Court Opinion

ID: 9755669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:46:07.26955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:10.100516
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CAPPY,
Concurring.
Appellant asserts that the statements elicited without benefit of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) should have been suppressed. Insofar as the majority disposes of this claim under federal law, I am compelled to join as I recognize that New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984), requires that result. Although Appellant makes a perfunctory statement that this claim is raised under the Pennsylvania Constitution, beyond that boilerplate asser*236tion he offers no independent argument under our state constitution. Accordingly, the question of the viability of Quarles, and the public safety exception to the right against self-incrimination, under our state constitution is left for another day.
Additionally, I note my disagreement with the majority’s depiction of this claim as one being considered under a prejudice analysis. (Majority opinion at p. 789-90). As the assertion of error presents a claim of trial error, I believe that it is subject to a harmless error analysis. Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86, 645 A.2d 1300, 1307 (1994) (discussing the difference between a harmless error analysis and a prejudice analysis); see also Commonwealth v. Baez, 554 Pa. 66, 720 A.2d 711, 720 (1998) (denial of pre-trial motion to suppress subject to harmless error analysis). However, as I agree with the majority that there is no error, any discussion of the standard for assessing the consequences of that error is unnecessary.
In all other respects I join the lead opinion.