Court Opinion

ID: 9370692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 16:09:07.957816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:23.104367
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Harold K. Waldman,                 :
                Appellant          :
                                   :
            v.                     :           No. 12 C.D. 2021
                                   :           Submitted: June 24, 2022
Borough of Fox Chapel Zoning       :
Hearing Board and Borough of       :
Fox Chapel and James and Christine :
Luketich                           :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT                               FILED: February 14, 2023

             Harold K. Waldman (Objector) appeals an order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) that authorized James and
Christine Luketich (Landowners) to build a three-car garage on their property. In
doing so, the trial court affirmed the decision of the Borough of Fox Chapel Zoning
Hearing Board (Zoning Board) that the proposed garage satisfied the setback
requirements of The Fox Chapel Zoning Ordinance.1 On appeal, Objector argues
that the trial court erred in its construction and application of the Zoning Ordinance.
Discerning no merit to Objector’s proffered interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance,
we affirm.

1
  CODE OF THE BOROUGH   OF   FOX CHAPEL, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, §§400-1-400-80
(Zoning Ordinance).
                                    Background
             Landowners own property in the Borough of Fox Chapel at 30 Sweet
Water Lane, and Objector owns an adjacent property at 10 Sweet Water Lane. The
two properties are divided by a north-south property line. A third parcel owned by
Joseph and Karen Kelley abuts the two properties owned by Landowners and
Objector. All three properties are in the Borough’s A-Residence zoning district,
which requires a minimum lot size of three acres.
             In 2017, Landowners’ house and garage were damaged in a fire. On
December 3, 2019, Landowners submitted a building permit application to the
Borough of Fox Chapel to reconstruct a three-car garage with a bedroom suite above
it. Reproduced Record at 119a (R.R. __). On December 11, 2019, the Borough’s
zoning officer issued a building permit for the project.
             On January 10, 2020, Objector appealed the issuance of the building
permit, asserting that the proposed garage violated the applicable setback provisions
in the Zoning Ordinance. Objector contended that the lines of an easement on
Landowners’ property should be used to measure the setbacks. Instead, Landowners
used the boundary with Objector’s property to measure the side setback for the
garage.
             At the Zoning Board hearing, a series of documents were admitted into
evidence. They included a zoning map, the original subdivision plan, the 1992
revised subdivision plan (Stoecklein plan), the 2002 revised subdivision plan
(Waldman plan), Landowners’ 2017 garage expansion and renovation plan, and
Landowners’ current plans for the three-car garage.
             Objector testified about the 40-foot-wide access and utility easement
on Landowners’ property, which extends the length of Landowners’ property and is

                                          2
adjacent to the north-south boundary with Objector’s property. The easement is
paved up to the entrance gate to Landowners’ and Objector’s properties, and the
remainder consists of grass and trees. Objector testified that the easement constitutes
a street because it provides access to his property, as well as to the properties owned
by Landowners and the Kelleys.
             Objector testified that in 2002, he and Landowners reconfigured their
lots by trading various parcels. Objector’s subdivision plan, known as the Waldman
plan, states as follows:

             We, Harold K. Waldman and Diane R. Waldman, owners of a
             portion of the Waldman plan, hereby adopt this plan as our plan
             of lots, and irrevocably dedicate all streets and other property
             identified for dedication on this plan to the Borough of Fox
             Chapel.
Notes of Testimony, 2/19/2020, at 37-38 (N.T. __); R.R. 182a-83a (emphasis
added). Objector explained that the Waldman plan, which is recorded, shows a “50-
foot setback line” on his side of the boundary line. N.T. 41; R.R. 186a. On cross-
examination, Objector acknowledged that the Borough did not accept his dedication
of the street referenced in that plan. N.T. 46-47; R.R. 191a-92a.
             The Borough’s zoning officer, Paul Bell, testified that the easement
provided Landowners, Objector, and the Kelleys with access to Sweet Water Lane.
Otherwise, their lots would be landlocked. Bell testified that Landowners’ proposed
garage was farther from Objector’s property line than it was before the fire. All the
recorded subdivision plans show a 40-foot access and utility easement located
entirely on Landowners’ property, and the Waldman plan shows the side setback as
measured from the boundary between Objector’s and Landowners’ properties, not
from the easement line. Bell testified that were the Borough to treat the access and

