Court Opinion

ID: 9961261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 15:10:36.953943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:32.257217
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RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2024
                                                         TO BE PUBLISHED

                   Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0158-MR

DEMETRIUS ROBERSON                                                   APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE JOE W. HENDRICKS, JR., JUDGE
                             NO. 17-CR-00220

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                 OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER

                                  AFFIRMING

      A Logan County jury convicted Demetrius Roberson of one count of

murder, one count of robbery in the first degree, nine counts of wanton

endangerment in the first degree, and one count of attempted murder.

Roberson was sentenced to life without parole for twenty-five years. This appeal

followed as a matter of right. See KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b). Having reviewed the

record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the Logan

Circuit Court.

                               I. BACKGROUND

      Between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on August 21, 2016, two men, dressed

in all black and with their faces covered, entered the apartment of Lexus Bell

(Bell) in Russellville, Kentucky. One man was shorter, and one was taller. The

shorter man went into the back bedroom where Bell was located with her baby
son. The shorter man fired a warning shot and then backed out of the

bedroom, closing the door. He then fired five shots toward the bedroom. One of

those gunshots went through the door and hit Bell, killing her. The taller man

stayed in the front of the apartment with his gun pointed at Estoria Mordica,

who was Bell’s boyfriend’s sister.

      Also in the apartment were five of Bell’s juvenile siblings, Estoria, and

Estoria’s three children. In all, eleven people were located in the two-bedroom

apartment. As he left the apartment, the shorter man fired five additional

shots, at least some of which were aimed towards Estoria and her children. In

total, eleven shots were fired in the small apartment.

      The Commonwealth’s theory of the case centered around Reba Kirk

(Kirk). Kirk was a resident of the Robinwood Apartments, the same apartment

complex where Bell lived. Kirk sold marijuana from her apartment. Zach

Mordica (Mordica), Bell’s boyfriend, sold marijuana from Bell’s apartment.

Jordan Lunsford (Lunsford), Kirk’s nephew and the boyfriend of Antoinette

Wynn (Wynn), Bell’s sister, stayed back and forth between Kirk’s apartment

and Bell’s apartment.

      In February of 2016, Kirk went on a trip to Atlanta. While she was gone,

she left her drug dealing business in the hands of Lunsford. When she

returned, her money and her drugs “weren’t right.” Eventually, Kirk determined

that Mordica had taken her drugs and money, and Kirk was angry.

      At the end of July of 2016, Kirk and Roberson began messaging on

Facebook and, according to Kirk, subsequently began a sexual relationship.

                                        2
Kirk testified that one day Roberson told her that he wanted to “hit a lick,”

which meant that he wanted to rob someone. Kirk suggested that they rob

Mordica because she wanted her money back from the February incident. She

testified that the robbery was not discussed again until the night that it

occurred.

      Kirk testified that on the night of August 20, 2016, she was at

Roberson’s mother’s trailer in Bowling Green, where Roberson also lived.

Roberson stepped out of the room to use the phone, and when he returned, he

told Kirk to ask his mother to borrow her car. Kirk did so, and Roberson

directed her to an apartment in Bowling Green. Roberson went into the

apartment and came back outside with two men whom Kirk did not know.

These two men were eventually identified as Tayveon Bibb and Deon Young.

      According to Kirk, the foursome then went to the Robinwood Apartments.

Kirk went into her apartment while the three men went towards Bell’s

apartment. Bibb had second thoughts and returned to the car, and Roberson

and Young went into the apartment dressed in all black and wearing masks.

After the robbery, Roberson called Kirk to pick them up, and she did so. Kirk

testified that Roberson got into the car carrying a black bag. Kirk then dropped

off Bibb and Young where she picked them up in Bowling Green. Then she

drove Roberson to a storage unit, where he deposited the bag. Then, they went

back to Roberson’s mother’s trailer.

      Kirk described Roberson’s demeanor back at the trailer variably as

“hysterical,” “frantic,” and “hyper.” Roberson told Kirk that his “ears were

                                        3
ringing, and he thought he killed her.” Kirk testified that neither she nor

Roberson slept very much that night and the next day, she told Roberson’s

mother that they had gone to Russellville the night before. Roberson became

very angry and told his mother to take Kirk to her mother’s house. Kirk

testified that Roberson threatened to kill her if she ever told anyone what

happened and that the relationship ended after that.

      The Commonwealth presented voluminous other evidence to support its

theory of the case, including testimony from Young and deposition testimony

from Bibb, who had died before the trial. The Commonwealth also presented

evidence that the murder weapon was found in a bag in the car of LaVonsaye

Roberson (LaVonsaye), Roberson’s wife. 1 While the evidence presented through

the testimony of each of the witnesses was not entirely consistent regarding

many of the details, it largely followed the general story as described by Kirk.

      Roberson, on the other hand, presented evidence that he was at his

mother’s house with numerous members of his family on the night of the

shooting and that he never left. Several family members testified to this alibi

defense. Throughout the trial, he also sought to impeach the Commonwealth’s

witnesses, questioning their credibility and their motives to lie.

      After hearing the evidence, the jury convicted Roberson of the murder of

Bell, the attempted murder of Estoria, and wanton endangerment in the first

degree as to each of the children in Bell’s apartment at the time of the shooting.

      1 At the time of the shooting, LaVonsaye was not yet Roberson’s wife but was

merely his girlfriend. Her maiden name was LaVonsaye Wilkerson.

                                          4
The trial court sentenced Roberson to life without parole for twenty-five years.

Additional facts are discussed as needed for our analysis.

