Court Opinion

ID: 2964055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:19:48.471599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:49.821538
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1900

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  JONATHAN FELDMAN,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                               Selya, Stahl and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                              _________________________

               Annemarie Hassett, Federal Defender Office, for appellant.
               _________________
               Diane Cabo  Freniere, Assistant United States Attorney, with
               ____________________
          whom Donald K. Stern,  United States Attorney, was on  brief, for
          the United States.

                              _________________________

                                    April 26, 1996

                              _________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.   Defendant-appellant  Jonathan
                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.
                            ______________

          Feldman pleaded guilty to  a twelve-count indictment charging him

          with fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property.  See
                                                                        ___

          18 U.S.C.     1341, 1343,  2314; 42 U.S.C.    408(a)(7)(B).   The

          district court convened a disposition hearing on  August 3, 1995.

          Using the  version of the  guidelines that was in  effect on that

          date, see United  States v.  Harotunian, 920  F.2d 1040,  1041-42
                ___ ______________     __________

          (1st  Cir. 1990),  the  court computed  the guideline  sentencing

          range (GSR) at 30-37 months  and imposed a 33-month incarcerative

          sentence.   Feldman now  challenges the court's  determination of

          the GSR and, ultimately, the sentence imposed.  We affirm.

          I.  OVERVIEW
          I.  OVERVIEW

                    We  draw an  overview of  the facts  necessary  to shed

          light on  this appeal  from the Presentence  Investigation Report

          (PSI  Report) and the transcript of the disposition hearing.  See
                                                                        ___

          United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1991).
          _____________    _____

                    The defendant worked  for Norman and Eleanor Rabb  as a

          home attendant from May  to October of 1993, assisting  them with

          their personal care.  The Rabbs were octogenarians.  In addition,

          Mr. Rabb was in  failing health and afflicted by  a deteriorating

          mental condition.   The couple  could not  handle their  personal

          finances and  a long-time  retainer, herself  seventy-eight years

          old, wrote checks to pay their household expenses.

                    During  the  course of  his  employment,  the defendant

          became  privy to the Rabbs' finances.  Having obtained Mr. Rabb's

          social security  number and  the account numbers  for a  Fidelity

                                          2

          Investments trust account and a Bank of Boston checking  account,

          he set out to defraud  the Rabbs upon leaving their employ.   His

          modus  operandi involved siphoning funds from  both the trust and
          _____  ________

          checking  accounts by impersonating  Mr. Rabb, forging negotiable

          instruments, and  similar  artifices.   To cover  his tracks,  he

          submitted to the postal service change of address forms directing

          that all  the Rabbs' business mail be forwarded to the address of

          his  own dwelling.   The  defendant then  retained the  mail that

          would have  revealed his skulduggery  (such as the  monthly trust

          account statements)  and forwarded the remainder to  the Rabbs to

          quell  any   suspicions.    All  told,   the  defendant  pilfered

          $139,972.00  from  the  trust  account and  $59,423.68  from  the

          checking account before his shenanigans were discovered.

          II.  DISCUSSION
          II.  DISCUSSION

                    The  defendant  challenges  two  rulings  made  by  the

          district court in constructing the GSR.  We address these rulings

          seriatim.

                             A.  Obstruction of Justice.
                             A.  Obstruction of Justice.
                                 ______________________

                    Invoking   U.S.S.G.    3C1.1,1   the   district   court

          increased  the  defendant's  offense  level  for  obstruction  of

          justice.  In requesting  the two-level enhancement the government

          argued  that  the defendant  burned  bank  statements and  checks

          belonging  to the  Rabbs in  his fireplace  on October  13, 1994,
                              
          ____________________

               1This  guideline directs  a  two-level  increase  "[i]f  the
          defendant  willfully  obstructed  or  impeded,  or  attempted  to
          obstruct  or impede,  the  administration of  justice during  the
          investigation,   prosecution,  or   sentencing  of   the  instant
          offense."  U.S.S.G.  3C1.1 (Nov. 1994).

                                          3

          after learning that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had

          launched an  investigation.  The  defendant admitted that  he had

          destroyed  documents after  learning  of the  investigation.   He

          nonetheless  objected to the upward  adjustment on the basis that

          he had  not burned financial data but had only burned drafts of a

          will  and  letters of  apology that  he  had written  (though not

          mailed) to  the Rabbs.  The district court did not choose between

          these  versions but stated in effect that, on either version, the

          enhancement applied.

