Court Opinion

ID: 9958141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 13:06:04.749951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.782761
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Bruns, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-Ohio-1308.]

                         IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF BRUNS.
                                        IN RE D.G.
 [Cite as In re Disqualification of Bruns, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2024-Ohio-1308.]
Judges—Affidavits of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Affiant had standing as a
        “party to the proceeding” under R.C. 2701.03(A) to seek judge’s
        disqualification from presiding over juvenile-court delinquency proceeding
        in which affiant’s child was the alleged delinquent child—Affiant failed to
        show that judge is interested in underlying case or “otherwise is
        disqualified” under R.C. 2701.03(A)—Disqualification denied.
                      (No. 24-AP-006—Decided March 5, 2024.)
 ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Montgomery County Court of Common
                     Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 23JC3115.
                                      ____________
        KENNEDY, C.J.
        {¶ 1} Robin Mapp, the mother of the alleged delinquent child in the
underlying case, has filed an affidavit of disqualification pursuant to R.C. 2701.03
seeking to disqualify Judge Julie Bruns of the Montgomery County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, from presiding over the case. Judge Bruns filed
a response to the affidavit of disqualification.
        {¶ 2} This matter presents the threshold question whether Mapp, as the
mother of the alleged delinquent child, has standing to seek Judge Bruns’s
disqualification. R.C. 2701.03(A) permits “any party to the proceeding or the
party’s counsel” to file an affidavit of disqualification against a judge of the court
of common pleas. As explained below, because the applicable statutes and court
rules give to or impose on parents certain rights and duties in juvenile-court
delinquency proceedings, Mapp is considered a party to the underlying delinquency
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case for the limited purpose of filing an affidavit of disqualification under R.C.
2701.03. Therefore, Mapp has standing to file the affidavit of disqualification.
       {¶ 3} Turning to the merits of the affidavit of disqualification, Mapp has not
established that the judge should be disqualified. Therefore, the affidavit of
disqualification is denied. The case shall proceed before Judge Bruns.
                            Trial-Court Proceedings
       {¶ 4} On June 24, 2023, Mapp’s child, D.G., was charged with two counts
of aggravated robbery, both felonies of the first degree, and was remanded to a
detention facility. On July 5, the complaint was amended to add two firearm
specifications, one for each count of aggravated robbery.
       {¶ 5} On July 25, D.G.’s attorney withdrew from the representation.
       {¶ 6} On August 10, D.G.’s new attorney requested a competency
evaluation for D.G. After the court’s psychologist completed an evaluation, D.G.’s
attorney requested a second competency evaluation, which Judge Bruns allowed.
The court scheduled a competency hearing for November 15. On request of D.G.’s
attorney, the court rescheduled the hearing for November 29.
       {¶ 7} At the November 29 hearing, Judge Bruns found D.G. competent and
scheduled a preliminary conference for December 8. The judge later rescheduled
the preliminary conference for December 12 because Mapp was unavailable on
December 8.
       {¶ 8} During the December 12 conference, D.G.’s family requested
removal of his attorney. Based on the attorney’s representation that he had a
breakdown in communication with Mapp, the judge granted that request.
       {¶ 9} On December 13, the court appointed a new attorney for D.G. and
scheduled a conference for January 8, 2024.
       {¶ 10} On January 8, the state of Ohio requested that the court appoint a
guardian ad litem for D.G. because of an alleged breakdown in communication