                                  II. ANALYSIS

      Roberson alleges several errors by the trial court and urges this Court to

reverse his convictions. First, he argues that the trial court erred in excluding

evidence that another man, Quinton Posey, admitted shooting Lexus Bell. Next,

he argues that the trial court erred in admitting deposition testimony of

Tayveon Bibb. He also argues that the trial court erred in excluding testimony

regarding why Roberson broke up with his child’s mother. He next argues that

the Commonwealth improperly called his mother a liar and accused her of

committing perjury during her cross-examination. He also argues that the trial

court erroneously excluded evidence that his family attempted to provide police

with exculpatory evidence. Roberson also argues that the trial court

erroneously failed to sequester the jury during its guilt phase deliberations.

Next, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to review only a

portion of a witness’s testimony and not the entirety of that testimony. Finally,

he asserts that the jury returned inconsistent verdicts as to his recommended

sentence, and that the trial court erred in imposing the longer of the two

sentences. We address each of Roberson’s arguments in turn.

A. Quinton Posey Admission

      Roberson first argues that the trial court erred in excluding testimony

from a defense investigator that Kelsey Hampton had told the investigator that

she had heard Quinton Posey admit that he shot Bell. He argues that Posey’s

                                        5
admission was not hearsay, as it was not offered for the truth of the matter

asserted but instead was offered as evidence that an alternative perpetrator

committed the murder. 2 He further asserts that even if it was hearsay, it was

admissible as a statement against interest and a verbal act by Posey. Roberson

focuses his argument on his right to present a defense and argues that the

exclusion of the evidence violated this right, as well as his rights to due process

and a fair trial.

      The standard of review on evidentiary issues is abuse of discretion. Clark

v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007); Commonwealth v. English,

993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether

the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported

by sound legal principles.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d

575, 581 (Ky. 2000) (citing English, 993 S.W.2d at 945).

      Posey testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. He testified that after the

shooting, many people suspected he may have been involved but that he was

not. On cross-examination, Roberson asked Posey if Posey knew Kelsey

Hampton. Posey stated that he did not know Hampton by name but may know

her if he saw her. He testified that he did not remember if he was ever at a

gathering with Hampton, and he unequivocally denied that he ever said he

“pulled the trigger” that killed Bell.

      2 In his reply brief, Roberson argues that the statement was not offered for its

truth but instead to prove that Posey made such an admission. The relevancy of this
admission, however, is suspect, if it is not offered for the truth of the admission.

                                           6
      During Roberson’s case-in-chief, Roberson called Kelsey Hampton to

testify. Hampton testified that she was married to Quinton Hampton and that

she was told Quinton Hampton and Quinton Posey were cousins. Roberson

asked Hampton if she was ever at a gathering with Posey, and Hampton said

that she could not remember. Roberson then attempted to ask Hampton if she

had heard Posey say that he “pulled the trigger” that killed Bell, but the

Commonwealth objected. The trial court held a bench conference and then

excused the jury so that the parties could discuss the admissibility of this

evidence. Eventually, outside of the presence of the jury, Hampton stated that

she could not remember whether she was ever at a gathering with Posey, could

not remember if Posey ever said he “pulled the trigger,” and could not

remember ever speaking with a defense investigator.

      After much discussion and argument, the trial court found that Posey’s

alleged statement that he “pulled the trigger” was inadmissible, as it was

hearsay and there were no hallmarks of trustworthiness as required for its

admission under Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 804(b)(3). 3 Roberson then

called Jessica Shoemaker, the defense investigator, to testify by avowel.

Shoemaker testified that she interviewed Hampton in July of 2018 at

Hampton’s home. Shoemaker testified that during that interview, Hampton told

her that she was at a gathering of some sort when she heard Posey say that he

      3 Under KRE 804(b)(3), a statement against the declarant’s interest is not

excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. However, “[a]
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” Id.

                                           7
had “pulled the trigger.” Shoemaker testified that Hampton told her that she

had heard Posey say this several times. Shoemaker further testified that

Hampton also told her that, because of her familial relationship with Posey, she

would not testify in open court but would only testify at a secret grand jury.

      Following this avowel testimony, the trial court again heard arguments

from the parties regarding the admissibility of Hampton’s statement regarding

Posey’s statement. Relying on this Court’s opinion in Askew v. Commonwealth,

768 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. 1989), the trial court again ruled to exclude the evidence.

      We begin by addressing Roberson’s assertion that the exclusion of this

evidence violated his due process right to present a defense. “Under the United

States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution, an accused has a right to

present a complete and meaningful defense.” Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 410

S.W.3d 63, 84–85 (Ky. 2013) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577,

624–25 (Ky. 2010)). The right to present a defense, however, “does not ‘abrogate

the rules of evidence.’” Id. at 85 (quoting McPherson v. Commonwealth, 360

S.W.3d 207, 214 (Ky. 2012)). The exclusion of evidence, even pursuant to the

rules of evidence, violates a defendant’s constitutional rights when the

exclusion “significantly undermines fundamental elements of the defendant’s

defense.” Id.

      In this case, Roberson’s defense was that he was innocent of the crime

and had been set up. Throughout the trial, he put forth evidence that the

witnesses against him had motive to lie and that several other people had a

motive and/or an opportunity to commit the murder. He further put forth

                                        8
substantial alibi evidence. The exclusion of Posey’s single statement that he

“pulled the trigger” did not “significantly undermine[] fundamental elements” of

Roberson’s defense, especially considering that Posey’s statement could only

come into evidence through multiple layers of hearsay. Id.

