Court Opinion

ID: 9771995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:04:34.655973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:41.085980
License: Public Domain

DUNCAN, Justice,
dissenting.
Had Mrs. Buys sued in any of the counties encompassed by the Dallas, El Paso, Houston, or Tyler Court of Appeals districts, she would have recovered her community property interest in her former husband’s military retirement benefits. Unfortunately, however, Mrs. Buys lives in San Antonio, and it is here that she sued for partition. And, in this district, a residuary clause disposing of “all property,” including “financial assets,” does not effect a division of military retirement benefits.1 In my view, prior precedent of this court does not require us to depart from the majority rule, and prior precedent of our supreme court requires that we follow it and give effect to the clear and unambiguous residuary clause in the Buys’ divorce decree. I therefore dissent.
First, let us be clear as to the terms of the residuary clause in the Buys’ divorce decree: “All of the other properties, financial assets, or belongings ... not specifically set aside to [Mr. Buys] ... shall be and is [sic] hereby *912specifically ... granted to [Mrs. Buys] as separate property....” Despite the fact that the right to military retirement benefits is unquestionably a “financial asset,” the majority holds that this clause does not effect a division of these benefits. In support of its decision, the majority states that it is “follow[ing] our own precedent,” referring to Yeo v. Yeo, 581 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1979, writ refd n.r.e.), and Dunn v. Dunn, 703 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). In my view, neither Yeo nor Dunn requires the majority’s decision.
The Yeos divorced in 1964. At that time, “the state of the law as to one spouse’s right in the other spouse’s military retirement benefits was nebulous and unsettled even among lawyers.” Yeo, 581 S.W.2d at 737. However, in 1970, the supreme court held that all military retirement benefits accruing during marriage are community property and, when these benefits are not provided for in the divorce decree, the former spouses become tenants in common or joint owners of the benefits. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex.1970). Neither the Yeos’ divorce decree nor their property settlement agreement mentioned the military retirement benefits; accordingly, Mrs. Yeo sued for partition. The trial court granted a summary judgment to Mr. Yeo, and Mrs. Yeo appealed. On appeal, the issue before this court was whether the residuary clause in the Yeos’ property settlement agreement disposed of the military retirement benefits. Yeo, 581 S.W.2d at 737.
The Yeo residuary clause provided that Mrs. Yeo “released, remised and quit-claimed” to her former husband “all claims to, upon and against all his property and estate”, including “all other property of whatever nature, separate or community, in his possession or claimed by him.... ” Id. This court held that Mrs. Yeo’s interest in the military retirement benefits was not a “claim,” and the benefits were not “property in [Mr. Yeo’s] possession”; therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case for trial. Id. at 737, 740. The purpose of a trial, of course, was to partition the military retirement benefits.
The Yeo Court drew support for its decision from three cases — Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1973, writ refd n.r.e.), Thompson v. Thompson, 500 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.Civ.App.— Dallas 1973, no writ), and Simmons v. Simmons, 272 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1954, no writ). Yeo, 581 S.W.2d at 738. In Dessommes, the Dallas Court of Appeals ruled that a “release of claims” clause does not effect a disposition of property, because “ ‘possession’ could not properly be interpreted as including such intangible contract rights as those there involved.” Id. The clauses at issue in Thompson and Simmons were also similar to the Yeos’ clause in that they effected a release of one spouse’s rights in the other spouse’s property. In both eases, the Dallas and Fort Worth Courts of Appeals held this type of clause does not effect a disposition of community property, which by definition belongs to both spouses. See Yeo, 581 S.W.2d at 738-39.
The majority bases its decision upon the Yeo Court’s statement that “[t]he essential thrust of these and other cases involving broad and comprehensive release or residuary clauses in property settlement agreements is that, unless the property involved in specifically identified and described, such clauses are not effective to transfer or release property owned by the so-called ‘relea-sor.’ ” Id. at 739 (emphasis added). However, in light of the fact that the clauses involved in Yeo and the cases upon which it relied were either a “release of claims” clause or a “release of rights in the other spouse’s property” clause, “such clauses” must, in my view, be read to refer to these types of clauses only. With this statement of the law I have no disagreement. My disagreement arises out of the majority’s overly broad interpretation of this statement — completely divorced from its context.
The majority also relies upon Dunn v. Dunn, 703 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). The Dunns’ di*913vorce decree awarded each spouse one-half of the proceeds of a horse and “any and all other property5’ in that spouse’s possession and control at the time of the divorce. Dunn, 708 S.W.2d at 318. One issue before the court was whether this clause disposed of the military retirement benefits claimed by Mr. Dunn. Following Yeo, and again relying upon Dessommes, this court ruled that “ ‘possession’ could not properly be interpreted as including such intangible contract rights as future military retirement benefits.” Id. at 319. Accordingly, Mr. Dunn’s “right ... to claim his retirement benefits is the type of ‘intangible right’ contemplated in Yeo and Dessommes and the trial court therefore properly characterized it as falling outside of the residuary clause.” Id. at 320. Dunn, therefore, like Yeo, stands for the proposition that a clause effecting a division of property in one spouse’s possession at divorce does not reach the right to future military retirement benefits. To the same effect is Ewing v. Ewing, 739 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1987, no writ), also relied upon by the majority.2
In my view, therefore, neither Yeo nor Dunn constrains our analysis in this ease, because neither involved a residuary clause purporting to divide all property not specified in the divorce decree or the property settlement agreement regardless of “possession and control,” as does the residuary clause involved in this case. In interpreting the clause before us, therefore, we are not bound by prior precedent of this court. We also do not write in a vacuum. We should be guided by decisions involving similar clauses by other courts of appeals and, more generally, by our supreme court.
The supreme court has made clear that a judgment is to be construed like any other written instrument. Permian Oil Co. v. Smith, 129 Tex. 413, 449, 107 S.W.2d 564, 567 (1937). Since the same rules of interpretation apply, judgments, like contracts, are to be construed as a whole, harmonizing and giving effect to each part. Lone Star Cement Corp. v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Tex.1971). Employing these familiar rules, the other courts of appeals addressing the issue before us have uniformly given effect to the plain meaning of similar residuary clauses. See Tharp v. Tharp, 772 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1989, no writ);3 Jacobs v. Cude, 641 S.W.2d 258 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.);4 Bloom v. Bloom, 604 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1980, no writ).5 The application of the rules in this context was succinctly stated in Jacobs:
By its very nature, a residuary clause encompasses those things not specified in the decree but included in the community property under the jurisdiction of the court. Otherwise, a party to an earlier judgment would be able to collaterally “chip away” at the ownership status of property already adjudicated by a court, and the entire purpose of the residuary clause would be destroyed.
Jacobs, 641 S.W.2d at 260.
In this case, the parties’ intent was expressly stated — to reach “a complete settle*914ment of their respective property and marital rights” “either now vested or to be vested.” To accomplish this intent, the residuary clause plainly and unambiguously awards to Mrs. Buys all property, including all financial assets, not specifically set aside to Mr. Buys. Indisputably, the right to military retirement benefits was not expressly set aside to Mr. Buys in the decree. Just as clearly, the right to military benefits is a financial asset. Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the residuary clause, therefore, the right to military benefits was awarded to Mrs. Buys. The benefits were thus “treat[ed]” in the Buys’ divorce decree and subject to partition under and in accordance with the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (codified, as amended, at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (West Supp.1993)) and Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1982).
Under unequivocal supreme court precedent, we are required to give effect to the parties’ intent as expressed in their clear and unambiguous agreement. The majority has failed to do so and has instead ignored the parties’ statement of their intent at the time of their divorce and completely eviscerated the expression of that intent in the residuary clause. For these reasons, and because I believe Mrs. Buys was entitled to attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest, I dissent.

