Court Opinion

ID: 9397270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 21:00:50.361851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:22.997175
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4438     Doc: 52           Filed: 05/23/2023   Pg: 1 of 15

                                              PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4438

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                    Plaintiff – Appellee,

              v.

        CHRISTOPHER ROBERTSON,

                    Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Newport News. David J. Novak, District Judge. (4:18-cr-00027-DJN-LRL-1)

        Argued: March 10, 2023                                           Decided: May 23, 2023

        Before AGEE and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion in which Judge Richardson
        and Judge Keenan joined.

        ARGUED: Fernando Groene, FERNANDO GROENE, PC, Williamsburg, Virginia, for
        Appellant. Jacqueline Romy Bechara, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney,
        Richmond, Virginia, Eric M. Hurt, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
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        AGEE, Circuit Judge:

               After committing or attempting to commit thirteen robberies, Christopher Robertson

        was indicted on twenty-two counts of robbery-related activity and one count of being a

        felon in possession of a firearm. Before a jury could return a verdict in Robertson’s original

        trial, it was deemed a mistrial.

               Before a retrial, at Robertson’s request, the district court severed Robertson’s

        charges into two trials—one for the felon in possession of a firearm charge and another for

        the robbery-related charges. After both trials resulted in guilty verdicts on all counts,

        Robertson filed motions for a judgment of acquittal in each case, arguing that there was

        insufficient evidence to support his convictions. The district court denied the motions.

        Robertson appeals, contesting the district court’s decisions on both motions for acquittal,

        the district court’s enforcement of a stipulation in the retrial, and the district court’s use of

        certain jointly proposed jury instructions, and alleging a speedy trial violation. For the

        reasons discussed below, we affirm.

                                                       I.

               In 2013 and 2014, Robertson orchestrated thirteen robberies throughout eastern

        Virginia. He and three coconspirators robbed gas stations, restaurants, grocery stores, and

        other similar businesses in Chesapeake, Fredericksburg, Newport News, Spotsylvania, and

        Yorktown.

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               As part of an investigation into the robberies and pursuant to a state court order,

        Newport News local law enforcement obtained cell site location information from Verizon

        cell towers that placed Robertson near the location of each robbery at the time it occurred.

               After unsuccessfully attempting to arrest Robertson, law enforcement obtained a

        warrant to search for him in the residence of Keosha Hodge, the mother of one of his

        children. At 6:00 AM on May 20, 2016, law enforcement executed the warrant and

        searched Hodge’s residence, in which they found a 9-millimeter Taurus handgun lying on

        the floor underneath some clothing in the main bedroom and Robertson’s prescription card

        in the bedroom closet. Law enforcement also located a motorcycle helmet in the residence

        and observed Robertson’s motorcycle parked outside of it. The officers then found

        Robertson hiding in the attic and arrested and searched him. In the course of the search, the

        officers found a 9-millimeter bullet in Robertson’s right front pants pocket, which had the

        “same, identical markings” as the bullets found in the firearm on the floor of the main

        bedroom. J.A. 205.

               Robertson was subsequently charged with fourteen counts of a combination of

        conspiracy to commit, actually committing, and attempting to commit Hobbs Act robbery;

        eight counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence; and one count of being a felon

        in possession of a firearm.

               Prior to Robertson’s first trial, Robertson and the Government entered into multiple

        stipulations, one of which provided that his robberies and attempted robberies “affected

        commerce.” J.A. 32. Before a verdict was reached, the district court declared a mistrial on

        February 15, 2019, for reasons unrelated to this appeal.

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               Thereafter, a superseding indictment was filed bringing the same twenty-three

        charges against Robertson and adding a coconspirator. Robertson moved to sever his

        claims, asking for separate trials on the felon-in-possession charge and the robbery-related

        charges. The district court granted the motion and scheduled a trial on the

        felon-in-possession charge for March 3, 2020.

               Robertson then proceeded to trial on the felon-in-possession charge, stipulating that

        he was a felon and was aware of his felon status. The Government presented evidence of

        the search of Hodge’s house and the seizure of the firearm found near Robertson’s

        possessions. They also presented evidence regarding the bullet found in Robertson’s

        pocket, which was identical to the bullets found in the firearm. Additionally, the

        Government     demonstrated    that   the   firearm    was   purchased    by   Robertson’s

        on-again-off-again girlfriend and the mother of his second child, Aquilla Jones. The jury

        found Robertson guilty.

