Court Opinion

ID: 9712763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:59:25.56695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.279352
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. Although not discussed by the majority, the record clearly shows that the appellant failed to comply with the requirements of Section (f) of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100, which provides, in pertinent part, that:
“At any time before trial, the defendant or his attorney may apply to the court for an order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this Rule has been violated.”
Thus, we are properly concerned here with the question of whether the appellant waived his right to a speedy trial, not, as perceived by the majority, whether the lower court erred by granting the Commonwealth an extension of time for commencement of trial. Because I believe that such a waiver occurred, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
It has long been held in this Commonwealth that failure to object properly constitutes a waiver of the right to a speedy trial. See Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 458 Pa. 351, 326 A.2d 285 (1974), and cases cited therein. Prior to the promulgation of Rule 1100, an objection to the length of delay in being brought to trial was proper*302ly raised in a pre-trial motion to quash the indictment.1 E. g., Commonwealth v. Gates, 429 Pa. 453, 240 A.2d 815 (1968). See Pa.R.Crim.P. 304. Similarly, Rule 1100 (f) requires an accused to file a petition before trial showing that the prescribed time period has expired. Here, however, no such petition was filed. The appellant did not formally assert his right to a speedy trial until after trial on the drug charge and after pleading guilty to the other three charges. Certainly, by this time, the appellant had forfeited his right to a speedy trial.
In Section (f) of Rule 1100, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically prescribes the exclusive method by which an accused may gain relief from a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Under Section (f), an accused may apply to the lower court for an order dismissing the charges only if such application is made prior to trial, but after the expiration of the prescribed period. Here, the appellant’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated when he filed his answer to the Commonwealth’s petition for an extension of time. Therefore, the appellant’s answer to the Commonwealth’s petition cannot satisfy the requirement of Rule 1100(f), as promulgated by our supreme court, that an accused’s application for dismissal be predicated upon a violation of the prescribed time period. The majority, however, would ignore the clear mandate of Rule 1100(f) in the present situation. The majority describes this interpretation of the prescribed procedure of Rule 1100(f) as “senseless” and “wasteful” because “presumably” the parties had made their respective arguments at the hearing on the petition for extension. Even assuming, argu-*303endo, that such arguments had been made, Rule 1100(f) requires that the issue of a speedy trial violation be affirmatively and clearly, not presumptively, preserved by means of a timely application. The procedure approved by the majority simply does not do this.
The appellant presents no other issue for our consideration. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of sentence.
VAN der VOORT, J., joins this opinion.

. However, in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Patterson, 409 Pa. 500, 187 A.2d 278 (1963), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the defendant’s pre-trial motion to nolle pros, thei indictment, although not technically proper, was sufficient to preclude a waiver of the right to a speedy trial. Although the form of the objection might therefore vary, it is clear that the objection could not be raised after trial.