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between D.G. and Mapp. The court appointed a guardian ad litem for D.G. and
scheduled another conference for January 24.
        {¶ 11} On January 12, Mapp filed this affidavit of disqualification.
        {¶ 12} Because the question of standing asks whether an individual is
entitled to have a court hear a controversy, a threshold issue here is whether Mapp
is qualified to file an affidavit of disqualification against Judge Bruns under R.C.
2701.03(A).
                 Standing to File an Affidavit of Disqualification
        {¶ 13} Standing to file an affidavit of disqualification is conferred by
statute. In re Disqualification of Gallagher, 173 Ohio St.3d 1201, 2023-Ohio-2977,
228 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 26. R.C. 2701.03(A) provides that “[i]f a judge of the court of
common pleas allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before the court,
allegedly is related to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding
pending before the court or a party’s counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified
to preside in a proceeding pending before the court, any party to the proceeding or
the party’s counsel may file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk” of this
court. (Emphasis added.)
        {¶ 14} Under this plain and unambiguous language, only a “party to the
proceeding or the party’s counsel” may file an affidavit of disqualification. Id.
Chief justices “have ‘strictly enforced’ this statutory language and have
consistently found that ‘individuals who do not qualify as a “party” or “party’s
counsel” do not have standing to file an affidavit of disqualification.’ ” Gallagher
at ¶ 26, quoting In re Disqualification of Grendell, 137 Ohio St.3d 1220, 2013-
Ohio-5243, 999 N.E.2d 681, ¶ 2; see also In re Disqualification of Leach, __ Ohio
St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4776, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 4. For purposes of R.C. 2701.03(A), a
“party’s counsel” includes counsel of record in the underlying case from which the
judge’s disqualification is sought or an attorney retained by a party in the

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underlying case to file an affidavit of disqualification in this court. Gallagher at
¶ 29-34.
       {¶ 15} “In general, a ‘party’ is defined as ‘[o]ne by or against whom a
lawsuit is brought; anyone who both is directly interested in a lawsuit and has a
right to control the proceedings, make a defense, or appeal from an adverse
judgment.’ ” In re Disqualification of Berhalter, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-
4881, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 21, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1350-1351 (11th
Ed.2019). Because the underlying delinquency complaint was not brought by or
against Mapp, it would be unusual to consider her a party—at least in the traditional
sense—to her child’s juvenile-delinquency proceeding. However, Mapp has an
interest in her minor son’s custody and care; as explained below, applicable statutes
and court rules confer rights and duties on parents in delinquency proceedings.
       {¶ 16} For example, when a child is admitted to a place of detention, an
informal detention hearing shall be held within 72 hours of admission to determine
whether detention is required. R.C. 2151.314(A). Notice of the time, place, and
purpose of the detention hearing must be given to the child’s parents. Id. If a parent
is not notified and did not appear or waive appearance at the hearing, upon the filing
of an affidavit stating these facts, the court shall rehear the matter without
unnecessary delay. Id.
       {¶ 17} After a complaint is filed, the court shall promptly issue a summons
to the child and to “the parents * * * and any other persons that appear to the court
to be proper or necessary parties to the proceedings, requiring them to appear before
the court at the time fixed to answer the allegations of the complaint.” R.C.
2151.28(C)(1). If the complaint alleges a child to be delinquent, “the court shall
require the parent * * * to attend all proceedings of the court regarding the child.”
R.C. 2151.35(A)(1). And if the parent fails to so attend, “the court may find the
parent * * * in contempt.” Id.

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       {¶ 18} A child and “the child’s parents” are “entitled to representation by
legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings under [Chapter 2151] or Chapter 2152
of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2151.352, held unconstitutional as applied in In re
Adoption of Y.E.F., 163 Ohio St.3d 251, 2020-Ohio-6785, 171 N.E.3d 302. And
the child’s parents “shall be entitled to visit such child at any reasonable time, be
present at any hearing involving the child, and be given reasonable notice of such
hearing.” Id. Before a juvenile court conducts a hearing to transfer a child charged
with delinquency to the adult division, the court “shall give notice in writing of the
time, place, and purpose of any hearing * * * to the child’s parents * * * at least
three days prior to the hearing.” R.C. 2152.12(G). Additionally, “when a child has
been committed” by the authority of the juvenile court, the court “shall issue an
order * * * requiring that the parent, guardian, or person charged with the child’s
support pay for the care, support, maintenance, and education of the child.” R.C.
2151.36.
       {¶ 19} The Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure reflect the will of the General
Assembly and expressly include in the definition of “party” a “child who is the
subject of a juvenile court proceeding” and “the child’s parent or parents.” Juv.R.
2(BB). The rules further require that a juvenile-court complaint contain the name
and address of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian or state that the name or
address is unknown, Juv.R. 10(B)(2), and that the court cause the issuance of a
summons directed to the parents, Juv.R. 15(A).
       {¶ 20} Because     parents   must       be   served   in   juvenile-delinquency
proceedings, lower courts have concluded that parents are necessary parties in
delinquency cases. See, e.g., In re Jordan, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2001-T-0067,
2002-Ohio-2820, ¶ 7 (“Parents are considered to be necessary parties to any
proceeding concerning their child and must be served”), citing In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); In re Brunner, 4th Dist. Scioto No.
02CA2865, 2003-Ohio-2590, ¶ 13 (same); In re Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

