Court Opinion

ID: 9647596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:41:35.264559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:51.122742
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
Given the facts and circumstances of this circumstantial evidence case, and the law that controls, the majority opinion correctly holds that the police conducted an unlawful search and seizure mission of the adult appellant’s room, that was located in his father’s residence, which room the appellant had personally made entry-proof.
The facts make it crystal clear that nobody, including the appellant’s father, who gave the police consent to enter the room, dared enter the appellant’s room in his absence. Thus, the trial judge erred by permitting the State to present evidence and testimony that was caused to exist by the unlawful entry which occurred in the appellant’s absence. See and cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); May v. State, 582 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Swinney v. State, 529 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Lowery v. State, 499 S.W.2d 160 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Perez v. State, 514 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Tijerina v. State, 578 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Vargas v. State, 542 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); In re Scott K, 24 Cal.3d 395, 155 Cal.Rptr. 671, 595 P.2d 105 (1979); People v. Nunn, 55 Ill.2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (Ill.Sup.Ct.1973).
I part company with the majority opinion because of its holding that the error is harmless as to the maximum possible punishment that was assessed the appellant by the jury.
The test for harmless error is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the maximum possible punishment that the jury assessed the appellant. See Matthew-Bender, 4 Texas Criminal Practice Guide, Sec. 90.06(2)(e); Ringel, 1 Searches and Sei*533zures, Arrests and Confessions, Sec. 20.-7(c). In this instance, it must be determined whether the State’s case on punishment might have been considerably weakened without all of the tainted evidence.
After having carefully read the record, it is obvious to me that there should be no doubt in any rational person’s mind that from the time of the voir dire examination of the jury by the prosecuting attorney, during which he referred to “how long the crime had been planned,” until he closed with the argument that is set out on page 7 of the majority’s slip opinion, he not only planted the seed of premeditation in the minds of the jurors, he did everything within his power to nourish the seed into a full blossoming plant of prejudice toward the appellant.
The deceased was shot with a .38 calibre weapon.
The seed for the prosecuting attorney’s plant came from 450 spent .38 calibre cartridges that the police seized from the room of the appellant, which led them to McBride, a Tyler gun shop dealer, who testified that only two days before the killing the appellant purchased the precise type of bullets found at the murder scene. McBride also testified that the appellant had attempted to purchase a shotgun when he was in the store. Two business cards of Sam Shabot, a pawnshop owner located in Houston, were also seized from the room. This enabled the police to contact Shabot from whom they learned that in October, 1976, the appellant had recently purchased from him a .38 calibre revolver and a .25 calibre pistol. The killing occurred in May, 1977.
Notwithstanding all of the above, the majority opinion states with a certain air of over confidence that “the jury would have reached the same verdict of life imprisonment.” The majority opinion appears to leave the hindsight impression that the above tainted evidence and testimony has now been antiseptically cleansed before it went before the jury. Perhaps in the hands of a neophyte prosecuting attorney such would be true. However, after having read the record, I can assure all that appellant was no match for Clark, who was undoubtedly a very competent and effective prosecuting attorney. It is clear that Clark obtained the maximum possible use of the tainted evidence and testimony.
It is true that in making the determination whether the error was harmless as to the punishment assessed this Court often looks to the jury argument of the prosecuting attorney, see, for example, Clemons v. State, 605 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Jordan v. State, 576 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). In this instance, Clark’s comment of “what kind of man sits at this Counsel table before you” was given meaning when one takes into consideration the fact that the jury had before it the tainted evidence and testimony.
To conclude as the majority opinion does, that there was not a reasonable possibility that the above tainted evidence and testimony had no affect upon the decision of the jury to assess the maximum possible punishment is, to me at least, truly mind boggling.
The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on the maximum possible punishment that the jury assessed. To the contrary holding by the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent.