Court Opinion

ID: 9898107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:31.05256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:54.488715
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                          No. 83489-4-I
                         Respondent,
                                                          DIVISION ONE
                 v.
                                                          UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 ABBAS SALAH ZGHAIR,

                         Appellant.

        CHUNG, J. — A jury convicted Abbas Zghair of felony murder in the

second degree while committing assault in the second degree with a firearm

enhancement. On appeal, Zghair challenges the sufficiency of the State’s

evidence, its exercise of a peremptory challenge, and the trial court’s failure to

instruct the jury regarding the missing witness doctrine. We hold that the

evidence was insufficient to support Zghair’s conviction either as a principal or an

accomplice. We reverse and remand for dismissal of Zghair’s conviction with

prejudice. 1

                                            FACTS

        A passerby found the body of Silvano Ruiz Perez in a gravel field at the

site of an old drive-in theater in Auburn, Washington, the morning of Sunday,

March 24, 2019, and called the police. A medical examiner later determined that

        1 Because we reverse for insufficiency of evidence, we do not address Zghair’s additional

assignments of error.
No. 83489-4-I /2

Ruiz Perez had died from a gaping shotgun wound to his left forearm which was

estimated to have been fired from “probably within three feet” of him. A trail of

blood led from the body back to the street. Auburn police officers found a broken

necklace at the scene that would later be identified as belonging to Ruiz Perez.

The police did not recover a shotgun, shotgun shells, or anything associated with

a shotgun at the scene. 2

        Ruiz Perez had a mobile phone provided by his employer. Although that

phone was not recovered from the scene, according to phone location data

obtained from the phone’s service provider, Ruiz Perez went to an automated

teller machine (ATM) a little after 1:00 a.m. on Saturday, March 23. Video from

the ATM shows him getting out of the rear driver’s side door of a white Pontiac

sedan. At about 2:00 a.m., Ruiz Perez called his fiancée, taxi companies, and a

coworker for a ride home. The last call from the phone was made at 2:41 a.m.

        The phone location data for Ruiz Perez’s phone demonstrates that the

phone traveled around Kent, Washington, between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. Traffic

cameras show the white Pontiac sedan driving through the same areas at the

same time. At 3:27 a.m., Ruiz Perez’s phone was near a Chevron gas station.

Video from that gas station shows two men entering the gas station. One man,

subsequently identified as Zghair, is wearing yellow pants. The other man is

wearing a red jacket or sweatshirt; his identity remains unknown. Ruiz Perez

       2 Nor did officers recover a shotgun or anything associated with a shotgun when they later

searched Zghair’s apartment.

                                               2
No. 83489-4-I /3

does not appear in the video. A minute later, at 3:28 a.m., the video shows the

white Pontiac leaving the gas station.

        By 4:00 a.m., phone location data placed Ruiz Perez’s phone near the

abandoned lot where his body was later found. Traffic camera video shows the

white Pontiac turning onto the street where the lot is located at 4:09 a.m., then

leaving at 4:14 a.m.

        Maryanne Denton testified that she heard two gunshots at about 3:30 a.m.

on Saturday, March 23, 2019. 3 She and her husband Mark were living in their car

and parked for the night next to the abandoned lot. After she heard the two shots,

they heard people arguing in a language they believed to be Spanish, then a car

leaving. The car’s headlights were shining at them, so the Dentons could not

identify the car or the people they had heard arguing.

        Later that morning, about 9:00 a.m., traffic cameras show that the white

Pontiac returned to the Chevron gas station. Records from Ruiz Perez’s phone

show it arrived at that area at the same time.

        Location data from Zghair’s phone matched the movements of Ruiz

Perez’s phone through the early morning hours of March 23 leading up to 4:00

a.m. and after. Google Geofence warrants for the Chevron station from 3:00 a.m.

to 4:00 a.m., the homicide scene between 3:45 a.m. and 4:45 a.m., and the

Chevron station again from 8:50 a.m. to 9:50 a.m. later that morning revealed no

         3 She states “March 22, around . . . 3:30 a.m.,” but it is clear from her further testimony that

she is referring to the very early morning of the next day, Saturday March 23, 2019.