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76429, 2000 WL 739457, *3 (June 8, 2000) (same); In re Koogle, 2d Dist. Greene
Nos. CA-82-68 and CA-82-93, 1983 WL 2461, *2 (June 16, 1983) (same).
        {¶ 21} Because of a parent’s special status in juvenile-court delinquency
proceedings, Mapp is considered a “party to the proceeding” for the limited purpose
of filing an affidavit of disqualification under R.C. 2701.03.
        {¶ 22} Based on the foregoing, Mapp has standing to file the affidavit of
disqualification in her child’s delinquency proceeding. Therefore, I turn to the
allegations in the affidavit of disqualification.
                    Affidavit-of-Disqualification Proceedings
        {¶ 23} R.C. 2701.03(A) provides that if a judge of a court of common pleas
“allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before the court, allegedly is related
to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding pending before
the court or a party’s counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified to preside in a
proceeding pending before the court,” then that party or the party’s counsel may
file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk of this court.
        {¶ 24} Under that statute, Mapp makes two allegations against Judge Bruns.
Mapp alleges that Judge Bruns has a “vested interest” in the underlying case and
that Judge Bruns should be disqualified for other reasons. The judge denies that
there are any grounds for her disqualification.
                                        Interest
        {¶ 25} In support of the allegation that the judge has an interest in the
underlying case, Mapp points to statements made by the judge. Mapp asserts that
on December 12, 2023, the judge said that the court would not be releasing D.G.
from detention “regardless of the evaluations or if he took a plea deal.” Mapp also
claims that on January 8, 2024, the judge threatened her because Mapp would not
approve the plea agreement offered to D.G. by the state, and Mapp claims that the
judge said that Mapp needs a translator to understand the terms of the proposed plea
agreement.

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       {¶ 26} In response, Judge Bruns denies having any interest in the juvenile-
court proceeding.    The judge also denies prejudging any issue in the case,
threatening Mapp in any way, and interfering with D.G.’s decision whether to
accept a plea deal from the state.
                  Otherwise Disqualified under R.C. 2701.03(A)
       {¶ 27} In support of the allegation that the judge is disqualified for other
reasons, Mapp asserts that the judge has deprived D.G. of a quick and speedy trial
and has violated his right to counsel by appointing ineffective attorneys. Mapp also
seeks the judge’s disqualification because Mapp named the judge in a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus that she filed on D.G.’s behalf in the Second District Court
of Appeals. Additionally, Mapp avers that an appearance of impropriety exists
“because the alleged plaintiff was a fully ran corporation within the State of Ohio.”
       {¶ 28} In response, the judge states that although the right to a speedy trial
is not applicable in the underlying juvenile-court proceeding, the court has been
vigilant about attempting to move the case forward. A trial date has not yet been
scheduled because of the issues raised in the underlying proceeding.
       {¶ 29} D.G.’s former attorney sought two competency evaluations. The
matter was scheduled for a competency hearing when D.G.’s attorney requested a
continuance of the proceeding. Shortly thereafter, D.G.’s family requested the
removal of D.G.’s attorney, which the judge granted, ordering the appointment of
new counsel. In January 2024, the state requested the appointment of a guardian
ad litem for D.G. because of a breakdown in communication between the child and
Mapp. The judge granted the request and appointed a guardian ad litem for D.G.
The judge also states that D.G. has been detained since his arrest based in part on
the serious nature of the charges.
       {¶ 30} With respect to D.G.’s right to counsel, the judge states that she has
appointed him two highly competent and experienced attorneys and a highly
competent guardian ad litem.

