Court Opinion

ID: 9639981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:54:25.754104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:24.452920
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in part in the remand:
Stanley M. Stefan appeals from an order of the Probate Division of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of the personal representative of the estate of the decedent, Frances Walker, with respect to Mr. Stefan’s claim that he, and not the estate, was entitled to the proceeds of a savings account which was jointly owned by Mr. Stefan and the decedent at the time of the decedent’s death. Mr. Stefan asserts that Mrs. Walker made an inter vivos gift to him of the money in the account. According to my colleagues in the majority, an impartial jury, upon viewing the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Stefan, could find by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Walker made an irrevocable inter vivos gift to Mr. Stefan. The majority so holds even though Mrs. Walker incontestably retained, until the day of her death, the power and right to withdraw the money from the account. I cannot agree that a trier of fact may fairly find a revocable act to be irrevocable. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the question whether there was an inter vivos gift should have been submitted to the jury.
Although I disagree with much of the majority’s discussion, however, I am constrained to concur in part in the remand *227on the strength of the decision (issued more than two years after argument in this case) in In re Estate of Blake, 856 A.2d 1151 (D.C.2004), and the discussion in the court’s opinion of the Uniform Nonpro-bate Transfers on Death Act, D.C.Code §§ 19-601.01 et seq. (Supp.2004). Id. at 1154-57. We noted in the Estate of Blake case that the relevant provisions of this statute apply retroactively to accounts established prior to its enactment. Id. at 1155. The parties have not been heard, however, with respect to the question whether the retroactivity principle applies even though Mrs. Walker died in 1999, well before the statute became effective in April 2001, or whether, on the contrary, any property rights vested at the time of Mrs. Walker’s death and could not be affected retroactively. In any event, in light of Estate of Blake, and under the Uniform Act, Mrs. Walker’s estate conceivably may not have been entitled to judgment in this case even if, as I attempt to demonstrate below, no impartial jury could reasonably have found that Mrs. Walker made an inter vivos gift to Mr. Stefan.
I agree with the majority, ante note 8, that the trial court should consider, in the first instance, whether the Act has any application in this situation. Accordingly, I join the remand to the extent that it requires the trial court to assess the effect, if any, of the Uniform Act on this appeal.
I.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review.
The question whether summary judgment was properly awarded to Mrs. Walker’s estate is one of law. Abdullah v. Roach, 668 A.2d 801, 804 (D.C.1995). Accordingly, we review the trial court’s decision de novo, and owe it no deference. Id. I agree with the majority that the trial judge, in speculating regarding what Mrs. Walker may or may not have understood, failed to follow the established rule that on summary judgment, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. This failure on the part of the trial judge was, however, irrelevant, for even without the questionable inferences, no impartial jury could reasonably find in Mr. Stefan’s favor by clear and convincing evidence.
B. The presumption applicable to joint accounts .9
The legal principles governing this appeal, like the historical facts, are largely undisputed,10 although the parties are at odds over their proper application to the present record. As this court explained in Davis v. Altmann, 492 A.2d 884, 885 (D.C.1985),
[w]here a party opens a joint account for [herjself and another without consideration, the account is presumed opened for the convenience of that party. Edstrom v. Kuder, 851 A.2d 506, 509 n.7 (D.C.1976); Murray v. Gadsden, 91 U.S.App. D.C. [38,] 44, 197 F.2d [194], 200 [ (1952) ]. This presumption applies in all cases where the funds have been contributed by one of the parties even where the printed bank card signed by the parties recites a right of survivor-*228ship. Imirie v. Imirie, 100 U.S.App. D.C. 371, 372, 246 F.2d 652, 653 (1957). This presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the one claiming gift. Harrington v. Emmerman, 88 U.S.App. D.C. [23,] 27, 186 F.2d [757,] 761 [ (1950) ].
