Court Opinion

ID: 9763805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:56:11.950127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:49.744020
License: Public Domain

CADENA, Justice
(concurring).
In view of the partial dissenting opinion filed by the Chief Justice, I consider it appropriate to state my reasons for joining in the holding that the portion of the order awarding temporary custody of the child to the Bexar County Welfare Department is invalid.
I do not question, nor do I construe Justice Klingeman’s opinion as questioning, the power of a district court to take a child temporarily from its legal custodian in order to protect the welfare of the child until a final determination can be made on the question of custody in a pending suit. *876The question in this case does not involve the existence of this admitted power, but, rather the manner in which the court’s jurisdiction is invoked.
In Page v. Sherrill, 415 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.1967), the temporary custody order was entered in a proceeding in the nature of habeas corpus which sought a termination of the custodial rights of the mother and the award of custody to the maternal aunt and uncle of the children. The petition alleged that if the children were allowed to remain in the custody of the mother they would suffer “irreparable and permanent” injury to their health and safety, and that it was “ . . dangerous for them to be in such condition * * *.’ ” 415 S.W.2d at 644. On the basis of such allegations, the district court entered an order, without notice to the mother, reciting the danger of irreparable injury and awarding temporary custody to a public agency pending a final determination of the custody question which was raised by proper pleadings.
Page does no more than affirm the power of a district court to enter such temporary order without notice to the parent, in a case where the original jurisdiction of that court to control minors has been properly invoked by pleadings raising the issue of custody. There is nothing shocking about such a holding. The power of a court to take necessary action, in order to avoid irreparable harm, without notice to the party affected, in a case in which its jurisdiction has been properly invoked, has long been recognized. For example, a court may issue a temporary restraining order without notice. But this can be done only where there are proper pleadings invoking the jurisdiction of the court in the first instance.
It is no answer to say that the filing of the adoption petition properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction over the child. Even if this be conceded, does this jurisdiction continue when the adoption proceedings, which constitute the only basis for vesting the court with control over the minor, have been dismissed? Suppose that H sued W for divorce and W filed a plea in abatement based on the fact that H does not meet the residence requirements. May the court sustain the plea in abatement, dismiss the divorce proceedings and, at the same time, enjoin W from disposing of the community assets pending determination of the merits of a divorce action which is no longer pending? The answer is clear. The dismissal of the action which clothed the court with power to deal with the subject matter of the suit necessarily divests the court of that power.
We cannot remand the custody issue for a full hearing on the merits. There is no case pending in which the court can make a final determination. There are no pleadings asking the court to make such a determination. What case are we remanding? There is no case pending in the district court in which pleadings have been filed by any party authorizing the court to make a final order concerning the custody of the minor. Is the temporary order, entered in a case which is no longer on the docket, to form the basis for the entry of a final order in a non-existing case?
Since the adoption proceeding has been dismissed, it cannot be said that the temporary order is justified by the necessity of protecting the child pending a final disposition of the adoption case. No petition seeking to have the child declared dependent and neglected is pending. No divorce proceeding is pending. No petition for ha-beas corpus is pending. Nothing is pending concerning the welfare of the child to which the temporary order might be considered ancillary.
The case before us differs from Green v. Green, 146 S.W. 567 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1912, writ dism’d), in which the petition on file showed on its face that some order of the court was necessary to properly protect the child until a final hearing could be had on the question of custody. The petition for adoption in the case before us gives no hint that the welfare of the child is being endangered. Even if we *877look to the statement of facts, the evidence conclusively establishes that at the time the petition was filed, and at the date of the hearing, the child was receiving proper care. There is nothing in the testimony to suggest the existence of conditions which constitute a threat of any kind to the welfare of the child. We simply have a case where neither the pleadings nor the evidence suggest that there exists a “situation of emergency” which may “. . . demand immediate action by the courts.” in order that they may effectively discharge their responsibility to protect minors. Page v. Sherrill, supra, 415 S.W.2d at 645.
The case before us also differs radically from Knollhoff v. Norris, 152 Tex. 231, 256 S.W.2d 79 (1953), where the party challenging the power of the district court to make a determination of custody was the very party who had invoked the jurisdiction of the court to deal with the personal status of the child'. It is conceded that appellee “. . . had the unconditional right to withdraw her consent at any time before the court acted on the petition for adoption.” Wilde v. Buchanan, 157 Tex. 606, 305 S.W.2d 778 (1957). To say, as the appellee contends, that the exercise of this right entailed investing the district court with power to determine the matter of custody is to make the right substantially less than an “unconditional” one.