      Under KRE 801(c), “‘[h]earsay’ is a statement, other than one made by

the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided

by these rules or by rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.” KRE 802. In

order for Posey’s statement that he “pulled the trigger” to have any relevance to

the case at bar, it must have been offered for its truth—that Posey did, in fact,

“pull the trigger” and kill Lexus Bell. It was not a verbal act, as Roberson

asserts. We have explained the verbal act doctrine as follows,

      the verbal act doctrine, which provides that the statements are not
      hearsay evidence because they are “not admitted for the purpose of
      proving the truth of what was said, but for the purpose of
      describing the relevant details of what took place.” Importantly,
      however, the “relevancy [of such statements] does not turn on
      whether the information asserted tends to prove or disprove an
      issue in controversy, but on whether the action taken by the police
      officer in response to the information that was furnished is an
      issue in controversy. . . . The rule is that a police officer may testify
      about information furnished to him only where it tends to explain
      the action that was taken by the police officer as a result of this
      information and the taking of that action is an issue in the case.”

Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 351–52 (Ky. 2006) (footnotes

omitted). In this case, Posey’s statement did not serve to “describe the relevant

details of what took place” or to explain the actions taken by someone else after

hearing Posey’s statement. Id. Instead, it was relevant only to establish that

Posey was an alternative perpetrator and had killed Bell.
                                         9
      Posey did not testify at trial that he pulled the trigger. Thus, that

statement is hearsay, in that it was made out of court and offered for its truth.

Further, during trial, Posey denied making the statement. Thus, Roberson

sought to admit Posey’s statement through Hampton’s testimony, and when he

was unsuccessful in doing so, sought to admit it through Shoemaker’s

testimony. Roberson had hoped that Hampton would testify that she heard

Posey make this statement. However, during trial, Hampton testified that she

could not remember if Posey made this statement. Thus, Roberson sought to

introduce Hampton’s prior out of court statement that she heard Posey say he

“pulled the trigger.” Hampton’s prior statement, therefore, was also hearsay, as

it was made out of court and offered for its truth.

      Generally, “[h]earsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the

hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an

exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.” KRE 805. In this case,

Posey’s statement that he “pulled the trigger” was inconsistent with his explicit

testimony at trial that he did not shoot Bell and therefore was not excluded by

the hearsay rule pursuant to KRE 801A(a)(1). 4

      Hampton’s statement that she heard Posey say he “pulled the trigger,”

however, is not excluded from the hearsay rule. We have previously stated that

      4 Under KRE 801A(a)(1), “[a] statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even

though the declarant is available as a witness, if the declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is examined concerning the statement, with a foundation laid as required
by KRE 613, and the statement is . . . [i]nconsistent with the declarant’s testimony[.]”

                                            10
“[a]n inconsistent statement for purposes of KRE 801A(a)(1) includes a

witness’s claimed inability to recall making the statement.” Downs v.

Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 604, 617 (Ky. 2020) (citing McAtee v.

Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 608, 618 (Ky. 2013)). However, Hampton testified

not only that she could not remember making the statement but also that she

could not remember even meeting with the defense investigator, could not

remember attending any gathering where Posey was also present, and could

not remember ever hearing Posey say that he “pulled the trigger.”

      The evidence Roberson sought to introduce through Shoemaker’s

testimony is exactly that prohibited by Askew v. Commonwealth, 768 S.W.2d

51, 5 which was cited by the trial court in makings its ruling. In Askew, we

stated,

      The Jett rule permits impeachment of a witness who possesses
      personal knowledge by proof of a prior contradicting statement.
      When the second witness, called for the purpose of disclosing the
      prior contradictory statement of the first witness, denies that the
      statement was made, it is improper to allow attempted
      impeachment of him. If it were otherwise, a long succession of
      witnesses could be called until finally one was found who would
      testify that the previous witness had earlier told a different story.

Id. at 56. 6 We explained that the “real mischief” in admitting this hearsay

within hearsay “is that a connection between [the alleged declarant] and the

      5 We acknowledge that Askew was rendered before the Kentucky Rules of

Evidence were adopted. However, it has not been treated critically on this issue and
remains relevant and applicable.
      6 The Jett rule expands the permissible use of prior inconsistent testimony from

only impeachment to use as substantive evidence. Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d
788 (Ky. 1969).

                                          11
statement attributed to him was never shown.” Id. at 57. Because of this lack

of connection, “the statement is inherently unreliable. If under the guise of Jett

evidence such as this is admitted, the hearsay rule would pass into non-

existence.” Id.

      Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

Shoemaker’s testimony that Hampton told her that she had heard Posey say

that he had “pulled the trigger” that killed Bell.

B. Tayveon Bibb Deposition

      Roberson next argues that the trial court erred in admitting the

deposition of Tayveon Bibb. He first argues that the trial court improperly

allowed the taking of the deposition, as the Commonwealth had not presented

the proof required by Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 7.10.

Alternatively, he argues that the deposition testimony should have been

excluded at trial because Bibb asserted his 5th Amendment rights multiple

times during cross-examination and refused to answer questions. We review

the trial court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.

A. RCr 7.10

      Under RCr 7.10(1),

      [i]f it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend
      or is or may be prevented from attending a trial or hearing or is or
      may become a nonresident of the Commonwealth, that the
      witness’s testimony is material and that it is necessary to take the
      witness’s deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice, in any
      pending proceeding the court may upon motion and notice to the
      parties order that the witness’s testimony be taken by deposition[.]

                                         12
RCr 7.10(3) also allows for the taking of a deposition or the use of a deposition

“by agreement of the parties.”

