Court Opinion

ID: 9545188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:08:05.979929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:41.218690
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (3d) 220400

                                 Opinion filed August 7, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                            THIRD DISTRICT

                                                   2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                       )       of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                      )       Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                      )       Appeal No. 3-22-0400
             v.                                       )       Circuit No. 20-CF-1550
                                                      )
      WILLIE J. ERBY,                                 )       Honorable
                                                      )       Carmen J. Goodman,
             Defendant-Appellant.                     )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
            Justice Hettel concurred in the judgment and opinion.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge specially concurred, with opinion.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                               OPINION

¶1          After entering a guilty plea, defendant, Willie J. Erby, was convicted of theft. Defendant

     was sentenced to 24 months’ conditional discharge and ordered to pay $15,321 in restitution. On

     appeal, defendant argues the amount of restitution was unsupported by the evidence. We dismiss

     the appeal.

¶2                                         I. BACKGROUND

¶3          Defendant was charged with theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2020)) and criminal

     damage to property (id. § 21-1(a)(1)). The charging instrument alleged defendant knowingly
     obtained unauthorized control over property belonging to M & M Mars DHL Supply Chain (DHL),

     specifically packs of candy bars, and intended to permanently deprive the company of use or

     benefit of the property. As part of a negotiated plea agreement, the State dismissed the criminal

     damage to property charge and defendant pled guilty to theft in exchange for a sentence of two

     years’ conditional discharge, court costs, and a hearing to determine restitution. Defendant

     affirmed his plea of guilty after the circuit court explained he would be agreeing to the imposition

     of an unspecified amount of restitution, which would be determined at a separate hearing.

¶4          At the restitution hearing, the State requested $15,321.85. This amount reflected the total

     value of nine pallets containing 30-pack cases of Mars candy bars alleged to have been damaged

     by defendant due to theft. DHL regional security manager Nicole Strickland testified for the State

     that she had reviewed photograph stills taken from video surveillance of the warehouse where

     defendant worked. The surveillance video showed that on March 22, 2020, defendant entered the

     warehouse with an empty gym bag and then left with the bag full and partially unzipped, revealing

     a blue box inside. The blue box was identified as a 30-pack case of Mars candy bars. Subsequent

     inventory checks indicated nine pallets loaded with that particular product had recently been

     written off as damaged and destroyed due to missing items. Additional surveillance footage from

     several other dates showed defendant entered the warehouse with an empty gym bag and left with

     the bag appearing to be full. On those occasions, the contents inside the bag were not visible.

¶5          On cross-examination, Strickland confirmed there was no video surveillance showing

     defendant at the pallets. Strickland further testified that one pallet was found in the wrong location

     in the warehouse a month after it was written off as damaged. Strickland explained that the

     warehouse was approximately 1.2 or 1.3 million square feet and with the amount of volume

     handled there a pallet could be misplaced within the warehouse and not be discovered for a period

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     of time. After this explanation, the court ended the cross-examination and ordered $15,321 in

     restitution.

¶6           Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing the State failed to present

     sufficient evidence to support the amount of restitution and the court erred in ruling before defense

     counsel finished its cross-examination of Strickland or presented any witnesses, including

     defendant. The court denied defendant’s motion, and defendant appealed. We remanded for

     compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). People v. Erby, No. 3-21-

     0600 (Ill. Apr. 18, 2022) (unpublished minute order). Defendant filed an amended motion to

     reconsider sentence, again challenging the restitution order on the same grounds as the previous

     motion, which was denied. Defendant appealed.

¶7                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶8           On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in ordering a restitution value that

     was unsupported by the evidence presented. At the outset, the State argues this appeal should be

     dismissed, as defendant’s challenge to the restitution amount is essentially an excessive sentence

     challenge and defendant failed to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea as required under Rule

     604(d), thus barring him from contesting restitution on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July

     1, 2017). We review issues regarding proper application of Rule 604(d) de novo. People v.

     Robinson, 2021 IL App (4th) 200515, ¶ 11.

