Court Opinion

ID: 9761149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:32:53.422113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.396313
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
One reason for granting the petition in this cause was to examine seriously a claim of “harmless fundamental error” in the *160charge of the court to the jury, and we ought to pursue that examination to a just end.
Beginning with Old Code Articles 594-603 and decisions construing them,1 I have tracked developments in the law of fundamental error in a court’s charge through legislative amendments of 1897 2 and 1913 3 and judicial opinions thereafter — more thoroughly than before.4 That research and conclusions drawn from it are contained in an opinion which has been circulated to all other members of this Court and presented in conference. However, it is much too long for publication as usual. Accordingly that opinion is being handed down as an appendix to this one, but will not be published.
Several lessons are taught by those historical developments that have been chronicled in my unpublished opinion concerning error in a charge of a trial court to a jury. One is that an alleged error not properly raised and preserved according to Articles 36.14, 36.15 or 36.16, V.A.C.C.P. will not be considered on appeal unless it presents “fundamental error.” Another is that when claimed error has been properly raised, preserved and brought up on appeal, the judgment shall not be reversed unless the error “was calculated to injure the rights of defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial,” Article 36.19, id. A third is that utilizing the tests of Article 36.19 to find “fundamental error” when an objection was not made before the charge was read to the jury, as is now so often done on appeal, may not be sound.
Accordingly, I do not agree that we improvidently granted the State’s petition for discretionary review. Still, a majority will not redefine the fundamental error doctrine as it applies to a charge of a trial court to a jury-
Therefore, I dissent.
W.C. DAVIS, McCORMICK and CAMPBELL, JJ., join.

. E.g., Bishop v. The State, 43 Tex. 390 (1875).

. Acts 1897, 25th Leg., ch. 21, p. 17.

. Acts 1913, 33rd Leg., ch. 138, p. 278.

. See Doyle v. State, 631 S.W.2d 732, 741-744 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Concurring Opinion on Motion for Rehearing); Wilson v. State, 625 S.W.2d 331, 334-335 (Tex.Cr.App 1981) (Concurring Opinion on Motion for Rehearing) and Sattiewhite v. State, 600 S.W.2d 277, 279-285 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Opinion on Motion for Rehearing).