Court Opinion

ID: 9703558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:00:26.638335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:35.976172
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40519         Document: 00516873174             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/25/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                  August 25, 2023
                                        No. 22-40519                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Laura Jordan, Mark Jordan

                                              Defendants—Appellants.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Eastern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 4:18-CR-87-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          The appellants, a Texas developer and a former mayor of Richardson,
   Texas, appeal their convictions for bribery and tax fraud, asserting that the
   bribes were merely gratuities and the district court failed to properly instruct
   the jury. For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM in part and VACATE
   in part.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-40519

               FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
          Laura Maczka (Laura) was elected to the Richardson, Texas city
   council in 2011. She was elected mayor of Richardson in 2013 after running
   largely on the platform of not allowing any new apartments near
   neighborhoods. Laura’s term as mayor began on May 20, 2013.
          Mark Jordan (Mark) is a commercial real estate developer with
   ownership interests in various business entities including, but not limited to,
   Sooner National Property Management, JP Realty Partners/JP-Richardson,
   LLC, and JP-PAL IV MM, LLC. In 2011, JP Partners purchased 43 acres of
   land and two office towers, known as the Palisades, on the west side of
   Interstate 75 in Richardson.     The property adjoined the Prairie Creek
   neighborhood, which is where Laura lived with her husband and children. At
   the time of purchase, the Palisades was zoned for retail use, office use, 121
   townhomes and 300 condominiums.
          On November 5, 2013, Mark requested a zoning change before the
   City Planning Commission that would allow the construction of 750
   apartment units on the property. On November 19, Mark amended the
   request to allow for 600 apartments.            The commission unanimously
   recommended that the zoning plan be approved by the city council.
          Residents opposed to the rezoning began organizing and started a
   petition drive. On December 2, 2013, the Prairie Creek homeowners’
   association issued a statement that it did not support the proposal.
          Meanwhile, behind the scenes in the months prior to that, Laura and
   Mark were secretly meeting, exchanging personal emails and calls, and
   working together to obtain the rezoning. Laura and Mark were documented
   on email chains for the Palisades project as far back as May 9, 2013, the same
   month that Laura was elected mayor. In October of 2013, Laura and Mark
   also set up a meeting to discuss the development project with another city

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   councilmember, Steve Mitchell, who had endorsed Laura for her campaign
   promise not to support the development of apartments in or adjacent to
   neighborhoods.
          On November 21, 2013, prior to the city council’s first vote, Laura
   forwarded Mark an email with the subject “CCHA Update: Palisades
   Statement to City Planning Commission” from her personal email account
   and said: “FYI . . . And FTR, good thing I had such a fun afternoon
   yesterday. Because last night the prairie creek mob hit me hard! You were
   probably enjoying barbecue and chillaxing. I was taking bullets for you! :-)”
   Later that day, Laura and Mark made plans to meet at one of his buildings
   and go to the mall.
          Around that same time, Mark’s wife, Karen, discovered the emails
   between Laura and Mark, who had a history of infidelity. When Karen
   confronted Mark, he said nothing was going on and he was only flirting with
   the mayor to get what he wanted. Laura’s husband, Mike, and Mark’s former
   paramour, Sarah Norris (Norris), who was also his business partner in Sooner
   National Property Management, also began to suspect that Mark and Laura
   were having an affair. When Mike confronted Laura, she denied anything
   other than a friendship.
          On December 9, 2013, the city council held a hearing on the Palisades
   rezoning. A large number of residents who opposed the rezoning were in
   attendance. The measure passed by a vote of five, including Laura, in favor
   and two opposed. But the city also requested that the matter be brought back
   with a plan for phasing the construction, leaving the vote with no legal effect.
          In January of 2014, Norris hired a private investigator to follow Mark.
   The investigator obtained photos and video of Mark and Laura walking arm-
   in-arm out of a restaurant and going to a Holiday Inn Express. After Mike
   later found the hotel invoice in his car, Laura admitted she was having an

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   affair but claimed it was with someone other than Mark. In mid-January,
   Laura told her husband she was going to Salt Lake City, Utah for a mayor’s
   convention. She was actually meeting Mark at a $3400 per night ski resort.
   About ten days later, Mark signed a contract for the option to purchase an
   additional 20 acres of Palisades land if it was rezoned to allow for additional
   apartments. Mark then asked the city to approve a rezoning plan to allow for
   1,400 apartments on the property. On January 27, 2014, the city council held
   a second vote on the rezoning and approved it by the same vote of five to two,
   with Laura again voting in support.
          Around the middle of April, Laura took a city business trip to San Jose,
   California. Once the official business concluded, Laura stayed behind to
   meet up with Mark, who was also in California on business, for a few nights
   at luxury hotels at his expense. After Laura returned home from California,
   Mike found additional evidence of the affair and Laura said she wanted a
   divorce.
          Meanwhile, Norris discovered numerous purchases by Mark on the
   company credit card for restaurants, resorts, limousines, a burner phone, and
   a charge for him upgrading Laura to first class for their return trip from
   California. Mark told Norris he was just using Laura to get approval for his
   rezoning plan. Mark later admitted to Karen that he and Laura had a
   relationship. But he insisted that they had only kissed, claiming he was not
   physically attracted to Laura.
          The city council scheduled the third vote on Mark’s plan regarding
   the proposal to add 1,400 new apartments. Numerous residents showed up
   to voice opposition to the proposal, and the number of apartments was
   reduced to 1,090. But on June 9, 2014 the rezoning passed again with Laura’s
   support yielding another five to two vote.

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          In August 2014, Mark sent a letter to the city on behalf of his
   partnership seeking reimbursement for the construction of public
   infrastructure for the Palisades. Mark estimated that the value of the
   Palisades would be $686,300,000 by 2024. Shortly thereafter, Laura opened
   a bank account in her own name and with herself as sole signatory. A series
   of transactions followed wherein Mark would withdraw money and Laura
   would deposit money. As one example, on September 9, Mark withdrew
   $1,000 from his bank account and Laura deposited $300 in her account. Two
   days later, Laura deposited $1,000 in her account while on a birthday trip
   with friends to Florida. Laura also abruptly left her friends to go stay with
   Mark in Rosemary Beach, Florida at his expense.
          Shortly thereafter, on September 22, 2014, the city council voted
   unanimously to authorize negotiations with Mark and his business partners
   to reimburse them for various construction and infrastructure expenses
   connected to the Palisades. Over the next several months, Mark worked with
   city staff, including Laura, to reach an agreement. During that time, Mark
   also continued to provide financial benefits to Laura, including multiple cash
   payments, a $40,000 check, home renovations after Laura’s husband moved
   out of the family home, various trips, luxury hotel stays, etc. Mark had the
   $24,030.02 in home renovations done by one of his contractors, and had it
   billed as “carpet stock” for one of his own buildings, MacArthur Plaza. He
   also asked the contractor to “keep it on the down low.” When Karen
   confronted Mark about why he was doing the remodeling work on Laura’s
   home, he replied: “Because, Karen, we owe her. We owe her a lot. She’s
   made us a lot of money.”
          Laura and Mike divorced in January 2015. Mark also filed for divorce
   from Karen on January 15, 2015. Laura filed to run for a second term as mayor
   the following month. Around that same time, Mark hired Laura as a leasing
   agent at Sooner National Property Management for $150,000 per year with

