Court Opinion

ID: 9892173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 19:03:54.024363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:18:32.185878
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/20/23 (unmodified opn. attached)
                  CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                             FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     DIVISION THREE
 YERBA BUENA NEIGHBORHOOD
 CONSORTIUM, LLC,                               A166091
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                (Alameda County
 v.                                             Super. Ct. No. RG21090517)
 THE REGENTS OF THE
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,
           Defendants and Respondents;

 PARNASSUS NEIGHBORHOOD                         (Alameda County
 COALITION et al.,                              Super. Ct. No. RG21088939)
           Plaintiffs and Appellants,
 v.
 THE REGENTS OF THE
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,
           Defendants and Respondents;

                                                A166094
 SAN FRANCISCANS FOR
 BALANCED AND LIVABLE                           (Alameda County
 COMMUNITIES,                                   Super. Ct. No. RG21089332)
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                ORDER MODIFYING OPINION;
 v.
                                                AND DENYING PETITIONS
 THE REGENTS OF THE                             FOR REHEARING AND
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,               PUBLICATION
 Defendants and Respondents.                     [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this
       *

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of sections IV through
VII, IX, and XI of the Discussion.

                                            1
BY THE COURT:*
      It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 20, 2023, be
modified as follows:
      1)    On page 30, at the end of the last sentence of the first full
paragraph, which reads, “And the final EIR explains that new transit riders
will be distributed among four transit routes in the immediate vicinity of the
campus, with no ‘requirement of additional or expanded transit
infrastructure . . . identified based on these new riders,’ ” add as footnote 5
the following footnote:
      The final EIR goes on to state that the Plan “is not responsible for
      analyzing the potential effects of Muni operational issues or changes,
      and Muni is expected to adjust operations accordingly in response to
      changes in demand on a citywide basis over the thirty-year
      implementation of the [Plan].” We disagree with Petitioners YB who
      assert, in a petition for rehearing, that this sentence addressing
      operational issues vitiates the preceding sentence about the adequacy
      of infrastructure, but in any event, our analysis does not turn on this
      portion of the final EIR.
The subsequent footnotes are renumbered as appropriate.
      2) On page 43, the second to the last sentence in the first paragraph,
which reads, “But in any event, we note that only the Research and Academic
Building is anticipated to produce significant operational TAC emissions,” is
modified to read:
      But in any event we note that, among the initial-phase projects whose
      operational TAC emissions were considered on a project level, only the
      Research and Academic Building is anticipated to produce significant
      operational emissions.

* Tucher, P.J., Fujisaki, J., and Rodríguez, J. participated in the decision.

                                        2
      The petition for rehearing filed by petitioners in No. A166091 on
October 5, 2023, is denied.
      The request for publication of certain portions of the opinion submitted
on behalf of the California Building Industry Association on October 6, 2023,
is denied.
      There is no change in the judgment.
                                          TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

                                      3
Trial Court:                Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge:                Hon. Frank Roesch

Counsel:                    Soluri Meserve, Patrick M. Soluri, Osha R. Meserve, and
                               James C. Crowder for Plaintiffs and Appellants Yerba
                               Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC and Parnassus
                               Neighborhood Coalition et al.

                            Thomas N. Lippe for Plaintiff and Appellant San
                              Franciscans for Balanced and Livable Communities

                            The University of California Office of General Counsel,
                               Anagha Dandekar Clifford; Lubin Olson &
                               Niewiadomski, Charles R. Olson, Philip J. Sciranka,
                               Carolyn J. Lee; Monchamp Meldrum, Amanda J.
                               Monchamp, and Hope Schmeltzer for Defendants and
                               Respondents

Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC et al. v. Regents of the University of California/San Franciscans for Balanced
and Livable Communities v. Regents of the University of California (A166091/A166094)

                                                            4
Filed 9/20/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION THREE

 YERBA BUENA NEIGHBORHOOD
 CONSORTIUM, LLC,
            Plaintiff and Appellant,          A166091

 v.                                           (Alameda County
 THE REGENTS OF THE                           Super. Ct. No. RG21090517)
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,
            Defendants and Respondents.

 PARNASSUS NEIGHBORHOOD
 COALITION et al.,
            Plaintiffs and Appellants,
 v.                                           (Alameda County
                                              Super. Ct. No. RG21088939)
 THE REGENTS OF THE
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,
            Defendants and Respondents.

 SAN FRANCISCANS FOR
 BALANCED AND LIVABLE
 COMMUNITIES,
                                              A166094
            Plaintiff and Appellant,
 v.                                           (Alameda County
                                              Super. Ct. No. RG21089332)
 THE REGENTS OF THE
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al.,
            Defendants and Respondents.

       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this
       *

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of sections IV through
VII, IX, and XI of the Discussion.
                                         1
      Petitioners in these consolidated appeals challenge the adequacy of an
environmental impact report (EIR) prepared in connection with the
Comprehensive Parnassus Heights Plan (Plan), a long-range planning
document intended to guide future development of a campus of the
University of California, San Francisco (UCSF or university). The Plan
stirred controversy because it anticipates considerably more intensive
development on that campus than was projected in the university’s existing
long-range development plan, which was prepared only a few years prior.
      Petitioners contend that, for a variety of reasons, the EIR fails to
comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub.
Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.).1 The trial court found the EIR compliant
and entered judgment for the Regents of the University of California
(Regents).
      We will affirm. In the published portions of this opinion, we hold (1)
the EIR considers a reasonable range of alternatives to the Plan and need not
have considered in detail an alternative that placed some of the anticipated
development off campus; (2) the EIR improperly declines to analyze the
impact of the Plan on public transit, but the error is not prejudicial because
the EIR adequately informs the public and decisionmakers regarding that
impact; (3) we need not scrutinize the EIR’s analysis of visual impacts
because section 21099, subdivision (d)(1) directs that aesthetic effects of an
“employment center project on an infill site within a transit priority area” be
deemed not significant; (4) the EIR is not required to adopt a mitigation
measure preserving certain historically significant buildings merely because
it is possible to restore and repurpose the buildings; and (5) the EIR’s

      1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Public Resources Code,

unless indicated otherwise.

                                       2
mitigation measure for wind impacts establishes a sufficiently specific
performance standard that the mitigation will achieve and adequately
identifies the type of actions to be taken to achieve that standard. In the
unpublished portions of the opinion, we address and reject petitioners’
remaining claims.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      UCSF is a world-renowned medical complex, research center, and
professional school. Its Parnassus Heights campus (Parnassus campus), the
university’s first home, is a 107-acre site in the Inner Sunset neighborhood of
San Francisco, south of Golden Gate Park. The Parnassus campus currently
accommodates two hospitals, a variety of medical clinics, four professional
schools, a graduate program, and space for research, student housing,
parking, and other support uses. Over half of its hilly site is dedicated as
public open space.
      In 2014, UCSF prepared a long-range development plan (2014 LRDP)
for the university as a whole, which consists of campuses at Parnassus
Heights, Mission Bay, Mount Zion, Mission Center, and Laurel Heights, as
well as assorted smaller sites and buildings around San Francisco. (See Ed.
Code, § 67504, subd. (a)(1) [requiring such plans].) Consistent with a
preexisting policy, the 2014 LRDP was structured to “[a]ccommodate the
majority of UCSF’s growth” through 2035 at the Mission Bay campus. That
policy arose from long-standing concerns that “the size of [the Parnassus
campus] was beginning to overwhelm” its neighborhood. As long ago as 1976,
these concerns had induced the Regents to adopt a resolution capping
building space at the Parnassus campus at 3.55 million gross square feet
(gsf). The 2014 LRDP reaffirmed this policy, while amending it to exclude all
on-campus housing from the ceiling. Acknowledging that the buildings on

                                       3
campus already exceeded the resolution’s cap, the 2014 LRDP adopted a plan
for development that would have resulted in a net reduction.
      The primary changes slated for the Parnassus campus under the 2014
LRDP were the construction of a new addition to one of its two hospitals, the
demolition of a series of older buildings, and the conversion of other buildings
to accommodate student and faculty housing. The smaller of the two existing
hospitals, Moffitt Hospital, does not comply with seismic standards for
inpatient hospitals that take effect in 2030. (See Sen. Bill No. 1953 (1993–
1994 Reg. Sess.) § 1.) Rather than attempt to bring Moffitt into compliance,
the 2014 LRDP proposed to build an addition to Long Hospital and repurpose
Moffitt for outpatient and hospital support services. The net result would
have been a small reduction in inpatient beds at the Parnassus campus, from
475 to 439.
      The university thereafter had a change of heart. According to the EIR,
UCSF concluded it had neglected the Parnassus campus while focusing on
development at Mission Bay, leaving the Parnassus campus in need of
“substantial renewal and investment.”2 In 2020, UCSF undertook the
Comprehensive Parnassus Heights Plan with the objective “to re-envision
and revitalize” the Parnassus campus, so that UCSF would “remain a leading
health science institution both nationally and internationally.” The Plan was
intended “to meet projected space needs for critical programs in research,
patient care, and education at the Parnassus Heights campus site while
improving the functional and aesthetic design of the campus environment”

      2 The Plan evolved as the environmental review process proceeded.

Unless otherwise noted, references to “the EIR” are to the final draft version
of the UCSF Comprehensive Parnassus Heights Plan Environmental Impact
Report, dated January 2021.
                                       4
and providing “much-needed on-campus housing.” The Plan amends the
2014 LRDP with respect to development on the Parnassus campus.
      In general, the Plan presents a thorough rethinking of the design of the
Parnassus campus. At its heart, the Plan is a catalog of proposed new
buildings, the identification of places on campus to put them and the
infrastructure necessary to support them, and a general timeline for their
construction, extending to year 2050. As an organizing principle, the Plan
divides the campus into six geographic districts, each projected to contain
buildings serving a particular function. The initial phase of redevelopment,
slated for completion by 2030, calls for enhancement of the campus entrance,
construction of two major new buildings, replacement of some student
housing, and upgrades to campus infrastructure, including a tunnel and
bridge connecting buildings on either side of Parnassus Avenue. The two
major buildings are a large new hospital, called “New Hospital,” and an
eight-story Research and Academic Building. Construction of other buildings
and infrastructure enhancements are proposed to occur after 2030. Eight
significant existing structures, including current or potential historic
resources, and a series of smaller housing units are identified as candidates
for demolition.
      In total, the Plan anticipates a 50 percent net increase in building
space on the Parnassus campus over the next 30 years—from approximately
four million to six million gsf. The centerpiece is the New Hospital, which
would replace the 150 beds in Moffitt Hospital and add more than 200
additional beds, increasing the campus’s hospital capacity to 675 beds. The
New Hospital building, anticipated to be 16 stories tall, would provide nearly
1 million gsf of space. The university explained the Plan’s proposal to raise
the space ceiling adopted in 1976 by an anticipated 1.5 million gsf, or 42

                                        5
percent, as “recognition of the tremendous need for program space at the
campus site in order for UCSF to retain its leadership position in patient
care, research, and education.”
      With regard to hospital space, for example, the EIR describes existing
capacity as woefully insufficient. Not only are the campus’s two hospitals
consistently full, but they have been turning away thousands of patient
transfer requests annually for lack of space. Between 2017 and 2019, UCSF
turned away about 40 percent of “requested medically necessary transfers,”
and the university anticipates the number of requests will increase
significantly in the future, particularly for the complex cases in which the
Parnassus campus specializes. Such patients require longer hospital stays,
further increasing the demand for beds.
      Pursuant to CEQA, the Regents prepared and certified an EIR for the
Plan. The EIR serves as a project EIR for the construction proposed to occur
in the initial phase of the Plan, with the exception of the New Hospital. A
project EIR, the most common type of EIR, examines the environmental
impacts of all phases of a specific development project, including planning,
construction, and operation. (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 14, § 15161;3 In re Bay-
Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 1169 (Bay-Delta).) The EIR serves as a
program EIR with respect to the Plan as a whole and its remaining
individual components, including the New Hospital. A program EIR is
generally prepared for a series of actions that can together be characterized

      3 We will cite and refer to CEQA’s implementing regulations, codified at

title 14, division 6, chapter 3 of the California Code of Regulations, as the
“Guidelines.” As the California Supreme Court explains, the CEQA
Guidelines are given “great weight in interpreting CEQA, except where they
are clearly unauthorized or erroneous.” (Center for Biological Diversity v.
Dept. of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 217, fn. 4.)
                                       6
as one large project, and it may be used before specific components of a
project are ready for approval; these may then require follow-on
environmental review. (See Guidelines, § 15168, subds. (a)–(c); Center for
Biological Diversity v. Dept. of Conservation, etc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 210,
230.)
        The primary significant and unavoidable adverse impacts of the Plan,
as found by the EIR, are (1) the creation of wind hazards in public areas on
campus, largely associated with the bulky New Hospital building, (2) an
increase in air pollutants resulting from more intensive use of the campus,
(3) the demolition of historically significant structures, and (4) an increase in
ambient noise levels during construction.
        Petitioners filed three separate challenges to the adequacy of the EIR
and stipulated to joint briefing and hearing of their petitions. The trial court
denied each of the petitions in three identical orders.
        Petitioner San Franciscans for Balanced and Livable Communities
(petitioner SF) filed an appeal from the judgment in its action, while
petitioners Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC, and Parnassus
Neighborhood Coalition, et al. (jointly, petitioners YB) filed a joint appeal
from the judgments in their respective actions. The two sets of petitioners
raise different issues, although they also incorporate each other’s arguments
by reference. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).) We issued an order
consolidating the two appeals for briefing and hearing, and we address below
first the arguments raised by petitioners YB (sections II through VI), then
the arguments of petitioner SF (sections VII through XII).4

        4 We note that the parties have filed several requests for judicial

notice. The Regents filed requests in No. A166094 on April 2 and August 25,
2023; petitioners YB filed a request in No. A166091 on April 24, 2023; and
petitioner SF filed a request in No. A166094 on August 25, 2023. Requests
                                         7
                                 DISCUSSION
      I. Governing Law
            A. CEQA
      CEQA “require[s] state and local governmental entities to perform their
duties ‘so that major consideration is given to preventing environmental
damage.’ ” (Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast Railroad Authority (2017)
3 Cal.5th 677, 711–712.) The beating heart of CEQA is its EIR. (Bay-Delta,
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1162.)
      Whenever a public agency proposes to undertake a project that
may have a significant impact on the environment, CEQA requires the
agency to prepare and certify an EIR. (§ 21100, subd. (a); Union of Medical
Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1187
(San Diego).) “The [EIR] must include a description of the proposed project
and its environmental setting and discussions of (1) the possible
environmental effects of the project, (2) feasible measures to mitigate any
significant, adverse environmental effects of the project, (3) the comparative
environmental effects of a range of reasonable alternatives to the proposed

for judicial notice are rarely appropriate in CEQA cases. As the Supreme
Court explained in Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995)
9 Cal.4th 559, 573, footnote 4, “it would never be proper to take judicial notice
of evidence that (1) is absent from the administrative record, and (2) was not
before the agency at the time it made its decision. This is so because only
relevant evidence is subject to judicial notice [citations], and the only
evidence that is relevant to the question of whether there was substantial
evidence to support a quasi-legislative administrative decision under Public
Resources Code section 21168.5 is that which was before the agency at the
time it made its decision.” With that understanding, we have reviewed the
information of which the parties seek judicial notice, and we deny all
requests. To the extent material was proffered for some purpose other than
to bolster substantial evidence supporting the EIR’s conclusions, we conclude
the material is not relevant to our consideration of dispositive issues.
                                       8
project, including a ‘no project’ alternative, and (4) the cumulative impact of
the project’s various environmental effects.” (County of Butte v. Department
of Water Resources (2022) 13 Cal.5th 612, 627 (Butte County).) In this way,
an EIR serves “to identify the significant effects on the environment of a
project, to identify alternatives to the project, and to indicate the manner in
which those significant effects can be mitigated or avoided.” (§ 21002.1,
subd. (a).) The EIR “inform[s] the public and its responsible officials of the
environmental consequences of their decisions before they are made.”
(Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564
(Goleta Valley).)
      The EIR’s alternatives analysis must consider “a range of reasonable
alternatives to the project . . . which would feasibly attain most of the basic
objectives of the project but would avoid or substantially lessen any of the
significant effects of the project.” (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a).)
Accordingly, “an EIR should not exclude an alternative from detailed
consideration merely because it ‘would impede to some degree the attainment
of the project objectives.’ ” (Bay-Delta, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1165;
Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (b); see Watsonville Pilots Assn. v. City of
Watsonville (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1087.) The lead agency is
responsible for selecting the alternatives to be examined and need not
consider alternatives that “fail[] to meet most of the basic project objectives”
or that are infeasible. (Guidelines, § 15126.6, subds. (a) & (c).)
      When an EIR concludes that a project, as proposed, will have a
significant effect on the environment, the EIR must propose mitigation
measures. These are “modifications of the proposed design and
implementation of a project . . . to reduce the project’s adverse environmental
effects.” (Butte County, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 627; Guidelines, § 15126.4,

