Court Opinion

ID: 9467626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:52:42.811431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:26.346266
License: Public Domain

FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I write separately to express my views regarding the holding in Massiah v. United *1242States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). In addition, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that appellant received a fair trial despite the possibility that extrinsic evidence may have affected the jury’s verdict. I would remand for a new trial.
I
THE MASSIAH ISSUE
The majority holds that this case is controlled by our previous decisions in United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980), and United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 860, 100 S.Ct. 124, 62 L.Ed.2d 81 (1979). I agree, but I believe the majority has somewhat overstated Glover's reach.
The majority states that in Glover and Irwin “this court held that to establish a violation of Massiah defendant must show that he suffered prejudice at trial as a result of evidence obtained from interrogation outside the presence of counsel.” In a case like this one, where none of the evidence obtained from the informant was used at trial, Glover and Irwin do require prejudice. Both Glover and Irwin recognized, however, that Massiah established an exclusionary rule prohibiting the use of evidence obtained'from an informant. Irwin, 612 F.2d at 1187 n. 15; Glover, 596 F.2d at 864 n. 12. When evidence obtained from an informant is used at trial, the defendant is not required to show prejudice in order to establish a Massiah violation.
II
THE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
The majority correctly states the standard to be applied in cases where the jury has received information not placed in evidence: a new trial must be granted unless “it can be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict.” Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1980). We recognized in Gibson that a defendant’s sixth amendment right to confrontation is lost when the jury considers extrinsic evidence, and that the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), was therefore appropriate.
Under the facts of this case, I fail to see how the majority can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the note to the jury did not affect their verdict. The majority recognizes that “[t]he jury’s question may . . . indicate that some jurors doubted the credibility of the government’s witness and the subsequent answer may have removed those doubts.” As we stated in Gibson, “the fact that [the] jurors believed that it was necessary to obtain more evidence is, by itself, an indication that there may have been a need to resolve some lingering hesitation or uncertainty.” 633 F.2d at 855. Where the jury’s uncertainty centered around the credibility of a key witness, the resolution of that uncertainty could unquestionably have affected the verdict.1
In fact, it appears quite likely that the verdict in this case was affected. The jury signalled its desire to communicate with the court shortly after receiving the answer to its question but before hearing the cautionary instruction. Although the court then instructed the jury not to consider the answer to the question, the jury deliberated for only two more minutes before returning a guilty verdict.
Finally, I am unpersuaded by the majority’s suggestion that we defer to the judgment of the trial court because “[t]here is no indication that the trial court applied an incorrect standard.” I would point out that there is also no indication that the trial court applied the correct standard. When constitutional error has been committed, the burden of proof is on the Government to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt *1243that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 596, 88 S.Ct. 1229, 1231, 20 L.Ed.2d 154 (1968) (per curiam); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 26, 87 S.Ct. at 829. The Government has not met its burden of proof in this court, and we cannot assume that the burden was met before the court below.
I would reverse.

. The majority characterizes the witness’ testimony as “merely cumulative.” The Supreme Court has, of course, rejected the suggestion that “if evidence bearing on all the ingredients of the crime is tendered, the use of cumulative evidence, though'tainted, is harmless error.” Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969).