedly incorrect address for one
candidate [was] not . . . a ruling of an election offi-
cial’’ for purposes of challenges under General Statutes
§ 9-329a because applicable statutes did not provide
town clerk with role in reviewing candidates’ addresses,
meaning that ‘‘there was no procedure mandated by
law that either [of the defendants, the city clerk and
the registrar of voters] failed to apply or follow, such
that it could be said that either implicitly engaged in an
incorrect interpretation of the statutory requirements’’);
Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz, 289 Conn. 522, 528, 958 A.2d
709 (2008) (‘‘the election statutes neither require nor
authorize the [secretary] to verify the constitutional
qualifications of a candidate’’); Caruso v. Bridgeport,
285 Conn. 618, 646–47, 941 A.2d 266 (2008) (observing
that ‘‘election officials generally do not conduct trial-
type proceedings or issue formal decisions on matters
that are presented to them’’ and that ‘‘they administer
the entire election process on a day-to-day basis to
ensure that it is fair and orderly, and complies with
the various statutory requirements,’’ in concluding that,
‘‘[w]hen an election statute mandates certain proce-
dures, and the election official has failed to apply or
to follow those procedures, such conduct implicitly
constitutes an incorrect interpretation of the require-
ments of the statute and, therefore, is a ruling’’); Ste-
fanowski v. Kohler, Docket No. HHD-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S,
2022 WL 6406200, *7 (Conn. Super. September 15, 2022)
(secretary’s obligation under § 9-452 to receive certifi-
cate of nomination by Independent Party, to act ‘‘as
the repository thereof, and [to] plac[e] the nominated
candidates certified by the presiding officer of the cau-
cus on the ballots submitted to the town clerks,’’ is
ministerial duty that does not constitute ‘‘a ruling of an
election official’’ under General Statutes §§ 9-323 and
9-324 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
  Although Giegler, as town clerk, lacked discretion to
refuse the filing of facially valid slates, this preliminary
conclusion does not complete our inquiry, as it ulti-
mately falls to the courts acting under § 9-328 to deter-
mine whether the filings at issue in this case complied
with the governing statutes.14 With this background in
mind, we turn to the parties’ specific statutory claims.
                              I
   We begin with the first certified question, which
requires us to consider whether the trial court incor-
rectly determined that the Alves slate was invalid because
it ‘‘did not comply with all of the notice requirements
of § 9-452a . . . .’’ The plaintiff contends that § 9-452a
‘‘requires that notice . . . be received by the town
clerk ‘[n]ot later than five days’ before the nominating
caucus’’ and that the trial court ‘‘did not specifically find
that the notice was untimely.’’ The plaintiff emphasizes
that, ‘‘[t]o the contrary, the evidence supports the con-
clusion that the notice was timely. Giegler never testi-
fied or claimed that she failed to receive timely notice
of the August 11 [2023] caucus.’’ The plaintiff also argues
that the copy of the newspaper notice in the town clerk’s
file is sufficient as a matter of form to satisfy § 9-452a
because it provided the requisite ‘‘written notice of the
date, time, location and purpose of the meeting to the
town clerk.’’
  In response, Giegler, joined by Rouen, asserts that
the Alves slate did not comply with the notice require-
ments of § 9-452a, thus precluding Giegler from submit-
ting it to the secretary as a matter of law pursuant to
§ 9-461. Giegler contends that there is ‘‘no evidence of
statutory written notice of the [August 11, 2023] meeting
being made to the town clerk, and certainly not at least
five days before the meeting,’’ and that, under, Cham-
bers v. Electric Boat Corp., 283 Conn. 840, 855, 930 A.2d
653 (2007), among other cases, ‘‘constructive notice
would not satisfy the statutory written notice require-
ment . . . .’’ Focusing on the statutory requirements,
and particularly the use of the word ‘‘[c]oncomitantly’’
in § 9-452a, Giegler argues that ‘‘there is no separate
statutory notice’’ of the August 11, 2023 meeting in the
town clerk’s file and that ‘‘it is clear’’ from the language
of § 9-452a, along with its legislative history, that the
statute ‘‘requires two separate notices: (1) a written
notice to the town clerk, [and] (2) publication of notice
in a newspaper of general circulation.’’ She emphasizes
that Chan, who purported to be the ‘‘presiding officer’’
at the August 11, 2023 meeting that produced the Alves
slate, does not claim to have filed the notices in ques-
tion. Although we agree with Giegler’s reading of the
statute as requiring separate notices in the newspaper
and to the town clerk, we conclude that a timely filed
copy of the newspaper advertisement would satisfy § 9-
452a and that the record does not establish, as a matter
of law, that the copy of the News-Times advertisement
was not timely filed with respect to the August 11, 2023
caucus.
