Court Opinion

ID: 9950740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 18:01:17.274907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:36.851145
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                      ____________
No. 24-3006                                                 September Term, 2023
                                                                      1:22-cr-00200-APM-1
                                                       Filed On: March 14, 2024
United States of America,

              Appellee

       v.

Peter K. Navarro,

              Appellant

       BEFORE:       Millett, Pillard, and Wilkins, Circuit Judges

                                         ORDER

       Upon consideration of the motion for release pending appeal, the opposition
thereto, and the reply, it is

       ORDERED that the motion for release pending appeal be denied. Appellant has
not shown that his appeal presents substantial questions of law or fact likely to result in
reversal, a new trial, a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment, or a
reduced sentence of imprisonment that is less than the amount of time already served
plus the expected duration of the appeal process. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B).

       First, appellant does not argue in his motion that this appeal presents a
substantial question of fact regarding the district court’s finding that executive privilege
was not invoked in this matter by former President Trump or the sitting President, and
he therefore has forfeited any such argument. See United States v. Wright, 923 F.3d
183, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

       Second, appellant’s argument that the assertion of executive privilege is either
presumptive or that the question is not one for the courts to decide does not present “a
close question or one that very well could be decided the other way” because the
argument presupposes that privilege has actually been invoked in this case in some
manner by the President. That did not happen here. See United States v. Perholtz,
836 F.2d 554, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Third, even had privilege been properly invoked in this matter, appellant has
forfeited any challenge to the district court’s alternative conclusion that dismissal of the
indictment still would not be required because executive privilege is a qualified privilege
                 United States Court of Appeals
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                      ____________
No. 24-3006                                                 September Term, 2023

that would be overcome by the imperative need for evidence. See Trump v. Thompson,
20 F.4th 10, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

       Fourth, appellant’s argument regarding Licavoli v. United States, 294 F.2d 207
(D.C. Cir. 1961), overreads United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), which
addressed the materiality element of a perjury offense—something not at issue here. It
also ignores the district court’s finding that any executive privilege would have been
overcome in this case, and so would not present an issue for the jury to consider.

         Fifth, even if executive privilege were available to appellant, it would not excuse
his complete noncompliance with the subpoena. Appellant makes no claim of absolute
testimonial immunity, nor could he. A properly asserted claim of executive privilege
would not have relieved him of the obligation to produce unprivileged documents and
appear for his deposition to testify on unprivileged matters. In fact, appellant has
forfeited any challenge to the district court’s ruling that he was obligated to appear and
(i) to invoke any relevant privilege in person in response to specific questions, as well as
(ii) to answer questions seeking information outside of the asserted privilege’s scope.

       Finally, appellant’s argument that “the jury may conclude a defendant’s state of
mind gives rise to a constitutional contravention of the separation of powers doctrine,”
Mot. for Release at 26, does not give rise to a substantial question of law under
controlling circuit or Supreme Court precedent.

                                        Per Curiam

                                                          FOR THE COURT:
                                                          Mark J. Langer, Clerk

                                                  BY:     /s/
                                                          Selena R. Gancasz
                                                          Deputy Clerk

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