Court Opinion

ID: 9559604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:32:15.240993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:26.068600
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ,
dissenting:
The majority sanctions the use at trial of evidence procured as a result of a police search of Altman’s home. See maj. op. at 1173. In my view, an examination of the affidavit underlying the search warrant in this case reveals that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause. Furthermore, following our holding in People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260 (Colo.1994), I believe that the affidavit lacked sufficient indicia of probable cause to render reasonable the belief in the existence of probable cause. Because the majority holds that the officer’s reliance upon the warrant was objectively reasonable, and consequently approves the prosecution’s use of this evidence, I respectfully dissent.
I.
On July 7, 1994, members of the Fort Collins police department entered the home of Damian Altman and searched the premises. Conducted pursuant to a warrant, the search uncovered, among other things, marijuana, operating hydroponic growing equipment, psilocybin mushrooms and documents identifying the residence as Altman’s home.
The search warrant in this case was based on the affidavit of Fort Collins police officer Paul Landolt. The affidavit presented the following salient facts. On June 14, 1994, two agents of the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (the “DEA”) advised Landolt that two men purchased hydroponic growing equipment in Denver and transported it in a rental car to 508 Maple Street in Fort Collins. The car was rented to Robert Newman, and was observed parked in front of this residence. Two other cars registered to Newman were also observed in front of the residence. Landolt eventually learned that a person identifying himself as Newman claimed to live at the residence.
The affidavit also stated that Landolt had determined, through city utility records, that Atman resided at the residence, and that Atman had paid the utility bills for the residence since October of 1993. Landolt also learned that, since October of 1993, the electrical consumption at the home was two to *1174three times higher than the previous -resident’s usage for the same period. Landolt determined that no business was registered at the address in question. Landolt learned further that Altman had “prior contact” with Fort Collins police, and that there was an outstanding warrant for Altman’s arrest on misdemeanor charges. The affidavit did not identify the nature of these charges.
The affidavit set forth Landolt’s experience with controlled substance investigations. The affidavit also related Landolt’s belief that, because hydroponic growing equipment was “commonly used in the indoor cultivation of marijuana,” and because of the “excessive use of electrical power” at the residence, there was probable cause to believe that cultivation of marijuana was in progress at the residence. Based on the affidavit as described above, a magistrate issued the search warrant. Altman was charged with cultivation of marijuana and unlawful possession of a Schedule I controlled substance (psilocybin mushrooms).
After a hearing on Altman’s motion, to suppress the evidence before the same judge who issued the search warrant, the trial judge reversed his earlier probable cause decision. The judge determined that the facts set forth in the affidavit did not amount to probable cause, and thus the warrant should not have been issued. The judge ruled that the affidavit failed to provide a substantial basis for concluding that the search would uncover evidence of illegal activity. However, the trial judge did not suppress the evidence because he determined that the evidence was seized by the officer as a result of a good faith mistake regarding the validity of the warrant. See § 16-8-308, 6 C.R.S. (1997). Altman was subsequently convicted.
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court’s decision regarding the affidavit’s failure to establish probable cause. See People v. Altman, 940 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Colo.App.1996). The court of appeals did not believe, however, that the officer’s belief in the validity of the warrant was objectively reasonable because the affidavit “was so lacking in probable cause that the executing officer should have known that the search of defendant’s residence was illegal despite the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant.” Id. at 1014. Thus, the court of appeals reversed Altman’s convictions. I would'affirm.
II.
The resolution of this case ultimately turns upon whether a reasonable police officer would determine that the facts set forth in the affidavit establish probable cause to believe evidence of illegal activity would be found in Altman’s home. Therefore, I will first discuss the probable cause determination before turning to the reasonableness of the officer’s reliance upon the warrant.
A.
For purposes of both federal and state constitutional analysis, this court employs the probable cause standard announced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). See People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904, 907 (Colo.1986). Under this totality of the circumstances approach, a judge or magistrate examining an affidavit for probable cause should be guided by
a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
People v. Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d 658, 660 (Colo.1993) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317). Probable cause exists where the affidavit “alleges facts sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution” to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at the location to be searched. Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d at 660.