   Beginning with the statutory language, as required
by § 1-2z, we observe that § 9-452a provides in relevant
part: ‘‘Not later than five days before a minor party
holds a party meeting to nominate a candidate for public
office, the presiding officer of such meeting shall give
written notice of the date, time, location and purpose
of the meeting to, in the case of a municipal office, the
town clerk of the municipality served by such office
. . . . Concomitantly, the presiding officer of such
meeting shall cause the written notice of such meeting
to be published in a newspaper with a general circula-
tion in the applicable town for such office. . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) As Giegler argues, the word ‘‘con-
comitantly’’ is the adverb form of ‘‘concomitant,’’ which
the dictionary defines as ‘‘[o]ccurring or existing con-
currently; attendant.’’ American Heritage College Dic-
tionary (4th Ed. 2004) p. 297; see id. (noting that origin
of ‘‘concomitant’’ is from Latin word for ‘‘to accom-
pany’’); see also Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/concomitant (last visited January 11, 2023) (defin-
ing ‘‘concomitant’’ as ‘‘accompanying especially in a
subordinate or incidental way’’). We conclude that the
plain and unambiguous language of § 9-452a requires
two separate written notices, one to the town clerk,
and one published in a suitable newspaper.
   Given this plain and unambiguous statutory language,
we agree with Giegler that the two ‘‘written notices’’
are an integral part of § 9-452a and that constructive
or even actual notice will not substitute for the written
notice required by the statute. See Chambers v. Electric
Boat Corp., supra, 283 Conn. 855–58 (concluding that
‘‘written notice of claim for compensation’’ under Work-
ers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-294c (a),
requires claimant to ‘‘reasonably inform the employer
or [the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner] of his or
her intent to pursue a claim specifically under the state
[Workers’ Compensation Act]’’ and that notice require-
ment was not satisfied by claimant’s providing notice
of his intention to seek federal benefits, despite similari-
ties in notice required under federal and state acts);
Kuehl v. Z-Loda Systems Engineering, Inc., 265 Conn.
525, 536–37, 829 A.2d 818 (2003) (declining to impute
to employer manager’s intent to seek survivor’s benefits
under Workers’ Compensation Act because to do so
would impermissibly read ‘‘written notice’’ provision
out of § 31-294c (a)). This is particularly so given that
the written notice requirement is part and parcel of the
legislature’s apparent intention to provide maximum
notice to the public of the proceedings of minor parties
that might affect the election ballot, rendering actual
notice to the town clerk ultimately irrelevant.15 See Tim-
ber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission,
222 Conn. 374, 378–80, 610 A.2d 617 (1992) (failure to
file copy of text of proposed zoning amendment with
town clerk, as required by General Statutes § 8-3 (a),
was not excused by newspaper publication of amend-
ment or fact that objectors’ ‘‘very thorough presentation
at the public hearing demonstrated that they had been
adequately notified of the nature of the proposed change’’
because filing requirement is grounded in ensuring ‘‘fair
notice’’ to ‘‘all interested persons’’ (emphasis omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted)).
   Turning to whether the requirements of § 9-452a were
satisfied in this case, we note that the record reveals
that the newspaper advertisement for the August 11,
2023 meeting was published in the News-Times on
August 4, 2023. There is no claim that the content of
that notice itself substantively would not satisfy § 9-
452a if it had been separately filed with the town clerk
in a timely manner. A separate copy of that advertise-
ment is contained in the town clerk’s file, but, unlike
the other documents from the town clerk’s file that
were admitted into evidence, there is no time stamp on
that notice indicating when the town clerk received it.
Similarly, there is no testimony from any of the wit-
nesses—either from Rouen, Chan, or Lombardi on
behalf of the Independent Party, or Giegler on behalf
of her office—about when or by whom it was filed.16
Put differently, the record is silent as to when the notice
to the town clerk in the form of a copy of the newspaper
advertisement for the August 11, 2023 meeting was filed,
which likely explains why the trial court did not make
a specific finding of untimeliness while concluding that
the notice did not comply with § 9-452a.
   The fact that the trial court did not make a finding
that the August 11, 2023 notice was untimely in its
analysis of the § 9-452a issue ultimately dooms any
attempt to invalidate it on that basis in this court. The
timeliness of a filing is ordinarily a finding of fact to
be made by the trial court in the first instance, which
is of particular importance in a proceeding in this court
under § 9-325, in which our jurisdiction is specifically
limited to ‘‘questions of law.’’ Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186
Conn. 125, 133–34, 440 A.2d 261 (1982); see, e.g., Shelby
v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board, Docket No. 1-
13-0789, 2013 WL 1919115, *6 (Ill. App. May 7, 2013)
(whether ‘‘the nomination papers were timely submit-
ted to the proper officer at the customary office within
the customary office hours’’ was question of fact); see
also State v. Freeman, 344 Conn. 503, 512–13, 281 A.3d
397 (2022) (whether arrest warrant was executed in
reasonable period of time for purposes of tolling statute
of limitations under State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443,
450–51, 521 A.2d 1034 (1987)); Washington Trust Co.
v. Smith, 241 Conn. 734, 744–45, 699 A.2d 73 (1997)
(timeliness of intervention as of right), overruled in
part on other grounds by Kerrigan v. Commissioner
of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 904 A.2d 137 (2006).
Ordinarily, a party seeking to establish that a particular
action is time barred has the burden of establishing
that defense.17 Cf. Herman E. v. Robinson, 292 So. 3d
561, 564–65 (La. App. 2019) (tax agency bears burden
of proving that request for tax refund was not timely
filed by certified mail within statute of limitations); St.
Paul Travelers Cos., Inc. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800, 815,
12 A.3d 852 (2011) (‘‘[o]rdinarily, a defendant must
plead the failure to meet the applicable statute of limita-
tions as an affirmative defense, and the defendant bears
the burden of proving the elements of the defense by
a preponderance of the evidence’’). With no finding by
the trial court that the filing of the notice of the August
11, 2023 meeting was untimely, long established conven-
tions of appellate practice, along with the strictures
specific to review under § 9-325, preclude us from con-
sidering that factual issue in the first instance on appeal.
See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 314 Conn. 465, 478–79, 102
A.3d 52 (2014). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court incorrectly determined that the Alves slate was
the product of a meeting that did not comply with the
notice requirements of § 9-452a, and we further con-
clude that the trial court should have exercised its equi-
table authority to order that the Alves slate be for-
warded to the secretary’s office.18
                             II
  The second certified question asks whether Giegler
improperly filed the Esposito slate with the secretary
on the ground that the Independent Party’s August 22,
2023 filing did not ‘‘comply with . . . § 9-452 because
it was not certified.’’ Emphasizing Rouen’s signature on
a certain cover letter, which was printed on Indepen-
dent Party letterhead and stated that the Esposito slate
represents the party’s ‘‘official endorsements,’’ Giegler
and Rouen argue that the trial court incorrectly con-
cluded that the Esposito slate was not certified. They
also rely on the plain meaning of the word ‘‘certify’’ and
the fact that § 9-452 does not prescribe any particular
manner of certification, along with the Appellate
Court’s decision in Williams v. Freedom of Information
Commission, 108 Conn. App. 471, 948 A.2d 1058 (2008).
In response, the plaintiff contends that a certification
‘‘is an attestation of the truth and correctness of the
matter certified,’’ and that certification, therefore, ‘‘is
not the same as signing the list of nominees or stating
that the list is ‘official.’ ’’ The plaintiff emphasizes that
‘‘certifying’’ is an act distinct from ‘‘signing,’’ given the
importance of certification by party officials in aiding
town clerks in verifying the authenticity of a purported
slate of candidates. We agree with Giegler and conclude
that the Esposito slate was ‘‘certif[ied]’’ within the
meaning of § 9-452.
   Beginning with the statutory text, as required by the
§ 1-2z analysis, we observe that § 9-452 provides in rele-
vant part: ‘‘All minor parties nominating candidates for
any elective office shall make such nominations and
certify and file a list of such nominations, as required
by this section, not later than the sixty-second day prior
to the day of the election at which such candidates
are to be voted for. A list of nominees in printed or
typewritten form that includes each candidate’s name
as authorized by each candidate to appear on the ballot,
the signature of each candidate, the full street address
of each candidate and the title and district of the office
for which each candidate is nominated shall be certified
by the presiding officer of the committee, meeting or
other authority making such nomination and shall be
filed by such presiding officer . . . with the clerk of
the municipality, in the case of any municipal office to
be voted upon at a municipal election, not later than
the sixty-second day prior to the day of the election.
. . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
   It is undisputed that the term ‘‘certify’’ or ‘‘certified’’
is not defined by the applicable statutory scheme. Con-
temporary dictionaries indicate that the ordinary mean-
ing of the term ‘‘certify’’ is (1) ‘‘to attest [especially]
authoritatively or formally,’’ (2) ‘‘to present in formal
communication, [especially] in a document under hand
or seal,’’ or (3) ‘‘to confirm or attest often by a document
under hand or seal as being true, meeting a standard,
or being as represented . . . .’’ Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary (1976) p. 367; see Ballentine’s
Law Dictionary (3d Ed. 1969) p. 188 (defining ‘‘certify’’
as ‘‘[t]o authenticate by a certificate; to vouch for a
thing in writing; a certificate is an authoritative attesta-
tion, and any form which affirms the fact in writing is
sufficient’’); see also American Heritage College Dic-
tionary, supra, p. 236 (defining ‘‘certify’’ as ‘‘[t]o confirm
formally as true, accurate, or genuine,’’ or ‘‘[t]o guaran-
tee as meeting a standard’’). In our view, the plain mean-
ing of the term is ambiguous for purposes of § 1-2z, as
we view both parties’ interpretations as reasonable with
respect to whether a specific statement of veracity and
correctness is required. See, e.g., Adesokan v. Bloom-
field, 347 Conn. 416, 425 n.7, 297 A.3d 983 (2023).
