Court Opinion

ID: 9882686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:18:31.632531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:43.521793
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Mill Creek Metro. Park Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Hough, 2023-Ohio-3426.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 MAHONING COUNTY

THE BOARD OF                                              APPEAL NO. 21MA065
COMMISSIONERS OF THE MILL
CREEK METROPOLITAN                                        TRIAL COURT NO. 2019 CV 179
PARK DISTRICT,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE ,

v.

THOMAS HOUGH, ET AL.,

        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                         OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                  Case No. 21MA065

                         BEFORE:
                          Judge Jason P. Smith (Sitting by Assignment)
                          Judge Peter B. Abele (Sitting by Assignment)
                          Judge Michael D. Hess (Sitting by Assignment)
__________________________________________________________________

                  JUDGMENT VACATED AND REMANDED
__________________________________________________________________
Molly K. Johnson                    James E. Roberts
Jason Rebraca                       Elizabeth H. Farbman
Johnson & Johnson                   Roth, Blair, Roberts, Strasfeld
12 West Main Street                 & Lodge
Canfield, Ohio 44406                100 Federal Plaza East, Suite 600
Attorney for Appellant              Youngstown, Ohio 44503
                                    Attorney for Appellee

                                       RELEASED: 09/22/23
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                                2

      {¶1} Appellant, Thomas Hough, appeals the judgment of the Mahoning

County Court of Common Pleas which entered judgment in favor of Appellee, the

Board of Commissioners of the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District (hereinafter

“Mill Creek”). The judgment was entered after a jury determined the amount of

compensation due to Hough as a result of Mill Creek’s taking of a portion of

Hough’s private property for the creation of a bikeway trail. Hough also appeals

the trial court’s subsequent denial of his motion to reopen, which was filed

pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). On appeal, Hough raises two assignments of error

contending 1) that the trial court erred in failing to make a determination as to

whether or not Mill Creek complied with R.C. 163.04, R.C. 163.041, and R.C.

163.05, as required by R.C. 163.09; and 2) that the trial court erred in failing to

address Hough’s arguments under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and 60(B)(5).

      {¶2} Because we conclude that the trial court’s order permitting Hough to

amend his answer in effect permitted Hough to challenge Mill Creek’s authority

and/or necessity to appropriate the property at issue, an obligation was created on

the part of the trial court at that time to set the matter for a necessity hearing as

required by R.C. 163.09(B)(1). We further conclude that because the trial court

did not make a determination regarding necessity prior to submitting the case to the

jury on the issue of compensation or before subsequently rendering final judgment,

the trial court erred. Accordingly, the “Agreed Jury Award and Magistrate’s
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                               3

Decision” as well as the “Judgment Entry” issued by the trial court, both of which

are dated June 18, 2021, are hereby vacated.

      {¶3} Furthermore, this matter is remanded with instructions for the trial

court to permit additional pleadings and evidence as necessary in response to the

trial court’s allowance of Hough’s answer to be amended to challenge Mill Creek’s

right to appropriate the property at issue and to set the matter for a necessity

hearing as required by to R.C. 163.09 before proceeding to a determination on

compensation.

                                       FACTS

      {¶4} This matter began with Mill Creek’s filing of a “Petition/Complaint to

Appropriate Property” on January 24, 2019. The petition sought to appropriate a

portion of Hough’s property for a 6.4 mile extension of a 10.6 mile bikeway trail

that was initially constructed in 2000 and 2001. The initial 10.6 mile trail was

identified as Phases I and II. The petition alleged that Mill Creek had the authority

to appropriate the property by virtue of a resolution passed in 1993 “resolving that

the public interest demanded the construction of a bicycle path on a railroad right-

of-way abandoned by Conrail.” The petition also alleged that another resolution

that was passed on September 10, 2018 resolved as follows:

      * * * that it was necessary and in the best public interest that Mill
      Creek be authorized to complete Phase III of the Bikeway project
      and, further, that Mill Creek be authorized to consummate and
      complete all acquisition transactions as may be necessary to
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                                4

      acquire the real property contemplated for inclusion in Phase III
      of the project or, in instances where agreement cannot be reached
      with the landowner, that Mill Creek by and through its legal
      counsel be authorized to appropriate such property by power of
      eminent domain and initiate legal proceedings pursuant to Ohio
      Revised Code Chapter 163.

