Court Opinion

ID: 9599980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:22:36.145198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:04.344568
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Divisions 1-3 and find that the holding in Division 4 is compelled by what is not in the record in addition to what is shown.
Hernandez pleaded guilty in Florida to an information originating in Arkansas, which charged him with violating 21 USC “Section 844 (a) and Section 846.” The “Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order” form states, in the section entitled “sentence or probation order,” that the court orders that: “Imposition of sentence of confinement is withheld and the defendant is placed on probation for THREE (3) YEARS. Special condition of probation is that the defendant shall remain employed during entire probationary period.”
*802Decided April 20, 1987
Rehearing denied May 5, 1987
David R. Sweat, Jeanne M. L. Player, for appellant.
Gerald W. Brown, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Section 844 (a), which the state contends this sentence falls under, provides for imprisonment for not more than one year, but a second or repetitious offense allows imprisonment of two years. Fines are also authorized, but probation is not expressly provided.
Hernandez contends that this is a sentence under Section 844 (b). It states that the court, with respect to a person who has not previously been convicted of a federal controlled substances crime, “may, without entering a judgment of guilty and with the consent of such person, defer further proceedings and place him on probation upon such reasonable conditions as it may require and for such period, not to exceed one year, as the court may prescribe.” Satisfactory completion of probation results in discharge and dismissal without adjudication of guilt.
The other federal statute involved is Section 846, which provides for a separate penalty for attempt or conspiracy to commit a controlled substance crime. Such is punishable “by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the [substantive] offense, . . .” In this case it is one year, or two years if repetitive, as prescribed by Section 844 (a).
In answer to Hernandez’ contention, first, the sentence of the Florida court does not contain the deferment language. Second, it contains the adjudication language, to wit: “the court adjudged the defendant guilty as charged and convicted . . .” Third, there is no record of consent to a subsection (b) deferment. Fourth, the latter is available only to a first offender. Since the maximum for a first offender would be two years’ probation (one year for Section 844 (b) and one year for Section 846), and the court having imposed three years’ probation, Hernandez must not have been eligible for subsection (b) treatment.
Thus I agree that the sentence was one of confinement, suspended upon satisfactory completion of three years’ probation. This being the case, Bennett v. State, 132 Ga. App. 397, 398 (3) (208 SE2d 181) (1974) controls.