Court Opinion

ID: 9726390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:47:28.922787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.787634
License: Public Domain

BROOK, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Initially, I note that Indiana's various law enforcement agencies, not administrative agencies such as the BMV, are charged with enforcing Indiana Code Section 9-19-10-2 ("the seatbelt statute"). Accordingly, we owe no deference to the BMV. Indeed, "we conventionally construe penal statutes strictly against the State." Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind.2001).
The State was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Owen committed the charged infraction. See Ind.Code § 34-28-5-1(d) (defining burden of proof for infraction proceedings); Ind. Code § 9-19-10-8(a) (providing that person at least sixteen years of age who violates seatbelt statute commits a Class D infraction). The majority correctly observes that Indiana Code Section 9-13-2-123 exempts front seat occupants of "trucks" from the requirements of the seatbelt statute. Indiana Code Section 9-13-2-188(a) defines "truck" as "a motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property." The majority reiterates Owen's argument that his Blazer was designed primarily for transporting property but ultimately holds that "if an SUV owner has paid the fee for a truck plate, then by law he drives a truck that is specifically excluded from the seat-belt law." Op. at 778, In my view, the majority's holding is both conclusory and a departure from its own analysis.
*779Quite simply, a vehicle's license plate type is not dispositive of whether that vehicle is a "truck" for purposes of the seatbelt statute.3 The determinative question is whether the vehicle is "designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property." Ind.Code § 9-13-2-188(a). A follow-up question then arises: designed, used, or maintained by whom? Unfortunately, the statute is silent on this point..
As we explained in Fuller v. State, 752 N.E.2d 235 (Ind.Ct.App.2001),
A statute should be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute. In so doing, the objects and purposes of the statute in question must be considered as well as the effect and consequences of such interpretation. When interpreting the words of a single section of a statute, this court must construe them with due regard for all other sections of the act and with regard for the legislative intent to carry out the spirit and purpose of the act. We presume that the legislature intended its language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals. Statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme. Courts are not bound to adopt a construction that would lead to manifest absurdity in order that the strict letter of the statute may be adhered to. They will rather look to the intention of the legislature, as gathered from the import of the whole act, and will carry out such intention as thus obtained. Though penal laws are to receive a strict construction, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious or expressed intent of the legislature.
Id. at 237-38 (citations omitted).
The object and purpose of the seatbelt statute is to foster public safety by requiring front seat occupants of passenger motor vehicles to have their seatbelts "properly fastened about [their bodies] at all times when the vehicle is in forward motion." Ind.Code § 9-19-10-2. The State contends that
the determination of whether sport utility vehicles fall within the definition of trucks for purposes of the seatbelt laws is an objective determination that must be applied across the board. It cannot be a subjective determination based on a given individual's personal use of his vehicle. Either SUVs are trucks for the purposes of this law or they are not. To hold otherwise would place police in the difficult and unworkable position of having to investigate a given individual's personal use of his vehicle in order to determine whether he could be given a ticket for failing to wear his seatbelt. The legislature certainly did not intend to give individuals the ability to "opt out" of the seatbelt law simply by claiming that they used their vehicles primarily to transport property or equipment of some sort. If so, then the driver of a station wagon, minivan, or even a regular sedan could make the same argument that he is exempt from the seatbelt law based on the same type of evidence relied upon by [Owen].
*780Appellee's Br. at '/-8 (footnote omitted). I agree with the State's contention, but only to a certain point.
I do not believe that we may hold, as the State urges, that all vehicles labeled as SUVs are not "trucks" for purposes of the seatbelt statute. A manufacturer may label a vehicle as both a truck and an SUV, whereas a government agency may label it a station wagon, and a consumer may label it something else entirely.4 In short, labels are worthless in this regard, and courts must make an objective determination of whether a particular vehicle is designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property. In making this determination, courts should consider evidence of the manufacturer's intent with respect to the vehicle's design, use, and maintenance. Otherwise, as the State correctly observes, vehicle owners would be able to "opt out" of the seatbelt statute simply by designing, using, or maintaining their vehicles primarily for the transportation of property and thereby defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.
In the instant case, Owen points to the Blazer's four-wheel-drive capability, luggage carrier, front tow hooks, tow package, folding rear seats, and tailgate-mounted spare-tire carrier as evidence that it is designed primarily for the transportation of property. It is common knowledge that numerous sedans and station wagons boast many, if not most, of these features.5 Although these features obviously facilitate the transportation of property, in my view they are insufficient to establish that the Blazer is designed primarily for the transportation of property.6 Indeed, the Blazer's folding rear seats and other features indicate that Chevrolet's engineers designed it to transport either passengers or property (or both) at the owner's choosing.7
As for the Blazer's intended use and maintenance, I believe that its form is indicative of its function as a multipurpose transporter of both persons and property. In sum, I believe that the Blazer is not designed, used, or maintained primarily for the transportation of property and is therefore not a "truck" for purposes of the seatbelt statute. Consequently, I would affirm the trial court's finding that Owen violated the seatbelt statute.

. In fact, Owen's certificate of vehicle registration lists the Blazer's license plate type as "TK," or "Truck," and the vehicle type as "2W," or "2 Door Station Wagon." See Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2 (certificates of vehicle registration expiring July 31, 2000, and July 31, 2003); Indiana Registration Record Help, Plate Information and Vehicle Information (explaining codes for license plate and vehicle types), at http://www.in.gow/bmav/pre-mium/rr/help.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2003).

. On its website, Chevrolet classifies the current Blazer as an SUV, the Avalanche as both an SUV and a truck, and the 2003 SSR as both a truck and a car. 2004 Chevrolet.com, at http://www.chevrolet.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2003). These isolated examples of the latest trends in automotive marketing and design highlight the shortcomings of the seatbelt statute, as well as the folly of holding that all so-called SUVs are not "trucks" for purposes of the seatbelt statute.

. Admittedly, most sedans and station wagons are not equipped with a tailgate-mounted spare-tire carrier, but then neither are semitrailer or pickup "trucks."

. Owen's dictionary defines "primarily" as "1) Fundamentally, 2) Originally." Appellant's Br. at 7 (citing Merriam-Webster Dictionary 551 (3d ed.1974)). My dictionary defines the word somewhat differently: "1. At first; originally. 2. Chiefly; principally." Tar American Heritage Dictionary 983 (2nd college ed.1991).

. Owen also points to the "truck warranty" mentioned in the Chevrolet warranty guide and owner's manual as evidence that the Blazer was designed primarily for the transportation of property. Defendant's Exhibits 4 and 5. I fail to see how this puffery relates to the Blazer's actual design.