Court Opinion

ID: 9561773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:16:04.752826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:24.877861
License: Public Domain

Judge Walker
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s denial of summary judgment as to plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims against defendant City, and defendants Paul and Evans in their official capacities. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s *53opinion affirming the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s state claims against defendant City and defendant Evans in his official and individual capacity and federal constitutional claims against defendant Evans in his individual capacity.
I. State Claims
In the present case, plaintiff brought claims against defendant City and defendant Evans individually and in his official capacity for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of each offense nor can plaintiff surmount the affirmative defense of governmental immunity. A common element of each claim is the requirement that plaintiff demonstrate that defendant acted without probable cause.
a. Probable Cause
The majority concludes that “there is indeed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant Evans had probable cause to arrest, imprison, and prosecute plaintiff.” The majority relies on Mrs. Sumpter’s affidavit in which she states:
I nodded to Sergeant Evans indicating that the individual had on the same color clothing as the person that I had seen in the Williams’ backyard. I had previously told Sergeant Evans that I would not be able to identify anyone. . . .
This affidavit conflicts with the affidavits from Officers K.S. Stewart, Vance Head, and defendant Evans which state that they were present when Mrs. Sumpter “positively identified” the plaintiff as the man she had seen in the neighbor’s backyard. However, I disagree that a genuine issue of material fact exists so as to preclude summary judgment in favor of defendants.
Notwithstanding the question of whether Mrs. Sumpter “positively identified” the plaintiff, probable cause existed to justify the warrantless arrest of the plaintiff. In its opinion the majority recognizes the line of cases holding that probable cause to arrest exists where a suspect is found in close proximity to the place where the offense occurred and where the similarity of the suspect’s appearance fits the description given by the witness. See e.g., State v. Joyner, 301 N.C. 18, 22, 269 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1980) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest the suspect where the suspect described *54as a bearded black male, wearing a toboggan and a jogging outfit was located approximately three and one-half blocks from the scene of the crime).
Our Supreme Court was asked to determine if sufficient evidence existed to support a finding of probable cause in the case of State v. Wrenn, 316 N.C. 141, 340 S.E.2d 443 (1986). I interpret the holding in Wrenn to be different from that of the majority opinion. The majority states that probable cause was found “when the facts indicated that the defendant’s vehicle was stopped exiting the apartment complex in which the crimes occurred; defendant was ordered to step out of the vehicle, was ‘patted down’ and his car was searched; [and] a loaded revolver was found in the unlocked console in the front seat of the vehicle ....” However, the finding of a weapon in the vehicle was not a factor considered by the Supreme Court in finding that probable cause existed for the arrest of defendant. Rather, such evidence was admissible because the search of defendant’s vehicle was incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, probable cause must have existed to justify a warrantless arrest prior to the search of defendant’s vehicle. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held:
We find that the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant. Defendant was apprehended almost immediately after the reported felony had been committed as he exited victim’s apartment complex at an early morning hour when there was no other vehicular or pedestrian traffic in the area. Defendant’s appearance at the time of the arrest fit victim’s general description of her assailant, i.e., white male wearing dark clothing. Under these circumstances, we find that the proximity of defendant to the location where the offenses were committed and the similarity of defendant’s appearance to the description which had been reported to the police provided the arresting officer with the element of probable cause necessary to effectuate the [warrantless] arrest. See State v. Joyner, 301 N.C. 18, 22 269 S.E.2d 125, 129.
Wrenn, 316 N.C. at 147, 340 S.E.2d at 447-48.
In the present case, the police were alerted on 15 May at 11:10 p.m. by Mrs. Sumpter that a break-in was in progress at 205 Edge Road. Officers Evans, K.S. Stewart, and Vance Head arrived on the scene. Officer Evans forwarded the description of the suspect given by Mrs. Sumpter. Within minutes of when the crime had been reported, Officer Vance Head located plaintiff four or five blocks from the crime scene. Considering the late hour, the proximity of the *55suspect to the crime scene, and the similarity of plaintiffs appearance to the description of the suspect provided by Mrs. Sumpter, I would find that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
b. Malice
Additionally, the plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim for punitive damages is deficient. In order to maintain an action for punitive damages, plaintiff must demonstrate actual malice. Moore v. City of Creedmoor, 120 N.C. App. 27, 43, 460 S.E.2d 899, 909 (1995), appeal dismissed and disc, review granted, 342 N.C. 658, 467 S.E.2d 718 (1996). Actual malice is defined as ill-will, spite, or desire for revenge. Id. As there is no showing of actual malice in this case, plaintiffs claim for punitive damages on the claim of malicious prosecution necessarily must fail.
c. Immunities
Defendant Evans is also entitled to summary judgment regarding plaintiffs state claims against him in his individual capacity on the basis of official immunity. The majority correctly states that to maintain a suit against a public official in his/her individual capacity, plaintiff must demonstrate that the official’s actions were malicious, corrupt, or outside the scope of his/her official duties. Epps v. Duke Univ., Inc., 122 N.C. App. 198, 211, 468 S.E.2d 846, 851 (1996). In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that Evans’ actions “were grossly and wantonly negligent, or intentional.” “An act is wanton when it is done of wicked purpose, or when it is done needlessly, manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Marlowe v. Piner, 119 N.C. App. 125, 128, 458 S.E.2d 220, 223 (1995).