                                          3
utility easement as a street, then Landowners’ lot size would fall below the required
three-acre minimum.
              Professor Joseph Mistick testified for Landowners about the Waldman
plan.2 He explained that setbacks are measured from property lines and not “from
access and utility easement[s] or any kind of easement lines.” N.T. 94; R.R. 239a.
Mistick testified that easements neither add to, nor detract from, the buildable area
of a recorded lot. He also testified about relevant case law precedent.
              Counsel for the Kelleys stated at the hearing that a survey done when
they purchased their property showed that they were allowed to use the “40-foot
easement” on Landowners’ property, which provides “the only access to their
property[.]” N.T. 114; R.R. 259a. The Kelley survey was accepted into evidence.
              The Zoning Board denied Objector’s appeal for the stated reason that
the garage setback must be measured from the property boundary line, not from the
easement boundary. It began with Section 400, Attachment 1:6, Part II, of the
Zoning Ordinance, which states:
              [n]o structure of any character shall be closer to any street line or
              property line of any street, road or lane than 75 feet; not closer
              to any side lot line than 40 feet with a combined distance from
              both side lot lines [of] not less than 100 feet; not closer to any
              rear lot line or any parkland than 50 feet.

Zoning Board Opinion at 2, Finding of Fact 3; R.R. 45a, 295a (quoting ZONING
ORDINANCE, §400, Attachment 1:6 Part II). The testimonial and documentary
evidence demonstrated that the proposed garage would be more than 40 feet from
the side lot line. The Zoning Board also found that there was no public or private

2
  Mistick served as chairman of the Zoning Board of Adjustment for the City of Pittsburgh for
seven years. He teaches land use law and the fundamentals of community planning at Duquesne
University School of Law.
                                             4
street, road, or lane located on Landowners’ property.            It credited Mistick’s
testimony that easements should not be deducted from the calculation of a lot’s
required square footage and that setbacks should be measured from the lot line, not
the edge of an easement.3
             Objector appealed to the trial court, which did not take additional
evidence. In an opinion and order dated December 7, 2020, the trial court affirmed
the Zoning Board’s decision in its entirety, concluding that the north-south property
line between Landowners’ and Objector’s respective properties was the proper
starting point for measuring the side lot setback. It observed that the recorded
“subdivision plans, deeds and other documents do not indicate that the easement was
a right-of-way for a road, street or lane.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/2020, at 3.
             Although the Zoning Ordinance does not define the terms “private
road,” “lane” and “road,” the Borough’s Subdivision Ordinance4 does. It defines a
private road as “[a] road not dedicated for general public use or public
maintenance[,]” and a “road” as “[a] right-of-way, municipally or privately owned,
serving or intended to serve as a means of vehicular and pedestrian travel, furnishing
actual or potential access from another road to four or more abutting lots.” SALDO,
§380-3 (emphasis added). A lane is “[a] cartway, which must have a dust-free
surface, providing access from a road to two or three dwellings or their individual
driveways.” Id. (emphasis added). Using these definitions in the SALDO, the trial
court concluded that the easement on Landowners’ property could not be a “road”
because “it is not used for vehicular and pedestrian travel and it does not provide
access . . . to four or more abutting lots.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/2020, at 4. The

