Court Opinion

ID: 9520984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:54:36.193303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:25.436991
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting: The statute in question, which has been amended in respects not material to this determination, provides: “In any criminal trial, where a defendant after his trial commences willfully absents himself from court for a period of 2 successive court days, the court shall proceed with the trial. The absence of such defendant shall not operate as a bar to concluding the trial, to a judgment of conviction resulting therefrom, or to a final disposition of the trial in favor of the defendant. ***” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 115—4.1. My quarrel with the majority opinion is that it renders part of this statute meaningless. Construing “shall” as permissive rather than mandatory, the majority reads the statute as permitting a trial judge to proceed or not, at his choice, at any time a defendant wilfully absents himself from court. This construction strips the statutory specification of a wilful absence for “a period of 2 successive court days” of all meaning. We may not treat a statute in this manner, because a fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that each word, clause and sentence of a statute be given some reasonable meaning, if possible. People v. Warren (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 620, 627; see also Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 453, 466; Hirschfield v. Barrett (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 224, 230, cert. denied (1969), 393 U.S. 1062, 21 L. Ed. 2d 706, 89 S. Ct. 716. Absent this statute, in view of the defendant’s sixth amendment right to be present at his trial, and the ordinary criteria for a knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right, a trial judge might well experience some uneasiness about how to proceed when a defendant “willfully absents himself” from court after trial begins. As I view the statute, it is a legitimate exercise of legislative authority that establishes a uniform judicial response to a difficult situation. I see nothing unconstitutional about a legislative directive such as this that safeguards the defendant’s right to be present at his trial while minimizing interference with the court’s business and its calendar. See People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 560 (“The General Assembly has the power to enact laws governing judicial practices when the laws do not unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary ***”); People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268, 274; Strukoff v. Strukoff (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 53, 59. I can accept the majority’s conclusion that the word “shall” is to be interpreted as permissive, provided that the discretion thus lodged in trial judges is limited to their course of action after a defendant’s absence of two days. This interpretation gives substance to the statutory language, permits trial judges flexibility in arranging their court calendars, and offers defendants a reasonable benefit of the doubt regarding an unexplained absence after the commencement of trial. An absent defendant should not be heard to complain, however, if his trial proceeds not on the third successive court day after he absents himself, but on a later day. Where a trial is to a jury, the trial judge would be likely, even in the absence of a statute, to make an effort to proceed on the third day or as soon thereafter as practicable in order to release the jury as early as possible. Where I part company with the majority is with reference to what the statute requires during the first two court days. I find no basis for the majority’s conclusion that during this period the court has discretion to proceed. As I read the statute, it clearly provides the opposite and requires that the trial not proceed for the specified period. During this period, the trial judge often will not even be certain that the defendant’s absence is wilful. If the defendant is absent for two days without explanation, however, the statute in effect creates a presumption that the absence is wilful. I do not regard this interpretation of the statute as incompatible with our State constitution’s separation-of-powers provision (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, sec. 1) because, if the statute intrudes on court procedure, the intrusion is only a minor one and does not unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary. (See City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 170, 174-75 (“separation of powers does not forbid every exercise of functions by one branch of government which conventionally is exercised by another branch”); People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 560; People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268, 274; Strukoff v. Strukoff (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 53, 59.) I believe that the statute interpreted in this manner is an appropriate legislative response looking towards a uniform solution in our trial courts to the problem of a defendant who wilfully absents himself after his trial has commenced. Thus, I conclude that the trial judge erred when he overrode the statute on constitutional grounds and that he should have waited for two successive court days before proceeding.