Court Opinion

ID: 9900049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 18:10:41.262749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:58.782680
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00207-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JONATHAN MICHAEL CADENA
A/K/A JONATHAN CADENA,                                                     Appellant,

                                              v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 156th District Court
                        of Live Oak County, Texas.

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

                  Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

      Appellant Jonathan Michael Cadena a/k/a Jonathan Cadena was convicted for

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a public servant, taking a weapon from

a peace officer, and felon in possession of a firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.42,
22.02(b)(2)(B), 38.14, 46.04, 12.42. With enhancements, 1 appellant was sentenced to

sixty, sixty, and twenty-five years of imprisonment with the sentences to run concurrently.

By two issues, appellant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding

expert testimony regarding the use of force by a taser; and (2) the trial court abused its

discretion by denying appellant’s “right to present a defense under the Sixth and

Fourteenth     Amendments         to    the    Constitution     of   the    United     States     by

excluding . . . evidence raising excessive force and self-defense.” We affirm.

                                       I.     BACKGROUND

       Officer Carlos Castillejos testified that on August 18, 2020, he was on duty when

dispatch advised him that “a driver . . . had jumped out of a moving vehicle on the side of

the highway and the vehicle had driven into the ditch.” At the time, Officer Castillejos was

wearing his city-issued police uniform and a body camera and was driving a Ford Explorer

with designations for George West Police Department (GWPD). Officer Castillejos arrived

at the scene on U.S. Highway 281 and spoke with a witness who informed him that a

male individual with a t-shirt wrapped around his head, wearing a black shirt and shorts,

was walking down the highway near the vehicle. Officer Castillejos discovered that the

vehicle, a black Mitsubishi, was still running. He observed that the faceplate of the radio

was missing, and wires were extruding from the bottom of the console, which indicated

to him that there was a possibility that the vehicle had been stolen. Officer Castillejos

called in the license plate for the vehicle and confirmed that the vehicle had been stolen.

        1 During the punishment phase of trial, appellant pleaded true to enhancements for the felony

offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child and criminal mischief.

                                                 2
       Officer Castillejos returned to his patrol unit and drove down the highway where

the witness indicated that the male individual was walking. He saw appellant, dressed as

the witness had described, walking along the highway on a grassy verge in front of a

storage facility. Officer Castillejos activated his siren and lights, stopped his patrol unit,

and exited his patrol unit with his firearm in his right hand and his taser in his left hand. At

this point, Officer Castillejos testified that he was executing a felony stop because the

vehicle had been stolen. He repeatedly instructed appellant to drop and lay flat on the

ground and that he would tase him if he failed to comply, but appellant failed to do so.

Appellant eventually held his hands up and put one knee on the ground but failed to lay

flat, and Officer Castillejos tased him.

       During these events, off-duty border patrol agent Gerardo Gonzalez Jr., a licensed

peace officer, drove past the incident, saw that Officer Castillejos was alone and armed

with his taser, and approached to determine if Officer Castillejos required assistance.

Agent Gonzalez parked his vehicle behind Officer Castillejos’s patrol unit and

approached, verbally identifying himself as a law enforcement officer and holding out his

identification. Agent Gonzalez approached appellant and attempted to handcuff him, but

appellant resisted. Agent Gonzalez told appellant to “stay on the ground,” but he did not

comply, then “he got up,” “pulled away,” and appellant, Agent Gonzalez, and Officer

Castillejos “went to the ground” and “started wrestling.” During the struggle, Officer

Castillejos exclaimed that appellant was trying to seize his firearm, and then subsequently

exclaimed that appellant had gained possession of the firearm. Agent Gonzalez

recovered the firearm, emptied the magazine, and shot the round that was in the chamber.

                                               3
Officer Castillejos suffered a blow to the face during the struggle.

       Trooper Raul Garcia Jr., with the Texas Department of Public Safety, arrived at the

scene, saw Officer Castillejos and two individuals struggling, and reported a “10-10,” or a

fight in progress. Trooper Garcia initially assumed that two individuals were beating up a

police officer, so he approached the trio with his weapon drawn. Agent Gonzalez informed

him that he was an off-duty border patrol agent, and Trooper Garcia instructed Agent

Gonzalez to throw the gun away from the scene and place appellant in handcuffs. Trooper

Garcia testified that appellant was still resisting arrest and “trying to get away.” At this

point, additional officers arrived on scene and assisted in securing appellant.

       Based on this sequence of events, appellant was indicted for aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon against a public servant, taking a weapon from a peace officer, and

felon in possession of a firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.02(b)(2)(B), 38.14,

46.04. At trial, the jury heard testimony from Officer Castillejos, Agent Gonzalez, Trooper

Garcia, and appellant’s expert witness, Michael Raymond Sanchez. Additionally, the jury

saw and heard videos of the incident secured from the body cameras worn by Officer

Castillejos and Trooper Garcia, reviewed a still photograph captured from one of the

videos that depicted a tattooed hand holding a firearm, and reviewed portions of the

GWPD policy manual. The jury convicted appellant on all three counts and assessed

punishment of sixty years of confinement on two counts and twenty-five years on the

remaining count. This appeal followed.

