Court Opinion

ID: 9692161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:44:57.954649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:32.235603
License: Public Domain

GILDEA, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I agree with the majority that Hull’s conviction should be affirmed, but I write separately to address one issue on which I part company from the majority’s analysis. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in admitting Sergeant Strack’s testimony that Hull’s name came up during the course of law enforcement’s investigation of a theft at Wilczek’s business. Specifically, the majority holds that the admission of this evidence violated Hull’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. I disagree.
I would hold that the district court did not err in admitting the challenged testimony because Hull opened the door to the State’s redirect examination. On direct examination, the State did not elicit any information from Strack about Hull. The majority nonetheless finds that the State opened the door to the cross-examination about Hull’s lack of involvement in the theft. The majority questions the relevance of Strack’s testimony and speculates that' “[t]he only possible relevance [of Strack’s testimony] was the inference that Hull could have been the thief.” But the State did not make this suggestion during its direct examination or during closing argument.
Moreover, the defense did not lodge a relevance objection to Strack’s testimony. Rather, the defense used Strack to exonerate Hull of the theft by directly asking Strack if Wilczek had told the police that he thought he knew who had committed the crime and that “it was not Jeremy Hull.” It was only after this cross-examination that the State elicited the testimony about which Hull now complains. By offering evidence that Hull was not responsible for the theft, the defense opened the door to the State’s response.1
The majority concludes that even if the defense opened the door to the testimony at issue, the Crawford analysis “would not end.” I disagree. The majority notes that we have not resolved the question of whether the defense’s opening the door to inadmissible testimonial evidence waives the Confrontation Clause protection. But we have applied a similar principle outside the context of the Confrontation Clause. See State v. DeZeler, 230 Minn. 39, 45, 41 N.W.2d 313, 318 (1950) (“Where one party introduces inadmissible evidence, he cannot complain if the court permits his opponent in rebuttal to introduce similar inadmissible evidence.”). I would follow the same analysis in this case.
I do not disagree with the majority that there is authority outside Minnesota to the contrary. See United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 679 (6th Cir.2004) (“[T]he mere fact that Cromer may have opened the door to the testimonial, out-of-court statement that violated his confrontation *108right is not sufficient to erase that violation”). But, in my view, the better rule is that the defendant waives his confrontation right by opening the door to the testimonial evidence. This is the rule that many jurisdictions follow. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 732 (10th Cir.2010) (holding that defendant waived his confrontation right by opening the door to the government’s elicitation of the testimony at issue); Tinker v. State, 932 So.2d 168, 187-88 (Ala.Crim.App.2005); State v. Birth, 37 Kan.App.2d 753, 158 P.3d 345, 355 (2007); People v. Ko, 15 A.D.3d 173, 789 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45 (N.Y.App.Div.2005): State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 492-93 (Tenn.2004). This rule is also consistent with our analysis in DeZeler. See 230 Minn, at 45, 41 N.W.2d at 318.
Finally, as the Tenth Circuit recognized in rejecting the contrary rule from Cromer, “[i]f the Cromer rule were correct, a defendant would be free to mislead a jury by introducing only parts of an out-of-court statement, confident that the remainder of the statement could not be introduced because the Confrontation Clause would provide a shield.” Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 733 (internal quotation marks omitted). I would follow the analysis of the Tenth Circuit and hold that Hull waived his confrontation right, and that the district court therefore did not err in admitting the redirect testimony that Hull’s name came up during the investigation.

. The majority cites State v. Carlson, 264 N.W.2d 639 (Minn.1978), to support its conclusion that "[t]he State cannot raise [the inference that Hull committed theft] and now complain about Hull’s appropriate response— which was to elicit from the officer on cross-examination that Wilczek named a suspect who was not Hull.” Carlson does not support the majority’s conclusion. The question in Carlson was whether the defendant, who was convicted of selling marijuana, was entitled to a mistrial because of testimony provided by one of the State’s witnesses in response to a question defense counsel posed during cross-examination. Id. at 640. The defense argued that the witness’ response was non-responsive and prejudicial because, in the non-responsive answer, the witness suggested that the defendant had been involved in prior drug sales. We upheld the district court’s conclusion that the defendant was not entitled to a mistrial. Id. at 643.