Court Opinion

ID: 9779190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:39:50.73881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:23.190739
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice. On July 9, 1987, at the age of fifteen, June Roe, unmarried, gave birth to Baby Roe (pseudonyms) as a result of an isolated sexual encounter with the biological father. The father apparently is unaware of the birth of the child. The mother has not disclosed the identity of the biological father; nor has she made any effort to notify him of the child’s birth. She declined to reveal the identity of the biological father for reasons of religion and privacy. Shortly after the birth of the baby boy she executed a “Consent to Adoption and Waiver and Entry of Appearance” in favor of the adoption agency. This document was also executed by a guardian ad litem who had been appointed to assist and advise June Roe during these proceedings. Adoption Services, Inc., then placed the child with D.J.B. and K.B.B., who subsequently filed a petition for adoption of the child in the Pulaski Probate Court.  After a hearing on the petition the trial court found that the adoption was proper in all respects except that the father had not received notice. While acknowledging that the applicable Arkansas statutes (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-9-206 and 207 (1987)) do not require notice to the father in this case, the court sua sponte held that the lack of notice to the father was a violation of both Due Process and Equal Protection. The court then stayed the pending adoption proceeding “until such time as evidence of notice to the father of its pendency is submitted to the Court.” This effectively terminated the adoption proceeding. (See Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 2(a)(2).) The only issue presented to this court is whether under the circumstances of this case notice to the father is mandated by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. We hold that notice to this father of the adoption proceedings is not required. Arkansas’ Revised Uniform Adoption Act is contained in Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-9-201 through 223 (1987). Chapter 9 section 206 enumerates those persons who are required to consent to an adoption; subsection (a)(2) requires the written consent of the father of the minor “if the father was married to the mother at the time the minor was conceived or at any time thereafter, the minor is his child by adoption, he has custody of the minor at the time the petition is filed, or he has otherwise legitimated the minor according to the laws of the place in which the adoption proceeding is brought.” Section 207 lists persons as to whom notice and consent are not required; subsection 207(a)(3) reads as follows: “The father of a minor if the father’s consent is not required by 9-9-206(a)(2).” The language of the Arkansas statutes is clear that notice to the father in this case is not required unless he has “otherwise legitimated” the child. He obviously meets none of the other statutory criteria which would entitle him to notice. The biological father was not interested enough in the outcome of his sexual encounter with this fifteen year old girl to even inquire concerning the possibility of her pregnancy. As far as we can discern from the record, he has exhibited absolutely no interest whatsoever in the child. It is probably true that he does not know of the existence of the child. Under this factual situation we must determine whether the Arkansas statute allowing adoption without notice to the father is constitutional. We are not dealing here with a situation where the unwed father had a significant relationship with the children as was the case in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). We are instead dealing with the situation where the father is merely “the biological link” which brought the child into existence. The U.S. Supreme Court has examined the extent to which a natural father’s biological relationship with his child receives constitutional protection in four cases. In Stanley v. Illinois, supra, the Court held that the Due Process Clause was violated by the automatic destruction of the parental rights of a father who had had a custodial relationship with his children without giving the father any opportunity to present evidence regarding his fitness as a parent. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), upheld the constitutionality (under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause) of a Georgia statute that authorized the adoption of a child over the objection of the natural father who had never legitimated the child. In Caban v. Mohammed, supra, the Court ruled that it violated the Equal Protection Clause to grant the mother a veto over the adoption of two children, but not to grant a veto to their father, who had admitted paternity and had participated in the rearing of the children; the Court held that such statutes may not distinguish between a mother and father who are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child. (The majority in Caban did not address the Due Process argument.) In Lehr v. Robertson, et al., 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court held that an unmarried father lacking a custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the child was not constitutionally entitled to notice of the child’s adoption proceeding. The father in Lehr filed a petition to vacate the order of adoption of his child. The child had been adopted when she was over two years old by the mother and the mother’s husband. The biological father had lived with the mother prior to the child’s birth and had visited the mother in the hospital when the child was born. However, he did not live with them after the birth, he never provided them with any financial support, and he never offered to marry the mother. Moreover, the father had not entered his name in New York’s “putative father registry,” which would have entitled him to receive notice of the adoption proceeding. The natural father was not a member of any class of possible fathers who were required by the New York statute to receive notice of the adoption proceeding. However, the father had filed a “visitation and paternity petition” one month after the adoption proceeding had been commenced. He subsequently learned of the pending adoption proceeding and attempted to intervene. The Supreme Court in Lehr held that until an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact with his child does not acquire substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. Said in other words, when the father acts like a father and takes on some of the responsibilities of fatherhood, he is entitled to be treated as a father. The Lehr Court expressly stated: “But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.” The Lehr opinion concluded the Due Process discussion: The Constitution does not require either a trial judge or a litigant to give special notice to nonparties who are presumptively capable of asserting and protecting their own rights. Since the New York statutes adequately protected appellant’s inchoate interest in establishing a relationship with Jessica, we find no merit in the claim that his constitutional rights were offended because the Family Court strictly complied with the notice provisions of the statute. [463 U.S. at 265]  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. When the Due Process Clause is invoked, the first step in the inquiry is to determine the precise nature of the private interest that is threatened by the state. Lehr. The parent-child relationship is a basic fabric of our society. There can be no doubt that this relationship merits constitutional protection unless the circumstances are exceptional. The states have traditionally been allowed to control matters of marriage, divorce, adoption, inheritance of property, and child custody. Society has always expressed a preference for formal families, and married parents generally have been considered to have equal authority over, and rights to, their children. It is clear from the foregoing discussion and the circumstances of this case that this father’s inchoate relationship with his child is not entitled to “equivalent constitutional protection” under the Due Process Clause.  The Equal Protection Clause requires that states may not draw distinctions between individuals or groups of individuals based solely on differences irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Again we find that Lehr controls the present appeal. The Court in Lehr stated: “We have held that these statutes may not constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where the mother and father are in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child.” The Court concluded this portion of the opinion: If one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal rights. [463 U.S. at 267] The mother and father in this case are not similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child. Moreover, the father is not similarly situated with any class of fathers entitled to receive notice under the statute. Under the circumstances of the present appeal, the Equal Protection Clause does not entitle this father to notice of the adoption proceeding. It is apparent from Stanley and Caban that an unwed father who has entered into a sustained relationship with the mother of his illegitimate child, or with the child, is entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding. However, it is clear from Lehr that a parent lacking a custodial, personal, or financial relationship with his child is not constitutionally entitled to notice. We agree with the appellants’ statement that the question is not so much whether the state may terminate the father’s parental rights without notice, but whether parental rights attached in the first place.  The Arkansas law governing the establishment of paternity by the county court is applicable to all putative fathers. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-104 (1987). In the present case, the putative father did not avail himself of this procedure, nor did he take any affirmative action concerning his paternity or inquire about the possibility of his fatherhood. We therefore conclude that an unmarried father lacking any substantial relationship with his child is not entitled to notice of the child’s adoption proceeding under either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Holt, C.J., and Glaze, J., concur. Dudley and Newbern, JJ., dissent.