Court Opinion

ID: 9881320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-30 09:21:41.173872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:14.554687
License: Public Domain

NO. 12-22-00280-CR

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                 TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                         TYLER, TEXAS

 ERIC LOCKE WHITING,                                   §   APPEAL FROM THE
 APPELLANT

 V.                                                    §   COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2

 THE STATE OF TEXAS,
 APPELLEE                                              §   ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS

                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Eric Locke Whiting appeals his conviction for interference with public duties. In five
issues, Appellant contends (1) the trial judge abused his discretion by overruling Appellant’s
motion for directed verdict and (2) the evidence is legally insufficient because the State failed to
disprove his “speech” defense, failed to establish that he violated the law under which he was
convicted, failed to prove that he interrupted, disrupted, impeded, or interfered with the officer’s
investigation, and failed to prove that he was “the legal cause” of any interruption, disruption,
impediment, or interference with public duties. We affirm.

                                              BACKGROUND

       Appellant was charged by information with interference with public duties. 1             The
information alleged that Appellant interfered with, disrupted, impeded, or interrupted Sergeant
Kyle Wilson’s public duties by failing to leave and by yelling “in an aggressive manner” while
Sergeant Wilson was investigating deadly conduct. Appellant pleaded “not guilty,” and the matter
proceeded to a bench trial.

       1
           See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15 (West 2016).
       Sergeant Wilson of the Angelina County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched to a convenience
store to investigate a report of deadly conduct. Two vehicles were swerving at each other in a
“road rage incident,” and both vehicles ultimately stopped in the parking lot of the convenience
store. Other officers were already on the scene when Wilson arrived, and Wilson parked on the
shoulder behind the other two deputies’ patrol units, which blocked the middle entrance to the
store. Wilson and other officers began speaking with the occupants of the vehicles to learn who
was driving the vehicles and what happened, and they arrested one individual. After Wilson had
been on the scene for fifteen to twenty minutes, Appellant pulled up to the scene in his truck and
began yelling at the officers, saying that they needed to move their vehicles because they were
blocking the view and endangering public safety. 2 Wilson testified that Appellant spoke in an
aggressive manner.
       Wilson and other officers told Appellant that they were conducting an investigation and
instructed him to leave. Appellant did not leave the scene and continued to yell “in an aggressive
manner” at Angelina County Deputy Daniel Tinajero. Wilson explained that he and the other
officers had to divert their attention from the investigation twice to deal with Appellant. Appellant
continued to yell at a deputy after officers asked him to leave. According to Wilson, Appellant
tried to exit through the blocked entrance. Officers instructed Appellant to back up and exit his
vehicle, after which they arrested him. While still at the scene, Wilson told another officer that he
researched the applicable statute, and that it is a defense to prosecution if the defendant’s actions
involved only speech. Officers ultimately decided to charge Appellant because he refused to leave
and was yelling aggressively. During cross-examination, Wilson responded affirmatively when
asked whether it was “speech that drew you all” to Appellant and agreed that speech is what led
to Appellant’s arrest. Video recordings from Wilson’s dash camera and his backseat camera were
admitted into evidence and published to the trial judge.
       Deputy Tinajero testified that he arrived at the scene fifteen to twenty minutes before
Wilson. Tinajero explained that the deadly conduct call involved several people and required
investigation. While Tinajero interacted with the person who was arrested, Appellant arrived at
the scene, pulled his vehicle fairly close to Wilson and another officer, and began yelling at them.
Tinajero described Appellant’s behavior as “very aggressive” toward the officers. Tinajero
explained that Appellant was both aggressive and driving a vehicle, and Appellant yelled that the

