Court Opinion

ID: 9792539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:30:31.301757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:43.507519
License: Public Domain

Guy, J.
(dissenting)—I disagree that the factors set forth in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986) have been met. Therefore there is no basis upon which the majority can conclude that a broader interpretation of privacy rights under article 1, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution is warranted. Further, garbage placed outside the confines of one's property does not fall within the contemplated meaning of "private affairs". Const. art. 1, § 7. Finally, the practical effect of the majority's holding creates a new boundary for warrantless trash searches that is in reality a distinction without a difference. As such, it provides no additional constitutional protection than what was previously under the Fourth Amendment.
Gunwall
This court has established six nonexclusive criteria to determine whether article 1, section 7 of our constitution provides greater protection to an individual than the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Gunwall, supra. Factor four requires a showing of previously established bodies of state law, including statutory law, that might bear on the granting of distinctive state constitutional rights. Such law may be responsive to concerns of its citizens long before they are addressed by analogous constitutional claims. Gunwall, at 61-62.
*584To satisfy this factor, the majority relies upon Port Townsend Municipal Ordinance 6.04.030, which requires that trash cans be placed in a location "where they will be convenient for the collector." Majority opinion, at 576. The majority also depends upon a Seattle ordinance that makes it unlawful for anyone other than the owner of the trash can, or one authorized by the owner to place objects in the can, to remove its contents "except for collection". See SMC 21.36.100; majority opinion, at 576. The majority concludes that these ordinances indicate an intent to recognize and to protect a privacy interest in trash even though it acknowledges the Port Townsend ordinance was intended to protect the health of the general public rather than establish a privacy interest for individuals in garbage. Majority opinion, at 576. The majority concludes that this distinction is irrelevant. Majority opinion, at 576.
This distinction is, in fact, of major relevance to resolution of the fourth factor. In Gunwall, the police obtained toll records and pen register tapes without a warrant. Gunwall, at 55-58. In concluding that greater protection under article 1, section 7 was warranted, this court found that Washington had a long history of protecting telephonic and other electronic communications. Gunwall, at 66. In particular, RCW 9.73.010 made it a misdemeanor for anyone wrongfully to obtain knowledge of a telegraphic message. This statute was enacted in 1909 and was based upon section 2342 of the Code of 1881. That code, adopted before statehood, extensively regulated telegraphic communications. Gunwall, at 66. In interpreting the statute, this court held that it was broad, detailed and extended considerably greater protection to our citizens than comparable federal statutes and rulings thereon. Gunwall, at 66 (citing State v. O'Neill, 103 Wn.2d 853, 700 P.2d 711 (1985)). Both the Legislature and the courts previously established a long history of protection for telephonic and other forms of electronic communications.
By contrast, it is unreasonable to hold that two local ordinances regulating the collection of trash, one of which *585was intended to address public health safety, comprise a long preexisting history of protecting privacy interests in garbage. See majority opinion, at 576 (acknowledging the Port Townsend ordinance was intended to protect the health of the general public rather than individual privacy interests in garbage). Because these ordinances do not demonstrate a history of legislative or judicial protection of privacy interests in garbage, I would hold that the fourth Gunwall factor has not been met.
The sixth Gunwall factor addresses whether the subject matter is local in nature or whether there appears to be a need for national uniformity. Gunwall, at 62. Only the former may be more appropriately addressed by resort to our state constitution. Gunwall, at 62. The Supreme Court has recognized individual states' freedom to determine under independent state grounds whether a privacy interest in garbage is reasonable. Majority opinion, at 576 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988)). The majority concludes that because California and Hawaii have found a privacy interest to exist in garbage, this indicates that the matter is of local concern. Majority opinion, at 577; see also People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), reaffirmed, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973); State v. Tanaka, 67 Hawaii 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985).
