Court Opinion

ID: 9368301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 17:07:34.443068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.769963
License: Public Domain

J-S41043-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHAD GOLDSBOROUGH                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 768 MDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 20, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-06-CR-0001286-2021

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                      FILED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023

        Appellant, Chad Goldsborough, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County after a jury found him

guilty of robbery and the trial court found him guilty of summary harassment.

Herein, Appellant raises claims challenging the sufficiency and weight of the

evidence, and he argues that the trial court erred in failing to provide notice

and the opportunity to be heard when it entered an order amending his

original sentencing order to correct a mistaken Recidivism Risk Reduction

Incentive (“RRRI”) program1 eligibility designation. After careful review, we

affirm.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4501-4512.
J-S41043-22

      The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion sets forth the pertinent facts

and procedural history, as follows:

      Chad Goldsborough (“Appellant”) was charged [by Information
      filed on May 6, 2021] with Robbery, Theft by Unlawful Taking or
      Disposition, and a summary charge of Harassment. The charges
      stemmed from a February 26, 2021, incident alleged to have
      occurred at 931 North 8th Street, in Reading, Berks County.

      The case went to trial on March 9, 2022, at which the
      Commonwealth first called Officer Eric Koller of the Reading Police
      Department, who testified that on February 29, 2020, he was on
      patrol when he was dispatched to 931 North 8th Street . . . where
      a notary shop was located (“the Notary Shop”) to assist another
      officer—Officer Sanchez—with downloading video from a
      surveillance system. Id. at 55-56. Officer Koller stated that he
      had to verify the correct date and time stamp on the video
      because it was incorrect on the system, but that he was able to
      determine the correct time and date of the video surveillance
      footage and reviewed and collected the footage for evidence. Id.
      at 56-57. On cross-examination, Officer Koller acknowledged that
      the video footage that was collected did not include any audio from
      the surveillance camera. Id. at 58.

      Officer Sandy Enrique Sanchez, also of the Reading Police
      Department, testified that on the same day, he was dispatched to
      the Notary Shop where he spoke with Bayron Soto-Lucha, (“[Soto-
      Lucha]”). Id. at 59. Officer Sanchez was present when Officer
      Koller downloaded the video footage from the surveillance system
      and reviewed the footage from the five cameras stationed inside
      and outside of the Notary Shop from the date of the incident,
      which occurred on February 26, 2021. Id. at 61-62.

      [Soto-Lucha] next testified that in February of 2021, he was living
      in Reading . . . with his wife and two children. Id. at 64. On the
      morning of February 26, 2021, [Soto-Lucha], who worked in
      construction, went to a job installing a door, where he received
      $675.00 in currency. Id. at 65. At the time, [Soto-Lucha] owned
      a 1992 Toyota Celica (“the Vehicle”) . . . that [he kept at a garage
      and advertised for sale for $1,200.00] through Facebook. . . . Id.
      at 66.

                                      -2-
J-S41043-22

     At approximately 11:30 a.m. on February 26, [[Soto-Lucha]]
     received a phone call from a prospective buyer, who told [Soto-
     Lucha] that he wanted to see the Vehicle but that he did not have
     a ride to get there. Id. at 67. [Soto-Lucha] said that he was
     already out in his truck, and he offered to pick up the prospective
     buyer. Id. [Soto-Lucha] then drove to a house on Orange Street,
     which was the address he was provided, and picked up the
     prospective buyer, later identified as Appellant, and his wife. Id.

     They then drove to the garage where Appellant test-drive [sic] the
     Vehicle, and [they] came to an agreement for Appellant to
     purchase the Vehicle for $900.00. Id. [Soto-Lucha] note[d] that
     Appellant took his cell phone out and said that he was going to
     purchase insurance for the Vehicle. Id. at 68. [Soto-Lucha]
     further mentioned that Appellant did not show him any cash. Id.

     [Soto-Lucha], Appellant, and Appellant’s wife then traveled to the
     Notary Shop on 8th Street for the title transfer, during which
     [Soto-Lucha] told Appellant that he would need to have the money
     in exchange for the title transfer at the Notary Shop. Id. Upon
     arriving at the Notary Shop, Appellant showed the notary his cell
     phone, which he alleged displayed insurance information;
     however, the notary would not accept the insurance. Id. at 69-
     70. [Soto-Lucha] likewise reaffirmed to Appellant that he would
     not transfer the title until he had the money for the Vehicle. Id.
     at 70.