               After trial, Robertson moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was

        insufficient evidence that he possessed the firearm because no fingerprints were obtained

        from the firearm, no testing was done on the bullet found in his pocket, and certain items

        in the bedroom where the firearm was found clearly belonged to Hodge. The district court

        denied the motion and explained that the Government provided sufficient evidence

        connecting Robertson to the bedroom and noted that he was found hiding in the house with

        a matching bullet in his pocket. This “mosaic of circumstantial evidence” was sufficient

        for a reasonable juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Robertson constructively

        possessed the firearm. J.A. 275 (footnote omitted).

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               Thereafter, the district court asked the parties to submit their speedy trial positions

        on an August 2020 trial date for the remaining counts. Robertson never asserted a speedy

        trial violation but advised the district court that he “wished to be tried as soon as possible.”

        J.A. 237. The district court found that the “ends of justice” were served by setting a trial

        date beyond the seventy-day window normally required by the Speedy Trial Act because

        the case was complex and counsel needed time to prepare. J.A. 247–48. However, before

        the parties could agree on a date, the district court closed due to COVID, but shortly

        thereafter the trial was scheduled for December 4, 2020.

               The district court entered an order which excluded the period from July 7, 2020 to

        December 3, 2020 from the speedy trial calculation due to COVID’s effect on the court’s

        operations. Robertson filed a position statement, agreeing that the court’s order was “well

        reasoned and sound” and “properly justifie[d] the exclusion” of time for speedy trial

        purposes. J.A. 290. He did “not object to this particular time exclusion” but restated “his

        desire to be tried as soon as possible” and refused to waive his right to a speedy trial. J.A.

        290. The district court extended its jury trial suspension twice more. Ultimately, the district

        court set a trial date of March 1, 2021.

               Before the trial, the Government moved to enforce several stipulations which the

        parties had entered into prior to Robertson’s first trial. Although he did not challenge the

        enforcement of some of the stipulations, Robertson did object to the enforcement of the

        prior stipulation that stated that the alleged robberies affected interstate commerce. The

        district court nonetheless accepted the stipulation, reasoning that Robertson had “not

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        demonstrated manifest injustice resulting from the enforcement of the stipulation, nor that

        he inadvertently entered into the stipulation.” J.A. 307.

               On March 1, 2021, Robertson was tried by a jury and the evidence included

        testimony from his three coconspirators—Michael Ellison, Ezekiel Keaton, and Jones.

        Each testified that they participated in the robberies at Robertson’s direction, J.A. 322–23,

        361, 484–85, 521–22, and stated that Robertson selected the locations to rob and

        accompanied them to the locations during every robbery. They further explained that

        Robertson did not enter the businesses because he believed the security cameras could

        identify him through retinal scans. Instead, Robertson kept lookout and advised Ellison and

        Keaton when it was clear to enter each business.

               The coconspirators revealed that the first group of robberies was committed by just

        Ellison and Robertson between September 24, 2013 and October 13, 2013. Ellison testified

        regarding every robbery that occurred and stated that Robertson aided him with each one.

        The second set of robberies involved Robertson, Ellison, Jones, and Keaton, and occurred

        throughout December 2014. The coconspirators testified as to Robertson’s involvement in

        each of those robberies as well.

               After the parties rested their cases, Robertson and the Government proposed joint

        jury instructions, which the district court accepted and provided to the jury. The jury then

        convicted Robertson on all counts. Thereafter, Robertson moved for an acquittal, arguing

        that there was insufficient evidence that his coconspirators succeeded in retrieving anything

        of value during certain robberies. The district court denied Robertson’s motion, laying out

        the evidence that demonstrated that the coconspirators took money from each robbery and

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        concluding that a rational juror accepting that testimony could find that they completed the

        robberies. United States v. Robertson, No. 4:18cr27 (DJN), 2021 WL 3575834, at *1–3,

        *7–8 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2021).

