Court Opinion

ID: 9826563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 16:08:42.770776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:54.795755
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                      No. 71A22

                              Filed 1 September 2023

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

              v.
DAVID MCKOY

      Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of

the Court of Appeals, 281 N.C. App. 602 (2022), affirming a judgment entered on 22

March 2019 by Judge John M. Dunlow in Superior Court, Durham County. Heard in

the Supreme Court on 26 April 2023.

      Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by M. Lynne Weaver, Special Deputy
      Attorney General, and Ryan Y. Park, Solicitor General, for the State-appellee.

      James R. Glover for defendant-appellant.

      ALLEN, Justice.

      A divided panel of the Court of Appeals upheld defendant’s voluntary

manslaughter conviction despite defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by

refusing to allow the jury to consider photographs and text messages found on the

victim’s cellular phone. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

and that admitting the photographs and text messages into evidence almost certainly

would not have changed the outcome of defendant’s trial. Accordingly, we affirm the

decision of the Court of Appeals.

                              I.    Background
                                   STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

      On 17 January 2017, a grand jury in Durham County returned an indictment

charging defendant with the murder of eighteen-year-old Augustus Cornelius

Brandon. The case was tried in Superior Court, Durham County, in March 2019.

Defendant maintained throughout trial that he shot Brandon in self-defense.

      The evidence presented to the jury tended to show the following. Defendant

and Brandon had known each other for years. While they were never friends, they

had several mutual acquaintances. Defendant believed that Brandon and some of his

friends were known “to rob people” and “gang bang and to tote guns.” Defendant

described a handful of interactions with Brandon that took place not long before

Brandon’s death. On one occasion, Brandon told a mutual acquaintance in

defendant’s presence that he would “smack” defendant. On another, Brandon

“randomly showed [defendant] a video of [Brandon] shooting a gun.” This last

incident left defendant feeling “confused and uncomfortable,” and he “tried to avoid”

Brandon thereafter. Defendant also alleged that one of Brandon’s friends “robbed

[defendant’s friend] at gunpoint for [a] fake [gold] chain.”

      Defendant decided to purchase a semi-automatic rifle for his own protection.

He usually kept the rifle in the trunk or the back seat of his Honda Accord because

his mother did not want any firearms in her home.

      On the morning of 9 December 2016, defendant was leaving his neighborhood

when Brandon drove by him in a gray car. As he passed defendant’s vehicle, Brandon

turned his head and appeared to notice defendant. Defendant exited his neighborhood

                                           -2-
                                   STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

with Brandon travelling ahead of him. Brandon then pulled off the road and allowed

defendant to pass him before reentering the road behind defendant. Defendant

turned onto a side road in an unsuccessful attempt to evade Brandon. Brandon passed

defendant and brought his car to an abrupt stop, forcing defendant to stop as well.

      Brandon stepped out of his vehicle and began walking toward defendant.

Defendant put his car in reverse gear and saw Brandon run to the rear of Brandon’s

vehicle and open the trunk. Although he did not see Brandon holding a gun,

defendant thought that Brandon had retrieved a firearm. Ducking below the steering

wheel, defendant pressed the accelerator, accidentally backing his car into a ditch.

Defendant testified that he “thought [Brandon] was going to shoot [him] while [he]

was stuck in the ditch.”

      Brandon returned to his vehicle and drove it closer to defendant’s car before

again exiting and approaching the passenger’s side of defendant’s automobile.

Defendant retrieved his rifle from the back seat and shot at Brandon through the

passenger window. Brandon ran toward the rear of his own car, and defendant got

out of his vehicle and crouched behind it “for cover.”

      The jury heard apparently inconsistent versions of what happened next.

According to the testimony of Detective Christin Reimann of the Durham County

Sheriff’s Office, defendant told her on the day of the shooting that Brandon started

running away, at which point defendant fired two more shots and watched Brandon

fall. In a subsequent interview with Detective Reimann and again at trial, defendant

                                           -3-
                                   STATE V. MCKOY

                                  Opinion of the Court

said he thought that Brandon was trying to reposition himself and flank defendant,

not flee the scene. Two motorists who witnessed the final moments of the encounter

between defendant and Brandon testified that Brandon was running away from

defendant’s position when defendant shot him.

