Court Opinion

ID: 9398399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 06:10:14.143279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.348101
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed May 23, 2023

                                                In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                           Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                       No. 05-22-01337-CV

                         IN THE INTEREST OF Z.E., A CHILD

                   On Appeal from the 304th Judicial District Court
                                Dallas County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. JC-22-00703-W

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Breedlove
                               Opinion by Justice Molberg

        Father and Mother appeal from the trial court’s decree terminating their

parental rights to their child, Z.E. Father raises five issues, which we address and

overrule below. Mother’s appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),1 concluding that no

arguable grounds for reversible error exist and that Mother’s appeal is frivolous and

without merit. Mother’s counsel and this Court both provided Mother a copy of the

    1
      Anders concerns the “duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a first appeal from a
criminal conviction, after that attorney has conscientiously determined that there is no merit to the
indigent’s appeal.” 386 U.S. at 739. Anders procedures apply in appeals from a trial court’s decree
terminating parental rights where, as here, the appellant’s appointed counsel concludes there are no non-
frivolous issues to assert on appeal. In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
Anders brief and advised Mother of her right to examine the appellate record and

file a pro se response. She filed a response that states, in part, there is “alot of he

say she say and no real suffient [sic] evidence to terminate my rights to [Z.E.],” thus

expressing, in essence, a belief the evidence is insufficient to support the termination

of her rights to Z.E.. We affirm the trial court’s decree and deny Mother’s counsel’s

motion to withdraw. Because the issues are settled, we do so in a memorandum

opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

                                I. TRIAL COURT BACKGROUND
        Z.E. was born in early 2016. Shortly after his fifth birthday, the Department

of Family and Protective Services filed an original petition for emergency protection,

conservatorship, and termination of Mother’s parental rights to Z.E. and two other

children.2 On March 5, 2021, the trial court issued an ex parte order for emergency

care and temporary custody of the children, appointing the Department as temporary

managing conservator. The trial court also appointed a court appointed special

advocate (CASA) and a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent the children.3

        In May 2021, the Department amended its petition, adding, among other

things, an allegation regarding Father’s parentage of Z.E., and allegations seeking

establishment and termination of Father’s parental rights to Z.E. Later that year,

    2
     No issue regarding the other two children is presented for our review in this appeal. The trial court
severed this case from the cases involving the other two children in August 2022.
    3
      The court later modified the GAL appointment by entering an order indicating the person appointed—
who is also an attorney—would serve in a dual role of guardian ad litem and attorney ad litem. For purposes
of this opinion, we refer to that person simply as GAL.
                                                   –2–
GAL filed a petition in intervention seeking to terminate Mother’s and Father’s

rights to Z.E. as well, and GAL later amended its petition.

      In the Department’s and GAL’s latest-filed pleadings, each alleged, among

other things, that Father is Z.E.’s alleged father; termination of Parents’ rights to

Z.E. was in Z.E.’s best interest; Father and Mother committed acts described in

family code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E); Mother also committed acts under

161.001(b)(1)(L); and Father also committed acts under section 161.001(b)(1)(Q).

      About two months before trial began, GAL filed a motion to admit videotaped

forensic interview statements of Z.E. and his brother and to use them in lieu of their

testimony at trial. See TEX. FAM. CODE 104.002. The trial court granted the motion,

admitting the videos “for all purposes,” and stating, in part, that the use of such

statements in lieu of the children’s trial testimony is “necessary to protect the

[children’s] welfare.”

      According to the record before us, a bench trial began August 29, 2022, and

was then recessed. Trial was continued in person and via Microsoft TEAMS on

November 14, 2022, and concluded the next day. Father, who was jailed in another

state at the time of trial, attended remotely.

      When trial continued on November 14, 2022, Mother moved to dismiss the

case against her, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction because there was no

record the March 7, 2022 dismissal deadline was extended before it expired. See

TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401(a). The trial court heard the motion and denied it.

                                          –3–
         At the trial’s conclusion, the trial court pronounced its ruling. In both its

pronouncement and in the later decree, the trial court found Father committed the

conduct described in family code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (Q), found

Mother committed the conduct in section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (L), and found

termination of each of their parental rights was in Z.E.’s best interest.

         After these pronouncements, the trial court stated:

         [THE COURT]: The Court will appoint the Department as permanent
         managing conservator. CASA will continue as a guardian. SMU will
         continue as attorney ad litem. The case will be transferred to the
         permanency court.
         The Court is ordering the Department to look at the paternal cousin[4]
         for a possible placement in Illinois since she has been approved in
         Illinois before, and she is a family placement. The Court orders that
         happen within the next 90 days.

