Court Opinion

ID: 9958259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 17:01:09.057013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.828896
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6061    Document: 010111028109   Date Filed: 04/08/2024   Page: 1
                                                                            FILED
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                     PUBLISH                            Tenth Circuit

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       April 8, 2024

                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                             FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                      Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  BRYAR G. JOHNSON,

         Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                    No. 23-6061

  METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND
  CASUALTY INSURANCE
  COMPANY, d/b/a Metlife Auto and
  Home,

         Defendant - Appellee.
                      _________________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Oklahoma
                          (D.C. No. 5:21-CV-00490-JD)
                       _________________________________

 Rex Travis of Travis Law Office, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff -
 Appellant.

 Michael Woodson (Nevin R. Kirkland with him on the brief) of Edmonds Cole
 Law Firm, PC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant - Appellee.
                    _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

 PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
                    _________________________________

       Bryar Johnson was seriously injured in a traffic accident in Tulsa,

 Oklahoma. First, a lane-changing car collided with his motorcycle, and then
Appellate Case: 23-6061   Document: 010111028109     Date Filed: 04/08/2024     Page: 2

 another car ran him over and dragged him down the road. After collecting the

 liability limits from the other two drivers’ insurance policies, Bryar claimed

 uninsured motorist (UM) coverage from his parents’ automobile policy with

 Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (MetLife). MetLife

 denied Bryar’s claim under an exclusion to his parents’ policy that denies

 coverage to resident-relative insureds injured while operating their own motor

 vehicle that is “not insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy.” App. vol. I, at

 68. Though Bryar carried liability insurance on his motorcycle, he had declined

 to purchase the offered UM coverage.

       Guided by Oklahoma’s UM caselaw interpreting its motor-vehicle-

 insurance statutes, we conclude that MetLife’s exclusion does not defeat UM

 coverage for Bryar. Because Bryar carried liability insurance on his

 motorcycle, we hold that his motorcycle was “insured by a motor vehicle

 insurance policy.” In its UM exclusion, MetLife chose not to require that

 resident-relative insureds (as Bryar was) carry UM coverage on their own

 motor vehicles to be eligible for UM benefits on other applicable policies (as

 his parents’ policy was to him). That means MetLife owes Bryar UM coverage

 from his parents’ policy. For this and the reasons below, we affirm in part,

 reverse in part, and remand.

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                                 BACKGROUND

 I.    Factual Background

       In November 2018, Bryar was in an auto accident involving two other

 cars while riding his motorcycle in Tulsa, Oklahoma. 1 The first motorist

 changed lanes immediately in front of Bryar’s motorcycle, causing Bryar to

 collide with the rear of the car. The collision ejected Bryar off his motorcycle

 onto the road. Then, a second motorist ran over Bryar and dragged him about

 150 feet before stopping.

       Both motorists paid out the state-mandated $25,000 per person liability

 limits on their auto policies. See Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 7-324. Because Bryar’s

 injuries exceeded this amount, Bryar sought additional UM benefits as a

 resident-relative covered under his parents’ (the Johnsons’) MetLife policy. 2

 But MetLife denied Bryar’s UM claim, asserting that its policy excluded

 coverage to resident-relatives operating their own motor vehicles without UM

       1
        We call Bryar by his first name throughout this opinion to avoid
 confusion with his parents, whom we call “the Johnsons.”
       2
         The policy defines “Uninsured Motor Vehicle” as a motor vehicle for
 which the “policy applies at the time of the accident but the limit for bodily
 injury liability is less than the amount of the claim.” App. vol. II, at 25.
 Technically, we understand this type of coverage to be underinsured motorist
 coverage because, though the other vehicles were insured, their liability limits
 were too low to cover the cost of Bryar’s injuries. But MetLife’s policy folds
 such vehicles into its definition of “uninsured motor vehicle,” so we stick with
 that term as used by the policy and the parties. Id.
                                          3
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 coverage. So even though Bryar had bought liability insurance for the

 motorcycle with GEICO, MetLife required that he carry UM coverage, too.

