Court Opinion

ID: 9692768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:04:49.129641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:36.749113
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that the-condition imposed in the instant trust was one that was not in violation of the public policy of this Commonwealth. I am therefore obliged to dissent.
This Court, as long ago as 1922, recognized as a fundamental precept of this Commonwealth the right of self-determination of every citizen in the exercise of his or her religious persuasion and practice.
The right of the citizens of the Commonwealth to worship God in accordance with the dictates of their own conscience is a landmark of the old colony. It was, in fact, one of the chief reasons for its establishment. The charter grant was in the early part of 1682, and, in the same year, the proprietor enacted, with the consent and advice of the deputies, in the first chapter of the laws, “That no person, now, or at any time hereafter, living in this province, who shall confess and acknowledge one Almighty God to be the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the world, *171............ shall in any case be molested or prejudiced for his, or her conscientious persuasion or practice. Nor shall he or she at any time be compelled to frequent or Maintain any religious worship, place of Ministry whatever, contrary to his or her mind, but shall freely and fully enjoy his, or her, Christian Liberty in that respect, without any interruption or reflection”: Duke of York’s Laws, p. 107.
This provision was reenacted later, though it was still later subjected to certain modifications and changes; these were subsequently removed and it is substantially the law of the Commonwealth to-day, through the Constitution of the United States as well as through our own Bill of Rights, section III, of the latter (1 Purd.Dig. 117), declaring that “no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.”
Drace v. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266, 269, 270, 118 A. 907 (1922).
The same sentiments were again reiterated by this Court in Devlin’s Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 11, 130 A. 238 (1925):
“The rearing of a child from three years of age until he is twenty-one ‘in the faith,’ covering as it does the formative period of life, necessarily tends to bar the exercise of religious freedom, and, though the motives of the grandfather, in so providing, were doubtless sincere, yet, under the public policy, as expressed in this State, such a condition is inoperative and void.
We can see no reason to distinguish the present case from the rule laid down in Drace v. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266. It was there held that a provision made by will, dependent on the devisee remaining attached to a particular church, was void. This court, through Justice Kephart, there said, in part: ‘Testator’s will violated this public policy. He wished to force his lineal descendants to adhere to a certain religious faith, under *172penalty of the loss of what might be termed their inheritance. . . . If we were to adopt appellant’s view, that such condition should be sustained, we would not only contravene this announced policy, but we would, by that authority, originate the first step to mark the entering wedge whereby, through successive encroachments, the worship of God according to a given religious persuasion could be controlled and compelled indefinitely through the disposition of property at death.’ ”
Id. at 14-15,130 A. at 239.
Each of these decisions were emphatic in stressing that the policy of this Commonwealth assures each of its citizens the right to worship the God of their choice in a manner in accordance with their conscience. Pursuant to that precept, our Court has refused to recognize restrictions by testators, or settlors, regardless how craftily designed, which encroach upon this freedom of choice.
In a strained attempt to distinguish the instant facts from earlier precedents, the majority first states that the key to Drace was that the condition imposed required the Court to make a determination of doctrine and to inquire into the remainderman’s adherence to that doctrine. Here they contend that the Court need only to determine whether the beneficiaries are members of a specified church. This reasoning is clearly fallacious. First, the condition imposed required the heir not only to be a member of the Presbyterian Church, but also a member in good standing. I fail to perceive any difference between a determination as to whether a person has remained true to a particular sect or whether or not he is in good standing within that sect. If religious freedom is to depend upon semantics, the protections afforded by this public policy are little more than illusory.
Further, I fail to perceive why there was any greater need in Drace to inquire into doctrine than there is as a result of the presently challenged condition. In Drace *173there was no question as to the religious faith to which the testator intended his descendants to adhere. Nor was there any question that the remainderman did, in fact, abandon that faith. Thus, there was no need in that instance to inquire into the question of doctrine, but the Court, nevertheless, recognized the provision as offensive and stated most appropriately:
“It would be a step backward, looking to the days of religious persecution, and it is our duty to stop this effort in its inception". Id. 275 Pa. at 270, 118 A. at 909. (Emphasis added)
Unfortunately the majority has failed to recognize the wisdom of that admonition.
The facts in Devlin are even closer to the instant case. There, there may have been some justification for the testator’s request in view of the fact that his deceased son, the father of the beneficiary in question, had entered into a premarital agreement with the child’s mother to rear the child in the faith that was made part of the condition. Further, the restriction in Devlin did not forever bind the beneficiary but only required that his training, during minority, be in accordance with a given faith. Nevertheless, the Court rejected this intrusion. Nowhere in that opinion was that rejection predicated upon a disruption of family unity as the majority would suggest. The tortuous distinction made by the majority in this instance only emphasizes the extent to which it has gone to justify abandoning a precedent.
In my judgment both Dr ace and Devlin were properly decided and are controlling under the present facts. I would therefore affirm the decree of the court below.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this opinion.