Court Opinion

ID: 9897478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:50.895654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:28.965366
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion 08

                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                THE STATE OF NEVADA                                     No. 85554
                DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
                HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF
                PUBLIC AND BEHAVIORAL HEALTH,
                Petitioner,
                vs.                                                        FILED
                THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
                                                                           AUG 31 20
                COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                                                                         EL'
                IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF                               CLE                     RT
                CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE                              BY
                                                                           , EF DEPUTY CLERK
                CHRISTY L. CRAIG, DISTRICT JUDGE,
                Respondents,
                  and
                ANDREW ALIANO; DESHAWN
                BENJAMIN; DANE GEE; CARLOS
                GUZMAN; ANTHONY JOHNSON;
                CHAVELE JOHNSON; YASIEL OJEDA;
                ROBERTO OTERO; DOUGLAS
                TALLEY; YOLANNE TOH: AND
                TIMOTHY WALLACE,
                Real Parties in Interest.

                             Original petition for writ of certiorari or mandamus challenging
                eleven district court orders imposing contempt sanctions of $500 for each
                day Petitioner fails to accept real parties in interest for restorative
                treatment.
                             Petition denied.

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                Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, and Julie A. Slabaugh, Chief Deputy
                Attorney General, Susanne M. Sliwa, Deputy Attorney General, and Jeffrey
                M. Conner, Deputy Solicitor General, Carson City,
                for Petitioner.

                Darin F. Imlay, Public Defender, and Arlene Heshmati, Chief Deputy Public
                Defender, Clark County,
                for Real Parties in Interest.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

                                                OPINION
                By the Court, BELL, J.:
                            In this opinion, we clarify that a district court may properly
                hold a party in civil contempt for failure to fulfill a statutory and
                constitutional obligation to accept incompetent criminal defendants for
                restorative treatment.
                            This matter arises from district court orders holding Petitioner
                Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health (DPBH) in contempt for
                violating competency court orders. The competency orders were issued in
                relation to real parties in interest, who are eleven criminal defendants in
                Nevada (defendants). Defendants were all deemed incompetent to assist in
                their own defense and ordered to psychiatric treatment under NRS 178.425.
                After significant delays in accepting defendants for treatment, defendants
                filed motions to dismiss their cases or, alternatively, for DPBH to show
                cause as to why it should not be held in contempt.

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                                 The district court denied the motions to dismiss but found
                  DPBH in contempt for failing to comply with the court orders and issued
                  sanctions. DPBH filed a petition for certiorari or mandamus in this court,
                  arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to find DPBH in contempt
                  and that the district court manifestly abused its discretion because DPBH
                  could not comply with the orders.
                                                  DISCUSSION
                  We elect to hear the petition for writ of certiorari or mandamus
                                 A writ of certiorari is available when an inferior tribunal
                  exceeds its jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at
                  law. NRS 34.020(2); Warren v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 134 Nev. 649,
                  650, 427 P.3d 1033, 1035 (2018). "[T]he inquiry upon a petition for a writ
                  of certiorari is limited to whether the inferior tribunal acted in excess of its
                  jurisdiction." Dangberg Holdings Nev., LLC v. Douglas County, 115 Nev.
                  129, 138, 978 P.2d 311, 316 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                                 A writ of mandamus is available "to compel the performance of
                  an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
                  trust or station." NRS 34.160; Walker v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 136
                  Nev. 678, 679-80, 476 P.3d 1194, 1196 (2020). This court only issues writs
                  of mandamus when (1) the petitioner establishes a legal right to have the
                  act that their petition requests done; (2) the respondent has a duty to
                  perform the requested action; and (3) the petitioner "has no other plain,
                  speedy, and adequate remedy." Walker, 136 Nev. at 680, 476 P.3d at 1196
                  (internal quotation marks omitted).        The standard of review is highly
                  deferential:

