Court Opinion

ID: 9882532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:16.577689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:11.943592
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Gibbs v. Mark Porter Autoplex, Inc., 2023-Ohio-3460.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      MEIGS COUNTY

Dianna L. Gibbs,                                   :       Case No. 23CA3

  Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,              :

        v.                                         :       DECISION AND
                                                           JUDGMENT ENTRY
Mark Porter Autoplex, Inc., et al.,                :

  Defendants-Appellees-                            :       RELEASED 9/25/2023
  Cross-Appellants.

______________________________________________________________________
                            APPEARANCES:

Jeffrey L. Finley, Esq., Finley & Eachus, Attorneys at Law, Gallipolis, Ohio, for
appellant/cross-appellee.

Trent M. Thacker, Cury Roby, LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for appellees/cross-appellants.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.

        {¶1}     Dianna L. Gibbs appeals and Mark Porter Autoplex, Inc., Mark Porter

Autogroup, Inc.,1 and Porter Pomeroy, LLC (collectively, “appellees”) cross-appeal from

a judgment of the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas granting the appellees’ motion

for summary judgment in a negligence action. Gibbs presents one assignment of error

asserting that the trial court erred in granting the motion. For the reasons which follow,

we overrule her sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. This

decision renders moot the appellees’ cross-assignment of error, which asserts that the

trial court properly granted summary judgment but did so for the wrong reason.

1 Appellees refer to this party as Mark Porter Auto Group, Inc.   We refer to it using the spelling in the caption
of the complaint.
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                                     2

                           I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        {¶2}    In April 2022, Gibbs re-filed a complaint against the appellees.”2 The

complaint alleged that Porter Pomeroy, LLC, and Mark Porter Autoplex, Inc. “were in

control, possession, and/or were the owners” of real property in Pomeroy, Ohio, where

Mark Porter Autoplex, Inc., engaged in the business of buying and selling motor vehicles.

The complaint alleged that on or about June 17, 2018, Gibbs was their “lawful business

invitee,” and while traversing their sales lot, “was caused to encounter a dangerous area

in the pavement, which caused her to fall” and sustain “severe injuries.” The complaint

alleged that Porter Pomeroy, LLC, and Mark Porter Autoplex, Inc. knew about the

dangerous condition and design of the sales lot, that they failed to cure the condition or

warn lawful business invitees like Gibbs of it, and that Gibbs’ injuries were the direct and

proximate result of their negligence. The complaint did not make any specific allegations

against Mark Porter Autogroup, Inc.

        {¶3}    Depositions were taken of Gibbs, her husband, her son, and Robert Eck,

P.E., Ph.D. Gibbs testified that she went to the Mark Porter Chevy Buick GMC dealership

in Pomeroy, Ohio, with her husband and son because her husband wanted to look for a

new truck there. They arrived at the dealership around 2:00 or 2:30 p.m. Gibbs knew

before they arrived that the dealership would not be open because it was Sunday, so they

could not purchase a vehicle that day. However, she testified that the premises are

always open and that there are no gates or no trespassing signs. She drove up a road

2 The complaint also named as defendants an “unknown corporation” and “unknown limited liability
company” with unknown addresses. The record does not reflect that Gibbs obtained personal service on
these defendants within one year of filing her complaint; therefore, she did not commence an action against
them. See Stubbs v. Sybene Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 20CA9, 2021-Ohio-
3454, ¶ 12.
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                       3

on a hill, and there were trucks parked on both sides of the road, facing the road. She

turned around and started driving back down the hill, and her husband asked her to see

if there was a price on a specific truck. She stopped and walked to the driver’s side door

of the truck. She did not see a price, so her husband asked her to look on the passenger

side. She walked to the front of the truck, and from there, she looked for a price on the

passenger side. She “turned to come back,” took a step, her “right foot turned,” and she

fell, sustaining injury.