     [Soto-Lucha] described Appellant as becoming “very annoyed and
     . . . moving around from here to there and saying that he
     [Appellant] didn’t understand and that [Soto-Lucha] had to do it.”
     Id. Appellant then began to argue with [Soto-Lucha], but [Soto
     Lucha] became embarrassed and left, walking to a nearby
     garage/gas station. Id. [Soto-Lucha] testified that he was afraid
     that Appellant “might want to assault [him].” Id.

     [Soto-Lucha] returned to the Notary Shop, because the title was
     still inside, where Appellant continued to argue with him. Id. at
     71, 73. As they left the Notary Shop and went outside, Appellant
     continued to argue. Id. at 71. Appellant, described as still being
     “very upset”, then told [Soto-Lucha] that if he would not transfer
     the title, then [Soto-Lucha] would have to pay Appellant “for the
     day’s work that he had lost for him and his wife and for the
     insurance as well.” Id.

                                    -3-
J-S41043-22

     [Soto-Lucha] stated that he wanted to leave, but that he could
     not do so because Appellant’s belongings were still in [Soto-
     Lucha’s] truck. Id. at 72. Appellant told [Soto-Lucha], “I know
     where you live, you have to give me this money or you’re going
     to see what’s going to happen.” Id. [Soto-Lucha] testified that
     Appellant then took out his cell phone, showed [Soto-Lucha] a
     photograph of [Soto-Lucha’s] uncle on Facebook, stating that
     “he’s going to pay, too,” and continued saying “I’m going to kill
     you, kill you.” Id. at 72, 90. [Soto-Lucha] stated that he was
     afraid that Appellant was going to kill him, and possibly his wife
     and kids. Id. at 75.

     Appellant made a phone call and a black car pulled up to the
     parking lot and another man step[ped] out of the car, walked over
     to [Soto-Lucha], and told [Soto-Lucha] that he had to give
     Appellant the money. Id. [Soto-Lucha] described this third
     person as a taller white male with a teardrop tattoo near his eye.
     Id. at 77. Both Appellant and this third person moved ever closer
     to [Soto-Lucha]. Id. at 73-74. Fearing that harm might come to
     him or his family, [Soto-Lucha] pulled out his wallet and gave the
     money inside to Appellant, which, according to [Soto-Lucha], was
     approximately $700.00. Id. at 72-75.

     Appellant continued to follow [Soto-Lucha] back to his truck and
     demanded more money. Id. at 76. [Soto-Lucha] then drove off
     in his truck and Appellant got into the third person’s car and
     followed [Soto-Lucha] for about three blocks. Id. at 76-77.
     [Soto-Lucha] was scared and did not initially report the incident
     to law enforcement, but a friend convinced him to do so two days
     later. Id. at 78.

     During [Soto-Lucha’s] testimony, the Commonwealth played the
     video recording extracted by Officer Koller from the surveillance
     cameras at the Notary Shop. Id. at 79-84; Comm.’s Ex. 2. [Soto-
     Lucha] provide some narration of the events depicted in the video
     through questions from the assistant district attorney. Id.

     On cross-examination, [Soto-Lucha], who was using the services
     of an interpreter at trial, acknowledged that he was a native
     Spanish-speaker and that he only spoke limited English. Id. at
     85. [Soto-Lucha] clarified that he was paid $675 for the door job
     earlier in the day, but that he had some money already in his
     wallet. Id. [Soto-Lucha] further admitted that he did not provide

                                   -4-
J-S41043-22

     a receipt, or have a copy of such, for the work that he performed.
     Id. at 86.

     [Soto-Lucha] indicated that he and Appellant had agreed that
     Appellant would pay [Soto-Lucha] the money for the vehicle prior
     to the title transfer. Id. at 88-89. However, they would record
     the transaction as a free transfer, so that [Soto-Lucha] would not
     have to pay taxes on the transaction. Id.

     When asked about the vehicle and its title, [Soto-Lucha] admitted
     that his name was not on the title but testified that he had been
     given the vehicle in exchange for some work that he had
     performed. Id. at 86-87. Moreover, the transfer between the
     previous owner and [Soto-Lucha] was a recorded transaction
     through a notary. Id. at 92. [Soto-Lucha] further stated that he
     had disclosed this fact to Appellant. Id. at 87.