         The Court finds that all orders entered today are in the best interest of
         this child. All right, anything else?

         [DEPARTMENT’S COUNSEL]: Judge, Department will request an
         expedited ICPC[5] order if we can on the cousin.

         THE COURT: Okay. Expedited ICPC request is granted. All right,
         anything else?

         [DEPARTMENT’S COUNSEL]: No, ma’am.

         [GAL]: No, Your Honor, thank you.
         THE COURT: All right. Thank you-all.

   4
       The initials of the cousin referred to here and in Father’s fifth issue are N.L.B.
   5
     ICPC refers to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. See generally TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 162.101–.107 (adopting compact in Texas).
                                                      –4–
      On November 17, 2022, two days after trial concluded, the trial court entered

an order of home study requiring Department to institute an ICPC home study

request on the paternal cousin referred to in the above exchange.

      The trial court signed the decree on December 7, 2022. The decree did not

mention the November 17, 2022 order but did refer the case to the local child

protection and permanency court for further hearings and stated that court was to

conduct a permanency hearing after final order no later than ninety days after the

trial court rendered the decree. The Department, GAL, and counsel for Father all

signed the decree, approving it as to form, while Mother’s appointed counsel

declined to do so.

      After the decree was signed, no party requested written findings of fact or

conclusions of law, requested any modification of the decree, or filed a motion for

new trial. Father and Mother timely appealed.

            II. PARENTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS IN OUR COURT
      On appeal, Parents have not raised any issue regarding the trial court’s denial

of Mother’s motion to dismiss. However, before filing their briefs, and similar to

Mother’s argument in the trial court, Father and Mother filed a joint motion to

dismiss the appeal, asking us to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, on the

theory that the trial court’s decree was void, when there was no record the March 7,

2022 dismissal deadline was extended before it expired.

                                        –5–
      We denied Parents’ motion because GAL filed its petition in intervention

before the dismissal deadline passed, and there is nothing in the record to indicate

the trial court lost its jurisdiction to decide GAL’s petition. See In re A.W., No. 05-

22-00053-CV, 2022 WL 195573, at *3 (Tex. App.—June 6, 2022, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (concluding similar arguments lacked merit); see also In re C.D., No.

05-21-00768-CV, 2022 WL 484559, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 17, 2022, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.); In re L.D.R., No. 05-21-00369-CV, 2021 WL 5104376, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 3, 2021, no           pet.) (mem. op.) (reaching similar

conclusions). Parents have not asked us to reconsider our ruling on their motion.

                             III. REVIEW STANDARDS
      A.     Evidentiary Sufficiency in Parental Termination Cases
      The involuntary termination of parental rights involves fundamental

constitutional rights. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 846 (Tex. 1980). A natural

parent’s desire for—and right to—the companionship, care, custody, and

management of his or her children is an interest “far more precious than any property

right.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982). A termination order is

final and irrevocable, divesting for all time that natural right as well as all legal

rights, privileges, duties, and powers between the parent and child except for the

child’s right to inherit. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); see In re

M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 549 (Tex. 2003) (referring to termination of a parent’s right

to his or her child as “traumatic, permanent, and irrevocable.”)

                                         –6–
       Section 161.001(b)(1) of the family code lists twenty-one predicate acts that,

if found by clear and convincing evidence, allow a court to terminate a parent-child

relationship if the court also finds that termination of the relationship is in the child’s

best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U); 161.001(b)(2). Only

one predicate finding is necessary to support a judgment of termination of parental

rights when a finding is also made that termination is in the child’s best interest. In

re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). However, due to the significant collateral

consequences that may result from such findings, even when we affirm the

termination of a parent’s rights on another ground, we must consider the sufficiency

of the evidence regarding subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) when raised on appeal,6

although the extent to which we must do so in an Anders context is unclear. See In

re E.K., 608 S.W.3d 815, 815 (Tex. 2020) (Green, J., concurring in denial of petition

for review) (stating the issue of how In re N.G. applies to parental termination

appeals in which the appellant’s counsel has filed an Anders brief is “an important

question” [the Texas Supreme Court] should answer”).

       “Because the fundamental liberty interest of a parent in the care, custody, and

control of his child is one of constitutional dimensions, involuntary parental

termination must be strictly scrutinized.” In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 748 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied). While we acknowledge the constitutional

   6
    See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234–37 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (explaining why, though not in an
Anders context).
                                                –7–
dimensions of parental rights, we also recognize the imperative that the “emotional

and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve” those rights.

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). The evidence supporting termination must

be clear and convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights.

Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree

of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction

as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 101.007. Termination of parental rights requires proof by clear and convincing

evidence that (1) a parent committed one or more of the enumerated statutory acts

in section 161.001(b)(1) of the family code, and (2) termination is in the best interest

of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). When the burden of proof requires

clear and convincing evidence, traditional legal sufficiency and factual sufficiency

standards are inadequate. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002)).

      As a result, in conducting legal sufficiency review in a parental termination

case, we determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

finding, is such that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or

conviction that its finding was true. Id. at 266. “[L]ooking at the evidence in the

light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that

the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder

could do so.” Id. We disregard all evidence a reasonable factfinder could have

disbelieved or found incredible. Id.

                                          –8–
      In factual sufficiency review in a parental termination case, we consider the

entire record, including evidence both supporting and contradicting the finding, and

determine whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm conviction or

belief about the truth of the allegation. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25–26. We

“consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not

have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d

at 266. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a

factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the

evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.

      B.     Other Standards
      Under the Texas Family Code, “The procedural and substantive standards for

termination of parental rights apply to the termination of the rights of an alleged

biological father.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.002(a). While subsection (b)(1) allows

the Department to summarily terminate the rights of an alleged biological father who

does not assert his paternity, an alleged biological father’s admission of paternity

“gives him the right to proceed to trial and require the state to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that he engaged in one of the types of conduct listed” in section

161.001(b)(1) and “that termination is in the best interest of his child.” Phillips v.

Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 25 S.W.3d 348, 357 (Tex. App.—Austin

2000, no pet.); see In re Z.A., No. 05-21-00126-CV, 2021 WL 3477713, *6 (Tex.

                                           –9–
App.—Dallas Aug. 6, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Phillips, stating, “an

alleged father who admits paternity can ‘stave off summary termination of his rights

[under section 161.002(b)(1)] and require[ ] the Department to meet the high burden

of proof found in section 161.001.’”). We assume, but do not decide, Father had

that right here.7

        Generally, to preserve an issue for appellate review, the record must show a

complaint was made to the trial court “by a timely request, objection, or motion”

that, among other things, “states the specific grounds for the desired ruling, if they

are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion.” TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a). However, in a civil nonjury case, as this case is, “a complaint regarding

the legal or factual insufficiency of the evidence . . . may be made for the first time

on appeal in the complaining party’s brief.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(d).

        Under rule of civil procedure 296, “[i]n any case tried in the district or county

court without a jury, any party may request the court to state in writing its findings

of fact and conclusions of law.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. We may not look to any

    7
       The family code states, “A respondent in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may admit to the
paternity of a child by filing a pleading to that effect or by admitting paternity under penalty of perjury
when making an appearance or during a hearing.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.623(a). While this is not “a
proceeding to adjudicate parentage,” see id., Father admitted in both his written filings and in his sworn
testimony in the trial court that Z.E. is his child. Father twice referred to Z.E. as “my child” in a pro se
letter he filed in the trial court, which declared it was made “under the penalty of perjury.” Father also
referred to himself as “Respondent Father of [Z.E.], the subject of this suit” in in his original answer, and
at trial, Father testified he is the father of Z.E. Neither the Department nor GAL dispute Father’s parentage
of Z.E. Though we have not located any such determination in the record before us, when the Department’s
caseworker testified at trial, she answered, “Yes” when Father’s counsel asked her if “during the pendency
of the case it has been determined that [Father] is the biological father of [Z.E.].”
                                                   –10–
comments the judge made at the conclusion of a bench trial as being a substitute for

findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex.

1984) (per curiam). Where, as here, findings of fact and conclusions of law are not

properly requested and none are filed, the trial court’s judgment implies all findings

of fact necessary to support it, Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471,

480 (Tex. 2017), and we must affirm the judgment of the trial court if it can be

upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. In re W.E.R., 669

S.W.2d at 717.

                                      IV. MOTHER’S APPEAL

        After we denied Parents’ joint motion to dismiss, Mother’s counsel filed an

Anders brief concluding that no arguable grounds for reversible error exist and that

Mother’s appeal is frivolous and without merit. Mother’s counsel also filed a motion

to withdraw as counsel, which repeated counsel’s conclusion and asked that Mother

be allowed to file a pro se brief or a brief through other counsel.

        Mother filed a pro se response reflecting she disagrees with the termination of

her rights to Z.E. When read reasonably and liberally,8 her response claims, in

essence, that insufficient evidence exists to support the termination of her parental

rights to Z.E. But aside from simply making a conclusory statement in that regard,9

    8
     See Gonzalez v. VATR Const. LLC, 418 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.)
(“Appellate courts must construe briefing requirements reasonably and liberally[.]”).
    9
     Mother’s pro se response states, there is “alot of he say she say and no real suffient [sic] evidence to
terminate my rights to my son.”

