Court Opinion

ID: 9394550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 19:03:06.3844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.884705
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                )
                                  )
                                  )
     v.                           )     ID. No. 1807009539
                                  )
                                  )
RASHAD GOODMAN                    )

                         Submitted: March 3, 2023
                          Decided: May 15, 2023

               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

     Upon Defendant Rashad Goodman’s Motion for Postconviction Relief,
                               DENIED.

Natalie S. Woloshin, Esquire, WOLOSHIN, LYNCH, & ASSOCIATES, P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Mr. Goodman.

Dominic Carrera, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DEPARTMENT   OF   JUSTICE,
Wilmington, Delaware, for the State.

WALLACE, J.
          Rashad Goodman is currently serving a prison sentence that is comprised, in

part, of a 10-year term of mandatory incarceration arising from a conviction for

Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited and related counts.

          In his present postconviction relief motion, Mr. Goodman insists the Court

must re-sentence him without the 10-year minimum mandatory sentencing

enhancement because, in his view, trial counsel wrongly conceded Mr. Goodman

was subject to that 10-year minimum. For the reasons below, Mr. Goodman’s

motion for postconviction relief is DENIED.

                I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          On March 11, 2019, Mr. Goodman was convicted of the following after a

bench trial: Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Possession

of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, and Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon.1

During the sentencing hearing the State argued that because of Mr. Goodman’s prior

Pennsylvania convictions, he is “subject to a 10-year minimum-mandatory Level

5 incarceration for possession of a firearm by a person prohibited.”2 The State then

argued for 15 years of incarceration.3 Mr. Goodman’s trial counsel affirmatively

“ask[ed] the Court to impose the minimum mandatory, which is ten years in this

1
    Goodman v. State, 2020 WL 1061691, at *1 (Del. Mar. 4, 2020).
2
   Def.’s Appendix at A350, State v. Goodman, I.D. No. 1807009539 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 16,
2021) (D.I. 50) (hereinafter “Def.’s App.”).
3
    Id.

                                            -1-
matter.”4

         The Court then sentenced Mr. Goodman to 31 years at Level V incarceration,

suspended after ten years with application of 11 Del. C. § 4204(k) thereto (thereby

requiring Mr. Goodman serve all ten years at Level V without diminution).5 The

Court noted that an unsuspended ten-year term was the minimum allowed due to the

operation of 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(c) and that the § 4204(k) provision was applied

as a matter of the Court’s discretion.6

         Mr. Goodman appealed his conviction to the Delaware Supreme Court

arguing only that the undersigned, who heard his bench trial, should have recused

himself once he had been exposed “to highly prejudicial evidence.”7 The Supreme

Court affirmed Mr. Goodman’s conviction.8

         Thereafter, Mr. Goodman docketed a motion for postconviction relief.9 The

Court appointed Mr. Goodman postconviction counsel who then filed an amended

motion for postconviction relief.10 The Court heard arguments on the motion and it

4
     Id. at A351.
5
     Id. at A361-62.
6
     Id. at A356-59; id. at A361-62; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448(e)(1)(c) (2018).
7
     Goodman, 2020 WL 1061691, at *3.
8
     Id. at *3-4.
9
     D.I. 41.
10
     D.I. 49.

                                                -2-
is now ripe for decision.11

                       II. THE POSTCONVICTION MOTION

     A. MR. GOODMAN’S MOTION CAN BE CONSIDERED ON ITS MERITS.

        Before the Court can consider the substance of any postconviction claim, it

must first address Criminal Rule 61’s procedural requirements.12 The procedural

bars in Rule 61 are timeliness, repetitiveness, procedural default, and former

adjudication.13

        Mr. Goodman’s postconviction motion is timely because it was filed less than

a year after his judgment of conviction became final. This is also Mr. Goodman’s

first motion for postconviction relief. And because Mr. Goodman’s sole claim

alleges ineffective assistance of counsel—which generally can’t be raised on direct

appeal—he is neither procedurally barred from raising it in this collateral

proceeding, nor has it been formerly adjudicated.

        Accordingly, the Court will address the merits of Mr. Goodman’s ineffective-

assistance-at-sentencing claim.

11
     D.I. 58.
12
   Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 150 (Del. 1996); State v. Jones, 2002 WL 31028584, at *2
(Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2002).
13
   State v. Taylor, 2017 WL 5054262, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2017). If any of these bars
apply, then the inmate must show entitlement to relief under Rule 61(i)(5). Id.