      {¶5} Mill Creek further alleged in its petition that it had “complied with the

requirements of R.C. §§ 163.04 and 163.041 by providing and delivering a written

Notice of Intent to Acquire and Good Faith Offer at least thirty (30) days prior to

the filing of this action.” The petition stated that “[t]rue and accurate copies of

Mill Creek’s Notice of Intent to Acquire and Good Faith Offer are attached hereto

as Exhibit 5.” The paper court record indicates that the petition did in fact have

several exhibits attached to it, one of which was the Notice of Intent to Acquire

and Good Faith Offer.

      (¶6} Hough filed his answer on February 13, 2019. Hough’s answer

generally denied, for lack of information, nearly all of the allegations contained in

Mill Creek’s petition. However, the answer specifically denied Mill Creek’s claim

that it had complied with the requirements of R.C. 163.04 and 163.041 relating to

the provision of the Notice of Intent to Acquire and Good Faith Offer. The answer

also specifically denied Mill Creek’s claim that the fair market value of the

property sought to be appropriated was $63,010.00. The answer did not set forth

any facts in support of these two specific denials.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                                5

      {¶7} At this point, the matter proceeded through motion practice and

discovery with the taking of several depositions, including the deposition of Hough

and John Saunders, an expert retained by Hough to render an opinion regarding the

value of topsoil and other materials located on Hough’s property in the area sought

to be appropriated. Thereafter, a jury was empaneled and a compensation trial was

held. Because this Court has only been provided with excerpts of the jury trial

transcript and was provided none of the trial exhibits, we do not have a complete

picture of what transpired at trial. However, at issue in this matter is what occurred

at the very end of trial, just before the matter was submitted to the jury for

deliberation.

      {¶8} At the conclusion of evidence, it appears that Hough’s counsel orally

moved for a directed verdict, and also moved the court to amend the pleadings to

conform to the evidence pursuant to Civ.R. 15. As will be discussed more fully

below, evidence introduced at trial indicated that the Notice of Intent to Acquire

and Good Faith Offer were provided to Hough by either a contractor of Mill Creek,

or by the contractor’s subcontractor, rather than by Mill Creek itself. Based upon

this testimony, Hough sought to amend his answer to challenge Mill Creek’s

authority to appropriate his property. Although the trial court denied Hough’s

motion for a directed verdict, a review of an excerpt of the trial transcript reveals

that the trial court granted Hough’s motion to amend the pleadings to conform to
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                               6

the evidence. More specifically, the trial court permitted Hough to amend his

answer to assert an “affirmative defense” regarding Mill Creek’s provision of the

Notice of Intent to Acquire and Good Faith Offer.

      {¶9} Thereafter, however, the trial court handed the matter over to the jury

for deliberation on the issue of compensation. The jury returned a verdict finding

that the value of the property being taken was $68,975.00. The trial was then

concluded, followed by the issuance of a magistrate’s decision and trial court

judgment. This appeal followed. However, on the day prior to filing a notice of

appeal, Hough filed a motion to reopen pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). This Court

returned the matter to the trial court by a limited remand in order for the court to

consider the pending Civ.R. 60(B) motion, which was ultimately denied.

      {¶10} Once the matter was returned to this Court and Hough filed his

appellate brief, Mill Creek followed with the filing of its appellee brief and it

attached two exhibits to its brief. The first exhibit consisted of a copy of the

underlying petition to appropriate that included several exhibits of its own, one of

which was a Notice of Intent to Acquire and Good Faith Offer. Hough responded

by filing a Motion to Strike Exhibit 1 arguing that neither the paper record nor the

electronic docket included exhibits attached to the underlying petition. Hough

essentially argued that Mill Creek was attempting to add evidence to the appellate

record that was not part of the trial court record. After reviewing the paper record
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                               7

that was transmitted to this Court on appeal, we determined that the underlying

petition did in fact include several exhibits, one of which was a copy of the Notice

of Intent to Acquire and Good Faith Offer. As such, Hough’s motion to strike was

denied. Hough has raised two assignments of error on appeal, both of which are

now currently before us for consideration and decision.

                           ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

      I.     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE
             A DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT
             PETITIONER COMPLIED WITH O.R.C. §163.04,
             §163.041 AND §163.05 AS REQUIRED BY §163.09.

      II.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
             ADDRESS RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS UNDER
             OHIO CIVIL RULE 60(B)(4) AND 60(B)(5).

