Court Opinion

ID: 9662766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:17:40.785362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:42.198114
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

MALONEY, Judge.
Appellee was indicted for aggravated perjury pursuant to Texas Penal Code Ann. § 37.03. Prior to trial, appellee filed a motion to determine the validity of the State’s evidence of materiality of the alleged false statements in the indictment and a motion to quash the indictment. The trial court conducted a pretrial hearing on appellee’s motions and ordered the allegations of materiality in the indictment quashed. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Judicial District affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Rosenbaum, 858 S.W.2d 22 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993). We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether a defendant may raise a pretrial challenge to the State’s evidence of materiality in an aggravated perjury indictment where the materiality allegation in the indictment is valid on its face, thus requiring the State to prove materiality prior to a trial on the merits.1 We will affirm.
A grand jury indicted appellee, Sheriff of Washington County, for aggravated perjury.2 Appellee filed two pretrial motions: Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality of Alleged False Statements (Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality) and Combined Motion to Dismiss or Quash the Indictment and Objection to Materiality of False Statements (Combined Motion to Quash). In his Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality, appellee moved the court to hold a pretrial hearing to determine, as a question of law, the materiality of appellee’s alleged *936false statements.3 Appellee moved the court to dismiss the indictment if the court found the statements not material since the district court would no longer have jurisdiction.4 In his Combined Motion to Quash, appellee moved the court to dismiss or quash the indictment and to hold that the alleged false statements were not material. In this motion, appellee argued that the indictment was void on its face, the indictment failed to give appellee adequate notice, and the statements alleged were not material to any matter then under inquiry. The trial judge set a pretrial hearing on both motions, and at the hearing he considered the two motions as one.
At the pretrial hearing, appellee called as a witness Blondean Kuecker, the District Clerk of Washington County. Kuecker testified regarding the grand jury records and indictments relevant to appellee’s case. Counsel for appellee introduced appellee’s testimony before the grand jury that indicted him for aggravated perjury and his testimony before an earlier grand jury where he allegedly perjured himself. The prosecutor called himself as a witness and testified about the grand juries and the indictments involved in appellee’s case. After listening to the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the trial judge determined that appellee’s testimony could not have affected the course or outcome of the investigation. In his order, the trial judge found no factual basis on which the grand jury could conclude that the statements were material. The trial court found, as a matter of law, that the statements were not material and ordered the allegations of materiality in the indictment quashed, leaving allegations accusing appellee of misdemeanor perjury. The State then appealed that order to the court of appeals.
The court of appeals held that the trial court had legal authority to hold the pretrial hearing on materiality and make the legal determination pursuant to Articles 27.02, 27.03, and 28.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Rosenbaum, 858 S.W.2d at 24.
The State contends that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court may require the State to prove materiality prior to trial. The State does not specifically address the court of appeals’ interpretation of Articles 27.02, 27.03, and 28.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Instead, while the State agrees with the premise that materiality is a question of law, it disagrees with the court of appeals’ conclusion that a trial court may quash a facially valid allegation of materiality at a pretrial hearing.
The state supports its argument with three lines of reasoning. First, the State argues that the court of appeals’ decision conflicts with established Texas practice. Second, the State contends that the court of appeals’ decision is inconsistent with federal case law and case law in other states. Third, the State argues that, although materiality is a question of law, the resolution of that legal issue will invariably be closely intertwined with questions of fact. Appellee argues that the court of appeals correctly interpreted Articles 28.01, 27.02, and 27.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in concluding that the trial court had authority to determine the issue of materiality pretrial. In addition, Appellee contends that the authorities cited by the State do not address the issue at hand, that is, whether the trial court properly determined materiality pretrial.
Both appellee’s pretrial motions involved a determination of materiality of the alleged statements. In a criminal case, unless otherwise provided in the Texas Code of Criminal *937Procedure, the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts. Tex.Code of Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 36.13. However, Section 37.04(c) of the Texas Penal Code explicitly provides that “whether a statement is material in a given factual situation is a question of law.” The trial court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the allegedly false statement could have affected the course or outcome of the proceedings. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 37.04(a) (emphasis added); Mitchell v. State, 608 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Materiality is distinguishable from other elements the State typically must prove in a criminal trial. As this Court stated in Yarbrough v. State, 617 S.W.2d 221, 228 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), “The question of materiality does not depend on the probative value of the evidence.” It has also been held that a factual evidentiary showing establishes the basis for the materiality of a statement, but “the ultimate finding of materiality turns on an interpretation of substantive law.” United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S.Ct. 86, 78 L.Ed.2d 95 (1983); see Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298, 49 S.Ct. 268, 273, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1929).
