Court Opinion

ID: 9643762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:39:58.249082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:03.485877
License: Public Domain

JAMES D. CLEMENS, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
Except for a single point — which I consider critical — the majority opinion keenly analyzes the problems which may arise under “the Act”, § 222.160 RSMo.1978. The unacceptable point is number (3) in the majority opinion, holding the defendant took no action that tolled the 180-day period in which the trial court should have brought her to trial.
When defendant was returned to Franklin County, pursuant to her request for disposition of numerous pending Missouri charges, she at first waived both counsel and a preliminary hearing but when the magistrate’s transcript was filed in the circuit court she reneged and requested appointment of counsel, at whose request the cause was remanded for a preliminary hearing. That resulted in re-certification to the circuit court where an information was promptly filed. Before arraignment, pursuant' to defendant’s request for disposition of other charges, she was transferred to St. Louis County and on November 1, 1977 arraignment in Franklin County was continued because of her absence in St. Louis County. Again, on November 15 the case was called and arraignment was postponed because of defendant’s continued absence. After that 29-day absence in St. Louis County defendant appeared in Franklin County on November 18 and pleaded not guilty.
By this time, defendant herself had consumed 116 days of court time, leaving only 64 days for the state to meet the 180-day limitation. Defendant’s case was set, and then reset, for trial on January 26,1978, the 182nd day after the clock had started to run. Defendant’s motion to dismiss was then denied. Prompt disposition should take into consideration the fact Franklin County is not in continuous session. It is part of a three-county, two-judge circuit.
Here, defendant sought return to Missouri not only for disposition of three charges pending against her in respondent’s Franklin County, but also for disposition of other charges pending against her in St. Louis, Pettis and Laclede counties. This case does not neatly fit into the pattern designed by the Act; its obvious design was to assure prompt disposition of a charge pending against an out-of-state defendant.
I would hold — as the respondent judge ruled — that the 180-day limitation had been tolled by the defendant’s invited 29-day absence from his court’s jurisdiction.
The record here shov/s defendant was absent from respondent’s jurisdiction for 29 days — during the critical period for her arraignment and trial setting. But for this voluntary absence defendant’s case could promptly have been set for trial well within the 180-day limitation period. This absence was caused by defendant herself; she had requested disposition of other charges pending against her in St. Louis County and for 29 days was there for that purpose.
The Act’s time limitation is not inflexible. Although the Act is to be liberally construed to afford prompt disposal of pending *61charges, it should not be construed to enable a charged defendant to obtain discharge by maneuvers calculated to produce delay. Paragraph 1 of Article III of the Act subjects the 180-day limitation to “any necessary or reasonable continuance”. Paragraph 1 of Article VI declares the time limitation shall be tolled “for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial”.
The majority opinion does limit its holding to the facts of this case. Its rationale, however, is that delays in bringing a case to trial, even when as here that is necessitated by a defendant’s affirmative action, those delays should not be charged against a defendant in computing the 180-day limitation. If that is the law it would open the gates to a host of dilatory actions. For example, by last-minute action a defendant could thwart a timely trial on such grounds as his illness or absence of counsel, by request for a mental examination, or delay to procure an essential defense witness. Or, even without his own affirmative action, a defendant could force dismissal of charges by other events necessitating a last minute delay in trial, such as illness of the judge or a juror, or any event that might result in a mistrial.
Strict application of the 180-day limitation is incongruous here for prompt disposition of the multiple charges against defendant in four different counties. Considering the consumption of time available to defendant by preliminary moves in each of the pending cases, it is inconceivable that the state could thereafter afford defendant trial in every case within 180 days of the request for disposition of all pending charges.
The issue here was whether during the critical period of her 29-day absence defendant was — voluntarily—“unable to .stand trial”, and the 180-day time limit was thereby tolled. I would say yes. The precise issue does not appear to have been ruled but a parallel case arose in United States v. Mason, 372 F.Supp. 651 (D.C.Ohio), where the court held: “Initially, the Court agrees with the Government that the time period must be tolled while the defendant was standing trial in Michigan, (citation). This appears to be the only logical result, since if a person is standing trial in one state he cannot be expected to be standing trial in another state simultaneously.”
Here, defendant was not standing trial in St. Louis County, but she was there at her own request for judicial determination of a felony complaint against her. I would hold that during the critical 29-day period defendant was “unable to stand trial” in Franklin County and running of the 180 day time limit was tolled for that time. It would follow that the respondent judge did not improperly deny defendant’s motions to dismiss and was not without jurisdiction to proceed. I would hold our preliminary writ of prohibition was improvidently granted.