Court Opinion

ID: 9742236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:08:56.475994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:29.989774
License: Public Domain

PRENTICE, Justice,
dissenting.
Under the circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that we can infer no more than the commission of a criminal homicide. The defendant’s admission that she shot her husband and wanted to go to jail is adequate evidence from which to infer that she purposely killed the decedent. We are left to speculate, however, whether she did so with the premeditation requisite of first degree murder, Ind.Code § 35-13-4-1 (Burns 1975) with only the malice requisite of second degree murder, Ind.Code § 35-1-54-1 (Burns 1975), or with neither the malice or premeditation of those offenses but merely upon a sudden heat, which reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter, Ind. Code § 35-13-4-2 (Burns 1975).
I do not find it significant that two shots were fired. It might well dispel any idea of *632accident; however, in view of her admission, there is no hypothesis of an accident to eliminate.
If it were shown that any appreciable time elapsed between the firing of the two shots, the element of sudden heat could be logically eliminated and malice, as the only alternative, inferred. However, there was no evidence from which such time interval could be inferred.
Under the present code, the defendant could be found guilty of murder, Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979), as the crime no longer embodies the element of malice; and the burden is upon the accused to prove, in mitigation, that such killing was done upon a sudden heat. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-3. But the offense was committed prior to the adoption of the present code, and the State was required to prove that the homicide was committed with malice. It is true that we have written many times that malice may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death. However, this can have no application when the circumstances are such as to render a conflicting inference equally as logical. To permit a finding to stand by inference from evidence that supports a conflicting inference with equal logic relieves the State from its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and is a denial of fundamental due process.
I concede that there was sufficient evidence presented from which to find that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. There is no evidence, however, from which it may be determined which. Under such circumstances, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. I would reverse the trial court and remand the cause with instructions to enter a verdict of guilty of the crime of manslaughter and to render judgment accordingly.