Court Opinion

ID: 9398424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 13:05:13.87521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.510479
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
 Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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 official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: May 31, 2023

                     S23A0281. COPELAND v. THE STATE.

        PINSON, Justice.

       Matthew Copeland was convicted of felony murder and related

crimes in connection with the shooting death of Carlos Glenn. 1 On

       1The shooting occurred on December 11, 2012. In March 2013, Copeland
was indicted by a Fulton County grand jury for malice murder (Count 1); two
counts of felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), predicated respectively on the crimes
charged in Count 4 (aggravated assault) and Count 5 (possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (Count 6). At the conclusion of a jury trial held in September 2013,
Copeland was acquitted of malice murder but found guilty on all remaining
counts. On September 23, 2013, Copeland was sentenced to serve life in prison
for Count 2, plus a consecutive five-year term for Count 6. The trial court
merged Count 4 into Count 2 for sentencing purposes. Although the court also
purported to merge Count 3 into Count 2 and then purported to merge the
predicate felony charged in Count 5 into Count 3, Count 3 actually stood
vacated by operation of law, see Noel v. State, 297 Ga. 698, 700 (2) (777 SE2d
449) (2015) (citing Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 372 (4) (434 SE2d 479)
(1993)), and Copeland thus should have been sentenced on Count 5. See id. But
“when a merger error benefits a defendant and the State fails to raise it by
cross-appeal,” we “exercise our discretion to correct the error upon our own
initiative only in exceptional circumstances.” Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 698
(4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017). Seeing no such circumstances here, we decline to
disturb the sentence. On October 2, 2013, Copeland filed a timely motion for
appeal, Copeland contends that the evidence was constitutionally

insufficient to support his convictions and that his trial counsel

rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. But the evidence

was sufficient: the only disputed question was whether the shooting

was justified, and the jury was entitled to discredit Copeland’s

testimony that he shot Glenn in self-defense. And, although trial

counsel admitted he relied on outdated precedent in seeking the

admission of evidence about Glenn’s criminal convictions, Copeland

has failed to establish that such evidence would have been

admissible even under the applicable standard, so he has not shown

the prejudice necessary to prevail on his claim of ineffective

assistance. We therefore affirm his convictions and sentence.

      1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the

evidence at trial showed as follows. On the day of the shooting,

Copeland went to Underground Atlanta with $400 in cash and

new trial, which he amended through new counsel on October 30, 2019. After
a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on October 3, 2022. On that same
day, Copeland filed a notice of appeal. The appeal was docketed to the term of
this Court beginning in December 2022 and was thereafter submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
                                      2
bought $10 worth of marijuana from Jamontae Strozier. Strozier

noticed that Copeland had a gun with a brown handle at his side,

concealed under his shirt.

     At some point later, Copeland met up with his friend Mario

Clifton and another friend identified only as Pierre. As they were

about to leave the mall, they ran into Glenn and Glenn’s friend

Shatel Fowle. Copeland had known Glenn for about ten years, and

the two had been on rocky terms since several years earlier when

they were in jail together. Copeland and Glenn began arguing and

tussling.

     As the men left the mall, their altercation continued. Once

outside, they walked ahead of the other men towards the nearby

MARTA train station. Just after they rounded the corner and out of

the other men’s sight, two gunshots rang out. Glenn was shot in the

forearm and the torso, and the shot to the torso was fatal. Copeland

ran from the scene.

     Later that evening, Copeland called Clifton and said he had

told Glenn to leave him alone and that he “didn’t want to fight.” A

                                 3
few days after the shooting, Copeland ran into Strozier and told him

that he “didn’t . . . mean to shoot anybody.”

     Although security cameras captured video footage of the men

walking inside the mall before the shooting, there was no footage of

the shooting, and no one came forward as an eyewitness to the actual

shooting.

     Investigators identified Copeland as a suspect after speaking

with witnesses and tipsters. Six days after the shooting, an Atlanta

police officer spotted Copeland’s car and conducted a traffic stop.

Copeland initially gave a false name, and he was ultimately arrested

for driving without a valid license. Detectives later questioned

Copeland about the murder, and he denied any involvement in or

knowledge about the shooting, even after the detectives told him

about the video footage of him with Glenn just before the shooting

and noted that his name had “come up” in the investigation.

     According to the GBI firearms examiner, the bullet removed

from Glenn’s body was a .38-caliber lead bullet. The clothing

removed from Glenn’s body was found to have “very few loose

                                  4
particles” of gunpowder, indicating that the gun was fired from a

distance of a few feet away.2 Clifton testified that Copeland owned a

silver .38-caliber gun with a brown handle.

