Court Opinion

ID: 9676824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:35:00.046577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:51.554306
License: Public Domain

PAUL H. ANDERSON, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Dr. Goodman’s affidavit is deficient. See Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 4 (1998).1 But I disagree with the majority’s decision to reverse the court of appeals by holding that the district court properly denied re*851spondent Kathleen Anderson’s request for a 30-day extension to file a supplemental affidavit.
As I have previously stated, I do not find the application of Minn.Stat. § 145.682 (1998) to be as “uncomplicated and unambiguous” as does the majority. See Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572, 579 (Minn.1999) (Anderson, Paul H., J., concurring specially). Nor do I conclude, as the majority does, that the statute’s language is “so plain and clear” that it leaves little doubt about the result in this case. Rather, I conclude that dismissal of Anderson’s action at this stage of the proceedings is inconsistent with both the public policy concerns addressed by the legislature in enacting section 145.682 and judicial precedent expressed in case law. The court of appeals got it right when it stated:
directing the district court to allow Anderson to supplement her affidavit would best serve the intent of the legislature, the judicial policy favoring disposal of cases on their merits, and the admonition of the Sorenson court that alternatives less drastic than dismissal be considered when the plaintiff has identified experts and given some meaningful disclosure of their testimony.
Anderson v. Rengachary, 591 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Minn.App.1999).
The majority focuses much of its analysis on the question of Dr. Rengachary’s failure to give any notice of the affidavit’s deficiencies until after expiration of the 180-day statutory period and then concludes that such failure does not warrant an extension of time to file a supplemental affidavit. But the critical question in this case has a much broader focus. This broader focus is required because Dr. Goodman’s affidavit fulfilled most of the primary requirements of section 145.682, subd. 4. The affidavit was filed in a timely manner, it identified the expert likely to testify at trial on malpractice and causation, and it demonstrated a good-faith effort to comply with the disclosure requirements. This good faith effort is demonstrated by the fact that we can conclude from the affidavit that the problems with Anderson’s vagus nerve were caused by the surgery or aftercare and that such problems should not normally result from either surgery or aftercare. More particularly, we can ascertain from the affidavit that: (1) Anderson had postoperative dys-phagia, (2) there was significant trauma to her esophagus, (3) a possible cause for the dysphagia was an injury to the vagus nerve either during surgery or during aftercare when Anderson was in a surgical collar, (4) trauma to the vagus nerve should not have occurred either during surgery or during aftercare, and (5) when such trauma occurs, it is a deviation from the standard of care.
I concede that Dr. Goodman’s affidavit is inartfully drafted and flawed, but it is not so flawed that Anderson’s action must be dismissed at this stage of the proceedings. Such a harsh consequence is not mandated by statute or case law. See Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 4(b) (1998); Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn.1990). Nor is such a consequence consistent with our recognition that “a primary objective of the law is to dispose of cases on the merits.” Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 192.
The majority asserts that under the abuse of discretion standard we must affirm the district court’s refusal to grant an extension. Section 145.682 is a relatively recent statute, having been enacted in 1986. See Act of March 25, 1986, ch. 455, § 60, 1986 Minn. Laws 871-72. All of our decisions applying the statute have been rendered in the past decade. See Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d 572; Stroud v. Hennepin County Med. Ctr., 556 N.W.2d 552 (Minn.1996); Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d 188. Our clearest direction to district courts on the exercise of their discretion was in Soren-son where we stated that in borderline cases when prejudice is absent, alternatives less drastic than procedural dismissal should be employed. See Sorenson, 457 *852N.W.2d at 193. I fear that by affirming this ease on the grounds that there was no abuse of discretion, we will now send a message to district courts that they have no alternative but to dismiss whenever an expert affidavit required by section 145.682 is even marginally deficient. In essence, the majority’s decision transforms this statute from a shield against unwarranted medical malpractice litigation into a sword that will be used to prematurely cut off actions with a “sharp but clean edge”2 before it can be properly determined whether they should be disposed of on the merits.

. Minnesota Statutes § 145.682, subd. 4, provides as follows:
Subd. 4. (a) The affidavit required by subdivision 2, clause (2), must be signed by each expert listed in the affidavit and by the plaintiff's attorney and state the identity of each person whom plaintiff expects to call as an expert witness at trial to testify with respect to the issues of malpractice or causation, the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. Answers to interrogatories that state the information required by this subdivision satisfy the requirements of this subdivision if they are signed by the plaintiff's attorney and by each expert listed in the answers to interrogatories and served upon the defendant within 180 days after commencement of the suit against the defendant.
(b) The parties or the court for good cause shown, may by agreement, provide for extensions of the time limits specified in subdivision 2, 3, or this subdivision. Nothing in this subdivision may be construed to prevent either party from calling additional expert witnesses or substituting other expert witnesses.
(c) In any action alleging medical malpractice, all expert interrogatory answers must be signed by the attorney for the party responding to the interrogatory and by each expert listed in the answers. The court shall include in a scheduling order a deadline prior to the close of discovery for all parties to answer expert interrogatories for all experts to be called at trial. No additional experts may be called by any party without agreement of the parties or by leave of the court for good cause shown.
Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 4 (1998).

. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 578 (stating "Dismissal is mandated under Minn.Stat. § 145.682, subd. 6, when the disclosure requirements are not met and, while we certainly recognize that the statute may have harsh results in some cases, it cuts with a sharp but clean edge.") (emphasis added).