                                         9
subd. (a)(1)(A).) With respect to a public project, such as the Plan, mitigation
measures, once identified, must be made “fully enforceable” through
“incorporat[ion] into the plan, policy, regulation, or project design.”
(Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(2); Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018)
6 Cal.5th 502, 524–525 (Sierra Club) [agencies are required to implement all
feasible mitigation measures].)
      If an agency concludes that a proposed project will result in an
environmental effect that cannot be reduced below the level of significance
through the application of feasible mitigation measures, the project may not
be approved unless the agency makes an express finding that “specific
overriding economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits of the
project outweigh the significant effects on the environment.” (§ 21081,
subd. (b); Butte County, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 627–628.) But even when a
project’s benefits are found to outweigh its significant environmental effects,
“agencies are still required to implement all mitigation measures unless
those measures are truly infeasible.” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
pp. 524–525.)
            B. Standard of Review
      “In general, judicial review of agency actions for CEQA compliance
extends to ‘whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.’ ” (Protecting
Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10
Cal.5th 479, 495 (County of Stanislaus).) “ ‘[A]n agency may abuse its
discretion under CEQA either by failing to proceed in the manner
CEQA provides or by reaching factual conclusions unsupported by
substantial evidence. [Citation.] Judicial review of these two types of error
differs significantly: While we determine de novo whether the agency has
employed the correct procedure, “scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively

                                        10
mandated CEQA requirements” [citation], we accord greater deference to the
agency’s substantive factual conclusions,’ ” asking only whether they are
supported by substantial evidence. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 512.)
For example, in determining whether an EIR appropriately considers
alternatives, we independently review whether the EIR’s alternatives
analysis complies with CEQA’s procedural mandates, and then decide
whether substantial evidence supports the decisions made. (Save Our
Capitol! v. Department of General Services (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 655, 703
(Save Our Capitol!).)
      A violation of CEQA’s procedural requirements “is deemed prejudicial if
it deprived the public and decision makers of substantial relevant
information about the project’s likely adverse impacts.” (Neighbors for Smart
Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439,
463 (Smart Rail).) An agency’s failure to disclose required information “may
be prejudicial ‘regardless of whether a different outcome would have resulted
if the public agency had complied’ with the law,” but “[i]nsubstantial or
merely technical omissions are not grounds for relief.” (Ibid.; see Rominger v.
City of Colusa (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 690, 709, disapproved on other
grounds, San Diego, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1194 & fn. 10 [“we cannot conclude
that [petitioners] are entitled to relief simply because the county failed to
comply with CEQA. . . . Instead, we must look at the nature of the county’s
noncompliance to determine if it was of the sort that ‘ “preclude[d] informed
decisionmaking and informed public participation” ’ ”].)
      We “ ‘review[] the agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision.’ ”
(County of Stanislaus, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 495.)

                                        11
      II. An Offsite Alternative for New Hospital
      Petitioners YB contend that the EIR fails to consider a reasonable
range of alternatives to the project because it does not include an alternative
locating the New Hospital somewhere other than the Parnassus campus.
Petitioners suggest a new hospital could be built instead at UCSF’s Mission
Bay or Mount Zion campuses, or on a university-owned parcel in the Hunter’s
Point neighborhood. But it is not our role—or petitioners’—to decide where
UCSF should build its next hospital. UCSF has devised the Plan, and
because we conclude the EIR considers a reasonable range of alternatives to
the Plan, we will reject this challenge to it.
            A. Alternatives in the EIR
      In advocating for an alternative that places the New Hospital
somewhere other than Parnassus Heights, petitioners YB neglect to address
the alternatives the Regents actually analyzed. The EIR considers several in
detail: two “No Project” alternatives—one consisting of no new development
on campus and one with development according to the 2014 LRDP; a
“Reduced Project” alternative; and two alternatives that hew closer to the
Plan’s proposal. In order to assess whether this range of alternatives is
reasonable, we begin by looking more closely at each of the analyzed
alternatives. (See Goleta Valley, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 566 [“[e]ach case must
be evaluated on its facts, which in turn must be reviewed in light of the
statutory purpose”].)
      The “No Project—No Development” alternative assumes no further
development on campus. Although this alternative would preserve
historically significant structures and avoid the environmental harms
associated with development, it would also result in the loss of almost half of
the campus’s hospital beds, with the legally necessary decommissioning of

                                        12
Moffitt Hospital for inpatient use. The EIR concludes that this no-
development alternative “would not achieve . . . any of [the] proposed [Plan’s]
objectives,” and is accordingly “both unrealistic and infeasible.”
      The “No Project—Development under 2014 LRDP” alternative
anticipates build-out of the remaining development planned in the 2014
LRDP. Instead of the Plan’s 2.04 million gsf of additional space, this
alternative adds only .47 million gsf, so it has correspondingly smaller
impacts on environmental and historical resources. This alternative would
preserve the campus’s hospital capacity at close to current levels through the
expansion of Long Hospital, but the EIR concludes it would not satisfy the
demand for “more beds to meet the demand for inpatient care for a growing
and aging Bay Area population,” and it would fail to meet certain other plan
objectives.
      The Reduced Project alternative allows three quarters as much
development as the Plan (i.e., 1.53 million gsf of additional space). This
alternative includes a smaller, although still large, New Hospital building,
and seismic upgrades to Moffitt Hospital to allow its continued use as a
hospital after 2030. The total number of hospital beds under the Reduced
Project alternative is the same as under the Plan, once the Moffitt retrofit is
complete. The Reduced Project alternative preserves all of the
architecturally significant buildings that would be demolished under the
Plan, but it omits the Plan’s Research and Academic Building and four
housing structures, as these would otherwise occupy the footprints of the
preserved structures. With 25 percent less development than the Plan, this
alternative would also diminish, if not eliminate, other significant impacts,
such as wind hazards generated by large new buildings and a deterioration in
air quality due to hazardous emissions and increased traffic. The EIR

                                       13
concludes the Reduced Project alternative would not “fully” meet the Plan’s
objectives for several reasons: Moffitt Hospital would “continue to be
outdated, undersized, and inflexible;” the Research and Academic Building
would not be built; and there would be less new housing. But the EIR
identifies the Reduced Project alternative as the environmentally superior
alternative, other than the no-project alternatives.
      The two other alternatives analyzed in the EIR are both smaller
deviations from the Plan. One features a taller, 19-story New Hospital with a
smaller footprint. The other is a phased option that divides the New Hospital
into two smaller buildings, one of which would be built only after Moffitt
Hospital is torn down. Both of these alternatives have environmental
impacts almost the same as those of the Plan, except that the alternatives
“could result in incrementally lower wind speeds near the northeast corner of
the New Hospital,” and would have slightly less impact on historical
resources.
      The EIR also contains summary descriptions of three alternatives that
were considered for full analysis but rejected as failing to satisfy Plan
objectives. The first of the dismissed alternatives involves building no New
Hospital but upgrading the existing hospitals at the Parnassus campus and
“continu[ing] to advance” plans under the 2014 LRDP for a new hospital at
the Mission Bay campus. The EIR rejects this alternative because it would
result in 284 fewer hospital beds at the Parnassus campus, “and hence at
UCSF campus-wide,” as compared to the Plan.
      The second dismissed alternative involves siting the New Hospital
where the Plan proposes to build the Research and Academic Building. The
EIR rejects this alternative for several reasons, including operational

                                       14
problems associated with locating the New Hospital across campus from the
existing hospitals.
      The third dismissed alternative involves building a New Hospital on
UCSF’s Mount Zion campus, “as previously studied in the 2002 UCSF Mount
Zion Master Planning Study.” The EIR rejects this alternative because it
would be “inefficient” for UCSF to operate hospitals at three different
campuses (Parnassus Heights, Mission Bay, and Mount Zion), and because
building the hospital somewhere other than the Parnassus campus “would
not help to achieve the benefits that can be realized through interdisciplinary
collaboration and convergence between clinical care, research and education.”
Like the other screened-out alternatives, this one fails to satisfy most of the
Plan’s objectives, according to the EIR.
      The final EIR reports that most comments on the draft EIR’s slate of
alternatives focused on options that would locate the New Hospital
somewhere other than the Parnassus campus. The final EIR defends the
range of alternatives explored and explains that, in addition to failing to meet
the need to increase hospital capacity at the Parnassus campus and locate
hospital facilities near the university’s professional schools, building the New
Hospital elsewhere would shift the environmental consequences of a new
hospital to a different site in the city, rather than eliminating them.
            B. Analysis
      When reviewing a challenge to an EIR’s consideration of alternatives,
courts apply a rule of reason: “ ‘the EIR [must] set forth only those
alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned choice.’ ” (Bay-Delta, supra, 43
Cal.4th at p. 1163, quoting Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (f).) Necessarily, an
EIR is not required to consider “every conceivable alternative to a project.”
(Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a); Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito County

                                       15
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 503, 521.) Rather, petitioners YB must show that the
alternatives the EIR considers “ ‘are manifestly unreasonable and that they
do not contribute to a reasonable range of alternatives.’ ” (Save Our Capitol!,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 703.)
      We begin by noting that the EIR evaluates alternatives that provide a
range of different amounts of new development: none in the no-development
alternative, a little in the 2014 LRDP alternative, a medium amount in the
Reduced Project alternative, and a large amount in the remaining
alternatives. But a reasonable range of alternatives requires more than just
quantitative variety. “ ‘[T]he key to the selection of the range of alternatives
is to identify alternatives that meet most of the project’s objectives but have a
reduced level of environmental impacts.’ ” (Save Our Capitol!, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 704.) We, accordingly, review the project’s objectives and
its environmental impacts.
      The project has multiple objectives, but most are variants of a central
theme: the need to “[r]evitalize the aging Parnassus Heights campus to
enhance its place as a premier educational, research, and clinical institution.”
The EIR’s list of objectives goes on for three pages and includes some carried
over from the 2014 LRDP, such as these: that the Parnassus campus remain
the central location for classroom instruction and that it provide space “to
foster collaboration and to facilitate the interdependence and connectivity . . .
of instruction, clinical, research and support uses in close physical proximity
to each other.” The list of objectives also includes some specific to aspects of
the new Plan. Among these are to “[s]ite and develop a new inpatient facility
in a way that optimizes operational activities with other clinical facilities at
Parnassus Heights,” and to “[i]ncrease inpatient beds at Parnassus Heights
to address severe constraints on capacity and access to care.”

                                       16
      The Plan’s environmental impacts are primarily of two kinds: those
associated with building a particularly large building, and those associated
with increasing the overall level of development on campus. In the first
category are “wind hazards in publicly accessible areas of substantial
pedestrian use.” The EIR determines that the Plan will have significant and
unavoidable impacts of this kind because the New Hospital will be taller than
the buildings around it. In the second category are impacts like construction
noise, which will accompany each new building project; harm to historical
resources, which will occur when older buildings of significance are torn down
to make room for new ones; and harms to air quality, which will accompany
more intensive use of the campus. These are significant and unavoidable
environmental effects of the Plan, and CEQA requires the EIR to consider
alternatives that would substantially lessen or avoid them, if that can be
done while “attain[ing] most of the basic objectives of the project.”
(Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a).)
      The alternatives evaluated in the EIR address these environmental
harms. Most dramatically with regard to historical resources, all of the
architecturally significant buildings are preserved under the Reduced Project
alternative. With regard to wind hazards, there are options for reducing
these by reducing the size of the New Hospital building (e.g., the Reduced
Project alternative) and by changing its configuration (e.g., the smaller
footprint and phased alternatives). Air quality and construction noise effects
were also reduced in the Reduced Project alternative. And, of course, all of
the environmental effects were improved in the low-growth 2014 LRDP
alternative.
      We are persuaded that, taken together, this represents a reasonable
range of alternatives. The 2014 LRDP alternative and the Reduced Project

                                       17
alternative, in their differing ways, would substantially reduce the significant
and unmitigable environmental impacts of the project. But, as the EIR
understandably concludes, these lower-growth alternatives fail to meet the
objectives of the Plan, which is intended to upgrade aging facilities and
expand the space available to house students and faculty and treat a growing
population of patients requiring inpatient care. Meeting the Plan’s
objectives, in other words, necessarily requires considerable new development
on campus. Rounding out this slate of alternatives, the two options with
different designs for the New Hospital (the smaller footprint and phased
alternatives) demonstrate the possibility of minor improvements in
environmental effects, although each has its own drawbacks. We conclude
that the considerable variation among these alternatives and their differing
approaches to addressing environmental harms are sufficient to foster
informed decisionmaking and public participation, as required by CEQA.
(Guidelines, § 15126.6, subd. (a).) The EIR’s alternatives analysis thus
complies with CEQA’s procedural mandate.
      Petitioners YB fault the EIR for failing to analyze an offsite alternative
for New Hospital, but the Regents were under no legal duty to consider that
type of alternative. CEQA Guidelines section 15126.6, subdivision (a), which
prescribes the scope of an alternatives analysis, states that an agency must
“describe a range of reasonable alternatives to the project, or to the location
of the project.” (Italics added.) The guideline anticipates that a different
location can constitute one of a range of reasonable alternatives, but it does
not require such an alternative. (Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of
Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 491 [“an agency may evaluate on-site
alternatives, off-site alternatives, or both”].) Further, petitioners do not
propose an alternative location for the project, but only for one component of

                                       18
the project. The project is a plan for the development of the Parnassus
campus. Development elsewhere is, in a sense, beyond the scope of the
project. Although the Regents could have considered an alternative that
placed some of the Plan’s anticipated development off campus, if such an
alternative could meet most of the Plan’s basic objectives, nothing compelled
them to consider such an alternative.
      In fact, the EIR did briefly address the option of placing the New
Hospital at Mount Zion, before rejecting that alternative as inconsistent with
the Plan’s objectives. We conclude that substantial evidence supports that
decision, given the importance the Plan’s objectives place on collaboration
among those involved in clinical care, research, and education. UCSF placed
great emphasis on maintaining these activities together at the Parnassus
campus, apparently concerned that relocating inpatient care to a cross-town
facility would complicate the critical use of the hospital’s patients for
teaching, as well as separate clinicians at the hospital from ready contact
with the researchers supporting their work. In this way, relocating the New
Hospital would frustrate the overall objective of allowing the campus to
“remain a leading health science institution both nationally and
internationally.” (See Jones v. Regents of University of California (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 818, 829 [“substantial evidence supports the determination that
the offsite alternative would not achieve the Lab’s objectives of creating a
more campus-like setting with the goal of enhancing collaboration,
productivity, and efficiency”].) “[A]n EIR need not study in detail an
alternative that . . . the lead agency has reasonably determined cannot
achieve the project’s underlying fundamental purpose.” (Bay-Delta, supra, 43
Cal.4th at p. 1165.)

