Court Opinion

ID: 9702830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:26:22.920906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:41.888559
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
“[W]here liberty is at stake, due process requires notice and opportunity appropriate to the nature of the case....” Smith v. United States, 583 A.2d 975, 979 (D.C.1990) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). Finding the government’s two-day notice to Ford regarding its intention to introduce Drew evidence to be inadequate under the circumstances, I must disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial judge’s refusal to grant a continuance did not amount to an abuse of discretion.1
It is true that there exists no specific rule in this jurisdiction requiring the government’s pretrial disclosure of its intention to introduce Drew evidence against a defendant. See Lewis v. United States, 567 A.2d 1326, 1329 (D.C.1989).2 However, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the federal courts require the government to reasonably notify a defendant prior to trial of its intention to introduce Drew evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); United States v. Alex, 791 F.Supp. 723, 729 (N.D.Ill.1992); United States v. Williams, 792 F.Supp. 1120, 1133 (S.D.Ind.1992); United States v. Long, 814 F.Supp. 72, 74 (D.Kan.1993); United States v. Evangelista, 813 F.Supp. 294, 302 (D.N.J.1993); United States v. Richardson, 837 F.Supp. 570, 575-76 (S.D.N.Y.1993). “The purpose of the ... [notice requirement] is to reduce surprise and promote early resolution of the issue of admissibility.” Long, supra, 814 F.Supp. at 73. See also Williams, supra, 792 F.Supp. at 1133 (“By receiving notice of the general nature of 404(b) evidence ..., surprise is avoided and the defendant has an adequate opportunity to challenge the admissibility of the information”). Thus, the notice requirement in Rule 404(b) is founded upon the principle of fundamental fairness. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT Evidence § 9.09, at 22 (1994) (“The imposition of a requirement for pretrial notice [of uncharged misconduct evidence] seems both justifiable and salutary.... The *1187advance notice allows the defense to investigate the incident to obtain rebuttal evidence and to think through the prosecution’s possible theories of logical relevance”); 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 404[19], at 404-125 (1993) (“fairness dictates notice”); e.g., United States v. Foskey, 204 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 254 n. 8, 636 F.2d 517, 526 n. 8 (1980). Indeed, it was the desire to eliminate unfair surprise and to promote early resolution of admissibility which led to the 1991 amendment to Rule 404(b) incorporating a notice requirement. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) Advisory Committee’s Note, 1991 Amendments. Similarly, this court has acknowledged that some trial judges already impose a pretrial disclosure requirement as a matter of practice. See Lewis, supra, 567 A.2d at 1329.
The majority would prefer to leave for another day the question of whether this jurisdiction should impose a similar disclosure requirement in our court system. I would not. The instant case illustrates the need for such a disclosure requirement in order to avoid the type of unfair surprise caused to Ford by the government’s failure to reasonably notify him of its intention to introduce evidence of uncharged misconduct. After failing to follow its general practice of charging an alleged BRA violation,3 the government notified Ford two days before trial that it intended to introduce as Drew evidence his absence at a previously scheduled trial in order to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. Claiming that the government failed to provide reasonable notice, Ford argued that if adequate notice had been given, he would have been able to prepare to defend against the government’s proffer of this Drew evidence. In addition, Ford informed the trial judge that there was a witness who could testify that Ford was present at the previously scheduled trial, but the witness was unavailable at that time. Despite these circumstances, the trial court refused to grant a continuance and admitted the Drew evidence.
I find it fundamentally unfair when the government through its own neglect and oversight fails to follow its customary procedure of formally charging a defendant with an asserted BRA violation and then is permitted by the trial court to introduce evidence of this uncharged misconduct at trial without having first provided the defendant adequate notice. Permitting the government to wait until almost the eve of trial before announcing its intention to introduce Drew evidence (that Ford was not present at his previously scheduled trial), and then admitting such evidence over timely objection, allows the government to inject substantially damaging evidence against Ford without affording him reasonable notice and an opportunity to defend against this evidence. See generally Williams, supra, 792 F.Supp. at 1133 (while “some eases might present facts which necessitate an earlier disclosure of the use of 404(b) evidenee[,]” ten-day notice by the government would be sufficient). In essence, the government’s failure to charge Ford with a BRA violation reasonably led him to believe that he would not be required to address the matter at trial. Mindful of the potential prejudice caused to a defendant by the admission of Drew evidence,4 I conclude that the trial court’s ruling deprived the defendant of a fair trial. As a matter of fundamental fairness, Ford was entitled to *1188reasonable notice of the government’s intent to introduce this Drew evidence at trial.
I would adopt a notice requirement patterned after Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Our authority to do so is the same we utilized in Day v. United States, 360 A.2d 483, 485 n. 5 (D.C.1976).

. I disagree with the majority’s view that Ford’s defense counsel initially failed to properly make a continuance request before the trial court. The matter of a continuance was addressed by the trial judge in fact. Viewing the transcript in its proper context, Ford’s defense counsel initially complained that he did not have adequate time to prepare against the government’s introduction of Drew evidence. When counsel for the government first suggested a continuance, as the appropriate remedy, the trial court summarily rejected any such relief.

. In Lewis, I concurred in the result only. 567 A.2d at 1327.

. The government generally includes, when warranted, a BRA violation in its indictment against a defendant. See Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 140 n. 2 (D.C.1992), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 509, 121 L.Ed.2d 444 (1992); Gray v. United States, 600 A.2d 367, 368 (D.C.1991); Goldsberry v. United States, 598 A.2d 376, 377 (D.C.1991); Kelly v. United States, 590 A.2d 1031, 1032 n. 1 (D.C.1991); Russell v. United States, 586 A.2d 695, 696 n. 1 (D.C.1991); Grant v. United States, 402 A.2d 405 (D.C.1979). The government’s failure to do so in this case resulted from its own neglect and oversight.

. When " ‘evidence of prior crimes [or bad acts] reaches the jury, it is most difficult, if not impossible, to assume continued integrity of the presumption of innocence. A drop of ink cannot be removed from a glass of milk.' ” Robinson v. United States, 623 A.2d 1234, 1238 (D.C.1993) (quoting United States v. Daniels, 248 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 205, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (1985)). See Byrd v. United States, 614 A.2d 25, 31 (D.C.1992); Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 418-20 (D.C.1988); Wheeler v. United States, 470 A.2d 761, 769 (D.C.1983); Jefferson v. United States, 463 A.2d 681, 685 (D.C.1983); Harris v. United States, 366 A.2d 461, 463 (D.C.1976).