Court Opinion

ID: 9577852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:38:45.513808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:22.109671
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice.
Defendants Koch Lumber & Implement Co., Inc., and Sperry Corporation bring this certified appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, filed after the running of the applicable statute of limitations, substituted defendants’ names in place of two fictitious names contained in the original complaint.
I
Hipólito Chacon’s right foot was injured August 1, 1981, while Chacon was operating a forklift. Chacon filed this action on July 28, 1983, near the end of the two-year limitation period of I.C. § 5-219, naming as defendants Thomas Bingham, his employer; Marjorie Bingham, the employer’s spouse; and two fictitious parties, ABC Implement Company and XYZ Manufacturing Company.
In April of 1984, Chacon determined that Koch Lumber & Implement Co. was the implement company which sold, and Sperry Corporation the manufacturing company which manufactured the forklift. On June 4, 1984, Chacon amended his complaint, deleting the fictitious names and inserting the names of Koch Lumber & Implement, Inc., and Sperry Corporation.
On June 12, 1984, Koch Lumber & Implement was served with summons and a copy of the amended complaint, and on June 14, 1984, Sperry Corporation was served. The record is uncontroverted that, prior to receiving service, neither Koch Lumber & Implement nor Sperry Corporation had any knowledge of this action or the claim of Chacon.
Koch Lumber & Implement and Sperry Corporation moved to dismiss the amended complaint, alleging that the amended complaint had not been filed within the two-year statute of limitations set forth in I.C. § 5-219, which is applicable to this action. The district court denied this motion, ruling that the amendment did not bring in new defendants but merely correctly identified party defendants already before the court, reserving for later determination whether plaintiffs had used diligence in attempting to discover the identity of the true parties. The defendants’ motions for reconsideration were denied. This interlocutory appeal followed.
II
I.R.C.P. 10(a)(4) permits a plaintiff to use a fictitious name in the pleadings when the adverse party’s true name is unknown and to later amend the pleadings to, reflect the party’s true name. The central issue raised in this appeal is whether I.R.C.P. 15(c) permits the amended pleading, adding the name of a party for the first time, to *272relate back to the date of the original pleading and thereby avoid dismissal of the amended pleading for failure to comply with the two year statute of limitations.
In 1959, when this Court by order adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the rules of procedure in Idaho, the then existing Federal Rule 15(c), which the Idaho rules adopted, read as follows:
“Rule 15(c). Relation back of amendments. — Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.”
In 1966, Federal Rule 15(c) was amended by adding the underlined language in the amended rule as follows:
“Rule 15(c). Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.
“The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or his designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer who would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with respect to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant.” (Underlining added.)
The federal cases interpreting Rule 15(c) as it appeared prior to the 1966 amendment generally held that amendments to a complaint made after the running of statute of limitations did not relate back to the time of the original filing of the complaint for statute of limitations purposes. See, e.g., Robbins v. Esso Shipping Co., 190 F.Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.1960); Athas v. Day, 161 F.Supp. 916 (D.Colo.1958). However, after the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c) adding the above italicized language, the federal cases have consistently held that, for purposes of statutes of limitations, the amended complaint designating the true name of a party previously pleaded by a fictitious name relates back only if the notice requirements of amended Rule 15(c) are met. See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1498 (1971). See also Sassi v. Breier, 584 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1978); Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.1969), cert.den. 396 U.S. 987, 90 S.Ct. 483, 24 L.Ed.2d 451; Bufalino v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 404 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir.1968), cert.den 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1468, 22 L.Ed.2d 763 (1969).
The notice requirements articulated in the second sentence of F.R.C.P. 15(c) are intended to ensure that:
“any party who is to be added by amendment after the limitations period has expired had adequate notice of the action and of plaintiffs mistake in failing to name him at the outset. Otherwise, the deprivation of the new party’s right to invoke a statute of limitations defense might raise a question of procedural due process. To guard against this possibility, Rule 15(c) provides that within the period prescribed for commencing an action against him, ‘the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits and (2) knew or should have known that, but for the mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been *273brought against him.’ If these prerequisites are satisfied and if the amended claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, then any amendment ‘changing’ a party against whom a claim is asserted will relate back.” Wright & Miller, supra.
In 1975, when Idaho made its first major revision of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and incorporated the changes which had been made in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after their adoption in Idaho in 1959, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee recommended the Court adopt the 1966 amended Federal Rule 15(c), including the following language:
“An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.”
The general rule of construction which this Court has adhered to regarding the adoption of statutory language from another jurisdiction is that the adoption of that language is presumed to be with that jurisdiction’s prior interpretation upon it. Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, 4, 624 P.2d 383, 387 (1981). See also Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 367, 659 P.2d 111, 121 (1983). In our recent case of Leliefeld v. Panorama Contractors, Inc., 111 Idaho 897, 728 P.2d 1306 (1986) (petition for rehearing granted, March 26, 1986), we reaffirmed the following rule from Odenwalt:
“This court has consistently held that ‘[a] statute which is adopted from another jurisdiction will be presumed to be adopted with the prior construction placed upon it by the courts of such other jurisdiction.’ Nixon v. Triber, 100 Idaho 198, 200, 595 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1979); State v. Miles, 97 Idaho 396, 545 P.2d 484 (1976); Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of America, 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969).” Leliefeld v. Panorama Contractors, Inc., 111 Idaho at 897, 728 P.2d at 1306, quoting from Odenwalt, 102 Idaho at 5, 624 P.2d at 387.
We see no difference between the adoption of a statute by the legislature or a rule by this Court. Thus, our adoption in 1975 of the above referenced language in post-1966 Federal Rule 15(c) is presumably with the interpretation placed upon that language by the federal courts.1 The federal court’s interpretation of Rule 15(c) after the 1966 amendment has been that the amendment of a complaint to designate the true name of a previously fictitiously designated party will relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint only if the notice requirements of amended Rule 15(c) are met. Wright & Miller, supra; Craig v. United States, supra; Bufalino v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., supra.
