Court Opinion

ID: 9690066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:52:47.341192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:53.423454
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
In Grunewaldt v. Bisson, 494 N.W.2d 193 (S.D.1992), this Court also reviewed a denial of modification of child support. We held that “the trial court did abuse its discretion in determining mother should be freed of any child support ...” Id. at 195 (emphasis added). I concurred in this rationale. Why did the trial court abuse its discretion? Because “there can be no deviation from the [mandatory child support] guidelines unless there is an entry of specific findings regarding the factors allowing deviation.” Id. Deviation from the guidelines is not at issue here; hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law in this motion hearing. See SDCL 15-6-52(a).
The gravamen of the error in the majority opinion is its failure to recognize that the case before us was not a court trial. It was a decision on a motion. Under SDCL chap. 15-6, South Dakota’s civil procedure establishes the conduct of trials which is broken down into jury trials (SDCL 15-6-38(a)) and trials to the court (SDCL 15-6-52(a)). If you look at the civil procedure which has been developed by this state, over a period of one century, it becomes obvious from the history of court trials that such must result in the court entering Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Of course, same may be waived. SDCL 15 — 6—52(b). There are dozens of cases collected and annotated under trials to the court, via SDCL 15-6-52(a). Not one of these cases address Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pertaining to ordinary motions. Rather, they all address “actions tried upon the facts without a jury.”
This Court has never required formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on ordinary motions concerning the modification of child support. As the Chief Justice has pointed out, because of specific legislative direction, this Court began to require the specific entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law when the trial courts deviated from the statutory guidelines for child support.
Under this precedent shattering decision, every trial judge — where there is no trial and no deviation from the guidelines, and there is simply a motion to change child support or modify it, or eliminate it — will now have to enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of *308Law. Again, read all of the collected and annotated cases under SDCL 15-6-52(a). You will note that those cases concern “actions” which were “tried to the court.”
Was this case “an action tried to the court?” No. It was a motion — a Motion to Modify Child Support Payments. We know, from examining past contempt proceedings involving child support, that there exists a necessity for formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support an adjudication of contempt. Thomerson v. Thomerson, 387 N.W.2d 509 (S.D.1986) (judgment of contempt must be based on clear and specific findings of fact); Talbert v. Talbert, 290 N.W.2d 862 (S.D.1980). Obviously, contempt proceedings are an exception. In such type of cases, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are vital. This case did not involve contempt.
This decision, which we reach today, will become a nightmare for the trial judges in this state. In practice, it will birth a tremendous amount of needless additional work for the trial judges of this state. It will consume precious judicial resources which could be employed to confront a burgeoning trial workload. This decision is the type of decision which places unwanted demands upon the time and talents of trial judges and this decision will spawn increasing appeals to further burden appellate justice.
Have we not, in the past, reviewed an award of child support upon the basis of “abuse of discretion?” Yes. Barrett v. Barrett, 308 N.W.2d 884 (S.D.1981). Therefore, the scope of review has been to consider if the trial court abused its discretion and not if the trial court was “clearly erroneous.” Under this erosion of precedent whereby our trial judges must now be entering Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in motions pertaining to child support eases, the scope of review will necessarily be: Are the Findings of Fact clearly erroneous? And are the Conclusions of Law mistakes of law? Gone is the abuse of discretion test (apparently) which was applicable because of the broad equitable power and discretion given to trial courts by state statute, namely SDCL 25-4-.45. Under said statute, the word “modify” exists; the motion before the trial court was “Motion to Modify Child Support Payments.” SDCL 25-4-45 applies and all of the precedent thereunder upon which the abuse of discretion test is then applied.
In my opinion, we are changing one century of settled law by this decision. We are changing because of the majority’s mistaken belief that an ordinary motion for a modification of child support is directly aligned with the statutory guidelines decisions which are set forth in the Chief Justice’s dissent. Stare decisis may be likened unto a bridge over which the law travels — and travels safely' — as it bears the burden of carrying the cargo of justice. When the bridge breaks down, justice can flounder, in confusion, in the swirling water below. As a life jacket, it does not hurt, from time to time, to examine the pilings of the bridge to determine if it is still strong enough and stable enough to bear the load. Here, the abuse of discretion test can still stand the load. So we should not abandon our precedent. We should decide this case upon the doctrine of stare decisis.
As the Chief Justice has pointed out, the Grunewaldt decision, upon which the majority relies, does not carry the day. We expressly held therein that the requirement of entering Formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pertained to “statutorily enumerated criteria” regarding the formal entry of “specific findings regarding factors allowing deviation [from child support guidelines].” Grunewaldt, 494 N.W.2d at 195. This case and Grunewaldt are on a totally different footing.
Our settled law has been, and should continue to be, that this Court will not tamper with modification decisions on child support unless the trial court has abused its discretion. This abused discretion would have to be “a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.” State, Fall River County v. Dryden, 409 N.W.2d 648, 651 (S.D.1987); Herndon v. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917, 918 (S.D.1981).
I vote to affirm the trial court.