Court Opinion

ID: 9557693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:55:21.231897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:14.743932
License: Public Domain

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge,
concurring' in part and concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the judgment and in Parts I, II-A, II-B and II — C(i) of the majority opinion. I disagree with the majority that Lopez’s testimony can be fairly characterized as an admission as to the date of his removal, and the date certainly was not proved to the jury. Although I would find Apprendi error, however, I agree, that we must affirm Lopez’s sentence because its imposition was not plain error.
To trigger the sentencing enhancement under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), “an alien must first be convicted of an aggravated felony, then be removed, and then attempt to reenter, in that order.” United States v. Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir.2006). Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and its progeny, the fact of a prior removal must be “proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or admitted by the defendant.” Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d at 1098. The majority finds an admission as to the date of removal from the following ambiguous exchange: 1
Prosecutor: In fact, you had been deported four times, correct?
Defense counsel: Objection, your honor; 404(b).
The Court: Sustained.
Prosecutor: You testified yesterday and admitted that you had been convicted of a felony?
Lopez: Yes, sir.
Prosecutor: And at the summer of 2004, you were in Mexicali?
Lopez: Yes, sir. •
Prosecutor: Had you been deported from the United States?
Lopez: Yes, sir.
Lopez responds affirmatively to questions of whether he 1) was in Mexicali in the summer of 2004, and 2) had been deported from the United States. His presence in Mexico in 2004 does not establish that he was deported in that year. His answers would have been the same even if he had been deported years earlier. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 625 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir.1980) (finding insufficient evidence and reversing conviction where defendant’s alleged admission was “[a]t most ... ambiguous..”).2
The parties stipulated to the fact, but not the date, of Lopez’s removal. Putting aside the exchange quoted above, nothing presented to the jury sheds light on whether this removal was subsequent to his conviction of an aggravated felony, as required for the § 1326(b)(2) enhancement *850to apply. Therefore, I would find Appren-di error because the fact of his 2004 removal was never admitted or proved to the jury. Id.
Because Lopez raises this Apprendi argument for the first time on appeal, review is under the plain error standard. Id. at 1093. To prevail, Lopez must therefore establish (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Even if those requirements are satisfied, we may exercise our discretion to correct the forfeited error only if it “ ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” United States v. Cabaccang, 481 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Evans-Martinez, 448 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir.2006)).
We have already held that “the enhancement of[a § 1326] sentence, based on the factual finding of a subsequent removal, constitute^] plain error.” Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d at 1098. However, Lopez’s substantial rights were not violated, and thus he cannot obtain relief, because he was not prejudiced “in a manner that affected the outcome of the ... proceedings.” United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 568 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Covi-an-Sandoval, we noted that the inquiry is “whether it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error,” and that, “[e]ritieally, the defendant bears the burden of raising a reasonable doubt as to the fact [of prior removal].” 462 F.3d at 1098.
We held that Covian had not met this burden because he had “practically concede^]” that he was removed subsequent to his conviction for an aggravated felony. Id. Specifically, he had never objected to the allegation of the subsequent removal contained in his presentence report. Id. Similarly, Lopez never objected to the allegation of a 2004 deportation in his presen-tence report.
“Most significantly, [Lopez’s] arguments to the sentencing court effectively conceded that a sentence enhancement under § 1326(b) would be appropriate.” Id. Had Lopez not been removed subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction, the statutory maximum sentence would have been two years. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). But at sentencing, Lopez’s counsel “agree[d]” with the district court’s tentative sentence of 30 months, a sentence exceeding the § 1326(a) statutory maximum but consistent with an enhanced sentence under § 1326(b). By accepting the district court’s tentative sentence, Lopez “effectively conceded” the relevant chronological sequence of conviction and removal. Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d at 1098.
Therefore, Lopez cannot meet his burden of showing that his substantial rights were violated. We should affirm the sentence because its imposition was not plain error under Olano.

. Despite the defendants’ shared last name, they are unrelated.