Court Opinion

ID: 9741812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:02:29.448597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:58:43.104744
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). The tenure commission made two independent findings of fact in this case which must be examined separately. First, it found, contrary to defendant board’s finding, that plaintiffs were qualified for certain teaching positions which became open at the beginning of the 1973-1974 school year. Secondly, it found that defendant board had manipulated, class and teachers’ schedules so as to exclude plaintiffs Stevens and Chester from positions for which they would have been qualified but for the rescheduling.
In regard to the first finding, I agree with the majority and would reverse the decision of the tenure commission. By statute, the school board is the body authorized to set the qualifications for its teachers. MCL 380.1231; MSA 15.41231, Holton Public Schools v Farmer, 77 Mich App 765, 772; 259 NW2d 219 (1977) (M. B. Breighner, J., concurring). The teacher tenure act does not empower the tenure commission to substitute its judgment as to teacher qualifications for that of the school *250board. The tenure commission may only set aside the school board’s determination on teacher qualification if it finds that the decision was arbitrary or capricious or done in bad faith as a subterfuge in order to circumvent the protections of the teacher tenure act. Cf. Freiberg v Board of Education of Big Bay De Noc School Dist, 61 Mich App 404; 232 NW2d 718 (1975). The tenure commission’s substitution of its judgment for that of the school board concerning plaintiffs’ qualifications for the open positions was improper. This portion of the case must be remanded to the tenure commission for a decision on whether the school board acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in determining that plaintiffs were not qualified for the open positions.
The decision as to the teachers’ qualifications for the open positions, however, does not end the tenure commission’s inquiry. Assuming arguendo that the school board had properly found that plaintiffs were not qualified for the open positions, the tenure commission is still empowered to determine whether the school board manipulated class schedules in such a way as to deprive plaintiffs of positions for which the board had determined they were qualified. A school board cannot do through indirection what it is prohibited from doing directly. Just as the board may not arbitrarily or in bad faith determine that tenured teachers are unqualified for the open positions, it also may not arbitrarily or in bad faith manipulate the schedule1 so as to close positions for which the laid-off *251teachers are qualified. The determination of whether the board acted in bad faith or as a subterfuge is a question for the tenure commission. Cf. Freiberg, supra, Goodwin v Board of Education of the School Dist of the City of Kalamazoo, 82 Mich App 559; 267 NW2d 142 (1978).
In the present case, the tenure commission made such a determination of bad faith. It held that the school board had itself determined that plaintiff Stevens was qualified to teach certain subjects, but had purposefully rearranged the schedule in such a manner as to combine the subjects for which he was qualified with subjects for which he was not qualified so as to deprive plaintiff of reentry into the school system.
In reviewing the factual findings of the tenure commission, this Court’s function is not to make an independent determination of the facts, but merely to see whether the commission’s conclusions are "supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record”. (Emphasis omitted.) Beebee v Haslett Public Schools, 66 Mich App 718, 720; 239 NW2d 724 (1976), remanded 401 Mich 954 (1977), quoting Const 1963, art 6, § 28. A review of the record convinces me that the commission’s finding of bad faith on the part of the board towards plaintiff Stevens was supported by the record.
Mr. Stevens had an undergraduate major in *252general science. He was certified to teach general science in grades 1 through 12 and had taught general science in defendant school district for the previous 14 years primarily in grades 8 through 12. Defendant school board conceded that he was qualified to teach general science. He was not rehired for the 1973-1974 school year because the open position called for someone who could teach four science courses and one chemistry course and plaintiff Stevens was not deemed qualified to teach chemistry. During the 1972-1973 school year there were two teachers, one who taught five courses in general science, and one who taught four chemistry courses and one science course. Before the start of the 1973-1974 year the school district decided to transfer one chemistry course from the chemistry teacher and give it to the science teacher because it was allegedly dissatisfied with the chemistry teacher. It was this rescheduling that the tenure commission found as a subterfuge to deprive plaintiff Stevens of reentry into the school system. I cannot hold this finding erroneous.
The chemistry teacher had taught for defendant school district for many years, but it was only when plaintiff Stevens sought to be rehired that defendant school district decided to take away one of the teacher’s chemistry classes. Secondly, if defendant school district was truly dissatisfied with the way the teacher taught chemistry and made the transfer to improve the quality of education, why did it transfer only one chemistry class? The transfer of one class would be sufficient to deprive plaintiff Stevens of reentry, but it would not be sufficient to upgrade the chemistry program. The allegedly deficient chemistry teacher would still be in charge of the chemistry program *253and the majority of students would still have to take chemistry from him. Only a tiny minority of students would be given the opportunity to have a supposedly superior teacher. The school district’s reasoning is arbitrary at best, and at worst seems to be a concerted effort to deprive plaintiff of a chance to reenter the system.
No administrator is going to admit to arbitrary or bad faith decisions. Such decisions can only be determined by viewing the circumstances of each individual case. The tenure commission is the body with the expertise in the field of teacher disputes. See Lipka v Brown City Community Schools, 59 Mich App 175; 229 NW2d 362 (1975), modified 399 Mich 704; 252 NW2d 770 (1977), reh gtd 400 Mich 984 (1977). This expertise gives the commission familiarity with the ways in which schools operate and places it in an advantageous position when determining if schedules can be manipulated and how this manipulation can be accomplished. The commission’s judgment in this area is entitled to great respect and should not lightly be set aside by this Court. Since the facts in this case show, at the very least, that the school board’s action was questionable, the commission’s expertise in this complex area should be honored and its determination of arbitrary or bad faith manipulation should be upheld.
The final issue in this case concerns the school board’s failure to rehire plaintiff Chester. Mr. Chester was laid off prior to the 1972-1973 school year when due to economic necessities the district had to totally eliminate its physical education program. Prior to his lay off plaintiff Chester had taught physical education in defendant school district for 21 years. The school board concedes that he was qualified to teach physical education. Due *254to the improved financial picture of the school district for the school year 1973-1974 the district reinstated its physical education program although on a more limited scale.
The reinstallation of the program created one vacancy in the physical education department. The school board gave that position to Mr. Goodwin, a teacher with six years’ experience at the school who formerly taught physical education with Mr. Chester but who was transferred to another department when the original cut back was made. The school board gave Mr. Goodwin the vacancy claiming that it was contractually bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement to assign any position in a reopened department to a teacher who had been transferred out of the department but requested to be transferred back. Mr. Goodwin made such a request.
The school board claims that there was no vacancy because it was contractually obligated to reinstate Mr. Goodwin. This is incorrect. A vacancy was created when the physical education program was reinstated. The question becomes what is the interrelation between the teacher tenure act and the collective bargaining agreement. The teacher tenure act specifically states that a tenured teacher laid off due to necessary reduction in personnel must be appointed to the first vacancy for which he is certified and qualified. MCL 38.105; MSA 15.2005. The act also states that the rights conferred by the act cannot be waived by contract. MCL 38.172; MSA 15.2054. This provision would indicate that the teacher tenure act takes precedence over any teacher contract or collective bargaining agreement. When the rights under the collective bargaining agreement would operate in such a manner as to deprive a teacher of his rights under the tenure act, the collective *255bargaining rights must yield.2 Since the reinstatement of the physical education program created a vacancy for which plaintiff Chester was qualified, he was entitled to the position under the provisions of the teacher tenure act. The collective bargaining contract cannot be used as a means of depriving plaintiff of his rights under the statute.
Conclusion
1 would affirm the tenure commission’s second finding of manipulation as to plaintiffs Stevens and Chester and order them reinstated. The tenure commission overstepped its authority in independently determining teacher qualifications for the open positions and this portion of their decision is reversed. Since plaintiffs Stevens and Chester would be reinstated under the second finding, the commission need only decide on remand whether the school board acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in determining that plaintiff Rieckhoff was not qualified for the open position.

