Court Opinion

ID: 9905532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:13.93607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:40.556680
License: Public Domain

J-S28022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MARKESE DENASHAWN LAMPLEY                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 693 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 18, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-25-CR-0000597-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                           FILED: NOVEMBER 28, 2023

       Appellant, Markese Denashawn Lampley, appeals from the August 18,

2021 judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie

County that imposed an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole to be followed by 13 to 44 years’ incarceration. We are

constrained to remand this case for an evidentiary hearing in accordance with

this memorandum.

       The trial court summarized the procedural history as follows:

       On April 15, 2020, the [Commonwealth] by way of information,
       charged Appellant with [numerous criminal offenses under the
       Crimes Code and several summary offenses under the Vehicle
       Code for events occurring on January 25, 2020.] On August 7,
       2020, Appellant through appointed counsel, Bruce G. Sandmeyer,
       Esquire, [(“Attorney Sandmeyer”)] filed an omnibus pre[-]trial
       motion seeking a change of venue, a change of venire, [] a
       []motion for dismiss[al,] and [a petition for] writ of habeas
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S28022-23

       corpus.[] Appellant's motions were denied on August 31, 2020.
       On November 2, 2020, Appellant privately retained Jason E. Nard,
       Esquire [(“Attorney Nard”)].      On June 16, 2021, a status
       conference was held to discuss the motion in limine that was filed
       by Attorney Nard, on behalf of Appellant, seeking to exclude
       photographs of the deceased victim, photographs taken at the
       victim's autopsy, and a letter written by Appellant to [a]
       magisterial district judge[.]      Prior to the hearing, the
       Commonwealth filed a response to [Appellant’s] motion in limine
       regarding the letter to [the] magisterial district judge[.] The
       [trial] court determined that the letter was admissible under
       Pennsylvania Rule[] of Evidence [] 901(b)(4) and incorporated the
       Commonwealth's legal arguments in its order. [On] June 17,
       2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion to amend information
       seeking to withdraw [several criminal charges] and also to amend
       a spelling error of the last name of the deceased victim[. That
       same day, the trial] court granted the Commonwealth's motion.

       With the jury trial quickly approaching, on June 16, 2021, Attorney
       Nard informed the [trial] court that Appellant unexpectedly
       decided he wanted to proceed pro se at trial. On June 21, 2021,
       [the trial] court held a Grazier[1] hearing. At the hearing, the
       [trial] court provided a brief summary of the history of the case.
       Attorney Nard stated he met with Appellant on Wednesday, June
       16, 2021, and was informed Appellant no longer wished to retain
       his services. Appellant provided the [trial] court with a "Pro Se
       Notice" and requested he be addressed as [“]Mileage Galor Bey[”].
       Attorney Nard stated that Appellant had been cooperative
       throughout the entirety of the proceedings since [Attorney Nard]
       was retained in November 2020[,] until June 16, 2021. Four []
       days before the start of his trial, Appellant proclaimed himself to
       be a sovereign citizen and incorrectly stated the [trial] court
       lacked authority and jurisdiction over him. After an exhaustive
       colloquy with Appellant, the [trial] court found that Appellant
       knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, relinquished his right to
       be represented by counsel. Appellant even stated to the [trial]
       court that: "it's my choice." Once satisfied with Appellant's
       waiver, the [trial] court appointed Attorney Nard to act as standby
       counsel. Appellant agreed with the appointment of Attorney Nard

____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

                                           -2-
J-S28022-23

       as standby counsel. The trial started with jury selection on June
       24, 2021.

       On July 2, 2021, after a four-day jury trial, Appellant was found
       guilty of murder in the second degree[ (Count 2), 3] counts of
       aggravated assault[ - serious bodily injury (Counts 3 - 5)],
       robbery[ - inflicts serious bodily injury (Count 6),] possessing
       instruments of crime (Count 11), 2] counts of simple
       assault[ - fear of imminent serious bodily injury (Counts 13 and
       14), 6] counts of recklessly endangering another person[ (Counts
       15 – 18, 20 and 21) and fleeing or attempting to elude police
       officer (Count 10).2] Additionally, the [trial] court found Appellant
       guilty of [10] summary motor vehicle offenses.[3]

       On August 18, 2021, after consideration of the pre[-]sentence
       [investigation] report, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) regarding
       rehabilitation potential, the gravity of the offense, the impact on
       the community[ and] the victims, [the] need to protect the public,
       and the sentencing guidelines, the [trial] court [imposed], inter
       alia, a sentence of life in prison without parole and 13 to [44]
       years[’ incarceration, with the aggregate term of incarceration
       imposed at Counts 3 - 6, 10, 11, 13 – 18, 20, and 21 set to run
       consecutively] to the sentence of life [in prison imposed] at Count
       2.[4]
____________________________________________

218 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 2702(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i), 907(b), 2701(a)(3),
2705, as well as 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a), respectively.

3 The 10 summary offenses were unauthorized transfer or use of registration

(Count 22), traffic-control signals – steady red indication (Count 24), driving
on right side of roadway (Count 25), driving on roadways laned for
traffic – driving within single lane (Count 26), stop signs and yield
signs – duties at stop signs (Count 27), turning movements and required
signals (Count 28), driving vehicle at safe speed (Count 29), careless driving
(Count 30), reckless driving (Count 31), and windshield obstructions and
wipers – sun screening and other materials prohibited (Count 32).            75
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1372(3), 3112(a)(3)(i), 3301(a), 3309(1), 3323(b), 3334(a),
3361, 3714(a), 3736(a), and 4524(e)(1), respectively.

