Court Opinion

ID: 9486098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:37:53.514657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:31.728985
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
I agree with Judge Silberman about the proper disposition of this case, and I join Part 11(C) of his opinion (with the exception of the last two sentences of footnote 12). But I write separately because I find the rest of his opinion unnecessarily broad.
Aside from the actual-notice issue dealt with in Part 11(C), this case presents two simple questions. First, does the Postal Service’s “Routine Use M” cover the information that the arbitrator has ordered the Service to provide the union? Second, assuming that Routine Use M does cover that information, would the purpose of disclosure here be “compatible” with the purpose for which the information was collected, as required by 5 U.S.C. § 552a(7)?
Taking the second question first, I see no conflict between the purposes for which the *147information was collected and those for which it will be disclosed. For me, that answers the second question. Assuming Congress meant what it said when it chose the word “compatible” rather than “congruent” or “parallel” or “related”, it required no more.1 This understanding of compatibility is, I think, in accord with our decision in Doe v. Stephens, 851 F.2d 1457 (D.C.Cir.1988), where we found that disclosure of psychiatric records to a grand jury was not compatible with the diagnostic purposes for which they were collected; the chilling effect of disclosure is plain. Cf. Op. of Silberman, J., supra at 145 n. 10. Judge Randolph apparently favors a stiffer compatibility requirement, see Op.- of Randolph, J., infra at 149, but in my view the Privacy Act’s primary cheek on routine uses stems instead from the requirement that agencies can invoke a routine use only if it has been tested by public notice, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D), and only if the person who provided the information in question was informed that such a use might be made of it, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(C).
Turning to the other question: If the Postal Service had provided an authoritative (and reasonable) interpretation of Routine Use M, we would be obliged to defer to it. FLRA v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1454 (D.C.Cir.1989). But as Judge Silberman explains, the Service has provided no authoritative interpretation at all. See Op. of Silberman, J., supra at 141-42. Accordingly, we must construe it ourselves in accordance with its language and the purpose expressed in that language.
The language of Routine Use M dovetails with the relevant passage of the Postal Service’s collective-bargaining agreement. The first calls for disclosure of records “needed” by a union for collective bargaining, the second for disclosure of records “necessary” for that purpose. Given this apparent harmony, I believe it proper to read the routine use notice as encompassing the disclosures that the arbitrator found required by the collective bargaining agreement — in a ruling that the Postal Service does not claim to be legally challengeable.
We could, of course, construe Routine Use M independently of the arbitrator’s decision, as Judge Randolph urges in dissent. But to do so would produce a system of double vetoes (both court and arbitrator being able to block disclosure), where the controlling documents suggest that the parties intended a more harmonious and simple process.
If the Privacy Act imposes no bar, the Postal Service’s contract with the union requires it to disclose the information covered by the arbitrator’s award. The conclusion that Routine Use M covers this information therefore resolves the case. I see no reason to speculate about whether the Postal Service’s obligations under the NLRA, or under an arbitrator’s interpretation of its collective bargaining agreement, require the Service to have such a broad routine-use notice, much less empower the courts to compel the Service to re-collect the data from its employees under appropriate notice. Cf. Op. of Silber-man, J., at 142^43,146 n. 12. This case does not present that question, and the parties have not addressed it.
Lest Judge Silberman’s hypotheses be taken as the final word, however, I note that they are not self-evidently true. The NLRA applies to the Postal Service only “to the extent not inconsistent with” the Privacy Act. 39 U.S.C. § 1209(a); 39 U.S.C. § 410(b)(1). To be sure, if the Service contracted with its unions to disclose certain information and then intentionally amended its routine-use notices to prevent itself from complying with this agreement, a court might find that the Service had not bargained in good faith and deserved appropriate sanctions. But Judge Silberman goes further. He suggests that the NLRA obliges the Postal Service to publish routine-use notices that permit it to disclose, without violating the Privacy Act, the same information that the NLRA requires private employers to disclose — even when the Service has not contracted to disclose this information. Likewise, he speculates that if the Service inadvertently fails to pro*148vide the actual notice required by 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(C) on (or with) the forms on which it collects such information, the NLRA might require the Service to re-collect the information with suitable notice to employees, so that it could be disclosed without violating the Privacy Act. While I take no position on these questions (since they are not before us), it is not clear to me that the statutory scheme compels this result. Cf. Local 2047, American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Defense General Supply Center, 423 F.Supp. 481 (E.D.Va.1976), aff'd per curiam, 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir.1978) (holding that federal agency was not required to publish routine-use notice that would have allowed it to continue disclosing information to union, even though it had agreed to disclose that information under a collective-bargaining agreement signed before the Privacy Act’s enactment); Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318-19 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1123, 1133 n. 16, 59 L.Ed.2d 333 (1979) (citing Local 204,7 as example of Privacy Act’s strength).

. I do not share Judge Silberman's belief that the meaning of "compatible” in § 552a(7) may depend on the identity of the entity to which information is being disclosed. Cf. Op. of Silberman, J., supra at 145.