Court Opinion

ID: 9373178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:14.166717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.943723
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                           MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     VALENTINE UKANDU,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-0752-21-0261-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: December 8, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Matthew Fogg, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Sandra Fortson, Esquire, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal.       For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the
     appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the
     case to the Atlanta Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with
     this Remand Order.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was employed as a GS-13 Contract Specialist with the
     agency.     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 20.       A Defense Acquisition
     Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level II certification is a requirement for
     a GS-13 Contract Specialist.         IAF, Tab 20 at 2 (setting forth the parties’
     stipulations). Effective March 2, 2021, the agency removed the appellant from
     the Federal service based on the charges of failure to maintain a condition of
     employment (1 specification) and lack of candor (2 specifications). IAF, Tab 7
     at 22-30. The agency alleged that the appellant did not maintain a condition of
     employment because he did not possess a DAWIA Level II certification and that
     he lacked candor when he misstated his level of certification in the job
     application process. Id. at 22-23.
¶3         The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging his removal. IAF, Tab 1.
     He also raised affirmative defenses of harmful procedural error, prohibited
     personnel practices, unlawful discrimination, and retaliation for other protected
     activity.   Id. at 3.   The administrative judge issued an order informing the
     appellant how to prove his affirmative defenses, IAF, Tab 14 at 2-9, and an order
     setting forth the burden of proof and elements for the agency’s charges of failure
     to maintain a condition of employment and lack of candor. IAF, Tab 20 at 1-2.
¶4         After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision that affirmed the appellant’s removal. IAF, Tab 25,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 15. The administrative judge sustained the charge of
     failure to maintain a condition of employment because he found that a DAWIA
     Level II certification was required for contract specialists at or higher than
     GS-11, and the appellant’s Level II certification was revoked in 2012. 2 ID at 3-6.

     2
       The agency’s Acquisition Professional Development Program (APDP) Certification
     Manager explained that the appellant was given a DAWIA Level II certification
     erroneously before the process for agency acquisition certifications became automated
     in 2012. IAF, Tab 23, Hearing Recording Day 1 (HR1) (testimony of the APDP
     Certification Manager). The appellant’s certification was deleted from the agency’s
                                                                                               3

     He noted that when, as here, there is no evidence of bad faith or patent unfairness,
     the Board defers to the agency’s determinations as to the requirements that must
     be fulfilled in order for an individual to qualify for appointment to a particular
     position and to retain that position. ID at 6. The administrative judge sustained
     the charge of lack of candor, reasoning that the appellant made a knowing
     misrepresentation concerning his DAWIA Level II certification in applying for a
     Supervisory Contract Specialist position in October 2020 and in providing
     documents to an agency human resources employee showing that he had a
     Level II certification in November 2020. ID at 7-8. He found that the appellant
     failed to prove his claims of race, national origin, and age discrimination,
     retaliation for equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity, and harmful
     procedural error.    ID at 8-13. Finally, the administrative judge found that the
     agency proved nexus and that removal was a reasonable penalty. ID at 13-14.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. 3
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2. He sets forth his extensive training in
     procurement matters, and he claims that he met the requirements for a DAWIA

     system in 2012 due to the appellant’s incomplete training, i.e., he had not completed a
     contracting course. Id. The agency’s Training and Certification Help Desk Manager
     testified that he discovered that the appellant had not completed the requirements for
     DAWIA Level II certification in 2019 or 2020 when the appellant sought to attend
     training for DAWIA Level III certification. HR1 (testimony of the agency’s Training
     and Certification Help Desk Manager).
     3
       The appellant asserts that, although the agency removed his DAWIA Level II
     certification in 2011, he believed that the agency reinstated his Level II certification, in
     accord with a settlement agreement executed with the agency in 2014, but the agency
     did not do so. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2 at 5. The administrative judge
     correctly noted, in a compliance initial decision, that there was no term in that
     agreement that required the reinstatement of the appellant’s DAWIA Level II
     certification. See Ukandu v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket Nos. CH-
     531D-13-0343-C-2, CH-0432-13-0372-C-2, Compliance Initial Decision at 4-5
     (June 22, 2021).
                                                                                              4

     Level II certification. Id. at 4-5. The agency has filed a response. 4 PFR File,
     Tab 4.

                                           ANALYSIS
¶6         The charge of failure to fulfill a condition of employment contains two
     elements: (1) the requirement at issue is a condition of employment; and (2) the
     appellant failed to meet that condition.         Gallegos v. Department of the Air
     Force, 121 M.S.P.R. 349, ¶ 6 (2014).         Absent evidence of bad faith or patent
     unfairness, the Board defers to the agency’s requirements that must be fulfilled
     for an individual to qualify for appointment to, or retention in, a particular
     position. Id.
¶7         In this appeal, the condition of employment at issue is a DAWIA Level II
     certification.   IAF, Tab 7 at 22.       It is undisputed that the certification is a
     requirement for the appellant’s position, and thus, the first element of the charge
     is satisfied. IAF, Tab 20 at 2. The issue is whether the second element—that the
     appellant failed to meet a condition of employment—is satisfied.
¶8         On review, the appellant reiterates that he met the requirements for a
     DAWIA Level II certification. PFR File, Tab 2 at 4. The administrative judge
     considered the appellant’s testimony on the matter, but he found that the agency’s
     Training and Certification Help Desk Manager credibly testified that the
     academic documentation submitted by the appellant was not adequate equivalent
     coursework to support substitution for the agency’s coursework requirements.
     ID at 5; IAF, Tab 23, Hearing Recording Day 1 (HR1) (testimony of the agency’s
     Training and Certification Help Desk Manager). Thus, the administrative judge

