Court Opinion

ID: 9428761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:24:42.577607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:15.080122
License: Public Domain

*486Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
Today the Court follows an isolated Second Circuit approach and holds that a discrimination complainant cannot bring a Title VII suit in federal court after unsuccessfully seeking state court “review” of a state antidiscrimination agency’s unfavorable decision. The Court embraces a rule that has been subject to challenge within the Second Circuit1 and that has been “vigorously attacked and soundly rejected by other courts.”2 The Court reaches this result because it purports to find nothing in Title VII inconsistent with the application of the general preclusion rule of 28 U. S. C. § 1738 to the state court’s affirmance of the state agency’s decision. For a compelling array of reasons, the Court is wrong.
*487I
The Court, as it must, concedes that a state agency determination does not preclude a trial de novo in federal district court. Ante, at 468-470, and n. 7. Congress made it clear beyond doubt that state agency findings would not prevent the Title VII complainant from filing suit in federal court.
Title VII provides that no charge may be filed until 60 days “after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated.” § 706(c), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(c). After a charge is filed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) may take action and, eventually, the complainant may file suit, §§ 706(b) and (f)(1). By permitting a charge to be filed after termination of state proceedings, the statute expressly contemplates that a plaintiff may bring suit despite a state finding of no discrimination.3
*488This fact is also made clear by § 706(b). In 1972, by Pub. L. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 104, Congress amended that section by directing that the EEOC “accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local law.”4 If the original version of Title VII had given the outcomes of state “proceedings” preclusive effect, Congress would not have found it necessary to amend the statute in 1972 to direct that they be given “substantial weight.” And if in 1972 Congress had intended final decisions in state “proceedings” to have preclusive effect, it certainly would not have instructed that they be given “substantial weight.”5
Thus, Congress expressly recognized in both § 706(b) and § 706(c) that a complainant could bring a Title VII suit in federal court despite the conclusion of state “proceedings.” And, as the Court must acknowledge, see ante, at 470-471, n. 8, when Congress referred to state “proceedings,” it referred to both state agency proceedings and state judicial *489review of those agency proceedings. “[TJhroughout Title VII the word ‘proceeding,’ or its plural form, is used to refer to all the different types of proceedings in which the statute is enforced, state and federal, administrative and judicial.” New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S. 54, 62-63 (1980).
Yet the Court nevertheless finds that petitioner’s Title VII suit is precluded by the termination of state “proceedings.” In this case, the New York State Division of Human Rights (NYHRD) found no probable cause to believe that petitioner had been a victim of discrimination. Under the Court’s own rule, that determination in itself does not bar petitioner from filing a Title VII suit in federal district court. According to the Court, however, petitioner lost his opportunity to bring a federal suit when he unsuccessfully sought review of the state agency’s decision in the New York courts. As the Court applies preclusion principles to Title VII, the state court affirmance of the state agency decision — not the state agency decision itself — blocks any subsequent Title VII suit.
The Court reaches this result through a schizophrenic reading of § 706(b). See ante, at 469-470, and n. 8. According to the Court, when Congress amended § 706(b) so that state “proceedings” would be accorded “substantial weight,” it meant two different things at the same time: it intended state agency “proceedings” to be accorded only “substantial weight,” while, simultaneously, state judicial “proceedings” in review of those agency “proceedings” would be accorded “substantial weight and more” — that is, “preclusive effect.” But the statutory language gives no hint of this hidden double meaning. Instead of reading an unexpressed intent into § 706(b), the Court should accept the plain language of the statute. All state “proceedings,” whether agency proceedings or state judicial review proceedings, are entitled to “substantial weight,” not “preclusive effect.” As the Court implicitly concedes when it permits suit despite the conclusion *490of agency proceedings, “substantial weight” is a very different concept from “preclusive effect,” and Congress thus did not intend for the termination of any state “proceeding” to foreclose a subsequent Title VII suit.
In addition, the Court must disregard the clear import of § 706(c). That section explicitly contemplates that a complainant can bring a Title VII suit despite the termination of state “proceedings.” Once again, the statute contains no suggestion that any state “proceeding” has preclusive effect on a subsequent Title VII suit. Nonetheless, contrary to § 706(c), the Court bars petitioner’s Title VII suit because of the termination of state “proceedings.”6
The Court’s attempt to give § 706(b) a double meaning and to avoid the language of § 706(c) is made all the more awkward because the Court’s decision artificially separates the proceedings before the reviewing state court from the state administrative process. Indeed, if Congress meant to permit a Title VII suit despite the termination of state agency proceedings, it is only natural to conclude that Congress also intended to permit a Title VII suit after the agency decision has been simply affirmed by a state court.
State court review is merely the last step in the administrative process, the final means of review of the state agency’s decision. For instance, in New York, the NYHRD “is primarily responsible for administering the law and to that end has been granted broad powers to eliminate discriminatory practices.” Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 52 N. Y. 2d 72, 77, 417 N. E. 2d 525, 528 (1980). When, as in this case, the NYHRD finds no probable cause, a reviewing court must affirm the Division’s decision unless it is “arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion,” see *491N. Y. Exec. Law §297-a(7)(e) (McKinney 1972),7 that is, unless the decision is “devoid of a rational basis.” State Office of Drug Abuse Servs. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 48 N. Y. 2d 276, 284, 397 N. E. 2d 1314, 1318 (1979). If the agency decides to hold a hearing, its decision must be affirmed if it is “supported by substantial evidence on the whole record.” N. Y. Exec. Law § 297-a(7)(d) (McKinney 1972). See State Division of Human Rights v. Syracuse University, 46 App. Div. 2d 1002, 362 N. Y. S. 2d 104 (1974). See generally N. Y. Exec. Law § 298 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