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

      {¶11} In his first assignment of error, Hough contends that the trial court

erred in failing to make a determination as to whether or not Mill Creek complied

with R.C. 163.04, 163.041 and 163.05, as required by R.C. 163.09. Hough first

argues that Mill Creek failed to attach any exhibits to its petition/complaint to

appropriate property, including the Notice of Intent to Acquire and Good Faith

Offer required by R.C. 163.04. As discussed above, when Mill Creek filed its

appellate brief and attached a copy of the petition/complaint along with several

exhibits that included a copy of the Notice of Intent to Acquire and Good Faith

Offer, Hough filed a motion to strike the exhibit from the record based upon its
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                               8

argument that the notice had not actually been attached to the petition/complaint

when it was filed and thus was never properly made part of the record below.

However, as also discussed above, this Court denied Hough’s motion to strike after

it was determined that the exhibits were actually attached to the complaint/petition

and therefore were part of the written record below and also part of the record on

appeal.

      {¶12} Hough also directs our attention to the fact that when testimony was

admitted during the compensation trial revealing that the Notice of Intent to

Acquire and Good Faith Offer were provided by a contractor and/or subcontractor

of Mill Creek, rather than Mill Creek itself, the trial court permitted Hough to

amend his pleadings, in particular his answer, to conform to the evidence

introduced at trial. Hough argues that the trial court’s allowance of the amendment

of the answer to conform to the evidence essentially restored Hough to the position

of having specifically denied Mill Creek’s right to appropriate his property and

entitled him to a hearing on the issue of necessity before having the issue of

compensation decided by a jury. On the other hand, Mill Creek argues that the

issues of authority and necessity were waived as a result of Hough’s failure to

specifically deny them in his answer and also because Hough engaged in discovery

rather than requesting a necessity hearing. Mill Creek further argues that the trial
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                               9

court properly overruled Hough’s motion for a directed verdict regarding Mill

Creek’s compliance with R.C. 163.04, 163.041 and 163.05.

                                   Legal Analysis

      {¶13} We conclude that the question we are presented with on appeal is

whether the trial court’s grant of Hough’s Civ.R. 15 motion to amend his answer to

conform to the evidence entitled Hough to a necessity hearing on the issue of

whether Mill Creek had complied with R.C. 163.04, 163.041, and 163.05 in filing

its petition/complaint to appropriate. Hough acknowledges the special

circumstances that took place at the trial court level and also acknowledges the

novelty of the situation presented to this Court. Nevertheless, he contends that

“[w]hen the [t]rial [c]ourt permitted [him] to amend his answer in order to

challenge [Mill Creek’s] right to make the appropriation, it resurrected its own

obligation to make the necessary and proper findings under §163.09(B)(1).” Mill

Creek simply focuses its arguments on the fact that Hough’s initial answer failed to

specifically deny and set forth operative facts challenging its right to appropriate

the property at issue and, as such, that Hough “lost his right to challenge the

necessity of the appropriation.” Mill Creek fails to acknowledge, however, the

procedural quandary that was created when the trial court granted Hough’s Civ.R.

15 motion to amend his answer.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                             10

      {¶14} For the following reasons, we find merit to this argument raised under

Hough’s first assignment of error and find that because the trial court allowed

Hough to amend his answer to raise an “affirmative defense” to Mill Creek’s right

to appropriate, the trial court was bound by R.C. 163.09(B)(1) to halt the

compensation trial and set the matter for a hearing on the issue of necessity. We

further conclude that the trial court was required to schedule a necessity hearing

despite the fact that the answer was permitted to be amended at the close of

evidence during the conclusion of the compensation trial. Moreover, as will be

discussed in more detail below, we find that the trial court’s denial of Hough’s

motion for a directed verdict did not dispense with the requirement of scheduling

the matter for a necessity hearing.

                                  Eminent Domain

      {¶15} Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution provides: “Private

property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.” Wray

v. Allied Indus. Dev. Corp., 138 Ohio App.3d 362, 364, 741 N.E.2d 238 (2000).

Further, “[t]he Fifth Amendment states that private property shall not be ‘taken for

public use, without just compensation,’ and is applicable to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Paczewski v. Antero Resources Corporation, 7th Dist.