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                                   No. 22-40519

   a signing bonus of $15,000. Laura had no real estate experience and was not
   a licensed agent. The person who had previously held the position had left
   because the position only paid $70,000 per year. The media attention
   generated by Laura’s involvement with the developer behind the Palisades
   resulted in an ethics investigation by the city. However, neither Laura nor
   Mark disclosed the sexual relationship, cash payments, luxury hotel stays,
   various trips, home renovations or the $40,000 check. Thus, the investigator
   found no wrongdoing, and the city entered into an agreement to reimburse
   Mark some $47 million for construction and infrastructure work. Laura
   voted in favor of the agreement to pay Mark the $47 million on September
   22, 2014. In fact, in December of 2014, Laura was still denying to members
   of the city council that she and Mark were having an affair. Laura claimed
   that her parents paid for her house to be remodeled.
          Around April or May of 2015, the FBI received a tip about the transfer
   of money, trips and other items of value between Laura and Mark and began
   an investigation. On May 18, 2015, Laura announced that she was declining
   another term as mayor for the 2015-17 term.
         In July of 2015, Mark had lunch with Norris, who no longer worked
   with him. She was wearing a wire for the FBI. Mark said he had hired a
   retired federal judge as his criminal defense attorney. He also said that the
   attorney had advised him to get engaged to Laura, but Mark denied to Norris
   that he would ever marry Laura. After Mark found out that the FBI was
   aware of him paying for Laura’s home renovations, he started telling people
   that he and Laura were getting married and that he loved her. Norris also
   recorded a meeting with Mark in October 2016 wherein Mark again denied
   that he would marry Laura.
         Mark and Karen finalized their divorce on August 16, 2016. On May
   30, 2017, the district court held a hearing as part of the grand jury’s

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   investigation of the bribery case. The following day, Laura told her friend, a
   reverend, that she and Mark wanted to get married right away rather than
   wait to have a family event in July 2017. Mark and Laura obtained their
   marriage license the very next day, June 2, and were married three days later
   on June 5, less than a week after the hearing. Laura also told another friend,
   “[o]ur lawyers have told us we have to get married, and hopefully we’ll marry
   some day because we choose to.”
          Mark and Laura were indicted in 2018 on the following seven counts:
   Four counts of honest services wire fraud and conspiracy in violation of 18
   U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 1349; one count of conspiracy to commit bribery
   concerning a program receiving federal funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371;
   one count of bribery concerning a program receiving federal funds in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B); and one count of bribery concerning a
   program receiving federal funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).
          Following a nearly month-long jury trial in early 2019, Mark and Laura
   were convicted on all but one count, Count 2, of honest services wire fraud.
   After the district court was informed of a conversation a court security officer
   had with a distraught juror, the district court granted the defendants’ motion
   for a new trial. The government appealed because the district court did not
   hold a hearing before granting a new trial, and a panel of this court affirmed.
   See United States v. Jordan, 958 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 2020).
          On December 9, 2020, the grand jury returned a superseding
   indictment that included the original counts but also added five additional
   charges, as follows: one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; two counts of willfully aiding and assisting in the
   preparation and presentation of materially false tax returns in violation of 26
   U.S.C. § 7206(2); and two counts of willfully aiding and assisting in the

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   preparation and presentation of materially false tax returns in violation of 26
   U.S.C. § 7206(2).
          Following the second trial, which was held July 2 to July 23, 2021, the
   jury found Mark and Laura not guilty on counts 1 and 4 (honest services wire
   fraud and conspiracy) but found them guilty of the bribery and conspiracy
   charges, and the tax and conspiracy charges. Laura was found guilty on
   counts 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 of the superseding indictment. Mark was found guilty
   on counts 5, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
          Mark and Laura filed various post-trial motions and asked the district
   court to postpone sentencing until this court decided United States v.
   Hamilton, 46 F.4th 389 (5th Cir. 2022). The district court denied all of the
   motions. The district court also concluded that, even if this court were to
   determine, as it ultimately did in Hamilton, that § 666 did not extend to
   gratuities, the convictions would stand because it found beyond a reasonable
   doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same even if the jury had
   been instructed that a quid pro quo was required.
          The total statutory maximum sentence for each defendant totaled 312
   months. The district court granted a downward variance of 240 months and
   sentenced each defendant to a total of 72 months of imprisonment.
   Specifically, Laura received 60 months on count 5, 72 months on count 6, 60
   months on count 8, 36 months on count 9, and 36 months on count 10, all to
   run concurrently. Mark received 60 months on count 5, 72 months on count
   7, 60 months on count 8, 36 months on count 11, and 36 months on count 12,
   all to run concurrently. Each defendant was also ordered to pay a fine of
   $100,000 to the United States, a special assessment of $500, and they were
   jointly and severally liable for restitution of $34,275. Each defendant also
   received 3 years of supervised release on each count, to run concurrently.
   Thereafter, Mark and Laura appealed.

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                               STANDARD OF REVIEW
           This court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment
   of acquittal de novo. United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 313 (5th
   Cir. 2013). This court must “affirm a conviction if, after viewing the evidence
   and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
   any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
   beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299,
   301 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal marks and citation omitted). 1 This court’s
   “review of the sufficiency of the evidence is highly deferential to the
   verdict.” United States v. Moreno-Gonzalez, 662 F.3d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 2011)
   (internal marks and citation omitted). The standard of review is the same for
   both direct and circumstantial evidence. Id.
           This court typically reviews jury instructions for an abuse of
   discretion. See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir.
   2013). However, “when, as here, a jury instruction hinges on a question of
   statutory construction, this court’s review is de novo.” Id. (internal marks
   and citation omitted). This court has said that a failure to instruct a jury on
   every essential element is error. See United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814,
   828 (5th Cir. 2016). Erroneous jury instructions are subject to a harmless

           _____________________
           1
             Mark concedes the application of this standard but asks that this court reconsider
   “to allow for a judgment of acquittal to be entered when the evidence is in equipoise, which
   was the rule in this circuit before it was rejected by the full court in Vargas-Ocampo in
   2014.” Mark argues that Vargas-Ocampo makes this circuit an outlier, and that the majority
   of other circuits apply the equipoise rule because “where an equal or nearly equal theory of
   guilt and a theory of innocence is supported by the evidence viewed in the light most
   favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable
   doubt.” He cites Winfield v. O’Brien, 775 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014), and United States v.
   Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 755 (7th Cir. 2010), as authority. However, the evidence here is not
   equipoise, and the en banc court has already spoken in Vargas-Ocampo.