This review, therefore, is not de novo in the state courts. When it affirms the agency’s decision, the reviewing court does not determine that the Division was correct. In fact, the court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the [NYHRD],” State Division of Human Rights v. Mecca Kendall Corp., 53 App. Div. 2d 201, 203-204, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 665, 666-667 (1976); the court is “not empowered to find new facts or take a different view of the weight of the evidence if the [NYHRD’s] determination is supported by substantial evidence,” State Division of Human Rights v. Columbia University, 39 N. Y. 2d 612, 616, 350 N. E. 2d 396, 398 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Gilinsky v. Columbia University, 429 U. S. 1096 (1977). In affirming, the reviewing court finds only that the agency’s conclusion “was a reason*492able one and thus may not be set aside by the courts although a contrary decision may ‘have been reasonable and also sustainable.’” Imperial Diner, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 52 N. Y. 2d, at 79, 417 N. E. 2d, at 529, quoting Mize v. State Division of Human Rights, 33 N. Y. 2d 53, 56, 304 N. E. 2d 231, 233 (1973).8
The Court purports to give preclusive effect to the New York court’s decision. But the Appellate Division made no finding one way or the other concerning the merits of petitioner’s discrimination claim. The NYHRD, not the New York court, dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of probable cause. In affirming, the court merely found that the agency’s decision was. not arbitrary or capricious. Thus, although it claims to grant a state court decision preclusive ef-*493feet, in fact the Court bars petitioner’s suit based on the state agency’s decision of no probable cause. The Court thereby disregards the express provisions of Title VII, for, as the Court acknowledges, Congress has decided that an adverse state agency decision will not prevent a complainant’s subsequent Title VII suit.9
Finally, if the Court is in fact giving preclusive effect only to the state court decision, the Court misapplies 28 U. S. C. §1738 by barring petitioner’s suit. The state reviewing court never considered the merits of petitioner’s discrimination claim, the subject matter of a Title VII suit in federal court. It is a basic principle of preclusion doctrine, see ante, at 481—482, n. 22, that a decision in one judicial proceeding cannot bar a subsequent suit raising issues that were not relevant to the first decision. “If the legal matters determined in the earlier case differ from those raised in the second case, collateral estoppel has no bearing on the situation.” Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 600 (1948). See also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90, 94 (1980). Here, the state court decided only whether the state agency decision was arbitrary or capricious. Since the discrimination claim, not the validity of the state agency’s decision, is the issue before the federal court, under § 1738 the state court’s decision by itself cannot preclude a federal Title VII suit.
*494Thus, the Court is doing one of two things: either it is granting preclusive effect to the state agency’s decision, a course that it concédes would violate Title VII, or it is misapplying § 1738 by giving preclusive effect to a state court decision that did not address the issue before the federal court. Instead of making one of these two mistakes, the Court should accept the fact that the New York state court judicial review is simply the end of the state administrative process, the state “proceedings.” The Court searches in vain for a partial repeal of § 1738 in Title VII because it is blind to the fact that judicial review is a part — indeed, a distinctly secondary part — of the administration of discrimination claims filed before the NYHRD.10
r — 1 HH
A
The Court’s decision also flies in the face of Title VII’s legislative history. Under the Court’s ruling, a complainant is foreclosed from pursuing his federal Title VII remedy if he unsuccessfully seeks judicial correction of the state agency’s adverse disposition of his discrimination charge. Thus, state proceedings are the complainant’s sole remedy when he unsuccessfully pursues judicial review on the state side. But Title VII’s legislative history makes clear that Congress never intended the outcome of state agency proceedings to be the discrimination complainant’s exclusive remedy.
One of the principal issues during congressional consideration of Title VII in 1964 was the proper role of state fair employment practices commissions. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7216 (1964). At various times, Congress considered proposals to give the state commissions exclusive jurisdiction over *495discrimination charges. But, repeatedly, Congress rejected those proposals.
When Title VII was before the House for the first time, the House twice rejected attempts to prevent the application of Title VII in States that were enforcing adequate fair employment laws. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2727 (1964); id., at 2828. In the end, the House provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the States, but only under certain conditions. Under the House version, the EEOC would have been given authority to determine the adequacy of state agency procedures. If it found the procedures to be adequate, the EEOC was directed to enter into a written agreement with the state agency. In States covered by those agreements, the EEOC would not bring civil actions in cases referred to in the agreements and the complainants would likewise be barred from bringing a civil suit in federal court. H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 708(b) (1964). See 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964).
But when the bill went to the Senate, the House approach was discarded for the present provisions of the statute. *496Senator Dirksen presented the explanation of the changes. Id., at 12817. Among these was the statement that the exclusive-jurisdiction provision of the House bill “which provides for the ceding of Federal jurisdiction is deleted.” Id., at 12819. Instead, “it has been replaced by the new provisions of section 706 which provide that where there is a State or local law prohibiting the alleged unlawful employment practice, the State or local authorities are given exclusive jurisdiction for a limited period of time” (emphasis added). Ibid. Thus, after state proceedings had terminated, the complainant was free to seek federal remedies. See id., at 12721 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 12595 (remarks of Sen. Clark) (accepting final version because complainant can “eventually” pursue federal remedies after applying for state relief).
Congress left open only a narrow exception for possible exclusive state agency jurisdiction. The EEOC was empowered to enter into worksharing agreements with state agencies. A worksharing agreement did not automatically foreclose a complainant from filing a federal civil suit, but the EEOC was free to include such a provision in a worksharing agreement if it considered that course wise. Id., at 12820. See § 709(b).
Thus, in the fend, Congress expressly decided that no discrimination complainant should be left solely to his remedies before state fair employment commissions, unless the EEOC agreed otherwise. Yet, contrary to this congressional choice, the Court would deny some discrimination victims any federal remedy and would make the decisions of state commissions their exclusive redress, even in the absence of an EEOC agreement. When a state court refuses to overturn a state commission’s rejection of a complainant’s dis*497crimination claim, the Court declares the state remedy to be exclusive.
B