                                II.     EXPERT TESTIMONY

       We review the trial court’s determination regarding the admissibility of expert

                                             4
testimony for an abuse of discretion. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2019). Under this standard, we “must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was within

the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000). “Because the possible spectrum of education, skill, and training is so

wide, a trial court has great discretion in determining whether a witness possesses

sufficient qualifications to assist the jury as an expert on a specific topic in a particular

case.” Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 527–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Thus, “[a] trial

court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony will rarely be disturbed on appeal.”

Buford v. State, 606 S.W.3d 363, 372 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.).

Whether expert testimony will help the jury understand the evidence or determine a

disputed fact and, thus, whether the expert’s testimony is admissible are threshold

determinations to be made by the trial court. Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006); Rodgers, 205 S.W.3d at 527; Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 856 (Tex.

App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d).

       Texas Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and

states that:

       A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
       training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the
       expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
       trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

TEX. R. EVID. 702. Thus, expert testimony is admissible if: (1) the witness is qualified as

an expert by reason of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the subject

matter of the testimony is appropriate for expert testimony; and (3) admitting the expert

testimony will assist the trier of fact to decide the case. Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 669.

                                              5
       To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion in ruling on an expert’s

qualifications, we consider three factors: (1) the complexity of the field of expertise; (2) the

conclusiveness of the expert’s opinion; and (3) the centrality of the area of expertise to

the resolution of the lawsuit. Id. at 669–70; Rodgers, 205 S.W.3d at 528. “Greater

qualifications are required for more complex fields of expertise and for more conclusive

and dispositive opinions.” Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 670. In soft sciences and fields based

primarily upon experience and training, an expert’s opinion will be reliable if: (1) the field

of expertise is a legitimate one; (2) the subject matter of the expert’s testimony is within

the scope of that field; and (3) the expert’s testimony properly relies upon and/or utilizes

the principles involved in the field. Allison, 666 S.W.3d at 759; see Nenno v. State, 970

S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas,

4 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc) (disapproving of Nenno’s holding that

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 applies only to custodial statements).

                                       III.   ANALYSIS

       Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert

testimony regarding the use of force by use of a taser and by denying appellant the right

to present a defense under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of

the United States by excluding evidence regarding excessive force and self-defense. See

U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV. Appellant summarizes his argument as follows:

       The defense proffered the testimony of a well-qualified expert on the use of
       force and excessive force, including the use of tasers. While the expert had
       not taught the use of tasers to police officers, he was certified in their use
       and he met all requirements for the admission of this testimony. The trial
       court’s exclusion of any testimony regarding use of force of any kind,
       including tasers was not only an abuse of discretion, but nullified

                                               6
       [a]ppellant’s constitutional right to present a defense.

Appellant asserts that the trial court’s actions left “the jury in the dark about the

significance of [Officer] Castillejos’s use of force.” Appellant also contends that:

       The facts of this case, displayed with sparkling clarity by way of on-scene
       video, raised self-defense and excessive force as issues for a jury, but only
       if the defense, through its expert witness Sanchez, could have put those
       issues before the jurors. The trial court precluded these issues, leaving the
       jury in the dark about the significance of [Officer] Castillejos’[s] use of force.
       The trial court’s exclusion of Sanchez’[s] testimony was not only an abuse
       of discretion, but constituted an evisceration of [a]ppellant’s constitutional
       right to present a defense.

The State argues, in contrast, that nothing in Sanchez’s proposed testimony related to a

fact in issue as set forth in the indictment, appellant has not explained how any issues

regarding self-defense would apply to the offenses of felon in possession of a firearm or

aggravated assault, appellant was not deprived of any defense to the charges against

him because the jury was expressly given an excessive force instruction, and the State

did not carry a burden of demonstrating the legality of Officer Castillejos’s encounter with

appellant.

A.     Self-Defense and Excessive Force

       The right to resort to self-defense is limited in the context of resisting a search or

an arrest, which includes being placed under restraint or taken into custody. Steele v.

State, 490 S.W.3d 117, 131–32 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). Under the

penal code, the use of force to resist an arrest or search is justified:

       (1) if, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace officer (or person
       acting at his direction) uses or attempts to use greater force than necessary
       to make the arrest or search; and

       (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is

                                               7
        immediately necessary to protect himself against the peace officer’s (or
        other person’s) use or attempted use of greater force than necessary.

TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 9.31(c); see Porteous v. State, 259 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. granted), pet. dism’d improvidently granted, 253 S.W.3d

288 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 2

        Here, the jury was expressly instructed that: “It is a defense to prosecution for the

offense of Taking a Weapon from a Peace Officer if the evidence shows that the

Defendant took or attempted to take the weapon from a peace officer who was using force

against the Defendant or another in excess of the amount of force permitted by law.”

B.      Preliminary Hearing on Expert Testimony

        Prior to trial and outside the presence of the jury, appellant presented Sanchez’s

qualifications and testimony. Sanchez has a bachelor’s degree in police science, a

master’s degree in criminal justice administration, and a PhD in business administration

with a specialization in criminal justice. Sanchez explained that he wrote his dissertation

on “the acculturation of police officers, in other words, dealing with people from highly

diverse cultures.” He has also written six chapters in five different books on international

police and peacekeeping. Sanchez acknowledged that he had not published any

materials on the use of force or police policies.

        Sanchez teaches criminal justice for the University of Texas, Rio Grande Valley,

online classes for Utica College, and in-service classes for Texas Southmost College

        2Self-defense is a confession-and-avoidance defense requiring the defendant to admit to his
otherwise illegal conduct. See Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The
confession-and-avoidance doctrine does not require an explicit admission from the defendant that he
committed the offense; however, the defensive evidence must allow the arbiter of facts to reasonably infer
the elements of the offense. See Maciel v. State, 631 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

                                                    8
Police Academy on an “as needed” basis. He currently serves as an active peace officer

and is a lieutenant for the constable’s office of Cameron County, Precinct 2, as a reserve

officer. He assists the constable’s office with developing policies, training, administration,

and internal affairs investigations.

       Sanchez testified that he has over twenty-five years of experience in the criminal

justice system and that he has worked as a jailer, patrol officer, sergeant, administrative

sergeant, investigator, lieutenant, special investigator, and interim chief of police.

Sanchez has further worked as an international police officer for the United Nations,

serving variously as an investigator on a counter-terrorism task force, police instructor

and firearms instructor, deputy chief of training, and director of personnel and

administration. He testified that he has specialized training as an instructor in the use of

firearms, batons, tasers, pepper sprays, defensive tactics, specialty impact munitions,

and crisis negotiation, and further testified that he was “basically an instructor in all

aspects of use of force.”

       Sanchez testified that he routinely investigates matters in which an officer has

potentially used excessive force. He has “also been looking at these sorts of incidents as

an instructor for the last [twenty] years, evaluating police incidents to try to find

improvements in approaches and techniques and tactics.” He testified that, “you can’t

assess or teach use of force mathematically” because it is “based on the totality of the

circumstances, everything that is happening at the time[,] and everything the officer knew

at the time.”

       Sanchez told the trial court that he has consulted as an expert and has qualified

                                              9
as an expert on cases involving various factual scenarios regarding a police officer’s use

of force; however, Sanchez did not indicate that any of these cases involved the

deployment of a taser. Sanchez further explained that the present case was the first case

in which he was presenting expert testimony in court.

       Sanchez testified that he had reviewed the documentation, discovery, and videos

pertaining to this case and had performed his own independent investigation. Sanchez

had developed an opinion about how appellant’s detention and arrest was handled and

whether commonly accepted best practices were used in this case, and he stated that he

was prepared to render an opinion on “the totality of the officer’s actions and the use of

force.” This analysis encompassed the officer’s approach, justifications, probable cause,

process of seizing, contemporaneous knowledge, reasonable suspicion, and best

practices.

       On cross examination, Sanchez explained that he was certified as a taser

instructor by Axon, a company that manufactures the “lion[’s] share” of tasers. Sanchez

clarified that he received that certification within the past year and that he has not provided

training on taser use since receiving that certification. Sanchez testified that he has fired

a taser, and he has been tased, but he has never actually deployed a taser on a subject.

Sanchez explained that he is currently working on developing a policy for the use of tasers

for the constable’s precinct but acknowledged that the precinct did not possess any

tasers. Sanchez testified that he has not conducted demonstrations or tests on the use

of tasers, that he has no publications on their use, and that he has no scientific or medical

training regarding tasers. The totality of his knowledge regarding tasers and interpreting

                                              10
the graphs or data from them is derived from his training as a taser instructor. The taser

training that Sanchez received included the interpretation of taser logs which show when

the taser was used, when it was deployed, when it was fired, “and if it made the correct

circuit, meaning if the probes were actually delivering the charge.” He stated that he did

not need to know how effective the charge was or the failure rate of the charge. Sanchez

stated that he was unaware of any peer reviewed studies that analyzed such data

regarding actual taser deployments. He was not aware of any possible error rate, flaws,

or methodology problems.

         Sanchez explained that his testimony would focus on the use and deployment of

the taser, rather than any scientific ramifications, and he would address when, why, and

how an officer should use a taser. Sanchez stated that he would also testify about the

use of force generally. Sanchez explained that he has conducted countless training

sessions regarding the use of force because the use of force “[is] interwoven through all

of police operations.” He testified that there is “nothing unique about when you should

employ the taser” as opposed to other secondary less lethal weapons, such as pepper

spray.

         Based on the foregoing, appellant’s counsel offered Sanchez as an expert witness.

The State objected as follows:

         The State would object to . . . the use of Dr. Sanchez as an expert. I’m still
         a little bit confused exactly what topics are going—he is going to be
         employed as an expert in. It sounds like use of force was one of them. I’m
         not sure that—he has never testified as an expert in use of force in Texas
         before. I understand that he has many years of experience in that area, but
         I don’t see how that would necessarily separate him from, say, any other
         officer who has training and experience that we would not necessarily
         consider an expert.

                                               11
       As to his—as an expert with regard to tasers, we would object as well as—
       although he is, I guess, certified as a taser instructor, he has never
       provided training in the use of tasers, has never actually deployed a taser
       or had to deploy it on someone, and I don’t think that overall[,] any of the
       factors under [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
       or Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)] have been
       satisfied here.

       There has been no theory presented that can be peer reviewed or
       scientifically tested. We have no knowledge of any kind of error rate or
       general acceptance of any theory as it relates to use of force or tasers.

