Court Opinion

ID: 9760885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:21:21.742808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:18.260761
License: Public Domain

DOGGETT, Justice,
concurring.
I dreamed [that] I was walking down a suburban street seeing other people’s children and I stopped to see one in a carriage and I thought it was a sweet child, but I was looking for my child in his face. And I realized, in the dream, that I would do that forever. And I went on walking heavy and sad and woke heavy and sad.1
Bonnie Weirich has suffered perhaps the greatest injury a mother can experience: the loss of her children. Her ex-husband abducted her two young children not twice but three times — first at gunpoint, then by subterfuge, and finally in violation of a temporary restraining order — each time with the apparent assistance of Opal Wei-rich. The final abduction lasted for over seven years, but in fact, Bonnie may have lost her children forever — by the time they were located they had grown distant from her, and no longer knew the stranger who was their mother.
*947The majority today correctly concludes that the court of appeals erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court under the Family Code. So as not to disregard this woman’s suffering, however, I would have also addressed Bonnie’s common law causes of action. For Bonnie, there appears to be little hope; her children are gone, this ten year-old case is remanded to the court of appeals solely for consideration of whether sufficient evidence exists of a statutory violation, and the likelihood of returning to this court is apparent. So that the court of appeals will not be misguided in its review by the majority’s silence, I write separately.
I.
The applicable sections of chapter thirty-six of the Family Code allow for recovery from a person who either “retains possession of a child or who conceals the whereabouts of a child in violation of a court order,” or who “aids or assists” in such conduct. Tex.Fam.Code § 36.02(a), (c). Opal was served on March 3, 1982 with the charges against her for interference with child custody and infliction of emotional distress. She was made aware of her son’s indictment for child abduction on March 5, and more significantly, she was present at the March 11 hearing, at which a contempt order against her son was announced and a writ of attachment issued for the children. In issuing these orders, the court stated:
[I]f there is anybody in this courtroom who loves this man [Opal’s son] and has feelings for him, like his sister and his mother and I assume his brother, I would strongly suggest that you advise him that court orders are signed by district judges to be adhered to.2
Examples of Opal’s aiding and assisting are set out by the majority, but there is additional suggestive evidence. During the second abduction, in the first weeks of February, 1982 Opal’s son and children apparently stayed in a trailer home on her property. Prior to the third kidnapping, Opal loaned her son money, enabling him to flee the country with the children. She provided her truck to remove household belongings which were then stored in her barn. On February 25, he used her car to get the children from school, after which she drove all of them to the airport for a flight to Mazatlan, Mexico. That same day, Opal told Bonnie that the children had gone camping, and at the March 11 hearing she professed unawareness by testifying that she would “notify th[e] court” if she learned of the children’s whereabouts. As noted by the majority, however, only two days after the abduction, Opal’s son had called her from Mazatlan, confirming the children’s location. Despite all of this, she continued not to advise the court of her son’s visits and communications. Any reasonable reading of this record, particularly when viewed in the light most favorable to the findings of fact, inescapably supports the jury’s finding that Opal assisted her son in concealing the whereabouts of Bonnie’s children, despite actual or constructive knowledge of a court order.
II.
By resolving this cause entirely on statutory grounds, the majority “expresses] no opinion on the correctness of the court of appeals’ writing on negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent interference with a family relationship.” At 946. This reluctance to reach Bonnie’s common law causes of actions should in no way be *948read as commenting on the ability of victims of interference with child custody to bring both statutory and common law causes of action. Since the statute explicitly provides that it “does not affect any other civil or criminal remedy available to any person ... for interference with child custody,” Tex.Fam.Code § 36.06, the court of appeals appropriately noted this enactment was not in “derogation of other available common law remedies.” 796 S.W.2d 513, 515 n. 3. See also Smith v. Smith, 720 S.W.2d 586, 600 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Ellen K. Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, 38 Sw.L.J. 173, 174 (1984) (“[continued expansion of the common law is permissible since the statute specifically does not preempt the possibility of other remedies”).
Because other causes of action may be brought in conjunction with the statutory action for interference with child custody, Bonnie properly pursued her common law claims. If on remand the court of appeals should somehow find factually insufficient evidence of a statutory violation, Bonnie is still free to appeal again to this court her negligence claims. Such delay, however, is unwarranted. As this court previously declared, “[directing a mother who has been deprived of her child for ... years ‘to go and start over’ is unconscionable, and compounds the error of the lower courts.” Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 168 n. 9 (Tex.1990) (citations omitted).
Regarding the cause of action for negligent interference with the family relationship, the court of appeals perceptively concluded that Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1983), did not create such a cause of action, but rather dealt with a damages issue. This court has neither expressly acknowledged nor rejected an independent action for negligent interference with family relationship. We have recognized, however, that negligence can cause recoverable damages in a setting involving the family relationship. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex.1978) (“either spouse has a cause of action for loss of consortium that might arise as a result of an injury caused to the other spouse by a third party tortfeasor’s negligence”); Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 252 (a “claim for damages for the loss of companionship of a child is closely analogous to the loss of consortium cause of action created in Whittlesey ”); Salinas v. Fort Worth Cab & Baggage Co., 725 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex.1987) (some evidence that negligent hiring caused impairment of the family relationship where a passenger was raped in front of her children by a taxi driver).