       The MetLife policy includes an endorsement for UM coverage up to

 $250,000 per person, including relatives. The policy defines “relative” as “a

 person related to [the policyholder] by blood, marriage or adoption . . . who

 resides in [the policyholder’s] household.” App. vol. I, at 26 ¶ 13. MetLife has

 stipulated that Bryar met this definition at the time of the accident. 3 Yet,

 MetLife denied Bryar’s UM claim under the following policy exclusion:

       We do not cover you or a relative who owns, leases or has available
       for their regular use, a motor vehicle if such motor vehicle is not
       insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy.

 Id. at 68.

       Bryar had bought a motor vehicle insurance policy with GEICO

 providing liability coverage for his motorcycle, but he had declined GEICO’s

 offer for UM coverage. Based on that, MetLife contended that the motorcycle

 had not been “insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy” at the time of the

 accident. Id. So, MetLife denied Bryar’s UM claim.

 II.   Procedural Background

       Bryar sued MetLife in Oklahoma state court for breach of contract. Bryar

 claimed that he was entitled to recover benefits as an insured under the

 Johnsons’ policy because he carried a liability-insurance policy with GEICO.

       3
           The MetLife policy also listed Bryar as a household driver.
                                          4
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 He argued that this satisfied MetLife’s requirement that he carry a “motor

 vehicle insurance policy” on his motorcycle. App. vol. I, at 15. MetLife

 removed the case to federal district court, based on diversity jurisdiction. 4

 MetLife then moved for summary adjudication and judgment that “[MetLife’s]

 policy contains a valid and enforceable exclusion under Oklahoma law” and

 summary judgment on Bryar’s breach-of-contract claim. 5 Id. at 70. Bryar cross-

 moved for partial summary judgment “that there is $250,000 underinsured

 motorist coverage for [his] injuries.” App. vol. II, at 1. Almost two months

 after Bryar moved for partial summary judgment, he filed for leave to amend

 his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) to add a claim for

 bad faith. 6

        Before the district court held a hearing on the competing motions, the

 parties stipulated to the few material facts, enabling the court to turn to the

 legal issue of insurance coverage. Reviewing Oklahoma’s UM statute, Okla.

 Stat. tit. 36, § 3636, and the applicable caselaw, the court ruled for MetLife.

        4
        Bryar is an Oklahoma resident; MetLife is incorporated and has its
 principal place of business in Rhode Island; the amount in controversy
 ($250,000) exceeds $75,000.
        5
         MetLife styled its motion as a “Motion for Summary Adjudication,” but
 the district court treated it as a motion for summary judgment. So we too treat
 MetLife’s motion as a motion for summary judgment.
        6
        Bryar alleged that “[t]he language relied upon [by MetLife] denies
 coverage when the vehicle an insured is operating is not insured for UM
 coverage, specifically. Because this language is not found in MetLife’s policy,
 the denial is improper, and is done in bad faith.” App. vol. II, at 87.
                                          5
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 The court found it dispositive that “[a]lthough [Bryar] was a resident relative

 and insured under his parents’ policy, [he] had the opportunity to purchase his

 own UM coverage, but he declined it.” App. vol. I, at 150. In other words, the

 court read Oklahoma law as requiring Bryar to either obtain liability insurance

 and UM coverage on his motorcycle policy or forego UM coverage under his

 parents’ policy. See id. (citing Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 221 P.3d 717, 730

 (Okla. 2009); Vickers v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 353 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1161

 (N.D. Okla. 2018)). That is, the district court read “motor vehicle insurance

 policy” as requiring UM coverage too.

        Next, the district court denied Bryar’s motion to amend his complaint. It

 ruled that the bad-faith claim was untimely under Oklahoma’s two-year statute

 of limitations for claims arising in tort, making Bryar’s motion to amend his

 complaint futile.

        In the end, the court granted MetLife’s motion for summary judgment,

 denied Bryar’s motion for partial summary judgment, denied Bryar’s motion for

 leave to amend, and entered judgment for MetLife.

        Bryar filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28

 U.S.C. § 1291.

 III.   Legal Background

        In 1968, the Oklahoma legislature enacted Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3636,

 which governs “Uninsured motorist coverage.” The statute requires all auto-

 insurance carriers to offer policyholders UM coverage with any general liability

                                         6
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 auto policy. See id. § 3636(A), (B). Policyholders may reject the UM coverage

 in writing. See id. § 3636(G).

