Court Opinion

ID: 9794275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:02:39.458959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:34.260747
License: Public Domain

TRAYNOR, J.
I dissent.
A possessor of land is hot an insurer of the safety of his business guests, nor is he liable for harm resulting from a condition from which no unreasonable risk was to be anticipated. He “is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he
(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them (Hinds v. Wheadon, 19 Cal.2d 458, 460 [121 P.2d 724]; Reese v. Smith, 9 Cal.2d 324, 328 [70 P.2d 933]; Chapman v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 745, 751 [158 P.2d 42]; Jones v. Bridges, 38 Cal.App.2d 341, 345 [101 P.2d 91]), and
(b) has no reason to believe that they will discover the condition or realize the risk involved therein (Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas Co., 4 Cal.2d 511, 512-513 [50 P.2d 801]; Shanley v. American Olive Co., 185 Cal. 552, 555 [197 P. 793]; Royal Insurance Co. v. Mazzei, 50 Cal.App.2d 549, 552-553 [123 P.2d 586]), and
(c) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land without exercising reasonable care
(i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or
(ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm.” (2 Restatement, Torts, § 343, pp. 938-939.) It was therefore incumbent on plaintiffs to present evidence from which reasonable men could conclude: (1) that defendants should have realized that the mat involved an unreasonable risk to business visitors; and (2) that defendants *231had no reason to believe such visitors would realize the- risk involved therein. In my opinion there was no evidence that would warrant either of these conclusions.
1. The evidence fails to show that the mat was in any way different from those in general use. (Yearsley v. American Stores Co., 97 Pa.Super. 275, 277.) There was no evidence that other persons had slipped or fallen on that mat or similar mats, which might have given defendants reason to believe that the continued use of the mat would be dangerous. The majority opinion states that “The fact that a negligent practice is general does not transform it into reasonable care.” It is equally true, however, that a practice that has been generally followed without incident is not transformed into negligence merely by the occurrence of a single accident not reasonably foreseeable. Plaintiffs rely upon the testimony of a witness familiar with the shoe business that plaintiff was wearing the type of heel that 60 per cent of the women of San Francisco wear for street use. Even if it is assumed that defendants were aware of this fact, it does not follow that they should have concluded therefrom that the mat was unsafe. There is no negligence if harm could not reasonably be foreseen. “The standard must be one of conduct, not of consequences.” (Prosser, Torts, §35, p. 220.) Any accident raises the question whether it could reasonably be foreseen, but one cannot conclude that it could have been foreseen merely because it occurred; negligence cannot be inferred by looking backward “with the wisdom borh of the event. ’ ’ (Cardozo, C. J., in Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 257 N.Y. 190, 192 [177 N.E. 416]; Dickson v. Emporium Mercantile Co., Inc., 193 Minn. 629, 631 [259 N.W. 375].)
It is plaintiffs’ theory that the heel of Mrs. Blumberg’s shoe became wedged in one of the interstices of defendants’ mat after being inserted at an angle with the toe pointed upward. They contend that “the accident could not have happened in any other manner.” Diagram B illustrates the outline of Mrs. Blumberg’s shoe with the heel in what plaintiffs term “the situation which must have occurred at the moment of Mrs. Blumberg’s injury.” They contend that as her toe descended and her foot rolled forward, the back of her heel, describing an are, wedged against the latitudinal strip of the interstice, causing her to fall. Even if it is assumed that the accident occurred according to plaintiffs’ theory, can it reasonably be said that it was within the normal *232scope of prevision of a possessor of land? A comparison of the sizes of the base of Mrs. Blumberg’s heel and the largest space in the mat demonstrates the unlikelihood of a heel’s

wedging in the manner alleged. Had plaintiff stepped straight down on the mat, it would admittedly have been impossible for her heel to enter the interstice. The accident could only have occurred, by plaintiffs’ own admission, because Mrs. Blumberg crossed the mat at a right angle to the long side of the interstice and the heel fell well into it. It is clear from Diagram B that plaintiff’s toe must have been raised at a relatively high angle and at about the only angle that could prevent the heel from swinging free as plaintiff stepped forward. The jury might have inferred that these unusual circumstances conspired to cause Mrs. Blumberg to fall. But the duty to anticipate such a possibility, which became apparent only by hindsight, cannot be said to be part of the requirement of ordinary care. (Baran v. Reading Iron Co., 202 Pa. 274 [51 A. 979]; Austin v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co., 269 Mass. 420 [169 N.E. 484]; see, also, Whiting v. City of National City, 9 Cal.2d 163, 165, 166 [69 P.2d 990]; Baddeley v. Shea, 114 Cal. 1, 7 [45 P. 990, 55 Am.St.Rep. 56, 33 L.R.A. 747].)
2. Even if reasonable men could differ as to whether the mat created an unreasonable risk to business visitors, the judgment should be affirmed Any danger inherent in the mat was as apparent to Mrs. Blumberg as to defendants, and a reasonable jury could not conclude that defendants had reason to believe that she would not realize the risk involved in walking across the mat with the type of heels she was wearing. One ordinarily looks where one is going, and the interstices of the mat were clearly visible. There was nothing unusual about them in size or design, nothing defective, to trip the average walker. Actually there was no danger in the mat lying in wait for Mrs. Blumberg. The danger to be *234anticipated was from the spiked heels, not from the mat. Those who walk on spiked heels court danger. That is their privilege, but it is also their responsibility to consider the consequences, to be aware of the peculiarities of the shoes they wear. Mrs. Blumberg not only could see everything that defendants could by looking at the mat, over which she had walked when she entered the building, but she knew as they did not the type of heel she was wearing. An “owner is entitled to assume that such invitee will perceive that which would be obvious to him upon the ordinary use of his own senses.” (Shanley v. American Olive Go., 185 Gal. 552, 555 [197 P. 793] ; Boyal Insurance Go. v. Mazzei, 50 Cal.App.2d 549, 552-553 [123 P.2d 586]; see, also, Blodgett v. B. E. Dyas Go., 4 Cal.2d 511, 512-513 [50 P.2d 801].)

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*234Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.