Court Opinion

ID: 9688875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:10:21.60836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:42.783383
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(to reverse). I concur in the result reached by my Brother Levin but do not agree that the discussion in the introductory matter or Sections I, II, and III of his opinion is necessary to reaching the proper result in this case.
As my Brother Levin notes, this Court stated less than three years ago in People v Martin, 386 Mich 407, 425; 192 NW2d 215 (1971):
"We conclude that a psychiatrist who conducts such a forensic psychiatric examination may not be called to testify in the criminal triál if there is an objection to the admission of such testimony by defendant.”
There is no need to consider whether this is a correct or incorrect interpretation of MCLA 767.27a(4); MSA 28.966(H)(4), inasmuch as in the instant case, as my Brother Levin points out, there is a clear waiver of the statute on the record. Defense counsel made specific reference to the Forensic Center competency diagnosis in the questioning of their own expert witness, Dr. Miller. The defense introduced a videotape of defendant’s sodium brevital examination at the Forensic Center. The defense introduced into evidence the Forensic Center file.
My Brother Levin contends that the waiver of the statute is not a waiver of the testimony of the psychiatrists in question because there is a "separate Martin -declared statutory right to prevent” such testimony. The Martin rationale is: There is only one statute and one statutory right. There is no "separate Martin -declared statutory right”.1 Without the statute there is no right; with the *219statute there is no reference to the competency transaction, and this includes reports, recommendations and examining psychiatrist or psychiatrists. As a consequence waiver of the statute waives all.
This finding of statutory waiver resolves this case and obviates the necessity of this Court reviewing the above analysis in Martin. I agree fully, therefore, with Section V of Justice Levin’s opinion on waiver. I would not, however, go further in obiter dicta to discuss aspects of this case involving constitutional issues where there is no necessity to do so.
Accordingly, I concur in my Brother Levin’s disposition of this case. The Court of Appeals is reversed; the defendant’s conviction is affirmed.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson and M. S. Coleman, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.

 Of interest is that defendant’s brief convincingly argues that the testimony of two psychiatrists in question cannot be disassociated from the statutorily prohibited report.

 Sandra Garland left home a few days before her death. She explained in a long note to her family her reasons for leaving. A college student, she wanted to be financially independent and live with friends near campus. She expressed love for her family and the belief that she would always be welcome at home.
Her father’s frantic search for her began immediately. He worked long hours from late afternoon to early morning and spent his days searching for Sandra. At least twice he visited the apartment house where Sandra was living, but he did not find her.
When his wife failed to persuade Sandra to return home, Garland put two handguns in his belt and a rifle in his car, and proceeded to his daughter’s apartment building. A flashlight in hand, he broke down the door of the apartment where Sandra was sleeping. When he saw a young man in bed with her, he drew the gun from his belt *220intending, he said, to strike him. Instead, the gun accidentally discharged, killing his daughter. Within minutes, three other people in the apartment had been shot. Garland then sought his daughter’s roommate but, unable to find her, he drove to a police station and made a full confession.