      Roberson argues that he did not agree to the taking of Bibb’s deposition

and that the Commonwealth did not offer the required evidence under RCr

7.10(1). He asserts that the Commonwealth only argued that because of Bibb’s

prior record and the dangerous nature of his past criminal acts, he might not

be available for trial. He argues that no proof was offered that Bibb would

actually be unable to attend trial and testify or that his deposition was

necessary to prevent a failure of justice.

      The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that Roberson’s

agreement to the deposition was immaterial because Bibb agreed to the

deposition as part of the plea agreement in his own case. Thus, the

Commonwealth and Bibb, the only two parties to Bibb’s criminal case, both

agreed to the deposition, which satisfied RCr 7.10(3).

      To begin, we disagree with the Commonwealth’s contention that Bibb’s

agreement to the deposition was sufficient, and that Roberson’s agreement was

not required to satisfy RCr 7.10(3). The term “parties” as used in the rule refers

to the “parties” to the “pending proceeding” where the deposition is sought to

be used, not the “parties” to some collateral proceeding. As such, the “parties”

that were needed to agree to the taking of Bibb’s deposition, to be used in the

“proceedings” against Roberson, were Roberson and the Commonwealth.

Roberson did not agree, and therefore, RCr 7.10(3) was not satisfied. Thus, we

must determine whether the requirements of RCr 7.10(1) were met.

                                        13
      In this case, although it does not appear the Commonwealth filed a

formal motion, the issue of Bibb’s deposition was repeatedly addressed by the

parties and the trial court. The trial court entered a written order which stated,

      After much discussion, and in consideration of the criminal history
      of Taveon [sic] Bibb recited in a previous order, plus information
      that he was shot prior to the incident that gave rise to charges in
      this case, the Court found that there would be a substantial risk
      that Taveon Bibb, if released from custody, may not be available
      for trial. This is both because of the pattern of his decision making
      suggested by the criminal history and the risk from others that
      may be inherent in his lifestyle to date. . . . The purpose of this
      order is to preserve the testimony of Mr. Bibb for use at trial in the
      event he is released from custody and is unavailable at time of
      trial.

      Subsequent to this order and prior to Bibb’s deposition and final

sentencing in his own case, Roberson moved to have Bibb held as a material

witness pursuant to RCr 7.06. In addressing that motion, the trial court found,

      Mr. Bibb is an indispensable witness and his deposition is being
      taken today for that reason. . . . Even though Mr. Bibbs [sic]
      deposition is being taken to preserve his testimony in the event he
      becomes unavailable for trial, it is in the interest of justice that he
      be personally present at trial.. . . [T]he facts concerning risk are
      known to the Court from having reviewed Mr. Bibb’s bond and Pre-
      sentence investigation.

The court then imposed a $1000 cash bond and a curfew with the requirement

that Bibb reside with his sister in Bowling Green.

      Pursuant to the trial court’s orders and after the Commonwealth

provided notice to Roberson, Bibb’s deposition was taken. Roberson was

present at the deposition and participated, including by cross-examining Bibb.

      We have previously held that “it was facially within the trial judge’s

discretion under RCr 7.10(1) to order the parties to depose a witness[.]” Lovett

                                        14
v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 72, 82 (Ky. 2003). In this case, based on the

trial court’s findings in its two orders, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in ordering Bibb’s deposition be taken.

B. Assertion of Fifth Amendment Rights

      Roberson also argues that the trial court erred in admitting Bibb’s

deposition testimony because Bibb invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination and refused to answer several questions during

cross-examination. He argues that this invocation would have prevented Bibb

from testifying live during the trial, had he been available, and therefore should

have resulted in the exclusion of his deposition from evidence. He asserts that

the erroneous admission of Bibb’s deposition violated his rights to due process,

fundamental fairness, and to confront witnesses, in violation of both the

Kentucky and the United States Constitutions.

      The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that a witness’s

invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege on collateral issues does not

require striking the entirety of his testimony. It further argues that even if the

trial court did err, this error was invited, as all invocations were made during

the portion of Bibb’s deposition played by Roberson.

      Finally, in response, Roberson argues that the matters on which Bibb

invoked his privilege against self-incrimination were not collateral and that

Roberson did not invite the error.

      On October 27, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a Notice of its intent to

use Bibb’s deposition at trial, as Bibb had died on January 10, 2021. Roberson

                                         15
objected to the admission of the deposition. Roberson raised the same

arguments to the trial court that he makes today. 7

      Generally, “a deposition, so far as otherwise admissible under the rules

of evidence, may be used” at a trial if “the witness is dead.” RCr 7.20(1).

However, “the prosecution may not call a witness knowing that the witness will

invoke the Fifth Amendment immunity.” Clayton v. Commonwealth, 786 S.W.2d

866, 868 (Ky. 1990). Nevertheless, a witness who “will testify as to some

matters but not as to others should ordinarily be allowed to take the stand.”

Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 789 (Ky. 2003) (citing Combs v.

Commonwealth, 74 S.W.3d 738, 742–43, 745 (Ky. 2002)). “If the prosecution

witness refuses to answer questions on cross-examination, the defendant’s

proper remedy is a motion to strike all or part of the witness’s direct

testimony.” Id. Because Bibb’s deposition was taken pretrial and the

Commonwealth sought to admit it at trial, Roberson’s motion to exclude the

deposition was the functional equivalent of a motion to strike all of Bibb’s

testimony. “The trial court’s decision whether to strike all or part of the

witness’s testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id.

      “[T]he federal courts have recognized that prohibiting a witness from

testifying or striking the entirety of a witness’s testimony is a ‘drastic remedy

not lightly invoked[.]’” Combs, 74 S.W.3d at 743. This remedy is “appropriate

      7 At the trial court, Roberson also argued that Bibb’s deposition contained other

inadmissible testimony such as improper KRE 404(b) evidence, but those claims have
not been presented on appeal.

