Court Opinion

ID: 9942328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 20:10:46.752773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:57.901586
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Prince v. Harper, 2024-Ohio-521.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      ROSS COUNTY

MARK PRINCE,                                                     :

                                                Plaintiff-Appellant,       :    Case
                                                No. 23CA9

                                                v.                         :

ANGELA M. HARPER, et al.,                       :    DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

                              Defendants-Appellees,    :
________________________________________________________________

                                             APPEARANCES:

Eric J. Wittenberg and Joshua S. Nagy, Dublin, Ohio, for
appellant.

Thomas M. Spetnagel, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:2-8-24
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is an appeal from a Ross County Common Pleas

Court judgment in favor of Angela M. Harper and Shawn R. Harper,

defendants below and appellees herein.                      Mark Prince, plaintiff

below and appellant herein, assigns the following errors for

review:

                 FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
                 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.”

                 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
           “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT
           IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE.”

    {¶2}   This appeal arises from a dispute regarding a 30-foot-

wide easement appellant claims to hold over appellees’ property.

On June 20, 2019, appellant filed a complaint to establish his

right to the easement.   Appellant sought a declaratory judgment

that “the Right-of-Way is valid and subsisting, is a necessary

means of ingress and egress for the Parcel and that the

Defendants have no right to deprive the Plaintiff of use of said

Right-of-Way.”   Appellant further requested temporary,

preliminary, and permanent injunctions, and sought to eject

appellees from the right-of-way.

    {¶3}   On July 2, 2019, the parties entered into an agreed

preliminary injunction that enjoined appellees from interfering

with or denying appellant access to the alleged right-of-way

until further order of the court.

    {¶4}   On October 11, 2022, the parties agreed to submit the

matter to the trial court upon stipulations.   One stipulation

stated “[t]here are no questions of material fact in dispute

between the parties as to Plaintiff’s claim for an Easement by

Grant, and as to that claim alone.”   The parties stipulated that

a question of law remained regarding the proper interpretation

of the easement as (1) “a roadway to Plaintiff’s parcel from
                                                                 3
ROSS, 23CA9

County Road 550 that crosses over the east side of Defendants’

parcel,” or (2) “a roadway to the southeast corner of

Defendants’ parcel from County Road 550, that does not reach

Plaintiffs’ parcel.”

     {¶5}   The parties agreed that on November 25, 1892, “a

roadway easement was recorded in the Ross County records,

establishing a dominant estate for the approximately 100-acre

parcel of Deborah Carter, and a servient estate on multiple

parcels, including the approximately 66-acre, 3 rood parcel

owned by Bertie H. Ware.”1   The parties agreed that this easement

is described as follows:

          The parties of the first part hereby grant the
     privilege of a gateway to the party of the second part
     leading from the Herods Creek and Frankfort Turnpike,
     running north to the lands of Deborah Carter not
     exceeding thirty (30) feet in width along the following
     described route to wit: a strip of land for the purposes
     of a roadway thirty feet in width along the east side of
     the following described tract of land belonging to
     Bertie H. Ware. “Beginning at an elm, black oak, and
     hickory corner to Mary Sandford [sic] thence .... (The
     foregoing description being taken from a quit claim deed
     made by Holcomb Porter, Nadie Porter, Annie P. Porter,
     J.W. Porter, Sallie M. Wiley, and L.E. Wiley to Bertie
     Ware on February 7th, 1891 and is recorded in the Records
     of Deeds of Ross County Vol. 111, Page 446).