                    1.   Adequacy of Findings.  The  defendant asserts that
                    1.   Adequacy of Findings.
                         ____________________

          the  district  court  erred  in leaving  unresolved  the  factual

          controversy concerning  what the flames  consumed.   We review  a

          sentencing court's factual findings under section 3C1.1 for clear

          error,  see United States  v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d  64, 68 (1st Cir.
                  ___ _____________     _______

          1991),  but  we  afford   plenary  review  to  essentially  legal

          determinations  (such   as  whether  section  3C1.1   includes  a

          defendant's allegedly obstructive conduct within its scope),  see
                                                                        ___

          United States v. Emery, 991 F.2d 907, 910 (1st Cir. 1993).
          _____________    _____

                    When a  defendant alleges that a PSI  Report contains a

          factual inaccuracy,  the district  court  ordinarily must  either

          make  a  finding, up  or  down,  as to  the  allegation, or  else

          determine that  no finding is necessary  because the controverted

          matter will not be taken  into consideration in connection  with,

          or  will not affect, the sentencing decision.   See Fed. R. Crim.
                                                          ___

          P. 32(c)(1); see  also U.S.S.G.   6A1.3 (Nov. 1994).   Thus,  the
                       ___  ____

          sentencing court need not resolve factual conflicts when doing so

                                          4

          will  serve no  useful purpose.   See  United States  v. Fuentes-
                                            ___  _____________     ________

          Vazquez, 52 F.3d 394, 397 (1st Cir. 1995); see also United States
          _______                                    ___ ____ _____________

          v.  Sepulveda, 15  F.3d  1161, 1199-1200  (1st Cir.  1993), cert.
              _________                                               _____

          denied, 114 S. Ct. 2714 (1994).  The instant case exemplifies the
          ______

          point:   the  judge was  not obliged  to choose  between the  two

          conflicting  accounts  if  under  either  version  the  documents

          constituted material evidence.  We explain briefly.

                    Given  that the defendant knew of the ongoing FBI probe

          and  nonetheless intentionally  incinerated  documents, the  only

          question that remained was whether the documents in the pyre were

          material to the investigation.  See United States v. St. Cyr, 977
                                          ___ _____________    _______

          F.2d  698, 705  (1st  Cir. 1992)  (explaining that  a defendant's

          actions  must  impede  the  government's  investigation  in  some

          material  way to trigger  an obstruction enhancement).   The bank

          records that  the government described  plainly met the  test for

          materiality.  In the alternative, the government argued that even

          if  the defendant  had been  toasting  letters of  apology, those

          letters would  also be material  and, hence, the  defendant would

          still  be  guilty  of  an  obstruction  of  justice  within   the

          contemplation of  section 3C1.1.   The record indicates  that the

          lower court accepted this reasoning.  The court stated:

                    [T]he defendant burned certain material after
                    he knew  about the investigation  that was in
                    progress and  that he did so  in this Court's
                    mind   with   an  idea   of   preventing  the
                    Government  from obtaining  relevant material
                    evidence.

                    Three   principles    guide   our   review    of   this

          determination.    First,  the  test  for  materiality  under  the

                                          5

          obstruction-of-justice guideline  is not  stringent.   See United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States v. Ovalle-Marquez, 36 F.3d 212, 226 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.
          ______    ______________                                    _____

          denied, 115  S. Ct. 947, 1322  (1995); St. Cyr, 977  F.2d at 705.
          ______                                 _______

          Second, a  sentencing judge's finding of  materiality is reviewed

          only for clear error.   See United States v. Biyaga, 9  F.3d 204,
                                  ___ _____________    ______

          205 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Pineda, 981  F.2d 569, 574-
                               _____________    ______

          75 (1st Cir.  1992).   Third, the  Sentencing Commission  defines

          "material"  evidence in this context as evidence that "would tend

          to influence or affect the  issue under determination."  U.S.S.G.