The majority's focus is misplaced. In Gunwall, we stated that factor six overlapped criterion four, and to that extent the same discussion applied to both. Gunwall, at 67. In other words, we found that a prevailing history of state protection would lend credence to the conclusion that the matter at hand was of local concern. We then found the sixth factor satisfied, reasoning that the objective of national uniformity was outweighed by overwhelming state policy considerations to the contrary. The focus of our inquiry was twofold: determining what the State of Washington had done in protecting privacy interests without *586resort to other states' treatment of the same issue; and balancing state, not local, policy considerations against an objective of national uniformity. See Gunwall, at 66-67.
In doing so, one can only conclude that the sixth factor has not been met. The majority has failed to provide one policy consideration that would weigh in favor of finding the privacy interest asserted in this case a matter of local concern. See majority opinion, at 576-77. Unlike Gunwall, there is no prior history of legislative or judicial protection of privacy interests in garbage. The two local ordinances upon which the majority relies cannot be characterized as reflecting State policy considerations that would sufficiently outweigh an objective of national uniformity.
Moreover, the majority's reliance upon other jurisdictions which have found a privacy interest on independent state grounds is tenuous at best. Majority opinion, at 576-77. If we are to rely upon other states' treatment of this issue, then the overwhelming majority of courts have held to the contrary. See, e.g., Greenwood, at 41-42 (citing Commonwealth v. Chappee, 397 Mass. 508, 512-13, 492 N.E.2d 719 (1986); Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653, 656 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985); State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 314-17, 367 N.W.2d 788, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985); State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224, 228-30 (N.D. 1985); State v. Brown, 20 Ohio App. 3d 36, 37-38, 484 N.E.2d 215 (1984); State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1982); People v. Whotte, 113 Mich. App. 12, 317 N.W.2d 266 (1982); Commonwealth v. Minton, 288 Pa. Super. 381, 391, 432 A.2d 212 (1981); State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Huddleston, 38 Ill. App. 3d 277, 347 N.E.2d 76 (1976); Willis v. State, 518 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973); State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, 592-93, 503 P.2d 807 (1972); Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Wyo. 1970); State v. Purvis, 249 Or. 404, 411, 438 P.2d 1002 (1968)).
We have adopted the six nonexclusive factors in Gunwall to ensure that resort to independent state grounds will be *587based upon well founded legal reasons and not by substitution of a court's own notion of justice for that of duly elected legislative bodies or the United States Supreme Court. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 62-63; majority opinion, at 575. Resort to our state constitution must be derived from a process that is at once "articulable, reasonable and reasoned." (Italics mine.) Gunwall, at 63. The majority's resolution of factors four and six frustrates the policy behind the adoption of the Gunwall criteria. I would hold that Gunwall has not been met. As such, there is no basis upon which to extend broader protection to garbage under article 1, section 7.
"Private Affairs" vs. Garbage
The majority fails to provide what the contemplated meaning of "private affairs" is and why it necessarily encompasses garbage. Yet it concludes that trash "falls squarely within the contemplated meaning of a 'private affair'" and finds a privacy interest to exist in garbage. Majority opinion, at 578. It bases this decision upon several cases establishing privacy interests in the area of search and seizure, none of which deals with garbage. It reasons that unlike the Fourth Amendment, which centers upon the subjective privacy expectations of citizens, article 1, section 7 focuses on those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant. Majority opinion, at 577 (citing State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510-11, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)).
Notably, the majority provides no basis for concluding that there is a historical privacy interest in garbage that has been held by the citizens of our state. Nor is it abundantly clear that this court's recognition of privacy interests in other areas of search and seizure provide a sufficient basis for extending such an interest to garbage.
The relevant inquiry for determining when a search has occurred under article 1, section 7 is whether the State unreasonably intruded into the defendant's "private *588affairs". Myrick, at 510 (citing State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 178, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)). By contrast, the pertinent inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is whether there has been governmental intrusion into an individual's '"reasonable expectation of privacy.'" Myrick, at 510 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967)). We have held this difference significant in determining whether an individual's privacy interests have been unconstitutionally violated. See, e.g., Myrick, at 510.
