Court Opinion

ID: 9767491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:20:29.031765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.442052
License: Public Domain

WELLIVER, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority states that the plain meaning of the statutes §§ 430.230 and 430.250 RSMo. (1986) relating to hospital liens and §§ 537.080 and 537.090 RSMo. (1986) relating to wrongful death, required the result reached. I find that neither the “plain meaning” suggested by the principal opinion nor do I find fairness, justice or economic responsibility in the result obtained by the principal opinion. I respectfully dissent.
Section 537.080 gives to defendant-appellant daughter the right to sue for the *139wrongful death of her mother. Section 537.090 permits her to recover:
[S]uch damages as the trier of facts may deem fair and just for the death and loss thus occasioned, having regard to the pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death, funeral expenses, and the reasonable value of the services, consotium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support of which those on whose behalf suit may be brought have been deprived by reason of such death and without limiting such damages to those which would be sustained prior to attaining the age of majority by the deceased or by the person suffering any such loss. In addition, the tier of facts may award such damages as the deceased may have suffered between the time of injury and the time of death and for the recovery of which the deceased might have maintained an action had death not ensued ....
Section 537.090, RSMo 1986 (emphasis added). Clearly she is authorized to and did recover for the hospital bills.
Section 430.230 grants to public hospitals and hospitals supported all or in part by charity a lien for services rendered for “treatment, care or maintenance therein for any cause including any personal injury sustained by such person as the result of negligence or wrongful act of another ...” (emphasis added) excepting therefrom workers compensation. Section 430.250 then provides that any person or insurance company, who after notice of the lien, makes any payment to “[S]uch patient or to his attorneys or heirs or legal representatives as compensation for the injury sustained ...” shall be liable for one year for the payment of the lien amount to the hospital. Reading all the stautes together, nothing could be plainer or clearer.
And, if the strained ambiguity conjured up by the principal opinion did in fact exist, what about public policy? Do we permit the daughter to recover the amount of the medical bills and the hospital who treated her mother go unpaid, or do we say that as a matter of public policy that if the funds to pay the bills are available, they go to the hospital rendering the treatment and services. Must the public pay for the insurance to pay the medical bills, and then pay again to support the hospital rendering the unpaid treatment and services. I do not believe that the General Assembly ever intended that the cost to the public, through taxes and charitable gifts, should be doubled for providing hospital care and services in cases such as this.
The cause should be reversed and remanded for satisfaction of the lien from the proceeds of the recovery.