Court Opinion

ID: 9757010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:14:22.33517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:34.095674
License: Public Domain

Digges, J.,

dissenting:
While I do not take issue with the facts as set out by the majority, my assessment of those facts leads me to conclude that Erbe was denied the speedy trial guaranteed him by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.1 Consequently, I respectfully dissent.
According to the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, “ [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial . . . .” Likewise, Article 21 of our Declaration of Rights provides “ [t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial. . ..”
I
Preliminarily, I would hold what the majority assumes arguendo — that sentencing is part of the trial for purposes of both of these speedy trial rights. Obviously, as these constitutional provisions do not define “trial,” the language *567of neither explicitly resolves the issue.2 Additionally, with regard to the legislative history of these two constitutional provisions, there is, as has been said with respect to the Sixth Amendment right, a “paucity of historical data [, which] makes it difficult to ascertain the intent of the framers when they enacted the . . . speedy-trial guarantee.” Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 476, 484 (1968); see United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 314 n. 5, 92 S. Ct. 455, 460 n. 5, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30, 41 n. 2, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 1570 n. 2, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). The closest the United States Supreme Court has come to addressing the question was in Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354, 361, 77 S. Ct. 481, 486, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957), in which a majority of the Court decided to “assume arguendo that sentence is part of the trial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment,” while the dissent observed, id. at 368, 77 S. Ct. at 489 (Warren, C. J., dissenting), that “ [i]t has never been held that the sentence is not part of the ‘trial.’ ” See also United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U. S. at 313, 320-21, 92 S. Ct. at 459, 463-64; Berman v. United States, 302 U. S. 211, 212, 58 S. Ct. 164, 166, 82 L. Ed. 204 (1937); Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U. S. 206, 210-11, 53 S. Ct. 325, 326, 77 L. Ed. 702 (1933). With regard to Article 21, although this Court has never specifically decided the question, there is language in Ash v. State, 238 Md. 317, 320-21, 208 A. 2d 691 (1965), as the majority here points out, indicating that sentencing is not part of the trial for purposes of that speedy trial clause. I am, however, unable to agree with this dicta in Ash, since I believe that the policies behind the speedy trial right require that sentencing, which constitutes the final judgment from which appeal is ordinarily taken, be included within the term “trial.” It will suffice here to merely mention some of these *568policies: the right to a speedy trial is intended to prevent unnecessary incarceration; minimize the anxiety suffered by the accused, his family and friends; protect the accused from undue public scorn, loss of employment and curtailment of his freedoms of speech and association; discourage official abuse of the criminal' justice system; deter the accused and others from violating the law; and alleviate the overcrowding of penal institutions. See Dillingham v. United States, 44 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Bee. 1, 1975.) (per curiam); Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434, 439-40, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 519-21, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2186-87, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U. S. at 320, 92 S. Ct. at 463; Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U. S. at 41-43, 90 S. Ct. at 1570-71 (Brennan, J., concurring); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374, 377-80, 89 S. Ct. 575, 577-78, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213, 222, 87 S. Ct. 988, 993, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120, 86 S. Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966). It is self-evident that in order to effectuate fully these policies the guarantee of a speedy trial must be read to apply to the period between the verdict and the imposition of sentence. In fact, decisions holding or assuming the right is applicable to this interval are legion. See, e.g., Juarez-Casares v. United States, 496 F. 2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1974); Brady v. Superintendent, 443 F. 2d 1307, 1310 (4th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F. 2d 1149, 1151 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 872 (1970); Johnson v. State, 305 A. 2d 622, 623 (Bel..), cert. denied, 413 U. S. 901 (1973 ).3 I would hold that *569the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right and the analogous Article 21 right both apply until, at least, a final judgment is entered upon the pronouncement of sentence.
II
Next, I will consider how to interpret the Article 21 guarantee. The majority states that it will regard its “discussion of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial as equally applicable to the right provided in Declaration of Rights, Art. 21.” That position is not at odds with what we today hold in Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521, 527, 350 A. 2d 628 (1976), “that the opinions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial are ‘very persuasive, although not necessarily controlling,’ as to the proper construction of Maryland’s parallel Article 21 right.” However, as the majority here correctly points out, this Court has held that a defendant waives his Article 21 right to a speedy trial by not demanding it. See, e.g., Keyes v. State, 236 Md. 74, 80, 202 A. 2d 582 (1964); Harris v. State, 194 Md. 288, 297-98, 71 A. 2d 36 (1950). While recognizing that those Maryland cases were all decided prior to the Supreme Court’s rejection in Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U. S. at 523-28, 92 S. Ct. at 2188-91, of the demand-waiver doctrine with