Court Opinion

ID: 9725253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:37:20.148354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:13.030638
License: Public Domain

Otis, Justice
(dissenting).
Although on petitioner’s first appearance the state moved that he be arraigned and charged with forgery in the second degree committed on September 16, in the city of Minneapolis, he was not in fact arraigned on that date because he had no attorney. However, the court on its own *14initiative and for reasons not apparent in the record, entered a plea of not guilty on petitioner’s behalf. The next day, when petitioner appeared with counsel, the assistant county attorney stated the following:
“Roy, you are charged with forgery in the second degree and you entered a plea of not guilty. Do you desire to withdraw that not guilty plea and enter a plea of guilty as charged?,” to which the defendant answered, “Yes.”
The majority holds that the county attorney’s statement, “[Y]ou are charged with forgery in the second degree,” constitutes a valid arraignment and substantially complies with the statute because of admissions made by petitioner after the plea of guilty was entered.
Under our statute an arraignment consists of furnishing defendant with a copy of the information and reading it to him before the plea is entered, unless the reading is waived. The record does not show compliance with any of these requirements. I respectfully submit that under no theory can a conviction be sustained without a valid arraignment, however damning defendant’s subsequent admissions may be. In neither State ex rel. Schwanke v. Utecht, 233 Minn. 434, 47 N. W. (2d) 99, nor State v. McDonnell, 165 Minn. 423, 206 N. W. 952, cited by the majority, did we discuss the question of whether defendant was furnished with a copy of the information or had it read to him, or waived the reading.
If we hold that petitioner’s statements in a presentence examination are adequate to supply the deficiencies in an arraignment, conceivably remarks made by a defendant after he is committed and in custody may next be held sufficient for that purpose.
I take issue with the majority’s statement that “arraignment in this state is not, from the standpoint of due process, a critical stage of the proceedings.” We have very recently indicated that the law is otherwise. In State ex rel. Becker v. Tahash, 265 Minn. 458, 462, 122 N. W. (2d) 100, 103, we referred to the arraignment and plea as “the critical period of the proceedings.”1 The Adams case,2 cited by the ma*15jority, does not specify in what manner that defendant alleged his arraignment was defective, but states that the formality of arraignment is sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute if the information is read to the accused and he pleads to the information as so read.
Whether or not the court followed the procedural steps specified in Adams is precisely the question which I suggest the court can only determine after a hearing, in view of the verbatim transcript which shows no arraignment in fact occurred.
The majority would permit the reporter’s typewritten transcript, showing petitioner was not properly arraigned, to be impeached by a printed recitation on a form signed by the clerk which shows that he was “duly arraigned.”
Even in pronouncing sentence the court made no mention of the allegations in the information on which the conviction was based. The court merely committed petitioner to the Youth Conservation Commission “as punishment for the crime of forgery in the second degree.”
I would remand and grant petitioner a hearing to determine whether he was in fact furnished a copy of the information and whether it was read or the reading waived, as required by law.

State ex rel. Adams v. Rigg, 252 Minn. 283, 287, 89 N. W. (2d) 898, 902.