                                        19
      Petitioners YB protest that this EIR has no “fundamental purpose” of
the sort discussed in Bay-Delta. Certainly, the EIR does not label any of its
many objectives as the “fundamental purpose” of the Plan, but any
reasonable reader reviewing the Plan’s multiple objectives will recognize that
co-locating clinical, teaching, and research personnel at the Parnassus
campus is fundamental to the Plan’s purpose. As our Supreme Court has
explained, “if the purpose of the project is to build an oceanfront resort hotel
[citation] or a waterfront aquarium [citation], a lead agency need not consider
inland locations.” (Bay-Delta, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1166.) So, here, where
the purpose is to revitalize the Parnassus campus, including by expanding its
capacity to treat patients in state-of-the-art hospital facilities, the Regents
need not have considered off-campus alternatives.
      We find guidance in California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa
Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957 (Native Plant Society). In that case, the
court considered an EIR prepared for a master plan for a large open-space
property owned by a city. (Id. at pp. 967–968.) The key objectives of the Plan
were the preservation of certain wild habitats, particularly those supporting
the Santa Cruz tarplant, and the creation of a system of pedestrian-only and
multi-use trails, the latter designed for use by pedestrians, bicycles,
wheelchairs, and leashed dogs. (Id. at p. 970.) In addition to a no-project
alternative, the EIR considered three alternatives that differed only in their
proposed trail systems; each reduced access by, for example, omitting paved
trails. (Id. at pp. 972–973.) The EIR did not consider any offsite alternatives
for the multi-use paths. (Id. at p. 988.)
      The petitioners contended that the EIR should have considered an
alternative locating a particular bicycle path offsite because this would
“ ‘completely avoid significant and unavoidable impacts to the Santa Cruz

                                        20
tarplant.’ ” (Native Plant Society, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) The
final EIR responded by citing the nature of the project as a master plan for
the property, not for other locations in the city, and environmental
evaluations undertaken prior to the EIR that had considered offsite trail
alternatives. (Ibid.) The court found the final EIR had “adequately informed
the public and the decisionmaking body about the existence of offsite
alternatives for the [bicycle path] and the reasons for excluding them from
the analysis.” (Ibid.) The court further rejected the petitioners’ challenge on
three grounds. First, CEQA does not require consideration of an offsite
alternative in every case. (Id. at p. 993.) Second, the requirement that an
EIR describe alternatives to the proposed project “is ‘applicable only to the
project as a whole, not to the various facets thereof.’ ” (Ibid.) CEQA does not
compel consideration of alternatives to a component of a project, the court
held. (Ibid.) Third, the court found substantial evidence in the
administrative record to support the decision to exclude offsite trail
alternatives in the “extensive prior consideration” given to such trails. (Id. at
p. 994.)
      We conclude that the omission of an alternative placing the New
Hospital at a location off campus does not violate CEQA for essentially the
same reasons. Nothing in CEQA required the Regents to discuss an offsite
alternative, let alone an offsite location for one component of the Plan. The
Regents satisfied their informational obligations by disclosing a previously
studied option to build a new hospital at Mount Zion and explaining why they
rejected this option as infeasible. Finally, as we have explained, substantial
evidence in the record supports the Regents’ conclusion that such an
alternative would not adequately meet the project’s objectives. Petitioners
YB have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating “that the alternatives

                                       21
‘are manifestly unreasonable and that they do not contribute to a reasonable
range of alternatives.’ ” (Save Our Capitol!, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 703.)
      III. Public Transit
      Petitioners YB contend that the EIR improperly fails to analyze the
Plan’s impact on public transit in San Francisco. We agree that substantial
evidence supports an argument that the Plan might have a significant impact
on public transit, requiring its discussion in the EIR. The EIR incorrectly
asserts that project-induced changes to transit operations, including effects
on transit ridership, capacity, and delays, are “outside the scope of the CEQA
analysis,” and it discusses the project’s effects on transit operations only
briefly, in an appendix and “for informational purposes only.” In light of the
requirement that an EIR discuss any potentially significant environmental
effects, this was error. We conclude, however, that the error was not
prejudicial because the EIR and the appendix, taken together, contain
sufficient information about transit impacts to serve the EIR’s function as an
informational document, especially in light of CEQA guidance regarding the
transportation impacts of infill development near major transit stops.
            A. Background
      Although the EIR declines to analyze the Plan’s impact on public
transit operations, it fulsomely describes existing public transit serving the
campus, as part of a chapter looking broadly at the Plan’s transportation
impacts. The same chapter also describes UCSF’s Transportation Demand
Management program, which includes incentives for people to use public
transit, and a UCSF-operated shuttle system connecting the Parnassus
campus to regional public transit and other UCSF sites. Most importantly,
the EIR’s transportation chapter analyzes the projected effects of the Plan on
travel demand—the number of trips to or from the campus expected daily

                                       22
and during the evening rush hour—and travel mode—whether travel is by
public transit, solo driver, UCSF shuttle, passenger drop off, etc. The chapter
concludes that the number of persons using the campus and the number of
trips they take will increase by 50 to 55 percent under the Plan, and that the
proportion of these trips occurring on public transportation will remain
approximately the same as it is today. The EIR also looks at where people
are traveling to or from, and at how the Plan will affect demand for parking
and loading spaces. It reports, for example, that when the Plan is fully
implemented “45 passenger loading instances would occur simultaneously
during the peak minute of the peak hour,” a 240 percent increase over
current conditions. And all of the numbers characterizing travel demand are
broken out separately for regular commuters (faculty, staff, and students),
patients and other visitors, and on-campus residents.
      When it comes to assessing the impacts of the Plan on transportation,
the EIR chooses significance criteria that address public transit only at a
bureaucratic or programmatic level. Specifically, the first criterion is
whether implementation of the Plan would conflict with a public law or policy
addressing transportation. To assess this, the EIR measures the Plan
against the 2014 LRDP, the University of California’s Sustainable Practices
Policy, and various policies the City and County of San Francisco (the City)
has adopted under the rubrics of its Transit First Policy, Better Streets Plan,
and Bicycle Strategy. The EIR concludes the Plan would not conflict with
any of these plans and policies.
      The second transportation-related significance criterion is whether
implementation of the Plan would be consistent with CEQA Guidelines
section 15064.3, subdivision (b), which establishes criteria for analyzing
transportation impacts. But this guideline is primarily directed at vehicle

                                       23
miles traveled (VMT), a measure of traffic volume not directly related to
public transit. Guidelines section 15064.3 provides that VMT “exceeding an
applicable threshold of significance may indicate a significant impact.”
(Guidelines, §15064.3, subd. (b)(1).) In assessing the project’s effect on VMT,
the EIR assumes that the number of parking stalls available on campus will
decrease by 17 percent under the Plan and that many people who currently
drive alone will instead be dropped off, including by taxis and rideshare
services. As a result, the EIR forecasts a near doubling of daily vehicle trips
to and from the Parnassus campus by the end of the Plan period. But the
EIR again finds the impact on transportation to be less than significant, since
the daily VMT will remain well below regional averages.
      An appendix to the EIR analyzes the localized effects of increased
traffic congestion around campus. The analysis includes detailed
quantitative modeling of traffic forecast for different times of day and
resulting in different amounts of expected delay at each of 17 intersections
around campus. The appendix also discusses how this traffic slow-down will
likely affect public transit. It anticipates that drivers queuing or circling for
parking “may periodically” delay public transit along Parnassus Avenue and
Irving Street and may block transit stops. This is particularly likely during
“peak passenger travel periods,” when demand for passenger loading space
may be greater than supply in certain locations. Neither the EIR nor the
appendix evaluates quantitatively the impact of increased traffic on the
transit system, and the EIR identifies no significance criterion against which
any such delays should be assessed.
      In a general response to comments questioning the EIR’s failure fully to
analyze impacts on public transit, the final EIR explains that (1) Appendix G
to the CEQA Guidelines does not include a question related to public transit

                                        24
and (2) under CEQA Guidelines section 15064.3, a project’s effect on
automobile traffic delays does not constitute an environmental impact. The
final EIR also notes that the City monitors transit ridership and would be
expected to modify its service to the extent necessary to accommodate
demand over the 30-year time horizon of the Plan. The Regents’ defense on
appeal relies on similar arguments.
            B. Analysis of Failure to Address Public Transit Impacts
      “Under CEQA, an agency must determine what, if any, effect on the
environment a proposed project may have.” (CREED-21 v. City of San Diego
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 488, 504.) To that end, the EIR “must identify and
discuss ‘all significant effects on the environment’ of a proposed project.”
(Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. County of Orange (2005) 131
Cal.App.4th 777, 792; Guidelines, § 15126, subd. (a).) The term
“ ‘[s]ignificant effect on the environment’ ” is defined as “a substantial, or
potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment.” (§ 21068;
Guidelines, § 15382.) Because a particular environmental effect can only be
identified as significant after careful consideration, an EIR is required to
discuss and analyze a possible impact of the project if there is a fair
argument that it constitutes a significant effect on the environment. (Visalia
Retail, LP v. City of Visalia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 (Visalia Retail); see
Butte County, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 627 [EIR must discuss “the possible
environmental effects of the project”].)
      “An agency must find a ‘fair argument’ if there is any substantial
evidence to support that conclusion, even if there is competing substantial
evidence in the record that the project will not have a significant
environmental effect.” (World Business Academy v. State Lands Com. (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 476, 499 (World Business Academy).) And we review the

                                        25
agency decision “ ‘de novo, with a preference for resolving doubts in favor of
environmental review.’ ” (Taxpayers for Accountable School Bond Spending v.
San Diego Unified School Dist. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1035.)
      Here, substantial evidence supports the proposition that the Plan could
cause “a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change” (Guidelines,
§ 15382) in public transit service near the campus. The number of persons
visiting the campus is projected to increase by over 50 percent, and for
regular commuters, almost a third of these trips will continue to occur by
public transit. Taken at face value, this suggests the potential for a
significant increase in the use of public transit serving the campus. Although
this does not necessarily imply that the Plan will cause public transit delays,
it raises that possibility. Indeed, the Regents were informed by the UCSF
president, in a memorandum prepared in connection with certification of the
EIR, that “[t]he plan would increase traffic and demand for . . . public transit
service.”
      The Regents offer no adequate reason for failing fully to analyze the
Plan’s impact on public transit. The final EIR’s initial reason for declining to
address the impact on public transit, that Appendix G of the CEQA
Guidelines does not include a question related to public transit, cannot justify
the failure. Appendix G is an “ ‘Environmental Checklist Form’ that may be
used in determining whether a project could have a significant effect on the
environment and whether it is necessary to prepare a negative declaration or
an EIR.” (Oakland Heritage Alliance v. City of Oakland (2011) 195
Cal.App.4th 884, 896, fn. 5; see Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (f).) The appendix
is not, and does not purport to be, a comprehensive listing of possible
significant impacts. To the contrary, Appendix G expressly informs users
that it is “a sample form that may be tailored to . . . project circumstances,”

                                       26
and that “potential impacts that are not listed on this form must also be
considered.” (Guidelines, Appendix G: Environmental Checklist Form, at
p. 1.) Given this limited role, the failure of Appendix G to mention a
particular impact does not justify the failure to discuss it. (Save Our Access
etc. v. Watershed Conservation Authority (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 8, 27
[although Appendix G contains no reference to impact on parking, the
discussion of “parking as an environmental factor is dependent ‘on the project
and its setting’ ”].)
      The second reason provided by the final EIR, that under CEQA
Guidelines section 15064.3, subdivision (a), a project’s impact on vehicle
traffic delays does not constitute a significant impact, is equally unavailing.
Although traffic and transit delays are often connected—that is, traffic delays
may lead to transit delays—a project can adversely affect public transit in
ways other than by causing a delay, for example, by increasing the demand
for transit infrastructure. Confirming the independence of these topics, the
Guideline subdivision on which the Regents rely directs that “the effects of
the project on transit” should be discussed when relevant. (Guidelines,
§ 15064.3, subd. (a).) And a “Technical Advisory on Evaluating
Transportation Impacts in CEQA” published by the Governor’s Office of
Planning and Research (OPR) is unequivocal: “lead agencies should consider
project impacts to transit systems.” (OPR, Technical Advisory on Evaluating
Transportation Impacts in CEQA (Dec. 2018) p. 19 (Technical Advisory)
<http://www. opr.ca.gov/docs/20190122-743_Technical_Advisory.pdf> [as of
Sept. 20, 2023]; see also § 21099, subd. (b)(1) [tasking OPR with proposing
relevant guidelines].) If there were any remaining question, the state statute
from which the Guideline’s exemption of traffic delays is derived, Public
Resources Code section 21099, instructs that “[t]his subdivision does not

                                       27
relieve a public agency of the requirement to analyze . . . any other impact
associated with transportation.” (§ 21099, subd. (b)(3).)
      The final EIR also suggests, without expressly stating, that the Plan’s
effect on public transit need not have been discussed because “UCSF does not
control the provision of public transit service” in San Francisco, which
operates under the authority of the San Francisco Municipal Transportation
Agency (Muni). We are unaware of any authority suggesting that an EIR is
excused from discussing an environmental impact merely because another
agency will share responsibility for addressing that impact. An important
function of the EIR is to provide information about the anticipated
environmental effects of a project, not only to decisionmakers and the public
but also to other interested governmental entities. (See California Building
Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th
369, 383 (Building Industry) [CEQA statute “focus[es] on informed
decisionmaking and self-government”].) Reflecting its understandable
interest in this issue, the City submitted a comment on the draft EIR
questioning its failure to discuss “the plan’s impact on Muni service and
transit delay.” As a tacit acknowledgment that implementing the Plan will
indeed affect public transit, the Regents then negotiated with the City a
Memorandum of Understanding committing the university to pay $20 million
toward transit improvements “to address . . . transit impacts near the
campus.” With this and other “generous community benefits” secured, the
City endorsed adoption of the Plan. Appropriately, the Regents worked with
the City to address the transit impacts of the Plan, even though they failed
adequately to discuss them in the EIR. (See Technical Advisory, supra, at
p. 19 [“Lead agencies should consult with transit agencies as early as
possible”].)

                                      28
      Finally, the Regents argue before this court that they were entitled to
presume that the Plan’s effect on public transit was not significant on the
authority of Guidelines section 15064.3, subdivision (b), which states in
connection with land use projects: “Generally, projects within one-half mile
of either an existing major transit stop or a stop along an existing high
quality transit corridor should be presumed to cause a less than significant
transportation impact.” Although reliance on the guideline might permit the
Regents to conclude that the project’s impact on public transit is not
significant, nothing suggests that this presumption was intended to excuse
CEQA’s requirement to discuss potentially significant environmental effects.
The guideline sets forth a standard for significance, but it does not govern the
initial choice of environmental effects to be discussed. There is independent
value in the discussion, regardless of the ultimate determination of
significance. (See Protect Historic Amador Waterways v. Amador Water
Agency (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1108–1109 (Amador Waterways)
[“notwithstanding compliance with a pertinent threshold of significance, the
agency must still consider any fair argument that a certain environmental
effect may be significant”].) Further, and in any event, Guidelines section
15064.3, subdivision (b), does not create a conclusive presumption of
significance. As the Guideline states, it is “[g]enerally,” not invariably,
applicable.
      In sum, we reject the Regent’s assertion that project-generated effects
on transit ridership, capacity, and delay are “outside the scope of the CEQA
analysis.” The EIR should have discussed these transit impacts and
addressed whether they were significant. (Amador Waterways, supra, 116
Cal.App.4th at p. 1109.) If the Regents found transit impacts not to be
significant, the EIR should have briefly stated the reasons for so finding.