      Copeland gave testimony in his own defense at trial that was

consistent with the defense’s theory that Glenn was a bully who

instigated the fatal altercation after Copeland refused to give him

money. Copeland testified that, throughout their acquaintance, he

and Glenn would often “get into it,” and he said he had seen Glenn

fight “numerous” other people in the past. On the day of the

shooting, Copeland testified, he encountered Glenn more than once

while at Underground. The first time, Glenn asked him for money,

and he refused and walked away. Later, after meeting up with

Clifton and Pierre, Copeland again ran into Glenn, who began

taunting and harassing him and then “grabbed my jacket and like

pulled me up”; Copeland told Glenn to leave him alone and went

outside to smoke a cigarette. When Copeland and his companions

      2According to the firearms examiner, gunpowder particles typically “stop
depositing” when the firearm is fired from “around three-and-a-half to five-
and-a-half feet” from the target.
                                      5
went back into the mall, Glenn resumed his insults and

provocations, and Copeland continued trying to rebuff him. The men

eventually left the mall, walking past the patio of a bar where

associates of Glenn were gathered, and Glenn handed his coat and

hat to Fowle and told him to “fall back, I got this.” As they headed

toward the train station, Glenn hit Copeland twice; Copeland

stumbled, and as Glenn raised his arm to swing again, Copeland

fired his gun. Copeland testified that he shot Glenn “to get him off

me,” that he had seen Glenn beat up “numerous folk” in the past,

and that he feared for his life and fired his gun as a last resort. When

asked why he had not given this account to the detectives, he said

he had been scared and did not trust them. Copeland admitted to

being a convicted felon.

     Evidence was elicited from various witnesses about Glenn’s

penchant for fighting and possible gang affiliation. Strozier

described Glenn as a “good fighter” who was “nice with his hands”

and admitted that he had told the lead detective that there were

“nothing but Bloods” at Glenn’s funeral. A mall security officer

                                   6
testified that people he believed were Glenn’s relatives, who

frequented the mall, were members of a local gang and that Glenn

“was not supposed to be on the [mall] property” at the time of the

shooting. Copeland testified that several of Glenn’s associates at the

bar patio that evening were members of the Bloods or a different

local gang.

     2. Copeland contends that the evidence was insufficient to

support his convictions. When assessing a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due process,

the evidence presented at trial is viewed in the light most favorable

to the verdicts to determine whether any rational trier of fact could

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the

crimes of which he was convicted. See Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594,

598 (2) (820 SE2d 696) (2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LEd2d 560) (1979)). In making

this determination, we do not evaluate witness credibility, resolve

inconsistencies in the evidence, or assess the weight of the evidence;

these tasks are left to the sole discretion of the jury. See Walker v.

                                  7
State, 296 Ga. 161, 163 (1) (766 SE2d 28) (2014). The jury’s verdicts

will be upheld as long as some competent evidence, even if

contradicted, supports each fact necessary to make out the State’s

case. See Jones, 304 Ga. at 598 (2).

     Here, Copeland does not dispute that he shot and killed Glenn

or that he was a convicted felon at the time he did so. Rather, he

contends that the shooting was committed in self-defense. “[A]

person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause

death or great bodily harm only if he . . . reasonably believes that

such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to

himself . . . or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” OCGA

§ 16-3-21 (a). Although the State bears the burden to disprove a

defendant’s self-defense claim, the jury decides whether this burden

has been met, and it is free to disbelieve the defendant’s testimony.

See Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 562-563 (1) (883 SE2d 773) (2023).

     The evidence here authorized the jury to reject Copeland’s

claim that he shot Glenn because he reasonably feared for his life.

See Huff, 315 Ga. at 562-563 (1). Given Copeland’s admitted lies to

                                  8
investigators and the inconsistency between the forensic evidence—

indicating his gun was fired from more than three feet away—and

Copeland’s claim that he fired as Glenn was about to strike him, the

jury could have disbelieved his claim that he fired out of fear rather

than anger. See id. Or the jury could have concluded that what fear

Copeland did feel in the situation did not justify the use of a gun.

