Court Opinion

ID: 9832516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:58:26.50947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:47.609044
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The appellant Commerce Trust Company, supported by the decision of .the Dallas Trust & Savings Bank v. Brown, 48 S.W.(2d) 1044, by the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals, in which a writ of error was refused, earnestly contends that we erred in rendering judgment against it for the interest payments made by appellee Best on December 1, 1925 and Í926. But as stated in our original opinion, the appellant trust company was a party to and became the owner of the usurious contract in question, and under the decision of the case of Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.(2d) 282, by the Supreme Court, the appellant trust company must be held to have known that the contract was usurious. While the transfer by the trust company of the original obligation to the California Insurance Company was placed of record, it does not affirmatively appear that the coupon interest notes in question were recorded or that Best had actual knowledge of the transfer. It further appears that prior to the due date of these notes the Commerce Trust Company notified Best of the due dates thereof and requested payment. Best, in accordance with the terms of these notes, paid the interest and transmitted it to the trust company in exact accord with the terms of the notes and in obedience to the request.
Under such circumstances, if the Texas decision by Chief Justice Wilson is not distinguishable from the one before us, we think we must bring ourselves in conflict therewith and hold that the trust company, legally knowing at all times involved that the interest demanded and received from Best constituted usury under the law, cannot be relieved of the penalty of the statute merely because, in obedience to an obligation going to the California Life Insurance Company, it transmitted to that company the two payments in question. So believing, we think our original conclusion holding the trust company liable as a tort-feasor must be upheld.
In 1 Corpus Juris, p. 1022, title Actions, § 146, the text states: “It has been held that an action to recover a statutory penalty is in contract and not in tort; but it is ordinarily held that, although technically and formally in contract, debt being the usual form of action, such action is substantially in tort.”
In Chaffee v. U. S., 18 Wall. 516, 21 L. Ed. 908, and as stated in 21 R. C. L. p. 222, title Penalties, § 15, it is said: “An action to recover a penalty, though in form ex contractu, is in truth and in fact founded on a tort. Therefore in an action against several it is not necessary to establish a joint liability, hut it is sufficient if the liability of any of the defendants be shown. Judgment may be entered against them and in favor of the others, whose complicity in the offense for which the penalty is prescribed is not proved, precisely as though the action were in form as well as in substance ex delicto.”
It is said in 30 Cyc. p. 1350, title Penalties, that: “Where a penalty is imposed on an of*1041fense which several may and. do jointly commit, the wrongdoers may be sued either jointly or severally.”
While a writ of error was refused in Dallas Trust & Savings Bank v. Brown, hy the Tex-arkana Court of Civil Appeals, above cited, it does not appear'that the question here discussed was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court; and we conclude upon the authorities cited and upon principle that we correctly held the appellant trust company liable for the penalties we have discussed and that were adjudged against it, and that the motion for rehearing should be overruled.