               Additionally, Robertson argued that the jury instructions contained a prejudicial

        error. The district court rejected this argument, reasoning that Robertson “forfeited his

        challenge to the[] instructions under the invited error doctrine” as he jointly proposed the

        instructions. Id. at *8. Moreover, the district court concluded that Robertson, who had not

        objected to the jury instructions before the jury retired to deliberate, failed to demonstrate

        plain error. Id. at *9.

               Robertson timely appealed, bringing four challenges to the district court’s decisions.

        First, Robertson argues that the district court abused its discretion by enforcing a stipulation

        in the retrial which the parties entered into before the first trial. Second, he posits that there

        was insufficient evidence supporting his convictions. Third, Robertson contests the district

        court’s use of a jointly proposed jury instruction. Finally, he contends that the district court

        violated his right to a speedy trial. 1 We take each argument in turn. 2

               1
                  Robertson also argues that the district court erred by denying two motions to
        suppress that he brought before his retrial. But Robertson failed to develop those arguments
        or provide any support for them in his opening brief. As such, they have been waived. See
        Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an
        argument by failing to present it in its opening brief or by failing to develop its argument—
        even if its brief takes a passing shot at the issue.” (cleaned up)).
               2
                   The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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                                                       II.

               Robertson initially asserts that the district court erred by enforcing in the retrial a

        stipulation that the parties entered into before his first trial. We disagree.

               We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, which the Court “will not

        find unless the decision was arbitrary and irrational.” United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331,

        346 (4th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Generally, “stipulations of attorneys made during a trial

        may not be disregarded or set aside at will.” Marshall v. Emersons Ltd., 593 F.2d 565, 569

        (4th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). As a result, we have recognized only two exceptions that

        require setting aside a stipulation: (1) “when it becomes apparent that [the stipulation] may

        inflict a manifest injustice upon one of the contracting parties,” and (2) “when a stipulation

        is entered into under a mistake of law.” Id. at 568 (citation omitted). Neither exception

        applies here.

               However, we have not previously considered the question now before us—whether

        a stipulation made before a previous trial can be binding in a later trial. Having reviewed

        the parties’ arguments on this issue, we join our sister circuits that have unanimously

        concluded that a district court may enforce in a later trial a stipulation entered into in an

        earlier trial. 3 See Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 616–20 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting a

        challenge to the district court’s acceptance of a stipulation in a later trial entered into before

               3
                  Notably, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its
        “broad discretion” by choosing not to enforce a stipulation entered into during a prior trial
        because stipulations “need not be rigidly and pointlessly adhered to at trial.” Hunt v.
        Marchetti, 824 F.2d 916, 918 (11th Cir. 1987) (cleaned up). It did not, however, state that
        a district court could not enforce an earlier-made stipulation in a later trial.

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        a previous trial); United States v. Marino, 617 F.2d 76, 82 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); United

        States v. Wingate, 128 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v.

        Burkhead, 646 F.2d 1283, 1285 (8th Cir. 1981) (same); Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc.

        v. Comm’r, 820 F.2d 1543, 1547–48 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Boothman,

        654 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Kanu, 695 F.3d 74, 78–82

        (D.C. Cir. 2012) (same); see also Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Richard Lundgren, Inc., 314

        F.3d 17, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2002) (rejecting a challenge to the district court’s acceptance of a

        stipulation entered into in a previous lawsuit); Calcutt v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 37 F.4th

        293, 322 (6th Cir. 2022) (concluding that the ALJ did not abuse his discretion by admitting

        stipulations from prior proceedings).

               In analyzing this issue, our sister circuits posit that the most important factor to

        consider is “the parties’ intention to limit or not limit a stipulation to only one proceeding.”

        Kanu, 695 F.3d at 78 (citation omitted); see also Waldorf, 142 F.3d at 617 (“[T]he parties’

        intention to limit or not limit a stipulation to only one proceeding is the overriding factor.”).

        So, “a stipulation does not continue to bind the parties if they expressly limited it to the

        first proceeding or if the parties intended the stipulation to apply only at the first trial.”

        Kanu, 695 F.3d at 79 (citation omitted). But where the stipulation was “an open-ended

        concession of liability without limitation to the ensuing trial,” there is no reason to relieve

        a party from an earlier-made stipulation in a later proceeding. Id. (cleaned up).

