Court Opinion

ID: 9699258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:16:17.138045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:47.979283
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge McGINLEY.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that 34 Pa.Code § 65.161, which defines the term “reasonable assurance” for purposes of ascertaining eligibility for benefits under Section 402.1(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), Act of December 5, 1936, P.L. 41, 43 P.S. § 802.1(1), is invalid and unenforceable because it was not adopted pursuant to a grant of legislative authority.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion in one respect, namely that Section 609 of the Law, added by Section 10 of the Act of March 24, 1964, Special Sess., P.L. 53, 43 P.S. § 849, is not a source of authority for adoption of 34 Pa.Code § 65.161. Majority Opinion at 1271. The authority to amend a statute lies with the General Assembly; consequently, a regulation may not amend a statute. If the Law is to be amended it has to be done in accordance with the procedures expressed in Section 609 of the Law, which were not followed in this instance. However, promulgation of 34 Pa. Code § 65.161 was neither the enactment of new legislation nor an amendment to Section 402.1(1) of the Law. Rather, 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 “defines reasonable assurance and sets forth criteria that must be met for reasonable assurance to exist.” 33 Pa. B. 25. Therefore, 34 Pa.Code *1274§ 65.161 expands and develops the term as it is used in Section 402.1(1) of the Law because the Law fails to define the disqualifying concept of “reasonable assurance” of future employment.
I am of the opinion that promulgation of 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 was a valid exercise of the Department’s legislative rule-making authority, pursuant to an express grant of legislative power by the General Assembly under Section 201(a) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 761(a), to enact regulations. The enabling statute, at Section 201(a) of the Law, provides:
Section 201. General Powers and Duties of Department.—
(a) [The Department] shall have power and authority to adopt, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations ... and take such other action as it deems necessary or suitable. Such rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
(Emphasis added). A regulation adopted within an agency’s legislative rulemaking authority is “valid and is as binding upon a court as a statute if it is (a) within the granted power, (b) issued pursuant to proper procedure, and (c) reasonable.” Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Uniontown Area School District, 455 Pa. 52, 76-77, 313 A.2d 156, 169 (1973). A presumption of administrative regularity may be applied if 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 was promulgated within the power granted under Section 201 of the Law because Slippery Rock Area School District has not alleged any procedural deficiencies. See Chambers Development Company, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 97, 545 A.2d 404 (1988).
The inquiry must focus on whether the promulgation of 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 was within the Department’s express grant of power under Section 201(a). Critically, in assessing the validity of 34 Pa.Code § 65.161, the Court must determine whether it contravened Section 402.1(1) of the Law because the enabling statute, Section 201(a) of the Law, granted the Department the express authority to adopt, amend and rescind a regulation provided the regulation is consistent with the provisions of the Law.
The more precise question is whether 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 is invalid on the basis that it is inconsistent with Section 402.1(1) of the Law because its application may lead to a different outcome than under judicial interpretations of the statute which adjudications had occurred before 34 Pa. Code § 65.161 was promulgated.1 A regulation may not be rendered invalid on such grounds if it was promulgated pursuant to a grant of legislative authority. See Popowsky v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Commission, 589 Pa. 605, 910 A.2d 38 (2006) (The Public Utility Commission had legislative authority to change a regulation regardless of previous interpretations by the courts).
In Popowsky, the regulation was challenged on the basis that it was inconsistent with a pre-regulation case. The Supreme Court held that the Public Utility Commission (PUC) was free to modify a regulation that interpreted statutory requirements that public utilities provide adequate services. The PUC was not obliged to adopt *1275regulations consistent with intermediate appellate judicial interpretations that existed in the absence of explicit regulations. Popowsky demonstrated that the Department, as an administrative agency, may promulgate a regulation to reflect its interpretation of a statute that it administers, even if that interpretation was different than a judicial interpretation that occurred prior to the regulation. Consequently, a past interpretation of the term “reasonable assurance” in Section 402.1(1) by this Court, that simply required a reasonable expectation of reemployment, did not deter the Department from promulgating a regulation that explains and expands the term “reasonable assurance” to include economic equivalency.
I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s characterization to the contrary that 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 “constitutes an interpretive rule.” Majority at 1273. The Majority’s conclusion is based, in part, upon a distinction between the current controversy and Popowsky. Majority at 1273. The Majority concludes that “Section 402.1 of the Law and the Department’s changed interpretation of it in 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 are not of the same character as the statutes and regulations at issue in Popowsky _” Majority at 1272-73. As the Majority explains, the regulation at issue in Po-powsky was adopted pursuant to the PUC’s legislative authority as the statute involved, Section 1504(1) of the Public Utility Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 1504(1), vested broad powers in the PUC to “[prescribe as to serve and facilities, including the crossing of facilities, just and reasonable standards, classifications, regulations and practices to be furnished, imposed, observed and followed by any or all public utilities.” Unlike in Popowsky, the Majority reasons in the current controversy that “[t]he legislature did not broadly declare that there would be an unemployment compensation system and then delegate legislative authority to the Department to formulate criteria for the grant or denial of benefits.” Majority at 1272-73.
I believe the Majority’s comparison of Section 402.1 of the Law to Section 1504(1) of the Public Utility Code in Popowsky is inappropriate. Instead, a comparison between Section 1504(1) of the Public Utility Code and Section 201(a) of the Law is appropriate and reveals that Section 201(a) of the Law is “of the same character” as the statute in Popowsky. Here, as in Popowsky, the General Assembly did delegate legislative authority to the Department because Section 201(a) of the Law vests broad powers in the Department to “adopt, amend, and rescind such rules and regulation ... as it deems necessary or suitable. [But][s]uch ... regulations shall not be inconsistent with the ... act.” Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s conclusion and would find that 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 was promulgated pursuant to a grant of legislative power.
Based upon review of the Law and in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Popowsky, I must disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 is inconsistent with Section 402.1(1) of the Law and its promulgation was not a proper application of the Department’s express statutory authority to enact regulations pursuant to Section 201(a). Accordingly, 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 is valid.
Upon finding that 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 is valid it necessarily follows that the Board properly relied on it to determine the claimant’s eligibility for benefits. There is no legally valid basis to disturb the Board’s application of 34 Pa.Code § 65.161 in the instant case. I would agree with the Board’s determination that the claimant should be eligible for benefits pursuant to Section 402.1(1) of the Law.
*1276Accordingly, I would affirm the Board’s decision.
Judge PELLEGRINI and Judge FRIEDMAN join in this dissent.

. There is no disagreement that the results in similar published decisions of the Court that involved long-term substitute teachers reassigned to work as day-to-day substitutes would differ based on whether they were decided before or after the adoption of 34 Pa. Code § 65.161. There are similar cases where a claimant was denied benefits, but likely would have been granted benefits if economic equivalency was considered a factor. See Neshaminy School District. 426 A.2d at 1245; Richland School District, 459 A.2d at 1358; and Board of Education, School District of Philadelphia, 609 A.2d at 596.