Court Opinion

ID: 9377030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 18:00:40.823949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:11.303147
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MATT YAMASHITA,                            No. 20-17512
         Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                         D.C. No. 1:20-cv-
 v.                                      00129-DKW-RT

LG CHEM, LTD.; LG CHEM
AMERICA, INC.,                              OPINION
           Defendants-Appellees,

and

COILART; GEARBEST.COM; WA
FA LA INC.; DOES, DOE LG Entities
1-10; John Does 1 - 10; Jane Does 1-
10; Doe Corporations 1-10; Doe
Partnerships 1-10; Doe Limited
Liability Companies 1-10; Doe
Business Entities 1-10; Doe
Governmental Entities 1-10; Doe
Unincorporated Associations 1-10,
               Defendants.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
                 for the District of Hawaii
      Derrick Kahala Watson, District Judge, Presiding
2                  YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

          Argued and Submitted January 21, 2022
         Submission Withdrawn September 8, 2022
             Resubmitted February 27, 2023
                    Honolulu, Hawaii

                       Filed March 6, 2023

    Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Eric D. Miller, and
              Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.

                Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

                          SUMMARY *

     Personal Jurisdiction / Jurisdictional Discovery

    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack
of personal jurisdiction of a products-liability suit brought
by Matt Yamashita against LG Chem, Ltd. (“LGC”) and LG
Chem America, Inc. (“LGCA”), claiming that they
negligently manufactured and distributed a battery which he
used to power an electronic cigarette until the battery and
electronic cigarette both exploded in his mouth.
   Yamashita is a resident of Hawaii, and he alleged that he
purchased the battery from an unidentified third party to
whom LGC and LGCA had distributed for resale in
Hawaii. LGC is a South Korean company headquartered in

*
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.                  3

Seoul, South Korea. LGCA is a wholly-owned marketing
subsidiary of LGC, and a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Georgia.
   After Yamashita appealed, but before he filed his
opening brief, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,
141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).
    Since this case was brought in Hawaii, and Hawaii’s
long-arm statute allows Hawaii courts to invoke personal
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the due process clause,
a court sitting in Hawaii can exercise jurisdiction over
Yamashita’s claims against LGC and LGCA if doing so is
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. Supreme Court
precedents      recognize     two     kinds     of    personal
jurisdiction: general and specific jurisdiction.
    Yamashita argued that LGC and LGCA’s contacts with
Hawaii were sufficient to establish general personal
jurisdiction. The panel held that LGC and LGCA are not “at
home” in Hawaii, and the district court of Hawaii could not
exercise general personal jurisdiction over them.
    For an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, the due
process clause requires that the defendant “take some act by
which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State,” and that the
plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024-25.” The
panel held that Ford modified, but did not abolish, the
requirement that a claim must arise out of or relate to a forum
contact in order for a court to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction.
4                YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

    Under Ninth Circuit law, the placement of a product into
the stream of commerce, by itself, is not an act purposefully
directed toward the forum state. The panel held that under
the stream-of-commerce-plus test, only some of the alleged
contacts between LGC and LGCA and Hawaii count as
purposeful availment. First, LGC and LGCA’s shipments to
and through the port of Honolulu qualified as purposeful
availment. Second, LGC’s involvement in the sale of
residential solar batteries in Hawaii qualified as purposeful
availment. Third, the various consumer products sold in
Hawaii containing LGC’s 18650 lithium-ion batteries did
not show purposeful availment, but only a bare stream of
commerce. Fourth, LGC’s introduction of stand-alone
18650 batteries into the stream of commerce through a third-
party website did not amount to purposeful availment
without some indication that LGC was targeting the Hawaii
market. The panel concluded that half of the alleged
contacts were not contacts at all, but for purposeful
availment purposes, a single sufficiently deliberate contact
can suffice.
    While LGC and LGCA’s Hawaii contacts clearly
showed that they purposefully availed themselves of Hawaii
law, they can only be subject to specific personal jurisdiction
if Yamashita’s injuries arose out of or relate to those
contacts. The panel held that Yamashita had not shown that
his injuries arose out of any contacts because he had not
shown but-for causation. Of the four types of contacts he
alleged, only two were actually forum contacts within the
meaning of the specific personal jurisdiction test: the use of
the port of Honolulu and the activity in the market for solar
batteries. Neither established but-for causation. The panel
further held that Yamashita had not shown
relatedness. Given that Yamashita could not show that his
                 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.                  5

