Court Opinion

ID: 9854081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:00:28.061934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:54.623932
License: Public Domain

TIMMONS-GOODSON, Justice.
In this case we consider whether defendant waived appellate review by failing to object to instructions by the trial court to a single juror. We hold that, because the trial court’s instructions to a single juror violated defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict under Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution, the error was preserved for appeal notwithstanding defendant’s failure to object. We further hold that the State failed to show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals granting defendant a new trial.
Background
Defendant Lekkie Constantine Wilson was tried on 30 January 2007 in Superior Court, Carteret County for armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The State’s evidence tended to show that on the evening of 16 October 2005, defendant and Tavoris Courtney robbed a convenience store in Newport, North Carolina, of over one thousand dollars in cash. Defendant’s wife worked as a clerk in the store on the night of the robbery. Courtney testified that defendant helped plan the robbery and drove the getaway car after Courtney entered the store armed with a handgun and demanded money from defendant’s wife. Defendant’s evidence tended to show that Courtney’s testimony was inconsistent with prior written statements in which Courtney denied defendant’s involvement. Defendant also presented evidence that Courtney received a substantially reduced bond in exchange for his testimony for the State.
On 1 February 2007, after the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the relevant law. The jury then retired to the jury room and began deliberations. Approximately twenty minutes after retiring for deliberations, the jury notified the deputy that *480there was a problem with the foreperson that needed to be addressed on the record. Instead of summoning all the jurors to the courtroom to hear the jury’s request, the trial court proposed to the attorneys that only the foreperson be summoned. The trial court asked counsel for the State and counsel for defendant whether they objected to this procedure, and neither stated an objection.
The trial court summoned only the foreperson and held the following exchange with the foreperson on the record:
THE COURT: It’s my understanding there may be some issue you may need to address and to the extent you’re comfortable telling me, can you tell me what THE [sic] nature of the concern is?
FOREPERSON: They seem to think that I already have my mind made up.
THE COURT: You come here and if counsel will come up here, please.
Calling the foreperson, counsel for the State, and counsel for defendant to the bench, the trial court conducted an unrecorded bench conference. The trial court then asked the foreperson to step aside and conducted an unrecorded bench conference with both counsel. The trial court then asked both counsel to return to their places and held the following conversation with the foreperson on the record:
THE COURT: Sir, to make sure I understand then, there is an issue that has arisen regarding your opinion about the case basically, is that right?
FOREPERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: Issue between you and the other jurors?
FOREPERSON: Yes.
THE COURT: This is an issue that I believe you and the other jurors need to handle in the jury room.
FOREPERSON: I need to say one more thing.
THE COURT: Yes, sir. Go on.
FOREPERSON: I can’t...
Calling the foreperson to the bench once more, the trial court conducted a second unrecorded bench conference with the foreper*481son, counsel for the State, and counsel for defendant. The court then summoned the remaining eleven jurors and instructed the entire jury as follows:
You all have a duty to consult with one another and deliberate with a view toward reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course of deliberations, each of you should not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion, if it is erroneous, but none of you should surrender your honest conviction as to the weight of the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellows [sic] jurors or for the purpose of returning a verdict.
After giving the jury these instructions, the trial court directed the jurors, with the exception of the foreperson, to return to the jury room but not to resume deliberations. The trial court conducted a third unrecorded bench conference with the foreperson and counsel. The trial court then engaged in the following colloquy with the foreperson on the record:
THE COURT: [0]ne other instruction I want to give you first and then have the other jurors come back out.
The issues about which we had talked in this courtroom, both here at the bench and also openly on the record, are issues that you are not to share with the other jurors and I do not wish for you to go back in there and somehow talk about what we talked about here or anything else.
Do you understand that?
FOREPERSON: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: It’s my understanding based on what you have said up here that I do believe you can continue to be a fair and impartial juror in this case, consider the evidence you’ve heard, the contentions of counsel, instructions of the court and proceed accordingly, is that correct?
FOREPERSON: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And at this time, do you know of any reason why you cannot continue as a juror in this case?
FOREPERSON: No, sir.
*482After summoning the rest of the jury back to the courtroom, the trial court instructed the entire jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this is a formality but I do need to bring you back out to tell you all twelve as a group that you may retire back to the jury room and resume your deliberations, all of you as a group to go back there and continue your deliberations.
At approximately 4:00 p.m., the jury returned to the jury room and resumed deliberations. The trial court summoned the jury to the courtroom at approximately 4:55 p.m. and recessed for the day. On 2 February 2007, the jury continued deliberations from approximately 8:49 a.m. until 11:59 a.m. The jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The trial court arrested judgment on the conspiracy offense and sentenced defendant to a term of forty-eight to sixty-eight months imprisonment for the armed robbery offense. Defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that (1) the trial court violated defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict under Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution by giving instructions to the foreperson that it did not give to the rest of the jury, (2) the error was preserved for appeal notwithstanding defendant’s failure to object at trial, and (3) the State failed to show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wilson, - N.C. App. -, -, -, 665 S.E.2d 751, 753, 755-56 (2008). The dissent in the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant waived his right to appellate review and failed to show that the trial court’s conversations with the foreperson constituted plain error. Id. at —, 665 S.E.2d at 758-59 (Tyson, J., dissenting). The State appeals on the basis of the dissent.
Analysis
Based upon the dissent in the Court of Appeals, the only questions presented for our consideration are (1) whether by failing to object at trial, defendant waived his argument that the trial court violated his right to a unanimous jury verdict and (2) whether defendant is entitled to a new trial under the applicable standard of review. See N.C. R. App. P. 16(b). We address each question in turn.

