Court Opinion

ID: 9560536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:50:42.415433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:07.964783
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. The evidence discloses that the residence in question, although containing three apartments, was described in the Clarke County tax records as a dwelling house, having two stories, a first floor, and a half attic. The search warrant only authorized a search of the entire first floor of the residence. The first floor was later found during the search to have been divided into two apartments, and was numbered as 620 Meigs Street, as was set forth in the warrant. Other than two doors opening upon the front porch, there was no external indication that the first floor contained two apartments. The police officers were not warned of possible multiple-occupancy until after they entered the premises. Said police immediately searched the male occupants, finding the marijuana on the person of the defendant. The search warrant was not rendered illegal because of the description of the premises or otherwise. See in this connection United States v. Santore, 290 F2d 51, 67, cert. den., 365 U. S. 834; United States v. Poppitt, 227 FSupp. 73, 78; Hanger v. United States, 398 F2d 91, 99.
The officers, having entered the premises in search of LSD, were not limited to this illegal drug when an immediate search of the accused disclosed the marijuana upon defendant’s person.
Under Code Ann. §27-309 the officers may reasonably detain or search any person in the place at the time to protect themselves from attack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of any instrument, article or thing particularly *847described in the warrant. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 763 (89 SC 2034, 23 LE2d 685).
In my opinion, the search was not illegal and the fruits of the search were a proper basis for the arrest of the accused. See Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455 (177 SE2d 487). The trial judge heard and weighed the evidence as to whether or not the officers had made efforts to determine in which part of the two-story dwelling "Barry” was allegedly located. As trior of the facts he determined that the officers were within the l?iw and had probable cause to search the first floor of the two-story building. He did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to suppress. The facts in this case are substantially different from Holtzendorf v. State, 125 Ga. App. 747 (188 SE2d 879), recently decided by this court.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the judgment of reversal.
I am authorized to state that Judges Pannell and Clark concur in this dissent.