Court Opinion

ID: 9724961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:23:18.66105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:08.491492
License: Public Domain

*616ASHBY, J.
I dissent.
The conclusion reached by the majority is based on two erroneous premises. The first is that upon the filing of a notice of appeal1 from the decision of the Regional Commission, that decision becomes a nullity. The second is that the tie vote by the membership of the State Commission constitutes action.
Stripped of its embellishments, appellant’s circular argument goes like this: The act provides that on appeal there shall be a de novo hearing in the same manner and vote as the Regional Commission hearing. A hearing de novo is a new hearing, thus the decision of the Regional Commission is a nullity. Because the Regional Commission decision is a nullity and the word “shall” is mandatory, the State Commission is required to cast at least “seven votes for the issuance of a permit.” Since there was no majority vote by the State Commission for issuance of the permit, there in effect was a denial. A denial is an action taken. Therefore neither California Administrative Code, title 14, section 14000,2 nor Public Resources Code section 27423, subdivision (b),3 applies.
Appellant’s argument is valid only if the Regional Commission’s decision becomes a nullity upon the filing of the notice of appeal. But this theory obviously disregards Administrative Code section 14000, which specifically and expressly provides that the operation and effect of the permit is merely suspended until final action is taken by the State Commission. If the permit is only suspended, then it of course does not become a nullity upon the filing of an appeal to the State Commission. It can become a nullity only if the State Commission takes action contrary to the action of the Regional Commission. Since the State Commission has plenary power to decide the appeal, it can substitute its contraiy determination for that of the Regional Commission, and, if it does, the Regional Commission action becomes a nullity. For example, the *617Regional Commission denies a permit and the State Commission votes to issue it or the Regional Commission issues a permit and the State Commission votes to deny it, in either situation the majority vote of the State Commission would be final action and would nullify the decision of the Regional Commission. But the decision of the Regional Commission does not become a nullity unless the State Commission takes action. (§ 27423, subd. (b).) To take action, the State Commission must have a majority vote.
Appellant’s next contention, which is inconsistent with its first contention, is that the permit is no longer suspended because the State Commission took action by its tie vote.
Appellant’s justification for its argument that a tie vote is action because it is in effect a denial cannot withstand analysis. If appellant is correct then any vote less than a majority vote is action since it also is in effect a denial. Under appellant’s theory, even the failure to vote because of the lack of a quorum would be action because it too would in effect be a denial. In other words, appellant is actually arguing that there can never be a situation in which the State Commission would take no action. This interpretation makes totally meaningless that portion of section 27423, subdivision (b), which provides that “[i]f the [state] commission fails to act within 60 days after notice of appeal has been filed, the regional commission’s decision shall become final.”
The Problem
In the instant case, appellant is urging a zoning ordinance approach to what is a use permit situation. The majority has been led into its error by appellant’s confusion of basic land-use permit procedures.4 This appeal *618involves quite a simple problem which becomes complex only when the plain meaning of the act is disregarded to reach the result urged by appellant.
The issue presented by this appeal is this: When a permit is issued by the affirmative majority vote of the Regional Commission, does a tie vote by the State Commission on appeal constitute a final action or does the decision of the Regional Commission become final.
Discussion
If effect is given to the plain meaning of the Coastal Act, no construction is necessary; but, even so, in construing legislation, its various provisions must be construed to harmonize its parts and sections so that no word, phrase, or provision is rendered unnecessary or meaningless. (Mercery. Perez, 68 Cal.2d 104, 112 [65 Cal.Rptr. 315; 436 P.2d 315]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App.3d 469, 472 [97 Cal.Rptr. 771]; Wemyss v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 616, 621 [241 P.2d 525]; Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal.2d 89, 93 [98 P.2d 729]; People v. Gilbert, 1 Cal.3d 475, 480 [82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580].)
The law is very clear. All permits are issued by the Regional Commission. “[A]ny person wishing to perform any development within the permit area shall obtain a permit authorizing such development from the Regional Commission. ...”(§ 27400; italics added.) In order to obtain such a permit, the application must be approved by either the Regional Commission or the State Commission. “. . . no permit shall be issued without the affirmative vote of a majority of the total authorized *619membership of the regional commission, or of the commission on appeal.” (§ 27400.)
The reason for the language “or of the commission on appeal” is that the situation frequently arises where the Regional Commission does not affirmatively vote to issue a permit to the applicant. Thus, in order to obtain the permit from the Regional Commission, the applicant must gain the approval of the State Commission by an affirmative vote. The procedure to be used is set forth in the act as an appeal. “An applicant. . . may appeal to the commission.” (§ 27423.) The State Commission is required to hear the appeal unless it determines that the appeal raises no substantial issue. (§ 27423, subd. (c); Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 13920.)
There are two types of appeals under the Coastal Act. (§ 27423, subd. (a); see also Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 13900.)
1. By the applicant from a denial.
2. By a person aggrieved by the issuance of a permit.
Where the applicant appeals from a denial by the Regional Commission, the applicant must receive the affirmative vote of the State Commission or no permit will be issued by the Regional Commission. This, however, is not the case before us.
