Court Opinion

ID: 9466881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:31:26.650056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:01.605637
License: Public Domain

*540RONEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The authorities used by the majority for holding this customs area pat-down search unconstitutional are United States v. Carter, 590 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908, 99 S.Ct. 2001, 60 L.Ed.2d 378 (1979); United States v. Smith, 557 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1073, 98 S.Ct. 1259, 55 L.Ed.2d 777 (1978); United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902, 98 S.Ct. 298, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977). Significantly, each of those cases involved a strip search and in each case the searches were held valid. The language in those opinions is weak precedent, if precedent at all, to set a standard for declaring a pat-down search unlawful.
A full discussion of the cases in this Circuit and in the Supreme Court would not be fruitful here. Suffice it to say that we have not been cited to any case that reverses a pat-down search in a customs area. Even the strip searches in airport customs searches were all held valid in the cases cited. Out of the 16 border search cases cited in appellant’s brief, only 8 involved searches in an airport customs area. All of those searches were held valid. The only 2 cases cited which held a search invalid were non-airport border searches involving a strip or body cavity search. Of the 23 cases cited by the Government, none reversed airport customs area searches.
My own computer-assisted research has failed to uncover a single case holding invalid a pat-down search of a traveler entering the country through an airport customs area. Indeed, the only case I have found holding invalid any body search of such a traveler is United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978). In that case, customs officials had a partially verified confidential tip regarding a specific member of the airplane’s crew. Solely on the basis of that tip and even before searching the crew member named in the tip, everyone else in the flight crew was strip searched and narcotics were found under the girdle of one of the stewardesses. Narcotics were also found on the crew member named by the informant. The Court held the search of the stewardess unlawful, on the ground that a reasonable suspicion must be directed to the individual before a “dé-grading strip search” may be conducted. 567 F.2d at 1331. It is noteworthy that the search of the crew member named in the informer’s tip was found by the Court to be valid.
Believing the way a case is decided on facts should be more important for prece-dential purposes than language used in a judicial opinion, I conclude the decision of this case is contrary to the law in this Circuit and contrary to the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in this difficult area of law enforcement.
Contrary to the suggestion that the customs agent had only a generalized suspicion in this case, a complete reading of the transcript shows the agent suspected that San-dler was carrying something in his boots. He suspected it was narcotics. He stated his reasons based upon undisputed facts. It is hard to imagine a more particularized suspicion. After the pat-down revealed a soft bulge in the precise area under suspicion, no one can reasonably contend there was not probable cause to have him remove his boots. There was no strip search or body cavity search conducted here.
I agree that the usefulness of United States v. Mendenhall, - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), in deciding this case is limited as far as voluntariness is concerned. Although the defendant accompanied the officer to the private office and did not resist the pat-down or the boot search, the fact that this was a customs area makes this case different from an ordinary airport case. Anyone who has ever been in a customs area coming into the United States knows that it is best not to plan to leave until the customs authorities have concluded that you are in compliance with the laws for entry into the country. What they tell you to dó, you do, as long as it is within their apparent authority. I doubt if the failure to resist going where they tell you to go, or the failure to resist a pat-down search, could be considered voluntary in any significant legal sense.
*541The facts outlined in the majority opinion, as properly construed upon a reading of the complete transcript, clearly support the finding of the district court that the search here was reasonable and within the limits of the Constitution and the customs laws. I would hold that the motion to suppress was properly denied.
ON REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC
Before COLEMAN, Chief Judge, BROWN, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, CHARLES CLARK, RONEY, GEE, TJO-PLAT, HILL, FAY, RUBIN, VANCE, KRAVITCH, FRANK M. JOHNSON, Jr., GARZA, HENDERSON, REAVLEY, POL-ITZ, HATCHETT, ANDERSON, RANDALL, TATE, SAM D. JOHNSON, THOMAS A. CLARK, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
BY THE COURT:
A member of the Court in active service having requested a poll on the application for rehearing en banc and a majority of the judges in active service having voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc,
IT IS ORDERED that the cause shall be reheard by the Court en banc on briefs without oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a briefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.