*274Respondents argue that the 1975 amendment to I.R.C.P. 15(c) is not applicable because of the simultaneous adoption in 1975 of I.R.C.P. 10(a)(4), which has no comparable provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As respondent correctly points out in his brief, Rule 10(a)(4) is substantially the same as Section 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure adopted by the Idaho Territorial Legislature in 1881 and which remained in the Idaho Code until the year 1975 when, as I.C. § 5-906, it was repealed.2 I.R.C.P. 10(a)(4) reads as follows:
“Rule 10(a)(4). Unknown party.— When a party does not know the true name of the adverse party he may state that fact in the pleadings and designate such adverse party by any name and the words, ‘whose true name is unknown,’ and when his true name is discovered the pleading must be amended accordingly.”
While there is no comparable federal rule relating to fictitious parties, there was at the time and still is an established federal practice in most federal circuit courts even without such a rule, recognizing the right to plead fictitious parties. See LeGrand v. Evan, 702 F.2d 415, 417 (2d Cir.1983); Schindler v. Wabash R. Co., 80 F.Supp. 685, 686 (W.D.Mo.1948). Thus, while there is no comparable federal rule, there is a comparable federal practice, and the federal courts have held that practice to be subject to the provisions of Rule 15(c). See Sassi v. Breier, 584 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1978); Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.1977).
I.R.C.P. 10(a)(4) does not address the question of the doctrine of relation back or the effect of an amendment changing the name of a party against whom a claim is asserted, vis-a-vis the statute of limitations.3 That issue is directly addressed by the 1966 amendment to Federal Rule 15(c) and the 1975 amendment to I.R. C.P. 15(c) which incorporates the 1966 federal amendment. Thus, Rules 10(a)(4) and 15(c) do not conflict. However, even if they did, it is the general rule of construction that the specific statute or rule, 15(c), in the event of conflict, would prevail over the general statute or rule, 10(a)(4). I.R. C.P. 10(a)(4) expressly permits the otherwise generally accepted practice of pleading fictitious parties, but makes no reference to the statute of limitations. I.R.C.P. 15(c) specifically addresses and provides the conditions under which an amendment changing the name of a party previously designated will relate back for purposes of the statute of limitations. Since I.R.C.P. 15(c) is the specific provision regarding the statute of limitations which, at the time of its adoption in 1975, had been interpreted by the federal courts to apply to amendments changing the names of fictitiously designated parties, Rule 15(c) controls on the statute of limitations issue. Accordingly, any amendment applied to fictitious party pleadings filed under I.R.C.P. 10(a)(4) will relate back to the date of the original filing only if the requirements of Rule 15(c) are complied with.
The state court decisions are divided on whether or not the amendment of a complaint designating a named defendant in place of a fictitious defendant relates back to the filing of the original complaint in order to toll the running of the statute of limitations. The different results in the various states generally reflects the fact that the statutes and rules in each state differ substantially. Many states have adopted the view that fictitious party pleadings are subject to the notice requirement *275of Rule 15(c). See, e.g., Medina v. Schmutz, 677 P.2d 953 (Colo.App.1983); Gould v. Tibshraeny, 21 Ariz. 146, 517 P.2d 104 (App.1974); Symms v. American Casualty Co., 131 Ga.App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121 (1974).4 There are cases which have ruled contrary to the federal courts’ interpretation of amended Rule 15(c). See Sooy v. Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc., 708 P.2d 1014 (Mont.1985); Wakuya v. Oahu Plumbing & Sheet Metal, 656 P.2d 84 (Hawaii 1982).
However, part of the reason for adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Idaho, and interpreting our own rules adopted from the federal courts as uniformly as possible with the federal cases, was to establish a uniform practice and procedure in both the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho. We recently adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence as the rules of evidence in Idaho in order to obtain uniformity in the trial practice in both the state and federal courts. Lack of uniformity in the rules of procedure, as well as rules of evidence, creates problems for both the courts and the practitioners. These problems can be avoided by interpreting our rules of civil procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same rules by the federal courts.
Oitr examination of case law directs us to conclude that the federal courts, both before and after our adoption of amended Rule 15(c), have held that an amended complaint designating the true names of fictitiously named defendants will not relate back and toll the statute of limitations unless the notice requirements of amended Rule 15(c) are satisfied.
Ill
A. Nevertheless, we are mindful of the established practice in the state courts which is reflected in the trial court’s decision in this matter. This practice allows the amendment of a complaint designating the true name of a fictitiously described party to relate back to the filing of the original complaint without meeting the notice requirements of Rule 15(c), if it can be established that the amending party proceeded with due diligence to discover the true identity of the fictitious party and promptly moved to amend and serve process upon the previously fictitiously described party. Because of the substantial reliance upon the previously existing practice, we deem it appropriate that the ruling in Part II of this opinion be prospective only, effective on the date that the remittitur issues to the district court in this case.
*276B. All cases filed prior to the issuance of the remittitur herein shall be governed by the following rule. An amendment to a pleading designating the true name of a previously fictitiously described party shall relate back to the date of the filing of the original pleading in those circumstances where, after a factual hearing conducted by the trial court, the trial court finds that (1) the party seeking to amend can establish that just cause existed for not earlier determining the name of the fictitiously described party; (2) that after filing the complaint or other pleading designating a fictitious party, the filing party proceeds with due diligence to discover the true identity of the party or parties described fictitiously and to expeditiously amend the pleadings to identify the true party and effect service of process upon the true party; and (3) that no prejudice is shown to the defendant by the late service of summons and complaint after the statute of limitations has run.
As the trial court noted in this case, there was not sufficient evidence before the court at the time it ruled on the motion to dismiss to determine whether or not due diligence had or could be shown. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court denying defendants’ motion to dismiss is affirmed, as modified in this Part III(B), without prejudice to renewing the motion to dismiss after sufficient time to conduct discovery on the issue of due diligence.
Affirmed, as modified, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs or attorney fees allowed.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.