       If a policyholder accepts UM coverage, then the insurance carrier must

 provide such coverage “for the protection of persons insured thereunder . . . to

 recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles . . .

 because of bodily injury.” Id. § 3636(B). 7 But § 3636(E) permits insurance

 carriers to exclude that otherwise-guaranteed UM coverage to insureds in

 limited situations. Section (E) provides:

       For purposes of this section, there is no coverage for any insured
       while occupying a motor vehicle owned by, or furnished or available
       for the regular use of the named insured, a resident spouse of the
       named insured, or a resident relative of the named insured, if such
       motor vehicle is not insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy.

       Tracking § 3636(E), MetLife’s UM endorsement excludes coverage to

 insureds as follows:

       We do not cover you or a relative who owns, leases or has available
       for their regular use, a motor vehicle if such motor vehicle is not
       insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy.

 App. vol. I, at 68 (emphases omitted and added).

       Section 3636 has spawned much Oklahoma state and federal caselaw,

 laying the boundaries for UM coverage and coverage exclusions under

 § 3636(E). But the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not decided the precise issue

       7
         The statute’s definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” includes “an
 insured motor vehicle, the liability limits of which are less than the amount of
 the claim of the person or persons making such claim.” Okla. Stat. tit. 36,
 § 3636(C).
                                         7
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 presented in this appeal. So “we must determine what decision the state court

 would make if faced with the same facts and issue.” Phillips v. State Farm Mut.

 Auto. Ins. Co., 73 F.3d 1535, 1537 (10th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). Oklahoma

 state courts and federal courts have produced a consistent line of authority that

 informs our analysis. See Reeves v. Enter. Prods. Partners, LP, 17 F.4th 1008,

 1012 (10th Cir. 2021) (advising that “a clear trend” of state law “can help give

 guidance to how we should apply state law” (citation omitted)).

                                  DISCUSSION

       Bryar appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for partial

 summary judgment and its grant of summary judgment for MetLife, as well as

 the court’s denial of his motion to amend his complaint to assert a bad-faith-

 insurance claim.

 I.    Motion for Summary Judgment

       We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment,

 “applying the same legal standard the district court used.” Edens v. Netherlands

 Ins. Co., 834 F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The parties

 stipulated to the material facts, so we can immediately consider whether Bryar

 is entitled to UM coverage under MetLife’s policy as a matter of law. See Fed.

 R. Civ. P. 56(a). Because this is a diversity-of-citizenship case, we apply

 Oklahoma’s substantive law in interpreting MetLife’s policy. Genzer v. James

 River Ins. Co., 934 F.3d 1156, 1167 (10th Cir. 2019).

                                         8
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       The district court granted MetLife summary judgment on Bryar’s breach-

 of-contract claim, reasoning that Bryar “had an opportunity to purchase UM

 coverage for his personal protection and declined [it] in writing.” App. vol. II,

 at 151. According to the court, this meant that MetLife “ha[d] no coverage

 obligations to [him].” Id. at 151–52. On appeal, Bryar maintains that MetLife

 owes him UM coverage up to $250,000 because his motorcycle in fact carried

 the “motor vehicle insurance policy” required by § 3636(E) and MetLife’s

 policy. Op. Br. at 8.

       A.     MetLife’s UM exclusion does not apply to Bryar.

       The UM exclusion in MetLife’s policy bars coverage to relative insureds

 who are injured while occupying their own motor vehicle if that vehicle “is not

 insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy.” App. vol. I, at 68. Thus, this

 appeal turns on a narrow legal issue—the meaning of “not insured by a motor

 vehicle insurance policy.” Id. If Bryar’s motorcycle indeed was “not insured by

 a motor vehicle insurance policy,” then MetLife’s exclusion applies. But if it

 was, then MetLife cannot deny Bryar coverage based on the exclusion.