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   error standard. 2 See United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 482 (5th Cir.
   2011); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1999). “Erroneous
   jury instructions are harmless if a court, after a thorough examination of the
   record, is able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict
   would have been the same absent the error.” Stanford, 823 F.3d at 828
   (internal marks and citation omitted). This court has also said that “we
   construe the evidence and make inferences in the light most favorable to the
   defendant.” United States v. Theagene, 565 F.3d 911, 918 (5th Cir. 2009).
          This court reviews a sentencing challenge under a deferential abuse-
   of-discretion standard regardless of whether the sentence is inside or outside
   the Guidelines range. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We
   “must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
   error,” and then “consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
   imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see
   also United States v. Hudgens, 4 F.4th 352, 357-58 (5th Cir. 2021).
   Additionally, “[t]his court reviews the district court’s interpretation and
   application of the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”
   United States v. Castelo-Palma, 30 F.4th 284, 286 (5th Cir. 2022).
                                  DISCUSSION
   I. Bribery convictions
          A. Quid pro quo evidence
          Mark asserts that his convictions for the bribery counts should be
   reversed or, at a minimum, vacated and remanded for a new trial because
   there was insufficient evidence of a quid pro quo and because the district
   court failed to properly instruct the jury. Mark cites Hamilton, 46 F.4th at

          _____________________
          2
             Though conceding its application, Mark also objects to the harmless error
   standard, arguing that some other circuits require more.

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   398, for the proposition that a quid pro quo is an element of a § 666 violation.
   Mark says that there was insufficient evidence, as summarized by the district
   court, and the convictions on the bribery counts must be reversed.
           Mark argues that the “heart” of the prosecution’s case for a quid pro
   quo was Laura’s change of mind on the Palisades. Further, he says that Laura
   voting in an inconsistent manner is not evidence of a quid pro quo. Mark also
   asserts that the “lead FBI case agent testified at trial that there was no
   evidence [Laura] received a bribe prior to the first vote.” 3 Mark says the
   emails between he and Laura also are not evidence of a quid pro quo.
   Additionally, Mark says the fact that the affair happened in the same
   timeframe as the votes does not support an inference that there must have
   been a quid pro quo agreement. He quotes United States v. Menendez, 291 F.
   Supp. 3d 606, 624 (D.N.J. 2018), as follows: “A close temporal relationship
   between political contributions and favorable official action, without more, is
   not sufficient to prove the existence of an explicit quid pro quo.” Mark
   asserts that this is particularly so because, after the first vote, the subsequent
   votes were a “foregone conclusion.”                Notwithstanding the fact that
   Menendez is a lower court case from New Jersey and not controlling authority,
   it does not apply because “without more” was not the case here.
           Mark argues that the payments he made to Laura were made after the
   final vote and, thus, were mere gratuities in reward for votes because Laura
   had made him a lot of money. Notably, Mark did not reward any of the other
   “yes” votes. Mark also says the facts that he and Laura hid their relationship,

           _____________________
           3
              Mark is quoting part of an exchange during cross examination while ignoring the
   rest of the agent’s testimony and other evidence in this case. Also, Laura’s counsel
   acknowledged at sentencing that Laura received “time, attention and affection” prior to
   the first vote. The Guidelines specifically say that “payment” means “anything of value”
   and “need not be monetary.” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 cmt. n. 1.

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   repeatedly lied, destroyed documents and emails, and got married on the
   advice of counsel after the FBI launched its investigation had nothing to do
   with a quid pro quo, “as opposed to a gratuity, a conflict of interest, or even
   a perfectly lawful but embarrassing affair.” Mark also explicitly admits that
   he paid for votes, saying: “There was insufficient evidence of a quid pro quo
   bribery agreement, rather than, at worst, the payment of gratuities as a reward
   for votes, to allow a jury to find a quid pro quo beyond a reasonable doubt.”
   (Emphasis added).
          Laura asserts that she presented substantial evidence that no quid pro
   quo agreement existed, and the jury may have wrongly convicted her of
   receiving a “reward” without a quid pro quo. She also asserts that only the
   first vote mattered, the affair did not begin until after the first vote, and the
   money, home improvements, trips, luxury hotel stays, job, etc., were all just
   mere gratuities. Laura also explicitly admits payment for votes. But Laura
   maintains that, as a city official rather than a federal official, she was free to
   accept “rewards” or “gratuities" on federally funded projects under
   § 666(a)(1) and Hamilton. Laura argues that all four votes she made for
   Mark’s Palisades project would have passed anyway without her vote. The
   problem with that argument is that Laura met with other city council
   members ahead of the first vote to try to get them on board. Additionally, the
   record reflects that Laura and Mark had planned for her to vote against him
   on one of the votes in an attempt to avoid the possible appearance of a conflict
   of interest. But prior to that vote, they realized they needed her vote and
   ditched the plan. Laura also adopts Mark’s briefing on this and other issues
   and instead focuses on jury instructions.
          The government asserts that there was sufficient evidence of a quid
   pro quo. Further, the government points to the district court’s conclusion
   that this is a bribery case and “[f]rom the outset, the government centered
   its theory of prosecution on quid pro quo bribery” and the defense “sought

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   to hold the government to proving a quid pro quo beyond a reasonable
   doubt.” The government further relies on the fact that the jury was
   repeatedly told during voir dire and the trial that the government had to prove
   a quid pro quo.
          The district court filed its Memorandum Opinion and Order on
   August 3, 2022. The order disposed of multiple motions, including the
   defendants’ motions to dismiss and for a new trial.
          Mark focuses on three pages of the order to argue that there was
   insufficient evidence of a quid pro quo. However, neither the record nor the
   order support his assertions. The record establishes that Mark and Laura
   were involved long before the first vote, that Laura was “taking bullets” for
   Mark over the project before the first vote, and that Mark told multiple
   people he was merely using Laura to get what he wanted. The record also
   indicates that multiple people, including but not necessarily limited to
   Norris, Karen, and the contractor who worked on Laura’s house, warned
   Mark about his inappropriate involvement with the mayor to get his zoning
   passed and his attempts to cover it up. Mark also told Karen that he owed
   Laura (money, renovations, etc.) because she made them a lot of money.
          The record reflects evidence of ongoing communications between
   Mark and Laura long before the first vote that clearly indicate they were
   working together to get the project approved.          Laura even had Mark
   answering questions from her constituents, and they found great humor in
   some of his responses. They were also secretly meeting and spending time
   alone together prior to the first vote, despite claiming that the affair did not