                                              -3-
     B. MR. GOODMAN’S POSTCONVICTION CLAIM

        Mr. Goodman alleges trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by

wrongfully conceding that Mr. Goodman’s previous out-of-state convictions

enhanced his minimum mandatory sentence to ten years.14                          According to

Mr. Goodman, he should be resentenced with the Court’s starting point being a lower

minimum-mandatory.15

                      III. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

        A movant who claims ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that:

(a) his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and (b) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.16

        There is a strong presumption that criminal defense counsel’s representation

was reasonable,17 and “[i]t is not this Court’s function to second-guess reasonable

[litigation] tactics” engaged by him.18 Too, one claiming ineffective assistance

14
   Oral Arg. Tr. at 25 (D.I. 58) (“[Trial Counsel] was ineffective because he conceded the 10
years.”); id. at 14 (“that minimum should not have been argued at 10”).
15
    Id. at 14. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 2021 WL 4098967, at *2 (Del. Sept. 8, 2021) (noting that
relief in the form of resentencing may be warranted to correct a court’s misimposition of non-
suspended imprisonment as a minimum-mandatory term to a sentence when that minimum term
did not in fact apply); State v. Palmer, 2022 WL 16641898, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2022)
(granting such relief under Rule 35(a)).
16
   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also Alston v. State, 2015 WL
5297709, at *2-3 (Del. Sept. 4, 2015).
17
     See Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).
18
     State v. Drummond, 2002 WL 524283, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2002).

                                               -4-
“must make specific allegations of how defense counsel’s conduct actually

prejudiced the proceedings, rather than mere allegations of ineffectiveness.”19

Lastly, a movant must demonstrate both deficient attorney performance and

resulting prejudice to succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.20

Failure to do so on either will doom that claim and obviate any need for the Court

to address the other.

                                      IV. DISCUSSION

         MR. GOODMAN’S TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL DID NOT PROVIDE
                          INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

        A. MR. GOODMAN’S TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL
           WERE NOT DEFICIENT.

        Mr. Goodman challenges the sentence he received via a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel.21 At bottom, Mr. Goodman suggests that had his counsel been

constitutionally effective, Mr. Goodman would not have been subject to a ten-year

minimum mandatory sentence and might instead be serving a reduced sentence.22

He says that counsel should have challenged the sufficiency of the State’s pre-

19
   Alston, 2015 WL 5297709, at *3 (citing Wright, 671 A.2d at 1356); Monroe v. State, 2015
WL 1407856, at *5 (Del. Mar. 25, 2015) (citing Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del.
1996)).
20
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland is a two-
pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the
deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.” (citation omitted)); State v. Hamby, 2005 WL 914462,
at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
21
     Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 12 (D.I. 49).
22
     Id. at 22-23.

                                                -5-
hearing document submission evidencing his out-of-state convictions—convictions

that were used to enhance the minimum-mandatory sentence he received.23

Mr. Goodman further urges the Court to now determine his eligibility for the

enhanced sentence by relying solely on the State’s memorandum submitted before

he was sentenced.24 But if not, Mr. Goodman maintains he should be given a

postconviction hearing. The scope of that hearing, according to him, should be

limited to the narrow question of whether the documents supplied by the State, both

to counsel pre-hearing and later at the sentencing hearing, were sufficient under

Shepard v. United States and Valentine v. State.25                    In his view of such a

23
     Id. at 16.
24
     Oral Arg. Tr. at 27-28.
25
    Id. (“Then there would need to be a postconviction hearing in which the Court were to
determine whether if these documents were presented to the Court whether the Court would find
that these met Shepard and Valentine.”).
    In Valentine v. State, 2019 WL 1178765 (Del. Mar. 12, 2019), the Delaware Supreme Court
adopted a requirement imposed by Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) and its progeny,
that out-of-state convictions introduced to enhance sentences under the federal Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”) must be proved with certain types of documents. Shepard, 544 U.S. at
16. Valentine took the Shepard document requirement for sentencings under the ACCA and
applied it to this State’s PFBPP analog. See Valentine, 2019 WL 1178765, at *1-2.
   Under Valentine and Shepard, a sentencing court evaluating an out-of-state conviction can
only rely on “charging document[s], written plea agreement[s], transcript[s] of plea colloqu[ies],
and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented,” but not “police
reports or complaint applications.” Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16; see Valentine, 2019 WL 1178765, at
*1-2.
    In Valentine itself, the defendant had been previously convicted of a gun possession and a
separate drug dealing offense in Pennsylvania, each of which’s Pennsylvania statutory definition
was broader than its comparative Delaware felony. Valentine, 2019 WL 1178765, at *1-2. To
identify whether the Pennsylvania offenses fit into the § 4201(c) violent felony definition, the
sentencing court looked at two documents – the first was the drug dealing jury verdict sheet and
the second was the arrest report for the gun possession charge. Id. at *2. Because both documents
                                                -6-
postconviction hearing, the State would be prohibited from submitting any

additional evidence to support its sentencing position that he is, in reality, eligible

for sentencing enhancement under 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(c).26

