Court Opinion

ID: 9682276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:08:51.030849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.596881
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, but write to insure that the door is left open for further discussion in the area of waiver of trial by jury in a proceeding before the trial court. As the majority correctly quotes from Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), fn. 11: “... [the] law governing trials before the court, sitting without a jury, upon a plea of guilty, has evolved on the basis of different policy considerations ...” The policy consideration that will have to be accomodated in the situation treated in the majority opinion is that reflected by Art. 26.13(a)(2), V.A.C.C.P.
Although we call a negotiated plea of guilty, pursuant to Art. 26.13, supra, made before the court sitting without a jury, a “trial”, there is a realistic difference between this and a “trial” to that judge which involves contested issues. In the latter situation it is unthinkable that the defendant, having waived his right to trial by jury under Art. 1.14, V.A.C.C.P., can reinvoke that right during the proceedings if things are not evolving to his liking. A guilty plea based upon a negotiated plea bargain, however, is governed by a different public policy. Specifically, it encourages the easy and speedy disposition of criminal matters that can be agreeably disposed of, leaving the court free to handle other matters.
Therefore, Art. 26.13(a)(2) specifically contemplates that the defendant may withdraw his plea if the court rejects the plea bargain agreement (and assumedly believes a harsher punishment is warranted). To leave the impression that an Art. 26.13(a)(2) withdrawal of a guilty plea does not ipso facto withdraw the waiver of jury trial would thwart the clear intent of the legislature. If such a waiver is not allowed to be withdrawn as a matter of right then the defendant, who by waiving the jury has given up his statutory right to have them assess punishment, would be at the mercy of the trial judge; the same judge who just informed him, by rejecting the plea bargain agreement, that his punishment will be harsher than that agreed to by the parties. Such a possibility would effectively retard the use of bargained pleas. This is the antithesis of Art. 26.13.
Where a defendant as a matter of right withdraws his plea of guilty or nolo conten-dere in a proceeding under Art. 26.13, he should also, as a matter of right, be able to withdraw his waiver of jury trial.
With this dicta, I join the majority.