4 On Count 2, Appellant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

Count 3 merged with Count 2 for sentencing purposes. On Count 4, Appellant
was sentenced to 54 to 120 months’ incarceration with the sentence set to

                                           -3-
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____________________________________________

run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 2. On Count 5, Appellant
was sentenced to 54 to 120 months’ incarceration with the sentence set to
run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 4. Count 6 merged with
Count 2 for sentencing purposes. On Count 10, Appellant was sentenced to 9
to 84 months’ incarceration with the sentence set to run consecutively to the
sentence imposed on Count 5. On Count 11, Appellant was sentenced to 3 to
60 months’ incarceration with the sentence set to run consecutively to the
sentence imposed on Count 10. Count 13 merged with Count 5 for sentencing
purposes. Count 14 merged with Count 4 for sentencing purposes. On Count
15, Appellant was sentenced to 6 to 24 months’ incarceration with the
sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 11. On
Count 16, Appellant was sentenced to 6 to 24 months’ incarceration with the
sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 15. On
Count 17, Appellant was sentenced to 6 to 24 months’ incarceration with the
sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 16. On
Count 18, Appellant was sentenced to 6 to 24 months’ incarceration with the
sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 17. On
Count 20, Appellant was sentenced to 6 to 24 months’ incarceration with the
sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 18. On
Count 21, Appellant was sentenced to 6 to 24 months’ incarceration with the
sentence set to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on Count 20. The
trial court did not impose a term of incarceration on Counts 22 to 29 and on
Counts 31 and 32, but did impose a fine of $25.00 each on Counts 22 to 29
and on Count 32. The trial court imposed a $200.00 fine on Count 31. The
aggregate fine imposed was $400.00 Count 30 merged with Count 21 for
sentencing purposes. Appellant received credit for 303 days for time already
served. As part of his sentence, Appellant was ordered to pay the costs of
prosecution and restitution in the amount of $28,766.58.

We note that at the sentencing hearing, the trial court, in imposing its
sentence on Count 5, stated that the sentence was set to run consecutively to
the sentence imposed on Count 2. N.T., 8/18/21, at 67-68. The sentencing
order states that the sentence imposed on Count 5 is set to run consecutively
to the sentence imposed on Count 4. It is clear from a review of the
sentencing order, as well as the sentencing hearing notes of testimony, that
the trial court intended each sentence to run consecutively to the sentence
imposed on the prior count. See Sentencing Order, 8/18/21; see also N.T.,
8/18/21,at 67-70. Moreover, “[i]n Pennsylvania, the text of the sentencing
order, and not the statements a trial court makes about a defendant's
sentence, is determinative of the [trial] court's sentencing intentions and the
sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d 1219, 1226 (Pa.

                                           -4-
J-S28022-23

       On August 30, 2021, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion
       claiming that because he was a sovereign citizen[,] the [trial]
       court lack[ed] jurisdiction over him, and asserted what the [trial]
       court gleaned as challenges to the judgment of sentence imposed
       by the [trial] court on August 18, 2021. On September 2, 2021,
       the [trial] court [denied] Appellant's [post-sentence motion. In
       so doing, the trial] court held that Appellant's sovereign citizen
       claim was frivolous and his other claims lacked legal merit. On
       September 7, 2021, Appellant filed [pro se] a "Notice Requesting
       Leave to Supplement Post-Sentence Notice for New Trial" dated
       September 6, 2021. Appellant alleged the Commonwealth never
       filed a motion to amend the criminal information and added
       additional charges, violating [Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
       Procedure] 564. The [trial] court found Appellant's claims to be
       "factually inaccurate" as the Commonwealth did file a motion to
       amend the information on June 17, 2021, and no new charges
       were added.      In fact, the Commonwealth withdrew several
       charges. Consequently, Appellant's motion was denied.

       On May 6, 2022, Appellant filed a "Motion to Reinstate Appellate
       Rights Nunc Pro Tunc." Due to the unique facts surrounding this
       case (Appellant proceeding pro se at trial and claiming sovereign
       citizenship) and out of deference to Appellant, [the trial] court
       granted Appellant's motion. Appellant filed his "Statement of
       Matters Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to [Pennsylvania Rule
       of Appellate Procedure] 1925(b)" and alleged the weight and
       sufficiency of the evidence were insufficient to support the
       verdicts. During this time, Appellant was proceeding pro se.
       Under directive from [this Court, the trial] court held a Grazier
       hearing in order to determine whether Appellant wished to
       continue his appeal pro se. Appellant immediately requested to
       be assisted by counsel, and [on] July 20, 2022, [the trial]
       appointed Jessica A. Fiscus, Esquire [(“Attorney Fiscus”)].

____________________________________________

2013). As such, Appellant’s aggregate sentence was life without the possibility
of parole to be followed by 13 to 44 years’ incarceration.

                                           -5-
J-S28022-23

Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/22, at 1-5 (record citations, footnotes, original

brackets, and extraneous capitalization omitted).

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       [1.]   Did the trial court err when it permitted Appellant to proceed
              pro se at the time of trial where the waiver colloquy does
              not reveal that Appellant made a knowing, voluntary, and
              intelligent waiver of counsel?

       [2.]   Did the trial court violate Appellant's federal and state
              constitutional right to self-representation when it adopted a
              practice of standby counsel acting as a "liaison" for
              Appellant at multiple sidebars and in-chambers discussions
              rather than allowing Appellant to speak for and represent
              himself as, on many of these occasions, the trial court
              received evidence, heard argument, [or] made decisions on
              evidentiary issues [or] issues affecting Appellant's
              fundamental rights as an accused person?