injury arose out of or related to LGC or LGCA’s Hawaii
contacts, the district court did not err in dismissing for lack
of personal jurisdiction over either firm.
    The panel next considered the district court’s denial of
jurisdictional discovery. First, Yamashita sought evidence
that LGC and LGCA had forum contacts related to the use
of lithium-ion batteries, particularly 18650 batteries, in
consumer products. The panel held that such contacts might
satisfy the “relates to” prong of the specific personal
jurisdiction test if causing one’s lithium-ion batteries to be
incorporated into consumer products meant entering the
consumer marker for stand-alone lithium-ion batteries. But
this was implausible. Second, Yamashita sought evidence
that the subject battery was removed from a consumer
product within Hawaii and resold to him as a stand-alone
product. Such evidence, in combination with previously
discussed hypothetical evidence, could satisfy the “arise out
of” prong. The panel held that Yamashita’s theory was too
speculative to ground jurisdictional discovery, and it was not
an abuse of discretion for the district court to reach this
conclusion. Third, Yamashita sought to show that LGC and
LGCA in fact sell 18650 batteries to third-party distributors
intending for them to introduce the batteries to Hawaii as a
stand-alone products, and that Yamashita bought the subject
battery from such a distributor. Declarations denied that
LGC of LGCA authorized any third parties to sell stand-
alone 18650 batteries. The panel held that in the context of
a motion for jurisdictional discovery, Yamashita’s bare
allegations were trumped by the sworn statements to the
contrary. The panel concluded that the district court’s denial
of jurisdictional discovery was not an abuse of discretion.
6                YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

                         COUNSEL

Jeremy K. O’Steen (argued) and James J. Bickerton,
Bickerton Law Group LLP, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Wendy S. Dowse (argued), Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &
Smith LLP, Indian Wells, California; Stefan M. Reinke,
Lyons Brandt Cook & Hiramatsu, Honolulu, Hawaii; for
Defendants-Appellees.

                         OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

    We must decide, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent
Ford Motor Company decision, whether a district court can
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
manufacturer that has various forum contacts, but does not
sell the allegedly defective product as a stand-alone product
to in-state consumers.
                               I
    Matt Yamashita brought this products-liability suit
against LG Chem, Ltd. (“LGC”) and LG Chem America,
Inc. (“LGCA”), claiming that they negligently manufactured
and distributed a battery which he used to power an
electronic cigarette until the battery and electronic cigarette
both exploded in his mouth.
                 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.                 7

                              A
    Yamashita is a resident of Hawaii. In December 2017,
the subject battery exploded, causing severe and permanent
injury. Yamashita alleges that the subject battery was an
18650 lithium-ion battery—that is, a lithium-ion battery
18mm in diameter, 65mm in length, and cylindrical in
shape—designed, manufactured, and distributed by LGC
and LGCA. Yamashita alleges that he purchased the battery
from an unidentified third party to whom LGC and LGCA
had somehow distributed it for resale in Hawaii.
                              B
    LGC, a South Korean company headquartered in Seoul,
South Korea, produces lithium-ion batteries. LGC sells
18650 lithium-ion batteries to manufacturers for use in
consumer products such as mobile devices, notebook
computers, and power tools. But LGC denies distributing,
advertising, or selling any 18650 lithium-ion batteries
directly to consumers as stand-alone batteries.
     LGCA, a wholly-owned marketing subsidiary of LGC,
is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in Georgia that resells and distributes various industrial
products. LGCA does not manufacture any products it
distributes. LGCA has facilitated sales of LGC 18650
batteries between LGC and at least one entity customer in
Texas. But LGCA denies selling to individual consumers.
    LGC and LGCA each have various contacts and alleged
contacts with Hawaii. These contacts fall into four broad
categories:
    First, both firms have shipped products through the port
of Honolulu. Some of these shipments went to Hawaii-based
companies, and some contained lithium-ion batteries, but the
8                YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

