Court Opinion

ID: 9845659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:25:54.017073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:17.445661
License: Public Domain

Hunt, Presiding Justice,
concurring.
One cannot argue with the logic of the dissent. In the abstract, it is entirely correct: the title of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1987 gives no clue that it applies to malpractice other than medical malpractice.5
*825But the reality is that, time and again, over the last five years, we, and the Court of Appeals, have applied the Act to all aspects of professional negligence. See Gillis v. Goodgame, 262 Ga. 117 (414 SE2d 197) (1992) (all professions recognized under Georgia law in OCGA §§ 14-7-2 (2); 14-10-2 (2); 43-1-24); Cheeley v. Henderson, 261 Ga. 498 (405 SE2d 865) (1991) (lawyers); Kneip v. Southern Engineering Co., 260 Ga. 409 (395 SE2d 809) (1990) (engineers); Housing Auth. v. Greene, 259 Ga. 435 (383 SE2d 867) (1989) (architects); Precision Planning v. Wall, 193 Ga. App. 331 (387 SE2d 610) (1989) (engineers); Frazier v. Merritt, 190 Ga. App. 832 (380 SE2d 495) (1989) (lawyers); Padgett v. Crawford, 189 Ga. App. 568 (376 SE2d 724) (1988) (lawyers); Barr v. Johnson, 189 Ga. App. 136 (375 SE2d 51) (1988) (lawyers). Surely if the members of the General Assembly were surprised by these holdings or disagreed with them, they would have cured the problem by clarifying the scope of the Act. To now declare the Act unconstitutional, while an interesting academic exercise, serves no practical purpose.

 While the allegation of invalidity in this case is based on the Georgia Constitution, the “single subject” constitutional provision at issue pertains to a procedural irregularity which, while not in the least trivial or unimportant, is not of the magnitude of an ongoing equal *825protection or substantive due process violation.