     4
       Nearly a year after the close of the record on petition for review, the appellant filed a
     reply to the agency’s response to the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 5. Because the
     appellant has not shown that the arguments in the pleading are new and material and
     that they could not have been raised prior to the close of the record, we have not
     accepted them for consideration. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(k). As we are remanding
     this matter, the appellant may make his arguments in the remand proceeding consistent
     with the administrative judge’s instructions and the Board’s regulations.
                                                                                               5

      found that the appellant failed to meet the agency’s requirement and that the
      agency proved its charge of failure to maintain a condition of employment. ID
      at 6.
¶9            However, in appeals such as this, when the agency controls the withdrawal
      or revocation of a certification necessary to perform in a position, the Board’s
      authority generally extends to a review of the merits of that withdrawal or
      revocation.    Adams v. Department of the Army, 105 M.S.P.R. 50, ¶¶ 10, 19
      (2007), aff’d, 273 F. App’x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2008).          Specifically, in Adams, the
      agency suspended the appellant’s computer access and then removed him for
      failure to maintain access to the agency’s computer system. Id., ¶ 6. Although
      the agency in that appeal argued that the Board lacked the authority to review the
      merits of the decision to suspend computer access because it was not an
      appealable adverse action, the Board found that, when a removal is based on the
      failure to possess a certification or similar qualification, it had the authority to
      review the merits of the agency’s revocation of the certification or similar
      qualification necessary for the employee to hold his position. 5 Id., ¶¶ 9-10.
¶10           Similarly, in Siegert v. Department of the Army, 38 M.S.P.R. 684, 685-86
      (1988), the agency revoked the appellant’s clinical privileges and then removed
      him from his Clinical Psychologist position for failure to maintain those
      privileges. The Board found that it had the authority to review the actions of the
      agency credentialing committee and remanded the appeal to the administrative
      judge to address that issue. Id. at 691. Finally, in a case very similar to the
      instant appeal, McGillivray v. Federal Emergency Management Agency,
      58 M.S.P.R. 398, 402 (1993), the agency removed the appellant based on the loss
      of his procurement authority, and the Board found that it had the authority to

      5
       The certification at issue in this appeal and in the appeals discussed in this decision do
      not involve national security determinations, over which the Board lacks jurisdiction.
      Adams, 105 M.S.P.R. 50, ¶ 11; see Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,
      530-31 (1988).
                                                                                              6

      consider the reasons underlying the agency’s decision to revoke the employee’s
      procurement authority. 6
¶11         Because the administrative judge failed to fully identify the issues in this
      appeal, and the parties did not have the opportunity to fully develop the record on
      those issues, remand is required.       On remand, the administrative judge shall
      afford the parties the opportunity to conduct discovery and submit additional
      evidence and argument.       The administrative judge shall hold a supplemental
      hearing, if requested by the appellant, and shall issue a new initial decision
      addressing the agency’s charges, 7 nexus, penalty, and the appellant’s affirmative
      defenses. 8 See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589
      (1980) (stating that an initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and
      law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the

      6
        The Board has followed the principle applied in Adams, Siegert, and McGillivray in
      other cases. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Department of the Army, 62 M.S.P.R. 688, 694-95
      (1994) (reviewing a security guard’s disqualification from the agency’s Chemical
      Personnel Reliability Program based on his alleged misconduct); Cosby v. Federal
      Aviation Administration, 30 M.S.P.R. 16, 17-19 (1986) (reviewing an Air Traffic
      Control Specialist’s decertification under the agency’s medical standards).
      7
        On petition for review, the appellant does not specifically challenge the administrative
      judge’s determination that the agency proved the lack of candor charge. Because we
      are remanding the case for further proceedings regarding the charge of failure to
      maintain a condition of employment, the administrative judge should determine on
      remand whether any additional evidence developed on remand affects his analysis of
      the lack of candor charge. If he determines that new findings regarding the lack of
      candor charge are not needed, the administrative judge may adopt his prior findings
      regarding that charge in his new initial decision.
      8
        Regarding the appellant’s affirmative defenses of race, national origin, and age
      discrimination and retaliation for prior EEO activity, the administrative judge should
      apply the standards of proof set forth in Pridgen v. Office of Management & Budget,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 21-22. The administrative judge shall apprise the appellant that,
      although he may prevail on these claims by showing that the prohibited consideration
      was a motivating factor in the contested personnel action, but-for causation is required
      in order for him to obtain full status quo ante relief, including reinstatement, back pay,
      and damages. See id., ¶¶ 21-22, 24 n.5. Furthermore, the appellant should be aware
      that there are multiple methods of proof for a discrimination or reprisal claim. See id.,
      ¶ 24.
                                                                                       7

      administrative judge’s conclusions of law and legal reasoning, as well as the
      authorities on which that reasoning rests).

                                           ORDER
¶12        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Atlanta
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.