     The Commonwealth recalled Officer Sanchez who reviewed some
     still screenshots from the surveillance video. Id. at 94. Officer
     Sanchez testified that law enforcement had attempted to identify
     the third person who arrived in the black car, but that they could
     not because the license plate was too blurry to identify the
     number. Id. at 95.

     On cross-examination, and upon reviewing his report, Officer
     Sanchez noted that [Soto-Lucha] told him that Appellant
     threatened to kill him, but that he did not include that detail in his
     report. Id. at 97-98. The Commonwealth then entered video
     footage from officer Sanchez’s body-worn camera of the interview
     he conducted with [Soto-Lucha]. Id. at 99-100; Comm.’s Ex. 6.
     During a review of the body-worn camera footage, Officer Sanchez
     explained that [Soto-Lucha] used language in Spanish that Officer
     Sanchez interpreted as meaning that Appellant threatened [Soto-
     Lucha]’s life.   Id. at 100. On recross-examination, Officer
     Sanchez admitted that [Soto-Lucha] had stated, in English, that
     Appellant threatened to “kick” [[Soto-Lucha]’s] ass.” Id. at 100-
     01. Officer Sanchez further conceded that [Soto-Lucha] initially
     provided him a value of money in his wallet to be between
     $600.00 and $1,000.00, but that [Soto-Lucha] later gave the
     $700.00 figure after giving it some thought. Id. at 101.

     Christa Johnson, Appellant’s fiancé, testified that on February 26,
     2021, Appellant contacted a person selling the vehicle through
     Facebook, and then he and [Soto-Lucha] exchanged text

                                     -5-
J-S41043-22

     messages and spoke on the phone once or twice before [Soto-
     Lucha] arrived to pick Appellant and Ms. Johnson up to see the
     vehicle. Id. at 106-07. They first traveled to an alleyway in a
     garage where Appellant looked at the vehicle and decided that he
     wanted to purchase it. Id. at 108. They then traveled to a Wawa,
     where Appellant got the money for the Vehicle, and Ms. Johnson
     ordered insurance for the vehicle on her cell phone. Id. Ms.
     Johnson described purchasing the insurance through the
     Progressive Insurance website, which the cost came to about
     $80.00, and then receiving a confirmation via email. Id. at 108-
     09, 114. She stated that she believed Appellant later received
     documentation in the regular mail for the insurance. Id. at 109.
     Defense Counsel, Sean Fitzgerald, Esq., then entered an insurance
     document into evidence, which Ms. Johnson identified as the
     declarations page from Progressive Insurance indicating that
     Appellant had to remove the vehicle from the insurance because
     Appellant did not purchase the vehicle. Id. at 109-10; Def.’s Ex.
     1. Ms. Johnson testified that because Appellant did not purchase
     the vehicle, he had to switch the insurance to another vehicle that
     was purchased from Ms. Johnson’s mother. Id. at 110.

     Ms. Johnson then described arriving at the Notary Shop, and while
     they were still in [Soto-Lucha]’s truck, [Soto-Lucha] was asking
     for the money for the vehicle. Id. at 111. When they entered the
     Notary Shop, Ms. Johnson showed the employee her phone, which
     had the insurance information displayed. Id. at 113. Ms. Johnson
     stated that the Notary Shop employee did not speak English, so
     [Soto-Lucha] told Appellant that he could not do the title transfer
     until after Appellant paid [Soto-Lucha]. Id. at 113. As Appellant
     and [Soto-Lucha] continued to debate, Ms. Johnson told Appellant
     that she did not think that they should go through with the
     transaction because she felt “like we’re going to get ripped off,”
     and that “[i]t all just seems sketchy.” Id. at 114.

     When Appellant, Ms. Johnson, and [Soto-Lucha] left the Notary
     Shop, they continued to talk in the parking lot. Id. at 115. Ms.
     Johnson testified that she did not hear Appellant make any threats
     to [Soto-Lucha], but that she left during the conversation to give
     them space. Id. at 116. At some point, Appellant called his friend
     for another ride, and a black vehicle arrived. Id. According to
     Ms. Johnson, when the friend arrived, he did not make any threats
     or act in an intimidating manner. Id. at 117.

                                    -6-
J-S41043-22

     On cross-examination, Ms. Johnson identified Appellant’s friend as
     Jay Antonini, who came in the black vehicle to pick the couple up
     after the failed transaction. Id. at 118. Ms. Johnson stated that
     [Soto-Lucha] had agreed to reimburse Appellant for the insurance
     costs and that was what he was handing over to Appellant in the
     video footage. Id. at 118-119.

