Court Opinion

ID: 9706983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:57:28.286907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:26.616866
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Cohen:
I concur only in that part of the result reached by the majority which vacates the judgment of the court below and remands the case for further proceedings. While I agree with the majority that appellees should have asserted their affirmative defense of res judicata by “New Matter” under Pa. B. C. P. 1030 in an answer to the complaint, I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that it would serve no useful purpose in sending the parties back to the trial court in order to correct the procedural posture of this case. In this respect, the majority exclusively relies upon one state*315ment taken ont of context from this Court’s decision in Brown v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42, 213 A. 2d 342 (1965), which reliance, in my view, is completely unwarranted and misplaced. The basis for our decision in Hahn is easily demonstrated by quoting the language immediately preceding the majority’s out of context statement wherein Justice Jones, speaking for a unanimous Court, remarked: “Even though Hahn erred procedurally, the confusion which has existed as to the proper procedure for raising the Statute of Frauds offers some excuse for Hahns’ procedural error. Under the instant circumstances, we should decide this appeal on its merits as though the issue of the Statute of Frauds had been properly raised under Rule 1030. All the relevant documents have been stipulated by the parties and made part of the record, the question of the Statute of Frauds was presented to and determined by the court below and both parties have briefed and argued the question before this Court. Nothing is to be gained by sending the parties back to the trial court to set their procedural house in order before coming once again to this Court with the identical controversy.” (Emphasis supplied. )
The result reached in Hahn was prompted and necessitated by the fact that the law with respect to the proper procedure for raising the defense of the statute of frauds was apparently in a state of confusion. As pointed out in Hahn, under these circumstances, the court felt compelled to treat the case as though the defense had been properly raised under Rule 1030. However, the majority of this Court by taking one statement out of the factual and legal context in Hahn has promulgated and sanctioned a new principle of law which directly contravenes and seriously undermines the viability of Rule 1030. The majority opinion amounts to an open invitation, both to the litigants *316and tbe lower courts, to ignore tbe mandatory language of Rule 1030 and decide all affirmative defenses by way of preliminary objections without fear that on appeal this Court will do nothing more than slap their hands and at the same time treat the case as though the correct procedure had been followed. Moreover, it is quite clear that the instant case cannot be so easily distinguished on the basis that the law with respect to the proper procedure for raising the defense of res judicata had heretofore been in a confusing state. For these reasons I would vacate the judgment of the court below without deciding the merits of the controversy and remand the case for the purpose of requiring both the parties and the court below to follow the mandatory procedure outlined under the present rules of civil procedure.
I dissent.