Court Opinion

ID: 9946766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 15:15:26.945514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:39.275114
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 23, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0712-ME

REBECCA SWITZER-PEMBLE                                              APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE A. CHRISTINE WARD, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 23-D-501286-001

LAWRENCE PEMBLE                                                       APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: LAMBERT, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Rebecca Switzer-Pemble appeals the Jefferson Circuit

Court’s May 18, 2023 order dismissing her petition for a domestic violence

protection order (DVO). After careful review of the briefs, record, and law, we

affirm.

          BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

            The parties were previously married, and two weeks after their

divorce in May 2022, Rebecca discovered eleven video cameras hidden throughout
her residence each of which was numbered out of thirteen on orange tape.

Lawrence admitted to hiding the cameras to eavesdrop on Rebecca’s

conversations. The matter was then resolved privately via a January 2023

settlement agreement.

             In April 2023, Rebecca discovered two additional hidden video

cameras, one in her grandchildren’s playroom and one in her dressing room.

Because these cameras were not marked with orange tape, Rebecca argued

Lawrence had unlawfully entered her residence and was spying on her anew. The

underlying petition was filed, and a final hearing thereon was held May 18, 2023.

In addition to the above, Rebecca testified at the hearing that Lawrence had made

multiple unauthorized attempts to access her Ring external security cameras. She

explained that, after filing this action, she transferred access to the Ring cameras

from Lawrence to herself, and by the next day she was notified of four

unauthorized access attempts.

             The following exhibits were entered into evidence: pictures of the

two cameras recovered from Rebecca’s residence in April 2023, pictures showing

where the cameras had been hidden, two emails dated April 22, 2023, from Ring

reporting blocked attempts to set up her cameras, and two pictures taken from the

Ring showing Lawrence on an unknown date during the summer of 2022 walking

towards Rebecca’s garage at 4:50:48 A.M. and walking back to his car six seconds

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later. Rebecca stated that she was afraid of Lawrence and she believed that

without the DVO she would continue to be harassed or subjected to violence.

Lawrence neither testified nor called any witnesses.

             Concluding there was insufficient evidence that Lawrence had stalked

Rebecca, the court dismissed the petition. This appeal timely followed, and we

will introduce additional facts as they become relevant.

                               LEGAL ANALYSIS

             A court may issue a DVO if, following a hearing, it “finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and

may again occur[.]” Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.740(1). The

preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied if sufficient evidence

establishes that the petitioner was more likely than not to have been a victim of

domestic violence. Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 2007) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996)). Domestic

violence and abuse includes stalking, although that term is not defined by the

statute. KRS 403.720(2)(a).

             On appeal, Rebecca argues that the court erred as a matter of law

when it adopted the definition of stalking from KRS 456.010(8), located in the

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Civil Orders of Protection Chapter,1 instead of according the common and

approved usage of the term as required by the general rules of statutory

interpretation. Rebecca asserts this issue is preserved because we review the

interpretation of a statute de novo; however, this is not correct. As the Court

explained in Fischer v. Fischer, the de novo “standard of review does not mean

that the appellate court is free to then address any and all legal issues that might

affect the case. Rather, the court is bound to address only the question of law

presented before a trial court[.]” 348 S.W.3d 582, 590 (Ky. 2011), abrogated on

other grounds by Nami Res. Co., L.L.C. v. Asher Land and Mineral, Ltd., 554

S.W.3d 323 (Ky. 2018).

              In the proceedings below, Lawrence expressly argued that KRS

456.010 applied. Rebecca not only failed to challenge this assertion or insist, as

she does on appeal, that the common meaning of the term stalking should apply,

she conceded the matter when she asserted she satisfied the requirements of the

statutory definition. Likewise, Rebecca did not object when the court announced

its ruling applying the statutory definition. Accordingly, her claim that the court

1
  A practice approved by this Court due to the substantial similarities between the DVO and
interpersonal protection statutes. See, e.g., Flintroy v. Gallegos-Esparza, No. 2021-CA-0928-
ME, 2023 WL 324617 (Ky. App. Jan. 20, 2023); Kiser v. Kiser, No. 2018-CA-000812-ME, 2019
WL 169204 (Ky. App. Jan. 11, 2019).

