Court Opinion

ID: 9930124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 14:02:19.736561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:04:26.721697
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: February 6, 2024

 S23Y0919, S24Y0084. IN THE MATTER OF TIMOTHY ORMAN
                         McCALEP.

        PER CURIAM.

        These disciplinary matters are before the Court on a notice of

discipline (S23Y0919) and the report and recommendation of Special

Master Daniel S. Reinhardt pursuant to a formal complaint

(S24Y0084). In both matters, the Bar seeks the disbarment of

Timothy Orman McCalep (State Bar No. 481089), a member of the

State Bar of Georgia since 2003, for his systemic abandonment of

multiple clients, for which he is charged with violating Rules 1.1,

1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15 (I) and (II), 1.16, 3.2, 3.5 (d), 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 8.4

(a) (1) and (4), and 9.3 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct

(“GRPC”), found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d). The maximum penalty for a

single violation of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.15 (I) and (II), 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, or
8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a single

violation of Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.16, 3.2, or 3.5 (d) is a public reprimand.

The maximum penalty for a single violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (1) is the

maximum penalty for the specific Rule violated; here, the maximum

penalty is disbarment because McCalep was charged with assisting

others to violate Rule 5.5. McCalep, who is currently under an

interim suspension, see Case No. S23Y0152 (Sept. 16, 2022), failed

to file an answer to the formal complaint or a notice of rejection to

the notice of discipline, and he has not requested review of the

Special Master’s report and recommendation by the State

Disciplinary Review Board or filed exceptions in this Court. Having

reviewed the record in both disciplinary matters, we agree that

McCalep’s multiple rule violations and history of abandonment of

clients warrant his disbarment.

     S23Y0919

     This notice of discipline is based on State Disciplinary Board

Docket (“SDBD”) No. 7712. McCalep acknowledged service on June

                                   2
6, 2023.1 He has not filed a notice of rejection and is, therefore, in

default, has no right to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such

discipline as may be determined by this Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1

(b). Additionally, by virtue of his default, the facts alleged in the

notice of discipline are deemed admitted. See, e.g., In the Matter of

Cleveland, ___ Ga. ___, at ___ n.14 (___ SE2d ___) (2023 Ga. LEXIS

213) (2023 WL 6611027) (Case No. S23Y0918, decided Oct. 11,

2023); In the Matter of Bonnell, 316 Ga. 460, 460 (888 SE2d 523)

(2023).

     The admitted facts show that a client hired McCalep to

represent her in a criminal matter and a contested divorce matter

in January 2022. The client spoke to McCalep over the phone and

scheduled an in-person meeting, but when she arrived at his office,

she only met with his paralegal and paid her a $10,000 retainer. The

client did not meet with McCalep that day, but she heard him speak

     1  In addition to McCalep’s acknowledgement of service, the Bar
attempted personal service in July 2023, and after that was unsuccessful but
before McCalep acknowledged service, the Bar effected service by publication
in August 2023.

                                     3
to the paralegal over the telephone. On January 28, 2022, the client

received a retainer agreement from McCalep stating that all fees

were paid in full. The client never met McCalep in person. In March

2022, McCalep called the client and told her that he had

“transferred” her case and retainer fee to another licensed Georgia

attorney, who worked for “Georgia Law Firm” (“GLF”). However,

when the client checked the GLF website, there was no information

about the attorney, and although the website listed McCalep’s office

address as its physical location, the website did not identify any

attorneys associated with GLF.2

      From March to July 2022, the client repeatedly asked for

updates on her divorce case, but she was only able to speak to the

paralegal and another individual, both of whom she believed worked

at GLF. The other individual represented himself as an attorney

working on the client’s case. However, that individual was not an

      2 The Bar references Rule 7.2 (c) (1), which requires that any
advertisement for legal services in Georgia must include prominent
disclosures, including, inter alia, the attorney’s identity and physical location.
McCalep is not charged with violating this Rule.

                                        4
attorney, and actually was the paralegal’s husband. McCalep later

admitted to knowing that his paralegal often asked her husband to

help her at work, but the record does not indicate whether McCalep

knew that the individual held himself out as an attorney, nor does

the record indicate whether McCalep ever formally hired his

paralegal’s husband.3 Neither the paralegal nor her husband put the

client in touch with McCalep, and McCalep did not return her calls.