To the extent that the fifteen year old provision of the Restatement of Torts on which the court of appeals relies can be read as recognizing only an action for intentional interference with the family relationship, 796 S.W.2d at 515-16 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700 (1977)), this does not comport with Texas’ allowance of mental distress damages in negligence actions.3 Furthermore, there seems to be some conflict in the Restatement itself, for while the wording of the relevant section uses language of intent, its commentary seems to be consistent with the general rule in Texas that serious injuries resulting from any conduct interfering with the family relationship should be compensated: “[t]he deprivation to the parent of the society of the child is itself an injury that the law redresses.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700, comment d (1977).4
Similarly, the court of appeals concluded that there is no Texas authority recognizing “an independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the context of a child abduction case.” 796 S.W.2d at 516. In fact, even the Fifth Circuit has recognized that mental suffer*949ing damages are recoverable under Texas law in child abduction cases. See Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir.1980).
The court of appeals is hasty in its conclusion that this court has never explicitly created a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.1987), we repeatedly referenced the “tort of negligent infliction of mental anguish,” id. at 651-52, 654, though admitting that the “[development and administration of [this] tort have been inconsistent and confusing.” Id. at 651. We therefore looked to guidance from other jurisdictions, and in large part followed the lead of California, whose experience on this particular subject remains informative.
In 1968, the California Supreme Court recognized that a bystander who observed an injury to a closely related third person could state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress despite the absence of any physical manifestation of injury. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968). Twelve years later, Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 (1980), allowed such a recovery in a non-bystander case. In 1989, in another bystander case, the court focused on establishing a duty of care as a necessary element of recovery in a negligence action. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 869-70, 771 P.2d 814, 818-19 (1989). The court criticized, but did not overrule Molien for implying that negligent infliction of emotional distress was a separate cause of action. Id. 257 Cal.Rptr. at 874, 771 P.2d at 823. Additionally, it suggested that, excepting bystander cases, emotional distress damages may be recoverable in a negligence action only where the party seeking recovery is the “direct victim” of that negligence. Id. 257 Cal.Rptr. at 866, 771 P.2d at 815. That same year, the court decided that negligent infliction of emotional distress is encompassed by the general tort of negligence, with the traditional elements of duty and causation, rather than existing as an independent cause of action. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 48 Cal.3d 583, 257 Cal.Rptr. 98, 102, 770 P.2d 278 (1989). Thus, since Molien ⅛ inception, California has apparently moved toward concluding that there is no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but rather that emotional distress is an element of damages in a traditional negligence action. See generally B.E. Wit-kin, 6 Summary of California Law §§ 838-57 at 194-220 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991).5 Like any other negligence action, damages need not necessarily be accompanied by a physical injury, although the California courts limit the recovery of solely emotional damages to cases where the nonphysical injury is severe. See Marlene F., 257 Cal.Rptr. at 102, 770 P.2d at 281-82. Our court has agreed that a physical manifestation requirement is an “arbitrary restriction[] on recovery.” St. Elizabeth Hospital, 730 S.W.2d at 654.6
*950Ordinarily, this court, like California, recognizes mental harm as an element of damages, and not of a cause of action.7 Our writing in St. Elizabeth Hospital appears to have confused the two, just as the California court did in Molien.
If Texas does recognize a separate tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, a question not answered today, then the court of appeals erred. If there is no separate tort, and rather, like California, emotional distress is solely a question of damages, then Bonnie need only have plead and shown negligence to justify her recovery for the severe mental suffering she has experienced. Her pleadings are sufficient to support such a cause, since they allege “negligence” in the interference with the family and “negligence” in inflicting emotional harm. Certainly all of the traditional negligence elements are present8: Opal owed Bonnie the duty not to assist in the children’s kidnapping, a legal duty on which chapter thirty-six of the Family Code is based, as well as a duty arising from her testimony to the court that she would notify the court of the children’s location.9 Bonnie pled and proved to the satisfaction of the jury that this duty was breached, with resulting emotional trauma foreseeable to any reasonable person.10 I am aware of no reason why the jury finding that Opal was “negligent” should not result in liability for the severe harm proximately caused.11
III.
In light of the foregoing, I concur with the majority that there was some evidence of a statutory violation in this instance. Because there was also an insufficiency point raised, the cause must be remanded for further consideration by the court of appeals.12 The wheels of justice have turned slowly for Bonnie, whose children were stolen from her ten years ago. By failing to address the issues above, today’s opinions have only ensured a continued slow grind through the system.

