Court Opinion

ID: 9840842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 15:06:32.262779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:20.214410
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                                State of Florida

                      Opinion filed September 20, 2023.
        Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                             ________________

                              No. 3D22-1870
                        Lower Tribunal No. 21-10 AP
                           ________________

                            Cristina Hernandez,
                                  Petitioner,

                                      vs.

                 City of Miami Code Enforcement Board,
                               Respondent.

     On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Appellate Division, Lisa S. Walsh, Daryl E. Trawick and Maria de
Jesus Santovenia, Judges.

     David J. Winker, P.A., and David J. Winker, for petitioner.

      Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, and Kerri L. McNulty, Litigation &
Appeals Division Chief, and Marguerite C. Snyder, Assistant City Attorney,
for respondent.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and BOKOR, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
     Upon consideration, the petition for second-tier certiorari is denied.

See Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla.

2010) (providing:

           This Court has continually applied certain
           fundamental principles for the use of certiorari to
           review decisions rendered by the circuit court acting
           in its appellate capacity from the time common-law
           certiorari jurisdiction was first recognized in 1855.
           See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.
           2d 885 (Fla. 2003); Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.
           2d 679 (Fla.2000); Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs,
           658 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1995); Combs v. State, 436 So.
           2d 93 (Fla. 1983); Halliday v. Jacksonville & Alligator
           Plank Rd. Co., 6 Fla. 304 (1855). We have
           consistently observed that “as a case travels up the
           judicial ladder, review should consistently become
           narrower, not broader.” Haines, 658 So. 2d at 530.
           Therefore, when a district court considers a petition
           for second-tier certiorari review, the “inquiry is limited
           to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due
           process an whether the circuit court applied the
           correct law,” or, as otherwise stated, departed from
           the essential requirements of law. Id.; see also
           Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d at 889–90. The departure
           from the essential requirements of the law necessary
           for granting a writ of certiorari is something more than
           a simple legal error. See Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d at
           889 (citing Ivey, 774 So. 2d at 682). Rather, a district
           court should exercise its discretion to grant review
           only when the lower tribunal has violated a clearly
           established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage
           of justice.) (footnote omitted).

See also Advanced Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr. Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co.,

103 So. 3d 866, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding that petitioner waived its

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claim of error in second-tier certiorari review where it failed to raise the error

as a basis for reversal in its appellate brief to the circuit court acting in an

appellate capacity); Detournay v. City of Coral Gables, 127 So. 3d 869, 873

(Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (reaffirming that “the City's discretion to file, prosecute,

abate, settle, or voluntarily dismiss a building and zoning enforcement action

is analogous to a prosecutor's discretion to file, prosecute, abate, settle, or

dismiss a criminal or civil lawsuit. The prosecutor's discretion in this regard

is a pure executive function that cannot be supervised by the courts, absent

the violation of a specific constitutional provision or law”) (citing Trianon Park

Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 922 (Fla.1985)).

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