After additional colloquy regarding Sanchez’s qualifications and proposed testimony, the

trial court made the following ruling:

       I’m going to find that the threshold, the standard, has not been met. The
       witness will not testify as an expert.

       You may have the witness testify regarding training, but he will not testify
       regarding an evaluation of any of the materials that he has related or
       rendered an expert opinion on [regarding] the activity of other officers. He
       can talk about training generally since he does training and has some
       expertise in that.

       But you have not demonstrated that he has any expertise or been qualified
       as an expert in the areas of either the handling or deployment of tasers or
       similar equipment or that he should be accepted as an expert in the area of
       appropriate police response or the other [topics] offered.

C.     Trial Testimony and Evidence

       Officer Castillejos served as the first witness at trial. He testified that he graduated

from the police academy in 2010 and had worked for GWPD as a patrol officer for three

years. He testified that the theft of a vehicle constitutes an unauthorized use of a motor

vehicle, which is a felony. Officer Castillejos found appellant walking down the freeway

approximately a quarter of a mile away, and there were no other pedestrians in the area.

Officer Castillejos suspected that appellant was the individual who had been driving the

                                             12
Mitsubishi because he was “the only individual that was walking alongside the road at

that time.” According to Officer Castillejos, “[t]he distance seemed appropriate as well as

the description, the physical description, the shorts, the color of shirt and the main

indicator I took to be the shirt over his face.”

          Officer Castillejos testified that the appropriate approach to individuals by a police

officer varies depending on what the officer perceives as “the threat level,” and he was

investigating a felony offense, so he performed what is called a “felony stop” or a “high-

risk stop.” He explained that in a felony or high-risk stop, an officer takes cover at his or

her vehicle, draws a firearm, and gains compliance from the subject before proceeding.

This procedure contrasts with a typical stop in which an officer walks to the subject to

make contact. The distinction in the two procedures is made for the purposes of officer

safety.

          Officer Castillejos testified that when he located appellant walking down the

highway, he stopped his patrol unit, took cover behind his door, and held his firearm in

his right hand and a taser in his left hand before contacting appellant. He acknowledged

that having a gun in his right hand and a taser in his left hand was not a “best practice”

because of the potential for a “sympathetic trigger squeeze.” Officer Castillejos stated that

he planned to place appellant in handcuffs for an investigative detention regarding the

stolen vehicle, and he told appellant to lay down on the ground because that “is the safest

positioning for an individual to be in . . . for me to get control of the situation and the

individual if I’m going to place him in handcuffs.” Officer Castillejos explained that he

wanted appellant to “lie completely on the ground” to prevent him from running away,

                                                13
running towards him, or running into the highway traffic given their “dangerous” proximity

to the highway. Officer Castillejos further explained that he was concerned that appellant

might be armed because he had left a stolen vehicle, and appellant “bladed his stance”

while not looking directly at him which is “something that people normally use to conceal

if they are carrying a weapon.”

       Officer Castillejos testified that he repeatedly instructed appellant to lay down;

however, appellant did not comply and was instead positioned on one knee with his hands

in the air. Officer Castillejos observed nothing in the area, such as broken glass, which

would have prevented appellant from laying on the ground. After reviewing the body

camera recording of the incident, Officer Castillejos testified that the video indicated that

he instructed appellant to lay down eighteen different times. The video further indicated

that appellant asked him, “Am I going to die right now?” He responded, “No.” Appellant

failed to lay down, so Officer Castillejos ultimately deployed his taser. Officer Castillejos

testified he had been trained in the use of tasers and had deployed them in training, but

this was his first time to deploy a taser.

       After tasering appellant, Officer Castillejos attempted to put his firearm back into

his holster but pulled his firearm back out when he “observed [appellant’s] hands reach

towards his waistline area” because he “believed that it was a possibility at that point in

time he might be reaching for a weapon.” Further, when the taser made contact, appellant

stiffened up, then pulled his arms towards his body, and “it appeared he was trying to

disconnect . . . the taser probes from his body.” Officer Castillejos informed dispatch that

he had deployed the taser, and he believed that he deployed the taser an additional four

                                             14
or five times while continuing to issue commands to appellant without gaining compliance.

       During this period, Agent Gonzalez arrived, displayed his badge, and verbally

identified himself as an off-duty border patrol agent. He attempted to handcuff appellant

after pulling him to a standing position, but appellant was actively resisting arrest and was

“wrestling” with Agent Gonzalez and Officer Castillejos. The three fell to the ground, and

Officer Castillejos testified that appellant was “going for [his] gun,” and that he “felt upward

tugging on [his] hip on [his] side in the area where [his] gun is located.” Officer Castillejos

explained that, at this point in time, his firearm was secured by passive retention, or

friction, and a switch which has to be pulled back in order to release the firearm, but he

had not engaged the “strap” covering the firearm after displaying the firearm earlier in the

stop. The firearm ultimately came out of Officer Castillejos’s holster. Officer Castillejos

testified that the firearm “had to have been purposely removed” and that it could not have

fallen out or been removed by “a simple tug.” He further testified that he visually saw

appellant with the firearm, “both with sole and exclusive possession of the firearm, and

then all three of us were also grabbing it at some point in time.” Officer Castillejos testified

that appellant’s possession of the firearm was not accidental, and he “saw [appellant] grip

firmly on [his] firearm.” Officer Castillejos identified a still frame taken from the video as

displaying appellant’s hand as the “heavily-tattooed hand holding my service weapon.”

Officer Castillejos testified that he feared for his life during the struggle and described

appellant’s conduct as intentional, deadly, and combative. He specifically described the

struggle as “a fight for my life.” Officer Castillejos testified that appellant “headbutted” him

twice during the struggle, causing pain to his mouth and cheek, and causing the inside of

                                              15
his mouth to bleed, and the jury examined photographs of this injury.

       At this point in the testimony, appellant’s counsel made an offer of proof outside

the presence of the jury regarding Sanchez’s proposed testimony. Sanchez opined that

Officer Castillejos used excessive force because he had no probable cause to believe

that appellant was the driver of the stolen vehicle. According to Sanchez, Officer

Castillejos did not have probable cause to detain appellant but instead “pointed his gun

at him without any explanation.” Sanchez testified that this action was contrary to the best

practices, policies, and procedures employed by police officers. Sanchez testified that

appellant’s lack of cooperation was likely caused by being in “crisis mode” due to the

firearm. Sanchez testified that according to taser training and policy, tasers are not to be

deployed merely because an individual is not following verbal commands, and they are

instead to be used if the subject is using force on the officer or is attempting to flee, and

neither situation occurred here.

       Further, Sanchez testified that Officer Castillejos had failed to properly holster his

weapon. Although Officer Castillejos testified that he engaged a secondary retention

device by latching his weapon into his holster, Sanchez opined that Officer Castillejos

failed to do so because the video of the recording failed to capture the “clicking” sound

that would have occurred when the secondary retention device engaged. Sanchez

testified that officers commonly fail to properly secure their weapons to shorten their

response time. Sanchez thus testified he believed that the gun fell out of the holster during

the struggle because it was not secured. Sanchez explained that according to his analysis

of the video, appellant did not attempt to charge at Officer Castillejos but was rather

                                             16
propelled forward by Agent Gonzalez who was attempting to cuff him. Ultimately,

Sanchez testified that Officer Castillejos used excessive force and that he failed to follow

proper police procedures.

       After hearing the foregoing, the trial court allowed Sanchez to testify but limited the

scope of his testimony:

       [Sanchez] has testified that he is qualified as a trainer for taser, although he
       has never trained anybody in the use or operation of a taser or similar-like
       device. He can testify about training in the use and operation of a taser. He
       trains officers in the use of force. He can testify about training officers in the
       use of force based on his experience and his work as a trainer of officers
       either in the academy someplace or as continuing law enforcement officer
       TCLEOSE [Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and
       Education] training. He can’t give any opinion—he is not qualified under his
       testimony, in my opinion, to give an opinion regarding the use of force in
       this case or the use of a taser in this case.

The trial court subsequently clarified that Sanchez could testify regarding how he trains

officers, but “he doesn’t demonstrate any expertise in evaluating or opining on use of

force by anybody else.”

       After the trial court’s ruling, appellant’s counsel cross-examined Officer Castillejos.

Officer Castillejos confirmed that the witness he initially interviewed did not see the

Mitsubishi leave the highway and go into the ditch and did not see appellant exit the car;

thus, the extent of Officer Castillejos’s knowledge at the inception of the incident was

merely that there was a man walking away from the vehicle. Officer Castillejos explained

that making reasonable deductions is part of his job, and he thought that it was reasonable

to assume that appellant was associated with the stolen vehicle given the time that had

elapsed since the dispatch, the distance between appellant and the vehicle, and the fact

that appellant was wearing the same clothing that the witness had described. Further,

                                              17
there were no other pedestrians, and it was not a residential area.

       Officer Castillejos acknowledged that in the past he had violated GWPD’s “Policy

and Procedures” manual “a couple of times to [his] knowledge,” and he had been

reprimanded for lack of performance duties, disobedience of or failure to comply with

departmental orders, and insubordination. However, Officer Castillejos denied violating

any policies and procedures on the date of this incident. In this regard, appellant’s counsel

extensively cross-examined Officer Castillejos regarding his use of a taser during the

encounter. The policy manual provides that an officer is authorized to use a taser,

denominated in the manual as a “conducted energy device” or a CED, as follows:

       1.     The CED may be utilized in situations when necessary to subdue a
              noncompliant subject when lesser means of control have not been
              successful and the suspect is physically resisting officers.

       2.     The act of verbal non-compliance shall not justify the use of the CED
              weapon.

       3.     The CED may be utilized to debilitate a subject who poses an
              immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death to himself/herself,
              the officer, or others.

