Court Opinion

ID: 9829332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:13:46.637967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:02.357809
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The appellants contend that the evidence conclusively shows that Mrs. Burnett acted under duress when she executed the last deed to the appellee. While, as stated in the original opinion, there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether any threats were ever in fact made to Burnett, it is doubtful if his own testimony raises that issue. In describing the conditions under which Mrs. Burnett signed the deed, Burnett stated that she was sick at the time, and for an hour or more declined to sign the deed. He said:
“She refused to sign it (the deed) until this other-contract was made (referring to the contract placing the . deed in escrow, which was set out at length in the original opinion). * * * I wrote up the agreement for the purpose of get*174ting my .wife to sign titó deed, for she would not sign it until then. But 'the agreement was between us all.”
This testimony tends strongly to indicate that Mrs. Bnrnett was not acting under duress at that time; that she undertook to carefully guard her rights in the property and convey it only upon the conditions stated in the written agreement. To constitute the duress here relied on the agents of the appel-lee must have made the threats of a criminal prosecution to which Burnett testified. The denial by those agents of having made them presented an issue for the jury, which was determined against the appellants. A deception resulting from any false statements by Burnett to his wife that such threats had been made would not affect the validity of the deed, without showing notice of the deception to the appellee. Davis v. Kennedy, 58 Tex. 516; Stringfellow v. Brazelton, 142 S. W. 937; Veeder v. Gilmer, 103 Tex. 458, 129 S. W. 595.
The second assignment of error referred to in this motion was not discussed in the original opinion. Under this assignment it is contended that, inasmuch as the property in controversy was the homestead, it could not be conveyed by a deed in escrow, as was done in this instance. The proposition is thus stated in the appellants’ brief: “A pretended sale of the homestead involving any condition of defeasance is void.” In support of that proposition the case of Jones v. Goff, 63 Tex. 254, is cited, along with some other authorities. In Jones v. Goff an effort was made to enforce specific performance of an executory contract entered into by a married woman to convey the homestead, and it was held that such a contract was not binding upon the wife. In Warren v. Jones, 69 Tex. 465, 8 S. W. 775, and Jones v. Robbins, 74 Tex. 617, 12 S. W. 826, our Supreme Court had under consideration the validity of a deed conveying the homestead, which had been executed by an agent under power of attorney signed and acknowledged by the husband and wife. In the first case the court said:
“The power of attorney when followed by the deed of her agent is treated as the conveyance itself. In a bond for title she has to execute another instrument before the legal title passes from her. The conveyance is not fully made until she acknowledges the deed she has bound herself to execute, and this must be done in accordance with the statute. She must be allowed the privilege of retracting before the deed is made, or the statute is not fulfilled. In case of a power of attorney she has that privilege, and may withdraw her consent at any time before the deed is made by her attorney.”
The case of Jones v. Goff was referred to and distinguished, the difference being that in making a bond or contract to convey title something remained to be done in the future —execution of the conveyance. To bind a married woman in advance to make a deed would deprive her of her right to retract. In this case there was no mere contract to convey the title, but the conveyance itself was executed, and nothing remained except to deliver the instrument upon the happening of the contingency the parties had in mind. If the wife executes a deed to be delivered immediately or in future, she may exercise her right of retraction until the deed is placed beyond her power to.recall. But if we concede that she may retract and recall at any time before actual delivery to the grantee, she is bound by her acknowledgment unless she does retract within that time. There is no evidence in this case that Mrs. Burnett attempted to exercise any such right, or that she desired to recall the deed before its delivery to the appellee. On the contrary, there was testimony tending to show that both Burnett and his wife were notified that the deed was about to be delivered, and that they consented.
It is again urged that the court should have submitted the issue as to whether ..or not Burnett had any further trouble with his creditors. Counsel for appellants agree that the construction placed upon the collateral agreement signed at the time the deed was executed is correct, but contends that we erred in our conclusions from the facts. A more careful examination of the record shows, according to Burnett’s own testimony, that on January 9, 1916, he filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and received his discharge before the deed was delivered to the appellee. He testified that during the year 1914 he had assigned some notes and accounts to the appellee bank and to Sanger Bros. These accounts were bought from him, not from the trustee in bankruptcy. They were owned by Sanger Bros, and the bank jointly. He had been paid for them in a settlement had in 1914, before he went into bankruptcy. After he received his discharge in bankruptcy he purchased Sanger Bros.’ interest in the notes and accounts, and had a controversy with the appellee bank regarding the delivery of the half which it claimed. In his cross-examination, when questioned about what trouble with his creditors he referred to in the written agreement, he said:
“I don’t know just what trouble you might say that refers to, but I meant any trouble in the settling of my bankrupt estate with my creditors.”
It is evident from Burnett’s own testimony just referred to that he had no trouble in securing his discharge,' and that the property about which the trouble arose was not part of his bankrupt estate.
There is another reason why we think the court might properly have refused to submit that issue. B. B. Perkins, who held the deed in escrow, testified, in effect, that Burnett and his wife were notified and made no objection to the delivery of the deed. The court, having the right to find all facts not submitted to the jury, might have concluded that, notwithstanding there was trouble *175with the creditors, that condition had been waived.
We adhere to the original disposition of this case, and the motion for a rehearing is overruled.