Court Opinion

ID: 9890306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 19:03:56.194593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:31.761330
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/12/23 P. v. Kester CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A165981
 v.
 ADAM MATTHEW KESTER,                                                    (Mendocino County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No. 22CR00958A)

         This is an appeal from final judgment after defendant Adam Kester
pleaded no contest to second degree burglary and received a two-year middle
term sentence. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erroneously
sentenced him to the middle term without considering whether to impose the
presumptive lower term under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
and that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object.1 We
conclude the court’s sentence was proper and therefore affirm.
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         On April 19, 2022, a complaint was filed charging defendant with one
count of second degree burglary (§ 459). The complaint further alleged

         1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal

Code.

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defendant had two or more felony convictions within the meaning of section
1203, subdivision (e)(4).2
      On June 22, 2022, defendant entered an open no contest plea to the
burglary count with the condition that his sentence would not exceed two
years. This plea arose from the following incident.3 On April 15, 2022,
defendant and a coparticipant ran out of gas near a Department of Forestry
and Fire Protection fire station. They walked to the station and, finding no
one around, entered the empty and unlocked building to look for help. The
battalion chief, who was conducting a security check, found defendant and
the coparticipant hiding behind a large cardboard box. The chief also found a
red air hose that had been cut and a red gas can, which came from
defendant’s vehicle.
      On July 19, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to the two-year
middle term and awarded him 141 days of custody credits.4 This timely
appeal followed.
                                 DISCUSSION
      On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of a middle
term sentence and his counsel’s failure to object to it. The following
principles apply.
I.    Governing Legal Principles.
      “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and that statute
specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order

      2 In a separate misdemeanor case, No. 22CR00575, defendant was

charged with possession of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377,
subd. (a).)
      3 These facts are from the probation report.

      4 In defendant’s misdemeanor case, No. 22CR00575, the court imposed

a concurrent 30-day term.

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imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise
provided in paragraph (2).” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).)
      On October 8, 2021, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) was
signed into law, effective on January 1, 2022, about six months before
defendant’s sentencing hearing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Among other
things, this bill amended section 1170, subdivision (b) to provide in relevant
part that “unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition
of the lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect,
exploitation, or sexual violence.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A); accord, Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.420(e).)
      On appeal, we review a trial court’s sentencing decision only for abuse
of discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) As such, we
will reverse only if the defendant “clearly show[s] that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 376–377.) “ ‘ “ ‘In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’ ” [Citation.] To meet this burden, the defendant must
“affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing
discretion.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions
made in the exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court.
[Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers
can no more exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or

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may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a
defendant’s record.” ’ (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391
[citations].)” (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988
(Fredrickson).)
II.   Application of the Law to the Facts.
      Defendant contends his two-year middle term sentence must be
vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing because the trial court
failed to understand, much less exercise, its discretion under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(A) to impose the lower term based on alleged psychological
or childhood trauma he suffered due to his own and his mother’s significant
substance abuse history. According to defendant, “the record reveals
extensive poly-substance abuse beginning in his childhood, including three
possible DSM-5[5] mental disorders, including Opioid Use Disorder, for which
jail medical staff prescribed medication.”
      The People respond that defendant forfeited his challenge by failing to
object before the trial court under the rule set forth in People v. Scott (1994) 9
Cal.4th 331 (Scott). Alternatively, the People contend there was no abuse of
discretion, as the record supports the court’s imposition of the middle term
sentence. We conclude the People’s forfeiture argument need not be
considered because the unambiguous record on appeal establishes there is no
basis for reversal.
      A.    Presentence Probation Report.
      According to the presentence probation report filed on July 12, 2022,
defendant “hop[ed] for a grant of probation, and residential substance abuse
treatment” instead of prison. Defendant recently contacted two residential
treatment programs because “he [was] tired of struggling and [had] been

      5 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013).

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‘homeless’ for the past seven years.” He began consuming heavy alcohol at
age 12 or 13 and was regularly consuming a half-gallon of whiskey and a 30-
pack of beer before deciding to give up alcohol. However, he continued to
smoke an ounce of marijuana daily, a habit that began at age 10.
      Defendant’s mother was a “chronic” methamphetamine user: “It has
been a part of my life pretty much my entire childhood.” Defendant first used
methamphetamine at about age 18 and still used “ ‘a couple of grams per
day,’ ” by smoking, snorting, and injecting it. He also tried cocaine and
heroin but replaced heroin with fentanyl about a year ago because “it was the
only thing that could get him off heroin.” In June 2022, he overdosed on
fentanyl but was revived after being given six doses of naloxone.
      In response to the probation officer’s question, defendant stated “he did
not believe substance abuse was the motivation for his criminality.” He also
reported taking buprenorphine, a treatment for opioid dependence prescribed
by jail medical staff. He was ready to enter a residential substance abuse
treatment program because: “I don’t want to be an addict.”
      Due to defendant’s extensive criminal history, which included seven
felonies, and his poor performance on parole and probation, the department
recommended a denial of probation and imposition of a two-year middle term
sentence.
      A.    The Sentencing Decision.
      At the sentencing hearing, the trial court weighed the relevant factors
on the record after hearing from both sides. In aggravation, the court
considered defendant’s lengthy history of criminal activity and poor
performance on probation and parole, noting: “This is his 7th felony. . . .
[H]e was just on probation last year, and initiating in 2019 he committed
several misdemeanors while on formal supervision which ultimately ended in