¶9           Rule 604(d) provides, in pertinent part:

                    “No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the

                    defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial

                    court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged,

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                      or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate

                      the judgment.

                             No appeal shall be taken upon a negotiated plea of guilty challenging the

                      sentence as excessive unless the defendant, within 30 days of the imposition of

                      sentence, files a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment. For

                      purposes of this rule, a negotiated plea of guilty is one in which the prosecution has

                      bound itself to recommend a specific sentence, or a specific range of sentence, or

                      where the prosecution has made concessions relating to the sentence to be imposed

                      and not merely to the charge or charges then pending.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff.

                      July 1, 2017).

       Compliance with Rule 604(d) is a condition precedent to an appeal from a plea of guilty, and

       dismissal is proper when this condition is not met. People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 107 (1988). In

       challenging a sentence pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, a defendant must first move to

       withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment. People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 332 (1996).

¶ 10          The State relies on People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, to reinforce its assertion that

       defendant’s challenge to the restitution amount as unsupported by the evidence is an excessive

       sentence claim. In Johnson, defendant argued his challenge based on improper sentencing factors

       was “one of constitutional dimension that implicates due process and fundamental fairness” and

       thus was distinctive from an excessive sentence claim. Id. ¶ 36. The supreme court rejected this

       distinction for the purposes of Rule 604(d), holding that, if sentencing challenges were allowed to

       be reframed as constitutional due process issues to avoid the rule, its requirements would

       consequently be rendered superfluous. Id. ¶ 41. The Johnson court noted its prior decisions only

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       exempted application of Rule 604(d) to negotiated pleas in limited instances where sentences were

       challenged as statutorily unauthorized or void ab initio as facially unconstitutional. Id. ¶ 35.

¶ 11          Similar to Johnson, we find defendant’s attempt to reframe his sentencing challenge

       unpersuasive. It is clear that restitution is a sentencing issue. See People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644,

       ¶ 47 (“[a]s a component of the sentence, a trial court may order a defendant to pay restitution for

       an economic loss caused by his criminal conduct”); People v. Higgins, 2014 IL App (2d) 120888,

       ¶ 6. Here, based on the circuit court’s admonishment, defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered

       a negotiated plea of guilty that included, as a component of his sentence, an undetermined amount

       of restitution. See People v. Odio, 2023 IL App (3d) 220184-U, ¶ 51 (where the plea hearing

       clearly indicated the terms of the agreement, defendant was fully aware the negotiated plea

       included an unknown amount of restitution to be determined at a hearing). In an effort to

       circumvent the requirements for contesting his negotiated plea sentence under Rule 604(d),

       defendant denies the characterization of his appeal as an excessive sentence claim and instead

       unequivocally challenges the fairness of the restitution hearing. He argues that the restitution

       ordered was unsupported by the State’s evidence and that the court improperly concluded the

       hearing before defense counsel finished presenting evidence through cross-examination of the

       State’s witness or calling his own witnesses. However, defendant’s assertion that the circuit court

       erred in ordering restitution without sufficient evidentiary support is ultimately indistinguishable

       from an excessive sentence argument because its premise asserts that, had the court not erred, the

       amount of restitution would have been lower. See People v. Stone, 2023 IL App (4th) 220406-U,

       ¶ 31. As the court in Stone explained:

                      “Defendant is arguing that the State and the court deprived him of a fair

                      sentencing hearing by, respectively, failing to present evidence of the actual

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                      economic loss suffered in this case and accepting the amount presented by the

                      State. In effect, he is arguing his sentence is excessive because had the court not

                      erred, it would have had no basis to impose restitution. In other words,

                      ‘[d]efendant attempts to couch his claim in the language of an appeal of the trial

                      court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, but *** its substance remains

                      the same—defendant’s dissatisfaction with his sentence and a claim that *** it

                      exceeds what he should have received.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Millsap, 2022 IL

                      App (4th) 210192, ¶ 22).