       [3.]   Is the evidence insufficient to sustain the convictions for
              aggravated assault, as to Kayla Hanas and Jacelyn
              Anderson, where the evidence of record, viewed in the light
              most favorable to the Commonwealth, did not demonstrate
              that Appellant had the specific intent to inflict serious bodily
              injury on either of them?

Appellant’s Brief at 11 (extraneous capitalization omitted).5

       In his first issue, Appellant asserts that his waiver of counsel was not

knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently provided because the “trial court clearly

did not comply with the minimum, mandatory requirements of [Pennsylvania

Rule of Criminal Procedure 121]” in conducting the waiver of counsel colloquy.

Id. at 46. In particular, Appellant contends that (1) “the trial court never

____________________________________________

5 For ease of disposition, Appellant’s issues have been reorganized.

                                           -6-
J-S28022-23

outlined the elements of the crimes [for which he was charged] in the

colloquy” as required by Rule 121(A)(2)(b); (2) the trial court “never indicated

that Appellant had the right to have free counsel appointed if he [were]

indigent” as required by Rule 121(A)(2)(a); (3) trial court failed to advise

Appellant that he may lose many rights permanently if not timely asserted as

required by Rule 121(A)(2)(f); and (4) “the trial court did not identify with

any particularity the summary offenses charged, incorrectly stated that

[Appellant] faced ten rather than eleven [summary offenses], and did not

identify the maximum fine[s permitted] by statute” as required by Rule

121(A)(2)(b).

      Because Appellant’s claims require us to interpret Rule 121 and its

colloquy requirements, these claims present a question of law for which our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 141 A.3d 512, 518 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal

denied, 161 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2016). It is well-established that

      an accused has a constitutional right to counsel during trial. While
      an accused may waive his constitutional right, such a waiver must
      be the free and unconstrained choice of its maker[] and also must
      be made knowingly and intelligently[.] To be a knowing and
      intelligent waiver [the] defendant must be aware of both the right
      and of the risks of forfeiting that right.

Commonwealth v. Tyler, 360 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 1976) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

      The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
      United States Constitution and Article V, Section 9 of the
      Pennsylvania Constitution. When a defendant wishes to waive the

                                     -7-
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      right to counsel, the trial court is ultimately responsible for
      ensuring that the defendant is questioned about the six areas
      specified in Rule 121 and for determining whether the defendant
      is indeed making an informed and independent decision to waive
      counsel. Specifically, it is incumbent on the [trial] court to fully
      advise the accused of the nature and elements of the crime before
      accepting waiver of counsel. A penetrating and comprehensive
      colloquy is mandatory, regardless of the defendant's experience
      with the system. Failure to conduct a thorough, on-the-record
      colloquy before allowing a defendant to proceed to trial pro se
      constitutes reversible error on direct appeal.

Commonwealth v. Isaac, 205 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations,

footnote, original brackets, and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 217

A.3d 795 (Pa. 2019). The appointment of stand-by counsel does not cure a

trial court’s failure to conduct an effective waiver of counsel colloquy.

Commonwealth v. Floyd, 257 A.3d 13, 18 (Pa. Super. 2020). Waiver of a

constitutional right, such as the right to counsel, cannot be presumed from a

silent record as it is well-established that the presumption must always be

against the waiver of a constitutional right. Commonwealth v. Norman,

285 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa. 1971); see also Commonwealth v. Murphy, 214

A.3d 675, 679 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating, “waiver cannot be presumed in a

silent record”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 158 A.3d 117, 121 (Pa. Super.

2017) (stating, “Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver

of fundamental constitutional rights”).

      Rule 121(A)(2) states in pertinent part that

      To ensure that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is
      knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the judge or issuing authority,
      at a minimum, shall elicit the following information from the
      defendant:

                                     -8-
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        (a) that the defendant understands that he or she has the
        right to be represented by counsel, and the right to have
        free counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent;

        (b) that the defendant understands the nature of the
        charges against the defendant and the elements of each of
        those charges;

        (c) that the defendant is aware of the permissible range of
        sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged;

        (d) that the defendant understands that if he or she waives
        the right to counsel, the defendant will still be bound by all
        the normal rules of procedure and that counsel would be
        familiar with these rules;

        (e) that the defendant understands that there are possible
        defenses to these charges that counsel might be aware of,
        and if these defenses are not raised at trial, they may be
        lost permanently; and

        (f) that the defendant understands that, in addition to
        defenses, the defendant has many rights that, if not timely
        asserted, may be lost permanently; and that if errors occur
        and are not timely objected to, or otherwise timely raised
        by the defendant, these errors may be lost permanently.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2)(a-f).

     When reviewing a trial court's basic compliance with the
     requirements of Rule 121, we do not first apply a “totality of the
     circumstances” test. In this context, we look at the totality of the
     relevant circumstances only after we decide the trial court
     has met the minimum requirements of Rule 121, to
     determine whether the defendant's waiver of the constitutional
     right to counsel was a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 93 A.3d 847, 853-854 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citations and footnote omitted; emphasis added). The trial court must make

a “probing inquiry” into whether a defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently waiving his or her right to counsel. Commonwealth v. Clyburn,

                                    -9-
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42 A.3d 296, 299 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Houtz,

856 A.2d 119, 125 (Pa. Super. 2004) (reiterating that, a trial court must

formally and searchingly inquire into the six areas covered by Rule 121);

Isaac, 205 A.3d at 363 (stating, a “penetrating and comprehensive colloquy

is mandatory” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)). “The ‘probing

colloquy”’ standard requires Pennsylvania trial courts to make a searching and

formal inquiry into the questions of (1) whether the defendant is aware of his

right to counsel or not and (2) whether the defendant is aware of the

consequences of waiving that right or not.” Commonwealth v. Starr, 664

A.2d 1326, 1335 (Pa. 1995).

