Court Opinion

ID: 9408948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 14:06:49.943924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.007917
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 7, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0208-MR

MEGAN WILSON                                                          APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CR-01088

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                OPINION
                        REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Megan Wilson brings this appeal from a February 18, 2022,

judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court, upon a trial by jury, sentencing her to

eleven-years’ imprisonment. We reverse and remand.

             Megan Wilson was indicted by the Hardin County Grand Jury upon

the offenses of assault in the first degree and tampering with physical evidence.

These indicted offenses stemmed from events that occurred between Megan and

her husband, Arron Wilson, in the late hours on October 7, 2020. At trial, it was
undisputed that Megan threw a pot filled with boiling water on Arron and then he

was stabbed with a kitchen knife. However, Megan testified that she did so only

after Arron physically abused her by throwing her down upon the floor, holding a

gun to her head, and threatening to kill her if she attempted to leave their residence.

Arron disputed Megan’s version of events and stated he was in bed sleeping at the

time of the assault.

               The jury was instructed upon the offenses of first-degree assault,

second-degree assault, assault under extreme emotional disturbance, fourth-degree

assault, tampering with physical evidence, and the defense of self-protection and

imperfect self-protection.1 Under the self-protection instruction, the jury could

have acquitted Megan of assault or found her guilty of second-degree assault or

fourth-degree assault (imperfect self-protection).

               Ultimately, the jury found Megan guilty of first-degree assault and not

guilty of tampering with physical evidence. Before sentencing, Megan filed a

motion for application of the exemption found in Kentucky Revised Statutes

(KRS) 439.3401(5), that reduces the time served by violent offenders, who were

also victims of domestic violence.2 In her motion, Megan asserted:

1
 Throughout this Opinion, the terms self-protection and self-defense are interchangeably
utilized; both terms refer to the defense set forth in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 503.050.
2
  KRS 439.3401(5) exempts a violent offender, who was a victim of domestic violence/abuse,
from the requirement to serve 85 percent of the sentence before being considered for parole or
probation.

                                               -2-
1.     That Defendant on the date and at the time of the
incident which is the subject of this case, and before that
date and time, was the victim of domestic violence and
abuse inflicted upon her by her husband, [Arron] Wilson,
the victim herein, as defined in KRS 403.720, and that
the use of physical force by Defendant upon [Arron]
Wilson was justified because Defendant believed at that
time that such force was necessary to protect herself
against the use of force or the imminent use of unlawful
physical force by [Arron] Wilson;

....

3.   That Defendant desires to testify in support of this
motion, and her testimony will pertain to all of the acts of
domestic violence and abuse inflicted upon her by her
husband, [Arron] Wilson, throughout their marriage.

4.    Defendant states that she desires to have the
following witnesses testify on her behalf, to-wit:

      (a) Lindsey House, or other representative,
Kentucky Child Protective Services, who will testify
concerning her investigation and findings of domestic
violence and abuse perpetrated on Defendant by her
husband, [Arron] Wilson;

       (b) Jeffery Pearman, brother-in-law of
Defendant who will testify concerning his observation of
Defendant and her injuries and emotional distress
inflected [sic] upon Defendant by her husband, [Arron]
Wilson;

      (c) Dominque Hughes, friend of Defendant,
who will testify concerning injuries inflicted upon
Defendant by her husband, [Arron] Wilson, and
statements made by Defendant to her concerning same;

       (d) Martina Carman, Defendant’s sister, who
will testify as an “in person” witness to mental and

                            -3-
            physical abuse inflicted on Defendant by her husband,
            [Arron] Wilson;

                  (e) Phyllis K. Lonneman, who will testify
            concerning her domestic violence counseling with
            Defendant;

                  (f)    Lauren L. Masters, LPCC, CADC, SCAC,
            Statesboro, Georgia, who will testify concerning her
            counseling with Defendant concerning domestic violence
            and mental abuse inflicted upon her by her husband,
            [Arron] Wilson;

                   (g) Megan Coffee, friend of Defendant, who can
            testify concerning help requested by Defendant to assist
            her in separating from her husband, [Arron] Wilson,
            because of domestic violence and abuse;

                   (h) Cole Weed, friend of Defendant, who will
            testify concerning his knowledge of domestic violence
            and abuse inflicted upon Defendant by her husband,
            [Arron] Wilson;

                  (i)   Medical Records Custodian, Lincoln Trail
            Hospital, Radcliff, Kentucky, who will introduce into
            evidence the records of their treatment of Defendant for
            mental violence and abuse inflicted upon Defendant by
            her husband, [Arron] Wilson; and

                   (j)   Records Custodian of the Hardin County
            Sheriff’s Department will introduce into evidence the
            DVD interview with Cole Weed on August 15, 2021[,]
            provided to the Defendant by the Commonwealth
            concerning knowledge of domestic violence and abuse
            inflicted on Defendant by her husband, [Arron] Wilson.

