Court Opinion

ID: 9830505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:15:27.573756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:29.678822
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Plaintiffs in error complain, in the motion, that the only case cited in the opinion having reference to service of citation by publication is Stephenson v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 42 Tex. 162, and contend that it announces a rule wholly inapplicable at this time because of the provision of article 1264, R. S., at the time of the rendition, of that opinion providing that, in service of citation by publication, the answer shall be filed on or before- appearance day of the next succeeding term to which such citation is returnable, and that, in the Stephenson v. Ry. Case, citation had been actually published four times before *283the court convened at the first term after suit.
It seems to us that plaintiffs in error confuse the question at issue; that is, the effect of service of the citation after return day as giving notice to a defendant to appear and answer, with the statute fixing the time when answer shall be filed. Plaintiffs in error refer to Hill v. Baylor, 23 Tex. 261, as the leading ease and say that it does not absolutely declare that one of the publications was made after November 17, 1856, the date court convened, and quotes from the judge’s memorandum, and the syllabus, from which they reason the holding to be that, where the time was too short for the required number of insertions in the newspaper before the return day of the citation, the effect of the publication thereafter would be. to require the answer be filed at the next term of court. We did not, in writing the opinion, and do not now, think the case in point. Judge Wheeler in making the statement in the Hill v. Baylor Case says:
“The petition alleged that the plaintiff in error was a nonresident of the state; it was filed on the 21st day of October, 1856. On the same day there was issued by the clerk of the district court -a citation for publication, as to the nonresident defendants, containing the substance of the petition, and the sheriff returned it, served by publication in a newspaper published in the county [quoting] ‘for four successive weeks previous to return day.’ The return was dated November 17, 1856, and filed December 3, 1856. At the fall term, which began on the 17th day of November, 1856, the case was continued [quoting]; ‘it appearing to the court, that the service in this cause has been made in part by publication.’ ”
Judgment by default was rendered at the spring term, 1857. As we read the case, from the statement made by the court and the statement in the opinion of the court, there is nothing to indicate that any one of the publications was made after the return day of the citation. To assume otherwise would be to contradict the quoted part of the sheriff’s return. To hold that the Supreme .Court sustained the judgment by default where the service was made after the return day of the writ, as seems to us, would make the opinion in the ease conflict with the provision of the statute in its articles providing for the service of citation, whether by personal service or by publication, and in conflict with the command in the citation itself.
The opinion recites:
“The sheriff’s return upon the writ shows that publication had been made for four successive weeks. The return does not appear to have been made until after the expiration of four weeks; that was after the first day of the term.”
To us there is nothing in the record of the case, including the syllabus, to indicate that any one of the publications was made after the return day of the citation. The return day of the citation is not anywhere stated.
The. point decided, as we understand it, is as to the sufficiency of the service to require answer to .the succeeding term where, for want of time, the-four publications could not be made to the return day of the writ.’ Now, if any one of the publications was made after the return day of the writ, the ease would be in point as to the sufficiency of the publications to require answer to the May term. To us the case seems to have no application to the issues in the instant case.
To the same effect is the holding in Eels v. Blair (Tex. Civ. App.) 60 S. W. 462, referred to by plaintiffs in error, in which the completion of the service as to Eels, and the unknown heirs of Eels, required answer on May 2d, and the last publication was made on May 5th, held the service was sufficient for Eels to the May terms, the suit having been dismissed as to the unknown heirs. There is nothing to indicate that a publication was made after the return day of the writ, more than the order of the court for eight publications and to the next term, to wit, May 2d. The recitation of the citation itself is not otherwise stated. It is clear, however, that the return day of the writ as to Eels, only four weeks as to him being required, was beyond the four weeks. The point decided was as to the time of the publication, as to Eels, to require an answer.
To the same effect is O’Leary v. Durant, 70 Tex. 409, 11 S. W. 116, referred to by plaintiffs in error. The sheriff’s return to the citation by publication did not show when the citation was executed and the manner of its execution. The Supreme Court said:
“The time of publication could not have expired at the return day — the beginning of the term of court after issuance. This did not affect its validity as citation to the succeeding term.”
The question decided was as to the sufficiency of the notice to the next term to require answer. The only point having application to the issue here is embraced in the statement of the court that the publications of the citation were made before the return day of the writ. That being a fact, the case has no application to the instant case.
It certainly is a correct proposition of law that a citation — any one of its publications made after return day — would not support a judgment rendered at any time. The county court judgment, rendered in May, 1920, recites that the citation had “been published more than the time required by law before the first day of this term of court.”
Plaintiffs in error, in the motion, insist that it was error to admit evidence to show that the citation was not published for sufficient length of time to authorize the rendition of the judgment. The whole record shows that the publications were all ful*284ly made before “this term”; that is, the May term, 1920. Certainly no evidence was offered to contradict that recitation in the judgment. It was not an issue in the case, and we have not found in the record any evidence offered, the purpose or effect of which was to contradict the quoted statement in the judgment.
We have concluded, however, that we are in error in sustaining defendant in error’s cross-assignment, and that the trial court’s judgment upon that issue must be sustained, under the following authorities from our own courts to which we have been referred in the supplemental argument on the motion by plaintiffs in error. French v. Grenet, 57 Tex. 273; Northcraft v. Oliver, 74 Tex. 162, 11 S. W. 1121; Morton v. Welborn, 21 Tex. 772; Howard v. North, 5 Tex. 290, 51 Am. Dec. 769; Walker v. Lawler, 45 Tex. 532; Halsey v. Jones, 86 Tex. 488, 25 S. W. 696; De Guerra v. De Gonzalez (Tecx. Civ. App.) 232 S. W. 896.
We need not review them.
In all other features of the motion the same is overruled.