respect to the Sixth Amendment, the majority concludes that they “need not decide today whether the concepts expressed in [the earlier Maryland cases] remain viable in the light of Barker. ” See Smith v. State, supra, 276 Md. at 527 n. 2, 350 A. 2d at 632 n. 2 (also not deciding the issue). Since the petitioner in this case was arrested on September 30, 1968, and convicted by a jury on June 25, 1969, but did not complain until January 16, 1974, about his not being sentenced, it would seem that under the pre-Barker Maryland decisions he waived his Article 21 right; thus the continuing vitality of these cases is an issue. I would overrule those decisions — following what the Supreme Court has said not only of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U. S. at 525-28, 92 S. Ct. at 2189-91, but also of other federal constitutional rights, see, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. *570238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (self-incrimination, trial by jury, confrontation); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-76, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1628-29, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (sell-incrimination and counsel); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 513-16, 82 S. Ct. 884, 888-90, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) (counsel) — and hold that the Article 21 right to a speedy trial must be presumed not to be waived. Only a record indicating that the defendant knew of the right and intentionally relinquished or abandoned it should support a waiver, and no such record exists here.
Ill
I will now consider whether, under the facts of this case, Erbe’s right to a speedy trial was violated. To determine if there has been such an infringement of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, the Supreme Court adopted, in Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U. S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2191-92, “a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” That Court identified four factors which were to be assessed in the process: (1) length of the delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id., 92 S. Ct. at 2192.
(1) Length of the Delay
The Supreme Court, in Barker, stated that
“The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Id.
Although the petitioner became an “accused,” so as to activate the speedy trial guarantee, when he was arrested on September 30, 1968, Dillingham v. United States, supra, 44 U.S.L.W. 3327; United States v. Manon, supra, 404 U. S. at 320-21, 92 S. Ct. at 463-64; Smith v. State, supra, 276 Md. at 528 & n. 4, 350 A. 2d at 633 & n. 4; Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 109-11, 345 A. 2d 62, 71-72 (1975), he was not sentenced until *571July 1, 1974. Consequently the delay with which we are concerned amounted to five years, nine months.4 A delay of “well over five years,” approximately five years and three months, led the Supreme Court to engage in the balancing process in Barker. 407 U. S. at 516-18, 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2185-86, 2193-94. This Court’s decision in Epps v. State, supra, 276 Md. at 111, 345 A. 2d at 72, is dispositive of the issue, however, as there we held that a one-year, fourteen-day postponement was sufficient to require us to examine the other factors. See Smith v. State, supra, 276 Md. at 528, 350 A. 2d at 633 (16-month delay sufficient). As implicitly recognized by the majority, the delay in Erbe’s sentencing necessitates our entering into the balancing test.
The majority, however, goes on to conclude that “[w]hile the delay in this case may be ‘inordinate,’ it should not, as an isolated factor, influence the balancing process to any significant degree.” (Emphasis added.) It is true, as the majority points out, that the Barker Court, after terming the approximately five-year interval between Barker’s arrest and trial “extraordinary,” found the length of the delay to be outweighed by other factors and concluded that there was no violation of the speedy trial right. See 407 U. S. at 533-36, 92 S. Ct. at 2193-95. Nevertheless, it seems to me, and the majority apparently does not disagree, that the Supreme Court did give some weight to the length of time Barker’s trial was postponed. But see Rudstein, The Right To A Speedy Trial: Barker v. Wingo In The Lower Courts, 1975 U.Ill.L. Forum 11, 22-23; Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets A Fast Shuffle, 72 Colum.L.Rev. 1376, 1383-85 (1972). I say this because of several things said by the Barker Court: first, the Court declared that the length of the delay is one of the factors “courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his [speedy trial] right,” 407 U. S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192; second, the Court only asserted that “length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism” (emphasis *572added) rather than it is to be treated only as a triggering mechanism, id.; third, in balancing the four factors the Court did characterize the five-year delay as “extraordinary” and called the case “close,” id, at 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2193-94; and fourth, after discussing the length of the delay and the reasons for it the Court concluded that “[t]wo counterbalancing factors [(insignificant prejudice shown and nonassertion of the right)] outweigh these deficiencies,” (emphasis added] referring back to the length of and reasons for the delay, id. at 534, 92 S. Ct. at 2194. It is of no moment that the Barker Court did not find the length of the delay determinative since the Court specifically stated that “[w]e regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Id. at 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. Exactly how much weight the Court afforded the five-year delay in Barker is not altogether clear, but since it called the case “close” and characterized the length of the delay as “extraordinary,” id., 92 S. Ct. at 2193-94, I believe they did give it, by itself, significant (although not decisive) weight. It only makes sense, considering the strong societal interests in the prompt administration of justice and the increasing possibility of prejudice to the accused, that as the sands of time flow they should add ever-increasing weight to the side of the scale marked “violation.” Consequently, I would hold contrary to the majority, that the length of delay at issue here, five years, nine months, which is about six months longer than the period involved in Barker, should be given significant weight in the balancing process.