The Right to a Unanimous Jury Verdict

Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous *483verdict of a jury in open court.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 24. The unanimity provision requires the trial court to summon all jurors before hearing a request from the jury and before giving additional instructions. State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 40, 331 S.E.2d 652, 659 (1985). In Ashe, the jury requested a review of the trial transcript during the defendant’s trial for first-degree murder. Without objection, the trial court summoned only the foreperson and held the following colloquy on the record:
THE COURT: Mr. Foreman, the bailiff indicates that you request access to the transcript?
FOREMAN: We want to review portions of the testimony.
THE COURT: I’ll have to give you this instruction. There is no transcript at this point. You and the other jurors will have to take your recollection of the evidence as you recall it and as you can agree upon that recollection in your deliberations.
Id. at 33, 331 S.E.2d at 655-56. We held that the trial court violated Article I, Section 24 and N.C.G.S. § 15A-1233(a) by failing to summon the entire jury before hearing and addressing the jury’s request to review the trial transcript. Id. at 40, 331 S.E.2d at 659. We later explained in State v. McLaughlin, 320 N.C. 564, 569, 359 S.E.2d 768, 772 (1987), that our reference to Article I, Section 24 in Ashe “was intended to convey no more than the seemingly obvious proposition that for a trial judge to give explanatory instructions to fewer than all jurors violated . . . the unanimity requirement imposed on jury verdicts by Article I, section 24.”
Similarly, in State v. Nelson, 341 N.C. 695, 698, 462 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1995), the jury requested a review of evidence during the defendant’s trial for second-degree rape and first-degree kidnapping. Without objection, the trial court summoned only the foreperson, asked him questions, and instructed him not to tamper with the evidence in the jury room. Id. at 698-700, 462 S.E.2d at 226-27. Citing Ashe, we explained that “the failure to require all jurors to réturn to the courtroom to ask a question of the court violates . . . the unanimous verdict requirement of Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution.” Id. at 700-01, 462 S.E.2d at 227-28. Thus, it is well established that for the trial court to provide explanatory instructions to less than the entire jury violates the defendant’s constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. We must therefore decide whether defendant’s failure to object at trial defeats his ability to raise this issue on appeal.