But the Court qualifies its holding. The Court permits the state agency’s decision to be the complainant’s exclusive remedy only if the agency’s procedures satisfy the minimal requirements of due process. Ante, at 481-485. The Court surveys the procedures of the NYHRD and concludes that they are in accord with due process. Ante, at 483-485.11 This discussion by itself demonstrates the fallacy of the Court’s attempt to differentiate between the state agency’s decision and the state court’s affirmance of that decision. By relying more heavily on the adequacy of the state agency’s procedures than on the adequacy of the state court’s procedures, the Court underscores that it is, in fact, granting pre-clusive effect to a state administrative decision.
It is important, also, to note that in two different ways the Court’s inquiry violates the congressional intent. First, the Court undertakes to determine whether the state procedures are adequate when Congress has expressly left that decision to the EEOC. Congress explicitly permitted a state complainant to file suit in federal court despite a final state agency decision, unless the EEOC has signed a worksharing agreement with the state agency foreclosing subsequent federal suits. If the EEOC agreed with the Court that minimal due process in agency procedures justified barring subsequent Title VII suits when the state agency’s decision had been affirmed by a state court, the EEOC could sign work-sharing agreements with state agencies on those terms. By assuming the authority to make that decision, the Court usurps a role that Congress reserved to the EEOC.
*498Second, throughout its consideration of Title VII, Congress was concerned that state agency procedures were not the equivalent of those that it intended federal authorities to employ. Senator Clark told the Senate that “State and local FEPC laws vary widely in effectiveness.” 110 Cong. Rec. 7205 (1964). He continued: “In many areas effective enforcement is hampered by inadequate legislation, inadequate procedures, or an inadequate budget.” Ibid. Unlike the Court, Congress realized that no legal doctrine could accurately gauge the effectiveness of state agencies and laws in eliminating discrimination. In their interpretative memorandum, Senators Clark and Case12 explained:
“It has been suggested . . . that there should be some provision automatically providing for exclusive State jurisdiction where adequate State remedies for discrimination in employment exist. Such a proposal is unworkable. Congress cannot determine nor can we devise a formula for determining which State laws and procedures are adequate. ... An antidiscrimination law cannot be evaluated simply by an examination of its provisions, ‘for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.’” Id., at 7214.
Yet the Court concludes that minimal due process standards provide safeguards sufficient to warrant denying a discrimination victim federal remedies if a state court rejects his request to overturn an adverse state agency decision. In Title VII, Congress wanted to assure discrimination victims more than bare due process; it wanted them to have the benefit of a vigorous effort to eliminate discrimination. See Al*499exander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 44-45 (1974). By affording some discrimination complainants less, the Court contravenes the congressional intent behind Title VIL
C
The Court’s search of the legislative history uncovers only a single bit of concrete support for its interpretation of Title VII.13 But, ironically, the legislative history cited by the Court actually undercuts its position. During the 1972 debates over changes in Title VII, Senator Hruska proposed an amendment that would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for a discrimination victim, with certain exceptions. One of the exceptions permitted concurrent state proceedings. The Senator explained: “[TJhere would be a further exception and that would be proceedings in a State agency. Those proceedings could continue notwithstanding the pend-ency of an employee’s action under section 706 of title VII. *500It seems to me and others that this is only fair.” 118 Cong. Rec. 3369 (1972). Thus, even Senator Hruska would not have prevented duplicative state and federal proceedings. Here is strong evidence of a congressional consensus that state and federal remedies should exist independently of each other.
The Court quotes part of Senator Javits’ response to Senator Hruska’s proposal. See ante, at 475. What the Court fails to point out is that the bulk of Senator Javits’ response rejected the suggestion that the number of discrimination remedies should be reduced. Senator Javits quoted with approval from the testimony of an official of the Department of Justice:
“In the field of civil rights, the Congress has regularly insured that there be a variety of enforcement devices to insure that all available resources are brought to bear on problems of discrimination. . . .
“At this juncture, when we are all agreed that some improvement in the enforcement of Title VII is needed, it would be . . . unwise to diminish in any way the variety of enforcement means available to deal with discrimination in employment.” 118 Cong. Rec. 3369-3370 (1972).
Thus, since Senator Javits was responding to a proposed amendment that expressly provided for separate federal and state proceedings, he certainly did not suggest that state proceedings should bar Title VII suits when he spoke of res judicata. See ante, at 475.14 At the most, he may have been *501referring to suits brought under overlapping federal statutes. And, given his reluctance to reduce the number of available antidiscrimination remedies, it is not clear that his remarks were intended to reach even that far.16 In no sense can the defeat of Senator Hruska’s amendment be interpreted as a congressional endorsement of the Court’s decision to bar a complainant’s Title VII suit based on a state court affirmance of an adverse state agency decision.16 In Senator Javits’ own words, “[w]e should not cut off the range of remedies which is available.” 118 Cong. Rec. 3370 (1972).17
H-l HH
The Court s opinion today is also contrary to the rationales underlying its past Title VII decisions. Time and again, the Court has held that Congress did not intend to foreclose a *502Title VII suit because of the conclusion of proceedings in another forum.
The case list begins with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), when the Court refused to prevent a plaintiff from bringing suit in federal court because of an EEOC determination of no reasonable cause. The Court cited “the large volume of complaints before the Commission and the nonadversary character of many of its proceedings,” id., at 799; noted that Title VII “does not restrict a complainant’s right to sue to those charges as to which the Commission has made findings of reasonable cause,” id., at 798; and refused to “engraft on the statute a requirement which may inhibit the review of claims of employment discrimination in the federal courts,” id., at 798-799. The Court today could just as easily have written about “the nonadversary character” of state agency proceedings and the fact that Title VII does not “restrict a complainant’s right to sue” to those charges as to which a state court has not affirmed the state agency’s findings.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974), the Court repeated the same theme by permitting a Title VII suit despite a prior adverse arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement. The Court emphasized that Congress intended a scheme of overlapping, independent, supplementary discrimination remedies:
“[Legislative enactments in this area have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination. . . . Title VII provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in several forums. . . . And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a later submission to another. Moreover, the legislative his*503tory of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.” Id., at 47-48 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court today disregards the congressional intent described in Alexander when it makes state agency proceedings the exclusive remedy for those complainants who unsuccessfully pursue state judicial review.