While both of appellee’s motions involve a determination of materiality, we will discuss them separately. The court of appeals considered both motions together as the trial judge did in the pretrial hearing. This has created some confusion in the appeals process. In short, the major portion of the State’s brief addresses the issue raised in appellee’s Combined Motion to Quash and appellee’s brief addresses the issue raised in his Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality. In his Combined Motion to Quash, appellee requested a ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the materiality allegation in the indictment. In his Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality, ap-pellee requested a pretrial ruling on materiality as a matter of law. The motions are distinct in the type of evidence the court may consider in its determination and the standard applied by the court in evaluating the evidence. When determining the sufficiency of evidence to support a materiality allegation in an indictment pursuant to a motion to quash, the court may not look beyond the face of the indictment. The court need only determine whether the indictment generally alleges materiality. However, when ruling on materiality as a question of law, the court may go beyond the face of the indictment and consider, for example, the transcript of prior proceedings or the testimony from witnesses at the proceedings.5 In addition, the State must meet a more rigorous evidentiary standard.6
A. Combined Motion to Quash
The State argues that the court of appeals’ opinion conflicts with established Texas practice. Specifically, the State contends that a defendant may not make a pretrial attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury to support the allegations in the indictment. While the State is correct in this statement of the law, only appellee’s Combined Motion to Quash attacked the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury. In contrast, appellee’s Motion for Pretrial Determination requested a pretrial ruling on a matter of law, the materiality of the alleged false statements and did not attack the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury.
To support its argument that the court of appeals’ decision conflicts with established Texas practice, the State cites cases where the defendants’ claims were based on insufficiency of evidence to support indictments. Ex Parte Millard, 587 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (indictment void because it failed to allege elements of a crime where name of property owner alleged where defendant’s name should have been alleged); Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190, 204 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (motion to quash assault indictment denied even though grand jury did *938not have witnesses or testimony before it upon which to predicate its finding); Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22, 28 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (court may not look beyond face of murder indictment to see if sufficient evidence to support it); Bourland et al. v. State, 133 Tex.Crim. 544, 112 S.W.2d 720 (App.1937) (theft indictment quashed because it did not describe property that was subject of theft); Ritter v. State, 76 Tex.Crim. 594, 176 S.W. 727 (App.1915) (forgery indictment facially tested to determine if gave adequate notice to accused). We find these authorities controlling with respect to appellee’s Combined Motion to Quash and hold that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s consideration of evidence beyond the face of the indictment to test the sufficiency of the materiality allegations.
This holding is consistent with federal decisions where materiality is also a question of law.7 E.g., United States v. Cole, 784 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.1986) (indictment for felony perjury sufficient if it simply alleges that the testimony was material without stating how it was material); United States v. Coiro, 785 F.Supp. 326 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (perjury indictment sufficient because government only had to make general statement that the matter was material); United States v. Clarke, 464 F.Supp. 749 (M.D.Florida 1979) (government need not allege in detail the facts relied upon to support materiality allegation for purposes of sufficiency of indictment). Our holding is also consistent with decisions from other states. E.g., Smallwood v. State, 584 So.2d 733, 737-38 (Miss.1991) (indictment sufficient even though failed to allege that words which constituted the alleged perjury were material to any issue in grand jury proceedings); State v. Cameron, 456 A.2d 8, 9 (Me.1983) (perjury indictment sufficient if contained a general allegation of materiality as long as possibility of materiality is apparent from face of indictment).
Appellee concedes that the decisions from other states cited by the State “stand for the proposition that a perjury indictment may be valid by merely alleging that the false statements were material'without including the facts supporting the allegation of materiality.” However, appellee argues these cases do not preclude the trial court from determining materiality as a question of law pretrial. We agree. While appellee’s Combined Motion to Quash is an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence to support an indictment, his Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality is a request for a pretrial ruling on a matter of law.
B. Motion for Pretrial Determination
