Court Opinion

ID: 9943352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 14:02:21.798762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:54.354357
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

     UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

                            PARIS TSIRNIKAS,

                                 Appellee.

                             No. 2D22-3539

                            February 23, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Keith Meyer, Judge.

Andrew A. Labbe of Groelle & Salmon, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

Charles M. Schropp of Schropp Law Firm, P.A., Tampa; James J.
Dowling of James J. Dowling, P.A., Tarpon Springs; and Jerry
Theophilopoulos of Theophilopoulos Law, P.A., Tarpon Springs, for
Appellee.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

     Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company appeals a final
judgment entered in favor of Paris Tsirnikas following a jury trial. Ms.
Tsirnikas sued Universal asserting that she had a homeowners
insurance policy with Universal and that Universal breached the
insurance contract by refusing to cover the damage to her property.
Among the defenses asserted by Universal, it claimed that the damages
were not covered by the terms of the insurance policy. Although the jury
found that Universal had established that the loss was not covered by
the policy, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Tsirnikas.
Because the final judgment should have been entered in favor of
Universal, we reverse.
                     I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
     In her amended complaint, Ms. Tsirnikas alleged one claim for
breach of contract. She asserted that Universal had issued a
homeowners insurance policy to her that covered her dock and, when the
dock suffered damage, Universal breached the insurance contract by
refusing to cover the loss.
     The case proceeded to trial, and the jury answered the following six
questions on the verdict form as follows:
            1.    Did Plaintiffs, Paris Tsirnikas and John Tsirnikas,1
     fail to provide the documentation they were required to
     provide prior to receiving the denial letter, dated February,
     12, 2018?
                 YES_____          NO ___√___
            2.    Did Plaintiffs, Paris Tsirnikas and John Tsirnikas,
     fail to provide the documentation they were required to
     provide prior to filing the lawsuit?
                 YES_____          NO ___√___
           3.   Did Plaintiff, Paris Tsirnikas, establish by the
     greater weight of the evidence the dock is covered property?
                 YES___√___              NO ______
          If your answer to question 3 is NO, your verdict is for
     the Defendant and you should not proceed further, except to

     1 John Tsirnikas was originally a plaintiff in the lawsuit, but he

passed away when the suit was pending in the trial court.
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     date and sign this verdict form and return it to the
     courtroom. If you answered YES to question 3, please answer
     question 4.
           4.    Did Plaintiff, Paris Tsirnikas, establish by the
     greater weight of the evidence the dock sustained a direct
     physical loss on November 24, 2017?
                 YES___√___              NO ______
           If your answer to question 4 is NO, your verdict is for
     the Defendant and you should not proceed further, except to
     date and sign this verdict form and return it to the
     courtroom. If you answered YES to question 4, please answer
     question 5.
           5.    Did the Defendant establish by the greater weight
     of the evidence that the alleged damage to the dock was the
     result of an excepted and/or excluded cause of loss?
                 YES___√___              NO ______
           6.    What is the cost to repair the dock at actual cash value?
                       TOTAL $9,400
     During discussions pertaining to the fifth question, the trial court
stated its intention to leave out language that an affirmative answer
would be a verdict for Universal. The attorney for Universal asked the
court, "So if the defendant proves an exclusion they don't -- it's not a
finding for defendant?" The trial court responded, "It is a finding for
defendant but the Court enforces the finding. This is an interrogatory
verdict form."
     Regarding actual cash value, the trial court instructed the jury,
"Actual Cash Value Calculation. Damage to covered structures, other
than screened enclosures, that are not buildings, shall be calculated at
actual cash value, meaning the actual cash value of a loss to covered
property that was actually damaged by a covered loss, less recoverable
depreciation." After returning the verdict to the trial court, no inquiry

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was made of the jurors concerning the verdict form, and they were
permitted to leave.
     Before the final judgment was entered, Universal filed a
"Defendant's Motion for Remittitur to Reduce the Jury's Damage
Calculation to Zero Dollars." The motion noted that the jurors had asked
the trial court if they were to decide how much compensation for Ms.
Tsirnikas. The trial court answered this question by instructing the jury,
"you are to follow the instructions on the verdict form."
     In its motion for remittitur, Universal argued that in rendering its
verdict, the jury was simply following the instructions set forth on the
verdict form, which required it to make a determination as to the cost to
repair the dock at actual cash value, even after the jury determined that
Universal established that the damage to the dock was the result of an
excepted and/or excluded cause of loss. The motion noted that the jury
had determined that $9,400 was the actual cash value to repair the
dock, but it were not asked to, and did not, determine that $9,400 was
owed to Ms. Tsirnikas by Universal.
     The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Ms. Tsirnikas,
ruling that, "[b]ased on the Jury's Verdict, Final Judgment is entered
against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff for $9,400.00 for which let
execution issue."
                               II. ANALYSIS
     We begin by observing that a "jury cannot be faulted for doing
exactly what it was instructed to do." Plana v. Sainz, 990 So. 2d 554,
557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Ms. Tsirnikas argues on appeal that the jury
rendered an inconsistent verdict and that Universal was required to raise
an objection to the inconsistent verdict before the jury was discharged.
See Francis-Harbin v. Sensormatic Elecs., LLC, 254 So. 3d 523, 525 (Fla.