*484
Preservation of Issue for Appeal

The State contends that by failing to object at trial, defendant waived appellate review of whether the trial court’s conversations violated his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. According to the State, Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(1) and controlling case law prevent defendant from raising his constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal. We disagree.
Rule 10(b)(1) sets forth the following requirements for preserving errors for appeal:
Any such question which was properly preserved for review by action of counsel taken during the course of proceedings in the trial tribunal by objection noted or which by rule or law was deemed preserved or taken without any such action, may be made the basis of an assignment of error in the record on appeal.
N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (emphasis added). On its face, Rule 10(b)(1) recognizes that errors may be “deemed preserved” “by rule or law” without any action by the parties. Id.
While the failure to raise a constitutional issue at trial generally waives that issue for appeal, see, e.g., Ashe, 314 N.C. at 39, 331 S.E.2d at 659, where the error violates the right to a unanimous jury verdict under Article I, Section 24, it is preserved for appeal without any action by counsel. Nelson, 341 N.C. at 700, 462 S.E.2d at 227 (citing Ashe for the proposition that “the failure to object does not prevent the defendant from appealing”); Ashe, 314 N.C. at 39, 331 S.E.2d at 659; see also N.C. R. App. P. 10 drafting comm. comment., para. 3, reprinted in 287 N.C. 698, 701 (1975) (noting that some objections may be “ ‘deemed’ taken without any action by counsel simply because the error is considered sufficiently fundamental”). In Ashe, for example, the State argued that, even if the trial court violated Article I, Section 24 by instructing a single juror, the defendant waived appellate review because he did not object at trial. 314 N.C. at 39, 331 S.E.2d at 659. We held that Article I, Section 24 “require[s] the trial court to summon all jurors into the courtroom before hearing and addressing a jury request to review testimony” and the trial court’s failure to do so “entitles [the] defendant to press these points on appeal, notwithstanding a failure to object at trial.” Id. at 40, 331 S.E.2d at 659. Similarly, in Nelson we rejected any notion that the defendant waived appellate review of his Article I, Section 24 argument by failing to object at trial and the State’s assertion that defend*485ant could not later complain because his attorney purportedly suggested the unconstitutional procedure at issue in the case. 341 N.C. at 700, 462 S.E.2d at 227.
Contrary to this precedent, the State echoes the dissent in the Court of Appeals by arguing that our decision in State v. Tate, 294 N.C. 189, 239 S.E.2d 821 (1978), rather than Ashe, is controlling authority in this case. In Tate, twice during defendant’s trial, a single juror asked or began to ask questions addressed to the trial court. Id. at 197, 239 S.E.2d at 827. Each time, the judge called the particular juror to the bench and held an unrecorded bench conference outside the presence of counsel for the defendant and counsel for the State. Id. The defendant’s sole argument on appeal was that “in terms of simple fairness the trial court should have immediately informed the defendant and his counsel of the nature of the conversations.” Thus, the issue in Tate was the defendant’s right to be present at every stage of the trial under Article I, Section 23. See State v. Boyd, 332 N.C. 101, 104-05, 418 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1992) (explaining the basis of our holding in Tate). Unlike the right to a unanimous jury verdict under Article I, Section 24, the right to be present at every stage of the trial under Article I, Section 23 may be waived by noncapital defendants. Id. at 105, 418 S.E.2d at 473. Accordingly, we held in Tate that the defendant waived appellate review of the trial court’s unrecorded conversations by failing to object at trial. In so holding, we explained our reasoning as follows:
We are of the opinion that the trial court’s private conversations with jurors were ill-advised. The practice is disapproved. At least, the questions and the court’s response should be made in the presence of counsel. The record indicates, however, that defendant did not object to the procedure or request disclosure of the substance of the conversation. Failure to object in apt time to alleged procedural irregularities or improprieties constitutes a waiver.
294 N.C. at 198, 239 S.E.2d at 827 (citations omitted).
In relying on Tate for its waiver argument, the State overlooks that defendant in the instant case appeals from the violation of his right to a unanimous jury verdict under Article I, Section 24 rather than his right to be present at every stage of the trial under Article I, Section 23. Further, while the conversations in Tate may fairly be characterized as innocuous “procedural irregularities,” the same cannot be said for the trial court’s conduct in this case. The record *486reveals that the trial court gave the foreperson instructions during its recorded and unrecorded conversations in violation of defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict. The trial court’s exchanges with the foreperson were prompted by the jury’s belief that “that [the foreperson] already ha[d] [his] mind made up” regarding defendant’s guilt or innocence. Rather than summoning and instructing the entire jury as to how to resolve this matter, the trial court instructed only the foreperson that “[t]his is an issue that . . . [the foreperson] and the other jurors need[ed] to handle in the jury room.” Further, immediately following the third unrecorded bench conference with the foreperson, the trial court stated that it needed to give him “one other instruction” before admonishing him not to divulge to the remaining jurors the substance of his conversations with the trial court. These facts compel the conclusion that the trial court provided the foreperson with instructions that it did not provide to the rest of the jury in violation of defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict.1 We therefore conclude that Ashe and Nelson control rather than Tate.
Consistent with this precedent, we hold that where the trial court instructed a single juror in violation of defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict under Article I, Section 24, the error is deemed preserved for appeal notwithstanding defendant’s failure to object. In so holding, we adhere to the principle that the right to a unanimous jury verdict is fundamental to our system of justice. See N.C. Const. art. I, § 24; N.C. Const. of 1868, art. I, § 13; N.C. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § 9; State v. Hudson, 280 N.C. 74, 79, 185 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1971); State v. Stewart, 89 N.C. 563, 564 (1883); State v. Moss, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 66, 68 (1854). While Appellate Rule 10(b)(1) protects judicial economy and speaks to our adversarial system of justice by requiring the parties to object in the majority of instances, it nevertheless recognizes that some questions may be deemed preserved for review by rule or law. Pursuant to Ashe, the trial court’s error in providing instructions to a single juror in the case at bar constitutes such a question.