       {¶4}    Gibbs testified that the area where the trucks were parked was slightly

higher than the road, that there was a slope between those areas, and that she believed

the slope caused her fall. She thought that when she “walked in front of the truck” and

“took that turn, there wasn’t enough room for [her] to take that step,” and her ankle “turned

on that slope.” Gibbs admitted she had to cross the slope to reach the elevated area

where the truck was. She testified that she did not notice the slope or change in elevation

at that time and “was focusing on the truck.” There was some space between the slope

and truck, and she was “pretty sure” she did not touch the slope when she went to look

at the passenger side of the truck. Gibbs testified that photographs marked as exhibits

accurately depicted the condition of the premises the day she fell except in some

photographs, some vehicles were further back than they were the day she fell. She

testified that the slope and surrounding area was the color of concrete, and there was no

warning paint, yellow striping, or reflectors to warn of the elevation change. However,

she testified that it was a sunny day, that there had been no recent precipitation, that the

slope was not slick, and that nothing was covering the slope.
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                           4

       {¶5}   During Gibbs’ first deposition, appellees’ counsel asked if Gibbs believed

she would have seen the slope if she looked down. Gibbs’ counsel objected and stated,

“That’s speculation. You can answer.” Gibbs testified, “Yeah. If I looked down I would

have probably seen it.” During Gibbs’ second deposition, appellees’ counsel asked, “Do

you remember your last deposition, I don’t want to misquote you, but I believe you told

me that if you had been looking down, you think you would have seen the slope, correct?

Gibbs testified, “Yeah, if I was looking down.”

       {¶6}   Gibbs’ husband and son did actually not witness her fall but observed the

area where the fall occurred. Gibbs’ husband testified that from inside a vehicle it was

“kind of hard to see, like, a roll like that. It looked like there wasn’t really a clash. It just

looked like it was all together. Your concrete was just, kind of from a distance it looked

more level. You didn’t really notice that slope, that roll. You didn’t notice it.” When asked,

“What about when you’re close up to it? Are you able to appreciate the difference when

you look at it?” he testified, “Well, you might if you was [sic] looking down at it. But if you

was [sic] looking at the wheel of the truck or the hood or trying to see the years, you

wasn’t [sic] really paying any attention to it. Because there was nothing there to bring

your attention to [sic].” Gibbs’ son testified that initially he was not able to see the slope,

but once he got closer to it, he could see the change in elevation.

       {¶7}   Dr. Eck testified that that he has a Ph.D. in civil engineering with a

specialization in transportation engineering. Dr. Eck created a report setting forth his

opinions, which was marked as an exhibit, and appellees’ counsel questioned him

regarding it. Among other things, the report includes four “Figures,” i.e., photographs of

the premises, and the following statements:
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                       5

     -   “[I]t is clear that this ‘curb’ was not installed for pedestrian use but rather
         was put in for the convenience of driving vehicles off of and onto the
         display areas.”

     -   “The curb face at issue is too steep to walk on. The defendants compare
         the curb face to a curb ramp at intersection [sic]. This is a false and
         misleading comparison since the curb face at issue does not come close
         to meeting relevant accessibility criteria. The curb face is not a ‘walking
         surface.’ ”

     -   “[A]s shown in Figure 1, the condition is deceptive since the vehicle
         travel way, the rolled curb itself, and the vehicle display area are all the
         same uniform concrete gray color. Thus, it is extremely difficult to
         distinguish one surface from another and particularly difficult to
         determine the slope of the curb.”

     -   “[A]s illustrated in Figure 2, there is no distinctive color or texture
         difference to alert customers to the existence or location of the steeply
         sloping curb (single step). Figure 3 illustrates that due to the lack of
         contrast, neither the height nor the steepness of the curb can be
         perceived from above.”

     -   “My site inspection and photographs such as Figure 4 indicated that the
         slope of the rolled curb is variable, that is, it is not uniform. The fact that
         the steepness of the curb varies along its length further complicates the
         pedestrian detection process.”

     -   “There were no cues to emphasize the nature and location of the
         steeply-sloped curb and to draw attention to it.            Under these
         circumstances, it is foreseeable that pedestrians will not detect the curb
         and that fall incidents will occur.”

     -   “A different color and/or texture should have been used for the steeply
         sloped curb to make it conspicuous (and distinguishable from the other
         surfaces) to pedestrians.”

     -   “The excessively steep, difficult-to-detect elevation change between the
         vehicle travel way and the vehicle display area is not appropriate for car
         dealerships where visitors include a wide range of people * * * with
         varying physical characteristics and footwear, including those who are
         not familiar with the facility.”

