Court Opinion

ID: 9530397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:59:32.661673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:05.975971
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Knauss
dissenting.
I dissent. Everyone must concede that the sketchy *156case attempted to be made by plaintiffs, presents an extremely weak set of facts upon which to predicate liability under our consistent holdings in guest cases.
This court has, on numerous occasions, construed the term “willful and wanton disregard” as used in our guest statute, C.R.S. ’53 13-9-1. The leading case is Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P. (2d) 1038, where the court, speaking through the late lamented Justice John R. Clark, stated:
“* * * One may be said to be guilty of ‘willful and wanton disregard’ when he is conscious of his misconduct, and although having no intent to injure anyone, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions is aware that his conduct in the natural sequence of events will probably result in an injury to his guest, and is unconcerned over the possibility of such result. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority does not expressly overrule this fundamental and well established definition but apparently prefers to ignore it. In Antonen v. Swanson, 74 S. D. 1, 48 N.W. (2d) 161 (1951), the trial court directed a verdict for defendant at the close of plaintiff’s case because there was no evidence of “willful and wanton” conduct. There the evidence disclosed that defendant driver had a malarial condition, and suffered from loss of sleep and felt groggy, tired and sick, but merely told plaintiff that he was tired, and there was no other indication that his driving was negligent. The host fell asleep and his .guest was injured. The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court directing a verdict for defendant on the issue of willful and wanton conduct. The following language of the court is particularly applicable here and noticeably similar to the language of the Pettingell case, supra: *157Sauer, 266 Mich. 230, 253 N.W. 278, 279, the Supreme Court of that state had occasion to determine whether a truck driver falling asleep while driving was liable under the statute. The court said: ‘Gross negligence requires willful or wanton misconduct. (Citation.) To constitute gross negligence in falling asleep while driving there must have been such prior warning of the likelihood of sleep that continuing to drive constitutes reckless disregard of consequences. There must be an appreciation of the danger of falling asleep or circumstances which would cause a reasonably prudent person to appreciate it and proceeding in defiance of results. It has been held that prior warning may be by way of having before gone to sleep or dozed off.’ The evidence showed that the driver in that case became drowsy, but there was no such prewarning as to indicate that his continuing to drive amounted to reckless disregard of consequences.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*156“A careful review of the record leads us to the conclusion that there is no evidence .that, the driver, of the truck was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. * * * We adopted our guest statute from Michigan. In Boos vs.
*157Again in Barrell v. Wessel, (La. App. 1953) 65 S. (2d) 818, the trial court, in a case involving an accident in Kansas, construed the Kansas guest statute, entered judgment for defendant at the conclusion of all evidence and the Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in the following language:
“The factual aspects which are urged in support of plaintiffs rights are that the defendant Wessel had been without sleep for a period of some twenty-two hours at the time of the accident; that his two passengers fell asleep immediately upon beginning the return trip from Salina; that defendant had consumed one or two bottles of beer during the course of the evening, and that the use of the car heater with little, if any, ventilation was conducive to a feeling of drowsiness. On the basis of these facts it is urged that Wessel should have known that he was in danger of falling asleep.
* * *
“Despite the persuasiveness of the argument we think *158it must yield to the apparently overwhelming weight of Kansas jurisprudence which leads to an opposite conclusion.
“In the course of the opinion the court cited a number of Kansas cases dealing with the construction of the phrase ‘gross and wanton negligence.’ An examination of these cases convinces us that the Kansas courts have construed the phrase to comprehend willful conduct coupled with a realization of an imminent danger to another resulting from such conduct, together with an indifference to such injury. (Citations.) (Emphasis supplied.)
“We can only consider that the use of the phraseology employed by the Kansas legislature indicated a clearly evidenced intent and purpose to restrict the recovery by guests to instances in which the host was guilty of active negligence in such superlative degree as would barely fall short of a willful and purposeful intent to injure.”
The court held as a matter of law, that the stated facts did not constitute gross and wanton negligence.
In Perkins v. Roberts, 272 Mich. 545, 262 N.W. 305, the accident occurred at 1 o’clock in the morning when defendant fell asleep at the wheel. The evidence disclosed that defendant had become drowsy and stopped the car for ,a smoke to wake up. He felt refreshened and continued to drive. It was held that this was not evidence that defendant continued to drive in reckless disregard of premonitory symptoms. To the same effect is Butine v. Stevens, 319 Mich. 176, 29 N.W. (2d) 325.