Finally, in two subsequent decisions, the Court adhered to Alexander. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 461 (1975), it held that Title VII and 42 U. S. C. § 1981, although “related” and “directed to most of the same ends,” provide “separate, distinct, and independent” discrimination remedies. And in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U. S. 840 (1976), the Court permitted a federal employee to bring a Title VII suit even though the Civil Service Commission had affirmed a federal agency’s rejection of the employee’s discrimination claim.
In each of these four cases, the Court refused to close the doors of the federal courthouse to the Title VII plaintiff. The Court has allowed Title VII plaintiffs to sue in federal court, though they had failed before the EEOC, an arbitrator, and a federal agency. And even today’s majority must add another forum to this list, namely, a state antidis-crimination agency. Until now, it has been “clear from [the] scheme of interrelated and complementary state and federal enforcement that Congress viewed proceedings before the EEOC and in federal court as supplements to available state remedies for employment discrimination.” New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S., at 65. The Court departs from the reasoning of an unbroken line of its prior decisions when it bars a discrimination complainant from suing under Title VII simply because he unsuccessfully sought state judicial “review” of an adverse state agency decision.
*504> I — i
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Court’s decision is its tendency to cut back upon two critical policies underlying Title VII.
First, Congress intended that state antidiscrimination procedures be an integral part of the Nation’s battle against discrimination. For that reason, Congress did not pre-empt state antidiscrimination agencies, see 110 Cong. Rec. 7216 (1964), and instead gave state and local authorities an initial opportunity to resolve discrimination complaints. See, e. g., id., at 12725 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
The Court’s decision is directly contrary to this congressional intent. The lesson of the Court’s ruling is: An unsuccessful state discrimination complainant should not seek state judicial review.18 If a discrimination complainant pursues state judicial review and loses — a likely result given the deferential standard of review in state court — he forfeits his right to seek redress in a federal court. If, however, he simply bypasses the state courts, he can proceed to the EEOC and ultimately to federal court. Instead of a deferential review of an agency record, he will receive in federal court a de novo hearing accompanied by procedural aids such as broad discovery rules and the ability to subpoena witnesses. Thus, paradoxically, the Court effectively has eliminated state reviewing courts from the fight against discrimination in an entire class of cases. Consequently, the state courts will not have a chance to correct state agency errors when the agencies rule against discrimination victims, and the quality of *505state agency decisionmaking can only deteriorate.19 It is a perverse sort of comity that eliminates the reviewing function of state courts in the name of giving their decisions due respect.
This argument against preclusion is not novel. In prior decisions, the Court has refused to set up incentives for discrimination complainants to abandon alternative remedies. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S., at 59, it concluded: “Fearing that the arbitral forum cannot adequately protect their rights under Title VII, some employees may elect to bypass arbitration and institute a lawsuit. The possibility of voluntary compliance or settlement of Title VII *506claims would thus be reduced, and the result could well be more litigation, not less.” In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U. S., at 65, the Court addressed state proceedings directly, explaining: “Complainants unable to recover fees in state proceedings may be expected to wait out the 60-day deferral period, while focusing efforts on obtaining federal relief. . . . Only authorization of fee awards ensures incorporation of state procedures as a meaningful part of the Title VII enforcement scheme.” In this case, the Court has chosen preclusion over common sense, with the result that the state courts will decline, not grow, in importance.20
Second, the Court, for a small class of discrimination complainants, has undermined the remedial purpose of Title VII. Invariably, there will be some complainants who will not be aware of today’s decision. The Court has thus constructed a rule that will serve as a trap for the unwary pro se or poorly represented complainant. For these complainants, their sole remedy lies in the state administrative processes. Yet, inevitably those agencies do not give all discrimination complaints careful attention. Often hampered by “inadequate *507procedures” or “an inadequate budget,” see 110 Cong. Rec. 7205 (1964), the state antidiscrimination agency may give a discrimination charge less than the close examination it would receive in federal court.21 When, as in this case, the state agency dismisses for lack of probable cause, the discrimination complainant is particularly at risk, because inadequate staffing of state agencies can lead to “a tendency to dismiss too many complaints for alleged lack of probable cause.”22 Though state courts may be diligent in reviewing agency dismissals for no probable cause, the nature of the agency’s deliberations combined with deferential judicial review can lead only to discrimination charges receiving less careful consideration than Congress intended when it passed Title VII. The Court’s decision thus cannot be squared with the congressional intent that the fight against discrimination be a policy “of the highest priority.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U. S. 400, 402 (1968).23
*508V
For all these reasons, the Court’s decision is neither “strongly suggested” nor “compelled” by Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980). See ante, at 476. In McCurry, the Court found only “the most equivocal support,” 449 U. S., at 99, for an argument that Congress intended to override the general preclusion rule of § 1738 when it enacted 42 U. S. C. § 1983. But here, the language, the legislative history, and the fundamental policies of Title VII all demonstrate that Congress contemplated relitigation of a discrimination claim in federal court, even though a state court had refused to disturb a state agency decision adverse to the complainant.
And no drastic consequences would flow from a decision finding § 1738 inapplicable in this case. The Court would not be forced to permit a subsequent Title VII suit in federal court if the complainant already had lost a trial on the merits in state court. See n. 10, supra. Furthermore, the state court affirmance of the state agency’s decision would not be discarded. The state decision could be “admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate,” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S., at 60, that is, “substantial weight,” see § 706(b).
But despite the reasonableness of the rule followed by other Courts of Appeals, see n. 2, supra, the Court improperly applies § 1738 to bar petitioner from bringing a Title VII suit in federal court. I dissent.