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3d DCA 2018) ("Because only the empaneled jury can correct such a
verdict, a party wishing to contest a legally inconsistent verdict must
raise the issue with the trial court before the jury is discharged, and the
failure to do so results in a waiver." (citing Coba v. Tricam Indus., Inc.,
164 So. 3d 637, 649 (Fla. 2015))). We conclude that the jury's verdict
was not inconsistent and that the trial court erred in entering final
judgment in favor of Ms. Tsirnikas after the jury found that the damage
to the dock was the result of an excepted and/or excluded cause of loss.
A. The verdict was not inconsistent.
      A legally inconsistent verdict is defined as "one which contains two
or more findings which, as a matter of law, cannot co-exist." Id. A
verdict of no liability that also awards damages "is not an inconsistent
verdict in the sense that an objection must be raised by the defendant
when the jury returns the verdict," but "as a matter of law a judgment for
damages cannot be entered where there is no finding of liability."
Oliveira v. Ilion Taxi Aero LTDA, 830 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
      Here, we must determine whether the jury's responses to questions
five and six create an inconsistent verdict. Ms. Tsirnikas contends that
the jury instruction on actual cost supports the jury's finding to question
six and is inconsistent with the answer to question five. While this
contention has some persuasive force, we do not find it dispositive.
Although the jury instruction contains language that "actual cash value
of a loss to covered property that was actually damaged by a covered
cause of loss," there is no mirror language in question six. (Emphasis
added.) Question six presents a limited inquiry directed to a factual, not
a factual and legal, matter. It only asks the jury to identify the cost to
repair the dock at actual cash value. It does not, on its face, assign
liability to Universal for the cost of repair. It also does not ask the jury to

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determine the amount of damages that are owed to Ms. Tsirnikas under
the policy. We look only to the language appearing on the face of the
verdict form, and we conclude that the verdict of no liability is not
inconsistent with the jury's factual determination regarding how much it
would cost to repair the dock.
B. The trial court improperly entered a judgment for damages in favor of
Ms. Tsirnikas when the jury verdict found that Universal was not
contractually liable for the loss.
      The jury's answer to question five is a determination of no
contractual liability on the part of Universal, and therefore, the trial
court should have entered the final judgment in favor of Universal. This
case is similar to Alvarez v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co., 305 So. 3d
5, 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), where the jury found that the homeowners had
materially misrepresented the facts by exaggerating the extent of their
loss, and the jury also awarded the homeowners $6,000. The Third
District held that the jury's award of damages did not alter the outcome
of the appeal because "[a]s a matter of law, the finding of material
misrepresentation voids coverage for the claim." Id. The Third District
further held that "[t]he trial court properly determined as a matter of law
that the jury's verdict finding material misrepresentation voided the
Homeowners' coverage for the claimed loss, and correctly rendered
judgment in favor of State Farm with no entitlement to damages." Id. at
9.
      As noted above, question five on the verdict form in this case
provides a factual and legal resolution to Universal's affirmative defense.
By answering this question in the affirmative, the jury found that
because the damage was an excepted cause of loss, an excluded cause of
loss, or both, Universal had prevailed. Because there was no liability
under the insurance contract, it follows that no damages could be

                                      6
assessed or awarded against Universal. As this was the verdict, the jury
had no need to proceed to question six. Arguably, because of the lack of
instruction found on the verdict form following question five and the trial
court's answer to the jury's question, the jury answered question six.
The trial court had noted during trial that, if Universal proves an
exclusion, "[i]t is a finding for defendant but the Court enforces the
finding." Nonetheless, when the jury found that Universal proved its
affirmative defense, the trial court failed to enforce that finding.
                             III. CONCLUSION
      Having made a degree of order from the chaos surrounding the
jury's verdict, we reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court
to enter judgment in favor of Universal.
      Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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