     1
       The record contains various spellings of words used
throughout this opinion, with “rood” and “rod” being two of
those words. To the extent that the record does not clarify
which versions are the correct spelling, this opinion uses the
spellings as they appear in the record.
                                                                4
ROSS, 23CA9

         From the South East corner of the above described
    tract of land along and over the following described
    route to wit: Beginning at the corner of Mary Sanford
    and Tighlman Porter and Gertrude Porter in a line of
    David A. Abernathy, where an elm black oak and hickory
    stand, thence with the line of David A. Abernathy S. 24
    W. 100 poles to a stone, thence South 9-1/2 E, with said
    line 45 poles to a stone, thence with the line of Scioto
    Abernathy S. 48 West 42.48 poles to a stone in the center
    of the Frankfort and Herods Creek Turnpike, thence
    westerly to a point within thirty (30) feet of the line
    of Da. Abernathy, thence N. 9-1/2 W, about 45 rods thence
    N. 24 E about 100-1/2 poles to the line between Mary
    Sanford and Tighlman Porter and Gertrude Porter, thence
    with their line thirty (30) feet wide from the beginning
    to the end, between the said described lines.
         Being a strip of land deeded to Tighlman Porter for
    the purpose of a road way, by Mary Sanford, John A.
    Sanford, Ella [] Sanford, Gertrude Devine, Michael
    Devine, and Jennie Devine, by a deed dated Feb. 19, 1889
    and recorded in record of Deeds of Ross County, Vol.
    101, Page 544 and deeded by Tighlman Porter, subject to
    his life estate therein, to Bertie H. Ware, by a deed
    dated Feb. 7, 1891 and recorded in record of deeds of
    Ross County, Ohio Vol. 111, age 447.
         The road way as described above is situated in Lucas
    Survey No. 404 in Concord Township, Ross County, Ohio.
    Said road way as above described to be used by the said
    Deborah Carter or any future owner of said lands or
    occupier of said lands as a passage way or road way to
    and from said lands of Deborah Carter to the Frankfort
    and Herods Creek Turnpike in perpetuity. It is further
    agreed that the said Deborah Carter or any occupier or
    owner of her said lands shall help to keep said passage
    way of road way in repair and on passing through the
    gates thereon to close the same after them. The said
    Deborah Carter the party of the second part for and in
    consideration of the benefits and privileges of said
    gate way aforesaid agrees to pay the sum of one hundred
    and fifty ($150.00) dollars and has executed a
    promissory note to the parties of the first part for
    said amount ($150.00) payable in one year from the date
    hereof with 6% interest from date.
                                                                   5
ROSS, 23CA9

    {¶6}    The stipulations further stated that the “Frankfort

and Herods Creek Turnpike identified in the above description is

today known as Ross County Road 550.”

    {¶7}    The parties further agreed that an easement also is

set forth in a February 17, 1902 deed from Deborah Carter’s

heirs to Strawder Pancake, and this easement is “functionally

equivalent” to the 1892 easement.    Appellant’s parcel is the

same 100-acre parcel described in the Deborah Carter and

Strawder Pancake deeds.    The legal description of appellant’s

parcel states in part:

    containing one hundred acres, more or less, being the
    same premises conveyed to Strawder M. Pancake by the
    heirs of Deborah Carter . . . recorded in Vol. 136, Page
    483 Ross County Deed Records . . . and also a thirty
    foot roadway conveyed to Strawder M. Pancake by the heirs
    at law of Deborah Carter by deed dated February 17, 1902,
    and recorded in Vol. 136, Page 485, Ross County Deed
    Records.

    {¶8}    Appellees’ parcel was created in 2018 by subdividing

Gwendolyn Harper’s parcel.    Before subdividing this parcel,

Harper’s parcel was the same 66-acre parcel that formerly

belonged to Bertie Ware.

    {¶9}    The parties agreed that appellant’s parcel is the

dominant estate and appellees’ parcel is the servient estate.

They did not, however, agree on the proper interpretation of the

easement.
                                                                      6
ROSS, 23CA9

    {¶10} To support their interpretation of the easement,

appellees relied upon a certificate of title that attorney

Joseph Motes prepared.   Motes concluded that “[t]he easement . .

. begins at the southeast corner of the 66-acre, 3-rood property

that is the progenitor of [appellees’] 8.701 tract, and then

heads South, ultimately reaching the Frankfort and Herrods [sic]

Creek Turnpike, which is now [Ross County Road] 550.”     Motes

further stated that, although the easement states “it is along

the East side of the 66-acre, 3-rood property that is the

progenitor of [appellees’] 8.701-acre tract, it is not.”     Motes,

however, did not elaborate upon this latter conclusion.