(2) Reasons for the Delay
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Supreme Court in Barker, concluded that
“[Different weights should be assigned to different reasons [for delay]. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but *573nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Id. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 (footnote omitted).
The reasons for the delay between petitioner’s arrest (September 30, 1968) and trial (June 25, 1969), a period of about nine months, are not indicated in the record. However, since this period is relatively short and Erbe has not argued that it should be weighed against the State, I will consider it to be, by itself, neutral. As for the approximately five-year interval between petitioner’s trial (June 25, 1969) and sentencing (July 1, 197-1), the majority is correct in saying that, while “there is not the slightest implication that [the Government] failed to act in good faith,” the delay “stemmed from inadvertence on the part of the State.” The Government, through the court and the State’s Attorney’s office, was simply negligent in not making sure Erbe was sentenced at an earlier date.5 As the Supreme Court said in Barker, “ [a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty . . . .” 407 U. S. at 527, 92 S. Ct. at 2190 (footnote omitted). The fact that negligence traceable to the State was responsible for the delay in petitioner’s sentencing must be, and the majority recognizes, weighed against the Government.
(3) Defendant’s Assertion of His Right
Although the petitioner was arrested on September 30, 1968, but not sentenced until July 1, 1974, it was not until January 16, 1974, that he first moved to dismiss his *574indictment on the ground that he had been denied a speedy trial. The Barker Court stated that
“Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” 407 U. S. at 531-32, 92 S. Ct. at 2192-93.
When balancing the four factors the Supreme Court indicated, as Judge Smith notes for the majority here, that it was of great importance “that Barker did not want a speedy trial.” Id. at 534, 92 S. Ct. at 2194. In fact, Mr. Justice Powell asserted in Barker that
“ [Bjarring extraordinary circumstances, we would be reluctant indeed to rule that a defendant was denied this constitutional right on a record that strongly indicates, as does this one, that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.” Id. at 536, 92 S. Ct. at 2195.
However, unlike the situation in Barker, there is no affirmative evidence that the accused in this case did not want a speedy trial. In Barker the Supreme Court relied on the admission of the defendant’s counsel that his client did not want to be tried; here no similar concession was made. See id. at 535, 92 S. Ct. at 2194. But underlying Barker is also an assumption that if a defendant is suffering prejudice from delay he would complain by asserting his right, and conversely, that if he doesn’t object to the delay he is not *575being prejudiced, at least when he is in a position to benefit from the postponement. While this assumption may possibly be justified before a defendant is found guilty,6 which was the situation in Barker, I think it unwarranted in a post-guilty-verdict setting. Once an accused is adjudged guilty he usually has so little to gain (starting his sentence so as to finish it sooner) and so much to lose (his money, his freedom or even his life) that no matter how much prejudice he endures while awaiting sentence he is unlikely to complain. Suppose a defendant is found guilty of a crime for which a possible punishment is death, even if he is being substantially prejudiced by the delay in sentencing it is farfetched to assume that he will climb the scaffolding, put the noose around his own neck and ask that the trap door be opened by asserting his constitutional right. “[T]o require a man to beg for a trial on such a charge, with its enormous penalty, requires too much of human nature.” United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230, 233 (N.D. Ill., 1955) (referring to delay in a murder case). Furthermore, to place significant weight on the accused’s assertion of his speedy trial right, a right which the Supreme Court has characterized as “fundamental,” Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, 386 U. S. at 223, 87 S. Ct. at 993, ignores the societal interests, which are independent of and sometimes in opposition to the accused’s interests, Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U. S. at 519, 92 S. Ct. at 2186, in bringing about a prompt trial. Consequently, when there has been a delay in sentencing such as here, I would only give minimal weight adverse to the accused, and not significant weight (as do the majority), to the fact that he did not demand a speedy trial.
*576(4) Prejudice to the Defendant
The Supreme Court, in Barker, “expressly rejected the notice that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial . . . .” Moore v. Arizona, 414 U. S. 25, 26, 94 S. Ct. 188, 189, 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973). Rather, if an accused can show prejudice he has a stronger case for dismissal, and the more prejudice he proves the more formidable his case. Unlike the majority, I conclude that petitioner has established that he was prejudiced.