Monroe No. 18MO0016, 2019-Ohio-2641, 2019 WL 2722600, ¶ 36, citing

Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                               11

L.Ed. 979 (1897). As the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained, “[t]he sovereign's

right to take property may be conferred by the legislature on municipalities, which

enjoy broad discretion in determining whether a proposed taking serves the

public.” Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d

1115, ¶ 70. However, “when the authority is delegated to another, the courts must

ensure that the grant of authority is construed strictly and that any doubt over the

propriety of the taking is resolved in favor of the property owner.” Id., citing

Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Com'rs. Of Cleveland Metropolitan Park

Dist., 104 Ohio St. 447, 453-454, 135 N.E. 635 (1922) (“The right of eminent

domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and only the sovereign power, or one to

whom it has delegated the right, can take property without the consent of the

owner, and, when this right has been granted to a subdivision of the state, a person,

or a corporation, the terms of the grant must be strictly pursued. When the matter

is in doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the property owner. These principles

are firmly established”).

      Chapter 163 of the Ohio Revised Code: “Appropriation of Property.”

      {¶16} A review of several provisions of the Ohio Revised Code related to

the appropriation of property is required at this juncture. R.C. 163.05 governs

petitions for appropriation and provides that “[a]n agency that has met the

requirements of sections 163.04 and 163.041 of the Revised Code, may commence
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                              12

proceedings in a proper court by filing a petition for appropriation * * *.” R.C.

163.04 is entitled “Notice; good faith offer to purchase; appraisal; inability to

agree; limiting effects of projects that will disrupt flow of traffic or impede access

to property” and it provides in section (A) that “[a]t least thirty days before filing a

petition pursuant to R.C. 163.05 of the Revised Code, an agency shall provide

notice to the owner of the agency’s intent to acquire the property.” R.C. 163.04

further provides in section (B) that in addition to the notice described in R.C.

163.04(A), not less than thirty days before filing a petition, “an agency shall

provide an owner with a written good faith offer to purchase the property.” This

“notice of intent to acquire” and “good faith offer” must “be substantially in the

form set forth in section 163.041 of the Revised Code[]” and “shall be delivered

personally on, or by certified mail to, the owner of the property or the owner’s

designated representative.” R.C. 163.04(A).

      {¶17} Once a petition for appropriation is filed by an agency, R.C. 163.08,

which governs “Answer[s] by owners,” provides that “[a]ny owner may file an

answer to such petition.” R.C. 163.08 further specifies as follows regarding the

contents of the answer:

      Such answer shall be verified as in a civil action and shall contain
      a general denial or specific denial of each material allegation not
      admitted. The agency's right to make the appropriation, the
      inability of the parties to agree, and the necessity for the
      appropriation shall be resolved by the court in favor of the
      agency unless such matters are specifically denied in the answer
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                            13

      and the facts relied upon in support of such denial are set forth
      therein * * * (Emphasis added).

      {¶18} R.C. 163.09 governs “Declaration of value and damages; time for

assessment of compensation by jury; hearings” and provides in section (B)(1) as

follows:

      When an answer is filed pursuant to section 163.08 of the
      Revised Code and any of the matters relating to the right to make
      the appropriation, the inability of the parties to agree, or the
      necessity for the appropriation are specifically denied in the
      manner provided in that section, the court shall set a day, not less
      than five or more than fifteen days from the date the answer was
      filed, to hear those matters.

      {¶19} The hearing referenced in R.C. 163.09(B)(1) is commonly referred to

as a “necessity hearing.” R.C. 163.09 further provides in section (C) as follows:

      When an answer is filed pursuant to section 163.08 of the
      Revised Code, and none of the matters set forth in division (B)
      of this section is specifically denied, the court shall fix a time
      within twenty days from the date the answer was filed for the
      assessment of compensation by a jury.

      {¶20} The hearing referenced in R.C. 163.09(C) is commonly referred to as

a “compensation trial.”

      {¶21} Thus, reading these statutory provisions in conjunction with one

another, it appears that a property owner may file an answer in response to an

agency’s filing of a petition for appropriation. If an owner files an answer that

fails to specifically deny “in the manner provided in” R.C. 163.08 an agency’s

“right to make the appropriation, the inability of the parties to agree, or the
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                               14

necessity for the appropriation[,]” the question of necessity is essentially waived

and the matter must proceed to what is commonly referred to as a “compensation

trial.” R.C. 163.09(C). However, if an owner files an answer specifically denying

(in the manner provided by R.C. 163.08) the agency’s right to appropriate, the

necessity for the appropriation, or the inability of the parties to agree, then R.C.

163.09(B)(1) requires the trial court to set the matter for a necessity hearing before

proceeding to a compensation trial.