The client also emailed the attorney to whom McCalep had

transferred her divorce matter, asking to speak with her, but that

attorney ignored her requests. In June 2022, the client was finally

able to contact the licensed attorney, who told her that McCalep had

informed the licensed attorney that the divorce case was

uncontested; that she was only “hired” for an uncontested divorce

and was paid $2,000 from the retainer; and that she did not work for

GLF but that McCalep occasionally referred clients to her. The

licensed attorney also told the client that the non-attorney did not

     3 The record in this disciplinary matter does not reflect whether the Bar

took any action in response to the suggestion that this individual may have
engaged in conduct constituting the unauthorized practice of law.

                                     5
work for her; that she did not know how to contact McCalep; and

that she did not know where the rest of the retainer went. On June

27, 2022, the client called McCalep’s office and was told that

McCalep was out of the country, that a non-attorney was handling

her case, and that he would close out the case based on her

dissatisfaction but would not give her a refund.

     The client filed a grievance on August 2, 2022. McCalep did not

respond, so on September 15, 2022, the Bar filed a petition for

interim suspension based on this case and several of the cases at

issue in S24Y0084. This Court ordered McCalep’s interim

suspension   on   September    16.   Subsequently,    he   failed   to

acknowledge service of the notice of investigation, but in an unsworn

response, McCalep stated that he never represented the client;

denied ever meeting or speaking to her or receiving her money;

stated he had never heard of GLF; acknowledged that he hired the

licensed attorney on multiple occasions to help with court

appearances while he dealt with health issues; stated that he did

not recall any conversations with that attorney about the client’s

                                 6
divorce case because he does not handle divorce matters; and denied

“transferring” the client’s case to her. McCalep stated that he fired

the paralegal in 2021 while he was out of the office on sick leave. He

stated that he knew his paralegal’s husband helped her while she

worked for McCalep, but he denied knowledge of any work those two

individuals did on this particular client’s case.

     The State Disciplinary Board (“Board”) found probable cause

to believe that McCalep violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5,

and 8.4 (a) (4). In determining the appropriate level of discipline, the

Board appropriately considered the American Bar Association

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”),

including the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. See In

the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (456 SE2d 52) (1995),

superseded by Rule on other grounds as stated in In the Matter of

Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 214-215 (857 SE2d 212) (2021). The Board

determined that McCalep knowingly and intentionally violated the

GRPC and that the client in SDBD No. 7712, as well as the grievants

in S24Y0084, were seriously harmed by McCalep’s disregard and

                                   7
abandonment       of   their    matters,     lack   of    communication,

misrepresentation, and the loss of significant funds they paid for

him to represent them. The Board found the following aggravating

factors: McCalep had two serious prior disciplinary offenses4 in the

form of a three-year suspension for his violation of Rule 1.7 related

to sexual misconduct with a 17-year-old client, see In the Matter of

McCalep, 283 Ga. 586 (662 SE2d 120) (2008), and a confidential

reprimand5 in 2020 for violating Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2; acted

with a dishonest and selfish motive; showed a pattern of misconduct;

had been charged with multiple offenses; displayed bad faith

obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to

comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency because he

failed to timely respond to the notice of discipline; refused to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct; had substantial

     4 The Board determined that the instant matter was McCalep’s third

disciplinary infraction, which is “discretionary grounds for suspension or
disbarment.” Bar Rule 4-103.
     5   Although the issuance of a confidential reprimand is a form of
confidential discipline, see Bar Rule 4-102 (b) (5), in the event of a later
disciplinary proceeding, the confidentiality of the imposition of the prior
confidential discipline is waived. See Bar Rule 4-208.

                                     8
experience in the practice of law; and showed indifference to making

restitution. See ABA Standard 9.22 (a)-(e), (g), (i)-(j).6

      The Board observed that McCalep had shown a marked

unwillingness to participate in the disciplinary process and it

appeared that he had abandoned the practice of law. The Board

determined that the Court has typically disbarred lawyers in similar

cases. See, e.g., In the Matter of Noriega-Allen, 308 Ga. 398 (841

SE2d 1) (2020) (disbarring lawyer on notice of discipline who

abandoned client matter and moved to Maine without providing

contact information); In the Matter of Jennings, 305 Ga. 133 (823

SE2d 811) (2019); In the Matter of Barton, 303 Ga. 818 (813 SE2d

590) (2018).

