Court Opinion

ID: 9395168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 14:03:24.658386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:05.988856
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

ELIZABETH SULLIVAN )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
V. )
) CPU4-21-004463
JARAAD WATSON )
And DARRELL STORY )
)
Defendants. )
Submitted: March 17, 2023
Decided: May 16, 2023
Elizabeth Sullivan, Darrell Stroy
500 Delaware Ave. Ste. 1 2700 N. Washington St.
P.O. Box 1403 Wilmington, DE 19802
Wilmington, DE 19899 Self-represented Defendant

Self-represented Plaintiff
Jaraad Watson
1307 Radford Road
Wilmington, DE 19803
Self-represented Defendant

ORDER ON DAMAGES
AS TO DEFENDANT DARRELL STROY

Surles, J.
Plaintiff Elizabeth Sullivan filed the present action against Defendants Darrell
Stroy and Jaraad Watson (collectively, “Defendants”) on December 30, 2021,
seeking to recover for slander, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and
harassment. On June 6, 2022, Ms. Sullivan obtained a default judgment against Mr.
Stroy for failure to file a responsive pleading, and the matter was scheduled for an
inquisition hearing to determine damages.

The inquisition hearing was held on March 17, 2023. Ms. Sullivan was the
only party to appear, and she submitted exhibits in support of her request for
damages in the amount of $25,000.' At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court
reserved decision. This is the Court’s Final Decision and Order as to damages
against Mr. Stroy.

Facts and Procedural History

Ms. Sullivan’s claims in the present case stem from, and are intertwined with,
prior litigation between the parties; therefore, a brief account of the parties’ historic
legal dealings is pertinent to the Court’s analysis of damages.

Ms. Sullivan was a tenant in a rental unit owned by Mr. Watson; Mr. Stroy
served as the property manager. On December 22, 2020, Mr. Stroy filed a summary

possession action against Ms. Sullivan in the Justice of the Peace Court to recover

 

1 Ms. Sullivan submitted a binder full of documents as Pl. Ex. 1, and a packet of documents as PI.
Ex, 2.
possession of the unit as well as $1,500 in unpaid rent (the “First Lawsuit”).2 Mr.
Stroy’s evidentiary showing at trial was scant and, upon motion of Ms. Sullivan
following his case-in-chief, the case was dismissed with prejudice.’

On July 28, 2021, Ms. Sullivan filed a debt action against Defendants in the
Justice of the Peace Court (the “Second Lawsuit”), seeking to recover $25,000 for
overpaid rent, unreturned security deposit, other damages relating to the rental unit
(the “Rental Unit Claims”) and for harm caused by the First Lawsuit (the “Tort
Claims”). In a written decision after the trial dated December 15, 2021, the court
dismissed the claims against Mr. Stroy, having found that he acted solely as an agent
of Mr. Watson.* However, the court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Sullivan and
against Mr. Watson in the amount of $13,057 for the Rental Unit Claims.’ The court
did not rule on Ms. Sullivan’s Tort Claims, as it lacked jurisdiction over such
claims. On December 27, 2021, Mr. Watson appealed the judgment for a trial de

novo in this Court. That action is currently pending.

 

2 Darrell Story v. Elizabeth Sullivan, J.P. C.A. No. JP13-20-007160, Portante, J. (Apr. 15, 2021).
At trial, Mr. Stroy represented that possession of the unit was no longer at issue, but he proceeded
on his claim for unpaid rent. Id.

3 Id. In its written order, the court found that Mr. Stroy “indeed failed to present the most basic of
information necessary to meet his burden of proof.” Jd.

4 Td. The Magistrate did not mask her disapproval of Defendants’ conduct before the court, as well
as their behavior in the First Lawsuit. Specifically, the court noted that their behavior “made it
difficult...to believe in the veracity of any of his statements,” and opined that “[t]he fact that
Defendants had the audacity” to pursue the First Lawsuit “to further perpetuate his fraudulent
shenanigans is outrageous conduct.” Id.

> Id.

