Court Opinion

ID: 9410089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 14:07:31.847271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:55.321417
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Brian Puricelli,                                    :
                          Petitioner                :
                                                    :
                  v.                                :
                                                    :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania                        :
Department of Education (Division of                :
Certification Services) and                         :
Alicia Steinhauer,                                  :    No. 354 M.D. 2022
                    Respondents                     :    Submitted: April 6, 2023

BEFORE:           HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
                  HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
                  HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                                       FILED: July 20, 2023

                  Before this Court are: (1) the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Department of Education, Division of Certification Services’ (Department), and
Alicia Steinhauer’s (Steinhauer) (collectively, Respondents) Preliminary Objections
to Brian Puricelli’s (Petitioner) Petition for Review in the nature of a Complaint for
Writ of Prohibition, Mandamus, Injunctive and Legal Relief (Complaint) filed in this
Court’s original jurisdiction; (2) Petitioner’s Preliminary Objection1 to Respondents’
Preliminary Objections; and (3) Petitioner’s Application to Strike Respondents’
Brief in Support of their Preliminary Objections (Application to Strike).

       1
            Although it contains multiple objections, Petitioner titles his Preliminary Objection in the
singular.
                                              Facts2
                In or about January 2020, Petitioner voluntarily elected to retire from
an active law practice. See Complaint ¶ 26. In or about January 2021, Petitioner
retired but maintained a law license, handled pro bono cases, and completed any
case that was not moved by its client in 2020, or resolved. See Complaint ¶ 27. In
or about January 2022, Petitioner sought employment as a substitute teacher and
obtained the employment at a rate of $250.00 per day. See Complaint ¶ 28. On or
about March 26, 2022, Petitioner met the Department’s requirements for
certification to be employed as a substitute teacher, and passed the mandatory
teaching test with an “on or about 94.3% out of 100% score.” Complaint ¶ 29. The
Department required Petitioner to submit an application for licensing through the
Teacher Information Management System (TIMS). See Complaint ¶ 30. On the
TIMS application there were questions about whether the applicant had any
licensing complaints, criminal convictions, and any founded or unfounded child
abuse complaints. See id. There were no questions on the TIMS application
concerning whether the licensing complaint or any criminal conviction concerned
child abuse. See Complaint ¶ 31. Petitioner was not convicted of any crime and has
no child abuse complaint history; he provided clearances to the Department from the
Department of Public Welfare, the Pennsylvania State Police, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. See Complaint ¶ 32. All of Petitioner’s clearances were
issued within one year of Petitioner having completed the TIMS application. See id.
                On or about June 6, 2022, Department employee Steinhauer sent
Petitioner an email requesting additional documentation about a previous licensing
complaint, which was the only licensing complaint against Petitioner in his nearly
30 years as an attorney, and it did not involve child abuse. See Complaint ¶ 34.

      2
          The facts are as alleged in Petitioner’s Complaint.

                                                 2
Petitioner had denied the complaint, and explained the matter to the Department
upon the Department’s demand for a written and signed explanation. See Complaint
¶ 35. Because the Department’s additional information email request was vague and
did not describe what was being requested, Petitioner asked the Department to be
specific as to what it was requesting. See id. The Department replied that it often
asks for additional information, but certification is not guaranteed even if the
additional information is provided. See id. The Department referred Petitioner to
its chief counsel’s office. See id. Despite two telephone calls and emails to the
Department’s chief counsel’s office, the chief counsel did not return Petitioner’s
calls or emails about the additional information request. See id. It stated on the
TIMS application that additional information was required, however, it did not
identify what specific additional information. See id. Rather, the TIMS application
reflected that, if no document or test is indicated, then none is needed. See id. Yet,
because Petitioner’s application in TIMS requires additional documents, the
application remains undecided for approval or, in turn, a denial of certification. See
id.
             On June 26, 2022, Petitioner filed the Complaint, pro se, asking this
Court to

             properly reverse[], declare[] rights, and issue[] Mandamus
             relief and a w[r]it of Prohibition.
             [] [] [P]etitioner seeks for the Commonwealth Court to
             declare rights, [and] grant injunctive[,] equitable, and
             economic relief. Including to vacate the Department’s
             adjudication and cease it and its employees’ conduct,
             including all decision[s], and use of the TIMS questions
             that exceed[] Pennsylvania statutory authority and create[]
             records the [D]epartment maintains that deprive [l]iberty
             and [r]eputation rights under the law and Pennsylvania[]
             Constitution[,] Title IX and VII, including for gender
             discrimination, and the First and Fourteenth
             [A]mendments of the United States [(U.S)] Constitution,

                                          3
             for equal protection, due process, free speech, and petition
             clause activity [sic].

