Court Opinion

ID: 9717683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:08:39.957616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.712773
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Presiding Judge.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
This cause was originally decided on February 9, 1982 and reported at 431 N.E.2d 132. In that decision, we found certain shareholders liable on a $75,000 promissory note but reversed and remanded on the issue of trial attorney fees due to insufficient evidence. Both the Appellants-Shareholders and Appellee-Bank have filed petitions for rehearing. Specifically, the Bank alleges there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of attorney fees for trial, ($5,000) and requests clarification of our decision to remand for a determination of a reasonable fee. Both parties also request a determination of the Bank’s entitlement to appellate attorney fees pursuant to the Bank’s petitions1 filed in this Court on appeal. We affirm our reversal on the issue of trial attorney fees with instructions on remand to hold a jury trial on this issue unless both parties stipulate to the contrary. We also grant the Bank’s petition for appellate fees. The petitions for rehearing are denied in all other respects.

Trial Attorney Fees

The Bank’s counsel argues there was sufficient evidence at trial for the jury properly to determine reasonable attorney fees, and therefore contends we are in error in reversing the jury’s award of such fees in the amount of $5,000. We wish to emphasize, however, that the issue presented for our review concerns not merely attorney fees, but rather reasonable attorney fees. Counsel presented the jury with some evidence of what his fees were in this case. He presented no evidence as to whether these fees were reasonable.
In U.S. Aircraft Financing, Inc. v. Jankovich, (1980) Ind.App., 407 N.E.2d 287, we disapproved counsel’s attempt to establish the reasonableness of his fees by evidence amounting to merely a self-serving statement concerning his total fee. The client testified that he was billed a specific amount. That statement was the only evidence on the subject. In the case before us we must reiterate that a statement by a bank officer' concerning how much the bank’s attorney charged the Bank for his services is insufficient to show the reasonableness of his fees for purposes of a jury determination on this issue.
The Bank next requests us to clarify our intention when we remanded the case for a determination of reasonable attorney fees incurred at the trial level. The Bank asks whether this determination on remand need be made by a jury, or can it instead be decided by the trial judge. We direct the parties’ attention to Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 39. It reads in relevant part:
“When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the docket as a jury action. Issues upon which a jury trial is so demanded shall be tried by jury, subject to the following exceptions:
(1) If the parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury upon any or all issues triable *3by jury as of right and so demanded, the court shall try those issues without a jury. The stipulation shall be effective only if filed or made in court before evidence is admitted at the trial or at such later time as the court, in its discretion, may allow.
(2) If a party demands a jury trial on any issue upon which he is entitled to jury trial as of right in the case, the court shall grant it on that issue.”
Appellants-shareholders have demanded a jury trial. The fact that we have remanded this case does not take that right away from them. A jury trial must be had on this issue unless both parties consent by stipulation to trial without a jury, as provided by the rule. The Bank further inquires whether the same jury should be empaneled to hear and determine the amount of fees due. T.R. 39 does not impose that requirement. The first jury has been discharged and has separated. A new one must be empaneled for such purpose.

Appellate Fees

The Bank further claims it is entitled to appellate attorney fees totaling $9,184.88, pursuant to its verified petitions filed with this Court. These petitions are appropriately supported by detailed time sheets and affidavits attesting to the reasonableness of the fees.
It is well settled that one is entitled to attorney fees when provided for by statute or contract. Trotcky v. Van Sickle, (1949) 227 Ind. 441, 85 N.E.2d 638; Cox v. Ubik, (1981) Ind.App., 424 N.E.2d 127; Honey Creek Corp. v. WNC Development Co., (1975) 165 Ind.App. 141, 331 N.E.2d 452; 20 C.J.S. Costs § 218 (1940). Recently, in Templeton v. Sam Klain & Son, Inc., (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 89, a mechanic’s lien case, our Supreme Court held that a statutory provision for “reasonable attorneys fees,” Ind.Code 32-8-3-14, must include fees for services on appeal: “A reasonable fee for the prosecution of the claim and foreclosure of the lien alone would not be a reasonable fee for those services plus the defense of the judgment on appeal.” Templeton v. Sam Klain & Son, Inc., supra at 95. In the instant case we are dealing with an identically worded provision, albeit contractual, fpi; “reasonable attorney’s fees.” The purpose x>f attorney fee clauses in security agreements, such as promissory notes, is to make the holder whole in the event court action is necessary to vindicate collection rights. Motor Dispatch Inc. v. Buggie, (1978) Ind.App., 379 N.E.2d 543. Where the disappointed maker of a note pursues, and loses, in appellate proceedings, legal expenses incurred by the holder of the note defending the judgment on appeal are also reasonably necessary to protect collection rights. We know of no rationale for any distinction between the scope of a statutory and a contractual provision for “reasonable attorneys fees.” We must therefore conclude the contractual provision in the instant case authorizes an award for both trial and appellate fees.
Moreover, Templeton v. Sam Klain & Son, Inc., supra, supports the procedure adopted by the Bank in requesting appellate fees by separate petition when filing its appellee’s brief. In Templeton our Supreme Court found a petition filed in the trial court after the overruling of the motion to correct error was timely filed. It additionally cited with approval language from Willsey v. Hartman, (1971) 150 Ind.App. 485, 487, 276 N.E.2d 577, 578-79 which suggested a petition in either the trial court or this Court would be appropriate. Under these authorities we conclude the Bank’s petition was timely filed.
We additionally find the Bank is entitled to an appellate attorney’s fee in the amount of $9,184.88. This amount is uncontested and well-documented. The petitions are accompanied by supporting affidavits, incorporating detailed time sheets, including an affidavit by the bank’s counsel who attested to $50 per hour as a “fair, reasonable, customary and usual fee in this community” for similar services.2 The opposition to *4these petitions by appellants consists solely of a challenge to the propriety of including appellate attorney fees pursuant to a contractual provision under Indiana law. Although the appellants have had ample opportunity, they have failed to object or call our attention to any factors indicating these fees are unreasonable. If there had been an adversary position taken on this issue, we would have preferred to remand the matter to the trial court to determine the amount of reasonable appellate fees. Since no such position has been taken, we hereby award the Bank $9,184.88 appellate fees.
Other issues raised by both parties have been fully discussed in our original opinion and shall not be addressed here. We affirm our original holding in all respects.
CONOVER and YOUNG, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.

. The Bank first petitioned for fees incurred in its appellate brief; its second petition sought additional fees for rehearing.

. The Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106(B)(3) lists “[t]he fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services” as a *4guide for determining the reasonableness of a fee.