Court Opinion

ID: 9590134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:51:50.13781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:25.527039
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe that the trial court correctly ruled that the requirement in the lease that appellee pay a $50 charge because of late payment of rent was invalid. Although the articulated basis of the trial court’s ruling was that the late charge was usurious, and although I agree with the majority that usury provisions do not strictly apply, I believe that the trial court was correct for another reason, and if a trial court’s order is right for any reason, the judgment must be affirmed. J. L. Lester & Sons v. Smith, 162 Ga. App. 506 (291 SE2d 251) (1982).
The majority states that “appellant was claiming an additional $50 to which it contends it was entitled under the written lease as a late charge for rent paid after the 5th day of the month” (majority opinion, p. 480) (emphasis supplied.) The lease provision invoked by appellant and construed by the trial court actually provides as follows: “Resident agrees to pay agent/owner an additional fifty dollars ($50.00) due for services required of the agent/owner, where any installment of monthly rent is received by the agent/owner on the fifth day after the due date thereof; . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, my initial concern is with the true meaning of that portion of the lease agreement giving the lessor the right to collect an additional sum of $50, without regard to whether that charge is construed to be liquidated damages or an invalid penalty. If the quoted language is read strictly, it would appear to mean that this “charge” is due and payable by the tenant only if the monthly rental payment is actually made on the fifth day of the month. While this may be an overly strict interpretation of the lease agreement, we are dealing with a provision which requires a substantial payment by the tenant over and above the actual rent reserved by the lease. Contrary to the majority’s determination, I simply do not believe that this provision meets the criteria of liquidated damages as enunciated in the cases cited by the majority.
For the purposes of this dissent, I will accept the majority’s summary of the determinations which must be made by a court in order to find a provision enforceable as liquidated damages rather *484than unenforceable as an unlawful penalty: “(1) that the injury caused by the breach is difficult or impossible to estimate accurately, (2) that the parties intended to provide for damages rather than a penalty, (3) that the sum stipulated is a reasonable pre-estimate of the probable loss.” Pretermitting compliance with (1) and (2), I am firmly convinced that the “sum stipulated” is not “a reasonable pre-estimate of the probable loss.” There is nothing in the record which would allow us to make such a determination. Even if we should rewrite the landlord’s contract for him and construe the provision to mean that the late penalty is due if the rent is paid on or after the fifth day of the month, the stipulated sum simply does not constitute the required reasonable pre-estimate of the damages which may be sustained by the landlord. Presumably, the same $50 fee would be due if the rent were paid on the fifth day of the month or the last day of the month. “Where, to secure the performance of the terms of a contract, there is a stipulation for the payment of a fixed, unvarying sum upon the breach thereof by one of the parties, irrespective of the time of the breach, and it appears that the amount of the damages which result from a breach would be controlled mainly by the time at which the breach occurred, the stipulation is prima facie a penalty.” Florence Wagon Works v. Salmon, 8 Ga. App. 197, 198 (68 SE 866) (1910). It is clear that where the characterization of the disputed provision is in doubt, the courts generally will adopt the construction which holds the stipulated sum to be a penalty rather than the enforceable liquidation of damages. See Thorne v. Lee Timber Products, 158 Ga. App. 226 (279 SE2d 521) (1981). At best, the correct construction of the disputed provision is in doubt and, at worst, it is clearly an unreasonable and arbitrary penalty. Therefore, I agree with the trial court that the provision was void and, accordingly, I believe that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.