                                         16
only where a witness’s invocation of the privilege frustrates cross-examination

on issues material to the witness’s testimony.” Id. at 744; see also McRae v.

Commonwealth, 635 S.W.3d 60, 66-67 (Ky. 2021). “When cross-examination is

precluded only with respect to collateral issues, the Sixth Amendment does not

require the court to strike the witness’s testimony.” Id.

      In this case, Roberson alleges that Bibb asserted his Fifth Amendment

privilege and refused to answer questions regarding four different topics: (1)

other crimes he claimed to have committed with Roberson during direct

examination; (2) who shot him two weeks prior to Bell’s murder; (3) whether he

had “hit a lick” before, after using the term to describe a robbery; and (4)

whether he committed other crimes with co-defendant Deon Young. Bibb’s

refusal to answer these questions, however, did not frustrate Roberson’s ability

to cross examine Bibb “on issues material to” Bibb’s testimony. Id. The answers

to these questions “were neither necessary to a probing cross-examination nor

particularly probative as to [Bibb’s] truthfulness.” Id. at 745. Bibb’s invocation

of his rights “neither prevented [Roberson] from inquiring as to matters going

‘to the heart of’ [his] direct testimony nor constituted a refusal to be cross-

examined.” Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting Bibb’s

deposition testimony.

C. Natasha Williams Testimony

      Roberson next argues that the trial court erred in excluding testimony

from his mother, Natasha Williams, regarding the reason for his breakup with

his baby’s mother, Diedra. He sought to admit evidence that he and Diedra

                                        17
broke up because Diedra had an affair with Tayveon Bibb. The Commonwealth

objected to the admission of this evidence, first on relevancy grounds and then

on hearsay grounds. The trial court excluded it based on a finding that it was

hearsay. We review the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence for abuse of

discretion. Clark, 223 S.W.3d at 95; English, 993 S.W.2d at 945. “The test for

abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Goodyear Tire

& Rubber Co., 11 S.W.3d at 581 (citing English, 993 S.W.2d at 945).

      During Williams’s testimony, Roberson’s counsel asked her why

Roberson and Diedra “had a falling out.” As stated, the Commonwealth

objected on relevancy grounds, and a bench conference ensued. At the bench

conference, Roberson’s counsel explained that Roberson and Diedra broke up

because Diedra had an affair with Bibb, and that he wanted to use this

information to establish that Roberson and Bibb did not get along. He further

explained that the breakup occurred sometime between the birth of Roberson’s

child in October of 2015 and Bell’s death in August of 2016. In seeking to

understand the basis of Williams’s knowledge about this, the trial court called

her up to the bench so that the jury could not hear the conversation. At the

bench conference, Williams explained that she was present when Diedra and

Roberson argued about Diedra’s affair with Bibb. She witnessed the argument

and was trying to figure out what the two were arguing about. Eventually, she

stated that both Diedra and Roberson “told” her. At that point, the

                                       18
Commonwealth stated that it believed Williams’s testimony was hearsay. The

trial court agreed and sustained the Commonwealth’s objection to the evidence.

      Once back on the witness stand and in front of the jury, Williams

testified that Roberson and Bibb were friends around 2015 and that they also

stopped being friends sometime in 2015, which was prior to the shooting. She

testified that after 2015, she never saw Bibb with Roberson again. She never

testified as to the reason the friendship ended.

      As previously discussed, “‘[h]earsay’ is a statement, other than one made

by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted.” KRE 801(c). Hearsay is generally

inadmissible. KRE 802. In this case, Williams never offered testimony about

any specific statements made by either Roberson or Diedra. Thus, there is no

specific out of court statement that Roberson sought to admit. Instead, he

sought to admit evidence that he and his child’s mother argued because Diedra

had an affair with Bibb, and that because of this affair, Roberson was no longer

friends with Bibb on the day of the murder. Thus, it would have been unlikely,

and perhaps unbelievable, that Roberson asked Bibb to commit a robbery with

him when they were no longer friends.

      There are several links in this logical chain that were not expressly stated

by Williams during Roberson’s offer of proof, but the inferences seem apparent

to this Court from the context of the testimony and arguments of the parties. 8

      8 KRE 103(a)(2) requires that if the trial court’s alleged erroneous ruling is one

excluding evidence, the party seeking to admit the evidence must make an offer of
                                           19
However, because Roberson did not offer a specific statement that he wished to

admit, and the Commonwealth did not identify a specific statement it sought to

exclude, the trial court’s ruling on this issue is difficult to review. Regardless,

any error in the exclusion of this evidence would have been harmless.

      Under the harmless error rule and pursuant to RCr 9.24, we will not

reverse a conviction based on a preserved error “if we can say with fair

assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.”

Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 595 (Ky. 2010). In this case, the

crux of the evidence Roberson sought to admit through this portion of

Williams’s testimony is that Roberson and Bibb were no longer friends at the

time Bell was murdered. Although Roberson was prohibited from admitting

evidence of why they were no longer friends, he successfully placed before the

jury the fact that they were no longer friends. Because this key piece of

information was admitted, we cannot conclude that the simple exclusion of

why they were not friends “substantially swayed” the verdict.

D. Cross-Examination of Natasha Williams

      Roberson next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the

Commonwealth to assert that Williams was both lying during her testimony as

well as committing perjury. Williams testified on direct examination that

Roberson was at her house all night on the night of the murder and did not

leave. Thus, he could not have gone to Russellville to commit the robbery and

proof whereby “the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or
was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.”

