Court Opinion

ID: 9736280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:49:38.963786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:05.479123
License: Public Domain

*283MOSER, J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority opinion. In this case, the trial courts were dealing with a man who had a verbal IQ of 69, a performance IQ of 58 and a full scale IQ of 60. The uncontradicted record shows that he had a mental defect. The following facts were uncontradicted in the record: that Blanco’s mental defectiveness was coupled with a schizophrenic mental disease that showed him to be delusional, nonresponsive, and disoriented as to time and place; that these conditions existed at the time the alleged crimes were committed; and that the coexistence of the mental defects and mental disease affected his ability to the degree that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform this conduct to the dictates of the law at the time of the offenses.
The federal and state supreme courts have held that the state has the burden of proof to prove every element of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.1 Section 941.30, Stats., provides that: “Whoever endangers another’s safety by conduct imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, is guilty of a Class D felony.” A depraved mind is defined as “[a]n inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude, equivalent to statutory phrase ‘depravity of heart’ defined as highest grade of malice.”2 Our supreme court has defined the element of “depraved mind” as something more than negligence but something less than specific intent, but more criminally culpable than negligence because of its offensive and shocking nature.3 In State v. Weso the supreme court said that a depraved mind was a self-created condition of the mind and was to be distinguished from insanity or feeble-*284mindedness.4 A depraved mind must be indifferent to the life of others, recklessness alone is insufficient, and more than a high degree of negligence or recklessness must exist.5 The court concluded that a depraved mind is not the normal state of mind of a reasonable person. The court said, “A depraved mind lacks a moral sense, an appreciation of life, is unreasonable and lacks judgment. A depraved mind has a general intent to do the acts and the consciousness of the nature of the acts and possible result but lacks the specific intent to do the harm.”6
The facts in this case are uncontroverted that the appellant set fires in his house of correction cell and that when guards came to his aid he threw urine and feces at them while dancing and shouting the Spanish words for “fire” and “good.” In the second instance, he set fires, then danced and babbled to himself that he was “superman.” It is uncontroverted that both of the court-appointed psychologists agreed that Blanco suffered from a mental deficiency and mental illness at the time of these incidents. In other words, he was a feeble-minded, insane person at the time he committed these acts. As such, he was not conscious of the nature of his acts and did not act with a depraved mind within 'the legal meaning of the phrase. The state thus could not prove that element of the crime charged.
Therefore, he should not have been found guilty of the two counts of endangering safety by conduct regardless of life in the first phase of this trifurcated trial. I would reverse the trial court’s finding of guilt because Blanco was a feeble-minded madman who set fires in his cell, not a rational human being who exhibited a depraved mind indifferent to injury. The state simply failed to prove the required depraved mind element.

 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Turner v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 1, 10, 250 N.W.2d 706, 711 (1977).

 Black’s Law Dictionary 396-97 (5th ed. 1979).

 Hagenkord v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 452, 484, 302 N.W.2d 421, 437-38 (1981).

 60 Wis. 2d 404, 409, 210 N.W.2d 442, 444 (1973).

 Id. at 410-11, 210 N.W.2d at 445.

 Id. at 411-12, 210 N.W.2d at 446.