Court Opinion

ID: 9382334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 08:08:54.442272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:38.712108
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
      Second Appellate District of Texas
               at Fort Worth
           ___________________________

                No. 02-22-00216-CV
           ___________________________

            WANDA BOWMAN, Appellant

                          V.

KWA202, LLC DBA KINGSWOOD APARTMENTS, Appellee

       On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
                 Denton County, Texas
          Trial Court No. CV-2022-01483-JP

          Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Wanda Bowman, appearing pro se, appeals the county court at law’s

judgment in a forcible-detainer action granting Appellee KWA202, LLC dba

Kingswood Apartments possession of an apartment located in Denton, Texas. We

vacate the judgment in part and affirm in part.

                                   I. Background

       In March 2022, Bowman1 and Appellee entered into a lease contract for an

apartment.    The initial lease term began on March 18, 2022, and expired on

September 30, 2022. The lease expressly prohibited “smoking of any kind, that is not

in accordance with . . . [l]ease addenda” and contained an addendum that forbade

smoking “in any form, anywhere inside any of the dwelling units, or inside any

buildings within the apartment community.” The addendum made clear that “any

violation of the no-smoking policy is a material and substantial violation . . . and a

breach of the [lease].”

       Despite the clear prohibitions in the lease, Bowman and her fellow tenants

were repeatedly observed smoking in their apartment. Appellee advised Bowman and

the other residents on four occasions that their smoking constituted a violation of the

lease terms. Despite these admonitions, Bowman and the other residents continued

       In addition to Bowman, Andrea Clark and Amanda Griggs signed the lease as
       1

residents. The lease also listed Destiny Griggs and Jayde Alice Sims as occupants.
While the county court’s judgment lists Bowman, Clark, Griggs, and “all occupants”
as defendants in the forcible-detainer suit, only Bowman elected to appeal.

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to smoke in the apartment. As a result, on April 18, 2022, Appellee gave Bowman

and the other residents a written notice to vacate within three days.

      After Bowman and the other residents failed to vacate the apartment by the

deadline contained in the notice, Appellee filed a forcible-detainer action. The justice

court rendered judgment for Appellee, and Bowman and Clark appealed to County

Court at Law No. 2. On June 6, 2022, after a de novo trial, the county court signed a

judgment awarding Appellee possession of the apartment as well as court costs and

$1,250 in attorney’s fees. Bowman filed a notice of appeal the following day.

      On June 15, 2022, the county clerk issued a writ of possession commanding the

constable to deliver possession of the apartment to Appellee. The constable executed

the writ the following day, and Bowman and her co-residents no longer reside in the

apartment.

                                    II. Discussion

      Though Bowman’s appellate arguments are not entirely clear, she lists four

issues in her brief. First, she asserts that her due process rights were violated.

Second, she seeks to “recover [for] the los[s]es and hardship that [she has] endure[d]”

as a result of having her name “slander[ed].” Third, she questions the validity of the

lease and whether Appellee complied with its obligations thereunder.2 Finally, she

      2
         This is the most difficult of Bowman’s arguments to interpret. Her brief poses
her appellate issue as follows: “Is it unconstitutional for [sic] to deprive a person the
right to pursue happiness by holding them hostage and you are allowing [sic] other[s
to] [s]tay where they please?” At other points in her brief, Bowman states that she

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argues that the county court erred by awarding Appellee a judgment for possession of

the apartment.

A.    The Possession Issue Is Moot

      As a preliminary matter, we address whether this appeal is moot because

Bowman has been evicted from the apartment.             Because “[t]he only issue in a

forcible[-]detainer action is the right to actual possession of the premises,” Marshall v.

Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006), a forcible-detainer appeal

becomes moot upon an appellant’s eviction from the property unless (1) the appellant

asserts a meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property, or

(2) damages or attorney’s fees remain at issue. Martinez v. HD Tex. Invs. LLC, No. 02-

21-00178-CV, 2021 WL 4319709, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 23, 2021, no

pet.) (mem. op.); Gillespie v. Erker, No. 02-20-00331-CV, 2021 WL 733084, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Feb. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Ratliff v. Homes by Ashley, Inc.,

No. 02-20-00014-CV, 2020 WL 1057320, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 5, 2020,

no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Because Bowman has been evicted from the apartment, the possession issue is

moot unless Bowman has a meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of

the apartment. See Martinez, 2021 WL 4319709, at *1; Gillespie, 2021 WL 733084, at

was unhappy with the condition of the apartment; that she had asked to be let out of
the lease; that Appellee was “holding [Bowman and the other tenants] hostage” by
refusing to let them out of the lease; and that the lease was “illegal.” Thus, we
construe Bowman’s third issue as a contention that Appellee had breached its
obligations under the lease and that the lease was invalid.

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*1; Ratliff, 2020 WL 1057320, at *1. The apartment lease has expired, and Bowman

presents no basis for claiming a right to possession after expiration of the lease. See

Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. Thus, Bowman’s appeal—as it pertains to the possession

of the apartment—is moot. See Devilbiss v. Burch, No. 04-16-00711-CV, 2018 WL

2418476, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 30, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      Because the possession issue is moot, we must vacate the trial court’s judgment

of possession. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785–90 (holding that because the “case

[wa]s moot . . . the court of appeals erred in dismissing only the appeal and leaving the

trial court’s judgment in place”); Martinez, 2021 WL 4319709, at *1 & n.3 (similar,

quoting Marshall); Devilbiss, 2018 WL 2418476, at *2.

B.    Remaining Issues

      Although the possession issue is moot, issues independent of possession are

still reviewable on appeal. De La Garza v. Riverstone Apartments, No. 04-06-00732-CV,

2007 WL 3270769, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 7, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 707 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.)). In

addition to awarding Appellee possession of the apartment, the county court’s

judgment awarded Appellee costs and attorney’s fees. Thus, while Bowman’s fourth

appellate issue—which solely pertains to possession—is moot, we may still examine

her other issues in the limited context of evaluating the award of costs and attorney’s

fees to Appellee. See, e.g., Allen-Mercer v. Roscoe Props., No. 03-15-00674-CV, 2016 WL

4506294, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

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       In her first issue, Bowman asserts that the “[t]rial [c]ourts” violated her due

process rights. Because she uses the plural, it appears that she intends her due process

complaint to apply to both the justice court and the county court. First, any due

process complaint based on the justice court proceedings is moot because Bowman

received a trial de novo in the county court. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Hous. Auth. of City of

Austin, 385 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) (holding that

complaint that justice court had denied appellant due process was mooted by de novo

trial in county court). With respect to the proceedings in the county court, Bowman

does not specifically state how her due process rights were denied, nor does she

provide any substantive analysis, citations to the record, or citations to any legal

authorities to show that the county court violated her right to due process. Thus, she

has forfeited the issue due to inadequate briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1; Fredonia

State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (observing that

error may be waived by inadequate briefing); McKinnon v. Wallin, No. 03-17-00592-CV,

2018 WL 3849399, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2018, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (holding that pro se appellant had waived his issues by inadequate briefing); see

also Amir-Sharif v. Mason, 243 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“A

pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply

with applicable laws and rules of procedure.” (first citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn,

573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); and then citing Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 126

S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied))). Moreover, even if Bowman

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had adequately briefed the issue, because she did not raise her due process claim in

the county court, she has failed to preserve it for appellate review.3 See Tex. R. App.

P. 33.1; Franklin v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-12-00453-CV, 2014 WL 3696092, at *1

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 24, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[B]ecause [appellant] did

not raise his due process complaint in the trial court, [he] failed to preserve this

complaint for appellate review.”); see also Nivens v. City of League City, 245 S.W.3d 470,

475 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (taxpayers

failed to preserve argument that trial court violated their due process rights by

granting plea to the jurisdiction when they did not raise complaint in trial court).

