Court Opinion

ID: 9455632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:28:11.446077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:40.289974
License: Public Domain

FISHER, District Judge
(dissenting).
Under the doctrine of “secondary meaning,” a trademark, though originally descriptive of a type of product, is nonetheless entitled to registration if the mark has, by association with a business, come primarily to identify its user, rather than the product, to that part of the public interested in contracting with the trademark user. Application of Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 404 F.2d 1391, 56 CCPA 817 (1969). Whether a descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning depends upon the particular facts of each case. W. E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 354 F.2d 868 (2d Cir., 1966).
Briefly, it has been shown that appellant has used the mark in question for its gasoline exclusively and continuously over a period of some twelve years. There is evidence of extensive advertising o.f and sales of large volumes of gasoline under that mark during this period. Surveys of record suggest that in at least two areas where there are other marketers of multi-grade, pump-blended gasoline, the term CUSTOM-BLENDED is associated in the public mind with this appellant in a preponderance which can only be accounted for by recognition of origin. There is no evidence which would imply that the mark is of such a descriptive nature that granting trademark rights therein to the user would deprive others of their right to normal use of the language.
In light of these facts, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board should be reversed and registration granted on the basis that the mark CUSTOM-BLENDED has acquired secondary meaning within Section 2(f) of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 1052(f)).