Court Opinion

ID: 9794842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:12:42.501873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:14.881578
License: Public Domain

Price, C. J.,
dissenting:
For many years the law of this state has been that injuries sustained by an employee as a result of an assault upon him by a fellow employee are not compensable under the workmen’s compensation act unless it affirmatively appears from the record that the employer had reason to anticipate injury would result if the two employees continued to work together (Johnson v. Guggenheim Packing Co., 168 Kan. 702, 215 P. 2d 178; Hallett v. McDowell & Sons, 186 Kan. 813, 817, 352 P. 2d 949).
When a specific rule of law has become well settled in this state I am not concerned with what the law on the point is in other jurisdictions, and neither am I convinced that it ought to be abandoned merely because it now appears that the reasons given for its original adoption do not seem altogether satisfactory. Under the facts of this particular case application of the rule may seem harsh. Over the years, however, the legislature has not seen fit to modify it. A pointed illustration of legislative action to curb the recent trend of *669decisions by this court in “heart attack” cases is found in the 1967 enactment of the last sentence in the “obligation” found at K. S. A. 1968 Supp. 44-501.
Workmen’s compensation examiners, the director, and district courts should be able to feel secure in the adjudication of controversies in reliance on past decisions of this court. The fundamental basis of the doctrine of stare decisis is that for the sake of certainty, stability and consistency in the law a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to succeeding cases if the facts and questions are substantially the same — to the end that those who are bound by it may rely upon it with the assurance that what was said yesterday will hold good tomorrow.
I therefore respectfully dissent.