      S24Y0084

      6 Although the Board considered in mitigation that McCalep “appears to

be suffering from some undefined personal problems,” there is no indication in
the record about what led the Board to this supposition. While a lawyer’s
personal problems may be a factor in mitigation, see ABA Standard 9.32 (c),
we decline to consider it as a mitigating factor in the absence of any evidence
supporting such a claim.

                                      9
     The eight grievances7 at issue were filed between 2021 and

2022. McCalep responded to the notices of investigation in

documents entitled “Bar Grievance Response,” which were all dated

March 11, 2022, but which the Bar did not receive until October

2022. The Bar filed a formal complaint addressing SDBD Nos. 7635

through 7642. On February 10 and March 8, 2023, the Bar’s staff

investigator attempted to personally serve McCalep at his official

address on file with the Membership Department, see Bar Rule 4-

203.1 (b) (3) (i), but he was informed by McCalep’s landlord that

McCalep had been evicted and that he had not been in the office

since 2020.8 McCalep was served by publication on March 17 and 24,

2023. See Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (ii). On March 20, 2023, another

attorney emailed Bar counsel on McCalep’s behalf, stating that he

could acknowledge service. Bar counsel informed that attorney that

McCalep was being served by publication and that an answer would

     7 The grievances only pertain to five separate underlying cases.

     8 We note that, pursuant to Rule 1-207, “all members of the State Bar of

Georgia shall keep the membership department of the State Bar of Georgia
informed of their current name, official address and telephone number.”

                                     10
be due by April 24, and sent the attorney the formal complaint and

an acknowledgment of service. Neither the attorney nor McCalep

ever acknowledged service or responded to the formal complaint.

The Bar filed a motion for default, which the Special Master granted.

     The formal complaint charged McCalep with violating Rules

1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15 (I) and (II), 1.16, 3.2, 3.5 (d), 5.3, 5.5, 8.4

(a) (1) and (4), and 9.3. The Special Master observed that he had

granted the Bar’s motion for default; that neither party had

requested a hearing as to aggravation and mitigation; and that he

had directed the parties to submit proposed reports and

recommendations pursuant to Bar Rule 4-214, but only the Bar had

submitted any such filing. The Special Master found that McCalep

had admitted, by virtue of his default, the following facts.

     In SDBD Nos. 7635 and 7636, a mother hired McCalep in

November 2020 to represent her son in a criminal matter, for which

she agreed to pay $5,000. She paid a down payment of $500 and

made regular monthly payments until she had paid the $5,000 in

full. McCalep filed an entry of appearance in December 2020, but

                                     11
failed to file discovery requests and never made any further contact

with the son. He also did not respond to inquiries from the son’s legal

team in New York about a case pending against the son there,

resulting in a bench warrant being issued against the son in New

York. The clients asked for a refund, and McCalep responded that

they needed to pay him more money because the district attorney

had filed an indictment that included additional charges. The clients

filed separate grievances in June 2021. In his response, McCalep

admitted he represented the son, but stated that he had done

everything the mother requested; he otherwise denied violating

ethical rules. While McCalep admitted that the total charge for the

case was $5,000, he contended that he was informed by the court

that the son had serious pending and unindicted charges; he

admitted that he did not explain to the clients that he would not be

handling the case for $5,000 and that he did not ask them to sign a

new contract for a different amount. McCalep further admitted that

he did not want to continue the representation, so he stopped

communicating with the clients and the New York legal team; he

                                  12
continued accepting payments until he was paid in full; and he did

not intend to provide the clients a refund. The Bar issued a notice of

investigation on both grievances on February 24, 2022. In his “Bar

Grievance Response,” McCalep stated that due to severe health

issues, he hired people to help him manage his office, but later

learned that they were stealing from and mismanaging the office

during the COVID-19 pandemic. McCalep stated that he fired those

people, and he could not say what they had done to the clients, but

he denied the mother and son’s allegations and denied ever speaking

to them. In the formal complaint, the Bar alleged that McCalep

violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) and (b), 1.5 (a) and (b), 1.16 (d),

and 8.4 (a) (4).

