Court Opinion

ID: 9481646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:27:10.223656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:29.087656
License: Public Domain

TACHA, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant Denver Anderson appeals a district court order granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of defendant-appellee United Telephone Company of Kansas (UTC). On appeal, Anderson argues the district court erred by finding a criminal blacklisting conviction is required for civil blacklisting liability. Anderson also argues the district court erred in granting a judgment for UTC because UTC did not base the motion for judgment n.o.v. on the same grounds raised in the motion for directed verdict. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Anderson was terminated from his employment with UTC in November 1985. In December 1985, he interviewed with United Telephone Company of Missouri, a company affiliated with UTC. He was not offered employment with that company. Anderson also was denied employment with Installation Technicians, Inc., a company that has contracted with UTC for telephone installation. Anderson ultimately brought suit against UTC in federal district court, alleging civil blacklisting in violation of title 44, section 119 of the Kansas Statutes; age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in *1502Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.; breach of an implied employment contract; and fraud. Anderson concedes UTC has not been prosecuted for criminal blacklisting.
At the close of Anderson’s case at trial, UTC moved for a directed verdict on the five claims. The district court entered judgment for UTC on the fraud claim. At the close of all the evidence, UTC moved for a directed verdict on the remaining claims. UTC specifically argued the evidence was insufficient to support a claim for civil blacklisting under section 44-119. The court deferred ruling on UTC’s motion for directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury. The jury found in favor of UTC on the age discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract claims. On the civil blacklisting claim, however, the jury returned a verdict for Anderson and awarded damages.
Following the jury verdict, UTC filed a motion for judgment n.o.v. and a motion for a new trial on the blacklisting claim, again arguing the evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict against UTC for civil blacklisting. In a supplemental brief supporting the motion for judgment n.o.v., UTC argued Anderson’s failure to introduce evidence that UTC had been convicted of criminal blacklisting precluded recovery for civil blacklisting. Anderson filed a motion for new trial on the breach of contract claim. The court ultimately denied Anderson’s motion for a new trial on the breach of contract claim but granted UTC’s motion for judgment n.o.v. on the blacklisting claim.
Anderson contends a criminal conviction under sections 44-117 and 44-118 is not required for civil liability under section 44-119. We review this question of statutory interpretation de novo. See Stissi v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 765 F.2d 370, 374 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Horowitz, 756 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 74, 88 L.Ed.2d 60 (1985). In 1897, the Kansas legislature enacted the blacklisting law at issue in this case. The statute states:
Any employer of labor in this state, after having discharged any person from his service, shall not prevent or attempt to prevent by word, sign or writing of any kind whatsoever any such discharged employee from obtaining employment from any other person, company or corporation, except by furnishing in writing, on request, the cause of such discharge.
Kan.Stat. § 44-117 (1986). The statute establishes criminal penalties for a blacklisting violation:
Any employer of labor, his agent or employee, who shall violate the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall upon conviction be fined for each offense the sum of one hundred dollars and thirty days’ imprisonment in the county jail.
Id. § 44-118. The statute also provides for civil penalties:
Any person, firm or corporation found guilty of the violation of this act, shall be liable to the party injured to an amount equal to three times the sum he may be injured, and such employers of labor shall also be liable for a reasonable attorney fee, which shall be taxed as part of the costs in the case.
Id. § 44-119 (emphasis added).
In discerning the Kansas legislature’s intent in section 44-119, we first look to the statutory language. Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 722, 109 S.Ct. 2156, 2161-62, 104 L.Ed.2d 796 (1989); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-66, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981). Legislative purpose generally is expressed in the ordinary meaning of the words the legislature has used. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1792, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979). Further, the legislature’s use of two different terms is presumed to be intentional. National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 172 (D.C.Cir.1982) (citing Russell v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin. of the United States, 637 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)).
Here, an examination of the statutory language indicates a criminal blacklisting *1503conviction is required for civil recovery under section 44-119. The statute states: “Any ... corporation found guilty of the violation of this act, shall be liable to the party injured_” 44 Kan.Stat. § 44-119. In this provision, the legislature specifically used the terms “guilty” and “liable.” Presuming the use of both terms to be intentional, we construe these terms in an ordinary way to mean criminal guilt and civil liability. When these terms are regarded in the context of the entire provision, we are convinced the Kansas legislature meant a corporation shall “be liable” only when it has been “found guilty” of criminal blacklisting. Based on the plain language of the statute, we hold a criminal blacklisting conviction is an element of a civil blacklisting claim against an employer under Kansas law.
