Court Opinion

ID: 9859655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:16:46.150993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:11:46.077215
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring: I concur in the majority’s opinion but write separately to clarify my view regarding the plaintiffs’ common law claim. In Novak v. Rathnam, 153 Ill. App. 3d 408, 411 (1987), this court expressed its belief “that Illinois would adopt Tarasoffs affirmative duty on therapists to warn foreseeable third parties” (referring to the landmark case of Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976)). I agree with the standard articulated in Tarasoff (which would warrant a reversal in the instant case); however, the Illinois Supreme Court has declined to adopt it: “We consider that the preferable view, and the one consistent with this court’s holdings and with legislation based on social and public policy, is that a plaintiff cannot maintain a medical malpractice action absent a direct physician-patient relationship between the doctor and plaintiff or a special relationship *** between the patient and the plaintiff.” Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 531 (1987). As the majority has observed, these requirements are not met under the instant facts. An example of the requisite “special relationship” is found in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348 (1977), where a duty was owed to an unborn child who allegedly suffered injuries from negligent treatment of the child’s mother. Unlike a child and its mother, the instant plaintiffs are not “intimately related” to the patient (David H.). See Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 528. Since we are bound by precedent from our supreme court, I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s judgment.