Court Opinion

ID: 9496431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:26:20.445676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:33.267297
License: Public Domain

RADER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
For a third (or perhaps a fourth) time, this court revisits some exceptions to an exception to an exception to the standard rule of infringement.1 These many pronouncements on such a fine point beg the question of why this court and the Supreme Court have repeatedly returned to such a detail. A part of the answer is that these exceptions, like many facets of patent law, do not affect solely infringement principles. Like the proverbial balloon, a pinch on this backside of the law disrupts symmetry on the front side. In this case, the pinch to rein in the doctrine of equivalents disrupts a fundamental practice of patent acquisition, namely that nearly every patent faces amendment during prosecution. While I concur in this court’s most recent pronouncement, I write separately to highlight the difficulty of preserving expectations when frequently revising standards affecting the scope of patent coverage. The principle of foreseeability, I conclude, focuses on the correct inquiries to preserve expectations for patent holders.
Before the Supreme Court ventured to create new presumptions for the exception to the exception to the standard rule for infringement, claim amendments without a fulsome explanation of purpose did not “bar the application of the doctrine of equivalents.”2 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). *1375Instead, a flexible rule permitted courts to tailor the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the intent and breadth of the amendment. Thus, under the flexible rule, the courts genuinely sought to determine the scope of the surrendered subject matter and to estop any recapture of that scope under the doctrine of equivalents.3 An amendment during prosecution did not work an entire forfeiture of equivalents beyond the scope of surrender. Of course, as documented by this court in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed.Cir.2000) (en banc) (Festo VI), this court’s first Festo en banc, that flexible rule engendered some imprecision.4 Nonetheless that rule — now discarded — sought to preserve expectations of patent applicants.
In response to the demise of the flexible rule and the rise of new rules, an applicant must now avoid amendments, file more and increasingly specific claims (at the risk of prolonging the backlogged prosecution process), resort to less precise functional claims to preserve a statutory equivalent,5 or perhaps even use continuation strategies 6 to protect claim scope. This court and the Supreme Court necessarily disturbed some settled expectations in the prosecution process, Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 41, 117 S.Ct. 1040 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), to achieve more certainty in the enforcement process. Doctrinal changes in enforcement rules almost invariably affect as well the patent acquisition process.
Without belaboring the point, I venture to suggest that, at the pace of these changes in fundamental patent law, the noble objective of bringing more certainty to the doctrine of equivalents nonetheless exacts a price in unintended consequences. For instance, the Supreme Court’s stringent estoppel presumptions also entail considerable unanticipated arbitrariness because examiners differ. Some examiners aggressively seek to narrow and define claims. Others demand far fewer amendments. Thus the application of the forfeiture presumption often depends on the luck of the examiner draw. In any event, the new certainty rules for equivalents (a rebuttable presumption that narrowing amendments erect a complete bar), at least *1376for a period of time, may disrupt as much certainty as they provide. In particular, these new rules are likely to influence both the patent acquisition and enforcement processes in unpredictable ways.
To make my point clearer, much of the unpredictability of these changes lies in the pace of change. By common law standards, this court’s jurisprudence moves at a lightning pace. This pace can engender uncertainty about the consequences of each new rule. This court met en banc to cabin the doctrine of equivalents in 1995. A scarce few years later, the doctrine is certainly more confined, but patent law also has numerous new rules affecting the scope of claims, the strategy of prosecuting a patent, and other aspects of invention law. Trial courts and practitioners have little time to assess the full impact of one rule before hit with another or an exception to the first. With exception added to exception, and presumptions rebutted by still newer presumptions, a practitioner can scarcely predict the scope of claims years in the future, when they are likely to be enforced, let alone the scope of claims drafted a few years ago when amendments did not potentially forfeit claim scope. In other words, the pace of the creation of new rules is itself disrupting the fundamental principle of certainty in the scope of patent claims.
With that word of caution about the pace and consequences of doctrinal shifts, I wish to emphasize that the principle of foreseeability, adopted by the Supreme Court, promises to bring the enforcement of the doctrine of equivalents together with the expectations of the claim drafting process. With some period of stability and uniform application, the foreseeability principle promises to ease the pace and uncertainties inherent in this transition to new rules. Ultimately, as this court has noted in the past, Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed.Cir.1997), foreseeability is the overarching principle that reconciles the notice function of claims with the protective function of the doctrine of equivalents.
This reconciling principle is simple: the doctrine of equivalents does not embrace subject matter that the patent drafter could have foreseen during the application process and thus could have included in the claims. Thus, the literal scope of the claims alone defines invention scope in any foreseeable circumstances. At the same time, the doctrine of equivalents protects against insubstantial and unforeseeable circumstances. The Supreme Court has embraced that principle by stressing that this court must not apply “the complete bar by another name.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 741, 122 S.Ct. 1831, 152 L.Ed.2d 944 (2002) (Festo VIII). Because it continues to embrace the other aspects of the “complete bar” it created in Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court posits foreseeability as an important way7 to ren*1377der its complete bar estoppel presumptions more sensitive to the patent drafter’s (and amender’s) expectations.
Upon reflection, foreseeability will continue to emerge as the unifying principle that justifies the doctrine of equivalents even beyond the confines of rebutting es-toppel presumptions. Because the foreseeability principle incorporates a realistic vision of what the applicant intended to achieve by claim drafting and amendments, this principle pledges to uphold, rather than disrupt, drafting expectations. The foreseeability principle , has the virtue of placing the judicial enforcer at the table of the patent drafter at the time of claiming or amending. From that vantage point and with knowledge of the prior art, the judge (guided by experts) can deduce something close to the bounds that a careful drafter would have drawn to define the invention.
Under the foreseeability principle, the doctrine of equivalents will not encompass any accessible prior art because this subject matter could have been included in the claims. On the other hand, any after-arising technology or later developments or advances would not fall within the scope of what the drafter should have foreseen and claimed. After all, a skilled patent drafter is a legal technician, not an inventor.
This enterprise depends on the intensely factual considerations of the state of the art at the time of drafting. In applying the foreseeability exception, the trial court must assess the factual record of events during prosecution, the factual contents of custom and usage of terms in the relevant art, the factual level of ordinary skill in the art, the factual bounds of the prior art, and the factual understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. A trial judge, who can freely elicit evidence as needed and can directly interact with technical experts, is thus in a better position to apply the foreseeability exception. By the same token, the trial judge’s findings deserve deference from this court.
At this point the Supreme Court has only applied foreseeability to identify the scope of surrendered subject matter for an estoppel. But applying the foreseeability principle directly to bar foreseeable equivalents outside an amendment and estoppel context is very consistent with th'e Supreme Court’s holding. This principle in operation promises to preserve drafting expectations while honoring the notice function of claims.

. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161 Fed.Cir.1997) (en banc); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 (Fed.Cir.2000) (en banc) (Festo VI); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc). Counting the Supreme Court's opinions, this opinion is the fifth or sixth visit to these exceptions to the exception to the doctrine of equivalents. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 122 S.Ct. 1831, 152 L.Ed.2d 944 (2002) (Festo VIII); Warner-Jen-kinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). Of course, by counting Federal Circuit panel opinions on this topic, the number could quickly rise into the dozens.

. Moreover, due to the pressure to keep up with rising patent filings, the prosecution process most often produces amendments without that fulsome explanation. According to United States Patent and Trademark Office statistics, about 67,000 applications were filed in 1950, about 103,000 in 1970, about 165,-*1375000 in 1990, and about 327,000 in 2001. U.S. Patent Activity, at http://www.uspto. gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm.

.Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1462-64 (Fed.Cir.1998) (an amendment barred some equivalents but not others, and Jerikinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). Of course, by counting Federal Circuit panel opinions on this topic, the number could quickly rise into the dozens.
Moreover, due to the pressure to keep up with rising patent filings, the prosecution process most often produces amendments without that fulsome explanation. According to United States Patent and Trademark Office statistics, about 67,000 applications were filed in 1950, about 103,000 in 1970, about 165,-000 in 1990, and about 327,000 in 2001. U.S. Patent Activity, at http://www.uppto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip /tafiLcounts.htm, remanding for factual determination underlying prosectution history es-toppel); Dixie USA, Inc. v. Infab Corp., 927 F.2d 584, 588 (Fed.Cir.1991)(an applicant may "obtain some degree of equivalence even in the face of prosecution history estoppel, ... a total preclusion of equivalence should not apply”); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. U.S., 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed.Cir.1983) (rejecting as a “wooden application of estoppel” the view that vitually any amendment of the claims bars all resort to the doctrine of equivalents).

. The problem is defining the scope of the surrender when an amendment literally abandons more subject matter than perhaps necessary to escape prior art or otherwise traverse the examiner's rejection.

. 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 (2000), includes a statutory equivalent as part of the literal infringement inquiry.

. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (stating that while the doctrine of equivalents does not extend to disclosed but unclaimed subject matter, the applicant may claim such subject matter in a continuation).

. The tangentiality and "some other reason” grounds for rebutting the complete surrender presumption are also important ways to acknowledge the drafter’s expectations when applying an estoppel. Tangentiality, in particular, should permit courts to honor the objective intent of amendments when seeking the scope of the surrender of subject matter. In the facts of the Wamer-Jenkinson case, for example, the applicant amended the claim to escape prior art on the top end of the claimed pH range. The alleged infringer sought to use prosecution history estoppel to foreclose use of the doctrine of equivalents to capture its product that used a pH below the claimed range. In that case, the amendment's surrender of subject matter above the claimed range may diverge from or only bear a peripheral relation to an equivalent beneath the claimed range. Similarly, by its terms, the "some other reason” rebuttal grounds requires courts to consider reasons, including as this court notes "the shortcomings of language,” that "the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question.” Maj. op. at 1370 (cit*1377ing Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 1831).