However, this difference in analyzing whether a violation has occurred does not determine that an alleged privacy interest would necessarily fall within the meaning of "private affairs" and thereby be constitutionally protected. To date, it appears we have not yet clarified what "private affairs" would entail. See, e.g., Myrick, at 510-11 (citing State v. Simpson, supra). One cannot legitimately conclude that an individual's private affairs have been unconstitutionally violated under article 1, section 7 until it has been determined that the privacy interest allegedly violated falls within the contemplated meaning of "private affairs".
In this regard, I believe the relevant inquiry would be the same as that of the Fourth Amendment. That is, whether the defendant possessed, from a societal perspective, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in that matter allegedly violated. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988); see also Myrick, at 510 (citing Katz, at 357). To hold otherwise would permit individuals to assert as private any matter subjectively held to be so. It could hardly be seriously contended that our constitution allows for such a result.
When applied to Boland's case, the relevant inquiry would be whether his asserted expectation of privacy in his garbage is objectively reasonable from a societal perspective and, if so, whether the warrantless search was a violation of that interest.
In that regard, the Supreme Court has already answered these questions. See California v. Greenwood, supra. First, garbage left on or at the side of a public street is readily *589accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Greenwood, at 40 (citing People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d at 367). Moreover, garbage is placed at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through the trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Greenwood, at 40. Accordingly, having deposited garbage in an area particularly suited for public inspection, there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items discarded. Greenwood, at 40-41.
The majority dismisses this reasoning by arguing that the fundamental purpose of the constitution is to govern the relationship between the people and the government rather than the relationship between private parties. Majority opinion, at 575 (citing Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wn.2d 413, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989)). Thus, it concludes that the focus of inquiry should be the reasonableness of governmental intrusion into a private individual's garbage and not the reasonableness of such intrusions by private individuals. Majority opinion, at 575.
While this is undoubtedly true, the majority's focus is misplaced. The Court in Greenwood does not maintain that the constitution governs the rights of people vis-a-vis one another. Rather, the point made is one of logic and a fundamental precept of constitutional analysis. That is, there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy in a matter held out to the public. Cf. Bedford v. Sugarman, 112 Wn.2d 500, 512, 772 P.2d 486 (1989). Thus, it is difficult to understand how the majority can acknowledge there is no reasonable expectation that "children, scavengers, or snoops" will not sift through one's garbage, yet find it reasonable to expect that the government will not absent a warrant. Majority opinion, at 578. The majority offers no explanation to reconcile how this court legitimately can engage in this type of selective enforcement of constitutional principles.
*590The majority relies upon the holding of the Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Tanaka, 67 Hawaii 658, 662, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985) as standing for the proposition that average persons would find a constitutionally protected privacy interest in garbage objectively reasonable. Majority opinion, at 578. To the contrary, an overwhelming majority of federal and state courts have held that society is not willing to accept as objectively reasonable an expectation of privacy in garbage left in an area accessible to the public. Greenwood, at 41 (citing, e.g., United States v. Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 791-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 308-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. United States, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); Commonwealth v. Chappee, 397 Mass. 508, 512-13, 492 N.E.2d 719 (1986); Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653, 656 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985); State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 314-17, 367 N.W.2d 788, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985); State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224, 228-30 (N.D. 1985); State v. Brown, 20 Ohio App. 3d 36, 37-38, 484 N.E.2d 215 (1984); State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1982); People v. Whotte, 113 Mich. App. 12, 317 N.W.2d 266 (1982).
If we are to resort to other jurisdictions to conclude what the citizens of Washington would find objectively reasonable, then the overwhelming majority of state and federal courts dictate a result contrary to the majority's.
The majority, however, declines to follow federal precedent and distinguishes Greenwood and other similar cases for two reasons. First, Greenwood is based in part on the fact that the garbage was left outside the curtilage of the home. Majority opinion, at 580. The majority argues that this court has previously held the location of a search is indeterminative. Majority opinion, at 580 (citing State v. *591Boland, 55 Wn. App. 657, 664-65, 781 P.2d 490 (1989) (Alexander, C.J., dissenting)).
