Court Opinion

ID: 9825934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:36:02.927442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:33.906365
License: Public Domain

Lush, J.,
in concurring, said: “I think therefore, in the absence of any explanation whatever, of how it was the brick got so loose as to fall down on the passerby, the jury might reasonably have inferred that the company were negligent, and that if they had made' a proper inspection they might have found out the condition of the bridge.”
'We have thus briefly reviewed all of the cases relied on by plaintiff’s counsel in support of his contention that the mere happening of the accident in question'in the manner set out in the declaration shows prima facie negligence on the part of defendant, and we are clearly' of opinion that none of them furnish such support. We have also examined many other authorities bearing upon the same general question, with the same result. See McCray v. Ry. Co. 89 Texas, 168, and cases cited; Ins. Co. v. Vermont Ry. Co. 56 Albany Law Journal, 96; Cummings v. Furnace Co., 60 Wis. 603; Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574; Labatt on Master and Servant, § 834, and cases in notes. ' ' •
(1) We do not think it can be said that the falling of pieces of *553lumber from a car which is being unloaded is such an occurrence as does not happen in the ordinary course of things, •even where those who have the charge and control of the work are in the exercise of proper care. On the contrary, we think it may safely be said that it is matter of common knowledge that such things do frequently occur.
Having thus found that the doctrine of “res-ipsa loquitur” •does not apply to the case at bar, the only remaining inquiry is whether the declaration shows any act of negligence on the part of defendant.
We do not think it does. The specific charge of negligence contained in the declaration we have already referred to, viz., “ That at the time the defendant received, held, cared for and (2) unloaded said lumber, it was piled together in a high pile on said car, and was not tied, braced, fastened or confined thereon, as the defendant well knew,” &c. This charges no negligence against the defendant. For the manner in which the lumber was piled upon the car at the time when he received it, he was •clearly not responsible. He took the car as he found it, and, •of course, was obliged to take it in that condition or not at all. If it was not tied, braced, or fastened upon the car, it was not his fault, and nothing for which he can be made chargeable. His duty simply was to unload the car which came to him, and to use reasonable care in so doing. And the declaration does not specify any neglect of this duty, but simply states that the lumber fell upon the plaintiff by reason of “ said negligence of the defendant and his agents and servants, of the character .and details of which negligence, otherwise than as aforesaid, the plaintiff is ignorant, and so can not more fully set out the same.”
This is clearly insufficient. In order to state a case the plaintiff is called upon to set out wherein the defendant was negligent in unloading the car, and this he has failed to do. The. only specific negligence charged is that of the shipper or , consignor of the lumber. And with that we are of course not concerned.
In Smith v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 152, this court said that: “It is not enough to show that the defendant has been guilty of *554negligence without showing in what respect he was negligent; and how he became bound to use care to prevent injury to others. So, too, it is not enough to state a relation from which the duty may arise under certain circumstances, but, unless the duty necessarily results from the relation, the circumstances which give rise to it must likewise be stated.” See also Wilson v. Ry. Co., 18 R. I. 491; Martello v. Fusco, 21 R. I. 572; Laporte v. Cook, supra; Dalton v. R. I. Co., 25 R. I. 575.
Irving Champlin and Frank H. Beilin, for plaintiff.
John W. Hogan and Philip S. Knauer, for defendant.
Finally, even if the lumber had been properly tied and fastened upon the car when it was received, of course it goes without saying that it must have been untied and unfastened before it could be removed from the car/ And we therefore fail to see any force in the allegation that it was not properly tied and fastened when the defendant took charge of it.
The demurrer is sustained, and case remanded for further proceedings.