Court Opinion

ID: 9762318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:19:52.195228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:33.214350
License: Public Domain

WATHEN, Justice,
with whom McKU-SICK, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting.
I am unable to agree with the conclusion of the majority. The trial court’s denial of the suppression motion is rationally supported by the record and therefore I must dissent. The applicable law is well documented and may be simply stated. The determination of the waiver of Miranda rights by a juvenile involves an application of the totality-of-the-circumstances test. State v. Michael L., Me., 441 A.2d 684 (1982); State v. Ann Marie C., Me., 407 A.2d 715 (1979). The admissibility of a confession and the associated factual findings are reserved to and decided by the judge presiding at the suppression hearing. State v. Theriault, Me., 425 A.2d 986 (1981). *381The conclusion of the trial judge, if he is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, will be sustained on appeal unless the record provides no rational support. State v. Bleyl, Me., 435 A.2d 1349 (1981); State v. Theriault, Me., 425 A.2d at 987-88; State v. Collins, Me., 297 A.2d 620, 625 (1972).
In denying the suppression motion, the trial court ruled that the juvenile waived his rights with knowledge and intelligence and did so voluntarily. The court found expressly that the juvenile “showed on the stand that he knew what the [Miranda] rights were, and it seemed to be that he understood them.” In the face of this express finding of fact, the majority determines that the record does not rationally support the conclusion that the juvenile was aware of his rights and the consequences of foregoing them.
The most compelling record evidence supporting the trial judge’s ruling is the testimony of the juvenile himself. Each time he was asked about his understanding he presented a variegated response but never specifically claimed that he did not understand.
Q. Did you know that you had a right to ask them to stop asking you questions?
A. Yeah, well, I stalled — I went like that, and they said “Well, what happened?” they asked me some more questions.
* * * Sic * *
Q. Did you know you had a right to say, “Well, hold on, I’m not going to answer”.
A. Well, I forgot, well, I was scared— I — I thought I had to. See, like the fingerprints, — or I thought I had to.
He * H5 * * *
Q. Did you know that you had the right, at any time, to request the police officers to stop asking you questions?
A. Well, I didn’t know, because they — I thought they really had me — really got me, you know, so I would have to tell — I thought they — I’d have to tell. Because they got my fingerprints. (emphasis added)
Having heard this evidence and witnessed the demeanor and manner of the juvenile, the trial judge was called upon to decide whether: (1) the juvenile had no understanding of his rights, (2) he initially understood but then forgot, or (3) he understood but voluntarily chose to talk, possibly because he knew that the police had obtained his fingerprint from the premises. The cold record suggests strongly that the latter situation prevailed. It would have been permissible for the trial court to conclude that understanding did exist and that the juvenile chose to talk because of the strength of the evidence and perhaps because he vainly hoped to shield his brother who was also implicated.
The accuracy of the foregoing speculation need not be established. It only serves to demonstrate that this record is not devoid of rational support for the conclusion reached by the trial judge. In a case such as this, in which the defendant does not unequivocally deny his understanding of the Miranda rights, the factual determination of his understanding is wisely left to the trial judge. He alone is in a position to believe or disbelieve the testimony of the defendant. He alone has “the prerogative selectively to accept or reject” testimony presented “in terms of the credibility of the witnesses or the internal cogency of the content.” In Re Fleming, Me., 431 A.2d 616, 618 (1981). The trial judge’s conclusion in this case that the juvenile understood his rights finds rational support in the record, even if only the testimony of the juvenile is considered.
I would affirm the judgment.