     -   “The fall in question was a direct result of the lack of adequate design,
         construction, inspection and maintenance of the interface between the
         vehicle travel way and the vehicle display area at this dealership, in
         contravention of accepted safety standards and practices.”
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                        6

       -   “Had the dealership used one or more of the safeguards described
           herein, in all likelihood this fall would not have occurred.”

Dr. Eck acknowledged that he is not a legal expert, was not testifying about what legal

duty the appellees’ owed, did not know the legal standard in Ohio for determining whether

something is open and obvious, and was not offering an opinion on that topic. Additional

photographs of the premises were marked as exhibits during Dr. Eck’s deposition.

       {¶8}   The appellees moved for summary judgment. They asserted that Gibbs

was a licensee, so their only duty was to refrain from willfully or wantonly causing her

injury, and there was no evidence that they willfully or wantonly caused Gibbs injury.

Alternatively, they asserted that even if Gibbs was an invitee, they had no duty to her for

two reasons: (1) “the alleged danger of the slope was open and obvious,” and (2) Gibbs

had “constructive knowledge” of it. The appellees also asserted that Mark Porter

Autogroup, Inc. was not a proper party and should be dismissed because it did not own

or operate the premises—Porter Pomeroy, LLC, owned it, and Mark Porter Autoplex, Inc.,

operated it. Gibbs agreed that Mark Porter Autogroup, Inc., was not a proper party and

should be dismissed but opposed a grant of summary judgment to Porter Pomeroy, LLC,

and Mark Porter Autoplex, Inc.

       {¶9}   The trial court issued an entry on the motion for summary judgment stating

that it had “considered arguments of the parties, affidavits, and transcripts of depositions.”

The court dismissed Mark Porter Autogroup, Inc. “[p]er agreement of the parties” and

granted the summary judgment motion. The court found Gibbs was an invitee but

explained “[t]here is no duty to protect business invitees from hazards which are obvious
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                     7

and apparent and hazards which are reasonably expected to be discovered by the

invitee.” The court stated:

               The depositions made it clear that the areas and changing levels of
       elevations where Plaintiff traversed around a truck were open and obvious.
       There was nothing obstructing the view of the change of elevations when
       Plaintiff decided to get off the concrete roadway path area of the lot and to
       move up the curve to get a closer look at the vehicle; where those vehicles
       were parked at the raised elevation. The condition of the ground and
       changes in elevation around the truck was [sic] open and obvious and
       therefore no duty of care was breached by Defendants. The Plaintiff
       successfully negotiated the raised curve while initially stepping up to look at
       the truck. It was not reasonably foreseeable that the same person, who
       saw the curve and stepped up, would not also see the curve when it
       becomes necessary to step down. A review of the depositions and exhibits
       cause the Court to find that there was nothing hidden or latently dangerous
       in the area around the truck being viewed by Plaintiff.

              The testimony and photos demonstrated that the curve was not
       unreasonably dangerous, hidden or concealed and was discoverable by
       ordinary inspection. The curve or changing of elevation was open and
       obvious. Plaintiff had responsibility to exercise due care herself while
       walking in the area with the open and obvious curve and rise of elevation.

This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

                              II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶10} Gibbs presents one assignment of error:

       The trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

       A. The trial court erred in de facto failing to consider and address the
          deposition testimony of Plaintiff’s expert witness Ronald W. Eck.

       B. The trial court erred in finding that the open and obvious doctrine applies
          to this case.

       {¶11} The appellees present one cross-assignment of error:

       Although the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
       Appellees/Cross-Appellants * * *, the trial court erred in finding Cross-
       Appellee to be an invitee instead of a licensee. By incorrectly classifying
       Cross-Appellee as an invitee when she was a licensee, the trial court erred
       in needing to reach the decision as to whether the alleged hazard was open
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                            8

       and obvious. Instead, the trial court should have determined no willful or
       wanton misconduct led to Cross-Appellee’s injury and entered summary
       judgment in favor of Cross-Appellants.