       The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently reviewed a UM exclusion nearly

 identical to the one in MetLife’s policy. 8 Coates v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co.,

       8
         The Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Coates while this litigation was
 ongoing in the district court. At the time, Bryar filed a notice of supplemental
 authority with the district court. The court ordered supplemental briefing from
 the parties to discuss Coates’s impact on the case but, in issuing its decision,
 found that Coates “d[id] not change this analysis.” App. vol. II, at 146.
                                                                 (footnote continued)
                                          9
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  512 P.3d 345, 348–49 (Okla. 2022). In Coates, the plaintiff carried two auto

  policies on two motor vehicles (a motorcycle and a truck) with the same

  insurance carrier. Id. at 347. On the motorcycle policy, the insured obtained

  liability coverage but declined UM coverage. Id. On the truck policy, he

  obtained both liability and UM coverage. Id. The truck policy contained a UM

  exclusion that denied coverage “where an insured is injured while occupying a

  motor vehicle ‘owned by, or available for the regular use of, an insured,

  resident spouse, or resident relative,’ and that motor vehicle ‘is not insured by

  a motor vehicle insurance policy.’” Id. at 348 (emphasis added) (quoting Okla.

  Stat. tit. 36, § 3636(E)).

        After the insured was injured while riding his motorcycle, he claimed

  UM coverage from his truck policy. Id. at 347. But based on the above

  exclusion, the insurance carrier denied the plaintiff the UM coverage. Id. The

  plaintiff sued for breach of contract, and the case eventually made its way to

  the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id. at 347–48.

        The Oklahoma court ruled that the insurance carrier could not apply the

  truck policy’s UM exclusion in determining that the motorcycle was “not

  insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy.” See id. at 348–49. This was so

  because the motorcycle policy carried liability coverage, which meant it was

  Specifically, the court remarked that “Coates is factually distinguishable from
  the instant case because Coates had UM coverage on a separate vehicle,”
  whereas in this case “plaintiff was offered the opportunity to purchase UM
  coverage, but he declined to do so.” Id.
                                          10
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  insured by “a motor vehicle insurance policy,” even without UM coverage. Id.

  at 349. In short, the court ruled that the term “motor vehicle insurance policy”

  does not require insureds to carry UM and liability coverage on their vehicles.

  Id. Instead, insureds meet the “motor vehicle insurance policy” requirement

  under the § 3636(E) exclusion by purchasing “either, or both, liability and UM

  coverage.” 9 Id. (emphasis added). Essentially, the court decided that “‘a motor

  vehicle insurance policy’—means what it says.” Id. Thus, the court ruled that

  the insured was “entitled to the benefit of the UM coverage that he bought and

  paid for.” Id. at 350.

        MetLife argues that there is a “critical distinction between the facts of

  this case and Coates”: instead of claiming benefits under his own UM policy,

  Bryar seeks to recover as a resident insured under his parents’ policy. 10 Resp.

        9
          Though the court acknowledged that it had once “interpreted the term
  ‘motor vehicle policy’ . . . to include a policy for UM coverage,” the court
  clarified, “that interpretation is not exclusive.” Coates, 512 P.3d at 349–50
  (citing Morris v. Am. First Ins. Co., 240 P.3d 661, 664 (Okla. 2010)).
        10
           MetLife also contends that “if Coates had held an exclusion, which
  ‘mirrored’ [§ 3636(E)] invalid, it would have had the effect of abrogating the
  statute itself.” Resp. Br. at 5. That argument stretches Coates beyond its use in
  this appeal. Our analysis focuses solely on MetLife’s application of the UM
  exclusion to Bryar’s claim. We do not extend Coates beyond that limited
  purpose, nor should any of the discussion in this opinion be construed as
  commentary on the general validity of MetLife’s UM exclusion under
  § 3636(E).

                                          11
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  Br. at 8. But that distinction is meaningless. 11 Coates did not condition its

  ruling on the insured’s paying the premiums on the UM policy. This leaves us

  unpersuaded by MetLife’s contention that, essentially, Bryar needed to pay UM

  premiums to keep his UM coverage. 12 Instead, our concern lies with Bryar’s

  enduring status as an insured under the policy, and whether MetLife’s UM

  exclusion applies to strip him of the UM coverage he would otherwise be owed.

