Court Opinion

ID: 9556967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 08:08:08.091476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:46.988034
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 17, 2023

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                              NO. 01-19-00608-CR
                            ———————————
                   TAIRON JOSE MONJARAS, Appellant
                                        V.
                         STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 232nd District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 1614762

                            OPINION ON REMAND

      After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, appellant, Tairon

Jose Monjaras, with an agreed punishment recommendation from the State, pleaded

guilty to the felony offense of possession of a firearm by a felon.1 In accordance

1
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(a), (e).
with the plea agreement, the trial court assessed his punishment at confinement for

five years. On original submission, in his sole issue, appellant contended that the

trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence.

      The Court previously held that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s

motion to suppress evidence because the Court concluded that appellant’s interaction

with law enforcement officers constituted a consensual encounter. See Monjaras v.

State, 631 S.W.3d 794, 810 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021) (Monjaras I),

rev’d, 664 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (Monjaras II); but see Monjaras I,

631 S.W.3d at 810–26 (Goodman, J., dissenting) (concluding interaction between

appellant and law enforcement officers ceased being consensual after certain point).

Having so held, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See Monjaras I, 631

S.W.3d at 810 (modifying trial court’s judgment to comport with record and

affirming as modified).     On original submission, the Court did not address

appellant’s argument that law enforcement officers lacked reasonable suspicion to

detain him. See id. at 810 n.4; but see id. at 810–26 (Goodman, J., dissenting)

(concluding law enforcement officers did not have reasonable suspicion when they

detained appellant).

      Appellant then filed a petition for review with the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals, which the court granted. See Monjaras II, 664 S.W.3d at 926 (granting

petition for review “to determine whether the court of appeals erred in finding that

                                          2
[a]ppellant’s interaction with the officers was a consensual encounter”). In its

decision, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that although appellant’s

interaction with law enforcement officers was initially consensual, it “became an

investigative detention.” Id. at 924–32. It thus reversed this Court’s judgment and

remanded the case to the Court to determine whether law enforcement officers “had

reasonable suspicion to detain [a]ppellant and whether that detention was valid.” Id.

at 924, 932.

      We reverse and remand.

                                   Background

      At the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, Houston Police Department

(“HPD”) Officer J. Sallee testified that he was on duty, with his partner, on

December 12, 2018. While on patrol around noon in a “high crime area,” Sallee

drove his patrol car into the La Plaza apartment complex on Glenmont Drive. The

patrol car’s emergency overhead lights and siren were not activated. The weather

was warm, in the “[m]id sixties” and “[s]eventies”2 and Sallee was “looking for

obscene crime.” As Sallee drove slowly toward the back of the apartment complex,

he saw appellant walking. Appellant had a backpack with him. Appellant did not

2
      Cf. Monjaras v. State, 664 S.W.3d 921, 924 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (Monjaras
      II) (noting appellant’s counsel stated during his closing argument at
      motion-to-suppress hearing that “the temperature [on December 12, 2018] from
      6:00 AM to 12:00 PM ranged from fifty-seven to sixty-eight degrees”).

                                         3
make eye contact with Sallee as the patrol car drove by; instead, appellant

“immediately looked down as . . . a child would . . . if [he was] doing something

wrong.” Appellant was “over dressed for th[e] temperature” outside. After the

patrol car passed appellant, Sallee’s partner saw appellant “immediately look[] up.”

According to Sallee, this was “not really normal human behavior,” but Sallee did not

believe that appellant had committed a criminal offense. Sallee also noted that he

had never seen appellant before in the area and he had never arrested appellant before

that day.

      Because Officer Sallee wanted “to see where [appellant] was going or what

was going on,” he made a U-turn in the patrol car. Sallee still did not activate his

patrol car’s emergency overhead lights or siren. After the patrol car turned around,

Sallee expected to see appellant walking, but appellant was not in sight. Sallee

believed that appellant had either “ducked off into an apartment” or run off, but he

acknowledged that a number of “different things” could have happened.

      While patrolling the other side of the apartment complex, Officer Sallee saw

appellant again. Sallee did not activate his patrol car’s emergency overhead lights

or siren. Sallee stopped the patrol car, exited, and approached appellant to engage

in a “consensual encounter” with him. At the time Sallee approached appellant, he

did not “suspect him of anything.” Sallee requested information from appellant but

did not demand information from appellant. Sallee did not exhibit his firearm, and

                                          4
appellant freely spoke to Sallee. Appellant understood what Sallee said to him.

Appellant was “free to go,” and if appellant “had just taken off running,” Sallee

would not have done anything.

