Court Opinion

ID: 9560710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:54:09.615857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:07.137373
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice:
(concurring in part and concurring in the result).
I concur in Justice Zimmerman’s concurring opinion, except for his view that the admission of other crimes evidence constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution; and I concur in the opinion of Chief Justice Hall on all *490other issues, except for the construction his opinion places on the Utah manslaughter statute.
With respect to the construction of the manslaughter statute, I submit that the trial court erred in requiring that a mental or emotional disturbance be generated by a cause external to the defendant. I note here for the sake of clarity that Justices Durham and Zimmerman and I are in essential agreement on the proper construction of the Utah manslaughter statute.
At the time of trial, the Utah manslaughter statute provided in relevant part:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
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(b) Causes the death of another under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. ...
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1)(b) (1978) (amended 1985).
The jury instruction given by the trial court required that the mental or emotional disturbance under which the actor causes the death of another be “triggered by something external from the accused” and that the death not be “brought about by his own peculiar mental processes.” In my view, the trial court’s instruction was contrary to the plain language of the manslaughter statute. On its face, the statute is not limited to a mental or emotional disturbance caused by an external stimulus; rather, it expressly extends to any “mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.” The manslaughter statute has been subsequently amended to change the requirement that the reasonableness of the defendant's explanation for the emotional disturbance be determined “from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believe[d] them to be,” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 compiler’s notes (1978). The plain language of the statute clearly contemplates that emotional disturbances may be triggered by either internal or external stimuli.
This construction of the statute does not transform the standard for determining when a homicide is manslaughter into a subjective one, as argued by the opinion of Chief Justice Hall. “The ultimate test ... is objective; there must be a ‘reasonable’ explanation or excuse for the actor’s disturbance.” II Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 210.3, at 50 (A.L.I.1980). “Where there is evidence of extreme mental or emotional distress, it is for the trier of fact to decide, in light of all the circumstances of the case, whether there exists a reasonable explanation or excuse for the actor’s mental condition.” Id. at 61. That determination is objective because the defendant’s mental or emotional condition must be based on a reasonable excuse or explanation. It is not sufficient that the defendant acted out of extreme mental or emotional distress alone, regardless of whether the distress or disturbance was excusable. See, Note, Utah’s Manslaughter Statute: Walking the Tightrope Between Social Utility and Fair Culpability Assessment, 1986 BYU Law Rev. 165, 175 (1986). There are numerous examples of internal “triggers” short of insanity, some of which are suggested in Justice Durham’s opinion, which aptly demonstrate the soundness of a literal reading of the statute.
The defendant asserts that the erroneous instruction effectively prevented the jury from considering his theory of the case. Defendant’s theory of the case was that his homosexual pedophilia was a mental or emotional disturbance which established a reasonable explanation or excuse for his conduct. The defendant had every right to have his legal theory presented to the jury, as long as it embodied a correct statement of the law and there was some evidence to support it. This Court has held on numerous occasions that each party is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to its theory of the case if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it. E.g., State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980). Both Dr. Washburn and Dr. Greer testified in support of defendant’s theory that he was a homosexual pedophile. Therefore, the issue, as I see it, is whether *491homosexual pedophilia is an emotional or mental disturbance within the meaning of the statute.
Therefore, even though the trial court erred in its manslaughter instruction, the error was harmless because the defendant had no factual basis on which the jury could have convicted of manslaughter. In my view, pedophilia does not, as a matter of law, provide a reasonable explanation or excuse for killing.
Finally, I note that although Justice Zimmerman concludes that the admission of evidence of other crimes constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, I do not believe it is necessary to reach that issue, and I would not do so.