Complaint ¶¶ 46-47.
             On July 26, 2022, Respondents filed their Preliminary Objections to
Petitioner’s Complaint. On July 29, 2022, Petitioner filed his Preliminary Objection
to Respondents’ Preliminary Objections. On October 17, 2022, Respondents filed
their Brief in Support of their Preliminary Objections. On October 24, 2022,
Petitioner filed his Application to Strike. On November 17, 2022, Petitioner filed
his Brief Opposing Respondents’ Preliminary Objections and in Support of
Petitioner’s Preliminary Objection and Application to Strike. On November 21,
2022, Respondents filed their Answer to the Application to Strike. By December 8,
2022 Order, this Court directed that the Application to Strike be decided at the same
time as Respondents’ Preliminary Objections and Petitioner’s Preliminary Objection
to Respondents’ Preliminary Objections. On December 12, 2022, Respondents filed
their Brief in Opposition to Petitioner’s Preliminary Objection and in Reply to
Petitioner’s Brief in Opposition to Respondents’ Preliminary Objections.

                                     Discussion

             In ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as true
             all well-pleaded material allegations in the [complaint], as
             well as all inferences reasonably deduced therefrom. The
             Court need not accept as true conclusions of law,
             unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative
             allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain
             preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that
             the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be
             resolved by a refusal to sustain them.
             A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits
             every well-pleaded fact in the complaint and all inferences
             reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the legal
             sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be
             sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed

                                          4
                to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When
                ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to
                the complaint.

Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (emphasis added;
citations omitted).       “‘[C]ourts reviewing preliminary objections may not only
consider the facts pled in the complaint, but also any documents or exhibits attached
to it.’ Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).” Foxe v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corr., 214 A.3d 308, 311 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

  I.        Petitioner’s Preliminary Objection to Respondents’ Preliminary
            Objections to Petitioner’s Complaint
                Petitioner objects to Respondents’ Preliminary Objections, asserting:
(1) they are replete with inaccuracies and fiction; (2) they do not conform with the
rule of law or court and are legally insufficient; and (3) they contain impertinent and
scandalous information or remarks. Respondents rejoin: (1) the Court need not
accept Petitioner’s unsupported assertions that the Department denied his
application for a teaching permit because his averments directly conflict with the
documents attached to the Complaint that indicate his TIMS application is open and
pending; and (2) the entire basis of Petitioner’s lawsuit is his refusal to provide the
Department with documents regarding his professional disciplinary issues, and an
update to the status of the disciplinary investigation and the suspension of
Petitioner’s law license investigation is not immaterial and inappropriate.
                At the outset, this Court notes that because Petitioner merges his
arguments regarding Respondents’ Preliminary Objections to Petitioner’s
Complaint, Petitioner’s Preliminary Objection to Respondents’ Preliminary
Objections, and Petitioner’s Application to Strike, it is extremely difficult to
decipher his specific arguments.3 However, after reviewing Petitioner’s Preliminary

       3
           Indeed, this Court agrees with Respondents’ observations that
                                                 5
Objection in conjunction with Petitioner’s Brief in Support thereof, it appears
Petitioner is arguing that Respondents’ Preliminary Objections should be stricken
because they do not conform to law and they include scandalous or impertinent
matter. Specifically, Petitioner contends that because Respondents’ Preliminary
Objections refer to Petitioner’s law license being suspended, aver that Petitioner was
not denied teacher certification, reference exhaustion of remedies, and introduce
state statutes which do not appear in the Complaint, the Preliminary Objections
should be stricken.

                            1. Petitioner’s License Suspension
               Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(2) provides, in relevant
part, that preliminary objections may be filed by any party to any pleading for
“failure of a pleading to conform to law or rule of court[,] or inclusion of scandalous
or impertinent matter[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(2). Petitioner contends that stating
that his law license is suspended is scandalous and impertinent matter. Respondents
rejoin that they included information regarding the suspension of Petitioner’s law
license in a footnote and attached the requisite Pennsylvania Supreme Court Order.
Respondents did not otherwise reference the suspension and did not use it to
disparage or insult Petitioner.

