Court Opinion

ID: 9591084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:02:02.024316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:01.408012
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the rule of Singleton v. Eastern Carriers, 192 Ga. App. 227 (384 SE2d 202) (1989), applies to the instant case or to Washington v. South Ga. Med. Center, 221 Ga. App. 640 (472 SE2d 328) (1996). Such rule does not preclude a party from obtaining sanctions against a deponent who fails to appear where the deposition was noticed by another party. Nor do I agree with the majority’s attempt to expand the rule of Singleton; therefore, I must respectfully dissent. The rule in Singleton regarding who may obtain discovery sanctions is limited to written discovery, and the majority’s extension of this rule to encompass deposition discovery is unwarranted. The reason for the rule in Singleton is that the party who submits the interrogatories is the only party who would have incurred expenses as a result of the failure to answer the interrogatories. This is not the case when a party appears at a noticed deposition and the deponent fails to appear. I also disagree with the majority’s characterization of pertinent language from Washington, supra, as dicta.
“Dicta” is that which is typically “unnecessary to the holding of the case.” Hoesch America v. Dai Yang Metal Co., Ltd., 217 Ga. App. 845, 847 (459 SE2d 187) (1995). The majority concludes that the language from Washington, supra, holding that a party other than the one noticing the deposition can obtain sanctions when the deponent fails to appear is dicta. This characterization is inaccurate because of another often-observed rule of this Court: that we will address issues on appeal which are likely to arise on remand. See Sellers v. Nodvin, 207 Ga. App. 742, 747 (4) (429 SE2d 138) (1993).
In Washington, this second rule was applied. We remanded the non-noticing party’s motion for sanctions after the deponent failed to appear, and we did so' on procedural grounds. However, because the *558viability of the motion was certain to be an issue on remand, we addressed the trial court’s options with respect to the motion. For this reason, the language referred to by the majority is not dicta, and it should not be overlooked as such.
With respect to the majority’s extension of Singleton, supra, to include deposition discovery, Singleton is being stretched to include discovery which it never contemplated. In a single paragraph, Singleton held simply, that the defendant whose written discovery requests the plaintiff had failed to answer was entitled to the sanction of dismissal, but co-defendants who were not parties to said written discovery could not also receive dismissal on this basis. Singleton, supra at 228 (2). Singleton cites for authority Johnson v. Martin, 137 Ga. App. 312 (223 SE2d 465) (1976), but Johnson is also limited only to written discovery.
The majority’s finding that a non-noticing party may not obtain sanctions when a deponent fails to appear ignores the economic realities of the practice of law, the scheduling of depositions, and the difficulties inherent in both. As noted in Washington, in cases involving multiple parties, depositions will frequently be attended by all parties and their counsel. The scheduling of such deposition involves a tremendous amount of communication, coordination, and planning. When the deponent fails to appear, it is irrefutable that all parties, not just the noticing party, suffer inconvenience and lost preparation time.
The majority concludes that the reason for requiring formal notice of depositions from every party attending depositions is so that the non-complying party will know who will be entitled to seek sanctions. A non-complying party will already know the identity of the parties involved in the case and, therefore, the potential liability for non-compliance.
Therefore, the majority’s attempted expansion of the written discovery rule to depositions adds no benefit to any party. This Court should interpret the law in a common-sense fashion with a view to efficiency and the reduction of litigation expenses. Such a rule applied to a case involving five plaintiffs and six defendants would require the sending of ten formal notices for the first deposition on a given day and ten for each deposition taken thereafter.
Moreover, the remedies proposed by the majority for non-noticing parties where deponents fail to appear do not adequately address the problem. Inviting such parties to appeal to “the inherent power of the court to control the conduct of the parties before it in the exercise of discovery,” creates additional litigation where an appellate rule would clarify and simplify the process for trial courts already overburdened with discovery disputes.
“The constitution . . . requires that rules of the court ‘provide for *559the speedy, efficient, and inexpensive resolution of disputes.’ Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I. The legislature has addressed that goal in the passage of the Georgia Civil Practice Act which ‘shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’ OCGA § 9-11-1.” Maddox v. Wilson, 219 Ga. App. 158 (1) (464 SE2d 226) (1995).
Decided May 28, 1997
Before Judge Lilly.
Elizabeth Pelypenko, for appellants.
Young, Thagard, Hoffman, Scott & Smith, F Thomas Young, Elizabeth C. Cleveland, for appellee.
For these reasons, I would find that the defendant hospital could seek sanctions as the plaintiffs had formal notice of the depositions, even though such notice came from another party. The plaintiffs knew when and where the depositions were to be taken and knew that the hospital was a party to the lawsuit with an interest to protect by being present at the deposition. I would affirm the trial court’s grant of the defendant hospital’s motion for sanctions for the plaintiffs’ failure to appear.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Presiding Judge Pope and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.