Court Opinion

ID: 9487081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:07:51.125019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:05.422926
License: Public Domain

ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
For the most part, I agree with the majority’s well-reasoned analysis of the state of the law concerning the Sentencing Guidelines’ increase for abusing a “position of trust” under § 3B1.3. However, I disagree with the majority’s apparent conclusion that § 3B1.3 requires us to determine who bestowed a position of trust on the defendant, or that we need to determine the “source of the lack of supervision” over the defendant. I also believe the majority’s opinion is at odds with our prior opinion in United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 420 (7th Cir.1993). Yet even if I agreed with the majority’s interpretation of § 3B1.3, I nonetheless believe the facts in this case are sufficiently clear that the defendant violated the Bank’s trust that a remand is superfluous.
The majority’s analysis releases § 3B1.3 from its moorings. The purpose of § 3B1.3 is to punish more severely those defendants whose crimes are more difficult to detect by virtue of the special nature of their positions. I, like the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, fail to see anything in the language of § 3B1.3 or its Commentary that requires that,the victim in particular bestow the defendant with the specific duties that create a position of trust. See United States v. Shyllon, 10 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1327, 127 L.Ed.2d 675 (1994). The language of § 3B1.3 requires simply that the defendant have occupied a position of trust which made it easier to commit a hard-to-deteet crime, regardless of who bestowed the position of trust on the defendant. Whether the victim himself bestowed the defendant with a position of trust is merely coincidental to the determination of whether the defendant in fact occupied a position of trust which enabled him to escape detection.
The rest of the footnote in United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 506 n. 3 (9th Cir.1990), cited by the majority, see Op. at 919, makes this clear: “a trust relationship may exist among other parties as well[,] such as between a customer and an employee.” For example, in the case of bank employee embezzlement, there could be multiple victims of an employee’s breach of trust, including the bank, its shareholders, its customers, and even federal insurers. However, not each of these victims explicitly bestows a position of trust upon or “fails to supervise” the bank employee — a finding the majority would apparently require before applying § 3B1.3. A *921bank customer may trust the bank and therefore also indirectly trust its employees, but it would be awkward to say the customer bestowed the bank employee with his position of trust or that the customer “failed to supervise” the bank employee, even though the customer might still be a victim of the employee’s embezzlement. In sum, the language of § 3B1.3 fails to support the majority’s reading of § 3B 1.3. As a result, I disagree that we need to venture beyond deference to the district court’s finding that the defendant in fact occupied a position of trust that enabled her to commit crimes otherwise more easily detectable.
Notwithstanding my disagreement with the majority’s analysis of § 3B1.3, I have a more fundamental problem with our holding today. In Lamb, 6 F.3d at 420, we analyzed the problem of the “ordinary bank teller.”1 Quoting United States v. Odoms, 801 F.Supp. 59, 64 (N.D.Ill.1992), we stated: “ ‘Ordinary bank tellers can and do embezzle funds, evading detection commensurate with their creativity, their computer skills and the bank’s detection sophistication and effort.’ ” We went on to say: “Thus we are of the opinion that bank tellers are in a position of trust and any attempt to provide a standard for district courts to distinguish bank tellers from other lower echelon employees would result in far too much confusion.” Lamb, 6 F.3d at 420 (emphasis supplied). Today’s holding flatly contradicts our analysis and holding in Lamb. In Lamb we recognized that bank tellers, equipped with specialized information and knowledge, occupy a position of trust which would make embezzlement more difficult to detect. That is precisely what happened in this defendant’s case. Kathy Hathcoat used her specialized knowledge of internal bank auditing procedures to devise an elaborate scheme of embezzlement designed to avoid detection. I see no reason to stray from Lamb.
Regardless of my disagreement with the majority regarding the correct application of § 3B1.3, I also believe further factual findings are unnecessary. The record shows that Hathcoat exercised responsibilities iden-tieal in substance to those of her supervisor, Cooper. As the district court concluded, Hathcoat and Cooper were essentially “alter egos” of one another, acting “without regard to the differences [between] their position[s].” Like Cooper, Hathcoat interacted with the Bank by filing false reports regarding the branch’s cash levels. Hathcoat also knew internal bank auditing procedures necessary to facilitate her fraud. Looking to the substance of Hathcoat’s duties, as the majority agrees is the proper approach, see Op. at 918, Hathcoat occupied essentially the same position of trust as her supervisor Cooper. Hathcoat relied on her specialized knowledge of bank procedures and the trust of the Bank to facilitate and conceal her criminal endeavors.
Moreover, it is apparent that the Bank itself was responsible for “failing to supervise” Cooper and Hathcoat. The district court concluded: “The fact that there were only two [employees at the branch] laid the basis for Ms. Cooper’s imparting all of this information about how the bank runs and basically made Ms. Hathcoat into a different sort of employee at the bank and gave her the opportunity by virtue of that position to commit this crime and to conceal the offense.” Thus, because the Bank assigned only two employees to the Pendleton branch, it was necessary, indeed probably proper, for Cooper to instruct Hathcoat on her additional responsibilities. Therefore, under the majority’s analysis, the Bank was responsible for the “failure to supervise” Hathcoat. As a result, I see no need to remand for further fact finding.

. For a discussion of the tension between § 3B1.3 and the Commentarys reference to the "ordinary bank teller,” and our rejection of the bank teller example, see Lamb, 6 F.3d at 418-21.