Court Opinion

ID: 9609064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:21:59.84011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:48.667875
License: Public Domain

PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, Judge,
concurring.
This court’s refusal to review the discretionary grounds asserted by the Bishops to support the grant of a new trial is supported by Pretti v. Herre, 403 S.W.2d 568, 569 (Mo.1966). Citing Rule 83.06(c), which is now Rule 84.05(d), the Court in Pretti refused to consider the weight of the evidence ground cited by the plaintiffs to support the granting of the new trial because it was a discretionary ground. Id. This court is bound to follow Pretti because it is the last controlling decision of the Supreme Court on the issue. See Kansas Ass’n of Private Investigators v. Mulvihill, 35 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Mo.App.2000) (stating that “[t]his court is constitutionally bound to follow precedent set forth by the most recent Supreme Court of Missouri decision.”).
I write separately, however, to note that Pretti contains no analysis of the issue.1 The Court in Pretti did not explain why it interpreted the rule’s language that “it shall never be presumed that the new trial was granted on any discretionary grounds,” to mean that an appellate court is precluded from even considering whether the grant of the new trial is supported by discretionary grounds. 403 S.W.2d at 569.2 This would seem to be contrary to *624the plain language of the rule. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word “presume” is “to accept as true or credible without proof or before inquiry: assume, infer, suppose.” Webster’s Third New International DICTIONARY 1796 (1971). Applying this definition of “presume,” the plain language of the rule appears to prohibit only this court’s assuming that the new trial was granted on any discretionary grounds without proof, and not this court’s considering discretionary grounds to support the order if those grounds have been adequately proved by the respondent.
Moreover, precluding the appellate court from considering discretionary grounds to support the grant of new trial where the trial court fails to state grounds seems to be contrary to the Court’s earlier pronouncements in King v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 350 Mo. 75, 164 S.W.2d 458, 465 (banc 1942), a case which appears to have been an impetus for the rule that is now Rule 84.05(c) and (d). See 2 Carr, Mo. Civ. Proc. § 1206, at 253 (1947) (stating that Rule 1.10, which is now Rule 84.05(c) and (d), was “a crystallization of the thoughts expressed in the recent cases,” and citing, inter alia, the King case).
In King, the Court held that “when the trial court sustains the motion [for new trial] without specifying any reason, the movant must assume the burden of pointing out assignments therein which should have been sustained.” 164 S.W.2d at 464 (emphasis added). In so ruling, the Supreme Court overruled prior eases which held that the appellate court would presume that the motion for new trial was granted upon all grounds presented in the motion; cases which held that the respondent had the burden to show that none of the grounds in the motion ought to be sustained; and other cases in which it was presumed that the new trial was granted upon an assignment in the motion that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 463-65.
In its opinion, the Court held that when the trial court has awarded a new trial without specifying its reasons, and the respondent asserts the discretionary ground of weight of the evidence to uphold the new trial grant on appeal, the appellate court will accord the trial court’s order less deference, but “may take the general order [granting the new trial] into consideration as a circumstance indicating the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the trial court so found when the question is close and no other sustainable grounds are pointed out.” Id. at 465. The Court further held that the burden rests with the respondent “to sustain his contention on the face of the whole record.” Id. The Court explained why it believed this practice was preferable to the alternatives:
This seems to us the best solution of a vexatious problem, although it may impose more work on our appellate courts. If we adhere to the present practice, and presume the motion was sustained on a weight of evidence ground, although the trial court did not so declare as the statute requires, and the ruling is contrary to our own convictions from the face of the record, the adversary litigant is, in practical effect, deprived of the right to have that question passed upon. *625If mandamus is sought to compel the trial judge to specify his reasons for sustaining the motion, it means another law suit and the appeal is impeded. If the cause is reversed and remanded because of his disobedience of the statute, the movant is prejudiced.
Id. The last alternative, rejected by King because of the prejudice it causes the respondent — to reverse and remand to reinstate the verdict in favor of the appellant simply because the trial court failed to obey the requirement that it specify its reason for granting a new trial to the respondent — is exactly what the Court in Pretti did and what this court does today.
Nevertheless, because this court is bound to follow the Court’s holding in Pretti, I concur.

. The Court in Pretti merely recited the language of what is now Rule 84.05(d), stated that the rule precluded the Court from presuming that the new trial was granted on the discretionary ground alleged, and then summarily held that "it is apparent that the action of the trial court cannot be sustained on that ground.” 403 S.W.2d at 569. The only other reference the Court made to the issue was in its conclusion, where it stated that "[s]ince the only point relied on by plaintiffs to support the granting of the new trial is one which we are precluded from considering, it follows that the action of the trial court cannot be sustained.” Id.

. It should also be noted that the intermediate appellate opinions which hold that this court is precluded from considering discretionary grounds do not cite Pretti for this proposition. See, e.g., Rodman v. Schrimpf, 18 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Mo.App.2000); Stewart v. Stewart, 901 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Mo.App.1995). In Stewart, this court relies on McCarthy v. Halloran, 435 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Mo.1968), a Supreme Court case that was after Pretti. The Court's ruling on the issue in McCarthy is unclear, however. In McCarthy, the trial court stated a "meaningless” ground for granting a new trial. Id. at 340. The Supreme Court found that stating a meaningless ground for granting a new trial was effectively stating no legal ground and, therefore, the respondent had the burden *624of demonstrating on appeal "that there was some adequate nondiscretionary ground for a new trial." Id. Despite finding that the respondent had to assert a nondiscretionary ground, the Supreme Court went on to review the discretionary grounds asserted by the respondent in her new trial motion. Id. at 341. In this review, the Court found that the effect of the trial court’s stating a "meaningless” ground was to overrule the discretionary grounds the respondent asserted in her new trial motion, and the Court also found that the respondent failed to support one of the discretionary grounds in her brief. Id.