   Our research did not reveal any case law construing
the term ‘‘certify’’ as used in § 9-452, and the legislative
history of the statute, which was originally enacted in
1955 as Public Acts 1955, No. 106, is silent on that point.
The Appellate Court’s decision in Williams v. Freedom
of Information Commission, supra, 108 Conn. App.
471, on which the parties heavily rely, is instructive. In
that case, the Appellate Court, in a decision authored
by former Justice David M. Borden, considered the
meaning of the term ‘‘certifying’’ as used in the Freedom
of Information Act, specifically with respect to a munici-
pality’s obligation under General Statutes § 1-210 (a) to
supply ‘‘certified copies . . . .’’ Id., 479–81. The plain-
tiff in Williams argued that, under that statute, ‘‘prop-
erly certified copies . . . must have the following char-
acteristics: the certification must attest that it is a true
and complete copy of the record on file; the certification
must be issued by the person who maintains the record
or his or her authorized representative; the certifier
must sign the record; the raised seal of the certifier must
appear on each page of the record; and the ‘certification
shall be truthful.’ ’’ Id., 478–79.
   The Appellate Court rejected the contention that the
Freedom of Information Act ‘‘mandates such a compre-
hensive set of requirements.’’ Id., 479. The court observed
that, ‘‘[u]nlike some other statutes,’’ such as General
Statutes § 7-23 (certification by town clerk)19 and Gen-
eral Statutes § 7-36 (certification by registrar of vital
statistics),20 ‘‘the [Freedom of Information Act] does
not prescribe any particular form or content of a certifi-
cation of records.’’ Id., 480. The Appellate Court held
that the ‘‘use of the term ‘certified’ [in § 1-210 (a)] sug-
gests that as long as an official with legal authority to
do so attests, or states in writing, that the records are
true copies of the originals, he or she has issued a
‘certified record’ properly under the [Freedom of Infor-
mation Act].’’ Id., 481. Relying on dictionary definitions
for the general meaning of the term ‘‘certify,’’21 the
Appellate Court observed that §§ 7-23 and 7-36, on
which the plaintiff in Williams relied for those ‘‘addi-
tional requirements,’’ ‘‘simply represent two instances
in which the legislature has decided that a specific
form of certification is necessary due to the nature and
importance of the records. [The Appellate Court saw]
nothing in the language or purpose of either of those
statutes or the [Freedom of Information Act] to suggest
that the specific requirements of those statutes be
imported into the provisions of [that] act.’’ Id., 482.
   Given the lack of specificity as to the required form
of ‘‘[c]ertification’’ under § 9-452, we find Williams
instructive. First, reading additional requirements into
the statute’s language runs afoul of the well settled rule
of statutory construction that ‘‘[w]e are not permitted
to supply statutory language that the legislature may
have chosen to omit.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Mayer v. Historic District Commission, 325 Conn.
765, 776, 160 A.3d 333 (2017). Second, importing addi-
tional substantive requirements as to the form of the
certification would contravene the maxim that ‘‘[a]mbi-
guities in election laws are [to be] construed to allow the
greatest scope for public participation in the electoral
process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to
allow parties to put their candidates on the ballot, and
most importantly to allow the voters a choice on [e]lec-
tion [d]ay.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Butts
v. Bysiewicz, supra, 298 Conn. 675. Although the legisla-
ture could well prescribe a specific form of certification,
such as requiring the submission under oath, it has not
yet done so. In the absence of specific direction from
our legislature as to the form such certification must
take,22 we adhere to our well settled reticence to
demand the use of ‘‘talismanic words,’’ which we have
stated in a variety of contexts, and decline to hold that
the absence of the word ‘‘certification’’ renders a filing
defective as a matter of law. Carpenter v. Daar, 346
Conn. 80, 130, 287 A.3d 1027 (2023); see, e.g., id., 130–31;
cf. In re Election of the United States Representative
for the Second Congressional District, 231 Conn. 602,
652–54, 653 A.2d 79 (1994) (depository envelopes
stamped with printed names and titles of town clerks,
but lacking stamped facsimile of clerks’ cursive signa-
ture, substantially complied with signature requirement
in General Statutes § 9-140c (a) because it was consis-
tent with statutory purpose of preventing absentee bal-
lot fraud through commingling authorized and unautho-
rized ballots).