    {¶11} Appellant, on the other hand, interpreted the easement

to mean that it reaches his parcel and does not begin at the

southeast corner of appellees’ parcel.   Appellant asserted that

the easement’s language unambiguously reflects the parties’

intent to give Deborah Carter and any future owners or occupiers

of the land “a passage way or road way from said lands of

Deborah Carter to the Frankfort and Herods Creek Turnpike in

perpetuity.”   Appellant believes that the easement unambiguously

establishes a 30-foot-wide roadway along the east side of

appellees’ property.
                                                                    7
ROSS, 23CA9

    {¶12} The parties also submitted stipulated exhibits,

including Motes’ deposition testimony.     Motes stated that when

he prepared his title certificate, he reviewed an 1875 atlas, a

1902 map of Concord Township, recent and historical aerial

photographs, and the grantor and grantee indices.     He stated

that Deed Volume 136, Page 485 describes an easement encumbering

the 66-acre parcel that is the progenitor of appellees’

property.     Motes concluded that the easement “begins at the

southeast corner of Bertie Ware’s property, the progenitor of

[appellees’] property, and runs generally in a southern

direction down to what is now County Road 550.”     Motes further

concluded that the easement “does not appear to reach

[appellant]’s 100-acre tract, because [the] easement begins at

the southeast corner of [the] 66-acre * * * property that’s

[the] progenitor of [appellees’] tract and then heads south.”

    {¶13} Motes explained that, if the easement begins at the

southeast corner of appellees’ property and heads south, “it

can’t reach [appellant’s] property to the north.”     He reached

this conclusion even though the easement states that it leads

“from the Herods Creek and Frankfort Turnpike Road running north

to the lands of Strawder Pancake along the following described

route.” Motes indicated that one of the first paragraphs
                                                                     8
ROSS, 23CA9

contained in the parties’ stipulated exhibit describes “the

tract of land that is the servient tenement” and the next

paragraph describes the easement.

       {¶14} On March 6, 2023, the trial court granted judgment in

appellees’ favor and found that appellant “does not have a valid

and/or subsisting right-of-way/easement over and through

[appellees’] property.”     Consequently, the court vacated the

agreed preliminary injunction and dismissed appellant’s

complaint.     This appeal followed.

                                   I

       {¶15} For ease of discussion, we first consider appellant’s

second assignment of error.     In his second assignment of error,

appellant asserts that the trial court erred by granting

judgment in appellees’ favor.     More specifically, appellant

contends that the court erred as a matter of law by determining

that the deed language does not create an easement that allows

appellant to traverse appellees’ property to reach County Route

550.    Appellant further asserts that the trial court improperly

relied upon expert testimony regarding the interpretation of the

easement.     Appellant claims that experts may not testify on

questions of law like the interpretation of legal instruments.
                                                                    9
ROSS, 23CA9

    {¶16} Appellees respond that because appellant failed to

file a Civ.R. 52 request for findings of fact and conclusions of

law, this court should presume that the trial court “considered

and weighed all the stipulated facts and documentary evidence *

* * and correctly followed the law applicable to this case.”

Appellees further argue that the trial court had discretion to

consider expert testimony.   They assert that the easement has

two reasonable interpretations and the trial court had

discretion to accept the interpretation that Motes offered.

    {¶17} We first observe that the parties do not agree upon

the standard of review that governs our disposition of

appellant’s second assignment of error.   Appellant contends that

his second assignment of error involves a question of law

subject to de-novo review.   Appellees, however, propose that we

apply the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review to

the trial court’s judgment and the abuse-of-discretion standard

of review to the court’s decision to consider expert testimony.