        Mr. Goodman’s procedural suggestion doesn’t square with this Court’s rules

or postconviction procedure. Just as it does for the conviction from which a given

sentence derives, Rule 61 provides a limited means to collaterally challenge such a

sentence within a narrow framework.27 And at this stage, it is the inmate-movant

who carries the burden of proof and persuasion.28 Here, Mr. Goodman has asserted

ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel so the applicable analysis under

narrowed the scope (i.e. elements) of what Valentine was convicted of, the sentencing court found
(with the aid of those documents) his Pennsylvania convictions were equivalent to Delaware §
4201(c) violent felonies. See id.
    On appeal, our Supreme Court found the use of the jury verdict sheet was proper, but the use
of the arrest report was not. Id. And because our Supreme Court barred consideration of the arrest
report, it left open the possibility that Valentine’s Pennsylvania gun possession charge was for an
act that wouldn’t attach § 4201(c)-defined-violent-felony liability in Delaware and thus ordered
resentencing. Id.
26
     Oral Arg. Tr. at 28.
27
    Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 745 (Del. 1990) (Rule 61 “is not designed as a substitute for
direct appeal.”); State v. Diggs, 2022 WL 779569, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2022) (“Rule 61
does not ‘allow defendants unlimited opportunities to relitigate’ their convictions.” (quoting Ploof,
75 A.3d at 820)).
28
    See Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 555 (Del. 1990) (“[I]n a postconviction proceeding, the
petitioner has the burden of proof and must show that he has been deprived of a substantial
constitutional right before he is entitled to any relief.” (citation omitted)); see also Swan v. State,
248 A.3d 839, 858-59 (Del. 2021) (The Rule 61 movant “carries the burden of establishing (i) that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) that the
deficiencies in counsel’s representation caused him substantial prejudice.” (citation omitted));
Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 174 (Del. 2020) (“The burden of persuasion is on [the postconviction
movant] to show that his counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, i.e., that no
reasonable lawyer would have conducted the defense as his lawyer did.” (citation omitted)).

                                                 -7-
Strickland v. Washington and its progeny requires he demonstrate both counsel

deficiency and resultant prejudice29—i.e., in this case whether a sentence

enhancement that was not statutorily authorized was applied.

        The first inquiry is whether counsel performed deficiently both pre-sentence

and at the sentencing hearing when conceding Mr. Goodman was subject to the

10-year minimum mandatory sentence instead of challenging the State thereon.

        The record reflects trial counsel reviewed the out-of-state convictions and the

relevant case law, including Shepard and its progeny; he found the state-provided

documents and other information he reviewed evidenced that Mr. Goodman was

subject to sentencing enhancement under 11 Del. C. §1448(e)(1)(c).30 In turn,

counsel made the reasonable decision not to press the State to provide the Court with

more information and engage in a full-court press on the issue. To him, that gambit

ran the risk of a sentencing hearing where bad facts, not already in the record, would

29
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Ploof, 75 A.3d at 825 (“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there
is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice
the defendant.” (citation omitted)); Hamby, 2005 WL 914462, at *2.
30
     Trial Counsel’s Affidavit at 3 (D.I. 51)
        Furthermore, prior to Mr. Goodman’s sentence, trial counsel in reviewing the
        relevant law in Shephard v. United States [sic] formed the legal opinion that the
        charging documents, including the Pennsylvania criminal complaints, trial
        dispositions and sentencings order were sufficient ‘Shephard’ [sic] documentation
        to satisfy the State’s burden of establishing prior felonies pursuant to 11 Del. C. §
        1448. Trial counsel had access to and reviewed all documents pertaining to Mr.
        Goodman’s past criminal record prior to his sentencing.
(internal citation omitted).

                                                -8-
be presented to the sentencing judge.31 And recall, the State was arguing for the

statutory maximum.