The sole authority cited by the State that directly addresses the issue presented in ap-pellee’s Motion for Pretrial Determination is United States v. Raineri, 521 F.Supp. 16 (W.D.Wisconsin 1980). In Raineri, the United States District Court in Wisconsin ' adopted the findings and recommendations of the United States magistrate below without amendment. The defendant in Raineri moved for dismissal of the perjury count in the indictment on the ground that the allegedly false statements were not material. The magistrate found that the indictment contained a well-pled allegation of materiality and thus was immune from an attack on sufficiency grounds. Id. at 28. This comports with our holding above regarding ap-pellee’s Combined Motion to Quash.
In addition, like appellee in his Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality in the case at hand, the defendant in Raineri requested a determination in advance of trial that his false statements to the grand jury did not constitute a crime because, as a matter of law, they were not material to the grand jury’s investigation. The defendant contended that the issue was appropriate for pretrial examination because materiality is a question of law. While agreeing that materiality is a question of law, the court concluded that “it does not follow ... that a court ought *939normally decide the question in advance of trial.” Id. at 28. The court held, without citing authority, that “a determination of the materiality of defendant’s alleged false testimony ... can most appropriately be made at trial, where the trial judge can assess the matter on the basis of all evidence bearing upon materiality, including evidence relevant to other counts of the indictment.” Id. at 28.
We are not persuaded by the decision in Raineri. Not only did the court fail to cite any authority for its holding, it also disregarded relevant federal case law on the issue of materiality. Many of the federal circuit courts have held that, since the issue of materiality is a question of law to be decided by the court rather than an issue for the jury to determine, the court should receive evidence bearing solely on materiality outside the presence of the jury. E.g., United States v. Vap, 852 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir.1988); United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029, 1041 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1037, 107 S.Ct. 1973, 95 L.Ed.2d 814 (1987); United States v. Jackson, 640 F.2d 614, 617 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed.2d 594 (1981); United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325, 333 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912, 99 S.Ct. 283, 58 L.Ed.2d 259 (1978); United States v. Dipp, 581 F.2d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071, 99 S.Ct. 841, 59 L.Ed.2d 37 (1979); United States v. Damato, 554 F.2d 1371, 1373 (5th Cir.1977).
If we accept that it is within the province of the judge, not the jury, to hear evidence bearing on materiality, the issue in this case is one of timing: When should the judge hear the materiality evidence? At a pretrial hearing? At a hearing on the day of trial? In Vap, the court of appeals held that the district court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to conduct a pretrial materiality hearing and allowing the jury to be present during the materiality hearing. United States v. Vap, 852 F.2d at 1249. Most federal courts have allowed juries to hear evidence on materiality only if that evidence is relevant to another issue properly before the jury. E.g., id. (citing United States v. Langella, 776 F.2d 1078, 1081 (2nd Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1019, 106 S.Ct. 1207, 89 L.Ed.2d 320 (1986); Harrell v. United States, 220 F.2d 516, 520 (5th Cir.1955)). In both federal and Texas courts, the prosecution bears the burden of proof in establishing materiality. Usually, the prosecution meets it burden of proof by entering the transcript of the prior proceedings into evidence, or by presenting testimony from persons who witnessed the proceedings. United States v. Damato, 554 F.2d at 1373 (citations omitted). A pretrial materiality hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury reduces the danger of prejudice to the defendant which could result from placing the transcript of a prior proceeding or testimony of a grand juror before the jury. United States v. Dipp, 581 F.2d at 1328 (trial judge reviewed entire transcript in pretrial hearing on materiality; jury received only excerpt containing allegedly false testimony). Here, the State has not alleged that any of the evidence on materiality was relevant to a proper jury issue. In the case at hand as in United States v. Hansen, “Nothing appears in the record to suggest why it was necessary that the matter of materiality be heard by the jury.” 583 F.2d at 334. Thus, the court of appeals did not err in affirming the trial court’s receipt of evidence bearing on materiality at a pretrial hearing pursuant to appellee’s Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality.
C. Mixed Question of Fact and Law
Finally, the State argues that, although materiality is a question of law, the resolution of that legal issue will invariably be closely intertwined with questions of fact. The State contends that the resolution of the materiality issue is analogous to a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal: Neither may fairly be resolved until after the full presentation of the State’s evidence at a trial on the merits.
We are aware of only one case supporting the State’s contention. In an 1898 perjury case, McAvoy v. State, 47 S.W. 1001, 1002 (Tex.Crim.App.1898), this Court held that since the materiality of the statements de*940pended on a number of facts, the trial judge should have submitted the facts to the jury and instructed them that, if they found the facts to be true, then the alleged false testimony was material. In every other perjury case we are aware of, the materiality of the statements was a question of law to be determined by the court alone. E.g., Lee v. State, 128 Tex.Crim. 32, 57 S.W.2d 123 (App.1933) (no error for court to tell the jury in charge that alleged false testimony was material); Martin v. State, 101 Tex.Crim. 77, 273 S.W. 855 (App.1925) (no error for court to determine materiality without assistance of jury). In Luna v. State, 44 Tex.Crim. 482, 72 S.W. 378, 379 (App.1903), this Court held that the trial court’s submission of the question of materiality to the jury was “fatally erroneous.” In Yarbrough v. State, 617 S.W.2d 221, 228 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), the judge instructed the jury that the statement by the defendant, if made, was material. On appeal, this Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the judge should have instructed the jury to determine whether the statement was material. The trial judge’s instructions were not error because the testimony of the grand jurors indicated that the defendant’s false statement could have affected the course of the proceedings. Therefore, the trial judge, not the jury, properly determined that the statement was material.
