Court Opinion

ID: 9844791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:08:58.868104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:43.154300
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I concur with the opinion of Justice Cal-lister, but desire to add these comments.
It is to be conceded that there are what appear upon the surface to be some perplexities involved in permitting the plaintiff to proceed in this case. This facade of apparent difficulties arises because of certain considerations which apply in the usual tort-liability-insurance situation which I expressly declare that I do not desire to depart from by what I say herein. These are: that the questions both as to the right to sue and of liability should be determined without regard to whether there *29is insurance coverage or not;1 and that thus in such a case the court would normally he concerned only with the right of the plaintiff to sue the defendant School District and not with rights she may have with any insurance company.2
Having declared as just stated it is nevertheless my opinion that in the present status of this case and under the new Governmental Immunity Act,3 there are issues to he tried and resolved before it can be determined what justice requires. This is true because an analysis of that Act shows that it creates quite a different situation from the usual liability insurance coverage.
While insurance coverage is not made mandatory, there are aspects of the Act which seem to proceed upon the assumption that such insurance will be carried. Section 63-30-28 expressly authorizes governmental entities to carry insurance against risks which may arise as a result of the Act; and all the rest of the Chapter, Sections 29 to 34 inclusive, spell out details concerning the insurance. This includes Section 30, which provides that the insurance carrier may not plead sovereign immunity. This manifest clear intent that where there is an insurance carrier it should not avail itself of protections which should belong only to the sovereign entity. But a preceding Section, 60-30-14 has the most important bearing upon the problem here involved. It provides that when a claim is filed “the governmental entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its approval or denial.”
There can be no doubt that the statute just quoted is a legislative imposition of a duty and also the conferring of authority upon the insurance carrier to act upon such a claim. A necessary consequence of this is that the person who files a claim is not only entitled, but in some instances is required, to do business with and have his rights depend upon the action of the insurance company upon the claim through its agent or adjuster. In such a situation the latter, although employed by the insurance company, will in reality be acting for and on behalf of the defendant School District. Inasmuch as the insurance company (who acts through its agent or adjuster) is by law both charged with the duty and authorized to act upon the claim against the governmental entity (defendant School District) it is necessary to know in this case whether the alleged agent was in that status. This fact is impossible to ascertain from this record due to the vacuums left by the ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
*30In the plaintiff’s affidavit she makes positive averments which indicate that the defendant School District has insurance coverage. With respect to this affidavit it is important to have in mind these facts: that the defendant has filed nothing under oath to dispute it, by counter-affidavit or otherwise; and that the position taken by the defendant in the lower court and here is simply that negotiations between the insurance adjuster and the plaintif could not affect a waiver or work an estoppel against the defendant School District’s assertion of the statute of limitations.
Upon the basis of the plaintiff’s aver-ments and upon the state of this record it seems to me that the plaintiff has effectively raised the issue that she was intentionally deceived into not bringing her action timely by the representations of an agent who, although employed by an insurance company, was acting in conformity with authorization by law for and in behalf of, and representing the interests of defendant School District. If this be true, it would be manifestly unjust to permit the defendant District to be in the position of taking the advantage of, but not be bound by, the conduct of an agent who may have deliberately and designedly deluded the plaintiff into believing that her claim would be settled, then after the statute of limitations had run, changing position.4 This court has previously pointed out that the statute of limitations should not protect one who fraudulently conceals another’s right of action against him. See Peteler v. Robinson, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (1933) ; McKee v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 550, 206 P.2d 715 (1949); see also Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. General Electric Co., 10 Cir., 315 F.2d 306 (1963); and 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 206.
In accordance with what I have said, it is my opinion that there should be a trial and determination of all of the issues involved.

.See Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224; Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176; Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186.

. See Anno., 65 A.L.R.2d 1278, 1302-1305, (1959).

. Chap. 139, S.L.U.1965, coded as Chap. 30, Title 63, Utah Code Annotated 1953.

. Cf. Rand v. Andreatta, 60 Cal.2d 846, 36 Cal.Rptr. 846, 389 P.2d 382.