Court Opinion

ID: 9586368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:09:55.914145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:48.255328
License: Public Domain

POFF, J.,
dissenting.
I agree that a defect in a jurisdictional requirement is not “a mere defect, irregularity or omission” within the contemplation of the curative provisions of Code § 16.1-114.* I disagree, however, *369with the majority’s holding that the writ tax requirement is jurisdictional.
At one time it was. Former Code § 16.1-112 provided that “if the writ tax ... be not so paid within 30 days . . . the appeal shall thereupon stand dismissed and the judgment shall become final. . . .” This statute was replaced in 1972 by Code § 16.1-107. Acts 1972, c. 585. The new statute no longer requires summary dismissal and final judgment. Code § 16.1-107 now provides that the appellant “shall, within thirty days . . . pay . . . the amount of the writ tax . . . and costs. . . .”
We should not assume, as the majority apparently does, that the change was meaningless. Significantly, every case cited by the majority in support of its conclusion that the writ tax requirement is jurisdictional involved a default in the bond requirement. Those cases merely reflect the mandate of the first paragraph of Code § 16.1-107 which expressly declares that “[n]o such appeal [from a court not of record] shall be allowed unless and until the [appellant] . . . shall give bond. . . .” The omission of such language respecting the writ tax requirement evinces a deliberate decision to make that requirement subject to the curative provisions of Code § 16.1-114, part of the same chapter of the same title of the Code.
The defined purpose of Code § 16.1-114 was “to promote substantial justice to all parties, and to bring about a trial of the merits of the controversy. . . .” “Tax-gathering is the purpose of the writ-tax statute. It is not intended to penalize a litigant.” Jenkins v. Faulkner, 174 Va. 43, 49, 4 S.E.2d 788, 790 (1939). I would hold that the appellants’ failure to pay the writ tax timely was “a mere defect, irregularity or omission” within the contemplation of the curative statute, reverse the judgment, and remand the action for a trial.on the merits.

 This statute, repealed effective January 1, 1985, Acts 1983, c. 499, provided:
Actions or proceedings appealed or removed from courts not of record shall be tried according to the principles of law and equity, and when the same conflict the principles of equity shall prevail. No warrant, motion or other pleading shall be dismissed by reason of a mere defect, irregularity or omission in the proceedings in the court not of record, or in respect to the form of any such pleading, when the same may be corrected by a proper order of the court of record. But in any such case the court of record shall retain the same, with full power to direct all necessary amendments, to enter such orders and direct such proceedings as will tend to correct any such defects, irregularities and omissions, to promote substantial justice to all parties, and to bring about a trial of the merits of the controversy; and the court may make such provision as to costs and continuances as may be just. This section *369shall be liberally construed, to the end that justice be not delayed or denied by reason of errors in the pleadings or in the form of the proceedings.