Accord, In re Estate of Delaney, 819 A.2d 968, 990 (D.C.2003). In this case, Mr. Stefan does not deny that all of the money in the joint account was placed there by Mrs. Walker. Accordingly, at least prior to the enactment of the Uniform Act, the presumption that the account was created for Mrs. Walker’s convenience was fully applicable.
C. Inter vivos gifts.
Mr. Stefan contends that in this case, the foregoing presumption has been rebutted by evidence that Mrs. Walker made him an inter vivos gift of the money in the joint account. The burden of proving that a transfer was an inter vivos gift is upon the party asserting the gift, ánd when the gift is asserted after the donor has died, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.11 Davis, supra, 492 A.2d at 885. The question before us is whether the trial judge correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that viewing the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Stefan, Mr. Stefan has failed to prove a gift by clear and convincing evidence.
The essential elements of an inter vivos gift are donative intent, delivery, and acceptance.... In order to prove dona-tive intent, it must be shown-from the evidence that the donor clearly and unmistakably intended to permanently relinquish all interest in and control over the gift.
Ross v. Fierro, 659 A.2d 234, 239 (D.C.1995) (emphasis in original; citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “In order to have a valid inter vivos gift, the donor must have an intent to make a present, absolute, and irrevocable transfer of the property to the donee.” 15 RICHARD R. POWELL & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 85.21[1], at 85-409 (2000) (emphasis added).
Applying these principles to the creation of a joint bank account, the difficulty in proving the elements of an inter vivos gift become readily apparent. In Murray v. Gadsden, 91 U.S.App. D.C. 38, 197 F.2d 194 (1952), a joint account case, the court stated:
The requisites of a valid gift inter vivos are delivery, intention on the part of the donor to make a gift, and absolute disposition of the subject of the gift. Harrington v. Emmerman, 1950, 88 U.S.App. D.C. 23, 186 F.2d 757; Cashman v. Mason, 8 Cir., 1948, 166 F.2d 693; Lust v. Miller, 1925, 55 App. D.C. 217, 4 F.2d 293. In Lee v. Lee, 1925, 55 App.D.C. 344, 5 F.2d 767, we held an unqualified declaration of gift to be ineffective because the agreement by which the subject of the gift (a trunk with valuable contents) was deposited with the trust company permitted withdrawal either by the donor or the donees. This retention of dominance by the donor was held to defeat the gift.
91 U.S.App. D.C. at 49, 197 F.2d at 205 (emphasis added).
*229In O’Hair v. O’Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 508 P.2d 66, 69 (1973) (en banc), the court persuasively explained why a gift in this context is so difficult to prove:
A bank account opened or carried in the name of two or more persons is in their joint custody. Joint custody of an account is a fact which, in itself, negatives any idea of a gift, In re Betts’ Estate, 122 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235-36 (Surr.Ct.1953), since the essential element of a gift of personal property requires an intent on the part of the donor to divest himself of all dominion and control....
The essential elements of a gift inter vivos are that the donor manifest a clear intent to give to the party claiming as donee, and give to the latter before death, full possession and control of the property. Goff v. Guyton, 86 Ariz. 349, 346 P.2d 286 (1959). There must be a donative intent, delivery, and a vesting of irrevocable title upon such delivery. Armer v. Armer, 105 Ariz. 284, 463 P.2d 818 (1970).
(Emphasis added.) Accord, In re Kelly’s Estate, 285 N.Y. 139, 33 N.E.2d 62, 67 (1941) (“joint custody negatives any idea of a gift”).
In Quesenberry v. Funk, 203 Va. 619, 125 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1962), the decedent’s daughter claimed that the decedent’s creation of a joint account, which had been in the name of the decedent and the daughter, constituted an inter vivos gift, but the court sustained a finding to the contrary:
The essential elements of a gift inter vivos are: (1) The gift must be of personal property; (2) possession of the property must be delivered at the time of the gift to the donee, or someone for him, and the gift be accepted by the donee; (3) the title to the property must vest in the donee at the time of the gift; and the donor must be divested of and the donee invested with the right of property in the subject of the gift; it must be absolute, irrevocable and without any reference to its taking effect at some future period.
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.)
