Court Opinion

ID: 9811483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:22:09.427082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:09.527442
License: Public Domain

OPINION
Opinion by
Chief Justice MORRISS.
While his wife, Isis, was pregnant with their daughter, N.S.G., William Green and Isis used illegal drugs together. During the twenty-two months after N.S.G.’s birth, William used drugs, physically abused Isis, brought stolen goods and unsavory characters home, absconded from Texas to Tennessee to avoid arrest, and ultimately was brought back and incarcerated in Texas for burglary. William’s ac*363tions produced three principal results: (a) William’s and Isis’s ejection from the home of William’s sister, Patricia Arnold, and Patricia’s husband, Jerry Arnold; (b) N.S.G.’s residence with the Arnolds, but not with William or Isis, the vast majority of her young life; and (c) William’s failure to support N.S.G.
William appeals from the termination of his parental rights to N.S.G.,1 the termination action having been instituted by the Arnolds. William contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the termination. We disagree and affirm the termination because we conclude that (1) sufficient evidence established at least one substantive ground under Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code and (2) sufficient evidence established that termination was in the best interest of N.S.G.
Although the petition for termination listed a variety of grounds for termination,2 only one statutory ground— along with a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child — is required to be adequately proven to support an order of termination. In re N.R., 101 S.W.8d 771, 774 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.). The trial court found that William did four things:
(1) voluntarily left [N.S.G.] alone or in the possession of another not the parent without expressing an intent to return, without providing for the adequate support of [N.S.G.], and remained away for a period of at least three months;3 [ground (B) ]
(2) voluntarily left [N.S.G.] alon[e] in the possession of another without providing adequate support of [N.S.G.] and remained away for a period of a[t] least six months;4 [ground (C) ]
(3) knowing[ly] placed or knowing[ly] allowed [N.S.G.] to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the physical or emotional well-being of [N.S.G.];5 [ground (D) ] and
(4) engaged in conduct or knowing[ly] placed [N.S.G.] with persons who engaged in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of [N.S.G.]6 [ground (E) ].
Termination of parental rights is a drastic remedy and is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the petitioner to justify termination by clear and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001 (Vernon Supp.2006); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex.2002). The “clear and convincing proof’ standard is an intermediate one, situated between the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of criminal proceedings. In re G.M., 596 *364S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980). Evidence is clear and convincing when the proof is such that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex.2002).
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 101.007 (Vernon 2002); J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that we must assume that the fact-finder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable fact-finder could do so. A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence contrary to the judgment that a reasonable finder of fact could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. In conducting a legal sufficiency review in a parental rights termination case, however, we must consider all of the evidence, not just that which favors the verdict. In re 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex.2005). If we determine that no reasonable fact-finder could form a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven, then the evidence is legally insufficient, and we must generally render judgment for the parent. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; see Tex.R.App. P. 43.3.
When reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge to a parental rights termination, we consider the evidence the fact-finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25-26. In applying this standard to a trial court’s findings, we ask whether there was sufficient evidence presented to produce in the mind of a rational fact-finder a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25; N.R., 101 S.W.3d at 774. In reviewing termination findings for factual sufficiency, we must give due deference to the fact-findings at the trial level, as in C.H., and should not supplant the fact-finder’s judgment with our own. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; see Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex.2003). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact-finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. In applying this standard, “[a]n appellate court’s review must not be so rigorous that the only factfindings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt.” C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767-69, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). We must assume that the fact-finder resolved any disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable fact-finder could have done so. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We must also disregard all evidence that a reasonable fact-finder could have disbelieved. Id. We must consider, however, undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we must consider evidence favorable to termination if a reasonable fact-finder could, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005).
