Court Opinion

ID: 9728956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:20:04.01944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:53.479687
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. I would agree that mere presence on a rural Vermont *637road after midnight does not deserve even a brief stop by police. State v. Emilo, 144 Vt. 477, 481, 479 A.2d 169, 171 (1984). It is not unusual for a neighbor to go for a walk or a traveler to pass through. For any Vermont person living “in the sticks,” however, those late hours have particular significance. When people are seen moving from driveway to driveway, suspicion is a typical and appropriate response.
Although the facts developed at the hearing were sparse, enough facts appear to support the legality of the stop. In this case, State Trooper Vincent DiMauro was informed that an old pickup truck was seen moving from driveway to driveway after midnight in a rural area. The informant told the police that when he saw the pickup in one driveway, more than one person was milling about. When he soon saw the truck in a second driveway, no one was visible, but the informant could see objects in the bed of the truck. The informant thought the activity was suspicious given the late hour. As the Court points out, information given by a citizen is presumed to be reliable, United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 763 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978), and the police officer must determine whether the informant’s tip constitutes suspicious activity. State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072, 1076 (Me. 1982). Trooper DiMauro testified that he agreed that the activity was suspicious, and that the late hour and very rural location made the activity indicative of burglary. Consequently, when the informant pointed out the pickup, Trooper DiMauro stopped the truck to ask the driver what he was doing. Was DiMauro unreasonable for doing that?
All that is required for a legal stop is that the officer act on more than a hunch or intuition. State v. Sutpkin, 159 Vt. 9, 11, 614 A.2d 792, 793 (1992). If specific facts, and rational inferences drawn from those facts, can be articulated that would lead an officer to the reasonable belief that a defendant is engaged in some wrongdoing, then an officer may stop the potential suspect to either confirm or dispel the suspicions. State v. Lambert, 146 Vt. 142, 143, 499 A.2d 761, 762 (1985).
This is a far stronger case than State v. Kettlewell, 149 Vt. 331, 335-36, 544 A.2d 591, 594-95 (1987), in which we held that an informant’s statement that he did not know whether two Mexicans on his property were legal aliens was a hunch based on mere speculation. The informant here did not speculate that it was after midnight, nor did he speculate that the pickup was in more than one driveway and had articles in the bed. Further, Emilo, 144 Vt. 477, 479 A.2d 169, supports my view. There we held that the police acted on a mere hunch when stopping a vehicle on a rural highway at 3 a.m. merely because it had a Massachusetts plate and was an unfamiliar car. Id. at 481, 479 A.2d at 171. The Emilo Court would have surely been intrigued by the added facts of this case. A car traveling on a rural highway late at night is not nearly as indicative of criminal activity as is a truck moving from driveway to driveway under the cover of darkness, especially where it appears that objects have been loaded in the bed of the truck at one of the residences. In short, an objective observer could surmise, as did Trooper DiMauro, that the driver acquired the load by larcenous activity. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (whether police have enough evidence to make a stop based on observance of innocent behavior determined by the degree of suspicion attaching to particular types of noncriminal acts); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1981) (reasonable suspicion based on common sense of trained officers).
A peace officer need not witness criminal activity or erratic driving after receiving a tip and before making a stop. In Lambert, we upheld a vehicle stop based solely on third-hand hearsay information, *638with no police observation of criminal behavior. Lambert, 146 Vt. at 143, 499 A.2d at 762; see State v. Schmitt, 150 Vt. 503, 507, 554 A.2d 666, 668-69 (1988). Further, the Court’s comparison of Schmitt and State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 81, 582 A.2d 119, 121 (1990), is inappropriate. Neither of those cases determined the reliability or sufficiency of the anonymous tip. Siergiey, 155 Vt. at 80, 582 A.2d at 120; Schmitt, 150 Vt. at 507, 554 A.2d at 668. Each case was decided solely on the basis of the officer’s observations. Using those cases to support the proposition that an officer must both receive a tip and witness criminal behavior would be mistaken. A more apt case is one this Court cited with approval in Siergiey, 155 Vt. at 81, 582 A.2d at 121. In State v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72, 72-74 (S.D. 1986), a vehicle stop was upheld based on an anonymous call that a car was being driven erratically and the car’s mere presence in the area, without police observation of erratic driving or criminal behavior. I see little difference between that case and this.
Finally, the intrusion on defendant’s privacy was minimal. Trooper DiMauro sought only to inquire why the defendant was loading his truck, apparently at different secluded homes, in the middle of the night. We have previously recognized that “[a] brief detention, its scope reasonably related to the justification for the stop and inquiry, is permitted in order to ‘investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.’” Lambert, 146 Vt. at 143, 499 A.2d at 762; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.”). The Court’s use of Trooper DiMauro’s innocuous inquiry to somehow show that reasonable and articulable suspicion was lacking runs contrary to the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Police officers must be able to respond to citizen complaints, and simple inquiries are the most appropriate, least intrusive response. Country dwellers would find much solace, and be better protected, if police were permitted to ask questions in cases such as this one.
I say there was enough evidence to deny the motion to suppress, and I would affirm.