Court Opinion

ID: 9718091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:16:52.29834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:54.545397
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because the findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous for two reasons:
1. FCS had actual notice of Decker’s death and the probable administration of his estate, precluding the application of equitable tolling.
2. IND.CODE § 29-l-7-7(e) is a non-claim statute not subject to equitable tolling.
The record in this case contains ample evidence that FCS received actual notice of Decker’s death, as well as actual notice of the probable administration of his estate. On September 25, 1990, the Estate’s attorney sent a letter to FCS informing FCS of Decker’s death and requesting the amount of FCS’s claim. Shortly thereafter, FCS responded by informing the Estate’s attorney that should he fail to open an estate, FCS could do so within a year. The subsequent correspondence between the parties could not have induced FCS’s failure to commence *538an action beyond the one-year nonclaim period in IC 29-l-7-7(e): FCS was well aware of Decker’s death and its statutory right to commence an action to collect its judgment. FCS took no action to protect its interest. Equitable principles are intended to aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Cook v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (1981), Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 110, 116, reh. denied. FCS cannot ignore a statutory deadline and cloak itself in ignorance of its rights, after affirmatively demonstrating knowledge of its independent legal remedies and the relevant time limitations.
Even should the record indicate that FCS received no notice of Decker’s death and the administration of his estate, equity should not save FCS’s claim because IC 29-l-7-7(e) is a nonclaim statute. A nonclaim statute is one that imposes a condition precedent for the enforcement of a right of action, precluding recovery if the condition is not met. State ex rel. Bodine v. Elkhart County Election Board (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 773, 776, reh. denied, trans. denied. Unless a claim is filed within the time allowed by the statute, it is forever barred; the time element is a built-in condition of the statute that is of the essence of the right of action. Donnella v. Crady (1962), 135 Ind.App. 60, 62-63, 185 N.E.2d 623, 624, trans. denied. No enforceable right is created if the claim is not filed in the time allotted, and this time limit cannot be tolled. Id. at 63, 185 N.E.2d at 625.
Although Indiana cases attribute the above characteristics to nonclaim statutes, orn-eases do not define a method of distinguishing between a nonclaim statute and a statute of limitations. Regarding this distinction, Public Service Company of Colorado v. Barnhill (1984), Colo., 690 P.2d 1248, is instructive. In Barnhill, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether the following statutory provision was a nonclaim statute or statute of limitations:
Limitation of Action. All [wrongful death] actions ... shall be brought within two years from the commission of the alleged negligence resulting in the death for which suit is brought.
Id. at 1252. In analyzing this language, the court stated:
Considering the history of our distinction between non-claim statutes and statutes of limitations in the context of probate proceedings, it may be inferred that the General Assembly was aware that the language it employed in encouraging rapid resolution of wrongful death claims was of importance. It is of some significance that the very section is entitled “Limitation of action.” Of much greater significance, however, is the fact that the statute does not employ language indicating that failure to file a claim within the two-year period therein specified bars the claim, that such filing is a condition to the existence of the claim itself, or that failure to so file deprives courts of jurisdiction. The presence of such language [in previous cases] led to our conclusion ... that the statute [at issue] was a non-claim statute.
Id. (Citations omitted). Legislative intent is key in determining whether a particular statute should be construed as a nonclaim statute or a statute of limitations. Id. at 1252-1253.
Relevant to this case is whether the limitations periods in IC 29-l-7-7(e) is a nonclaim statute, and thus not subject to equitable tolling. To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the history of both limitations periods in our probate code. In 1990, IC 29-1-14-1, which contains a five month limitation period, was amended4 and made *539contingent upon the notice requirements in IC 29-1-7-7. At that time, specific subsections addressing notice to creditors were added to IC 29-1-7-7. See IC 29-l-7~7(d) and (e). In so doing, the General Assembly included the following language in subsection (e): “[hjowever, a claim subject to this subsection may not be filed more than one year after the death of the decedent.” From this language, it is clear that the time element is a part of the right of action provided in IC 29-l-7-7(e), because it dictates that claims are barred after one year from the date of decedent’s death. IC 29-l-7-7(e) is thus a nonelaim statute.
The conclusion that IC 29-1-7-7(e) is a nonelaim statute is consistent with the criteria outlined by the Colorado Supreme Court in Barnhill, supra. IC 29-l-7-7(e) employs language indicating that the failure to file a claim within the one-year period specified therein bars the claim. Moreover, the addition of this one-year limitation after the 1990 amendment to IC 29-l-7-7(e) evinces a legislative intent to place a time limit on creditors claims that could not be circumvented by tolling or other equitable claims. Such a limit is necessary to promote expeditious settlement of estates, as well as the finality of asset distribution when estates are closed. See Falender, supra at 690.
Because FCS had ample notice of Decker’s death, and because FCS’s claim was not filed within the nonelaim period in IC 29-l-7-7(e), FCS has no claim against the Estate. The findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous, and its judgment should be reversed.

. IC 29-1-14-1 was amended in response to Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope (1988), 485 U.S. 478, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565, in which the United States Supreme Court held that due process entitles known and reasonably ascertainable creditors of an estate to actual notice of administration of the estate. In Pope, the Court faced a due process challenge in the context of a short-term nonclaim statute, which ran from the opening of the decedent’s estate. Id. at 487-488, 108 S.Ct. at 1346. However, the Court expressly declined to determine the relationship between due process and long-term non-claim statutes, which run from the date of the decedent death. Id. Because IC 29-l-7-7(e) bars claims filed more than one year after the decedent's death, it is a long-term nonclaim statute.
For an excellent discussion of the distinction between the short-term and long-term nonclaim statutes, see Debra A. Falender, Notice to Credi*539tors in Estate Proceedings: What Process is Due?, 63 N.C.L.Rev 659, 667-671.