The evidence shows that Isis gave birth to N.S.G. in December 2004 in Odessa, Texas, where William and Isis had driven to visit friends, arriving just shortly before the birth. William testified that his wife *365had been using marihuana and cocaine for the first three months of her pregnancy, before they learned of her pregnancy. He also testified that he was using drugs with Isis and that the burglary which resulted in the issuance of the warrant for his arrest occurred while Isis was pregnant with N.S.G. When N.S.G. was born, tests revealed that Isis had marihuana in her blood but that N.S.G. did not.
William, Isis, and N.S.G. returned to Linden from Odessa two days after the birth and moved in with the Arnolds, the petitioners in this action for termination. On December 15, William signed an agreement to place N.S.G. with Patricia. He also agreed to undergo a drug assessment on January 6, 2005, and had agreed to stay in the Arnolds’ home until the investigation was complete. Despite these agreements, William left the area and went to Tennessee, leaving N.S.G. with Patricia. Isis testified that, two days after N.S.G.’s birth, William committed a burglary and that, after N.S.G.’s birth, William was ejected from the Arnolds’ household. The evidence shows that William voluntarily left N.S.G. with the Arnolds when he left Texas to evade the outstanding arrest warrants; there is no evidence that he expressed an intent to return (other than a statement at trial that he intended to return after he had saved sufficient money to hire a lawyer to contest his burglary charge).
N.S.G. (twenty-two months old at the time of trial) had lived in the Arnolds’ household since she was five days old. Although there is some contradiction in the testimony whether William or Isis first ceased living at the Arnold home, it is clear that both William and Isis left the home within the first week of their arrival and that they left N.S.G. with the Arnolds when they left the home.
Isis testified that William was ordered out of the Arnold house because he had been using drugs while living there. Jerry’s testimony added that William had also “roughed up” Isis, had brought stolen goods into the house, and had allowed some of William’s unsavory friends into the house, all in violation of conditions which Jerry had placed on William’s residency there.
Isis had attempted to take N.S.G. from the day care center operated by Patricia, but was prevented from doing so by representatives of the Child Protective Services agency of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (CPS) until after she had received a drug assessment and had participated in counseling. Until Isis complied with these requirements, her contact with N.S.G. was to be restricted to supervised visitation. Instead of complying, she and William drove to Tennessee. William and Isis freely admit that the reason they hurriedly left Texas and went to Tennessee was for the purpose of avoiding William’s arrest and prosecution for the felony charge of burglary. William testified that they had left N.S.G. with the Arnolds because CPS would not allow Isis to take the baby away from the Arnolds’ day care center because of her alleged drug use. Patricia testified that both William and Isis lived with her and her husband very briefly after N.S.G. was born, but then left and went to Tennessee. She further indicated that neither William nor Isis communicated with the Arnolds about N.S.G. during the six weeks they were on the run from police in Tennessee. The testimony also showed that, during the first twenty-two months of N.S.G’s life, William and Isis had spent perhaps a week with N.S.G.
Despite their flight, William and Isis were both arrested January 28, 2005, and were brought back to Texas from Tennes*366see. For all but six weeks of N.S.G.’s life up to the time of trial, William and Isis had each been incarcerated. At the time of trial, William and Isis were each still incarcerated; both participated in the hearing under bench warrants issued for that purpose.
The evidence shows that neither William nor Isis ever provided any support for N.S.G., either during or after the six weeks they were on the run. There is evidence that William left N.S.G. with the Arnolds for over six months without providing any support.7 There is no evidence that William made an attempt to do anything for the benefit of N.S.G. during the period of time beginning when he left N.S.G. with his sister until the trial of the termination proceeding. During the approximately six weeks that William was in Tennessee, he made no effort to monitor the condition of N.S.G. and had very little contact with the Arnolds about N.S.G. while he was incarcerated in Texas. The sole evidence of any action by William directed toward N.S.G., after leaving her with the Arnolds, is his participation in defending the termination action and filing this appeal. Little evidence suggests that he had any plan in place to return from Tennessee or to seek to recover N.S.G. His return to Texas was compelled by law enforcement action and was not due to any choice of his own. William also, however, testified that he paid nothing toward the support of N.S.G. because he had nothing with which to pay during his six weeks of freedom; according to his testimony, after his arrest, he remained imprisoned and, thus, had no funds to send for her support. William was incarcerated during the last twenty months of the first twenty-two months of N.S.G.’s life. That incarceration, coupled with the extremely young age of N.S.G., considerably limited his options regarding her care or support.
In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated under subdivision (1) of the statute — that is, one or more “grounds” — and must also prove that termination is in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001; Richardson v. Green, 677 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.1984); Swate v. Swate, 72 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied). Both elements must be established; termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 277; Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987). We conclude that both elements were established.