        “[A] lawyer’s performance is constitutionally deficient only if no competent

attorney would have chosen the challenged course of action.”32 It is not the role of

the Court to determine “what the best lawyers would have done . . . [or] even what

most good lawyers would have done.”33 “Instead, the Court must determine whether

. . . ‘counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

guaranteed [to] the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’”34 “Strickland doesn’t

deem . . . counsel ineffective for not pursuing the best or most successful strategy;

instead, it requires trial[] counsel be informed by a thorough investigation of law and

facts.”35 That is what happened here. “[D]efense counsel has a general duty to

investigate, [but] he need not travel blind alleys in hope they might lead to something

31
    No doubt, any information gleaned from Shepard documents can be considered by the
sentencing judge for more than just the statutory-enhancement calculus. Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d
839, 842 (Del. 1992) (“[A] sentencing court has broad discretion to consider information
pertaining to a defendant’s personal history and behavior which is not confined exclusively to
conduct for which that defendant was convicted.” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Lake v. State, 1984 WL 997111, at *1 (Del. Oct. 29, 1984) (“The sentencing judge may
conduct a broad inquiry which examines almost any factor including prior criminal charges,
hearsay, and other information normally in-admissible for the purpose of determining guilt.”
(citations omitted)).
32
     Green, 238 A.3d at 178 (citing Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011)).
33
     Id. (alterations in original) (quoting White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992)).
34
   State v. Peters, 283 A.3d 668, 686 (Del. Super. Ct. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting
Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014)).
35
     Id. at 687 (citing Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 788 (Del. 2013); Hoskins, 102 A.3d at 730).

                                                  -9-
helpful to his client’s case.”36 After reviewing the facts available to him—which

appears to include more than just the State’s proffers—and applicable law,

sentencing counsel decided it was best not to challenge the State’s document

submissions and risk a worse picture of Mr. Goodman’s criminal past at his

sentencing proceeding where the State was seeking the statutory maximum. That is

not counsel deficiency.

        B. MR. GOODMAN HAS NOT SHOWN ANY RESULTANT PREJUDICE
           FROM HIS ATTORNEYS’ ALLEGED DEFICIENT PERFORMANCES.

        Even if trial counsel was deficient, which he is not, Mr. Goodman doesn’t

assert the State couldn’t produce sufficient documentation to prove that his out-of-

state convictions were equivalent to Delaware violent felonies.37 Mr. Goodman,

instead, says that to succeed on his postconviction claim he need only show the

documents provided at the time of the sentencing were insufficient.38 Not so.

        To reiterate, failure to make a deficiency or prejudice showing under the

Strickland test “will render the claim unsuccessful.”39 And again, if any supposed

attorney shortcoming didn’t actually prejudice Mr. Goodman, then there is no need

36
     State v. Harrell, 2017 WL 2418278, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 5, 2017) (citation omitted).
37
    See Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 21 (“Absent those documents, the convictions alone
leave open the possibility that Mr. Goodman was convicted of the portions of the statutes that do
not constitute a violent felony in Delaware.”).
38
     Oral Arg. Tr. at 29-30.
39
     Hamby, 2005 WL 914462, at *2 (citation omitted).

                                               -10-
to examine whether his sentencing attorney did indeed perform deficiently.40 The

necessary prejudice here must be a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

errors the result of his sentencing proceeding (or appeal therefrom) would have been

different.41 To carry his prejudice burden in these circumstances, Mr. Goodman

must prove counsel’s Strickland-level deficient performance resulted in the

application of a specific, demonstrable sentencing enhancement that would not have

occurred but for counsel’s error.42

        Even if the Court were to limit itself to the documents the State initially

supplied, that would, under Mr. Goodman’s theory, only afford him a new

sentencing hearing where the State certainly could introduce supplemental

documentation.43 The ultimate relief, therefore, would not perforce be a different

40
     Ploof, 75 A.3d at 825; Green, 238 A.3d at 174-75.
41
     Harden v. State, 180 A.3d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2018).
42
   Peters, 283 A.3d at 697 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 337
(3d Cir. 2007) (finding prejudice prong satisfied “when a deficiency by counsel resulted in a
specific, demonstrable enhancement in sentencing . . . which would not have occurred but for
counsel’s error” (quoting United States v. Franks, 230 F.3d 811, 815 (5th Cir. 2000)).
43
    At oral argument Mr. Goodman insisted the Delaware Supreme Court’s then-pending decision
in Downs v. State would support his position that if the Court were to hold a hearing on the
sufficiency of the State’s out-of-state supporting documents, the State would be barred in that
hearing from supplementing its submissions either on its own or by order of the Court. Oral Arg.
Tr. at 11-12, 27-28.
   When the Supreme Court issued its Downs decision, the Court allowed the parties to submit
supplemental letters explaining the effect, if any, that decision had here. D.I. 59.
    In his supplemental letter, Mr. Goodman acknowledged the Supreme Court’s determination
that the Superior Court has inherent powers to manage its affairs but insisted in this case “[a]ny
allowance for a modification of the sentencing memorandum after such opportunity to fully
                                              -11-
sentencing outcome. His failure to affirmatively demonstrate he was not

