Court Opinion

ID: 9786532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:57:28.799977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:46.165176
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring.
I agree that in this case, where “the El Dorado County prosecutor was fully aware of the simultaneous Sacramento County prosecution,” prosecution of the El Dorado County action was barred by Penal Code section 654’s prohibition of multiple prosecutions. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 955-956.) I therefore join fully in the judgment reversing defendant’s El Dorado County conviction. I write separately only to highlight two aspects of the majority opinion:
1. The majority opinion’s discussion of the multiple-punishment issue is unnecessary. Today, we reverse the judgment of conviction in the El Dorado County action as violative of the bar on multiple prosecutions set forth in Penal Code section 654. Neither El Dorado County nor Sacramento County will be able to retry defendant for violating Penal Code section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A). Accordingly, any additional claim of error arising from the El Dorado County action that presumes retrial is possible—i.e., any claim that defendant’s waiver of jury trial was defective, that certain evidence was erroneously admitted or excluded, or that defendant could not be separately punished for that offense—is now moot. (E.g., People v. Killebrew (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644, 661 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876] [reversal for insufficient evidence renders remaining contentions “moot”]; Weston v. Kernan (9th Cir. 1995) 50 F.3d 633, 639 [reversal for double jeopardy violation renders remaining contentions “moot”].) Part B. of the majority opinion falls into that category and is thus dictum.
2. The bar on multiple prosecutions does not apply “if . . . ‘severance [is] permitted for good causé.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 954.) This case involves a second prosecution under Penal Code section 290 brought by a contiguous county that was fully aware of the simultaneous prosecution in Sacramento. Future cases may involve counties that are geographically remote from each *957other or are otherwise without the resources to shuttle witnesses from one place to the other. Our decision today does not prevent a court from finding that good cause exists to sever the charges in such circumstances.
Werdegar, J., concurred.