     At the conclusion of the trial on March 10, 2022, the jury found
     Appellant guilty of Robbery and not guilty of Theft by Unlawful
     Taking or Disposition. [The trial] court likewise found Appellant
     guilty of the summary charge of harassment. The same day, [the
     trial] court sentenced Appellant on the robbery conviction to a
     term of five to ten years of incarceration in a state correctional
     facility, with a $300.00 fine for the harassment conviction. At the
     time, we found that Appellant was eligible for the Recidivism Risk
     Reduction Incentive (RRRI) program.

     On March 11, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a post-sentence
     motion seeking to modify the sentencing order [] to make
     Appellant not RRRI eligible because of the robbery conviction. On
     March 21, 2022, Appellant, through Defense Counsel, filed post-
     sentence motions challenging both the sufficiency and weight of
     the evidence. By order dated March 23, 2022, [the trial court]
     directed that the parties file briefs in support of their respective
     positions as to Appellant’s RRRI eligibility. Both Defense Counsel
     and the Commonwealth agreed in their filed briefs that Appellant
     was not RRRI eligible. No hearing was thereafter held. On April
     19, 2022, [the trial court] entered two separate orders—one
     granting the Commonwealth’s motion and the other denying
     Appellant’s motion. [The trial court, therefore,] entered an
     amended sentencing order indicating that Appellant was not RRRI
     eligible by statute.

     On May 17, 2022, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the
     Superior Court. [The trial] court, on May 19, 2022, entered an
     order directing Appellant to file a Concise Statement of Matters
     Complained of on Appeal on June 1, 2022, in which he sought
     review on the following issues:

           1. The Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
              evidence to establish a conviction for Robbery
              when no threat was made.

                                    -7-
J-S41043-22

            2. The Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
               evidence to establish a conviction for Robbery
               when no theft was attempted or committed.

            3. [Appellant]’s conviction for Robbery was against
               the weight of the evidence when no credible
               testimony was presented that [Appellant]
               threatened the Victim with or intentionally put the
               Victim in fear of immediate serious bodily injury.

            4. [Appellant]’s conviction for Robbery was against
               the weight of the evidence when no credible
               testimony was presented that there was an
               attempt to take any money or that any money was
               taken in the course of committing a theft.

            5. The trial court erred when it entered an amended
               sentencing order making [Appellant] RRRI
               ineligible without [Appellant] being present to the
               hearing.

      Appellant’s Concise [Statement of Matters Complained of on
      Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)].

Trial Court Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), filed July 18, 2022, at 1-7.

      In Appellant’s brief, which largely tracks his Rule 1925(b) statement, he

begins by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence offered to prove he

committed the crime of robbery as defined under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701, infra.

We set forth our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence, as follows:

      In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
      determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
      elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d
      133 (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the
      evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact

                                     -8-
J-S41043-22

      finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.
      2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
      links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable
      doubt. Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      In Appellant’s first sufficiency issue, he argues that he neither

threatened Soto-Lucha with, nor placed him in fear of, immediate serious

bodily injury, while in his second issue, he maintains that the Commonwealth

failed to prove he directed such alleged threats and actions as part of a course

of committing a theft. After careful review, we find no merit to his arguments.

      Appellant challenges his conviction for robbery under 18 Pa.C.S. §

3701(a)(1)(ii).

      To sustain a conviction for first-degree robbery under [s]ection
      3701(a)(1)(ii), the Commonwealth must establish that “in the
      course of committing a theft,” the defendant “threatens another
      with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily
      injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 3701(a)(1)(ii). “An act shall be deemed
      ‘in the course of committing a theft’ if it occurs in an attempt to
      commit theft or in flight after the attempt or commission.” 18
      Pa.C.S.[ ] § 3701(a)(2).

      A conviction under [s]ection 3701(a)(1)(ii) is contingent upon the
      type of bodily harm threatened. See Commonwealth v. Ross,
      570 A.2d 86, 87 ([Pa. Super.] 1990) (evidence sufficient to show
      appellant, by the use of an upraised knife, threatened the victim
      with serious bodily injury), appeal denied, 593 A.2d 417 ([Pa.]
      1990). The Commonwealth need not prove a verbal utterance or
      threat to sustain a conviction under [s]ection 3701(a)(1)(ii).
      Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 914 (Pa. Super.
      2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). It is sufficient if
      the evidence demonstrates aggressive actions that threatened the
      victim's safety. Id. For the purposes of [s]ection 3701(a)(1)(ii),
      the proper focus is on the nature of the threat posed by an
      assailant and whether he reasonably placed a victim in fear of
      “immediate serious bodily injury.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus,