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   start until after the first vote. 4 Also, the first vote basically had no effect
   because the city requested that it be brought back with a plan. The argument
   that only the first vote counted lacks merit. 5 Further, once the first request
   was approved, Mark kept asking for more. He bought additional land, sought
   approval of more apartments, requested reimbursements, and used his
   influence over Laura to advance his pecuniary interest. Clearly, the first vote
   was not the only one that mattered.
           Moreover, even Hamilton did not go so far as to say that payments are
   not bribes as long as you make them after an initial vote. Instead, in Hamilton,
   this court adopted the First Circuit’s interpretation of § 666 that “reward”
   is included “to prevent a situation where a thing of value is not given until
   after an action is taken.” 46 F.4th at 397 (citing United States v. Fernandez,
   722 F.3d 1, 23 (2013) (emphasis original)). In Fernandez, the First Circuit
   said that the term reward serves to clarify “that a bribe can be promised
   before, but paid after, the official’s action.” 722 F.3d at 23 (internal marks
   and citation omitted).
           A review of the record in this matter establishes that there was
   sufficient evidence of a quid pro quo, and that distinguishes this case from
   Hamilton, as discussed more fully below.
           B. Quid pro quo instruction
           This case basically comes down to whether the district court’s failure
   under Hamilton to instruct the jury as to quid pro quo is harmless error. In
   Hamilton, a panel of this court decided that 18 U.S.C. § 666 only applies to
           _____________________
           4
              Mark and Laura do not explain why they were keeping their involvement a secret
   at that point if they were neither conspiring to get the rezoning approved nor having an
   affair yet.
           5
            Laura dismisses the three votes after the first vote as “faits accomplish” or having
   already been decided.

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   quid pro quo bribery. 46 F.4th at 397. In doing so, the panel determined that
   § 666 does not apply to “mere gratuities,” vacated Hamilton’s convictions
   and remanded. Id. at 398.
           Mark asserts, in the alternative, that the bribery convictions should be
   vacated and remanded for a new trial because the district court failed to
   instruct the jury on the need to find a quid pro quo agreement as an element
   of a § 666 offense as required by Hamilton, and that the error was not
   harmless. Mark says that the instructions here were like the instructions in
   Hamilton that this court found insufficient. 6 See id. at 398. In other words,
   Mark says, “the instructions in both cases permitted the jury to convict a
   defendant for a gratuity or reward without finding a preconceived quid pro
   quo.”
           Mark says that, because the district court found that its instructions
   were in error under Hamilton, the only issue before this court is whether the
   error was harmless. He further says the government acknowledged in its
   response to post-trial motions that the jury could have reasonably found
   either a quid pro quo or a reward. Mark asserts that the evidence in this case
   plainly establishes that the jury could have acquitted of a quid pro quo. He
   argues that, even if this court finds that the evidence was sufficient, it still
   must find that the failure to properly instruct the jury was not harmless
   because the district court’s analysis did not draw all inferences in favor of

           _____________________
           6
             In his initial brief, Mark acknowledged that the government had filed a petition
   for rehearing in Hamilton in which it argued that the instructions did require the jury to find
   a quid pro quo to convict. However, Mark then argued that the district court here did not
   give the same instructions as Hamilton. Thus, he asserted that, even if the rehearing was
   granted, it would not affect this case. En banc rehearing was denied in Hamilton on
   February 17, 2023, with seven judges voting in favor of rehearing and nine against. United
   States v. Hamilton, 62 F.4th 167 (5th Cir. 2023). Regardless of whether Hamilton was
   correctly decided, there are key distinctions between the two cases, as discussed herein.

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                                       No. 22-40519

   acquittal as required. Also, Mark asserts that the district court erred in
   relying on the statements of counsel in opening and closing arguments to
   conclude that the case was argued as a bribery case and the jury must have
   found a quid pro quo. 7
          Laura largely argues the same.
          The government concedes that the district court committed a
   Hamilton error when instructing the jury on the § 666 charges but asserts that
   the error was harmless. The government is correct. The district court made
   an explicit finding that it was concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that
   Mark and Laura would have been convicted even under the correct
   instruction. The record supports that finding.
          Mark and Laura conceded that the payments were for votes but that
   under Hamilton they were merely “gratuities” or “rewards,” and she was
   not a federal official.
          In Hamilton, the panel said that “Ruel Hamilton gave money to
   members of the Dallas City Council. He received nothing tangible in return.”
   Id. at 391 (emphasis added). That was because the low-income-housing tax
   credits Hamilton sought were ultimately not granted by the Texas
   Department of Housing and Community affairs after the local officials voted
   to recommend them. Id. The panel also said, in instructing the jury, “the
   district court (over Hamilton’s objections) told the jury that neither a quid-
   pro-quo exchange nor any ‘official act’ by the councilmembers was
   required.” Id. at 393. The panel said that “it is an abuse of discretion ‘to
   apply an erroneous view of the law.’” Id. at 394 (quoting United States v.
   Ayelotan, 917 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2019)) (emphasis original). The panel
          _____________________
          7
            Mark concedes that the jury was properly instructed that statements of counsel
   were not evidence and irrelevant to the harmless error determination.

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                                     No. 22-40519

   then concluded “that § 666 does, in fact, require a quo; a quid alone will not
   suffice. And the jury instruction that the district court gave did not convey
   that.” Id. at 394.
          Here, Mark received much in return, as discussed previously herein.
   While there was not a specific instruction, the jury was told repeatedly that it
   was a quid pro quo case, and the evidence clearly supported a quid pro quo.
   The parties agree that the dispositive issue is whether the district court’s
   error was harmless.
          As stated previously, “[e]rroneous jury instructions are harmless if a
   court, after a thorough examination of the record, is able to conclude beyond
   a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the
   error.” Stanford, 823 F.3d at 828 (internal marks and citation omitted). The
   district court made that explicit finding in case this court decided Hamilton
   as it ultimately did. The record supports that finding. Thus, any error in the
   district court’s failure to explicitly instruct on quid pro quo was harmless.
          C. Motive instruction
          The district court instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows:
                  During the trial, evidence was presented regarding the
          defendants’ possible motives for their actions. The fact that an
          action may have been motivated, in part, by friendship or a
          romantic interest is no defense. Actions taken with a dual
          motive constitute bribery so long as one of the motives is to
          influence or reward a public official, or, in the case of the public
          official, to be influenced or rewarded. On the other hand, if
          actions were entirely motivated by legitimate reasons, like
          romantic interest, then they do not constitute bribery.

