Court Opinion

ID: 9558042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:02:01.622901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:53.699594
License: Public Domain

GRABER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because, in my view, Congress clearly intended to authorize cumulative punishment for receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornography.
I disagree with the majority for two independent reasons. First, the majority creates a circuit split by announcing a new interpretation of the test first applied in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Second, the majority ignores Congress’ clear intent to authorize cumulative punishment for the crimes of receipt and possession.
A. The Blockburger Test and Affirmative Defenses
The majority’s formalistic application of the Blockburger test looks only at the elements of each crime. In my view, we need not turn a blind eye to all affirmative defenses that do not negate an element of the crime. I would join the only circuits to have addressed the issue and hold that affirmative defenses are part of the analysis. United States v. Franchi-Forlando, 838 F.2d 585, 591 (1st Cir.1988); United States v. Ortiz-Alarcon, 917 F.2d 651, 653 (1st Cir.1990) (following Franchi-Forlando ); United States v. Gomez-Ruiz, 931 F.2d 977, 979-80 (1st Cir.1991) (same); United States v. Ahad, 985 F.2d 554, 1993 WL 27384, *1 (4th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (unpublished disposition)1 (expressly adopting the reasoning and holding of Franchi-Forlando); see also United States v. Verduzco, 373 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir.2004) (rejecting, in a different context, the argument that the term “element” should not encompass an affirmative defense as a “formalistic reading” of the term “element”).
Suppose these facts: John Doe ordered and received two images of child pornography. He immediately regretted his curiosity; an hour later, he shredded one image and took the other to the nearest police station. Under the present version of the statutes, John Doe is guilty of receiving child pornography, notwithstanding the small number of images and the buyer’s remorse, but he is not guilty of possessing child pornography.
As I read Blockburger, we simply examine the text of the statutory provisions to see whether the crime of possession requires proof of a fact that the crime of receipt does not. The crime of possession requires proof that the defendant possessed three or more images or failed to delete the images or inform the police about them. Receipt does not require proof of any of those facts. Thus, the crime of possession requires proof of a fact that the crime of receipt does not. That’s all there is to it.2
*949B. Congressional Intent
In determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits punishment for two separate crimes, the “ ‘dispositive question’ [is] whether Congress intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes.” Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980)). The Block-burger test is only one indicator of congressional intent and “is not controlling when the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the legislative history.” Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985); see also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) (“[S]imply because two criminal statutes may be construed to proscribe the same conduct under the Block-burger test does not mean that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punishments pursuant to those statutes.”). In my view, Congress clearly intended to authorize cumulative punishment for the crimes of receipt and possession. Accordingly, even if I agreed with the majority’s formalistic application of the Blockburger test, I would nevertheless conclude that cumulative punishment is authorized.
1. Legislative History of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A
In 1996, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2252A to criminalize activities related to child pornography, including the separate crimes of receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornography. “Any person who ... knowingly receives ... any child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce” commits the crime of receipt. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (1996). “Any person who ... knowingly possesses any ... material that contains 3 or more images of child pornography” commits the separate crime of possession. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (1996).
Supporting the enactment of the statute, Congress made findings about the harms that flow from child pornography. Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26 (1996). At least two distinct harms were identified.
First, Congress recognized the harm to the actual children who are used in creating child pornography:
(1) the use of children in the production of sexually explicit material, including photographs, films, videos, computer images, and other visual depictions, is a form of sexual abuse which can result in physical or psychological harm, or both, to the children involved;
(2) where children are used in its production, child pornography permanently records the victim’s abuse, and its continued existence causes the child victims of sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting those children in future years[.]
Id. The creation of child pornography results from the market for such images. Of note, a person who receives images (for instance, by ordering a magazine or subscribing to an online website) furthers the market for such images whether or not the person retains them. Indeed, even a person who receives the images and never gets around to viewing them still causes these harms that Congress noted.
Second, and separately, Congress identified the harmful uses of child pornography in the hands of pedophiles and sexual abusers:
(3) child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing other children into sexual activity; a child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to pose for sexually explicit photographs, can sometimes be *950convinced by viewing depictions of other children “having fun” participating in such activity;
(4) child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out with children; such use of child pornography can desensitize the viewer to the pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation of children, so that it can become acceptable to and even preferred by the viewer[J
Id. Production or receipt of child pornography does not per se cause these harms. Rather, a person’s possession and use of the images causes these harms.
Congress amended the statute two years later. Its express purpose was to get tougher on persons who possessed child pornography. See 144 Cong. Rec. S1226265 (1998) (explaining that the “Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of 1998” was an effort to take a “zero tolerance” approach to possession of child pornography). Congress effectuated that purpose by criminalizing the possession of any number of images (not just “3 or more”). 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5). At the same time, it passed an affirmative defense for persons who possessed less than three images and promptly destroyed the images or contacted law enforcement. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d).3