¶ 12          Like in Stone, defendant contends he was deprived of a fair sentencing hearing when the

       circuit court accepted the restitution amount presented by the State despite the lack of sufficient

       evidence supporting the actual economic loss suffered. See id. This argument, at its core, still

       claims dissatisfaction with the sentence, as it exceeds what defendant believes he should have

       received. See id. Defendant’s challenge to his sentence as excessive is barred because defendant

       did not comply with the Rule 604(d) requirements for negotiated pleas to file a motion to withdraw

       his guilty plea within 30 days of the imposition of restitution. Therefore, we must dismiss the

       appeal. See Robinson, 2021 IL App (4th) 200515, ¶ 11.

¶ 13          In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Hermann, 349

       Ill. App. 3d 107, 114 (2004), for the proposition that a postplea motion to reconsider sentence

       satisfies the requirements of Rule 604(d) when it does not challenge the sentence as excessive or

       attempt to alter the plea agreement. In Hermann, the defendant appealed the imposition of

       restitution relating to a charge that had been dismissed as part of the negotiated plea, arguing the

       restitution was void as the circuit court exceeded its statutory sentencing authority. Id. at 108. The

       Hermann court held that filing a motion to reconsider sentence satisfies Rule 604(d) for void

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       sentencing claims because the issue does not challenge the sentence as excessive and does not seek

       to change the terms of the plea agreement. Id. at 113-14. Here, defendant does not dispute the

       circuit court’s statutory authority to impose restitution as a component of his sentence. Moreover,

       after our supreme court’s decision in People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 19, it is no longer

       valid for a defendant to argue that a sentence is void for failing to conform to a statutory

       requirement. People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 33.

¶ 14                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 15          For the reasons stated, we dismiss the appeal.

¶ 16          Appeal dismissed.

¶ 17          PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring:

¶ 18          I agree with the majority that the outcome here is correct considering the current state of

       the law. However, I write separately to point out that the law requires an absurd and unjust result

       as (1) the amount of restitution exceeded the charge to which the defendant pled and (2) the

       evidence regarding the amount was lacking.

¶ 19          First, the defendant pled guilty to a charge of theft that, per the indictment, alleged the

       value of the stolen candy bars exceeded $500 but did not exceed $10,000. The imposition of

       restitution in the amount of $15,321 is considerably greater than the maximum amount contained

       in the charge to which the defendant pled guilty. See People v. Bradford, 207 Ill. App. 3d 436,

       438-39 (1991) (“trial court erred in ordering restitution in excess of the amount appearing in the

       indictment”). Based on the inclusion of a dollar range representing the monetary losses in the

       charging instrument, the defendant reasonably could have inferred when entering the negotiated

       plea that the amount of restitution imposed at the hearing would fall within that range. Putting the

       defendant on notice of a range here is relevant because “due process requires that it be evident

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       from the record that a defendant’s plea of guilty is entered with full knowledge of the

       consequences.” People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 200 (2005). The equitable result would allow

       the defendant to solely challenge this restitution amount as it was in excess of the amount appearing

       in the indictment for the charge to which the defendant pled.

¶ 20          Second, the evidence in the record was insufficient to support the restitution ordered. In

       ordering restitution, “the trial court must evaluate the actual costs incurred by the victim and cannot

       rely on conjecture or speculation as to the amount to be awarded.” Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 48. It

       is apparent from the record that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support the

       restitution amount imposed. The defendant was definitively seen on surveillance video only once

       with one box of candy bars. No other evidence was provided connecting the defendant to each of

       the nine pallets alleged to be damaged. Strickland testified that it was normal for pallets to be

       misplaced due to the large size of the warehouse. It is fundamentally unfair that the law now

       precludes the defendant from challenging restitution when it exceeds the amount alleged in the

       indictment and is unsupported by the evidence.

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                         People v. Erby, 2023 IL App (3d) 220400

Decision Under Review:       Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 20-CF-1550;
                             the Hon. Carmen J. Goodman, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                    James E. Chadd, Santiago A. Durango, and Andrew J. Boyd, of
for                          State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                    James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino,
for                          Thomas D. Arado, and Laura Bialon, of State’s Attorneys
Appellee:                    Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

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