Court Opinion

ID: 9473627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:34:25.393821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:37.894567
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The petitioner, Jack Riner, claims that his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him was violated when the prosecution elicited testimony of a jail cell conversation between Ronald Riner, the petitioner’s brother, and Wayne Evans, the petitioner’s uncle, implicating Jack Riner in the murder of Edward Gibson. Riner waived his Sixth Amendment claim by failing to raise the issue either at trial or on direct appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the majority holds that Riner has demonstrated sufficient cause and prejudice to overcome this waiver and prevail on the merits of his Sixth Amendment claim. I dissent. The record clearly reveals that the State of Indiana introduced more than ample evidence at trial, independent of the jail cell conversation, to establish the petitioner’s participation in the murder of Edward Gibson, beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I would hold that Jack Riner has failed to demonstrate the prejudice necessary to overcome the waiver of his Sixth Amendment claim.
I
On September 4, 1970, the Grand Jury of Hendricks County, Indiana, indicted the petitioner, Jack Riner, and his uncle, Wayne Evans, for first degree murder in connection with the shooting of Edward Gibson during an attempted burglary of Gibson’s Trading Post in Belleville, Indiana. In December 1970, following a joint trial where Jack Riner and his uncle were represented by the same defense counsel, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against each defendant. At trial, Harold Gibson, the victim’s brother; Ronald Riner, the petitioner’s brother; and Virgil Ramp, the Hendricks County Deputy Sheriff who arrested Jack Riner, presented the testimony relevant to Jack Riner’s conviction.
Harold Gibson testified that on August 10, 1970, at approximately 3:00 a.m., the burglary alarm sounded at Gibson’s Trading Post, a general store in Belleville, Indiana, that was co-owned and operated by Harold and his brother Edward Gibson. *1261Harold arose from bed, instructed his wife to call the Indiana State Police, and proceeded immediately to the store where he met his brother. As Harold began to circle the outside perimeter of the store, he was shot in the leg and fell to the ground. When he looked up, he peered into the distance and saw “somebody trying to go over the fence in the backyard.” According to Harold, he attempted to pursue the burglary suspect and:
“when I got almost to the east end of the building, my brother was down on one knee, holding his gun, and he hollowed [sic] that, he had been hit. I stopped by a telephone booth and telephone pole there, on the east end and some man or boy was running across the neighbor’s yard. And I fired a few shots at him. I went over to my brother and asked him if he was alright, he said, just burned.”
Harold further testified that once he discovered that his brother had been shot, he:
“noticed a man or boy running across [Highway] # 40, going south, and my brother seen him at the same time.
When I seen him run across # 40, I got up and got in my car, put a new clip in my gun, drove across # 40, got just a glimpse of a man running behind a house or beside the house.”
The Indiana State Police arrived a short time later and Harold informed them that “there was something in the weed patch running, that was carrying a gun, or in that line.” Harold returned to his store and “tried to go into the building, which the doors was ‘jimmied’ and we couldn’t get in.” The law enforcement officers then placed the wounded Gibson brothers in an ambulance and transported them to a nearby hospital where Edward Gibson later died as a result of his gunshot wound.
Ronald Riner testified that on August 9, 1970, at approximately 10:00 p.m., he, his brother Jack Riner, and their uncle, Wayne Evans, were joyriding around Indianapolis, Indiana in Evans’ 1963 Pontiac. Ronald, who was lying down in the back seat, asked Evans to return home because he was getting “sleepy.” Ronald fell asleep and the next thing he remembers Evans stopped the automobile, exited the driver’s side, and proceeded to the trunk of the car. Evans retrieved a plastic bag from the trunk, and, according to Ronald, it “looked like the butt of a gun, sticking out of the bag ... it was a long gun____” Ronald further testified that Evans returned to the front of the vehicle and asked Jack Riner, “if he would go with him.” Jack agreed and “got out of the car.” According to Ronald, Evans and Jack Riner “went off west from the car” toward Gibson’s Trading Post and he “laid back down in the car.” The next thing Ronald remembers is that he:
“heard some shooting going on, several cars pulling up at a building off to my right. Some people hollering, shouting, then I jumped out of the car and looked back over the top of the car and I saw somebody that looked like Wayne running south on U.S. 39, coming towards the car and then he turned east and went toward Plainfield.”