      In her second issue, Bowman seeks damages against Appellee for slander. But

because Bowman did not assert any counterclaims requesting this affirmative relief in

      3
         At various points in her brief, Bowman suggests that the county court erred by
denying her request for a continuance to allow her additional time to retain counsel.
However, “neither the Texas nor the United States Constitution guarantees a right to
counsel in a civil suit.” Approximately $42,850 v. State, 44 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Further, because Bowman did not raise a
constitutional complaint in the county court concerning the denial of her motion for
continuance, she has forfeited the issue. See, e.g., Graves v. Alders, 132 S.W.3d 12, 16
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) (holding appellant waived claim that trial
court violated due process rights by denying continuance to complete discovery).
Moreover, given that Bowman’s request for continuance was not made until the day
of trial, even if Bowman had preserved her complaint, we could not conclude that the
county court abused its discretion by denying the request. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 253
(“[A]bsence of counsel will not be good cause for a continuance or postponement of
the cause when called for trial, except it be allowed in the discretion of the court,
upon cause shown . . . .”); Smith v. McKinney Hous. Auth., No. 05-08-01466-CV, 2010
WL 3529524, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 13, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g)
(holding reasonable trial judge could conclude appellant did not carry burden to show
sufficient cause for continuance where appellant made only a couple of attempts to
find counsel during the period between date of service of process and trial).

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the county court, we cannot grant her such relief on appeal. See Cnty. of Dall. Tax

Collector v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Dall., 41 S.W.3d 739, 746 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001,

no pet.) (“We cannot grant appellant more relief than was requested of the trial

court.” (citing CRA, Inc. v. Bullock, 615 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1981))); see also Tex. R.

App. P. 43.2. Moreover, like her first issue, Bowman’s second issue is inadequately

briefed and therefore forfeited. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1; Fredonia State Bank, 881

S.W.2d at 284; McKinnon, 2018 WL 3849399, at *2–3.

      In her third issue, Bowman appears to challenge the validity of the lease and

whether Appellee fulfilled all of its obligations thereunder. But because Bowman did

not raise these issues in the county court, she has not preserved them for appeal. 4 See

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Lenk, 361 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex. 2012)

(“When a party fails to preserve error in the trial court or waives an argument on

appeal, an appellate court may not consider the unpreserved or waived issue.”).

Further, like her first two issues, this issue is inadequately briefed and therefore

      4
        Even if we generously construe Bowman’s argument as a complaint regarding
the factual sufficiency of the county court’s implied finding that the lease was valid,
which may be raised for the first time on appeal, see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(d), we still
must overrule her third issue. Appellee offered signed copies of the lease and the no-
smoking addendum into evidence, and Appellee’s representative testified that each
document had been signed by Bowman and the other tenants. Bowman elected to
leave the courtroom and not participate in the evidentiary portion of the hearing and
therefore did not object to any of Appellee’s evidence. On this record, we cannot
conclude that the credible evidence supporting the trial court’s implied finding that
the lease was valid is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the
evidence, that the finding should be set aside. See Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d
629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986);
Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).

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forfeited. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1; Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 284; McKinnon,

2018 WL 3849399, at *2–3.

      For the reasons set forth above, we overrule Bowman’s first, second, and third

issues. Accordingly, we affirm the county court’s award of costs and attorney’s fees to

Appellee. Cf. Devilbiss, 2018 WL 2418476, at *3 (vacating judgment of possession but

affirming judgment in all other respects); Stewart v. Warren Props., Inc., No. 04-13-

00141-CV, 2014 WL 470146, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 5, 2014, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (same).

                                  III. Conclusion

      We vacate the judgment in part and affirm in part. Because the possession

issue is moot, we vacate the trial court’s judgment of possession. We affirm the

judgment in all other respects.

                                                     /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                     Wade Birdwell
                                                     Justice

Delivered: March 23, 2023

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