Court Opinion

ID: 9727429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:36:43.978151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:37.600065
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion correctly applies the law as it was interpreted in Lomb v. Wenning (1992), Ind., 600 N.E.2d 96, Debruler, J., dissenting (majority determined that modification of joint custody obtained through "substantial and continuing change" standard). However, an issue which has not been addressed by the legislature or our Supreme Court is whether joint custody can remain viable once contested modifications arise after the initial determination that joint custody is in the best interests of the children.
In the present case, the parties initially agreed to joint custody with primary physical custody residing with Richardson. The dissolution court awarded joint custody as requested by the parties. The preciseness with which the custody and visitation schedules were set out appears telling with regard to the parties' ability to cooperate in matters concerning the children. Even after the January 15, 1992 order modifying custody, the parties continued to file petitions based upon differing interpretations of the visitation order and an unwillingness on the part of the father to comply with the order.
One of the statutory factors to be considered prior to an award of joint legal custody is: "whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child's welfare." IND.CODE § 31-1-11.5-21(g) (1984 Supp.). Although this requirement is not explicitly elevated to paramount stature within Indiana's joint custody provisions, some jurisdictions have so provided.
See e.g. Petrashek v. Petrashek (1989), 282 Neb. 212, 440 N.W.2d 220 (joint eustody not favored, only awarded in rare circumstance where parents possess great ability to cooperate);
Dunham v. Dunham (1989), Okla. App., 777 P.2d 408 (cardinal criterion is agreement by parties along with ability to cooperate to reach shared decisions; thus, parties' opposition to joint custody is antithesis of joint custody concept);
Trolf v. Trolf (1987), 126 App.Div.2d 544, 510 N.Y.S.2d 666, app. diss. 69 N.Y.2d 1088 (joint custody not favored and such order must be reversed where record demonstrates animosity and inability to cooperate).
Here, the parties did not object to joint custody. However, the highly contested nature of the modification proceedings and the parties' continued inability to amicably abide by a detailed visitation schedule portends future behavior inconsistent with joint custody. The mere necessity for such a detailed visitation schedule reflects a low level of concerted effort between the parties.
I continue to believe that the divisive nature of dissolution and custody proceedings requires the utmost caution prior to an award of joint custody. The statutory con*162siderations attempt to insure that joint custody will not be awarded unless some spirit of cooperation between the parties concerning the children is readily apparent. Once joint custody has been awarded, the parties must be able to maintain that spirit of cooperation.
Filing contested modification proceedings should dissolve a joint custody award and return the parties and the custody matters to status quo ante, requiring a custody determination under the best interests standard. There is no such thing as unilateral cooperation. When at least one party does not wish to proceed with the joint custody arrangement and has been unable or unwilling to amicably alter the arrangement, the spirit of cooperation necessary for the children to thrive in a joint custody arrangement has been destroyed. To allow such an award to stand does not serve the interests of the children but merely placates the desire of both parties to have custody. Thus, the filing of a contested modification proceeding should require a hearing to determine the best interests of the children as in any initial custody proceeding.
To the extent that Lomb, supra, 600 N.E.2d at 98, could be read as a barrier to an assessment of custody based upon the best interests of the child after a joint custody award is dissolved, I would urge the Supreme Court to revisit this aspect of the custody formula. As noted by the majority in Lamb, "[olne of the most significant elements of stability in a child's life is the child's primary caretaker...." Id. The substantial and continuing change standard is primarily suited to curb the role of the judiciary and limit the court's discretion to alter custody once established. It does not, however, comport with the reality of the destabilizing qualities inherent in joint custody.
The terms "joint" or "shared" custody are legal fictions in that the parties' dissolution effectively prohibits them from simultaneously sharing custody. For those parties who wish to split physical custody, the children are bounced to and fro without stability. When physical custody lies with one party, the everyday decisions are, for the sake of stability and practicality, left to that party. Any major decisions which the parties should share are exactly of the type which cause turmoil straining familial relationships in the most congenial families. Such decisions would appear to be beyond the scope of the relationship of parties who chose to resolve their differences through divorce.
Therefore, I would vote to remand the cause for a hearing to determine the best interests of the children and for an award of sole custody based upon such evidence.