                                                   3
No. 83489-4-I /4

phones other than Zghair and Ruiz Perez’s present in those areas during those

times. 4

        More than two weeks after the shooting, an officer on patrol located a

vehicle near the Polaris apartments in Covington, Washington, that matched the

description of a white Pontiac pictured in a bulletin that was issued to police

departments. Although “someone” had moved the front license plate and tried to

remove a distinctive sticker from the front windshield, the car matched the white

Pontiac from the videos based on its mirrors, its wheels, and damage to the car.

The car was registered to Zghair. The same day that police found the Pontiac,

Zghair pawned his mobile phone.

        A Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) team searched Zghair’s Pontiac.

The car “had a very strong smell of cologne or something.” The rear passenger

seat behind the driver was torn. The tear was toward the window side of the seat,

and blood was found in the cushion in the same area. The FBI team recovered

small amounts of blood from the cushion and the car’s door jamb, and DNA 5

tests matched that blood to Ruiz Perez. They recovered birdshot from the seat

cushion after it was x-rayed.

         4 At trial, Detective Arneson explained that a Google Geofence is “an imaginary fence . . .

around a location and by providing . . . this fence . . . to Google, they will provide for a date and a
time[ t]he user ID numbers for . . . every phone that contacts their network.” The area centered on
the Chevron station encompassed a 100-meter radius. The area centered on the homicide scene
encompassed a 200-meter radius. The evidence at trial suggests Maryanne Denton’s phone was
in the vicinity, as she was “watching a movie on [her] phone” at the scene when she heard two
shots at about 3:30 a.m. Saturday. Also, the man in the red jacket is pictured with Zghair at the
Chevron gas station at 3:27 a.m. Even so, neither Maryanne Denton’s phone nor any other phone
was identified in the response to the geofence warrants.
         5 Deoxyribonucleic acid.

                                                  4
No. 83489-4-I /5

       Police obtained a search warrant for Zghair’s address of record, as he was

a possible suspect. A crime response team searched this apartment three weeks

after the shooting on April 12, 2019. The next day, April 13, Zghair joined two

friends traveling to Canada. Canadian officials denied the group entry. Returning

to the U.S. border station at Sumas, Washington, Zghair presented a friend’s

Washington State driver’s license. Because the group had been denied entry into

Canada, they were referred for further processing but not detained.

       While waiting for further processing, Zghair went to a nearby gas station.

Border control officers went looking for Zghair and soon located him. Zghair ran

from the officers but was quickly apprehended.

       Zghair was detained in Bellingham, Washington. Detectives from the

Auburn Police Department investigating the murder of Ruiz Perez had asked the

Department of Homeland Security to notify them if they encountered Zghair.

Accordingly, border control agents notified Detectives Arneson and Walker, who

interviewed Zghair at the Whatcom County Jail on April 13, 2019. In that

interview, Zghair acknowledged owning the Pontiac. He explained that his

license was not valid, so he did not drive the car anymore, but friends did. The

detectives noted that Zghair had shaved off all his facial hair.

       The detectives told Zghair his car had been used in a murder but gave him

no other details. At trial, the videotaped interview was played for the jury:

       DET WALKER:          Your car was used in the commission of a
                            murder. It was involved in a murder. Someone
                            drove someone somewhere and murdered
                            them and then left in the car.
       ZGHAIR:              What? How?

                                          5
No. 83489-4-I /6

             ....

      DET WALKER:         I think that-that you tried to earn money some
                          wrong way and that things went bad. That’s
                          what I think happened.
      ZGHAIR:             what...
      DET WALKER:         But I would like you to tell us what happened.

             ....

      ZGHAIR:             Nah I’m not like that. I’m not like that. I’m . . .
      DET ARNESON:        So you’re just [sic] and killed him for no reason.

             ....

      ZGHAIR:             Killed who? What are you guys talkin’ about? I
                          can’t use a gun. Um I don’t know how to use
                          guns. What are you guys talkin’ about?
      DET WALKER:         What do you mean you don’t know how to use
                          a gun?
      ZGHAIR:             I don’t know how to use a gun. Come on man.

The detectives then asked about the man in red:

      DET WALKER:         The guy in red.
      DET ARNESON:        Who was that?
      ZGHAIR:             Guy in the red?
      DET WALKER:         Yeah. Black dude. Bright red jacket.
      ZGHAIR:             I-I-I don’t know what you guys are talkin’ about
                          man. I-I...
      DET WALKER:         Bright red jacket. In your white...
      ZGHAIR:             uh so...
      DET WALKER:         in your white Pontiac.
      ZGHAIR:             I told you if you guys talkin’ about a Mexican
                          guy...
      DET WALKER:         No.
      ZGHAIR:             yes, I picked him up from gas station. I drop
                          him off. I’m telling you the truth.