    {¶18} This court previously stated that when parties submit

a matter to a trial court for decision using stipulated facts,

as the parties have done in the case sub judice, appellate

“[r]eview of a trial court’s application of the law to

stipulated facts is de novo.”   Brown v. Gallagher, 2013-Ohio-
                                                                    10
ROSS, 23CA9

2323, 993 N.E.2d 415, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.); accord Clark v. Butler,

4th Dist. Ross No. 12CA3315, 2012-Ohio-5618, ¶ 9, 12, fn.2

(“[b]ecause this case was decided on stipulated facts, it does

not lend itself to a ‘manifest weight of the evidence’ standard

of review”); e.g., Wayne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parks, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 20945, 2002-Ohio-3990, ¶ 13 (applying de-novo review

when parties submitted stipulated facts); Iiams v. Corp.

Support, Inc., 98 Ohio App.3d 477, 480, 648 N.E.2d 902, (3rd

Dist.1994) (applying de-novo standard and declining to apply

manifest-weight standard when parties had stipulated facts)

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Slutz, 5th Dist. Stark No. CA–7109, 1987

WL 18538, *1 (Oct. 13, 1987) (“the prevailing rule is that the

appellate court stands in the shoes of the trial court when

reviewing appeals from judgments rendered solely on stipulated

facts”); Poe v. Sheehan, 106 Ohio App. 413, 422, 151 N.E.2d 660

(8th Dist.1958) (when parties try case using stipulated facts,

appellate court’s function “is to determine whether the court’s

conclusions of law are supported by the agreed facts”).

    {¶19} Accordingly, we do not afford any deference to the

trial court’s decision and, instead, conduct our own independent

review.   Clark at ¶ 9.   After our review in the case at bar, we

agree with appellant that the plain language of the easement
                                                                    11
ROSS, 23CA9

reveals that he possesses an easement that runs across

appellees’ property to County Road 550.

    {¶20} “An easement is a non-possessory property interest in

the land of another.”   Pomante v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line,

LLC, 187 Ohio App.3d 731, 2010-Ohio-1823, 933 N.E.2d 831, ¶ 7

(10th Dist.), citing Andrews v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 544

F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir.2008).    An easement “entitles the owner

of the easement, the dominant estate, to a limited use of the

land in which the interest exists, the servient estate.”     Crane

Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, L.L.C., 138 Ohio

App.3d 57, 66, 740 N.E.2d 328 (4th Dist.2000), citing Alban v.

R.K. Co., 15 Ohio St.2d 229, 231, 239 N.E.2d 22 (1968).

    {¶21} “When an easement is created by an express grant, * *

* the extent of and limitations on the use of the land depend on

the language in the grant.”     State ex rel. Wasserman v. Fremont,

140 Ohio St.3d 471, 2014-Ohio-2962, 20 N.E.3d 664, ¶ 28.     “The

language of the easement, considered in light of the surrounding

circumstances, is the best indication of the extent and

limitations of the easement.”    Id. (citations omitted).   Thus,

courts first must review the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the

language used in the easement “unless manifest absurdity results

or unless some other meaning is clearly intended from the face
                                                                   12
ROSS, 23CA9

or overall contents of the instrument.”   Alexander v. Buckeye

Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 245–46, 374 N.E.2d 146 (1978);

see Koprivec v. Rails-to-Trails of Wayne Cnty., 153 Ohio St.3d

137, 2018-Ohio-465, 102 N.E.3d 444, ¶ 24 (courts must interpret

deeds using plain language contained in the document).

    {¶22} Furthermore, when the language of the easement is

clear and unambiguous, courts “cannot in effect create a new

contract by finding an intent not expressed in the clear

language employed by the parties.”   Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53

Ohio St.2d at 246; accord Esteph v. Grumm, 175 Ohio App.3d 516,

2008-Ohio-1121, 887 N.E.2d 1248, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.) (“[w]hen the

language granting an easement is clear and the delineation of

the easement is unambiguous, we presume that the deed expresses

the intent of the parties, and we need not go beyond that

language in determining the scope of the easement”); Murray v.

