Court Opinion

ID: 9743130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:26:05.646764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:39.559916
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Crampton, dissenting: I am constrained to dissent from the majority view. Plaintiff in error contends that the evidence fails to show that she actually received or aided in concealing any of the articles described in the indictment. The evidence shows conclusively that the dwelling house belonged to plaintiff in error and that she had resided therein for about eight years. While it appears that Lounsbury had free access to the premises, it does not appear that he was a tenant or had exclusive possession of, or control over, any part of the premises. Under such circumstances, plaintiff in error cannot escape responsibility for the presence of the stolen articles on her premises by claiming that they were in the possession of someone else. It is enough if the accused has control over the property even in the hands of the thief. (People v. Poncher, 358 Ill. 73.) Joint possession of stolen property with the thief has been held to be sufficiently exclusive to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property. People v. Calcione, 369 Ill. 154. The next contention of plaintiff in error is that the evidence fails to show that she had any knowledge that the articles found in her home had been stolen. The applicable rule was stated in the early case of Huggins v. People, 135 Ill. 243, at page 246, where it was said, “It rarely happens that direct and positive proof of the guilty knowledge is attainable, unless the thief be produced for that purpose. It is therefore, ordinarily, to be shown by proof of attending facts and circumstances, from which, by the common understanding and experience of men, the inference of the fact arises. Thus, numerous circumstances may be shown, as, that the purchase was for much less than the real value ; that the defendant denied that the property was in his possession, or concealed it; his failure to make reasonable explanation; the evil reputation of the person from whom purchased or received, and the like.” The evidence shows that plaintiff in error was well aware that Lounsbury had previously violated the laws of this State and was then on parole from the penitentiary. The fact that she then permitted Lounsbury to bring a variety of articles into her home, such as cash registers, typewriters, humidifiers, expensive radios, and the like, is' a circumstance to be taken into consideration in determining the question of her guilty knowledge. Her explanation that Lounsbury was engaged in the business of “swapping” secondhand personal property would have been more credible had it been made spontaneously to the police officers at the time of the search of her premises, rather than at the trial some months later. Another circumstance tending to show guilty knowledge oh the part of plaintiff in error was her explanation that the blanket in her bedroom covered an old Philco radio being repaired by Lounsbury, when in fact it covered a new, expensive console radio with the price tag still attached. The presence of other stolen articles on the premises together with the continuous close personal relationship between plaintiff in error and Lounsbury were also factors 'tending to show guilty knowledge. A careful- review of the facts and circumstances in evidence discloses no reversible error was committed by the admission in evidence of other stolen, property, because it was received from the same person as the property described in the indictment, which continuous dealing between the same parties tends to show guilty knowledge. People v. Niles, 300 Ill. 458; Lipsey v. People, 227 Ill. 364; People v. Kasallis, 385 Ill. 158. The judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County should be affirmed. Mr. Justice Simpson joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.