Court Opinion

ID: 9826973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:01:21.968258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:15:51.321980
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14198    Document: 13-1     Date Filed: 08/31/2023   Page: 1 of 4

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14198
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       ABEL DIAZ,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN - USP I,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-00228-CEM-PRL
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-14198      Document: 13-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023     Page: 2 of 4

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14198

       Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Abel Diaz, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
       district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition
       for a writ of habeas corpus. He argues that the district court had
       jurisdiction under the saving clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) because
       his remedy under § 2255 was inadequate and ineffective.
               “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of ju-
       risdiction.” Howard v. Warden, 776 F.3d 772, 775 (11th Cir. 2015).
       If a district court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
       jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
       Likewise, we review de novo whether a prisoner may bring a peti-
       tion for a writ of habeas corpus under the saving clause of § 2255(e).
       McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus. Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076,
       1081 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). A district court only has jurisdic-
       tion over a federal prisoner’s habeas petition if it falls within the
       saving clause. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1080.
               A federal prisoner who seeks to collaterally attack the valid-
       ity of his sentence must file a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C.
       § 2255. Id. Challenges to the execution of a sentence, rather than
       to its validity, may be brought through a petition for writ of habeas
       corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. at 1089.
              The saving clause of § 2255 permits a federal prisoner to file
       a § 2241 habeas petition if the remedy provided under § 2255 is “in-
       adequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28
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       22-14198                   Opinion of the Court                            3

       U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Jones v. Hendrix, 143 S. Ct. 1857, 1863
       (2023). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that § 2255
       is inadequate or ineffective. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1081.
              To determine whether a § 2255 motion would be inade-
       quate or ineffective, the key consideration is whether the prisoner
       would have been permitted to bring that type of claim in a § 2255
       motion. Id. at 1086. If so, the § 2255 remedy is adequate and effec-
       tive, even if the specific claim would have been foreclosed by cir-
       cuit precedent or subject to a procedural bar. Id.
              The savings clause is typically invoked to cover “unusual cir-
       cumstances in which it is impossible or impracticable for a prisoner
       to seek relief from the sentencing court.” Jones, 143 S. Ct. at 1866.
       Three clear instances of such circumstances include: (1) when rais-
       ing claims challenging the execution of the sentence, such as the
       deprivation of good-time credits or parole determinations; (2)
       when the sentencing court is unavailable, such as when the sen-
       tencing court itself has been dissolved; or (3) when practical con-
       siderations, such as multiple sentencing courts, might prevent a pe-
       titioner from ﬁling a motion to vacate. Id. at 1866–67; McCarthan,
       851 F.3d at 1092–93.
               Here, Diaz argues that § 2255 was an inadequate and inef-
       fective remedy to test the legality of his detention because he raised
       an Apprendi 1 argument on direct appeal and, therefore, could not
       raise it again in a § 2255 motion. Diaz also argues McCarthan does

       1 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
USCA11 Case: 22-14198     Document: 13-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023    Page: 4 of 4

       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-14198

       not apply here because it did not address whether a § 2255 motion
       is inadequate or ineffective when an argument was raised on direct
       appeal.
               Diaz’s petition, however, does not fall into an “unusual cir-
       cumstance[] in which it is impossible or impracticable . . . to seek
       relief from the sentencing court.” Jones, 143 S. Ct. at 1866. He is
       challenging the validity of his sentence, not its execution; the sen-
       tencing court, the Southern District of Florida, is not unavailable;
       and he was not sentenced by multiple courts. Id. Accordingly, the
       district court did not err in dismissing Diaz’s petition because his
       claims challenged the validity of his sentence and could have been
       raised in a § 2255 motion to vacate. Although his arguments would
       have been procedurally barred because he already raised them on
       direct appeal, that does not make a § 2255 motion inadequate or
       ineffective within the meaning of the saving clause. Therefore, his
       petition did not fall within the saving clause and the district court
       properly dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.
             AFFIRMED.