               Petitioner’s brief is rambling, disorganized and replete with spelling,
               grammar and formatting errors that make parts difficult, if not
               impossible, to comprehend. . . . [Petitioner] repeatedly asserts legal
               conclusions without citation. Indeed, [in] over 35 pages, Petitioner
               devotes more words to making personal attacks on counsel and
               baselessly alleging improprieties than to citing case[ ]law in support
               of his arguments.
Respondents’ Reply Br. at 6 (citations omitted).

                                                   6
             “To be scandalous and impertinent, the allegations must be immaterial
and inappropriate to the proof of the cause of action.” Common Cause/Pa. v.
Commonwealth, 710 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (en banc), aff’d, 757 A.2d
367 (Pa. 2000). In his Complaint, Petitioner expressly alleged:

             30. [] Petitioner was required by the [D]epartment for
             certification [to] submit an application for licensing
             through TIMS. The TIMS questions asked about any
             licensing complaint, conviction of a crimes [sic] and any
             founded or unfounded child abuse complaint.
             ....
             34. On or about June 6, 2022[,] the [D]epartment by its
             employee [] Steinhauer sent to [Petitioner] an email to
             send additional documentation about a licensing
             complaint, which complaint did not concern[] child
             abuse, and is the only licensing matter against the
             [P]etitioner in his near [30] years as an attorney. The
             [matter] is denied by [] Petitioner and explained to the
             [D]epartment upon the [D]epartment’s demand for a
             written and signed explanation.

Complaint ¶¶ 30, 34 (emphasis added). Clearly, Petitioner’s license suspension,
which occurred on July 11, 2022, is material and appropriate here, as the
Department’s request for this information is at the heart of Petitioner’s Complaint.
Accordingly, this Preliminary Objection is overruled.

                              2. Denial of Certification
             Petitioner avers that “[Respondents] add the new facts [sic], such as the
certification as a substitute teacher is not denied to [Petitioner].” Petitioner’s Prelim.
Obj. ¶ 30.     Petitioner argues that because he alleged in his Complaint that
certification was denied, and Respondents did not accept this allegation as true,
Respondents’ Preliminary Objection does not conform to law. Respondents rejoin

                                            7
that the emails attached to the Complaint evidence that Petitioner’s certification was
not denied.
              Petitioner attached two emails to the Complaint. The first states, in
relevant part: “Your application has been reviewed and more information is needed
to continue processing. You will receive a separate email from your evaluator
detailing the documentation needed. Follow the request for information in your
personalized evaluation email since your coversheet may not accurately list all
outstanding documentation.” Complaint Attachment at 1 (emphasis added). The
second email provides: “The [Department] is in the process of reviewing your
permit application and additional documentation, in order to continue the
review, please submit official documentation regarding the pending disciplinary
matter in order to corroborate your statement of events. You may email this
information to [Steinhauer].”     Complaint Attachment at 2 (emphasis added).
Because courts reviewing preliminary objections may also consider any documents
attached to a complaint, and the Complaint attachments in this case reflect that
Petitioner’s certification is still being processed (i.e., has not been denied), this
Preliminary Objection is overruled.

                            3. Exhaustion of Remedies
              Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(7) provides, in relevant
part, that preliminary objections may be filed for “failure to exercise or exhaust a
statutory remedy[.]”       Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(7).         Here, Petitioner avers:
“[Respondents] argue with no facts from the [C]omplaint that there are available
remedies, which have not been exhausted; [Respondents] do not specifically identify
what remedies exists [sic] or show factually they are available to [Petitioner].”
Petitioner’s Prelim. Obj. ¶ 31. Respondents rejoin that the remedies that Petitioner
has failed to exhaust are not new facts, but rather a statutory appeal requirement set
                                          8
forth in the Pennsylvania Code. See Section 49.66 of the Department’s Regulations,
22 Pa. Code § 49.66 (“Applicants who have been denied certification may appeal
for reconsideration of their case to the Department.”). Because the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is a permitted preliminary objection, this Preliminary
Objection is overruled.