      Officer Sallee also testified that when he eventually searched appellant, he

found five .22 caliber bullets in appellant’s backpack. According to Sallee, “[t]he

only reason[] you have the bullets is [be]cause you have a gun.” Sallee then “felt

[a] gun” in appellant’s waistband when he searched appellant’s person. Appellant

immediately started fighting with Sallee after Sallee “felt the gun.” Sallee believed

that appellant was trying to get his firearm when he struggled with Sallee. Following

the struggle, Sallee and his partner recovered a firearm from appellant that was “fully

loaded.”

      HPD Officer C. Starks testified that while on duty on December 12, 2018, he

rode, along with his partner, Officer Sallee, in a patrol car. While on patrol, Sallee

and Starks went to the La Plaza apartment complex on Glenmont Drive. As they

drove around the apartment complex, Starks saw appellant walking. When appellant

saw the law enforcement officers, he “lowered his head” and did not look at them,

which caught Starks’s attention because it was not a normal reaction. According to

Starks, “[m]ost people look at the marked [patrol car] when [it] drive[s]-by.” Starks

also stated that appellant was “not dressed appropriately” because it was a “warm

                                          5
day” and appellant was wearing a jacket and a hat. Appellant was carrying a

backpack.

      After Officers Sallee and Starks passed by appellant in the patrol car, appellant

“raised his head.” When Sallee turned the patrol car around to drive back toward

appellant, he was gone. Starks believed that appellant had “taken off running into

the courtyard.” Neither Sallee nor Starks activated the patrol car’s emergency

overhead lights and siren. Starks noted that appellant had not committed a criminal

offense at that time, and Starks did not believe that he had ever seen appellant before

that day.

      When they saw appellant again, Officers Sallee and Starks made a stop to have

a consensual encounter with appellant. The manner in which Sallee parked the patrol

car gave appellant a “clear path,” and Starks testified that appellant was “free to

leave.” Starks did not exhibit his firearm; he “never grabbed it,” “never removed

it,” and “never took it out of the holster.” Starks stayed “back” as Sallee spoke to

appellant, and at one point, he walked away to “get a portable fingerprint device.”

Starks denied “cornering” appellant. If appellant had “taken off running,” Starks

would have “watch[ed] him take off run[ning].” Starks noted that while Sallee spoke

to appellant, another person flagged Starks down to report an incident unrelated to

any interaction the officers were having with appellant.

                                          6
      According to Officer Starks, during the officers’ interaction with appellant,

Officer Sallee asked appellant if he could search him. And later, after appellant’s

struggle with Sallee, Sallee removed a firearm from appellant’s person.

      The trial court admitted into evidence, State’s Exhibit 1, a copy of the HPD

offense report.3 A portion of the offense report, titled “Case Summary,” states:

      Officer . . . Starks and Officer . . . Sallee were patrolling at La Plaza
      Apartments located at 5909 Glenmont on 12-12-18 in response to an
      increase in violent crime in the area. The officers noticed [appellant]
      walking inside of the complex. [Appellant] was heav[ily] dressed with
      a [backpack] and put his head down as the officers drove by.
      [Appellant] quickly walked into the courtyard and ran eastbound
      through the complex. The officers noticed [appellant] exited a
      breezeway and decided to question him regarding his suspicious
      activity. . . . Sallee asked [appellant] for his permission to search his
      person, including his pockets and [appellant] freely agreed to
      allow . . . Sallee to search him. . . . Sallee found several bullets in
      [appellant’s] backpack during [the] search. . . . Sallee then searched
      [appellant’s] body and touched a .22 caliber handgun concealed inside
      of [appellant’s] pants. [Appellant] grabbed this gun and began to
      wrestle with [the] officers. [Appellant] grabbed this gun in an attempt
      to murder . . . Sallee and . . . Starks. The officers wrestled with
      [appellant] for approximately a minute until . . . Starks tasered him and
      he began to comply. . . . Sallee recovered a fully loaded . . . .22 caliber
      revolver from [appellant]. This [was] a firearm that [appellant]
      unlawfully possessed because of his felony conviction. . . . Sallee
      received abrasions to his forehead and hand during th[e] struggle.

3
      See Perez v. State, 495 S,W.3d 374, 387 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016,
      no pet.) (appellate court “consider[s] [the] evidence available to the trial court when
      it ruled on the motion to suppress”); see also Adroin v. State, No. 01-15-01062-CR,
      2016 WL 7368101, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 15, 2016, no pet.)
      (mem. op., not designated for publication) (appellate courts limit their review of
      trial court’s ruling on motion to suppress “to an examination of the evidence
      produced at the suppression hearing” unless parties relitigate suppression issue at
      trial on merits).

                                             7
Another portion of the offense report written by Officer Sallee states:

      I have made a prior arrest in this same area of Houston for violent gang
      related crimes while I was assigned to [the] gang division as a crime
      reduction unit. Officer Starks and I were in a fully marked police Tahoe
      and were wearing [our HPD] issued uniforms with [body-worn
      cameras] activated. We entered the La Plaza apartment complex
      located at 5909 Glenmont Drive.