The Barker Court stated that prejudice should be appraised in the light of the policies underlying the speedy trial right. 407 U. S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. One of the aims of this right was “to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration,” id., including, since sentencing is part of the trial for purposes of the right, oppressive pre-sentence incarceration. Although Erbe was undoubtedly prejudiced to some extent by being imprisoned for one month while awaiting sentence, the prejudice was apparently minimal. However, the speedy trial right was also intended to protect the accused from public scorn, financial ruin and having to curtail the exercise of his freedoms of speech and association, as well as to prevent the accused, his family and friends from suffering unnecessary anxiety. See Barker v. Wingo, id. at 532-33, 92 S. Ct. at 2193; United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U. S. at 320, 92 S. Ct. at 463; Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, 386 U. S. at 222, 87 S. Ct. at 993; Epps v. State, supra, 276 Md. at 118, 345 A. 2d at 76-77. While the majority concludes that Erbe cannot complain of public obloquy since he was found guilty by a jury, I think he has a legitimate grievance at least until a final appealable judgment is entered by the imposition of sentence. The financial problems that Erbe encountered are not mentioned by the majority. No doubt petitioner found it difficult to retain or obtain employment after he was found guilty and was awaiting sentence; this is especially so inasmuch as the sentence could have involved Erbe’s imprisonment. Since, as the Supreme Court said in Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, 386 U. S. at 222, 87 S. Ct. at 993, the mere “pendency of the *577indictment. . . almost certainly will force curtailment of [an accused’s] speech, associations and participation in unpopular causes,” clearly a verdict of guilty will lead an accused awaiting sentence to do likewise. Additionally, the majority apparently concludes that the only anxiety with which the speedy trial clause is concerned relates to whether or not one will be found guilty, and that consequently Erbe sustained no such distress because his guilt was promptly determined by the jury. That, however, is only one of the sources of worry the constitutional guarantee attempts to minimize; another is what sentence will be imposed once an accused is found guilty. There can be not the slightest doubt that petitioner suffered the pangs of mental anguish while being kept in suspense for five years as to what his sentence would be. I would conclude, therefore, that Erbe did show that he suffered prejudice while awaiting sentence, and I would weigh this in favor of finding a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Furthermore, in the words of Judge O’Donnell, speaking for this Court in Epps v. State, supra, 276 Md. at 119, 345 A. 2d at 77, the Supreme Court has indicated that “prejudice may be presumed from the inordinate length of the delay itself, Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U. S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. [at 2192]; Strunk v. United States, supra, 412 U. S. at 439, 93 S. Ct. [at 2263] . . . .” Asserting that the Supreme Court “has not said that such prejudice would be assumed from any delay which would mandate a determination that there was a denial of the right to a speedy trial,” 7 the majority here attempts to avoid the presumption by limiting it to delay occurring prior to the verdict on the ground that the pre-verdict and post-verdict “concerns of defendants . . . are so entirely different.” The Supreme Court has not made this distinction, nor do I think they will fragment the Sixth Amendment to do so. See Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U. S. at 44-45, 90 S. Ct. at 1572 *578(Brennan, J., concurring). The reasons for presuming prejudice from inordinate delay relate to the difficulty of proving certain kinds of prejudice and to the policies behind the speedy trial right, and I do not think they evaporate when the verdict is rendered. How much prejudice can be assumed from the extreme length of the delay between the verdict and Erbe’s sentencing was determined and factored into the Barker calculus when I indicated earlier that significant weight must be given to the length of the delay itself.
Besides the detriment suffered by Erbe himself, society is prejudiced when an accused is not furnished a prompt trial. It is of substantial significance that when a defendant and others are not impressed with the swiftness of justice the possibilities for rehabilitation and deterrance are diminished. See Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U. S. at 520 & n. 10, 92 S. Ct. at 2187 & n. 10; Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U. S. at 42, 90 S. Ct. at 1571 (Brennan, J., concurring). Delay may further hamper the criminal justice system by permitting defendants to obtain better plea bargains, increasing the opportunity of those free while awaiting trial to flee or commit other crimes, making it harder for the State to prove its case, adding to the costs and overcrowding of penal facilities, possibly swelling the public assistance rolls, and opening the door to official abuse of the judicial system. See Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U. S. at 519-21, 92 S. Ct. at 2186-87; Dickey v. Florida, supra, 398 U. S. at 42-43, 90 S. Ct. at 1571 (Brennan, J., concurring); Smith v. State, supra, 276 Md. at 533-34, 350 A. 2d at 636. Furthermore, Maryland has indicated its concern over undue delay in criminal trials via statute and rule. See Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol., 1975 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 591; Maryland Rules 709, 740, 761 a. These considerations should also be taken into account, and weighed against the State, when an accused is not afforded a prompt trial.
Having examined each of the four factors mentioned by the Barker Court, I proceed to the “difficult and sensitive balancing process.” 407 U. S. at 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. Upon examination of the entire record I would, as already *579explained, give significant weight to the extreme length of the delay, some weight to the reasons for it, minimal weight to the petitioner’s tardy assertion of his right and some weight to the prejudice petitioner was shown to have endured and to that suffered by society. Weighing them as a composite whole, I am persuaded that Erbe was denied the speedy trial guaranteed him by both the Sixth Amendment and Article 21, and consequently I would, as required by Strunk v. United States, supra, 412 U. S. at 439-40, 93 S. Ct. at 2263, reverse and remand the case for dismissal of the indictment.
Since I would find a violation of the speedy trial right there is no need for me to extend this already lengthy dissent by discussing the additional possibility of a due process infringement.
Judge Eldridge has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissent and concurs in the views here expressed.