 Before the Court of Appeals addressed the issue, one District Court in the Second Circuit held that a state court affirmance of a decision by the New York State Division of Human Rights did not preclude a subsequent Title VII suit. Benneci v. Department of Labor, New York State Division of Employment, 388 F. Supp. 1080 (SDNY 1975). Then in Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F. 2d 265 (1977), the Second Circuit ruled, over a strong dissent, that a state court affirmance of a state agency decision barred a subsequent civil rights suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1981. Later, in a brief per curiam decision, Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F. 2d 60, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 983 (1979), the Circuit concluded that Mitchell dictated the same res judicata result for Title VII, despite the significant differences between § 1981 and the complex structure of Title VII, which expressly addresses the role of state proceedings in the resolution of discrimination claims. The District Judge in this case appropriately felt himself bound by Sinicropi, but he wrote a persuasive opinion questioning its wisdom. 477 F. Supp. 587, 591-594 (SDNY 1979). On appeal, a panel of the Second Circuit also found the outcome in this case dictated by Sinicropi. 623 F. 2d 786 (1980). Two judges of that court voted for rehearing en banc. App. 80.

 Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F. 2d 909, 914, n. 5 (CA7 1981). All other Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue have disagreed with the Second Circuit. In addition to Unger, see Smouse v. General Electric Co., 626 F. 2d 333, 336 (CA3 1980) (expressly rejecting *487Sinicropi); Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 612 F. 2d 1079, 1084 (CA8) (“questioning” Sinicropi), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 966 (1980). See also Aleem v. General Felt Industries, Inc., 661 F. 2d 135, 137 (CA9 1981) (“Sinicropi is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander [v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974)]”).
Commentators, too, agree that the Second Circuit’s rule is ill-conceived. See Note, Res Judicata in Successive Employment Discrimination Suits, 1980 U. Ill. Law Forum 1049, 1099; Comment, 15 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 29, 266-276 (1980) (criticizing application of Second Circuit’s rule to 42 U. S. C. § 1981); Comment, 31 Rutgers L. Rev. 973 (1979) (same); Comment, 6 Ford. Urban L. J. 481, 492-494 (1978) (same); Comment, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 987 (1978); Note, 53 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 187 (1978). See also Jackson, Matheson, & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1485, 1519-1520 (1981) (rejecting application of res judicata when, as in this case, the state court affirms a state agency finding of no probable cause); Comment, 30 Vand. L. Rev. 1260 (1977); Richards, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver: A Threat to Title VII Rights, 29 Ark. L. Rev. 129, 158 (1975) (interpreting Title VII contrary to Second Circuit’s decisions, but before the relevant Second Circuit cases were decided).