   Turning to the document at issue, we observe that it
is a cover letter printed on Independent Party letterhead
and signed by Rouen in his capacity as the chairperson
of that party. That cover letter indicates that the party
was filing its ‘‘official endorsements . . . .’’ This degree
of formality, with Rouen’s averment that the endorse-
ments are ‘‘official,’’ meets the dictionary definition of
‘‘certify’’ because the filing involved the presentation
of a ‘‘formal communication,’’ and a confirmation that
the endorsements ‘‘[met] a standard.’’ Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary, supra. This is particularly so when
the cover letter is read in context, with its averment that
the attached endorsements are ‘‘official,’’ as opposed
to the previously filed competing set that Rouen sought
to revoke in the same cover letter. Although one of the
annexed signature pages tellingly refers to the Danbury
Republican Town Committee’s support of that set of
endorsements, and the other candidate signatures also
predate the August 22, 2023 filing by more than one
month,23 this nevertheless does not detract from the
fact that Rouen’s letter—which is the controlling docu-
ment as to certification—meets the broad standard
applicable to that term under current statutory law.
Accordingly, we conclude that Rouen’s letter consti-
tuted the voucher necessary to comply with the statu-
tory certification requirement under § 9-452, rendering
the Esposito slate validly filed.
   Given the ministerial role of the town clerk, we con-
clude that Giegler had no choice under the statutory
scheme but to accept and to transmit to the secretary
both filings—August 11, 2023, by Chan, and August 21,
2023, by Rouen—purporting to be the endorsements of
the Independent Party, insofar as both were facially
compliant with the governing statutes. It is undisputed
that the presence of two facially valid slates had the
effect of creating what, at the time, would be an over
endorsement by the Independent Party; in such a case,
there functionally would be no endorsement with
respect to the affected offices by operation of § 9-414,
which provides: ‘‘No town committee, caucus or con-
vention shall endorse and certify to the clerk of a munic-
ipality, and no primary shall choose, more candidates
for nomination to municipal office or more persons as
members of a town committee than an elector may
vote for in each such case.’’ See also, e.g., Lobsenz v.
Davidoff, 182 Conn. 111, 119–20 and n.5, 438 A.2d 21
(1980). Accordingly, the trial court’s ultimate determina-
tion that neither set of endorsements should be placed
on the ballot is correct, albeit for reasons different from
those stated in the memorandum of decision. See, e.g.,
Heisinger v. Cleary, 323 Conn. 765, 776 n.12, 150 A.3d
1136 (2016) (‘‘[When] the trial court reaches a correct
decision but on [alternative] grounds, this court has
repeatedly sustained the trial court’s action if proper
grounds exist to support it. . . . [W]e . . . may affirm
the court’s judgment on a dispositive [alternative] ground
for which there is support in the trial court record.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.)).
   We acknowledge Rouen’s argument that this result
has deprived the Independent Party of its first amend-
ment rights ‘‘to identify the people who constitute the
association . . . and to select a standard bearer who
best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nielsen v. Kezer,
supra, 232 Conn. 87; see Butts v. Bysiewicz, supra, 298
Conn. 673–74. As was heavily discussed at oral argu-
ment before this court, the Independent Party’s remedy
for what Rouen characterizes as a ‘‘coup’’ by interlopers
who joined the party mere days before the August 11,
2023 meeting lies within its own bylaws and any dispute
resolution mechanism provided therein as required by
General Statutes § 9-387,24 coupled with judicial enforce-
ment of the party’s internal resolution of that dispute.
See Price v. Independent Party of CT—State Central,
323 Conn. 529, 543, 147 A.3d 1032 (2016) (‘‘the judiciary
has a role to play in promoting fair play even within
the nomination process’’); Nielsen v. Kezer, supra, 79
(describing political parties’ ‘‘historical autonomy’’ and
‘‘broad discretion to select candidates’’ in concluding
that, ‘‘[b]ecause the . . . interpretation of party rules
[by the executive committee of the defendant political
party] was an integral part of the deliberative process
by which the committee resolved the endorsement dis-
pute, the committee was entitled to wide latitude in
interpreting and applying those rules’’). Although Rouen
argues in his brief that the Independent Party did in
fact implement that process to veto the August 11, 2023
nomination of the Alves slate, and that the August 22,
2023 filing contained a veto message signed by Rouen
with respect to the Alves slate while also stating that
the Esposito slate represented the ‘‘official endorse-
ments’’ of the Independent Party, oral argument before
this court revealed that, in sharp contrast to the pro-
ceedings and rules at issue in Nielsen; see Nielsen v.
