Court Opinion

ID: 9737468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:26:04.877986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.130878
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting
I believe the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the Department of Natural Resources (the DNR) and therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that summary judgment should be reversed.
The majority concludes that the DNR committed an act of affirmative negligence when it allowed people to go sledding in the Indiana Dunes State Park. This conclusion is significant because of its implications on the question of duty. In order to recover in a negligence action against a governmental entity, the plaintiff must show more than a duty owed to the public as a whole. Greathouse v. Armstrong, 616 N.E.2d 364 (Ind.1993). In such cases, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a private duty owed to a particular individual. Id. According to Mullin v. Municipal City of South Bend, 639 N.E.2d 278 (Ind.1994), the following elements are prerequisites for imposing a private duty on governmental defendants:
(1) an explicit assurance by the municipality, through promises or actions, that it would act on behalf of the injured party;
(2) knowledge on the part of the municipality that inaction could lead to harm; and
(3) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured party on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.
Id. at 284. The above public/private duty analysis, however, does not apply if the allegation against the governmental defendant is one of affirmative negligence. Henshilwood v. Hendricks County, 653 N.E.2d 1062 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. The Mullin test applies only in determining whether a duty is owed based upon a governmental entity’s alleged failure to act.
In their complaint, the Servisses alleged that the DNR was negligent in (1) failing to properly maintain, manage, and supervise the park property; (2) failing to properly supervise park rangers; (3) failing to warn park patrons of a dangerous condition; and (4)failing to construct or maintain a suitable walkway or construct a guard to protect pedestrians from sledders. In my view, all of these counts allege failures to act and not affirmative negligence. See McCormick v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources, 673 N.E.2d 829 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (plaintiffs decedent drowned; the complaint did not allege affirmative negligence when allegations in-*101eluded (1) failure to warn of dangers; (2) failure to patrol the premises; (3) failure to remedy a dangerous situation; (4) failure to take steps to prevent such incidents; and (5) failure to appropriately limit access to the spillway).
The Servisses responded to the DNR’s summary judgment motion with the allegation that the DNR committed affirmative negligence in requiring sledders to use one particular hill. Such an allegation could only emanate from Paragraph 10 of Count I of the Complaint for Damages, which states: “That IDNR authorized snow sledding on certain locations of the Dunes park grounds and owed a duty of reasonable care and supervision to those persons engaged in sledding activities on the park grounds.” Record at 4. In my view, Paragraph 10 does not contain an allegation that the DNR was negligent in designating a particular location for sledders to use. Therefore, such an allegation cannot serve as a basis for defeating summary judgment based upon the argument that it arguably constituted affirmative negligence. Moreover, even if Paragraph 10 could be understood to contain an allegation of negligence, it would not constitute an allegation of affirmative negligence. See Aldridge v. Indiana Dep’t of Natural Resources, 694 N.E.2d 313 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied (otherwise general duty that exists when a governmental entity employs a lifeguard to monitor a public pool is not automatically transformed into a private duty merely because the governmental entity provides only one pool, thus dictating where each individual must swim).
Because, the Servisses’ complaint alleges a failure to act and not affirmative negligence, I would apply the Mullin test to determine whether the DNR owed the Servisses a private duty. The first element that the Ser-visses must prove to establish the existence of a private duty under Mullin is that the DNR issued an explicit assurance that it would act on Sandra’s behalf. The Servisses have presented no evidence that the DNR made such an assurance. “Without any such assurance, there can be no reliance.” McCormick v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources, 673 N.E.2d at 838. Therefore, there is no evidence of a special duty of relationship between Sandra and the DNR. If the DNR owed any duty to Sandra, it was a duty to the general public and not to Sandra individually. Because no genuine issue of material fact exists on the issue of duty, I believe that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the DNR. I would affirm the trial court.