                                                   –11–
Mother fails to cite to the evidence, record or legal authorities in support and fails to

make any specific argument. In another context, we have concluded that a brief of

this nature is inadequate and fails to preserve any issue for appellate review.10

         But even if we assume without finding Mother’s pro se response is adequate—

as we do here—we need only determine whether there are any arguable grounds for

reversal. Previously, we stated:

         In reviewing an Anders brief, this Court is not required to address the
         merits of each claim raised in the brief or a pro se response. See Bledsoe
         v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Rather, this
         Court’s duty is to determine whether there are any arguable grounds for
         reversal and, if so, to remand the case to the trial court so that new
         counsel may be appointed to address the issues.

In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d at 850; see In re J.A., No. 05-16-00825-CV, 2016 WL

5945003, *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).

         Similar to the situation in J.A., see id. at *2, in his Anders brief, Mother’s

counsel provides his professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there

are no arguable grounds for reversal and concluding that Mother’s appeal is frivolous

and without merit. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Mother’s counsel also details in

his Anders brief the compelling evidence supporting the implied findings against

Mother, including, but not limited to, evidence regarding her actions under

subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E), some of which we also detail below.

    10
       See Gonzalez, 418 S.W.3d at 784 (discussing briefing requirements under rule of appellate procedure
38.1 and stating, “Appellate courts must construe briefing requirements reasonably and liberally, but a party
asserting error on appeal still must put forth some specific argument and analysis showing that the record
and the law support his contention” and concluding issue was not preserved for appellate review).
                                                   –12–
         Having thoroughly reviewed the record ourselves, we conclude, as Mother’s

counsel did, there are no arguable grounds for reversal. We independently reviewed

the entire record and counsel’s Anders brief, find nothing in the record that could

arguably support the appeal, and agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit.

Also, while the extent to which In re N.G.11 applies in an Anders context is unclear,12

we have specifically considered the trial court’s implied findings as to Mother under

family code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and we find no non-frivolous issues

that could be raised on appeal with respect to those implied findings. See In re

J.A.R., 658 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied) (doing and

concluding the same as to the trial court’s findings in that case); In re M.M., 584

S.W.3d 885, 891 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, pet. denied) (Quinn, C.J., concurring)

(expressing belief that an appellate court would further justice by assuring in an

Anders context that findings based on subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) have sufficient

evidentiary support and that an appellant’s counsel would serve his client by

addressing and detailing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying such findings

when concluding the Anders procedure is the correct avenue to follow).

    11
      See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 234–37 (holding “that due process and due course of law requirements
mandate that an appellate court detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under
section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code.”).
    12
       See In re E.K., 608 S.W.3d at 815 (Green, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for review,
stating the court “should answer” the “important question” of “how In re N.G. applies to parental
termination appeals in which the appellant’s counsel has filed an Anders brief,” and explaining why the
question was not, in his view, squarely before the court in that case).
                                                 –13–
      Here, evidence supporting these implied findings includes, but is not limited

to, photographs of permanent scarring on Z.E. on multiple parts of his body; Z.E.’s

forensic interview which included statements that he “got a whipping all the time”

by Mother and that Mother hit him with an extension cord and the silver part of a

belt; Mother’s admission at trial that she did hit and cause injuries to Z.E. with an

extension cord, which she claimed was a one-time event, though she provided

inconsistent testimony regarding its timing; Mother’s testimony that she had

multiple partners that “beat [her] children” but that she made no report about that;

Mother’s agreement that the children’s “home environment for probably as long as

they can remember includes the adults in their world beating them,” and Z.E.’s

therapist’s testimony that the only person Z.E. mentioned as being responsible for

hitting him was Mother.

      Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s issue but deny Mother’s counsel’s motion

to withdraw. Because this is a termination of parental rights case, appointed

counsel’s duties to Mother continue through the filing of a petition for review in the

Texas Supreme Court, and a motion to withdraw in our Court may be premature

unless good cause is shown. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per

curiam) (stating, “In light of our holding, however, an Anders motion to withdraw

brought in the court of appeals, in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal,

                                        –14–
may be premature.”);13 see also J.A., 2016 WL 5945003, at *2 (applying P.M. and

reaching similar conclusion). No good cause has been offered or shown.