           3C1.1,  comment. (n.5)  (Nov. 1994); see  also United  States v.
                                                ___  ____ ______________

          Kelley, 76 F.3d 436, 441 (1st Cir. 1996).
          ______

                    These  three   principles  counsel  rejection   of  the

          defendant's  assignment of error.   The papers that the defendant

          burned  were material if  they could have  influenced or affected

          the  official investigation  into  his fraud.    If those  papers

          included  the  Rabbs'  bank  statements  and  checks  (which  the

          defendant  had intercepted  and which  were never  located), they

          were obviously material.2   If, however, the  papers included the

          defendant's written apologia  to the Rabbs,  then they were  also

          material.  A letter of apology to the victims of a crime, even in

          draft form,  is tantamount  to a confession  of guilt.   Had this

          voluntary   confession,  in  the  defendant's  handwriting,  been

          uncovered  in his home on  that October afternoon,  it would have

          had the potential to influence the investigation of the fraud.

                              
          ____________________

               2The defendant claims somewhat unconvincingly that he "lost"
          all the bank records and checks belonging to the Rabbs.

                                          6

                    In  this case, all roads  lead to Rome.   Regardless of

          which  version  of events  the  sentencing  court believed,  both

          entailed  the destruction of material  evidence in the  face of a

          known  investigation.   Thus,  we descry  no  clear error  in the

          sentencing court's determination that the defendant's burning  of

          evidence   whether bank records or letters of apology   warranted

          an upward adjustment under section 3C1.1.  By the same token, the

          district court  did not  err in  declining to  spin the  web more

          finely  by making a particularized finding as to the exact nature

          of the documents that were burned.

                    This conclusion  likewise  stills the  defendant's  cry

          that the district court  abused its discretion when it  failed to

          hold  an  evidentiary  hearing  to resolve  the  factual  dispute

          concerning the  nature  of the  burned  documents.   Because  the

          defendant  destroyed evidence  material to  the investigation  on

          either  version  of the  facts, the  evidentiary hearing  that he

          demanded would have  amounted to  an empty charade.   A  district

          court need not   indeed, should not   hold an evidentiary hearing

          when nothing will turn on it.3

                    2.   Fifth Amendment.  The  defendant's backup argument
                    2.   Fifth Amendment.
                         _______________
                              
          ____________________

               3The defendant  also contends that the  district court erred
          in failing to  make a  factual finding that  the defendant  acted
          willfully and  with specific  intent to avoid  responsibility for
          the fraud.    This contention  misperceives  the record.    Judge
          Gorton did make  an explicit finding  of specific intent,  noting
          that the  defendant's act of burning documents occurred "after he
          knew about the investigation  that was in progress" and  that the
          defendant  had in mind "an idea of preventing the Government from
          obtaining  relevant material  evidence."   We require  no greater
          precision  from  a  sentencing  court.    See  United  States  v.
                                                    ___  ______________
          Gonzales, 12 F.3d 298, 299-300 (1st Cir. 1993).
          ________

                                          7

          on obstruction  of justice involves a  strained interpretation of

          the  constitutional  right against  compelled self-incrimination.

          He  posits that  the  papers he  burned  were personal  papers   

          letters of apology   not prepared in the course of committing the

          offense, and he asseverates that it was  his constitutional right

          to   incinerate  these   personal  papers   in  order   to  avoid

          incriminating   himself.     This   argument   misconstrues   the

          protections that the Fifth Amendment offers.

                    The  law  is clear  that,  though  the Fifth  Amendment

          protects  against  the  compelled  preparation  of  incriminating

          documents  as  well  as   the  compelled  production  of  private

          documents when the act of production itself is incriminating, the

          Amendment does  not act  as a  general bar  to the production  of

          private information  voluntarily prepared.  See  United States v.
                                                      ___  _____________

          Doe,  465 U.S. 605, 610-11  (1984); Fisher v.  United States, 425
          ___                                 ______     _____________

          U.S. 391, 400-01 (1976).  Once  an individual chooses voluntarily

          to prepare a written account, the act of preparation serves as an

          effective waiver of the Fifth  Amendment's protections.  See Doe,
                                                                   ___ ___

          465  U.S. at 610-11.  In other  words, just as a defendant cannot

          begin to testify  at trial and  then change his  mind, a  suspect

          cannot create a testimonial communication embodying incriminating

          admissions and then  choose to destroy it  when he knows that  it

          has become relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.

                    In  this  instance,  the  defendant  concedes  that  he

          voluntarily  prepared  letters  of   apology,  but  he  claims  a

          privilege on  the  basis that  the  letters were  private  papers

                                          8

          unrelated to the commission  of the crime.   This point does  not

          aid the defendant's quest.