In the present case, plaintiff alleges that defendant Evans prosecuted and imprisoned him without probable cause. A similar argument was made by the plaintiffs in Marlowe v. Piner, 119 N.C. App. 125, 128, 458 S.E.2d 220, 223 (1995). In Marlowe, the plaintiffs brought an action against defendant Piner, individually and in his official capacity as sheriff, for false arrest and false imprisonment. Id. at 126-27, 458 S.E.2d at 221-22. Although the plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s actions were malicious in that the defendant arrested plaintiffs without probable cause, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on official immunity. Id. at 128, 458 S.E.2d at 223. This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision stating:
*56Plaintiffs have made no forecast of evidence which would tend to show that defendant intended his actions to be prejudicial or injurious to them. At most, plaintiffs’ evidence tends to show that defendant negligently believed he had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs.
Id. Similarly, based on plaintiff’s forecast of the evidence, I would reverse the trial court’s decision denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s state' claims against defendant City and defendant Evans in his official and individual capacity.
II. Federal Constitutional Claims
I also disagree with the majority’s holding that defendant Evans was not entitled to qualified immunity regarding plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims. In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the plaintiff’s right must be established so clearly that a reasonable official would know that his action violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 531 (1987). While the majority correctly states the test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, I disagree with their application in the present case.
The United States Supreme Court established that “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from civil liability to the extent their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 410 (1982)). Accordingly, qualified immunity is intended to remove most cases from the legal process prior to submission to the jury except in cases where the official clearly violated the law. Id. The purpose of qualified immunity is to allow officials to perform their duties without the fear of impending lawsuits. “[PJermitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 530 (1987).
Qualified immunity is particularly appropriate for police officers who must make quick decisions in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit *57noted, “[hjolding police officers liable in hindsight for every injurious consequence of their actions would paralyze the functions of law enforcement.” Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 133 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1995). Furthermore,
[i]f every mistaken seizure were to subject police officers to personal liability under § 1983, those same officers would come to realize that the safe and cautious course was always to take no action. The purposes of immunity are not served by a police force intent on escaping liability to the cumulative detriment of those duties which communities depend upon such officers to perform.
Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 967 (4th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff contends that defendant Evans violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unwarranted searches and seizures. Having concluded that there was sufficient evidence for probable cause, I cannot say that Evans’ conduct in arresting plaintiff violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Even if Evans wrongly believed that there was probable cause to arrest defendant, he would be entitled to qualified immunity. As the Fourth Circuit explained:
The “meaning” of the fourth amendment, at least when stated in broad philosophical terms, is relatively clear. The precise action or combination of actions, however, which will infringe a particular suspect’s fourth amendment rights is often difficult for even the constitutional scholar to discern. . . . [T]here is often a “legitimate question” whether an officer’s particular conduct constituted an improper search or seizure. When such a “legitimate question” exists, the principle of qualified immunity gives police officers the necessary latitude to pursue their investigations without having to anticipate, on the pain of civil liability, future refinements or clarifications of constitutional law.
Tarantino v. Baker, 825 F.2d 772, 775 (4th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Accordingly, I would hold that defendant Evans is entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim.
Plaintiff also argues that he had a clearly established right to be released from jail when John Erick Ellis confessed to the commission of the crime. The existence of an additional suspect, albeit one who confesses, does not automatically negate probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest and detention. See e.g., In re Moss, 295 S.E.2d 33, 39 *58(W.Va. 1982) (holding that evidence showing that another individual confessed to the crime and was charged does not dictate a finding of no probable cause).
Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendant Evans violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by depriving him of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To successfully assert a 1983 claim in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff “must assert facts that, at a minimum, demonstrate [defendants acted with deliberate or reckless intent.” Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1995).
Here, the plaintiff alleged that defendant Evans acted with deliberate and reckless intent when conducting his post-arrest investigation. The issue of whether an officer’s post-arrest investigation rises to the level of deliberate or reckless intent has been addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Simmons v. McElveen, 846 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1988). In Simmons, plaintiff filed` a § 1983 action against police officers alleging that their post-arrest investigation violated his constitutional rights. Following plaintiffs arrest for armed robbery, the police failed to disclose exculpatory fingerprint evidence to the district attorney’s office and failed to conduct a physical line-up and fingerprint comparison of another suspect who was implicated by a “crime stoppers” program tip. Id. at 338. Eight months after the arrest, defendant was released after his attorney located a witness who exonerated and conclusively implicated the “crime stoppers” suspect. Id. at 338-39. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to award summary judgment to the defendant officers holding that the officers’ conduct “simply [did] not exceed the level of negligence.” Id. at 339.
Similarly, in Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1995), the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against police alleging that their post-arrest investigation violated his constitutional rights. In Romero, plaintiff was arrested for the murder of David Douglas and was imprisoned for approximately three months before he was released from jail. Id. at 1474. Following his arrest, the police failed to contact plaintiff’s alibi witnesses and failed to interview individuals who allegedly saw another man threaten and attempt to fight David Douglas approximately two hours before he was murdered. Id. at 1479. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to allege conduct which amounted to a constitutional violation. Id. at 1478. The Court reversed the district court’s decision denying defendants’ qualified *59immunity upon concluding that defendants’ conduct did not exceed negligence even though in hindsight investigation of plaintiff’s alibi witnesses and other individuals would have been fruitful. Id. at 1479.
In sum, while I do not condone the post-arrest investigation performed by defendant Evans, plaintiff has failed to allege that defendant acted with “deliberate or reckless intent” and he is therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s decision and remand this case for an entry of summary judgment in favor of all defendants.