In In re Mulqueeny’s Succession, 156 So.2d 317, 321-22 (La.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 157 So.2d 234 (La.1963), another joint account case, the court stated:
Since decedent opened the homestead accounts payable to him or the Executrix, he did not divest himself of title thereto in favor of the Executrix, but continued his dominion and control over them with the power of withdrawal, in whole or in part, without her knowledge or consent. The deceased often expressed his desire that she should have these accounts, but he never executed a valid inter vivos manual gift to her.
(Emphasis added.)
In Denigan v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc’y, 127 Cal. 137, 59 P. 389, 390 (1899), the court described as “untenable” the claim that the decedent, who had opened a joint account in her name and in her husband’s name, thereby made a gift of the money to her husband:
There is no presumption in favor of a gift (citation omitted); and in the present case the idea of a gift is inconsistent with the retention by the wife of the right in herself to withdraw the whole of the money from the bank. A valid gift goes into immediate effect, and has no reference to the future. It divests the donor of his title, and requires a renunciation on his part of all claim and interest in the subject of the gift.
(Emphasis added.)12
The logic of these decisions and of the articulation of the elements of a gift, both *230by courts in the District and by other courts, would suggest that the creation of a joint account might never constitute a gift. In the District, however, our cases simply presume that there is no gift, and this presumption permits a finding, in extreme cases, that a gift was intended and made. See, e.g., Prather v. Hill, 250 A.2d 690, 691-93 (D.C.1969) (finding of gift sustained where some of the money in the account was owed to the claimant by the decedent, and where the decedent “was heard by others to say that the money in the account belonged to her”). See also Part I D, infra.
D. Application of the law to the facts.
With the foregoing legal principles in mind, I turn to Mr. Stefan’s claim that he was the recipient of an inter vivos gift, or at least that there exists a genuine issue of material fact with respect to that issue precluding the entry of summary judgment against him. If, as Mr. Stefan asserts, Mrs. Walker made an inter vivos gift to him, then she must have done so on July 16, 1998, the date on which she opened the joint account in his name as well as her own.13 Mr. Stefan asserts that all of the elements of a gift, including donative intent, were satisfied at that time, or at least that a jury finding to that effect would not be unreasonable. I cannot agree.
As previously noted, one who makes an inter vivos gift must make an absolute disposition, Murray, 91 U.S.App. D.C. at 49, 197 F.2d at 205, and must thus intend to relinquish all of her interest or control in, the subject matter of the gift. O’Hair, 508 P.2d at 69; Quesenberry, 125 S.E.2d at 873. The gift must be “irrevocable and without any reference to its taking effect at some future period.” Quesenberry, 125 S.E.2d at 873. Indeed, there must be a vesting of irrevocable title upon delivery of the gift. O’Hair, 508 P.2d at 69. Moreover, Mrs. Walker’s intent to relinquish her interest and control absolutely and irrevocably must be clear and unmistakable. Ross, 659 A.2d at 239. Mr. Stefan insists that he has satisfied these requirements because, as Ms. Daniels explained to Mrs. Walker, he (Stefan) was authorized to withdraw all of the money in the account ten minutes after the account was established.
But Mr. Stefan’s principal argument is a two-edged sword. Just as Mr. Stefan could withdraw the money without Mrs. Walker’s consent, so too could Mrs. Walker withdraw it without Mr. Stefan’s consent. Mrs. Walker and Mr. Stefan thus had joint custody and control over the account. This is the very circumstance that was held to be incompatible with a gift in In re Mulqueeny’s Succession, 156 So.2d at 321-22. As the New York Court of Appeals explained in In re Kelly’s Es*231tate, 33 N.E.2d at 67, joint custody is incompatible with the idea of a gift. In this case, as in the Denigan case decided more than a century ago, “the idea of a gift is inconsistent with [Mrs. Walker’s] retention ... of the right ... to withdraw the whole of the money from the bank.” Denigan, 59 P. at 390. Indeed, if Mrs. Walker had suffered a catastrophic illness or other misfortune, there is nothing in the record to negate that she would have done exactly that. So far as the record reveals, Mrs. Walker’s main purpose was to prevent the money in the account from going to Mr. Young, rather than assuring that it be given to Mr. Stefan.
