Court Opinion

ID: 9773732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:57:05.309358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:56.827497
License: Public Domain

John E. Jennings, Judge, dissenting. The issue here is whether the Commission’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. A decision of the Commission is supported by substantial evidence if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion. Farmland Ins. Co. v. Dubois, 54 Ark. App. 141, 923 S.W.2d 883 (1996). I cannot agree that the Commission’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Two statutes are involved in this case. Section 11 — 9— 102(5) (B) (iii) (Repl. 1996) excludes from the definition of com-pensable injury any “[ijnjury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. . . .” Section 11-9-704(c)(3) (Repl. 1996) requires that “[administrative law judges, the commission, and any reviewing court shall construe the provisions of this chapter strictly.” On these facts, and given the requirement that the law be strictly construed, the Commission could reasonably find that Mr. Fisher was not performing “employment services” at the time of his injury. I cannot agree that our decision here is governed by our earlier decision in Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 55 Ark. App. 343, 934 S.W.2d 956 (1996), or the supreme court’s subsequent affirmance of that case found at 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997). In the first place the facts in Olsten Kimberly were much more compelling. There the claimant was a traveling nurse employed by the respondent to provide nursing services to its customers in their homes. The claimant was injured in an automobile accident that occurred as she was traveling between her employer’s offices and the home of her first patient for that day. In affirming the Commission’s decision in that case that the claimant was performing employment services at the time of her accident, both this court and the supreme court relied upon the facts that “delivering nursing services to patients at their homes is the raison d’etre of the appellant’s business, and . . . traveling to patients homes is an essential component of that service.” Here, on the other hand, appellant was tentatively hired as a truck driver. He was injured while driving his personal vehicle to deliver to appel-lee the results of the drug screening that he was required to undergo before he could drive a truck. Delivery of those results was neither part of the job for which appellant had been hired nor an activity that he had been directed or even asked by appellee to undertake; indeed, the evidence showed that such results were ordinarily transmitted by the laboratory to appellee via the U.S. mail. These facts do not even approach those in Olsten Kimberly. In the second place we were affirming the Commission’s award of benefits in Olsten Kimberly and in doing so said we give some deference to the administrative agency’s interpretation of the statute. For these reasons I respectfully dissent. Pittman, J., joins in this dissent.