Court Opinion

ID: 9793425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:47:21.428446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:54.406693
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Doyle
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the decision and reasoning expressed in the majority opinion. My objections fall into two classes and I shall preface my specific objections with some general observations.
First, the opinion seems unlimited in its sweeping terms. It expresses a philosophical aversion to all zoning efforts. The decision itself is limited to a holding that the off-street parking and non-conforming use provisions *166of the zoning ordinance are invalid. Its expressions of viewpoint are at variance with the basic premise that a city can be planned and that restrictions for the general good of the community can be imposed. While conceding that arbitrary regulation of property is invalid, I had thought that the power of the municipality to impose restrictions in the interests of the community so basic and fundamental that it cannot now be questioned. From earliest times restrictions on the use of property have been a necessary product of the development of the town or the urban community. Such restrictions are upheld unless shown to be arbitrary and capricious.
In the year 1923 the City of Denver enacted a Charter Amendment (Sec. 219 A) which authorized in broad and general terms the enactment by council of zoning and planning legislation. Sections A, B and C emphasize the scope of this grant of power and read as follows:
“A — -GRANT OF POWER. For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the community, the council of the city and county of Denver is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lots that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of population and the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.
“B — DISTRICTS. For any or all of said purposes, the council may divide the city and county of Denver into districts of such manner, shape and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this amendment; and within such districts it may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair or use of buildings, structures or land. All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts.
*167“C — PURPOSES IN VIEW. Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provisions of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the city and county of Denver.”
Early decisions of this Court have also recognized the need for this type of regulation. See, for example, Colby v. Board of Adjustment of Denver, et al. (1927), 81 Colo. 344, 255 Pac. 443, which noted the passing of the horse and buggy era and wherein it was stated:
“ * * * The justice writing the opinion in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra, remarks on the decided trend of opinion toward a broader view of zoning ordinances, and refers to state courts reversing themselves, citing instances. Even so, we do not apprehend that we are now offending the rule of stare decisis, as applied to any of our previous decisions. We are only applying old principles to new conditions, or to the changed facts of modern life. Thus, a horse and buggy day decision in the livery stable case, Phillips v. City of Denver, 19 Colo. 179, 34 Pac. 902, intimately allied with those times, would be incongruous now if not considered in the light of modern industrial and civic development. It would be applying the law to an obsolete situation. The same may be said of brickyards in a residence zone under the state of this record. * * * ”
In a more recent decision, Cross v. Bilett, 122 Colo. *168278, 221 P. (2d) 928 (1950), the Court commented as follows:
“ * * * With the growth of congested urban populations, containing areas of attractive residential development, with values greatly dependent on conformity, and with the increasing concern for quiet, safety and beauty, there have been enacted zoning laws under appropriate legislative or constitutional authority in most municipalities in the United States and in many rural areas. The concept of public welfare thereunder has broadened. Under such ordinances uses permitted and legal in one district of the city are prohibited in another. Such prohibition is based not strictly upon the inherent danger to the public health, public morals, the public safety, or the public welfare of the prohibited use generally, but upon its interference with the appropriate use of property and the maintenance of its value in the zone in which such use is sought. We have repeatedly upheld such restrictions. So in Flinn v. Treadwell, 120 Colo. 117, 207 P. (2d) 967, we held invalid a provision requiring in a ‘B’ residential district a front yard of not less than twenty-five feet in depth, directly contrary to the old ruling in Willison v. Cooke, supra. * * * ”
An early definitive and recognized decision upholding zoning is that of the Supreme Court of the United States in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1925), 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. Rep. 114. Mr. Justice Sutherland, who was not noted for his liberal economic philosophy, nevertheless recognized that the community has the power to impose restrictions on the use and occupation of lands in urban communities. It was there stated:
“ * * * Building zone laws are of modern origin. They began in this country about 25 years ago. Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but, with the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect to the use and occupation of pri*169vate lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for, while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must fall. * * * ”
The majority opinion here quotes from Mr. Justice Holmes in an eminent domain opinion, which apparently dealt with what constitutes a taking. However, that distinguished jurist acknowledged that the state has the authority to impose restrictions for the general good and that it is not the function of a judge to substitute his own economic and political viewpoint for that of the legislature. In his now famous dissenting opinion in the case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), he stated:
“ * * * This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my -mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority *170to embody their opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and which equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract. Sunday laws and usury laws are ancient examples. A more modern one is the prohibition of lotteries. The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics. The other day we sustained the Massachusetts vacinnation law. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)
Another expression of the basic philosophy that community existence requires curtailment of rights is found in the opinion of Chancellor Earl in Losee v. Buchanan (1873), 51 N.Y. 476.
“By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled to give up many of my natural rights, but I receive more than a compensation from the surrender by every other man of the same rights, and the security, advantages and protection which the law gives me. * * * We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals, and railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of mankind, and lie at the basis of all our civilizations. * * * Most of the rights of property, as well as of the person, in the social state, are not absolute but relative, and they must be so arranged and modified, not unnecessarily infringing upon natural rights, as upon the whole to promote the general welfare.”
Second, the third part of the majority opinion wherein the classification of B 5 and B 6 is condemned as an unlawful discrimination is especially broad in its effect. It appears to kill all the regulations in the B 6 zone in *171one fell swoop without regard to whether they are reasonable or arbitrary, applicable or inapplicable. This ruling is certain to leave chaos and uncertainty in its wake. Does the 1925 ordinance with its onerous height and other restrictions now apply in this B 6 section or is this section now free altogether from any zoning regulation? These and other equally difficult questions will have to be faced as the aftermath of the “tornado” which is the majority decision.
Third, fundamental canons of procedure have been overlooked. This legislation cannot be judged by a mere reference to its terms. It is not invalid per se. If a judgment were to be made from examination of the legislation alone, it would be more logical to conclude that it is well founded factually and that it does bear a relationship to the public health and safety. The plaintiffs can succeed in this case, according to my view, only by proving the unconstitutionality of this legislation beyond a reasonable doubt. See Consumers League of Colorado, et al. v. Colorado & Southern Railroad Company, 53 Colo. 54, 125 Pac. 577; People ex rel. Rogers v. Letford, 102 Colo. 284, 79 P. 274; Mosko v. Dunbar, 135 Colo. 172, 309 P. (2d) 581.
The instant legislation has been killed without even requiring proof of its invalidity. In fact, the court refused to allow the plaintiff to introduce evidence to show the reasonable basis for its enactment. It strikes me that a question which has the scope and magnitude of that before us should not be decided in a vacuum; evidence should be received to the end that the court might be in a position to determine whether the enactment as applied to the facts is reasonable or arbitrary.
I also have specific objections to the rulings of the majority.
1. Off-Street Parking.
If the court had determined that these particular off-street parking requirements were unnecessary, unreasonable and onerous as applied to these plaintiffs and *172the uses which they have proposed, I would be inclined to concur in the decision. I cannot, however, join in a condemnation of all off-street parking as an invalid exercise of the police power. It is not possible to conclude in the absence of evidence that the land use and the parking requirement ratios which are set up in the ordinance are unreasonable, and it is impossible to conclude that such requirements do not contribute to a solution of the tremendous urban problem of traffic congestion. On the other hand, no evidence is needed to establish that this is a problem of great magnitude and that it is not going to go away by the simple expedient of ignoring it. The number of automobiles and the extent and consequent traffic congestion will constitute a problem at all times in the future. Courts are not better qualified to solve these questions than legislators and enactments which are intended to look toward such solutions should not be voided merely because we might disagree with them.
The majority fail to cite any decisions which specifically support its conclusion. There are cases which hold particular off-street parking requirements invalid upon the basis of their special arbitrariness. All of these, however, proceed on the premise that off-street parking generally is valid. See Rhyne, Municipal Law, 967.
The relationship of off-street parking to the general welfare is ably outlined in 2 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice (2d ed.), 76, 77, 78:
“While traffic is not the moving factor in the drafting of zoning ordinances, most comprehensive zoning ordinances now make some provision for the proper programming of present and future traffic improvements. It has been found that this can best be done through the medium of off-street parking requirements for certain classes of buildings and structures.
“Amendments to zoning ordinances incorporating off-street parking requirements are now widespread in apolication, many cities having found that provisions in *173zoning ordinances which make imperative the provision for parking facilities constitute an excellent application of the zoning concept in alleviating traffic congestion.
“At this writing it appears, from information furnished by David R. Levin, Chief of the Land Studies Section of the Bureau of Roads, Department of Commerce, that 265 known localities in thirty-three different states have enacted ordinances or amendments thereto requiring off-street parking accommodations for designated property uses.
“The effects of zoning on transportation are immediately apparent when it is realized that the volume of the traffic which the urban street must accommodate is directly related to the height, bulk and function of the buildings comprising the community.
“As we have had occasion to state before:
“ ‘Among the many problems pressing for solution in the crowded metropolitan areas of America, traffic congestion still takes its rightful place near the top of the list.’
“For our cities to prosper, it is imperative that an adequate supply of off-street terminal spaces be provided, particularly in central business districts, in order to meet the ever expanding demand for the parking of automobiles. It is equally as essential to provide for off-street truck berths. The use of curb spaces for the parking of autos and loading and unloading of trucks blots out a final hope for vehicular capacities of city streets already bled white by the many encroachments thereon. Increasing proportions of the population prefer private autos to mass transportation for travel to central business districts and employment centers. Nothing could better illustrate this than the arguments of mass transportation utilities for higher fares in order to meet increased operating expenses in the face of revenue losses due to decreased patronage by former riders who prefer to use private transportation facilities. This ar*174gument highlights almost every rate hearing in which increased fares are sought.
“It must be beyond debate that the private parking lot and the private parking garage have failed to meet the crisis and solve the problem in most large cities. This failure has brought into being a two-fold municipal activity — the public parking of automobiles and the inclusion of off-street parking provisions in municipal zoning ordinances. * * * ”
The decisions which uphold off-street parking generally deal in each instance with the legality of the specific regulation as applied to particular fact. This is apparent from the discussion in Rhyne, supra. No case that we have been able to find invalidates the principle of off-street parking. For example, in City of New Orleans v. Wimberly, 226 La. 335, 76 So. (2d) 387, the Court enforced an off-street parking requirement as applied to movie theaters. In Roselle v. Wright, 37 N.J. Super. 507, 117 A. (2d) 661, the Court held an off-street parking requirement for a storage garage to be unreasonable in view of its particular terms, but at the same time recognized the validity of such regulation where it bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. The Court said:
“ * * * That provision as applied to stores, warehouses, office buildings, or other commercial structures, to which it may reasonably be anticipated large numbers of people would come by means of automobiles, thus giving rise to congestion in the public streets, appears to be entirely reasonable and logical. * * * ”
See also Allendale Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Grossman (1950), 30 N.J. 273, 152 A. (2d) 569. This holds a requirement of one parking space for every three seats in a church to be reasonable.
State v. City of East Cleveland (1958), (Ohio) 153 N.E. (2d) 177, recognizes that such provisions are valid and cites McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264, 59 A. (2d) 142, and many other cases which deal with similar and *175related problems. Mirschel v. Weissenberger, 277 App. Div. 1039, 100 N.Y.S. (2d) 452, recognizes the general validity of such requirements and also holds that the vesting of authority in a board to make particular determinations does not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. See also Fleishon v. Philadelphia Zoning Board, 385 Pa. 295, 122 A. (2d) 673, and Hill v. Kesselring, 310 Ky. 438, 220 S.W. (2d) 858, and see Foronoff, The Relationship of Zoning to Traffic Generators, 20 Law and Contemporary Problems 197 (1955). Town of Islip v. Summers (1931), 257 N.Y. 167, 177 N.E. 409, is analagous in that it upholds a zoning ordinance requiring building setbacks. The language of the Court per Pound, J., is here relevant:
“The question is whether the zoning ordinance of the town of Islip is unconstitutional in so far as it requires a setback of ten feet from the street on that part of Montauk avenue which is zoned for business purposes. The court below has held that such ordinance is detrimental and prejudicial to the use of the premises for building purposes, and unconstitutional as a taking of private property for public purposes without just compensation.
“[1] Can it be said that the ordinance in this respect on its face ‘passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely arbitrary fiat?’ Village of Euclid, Ohio, v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389, 47 S.Ct. 114, 119, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016. ‘If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.’ Village of Euclid, Ohio, v. Ambler Realty Co., supra, page 388 of 272 U.S. 47 S.Ct. 114, 118; Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 296, 150 N.E. 120, 43 A.L.R. 651.
“[2] In the light of these rulings, how can a court say upon mere inspection of the zoning ordinance that the end in view is not reasonably pursued by its adoption in order to lessen congestion in the streets and thereby *176to promote the public safety? Town Law, Consol. Law, c. 62, §349-o. * * * ”
In summary, I am of the opinion that the off-street parking regulations which the majority holds invalid are not per se unconstitutional. Moreover, the evidence at the trial fails to demonstrate specific invalidity as applied to plaintiffs and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt a lack of relationship between these regulations and the public health, safety and welfare. They should, therefore, be upheld.
2. Invalidity of the Non-Conforming Use Provisions.
The majority opinion determines that the restrictions which were incident to the grant of non-conforming uses are so “onerous and unreasonable” as to be invalid. To my mind, this holding is not here justified. In the first place, the non-conforming use is a fundamental aspect of any comprehensive zoning law. It merely declares that a use existing at the time of the enactment of a zoning ordinance may be continued though it is not in harmony with the character of the zone or district which is created by the law. In effect, therefore, it is a recognition of a right to continue an existing use and is in legal effect a saving clause which protects a zoning ordinance from the charge that it is retroactive. The philosophy behind the non-conforming use is well expressed in a case note recorded in 44 Cornell Law Quarterly, 451, 452:
“Ever since the landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, the power of a municipality to pass reasonable zoning ordinances has been firmly established. This case settled the controversy over prospective regulation of undeveloped land, but left unresolved the problem of how to deal with previously existing nonconforming uses, which were long believed to be entitled to constitutional protection as vested property rights.
“Ideally, in order to achieve the perfectly planned city, a city zoning plan should start with virgin terri*177tory. There, everything could at the outset be put in its proper place or zone and, theoretically, there would be complete conformity. Obviously, this situation was not present in most areas of the United States. As a result, when zones were set up in already developed areas, those who established the zones had to harmonize, as best they could, various pre-existing uses of the land. These pre-existing uses, established before the zones were set up and allowed to continue in technical violation of the zoning law, are called prior nonconforming uses.
“Generally, prior nonconforming uses were allowed to continue for two basic reasons: (1) Because it was felt that zoning laws could not constitutionally be applied retroactively to deprive the owner of his nonconforming use, and (2) because zoning looks primarily to the future and ‘seeks to stabilize, and protect and not to destroy.’ In the early stages of zoning, it was believed that prior nonconforming uses would eventually eliminate themselves over a period of years through abandonment, destruction and other normal changes. Contrary to these expectations, nonconforming uses still abound. It is frequently said that the primary problem facing zoning is elimination of the nonconforming use.”
These provisions have been generally upheld by the courts and certainly they have never before been condemned in the abstract, that is, in the absence of a showing by a plaintiff that a particular restriction deprives him of some right. See 1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, §§ 149, 151, 156, 157, and Rathkopf, Law of Zoning, Chapters 60, 61 and 62, also 8 McQuillen, Municipal Corporations, pp. 464, 465.
Examination of the instant ordinance does not indicate that its terms are palpably unjust. The ordinance does not, for example, require the use to be eliminated after a period of time. It merely demands that the use be reported and that permission be obtained before any major structural change is made. It also provides that *178the right can be abandoned under certain circumstances such as one year vacancy, and that it can be lost by destruction of the building as the result of a fire or a force of nature. Such restrictions are not specifically in question and their mere presence in the ordinance does not justify a holding that the ordinance is per se invalid. A particular deprivation of right may in a given case justify a holding that some one restriction is arbitrary and oppressive, but that is not the present case. This is an injunction suit and not a declaratory judgment action.
The majority ruling is so fundamental as to constitute a condemnation of all zoning and planning because if changes cannot be made which look to eventual elimination of non-conforming spot areas, the plan itself is undermined to the point that it means little or nothing.
Nor can I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the city council did not have the power under Section 219 A of the Charter to provide for non-conforming uses. As indicated above, this is authority which need not be specifically set forth. It is a fundamental part of any comprehensive plan. For these reasons, I disagree also with this determination.