Zghair admitted taking the person he described as the “Mexican guy,” to the

ATM, where the man withdrew $100. He said the man wanted to buy “coke.”

                                       6
No. 83489-4-I /7

       The State charged Zghair with felony murder in the second degree while

committing assault in the second degree with a firearm enhancement. The jury

was instructed on both liability as a principal and as an accomplice. It returned a

general verdict of guilty and affirmatively answered a special verdict asking if

Zghair was armed with a firearm at the time of the commission of the crime. The

court sentenced Zghair to a standard range term of 192 months plus the 60-

month mandatory firearm enhancement, for a total of 252 months. He timely

appeals.

                                    ANALYSIS

       Zghair challenges the State’s evidence as insufficient to convict him of

felony murder as either the principal who shot Ruiz Perez, resulting in his death,

or as an accomplice to that shooting. The sufficiency of the evidence is a

question of constitutional law that we review de novo. State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d

897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). The State bears the burden of proving all the

elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Rich, 184 Wn.2d at 903

(citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368

(1970); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3). “A ‘modicum’ of

evidence does not meet this standard.” Rich, 184 Wn.2d at 903 (quoting Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)).

       “A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all

inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d

192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). “In determining the sufficiency of the evidence,

circumstantial evidence is not to be considered any less reliable than direct

                                         7
No. 83489-4-I /8

evidence.” State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).

“ ‘[I]nferences based on circumstantial evidence must be reasonable and cannot

be based on speculation.’ ” Rich, 184 Wn.2d at 903 (quoting State v. Vasquez,

178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318 (2013)).

       Thus, “[t]o determine if sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we

consider ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Rich, 184 Wn.2d at 903 (quoting

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (emphasis from Jackson and Rich) (other citations

omitted). Even so, “[o]ur role as the reviewing court is not to reweigh the

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury.” State v. Notaro, 161

Wn. App. 654, 671, 255 P.3d 774 (2011) (citing State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216,

221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980)). Our inquiry “impinges upon a jury’s discretion only to

the extent necessary to protect the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt.”

Green, 94 Wn.2d at 221.

       Zghair was charged with and convicted of felony murder in the second

degree while committing assault in the second degree. As charged here, the

State had to prove that Zghair or an accomplice committed assault in the second

degree and that Zghair or an accomplice caused the death of Ruiz Perez in the

course of and in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight from such crime.

RCW 9A.32.050(1)(b). We consider separately the sufficiency of the State’s

evidence to convict Zghair as the principal and as an accomplice.

                                         8
No. 83489-4-I /9

I.      Liability as a principal

        To convict Zghair as a principal, the State had to prove that he committed

the predicate offense of assault in the second degree. A person commits assault

in the second degree when the person assaults another person with a deadly

weapon. RCW 9A.36.021(c). 6 Zghair argues that there was insufficient evidence

to prove he is the person who shot Ruiz Perez.

        The State concedes there is no direct evidence to show that Zghair was

the person who shot Ruiz Perez or that he had the requisite intent to do so. 7

Instead, the State argues the jury could reasonably infer that the shooting was

intentional based on circumstantial evidence. Specifically, the State points to the

early hour of the shooting, the secluded place where Ruiz Perez was shot, and

the fact that he was shot at close range, “likely while still in Zghair’s car,” as

supporting an inference that the shooter intentionally pointed the shotgun at him

and intentionally pulled the trigger. The State also suggests that the assault was

intentional, not accidental, as Ruiz Perez’s broken necklace and the Dentons’

testimony that they heard an argument provide circumstantial evidence that the

shooting occurred in the context of a fight or struggle. The State further contends

that a jury could infer the shooting was intentional, rather than accidental,

because Maryanne Denton heard two gunshots, not one, and Ruiz Perez’s

assailants did not pursue him into the abandoned lot.

        6 A firearm is a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.04.110(6). Zghair does not dispute the sufficiency

of the State’s evidence that Ruiz Perez was shot with a shotgun and died from a shotgun wound.
         7 A person acts intentionally when they act with the objective or purpose to accomplish the

result that constitutes a crime. RCW 9A.08.010.