In reviewing a judge’s probable cause determination, we must give great deference to that determination. See Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1266. We must, however, ensure that the judge or magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. See id. With these principles in mind, I now turn to the question of whether the affidavit in this ease established probable cause to *1175believe that contraband or evidence of criminal activity would be found in Altman’» home.
B.
In essence, the affidavit alleged the following: (1) Altman delivered hydroponic growing equipment to his home, (2) Altman accomplished this delivery through the use of a roommate’s rental car, (3) the consumption of electricity at Altman’s home was unusually high, and (4) Altman had prior contact with the law, including an arrest warrant. Whether considered individually or collectively, these allegations do not provide a substantial, or even a reasonable, basis to believe that contraband or illegal activity would be found within Altman’s home.
Initially, I note, as did the court of appeals, that the affidavit did not contain a specific allegation of criminal activity. See Altman, 940 P.2d at 1012 (affidavit “did not contain facts, such as statements by informants, clearly indicating that [Altman] .was or might have been engaged in illegal drug activity”). For example, the affidavit did not allege, that an officer had personally sighted marijuana on the premises. See, e.g., People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Colo.1989); People v. McGill, 187 Colo. 65, 68, 528 P.2d 386, 388 (1974); People v. Oynes, 920 P.2d 880, 883 (Colo.App.1996). Moreover, the affidavit did not contain an informant’s tip that Altman was growing marijuana or other illegal substance on the premises. See, e.g., Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d at 659; People v. Quintana, 785 P.2d 934, 935 (Colo.1990); People v. Atley, 727 P.2d 376, 377 (Colo.1986); People v. McFall, 672 P.2d 534, 536 (Colo.1983); see also Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1263 (informant alleged “first-hand knowledge and eyewitness accounts” of defendant’s drug dealing).
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and this court have recognized that corroboration of noncriminal behavior may support a finding of 'probable cause. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317; Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1268. We have also held that “verification of these noncriminal facts alone would not, however, be sufficient to find probable cause.” Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d at 661. Rather, probable cause exists only when such verification is considered along with reliable information about the defendant’s illegal activities. See id.; Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1268 n. 10 (noting that noncriminal activity was only a part,of the basis for probable cause finding in Turcotte-Schaejfer); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 243-46, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (innocent behavior corroborated specific allegation of criminal activity); State v. Diamond, 628 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Me.1993) (“Gates cannot ... stand for the much broader proposition that an affidavit based solely on noncriminal behavior can support a showing of probable cause.”).
In this ease, the affidavit contained no facts directly implicating Altman’s residence in criminal activity. The majority contends, however, that hydroponic growing ‘equipment and abnormally high electrical usage are “inherently suspicious activities” that raise a inference of criminal activity within the residence. Maj. op. at 1171. As I explain below, even assuming that this contention is correct, it falls far short of the'probable cause standard.
Firstly, neither the purchase nor the use of hydroponic growing equipment is illegal. The equipment is used for the indoor cultivation of plants, including vegetables and other legal plants. That the equipment may also be used to further illegal ends does not transform it into contraband or an “inherently suspicious” item. Moreover, the abnormally high electrical use indicated nothing more than that Altman was perhaps using hydroponic equipment to grow something in the house.1 These indications alone cannot support probable cause to believe that Alt*1176man was engaged in illegal activity. As the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned in a case very similar to this one:
[T]he evidence must show a nexus between the home to be searched and the contraband sought. The contraband sought in this case was marijuana, not indoor growing equipment. The indoor growing equipment could be considered contraband only to the extent it was being used to grow marijuana. The nexus between the [defendants’] home and the probability of marijuana being found there was not supplied by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
State v. Lewis, 527 N.W.2d 658, 662 (N.D.1995).2
Secondly, both the federal and state constitutions prohibit the issuance of a search warrant except upon probable cause. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const., art. 2, § 7. As the majority correctly notes, “probable cause deals with probabilities, not certainties.” Maj. op. at 1171. However, suspicion, "without more, does not amount to probable cause to search. An affidavit in support of a search warrant must establish the probability of finding contraband or criminal activity, not merely the possibility. See State v. Carter, 316 Or. 6, 848 P.2d 599, 603 (1993) (“Probable cause is necessary to support a warrant, not merely one possibility, among many.”).
In this ease, not only did the affidavit lack a specific and reliable allegation of drug related behavior, but, according to the affiant, the affidavit’s crucial allegations were the transport of the hydroponic equipment and the increased electrical usage. These activities, as well as the use of a rental car, are just as consistent with legal behavior as with illegal behavior. “A fact that merely supports an inference that some other fact is possible — as one among the range of many other and different possibilities — does not support an inference that any specific one of the possible facts is itself probable.” Id. 848 P.2d at 602. Accordingly, although the cultivation of marijuana is one possible explanation for the purchase of the hydroponic equipment and high electric bills, it is not a probable one absent other significant facts implying illegal activity.
Thirdly, my research has uncovered no case in which a showing of probable cause was upheld on facts as bare as those alleged in this ease. This result is hardly surprising in light of the preceding discussion of the standards for probable cause. To illustrate, the majority cites several cases in support of its assertion that hydroponic growing equipment and excessive electrical use are “inherently suspicious activities known to indicate indoor marijuana cultivation.” See maj. op. at 1171. In none of these case do these “suspicious activities” form the sole basis for a probable cause determination. In all of these cases, the affidavit supplied additional vital information implicating the defendant in marijuana possession or cultivation. See Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d at 659 (tip from reliable informant that he had purchased marijuana at defendant’s home); Quintana, 785 P.2d at 935-36 (reliable and detailed tip regarding defendant’s marijuana cultivation); People v. Dunkin, 888 P.2d 305, 309 (Colo.App.1994) (daily one-hour visits to apparently unoccupied house with covered windows); People v. Wilson, 819 P.2d 510, 514 (Colo.App.1991) (frequent visits to and from an office not used for any legitimate business, strange odor emanating from office, condensation on covered windows); see also United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir.1995) (purchase of growing equipment with cashier’s cheek for over $7000, defendant resided at expensive house but paid no state income tax, overhead thermal imaging equipment detected heat surges in suspicious areas of house); State v. Miller, 815 S.W.2d 28, 30-31 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (residence guard*1177ed by large dogs which were typical of marijuana growers, tip from DEA similar to tips which resulted in discovery of criminal activity in large percentage of Missouri cases).
In contrast, the affidavit in this case contains no additional vital information connecting Altman with marijuana possession or cultivation. The affidavit’s reference to Altman’s prior contact with police and his outstanding arrest warrant on misdemeanor charges did not supply this connection. As the court of appeals explained, “The affidavit did not explain the nature of the charges and did not contain any information implicating the defendant in previous illegal activity related to the possession, cultivation, or sale of drugs.” Altman, 940 P.2d at 1012-13. Furthermore, Altman’s use of a rental car to transport the growing equipment provided no connection to illegal drug activity, especially in light of the fact that Altman had no apparent car of his own.
Thus, the affidavit failed to supply a substantial basis to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found at Altman’s home. The degree of suspicion surrounding the noncriminal behavior alleged in the affidavit did not rise to the level of probable cause to search. Accordingly, thé tidal court and the court of appeals' wére correct in ruling that the affidavit failed to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant in this case.
III.
Our inquiry does not end upon determining that the affidavit underlying the search warrant failed to establish probable cause; The Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained pursuant to a defective search warrant should not be suppressed if the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s determination as to the existence of probable cause was “objectively reasonable.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984); see also Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1269. The Supreme Court has also held, however, that an officer cannot manifest objective good faith if the affidavit is “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (citations omitted). An affidavit so deficient is known as a “bare bones” affidavit. See id. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405.
One test for a bare bones affidavit is “whether the affidavit was sufficient to ‘create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause.’ ” United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 139 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405); see Diamond, 628 A.2d at 1034; see also Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1269 (a bare bones affidavit is “so lacking in probable cause that [the officer] knew, or should have known, that the search was illegal”). Colorado also has a statutory good-faith exception in the form of section 16-3-308, 6 C.R.S. (1997). Section 16-3-308 requires an ' objective standard substantially similar to the reasonableness requirement described in Leon. See Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1272.