      After Brandon fell, defendant called 911. Law enforcement officers arrived at

the scene, where they found Brandon dead and unarmed. Forensic examination

revealed that Brandon had been shot in the back of the head and in the mid-area of

the left side of his back. The shot to the back of the head killed Brandon.

      The State’s witnesses at trial included Brandon’s parents, Angela and Darius

Clark. Mrs. Clark testified that Brandon was her only son and that he lived in the

family home with the couple and their two daughters. Although Mrs. Clark testified

that the family did not keep guns at home—she cleaned Brandon’s room and never

saw one there—she also testified that one of Brandon’s friends informed her three

days before Brandon’s death that Brandon had a firearm. When Mrs. Clark asked

Brandon whether he had a gun, he teared up and confessed to having possessed a

firearm, though he also claimed that someone had stolen it. Brandon told his mother

that he needed a gun for protection and asked her for help in obtaining another one.

Mrs. Clark knew that Brandon was frightened because he did not normally “tear up

and cry like that.” In her recollection, Brandon was “always a happy, smiling child.”

Mrs. Clark testified that she was unfamiliar with defendant prior to her son’s death.

In response to questions from defense counsel, Mrs. Clark admitted that she and Mr.

                                          -4-
                                   STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

Clark went through the contents of Brandon’s cell phone with Detective Reimann.

Defense counsel did not ask Mrs. Clark any questions regarding those contents.

        Before Mr. Clark took the stand, the State filed a motion in limine urging the

trial court to prohibit defense counsel from “ask[ing] about contents of [Brandon’s]

phone that would potentially show specific acts of conduct of the victim in the past.”

The State maintained that such evidence was “not admissible unless the defendant

had knowledge of it on the date of the alleged offense.” The trial court reserved its

ruling on the motion, and the State called Mr. Clark to the witness stand.

        Like Mrs. Clark, Mr. Clark testified that he had never heard of defendant

before Brandon’s death. On the morning of 9 December 2016, according to Mr. Clark,

Brandon seemed “really happy. He was always a happy guy, lot of fun.” Mr. Clark

stated that he did not allow guns in the house and that, to the best of his knowledge,

Brandon did not have a gun with him or in his car on the morning of 9 December

2016.

        Before cross-examining Mr. Clark, defense counsel requested that the jury be

excused. Defense counsel notified the trial court that he planned to ask Mr. Clark

about the contents of Brandon’s cell phone, “which, according to discovery as tendered

by the [S]tate, [Mr. Clark] went through with his wife, Ms. Clark, and [Detective

Reimann].” Those contents, “according to the discovery,” included photographs of

Brandon and his friends holding guns and SMS text conversations “of a somewhat

violent nature” between Brandon and other people. Noting that defendant was

                                           -5-
                                  STATE V. MCKOY

                                  Opinion of the Court

claiming self-defense, the State argued that the photographs and text messages could

not have influenced defendant’s state of mind on 9 December 2016 because he did not

find out about them until later. Defense counsel countered that the State opened the

door to the cell phone evidence when Mr. Clark testified that Brandon was “always a

happy guy.”

      The trial court allowed defense counsel to question Mr. Clark outside the jury’s

presence so that the court could better understand what information defense counsel

wished to present. In response to defense counsel’s questions, Mr. Clark denied

having been shown any photographs or text messages on Brandon’s phone during his

meetings with Detective Reimann. In particular, he claimed not to recall seeing any

photographs of Brandon holding guns or any text messages in which, as defense

counsel put it, Brandon “was setting up times and places to meet up to fight other

people.”

      The trial court ruled that defense counsel could ask Mr. Clark in front of the

jury whether he met with Detective Reimann and viewed the contents of Brandon’s

phone. The court further ruled that “any question relative to the contents of that

phone and text messages that may or may not have been contained on that phone

[would not be] allowed.”