  In answering that question, Coates quickly sharpens into focus as the leading

  state-law authority. The UM exclusion in Coates exactly matches the plain

  language of MetLife’s exclusion: it denied UM coverage to resident-relative-

  owned vehicles “not insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy.” 512 P.3d at

  348. So in applying Oklahoma law, we import the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s

  interpretation of that identical language. See Amparan v. Lake Powell Car

  Rental Cos., 882 F.3d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 2018) (“When the federal courts are

        11
           We also recognize that the plaintiff in Coates held his liability and UM
  policies with the same insurance carrier, while Bryar and his parents hold their
  policies with different insurance carriers—GEICO and MetLife. MetLife
  doesn’t raise this factual distinction in its brief. But even if it had, the fact of
  multiple insurance carriers would not alter our analysis. Oklahoma courts allow
  an insured to recover UM benefits from an insurance carrier different than the
  one that covered the liability limits on the accident vehicle. See, e.g., Morris,
  240 P.3d at 662 (plaintiff carried liability insurance on the accident vehicle
  with his employer’s insurer; yet he claimed and recovered UM benefits under
  his mother’s policy with America First Insurance Company).
        12
          In arguing against Bryar’s receiving benefits, MetLife emphasizes that
  “Plaintiff has never paid for UM coverage.” Resp. Br. at 13.
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  called upon to interpret state law, the federal court must look to rulings of the

  highest state court . . . .” (citation omitted)).

        To start, MetLife stipulated that its policy covers Bryar as the Johnsons’

  “relative,” meaning that Bryar can recover UM benefits unless the exclusion

  applies. App. vol. I, at 27 ¶ 15. MetLife’s exclusion requires relative insureds

  to have carried “motor vehicle insurance,” id. at 68, on the vehicle they owned

  and occupied when injured, which we know from Coates includes policies that

  carry only liability coverage, see 512 P.3d at 349. Bryar bought liability

  coverage on the motorcycle, and MetLife offers no “other justification” for

  denying his claim. Coates, 512 P.3d at 349. We therefore conclude that Bryar’s

  liability insurance with GEICO saves him from MetLife’s exclusion.

        B.     MetLife unduly emphasizes Bryar’s previous opportunity to
               buy UM coverage.

        Before this court, MetLife argues that Bryar cannot claim UM coverage

  under the Johnsons’ policy, because he had the opportunity to purchase his own

  UM coverage with GEICO and declined it. According to MetLife, Bryar’s case

  is indistinguishable from Conner v. American Commerce Insurance, where the

  Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the plaintiff couldn’t recover

  under his parents’ UM policy because “[e]ven though [he] did obtain liability

  insurance” on his motorcycle, he had rejected UM coverage. 216 P.3d 850, 851

  (Okla. Civ. App. 2009). Likewise, MetLife notes, in Morris v. America First

  Insurance Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted the plaintiff recovery

                                            13
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  under his mother’s UM policy because the plaintiff had separately purchased

  UM on other vehicles he owned, which Bryar did not do. 240 P.3d 661, 662,

  664 (Okla. 2010). Finally, MetLife adds that in Vickers v. Progressive Northern

  Insurance Co., the Northern District of Oklahoma stated that “[t]hese decisions

  turn . . . on the resident insured’s opportunity to purchase his or her own UM

  coverage.” 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1161. Leaning on this caselaw, MetLife asserts

  that Bryar cannot recoup benefits under his parents’ policy because though

  “[Bryar] was a resident relative of his parents’ household, he did not purchase

  any UM coverage himself, despite having an opportunity to do so.” Resp. Br. at

  13.

        What MetLife ignores is that the UM policy exclusions in Conner,

  Morris, and Vickers all required resident-relative insureds to carry UM

  coverage specifically, not just liability insurance. See Conner, 216 P.3d at 851;

  Morris, 240 P.3d at 662; Vickers, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1157. So in those cases,

  the claimants had to demonstrate that they bought separate UM coverage on

  their personal vehicles or be subject to the insurance carriers’ exclusions in the

  operative policies. 13 That is not the case here. MetLife’s exclusion requires

        13
           For example, in Morris and Conner, the UM exclusions required the
  plaintiffs (as resident-relative insureds) to carry separate UM coverage on their
  vehicles on top of liability coverage. Morris, 240 P.3d at 662 (“The policy
  excluded UM coverage for an ‘insured’ who was a family member and was
  injured while occupying a vehicle he owned that was not insured for UM
  coverage at the time of the accident.”); Conner, 216 P.3d at 851 (“We do not
  provide [UM] coverage for ‘bodily injury’ sustained by any ‘insured:’ . . .
                                                                 (footnote continued)
                                          14
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  only that Bryar’s motorcycle be “insured by a motor vehicle insurance policy,”

  rendering his liability policy with GEICO sufficient, even without his also

  purchasing UM coverage for his motorcycle. The exclusionary language—

  “motor vehicle insurance policy”—permits this under Coates. We follow the

  Oklahoma Supreme Court’s direction to interpret “motor vehicle insurance

  policy” as meaning “either, or both, liability and UM coverage.” Coates, 512

  P.3d at 349. So with or without the UM coverage, Bryar’s GEICO policy

  satisfies the plain language of MetLife’s exclusion.

