Court Opinion

ID: 9392769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-06 00:00:49.060112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:48.681651
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50439        Document: 00516740478             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/05/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                      No. 22-50439
                                                                                     May 5, 2023
                                     ____________
                                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
   Erik Carrasco                                                                          Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Terry Henkell,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 7:21-CV-190
                     ______________________________

   Before King, Jones, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Officer Terry Henkell was sued for violating the Fourth Amendment
   after he swore out an allegedly incomplete probable cause affidavit to arrest
   Erik Carrasco. The affidavit did not state that, besides Erik, Henkell had
   information that two other men named “Carrasco” were possible suspects.
   The district court denied Henkell’s motion to dismiss based on qualified

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50439        Document: 00516740478             Page: 2      Date Filed: 05/05/2023

                                         No. 22-50439

   immunity. We reverse and render judgment granting Henkell qualified
   immunity. Even if Henkell violated the Fourth Amendment, something we
   do not decide, Carrasco has not identified a single controlling precedent
   showing that Henkell transgressed clearly established law.
                                              I.
           Crocket Middle School is part of the Ector County Independent
   School District (“District”).1 On November 1, 2019, Officer Terry Henkell,
   a member of the District’s police department, received a call from a female
   seventh grader at Crocket. The student claimed that, on October 23, 2019,
   her substitute teacher, “Mr. Carrasco,” inappropriately touched her breast.
   Over the next several days, Henkell interviewed the victim and other
   students, learning that “Mr. Carrasco” had been substituting at Crocket for
   the past three weeks, was “about 21 years of age,” was “Mexican
   American,” and had brown eyes. Henkell also learned about the teacher’s
   TikTok account (“mlpcrybaby5”), which he advertised to students. Finally,
   Henkell obtained from the District’s human resources office the names and
   contact information of three persons surnamed “Carrasco” employed by the
   District, one of whom was Appellee Erik Carrasco.
           On November 12, 2019, Henkell phoned one of the other Carrascos
   on the list but got no answer. Later that day, without calling the other two
   numbers, Henkell swore out an affidavit to arrest Erik for the crime of
   Indecency with a Child, a second degree felony under Texas law. See Tex.
   Penal Code §§ 21.11(a)(1), (c)(1), (d); id. §§ 21.12(a)(1), (b), (e)(1). The
   affidavit summarized the touching incident according to the accounts of the
   victim and witnesses. It identified the suspect as “Erik Carrasco,” a “white
           _____________________
           1
             The facts are taken from the complaint, whose well-pleaded allegations we accept
   as true for purposes of evaluating the officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity. See
   Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2021).

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                                        No. 22-50439

   male,” with a date of birth making him 29 years old. It also mentioned that
   the suspect talked to students “about Tik Tok.” The affidavit, however, did
   not explain how Henkell’s investigation linked Erik to the touching incident,
   nor did it mention that Henkell had been given the names and contact
   information of two other “Carrascos” employed by the District.
           Erik was arrested and charged with two felonies: Indecency with a
   Child and Sexual Contact and Improper Relationship between Educator and
   Student. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 21.11(a)(1), (c)(1), (d); id.
   §§ 21.12(a)(1), (b), (e)(1). He lost his job and had to hire an attorney, post
   bond, and abide by special bond conditions. The charges against Erik were
   dropped, however, when it came to light that he was the wrong Carrasco.
   True, both Erik and the real suspect taught in the District and both were
   Hispanic. But it turned out that Erik was a tutor at Ector Middle School, not
   a substitute teacher at Crocket. Eric was 29, not 21, and he had hazel eyes,
   not brown eyes. And the TikTok account contained a photo of the real
   suspect that did not look like Erik.
           Erik sued Henkell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest in violation
   of the Fourth Amendment.2 Specifically, Erik alleged that Henkell recklessly
   omitted material facts from his affidavit that, had they been included, would
   have vitiated probable cause to arrest him. See Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d
   483, 494 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[A] defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are
   violated if (1) the affiant, in support of the warrant, includes ‘a false statement
   knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth’ and (2)
   ‘the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.’”
   (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978))). He sought
           _____________________
           2
              Carrasco also claimed that Henkell violated his substantive due process rights
   under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that Carrasco’s claim sounds
   only in the Fourth Amendment. Carrasco v. Henkell, 2022 WL 1760807, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex.
   May 17, 2022). Carrasco does not appeal this ruling.

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   damages for emotional distress, deprivation of liberty, loss of income, and
   damage to his reputation. He also sought attorney’s fees and punitive
   damages.
          Henkell moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and asserted
   qualified immunity. The district court denied Henkell’s motion, holding that
   Carrasco stated a Fourth Amendment claim and that Henkell is not entitled
   to qualified immunity. Carrasco v. Henkell, 2022 WL 1760807, at *3–5 (W.D.
   Tex. May 17, 2022). Henkell appealed.
                                        II.
          We have jurisdiction to review by interlocutory appeal the denial of a
   motion to dismiss premised on qualified immunity. Ramirez v. Escajeda, 921
   F.3d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th
   Cir. 2008)). Our review is “de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true
   and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Brown, 519 F.3d
   at 236 (citation omitted). On interlocutory appeal, however, “our review is
   ‘restricted to determinations of questions of law and legal issues.’” Ramirez,
   921 F.3d at 500 (quoting Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 194 (5th
   Cir. 2009)). Accordingly, in this posture we may review only “whether the
   facts pleaded establish a violation of clearly-established law.” Id. at 501
   (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673 (2009)) (cleaned up).
                                        III.
          To overcome qualified immunity, Carrasco has the burden to
   (1) sufficiently plead that Henkell violated the Fourth Amendment, and
   (2) show that the violation was “clearly established” at the time of the
   alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Club
   Retro, 568 F.3d at 194. On interlocutory appeal, Henkell properly limits his
   arguments to the second prong. See Ramirez, 921 F.3d at 501 & n.3
   (explaining we lack jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal “to decide the