                                  III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

                                    A. Standard of Review

       {¶12} We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment de

novo. Harter v. Chillicothe Long-Term Care, Inc., 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3277, 2012-

Ohio-2464, ¶ 12. We afford no deference to the trial court’s decision but rather conduct

an independent review to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Id. “A

summary judgment is appropriate only when: (1) there is no genuine issue of material

fact; (2) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion when viewing the evidence in

favor of the nonmoving party, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party; and

(3) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hawk v. Menasha

Packaging, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2966, 2008-Ohio-483, ¶ 6.

       {¶13} “The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to

demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that they are entitled to

judgment in their favor as a matter of law.” DeepRock Disposal Solutions, LLC v. Forté

Prods., LLC, 4th Dist. Washington No. 20CA15, 2021-Ohio-1436, ¶ 68. “To meet its

burden, the moving party must specifically refer to ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written

stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action,’ that affirmatively demonstrate that the

nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claims.” Id., quoting

Civ.R. 56(C). “Once that burden is met, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden

to set forth specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                       9

                          B. Consideration of Expert Testimony

       {¶14} Gibbs contends the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment

motion because it “erred in de facto failing to consider and address the deposition

testimony” of Dr. Eck. Gibbs maintains that “[i]t is beyond dispute that Dr. Eck is qualified

to give an expert opinion in this case and that the [t]rial [c]ourt should have given

significant weight to Dr. Eck’s opinion.” She acknowledges that the trial court’s summary

judgment entry states that the court considered “transcripts of depositions.” However,

Gibbs asserts that the trial court did not actually take Dr. Eck’s opinions into account. She

emphasizes that the court’s entry “does not specifically mention Dr. Eck’s deposition at

all,” “quote or reference any section of Dr. Eck’s deposition,” or use the word “expert.”

Gibbs cites various portions of Dr. Eck’s report and deposition testimony and asserts that

she presented “overwhelming evidence” that the appellees “were responsible for the

hazardous condition” that caused her fall.       She claims there “is no question” she

presented expert testimony which the trial court had to accept as true, which pertained to

the appellees’ liability, and “therefore raised a genuine issue of material fact that

precluded summary judgment in” the appellees’ favor. Thus, she asserts the trial court

“appears to have ignored or disregarded Dr. Eck’s opinions and testimony” and erred in

granting the appellees’ summary judgment.

       {¶15} “Civ.R. 56(C) places a mandatory duty on a trial court to thoroughly examine

all appropriate materials filed by the parties before ruling on a motion for summary

judgment. The failure of a trial court to comply with this requirement constitutes reversible

error.” Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992), paragraph

one of the syllabus. “Thus, when a deposition is properly filed with the trial court, the
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                      10

court must actually read it.” Hudson v. Hapner, 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA2, 2016-Ohio-

1347, ¶ 22. “Accordingly, when ‘a court has failed to consider a deposition properly before

it in rendering summary judgment it commits error which is, per se, prejudicial and renders

the judgment erroneous as a matter of law.’ ”          Id., quoting Kramer v. Brookwood

Retirement Community, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-920182, 1993 WL 293413, *2 (Aug. 4,

1993).

         {¶16} “ ‘Trial court proceedings generally enjoy a presumption of correctness and

an appellant has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.’ ” State v. Smith, 4th Dist.

Gallia Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4, 2023-Ohio-681, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Pettygrove, 4th Dist.

Adams No. 12CA941, 2013-Ohio-1062, ¶ 7. The trial court’s summary judgment entry

explicitly states that the court considered “transcripts of depositions.” The fact that the

court did not specifically mention Dr. Eck’s deposition does not prove the court did not

consider it. In addition, even if we agreed with Gibbs that Dr. Eck’s testimony raised a

genuine issue of material fact which precluded summary judgment in the appellees’ favor,

that also would not prove the court simply failed to consider his testimony. Gibbs has not

affirmatively demonstrated that the trial court failed to consider Dr. Eck’s deposition

testimony. Contrast with Murphy at 359-360 (trial court made statement indicating it “did

not conduct even a cursory review” of the depositions before ruling on summary judgment

motion, and Supreme Court of Ohio remanded to trial court “to conduct a conscientious

examination of the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate”);

Hudson at ¶ 23-24 (reversing summary judgment where it did not appear trial court

considered all the depositions because the court made statements indicating it could not

consider uncited parts of depositions, and the court specifically stated that it had reviewed
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                       11

certain documents but did not state that it had reviewed the depositions). Thus, we reject

Gibbs’ contention that the trial court erred in de facto failing to consider and address Dr.

