Court Opinion

ID: 9612311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:06:54.586427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:58.268054
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority misinterprets Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), by holding that the Supreme Court’s requirement of “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior” requires, in turn, an instruction in that exact language. In fact, the Supreme Court made no mention whatsoever of the need for a new instruction or even the need for additional findings by the jury. I would hold, instead, that the instruction given, though couched in different language, necessarily required that same “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”
A closer look at the Crane opinion supports this conclusion. The Court begins by reaffirming the constitutionality of the Kansas statute (essentially identical to its Missouri counterpart), as written. In revisiting the statute, though, the stated purpose of the Court was simply to address the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), and, in particular, a passage from Hendricks that “referred to the Kansas Act as requiring a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it ‘difficult, if not impossible, for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.’ ” Kansas v. Crane, 122 S.Ct. at 869. The Kansas Supreme Court had interpreted Hendricks as imposing a requirement that the state must always prove that a defendant is- completely unable to control his behavior. In Crane, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected that interpretation, holding that “it is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” Id. at 870. In so holding, the Supreme Court meant only to clarify the constitutional threshold on which the Kansas statute had already been upheld. Although the exact words were not used, “proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior” was already a requirement under the Kansas statute. In other words, proving that defendant had a “mental abnormality” that makes him “more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence” is simply one *793way of proving (more than enough!) that defendant had “serious difficulty in controlling behavior.” In short, there is no need for a new instruction.
The first part of the Crane opinion bears this out because the Court reaffirmed key holdings in Hendricks regarding the constitutionality of the statute, and necessarily, the verdict directing instruction that tracked the language of the statute: First, “the statutory criterion for confinement embodied in the statute’s words ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ satisfied ‘“substantive” due process requirements.’ ” M at 868. Second, “the Kansas ‘Act unambiguously requires a finding of dangerousness either to one’s self or to others,’ ... and then ‘links that finding to the existence of a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.’” Id. at 869 (the passage with which the Kansas Supreme Court had difficulty). Third, “the statute’s ‘requirement of a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” is consistent with the requirements of ... other statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.’ ” Id.
In my view, Crane’s reaffirmation of Hendricks ’ holdings precludes this Court’s determination that the instruction given, which tracks the statute’s requirements, “is not enough because [it] does not require the [jury] to ‘distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose mental illness, abnormality or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist.’ ” The instruction given does, indeed, make that distinction, and that is why the Supreme Court upheld the statute on which the instruction is based.
If, on the other hand, the majority is correct that Crane requires a new instruction setting out “that the ‘degree’ to which a person cannot control his behavior is ‘serious difficulty,’ ” and that the instructions given, which tracked the statute, “did not define mental abnormality in this essential way,” then the instruction, and thus the statute, is constitutionally infirm. A constitutionally required element is missing from the instruction, and necessarily from the statute on which it is based. The proper recourse, however, is not to rewrite the instruction, which, in effect, is to rewrite the statute, but instead to strike down the statute altogether. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of City of St Louis v. State, 47 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Mo. banc 2001) (striking down and refusing to rewrite unconstitutional statute directing school board elections); Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Dir. of Revenue, 918 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo. banc 1996) (striking down and refusing to rewrite unconstitutional statute implementing use tax). To judicially supply a missing element, of course, is to usurp the legislative function.
To finesse this problem, footnote 1 purports to explain that the newly required finding of “serious difficulty” is merely “a refinement of this term [mental abnormality], not the addition of a new element.” As I see it, however, if the instruction is unconstitutional without the new language, then the new language must mean something different than that used in the instruction that was given. Otherwise, the defendant would not be prejudiced by the language in the instruction given, and there would be no need to add the new language. It follows that if the newly required language is indeed different, then the language is not merely a “refinement,” but a rewrite of the statute with the addition of a new element. The majority can only extricate itself from this predicament by recognizing that the instruction given *794was sufficient and that no new language is required.
In sum, I would hold that the juries in these two cases were properly instructed and would affirm the judgments entered.