      {¶22} Here, as set forth above, Hough concedes that he initially waived the

issues of the agency’s right to appropriate as well as the necessity for the

appropriation. This waiver was clear throughout the proceedings below as several

hearings were held and discovery was conducted. Further, the record is clear that

the matter proceeded to and through a jury trial on the issue of compensation.

However, prior to the conclusion of the compensation trial, Hough’s counsel

moved the trial court pursuant to Civ.R. 15 to amend the pleadings to conform to

the evidence. This request was made as a result of testimony provided by Mill

Creek’s representative, Stephen Avery, indicating that the Notice of Intent to

Acquire and Good Faith Offer were provided to Hough by one of Mill Creek’s

contractors or possibly even the contractor’s subcontractor, rather than Mill Creek

itself, coupled with a lack of evidence in the record demonstrating the contractor

and/or subcontractor had been properly empowered to act on behalf of Mill Creek.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                        15

       {¶23} The following exchange took place between the court and counsel

near the conclusion of the compensation trial, but before the matter was submitted

to the jury:

       Mr. Rebraca:      Your Honor, the respondent’s going to move
                         to conform his pleadings to the evidence
                         that’s been provided at this time under Civil
                         Rule 15. At the onset of this case, necessity
                         was waived, essentially, by not addressing it
                         in the answer. Based on the evidence that’s
                         been presented today, I believe that necessity
                         has now become an issue.
                         Under Ohio Revised Code 163, the
                         appropriate agency needs to make a written
                         offer of good faith to the respondent here.
                         There’s no evidence on the record of a written
                         offer being provided by anybody from the
                         agency.

       The Court:        Attorney Farbman?

       Ms. Farbman:      The actual written offer that was done on
                         behalf of the park that Mr. Avery testified to
                         was attached to the complaint, which we
                         talked about today. So that’s in evidence.
                         He testified that it was sent – these things
                         were sent out and done pursuant to their
                         contract with GPD, and then GPD got O.R.
                         Colan on board. So it was satisfied. The
                         offer was delivered. That’s why we’re here.

       The Court:        It’s my understanding, and I’m going to defer
                         – I’m going to defer to – for a moment to
                         counsel for the petitioner the issue of
                         necessity is to be addressed –

       Ms. Farbman:      Before the trial, yeah.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                              16

     The Court:     Certainly before the trial.

     Ms. Farbman:   Correct. It’s a preliminary step that must be
                    –

     The Court:     And we – in fact, we discussed, I believe, in
                    trial hearings – when I say pretrial hearings,
                    I’m talking about the numerous status
                    hearings and pretrial hearings that we had
                    over the course of time – that necessity was
                    not – in fact, not being challenged in this
                    matter, but waived. That was my
                    understanding.

     Mr. Rebraca:   It was my understanding, too, Your Honor.
                    However, at this point – at that point in time,
                    we did not know that the agency, Mill Creek
                    Park, did not provide the offer. Mr. Avery
                    testified that there was some random Board
                    vote that approved these people to make the
                    offers, but none of them have been admitted
                    into evidence.

     Ms. Farbman:   That’s not what he testified to.

     Mr. Rebraca:   I specifically asked him who from Mill Creek
                    Park made the offer.

     Ms. Farbman:   And he said GPD was the contractor and O.R.
                    Colan was the subcontractor, and O.R. Colan,
                    who does this for a living, went out and talked
                    to every –

     The Court:     Yes. I’m going to overrule the motion for –
                    I’ll allow your pleadings to conform to the
                    evidence. In the form of an affirmative
                    defense, is that what you’re suggesting, that
                    –

     Mr. Rebraca:   Yes.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                                                           17

         The Court:                 -- you’re permitted to amend your answer?

         Mr. Rebraca:               Yes, Your Honor.

         The Court:                 For that matter, Attorney Rebraca, was that
                                    the basis of your motion for directed verdict?

         Mr. Rebraca:               Yes, Your Honor.

         The Court:                 Very well. Overruled.