                                                 9
No. 83489-4-I /10

        But to prove that Zghair was the principal in the shooting, not only did the

State have to prove that the shooting was intentional, 8 the State had to establish

that Zghair was the person who shot Ruiz Perez. And while the State argued in

closing that Zghair “very well could have been the human being that pointed that

shotgun,” it never presented evidence that supports a reasonable inference that

Zghair was the shooter. Although there is evidence that Zghair’s and Ruiz

Perez’s phones were in the car at the time of the shooting, as well as blood and

birdshot in the seat cushion to connect the car to the shooting, no evidence

permits an inference that connects Zghair to the act of shooting. Nor is there

evidence even to connect Zghair to a shotgun; no one saw him with a shotgun,

and there is no physical evidence because the weapon was never found.

        There was also no evidence that Zghair had a motive to shoot Ruiz Perez;

the two were “strangers” to one another who had never met before. While the

State argued at closing that Ruiz Perez “possibly” was killed for his phone, the

intent to commit robbery does not establish the intent for the charged crime,

assault with a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.36.021. Nor does the Dentons’ testimony

that they overheard an argument that they thought was in Spanish connect

Zghair to the shooting or establish that he had a motive to shoot Ruiz Perez.

Zghair’s first language is Arabic, and there was no evidence that he speaks or

understands Spanish. And the argument the Dentons said they overheard

happened after Maryanne heard two shots fired, not before.

        8 The jury was instructed that “[a] person acts with intent or intentionally when acting with

the objective or purpose to accomplish a result that constitutes a crime.” See RCW 9A.08.010.

                                                10
No. 83489-4-I /11

       “ ‘[I]nferences based on circumstantial evidence must be reasonable and

cannot be based on speculation.’ ” Rich, 184 Wn.2d at 903 (quoting State v.

Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318 (2013)). Here, determining that Zghair

performed the physical act of pulling the shotgun’s trigger required the jury to

speculate. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

while a juror might reasonably infer from the State’s evidence that somebody

shot Ruiz Perez intentionally, we cannot say that any rational trier of fact could

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Zghair was the person who pulled

the trigger of the shotgun that killed Ruiz Perez. Therefore, we hold that there

was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict Zghair of the felony murder

predicated on an assault as the principal actor.

II.    Liability as an accomplice

       Next, we consider the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to convict Zghair

under the alternative theory that he was an accomplice. To convict Zghair of

felony murder under this theory, the State was required to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Zghair was an accomplice in the predicate crime of assault

in the second degree by use of deadly weapon.

       RCW 9A.08.020(3) defines when a person may be liable as an

accomplice:

             A person is an accomplice of another person in the
       commission of a crime if:
             (a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the
       commission of the crime, he or she:
             (i) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other
       person to commit it; or

                                         11
No. 83489-4-I /12

            (ii) Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or
       committing it.

RCW 9A.08.020(3).

       To be an accomplice, an individual must have acted with knowledge that

they were promoting or facilitating the crime for which they were eventually

charged, not merely the knowledge that the principal intended to commit a crime.

State v. Cronin, 142 Wn.2d 568, 579, 14 P.3d 752 (2000). A defendant has

actual knowledge when “he or she has information which would lead a

reasonable person in the same situation to believe” that he was promoting or

facilitating the crime eventually charged. State v. Allen, 182 Wn.2d 364, 374, 341

P.3d 268 (2015) (quoting RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b)(ii)). “[T]he jury must find actual

knowledge but may make such a finding with circumstantial evidence.” Id.

(explaining the “critical” distinction between a jury permissibly finding actual

knowledge through circumstantial evidence and impermissibly finding a

defendant constructively “should have known”) (citing State v. Shipp, 93 Wn.2d

510, 514-16, 610 P.2d 1322 (1980)).

       “To prove that one present is an aider, it must be established that one is

“ ‘ready to assist’ ” in the commission of the crime. State v. Rotunno, 95 Wn.2d

931, 933, 631 P.2d 951 (1981) (quoting In re Welfare of Wilson, 91 Wn.2d 487,

491, 588 P.2d 1161 (1979)). “One does not aid and abet unless, in some way, he

associates himself with the undertaking, participates in it as in something he

desires to bring about, and seeks by his action to make it succeed.” State v. J-R

Distributors, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 584, 593, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418

                                         12
No. 83489-4-I /13

U.S. 949, 94 S. Ct. 3217, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1166 (1974). Further, to be liable as an

accomplice, the person must knowingly aid the criminal enterprise of another

before the fact. State v. Anderson, 63 Wn. App. 257, 261, 818 P.2d 40 (1991)

(citing RCW 9A.08.020) (distinguishing the crime of rendering criminal

assistance, in which a person knowingly aids another’s criminal enterprise after

the fact).

