Court Opinion

ID: 9809531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:16:58.07305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:11.782253
License: Public Domain

*173Hoke, J.,
concurring: I concur in the disposition made of this case for the reason that the placing of the child was in ,'the sound legal discretion of the Court; and that, on the facts presented, such discretion was properly exercised when the child was left in the control and custody of its aunt, Mrs. " Swinson.
■ If, as the principal opinion assumes, the appointment of ^.Egbert Hardy as guardian was only irregular, then such appointment is not open to collateral attack, and stands as the . judgment of the Court until same is reversed on appeal or set aside on motion; and this both as to Mrs. Swinson and all others. Williams v. Pender, 127 N. C., 481; Black on Judgments, sec. 261.
Hardy, then, being the guardian of the -person, duly appointed, and the parents of the child ¿being dead, has the 'prima facie right to the custody of -the ward; but this superior right of the guardian does not obtain necessarily nor as a matter of law.
• The .authorities are to the effect 'that in this country the disposition of thei child rests in the sound legal discretion of the Court, and that it will be exercised as the best interest of the child may require. Newsome v. Bunch, 142 N. C., 19; Tiffany on Persons and Domestic Relations, p. 308; Shouler on Domestic Relations, sec. 240.
The best interest of the child is being given more and more prominence in cases of this character; and, on especial facts, has been made the paramount and controlling feature in well-considered decisions. Bryan v. Lynn, 104 Ind., 227; In re Welsh, 74 N. Y., 299; Kelsey v. Greene, 69 Conn., 291.
.Again, I think it is well established that, while in habeas corpus proceedings concerning the custody of children the power of the Court is ordinarily restricted to freeing them from illegal restraint and allowing them to select their plac*174ing or go where they please, that this is only true where the child, in a given case, is of years of discretion and sufficient intelligence to determine the question for itself; and where it is otherwise, when the child is not of proper age or sufficient intelligence to determine for himself, the Court must decide for him and make orders for his being placed in proper custody. Musgrove v. Kornegay, 52 N. C., 73; In re Wollstonecraft, 4 Johnston Chan., p. 79; Mayne v. Baldwin, 5 N. J. Eq., 454; Church on Habeas Corpus, sec. 439, 15 Am. and Eng. Enc., p. 185, note 5.
In Musgrove v. Kornegay, supra, it is intimated that, so far as the matter is dependent on an arbitrary limit, the age of twelve years in this country, and in cases of this kind, will be considered the age of discretion; in England it seems to have been fourteen years, and there being two children— one above, and one below this age — the Court, in determining ifpon the judgment, said, “As to the one over twelve years of age, we find it settled that the proper order is to discharge the infant .and permit him to go where he pleases. And in respect to the other, who is under the age of twelve, we find, by the same authority, that the proper order is to restore him to the custody of his father.”
In Mayne v. Baldwin, supra, the child being five years and seven months of age, the Court said: “In this case, the child is of such tender years the father could properly apply for the writ of habeas corpus in his own right without the privity of the child; and it is a case in which, for want of discretion in the child, it is proper that instead of merely delivering the child from improper restraint, an order should be made delivering the child to its father. Citing 3 Hill, p. 399.
And, in the notes of the Encyclopedia above referred to, it is said: “The power of the Court in habeas corpus to deter*175mine tbe right of custody and to award it accordingly is well established by adjudged cases, both in the English and American courts.” Citing many cases.
In at least three of the authorities cited in the principal opinion the child had reached the age of twelve and over; ,and the child was set at liberty because it was held to have the necessary discretion to make such an order proper.
Section 1853, Revisal, was enacted to enable the Court to make proper regulations as to the care and custody of children as betweeiL husband and wife who are living in a state of separation without being divorced. It seems to be confined to such cases, and has, to my apprehension, no perceptible bearing on the case before us.
I concur in the decision for the reason that it affirmatively appears that the best interests of the child require that it remain, for the present at least, with its aunt, the respondent, and that the legal discretion vested in the Court in such cases has been properly exercised.
Walker, J"., concurs in the opinion of Hoke, J.