Court Opinion

ID: 9624443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:03:03.893887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:46.574628
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
1. The trial court found that Handschuh was read an implied consent (“IC”) notice on the basis of both serious injury and probable cause to arrest for DUI; the probable cause determination was based *686upon the inexplicable location of Handschuh’s vehicle overturned 200 feet off the side of an embankment, the strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle, the open Crown Royal container found in the vehicle, the strong odor of alcohol on Handschuh’s breath, his slurred speech, and his belligerence toward the hospital personnel trying to aid him. The officer specifically testified that he determined Handschuh to be intoxicated, but too incapacitated with a possible spinal injury to be physically placed under arrest. Therefore, pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-55 (a) relating to serious injury, the officer read Handschuh the IC notice for suspects over 21. Handschuh refused testing.
In Cooper v. State,15 our Supreme Court recognized that, “[I]t is clear that the legislature can condition the privilege of driving upon submitting to a chemical test if a driver is involved in an accident resulting in serious bodily injury or death.”16 The Court’s Fourth Amendment concern was directed toward seizing blood under implied consent for a DUI test solely due to the presence of serious injury or death, without any cause to believe that DUI was involved. So, Cooper held “that OCGA § 40-5-55 is unconstitutional Ho the extent that it requires chemical testing of the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities regardless of any determination of probable cause.’ ”17
In this case, however, the officer did not seek chemical testing solely due to involvement in a traffic accident resulting in serious injury or death; the officer’s request was supported by probable cause. This combination of serious injury and probable cause is sufficient to pass muster under Cooper.18 “A constitutional challenge to a criminal statute which is not based on alleged violations of the First Amendment must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand.”19 In that regard, OCGA § 40-5-55 (a) was constitutional as applied to this case. The IC notice was properly read, and testing was refused. In my view, the trial court’s denial of the motion in limine should be affirmed.
2. Because testing was sought pursuant to the serious injury portion of OCGA § 40-5-55 (a) and was supported by probable cause, the issue of arrest is totally irrelevant in this case. And the majority’s discussion thereof is totally gratuitous.
*687More importantly, however, not one of the three cases the majority overrules held that a chemical test can be administered without arrest. In State v. Goolsby,20 the issue was testing after an arrest for an offense other than DUI; at the time of testing, Goolsby was under arrest for failure to maintain a lane, and the officer had “reasonable grounds” to believe he was DUI.
In both Kahl v. State21 and State v. Lentsch,22 the defendants were under arrest at the time of testing, and the officers reasonably believed them to be DUI; the issue in Kahl and Lentsch was the timing of the reading of the IC warnings. The law in that regard is that an IC warning should be read “at a time as close in proximity to the instant of arrest as the circumstances of the individual case might warrant.”23 The statute in question, OCGA§ 40-5-55, does not speak to the timing of the reading of an IC notice; instead, the statute addresses the post-arrest authority to administer a chemical test of a driver’s blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance pursuant to implied consent.
What the majority is doing here is mixing up the obligation to read IC warnings as close to the time of arrest as circumstances permit with the statutory authority to perform a chemical test after arrest. In my view, this merger is ill advised. The unexplained overruling of unrelated precedent is as well.
3. A fair reading of this Court’s decision in Buchanan v. State24 does not permit the majority’s interpretation that a suspect must be arrested specifically for driving under the influence before chemical testing under implied consent is authorized.25 Buchanan was fact driven and legally distinguishable from this case. In Buchanan,
the police officer testified that, based on Buchanan’s behavior, he concluded that Buchanan was either injured or under the influence of alcohol or drugs; the officer was not sure to which circumstance he could attribute Buchanan’s conduct.26
Clearly, these ambiguous facts did not demonstrate either probable *688cause to suspect Buchanan of DUI or a serious injury, pursuant to the requirements of OCGA§ 40-5-55 (a) as explained by Cooper, nor was there an arrest under OCGA § 40-6-391 so as to permit the chemical testing that occurred. Further, as in Cooper, Buchanan consented to having his blood tested after being told that “the officer... ‘had to take it anyway’ given the seriousness of the accident. [Thus,] Buchanan did not believe he had a choice.”27
Here, on the other hand, Handschuh was given a choice and he refused. Moreover, there was the possibility of serious injury as well as probable cause to suspect Handschuh of DUI. Based upon these factual and legal distinctions, the majority plainly misapplies our decision in Buchanan to the circumstances of this case.
4. To me, the largest flaw in the majority and special concurrence’s reasoning is reflective of a general myopia that will not allow the specific factual circumstances of a case to impact on the proper application of the appropriate legal principle. Cooper held as unconstitutional DUI testing based solely on injury without probable cause to establish DUI; so, the majority finds unconstitutional DUI testing based on injury with probable cause to establish DUI. Buchanan contained a statement regarding the inapplicability of implied consent in light of the officer’s failure to arrest for DUI or to establish that Buchanan was drunk or injured; so, the majority finds that a suspect must be arrested for DUI before consent may be implied, even when an officer establishes probable cause to find a suspect drunk or injured. OCGA § 40-5-55 (a) states that all Georgians who operate a motor vehicle impliedly consent to the administration of a chemical test simply through exercising the privilege of driving, which test will be administered if “arrested”; so, the majority finds that one must be arrested before implied consent even arises and thus before a suspect can refuse testing. The law does not exist in a vacuum, and the facts of a case are irrelevant only in a nonexistent abstract world. No good can come from the failure to recognize that the application of appropriate legal principles is contingent upon the facts.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Smith, Presiding Judge Andrews, Presiding Judge Johnson and Judge Adams join in this dissent.
*689Decided December 1, 2004
Sexton & Morris, Joseph S. Key, for appellant.
Steven L. Harris, Solicitor-General, for appellee.

 277 Ga. 282 (587 SE2d 605) (2003).

 Id. at 290 (V).

 (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Ferguson v. State, 277 Ga. 530 (590 SE2d 728) (2004), citing Cooper v. State, supra at 291.

 Hough v. State, 269 Ga. App. 744 (605 SE2d 43) (2004).

 (Citation omitted.) State v. Boyer, 270 Ga. 701, 704-705 (512 SE2d 605) (1999) (Carley, J., concurring specially).

 262 Ga. App. 867 (586 SE2d 754) (2003).

 268 Ga. App. 879 (602 SE2d 888) (2004).

 252 Ga. App. 655 (556 SE2d 248) (2001).

 Perano v. State, 250 Ga. 704, 708 (300 SE2d 668) (1983); accord Crawford v. State, 246 Ga. App. 344, 345 (1) (540 SE2d 300) (2000).

 264 Ga. App. 148, 150 (589 SE2d 876) (2003).

 The implied consent statute, OCGA § 40-5-55 (a), permits the administration of a chemical test if a person is “arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of Code Section 40-6-391.” (Emphasis supplied.) See State v. Goolsby, supra at 871.

 (Emphasis supplied.) Buchanan v. State, supra at 150 (1).

 Id. at 149.