Eck’s deposition testimony.

                    C. Application of the Open and Obvious Doctrine

       {¶17} Gibbs also contends that the trial court erred in granting the summary

judgment motion because it “erred in finding that the open and obvious doctrine applies

to this case.” Gibbs asserts that Dr. Eck “presented attendant circumstances that allow

reasonable minds to differ with respect to whether the dangerous condition on [the] car

lot was open and obvious.” Gibbs directs our attention to Dr. Eck’s opinions that the curb

was not installed for pedestrian use, that the curb face does not meet relevant

accessibility criteria, that the curb face is not a walking surface, that the uniform concrete

gray color makes it “extremely difficult to distinguish one surface from another” and

“determine the slope of the curb,” that the height and steepness of the curb cannot be

perceived from above due to the lack of color contrast, and that “it is foreseeable that

pedestrians will not detect the curb and that fall incidents will occur” because there “were

no cues to emphasize the nature and location of the steeply-sloped curb and to draw

attention to it.” She asserts that “Dr. Eck’s deposition testimony and opinion letter are

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the condition on

[the] property that caused [her] to fall was open and obvious.” Therefore, she asserts the

trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment.

                                    1. Legal Principles

       {¶18} “ ‘A successful negligence action requires a plaintiff to establish that: (1) the

defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached the duty of care;
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                      12

and (3) as a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s breach, the plaintiff suffered

injury.’ ” Stubbs v. Sybene Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., 4th Dist. Lawrence No.

20CA9, 2021-Ohio-3454, ¶ 16, quoting Allen v. Rankin, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 12CA10,

2013-Ohio-456, ¶ 21. “ ‘In a premises liability case, the relationship between the owner

or occupier of the premises and the injured party determines the duty owed.’ ” Id. at ¶ 17,

quoting Allen at ¶ 22.    “Ohio ascribes to the common-law classifications of invitee,

licensee, and trespasser in cases of premises liability which determines the standard of

care owed to the individual.” Wise v. E. Hall Funeral Home, Inc., 4th Dist. Lawrence No.

21CA6, 2022-Ohio-394, ¶ 13, citing Shump v. First Continental-Robinwood Assocs., 71

Ohio St.3d 414, 417, 644 N.E.2d 291 (1994).

       {¶19} The trial court found that Gibbs was an invitee. “A person ‘who rightfully

come[s] upon the premises of another by invitation, express or implied, for some purpose

which is beneficial to the owner’ is an ‘invitee.’ ” (Alteration sic.) Id., quoting Gladon v.

Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St. 3d 312, 315, 662 N.E.2d 287

(1996). “ ‘A landowner owes an invitee the duty to “exercise ordinary care to render the

premises reasonably safe.” ’ ” Id., quoting Combs v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources,

146 Ohio St.3d 271, 2016-Ohio-1565, 55 N.E.3d 1073, ¶ 9, quoting Cincinnati Baseball

Club Co. v. Eno, 112 Ohio St. 175, 147 N.E. 86 (1925), syllabus. “ ‘Keeping the premises

in a reasonably safe condition generally means that a premises owner (1) must not create

a dangerous condition on its premises, and (2) must warn its invitees of latent or

concealed dangers, if the premises owner has actual or constructive knowledge of those

dangers.’ ” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2013-Ohio-2684, 993 N.E.2d

808, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.).
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                         13

       {¶20} However, “landowners are not insurers of their invitees’ safety.” Wright v.

Williamsport, 2019-Ohio-2682, 140 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.). “Invitees are expected * *

* to take reasonable precautions to avoid dangers that are patent or obvious.” Id., citing

Brinkman v. Ross, 68 Ohio St.3d 82, 84, 623 N.E.2d 1175 (1993). “Where a danger is

open and obvious, a landowner owes no duty of care to individuals lawfully on the

premises.” Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d

1088, syllabus.

