Court Opinion

ID: 9570550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:24:10.353351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:36.857060
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice:
(concurring and dissenting).
I concur in remanding this case to the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the work incident aggravated a preexisting condition such as would warrant an award of compensation.1 However, I do not join the Court in adopting an “unexpected result” standard to be applied in determining the existence of a compensa-ble accident.
I do not believe that this Court has “misconstrued the historical and logical” definition of “by accident” in the bulk of its recent cases concerning the issue at bar. The majority’s reliance upon Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission2 is misplaced. The holding therein is without precedential value because it has been simply ignored.3 The only case in which this Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt v. Industrial Commission,4 which support is similarly without precedential value because it has also been ignored beginning with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler;5 the very next accident case handed down. In that case, the Court cited and relied upon Carling v. Industrial Commission6 and again defined “accident” as an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events. In my view, Purity Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberrations in our post-war case law.
The majority opinion holds that henceforth an injury by accident “is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of an injury.” (Emphasis in original.) However, the legislature, whose prerogative it is to establish policy, has chosen wording which precludes such an interpretation. The reasoning of Justice Latimer’s dissent in Puri*29ty Biscuit illustrates the shortcomings of the majority’s interpretation. The word “accident,” when viewed in isolation, may be used to denote both an unexpected occurrence which produces injury as well as an unexpected injury. The word “injury,” on the other hand, denotes a result and not a cause. Had the legislature only used the word “injury” in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., Supp.1986)), then that statute would cover all results regardless of the cause. Had the legislature only used the word “accident,” then I would agree with the majority’s holding today that the legislature intended to cover both the cause and the result. In fact, however, the legislature has used both words “injury” and “accident.” It follows that the word “accident” must be interpreted as focusing upon the cause and not the result. In short, the majority’s interpretation writes the word “injury” out of the statute. Such a decision is unwarranted in my view.
The legislature recently amended section 35-1-45,7 but chose to leave intact the standard which limits the payment of compensation to those injured “by accident arising out of or in the course of ... employment.” 8 Moreover, the singular “injury by accident” standard has not been altered or amended since its inception in 1917.9 The legislature thus being satisfied with the Court’s interpretation of the term “accident” in the long line of cases beginning with Carling v. Industrial Commission,10 I decline to embark upon a new effort to redefine that term.

. Powers v. Industrial Comm’n, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967).

. 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949).

. Emery Mining Corp. v. DeFriez, 694 P.2d 606 (Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Comm’n, 692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983); Sabo’s Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982); Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981); Farmer’s Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm’n, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969); Carling v. Industrial Comm’n, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965).

. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980).

. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980).

. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965).

. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1, 1984 Utah Laws 610, 610.

. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., Supp.1986).

. Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 52a, 1917 Utah Laws 306, 322-23.

. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965).