Court Opinion

ID: 9546787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:35:17.09087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:51.129686
License: Public Domain

Durham, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — The majority holds, inter alia, that a trial court has jurisdiction to release evidence upon which a criminal case is based while an appellate court is reviewing an unrelated question of law, without first obtaining the permission of that appellate court. I must dissent from this position.
RAP 7.2 controls the extent of a trial court's jurisdiction in a case pending review in an appellate court. Under that rule, the trial court has authority to adjudicate postjudgment motions authorized by the criminal rules or statutes, but *[i]f the trial court determination will change a decision then being reviewed by the appellate court, the permission of the appellate court must be obtained prior to the entry of the trial court decision." RAP 7.2(e). The majority *782concludes that the Superior Court's decision to return the allegedly pornographic materials seized by the State did not change a decision under review in this court, and that consequently the trial court had authority to return the property.
A brief review of the procedural history of this case is warranted. J-R Distributors was charged with 93 counts of promoting, or attempting to promote, pornography in violation of RCW 9.68.140. On February 4, 1987, the Superior Court held that this statute was unconstitutionally vague and dismissed all 93 counts. We accepted review and reversed the trial court ruling on June 23, 1988. However, in the interim, J-R brought a motion in the Seattle District Court to return the allegedly pornographic materials that had been seized by the State. The motion was denied, and J-R appealed to the King County Superior Court. Without seeking prior permission from this court, the Superior Court determined that the seizure was illegal and entered an order returning this property. The State obtained a stay of the order and appealed to this court.
The majority focuses on the fact that although the seized material was relevant to 83 of the 93 counts, the other 10 counts were " unaffected" by the motion to return property. Because 10 counts were not dependent on the seized evidence,4 the majority concludes that the motion to return property did not change the decision being reviewed in this court. Therefore, under RAP 7.2(e) the trial court did not need appellate permission before returning the property. Majority, at 771. The majority also hypothesizes that "[i]f the State's entire case had been based- on evidence seized from J-R's store and warehouse", then the Superior Court's order would have changed the decision under review in this *783court because the order would have "effectively precluded the State from bringing its case." Majority, at 771.
With this analysis, the majority arbitrarily establishes a rule that when 11 percent of the counts in an information survive, the case as a whole is unaffected. The ramifications of such a holding are mind boggling. Where is the line to be drawn? When all but one count remains? This cannot be. A decision is changed if any single count of the case under review is changed, regardless of the number that remain unaffected.
I acknowledge that the language of RAP 7.2 is confusing by its use of the phrase "[i]f the trial court determination will change a decision then being reviewed by the appellate court". The decision that was originally being reviewed here was the constitutionality of RCW 9.68.140, an issue technically unrelated to the legality of the search of the warehouse. Nonetheless, to allow a trial court to effectively dismiss the majority of the State's case while this court is determining the correctness of another issue flies in the face of reason. Thus, I would hold that the release of the evidence which supported 83 of the counts charged would "change" the case and that approval of this court should have been obtained.
As to the other issues resolved in the majority opinion, I concur fully.
Dore and Andersen, JJ., concur with Durham, J.
Reconsideration denied April 7, 1989.

 Eighty-three counts in the information were based on evidence acquired in the October 9, 1986 seizure that the trial court ruled was illegal. The other 10 counts related to magazines that were allegedly sold or displayed between July 1 and October 8, 1986, the seizure of which apparently has not been challenged. Majority, at 771.