                                       29
(Ibid.; § 21100, subd. (c).) If transit impacts were found to be significant, the
EIR should have discussed mitigation measures to minimize the impacts.
(§ 21100, subd. (b)(3).) That no such discussion is found in the EIR, at least
not in any organized, transit-focused section of the document, means the
Regents fell short of their legal obligation to “proceed in the manner CEQA
provides,” an abuse of their discretion. (See Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 512.)
      We conclude, however, that the error was not prejudicial because the
EIR, taken as a whole, includes sufficient information to inform “the public
and decision makers of substantial relevant information about the project’s
likely adverse impacts” on public transit. (Smart Rail, supra, 57 Cal.4th at
p. 463.) The body of the EIR describes baseline conditions in a manner that
includes transit; it describes project-induced changes to the number and type
of trips expected to and from the campus, and changes to the availability of
parking and loading spaces; and it discusses how the Plan is consistent with
various transit policies. The transportation appendix to the EIR quantifies
expected traffic congestion and discusses qualitatively the possibility that
this congestion will lead to transit delays during periods of peak travel. And
the final EIR explains that new transit riders will be distributed among four
transit routes in the immediate vicinity of the campus, with no “requirement
of additional or expanded transit infrastructure . . . identified based on these
new riders.”
      Focusing on transit delays, petitioners YB fault the EIR for failing to
set forth a significance standard, assess impacts with reference to that
standard, and propose feasible mitigation measures in the event project-
induced transit delays are found to be significant. Although we acknowledge
the centrality of a determination of significance in an EIR’s discussion of

                                       30
environmental impacts, we find the EIR’s failure to engage in such an
analysis to be harmless here, for reasons peculiar to the assessment of transit
impacts in “transit priority areas.” (§ 21099, subd. (b)(1).) These are areas
“within one-half mile of a major transit stop” (§ 21099, subd. (a)(7)), which
includes the Parnassus campus.
      To encourage “transit-oriented infill development consistent with the
goal of reducing greenhouse gases,” the Legislature enacted section 21099.
(Covina Residents for Responsible Development v. City of Covina (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 712, 725 (Covina Residents).) This legislation calls on OPR to
propose revisions to CEQA guidelines that “establish[] criteria for
determining the significance of transportation impacts of projects within
transit priority areas.” (§ 21099, subd. (b)(1).) Pursuant to this mandate,
OPR issued extensive guidance on evaluating transportation impacts,
making three main points: (1) lead agencies should consider whether a
project blocks access to a transit stop or otherwise interferes with transit
functions, and should promptly consult with transit agencies; (2) “lead
agencies generally should not treat the addition of new transit users as an
adverse impact,” since adding riders to a transit system may slow transit
vehicles but may also enhance transit availability and regional vehicle flow;
and (3) the cumulative effects of increased demand may require new transit
infrastructure, the costs of which may be allocated across a region.5
(Technical Advisory, supra, at p. 19.)

      5We set forth here the entirety of OPR’s guidance on assessing CEQA
“Impacts to Transit”:

      “Because criteria for determining the significance of transportation
      impacts must promote ‘the development of multimodal transportation
      networks’ pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21099,
      subd. (b)(1), lead agencies should consider project impacts to transit
                                         31
      In light of OPR’s guidance, we conclude that the EIR’s truncated
discussion of transit impacts meets the minimum requirement for an
informational document, even without a detailed analysis of transit delays.
First, the EIR’s transit appendix is evidence that the Regents did consider
whether the Plan would result in blocking access to transit stops or otherwise
interfering with transit; it reports, based on traffic modeling, that congestion
may periodically block access to transit stops or delay transit vehicles. But
the Legislature has directed that “a project’s effect on automobile delay shall
not constitute a significant environmental impact” (Guidelines, § 15064.3,
subd. (a)), and transit delays resulting from automobile delays may

      systems and bicycle and pedestrian networks. For example, a project
      that blocks access to a transit stop or blocks a transit route itself may
      interfere with transit functions. Lead agencies should consult with
      transit agencies as early as possible in the development process,
      particularly for projects that are located within one half mile of transit
      stops.

      “When evaluating impacts to multimodal transportation networks, lead
      agencies generally should not treat the addition of new transit users as
      an adverse impact. An infill development may add riders to transit
      systems and the additional boarding and alighting may slow transit
      vehicles, but it also adds destinations, improving proximity and
      accessibility. Such development also improves regional vehicle flow by
      adding less vehicle travel onto the regional network.

      “Increased demand throughout a region may, however, cause a
      cumulative impact by requiring new or additional transit
      infrastructure. Such impacts may be adequately addressed through a
      fee program that fairly allocates the cost of improvements not just to
      projects that happen to locate near transit, but rather across a region to
      all projects that impose burdens on the entire transportation system,
      since transit can broadly improve the function of the transportation
      system.”

(Technical Advisory, supra, at p. 19.)
                                         32
reasonably be seen as falling within the ambit of this rule. Second, OPR
directs that new transit users generally should not be considered an adverse
impact. Similarly, Guideline section 15064.3, subdivision (b) instructs that
projects near transit stops generally “should be presumed to cause a less than
significant transportation impact.” These authoritative interpretations of
CEQA excuse the Regents’ decision not to quantify transit delays, as such
delays would be, almost by definition, less than significant. And third, the
final EIR discloses, in the form of a comment letter from the City, that if the
university were a private developer with a project of this scope, it would be
assessed a Transit Sustainability Fee of about $30 million as its contribution
toward the cost of increased transit infrastructure and service. This is a
measure of the cumulative effects of increased transit demand, and the fact
that the City was able to calculate the amount based on information provided
in the draft EIR demonstrates that the EIR adequately served its role as an
informational document.
      The EIR’s discussion of transit impacts is spartan, a result of the
Regents’ mistaken conclusion that transit operations were beyond the scope
of a proper CEQA analysis. But in light of the approach to analyzing transit
impacts in a transit priority area that the Legislature, the Guidelines, and
OPR’s Technical Advisory prescribe, we conclude that the EIR’s discussion is
adequate, and the Regents’ error was not prejudicial. (Smart Rail, supra, 57
Cal.4th at pp. 464–465 [agency’s failure to analyze effects on traffic
congestion and air quality “did not deprive agency decision makers or the
public of substantial information relevant to approving the project, and is
therefore not a ground for setting that decision aside”].)

                                       33
            C. Analysis of Effect of Transit Delay on VMT
      Petitioners YB also argue that the EIR’s discussion of the Plan’s impact
on VMT is inadequate because it “fails to analyze transit delay’s indirect
impact on VMT.” This argument relies on the speculative assumption that
implementation of the Plan will lead to the transit system being
overwhelmed and transit users will resort to private automobiles instead.
We find substantial evidence in the record supporting the EIR’s contrary
conclusion, that the percentage of trips that regular users of the campus will
take on public transit will remain largely unchanged under the Plan.
Specifically, the transit delay forecast in the EIR’s appendix results from
traffic delays on major thoroughfares near campus, which means commuters
frustrated at the pace of public transit will have little incentive to abandon
transit for also slow-moving private vehicles. And, as the OPR Technical
Advisory points out, adding riders to transit systems can actually result in
improving public transit service. (Technical Advisory, supra, at p. 19.)
Finally, we note that even if the EIR is wrong about transit retaining its
share of trips, that would not make the Plan’s effects on VMT significant. If a
displacement effect were to cause some additional increase in VMT at the
expense of transit, VMT impacts would remain less than significant under
the Plan because VMT as forecast in the EIR falls far short of the threshold of
significance; there is plenty of margin for error.
      IV. Noise
      Petitioners YB fault the EIR’s analysis and mitigation of the noise that
will be created by construction activities on campus. Specifically, petitioners
contend (1) the EIR’s discussion of noise impacts fails to correlate
construction noise with impacts on human health, and (2) details of a noise

                                       34
mitigation measure are improperly deferred. We find no CEQA violation in
the EIR’s treatment of noise impacts.
            A. Discussion of Noise Impacts on Health
      Petitioners YB’s criticism that the EIR fails to correlate noise impacts
to human health relies on Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 520. Sierra
Club considered a program EIR for a planned development community, and
the question was whether the EIR’s discussion of air quality effects was
adequate. (Id. at p. 507.) The EIR discussed the health impacts of various
air pollutants. For ozone, it identified concentrations, expressed in parts per
million, at which listed symptoms were triggered by pollutants. (Id. at p.
519.) But the EIR did not describe the quantity of ozone generated by the
project in parts per million; it instead disclosed the tons per year emitted of
two precursor pollutants that together, when reacting with sunlight, form
ozone. (Id. at p. 520.) As a result, the information provided by the EIR did
not permit a reader to connect the ozone emissions of the project to their
likely health impact. And the EIR was even less informative for other
pollutants whose triggering concentrations were not disclosed at all. As
Sierra Club summarized its holding, “CEQA requires that the EIR have
made a reasonable effort to discuss relevant specifics regarding the
connection between two segments of information already contained in the
EIR, the general health effects associated with a particular pollutant and the
estimated amount of that pollutant the project will likely produce . . . .
Because the EIR as written makes it impossible for the public to translate
the bare numbers provided into adverse health impacts . . . the EIR’s
discussion of air quality impacts in this case was inadequate.” (Id. at p. 521.)
In Sierra Club, the EIR failed the ultimate test of providing “enough detail ‘to
enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to

                                        35
consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed project.’ ” (Id. at
p. 516.)
      We find no similar flaw in this EIR’s discussion of noise impacts. As an
outline for development on campus, the Plan necessarily anticipates a series
of noisy construction projects. The EIR’s discussion of construction noise
begins with an explanation of the measurement and physics of noise,
including a table quantifying the intensity of noise generated by various
sources—from rustling leaves to a jet engine—as measured in decibels 50 feet
from the source. It then describes the health effects of environmental noise,
reports on current levels of ambient noise on campus, and identifies the
location of “sensitive receptors,” such as schools and homes, near the planned
construction. The discussion of health effects describes in general terms the
impact of noise at various decibel levels, including thresholds at which noise
disturbs sleep, “seriously annoy[s]” those who are awake, interferes with
human speech, or damages hearing.
      In analyzing the environmental impact of the Plan’s construction noise,
the EIR describes the noise level to be expected from typical types of
construction equipment, measured at distances of both 50 and 100 feet. It
then maps this information into an extensive table listing the daytime noise
levels to be expected at various locations from construction anticipated in the
initial phase of the Plan, with the exception of the New Hospital. Despite the
adoption of various noise control practices as mitigation measures, the EIR
finds that the Plan would generate “a substantial temporary increase in
ambient noise levels in the vicinity of the construction project in excess of
standards established” by the City and, for that reason, concludes that the
impact of noise would be significant and unavoidable, despite the
implementation of proposed mitigation measures.

                                       36
      As this summary suggests, the EIR contains a wealth of information
about the daytime noise levels to be expected from the Plan’s projects,
expressed in decibels perceived at a specified distance from the source.
Because noise levels decrease with distance, this is an appropriate and
meaningful means of presenting such information. The EIR also discusses
various health effects that can occur as a result of different levels of noise,
again expressing several of these in decibels. On the basis of this
information, possible effects of any given source of noise can be determined,
once the relative locations of the source and the receptor are known. While
more could always have been written, this information provides “enough
detail ‘to enable those who did not participate in [the EIR’s] preparation to
understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed
project.’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516; see Sierra Watch v. County
of Placer (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 86, 107–108 [finding similar discussion of
noise impacts adequate].) Because the health impact of noise pollution is
highly dependent on the precise location and nature of the receptor, it would
be unreasonable to require more.
            B. Deferral of Mitigation Details
      Petitioners YB also contend that a measure adopted to mitigate the
impact of noise from construction activities is unenforceable and constitutes
“impermissibly deferred mitigation.” We disagree.
       The EIR’s mitigation measure for construction noise is in three parts.
Two of these seek to reduce noise by regulating the equipment used and the
location of noise-generating activities. The challenged part, Mitigation
Measure NOI-1b, limits the hours of construction. Measure NOI-1b allows
work to be performed between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays, unless
the project manager gives advance notice to the UCSF Community and

                                        37
Governmental Relations office, in which case work can continue until 8:00
p.m. on weekdays and occur between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekends.
This schedule is further constrained for noisy work—that generating more
than 80 decibels at 100 feet. But in “rare circumstances” when work “need[s]
to occur outside of these work hour limits,” Mitigation Measure NOI-1b
allows it.
      Petitioners YB’s concern is that the “rare circumstances” that will
permit work outside the permitted hours are not specified in the mitigation
measure. However, that the mitigation measure lacks specificity in one
regard does not mean that its details have been deferred. Perfection in the
formulation of mitigation measures is not required. (San Franciscans
Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City & County of San Francisco (2002) 102
Cal.App.4th 656, 696 (Downtown Plan).) The EIR specifies that
circumstances justifying the exception will be “rare,” only when work “need[s]
to occur outside of” specified hours, suggesting a requirement of good cause
intrinsic to the nature of the construction activity. This is sufficient to give
the university, the construction contractors, and the public a basis for
implementing the mitigation measure.
      Petitioners rely on King & Gardiner Farms, LLC v. County of Kern
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814 (King & Gardiner) in contending that the
mitigation measure is inadequate, but the circumstances of that case bear
little resemblance to the university’s noise mitigation measure. The
mitigation measure in King & Gardiner stated, “ ‘Applicant shall increase the
re-use of produced water and shall reduce its use of municipal and industrial
quality ground or surface water to the extent feasible,’ ” which the court found
too vague to satisfy CEQA. (Id. at pp. 855, 858.) Mitigation Measure NOI-
1b, in contrast, specifies authorized hours of construction. Even the language

                                        38
allowing an exception in “rare circumstances” establishes a clearer standard
than the relative terms “increase” and “reduce,” found in the King &
Gardiner mitigation measure.
      V. Toxic Air Contaminants
      Petitioners YB contend that the EIR understates the significance of the
Plan’s health risks from the emission of toxic air contaminants (TACs),
arguing that the EIR “piecemeals various emission sources and thereby fails
to identify the overall cancer risk . . . resulting from the combined emissions
from all Project emissions.” Stated differently, petitioners YB contend that
the EIR avoids finding that the environmental impact of the Plan’s TAC
emissions is significant by improperly applying the thresholds of significance.
We are unpersuaded.
      The EIR’s chosen thresholds of significance for TAC emissions are
based on the emissions’ likely health impact. TACs are a class of air
pollutants subject to local, rather than federal, regulation by the Bay Area
Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD). The EIR adopts significance
thresholds set by BAAQMD’s guidelines, under which TAC emissions are
deemed significant if (1) an individual project would result in 10 or more
cancer cases per one million persons exposed over a lifetime, or
(2) cumulative TACs impacts would result in 100 cancer cases per million
exposed persons. (See BAAQMD CEQA Air Quality Guidelines (May 2017)
§ 2 & Table 2-1, at p. 2-2 (BAAQMD 2017 CEQA).)
      In assessing emissions against these thresholds, the EIR analyzes
three separate sources of TAC emissions: (1) emissions from construction
activities anticipated in the initial phase of the Plan, (2) operational
emissions from buildings other than the New Hospital constructed in the
initial phase of the Plan, and (3) operational emissions from the New

