Court Opinion

ID: 9722863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:53:24.125418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:41.064696
License: Public Domain

Levin, P. J.
(dissenting). The plaintiffs challenged their property’s present zoning both on the ground that it bears no substantial relationship to public health, morals, safety, or general welfare and on the ground that it deprives the property of any reasonable use. Holding for the plaintiffs on both grounds, the trial judge found the zoning both irrational and confiscatory.
Concluding that at best plaintiffs’ evidence presented nothing more than a “debatable question” on the rationality of present zoning, the majority reverses the trial judge. However, even if zoning is entirely reasonable in the sense it bears a substantial relationship to public health, morals, safety, or general welfare,1 it may nonetheless be unreasonable in its application to particular property if that property cannot reasonably be used as zoned.2 Zoning which prevents any reasonable use of property is confiscatory and, for that reason, invalid.
*196While the trial judge and we must find for the municipality if we find there is a debatable question concerning the rationality of the zoning, i.e., zoning is not irrational if, on the evidence presented, its rationality remains debatable,3 a “debatable question” rule has not been established where the question presented is whether the zoning is unreasonable because it is confiscatory.4 Whether zoning is confiscatory is more a question of fact than of judgment. That fact may be proved like any other fact. It is not necessary for one claiming confiscation to prove it beyond dispute.
The evidence presented here concerning the confiscation issue was in conflict. The trial judge correctly went about resolving that factual dispute in the same manner he would approach decision of any disputed factual issue in a case tried by him. Merely because all reasonable men would not necessarily have reached the same decision did not oblige the trial judge to decide the issue of confiscation for the municipality.
Although the plaintiffs seek equitable relief, we have no greater freedom to ignore the trial judge’s findings of fact in this case than in a “law” case tried without a jury. In all cases, law and equity,5 tried *197without a jury, we apply the same reviewing standard, the “clearly erroneous” standard. OCR 1963, 517.1 cautions us that in the application of the principle that findings of fact shall not he set aside unless clearly erroneous, “regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those witnesses who appeared before it.” We are advised6 that the very same standard was in fact applied in reviewing chancery cases prior to the effectiveness of Rule 517.
The phrase “clearly erroneous” was borrowed from Fed Rules Civ Proe 52(a). The court that promulgated that standard explained it in these terms:
“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1948), 333 US 364, 395 (68 S Ct 525, 542, 92 L Ed 746, 766), *198rebearing denied 333 US 869 (68 S Ct 788, 92 L Ed 1147). (Emphasis supplied.)
On the entire evidence I am not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed by the trial judge.7 The trial judge stated that the plaintiff’s house builder witness
“made the greatest impression on the court. A home builder with considerable experience in Royal Oak, he testified that plaintiffs’ land was totally unsuited to single residence development and that at least to him the land had no value for that purpose. Based on his own experience he said that lots adjacent to the unsightly and noisy railroad tracks were not readily salable for single residence purposes. He has owned 2 comparable lots for some time and has been unable to dispose of them. Furthermore, again based on his own experience, he said that adequate home financing could not be obtained on land adjacent to railroad tracks.”
The trial judge thereby indicated he chose to adopt the testimony offered in behalf of the plaintiffs in preference to testimony offered in behalf of the defendant.8
*199There is no reason to reject the trial judge’s evaluation of the conflicting testimony. The testimony of plaintiffs’ house builder witness so adopted by the trial judge was not incredible. It was supported by the testimony of plaintiffs’ appraisal witness who, while he valued the property at $11,500, stated that a prudent developer would not buy it. I interpret that to mean a speculator could be found to buy the property, but not a developer. The question before the trial judge and us, on the issue of confiscation, is whether the property can reasonably be used as zoned, not whether it has an exchange value. That a buyer could be found for it, that it has a buying and selling value, does not establish that anyone could be found who would develop and use the property.
Passage of time and accompanying changes in controlling facts, a change in zoning itself, might make the property more valuable and justify a speculator’s investment. And then again the property might become worth less. This judicial inquiry is not concerned with the speculative possibilities of the property, but rather seeks to determine whether it can now be reasonably used as now zoned.
*200That the 12 home owners between plaintiffs’ property and Benjamin avenne foresee9 damage to their property from further multiple development, bears out plaintiffs’ expert testimony that it would be difficult to find home buyers willing to make an investment in single-family residences constructed on plaintiffs’ property located, as it is, alongside extensive multiple development to the south. It is entirely believable that, with the location disadvantages of both adjoining multiple dwellings to the south and adjoining railroad tracks to the east, plaintiffs’ property could not prudently be developed consistent with present zoning.10
The defendant acknowledges that the property could not be developed for single family use until the existing structures are removed, the property platted and utilities and other land improvements installed. On the record before him, the trial judge was entirely justified in concluding it would be so *201difficult to find a land developer or bouse builder willing to speculate in tbe improvement of tbis land in preference to land wbicb does not bave tbe location disadvantages wbicb tbis land bas, that tbis land was not suitable for development witb single-family residences, and that, accordingly, present zoning was confiscatory. Sucb finding not being clearly erroneous, I. would affirm on that issue.

 See, e. g., Sisters of Bon Secours Hospital v. City of Grosse Pointe (1967), 8 Mich App 342, 349.

 Ervin Acceptance Company v. City of Ann Arbor (1948), 322 Mich 404, 408; McGiverin v. City of Huntington Woods (1955), 343 Mich 413, 419; Bassey v. City of Huntington Woods (1956), 344 Mich 701, 704; Pere Marquette Railway Co. v. Muskegon Township Board (1941), 298 Mich 31, 37; Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company v. City of Detroit (1949), 326 Mich 387, 392; Frendo v. Township of Southfield (1957), 349 Mich 693, 698.

 Brae Burn, Inc., v. City of Bloomfield Hills (1957), 350 Mich 425, 433.

 In Brae Burn, Inc., v. Bloomfield Hills, supra, p 434, the Court said: “It must be stressed that we are not, on this reeord (as we pointed out in Anderson v. City of Solland, 344 Mich 706, 710) ‘dealing with a situation in which the property involved is unsuitable for residential purposes and has little or no value if so restrieted.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) See, also, Alderton v. City of Saginaw (1962), 367 Mich 28, 33, where the Court observed: “The debatable question rule as presented in Brae Burn, supra, does not mean sueh question exists merely because there is a difference of opinion between the zoning authority and the property owner in regard to the validity of the ordinance. If this were the ease, no ordinance could ever be successfully attacked.”

 See GCR 1963, 11: “These rules govern the practice in the circuit courts * * * the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, in actions of a civil nature whether heretofore cognisable as *197actions at law or in equity." See, also, 2 Honigman and Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), authors’ comments, p 595: “It should be emphasized that the standards for reviewing findings by the court, as set forth in Rule 517, apply in all civil actions tried upon the facts without a jury, including law cases tried without a jury and equity actions tried by the court or with an advisory jury.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 “Formerly in chancery cases, although it was commonly said that issues of fact were tried de novo on appeal or that the Supreme Court must weigh the evidence and reach an independent conclusion on review of the facts, this did not mean that the findings of the trial judge were entitled to no consideration. Notwithstanding the right and duty of the Supreme Court to make its independent evaluation of the evidence, it would not set aside the findings of the trial judge unless it was convinced that a clear showing of error had been made. Running through the opinions are phrases sueh as 'dear error,’ ‘manifest error,’ ‘palpably erroneous.’ * * *
“Thus it is dear that Rule 517 accurately restates former practice in the review of chancery eases in Michigan, although the language itself is borrowed from Federal Rule 52.” 2 Honigman and Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), Rule 517, authors’ comments, p 596.
See Christine Building Company v. City of Troy (1962), 367 Mich 508, 517, 518.

 See Lacey v. City of Warren (1967), 7 Mich App 105, 107; Reid v. City of Southfield (1967), 8 Mich App 553, 557; Sisters of Bon Secours Hospital v. City of Grosse Pointe, supra, p 358.

 A house builder testified for the city that he would not hesitate to buy the property as zoned, that he wouldn’t be interested unless he thought he could make 10%, and then acknowledged costs of development and sale which would preelude realization of that rate of return; he conceded he did not have any experience building or selling alongside railroad tracks, that he had not investigated the cost of making land improvements on this property, and when asked whether he had made inquiry concerning the availability of financing, replied, “I didn’t go into that point, but I don’t believe there would be any problem.”
The parties appear to agree that if plaintiffs’ property can be developed at all for single family purposes it would be necessary to remove the existing structures thereon, following whieh, a cul-de-sac road would be constructed north from Starr road through the center of the property, around which roughly 13 lots would be platted, some lots would face east (and thus the railroad traeks), others would faee west (their rear yards adjacent to the railroad *199tracks). If the land were developed for this purpose by a land developer he would expect to make a land developer’s profit. The defendant’s appraisal witness in declaring the value of plaintiffs’ property to be $23,000 assumed that the property could be sold without a broker directly to a builder who would be willing to remove the existing structures and do the necessary platting and land improvement without compensation other than the profit anticipated in selling the houses, with the result that some $10,000 allowed for land sales expense and land developer’s profit by plaintiffs’ appraisal witness would be saved to the existing owners. Defendant’s experts assumed that a builder could be found to buy the land and improve it at an aggregate cost of $40,500, with a view to building thereon 13 houses at an aggregate estimated cost, including the cost of the land, of $203,000, to achieve a total anticipated profit of less than $17,000. The trial judge was not bound to aceept that testimony. I do not have a definite and firm conviction that he erred in rejecting it.

 Compare American University v. Prentiss (DC, 1953) 113 E Supp 389, affirmed per curiam, 94 App DC 204 (214 F2d 282), certiorari denied 348 US 898 (75 S Ct 217, 99 L Ed 705).

 Plaintiffs’ property is a 3-1/2 acre triangular-shaped pareel. The hypotenuse of the property, which runs northwesterly and southeasterly, abuts the Grand Trunk Western railroad and paralleling high tension lines. The southerly base of the triangle is Starr road, which runs east and west. The remaining, westerly arm of the triangle is east of and parallels north and south Benjamin avenue. Between Benjamin and the westerly boundary of plaintiffs’ property there are approximately 12 dwellings fronting on Benjamin, valued at between $9,000 and $17,000 each, including one 3-family, 1-story multiple nonconfol-ming dwelling. Continuing to the west, on the west side of Benjamin, is the Boyal Oak municipal golf course. Starr road to the south is the first street north of 13 Mile road. The bloek bounded by Starr on the north, 13 Mile on the south and Benjamin on the west is improved with multiple dwellings, as is all of both sides of 13 Mile road from the railroad tracks on the east for over 5 blocks west of Benjamin to Woodward avenue, except that the blocks immediately east of Woodward are zoned commercial. With the exception of the dozen residences between plaintiffs’ property and the golf course and those to the east of the elevated railroad right-of-way, the closest single-family residence to plaintiffs’ property is 700 feet south of plaintiffs’ property, and that 700 feet is entirely improved with multiple dwellings.