     In SDBD No. 7637, in March 2020, the client’s family retained

McCalep to represent the client in a murder case, but McCalep did

not visit the client in jail; did not give the client information about

his case; and failed to file any pre-trial motions or respond to the

State’s discovery. McCalep did not attend court dates for the client’s

bond hearing (which was denied), indictment, and the first plea and

                                  13
arraignment hearing; instead, a person identified as a paralegal

appeared. When McCalep informed the client and his family that he

would not come see them until three days before the client’s next

court date, the family requested a refund so they could hire a new

lawyer. McCalep failed to provide the refund and failed to formally

withdraw from the case as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule

(“USCR”) 4.3 and GRPC Rule 1.16 (a). The client’s family hired other

attorneys in June 2021. The client filed a grievance, to which

McCalep did not respond. In his “Bar Grievance Response” to the

notice of investigation, McCalep denied meeting or speaking with

the client, reiterated his problems with the personnel he hired to

manage his law office, and stated as to the client’s allegations of

rudeness that “[w]hen I was healthy, I did my best to speak and see

all my clients as much as possible if they were incarcerated. Her [sic]

allegations are not me.” The Bar alleged that McCalep violated

Rules 1.1, 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) and (b), 1.5 (a), 1.16 (c) and (d), 3.2, and

8.4 (a) (4).

                                     14
     In SDBD No. 7638, the client hired McCalep to handle a

personal injury matter for herself and her minor son. The client filed

a grievance in September 2021, to which she attached a letter that

she had sent to McCalep. The letter indicated that the client had

fired McCalep; demanded that McCalep turn over the case files;

requested that he provide a list of work he had performed, including

the breakdown of financial activity; requested an accounting of any

recovery and a disbursement of funds; and asked when she could

pick up the records. The letter stated that the last communication

the client had received from McCalep was an email asking her to

sign for a settlement check, even though he had not contacted her to

ensure that she wanted to settle the case; that when the client went

to the office to sign the check, McCalep was not present and the

client was told to sign, but she declined the settlement offer; that the

client had spoken to McCalep’s paralegal, who had not been helpful

and had not sent over the files; and that the client had no further

communication with McCalep. Moreover, the letter stated that

although McCalep claimed he paid her medical bills, her doctors

                                  15
informed her that they did not know she had an attorney. McCalep

settled the case on behalf of the client and her son without

permission; did not disburse any money to the client; and failed to

pay the medical bills, provide an accounting, and refund the client’s

money. In his “Bar Grievance Response” to the notice of

investigation, McCalep stated that he did not know what his office

staff did on the client’s case because he had no information about

her, but it appeared that she had communicated with the paralegal,

became upset, and tried to terminate the representation. He stated

that he did not have the client’s file and received no money from her.

The Bar alleged that McCalep violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) and

(b), 1.5 (a), 1.15 (I) and (II), and 8.4 (a) (4).

      In SDBD Nos. 7639 and 7640, the chief judge of a superior court

notified the Bar that McCalep had requested that his client be

produced from the Department of Corrections to enter a negotiated

plea, but McCalep failed to appear for that hearing. The chief judge

spoke to the client and determined that McCalep had not discussed

the potential plea with him prior to scheduling the plea hearing.

                                     16
When McCalep subsequently failed to appear for calendar call, the

chief judge scheduled a contempt hearing, which McCalep also failed

to attend. Before the contempt hearing, the chief judge learned that

McCalep had filed a leave of absence but had failed to send it to the

court or opposing counsel as required by USCR 16.1. The chief judge

rescheduled the contempt hearing, but McCalep never contacted the

court to attempt to resolve the matter. During the time McCalep

represented the client, he never personally spoke to the client or

visited him in jail; failed to provide the client or his family members

with a copy of the attorney-client agreement or to explain the terms;

and failed to file discovery motions, investigate the case, or give the

client an opportunity to assist in his own defense. McCalep falsely

told the chief judge that he had not been paid, but in fact, the client’s

family had paid in full. Emails between McCalep and the client’s

mother indicated that he was trying to use his non-appearance at

court to force the mother to pay an additional $5,000 to “fund a trial,”