(1) Sufficient Evidence Established at Least One Substantive Ground Under Section 161.001

We first address the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that William has committed one of the actions required by Section 161.001(1) to justify termination of his parental rights to N.S.G. As previously mentioned, four grounds were alleged. We hold that ground (E) was adequately proven.
Ground (E) allows for termination on proof that the parent “engaged in conduct ... which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E). Ground (E) “refers only to the parent’s conduct, as evidenced not only by the parent’s acts, *367but also by the parent’s omissions or failures to act.” In re S.K., 198 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied). “The conduct to be examined includes what the parent did both before and after the child was born.” Id.
“Endanger” means
more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury. Rather, “endanger” means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize and imprisonment is certainly a factor to be considered by the trial court on the issue of endangerment.
Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533 (citations omitted). Endangerment can occur through both acts and omissions. Neglect can be just as dangerous to the child’s emotional and physical health as intentional abuse.
Subsection E [of the termination statute] focuses on the parent’s conduct alone, including acts and omissions. While the endangerment must be a direct result of the parent’s course of conduct, the conduct does not have to be directed toward the child, nor does the child have to suffer actual injury for the finding to be upheld. Similarly, the conduct does not have to cause a concrete threat of injury to the child. If the evidence shows that the parent has engaged in a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the child, then the finding under subsection E may be upheld.
In re A.J.H., 205 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (quoting In re W.J.H., 111 S.W.3d 707, 715-16 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied)).
Subsection (E) does not require there be danger of physical harm; endangering a child’s emotional well-being alone is sufficient. In re S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 83-85 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, writ refd n.r.e.); see Allred v. Harris County Child Welfare Unit, 615 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (conduct, abusing mother during pregnancy and violating parole conditions which caused parent to be incarcerated, endangered emotional well-being of child).
It has long been settled that imprisonment, standing alone, does not constitute “abandonment” of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533 (imprisonment alone does not endanger child); In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied); In re S.D.H., 591 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1979, no writ) (imprisonment does not constitute “abandonment,” nor is it conduct “endangering” a child); H.W.J. v. State Dep’t of Public Welfare, 543 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ) (same); Hutson v. Haggard, 475 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1971, no writ) (imprisonment is not “abandonment”). Though imprisonment of a parent is insufficient, standing alone, to constitute “engaging in conduct which endangers the emotional or physical well-being of the child,” it is a factor to consider on the issue of endangerment. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533-34; In re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d 190, 199 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
On the other hand, if the evidence, which includes imprisonment, shows a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional well-being of the child, a finding under Section 161.001(1)(E) is supportable. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533-34; M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d at 199; Wray v. Lenderman, 640 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1982, no writ). “[C]onduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endan*368gers the physical and emotional well-being of a child. Drug use and its effect on a parent’s life and his ability to parent may establish an endangering course of conduct.” A.J.H., 205 S.W.3d at 81 (quoting In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).
There is ample evidence that William engaged in activities — illegal and otherwise — that resulted in this type of uncertainty in the life of N.S.G. See A.J.H., 205 S.W.3d at 81; see also In re S.T., 127 S.W.3d 371, 378-79 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.). After N.S.G.’s birth, William engaged in criminal activity (burglary), “roughed up” Isis, failed to submit to drug counseling, and engaged in the taking of illicit drugs. Because of William’s actions while residing with the Arnolds— drug use, abuse of Isis, possession of stolen goods at the Arnold home, and allowing unsavory characters into the home— William broke his agreement with the Ar-nolds and thus disqualified himself from continued residence, with N.S.G., at the Arnold home. William’s pattern of conduct which has been severe enough to cause his incarceration — not to mention his disqualification from residence with the Arnolds, the one place he could have lived with N.S.G. with his limited circumstances — can certainly be sufficient for the trial court to have based its determination that his course of conduct endangers the emotional well-being of N.S.G. and supports termination of his parent-child relationship.8 C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (pattern of conduct inimical to child-rearing; including failure to support emotionally and pattern of criminal activity and separation from child after child’s birth); see In re *369No. 14-06-00137-CV, 2007 WL 174371, at *5, 2007 Tex.App. LEXIS 476, at *14-15 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 25, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent’s “life choices have left him unable to provide a safe and stable home,” “unable to care for,” “pattern of conduct inconsistent with the very idea of child-rearing,” parent incarcerated majority of child’s life for crimes committed before and after birth of child, termination affirmed).

(2) Sufficient Evidence Established that Termination Was in the Best Interest of N.S.G.