See Nelson v. State, 283 Ga. 119, 120 (1) (657 SE2d 201) (2008) (jury

was authorized to reject self-defense claim where it concluded that

appellant had used excessive force by shooting the victim after being

punched). And the evidence was otherwise sufficient to support

Copeland’s convictions. See Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 235-236 (1)

(862 SE2d 285) (2021) (because the jury was authorized to disbelieve

the defendant’s self-defense claim, the evidence was sufficient to

support felony-murder and firearm-possession convictions). 3

      3 It is not clear that Copeland would have been entitled to claim self-
defense in the first place. Justification is generally not available as a defense
to someone who commits a crime while otherwise engaged in the commission
of a felony, see OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2), and here, there was undisputed
evidence that Copeland was carrying a gun on the day of the shooting, which—
because of his status as a convicted felon—was a felony. See OCGA § 16-11-

                                       9
      3. Copeland also contends that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence of Glenn’s

criminal convictions to the jury. To succeed on a claim of ineffective

assistance, a defendant must establish both that his counsel’s

performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result of

that deficient performance. See Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771,

773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).

      To prove deficient performance, a defendant must establish

that counsel “performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable

way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

131 (b). And although our precedent at the time recognized an exception to the
statutory bar against claiming justification “[w]here, upon a sudden
emergency, one suddenly acquires actual possession of a pistol for the purpose
of defending himself,” Cauley v. State, 260 Ga. 324, 326 (2) (c) (393 SE2d 246)
(1990), the evidence here seems not to support such an exception. This issue
does not appear to have been raised or considered at trial so we do not decide
it. But nothing in this opinion should be read to undermine existing law—
which, we note, has changed since the trial in this case—governing the
circumstances under which justification may be barred for those violating gun
possession laws. See OCGA § 16-11-138 (“Defense of self or others . . . shall be
an absolute defense to any violation under this part.”); Johnson v. State, 308
Ga. 141 (839 SE2d 521) (2020) (examining the effect of OCGA § 16-11-138 on
OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2)).
                                      10
professional norms.” Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3) (citation and

punctuation omitted). To overcome the “strong presumption” that

counsel performed reasonably, the defendant must show that “no

reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would

have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted). To prove prejudice, a defendant must

establish that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been

different.” Id. A reasonable probability is a probability “sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Neal v. State, 313

Ga. 746, 751 (3) (873 SE2d 209) (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted). If a defendant fails to make a sufficient showing on one

part of the Strickland test, we need not address the other part.

Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3).

     In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on an ineffective-assistance

claim, we accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility

determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we

independently apply the relevant legal principles to the facts. See

                                  11
Sullivan v. State, 301 Ga. 37, 40 (2) (799 SE2d 163) (2017).

     (a) Before trial, Copeland’s trial counsel moved for leave to

introduce evidence of Glenn’s prior criminal history, which included

three separate judgments of conviction for robbery by intimidation;

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and obstruction of a law

enforcement officer; and robbery and aggravated assault arising

from a carjacking. At a pretrial hearing, counsel argued that the

prior crimes were relevant to establishing Copeland’s claim of self-

defense. The State argued that the first and second crimes were not

crimes of violence and thus not relevant to the self-defense claim,

and that there was no evidence that Copeland had knowledge of the

carjacking incident, which would be required for the evidence of any

of the crimes to be admissible under the newly enacted OCGA § 24-

4-404 (a). Trial counsel responded that he “did not know the new

[evidence] code in terms of that situation” and was given time to

research the issue during a recess. After the recess, counsel stated

that he “could not find that particular statute” in the court’s law

library, but noted that he had found “the Hodges case that does

                                 12
speak to Chandler . . . as the main authority” on this issue. 4 The

State pointed out that the rule in Chandler was no longer good law,

because “the whole Evidence Code changed on January 1, 2013,” and

the trial court denied the motion, stating it would revisit the issue if

counsel later offered additional authority or proffered evidence of

Copeland’s knowledge of any of Glenn’s alleged prior bad acts.

Counsel did not seek to revisit the issue, and thus the jury was never

presented with any evidence of Glenn’s prior crimes.

      At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel testified that

the defense strategy had been to show that “Mr. Copeland was

confronted by a bully, and he defended himself against the bully.”

He testified further that he believed his performance at trial had

been deficient due to his lack of knowledge of the newly-enacted

Evidence Code, and that this had prejudiced Copeland’s ability to

      4 See State v. Hodges, 291 Ga. 413, 415 (728 SE2d 582) (2012) (citing, as
the seminal case on victim-prior-acts evidence, Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402,
407-408 (3) (b), (c) (405 SE2d 669) (1991) (announcing rule that “evidence of
specific acts of violence by a victim against third persons shall be admissible
where the defendant claims justification” and imposing procedures governing
the introduction of such evidence)).
                                      13
prove Copeland’s claim of self-defense. In rejecting Copeland’s

ineffectiveness claim, the trial court made no express factual

findings and summarily concluded that Copeland had shown neither

deficient performance nor prejudice.