record does not show whether these subsets overlapped, or
whether any shipment contained 18650 batteries. Yamashita
alleges that LGC and LGCA have shipped lithium-ion
batteries into Hawaii.
    Second, LGC has significant involvement in the sale of
residential solar batteries in Hawaii. Various LGC
representatives have visited Hawaii for reasons related to
such business.
    Third, various consumer products sold in Hawaii contain
LGC-produced lithium-ion batteries, including 18650
batteries. Again, the record does not show whether any of
these batteries are brought into Hawaii by LGC, nor whether,
if third parties acquire the batteries elsewhere for
incorporation into consumer products, LGC and LGCA
nevertheless play some role in directing the batteries toward
Hawaii. Yamashita alleges that LGC and LGCA provide
18650 batteries for products that they expect will be sold in
Hawaii.
    Finally, a third-party website sells stand-alone LGC-
produced 18650 lithium-ion batteries. The record does not
reveal how this website obtains the batteries. Yamashita
alleges that LGC and LGCA sell their batteries to the third-
party website knowing that they will be sold into Hawaii as
stand-alone batteries. But declarations from LGC and LGCA
employees deny that either firm has authorized any third-
party retailer or distributor to sell stand-alone 18650
batteries in Hawaii, or anywhere for that matter.
                             C
    Yamashita sued LGC and LGCA in Hawaii state court,
bringing various state-law claims related to the design,
manufacture, labeling, advertising, and distribution of the
                 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.                  9

subject battery. LGC and LGCA timely removed from
Hawaii state court to the District Court for the District of
Hawaii, and then moved to dismiss Yamashita’s complaint
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Yamashita opposed the
motions and moved for jurisdictional discovery.
    The district court denied Yamashita’s motion for
jurisdictional discovery. Based on the allegations, as well as
exhibits and declarations submitted by the parties, the
district court granted the motions to dismiss Yamashita’s
claims for lack of personal jurisdiction over LGC and
LGCA. Yamashita timely appealed.
    After Yamashita appealed, but before he filed his
opening brief, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ford
Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court
(“Ford”), which is the most recent Supreme Court guidance
on personal jurisdiction. 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).
                              II
                              A
    We determine de novo whether Yamashita met his
burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper.
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066,
1073 (9th Cir. 2011). “Where, as here, the defendant’s
motion is based on written materials rather than an
evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima
facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion
to dismiss.” Id. at 1073 (cleaned up). Uncontroverted
allegations in the complaint are taken as true, but in the face
of a contradictory affidavit, the “plaintiff cannot simply rest
on the bare allegations of its complaint.” Mavrix Photo, Inc.
v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011)
(cleaned up).
10               YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

                              B
    “A federal district court sitting in diversity has in
personam jurisdiction over a defendant to the extent the
forum state’s law constitutionally provides.” Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1990). Since
this case was brought in Hawaii, and “Hawai‘i’s long-arm
statute allows Hawai‘i courts to invoke personal jurisdiction
to the full extent permitted by the due process clause,”
Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 518 P.3d 1169, 1171 (Haw.
2022), the statutory question here collapses into the
constitutional one: a court sitting in Hawaii can exercise
jurisdiction over Yamashita’s claims against LGC and
LGCA if doing so is consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court’s due process precedents
have “recogniz[ed] two kinds of personal jurisdiction:
general … and specific … jurisdiction.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at
1024. Yamashita argues that both apply here.
                              C
    General personal jurisdiction permits a court to hear “any
and all claims” brought against a defendant, Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011), concerning any of the defendant’s activity
“anywhere in the world,” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024. For a
court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over a
defendant corporation, the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state must be “so continuous and systematic as to
render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (cleaned up). A corporation is “at
home” in “its place of incorporation and principal place of
business,” and “in an exceptional case a corporation might
also be ‘at home’ elsewhere.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024
(cleaned up).
                  YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.                 11