The majority opinion cites Carvalho v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 304, 25 N.E. (2d) 764, and Newell v. Riggins, 197 Va. 490, 90 S.E. (2d) 150 (1955) to support a reversal of the judgment for defendant. The Massachusetts and Virginia law is easily distinguished from our own as is *159shown in Antonen v. Swanson, supra, where the court stated:
“Plaintiff also cites Blood v. Adams, 269 Mass. 480, 169 N.E. 412, and Jones v. Pasco, 179 Va. 7, 18 S.E. (2d) 258, 138 A.L.R. 1385. In Massachusetts gross negligence constitutes great negligence or the absence of slight diligence and does not necessarily partake of the nature of deliberate or intentional wrong. Cook v. Cole, 273 Mass. 557, 174 N.E. 271. Virginia has adopted the Massachusetts rule as indicated by the Jones case. Under the guest statute in this state as we have indicated, willful and wanton misconduct is something more than negligence of any sort. The cases cited, while apparently supporting plaintiff’s contention, are not in point because of the difference in criterion of liability in guest cases. The trial court did not err in holding as a matter of law that Swanson was not guilty of willful and wanton misconduct.”
To paraphrase the South Dakota court, under the guest statute in Colorado, willful and wanton disregard is something more than a degree of negligence and the Virginia and Massachusetts decisions can have no effect under our decisions. As stated in Pettingell v. Moede, supra:
“Under the guest statute, the facts must show more than negligence. To willfully and wantonly disregard the rights of others requires a consciousness of heedless and reckless conduct by which the safety of others is endangered. For the purpose of properly construing this statute, ordinary or simple negligence should be considered as resulting from a passive mind, while willful and wanton disregard expresses the thought that the action of which complaint is made was the result of an active and purposeful intent. Willful means voluntary; by choice; intentional; purposeful. Wantonness signifies an even higher degree of culpability in that it is wholly disregardful of the rights, feelings and safety of others. * * *”
*160There is no evidence in the instant case of willful and wanton conduct as that phrase has been frequently construed in this jurisdiction. Ladd testified that he didn’t think he was drowsy enough to fall asleep. Yet the majority states that “Ladd took the needless chance of falling asleep while driving; he and all drivers are chargeable with knowledge that driving while asleep would probably lead to an accident.” There is not one scintilla of evidence in the record disclosing that Ladd was conscious of falling asleep, nor is there evidence showing that he was “unconcerned over the possibility” that such conduct would result “in an injury to his guest.” The evidence discloses no more than simple negligence “resulting from a passive mind.” What evidence shows the accident to be “the result of an active and purposeful intent * * * wholly disregardful of the rights, feelings and safety of others?” I submit that nothing of the sort appears in this record.
The only case relied on by the majority is Ausmus v. Swearington, (Mo.) 296 S.W. (2d) 8, wherein the Missouri court, in a case involving a Colorado accident, construed the Colorado guest statute according to the Virginia holding rather than the Colorado decisions. The Missouri court chose to ignore the existing fundamental Colorado law as stated in the Pettingell case.
The law in this jurisdiction as it has existed in the past and as it should continue to exist in the future is convincingly set forth in the Pettingell case, supra, and the language there is strikingly similar to that found in Ansback v. Greenberg, (Ky.) 256 S.W. (2d) 1 (1953) where the court states:
“Most courts hold that merely falling asleep at the wheel of an automobile, in the absence of facts which ordinarily would create an appreciation of such danger, is not gross negligence. A typical case is Boos v. Sauer, 266 Mich. 230, 253 N.W. 278, 279, where it was said: ‘It is also the weight of authority that the mere falling asleep is not gross negligence.’ In Richards v. Parks, 19 *161Tenn. App. 615, 93 S.W. 2d 639, 645, the Tennessee Court said: * * and, of course, where falling asleep is relied upon as gross negligence, as must be the case here, it would be necessary that the driver was aware of the danger of falling asleep and, in utter forgetfulness and disregard of, and indifference to the legal rights and safety of the injured party, continued to drive the car, proximately resulting in the injury complained of.’ To the same effect are Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432, 44 A.L.R. 785; Cooper v. Kellogg, 2 Cal. 2d 504, 42 P. 2d 59; Gilliland v. Harris, 25 Ala. App. 549, 150 So. 184; Diamond State Tel Co. v. Hunter, 2 Terry 336, 41 Del. 336, 21 A. 2d 286; Kaplan v. Kaplan, 213 Iowa 646, 239 N.W. 682.”
In the present case the evidence discloses that defendant had slept for a considerable period prior to taking the wheel, that he was drov/sy but didn’t feel tired enough to interfere with his taking the wheel for the short distance to Fort Collins, after his two companions had each driven the car while defendant slept. From this meager testimony can it be inferred that defendant was “conscious of his misconduct * * * and * * * from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions is aware that his conduct in the natural sequence of events will probably result in an injury to his guest, and is unconcerned over the possibility of such result * * *” as announced in the Pettingell case? I think not. This is another of those hard cases which I am afraid make bad law.
Mr. Chief Justice Sutton and Mr. Justice Day concur in this dissent.