In any event, there is simply no evidence from which an impartial trier of fact could fairly find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mrs. Walker intended to, or did, permanently relinquish to Mr. Stefan all control over the purported subject matter of the gift. On the contrary, the transaction was incontestably revocable; Mrs. Walker could have withdrawn the money from the account immediately after she set it up. After the joint account came into existence, ie., after the purported gift was made, Mrs. Walker had exactly the same amount of control over the money in the account as Mr. Stefan did, and not one iota less.
Moreover, the existence of any donative intent on Mrs. Walker’s part is belied by the events that preceded the establishment of the account. The reader will recall that Mrs. Walker’s initial plan was to set up a joint account in three names — Mrs. Walker, Mr. Stefan, and Ms. Daniels, the assistant branch manager of the bank. If Ms. Daniels had not refused (in order to avoid a conflict of interest) to allow her name to be placed on the account, then she too would have had the authority to withdraw all of the funds immediately. But no reasonable trier of fact could find, by clear and convincing evidence, or even by any lesser standard, that Mrs. Walker intended to make a gift of the money in the account to a representative of the bank. It is therefore readily apparent that Mrs. Walker did not consider the naming of a person as the co-owner of a joint account as being the equivalent of making an inter vivos gift to that person.
I conclude that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Stefan, would not permit an impartial jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Stefan had established Mrs. Walker’s do-native intent. Accordingly, I need not address the other elements of a gift.
E. The Estate ofPresgrave decision.
In Estate of Presgrave v. Stephens, 529 A.2d 274, 280 (D.C.1987), relied upon by the majority, a divided court, over a powerful dissent by Judge Mack, held that on the facts before the court, the trial judge’s finding that the decedent’s creation of an “either or” account in her name and in the name of her nephew, “subject to the order of either or the survivor,” 529 A.2d at 275, constituted an inter vivos gift of an interest in the account and the creation of a right of survivorship, and that the nephew was entitled to the proceeds of the account upon the decedent’s death. The court did not address the problem raised by the decedent’s retention, after the creation of the account, of control over the money therein — control that was identical to the nephew’s control — nor did it deal with the requirement that in order to be effective, a gift inter vivos must be absolute and irrevocable:
Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.
*232Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925); see also District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 360 (D.C.1996).
Be that as it may, Estate of Presgrave is distinguishable from the present case in significant respects. First, there was testimony in Estate of Presgrave, credited by the trial judge, that the decedent wanted her nephew to use some of the money during her lifetime for his own personal use, “[u]nd after she passed away she wanted him to have that account.” Estate of Presgrave, 529 A.2d at 280 (emphasis added). This testimony was consistent with the provision in the account that the funds contained therein were subject to the order, inter alia, of the survivor.14 There was no such testimony in the present case. Second, unlike the decedent in Estate of Presgrave, Mrs. Walker made it absolutely clear that she did not equate the placing of a person’s name on a joint account with a gift to that person. She did so by proposing that the assistant branch manager of the bank — i.e., an individual whom the decedent plainly did not intend to be the recipient of a gift of approximately $180,000 — be named a co-owner of the joint account. There was no comparable testimony in Estate of Presgrave. The Presgrave case is, for the reasons stated, distinguishable from the present one, and does not require reversal here.15
II.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I would conclude, as a matter of law, that under the law in force at the time of the creation of account and also at the time of her death, Mrs. Walker did not intend to make, nor did she make, an inter vivos gift to Mr. Stefan.16 I concur in the remand, howev*233er, solely to permit the trial court to determine, in the first instance, the applicability to this case of the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act. See Estate of Blake, 856 A.2d at 1154-57.

