Court Opinion

ID: 9570296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:22:06.641825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:35.989709
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In the hearing held on September 30, 1986, after the plea bargain had been dis*561cussed in detail which involved credit for presentence jail time of the 13 months,1 and after the judge had advised that he would not be controlled by any plea bargain, the following was said:
“Now, Mr. Percival after I received the presentence investigation report if I don’t want to accept any parts of the plea bargaining, I will give you the opportunity to withdraw the pleas you have made and give you the opportunity to enter a plea of not guilty and go to trial.
“Do you understand that?
“MR. PERCIVAL: Yes.”
At the sentencing hearing November 25, 1986, after extensive review of the facts and the event involved, the court said:
“The Court is not going to give jail time based on the escape from the Park County Jail. If you had not escaped from the Park County Jail, the Court would have certainly considered giving you jail time, probably in light of my past sentencing. *562“You took it upon yourself to escape, and I haven’t remarked about the two crimes you committed while out.”
The record clearly defines the original plea-bargain discussion to be that with the pleas of guilty to escape, and nolo contendere to aggravated robbery, other charges would be dismissed, sentences would be concurrent, and credit for jail time would be recommended. No máximums or minimums were stated. Under these circumstances, it is hard to understand why the trial court, if it felt that additional punishment should be assessed for the escape in contravention of the concurrent sentences, did not simply raise the minimum sentence on the aggravated robbery to 11 years and one month or give the defendant a right to replead.
I dissent in this case simply because the judge did advise the defendant on initial discussion that, if the trial court rejected the plea bargain, the defendant would be given an opportunity to change his plea. This was not done. Little benefit is afforded by a comprehensive review of the provisions of the federal rule, Rule 11(e), F.R. Cr.P.2 and the present state rule on plea bargains, Rule 15(e), W.R.Cr.P.3 Hence, the issue with which I am concerned is simply that what was said on initial plea did not occur when sentencing was entered. Certainly the actual sentence was reasonable, and the attitude of the court fair and realistic.
Although the result in this case does not disturb my sensibilities, concern is raised for a rule apparently created. The court seems to say that even if the pleading defendant is led to believe he will have an opportunity to change his plea before sentence when the plea bargain is rejected, the opportunity to replead is even so not provided. I do not find the issue as actually presented to be whether the Wyoming rule in its unmodernized form accommodates in some fashion the specific requirement of the federal rule of advice to the defendant that if the recommendation aspect of the plea bargain is not accepted, the defendant will have no automatic right to withdraw his plea. Rule 11(e)(2), F.R.Cr.P. The trial court here did not state any restriction on the defendant’s right to withdraw the plea if the court elected to reject the recommended arrangement derived by the parties as a plea bargain. See the converse result, *563where the state seeks to enforce the bargain, including a sentence recommendation, Commonwealth v. Coles, Pa.Super., 530 A.2d 453 (1987).
It is to be said that if the judge advises the defendant that he will have a right to change his plea upon plea-bargain rejection, all aspects of the bargain are included in the proviso unless restriction is made or terms excluded. What we should seek is that each party knows what the rules of the game will be and can make a decision intentionally and with knowledge.
Although I am not convinced that it would necessarily do any favor to the defendant, since to remand for sentencing could accommodate the identical result of the present sentence, a more severe sentence, or even a new trial which is implausible under the circumstances, I would reverse and remand since the defendant was not afforded an opportunity which had been previously stated to be available to him at the time of original entry of his plea.

. Since the issue stated by this court is that the trial court did not give appellant credit for the 13 months spent in the Park County jail awaiting trial, one would ask how this could be since by Rule 204, Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming, Wyoming has a 120-day speedy-trial provision.
That rule provides:
"(a) It is the responsibility of court and counsel to insure to each person charged with crime a speedy trial.
"(b) A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 120 days following the filing of information or indictment.
“(c) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial:
"(1) All proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency of the defendant.
"(2) Proceedings on another charge.
“(3) Delay granted by the court pursuant to Section (d).
“(4) The time between the dismissal and the refiling of the same charge.
“(5) Delay occasioned by defendant’s change of counsel or application therefor.
“(d) Continuances may be granted as follows:
“(1) On motion of defendant supported by affidavit of defendant and defendant’s counsel.
“(2) On motion of the prosecuting attorney or the court if:
”(i) The defendant expressly consents; or
“(ii) The state’s evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; or
“(iii) Required in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced.
“(e) Upon receiving notice of possible delay the defendant shall show in writing how the delay may prejudice his defense.
"(f) If the defendant is unavailable for any proceeding at which his presence is required, the time period shall begin anew upon defendant’s being available.”
Sequentially, the record shows that on October 9, 1985, defendant was arrested and initially appeared in justice of the peace court for arraignment on a charge of attempted murder. Bond was set at $25,000, and a preliminary hearing scheduled for October 18. On that day, a motion by defendant to suspend proceedings was made for transfer of the case to the district court in order that a mental illness or deficiency evaluation could be made. An order appointing a designated examiner was signed by the district court on October 23, providing for transfer to the Wyoming State Hospital at Evanston. After examination, the case was remanded to the justice of the peace court on November 26 for a preliminary hearing. Following a motion for a change of judge, the preliminary hearing was apparently held on January 21, 1986, with the information then filed in the district court on January 31, 1986, which would have commenced the 120-day speedy-trial time. Although an order was entered on February 5 for the arraignment on March 25, Percival was arraigned by a different judge on March 5, at which time pleas of not guilty and not triable by reason of present insanity were entered. An order for examination was then entered on March 14 for a further medical evaluation by Dr. Brian Miracle in Lander. The comprehensive evaluation report, dated May 23, 1986, was filed in the district court May 30. During this period of time, having been returned from Lander, the defendant remained in the county jail. On July 15, 1986, an order was entered setting the case for trial on September 30. Unfortunately, on August 14, Percival, without right, leave or privilege, departed the jail, having then been incarcerated for nine and one-third months except while in Lander and Evanston for mental evaluation. On September 30, 1986, he reappeared in district court and entered pleas of guilty to unlawfully escaping from official detention, and nolo contendere to aggravated robbery. The escape episode apparently lasted two and one-half days before he was rearrested.
This is how a speedy-trial provision of 120 days became 13 months in confinement time. It is strongly indicated in the record that the escape effort was the result of the delayed trial. Obviously, that did not afford either legal or moral justification, but it does demonstrate the emotional nature of the claim that credit for the 13 months should have been given on the sentence.

. "(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
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"(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report. If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw his plea.
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"(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.” Rule 11(e), F.R.Cr.P.

. "(e) Plea agreement procedure.
* * * * *
"(2) Notice of Such Agreement. — If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.
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"(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. — If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.” Rule 15(e), W.R.Cr.P.