Court Opinion

ID: 9771091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:31:37.892598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:00.465886
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Justice,
concurring.
While I find myself in agreement in the result the majority achieves, I cannot concur in their reasoning, it is for this reason that I write this separate concurrence. Judicial Ethics Opinion JE-88 interpreted Canon 3B(4) of the Judicial Code of Conduct and in brief, it found that it was a violation of this Canon to compensate a relative with state funds. Circuit Judge Danny P. Caudill sought guidance from the Judicial Ethics Commission regarding whether it was permissible for a judge to hire his wife as a secretary. JE-90, which was issued in response to Judge Caudill’s inquiry, stated unequivocally that it was a violation of the Canon for a Judge to employ his wife as a secretary. Judge Caudill, joined by Circuit Judge Lovelace and District Judge Bates, sought review of JE-90 by this Court.
In examining Canon 3B(4),1 I believe that this Court can find a sufficient basis to resolve the matter before us within the language of the Canon itself. The language employed by the Canon is permissive rather than mandatory, accordingly, judges are merely encouraged to avoid nepotism, rather than required to do so. I believe that by construing the statute in this fashion we avoid making a broad ruhng-which is only too likely to invite mischief in the future.
In comparing the definitions of should versus shall, it becomes evident that their meanings, while similar, are indeed distinct. Should is used to express duty, obligation, necessity, propriety, or expediency. Web-steR’s Third New International Dictionary 2104 (3rd ed. unabridged 1993). Shall is used to express a command or exhortation. Id. at 2086. Should, while definitely strongly encouraging a particular course of action, is permissive. Shall requires a particular course of action and accordingly, is mandatory.
This Court must accord the words of a statute their literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion. Bailey v. Reeves, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 832 (1984); Dept. of Revenue v. Greyhound Corp., Ky., 321 S.W.2d 60 (1959). In this matter we have clear language to interpret and are thus bound to follow it. Shall is mandatory language, while should is permissive language, that while encouraging a certain course of action, does not require that a particular course be followed. See Hardin County Fiscal Court v. Hardin County Board of Health, Ky.App., 899 S.W.2d 859 (1995). Since anti-nepotism laws are penal in character, they are to be strictly construed. Baillie v. Medley, 262 So.2d 693 (Fla.App.Dist.3). Employing strict construction to the instant case, it is clear that Canon 3B(4) does not prohibit judges from engaging in nepotism or favoritism, but rather merely discourages the practice. In achieving this result the majority achieves in this particular case should not be read as this Court endorsing nepotism or favoritism, rather it should be seen as this Court interpreting the plain language of the law. At this point, I would end my analysis of the instant matter and declare whatever language which followed to be dicta.
However, the majority opinion does go farther and I believe that some of the language is ill-chosen. I disagree with the majority’s *439definition of nepotism.2 The majority states that nepotism is the hiring of a person who is unqualified for a job position because of the familial relationship. Nepotism is showing favoritism towards relatives. WebsteR’s Third New INTERNATIONAL Dictionary 1518 (3rd ed. unabridged 1993). Black’s Law Dictionary defines nepotism as the bestowal of patronage by public officers in appointing others to positions by reason of blood or marital relationship to appointing authority. Blace’s Law Dictionary 1039 (6th ed.1990). Giving a family member a position because of the familial relationship rather than merit is an example of nepotism, but is it not the only manifestation. Favoritism is in turn defined as “the treating of one person, family or class of men with special favor or partiality to the correlative neglect of others.” Webster’s at 830.
I discuss the definition of favoritism because not only is it implicated by the definition of nepotism, but it is equally discouraged by the statute. Nepotism is simply a subset of favoritism in which the group unfairly benefited are family members. Thus the granting of undue favor to a family member or any other person is equally discouraged by Canon 3B(4). JE-90 does not deal with persons other than the wives of judges serving as secretaries because that question was not posed to the Judicial Ethics Commission. However, given the reasoning of JE-90 and the plain language of Canon 3B(4), I have no doubt that the Judicial Ethics Commission would have been equally critical of the hiring of a friend or other romantic interest on the basis of that relationship. In summary, the issue is not whether or not the individuals in question were qualified, that has never been at issue in this case, the question was whether or not the dictates of Canon 3B(4) were permissive or mandatory.
The majority cites Chapman v. Gorman, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 232 (1992), for the proposition that nepotism is concerned with waste and mismanagement as the evils to be avoided, I do not agree with this assessment. Among the barriers to an efficient school system identified by this Court in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., Ky., 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989), were waste, duplication, mismanagement and political influence. Id. at 193. Certainly nepotism plays a role in furthering all of these four factors; however, nepotism also damages an institution by undermining the public’s confidence in that institution and its operations. The Court often refers to this concept as the appearance of impropriety.
Virtually all anti-nepotism statutes simply prohibit the hiring of persons based on their family relationship without regard to the qualifications of an individual. KRS 160.380(1)(a), (2)(f) (prohibits a superintendent from hiring the relative of a board member to work within that district); Rosenstock v. Scaringe, 54 App.Div.2d 779, 387 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1976, 3rd Dept) (law prohibited more than a single family member from serving on the same school district’s board of education); Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609 (11th Cir.1995) (law prohibited relatives of city employees from working in a supervisory position in the same department). By focusing on waste and mismanagement, the majority has ignored the problem created by the public perception that the wives of judges, no matter what their qualifications, will be perceived as having received improper favorable treatment.
I wish to stress that I have no personal animus toward any of the movants in this suit or toward their spouses. I simply believe that the majority in this case has gone farther than is required to reach a decision in this matter and that the language they have employed shall come back to haunt this Court at a later date. The evil that I believe anti-nepotism provisions are designed to combat is the appearance of impropriety which has the inevitable effect of undermining the public’s trust in a given institution.
For the reasons stated above, I concur in result only.

. Canon 3B(4) provides:
A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should exercise his power of appointments only on the basis of merit, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. He should not approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered. (emphasis added).

. I would also like to note that Canon 3B(4) speaks out against favoritism as well as nepotism.