Anderson contends the district court erred in granting judgment for UTC because UTC did not base the motion for judgment n.o.v. on the same grounds raised in the motion for directed verdict. Rule 50(b) states: “Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion.” According to Rule 50(a), “[a] motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor.” A motion for judgment n.o.v. cannot assert new matters not presented in the motion for directed verdict. Dow Chemical Corp. v. Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 481, 486 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 360 F.2d 260, 265 (10th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036, 87 S.Ct. 1474, 18 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967).
This court has recognized that in satisfying the requirements of Rule 50, technical precision is unnecessary. Fenix & Scisson, 360 F.2d at 266. Because the requirement of Rule 50 that a directed verdict motion must precede a motion for judgment n.o.v. is “ ‘harsh in any circumstance[ ],’ ” a directed verdict motion should not be reviewed narrowly but rather in light of the purpose of the rules to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of a case. 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2537, at 597 n. 32 (1971) (quoting Mosley v. Cia. Mar. Adra S.A., 362 F.2d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir.1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 933, 87 S.Ct. 292, 17 L.Ed.2d 213, 385 U.S. 933, 87 S.Ct. 296, 17 L.Ed.2d 213 (1966)); see also National Indus., Inc. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 781 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir.1986) (taking liberal view because “rule is a harsh one”). As the Fourth Circuit has noted, “rigid application of this rule is inappropriate ... where such application serves neither of the rule’s rationales — protecting the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, and ensuring that the opposing party has enough notice of the alleged error to permit an attempt to cure it before, resting.” FSLIC v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130, 138 (4th Cir.1987); see also McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc. 826 F.2d 1554, 1556 (7th Cir.1987) (modern-rationale of rule is opposing party should have opportunity to rectify deficiencies in evidence presented to jury before it is too late); Miller v. Rowan Cos., 815 F.2d 1021, 1024 n. 4, 1025 (5th Cir.1987) (aims of rule include avoiding trapping plaintiff after submittal to jury because he cannot then cure defects in proof and securing fair trial); Lifshitz v. Walter Drake & Sons, Inc., 806 F.2d 1426, 1429 (9th Cir.1986) (purpose of directed verdict motion is to provide notice of claimed eviden-tiary insufficiencies and preserve issue of sufficiency of evidence as question of law); Sharon Steel Corp., 781 F.2d at 1549 (purpose of directed verdict requirement is to avoid ambushing court and opposing party after the verdict so that only remedy is completely new trial) (citing Quinn v. Southwest Wood Prods., Inc., 597 F.2d 1018, 1025 (5th Cir.1979)); Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 831-32 (3d Cir.1983) (same) (citing Wall v. United States, 592 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.1979)).
Here, UTC moved for a directed verdict on the blacklisting claim after Anderson had presented his case at trial. At the close of all the evidence, UTC again moved for a directed verdict on the blacklisting claim. In this directed verdict motion, UTC specifically argued there was insufficient *1504evidence to support a claim for civil blacklisting under section 44-119. Following the jury verdict, UTC filed a motion for judgment n.o.v. and a motion for new trial on the grounds the evidence was insufficient to support the civil blacklisting claim. Because UTC raised insufficiency of the evidence on the blacklisting claim as specific grounds for both the motion for directed verdict and the motion for judgment n.o.v., we hold UTC has complied with the requirements of Rule 50.
Anderson argues Rule 50 demands that UTC must have stated in the directed verdict motion the evidence is insufficient to prove the element of a criminal blacklisting conviction. Although Rule 50(a) requires a motion for directed verdict to state the “specific grounds,” the rule does not define how specific the grounds must be. We are convinced that UTC’s directed verdict motion satisfies the rule’s requirement. To be sure, a more specific motion may be upheld. See, e.g., Acosta, 717 F.2d at 832; Thezan v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 708 F.2d 175, 179 n. 2 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050, 104 S.Ct. 729, 79 L.Ed.2d 189 (1984). However, a significant number of the cases interpreting Rule 50’s specificity requirement have accepted less specificity in directed verdict motions. See, e.g., Sharon Steel, 781 F.2d at 1548-49 (motion raising issue of sufficiency of evidence for liability, damages, and future lost profits sufficient to raise sufficiency of evidence of injury to goodwill and reputation); Stewart v. Thigpen, 730 F.2d 1002, 1006 n. 2 (5th Cir.1984) (motion requesting “the verdict be directed in the plaintiff’s favor and award damages to the plaintiff” sufficient when parties and court understood basis for motion was sufficiency of evidence to support claim); Acosta, 717 F.2d at 832 (motion raising sufficiency of evidence for “Counts I and the remaining counts” under theories of strict liability and negligence sufficient to raise issue of punitive damages); Cortez v. Life Ins. Co. of America, 408 F.2d 500, 503 (8th Cir. 1969) (motion based on lack of grounds for liability sufficient).