which was not permitted by the attorney-client agreement. In

September 2021, the Board issued a grievance based on the chief

                                   17
judge’s report, and the client filed his own grievance in January

2022. McCalep did not respond to either grievance. In his “Bar

Grievance Response” to the notice of investigation, McCalep denied

the Board’s allegations and noted that several attorneys entered an

appearance for the client; that a leave of absence had been filed on

his behalf due to sickness, but he was unsure whether the proper

filing protocol was followed; and that he was not held in contempt of

court. In response to the client’s allegations, McCalep stated that he

had personally appeared for the client on Zoom while he was sick,

and he also hired two attorneys to help him with representing the

client. McCalep asserted that the client had verbally received a

global plea offer and told a family member that he thought the offer

was good, but later told the chief judge that he had never received

an offer. McCalep believed that the client used this as a tactic to

delay his sentencing, but the chief judge thought the client might be

telling the truth and admonished McCalep and his office. However,

the client’s recorded jail calls proved that the client was being

dishonest about not receiving the plea offer. The Bar alleged that

                                 18
McCalep violated Rules 1.1, 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) and (b), 1.5 (a) and

(b), 1.16 (d), 3.2, 3.5 (d), and 8.4 (a) (4).9

      In SDBD Nos. 7641 and 7642, a mother hired McCalep in

November 2021 to represent her son in a criminal matter. By March

2022, the grievants had paid McCalep over $18,000, including

$5,000 for a bond hearing. McCalep purported to waive the son’s

      9 Rule 1.1 requires lawyers to “provide competent representation to a

client.” Rule 1.2 (a) requires lawyers to “abide by a client’s decisions concerning
the scope and objectives of representation” and “consult with the client as to
the means by which they are to be pursued.” Rule 1.3 requires lawyers “to act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Rule 1.4
(a) requires lawyers to “promptly inform the client of any decision or
circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent” is required,
among other things. Rule 1.4 (b) requires lawyers to “explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.” Rule 1.5 (a) prohibits lawyers from “mak[ing]
an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable
amount for expenses.” Rule 1.5 (b) requires lawyers to communicate “the basis
or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible,”
“preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing
the representation.” Further, this Rule requires lawyers to communicate “[a]ny
changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses.” Rule 1.16 (d) requires
lawyers to, “[u]pon termination of representation,” “take steps to the extent
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel,
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.” Rule 3.2 requires
lawyers to “make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interests of the client.” Rule 3.5 (d) prohibits lawyers from “engag[ing] in
conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.” Finally, Rule 8.4 (a) (4) prohibits
lawyers from “engag[ing] in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.”

                                        19
bond hearing; failed to visit the son in jail; and refused to contact

the son or to communicate with the mother. Thus, the grievants

asked for a refund, which McCalep ignored. The mother and the son

filed separate grievances in March and May 2022, but McCalep

failed to respond. In his “Bar Grievance Response,” McCalep stated

that it appeared that the people he hired to manage his law office

had been stealing from the grievants and noted that the documents

reflecting their payments did not contain his telephone numbers or

address; instead, they showed a Miami area code and his office was

listed as being in McDonough, though he never had an office there.

The Bar alleged that McCalep violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4 (a) and

(b), 1.5 (a) and (b), 1.16 (d), and 8.4 (a) (4).

     Based on McCalep’s statements about his office staff stealing

from and mismanaging his law firm, the Bar alleged in the formal

complaint that in all of the matters, McCalep violated Rules 5.3 (a)

through (c) because he possessed managerial and direct supervisory

authority at his firm but failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure

that the conduct of his non-lawyer employees was compatible with

                                     20
his professional obligations; and his non-lawyer employees engaged

in conduct that would have been violations of the GRPC if committed

by a lawyer, and he knew of or ratified the conduct and failed to take

reasonable remedial action after learning of it. The Bar also alleged

that McCalep violated Rule 5.5 (a) because he provided an

opportunity for his employees to hold themselves out falsely as

people authorized to practice law in Georgia. Moreover, the Bar

alleged that McCalep violated Rule 8.4 (a) (1) by allowing his non-

lawyer employees to engage in conduct that violated the GRPC,

including Rule 5.5 (a) and the other Rules as charged. The Bar

further alleged that McCalep’s conduct during the disciplinary

proceedings violated Rule 9.3 because he failed to adequately

respond to the notices of investigation.

     Turning to the ABA Standards, the Special Master analyzed

(1) the duties violated; (2) the lawyer’s mental state; (3) the potential

or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (4) the

existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. As to duties violated,

the Special Master found that ABA Standard 4.11 (disbarment

                                   21
appropriate when lawyer knowingly converts client property and

causes injury) applied to McCalep’s violations of Rules 1.15 (I) and

(II). ABA Standard 4.41 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer

abandons the practice, knowingly fails to perform services for client,

or engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and

causes injury) applied to his violations of Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, and 1.4.