                                     -9-
J-S41043-22

      a reviewing court will consider the defendant's intent and actions
      and not necessarily the subjective state of mind of the
      victim. Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 673 A.2d 962, 966 ([Pa.
      Super.] 1996); see Commonwealth v. Nelson, 582 A.2d 1115,
      1118 ([Pa. Super.] 1990) (“The fact that the threat may not have
      produced the intended fear is irrelevant.”), appeal denied, 593
      A.2d 840 ([Pa.] 1991); see also Commonwealth v. Mays, 375
      A.2d 116, 117-18 ([Pa. Super.] 1977) (noting that it is irrelevant
      that the victim may not have taken the threat seriously).

Commonwealth v. Ouch, 199 A.3d 918, 923–24 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      As discussed above, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that

Appellant reacted to both the notary’s rejection of his insurance proffer and

Soto-Lucha’s consequential refusal to transfer title by threatening Soto-Lucha

with immediate bodily harm if Soto-Lucha did not compensate him for his and

his wife’s alleged lost wages and auto insurance costs. According to Soto-

Lucha, a “very upset” Appellant said he knew Soto-Lucha’s address, displayed

a cell phone photograph to show he also knew where Soto-Lucha’s uncle lived,

and promised that both Soto-Lucha and his uncle “would see what’s going to

happen” unless he received payment as demanded. N.T. at 71-72. Soto-

Lucha asked why Appellant could not do what was necessary to complete the

transfer of title, but Appellant, while placing a call on his cell phone, insisted

he would kill Soto-Lucha if the cash payment was not made. N.T. at 72, 90.

      Just moments after Appellant completed the cell phone call, an apparent

associate of his, described by Soto-Lucha as a tall, white man with a teardrop

tattoo near his eye, arrived by car. N.T. at 72-74, 77. This other man joined

Appellant, and the two walked right up to Soto-Lucha and positioned

themselves “very close” to him, where the other man warned, “you have to

                                      - 10 -
J-S41043-22

do what he’s [Appellant’s] telling you, you have to give [Appellant] the

money.” N.T. at 72. At this point, Soto-Lucha testified, “I felt like they were

going to kill me.” N.T. at 75. Fearing imminent serious harm, Soto-Lucha

paid Appellant approximately $700 cash, and shortly thereafter handed over

the remainder of what he possessed in his wallet after Appellant demanded

he do so. N.T. at 72-74, 76. Soto-Lucha testified, “People like that, you know,

bad people, you feel like you almost have to pay.” N.T. at 76.

      Officer Sandy Enrique Sanchez of the Reading Police Department

testified that he interviewed Soto-Lucha and took down his statement two

days later outside of the Notary Shop. N.T. at 97. The officer indicated Soto-

Lucha was nervous and “jumping around” when recounting the incident

between himself and Appellant, and the officer described making “many

attempts to try to calm [Soto-Lucha] down[]” during the interview. Id.

      On cross-examination, Officer Sanchez testified that Soto-Lucha

reported Appellant had threated to kill him during their February 26 th

encounter, even though the officer acknowledged he failed to include this

accusation in his written report. N.T. at 98. On redirect, the Commonwealth

played a 25-minute-long video of the interview recorded on Officer Sanchez’s

body-worn camera, after which Officer Sanchez underscored that Soto-Lucha

had used the Spanish word, “dano”, during the interview to refer to how

Appellant allegedly had threatened him. N.T. at 99-100. According to the

officer, “dano” is a vague term meaning “I want to do harm to a person, he

wants to do harm to me.” The officer testified that he understood the term

                                    - 11 -
J-S41043-22

as Soto-Lucha used it to mean Appellant had threatened his life. N.T. 100.

On cross-examination, Officer Sanchez acknowledged that Soto-Lucha also

said that Appellant threatened to “kick my [Soto-Lucha’s] ass.” N.T. 100-101.

