Court Opinion

ID: 9537462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:18:40.758105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:42.290621
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes as a matter of law that approximately ten installers who "worked fairly regularly” for Pam’s during the audit period were, or might be determined to be, employes within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Law, but that those who worked only occasionally or briefly were independent contractors. In my view, this distinction is untenable. Either all of the installers were employes within the meaning of ORS 657.040 or none was.
A remedial statute is to be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes. Puget Sound B & D Co. v. SUCC, 168 Or 614, 126 P2d 37 (1942) (Unemployment Compensation Law); Boling v. Nork, 232 Or 461, 375 P2d 548 (1968) (Workmen’s Compensation Law); Myers/Sherwood v. Tualatin RFD, 5 Or App 142, 483 P2d 95 (1971) (Firemen’s Civil Service Act).
*686The purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Law is to protect from economic hardship all persons actually employed in the labor market for the required number of weeks, not simply those who work "fairly regularly” for an employer, as the majority now holds.
The evidence offered at the hearing was that after Pam’s receives the order for the carpeting, linoleum or drapes from the customers, Pam’s contacts one or more installers until it finds one who is available. Pam’s engages that installer, tells him when and where the job is to be done and when it is to be completed. In other words, Pam’s schedules all the jobs. While the job is in progress Pam’s owner would occasionally but not frequently drop by the job and inspect it. One installer testified that Pam’s owner would come by about once a month. It is reasonable to infer from the testimony that one reason Pam’s did not inspect more often was that it employed only those installers whom it had found through experience to be competent to do the jobs without the necessity of overseeing their work. Certainly, Pam’s does not argue that it did not have the right to inspect any job if it chose to do so. Any complaints concerning the job were received by Pam’s, who in turn forwarded the same to the installer for rectifying. As one installer testified, if the job is not done right, Pam’s has the last word. Finally, Pam’s retained the right to hire and fire. Installers hired by Pam’s who did not perform were not rehired.
As our Supreme Court stated in Kirkpatrick v. Peet, 247 Or 204, 212, 428 P2d 405 (1967):
" * * * [I]n using the word 'employment’ in the Unemployment Insurance Act the legislature did not intend to incorporate the common law test for determining the master-servant relationship. * * *” Accord, Republic Dev. Co., Inc. v. Emp Div., 284 Or 431, 587 P2d 466 (1978).
In reference to Pam’s contention that the installers are free from its direction and control, our Supreme Court has held that an individual’s freedom from *687control or direction is not established under ORS 657.040(1) if there is reserved to the user of his services the right to control or direct when, where, how much and in what way the individual performs those services. Journal Pub. Co. v. State U. C. Com., 175 Or 627, 155 P2d 570 (1945); Union Avenue Club v. Peet, 249 Or 135, 437 P2d 730 (1968); Dick v. Morgan, 2 Or App 437, 468 P2d 544 (1970). This is so even though that right might not in some respects be exercised. It is not necessary that the person having the right to control exercise such right in every particular in order to bring the services within the coverage of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Union Avenue Club v. Peet and Dick v. Morgan, both supra.
Based upon my examination of this record, I submit that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the referee’s finding that the installers were not free from the ultimate direction and control of Pam’s in the performance of their work within the meaning of ORS 657.040(1) and the finding that the installers were not customarily engaged in an independently established business within the meaning of ORS 657.040(2)(a) and (b).
The evidence shows that Pam’s still retains the ultimate authority to control where, when, how much and in what way the individual installer performs such services.
As to the finding that the installers were not customarily engaged in an independently established business within the meaning of ORS 657.040(2)(a) and (b), I point to the following evidence that supports this finding: Most if not all of the installers had no employes who actually performed installation work; none employed anyone to assist them with installations on any of Pam’s jobs; none of the installers were recognized by the Department of Revenue as employers; none of the installers had any "risk capital” invested apart from their supplies such as tape, *688fasteners and adhesives, a few tools, some installing equipment and a vehicle. None had employes except one who had an oral arrangement for help from his son. As to the seven who were supposed to have one or more employes, none was recognized by the Department of Employment as an employer. Those who testified generally agreed that theirs was basically a one-man operation which could not be sold as a going business to another person.
As the Supreme Court noted in Kirkpatrick v. Peet, supra, risk capital is capital invested for a profit where the investor assumes the risk of loss. Risk capital is money that is spent for material, labor costs and items such as subcontracts, the value of which could result in a monetary loss to the investor should the return be less than the amount invested.
This being the case, Pam’s has not sustained its burden of proving that it is exempt under ORS 657.040 from payment of unemployment compensation tax on those individuals listed in the referee’s "Second Reconsidered Decision.” Republic Dev. Co., Inc. v. Emp. Div., 284 Or 431, 587 P2d 466 (1978).
I would affirm.