Court Opinion

ID: 9899737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 16:10:29.691112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:47.760180
License: Public Domain

J-S33033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ROBERT L STEVENSON                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1499 WDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 17, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-16-CR-0000063-2022,
                          CP-16-CR-0000130-2022

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: November 17, 2023

       Appellant, Robert L. Stevenson, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County following the

revocation of probation. In this direct appeal, Appellant's counsel has filed a

petition for leave to withdraw and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We conclude that Appellant's counsel has complied with

the procedural requirements necessary to withdraw. Moreover,              after

independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the appeal is wholly

frivolous. We, therefore, grant counsel's petition to withdraw and affirm the

judgment of sentence.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S33033-23

      The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of the

case, as follows:

      [Appellant] was charged with: Strangulation — Applying Pressure
      to Throat or Neck; Simple Assault; and Harassment — Subject
      Other to Physical Contact (at Case No. 63 CR 2022) and Disorderly
      Conduct Hazardous/Physical Offense and Resisting Arrest/Other
      Law Enforcement (at Case No. 130 CR 2022). Under the terms of
      a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to Simple Assault and
      Disorderly Conduct and received a term of probation for each
      offense to run concurrently. On May 18, 2022, the [trial] court
      ordered [Appellant] placed on probation for a period of eighteen
      (18) months at Case No. 63 of 2022 and a period of one (1) year
      at Case No. 130 of 2022 under the supervision of Clarion County
      Adult Probation.

      [Appellant] received new charges of Strangulation (F2) and
      Simple Assault (M1) for offenses committed on June 30, 2022. He
      pled no contest to Simple Assault and was sentenced for these
      offenses on November 2, 2022. Further, [Appellant] failed to
      complete his drug and alcohol assessment that he was ordered to
      complete on May 18, 2022. [Appellant] waived a Gagnon I
      hearing, and a Gagnon II hearing was held on November 17,
      2022.    At his Gagnon hearing, [Appellant] admitted to the
      violations. The court revoked probation at both cases and
      resentenced [Appellant] at Case No. 63 of 2022 to serve a
      minimum of eighty-five (85) days to a maximum of two years,
      less one (1) day in Clarion County jail, and at Case No. 130 of
      2022, to serve one (1) year of probation, to run consecutively.

      [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal on December 19, 2022. In
      [Appellant’s] Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on
      Appeal, filed on January 12, 2023, he raised one (1) claim of error.
      ...

      [Specifically,] [i]n the Statement of Matters Complained of on
      Appeal, [Appellant] contends that the court abused its discretion
      and created an excessive sentence by revoking [Appellant’s]
      probation at both dockets and running the sentences
      consecutively.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/2/23, at 1-2.

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J-S33033-23

       We preliminarily address a potential Walker1 issue affecting the instant

appeal. As noted, following a probation revocation, judgment of sentence was

entered against Appellant at two trial court docket numbers on November 17,

2022. Counsel timely filed2 a single notice of appeal listing two trial court

docket numbers, implicating Walker, wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court held that appellants are required to file separate notices of appeal when

a single order resolves issues arising on more than one trial court docket. The

decision applies to all cases filed after June 1, 2018.

       While a Walker violation may result in the quashal of an appeal, there

are exceptions to the rule. In Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157,

160 (Pa. Super. 2019), this Court concluded that a breakdown in the court

occurs when a court misinforms appellants of their appeal rights by advising

____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018).

2 There is a discrepancy regarding when the appeal was filed, as the notice of

appeal is dated December 16, 2022, and Counsel indicates on the certificate
of service that the Notice of Appeal was PACfiled. The notice of appeal includes
two timestamps by the Clarion County Clerk of Courts: one on December 16,
2022, and one on December 19, 2022. The trial court docket indicates that
the notice of appeal was dated December 16, 2022, but filed on December 19,
2022. This discrepancy, however, is of no effect. Thirty days from November
17, 2022, was Saturday, December 17, 2022. Accordingly, the notice of
appeal was timely filed regardless of whether it was filed on December 16,
2022, or Monday, December 19, 2022.              See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (for
computations of time, if the last day of any such period shall fall on a Saturday,
Sunday, or any legal holiday, such day shall be omitted from the
computation); see also Pa.R.A.P. 107 (stating that 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 shall be
applicable to the Rules of Appellate Procedure); and see Commonwealth v.
Fill, 202 A.3d 133, 138 (Pa. Super. 2019) (applying 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908).

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J-S33033-23

them that they can pursue appellate review by filing a single notice of appeal,

even though the court is addressing cases at multiple docket numbers. See

also Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 352-54 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(en banc) (reaffirming Stansbury); and see Commonwealth v. Patterson,

940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007) (finding that a breakdown occurs in

instances where the trial court fails to advise or misadvises defendants of their

appeal rights when required to do so).

      Here, despite the imposition of two separate sentences at Appellant’s

sentencing hearing, one on each docketed case, the trial court’s written

sentencing order states at paragraph 9, “The Defendant has the right to file a

motion to modify sentence within ten (10) days, the right to appeal to [the]

Superior Court within thirty (30) days, and the right to assistance of counsel

in the preparation of the motion and appeal.” (Emphasis added). In light of

the foregoing authority, we discern that a breakdown occurred when the trial

court advised Appellant that he could pursue his post-sentence and appeal

rights through a single filing.   Therefore, we decline to quash the present

appeal.