      The instant facts as presented by the Commonwealth and accepted by

the finder of fact were sufficient to prove that Appellant threatened, or

intended to put Soto-Lucha in reasonable fear of, immediate serious bodily

injury as required to prove robbery under section 3701(a)(1)(ii). Soto-Lucha

testified that Appellant angrily demanded money and said to him, “I’m gonna

kill you”, as he was dialing someone on his cell phone. Just a moment after

the call, an associate of Appellant’s arrived and joined Appellant in a unified

show of force, as the two walked right up to Soto-Lucha and told him that he

needed to pay Appellant immediately. Soto-Lucha believed at that moment

that he was in danger of serious bodily harm or worse unless he met

Appellant’s demands. Officer Sanchez testified that he understood Soto-Lucha

to mean as much during their interview two days later when Soto-Lucha used

the Spanish language term “dano” to describe what Appellant had said to him.

      Any show of force directed to a person while committing a theft, whether

actual or constructive, brings that act within the scope of the Crimes Code's

robbery provision. Commonwealth v. Duffey, 548 A.2d 1178, 1182 (Pa.

1988).   Threats to kill a victim support a fact-finder’s conclusion that a

defendant intentionally placed a victim in fear of immediate serious bodily

injury. Commonwealth v. Matthew, 909 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Pa. 2006).

                                    - 12 -
J-S41043-22

       The evidence introduced at Appellant’s criminal trial demonstrated that

he employed both intimidating actions and threats to seriously harm or kill

Soto-Lucha.      When viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as verdict winner, such evidence was sufficient to prove the necessary element

of Section 3701(a)(1)(ii) that the defendant had placed the victim in

reasonable fear of immediate serious bodily injury to accomplish the

underlying theft. See also Commonwealth v. Mullen, No. 640 MDA 2022,

2022 WL 17588521, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2022) (holding evidence

of defendant’s threats to kill victim sufficed to establish element that theft was

enabled by placing victim in fear of immediate bodily injury).2

       Appellant’s closely related, second sufficiency claim challenges the

Commonwealth’s evidence offered to prove that he committed the underlying

theft against Soto-Lucha. To support his argument that he neither committed

nor attempted a theft of Soto-Lucha, Appellant points to the trial testimony of

his girlfriend, eyewitness Christa Johnson, who maintained that Mr. Soto-

Lucha willingly paid Appellant to cover the costs associated with both the

insurance Appellant had secured in vain and the lost wages for that day. N.T.

at 108-09. However, this portion of Appellant’s argument pitting Johnson’s

testimony against Soto-Lucha’s testimony goes to the weight, rather than to

____________________________________________

2 While Mullen is not controlling because it is a non-published memorandum,
it nevertheless provides persuasive authority to this Court. See Pa.R.A.P.
126(b) (providing that unpublished nonprecedential memorandum decisions
of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for
their persuasive value).

                                          - 13 -
J-S41043-22

the sufficiency, of the evidence and is therefore of no avail to him in arguing

this issue. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 229 A.3d 298, 306 (Pa. Super.

2020) (citation omitted) (recognizing that “a challenge to the weight of the

evidence is distinct from a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in that

the former concedes that the Commonwealth has produced sufficient evidence

of each element of the crime, but questions which evidence is to be

believed.”).

      The remainder of Appellant’s sufficiency argument is appropriately

directed and is two-fold.   First, Appellant contends that because the jury

acquitted him of the separate charge of theft by unlawful taking, his robbery

conviction, which depends upon proof of an underlying theft, cannot stand. It

is well-settled, however, that the occurrence of an inconsistent verdict, alone,

provides no ground for overturning a conviction because the inconsistency is

simply understood as an act of the jury’s lenity:

      Consistency     in   verdicts    in   criminal    cases    is   not
      necessary. Commonwealth v. Strand, 464 Pa. 544, 347 A.2d
      675 (1975). This Court has stated, “When an acquittal on one
      count in an indictment is inconsistent with a conviction on a
      second count, the court looks upon [the] acquittal as no more than
      the jury's assumption of a power which they had no right to
      exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.”
      Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 376 Pa.Super. 188, 191, 545 A.2d
      890, 892 (1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 602, 562 A.2d 825
      (1989) (quoting Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 279 Pa.Super 18,
      420 A.2d 722 (1980) (citations omitted)) (jury's acquittal of
      appellant of theft charge and conviction of robbery charge did not
      entitle appellant to any relief). Thus, this Court will not disturb
      guilty verdicts on the basis of apparent inconsistencies as long as
      there is evidence to support the verdict. Commonwealth v.

                                     - 14 -
J-S41043-22

      Boyles, 407 Pa.Super. 343, 595 A.2d 1180 (1991), appeal
      denied, 531 Pa. 651, 613 A.2d 556 (1992).