                                       39
Hospital and all emissions from remaining activities of the Plan. The EIR
concludes that TAC emissions from the construction of each of the initial-
phase projects would be significant, and it proposes measures to reduce these
emissions below the threshold of 10 cancer cases per million. In evaluating
TAC emissions from the operation of initial-phase buildings excluding the
New Hospital, the EIR considers only the Research and Academic Building
because operation of the remaining buildings will not generate significant
TACs. The EIR finds cancer risks from these operations to be minimal and
not significant. TAC emissions from operation of the New Hospital and
construction and operation of the remaining development anticipated by the
Plan are analyzed only as cumulative impacts. Assuming implementation of
the proposed mitigation measures, the EIR finds cumulative impacts to be
less than significant when judged against the BAAQMD’s standard of 100
new cancer cases per million exposed persons.
      When the CEQA statute and Guidelines do not establish a threshold for
significance of an environmental impact, “it is the responsibility of lead
agencies to choose the thresholds of significance to be applied.” (King &
Gardiner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 884.) The Guidelines “recognize that
an agency’s adoption of a threshold of significance requires an exercise of
reasoned judgment” and an agency’s choice “will be upheld if founded on
substantial evidence.” (Mission Bay Alliance v. Office of Community
Investment & Infrastructure (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 160, 206 (Mission Bay).)
      Petitioners YB first contend that the EIR’s conclusion that mitigated
TAC emissions from construction of the initial-phase projects will not be
significant was erroneous because the analysis did not include all TAC
emissions. The claim, however, is premised on a misunderstanding of the
EIR’s application of the BAAQMD threshold for significance. In making their

                                       40
argument that mitigated TAC emissions are “very close to the applicable
significance standard of ten,” petitioners sum the TAC emissions from all four
of the initial-phase projects, assuming that the threshold applies to the
projects jointly. The BAAQMD threshold of significance of 10 cases per
million persons, however, is intended to be applied to an “Individual Project.”
(BAAQMD 2017 CEQA, supra, § 2 & Table 2-1, at p. 2-2.) That phrase is
ambiguous because it could refer either to a CEQA “Project,” that is, the
subject of an EIR, or more generally to an individual construction project.
The EIR elects to apply the threshold individually to each of the four initial-
phase construction projects. Applying the threshold in this manner was well
within the Regents’ discretion and is supported by substantial evidence.
(Mission Bay, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.) These are discrete
construction projects. One of the four is the New Hospital. Two others are
the Research and Academic Building and the new housing. We see no reason
all of these, plus the fourth project, must be considered as a single project,
especially since the largest contribution comes from the New Hospital, which
will be the subject of a separate project-level EIR.
      With that understanding, the individual excess cancer risks to an
“Offsite Receptor” from TAC emissions during construction for the four
projects are 0.67, 1.17, 2.91, and 4.72. Each of these is less than half of the
project threshold of 10, and petitioners provide no evidence to suggest that
the purportedly omitted sources of TACs would raise the risk of any of these
projects to 10 or above. Petitioners therefore provide no reason to doubt the
EIR’s conclusion that mitigated TAC emissions from construction of the
initial-phase projects will not cause a significant environmental effect.
      Petitioners YB argue that applying the significance threshold to the
buildings individually was improper because “nowhere does UC claim that

                                       41
these various construction activities have independent utility.” “Independent
utility,” like the concept of “piecemealing” also invoked by petitioners, is a
term of art used in connection with an applicant’s decision to engage in
CEQA analysis of a particular project in isolation, rather than as part of a
larger plan of which it is a part. (See Planning & Conservation League v.
Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 237.) In general, two
activities must be analyzed in the same EIR, as part of the same CEQA
project, if they are “linked in a way that logically makes them one project, not
two.” (Make UC A Good Neighbor v. Regents of the University of California
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 656, 683 (Good Neighbor), review granted, May 17,
2023, S279242.)6 “But two projects may be kept separate when, although the
projects are related in some ways, they serve different purposes or can be
implemented independently”—i.e., have independent utility. (Good
Neighbor, at p. 684.) As this explanation makes clear, the concept of
independent utility has no direct application to the adoption and application
of thresholds of significance. Whether two activities should be analyzed in
the same EIR is a distinct issue from how the significance of their
environmental impact should be assessed. But in any event, we have no
trouble discerning independent utility in a hospital, a research building, and
a housing project. We thus find no error in the Regents’ application of the
BAAQMD thresholds separately to each of four initial-phase construction
projects.

      6 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115, subdivision (e)(1),

a published Court of Appeal case pending Supreme Court review “has no
binding or precedential effect, and may be cited for potentially persuasive
value only.” We cite Good Neighbor, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th 656 for its
persuasive value here.
                                       42
      Petitioners YB raise a similar claim with respect to operational TAC
emissions from the initial-phase projects, contending that the impact of TAC
emissions should have been found significant because (1) the EIR was
required to combine construction and operational emissions in applying the
threshold and (2) operational emissions should have included TAC emissions
resulting from the additional vehicle trips that will result from persons using
the new buildings. As to the first argument, we note the BAAQMD
thresholds independently address emissions during construction and
operation, and we are skeptical of petitioners’ argument since construction
and operation of any one building will not occur at the same time. But in any
event, we note that only the Research and Academic Building is anticipated
to produce significant operational TAC emissions. Summing its construction
and operational risks results in an excess cancer risk of 3.17, far short of the
significance threshold of 10. Combining construction and operational TAC
emissions therefore would not have changed the EIR’s finding that mitigated
TAC emissions are not significant.
      As to the second argument, we agree with petitioners YB that the
calculation of risks from operational TAC emissions should have included
emissions resulting from additional vehicle trips that will be generated by the
Plan, but we are not persuaded that including these emissions would have
pushed new cancer cases beyond the threshold of significance. The EIR
estimates that the Plan will result in 28,800 additional daily vehicle trips.
Only a portion of those trips will be attributable to initial-phase projects
other than the New Hospital—that is, to the portion of the Plan’s anticipated
development for which the EIR analyzes operational emissions. Sixty
percent of the new trips are by patients and visitors; most of these are
presumably persons using the New Hospital, the primary new clinical

                                       43
building. The remaining 12,300 anticipated new trips are mostly taken by
faculty, staff, and students, though some are by residents. We find in the
EIR no evidence directly addressing the health impact of these trips, but the
EIR does provide evidence that allows us to understand the order of
magnitude for the increased cancer risk they cause. The EIR estimates that
traffic on Parnassus Avenue, which bears more than 10,000 vehicles a day, is
responsible for an increased cancer risk of 0.9 per one million persons. Even
if we generously assume that all 12,300 of the new trips not associated with
patients and visitors are associated with the initial-phase project that
already entails the highest increase in cancer risk from operations, the
Research and Academic Building, they do not cause the increased cancer risk
from this building project to exceed the 10 per one million threshold. One can
double or triple (or even double and then triple) 0.9 per one million and add it
to the increased cancer risk of 0.26 associated with operations at the
Research and Academic Building, and the result still leaves the risk well
below 10 per one million. This is true even if, as petitioners contend is
appropriate, the operational and constructional risks are combined. Thus,
the omission of new vehicle trips from the EIR’s analysis of TACs did not
affect the EIR’s conclusion that such impacts are not significant.
      We further find no error in the EIR’s decision to analyze the remaining
TAC emissions only as cumulative impacts. These emissions are associated
with future projects that will, at an appropriate time, be the subject of
individual project EIRs. Given the uncertainty surrounding the precise
nature of their impacts and the university’s obligation to evaluate them
under the project EIR standard in the future, we find the Regents’ decision to
evaluate them only as cumulative impacts and to apply the significance
threshold applicable to such impacts to be supported by substantial evidence.

                                       44
      VI. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
      Petitioners YB contend that a measure providing for the purchase of
carbon offset credits to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is
unenforceable, and its details improperly deferred. Petitioners rely largely on
Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
467 (Golden Door II), which considered a less effective mitigation measure.
We conclude the challenged mitigation measure here is adequate.
      Over time, the Plan will increase consumption of carbon-based energy
on campus, potentially resulting in a substantial increase in GHG emissions.
Given the incremental contribution of all GHG sources to climate change, the
EIR concludes that the Plan would have a significant environmental effect if
it causes any net increase in the campus’s GHG emissions. To avoid this
result, the EIR adopts three mitigation measures. The first two specify
operational measures to reduce GHG emissions. The third, Mitigation
Measure GHG-1c, requires the university to monitor campus GHG emissions
and, if other measures fail to hold GHG emissions below net zero, to purchase
carbon offset credits (offsets) to the extent emissions “exceed the . . . campus’s
baseline emissions . . . in 2018.” Although the purchase of offsets is expressly
authorized as a means of mitigating GHG emissions under CEQA
(Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (c)(3)), the ephemeral nature of offsets can
create problems of enforcement.
      The concept of offsets grew out of the cap-and-trade system for limiting
GHG emissions, under which each GHG emitter is granted an emissions
allowance. (Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 485.) An emitter
that does not use its entire allowance may sell the excess to an emitter that
would otherwise exceed its cap. In this way, “GHG emitters may comply with
the cap by purchasing GHG reductions that others achieve, called

                                       45
offsets.” (Ibid.) Offsets are effective in mitigating GHG emissions, however,
only if the offsets reflect genuine reductions in GHG emissions. As Golden
Door II explained, “ ‘[U]nlike the produce at the farmer’s market, we can’t
examine the [GHG offset] product to determine its value. Not only are
emission reductions invisible, they actually didn’t happen. So to have
confidence in their value, we need a reliable and accurate picture of what
would have happened, as well as what actually happened.’ ” (Id. at p. 507.)
That confidence is provided by “ ‘[p]rotocols,’ ” which are “ ‘formalized
procedures for accounting for credits that ensure the credits are an accurate
and reliable representation of emission reductions that actually occurred.’ ”
(Id. at pp. 507–508.)
      The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is responsible for
“monitoring and regulating sources of emissions of greenhouse gases . . . in
order to reduce emissions.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 38510.) In that role,
CARB has developed offset protocols for use in the state’s cap-and-trade
program. To qualify, offsets must satisfy regulations designed to ensure that
the “emission reduction achieved is ‘real, permanent, quantifiable,
verifiable, enforceable, and additional to any GHG emission reduction
otherwise required by law or regulation, and any other GHG emission
reduction that otherwise would occur.’ ” (Golden Door II, supra, 50
Cal.App.5th at p. 506, quoting Health & Saf. Code, § 38562, subds. (d)(1)
& (2).) The CARB protocol regulations are the gold standard for ensuring
offsets constitute genuine GHG mitigation.
      CEQA mitigation measures must be “fully enforceable.” (Guidelines,
§ 15126.4, subd. (a)(2).) Golden Door II considered whether a mitigation
measure the County of San Diego adopted for controlling GHGs met this
requirement. The measure was part of the county’s climate action plan and

                                       46
called for the purchase of offsets. (Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at
p. 482.) The county contended the mitigation measure was comparable to
CARB-issued offset credits, but the court concluded it fell short of CARB
standards in three respects that rendered it unenforceable. (Id. at pp. 506–
507.) First, although the measure set standards for the registries from which
offsets could be purchased, it did not also require that those registries use
protocols that CARB had approved. (Id. at pp. 511–512.) Second, where
CARB requires government approval of any offset credits generated outside
California, the mitigation measure contained no similar safeguard for out-of-
state, in particular internationally sourced, offsets. (Id. at pp. 512–513.)
Finally, CARB requires offsets to reflect GHG reductions that are
“additional” to those otherwise required by law or generated in the ordinary
course, and the mitigation measure contained no requirement of
additionality. (Id. at pp. 513–515.) On the basis of these departures from
CARB standards, the court found the GHG mitigation measure
unenforceable. Petitioners YB raise similar concerns about the provisions of
Mitigation Measure GHG-1c.
      Mitigation Measure GHG-1c is in two sections. The first section
requires UCSF to purchase CARB-approved offset credits as part of its
participation in California’s cap-and-trade program. Although this aspect
satisfies Golden Door II, it applies only to emissions from the university’s
utility plant, and allows only a small fraction of these to be addressed
through offset purchases. To the extent meeting the Plan’s net zero goal
requires additional offsets, the second section of the mitigation measure
requires carbon offsets purchased in the “voluntary carbon offset market.”
These purchases will be pursuant to “internal guidelines” the Carbon
Neutrality Initiative of the University of California has developed to ensure

                                       47
offsets “result in additional, verified GHG emissions.” Consistent with these
internal guidelines, offsets will be “verified by a major registry recognized by
CARB.” Out-of-state offsets will be purchased only if sufficient local and in-
state offsets are unavailable, and there is no provision for international
offsets. Further, “[t]he protocols of each registry, and UC[’s] own internal
screens, shall be used to demonstrate that the carbon offset credits provided
are real, permanent, additional, and have been independently verified as
adhering to its applicable project protocols.”
      This measure does not suffer from the same deficiencies as the
mitigation measure in Golden Door II. At least some of the offsets purchased
here will be directly governed by CARB cap-and-trade regulations. The
remainder will be purchased according to preexisting University of California
guidelines that, like CARB’s cap-and-trade regulations, are designed to
ensure the offsets are “real, permanent, [and] additional.” Although the
protocols for these offsets will not necessarily have been approved by CARB,
the EIR expressly states that the protocols will be examined to ensure the
validity of the offsets. Out-of-state offsets will be used only as a last resort,
and offsets will not be sourced internationally. In short, this mitigation
measure addresses the concerns of the Golden Door II court.
      Petitioners YB object that Mitigation Measure GHG-1c does not meet
the “same enforceability standard as CARB’s cap and trade program.” But
CEQA does not require that all GHG mitigation measures satisfy CARB
standards. Golden Door II relied on CARB standards as exemplary, but did
not purport to require them. Golden Door II applied CARB’s cap-and-trade
standards in that case because the mitigation measure before it “self-imposes
these requirements.” (Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 507,
fn. 21.) For us to impose the same standards would, in the absence of a

                                        48
statutory or administrative requirement, be inconsistent with our standard of
review: “We review the EIR’s discussion of mitigation measures by the
traditional substantial evidence standard. It is not our task to determine
whether adverse effects could be better mitigated.” (Downtown Plan, supra,
102 Cal.App.4th at p. 696.)
      Petitioners YB also contend that the details of Mitigation Measure
GHG-1c are impermissibly deferred, again relying on Golden Door II. The
mitigation measure before us, however, contains none of the subjective or
absent standards on which the Golden Door II court relied in finding
improper deferral. (Golden Door II, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 518–525.)
Petitioners fault the EIR for ostensibly failing to describe the internal
University of California guidelines that will be used in purchasing offsets,
but petitioners ignore specifics about the guidelines that the EIR sets forth.
We are not persuaded that a fuller account was necessary. The guidelines
already exist, they implement a larger UC policy, and substantial evidence
thus supports the conclusion that UCSF’s implementation of this measure is
not left to the unconfined discretion of university officials.
      VII. Marine Water Quality
      The EIR discusses the Plan’s impact on stormwater runoff and
adopts—in response to petitioner SF’s comments on the draft EIR—a
mitigation measure intended to limit stormwater discharges. Unwilling to
settle for this victory, petitioner SF here contends the EIR should have more
fully discussed the environmental effects of stormwater discharges into the
marine waters surrounding San Francisco, and that the new material in the
final EIR fails to cure the problem. We disagree.
      The draft EIR discusses the Plan’s impact on hydrology and water
quality, describing the City’s system for collecting and treating sewage and

                                        49
stormwater, as well as the federal, state, and local regulation of wastewater
discharge. The discussion notes, in brief, that stormwater from the campus is
collected by the university and discharged to the City’s sewer system. The
system conveys both sewage and stormwater runoff to two wastewater
treatment plants. Because the City is “covered in impermeable surfaces,” the
treatment plants “can be overwhelmed” during storms, resulting in the
discharge of minimally treated wastewater into San Francisco Bay.
      With respect to stormwater, the EIR’s water quality analysis states
that 86 percent of the campus “core” already consists of impermeable
surfaces, and development anticipated by the Plan would add about 4 percent
to this total. The draft EIR concluded that this increment “would not
substantively change” treatment of runoff, and that “site design measures” to
minimize the increase in impervious surfaces would help limit “the offsite
discharge of stormwater pollutants.” Concluding the Plan would not
“substantially degrade surface or groundwater quality,” the draft EIR found
no significant impact.
      Petitioner SF’s comments on the draft EIR caused the Regents to
change course. Petitioner pointed out that the City’s sewage treatment
system had a long history of violations due to stormwater discharges,
resulting in bacterial contamination of coastal waters and harming “beach
water quality.” In response, the final EIR acknowledges that “existing water
quality in the Bay and the Ocean is negatively affected by wet weather
discharges, and that condition is part of the CEQA baseline for evaluation of
impacts.” The EIR now states that the Plan would have potentially
significant impact on water quality because “increases in stormwater
volumes and wastewater volumes under the [Plan] could increase the volume
or frequency of overflow events . . . in wet weather.”

