Court Opinion

ID: 9671121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:31:28.7048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.812572
License: Public Domain

FRASER, Justice
(concurring).
I agree with the overall holding of the majority, wherein it holds that the ends of justice and the rights of the parties would be better served by another trial of this controversy.
However, I cannot agree with some of the holdings set forth in the majority opinion. For example, the majority here holds that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that the meat was in good condition when delivered to the defendant carrier in El Paso, and that such rules out the presumption of negligence. While it is true that plaintiff’s employees violated many rules which they, themselves, had enunciated as being necessary to proper handling of this kind of merchandise, there still remains no evidence whatsoever, other than suggestion, that the meat had started to 'spoil before it left El Paso. There is not a single word to that effect. Now the meat had to be either good or bad, and the witness, Dr. Plamilton, testified affirmatively that, in his opinion, it was good — at least as much of it as he examined. This was positive evidence of probative value, and the jury believed it. It is entirely possible that the meat had begun to spoil, but, again I repeat, on the basis of the record before us, this can only be speculation resulting from suggestion. Such is not evidence. Therefore, I do not feel that the majority opinion is correct in its holding, for the only evidence relative to the condition of the meat in El Paso was that it was good.
Secondly, it does not seem to this writer that the case of Davis v. Standard Rice Co., Tex.Civ.App., 293 S.W. 593, is similar to this controversy. The defendant in the Davis case was not an initial carrier, but an intervening carrier. This case was decided some thirty years ago. It was the established law, at the time the facts arose in the present controversy, that the initial carrier is primarily responsible for any acts or failures of intervening carriers. If defendant in the Davis case accepted a faulty car, it did so, not initially, executing its bill of lading therefor, but as a link in the transit. Under the present status of the law, the initial carrier is primarily responsible for the shipment, including negligence of intervening carriers.
Lastly, it does not seem credible that a railroad, in the face of the legal presumption of negligence when goods, fit when accepted, arrive at destination in unfit condition; would, as the initial carrier, accept a carload of highly perishable merchandise, such as meat, and agree to transport it approximately two thousand miles, in the midst of the hot summer weather, without at least some inspection of both the cargo and the refrigerator car. If Brown, the broker, could go in and look at the car before it was finally sealed, of course the railroad could have had its inspector there, too. Much has been said about the duty to inspect, and it must be admitted that the briefs do not settle this question, nor have we found any adequate legal disposition of same to serve as precedent or example. It seems to this writer, for a railroad to act as the record here indicates it did, — to-wit, entered into a bill of lading contract to ship perishable meat thousands of miles in hot weather, — without checking the meat or the car, was not only negligent, but certainly took a calculated risk, in view of the presumption that might well come into effect. As to a duty to inspect, it seems clear that the railroad should owe this duty under the facts in the record before us, because they assume the responsibility, as initial carrier, of transporting this cargo. How can they discharge that duty unless they use proper equipment; how do they dare to do it without at least seeing if the cargo is fit before they start? Therefore, this writer believes that an initial carrier is under the duty to make a reasonable inspection, at least of the equipment it plans to use in hauling the cargo under the terms of the bill of lading under which it expects to be paid for this service.
*935With reference to the matter of inspection, the majority opinion makes mention that, in its opinion, defendant did not enter into the execution of the bill of lading until after the car was sealed, and points out that the railroad was, therefore, helpless to break the seal and consequently unable to make a thorough inspection. Now this was true of the defendant’s position in the Davis case, for there defendant carrier was intervening carrier. The contract of shipment had already been entered into and the car was on its way, and intervening carrier would owe no more duty than that of making such inspection as was available and practical. Here, the defendant carrier was under no obligation to accept the contract unless satisfied, as it stoutly maintains that the record does not show that it furnished the car. Therefore, if it was true that this defendant railroad suffered this car to be spotted on its, the defendant’s, tracks, for several hours, it must have expected to handle the car. It does not seem likely, nor within the realm of reasonableness, that this car would have been spotted on the defendant’s tracks without its permission and knowledge. Defendant, under these circumstances, surely should have made some effort to be present when the car was to be inspected and re-sealed. But if the contrary, incredible though it seems, be true, and the railroad knew nothing of the matter (although Brown testified he had telephoned them about it), and simply entered into the bill of lading when presented, it certainly did so knowing the law applicable to the matter. There was no compulsion on defendant to do business in this way. It could have declined to execute the bill of lading until it was satisfied that the equipment was in good shape; and this writer feels that it was negligence and a calculated risk not to do so; and, of course, it would seem only prudent for the railroad to have made some inspection of the cargo it was to be responsible for shipping.
However, it is clear that many issues answered by the jury in this case were not supported by sufficient evidence and, in many cases, by no evidence at all. For example, the evidence with reference to the rotten canvas on the stiles in and about the doors of the railroad car. In the first place, we are not favored with a diagram, or anything like an adequate description of this type of car, or exactly where the canvas is fastened. We cannot tell, from the record, whether a reasonable inspection, after the car was sealed, could have revealed this rotten canvas, or not. Also, it must be noted that neither Brown nor Hamilton noticed anything wrong with the car in El Paso, and the evidence as to the rottenness of the canvas came from an inspection approximately four weeks later. Also, the evidence O'f witness Zinn, that the door was loose and ill-fitting, does not disclose whether it was loose and ill-fitting enough to permit the passage of air or, in other words, to permit the leakage of cold air. There is no evidence as to how much ice a shipment of this kind ordinarily would use, so that no comparison can be made. If the door was loose-fitting enough to admit hot air and leak cold air, it seems to me that this would be proof of negligence on the part of the initial carrier. The majority opinion points out that there is no evidence that the door was loose-fitting in El Paso; but, under the law as it now exits, the initial carrier assumes primary responsibility, and if the door became loose or ill-fitting in transit, the initial carrier would be primarily responsible.
Therefore, because of the state of the record and the evidence that it seems was, and should have been, available, I agree with the majority opinion that justice would be better served if the case were re-tried.