Court Opinion

ID: 9877473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:05:23.081428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:19.379727
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 23-0334
                           Filed September 27, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JOSEPH RICARDO CRUZ CORDERO,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County, Bethany Currie,

Judge.

      A defendant appeals his sentence for sexual abuse in the third degree.

AFFIRMED.

      Katherine R.J. Scott of New Point Law Firm, PLC, Ames, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

        Joseph Cruz Cordero (Cruz) appeals his sentence for sexual abuse in the

third degree. The district court sentenced him to an indeterminate ten-year period

of incarceration to be served consecutively with a sentence from another

conviction. He alleges the court committed reversible error by failing to clearly

state the reasons for the sentence. Finding adequate reasons for the sentence

imposed, we affirm.

   I.      Background Facts and Prior Proceedings

        Cruz’s sentence for a 2021 conviction is before this court for a second time.

See State v. Cruz Cordero, No. 21-1926, 2022 WL 10802870, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

Oct. 19, 2022). Following his consent to a trial on the minutes of testimony, Cruz

was convicted of sexual abuse in the third degree. Cruz was sentenced on

December 7, 2021, to a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years, to be served

consecutively with a sentence in a prior conviction. Cruz was already serving a

twenty-five-year sentence for distribution of drugs to a minor, which he was

ordered to serve concurrently with a ten-year sentence on a sexual-abuse-in-the-

third-degree conviction that is distinct from the instant charge. Cruz appealed the

December 2021 sentence, contending that the court considered improper factors.

Id.. This court agreed, and the case was remanded for sentencing. Id.

        Cruz was resentenced on February 27, 2023. He requested either that the

court suspend his sentence and place him on probation or that the court run his

sentence concurrently with his sentence from his prior conviction. The court

imposed a sentence that mirrored the disposition from December 2021—an
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indeterminate ten-year period of incarceration to be served consecutively with the

sentence from a prior conviction. Cruz now appeals.

   II.       Standard of Review

          Sentencing decisions are reviewed for errors at law, but “[w]e will not

reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some

defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa

2002). An abuse of discretion is found when “we are able to discern that the

decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or

unreasonable.” Id.

   III.      Sentencing

          Cruz argues that the district court “failed to clearly and explicitly state its

reason for imposing a term of incarceration,” and “the court’s stated reason for

imposing a consecutive sentence was insufficient to allow appellate review of the

discretionary action.”      Finally, Cruz asserts that the district court abused its

discretion in failing to acknowledge the court’s discretion to order a consecutive or

concurrent sentence.

          We turn first to Cruz’s argument that the court failed to state sufficient

reasoning for imposing a term of incarceration. A sentencing court must state on

the record its reason for selecting a particular sentence.           Iowa R. Crim. P.

2.23(3)(d) (2023). The reasons stated by the court must be sufficient for appellate

review of the court’s discretionary action. State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Iowa

2016). However, those reasons need not be detailed. State v. Jacobs, 607

N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000). In fact, “a ‘terse and succinct’ statement may be

sufficient, ‘so long as the brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent review
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of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.’” State v. Thacker, 862

N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343

(Iowa 1989)).

      At Cruz’s resentencing, the court stated:

             In selecting this particular sentence for you I have considered
      your age, your education, your prior criminal history, particularly
      Hardin County FECR311825, but not only that, the nature of the
      offense committed and the harm to the victim, the need to protect the
      community, the State’s recommendation, your attorney’s
      recommendation, the recommendation of the presentence
      investigation report, your statement made here today as well as your
      written version of events that was contained in the presentence
      investigation report, . . . your character, propensities, needs and
      potential for rehabilitation, the need to deter you and others similarly
      situated from committing offenses of this nature.

      We determine this court’s stated reasons for the sentence are sufficient. In

State v. Mai, 572 N.W.2d 168, 170 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997), we stated: “[t]he nature

of the crime committed, age, past record, recommendations in the substance

abuse evaluation, your blood-alcohol test result and the recommendations and

facts included in the presentence investigation” was sufficient; it was “brief but

nonetheless adequate.” Mai, 572 N.W.2d at 170. This is distinguished from

statements that have been found insufficient, including: “‘[t]he Court has reviewed

the circumstances of the offense, and the defendant's prior background, [sic].’”

State v. Cooper, 403 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987).

      The court’s reasoning for the sentence resembles sentencing statements

that we have found sufficient.     See, e.g., Mai, 572 N.W.2d at 170.            At the

sentencing hearing, the court noted the many factors it considered. While Cruz

argues another statement specifically declining to suspend the sentence was

necessary, we reject this assertion. As we have stated: “[t]he court was not
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required to separately state reasons for rejecting concurrent sentences, or for

rejecting a suspended sentence and probation on the conviction . . . provided that

it stated reasons for ordering the sentences to be served consecutively.” State v.

Moore, No. 08-0147, 2008 WL 5412315, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2008). We

find no abuse of discretion concerning the imposition of a term of incarceration.

      Cruz also argues that the court did not sufficiently state its reasoning for

imposing consecutive sentences. Cruz argues the court’s statement is insufficient

largely because the court is unclear what reasoning it relied on in imposing a term

of incarceration versus what reasoning it relied on in imposing consecutive

sentences. We disagree.

      Just as a district court must state its reasoning for the sentence, it must also

state its reasoning for imposing consecutive sentences, and that statement must

also be sufficient for appellate review. Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 273–74. In ordering the

imposed sentences to run consecutively, the court stated:

      The reason for the consecutive sentences are these were different
      dates of offenses. In the 825 case the offense occurred on April 6,
      2019. The offense in this case occurred July 25, 2019. There’s a
      different victim. This is J.N. and in the 825 case the victim was T.N.
      They are factually separate offenses.

      The statement of reasoning supporting consecutive sentences is sufficient.

Even where the “statement of reasons for imposing consecutive sentences was

extremely terse[,] [s]uch brevity of statement, however, does not necessarily

handicap our review of the sentencing discretion.” State v. Carberry, 501 N.W.2d

473, 478 (Iowa 1993). Where “it is reasonably clear from what was said that the

judge imposed consecutive sentences based on his perception of the aggregate

culpability of two separate and distinct heinous offenses,” our supreme court has
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found the statement of reasoning sufficient. Id. Here, the court’s statement of

reasoning made it clear that it was imposing consecutive sentences because of

the different victims and separate date of offenses.

       Cruz makes a final argument—that “Hill required the district court at

sentencing . . . to acknowledge their discretion when choosing between concurrent

and consecutive sentences.” Cruz argues that the court failed to acknowledge its

discretion to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences.

       First, we do not read Hill to require such an explicit statement.1   But in any

event, the record reflects the court’s acknowledgment of its discretion.          The

transcript of the court’s remarks relevant to this issue read:

               The Court declines to suspend the prison term and in fact the
       sentence just imposed shall be served consecutively to the sentence
       in FECR311825. The reason for the consecutive sentences are
       these were different dates of offenses. . . . There’s a different
       victim. . . . They are factually separate offenses.

The court’s statement demonstrates the court’s exercise of its discretion to impose

concurrent or consecutive sentences.

       We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s imposition of a period of

incarceration or in the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Accordingly,

we affirm.

       AFFIRMED.

1. The Hill court stated, “We cannot tell from the record whether the district court

understood it had discretion under the statute to choose concurrent or consecutive
sentences.” 878 N.W.2d at 274. We have not encountered this difficulty in the
instant appeal.