Court Opinion

ID: 9628027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:05:17.36546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:36.675939
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(concurring) — I agree with the majority that the zoning process was legislative in nature and that the appearance of fairness doctrine does not apply. The distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial functions is at times difficult to perceive. By pigeonholing this concept as legislative, one result follows; however, if it is quasi-judicial, the result is different.
The doctrine of the appearance of fairness is wholesome and therapeutic.
The basic concepts of the appearance of fairness are the existence of unbiased tribunals and the right to have decisions based on the evidence presented. The doctrine is constitutionally sound and has been adopted since 1898 in the case of State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Educ., 19 Wash. 8, 52 P. 317 (1898). The language of Judge Dunbar cannot be improved upon:
The principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge is as old as the history of courts; in fact, the administration of justice through the mediation of courts is based upon this principle. It is a fundamental idea, running through and pervading the whole system of judicature, and it is the popular acknowledgment of the inviolability of this principle which gives credit, or even toleration, to decrees of judicial tribunals. Actions of courts which disregard this safeguard to litigants would more appropriately be termed the administration of injustice, and their proceedings would be as shocking to our private sense of justice as they would be injurious to the public interest. The learned and observant Lord Bacon well said that the virtue of a judge is seen in making inequality equal, that he may plant his judgment as upon even ground. Caesar demanded that his wife should not only be virtuous, but beyond suspicion; and the state should not be any less exacting with its judicial officers, in whose keeping are *181placed not only the financial interests, but the honor, the liberty and the lives of its citizens, and it should see to it that the scales in which the rights of the citizen are weighed should be nicely balanced, for, as was well said by Judge Bronson in People v. Suffolk Common Pleas, 18 Wend. 550:
"Next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment, is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge."
Barnard, at 17-18.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the matter of procedural due process requires the appearance of fairness and fairness in fact. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712, 95 S. Ct. 1456 (1975). Quasi-judicial administrative decisions will be reversed upon a showing of the probability or appearance of conflict or prejudgment. Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1977).
The number of cases which the courts review regarding quasi-judicial action is miniscule when compared to the number of cases on which quasi-judicial boards function. The action of a quasi-judicial board may change a marginal plan developer into a millionaire. In the public utility field, a board may grant a rate increase as high as $60 million per year. The appearance of fairness doctrine is designed to assure unbiased review. Hopefully, it prevents excessive fraternization, conflict of interest, prejudgment and improper ex parte contacts; and what is commonly known in street parlance as "pal deals".
The appearance of fairness doctrine has restored faith and credibility in the judicial process. It is a useful tool that should not be abandoned.