       {¶21} The rationale underlying the open and obvious doctrine is “ ‘that the open

and obvious nature of the hazard itself serves as a warning. Thus, the owner or occupier

may reasonably expect that persons entering the premises will discover those dangers

and take appropriate measures to protect themselves.’ ” Id. at ¶ 5, quoting Simmers v.

Bentley Constr. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 597 N.E.2d 504 (1992). “The fact that a

plaintiff was unreasonable in choosing to encounter the danger is not what relieves the

property owner of liability. Rather, it is the fact that the condition itself is so obvious that

it absolves the property owner from taking any further action to protect the plaintiff.” Id.

at ¶ 13.

       {¶22} “ ‘Open and obvious dangers are not hidden, are not concealed from view,

and are discoverable upon ordinary inspection.’ ” Wright at ¶ 29, quoting Zambo v. Tom-

Car Foods, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009619, 2010-Ohio-474, ¶ 8. “ ‘The determinative

issue is whether the condition is observable.’ ” Id., quoting Kirksey v. Summit Cty. Parking

Deck, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22755, 2005-Ohio-6742, ¶ 11. “[C]ourts that review whether

a danger is open and obvious employ ‘an objective, not subjective, standard.’ ” Id. at ¶

30, quoting Goode v. Mt. Gillion Baptist Church, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87876, 2006-
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                        14

Ohio-6936, ¶ 25. “[T]he question is whether a reasonable invitee would have discovered

the hazard.” Id. Therefore, “ ‘[a] person’s failure to notice an open and obvious condition

until after he or she fell does not vitiate the application of the doctrine.’ ” Wise, 4th Dist.

Lawrence No. 21CA6, 2022-Ohio-394, ¶ 26, quoting Breier v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 6th

Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1327, 2008-Ohio-6945, ¶ 11. And “ ‘ “[a] pedestrian’s failure to avoid

an obstruction because he or she did not look down is no excuse.” ’ ” Id., quoting Breier

at ¶ 11, quoting Lydic v. Lowe’s Cos., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-1432, 2002-Ohio-

5001, ¶ 16.

       {¶23} “In most situations, whether a danger is open and obvious presents a

question of law.” Tarlton v. Logan, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 19CA1, 2019-Ohio-4832, ¶ 23.

“Under certain circumstances, however, disputed facts may exist regarding the openness

and obviousness of a danger, thus rendering it a question of fact.” Id. “ ‘Although the

Supreme Court of Ohio has held that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the

court to decide, the issue of whether a hazardous condition is open and obvious may

present a genuine issue of fact for a jury to review.’ ” Id., quoting Klauss v. Marc

Glassman, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84799, 2005-Ohio-1306, ¶ 17. “ ‘Where only one

conclusion can be drawn from the established facts, the issue of whether a risk was open

and obvious may be decided by the court as a matter of law.’ ” Id., quoting Klauss at ¶

18. “ ‘However, where reasonable minds could differ with respect to whether a danger is

open and obvious, the obviousness of the risk is an issue for the jury to determine.’ ” Id.,

quoting Klauss at ¶ 18.

       {¶24} “ ‘Attendant circumstances,’ for example, may create a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether a hazard is open and obvious.” Id. at ¶ 24. “An attendant
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                                 15

circumstance is a factor that contributes to the fall and is beyond the injured person’s

control.” Id. “ ‘The phrase refers to all circumstances surrounding the event, such as time

and place, the environment or background of the event, and the conditions normally

existing that would unreasonably increase the normal risk of a harmful result of the event.’

” Id., quoting Cummin v. Image Mart, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-1284, 2004-Ohio-

2840, ¶ 8. The phrase has also been defined to encompass “ ‘any distraction that would

come to the attention of a pedestrian in the same circumstances and reduce the degree

of care an ordinary person would exercise at the time.’ ” Id., quoting McGuire v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 118 Ohio App.3d 494, 499, 693 N.E.2d 807 (1996). “Ordinarily, ‘the

attendant circumstance must be “an unusual circumstance of the property owner’s

making.” ’ ” Id., quoting Haller v. Meijer, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-290, 2012-

Ohio-670, ¶ 10, quoting McConnell v. Margello, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-1235, 2007-

Ohio-4860, ¶ 17.