The instant case involves a type two appeal. Since the applicant has already obtained its permit from the Regional Commission upon its affirmative majority vote to issue, the issuance of the permit is not dependent upon the affirmative vote of the State Commission. (§ 27400.)
Upon the filing of the appeal by a person aggrieved, the decision of the Regional Commission to issue the permit is suspended until the State Commission takes final action. “The filing of an appeal from any . . . decision of a Regional Commission granting a permit . . . shall suspend the operation and effect of such . . . decision, or permit until final action on said appeal by the Commission.” (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 14000; italics added.)
In hearing the appeal, the State Commission conducts a full hearing not limited to the evidence before the Regional Commission. The State Commission may exercise its discretion in considering the evidence in resolving conflicts in the evidence and may affirm or substitute its own *620judgment for that of the Regional Commission and reverse or modify that decision.5
In order to reach its conclusion that the decision of the Regional Commission is a nullity, appellant argues that the “appeal to the State Commission is not an ‘appeal’. . ., but merely the description of another forum for approval of an applicant’s permit.”6 Appellant bases this argument on the provisions of section 27423, subdivision (c), which provides for “a de novo public hearing . . . decided in the same manner and by the same vote as provided for decisions by the regional commissions.” (Italics added.)
Appellant seizes upon the words “de novo hearing” to bolster its argument that the decision of the Regional Commission became a nullity once the matter was appealed to the State Commission. It argues that '“[a] hearing de novo is literally a new hearing. It contemplates an entire trial of the controverted matter in the same manner in which it was originally heard. The decision therein is binding on the parties and takes the place of, and completely nullifies, the former determination of the matter....”
De novo hearings are the norm in zoning and permit matters, e.g., Russian Hill Improvement Assn. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal.2d 34, 38 [56 Cal.Rptr. 672, 423 P.2d 824]; Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal.2d 303, 313 [144 P.2d 4]; City & County of S. F. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 236, 248 [1 Cal.Rptr. 158, 347 P.2d 294]. The fact that the hearing before the State Commission is de novo does not mean that the action of the Regional Commission becomes a nullity merely because of the appeal. It means that the function of the State Commission is not limited to reviewing the record for errors or substantiality of the evidence, or merely determining whether or not the Regional Commission abused its discretion. De novo hearing means that the State Commission may hear all evidence submitted and is not limited *621to the evidence before the Regional Commission. It further means that the State Commission may exercise its discretion in considering the evidence resolving conflicts within its discretion and, if reasonable, substitute its judgment for that of the Regional Commission. What appellant fails to understand is that there is no inconsistency between the concept of a hearing de novo by the State Commission and the fact that the decision of the Regional Commission is merely suspended by the appeal. Where there is a de novo hearing, the determination of the permit issuing agency does not become a nullity merely because its decision was appealed. It becomes a nullity only when the appellate body makes a judgment and takes an action which is contrary to the decision of the issuing body. (See Collier & Wallis, Ltd. v. Astor, 9 Cal.2d 202 [70 P.2d 171].)
Appellant’s argument completely disregards Administrative Code section 14000 which provides: “The filing of an appeal from any order or decision of a Regional Commission granting a permit or claims of exemption, shall suspend the operation and effect of such order, decision, or permit until final action on said appeal by the Commission. ...” (Italics added.) It also disregards section 27423, subdivision (b), which provides that “[i]f the commission fails to act within 60 days after notice of appeal has been filed, the regional commission’s decision shall become final.” It is clear that the decision of the Regional Commission was not intended to be a nullity. The act is very clear that that decision is held in abeyance until a final action is taken by the State Commission.
There is no validity to appellant’s argument that “in the same manner and by the same vote as provided for decisions by the regional commissions” means that the State Commission can only grant or deny a permit and by not granting it must be denying the permit. This language merely means that the hearing procedures are the same and a majority vote is necessary for action. It does not mean that the State Commission can only “grant or deny” when an appeal is heard from the issuance of a permit. The grant or deny wording applies only to type one appeals where no permit has been issued by the Regional Commission. Where the appeal is type two, as in the instant case, the action of the State Commission as prescribed by section 27423, subdivision (b), is to “affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the regional commission.” Where general and specific provisions are inconsistent and cannot be reconciled, the specific provision controls. (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal.2d 621, 637 [268 P.2d 723]; Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 723-724 [123 P.2d 505]; In re Marquez, 3 Cal.2d 625, 629 [45 P.2d 342]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1859.)
*622Appellant’s argument gives no effect to the portion of section 27423, subdivision (b), which provides that the “commission may affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the regional commission.” Appellant argues that “[t]he terms are merely descriptive and should only be used to characterize a determination parallel or contrary to that of the regional commission. Certainly inquiry into the proper interpretation of a word cannot solely be guided by its legal use.” If appellant is correct in maintaining that the decision of the Regional Commission is a nullity, then section 27423, subdivision (b), has no meaning since there would be nothing for the State Commission to “affirm, reverse, or modify.”
