Court Opinion

ID: 9747543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:20:13.722436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:24.420532
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
The appellant argued before this Court that the lower court erred in its refusal to grant a series of points for charge to the effect that unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment is a factor to be considered by the jury in determining the voluntariness of the confession. The court below had refused the requested points of charge reasoning that unnecessary delay is a question of *402law and not a concern of the jury. The majority today holds that the trial court was in error and reversed the judgments of sentence. I disagree and therefore dissent.
An analysis of the requested points for charge which are at the center of this controversy satisfies me that the points were designed to raise the evidentiary question of a violation of Pa.R.Crim.Pro. ISO and were not designed to further the inquiry as to the issue of the voluntariness of the statement.1 Requested point of charge # 14 was a statement of Rule 130. Its inclusion in the charge would have required the jury to pass upon an alleged violation of this rule. This clearly was not within the province of the jury and is also not necessarily relevant to the issue of the voluntariness of the statement. Commonwealth v. Myers, 472 Pa. -, 371 A.2d 1279 (1977) (Dissenting opinion of this writer joined by Eagen, J.).
*403Requested points of charge # 15 and ±t 16, although phrased in terms of voluntariness, nevertheless focus upon the legal concept of “unreasonable delay”. This concept has no meaning where the issue is coercion, but rather relates to a legal determination which is incident to a consideration of a Futeh2 violation.
The length of time is only significant where the question of voluntariness is at issue, and it is asserted that the period of time acted upon the accused as a coercive factor tending to overcome his will. Thus, time is normally only relevant when it precedes the confession. While we have considered post-confession delay in some instances, as stated in my dissent in Myers, I believe that this evidence is only appropriate where it is reflective of the circumstances operating at the time the confession was elicited. Such was not the case here.
Since these points for charge were designed to introduce an issue not properly before the jury, I agree with the trial court’s action in refusing the charges. Additionally, since the evidence of post-confession delay would not have advanced the inquiry as to the voluntariness of the appellant’s statement, I do not agree that there was an obligation for the court to permit this fact to be called to the attention of the jury.
I would affirm the judgments of sentence.
EAGEN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The requested instructions were as follows:
“14. There is a rule of law that you have to apply in this situation in accordance with the instructions of the Court, which provides, that upon arrest, the defendant is to be taken before a magistrate. The law states as follows:
“When a defendant has been arrested without a warrant, he shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the proper issuing authority where a Complaint shall be filed against him.
“15. In considering the evidence as to any claim of unlawful delay or unreasonable delay, any illegal delay is but one circumstance to be considered along with any other evidence bearing upon the question of the voluntary character of the admission.
“16. As to any claim of delay in arraignment that is in issue under the evidence, it is for the jury to determine as a question of fact as to whether there was any unnecessary delay. If the jury finds that delay in arraignment of the defendant was unnecessary then and in that event, it constitutes a circumstance that can be considered along with any other evidence bearing upon the question of the voluntary character of the admissions.
“17. If you find from the evidence that there was a noncompliance with the prompt arraignment section and that there was an unlawful or unnecessary delay, you have a right to consider that in determining the question as to whether any admissions statements were voluntary or involuntary. Of course, you take that into consideration with all the other evidence in the case.”

. 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).