        Here, there was circumstantial evidence that Zghair was present at the

scene of the crime. Zghair’s phone location data establishes that his phone was

in the Pontiac, and Zghair was the owner of the phone and the registered owner

and driver of the car. Further, the birdshot and blood recovered from the Pontiac

connect the car to the shooting. This evidence together permits the inference that

Zghair was present at the shooting. 9

        Zghair argues that his “mere presence” at the scene of the crime cannot

establish his liability as an accomplice. We agree. “This court has repeatedly

stated that one’s presence at the commission of a crime, even coupled with a

knowledge that one’s presence would aid in the commission of the crime, will not

subject an accused to accomplice liability.” Rotunno, 95 Wn.2d at 933. See also

In re Welfare of Wilson, 91 Wn.2d at 491-92 (“Mere knowledge or physical

presence at the scene of a crime neither constitutes a crime nor will it support a

charge of aiding and abetting a crime.”). The State must prove more than

        9 When interviewed, Zghair initially claimed his driver’s license wasn’t valid and he did not

drive the Pontiac. Almost immediately thereafter, in the same interview, Zghair said, “Yeah I drive
it.”

                                                13
No. 83489-4-I /14

Zghair’s presence at the shooting; it must establish that Zghair had actual

knowledge, or information which would lead a reasonable person in his situation

to believe, that he was promoting or facilitating the shooting.

       The State argues that “[t]here was ample circumstantial evidence of

Zghair’s knowledge and facilitation of a second-degree assault in that he drove to

the secluded scene of the shooting, with a shotgun in his car, then immediately

fled the scene . . . .” At closing argument, the State argued:

               And at that moment that is [Zghair] turning a white Pontiac
       down that dark, you can see how dark it is, there’s no lights down D
       Street. It’s excluded, it’s quiet. And that is [Zghair] turning down
       what seems to be a somewhat abandoned road and inside his car
       it’s [Ruiz Perez], very likely the guy in the red shirt. And the gun that
       would be used to kill [Ruiz Perez].
               [Zghair] at that moment is an accomplice to the murder of
       [Ruiz Perez]. [Zghair] at that moment whether he shot [Ruiz Perez]
       or not, facilitated the commission of [Ruiz Perez]’s shooting by his
       acts. Driving [Ruiz Perez] to this location of his death.

       State v. Asaeli, 150 Wn. App. 543, 208 P.3d 1136 (2009), is instructive

regarding what is sufficient evidence of the requisite knowledge to establish

accomplice liability. There, following a gang shooting in a park, defendants

Vaeilua and Williams were both convicted of felony murder in the second degree

predicated on assault. Both challenged the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to

convict them as accomplices. Id. at 550, 568, 572.

       Division Two of this court reversed Vaielua’s conviction. Id. at 598.

       “[A]lthough there was evidence that Vaielua was present at the
       park, that he drove [co-defendant] Williams and others to the park,
       and that he was aware that some members of the group he was
       with were trying to locate [the victim] Fola, the evidence failed to
       show that Vaielua was present at the scene with more than mere
       knowledge of some potential interaction with Fola.”

                                          14
No. 83489-4-I /15

Id. at 568. Evidence showed that, at the scene of the crime, Vaielua spoke with

people there and asked where “Blacc” was, referring to the victim by his street

name. Id. at 569, 551. But there was no evidence about what was said during

any conversation Vaielua had or overheard, nor any evidence that any of these

conversations related to a plan to shoot or assault the victim. Id. at 569. Thus,

the court reasoned that “no evidence, direct or indirect, establish[ed] that Vaielua

was aware of any plan . . . to assault or shoot [the victim].” Id. at 568-69.

        In contrast, in the same case, the court held that there was sufficient

evidence to convict Williams as an accomplice. Williams approached the victim,

who was still in the driver’s seat, and challenged him to a fight. 10 Id. at 556-57.

