Court Opinion

ID: 9514745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:27.183244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.463728
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 33.] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 34.] In reviewing questions of fact, this court must determine whether the agency’s findings are clearly erroneous. Further, “the question is not whether there is substantial evidence contrary to the agency finding, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency finding.... [T]he court shall give great weight to findings made and inferences drawn by an agency on questions of fact.”
Egemo v. Flores, 470 N.W.2d 817, 819-20 (S.D.1991) (citations omitted). We have often stated,
we are not bound by the circuit court’s decision. “The Supreme Court [reviews] the administrative agency’s decision ... unaided by any presumption that the circuit court’s decision was correct.” Similarly, we give no deference to Director’s decision since it is based entirely upon his review of the same record which we have before us. We are as capable of reading the record as the Director.
Kurtz v. SCI, 1998 SD 37, ¶ 10, 576 N.W.2d 878, 882 (citations omitted).
[¶ 35.] The majority opinion concludes that Vu’s diagnosis was “misleading” to excuse her failure to provide notice to John Morrell within the statutorily prescribed time period. Further, the majority specifically stated that “[w]e cannot conclude that it was a misdiagnosis because no testimony was received from Dr. Benson or Dr. Sabow.” Without such testimony, how can we say that it was misleading either? A review of the record reflects no findings or conclusions by either Department or the Circuit Court in regards to whether the diagnosis was a misdiagnosis or misleading. How can this Court make such a finding without any supporting evidence on that issue? I submit we cannot and should not make such conclusory findings without ample supporting evidence in the record. Instead, our ■ review should focus on whether ample evidence exists in the record to support Department’s findings. See Egemo, 470 N.W.2d at 819-20.
[¶ 36.] Under SDCL 62-7-10, an employee who claims compensation for an injury must provide notice to the employer. This “ ‘time period for notice or claim does not begin to run until the claimant, as a reasonable person, should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable compen-sable character of [the] injury or disease.’ ” Vaughn v. John Morrell & Co., 2000 SD 31, ¶ 13, 606 N.W.2d 919, 922 (quoting Miller v. Lake Area Hosp., 1996 SD 89, ¶ 14, 551 N.W.2d 817, 820 (citation omitted)). “Whether the claimant’s conduct is reasonable is determined ‘in the light of *178[her] own education and intelligence, not in the light of the standard of some hypothetical reasonable person of the kind familiar to tort law.’ ” Id. (quoting Loewen v. Hyman Freightways, Inc., 1997 SD 2, ¶ 9, 557 N.W.2d 764, 768 (citation omitted)).
[¶ 37.] The findings in the record concluded that “Vu’s testimony is not supported by the evidence as a whole” and Vu “failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [John Morrell] had actual or constructive knowledge of an alleged work injury[.]” The circuit court also held,
[t]he ALJ found as a matter of law that Vu should have known at the time she quit her employment with Morrell that she was suffering from a compensable work injury or, at the very latest, should have recognized the nature, seriousness and probable compensable nature of her injury at the time her injury affected her ability to perform job tasks for other employers. The Department’s Conclusion is not in error.
[¶ 38.] In the present case, on January 6, 1989, Vu had reached over her table to grab a large cut of pork when she felt a “terrible pain” in her back. As a result of this pain, which she “never had before,” she was excused from her line to go to the nurse’s station. Her supervisor had asked her whether she “needed help down the stairs,” but she was able to go to the nurse’s office herself. Vu stated during her deposition that on January 9, she contacted the nurse’s station and told the nurse that she had bent over at home and was unable to straighten up due to the injury she sustained at work. She also stated that she told her other supervisor that she had an appointment for her back because “[w]hen I was working the other day ... something happened[.]” Vu ultimately went to see Dr. Gail Benson, the John Morrell doctor, on January 10 about the pain in her back. Vu quit her job three months later in April 1989 because of the pain in her back. She continued to suffer back pain for over two years and finally sought further treatment on October 2,1991.
[¶ 39.] The facts reflect that Vu reasonably should have had knowledge of her “work-related” back injury. Vu felt the pain in her back when she reached over her table and reported to the nurse’s office to lie down. Vu claims to have told the nurse over the phone that she could not straighten her back because of the injury she sustained at work. Vu ultimately went to the doctor regarding this back injury. Also, after leaving employment with Mor-rell, the record reveals numerous doctor visits by Vu where she claimed continuing back problems.7 Finally, the record shows *179that Vu had prior experience with injuries involving workers’ compensation while at Morrell. A review of all the facts shows that Vu, in light of her education and intelligence, should have clearly recognized “the nature, seriousness and probable com-pensable character” of her injury. In Miller, we addressed a situation where workers’ compensation claimant' had repeated doctor visits for an injury to her elbow, but was now claiming she had a reasonable excuse for failing to give timely notice to his employer. See 1996 SD 89, ¶¶ 2-6, 651 N.W.2d at 818-19. We concluded that this evidence supported the finding that claimant had no reasonable excuse for not timely notifying employer. See id., 1996 SD 89, ¶ 18, 551 N.W.2d at 822. Further, in Loewen, claimant had hurt his back and suffered acute pain while at the workplace. See 1997 SD 2, ¶¶3-4, 557 N.W.2d at 765. Claimant was aware of the acute nature of the back injury at its occurrence. We held that no timely notice was given to employer based upon this fact. See id., 1997 SD 2, ¶ 16, 557 N.W.2d at 768. In the present case, Vu’s knowledge of the acute pain at the time of her injury and her history of doctor visits support the fact that she had knowledge of the compensable nature of her injury long before reporting it.
[¶ 40.] We previously noted in Vaughn, “the purpose of the notice requirement ... is ‘to give the employer opportunity to investigate the injury while the facts are accessible.’” 2000 SD 31, ¶ 20, 606 N.W.2d at 923 (quoting Loewen, 1997 SD 2, ¶ 18, 557 N.W.2d at 768). For approximately thirty-two months, Vu had back pain, but never advised her employer of her condition. With this lapse of time between the injury and the filing of the claim, I submit that employer has been totally thwarted from having a meaningful opportunity to investigate Vu’s claim.
[¶ 41.] The record supports Department’s findings and I would affirm.
[¶ 42.] MILLER, Chief Justice, joins this dissent.

. Vu submitted the following timeline in her brief to the Division of Labor and Management:
[[Image here]]
[[Image here]]