                                           V. FATHER’S APPEAL
          Father raises five issues on appeal. We construe Father’s first four issues as

challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the implied

finding he committed the acts described in family code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D),

(E), and (Q) (first three issues) and the implied finding that termination of his rights

was in Z.E.’s best interest (fourth issue).14 Alternatively, in his fifth issue, Father

asks us to modify the decree to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement that the

Department continue with an ICPC placement investigation on Father’s cousin.15

    13
      In re P.M. also indicates that Mother’s appointed counsel may satisfy his obligation in the supreme
court by “filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” 520 S.W.3d at 27.
    14
         Father frames his first four issues as follows:
          1. Whether or not the parental rights of an alleged father may be terminated under TEX.
          FAM. CODE §161.001(b)(1)(D) based on acts which occurred before birth, before the
          alleged father had any knowledge of his status as an alleged parent, and where the record
          establishes that a parent did not influence the child’s environment.

          2. Whether or not the parental rights of an alleged father may be terminated under TEX.
          FAM. CODE §161.001(b)(1)(E) based solely on a criminal conviction without evidence of
          knowledge and without evidence of a conscious course of conduct.

          3. Whether or not the parental rights of an alleged father may be terminated under TEX.
          FAM. CODE §161.001(b)(1)(Q) based upon a conviction for a reckless act, and where there
          is evidence of a plan and effort to support a child after gaining knowledge of alleged
          paternity.

          4. Whether or not the best interests of a child require the termination of an alleged father’s
          parental rights when the only evidence in the record establishes that the termination of a
          parent’s rights is unnecessary to accomplish a child’s best interests.
    15
         Father frames his fifth issue as follows:
          5. Whether or not the court’s judgment, as reduced to writing, accurately reflects the
          judgment of the trial court as orally announced.

                                                      –15–
      A.     Father’s Acts Under 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)

             1.     Applicable Law
      If a best-interest finding under subsection (b)(2) is also made, parental rights

may be terminated if clear and convincing evidence supports a finding under

subsection (b)(1)(D) that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the

child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or

emotional well-being of the child” or a finding under subsection (b)(1)(E) that the

parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged

in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” See

TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

      Proof of endangerment is required under both subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E).

Id. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). “Endanger” means to expose to loss or injury or to

jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health, but it is not necessary that the

conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer an injury. In re M.C.,

917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); In re J.D.B., 435 S.W.3d 452, 463

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.).

      At least three distinctions exist between subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E): the

source of the endangerment, the frequency of the endangerment, and the necessity

of knowledge of paternity.

      First, the source of the physical or emotional endangerment to the child is the

primary distinction between subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E). See In re J.D.B., 435

                                         –16–
S.W.3d at 463. Subsection (D) addresses the child’s surroundings and environment,

while subsection (E) addresses parental misconduct. Id.; In re S.K., 198 S.W.3d 899,

902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (subsection (E) “refers only to the

parent’s conduct, as evidenced not only by the parent’s acts, but also by the parent’s

omissions or failures to act”). However, parental conduct is also relevant to the

child’s environment under subsection (D). In re J.D.B., 435 S.W.3d at 463. That is,

“[c]onduct of a parent or another person in the home can create an environment that

endangers the physical and emotional well-being of a child as required for

termination under subsection (D).” Id. at 464 (quoting Castaneda v. Tex. Dep’t of

Protective & Regulatory Servs., 148 S.W.3d 509, 522 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004,

pet. denied)). “Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in

the child’s home is part of the ‘conditions or surroundings’ of the child’s home under

[subsection (b)(1)(D)].” Id.; see also In re W.S., 899 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1995, no writ) (“environment” refers not only to the acceptability of the

living conditions but also to a parent’s conduct in the home).

      Second, as to frequency of the endangerment, termination of parental rights

under subsection (b)(1)(D) can be based on only a single act or omission. See In re

L.D.C., 622 S.W.3d 63, 71 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.); Jordan v. Dossey,

325 S.W.3d 700, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); In re T.B.,

No. 07-12-00538-CV, 2013 WL 2467344, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 31,

2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, under subsection (b)(1)(E), termination “must

                                        –17–
be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and

conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.” In re K.S., No. 05-15-01294-

CV, 2016 WL 1613126, at *14 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 21, 2016, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

      Third, knowledge of paternity is a prerequisite to a showing of a knowing

placement of a child in an endangering environment under subsection (D) but not to

a showing of a parental course of conduct endangering a child under subsection (E).

A.S. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 394 S.W.3d 703, 713 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2012, no pet.); see In re D.W., No. 10-09-00188-CV, 2009 5155890, at *3

(Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re M.J.M.L., 31 S.W.3d 347, 351

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied).

      Though subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E) have distinctions, they also have

similarities. Under both subsections, a trial court may consider endangering conduct

that occurred before and after the child’s birth. See In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796,

804–05 (Tex. 2012) (agreeing “an offense occurring before a person’s children are

born can be a relevant factor in establishing an endangering course of conduct”); In

re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (noting “endangering conduct may

include the parent’s actions before the child’s birth, while the parent had custody of

older children, including evidence of drug usage” which was at issue in that case).