                                            -4-
misapplied the law is not preserved and, as Rebecca has not sought review for

palpable error, we do not reach its merits.

                Next, Rebecca maintains that, regardless of how the court defined

stalking, the denial of her petition was an abuse of discretion. Summarizing the

applicable statutes, to be granted a DVO Rebecca was required to show that

Lawrence intentionally engaged in two or more acts directed at her that seriously

alarmed, annoyed, intimidated, or harassed her, that served no legitimate purpose,

and that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial mental distress.

KRS 456.010(8); KRS 508.130(1); KRS 508.150.2 Additionally, Lawrence must

2
  Relevantly, KRS 456.010(8) defines stalking as “conduct prohibited as stalking under . . . KRS
508.150[, stalking in the second degree], or a criminal attempt, conspiracy, facilitation, or
solicitation to commit the crime of stalking[.]”

Stalking in the second degree occurs when a person intentionally “[s]talks another person[] and
[m]akes an explicit or implicit threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of: 1.
Sexual contact as defined in KRS 510.010; 2. Physical injury; or 3. Death.” KRS 508.150.

Additionally,

                As used in KRS 508.130 to 508.150, unless the context requires
                otherwise:

                (1) (a) To “stalk” means to engage in an intentional course of
                conduct:

                       1. Directed at a specific person or persons;

                       2. Which seriously alarms, annoys, intimidates, or harasses
                       the person or persons; and

                       3. Which serves no legitimate purpose.

                                                 -5-
have made an implicit or explicit threat that was intended to place her in

reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death. KRS 508.150(1)(b).

              Rebecca contends that, whether Lawrence recently installed the two

cameras at issue, as she asserted below, or whether he merely failed to disclose to

her that they remained undiscovered from the 2022 incident, the only reasonable

inference is that Lawrence intended to continue monitoring her in her home.

Likewise, she insists that Lawrence’s prior access to the Ring account and the

timing of the unauthorized access attempts after she discovered the hidden cameras

was competent evidence of his intentional and repeated harassment. She reasons

that his spying coupled with her averred fear of physical injury constitutes stalking

and that the judgment must be reversed. Again, we disagree.

              An “[a]buse of discretion occurs when a court’s decision is

unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary, or capricious.” Castle v. Castle, 567 S.W.3d 908,

                 (b) The course of conduct shall be that which would cause a
                 reasonable person to suffer substantial mental distress.

              (2) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of
              two (2) or more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose. One (1)
              or more of these acts may include the use of any equipment,
              instrument, machine, or other device by which communication or
              information is transmitted, including computers, the Internet or
              other electronic network, cameras or other recording devices,
              telephones or other personal communications devices, scanners or
              other copying devices, and any device that enables the use of a
              transmitting device.

KRS 508.130(1), (2).

                                             -6-
915 (Ky. App. 2019) (quoting Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 114-15 (Ky.

App. 2010)). Here, the court was simply not convinced that Lawrence had hidden

additional cameras, knew any remained in the residence, or accessed either the

cameras or the Ring. Being mindful “that in reviewing the decision of a trial court

the test is not whether we would have decided it differently,” Guenther v.

Guenther, 379 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Ky. App. 2012), we cannot say that the

admittedly circumstantial evidence derived almost wholly from an interested party

was of sufficient caliber to render the court’s findings erroneous or its conclusions

arbitrary. See, e.g., Bullock v. Gay, 296 Ky. 489, 492, 177 S.W.2d 883, 885

(1944).

             Finally, Rebecca argues the court rendered contradictory conclusions

that are contrary to law. At issue is the court’s statement that “even if [Lawrence]

continued to access the remaining cameras in the home, this alone would not show

an intentional course of conduct . . . under the stalking statute.” As we have

already concluded the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition,

based in part on its finding that there was no evidence to support this allegation, we

need not address this alternative reasoning.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.

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           MCNEILL, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.

           TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND DOES NOT FILE SEPARATE
OPINION.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:          BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Allison Spencer Russell        Philip M. Longmeyer
Shanna R. Balinger             Louisville, Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky

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