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        {¶ 31} Lastly, the judge denies that any appearance of impropriety exists.
               Disqualification of a Common-Pleas-Court Judge
        {¶ 32} As set forth above, R.C. 2701.03(A) provides two specific grounds
and a catchall provision for the disqualification of a judge of the court of common
pleas. Granting or denying an affidavit of disqualification turns on whether the
chief justice determines that the allegations of interest, bias, prejudice, or
disqualification set forth in the affidavit exist. R.C. 2701.03(E).
        {¶ 33} The burden falls on the affiant to submit “specific allegations on
which the claim of interest, bias, prejudice, or disqualification is based and the facts
to support each of those allegations.” R.C. 2701.03(B)(1). Therefore, “[a]n
affidavit must describe with specificity and particularity those facts alleged to
support the claim.” In re Disqualification of Mitrovich, 101 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2003-
Ohio-7358, 803 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 4.
        {¶ 34} Mapp alleges two bases for the disqualification of Judge Bruns—the
judge has an interest in the case and the judge should be disqualified for other
reasons.
        {¶ 35} The term “interest” is not defined in R.C. 2701.03. The Code of
Judicial Conduct requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding
in which the judge “[h]as more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially
affected by the proceeding,” Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(2)(c), or “the judge knows that
he or she * * * has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding,” Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(3).
        {¶ 36} A judge “otherwise is disqualified” under R.C. 2701.03(A) when
one of the express bases for disqualification—interest, relation to a party, bias, or
prejudice—does not apply but other grounds for disqualification exist. See In re
Disqualification of Schooley, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4332, __ N.E.3d __,
¶ 19. For example, the statute speaks in terms of actual bias and prejudice;
“[n]evertheless, even in cases in which no evidence of actual bias or prejudice is

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apparent, a judge’s disqualification may be appropriate to avoid an appearance of
impropriety or when the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial system
is at issue,” In re Disqualification of Crawford, 152 Ohio St.3d 1256, 2017-Ohio-
9428, 98 N.E.3d 277, ¶ 6. In addition, an ex parte communication between a judge
and a party can be grounds for the judge’s disqualification when the communication
either was initiated by the judge or addressed substantive matters in the pending
case. In re Disqualification of Calabrese, 100 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2002-Ohio-7475,
798 N.E.2d 10, ¶ 2. Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 sets forth additional circumstances under
which a judge should be disqualified, including the economic interests of the
judge’s family members and the judge’s likely being a material witness concerning
the matter in controversy.
       {¶ 37} These examples are not exhaustive, but they illustrate that a judge
may be “otherwise * * * disqualified” when the specific grounds for
disqualification set forth in R.C. 2701.03(A) are not applicable.
                                      Analysis
       {¶ 38} As explained below, Mapp has not established that Judge Bruns’s
disqualification is warranted.
                                       Interest
       {¶ 39} Mapp’s allegation of interest is based on one thing the judge would
not do—release D.G. from detention—and one thing the judge allegedly did do—
threaten Mapp for not approving the plea deal. But Mapp does not explain how
either of these actions shows that the judge has a personal interest in the case.
       {¶ 40} Therefore, this allegation lacks merit.
                  Otherwise Disqualified under R.C. 2701.03(A)
       {¶ 41} Mapp has also not proven that the judge is otherwise disqualified.
       {¶ 42} Mapp states that the judge should be disqualified because the judge
has deprived D.G. of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial and to effective
assistance of counsel. Moreover, Mapp claims that the judge should be disqualified