                    The  Fifth Amendment does not deal  with the privacy of

          the contents of documents, but, rather, with the voluntariness of

          their preparation and production.   See Fisher, 425 U.S.  at 401.
                                              ___ ______

          This  court has  stated  that  if  the  privilege  against  self-

          incrimination applies at all  to the contents of  private papers,

          it does so  "only in rare situations, where  compelled disclosure

          would break the heart of our sense of privacy."  In re Grand Jury
                                                           ________________

          Subpoena, 973 F.2d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations and internal
          ________

          quotation  marks  omitted).    The  defendant's  letters,  as  he

          describes them, do not fit this mold.

                    The appellant  goes one  step further when  he suggests

          that the  privilege against self-incrimination includes the right

          to  destroy  voluntarily  prepared   documents.    Otherwise,  he

          maintains, any time a defendant authors personal notes that might

          aid  an investigation, and  later decides to  eradicate them, the

          fact  of destruction  could be  used to  enhance his  punishment.

          This may be so   but the contention that such a rule violates the

          privilege against self-inculpation  distorts the contours  of the

          Fifth  Amendment.   There  is simply  no constitutional  right to

          destroy evidence.

                    The Supreme Court made the  point bluntly in Segura  v.
                                                                 ______

          United States, 468 U.S.  796 (1984).  There the Court stated that
          _____________

          the very  idea  of such  a right  "defies both  logic and  common

          sense."  Id. at  816; accord United States v.  Corral-Corral, 899
                   ___          ______ _____________     _____________

                                          9

          F.2d 927, 930 (10th Cir. 1990); Hancock v. Nelson, 363 F.2d  249,
                                          _______    ______

          254 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 984 (1967).  Though a
                               _____ ______

          person  ordinarily may refuse to prepare  or produce any evidence

          that is self-incriminating, see,  e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427
                                      ___   ____  ________    ________

          U.S. 463, 475 (1976), that privilege  in no way suggests that the

          person  may take  affirmative action  to destroy evidence    even

          evidence that  he himself  has created    once he  is aware  that

          authorities  are searching for it  (or something like  it).  That

          act  of affirmative  misconduct,  undertaken with  the intent  of

          hindering an extant investigation, is the paradigmatic example of

          an  obstruction  of  justice.    See  U.S.S.G.   3C1.1,  comment.
                                           ___

          (n.3(d)) (Nov. 1994).

                    Nor  do  the sentencing  guidelines  provide a  special

          layer  of swaddling.  To be sure, the Sentencing Commission wrote

          that the  enhancement for obstruction of justice "is not intended

          to  punish  a  defendant for  the  exercise  of a  constitutional

          right."   U.S.S.G.   3C1.1, comment.  (n.1)  (Nov. 1994).    This

          reminder  of Fifth  Amendment  safeguards simply  means that  the

          enhancement should not apply to a defendant who does no more than

          stand  upon  his  rights,  say, by  maintaining  his  silence  or

          refusing  voluntarily to  disclose  evidence of  his guilt.   See
                                                                        ___

          Thomas W. Hutchison  & David Yellen,  Federal Sentencing Law  and
                                                ___________________________

          Practice     3C1.1  author's   comment  4  (1994).    Affirmative
          ________

          misconduct, however,  is the intended target  of the obstruction-

          of-justice  enhancement, and, as  such, increasing  a defendant's

          sentence  for  affirmative  misconduct  does  not  trespass  upon

                                          10

          protected terrain.

                    In sum,  the defendant's  act of  burning incriminating

          documents was not shielded  by the Fifth Amendment even  if those

          documents comprised  personal  papers that  he  himself  created.