Contrary to the majority's position, while stating that location was not dispositive, this court held it was a factor to be considered in determining the validity of the intrusion. See State v. Myrick, supra. Thus, it has direct bearing on whether an unreasonable intrusion into Boland's private affairs has occurred. See majority opinion, at 580. In this regard, Greenwood's conclusion that the trash was placed in an area accessible to the general public is of major relevance. Greenwood, at 40-41. Trash cans placed immediately adjacent to a home, in a place to which the general public is not invited, are within a constitutionally protected area as to which the homeowner may reasonably expect privacy from governmental intrusion. See People v. Krivda, at 368 (Wright, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374, 87 S. Ct. 408 (1966)). That privacy, however, is inextricably bound up in the physical location of the trash cans. Krivda, at 368. It is inconceivable that article 1, section 7 of our constitution compels extending protection to garbage where it is placed adjacent to or on a public thoroughfare. See Krivda, at 368-69.
The majority also declines to apply Greenwood because it allegedly conflicts with this court's interpretations of Const. art. 1, § 7. Majority opinion, at 580. Specifically, the majority points to the fact that unlike our holding in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986), the Supreme Court has allowed the warrantless use of pen registers. Majority opinion, at 580 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979)).
In Gunwall, we stated that a telephone was a necessary component of modern life, indispensable to effective communication in today's complex society. Gunwall, at 67 (quoting People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141 (Colo. 1983)); majority opinion, at 581. Thus, we held that the concomitant disclosure to the telephone company for *592"internal" business purposes does not alter a caller's expectation of privacy and transpose it into an assumed risk of disclosure to the government. Gunwall, at 67; majority opinion, at 581. The majority analogizes this rationale to garbage collection. Majority opinion, at 581.
While garbage collection may be considered necessary to the proper functioning of society, unlike Gunwall, the placement of trash in a publicly accessible area cannot legitimately be characterized as placement for an internal business or personal purpose. Moreover, one who discards his trash and places it at curbside to be picked up assumes the risk that the garbage collector may be an agent of the police or may permit the police to examine the unconglomerated trash once it is picked up. Krivda, at 369.
I find the rationale in Greenwood a logical application of constitutional principles to garbage placed in a public area and would apply it to Boland's case.
Distinction Without a Difference
Assuming the majority's result is justified, the new constitutional parameter it draws provides no additional protection against the warrantless search of garbage than what was previously accorded under the Fourth Amendment. The majority concludes that garbage in the can retains a privacy interest requiring a search warrant. Majority opinion, at 578. The majority, however, does not require that once the trash is out of the can it be commingled before a warrantless search can occur. One could therefore reasonably conclude that once the garbage is in the collection bin of the truck, it loses its privacy interest or, at the very least, the privacy interest is diminished. Thus, the garbage could be searched without a warrant. Consequently, garbage collectors could be instructed to empty the truck's bin before picking up an individual's trash and then turn the contents over to the police.
This new boundary creates a distinction without a difference. Police merely have to wait until the trash is carried a *593few feet further than the curb and is emptied into the collection bin of the garbage truck before engaging in a warrantless search. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988). This fruitless extension of the warrantless search boundary does nothing more than complicate an already complex area of law.
Conclusion
In interpreting the constitution, our primary objective has been to strike an acceptable balance between governmental and societal interests advanced to justify intrusions against constitutionally protected interests of the individual citizen in the privacy of his effects. State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 157, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). While we should not condone blatant misconduct by the government, we should not also restrict its ability to function, particularly where the police acted in good faith. The record discloses that the police in this case sought legal advice prior to the warrant-less search. They acted in what they perceived to be a constitutionally permissible manner based upon that advice. Yet, the majority chooses to extend constitutional protection in this case beyond that previously required and, in effect, penalizes the police for their good faith, legitimate actions. Moreover, the practical effect of the majority's holding makes the obtaining of a warrant for trash extremely difficult, if not impossible. Because garbage is typically disposed of within the confines of one's home, there may never be a witness to discarded evidence. Without some indication that an individual's garbage potentially contains specific evidence, there would never be any basis for a warrant. I cannot accept this as an acceptable balancing of the prospective interests involved. Thus, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
Dore, Andersen, and Durham, JJ., concur with Guy, J.