Commonwealth v. Swann, 128, 635 A.2d 1103, 1104–05 (Pa. Super.

1994).

      Second, Appellant asserts that the surveillance video played at trial

proved that no theft occurred, as it depicted Soto-Lucha pulling money out of

his wallet and handing it to Appellant without either physical contact between

them or any “struggle” over the contents of the wallet. Brief for Appellant at

30. This argument fails to address, let alone disprove, the Commonwealth’s

case that what occurred was a robbery accomplished not by the physical

taking of Soto-Lucha’s money but by threatening, or intending to place Soto-

Lucha in immediate fear of incurring, immediate serious bodily harm.

      At trial,   the   Commonwealth presented evidence       that Appellant

threatened and intimidated Soto-Lucha for the sole purpose of unlawfully

confiscating all the money Soto-Lucha carried on his person. Indeed, the facts

recounted supra established that Appellant’s demand for reimbursement of

alleged lost wages and auto insurance expenses was made not in earnest but,

instead, as the planned culmination of a con.

      It was undisputed that Appellant, alone, frustrated the sale of and

transfer of title to the vehicle by presenting invalid auto insurance to the

notary and making no attempt thereafter to remedy the matter and complete

the transaction as Soto-Lucha was asking him to do. Instead, he turned on

Soto-Lucha,   aggressively   insisted   Soto-Lucha   “reimburse”   him,   and

eventually, with the aid of an accomplice who arrived right when summoned,

                                    - 15 -
J-S41043-22

extracted money from Soto-Lucha with the aid of death threats and acts of

intimidation.

      The testimony of Soto-Lucha in this regard, therefore, was entirely

consistent with, and hardly disproven by, the surveillance video depiction of a

transfer of money completed without a physical struggle.        Accordingly, we

discern no merit to Appellant’s sufficiency argument.

      In Appellant’s next issue, he challenges the weight of the evidence

admitted on the robbery charge. Our standard of review for such a claim is

as follows:

      Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
      discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
      is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has
      had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
      appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
      and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
      court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
      denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict
      was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new
      trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis and

citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1270

(Pa. 2016) (stating that “in reviewing a challenge to the weight of the

evidence, a verdict will be overturned only if it is so contrary to the evidence

as to shock one's sense of justice.”) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Additionally, the finder of fact, while passing upon the credibility of

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part,

                                     - 16 -
J-S41043-22

or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 767, 771 (Pa.

Super. 2009).

      Appellant contends that evidence of Soto-Lucha’s statements made

during his interview with Officer Sanchez undermined the credibility of his trial

testimony regarding the level of threat made and the amount of money taken.

Specifically, he alludes to Soto-Lucha’s use of the broad term “dano” to

describe to Officer Sanchez what Appellant had threatened, and he declares

the term is too imprecise to prove that immediate serious bodily injury was

implicated. He also argues that the conflict between Soto-Lucha’s initial loss

estimate of between $600 and $1,000 cash and the final figure of $700

reached after giving it more thought further shows the unreliability of Soto-

Lucha’s accusation.

      Also bearing negatively on Soto-Lucha’s veracity, Appellant continues,

were Soto-Lucha’s two-day delay in calling authorities about his alleged

robbery and his inability to recall for Officer Sanchez where he performed the

carpentry work for which he received this cash payment just two days earlier.

      In the trial court’s responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, it sets forth

relevant evidence and legal authority, and it explains that it denied Appellant’s

post-sentence motion raising this claim after having determined the jury

reached a sound guilty verdict based on a finding of fact that Soto-Lucha

credibly testified about his encounter with Appellant. See Trial Court Opinion,

7/18/22, at 9-11. Specifically, the trial court observes that the jury viewed

                                     - 17 -
J-S41043-22

all Commonwealth and Defense witnesses testify under direct examination

and rigorous cross-examination,3 watched both the surveillance video

depicting the actions leading up to Soto-Lucha’s relinquishment of $700 cash

to Appellant and the video of Soto-Lucha’s interview taken from Officer

Sanchez’s body-worn camera, and considered Appellant’s arguments offered

in impeachment of Soto-Lucha before it deemed credible Soto-Lucha’s account

of the alleged robbery.

       Under our standard of review, it is not the function of this Court to

substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact on matters of witness

credibility and weight of the evidence, and we will not grant a new trial absent

a verdict that is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Presented with no such verdict in the instant case, we discern no abuse of the

trial court's discretion in denying Appellant’s weight of the evidence

challenge. See, e.g., In the Interest of C.S., 63 A.3d 351, 358 (Pa. Super.