Lyon, 95 Ohio App.3d 215, 219, 642 N.E.2d 41 (9th Dist.1994)

(“[i]f the intent is plain from the face of the document, then

it is not necessary to resort to rules of construction to

determine the easement’s effect”).   An easement “is unambiguous

if it can be given a definite legal meaning.”   Westfield Ins.

Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d

1256, ¶ 11 (citation omitted).
                                                                    13
ROSS, 23CA9

    {¶23} To determine whether language is unambiguous courts

must consider the document “‘as a whole,’” and not simply

“‘detached or isolated parts thereof.’”     Sauer v. Crews, 140

Ohio St.3d 314, 2014-Ohio-3655, 18 N.E.3d 410, ¶ 13, quoting

Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 166, 172,

436 N.E.2d 1347 (1982).    Moreover, courts should not “zero[] in

on the meaning of [a] word or phrase in isolation.”      Great Lakes

Bar Control, Inc. v. Testa, 156 Ohio St.3d 199, 2018-Ohio-5207,

124 N.E.3d 803, ¶ 11.     Rather, courts should eschew

“hyperliteral” readings and, again, consider the text as a

whole.   Id.   “Only when a definitive meaning proves elusive

should rules for construing ambiguous language be employed.”

State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5, 2005-Ohio-3095, 829

N.E.2d 690, ¶ 11, citing Galatis at ¶ 11.    The language of an

easement may be ambiguous if it is “susceptible to more than one

reasonable interpretation.”    Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ironics,

Inc., 168 Ohio St.3d 467, 2022-Ohio-841, 200 N.E.3d 149 ¶ 68.

    {¶24} It is important to recognize, however, that the

language of an easement does not become ambiguous simply because

litigants propose competing interpretations.     Corder v. Ohio

Edison Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020-Ohio-5220, 166 N.E.3d 1180,

¶ 38 (DeWine, J., concurring) (“mere fact that there are
                                                                    14
ROSS, 23CA9

competing interpretations of a legal text doesn’t mean that the

text is ambiguous”).   Instead, the competing readings may not be

“equally plausible,” and one reading may be “more natural.”

Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554

U.S. 33, 41, 128 S.Ct. 2326, 171 L.Ed.2d 203 (2008).    A

competing reading may be less plausible, for example, if it

“strain[s] ordinary usage or conflict[s] with the structure or

purpose of the [document] as a whole.”   Corder at ¶ 38 (DeWine,

J., concurring), citing Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554 U.S. at 41.

Competing readings, therefore, generally do not automatically

render a legal document ambiguous.    See id. (courts can declare

language ambiguous “[o]nly when a court has concluded that no

one reading of the language is superior to the other

possibilities”).

    {¶25} “[T]he initial determination of whether an ambiguity

exists presents an abstract legal question, which [appellate

courts] review on a de novo basis.”   Pierron v. Pierron, 4th

Dist. Scioto No. 07CA3153, 2008-Ohio-1286, ¶ 8, citing Stewart

v. Stewart, 4th Dist. Ross No. 92CA1885, 1992 WL 388546, *2

(Dec. 22, 1992); accord Ayersville Water & Sewer Dist. v.

Geiger, 3rd Dist. Defiance No. 4-11-19, 2012-Ohio-2689, ¶ 31

(“[w]hether the easement’s language was sufficiently definite to
                                                                    15
ROSS, 23CA9

establish its location is a question of law that is reviewed de

novo upon appeal”).   If ambiguity exists, “then the

determination of what the actual terms were becomes a question

of fact.”   Lake Erie Towing v. Troike, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-05-

062, 2006-Ohio-5115, ¶13.    In the absence of ambiguity, the

interpretation of an express easement is a question of law

subject to de-novo review.    Corder at ¶ 25, citing Buckeye Pipe

Line Co., paragraph one of the syllabus.

    {¶26} In the case before us, we do not believe that the

language of the easement is ambiguous.     Instead, the plain

language of the easement shows that the parties intended to give

Deborah Carter, and subsequent owners of the land, an easement

that crosses along the east side of the original Ware 66-acre

parcel and continues to County Road 550.