. The 1975 Idaho amendment to Federal Rule 15(c) added one other sentence, not contained in the federal rule, concerning real parties in interest. The additional sentence reads, “The relation back of an amendment joining or substituting a real party in interest shall be as provided in Rule 17(a)." The purpose of that additional sentence was explained in the comments to the 1975 amendments to the Idaho rules as follows:
"COMMENT: The committee recommends .adoption of the Federal rule. The scope and conditions of the relations back of amendments has always been one of considerable difficulty, particularly where it involves the statutes of limitation. The committee felt that the existing [post-1966] Federal rule quoted above provided more direction and guidelines in this regard. However, as the rule appears to only deal with an amendment of a plaintiff changing the party defendant, it was felt that reference should be made to rule 17(a), as to the relation back effect of joining or substituting a real party in interest____ (Such as if suit was originally brought in the name of the wrong party, and later the proper party plaintiff was substituted in the action.) Accordingly the second to last sentence was added." (Emphasis added.)

. "Sec. 268. When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.”

. As previously noted, I.R.C.P. 10(a)(4) was modeled after I.C. § 5-906 which, when originally enacted in 1881 as Section 268 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was adopted from Section 474 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Subsequent to the adoption of the California act by the Idaho legislature in 1881, the California Supreme Court, in 1886, in Irving v. Carpenter, 11 P. 391 (Cal.1886), interpreted their statute to provide that amendments subsequent to the running of the statute of limitations relate back, thus avoiding the statute of limitations defense.

. Even cases from the State of Nevada, which are relied upon by Chacon in support of his position, serve to persuade us that Rule 15(c) does apply. By court decision the Nevada court has adopted the notice requirements of amended Rule 15(c), even though the state hasn’t formally adopted the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c). That court, in Lunn v. American Maintenance Corp., 618 P.2d 343 (Nev.1980), considered the amendment of a fictitious party pleading and, affirming an earlier decision, stated:
”[W]e announced the three factors that we perceived as governing the determination of when a proper defendant may be involved in an amended pleading even though the statute of limitations has run. They are that the proposed party defendant (1) have actual notice of the institution of the action; (2) knew that it was the proper defendant in the action; and (3) was not in any way misled to its prejudice. (Citations omitted). [Servatius v. United Resort Hotels, 85 Nev. 371] at 373, 455 P.2d [621] at 622-23. Those factors are not present here.” 618 P.2d at 345.
Thus, in effect, the Nevada court ruled that its fictitious party rule was to be read in conjunction with the notice requirements articulated in amended Rule 15(c), even though Nevada had not yet adopted amended Rule 15(c).
On the issue of prejudice to the defendant who was not aware until after the statute of limitations had run that the action had been commenced, the Nevada court in Lunn found prejudice to the newly named defendant because ”[t]he respondent’s ability to timely investigate the scene of the accident, to marshall the evidence, and to locate witnesses has been lost or is greatly impaired.” 618 P.2d at 345. The same sort of prejudice to the defendants is found in this case. The defendants Koch and Sperry were not served with the amended complaint until June of 1984, nearly three years after the accident occurred. Prior to that time, they had no notice that the plaintiff had been injured, allegedly by a forklift sold or manufactured by them, and their opportunity "to timely investigate the scene of the accident, to marshall the evidence, and to locate witnesses has been lost or is greatly impaired.” 618 P.2d at 345.