December 22, 2021, motion for exemption, Record at 101-03.

                                       -4-
              The circuit court conducted a sentencing hearing. At the hearing,

Megan testified that she was physically abused by Arron throughout their two-year

marriage and described specific instances of domestic violence and abuse. Megan

also produced other witnesses, who testified to seeing bruises on Megan and that

Megan had discussed Arron’s abuse. By order entered February 18, 2022, the

circuit court concluded that Megan was not entitled to the exemption in KRS

439.3401(5), as the court did not believe Megan was a victim of domestic violence.

The circuit court sentenced Megan to a total of eleven-years’ imprisonment. This

appeal follows.

              Megan contends that the circuit court committed reversible error by

excluding evidence of past domestic violence and abuse she suffered throughout

the approximate two-year marriage. Megan asserts that such evidence was

admissible to prove her defense of self-protection and that its exclusion was

crippling to her defense. Our Court shall review this contention of error for

palpable error per Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26, as it is

unpreserved.3

3
  Megan Wilson failed to properly preserve this issue for appellate review. Megan did seek to
admit evidence of past instances of domestic violence and abuse at trial but argued that it was
admissible to prove that she acted under extreme emotional disturbance. And, the excluded
evidence was not entered into the record by avowal. However, Megan’s attorneys informed the
circuit court at a bench conference that the evidence would demonstrate a pattern of domestic
abuse and violence perpetrated by Arron Wilson during the two-year marriage. Additionally,
Megan and other witnesses testified concerning instances of past domestic violence and abuse

                                              -5-
              A palpable error is an error that affects the substantial rights of a party

and results in manifest injustice. Kentucky Rules of Evidence 103(e); RCr 10.26.

To rise to the level of manifest injustice, there must exist a reasonable probability

that the result would have been different absent the error. Graves v.

Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858, 864 (Ky. 2000).

              The defense of self-protection is set forth in KRS 503.050, as follows:

              (1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon
                another person is justifiable when the defendant
                believes that such force is necessary to protect himself
                against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical
                force by the other person.

              (2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon
                another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only
                when the defendant believes that such force is
                necessary to protect himself against death, serious
                physical injury, kidnapping, sexual intercourse
                compelled by force or threat, felony involving the use
                of force, or under those circumstances permitted
                pursuant to KRS 503.055.

              (3) Any evidence presented by the defendant to establish
                the existence of a prior act or acts of domestic violence
                and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720 by the person
                against whom the defendant is charged with employing
                physical force shall be admissible under this section.

              (4) A person does not have a duty to retreat prior to the
                use of deadly physical force.

suffered by Megan at the sentencing hearing. So, the substance of the excluded evidence is
available for this Court to review.

                                              -6-
And, domestic violence and abuse is defined in KRS 403.720(2):

             (a) Physical injury, serious physical injury, stalking,
                sexual abuse, strangulation, assault, or the infliction of
                fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical
                injury, sexual abuse, strangulation, or assault between
                family members or members of an unmarried couple[.]

The term imminent is particularly defined as:

             “Imminent” means impending danger, and, in the context
             of domestic violence and abuse as defined by KRS
             403.720, belief that danger is imminent can be inferred
             from a past pattern of repeated serious abuse.

KRS 503.010(3).

             It is evident from the plain language of KRS 503.050(3) that evidence

of prior domestic violence and abuse perpetrated by the victim upon the defendant

is admissible to prove the defense of self-protection. Our common law also

recognizes “that evidence of a victim’s prior acts of violence, threats . . . may be

admissible if offered to prove that the defendant so feared the victim that he

believed it was necessary to use physical force . . . in self-protection[.]” McGaha

v. Commonwealth, 414 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Robert G. Lawson, The

Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2:15[4][d] (4th ed. 2003); see also Saylor v.

Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Ky. 2004); Moorman v. Commonwealth,

325 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Ky. 2010). More particularly, the Kentucky Supreme Court

has recognized that prior domestic violence and abuse can result in battered

woman syndrome and that the defense of self-protection may be based upon

                                          -7-
battered woman syndrome. Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 452 (Ky.

1999).

               In the final analysis, both Kentucky statutory and common law clearly

provide that prior instances of domestic violence and abuse are admissible to prove

that the defendant feared the victim and assaulted or killed the victim in self-

protection. As a result, the circuit court erred by excluding evidence of prior acts

of domestic violence and abuse allegedly perpetrated by Arron against Megan

throughout the marriage.4 Megan should have been permitted to introduce alleged

past instances of domestic violence to prove that her fear of Arron led her to use

physical violence in self-protection on the night in question.

