Court Opinion

ID: 9611666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:59:06.937819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:43.876719
License: Public Domain

Stafford, J.
(dissenting) — The majority has adequately related the essential facts, thus, nothing will be gained by repetition thereof.
It is important to note, however, that the amended complaint and appended documents make it clear that appellants did not possess the requisite contractor’s registration certificate1 at the time they entered into the contracts. Furthermore, the amended complaint fails to allege that appellants were duly registered either at the time they contracted for the performance of the work or when they entered into the contract. Thus, on the face of the pleadings, appellants were not entitled to “bring or maintain any action in any court . . . for the collection of compensation for the performance of any work or for breach of any contract.” (Italics mine.) RCW 18.27.080.2 As a result, the first two claims were properly dismissed.
The appellants contend strict enforcement of RCW 18.20.020 and RCW 18.27.080 will cause them an injustice. *424Thus, they assert, the two sections should be liberally construed to encompass the doctrine of substantial compliance. A majority of this court has agreed with that theory. As a result, the doctrine of substantial compliance has been superimposed upon the legislative enactment. It is a good example of hard cases making bad law.
To be perfectly candid, the courts of California have given limited recognition to use of the doctrine in connection with a similar statute. However, the majority of this court would discard even California’s limited criteria for application of the doctrine: i.e., (a) that the contract was at least valid at the inception by virtue of a then current license, (b) that the contractor readily obtained renewal after the lapse, (c) there is some indicia of the contractor’s continuing qualification during the lapse.3
A review of the cases reveals few states have deemed it advisable to follow California’s lead, much less to exceed it. Most have held an unlicensed contractor cannot enforce his contract or recover for services rendered thereunder4 where the statute expressly provides that the contract of an unlicensed contractor cannot be enforced unless he first establishes he was duly licensed. 33 Am. Jur. Licenses § 69 at 386, § 70 at 387 (1941, Supp. 1970); see also the cases collected in 82 A.L.R.2d 1429 et seq. (1962). Furthermore, *425most courts have held that if a contractor is not licensed at the time specified in the statute, he cannot enforce the contract even if he becomes duly licensed thereafter. These cases are collected in Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1429 § 4 (1962).
RCW 18.27.080 provides that a contractor must allege and prove that he was a “duly” registered contractor at the time he contracted for the performance of work or entered into a contract. In construing statutory language, each word must be given effect according to its usual and ordinary meaning. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 75 Wn.2d 758, 762, 453 P.2d 870 (1969). The word “duly” means “properly, regularly, sufficiently”. Merriam-Webster Third International Dictionary (1966). This leaves no room for the use of substantial compliance as a means of watering down express language of a statute which appellants concede is designed for protection of the public.
Although RCW 18.27.020 provides only a minor criminal penalty for violations, the restrictions imposed by RCW 18.27.080 on the civil enforcement of contracts are meant to operate as additional sanctions. RCW 18.27.020 and RCW 18.27.080 represent a legislative determination that the importance of deterring unregistered persons from engaging in the contracting business outweighs any harshness between the parties. The injection of “substantial compliance” erodes the policy deemed necessary by the legislature for public protection.
The majority correctly states that statutory interpretation traditionally falls within the role of the judiciary as a counterpart of the recognized function of the legislature. Further, it is correct to say that the scope of judicial review includes the ascertainment of legislative intent and an attempt to effectuate legislative objectives. However, we have not yet gone so far as to hold that possession of the right to interpret gives us judicial license to modify or amend legislative enactments. In fact, we have consistently held to the contrary. In State v. Spino, 61 Wn.2d 246, 249, 377 P.2d 868 (1963), we said:
*426The rules of statutory construction can be used only to ascertain the meaning of a statute and not to modify it.
The rule was repeated in State ex rel. Thigpen v. Kent, 64 Wn.2d 823, 827, 394 P.2d 686 (1964). In King County v. Seattle, 70 Wn.2d 988, 991, 425 P.2d 887 (1967), we held:
The court will not read into a statute matters which are not there nor modify a statute by construction.
See also, State ex rel. Tarver v. Smith, 78 Wn.2d 152, 155, 47Ó P.2d 172 (1970), as well as Anderson v. Seattle, 78 Wn.2d 201, 202, 471 P.2d 87 (1970), in which we stated:
It is neither the function nor the prerogative of courts to modify legislative enactments.
Possession of the power to act carries with it a corresponding duty to exercise it with some restraint. It is a giant step from giving the statutory scheme “a rational interpretation founded upon its design”, as suggested by the majority, to the emasculation of the statute under the guise of interpretation.
By a stroke of the pen, the majority has done more to destroy the effectiveness of RCW 18.27 than the legislative opponents were able to accomplish during the statute’s stormy legislative history.
It is not denied that refusal to adopt the doctrine of substantial compliance may lead to a harsh result in isolated cases. One may well be sympathetic with the argument of the contractor. This, however, is a matter that should be directed to the legislature, not the court.
Appellants’ third claim is based on quantum meruit. It is contended that even if they are not entitled to maintain an action for the performance of services or an alleged breach of contract, they are entitled to recover for the reasonable value of material and equipment furnished. They rely on Lund v. Bruflat, 159 Wash. 89, 292 P. 112 (1930) and Ogilvy v. Peck, 200 Wash. 122, 93 P.2d 289 (1939).
Clearly, Ogilvy is not in point and need not be considered. Lund involved an action for recovery of the reasonable value of labor and material furnished by a plumber *427who was not licensed to carry on such trade. The court denied recovery for his services, but granted him the reasonable value of material furnished holding that the furnishing of materials did not constitute the doing of “plumbing work” prohibited by the ordinance.