          Hence,  the  sentencing court  did not  err  when it  applied the

          section 3C1.1 enhancement in this case.4

                               B.  Vulnerable Victims.
                               B.  Vulnerable Victims.
                                   __________________

                    Feldman's second  assignment  of error  calumnizes  the

          district  court's imposition  of  a  two-level upward  adjustment

          attributable to the Rabbs' status as vulnerable victims.5 

                    1.   Generic  Traits.   The defendant's  first sally   
                    1.   Generic  Traits.
                         _______________

          which contends that the sentencing court applied the  wrong legal

          standard  because   it  based  the  enhancement   on  the  Rabbs'

          membership in a generic  class of elderly persons rather  than on

          some individualized vulnerability that  they might have possessed

            need not occupy us for long.  We are in  general agreement with

          the  defendant's premise:   in  determining  the propriety  of an

          upward  adjustment  for  vulnerability,  the  sentencing  court's

          sights   must    be   trained   on    the   victim's   individual
                              
          ____________________

               4At oral  argument defense counsel suggested  that the Fifth
          Amendment  applied here  because  the  letters  were  preliminary
          drafts  rather than finished products.   We do  not consider that
          argument.  It was not made below,  it was not made in the briefs,
          and it was  not developed at any time.   It is, therefore, triply
          waived.

               5The guidelines provide  for a  two-level upward  adjustment
          when an  offender "knew or should have known that a victim of the
          offense was unusually vulnerable  due to age, physical  or mental
          condition,   or  that   a  victim   was  otherwise   particularly
          susceptible  to the  criminal  conduct."   U.S.S.G.  3A1.1  (Nov.
          1994).

                                          11

          characteristics.   Thus, in order to warrant a finding of unusual

          vulnerability, there must be some evidence, above and beyond mere

          membership  in a large class, that the victim possessed a special

          weakness  that the  defendant exploited.   See  United  States v.
                                                     ___  ______________

          Smith,  930 F.2d 1450,  1455 (10th  Cir.) (holding  that advanced
          _____

          age,   without  more,   does  not   render  a   victim  unusually

          vulnerable), cert. denied, 502  U.S. 879 (1991); see  also United
                       _____ ______                        ___  ____ ______

          States v. Rowe, 999 F.2d 14,  17 (1st Cir. 1993) (cautioning that
          ______    ____

          courts  cannot predicate  a finding  of unusual  vulnerability on

          generalizations about large classes to which the victim belongs).

                     Contrary  to the  defendant's importuning,  the record

          reflects  that the  district  court apprehended  and applied  the

          standard enunciated above.   This conclusion is buttressed in two

          separate  ways.  First,  at the  sentencing hearing  Judge Gorton

          explicitly found  (a) that "the  defendant knew that  the victim,

          Norman  Rabb,  was elderly  and  that his  mental  faculties were
                                      _____________________________________

          failing"  (emphasis  supplied),   and  (b)  that  the   defendant
          _______

          proceeded to exploit this condition.  Second, the judge expressly

          adopted  the factual  findings contained  in the  PSI Report    a

          document  that  made  clear,  inter   alia,  that  Mr.  Rabb  was
                                        _____   ____

          physically  debilitated and that the Rabbs  were unable to handle

          their  personal finances.  We have accepted such findings as long

          as the purport and intent of the sentencing court is clear.   See
                                                                        ___

          United  States  v. Savoie,  985 F.2d  612,  620 (1st  Cir. 1993).
          ______________     ______

          These adopted findings qualify under that test.

                    To say more would be supererogatory.  The record simply

                                          12

          does not bear out the claim that the sentencing court applied the

          enhancement only  because the Rabbs were  octogenarians or shared

          certain generic aspects of a class of elderly persons.

                    2.  Targeting.   The defendant  also contends that  the
                    2.  Targeting.
                        _________

          sentencing  court erred  in  applying section  3A1.1 because  the

          government  did not show that he  targeted the Rabbs due to their

          particular  vulnerability to  the planned  fraud.   This argument

          prescinds from the Sentencing Commission's advisory (now revoked,

          but  in  effect on  the date  of  Feldman's sentencing)  that the

          adjustment  here  in  question  "applies  to  offenses  where  an

          unusually vulnerable victim is made a target of criminal activity

          by the defendant."  U.S.S.G.  3A1.1, comment. (n.1)  (Nov. 1994).

