Court Opinion

ID: 9713554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:17:25.554322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.264611
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: The prosecutor, in cross-examining the defendant, used the form of question set forth in the majority opinion, saying, “Isn’t it a fact that * * In the course of that cross-examination, by his questions, the prosecutor asserted as true that (1) Detective Crowe told the defendant that he would be released from custody if he told all about “these burglaries” and (2) that Detective Crowe told the defendant that he would not be “charged with the other burglaries if he told about the car wash burglary, that he would riot be charged with anything else if he told about the car wash burglary” and, finally (3), the questioner asserted as a fact, in the form of a question, that the defendant told about everything else because he wanted “a pass” on everything. He told everything because he wanted the benefit of “a bargain.” It is the rule that such form of questioning is permissible, but such form is objectionable unless the asserted fact is true and known by the questioner to be true. If it was untrue, such tactic would be planting untruths by innuendo. As was stated in Payton, such method of interrogation is unobjectionable if done in good faith and if the examiner is prepared to back up the implications incorporated in his questions. I am not prepared to believe that the questioning was not done in good faith. Assuming, as we must, that the questioning was in good faith, then the matter asserted as true must be taken as true. It is manifestly unfair and contrary to a fair proceeding to have the State now deny that there was a bargain, to deny that there was a promise of leniency, to deny the existence of the motive for talking. Indeed to deny as true all that the prosecutor described as, “Isn’t it a fact that,” is manifestly unfair. The evidence of the defendant’s guilt in this case is rather overwhelming. In view of that fact, the unfairness used can be cured by vacating the enhanced penalty imposed because of the evidence of the numerous criminal activities other than the car wash burglary. Such enhanced penalty breached the bargain and this the State is precluded from doing. See Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495. I would vacate the sentence and remand for the imposition of a new sentence before a different judge since it seems unwise to ask that the trial judge who heard the evidence impose a new sentence and forget that which he heard in the prior proceeding.