                                             2. Analysis

       {¶25} Initially, we observe that the parties, trial court, and witnesses used a variety

of terms to describe the area where Gibbs testified that she fell; for the sake of simplicity,

we will refer to this area as the “curb” in our analysis. In this case, the appellees owed

no duty of care to Gibbs because the curb was open and obvious. Gibbs admitted nothing

obstructed her view of the curb prior to her fall, and had she been looking down, she

probably would have seen it.3 Her husband admitted one might be able to see the curb

if one got close to it and looked down. Gibbs’ son admitted that he saw the curb when he

3 Although Gibbs’ counsel objected during Gibbs’ first deposition when appellees’ counsel asked if Gibbs

believed she would have seen the slope if she had looked down, Gibbs does not address the objection in
her appellate brief, and Gibbs’ counsel did not object when appellees’ counsel inquired about the topic
during Gibbs’ second disposition.
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                      16

got closer to it. And in viewing the photographs, we find that as a matter of law, the curb

was visible to all persons entering and exiting the vehicle display area. See generally

Armstrong, 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d 1088, at ¶ 16 (plaintiff

admitted in deposition that nothing obstructed his view of a guardrail prior to his fall,

plaintiff admitted that he would have seen the guardrail if he had been looking down, and

“in viewing the photographs supplied by both parties,” Supreme Court of Ohio found “as

matter of law” that the guardrail “was visible to all persons entering and exiting” the

defendant’s store and thus “presented an open-and-obvious danger”). The curb was

observable even though it is harder to discern in some photographs due to the poor quality

of the images.    The curb was not hidden, was not concealed from view, and was

discoverable upon ordinary inspection.

       {¶26} Dr. Eck’s opinions did not preclude the trial court from applying the open

and obvious doctrine. We see no connection between the issue whether the curb was

open and obvious and Dr. Eck’s opinions that the curb was not installed for pedestrian

use, that the curb face does not meet relevant accessibility criteria, and that the curb face

is not a walking surface. Dr. Eck’s opinion that the uniform concrete gray color makes it

extremely difficult to distinguish one surface from another and determine the slope of the

curb and opinion that the height and steepness of the curb cannot be perceived from

above due to the lack of contrast do not create a genuine issue of material fact. Dr. Eck

specifically testified that he was not offering an opinion on whether the curb was open

and obvious. Moreover, the curb was open and obvious even if its exact height and slope

could not be determined. See generally Ryan v. Guan, 5th Dist. Licking No.

2003CA00110, 2004-Ohio-4032, ¶ 12 (“hazard presented by the slope was open and
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                      17

obvious, even though the exact degree of the slope was unknown,” because “[b]usiness

invitees entering the premises could ascertain the ramp was sloped”). Finally, even if, as

Dr. Eck opined, it is foreseeable that pedestrians will not detect the curb and fall due to a

lack of cues drawing attention to it, the foreseeability of falls is a separate issue from

whether the curb was open and obvious.

       {¶27} There is no genuine issue of material fact. When viewing the evidence in

favor of Gibbs, reasonable minds could only conclude that the curb was open and obvious

and that no attendant circumstances rendered it less than open and obvious. Thus, we

reject Gibbs’ contention that the trial court erred in finding that the open and obvious

doctrine applies to this case. We do not reach the argument raised by appellees that any

purported misapplication of the open and obvious doctrine is irrelevant because the grant

of summary judgment was supported by an alternate ground which Gibbs did not appeal.

                                      D. Conclusion

       {¶28} For the foregoing reasons, we reject Gibbs’ contention that the trial court

erred in granting the summary judgment motion because it erred in de facto failing to

consider and address Dr. Eck’s deposition testimony and erred in finding that the open

and obvious doctrine applies to this case. Because the curb was open and obvious, the

appellees had no duty to Gibbs, and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, we overrule Gibbs’ sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s

judgment. This decision renders moot the cross-assignment of error, so we do not

address it. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

                                                                  JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Meigs App. No. 23CA3                                                                   18

                                   JUDGMENT ENTRY

         It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.

         The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Meigs
County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

       Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date of
this entry.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                          For the Court

                                          BY: ________________________
                                              Michael D. Hess, Judge

                                 NOTICE TO COUNSEL

       Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.