      At the conclusion of the evidence, and before the jury’s deliberations, the trial

court instructed the jury on the elements of first-degree murder, second-degree

murder, and voluntary manslaughter. The court explained to the jury that “defendant

                                          -6-
                                   STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

would not be guilty of any murder or manslaughter if [he] acted in self-defense, and

if [he] did not use excessive force under the circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) The

court further explained that, even if the jury did not find defendant guilty of murder,

the jury had a duty to convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter if it found beyond

a reasonable doubt that defendant “intentionally wounded [Brandon] with a deadly

weapon and thereby proximately caused [Brandon’s] death, and that [he] used

excessive force.” (Emphasis added.)

      On 22 March 2019, the jury found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter,

and the trial court sentenced defendant to imprisonment for a term of sixty-four to

eighty-nine months. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court

committed reversible error by excluding the photographs and text messages on

Brandon’s cell phone.

      On 1 February 2022, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals held that

defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error. State v. McKoy, 281 N.C. App.

602 (2022). According to the majority, in deciding which questions defense counsel

could or could not ask Mr. Clark regarding Brandon’s cell phone, “the [trial] court

engaged in the evidentiary balancing test prescribed by Rule 403 of the North

Carolina Rules of Evidence.” Id. at 607. Moreover, in the majority’s view, even if the

trial court erred in refusing to admit the cell phone evidence, the error “was not

sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.” Id. at 608. The majority saw no

reasonable possibility that the cell phone evidence would have changed the outcome

                                           -7-
                                    STATE V. MCKOY

                                    Opinion of the Court

of defendant’s trial because (1) “the trial court admitted substantial evidence

supporting [d]efendant’s theory of self-defense” and (2) “the evidence tended to show

that [d]efendant was honestly in fear for his life, but that the degree of force he used

was unreasonable, as . . . Brandon was unarmed and running away from [d]efendant

when he was killed.” Id.

      The dissent would have held that the testimony of Brandon’s parents opened

the door to the cell phone evidence and that the trial court’s refusal to admit the

evidence entitled defendant to a new trial.

                     Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter
             for imperfect self-defense because the jury found his degree
             of force was unreasonable. The [cell phone] evidence goes
             towards [d]efendant’s state of mind and reasonableness of
             fear during the incident. There is a reasonable possibility
             if this evidence and testimony had not been excluded . . . a
             different result may have been reached by the jury . . . .

Id. at 613–14 (Tyson, J., dissenting).

      On 7 March 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal with this Court based on

the dissent. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2021) (“[A]n appeal lies of right to the Supreme

Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case . . . [i]n which

there is a dissent when the Court of Appeals is sitting in a panel of three judges.”).

                              II.    Analysis

      In his principal brief to this Court, defendant concedes that the evidence on

Brandon’s cell phone was inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence. He argues,

however, that the State opened the door to the evidence “th[r]ough the testimony of

                                            -8-
                                      STATE V. MCKOY

                                     Opinion of the Court

[Brandon’s] parents.” Specifically, defendant points to Mrs. Clark’s testimony that

Brandon was “always a happy, smiling child” who nonetheless admitted to Mrs. Clark

that he had obtained a firearm for protection. Defendant also cites Mr. Clark’s

assertion that Brandon was “always a happy guy” who did not have a gun in the house

or in his car on 9 December 2016, as well as Mr. Clark’s denial of any knowledge that

Brandon had ever possessed a gun. Defendant maintains that the trial court’s

exclusion of the cell phone evidence prejudiced his defense:

                      If the jury had been allowed to hear that [Brandon]
              . . . was a person who had possession of guns on multiple
              occasions when under no threat of harm, it would have
              been reasonable for the jury to conclude that the State had
              failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant]
              used more force than reasonably necessary to repel . . .
              Brandon’s lethal attack on him.1

Defendant asks this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to

the trial court for a new trial.