. Diary entry of Anne Morrow Lindbergh, who lost her child in one of the most famous kidnappings in American history. Anne Morrow Lindbergh, Hour of Gold, Hour of Lead: Diaries and Letters of Anne Morrow Lindbergh 1929-1932 252 (1973).

. When Opal became a party to the suit, the notice requirement of chapter thirty-six, applicable only to third parties, became irrelevant. See Tex.Fam.Code § 36.07(d). For the period before she was named, the statute provides that "[njotice need not be given to persons aiding or assisting in conduct for which a cause of action is authorized under this section." Id. There is some confusion in the Code because section 36.07(d) does not exempt actions for actual concealment from the notice requirement, while section 36.02(d) purports to exempt all actions under that chapter where a third party "had reasonable cause to believe that the child was the subject of a court order and that his actions were likely to violate the order.” We need not attempt to resolve this apparent conflict today because Opal was actually made party to the suit, and as even Opal’s counsel conceded at oral argument, by 1983, Opal had actual notice of a court order.

. This difference between the rule in Texas and that of the Restatement has been recognized in Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir.1980).

. The recent trend towards recognizing causes of action for interference with the family relationship was referenced to the legislature in its deliberations regarding chapter thirty-six in the testimony of University of Texas School of Law Professor Jack Sampson. Debate on Tex. H.B. 544, 68th Leg., R.S. (March 23, 1983) (recording available from the Texas House of Representatives).

. North Carolina has also recently concluded that "an allegation of ordinary negligence will suffice" so long as the pleadings also "allege that severe emotional distress was the foreseeable and proximate result of such negligence." Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (1990).

. Numerous other states have abandoned the outdated physical impact or manifestation requirement. See, e.g., Johnson, 395 S.E.2d at 95; Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987); Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Hancock, 506 So.2d 305 (Ala.1987); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo.1986); James v. Lieb, 221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985); Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 513 A.2d 66 (1986); Johnson v. Supersave Markets, Inc., 211 Mont. 465, 686 P.2d 209 (1984); Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo.1983) (en banc); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983); Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me.1982); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash.2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D.1972); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Battalia v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961). Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized that “the majority of jurisdictions now appear to have abandoned” the rule that “a plaintiff could not recover for mental injuries unconnected with actual or threatened impact.” Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 569-70 n. 20, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1418 n. 20, 94 L.Ed.2d 563 (1987).

. See, e.g., Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d 249 (damages for loss of companionship of a child in a wrongful death suit); Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.1984) (mental anguish damages recoverable in DTPA action); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Tex.1973) (mental anguish is recoverable as an element of damages for invasion of privacy). See also Federal Land Bank Assn’ of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex.1991) (considering mental anguish arising from a negligent misrepresentation claim purely as a matter of damages, and concluding that pecuniary loss is required "in what is essentially a commercial tort").

. Bonnie’s briefs to this court specifically maintain the presence of all such elements.

. Duty also arose from Opal’s voluntarily entering into an "affirmative course of action affecting the interests of another.” Otis Eng’g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1983).

. As expressed by counsel for Bonnie at oral argument, "one would certainly foresee that if you kidnap a woman’s children, both the mother and the child will suffer mental anguish.”

. Although pleading "negligent infliction of emotional distress” rather than “negligence," the mother of a sexually abused child was held thereby to have stated a proper claim for negligence in Marlene F., 257 Cal.Rptr. at 102-03, 770 P.2d at 282.

. Hopefully the majority’s overly narrow view of this cause will in no way constrict the court of appeals from doing its job in "assistfing] this court in meeting its responsibilities.” Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 733 (Tex.1990) (Doggett, J., concurring).