§ 1448(e)(1)(c)-eligible dooms his ability to show the resultant prejudice specific to

this claim.44

        What’s more, the documents already provided by the State satisfy Valentine

and Shepard. Shepard, as applied to Delaware’s PFBPP statute through Valentine,

instructs that “the charging document” (or “some comparable judicial record of this

information”) is needed to credit the out-of-state convictions—as opposed to “police

reports or complaint applications.”45 Mr. Goodman might like to say otherwise, but

develop the record may be considered an abuse of discretion.” Mr. Goodman’s Supp. Ltr. at 2
(D.I. 60). But Mr. Goodman does no more to explain why it would.
    In Downs v. State, the Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s decision to sua sponte postpone a
sentencing hearing and allow the State to refile its habitual offender motion. 2023 WL 1977572,
at *3 (Del. Feb. 14, 2023). The Supreme Court recognized the “Superior Court’s . . . inherent
power to ‘manage its affairs and to achieve the orderly disposition of its
business.’” Id. (quoting State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 (Del. 1992)). And found “[t]here is
no abuse of discretion when a trial judge gives parties an opportunity to fully develop the record
before ruling on an issue’s merits.” Id.
    Mr. Goodman asserts that once the State had submitted its sentencing memorandum its hands
were tied because it had an opportunity to fully develop the record and failed to do so. Mr.
Goodman’s Supp. Ltr. at 2. Not so. Were the Court to need a hearing on postconviction—where
Mr. Goodman shoulders the burden (see supra note 28)—the State would be permitted to
supplement its earlier- abbreviated sentencing presentation to counter Mr. Goodman’s now-minted
prejudice claim; that is, to show Mr. Goodman is not due relief because he was, in fact, due the §
1448(e)(1)(c) enhancement.
44
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”); Peters, 283 A.3d at 697 (for this species of ineffectiveness claim, that means
misapplication of a specific demonstrable sentencing enhancer).
45
     Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 26.

                                              -12-
a Pennsylvania “criminal complaint is not merely a police report.”46 It is, in fact, the

charging document.47 And while it may, in some instances, be superseded by an

information or indictment, in Mr. Goodman’s Pennsylvania prosecution it was the

charging document.

                                      V. CONCLUSION

        Mr. Goodman has proved neither the deficient performance by counsel48 nor

46
     Garcia v. Attorney General of the United States, 462 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2006)
        In Pennsylvania, a criminal complaint is not merely a police report. It is the
        charging instrument, and in this case bears the imprimatur of the district attorney.
        The filing of a criminal complaint is sufficient to initiate criminal proceedings in
        the Commonwealth and Pennsylvania law does not require the subsequent filing of
        either an information or an indictment if a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is
        entered.
(citing Pa. R. Crim. P. 502 & Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 372 A.2d 826, 829 (Pa. 1977)).
47
    Id. Not so, challenges Mr. Goodman. But the distinction he struggles to draw (Reply Br. at
10) illustrates a weakness in the Shepard-Valentine line. Even when documents are clearly
reliable, a sentencing court is instructed to “close [its] eyes to what is obvious” and instead “feign
amnesia” depending on the type of document. See United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 138-
39 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring). This approach has been met with deserved skepticism
and sharp criticism across the federal circuits. United States v. Scott, 14 F.4th 190, 200-02 (3d
Cir. 2021) (Phipps, J., dissenting) (surveying federal circuits).
48
    Mr. Goodman concludes his postconviction motion by asserting that his appellate counsel was
also ineffective. Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 23-24. In order to succeed in demonstrating
that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, Mr. Goodman would, first have to show
that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find and pursue a particular
nonfrivolous claim on its merits. See Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 946 (Del. 2013) (observing also,
however, that appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but
rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal”
(quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000))). In addition, he must demonstrate
that counsel’s allegedly deficient performance caused prejudice—“[t]hat is, [Mr. Goodman] must
show a reasonable probability that, but for his [appellate] counsel’s unreasonable failure to file a
[particular claim], he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Id. at 947 (alteration added) (quoting
Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285). And again, Mr. Goodman cannot obtain postconviction relief unless
he adequately establishes both—objectively unreasonable performance and sufficient resulting
prejudice. Given the disposition of the sentencing-enhancement issue here on postconviction, Mr.
Goodman can demonstrate neither.
                                                -13-
the prejudice required for relief under Strickland. Accordingly, Mr. Goodman’s

Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.

     IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                            Paul R. Wallace, Judge
     Original to Prothonotary

                                     -14-