       The State denies opening the door at trial to the cell phone evidence. It argues

that descriptions of Brandon as a generally happy person did not amount to a claim

       1 In his principal brief, defendant also seems to argue that the trial court’s ruling

implicates his constitutional right “to call witnesses and to elicit testimony that bolsters a
theory of defense.” Defendant did not make any constitutional arguments to the trial court
regarding the cell phone evidence. To the extent that he attempts to raise constitutional
claims for the first time on appeal, our case law bars him from doing so. State v. Garcia, 358
N.C. 382, 410 (2004) (“It is well settled that constitutional matters that are not ‘raised and
passed upon’ at trial will not be reviewed for the first time on appeal.” (citation omitted)),
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156 (2005); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (“In order to preserve an
issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request,
objection, or motion . . . .”).

                                             -9-
                                    STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

that Brandon was peaceful or law-abiding. The State further argues that the trial

court acted within its sound discretion in limiting the questions that defense counsel

could ask on cross-examination regarding the cell phone evidence. Lastly, the State

contends that, even if the trial court excluded the cell phone evidence in error,

defendant has not shown the prejudice necessary to support his demand for a new

trial.

A. Scope of Appellate Review

         When a case comes to us under N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) based solely on a dissent

in the Court of Appeals, “the scope of review is ‘limited to those questions on which

there was division in the intermediate appellate court.’ ” State v. Rankin, 371 N.C.

885, 895 (2018) (quoting C.C. Walker Grading & Hauling, Inc. v. S.R.F. Mgmt. Corp.,

311 N.C. 170, 175 (1984)); see also N.C. R. App. P. 16(b) (“When the sole ground of the

appeal of right is the existence of a dissent in the Court of Appeals, review by the

Supreme Court is limited to a consideration of those issues that are (1) specifically

set out in the dissenting opinion as the basis for that dissent, (2) stated in the notice

of appeal, and (3) properly presented in the new briefs . . . filed in the Supreme Court.”

(emphasis added)).

         In their briefs to this Court, the parties argue extensively over whether the

State opened the door at trial to the disputed cell phone evidence; however, we

perceive no division between the majority in the Court of Appeals and the dissenting

judge on this point. The majority opinion does not take a position contrary to the

                                          -10-
                                    STATE V. MCKOY

                                    Opinion of the Court

dissent’s assertion that the State opened the door to the evidence in question; rather,

it assumes that the door was opened. McKoy, 281 N.C. App. at 608. The disagreement

between the majority and the dissent thus centers not on whether the State opened

the door but on whether, if the door was opened, defendant had the right to ask Mr.

Clark specific questions about the cell phone’s contents in front of the jury. See id. at

607 (“[T]he ultimate question on appeal is whether the trial court abused its

discretion by excluding the cell-phone evidence, not whether the State ‘opened the

door’ to evidence of Mr. Brandon’s allegedly violent character.”). We therefore limit

our review to that issue and look to our precedents for guidance on the authority of a

trial court to exclude evidence to which a party has opened the door.

B. Opening the Door

      “The basis for the rule commonly referred to as ‘opening the door’ is that when

a [party] in a criminal case offers evidence which raises an inference favorable to his

case, the [other party] has the right to explore, explain or rebut that evidence.” State

v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 571 (1984). Specifically, “the other party is entitled to

introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though such latter

evidence would be incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially.” State v.

Albert, 303 N.C. 173, 177 (1981).

      The opening-the-door rule originates in case law and predates the General

Assembly’s enactment of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Compare An Act to

Simplify and Codify the Rules of Evidence, ch. 701, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 666–84,

                                           -11-
                                   STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

with State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, 434–36 (1980) (applying the opening-the-door rule),

superseded by statute, An Act to Abolish the Distinction Between Accessories Before

the Fact and Principals and to Make Accessories Before the Fact Punishable as

Principal Felons, ch. 686, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 984, 984. See generally Kenneth

S. Broun et al., Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence § 2 (8th ed. 2018) (“Prior

to enactment of the Rules [of Evidence], the North Carolina law of evidence embodied

constitutional decisions, specific statutes, and common law as evolved by the

courts.”).

       Reliance on the opening-the-door rule is no longer necessary in many instances

because the Rules of Evidence expressly provide for the introduction of rebuttal or

explanatory evidence in certain situations. See, e.g., State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 121–

22 (2005) (observing that Rule 404(a)(1) allowed the State to introduce evidence of a

defendant’s character for violence after the defendant introduced evidence of his

character for peacefulness), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 855 (2006). Nonetheless, the rule is

still sometimes invoked to permit the introduction of evidence that the Rules might

otherwise exclude. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 100 N.C. App. 706, 710–11 (1990)

(concluding that a defendant’s misleading testimony regarding his criminal record

opened the door to admission of his conviction of misdemeanor marijuana possession

notwithstanding the time restrictions in Rule 609(b)).

       As our precedents illustrate, the opening-the-door rule is intended to reduce

the likelihood that a party’s introduction of misleading or confusing evidence will

                                          -12-
                                    STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

impair the capacity of the jury to perform its fact-finding role. In State v. Patterson,

for example, the defendant’s stepdaughter testified for the prosecution at the

defendant’s murder trial. 284 N.C. 190, 195 (1973). On cross-examination, defense

counsel elicited statements from the stepdaughter “that she disliked the defendant

and harbored a feeling of ill will toward him.” Id. The prosecutor asked the

stepdaughter on redirect why she disliked the defendant, and she alleged that the

defendant had raped her. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court

erred by admitting the stepdaughter’s rape allegation. Id. While acknowledging the

“general rule of evidence that in a prosecution for a particular crime the State cannot

offer evidence tending to show that the accused has committed another distinct,

independent, or separate offense,” this Court found no error. Id. at 195–96.

             Here, evidence was elicited from [the defendant’s
             stepdaughter] on cross-examination calculated and
             intended to show bias and to discredit her testimony. This
             calls for application of the rule that where evidence of bias
             is elicited on cross-examination[,] the witness is entitled to
             explain, if he can, on redirect examination, the
             circumstances giving rise to bias so that the witness may
             stand in a fair and just light before the jury.

Id. at 196 (emphasis added); see also Small, 301 N.C. at 436 (“Here on direct

examination defendant testified in such a way as to leave the false impression that

the state had refused to accept his offer to submit to a polygraph examination. It was

proper for the state, therefore, on cross-examination to show that, in fact, defendant

had been given a polygraph [and failed it]. . . . Defendant by first injecting the subject

of the polygraph into the trial in a manner designed to mislead the jury invited the

                                          -13-
                                     STATE V. MCKOY

                                     Opinion of the Court

very cross-examination of which he now complains.”).

       Although a party can open the door to otherwise irrelevant or inadmissible

evidence, we have never held that the opposing party’s right to introduce such

evidence is absolute. The opening-the-door rule exists to prevent the jury from being

led astray, and there may be circumstances in which the opposing party’s evidence

risks confusing or misleading the jury as much as the evidence that the opposing

party wishes to refute or contextualize. Thus, even when the door has been opened to

otherwise irrelevant or inadmissible evidence, the trial court as gatekeeper may still

exclude it pursuant to Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence “if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.”2 N.C. R. Evid. 403. See generally Queen City

Coach Co. v. Lee, 218 N.C. 320, 323 (1940) (“The competency, admissibility, and

sufficiency of the evidence is a matter for the [trial] court to determine.”).

       A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence to which a party has

opened the door is subject to review on appeal for abuse of discretion. State v. Darden,

323 N.C. 356, 359 (1988) (“[D]efendant ‘opened the door’ to cross-examination

       2 We have also held that a trial court must exclude rebuttal or explanatory evidence

that lacks a proper foundation. See State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 409–10 (2009) (“Even
though a defendant may open the door to otherwise inadmissible testimony, . . . ‘[a] witness
may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that
he has personal knowledge of the matter.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting N.C. R.
Evid. 602)), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1074 (2010).

                                            -14-
                                   STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

designed to rebut his assertion. . . . We find no abuse of discretion in the cross-

examination allowed. We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the refusal to prohibit

the cross-examination on the ground that the probative value of the evidence

produced thereby was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”), cert. denied,

517 U.S. 1197 (1996). See generally State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 673 (2005) (“The

decision whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403 . . . is within the discretion of

the trial court and will not be overturned [on appeal] absent an abuse of discretion.”),

cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073 (2006).

      “A trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing

that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned

decision.” State v. Hayes, 314 N.C. 460, 471 (1985) (citation omitted); see also In re

K.N.L.P., 380 N.C. 756, 759 (2022) (“Under [the abuse of discretion] standard, we

defer to the trial court’s decision unless it is manifestly unsupported by reason or one

so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” (quoting In

re A.K.O., 375 N.C. 698, 701 (2020))). Hence, in a case in which the door was opened

to otherwise irrelevant or inadmissible evidence, the party appealing the trial court’s

decision to admit or exclude such evidence under Rule 403 faces a steep uphill climb.

C. No Reversible Error

      The Court of Appeals’ majority correctly rejected defendant’s call for a new

trial. In the first place, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by preventing

defense counsel from using cross-examination to inform the jury that Brandon’s cell

                                          -15-
                                   STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

phone contained photographs of Brandon holding firearms and text messages

implicating Brandon in acts of violence. The court took seriously defense counsel’s

contention that the State had opened the door to this evidence. It also recognized,

however, that evidence of a victim’s past violent acts can sometimes unduly influence

a jury. See State v. Bass, 371 N.C. 535, 544 (2018) (explaining that Rule 405(b) does

not allow a defendant claiming self-defense to use evidence of the victim’s past violent

acts to prove that the victim was the aggressor because “a generally peaceful person

may experience a moment of violence, and a normally aggressive or violent person

might refrain from violence on a specific occasion”).

      The trial court tried to strike a balance that was fair to both parties and

protective of the jury. It did not allow defense counsel to ask Mr. Clark specific

questions about the cell phone’s contents, but it did permit defense counsel to ask Mr.

Clark whether Detective Reimann had shared the contents of Brandon’s cell phone

with him. Especially when viewed alongside Mrs. Clark’s testimony that Detective

Reimann had done just that, this question invited the jury to doubt Mr. Clark’s

testimony that he did not know anything about Brandon possessing a firearm. We

are not prepared to conclude based on the record before us that the trial court’s ruling

was “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Hayes,

314 N.C. at 471.

      Furthermore, even if the trial court abused its discretion, a new trial is not

warranted because the exclusion of the cell phone evidence did not prejudice

                                          -16-
                                   STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

defendant. We have explained that

             evidentiary error does not necessitate a new trial unless
             the erroneous admission was prejudicial. The same rule
             applies to exclusion of evidence. Evidentiary error is
             prejudicial when there is a reasonable possibility that, had
             the error in question not been committed, a different result
             would have been reached at the trial out of which the
             appeal arises. Defendant bears the burden of showing
             prejudice.

State v. Jacobs, 363 N.C. 815, 825 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted); see also State v. Brewer, 325 N.C. 550, 565 (1989) (“Assuming arguendo that

defendant’s proffered evidence was erroneously excluded, . . . [d]efendant has not

carried his burden of showing a ‘reasonable possibility that, had the error in question

not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial.’ ” (quoting

N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1988))), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 951 (1990).

      The trial court instructed the jury that defendant was not guilty of murder if

he shot Brandon in self-defense. The court further explained that, even if defendant

acted in self-defense, the jury should convict him of voluntary manslaughter if it

found beyond a reasonable doubt that he used excessive force, which the court defined

as “more force than reasonably appeared to the defendant to be necessary at the time

of the killing.” As the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeals acknowledged, once

the jury determined that defendant was not guilty of murder, the only remaining

question was whether defendant’s use of force in self-defense was reasonable “under

the facts as [they] appeared to him at the time.” McKoy, 281 N.C. App. at 613 (Tyson,

J., dissenting). By convicting defendant of voluntary manslaughter, the jury signaled

                                          -17-
                                    STATE V. MCKOY

                                   Opinion of the Court

its belief that defendant acted in self-defense but that the force he employed was

excessive. See id., 281 N.C. App. at 608–09 (majority opinion) (“As Defendant

concedes, the guilty verdict suggests ‘that the jury concluded that [Defendant] had a

reasonable fear that he was facing an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury

from [Mr.] Brandon at the time of the shooting, but that the State had proven beyond

a reasonable doubt that he used more force than necessary.’ ” (alterations in

original)); id. at 613 (Tyson, J., dissenting) (“Defendant was convicted of voluntary

manslaughter for imperfect self-defense because the jury found his degree of force

was unreasonable.”).

      There is no reasonable possibility that the cell phone evidence would have

persuaded the jury that defendant’s use of force was appropriate under the

circumstances. The record nowhere indicates that defendant saw or knew anything

about the photographs and text messages on Brandon’s phone in advance of his fatal

encounter with Brandon on 9 December 2016. It follows that the photographs and

messages could not have influenced defendant’s actions on that date. See id. at 613

(Tyson, J., dissenting) (“Defendant’s . . . belief at the time of the incident determines

the degree of force necessary to use for self-defense.”).

      Defendant insists that the cell phone evidence might have persuaded the jury

that Brandon had a firearm on 9 December 2016 and thus that defendant did not use

excessive force. Defendant highlights the testimony of two eyewitnesses who observed

the final moments of his fatal encounter with Brandon. According to defendant, both

                                          -18-
                                  STATE V. MCKOY

                                  Opinion of the Court

eyewitnesses testified to hearing more gunshots than the three shots fired by him.

When this testimony is considered together with the photographs on Brandon’s cell

phone of Brandon holding firearms, defendant asserts, the extra gunshots “can most

reasonably be explained as being fired by [Brandon].”

      We are unconvinced. The cell phone evidence demonstrated that Brandon and

some of his friends had access to firearms before 9 December 2016, but the jury heard

other evidence to the same effect. Defendant testified that Brandon showed him a

video of Brandon shooting a gun; he likewise alleged that Brandon and his friends

were known “to rob people” and “gang bang and to tote guns.” One of Brandon’s

friends seemingly corroborated some of defendant’s allegations by admitting on the

witness stand to misdemeanor convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and

breaking and entering. Brandon’s own mother testified that Brandon confessed to

having possessed a firearm, though he claimed that someone had stolen it.

      Moreover, on closer inspection, the eyewitness testimony offers little support

for the theory that Brandon shot at defendant. Although one of the two eyewitnesses

recalled hearing as many as seven shots, the other testified to hearing “between three

and four” shots, an estimate consistent with the State’s contention that Brandon was

unarmed on 9 December 2016. The second eyewitness’s recollection also accords with

the testimony of a third person at the scene who remembered hearing “at least three

shots.” Notably, no eyewitness reported observing Brandon with a gun.

      Of course, the biggest hole in defendant’s theory is the uncontested fact that

                                         -19-
                                    STATE V. MCKOY

                                    Opinion of the Court

defendant’s rifle was the only weapon found at the crime scene. Given this evidentiary

lacuna, no reasonable possibility exists that the cell phone evidence would have

persuaded the jury that Brandon fired at defendant and defendant was therefore

justified in killing him.

       Finally, the cell phone evidence would not have helped defendant rebut

substantial evidence showing that Brandon was attempting to flee when defendant

fired his last two shots. The two eyewitnesses who had a clear view of Brandon

testified that defendant fired at Brandon as he was running away. Brandon was

wounded in the back of the head and in the back, which indicates that he was not

facing defendant when defendant shot him. This eyewitness testimony, combined

with the location of Brandon’s injuries, undoubtedly contributed to the jury’s

apparent belief that defendant used excessive force under the circumstances as they

appeared to him on 9 December 2016. We do not think the photographs and text

messages on Brandon’s cell phone would have blunted the impact of this evidence.

                             III.    Conclusion

       The trial court’s refusal to permit defense counsel to ask the victim’s father or

other witnesses about the photographs and text messages on the victim’s phone did

not constitute an abuse of discretion. There is no reasonable possibility that a ruling

in defendant’s favor on that matter would have led to a different jury verdict. We

therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding defendant’s voluntary

manslaughter conviction.

                                           -20-
            STATE V. MCKOY

            Opinion of the Court

AFFIRMED.

                   -21-