Court Opinion

ID: 9675434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:53:55.953495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:34.566294
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree that Art. 38.29, V.A.C.C.P., absolutely prohibits admissibility of the prior conviction admitted herein to impeach the appellant as a witness, but cannot concede correctness of the majority’s conclusion that such error was harmless.
All courts accept and agree as a matter of fact and law that a previous conviction of a felony or offense involving moral turpitude is a matter properly to be considered by a trier of fact in deciding whether or not to believe a witness. The prosecutor, who was present and observing the demeanor and reactions of the jury to the testimony of the witnesses, including the appellant, apparently thought that such impeaching evidence might be necessary to obtain a conviction or surely such would not have been injected over the defense objection. Where a defendant takes the stand and denies any involvement in the offense charged, for this Court to hold such evidence harmless requires an adjudication by this Court that the jury would have given greater weight to and accepted as true the evidence conflicting with the defendant’s testimony even if the defendant had not been so impeached. This Court is precluded from such adjudication by Art. 38.04, Y.A.C. C.P., which provides as follows:
“The jury, in all cases, is the exclusive judge of the facts proved and the weight to be given to the testimony.”
I respectfully dissent.