Court Opinion

ID: 9496779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:35:04.84496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:47.471820
License: Public Domain

FLAUM, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
This case presents the challenging question of whether a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act occurred at the Lafayette, Indiana, train station in December of 2000. The rule promulgated by the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) governing access to mass transit facilities compels that an inquiry be made to determine whether the steps taken by the City of Lafayette to accommodate disabled individuals in response to the station’s elevator outage were reasonable. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.161. Considering the facts in this case, I conclude that the answer should appropriately come from a jury and I therefore must respectfully dissent.
Under the majority’s interpretation, violations of 49 § C.F.R. 37.161 will occur only in situations where frequent or systemic problems in an entity’s operation of mass transit facilities have been alleged. The rule itself states:
(a) Public and private entities providing transportation services shall maintain in operative condition those features of facilities and vehicles that are required to make the vehicles and facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. These features include, but are not limited to ... elevators.
(b) Accessibility features shall be repaired promptly if they are damaged or out of order. When an accessibility feature is out of order, the entity shall take reasonable steps to accommodate individuals with disabilities who would otherwise use the feature.
(c) This section does not prohibit isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access due to maintenance or repairs.
49 C.F.R. § 37.161 (2004) (emphasis added). . In my view, sub-section (c) cannot be read in a manner that eliminates the requirement under sub-section (b) that during temporary outages “reasonable steps” must be taken to accommodate individuals with disabilities. If sub-section (c) were to provide blanket immunity for entities during temporary service interruptions, sub-section (b)’s second sentence would have no force. Clearly, the only types of interruptions in service contemplated under this regulation are those that *932are isolated or temporary. Consequently, it must be during these periods that the “reasonable steps to accommodate” duty applies' — and thereby insulates an entity from liability if it is satisfied. Read in conjunction, sub-sections (b) and (c) dictate that while temporary interruptions in service are envisioned, repairs must be made “promptly” and “reasonable steps” must be taken to “accommodate individuals” when such interruptions arise. I am unable to find in subsection (c), or in any other authority, support for a rule that discharges or diminishes an entity’s “reasonable steps” duty absent frequent denials of access to disabled persons or a neglectful maintenance policy.
I agree with the majority that the elevator’s inaccessibility in this case was an isolated and temporary interruption. Robert Foley (“Foley”) does not attempt to show that other disabled persons were denied access because of frequent elevator breakdowns. Furthermore, the breakdown at issue was temporary as the elevator was inoperable for at most a total of eight days. While a speedier repair would have been preferable, eight days is certainly not long enough to be considered permanent.
My disagreement with the majority arises over the reasonableness of Lafayette’s response to the elevator outage. The majority concludes as a matter of law that the bicycle ramp to the pedestrian bridge and the assistance provided by Bill O’Connor, a non-city employee, constituted reasonable alternative accommodations. While not inherently without basis, I believe that this is a determination that should be addressed by a jury. Foley has put forth evidence to show that (1) Fred Taylor knew about the elevator outage for at least four days prior to Foley’s arrival at the Lafayette station; (2) Taylor had nearly five hours advance notice of Foley’s impending arrival; (3) Taylor shoveled portions of the station and platform, but not the ramp; and (4) Taylor knew that the ramp was snow-covered. Confronted with these facts, a jury could appropriately find that reasonable steps were not taken to accommodate Foley.
The majority finds dispositive the fact that these alleged inadequacies fall on the shoulders of a single employee, Taylor. In the majority’s view, “[ijsolated acts of negligence by a city employee do not come within the ambit of discrimination against disabled persons proscribed by the ADA.” Majority opinion at 11. However, Foley’s contentions reach beyond Taylor’s failures to contact Kone or clear the bicycle ramp and extend to allegations of Lafayette’s wrongdoing. Foley alleges that Lafayette knew of the problem at the station as soon as the heavy snowfall hit — the implication being that additional personnel should have been sent to the station to assist with the snow removal on the ramp. Furthermore, since an individual employee’s actions might be relevant to the reasonableness of an entity’s response, there is no reason such conduct should not be considered in determining whether § 37.161(b) was violated.4 Indeed, it is easy to envision a situation where an entity’s entire response may consist of the actions of a sole individual.
“[Reasonable steps to accommodate” is not a rigid, one-size-fits-all mandate. Rather, the regulation is written to allow *933for flexibility in an entity’s response to an interruption in service depending on the particular circumstances of the situation. What constitutes “reasonable steps” may be subject to change depending on-the duration of the interruption, the cost of the proposed alternate accommodation, the resources available to the entity, or even the current weather conditions. Providing-nothing beyond access to the bicycle ramp may be entirely reasonable as an accommodation when the train station’s elevator malfunctions on a mild day. However, when the outage occurs during blizzard-like winter conditions, simply pointing wheelchair-bound passengers in the direction of the snow-covered ramp may well be insufficient.
Underscoring the need for entities to make particularized responses to problems as they arise, the DOT’s published commentary regarding accommodating disabled individuals during service interruptions notes:
The rule ... requires that accommodations be made to individuals with disabilities who would otherwise use an inoperative accessibility feature. For example, when a rail system discovers that an elevator is out of order, blocking access to one of its stations, it could accommodate users of the station by announcing the problem at other stations to alert passengers and offer accessible shuttle bus service around the temporarily inaccessible station. If a public address system were out of order, the entity could designate personnel to provide information to customers with visual impairments.
Transportation for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed.Reg. 45,621 (Sept. 6, 1991) app. D, subpt. G, § 37.161.
The commentary examples do not represent systematic or generalized accommodations, but rather responses to particular service disruptions. Such an approach makes sense as it serves Title II’s purpose of guaranteeing disabled persons equal access to the benefits and services of public entities. The disabled will be less likely to utilize trains, buses, and other services if during accessibility-feature outages they will be left out in the cold, literally. Under 49 C.F.R. § 37.161(b) Lafayette was not required to make Herculean efforts to accommodate Foley and other disabled travelers, just reasonable ones. In my judgment, whether the City of Lafayette satisfied this statutory duty presents a jury question. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision.

. I am unpersuaded that the Colorado case cited by the majority provides useful guidance for the case at bar. See Pack v. Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility, 894 P.2d 34, 39 (Colo.Ct.App.1995). The regulation at issue in Pack, 28 C.F.R. § 35.133, shares language identical to 49 C.F.R. § 37.161(a) and (c). However, the regulation in Pack has no counterpart to § 37.161(b)’s requirement that "reasonable steps to accommodate” be taken during temporary disruptions in service.