William also argues that there was insufficient evidence to allow the court to find that it was in the best interest of N.S.G. to terminate his parental rights. This portion of our review proceeds from the policy-based presumption that the best interest of a child is usually served by preserving the parent-child relationship. G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847; see Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.1976). In determining the child’s best interest, the fact-finder may consider the current and future physical and emotional needs of the child, the current and future physical and emotional danger the child may confront with his or her parent, and the parental abilities of the individual seeking custody. Some factors which may be considered when determining the best interest of a child include (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex.1976); see In re R.M., 180 S.W.3d 874, 879 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
Of course, in this circumstance, the desires of the child cannot be determined because of her age. The emotional and physical needs of N.S.G. would clearly be very well met with the Arnolds, as acknowledged by both Isis and William and ratified by their decision to leave N.S.G. with them; this was also shown by the evidence of the stability of the Arnold home and the fact that Patricia owns and operates a State-licensed child-care facility. Emotional and physical danger to N.S.G. caused or potentially caused by William’s prior and continued criminal behavior 9 is a factor to be considered. William’s decision to commit additional crimes and to use drugs after NS.G.’s birth and his decision to leave her (albeit in a safe, State-approved place) while he was attempting to avoid arrest also mitigate against William’s case. Likewise, his wife’s use of illicit drugs without any intervention by William and his physical abuse of his wife weighs against him. Finally, when William was questioned about any plans he might have that would allow him to become a parent to N.S.G., he only responded generically by testifying that he intended to be a good parent and that he believed he could get an oil-field job after getting out of jail.
Under the standards as set out above, we conclude that there is both legally and *370factually sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to determine that the best interest of N.S.G. was served by the termination of William’s parental rights. Therefore, Section 161.001(2) of the Texas Family Code has been met. See Tex Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(2).
We affirm the judgment terminating William’s parental rights to N.S.G.

. Isis has dismissed her appeal of the termination of her parental rights to N.S.G. Though this appeal is brought by William alone, the case was tried against both William and Isis.

. Significantly, the grounds as pled did not include an allegation that William had knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that had resulted in his conviction for an offense and his confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for N.S.G. for not less than two years from the date of filing the petition, which could have allowed termination under Section 161.001 (1)(Q) of the Texas Family Code.

. See Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(B) (Vernon Supp.2006).

. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1 )(C) (Vernon Supp.2006).

. See Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(I)(D) (Vernon Supp.2006).

. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E) (Vernon Supp.2006).

. Rather than leaving N.S.G. in conditions or surroundings that would likely endanger N.S.G.'s physical or emotional well-being, he left her with the Arnolds. The evidence shows that the Arnold home is a good one and that they care for N.S.G. well.

. The Other Grounds. Ground (D) allows for termination on proof that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D). Ground (D) "refers only to the acceptability of a child's living conditions.” S.K., 198 S.W.3d at 902. The Ar-nolds, with whom William left N.S.G., provide a safe and healthy environment for N.S.G., and neither of them engages in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of N.S.G. Therefore, the Arnolds themselves, by their meritorious conduct, have taken away the ground alleged that William knowingly placed N.S.G. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of N.S.G. Ground (D) was not adequately proven.
Grounds (B) and (C) are questionable. The evidence is clear that William left N.S.G. with the Arnolds, who were not parents, that he did not express an intent to return at the time, and that he remained away for a period of at least six months, a course of action which appears to qualify under either ground (B) or (C). See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(B), (C). The question remaining as to each subsection is whether William failed to provide adequate support for N.S.G. within those provisions. The evidence shows that he did not provide any support for her, but it also suggests he was unable to support her. There may be unresolved issues on (1) whether these grounds require proof of the parent's ability to support and (2) whether the evidence shows proper arrangements for support were made with the Arnolds. See In re 178 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (grounds (C) and (F) involved; court recited lack of proof of ability to support); In re Fite v. Nelson, 869 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex.App.-Flouston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (leaving child with one able to provide, without agreement for that person to support for parent, insufficient to show provision of adequate support by parent); see also Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex.1985) (parent left children with relatives who explicitly agreed to care for them until parent "could get on her feet”; parent made efforts; no termination). But see Roderick v. Tabor, No. 03-98-00075-CV, 1999 WL 125443, 1999 Tex.App. LEXIS 1594 (Tex.App.-Austin Mar. 11, 1999, no pet.) (mem. op.) (distinguishing Holick and holding that ground (C) does not require proof of ability to support). But, because we conclude that ground (E) was adequately proven, we need not decide whether grounds (B) and (C) were properly supported.

. He had spent six years of his twenty-five-year life incarcerated in prison, in jail, or in the Texas Youth Commission. He testified that he had two felony convictions for burglary of a habitation and a felony conviction for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.