      It is incumbent upon the trial court to ensure that a defendant is aware

of both the nature of his or her right to counsel and the risks and consequences

of forgoing that constitutional right before finding that a defendant knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her right to counsel. Phillips, 93

A.3d at 852. In addition to the six inquiry factors enumerated in Rule 121,

the trial court must also inquire about a defendant’s age, educational

background, and basic comprehension skills in order to ensure that the

defendant possesses the ability to understand the questions posed to him or

her during the waiver colloquy. Commonwealth v. McDonough, 812 A.2d

504, 507 n.1 (Pa. 2002); see also Phillips, 93 A.3d at 853.

      Regarding   the   Rule   121(A)(2)(b)   factor – whether    a   defendant

understands the nature of the charges against the defendant and the elements

of each of those charges – the trial court must go beyond a mere inquiry of

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the defendant’s understanding of the offenses. Phillips, 93 A.3d at 853. In

order to satisfy Rule 121(A)(2)(b), the trial court must “fully advise the

[defendant] of the nature and elements of the crime before accepting the

waiver of counsel.”     Id. (citation, original quotation marks, and original

brackets omitted); see also Clyburn, 42 A.3d at 299. The failure to fully

advise a defendant of the elements of the crime constitutes reversible error.

Phillips, 93 A.3d at 854-855 (holding that, the failure to advise a defendant

of the elements of the offenses constitutes error); see also Clyburn, 42 A.3d

at 301 (stating that, Rule 121(A)(2)(b) requires the trial court to elicit from

the defendant that he or she understands, inter alia, the elements of the

offenses); Commonwealth v. Lasko, 14 A.3d 168, 173 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(stating that, a “full [waiver] colloquy was not conducted on the record as the

trial court did not explain the elements of the crimes” but, rather, only orally

explained    the   charges    and    the      possible   sentencing   exposure);

Commonwealth v. Floyd, 257 A.3d 13, 18 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that,

the waiver colloquy was deficient because the trial court did not advise the

defendant of the elements of the charged offenses); Isaac, 205 A.3d at 363

(noting that, a trial court’s failure to inform a defendant of the elements of the

charged offenses constitutes a deficient waiver colloquy); Commonwealth v.

Hood, 2022 WL 4090008, at *6 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 7, 2022) (unpublished

memorandum) (stating, the minimum requirements of Rule 121 are not

satisfied when the trial court fails to, inter alia, ensure the defendant

understood the elements of each charge). Moreover, a signed waiver form

                                     - 11 -
J-S28022-23

containing a perfunctory statement that the defendant agreed he or she was

informed of the nature and elements of the crime but fails to list the charges

and elements of each crime, does not cure an insufficient oral colloquy.

Clyburn, 42 A.3d at 301. Strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of

Rule 121 is of import because a defendant may change his or her mind as to

self-representation based upon the disclosures made, and information gained,

during the waiver colloquy. Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d 695, 703

(Pa. Super. 1999).

      During a Grazier hearing on Appellant’s pro se motion requesting

self-representation, the following pertinent dialogue occurred:

      [Trial Court:]       Okay. And so what I'm going to do now is to
                           just make sure that you know your
                           constitutional rights. You've referenced the
                           6th Amendment. And your notice has that,
                           but we want to make sure that you know
                           your rights before you give them up. It's
                           called a waiver of right to counsel; do you
                           understand that?

      [Appellant:]         Yes, I understand that.

      [Trial Court:]       Okay. And are you waiving the right to
                           counsel just for today's hearing or also for
                           the trial?

      [Appellant:]         Also for the trial.

      [Trial Court:]       Okay. So you want to represent yourself at
                           the trial; that's what you're saying.

      [Appellant:]         If we ever get to that point.

      [Trial Court:]       Yes.    Okay.   The trial starts with jury
                           selection on Thursday, so we'll get to that
                           point. Okay. So I don't - did you reference

                                     - 12 -
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                      to Attorney Nard that you were what is called
                      a sovereign citizen?

     [Appellant:]     I'm a Moor.

     [Trial Court:]   A what?

     [Appellant:]     A Moor, indigenous to this land.

     [Trial Court:]   Okay. I don't recognize that, so any claim of
                      being indigenous to the state is rejected. We
                      will start trial on Thursday.

     [Appellant:]     Well, as of -

     [Trial Court:]   You need to know -

     [Appellant:]     I am indigenous to this land. And this [trial]
                      court has no authority nor jurisdiction over
                      me or no contract with me. And the only
                      ones who have a contract with me is the
                      federal government, which they do not have.
                      Can you provide the delegation of authority
                      order?

     [Trial Court:]   Okay. So I reject that argument once again.
                      Attorney Nard, can you -

     [Appellant:]     The delegation of authority –

     [Trial Court:]   I'm going to ask that you not interrupt me.
                      Here's what's going to happen if you keep
                      interrupting, I'm going to have you removed
                      from your very own hearing, but I'm going to
                      give you fair warning. I'm going to give you
                      a chance to abide by the rules in this
                      courtroom.

     [Appellant:]     I'm under the supreme laws -

     [Trial Court:]   If you don't want to listen to those rules, then
                      you're going to be removed.

     [Appellant:]     I'm under the supreme law -

     [Trial Court:]   Do you understand that?