      Also, under both subsections, a trial court may consider conduct that occurred

both inside and outside the child’s presence. Dir. of Dall. Cnty. Child Protective

                                        –18–
Servs. v. Bowling, 833 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no writ)

(concluding that endangerment under predecessor statute to subsection (b)(1)(E)

does not require that the child witness the conduct).

        As to endangerment generally, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed

at the child or that the child actually suffers injury. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.

Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re J.D.B., 435 S.W.3d at 463. Specific

danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred from the parent’s misconduct alone.

Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; see In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 750. A parent’s conduct

that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the child’s

physical and emotional well-being. In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 750.

               2.      Analysis
        We construe Father’s first and second issues as challenging the legal and

factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the implied finding that he committed

the acts described in subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E). We consider both together

because the evidence on them is interrelated.16

        Father has been incarcerated since June 2015, roughly six months before Z.E.

was born. His anticipated release date is 2028.

        Though he denied he knew Mother was pregnant with Z.E. before he was

incarcerated—which Mother disputed—Father testified Mother “probably said she

   16
     See In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d at 750 (consolidating examination under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and
161.001(b)(1)(E) because evidence on these two grounds is interrelated).
                                                –19–
wanted to have a baby, and I participated in that.” Mother brought Z.E. to jail to see

Father after he was incarcerated. When asked why he was currently in custody,

Father answered, “aggravated battery, discharge of firearm, . . . unlawful usage of

firearm by a felon, and criminal damages.” The record also includes other evidence

regarding Father’s criminal convictions and incarceration, which we discuss in more

detail in the next section regarding subsection (b)(1)(Q).

      When asked why he believed Z.E. is in foster care, he stated, “Well, a little

rough. You know, like probably over, you know, disciplining and allowing certain

different type of authority figures in his life to discipline him when it wasn’t needed.”

He confirmed that he understood Mother has been criminally charged for injury to a

child for excessive discipline inflicted on the children and described Mother as a

person “overwhelmed with too many different emotions, and sometimes she lose[s]

control.” He also described Mother as a person that “picks arguments” and stated

the two “normally don’t see eye to eye so she normally don’t bother with me, and I

don’t bother her.”

      After responding to questions from the trial court about his “little rough”

comment—which the trial court described as a comment regarding “rough love,”

with an explanation from and without disagreement from Father—Father stated

Mother “need[s] to get herself together mentally” and “work some things out for

herself which is anger.”

                                         –20–
      Despite his belief that Mother “probably made one big mistake that ended up

into a greater mistake” and his feeling Mother was “taking out her anger – what she’s

been through on the kids,” when asked what Father thought was best for Z.E., he

answered, in part, “If it’s a possibility that his mother get him, I would – I would

highly, you know, agree upon that.”

      The Department’s caseworker testified Father did not contribute in any way

to any of the facts that led to Z.E.’s removal in Texas. Z.E.’s therapist provided no

opinion regarding Father’s relationship with Z.E. Father described the last visit he

had with Z.E. as a video visit he had with him when Z.E. was around three years old,

when Mother let Father’s sister watch Z.E. for a couple of weeks. Father testified

that since that video visit, he had no interaction with Z.E. but “probably talked on

the phone with him three times after that” but stated Mother changed her phone

number so much it was hard to catch up with her. When GAL asked whether it had

been “quite, quite some time” since he actually had contact with Z.E., Father agreed.

      After reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the implied

termination findings, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm

belief or conviction as to the truth of the implied findings that Father committed the

acts described in subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E). We also conclude, based on the

entire record, that the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have

credited in favor of these termination findings is not so significant that a factfinder

could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of these

                                        –21–
findings under subsections (b)(1)(D) and (E). We therefore hold the evidence is

legally and factually sufficient to support the implied findings under subsections

(b)(1)(D) and (E) as to Father. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

      We overrule Father’s first and second issues.

      B.     Father’s Acts Under § 161.001(b)(1)(Q)
      Next, we consider Father’s third issue, which we construe as challenging the

legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s implied

finding that Father committed the acts described in section 161.001(b)(1)(Q). We

do so even though we are not required to, as only one predicate finding is necessary

to support a judgment of termination of parental rights when there is also a finding

that termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362.

             1.     Applicable Law
      If a best-interest finding under subsection (b)(2) is also made, parental rights

may be terminated under section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) if clear and convincing evidence

supports a finding that the parent “knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has

resulted in the parent’s (i) conviction of an offense; and (ii) confinement or

imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the

date of filing the petition.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(Q).