          Mark asserts that the convictions for the bribery counts should be
   vacated and remanded for a new trial because the district court’s instruction
   on mixed motive was an error that allowed the jury to convict without finding

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                                          No. 22-40519

   that his motive was primarily or materially corrupt. He incorporates Laura’s
   arguments in her opening brief in support of the proposition that the
   instructions improperly allowed the jury to convict even if it did not find that
   the government proved Mark’s motives were not primarily or materially
   corrupt. Finally, he asserts that the “instructional error merits a new trial on
   the bribery counts and on the tax conspiracy count that is premised on the
   bribery counts.”
           Laura asserts that the jury instructions unconstitutionally shifted the
   government’s burden to her by saying she could be found guilty if at least one
   of her motives of accepting benefits from Mark was to be influenced or
   rewarded for official actions and she had the burden of proving the
   affirmative defense that acceptance of the benefits was entirely motivated by
   legitimate reasons. Laura says that means that jurors could have interpreted
   that to mean if only one percent of her motive was corrupt, she was still guilty.
   Laura also argues that including “or rewarded” in the instruction violated
   Hamilton because she was free to accept “rewards” for votes. 8 Laura also
   cites inapplicable cases for the proposition that there should be a materiality
   requirement read into 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1). Laura says that would mean a
   public official’s corrupt motive in accepting a bribe would have to be more
   than incidental or irrelevant at the time she accepted the bribe. She then cites
   what she says is an analogous case for the proposition that: “Otherwise, the
   improper motive would not be significant enough to call into question the
   integrity of the public official’s actions.” See United States v. Sun-Diamond
   Growers of Calif., 526 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1999).

           _____________________
           8
             As discussed herein, Hamilton does not establish that rewards for votes are lawful
   in every circumstance.

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                                     No. 22-40519

          The government correctly asserts that the minor corrupt motive
   argument was raised for the first time on appeal, and a materiality objection
   was not raised at trial. Thus, it is reviewed for plain error. With regard to
   the burden shifting argument, which was raised at trial pertaining to the
   instruction defining “corruptly,” the government asserts that the district
   court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725,
   740 (5th Cir. 2017). The government also sets out that the district court did
   not shift the burden of proof. We agree.
          Notwithstanding our agreement that the district court did not shift the
   burden of proof, the cases cited by Laura are inapplicable. For example, in
   Sun-Diamond Growers, the Supreme Court was talking about why 18 U.S.C.
   § 201(c)(1)(A) does not criminalize token gifts such as a school baseball cap
   or a replica jersey from a championship team, not large cash payments or
   anything else of the sort that occurred here. See id., 526 U.S. 406-07.
   Significantly, Sun-Diamond Growers also does not support Laura’s argument
   regarding materiality or motive. Laura acknowledges as much, then asserts
   alternatively, “the doctrines of lenity and constitutional-doubt require such
   an interpretation of the statute,” citing United States v. Tucker, 47 F.4th 258,
   261 (5th Cir. 2022). But Tucker, which involved the sufficiency of the
   evidence of convictions for making false statements to a federally licensed
   firearms dealer and possession, is not analogous and provides no authority
   for Laura’s argument here. Id. at 259. In dicta, this court merely mused as
   to what canons might come into play should it “venture beyond the statute’s
   plain language.” Id. at 261. Further, there is no “materiality” requirement
   in § 666(a), and Mark and Laura fail to cite any controlling authority
   requiring us to insert one now.
          This issue has no merit, and the district court did not plainly err or
   abuse its discretion.

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            D. Federal or local funds
            Mark asserts that the government failed to establish that the conduct
   underlying the bribery counts affected federal or local funds as required by
   § 666.     Thus, Mark says that the application of § 666 to him was
   unconstitutional and the district court’s denial of Mark’s motion for entry of
   a judgment of acquittal should be reversed under Sabri v. United States, 541
   U.S. 600, 604-06 (2004); United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir.
   2000); and United States v. Spano, 401 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2005).
            Finally, Mark asserts that his constitutional challenge was not
   untimely in reference to what he says was the district court faulting him for
   not filing a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on the basis that
   § 666 cannot be constitutionally applied because it fails to allege that the
   conduct had an effect on local funds. Mark cites a nonbinding case from the
   Northern District of Georgia for the proposition that as-applied
   constitutional challenges are not appropriately raised in pre-trial motions to
   dismiss. Mark then concedes that, if he had filed such a motion, the
   government would have argued that the indictment, on its face, alleged an
   impact on local funds of $47 million. Further, he says that even if he was
   required to move on this issue before trial, it was not waived and this court
   could review his argument for plain error under United States v. Vasquez, 899
   F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2018). Mark says his challenge satisfies plain error
   because “it raises a clear constitutional concern” and would affect his rights
   “since it invalidates the convictions on the bribery counts.” Laura joins
   Mark’s argument on this issue.
            The government asserts that the district court did not plainly err in
   rejecting the untimely Article I challenge as a basis for post-trial dismissal or
   acquittal. Further, the government points out that precedent forecloses the
   claim.

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                                     No. 22-40519

          Mark and Laura were charged in 2018. They moved to dismiss other
   counts prior to their first trial. They were convicted the first time in 2020.
   They moved to dismiss other counts again. After they were retried and
   convicted a second time, they argued in post-verdict motions that the bribery
   counts should be dismissed because the application of § 666 was
   unconstitutional. Mark and Laura argued that their conduct involved only a
   city zoning issue that did not put any federal funding at risk.
          The district court found the Article I claim untimely under Rule 12,
   which provides that such a motion must be made before trial. See Fed. R.
   Crim. P. 12(b)(3). The district court also found that Mark and Laura did not
   show good cause for an exception under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).
   Additionally, to the extent that Mark and Laura were not challenging the
   indictment but rather the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, the district court
   rejected the argument on the merits.
          As the district court correctly found, the elements of § 666 do not
   require the government to prove that the conduct is traceable to federal
   funds. Section 666, in relevant part, states:
          (a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of
          this section exists--
              (1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or
              Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof--
                 ...
                 (B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any
                 person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value
                 from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded
                 in connection with any business, transaction, or series
                 of transactions of such organization, government, or
                 agency involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more;
                 or

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                                     No. 22-40519

              (2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of
              value to any person, with intent to influence or reward an
              agent of an organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal
              government, or any agency thereof, in connection with any
              business, transaction, or series of transactions of such
              organization, government, or agency involving anything of
              value of $5,000 or more.

   18 U.S.C. § 666(a). Section 666 further says:
          (b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this
          section is that the organization, government, or agency
          receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000
          under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy,
          loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.