     [Appellant:]     I don't recognize this court.

                                - 13 -
J-S28022-23

     [Trial Court:]     Right. And I don't recognize that argument,
                        so it's denied. You're starting -

     [Appellant:]       So how do you have authority over -

     [Trial Court:]     Attorney Nard, can I just ask, was the first
                        time you heard about his sovereign citizen or
                        immunity or being indigenous, not subject to
                        the jurisdiction of this court - was the first
                        time you heard something like that on that
                        Wednesday at the Erie County jail.

     [Attorney Nard:]   Your Honor, it was - I was going to ask the
                        court's indulgence.       While I'm not the
                        attorney as of now, perhaps because of the
                        relationship that I believe I have built, if I can
                        just speak right now to [Appellant], as per
                        the complaint. [Appellant] as his name is
                        stated.

     [Trial Court:]     Right. Yes.

     [Attorney Nard:]   Perhaps if I do that, I can explain the
                        procedure. And that if he answers the
                        questions, he'll still have the opportunity to
                        make the argument that he wants to make
                        to the court when the court's done speaking.
                        Perhaps that will make this process go a little
                        smoother and eliminate the possibility of him
                        being removed.

     [Trial Court:]     Sure. All right.

     [Attorney Nard:]   Would that be fair?

     [Trial Court:]     It would be. And if we in fact get through the
                        colloquy, he has expressed his knowledge of
                        the Constitution, as set forth in his claim for
                        the waiver under the 6th Amendment. So he
                        shows he has a grasp of that constitutional
                        right, but I would like to do a subsequent
                        colloquy to that, but I will allow you first to
                        interject. Go ahead.

     [Attorney Nard:]   Thank you, Your Honor.

     [Trial Court:]     Do you want a recess?

                                  - 14 -
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     [Attorney Nard:]   Perhaps that would be best so I can explain.

     [Trial Court:]     Let's just take five minutes.

     [Attorney Nard:]   I apologize, Your Honor.

     [Trial Court:]     No, I think it's warranted.

                            (Recess taken.)

     [Trial Court:]     Attorney Nard.

     [Attorney Nard:]   Thank you, Your Honor. I did speak with my
                        client during this intermission. I tried to
                        explain the procedure to make this go a little
                        smoother. His concern, why he was speaking
                        over Your Honor, was he [was] afraid that he
                        would not get an opportunity to fully state his
                        position. I explained to him that any court
                        I've been in, and certainly this one, would
                        give him that opportunity, but there's certain
                        questions prior to that that need to be gone
                        through.

                        And that if he could manage to do that, then
                        he would have his ability to fully state his
                        position without being removed prior to
                        having that ability, which would provide for
                        the interest of judicial economy as well -

     [Trial Court:]     Well, I don't know how much more there is
                        to state, than his position is that he's
                        indigenous and not subject to the jurisdiction
                        of the court.

     [Attorney Nard:]   Your Honor, since I'm not part of this
                        conversation and I have advised that I don't
                        believe it's valid, I can't say -

     [Trial Court:]     Can you direct [Appellant] to come back up.
                        come on back up.

     [Appellant:]       Mileage Galor Bey.

     [Trial Court:]     So we're addressing – [Appellant] insists on
                        being addressed as Mileage [Galor] Bey, but
                        [Appellant’s] name by birth is Markese
                        Denashawn Lampley. Again, for purposes of

                                 - 15 -
J-S28022-23

                        this hearing and just to make sure that we
                        can get through it, [Appellant] come on up.
                        We know that you're 20 years old. How far
                        did you go in school?

     [Appellant:]       (No response.)

     [Trial Court:]     How far did you go in school?

     [Appellant:]       Not relevant.

     [Trial Court:]     How far did you go in school?

     [Appellant:]       It's not relevant.

     [Trial Court:]     So he fails to be responsive to the court's
                        questions. He fails to follow the directives.
                        His attorney has met with him on numerous
                        occasions. Do you know the charges against
                        you?

     [Appellant:]       (No response.)

     [Trial Court:]     Do you know the charges? You're aware that
                        you're charged with murder, which has a
                        maximum penalty of life in prison.

     [Appellant:]       With no authority and jurisdiction over me.

     [Trial Court:]     You're aware of that. Okay. Is that your
                        claim? But you even though you claim that
                        there's no jurisdiction, you at least know
                        what the government has said though, right?

     [Appellant:]       You said that.       The government didn't say
                        that.

     [Trial Court:]     Okay. So -

     [Attorney Nard:]   Your Honor.

     [Trial Court:]     Yes.

     [Attorney Nard:]   If I may. [Appellant (Bey)], for purposes of
                        the court[, Appellant (Lampley)] as per the
                        complaint, we've had an opportunity for me
                        to state to you what the Commonwealth is
                        trying to charge you with, or as far as

                                 - 16 -
J-S28022-23

                        [Pennsylvania] law is concerned, has
                        charged you with the criminal indictment -

     [Trial Court:]     He's been charged.

     [Attorney Nard:]   Correct.

     [Appellant:]       (No response.)

     [Trial Court:]     He asked you a question. Did you hear him?

     [Appellant:]       I asked you a question.

     [Trial Court:]     No, you don't ask me questions. I'll ask you
                        the questions. If you don't want to be
                        responsive, here's how this will go, you're
                        not following the decorum. You can play the
                        silly games. I don't recognize the indigenous
                        statement that you've made. No court has.
                        There's no precedent whatsoever for your
                        claim. It's rejected.

     [Appellant:]       So it’s a violation -

     [Trial Court:]     So let’s make sure that we understand each
                        other.