               Having concluded that the circuit court erroneously excluded evidence

of past domestic violence and abuse allegedly perpetrated by Arron, we must next

determine whether exclusion of such evidence led to manifest injustice – whether a

substantial probability exists that the result would have been different absent the

error. See Graves, 17 S.W.3d at 864.

               At trial, Arron testified that he was asleep in bed when Megan threw

the pot of boiling water on him and that upon standing Megan stabbed him with a

kitchen knife. Arron denied that he had committed any acts of physical violence or

4
 The circuit court ruled that only domestic violence that occurred on the night of the underlying
events or within one week thereof was admissible during trial.

                                               -8-
abuse against Megan that night. By contrast, Megan testified they were in a heated

argument that evening that lead to Arron pushing her to the floor, holding a gun to

her head, and threatening to kill her if she attempted to leave the residence.

Megan admitted to throwing the pot of boiling water on Arron and that Arron was

stabbed with a kitchen knife. But, Megan claimed she was acting in self-defense.

              The jury was instructed upon the defense of self-protection under

KRS 503.050 and imperfect self-protection under KRS 503.120(1). Under KRS

503.050, the use of physical force is justified if defendant “believes that such force

is necessary to protect himself.” So, “[t]he need for self-defense must be viewed

subjectively from the standpoint of the accused, not objectively from the

standpoint of a reasonable person[.]” Hayes v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 786,

787 (Ky. 1994) (citation omitted). Stated differently, a “defendant’s use of force is

justifiable if he actually believes, correctly or incorrectly, that force is necessary to

protect himself from an attack[.]” Commonwealth v. Hasch, 421 S.W.3d 349, 362

(Ky. 2013).

              However, the law also recognizes that a defendant’s actual belief that

the use of force is necessary for self-protection may be mistaken from an objective

viewpoint. Hasch, 421 S.W.3d at 358. A mistaken belief as to “the need to act in

self-protection does not affect the privilege to act in self-protection unless the

mistaken belief is [objectively] so unreasonably held as to rise to the level of

                                           -9-
wantonness or recklessness[.]” Commonwealth v. Hager, 41 S.W.3d 828, 841-42

(Ky. 2001) (citation omitted);5 see also Hasch, 421 S.W.3d at 358-59. In instances

where the mistaken belief is wantonly or recklessly held by defendant, the defense

of imperfect self-protection is available per KRS 503.120(1). Hasch, 421 S.W.3d

at 358-59. Under imperfect self-defense, the defendant is not completely

exonerated but instead a jury may convict a defendant for a lesser offense, one for

which wantonness or recklessness is the culpable mental state. Elliott v.

Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Ky. 1998).

               In this case, evidence of alleged past domestic violence and abuse

perpetrated by Arron upon Megan is clearly material to Megan’s defense of self-

protection and imperfect self-protection. To be entitled to either self-protection or

imperfect self-protection, it was necessary for Megan to demonstrate that she

subjectively feared Arron and believed that force was necessary to protect herself.

The past instances of domestic violence and abuse are directly relevant to Megan’s

subjective belief that the use of force was necessary to protect herself from

imminent physical violence from Arron. Even “the belief that danger is imminent

can be inferred from a past pattern of repeated serious abuse.” KRS 503.010(3).

And, if Megan’s actual belief concerning the need to use self-protection was

5
  The mistaken belief may be either a mistake in the belief to act in self-protection or a mistake
in the degree of force utilized. Commonwealth v. Hasch, 421 S.W.3d 349, 358 (Ky. 2013).

                                               -10-
objectively mistaken, the evidence of prior instances of domestic violence and

abuse is also directly relevant to whether Megan’s mistaken belief was reckless or

wanton for imperfect self-defense, which could have resulted in a conviction of

second-degree assault or fourth-degree assault.

             Accordingly, we view the evidence of alleged past domestic violence

and abuse by Arron as crucial to Megan’s defense of self-protection and imperfect

self-protection. Moreover, we hold that its exclusion constituted palpable error, as

there exists a probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different

had the evidence been presented. We, thus, reverse and remand for a new trial.

             Megan also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her

motion to continue the trial and denying the application of the domestic violence

exception regarding her parole eligibility as set out in KRS 439.3401. Since this

Court has remanded the case for a new trial and is further directing that evidence of

prior domestic violence and abuse be admitted into evidence at the new trial, we

conclude that those issues are now moot.

             For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is

reversed and remanded for a new trial.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -11-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Michael L. Goodwin        Daniel J. Cameron
Louisville, Kentucky      Attorney General of Kentucky
                          Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:                Stephanie L. McKeehan
                          Assistant Attorney General
Rob Eggert                Frankfort, Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky
                          ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                          APPELLEE:

                          Harrison Kilgore
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                        -12-