. The majority opinion, by its terms, applies only to military retirement benefits; the opinion leaves open whether similar residuary clauses effect a disposition of other types of community properly. If limited to military retirement benefits, the majority’s rule unfairly penalizes spouses of military personnel; if expanded to include all types of community property, the majority’s rule will require a new division each time a new item of community property is discovered.

. In a case involving a clause setting aside the parties' “community property” to the spouse with "possession and control” at the date of divorce, the El Paso Court of Appeals gave effect to the parties’ intent to dispose of all of their community property and declined to following the reasoning in Dessommes. See Carreon v. Morales, 698 S.W.2d 241 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1985, no writ). Presumably, therefore, the El Paso Court of Appeals would also give effect to a clause awarding property and financial assets to one or the other spouse without regard to "possession and control.”

. Tharp, 772 S.W.2d at 468-69 (residuary clause awarding “the remainder of the marital estate” to ex-husband effected disposition of retirement benefits).

. Jacobs, 641 S.W.2d at 259-60 (residuary clause awarding former husband "all community property not mentioned above” effected disposition of retirement benefits).

. Bloom, 604 S.W.2d at 394 (where retirement benefits were in former’s husband’s name, and residuary clause provided that property not specifically divided but in the name of one spouse at the time of divorce became that spouse’s separate property, husband entitled to retirement benefits).