ABA Standard 4.51 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer’s course

of conduct demonstrates that he does not understand the most

fundamental legal doctrines or procedures and causes injury)

applied to McCalep’s violations of Rule 1.1. ABA Standard 4.61

(disbarment appropriate when lawyer knowingly deceives client

with intent to benefit lawyer or another and causes injury) applied

to his violations of Rules 1.5 and 8.4 (a) (4). ABA Standard 5.11

(disbarment appropriate when lawyer engages in serious criminal

conduct    which     involves    dishonesty,     fraud,    deceit,   or

misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on lawyer’s

fitness to practice law) applied to his violations of Rule 8.4 (a) (4).

ABA Standard 6.2 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer knowingly

                                  22
violates court order or rule with intent to obtain benefit for himself

or another) applied to his violations of Rule 3.2, and ABA Standard

6.3 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer causes significant or

potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal

proceeding and causes injury) applied to his violation of Rule 3.5 (d).

Finally, ABA Standard 7.0 (disbarment appropriate when lawyer

knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a

professional with intent to obtain benefit for lawyer or another and

causes injury) applied to his violations of Rules 1.5, 1.16, 5.3, 5.5, 8.4

(a) (1), and 9.3.

     The Special Master found that McCalep had violated the GRPC

knowingly and intentionally, and that his misconduct caused

serious injury to the grievants due to the loss of funds they paid for

services he did not provide, and the loss of their opportunities to hire

competent and diligent lawyers to pursue their claims and defend

their rights. McCalep’s misconduct also injured the legal profession.

The Special Master found that the presumptive penalty was

disbarment. The Special Master found the following aggravating

                                   23
factors: prior disciplinary history, in that McCalep received a three-

year suspension for violating Rule 1.7, see McCalep, 283 Ga. at 586;

dishonest or selfish motive; pattern of misconduct; and multiple

offenses. See ABA Standard 9.22 (a) – (d). Moreover, the Special

Master found that McCalep refused to acknowledge the wrongful

nature of his conduct; his incarcerated clients were vulnerable

victims; he had substantial experience in the practice of law; and he

was indifferent to making restitution.10 See ABA Standard 9.22 (g)

– (j). The Special Master found no applicable mitigating factors.

      The Special Master summarized that McCalep’s misconduct

involved keeping fees for work he did not appear to have any

intention of completing, or otherwise abandoning his office to be

mismanaged by his non-lawyer staff, which seriously injured the

      10 The Special Master also found that McCalep’s failure to respond to the

notices of investigation was a factor in aggravation. See ABA Standard 9.22 (e)
(identifying as a factor in aggravation “bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the
disciplinary agency”). However, McCalep was charged with violating Rule 9.3
for failing to respond to the notices of investigation, and we decline to rely on
specific conduct in aggravation of discipline when that same conduct is also
charged as a violation of the GRPC. See, e.g., In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga.
409, 418 n.3 (877 SE2d 248) (2022).

                                       24
clients, and McCalep failed to respond to the disciplinary

proceedings. Thus, the Special Master concluded that McCalep

should be disbarred. See In the Matter of Farmer, 307 Ga. 307 (835

SE2d 629) (2019).

      Conclusion

      Having reviewed the records in both cases, we conclude that

disbarment is the appropriate sanction for McCalep’s severe

misconduct in these matters and is consistent with the sanction

imposed in similar cases.11 See Cleveland, ___ Ga. at ___ (disbarring

attorney who abandoned clients in civil and criminal matters and

was found in default on notice of discipline); In the Matter of Proctor,

313 Ga. 637 (872 SE2d 691) (2022); In the Matter of Powell, 310 Ga.

859 (854 SE2d 731) (2021). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the

name of Timothy Orman McCalep be removed from the rolls of

      11 We note that the questions of whether the Bar has proven violations

of Rules 5.5 and 8.4 (a) (1) seem uncertain and we do not base our action here
upon a violation of those Rules. Resolution of those questions is obviated by the
strong evidence of severe violations of other Rules warranting disbarment.

                                       25
persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. McCalep

is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

     Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

                                 26