In accord with the decisions discussed above, a jury should not be present at a materiality determination unless the State alleges that the evidence on materiality is relevant to a jury issue. Here, the State has made no such allegation, nor has it alleged, as in McAvoy, that the materiality of the appellee’s statements depended on a number of facts that the trial judge should have submitted to the jury with instructions that, if they found the facts to be true, then the alleged false statements were material. Absent any such allegation on the part of the State, we find that the court of appeals did not err in affirming the trial judge’s consideration of materiality pretrial pursuant to appellee’s Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality.
Accordingly, we hold that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the trial court had authority both to hold the pretrial hearing and make the legal determination with respect to appellee’s Motion for Pretrial Determination. State v. Rosenbaum, 858 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993). In its discussion of both of appellee’s motions together, the court of appeals relied on Article 28.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure which provides that a “court may set any criminal case for a pre-trial hearing before it is set for trial.”8 At a pretrial hearing, a court may resolve the “pleadings of the defendant” and “exceptions to the form or substance of the indictment.” Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 28.01 § 1. Pursuant to Article 27.02, a defendant’s pleadings include any motions or pleadings that are permitted to be filed by law.9 The court of appeals reasoned that because a “motion to quash” or a “motion to dismiss” can reasonably be regarded as coming within the purview of Article 27.02, the trial court had the authority to hear appellee’s motion, citing State v. Eaves, 800 S.W.2d 220, 223 *941(Tex.CrimApp.1990). The court of appeals further concluded that, since materiality is a question of law, TexJPenal Code Ann. § 37.04, and judicial power embraces “(1) the power to hear facts, (2) the power to decide issues of fact made by the pleadings, (3) the power to decide questions of law involved^ (4) the power to enter a judgment ... and (5) the power to execute the judgment or sentence,” the trial court properly heard appel-lee’s motion. State v. Rosenbaum, 858 S.W.2d at 24 (quoting Kelley v. State, 676 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)) (emphasis added by Court of Appeals).
We agree that appellee’s Combined Motion to Quash fell within the purview of Article 28.01 since a motion to quash is a “pleading of the defendant” as defined in Article 27.02. However, we hold that, while the trial court had authority to hold a hearing pursuant to the Combined Motion to Quash, it improperly conducted an evidentiary hearing in which it considered evidence beyond the four comers of the indictment.
In addition, we agree with the court of appeals that the trial court had authority both to hold the pretrial hearing and make the legal determination with respect to appel-lee’s Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality. Since the trial court had the authority to determine materiality as a question of law, we hold that appellee properly filed a motion requesting the court to make that determination. Thus, the Motion for Pretrial Determination fell within Article 28.01(2) as a “pleading of the defendant,” defined by Article 27.02(8) as including any “motions or pleadings that are by law permitted to be filed.”10
D. Conclusion
With respect to appellee’s Combined Motion to Quash, we hold that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the trial court had authority to consider evidence beyond the face of the indictment to test the sufficiency of the materiality allegations. With respect to the Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality, we hold that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the trial court had authority to hold the pretrial hearing, hear evidence regarding materiality, and make the legal determination. The trial court heard both motions together, made a pretrial ruling on materiality and quashed the portion of the indictment relating to materiality. The court of appeals held that the trial court properly heard the motions in a pretrial hearing and made the appropriate legal determination. While we hold that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the pretrial evidentiary hearing on materiality was authorized with respect to the Combined Motion to Quash, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the pretrial evidentiary hearing was authorized with respect to the Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality. Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ error with respect to the Combined Motion to Quash, the outcome of its holding is unchanged, that is, affirming the trial court’s order to quash the materiality allegations in the indictment. Even if the trial court had treated the two motions separately, it still would have determined, pursuant to the Motion for Pretrial Determination of Materiality, that the statements were not material as a matter of law and ordered the allegations of materiality in the indictment quashed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to *942the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this judgment and opinion.11