      While [we] were patrolling through the parking lot[,] we passed by
      [appellant] who was walking east bound, down the southside of the
      apartment complex. Both Officer Starks and I noticed that [appellant]
      appeared to be nervous and stared at the ground and only looked up
      once we passed him. I continued driving a short distance and turned
      our patrol vehicle around.

      We did not see [appellant] once we turned around for a short time and
      observed him walking down one of the breeze[ways]. Both Officer
      Starks and I activated our body[-]worn cameras . . . and I made first
      contact with [appellant].

      I introduced myself and shook [appellant’s] hand and began speaking
      with him. After a short conversation[,] I learned that [appellant] did not
      have any identification on his person. I have seen this many times with
      fugitives so they can lie about their identity. [Appellant] verbally
      consented for me to search him. The consent to search can be clearly
      heard and [seen] on my [body-worn camera]. [Appellant] continued
      not to make eye contact with me and had trembling hands.

      I searched [appellant] once and then moved to his [backpack] where I
      located approx[imately] 5 unfired .22 caliber bullets. I recognized the
      bullets to be [for] a .22 caliber pistol [which] is a smaller firearm. I
      informed Officer Starks that I had found several bullets and told him it
      would be a smaller pistol that I could have missed. I began searching
      [appellant] again and felt a gun near his right[-]side groin area. Once
      [appellant] knew I had found the gun[,] he reached for it and began
      fighting [with the] officers. I maintained my right hand on the gun and
      wrapped my left arm around [appellant’s] waist. . . . Starks,
      [appellant,] and I went to the ground after a short struggle on our feet.
                                          8
      The entire time [appellant] was attempting to retrieve the gun.
      Some[how] [appellant] regained his feet and I followed with him by
      having my arms still wrapped around his waist. We took several steps
      and I took [appellant] back to the ground. I struck [appellant] several
      times with my left hand while I maintained my right hand on the
      gun. . . . Starks regained his feet and was able to deploy his [conducted
      energy device] striking [appellant] in his upper left shoulder. All while
      [Starks and I] gave verbal commands to [appellant]. [Appellant] still
      had his right hand under his body with his hand on the gun. I yelled at
      [appellant] and . . . Starks recharged the [conducted energy device].
      This time [appellant] finally gave up and placed his hands behind his
      back. . . . I placed [appellant] into hand restraints and retrieved the gun
      from his waist band. I could see from the side of the revolver that it
      was loaded and placed it behind me. . . .

And a portion of the offense report written by Officer Starks states:

      We drove to the La P[laza] Apartments at 5909/5913 Glenmont and
      began to drive through the parking lot. There was some activity with a
      few people walking in the complex.

      We drove in southbound from Glenmont, drove to the back of the
      complex and turned to the west[.] [W]e drove to the west parking lot
      and turned northbound.

      I first saw [appellant] walking southbound on the sidewalk along the
      side of the apartments. It was a warm morning and [appellant] appeared
      to be overly dressed wearing what looked like multiple layers of
      clothing and a knit cap. He was also carrying a backpack. [Appellant]
      saw us and looked down toward the sidewalk and did not look our way
      when we passed. [Appellant] then looked forward and continued
      walking northbound as soon as we passed him.

      ....

      We made a U-turn and then drove back to the south side of the complex.

      [Appellant] was [nowhere] to be seen. He had obviously taken off
      running into the courtyard of the apartments. We lost sight of him.

                                          9
We continued driving eastbound and then turned northbound back
toward the entrance that we had just drove through.

Officer Sallee then saw [appellant] walking eastbound through a
breezeway into the same parking lot that we were now in.

We decided to do a consensual interview with [appellant] due to his
suspicious behavior.

Officer Sallee drove past the breezeway to the north of [appellant]. We
stopped in a location that did not impede [appellant’s] travel or walking
path.

Officer Sallee exited the vehicle and approached [appellant] toward the
rear of our truck. . . . Sallee identified himself and shook [appellant’s]
hand.

[Appellant] told Officer Sallee that he did not have any identification
and verbally identified himself during this conversation. [Appellant]
was visibly shaking during th[e] interview.

I had exited the vehicle and had neglected to inform the dispatcher of
our location. I saw that [appellant] did not have identification. I then
walked to the passenger door of our truck and advised the dispatcher of
our location and obtained my portable fingerprinting device.

I was walking back around when [a] witness . . . walked up to me
wanting to inform me of some type of incident that had occurred
overnight.

I instructed her to step away and wait for me on the sidewalk of the
apartments.

I heard Officer Sallee ask [appellant] if he could search his person and
his pockets. I heard [appellant] freely say yes.

Officer Sallee then searched [appellant’s] person and pockets and
began to search his backpack while I was fingerprinting him.

