Court Opinion

ID: 9606054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:46:12.703899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:32.016438
License: Public Domain

RAPER, Chief Justice,
dissenting with whom GUTHRIE, Justice Retired, joins.
I join in the separate dissent of Justice Guthrie, Retired, but file this separate dissent as well.
I cannot agree that the district judge’s references to certain defense witnesses as co-conspirators is reversible, if error at all, under the circumstances of this case. The trial was complex and difficult. The testimony and evidence presented by the State made it plain that the appellant and the defense witnesses, who were referred to as co-conspirators, were just that — cohorts in the theft and sale of an oil well pumping unit.
It is advisable to set out the exact fashion in which the purportedly offensive statements were made. This will serve to demonstrate just how harmless what was said really was. The witness Gwaltney was testifying to his part in the negotiations to purchase the stolen pumping unit. He went to Casper to discuss the purchase, including a warranty of title, with Floyd Suchta whom he met in a storage yard which belonged to Grable. At that time, Suchta assured Gwaltney the pump was operational and its title clear. It was agreed that until placed in operation on site, payment would not become due.
Gwaltney stated the pump was eventually placed in operation and then started to describe why the purchase price was never paid. It was at this point that the district court made reference to Suchta as an “indicted co-conspirator”:
“Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge, Mr. Gwaltney, if your company ever paid the purchase price?
“A. No, sir, it was never paid.
“Q. And do you know yourself why it was never paid?
“A. Yes, sir, I do, I was, the unit was delivered on or about somewhere about the 21st, the 23rd, 24th of September, and the next day then the erection operation, again disassembly and erection operations began, it took approximately a week to prepare everything and after the unit was delivered and erection and assembling operation began, Mr. Suchta called me in my office in Denver and presented me with—
“MR. McCARTY: Your Honor, again I would object to the comments made by Mr. Suchta, if it wasn’t shown Mr. Grable was there.
*1005“THE COURT: Mr. Suchta is an indicted co-conspirator in this case, outside the hearsay rule. Overruled. (Emphasis added.)
“MR. McCARTY: Also it seems this man is testifying about a lot of things gained than by his own personal observations, is that true, sir?
“THE COURT: Well, if that arises again, call it to my attention, please.
“MR. McCARTY: May we approach the Bench, Your Honor, please?
“THE COURT: Yes.
“(The following proceedings were had at the Bench outside the hearing of the Jury):
“MR. McCARTY: Your Honor, at this point on behalf of the Defendant Grable, I move the Court for a mistrial. The Court has announced to the Jury that Mr. Suchta is an indicted co-conspirator in this case, that is not the case. At this point the indictment against him has been dismissed and he plead [sic] guilty to another count that was not named in the original indictment. There is no proof that has been presented at this point that Mr. Suchta had been indicted and it put both sides in an unfair position by announcing this to the Jury, at this time, no evidence at all.
“THE COURT: There is in one of these files a sentence and judgment against Mr. Suchta, which is part of the records of this court, if they wish to introduce it I would let it in.
“MR. McCARTY: There is no proof in the case at this point, and Mr. Suchta did not plead guilty to one of the original charges, it was modified.
“THE COURT: I think squarely within the ruling of Jasch against State decided in 1977.
“MR. McCARTY: Mr. Suchta plead [sic] guilty to a new count, which was developed before Your Honor in open court, that was a count of conspiring to receive stolen property, was not one of the counts in the original indictment.
“THE COURT: Mr. McCarty, I will say I think we are squarely within the ruling of Jasch and not hearsay.
“MR. McCARTY: Again for the record, I am not at this point complaining about the Court’s ruling, I am complaining about the Court’s announcement to the Jury that Mr. Suchta is an indicted co-conspirator, and that is not the fact. (Emphasis added.)
“THE COURT: He does, his name appears. The motion for new trial is denied.
“MR. McCARTY: Mistrial.”
Thereafter, Gwaltney’s testimony was only to the effect that Suchta presented him with an invoice. Gwaltney started to explain what he said to Suchta as to why payment was not made but it involved hearsay of what another person said, not a conspirator so that is where Gwaltney’s testimony ended.
The point is that the jury was only advised by the court that Suchta was an “indicted” co-conspirator, not a “convicted” co-conspirator or one who had pled guilty. Suchta testified at length for the defendant, giving his version of the transaction and his involvement. On cross-examination Suchta admitted having been convicted on a plea of guilty to the felony of receiving stolen property (the offense was actually conspiring to receive stolen property). This plea was in regard to the same pumping unit which is the subject matter of the prosecution against the defendant Grable.