 See also § 706(f)(1) (permitting the district court to stay a Title VII suit for not more than 60 days pending termination of “State or local pro*488ceedings,” without suggesting that the termination would bar further district court proceedings).

 By indicating that final decisions in state proceedings have no preclu-sive effect on the EEOC, Congress also indicated that final decisions in state proceedings do not preclude a subsequent Title VII suit in federal court. “It would be meaningless for Congress to set up standards for E. E. O. C. examination of cases after determinations were made in state proceedings if Congress intended that those cases be barred from consideration in federal court,” because the EEOC, “which lacks enforcement power, would be attempting to mediate with defendants who were already protected from any further legal action.” Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F. 2d 447, 450, n. 1 (CA7 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 928 (1975).

 Congress simply would have inserted the words “preclusive effect” instead of “substantial weight.” The legislative history of the “substantial weight” amendment indicates that Congress intended for the EEOC to refrain only from overturning state decisions “peremptorily” and for the EEOC simply to give them “due respect.” 118 Cong. Rec. 310 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin).

 The Court observes that this section does not address the issue of the proper weight to be afforded state decisions. See ante, at 471, n. 8. It is *491true that § 706(c) does not specify the precise amount of deference due a state decision. But by permitting a complainant to file charges with the EEOC and ultimately to bring suit despite the termination of state proceedings, § 706(c) does provide that the termination of state proceedings will not have preclusive effect.
Section 706(f)(1) follows the same path. It permits the federal court to stay a Title VII suit pending termination of state “proceedings,” without suggesting that the termination of state proceedings will preclude further action in the Title VII suit.

 Sections 297-a(7)(d) and (e) describe the scope of review by the New York Human Rights Appeal Board. Those standards also apply to review *492by the New York courts of NYHRD decisions. See Mize v. State Division of Human Rights, 33 N. Y. 2d 53, 57, 304 N. E. 2d 231, 233 (1973); N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7803 (McKinney 1981); Gabrielli & Nonna, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in New York: An Overview and Survey, 52 St. John’s L. Rev. 361, 369-373 (1978).

 Despite these express statutory provisions and explanations from New York’s highest courts, this Court seems to insist that New York courts pass upon the merits of a complainant’s discrimination claim. See ante, at 480-481, n. 21. If this is the basis for the Court’s decision giving the New York court’s ruling preclusive effect, then today’s decision is much less important than some might think at first glance. If a state court in fact adheres to a pure arbitrary and capricious standard, the Court might not grant such a state court decision preclusive effect.
On the other hand, the Court may be stating only that use of an arbitrary and capricious standard involves some examination of the merits, because the reviewing court must look at the evidence to determine if the agency acted in an arbitrary fashion. If this is the gist of the Court’s argument, the Court advances its case very little. When a court reviews an agency record under a deferential standard of review, the agency, not the court, decides the merits of the claim.
The Court states that “[t]here is no requirement that judicial review must proceed de novo if it is to be preclusive.” Ante, at 481, n. 21. Whether that conclusion is correct in the usual case or not, it certainly cannot stand in the context of Title VII. As the Court itself holds, Congress *493expressly intended that a state agency’s determination would not bar a Title VII suit. When the state court does not conduct a de novo review, it accepts the determination of the state agency. When the Court gives such a state court affirmance preclusive effect, it thereby forecloses a Title VII suit based on a state agency’s resolution of the complainant’s discrimination charge — a result that Title VII condemns.

