Court Opinion

ID: 9747900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:41:36.351608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:28.442756
License: Public Domain

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I
I respectfully dissent from the principal I opinion to the extent it holds that Mr. I Davis knowingly and voluntarily waived! his Sixth Amendment right to self-repre-l sentation. Nearly all criminal defendants! would be better served by accepting repre-| sentation from an attorney rather thanl attempting to navigate the complexities oil litigation on their own. Perhaps for that| reason, trial courts are required to ensure that the defendant’s waiver of counsel k| made voluntarily with knowledge of the dangers associated with waiving constitu-l *647tional rights. Regardless of the wisdom of electing self-representation, the fact remains that self-representation is a constitutional right guaranteed to all defendants who unequivocally and voluntarily waive the right to counsel in a timely manner. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Black, 223 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Mo. banc 2007). Accordingly, the trial judge’s explanation of the potential pitfalls of self-representation should be thorough and [complete, but it should not serve as a [means of dissuading a defendant from [knowingly and voluntarily exercising his or lier right of self-representation.
I In this case, Davis made several motions requesting investigators and other assis-lance so that he could represent himself. In discussing the availability of funding in Ihe event Davis represented himself, the Irial court repeatedly emphasized the likely unavailability of funding and, at the end If the discussion, stated:
I I’m telling you up front, you understand,
II have no power to do that. I can’t I force people to work for free. Do you I understand that?
Ihe clear implication of the court’s state-lent is that if Davis elected to represent Imself, then he would be wholly on his Ivn, incarcerated with no assistance or Hnds to conduct even the most rudimenta-H investigation. The court’s dire assess-Int of Davis’ options in self-representa-Hn may well have been in Davis’ best Berests, but it also raised a substantial Bssibility that Davis improperly was dis-Haded from exercising his constitutional Bht to self-representation.
■The principal opinion concludes that Hvis’s claim for investigative assistance is H; encompassed within Ake because noth-in Ake suggests that a state must offer ^■efendant the choice of whether to re- « defense tools through counsel or himself. The defendant in Ake was represented by counsel, and the issue of the state’s obligation to provide funding for a self-represented defendant was not at issue. The Court’s silence speaks to the facts of the case and does not imply that a defendant who exercises his or her Sixth Amendment right to self-representation thereby forfeits any of the baseline due process requirements established in Ake. To the contrary, courts have held that depriving a self-represented defendant of the means of presenting a defense violates the right of self-representation. People v. Blair, 36 Cal.4th 686, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145, 1175 (2005). Therefore, a self-represented defendant may not be placed in the position of presenting a defense “without access to a telephone, law library, runner, investigator, advisory counsel, or any other means of developing a defense.” Id.
The trial court’s statements in this case clearly implied that if Davis elected self-representation, he very likely would be without the kinds of basic defense tools that are identified in Blair and that, as a matter of common knowledge, are necessary to defend against criminal charges. It is difficult to fault Davis for not unequivocally and unconditionally asserting the right to self-representation because ■the trial court had all but guaranteed that if Davis proceeded to represent himself, he would, as a practical matter, have no access to meaningful investigative assistance.
The principal opinion also rejects Davis’ argument because he did not state with particularity facts indicating what the investigator might uncover or how that was important to an issue that reasonably could be expected to be significant at his trial. It is true that Davis did not state with particularity, in advance, the facts or information an investigator might uncover. But how could he? The need for an inves*648tigation of witnesses presupposes a lack of knowledge as to what the potential witnesses know. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for Davis to state, at the outset, particular facts demonstrating a specific need for an investigator. The difficulty of this task was compounded by the trial court’s statements that incorrectly implied that if Davis elected self-representation, there would be no funding for him to investigate his case.
In this context, there is substantial doubt as to whether Davis knowingly and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Davis should be given the full opportunity to exercise his Sixth Amendment rights. I would reverse and remand.