                                   10
Officer Sallee advised that there w[ere] bullets inside of the backpack.
I saw these bullets. . . . Sallee then told me that they were .22 caliber
bullets and that he wanted to search [appellant] again to make sure that
he did not miss a pistol during the original search.

[Appellant] cl[e]nched his hands and stiffened up and then quickly
reached for his waistband area.

Officer Sallee then told me that [appellant] had a gun and we both began
to struggle with [appellant].

....

We struggled with [appellant] for several seconds. I had a grip on
[appellant’s] head and hands at one time and lost grip on them during
the struggle.

I ended back up on my feet at some time. [Appellant] and Officer Sallee
both had their hands on [appellant’s] gun and were struggling for
several seconds. . . . .

....

I then took out my issued conducted energy device . . . . I told Officer
Sallee that I had my taser. The only open spot that I could deploy the
conducted energy device [was] on the back of [appellant’s] left
shoulder.

I activated the [conducted energy device,] and I deployed the trigger
until [appellant] stopped trying to pull his gun out to kill us. I released
the trigger and [appellant] then began to reach back for his gun. I then
re-activated the [conducted energy device] on the same cartridge until
[appellant] said something to the effect [of] “I quit” and stopped
resisting. I immediately stopped the [conducted energy device] when
[appellant] stopped resisting. He was then handcuffed and compliant.

....

Officer Sallee removed the pistol . . . .

                                    11
      The trial court also admitted into evidence, State’s Exhibit 2, videotaped

recordings from the body-worn cameras of Officers Sallee and Starks on December

12, 2018. The videotaped recording from Sallee’s body-worn camera shows Sallee

driving his patrol car in an apartment complex. Sallee stops the patrol car and states

that he is going to initiate a consensual encounter. He exits the patrol car and says

to appellant, “Good morning. How you doing, sir?” Sallee introduces himself to

appellant and shakes appellant’s hand. Sallee stands close to appellant, within arm’s

reach. Appellant is wearing a jacket, a knit hat, and carrying a backpack over his

shoulder. Sallee asks appellant if he lives in the apartment complex. After appellant

responds that he does, Sallee asks appellant if he has any “ID.” Officer Starks is

shown on the videotaped recording standing off to the side near the back of the patrol

car and several feet away from Sallee and appellant. Appellant says that his

identification is at his home and points in its direction. When Sallee asks appellant

for his name, appellant offers to write his name down on Sallee’s notepad. Appellant

and Sallee move closer so that appellant can take the notepad and a pen from Sallee.

Sallee asks appellant “how[] [his] day [is] going,” and Starks, while still standing

off to the side, asks appellant if he “[is] a painter.” Appellant answers the officers’

questions. As appellant writes down his name for Sallee, Starks walks away from

appellant and Sallee, and Starks is no longer visible on the videotaped recording.

                                          12
      Officer Sallee next asks appellant if he has “ever been arrested.” Appellant

responds, “Yeah . . . for assault, domestic violence.” Sallee also asks appellant to

write down his date of birth, which appellant does. While this is occurring, a woman

approaches Officer Starks, who reappears on the videotaped recording and moves

further away from Sallee and appellant to speak with the woman. Sallee asks

appellant if he is nervous and states that appellant is “shaking.” Appellant responds.

After Starks is finished speaking with the woman, he walks back closer to appellant

and Sallee, standing closer to appellant than he was previously. Appellant is now in

the middle standing in between the two officers with the patrol car directly in front

of him. Sallee asks appellant if he has “anything . . . illegal” on him, including any

narcotics or “weapons.” Appellant shakes his head “no” in response to Sallee’s

question. Sallee then asks appellant if he can “search [him],” and appellant starts to

empty his pockets. Sallee asks appellant to “hold on” and sticks his hand out,

touching appellant’s arm, to stop him. Sallee asks again if he can search appellant,

and when appellant tries to empty his pockets again, Sallee puts his hand on

appellant’s arm and tells appellant that he only asked appellant “a question.” Sallee

then puts his hand on appellant’s back, and Starks moves closer to appellant with his

hands stretched out, saying “manos, manos.”4 Sallee then asks appellant again,

“May I search you,” and appellant responds, “Yeah.”

4
      “‘Mano’ is the Spanish word for hand.” Monjaras II, 664 S.W.3d at 925 n.3.

                                         13
      To search appellant, Officer Sallee asks appellant to put his hands on the patrol

car for the search.    Appellant complies, and Officer Starks takes appellant’s

backpack off and sets it on the ground by the patrol car. Sallee searches appellant’s

person. Appellant tells Sallee that he was coming “from work.” Sallee then searches

appellant’s backpack, while Officer Starks stands to the side with appellant and

fingerprints appellant. While searching appellant’s backpack, Sallee finds bullets.

Starks asks appellant if he “ha[s] a gun,” and appellant says, “No,” and that it is his

“painter’s backpack.” Sallee goes over to appellant to search his person again,

telling Starks that the firearm would be “small.” Sallee then says, “Yeah, he’s got a

gun, partner.” On the videotaped recording sounds of a struggle can then be heard.

      The videotaped recording from Officer Stark’s body-worn camera shows

Starks riding in the front-passenger seat of a patrol car as it drives through an

apartment complex. The patrol car stops, and Starks states, “[F]or [a] consensual

encounter.” Officer Sallee can be heard saying, “Good morning. How you doing,

sir?” Starks exits the front-passenger side of the patrol car and walks around to the

back of the car. He stands off to the side behind the patrol car.

      The videotaped recording shows Officer Sallee standing with appellant,

within arm’s reach of appellant. Appellant is wearing a jacket, a knit hat, and

carrying a backpack. Sallee asks appellant if he has any “ID.” Appellant says, “No,”

and that he has it at his home. Sallee asks appellant if he can “get [appellant’s]

                                          14
name,” and appellant agrees. Sallee asks appellant how his “day [is] going,” and

appellant responds, “Good.” Starks asks appellant if he “[is] a painter,” and

appellant responds, “Yeah.” Appellant offers to write his name down on Sallee’s

notepad and takes the pen and notepad from Sallee’s hands.

      Officer Starks then walks away from appellant and Officer Sallee and back

around the patrol car to open his front-passenger-side door. He gets a device out of

the patrol car, and as he walks toward the back of the patrol car again, a woman

approaches him. Starks greets the woman. The woman and Starks stand off to the

side further away from Sallee and appellant. The woman speaks to Starks about an

unrelated incident, and he asks her to wait nearby on the sidewalk. While Starks is

speaking to the woman, Sallee can be seen standing right next to appellant, asking

appellant if he is nervous and telling appellant that he is shaking.

      After speaking to the woman, Officer Starks moves back toward where

appellant and Officer Sallee are standing—standing closer to appellant and Sallee

than he was previously. Sallee asks appellant if he has “anything . . . illegal” on him,

including any narcotics or “weapons.” In response, appellant shakes his head, “no.”

Sallee asks appellant, “May I search you?” And appellant starts removing items

from his pockets. To clarify that Sallee is only asking if he can search appellant,

Sallee asks appellant to stop taking items out of his pockets and sticks his hand out

to stop appellant, touching him. Sallee then places his hand on appellant’s arm and

                                          15
asks appellant again, “May I search you?” Sallee then places his hand on appellant’s

back, and Starks tells appellant, “manos, manos,” while stretching out his hand

toward appellant. Sallee takes his hand off appellant and asks appellant, “May I go

in your pockets and search you.” And appellant says, “Yeah.” To carry out his

search, Sallee asks appellant to put his hands on the patrol car. Appellant complies,

and Starks places appellant’s backpack on the ground. Sallee searches appellant’s

person.

      After searching appellant’s person, Officer Sallee searches appellant’s

backpack. While this is occurring, Officer Starks asks appellant if he can “see

[appellant’s] hands” to fingerprint them. Appellant says, “Yeah.” Starks asks

appellant if he has “ever been arrested before,” and appellant responds,

“Yeah . . . for domestic violence.” Sallee then informs Starks that he found bullets

in appellant’s backpack. Starks asks appellant if he “ha[s] a gun,” and appellant

says, “No” and that his backpack is his “painter’s backpack.” Sallee proceeds to

search appellant’s person again and tells Starks that the firearm would be “small.”

Sallee then says, “Yeah, he’s got a gun, partner,” and a struggle ensues between the

officers and appellant.

      After the suppression hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to

suppress evidence.

                                         16
                                Standard of Review

      We apply a bifurcated standard to review a trial court’s denial of a motion to

suppress evidence. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013). We review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion and the

trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id.; see also State v.

Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“[W]hether a given

set of historical facts amount to a consensual police-citizen encounter or a detention

under the Fourth Amendment is subject to de novo review because that is an issue

of law[—]the application of legal principles to a specific set of facts.” (emphasis

omitted)). At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge

of the witnesses’ credibility, and it may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any

part of the witnesses’ testimony. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2002); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). When, as

here, a trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in

a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and we assume that the trial court

made implied findings of fact that support its ruling as long as those findings are

supported by the record. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 35–36 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017); see also Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. Crim. App.

2000). We give almost total deference to a trial court’s implied findings, especially

those based on an evaluation of witness credibility or demeanor. Valtierra v. State,

                                          17
310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We will sustain the trial court’s ruling

if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law

applicable to the case. Id. at 447–48. This is so even if the trial court gives the

wrong reason for its decision. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App.

2003); State v. Brabson, 899 S.W.2d 741, 745–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995)

(stating, in context of reviewing trial court order granting motion to suppress,

appellate court “cannot limit [its] review of the [trial] court’s ruling to the ground

upon which it relied” and it “must review the record to determine if there is any valid

basis upon which to affirm the [trial] court’s ruling”), aff’d, 976 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1998).

                                Motion to Suppress

      In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress evidence because appellant “was detained and in custody from

the very second the [law enforcement] officers pretended to have a ‘consensual

encounter’ with him” and “[t]here was no reasonable suspicion for the

[investigative] detention.”

      The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against

unreasonable searches and seizures. Atkins v. State, 882 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Yet, not

every encounter between law enforcement officers and citizens implicates

                                          18
constitutional protections. Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997).   Interactions between law enforcement officers and citizens are often

characterized as either consensual encounters, investigative detentions, or arrests.

State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Crain v. State,

315 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Arrests require either a warrant or

probable cause, while investigative detentions constitute brief seizures that are less

intrusive than arrests and only require reasonable suspicion. Derichsweiler v. State,

348 S.W.3d 906, 914–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872,

878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Consensual encounters do not trigger any Fourth

Amendment protections, so a law enforcement officer does not need probable cause

or reasonable suspicion to initiate a consensual encounter. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at

411 (noting “[l]aw enforcement [officer] is free to stop and question a fellow citizen;

no justification is required for an officer to request information from a citizen”

(internal footnotes omitted)); State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 678–79 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999); Gaines v. State, 99 S.W.3d 660, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

      Here, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that appellant’s initial

interaction with Officers Sallee and Starks constituted a consensual encounter. See

Monjaras II, 664 S.W.3d at 928–29. But it determined that the officers’ interaction

with appellant subsequently escalated into an investigative detention at a certain

                                          19
point. See id. at 929–32. According to the court, at the point during the interaction

when “Starks moved very close to [a]ppellant, told [a]ppellant ‘manos, manos’ while

holding his hands out to direct [a]ppellant to follow suit while Sallee had his hand

on [a]ppellant’s back,” an investigative detention occurred. See id. at 932. This was

because “[a]t th[at] time . . . one officer had his hand on [a]ppellant’s back, the other

officer was two or three feet in front of [a]ppellant, the patrol car was within four or

five feet from one side of [a]ppellant and the apartment complex was approximately

twenty-five feet from [a]ppellant’s other side,” and “[a] reasonable person in

[a]ppellant’s shoes would not feel free to leave under th[e] circumstances.” Id.

      A law enforcement officer may temporarily detain a person for investigative

purposes if the officer reasonably suspects that the detained person is, has been, or

soon will be engaged in criminal activity. See Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Pate v. State, 518 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d); see also Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000) (stating law enforcement officer is generally justified in briefly

detaining individual on less than probable cause for purpose of investigating possible

criminal behavior if officer has reasonable suspicion).          Thus, there must be

reasonable suspicion for an officer to conduct an investigative detention. See Enns

v. State, 612 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Here,

we must determine whether Officers Sallee and Starks had reasonable suspicion to

                                           20
detain appellant at the time their interaction with him escalated to an investigative

detention. See Monjaras II, 664 S.W.3d at 932; see also Judgeware v. State, No.

01-93-00286-CR, 1994 WL 64869, at *3–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3,

1994, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (after determining defendant was

detained, analyzing whether law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion).

      A law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion to detain a person if he

has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those

facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person is, has been, or soon

will be engaging in criminal activity. Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914. This is an objective

inquiry that disregards the subjective intent of the officer and looks, instead, to

whether an objectively justifiable basis for the detention existed. Derichsweiler, 348

S.W.3d at 914.

      When determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, we consider

the totality of the circumstances. Id.; see also Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393,

397 (2014) (“The standard takes into account the totality of the circumstances—the

whole picture.” (internal quotations omitted)). “[C]ircumstances may all seem

innocent enough in isolation, but if they combine to reasonably suggest the

imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified.”

Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914; see also Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.

                                          21
Crim. App. 1997) (“[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is

innocent or criminal, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of

noncriminal acts.”). Whether reasonable suspicion exists depends on “both the

content of the information known to the officer and its degree of reliability.”

Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Reasonable

suspicion requires more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or

‘hunch.’” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); see also Munoz v. State, 649 S.W.3d

813, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (“[T]he officer must have

more than an inarticulable hunch or mere good-faith suspicion . . . .”). Notably, the

State has the burden to show that a law enforcement officer had at least reasonable

suspicion that the defendant had either committed an offense, or was about to do so,

before he detained the defendant. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913.

      The State first argues that Officers Sallee and Starks had reasonable suspicion

to believe that “[a]ppellant was engaged in criminal activity” because “Sallee

discovered [that] [a]ppellant possessed ammunition” in his backpack. But Sallee did

not search appellant’s backpack and find the five .22 caliber bullets until after the

officers had already detained appellant. See State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 569–

70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“Information that the officer either acquired or noticed

after a detention . . . cannot be considered. A detention is either good or bad at the

moment it starts.” (internal footnote omitted)); Paschall v. State, No.

                                         22
01-17-00217-CR, 2018 WL 2976120, at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

June 14, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“We review

whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a detention based on the facts

and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the detention.”); cf. Amores v.

State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (“[T]o determine the existence

of probable cause, we look to the facts known to the officers at the time of the arrest;

subsequently     discovered     facts      or    later-acquired   knowledge . . . cannot

retrospectively serve to bolster probable cause at the time of the arrest.”). Thus, the

State cannot rely on the bullets found in appellant’s backpack to establish that Sallee

and Starks had reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant had engaged, or was

about to engage, in criminal activity at the time their interaction with appellant

escalated to an investigative detention.

      The State next argues that Officers Sallee and Starks had reasonable suspicion

to detain appellant because “they were patrolling . . . a high crime area,” when the

officers first saw appellant, he “avoid[ed] eye contact,” “[a]ppellant fled from the

officers when they first passed him,” and he “acted nervously when [they] finally”

spoke to him. We review de novo whether the totality of the circumstances gave

rise to reasonable suspicion that appellant had engaged, or was about to engage, in

criminal activity at the time the officers’ interaction with appellant escalated to an

                                            23
investigative detention. See Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668; see also Madden v. State,

242 S.W.3d 504, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

      As to the State’s first argument that Officers Sallee and Starks had reasonable

suspicion to detain appellant because appellant was in “a high crime area,” we note

that a person’s presence in an area with a high-crime reputation alone is not sufficient

to justify a detention. See Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300, 303 (Tex. Crim. App.

1994); Sieffert v. State, 290 S.W.3d 478, 484–85 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no

pet.); Gamble v. State, 8 S.W.3d 452, 453–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,

no pet.); see also Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 53 (“Neither time of day nor level of criminal

activity in an area are suspicious in and of themselves . . . . Neither fact proves that

the suspect is engaged in any sort of criminal offense.”); Sterns v. State, No.

12-11-00283-CR, 2012 WL 3458096, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 15, 2012, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant’s presence in high-crime

area does not justify investigative detention).

      As to the State’s second argument that Officers Sallee and Starks had

reasonable suspicion to detain appellant because when the officers first saw

appellant, he “avoid[ed] eye contact” as they drove by in their patrol car, Texas

courts have held that a person’s observation of a law enforcement officer’s patrol

car, standing alone, is not suspicious. See Rodriguez v. State, 578 S.W.2d 419, 419–

20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (unreasonable to stop pedestrian “solely because he looks

                                          24
over his shoulder in the direction of a police car”); Gamble, 8 S.W.3d at 453–54

(“Standing alone, neither the area’s high-crime reputation nor appellant’s watching

the passing police car would have sufficed to justify a detention.”); Leday v. State, 3

S.W.3d 667, 672 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. ref’d) (“Merely looking at a

police car has been held insufficient to constitute a basis for reasonable suspicion for

a detention.”). And neither is a person’s action in looking away from a patrol car as

it passes by. See Contraras v. State, 309 S.W.3d 168, 171–72 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2010, pet. ref’d) (although defendant looked “quickly . . . to the right, away from the

[officers]” as they passed, conduct of defendant did not give rise to reasonable

suspicion that defendant was engaged, had engaged, or was about to engage in

criminal conduct); Gonzalez-Gilando v. State, 306 S.W.3d 893, 895–96 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d) (“It is not a crime in this State to . . . look away

from passing police officers . . . . A student looking down in the classroom upon the

teacher asking a question does not ipso facto mean the student committed a misdeed.

The same can be said of those who look away from law enforcement officials while

driving on the roadway.”); see also Luera v. State, 561 S.W.2d 497, 498–99 (Tex.

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (looking straight ahead and not looking at law

enforcement officers is insufficient for finding of reasonable suspicion); Loesch v.

State, 979 S.W.2d 47, 52–53 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1998, no pet.)

(no reasonable suspicion where defendant was driving in high-crime area, drove an

                                          25
older car, and did not look at law enforcement officers when he drove past them);

Muñera v. State, 965 S.W.2d 523, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet.

ref’d) (furtive eye movements and nervousness are not reasonable grounds for

suspicion). Further, Sallee testified that the circumstances that occurred before he

stopped his patrol car and walked up to appellant did not indicate that appellant had

committed a criminal offense.

      As to the State’s third argument that Officers Sallee and Starks had reasonable

suspicion to detain appellant because “[a]ppellant fled from the officers when they

first passed him,” we note that neither officer actually testified that appellant “fled”

from them. Sallee testified that after he initially drove his patrol car past appellant,

he wanted “to see where [appellant] was going or what was going on,” so he made

a U-turn in the patrol car. After the patrol car turned around, Sallee expected to see

appellant walking, but appellant was not in sight. Sallee believed that appellant had

either “ducked off into an apartment” or run off, but he also acknowledged that a

number of “different things” could have happened to appellant. See State v. Kerwick,

393 S.W.3d 270, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (law enforcement officer’s subjective

beliefs are not relevant to determination of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

to justify investigative detention); Hall v. State, 74 S.W.3d 521, 526 n.6 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (law enforcement officer’s “observation was nothing

more than an unfounded surmise, conjecture or speculation, and such is not stuff of

                                          26
reasonable suspicion”). Starks testified after Sallee turned the patrol car around to

drive back toward appellant, appellant was gone, and Starks believed that appellant

had “taken off running into the courtyard.” See Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 274 (law

enforcement officer’s subjective beliefs are not relevant to determination of

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify investigative detention); see also

Hall, 74 S.W.3d at 526 n.6 (“[Just because the law enforcement officer] considered

the practice suspicious does not mean that it was for purposes of a Fourth

Amendment analysis.”). But neither officer testified that they saw appellant flee.

See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (law enforcement officer’s

“reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a[n] [investigatory] stop”);

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (recognizing hunch or speculation is not enough basis for

reasonable suspicion); see also Turner v. State, No. 05-10-01225-CR, 2011 WL

4953438, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 18, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (noting law enforcement officer provided no evidence that defendant

“was in fact fleeing from the scene”).

      Further, even if appellant had left the area after seeing Officers Sallee and

Starks’s patrol car, a person’s decision to walk or run away from a patrol car that is

merely passing by is insufficient to justify an investigative detention. See Gurrola,

877 S.W.2d at 303 (“Mere flight alone does not justify an investigative

detention . . . .”); McKinney v. State, 444 S.W.3d 128, 133–34 (Tex. App.—San

                                          27
Antonio 2014, pet. ref’d) (“A person running at the sight of a patrol vehicle in [a]

high crime area, in and of itself, does not give an officer reasonable suspicion to

conduct an investigatory detention.”); Gamble, 8 S.W.3d at 453–54 (defendant’s

action in watching patrol car and walking away from it when it turned around did

not give rise to reasonable suspicion to detain defendant); cf. Reyes v. State, 899

S.W.2d 319, 324–25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) (“[F]light

from a show of authority is a factor in support of a finding that there is a reasonable

suspicion that a person is involved in criminal activity.” (emphasis added)). And

Sallee testified that the circumstances that occurred before he stopped his patrol car

and walked up to appellant did not indicate that appellant had committed a criminal

offense.

      Finally, as to the State’s fourth argument that Officers Sallee and Starks had

reasonable suspicion to detain appellant because he “acted nervously when [they]

finally” spoke to him, nervousness, alone, is not sufficient to establish reasonable

suspicion. See Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 670–71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (nervousness

“is not particularly probative because most citizens with nothing to hide will

nonetheless manifest an understandable nervousness in the presence of [an] officer”

(internal quotations omitted)); Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012); see also State v. Tucker, No. 13-15-00491-CR, 2016 WL 2609310, at

*7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 5, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

                                          28
designated for publication) (holding law enforcement officer lacked reasonable

suspicion even though officer observed defendant’s “shaking hands” and “slight

nervousness” when he encountered defendant (internal quotations omitted)); State v.

Sastaita, No. 13-14-00237-CR, 2015 WL 9257068, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Dec. 17, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(holding defendant’s nervousness and “odd behavior” were insufficient to constitute

reasonable suspicion (internal quotations omitted)).

      Standing alone, neither the area’s high-crime reputation, appellant’s decision

to look away and walk away as Officers Sallee and Starks passed him in their patrol

car, nor appellant’s purported “nervousness” when the officers actually spoke to

him, gives rise to reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant had engaged, or was

about to engage, in criminal activity. See Gamble, 8 S.W.3d at 453–54. Nor do

these facts give rise to reasonable suspicion when considered in light of the totality

of the circumstances testified to by Sallee and Starks.5 See id.

5
      We note that Officer Sallee testified that at the time he approached appellant, he did
      not suspect appellant “of anything,” and Officer Starks testified that at the time the
      officers approached appellant, appellant had not committed a criminal offense. And
      both officers agreed that appellant was “free to go” at the beginning of their
      interaction with him. Neither officer testified that they had reasonable suspicion to
      believe that appellant had engaged, or was about to engage, in criminal activity,
      until after Sallee found bullets in appellant’s backpack—which was after the
      officers’ interaction with appellant had escalated to an investigative detention.

                                            29
      Here, we cannot conclude that Officers Sallee and Starks at the time their

interaction with appellant escalated to an investigative detention had reasonable

suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances, to believe that appellant had

engaged, or was about to engage, in criminal activity. Thus, we hold that the trial

court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.

      We sustain appellant’s sole issue.

                                    Conclusion

      We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                Julie Countiss
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Goodman, and Countiss.

Goodman, J., concurring.

Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           30