Court Opinion

ID: 9917248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 19:02:10.825258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:59.400905
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/11/24 P. v. Roberts CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E082057

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIF103844)

 PAUL DEAN ROBERTS,                                                      OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.

Affirmed.

         Paul Dean Roberts, in pro. per.; and Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                                  1
       Defendant and appellant Paul Dean Roberts apparently filed a request pursuant to

Penal Code section 1172.751 to have his prior prison term enhancement stricken.2 The

court implicitly dismissed the request by taking the matter off calendar.

       Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14

Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), setting forth a statement of facts, a statement of the case, and

identifying three potentially arguable issues: (1) whether the court erred in determining

that defendant’s convictions for lewd and lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14

rendered him ineligible for relief as a matter of law; (2) whether the court erred in

determining it did not have jurisdiction to recall defendant’s sentence; and (3) whether the

trial court erred in holding the hearing without defendant’s personal presence.

       Defendant was offered the opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which

he has done.3 Defendant contends his original convictions included findings that his

offenses were committed without force or violence and that he was never convicted of

sexual crimes committed in Riverside County. Therefore, defendant maintains the court

       1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

       2 No letter, motion, request, or petition for such relief appears in the record. We
infer defendant filed such a request from the court’s statements: “While there were a
number of invitations for me to put these on calendar because defendants sent letters, I
always denied them.” “I’ve seen several opinions and a couple of denials now from the
Court of Appeals indicating I’m without jurisdiction to handle the petition because there
is a statutory process for the orderly administration of the new statute. They have said
the defendant does not have standing to make the petition.”

       3 “If the defendant . . . files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is
required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written
opinion.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
                                                  2
erred in finding him ineligible for relief without holding a hearing, with defendant

present, at which the court should have held the People to the burden to prove, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that defendant’s prior conviction offenses were sexually violent. We

affirm.

                   I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4

          Both defendant’s underlying cases arose from convictions that originated in

Orange County in 1984 and 1985, but were transferred to Riverside County during

defendant’s period of probation. In the first case, defendant pled guilty to eight counts

under sections 288, subdivision (a) (lewd or lascivious conduct upon a child under 14)

and 647a (child molesting). Defendant admitted he had committed lewd acts four times

against the first victim, two times against the second victim, and one time against the

third and fourth victims. (Roberts I, supra, E003648; Roberts II, supra, E042192.)

          In the second case, defendant pled guilty to five counts of lewd and lascivious

conduct (§ 288, subd. (a)) upon a 12-year-old victim: “[D]efendant admitted the charges

in the following language: [¶] ‘I placed my penis in contact with his buttocks. I placed

his penis in my mouth on [two] separate occasions, I masturbated the penis of [the

victim] (age 12) and had [the victim] masturbate my penis all acts done with and for the

purpose of my own sexual gratification.’” (Roberts I, supra, E003648.) The court placed

          4 We take judicial notice of this court’s prior opinions from defendant’s appeal
from the revocation of his probation (People v. Roberts (Oct. 3, 1988, E003648) [nonpub.
opn.] (Roberts I)), and his appeal from his judgment for failure to register as a sex
offender (People v. Roberts (June 9, 2008, E042192) [nonpub. opn.] (Roberts II)). (Evid.
Code, §§ 452, 459; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(b).)
                                                   3
defendant on probation with a suspended sentence and required that he register as a sex

offender. (Roberts II, supra, E042192.)

       In 1986, while on probation, defendant forced an eight-year-old boy to orally

copulate him. The trial court revoked defendant’s probation on October 1, 1986.5 The

court sentenced defendant to 15 years in the first case and 10 consecutive years in the

second. (Roberts I, supra, E003648; Roberts II, supra, E042192.)

       Defendant appealed. This court affirmed the judgment. (Roberts I, supra,

E003648.) After he completed a portion of his 25-year sentence, defendant was released

from prison. (Roberts II, supra, E042192.)

       As a sex offender, defendant was required to notify law enforcement of his

residence or location in California. Defendant had repeatedly requested permission to

leave California; his parole agent told him he could not do so. Defendant was to report to

his parole agent on October 15, 2001, but failed to show. That day, defendant’s parole

agent checked defendant’s motel and was informed defendant had left. (Roberts II,

supra, E042192.)

       By Christmas 2001, defendant had moved in with a woman and her 10-year-old

son, in Montana. California law enforcement located defendant in Montana shortly

before they arrested him in March 2005. (Roberts II, supra, E042192.)

       5 We note that Roberts I reflects that the court revoked defendant’s probation on
October 1, 1986, while Roberts II reflects the court revoked defendant’s parole on
October 21, 1986. (Roberts I, supra, E003648; Roberts II, supra, E042192.) The
discrepancy is of no relevance in the instant case.

                                                4
       A jury convicted defendant of failing to notify law enforcement he had changed

his residence or location (§ 290, subd. (f)(1), count 1) and failing to register his new

address within five working days of moving on or about October 16, 2001 (§ 290,

subd. (a)(1)(A); count 2). The court thereafter found true allegations defendant had

suffered four prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A) & 1170.12, subd.

(c)(2)(A)) and one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant

to a total term of 26 years to life in state prison consisting of a term of 25 years to life on

count 1, plus a consecutive one-year for the prison prior. The court also imposed a term

of 25 years to life on count 2 but stayed the sentence under section 654. (Roberts II,

supra, E042192.)

       Defendant appealed. This court reversed the judgment as to the count 2 offense.

In all other respects, this court affirmed the judgment. (Roberts II, supra, E042192.) On

November 6, 2008, the court dismissed the count 2 offense.

       At a hearing on July 31, 2023, at which defendant was represented but not present,

the court observed: “While there were a number of invitations for me to put these on

calendar because defendants sent letters, I always denied them. I always sent a copy of

that, of the letter, to both the prosecutor and to a member of the public defender’s office.

But I’ve seen several opinions and a couple of denials now from the Court of Appeals

indicating I’m without jurisdiction to handle the petition because there is a statutory

process for the orderly administration of the new statute. They have said the defendant

                                                   5
does not have standing to make the petition.” “All right. Then that being the case, this

one is off calendar.”

       Nevertheless, the court noted that defendant’s prior prison term “purports to be a

violation of . . . section 288, subdivision (a), which does survive the change in the law as

it relates to prison priors. So it would appear that the gentleman is not entitled to relief.”

                                      II. DISCUSSION

       Defendant contends his original conviction included a finding that his offenses

were committed without force or violence and that he was never convicted of sexual

crimes committed in Riverside County. Therefore, defendant maintains the court erred in

finding him ineligible for relief. He argues the court should have held a hearing, with

defendant present, at which the court should have held the People to the burden to prove,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant’s prior conviction offenses were sexually

violent. We affirm.

       “Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial courts to

impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the

defendant had served a separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody

for at least five years. [Citation.] Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-

2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590) (Senate Bill 136) amended section 667.5 by

limiting the prior prison term enhancement to only prior terms for sexually violent

offenses. [Citations.] Enhancements based on prior prison terms served for other

offenses became legally invalid. [Citation.] The amendment was to be applied

                                                  6
retroactively to all cases not yet final on January 1, 2020. [Citation.]” (People v. Burgess

(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 379-380 (Burgess).)

       A “‘[s]exually violent offense’ means the [] acts when committed by force,

violence, duress, menace, fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or

another person, or threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other

person, . . . and result[ing] in a [felony] conviction . . . of Section . . . 288 . . .” (Welf. &

Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (b).)

       “Later, in 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg.

Sess.) (Senate Bill 483). This bill sought to make the changes implemented by Senate

Bill 136 retroactive. [Citation.] It took effect on January 1, 2022, and added former

section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, to the Penal Code. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats.

2022, ch. 58, § 12.)” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.)

       “Section 1172.75 states that ‘[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior

to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5, except for any

enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally

invalid.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The statute further establishes a mechanism to provide

affected defendants a remedy for those legally invalid enhancements. Subdivision (b) of

section 1172.75 directs the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR) and the correctional administrator of each county to ‘identify those persons in

their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement

described in subdivision (a) and . . . provide the name of each person, along with the

                                                    7
person’s date of birth and the relevant case number or docket number, to the sentencing

court that imposed the enhancement.’ [Citation.]” (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at

p. 380.)

       “[S]ection 1172.75 does not authorize a defendant to seek resentencing on his or

her own motion or petition. Rather the process is triggered by the [CDCR] identifying a

defendant as a person serving a sentence that includes a prior prison term enhancement.

[Citation.]” (People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 332.)

       Regardless of whether any or all of defendant’s 13 convictions for lewd and

lascivious behavior with minors under section 288, subdivision (a), would qualify as

sexually violent, the court was without jurisdiction to rule on the matter because

defendant brought the request for relief himself. Only the filing of documentation by the

CDCR would trigger the court’s jurisdiction to strike defendant’s prior prison term

enhancement. (Cota, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 332; Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at

p. 380.) Thus, the court correctly dismissed defendant’s request for relief for lack of

jurisdiction.

                                                 8
                                  III. DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                     McKINSTER
                                                                 Acting P. J.

We concur:

MILLER
                        J.

FIELDS
                        J.

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