The victim leaned over and reached for something under the seat, and then

reached for the glove box. Id. at 557. A witness testified that Williams stated the

victim had a gun and tapped the person behind him, Asaeli, upon which gunfire

erupted. Id. The court held that Williams acted in the course of and in the

furtherance of or in immediate flight from an assault:

        [T]aken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was
        sufficient to allow the jury to find that Asaeli was standing ready to
        assist Williams; that Williams knew Asaeli was armed because
        Asaeli positioned himself near Williams in way that allowed him
        access to [the victim] Fola; that Williams turned to Asaeli and
        signaled to him with a tap when the situation escalated; and that, in
        response to Williams’s tap, Asaeli immediately stepped in and shot
        Fola. The evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that
        the assault or attempted assault encompassed the entire incident,
        not just Williams’s initial verbal challenge to Fola, and that the

       10 A witness testified that Williams said to the victim, “[T]his be Twix ... let's go heads-up,”

which she interpreted as an invitation to fight. Asaeli, 150 Wn. App. at 557.

                                                 15
No. 83489-4-I /16

        shooting occurred during the course of the assault or attempted
        assault.[11]

Id. at 572.

        Regarding whether Williams knew the shooter, Asaeli, was armed and

was going to shoot the victim, or that the two of them were acting in concert, the

evidence showed that Williams and Asaeli spoke before going to the park where

the shooting occurred and arrived simultaneously at the park. Id. at 573. Several

people in the group with whom they arrived called out asking for the victim. Id.

Further, Williams approached the victim with the shooter and positioned himself

close by, and Williams signaled to the shooter once the situation escalated, upon

which the shooter, Asaeli, immediately stepped forward and shot the victim. Id.

The court reasoned that this evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s

conclusion that Williams knew Asaeli was armed and prepared to shoot the

victim despite the lack of direct evidence of such knowledge. 12 Id.

        Here, at most, the evidence supports an inference that Zghair drove with

the victim and another person, the unidentified man in the red jacket, to the

scene of the shooting. However, like Vaielua in Asaeli, merely driving to the

scene does not support an inference that Zghair was aware of a plan to assault

         11 Unlike in the present case, where the predicate crime was assault with a deadly weapon,

in Asaeli, the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict Williams of felony murder if he assaulted
or attempted to assault the victim. The court in that case held that the evidence was sufficient to
allow the jury to conclude that Williams and the others who approached the victim attempted to
assault him. Asaeli, 150 Wn. App. at 557.
         12 While the court held the State’s evidence was sufficient to support Williams's conviction,

it also held that the trial court erred by admitting gang association evidence and gang expert
testimony that unfairly prejudiced him. Id. at 549. Therefore, the court reversed Williams’s
conviction and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 598.

                                                 16
No. 83489-4-I /17

the victim. And, unlike Williams in Asaeli, where there was sufficient evidence

that Williams challenged the victim to a fight, culminating in the shooting, and did

so knowing Asaeli was armed and prepared to assist in that fight, here, while

Zghair was with the unknown person in the red jacket in the car, there is no

evidence that Zghair or the person in the red jacket was the shooter or that

Zghair was aware of any plan that any person was armed and prepared to shoot

Ruiz Perez.

       The State also asserts that Zghair was aware of a plan to shoot Ruiz

Perez because he drove to the scene “with a shotgun in his car.” But there was

no evidence that Zghair was aware there was a shotgun in the Pontiac, much

less of a plan to use it to shoot Ruiz Perez. While the evidence of birdshot and

blood in the car supports the inference that Ruiz Perez was shot with a shotgun

in or very close to the rear seat on the driver’s side of the car, the police did not

recover the shotgun used to commit the crime, and there is no evidence that

Zghair possessed one. There was no evidence of the dimensions of the shotgun

that killed Ruiz Perez or whether the shotgun that killed him was fired from within

the car or from outside it.

       As evidence that Zghair was “at least a knowing participant” in the

shooting, the State also points to Zghair’s actions after the shooting. Zghair

counters that evidence from after the fact of the shooting, including flight

evidence, is insufficient to establish his actual knowledge before and during the

crime charged.