         {¶24} A close reading of the transcript reveals that although the trial court

overruled Hough’s motion for a direct verdict on the issue, it granted Hough’s

request to amend his answer to assert an affirmative defense related to Mill Park’s

provision, or failure to provide, a Notice of Intent to Acquire and Good Faith Offer

as required by R.C. 163.04 and 163.041 prior to the filing of its petition for

appropriation pursuant to R.C. 163.05.1 We conclude that under these limited

circumstances, once the trial court allowed Hough to amend his answer, it was

required to set the matter for a necessity hearing prior to proceeding to judgment

on the issue of compensation. A necessity hearing would have permitted Hough to

further develop his challenge to Mill Creek’s right to appropriate and would have

1
 Although the magistrate clearly permitted Hough to amend his answer to conform to the evidence at trial on the
record and in open court, the magistrate’s decision mistakenly stated that the motion to amend the pleadings had
been denied. When counsel was questioned about this discrepancy by this Court during oral argument, counsel for
Mill Creek did not dispute that Hough’s Civ.R. 15 motion had been granted. Under these circumstances, this Court
has the authority to sua sponte modify the magistrate’s decision to correct a scrivener’s error. Ameritech Publishing,
Inc. v. Snyder Tire Wintersville, Inc., 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 09 JE 35, 2010-Ohio-4868, ¶ 43-44 (where the
appellate court sua sponte modified the trial court’s judgment to correct a scrivener’s error after clarifying with the
parties during oral argument that the discrepancy in the record was simply a scrivener’s error). However, because
we ultimately determine that the magistrate’s decision and subsequent judgment issued by the trial court must be
vacated, we need not modify the magistrate’s decision.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                             18

permitted Mill Creek to respond to Hough’s newly raised challenge to its authority

to appropriate.

      {¶25} We further conclude that the trial court’s denial of Hough’s motion

for a directed verdict did not eliminate the need for a necessity hearing. The

motion for a directed verdict appears to have been an oral motion made on the

record during the compensation trial. Civ.R. 50 governs motions for directed

verdicts and provides in section (A)(1) that “[a] motion may be made on the

opening statement of the opponent, at the close of the opponent’s evidence or at the

close of all evidence.” The rule further provides in section (A)(4) that “[w]hen a

motion for a directed verdict has been properly made,” if the court finds after

construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the

motion is directed, “that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could

come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is

adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the

moving party as to that issue.” A directed verdict is improper “if reasonable minds

could come to different conclusions on any determinative issue.” Poland Twp. Bd.

of Trustees v. Swesey, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 02CA185, 2003-Ohio-6726, ¶ 8.

Furthermore, because motions for directed verdict “test the legal sufficiency of the

evidence[,] * * * such motions present a question of law even though in deciding

such motions it is necessary to review and consider evidence.” Id., citing Grau v.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                              19

Kleinschmidt, 31 Ohio St.3d 84, 90, 509 N.E.2d 399. “An appellate court reviews

questions of law de novo.” Poland Twp. at ¶ 8, citing Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.

Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108, 652 N.E.2d 684.

      {¶26} In our view, the motion for directed verdict was premature. Even

though it was made at the close of all evidence during the compensation trial, the

motion sought a directed verdict on the issues of authority and/or necessity, which

were legal issues that had just been permitted to be raised and that had yet to be

fully argued or heard. Further, the fact that there had not been an opportunity to

place any evidence going to the legal issues of authority and/or necessity into the

record, there was no evidence for the trial court to consider when it denied the

motion, which further leads to the conclusion that the motion was prematurely

made. As this Court explained in Netherlands Insurance Company v. BSHM

Architects, Inc., 2018-Ohio-3736, 111 N.E.3d 1229, ¶ 44 (7th Dist.), “[a]ppellate

courts have indicated that a motion [made] at times different from the ones

expressed in Civ.R. 50(A)(1) are improper[]” and “should not be entertained.”

Citing Sherwin v. Cabana Club Apartments, 70 Ohio App.2d 11, 433 N.E.2d 932

(8th Dist. 1980). However, this Court also observed in Netherlands that the

granting of a premature motion for directed verdict “may result in harmless error”

depending on the circumstances. Netherlands at ¶ 45.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                              20

      {¶27} Here, we are obviously dealing with the denial of a motion for a

directed verdict rather than the granting of a motion for a directed verdict.

Nonetheless, the denial of Hough’s motion for a directed verdict merely meant that

the trial court determined that reasonable minds may come to different conclusions

on the issues of authority and/or necessity and the summary denial did not

foreclose either Hough or Mill Creek from presenting evidence and arguments

related to those issues at a later necessity hearing. Thus, although we deem

Hough’s motion to have been prematurely made and the trial court’s entertainment

of the motion and denial of the motion to be improper, we also find that the denial

of the motion constituted harmless error because those issues could still yet be

argued and determined at a necessity hearing.

