Court Opinion

ID: 9732898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:42:34.963944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:36.096489
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BRESLIN, dissenting: Because I believe that the plaintiffs do not have a right to insist that the Review Board assess their property at an amount that is less than the fair market value, and because I believe the PTAB lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, I would analyze this case differently. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. The tax statute applicable during the tax year in dispute mandates that "[e]ach tract or lot of real property shall be valued at 33⅓ % of its fair cash value.” 35 ILCS 205/20 (West 1992). The fact that "other property *** may have been undervalued is irrelevant as to whether [the plaintiffs’ property] was valued in excess of fair market value.” In re Application of Rosewell, 106 Ill. 2d 311, 325, 478 N.E.2d 343 (1985). The plaintiffs admit that their property was assessed at its fair cash value. Thus, it is clear that the assessment was proper under the statute. But the plaintiffs complain that they are entitled to an assessment that is statutorily invalid because other properties have received such an assessment. In my view, the plaintiffs are not entitled to such relief even though the mass appraisal system that was used here is vulnerable to constitutional attack. Neither the PTAB nor the courts can order that an incorrect assessment be substituted for an admittedly correct one. Two wrongs do not make a right. Moreover, the plaintiffs may not attack the constitutionality of the mass appraisal system before the PTAB. The statute that provides for appeals to the PTAB limits the appeals before it. Section 111.1 of the Revenue Act of 1939 provides that a taxpayer may appeal the decision of a Board of Review "as such decision pertains to the assessment of his property for taxation purposes.” 35 ILCS 205/111.1 (West 1992). This is the only power of review granted to the PTAB. It is well settled that an administrative body has only those powers that are expressly granted to it by statute. E.g., People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 22 Ill. App. 3d 316, 317 N.E.2d 121 (1974). Accordingly, I would hold that the PTAB lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the assessment scheme used by the Review Board was unconstitutional. In addition, I question whether the circuit court should entertain such constitutional considerations in an administrative review of a PTAB decision. While it is true that the circuit court may consider a constitutional challenge to a statute on. administrative review (Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Department of Revenue, 163 Ill. 2d 290, 644 N.E.2d 1166 (1994)), the plaintiffs in this case have not challenged the constitutionality of a statute. Although judicial review of administrative decisions is available in part to guard the constitutional rights of those who are subject to administrative action (Murray v. Board of Review, 237 Ill. App. 3d 792, 604 N.E.2d 1040 (1992)), judicial review of constitutional questions that were not properly before the administrative agency and that do not concern the agency’s conduct is not appropriate. Accordingly, I would hold that administrative review is limited to questions concerning the constitutionality of the agency’s actions and procedures. Here, the plaintiffs are not challenging the constitutionality of the PTAB’s procedures or decision. They challenge instead the constitutionality of the mass appraisal system as imposed by the Pekin Township tax assessor. Such a challenge must be brought against Pekin Township in the circuit court to force township officials to assess property in the township at its fair cash value. To recap, property must be assessed at its fair cash value and the PTAB’s function is to determine whether the board of review has complied with this statutory requirement. In this case, the plaintiffs agree that their property was assessed at its fair market value, and they have not claimed that the PTAB acted unconstitutionally in reviewing the assessment. Rather, the plaintiffs claim that the Review Board’s assessment method is unconstitutional. This is not the type of claim that the PTAB may consider, nor is administrative review of the PTAB’s decision the appropriate method to raise this challenge.