   18 U.S.C. § 666(b).

          Additionally, none of the cases cited by Mark and Laura establish
   otherwise. In Sabri, the Supreme Court answered the question of “whether
   18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), proscribing bribery of state, local, and tribal officials
   of entities that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds, is a valid exercise of
   congressional authority under Article I of the Constitution” by concluding
   that it is. Id., 541 U.S. at 602. As the Court further explained:
                  It is true, just as Sabri says, that not every bribe or
          kickback offered or paid to agents of governments covered by
          § 666(b) will be traceably skimmed from specific federal
          payments, or show up in the guise of a quid pro quo for some
          dereliction in spending a federal grant. . . . But this possibility
          portends no enforcement beyond the scope of federal interest,
          for the reason that corruption does not have to be that limited
          to affect the federal interest. Money is fungible, bribed officials
          are untrustworthy stewards of federal funds, and corrupt
          contractors do not deliver dollar-for-dollar value. Liquidity is
          not a financial term for nothing; money can be drained off here
          because a federal grant is pouring in there. And officials are not

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                                    No. 22-40519

          any the less threatening to the objects behind federal spending
          just because they may accept general retainers. . . . It is
          certainly enough that the statutes condition the offense on a
          threshold amount of federal dollars defining the federal
          interest, such as that provided here.

   Id. at 605-06 (internal citations omitted). In other words, the Court said that
   the $10,000 threshold alone satisfies Article I without any requirement that
   the federal money be directly connected as an element to the offense. Id.; see
   also United States v. Franco, 632 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2011). While Sabri
   involved a facial challenge, the Court gave clear indications that an as-applied
   challenge would not have fared any better. Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609.
          The record and the applicable authority support the district court’s
   findings. This issue has no merit.
   II. Tax convictions
          A. Vindictive Prosecution
          Mark asserts that the tax counts should be dismissed for vindictive
   prosecution, or in the alternative, the issue should be remanded to the district
   court for an evidentiary hearing. Mark says that, because the government
   added the tax counts only after the district court vacated the convictions in
   the first trial and ordered a new trial, the timing is sufficient to trigger the
   presumption of vindictiveness. He cites United States v. Dvorin, 817 F.3d
   438, 455 (5th Cir. 2016), as authority.
          In Dvorin, the government added a forfeiture notice in the second
   superseding indictment. Id. at 454. Dvorin argued that the addition was an
   act of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id. at 455. In reviewing the matter, this
   court said, “[t]he defendant must prove prosecutorial vindictiveness by a
   preponderance of the evidence, and may do so either by showing actual
   animus or showing sufficient facts to give rise to a presumption of
   vindictiveness.” Id. (internal marks and citation omitted). In determining

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                                    No. 22-40519

   whether a “presumption of vindictiveness” applies, “the court examines the
   prosecutor’s actions in the context of the entire proceedings.” Id. (internal
   marks and citation omitted). If “the course of events provides no objective
   indication that would allay a reasonable apprehension by the defendant that
   the additional charge was vindictive,” then a presumption of vindictiveness
   applies.    Id. (internal marks and citation omitted).     To overcome the
   presumption, the government must prove “by a preponderance of the
   evidence that events occurring since the time of the original charge decision
   altered that initial exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion.” Id. (internal
   marks and citation omitted). The court concluded that Dvorin had alleged
   facts sufficient to invoke the presumption and the government had not
   rebutted the presumption. See id.
            Here, the government asserted that it had planned to bring the tax
   counts in the original indictment, but the internal DOJ approval process was
   too slow. The approval process was apparently restarted when “there was a
   realistic possibility” the convictions would be overturned.
            Mark argues that this does not provide a non-retaliatory explanation
   for the government’s decision. Mark also argues that the district court
   erroneously believed he had forfeited the issue by not raising it in a pretrial
   motion to dismiss. Mark says that “[a]llowing a presumptively vindictive
   prosecution to stand would constitute a clear and obvious error that would
   affect defendants’ substantial rights, and therefore satisfies the plain error
   standard.”     (Internal marks and citation omitted).      Thus, he says the
   convictions on the tax counts must be reversed. Mark also argues that, at the
   very least, the court should remand for an evidentiary hearing, citing the
   nonbinding case of United States v. Tingle, 880 F.3d F.3d 850, 856 (7th Cir.
   2018).     In doing so, Mark again contradicts himself by claiming the
   government “offered no explanation for its charging decision” even though
   he already conceded that the government did offer an explanation that he

                                         24
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                                       No. 22-40519

   believed was insufficient. Regardless, we conclude that Mark is unable to
   establish a presumption of vindictiveness because the government offered an
   explanation sufficient to establish an objective event or non-retaliatory basis
   for adding the tax counts. See Dvorin, 817 F.3d at 455; see also United States
   v. Saltzman, 537 F.3d 353, 358-64 (5th Cir. 2008). Thus, we affirm on this
   issue.
            B. Insufficient evidence
            Mark asserts that there is insufficient evidence that he possessed the
   heightened level of willfulness needed to support a conviction on the tax
   counts. He says that, for him to be found guilty of the tax counts, the jury
   had to find he had actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty and violated
   it. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200-02 (1991). Mark argues that
   the district court failed to identify the relevant evidence in denying his
   motion for a judgment of acquittal.
            With regard to the tax conspiracy count, Mark argues that the district
   court failed to identify evidence that he had knowledge of whether Laura
   reported the benefits he provided her as income on her tax returns.
   Additionally, Mark argues that, if this court agrees there was insufficient
   evidence of a quid pro quo, then “there was no evidence Mr. Jordan believed
   that non-quid pro quo gratuities” are taxable income.
            The parties agreed that Laura did not report the benefits she received
   from Mark as income on her tax returns. However, she asserts that her
   conviction on these charges is tainted by the same jury instructions that she
   claims transformed her claimed rewards for votes into illegal bribes. Laura
   also asserts that she did not report the $52,000 in cash and a check, the
   $25,030 in home renovations, the travel expenses, and various other
   payments, including her legal fees from the ethics investigation, from Mark
   because she considered them all to be gifts. Laura also argues that authority

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                                     No. 22-40519

   supporting the proposition that even “rewards” become “income” does not
   apply to her. For example, Laura says that Dobbe v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo
   2003-330, 2000 WL 1586383 at *11-12 (U.S. Tax Ct. Oct. 25, 2000), involved
   a gift from an employer to an employee for no other reason than an
   employment relationship, as opposed to someone having a romantic
   relationship with their boss, like her. While one of the deductions in Dobbe
   stemmed from a gift of golf clubs to a salesman, others stemmed from
   payments for personal benefit of the taxpayers, who were married
   shareholders of their wholly owned corporation. Id. Laura then argues that
   “Mark could have paid benefits to Laura for reasons other than her economic
   contribution as an employee, namely, because they had an affair or because
   of her acts as mayor (without a quid pro quo).” Thus, Laura says, the
   Hamilton error also requires reversal of all of the tax counts.
          As we have previously concluded, any Hamilton error was harmless.
   Additionally, the record provides sufficient evidence of willfulness. This
   issue has no merit.
          C. Conspiracy
          Mark asserts that the tax conspiracy count should be reversed because
   there is insufficient evidence of an agreement to falsify tax returns to support
   a conviction. Mark cites one case as general authority, United States v.
   Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d 1346, 1348 (5th Cir. 1998), then argues, again,
   that the district court failed to identify the evidence in denying his motion for
   judgment of acquittal. Mark then discusses the “one paragraph the district
   court devoted to this issue,” but fails to provide a record citation or any other
   authority. In the alternative, Mark argues that, if the tax conspiracy count is
   not reversed, it should be remanded for a new trial. Laura likewise argues for
   reversal.

