Court Opinion

ID: 9625598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:45:30.449508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:11.695320
License: Public Domain

HENDLEY, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the majority opinion except as to that part entitled “Springer’s Expert Witness.” Supreme Court Rule 16, § 21-1-1(16), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, 1970) relating to pre-trial orders provides in part: “ . . . and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. ...” (Emphasis added) We are presented with the question of what is a manifest injustice. Would it be the fact that the report of WABCO’s expert turned out to be different, i. e. “point” instead of “paint”? In the context of the case it cannot be said that this was minor. The theory of liability centered around the torquing of the bolts. Would it be the fact that the original bolts tested by the expert were no longer in existence so that Springer could have its own expert make his evaluation? There was testimony that torquing would leave a “point” mark on the bolt. Would it be the fact that plaintiff’s counsel found one of the original bolts at the mine site which he promptly turned over to Springer just before the start of the trial. This was the only original bolt available for Springer to test. Would the cumulative effect of all of the foregoing create a manifest injustice ? The appellate review standard is abuse of discretion. Tobeck v. United Nuclear-Homestake Partners, 85 N.M. 431, 512 P. 2d 1269 (Ct.App.1973). This court in Tobeck, speaking to the spirit of Rule 16, stated: “ . . . The purpose of the federal rules of civil procedure was to get away from a ‘sporting’ theory of justice and to minimize the often fatal technicalities of common law pleading. We believe the pre-trial conference and the resulting pre-trial order must be examined in this light. In Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R., 328 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1964), the court pointed out that: ‘[I]t is a fundamental principle of pretrial that his procedure be flexible, with power reserved to the trial judge to amend the order or permit a departure from strict adherence to the pre-trial statements of either party, when the interests of justice make such a course desirable. Otherwise a pre-trial order or pre-trial statements would hold the parties in a vise, and the result might be just about as bad as a return to the old sporting theory of justice . ’ ” (Emphasis added) See generally 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, para. 16.20 at 1136 (2d Ed. 1974) and cases cited therein. Based on the foregoing, I would hold the trial court abused its discretion. I do not address the issue of how the trial court should have handled the practical aspects, as relates to WABCO, had it not have abused its discretion. I only state that speed is not the ultimate in every trial.