Ronald Riner became scared and fled to a nearby field where he remained hidden for approximately one hour before being arrested by two Marion County sheriffs. According to Riner, he informed the law enforcement officer “who was with me. And the last time I had saw [sic] them. And gave them a description.” Ronald explained that “Jack Riner, my brother and Wayne Evans, my uncle” were the ones with him.
Deputy sheriff Ramp testified that on August 10, 1970, at approximately 8:00 a.m., he apprehended Jack Riner “about one-half mile east of Belleville on U.S. 40.” According to deputy sheriff Ramp, Jack Riner’s “trousers were all wet from the knee down and his clothes were all rumpled. That is how I come [sic] to stop him. The conditions [sic] of his clothes and stuff.” The record also reveals that Wayne Evans was arrested on August 10, 1970, at approximately 10:30 p.m., on U.S. Highway 40, east of Belleville, Indiana.
Following the presentation of the foregoing testimony of Harold Gibson, Ronald *1262Riner, and deputy sheriff Ramp to the jury, the prosecution questioned Ronald Riner about a jail cell conversation he had with his uncle Wayne Evans, some two weeks after their arrest. The State’s Attorney asked Ronald, “what did he say to you, and what did you say to him?” At that point, the defense counsel; who was representing both Jack Riner and Wayne Evans at trial, raised an “[ojbjection, as far as Jack Riner is concerned” beéause he was not a party to the conversation. The court sustained the objection- and admitted the testimony “only as to Wayne Evans.” Ronald Riner then testified that in the jail cell conversation:
“A. [Wayne Evans] told me that, him and Jack, was over to the building, he asked Jack if he would watch for him, that they were going to try and get into the building. He tried to force open a door, and continued doing so until he heard a car in front of the building. He went to look and there was someone running toward the building and Jack hollored [sic] from the other side that, there was somebody over there. And they said that was when the shooting started.
Q. What did he specifically tell you, Ronald that happened?
A. He just said he was shot at, he shot back he fired several rounds from the ground on the west end of the building. In order to stop the man, then he ran east, from the back of the building. At which time he was confronted on the east end of the building by another man, he began firing at him, he ran across the street and fell, the man started running toward him, fired several rounds at him.
Q. You say he? You mean Wayne Evans fired?
A. No, sir. The other man fired.
A. The man that I understand that got killed was doing the firing at the time he fell. He fired several rounds at him, he said. He said he had no alternative, when he got up but to shoot the man, rather than the man to shoot him. At which time he shot twice at him, the man fell forward and he ran south on U.S. 39.”
Ronald Riner further testified that in another jail cell conversation, Jack Riner and Wayne Evans approached him and stated that “they didn’t think I should testify in this matter, that they felt like that was what it was leading to, was me, turning State’s evidence. That they wouldn’t like it, and didn’t think it was fair.” Based upon the totality of the evidence presented at trial, the jury found Jack Riner and Wayne Evans each guilty of the murder of Edward Gibson and the trial judge sentenced each defendant to life imprisonment.
Jack Riner filed a direct appeal of his conviction to the Indiana Supreme Court, alleging, inter alia, that he was improperly tried in the Morgan County Circuit Court because he was only sixteen years of age at the time of trial, that Ronald Riner’s testimony was incompetent, and that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct.1 At no time did Jack Riner argue before the Indiana Supreme Court that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. On May 3, 1972, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Jack Riner’s conviction for the first degree murder of Edward Gibson. Riner v. State, 258 Ind. 428, 281 N.E.2d 815 (1972) (“Riner I”). On March 29, 1973, Riner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Federal court that was subsequently denied on May 3, 1974. On March 1, 1976, some five-and-one-quarter years after his conviction for the first degree murder of Edward Gibson, Riner filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Morgan County Circuit Court, alleging *1263for the first time that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him when Ronald Riner testified about Wayne Evans’ jail cell conversation, implicating Jack Riner in the murder of Edward Gibson. The court denied post-conviction relief, finding that Riner had failed to raise the Sixth Amendment claim either at trial or on direct appeal and had thus waived the issue. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Riner’s motion for post-conviction relief, ruling that:
“[t]he post-conviction relief process is not a substitute for direct appeal, but is a process for raising issues not known at the time of the original trial and appeal or for some reason not available to the defendant at that time. Bradberry v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 530, 364 N.E.2d 1183, 1188. Additional review of [Ronald Riner’s] testimony on other grounds is not available here in this post-conviction relief procedure and the court properly found against the appellant in that this issue had been waived.”