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                                            No. 22-40519

            The government concedes this issue, acknowledging that evidence of
   the agreement to commit bribery and attempts at concealment was
   insufficient to support the conspiracy charge under 18 U.S.C. § 371. We
   agree, and we vacate the convictions and sentences of Mark and Laura on this
   count.
   III. Sentence
            Mark asserts that his sentence should be vacated and remanded for
   resentencing. He asserts that the sentence was driven entirely by the bribery
   counts, with no additional offense levels added based on the tax counts. If
   the bribery counts are reversed, but any of the tax counts are not, he asserts
   that the sentence on the tax counts should be vacated and remanded for
   resentencing. However, we affirm on the bribery counts. Mark asserts that,
   if the bribery counts stand, the errors in application of the Guidelines tainted
   the sentencing process and the case should be remanded for resentencing.
   He says that this resulted in a non-Guidelines sentence being imposed. 9
            The district court adopted the PSR’s calculation of an offense level of
   42 and a criminal history category of 1, which provided for a Guideline range
   of 312 months. 10 Mark argues that the district court declined to follow the
   Guidelines and ordered a non-Guidelines sentence of 72 months. Mark also
   argues that the correct Guideline range should have been 33 to 41 months for
   an offense level of 20 and a Criminal History Category I. Additionally, Mark
   argues that the PSR did not indicate the total value of the payments Mark
   made to Laura, the total value of anything obtained by Laura or the total
   benefit received by Mark.              He says, instead, that the PSR based the

            _____________________
            9
             Mark’s counsel agreed at sentencing that a non-Guidelines’ sentence was
   appropriate.
            10
                 The statutory maximum for a violation of § 666(a)(1) is 120 months.

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                                    No. 22-40519

   enhancement under the § 2B1.1 table solely on the $42,777,079 he was to
   receive.
          The PSR set out the following:
          Between October 6, 2011, and September 4, 2014, Mark Jordan
          (Mark), a commercial real estate developer, and his limited
          liability company (LLC) partnerships (JP-Richardson, LLC,
          and JP-PAL IV MM, LLC) formed multiple Limited Liability
          Company Agreements (JP-KBS Richardson Holdings, LLC;
          JP-Richardson Holdings II, LLC; and JP-Palisades IV, LLC)
          (Company Agreements) with equity investors that led to the
          purchase of Palisades, an 80-acre proposed mixed-use
          development within Richardson, Texas. The total Palisades
          project was purchased for $54,955,000. Through these
          Agreements, Mark Jordan acted as the managing partner.

          The PSR said that Mark had a ten percent ownership interest in each
   of JP-Richardson, LLC and JP-PAL IV MM, LLC. With regard to JP-
   Richardson, LLC, the PSR said:
          JP-Richardson, LLC’s 10 percent interest was comprised of 20
          percent ownership by 2004 Jordan Family Trust, of which
          Mark was the Trustee, and 80 percent ownership by JP
          Richardson Investors Joint Venture, of which the 2004 Jordan
          Family Trust had 62.33 percent ownership. Therefore, Mark
          owns 6.233 percent of JP-Richardson.

          Mark objected to the PSR’s statements regarding his ownership
   interest in the Palisades development. Mark’s objection was largely centered
   around the fact that he and Karen eventually divorced, which divided his
   ownership interest. The probation officer’s response maintained that, at the
   time Mark committed the criminal conduct, he held a 6.233 percent interest
   in the Palisades development, and that amount was consistent with trial
   evidence.

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          The PSR divided Mark’s convictions into two groups pursuant to
   U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. The bribery group, counts five and seven, started with a
   base offense level of 12 under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, and included the following
   increases: 2 levels under § 2C1.1(b)(1) for multiple bribes; 22 levels under
   § 2C1.1(b)(2) for an expected benefit of $42,777,079; 4 levels under
   § 2C1.1(b)(3) for involving an elected public official; and 2 levels under
   § 3C1.1 for obstruction by deleting emails. The adjusted offense level for this
   group was 42.
          Specifically, the PSR said: “Based on Mark Jordan’s 6.23 percent
   ownership stake in Palisades and future valuation of Palisades at
   $686,300,000, as detailed in his Request for Development Incentives
   submitted to the City of Richardson, his benefit to be received in return for
   his bribes to Laura Jordan amounts to $42,777,079.”
          U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2) provides that the table in § 2B1.1 applies when
   the value of the payment or the benefit received exceeds $6,500. For a loss
   of more than $25 million, the table provides an increase of 22 levels. See
   U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(L). The commentary to § 2C1.1 states:
          “Loss”, for purposes of subsection (b)(2), shall be determined
          in accordance with Application Note 3 of the Commentary to
          § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud). The value
          of “the benefit received or to be received” means the net value
          of such benefit. Examples: (A) A government employee, in
          return for a $500 bribe, reduces the price of a piece of surplus
          property offered for sale by the government from $10,000 to
          $2,000; the value of the benefit received is $8,000. (B) A
          $150,000 contract on which $20,000 profit was made was
          awarded in return for a bribe; the value of the benefit received
          is $20,000. Do not deduct the value of the bribe itself in
          computing the value of the benefit received or to be received.
          In the preceding examples, therefore, the value of the benefit
          received would be the same regardless of the value of the bribe.

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                                         No. 22-40519

   U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 cmt. n. 3.

