Court Opinion

ID: 9410080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 14:00:35.510222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:55.258315
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13872   Document: 17-1    Date Filed: 07/20/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-13872
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       NEIL WALKER,
                                                 Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       MICHAEL CRESPI,
       Ex Judge,
       FRANCES H. SMITH,
       Ex Attorney,
       JEFF SESSIONS,
       Ex Attorney General,
       SUE BELL COBB,
       Ex Judge,
       WILLIAM RICHARD MOEGLIN,
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13872

       Ex Court Reporter, et al.,

                                                    Respondents-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00515-WHA-SMD
                            ____________________

       Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Neil Walker, an Alabama prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a
       complaint in this action; the district court construed it as a petition
       for habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Walker pre-
       viously filed a § 2254 petition and failed to obtain authorization
       from this Court before filing his current one, the district court con-
       cluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the
       case. After careful consideration, we affirm.
                                         I.
               In 1994, Walker was convicted in Alabama of murder and
       sentenced to life imprisonment. Since then, Walker has filed sev-
       eral § 2254 habeas petitions in federal court, challenging the validity
       of his conviction and sentence. In 2001, Walker filed his first § 2254
       petition in federal court. The district court determined that Walker
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       22-13872                  Opinion of the Court                         3

       was entitled to no relief on any of his claims and denied the peti-
       tion.
               Walker then filed several other habeas petitions challenging
       his conviction or sentence. He filed another petition in 2010. Be-
       cause Walker failed to obtain prior authorization from this Court
       before filing the petition, the district court concluded that it was an
       unauthorized second or successive petition and dismissed it.
       Walker filed additional petitions in 2014, 2015, and 2016. The dis-
       trict court determined that those petitions, too, were unauthorized
       second or successive petitions and dismissed them.
               In 2022, Walker filed this action in federal district court. He
       initiated the action by completing a form used by pro se litigants
       seeking to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filing it with the
       court. In the form complaint, Walker alleged that the judge in his
       criminal case originally sentenced him to a term of imprisonment
       for a “natural life” but later changed the sentence to “life sentence.”
       Doc. 1 at 6. 1 Claiming that this change violated his constitutional
       rights, Walker asked the district court to declare his life sentence
       “void.” Id. at 7.
              A magistrate judge reviewed Walker’s complaint and sub-
       mitted a recommendation. Although the complaint stated that
       Walker was proceeding under § 1983, the magistrate judge rechar-
       acterized the complaint as a habeas petition brought under
       28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Walker was challenging the state court

       1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13872

       judgment under which he was imprisoned. The magistrate judge
       then recommended that the district court dismiss the petition as an
       unauthorized second or successive petition.
              Walker objected to the recommendation, arguing that the
       magistrate judge erred in recharacterizing his complaint brought
       under § 1983 as a § 2254 habeas petition. The district court over-
       ruled the objection, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommenda-
       tion, and dismissed the case. This is Walker’s appeal.
                                          II.
              “We review de novo whether a petition for a writ of habeas
       corpus is second or successive.” Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
       849 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
                                         III.
               The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
       (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, requires that be-
       fore a prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment can
       file a “second or successive” federal habeas petition, he must
       “move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing
       the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C.
       § 2244(b)(3)(A). If a prisoner fails to obtain such prior authorization
       before filing a second or successive application, the district court
       must dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. See Farris v. United
       States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). To determine whether
       a petition is second or successive, we look to whether the prisoner
       previously filed a federal habeas petition challenging the same
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       22-13872                Opinion of the Court                          5

       judgment. Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1278–
       79 (11th Cir. 2014).
              Walker argues that the district court erred by recharacteriz-
       ing his complaint as a habeas petition filed under § 2254. We disa-
       gree.
              A prisoner “convicted and sentenced under state law may
       seek federal relief under two primary avenues:” either a petition for
       habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or a complaint pursuant
       to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir.
       2006). These two avenues are “mutually exclusive,” meaning “if a
       claim can be raised in a federal habeas petition, that same claim
       cannot be raised in a separate § 1983 civil rights action.” Id.
              “The line of demarcation between a § 1983 civil rights action
       and a § 2254 habeas claim is based on the effect of the claim on the
       [prisoner’s] conviction and/or sentence.” Id. When a prisoner
       “challenges the circumstances of his confinement but not the valid-
       ity of his conviction and/or sentence, then the claim is properly
       raised in a civil rights action under § 1983.” Id. (internal quotation
       marks omitted). In contrast, when a prisoner raises “any challenge
       to the lawfulness of confinement or the particulars affecting its du-
       ration, his claim falls solely within the province of habeas corpus
       under § 2254.” Id. (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks
       omitted). As the Supreme Court recently explained, when a pris-
       oner seeks an “immediate or speedier release from prison,” he is
       challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence and proceed-
       ing under § 2254. Nance v. Ward, 142 S. Ct. 2214, 2221 (2022)
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13872

       (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the prisoner must
       comply with AEDPA’s procedural requirements, including its bar
       on second or successive petitions. Id. When deciding whether a pro
       se prisoner’s claim should be characterized as a § 2254 habeas peti-
       tion or a civil action under § 1983, “[f]ederal courts are obligated to
       look beyond the label” attached to the filing. United States v. Stossel,
       348 F.3d 1320, 1322 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003).
              Although Walker labeled his complaint as a claim under
       § 1983, the district court properly recharacterized it as a § 2254 ha-
       beas petition. In the complaint, Walker attacked the duration of his
       sentence and sought a speedier release from confinement. As a re-
       sult, his claim was subject to AEDPA’s procedural requirements,
       including the bar on second or successive petitions. See Hutcherson,
       468 F.3d at 754. Because Walker did receive authorization from this
       Court before filing the petition, the district court properly dis-
       missed the petition as an unauthorized successive § 2254 petition.
       See Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216.
              AFFIRMED.