The language which appellant so lightly dismisses is the standard wording of zoning and permit appeals provisions. For example, Government Code section 65903 authorizes the creation of boards of appeals for local agencies and provides as follows;
“A board of appeals, if one has been created and established by local ordinance, shall hear and determine appeals from the decisions of the board of zoning adjustment or the zoning administrator, as the case may be. Procedures for such appeals shall be as provided by local ordinance. Such board may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify the order, requirement, decision or determination appealed from, and may make such order, requirement, decision, or determination as should be made, and such action shall be final.”7 (Italics added.)
Appellant’s argument that the lack of a majority vote by the membership of the State Commission is action is not valid. The Attorney *623General made a similar argument in People of St. of Cal. ex rel. Younger v. Tahoe Reg. P. Ag., 516 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1975), (cert, den., 423 U.S. 888 [46 L.Ed.2d 97, — S.Ct. —]). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument. In TRPA, the applicant obtained the approval of the Nevada Tahoe Regional Planning Agency for the building of two projects. Although, as in the instant case, the TRPA was not the permit issuing authority, it had appellate authority to review the issuance of those permits. TRPA’s land use ordinance section 4.32 provided: “Administrative permits and variance permits . . . issued by the permit-issuing authority shall be subject to Agency review, and upon review of any such permit the Agency shall take final action, whether to approve, to require modification or to reject such permit within 60 days after such permit is delivered to the Agency. If the agency does not take final action within 60 days, the permit shall be deemed approved.”
The vote of the TRPA was a tie. The Attorney General argued there, as he does in the instant case, that the tie vote amounted to a denial. The Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument holding that:
“Under the TRPA statutory and regulatory scheme, variance and use permits must be submitted for review to the TRPA, and the TRPA has broad discretion to reject or approve on the merits each building permit request. However, the TRPA’s power of de novo review is fully exercised only when a dual majority for or against a proposal is reached.
“When a split vote is registered, the TRPA assumes a different posture, and becomes more like an appellate court than a zoning board. If an appellate court cannot agree on a majority decision, then the lower body’s decision stands affirmed—the rationale being that no ‘decision’ has been reached by the higher authority. Cf. State Department of Ecology v. City of Kirkland, 84 Wash.2d 25, 523 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1974). Similarly, in this case where no dual majority was mustered for either approval or rejection, we conclude that no ‘decision’ was ever rendered nor ‘final action’ ever taken by the TRPA. By virtue of Article VI(k) which provides in such a case that the project be deemed approved, the decision of the local permit issuing authority in effect stands affirmed ” {Id. at p. 219; italics aded.)
TRPA is directly in point.8 There as in the instant case the issuance of a permit was by a body other than the reviewing body. Secondly, the *624TRPA had the appellate power of de novo review as does the State Commission in the instant case. In both cases, there were tie votes and as a consequence no action was taken. Both the Tahoe Act and the Coastal Act provide that where no action is taken within the prescribed period the decision of the subordinate body becomes final.
Finally, appellant argues that its contemporaneous administrative construction of the act is entitled to great weight and should be controlling. Certainly the administrative practice of the State Commission is entitled to weight but it is not controlling in the present situation where it is so clearly not in accordance with the plain meaning of the statutes. “ ‘[A]lthough contemporaneous construction by officials charged with the administration of a statute or ordinance is given great weight, “final responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests with the courts. ‘At most administrative practice is a weight in the scale, to be considered but not to be inevitably followed.’ ” (Whitcomb Hotel v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 753, 756-757 [151 P.2d 233, 155 A.L.R. 405], quoting from F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 973.) The rule of contemporaneous construction may not be applied when the wording of the statute or ordinance, as in the present case, clearly calls for a different construction. (California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287, 294 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028].)’ (Johnston v. Board of Supervisors (1947) 31 Cal.2d 66, 74-75 [187 P.2d 686]; see also Goodwill Industries v. County of Los Angeles (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 19, 26 [254 P.2d 877].)” (Atlantic Oil Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 69 Cal.2d 585, 599 [72 Cal.Rptr. 886, 446 P.2d 1006].)
Conclusion
The State Commission cannot take action without the vote of a majority of its membership. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 13152.) The tie vote resulted in a failure by the State Commission to act within 60 days after the filing of notice of appeal as prescribed by section 27423, subdivision (c), as extended by agreement of REA and appellant.
(Klitgaard & Jones, Inc. v. San Diego Coast Regional Com., 48 Cal.App.3d 99, 112 [121 Cal.Rptr. 650].) Therefore, as provided in that section, “the regional commission’s decision shall become final.”
I would affirm the judgment.
On November 13, 1975, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 24, 1975. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Although the majority speaks of acceptance of the appeal rather than the filing of notice, the operative act is the filing of a notice of appeal, not an acceptance. The reason for this is that the State Commission must hear every appeal unless by a majority vote of its membership it declines to hear it. In other words, the State Commission does not accept appeals, it can only decline to hear them if they present no substantial issue.

 “The filing of an appeal from any . . . decision of a Regional Commission granting a permit . . . shall suspend the operation and effect of such . . . decision, or permit until final action on said appeal by the Commission.” (Italics added.)

 “. . . If the [state] commission fails to act within 60 days after notice of appeal has been filed, the regional commission’s decision shall become final.” (Italics added.)
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Public Resources Code.

 The procedures set forth in the Coastal Act are not unique. They are based on and follow the traditional land-use procedural scheme.
BASIC LAND-USE PROCEDURES
Zoning law involves the use of land. Land use is controlled by zoning and permits. Cities and counties are legislative bodies and each has a planning commission. (Gov. Code, § 65100.) Both the planning commission and the legislative body are involved in zoning and the issuance of use permits.
1. Zoning Ordinances.
Zoning is accomplished by the enactment of a zoning ordinance which is a legislative act. (Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 834-835 [323 P.2d 71]; Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 460 [202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990]; Gov. Code, § 65851.) An applicant landowner desiring to have his land zoned or the zone changed files an application with the planning commission. The planning commission holds hearings and makes a recommendation to the legislative body. The determination of the planning commission requires a majority vote. The implementation of that action requires a *618majority vote of the legislative body. If the legislative body fails to act by an affirmative majority vote, there is no ordinance and the application in effect is denied. (See Richter v. Board of Supervisors, 259 Cal.App.2d 99, 106 [66 Cal.Rptr. 52].
2. Use Permits.
Each type of zoning permits certain uses. Other uses may be made of the property if a permit is obtained. To obtain a permit the landowner must make application to the planning commission. (Gov. Code, §§ 65901, 65902.) A hearing is held and a decision is made by the planning commission by a majority vote to grant or deny the permit. In the absence of an appeal, the decision of the planning commission is final. Although the authority to issue the permit is with the planning commission, the legislative body has the power to review. Upon the filing of an appeal, the decision of the planning commission is suspended. The reviewing power of the legislative body is plenary and the hearings they conduct are de novo. This function is administrative rather than legislative. They can affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the planning commission. (Gov. Code, §§ 65903, 65904.) To do so, however, they must take action. If no action is taken within the period of time specified in the ordinance, the decision of the planning commission becomes final.

 One reason the State Commission was given plenary power of review is that it must consider the state-wide aspects of the permit.

 Appellant’s contention is in direct conflict with the proposal submitted to the electorate. The argument in the “Detailed Analysis by the Legislative Counsel” which was submitted to the voters in November 1972 contained the following pertinent paragraph;
“4. Beginning February 1, 1973, require a permit from a regional commission for any proposed development (with specified exemptions) within the ‘permit area,’ defined, generally, as that portion of the coastal zone lying between the seaward limit of the jurisdiction of the state and 1,000 yards landward from the mean high tide line, subject to various exceptions. Provision is made for appeals to the state commission and to the courts.” (Italics added.)

 An example of this standard approach in a charter jurisdiction is found in Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal.2d 303 [144 P.2d 4], There a writ of mandate was sought to compel the San Francisco Board of Permit Appeals to rescind its action overruling the issuance of building permits to the petitioner and to reinstate the permit and to affirm the action of the central permit bureau in granting them. The ordinance defining the authority of board of permit appeals provided as follows:
“ ‘Any applicant for a permit... or any person who deems that his interest or property or that the general public interest will be adversely affected as the result of operations authorized by or under any permit or license granted or issued by any department, may appeal to the board of permit appeals. Such board shall hear the applicant, the permit-holder, or other interested parties, as well as the head or representative of the department issuing or refusing to issue such license or permit,... After such hearing and such further investigation as the board may deem necessary, it may concur in the action of the department authorized to issue such license or permit, or, by the vote of four members, may overrule the action of such department and order that the permit or license be granted, restored or refused.’ ” (23 Cal.2d at p. 313.)
The Supreme Court in Lindel! upheld the action of the board of permit appeals and denied the writ.

 It is noted that the Attorney General did not even mention TRPA even though it was decided prior to the filing of the appellant’s reply brief.