Court Opinion

ID: 9564447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:00:52.898863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:24.629553
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY
dissenting:
The majority holds that violation of regulatory standards issued pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1988) (OSHA), does not constitute negligence per se. Because I believe that application of OSHA standards to negligence analysis does not expand or enlarge the rights of injured parties, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Much of the majority’s analysis focuses on section 653(b)(4) of OSHA, which provides that:
[njothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workman’s compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common laiv or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any latv with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
(emphasis added). The provision has been construed as precluding the creation of a new federal cause of action against either a plaintiffs employer or a third party. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234, 1243 (1986); Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir.1981). At the same time, however, this provision is not intended to reduce any of the existing private rights of an injured employee. Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Occupational S & H.R.C., 521 F.2d 628, 631 (10th Cir.1975).
Using OSHA standards to establish negligence per se does not enlarge or diminish the common law rights of an employee or employer. The case now before us was originally pled and has been appealed as a negligence case. To prove negligence, the plaintiff must establish: a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, injury to the plaintiff, and proximate cause between the breach and the injury. Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 (Colo.1992). The duty of a defendant may be:
(a) established by a legislative enactment or administrative regulation which so provides, or
(b) adopted by the court from a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which does not so provide, or
(c) established by judicial decision, or
(d) applied to the facts of the case by the trial judge or jury, if there is no such enactment, regulation, or decision.
Restatement (second) of Torts § 285.8 Accordingly, the violation of a statute or regulation may constitute a breach of a duty. See *768Lyons v. Nasby, 770 P.2d 1250, 1257 (Colo.1989). In Colorado, the violation of a statute or regulation is negligence per se if it is established that the violation proximately caused the injury, that the plaintiff is a member of the class that the statute or regulation intended to protect, and that the injuries suffered were of a kind that the statute was enacted to prevent. Id.; State v. Moldovan, 842 P.2d 220, 228 (Colo.1992).9
Negligence per se does not shift the rights or liabilities of employers or employees when an action in general negligence exists. The only difference between negligence per se and general negligence is the method of determining the applicable standard of care. To prevail in a negligence case, the plaintiff still must prove that he or she was injured and that the conduct of the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury.
A negligence cause of action is permitted under state common law and is not an independent private right of action under OSHA. Rather, OSHA may be used to establish the minimum standards within the industry to ensure safety, a purpose which OSHA wholly endorses. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).10 The other elements, causation and proof that OSHA intends to protect the injured party, must be proven for negligence per se to be effective.
Thus, before a violation of an OSHA regulation could be considered negligence per se, the plaintiff must have an independent cause of action based on statute or the common law. Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 265 (1st Cir.1985). Allowing OSHA regulations to determine standards of care should not be viewed as expanding rights or liability. Id.; Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 581 (5th Cir.1985) (holding that OSHA may be used as a standard of care when the underlying cause of action is based on state common law or a federal statute); National Marine Service, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Co., 433 F.Supp. 913, 919 (E.D.La.1977), aff'd 608 F.2d 522 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that OSHA regulations impose duties of care on employers to ensure a safe workplace).
Since the plain language of OSHA does not prohibit use of its standards as negligence per se, the majority must turn to the legislative history to support its interpretation of OSHA. The available legislative history, however, does not support the majority opinion. Rather, the legislative history of OSHA shows that Congress considered the interaction of OSHA regulations with other common law and statutory schemes only in the context of worker’s compensation. Pratico, 783 F.2d at 266. The chair of the House Select Committee on Labor received the following letter of inquiry during the hearings preceding the enactment of OSHA:
Some of our members are quite concerned that under proposed legislation dealing with the Occupational Health and Safety Law that an injured employee could claim violation of the requirements and thus bypass the applicable state workmen’s compensation benefits through an action in the federal courts.
This situation is not possible under the present law, but I do not know whether any of the proposed bills permit such a procedure.
I would appreciate it very much if you would look into this matter with officials of the Department of Labor.
*769Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1969: Hearings on H.R. 843, H.R. 3809, H.R. 4294 and H.R. 13373 before the Select Subcomm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part 2 at 1592 (letter of James E. Bailey, Legislative Counsel, American Society of Insurance Management, Inc.). It was in response to Mr. Bailey’s letter that the Solicitor of Labor sent the following letter to the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Labor, cited by the majority at maj. op. at 765:
This is in response to your recent request for information upon which to base a reply to Mr. James E. Bailey, Legislative Counsel, American Society of Insurance Management, Inc.
In his letter, Mr. Bailey expresses concern that under proposed legislation dealing with occupational health and safety “an injured employee could claim violation of the requirements of the legislation and thus bypass the applicable state workmen’s compensation benefits through an action in the Federal courts.”
The provisions of S. 2788, the Administration’s proposed Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1969 would in no way affect the present status of the law with regard to workmen’s compensation legislation or private tort actions.
Id. at 1592-93 (letter of L.H. Silberman, Solicitor of Labor). According to the Solicitor’s letter and the context of the inquiry letter, the purpose of the provision which our court now is construing was to prevent injured employees from using OSHA to bypass state workers’ compensation laws through asserting a private right of action in federal court. The OSHA provision clearly explains that it does not create a new private right of action and that OSHA regulations do not affect state workers’ compensation claims. Pratico, 783 F.2d at 266. The Solicitor’s letter, however, does not state that application of negligence based on the violation of OSHA standards is inappropriate when a common law or statutory right of action exists against third parties. In my opinion, the Solicitor’s letter presents no support for the majority opinion. Thus, I find no textual or legislative history to support the majority’s construction of the OSHA provision before us.
Furthermore, a significant body of case law has found OSHA regulations to establish the applicable duty of care when applying negligence per se in both employee and non-employee contexts. See Sanchez, 112 Idaho at 609, 733 P.2d at 1234 (holding that OSHA may be applicable standard of care under negligence per se); Pratico, 783 F.2d at 255 (applying OSHA as negligence per se when cause of action exists under another federal statute); Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 802-05 (6th Cir.1984) (holding company liable to an independent contractor under negligence per se for violation of OSHA standards); Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Const. Co., 90 Wash.2d 323, 582 P.2d 500, 508 (1978) (holding that because employer has duty to maintain a safe workplace, OSHA standards can establish negligence per se); Koll v. Manatt’s Transportation Co., 253 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Iowa 1977) (holding that OSHA standards are appropriate for employees and nonemployees when applying negligence per se). I would follow these cases.
Based upon this analysis, I would reverse the holding of the trial court and allow a negligence per se instruction because application of the OSHA standards neither enlarges nor diminishes the rights of employees or employers. Thus, I respectfully dissent from the majority.
KIRSHBAUM, J., joins in this dissent.