               Applying those sound principles here, nothing in the stipulation’s language limited

        its applicability to the first trial. See J.A. 32 (stating that the parties “agree that the robbery

        or attempted robbery of the listed businesses affected commerce on the date of the robbery

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        or attempted robbery” and listing the relevant businesses). The parties entered into an

        open-ended stipulation in which they both agreed that Robertson’s alleged robberies

        affected commerce. That Robertson later regretted entering into the stipulation is not

        sufficient to relieve him of its continuing effect. See Waldorf, 142 F.3d at 616 (“Generally,

        a stipulation entered into prior to a trial remains binding during subsequent proceedings

        between the parties.”). Accordingly, the district court’s acceptance of the stipulation in the

        retrial was not an abuse of discretion.

                                                     III.

               Robertson next argues that the district court erred by denying his motions for a

        judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions.

        Again, we disagree.

               When considering a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a jury’s guilty verdict,

        the court must sustain the verdict “if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most

        favorable to the Government, to support it.” United States v. Stockton, 349 F.3d 755, 761

        (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable finder

        of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s

        guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996)

        (en banc). We review the district court’s sufficiency conclusion de novo but can reverse a

        conviction “only where no reasonable juror ‘could have found the essential elements of the

        crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Dennis, 19 F.4th 656, 666 (4th Cir.

        2021) (citation omitted).

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               To establish the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the Government

        must prove: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony, (2) the defendant knew

        he was a felon, (3) the defendant knowingly possessed the firearm, and (4) the possession

        was in or affecting commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct.

        2191, 2200 (2019). For the third element, constructive possession of the firearm is

        sufficient, meaning a person can be considered to have possessed the firearm if “he

        exercised, or had the power to exercise, dominion and control over the firearm.” United

        States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 282 (4th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). This can be established

        “through direct or circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Smith, 21 F.4th 122, 140 (4th

        Cir. 2021).

               There was sufficient evidence supporting Robertson’s conviction for being a felon

        in possession of a firearm. As indicated, Robertson stipulated that he was previously

        convicted of a felony and knew of his status as a felon. And Robertson does not argue that

        the firearm possession did not affect commerce. As to the possession element, the relevant

        firearm was purchased by Robertson’s on-again-off-again girlfriend, Jones. It was found

        in the home of another one of his girlfriends and the mother of his child—the house in

        which Robertson was hiding at 6:00 AM—in a room where Robertson kept other

        belongings. Further, police recovered a bullet from Robertson’s pocket with identical

        markings as the bullets found in the firearm. This is sufficient evidence for a reasonable

        juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Robertson constructively possessed the

        firearm. See United States v. Jones, 945 F.2d 747, 749–50 (4th Cir. 1991) (concluding that

        there was “ample evidence” of constructive possession where “police found the gun in [the

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        defendant’s] bedroom and ammunition for the gun in his pocket”); United States v.

        Jones, 204 F.3d 541, 543–44 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Given that the cocaine . . . was found behind

        a dresser drawer in the bedroom from which the officer saw Jones exit and in which

        authorities discovered Jones’ personal papers, we cannot say that the district court, sitting

        as trier of fact, erred in finding that Jones possessed the cocaine.”); United States v. Griffin,

        175 F. App’x 627, 630 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (determining that the defendant’s “early

        morning presence in the bedroom where th[e] items were found” along with his personal

        papers in the bedroom provided sufficient evidence to support a conviction for constructive

        possession of the items). And, contrary to Robertson’s argument, this is true despite the

        fact that the evidence is circumstantial because the Government can prove constructive

        possession “through direct or circumstantial evidence.” Smith, 21 F.4th at 140.

               Similarly, there was sufficient evidence to support Robertson’s convictions for

        Hobbs Act robbery, which requires the Government to show: “(1) that the defendant

        coerced the victim to part with property; (2) that the coercion occurred through the

        wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear. . . ; and (3) that the coercion

        occurred in such a way as to adversely affect interstate commerce.” United States v. Reed,

        780 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). A defendant can also be convicted of aiding

        and abetting Hobbs Act robbery. United States v. Ali, 991 F.3d 561, 574 (4th Cir. 2021).

