Court Opinion

ID: 9764606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:32:27.971243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:58.668287
License: Public Domain

ON state’s motion for rehearing.
MORRISON, Judge.
We are urged, on motion for the state, to construe the Adult Probation and Parole Law (Article 781b) as implementing the Suspended Sentence Law (Articles 776-781, Vernon’s Ann. C. C. P.). That is, we are asked to merge the two laws as a unit and hold that the Adult Probation Law supplemented the Suspended Sentence Law. The state’s brief and the dissenting opinion herein overlook the legislative expression of intention contained in Section 34 of the Adult Probation Law. The legis*311lature, there, stated in no uncertain terms that nothing in the Adult Probation Law should be construed as repealing the Suspended Sentence Law.
We are asked, in the face of this express mandate, as to the construction to be given the act; to say that the legislature intended to say that the Adult Probation Law shall be construed as additional powers and duties granted in connection with the already existing Suspended Sentence Law. This, we cannot do.
The state takes the position that the accused may, by the filing of an application for a suspended sentence, deprive the court of authority to employ the provisions of the Adult Probation Law. With this, we cannot agree. In fact, if a jury refused to grant a suspended sentence, the court would still, under the Adult Probation and Parole Law, have the authority in a proper case to probate the sentence. We do hold that a time of election does arise, but that election is exclusively within the province of the trial court; and, having elected to proceed under one law, the court may not change laws in the middle of the stream. This, we think, carries out the intention of the legislature when they said that each law shall stand alone, neither affecting the other.
There can be no question but that the trial court granted relator a “suspended sentence.” In this connection, we observe that whenever a court employs the Adult Probation and Parole Law, it is incumbent upon him to incorporate in his order or judgment the conditions upon which the accused is paroled so that the accused and the authorities may know, with certainty, what those conditions are. We find none in the case at bar, which is further evidence to us that it was the intention of the court to follow the Suspended Sentence Law. However, we need not inquire into his intentions, for the order he made must control regardless of his intentions. Such order was for a suspension of the sentence.
We hold, here, that, having elected to grant relief under such law, he may not now look to the Adult Probation Law for powers not granted him under the law which he employed.
Remaining convinced of the soundness of our original opinion, the state’s motion for rehearing is overruled.