. Comment b to this section states:
In any or all of these respects the standard of conduct may be defined and established by a legislative enactment which lays down requirements of conduct, and provides expressly or by implication that a violation shall entail civil liability in tort. In such case the only questions that can arise as to the effect of the statute are as to its constitutionality and construction ....
Comment c adds:
Even where legislative enactment contains no express provision that its violation shall result in tort liability, and no implication to that effect, the court may, and in certain types of cases customarily will, adopt the requirements of the enactment as the standard of conduct necessary to avoid liability for negligence.

. Although the trial court refused to give a negligence per se instruction on the grounds that the OSHA standard did not apply to the facts of this case, the court of appeals ruled on the more general basis that OSHA itself does not allow violations of its standards to constitute negligence per se in a state action for personal injury. My dissent addresses the court of appeals’ rationale and does not consider whether the facts of this case can show a violation of the particular OSHA standard raised in the trial court.

. This view is also supported by the extensive legislative history of OSHA. The vast majority of legislative discussion prior to enactment of OSHA focused on the need for and the efficacy of a national standard setting organization. The general conclusion of the various members of Congress was that OSHA could be used to establish minimum standards within various industries to ensure the safety and health of workers. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1969: Hearings on H.R. 843, H.R. 3809, H.R. 4294, and H.R. 13373 before the Select Subcomm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., part 1 & 2.