Court Opinion

ID: 9947953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 22:03:16.758938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:47.730967
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/5/24 P. v. Castellanoz CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                          G062669

           v.                                                            (Super. Ct. No. FWV801883)

 RUBEN CASTELLANOZ,                                                      OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Jon D. Ferguson, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Anna M. Jauregui-Law, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
              We appointed counsel to represent Ruben Castellanoz on appeal from the
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trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing based on Penal Code section 1172.6.
Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against her
client but advised the court she found no issues to argue on his behalf.
              The procedures set forth in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and
Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, do not apply to appeals from the denial of
section 1172.6 petitions. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 226, 231.)
Therefore, when appointed appellate counsel finds no viable issues, counsel should file a
brief informing the court that counsel found no arguable issues and include a concise
narration of facts. (Id. at p. 231.) The reviewing court should send the brief to the
defendant with notice the defendant may file a supplemental brief or letter within 30
days, and if the defendant does not, the court may dismiss the appeal. (Id. at pp. 231-
232.) While no review of the record is compelled, the court retains discretion to
independently review the record. (Id. at p. 232.)
              Counsel requested this court exercise its discretion to conduct an
independent review, which we have. Counsel identified the following issue to assist the
court in conducting a discretionary independent review of the record: “Did the trial court
err in denying the petition based on the record of conviction it examined?” (Boldface
omitted.)
              We gave Castellanoz 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf.
Castellanoz did not file a supplemental brief or letter. We have independently reviewed
the record and found no arguable issues on appeal. We affirm the postjudgment order.

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               Although the November 2022 petition identified Penal Code former section
1170.95 as the authorizing statute, the Legislature renumbered that section to section
1172.6, effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive
changes to the statute. For clarity, we refer to the statute as section 1172.6. All further
statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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                                            FACTS
              The context for the limited issue of this appeal is taken from the prior
nonpublished opinion, People v. Castellanoz (May 24, 2011, G044931) (Castellanoz).
After a man died in a shooting incident, a police informant arranged for a meeting with
Castellanoz where Castellanoz admitted he had killed the victim. (Ibid.) “The tape and
transcript of the conversation [between Castellanoz and the informant] were presented to
the jury” at Castellanoz’s trial. (Ibid.)
              The jury convicted Castellanoz of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a))
(count 1), and found true that he personally discharged a firearm (§§ 12022.5,
subd. (a) & 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced Castellanoz to a prison term of 50 years to life based
on the conviction and sentencing enhancements. In his appeal from the judgment,
Castellanoz argued (among other things) that the police violated his constitutional rights
through the manner of setting up his meeting with the informant. (Castellanoz, supra,
G044931.) We affirmed the judgment. (Ibid.)
              In 2022, Castellanoz filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel, reviewed briefing by both sides, and denied
the petition. The court explained that the jury instructions given at Catellanoz’s trial—
which only presented a theory of first degree murder that required finding a willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing, and did not implicate the felony-murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine—did not implicate any theory of murder
liability recently changed by the Legislature. Castellanoz timely appealed.
                                        DISCUSSION
              Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) amended sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019, to eliminate natural
and probable consequences liability for murder and to limit the scope of the felony-

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murder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959 (Lewis).) The statutes
were amended “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who [was] not
the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, [and] was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) SB 1437 also added section
1172.6, which, as originally enacted, set forth a procedure whereby a “person convicted
of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory” could
petition for resentencing relief. (Former § 1172.6, subd. (a); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
              A section 1172.6 petition must make “‘a prima facie showing’ for relief.
[Citation.]” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) In Lewis, our Supreme Court held,
“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry
under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.)
              The trial court correctly concluded Castellanoz was ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. The record established conclusively (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708) that he was not convicted of murder under the natural and
probable consequences theory or the felony-murder rule, and Castellanoz does not
contend otherwise. All of the jury’s instructions for his trial were premised on a theory
that Castellanoz was the actual perpetrator of the charged crimes and that he killed with
specific intent. Additionally, as noted, the jury explicitly found Castellanoz personally
used a firearm that caused the death of his victim. We have independently reviewed the
record and found no arguable issues on appeal.

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                                DISPOSITION
          The postjudgment order is affirmed.

                                           O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, J.

GOETHALS, J.

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