In Leftwich, we discussed the relationship between the Gates probable cause standard and the Leon good faith exception, especially with respect to a bare bones affidavit. See id. at 1269-72. We noted that the totality of the circumstances test announced in Gates requires a reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause to search. See Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1271 n. 12. Thus, probable cause is lacking where the affidavit is so devoid of incriminating facts as to prevent a “practical, common-sense” determination that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the" place to be searched. See id. at 1265.
Given that the standard for probable cause depends upon whether a belief in the existence of probable cause is objectively reasonable, we explained the extensive overlap between the Gates test and the Leon good faith test. See Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1271 n. 12. We noted, “ ‘Because the standards overlap so completely, it is unlikely that a warrant could, be found invalid under Gates and yet the police reliance upon it could be seen as objectively reasonable.’ ” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 958-59, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Accordingly, we concluded that “in the vast majority of cases, if a court applies Gates and ascertains that a substantial basis for determining probable cause did *1178not exist, the court will reach the conclusion that the officer unreasonably relied on the affidavit.” Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1271 n. 12 (emphasis supplied).
Thus, we are presented with the following question: does this case fall into that minute category of cases where the affidavit failed to provide a substantial basis for determining-probable cause yet the officer’s reliance upon the affidavit was reasonable? In other words, does this case reflect “objectively reasonable reliance upon an objectively unreasonable warrant?” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 968-59, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). I would answer these questions in the negative.
As the discussion in Part II of this opinion demonstrates, this affidavit fell far short of establishing probable cause to search. At the very most, the affidavit established a suspicion that Altman’s home contained contraband or evidence of a crime. The affidavit lacked specific allegations that Altman was currently or previously engaged in illegal drug activity and it lacked facts indicating that a search of his residence was likely to uncover contraband. Because this was an archetypal bare bones affidavit, no police officer could reasonably rely upon this warrant.
The majority’s conclusion that Officer Lan-dolt’s reliance upon this warrant was reasonable is grounded in one of two theories. First, the majority may mean that reliance upon this affidavit was reasonable because the situation described by this affidavit is just a fact or two away from establishing probable cause. However, this cannot be the standard for good faith reliance upon a search warrant. If the purpose behind the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, see Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405, we cannot interpret the good faith exception to permit a search by police where the officer knows or should know that he or she is a just a few facts away from having probable cause to search. To give effect to the protections of the Fourth Amendment, we must insist that police officers either find the few additional, but vital, facts necessary to support a search, or else refrain from conducting a search. Otherwise, “the constitutional requirement that a search warrant only issue upon probable cause becomes a nullity.” Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1268.
Alternatively, the majority sanctions the officer’s reliance upon the warrant on the theory that reasonable minds may disagree about whether the particular facts in this affidavit alone establish probable cause. This assertion is simply incorrect. There is no precedent for a showing of probable cause on facts as sparse as these. See discussion supra Part II.B. Every like case in which a court has upheld a probable cause determination has contained significant additional facts that are absent from this affidavit.
Furthermore, a number of courts that have examined affidavits containing more incriminating facts than are found in this case have held the Leon good faith exception inapplicable. For example, the North Dakota Supreme Court in Lewis not only rejected a showing of probable cause, but also rejected the claim that the officer reasonably relied upon the warrant. See Lewis, 527 N.W.2d at 663; see also discussion supra p. 9. The affidavit in that case described, in addition to the use of indoor growing equipment and excessive electrical use, windows covered with styrofoam and fiberglass, excess infrared heat emanating from the house, and an informant who spoke of a marijuana cultivation operation in the area. Yet, the Lewis court found that “[t]he implication of criminal activity in this ease is simply too weak and tenuous to make it objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on the warrant.” Lewis, 527 N.W.2d at 663.