. This case has come before this Court on three separate occasions. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals dismissed the State’s first appeal, holding that the State’s Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. State v. Rosenbaum, No. A14-90-0061-60-CR, 1990 WL 122113 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.], August 23, 1990) (unpublished). We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded to the court of appeals. State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). On remand, the court of appeals dismissed the State's appeal on the grounds that the Notice of Appeal had been signed by the Special Prosecutor instead of the recused District Attorney. State v. Rosenbaum, 830 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992). The State’s second petition for discretionary review was granted, and we again reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded to the court of appeals. State v. Rosenbaum, 852 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). On remand, the court of appeals held that the trial cotut had properly resolved the issue of materiality of the allegations in the indictment in a pretrial hearing. State v. Rosenbaum, 858 S.W.2d 22 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993). The State petitioned for discretionary review a third time, which we granted and now address in this opinion.

. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.03, Aggravated Perjury, states:
(a) A person commits an offense if he commits perjury as defined in Section 37.02 of this code, and the false statement:
(1) is made during or in connection with an official proceeding; and
(2) is material.
(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.

. Tex. Penal Code-Ann. § 37.04 defines “materiality” as follows:
(a) A statement is material, regardless of the admissibility of the statement under the rules of evidence, if it could have affected the course or outcome of the official proceeding.
(b) It is no defense to prosecution under Section 37.03 of this code (Aggravated Perjury) that the declarant mistakenly believed the statement to be immaterial.
(c)Whether a statement is material in a given factual situation is a question of law.

. Without the allegation of materiality, appellee is charged with misdemeanor perjury. Compare Tex. Penal Code § 37.02 with § 37.03. District courts do not have jurisdiction over misdemean- or perjury cases. Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 4.05.

. See United States v. Damato, 554 F.2d 1371, 1373 (5A Cir.1977).

. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.04(a).

. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1988); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 1547, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298-99, 49 S.Ct. 268, 273, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1929).

. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Aim. art. 28.01 provides in relevant part:
The pre-trial hearing shall be to determine any of the following matters:
(1) Arraignment of the defendant, if such be necessary; and appointment of counsel to represent the defendant, if such be necessary;
(2) Pleadings of the defendant;
(3) Special pleas, if any;
(4) Exceptions to the form or substance of •the indictment or information;
(5) Motions for continuance either by the State or defendant ...;
(6) Motions to suppress evidence ...;
(7) Motions for change of venue ...;
(8) Discovery;
(9) Entrapment; and
(10) Motion for appointment of interpreter.

. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 27.02 provides in relevant part:
The pleadings and motions of the defendant shall be:
(1) A motion to set aside or an exception to an indictment or information for some matter of form or substance;
⅜ ‡ ‡ ⅜ ⅜! ⅜
(8) Any other motions or pleadings that are by law permitted to be filed.

. We also note that Article 28.01 is not an exhaustive enumeration of the issues that a court may determine prior to trial. For example, a defendant is entitled to a pretrial hearing to determine competency, indigency, and bail, though not mentioned in Article 28.01. While Judge Clinton, in his dissent, acknowledges that Article 28.01 is not exhaustive, he nevertheless argues that any matter not expressly listed in Article 28.01 or in Article 27.02 cannot be litigated pretrial. The dissent would have us return to the pre-Article 28.01 period by preventing trial judges from conducting pretrial hearings on any pleading of the defendant not expressly mentioned in 28.01 or 27.02.

. We note that the indictment now, without the materiality allegations, alleges misdemeanor perjury. Compare Tex. Penal Code § 37.02 with § 37.03.