Court Opinion

ID: 9898002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:43.363792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:50.833916
License: Public Domain

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                                                                                                    Filed
                                                                                              Washington State
                                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Division Two

                                                                                                April 18, 2023

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                DIVISION II
        In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of:                        No. 54868-2-II

        DARCY DEAN RACUS

                                                                      PUBLISHED OPINION

              CRUSER, A.C.J. – In this personal restraint petition (PRP), Darcy Dean Racus challenges

       his 2016 jury trial convictions for attempted first degree rape of a child and communication with

       a minor for immoral purposes. Less than a year after his direct appeal mandated, Racus filed a

       PRP. Racus subsequently amended his PRP by filing a supplemental claim asserting that the trial

       court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the entrapment defense, relying on State v.

       Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d 356, 506 P.3d 1238 (2022). He further argues that the entrapment instruction

       claim is not time barred because Arbogast is a significant, material, retroactive change in the law

       under RCW 10.73.100(6), excepting it from the limitation in RCW 10.73.090(1).

              We hold that Arbogast is not a change in the law because it merely clarified existing law.

       Accordingly, we hold that the entrapment instruction claim is time barred. And because this claim

       is time barred, we dismiss this petition as mixed without addressing any of the other claims.
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       No. 54868-2-II

                                                        FACTS

                                                   I. BACKGROUND

                 Racus was arrested in an undercover sting operation commonly referred to as “Net Nanny

       II.” 5 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 761. Racus had responded to an online Craigslist

       ad that was designed to appear to be seeking someone to participate in sexual encounters with

       children. The State charged him with attempted first degree rape of a child, commercial sex abuse

       of a minor, and communication with a minor for immoral purposes.

                 At trial, Racus requested that the trial court instruct the jury on the entrapment defense.

       The trial court denied his request, stating that it did not “think this case, based upon the evidence

       presented, rises to the level of an entrapment defense, so I would not be inclined to give the

       entrapment instruction.1 7 VRP at 1101.

                 The jury found Racus guilty of attempted first degree rape of a child and communicating

       with a minor for immoral purposes.2

                                        II. APPEAL AND PETITION FOR REVIEW

                 Racus appealed. This court affirmed the convictions. State v. Racus, 7 Wn. App. 2d 287,

       303, 433 P.3d 830 (2019).

                 In his appeal, Racus argued, in part, that the trial court erred when it denied his request for

       an entrapment jury instruction. State v. Racus, No. 49755-7-II, slip op. at 18 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan.

       23, 2019) (unpublished portion), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/497557.pdf. In the

       unpublished portion of our decision, we held that the trial court did not err “[b]ecause Racus failed

       1
           The trial court did not state what burden of production it was applying.
       2
           The trial court dismissed the commercial sexual abuse of a minor charge for insufficient evidence.

                                                           2
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       No. 54868-2-II

       to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to a jury instruction on

       entrapment.” Id. at 20.

              In reaching this conclusion, we stated,

              The quantum of evidence required for an instruction to be given as an affirmative
              defense is sufficient evidence “to permit a reasonable juror to conclude that the
              defendant has established the defense of entrapment by a preponderance of the
              evidence.”

       Id. at 19 (quoting State v. Trujillo, 75 Wn. App. 913, 917, 883 P.2d 329 (1994)).

              Racus then petitioned for review in our supreme court. Am. Pet. for Rev., State v. Racus,

       No. 96820-9, at 1 (Wash. Mar. 4, 2019). In his amended petition for review, Racus challenged this

       court’s rejection of his entrapment instruction argument. Id. at 13. He argued, in part, that we erred

       in relying on the preponderance of the evidence standard set out in Trujillo. Id. at 14-15. And he

       asked our supreme court to “disavow Trujillo’s reasoning.” Id. at 15. Our supreme court denied

       review without commenting on Racus’s arguments. Ord., No. 96820-9 (Wash. June 5, 2019).

              Racus’s appeal mandated on June 18, 2019. Mandate, State v. Racus, No. 49755-7-II, at 1

       (Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 2019).

           III. PERSONAL RESTRAINT PETITION, ARBOGAST DECISIONS, AND SUPPLEMENTAL FILINGS

              On May 5, 2020, less than a year after his appeal mandated, Racus filed a PRP in this court.

