Court Opinion

ID: 9747677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:27:13.530375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:25.569852
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
In this case the trial court, after hearing testimony for the purpose of considering Jencks Act requirements, specifically found that “lost” notes were producible as a substantially verbatim recital of a victim’s statement made at a showup, that the identification issue was a “crucial one” for appellant, and that the police exercised “bad judgment in failing to preserve those notes.” Upon such a finding the trial court was required to strike at least all of that portion of the witness’ testimony relating, for impeachment and cross-exami*545nation purposes,1 to the subject matter of the missing statement — here, the identification testimony. See 18 U.S.C. 3500(d) (1970). This is what I understand the position of the appellant to be, and I think such position a sound one.
In sustaining this conviction, the majority has engrafted upon the statutory provisions of the Jencks Act a constitutional concept which is incompatible with the express wording of the statute, which first was urged and then discarded by the government in the trial court, and which is not advanced by the government in this Court. The reasoning appears to be that if there is an “independent source” 2 for testimony which is otherwise inadmissible because of sanctions required by the Jencks Act, such testimony is admissible notwithstanding the Jencks Act. No authority whatever is cited for this pronouncement, except the broad statement that the Jencks Act was intended to aid in the search for truth — a principle with which no one would disagree.
The independent source theory was first introduced by the government in response to the trial court’s ruling that the complainant’s identification testimony would be stricken as the sanction for the Jencks violation. The government argued that if it could establish an independent source for the lineup and in-court identifications, then only the showup testimony need be stricken. The court acquiesced in this effort, and the complainant was recalled to the stand to testify as to independent source. Following such testimony, the trial court found no independent source for the lineup testimony.3 Then the prosecutor argued that the Jencks statute did not bring into play the legality of a confrontation and since the showup was constitutionally lawful, the lineup could not be “tainted.” The trial court agreed.' On this state of affairs, the lineup identification was admitted. Next, the in-court identification was admitted on the basis of the trial court’s ruling that there was an independent source for such identification, despite the fact that neither counsel had questioned the complainant on this point.
In this court, since the majority now thinks that the independent source theory is determinative, it must reckon with the trial court’s evidentiary finding that the lineup identification was based upon the showup. It must also reckon with a record showing insufficient evidence in support of the trial court’s finding of an independent source for the in-court identification. It was at the showup that the complainant presumably saw, for the first time, the face of the man who had worn the bandana across his face and the unique shoes during the commission of the crime, and whom he subsequently identified at the latter two encounters.
In any event, "taint” and "independent source” are irrelevant to the Jencks issue (as both parties have now apparently concluded). The remedy for a Jencks Act violation rests not in a constitutional “exclusionary rule” as modified by the “independent source doctrine,” but in the Jencks Act itself. In my opinion, therefore, the *546trial court, having determined to invoke the Act’s sanctions, erred in refusing to strike all of the identification testimony.4 Despite the strongly corroborative circumstantial evidence linking appellant to this crime, one would be hard-pressed, in this single-witness identification situation, to. find that the trial court’s action was harmless error. The defense has suggested that such an approach would be ludicrous, and the prosecutor at oral argument candidly conceded that if the Jencks Act were controlling here5 and the trial court erred in not striking the testimony, then the government could not urge that it was harmless error. Testimony at the Jencks hearing revealed that those present at the showup (police officers and complainant) had significantly different recollections of what the complainant had said when confronted with the appellant at that time, and the identification issue, according to the trial court, was crucial. I would, therefore, reverse.
But this is not the end of the matter. My colleagues, having added new dimensions to the Jencks Act, make further representations which I find to be either gratuitous or contrary to established law in this jurisdiction.
I am at a loss as to why, in view of the trial court’s finding that the officer’s notes were a substantially verbatim recital of the statement of the witness,6 the majority suggests that “[[w]e first must consider] whether the lost notes constituted a statement within the meaning of the Jencks Act,” before concluding that the record was sufficient to decide the case on the “assumption” that the notes did constitute such a statement. The Supreme Court has *547told us quite clearly that Jencks Act questions are to be resolved by the trial court, subject to limited review at the appellate level. Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 96 S.Ct. 1338, 1342, 1347-48, 47 L.Ed.2d 603 (1976); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 355, 89 S.Ct. 528, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1969); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1959). The Goldberg decision, in holding that an appellate court erred in undertaking to make an initial determination as to whether materials constituted producible statements under the Act, questioned “[i]f that function may ever be properly undertaken by a court of appeals.” 96 S. Ct. at 1347. Our own court only recently held that a “clearly erroneous” standard is the appropriate measure by which we are to review the trial court’s conclusion that requested material, by virtue of its contemporaneous and substantially verbatim qualities, falls within the reach of the Act. March v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A. 2d 691, 702 (1976). See also Johnson v. United States, D.C.App., 336 A.2d 545 (1975).
Applying this standard, it appears to me clear that we are bound by the conclusion of the trial court in the instant case that the police notes were producible. That such investigative police notes constitute potentially producible statements under the Act is also clear. See Moore v. United States, D.C.App., 353 A.2d 16, affd after remand, 363 A.2d 288 (1976). See also Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 355 A.2d 784 (1976); Jackson v. United States, D.C.App., 354 A.2d 869 (1976); Jones v. United States, D.C.App., 343 A.2d 346 (1975) ; Hardy v. United States, D.C.App., 316 A.2d 867 (1974); Banks v. United States, D.C.App., 305 A.2d 256 (1973); United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Harrison, 173 U.S.App.D.C. 260, 524 F.2d 421 (1975); compare language in March, supra, purportedly relying on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell in Goldberg, supra, but which, in turn, I read as being addressed, not to rough police notes but to “typical interview notes” made by the prosecutor in preparation for trial (notes nevertheless held to be producible under the Jencks Act).
Finally, I believe it is a little late in the game to suggest that an “election” by the United States not to produce under the Act contemplates only a deliberate refusal or a deliberate destruction and that sanctions should not be applied for the “negligent” loss of notes. See Jones v. United States, supra; Hardy v. United States, supra; United States v. Perry, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 89, 471 F.2d 1057 (1972);7 United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 439 F.2d 642, aff'd after remand, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 448 F.2d 1182 (1971). See also United States v. Harris, supra. Indeed the very authority relied upon by the majority confirms that the trial court, before imposing a sanction, need only find that the government’s conduct amounted to one of the following: (1) negligence and bad motive, (2) negligence and bad judgment, (3) purposeful destruction and bad motive, or (4) purposeful destruction and bad judgment.8 *548Here, the trial court expressly found negligence and bad judgment.
The government has suggested here that there was considerable confusion on the part of the trial court as to the appropriate remedy to be applied for the loss of the notes. I would be amazed if it were otherwise, in view of the morass emerging as a result of the gratuitous and inconsistent thinking finding its way into our decisions interpreting the Jencks Act. Today’s decision, in which the majority seeks to carve an “independent source” exception out of the Act in order to avoid imposing the sanction expressly mandated by Congress, adds considerably to that confusion. I respectfully dissent.

