Court Opinion

ID: 9951777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 00:02:11.106471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:38.314051
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30707           Document: 54-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/18/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                                   No. 23-30707                                     FILED
                                                                              March 18, 2024
                                 Summary Calendar
                                 ____________                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
Elvelyn Smith, on behalf of her minor son,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

Bogalusa City; Bogalusa Police Department; Bogalusa
City Schools,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:22-CV-3380
                  ______________________________

Before Davis, Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Plaintiff-Appellant, Elvelyn Smith, appeals the district court’s order
dismissing her complaint without prejudice for failure to prosecute under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). We AFFIRM.

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30707        Document: 54-1        Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/18/2024

                                 No. 23-30707

                                       I.
       On September 20, 2022, Smith filed a complaint, on behalf of her
minor child, against the city of Bogalusa, the Bogalusa Police Department,
and the Bogalusa School Board (collectively “Defendants”).             Smith’s
complaint alleges that on September 21, 2021, police officers with the
Bogalusa Police Department “violently attacked” her son at the Bogalusa
High School. The complaint additionally states that the Bogalusa School
Board failed to protect Smith’s son, who at the time of the alleged beating
was a special needs student at the high school. Smith asserts claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, state law claims for battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligence, and claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
       On February 16, 2023, Smith’s counsel, Carl Perkins, failed to call into
a scheduling conference set by the district court. Later that day, the district
court issued an order continuing the scheduling conference to March 2, 2023,
“[d]ue to the unavailability of counsel for plaintiff.” The court’s order also
advised that “[f]ailure of plaintiff’s counsel to appear may result in
DISMISSAL of the case, without any further notice, for failure to
prosecute.” A few days later, Perkins informed the court that he intended to
withdraw as counsel and have new counsel enroll. However, by March 2, no
additional counsel for Plaintiff had enrolled, and Perkins again did not call
into the rescheduled conference.
       On March 6, 2023, the district court ordered Smith to submit in
writing, within fourteen days, why her case should not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute. The court warned that failure to comply with this show
cause order may result in the dismissal of Smith’s case without further
notice. Rather than reply to the order, Smith filed a motion to enroll Lillian
Ratliff as additional counsel of record, explaining that Perkins, her counsel of

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Case: 23-30707            Document: 54-1           Page: 3     Date Filed: 03/18/2024

                                       No. 23-30707

record, was undergoing “intense radiation treatment for prostate cancer in
Texas” and has “not had the opportunity to file the documents to . . .
withdraw from this matter.” The district court granted Smith’s motion to
enroll additional counsel and scheduled a conference for April 27, 2023. Due
to a conflict in the court’s calendar, the conference was reset for May 4, 2023.
On May 4, neither party called into the scheduling conference.
       On May 15, 2023, the district court sua sponte dismissed Smith’s
claims for want of prosecution under Rule 41(b). The dismissal was without
prejudice. The court noted that Smith’s counsel had failed to attend three
scheduling conferences, causing the case to remain stagnant without any
deadlines. And although the court explained it was “sympathetic to Mr.
Perkins’ illness, he is still enrolled in this matter and maintains a duty to his
client and to this Court,” and that Smith’s “additional counsel, Lillian
Ratliff, also failed to appear at the most recent scheduling conference.”
       In response, Plaintiff’s additional counsel, Ratliff, filed a motion to
reconsider or, in the alternative, a motion for leave to refile and to waive the
filing fee, explaining that she called in twenty-one minutes late to the May 4
conference because she was stuck in “congested traffic” and unable “to exit
the interstate in a safe manner.” The district court denied the motion. Smith
timely appealed.
                                             II.
       A district court may sua sponte dismiss an action for failure to
prosecute or comply with a court order with or without notice to the parties. 1
We review such dismissals under Rule 41(b) for abuse of discretion. 2 When
       _____________________
       1
         Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir.
1988) (per curiam).
       2
           Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 798, 801 (5th Cir. 2021).

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 Case: 23-30707            Document: 54-1           Page: 4       Date Filed: 03/18/2024

                                         No. 23-30707

a district court dismisses a suit without prejudice, we “apply a less stringent
standard of review . . . , because the plaintiff would be able to file his suit
again.” 3      However, “[w]hen a dismissal is without prejudice but the
applicable statute of limitations probably bars future litigation, our
examination is searching, and review the dismissal as we would a dismissal
with prejudice.” 4 Here, the district court specified that dismissal was
without prejudice, and Smith does not contend that the statute of limitations
has run on any of her claims. 5 To the contrary, Smith filed a motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal or alternatively for leave to refile the suit,
suggesting that her claims are not time-barred. Accordingly, we apply the
less exacting standard of review to the district court’s dismissal. 6
        On appeal, Smith argues that her counsel had “good cause” for not
attending the scheduling conferences and that her counsel’s twenty-one-
minute delay in calling into the third rescheduled conference is not grounds
for dismissal for failure to prosecute. Additionally, Smith argues that a
district court may not dismiss a case for failure to prosecute unless the case

        _____________________
        3
            Boazman v. Econ. Lab’y, Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212–13 (5th Cir. 1976).
        4
          Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
        5
          A plaintiff “forfeit[s] the argument that a more exacting standard of review
applies” to a Rule 41(b) dismissal without prejudice based on the statute of limitations by
failing “to describe which of their claims specifically are time-barred, how they are time-
barred, and why they are time-barred.” Jones v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., No. 23-10148, 2023
WL 6518145, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished).
        6
           McCullough, 835 F.2d at 1126–27 (applying the abuse of discretion standard
because the district court order was without prejudice and there was “no indication that
the statute of limitations on [plaintiff’s] action has run”); see also Francois v. City of Gretna,
668 F. App’x 574, 575 n.1 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (refusing to review
the district court’s dismissal without prejudice under the heightened dismissal with
prejudice standard because plaintiffs did not contend the statute of limitations had run on
their claims).

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 Case: 23-30707            Document: 54-1          Page: 5        Date Filed: 03/18/2024

                                         No. 23-30707

has been delayed for six months and the court gives notice to the parties.
Both of Smith’s arguments lack merit.
        The district court acted within its discretion by dismissing Smith’s
case without prejudice. In McCullough v. Lynaugh, this Court affirmed a
district court’s dismissal without prejudice due to a pro se plaintiff’s failure
to attend a status conference, even though the plaintiff had up to that point
been conscientiously litigating his case. 7 In affirming the dismissal, we
emphasized that “[f]ailure to attend a hearing is a critical default,” and that
in “such circumstances trial courts must be allowed leeway in the difficult
task of keeping their dockets moving.” 8 Here, the grounds for dismissal are
even stronger. Specifically, unlike in McCullough, Smith’s counsel missed
three conferences and did not respond to the court’s show cause order. 9
Such failures are particularly notable given that counsel received two
warnings from the court that failure to appear could result in the dismissal of
the case without further notice. Moreover, as in McCullough, because the
dismissal is without prejudice, Smith “has not suffered prejudicial harm
resulting from the dismissal.” 10
        For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Smith’s complaint without prejudice under Rule 41(b).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

        _____________________
        7
           McCullough, 835 F.2d at 1126–27; see also Francois, 668 F. App’x at 575–76
(concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing pro se plaintiffs’ suit
for failure to appear at a status conference).
        8
            McCullough, 835 F.2d at 1127.
        9
          Although Smith’s appellate brief focuses on the reasons her counsel did not
attend the three scheduling conferences, she does not address the fact that her counsel
never responded in writing to the district court’s show cause order.
        10
             Id.

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