Court Opinion

ID: 9700868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:51:52.218118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:15.602193
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Our standard of review in support cases is unambiguous: we may not reverse the decision of the trial court absent a manifest abuse of discretion.
“In order to determine whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, we consider whether the lower court has misapplied or overridden existing law, made a manifestly unreasonable judgement, or ruled with partiality, prejudice, *600bias or ill-will. Among the principles of existing law that the lower court must apply is the principle that in determining a spouse’s support obligation, the factors to be considered are income, potential earning capacity, and other property and financial resources.”
Machen v. Machen, 278 Pa.Super. 135, 137, 420 A.2d 466, 467 (1980).
Further, “if there is sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s decision, that decision will be affirmed.” Chase v. Chase, 331 Pa.Super. 445, 451-53, 480 A.2d 1117, 1121 (1984).
In view of this very clear mandate, I find several of the majority’s findings particularly troubling.
First, although our usual practice is to defer to the trial court’s assessments on evidentiary matters, id,., the majority disputes the trial court’s factual findings on all those elements intrinsic to a determination of support questions. Here the degree of appellant’s need, earning capacity, and diligence in seeking employment determined by the trial court have all been dismissed by the majority on the basis of the same record and less proximity than the trial court enjoyed. Specifically, the trial court found that appellant resided with his mother, and although he claimed indebtedness to her, failed to submit evidence of this fact. Further, it was determined that appellant had made no concrete efforts to obtain employment, since he deliberately and severely restricted both the type and location of any prospective work. Additionally, appellant, the co-owner with appellee of a house, had not consented to rent the house to defray its expense, and testified as to two sales inquiries that he had no intention of responding. Finally, the trial court found that appellant was the title owner of twelve vehicles, some operable and some not. At hearing appellant admitted that at least two of these vehicles were valuable. I believe that in contradicting the trial court’s assessment of these facts, the majority has erred.
*601The majority has also concluded that “If the respective circumstances of the parties were reversed and the wife had asked for an order requiring the payment of support by her husband, the result would be clear.” (Majority Op. at 598). I strongly disagree. Regardless of the sex of the petitioner, actions such as those of appellant are sufficient to deny support. Since citations to Henderson, supra, appear in the lower court opinion it is obvious that the trial judge was aware of the equal rights ramifications of his decision. One part of the Henderson holding deserves yet another repetition: “the right of support depends not upon the sex of the petitioner but rather upon need in view of the relative financial circumstances of the parties.” Id., 458 Pa. at 101, 327 A.2d at 62. The trial court stated unequivocally that appellant had failed to demonstrate good faith by his minimal efforts to support himself. Given the evidence of appellant’s testimony in the record, I would find no grounds on which to question that judgement. Nor do I believe a woman about whom the same could be said would be awarded support simply because of her gender. The concept of equal rights for men is crucial to the achievement of economic justice in spousal support cases. This case, however, does not present a fertile field for its application.
Finally, the majority also “reject[s] the trial court’s suggestion that in order to be entitled to support it was necessary for appellant to show that he was willing to leave the community in which he lived and seek employment elsewhere in Pennsylvania or beyond.” (Majority Op. at 599). The willingness to exert a reasonable effort to find employment includes at least a modicum of flexibility as to location. However, had appellant’s job search demonstrated more determination in other respects, his resolve not to travel would have been less critical. Herein, appellant’s less than impressive efforts, combined with his resolve in restricting the scope of those efforts, conveyed to the trial court a clear impression of less than enthusiastic intent. I believe this perception to have been an accurate one.
I would affirm.