Court Opinion

ID: 9686315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:41:53.070517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:59.723722
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, District Judge
(concurring in the result):
I agree that plaintiff cannot be summarily denied registration and thereby employment as a private detective solely because of his prior felony conviction. However, I find it unnecessary to consider the constitutional issue decided by the Court because I believe the pertinent state statutes should *1083be construed to entitle plaintiff to the hearing he seeks.
Connecticut’s scheme for regulating the occupations of private detective and security guard involves two concepts: licensure and registration. No person can engage in the business of (a) a private detective or investigator, or (b) a watchman, guard or patrol service without a license from the Commissioner of State Police. Conn.Gen. Stat. § 29-153. No person can work as an employee of those in business in these fields without registering for such employment with the Commissioner of State Police. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 29-156a. Licenses will not be given to any person convicted of a felony, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 29-154a, nor can any felon be registered for employment as a private detective or security guard. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 29-156a(c).
In 1973, however, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted broad legislation substantially restricting the extent to which a felony conviction can be used as an automatic barrier to employment. Conn.Pub. Acts 73-347. Having made a legislative finding that “the public is best protected when criminal offenders are rehabilitated and returned to society prepared to take their places as productive citizens and that the ability of returned offenders to find meaningful employment is directly related to their normal functioning in the community,” the legislature announced that it is “the policy of this state to encourage all employers to give favorable consideration to providing jobs to qualified individuals, including those who may have criminal conviction records.” Conn.Gen.Stat. § 4-61n. This policy is implemented by a prohibition against disqualifying any person from employment by the State or its agencies or from pursuing any occupation for which state licensure or registration is required solely because of a prior criminal conviction, unless it is specifically determined that the applicant is unsuitable after an individualized consideration. This assessment must include (1) the nature of the crime and its relation to the position sought, (2) the extent of rehabilitation, and (3) the time elapsed since the conviction or release from confinement. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 4-61o. This statute applies “[njotwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary.” Ibid. However, another provision of the 1973 legislation renders the act inapplicable “to any law enforcement agency,” although such an agency may adopt the new restrictive policy voluntarily. Conn.Gen.Stat. § 4-61p.
Thus, under § 4-61p, the State Police, as a law enforcement agency, is exempt from the provisions of § 4-61o and can continue to bar all felons from employment with that agency. The statutory issue in this case, however, is whether the law enforcement agency exception of § 4-61p exempts the State Police from the procedures of § 4 — 61 o not only in its own employment decisions, but also in its licensing and registration decisions as well.
The legislative history sheds little light on the scope of the law enforcement agency exception. The floor debates do not consider the issue. See Connecticut General Assembly Proceedings 1973, House Vol. 16, Part 11, pp. 5464-65; id. Senate Yol. 16, Part 5, pp. 2272-73. The record of the Hearings of the Joint Standing Committee on Human Rights & Opportunities, 1973, contains a letter dated March 13,1973, from the State Police Commissioner to the committee. Id. at 164. In that letter the Commissioner expressed his understanding that the exception applies to hiring by the State Police. He goes on to request that the exception should also “extend” to licenses and permits issued by the department and he specifically refers to private detectives. That language standing alone might suggest that the Commissioner thought that the exception, as written, did not include licensing and registration. The Commissioner went on to say, however, that “[i]f this bill does except the State Police Department in all these areas, we would have no further comment concerning this.” It is evident, therefore, that the Commissioner himself was unsure whether or not the exception included licensure and registration. His letter to the committee alerted the legislators to the ambiguity, but they failed to *1084resolve it. Thus the issue of statutory construction is left for judicial interpretation, with scant legislative guidance.1
I think the statute should be narrowly construed to exempt State Police hiring but not licensing and registration. Though the statute exempts “any law enforcement agency” without specification of agency functions, there are several considerations that point toward a narrow reading exempting only the State Police hiring function. In the first place,, the legislature emphatically expressed a broad policy against absolute barriers to employment based on prior felony records. The exception to this policy should be narrowly construed to provide the minimum departure from the legislature’s rehabilitative objective. Secondly, whatever the public interest in absolute disqualification of felons from employment, that interest is less substantial when the employer is a private detective or private security guard agency than when it is the State Police Department or other State law enforcement agency. Third, reading the exception broadly to include State Police licensure and registration would create anomalies unlikely to have been intended by the legislature. For example, under a broad reading of the exception, a felon would be automatically disqualified from serving as a night watchman for a licensed private agency supplying contract service to a state agency operating sensitive facilities such as the National Guard Armory or Bradley International Airport, but would be eligible for employment if the departments operating these facilities chose to hire him directly. It would also mean that a convicted bigamist would automatically be barred from night watchman employment with a licensed private guard agency, but a convicted embezzler could not automatically be barred from employment as a licensed real estate broker. I doubt that the legislature intended such results. Finally, a broad reading of the law enforcement agency exception would encounter the substantial constitutional objections that a'majority of this Court has considered and found to be well taken. Cf. Pordum v. Board of Regents of State of New York, 491 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843, 95 S.Ct. 74, 42 L.Ed.2d 71 (1974). Even if some legislators were willing to permit such bizarre results, the statute should make such intention unmistakably clear before a court is called upon to adjudicate its constitutionality. Neither the subsequent practice of the State Police nor the acquiescence of the State Attorney General’s office in this suit persuades me that the legislature should be relieved of the obligation to make plain the broad authority asserted by the defendant.
For all these reasons, I conclude that § 4 — 61p exempts only State Police hiring from the prohibition of § 4 — 61 o, leaving State Police licensing and registration subject to the procedural safeguards of the latter provision, and that the automatic disqualification provisions of § 29-156a have been modified by the procedural provisions of § 4-61 o. I therefore concur in the result that the plaintiff is entitled to have his application for registration considered pursuant to § 4-61o.

. Abstention might be appropriate to permit the plaintiff to seek a state court construction of the statute that would avoid the constitutional issue. However, I think it appropriate to resolve the statutory issue now to avoid further delay, especially in the absence of any request by the defendant to defer consideration pending a state court determination.