              In December 2020, Division Three of this court rejected Trujillo’s preponderance of the

       evidence standard in State v. Arbogast, 15 Wn. App. 851, 871-73, 478 P.3d 115 (2020), aff’d, 199

       Wn.2d 356 (2022). Racus filed his first supplement to this PRP on January 27, 2021. In this

       supplement, Racus argued that Division Three’s Arbogast decision was a significant, material,

       retroactive change in the law and that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred

       when it refused to instruct the jury on entrapment.

                                                         3
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       No. 54868-2-II

              At the State’s request, we stayed the consideration of this matter pending our supreme

       court’s review of Division Three’s Arbogast decision. Our supreme court affirmed Division

       Three’s Arbogast decision in March 2022. Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d at 361.

              After the stay was lifted, Racus filed a second supplemental filing on June 29, 2022. In this

       supplemental filing, Racus argued that our supreme court’s Arbogast decision was a significant,

       material, retroactive change in the law and that it established that the trial court had erred when it

       refused to instruct the jury on the entrapment defense.

                                                    ANALYSIS

                            I. ARBOGAST IS NOT A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE LAW

              Racus argues that our supreme court’s Arbogast decision overrules Trujillo and establishes

       that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the entrapment defense. He also

       argues that Arbogast is a significant, material, retroactive change in the law, so his entrapment

       instruction issue is not time barred. The State argues that Arbogast is not a significant change in

       the law, so we should not address this claim further. We hold that this claim is time barred because

       Racus fails to establish that Arbogast is a significant change in the law.

       A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

              RCW 10.73.090(1) bars collateral attacks on a judgment and sentence “filed more than one

       year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was

       rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Under RCW 10.73.100(6), a petitioner can

       overcome the time bar by establishing that (1) there has been a significant change in the law, (2)

       the change in the law is material, and (3) the change in the law applies retroactively. State v. Miller,

       185 Wn.2d 111, 114, 371 P.3d 528 (2016).

                                                          4
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       No. 54868-2-II

              The significant change in the law exception applies “ ‘where an intervening opinion has

       effectively overturned a prior appellate decision that was originally determinative of a material

       issue.’ ” In re Pers. Restraint of Yung-Cheng Tsai, 183 Wn.2d 91, 104, 351 P.3d 138 (2015)

       (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Greening, 141 Wn.2d 687, 697, 9 P.3d 206 (2000)). “ ‘One test

       to determine whether an [intervening case] represents a significant change in the law is whether

       the defendant could have argued this issue before publication of the decision.’ ” In re Pers.

       Restraint of Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249, 258-59, 111 P.3d 837 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting

       In re Pers. Restraint of Stoudmire, 145 Wn.2d 258, 264, 36 P.3d 1005 (2001)).

       B. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT CASE LAW

              In State v. Galisia, Division One of this court held that to be entitled to an entrapment

       instruction the defendant had to produce “some evidence” to support the instruction.3 63 Wn. App.

       833, 836, 822 P.2d 303 (1992), abrogated in part by Trujillo, 75 Wn. App. at 917. Two years later,

       Division One disavowed Galisia in Trujillo, holding that in order to be entitled to an entrapment

       instruction “a defendant must present evidence which would be sufficient to permit a reasonable

       juror to conclude that the defendant has established the defense of entrapment by a preponderance

       of the evidence.” Trujillo, 75 Wn. App. at 917, abrogated by Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d at 371-72.

              In 2020, Division Three of this court rejected Trujillo’s preponderance of the evidence

       standard in their Arbogast decision. 15 Wn. App. 2d at 871-73. Observing that “Trujillo’s holding

       on this heightened standard for instruction has been relied on without examination in over a dozen

       3
         In Galisia, Division One relied on our supreme court’s opinion in State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d
       484, 488, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983), which stated that in order to obtain an instruction on an affirmative
       defense, “there need only be some evidence admitted in the case from whatever source” to support
       the defense.

                                                        5
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       No. 54868-2-II

       unpublished Court of Appeals decisions” and that Trujillo had never been cited by our supreme

       court, Division Three analyzed the issue and determined that the application of the Trujillo

       standard violated due process. Id. Our supreme court accepted review of this decision. State v.

       Arbogast, 197 Wn.2d 1007, 484 P.3d 1262 (2021).

              On review, our supreme court addressed “the standard for obtaining an entrapment

       instruction.” Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d at 365. The court stated that although the burden of proof for

       entrapment was well settled law, “other cases have created confusion about the burden of

       production, that is, the quantum of evidence necessary to raise the defense and get it before a jury.”

       Id. at 366-67.

