Court Opinion

ID: 9713283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:12:45.510397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:17.967430
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with Judge PRICE that we should not presume that time is of the essence in every contract, whether in an action at law or in equity. Here, however, it is clear that time was of the essence. This conclusion is not based on any presumption but on the specific and unequivocal language of the contract that “[i]n the event [appellants] are unwilling or unable to complete the sale on or before said closing date, they hereby agree to release [appellees] from any and all liability under the terms of this Agreement and' . they further agree, in such event, that [appellee Cafaro Company] may take title to the subject property directly in its name and any additional expenses, costs, fees or additions to the purchase price that may be required to be paid to [appellee Sears] shall be reimbursed to [appellee Cafaro Company] by [appellants].” R. at 70a. See Shumaker v. Lear, 235 Pa.Super. 509, 345 A.2d 249 (1975) (time was of essence where agreement null and void if mortgage commitment not arranged by stated date).
I should nonetheless reverse the order of the lower court. “A demurrer admits every well-pleaded material fact . as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom . . [citations omitted].” Gekas v. Shapp, 469 Pa. 1, 5, 364 A.2d 691, 693 (1976). Here, appellants pleaded facts *91from which a trier could infer that Cafaro and Sears waived the requirement that the sale be completed on or before the closing date. R. 9a-10a.
I therefore believe that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
CERCONE, President Judge,