Riner v. State, 271 Ind. 578, 582, 394 N.E.2d 140, 144 (1979) (emphasis added) (“Riner II”).
On April 15, 1982, Jack Riner filed his present habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, alleging that his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him was violated when Ronald Riner testified as to his jail cell conversation with Wayne Evans concerning Jack Riner’s participation in the murder of Edward Gibson. The district court properly ruled, based upon the controlling case law, that Riner’s Sixth Amendment claim was “waived by the failure of petitioner to raise it on direct appeal.” The court reasoned that:
“[pjetitioner here fails to show how he was harmed and substantially prejudiced.
Evans did not implicate petitioner as the killer but merely as a lookout. Even without this testimony it is clear that Ronald Rider [sic] could place petitioner at the scene of the murder, and had heard Wayne Evans ask for petitioner’s assistance. Such evidence, in itself, is enough to establish petitioner as an accomplice and subject to criminal prosecution for felony murder.”
The majority now reverses the district court’s ruling and holds that Jack Riner has demonstrated sufficient cause and prejudice to overcome the waiver and prevail on the merits of his Sixth Amendment claim.
II
The law is well-settled that “when a procedural default bars state litigation of a constitutional claim, a state prisoner may not obtain federal habeas relief absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). See also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547, 101 S.Ct. 764, 769, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). In the present case, the Indiana Supreme Court properly ruled in Riner II that Jack Riner’s failure to raise his Sixth Amendment claim either at trial or on direct appeal constitutes the procedural default of waiver, barring subsequent litigation of the claim under Indiana law. 271 Ind. at 582, 394 N.E.2d at 144. Thus, in order for Riner to obtain federal habeas relief he must establish cause for and actual prejudice resulting from his failure to raise the Sixth Amendment claim at trial or on direct appeal. This “cause and prejudice” standard is a conjunctive test that requires Riner to establish both cause and prejudice if he is to overcome the procedural default of waiver; failure to establish either one of the elements results in a dismissal of his habeas corpus petition.
The district court found that:
“[petitioner here fails to show how he was harmed and substantially prejudiced.
Evans did not implicate petitioner as the killer but merely as a lookout. Even *1264without this testimony it is clear that Ronald Rider [sic] could place petitioner at the scene of the murder, and had heard Wayne Evans ask for petitioner’s assistance. Such evidence, in itself, is enough to establish petitioner as an accomplice and subject to criminal prosecution for felony murder.”
I agree with the district court judge that Jack Riner has failed to demonstrate that his failure to raise the Sixth Amendment claim either at trial or on direct appeal actually prejudiced his case. In view of this conclusion, I do not reach the issue of whether representation by the same attorney at a criminal trial and on direct appeal constitutes sufficient “cause” to overcome the procedural default of waiver. Moreover, I do not reach the merits of Riner’s claim that the jail cell conversation violated the principles of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), depriving Riner of his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.
The record reveals that Jack Riner was charged with and found guilty of the first degree murder of Edward Gibson. At the time of Riner’s prosecution, Ind.Code Ann. § 10-3401 (Burns 1956) provided that “[w]hoever ... in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a ... burglary ... kills any human being, is guilty of murder in the first degree____” Moreover, Ind. Code Ann. § 9-102 (Burns 1956) provided that “[e]very person who shall aid or abet in the commission of a felony ... may be charged by indictment, or affidavit, tried and convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal____” The majority asserts that “[t]he petitioner was prejudiced because the admission of [Wayne Evans’ jail cell] testimony was the only evidence before the jury of the petitioner’s involvement in aiding and abetting the burglary and murder.” From my independent review of the record, I am convinced that the jury was presented with more than sufficient evidence, before introduction of the jail cell conversation, to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jack Riner aided and abetted in the burglary that resulted in Edward Gibson’s death.