Harmless Error

Having determined that defendant’s constitutional argument was preserved for appeal, we next consider whether defendant is entitled *487to a new trial as a result of the trial court’s error. Following its contention that defendant waived appellate review, the State engages primarily in plain error analysis rather than harmless error analysis. According to the State, defendant cannot meet his burden under plain error review because he has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s conversations and because there was strong evidence at trial supporting the jury’s verdict. In the event that this Court conducts harmless error review, the State argues that for the same reasons, the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with defendant that the proper standard of review in the instant case is harmless error and conclude that the State’s arguments are insufficient to meet its burden.
Where the error violates a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict under Article I, Section 24, we review the record for harmless error. Nelson, 341 N.C. at 700-01, 462 S.E.2d at 227-28; see Ashe, 314 N.C. at 36-39, 331 S.E.2d at 657-59 (applying the harmless error test and concluding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial). The State bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nelson, 341 N.C. at 701, 462 S.E.2d at 228. “An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction.” Id.
In the instant case, the State’s arguments are inadequate to show harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The record reveals that the jury was sufficiently concerned that the foreperson “already ha[d] [his] mind made up” regarding defendant’s guilt or innocence to request instructions from the trial court and to elect another foreperson. In response to the jury’s request for guidance, the trial court summoned only the foreperson and provided him with instructions on and off the record that it did not provide to the rest of the jury. The trial court instructed only the foreperson that jurors needed to resolve the issue in the jury room. The trial court’s failure to similarly instruct the remaining jurors may have given them the impression that the trial court had resolved the matter, foreclosing further debate on this issue during deliberations. Further, following the third unrecorded bench conference with the foreperson, the trial court informed the foreperson that it needed to give him “one other instruction” and instructed him that “[t]he issues about which we had talked in this courtroom, both here at the bench and also openly on the record, are issues you that are not to share with the other jurors.”
While the record sufficiently reveals that the trial court violated the unanimity requirement by instructing only the foreperson, the *488record is inadequate to meet the demanding task of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the State to meet its burden, the record must reveal the substance of the conversations at issue or the conversations must be adequately reconstructed. See, e.g., Boyd, 332 N.C. at 106, 418 S.E.2d at 474 (holding that the State cannot demonstrate harmless error where the substance of the trial court’s conversation with an excused juror was not revealed by the transcript or reconstructed at trial); State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 794-95, 392 S.E.2d 362, 363-64 (1990) (holding that the State could not meet its burden of proving harmless error where the record did not reveal the substance of the trial court’s unrecorded conversations with prospective jurors). The record in the present case does not disclose the substance of the trial court’s unrecorded bench conferences with the foreperson, nor have the conversations been reconstructed.
In light of the limited record and the State’s failure to present arguments that go to the proper standard of review, we hold that the State has failed to meet its burden of showing the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals granting defendant a new trial.
AFFIRMED.

. The dissent characterizes the conversations between the trial court and the foreperson as mere “bench conferences” and surmises that this opinion “will lead to inconsistency and confusion in future cases” and a “chilling effect on juror communication.” Post at 8-9, 18. However, those dire consequences will be avoided because our holding is limited to instructions and not all communications between judge and juror.