Because Rule 50(a) does not itself define “specific grounds,” we must determine in each case whether the purposes the rule embodies have been served. See Acosta, 717 F.2d at 832 (“communicative content, ‘specificity’ and notice-giving function of an assertion [in a directed verdict motion] should be judged in context”); see also K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 157-58 (1960) (“[T]he rule follows where its reason leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule.”); cf. Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986) (construing Rule 50(b) liberally to serve rule’s purpose).
We believe requiring more specificity in this case would be harsh and run contrary to the policy favoring a liberal application of the rules to allow correction of evidentia-ry shortcomings and provide a just and efficient determination of the case. More specific notice would be useless here because there is no possibility Anderson could have corrected the evidentiary shortcoming during trial. Like the Fourth Circuit in Reeves, we refuse to reverse the district court’s judgment and grant a new trial based on an alleged procedural error that did not prejudice the plaintiff in any way. 816 F.2d at 138; see also Benson, 786 F.2d at 274 (because question of qualified immunity is addressed to court, not jury, strict compliance with Rule 50 not necessary when no prejudice involved). The defendant here raised the defense of failure to state a claim for blacklisting at the first opportunity in the answer to the complaint. Clearly, Anderson’s right to a jury trial and possible lack of notice of the deficiency of the blacklisting claim did not prejudice him. Further, granting Anderson a new trial on the blacklisting claim would defeat the rule’s objective of ensuring a just and efficient determination since the record shows Anderson cannot prove he is entitled to relief based on our interpretation of section 44-119.
Anderson finally contends UTC waived the defense of failure to plead and prove a condition precedent — here, a criminal conviction under section 44-118 — by not pleading it with the specificity and particularity Rule 9(c) of the Federal Rules of *1505Civil Procedure requires. Although the district court labeled the criminal conviction requirement a “condition precedent,” thereby apparently implicating the special pleading requirements of Rule 9(c), we reject this characterization.
We are convinced the requirement of criminal liability is simply a statutory element that does not implicate Rule 9(c). Rule 9(c) requires: “A denial of performance or occurrence [of conditions precedent] shall be made specifically and with particularity.” This special pleading requirement has been applied to conditions precedent in common law contracts claims and nonjurisdictional agency exhaustion requirements in some federal statutory claims. See, e.g., McKee-Berger-Mansueto, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 626 F.2d 559, 562-63 (7th Cir.1980) (lack of specific statements in pleadings contesting adequacy of company’s performance of contract for construction management services implicates Rule 9(c)); Ginsburg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 427 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (6th Cir. 1970) (failure to specifically deny timely filing of proof of loss in insurance contract implicates Rule 9(c)); Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 313 F.2d 381, 387 (10th Cir.1963) (proof of loss is condition precedent to enforcement of insurance contract); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 999 n. 7, 1000-01 (11th Cir. 1982) (failure to allege in pleadings exhaustion- of administrative remedies implicates Rule 9(c)). We find no indication in the rules or the case law that the special pleading requirements of Rule 9(c) were meant to apply more broadly to pleading the basic elements of a cause of action. Cf. EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 106-07 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (federal statute requiring “proper averment in [EEOC’s] complaint that conciliation has failed” creates condition precedent subject to Rule 9(c)). Although we acknowledge the proof of all statutory elements may be described loosely as a precondition to recovery, we conclude the statutory requirement of criminal blacklisting is not a condition precedent as contemplated by Rule 9(c).
Much of the confusion in this case rises from the fact the plaintiff simply failed to offer evidence at trial entitling him to relief. We refuse to find the defendant acquired responsibility to notify the court of specific factual shortcomings beyond raising the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on the blacklisting claim in the motions for directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. When there have been no procedural violations, the benefit of hindsight will not cause us to conclude the defendant must suffer from both parties’ failure to sharpen for the court the specific legal question of the statutory requirements of section 44-119. Under the facts of this case, we see nothing improper in the determination of this specific legal question post-verdict in the hearing on the judgment n.o.v. when it did not affect the factual determinations or weighing of the evidence on the issues before jury. In the interests of fairness to the parties and judicial efficiency, we AFFIRM.