                                        4. Statutes
              Petitioner avers: “[Respondents] by their [P]reliminary [O]bjection[s]
further argue new facts that do not appear in the pleadings, such fact a statute [sic],
viz 6344 b.1 [sic].” Petitioner’s Prelim. Obj. ¶ 34. Respondents retort that a citation
to a statute is not a new fact. Respondents allege in their Preliminary Objections:

              The process for obtaining a teaching permit or certificate
              is governed by a myriad of statutes and regulations
              designed to ensure that children are safe and individuals
              who have direct contact with them within a school setting
              are of good moral character. See [Section 4912 of the
              Department’s Regulations,] 22 Pa. Code § 4912; [Section
              6344 of the Child Protective Services Law,4] 23 Pa.C.S. §
              6344; [Sections 111 to 111.1 and 1209 of the Public
              School Code of 1949 (School Code),5] 24 P.S. §§ 1-111 -
              1-111.1; 12-1209. The legislature has empowered [the
              Department] to administer this statutory scheme, evaluate
              applicants, and grant or deny their applications. See
              [Sections 1.1 to 49[.]12 of the Department’s Regulations,]
              22 Pa. Code §§ 1.1[-]49[.]12.

Respondents’ Prelim. Objs. ¶ 42. Because citations to the relevant statutes and
regulations are not new facts, this Preliminary Objection is overruled.

       4
         23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6388.
       5
         Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 1-101 - 27-2702. Section 111.1
of the School Code was added by Section 1 of the Act of October 22, 2014, P.L. 2624.

                                              9
  II.         Petitioner’s Application to Strike Respondents’ Brief in Support of
              Their Preliminary Objections
                  Petitioner argues that Respondents’ Brief in Support of their
Preliminary Objections should be stricken for lack of service, and because it is
legally insufficient as not conforming to the law, i.e., Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure (Rule) 121, and believed to include impertinent and scandalous
information. Respondents rejoin that Respondents filed their Brief in Support of
Preliminary Objections on October 17, 2022, and served it on Petitioner by U.S.
mail the same day. See Answer to Appl. to Strike ¶ 4. Respondents further retort
that, after they became aware of Petitioner’s claim that he was not served, they sent
additional copies to him by email and U.S. mail on October 26, 2022. See id.
                  By September 15, 2022 Order, this Court directed Respondents to file
and serve a brief in support of Respondents’ Preliminary Objections no later than
October 17, 2022. This Court received Respondents’ Brief in Support of Preliminary
Objections at 11:50 a.m. on October 17, 2022.                 However, the accompanying
Certificate of Service states that the Brief was served on Petitioner by email, not by
U.S. mail, as Respondents asserted in their Answer to Application to Strike. See
Cert. of Serv. filed Oct. 17, 2022. Although Petitioner argued in support of his
Application to Strike in his brief, Respondents did not include any argument in
response thereto in their Reply Brief. Given the discrepancy between the Certificate
of Service and the Answer to the Application to Strike, and Respondents’ failure to
address the same in their Reply Brief, this Court is constrained to grant Petitioner’s
Application to Strike.6

         6
             This ruling however, does not prevent this Court from reviewing Respondents’ Reply
Brief.
                                                10
  III.   Respondents’ Preliminary Objections to Petitioner’s Complaint
             In their Preliminary Objections, Respondents allege: (1) the
Department did not exceed its authority by asking about Petitioner’s disciplinary
complaint, as it is required by statute to evaluate teaching permit applicants for good
moral character (demurrer); (2) Petitioner lacks standing and none of his claims are
ripe because he has not been denied a teaching permit (demurrer); (3) a writ of
mandamus or prohibition would be inappropriate as the Department has discretion
to determine whether applicants possess the good moral character required for a
teaching permit (demurrer); (4) Petitioner has not alleged any facts to support a claim
of gender discrimination (demurrer); and (5) failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Petitioner rejoins that there is a concrete injury in fact and damages pled
sufficiently to show standing. Petitioner further retorts that the clear right to
mandamus relief is sufficiently pled, Respondents fail to show that the law is clear
and certain, and there is no doubt that relief cannot be granted. Lastly, Petitioner
asserts that Respondents completely fail the demurrer standard.

                       Department’s Authority - Demurrer
             In his Complaint, Petitioner alleges “facial and as[-]applied challenges
to [the] [D]epartment’s policy, custom and practices, and the TIMS [q]uestions[.]”
Complaint ¶ 12. Specifically, Petitioner claims:

             The Department’s email to [Petitioner] by [] Steinhauser
             [sic], occurring on or about June 6, 2020[,] . . . that []
             [P]etitioner is to provide additional information but to not
             be specific of what to send. Then, suspend the application
             process and refer [] [P]etitioner to the [D]epartment’s
             chief counsel is an adjudication and act that crated [sic]
             concrete damages to [] [P]etitioner.

