Court Opinion

ID: 9760347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:49:17.947118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:10.763045
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
This case presents us once again with the issue of the extent of relief a PCHA court may grant once it is determined that a petitioner’s rights have been denied. In this case, the Commonwealth concedes, and the majority finds, two distinct denials: 1) appellant was not advised on October 5, 1977, when he was sentenced after the revocation of his probation, of his right to appeal; and 2) appellant was not advised on June 23, 1978, when he was sentenced after his guilty pleas, of his right to file a motion to withdraw the pleas.
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In my opinion, when a defendant alleges in a petition filed under the Post Conviction Hearing Act that he has been unlawfully denied the right to direct appeal, guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution, article V, section 9, the PCHA court must decide that issue first. If the court determines that the defendant’s right to direct appeal has been denied, it should reinstate the right, so that the defendant may appeal nunc pro tunc, and not decide whether the other claims made in the PCHA petition are valid.
*343This procedure has been approved in several cases. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Gaston, 474 Pa. 218, 378 A.2d 297 (1977); Commonwealth v. Webster, 466 Pa. 314, 353 A.2d 372 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 458 Pa. 367, 326 A.2d 279 (1974); Commonwealth v. Fareri, 271 Pa.Super. 174, 412 A.2d 632 (1979); Commonwealth v. Drummond, 238 Pa.Super. 311, 357 A.2d 600 (1976). Apart from considerations of precedent, I endorse it because it places the defendant who has been denied his right to appeal in the same position as one who has been allowed to exercise that right. The procedure approved by the majority discriminates against the defendant who has been denied his right to appeal. As petitioner in a PCHA proceeding, the defendant has the burden of proving that counsel was ineffective. As appellant on a direct appeal, the defendant has only the burden of proving that his claims are meritorious and have not been waived.
These considerations lead to the further conclusion that if trial counsel fails to file post-verdict motions as well as an appeal, the PCHA court, instead of reinstating the defendant’s right to direct appeal, should direct him to file post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 280 Pa.Super. 309, 421 A.2d 737 (1980), thereby restoring by making fully effective the right to appeal denied by ineffective counsel.
I acknowledge that this court has not been consistent. Several opinions have recommended that if a PCHA court determines that a defendant’s right to appeal has been denied, the court should decide whether the claims made in the PCHA petition are valid. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Harper, 273 Pa.Super. 426, 417 A.2d 722 (1980); Commonwealth v. Miller, 246 Pa.Super. 392, 371 A.2d 896 (1977); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 239 Pa.Super. 324, 361 A.2d 706 (1976). I hope that we shall be able to resolve the issue of how the PCHA court should proceed in our forthcoming opinions in two cases recently argued before our court en banc: Commonwealth v. May, (J. 988/80) and Commonwealth v. Miranda, (J. 989/80). Until such time, however, I remain of the opinion I have expressed above.
*344Since here the record discloses that post-verdict motions were not filed on appellant’s behalf, I should not consider whether the other claims made in the PCHA petition are valid but should remand with instructions to allow appellant to file post-verdict motions nunc pro tunc.
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As the majority acknowledges, failure to advise a defendant of his right to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea requires granting permission to file a motion to withdraw nunc pro tunc. Commonwealth v. Brandon, 485 Pa. 215, 401 A.2d 735 (1979); Commonwealth v. Beatty, 474 Pa. 104, 376 A.2d 994 (1977); Commonwealth v. Good, 256 Pa.Super. 522, 389 A.2d 168 (1978). It follows for the reasons as discussed above, that if the PCHA court determines that the defendant was not advised of his right to file a motion to withdraw, it should grant permission to file the motion nunc pro tunc and do no more; it should not go on and determine whether the defendant was denied the right to file a motion to withdraw due to ineffective counsel.
The majority suggests, however, that the failure of the PCHA court to follow the proper procedure is unimportant because the court “allowed appellant full rein to present whatever testimony he wished,” making a remand for a hearing on a motion to withdraw the pleas nunc pro tunc a needless duplication. (Maj. op. at 315-316) A review of the notes of testimony at the PCHA hearing suggests the opposite. In particular, appellant argued on PCHA that counsel was ineffective for several reasons, including his failure to move to suppress certain evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure, and an incriminating statement made by appellant in Graterford prison in the absence of counsel. (N.T. 24—25) It is settled that where it is unclear from the record whether counsel’s failure to move to suppress had a reasonable basis, the proper remedy is to remand for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. Commonwealth v. Mosely, 261 Pa.Super. 198, 395 A.2d 1384 (1978). See also Commonwealth v. Morris, 265 Pa.Super. 589, 402 A.2d 702 *345(1979). In the present case, the record is indeed unclear. The attorney charged with ineffectiveness testified that in his judgment, there were “absolutely no grounds” for a motion to suppress. (N.T. 35) This conclusory statement remains unexplained; there was no evidence as to precisely what the evidence in question was, or why counsel was of the opinion that there were no grounds for a motion to suppress.
The order of the lower court should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.