Similarly, in State v. Huft, the Washington Supreme Court refused to find good faith reliance upon a defective search warrant. 106 Wash.2d 206, 720 P.2d 838, 841 (1986). In that case, the affidavit contained allegations from an informant that the defendant was growing marijuana in his basement, information about excessive electrical use, and an officer’s observation of an unusually bright light emanating from the basement. See id. 720 P.2d at 839. After rejecting a showing of probable cause, the court concluded that “the affidavit in support of the probable cause was no more than a ‘bare bones’ affidavit and was invalid. Quality of information, not quantity, is what establishes proba*1179ble cause.” Id. at 841; see also Diamond, 628 A.2d at 1034 (officer’s reliance upon affidavit that alleged only noncriminal behavior was not objectively reasonable).
Consequently, it is clear that the facts alleged by the affidavit in this case would not “create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405. This point is further illustrated by the fact that every judicial officer who has reflected upon this case has reached this conclusion.3 Moreover, because the Leon test “requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits,” id. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 3405, these sparse facts would not lead a reasonable police officer to conclude that probable cause existed.4 The only reasonable conclusion that flows from these facts is that, the affidavit did not provide a substantial basis for a belief in the existence of probable cause.
Because the affidavit in this case was largely devoid of indicia of probable cause, I would hold that this case does not belong to the very small category of eases, described by Lefkvich, where the Leon good faith doctrine applies. Therefore, reliance upon the affidavit underlying the search warrant was objectively unreasonable.- Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
TV.
To summarize, the affidavit in this case failed to establish probable cause to search Altman’s home. Moreover, the affidavit did not contain sufficient facts to render reasonable -a belief in the existence of probable cause. Thus, the police search of Altman’s home was illegal, and the product of that search should have been suppressed at trial. Because the majority’s holding approves of the use of this evidence to convict Altman, I respectfully dissent.
MULLARKEY and BENDER, JJ., join in the dissent.

. I take care to use "perhaps” here because we cannot conclude, solely from the electrical records in this case, that Altman was using the hydroponic equipment that he delivered to his home. The electrical bills uncovered by Landolt showed that the electrical usage was abnormally high at the house beginning in October of 1993. Altman did not acquire this hydroponic equipment until June 13, 1994. The police searched his home on July 7, 1994. Clearly, the excessive electrical use at the house reported by Officer Landolt did not result from the use of this equipment. My broader point is that, even assuming that this equipment did occasion the electrical use, these facts alone do not give rise to probable cause to believe that marijuana cultivation is occurring on the premises.

. Thus, the court held that the affidavit underlying the search warrant failed to establish probable cause. See id. at 663. Significantly, the affidavit in that case set forth considerably more facts than the affidavit in this case. To illustrate, the affidavit in Lewis alleged (1) defendants purchased indoor growing equipment, (2) the residence emitted excessive infrared heat, (3) high electrical use, (4) the windows were covered with styrofoam and fiberglass, and (5) an informant knew of a marijuana growing operation in the area. See id. at 661. The North Dakota Supreme Court has also rejected a finding of probable cause in another marijuana cultivation case whose facts do not materially differ from those in Lewis. See State v. Ennen, 496 N.W.2d 46 (N.D.1993).

. The majority suggests that these facts present a close case of probable caúse because the judge who issued the warrant initially believed probable cause existed, and then reversed his decision “upon further review.” Maj. op. at 1168. First of all, as the majority concedes, "the fact that a magistrate acted favorably upon a warrant request is of no moment in the determination of whether the officer acted with objective reasonableness.” Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1269 n. 11; see maj. op. at 1169 n. 3. Secondly, the fact that the issuing judge reversed his initial probable cause finding implies nothing more than that the judge ultimately found probable cause lacking. If, however, one is inclined to draw inferences from the judge's reversal of his previous decision, one may infer from this reversal that the affidavit was so devoid of probable cause that the issuing judge thought it necessary to publicly disagree with himself even though he believed the product of the search was admissible for other reasons.

. As the Leon court noted, " ‘[T]he requirement that the officer act in "good faith” is inconsistent . with closing one's mind to the possibility of illegality.’ 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 Mich.L.Rev. 1319, 1413 (1977)).