Lund, however, does not support appellants’ position. The statutes in the instant case require strict compliance and even contain civil sanctions for noncompliance. RCW 18.27.080 declares that an unregistered contractor may not “bring or maintain any action . . . for the collection of
compensation for the performance of any work or for breach of any contract for which registration is required.” (Italics mine.) The ordinance involved in Lund contained no such language.
In considering whether an unlicensed artisan or contractor can recover either for his services or for materials on grounds other than enforcement of the contract, the courts have generally held that recovery may not be based on quantum meruit. Northen v. Elledge, 72 Ariz. 166, 232 P.2d 111 (1951); Kaiser v. Thomson, 55 N.M. 270, 232 P.2d 142 (1951); Cash v. Blackett, 87 Cal. App. 2d 233, 196 P.2d 585 (1948); Campbell v. Smith, 68 N.M. 373, 362 P.2d 523 (1961) ;5 see also the cases collected in 82 A.L.R.2d 1429 § 3(c) (1962). The reason generally given is that where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no recovery permitted because of noncompliance, no actionable cause arises from the contract. Annot., 30 A.L.R. 834 (1924); 33 Am. Jur. Licenses § 69 (1941). I feel the view is sound.
We now turn to the fourth claim denominated by the trial court as an action in fraud. Our rules require that the circumstances constituting fraud be pleaded with particularity. CR 9 (b). In the case at hand, however, the amended complaint failed to allege one of the most basic of the nine essential elements of fraud — the representation of an existing fact. Markov v. ABC Transfer & Storage Co., 76 Wn.2d 388, 457 P.2d 535 (1969); Puget Sound Nat’l Bank v. Mc*428Mahon, 53 Wn.2d 51, 330 P.2d 559 (1958). The amended complaint alleged instead the representation of a future fact.
According to Nyquist v. Foster, 44 Wn.2d- 465, 471, 268 P.2d 442 (1954), the test to determine whether a particular representation is one of an existing fact is as follows:
Where the fulfillment or satisfaction of the thing represented depends upon a promised performance of a future act, or upon the occurrence of a future event, or upon particular future use, or future requirements of the rep-resentee, then the representation is not of an existing fact.
Fraud cannot be predicated upon a representation as to a future event, or on a promise to perform in the future. Baertschi v. Jordan, 68 Wn.2d 478, 413 P.2d 657 (1966). Such a statement would be no more than an “estimate” of something to take place in the future. By its very nature, it can be neither true nor false at the time it is made. If the rule were otherwise, any breach of contract would amount to fraud. Nyquist v. Foster, supra. Thus, insofar as the claim appears to rely on fraud, the trial court properly dismissed it. CR 12 (b) (6).
Appellants cite the well established rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to relief. Hofto v. Blumer, 74 Wn.2d 321, 444 P.2d 657 (1968); Sherwood v. Moxee School Dist. 90, 58 Wn.2d 351, 363 P.2d 138 (1961). Both in oral argument and in their brief, appellants characterize the fourth claim as one of equitable estoppel, waiver or promissory estoppel as well as of fraud. They assert the amended complaint should not have been dismissed if they are entitled to recover on any one of these legal theories.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel can be disposed of almost summarily. The allegations do not support it. As in fraud, equitable estoppel requires the representation of an existing or past fact. East Providence Credit Union v. Gere-*429mia, 103 R.I. 597, 239 A.2d 725 (1968); accord, Hellbaum v. Burwell & Morford, 1 Wn. App. 694, 463 P.2d 225 (1969). The other theories require some analysis, however.
The fourth claim alleges that respondent promised to refrain from resorting to the “contractor’s registration act” as a bar to appellants’ right to assert a claim under the contracts. Even though the promise does not appear to be supported by consideration, it is said to be enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 1 Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932). Under such a theory, the court is neither asked to create a new right nor to sustain an action on the promise. As stated in 1 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 140, p. 614 (3d ed. 1957):
[I]t reaches the desired result by allowing ... an original right to be enforced by merely prohibiting the interposition of a defense.
Thus, it is asserted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel prohibits respondent from interposing, as a defense, appellants’ failure to comply with RCW 18.27.020 and RCW 18.27.080.
It is important to note, however, that proof of being duly registered is of importance to more than the immediate contracting parties. Among other things, the act requires that contractors carry public liability and property damage insurance. It also provides for suspension of a contractor’s registration if such insurance ceases to be effective. RCW 18.27.050. If contracting parties can waive the requirements or otherwise render the statute inapplicable, a contractor could avoid the necessity of carrying such insurance. This could result in innocent third parties being forced to suffer the loss if injured by negligent activities of an insolvent contractor.6 Thus, the court will not give credence to an attempted waiver or estoppel where the rights of the public are involved. See 56 Am. Jur. Waiver § 7 (1947); 92 C.J.S. Waiver at 1067 (1955).
*430As previously noted, appellants concede the statutory requirements were designed for protection of the public. It is precisely for this reason that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable. One may not foreclose enforcement of a statute against himself if it has been passed for the benefit of the general public. An agreement to circumvent such a statute is void. Grandview Inland Fruit Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 189 Wash. 590, 66 P.2d 827, 109 A.L.R. 1472 (1937); Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449, 298 P. 705, 79 A.L.R. 29 (1931); 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 173 (1964). Estoppel may not be asserted to enforce a promise that is contrary to the policy of such a statute. King County Employees’ Ass’n v. State Employees’ Retirement Bd., 54 Wn.2d 1, 336 P.2d 387 (1959); State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn.2d 1, 182 P.2d 643 (1947). In such a case, public policy demands that the law override the doctrines of promissory estoppel and waiver. Any other rule would render enforcement of legislation enacted for the benefit of the general public subject to the whims of individuals.
The amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court should be affirmed.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Stafford, J.

