Court Opinion

ID: 9472361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:58:04.531958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:53.691539
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In recommending a sentence as part of a plea bargain, the prosecutor must effectively communicate the government’s firm *1004position to the sentencing judge. The Assistant United States Attorney did exactly that in Benchimol’s case. As the district judge later stated:
It was perfectly apparent to everybody present that the government was recommending probation and that I took that into account, as I said that I would, at the time of the entry of sentence---- I do remember the occasion, and on reviewing the presentence report I remembered the circumstances, and there was no doubt in my mind at that time that everyone was in perfect understanding of what the position of the United States was and of the fact that I was disregarding it in that case.
Though Benchimol got what he bargained for, the government’s clear recommendation of probation to the sentencing judge, the majority would set aside the sentence. Neither law nor logic requires this strange result and I therefore dissent.
First, the majority focuses on the wording and the length, or perhaps the volume, of the government’s recommendation. Following common practice, the Assistant United States Attorney allowed integration into the presentence report of his consideration for the plea bargain. His recommendation of probation was unqualified; but, because of a mistake in the probation office, the presentence report did not accurately reflect this firm position. Benchimol’s counsel noticed the mistake and brought it to the court’s attention. Because she used the word “recommended,” the majority finds the government at fault.
Second, I find the majority’s reliance on United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.1977), and United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375 (4th Cir.1974), unpersuasive. In both cases the government failed to fulfill its obligation not because it agreed with the advocacy of defense counsel, as happened in Benchimol’s case, but because the prosecutors expressed open distaste for the plea bargains. See United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d at 725 (the government attorney said of the plea bargain “I have very serious problems with that .... I’m not too sure of the legality of it nor the propriety ....”); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d at 377 (the government attorney said of the plea bargain “I do have some problems with that, anyhow, but that is the way I understand it.”). In addition, although those cases contain some stray language involving a governmental responsibility to “strongly advocate” the plea bargain or to express “some degree of advocacy,” the majority opinion, properly I suggest, has not adopted such a rule for government prosecutors. Neither the Supreme Court nor professional standards, see Model Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-1, imposes the duty of zeal an advocate owes to his client on the prosecutor fulfilling a bargain, nor could they. The defendant is not the prosecutor’s client.
In arguing for a sentence of probation with restitution, Benchimol’s lawyer pointed out the mistake in the presentence report and said the government, too, “recommended there be probation with restitution in this case.” The government’s counsel concurred: “That is an accurate representation.” He agreed with her position; he did not undercut it or express distaste for the plea bargain.
I believe performance of a plea bargain requires the government to convey the promised recommendation to the sentencing judge without qualification. Although Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252, 256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 839, 91 S.Ct. 79, 27 L.Ed.2d 73 (1970), requires both the prosecution and defense fully to disclose both the terms of a plea bargain and the circumstances under which it was reached, we imposed this requirement to insure the voluntary nature of the plea. It does not require the prosecution to express its “justification” for the bargain to the court unless asked. Cf. United States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637, 640 (8th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907, 94 S.Ct. 1613, 40 L.Ed.2d 112 (1974) (requiring that judges have the parties “set forth in detail” the reasons for reaching the plea agreement). Here, the district court found such *1005extended inquiry unnecessary. The government performed properly. No one was misled. I would therefore affirm.