Complaint ¶ 17.        Finally, Petitioner avers: “The [Complaint] is for the
[D]epartment’s exceeding statutory authority under [] [S]ection[s] 111[] and 111.1

                                          11
of the [School Code] but not limited to these section[s] and law, when investigating
or revising an application for a teacher certification by the [D]epartment.”
Complaint ¶ 20.
             Respondents object, averring:

             [The Department] is statutorily required to evaluate the
             moral character of teacher’s [sic] permit applicants and is
             prohibited from granting a permit to any person who does
             not have “good moral character.” 22 Pa. Code § 49.12; 24
             P.S. § 12-1209. [The Department] requested information
             pertaining to Petitioner’s licensing complaint to fulfill its
             duty to evaluate his character under these statutes.

Respondents’ Prelim. Objs. ¶ 15. Petitioner rejoins: “This is nothing more than a
denial than [sic] admitting true the [C]omplaint to then show from the facts and law
it is certain and free of all doubt there can be no relief. In short, they neither argue
the motion standard no[r] sho[w] they meet [sic] it.” Petitioner’s Br. at 11-12.
             Respondents assert in their Reply Brief that Petitioner claims that the
law limits a background review to criminal and child abuse history and references
Sections 111 and 111.1 of the School Code. Respondents rejoin that, even if these
statutes were applicable to the Department, they expressly state that they do not limit
the information that can be requested of an applicant during a background review.
Respondents maintain that the Department is required to consider the whole of an
applicant’s moral character.
             Section 111 of the School Code mandates, in relevant part:

             (a.1) Beginning April 1, 2007, this section shall apply to
             all current and prospective employes of public and private
             schools, intermediate units and area career and technical
             schools, including, but not limited to, teachers, substitutes,
             janitors, cafeteria workers, independent contractors and
             their employes, except those employes and independent
             contractors and their employes who have no direct contact
             with children.

                                          12
             ....
             (b) Administrators of public and private schools,
             intermediate units and area career and technical
             schools shall require prospective employes to submit with
             their employment application, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. Ch.
             91 (relating to criminal history record information), a
             report of criminal history record information from the
             Pennsylvania State Police or a statement from the
             Pennsylvania State Police that the State Police central
             repository contains no such information relating to that
             person. Such report of criminal history record information
             shall be no more than five (5) years old. An applicant may
             submit a copy of the required information with the
             application for employment.          Administrators shall
             maintain a copy of the required information.
             Administrators shall require contractors to produce a
             report of criminal history record information for each
             prospective employe of such contractor prior to
             employment. A copy of the report of criminal history
             record information from the Pennsylvania State Police
             shall be made available to the applicant in a manner
             prescribed by the Department . . . .
             ....
             (f.2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
             interfere with the ability of a public or private school,
             intermediate unit or area career and technical school
             to make employment, discipline or termination
             decisions, provided that this subsection shall not be
             construed to conflict with subsection (e), (f.1) or (j)(6).

24 P.S. § 1-111 (emphasis added).
             Section 49.12 of the Department’s Regulations requires: “[E]very
professional employee certified or permitted to serve in the schools of this
Commonwealth shall . . . [b]e of good moral character.” 22 Pa. Code § 49.12.
Further, Section 1209 of the School Code mandates: “No teacher’s certificate shall
be granted to any person who . . . [d]oes not have a good moral character.” 24 P.S.
§ 12-1209.

                                         13
              This Court has explained:

              ‘Good moral character’ is defined, in part, as follows:
                   1. A pattern of behavior that is consistent with the
                   community’s current ethical standards and that
                   shows an absence of deceit or morally
                   reprehensible conduct . . . [.] 2[.] A pattern of
                   behavior conforming to a profession’s ethical
                   standards and showing an absence of moral
                   turpitude . . . [.] Good moral character is [usually]
                   a requirement of persons applying to practice a
                   profession such as law or medicine [. . . .]
              Black’s Law Dictionary 714 (8[th] ed. 2004). Case law
              provides an additional understanding of those terms in the
              specific context of licenses and similar interests.
              In Gombach v. Department of State, Bureau of
              Commissions, Elections and Legislation, 692 A.2d 1127
              (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), the [C]ourt defined the analogous
              ‘good moral character’ requirement in [S]ection 5 of the
              Notary Public Law[7] to require the absence of conduct or
              acts indicating moral turpitude, stating, our [C]ourts have
              defined moral turpitude as ‘anything done knowingly
              contrary to justice, honesty or good morals,’ Gombach[,
              692 A.2d] at 1130 (quoting Foote v. State Bd. of Vehicle
              Mfrs., Dealers [&] Salespersons, 578 A.2d 1355, 1357
              (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)).           See also Bowalick v.
              Commonwealth, 840 A.2d 519 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (an act
              [of] moral turpitude may consist of intentional, knowing
              or reckless conduct involving dishonesty, fraud or
              deception). Therefore, under Gombach and these similar
              cases, good moral character is demonstrated by the
              absence of conduct or acts done knowingly contrary to
              justice, honesty or good morals.

