Court Opinion

ID: 9650542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:42:58.291849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:15.530773
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority affirms the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County continuing custody of the minor subject of this litigation in appellees, his paternal aunt and uncle. In so doing, it holds that the trial court applied the proper standard in deciding the issue and that its factual findings are supported by the evidence in the record. I believe that the majority is wrong on both counts. Consequently, I would reverse. It is for that reason that I dissent.
I agree with the majority that where the contest is between a natural parent and a third party, the proper standard is whether the natural parent is unfit or exceptional circumstances exist which make custody in the natural parent detrimental to the best interest of the child. See Newkirk v. Newkirk, 73 Md.App. 588, 593, 535 A.2d 947 (1988). I do not agree that the court applied the proper standard.
Relying on the fact that appellant’s counsel “ably presented the standard in his closing argument”, the majority concludes that “the judge clearly was aware of the standard” and, applying it, found both that appellant was unfit to have custody of her child and that exceptional circumstances militated against appellant having custody. Perusal of the trial court’s written opinion belies these conclusions. First of all, the opinion does not explicitly *326state the correct standard. Moreover, nowhere in the opinion is it specifically stated that appellant is unfit to have the care and custody of the minor child.
When stating its disagreement with the Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services’s recommendation that appellant be awarded custody, the court did state:
Although this case is a close and difficult one, we cannot agree. Mrs. Pastore’s situation impresses us as a tenuous one. She is in a partial welfare program, renting a room barely large enough for herself and her other son. She is an intelligent woman, but her plans for the future are vague at best. As her mother-in-law pointed out, she was always in need of some support. Her church quite properly supplies it at the present time, but we think the responsibility of taking on another child is more than she can handle.
Later, after noting its concern about behavior exhibited by the child after visitation with appellant—the child gave one of his nursery mates “the finger” and had been persuaded by his mother to say that he did not like his day care center—the court opined:
While we applaud Mrs. Pastore’s attempts at rehabilitation, we do not believe it would be in his [Nicholas] best interest to be removed from the custody of the Sharps. Unfortunately, all the damage done in twenty years cannot always be corrected in two.
While, in candor, it may be argued that, implicit in these comments, is a finding of unfitness, the evidence presented in the case is all to the contrary. The Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services recommended that appellant be given custody of the minor child. It did so after visitation, both here and on Long Island, and after interviewing all the parties. The evidence also reflected that appellant was drug free, and had been for two years, and was receiving support from her church. Furthermore, the evidence showed that appellant was adequately parenting her other son. On the opposite side of the ledger is only the *327court’s “thought” and belief as to what appellant’s situation is and what she can handle.
With regard to “exceptional circumstances”, the majority focuses on the length of time that the minor child has been separated from his mother;1 the limited attempts appellant made to regain custody of the minor child;2 the “outstanding care” given the minor child by appellees; and the projected lack of stability and certainty that would ensue were the child placed with appellant. It maintains that the record, specifically the trial court’s references to the appellant’s situation as “tenuous”, to her apartment as “barely large enough for herself and her other son”, and to appellant’s plans for the future as “vague at best”, supports these findings. Again, I do not agree. As with the unfitness finding, the only support in the record for the existence of exceptional circumstances consists of the court’s conjecture.

. It is interesting to note that, as to this, appellees are largely responsible. They sought custody, on a temporary basis, in Maryland, without any effort to notify appellant, who was, as they knew, in New York, that they were doing so. As a result of that order, all of appellant’s visitation rights were eliminated and not reinstated until more than a year later, when appellant first filed a counter complaint for custody in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

. The trial court acknowledges that appellant was “admittedly hampered by lack of funds” during the period during which she sought to rehabilitate herself. Therefore, it is somewhat misleading and unfair for the trial court to rely upon, and the majority to accept, the lack of effort on the part of appellant to seek custody or visitation until August 1988. I think it is to appellant’s credit that she made the effort to obtain custody when she was best able to do so, especially after her initial efforts were unsuccessful.