. See, e. g., Hardy v. United States, D.C. App., 316 A.2d 867, 869 (1974) ; United States v. Perry, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 89, 94, 471 F.2d 1057, 1062 (1972) ; United States v. Birnbaum, 337 F.2d 490, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1964).

. By analogy to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).

. The .trial court said:
Now Mr. Bruzzo has indicated in his cross-examination about the fact that he had seen the defendant’s face, was a part of the basis of his identity at the lineup. While he refers to other physical characteristics of the defendant as being part of that, nevertheless it appears to the Court that the fact that he has seen the defendant, has seen the defendant’s face prior to the lineup, it occurs to the Court that it would be very difficult to determine having seen the defendant’s face that that would not form a strong basis for the identity in the lineup, and I believe I would have to rule out .the evidence of the lineup procedure on that basis.

. I do not question, of course, that the trial court has considerable discretion in applying the Jencks Act, i. ■«., in weighing the degree of government culpability and the prejudice to the accused. United States v. Perry, supra note 1.

. In this court the government having abandoned the independent source theory, argues that it is not the Jencks Act but the law of United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 439 F.2d 642, aff’d after remand, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 448 F.2d 1182 (1971), which is controlling when the government fails to produce a statement because it has been lost. The latter law, argues the government, permits the trial court to choose from a wide range of sanctions.

. When asked if he had written .down what Mr. Bruzzo said with respect to the defendant, former Officer Huff — whose notes were missing — testified, “Yes sir. I’m sure I did.” (It was Officer Kennedy — whose notes were produced — who testified that he tried to take down the exact words of everything Mr. Bruz-zo said but in fact was not able to get every word).
After hearing the complainant’s and the police officers’ testimony, and arguments of counsel, the trial court stated:
It is also the Court’s opinion that the issue is a crucial one to the defendant.
It is the Court’s opinion . . . that there is a requirement upon the Police Department to maintain those records, and in light of the regulations which were promulgated the Court thinks that there is bad judgment in failure to preserve those notes, and under the circumstances the Court is going to eliminate .the testimony, the identification of Mr. Bruzzo.
After a recess, the government moved the court “to reconsider the judgment of applying the Jencks sanction,” in light of a particular case, and both sides addressed the issue of whether or not the notes were “substantially verbatim” Jencks material. After considerable argument on this point, the trial court ruled:
THE COURT: . . . [Wjith respect to .the testimony of former detective Huff, it would appear to the Court that the notes . . . appear to have been verbatim, . . . and the Court does not find it persuasive to change the Court’s ruling after having read Schreiber [sic]. [See United States v. Scriber, 163 U.S.App. D.C. 36, 499 F.2d 1041 (1974).]
PROSECUTOR: . . .
Is it Your Honor’s ruling that the complaining witness may not testify to the . . . confrontation between he and the accused when he is brought to Court?
THE COURT: Right.
PROSECUTOR: Is it Your Honor’s ruling that no other officer may testify to that conversation?
THE COURT: No.
[M]y ruling with respect to the Jencks matter . . . goes to Mr. Bruz-zo.

. In United States v. Perry, for example, supra at 94, 471 F.2d at 1062, the court expressly rejected the government’s argument that “a ‘good faith’ loss of evidence or statements should not invoke the statutory sanctions of the Jencks Act,” noting, inter alia, that:
The United States might have ‘elected’ to destroy the statement . . . . Or it might have acted negligently, and the policy of the statute, the quest for truth, is undercut as much by governmental negligence as by intentional acts of destruction. . . .
We do not read ‘elect’ in the literal or narrow sense, but rather as a purposive or negligent act on the part of the Government which has as a direct and foreseeable result the loss or destruction of documents which otherwise the Government could be compelled to produce. [Id. at 95, 471 F. 2d at 1063 (emphasis added).]

. Hardy v. United States, supra note 1, at 870, quoting United States v. Perry, supra note 1, at 99, 471 F.2d at 1067.