6 The court construed the First Lawsuit-based claims as malicious prosecution, harassment, and
special provisions. Jd.
Shortly thereafter, on December 30, 2021, Ms. Sullivan filed the present
action in the Court of Common Pleas, seeking to recover for slander, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, and harassment. Service was timely perfected upon
both Defendants.? Mr. Watson promptly filed an Answer, but Mr. Stroy failed to
file any responsive pleading; so, on April 1, 2022, Ms. Sullivan filed a Motion for
Default Judgment as to Mr. Stroy. On June 6, 2022, this Court held a hearing on the
Motion, at the conclusion of which this Court entered judgment against Mr. Stroy
and scheduled the matter for a subsequent hearing to determine damages.

The inquisition hearing was held on March 17, 2023. At the hearing, Ms.
Sullivan, the only party to appear, was asked to delineate the basis of her request for
$25,000 against Mr. Stroy. She described the prior proceedings in the Justice of the
Peace Court, emphasizing the court’s dismissal of the First Lawsuit and the basis of
damages awarded (and not awarded) in the Second Lawsuit. Although the Court
made clear that the proceedings in the Justice of the Peace Court had no bearing on
the issue of damages in this litigation, Ms. Sullivan continued to refer to the Second
Lawsuit in justifying her request for damages.

Ms. Sullivan explained that in the Second Lawsuit, she was awarded a

judgment against Mr. Watson in the amount of $13,000, but that she had asked for

 

7 The service returns indicate that service of the summons and complaint was made upon Mr.
Watson on January 6, 2022, and upon Mr. Stroy on March 3, 2022.

4
$25,000 against Mr. Stroy. She introduced into evidence her Bill of Particulars from
the Second Lawsuit which, she suggested, itemized the basis of her claim for
$25,000.82 The Bill of Particulars itemizes $14,478.20° in damages related to the
overpayment of rent, unreturned security deposit, moving expenses, and various
other expenses related to Defendants’ failure to maintain the rental unit.!° It also
particularized $10,521.80 for “malicious prosecution, harassment, and special
provisions due to special needs minor was involved who is learning disabled.”'! She
explained that she was not awarded the $25,000 in the Second Lawsuit because the
magistrate “didn’t realize” that Mr. Stroy’s behavior required her to move, and
because that court lacked jurisdiction over her malicious prosecution claim.

After reiterating that “everything I claim for damages is in my bill of
particulars,” Ms. Sullivan went on to request payment for all expenses accrued since
she vacated the rental unit, including $6,200 for storage fees, mental hardship to
herself and her son, and health problems that went unaddressed in the wake of the
conflict with Defendants. At the conclusion of the hearing, Ms. Sullivan submitted

binders of documents into evidence, and the Court reserved decision.

 

8 The Bill of Particulars was admitted into evidence as part of Pl. Ex. 1.

9 In the Bill of Particulars, Plaintiff variably lists the total amount owed for rental unit-related
expenses as $14,478.20, $14,478.25, and $14,488.25. Id.

10 Td.

"7d.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 55(b)(2), the Court may hold
a hearing to “determine the amount of damages or, to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter.” Delaware

12 but does not call

law requires damages to be proven “with reasonable certainty,
for mathematical precision in the calculation of damages “where a wrong has been
proven and injury established.”'? “The quantum of proof required to establish the
amount of damage is not as great as that required to establish the fact of damage.”!*
At the same time, the court may not award damages based on “mere ‘speculation or
conjecture’ where a plaintiff fails adequately to prove damages.”!°
i. Damages as to the Rental Unit Claims

At the inquisition hearing, Ms. Sullivan implied that she was seeking to
recover for claims decided by the Justice of the Peace in the Second Lawsuit (ie.,
the Rental Unit Claims) as well as claims which were not decided due to

jurisdictional limitations (i.e., the Tort Claims). Importantly, she did not raise the

Rental Unit Claims in her complaint filed in this Court. The default judgment

 

12 Pharmathene, Inc. v. SIGA Tech., Inc., 2010 WL 4813553, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2010).

13 Del, Express Shuttle v. Older, 2002 WL 31458243, at *15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2002)(quoting Red
Sail Easter Ltd. Partners, L.P. v. Radio City Music Hall Productions, Inc., 1992 WL 251380, *7
(Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 1992)).