        Given the foregoing, MetLife overstates the relevance of Bryar’s

  previous opportunity to buy UM coverage. 14 To be excluded from UM coverage

  under MetLife’s policy, an insured must both (1) have owned, leased, or had

  [w]ho is a ‘family member,’ while ‘occupying,’ . . . any motor vehicle owned
  by that person: . . . which is not insured for [UM] coverage.”). These
  requirements decided the outcome in each case: In Connor, the plaintiff didn’t
  carry his own UM coverage, so the exclusion on his parents’ policy applied,
  216 P.3d at 851; but in Morris, the plaintiff had bought his own, separate UM
  coverage on his other, personally owned vehicles, so the exclusion on his
  mother’s policy was inapplicable, 240 P.3d at 664.
        14
           MetLife relies on Vickers in particular, advancing that the “Oklahoma
  Supreme Court . . . approved the analysis in [Coates]” that plaintiffs who reject
  UM coverage on their vehicles should be bound by UM exclusions unless the
  plaintiff, “unlike [Bryar] here, had never had the opportunity to purchase [UM]
  coverage.” Resp. Br. at 12 (citing Vickers, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1166). But to the
  extent that Coates favorably discusses Vickers, that discussion is dicta. Coates,
  512 P.3d at 349. The Coates court deliberately distanced Vickers from its
  holding by stating that Vickers was based on “particular facts” and that its
  “conclusion is not relevant to the issue presented here, and we do not rely on it
  in our analysis.” Id. at 349 n.4. This commentary from the Oklahoma high court
  combined with Vickers’s nonbinding authority on this court, see Camreta v.
  Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011), makes the case of little utility here.
                                         15
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  regular access to the vehicle occupied when the injury occurred and (2) have

  neglected to insure that vehicle with a “motor vehicle insurance policy.” App.

  vol. I, at 68. By purchasing “motor vehicle insurance” from GEICO, Bryar

  satisfies the second requirement; and automatically, he avoids the exclusion.

  This makes his previous opportunity to buy UM coverage irrelevant. Yet,

  MetLife focuses entirely on this point, as though that forgone opportunity alone

  defeats Bryar’s claim. This reveals MetLife’s “significant misunderstanding” of

  the exclusion’s reach. Coates, 512 P.3d at 349; see id. (repudiating the

  insurance carrier’s argument that the plaintiff “reject[ing] UM coverage under

  the motorcycle policy” alone, “allow[ed] it to deny UM coverage” otherwise

  available).

        At bottom, if MetLife wanted to require Bryar (as a resident insured) to

  carry UM coverage under his own motorcycle policy as a condition to his

  retaining UM coverage on his parents’ policy, then it merely had to write its

  exclusion to say so. See, e.g., Conner, 216 P.3d at 851 (holding that exclusions

  requiring resident insureds to carry UM coverage are valid and “not

  inconsistent with the purpose of § 3636(E)”). But MetLife chose otherwise,

  extending UM coverage on the lesser condition that Bryar merely obtain a

  “motor vehicle insurance policy.”

        The Coates rule makes sense. MetLife can write the exclusion as it

  pleases. But it cannot write its exclusion broadly (“not insured by a motor

  vehicle insurance policy”) and enforce it narrowly (requiring that a “motor

                                         16
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  vehicle insurance policy” include UM coverage in addition to liability

  coverage). To interpret MetLife’s UM exclusion as it does would offend the

  Johnsons’ choice to protect their son by purchasing and paying premiums on a

  policy that covered him as their relative. See Lane v. Progressive N. Ins. Co.,

  494 P.3d 345, 351 (Okla. 2021) (“The purpose of Oklahoma’s statutory scheme

  is to assure each UM insured person the full contracted coverage for which a

  premium has been paid.” (cleaned up)). As written, MetLife’s UM exclusion

  fails to advise even the most attentive policyholders that a resident insured in

  Bryar’s position needs to buy separate UM coverage on his motorcycle.

