Court Opinion

ID: 9615802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:40:51.260456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:52.342843
License: Public Domain

Fox, Peesident,
dissenting:
The adroit, if somewhat labored defense of the defendant, contained in the majority opinion, has not convinced me that the judgment of the trial court, or that of the Circuit Court, should be reversed, and the verdict of the jury, on which it was based, set aside. Therefore, I. dissent.
No one will question the statement that in the trial of a criminal case the guilt of the defendant must be established beyond all reasonable doubt; or that a conviction *256based solely on mere suspicion of guilt, however strong, cannot stand. But, in my opinion, this is not such a case. The verdict returned by the jury in this case is not based on suspicion. It is based upon direct testimony of witnesses, and by strong. circumstances. It is true that the evidence is in conflict on certain points, requiring the jury to decide as to what evidence should be believed and what disbelieved. Where the evidence in the case, and the inferences which may be drawn therefrom, creates a situation where the minds of reasonable men may differ, as we think is the situation in this case, we are not permitted to. disturb a jury verdict.
In this case, there is the testimony of Eloise Jackson, which, if believed, is alone sufficient to justify the jury verdict. When she was not paid her winnings, she went to the defendant and made demand therefor. She also gave this testimony about a conversation she had with Tabet about the ticket she asked him to pay: “A. I asked him if he was going to pay it.” “Q. What did he say?” “A. He said he had half of it, $25.00, but he found out I had gone to see the policeman and he said somebody down at the police station there told him I had seen Captain Williams.” Tabet denied he had anything to do with the numbers game, but from his own testimony, it appears he-was fully acquainted with the situation which brought, the Jackson woman to him. He explained to her that a mistake had been made. The plain inference is that if‘ such mistake had not been made, the money claimed would have been paid to her. Her testimony clearly shows that Tabet knew of the mistake. This could scarcely have happened if he had not had some previous knowledge of it, or felt himself under some responsibility. Tabet denies most of the testimony of the Jackson woman, but. evidently the jury believed her testimony, and did not. believe that of Tabet, that he had no connection with the numbers game. This they had a right to do, and this Court has no right to substitute its judgment on this point fon that of the jury.
*257But this is not all that appears in the case which sustains the jury verdict. Richardson who sold the ticket to Eloise Jackson made his reports to 155 Summers Street, which was leased to and controlled by Tabet. Both 155 and 159 Summers Street were controlled by Tabet according to his own statement. One was occupied by the Diamond Poolroom and the other by a shoeshine shop. When the raid was made, evidence that the numbers game was being conducted in both of them was found, and evidence of various transactions by which money was paid to a man by the name of Davis, and large sums of money were at different times paid to Tabet, and by him paid to Davis, and perhaps others. Memorandums of sums paid to various people, many blank number slips, and instructions pertaining to the numbers game were found. In one instance, $6,000.00 was involved, and in another instance more than $2,000.00 was involved. In short, everything indicates that the numbers game was being operated at these two addresses.
It cannot be doubted from the testimony that the defendant Tabet was in control. He rented the properties from the owner, Boggs, and paid the rent. Tabet in his own testimony says: “I own both places,” referring to the shoeshine parlor and the Diamond Poolroom. The shoeshine parlor was leased by him to Lonzo Peace at $50.00 per week, and not $50.00 per month as the majority opinion states. As to the Diamond Poolroom he testified on cross examination: “A. I own the Diamond.” “Q. It is your business?” “A. That is right.” The majority opinion contains this statement: “Except for Tabet’s stockholdership in Diamond Billiards and his position as original lessee of No. 155 Summers Street; and the slips bearing the legend ‘Cash to Tabet’, and the diary found in the safe, which contained a list of cash turned over to defendant and to F. E. Davis, there is nothing in this record to indicate that defendant had any connection with No. 155 or No. 159 Summers Street, after his removal to the Monarch Pool Room.” This statement is directly contradicted by the testimony of Tabet. He stated that *258he owned the majority stock of the Diamond Poolroom and of the shoeshine parlor, but not all of the shares. He also testified that he owned the majority of the stock in Monarch Billiards. When asked if he did not instruct the people who were ■ operating these places what to do, and how to do it, he replied: “In the case of the Monarch, I ran it myself. As to the Strand, it was not open until September, a week before I came here. The. Diamond I ran from a distance and gave my instructions.” He was the principal owner and operator of the businesses at 155 and 159 Summers Street, and the jury had a right to believe that he knew what transpired at both places. Therefore, the statement which implies that there is no substantial evidence in the record indicating that the defendant had any connection with these establishments is in direct conflict with the record.
The indictment in this case is in six counts, and I need not go into detail as to what it contains. Suffice to say that it charges the defendant, in the language of the statute, with different offenses in connection with the numbers game, including the possession of numbers' tickets, and the control of the location where they were sold. The lower court correctly held that the defendant was not entitled to require the State to elect on which count it would rely for conviction, at the time a demand therefor was made. Therefore, if the evidence is sufficient to justify a general verdict based on evidence sufficient to sustain any one count of the indictment, the verdict and the judgment thereon must stand. This Court is not warranted, under the evidence in this case,' in substituting its judgment for that of the judgment of the jury in returning its verdict. We cannot say that the verdict is without evidence to support it, nor can we say the verdict is plainly wrong, or that the evidence is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond, a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, the verdict and the judgment thereon should be upheld by this Court. I would affirm the judgments of the Intermediate Court *259of Kanawha County and the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.
I am authorized to say that Judge Haymond concurs in this dissent.