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a local prison—a straight local prison sentence with no mandatory
supervision. [¶] He made it apparent he cannot or will not comply with
probation.” The court also considered defendant’s request for residential
substance abuse treatment, explaining: “I do embrace the idea of
rehabilitation through mandatory supervision. And sometimes it really is
giving people a shot at less time in custody, as it should be if they’re willing
to engage in treatment. [¶] However, the fact that he was just on probation
really kind of weighs against that in the court’s mind.” Ultimately, the court
found these various factors “waive each other out” and imposed the middle
term.6
      For reasons discussed post, we conclude there is no basis to disturb this
decision, as defendant has not affirmatively demonstrated it was irrational or
arbitrary. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377; Fredrickson,
supra, 90 Cal. App.5th at p. 988.)
      As this court has previously explained, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
by its plain language, does not mandate a presumption in favor of the lower
term in every case in which the defendant experienced some form of trauma,
was under age 26 at the time the crime was committed, or was the victim of
intimate partner violence or human trafficking prior to or at the time the
crime was committed. Rather, the presumption applies only if one of these
conditions was “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A)–(C); see Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 991
[discussing § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B)].) Thus, “in order to trigger the
presumption, there must be some initial showing that the defendant’s
[trauma] was a contributing factor, and only then must the record

      6 The court denied defense counsel’s request to split his time between

prison and mandatory supervision.

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affirmatively show compliance with the statute.” (Fredrickson, supra, at p.
992.)
        Consistent with this principle, our Third Appellate District colleagues
recently explained under somewhat comparable circumstances that “[s]ection
1170, subdivision (b)(6) does not require the court to impose the lower term
because of defendant’s mental illness, but for psychological trauma. While at
least one court has concluded ‘psychological trauma based on mental illness
may be a circumstance qualifying for the lower term presumption in section
1170, subdivision (b)(6),’ that court also emphasized that mental illness alone
did not qualify for the lower term presumption. (People v. Banner (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 226, 241 [292 Cal.Rptr.3d 574] [‘Psychological trauma must
attend the illness, and that trauma must contribute to the crime under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)’].)” (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
772, 777–778, 1st italics added.) Thus, assuming for the sake of argument
defendant is correct that a mental disorder stemming from a defendant’s
sustained substance abuse may cause psychological trauma, that trauma, in
order to trigger the presumptive lower term under this provision, must have
contributed to the defendant’s crime.
        Here, there is evidence of defendant’s longtime substance abuse and a
brief reference to his mother’s chronic methamphetamine use. However,
there is no indication in the record that defendant experienced psychological
trauma based on his substance abuse or that such trauma contributed to his
crime. (People v. Tilley, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 777–778; People v.
Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241.) On the contrary, defendant reported
to the probation officer that he did not believe substance abuse motivated his
criminality. And, by his own admission, defendant committed this crime
because he needed fuel for his car, not because of his substance abuse.

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      Thus, in the absence of an initial showing that defendant suffered
psychological trauma based on his or his mother’s longtime substance abuse
and that this trauma contributed to his crime, the trial court was not
required to make an express finding regarding the section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) presumption.
      For similar reasons, we also reject defendant’s contention that his
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to his middle term
sentence based on this presumption.
      “To prevail on this claim, defendant must show, among other things,
that his ‘counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’ [Citation.]
In evaluating his claim, we ‘defer[] to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions’
and presume that ‘counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.’ [Citation.] Thus, defendant ‘ “must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy.’ ” ’ [Citations.] His burden in this regard ‘is
difficult to carry’ in this case, because this is a direct appeal and the record
does not disclose the reason for counsel’s failure to object. [Citation.] For
those reasons, we may reverse ‘only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission,
(2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (People v. Arrendondo (2019) 8
Cal.5th 694, 711.)
      Defendant cannot meet this high standard on direct appeal. As stated
ante, defendant denied to his probation officer that substance abuse
motivated his criminality. Moreover, he admitted committing this crime
because he needed fuel for his car and not because of any substance abuse

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disorder. These facts suggest there indeed was a rational tactical purpose
behind counsel’s failure to ask the court to impose the presumptive lower
term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). (People v. Kendrick (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 769, 780 [“ ‘[D]efense counsel is not required to make futile
motions or to indulge in idle acts to appear competent.’ ”].) Accordingly, his
counsel’s performance provides no basis for reversal.
                                    DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                             Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Burns, J.

A165981/People v. Adam Matthew Kester

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