Court Opinion

ID: 9575148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:02.994503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:51.018929
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that summary judgment was improperly granted because there is evidence the hole was a concealed hazard. The plaintiff testified in her deposition that, “I believe that the way the road is curved and the way the shadows of the buildings are there, that you would not see it unless you knew that that hole was there.” In other words, the plaintiff claims the combination of these two factors obscured the hole or produced an optical illusion which prevented her from seeing it.
It is undisputed that the accident occurred on a clear day be*540tween 10:00 a.m. and noon, and the plaintiff testified that she was not distracted in any way. She further testified: “I had a plain view of the area. I looked across. I saw no obstructions to go across that area; saw no holes. Saw nothing that looked unusual, went to go get the papers, and when I did, I ended up in the hole. . . . There was nothing in front of it [the hole] or behind it that would have blocked the view.” Apart from her specific claims that the hole was obscured by shadows and the curve of the road, this evidence establishes that the hole was a discernible hazard and the plaintiff’s ability to apprehend the dangerous condition was otherwise unimpeded. If an invitee knows of a condition or hazard, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have been aware of it, the proprietor has no legal duty to warn the invitee and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge of the discernible hazard as the proprietor does. Froman v. George Smith &c. Auth., 197 Ga. App. 338, 339 (398 SE2d 413) (1990); Gyles, Inc. v. Turner, 184 Ga. App. 376, 377 (361 SE2d 538) (1987); Amear v. Hall, 164 Ga. App. 163, 167 (296 SE2d 611) (1982); compare Nunnelley v. Brown, 197 Ga. App. 711 (399 SE2d 219) (1990) (despite plaintiff’s claim that optical illusion obscured view, defendant granted summary judgment where plaintiff encountered steps in plain view, under clear conditions, with no distractions).
Moreover, the trial judge was authorized, as a matter of law, to conclude that the plaintiff’s claims that the hole was obscured created no issue of fact on summary judgment. At her deposition the plaintiff presented testimony and evidence which contradicted her testimony that shadows and the curve of the road obscured the hole. When asked if it was her testimony that the hole was obscured by shadows at the time when the accident occurred between 10:00 a.m. and noon, the plaintiff responded: “I think the hole just basically is not easily seen. I think it has to do with the way the road and shadows and the buildings are. I don’t directly recall if there were shadows at that time of day, but it is not able to be seen.” At the deposition the plaintiff produced photographs of the scene taken between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. a few days after the accident. The photographs showed apparent shadows at that time of day, and perhaps a slight crown in the road, but no discernible curvature to the road which could have possibly contributed to obscuring the hole.
Although all evidence is to be construed against the movant on summary judgment, an exception to this rule provides that the testimony of a non-moving party in her own behalf is to be construed most strongly against her when it is contradictory, vague or equivocal. Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27, 30 (343 SE2d 680) (1986). If a reasonable explanation is subsequently offered to explain the contradiction, the testimony will not be construed against *541the party giving it. Whether testimony is contradictory, and whether the party giving it has carried the burden of offering a reasonable explanation is an issue of law for the trial judge on summary judgment. Id. at 30; Thacker v. Matthews Tuxedo, 183 Ga. App. 474, 475 (359 SE2d 231) (1987).
Decided January 6, 1992
Reconsideration denied January 22, 1992.
Fleming, Blanchard & Bonner, G. Larry Bonner, for appellant.
Allgood, Childs, Mehrhof & Millians, Richard R. Mehrhof, Jr., for appellee.
The plaintiff contradicted her claim that shadows and the curve of the road obscured the hole when she later testified that she could not recall whether there were shadows at the time of the accident, and produced photographs of the accident scene which did not support her claim that the hole was in any way obscured by a curve in the road. See Prophecy Corp., supra at 31 (witness’ testimony that he could not recall contradicted his testimony that the event had occurred). Since the plaintiff offered no explanation for the contradiction, the trial judge was authorized to construe the plaintiff’s testimony that the hole was obscured against her. In the absence of this claim, there is no evidence that anything obscured the hole or otherwise prevented the plaintiff from seeing it. The hole was an open and observable static condition of which an invitee exercising ordinary care would or should have had as much knowledge as the proprietor. Jeter v. Edwards, 180 Ga. App. 283 (349 SE2d 28) (1986); Harmon v. Reames, 188 Ga. App. 812, 814 (374 SE2d 539) (1988). The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendant because the facts are so plain and palpable that they demand a finding, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care to avoid the hazard. Folks, Inc. v. Dobbs, 181 Ga. App. 311, 312 (352 SE2d 212) (1986); Soto v. Roswell Townhomes, 183 Ga. App. 286 (358 SE2d 670) (1987).