Court Opinion

ID: 9944918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:52:29.85897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:45.679088
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT *Page 530 
The dispute in this case involved the title to residential rental property, located in the City of Jackson, Michigan. A review of the relevant history of the title discloses that, on February 3, 1948, Ida Tray, by quitclaim deed, conveyed the property in question through a straw man, to herself and to Sarah Tray, her daughter-in-law, Sally Ann Tray and Edward S. Tray, both minors, her grandchildren, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Through letters which are exhibits in this case, it appears that this gift by Ida Tray to the others was subject to an oral agreement that the property would be reconveyed to her at her request. At all times relevant to this case, Sarah Tray, Sally Ann Tray, and the plaintiff were residents of the State of Wisconsin. On December 29, 1953, Sarah Tray, individually, and as guardian of Edward S. Tray (plaintiff herein), at that time 19 years of age and a minor, and Sally Ann Tray, who had by that time attained her majority, attempted to convey all interests in the property in question back to Ida Tray. No guardian for the minor Edward S. Tray was legally appointed, nor did he individually join in the execution of the deed. This reconveyance appears to have been an attempted fulfillment of the oral agreement by his mother.
On January 9, 1954, Ida Tray, through a straw man, attempted to convey the property in question to herself, Jessie M. Whitney (Ida Tray's sister), *Page 532 
and Cathryn M. Whitney (Jessie M. Whitney's daughter), as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
Ida Tray died on May 17, 1956. Jessie Whitney died January 12, 1958.
All deeds at issue in this case were properly recorded with the county register of deeds.
Testimony at trial indicated that the plaintiff first began investigating the possibility of his having an interest in the property in question in 1956. The complaint in this matter was filed April 23, 1963, asking the court to determine that plaintiff is the owner of said lands, alleging:
"Plaintiff, at the time of the execution of the deed referred to in the last preceding paragraph, was a minor, having been born on November 8, 1934; plaintiff did not join in said deed; in point of fact, the said Sarah Tray had never been appointed general guardian of plaintiff, or of his estate, either in the State of Wisconsin, then the residence of the said Sarah Tray and her son, the plaintiff, in the State of Michigan, or elsewhere; and the attempted conveyance of the interest of the plaintiff in said premises in such manner by the said Sarah Tray was a nullity and ineffectual to divest plaintiff of the interest created in him to said lands by virtue of the conveyance above set forth."
After much delay, trial in this action was held on August 6, 1968. It should be noted that the record and the trial court's opinion are barren of any prejudices resulting to the defendant by such delay, other than the finding that the defendant paid taxes and maintained the property, which she "rented out". On February 17, 1970, the trial judge issued an opinion deciding the matter on the basis of laches, which the defendant had asserted as an affirmative defense. The opinion of the trial court is based *Page 533 
solely on this issue and does not deal with any of the other issues raised in this matter. A motion for new trial was made and denied by the trial court.
The question before the appellate court is whether the trial judge properly applied the doctrine of laches in his decision.
Plaintiff cites nine issues on appeal. The cumulative result, basically, is that the doctrine of laches was inapplicable to the case at hand.
Defendant cites two issues, one being whether laches was properly applied, and the other dealing with whether the beneficiary of a gift can accept the benefits and reject the burdens of a contract. This second issue was not ruled on by the lower court and is not properly before this Court.
A review of the complaint indicates that it is a classical action for ejectment. The plaintiff is a party who is not in possession of property, who is seeking to determine proper title to the property in possession of another.1 Ejectment is an action at law, as opposed to an action to quiet title, an action where one in possession of property seeks to clear title against the world, which is an action in equity. At common law, equitable defenses were not available in ejectment. Paldi v. Paldi
(1893), 95 Mich. 410. Laches is an equitable defense. In 1924, the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following statement with respect to a defense of laches in an action of ejectment:
"Defendants invoke the doctrine of laches. Laches, short of limitations fixed by law, are not available defenses in ejectment." Lowry v. Lyle (1924), 226 Mich. 676.
The principle enunciated above, cited in Lowry, has never been repealed by a Michigan court. *Page 534 
Applying the principle stated above to the action at hand, the application of the doctrine of laches by the trial judge in this case was inappropriate, as the plaintiff brought his action within the 15-year limitation period, found in MCLA § 600.5801(4) (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5801[4]). PA 1961, No 236, MCLA §600.2932 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2932) combined the two actions of ejectment and quiet title, and created a single action to determine interests in land. Subsection 5 of the statute states:
"Actions under this section are equitable in nature."
If all actions to determine title in land are equitable in nature under MCLA § 600.2932, it is questionable whether the principle that equitable defenses are not available in actions of ejectment still has viability. Apparently, this question has not been passed on by our Supreme Court. It would seem logical that the merger of law and equity eliminates any reason to prevent application of equitable defenses to what had previously been legal actions. Therefore, equitable defenses should no longer be inapplicable.
If the reasoning stated above is valid, this Court is then faced with the question of whether, on the merits, the trial judge properly applied the doctrine of laches.
It is well established that the doctrine of laches consists of more than the mere passage of time. In Sloan v. Silberstein
(1966), 2 Mich. App. 660, our Court made the following statement:
"While laches is similar to statutory limitations, there is a substantial difference between them. Laches differs from limitations in that limitations are concerned with the fact of delay, laches with the effect of delay. Laches is concerned principally *Page 535 
with the question of the inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced and depends on whether plaintiff has been wanting in due diligence. Limitations are statutory, while laches is not. Laches applies only in equity, while limitations prior to January 1, 1963, apply only at law. Limitations are based on fixed time, while laches is not." 2 Mich. App. 676.
In the case of Brydges v. Emmendorfer (1945), 311 Mich. 274, the Supreme Court discussed the elements of laches extensively:
"We are not in accord with defendants' claim that the trustee is barred by laches or statute of limitations from maintaining the suit. The statute of limitations does not control the question of laches in equitable actions.
"`Time alone does not constitute laches, but there must have been a change of conditions which would render it inequitable to enforce the claim (21 CJ, p 212 et seq.), or a showing that the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. Orloff v. Stott,
(1927), 239 Mich. 563.' Collins v. Lamotte (1928), 244 Mich. 504,509.
"`In Sanders v. Campbell (1925), 231 Mich. 592, it was held that even where there was delay in asserting the right, that in itself did not constitute laches; instead the delay must have resulted in some prejudice to the party asserting laches which would make it inequitable to disregard the lapse of time and incidental consequences.' Carey v. Lauhoff (1942), 301 Mich. 168,175.
"`Furthermore, laches is purely an equitable defense and lapse of time alone will not create it. There must be other circumstances than mere lapse of time that would make it inequitable to grant the relief sought.' Kutschinski v. Zank
(1943), 307 Mich. 260, 271, 272.
"There is no showing in this case from which an inference may be drawn that the defendants have *Page 536 
been harmed by any delay in bringing the suit to set aside the deeds.
"`In Carey v. Lauhoff (1942), 301 Mich. 168, the Court applied the rule laid down in Sanders v. Campbell (1925),231 Mich. 592, where it was held that, even where there was delay in asserting the right, that of itself did not constitute laches, but that it must appear that the delay resulted in some prejudice to the party asserting laches which would make it inequitable to disregard the lapse of time and the incidental consequences.'Spencer v. Childers (1943), 307 Mich. 145, 148."311 Mich at pp 279, 280.
Laches is not the mere passage of time, but is rather the passage of time combined with a change in condition which would make it inequitable to enforce a claim against the defendant. Nowhere in the record of this case is there any indication of any change of condition caused by the passage of time which would make it inequitable to enforce this claim against the defendant. Defendant did not specifically allege any harm which stems from the passage of time that would result from the enforcement of the claim against her. Her affirmative defense merely sets out the defense of laches without any specificity. A review of the transcript in this matter does not reveal any grounds other than the mere passage of time upon which the defense of laches is asserted, and a reading of the opinion of the trial judge shows that he has not stated any grounds upon which laches may be founded other than the mere passage of time. No other inequities can be found in the record. From this lack of inequities other than the passage of time, it is clear that the trial judge has inappropriately applied the doctrine of laches.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further action not inconsistent with this opinion. *Page 537 
This opinion is not to be construed as deciding which party is legally entitled to said property or the interest therein. Costs to plaintiff.
BRONSON, J., concurred.
1 See 10 Michigan Law Practice, Ejectment, § 1, pp 339-342.