                                       50
      To address these potential impacts, the final EIR adopts Mitigation
Measure HYD-1. This measure requires the university to reduce stormwater
discharges from the campus “by an amount sufficient to offset flows from any
increase in impervious surfaces and any increases in wastewater discharges
as a result of the [Plan].” In short, the university commits to no new net flow
during wet weather. There is an exception, “if modeling demonstrates there
is sufficient storage, pumping, and treatment capacity in the City’s [system]
to avoid increased discharges” into marine waters. And there are details, for
example, about the required modeling, timing, and funding for any capacity
improvements. With the adoption of this measure, the final EIR assesses the
Plan’s effects on water quality as less than significant.
            A. Discussion of Water Quality
      Petitioner SF first contends that the EIR’s discussion of the Plan’s
potential impact on beach water quality is inadequate because it fails to
describe (1) “San Francisco’s degraded beach water quality” and (2) “the
dysfunctional regulatory system governing San Francisco’s sewage treatment
plants.”
      In reviewing the adequacy of an EIR’s discussion of environmental
impacts, “[t]he ultimate inquiry . . . is whether the EIR includes enough
detail ‘to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to
understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed
project.’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516; see Guidelines, § 15151.)
“[W]e do not require technical perfection.” (Sierra Club, at p. 515.) We are
persuaded that the EIR’s discussion of stormwater impacts contains
sufficient information to meet CEQA standards.
      The EIR discusses the circumstances under which stormwater
discharges into coastal waters, and it addresses the risk that changes

                                       51
anticipated by the Plan might increase these discharges. The EIR recognizes
that stormwater during construction could contain “oil, grease, gasoline,
brake fluid, antifreeze, or other vehicle-related fluids and pollutants,” while
stormwater from operations could “contain pollutants common in urban
runoff, including metals, oils and grease, pesticides, herbicides, nutrients, pet
waste, and garbage/litter.” The threat posed by the untreated release of
these materials into the sea is clear. More information about the specific
nature of the pollution of coastal waters was unnecessary to an
understanding of the problem.
      Petitioner SF characterizes the regulatory system governing operation
of the City’s sewage treatment as “dysfunctional,” but this contention relates
less to the nature of the system than to the City’s failure to satisfy its
obligations under it. The EIR’s general description of the regulatory system
governing wastewater is thorough, and details of the City’s past
noncompliance are not necessary “ ‘to understand and to consider
meaningfully the issues raised by’ ” changes in water quality resulting from
the Plan. (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 516.)
      Petitioner SF also contends that the draft EIR improperly relies on
“ratio theory,” apparently referring to the draft EIR’s conclusion that the
Plan’s small increase in impervious surfaces precludes a significant impact on
water quality. The draft EIR does not expressly draw the conclusion
suggested by petitioner, but in any event, the final EIR’s acknowledgment of
a potentially significant impact on water quality effectively moots this
contention.
              B. Recirculation
      Petitioner SF argues that the Regents’ revision of the EIR in response
to comments required its recirculation. “An EIR must be recirculated if

                                        52
‘significant new information’ is added after issuance of the draft EIR.” (East
Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1226,
1265 (East Oakland).) And if an agency decides not to recirculate, that
decision must be supported by substantial evidence. (See Ibid.; Guidelines,
§ 15088.5, subd. (e).)
      We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Regents’ decision
not to recirculate here. The primary changes to the discussion of hydrology
and water quality are the reclassification of the Plan’s impact from not
significant to potentially significant and the adoption of a mitigation measure
requiring the university to ensure there is no net increase in stormwater
discharges. Guidelines section 15088.5, subdivision (a), states that new
information is not significant “unless” the change deprives the public of an
opportunity to comment upon a “substantial adverse environmental effect of
the project or a feasible way to mitigate or avoid such an effect . . . that the
project’s proponents have declined to implement.” (Id., subd. (a).) The Plan
was not changed in a manner that increased its environmental impact, and
no new environmental impact, let alone a substantial impact, was disclosed.
On the contrary, the information relating to the environmental effect was
included in the original EIR, thereby permitting the public (including
petitioner SF) to comment on it. Nor did the Regents decline to implement a
proposed mitigation measure. The Regents were simply persuaded that the
impact of the Plan’s increase in sewage flow and impermeable surface, which
they originally found not significant, should be considered potentially
significant and deserving of mitigation.
      Petitioner SF urges us to review de novo the Regent’s decision not to
recirculate, contending the “draft EIR was so fundamentally and basically
inadequate and conclusory” as to deprive the public of the opportunity to

                                        53
comment. (Guidelines, § 15088.5, subd. (a).) But we would reject the factual
premise of this argument under any standard of review, and thus need not
entertain this novel argument.
      The parties have cited us to a variety of prior decisions; we find the
Supreme Court’s decision in Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of
the University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, most closely applicable. In
that decision, which concerned the construction of the university’s Laurel
Heights campus, the draft EIR did not include a discussion of the potential
impact of the campus buildings’ lights after dark. In response to comments,
the Regents included a discussion of the issue in the final EIR, concluded the
lighting would not cause a significant impact because it would add “ ‘only
incrementally’ ” to existing night lighting conditions, and adopted a
mitigation measure nonetheless. (Id. at p. 1140.) The court rejected the
claim that the effect was potentially significant and required recirculation,
concluding the change was “an insignificant modification to the EIR that does
not disclose a new adverse environmental impact.” (Ibid.) The court noted
the mitigation measure would not cause any additional adverse
environmental effects, and that the Regents did not decline to adopt any
suggested measures. (Id. at p. 1141.) Accordingly, “[n]one of the purposes of
CEQA will be served by solicitation of further public comment on this subject;
only needless delay will result.” (Ibid.) The same is true here with respect to
the Plan’s impact on hydrology and water quality.
            C. Deferred Mitigation
      Petitioner SF contends that Mitigation Measure HYD-1 constitutes an
improper deferral of the details of mitigation. Under the Guidelines, an
agency may not defer “[f]ormulation” of mitigation measures. (Guidelines,
§ 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) “The specific details of a mitigation measure,

                                       54
however, may be developed after project approval when it is impractical or
infeasible to include those details during the project’s environmental review
provided that the agency (1) commits itself to the mitigation, (2) adopts
specific performance standards the mitigation will achieve, and (3) identifies
the type(s) of potential action(s) that can feasibly achieve that performance
standard and that will [be] considered, analyzed, and potentially
incorporated in the mitigation measure.” (Ibid.; see East Oakland, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1254–1255.)
      Petitioner SF contends Mitigation Measure HYD-1 improperly defers
mitigation “because setting a goal, even a no net increase goal, unsupported
by evidence that it is feasible to achieve the goal is not a ‘performance
standard.’ ” The decision on which petitioner relies for that principle, POET,
LLC v. State Air Resources Bd. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 681, featured a
distinctly different mitigation measure. The POET court concluded that a
state agency’s commitment to test biodiesel fuels and then engage in
“ ‘rulemaking to establish specifications to ensure there is no increase in
NOx’ ” failed to articulate a specific performance criterion. (Id. at p. 739.) It
was unclear, the POET court explained, “what tests will be performed and
what measurements will be taken to determine that biodiesel use is not
increasing NOx emissions.” (Id. at p. 740.)
      Mitigation Measure HYD-1 suffers no such infirmities. It sets forth the
specific model to be used in assessing stormwater flows, clarifies that
improvements constructed off-campus or in public rights of way must be
included in the calculations, and establishes a schedule for baseline and
regular follow-up testing. Further, it specifies several means to achieve any
necessary reductions. We will, accordingly, follow East Oakland in
concluding that this “net-zero” goal is a satisfactory performance standard

                                        55
and quite “[u]nlike the proposed regulations in POET.” (East Oakland,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1257, 1259 [approving mitigation measure to
ensure no increase in GHG emissions].)
      Petitioner SF also contends the mitigation measure is unenforceable
because it has no “reporting processes providing a basis for enforcement
review or enforcement action by anyone outside of UCSF.” CEQA does not,
however, require that enforcement of a mitigation measure be vested in a
third party when a public agency is the project sponsor. On the contrary,
although Guideline section 15126.4, subdivision (a)(2) states that mitigation
measures must be “fully enforceable,” it recognizes that “[i]n the case of the
adoption of a plan . . . or other public project, mitigation measures can be
incorporated into the plan, policy, regulation, or project design.”
      Petitioner also argues that there is no evidence the mitigation measure
is feasible, citing the failure of current City efforts to prevent pollution by
stormwaters. However, the “feasibility” standard is not addressed to
mitigation of the underlying problem of ocean water contamination, but to
the feasibility of meeting the performance standard established in the
mitigation measure. The university is neither required nor expected to cure
the city-wide problem of stormwater pollution.
      VIII. Historic Buildings
      Petitioner SF contends that the EIR improperly concludes it is not
“feasible” to avoid the demolition of several historic buildings on campus. We
are unpersuaded.
      The Plan anticipates the demolition of at least eight structures.
Several of these are eligible for listing in the state and/or national registers of
historical resources. The buildings are considered historical resources not
only because of their age, but also for their historical roles, architectural

                                        56
significance, and artwork. The EIR considers a Reduced Project alternative
that would have preserved all of the architecturally significant buildings on
the campus, but this alternative did not “fully achieve” the objectives of the
Plan and ultimately was not chosen.
      The EIR acknowledges that demolition of historically significant
structures would be “ ‘a substantial adverse change’ ” that it judges to be both
significant and unavoidable under the Plan, even with mitigation. The EIR
proposes mitigation measures that would create a digital record of the
buildings but would not preserve the structures themselves.
      Relying on the general principle that a lead agency may not “approve
the project as proposed if there are feasible alternatives or mitigation
measures that would avoid or substantially lessen the adverse environmental
effects” (Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton (2010) 48
Cal.4th 481, 498; see § 21002), petitioner SF asserts that “the EIR’s
conclusion that it is infeasible to avoid demolishing” the buildings “is based
on errors of law and is not supported by substantial evidence.” Petitioner
appears to be arguing that it is “feasible” to avoid demolishing the buildings
because a use was found for them in the 2014 LRDP; that is, preserving the
buildings is feasible because they are not beyond repair.
      The argument takes too narrow a view of the concept of “feasibility.”
Petitioner SF ignores that the Plan’s purpose in demolishing these historic
buildings is to make room for new structures. As the final EIR points out in
responding to a comment raising this issue, this EIR “evaluates a different
project than the 2014 LRDP EIR, with different objectives and different
component parts.” We find that a sufficient response.
      CEQA “defines a ‘ “[f]easible” ’ mitigation measure as one that is
‘capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable

                                       57
period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, social, and
technological factors.’ ” (City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California
State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 341, 363.) Given this broad definition,
feasibility is ultimately a policy judgment, not a narrowly technical
assessment, and one we must review with deference. (See, e.g., Native Plant
Society, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001.) An EIR is not required to adopt a
mitigation measure or alternative simply because doing so would reduce a
significant impact. After all, it is always possible to eliminate a project’s
significant environmental effects by cancelling whatever aspect of the project
causes that environmental effect.
      Here, the impact on historic buildings could be eliminated by canceling
the portions of the Plan that require their demolition. But, “an alternative
that ‘is impractical or undesirable from a policy standpoint’ may be rejected
as infeasible.’ ” (Native Plant Society, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001.) As
the Regents demonstrated in rejecting the Reduced Project alternative and
adopting a statement of overriding considerations with respect to the
significant, unmitigated impact on cultural resources that will result from
the Plan’s demolition of these buildings, the Regents deem the erection of
buildings better suited to the demands of modern medical research and
treatment to outweigh the cultural impact of the loss of the older buildings.
Setting that priority is, of course, the Regents prerogative under CEQA. (Id.
at p. 982 [“Under CEQA, ‘a public agency is not required to favor
environmental protection over other considerations’ ”].)
      IX. Toxic Air Contaminants—Thresholds of Significance
      Petitioner SF argues the EIR errs in using thresholds for significance
for impacts to air quality that (1) the Regents did not adopt through a formal

                                        58
rule-making process and (2) consider only new cases of cancer, not existing
cancer risk. We find no merit to either contention.
             A. BAAQMD Thresholds
      As discussed in Section V. above, the EIR adopts thresholds for air
quality impacts from CEQA Guidelines published by the BAAQMD. The EIR
notes that “[t]hese thresholds are based on substantial evidence identified in
Appendix D” to the BAAQMD Guidelines, a document that, in turn,
references analysis by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).
      Petitioner SF contends, citing Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of
San Diego (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 892, 903 (Golden Door I), that the EIR’s
adoption of the BAAQMD significance thresholds was invalid because a lead
agency must adopt such a threshold “by a public rule-making process, and
must show in that process that the thresholds are supported by substantial
evidence.”
      Petitioner is mistaken. The CEQA Guidelines permit a lead agency to
use thresholds established by other agencies: “When adopting or using
thresholds of significance, a lead agency may consider thresholds of
significance previously adopted or recommended by other public agencies
. . . , provided the decision of the lead agency to adopt such thresholds is
supported by substantial evidence.” (Guidelines, § 15064.7, subd. (c).)
Petitioner does not argue that the adoption of the BAAQMD standard was
not adequately supported.
      Golden Door I, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 892, is not to the contrary
because it addresses a different situation. The lead agency in Golden Door I,
a county, had established a threshold for significance of GHG emissions to be
used generally in EIRs prepared by the county. Adoption by a lead agency of

                                       59
a threshold for general use—that is, for use in all EIRs for which the agency
acts as a lead agency—is governed by Guidelines section 15064.7 and does
require an “ordinance, resolution, rule, or regulation . . . developed through a
public review process.” (Guidelines, § 15064.7, subd. (b); see Golden Door I,
at pp. 897–898.) The same subdivision, however, recognizes that “[l]ead
agencies may also use thresholds on a case-by-case basis” (Guidelines,
§ 15064.7, subd. (b)) and does not require a formal process for adoption of
such thresholds. Recognizing the difference, Golden Door I expressly
distinguishes a case, Save Cuyama Valley v. County of Santa Barbara (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 1059, that approved a threshold adopted through a case-by-
case approach. (Golden Door I, at p. 903; see Cuyama Valley, at p. 1068
[“CEQA only requires that a threshold be formally adopted if it is for ‘general
use’—that is, for use in evaluating significance in all future projects”].)
Petitioner suggests that the Regents adopted the BAAQMD standard for
general use but provide no basis for the claim, and nothing in the EIR
indicates that the Regents require the use of the BAAQMD threshold in all
EIRs prepared by the University of California. Accordingly, the Regents were
not required to engage in a formal rule-making process.
      Petitioner SF argues alternatively that when a lead agency adopts a
threshold established by another body under Guidelines section 15064.7,
subdivision (c), that body must have adopted the threshold through a public
process. Petitioner cites no authority for the claim, which is inconsistent
with the authorization in section 15064.7, subdivision (c) for a lead agency to
consider thresholds of significance “previously adopted or recommended by
other public agencies or recommended by experts.” (Italics added.)