It makes no difference what charge Such-ta pled guilty to. He was, according to the State’s theory, a co-conspirator and that fact is evident throughout the State’s case and the defendant’s case. While the State failed to satisfy the jury that there was a conspiracy as far as the defendant was concerned and instead found him guilty of forgery, that nevertheless was the thrust of much of its evidence and it was entitled to at least present its case in that light. The trial judge’s reference to “Jasch” was to Jasch v. State, Wyo.1977, 563 P.2d 1327 where it was held that the statements of a conspirator may be received against the *1006other and they are not hearsay.1 More importantly, as held in Jasch, in order to use the statements of a conspirator, it is not even necessary that a conspiracy be charged or alleged, as long as the statements are made in furtherance of the common design and plan. It is proper that the jury be informed that Suchta had been indicted along with the defendant Grable. The evidence clearly disclosed that he was right in the middle of the theft and sale. His plea of guilty discloses his involvement in the whole affair. The court’s statement neither enlarged nor changed the facts which were properly developed before the jury. The defendant was not even found guilty of conspiring but was found guilty by the jury of forgery in violation of § 6-17, W.S.1957 (§ 6-2-101, W.S.1977); and so even if error, such a statement could not be considered prejudicial.
Kwallek v. State, Wyo.1979, 596 P.2d 1372, is completely inapplicable as authority for any holding in this case. In Kwallek, the prosecution called a witness who had been charged with the exact same crime as the defendant on trial; they had acted together in committing an assault and battery. The prosecution questioned the witness about the events constituting the crime charged. However, at the end of his direct examination the prosecutor asked the witness if he had pled guilty to the same charge for which the defendant was being tried and, over objection, the trial judge permitted the witness to answer that he had. It seemed clear that the only purpose served by this testimony was to prejudice the defendant with the fact that the witness had already pled his guilt arising out of the alleged criminal transaction and so the defendant must also be guilty. We properly held that to be reversible error.
In the case before us, the facts were entirely different. In the first place, Such-ta did not plead guilty to the same offense with which the defendant was charged and his plea to a different charge was not called to the attention of the jury in the so-called erroneous statement of the judge in the presence of the jury; but, as pointed out later, the defendant attempted to do so. The defendant never objected to the statement of the court on the ground that the court here finds to be erroneous. His objection was that since the indictment against Suchta had been dismissed and he pled guilty to another charge, Suchta was therefore not an “indicted co-conspirator.” That he pled guilty to another charge and others were dropped does not relieve him from the fact that he was an “indicted co-conspirator” with defendant.
Furthermore, in defendant’s opening statement to the jury, counsel stated that through Mr. Suchta’s testimony, the jury would learn, “ * * * that Mr. Suchta originally was charged in this matter with the same counts Mr. Grable is to meet with you.” 2 That this court can find error in the trial judge’s statements, when the defendant himself emphasizes and points out the same facts to the jury, is unbelievable. Even assuming the trial judge’s remarks and statement of facts to be erroneous, which I do not, error is cured where the defendant makes use of and admits the same facts alluded to by the court. State v. *1007Holm, 1950, 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500; Richey v. State, 1921, 28 Wyo. 117, 201 P. 154, reh. den. 205 P. 304. The defendant cannot have it both ways.
The majority also cited Filbert v. State, Wyo.1968, 436 P.2d 959 as authority. That case is as far out as Saturn, as far as any applicability to this case is concerned. In Filbert, reversal was based on a court’s instruction that, “The evidence of the witness James Hoblit shows that he was an accomplice of the defendant in the commission of the crime charged against the Defendant. * * * ” The court held that the trial court is not permitted to instruct that the witness is an accomplice of the defendant since that carries with it an implication defendant’s guilt has been determined when that fact is within the province of the jury. In the case before us, the court did not instruct or tell the jury that Suchta was a co-conspirator but only stated that he was an “indicted co-conspirator,” wholly different. People v. Brown, 1973, 44 Mich.App. 402, 205 N.W.2d 207, 209, cited by the majority is of the same inapplicable dimensions. In that case, the trial judge advised the jury that an accomplice of the defendant had pled guilty to the same offense for which the defendant was being tried.
In addition, the verdict of the jury in finding defendant guilty of forgery rather than conspiracy has cured any defect, if there was one. Where a defendant is charged with several counts but is acquitted as to some of the counts, the improper admission of evidence in support of any count of which the defendant is acquitted is not reversible error. State v. Kump, 1956, 76 Wyo. 273, 301 P.2d 808. Here the majority has treated the trial judge’s comment as evidence, in comparing it to the inapplicable authority of Kwallek.
