Court Opinion

ID: 9807819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:16:39.534981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:59:16.196194
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
dissenting.
I can not concur in any phase of the opinion of the Court, either in its view of the law, its construction of the deed, or its conclusions of fact. It is evident, to my mind, that the defendant never intended to convey anything south of the garden fence. The deed specifically calls for a stone, corner of B. F. Houston’s garden. Even if we take the stone as merely indicating a point, that point is expressly located by the deed itself at the “corner óf B'. E. Houston’s garden.” This was the comer of a marked line. I can not imagine how a line could be much better marked than hy a fence, which was on the line at the time the deed was made, and has been there ever since. Let uS take a plain, commonsense view of the matter: Two- women go out to> trade for a lot. They agree that the lot shall run 170 feet and shall stop at the comer of the garden. It turns out that 170 feet runs a foot beyond the garden fence. Which is more likely, that they should have made a mistake of one foot in-the length of the line, or that they should be mistaken as to the location of the fence, which was in full view ? The answer seems to me-too plain for argument. They could see the fence, but could not see an imaginary point where a given number of feet would end. This is not an attempt to change hy parol the description in the deed, but simply to locate the point called for by the deed, to-wit, the corner of the garden.
The Court says that “the grantor undertakes to- change by parol agreement and evidence a line about which there is no-*572uncertainty, either in the deed or in the survey and plat.” I can not see any such attempt whatsoever. It is true there is no patent ambiguity in the deed, because the deed assumes that the distance called for will stop at the corner of the .garden. A latent ambigTiity is developed because, in fact, the two points do not coincide. Hence, the question arises whether the grantor intended the line to stop at the garden fence or to continue the full 170 feet, no matter where it went. If we follow the settled rule of interpretation, it seems that we have no alternative but to stop at the corner of the garden, which was a well-known line of another lot then and now marked by a fence, which has never been changed. I have time but for few citations.
In the old and leading case of Person v. Rountree, 2 N. C., 378, note, repeatedly cited and approved, the course of the first line was “north” from a creek, so as to put the entire tract on the north side. The marked line ran south from the creek, so as to put the entire tract on the south side of the creek. It was held that the marked line controlled.
In Cherry v. Slade, 7 N. C., 82, it was held, quoting from the headnotes: “2. Whenever it can be proved that there was a line actually run by the surveyor, was maihed and a comer made, the party claiming under the patent or deed shall hold accordingly, notwithstanding a mistaken description of the land in the patent or deed.”
“3. When the lines or courses of an adjoining tract are called for in a deed or patent, the lines shall bei extended to them, without regard to distance.” * * *
“4. Where there are no natural boundaries called for, no marked trees or corners to be found, nor the places where they once stood ascertained and identified by evidence, or where no lines or courses of an adjoining tract are called for, in all such cases we are of necessity confined to the courses and distances described in the patent or deed; for however fallacious such guides may he, there are none other left for the location.”
*573In Houser v. Belton, 32 N. C., 358, 51 Am. Dec., 391, Judge Pearson gives tbe reason for tbe rule as follows: “Marked lines and corners control course and distance, because a mistake is less apt to be committed in reference to tbe former than the latter. Indeed tbe latter is considered as tbe most uncertain kind of description; for it is very easy to make-a mistake in setting down tbe course and distance, wben transcribing from tbe field book, or copying from tbe grant dr some prior deed, or a mistake may occur in making tbe survey by losing a stick, as to distance or making a wrong entry as to-course. Por these reasons, wben there is a discrepancy between course and distance and tbe other descriptions, the-former is made to give way.”
Does not this case settle that at bar ? There is a discrepancy between tbe distance and tbe call for tbe corner of tbe garden,, which is in the marked and well-known line of another lot. Therefore, the distance must give way, and tbe line stop at the' garden fence.
Two more citations and I am done:
In Deaver v. Jones, 119 N. C., 598, it is held by a unanimous Court that, quoting from tbe beadnotes:
“1. When a grant is located by contemporaneously marked lines, those lines govern and control its boundary and fix the-location so as to supersede other descriptions.”
“2. Where there is conflicting testimony as to tbe true location of a corner forming a boundary of tract of land, the highest evidence is proof of the consent of the parties to the-deed that certain marked lines or corners should constitute the boundary, and the identity of the corner is a question for the’ jury.”
Again, it is said by a unanimous Court, in Bowen v. Gaylord, 122 N. C., 816, 820: “That an inconsistent course and distance must give way to a, natural object or tbe well-known line of another tract wben called for in the deed, was settled as far back as Taylor’s Keports in Witherspoon v. Blanks, 1 *574N. C., 65 (157), and Bustin v. Christie, Ibid., 68 (160). It would be useless to cite the long line of decisions to the same effect, ending in Deaver v. Jones, 119 N. C., 598.”
In the case a,t bar the defendant offered to- prove that at the time the deed was made, it was “agreed and understood between the parties to the said deed at the time of its execution that the line of plaintiff’s lot on Church street extended only from the intersection of Houston and Church streets to the corner of defendant’s garden on Chinch street, and the corner of plaintiff’s lot on Church street was at the same time definitely located at the comer of defendant’s garden, and the line west from the corner of the garden was definitely located and fixed to be, and run with the garden fence, them dividing the lots of plaintiff and defendant; that the lot sold to plaintiff at the time of the execution of said deed was entirely surrounded by a fence, and its boundaries were well known, and it was well understood and agreed that only the lot included by said fence was sold to plaintiff; that the corner of defendant’s garden on Church street is an old and well-located corner, having been marked by a stone planted there more than twenty-five years agO'; that the fence dividing the lots of plaintiff and defendant has been standing where it now stands, and where it was at the time of the execution of plaintiff’s deed, for more than twenty-five years; that the defendant is not in possession of any of the lot north of the dividing fence between the lots of plaintiff and defendant.”
This testimony should have been admitted under proper instructions from the Court, and in its exclusion I. think there was error.
The case of Davidson v. Arledge, 88 N. C., 326, has no application to that at bar, because in Arledge’s case the deed in question appears to have described the lots simply by reference to the plat and number, with no mention whatever of any marked line or adjoining tract. As there was nothing but the plat to go by, of course it controlled the description.