3. Authority of the City Council to Distinguish Between the B-5 and the B-6 Districts.
The holding of the majority that there is no appreciable difference between the downtown property and that which is South of Colfax Avenue, the dividing line adopted by the City Council, ignores the facts. To be sure, there may be similarities between the two districts, but there are also substantial differences which justify the adoption of the dividing line. Certainly the legislature must be in a position to create districts and to determine differences and to declare land uses in accordance with its findings. The Charter provision itself which the majority considers narrow in scope and which I regard as broad and comprehensive certainly contemplates this type of legislative decision. We need only look out of the windows of our own offices to observe *179the very marked differences. The B-6 district by no stretch of the imagination can be classified as a concentrated commercial area such as B-5. The ground South of Colfax Avenue, which is here in question, is in the process of changing from residential to commercial. The Council has classified it as a secondary rather than a primary commercial district, and it is within its power, as I view it, to so determine. Adoption of ground rules to govern development is much easier than adoption of rules which seek to effect changes after the area has quickened and it cannot be said that the classification of this district as a secondary commercial area is unreasonable or unrealistic. On the contrary, the holding that there is no appreciable difference between this district and the traditional “downtown” district seems to me to be extremely unrealistic and arbitrary.
Finally, I fail to see that it is unreasonable discrimination to require this developing commercial area to provide off-street parking. The impossibility of requiring off-street parking in the so-called downtown district is at once apparent. It seems to me reasonable to distinguish between these two areas and to demand that new constructions in the developing commercial area comply with the off-street parking requirement.
4. The Question Whether This Legislation Is Invalid by Reason of its Being Retrospective.
Merely because the plaintiffs applied for building permits prior to November 7, 1956, the effective date of this ordinance, does not mean that it may not be constitutionally applied to them. In order to hold that legislation is invalid because of its being retrospective, it must appear that the provision authorizing retrospective application is more than just form and operates so as to deprive them of a substantive right that had matured prior to the enactment of the ordinance. I cannot agree that the mere application for a building permit can result in one’s having a vested right to build in accord*180anee with the application, and that is the effect of the majority’s alternative holding.
The holding that the mere filing of an application for a building permit creates a constitutionally protected property right is not supported in the majority opinion by citation to any authority. My research indicates that the authorities on the subject are to the contrary. The Court of Appeals of New York in 1930 affirmed a decision which restrained the defendant from erecting apartment houses by a zoning ordinance which became effective after the issuance of a permit for said construction but before any work had been commenced on the building. Rice v. Van Vranken, 225 N.Y. 541, 175 N.E. 304. It is interesting to note that the then chief justice of that court was Benjamin Cardozo. For a more recent decision adhering to the decision in Van Vranken see Application of Kunz, 128 N.Y.S. (2d) 680 (Sup. Ct. 1954). The authorities there cited make clear that the underlying basis for extending the protections of substantive due process to this sort of situation depends on the extent to which the applicant has taken steps in justifiable reliance on the permit, such as performing substantial work and incurring significant expenses and obligations. Similarly, where attempt has been'made to commence an undertaking prior to the date of an ordinance declaring it to be a nonconforming use, the courts have applied the principal of the Van Vranken case to prevent this race to the courthouse where there has been no substantial commitment of resources in reliance on the preexisting law. Smith v. Juillerat, 161 Ohio St. 424, 119 N.E. (2d) 611; Ohio State Students Trailer Park Coop. v. County of Franklin, 123 N.E. (2d) 542 (Ohio App. 1953). Judged by these principles the plaintiffs have failed to show deprivation of any substantive rights. Article II, sec. 11 of the Constitution of Colorado prohibits only a law retrospective in its operation. As to these plaintiffs this ordinance is retrospective only in *181form. They have attempted to exploit the law rather than justifiably rely on it.
In conclusion, it is my opinion that the ordinance should be upheld and that we should determine that these plaintiffs have failed to establish that the ordinance, or any provision of it, operates to deprive them of any constitutional right. The mere fact that plaintiffs cannot, under the adopted plan, use the land so that they can make the maximum economic use of it does not justify the far-reaching and sweeping conclusion contained in the majority opinion. There cannot be a zoning plan applicable to all of the people of the city and having for its purpose the orderly development of the city which will at the same time permit every individual to use his property exactly as he sees fit. So long as the scheme itself is reasonable, it should be upheld. If particular individuals can show that a specific provision is unreasonably oppressive, it then becomes appropriate to strike down that particular provision. The present plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the impossibility of their living and prospering under this ordinance. The judgment of the district court should be reversed and the denial of the building permit by the zoning administrator should be upheld.
Mr. Justice Day concurs in this dissent.