Court Opinion

ID: 9613770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:19:52.598733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:31.662245
License: Public Domain

Felton, J.,
dissenting. 1. I do not think the court was right in qualifying the jury as to their interest in an insurance company and relationship to stockholders and officers, etc., under the circumstances of this case. As the majority opinion does not disclose all of the facts in connection with the first special ground of the amended motion for new trial, it will be necessary for me to add additional facts shown by the record in order to make my position clear and understandable. The trial judge stated in his order overruling the motion for a new trial: “The fact that there may be a dispute between his client and the Shepherd defendant as to the details of liability, or amount thereof, is immaterial, if there was a policy, under which counsel has admitted to the court that the insurer is liable for the personal injuries, if any.” (Emphasis supplied.) It may be that if any counsel for the insurance company, representing the insured, had made a binding admission in judicio to the effect that there was a policy of insurance covering a part of the damages *297sued for, the defendants would be estopped to raise the question under discussion. However, under the facts, I do not think that any such admission was made. The record shows that the so-called admission,' referred to by the judge in his order, was a statement made to him in connection with the proposed filing by the insurance company of an intervention in an effort to protect the rights of the insurance company. The statement was -made by a partner of the attorney who represented the defendants at the trial and who was employed by the insurance company. This attorney stated to the court in connection with the discussion as to the filing of the intervention that the insured defendant’s policy covered only personal injuries. The insurance company’s attorney, representing the defendants, stated at the time of the trial that he did not concede that there was any insurance coverage, and objected to the qualification of the jury as to the insurance company, etc., on the ground that the policy of insurance was the only competent evidence of insurance coverage since the plaintiff neither produced the policy nor gave notice to produce, nor proved that the policy was lost, destroyed, or out of the State. At the time of the so-called admission by one of the attorneys for the insurance company, it did not appear that he was representing the defendants in this case, and there is no evidence of any ratification by any defendant of such an admission with full knowledge of the facts. Such an admission certainly cannot bind the defendants in this case, when they in effect repudiate the admission and when their attorney, even though representing the insurance company also, refuses to concede insurance coverage and demands a legal finding as to insurance coverage. I think the consequences of the majority ruling in this case can be tragic if this practice is followed. The mere fact that an insurance company’s attorney assists a defendant in the trial of a case is not a ground upon which to base the qualification of a jury as was done in this case. The law requires more than a strong probability that the insurance company is financially interested in the outcome of the case. Only an admission by authorized counsel in judicio or proof of insurance coverage is legally sufficient.
2. I think the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that, if they found that the plaintiff would suffer the loss of his wife’s *298services in the future by reason of the acts complained of, they should reduce the sum so found to its present value. The defendant’s request to charge did not cover that subject matter, and a party does not waive the giving of a correct charge on one subject by requesting a charge on another subject, even if the two are related.
3. The charge complained of in special ground five is erroneous because it confuses the issues as to loss of earnings with loss of ability to labor and earn money. In my opinion, both the pleadings and the evidence make jury issues as to both elements of damages. • The plaintiff’s amendment of August 22, 1952, alleged that his earning capacity had been reduced, and the plaintiff testified that he was capable of earning $100 per week as a plasterer before the injury and that his earning capacity had been reduced 50%.
4. The charge complained of in ground seven was not error for the reason assigned, but I should like to make it clear that I do not think the charge was correct as applied to the facts of this case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover for the annoyance and discomfort caused by the nuisance, as an element of damage distinct from pain and suffering, but such damage would be the diminution in the rental value of the property for the duration of the nuisance. Swift v. Broyles, 115 Ga. 885. In this case, since damages for permanent injury to the plaintiff’s premises were sued for, the finding of damages for diminution in rental value would have been double recovery to such extent.