                                         20
murder. On cross-examination, the Commonwealth questioned Williams about

why she did not come forward to the prosecutor or the police with this alibi

evidence prior to the trial date.

      The cross-examination became heated, with Williams and the

Commonwealth’s Attorney often speaking over each other. Roberson’s counsel

interrupted and asked that the Commonwealth’s Attorney allow Williams to

answer the questions. A short time later, Roberson objected, and a bench

conference was held. Roberson asserted that the Commonwealth’s questioning

was argumentative, and that the Commonwealth would not allow Williams to

answer the questions. The trial court ordered the Commonwealth to “let her

answer.” Quickly thereafter, the tone of the cross-examination escalated again.

The Commonwealth’s Attorney asked Williams, “Isn’t the real reason we didn’t

have [the alibi] information is because you wanted to make sure when you

came in here and lied for your son, that we would hear it for the first time

today?” Williams then asserted that the Commonwealth’s Attorney had refused

to speak to her. The Commonwealth’s Attorney then stated, “I’ve never seen

you before.” Williams then stated that the Commonwealth’s Attorney had seen

her in the courtroom before and had even tried to get her in trouble for talking

while court was in session. The Commonwealth’s Attorney then said, “That is a

lie that you are trying to tell the jury. Have you been advised of the penalties of

perjury?” Again, Williams was speaking over him during this portion of the

cross-examination.

                                        21
      Roberson objected on the grounds that the questioning was

argumentative. The trial court overruled that objection. The Commonwealth’s

Attorney then asked Williams, “Have you been advised of the penalties of

perjury, a felony, before you came in here today?” Roberson objected during

this question, and the trial court sustained the objection as to the perjury

comment. Roberson did not ask for an admonition or seek any further relief.

The tone of the cross-examination subsequently calmed, and the examination

eventually concluded without further significant incident.

      To this Court, Roberson argues that the Commonwealth’s questioning

was improper because the Commonwealth’s Attorney improperly accused

Williams of lying and because the Commonwealth’s Attorney sought to impeach

Williams through what was essentially his own testimony. The Commonwealth

asserts that these arguments were not preserved and should not be reviewed.

While we agree with the Commonwealth that, because these specific issues

were not presented to the trial court for a ruling, they were not preserved, we

disagree that this lack of preservation prohibits us from reviewing the issues.

Accordingly, we will review the Commonwealth’s questioning for palpable error

pursuant to RCr 10.26.

      “For an error to rise to the level of palpable, it must be easily perceptible,

plain, obvious and readily noticeable. Generally, a palpable error affects the

substantial rights of the party only if it is more likely than ordinary error to

have affected the judgment.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340, 344

(Ky. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Even then, relief is

                                         22
appropriate only “upon a determination that manifest injustice resulted from

the error.” RCr 10.26.

      In this case, the Commonwealth apparently concedes error on both of

these issues but asserts that palpable error did not result. The

Commonwealth’s explicit statement that Williams was “trying to tell the jury” “a

lie” was plainly improper. “It [is] a clear rule of law that counsel cannot state

that a witness or defendant is lying.” Commonwealth v. Padgett, 563 S.W.3d

639, 650 (Ky. 2018) (citing Sneed v. Burress, 500 S.W.3d 791, 795 (Ky. 2016)).

The Commonwealth violated this rule. Further, it was improper for the

Commonwealth’s Attorney to make himself a witness by making assertions of

fact during his cross-examination of Williams, such as “I’ve never seen you

before.” This had “the effect of making a witness of the lawyer and allowing his

or her credibility to be substituted for that of the witness” and is prohibited.

Holt v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Ky. 2007).

      We now must determine whether those errors rise to the level of palpable

error, necessitating reversal of Roberson’s convictions. We hold that they do

not. Although Roberson’s defense centered, in large part, on alibi evidence, his

mother was not the only person to offer that evidence. His sister, his sister’s

significant other, his aunt, and his wife all testified that they were with

Roberson at Williams’s house, during the timeframe of the shooting. They all

testified that Kirk was not at the house, that they did not know who Kirk was,

and that Roberson never left the house during the night between August 20

and 21, 2016. The Commonwealth did not similarly improperly question any of

                                        23
those witnesses. Further, during deliberations, the jury asked to rewatch

portions of Kirk’s testimony and LaVonsaye’s testimony, arguably showing that

the jury’s decision hinged more on LaVonsaye’s alibi testimony than it did on

Williams’s alibi testimony. We simply cannot conclude that manifest injustice

resulted from the Commonwealth’s improper questioning of Williams.

E. Evidence of Exculpatory Information

      Roberson next argues that the trial court erred in excluding certain

evidence he sought to admit through the testimony of LaVonsaye Roberson,

Roberson's wife. Roberson sought to admit evidence that LaVonsaye had

provided Facebook messages to law enforcement in which Jasmine Thompson

admitted to killing Bell and planting the murder weapon in LaVonsaye's car.

The trial court excluded the substance of the text messages based on hearsay.

The court also excluded mention of text messages specifically, but allowed

testimony that LaVonsaye provided exculpatory information, generally, to law

enforcement. The trial court’s rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence

are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Clark, 223 S.W.3d at 95; English, 993

S.W.2d at 945. “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s

decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 11 S.W.3d at 581 (citing English, 993

S.W.2d at 945).

      Roberson argues to this Court that the Commonwealth opened the door

to LaVonsaye’s testimony about the text messages by accusing Williams of

lying about her attempts to contact law enforcement. He also argues the

                                       24
evidence was relevant to prove law enforcement botched the investigation, in

part, by failing to follow up on these Facebook messages. Finally, he argues

that the messages were not hearsay because they were not offered for the truth

of the matters asserted in them.