           Mark argues that the votes would have passed without Laura. But
   they did not pass without Laura or her influence. He also asserts that Laura
   supported the Palisades project before she met him. However, there is
   substantial evidence in the record that she did not, and that she campaigned
   on her opposition to apartments near neighborhoods. Regardless, Mark says
   any value received would have been received even without the bribes. In
   support, Mark cites United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 367 (5th Cir. 2003)
   which he summarizes as: “[R]eversing sentence based on Guidelines
   calculation that included salary negotiated before alleged bribe.” But Mark
   fails to establish how that is applicable here.
           Mark also argues that the $42,777,079 did not represent the “net
   value of the benefit” as required under § 2C1.1 cmt. 3, citing United States v.
   Ricard, 922 F.3d 639, 657-58 (5th Cir. 2019), as authority. He asserts that the
   amount is based on an incorrect assumption that he held a 6.233 percent share
   of the future value of the Palisades.             Instead, he says, “[t]he 6.233%
   represented the district court’s mistaken understanding of Mr. Jordan’s
   share of the vacant undeveloped land.” 11 Mark also says that he held
   different percentage stakes in different parcels to be developed.
           Ricard was a case involving Medicare kickbacks and a guideline range
   calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2B4.1(b)(1) for commercial bribery. Id., 922
   F.3d at 656-57. U.S.S.G. § 2B4.1(b)(1) states, in relevant part:
           If the greater of the value of the bribe or the improper benefit
           to be conferred (A) exceeded $2,500 but did not exceed
           $6,500, increase by 1 level; or (B) exceeded $6,500, increase by
           _____________________
           11
              The record indicates that there were two existing buildings and a parking garage
   located at the Palisades at the time it was acquired.

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                                    No. 22-40519

          the number of levels from the table in § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property
          Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to that amount.

   U.S.S.G. § 2B4.1(b)(1).

          While noting that the commentary to § 2B4.1 cross-references
   U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, this court has previously interpreted the meaning of the
   “value of the improper benefit conferred” and concluded that direct costs,
   but not indirect costs, should be deducted from the gross value to determine
   a net value. See United States v. Landers, 68 F.3d 882, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1995).
   This court also concluded that the district court’s finding accurately
   represented the net value because Landers failed to establish any other direct
   costs to be deducted. Id. at 885. This court also concluded that “net value”
   does not mean “net profits,” and relied on a Third Circuit case for the
   following: “This concept of ‘net value received’ has nothing to do with the
   expense incurred by the wrongdoer in obtaining the net value received. This
   is clear from the Note’s instruction that the value of the bribe is not to be
   deducted in calculating the ‘net value.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
   Schweitzer, 5 F.3d 44, 47 (3d Cir. 1993). Further, “[t]he harm caused by a
   bribe is the value lost to a competing party had the bribe not been paid.” Id.
   (citing United States v. Ford, 986 F.2d 1423 (6th Cir. 1993)). “That harm is
   independent of the value of the bribe.” Landers, 68 F.3d at 885.
          Citing Landers, this court in Ricard concluded that the district court
   erred by not deducting the direct costs from the value of the treatment
   provided in calculating the improper benefit conferred. See Ricard, 922 F.3d
   at 658. Importantly, this court did so after concluding that Ricard had
   “satisfied her basic burden to proffer evidence” showing that patients were
   receiving legitimate treatment. Id. The court also clarified that, while the
   government has the burden of proving facts in support of a sentencing

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   enhancement, “Ricard’s burden was ‘to establish that [Progressive] incurred
   any direct costs.’” Id. (quoting Landers, 68 F.3d at 885).
          Here, Mark did not satisfy his basic burden to establish any direct
   costs or applicable deductions. See id.; see also Landers, 68 F.3d at 885.
   Moreover, the record and the authority support the PSR’s calculations,
   which were confirmed by Mark’s own documents and statements recorded
   at city council meetings. Further, Griffin explicitly reiterated that “[t]he
   district court need not determine the value of the benefit with precision.”
   Id., 324 F.3d at 366. 12 “In fact, in determining the amount of benefit to be
   received, courts may consider the expected benefits, not only the actual
   benefits received.” Id., 324 F.3d at 366. Thus, there was no error.
          Even if there had been error, it would be subject to a harmless error
   standard. See United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 651 (5th Cir. 2018).
   To satisfy harmless error, the government must show that “(1) that the
   district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not made the
   error, and (2) that it would have done so for the same reasons it gave at the
   prior sentencing.”          Id. (internal marks and citation omitted).         The
   government is easily able to do so here, as the district court explicitly said it
   would impose the same sentence for the same reasons even if Mark and Laura
   prevailed on every objection on appeal.
          Further, though Mark does not challenge the substantive
   reasonableness, the sentence was substantively reasonable. See Hudgens, 4
   F.4th at 358.

          _____________________
          12
               Citing Landers, 68 F.3d at 884 n.2.

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                                     No. 22-40519

   IV. Evidentiary ruling
          Laura asserts that the district court committed reversible error by
   admitting evidence of a prior marital infidelity for the purpose of proving that
   she was a liar. The district court found the evidence admissible pursuant to
   Rules 404(b), 608 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
          The government agrees with Laura that the evidence was not
   admissible under Rule 404(b). With regard to whether it was admissible
   under 608(b), “the government believes that the better end of the argument
   is that Laura’s prior infidelity was not admissible under Rule 608(b).”
   However, the government also asserts that any error was harmless.
          As Laura and the government state, we review a district court’s
   evidentiary rulings under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, subject
   to a harmless error analysis. See United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 325 (5th
   Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 2003).
          Laura cites United States v. Stone, 472 F.2d 909, 916 (5th Cir. 1973),
   for the proposition that the trial court there properly refused to allow the
   defendant to seek to impeach a key prosecution witness with her marital
   infidelity. She also cites some non-controlling authority for the general
   proposition that, under Rule 608, a witness’ marital infidelity is simply not
   probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.        In Stone, a Georgia case
   involving a kidnaping, brutal rape, and maiming, the trial court refused to
   make an in camera inspection of the government’s files at the defendant’s
   request so that he could discover whether the government had any evidence
   regarding the marital infidelity of the victim while her husband was in
   Vietnam. Id. Stone presented a different scenario than we have here, where
   Laura, neither a prosecution witness nor a victim, claimed she was having an
   affair and in love, not engaging in bribery or corruption and was cross-
   examined about it. But we will presume, without deciding, that the evidence

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   was inadmissible for purposes of determining harmless error. Under the
   doctrine of harmless error, the evidentiary ruling will be reversed only if it
   affected Laura’s substantial rights. See Adams v. Memorial Hermann, 973
   F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 2020).
           Laura asserts that the evidence that she had another extra-marital
   affair prior to her affair with Mark and lied about it was not harmless because
   it “invoked a dark image of an immoral woman in search of sex for votes. It
   went to the heart of the theory of the defense – that Laura accepted benefits
   from Mark out of love and affection.”
           The record does not support Laura’s argument. The record is replete
   with evidence of Laura’s dishonesty and her extramarital affair with Mark.
   Additionally, when Laura initially admitted her extramarital affair with Mark
   to her husband, she lied and said the affair was with someone other than
   Mark. Moreover, there was no suggestion that the previous affair was with
   someone who had matters pending before the city council. Because Laura is
   unable to establish that the evidentiary ruling affected her substantial rights,
   any error was harmless.
                                 CONCLUSION
           For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM in part and VACATE in
   part.

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