      Subsection (b)(1)(Q) requires finding both that the parent is incarcerated and

that he is unable to care for the child for at least two years from the date the petition

was filed. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); TEX. FAM.

                                         –22–
CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(Q). Absent evidence that a non-incarcerated parent or other

person has agreed to provide support for the child on the incarcerated parent’s behalf,

merely leaving a child with a non-incarcerated parent does not constitute the ability

to provide care. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 110.

      We employ a burden-shifting analysis to assess an incarcerated parent’s

ability to care for a child. In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d 101, 118–19 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). The party seeking termination must first

establish that the parent will remain in confinement for the requisite period. In re

B.D.A., 546 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

The burden then shifts to the parent to produce “some evidence” as to how he would

provide or arrange to provide care for the child during his incarceration. Id. at 358.

“Cases discussing the incarcerated parent’s provision of support through other

people contemplate that the support will come from the incarcerated parent’s family

or someone who has agreed to assume the incarcerated parent’s obligation to care

for the child.” In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 110. When the incarcerated parent meets

that burden of production, the person seeking termination then has the burden of

persuasion to show by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s provision or

arrangement would not satisfy the parent’s duty to the child. In re Caballero, 53

S.W.3d 391, 395 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. denied).

                                        –23–
             2.    Analysis
      Here, Father does not dispute that he engaged in criminal conduct resulting in

his incarceration for at least two years from the date of the filing of the petition.

Instead, Father argues there is no evidence in the record to establish that he

“knowingly” engaged in such criminal conduct.

      We disagree. State’s exhibit 2, which was admitted into evidence, consists of

certified copies of various court records relating to Father’s present incarceration.

That exhibit reflects that on July 10, 2015, Father was charged with eight different

felony counts in Illinois, one of which alleged the following:

      As it reflects, the indictment states, in part, that Father, “on or about the 13th

day of June, 2015 . . . committed the offense of “AGG BATTERY/DISCHARGE

FIREARM,” in violation of an Illinois law cited in the indictment, “in that [Father]

. . . in committing a battery . . . knowingly and by means of discharging a firearm

caused an injury to [a particular individual] in that said defendant shot [the

individual] in the foot with a semiautomatic rifle.”

                                        –24–
       State’s exhibit 2 also reflects that on June 29, 2016, Father pleaded guilty to

that felony charge and another felony charge, and on August 10, 2016, the court

entered a judgment convicting him of both charges and sentencing him to a fifteen-

year sentence on the first charge and a three-year sentence on the other charge,

allowing him credit for time served beginning June 10, 2015, and ordering, on the

first charge, that he serve eighty-five percent of the sentence. Father testified his

anticipated release date is in 2028, which is roughly seven years after the Department

filed its petition.

       The Department and GAL, the parties seeking termination, thus met their

burden of first establishing that Father will remain in confinement for the requisite

period. See In re B.D.A., 546 S.W.3d at 358.

       The burden thus shifted to Father to produce “some evidence” as to how he

would provide or arrange to provide care for the child during his incarceration. Id.

at 358. To the extent he argues he met that burden of production and that GAL and

Department failed to meet its resulting burden of persuasion, we disagree because

we find no evidence in the record as to how Father would provide or arrange to

provide care for Z.E. during his incarceration. See In re B.D.A., 546 S.W.3d at 358;

see also In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d 101, 119 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019,

pet. denied) (“An incarcerated parent cannot meet his burden merely by producing

evidence that there is an unincarcerated [caregiver] who is willing and able to care

for the child; instead, the parent must present evidence that the alternative caregiver

                                        –25–
is providing care on behalf of the parent.”) (emphasis added). We find no such

evidence in the record before us.

      We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial

court’s implied finding that Father knowingly committed criminal conduct that

resulted in “imprisonment and inability to care for the children for not less than two

years from the date the petition was filed.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(Q); see

In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 110. We overrule Father’s third issue.

      C.     Best Interest Under 161.001(b)(2)
      We construe Father’s fourth issue as challenging the legal and factual

sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding under

subsection (b)(2) that termination of Father’s rights was in Z.E.’s best interest.