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                                       Where a district court is entrusted with
                                 discretion on an issue, the petitioner's burden to
                                 demonstrate a clear legal right to a particular
                                 course of action by that court is substantial; [this
                                 court] can issue traditional mandamus only where
                                 the lower court has manifestly abused that
                                 discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
                    Id. (emphases omitted). Under this standard, a lower court must go further
                    than commit "a mere error in judgment." Id. at 680, 476 P.3d at 1197
                    (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the lower court must have
                    overridden or misapplied the law, or acted out of prejudice, bias, or ill will.
                    Id. at 680-81, 476 P.3d at 1197.
                                 "[T]he decision to entertain a petition for a writ of certiorari" or
                    a writ of mandamus is within this court's discretion. Warren, 134 Nev. at
                    650, 427 P.3d at 1035 (internal quotation marks omitted); Walker, 136 Nev.
                    at 679, 476 P.3d at 1196. Because DPBH has no remedy at law to challenge
                    a contempt order, we exercise discretion to entertain DPBH's petition.
                    Pengilly u. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Ass'n, 116 Nev. 646 649, 5 P.3d
                    569, 571 (2000) (explaining that compared to direct appeal, writ petitions
                    are "more suitable vehicles for review of contempt orders").
                    The district court had jurisdiction to hold DPBH in contempt
                                 The contempt process largely depends on whether the contempt
                    is classified as civil or criminal and whether the contempt is direct or
                    indirect.   Here the contempt order is undisputedly civil in nature—the
                    intent of the contempt was to compel DPBH to comply with the court's order,
                    and the contempt order provided a purge clause.           Rodriguez v. Eighth
                    Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 798, 804, 102 P.3d 41, 45 (2004) ("Whether a
                    contempt proceeding is classified as criminal or civil in nature depends on
                    whether it is directed to punish the contemnor or, instead, coerce his
                    compliance with a court directive.").
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              A):
                                 While the parties agree the contempt order is civil, they
                      disagree on whether the contempt is direct or indirect. Direct contempt
                      "may be punished summarily" and may take the form of a person disrupting
                      a court proceeding. NRS 22.030(1). In direct contempt, the events occurred
                      "in the immediate view and presence of the court," so the court requires no
                      additional information in order to enter a sanction. Id.; Paley v. Second
                      Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 701, 705, 310 P.3d 590, 593 (2013).
                                  Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is contempt where the
                      court must receive additional information to determine whether a sanction
                      is appropriate and what that sanction should be. NRS 22.030(2) provides
                      that TN a contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence
                      of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit must be presented to the
                      court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the
                      facts by the masters or arbitrators."
                                In this case, while certain aspects of the contempt were within
                      the knowledge and presence of the judge, additional information was
                      necessary to determine the reason DPBH was not following the court orders.
                      Consequently, the contempt in question here—the failure of DPBH to
                      timely accept inmates for restorative treatment—is a question of indirect
                      contempt.
                                  Given that the question is one of indirect contempt, DPBH
                      argues the district court lacked jurisdiction to hold DPBH in contempt
                      because defendants failed to provide the district court with affidavits
                      identifying the material facts of the contempt. An affidavit is required for
                      indirect contempt pursuant to NRS 22.030(2). "The law is clear in Nevada
                      that before a court can assume jurisdiction to hold a person in contempt, an
                      affidavit must be filed." Awad v. Wright, 106 Nev. 407, 409, 794 P.2d 713,
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                       714 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by Pengilly, 116 Nev. at 649, 5 P.3d
                       at 571.
                                     Contrary   to   DPBH's       assertions,   defendants   met   the
                       requirements of NRS 22.030(2). Each motion in the record included the
                       same declaration from counsel under the penalty of perjury.                 The
                       declaration states, "I am familiar with the procedural history of the case
                       and the substantive allegations made by The State of Nevada. I also have
                       personal knowledge of the facts stated herein or I have been informed of
                       these facts and believe them to be true." The motions lay out in detail the
                       history of the issues regarding DPBH failing to provide prompt restorative
                       treatment to each of the defendants.
                                     An unsworn declaration signed under penalty of perjury may be
                       used in lieu of an affidavit. NRS 53.045. This court has previously found
                       that a declaration can satisfy a statutory requirement for an affidavit.
                       Buckwalter v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 126 Nev. 200, 202, 234 P.3d 920,
                       921 (2010).
                                     While certainly a preferred practice would be for counsel to set
                       forth all factual matters within the declaration itself, the declaration here
                       was included within and refers to the facts contained within the motion.
                       Because the facts underlying the contempt were sworn to and presented to
                       the district court, the district court had jurisdiction to find DPBH in
                       contempt under NRS 22.030(2).
                       The district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by holding DPBH
                       in contempt
                                     DPBH argues the district court manifestly abused its discretion
                       by violating DPBH's due process right to an evidentiary hearing, basing its
                       order on clear legal error and inconsistent findings, ignoring DPBH's
                       defense of impossibility, and issuing counterproductive fines.
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                            DPBH's arguments do not warrant extraordinary relief. When
                reviewing these arguments, "the standard of review in a writ petition is
                appropriate to the review of a contempt order." Pengilly, 116 Nev. at 650, 5
                P.3d at 571. Further, "[w]hether a person is guilty of contempt is generally
                within the particular knowledge of the district court, and the district court's
                order should not lightly be overturned." Id.
                            DPBH failed to show how the court violated DPBH's due
                process rights to a hearing with proper notice. This court has held a party
                accused of indirect contempt has a due process right to confront witnesses
                and offer testimony on their behalf. Awad, 106 Nev. at 411, 794 P.2d at
                716. While DPBH correctly asserts it had the right to present evidence on
                facts in dispute, it does not assert any disputed facts. DPBH asserts the
                same facts to this court regarding its failure to provide prompt treatment
                as DPBH provided to the district court. DPBH also did not ask for an
                evidentiary hearing. The district court based its order on undisputed facts,
                many of which were provided by DPBH itself through affidavits. This court
                therefore rejects DPBH's argument that it was deprived of an evidentiary
                hearing in violation of due process.
                            DPBH also argues it lacked notice because defendants' motion
                only asked for an order to show cause rather than a contempt order. While
                typically a court would issue an order to show cause and set a hearing, here,
                DPBH had clear advance notice that contempt was a possible outcome.
                DPBH had the opportunity to respond and did so. Further, DPBH does not
                provide any legal authority distinguishing a hearing on an order to show
                cause as to why a party should not be held in contempt, from a contempt
                hearing, for the purposes of proper notice. See Edwards v. Emperor's
                Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (this
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                court need not consider an appellant's argument that is not cogently argued
                or lacks the support of relevant authority). Therefore, DPBH failed to show
                how the district court violated DPBH's due process rights due to lack of
                notice.
                            Additionally, DPBH argues the district court erred by imposing
                an arbitrary deadline for compliance. The district court did not impose an
                arbitrary rule when it gave DPBH seven days to comply with the
                competency orders. Rather, the district court interpreted NRS 178.425(1)
                and the competency orders' use of the term "forthwith" as requiring
                transport within seven days based on past consent decrees in effect for many
                years. DPBH's argument therefore lacks merit.
                            DPBH argues further that compliance was impossible because
                of bed and staffing shortages. The district court considered this argument
                at the hearing and properly rejected it, reasoning that based on its history
                with DPBH, prior contempt orders worked to ensure compliance.             The
                record on review shows that DPBH struggles to honor its constitutional
                obligation to promptly treat incompetent inmates when the agency is not
                under the supervision of a court order or settlement agreement.           See
                Burnside v. Whitley, Case No. 2:13-cv-01102-MMD-GWF (D. Nev., Modified
                Consent Decree, Order, and Judgment, Dec. 22, 2015); Nev. Disability
                Advocacy & Law Ctr., Inc v. Brandenburg, Case No. CV-S-05-0782-
                RCJ(RJJ) (D. Nev., Stipulated Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice,
                Apr. 18, 2008); see also Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th
                Cir. 2003) (explaining that restorative treatment is a due process
                requirement).
                            In fact, DP8H's inability to accept defendants for treatment has
                been the subject of two civil suits in federal court. Burnside, Case No. 2:13-