      As previously discussed, hearsay is generally inadmissible. KRE 802.

“Hearsay” is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of

the matter asserted.” KRE 801(c). In this case, the substance of the text

messages—that Jasmine Thompson admitted to killing Bell and planting the

guns to frame Roberson—was hearsay, to the extent it was offered for the truth

of the matter asserted. At the trial court, Roberson argued that the evidence

was excepted from the hearsay rule because the text messages were statements

against Thompson’s penal interest pursuant to KRE 804(b)(3), however, he

appears to have abandoned that argument on appeal. Instead, he merely

argues that the text messages were not, in fact, offered for the truth of the

matter asserted but instead were offered to rebut the Commonwealth’s

accusations that Williams was lying and to show that the police botched the

investigation.

      This Court agrees that the messages were relevant to rebut the

Commonwealth’s assertions that Williams lied in her testimony about

attempting to contact law enforcement and provide information to them.

However, the substance of the messages was not relevant for this purpose.

Further, the fact that the information Williams and LaVonsaye sought to

                                         25
provide the police was in the form of text messages was not of particular

importance. The probative evidence was that Williams and LaVonsaye had

exculpatory information that they sought to provide to law enforcement, and

that they did, in fact, provide it to certain members of the Russellville Police

Department. This evidence was admitted through LaVonsaye’s testimony, and

thus, there was no error in the exclusion of the text messages for this purpose.

      The substance of the text messages, and the fact that the exculpatory

information was contained in text messages, was also only of minimal

probative value in Roberson’s assertion that the police botched the

investigation by failing to follow up on these messages. The jury heard

testimony that the police received exculpatory evidence from LaVonsaye,

specifically information that Thompson had planted the gun, and that the

police had interviewed Thompson. This was sufficient, and the trial court’s

exclusion of further testimony about the text messages was not an abuse of

discretion.

F. Jury Sequestration

      Roberson next argues that the trial court erred in failing to properly

sequester the jury as required by RCr 9.66. 9 Specifically, he argues that the

trial court erred in allowing the jury to go home for the night during guilt phase

deliberations and then leave the courthouse for a lunch break during the

second day of deliberations. Although he asserts that he did not have the

       9 Roberson cites to RCr 9.68 in his brief, but the context of the argument makes

clear he means RCr 9.66.

                                          26
opportunity to object, he concedes that this alleged error is unpreserved and

requests palpable error review under RCr 10.26.

      The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that Roberson waived

this issue by agreeing with the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to go

home for the night. It further asserts that because Roberson agreed with the

first instance of jury separation, he implicitly agreed to the second separation

for lunch.

      Under KRS 29A.320(1), after the jury begins deliberating, “they shall be

kept together in some convenient place, under the charge of an officer, until

they agree upon a verdict or are discharged by the court, subject to the

Supreme Court rules permitting them to separate temporarily at night and for

their meals.” Under our Court’s rules, however, “in the trial of a felony charge,

after the case is submitted for [the jurors’] verdict, they shall be sequestered

unless otherwise agreed by the parties with approval of the court.” RCr 9.66.

      In the case at bar, just prior to the jurors beginning their deliberations,

the trial court instructed them to elect a foreperson and to let the court know

how long they wanted to deliberate that evening, whether they wanted the

court to order dinner for them, and when they wanted to go home for the night.

The jurors then proceeded to the jury room to begin deliberating. The trial

court stayed on the record for a short period of time so that the attorneys could

determine what exhibits would go back to the jury room. Roberson made no

objection to the trial court’s instructions to the jury described above, and there

was no discussion of sequestration.

                                        27
      Approximately one hour later, the trial record recording resumes, and the

trial court indicates that it has received two notes from the jury. Pertinently,

the first note said, “The jury would like to break and return in the morning.”

The trial court said, “The first one is really easy. . . . Obviously, that’s what I

told them.” Again, Roberson does not object, and there is no further discussion

of this particular issue. A few minutes later, the jury returns to the courtroom.

The trial court admonishes the jurors that they should not discuss the case

with anyone and should not undertake any independent research and

investigation. The court then releases the jurors for the night.

      After the jurors have left, the trial court asked the parties, “Anyone have

any objections to the instructions I have given?” Roberson’s counsel responded,

“No, judge. I’m tempted to put them all in the Executive Inn, but your honor

told them they could go home so I guess they can go home.” By saying this, in

addition to his failure to object at any point prior, Roberson’s counsel

effectively waived any objection he had to the trial court’s failure to sequester

the jurors after the case was submitted to them. We further conclude that

Roberson’s waiver of any objection to the trial court’s failure to sequester the

jury overnight extended to the lunch break the following day. Thus, we decline

to review the issue any further.

      Notwithstanding our holding on the issues presented to us, we are

compelled to address the wisdom of requiring jurors to remain sequestered

during the lunch break as an appropriate use of the trial court’s discretion.

This Court acknowledges the significant burden that jury service places on

                                         28
individual jurors and their families. In order to reduce this burden, we

understand a trial court’s decision, assuming agreement of the parties, to allow

jurors to return to their homes for the night when deliberations extend into the

evening. However, we are significantly concerned with allowing jurors to

separate during the lunch break. Requiring jurors to remain sequestered,

under the watchful eye of court security, and bringing lunch to them, is a

minimal additional burden on the jurors. However, it has a great impact, not

only on maintaining the integrity of the trial process, but also on ensuring the

safety and security of our jurors. The case at bar is a prime example of one

fraught with violence, in which the jurors, and our system as a whole, would

have been best served by requiring they remain in the jury room during the

lunch break.

G. Review of Testimony During Deliberations

      Roberson next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to

rewatch only a portion of Reba Kirk’s testimony. The Commonwealth, on the

other hand, argues that the trial court’s decision was an appropriate use of its

discretion. Roberson adequately preserved this issue through his

contemporaneous objection.

      On the second day of deliberations, the jury sent out a note asking to

review the testimonies of Kirk and LaVonsaye Roberson. After the jury had

watched the Commonwealth’s direct examination of Kirk and a portion of

Roberson’s cross-examination, the trial court took a lunch break. Upon return

from the lunch break, the jury sent out another note indicating that they did

                                       29
not want to watch the rest of Kirk’s testimony and wanted to move on to watch

LaVonsaye’s testimony. Roberson objected, arguing that the jury should be

required to watch at least the entirety of the cross-examination so that they did

not place more weight on the direct examination than the cross-examination.

The trial court overruled Roberson’s objection, and after the jury confirmed

they did not want to watch any more of Kirk’s testimony, the court allowed

them to proceed to watch LaVonsaye’s testimony.

      “The decision with respect to how much testimony to read or replay to

the jury is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be

overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Harris v. Commonwealth, 134

S.W.3d 603, 610 (Ky. 2004) (citing Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817,

825 (Ky. 1997)). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s

decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 11 S.W.3d at 581 (citing English, 993

S.W.2d at 945). We have previously explained,

      [i]n exercising that discretion, the judge must balance the risk of
      emphasizing particular testimony against the need to obviate juror
      confusion. . . . A trial judge is only required to provide the jury
      with the requested portion of the testimony and has a duty to
      ensure that the trial is not unnecessarily prolonged. . . . A judge
      need not replay cross-examination when the answer to the jury’s
      question lies in testimony given during direct examination.

Harris, 134 S.W.3d at 610 (citations omitted). In this case, the trial court only

replayed the portion of Kirk’s testimony that the jury wished to hear. After

receiving the jury’s note that it did not want to review anymore of Kirk’s

testimony, the trial court even went so far as to confirm that no members of

                                        30
jury wanted to watch the rest of Kirk’s testimony. We cannot hold the trial

court abused its discretion in refusing to require the jury to watch portions of

Kirk’s testimony that it explicitly indicated it did not want to watch.

H. Sentencing

      Finally, Roberson argues that the jury returned inconsistent sentencing

verdicts, and that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the longer of the

two recommended sentences. After the penalty phase of the trial, the jury

deliberated and recommended the following sentences: life without parole for

twenty-five years for the offense of murder (count 1), twenty years for first-

degree robbery (count 2), five years for each of the nine counts of first-degree

wanton endangerment (counts 3 through 11), and twenty years for attempted

murder (count 12). The jury was instructed that it should recommend “whether

any or all of the punishments which you have fixed . . . should be served

concurrently (at the same time) or consecutively (one to begin after the

completion of the other).” They were further instructed that “[c]onsecutive

sentencing is subject to the following: A. That the aggregate of consecutive

terms of years cannot exceed 70 years; and B. That no sentence may run

consecutively with a life sentence.”

      The final instruction given to the jury was a “Concurrent or Consecutive

Sentence Verdict Form.” This verdict form stated as follows,

      We recommend that the punishment fixed for the Defendant
      under Counts ___, ___, ____, ___, ___, ___, ___, ___, ___, ___,
      ___, and ___ be served concurrently (at the same time) or
      consecutively (one after the other), in whole or in part, as
      follows:

                                        31
       CHECK AND COMPLETE ONE AND ONLY ONE OF THE
       FOLLOWING:

       1.□ We recommend that the punishment fixed for the
       Defendant under Counts ___, ___, ____, ___, ___, ___, ___, ___,
       ___, ___, ___, and ___ be served concurrently (at the same
       time).

       2.□ We recommend that the punishment fixed for the
       Defendant under Counts ___, ___, ____, ___, ___, ___, ___, ___,
       ___, ___, ___, and ___ be served consecutively, one after the
       other. For [sic] a total of ______ years not to exceed 70 years
       or life.

The form then had a line for the foreperson’s signature and the date. The jury

filled in the first set of blanks with the numbers 1 through 12, for each of the

twelve counts. The jury then placed a checkmark in the box beside paragraph 2

and filled in the blanks with the numbers 1 through 12, for each of the twelve

counts. The jury filled in the final blank space of paragraph 2 with the number

70. Thus, the jury’s sentencing recommendation regarding concurrent or

consecutive sentencing was, “We recommend that the punishment fixed for the

Defendant under Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 be served

consecutively, one after the other. For [sic] a total of 70 years not to exceed 70

years or life.”

       Roberson asserts that the jury’s recommended sentence of life without

parole for twenty-five years on the murder charge is inconsistent with its

recommendation that all sentences run consecutively for a total of seventy

years. Even if the jury’s recommended sentences were inconsistent, it would

not matter. The trial court has the final authority to determine whether

sentences for multiple offenses are to be imposed consecutively or

                                        32
concurrently. Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Ky. 2008).

Because this decision is not within the province of the jury and is solely within

the power of the trial court after a recommendation from the jury, any

inconsistency in the jury’s verdict is inconsequential. Accordingly, the trial

court did not err in sentencing Roberson to life without parole for twenty-five

years on the murder charge, with all other sentences running concurrently to

that one.

                                 III. CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Logan Circuit

Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Michael Lawrence Goodwin

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Kristin Leigh Conder
Assistant Attorney General

                                        33