    Neither LGC nor LGCA has Hawaii as its place of
incorporation or principal place of business. Yamashita
argues that their contacts with Hawaii are sufficient to
establish general personal jurisdiction, but nothing about
these “random, fortuitous, [and] attenuated contacts” merits
an exception to the rule. Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus.
AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (cleaned up). If they
did, the exceptions would swallow the rule, such that most
international firms selling into the U.S. market would be at
home in most U.S. states, despite being neither incorporated
nor headquartered in any of them. LGC and LGCA are not
at home in Hawaii, and the district court of Hawaii cannot
exercise general personal jurisdiction over them.
                               D
    Even absent general personal jurisdiction, the district
court might be able to exercise specific personal jurisdiction.
For an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, the due
process clause requires, inter alia, that the defendant “take
some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,”
and that the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at
1024-25 (cleaned up).
                               1
                               i
    For LGC and LGCA to have purposefully availed
themselves of the laws of Hawaii, they must have
“deliberately reached out beyond [their] home[s]—by, for
example, exploiting a market in the forum State or entering
a contractual relationship centered there.” Id. at 1025
(cleaned up). “[U]nilateral activity of another party or a third
12               YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

person” does not suffice. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984). Under our
circuit’s law, “[t]he placement of a product into the stream
of commerce, without more, is not an act purposefully
directed toward a forum state,” even if the defendant is
“aware[] that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the
product into the forum state.” Holland Am. Line Inc. v.
Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 459 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102,
112 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (finding no
purposeful availment in part because defendant “did not
create, control, or employ the distribution system that
brought its [product] to [the forum state]”)). This approach
is referred to as the “stream-of-commerce-plus test.” In re
Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F.3d
576, 585 (5th Cir. 2014).
    Yamashita argues that the stream-of-commerce-plus test
was abrogated by Justice Breyer’s minority opinion in J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
But this argument is unconvincing. While Justice Breyer did
suggest that the Court might reject purposeful availment in
an appropriate case, he did not find J. McIntyre an
appropriate case for any legal development. Id. at 890
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[O]n the record
present here, resolving this case requires no more than
adhering to our precedents.… I would not go further.”).
Since his opinion did nothing more than adhere to existing
Supreme Court precedents, it could not have abrogated our
circuit’s existing rule, which was based on those same
precedents.
                 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.               13

                             ii
    Under the stream-of-commerce-plus test, only some of
the alleged contacts between LGC and LGCA and Hawaii
count as purposeful availment:
    First, Yamashita points to LGC and LGCA’s shipments
to and through the port of Honolulu. These contacts do
qualify as purposeful availment—LGC and LGCA relied on
the laws of Hawaii to protect their property while it was
located within its jurisdiction.
    Second, Yamashita points to LGC’s involvement in the
sale of residential solar batteries in Hawaii. These contacts
also clearly qualify as purposeful availment.
    Third, Yamashita points to the various consumer
products sold in Hawaii containing LGC’s 18650 lithium-
ion batteries. On their own, these sales do not show
purposeful availment, but only a bare stream of commerce.
The record does not show that LGC deliberately navigates
the stream of commerce towards Hawaii, either by
introducing these batteries into Hawaii itself, or by
“creat[ing], control[ling], or employ[ing] the distribution
system” which does so. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
    Finally, Yamashita alleges that LGC introduced stand-
alone 18650 batteries into the stream of commerce through
a third-party website. But both firms submitted sworn
statements denying these allegations, and Yamashita offers
no evidence to the contrary. And even if LGC did sell its
batteries to a third-party website, that conduct would not
amount to purposeful availment without some indication that
LGC was targeting the Hawaii market.
14               YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

    In sum, half of Yamashita’s alleged contacts are not
contacts at all—but for purposeful availment purposes, a
single sufficiently deliberate contact can suffice.
                              2
    While LGC and LGCA’s Hawaii contacts clearly show
that they purposefully availed themselves of Hawaii law,
they cannot be subject to specific personal jurisdiction there
unless Yamashita’s injuries “arise out of or relate to” those
contacts. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (cleaned up).
                              i
    We have long understood that for an injury to arise out
of a defendant’s forum contacts required “but for” causation,
in which “a direct nexus exists between [a defendant’s]
contacts [with the forum state] and the cause of action.” In
re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d
716, 742 (9th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up), aff’d sub nom. Oneok,
Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015). The Supreme
Court announced in Ford that ‘arise out of’ and ‘relate to’
are alternatives: for a claim to arise out of a defendant’s
forum contacts requires causation, while a claim can relate
to those contacts, even absent causation, where, for example,
“a company … serves a market for a product in the forum
State and the product malfunctions there.” Ford, 141 S. Ct.
at 1026-27. Specifically, Ford held that Ford Motor
Company was subject to specific personal jurisdiction over
claims of injuries caused by a Ford Explorer in Montana, and
by a Ford Crown Victoria in Minnesota, despite the vehicles
having been sold by Ford out-of-state, because:

       By every means imaginable—among them,
       billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and
       direct mail—Ford urges Montanans and
                 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.                 15

       Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including (at
       all relevant times) Explorers and Crown
       Victorias. Ford cars—again including those
       two models—are available for sale, whether
       new or used, throughout the States, at 36
       dealerships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota.
       And apart from sales, Ford works hard to
       foster ongoing connections to its cars’
       owners. The company’s dealers in Montana
       and Minnesota (as elsewhere) regularly
       maintain and repair Ford cars, including
       those whose warranties have long since
       expired. And the company distributes
       replacement parts both to its own dealers and
       to independent auto shops in the two States.
       Those activities, too, make Ford money. And
       by making it easier to own a Ford, they
       encourage Montanans and Minnesotans to
       become lifelong Ford drivers.

Id. at 1028.
    Ford explicitly stated that it did “not address” a scenario
in which Ford sold other models in the forum state, but
“marketed the models [in question] in only a different State
or region.” Id. Nor has our circuit addressed a scenario in
which the defendants had extensive forum contacts, and the
main question was whether they sufficiently related to the
plaintiff’s injury. See LNS Enters. LLC v. Cont’l Motors,
Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 864 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding that a
defendant’s sole forum contact, ownership of a service
station, did not relate to the alleged injury). Accordingly, we
look beyond Ford’s holding to its reasoning. Three aspects
of Ford’s reasoning provide guidance on how to determine
16                YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

whether a defendant’s contacts sufficiently relate to a
plaintiff’s injury.
    First, the Court emphasized that Ford’s forum contacts
may well have played a causal role in the introduction to the
forum state of the particular vehicle causing the injury: the
owner may have seen “ads for the [model] in local media,”
or “take[n] into account a raft of Ford’s in-state activities
designed to make driving a Ford convenient there.” Ford,
141 S. Ct. at 1029. Given the likelihood of causation, the
Court reasoned, jurisdiction should not “ride on the exact
reasons for an individual plaintiff’s purchase, or on his
ability to present persuasive evidence about them.” Id. In
effect, relatedness proxies for causation, ensuring
jurisdiction over a class of cases for which causation seems
particularly likely but is not always easy to prove. On this
line of reasoning, a plaintiff’s injury relates to a defendant’s
forum contacts if similar injuries will tend to be caused by
those contacts.
    Second, the Court emphasized that exercising
jurisdiction was fair to Ford because, by “extensively
market[ing]” the car models at issue in the forum states, Ford
incurred an obligation to ensure that the models were “safe
for their citizens to use there.” Id. at 1030. This reasoning
would not apply if Ford had marketed only other models in
the forum states—otherwise Ford would have to choose
either to leave the forum state’s auto market entirely, or to
expose itself to suits in the forum state based on vehicles of
a type which Ford never sold there, but which were brought
in by third parties. On this line of reasoning, a plaintiff’s
injury relates to a defendant’s forum contacts if the
defendant should have foreseen the risk that its contacts
might cause injuries like that of the plaintiff.
                     YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.                           17

    Third, Ford makes clear that ‘relate to’ “does not mean
anything goes.” 141 S. Ct. at 1026. To the contrary, to give
‘relate to’ too broad a scope would risk “collaps[ing] the core
distinction between general and specific personal
jurisdiction.” Bernhardt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 47 F.4th
856, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Other circuits’ applications of
Ford suggest that relatedness requires a close connection
between contacts and injury. See, e.g., NBA Props., Inc. v.
HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614, 625-27 (7th Cir. 2022) (finding
relatedness when a company sold an allegedly trademark-
infringing product online and it was purchased by at least
one resident of the forum state); Hood v. Am. Auto Care,
LLC, 21 F.4th 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2021) (finding
relatedness when a telemarketer called a forum resident’s
out-of-state cell phone number because the telemarketer
regularly made similar phone calls to in-state numbers).
                                       ii
   Given this understanding of Ford, we must determine
whether Yamashita’s injuries either arose out of or related to
LGC and LGCA’s Hawaii contacts. 1

