Court Opinion

ID: 9768292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:54:47.563786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:37.109431
License: Public Domain

WELLIVER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I fail to see the wisdom of the new and fresh approach to lawyer discipline proposed by the author of the principal opinion.
It always has been my belief that there is no such thing as being ethically half qualified to practice law, you are either ethically qualified or you are not ethically qualified. In my view, one who fails to carry out his contract of employment for professional service promptly; who solicits $500 each from a friend of the client and from a family member of the client for bond money and refuses to return the money when bond is set at $50; who makes sexual advances to the client; and, who accepts a number of files from another client and fails to either review them or return them, is not a person ethically qualified to represent the public in legal matters.
The Court’s primary obligation is to protect the public.1 The purpose of discipline is not to punish lawyers.2 All that can be said for “suspension” is that it gives the appearance of imposition of punishment. All that the suspension for months does is put the offender’s law practice on hold for the designated number of months. If there is no evidence now before us at the present time to indicate that the offender has or will change his erring ways, what real possibility is there that he will have so changed in the brief period of six months. Viewed as punishment, which is all that the suspension can possibly amount to — the suspension is nothing more than a gentle slap of the wrist. Wrist slapping does not protect the public, it deceives and misleads the public.
A few years following the formation of the Integrated Missouri Bar, this Court started giving “suspensions for an indefinite period of time” or “indefinite suspensions” with leave to apply for reinstatement at a fixed time (generally one to five years)3 as something that should be more acceptable to and more palpable to the disciplined lawyers. These were “disguised disbarments.” For most of the last decade, the Court has faced up to its obligation and duty to the public and has abandoned the use of the suspension “fiction” or “disguised disbarment.”
Today, we re-invent the wheel by returning to the “indefinite suspension” with leave to reapply at a fixed time. The only difference is that we make our wrist slap*780ping even more gentle and our process more deceptive to the public by restricting and limiting the time in which the Advisory Committee may investigate and determine the offender’s qualifications to practice law.
Missouri Bar, during the year that I served as President (1967-68), had approximately 7,000 lawyers. Today Missouri Bar has more than 19,000 licensed lawyers, approximately one lawyer for each 251 people in the state. It is inconceivable that we will deprive the public of adequate legal representation by disbarring a few of those who prove themselves unqualified to represent the public. There is no shortage of lawyers. And, perhaps as a result of following a policy of firm discipline, eventually, we may fulfill our secondary obligation — to protect the Bar by assuring the public that they can have confidence in the remainder of the 19,000 lawyers who are out there trying to honestly and effectively represent their clients.
The public has a right to have its legal business handled promptly and competently. Members of the public who entrust money to lawyers for a specified purpose should not have to sue for the rightful return of the unused portion of the entrusted funds. Sexual harassment and sexual assault of women are not among the qualifications for a license to practice law.
I would disbar respondent.

. In re Lang, 641 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. banc 1982); In re Randolph, 347 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. banc 1961); In re Canzoneri, 334 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1960).

. In re Sabath, 662 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. banc 1984); In re Randolph, 347 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. banc 1961).

. 1 year — Matter of Lowther, 611 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1981).
18 months — /« re Kueter, 501 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. banc 1973).
2 years — In re Sabath, 662 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. banc 1984); In re Lang, 641 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. banc 1982); In re Gamblin, 458 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. banc 1970).
3 years — In re Houtchens, 555 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. banc 1977); In re Mattes, 409 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. banc 1966); In re McMullin, 370 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. banc 1963); In re McLendon, 337 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. banc 1960); In re Canzoneri, 334 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1960).
5 years — In re Lurkins, 374 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. banc 1964).