Kezer, supra, 68–72, 78–82; the record, including the
governing Independent Party bylaw provision that was
admitted into evidence, was not at all clear with respect
to how that process functioned or occurred in this case,
lacking, for example, minutes of the August 21, 2023
meeting. In the absence of a record establishing how the
Independent Party resolved the two competing slates
in accordance with its own intraparty dispute resolution
procedures, and a request for a court order challenging
or enforcing that resolution, neither the trial court nor
this court is positioned to enforce that result via an
order to the town clerk.25
  The answer to the first certified question is ‘‘yes,’’
and the answer to the second certified question is ‘‘no.’’
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
    Also named as a defendant was Stephanie Thomas, the secretary of the
state. The trial court subsequently granted the secretary’s motion to dismiss
the action against her, subject to a stipulation that she would ‘‘abide by any
ruling of [the] court, directed to the town clerk or other parties, with regard
to the substance of this matter . . . .’’
  2
    Specifically, the trial court ordered Giegler ‘‘to remove from the Indepen-
dent Party line those names submitted by her to the [secretary] on September
18, 2023, excluding only those four candidates set forth in the parties’
October 10, 2023 stipulation . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) We note that those
unaffected offices, as set forth in the October 10 stipulation, include the
Board of Education (2-year term), Board of Education (4-year term), City
Council, Ward 5, and City Council, Ward 6.
  3
    In Docket No. SC 20907, Giegler appealed, and the plaintiff cross
appealed, directly to this court from the judgment of the trial court pursuant
to General Statutes §§ 9-325 and 51-199 (b) (5).
  In Docket No. SC 20908, Rouen appealed, and the plaintiff cross appealed,
directly to this court from the judgment of the trial court, along with its
October 12 order, pursuant to §§ 9-325 and 51-199 (b) (5).
  On October 17, 2023, we consolidated the appeals and cross appeals with
the questions of law certified under § 9-325 and directed all filings to take
place in Docket No. SC 20907. See, e.g., Keeley v. Ayala, 328 Conn. 393, 399
n.5, 179 A.3d 1249 (2018); Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125, 133–35, 440
A.2d 261 (1982).
   4
     The parties also filed motions to expedite these appeals. In light of our
October 17, 2023 order directing briefs to be filed by October 19, 2023, and
the scheduling of oral argument for October 20, 2023, we determined that
no action was necessary on the motions to expedite.
   5
     We note that the trial court had stayed the October 12 order and ordered
Giegler not to distribute absentee ballots and applications to voters in con-
nection with the October 5, 2023 statutory deadline that otherwise would
have governed in this case. Giegler moved for review of that order. After
oral argument, we ordered those stays terminated and granted the pending
motions for review of those stays, but we denied the relief requested therein.
   6
     Lombardi’s minutes, which were filed with the secretary’s office by email,
state in more detail that the disagreement over voting rights was between
Chan and Michael Sfranek, who is the chairperson of the Danbury Republican
Town Committee and had taken the position that only Republicans could
vote at the Independent Party meeting. Sfranek asked for the meeting to
be adjourned. Lombardi’s minutes indicate that Rouen, in presiding over
the motion to adjourn, never asked for the votes of those opposed to adjourn-
ment, despite repeated calls for a roll call vote, a point of order request,
and a call for the nay votes to be heard.
   7
     Giegler spoke to Attorney Lewis A. Button III at the secretary’s office.
In a follow-up email, Button advised Giegler ‘‘to accept any endorsements
that either side files with you. If there are more endorsements than offices
to be filled on the ballot, then an over endorsement has occurred, and you
may not place any candidates on the ballot for that party line. If this occurs,
you should send a letter to both sides confirming the fact that you have
received multiple endorsements and may not be able to put anyone on the
ballot. We would not want an election official to choose among varying
nominations, nor would we want to place a municipal officer in a role meant
for the judiciary. I say this because if the Independent Party has a dispute
regarding nominations, the merits of such a dispute must likely be tried in
a court of law.’’
   8
     Giegler testified that she did not notice the words ‘‘Republican Town
Committee’’ when her assistant initialed and accepted the submission of
the Esposito slate on August 23, 2023. Rouen did not know why the reference
to the Republican Town Committee appeared on the Independent Party’s
endorsement of the Esposito slate as submitted to the town clerk but empha-
sized that the slate of endorsed candidates was indeed that of the Indepen-
dent Party.
   9
     Beyond the certified issues, the trial court rejected claims advanced by
Rouen that (1) Giegler’s decisions were not ‘‘rulings of an election official’’
for purposes of aggrievement under § 9-328, and (2) the preclusion on ‘‘over
endorsements’’ under § 9-414 is inapplicable to minor parties. The trial court
also rejected Giegler’s claim that the doctrine of laches barred the plaintiff’s
action, which was brought nine days after Giegler’s decision on September
18, 2023.