     [Appellant:]       Your violation -

     [Trial Court:]     Your claim. I heard it. It's rejected. We
                        start this trial on Thursday. Now, do you
                        want to come to trial with the assistance of
                        counsel or not?

     [Appellant:]       Can you provide the delegation of authority
                        order?

     [Trial Court:]     Okay. That request is denied also. Attorney
                        Nard, he has set forth his claim to be pro se?
                        [Commonwealth counsel], I don't have the
                        right to counsel form. Do you have a copy of
                        that?

     [Commonwealth:]    Judge, I do not know if we do. I don't believe
                        so.

     [Trial Court:]     In the laws that you recognize, can you read
                        those laws –

                                   - 17 -
J-S28022-23

     [Appellant:]     The laws that I recognize -

     [Trial Court:]   - you printed. No, I'm just asking you. You
                      printed in English and referenced the 6th
                      Amendment, so now we're going to give you
                      the same form in English to recognize it. And
                      what we want to make sure is that you
                      understand you're charged with two
                      forms of murder, murder of the first
                      degree, murder of the second degree,
                      aggravated assault as a felony of the
                      first degree. There are three counts of
                      those.

                      Robbery, felony of the first degree.
                      There are three counts of those.
                      Firearms not to be carried without a
                      license, fleeing or attempting to elude
                      police officers, felonies - both felonies
                      of the third degree.          Possessing
                      instruments of crime as misdemeanors
                      of the first degree. Simple assault at
                      Counts 12, 13 and 14, misdemeanor of
                      the second degree, and recklessly
                      endangering another person at [Counts]
                      15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 as
                      misdemeanors of the second degree.

                      Murder of the first and second degree
                      carries a maximum penalty of life in
                      prison and/or a $50,000[.00] fine. The
                      felonies of the first degree carry
                      maximum penalties of 20 years and/or
                      $25,000[.00] in fines. The felonies of
                      the third degree carry maximum
                      penalties of seven years and/or
                      $15,000[.00] in fines.       And the
                      misdemeanors of the first degree carry
                      a five year maximum and/or a
                      $10,000[.00] in fines.       And the
                      misdemeanor of the second degree
                      carries possible maximums of two years
                      in jail and/or $5,000[.00]. There are
                      ten violations of the vehicle code

                               - 18 -
J-S28022-23

                        charged as summaries, which carry
                        fines and fees.

                        Attorney Nard, have you explained the
                        substance   of   these  charges   [to
                        Appellant]?

     [Attorney Nard:]   I have, Your Honor.

     [Trial Court:]     All right.     And was he appropriately
                        responsive in understanding when he was
                        explained these charges? In other words, did
                        he interact with you regarding them?

     [Attorney Nard:]   He did, Your Honor.

     [Trial Court:]     All right. Perhaps, [Commonwealth counsel],
                        one suggestion would be - I'd like to know
                        your position about the right to counsel
                        waiver. If you would like to engage in this,
                        or if you have a suggestion, if Attorney Nard
                        would do it or the court.

     [Commonwealth:]    We do it typically, but Your Honor can do it.
                        I have no problem doing it though.

     [Trial Court:]     All right. Does [Appellant] have a copy of
                        one of [the right to counsel waiver forms]?

     [Tipstaff:]        Yes.

     [Trial Court:]     Okay. You have a form in front of you,
                        [Appellant], that states that you have a right
                        to be represented by counsel. Now, you've
                        referenced that in the 6th Amendment, so
                        you obviously understand that, correct?

     [Appellant:]       Uh-huh.

     [Trial Court:]     All right. And you know the nature and
                        elements of the charges against you as
                        you've had a preliminary hearing.
                        You've had an information, a complaint,
                        discussions with Attorney Sandmeyer
                        and Attorney Nard, and as well, I just
                        read the charges to you; is that correct?

     [Appellant:]       Uh-huh.

                                  - 19 -
J-S28022-23

     [Trial Court:]   Alright. And do you understand the possible
                      range of sentences, including what the fines
                      or maximum penalties could be in these
                      cases?

     [Appellant:]     Uh-huh.

     [Trial Court:]   All right. And do you understand the lawyer
                      could be more familiar with these rules of
                      evidence and procedures than you might be?

     [Appellant:]     Yes. Yes, sir, I understand that.

     [Trial Court:]   All right. Do you understand if you represent
                      yourself, you would be required to follow all
                      of the rules of criminal procedure and
                      evidence; do you understand that?

     [Appellant:]     Uh-huh.

     [Trial Court:]   Do you understand there may be defenses to
                      charges which counsel would be aware of; do
                      you understand that?

     [Appellant:]     Uh-huh.

     [Trial Court:]   Do you understand that if these defenses or
                      other rights are not raised at the right or
                      correct time, they could be permanently lost;
                      do you understand that?

     [Appellant:]     Uh-huh.

     [Trial Court:]   Do you understand if error or rule violations
                      occur and you don't object to them at the
                      right time, you could [lose] your right to
                      object to them permanently; do you
                      understand that?

     [Appellant:]     Uh-huh.

     [Trial Court:]   Are you voluntarily giving up your right to be
                      represented by a lawyer? In other words, is
                      that your decision?

     [Appellant:]     I got a question though.

                                - 20 -
J-S28022-23

     [Trial Court:]    No, first answer that and then you can ask
                       your question. So, is it your choice not to
                       have Attorney Nard represent you?

     [Appellant:]      Yes, it's my choice.

     [Trial Court:]    Okay. No one forced you to do that.

     [Appellant:]      It's my choice.

