Court Opinion

ID: 9647382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:34:33.799035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:48.602750
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority grants O’Leary a new trial to permit her to present a theory of recovery never advanced in her pleadings or at any time during the original trial. The result is manifestly unfair and in viola*207tion of the intendment of Maryland Rule 8-131(a) (formerly Rule 885).
O’Leary’s complaint for injunctive relief and damages advanced several theories. She alleged that she was a Democrat, Shipley was a Republican, and that Shipley refused to reappoint her in retaliation for her having opposed him in the general election. She alleged that Shipley’s action violated a by-law of the Maryland Court Clerks Association, which specified that members of the association should not refuse to employ any individual because of political affiliation. Further, she alleged that in failing to reappoint her, Shipley violated a State constitutional mandate that he confer with the circuit judges of Carroll County before making his decision. Finally, she claimed that Shipley had deprived her of two weeks salary to which she was entitled. At no point in her complaint did she allege or suggest that Shipley’s failure to reappoint her was in retaliation for her exercise of free speech. At trial, O’Leary made no claim that her speech on matters of public concern had anything to do with her failure to achieve reappointment. In a very brief opening statement, her attorney said, “Initially we intend to prove by the testimony given today, and any documentation that we might submit, that the sole reason for the failure of the Defendant to reappoint our client, Ms. Diane O’Leary, was a political reason____” In closing argument, her attorney said:
We feel that ... we have indicated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff, Ms. O’Leary, has ... set forth that she was not reappointed solely for only one reason, sole fact to consider, and that is the fact that she declared her candidacy and that she ran against the incumbent, the Defendant, Mr. Shipley.
# Jit 3ft * * #
The evidence of Mr. Shipley so far as any other reason other than a political reason certainly was not corroborated in any way, it was sparse, it was very vague —
*208[W]e have also established the fact that the sole reason for her separation was due to a political reason____
O’Leary never mentioned Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), or any other case dealing with dismissal of public employees for their speech on matters of public concern. She did not suggest to the trial judge that he should employ the Pickering test, or that the burden should be upon Shipley to show that Shipley would have reached the same employment decision even in the absence of protected speech. She did not interpose any objection when the trial judge allocated to her the burden of proving that Shipley failed to reappoint her for purely political reasons. Indeed, she agreed that the burden was properly upon her. The Pickering theory of liability was injected into this case for the first time when O’Leary, who had by that time changed attorneys, filed her brief on appeal. Rule 885, which was in effect when this case was briefed and argued, provided that “[t]his Court will not ordinarily decide any point or question which does not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the circuit court.” Successor Rule 8-131(a) is to the same effect. As we pointed out in Banks v. State, 203 Md. 488, 495, 102 A.2d 267 (1954), this rule was adopted to ensure fairness for all parties in a case, and to promote the orderly administration of the law. See also Medley v. State, 52 Md.App. 225, 230-31, 448 A.2d 363 (1982). We have said that a petitioner is bound to the theory he elects to pursue at trial. Kasten Constr. Co. v. Jolles, 262 Md. 527, 533-34, 278 A.2d 48 (1971). See also Chertkof v. Dep’t of Nat. Resources, 43 Md.App. 10, 16-18, 402 A.2d 1315 (1979).
The rule rests on a solid foundation. It is manifestly unfair to reverse a trial judge on a ruling he was never allowed to make—on an issue that was never placed before him. It is equally unfair to subject a defendant to successive trials for claims arising out of the same occurrence, *209simply because the plaintiff develops a theory she did not have before, or wishes to try a new tactic. And, quite apart from the question of fairness, our court system cannot afford the luxury of granting a new trial to a disappointed litigant who would like to try a different approach.
A plaintiff should be given a full and fair opportunity to present all claims she or he may have against a defendant as a result of the given transaction or occurrence. Our rules of pleading, including those relating to amendment, are deliberately structured to effectuate this purpose. O’Leary was free to present alternative claims, regardless of consistency. Maryland Rule 2-303(c). She did not do so. She was free to seek amendment of her pleadings, argue the Pickering theory, or object to the trial judge’s failure to allocate the burden of persuasion in a different manner. She did not do so. I would affirm.
ADKINS and BLACKWELL, JJ., join in this dissent.