3
 The significance of Mistick’s testimony is limited because the law is evidence of itself.
4
 The Borough of Fox Chapel Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance (SALDO), §§380-1-
380-31.
                                            5
easement was not a “lane” because it did not have a “dust-free surface” and because
the Waldman plan did not show that the easement had a dividing line. Instead, the
easement was located entirely on Landowners’ property and “filled with trees and
improved with landscaping.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/2020, at 4.
               Objector appealed to this Court.5
                                               Appeal
               On appeal, Objector raises three issues.6 First, Objector argues that the
trial court erred in holding that the required setback for Landowners’ garage was
properly measured from the common boundary line. He argues that the boundary of
the easement constitutes a “street line” under the Zoning Ordinance. Second,
Objector argues that the trial court erred because the Zoning Board improperly
adjudicated title questions, which are beyond the Board’s jurisdiction. Third,
Objector argues that the trial court erred in affirming the Zoning Board’s decision
permitting reconstruction of a nonconforming structure in violation of the Zoning
Ordinance. Objector Brief at 56.
               The Zoning Board rejoins that its factual findings regarding the
easement were supported by substantial evidence and that it properly construed and
applied the Zoning Ordinance.7 Further, in reaching its conclusion, the Zoning

5
  Where, as here, the trial court has taken no additional evidence, our review is limited to
determining whether the Zoning Board committed an error of law or a manifest abuse of discretion.
Delchester Developers, L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Township of London Grove, 161 A.3d
1081, 1085 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). An abuse of discretion will be found only where the Zoning
Board’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
(quoting Hertzberg v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 721 A.2d 43, 46 (Pa. 1998)).
6
  We have consolidated Objector’s first two issues for the sake of clarity.
7
  Landowners and the Borough filed a joint brief to this Court as intervenors in support of the trial
court and the Zoning Board decisions. Objector moved to strike the Borough’s brief for the stated
reason that, after intervening before the trial court, it did not file a brief. As a result, the Borough
                                                   6
Board did not adjudicate title matters. Accordingly, the trial court appropriately
affirmed its decision.
                                         Analysis
              In his first issue, Objector contends that the side setback for
Landowners’ garage should not have been measured from the property line but,
rather, from the easement line. He argues that the easement is, in actuality, a right-
of-way, and the Zoning Board and trial court erred in otherwise holding.
              With respect to the applicable setback, the Zoning Ordinance states as
follows:
              No structure of any character shall be closer to any street line or
              property line of any street, road or lane than 75 feet; not closer
              to any side lot line than 40 feet with a combined distance from
              both side lot lines of not less than 100 feet; not closer to any rear
              lot line or any parkland than 50 feet.

ZONING ORDINANCE, §400, Attachment 1:6 Part II; R.R. 295a (emphasis added).
Objector argues that to satisfy the setback, Landowners’ garage must be located 75
feet from the boundary line of the easement because it is a street, road, or lane under
the Zoning Ordinance.
              Relying on Mistick’s testimony, inter alia, the Zoning Board concluded
that an easement is not a right-of-way. In Loch v. Zoning Hearing Board of Borough
of Emmaus, 569 A.2d 1035, 1037 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), this Court noted “that
easement rights do not negate open space” and “do not detract from the land area
countable for minimum lot area purposes.” Stated otherwise, the easement was
irrelevant to the location of Landowners’ lot lines, which must enclose a minimum

did not preserve any issue on appeal. However, Objector does not argue that Landowners’ brief
should be stricken. Because it is a joint brief, Objector’s application to strike is denied.
                                             7
of three acres. Likewise, the easement was irrelevant to the measurement of
setbacks, which are determined solely on the basis of lot boundaries.
             Objector argues that the “easement” over which he has a right-of-way
to access his property is a street, road, or lane. The Zoning Board responds that an
easement implies a specific and limited use of land by the holder of the easement
rights. By contrast, a right-of-way benefits the public at large and is created by
condemnation by the Commonwealth, a municipality, or a public utility.
             The Zoning Ordinance defines a “street line or public highway line” as
follows:
             The dividing line between a lot and a public street, road or lane
             dedicated to the public or officially plotted by the Borough, or
             between a lot and a private street, road or lane, over which the
             owners or tenants of two or more lots held in single and separate
             ownership have the right-of-way. The terms street, road and lane
             shall include the cartway, sidewalk, gutter and right-of-way area
             of the street, road or lane.