 The primacy of the state agency’s decision is underscored by the source of the preclusion rule upon which the Court relies. To determine the pre-clusive effect the state court affirmance would have in the New York courts, the Court quotes N. Y. Exec. Law § 300 (McKinney 1972). Ante, at 467. But § 300 makes no reference to state court decisions; it prevents state suit after a final decision in any proceeding brought before the *494NYHRD. Thus, for the purposes of state preclusion, a state court affirmance of the state agency’s final decision is mere happenstance.

 One reason for the Court’s decision is its fear that a state court affirmance of a state agency decision cannot be distinguished from a full state *495court trial of a discrimination claim. See ante, at 469-470. This fear is unfounded.
When Congress permitted a complainant to bring a Title VII suit despite the termination of his state proceedings, it had proceedings connected with state antidiscrimination agencies clearly in mind. See §§ 706(c) and 709(b). Thus, the Court easily could hold that Congress referred to state administrative processing of discrimination claims, including judicial review of agency decisions, when it referred to “proceedings” in §§ 706(b) and (c), and, at the same time, could refuse to hold that Congress intended to include a state court trial on the merits of the complainant’s claim within the term “proceedings.”
Such a decision would be buttressed by the fact that the procedures available in state court closely approximate those available in federal court. Moreover, the policies favoring preclusion under 28 U. S. C. § 1738 would be considerably stronger if the merits of the discrimination claim had been settled by the state court itself. The Fourth Circuit recently had no difficulty distinguishing a state court trial on a discrimination claim from a *496state court affirmance of a state agency’s determination. Moosavi v. Fairfax County Bd. of Educ., 666 F. 2d 58 (1981).

 The Court is quite correct in holding that a state decision must satisfy at least due process before it can be given preclusive effect in the federal courts. Indeed, this aspect of the Court’s decision follows directly from *498our decision earlier this term in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 (1982).

 The Clark-Case memorandum is a particularly authoritative source for determining the congressional intent behind Title VII. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 350-352, and 351, n. 35 (1977).

 The Court also cites legislative materials indicating that congressional defenders of employers and unions preferred trial de novo in federal court over conclusive administrative proceedings before the EEOC. See ante, at 473-475. But the Court focuses on the wrong choice. The question is not why Congress chose federal trial de novo over conclusive EEOC proceedings, but why Congress chose to provide a federal remedy rather than relying on state remedies. The reason is that Congress wanted to provide a federal remedy, whether before a federal court or the EEOC, separate from and independent of the antidiscrimination procedures afforded by the States.
Furthermore, the Court’s decision is contrary to its own reading of the legislative history. Presumably, if the complainant prevails before the state agency and also before the state courts, the Court would give that decision in his favor preclusive effect. Thus, if state law provides the complainant with an inadequate remedy, evidently he will be able to bring a Title VII suit in federal court asserting the state decision as res judicata on the issue of the employer’s liability. Yet the Court insists that Congress intended that employers not be bound by administrative findings but instead intended that employers have the protection of a trial de novo in federal court. Ibid.

 The Court finds it significant that Senator Javits referred to New York state administrative proceedings during his remarks. Ante, at 475-476, n. 17. But Senator Javits cited New York proceedings only to show that businessmen had not been subject to harassment through discrimination complaints; he did not mention state proceedings during his discussion of res judicata. See 118 Cong. Rec. 3370 (1972). Furthermore, when Senator Javits discussed res judicata, he spoke of litigation instigated by the EEOC, the Attorney General, and an individual. See ante, at 475. Thus, Senator Javits was addressing only federal proceedings; he was not sug*501gesting that the outcome of state proceedings might have res judicata effect. The EEOC and the Attorney General of the United States obviously do not participate in proceedings before the New York state agency.

 Since Senator Javits specifically mentioned successive suits brought by the EEOC, the Attorney General, and an individual, see ibid., he may have been referring only to successive suits brought under Title VII. See also 118 Cong. Rec. 3371-3372 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (rejecting Hruska amendment and insisting that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 and Title VII should not be mutually exclusive).

 The Court quotes Senator Williams’ statement that “the individual claimant should [not] be allowed to litigate his claim to completion in one forum, and then if dissatisfied, go to another forum to try again.” 118 Cong. Rec. 3372 (1972). See ante, at 476. But the Court fails to quote Senator Williams’ immediately succeeding statement: “I do feel that where one form of relief proves unresponsive or impractical, . . . [the complainant] should have that right.” 118 Cong. Rec. 3372 (1972). Indeed, the feared unresponsiveness of some state agencies was a principal reason for the enactment of Title VII. See 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 48, n. 9 (1974).