   10
      Although the trial court determined that the plaintiff’s challenge to
Giegler’s decision to submit the Esposito slate to the secretary on the ground
that it had not been properly certified under § 9-452 was a question of
statutory construction, it also spent considerable time in its memorandum
of decision negatively assessing Giegler’s credibility as a witness. Insofar
as all of the issues in this appeal are determinable from the face of the record
as questions of law, we agree with Giegler’s argument that her credibility
is of no moment to this appeal.
   11
      Specifically, the trial court stated that it was rendering a judgment
declaring that ‘‘Giegler improperly exceeded her statutory authority to invali-
date the Alves slate, which, coupled with [her] decision to validate the
Esposito [slate], created an impermissible over endorsement in violation of
. . . § 9-414. In such a case, no endorsement should appear on the line in
question.’’ This conclusion is inconsistent with the trial court’s determination
that both slates failed to comply with the statutory scheme and, therefore,
should not be on the ballot. Ultimately, this inconsistency does not affect
the outcome of this case.
   12
      See footnote 2 of this opinion.
   13
      We take this opportunity to express our gratitude to all counsel, and
to Judge Medina, for their professionalism in conducting these proceedings,
which required trial and appellate review to be conducted on a highly
expedited basis given the need to finalize, print, and distribute ballots in
advance of the November 7, 2023 municipal elections. We emphasize, how-
ever, that the scheduling of expedited proceedings such as this case should
account for a meaningful time for appellate review, including briefing, oral
argument, and decision.
   14
      We acknowledge Giegler’s argument that the language of § 9-461, which
requires the town clerk to file with the secretary nominations made ‘‘in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter,’’ permits the town clerk to
file only those lists that are statutorily compliant. With respect to compliance,
that argument merely begs the question: who decides? Consistent with our
understanding of the case law governing the duties of town clerks and the
secretary, we do not understand Giegler to argue that this language gives
town clerks the authority to conduct investigations or to make assessments
that go beyond the face of the documents. Indeed, during her testimony
before the trial court, Giegler conceded that a town clerk is required to
accept filings but is not required ‘‘to seek minutes from groups’’ submitting
endorsements. She further conceded that the position of town clerk does
not afford her any investigative or adjudicatory powers concerning circum-
stances that have resulted in contested endorsements, or their ultimate valid-
ity.
   15
      Assuming ambiguity in the statute for purposes of § 1-2z, we note that
the legislative history indicates that the newspaper publication provision
was added to § 9-452a in 2007 via the enactment of § 46 of No. 07-194 of
the 2007 Public Acts, which was a broader election reform and security bill
aimed at auditing voting machines. The limited commentary in the legislative
history indicates that it was intended to conform the notice practices of
minor parties to those of the major parties. See 50 S. Proc., Pt. 16, 2007
Sess., p. 5092, remarks of Senator Gayle Slossberg.
   16
      We disagree with Giegler’s argument that notice of the meeting could
be filed only by Chan because § 9-452a requires the ‘‘presiding officer’’ of
the meeting to file the notice, and he had served as chairperson of the
caucus on August 11, 2023. This argument is inconsistent with the statutory
scheme, in particular § 9-452, which contemplates certification of endorse-
ments by a ‘‘presiding officer of the committee, meeting or other authority
making such nomination,’’ which would encompass the caucus, as distinct
from the presiding officer of the meeting, who must give the premeeting
notice contemplated by § 9-452a. As was discussed at oral argument before
this court, it is entirely plausible for one individual to call and preside over
the meeting, and then to turn over the chair to another individual for purposes
of presiding over the nomination proceeding.
   17
      Although Giegler accurately points out that no participant in the August
11, 2023 meeting, including Chan, Rouen or Lombardi, testified as to when
the notice was filed with the town clerk’s office, it bears mention that
Giegler was uniquely positioned, in her role as town clerk, to establish when
documents were filed with her office. In comparison to the other documents
from the town clerk’s office that were submitted into evidence, the potential
timeliness issue in this appeal renders all the more significant the lack of
a date and time stamp on the advertisement in her file. We simply decline
to presume that the filing was not timely or properly filed. See, e.g., Scovil
v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 155 Conn. 12, 18–20, 230 A.2d 31 (1967)
(declining to conclude that absence of proposed zoning regulations from
file in town clerk’s office meant that they were not filed in advance of public
hearing, because statute did not require their retention ‘‘for any given period
after the public hearing,’’ even though retention would have been better
practice, given ‘‘the presumption that the [zoning commission] acted in
accordance with [the] law and that the regulations were properly kept on
file in the town clerk’s office, available for public inspection, until sometime
after the public hearing’’).