2013) (holding that the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in

rejecting the juvenile's weight of the evidence challenge to her adjudication

of delinquency for robbery, where (1) the victim, a convenience store clerk,

testified that the juvenile stole items from the store after threatening the clerk

that a nearby friend of the juvenile possessed a gun; and (2) the juvenile

____________________________________________

3  During the testimony of Defense witness Christa Johnson, the jury learned
that she had two prior convictions for retail theft and received instruction that
it could consider this criminal history as bearing on her credibility as a witness.
N.T. at 122-23.

                                          - 18 -
J-S41043-22

court found the clerk's testimony to be credible); see also Commonwealth

v. Brawner, 553 A.2d 458, 462 (Pa. Super. 1989) (stating that the trial court

properly rejected the defendant's weight of the evidence challenge to his

robbery conviction, where the purported contradictions in the testimony of the

victim alleged by defendant were minor and did not undermine the propriety

of the jury's guilty verdict).

      In Appellant’s final issue, he contends the trial court erred when it filed

an amended sentencing order to correct the original sentencing order’s

patently mistaken designation of Appellant as RRRI-eligible without first

scheduling a hearing “to afford [Appellant] the opportunity to respond to the

amended sentencing [and] be informed of the basis for the change, the impact

on his minimum sentence, and his eligibility for parole.” Brief of Appellant at

32. We disagree.

      The failure to conduct a hearing, Appellant posits, violated the notice

requirements of Section 5505 of the Judicial Code, “Modification of Orders”,

which provides as follows:

      Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon
      notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30
      days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any
      term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or
      allowed.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5505.

      Appellant devotes the remainder of his argument claiming that his case

comes squarely under this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Blair, 230

                                     - 19 -
J-S41043-22

A.3d 1274 (Pa. Super. 2020), in which we discussed both the notice

requirement of Section 5505 and a defendant’s due process rights of notice

and the opportunity to respond during the sentencing phase:

      Even if there is a clear mistake [in the trial court’s sentencing
      order], that does not relieve the court of its obligation to give
      notice as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 to both the defendant and
      the district attorney of the proposed changes and an opportunity
      to respond to those changes. Not only is such a notice required
      by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, the sentencing process must also satisfy
      due process, which similarly requires a notice and opportunity to
      respond.
Blair, 230 A.3d at 1277.

      The present facts are distinguishable from those in Blair. In Blair, the

trial court received a letter from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

(DOC) advising that Blair was not entitled to the entire time credit that the

court applied to his sentence because the DOC had already applied a portion

of the credit to a different sentence.   Without giving to Blair either notice or

an opportunity to respond, the trial court entered an order amending its

sentence to reduce the amount of credit awarded for time served. The order

directed that all other provisions of the sentencing disposition remained in full

force and effect.

      Accordingly, Blair argued in his nunc pro tunc direct appeal that the trial

court erred in amending judgment of sentence to reduce his time credit

without first providing notice and holding a hearing in his presence on the time

credit issue.   Id. at 1276.   Determining that Blair had been denied both

Section 5505 notice and his due process right to be afforded the opportunity

                                     - 20 -
J-S41043-22

to respond, we       vacated Blair’s sentence and remanded for further

proceedings. Id. at 1277.

      Here, in contrast, Appellant received both notice of, and an opportunity

to be heard on, the proposed change to the original sentencing order’s

incorrect designation of RRRI eligibility. Indeed, the trial court ordered the

submission of briefs on the parties’ respective post-sentence motions, and

Appellant submitted a counseled brief in which he conceded the need for an

amended sentencing order that properly categorized him as RRRI-ineligible.

Afterward, the trial court entered the amended sentencing order that changed

only Appellant’s RRRI eligibility designation.

      The record establishes that the trial court’s amended sentencing order

effected no change other than that which both parties in their court-ordered

briefs had agreed was necessary—the entering of a new sentencing order that

changed the patently mistaken RRRI categorization of Appellant from eligible

to ineligible.   Considering Appellant thus received notice of the proposed

change and informed the trial court that he agreed with the proposal, we

distinguish the present facts from those at issue in Blair and conclude that

Appellant was afforded the due process protections of notice and the

opportunity to respond. Accordingly, we discern no merit to his final issue.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

                                     - 21 -
J-S41043-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/03/2023

                          - 22 -