Court Opinion

ID: 9663787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:50:42.689694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:56.489645
License: Public Domain

Peterson, Justice
(concurring specially).
A basic concern of this court must be to strive for greater fairness in the administration of criminal justice. The ultimate concern is to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction, a concern for the poor as much as for the affluent. A correlative consideration, nevertheless, must be to protect society from burdens that, if intolerable, might impair the administration of justice. Achieving the right balance between these competing considerations inherently requires that lines be drawn, a pragmatism that seldom achieves an ideal result.
The court has decided that the line should not be permanently drawn to exclude all misdemeanors from the class of offenses for which counsel should be provided to the indigent accused, and with this I concur. The majority, however, would include any offense statutorily defined as a misdemeanor if confinement in jail or prison is the direct or even alternative result,1 but with this I disagree.
I would draw a different line for now and exclude from the operation of the rule any violations of highway traffic regulation statutes and those cases of violations of the criminal code constituting misdemeanors where incarceration is only the alternative punishment upon failure to pay the fine or to comply with other conditions imposed by the court.
The line which I propose is an empirical one, with no pretense that it is logically unassailable. There is much that could be said for a legislative *402reclassification of misdemeanors to distinguish “petty” from “serious” misdemeanors for purposes of furnishing counsel, but for now I think the line to which I would subscribe has the present virtue of greater certainty. The element of incarceration is the key to the rule-proposed by the majority. I think, however, there is a basis for difference between short confinement in a workhouse and imprisonment in the state penitentiary. I think, too, that there is a difference between incarceration as the only punishment meted out by the court and incarceration only in the event the convicted offender fails to pay the fine or comply with other condition imposed by the court.2 Even though the penalties for violation of some highway traffic regulation's are more severe than for some; violations of the criminal code, I nevertheless would exclude such offenses from the rule on the ground that traffic infractions are historically considered to be less serious transgressions, distinguishable from more serious offenses and crimes,, and that more summary disposition without the benefit of defense counsel is not inherently so unfair as to require the furnishing of counsel.3
We deal here with a rule of court which, although having constitutional overtones, is based neither on constitution nor statute. As for statute, the legislature has plainly drawn the line between felonies and gross misdemeanors on the one hand and simple misdemeanors on the other hand,4 a consideration not without relevance in view of the legislative responsi*403bility to fund the extension of furnished counsel to indigents.5 As for constitution, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has held that providing counsel for indigents accused of misdemeanors is constitutionally mandated. The United States Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to so extend the concept of constitutional guarantees, a forbearance dramatically underscored by the denial of certiorari in Winters v. Beck, 385 U. S. 907, 87 S. Ct. 207, 17 L. ed. (2d) 137, in which an Arkansas misdemeanant charged with “immorality” was sentenced to 30 days in jail and assessed a $254 fine and, because of his inability to pay the fine, was confined under the Arkansas “dollar-a-day” statute to incarceration at the state’s prison farm for an additional 254 day's. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, urged the court to (385 U. S. 908, 87 S. Ct. 208, 17 L. ed. [2d] 138) “clarify the scope of Gideon v. Wainwright” but, as he at the same time noted, he did “not suggest what the ultimate resolution of this problem should be.” 6
The apparent reticence of the United States Supreme Court to consider cases demanding furnished counsel for misdemeanants, I am convinced, has been an exercise in “creative ambiguity,” the court wishing more time and experience to assess the probable consequence's of extending constitutional requirements for counsel. I do not for a moment suggest that Minnesota should defer appropriate action until the United States Supreme Court by decision compels it as a constitutional requirement. I do think, however, that it would be constructive not to proceed *404so far so soon in the absence of fuller opportunity to measure the impact of a less sweeping rule than announced in today’s case.
The majority opinion does not suggest at what point the right of counsel would end. I should think, however, that the right now conferred will be substantially coextensive with the right of indigents accused of felonies or gross misdemeanors. One major consequence will be to require counsel for appellate review, and at this point a most serious burden may well result. It is a matter of general knowledge that many people who can afford to do so nevertheless do not engage counsel in defense of traffic violations,7 let alone incur the expense of appellate review. The indigent defendant will not be so inhibited and would have the right to enter a plea of not guilty, no matter how baseless or dubious the defense — and to pursue the same defense on appeal. He is then favorably situated for “plea bargaining” to save the state substantial expense.8 The *405indigent defendant is accordingly granted more than equal protection of the laws.9
I concur in the remand in this case for a reevaluation of defendant’s claim of indigence, and I agree that if the punishment is to be direct incarceration counsel must be appointed.