     (b)   Even     assuming      trial   counsel    rendered      deficient

performance, Copeland has failed to establish prejudice because he

cannot show that the evidence of Glenn’s past convictions could have

been admitted.

     Under the current Evidence Code, which governed Copeland’s

2013 trial, 5 an accused may offer “evidence of a pertinent trait of

character of the alleged victim,” “for the purpose of proving action in

conformity therewith,” OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (2), but that evidence is

generally limited to “testimony as to reputation or by testimony in

the form of an opinion,” OCGA § 24-4-405 (a). Evidence of “specific

instances” of a victim’s conduct is admissible for this purpose only

when the character trait “is an essential element of a charge, claim,

     5  See Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, 214, § 101 (2013 Evidence Code made effective
as to all trials “commenced on or after” January 1, 2013).
                                     14
or defense.” OCGA § 24-4-405 (b). See Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga.

532, 536 (3) (773 SE2d 755) (2015) (construing OCGA § 24-4-405 to

mean that “as a general rule, character evidence of a victim is

limited to reputation or opinion, not specific bad acts”) (emphasis in

original); see also United States v. Gulley, 526 F3d 809, 818-819 (5th

Cir. 2008) (recognizing that “the plain language of federal Rule 405

(b) limits the use of specific instances of conduct to prove essential

elements of a charge or defense” and thus that the victim’s prior

violent acts were not admissible in support of the defendant’s self-

defense claim); United States v. Gregg, 451 F3d 930, 933-935 (8th

Cir. 2006) (same). 6

      Specific instances of a victim’s past conduct may also be

admitted, not to show the victim’s action in conformity therewith,

but rather “to show the defendant’s state of mind and the

reasonableness of the defendant’s use of force.” United States v.

      6  “OCGA §§ 24-4-404 (a) and 405 closely track their counterparts in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, so we look to federal appellate decisions applying
these federal rules for guidance in interpreting the Georgia statutes.” Strong
v. State, 309 Ga. 295, 314 (3) (845 SE2d 653) (2020). At the time of Copeland’s
trial, no Georgia appellate decisions had construed these provisions.
                                      15
Bordeaux, 570 F3d 1041, 1049 (8th Cir. 2009). Because such

evidence is offered as proof of the defendant’s state of mind at the

time of the charged crime, it is admissible only if there is proof that

the defendant actually knew about the victim’s prior acts at that

time. See id. at 1050-1051 (affirming exclusion of evidence of victim’s

prior acts of which defendant had no knowledge); United States v.

Saenz, 179 F3d 686, 688-689 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that

prohibition on victim-prior-acts evidence “does not apply when a

defendant seeks to introduce evidence that he knew of a victim’s

other acts to show the defendant’s state of mind) (emphasis in

original). 7

      Thus, here, evidence of Glenn’s prior crimes would not have

been admissible to prove that Glenn had a violent or non-law-

abiding character. It would only have been admissible—and even

then, only potentially—to show Copeland’s state of mind at the time

      7See also Griffin v. State, 309 Ga. 860, 873 & n.14 (5) (b) (849 SE2d 191)
(2020) (noting that admissibility of such evidence was still an open question
under Georgia law but that in any event appellant had failed to show he had
knowledge of victim’s prior crime).
                                      16
of the shooting and the reasonableness of his use of force. And it

could have been admissible for that purpose only upon a showing

that Copeland actually knew about the past crimes at the time of

the shooting.

     But Copeland has offered no evidence—nor even any

argument—that he knew of Glenn’s past crimes at the time of the

shooting. Copeland asserts on appeal that “Not only was Mr.

Copeland a victim of Mr. Glenn’s prior acts of violence and

intimidation, he was also aware of Mr. Glenn’s previous acts of

violence against others.” But in support of this assertion, he cites

only his own testimony that “I seen [Glenn] beat numerous folk

before,” and his affirmative response when asked on direct

examination whether, “based on [his] personal experience with Mr.

Glenn,” Glenn “could whip” him “if he wanted to.” Neither these

assertions about unspecified prior acts nor anything else in the

record shows that Copeland actually knew about Glenn’s prior

convictions. Without such evidence, he cannot show that, even had

his counsel been familiar with the controlling law at the time of trial,

                                  17
he would have had any chance at persuading the court to admit the

evidence of Glenn’s prior crimes. And short of such a showing,

Copeland cannot establish a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.

See Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3). So Copeland’s claim of

ineffective assistance fails.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                  18