     [Trial Court:]    In other words, you came to that decision by
                       yourself[?]

     [Appellant:]      By myself.

     [Trial Court:]    Okay. I would indicate on this form and then,
                       [Commonwealth counsel] - and then I'll let
                       you ask your question. Okay. So, hang on.
                       I'm just filling out the form. [Commonwealth
                       counsel], you can look at the form. I think
                       as indicated by the responses, I'll ask that
                       you sign for the Commonwealth.

     [Commonwealth:]   Number 10, Your Honor.

     [Trial Court:]    Okay. Let me see. I thought I asked it. I'm
                       sorry, I asked if he's been forced or
                       pressured in any way.

     [Commonwealth:]   Yes.

     [Trial Court:]    And he said, no, it's his own decision. I'm
                       satisfied.

     [Commonwealth:]   You marked it yes.

     [Trial Court:]    I'm sorry. I went down the form. He did
                       indicate no, he was not - and it was his own
                       decision. I guess I looked at it affirmatively.

     [Commonwealth:]   We do the same thing, Your Honor.

     [Trial Court:]    Yeah. I understand. With that being - the
                       record should reflect he indicated it was his
                       own decision. That he came to it freely and
                       voluntarily without the force or coercion by
                       any other individual; is that right?

     [Appellant:]      Uh-huh.

                                 - 21 -
J-S28022-23

     [Trial Court:]    All right.     And then you can sign it.     Go
                       ahead.

     [Commonwealth:]   Your Honor, just in terms of then the caption
                       on this.

     [Trial Court:]    Yes. It will be Lampley.

     [Commonwealth:]   Okay.

     [Trial Court:]    But I think it has to be, because no change
                       has been made in the amended information.
                       It still reads Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
                       versus Markese Denashawn Lampley, but he
                       can choose to sign it how he identifies
                       himself. Okay.

     [Appellant:]      Uh-huh.

     [Trial Court:]    And I'll let you do that.

     [Appellant:]      Before I sign that.

     [Trial Court:]    Yeah. Go ahead.

     [Appellant:]      Can you provide evidence of authority and
                       jurisdiction over me?

     [Trial Court:]    Okay. No. And I'm not going to, because I
                       don't    need    to.      The    evidence     is
                       self-proclaiming. I reject your theory of
                       being indigenous and I will not entertain that,
                       as I see that as a frivolous argument. So
                       your claim is denied. If you want to reserve
                       that right for appeal, you can, but I'd ask that
                       based on everything you just told me, you
                       can sign that form in the name that you
                       identify as.

     [Appellant:]      All right.

     [Commonwealth:]   The other matter, Your Honor, while
                       [Appellant] is signing the form, I just want to
                       be clear for the record that each of
                       [Appellant’s]    answers     to  the    court's
                       questions, which followed the right to
                       counsel waiver, he didn't say yes or no, he
                       simply said uh-huh. And I want the record

                                    - 22 -
J-S28022-23

                          to reflect that both the court reporter and the
                          court recognized those as yes answers,
                          except for Number 10.

     [Trial Court:]       Which - go ahead.

     [Commonwealth:]      He said uh-huh when you asked, is the
                          decision yours.

     [Trial Court:]       And he said yes. I asked him, I guess, more
                          affirmatively than how the question actually
                          reads on the form. But then when asked if
                          anyone pressured him or coerced him, he
                          said no, and that's how it's filled out.

     [Commonwealth:]      I know the court reporters have a certain way
                          of typing what is a yes and what is a no and
                          I just wanted to – [in case] there's any
                          argument about that down the road.

     [Trial Court:]       Okay. So I'll address you, you've signed this
                          as Mileage Galor Bey.

     [Appellant:]         Yes.

     [Trial Court:]       All right. And the answers of uh-huh meant
                          yes, correct?

     [Appellant:]         Correct.

     [Trial Court:]       All right. Okay. I've signed this. I'll make
                          that part of the record. With that being
                          acknowledged, Attorney Nard, I am going to
                          require that you be standby counsel. And I
                          know you were privately retained; however,
                          we will ensure that the county contract be
                          also satisfied as it pertains to your
                          retainment.

N.T., 6/21/21, at 15-31 (extraneous capitalization omitted; emphasis added).

     As part of the colloquy, Appellant executed a right to counsel waiver

form in which he answered affirmatively (“yes”) to the following questions:

                                     - 23 -
J-S28022-23

     1. Do you understand you have a right to be represented by an
     attorney, and a right to a free attorney if you can’t afford one and
     you meet the eligibility requirements of the Erie County Public
     Defender’s Office?

     2. Do you know the nature and the elements of the charges
     against you?

     3. Are you aware of the possible range of sentences, including
     fines and the maximum possible penalty that can be imposed, if
     you are found guilty or plead guilty?

     4. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you will still
     be required to follow all the rules of criminal procedure and
     evidence?

     5. Do you understand that an attorney will be more familiar with
     these Rules than you?

     6. Do you understand there may be defenses to these charges
     which counsel would be aware of?

     7. Do you understand that if these defenses or other rights are
     not raised at the right time, they may be permanently lost?

     8. Do you understand if errors or rule violations occur and you
     don't object to them at the right time you will lose your right to
     object permanently?

     9. Are you voluntarily giving up your right to be represented by
     an attorney?

Right to Counsel Waiver Form, 6/21/21. To the question – “Have you been

forced or pressured in any way, or have promises been made to you that have

influenced your decision to waive your right to be represented by an

attorney” – Appellant answered “no.” Id.