 This reading of the statute is fully supported by the original legislative history of Title VII. In 1964, Senator Tower offered an amendment similar to Senator Hruska’s 1972 amendment, making Title VII the exclusive federal employment discrimination remedy. 110 Cong. Rec. 13650 (1964). Like Senator Hruska’s amendment, Senator Tower’s made an exception for state proceedings. Ibid. There was no mention of res judicata during the *502debates, see id,., at 13650-13652, and the Senate rejected the amendment by a vote of 29 to 59. Id., at 13652.

 Indeed, a prudent discrimination complainant may make every effort to prevent the state agency from reaching a final decision. If the complainant prevails after a full hearing, he runs the risk that his adversary may seek judicial review. He could then find himself closed out of federal court if a state court decides that the agency’s decision is unsupported by sufficient evidence. See Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 612 F. 2d, at 1084. In some future case, the Court may find such a result inimical to Title VII but, given today’s decision, no complainant could safely predict *505that the Court would not apply § 1738. For a complainant with some evidence to support his claim, the wiser course might well be to thwart all state proceedings and wait for EEOC attempts at conciliation and the full procedural advantages of federal court adjudication.

 The Court’s response to this is unconvincing. The Court argues that, if it does not give the state court affirmance preclusive effect, it will “lesse[n] the incentive for full participation by the parties and for searching review by state officials.” Ante, at 478. It is difficult to see how this result will come about, when a complainant can win a ruling in his favor if he succeeds on judicial review and when his adversary risks losing the state court judgment if he does not rebut the complainant’s arguments. Moreover, the parties will have another incentive to litigate vigorously during state judicial review, because no one disputes that state court affirmances “may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the [federal] court deems appropriate.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S., at 60, that is, “substantial weight,” see § 706(b).
The Court also insists that a reversal in this case would “reduce the incentive for States to work towards effective and meaningful antidiscrimination systems.” Ante, at 478. This fact will undoubtedly surprise state officials in the 47 States outside the Second Circuit — States which have not been governed by the preclusion rule currently followed only in that Circuit. See n. 2, supra. These state officials unquestionably recognize, as did Congress when it passed Title VII, that state procedures can provide efficient dispute resolution, even if the possibility of a subsequent Title VII suit exists. In any event, the Court hardly increases the quality of state decisionmaking when it effectively writes the state courts out of a large number of administrative cases.

 Thus, when the Court labels this line of reasoning “dubious,” see ante, at 478, n. 19, it is doubting not only the logic of this dissent, but also the logic of two prior decisions of this Court. In addition, it seems unlikely that many discrimination complainants will find the “delay,” see ante, at 479, n. 19, of a Title VII suit a measurable burden when they take into account the procedural advantages of federal court litigation as compared with state judicial review of agency decisions.
The Court also questions whether the state decisionmaking process will improve through practice. See ante, at 478-479, n. 19. Although some might argue the point, it seems that state agencies will be more careful if their decisions are subject to state court review and that state decision-makers will learn from experience. But even if the quality of state decisionmaking does not decline as fewer complainants seek state judicial review, a reduction in the number of discrimination cases handled by state courts obviously carries with it a reduction in the role of state authorities in resolving discrimination charges. This result is directly contrary to the congressional intent.

 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S., at 57-58 (concluding that the informal procedures used during arbitration “mak[e] arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts”).

 Bonfield, An Institutional Analysis of the Agencies Administering Fair Employment Practices Laws (Part II), 42 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1035, 1048-1049 (1967). “[T]he vagueness of the probable cause concept makes it a flexible tool in the hands of a commissioner”; “[b]y tightening it he can cut the Agency’s caseload, perhaps to allow the Agency to devote its resources to cases that may be expected to produce a higher return in terms of job opportunities, or perhaps only to disguise his own personal timidity.” Note, The California FEPC: Stepchild of the State Agencies, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 187, 191 (1965).
The risk is heightened by the fact that the complainant evidently must present more proof to establish probable cause than to survive a summary judgment motion in federal court. Probable cause exists when there is “reasonable ground of suspicion supported by facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the law is being violated.” See Goldberg v. State Commission for Human Rights, 54 Misc. 2d 676, 680, 283 N. Y. S. 2d 347, 352 (1966).

 There is one final irony in the Court’s decision. While the Court holds that a New York court’s affirmance of an adverse state agency decision *508precludes a complainant from bringing a federal Title VII suit, a New York court has held that an unsuccessful Title VII suit in federal court does not preclude a proceeding before the NYHRD. State Division of Human Rights v. County of Monroe, 88 Misc. 2d 16, 386 N. Y. S. 2d 317 (1976). Citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, the court noted that “dual or overlapping remedies were contemplated and expressly intended *509by Congress in Title VII,” 88 Misc. 2d, at 19, 386 N. Y. S. 2d, at 320, and held that “neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applies,” id., at 20, 386 N. Y. S. 2d, at 321.