    {¶27} According to the parties’ stipulations, the first

paragraph of language at issue reads:

         The parties of the first part hereby grant the
    privilege of a gateway to the party of the second part
    leading from the Herods Creek and Frankfort Turnpike,
    running north to the lands of Deborah Carter not
    exceeding thirty (30) feet in width along the following
    described route to wit: a strip of land for the purposes
    of a roadway thirty feet in width along the east side of
    the following described tract of land belonging to
    Bertie H. Ware. “Beginning at an elm, black oak, and
    hickory corner to Mary Sandford [sic] thence .... (The
    foregoing description being taken from a quit claim deed
    made by Holcomb Porter, Nadie Porter, Annie P. Porter,
                                                                  16
ROSS, 23CA9

    J.W. Porter, Sallie M. Wiley, and L.E. Wiley to Bertie
    Ware on February 7th, 1891 and is recorded in the Records
    of Deeds of Ross County Vol. 111, Page 446).

    {¶28} This first paragraph describes the essential purpose

of the easement: to grant the party of the second part (i.e.,

Deborah Carter) a gateway that leads from the former Herods

Creek and Frankfort Turnpike (and, according to the parties’

stipulations, the current County Road 550) and continues north

to Deborah Carter’s property (now, appellant’s property).

    {¶29} The first paragraph also describes the gateway’s

route.   It states that the gateway is “along the following

described route to wit: a strip of land for the purposes of a

roadway thirty feet in width along the east side of the

following described tract of land belonging to Bertie H. Ware.”

This language unambiguously defines the route of the gateway as

beginning with a 30-foot-wide easement along the east side of

the Ware tract.   The next sentence contains the legal

description of the tract that is subject to this 30-foot-wide

easement, i.e., Ware’s 66-acre parcel.

    {¶30} The second paragraph continues to describe the

gateway’s route and states:

         From the South East corner of the above described
    tract of land along and over the following described
    route to wit: Beginning at the corner of Mary Sanford
    and Tighlman Porter and Gertrude Porter in a line of
                                                                  17
ROSS, 23CA9

    David A. Abernathy, where an elm black oak and hickory
    stand, thence with the line of David A. Abernathy S. 24
    W. 100 poles to a stone, thence South 9-1/2 E, with said
    line 45 poles to a stone, thence with the line of Scioto
    Abernathy S. 48 West 42.48 poles to a stone in the center
    of the Frankfort and Herods Creek Turnpike, thence
    westerly to a point within thirty (30) feet of the line
    of Da. Abernathy, thence N. 9-1/2 W, about 45 rods thence
    N. 24 E about 100-1/2 poles to the line between Mary
    Sanford and Tighlman Porter and Gertrude Porter, thence
    with their line thirty (30) feet wide from the beginning
    to the end, between the said described lines.

    {¶31} The phrase, “From the South East corner of the above

described tract of land,” indicates that the easement continues

from the southeast corner of the Ware tract, which is “the above

described tract of land.”    Then, the easement proceeds “along

and over the following described route.”    The “following

described route” defines the easement as “[b]eginning at the

corner of Mary Sanford and Tighlman Porter and Gertrude Porter

in a line of David A. Abernathy, where an elm black oak and

hickory stand, thence with the line of David A. Abernathy S. 24

W. 100 poles to a stone, thence South 9-1/2 E, with said line 45

poles to a stone, thence with the line of Scioto Abernathy S. 48

West 42.48 poles to a stone in the center of the Frankfort and

Herods Creek Turnpike.”     This language describes the easement’s

southerly route towards the Frankfort and Herods Creek Turnpike

(now, County Road 550).
                                                                  18
ROSS, 23CA9