. In this part of the opinion, I am referring to the presumption in effect at the time of Mrs. Walker's death, and prior to the enactment of the Uniform Act.

. I agree with the majority that if "the case turns on controverted facts and the credibility of witnesses, the case is properly for the jury.” In my opinion, however, there are no disputed material issues of fact, and Mr. Stefan is not entitled to judgment even if all of the evidence on his behalf is credited.

. "Clear and convincing evidence” requires “a degree of persuasion much higher than 'mere preponderance of the evidence,’ but still somewhat less than 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' " District of Columbia v. Hudson, 404 A.2d 175, 179 (D.C.1979) (citations omitted). It must “produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re Estate of Soeder, 7 Ohio App.2d 271, 220 N.E.2d 547, 574 (1966).

. There is case law in some jurisdictions contrary to the authorities I have cited with *230respect to the necessity and extent of the donor’s relinquishment of interest and control over the subject matter of the gift. See generally Gary D. Spivey, J.D., Annotation: Creation of Joint Savings Account or Savings Certificate as Gift to Survivor, 43 A.L.R.3d 971 (1972 & Supp.2005). This is due in part to the fact that in some jurisdictions, though not in the District of Columbia prior to the enactment of the Uniform Act, the creation of a joint account is presumed to be a gift. See, e.g., Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Sav. Bank, 31 Ill.2d 587, 202 N.E.2d 470, 472 (1964). In any event, the decisions in this jurisdiction require "absolute disposition of the subject of the gift," see, e.g., Murray, 91 U.S.App. D.C. at 49, 197 F.2d at 205, although the application of the principle may be somewhat uneven. See, e.g., Part I D, infra. In any event, I find persuasive the reasoning of the decisions of courts of other jurisdictions which I have cited in this opinion.

. My colleagues in the majority do not, and indeed cannot, dispute that if a gift was made, it was made on that date.

. But cf. Imirie v. Imirie, 100 U.S.App. D.C. 371, 372, 246 F.2d 652, 653 (1957) (presumption that joint account was created for convenience of party that contributed the money to a joint account and received no consideration applies even where the printed bank card provides for a right of survivorship); Davis, 492 A.2d at 885 (same).

. In a cogent separate opinion in Estate of Presgrave, Judge Mack wrote, in pertinent part, as follows:
In allowing the trial court to determine ownership of the accounts based on an incomplete presentation of witnesses and facts, the majority gives short shrift to the commendable policy reasons underlying our decision in Davis v. Altmann, supra. Joint accounts are extremely useful for the elderly or ill who, with the passage of time, become less mobile or less able to manage their own finances. Such accounts allow another person to deposit and withdraw money from the original depositor’s account for the well being of the original depositor. The convenience of such accounts would be greatly diminished if the mere listing of a second name on the account was sufficient to vest unconditional ownership in the second person when the depositor is no longer able to speak to intent. It is for this reason that we held in Davis v. Altmann, that, where a party opens a joint account for himself (or herself) and another, the account is presumed open for the convenience of that party. The presumption of convenience operates to ensure that a caretaker can administer a depositor’s finances without running a risk that a court of law will lightly construe the depositor as a donor with present intent to give the accounts to the caretaker.
Estate of Presgrave, 529 A.2d at 284 (Mack, J., dissenting).

.According to Ms. Daniels’ affidavit, Mrs. Walker stated that she did not want Mr. Young to receive "one red cent” from the account. She accomplished this goal by closing the account of which Mr. Young had been a co-owner. The issue before us, however, does not relate directly to Mr. Young, even though Mr. Young happens to be the personal representative of Mrs. Walker’s intestate estate. Rather, the question that the court must decide is whether the record would permit an impartial trier of fact to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mrs. Walker made *233an inter vivos gift to Mr. Stefan. For the reasons stated, I would answer that question in the negative.