Court Opinion

ID: 9759547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:19:40.139249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.784087
License: Public Domain

MULLIGAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result):
I cannot agree with the majority that this court has jurisdiction under section 1331 to award damages for a violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Since municipalities are expressly excluded from section 1983 liability,1 Congress could hardly have intended them to be included in a Fourteenth Amendment action predicated on section 1331, the general federal jurisdiction section. The legislative background of section 1331, which is discussed in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,2 is hardly indicative of a congressional intention to create a jurisdictional base for actions against municipalities founded directly on the Constitution.
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth contains an explicit provision (section 5) giving Congress the power to enact appropriate legislation. The predecessor of section 1983 (and its jurisdictional predicate, section 1343) was section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which Congress expressly stated was enacted to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Thus section 1983 is the product of congressional ac* tion pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in enacting section 1983, Congress rejected relief against municipalities.4 Hence Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,5 a Fourth Amendment case, is distinguishable. In Bivens there also were “no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,” 6 and there was “no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents.”7 In this case there is a special factor counselling hesitation, namely, the fiscal vulnerability of a sorely pressed municipality, and the explicit language of section 1983 limiting liability to “persons,” which has been construed not to encompass municipalities.
I would hold instead that we have pendent jurisdiction here. The plaintiff does have a state cause of action to recover back wages following an improper dismissal.8 The state and federal claims here arise out of a “common nucleus of operative fact” and it certainly is in the interest of judicial economy to dispose of the claims together.9 The defendants argue that the claim has been raised too late by the plaintiffs, but they themselves did not raise the jurisdictional issue until this stage of the litigation.10 As the majority opinion *1002notes, the equities are entirely with the plaintiff; since the question of pendent jurisdiction is one within our discretion to entertain,11 we should take account of the hardship and delay already suffered by the plaintiff here. The argument that pendent jurisdiction is foreclosed by res judicata because the plaintiff’s state claims have already been, litigated and dismissed in New York is specious, since it is clear that the New York dismissal12 was for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. That would not bar a subsequent state action on the merits. Since.we have already determined that section 72 of the New York Civil Service Act is unconstitutional, the claim for back wages should properly be determined here.

. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed. 2d 492 (1961).

. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130.

. 168 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 1972, at 2.

. 405 U.S. 538, 546-48, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972).

. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973).

. Monroe v. Pape, supra.

. 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

. Id. at 396, 91 S.Ct. at 2005.

. Id. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005.

. New York Civil Service Law § 77.

. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725. 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

. See 28 U.S.U. § 1053 (defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended in the trial or appellate courts).