RCW 18.27.020. “It shall be unlawful for any person to submit any bid or do any work as a contractor until such person shall have been issued a certificate of registration by the state department of licenses. A partnership or joint venture shall be deemed registered if any one of the general partners or venturers whose name appears in the name under which the partnership or venture does business shall be registered. A violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor.” (Italics mine.)

RCW 18.27.080. “No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor may bring or maintain any action in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the perform-*424anee of any work or for breach of any contract for which registration is required under this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly registered contractor at the time he contracted for the performance of such work or entered into such contract.” (Italics mine.)

For a review of California’s contractor licensing statute see Case Notes, “Substantial Compliance with Contractors Licensing Statutes,” 7 Santa Clara Lawyer 157 (1966).

We have previously held that an unlicensed person cannot recover under a contract where such service was of the type for which an occupational license is required. Shorewood, Inc. v. Standring, 19 Wn.2d 627, 144 P.2d 243 (1943); Kinney v. Sando, 28 Wn.2d 252, 182 P.2d 45 (1947), both of which interpret RCW 18.85.100. Meyer v. Simpson, 34 Wn.2d 486, 209 P.2d 294 (1949) interpreted RCW 18.08.010, since repealed by Laws of 1959, ch. 323, § 19, p. 1579.
See also Stewart v. Hammond, 78 Wn.2d 216, 471 P.2d 90 (1970), which, contrary to the position now taken by -the majority, interprets RCW 18.27.020 and.RCW 18.27.080 strictly.

Campbell v. Smith, 68 N.M. 373, 362 P.2d 523 (1961) is limited to the subject of labor and services.

Parenthetically, the same could happen to those who iurnish labor and materials. They, too, were meant to be protected by the bond provided for in RCW 18.27.040.