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No. 83489-4-I /18

        Here, it is true there is evidence that, Zghair was aware of the shooting

after the fact. After he was stopped at the U.S./Canada border crossing with

another person’s license, Zghair was interviewed by two Auburn Police

Department detectives. They told him they were investigating a murder that took

place in his car, but they did not mention a shooting. Zghair nonetheless offered

that “I can’t use a gun. Um, I don’t know how to use guns.” In the same interview,

Zghair referenced the victim’s apparent nationality—“if you guys talkin’ about a

Mexican guy”—without the detectives having told him the victim’s race, ethnicity,

or nationality. Zghair’s statements at most could lead to the inference that he had

knowledge of the crime after it occurred. This is not sufficient to establish that

Zghair had knowledge of a plan to shoot Ruiz Perez before the crime occurred,

as is required to establish accomplice liability.

        Moreover, evidence that a person has knowingly aided a criminal

enterprise after the fact is insufficient to establish accomplice liability. 13 See

Anderson, 63 Wn. App. at 261 (contrasting crime of rendering criminal

assistance, which involves knowingly aiding a criminal enterprise after the fact).

The State characterizes Zghair’s after-the-fact conduct instead as flight evidence,

which “is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt.” State v. Slater, 197

Wn.2d 660, 669, 486 P.3d 873 (2021). 14 However, a court must not instruct the

        13 The State claims that because no one came to Ruiz Perez’s aid and because Zghair’s

car left the scene six minutes after arriving, with Ruiz Perez’s phone still in it, this evidence
establishes a “getaway” from an intentional shooting, a “classic example of aiding and facilitating a
crime.” But this after-the-fact evidence cannot establish that Zghair had the requisite knowledge of
a plan to commit a crime before the fact.
         14 Examples of flight evidence include fleeing the scene of the crime, travelling to a different

state, evading arrest for a significant period of time, cleaning the murder weapon, failing to contact

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No. 83489-4-I /19

jury that flight evidence is conclusive proof of guilt. Slater, 197 Wn.2d at 668

(citing Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 421, 16 S. Ct. 327, 40 L. Ed. 474

(1896) (“The statement that no one who was conscious of innocence would

resort to concealment was substantially an instruction that all men who did so

were necessarily guilty, thus ignoring the fundamental truth, evolved from the

experience of mankind, that the innocent do often conceal through fear or other

emotion.”)). Instead,

        the circumstance or inference of flight must be substantial and real.
        It may not be speculative, conjectural, or fanciful. In other words,
        the evidence or circumstances introduced and giving rise to the
        contention of flight must be substantial and sufficient to create
        a reasonable and substantive inference that the defendant’s
        departure from the scene of difficulty was an instinctive or impulsive
        reaction to a consciousness of guilt or was a deliberate effort to
        evade arrest and prosecution. Pyramiding vague inference upon
        vague inference will not supplant the absence of basic facts or
        circumstances from which the essential inference of an actual
        flight must be drawn.

Slater, 197 Wn.2d at 668 (quoting State v. Bruton, 66 Wn.2d 111, 112-13, 401

P.2d 340 (1965)). Thus, even if flight evidence is admissible to show an inference

of consciousness of guilt, “it tends to be only marginally probative as to the

ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.” Slater, 197 Wn.2d at 668 (quoting State v.

Freeburg, 105 Wn. App. 492, 498, 20 P.3d 984 (2001)).

        Here, the evidence shows that, after the shooting, Zghair’s car left the

scene of the crime with both Zghair’s phone and Ruiz Perez’s phone in it and that

police while claiming self-defense, and destroying clothing. Slater, 197 Wn.2d at 669-70 (collecting
cases). Other types of flight evidence include resisting arrest, concealment, assumption of a false
name, and related conduct if the conduct allows a reasonable inference of consciousness of guilt
of the charged crime. State v. Freeburg, 105 Wn. App. 492, 497-98, 20 P.3d 984 (2001).

                                                19
No. 83489-4-I /20

Ruiz Perez’s phone was never found. Zghair’s Pontiac was later doused with

cologne, and someone tried to remove a distinctive sticker from its windshield.

The same day police found his car, Zghair pawned his mobile phone. Thus, as

the State argues, there is evidence from which a juror could infer that Zghair was

the person driving the Pontiac who “fled the crime scene immediately” and then

took further actions to alter or remove evidence, thereby demonstrating

consciousness of guilt.

      Also, after the shooting, Zghair tried to enter Canada the day after police

searched his address of record, using false identification and having shaved off

his facial hair. He was stopped at the border for using another person’s license

and had gone to a nearby gas station while awaiting further processing, and

when he saw border agents approaching, he ran from them. These actions by

Zghair also could support an inference of consciousness of guilt.

      However, after-the-fact evidence of consciousness of guilt of an

unspecified crime cannot overcome a lack of evidence of the elements of the

charged crime. Even if flight evidence may provide an inference of

consciousness of guilt, “[p]yramiding vague inference upon vague inference will

not supplant the absence of basic facts or circumstances from which the

essential inference of an actual flight must be drawn.” Slater, 197 Wn.2d at 668

(quoting Bruton, 66 Wn.2d at 112-13). For example, leaving the scene of the

crime could potentially suggest consciousness of a crime other than the charged

crime, such as assisting in or engaging in the sale of drugs, or rendering criminal

assistance, but Zghair was not charged with those crimes. Specifically, flight

                                        20
No. 83489-4-I /21

evidence cannot substitute for evidence that Zghair acted with knowledge that he

was promoting or facilitating the shooting. Yet two questions from the jury

suggest that it engaged in speculation based on Zghair’s after-the-fact conduct

and improperly relied on this evidence to determine accomplice liability. 15

        First, the jury asked, “Regarding instruction #11, is an action of intent

limited to actions leading up to the commitment of a crime? Or can aid be implied

by actions occuring [sic] after a crime?” Instruction 11 states “A person acts with

intent or intentionally when acting with the objective or purpose to accomplish a

result that constitutes a crime.” Second, the jury asked about instruction 14,

which provided information about accomplice liability: 16 “Regarding instruction

        15 Courts review questions asked by juries when considering whether a jury properly

followed the law as instructed. State v. Davenport, 100 Wn.2d 763-64, 675 P.2d 1213 (1984)
(question from the jury was a “contrary showing” rebutting the presumption that a jury properly
follows a court’s instructions); State v. Whitaker, 6 Wn. App. 2d 1, 23, 429 P.3d 512 (2018) (jury
question made it “clear from the record” that the jury considered a prosecutor’s misstatement of the
law during closing argument).
        16 Instruction 14 stated as follows:

                  A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another
        person for which he or she is legally accountable. A person is legally accountable
        for the conduct of another person when he or she is an accomplice of such other
        person in the commission of the crime.
                  A person is an accomplice in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge
        that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he or she either:
                  (1) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests another person to commit
        the crime; or
                  (2) aids or agrees to aid another person in planning or committing the
        crime.
                  The word “aid” means all assistance whether given by words, acts,
        encouragement, support, or presence. A person who is present at the scene and
        ready to assist by his or her presence is aiding in the commission of the crime.
        However, more than mere presence and knowledge of the criminal activity of
        another must be shown to establish that a person present is an accomplice.
                  A person who is an accomplice in the commission of a crime is guilty of
        that crime whether present at the scene or not.

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No. 83489-4-I /22

#14, does the withholding of information to detectives constitute aiding another

person in planning or committing a crime?”

       Both questions inquire about the same type of evidence: Zghair’s after-

the-fact conduct. But as the jury was instructed, accomplice liability is limited to

actions that occur before or during the crime charged. 17 Anderson, 63 Wn. App.

at 261; RCW 9A.08.020. The jury’s questions point to the problem here: absent

sufficient evidence, the jury would have to speculate that after-the-fact evidence,

including flight evidence, could prove the crime charged.

       The State contends that “[t]hough Zghair did not directly confess to the

crime, any rational jury could have inferred that his evasiveness and dishonesty,

combined with his knowledge of the crime, was evidence of his guilt.” A

reasonable juror could infer that Zghair drove his Pontiac with Ruiz Perez in it to

the scene of the crime. There is, however, no evidence from which to infer that

he was the person who shot Ruiz Perez. With all the inferences taken in the

State’s favor, no rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a

shotgun was inside the Pontiac, that Zghair knew a shotgun was in his car when

he drove Ruiz Perez to the scene, or that Zghair knew of a plan to shoot Ruiz

Perez. Nor could a rational juror conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Zghair

had information that would lead a reasonable person in his situation to believe he

was assisting in the planning or commission of the crime charged.

       17    Neither party disputes the trial court’s jury instructions or its answer to the jury’s
questions.

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No. 83489-4-I /23

      We conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to support Zghair’s

conviction for second degree felony murder. We reverse and remand to the trial

court to vacate Zghair’s conviction and dismiss the charge against him with

prejudice.

 WE CONCUR:

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