ZONING ORDINANCE, §400-5; R.R. 97a-98a (emphasis added). The SALDO defines
a “cartway” as “[t]he portion of a road or land intended for vehicular use” and states:
             In determining the width of a cartway, the edge of the cartway is
             considered to be the gutter line or the inside of the curb,
             whichever is more limiting; where a curb is not present, the edge
             of the cartway is considered to be the edge of the area paved for
             vehicular use.

SALDO, §380-3; R.R. 59a. In addition, a cartway must provide access from a road
to two or three dwellings.
             Objector asserts that the boundary of the easement, which is a “right-
of-way,” constitutes a “street line.” Objector argues:
             While the entirety of the [easement] is not now opened for travel,
             it will be as it is the only means of access to the public right-of-
             way the Kelley property has. The purpose in establishing
                                          8
               setbacks is not just for what is built in the present, but to protect,
               preserve and facilitate proper development in the future (as the
               Borough has determined) and to provide persons investing . . .
               money in their homes [with] some reasonable expectation upon
               which they can rely to protect their investments and their
               experience of living in their homes, using the rights-of-way and
               their surrounding property.

Objector Brief at 40. There are several problems with this argument.
               First, the Waldman plan does not state that the easement is intended to
be a road, street, or lane. Further, were the 40-foot-wide easement to be removed
from Landowners’ lot, it would no longer meet the three-acre minimum for the A-
Residence zoning district.8 If that were the case, the Waldman Plan could not have
been accepted by the Borough of Fox Chapel. Further, the zoning officer testified
that for a subdivision plan to show a road, the plan would have to show curves and
radiuses, and none of these are shown on the Waldman plan. N.T. 59-60; R.R. 204a-
05a.
               Second, it is not disputed that the easement is “just natural grass” and
is paved only “up to [the] mutual entrance gates on each side” of Objector’s and
Landowners’ properties. N.T. 47-48; R.R. 192a-93a. “There are sizeable trees on
the easement which provides access to an undeveloped lot to the rear of the
properties.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/2020, at 2. These facts remove the easement
from the definitions of a “right-of-way” or “lane.” See SALDO, §380-3.
               Nevertheless, Objector argues that the paving makes the easement a
lane because it has a “dust-free surface, providing access from a road to two or three
dwellings or their individual driveways.” Objector Brief at 44 (quoting SALDO,

8
  The SALDO provides that in “determining the area of a lot, no part of the right-of-way of a road
or lane, whether public or private, may be included.” SALDO, §380-3. The easement exists
exclusively on Landowners’ property and is included in the three-acre minimum necessary for
inclusion in the A-Residence zoning district.
                                                9
§380-3 (definition of “lane”)). Further, Objector argues that he has a right-of-way,
i.e., “the right to access the utility easement for maintenance, repair and
replacement” and that his property “would be landlocked under Mistick’s
interpretation.” Objector Brief at 45. Indeed, the zoning officer “admitted that the
‘[e]xtension’ of Sweet Water Lane was a private road, which then segues into a
private lane” that connects to the driveways of Landowners and Objector. Objector
Brief at 47. Thus, the so-called “easement” meets the definition of “private road” or
“lane” in the SALDO, and the trial court erred in otherwise holding. We reject
Objector’s argument.
             The Waldman plan places the entirety of the easement on Landowners’
property. That plan states, expressly, that it is an “access easement” and “utility
easement.” R.R. 297a. Under the SALDO, the easement cannot be a “road” because
it serves only three lots. SALDO, §380-3. It cannot be a “lane” because it does not
have a dust free surface for its entire length that is readily accessible and passable
by emergency vehicles. Id. The SALDO states, in relevant part, as follows:
             [R]oads and lanes, whether public or private, shall be constructed
             and maintained with an all-weather, dust-free surface and shall
             at all times be maintained so as to be readily accessible and
             passable by emergency vehicles.