Through cross-examination, appellant’s counsel suggested that none of these three

situations applied in the circumstances of this case given that the video depicted appellant

on his knees “begging” for Officer Castillejos not to harm him. Counsel’s questioning

further suggested that appellant was merely failing to follow Officer Castillejos’s

commands, and thus the situation involved “verbal non-compliance” rather than physical

non-compliance. In response, Officer Castillejos testified that he acted pursuant to

GWPD’s policies because appellant was physically noncompliant with his commands,

and verbal non-compliance consisted of oral non-compliance, such as telling an officer

                                             18
“no.” Officer Castillejos further explained that the manual allowed him to use a taser

because appellant posed a threat of bodily harm. “I am all of four feet from a highly-

traveled roadway in his position [and] he would be able to very quickly close distance on

me and push me into traffic.” In this regard, Officer Castillejos testified that appellant was

in a “flight-or-fight mode” based on various indicators including appellant’s stance, angled

slightly away from him, which indicated he might be attempting to conceal a weapon; his

failure to comply with commands to lay down; his assumption of a physical position similar

to a runner in a starting line; and his constant visual scanning of the area as though he

was looking for “either a way out, a direction to run in or . . . situational weapons.” Officer

Castillejos explained that he is familiar with a common circumstance in which a suspect

feigns compliance with an officer’s command in order to stall, escape, or attack. He did

not believe that appellant’s failure to comply and expressed concerns about physical harm

were genuine.

       Officer Castillejos testified that he tased appellant as the lowest level of force that

he could use to obtain appellant’s compliance given the totality of the circumstances

considering his safety, appellant’s safety, and the safety of the motorists on the road at

that time. Based on his training and experience, an officer should not wait to deploy a

taser until a subject physically attacks because there is a “reactionary gap” to consider.

According to Officer Castillejos, “that reactionary gap could have had pretty bad

consequences” in the circumstances present in this case.

       Appellant’s counsel further queried whether Officer Castillejos had properly

secured his weapon given that the video failed to include any audible indication that the

                                              19
secondary retention device on Officer Castillejos’s holster had engaged. Counsel thus

suggested that his weapon fell out of his holster during the struggle. Officer Castillejos

affirmatively stated that his “gun was secure with two levels of retention,” that there was

no reasonable possibility that his gun was not clipped in, and that mere gravity will engage

the second retention device. He stated that appellant landed on top of him when they fell,

and that his firearm could not have landed on appellant or his hand. Officer Castillejos

testified that from the beginning of the incident to the end, appellant “was actively trying

to gain possession of the firearm.” He testified that he had no regrets about deploying his

taser during the encounter but further explained that, in hindsight, he would have waited

for backup to arrive before continuing with the encounter.

       Agent Gonzalez also provided some testimony relevant to the facts pertaining to

appellant’s convictions. Agent Gonzalez testified that appellant was actively “fighting or

resisting arrest” during the struggle and was not passively resisting the officers. Agent

Gonzalez did not see how Officer Castillejos’s firearm came loose from his holster during

the struggle; however, Agent Gonzalez explained that he saw appellant in “possession of

the weapon.” When asked if it was possible that appellant “just accidentally had brushed

up against [the firearm] with his hand,” Agent Gonzalez denied it, and stated that he “saw

[that appellant] had full grip . . . of the weapon.” He confirmed that during the struggle,

Officer Castillejos was on the ground, appellant fell on top of him, and Agent Gonzalez

fell on top of them both. Agent Gonzalez did not see appellant head-butt Officer

Castillejos, but he saw that Officer Castillejos was bleeding from his mouth after the

incident. Agent Gonzalez further testified that appellant bit him during the struggle,

                                            20
causing a bruise to his arm; however, Agent Gonzalez acknowledged that in his

statement, provided shortly after the accident, he told officers that appellant did not bite

him, and he did not know how he got the bruise.

       Trooper Garcia provided additional testimony about the incident. He confirmed

previous testimony that “[a] felony stop consists of our weapons drawn, we order the guys

to the ground, or we can order them to our vehicle and handcuff them safely.” He

explained that officers use their policies and procedures to effect an arrest on a felony

stop, and that procedure entails drawing a weapon, ordering the suspect “to the ground”

or “to our vehicle,” and cuffing the suspect. He has made felony stops on his own, without

additional officers, and they comprise the same actions but are “very high stressed”

because “[y]ou don’t know what is going to happen.” Trooper Garcia testified that it is

“always recommended” to “wait for backup.” However, Trooper Garcia clarified that if he

is the first officer on the scene and “time is of the essence,” the initial protocol is to “get

them in handcuffs quickly.” Trooper Garcia confirmed that he saw appellant resisting

arrest and “trying to get away.”

       At this point in the trial, the State rested, and appellant’s counsel called Sanchez

to testify. Sanchez described his qualifications to the jury and explained that he teaches

and trains officers in general police instruction, including the use of force, and specifically,

the use of a taser. Sanchez told the jury that the “overarching guiding principle” regarding

the use of force is that officers “must use the minimum amount of force necessary to

accomplish a legitimate law enforcement goal.” Sanchez explained that when a subject

fails to comply with an officer’s command, the situation is handled through the “use-of-

                                              21
force continuum” beginning with the officer’s presence in uniform, which “has an effect on

people’s behavior,” followed by verbal commands, where an officer communicates with

the subject attempting to gain compliance, followed by “soft techniques,” which Sanchez

defined as “laying . . . hands [on] the person to control them but without using impact,”

followed by “hard techniques,” which includes “impact with empty hand fists, baton,

pepper spray, conductive energy weapons[,] and any other less than lethal weapon,”

followed finally by “deadly force.”