                                        60
            B. Description of Baseline Cancer Risk
      In its discussion of air quality impacts, the EIR attempts to estimate
the existing level of cancer risk from TACs in the neighborhood surrounding
the campus. The EIR first presents estimates based on the levels of certain
TACs measured by BAAQMD and CARB in San Francisco. Because this data
does not include cancer from exposure to diesel particulate matter, another
recognized TAC, the EIR also uses CARB estimates of cancer risk from
exposure to diesel emissions in the Bay Area as of the year 2000.
      Petitioner SF faults the EIR for failing to provide a more recent
estimate of baseline cancer risk from diesel particulate matter. “Generally,
the lead agency should describe physical environmental conditions as they
exist at the time the notice of preparation is published.” (Guidelines,
§ 15125, subd. (a)(1).) But this is not an inflexible rule and must be read in
light of the teaching that “in reviewing an EIR’s discussion, we do not require
technical perfection or scientific certainty: ‘ “ ‘[T]he courts have looked not for
an exhaustive analysis but for adequacy, completeness and a good-faith
effort at full disclosure.’ ” ’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 515.) The
draft EIR discloses that CARB estimates the statewide cancer risk from
diesel admissions to have declined about 10 percent between 1995 and 2012,
and the final EIR shows an even steeper decline by 2020 and quantifies
cancer risk in the Bay Area from diesel particulate matter in 2020. In light of
this downward trajectory and the information in the final EIR, we are
satisfied that the EIR’s description of rates of cancer risk associated with
diesel particulate matter more than met this standard of good faith.
            C. Failure to Consider Baseline Cancer Risk
      Petitioner SF also faults the EIR for adopting a threshold for
significance based on the incremental cancer risk added by the Plan, rather

                                        61
than basing significance on the total local cancer risk once the Plan is
implemented. Petitioner cites no decision or regulation adopting that
position, and we find no merit in petitioner’s various arguments in support of
it. We also recall that “ ‘CEQA grants agencies discretion to develop their
own thresholds of significance’ and an agency’s choice of a significance
threshold will be upheld if founded on substantial evidence.” (Mission Bay,
supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.)
      A primary purpose of an EIR is to evaluate a project’s impact on the
environment. Necessarily, that impact is determined by the environmental
change the project will bring about. (See Building Industry, supra, 62
Cal.4th at p. 388 [“CEQA calls upon an agency to evaluate” “a project’s
potentially significant exacerbating effects on existing environmental
hazards”].) A threshold of significance can be used to determine whether that
change should be considered “significant,” as the term is used by CEQA. As
described above, the Regents’ chosen threshold for significance does just that.
      Petitioner protests that “under CEQA, an EIR analyzes the
environmental impacts of the proposed project on the environmental setting.”
But that is exactly what the chosen threshold of significance does—measure
the change in cancer risk created by the Plan. Petitioner also objects that
this threshold “is a policy judgment, not a finding of fact based on evidence.”
But determinations of significance necessarily involve such judgments.
Estimates of a project’s likely impact must be based on evidence; the
determination of whether that impact is “significant” comes from comparing
the likely impacts against criteria for when an impact is significant. That a
decision is ultimately one of policy does not mean it is not also grounded in
evidence.

                                       62
      A hypothetical proposed in petitioner SF’s reply brief highlights the
fallacy in its argument. Petitioner posits two regions, one with a baseline
risk of 50 cancers per million and one with a baseline risk of 30 per million.
Petitioner further posits two projects in the respective regions, each of which
raises the local risk to 55 cancers per million. By the Regents’ threshold, the
first impact would not be significant because the increase was only five
cancers per million, while the second would be because the increase would be
25 cancers per million. Petitioner contends this is necessarily error because
the resulting risk of cancer is the same in both cases. But a project’s
environmental impact is determined by the change brought about by the
project, not by the absolute value of the resulting conditions. Because the
environmental impact of the second hypothesized project is five times greater
than the first (i.e., 25 instead of five cancer deaths), it would not be
unreasonable to find one impact significant, but not the other. The baseline
level of risk may influence the choice of a threshold for significance, but the
impact of a project is appropriately measured by the change the project
induces.
            D. Significance of Cumulative Air Quality Impacts
      Petitioner SF contends that the EIR fails properly to apply its chosen
threshold for the significance of cumulative air quality impacts. “ ‘The
cumulative impact from several projects is the change in the environment
which results from the incremental impact of the project when added to other
closely related past, present, and reasonably foreseeable probable future
projects.’ [Citation.] It is an impact ‘which is created as a result of the
combination of the project evaluated in the EIR together with other projects
causing related impacts.’ ” (League to Save Lake Tahoe v. County of Placer
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 63, 147–148.)

                                        63
      As noted, the EIR adopts the BAAQMD cumulative impacts standard of
an increase of more than 100 cancer cases per one million persons.
(BAAQMD 2017 CEQA, supra, § 2 & Table 2-1, at p. 2-2.) As the draft EIR
explains, the EPA considers this “within the ‘acceptable’ range of cancer risk.
A cumulative cancer risk of 100 in one million is also used by the City of San
Francisco.” The final EIR is even more specific: “[a]ccording to BAAQMD, a
project’s cumulative cancer risk would be significant if the increase in cancer
risk from the project, when combined with the risk from other sources within
1,000 feet of the project, exceeds 100 in a million.”
      Petitioner SF first contends that the EIR’s application of the threshold
is confusing because of inconsistencies in the EIR’s explanation of its
threshold. What petitioner purports to find confusing is that the EIR does
not sum ambient TAC concentrations with TAC emissions resulting from the
project and other identified local sources. But petitioner raised this concern
in commenting on the draft EIR, and the university’s response provides the
necessary clarity: Cumulative cancer risk, the final EIR explained, is
assessed by summing emissions from the project and all other sources within
1,000 feet, not by adding these numbers to regional or background risk levels.
As articulated in the final EIR, we find the description of the cumulative
threshold sufficiently clear.
      Petitioner SF also contends that the cumulative threshold “suffer[s
from] the same legal defect” discussed above, that it is “applied without
regard to the baseline cancer risk.” But whether individual or cumulative,
the environmental impact of a project is the change in the environment
brought about by the project. A threshold for determining the significance of
such a change may properly be based on the magnitude of that change,
without regard for baseline conditions. (Building Industry, supra, 62 Cal.4th

                                        64
at p. 388.) In some circumstances an agency might appropriately consider
baseline conditions in setting a threshold of significance, but this is not
required (ibid.), and substantial evidence supports the EIR’s decision to
employ the BAAQMD cumulative threshold, in which significance is based
exclusively on the increase in cancer cases attributable to sources within
1,000 feet of the project.
      The cases petitioner cites for its contention that “the severity of
existing conditions is always a factor in determining significance of project
impacts” do not so hold. In the primary case, Kings County Farm Bureau v.
City of Hanford (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, the agency discounted a project’s
ozone impact as insignificant because it was small in comparison with the
baseline level of ozone. The court faulted this conclusion because “[t]he EIR’s
analysis uses the magnitude of the current ozone problem in the air basin in
order to trivialize the project’s impact. In simple terms, the EIR reasons the
air is already bad, so even though emissions from the project will make it
worse, the impact is insignificant.” (Id. at p. 718.) While Kings County
certainly holds that a high baseline level cannot be used to minimize the
significance of a project’s contribution, it does not hold that every threshold
for significance must incorporate baseline conditions. The other case
petitioner cites, Communities for a Better Environment v. California
Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 118, disapproved on other
grounds, Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th
1086, 1109 and footnote 3, merely follows Kings County.
      Petitioner SF lobs a few additional criticisms at the EIR’s adoption of
the BAAQMD cumulative threshold, but we need not address these
individually. We must affirm the Regents’ adoption of a threshold if it is
supported by substantial evidence (Mission Bay, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at

                                       65
p. 206), and we find such evidence in the BAAQMD’s discussion of its
rationale.
      X. Aesthetics
      Petitioner SF contends that the EIR’s analysis of visual impacts is
inadequate because the EIR fails to consider views from surrounding
residential neighborhoods and mistakenly finds the visual impact of the
proposed New Hospital not significant. We need not address these claims
because we agree with the Regents that the Plan qualifies under a CEQA
provision declaring that the aesthetic impacts of certain projects may not be
considered significant.
      The EIR contains an extensive analysis of the visual impacts of the
Plan but explains at the outset that this is for informational purposes only
because, under section 21099, subdivision (d)(1) (section 21099(d)(1)), any
aesthetic effect of the Plan must not be considered significant.
      Section 21099(d)(1) states, “Aesthetic and parking impacts of a
residential, mixed-use residential, or employment center project on an infill
site within a transit priority area shall not be considered significant impacts
on the environment.” As relevant here, the statute defines an infill site as “a
lot located within an urban area that has been previously developed”
(§ 21099, subd. (a)(4)) and a “ ‘[t]ransit priority area’ ” as “an area within one-
half mile of a major transit stop that is existing or planned” (§ 21099,
subd. (a)(7)). “[R]esidential” and “mixed-use residential” projects are not
defined in section 21099, but an employment center project is “a project
located on property zoned for commercial uses with a floor area ratio of no
less than 0.75.” (§ 21099, subd. (a)(1).) “ ‘Floor area ratio’ ” is further
defined; it is a measure of how much of the useable portion of a lot is covered
by a building. (§ 21099, subds. (a)(2), (a)(5), & (a)(6).)

                                        66
      Section 21099 “was enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 743 (2013–2014
Reg. Sess.) to further the Legislature’s strategy of encouraging transit-
oriented, infill development.” (Covina Residents, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at
p. 725.) “[T]he Legislature has charted a course of long-term sustainability
based on denser infill development, reduced reliance on individual vehicles
and improved mass transit, all with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. Section 21099 is part of that strategy.” (Covina Residents, at
pp. 729–730.)
      Petitioner SF does not dispute that the Plan calls for infill development
in a transit priority area but maintains that section 21099(d)(1) does not
apply because the Plan is not a residential, mixed-use residential, or
employment-center project. Specifically, the campus is not “located on
property zoned for commercial uses,” as required by the statutory definition
of an employment center project, petitioner urges. (§ 21099, subd. (a)(1).)
Because this dispute turns on an issue of statutory construction, our review is
de novo.
      According to the EIR, the campus is primarily zoned “P (Public).”
Petitioner notes that a portion of the campus is zoned “Residential House
District, Two-Family,” but this designation applies only to residential areas
along Third and Fifth Avenues, on the margins of campus; the portions of
campus affected by the Plan are zoned P-Public. The university’s use of its
property, however, is not subject to local zoning regulations. (Oakland
Raiders v. City of Berkeley (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 623, 626 [“the University of
California is not subject to local regulations with regard to its use or
management of the property held by the Regents in public trust”].) The
P zoning district anticipates this regulatory independence. Although P
zoning allows for a variety of public uses, it also expressly authorizes

                                       67
“[s]tructures and uses of governmental agencies not subject to regulation by
this Code.” (S.F. Planning Code, § 211.1, subd. (a).) In other words, the
City’s zoning for the campus essentially defers to the university with respect
to land uses permitted on the site.
      As explained in the 2014 LRDP, the University of California applies to
its properties its own version of zoning, referred to as “functional zones.” The
functional zones applicable to the developed portion of the campus authorize
a variety of essentially commercial uses, including instruction, clinical
medical care, laboratory research, offices, food services, retail, and recreation
and fitness. There seems little doubt that this zoning equivalent permits
commercial development.
      Petitioner SF argues that the campus “is not zoned at all” because it is
not governed by the City’s zoning ordinance, and that section 21099(d)(1)
should not apply because the university has not “subject[ed] itself to the
regulatory burdens of the Planning and Zoning Law.” But the City does zone
the campus, albeit in a manner that appropriately defers to the university’s
land-use planning. (San Francisco Planning Code, § 211.1, subd. (a).) And
the university has authorized commercial development in the areas where
the Plan proposes to build. The dispositive fact is that the property in
question is zoned in a manner that allows “commercial uses.” (§ 21099,
subd. (a)(1).)
      We see no basis for construing the statute to require more. In
particular, nothing in the language of the statute requires that applicable
zoning allow only commercial uses. And we detect no suggestion in section
21099 that the provision was intended not to reach landowners, such as the
university, that are exempt from local government’s land use regulation.
Rather, the requirement in subdivision (a)(1) that a project be zoned to allow

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“commercial uses” appears intended simply to ensure that the property can
lawfully be used for commercial purposes, consistent with its designation as
an “[e]mployment center.” Our task is “to discern and give effect to the
legislative intent” behind section 21099 (Summers v. Newman (1999) 20
Cal.4th 1021, 1026), and we see no reason the Legislature would have wanted
to carve out university-owned property from the incentives it was
establishing to promote infill development.
      Applying section 21099(d)(1), the EIR properly concluded the aesthetic
effects of the Plan may not be considered significant environmental impacts.
We accordingly do not reach petitioner SF’s contentions that the EIR
improperly analyzed visual impacts. (Protect Telegraph Hill v. City and
County of San Francisco (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 261, 272.)
      XI. Shadows
      Petitioner SF contends that the EIR improperly fails to analyze the
impact on the neighborhoods surrounding the campus of shadows created by
the Plan’s new buildings. The EIR does, in fact, analyze the impact of
shadows cast by the proposed new buildings, but it assesses their impact only
on “publicly accessible open spaces and recreation facilities near the project
site.” The EIR finds that the Plan’s new development would cast shadows on
parks and open spaces in the vicinity of campus, but that the impact is not
significant because the shadows “would reach these spaces during the time of
day when usage is expected to be lowest.” We find no fault with the EIR’s
discussion of shadows.
      As explained in the final EIR’s response to comments, the EIR chose to
analyze shadows cast on public open spaces because City ordinances prohibit
the issuance of a building permit for a proposed structure if its shadows will
have “any adverse impact” on the use of City parks, “unless it is determined

                                       69
that the impact would be insignificant.” (S.F. Planning Code, § 295,
subd. (b).) Although the university is not bound by City ordinances, it
“ ‘strives to be substantially consistent with local policies where feasible.’ ”
The EIR asserts that it did not analyze the impact of shadows on city streets
and buildings because this impact was outside its criterion for significance,
which address only the impact on public open spaces. The final EIR notes,
however, that the diagrams developed for the shadow analysis, which
demonstrate “the extent of net new shadow that would fall on all locations
throughout the Parnassus campus vicinity,” reveal that “for the most part,
areas one block or more distant from the campus site would be subject to only
occasional shadow during the course of a year,” generally in early morning or
late afternoon.
      Petitioner SF contends that the EIR should have analyzed the impact
of shadows cast by proposed buildings on surrounding neighborhoods because
there is a fair argument that these shadows might constitute a significant
environmental impact. We reject this contention for two reasons. First, it
ignores that the EIR does analyze the impact of shadows on surrounding
neighborhoods, albeit against a significance threshold that petitioner
considers insufficient. Second, we find no fair argument—no substantial
evidence to support the conclusion—that the project will have a potentially
substantial adverse effect on the environment in this regard. (See Visalia
Retail, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 13; World Business Academy, supra, 24
Cal.App.5th at p. 499; Guidelines, § 15382.) Shadows are by nature fleeting;
the campus is located in a densely urbanized city where streets and yards are
already subject to the shadows cast by neighboring buildings; and shadows
present no threat to health. Even if the shadows cast by new buildings on
the campus add, at particular times of day or in some seasons, to the shadows