       2
           Appellant was not involved in the deadly conduct incident that was under investigation.

                                                         2
officers needed to move their vehicles. According to Tinajero, Wilson and another officer “yelled
at [Appellant] to go[,] [a]nd then that’s when he started to roll up[.]” Tinajero testified,
“[Appellant] started yelling to me, same thing, it’s a matter of public safety, you need to move
your vehicles. And I just told him to go multiple times.” According to Tinajero, Wilson and the
other officer heard Appellant yelling and asked him to back up. Tinajero agreed that officers asked
Appellant to stop, but he continued to move forward and engage with officers, and when he was
again asked to leave, he was instructed to back up and did so. Tinajero estimated that he engaged
with Appellant for approximately one minute, but other officers spent more time with Appellant.
When defense counsel asked whether Appellant’s aggression was solely yelling, Tinajero
explained, “[y]eah, most of it. Speech and hand gestures, that’s it.” Tinajero agreed with defense
counsel’s assertion that Appellant engaged the officers “[j]ust with speech[.]”
       At the conclusion of Tinajero’s testimony, defense counsel moved for an instructed verdict.
Defense counsel stated, “the State’s failed to meet their burden. Under [Section] 38.15(d) of the
Texas Penal Code, it is a defense . . . that the interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference
alleged consisted of speech only. I believe the testimony has shown that it was only the speech of
Mr. Whiting that led to his arrest and this charge.” The prosecutor responded that “there were
many acts taken physically by Mr. Whiting [that] go well beyond speech. And just refusing to
leave, according to the courts, is beyond speech only.” The trial judge denied the motion and
stated, “based on the video and based on the description of [Appellant’s] actions, I think that the
Defendant’s action went far beyond speech alone.”
       The trial judge ultimately found Appellant “guilty,” sentenced him to six months in the
Angelina County jail, probated for one year, and assessed a fine of $750. The trial judge also
required Appellant to serve fifteen days in the Angelina County jail as a condition of probation,
participate in a cognitive thinking program, and perform community service.              This appeal
followed.

                                 SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       As mentioned above, Appellant presents five issues for our review: (1) the trial judge
abused his discretion by overruling Appellant’s motion for directed verdict; (2) the evidence is
legally insufficient because the State failed to disprove his “speech” defense; (3) the evidence
failed to establish that he violated the law under which he was convicted; (4) the evidence failed

                                                  3
to prove that he interrupted, disrupted, impeded, or interfered with the investigation; and (5) the
evidence failed to prove that he was “the legal cause” of any interruption, disruption, impediment,
or interference. Because each of these issues challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we
will address them together.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       To establish the misdemeanor offense of interference with public duties, the State must
prove that the defendant, acting with criminal negligence, interrupts, disrupts, impedes, or
otherwise interferes with a peace officer “while the peace officer is performing a duty or exercising
authority imposed or granted by law[.]” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(a)(1), (b) (West 2016).
“It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the interruption, disruption, impediment, or
interference alleged consisted of speech only.” Id. § 38.15(d) (West 2016). Refusing to leave the
scene when instructed to do so and distracting an officer from performing his duty constitute
interference under Section 38.15. See Hernandez v. State, No. 07-22-00042-CR, 2022 WL
15334312, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
       A challenge to a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction and is reviewed under the same standard.
Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see also Rios v. State, 982 S.W.2d
558, 560 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. ref’d). When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the
evidence, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether
a rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 n.19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)); Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315-16, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Escobedo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d).
       It is the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and
draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts, and we defer to the factfinder’s role
as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be afforded their testimony.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton v. State, 235

                                                 4
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When the record supports conflicting inferences, we
presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor the prosecution and defer to that
determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The factfinder may make
reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial, and circumstantial evidence is as
probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016).
Analysis

       The trial judge heard Wilson testify that while he was investigating a report of deadly
conduct, Appellant approached the scene in his vehicle and began yelling aggressively at officers.
Wilson also testified that despite being told that an investigation was underway and instructed to
leave, Appellant refused to leave the scene and instead continued to yell aggressively at officers.
The trial judge also heard Wilson testify that officers twice had to divert their attention from the
investigation to deal with Appellant. Additionally, the trial judge heard Tinajero testify that
Appellant yelled at officers, behaved aggressively, and refused to leave the scene despite Tinajero
instructing him to do so multiple times.
       Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and giving
full deference to the factfinder to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Appellant “guilty”
beyond a reasonable doubt of interference with public duties. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.
Ct. at 2789; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Hernandez, 2022 WL 15334312, at *1-2; Escobedo, 6
S.W.3d at 6; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15. We further conclude that a rational trier of
fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s conduct consisted of more than
speech. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(d); Trevino v. State, 512 S.W.3d 587, 601-02 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (holding that speech-only provision in Section 38.15(d) is a defense
to prosecution, and State therefore has no affirmative obligation to negate its existence).
Accordingly, we overrule issues one, two, three, four, and five.

                                                  5
                                                  DISPOSITION

         Having overruled each of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                JAMES T. WORTHEN
                                                                   Chief Justice

Opinion delivered September 29, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

                                             (DO NOT PUBLISH)

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                                   COURT OF APPEALS

      TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                           JUDGMENT

                                        SEPTEMBER 29, 2023

                                         NO. 12-22-00280-CR

                                     ERIC LOCKE WHITING,
                                            Appellant
                                               V.
                                     THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                            Appellee

                            Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
                          of Angelina County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 21-0966)

                    THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and the briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the court
below should be affirmed.
                    It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of
the court below be in all things affirmed, and that the decision be certified to the court below for
observance.
                    James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
                    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.