Court Opinion

ID: 9730100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:01:16.570098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:04.133140
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects except one. I do not agree that Marcia Burgdorf, a private attorney and friend of the rape victim, should have been permitted her role as “special deputy prosecutor” to which she was appointed specially for this case. In that respect, the trial court and state both erred. Because Burg-dorf sat mute throughout the proceedings, however, no prejudice inured to defendant by virtue of her presence. For that reason, I respectfully concur in the result ultimately rendered by this Court.
The majority states that because Burg-dorf was “sworn as a deputy prosecuting attorney” for the instant case, she had a “perfect right to appear for the State.” (Emphasis added). Burgdorf should never have been appointed; however, once appointed, the court should not have permitted Burgdorf to fulfill her appointment.
That is so because of the responsibilities which are peculiarly incumbent upon prosecutors. Those duties are fully outlined in Ethical Code 7-13 of our Code of Professional Responsibility:
“The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute; (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts. With respect to evidence and witnesses, the *367prosecutor has responsibilities different from those of a lawyer in private practice: the prosecutor should make timely disclosure to the defense of available evidence, known to him, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he believes it will damage the prosecution’s case or aid the accused.” (Emphasis added.)
An attorney of private practice, such as Burgdorf, is “the usual advocate” as that phrase is employed in the canon.
The usual advocate may fully appreciate the imperative demand of EC 7-13 that the prosecutor simultaneously assume an adversarial and non-adversarial posture. Yet the usual advocate, as implied'in the appellation, is not daily practiced in the rigors of the art. The human experience tells us we should not project a neophyte prosecutor into the grave matter of a felony arrest, charge, and trial when the neophyte-usual advocate is a friend of the victim. The friendship and human compassion which inspires assumption of the role might inevitably detract from the vigilant impartiality with which a prosecutor is expected to proceed.
That the expectation be fulfilled is crucial to continued public trust and confidence in our criminal justice system, as well as in the office of the prosecutor. That concern also warrants the appearance of impropriety and impartiality be scrupulously avoided, as is emphasized in our canons. Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 9-1 et seq. Although no “appearance of impropriety” is present in the facts of this case, circumstances such as those involved here are ripe with opportunity for both the appearance of impropriety, as well as actual impartiality measured against the precepts of Canon EC 7-13.
For these reasons, appointments like those present here have no place in our system of justice. Burgdorf had no right to appear as special deputy prosecutor, let alone a perfect right. Her passive role, however, rendered the error wholly harmless.
I concur in result.
PRENTICE, J., concurs.