2. Analysis
To find congressional intent, we are to consider whether the two statutory provisions are “directed to separate evils” or address “diverse societal harms.” Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985); Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343, 101 S.Ct. 1137; see also Garrett, 471 U.S. at 781, 105 S.Ct. 2407. Plainly that is so here. Congress explicitly found that child pornography causes many harms. Some of those harms are caused by receipt but not by possession, and others are caused by possession but not by receipt.
To find congressional intent, we are also to consider the statute’s history. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 342-43, 101 S.Ct. 1137. When Congress enacted the original version of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (1996), there is no question that Congress plainly authorized cumulative punishment for possession and receipt, even under the majority’s strict interpretation of the Blockbwrger test.4 When Congress amended the statute two years later, its express purpose was to get tougher on the crime of possession. The amendment got tougher by creating a “default” that proving possession of forbidden images presumes possession of three or more and by adding that even a very small number, by itself, does not relieve a defendant of criminal liability. Surely Congress did not intend, at the *951same time, to reduce criminal penalties for a typical offender, that is, someone who receives and possesses three or more images of child pornography.
The Supreme Court’s conclusion in Albemaz regarding certain drug offenses apples with equal force to the statutory provisions that we consider today:
The conclusion [I] reach today regarding the intent of Congress is reinforced by the fact that the two [child pornography] statutes are directed to separate evils presented by [the child pornography market], [Receipt and possession of child pornography] impose diverse societal harms, and ... Congress has in effect determined that [receiving and possessing child pornography] is twice as serious as ... do[ing] either object singly. This result is not surprising for ... the history of the [child pornography] legislation in this country reveals the determination of Congress to turn the screw of the criminal machinery-detection, prosecution, and punishment — tighter and tighter.
450 U.S. at 343, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
I do not agree with the majority that Congress’ intent is unclear. Op. at 946-47. The majority does not dispute any of the following facts: Congress plainly authorized cumulative punishments when it enacted the law in 1996, even under the majority’s test; the statutory provisions are directed toward different harms; two years later, Congress amended the statute to “get tougher” on child pornography crimes; and nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to remove cumulative punishment. Short of an express provision for cumulative punishment, it is hard to imagine a clearer indication of Congress’ intent.
Indeed, the majority implies that an express provision is required, op. at 947, but the Supreme Court has squarely rejected that view. In Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778-86, 105 S.Ct. 2407, the two statutory provisions at issue covered the “same conduct” under the Blockburger test, and neither the statute nor the legislative history contained an express provision authorizing cumulative punishment. Nevertheless, the Court held that Congress’ intent to authorize cumulative punishment was plain from the legislative history and other indicators. Id. The Supreme Court warned that the Blockburger rule is “not controlling,” because to hold otherwise would “convert! ] what is essentially a factual inquiry as to legislative intent into a conclusive presumption of law.” Id. at 779, 105 S.Ct. 2407. The majority’s analysis in this case falls prey to that temptation: the majority improperly views “the application of the Blockburger rule as a conclusive determinant of legislative intent, rather than as a useful canon of statutory construction.” Id.
The majority loses sight of why the Blockburger test is a relevant indicator of Congress’ intent. As the Supreme Court has explained, it is “ ‘assumed ... that Congress was aware of the Blockburger rule and legislated with it in mind.’ ” Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 341-42, 101 S.Ct. 1137. To reach the majority’s conclusion, one must also assume that Congress knew that the Blockburger test excluded consideration of affirmative defenses. The problem with that assumption is that the only circuits to have weighed in on the issue had held the exact opposite. See cases cited above, in Part A. In effect, the majority today creates a new interpretation of the Blockburger test, contrary to existing interpretations, and then assumes that, in 1998, Congress legislated with the majority’s novel interpretation in mind. I cannot concur in that strained method of determining congressional intent.
*952In summary, Congress clearly intended to permit cumulative punishment for receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornography. Accordingly, I would hold that punishing Defendant for both receipt and possession does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. His convictions and sentence should be affirmed in full.

. Unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit may be cited for their persuasive value, regardless of the date of publication. 4th Cir. R. 32.1.0.

. In practice, the government must take account of the affirmative defense. If a prosecutor knew for certain that the affirmative defense applies (as in my John Doe hypothetical), the government could not ethically charge John Doe with the crime of possession.

. That provision reads:
It shall be an affirmative defense... that the defendant—
(1) possessed less than three images of child pornography; and
(2) promptly and in good faith, and without retaining or allowing any person, other than a law enforcement agency, to access any image or copy thereof—
(A) took reasonable steps to destroy each such image; or
(B) reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and afforded that agency access to each such image.
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d).

. In the original version of the statute, the crimes of possession and receipt had differing elements. Receipt contained an element requiring proof of interstate or foreign shipment but possession did not. Possession contained an element requiring proof of 3 or more images but receipt did not. The majority therefore does not dispute that the original version of the statute authorized cumulative punishment.