      {¶28} In light of the foregoing, we have found that the trial court’s

allowance of Hough’s Civ.R. 15 motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the

evidence essentially permitted Hough to effectively amend his answer to assert a

specific denial in the manner provided by R.C. 163.08 as to Mill Creek’s authority

to appropriate the property at issue and created at that time an obligation on the

part of the trial court to schedule the matter for a necessity hearing. Because the

trial court did not hold such a hearing and instead allowed the issue of

compensation to be submitted to the jury for determination and further allowed the

trial to be concluded without first conclusively determining the issue of Mill Park’s
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                             21

authority to appropriate at a necessity hearing, the trial court erred. Additionally,

although we have found that Hough’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of

Mill Creek’s authority was prematurely made and that the trial court’s

entertainment of the motion and ruling on the motion was improper, we have also

found that the trial court’s error constituted harmless error because Hough was not

foreclosed from having a necessity hearing as a result of the denial of the motion.

      {¶29} Before concluding, we must note that we have identified no other

cases involving the appropriation of property that have a procedural history similar

to this case. These appear to be uncharted waters in terms of what an appropriate

remedy is for the events that occurred during the compensation trial. However,

despite the lack of guidance on the questions and issues presently before us, we

conclude the proper remedy is to vacate the jury’s verdict on the issue of

compensation and to vacate the magistrate’s decision confirming the jury verdict,

as well as the trial court’s judgment confirming the magistrate’s decision. At the

time the trial court permitted Hough to amend his answer, the proceedings should

have been stopped, or at least delayed, in order for the trial court to set the matter

for a necessity hearing. Because that was not done, we conclude the only way to

remedy these matters is to vacate the verdict and judgments and remand the case to

an earlier stage in the proceedings to determine the issue of authority at a necessity

hearing in accordance with R.C. 163.09.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                            22

      {¶30} Accordingly, the jury verdict, the Agreed Jury Award and

Magistrate’s Decision, and the Judgment Entry issued by the trial court are hereby

vacated. Furthermore, this matter is remanded with instructions for the trial court

to permit additional pleadings and evidence as necessary in response to the trial

court’s allowance of Hough’s answer to be amended to challenge Mill Creek’s

right to appropriate the property at issue and to schedule this matter for a necessity

hearing as required by R.C. 163.09.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

      {¶31} In his second assignment of error, Hough contends that the trial court

erred in failing to address his arguments under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and (5). More

specifically, Hough contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

reopen which was grounded upon the Ohio General Assembly’s passage of H.B.

110 just two weeks after the jury returned a verdict in this matter. H.B. 110

provided in Section 715.05(B) that certain park districts, which by definition

included Mill Creek, were prohibited from appropriating property for the purpose

of providing recreational trails. Mill Creek counters by arguing that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Hough’s motion because the legislation at

issue was not in effect at the time the case was decided and the legislation was not

retroactive.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                               23

      {¶32} As set forth above, we have already concluded that at the time the

trial court granted Hough’s motion to amend his pleadings to assert a challenge to

Mill Creek’s authority to appropriate the property at issue, R.C. 163.09(B)(1)

required the trial court to set the matter for a necessity hearing before proceeding

to a determination on the issue of compensation. Even though the amendment of

the pleadings occurred at the conclusion of testimony during the compensation

trial, it was incumbent upon the trial court to set the matter for a necessity hearing

and determine compliance with R.C. 163.04, 163.041 and 163.05 before

proceeding to the issue compensation. As we concluded in our disposition of

Hough’s first assignment of error, the compensation trial should have been stopped

and should not have been concluded without the trial court first making the

required statutory determinations regarding necessity. As such, because we have

ordered that the trial court’s judgment regarding the issue of compensation must be

vacated and that the matter must be remanded to an earlier stage in the proceedings

for the issues related to Mill Creek’s authority to appropriate to be determined

before proceeding, if at all, to a determination on the issue of compensation, the

question of whether the trial court erred in denying a subsequently-filed motion to

reopen is moot.

                                 JUDGMENT VACATED AND REMANDED.
Mahoning App. No. 21MA65                                                              24

                              JUDGMENT ENTRY

       It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE VACATED AND REMANDED and
costs be assessed to Appellee.
      The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Mahoning County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J., & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
                                For the Court,

                                _____________________________
                                Jason P. Smith (Sitting by Assignment)

                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL
      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.