 The case of Freiberg v Board of Education of Big Bay de Noc School District, 61 Mich App 404; 232 NW2d 718 (1975), is instructive on this point. The teacher in that case alleged that there was no economic necessity which required termination of his employment, but instead class schedules were juggled to eliminate him. This Court found that the tenure commission had jurisdiction to hear this complaint. This Court based its holding on one of the deleterious *251practices which the teacher tenure act sought to prevent, namely, the discharge of teachers "in order to effect economies either by diminishing the number of teachers and increasing the amount of work assigned to those retained, or by creating vacancies to be filled by lower salaried, inexperienced employees.” 37 Mich L Rev 430, 431 (1939), quoted in Freiberg, supra at 413.
The present case is merely the reverse of Freiberg. Instead of juggling the schedule to terminate a teacher, the charge here is that the schedule was juggled to keep the teacher from returning. In either case, the tenure commission is empowered to decide the question of manipulation.

 This does not mean that a currently employed teacher could never be given the right of first assignment. It only means that this right cannot be granted if it would deny a laid-off teacher of the only position for which he is qualified. For example, the currently employed teacher could be given the vacancy for which the laid-off teacher was qualified if there is another vacancy for which the teacher was also qualified. The first assignment right would only be denied in those cases when, as here, the assignment would close the only position for which the laid-off teacher is qualified.