          The defendant maintains that, unless we are prepared to disregard

          Rowe's interpretation  of the  "target" language, the  government
          ____

          must demonstrate  that the offender selected  his victims because

          of some "special susceptibility."  Rowe, 999 F.2d at 17.
                                             ____

                    A backward glance helps to place this asseveration into

          perspective.  Application Note 1, in its pre-1995 form, proved to

          be controversial.  In particular, the "target" language split the

          circuits on the issue of whether the government had to prove that

          the defendant was motivated by the victim's special vulnerability

          in  order to  lay a  foundation for  the upward  adjustment, see,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., United States  v. Smith, 39 F.3d 119,  124 (6th Cir. 1994);
          ____  _____________     _____

          United States  v. Cree,  915 F.2d  352, 354  (8th Cir. 1990),  or
          _____________     ____

          whether  the  government merely  had to  show that  the defendant

          targeted his  victim with the knowledge  (actual or constructive)

                                          13

          that  the  victim was  unusually  vulnerable,  see, e.g.,  United
                                                         ___  ____   ______

          States  v. O'Brien, 50 F.3d 751, 754-55  (9th Cir. 1995).  Dictum
          ______     _______

          in Rowe  tended to edge this  court toward the former  view.  See
             ____                                                       ___

          Rowe, 999 F.2d at 17.
          ____

                    We  need not probe the point more deeply.  For purposes

          of the  case at hand,  the dispute is  academic; either  way, the

          proof suffices.  As  for future cases, the  Sentencing Commission

          has  removed all reasonable  doubt by amending  the commentary to

          section  3A1.1.  In an  effort to resolve  "some inconsistency in

          the  application  of   3A1.1  regarding whether  this  adjustment

          required proof  that the  defendant had  `targeted the  victim on

          account of the victim's vulnerability,'" U.S.S.G. App. C., Amend.

          521,  at 430  (Nov. 1995),  the Commission  deleted  the "target"

          language.   The revised  note merely  states that  the vulnerable

          victim  provision "applies  to  offenses  involving an  unusually

          vulnerable victim in  which the  defendant knows  or should  have

          known of  the victim's unusual vulnerability."   U.S.S.G.  3A1.1,

          comment.  (n.2) (Nov. 1995).  In future cases this provision, not

          our statements in Rowe, will govern.
                            ____

                    Applying  Rowe  generously,  i.e.,  assuming  arguendo,
                              ____                                ________

          favorably to Feldman, that targeting was an essential  element of

          the government's proof, the  defendant's argument founders.  Rowe
                                                                       ____

          merely requires that a special susceptibility have  been a factor

          in the offender's process of selecting  his prey.  See id. at 16-
                                                             ___ ___

          17 & n.3.  This means that  the government did not need to  prove

          here  that  the defendant  set  out  to  defraud elderly,  infirm

                                          14

          people,  and targeted the  Rabbs because they  fit the bill.   It

          also means that  the government  did not need  to prove that  the

          Rabbs' infirmities were the sole reason that the defendant zeroed

          in on them.   Even under the Rowe regime,  expansively construed,
                                       ____

          the government had to  show only that the defendant  selected the

          Rabbs  as his  victims  in part  because  they were  elderly  and

          infirm.   See Cree, 915 F.2d at 354 (explaining that "enhancing a
                    ___ ____

          defendant's sentence  based on victim vulnerability  is justified

          only when a  defendant's actions  in some way  exploited or  took
                                            ___________

          advantage of that vulnerability") (emphasis supplied).

                    The  record  in this  case  contains  more than  enough

          evidence to  justify a finding  that the  defendant targeted  the

          Rabbs  because of their vulnerability.  After all, he entered the

          Rabbs'  employ  only  because  of  their  infirmity and,  in  his

          capacity as a home care assistant, he gained copious knowledge of

          their  afflictions.   Knowing  of their  diminished capacity,  he

          obtained  information necessary  to carry  out  his plot.   Given

          these and other facts,  we believe that the record  establishes a

          nexus   between   victims'   susceptibility    and   victimizer's

          criminality adequate  to establish targeting.   See United States
                                                          ___ _____________

          v. Pavao,  948 F.2d 74, 78  (1st Cir. 1991).   Thus, the district
             _____

          court's  finding  that  the  defendant targeted  his  victims  on

          account of their age and infirmity warrants our approbation.

                    We need  go no further.   Here, the  defendant selected

          his  victims because he had been their personal caretaker and had

          discovered their vulnerabilities at first hand.  The victims were

                                          15

          elderly, in failing  health, and  no longer in  control of  their

          finances.  The  defendant enacted his scheme  with full knowledge

          that  these  vulnerabilities  would  make  his  crime  easier  to

          accomplish.  Consequently, the district court did not clearly err

          in determining that the Rabbs were vulnerable  victims within the

          scope  of U.S.S.G.   3A1.1, and  that the defendant  had targeted

          them on that basis.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                                          16