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   sufficiency of the pleadings” (citing Brown, 519 F.3d at 238)). Specifically,
   Henkell argues that Carrasco failed to identify controlling precedent showing
   that he violated clearly established law and that, accordingly, the district
   court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. We
   agree.
            According to Erik’s allegations, Henkell violated the Fourth
   Amendment by submitting an affidavit that recklessly omitted facts that
   would have defeated probable cause. Specifically, he alleges that Henkell left
   out the facts that two other District employees shared Erik’s last name and
   that Henkell had not ruled out those persons before seeking a warrant to
   arrest Erik. The district court agreed. Citing the now-vacated panel opinion
   in Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 17 F.4th 532, 539 (5th Cir. 2021), vacated on en
   banc reh’g, 52 F.4th 363, the court reasoned that Henkell’s failure to eliminate
   suspects with the same last name constituted an “obvious” violation of the
   Supreme Court’s decision in Franks, 438 U.S. 154. Franks held that the
   Fourth Amendment entitles a defendant to a hearing on the veracity of a
   warrant affidavit if he can show “deliberate falsehood” or “reckless
   disregard for the truth” that would defeat probable cause. Id. at 171.
            In qualified immunity cases, courts must not “define clearly
   established law at too high a level of generality.” City of Tahlequah v. Bond,
   142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (per curiam); see also Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359,
   373 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). To be clearly established, a right must be
   “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that
   what he is doing violates that right.” Betts v. Brennan, 22 F.4th 577, 584 (5th
   Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the right must
   be framed “with specificity and granularity.” Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d
   870, 874–75 (5th Cir. 2019). Qualified immunity thus shields officers “unless
   existing precedent ‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue,” Kisela v.
   Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13

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   (2015)), and puts that question “beyond debate,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
   U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
          Those well-settled principles lead us to disagree with the district
   court’s denial of qualified immunity. Instead of framing the claimed right
   with specificity, the court only “recite[d] the general contours of Franks
   liability.” Laviage v. Fite, 47 F.4th 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2022). But the court did
   not identify a single controlling precedent holding that an officer who fails to
   rule out other suspects with the same last name and similar relevant
   characteristics necessarily exhibits a “reckless disregard for the truth” or
   states a “deliberate falsehood.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. Indeed, Erik’s
   counsel admitted the lack of such precedent at oral argument.3
          To defeat qualified immunity, however, “[m]uch more is needed”
   than the ostensible violation of a general legal principle. Laviage, 47 F.4th at
   408. A court “cannot deny qualified immunity without identifying a case in
   which an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated
   the Fourth Amendment, and without explaining why the case clearly
   proscribed the conduct of that individual officer.” Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d
   319, 345 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Vincent v. City of Sulphur, 805 F.3d 543, 547
   (5th Cir. 2015) (“Abstract or general statements of legal principle untethered
   to analogous or near-analogous facts are not sufficient to establish a right
   ‘clearly’ in a given context; rather, the inquiry must focus on whether a right
   is clearly established as to the specific facts of the case.”).
          Indeed, controlling precedent cuts against Carrasco’s position. For
   instance, in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), the Supreme Court held
   that a sheriff did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he arrested

          _____________________
          3
             Oral Argument at 21:17, Carrasco v. Henkell (No. 22-50439),
   https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/22/22-50439_4-3-2023.mp3.

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   Leonard McCollan instead of Linnie McCollan, despite the fact that the
   suspect’s available picture would have alerted the sheriff that Leonard was
   the wrong man. Id. at 145–46. As the Court explained, “[g]iven the
   requirements that arrest be made only on probable cause and that one
   detained be accorded a speedy trial, we do not think a sheriff executing an
   arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate independently
   every claim of innocence.” Id. at 146.
          Our court has also granted qualified immunity in similar cases. For
   instance, in Nerio v. Evans, 974 F.3d 571 (5th Cir. 2020), we granted qualified
   immunity against a Franks claim to officers who mistakenly arrested a man
   with the same name as the suspect (the two men were half-brothers). Id. at
   574–75. Similarly, in Bosarge v. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 796 F.3d 435 (5th
   Cir. 2015), we held it was not a violation of clearly established law when
   narcotics agents wrongly identified the plaintiff as a participant in a drug ring
   and caused him to be detained for six months. Id. at 442. We explained that
   it is “well-established . . . that reasonable mistakes by police officers, even
   leading to the arrest of the wrong person, do not implicate the Fourth
   Amendment.” Id. (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66 (2014)
   (noting that the Fourth Amendment tolerates objectively reasonable
   mistakes)); see also Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1994)
   (officer was entitled to qualified immunity after he arrested a person with
   “the same height and weight, sex, race, age, nickname, and at the location
   where he expected to find [the suspect]”).
          Because no controlling precedent would have given Henkell “fair
   notice” that his conduct was unconstitutional, he is entitled to qualified
   immunity. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). By resolving the
   case on this basis, we necessarily express no opinion whether Henkell’s
   actions, as alleged in the complaint, violated the Fourth Amendment.

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                                        IV.
          We REVERSE the district court’s judgment and RENDER
   judgment dismissing the case against Officer Henkell on the basis of qualified
   immunity.

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