Court Opinion

ID: 9782484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:51:15.946222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:03.257212
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467 (1992), the defendant was tried in absentia despite not having received section 113 — 4(e) admonishments. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, and the State appealed to this court. Before this court, the State argued, inter alia, that, despite the lack of statutory admonishments, “defendant had knowledge that he could be tried in absentia since the bond slip he signed contained a printed notice warning him of the consequence of failure to be present for trial.” Garner, 147 Ill. 2d at 478. Although the court rejected this argument, it did so not because a bond slip may never satisfy the requirements of section 113 — 4(e), but only because the particular bond slip used in that case did not satisfy the requirements of section 113 — 4(e): “We have reviewed the bond slip in this case. Most assuredly, the bond slip states that defendant should appear on June 30, 1981. Additionally, the slip provides a warning of the penalties for failure to appear. Noticeably absent from the slip, however, is any warning of the possibility of trial in absentia. Thus, we find that the bond slip does not satisfy the requirement of section 113 — 4(e).” (Emphasis added.) Garner, 147 Ill. 2d at 478. According to this passage, the only reason that the bond slip in Garner did not satisfy the requirement of section 113 — 4(e) was the absence from that slip of any warning of the possibility of trial in absentia. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2388 (1993) (defining “thus” as either “in this or that manner or way” or “for this or that reason or cause”). Stated conversely, then, had the bond slip in Garner contained a warning of the possibility of trial in absentia, it would have satisfied the requirement of section 113 — 4(e), and the defendant’s trial in absentia would have been proper. This case presents the very situation contemplated but not quite present in Garner. Like the bond slip in Garner, the bond slip in this case most assuredly states that defendant must appear and warns defendant of the penalties for failing to appear. In addition, and unlike the bond slip in Garner, the bond slip in this case most assuredly warns defendant of the possibility of trial in absentia. Thus, the sole deficiency from Garner is cured, and the requirements of section 113 — 4(e) are satisfied fully. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d at 478. This court has explained that section 113 — 4(e) is “a prophylactic measure which is designed both to dissuade defendants from absconding at any time, before or after trial, and to provide for a formal waiver of their right to be present.” People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 41 (1988). Here, both of these purposes were achieved. The bond slip that defendant signed before a deputy court clerk not only informed him of the consequences for failing to appear, up to and including trial and sentencing in absentia, but also put defendant on direct notice that “[his] failure to appear would constitute a waiver of [his] rights to confront the witnesses against him.” These warnings track the language of section 113 — 4(e) exactly, and therefore there is nothing that the trial court could have told defendant through formal admonishment that defendant did not already know. Defendant understood fully the consequences of fleeing, and he chose to flee anyway. To the extent an error in judgment occurred in this case, it is to defendant we must look, not to the trial court. For these reasons, I am convinced that the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant in absentia, and the judgment of the appellate court therefore should be reversed. JUSTICES CARMAN and KARMEIER join in this dissent. Dissenting Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing