Court Opinion

ID: 9733749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:16:29.474631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:43.991407
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE WEXSTTEN, dissenting: In my opinion, the circuit court’s decision to grant the petition for removal was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority decision. With regard to the In re Marriage of Eckert factors, the court should first consider “the proposed move in terms of likelihood for enhancing the general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the children.” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 326-27, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (1988). The circuit court, with the majority of this court agreeing, found that the petitioner had met this factor by having “more realistic employment opportunities in Arizona.” 392 Ill. App. 3d at 173. Additionally, the court found that, upon removal, the petitioner would have the added support and assistance of her mother. According to In re Marriage of Collingbourne, any enhancement in the custodial parent’s quality of life does not automatically translate into an enhancement of the minor child’s quality of life. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d 498, 528, 791 N.E.2d 532, 548 (2003). Also, as the Illinois Supreme Court stated in In re Marriage of Eckert, “the mere desire of the custodial parent to move to another State, without more, is insufficient to show that the move would be in the children’s best interest.” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 325, 518 N.E.2d at 1044. In this case, the petitioner testified that if allowed to move to Arizona, she would be able to obtain employment as a cashier making $8 an hour at a Safeway grocery store. However, this employment opportunity is not definite because the petitioner was only told by an assistant manager that an effort would be made to rehire her. Cf. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d at 524, 791 N.E.2d at 546 (the petitioner sought a removal because she had a definite job offer with a higher salary in another state). The petitioner’s testimony that she can obtain employment as a cashier at a Safeway grocery store is merely speculative. Given the petitioner’s education and employment history, she is limited to finding employment at minimum wage jobs, and she has offered no evidence to suggest that Arizona offers her a greater opportunity for finding this type of employment. Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that the petitioner is unable to obtain a comparable job in Illinois. Cf. In re Marriage of Parr, 345 Ill. App. 3d 371, 379-80, 802 N.E.2d 393, 400-01 (2003) (where the petitioner sought a removal to Colorado to accept a job offer, because she was unsuccessful in her efforts to find a job closer to home, the court found that the petitioner had “done a thorough job search” in areas closer to home and that the petitioner’s reasons for the removal were neither frivolous nor inadequate). The petitioner testified that she had applied for employment in Illinois but was unable to accept any offered jobs because the cost of daycare would exceed her income. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the respondent would be unwilling to help watch the minor child to lessen the daycare expenses. Also, absent unspecified assistance from the petitioner’s mother and family friends, there is no evidence in the record regarding the cost of daycare in Arizona or any comparison of that cost between the two states. Because the increase in the petitioner’s economic opportunities is speculative at best, the only possible benefit that she seems to gain by the move is having her mother’s support and assistance in raising the child. This benefit alone is insufficient to justify a removal to Arizona, especially since the petitioner’s mother has been able to provide monetary support to the petitioner while the petitioner has lived in Illinois. Although the quality of the petitioner’s life may be enhanced by the additional support and assistance of her mother, any enhancement to the minor child’s quality of life is not established by the record. Under In re Marriage of Eckert, the court should consider the enhancement to the quality of life for both the custodial parent and the child. In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326-27, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. Any benefit that the minor child gains from moving to Arizona is overshadowed by the fact that he will be losing a close relationship with a father, who has been present throughout his life. The third and fourth factors that the court should consider under In re Marriage of Eckert are “the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the move” and “the motives of the noncustodial parent in resisting the removal.” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327, 518 N.E.2d at 1045. The petitioner argues that the respondent’s motives in resisting the move are questionable, as the respondent engaged in dishonorable behavior by luring the petitioner back to Illinois on the pretense of working out their marital problems. Notwithstanding the fact that the respondent admitted to this dishonest behavior on cross-examination, the petitioner was under no obligation to remain in Illinois and file for a dissolution of the marriage in this state. Accordingly, even though the respondent’s behavior has been questionable in the past, there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that his motives in resisting the removal are improper. The evidence also shows that the petitioner’s motives in seeking the removal are proper. As the circuit court stated in the judgment for the dissolution of the marriage, the motives of both parents in this cause are not an issue. The last factor to be considered under In re Marriage of Eckert is whether “a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can be reached if the move is allowed.” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327, 518 N.E.2d at 1045-46. According to the judgment for the dissolution of the marriage, the respondent was awarded visitation for one week of every month in the State of Arizona unless the respondent flies the minor child to Illinois. The respondent also receives visitation for two weeks in June, three weeks in July, and one week in August. While the respondent is in Arizona exercising visitation, the petitioner is to allow the respondent to stay in her home or that of her mother. The petitioner is also required to pay one-half of all airline travel expenses and provide at least two free American Airlines travel vouchers per year. The respondent argues that this schedule is not realistic due to his inability to afford such frequent travel. “A reasonable visitation schedule is one that will preserve and foster the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent.” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327, 518 N.E.2d at 1046. When a noncustodial parent has been diligent about exercising visitation rights, the court should be hesitant about interfering with those rights “ ‘by permitting removal of the children for frivolous or unpersuasive or inadequate reasons.’ ” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327, 518 N.E.2d at 1046, quoting D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 206, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (1976). Additionally, “[w]hen removal to a distant jurisdiction will substantially impair the noncustodial parent’s involvement with the child, the trial court should examine the potential harm to the child which may result from the move.” In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 328, 518 N.E.2d at 1046. Although this schedule may seem reasonable because it allows the respondent significant visitation time with the minor child, the schedule is totally unrealistic and unlikely to be followed. The respondent is currently working at a minimum wage job without health care benefits. It is hard to imagine how he will continue to have this job when, at a minimum, he will be taking off one week out of every month. Additionally, it is unrealistic to expect that either the petitioner or the respondent will have the necessary funds to support this once-a-month travel. Although the judgment requires the petitioner to provide at least two travel vouchers to the respondent every year, the record is unclear whether the petitioner will actually be able to meet this requirement. According to the record, the petitioner will be obtaining these vouchers from her father; however, there is no guarantee that her father will be able to provide the travel vouchers. It is unlikely that the respondent will be able to afford the frequent travel to Arizona without the vouchers. According to the judgment, the petitioner is to allow the respondent to stay in her home or that of her mother when he is in Arizona exercising visitation. Although this seems like a reasonable solution to lessen travel expenses for the respondent, this arrangement is again unrealistic and likely to deter the respondent from exercising visitation. If this arrangement is unsuccessful, then the respondent will have to pay the additional cost for hotel accommodations. The unrealistic visitation schedule is likely to substantially impair the respondent’s involvement with the child. The supreme court has noted that “the Eckert factors ‘are not exclusive’ ” and are only factors to be considered and balanced in determining whether removal is in the child’s best interest. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d at 523, 791 N.E.2d at 545-46, quoting In re Marriage of Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 312, 321, 665 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (1996). No individual factor is controlling, and the weight accorded to each will depend on the individual facts of each case. In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d at 523, 791 N.E.2d at 546. Absent speculation, the facts of this case are devoid of any benefit to the child, particularly when balanced against the loss of his relationship with his father due to the unrealistic belief that the proposed visitation schedule is even remotely possible. Accordingly, I believe that the application of the Eckert factors to this case demonstrates that the best interest of the child would be to deny the petition for removal. Therefore, the decision of the circuit court should be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence.