Court Opinion

ID: 9602969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:02:08.228337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:17.208728
License: Public Domain

Wedell, J.
(dissenting in part): G. S. 1951 Supp. 60-3314a, reads:
*653“When an appeal or cross-appeal has been timely perfected the fact that some ruling of which the appealing or cross-appealing party complains was made more than two months before he perfected his appeal shall not prevent a review of the ruling.” (Italics supplied.)
The question is whether the above statute grants plaintiff a right of review, before final judgment, of orders which overruled his separate motions to make the city’s answer definite and certain and to strike portions thereof, both of which orders rested in the discretion of the trial court and neither of which is in itself a final or appealable order. I do not think it does.
The only statute which contains a provision about two months is G. S. 1949, 60-3309 which pertains solely to appealable orders. It reads:
“The appeal shall be perfected within two months from the date of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken: Provided, That appeals from judgments and appealable orders of a date within four months immediately prior to the taking effect of this act may be perfected within two months after the effective date of this act.” (Italics supplied.)
I find myself in the rather peculiar position of believing we overstated the intent and purpose of the above statute in Herron v. Chappell, 174 Kan. 350, 255 P. 2d 632, which I authored, although the majority of the court believes we did not. Continuing to be of the opinion the statute was too broadly interpreted in that case and in Holmes v. Kalbach, 173 Kan. 736, 252 P. 2d 603, I shall briefly state my general views although the broad implications of the instant decision merit fuller treatment.
In both the above cases the prior rulings complained of from which no separate appeal had been perfected for “more than two months” were rulings on demurrers, appealable orders, under G. S. 1949, 60-3302. I adhere to both decisions insofar as the prior appealable orders there involved are concerned. I, however, do not believe the statute was intended to apply to the numerous orders which rest in the discretion of the trial court and which are not reviewable under G. S. 1949, 60-3302 and 60-3303.
Rulings such as on motions to make definite and certain, to strike portions of pleadings, permitting amendments of pleading, for continuances, setting cases for trial, limiting number of witnesses upon a particular issue, for separation of witnesses, order of proof; allowing evidence in rebuttal, time for argument, the number of special interrogatories to be submitted, and many others which might be mentioned do not pertain to substantive law and must of necessity *654rest in the trial court’s discretion. Ordinarily they are not in themselves reviewable, before final judgment. Of course, a ruling which strikes out a cause of action or a defense is equivalent to a demurrer and was reviewable long before the 1951 statute was enacted. That statute, therefore, was not enacted to permit a review of such a ruling.
The reason merely discretionary rulings are ordinarily not reviewable before final judgment is obvious. Such rulings ultimately may not affect the substantial rights of the complaining party in the slightest degree, even though the ruling should not have been made. In fact, the party complaining of such rulings frequently prevails in the action, as disclosed in many of our reports. Whether a party’s substantial rights were affected by such discretionary rulings can seldom be determined properly until an appellate court obtains the complete record after final judgment. Justice Rrewer stated the rule aptly in the early case of Foreman v. Carter, 9 Kan. 674, as follows:
“It is further objected that the question of amendments is one of discretion, and will not therefore be reviewed in this court unless it appear that that discretion has been abused. This is unquestionably so. Yet when the question arises on a record we are generally placed in a better position to weigh that discretion tiran when it is exercised during the trial of a cause.” (p. 683.)
That sound doctrine has been followed consistently. Under it a party against whom an adverse ruling is made on an unappealable, as well as on an appealable, matter may present it on his motion for a new trial and obtain a review thereof by the trial court. If that court believes no prejudice has resulted therefrom the complaining party may have a review thereof in this court.
The instant opinion of the court, however, makes the great multitude of discretionary orders all reviewable before final judgment, if an appeal is later taken from an appealable order. The result may well be that this court, after judgment, with the additional light thrown upon the subject by a complete record, may be obliged to reverse its own former rulings. The real question in the instant case should not be confused. It is not whether appellate courts should be vested with greater power to review discretionary rulings. They possess full power in that respect now which is the right to examine critically a record to determine whether the discretionary power of a trial court has been abused. Neither is the question whether appellate courts should more carefully scrutinize such *655rulings of trial courts, after final judgment. If that were the question I probably would agree they should.
The real question here now, however, is whether the legislature intended this court should exercise appellate review over the great multitude of discretionary orders, before final judgment. The previous statute, G. S. 1949, 60-3314a, applied only to a review after final judgment. Of course, neither was that statute enacted to make a review of discretionary rulings permissible for the obvious reason the right to have a review of such rulings, after final judgment, already existed. Its purpose was to eliminate the necessity of intermediate appeals from appealable orders within two months after they were made.
It also will be observed the legislature did not amend G. S. 1949, 60-3303, which defines a final order, or G. S. 1949, 60-3302, which specified what orders are reviewable, by adding discretionary orders thereto. Moreover, I find nothing in G. S. 1951 Supp. 60-3314a which discloses an intent to enlarge the scope of orders made reviewable by G. S. 1949, 60-3302 and 60-3303. Had the 1951 act been intended to make nonappealable orders reviewable, before final judgment, the legislature could easily and plainly have said, “Any and all previous rulings complained of are reviewable after an appeal has. been properly perfected from any appealable order.” It appears it cautiously avoided doing that. By its very language it expressly limited the review to some ruling of which the party complains which “was made more than two months before he perfected his appeal.” Why was the right of review expressly restricted to rulings “made more than two months before he perfected his appeal”? It seems clear it was so restricted because the statute was intended to apply to prior appealable orders. They are the only orders to which the period of two months for appeal could possibly apply. (G. S. 1949, 60-3309.) Manifestly, that statute does not apply to discretionary nonappealable orders.
Of course, it would be inaccurate to say there can be no review, before final judgment, of any prior ruling which in itself is not appealable, as, for example, a discretionary ruling which is directly involved in the merits of a subsequent appealable order. A review of such a discretionary ruling is always permitted. It generally has been held an order overruling a motion to make a pleading definite and certain, when such motion has been successfully resisted, will be reviewed for the purpose of determining whether it *656was properly overruled, if the identical pleading is later challenged by demurrer. Such discretionary ruling long has been reviewable for the purpose of determining whether the motion was properly overruled in order to ascertain whether the pleading later challenged by demurrer shall continue to be liberally, instead of strictly, construed on demurrer. In order to have a right of review of such a discretionary ruling the 1951 statute, therefore, was wholly unnecessary. The right also has previously existed to have a ruling reviewed which excluded evidence, a nonappealable order, where a demurrer was later sustained to the evidence. There again the reason for permitting a review of a ruling excluding the evidence is apparent. If the evidence had not been excluded a cause of action, or defense, might have been established and, if so, the demurrer should have been overruled. The 1951 statute was wholly unnecessary to permit a review of such an order which in itself was nonappealable. There are other similar- discretionary rulings which have been held to be reviewable before final judgment where they are directly connected with an appealable order. We shall not take tire time to enumerate them.
To my mind two things are quite clear. One is the 1951 statute was not intended to authorize a wholesale review of all nonappealable orders, before final judgment, for the simple reason that in many instances it cannot be determined with certainty and fairness, at that stage of the proceedings, whether the discretionary ruling has, or will, affect a party’s substantial rights. The other thing is the statute does not by its terms indicate an intention to make reviewable purely discretionary rulings, before final judgment, but on the contrary, indicates an intention to make intermediate appealable orders reviewable although no independent appeal had been perfected therefrom within two months as required by G. S. 1949, 60-3309, provided an appeal from an appealable order properly has been perfected thereafter.
Smith and Price, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.