       Sanchez testified that an officer determines how to approach a stop and whether

to approach the stop as a felony stop based on a “reasonable basis” that is “dependent

on each situation.” When asked if it “usually include[s] something more than a suspect

being in the vicinity of a possible . . . felony,” Sanchez stated that the determination is

“situational.” He explained that there has to be a “perception” or a report that a suspect is

“dangerous or armed.” “Usually, the felony stop is a vehicle stop, so it involves pulling the

vehicle over, drawing your weapon and giving clear commands and then pulling each

subject out of the car one by one in a safe manner, patting them down, securing them

until they can be identified and handled according to whatever the nature of the call was.”

When asked if a felony stop typically encompasses “explaining to the persons involved

what is going on,” Sanchez stated that “it depends on the particular incident.”

       Sanchez testified about his experience instructing and training officers regarding

the use of firearms, including holstering. He described the three level of retentions

employed by standard holsters as: (1) the body of the holster which is designed to prevent

a firearm from falling out; (2) as an internal device “that you hear click in” which “grabs

                                             22
the weapon by the ejection port so that it can’t be pulled out”; and (3) the “hood” of the

holster which flips over the top of the weapon. Sanchez testified that officers are trained

to holster using all three retention levels, and he could not “think of a situation where it

would be beneficial to halfway holster your weapon. . . . If I’m going to go hands-on with

somebody, it’s even more important that I put the proper procedures in place.” He further

explained that depending on the video, “most of the time you can hear the sounds of the

weapon being holstered.” He explained that he sees officers fail to “holster the entire way”

“on a consistent basis” to save time. When he reviews an officer’s actions, he looks for

“reasonableness,” what the officer knew at the time, and whether they followed

procedure.

D.     Evaluation

       As stated previously, appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by:

(1) excluding Sanchez’s expert testimony regarding the use of force by a taser, and

(2) denying appellant the constitutional right to present a defense when it excluded

Sanchez’s testimony concerning excessive force and self-defense.

       Considering the entirety of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion. As a threshold matter, the trial court did not entirely preclude Sanchez from

testifying as an expert, but instead limited his testimony. Sanchez unequivocally told the

jury that officers “must use the minimum amount of force necessary to accomplish a

legitimate law enforcement goal,” and that the “use-of-force continuum” requires officers

to use soft techniques, such has physical handling, before employing hard techniques,

such as the use of a taser, to gain a subject’s compliance. Sanchez’s excluded testimony

                                             23
as delineated in the pretrial hearing and offer of proof was of limited relevance in the

context of the entire case given that only one of the three charges against appellant

concerned a defense regarding the excessive use of force. See TEX. R. EVID. 702; Kelly,

824 S.W.2d at 572. Given the other testimony at trial, and the videos of the struggle, the

trial court may have reasonably concluded that Sanchez’s testimony would not help the

jury understand the evidence or determine a disputed fact. See Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131;

Rodgers, 205 S.W.3d at 527. Further, the trial court may have reasonably concluded that

Sanchez was not qualified to testify in an expert capacity about the use of a taser or

excessive force given that he had never deployed a taser on a subject nor provided

instruction regarding the use of a taser. See Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 669. In light of the

trial court’s wide discretion regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, we cannot say

that the trial court abused its discretion. See Rodgers, 205 S.W.3d at 527–28; Buford,

606 S.W.3d at 372. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

       In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court denied him a fundamental

component of due process—that is—the opportunity to present his defense to the jury.

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for two different standards for reversible

error in criminal cases. If the error is of constitutional magnitude, “the court of appeals

must reverse a judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond

a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.” See

TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). If the error is non-constitutional, the reviewing court must

disregard it unless the error affected the defendant’s “substantial rights.” See id. R.

44.2(b).

                                            24
        The erroneous exclusion of evidence generally constitutes non-constitutional error

and is reviewed under Rule 44.2(b). See Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 219 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007); Tillman v. State, 376 S.W.3d 188, 198 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2012, pet. ref’d). However, the erroneous exclusion of evidence can constitute

constitutional error when:

        (1)     a state evidentiary rule categorically and arbitrarily prohibits the
                defendant from offering otherwise relevant, reliable evidence vital to
                his defense; or

        (2)     a trial court’s clearly erroneous ruling results in the exclusion of
                admissible evidence that forms the vital core of a defendant’s theory
                of defense and effectively prevents him from presenting that
                defense.

Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 219; see Ray v. State, 178 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005); Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Potier v. State, 68

S.W.3d 657, 662, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The exclusion of evidence that would only

“incrementally” further the defendant’s defensive theory is not constitutional error.

Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 222 (quoting Ray, 178 S.W.3d at 836); see Potier, 68 S.W.3d at

665–66 (“That [the defendant] was unable to . . . present his case to the extent and in the

form he desired is not prejudicial where, as here, he was not prevented from presenting

the substance of his defense to the jury.” (quoting United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384,

1398–99 (10th Cir. 1991)). 3

        3 Compare Green v. State, 589 S.W.3d 250, 263 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d)

(concluding that the exclusion of self-defense evidence regarding the decedent’s earlier threat against
appellant, gang membership, and physical altercations was non-constitutional and “did not influence the
jury or had but a slight effect”), and Vasquez v. State, 501 S.W.3d 691, 700–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (concluding that the exclusion of expert testimony and other evidence did not
constitute constitutional error where appellant testified regarding his defense and the charge included an
instruction relating to appellant’s defensive theory), and Broussard v. State, 434 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (concluding that the exclusion of evidence regarding the smell
                                                   25
        We disagree with appellant’s contention that the trial court’s ruling prevented him

from presenting a defense. Appellant’s counsel focused on Officer Castillejos’s actions

and use of force throughout the case. In voir dire, appellant’s counsel questioned the jury

panel if they believed that “officers . . . can use excessive force sometimes,” and in

opening argument, appellant’s counsel described the events at issue as resulting from

the “tragic consequences of what happens when an officer ignores and neglects his

knowledge, training[,] and experience.” During trial, appellant’s counsel methodically

cross-examined Officer Castillejos regarding his actions and his compliance with the

policies and procedures of GWPD regarding force and the use of a taser, and further

cross-examined Agent Gonzalez and Trooper Garcia regarding their perception of the

events, including appellant’s actions and Officer Castillejos’s use of force. Appellant’s

counsel displayed and discussed the videos of the incident with the witnesses, and in so

doing, characterized appellant’s actions as motivated by fear and apprehension. Further,

appellant’s counsel presented the testimony of Sanchez, as described above, regarding

the use of force.

        In closing argument, appellant’s counsel explicitly discussed the jury’s instruction

regarding the use of excessive force, and argued that officers were “held to a certain

standard”; that “[t]here are certain instances where [officers] can use a certain level of

force, and there are certain instances where they cannot”; that Officer Castillejos

of an herbal alternative to marijuana was non constitutional and did not have a substantial and injurious
effect on the verdict), with Wilson v. State, 451 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.
ref’d) (concluding that the exclusion of evidence of appellant’s “good character for moral and safe conduct
around young children” was constitutional error and raised reasonable doubt).

                                                   26
effectively pulled a gun on a pedestrian; “that there was definitely excessive force being

used”; that deploying a taser multiple times constituted excessive force; and that appellant

was confused and “scared for his life.” Appellant’s counsel specifically argued that Officer

Castillejos did not follow and “ignore[d] and neglect[ed]” “his knowledge, training[,] and

experience” during the encounter. We conclude that appellant was not effectively

prevented from presenting his defensive theory, and Sanchez’s excluded testimony would

have only incrementally furthered that defensive theory. See Tillman, 376 S.W.3d at 198–

99 (concluding that appellant was not prevented from presenting a defense when the trial

court excluded his expert because he was able to challenge the reliability of police

identification procedures through cross-examination and closing arguments). Therefore,

any alleged error in excluding Sanchez’s testimony was non-constitutional. See Walters,

247 S.W.3d at 219; Ray, 178 S.W.3d at 835.

       “Non-constitutional errors require reversal only if they affect an appellant’s

substantial rights—i.e., when they have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Cook v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. Crim. App.

2023); see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App.

2000). To determine if the jury’s decision was affected by the error, we consider the entire

record, including the admitted evidence, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict,

the character of the alleged error, how the error might be considered in connection with

other evidence, the jury instructions, the parties’ theories of the case, closing arguments,

voir dire, and whether the State emphasized the error. Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510,

518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Green v. State, 589 S.W.3d 250, 261 (Tex. App.—Houston

                                            27
[14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d).

       Here, the jury saw two body camera videos depicting Officer Castillejos’s

interactions with appellant. The video from Officer Castillejos’s shows that appellant failed

to comply with Officer Castillejos’s repeated and increasingly strenuous commands to lay

flat on the ground and includes Officer Castillejos’s explicit warnings that he would deploy

the taser if appellant did not lay flat. Although appellant’s counsel characterized

appellant’s behavior as extremely fearful and confused, Officer Castillejos disagreed with

this characterization and testified that appellant’s expressed concerns about physical

harm were disingenuous. Ultimately, the jury witnessed this interaction, and the video

clearly depicts appellant’s demeanor and body language. The jury could choose to

believe or to disbelieve appellant and could choose to accept or to reject his expert’s

opinions. See Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that

the “credibility determination” of defensive evidence “is solely within the jury’s province”).

       While the video of the struggle between Officer Castillejos, appellant, and Agent

Gonzalez is unclear, both Officer Castillejos and Agent Gonzalez testified that appellant

intentionally seized Officer Castillejos’s firearm during the struggle and rejected any

possibility that appellant’s contact with the firearm was a fortuitous event caused by a

failure to properly holster the firearm. Further, the jury saw a still photograph captured

from the video depicting a hand, identified as appellant’s, on the firearm. Both Officer

Castillejos and Agent Gonzalez testified that appellant actively resisted their attempts to

handcuff him. Officer Castillejos testified that appellant head-butted him during the

struggle, and although Agent Gonzalez did not see it happen, he confirmed that Officer

                                             28
Castillejos was bleeding from the mouth after the incident.

       Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s alleged error, if any, did

not affect appellant’s substantial rights, and did not have a substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Cook, 665 S.W.3d at 599. Accordingly,

we overrule appellant’s second issue.

                                    IV.     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                 CLARISSA SILVA
                                                                 Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
16th day of November, 2023.

                                               29