Court Opinion

ID: 9661309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:35:00.092671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:27.081304
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
COLEMAN, Justice.
By the trial court’s decree, the granddaughters and the brother are given sums of money payable out of proceeds of sale of Woodley property. By our decision, the husband also is awarded a sum payable out of proceeds of sale of Woodley property. The grandson is given the Adams Street property itself, subject to the condition that the son must “keep up the payments” on the property.
The husband and the granddaughters contend, on rehearing, that we erred in not declaring that the Adams Street property, as well as the proceeds of the sale of the Woodley property, should bear the' payment of debts and costs of administration.
Husband says in brief that the provision in the first codicil for payment to the husband should take precedence over provisions which might be defeated by sale of the Woodley property, and, on the other hand, if the foregoing statement -be incorrect, “. . . . then the decree is .erroneous in finding an intent on the part of testatrix *570to exempt the Adams Street property from its share of the necessary abatement.”
The granddaughters agree with the husband’s contention that the Adams Street property should share ratably in the abatement.
In response to this contention we have again examined the record and especially the will and codicils, keeping in mind the primary and controlling principle that the intent of the testatrix is to be ascertained and given effect.
What is the intent of testatrix with respect to priority of the gifts to these parties? What is the nature of the respective gifts ?
Is it the intention of testatrix that the gift to grandson shall also abate if the Woodley property is insufficient to pay in full the debts and costs of administration and the gifts to granddaughters, brother, and husband?
We will not undertake to state in detail all the qualities or considerations which make up a specific devise. For the purposes of determining priority, we pretermit discussion of preference between gifts of personalty and realty and will regard tire gift to the grandson as a specific devise which has at least the qualities of a specific legacy of personalty. The gifts out of Woodley property to granddaughters, brother, and husband we regard as of the nature of demonstrative legacies.
“' “A specific legacy is a bequest of a particular article or specific part of the testator’s estate which is so described and distinguished from all other articles or parts of the same as to be capable of being identified.” “A demonstrative legacy is a bequest of money or other fungible goods, charged upon a particular fund in such way as not to amount to a gift of the corpus of the fund, or to evince an intention to relieve the general estate from liability in case the fund fail, and so described as to be undistinguishable from other things of the same kind.” “A general' legacy is a bequest chargeable upon the general estate, and not so given as to be distinguishable from other' parts of the estate of the same kind,” or, as otherwise defined “a general legacy is one of quantity merely, and includes all legacies not embraced within the definitions of specific and demonstrative legacies.” (Citations Omitted.)’ (Citation Omitted.)
“A demonstrative legacy bears some likeness to a specific legacy in that it is charged upon or its payment directed from a named fund, but it is in fact a type of general legacy, payable from the general estate, in case the specified fund fails. (Citations Omitted.)” Willis v. Barrow, 218 Ala. 549, 551, 552, 119 So. 678, 680.
In the instant case, however, there are no general assets other than the proceeds of the sale of Woodley property, and those proceeds are the very fund from which the demonstrative gifts to granddaughters, brother, and husband are payable.
The broad statement is sometimes made that demonstrative legacies abate with specific ones where there is a deficiency of assets. 57 Am.Jur. 982, Wills, § 1459. It is also said, however,
“The cases are few in which the question of precedence in abatement has arisen between specific and demonstrative legacies, which is somewhat surprising in view of the numerous cases where the abatement of general legacies is involved. No hard and fast rule can be formulated as to which of these two classes should abate first, since the courts strive to give effect to what they think would have been the intention of the testator could he have foreseen the contingency causing the difficulty. The question, therefore, is always one of the interpretation of the will. Recourse must be had to it and other proper circumstances to discover what preference the testator would *571probably have had with reference to his legatees in order to apply that preference to the abatement of the legacies. It is not a surprising matter, therefore, to find demonstrative legacies abating sometimes with specific legacies and sometimes before them.” 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 922, 923.
If costs and debts are charged against 'the specific devise of the Adams Street •property, there will be an increase in the ■amount available to' pay the demonstrative legacies to granddaughters, brother, and husband. The effect is to use a part of the Adams Street property to increase the demonstrative legacies. We come then to decide, in effect, whether demonstrative legacies, or a part of them, are payable out of a specific devise or a specific legacy under the circumstances of this case.
Suppose the mortgage debt on Woodley property had been equal to or greater than the price which sale of Woodley property would bring and that the value of the only remaining asset of the estate, Adams Street property, had been sufficient to pay all debts and costs of administration and to provide also a surplus after such debts and costs had been paid. Now, the Adams Street property is devised to the grandson. “He alone” is to receive it. Did testatrix intend that granddaughters, brother, and husband should be entitled, in such a case, to have all or a part of their respective demonstrative legacies paid out of Adams Street property? We think it is clear that the answer is no, and that granddaughters, brother, and husband should have no right to share in the property specifically devised to grandson. The demonstrative legacies are payable out of proceeds of sale of Woodley property. If there should be no proceeds from sale of Woodley property, the demonstrative legatees would not be entitled to any payment unless out of the residue, and tire residue has been exhausted. If the demonstrative legatees be permitted to share in Adams Street property, .then the grandson alone would not receive it.
