Court Opinion

ID: 9721373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:57:32.730137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:25.067855
License: Public Domain

CALDECOTT, P. J.
I concur in parts II, III, IV and V of the majority opinion but dissent as to part I.
The majority concede that the rule is well established that if an administrative remedy is provided by statute (or ordinance) a litigant must invoke and exhaust such remedy before relief of mandamus under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is available. (Ralph’s Chrysler-Plymouth v. New Car Dealer’s Policy & Appeals Bd. (1973) 8 Cal.3d 792 [106 Cal.Rptr. 169, 505 P.2d 1009]; Temescal Water Co. v. *121Dept. Public Works (1955) 44 Cal.2d 90 [280 P.2d 1].) Exhaustion of petitioner’s administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite, not a matter of judicial discretion. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 293 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715]; Morton v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 977, 981 [88 Cal.Rptr. 533].)
“[E]ven where the statute sought to be applied and enforced by the administrative agency is challenged upon constitutional grounds, completion of the administrative remedy has been held to be a prerequisite to equitable relief.” (United States v. Superior Court (1941) 19 Cal.2d 189, 195 [120 P.2d 26]; Smith v. City of Duarte (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 267, 269 [39 Cal.Rptr. 524]; People v. Coit Ranch, Inc. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 52, 57-59 [21 Cal.Rptr. 875]; Dunham v. City of Westminster (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 245, 249 [20 Cal.Rptr. 772]; Tushner v. Griesinger (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 599, 608 [341 P.2d 416].) As stated by the court in United States v. Superior Court, supra, at pages 194-195: “The respondents apparently contend that the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only to erroneous orders and does not preclude judicial interference where, as here, an order is assailed as a nullity because illegally adopted. . . . But there is no substantial difference, insofar as the necessity for resort to administrative review is concerned, between an erroneous order and one which, it is claimed, is being executed in violation of statutory authority.”
As the Supreme Court said in Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, 17 Cal.2d 280 at page 293: “The rule itself is settled with scarcely any conflict. It is not a matter of judicial discretion, but is a fundamental rule of procedure laid down by courts of last resort, followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, and binding upon all courts. We are here asked to sanction its violation, either on the ground that a valid exception to the rule is applicable, or that despite the uniformity with which the rule has been applied, it may be disregarded by lower tribunals without fear of prevention by the higher courts. This last point cannot be too strongly emphasized, for the rule will disappear unless this court is prepared to enforce it.”
The fact that the time limit for the administrative appeal is now past, or even that such time limit had expired when the petition for writ of mandamus was filed below, so that the administrative remedy provided by the municipal code was no longer available, does not alter the application of the exhaustion doctrine. To hold otherwise. would obviously permit parties to easily circumvent the entire judicial policy *122behind the doctrine. (Alexander v. State Personnel Bd. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 198 [137 P.2d 433]; cf. Humbert v. Castro Valley County Fire Protection Dist. (1963)214 Cal.App.2d 1 [29 Cal.Rptr. 158].)
The majority would create an exception to the doctrine and hold that the failure of a private person to exhaust an administrative remedy, against government action taken in an administrative proceeding to which he was not a party does not bar him from seeking judicial relief from such action by way of enforcing rights which he holds as a member of the affected public.
The majority state that the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies would operate to bar the public from redressing a public wrong by insulating the zoning action from judicial review. The doctrine does not bar the public from judicial review, it merely provides the procedural steps to be taken and judicial review is one of the steps available. The fact that in the exercise of these rights there are preliminary steps prior to judicial review does not mean that the public is deprived of any rights.
A party to an administrative proceeding also has rights as do persons whose property is affected by the administrative action. But, as discussed above, these persons must, in the exercise of their rights, follow the procedure of first exhausting their administrative remedy before resorting to the courts. This has been found to be a reasonable and lawful condition as well as a practical one. The majority cite no cases or authority in support of their proposal and give no reason why persons who are only indirectly concerned with an administrative action should be given greater rights than those directly affected.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the respondents were acting on behalf of the public. There is an allegation in the petition that the respondents were acting in the public interest and that the respondent corporation was established to safeguard the physical environment. This allegation, however, was denied in the answer. No evidence was offered on the issue and no finding of fact was made concerning it. Actually, this issue was never before the trial court and neither the trial nor the appeal was based on this theory. Thus, if there is such an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, on the facts of this case, it would not be applicable.
*123Furthermore, there is no evidence that the respondents did not have knowledge of the proceedings relative to the subject property. In fact, the petition alleges that the two individual respondents were present at some of the administrative hearings. No excuse appears in the record as to why the respondents (at least the individuals) could not have pursued their administrative remedy.
The practical effect of this proposal would be to destroy the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and throw these cases directly into the courts. The proposed exception would not be workable.
I would reverse that portion of the judgment declaring invalid the procedure for approval of the planned unit development and that portion of the judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandate as to the conditional use permit.