    {¶32} Next, the easement describes the roadway’s northerly

return route.   According to the parties’ Stipulation 13, after

the easement reaches the center of the former Frankfort and

Herods Creek Turnpike, it continues “westerly to a point within

thirty (30) feet of the line of Da. Abernathy, thence N. 9-1/2

W, about 45 rods thence N. 24 E about 100-1/2 poles to the line

between Mary Sanford and Tighlman Porter and Gertrude Porter,

thence with their line thirty (30) feet wide from the beginning

to the end, between the said described lines.”   We observe,

however, that the parties’ Stipulation 13 appears to omit one of

the links on the northerly return route.   One stipulated exhibit

is a typewritten version of the original, handwritten 1892

easement (Joint Exhibit 5) and includes a northerly route

description that is missing in the parties’ Stipulation 13.    The

pertinent provisions for the northerly route, as shown in Joint

Exhibit 5, reads:

    thence Westerly with the center of said road on turnpike
    thirty (30) feet to a stone thence North 48 East about
    42 rods to a point within thirty (30) feet of the line
    of D. A. Abernathy thence North 9 & ½ West about 45 rods
    thence North 24 East about 100 & ½ poles to the line
    between Mary Sandford and Tighlman Porter & Gertrude
    Porter thence with their line thirty (30) feet to the
    place of beginning making a width or strip thirty (30)
    feet wide from the beginning to the end between the said
    described lines.
                                                                   19
ROSS, 23CA9

(Emphasis added).     The parties’ stipulated language omits the

italicized language, “with the center of said road on turnpike

thirty (30) feet to a stone thence North 48 East about 42 rods.”

This route essentially is the reverse of the southerly route,

i.e., “thence with the line of Scioto Abernathy S. 48 West 42.48

poles to a stone in the center of the Frankfort and Herods Creek

Turnpike.”

         Thus, with this reading it appears that the
    language unambiguously tracks the northerly return path
    of the easement to the southeast corner of the Ware
    tract. It uses substantially the same descriptions as
    the southerly route but describes the return as
    proceeding in the opposite direction.      So, on the
    southerly route the easement travels to the center of
    the Frankfort and Herods Creek Turnpike.        On the
    northerly route, the easement travels north from the
    former Turnpike until it reaches the point where it
    began.

    {¶33} This second paragraph thus describes the 30-foot-wide

easement that runs between the Ware tract and the former

Turnpike.     It does not define the entire easement.   Instead,

this second paragraph defines the easement after it exits the

Ware 66-acre tract.    Therefore, reading the two paragraphs

together establishes that the 30-foot-wide easement runs along

the east side of the original 66-acre Ware tract (of which

appellees’ parcel is a part) and continues uninterruptedly to
                                                                    20
ROSS, 23CA9

and from the former Frankfort and Herods Creek Turnpike (now,

County Road 550).

    {¶34} The third paragraph then summarizes the second half of

the easement:

         Being a strip of land deeded to Tighlman Porter for
    the purpose of a road way, by Mary Sanford, John A.
    Sanford, Ella [] Sanford, Gertrude Devine, Michael
    Devine, and Jennie Devine, by a deed dated Feb. 19, 1889
    and recorded in record of Deeds of Ross County, Vol.
    101, Page 544 and deeded by Tighlman Porter, subject to
    his life estate therein, to Bertie H. Ware, by a deed
    dated Feb. 7, 1891 and recorded in record of deeds of
    Ross County, Ohio Vol. 111, age 447.

This third paragraph describes the strip of land contained in

the second paragraph to help further define the easement.     The

third paragraph shows that the easement was established for

Tighlman Porter to use as a roadway and Tighlman then deeded the

easement to Bertie H. Ware.

    {¶35} The fourth paragraph reiterates the purpose of the

easement and states that the “road way as above described [is]

to be used by the said Deborah Carter or any future owner of

said lands or occupier of said lands as a passage way or road

way to and from said lands of Deborah Carter to the Frankfort

and Herods Creek Turnpike in perpetuity.”

    {¶36} After our review, we do not find any ambiguity in the

language.     As we explained above, the first paragraph defines
                                                                   21
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the portion of the easement along the Ware tract.    The second

paragraph is a continuation of that easement along the property

of several others that travels south toward the center of the

former Turnpike, then back to the beginning of the Ware tract

for an uninterrupted easement between the original Carter

property (now, appellant’s property) and the former Turnpike

(now, County Road 550).