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                     cv-01102-MMD-GWF; Brandenburg, Case No. CV-S-05-0782-RCJ(RJJ).
                     DPBH's argument that compliance is impossible strains credulity after
                     nearly 20 years of notice. And while DPBH argues it suffers from budget
                     constraints, "[1]ack of funds, staff or facilities cannot justify the State's
                     failure to provide [such persons] with [the] treatment necessary for
                     rehabilitation." Or. Advocacy Ctr., 322 F.3d at 1121 (alterations in original)
                     (internal quotation marks omitted).
                                 The district court found DPBH has a long history of allowing
                     inmates to languish for long periods in jail, only to move them within days
                     of contempt findings.     Incapacitated criminal defendants suffer from
                     various harms when they languish in facilities that are not equipped to
                     treat them while awaiting transport. Id. at 1122. These harms include the
                     worsening of their mental illness, bodily harm, and even death. Id. DPBH
                     does not dispute this. The record shows that DPBH can and does comply
                     with competency orders once a civil contempt order with sanctions is issued.
                     Therefore, DPBH's arguments that compliance is impossible and that
                     sanctions undermine its ability to comply with the competency orders lack
                     merit.
                                                   CONCLUSION
                                 We conclude that DPBH failed to meet its burden of
                     demonstrating the need for extraordinary relief. The district court had
                     jurisdiction to hold DPBH in contempt and did not manifestly or
                     capriciously abuse its discretion in doing so. We therefore deny DPBH's

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                     petition for writ of certiorari or mandamus and the stay granted by this
                     court on November 2, 2022, is lifted.

                                                                                    J.

                     We concur:

                                                    C.J.
                     Stiglich

                                                    J.
                     Cadish

                     Herndon

                     Lee

                           a44.
                     Parraguirre

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