Court Opinion

ID: 9893415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 21:05:47.862234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:23.049488
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 220658-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                          NOTICE
 Decision filed 10/26/23. The
                                                                               This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0658
                                                                               Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                  not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                          limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                     under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

JEFFREY S. VOGELPOHL,                           )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                      )     Madison County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 21-CH-204
                                                )
GREGORY HACKER,                                 )     Honorable
                                                )     A. Ryan Jumper,
      Defendant-Appellee.                       )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.
         Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Cates concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: Where the plaintiff, Jeffrey S. Vogelpohl, was not required to exhaust state
               administrative remedies before bringing his United States and Illinois constitutional
               claims, the trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction and the trial court’s
               dismissal of the complaint with prejudice was improper. We reverse and remand
               for further proceedings.

¶2       The plaintiff, Jeffrey S. Vogelpohl (Vogelpohl), appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of

his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Vogelpohl sued the Captain Bureau Chief of

the Firearms Services Bureau, Gregory Hacker, in his official capacity, seeking injunctive relief

from the revocation of his firearm owners identification (FOID) card. The trial court dismissed

Vogelpohl’s complaint with prejudice on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

We reverse and remand.

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¶3                                         I. Background

¶4     The core issue on appeal in this case is whether Vogelpohl was required to exhaust his

Illinois administrative remedies before he could file this suit in chancery court. We include only

the relevant facts to the narrow issue before this court on appeal.

¶5     In his amended complaint, Vogelpohl alleged that in 2021 he applied for and received a

FOID card. In October 2021, Vogelpohl unsuccessfully attempted to complete a transfer of two

firearms from a licensed firearm dealer. The transaction was disapproved because his FOID card

had been revoked due to an alleged felony cannabis possession conviction in 1980. He was

officially notified of the FOID card revocation one week later.

¶6     In August 1980, the State charged Vogelpohl with possession of more than 500 grams of a

substance containing cannabis in Pike County, Illinois. In September 1980, Vogelpohl entered a

guilty plea for which he was sentenced to two years of probation. Vogelpohl was successfully

discharged from probation in September 1982. The probation to which Vogelpohl was sentenced

qualified as a “second chance” form of probation pursuant to section 10 of the Cannabis Control

Act (720 ILCS 550/10 (West 2020)). The candidates for this type of probation are first-time felony

offenders. Id. § 10(a). Upon fulfillment of the term of probation, the court must discharge the

person and dismiss the proceedings against him. Id. § 10(f). “[D]ischarge and dismissal under this

Section is not a conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon

conviction of a crime ***.” Id. § 10(g).

¶7     Vogelpohl specifically alleged that he had a constitutional right to keep and bear arms

pursuant to the second amendment of the United States Constitution applicable to the states

pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const., amends. II, XIV.

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¶8     The State asked the trial court to dismiss Vogelpohl’s first amended complaint because he

only sought relief pursuant to the United States and Illinois Constitutions, and not under the Illinois

Firearm Owners Identification Act (FOID Act). Although Vogelpohl framed his claims in

constitutional terms, the State argued that the FOID Act was the appropriate vehicle for

Vogelpohl’s relief as what he ultimately sought was the return of his FOID card. Pursuant to the

FOID Act, the State argued that his claim or appeal should not have been filed in state court but

should have been filed directly with the Illinois State Police Director. Thus, the State contended

that Vogelpohl must exhaust administrative remedies before he seeks constitutional relief.

¶9     The trial court agreed with the State’s analysis and dismissed Vogelpohl’s complaint on

the basis that he had yet to exhaust administrative remedies, and thus, the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to reach the constitutional claims. Vogelpohl timely appealed this order.

¶ 10                                        II. Analysis

¶ 11   We review the question of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction on a de novo basis.

Miller v. Department of State Police, 2014 IL App (5th) 130144, ¶ 8; Harper Square Housing

Corp. v. Hayes, 305 Ill. App. 3d 955, 959 (1999).

¶ 12   The Illinois State Police maintains the authority to revoke a previously issued FOID card

if it determines that the person to whom the card was issued no longer meets the eligibility criteria

or did not meet the eligibility criteria when the card was issued. 430 ILCS 65/8(c) (West 2020). In

Illinois, a party may not seek judicial review of a FOID card revocation if administrative remedies

are available. Sedlock v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the City of Ottawa, 367

Ill. App. 3d 526, 527-28 (2006). Stated another way, administrative remedies must be exhausted

before a party may seek judicial review. Id. The exhaustion doctrine allows full development of

the facts before the administrative agency which has expertise on the subject matter.

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¶ 13   The version of section 10(a) of the FOID Act in effect at the time the defendant’s FOID

card was revoked plainly set forth two procedural paths for challenging the denial or revocation of

a FOID card. 430 ILCS 65/10(a) (West 2020). The first path required the rejected or revoked

applicant to appeal within the agency to the Director of the Illinois State Police. Id. However, if

the revocation was based upon specific crimes, including violations of the Illinois Cannabis

Control Act classified as a Class 2 felony or greater, then “the aggrieved party may petition the

circuit court in writing in the county of his or her residence for a hearing.” Id.

¶ 14   While we understand the foundation of the trial court’s order concluding that Vogelpohl

must first exhaust his administrative remedies, we conclude that the trial court’s order was in error.

Having reviewed Vogelpohl’s amended complaint, there is no question that his claim factually

began with his state efforts to administratively obtain his FOID card. However, after his FOID

card was revoked, Vogelpohl legally raised constitutional claims, stating: “At all times relevant,

Plaintiff has a constitutional right to keep and bear arms, including handguns, at least, in his private

home, for private self defense, under the Second Amendment, said Amendment being incorporated

against the states under the 14th Amendment.” As Vogelpohl correctly stated, the government

“bears the burden of establishing that laws that infringe on Second Amendment rights are

constitutional.”

¶ 15   The United States Supreme Court has held that an individual need not exhaust state

administrative remedies before seeking relief pursuant to the Civil Rights Act. Patsy v. Board of

Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 501-12 (1982) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed.,

Supp. IV)). The Supreme Court found that the United States government was established “as a

guarantor of the basic federal rights of individuals against incursions by state power.” Id. at 503.

The Court quoted its own decision in Mitchum v. Foster stating that the purpose of § 1983 of the

                                                   4
Civil Rights Act was “to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as

guardians of the people’s federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under

color of state law, ‘whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.’ ” Mitchum v. Foster,

407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)). The Supreme

Court also found that congressional intent provided strong evidence that exhaustion of state

administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a civil rights action. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 507-12.

¶ 16     In accordance with United States Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that given the

structure of Vogelpohl’s constitutional claims, he was not required to exhaust administrative

remedies—to the extent that any existed in this case—before raising his constitutional claims in

court.

¶ 17                                     III. Conclusion

¶ 18     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County is hereby

reversed and the cause is remanded.

¶ 19     Reversed and remanded.

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