   18
      As was discussed at oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s
operative complaint did not specifically seek the relief of forwarding the
Alves slate to the secretary’s office for addition to the ballot, and a footnote
in its memorandum of decision indicates that the trial court did not appear
to understand the plaintiff to be seeking that form of relief. Nevertheless,
we agree with the plaintiff that the relief he sought was broad enough to
encompass that form of relief, particularly given the attention paid to the
§ 9-452a issue concerning the August 11, 2023 endorsements as the issues
developed during the expedited trial proceedings. Indeed, the plaintiff seeks
that relief on appeal, and neither party challenges the propriety of granting
the plaintiff such an appellate remedy. In the absence of a challenge, we
leave for another day any question concerning a court’s equitable authority
to add candidates to the ballot after Butts v. Bysiewicz, supra, 298 Conn. 665.
   19
      General Statutes § 7-23 provides in relevant part: ‘‘No copy of record
certified by the town clerk or assistant town clerk of any town shall be
deemed valid in law unless the seal of such town is affixed thereto; and the
town clerk of each town . . . shall affix the seal of such town to all certified
copies of record . . . .’’
   20
      General Statutes § 7-36 (5) provides: ‘‘ ‘Certified copy’ means a copy
of a birth, death, fetal death or marriage certificate that (A) includes all
information on the certificate except such information that is nondisclosable
by law, (B) is issued or transmitted by any registrar of vital statistics, (C)
includes an attested signature and the raised seal of an authorized person,
and (D) if submitted to the department, includes all information required
by the [Commissioner of Public Health] . . . .’’
   21
      Consistent with the dictionary definitions cited in this opinion, the
Appellate Court observed that ‘‘this general meaning is consistent with the
most apt definition provided by the dictionary for the word ‘certify’: ‘To
confirm formally as true, accurate, or genuine; testify to or vouch for in
writing.’ American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (New College
Ed. 1981).’’ Williams v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 108
Conn. App. 481; see id. (observing that plain language definition was consis-
tent with ‘‘the purposes of the [Freedom of Information Act], namely, to
make public records available to the public, except when specifically
exempted . . . and to do so without undue burden on the provider of the
records’’ (citation omitted)).
   22
      For example, an Illinois statute requires that the presiding officer and
the secretary of the nominating proceeding specifically certify under oath,
in a document ‘‘annexed to the certificate of nomination,’’ that their report
of the nominations is ‘‘true to the best of their knowledge and belief . . . .’’
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/10-1 (a) (West 2022); see, e.g., People ex rel. Vigilant
Party v. Dolton, 118 Ill. App. 2d 392, 395, 254 N.E.2d 832 (1969). Given the
legislature’s role as our state’s primary source of public policy, and the
existence of a comprehensive statutory scheme of election laws, we leave it
to that branch to determine whether a more robust and specific certification
requirement might serve to avoid conflicts such as those presented in this
appeal. See, e.g., Salce v. Cardello, 348 Conn. 90, 115 n.12, 301 A.3d 1031
(2023) (‘‘[i]n areas [in which] the legislature has spoken . . . the primary
responsibility for formulating public policy must remain with the legislature’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
   23
      As was discussed at oral argument before this court, the facilitation of
the Independent Party’s endorsements by the Danbury Republican Town
Committee is entirely consistent with the Independent Party’s determination
that its participation in the political process might be most effectively accom-
plished via the cross endorsement of major party candidates, rather than
through the nomination of separate candidates.
   24
      General Statutes § 9-387 provides: ‘‘The state rules of each party shall
prescribe the manner in which any dispute as to the endorsement by such
party of a candidate for state, district or municipal office or for town commit-
tee member, or as to the selection by such party of a delegate to a convention,
including conflicting claims to such endorsement or selection, shall be
resolved.’’
   25
      Even if we assume, without deciding, that the Independent Party bylaws
allow its executive committee, or officers, to veto the action of the member-
ship of the party itself, it would go far beyond the ministerial role of the
town clerk to require her to choose between two competing sets of endorse-
ments on the ground that one is proper under the bylaws of the party.
In the absence of a court order declaring that only one set of disputed
endorsements is valid under the governing rules of the party, the town
clerk—in this case, Giegler—was obligated to accept and file both with the
secretary. Cf. Independent Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill, 330 Conn.
681, 723, 200 A.3d 1118 (2019) (observing necessity of naming secretary as
party in case involving intraparty dispute as to nomination of candidates in
view of ‘‘the necessity of an order directed to the [s]ecretary given her
office’s long established policy of not accepting a minor party’s nomination
for an office when there is a conflicting nomination under the same party
designation’’).