      In the present appeal, Appellant's counsel has filed a petition for leave

to withdraw and an accompanying Anders brief. Before reviewing the merits

of this appeal, this Court must first determine whether counsel has fulfilled

the   necessary   procedural   requirements    for   withdrawing   as   counsel.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa. Super. 1998).

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J-S33033-23

      To withdraw under Anders, counsel must first “petition the court for

leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of

the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous.”

Miller, 715 A.2d at 1207. Second, counsel must file an Anders brief, in which

counsel:

      (1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the record that
      counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth
      counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state[s]
      counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
      Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
      case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
      that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

      Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the Anders brief to his or her

client and advise the client “of [the client's] right to retain new counsel,

proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court's attention.”

Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2007).

      If counsel meets all obligations, “it then becomes the responsibility of

the reviewing court to make a full examination of the proceedings and make

an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly

frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5; see also Commonwealth v.

Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (holding that the

Anders procedure requires this Court to review “the entire record with

consideration first of the issues raised by counsel. ... [T]his review does not

require this Court to act as counsel or otherwise advocate on behalf of a party.

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J-S33033-23

Rather, it requires us only to conduct a review of the record to ascertain if[,]

on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel, intentionally or not,

missed or misstated. We need not analyze those issues of arguable merit;

just identify them, deny the motion to withdraw, and order counsel to analyze

them”). It is only when all the procedural and substantive requirements are

satisfied that counsel will be permitted to withdraw.

       In the case at bar, counsel complied with all procedural obligations.

Counsel filed together both his petition to withdraw as counsel and his Anders

brief, to which he attached a notice of rights letter addressed to Appellant

advising him of his rights. See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748,

752 (Pa. Super. 2005) (opining that the prudent course is to require counsel

to attach to the petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to the client

advising of their rights); see also Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d

1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (to withdraw from representation

pursuant to Anders, counsel must: 1) petition the court for leave to withdraw

stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel

has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) provide the defendant

a copy of the brief and petition to withdraw; and 3) advise the defendant that

they have the right to retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that

the defendant deems worthy of the court's attention). 3

____________________________________________

3 As of the time of this writing, Appellant has not filed a response to counsel’s

Petition to Withdraw.

                                           -6-
J-S33033-23

      We proceed, therefore, to review the entire record and analyze whether

this appeal is wholly frivolous. The Anders brief states that the revocation

court’s decision to revoke Appellant’s street time at both dockets, and then to

impose an aggregate, standard range sentence of not less than 85 days nor

more than two years less one day at docket 63-2022, and an additional one

year of probation at 130-2022, can be argued as excessive considering

Appellant’s circumstances and resentencing guidelines.

      As such, the Anders brief raises a challenge the discretionary aspects

of his sentence, from which there is no absolute right to appeal.         See

Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating

that a claim that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of total

confinement upon revocation of probation is a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of sentencing).       Rather, when an appellant challenges the

discretionary aspects of his sentence, we must consider his brief on this issue

as a petition for permission to appeal. Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d

260, 267 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 522

A.2d 17, 18 (Pa. 1987).     Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary

sentencing issue,

      [this Court conducts] a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
      whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
      Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
      preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
      sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant's brief
      has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
      substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

                                     -7-
J-S33033-23

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation

marks and some citations omitted).

      Here, Counsel filed a timely Notice of Appeal and properly included a

Rule 2119(f) Statement in his brief. However, Counsel did not object at

sentencing to the trial court's allegedly excessive sentence, nor does his post-

sentence Motion raise this claim. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d

274, 282-83 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of a sentence is waived where the appellant failed to preserve such

challenge at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion). Accordingly, Appellant

has not invoked this Court's jurisdiction, and his discretionary sentencing

claim is not preserved for our review. See id.; see also Moury, supra.

      Nevertheless, we review the merits of Appellant’s claim as part of our

independent review of the record. See Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187

A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018). Our standard of review for a trial court's

revocation of probation is as follows:

      The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation
      is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which
      absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.
      An abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment—a
      sentencing court has not abused its discretion unless the record
      discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly
      unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2014).

      A revocation court may choose from any of the sentencing options that

existed at the time of the original sentence, including incarceration.           42

                                       -8-
J-S33033-23

Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b). The imposition of total confinement upon revocation,

however, requires a finding that either “(1) the defendant has been convicted

of another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely

that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or (3) such a

sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court.” Id. § 9771(c).

      A revocation court “shall make as part of the record, and disclose in

open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for

the sentence imposed.” Id. § 9721(b). However, following a revocation of

probation, a sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its

reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statutes in

question. See Pasture, 107 A.3d at 28 (stating that “since the defendant

has previously appeared before the sentencing court, the stated reasons for a

revocation sentence need not be as elaborate as that which is required at

initial sentencing.”).

      Upon review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in imposing the standard range, revocation sentence of 85 days to

two years less one-day total confinement at Case 63, to be followed by a

consecutively run sentence of one year’s probation.       As addressed at the

Gagnon II and Sentencing hearing, Appellant had pleaded no contest to a new

charge of simple assault that involved an accompanying charge of

strangulation, and he had failed to complete his drug and alcohol assessment

that the court had ordered him to complete. As such, the imposition of the

revocation sentence was supported by Appellant’s new conviction and was

                                      -9-
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clearly essential to vindicate the authority of the court considering Appellant’s

failure to complete court-ordered drug and alcohol assessments. Under these

circumstances, we deem Appellant’s claim frivolous.

      Application to Withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 11/17/2023

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