Court Opinion

ID: 9624614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:11:35.764061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:51.441612
License: Public Domain

Raymond, President,
dissenting:
Though I do not disagree with the principles of law stated in both points of the syllabus, I challenge their application to the facts of this case, which in the main are undisputed, and I dissent from the decision of the majority of the Court in affirming the final judgment of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County which refuses to award the custody of the infant daughter of the petitioner to her and permits the West Virginia Department of Welfare to retain the custody of the child which, until it finds a permanent home for the child which as yet it has not done although it has had possession of the child and has placed it in a foster home since it obtained such possession in December 1962, is necessarily of a temporary nature and renders the permanent disposition of the child utterly uncertain and its status entirely unsatisfactory and undesirable with respect to the welfare of the child.
It clearly appears from the facts which are adequately stated in the maj ority opinion that the idea of relinquishing the baby daughter of the petitioner was suggested by a social worker who visited the petitioner during the period December 1, 1962, when the child was born at the Beckley Hospital and *150December 11, 1962, when the signed relinquishment was executed and that during that period a representative of the department urged the petitioner, whose health was then not good and who was beset by worry and doubt as to whether the condition of her health would permit her to keep and care for the child, to relinquish her parental rights by telling her that she could reheve herself of the financial burden and all matters in connection with the rearing of her child by such action and who also promptly furnished her with a form of relinquishment and made prompt provision for its execution. It also clearly appears from the undisputed facts that the petitioner was reluctant to inform her stepfather and her mother about the birth of the child and did not do so until some time after she had left the hospital about December 15, 1962. After she informed them of the birth of the child they agreed to help her to care for it if she could regain its possession and they made adequate provision to assist her in caring for the child and, at least partly for that purpose, moved from their former home in Cedar Bluff, Virginia, to North Tazewell, Virginia, where they own and maintain a five-room home which is occupied by the petitioner’s mother, stepfather and sister and in which the petitioner would be permitted to live with her child, which would be cared for by the petitioner and by her mother when the petitioner would be absent at work. It also appears that the stepfather has an annual income of approximately $6,000.00, that he and the mother of the petitioner are decent, honest and respectable people and that the petitioner is now a person of good moral character and is employed as a bookkeeper. The evidence also shows that the department has had possession of this child of tender years since December 1962; that from a period beginning about two months after the department received possession of the child and continuing until September 1963, when the petitioner was notified that it would not return the child to her, the petitioner undertook to negotiate with the department for the return of the child and after being told that the department would refuse to return the child to her she instituted this habeas corpus proceeding on September 23, 1963. It is clear from the evidence that the department has not *151placed the child in a permanent home but has provided for its temporary possession in a foster home, the identity, location and character of which are not disclosed by the evidence.
Notwithstanding the foregoing facts that the stepfather and the mother of the petitioner are persons of good moral character who could and would provide a suitable home for the petitioner and her child, that the petitioner is a person of good moral character, and that the child was still in the temporary custody and control of the department and its future permanent home had not been determined, the circuit court found that the best interest of the child would be served by allowing it to remain in the custody of the department. In making such finding it is apparent that the court felt that there was merit in the contention of the defendant that because the child was bom out of wedlock an embarrassing situation would result if its possession should be given to its unwed mother, a factor which, in my judgment, is of slight, if any, importance in connection with the permanent welfare of the child inasmuch as the petitioner since the birth of her child has been guilty of no moral misconduct and has become a person of good moral character. As to her moral character and fitness this quotation from the opinion in Pierce v. Jeffries, 103 W. Va. 410, 137 S. E. 651, 51 A.L.R. 1502, seems to be applicable to the petitioner: “There is no evidence that the relator is unfit to have the custody of her baby. It is true that the relator may have erred prior to the birth of her child. She may have trusted too much or loved too well. But, be that as it may, there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record as to any subsequent misconduct on her part which would convict her of being an unfit person to have the custody of her boy. In order to separate a child from its parent on the ground of the latter’s unfitness, there must be cogent and convincing proof of such fact.”
From the foregoing evidence I am firmly convinced that the welfare of the child, which is the polar star by which its custody should be determined, would be materially pro' moted by awarding its custody to the petitioner, its natural parent, instead of requiring it to remain in the temporary *152custody of the department until it can find a permanent home for the child, the identity, location and character of which are entirely unknown and can not presently be definitely ascertained or determined. In other words the permanent possession of the child by its mother, the petitioner, would permit the child to five in the custody of its natural parent in a suitable and respectable home, occupied by her and her mother, stepfather and sister, instead of a foster home for an indefinite period and eventually in a permanent home, the identity, location and character of which are presently undertermined and can not at this time be determined. In that situation it is clear to me that in refusing to award the custody of the child to its natural mother, the petitioner, the circuit court abused its discretion in that its finding that the best interest of the child would be served by allowing it to remain in the custody of the department is clearly wrong and contrary to the undisputed evidence in the case.