. The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is enforced against the several states, as a fundamental right, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213, 222-23, 87 S. Ct. 988,993,18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967).

. On its face, the Sixth Amendment only applies to those persons who can be characterized as “accused.” United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 313, 92 S. Ct. 455, 459, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); see Dillingham v. United States, 44 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1975) (per curiam). I believe that a criminal defendant remains so designated at least until a judgment of conviction, meaning sentence, is imposed. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30, 44-45, 90 S. Ct. 1564, 1572, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).

. It might also be argued that the speedy trial right of the Sixth Amendment should encompass sentencing since the right to counsel, also guaranteed by that amendment, was held to do so in Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948), as interpreted in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128, 134, 88 S. Ct. 254, 257, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). However, in United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U. S. at 320-21, 92 S. Ct. at 463-64, a parallel argument, that the speedy trial right should apply to certain pre-arrest, pre-indictment, situations since the right to counsel was held to do so in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), failed to persuade a majority of the Supreme Court to extend the speedy trial right to pre-arrest, pre-indictment, delays. See United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U. S. at 332-33, 92 S. Ct. at 469-70 (Douglas, J., concurring in result). See also Dillingham v. United States, supra, 44 U.S.L.W. 3327 (interpreting Marion).

. It is not clear to me whether the majority similarly measures the delay or if they consider only the approximately five-year period between the date of trial (June 25,1969) and sentencing (July I, Í974).

. Clearly, I agree that a defendant need not be sentenced immediately upon conviction; the State is permitted an appropriate period within which to develop a pre-sentence report and the trial court must be allowed a reasonable time to deliberate upon the vexing question of what is a proper sentence under the circumstances.

. This is one of the most criticized aspects of Barker. See Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 Stan.L.Rev. 525, 539-41 (1975); Rudstein, The Right To A Speedy Trial: Barker v. Wingo In The Lower Courts, 1975 U.Ill.Forum 11, 39-40, 55-56, 58; Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets A Fast Shuffle, 72 Colum.L.Rev. 1376, 1387-88, 1391, 1399 (1972); Comment, The Speedy Trial Guarantee: Criteria And Confusion In Interpreting Its Violation, 22 DePaul L.Rev. 839, 850-52 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 49, 168-70 (1972); 58 Cornell L.Rev. 399, 406-08, 411-12 (1973).

. Although I do not think they are, if the majority is implying that there could be a delay of such duration as to trigger the need to enter into the balancing process yet not long enough for prejudice to be assumed, they are flying in the face of the Barker Court’s rule that only a deferral of “presumptively prejudicial” length requires the weighing process to be undertaken. See 407 U. S. at 530,92 S. Ct. at 2192.