Likewise, I do not agree that the trial court’s rulings, which had the effect of preventing the defense witnesses who had pled guilty to charges arising out of the same criminal transaction for which appellant was on trial from explaining those guilty pleas, constituted reversible error under the circumstances of this case. Neither the majority opinion nor the appellant’s brief cited authority which will support such a conclusion. The majority opinion apparently concludes that the State could properly impeach these defense witnesses with their guilty pleas. In any case, it is clear to me that such was proper under the circumstances of this case:
“A difficult situation may be presented when a codefendant or coindictee, who has pleaded guilty * * *, testifies on behalf of the defendant. In light of Bru-ton, the prosecuting attorney should exercise care in conducting his cross-examination to avoid unnecessary questions involving the facts alleged in the indictment. If the witness is a key witness for the defendant, however, and if he denies substantial implication in the case, it is hard to see how the prosecutor can be prevented from attacking his credibility by confronting him with his plea. It is unlikely that this situation will often arise. If the witness for the defense has pleaded guilty, it is probable that defense counsel will want to establish this fact at the outset since it will probably buttress his case and will certainly take the sting out of the government’s attack on the witness’s credibility by proof of his prior crime.” 2 Weinstein’s Evidence, ¶410[06], pp. 419-40 (1979); and see, State v. McDonald, 1977, 117 Ariz. 159, 571 P.2d 656; Swift v. United States, 10th Cir. 1963, 314 F.2d 860, 863; State v. Edwards, 1962, 13 Utah 2d 51, 368 P.2d 464, 466-467; Zarnik v. State, Ind.App. 1977, 361 N.E.2d 202, 206-207; Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1016 (and Later Case Service).
Thus, under the circumstances here presented, the prosecution could properly confront these defense witnesses with their pleas of guilty. If there was any right for the defense to then seek to give the jury a fuller explanation of the guilty pleas, the defense counsel failed to ask proper questions which were not objectionable. The trial court has great discretion in this regard. Annot., “Right of witness whose credibility has been impeached by evidence of previous conviction, charge of crime, or *1008arrest, to assert innocence or to explain or show circumstances,” 166 A.L.R. 211 (1947); 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 534, pp. 470-471.
Here the prosecutor’s cross-examination of these witnesses was within the proper bounds. Objections were properly sustained when the defense sought to reexamine matters which were not proper under the accepted rules cited above. The majority opinion establishes a rule which says it is reversible error per se to refuse to allow explanation of a guilty plea — and does so without benefit of any authority. The authorities which I have reviewed and which I deem pertinent to this issue are largely to the contrary.
Indeed, the rule which the majority adopts serves to create and extended sequence of events which violate long-established and well-reasoned case law (see 166 A.L.R. 211), as well as the purpose and design of Wyoming Rules of Evidence, Rule 403:
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” (Emphasis added.)
In this case the defense witness testified essentially that he and the other alleged cohorts in crime, including Grable, had not committed a crime. The State quite properly impeached this testimony by pointing out that the witness had already pled guilty to a crime arising out of these facts. The defense then wanted to explain further this guilty plea and point out to the jury that the only reason the witness pled guilty was to avoid the rigors of prosecution. If we extend the sequence of events this far, must we not also allow the State to call witnesses and present evidence to demonstrate that the State in fact had good evidence against this witness (sort of a mini-trial within the trial — and what if some of this evidence would not have been admissible against the instant defendant?). Should we then not extend this yet one step further and let the witness present his exculpatory evidence? And then why should we not go the full course and let the jury decide the witnesses’ guilt in the course of determining the defendant’s guilt! Obviously there is a good reason for the authority which holds that a witness may not explain a conviction or a guilty plea. That story has come to a conclusion and the chickens have come home to roost. There is no workable way to open the book only to page one, or to open the chicken coop door only a crack. Either we keep the matter closed or we must open it up all together.
The thrust of North Carolina v. Alford, 1970, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, cited by the majority, did not open the door to the trial of a witness in a case other than his own. The holding of Alford was that a guilty plea may be accepted if the defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains evidence of actual guilt. The Court there noted that its holding did not mean that a trial judge must accept every guilty plea merely because the defendant wishes to so plead and there is no absolute right to do so. A defendant cannot vacillate between admitting and denying charges against him. Oregon v. Brumfield, 1973, 14 Or.App. 273, 511 P.2d 1256. To permit such conduct makes a sham of the law.
I would have affirmed.

. This rule is now incorporated in Rule 801(d)(2)(E), W.R.E., declaring that a statement by a co-conspirator is not hearsay if made “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”

. Counsel’s opening and proceedings in connection with Suchta’s expected testimony went on:
“Mr. Suchta will testify that he entered into a bargain with respect to his charges and that all of the counts which were originally charged against him were dismissed, that in open court a new charge which was—
“MR. BOYNTON: Your Honor, I will object to what goes on here as to what happened in negotiations, if Mr. McCarty wants to say what he plead [sic] guilty to, but what he did or what plea negotiations were I think highly objectionable in opening argument. I object to it on those grounds.
“THE COURT: I think that.
“MR. McCARTY: This is what Mr. Suchta will describe to the Jury.
“THE COURT: If I permit him. But traditionally any negotiations leading up to a bargain are not evidence.
“MR. McCARTY: Anyway Mr. Suchta will tell you how, [if] the Court will let him, how he disposed of his charges, * *