       7
         Act of August 21, 1953, P.L. 1323, as amended, formerly 57 P.S. § 151. Section 5 of the
Notary Public Law was repealed by Section 3(2)(ix) of the Act of October 9, 2013, P.L. 609,
effective October 26, 2017.
                                              14
Sehbai v. Bureau of Pro. & Occupational Affs., State Bd. of Med. (Pa. Cmwlth. No.
1743 C.D. 2016, filed Sept. 27, 2017), slip op. at 11 (footnote omitted).8
               Here, in answering the questions on the TIMS application regarding his
teacher’s certification, Petitioner referenced a licensing complaint, but stated that it
did not involve child abuse.

               On or about June 6, 2022[,] the [D]epartment by its
               employee [] Steinhauer sent to [Petitioner] an email to
               send additional documentation about a licensing
               complaint, which complaint did not concern[] child abuse,
               and is the only licensing matter against [] [P]etitioner in
               his near [30] years as an attorney. The mat[t]er[] is denied
               by [] Petitioner and explained to the [D]epartment upon
               the [D]epartment’[s] demand for a written and signed
               explanation.

Complaint ¶ 34 (emphasis added). This supplemental documentation request is the
basis for Petitioner’s entire action.           Clearly, any licensing complaint would
potentially reflect on whether Petitioner has “good moral character.” 22 Pa. Code §
49.12; 24 P.S. § 12-1209. Consequently, the Department was not only permitted to
request that Petitioner submit additional documentation (other than Petitioner’s own
explanation) regarding the licensing complaint, but it was statutorily required to do
so. Accordingly, the Department did not exceed its authority, and Petitioner “has
clearly failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.” Torres, 997 A.2d at
1245. Because “it [] appear[s] with certainty that the law will not permit recovery,”
id., Respondents’ first Preliminary Objection is sustained, and Petitioner’s
Complaint is dismissed.9

       8
          Unreported panel decisions of this Court may be cited for their persuasive value, but not
as binding precedent, pursuant to Rule 126(b)(1), Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1), and Section 414(a) of this
Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). Sehbai is cited for its persuasive
value.
        9
          Given the disposition of Respondents’ first Preliminary Objection, this Court need not
reach their remaining Preliminary Objections.

                                                15
                                   Conclusion
            For all of the above reasons, Petitioner’s Objection to Respondents’
Preliminary Objections is overruled, Petitioner’s Application to Strike is granted,
and Respondents’ first Preliminary Objection to Petitioner’s Complaint is sustained.
Petitioner’s Complaint is dismissed.

                                       _________________________________
                                       ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

                                        16
             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Brian Puricelli,                         :
                   Petitioner            :
                                         :
             v.                          :
                                         :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania             :
Department of Education (Division of     :
Certification Services) and              :
Alicia Steinhauer,                       :   No. 354 M.D. 2022
                    Respondents          :

                                    ORDER

             AND NOW, this 20th day of July, 2023, Brian Puricelli’s (Petitioner)
Preliminary Objection to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of
Education, Division of Certification Services’ and Alicia Steinhauer’s (collectively,
Respondents) is OVERRULED; Petitioner’s Application to Strike Respondents’
Brief in Support of their Preliminary Objections to Petitioner’s Petition for Review
in the nature of a Complaint for Writ of Prohibition, Mandamus, Injunctive and
Legal Relief (Complaint) is GRANTED; Respondents’ first Preliminary Objection
to Petitioner’s Complaint is SUSTAINED; and Petitioner’s Complaint is
DISMISSED.

                                       _________________________________
                                       ANNE E. COVEY, Judge