    {¶37} We recognize that Attorney Motes opined that the first

paragraph does not describe an easement.    Instead, Motes thought

that the first paragraph simply described the Ware tract.

However, we believe that the language plainly states that it

describes the route of the “gateway” as being a 30-foot-wide

roadway along the east side of the Ware tract.    The language

then describes the Ware tract that is subject to this 30-foot-

wide easement.   We do not believe that it is equally plausible

that this language simply describes the Ware tract and that the

language about a 30-foot-wide roadway along the east side of the

Ware tract has no meaning.

    {¶38} Moreover, experts typically cannot testify regarding

the interpretation of a legal instrument, which, absent

ambiguity, constitutes a question of law.    Am. Energy Corp. v.

Datkuliak, 174 Ohio App.3d 398, 2007-Ohio-7199, 882 N.E.2d 463,
                                                                    22
ROSS, 23CA9

¶ 93 (7th Dist.) (trial court did not err by excluding expert

testimony regarding unambiguous language of deed); Nicholson v.

Turner/Cargile, 107 Ohio App.3d 797, 803, 669 N.E.2d 529 (10th

Dist.1995) (disregarding expert opinion that contracts imposed a

duty on defendants, saying “any expert opinion interpreting [the

contract terms] has no effect”); see Mentor Exempted Village

School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Lake Cty. Educational Serv. Ctr.

Governing Bd., 2016-Ohio-7649, 74 N.E.3d 706, ¶ 82 (11th Dist.)

(trial court erred by considering expert’s interpretation of a

contract).    In this case, we have found no ambiguity in the

language contained in the easement.    Thus, Motes’s testimony is

of no effect.

    {¶39} We also recognize that Motes stated that the easement

is not along the east side of the Ware tract.   He did not,

however, explain how he reached this conclusion.   Instead, it

appears to be a bare conclusion that the easement’s plain

language contradicts.    Additionally, an August 8, 2018 survey

map of appellees’ property included with the parties’

stipulations shows that the easement runs along the east side of

the Ware tract.

    {¶40} We also observe that to view the length of the entire

easement would require severing the 2018 survey map into two
                                                                     23
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parts.   The first part is on the right-hand side and illustrates

the 30-foot-wide easement that runs along the east side of the

original Ware tract.   The second part is on the left-hand side

and contains the easement that stretches from the southeast

corner of the Ware lot to and from County Road 550.     The survey

map notes this distinction by pointing out the “matchline” for

the two drawings, and joining the two drawings at the

“matchline” would show a visual display of the entire easement.

    {¶41} We further point out that the survey map of appellees’

property identifies an “existing 30.00 foot wide ingress and

egress easement as found in Deed Volume 136, Page 485.”

According to the parties’ stipulations, Deed Volume 136, Page

485 contains the same language as the 1892 stipulated easement

language and is the 1902 deed that Deborah Carter conveyed to

Strawder Pancake.   The parties further stipulated that this deed

describes the same property that appellant now owns.

    {¶42} In sum, we agree with appellant that the language of

the easement is clear and unambiguous and grants appellant a 30-

foot-wide easement that extends along the east side of

appellees’ property and continues to County Road 550.     The trial

court, therefore, erred by determining that appellant does not

have a valid easement across appellee’s property.
                                                                  24
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    {¶43} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

sustain appellant’s second assignment of error.

                                II

    {¶44} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts

that the trial court erred by denying his summary judgment

motion.

    {¶45} Because our disposition of appellant’s second

assignment of error renders his first assignment of error moot,

we do not address it.   See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

    {¶46} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

hereby reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this matter

to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

                              JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE
                              REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
                              CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
ROSS, 23CA9

                                                                  25
                            JUDGMENT ENTRY

    It is ordered that the appeal be reversed and remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.    Appellant

shall recover of appellees the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this

appeal.

    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this

Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this

judgment into execution.

    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that

mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                     For the Court

    BY:__________________________
                                         Peter B. Abele, Judge

                           NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.