  MetLife cannot exclude Bryar from UM coverage without plainly saying so in

  its exclusion. 15

         The district court erred in concluding that MetLife’s UM exclusion

  applies to Bryar’s claim, and so we reverse the court’s grant of MetLife’s

  motion for summary judgment and its denial of Bryar’s motion for partial

  summary judgment.

         15
           In his reply, Bryar briefly sojourns into principles of contract
  interpretation, imploring that “any sort of construction of the . . . clear words of
  the [insurance policy],” Reply Br. at 6, should be “narrowly viewed,” id.
  (quoting Conner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 496 P.2d 770, 774 (Okla. 1972)).
  Our analyses and conclusions do not rely on these principles, but we note
  Oklahoma’s stance that “[i]nsurance contracts are contracts of adhesion” to be
  “interpreted most strongly against the party that prepared the contract.” Porter
  v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 330 P.3d 511, 515 (Okla. 2014)
  (citation omitted).
                                          17
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  II.   Motion for Leave to Amend

        After he moved for partial summary judgment against MetLife, Bryar

  sought leave from the district court to amend his complaint to add a bad-faith

  claim. The district court denied the motion. We affirm.

        Once the twenty-one-day window for amending the complaint as of right

  has passed, the district court should “freely give leave” for a party to amend

  “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “But a district court may

  withhold leave to amend if the amendment would be futile.” Chilcoat v. San

  Juan Cnty., 41 F.4th 1196, 1218 (10th Cir. 2022). An amendment is futile if,

  “as amended, [it] would be subject to dismissal,” Full Life Hospice, LLC v.

  Sebelius, 709 F.3d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 2013); for example, an amendment

  would be futile where the added claim would be “time-barred,” id. at 1019.

  Though “[w]e usually review the denial of leave to amend a complaint under

  the abuse-of-discretion standard,” “when a district court denies leave to amend

  because amendment would be futile, our review for abuse of discretion includes

  de novo review of the legal basis for the finding of futility.” Castanon v.

  Cathey, 976 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

        The district court denied Bryar’s motion for leave to amend his

  complaint. In part, the court determined that the bad-faith claim was futile,

  given its decision that Bryar lacked any right to recover under the policy. But

  regardless, the court found that the claim would be time-barred by the relevant

  statute of limitations.

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Appellate Case: 23-6061   Document: 010111028109      Date Filed: 04/08/2024   Page: 19

        Under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(3), actions for injury arising in tort must

  be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues. MetLife denied

  Bryar coverage on March 7, 2019, which gave him until March 7, 2021, to

  bring his bad-faith claim. 16 Yet Bryar moved for leave to amend on January 7,

  2022. Bryar does not contest these facts. So even though we reverse the

  summary-judgment ruling in Bryar’s favor, we affirm the district court’s

  decision denying his motion for leave to amend on futility grounds. See

  Chilcoat, 41 F.4th at 1218.

        On this issue, Bryar argues that the court’s denial was a “result” of its

  erroneous decision on summary judgment and that we should therefore reverse.

  Op. Br. at 26. That argument is wanting. Even if Bryar’s bad-faith claim is now

  viable, based on our favorable resolution of the summary-judgment motions,

  the claim is still time-barred. And Bryar supplies no reason supported by Rule

  15 or caselaw that would excuse his delinquency or otherwise convince us that

  the statute of limitations doesn’t apply. See Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., 451

  F.3d 1196, 1206 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We have held that denial of leave to amend

  is appropriate when the party filing the motion has no adequate explanation for

  the delay.” (cleaned up)).

        16
          Bryar filed his original state court petition on April 16, 2021, about a
  month after the statute-of-limitations expired on March 7, 2021. So even if the
  bad-faith claim related back to the original complaint, it would still be time-
  barred. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
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Appellate Case: 23-6061   Document: 010111028109    Date Filed: 04/08/2024   Page: 20

                                  CONCLUSION

        We affirm in part and reverse in part. This case is remanded for further

  proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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