Court Opinion

ID: 9499016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:35:31.377603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:14.026151
License: Public Domain

SILER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the conclusions by the majority in part III of its decision, that is, I agree that counsel was not ineffective during the guilt phase of the trial and that the trial court did not err by allowing Dickerson to waive trial by jury in favor of a trial by a three-judge panel. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), during the mitigation part of the trial.
I agree with the majority that the applicable Supreme Court law comes from Strickland and subsequent Supreme Court cases which have interpreted Strickland. I also agree with the majority that in Supreme Court precedence, the ABA Guidelines state the required professional obligation of conduct in mitigation investigation. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 376 n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 485-88 (6th Cir.2003). I accept the criteria from those cases, although some attorneys must think it strange that counsel in 1985, when this case was tried, had to adhere to the 1989 ABA Guidelines and the 2003 Guidelines, which were adopted subsequent to the trial in this case. However, the rationale for these standards is explained in Hamblin, 354 F.3d at 487-88.
As the majority opinion states, the district court discussed the mitigating evidence which defense counsel did not produce at trial. It is true that the Ohio Court of Appeals found that strategic and tactical decisions were made by defense counsel in declining to put on additional mitigating evidence, and the district court found that that was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. Although I would not characterize the actions by defense counsel during mitigation as strategic choices, I suggest that Dickerson cannot establish prejudice here under Strickland sufficient for us to conclude that counsel was ineffective.
To assess the potential prejudice to the accused at sentencing, the court should weigh the evidence and aggravation *701against the total available mitigating evidence adduced at trial and in post-conviction proceedings, see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), to determine “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Where at least some evidence in mitigation has been researched and presented, Dickerson must show how counsel’s alleged deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of his sentencing proceeding. See Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 613 (6th Cir.2002).
Dickerson’s counsel presented eight witnesses in mitigation. Psychiatrists Gottlieb and Sherman testified that, at the time of committing the offenses, Dickerson lacked the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Dr. Gottlieb described Dickerson’s intense feelings of loss of control after his mother died and after Denise Howard left him. He concluded that Dickerson suffered from depression, had personality problems with antisocial and paranoid traits, felt powerless, and expressed rage and despair. Dr. Sherman diagnosed Dickerson as having a borderline personality disorder and emphasized that Dickerson was unable to tolerate separation and unable to integrate facts. He stated that it was unlikely that Dickerson would have committed the crimes if not for the loss of his mother and the loss of Howard. Dickerson’s sister and estranged wife testified about his close bond to his mother, the severe depression he suffered after his mother died, and the deterioration in-his appearance and behavior after Howard left him. Other witnesses recounted their contacts with Dickerson and said that he was a troubled man who regretted his conduct.
Although Dickerson claims that counsel could have collected additional mitigating evidence regarding his family background, much of his family background was introduced through family members and the psychiatrists. The majority suggests that the psychiatrists did not talk about Dickerson’s IQ of 77, which is very close to the retarded level. However, it is not below the retarded level, and the psychiatrists testified that Dickerson had many mental problems. If Dickerson could prove that he was below the retardation line at the time of the offense, he had the right under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), to show that he could not be executed at all. That issue is not before this court presently. The failure to produce all of Dickerson’s family background did not amount to ineffective assistance. Although this evidence would have helped to explain the source of Dickerson’s psychological problems, the psychiatrists who testified at trial described Dickerson’s traits and linked these to the crimes Dickerson committed. Notably, Dickerson’s post-conviction experts did not uncover any previously undiagnosed psychological or physical conditions. Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude that counsel’s alleged deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of Dickerson’s sentencing proceeding. See Slaughter v. Parker, 450 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. June 13, 2006); Martin, 280 F.3d at 613.
Our precedent supports the conclusion that Dickerson has not shown prejudice. See, e.g., Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 331-32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 744, 163 L.Ed.2d 582 (2005)(rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where a mitigation psychologist was not retained until the day before the mitigation hearing, as the mitigation theory that the psychologist presented did not differ materially from the one that would have been presented with *702more preparation); Martin, 280 F.3d at 614 (psychologist’s post-conviction assertion that petitioner suffered from a “severe psychological disorder” did not show that petitioner was prejudiced by the use of a psychological workup prepared by the state); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1312-13 (6th Cir.1996) (counsel was not ineffective for presenting an expert who gave a frank opinion that petitioner was sociopathic).
Defense counsel introduced a lot of mitigating evidence. In hindsight, of course, one can always find additional witnesses who could have testified in mitigation, but the issue is whether it was prejudicial to fail to have those witnesses testify. Some of the evidence which Dickerson claims should have been produced in mitigation is in direct contradiction to testimony at trial or with other testimony which he suggests should have been introduced. For instance, he suggests that someone should have testified that his mother referred to him as “the moron.” However, that would appear to be in direct contradiction to the testimony at trial by his sister and estranged wife that he had a close bond to his mother and went into a severe depression after his mother died. Moreover, Dickerson suggests that proof should have been presented that Dickerson had an ideation attachment to his mother which prevented him from having a meaningful relationship with another woman. Again, that would be contradicted by evidence that his mother called him a moron or by a mother who was engaged in prostitution. Therefore, I do not find prejudice, so I would affirm the decision of the district court in concluding that the Ohio Court of Appeals’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.