               Robertson argues that there was insufficient evidence that he participated in the

        robberies. Notably, he concedes that his coconspirators’ testimony constituted evidence

        that he participated in the robberies because it “is well settled in this circuit that the

        uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.”

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        United States v. Baker, 985 F.2d 1248, 1255 (4th Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, Robertson

        contends that his coconspirators’ testimony should have been disregarded because they

        were not credible. For example, Robertson posits that Ellison “barely had any recollection”

        of the robberies and his testimony was vague. Opening Br. 22. He also states that all the

        evidence that he participated in the 2014 robberies came from coconspirators who had

        equivocated or lied in earlier proceedings.

               These arguments all must fail because “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court, weighs

        the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented. And,

        in conducting such a review, [the Court] is obliged to view the evidence and all reasonable

        inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United

        States v. Palacios, 677 F.3d 234, 250 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). As the district

        court thoroughly explained, Robertson’s coconspirators—particularly Ellison—described

        each of the robberies and summarized Robertson’s role in them. Accepting that testimony

        as true, as the Court must in reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, a reasonable

        juror could find Robertson guilty of the robberies beyond a reasonable doubt. As such,

        Robertson’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are without merit. 4

               4
                 Moreover, below, Robertson’s only sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument was that
        there was insufficient evidence that “money or another thing of value was taken by Ellison
        and his accomplices in the alleged robberies charged in Counts 2, 4, 5, 12, 13 and 15.” J.A.
        817. He did not challenge the evidence of his involvement in the robberies. Therefore, we
        can only correct the district court’s error if it was particularly egregious, which we do not
        find here. See United States v. Hardy, 999 F.3d 250, 253–54 (4th Cir. 2021) (“When a
        defendant fails to raise an argument in the district court, [the Court] may correct only
        particularly egregious errors.” (cleaned up)).
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                                                     IV.

               Robertson also argues that the district court abused its discretion by utilizing certain

        jury instructions that he and the Government jointly proposed to the court. But we “fail to

        see how the trial court abused its discretion based on [an] allegedly prejudicial instruction

        when [Robertson] asked for it and thus invited the error.” United States v. Simmons, 11

        F.4th 239, 263 (4th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 257 (4th

        Cir. 2019) (declining to address an argument about an improper jury instruction where the

        defendants “invited the claimed error”); United States v. Herrera, 23 F.3d 74, 75 (4th Cir.

        1994) (“[A] court can not be asked by counsel to take a step in a case and later be convicted

        of error, because it has complied with such request.” (citation omitted)). Thus, regardless

        of the merit of Robertson’s claim, we decline to vacate Robertson’s convictions on this

        ground. See Simmons, 11 F.4th at 262 (“In the ordinary case, Defendants might have a

        colorable argument that this instruction conflicts with our precedent . . . . But Defendants,

        along with the Government, jointly proposed this instruction to the trial court.”).

                                                      V.

               Robertson finally argues that the district court violated his speedy trial rights by

        holding his retrial more than seventy days after his mistrial. Indeed, the Speedy Trial Act

        requires that, in the event of a mistrial, a defendant be brought to trial within seventy days

        of “the date the action occasioning the retrial becomes final.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e).

        Although there are certain periods of delay that are excluded from computing the time

        within which trial must begin, see id. § 3161(h), if more than seventy nonexcludable days

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        pass without bringing the defendant to trial, the district court “shall” dismiss the indictment

        “on motion of the defendant.” Id. § 3162(a)(2). However, failure to move for dismissal

        prior to trial “shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal.” Id. And plain-error review

        is unavailable for violations not timely asserted before trial begins. United States v.

        Mosteller, 741 F.3d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 2014).

               Although Robertson stated multiple times that he wished to be tried as soon as

        possible, he never moved for a dismissal prior to trial based on a speedy trial violation. In

        fact, even when prompted, Robertson never objected to the district court’s trial schedule.

        Accordingly, Robertson waived his right to assert a speedy trial violation and we need not

        consider his argument further.

                                                           VI.

               For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Robertson’s convictions.

                                                                                          AFFIRMED

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