There is one consideration which the parties have not argued. The second codicil recites that testatrix has “ . deemed it best .... for my new grandchild (the grandson) .... to share and share alike in the benefits of our home at 2566 Woodley Rd and the acreage and other property — he is to share this with .... his half sisters.” (Par. Added.)
Now the court has adjudged that the granddaughters were given life estates in the garage apartment, together with a lot of 100 feet by 200 feet; and, acting on testimony as to the value of the garage apartment and lot, the court finds that the values of the life interests of the granddaughters are $3,493.69 and $3,467.44, respectively. No objection has been raised to this part of the decree. We do not raise objection to it now, but we do inquire whether the grandson was entitled “to share and share alike” with his half sisters in the Woodley property and to have awarded to him the value of his own life interest in the property.
The decree does not award to the grandson any interest in the proceeds of sale of Woodley property. That, we think, is a circumstance to be considered in deciding what testatrix intended in event of a deficiency of assets. If the decree carries out her intent in not awarding the grandson an interest in the Woodley property, then we think such a construction shows the further intent that the grandson should be required to pay the $10,000.00 mortgage on Adams Street property but no other debt of testatrix or costs of administration of her estate.
In the decree on rehearing, the trial court decreed that all “debts and claims” be paid “ . . . . out of the residue.” We understand the decree to refer to the proceeds of sale of Woodley property as the residue. Debts and costs are ordered paid out of that residue. The effect of the decree on rehearing is to place, on the proceeds of sale of Woodley property, primary liability for costs of administration and for all debts except the mortgage on Adams *572Street property. We affirm the holding that, until after proceeds of sale of Woodley property have been exhausted, Adams Street property is not liable for costs of administration or for any debt other than the mortgage on Adams Street property.
We think we should write to some further features of our decision with respect to liability of parties for costs.
As stated on original deliverance, all appellees, except the executor, united against the husband in support of the decree wherein the court denied any payment to the husband. On the husband’s appeal we reversed that holding.
We also said that the “Costs of administration, including costs of this appeal . . . .” should be paid out of the money which remains in the hands of the executor. On further consideration, we are of opinion that the quoted directions as to payment of costs of appeal should be modified.
Since appellant is successful on this appeal and on the cross-appeal, all costs of appeal should be assessed against the following appellees: Maury D. Smith, as guardian ad litem for J. Ed Pepperman, Jr., Jean Pepperman, and Ed Pepperman Sealy, minors; John C. Godbold, as guardian ad litem for Candace Tartt Sealy and Cynthia Anne Sealy, minors; and Cornelia Sealy. Shaddix v. Bilbro, 220 Ala. 657, 127 So. 227.
A cross-appeal was taken on behalf of the two granddaughters. They were not successful on the cross-appeal, and, for that reason, we are of opinion that the costs of the cross-appeal should be assessed against the cross-appellants.
No part of the costs of appeal or cross-appeal is to be assessed in anywise against the estate of testatrix.
Appellant argues, on rehearing, that .the fees allowed the guardians ad litem should be paid out of the estates given to their respective wards. The June 12, 1962, decree of the circuit court recites that $18,-085.19 remained in the registry of the court and ordered the register to pay to the guardians ad litem the respective amounts allowed to them for services as guardians ad litem. We understand the decree to order that the guardian ad litem fees be paid out of the proceeds of sale of Woodley property. We have not found where appellant assigned those rulings of the circuit court as error or argued the point in original brief.
 Where a question is not raised' in brief at the submission of the cause or until after judgment has been rendered by this court, the question is not ordinarily due to be considered on application for rehearing. Robinson v. Allison, 97 Ala. 596, 12 So. 604; Rudolph v. Rudolph, 251 Ala. 317, 36 So.2d 902. Under the rule, appellant’s contention as to payment of guardian-ad litem fees is not to be considered as a. basis for granting a rehearing.
The husband requests us “to clarify” the-opinion with respect to taxation of costs in the trial court. The opinion says “Costs, of administration,” should first be paid out of the sum remaining in the hands of the-register. We think the opinion, in this respect, merely affirms the decree of June-12, 1962, which recites:
“Costs are taxed against the petitioner, J. Ed Pepperman as executor of said estate.”
We do not understand that the-husband, on submission in this court, assigned the taxation of costs as error or argued the point in brief on original hearing. If our understanding is correct, the husband is not entitled to raise the point for the first time on rehearing. Robinson v. Allison, supra; Rudolph v. Rudolph, supra.
The opinion is modified with respect to-taxation of costs of appeal and cross-appeal.. In all other respects wc adhere to our original decision.
Opinion modified and extended.
Application overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON! and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.