1
  We note considerable confusion among district courts about how to
apply Ford in cases highly similar to those at issue here. See, e.g., Richter
v. LG Chem, Ltd., No. 18 CV 50360, 2022 WL 5240583, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 27, 2022) (finding no jurisdiction over LGC); LG Chem, Ltd. v.
Superior Ct., 295 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 679 (Ct. App. 2022) (similar),
review denied (Oct. 12, 2022); LG Chem, Ltd. v. Granger, No. 14-19-
00814-CV, 2021 WL 2153761, at *7 (Tex. App. May 27, 2021) (similar).
But see, e.g., Eisenhauer v. LG Chem, Ltd., No. 21-CV-964, 2022 WL
123783, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 13, 2022) (finding no jurisdiction over
LGCA); id., 2022 WL 2208952, at *6 (E.D. Mo. June 21, 2022) (but
finding jurisdiction over LGC).
18               YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

    Yamashita has not shown that his injuries arose out of
any contacts because he has not shown but-for causation. Of
the four types of contacts he alleged, only two were actually
forum contacts within the meaning of the specific personal
jurisdiction test: the use of the port of Honolulu, and the
activity in the market for solar batteries. The former does not
establish but-for causation because Yamashita does not
allege that LGC or LGCA shipped the subject battery into
the port of Honolulu. The latter does not establish but-for
causation because Yamashita does not allege that LGC’s
activity in the solar battery market caused the introduction
of the subject battery to Hawaii.
     Yamashita also has not shown relatedness. Again, only
the port and solar contacts count as forum contacts to which
Yamashita’s injury could relate. Regarding the port contacts,
Yamashita suggests that his injury related to various
shipments—shipments of batteries in that Yamashita was
injured by a battery, and shipments of raw materials “to the
extent these types of products go into lithium-ion battery
production.” This is implausible. Ford found specific
jurisdiction because Ford sold the relevant models to
consumers in the forum states, not because it shipped raw
materials, or even completed cars, through those states.
Regarding the solar contacts, Yamashita suggests that his
injury related to LGC’s sale of solar batteries because his
injury was allegedly caused by an LGC-manufactured
battery. But the large batteries installed in stationary solar-
power systems and the small portable stand-alone battery at
issue here are as different as sedans and 18-wheelers. There
is little reason to believe that either firm’s port contacts or
LGC’s solar contacts have anything to do with Hawaii
residents’ acquisition of 18650 lithium-ion batteries.
                 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.                 19

    Given that Yamashita cannot show that his injury arose
out of or related to LGC or LGCA’s Hawaii contacts, the
district court did not err in dismissing for lack of personal
jurisdiction over either firm.
                              III
    Since Yamashita had not pled facts sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction, we consider the district court’s denial
of jurisdictional discovery.
                              A
    We review denials of jurisdictional discovery for abuse
of discretion. Laub v. U.S. Dept. of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093
(9th Cir. 2003). Jurisdictional discovery “should ordinarily
be granted where pertinent facts bearing on the question of
jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory
showing of the facts is necessary.” Id. (cleaned up). But “a
mere hunch that discovery might yield jurisdictionally
relevant facts, or bare allegations in the face of specific
denials, are insufficient reasons for a court to grant
jurisdictional discovery.” LNS Enters., 22 F.4th at 864-65
(cleaned up). “The district court’s refusal to provide such
discovery will not be reversed except upon the clearest
showing that denial of discovery results in actual and
substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” Boschetto
v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) (cleaned
up).
                              B
    Yamashita sought jurisdictional discovery on various
issues. Given our analysis of specific personal jurisdiction,
most of the information he seeks is clearly irrelevant—the
jurisdictional analysis would not be affected by the details of
LGC or LGCA’s use of the port of Honolulu, or the extent
20               YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