     In addressing Appellant’s waiver of counsel claim, the trial court stated

that it “ensured Appellant was aware of his charges by reviewing the amended

information, and the maximum penalties Appellant was facing with each

                                    - 24 -
J-S28022-23

count.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/15/22, at 12, citing N.T., 6/21/21, at 23-24.

In support of its position that Appellant was made aware of the charges and

the maximum potential penalties, the trial court relied upon the executed

waiver form, as well as Appellant’s affirmative answer to the trial court’s

inquiry – “And you know the nature of the elements of the charges against

you as you’ve had a preliminary hearing.           You’ve had an information, a

complaint, discussions with Attorney Sandmeyer and Attorney Nard, and as

well, I just read the charges to you; is that correct?” Trial Court Opinion,

12/15/22, at 12-13. The trial court explained that it conducted a valid waiver

colloquy pursuant to Rule 121 and that the totality of the circumstances

demonstrates that Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived

his right to counsel. Id. at 16.

       Appellant was charged with 21 criminal offenses under the Crimes Code

and 11 summary offenses under the Vehicle Code. See Amended Information,

6/17/21. The trial court informed Appellant of the 21 offenses for which he

was charged under the Crimes Code.6 N.T., 6/21/21, at 23. The trial court
____________________________________________

6 The trial court misspoke when it indicated to Appellant that he had been
charged with only 10 summary offenses under the Vehicle Code when, in fact,
Appellant had been charged with 11 summary offenses. N.T., 6/21/21, at 24
(stating, “[t]here are ten violations of the [V]ehicle [C]ode charged as
summaries” (emphasis added)).

When a defendant has been charged with summary offenses, neither the
United States Constitution not the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees the
defendant an absolute right to counsel. Commonwealth v. Smith, 868 A.2d
1253, 1256 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 877 A.2d 462 (Pa. 2005).

                                          - 25 -
J-S28022-23

then proceeded to explain the potential penalties Appellant faced if convicted.7

Id. at 23-24. The trial court did not, however, orally advise Appellant of the

elements of each offense that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt to convict Appellant of the various offenses under the Crimes

Code. Instead, the trial court asked Attorney Nard whether he “explained the

substance of these charges” to Appellant, to which Attorney Nard replied

affirmatively. It is unclear, based upon the record, what was meant by the

term “substance” as it related to the charges.

____________________________________________

Rather, “[t]he right to counsel in summary cases attaches only to those
defendants who are unable to employ counsel when there is a likelihood
that imprisonment will be imposed.” Smith, 868 A.2d at 1256 (citation
and original quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). When the only
sentence provided for in a summary offense violation is a fine and costs, a
defendant does not have a right to counsel. Id. Ergo, if no right to counsel
has attached, the trial court does not need to conduct a waiver of counsel
colloquy before permitting a defendant to proceed pro se in defending against
the summary offenses.

Here, the trial court indicated that Appellant’s 11 summary charges were
punishable by fines and costs. Therefore, Appellant had no right to counsel in
defending against those charges. As such, Appellant’s challenge to the trial
court’s failure to satisfy the colloquy requirements of Rule 121 with regard to
the summary offenses is without merit.

7 The trial court identified the potential penalties according to the classification

of the felony or misdemeanor, i.e. felonies of the first degree carry a maximum
penalty of 20 years’ incarceration and a $25,000.00 fine and misdemeanors
of the first degree carry a maximum penalty of 5 years’ incarceration and a
$10,000.00 fine, rather than identifying the potential penalty Appellant faced
with each offense, i.e., a conviction for robbery carries a maximum penalty of
20 years’ incarceration and a $25,000.00 fine and a conviction of possessing
instruments of crime carries a maximum penalty of 5 years’ incarceration and
a $10,000.00 fine.

                                          - 26 -
J-S28022-23

      Based upon the record before us, it is unclear whether the trial court

conducted a waiver colloquy in accordance with Rule 121. In particular, we

are unable to discern, based upon this record, whether Appellant was

appropriately and sufficiently advised of the elements of each crime.       See

Phillips, 93 A.3d at 853; see also Clyburn, 42 A.3d at 299; Lasko, 14 A.3d

at 173; Floyd, 257 A.3d at 18; Isaac, 205 A.3d at 363; Hood, 2022 WL

4090008, at *6. In order to comply with the mandate of Rule 121(A)(2)(b),

the record must demonstrate that the elements of the crimes were explained

to the defendant and that there is support for a trial court’s determination that

the defendant understood the elements of the crimes and knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her right to counsel. As the case

sub judice contains ambiguity as to whether the elements of the crimes were

explained to Appellant and whether Appellant understood that explanation, we

are constrained to remand this case to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary

hearing to determine what, if anything, was explained by Attorney Nard to

Appellant regarding the elements of the crimes. In other words, the trial court

shall determine what Attorney Nard meant when he stated he “explained the

substance of the case” to Appellant.          The trial court shall conduct an

evidentiary hearing and return the certified record to this Court within 60 days

of the date of this memorandum.

      Moreover, the trial court indicated that Appellant may have been

informed of the elements of the charges during, inter alia, the preliminary

hearing. The record reveals that the trial court granted Appellant’s request to

                                     - 27 -
J-S28022-23

have a transcript of the preliminary hearing produced. See Trial Court Order,

2/28/20, see also Trial Court Order, 4/23/20.      A copy of the preliminary

hearing transcript, however, is not contained in the certified record presently

before this Court. Upon remand, the trial court shall obtain and file a copy of

the preliminary hearing transcript, and the transcript shall be forwarded to

this Court as part of the certified record.

      Case remanded. Jurisdiction retained.

                                      - 28 -