              The court further stated that “[g]enerally, affirmative defense instructions are permitted

       upon a prima facie showing of some evidence in support of the defense.” Id. at 368 (emphasis

       added). But the court acknowledged that “[a] handful of cases describe the burden differently,” for

       instance by stating “that defendants are entitled to an instruction if it is supported by substantial

       evidence.” Id. at 369. In light of the differences in language, the court stated, “Simply put, our case

       law has used different terms to articulate the burden of production. We take the opportunity to

       clarify that regardless of the terms used, the quantum of proof justifying an instruction on a party’s

       theory of the case is some evidence supporting the proposition.” Id. at 370 (emphasis added).

              After describing Trujillo and Division Three’s Arbogast decision, our supreme court held

       that because “Galisia set out the proper burden of production, to the extent that Trujillo

       disapproved of Galisia it is incorrect.” Id. at 371-72. By “clarifying” the law, our supreme court

       made it clear that the burden of production is, and has always been, “some evidence” and that

                                                         6
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       No. 54868-2-II

       Trujillo never altered the burden of production because it contravened established supreme court

       law.

       C. ENTRAPMENT JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUE IS UNTIMELY

              Racus’s judgment and sentence became final when his direct appeal mandated on June 18,

       2019. RCW 10.73.090(3)(b). The supplemental pleading raising the entrapment instruction claim

       was filed in 2021, well over a year after Racus’s judgment and sentence became final. Thus, before

       this court can address the entrapment instruction claim, it must determine whether this claim is

       time barred.

              Racus argues that our supreme court’s Arbogast decision is a significant, material,

       retroactive change in the law under RCW 10.73.100(6) because it overrules Trujillo. But this

       argument fails because our supreme court in Arbogast did not change the law, it merely clarified

       the existing law and, in so doing, acknowledged that Trujillo had misinterpreted, but not changed,

       that law.4

       4
         We have found no case in which the reversal of a court of appeals decision that contravenes
       existing supreme court law was held to be a significant change in the law for purposes of RCW
       10.73.100(6). Moreover, in light of In re Personal Restraint of Arnold, 190 Wn.2d 136, 148-49,
       410 P.3d 1133 (2018), which holds that “horizontal stare decisis” does not exist among the
       divisions of the court of appeals, it would seem inconsistent to conclude that the reversal of one
       division’s case would be a change in the law in another division that was never bound by that case.

                                                       7
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       No. 54868-2-II

              Because Arbogast clarified the law and corrected an erroneous interpretation of existing

       law but did not change the law, Racus fails to show that the significant, material, retroactive change

       in the law exception to the time bar applies.5 Accordingly, we will not consider this claim.

                                        II. MIXED PETITION RULE APPLIES

              The State argues that this petition must be dismissed because, if we hold that the entrapment

       instruction issue is time barred, the petition is mixed. Racus does not respond to this argument.

       We agree with the State and dismiss this petition as mixed.

              When one or more grounds for relief fall within the exceptions in RCW 10.73.100 and one

       or more do not, then a petition must be dismissed as a mixed petition without any further

       consideration.6 In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 200 Wn.2d 622, 632, 520 P.3d 933 (2022). Here,

       the petition contains a time-barred claim and must be dismissed as mixed under RCW 10.73.100.

                                                 CONCLUSION

              We hold that (1) Arbogast is not a significant, material, retroactive change in the law, so

       Racus’s supplemental claim is time barred; and (2) the petition is mixed. Accordingly, we dismiss

       this PRP without reaching any of the other claims.

       5
         In his supplemental reply, Racus argues that judicial estoppel prohibits the State from arguing
       that Trujillo was not controlling law because the State argued on appeal that Trujillo was
       controlling law. We decline to address this argument because it was raised for the first time in a
       responsive brief. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549
       (1992).
       6
         This rule applies solely to claims governed by RCW 10.73.100. A claim of error arising under
       RCW 10.73.090(1)—to wit, that the judgment and sentence contains a facial invalidity or that the
       judgement and sentence was not rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction—does not trigger
       the mixed petition rule. In re Pers. Restraint of Stoudmire, 141 Wn.2d 342, 349, 5 P.3d 1240
       (2000); see also Williams, 200 Wn.2d at 632. Racus does not assert that any of the claims in his
       petition implicate facial invalidity or that his judgment and sentence was not entered by a court of
       competent jurisdiction.

                                                         8
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       No. 54868-2-II

                                            CRUSER, A.C.J.
        We concur:

        MAXA, J.

        VELJACIC, J.

                                        9