Court Opinion

ID: 9648740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:33:54.571123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:05.122738
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
There is no evidence in this record of compliance with the safeguards which must be observed when trial counsel represents co-defendants. Accordingly, I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that there was no violation of appellant’s constitutional right to effective representation.
While “dual representation alone does not amount to a conflict of interest,” it is well-settled that “[t]o make the dual representation rise to a true conflict, appellant need not show that actual harm resulted, . . . but he must at least show the possibility of harm . . . . Commonwealth v. Wilson, 429 Pa. 458, 463, 240 A.2d 498, 501 (1968); Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 318 A.2d 354 (1974) (plurality opinion); see also United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512 (3d Cir.) (habeas corpus petitioner denied sixth amendment right to counsel because of dual representation), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 823, 100 S.Ct. 44, 62 L.Ed.2d 30 (1979).
*508In Commonwealth v. Breaker, supra, we stated that the “possibility of harm” standard embodies the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility. Ethical Consideration 5-15 of the Code provides:
“if a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the employment. He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation.”
Ethical Consideration 5-16 provides:
“[BJefore a lawyer may represent multiple clients, he should explain fully to each client the implications of the common representation and should accept or continue employment only if the clients consent,” giving each client “the opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free of any potential conflict.”
Similarly, the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice reflects concern for the dangers inherent in dual representation. Section 3.5(b) of the Standards Relating to the Defense Function states that “[t]he potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one of several co-defendants except in unusual situations, when, after careful investigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely to develop and when the several defendants give an informed consent to such multiple representation.” Section 3.4(b) of the Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge provides that in cases of dual representation, “the trial judge should inquire into potential conflicts which may jeopardize the right of each defendant to the fidelity of his counsel.”
Here, when the trial judge asked counsel whether there was a conflict of interest arising from the dual representation, counsel replied:
“It is my understanding that originally I was under the impression, quite frankly, until about ten minutes ago that *509both of my clients were charged with assault by a life prisoner. It turns out that is not the case, and with that in mind, I would think there is no problem.”
It is evident from this response that counsel did not “weigh carefully” the possible conflict. Nor did counsel discuss the situation with each defendant, in order to secure their informed consents to his continued representation. Even the trial judge commented on the gravity of the situation:
“This experience will be the occasion for the Court to be more careful in the future, even though it may further prolong our already prolonged and protracted cases, to involve conflict of interest. A representation by Counsel alone is demonstratively insufficient and unreliable.”
In these circumstances I cannot agree that appellant was afforded his constitutional right to effective representation. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.