Court Opinion

ID: 9726179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:35:59.876458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:23.904426
License: Public Domain

CRAVEN, P. J., dissenting: I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County entered upon the verdict of the jury. The sole basis for this appeal is the alleged error in admitting the testimony of a state highway patrolman as to the speed of the vehicles prior to the collision. The police officer testified and expressed an opinion based on observations of the scene of the accident, the skid marks, the relative position of the vehicles and the damage to them. He arrived at the scene of the accident before either of the vehicles had been moved. He described the oil surface of the roadway. He measured the skid marks. He observed gouge marks, the terrain and the scene. This witness had nine years’ experience as a state patrolman. He had had special training as related in the majority opinion and had investigated some 450 to 500 accident cases. Under these circumstances and absent competent eyewitnesses, the admissibility of this testimony was within the sound discretion of the trial court and its admission was not an abuse of discretion. In Miller v. Pillsbury Co., 33 Ill2d 514, 211 NE2d 733 (1965), the Illinois Supreme Court talks of the admissibility of expert testimony and concluded that such testimony would be admissible since it was essential in aiding the jury to make proper inferences from the raw physical facts. In Miller, there were no objections to the qualifications of the expert. In Thomas v. Cagwin, 43 Ill App2d 336, 193 NE2d 233 (2d Dist 1963), a police officer witness was permitted to give his opinion as to the location on the roadway of the point of impact. The court there held that although this type of evidence should be admitted with caution, its admissibility rests within the discretion of the trial judge and there found no abuse of discretion. The qualifications of the police officer in this case are not asserted to equal the qualifications of the expert in Miller, but from all that can be gleaned from the statement in the Thomas case the police officer here possessed more qualifications than in Thomas. The annotation found in 66 ALR2d 1048, et seq., is referred to in Miller and in Thomas. The latter case quotes, with approval, language to the effect that there is a strong and apparently growing authority recognizing that skilled or expert opinion is admissible upon the question. The question there being referred to is place of collision. An annotation in 93 ALR2d 287, et seq., seems not to establish any logical difference between opinion evidence on speed as distinguished from opinion evidence on point of impact as was admitted in Thomas. The language of the Supreme Court in Miller and the Appellate Court in Thomas permits of the admissibility of the testimony of the state trooper in this case. The nature and extent of his qualification as an expert goes to the weight that should be given his testimony, and not its admissibility. As stated in Buckler v. Sinclair Refining Co., 68 Ill App2d 283, 293 (216 NE2d 14, 19 (5th Dist 1966)): “To render an opinion an expert need only possess special skill or knowledge beyond that of the average layman, and the determination of his qualifications rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. People v. Jennings, 252 Ill 534, 550, 96 NE 1077. The weight to be attached to such an opinion is a question for the jury in light of the expert’s credentials, the facts upon which he bases his opinion and any limitations placed thereon during cross-examination. . . .” In my view, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the testimony of the trooper.