Court Opinion

ID: 9811488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:22:27.747667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:23.940365
License: Public Domain

BRIAN QUINN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion to the extent it holds that appellant was harmed when the trial court prevented her from impeaching witness Vega. Furthermore, my dissent is based upon the following circumstances appearing of record.
First, the State indicted appellant for intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly causing “bodily injury” to Officer Ernest Rendleman (Rendleman) by kicking him. Statute defines bodily injury as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(8) (Vernon 1994). It is clear that the form of bodily injury at issue below involved physical pain. Indeed, the prosecution conceded as much during summation. There it argued to the jury that 1) the “law doesn’t require that there be blood,” 2) it “doesn’t require that there be broken bones or that there be bruising,” 3) “[a]ll that’s required is physical pain,” and 4) “it really comes down to whether ... you believe [the officer] when he told you that when ... kicked [by appellant] that it did hurt ... that it did cause him pain.” (Emphasis added). Next, according to the officer himself, the only kicks that allegedly caused him to suffer physical pain were those administered by appellant when the *391two were standing. When asked if any blows received after appellant was “take[n] down” to the ground caused physical pain, the officer replied: “[n]o, sir, they did not ... [tjhere was none.” This is of import because Vega (the witness whom appellant could not impeach due to the trial court’s ruling) mentioned only kicks imparted by appellant after she was on the ground. That is, in his description of what occurred nothing was said about appellant kicking the officer while the two stood. He simply said that she kicked the officer when the two were on the ground. Given this, the jury had before it testimony (supplied by Vega) suggesting that appellant only kicked the officer while the two wrestled on the ground and testimony (supplied by the officer) that those particular blows caused no physical pain.
In short, Vega supplied the jury with means to reject Rendleman’s testimony and acquit appellant. That this is true was noted by defense counsel during his closing argument. Yet, because she was denied opportunity to impeach Vega through mention of a pending deferred adjudication, appellant cried foul and harm. While that may be foul according to a recent pronouncement in Maxwell v. State, 48 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (holding that one may impeach a witness for bias by reference to a pending deferred adjudication), I cannot reasonably say it is harm. Simply put, being denied the chance to tell the fact-finders to ignore or discredit testimony that helped appellant cannot harm appellant, in my humble opinion.1 Nor can I say that it created a “reasonable possibility that the error [ie. preventing appellant from impeaching a favorable witness], either alone or in context, moved the jury from a state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion as to the issue in question.” Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). And, that is, after all, the test to use in assessing harm. Id.
Similarly, to the extent that Vega only saw appellant kick the officer while the two were down and the officer conceded that those blows did not hurt, Vega’s testimony hardly supported a finding of guilt. And, because it did not, his testimony was not that of a crucial State’s witness necessitating impeachment.
Third, that the prosecution said nothing about Vega’s testimony during its summation adds further support to my conclusion. Hastings v. State, 20 S.W.3d 786, 792 ( Tex.App.—Amarillo 2000, pet. ref d) (considering this as a factor when assessing harm). Whether the silence arose from inadvertence or conscious decision upon recognition that the testimony did not further the likelihood of conviction is unknown. I merely see that it was not emphasized.
Fourth, that the prohibition emanated from judicial decision as opposed to prose-cutorial fiat also urges me to find the wrong harmless. Id. (considering this as a factor when assessing harm). In other words, the error did not arise due to any bad faith of the prosecution. So, holding it harmless would not serve as impetus for the State to act with impunity in the future, especially since the legal issue underlying the error was settled in Maxwell.
In sum, the circumstances of record do not induce me to find harm, and, thus, I respectfully dissent.

. Incidentally, how it could or did went unexplained by appellant. She merely concluded that it did without offering any analysis.