Court Opinion

ID: 9533057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:27:53.202059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:54.324675
License: Public Domain

Wertz, J.
(dissenting): I cannot agree with the majority opinion that, under our rules, was assigned to me to write. I am of the opinion the rule stated in the case of Finson v. City of Topeka, 87 Kan. 87, 123 Pac. 723, should be applied here. The facts in this case and the facts in the Finson case are similar in that both cases involve a master’s liability for injuries to his servant caused by the explosion of inflammable gas that had been negligently allowed to escape into a confined area. In the instant case the fumes from the LP gas accumulated in the roundtop building, and an explosion of this subtle and dangerous gas, when thus confined, should have been regarded and reasonably foreseen by defendant as a natural and probable consequence, and he should have anticipated the danger of its being set afire. The fire for which defendant should have been on guard or which he should have foreseen or anticipated need not have been the one set by the spark from the engine of the pickup truck. By his own testimony defendant admitted he was aware of the fact that butane was highly explosive and dangerous, and the undisputed evidence disclosed the principal uses of LP gas are for heating and fuel for engines, and that it is not used commercially as a fumigant.
The maimer by which the gas becomes ignited is not material. We should apply the rule that where gas of a highly inflammable character that is liable to explode when brought into contact with fire is negligently allowed to escape into a confined place, the proximate cause of the .explosion is the negligent act of permitting the gas to escape into and remain in such a place. (Finson v. City of Topeka, supra.) This rule imposes liability on a master who uses explosive gases for purposes other than those for which they are normally intended. Under this rule the negligence of the master would have to be shown. In the instant case the undisputed evi*694dence established defendant’s negligence, and the jury so found.
The mentioned rule would not preclude the use of the affirmative defense of assumption of risk, since the assumption of risk doctrine ordinarily involves a matter of preliminary conduct in getting into a dangerous situation. A person is deemed to assume the risk of injury when he knows of the dangers involved in a certain course of action, has a full appreciation of the risks involved and then voluntarily exposes himself to the risk. (Shufelberger v. Worden, 189 Kan. 379, 369 P. 2d 382, and cases cited therein.) In the performance of the ordinary duties of a farm laborer Hall would have assumed the normal risk; however, the position in which he was placed in the extraordinary use of the LP gas by defendant did not fall within this category.
The jury found the defendant was negligent but that his negligence was not the proximate cause of Hall’s injuries. I would apply the stricter liability rule of the Finson case, supra, and hold that once the defendant is found negligent in the use of the gas, his negligence was the proximate cause of the resulting injury.
I am of the opinion the court committed prejudicial error in giving instruction No. 6 and in submitting special question No. 5 over plaintiff’s objection. There was no evidence to support instruction No. 6. In fact, the undisputed evidence was that Hall was a resident farm laborer with general duties and no set hours to work and his duties were subject to twenty-four-hour vigil. This instruction on the legal effect of an injury sustained after the employee has ceased working for his employer should not have been given. There was no evidence to support the answer to special question No. 5. I do not believe, in view of the answer to the special question submitted by the court, that the jury did not, in substance, base its verdict on the fact Hall had ceased work for the day and was on his own time when the explosion occurred.
Special questions Nos. 2 and 3 were erroneously submitted to the jury, and they were prejudicial in their effect. Question No. 2 asked, in essence, “Who had the most experience with the use of the gas, the defendant or Hall?” Question No. 3 asked, in essence, ‘Did Hall know of the danger of using this gas to the same or greater extent than the defendant?” The comparative experience or the comparative knowledge of the parties determines no issue in this lawsuit. If these questions were submitted to the jury in connection with the defendant’s theory that Hall assumed the risk of *695this injury, they were erroneous. It is not in every instance where one exposes himself to a known danger and injury results that he is denied a right to recover, but only in that class of cases where the danger is so obvious and imminent that a person of ordinary prudence under like circumstances would not subject himself to it. Mere knowledge of the danger of doing a certain act without full appreciation of the risks involved is not sufficient to preclude a plaintiff from recovery even though there may be added to the knowledge of danger a comprehension of some risk. (Wainscott v. Carlson Construction Co., 179 Kan. 410, 295 P. 2d 649; Shufelberger v. Worden, supra.) Assumption of risk requires a determination of whether the servant knew of the danger, fully appreciated the risk involved and voluntarily chose to encounter the risk. All three of these elements must exist. (Shufelberger v. Worden, supra.) Questions Nos. 2 and 3 ask only for a comparison of knowledge and experience between Hall and the defendant. Assumption of risk does not have as an element these comparisons.
In view of the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Robb and Jackson, JJ., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.