According to the evidence presented to the jury, Wayne Evans retrieved a gun from the trunk of his automobile and then approached Jack Riner, asking him “if he would go with him.” Jack Riner agreed and “got out of the car.” Evans and Jack Riner then “went off west from the car,” toward Gibson’s Trading Post. At approximately 3:00 a.m. the burglary alarm at Gibson’s Trading Post sounded, causing Harold Gibson to rise from bed and proceed immediately to the store. Upon his arrival, Harold was shot in the leg, fell to the ground, and as he looked up he saw “somebody trying to go over the fence in the backyard.” Harold hobbled toward his wounded brother and observed “some man or boy ... running across the neighbor’s yard.” Once he reached his brother, Harold “noticed a man or boy running across # 40 going south.” The law enforcement officers arrived on the scene, apprehended Ronald Riner, and questioned him as to who else was involved in the crime. Ronald informed the officers that “Jack Riner, my brother and Wayne Evans, my uncle” were with him. At approximately 8:00 a.m., deputy sheriff Ramp arrested Jack Riner one-half mile east of Belleville, Indiana on U.S. Highway 40. Similarly, at approximately 10:30 a.m., the law enforcement officers arrested Wayne Evans, who was also traveling east on U.S. Highway 40.
The foregoing evidence establishes that after Wayne Evans retrieved a gun from the trunk of the car, he and Jack Riner left Ronald and proceeded toward Gibson’s Trading Post, the scene of the attempted felony burglary and the murder of Edward Gibson. Evans’ question to Jack Riner, “if he would go with him,” clearly evidences Evans’ intent that Jack aid and abet in the armed burglary. Indeed, the fact that Jack Riner freely agreed to accompany Evans evidences Riner’s intent to assist in the burglary, as there is no other possible explanation for accompanying the armed Evans to Gibson’s Trading Post. It is for this very reason that following the attempted *1265burglary and the murder of Edward Gibson, Ronald Riner informed the law enforcement officers, “Jack Riner, my brother and Wayne Evans, my uncle,” were the ones involved in the crime.
Furthermore, a reasonable juror would have considered the fact that Jack Riner not only knowingly and willfully accompanied Wayne Evans to Gibson’s Trading Post, but that he also fled the scene of the crime once the shooting began. Harold Gibson testified that as he began to search the perimeter of the store, he was immediately shot in the leg and when he peered into the distance, he observed “somebody trying to go over the fence in the backyard.” When Harold hobbled toward his wounded brother, he again saw “some man or boy ... running across the neighbor’s yard.” Once he reached his brother on the other side of the building, he “noticed a man or boy running across # 40 going south____” Though Harold was unable to identify the person climbing the fence and running through the neighbor’s yard or the person running south across U.S. Highway 40, due to the nighttime conditions existing at 3:00 a.m. in the morning, the law enforcement officers apprehended Jack Riner some five hours later, approximately one-half mile from the scene of the crime. Riner’s physical appearance revealed that he had been “on the run” for some time. Riner’s decision to flee from the scene of the crime when the shooting commenced and his attempt to evade law enforcement officers by running through the farmlands of rural Indiana is a further indication of his participation in the attempted burglary. In view of this evidence, I am convinced that a reasonable juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jack Riner aided and abetted in the felony burglary that resulted in the murder of Edward Gibson. Accordingly, I would hold that Wayne Evans’ jail cell conversation, simply confirming Riner’s participation in the felony burglary, did not prejudice Jack Riner’s case. As a result, Riner has failed to demonstrate the prejudice necessary to overcome the procedural default of waiver and the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied.

. The record reveals that on October 2, 1970, a change of venue was granted in this case, transferring the first degree murder trial from the Circuit Court of Hendricks County, Indiana to the Circuit Court of Morgan County, Indiana.