 The majority, in fact, expressly leave open at least the possibility that today’s rule may later be altered to require counsel for indigents even where only a fine is imposed. Such extension might logically be required if the requirement of counsel is ever squarely based on Fourteenth Amendment rights, for that constitutional mandate provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (Italics supplied.)

 I recognize, of course, that for some indigents the requirement of an unpayable fine would be tantamount to direct imposition of the alternative incarceration, but at least part of the answer in such circumstances would be to assess fines more nearly in accordance with the offender’s ability to pay. In many cases, on the other hand, the accused, even though indigent for purposes of furnishing counsel, can pay a fine or comply with other conditions imposed by the court, so that he carries the key to the workhouse in his own pocket.

 See, People v. Letterio, 16 N. Y. (2d) 307, 266 N. Y. S. (2d) 368, 213 N. E. (2d) 670. I do not argue that there may not be occasional miscarriage of justice in traffic cases, but I do argue that even in those cases such result might well be the same in many instances even if counsel is present.

 See, Minn. St. 611.07, subd. 1; 611.12.

 It is true that lawyers will in many instances render gratuitous service for indigent offenders, as they have done so magnificently in the cases involving indigents accused of felonies and gross misdemeanors. However, I would rather doubt that lawyers will have the same enthusiasm for rendering service to indigents accused of traffic violations or some of the more petty misdemeanor crimes.

 There may be cases in other states where a result as in Arkansas under its statute may well be offensive, and which ultimately may cause the United States Supreme Court to expand the scope of the constitutional right to counsel; but such an extreme situation could not exist in Minnesota, where the penalty for a misdemeanor is limited to imprisonment for not more than 90 days orto payment of a fine of not more than $100. Minn. St. 609.03(3).

 It is also a matter of general knowledge, I think, that many defendants in cases of traffic violations demand a jury trial for purposes of delaying the ultimate day of reckoning, particularly in cases where the driver’s license may be suspended or revoked.

 I recognize, with deference, the recommendation of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice which, as an “immediate minimum,” recommended that counsel be appointed for “all criminal defendants who are in danger of substantial loss of liberty.” (Italics supplied.) The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, p. 150. However, in the discussion preliminary to that recommendation (p. 149) it stated:
“* * * The recommendations earlier in this chapter regarding precharge conference, plea negotiation and early factfinding will, if implemented, increase the number of lawyers needed. Nor does the need for a lawyer terminate after sentence, for the appellate process and the collateral proceedings that may follow it are uniquely the province of the law-trained man, able to deal with technical legal issues with an advocate’s special skill.
“The provision of counsel entails costs beyond the expense of paying for their services. Counsel can be expected to require that the court deal deliberatively with his client; in many respects lawyers complicate the process. A court that has been adjudging men guilty and fixing their punishments in a matter of a few minutes is unlikely to be able to continue to do so when the accused persons before it are represented by lawyers. Defense counsel will demand compliance with the rules of evidence and make motions for *405discovery and suppression of evidence. Sometimes they will seek delay for tactical advantages, cast doubt on a truthful witness, or challenge legitimate proof.”
An indirect expense will be the time required for police officers to be in court when the defendant pleads not guilty, a real burden to under-manned police forces.

 Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart in dissent, has warned that the uncritical application of the equal protection clause “can lead only to mischievous results.” Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 361, 83 S. Ct. 814, 818, 9 L. ed. (2d) 811, 817. In the same case, Mr. Justice Clark, also dissenting, observed that neither the equal protection clause nor the due process clause should require a “useless gesture” without regard to “utter extravagance and a waste of the State’s funds.” 372 U. S. 353, 359, 83 S. Ct. 814, 817, 9 L. ed. (2d) 811, 816.