to which either firm sells or authorizes the sale in Hawaii of
products containing 18650 batteries, or the precise
relationship between the two entities. But Yamashita does
seek three pieces of information whose irrelevance to the
jurisdictional determination is less obvious.
                              1
    First, Yamashita seeks evidence that LGC and LGCA
have forum contacts related to the use of lithium-ion
batteries, and particularly 18650 batteries, in consumer
products. Yamashita hypothesizes that these firms either are
directly responsible for shipping such batteries into Hawaii,
or that they purposefully avail themselves of the laws of
Hawaii through contractual agreements requiring
manufacturers of battery-containing products to market their
products in Hawaii.
     Such contacts might satisfy the ‘relates to’ prong of the
specific personal jurisdiction test if causing one’s lithium-
ion batteries to be incorporated into consumer products
meant entering the consumer market for stand-alone lithium-
ion batteries. But this is implausible. Whether the relevant
market is that for lithium-ion batteries generally or that for
18650 batteries specifically, the relevant market is the
consumer market. The logic of Ford did not turn on the mere
fact that Ford had introduced some Explorers and Crown
Victorias into Montana and Minnesota, but on the fact that it
marketed these models to consumers, sold them to
consumers, and serviced them for consumers. Ford gives
little reason to think that the relatedness prong would have
been satisfied if, for example, Ford had sold Crown Victorias
only to police departments in Minnesota, had not marketed
them to consumers, and had not serviced them at all. Such
contacts would not typically cause, and could not be foreseen
                 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.                21

to cause, injuries resulting from consumer ownership of
Crown Victorias, especially if most consumer-owned Crown
Victorias were acquired out-of-state. Similarly, even if LGC
or LGCA sells 18650 batteries to manufacturers for
incorporation in consumer products sold in Hawaii, these
sales would not be related to purchases of stand-alone
batteries by Hawaii consumers.
                              2
    Yamashita also seeks evidence that the subject battery
itself was removed from a consumer product within Hawaii
and resold to him as a stand-alone product. Such evidence,
in combination with the hypothetical evidence discussed
above, could satisfy the ‘arises out of’ prong. After all, if
LGC and LGCA purposefully availed themselves of the laws
of Hawaii by causing 18650 batteries to be incorporated into
consumer products sold in Hawaii, and then such a battery
were removed from such a device and sold to Yamashita,
their contacts would be a but-for cause of Yamashita’s
injury.
    But Yamashita has given no reason to think that the
battery came from such a device—he only says that it cannot
be ruled out. As evidence, he cites three YouTube how-to
videos explaining how to remove 18650 batteries from
various consumer products. He offers no evidence that
batteries removed in this manner are ever resold
commercially. This theory seems too speculative to ground
jurisdictional discovery, and it certainly was not an abuse of
discretion for the district court to reach this conclusion.
22               YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.

                              3
    Finally, Yamashita seeks to show that LGC and LGCA
in fact sell 18650 batteries to third-party distributors
intending for them to introduce the batteries to Hawaii as
stand-alone products, and that Yamashita bought the subject
battery from such a distributor. Such evidence would show
that LGC and LGCA purposefully availed themselves of the
market for stand-alone 18650 batteries in Hawaii. Moreover,
such evidence would establish relatedness, and likely also
that Yamashita’s injury arose out of the firms’ Hawaii
contacts.
    But—again—declarations deny that LGC or LGCA have
authorized any third parties to sell stand-alone 18650
batteries. In the context of a motion for jurisdictional
discovery, just as in the context of a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, bare allegations are trumped by sworn
statements to the contrary. LNS Enters., 22 F.4th at 864-65.
    In sum, Yamashita has no viable route to establish
personal jurisdiction. Jurisdictional discovery would be little
more than a fishing expedition seeking support for
jurisdictional theories one of which is farfetched, and the
other of which LGC and LGCA have specifically denied via
sworn statements. The district court’s denial of jurisdictional
discovery was not an abuse of its discretion.
                              IV
    Ford modified but did not abolish the requirement that a
claim must arise out of or relate to a forum contact in order
for a court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction.
Yamashita has not met his burden to show that either prong
is satisfied here, and he has only a mere hunch that
jurisdictional discovery will allow him to meet his burden.
                 YAMASHITA V. LG CHEM, LTD.               23

The district court did not err in dismissing for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Neither did it abuse its discretion in
denying jurisdictional discovery.
   AFFIRMED.