             1.     Applicable Law
      “Best interest” is a term of art encompassing a broad “facts-and-circumstances

based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445,

460 & n.22 (Tex. 2013). The best-interest prong “is child-centered and focuses on

the child’s well-being, safety, and development,” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631, and

it allows a court to consider the following non-exclusive factors:

      (1) the desires of the child;
      (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;

      (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
      (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;

                                        –26–
         (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best
         interest of the child;

         (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking
         custody;

         (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
         (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the
         existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
         (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d

at 631 & n.29 (citing Holley, while listing many of these same factors and noting

that family code section 263.307 also provides additional best-interest factors).17

         These Holley factors are not exhaustive, and a best-interest finding need not

be supported by evidence of every Holley factor. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The

same evidence can be relevant to both section 161.001(b)(1) termination grounds

and the child’s best interest. Id. Moreover, while there is a strong presumption that

    17
        Section 263.307(b) lists several best-interest factors that the trial court and the Department can
consider in determining whether a child’s parents are willing and able to provide the child with a safe
environment, including (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and
nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the
child; (4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by
the Department or other agency; (5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home;
(6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents,
or other family members, or others who have access to the child’s home; (7) whether there is a history of
abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8)
whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s
home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s
family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an
appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect
positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s
family demonstrates adequate parenting skills; and (13) whether an adequate social support system
consisting of an extended family and friends is available to the child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b). Father
lists the Holley factors and does not discuss these other factors in his brief.
                                                    –27–
maintaining the parent–child relationship serves the child’s best interest, there is also

a presumption that promptly and permanently placing the child in a safe environment

is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 153.131(b); 263.307(a); In re

D.W., 445 S.W.3d 913, 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied).

       In C.H., the supreme court stated, “The absence of evidence about some of

these considerations would not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a

strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly

if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety

of the child.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Although “paltry evidence relevant to

each [Holley factor] would not suffice to uphold [a factfinder’s] finding that

termination is required,” id., as we discuss below, we conclude the evidence in this

case is sufficient.

              2.      Analysis
       Much of the evidence discussed above is also pertinent here, particularly with

regard to the second, third, sixth, eighth, and ninth factors. Also, as to the first factor,

although no evidence was presented regarding Z.E.’s desires regarding placement in

connection with Father, in his forensic interview, when asked about his Father, Z.E.

expressed no desire to be placed with Father and, in fact, described his Father as

being “dead.”

       Based on the record evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

ruling and as a whole, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed

                                           –28–
a firm belief or conviction that termination of Father’s parental rights is in Z.E.’s

best interest and therefore hold the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient

to support the trial court’s implied best-interest finding as to Father under subsection

(b)(2). See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(2).

         We overrule Father’s fourth issue.

         D.     Pronouncement & Decree
         Unlike his first four issues—in which Father asks us to reverse the decree—

in his fifth issue, Father asks us, alternatively, to modify the decree to reflect the trial

court’s oral pronouncement that the Department continue with an ICPC placement

investigation on Father’s cousin.18

         After its pronouncement, but before the decree was signed, the trial court

signed a separate order requiring the Department to institute an ICPC priority home

study request on Father’s cousin regarding Z.E. The decree does not refer to,

modify, or mention that order, and after the order, the record does not show any

request, objection, or other motion by Father regarding the ICPC placement

investigation. Father’s counsel signed the decree, agreeing as to its form, and Father

did not object to or seek to modify the decree in the trial court.

    18
       When the trial court pronounced its ruling, the trial court ordered the Department “to look at the
paternal cousin for a possible placement in Illinois since she has been approved in Illinois before, and she
is a family placement” and to do so “within the next 90 days.” In the decree, the trial court referred the
case to the local child protection and permanency court (CPPC) for further hearings and stated the CPPC
shall conduct a permanency hearing after final order no later than ninety days after the trial court rendered
the decree.
                                                   –29–
      GAL argues that, by failing to object to the decree in the trial court, Father

failed to preserve for appellate review any error related to its contents. We agree.

      Generally, to preserve an issue for appellate review, the record must show a

complaint was made to the trial court “by a timely request, objection, or motion”

that, among other things, “states the specific grounds for the desired ruling, if they

are not apparent from the context of the request, objection, or motion.” TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a). The record fails to show Father made any such request, objection, or

motion in the trial court regarding the lack of a reference in the decree to the ICPC

placement investigation of his cousin.

      We conclude Father failed to preserve his fifth issue for appellate review, and

it is waived. See id. We overrule Father’s fifth issue.

                                  V. CONCLUSION
      We affirm the trial court’s decree and deny Mother’s counsel’s motion to

withdraw.

                                           /Ken Molberg/
221337f.p05                                KEN MOLBERG
                                           JUSTICE

                                         –30–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF Z.E.,                      On Appeal from the 304th Judicial
A CHILD                                       District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. JC-22-00703-
No. 05-22-01337-CV                            W.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Molberg. Justices Reichek and
                                              Breedlove participating.

      In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial

court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 23rd day of May, 2023.

                                       –31–