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already present in the neighborhoods on its borders, there is no reason to
believe that the effect will be so predominant or pervasive as to cause a
substantial adverse change in the environment.
      Petitioner SF does not point to any substantial evidence of a possible
significant impact. Petitioner places primary reliance on the comments of an
urban planner who, while acknowledging that the campus’s surrounding
neighborhoods “currently receive shadows from existing structures,” was
concerned “that the increased height of [certain buildings proposed in the
Plan] will further increase the time and frequency of the shadows.” The mere
fact that the project will cause a change in the environment, however, does
not mean that the change will be a significant environmental impact. We
agree with the Regents that the planner’s comments fall short of suggesting
the possibility of a substantial adverse change in the environment. The EIR’s
shadow studies confirmed as much, demonstrating the lack of any significant
shadow impact on surrounding neighborhoods.
      XII. Wind
      Petitioner SF argues that the EIR’s mitigation of wind impacts is
improper because details of the mitigation are deferred unnecessarily, and
without requiring future compliance with a specific performance standard.
We consider the first issue almost frivolous and the second close, but
ultimately find the EIR adequate.
      Surrounded on three sides by the Pacific Ocean and San Francisco Bay,
the City is a windy place. As the EIR recognizes, winds confronting
pedestrians can be intensified by the presence of buildings that are
“considerably taller than surrounding structures, particularly where such
taller buildings present large planar surfaces towards the prevailing winds.”
Buildings that are less than 80 feet taller than surrounding buildings,

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however, tend not to increase wind effects significantly. The EIR recognizes
that City ordinances have established a “wind hazard criterion” for judging
the significance of wind impacts: the creation of winds sustained at a speed
of 26 miles per hour for one full hour of the year. (S.F. Planning Code, § 148,
subd. (a).) The EIR adopts this as a criterion for significance, to the extent
the project “[c]reate[s] wind hazards in publicly accessible areas of
substantial pedestrian use.” The EIR observes that the City has also
established a “pedestrian comfort criterion” of 11 miles per hour for
pedestrian areas but, although the EIR assesses wind impacts against this
threshold, it does not purport to adopt this lower threshold as a standard of
significance.
      The EIR’s discussion of wind impacts recognizes that some of the
buildings proposed in the Plan, particularly the New Hospital, have the
potential to create substantial wind effects. Computer modeling based on
simple massing suggests that the Plan’s buildings could result in winds
exceeding at least the pedestrian comfort criterion in several areas on and
around campus. More precise modeling, relying on wind-tunnel testing to
evaluate the specific design and siting of a building, was not performed
because building designs were not yet available. In the absence of more
precise information, the EIR predicts the New Hospital could, in some areas,
create conditions exceeding “the wind hazard criterion,” and it therefore
assumes that the New Hospital would cause a significant wind impact that
would be unavoidable with mitigation.
      As required when a significant impact is found, the EIR adopts a
mitigation measure to minimize pedestrian wind impacts. The mitigation
measure requires wind-tunnel testing of the design of any new building
higher than 80 feet, evaluated under conditions representative of anticipated

                                       72
Plan buildout. If the testing indicates the building would “increase the hours
of wind hazard exceedance or the number of test points subject to hazardous
winds, compared to then-existing conditions,” the university is required to
“work with the wind consultant to identify feasible mitigation strategies,
including design changes (e.g., setbacks, rounded/chamfered building corners,
stepped facades, etc.), to eliminate or reduce wind hazards to the maximum
feasible extent. If UCSF finds that these changes or other wind speed
reduction strategies are not feasible as they would unduly restrict the
proposed building’s space program, result in operational inefficiencies, and/or
[impose] substantially higher costs, the building(s) may nonetheless be
approved provided that the project incorporates wind speed reduction
strategies to the maximum feasible extent, as determined by UCSF in
consultation with the wind consultant. Wind speed reduction strategies could
also include features such as landscaping, localized installation of
porous/solid screens, installation of canopies along building frontages, and
the like.”
      As discussed infra, an agency may not defer “[f]ormulation” of
mitigation measures but may defer “specific details . . . when it is impractical
or infeasible to include those details during the project’s environmental
review.” (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Petitioner SF disputes that
any such deferral was necessary, contending that designs for the new
buildings, including the New Hospital were, or could have been, available for
wind-tunnel testing while the EIR was being prepared. But petitioner points
to no persuasive evidence that this is true, and substantial evidence proves
otherwise, as the EIR makes clear that planning for the New Hospital was
still in process, which is why it would require a subsequent, project-level EIR.
Even at the time of the Plan’s final EIR, the specific design of New Hospital

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was still “being developed.” Since any concept design for the building was
necessarily subject to change and petitioner does not dispute that a final
building design is necessary for wind-tunnel testing, this aspect of its
challenge is without merit.
      As for the second aspect of petitioner SF’s challenge, an EIR may defer
details of a mitigation measure only if “the agency (1) commits itself to the
mitigation, (2) adopts specific performance standards the mitigation will
achieve, and (3) identifies the type(s) of potential action(s) that can feasibly
achieve that performance standard and that will [be] considered, analyzed,
and potentially incorporated in the mitigation measure.” (Guidelines,
§ 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).; see East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1254–1255.) Petitioner acknowledges that the mitigation measure
identifies a specific performance criterion—new exceedances of the 26 miles
per hour standard in pedestrian areas—but contends it does not require this
criterion to be met.
      At the outset, we observe that the mitigation measure need not require
full compliance with the City’s 26 miles per hour wind hazard criterion.
CEQA does not require that all environmental impacts of a project be reduced
below the level of significance. A lead agency may approve a project with
unmitigable significant impacts if it adopts a statement of overriding
considerations (§ 21081, subd (b); Butte County, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 627–
628), as the Regents did here. The question is whether this mitigation
measure articulates a sufficiently specific performance standard that the
mitigation efforts must meet. (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B).) We
conclude that the measure’s requirement to “reduce wind hazards to the
maximum feasible extent” passes the test because the measure defines

                                        74
feasibility with reference to “the proposed building’s space program, . . .
operational inefficiencies, and/or substantially higher costs.”
      But we acknowledge that petitioner SF’s argument finds some support
in the recent East Oakland decision, which reached a contrary conclusion
regarding a similar mitigation measure. The project there was a new
professional baseball park, situated in a sizable proposed commercial
development that would feature several other large new buildings. (East
Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1237.) Because the size, design, and
location of buildings other than the ballpark had not yet been determined,
the project sponsor was unable to determine wind impacts with precision but
anticipated they would be significant and unavoidable. (Id. at p. 1273.) The
mitigation measure in East Oakland required wind-tunnel analysis for any
building exceeding 100 feet in height, and defined a significant wind impact
as winds over 36 miles per hour for an hour. (Ibid.) If wind-tunnel analysis
determined that a building’s design would cause an increase in significant
wind impacts, the project sponsor was required to “ ‘work with the wind
consultant to identify feasible mitigation strategies, including design changes
(e.g., setbacks, rounded/chamfered building corners, or stepped facades), to
eliminate or reduce wind hazards to the maximum feasible extent without
unduly restricting development potential. Wind reduction strategies could
also include features such as landscaping and/or installation of canopies
along building frontages, and the like.’ ” (Ibid.) The East Oakland court held
that for two reasons this mitigation measure failed to satisfy Guidelines
section 15126.4, subdivision (a)(1)(B). (Id. at pp. 1273–1274.)
      First, the performance standard was not “ ‘specific’ ” because it
required “a reduction in wind impacts ‘to the maximum feasible
extent without unduly restricting development potential.’ ” (East Oakland,

                                       75
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1273–1274.) As the East Oakland court
explained, “[e]ven assuming that a mitigation measure may, in appropriate
circumstances, strike a balance between the reduction of environmental
impacts and commercial functionality, the mitigation measure must inform
the public where that balance has been struck. Mitigation measures ‘need
not include precise quantitative performance standards’ [citation],
but [Guidelines, s]ection 15126.4’s reference to ‘specific’ performance
standards implies a reasonably clear and objective measure of compliance.”
(Id. at p. 1274.) The East Oakland mitigation measure failed this test
because “the point at which a restriction on development potential becomes
‘undue’ depends entirely on the value placed on reducing wind impacts by the
agency charged with overseeing compliance with the mitigation measure,”
and because the EIR failed “to explain the concept of ‘development
potential.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Second, the East Oakland court held that the mitigation measure did
not sufficiently identify types of potential action that could feasibly achieve
the proposed performance standard and would be considered in implementing
it. “The wind mitigation measure merely mentions three possible design
changes in a parenthetical, combined with a final mention of ‘landscaping
and/or installation of canopies along building frontages, and the like.’ There
is no indication whether more significant changes in overall building size or
location may be considered or, if not, why more substantial changes are
deemed infeasible.” (East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1274–1275.)
      Although the performance standard articulated in the Regent’s
mitigation measure is similar, we are persuaded that it differs enough to
articulate a “reasonably clear and objective measure of compliance” and
adequately inform the public where the balance between wind mitigation and

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commercial functionality has been struck. (East Oakland, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 1274.) Our conclusion is influenced by the nature of wind
impacts and their mitigation. As noted above, significant wind impacts are
caused primarily by building size, particularly building height. The best way
to reduce wind impacts is to reduce the size of the building causing the
impact. Reducing building size, however, risks frustrating the project
sponsor’s objectives. Other types of mitigation are less effective but also have
less impact on the building’s utility.
      Under the EIR’s wind mitigation measure, the university must
“identify feasible mitigation strategies . . . to eliminate or reduce wind
hazards to the maximum feasible extent.” The word “feasible” is key. “If
UCSF finds that . . . wind speed reduction strategies are not feasible as they
would unduly restrict the proposed building’s space program, result in
operational inefficiencies, and/or [impose] substantially higher costs, the
building(s) may nonetheless be approved. . . .” In other words, the university
is required to apply the modest mitigation strategies identified by the
measure—“design changes” such as “setbacks, rounded/chamfered building
corners, stepped facades, etc.” and “landscaping, localized installation of
porous/solid screens, installation of canopies along building frontages, and
the like”—to the extent those measures can be successfully employed to
reduce the wind impact of the offending building, but the university will not
be required to implement these or other measures to the extent they would
reduce the project’s “space program,” which we understand to mean
requirements for a building’s floor space, or impose “operational inefficiencies
and/or substantially higher costs.” The EIR discusses in several places the
Plan’s requirements for new space and the concepts of space utilization and
operational inefficiencies, putting some meat on the bones of those phrases.

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For example, the EIR assesses the reduced footprint alternative with a 19-
story New Hospital as suffering from “operational inefficiencies” because its
“irregularly-shaped footprint . . . would result in inefficient floor plates for
patient rooms, surgery suites, diagnostics and testing, labs and other hospital
functions.” Against the backdrop of this discussion, the standard expressed
in this mitigation measure is more specific than the standard at issue in East
Oakland of “unduly restricting development potential.” (East Oakland,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1274.) The Regent’s standard requires the
university to implement the identified type of wind mitigation measures, but
only to the extent those measures would not significantly change the size or
interfere with the operation of the proposed buildings.7
      Petitioner SF objects that this is not a true standard, arguing that the
EIR was required to adopt as a performance standard its threshold of
significance for wind impacts. We might agree if the Regents were required
to mitigate wind impacts below the level of significance, as is ordinarily the
case. In that event, the mitigation measure would be required to describe, in
a reasonably clear and objective manner, the threshold for significance and
adopt that threshold as a performance standard. The Regents, however,
adopted a statement of overriding considerations with respect to wind

      7 When, at oral argument, counsel for petitioner SF was asked what

language petitioner would propose to make the mitigation measure’s
performance standard more specific, he suggested only use of the word
“feasible.” When it was pointed out that the measure already uses that term
repeatedly, counsel responded that the mitigation measure’s definition of the
term was not consistent with CEQA, ignoring that CEQA’s concept of
feasibility includes the consideration of policy objectives. (See California
Native Plant Society, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001 [“an alternative that
‘is impractical or undesirable from a policy standpoint’ may be rejected as
infeasible’ ”].) The wind mitigation measure’s use of the term properly takes
into account such objectives.
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impacts. Although we agree with East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1275, that the adoption of such a statement does not exempt an agency
from the obligation to establish a specific performance standard, its adoption
can change the nature of the standard required. By adopting a statement of
overriding considerations, the Regents expressed their view that the
environmental benefits of wind reduction measures do not justify impeding
the economic, technological, and other benefits of the Plan by reducing
building size, creating operational inefficiencies, or imposing substantially
higher costs. (§ 21081, subd. (b); see Butte County, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
pp. 627–628.) Given the Regents’ acceptance of significant wind impacts, the
performance standard was not required to specify an inflexible goal, but
rather to describe in a reasonably clear and objective manner what the
university will and will not do to reduce the wind impacts of the Plan’s
buildings. We are satisfied that the wind mitigation measure satisfies this
requirement.8
      We acknowledge that the list of proposed actions to mitigate wind
impacts in the EIR is little different from list of actions found inadequate in
East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pages 1274–1275, adding only
“localized installation porous/solid screens.” The mitigation measure
recognizes, however, that these are merely illustrative examples of the design
and landscaping features that may be used to reduce wind impacts, adding

      8 King & Gardiner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 814, cited by counsel at oral

argument, is not to the contrary. King & Gardiner properly observes that the
adoption of a statement of overriding considerations “does not negate the
statutory obligation to implement feasible mitigation measures.” (Id. at
p. 852.) But the case does not address the issue presented here: whether the
adoption of such a statement can influence the nature of a performance
standard adopted to guide future mitigation.

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“etc.” and “and the like” to its two lists of proposed actions. And unlike in
East Oakland, there is no question here that “significant changes in overall
building size” are not among the mitigation strategies that will be considered.
(East Oakland, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1274–1275.) Given the nature of
the EIR’s performance standard, we find the list of proposed actions in
mitigation sufficient.9
                                DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s judgment in each of the three Superior Court actions is
affirmed.
                                            TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

      9 At the court’s request, the parties provided supplemental briefing

addressing whether petitioner SF’s wind-related challenge to the EIR was
moot in light of the subsequent certification of a project-level EIR for the New
Hospital (or any other recent event). Having reviewed the parties’
submissions, we decline to resolve the issue on mootness grounds because, as
petitioner points out, the mitigation measure also applies to building projects
other than the New Hospital, including to the Research and Academic
Building, which may also cause significant wind impacts.
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Trial Court:                Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge:                Hon. Frank Roesch

Counsel:                    Soluri Meserve, Patrick M. Soluri, Osha R. Meserve, and
                               James C. Crowder for Plaintiffs and Appellants Yerba
                               Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC and Parnassus
                               Neighborhood Coalition et al.

                            Thomas N. Lippe for Plaintiff and Appellant San
                              Franciscans for Balanced and Livable Communities

                            The University of California Office of General Counsel,
                               Anagha Dandekar Clifford; Lubin Olson &
                               Niewiadomski, Charles R. Olson, Philip J. Sciranka,
                               Carolyn J. Lee; Monchamp Meldrum, Amanda J.
                               Monchamp, and Hope Schmeltzer for Defendants and
                               Respondents

Yerba Buena Neighborhood Consortium, LLC et al. v. Regents of the University of California/San Franciscans for Balanced
and Livable Communities v. Regents of the University of California (A166091/A166094)

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