Court Opinion

ID: 9471925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:44:29.833595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:39.009020
License: Public Domain

J. BLAINE ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,
with whom WALLACE and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges, join, concurring and dissenting:
I concur, but with additional reasons, in the majority’s holding that the 1938 Act did not impliedly repeal the 1924 Act. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s view that the 1924 Act’s taxing authorization is inapplicable to leases entered into after promulgation of the 1938 Act.
My disagreement has three bases. First, the majority misapplies well-established rules of statutory construction by stating that the issue is whether the 1938 Act “expressly incorporated” the 1924 Act’s taxing authorization. Majority Opinion at 13. Once having concluded that the 1924 Act is still in effect, I fail to understand how it can be construed to have no force. Second, there has been a long-standing and consistent interpretation by the Department of Interior of the continued effectiveness of the 1924 Act’s taxing authorization. I find this prior consistent interpretation much more indicative of the intended effect of the 1938 Act on the 1924 Act than the Department’s reversal of its prior position in 1977. Third, if Congress meant to abrogate the authority of the states to tax the extraction of mineral resources on unallotted land as conferred by the 1924 Act, it surely would have made such an intent clear. It did not and it is not the province of this court to make that judgment for the legislative branch.
The majority opinion concludes that the 1924 Act was not impliedly repealed because the 1938 Act recognized the continued effectiveness of leases entered under the authority of prior acts. I agree with that observation, but I believe as well that other reasons compel such a conclusion.
Section 7 of the 1938 Act contains a “general repealing” clause. It is hornbook law that a general repealer is in “legal contemplation a nullity.” 1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 23.08 at 221 (4th ed. 1972). In fact, a general repealer has been held to imply “very strongly that there may be acts on the same subject which are not thereby repealed.” Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 79, 5 S.Ct. 377, 379, 28 L.Ed.2d 927 (1885). One must turn therefore to other rules governing the determination whether the 1938 Act repealed the 1924 Act. Sutherland, supra. As Congress did not expressly repeal the 1924 Act, the question is whether it impliedly did so.
Repeals by implication are strongly disfavored. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2482, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974); Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503, 56 S.Ct. 349, 352, 80 L.Ed. 351 (1936). As stated by the Supreme Court in Posadas:
There are two well-settled categories of repeal by implication — (1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the latter act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the latter act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act. But in either case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest ....
296 U.S. at 503, 56 S.Ct. at 352.
Simply, there is no “irreconcilable conflict” between the provisions of the 1924 and 1938 Acts. There is no doubt the two statutes are capable of coexistence. The 1938 Act uses and expands the oil and gas leasing procedures outlined in the 1924 Act and applies them to all leases. Section 1 of the 1938 Act, 25 U.S.C. § 396a, reiterates much of the language of the 1924 Act regarding tribal council consent, BIA approval, and a general ten-year durational limit on the leases. Section 2 of the 1938 Act, 25 U.S.C. § 396b, expands the 1924’s Act public auction requirements. The 1938 Act is silent regarding taxation. The language of the statute does not evince a clear indication that repeal of the taxing authorization was intended. On its face, taxation *1205of mineral production is quite compatible with the 1938 Act.
Nor does the 1938 Act “cover the whole subject” of the 1924 Act, for although the 1938 Act was an attempt to make uniform the “patch-work state” of the prior leasing laws, F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 328 (1942 ed.), it is silent on the subject of taxation. It is true that the 1938 Act replaces the 1924 Act’s leasing procedures. The taxing provision of the 1924 Act stands on its own, however. As stated in Posadas, an implied repeal will be found only to the extent of the conflict between the prior and latter statutes. 296 U.S. at 503, 56 S.Ct. at 352. The 1938 Act does not address taxation and nothing otherwise indicates that taxation conflicts with it.
Last, there has been a long-term interpretation by the Department of Interior that the 1938 Act did not impliedly repeal the 1924 Act, including its taxing authorization. See 84 Interior Dec. 905 (1977) and its references to the prior opinions. Generally, the construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to great weight, especially when, as here, Congress has refused to alter the administrative interpretation. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1801, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969).
Once having concluded that no implied repeal occurred, the majority nonetheless states that the taxing consent does not apply to the 1938 Act because the 1938 Act did not “expressly incorporate” the 1924 Act’s taxing authorization. See majority opinion at 13, 17. Such a result plainly contravenes the principle that once having found no implied repeal, it is the court’s obligation to read the statutes together and give effect to both. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551, 94 S.Ct. at 2483; Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133-134, 95 S.Ct. 335, 353-354, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974); see Nebraska Public Power District v. 100.95 Acres of Land, 719 F.2d 956 (8th Cir.1983); Yellowfish v. City of Stillwater, 691 F.2d 926 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 2087, 77 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983). The majority’s holding also neglects the related rule that “[wjhere there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one regardless of the priority of enactment.” Morton, 417 U.S. at 550-551, 94 S.Ct. at 2483. The 1938 Act is a general leasing statute and the specific taxing provision of the 1924 Act should be read into it, rather than nullified. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153, 96 S.Ct. 1989, 1992, 48 L.Ed.2d 540 (1976).
By implication, the majority relies on the Tribe’s argument that this court should follow the canon of construction which provides that ambiguities in statutes are to be resolved in favor of the Indian tribes. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2112, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976). The taxing authorization in the 1924 Act is, however, unambiguous. This “canon of construction is not a license to disregard clear expressions of ... congressional intent.” DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 447, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 1094, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975); accord, Andrus v. Glover, 446 U.S. 608, 619, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 1911, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980). Nor does the 1938 Act create any ambiguity. It is silent on the repeal of the 1924 Act. Use of this canon of construction would require the court to amend the 1938 Act to expressly limit the 1924 Act. That, however, goes beyond a liberal interpretation of an ambiguous clause or phrase and entails legislating by the judicial branch. This we may not do. Shields v. United States, 698 F.2d 987, 990 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 73, 78 L.Ed.2d 86 (1983); see Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 754 (1978).
In British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U.S. 159, 57 S.Ct. 132, 81 L.Ed. 95 (1936), the Supreme Court was faced with a similar situation. In that ease the Court upheld Montana’s right to tax oil and gas production on the Blackfeet Reservation pursuant to the 1924 *1206Act. The non-Indian oil producer argued that two other statutes, the Act of June 30, 1919, 41 Stat. 3, 16, 17, and the Act of September 20, 1922, 42 Stat. 857, specifically governed the leasing of minerals on the Blackfeet Reservation. These provisions were silent on the subject of state taxation and, it was argued, the 1924 Act therefore did not apply. The Court, however, read all the acts together as one law and approved state taxation under the 1924 Act. 299 U.S. at 166. This court should do the same. While the 1938 Act replaced the 1924 Act’s leasing provisions, the taxing authorization was left intact and must be read as effective along with the 1938 Act. See Yellowfish, 691 F.2d at 930.
The question is not whether the 1938 Act “expressly incorporated” the 1924 Act, but whether the 1924 Act’s taxing authorization applies under its own terms to leases entered into under the 1938 Act. The language of the 1924 Act and the construction of it by the Supreme Court show that it is applicable. By its plain language, the 1924 Act applies to “unallotted land on Indian reservations other than the lands of the Five Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject to lease for mining purposes for a period of ten years under the proviso to Section 3 of the Act of February 28, 1891____” The Act then provides that “the production of oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by the state____” (Emphasis added). “Such lands" clearly applies to unallotted lands subject to lease under the 1891 Act. Lands subject to lease under the 1891 Act are those “lands occupied ... by Indians who have bought and paid for the same, and which lands are not needed for farm or agricultural purposes____” In British-American Oil, the Supreme Court construed this language to include not only “lands acquired by Indians through the payment of a consideration in money, but equally including lands reserved for Indians in return for cession or surrender by them of other lands, possessions or rights.” 299 U.S. at 164, 57 S.Ct. at 134. The Court relied on Strawberry Valley Cattle Co. v. Chipman, 13 Utah 454, 45 P. 348 (1896), and uniform administrative practice to support its construction of “bought and paid for”:
It has been repeatedly ruled that Indians who are in possession of lands that have been given to them by the United States, for permanent occupancy, where Congress has recognized the right and title of the Indians to such lands, holds said lands as purchasers having paid for the same, in the sense in which the words “have paid for the same” are used in the Act of 1891.
Opinion of the Assistant Attorney General, cited in 25 Land Dec, 408, 412 (1897); see Strawberry Cattle Co., 45 P. at 350-351.
The Tribe argued, and the majority impliedly accepts, that the use of the term “such lands” in the 1924 Act should limit the tax authorization to leases made pursuant to the 1891 or 1924 Acts. We think the plain meaning of the 1924 Act cannot be so narrowly constricted. The term “such lands” addresses generally the property which may be leased. It does not refer only to those leases in which the 1891 or 1924 Acts are cited as authority. In British-American Oil, the Supreme Court concluded that the 1924 Act authorized taxation of oil and gas leasing on the Blackfeet Reservation. In addition, Felix Cohen construed the 1924 Act as applying to unallotted reservation land. Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra, at 257. The 1938 Act leases at issue here involve unallotted land. The language of the 1924 Act’s taxing authorization is broad, and it plainly applies.1
*1207I also disagree with the majority's rejection of the long and consistent Department of Interior interpretation that the 1938 Act did not affect the right of the states to tax. First, from 1938 to 1956 the Department of Interior acquiesced in state taxation of mineral production, notwithstanding the existence of the 1938 Act. Since Interior sponsored the 1938 Act, it certainly could have put an end to state taxation of mineral extraction if it intended the 1938 Act to have that effect. Then, in 1956, the Solicitor for the Department of Interior explicitly found that the 1938 Act did not affect the 1924 Act’s taxing authorization. In 1966, the Solicitor affirmed this position. It was not until 1977 that the Department reversed its position. 84 Interior Dec. 905. The majority follows that later decision in holding that taxation is permitted only for leases entered under the authority of the 1924 and 1891 Acts. This later interpretation, however, overturned a long-standing and consistent administrative construction of the law, and is not entitled to any substantial deference. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 272-273, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1680-81, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981); Red Lion Broadcasting Co., 395 U.S. at 381, 89 S.Ct. at 1801.
Instead, this court should rely on the Department’s prior consistent interpretation of the 1924 and 1938 Acts. It is true, as the majority states, that the prior announcements of the Department were not contemporaneous with the passage of the 1938 Act. Also, they were informal opinions. Nonetheless, they are still entitled to deference from the courts. See Rice v. Rehner, — U.S.-,---& n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 3291, 3300-3301 & n. 13, 77 L.Ed.2d 961, 976-977 & n. 13 (1983); Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Nordwick, 378 F.2d 426, 432 (9th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1046, 88 S.Ct. 764, 19 L.Ed.2d 838 (1968). Moreover, they most likely were the result of what the Department thought was plainly the law, i.e., the 1938 Act had no effect on the power of the states to tax mineral resource extraction on unallotted land because it did not expressly repeal the 1924 Act.
If Congress had intended to limit the taxing authorization of the 1924 Act, it would have done so expressly. Surely, there would have been at least some protest from the representatives of the western states, to which the taxation of mineral resources is so important, if the 1938 Act was intended to have such effect. No such protest can be found in the history of the passage of the 1938 Act.
For the preceding reasons, I would affirm the district court.2

. Mr. Cohen also made no mention of any loss of effectiveness of the 1924 Act’s authority for state taxation due to the 1938 Act. At the time of the 1942 publication of his Handbook, Mr. Cohen was an Assistant Solicitor in the Department of Interior. Mr. Cohen, who died in 1953, was also this country’s preeminent authority on Indian law. Presumably, he was well aware of the intent underlying the 1938 Act and surely he would have been aware of any loss of effectiveness of the 1924 Act due to the operation of the 1938 Act. Perhaps that is why the Department of Interior consistently upheld state taxation of mineral resources until 1977.

. The Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1347, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-e, permits the state taxation of mineral resource extraction on unallotted executive order reservation land. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 102 S.Ct. 894, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982). The majority fails to point out that its holding would have a like effect on the continued effectiveness of the 1927 Act, which was modeled largely on the 1924 Act.