Court Opinion

ID: 9517730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:29:57.85831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:24.250053
License: Public Domain

CRAIG, Judge,
dissenting.
Are the courts of this Commonwealth powerless to require that attorneys-at-law—officers of the court—obey the statutory law which clearly requires them to give notice to the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) of suits against third parties on behalf of public assistance beneficiaries?
Because the statutory duty is clear and explicit, its violation constitutes irreparable injury as a matter of law, and there is no other remedy at law, by statute or otherwise, hence the judicial power and duty to enjoin disobedience of the legislative mandate is plain. Berman v. Philadelphia, 425 Pa. 13, 228 A.2d 189 (1967).

1. The Legal Duty Is Clear

Section 1409(b)(12) of the Public Welfare Code, Act of June 13, 1967, P.L. 31 as amended, 62 P.S. § 1409(b)(12) unambiguously states:
(12) In the event that the beneficiary ... brings an action against the third person whom may be liable for the *482injury, notice of institution of legal proceedings, notice of settlement, and all other notices required by this act shall be given to the Secretary____
All such notices shall be given by the attorney retained to assert the beneficiary’s claim, or by the injured party beneficiary ... if no attorney is retained. (Emphasis added.)
This court should not give license to any member of the Bar to ignore that explicit legal duty, enacted by the elected lawmakers and obviously designed to facilitate reimbursement to the public treasury, when proper, so that the public assistance program may aid as many citizens as possible.

2. Violation of Law Necessarily Imports Immediate and Irreparable Harm

With respect to necessity of supporting injunctive relief by the existence of immediate and irreparable harm, this court has stated:
This traditional prerequisite to the issuance of an injunction is not applicable where as here the Legislature declares certain conduct to be unpermitted and unlawful. For one to undertake and pursue such statutorily prohibited conduct constitutes irreparable injury which is the proper subject of injunctive relief. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Israel, 356 Pa. 400, 52 A.2d 317 (1947).
City of Erie v. N.W. Pa. Food Council, 14 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 355, 364, 322 A.2d 407, 412 (1974).
In Pa. P.U.C. v. Israel, 356 Pa. 400, 52 A.2d 317, the Supreme Court approved Judge Woodside’s oft-quoted statements on the subject:
When the Legislature declares certain conduct to be unlawful it is tantamount in law to calling it injurious to the public. For one to continue such unlawful conduct constitutes irreparable injury.
Israel, 356 Pa. at 406, 52 A.2d at 321.
To allow violation of the statutory mandate in this case, by one group of attorneys, is to allow the thousands of *483lawyers across the state to disobey the law which they have sworn to uphold, underscoring the force of Judge Wood-side’s further statement, that spreading unlawful conduct is irreparable injury of the most serious nature.

3. Injunctive Relief Is Proper Because No Alternative Relief Exists

Although equitable relief is not available when an adequate remedy by common law or statute exists, and has not been exhausted, this court is apparently unanimous in agreeing that neither statute nor common law provide the Commonwealth with any remedy against the attorneys, so that, accordingly, injunctive compulsion is fully warranted.
If, as the majority opinion here holds, the state cannot recover damages from the lawyers when their violation of the notice requirement results in loss to the public treasury, there is no adequate common law remedy available.
Because the majority opinion also rightly notes that the Public Welfare Code contains no statutory provisions to implement performance of the lawyers’ notice duty, there is no alternative statutory remedy. And, with no alternative statutory remedy provided against the lawyers, this court certainly cannot withhold equitable relief to the Commonwealth on the ground that DPW has failed to exhaust a statutory remedy against the lawyer appellees.
The availability of some statutory remedies against public assistance beneficiaries does not, in law or logic, constitute a remedy against the attorney’s duty to give notice. A remedy against public assistance recipients, particularly if delayed by lack of notice, is not likely to be productive in any practical sense, and will therefore not be adequate. Without notice from the counsel who are prosecuting proceedings against third-party defendants, the state’s remedies to obtain reimbursement from beneficiaries become meaningless. For example, possession of a lien on proceeds, such as the law here gives the state, is of no significance if there is no notice of the lien’s existence.
*484Moreover, if lawyers are under no compulsion to give notices of these claims or recoveries, some attorneys will be prompted by their consciences and respect for law to give the notices, while others will not. The result will be unequal treatment of welfare beneficiaries, with some obliged to provide reimbursement while other recipients do not.

Conclusion

Issuance of the injunction, to require obedience to the law and thereby to support the strength and fairness of the public assistance system, is warranted in every respect.
BARRY and McGINLEY, JJ., join in this dissent.