Court Opinion

ID: 9549420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:18:18.040309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:17.683133
License: Public Domain

Miller, J.,
dissenting: The State, for good reason, sought and was granted one continuance; the defendant, also for good reason, was granted two continuances. The case was finally set for trial on March 11 and 12, 1982. When the prosecutor learned, among other things, that one of his subpoenaed medical witnesses was scheduled to take the Minnesota medical board examinations at the time fixed for trial and another was planning to be out of state, he sought a second continuance, asking the court for a different trial setting. For this kindly and under*193standing gesture, the prosecutor is soundly criticized by the majority, who would have required the enforcement of the subpoenas, medical board and the doctors’ careers notwithstanding. The trial court denied the request without making any attempt to fix a trial date on which the witnesses could be present. The ultimatum to the prosecutor was loud and clear: Try the case on March 11, witnesses or not, or dismiss. The only reason advanced by the trial court in denying the continuance was that the Supreme Court, by its GUIDELINES and its constant harping on the prompt disposition of cases, is forcing trial judges to overlook the equities and justice of matters before them and to consider only one thing — the speedy termination of cases. This is not the first time we have heard this philosophy stated and seen it relied upon, and it will not be the last. An affirmance in this case will reinforce this erroneous, unfortunate, and all too widespread belief.
Our GUIDELINES are not designed to encourage trial courts to run roughshod over litigants and witnesses. These people deserve to be treated with understanding and consideration, even though it may take a few days longer to complete a given case. In my judgment, this case should have been rescheduled ten days or two weeks later, tried, and finished; the one physician could have taken his Minnesota board, the other could have attended the New York conference, and no one would have been inconvenienced. There is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest that this could not have been done.
Since the State was compelled to dismiss the original case, the Cuezze doctrine should not be applied.
McFarland and Herd, JJ., join the foregoing dissenting opinion.