4 Total Care Physicians, P.A. v. O’Hara, 2003 WL 21733023, at *3 (Del. Super. July 10, 2003).
'5 Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, 2020 WL 948513, at
*23 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2020)(quoting Medicalgorithmics S.A. v. AMI Monitoring, Inc., 2016 WL
4401038, at *24 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2016)).
entered against Mr. Stroy was limited to the allegations set forth in the complaint.
Therefore, to the extent that Ms. Sullivan is seeking an award of damages against
Mr. Stroy on the Rental Unit Claims, she is not entitled to damages on those claims.
Moreover, even if she had asserted the Rental Unit Claims in her complaint, such
claims would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata."

The Court notes that this ruling does not preclude Ms. Sullivan from pursuing
the Rental Unit Claims against Mr. Stroy in the de novo appeal currently pending in
this Court.'7. Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 72.3(f) provides that an appeal de
novo “shall join the necessary parties and raise the same issues that were before the
Court below.” Since Mr. Stroy was a named defendant in the case below, Ms.
Sullivan will have opportunity to pursue the Rental Unit Claims against him in the
pending appeal.

ii. Damages as to the Tort Claims
Ms. Sullivan’s Tort Claims include (i) slander, (ii) malicious prosecution, (iii)

abuse of process, and (iv) harassment. As an initial matter, the Court notes that

 

'6 Given that the Justice of the Peace Court entered a final, appealable order on the Rental Unit
Claims, any effort to reassert those claims in a separate cause of action would be barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. See Carnevale v. Gaeger, 2012 WL 3642721, at *2 (Del. Super. July 31,
2012)(“Res judicata bars a claim where: (1) the original court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (2) the parties to the original action were the same as those parties, or in
privity, here; (3) the cause of action is the same in both cases or the issues decided were the same;
(4) the issues were decided adversely to the appellant; and (5) they were finally decided”).

'7 Watson vy. Sullivan, Del. CCP, C.A. No. CPU4-21-004447.

7
Delaware does not recognize a private civil cause of action for harassment.!®
Therefore, Ms. Sullivan cannot recover damages on her harassment claim.

As stated above, although damages need not be proven with certainty, they
cannot rest on a foundation of speculation, and damages can be awarded only if
injury is established.!? Here, Ms. Sullivan failed to establish that she suffered
damages as a result of any of the Tort Claims. She insisted that the Bill of Particulars
“breaks down” the justification for her request for damages. Indeed, the Bill of
Particulars itemizes the damages incurred relating to the Rental Unit Claims.
However, such detail was lacking with regards to the Tort Clatms—in fact, the only
Tort Claims referenced in the Bill of Particulars are the malicious prosecution and
harassment claims, for which Ms. Sullivan sought $10,521.80. The Bill of
Particulars does not provide the critical link between the amount demanded and the
harm sustained.

Further, the explanation Ms. Sullivan provided outside of the Bill of
Particulars was insufficient to establish damages. She vaguely referenced hardships
she and her son had suffered when litigation between the parties necessitated her

moving out of the rental unit, including housing struggles, emotional challenges, and

 

18 Washington v. Talley, 2017 WL 1201125, at *3 (Del. Com. Pl. Feb. 15, 2017). See also
McCambridge v. Bishop, 2009 WL 3068915, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 23, 2009).
'9 Great Hill Equity Partners IV, 2020 WL 948513 at *23.

8
health issues.2° However, she never connected the dots between the harms she
suffered and the causes of action she raised. Simply put, Ms. Sullivan has not
presented sufficient evidence to support an award of damages on her Tort Claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds there is no basis to award
damages against Defendant Darrell Story.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
(Clt Suse
Robert H. Surles,
Judge

 

20 Ms. Sullivan concluded that she “would like payment for all of my expenses, everything I’ve
accrued since I’ve been out of that home.”