SALDO, §380-19(A). The easement may one day provide access to the yet to be
developed Kelley lot. However, it will still be an easement, not a road, because it
will serve three properties. It will not be a lane unless it is entirely paved, as opposed
to having a gravel or dirt surface. The surface of the easement is a matter for those
that hold the easement interest.
             The Waldman plan identifies the area in dispute as an access and utility
easement, and the area designated an easement does not meet the definition of a road

                                           10
or lane under the SALDO. All of these factors, taken together, support the trial
court’s determination that the boundaries of the easement are not a street line and
that the setback was properly calculated by the Borough’s zoning officer.
             In his second issue, Objector argues that the trial court erred in
affirming the Zoning Board because it adjudicated real estate title matters in a land
use appeal. Objector argues that zoning hearing boards “do not have jurisdiction
over issues of title, determination of real property interests, private contracts or
agreements affecting zoning, such as building or use restrictions created by private
contracts or other recorded instruments.” Objector Brief at 48.
             The Zoning Board responds that this issue was waived because it was
not raised before the Zoning Board and, in any case, it mischaracterizes the Zoning
Board’s decision. We agree.
             Objector notes that he filed a separate declaratory judgment action in
the trial court on August 18, 2020, followed by a motion for clarification, which is
still pending before the trial court, regarding these “title matters.” He suggests that
this Court take judicial notice of the same. The Zoning Board counters that Objector
did not raise this issue until he filed a post-judgment motion and, thus, it is waived.
             A party must raise an issue at the earliest possible opportunity in order
to preserve it for appeal. See Dehus v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 545 A.2d 434, 436 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). Subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised for the first time on appeal. However, we reject Objector’s challenge to the
Zoning Board’s jurisdiction on grounds that it adjudicated the matter of real estate
title. As it must, the Zoning Board construed and applied the Zoning Ordinance
provisions on terms such as “street line.”

                                          11
               In his final issue, Objector argues that the trial court erred because the
building permit will allow Landowners to rebuild a nonconforming garage in
violation of the 50-foot setback from a street line in effect when it was built. The
Zoning Ordinance prohibits the reconstruction of a nonconforming structure that has
been more than 50% destroyed.9 Objector argues that the prior garage was a
nonconforming structure and was 100% destroyed.
               The Zoning Board rejoins that Objector’s claims that the previous
garage was nonconforming when built or that it was completely destroyed lack any
support in the record.         Section 400-17(B) of the Zoning Ordinance is simply
inapposite.
               We agree. Objector’s evidence did not prove that the previous garage
was nonconforming or that it was completely demolished in the fire. Accordingly,
we reject this claim.

9
 The Zoning Ordinance states, in pertinent part, as follows:
      Where at the time of passage of the Fox Chapel Zoning Ordinance of 1935 a lawful
      structure existed which could not be built under the terms of said Zoning Ordinance
      of 1935 or any amendment thereto, including this Zoning Ordinance of 1971, by
      reason of restrictions on area, lot coverage, height, yards, its location on the lot, or
      other requirements concerning the structure, such structure may be continued so
      long as it remains otherwise lawful, subject to the following provisions:
                                              ****
              B. Should such nonconforming structure or nonconforming portion of a
              structure be destroyed by any means to an extent of more than 50% of its
              replacement value at time of destruction, it shall not be reconstructed except
              in conformity with the provisions of this Part 1.
ZONING ORDINANCE, §400-17(B).
                                                 12
                                    Conclusion
             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court.

                            ____________________________________________
                            MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

Judge Wojcik did not participate in the decision of this case.

                                         13
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Harold K. Waldman,                 :
                Appellant          :
                                   :
            v.                     :     No. 12 C.D. 2021
                                   :
Borough of Fox Chapel Zoning       :
Hearing Board and Borough of       :
Fox Chapel and James and Christine :
Luketich                           :

                                 ORDER

           AND NOW, this 14th day of February, 2023, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County, dated December 7, 2020, is AFFIRMED.
           Harold K. Waldman’s Application to Strike Intervenor, Borough of Fox
Chapel’s Brief and Preclude from Oral Argument is DENIED.

                         ____________________________________________
                         MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita