Court Opinion

ID: 9671483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:37:22.062445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:41.453927
License: Public Domain

Fitzgerald, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s request that the jury be instructed that a condition that limits a life activity is a handicap even *716if the condition is controlled with medication or medical care.
The determination whether an instruction is accurate and applicable based on the characteristics of a case is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Williams v Coleman, 194 Mich App 606, 623; 488 NW2d 464 (1992). When a party requests an instruction that is not covered by the standard jury instructions, the trial court may, at its discretion, give additional, concise, understandable, conversational, and nonargumentative instructions, provided they are applicable and accurately state the law. MCR 2.516(D)(4); Wengel v Herfert, 189 Mich App 427, 431; 473 NW2d 741 (1991). A supplemental instruction need not be given if the instruction would neither add anything to an otherwise balanced and fair jury charge nor enhance the ability of the jurors to decide the case intelligently, fairly, and impartially. Houston v Grand Trunk W R Co, 159 Mich App 602, 608; 407 NW2d 52 (1987). The failure to give a properly requested, applicable, and accurate instruction does not require reversal unless failure to vacate the jury verdict would be inconsistent with substantial justice. Johnson v Corbet, 23 Mich 304, 326; 377 NW2d 713 (1985).
Before its amendment in 1990, the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (hcra) defines the term handicap as
a determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual or a history of the characteristic which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder which characteristic:
(i) .. . is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position, or is unrelated to the *717individual’s qualifications for employment or promotion. [MCL 37.1103(b)(i); MSA 3.550(103)(b)(i).]
The Legislature amended the definitional language in 19901 to define a handicap as
(i) A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the characteristic:
(A) .. . substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position. [MCL 37.1103(e)(i)(A); MSA 3.550(103)(eXi)(A).]
Under both of these definitions, a condition related to an individual’s ability to perform the duties of a job is not a handicap within the meaning of the hcra. Koester v Novi, 213 Mich App 653, 661-662; 540 NW2d 765 (1995). Here, plaintiff’s physician testified that as long as plaintiff continued to take antirejection medication, plaintiff did not suffer any limitations on his major life activities or his ability to perform his job duties.
Given this testimony, plaintiff, relying on Hines v Grand Trunk W R Co, 151 Mich App 585, 595-596; 391 NW2d 750 (1985), requested a supplemental jury instruction as follows:
A person that has a determinable physical characteristic which substantially limits one or more life activities is handicapped even if the determinable physical condition— physical characteristic is controlled with medication or medical care.
*718The trial court refused to give the instruction on the ground that Hines was decided under the preamendment definition of “handicap,” which required only that the condition be unrelated to the plaintiff’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job.
The added definitional language is nearly identical to the language in the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 USC 706(8)(B), which defines a handicapped individual as any person who (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (2) has a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. Because the new definitional language has yet to be inteipreted in this state, federal case law interpreting the similar language of the federal act provides guidance in interpreting the HCRA.
The federal courts have recognized that an individual who suffers a life-threatening condition brought under control by medication may still suffer a limitation of major life activity to the extent that the condition, even though controlled, affects the individual’s employability. See, e.g., Reynolds v Brock, 815 F2d 571, 574 (CA 9, 1987) (epilepsy); Bey v Bolger, 540 F Supp 910, 927 (ED Pa, 1982) (high blood pressure). Moreover, under the federal statute, the court’s have recognized that it is sufficient if the individual has a “record” of impairment, even though the impairing condition is in remission or under control. In School Bd of Nassau Co, Florida v Arline, 480 US 273, 281; 107 S Ct 1123; 94 L Ed 2d 307 (1987), the Supreme Court found that an employee’s hospitalization for tuberculosis in 1957 was a sufficient record of impairment to establish that the employee was handicapped *719under the federal act, even though the disease remained in remission for approximately twenty years after the hospitalization:
This impairment was serious enough to require hospitalization, a fact more than sufficient to establish that one or more of her major life activities were substantially limited by her impairment. Thus, Arline’s hospitalization for tuberculosis in 1957 suffices to establish that she has a “record of . . . impairment” . . . and is therefore a handicapped individual.
Despite the additional requirement that the condition substantially limit one or more of the individual’s major life activities, the conclusion in Hines that a person whose condition is controlled by medication may still qualify as handicapped remains viable. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the proposed instruction leaps to the conclusion that if a condition requires medication then it constitutes a substantial impairment per se. Rather, the instruction provides that an individual who suffers a determinable physical characteristic that is brought under control by medication may still suffer a substantial limitation of major life activity to the extent that the condition, even though controlled, affects the individual’s employability. Because a disputed issue at trial was whether plaintiff was in fact handicapped, plaintiff’s proposed supplemental instruction was both applicable and accurate under the facts of this case, and may have enhanced the ability of the jurors to decide the case intelligently, fairly, and impartially. Houston, supra at 608. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing the requested instruction.
The failure to give a properly requested, applicable, and accurate instruction does not require reversal *720unless failure to vacate the jury verdict would be inconsistent with substantial justice. MCR 2.613(A); Houston, supra at 609. Here, during closing argument plaintiff’s counsel argued that the jury was to consider plaintiff’s determinable physical condition without the use of medication to determine whether he suffered a substantial limitation of a major life activity. Defense counsel argued that the definition of “handicap” under the act did not require consideration of the fact that medication was used to control the condition, and that a condition controlled by medication was not a handicap. Both plaintiff and defendant vigorously argued the role of medication in this case, and a note sent by the jury to the trial court reveals that the jury was apparently confused regarding the role medication can play in determining whether a physical condition qualifies as a handicap. Not having the benefit of a special verdict form to determine the basis of the jury’s verdict for defendant, I would conclude that the failure of the trial court to give plaintiff’s proposed instruction resulted in substantial injustice. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
In all other respects, I concur with the majority opinion.

 1990 PA 121.