Court Opinion

ID: 9746081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:56:37.036865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:08.504737
License: Public Domain

WALSH, J., Concurring.
I concur not only in the result but also in the reasoning in this case, with the exception of the discussion of People v. Chambless (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 773 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 444] (Chambless). I agree with the majority that “substantial sexual conduct” includes masturbation accomplished through clothing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600.1, subd. (a).) I write separately because Chambless presents a difficult definitional problem. In my view, the adoption of the phrase “any touching or contact, however slight, of the genitals” (Chambless, supra, at p. 783) suggests a doubtful minimum standard of “substantial sexual conduct.” The Chambless definition would permit finding “substantial sexual conduct” in simple misdemeanor lewd conduct, the elements of which include “the touching of genitals.” (CALJIC No. 16.400.)
*1316I do not believe that invoking this standard from Chambless is necessary in light of the strong evidence of substantial sexual conduct in this case. Clearly, the conduct of the defendant here, however defined, was abhorrent. But, we must mean what we say and must assume that the Legislature does so as well. To apply the standard “any touching . . . , however slight,” contradicts the Legislature’s requirement of “substantial sexual conduct.” An appellate court’s role in statutory construction is a conservative one. Our function in construing a statute is simply “to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) The Legislature has set the standard at “substantial”; it should not be transmuted to “slight.”
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 16, 2005.