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because the judge is named in a habeas corpus case and “because the alleged
plaintiff was a fully ran corporation within the State of Ohio.”
        {¶ 43} The chief justice’s authority in an affidavit-of-disqualification
proceeding is limited. The chief justice lacks authority “to resolve legal issues that
are subject to appellate review.” Schooley, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-4332, __
N.E.3d __, at ¶ 23. The questions whether a juvenile is entitled to a speedy trial,
whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated, and whether appointed counsel
provided effective representation are matters for appellate review and therefore
“not proper subjects in an affidavit of disqualification,” id. at ¶ 24.
        {¶ 44} Moreover, “[i]t is well established that a judge will not be
disqualified solely because a litigant in a case pending before the judge has filed a
lawsuit against that judge.” In re Disqualification of Pokorny, 135 Ohio St.3d 1268,
2013-Ohio-915, 986 N.E.2d 993, ¶ 4. However, “it does necessarily follow that a
judge should never be disqualified on the grounds that he or she is involved in an
unrelated lawsuit with a litigant. Each case must be determined on its own merits
and based on the nature of the perceived conflict.” In re Disqualification of
Favreau, 145 Ohio St.3d 1212, 2015-Ohio-5666, 47 N.E.3d 862, ¶ 5.
        {¶ 45} In her petition for a writ of habeas corpus for D.G., Mapp cites the
judge’s actions in the underlying case. “The fact that a party has brought suit
against a judge is especially unlikely to be deemed to provide a cognizable ground
for seeking that judge’s disqualification * * * where the judge has been sued * * *
as a result of her rulings in the case.” Flamm, Recusal and Disqualification of
Judges, Section 60.3, at 932-934 (2018); see also In re Disqualification of Saffold,
155 Ohio St.3d 1272, 2018-Ohio-5258, 121 N.E.3d 387, ¶ 5. Therefore, Mapp’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus for D.G. does not require Judge Bruns’s
disqualification from the underlying juvenile-court case.
        {¶ 46} Lastly, “[t]he proper test for determining whether a judge’s
participation in a case presents an appearance of impropriety is * * * an objective

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one. A judge should step aside or be removed if a reasonable and objective observer
would harbor serious doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” In re Disqualification
of Lewis, 117 Ohio St.3d 1227, 2004-Ohio-7359, 884 N.E.2d 1082, ¶ 8. Mapp’s
only evidence to support the allegation that an appearance of impropriety exists is
her statement that “the alleged plaintiff was a fully ran corporation within the State
of Ohio.” Judge Bruns maintains that she is fair and impartial.
       {¶ 47} All judges are accorded a “presumption of impartiality.” In re
Disqualification of Celebrezze, 101 Ohio St.3d 1224, 2003-Ohio-7352, 803 N.E.2d
823, ¶ 7. A judge’s subjective belief about his or her own impartiality is generally
not a decisive factor in whether to grant an affidavit-of-disqualification request, but
a judge’s personal assessment is entitled to some weight. Lewis at ¶ 11, citing
Flamm, Judicial Disqualification, 158, Section 5.6.2 (1996). The question whether
a judge’s impartiality can “reasonably be questioned” is resolved by considering
the facts as they existed at the time of the judge’s statements or actions.
       {¶ 48} The affiant has the burden “to not only identify specific allegations
of bias but to ensure the ‘allegations could be verified by the record.’ ” In re
Disqualification of Schroeder, 172 Ohio St.3d 1238, 2023-Ohio-3171, 225 N.E.3d
1064, ¶ 49, quoting In re Disqualification of Sheward, 136 Ohio St.3d 1262, 2013-
Ohio-4244, 995 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 6. “When necessary, an affiant should submit
evidence beyond the affidavit to support the allegations contained therein.” In re
Disqualification of Trimmer, 164 Ohio St.3d 1212, 2021-Ohio-2320, 172 N.E.3d
192, ¶ 5.    “[I]t is not the chief justice’s duty in deciding an affidavit of
disqualification to further investigate an affiant’s claims or obtain evidence on the
affiant’s behalf.” In re Disqualification of Knece, 138 Ohio St.3d 1274, 2014-Ohio-
1414, 7 N.E.3d 1213, ¶ 11.
       {¶ 49} Here, Mapp has failed to prove the allegation that the judge is
otherwise disqualified to preside over the underlying case. Her statement alone is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of impartiality afforded to Judge Bruns.

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       {¶ 50} Therefore, this allegation lacks merit.
                                   Conclusion
       {¶ 51} The affidavit of disqualification is denied. The case shall proceed
before Judge Bruns.
                              _________________

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