Section 7, Article 10, Chapter 44, Code, 1931,' provides, in part, that the father and the mother of any minor child shall, with equal powers, rights and duties, be entitled to the custody of the person of such child and to the care of its education. This Court has held in many cases that the right of a parent to the custody of his or her child, though not absolute, is founded on natural law and arises because the child is his or hers to care for and rear. Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S. E. 2d 691; Hoy v. Dooley, 144 W. Va. 64, 105 S. E. 2d 877; Stout v. Massie, 140 W. Va. 731, 88 S. E. 2d 51; State ex rel. Lipscomb v. Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302, 47 S. E. 2d 221; Pukas v. Pukas, 129 W. Va. 765, 42 S. E. 2d 11; State ex rel. Bennett v. Anderson, 129 W. Va. 671, 41 S. E. 2d 241; Straughan v. Straughan, 115 W. Va. 639, 177 S. E. 771; State ex rel. Palmer v. Postlethwaite, 106 W. Va. 383, 145 S. E. 738; Connor v. Harris, 100 W. Va. 313, 130 S. E. 281; Fletcher v. Hickman, 50 W. Va. 244, 40 S. E. 371, 55 L.R.A. 896, 88 Am. St. Rep. 862; Cunningham v. Barnes, 37 W. Va. 746, 17 S. E. 308, 38 Am. St. Rep. 57; Green v. Campbell, 35 W. Va. 698, 14 S. E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 843; Rust v. Vanvacter, 9 W. Va. 600. This right of a parent will be respected when it has not been transferred or abandoned. Hoy v. Dooley, 144 W. Va. 64, 105 S. E. 2d 877; Settle v. Settle, 117 *153W. Va. 476, 185 S. E. 859; Straughan v. Straughan, 115 W. Va. 639, 177 S. E. 771; Pierce v. Jeffries, 103 W. Va. 410, 137 S. E. 651, 51 A.L.R. 1502; Buseman v. Buseman, 83 W. Va. 496, 98 S. E. 574; Cunningham v. Barnes, 37 W. Va. 746, 17 S. E. 308, 38 Am. St. Rep. 57. Even when a parent has transferred, relinquished or surrendered the custody of his or her child to a third person and subsequently demands the return of the child the action of the court in determining whether the custody of the child shall remain in such third person or whether the child shall be returned to its parent depends upon which course will promote the welfare and best interest of the child and though the parent will not be permitted to reclaim the custody of the child unless the parent shows that such change of custody will materially promote the moral and physical welfare of the child, Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S. E. 2d 691, and the many cases cited in the opinion in that case, the Court should permit the parent to reclaim the custody of the child when it appears, as it clearly does-in the case at bar, that such change will materially promote the moral and physical welfare of the child.
Though the circumstances under which the relinquishment of the child was obtained by the representative of the department do not render it invalid, yet it is manifest to me, at least, that the relinquishment shows that the petitioner thought that she was unable properly to care for her child does not reflect the actual and considered wish of the petitioner to relinquish permanently the custody of her child. The mere statement of the undisputed facts disclosed by the evidence compels the conclusion that in finding that it was for the best interest of the child to permit it to remain with the department and in entering judgment to that effect the circuit court was clearly wrong and the rendition of such judgment constituted a clear abuse of discretion. The evidence does not disclose the present whereabouts of the child or the kind of care and attention which it is receiving and no ■ representative of the department knows the character and nature of its future home or what the department will do with the child or if any representative of the department *154possesses such knowledge it is not disclosed by any evidence in the record. Certainly there is nothing in the evidence to show that the continued possession of the child by the department can be said to be as beneficial or promotive of the welfare of the child as the presently available home for the child and the parental care and affection which it would receive if its custody had been awarded to its natural mother, the petitioner. When the finding of a trial court in a case tried by it in lieu of a jury is against the preponderance of the evidence, is not supported by the evidence, or is clearly wrong, such finding will be reversed and set aside upon appellate review. J. and G. Construction Company v. Freeport Coal Company, 147 W. Va. 563, 129 S. E. 2d 834; Huntington Development and Gas Company v. Topping, 115 W. Va. 364, 176 S. E. 424; McKown v. Citizens State Bank of Ripley, 91 W. Va. 716, 114 S. E. 271. Considering the practical aspects of this case, it is true that this then worried and distressed young woman executed a relinquishment of the custody of her baby but it is also, I believe, equally true that she did not fully realize what she was doing or the permanent consequences of her ill-considered and mistaken act. Accordingly I see no sound reason for punishing her permanently by denying her the custody of her child. If the department had placed the custody of the child suitably and permanently and personal attachment or affectionate relations had been formed which should not be disturbed, I would be less reluctant to agree with the ruling of the circuit court. But no such permanent custody and affectionate relationship now exist or will likely exist in the reasonably near future, and in my judgment, as a matter of fairness and humanity and, indeed, as a matter of law in the proper exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the petitioner should be given the custody of her baby daughter.
As it is my considered opinion that the moral and physical welfare of this child of tender years would be materially promoted by awarding its custody to the petitioner, its natural mother, instead of leaving it, with its uncertain future, under the control of the department, a bureaucratic agency of the government whose representatives obviously do not entertain the same affection and solicitude for its welfare *155as its natural mother, who is fond of the child and earnestly desires to have its permanent custody, I would reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County and award such custody to the petitioner.