Court Opinion

ID: 2964124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:20:55.811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:51.194055
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-2170

                          ELIEZER BARRIOS-VELAZQUEZ, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                                          v.

                             ASOCIACION DE EMPLEADOS DEL
                    ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO, ET AL.,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                   [Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________

                                _____________________

               Francisco R. Gonz lez-Col n, with whom Francisco R. Gonz lez
               ___________________________            _____________________
          Law Firm was on brief for appellants.
          ________
               Lino  J. Salda a, with whom Carmen M. Dom nguez was on brief
               ________________            ___________________
          for appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                     May 24, 1996
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA,  Chief Judge.   Appellants  Eliezer Barrios-
                    TORRUELLA,  Chief Judge.
                                ___________

          Vel zquez  ("Barrios"), Myrta  Nieves-Vega ("Nieves")  and Isidro

          Collazo   ("Collazo"),   in  their   personal  capacity   and  as

          representatives  of the "Comit  de  Delegados y Miembros Pro Sana

          Administraci n    de    AEELA"   ("SAAEELA")       (collectively,

          "Plaintiffs"), appeal the district  court's dismissal for lack of

          subject matter jurisdiction of  their complaint brought  pursuant

          to 42  U.S.C.    1983 against  the  Asociaci n de  Empleados  del

          Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto  Rico ("AEELA") and Isaac Neftal 

          Rojas-Nater  ("Rojas"),  Roberto  Aquino-Garc a   ("Aquino")  and

          Miguel  Mart nez-Williams  ("Mart nez"),  in  their  personal and

          official capacities (collectively, "Defendants").  We affirm  the

          decision of the district court.

                                I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
                                I.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

                    "We  review the grant of  a motion to  dismiss de novo,
                                                                   _______

          taking  the allegations in the  complaint as true  and making all

          reasonable inferences in  favor of plaintiff."  Rockwell  v. Cape
                                                          ________     ____

          Cod  Hosp., 26  F.3d  254,  256  (1st  Cir.  1994);  see  Rumford
          __________                                           ___  _______

          Pharmacy, Inc. v.  City of E. Providence, 970 F.2d  996, 997 (1st
          ______________     _____________________

          Cir. 1992).  "We  must liberally construe [Plaintiffs'] complaint

          and affirm its dismissal only if  [they] cannot prove any set  of

          facts entitling [them] to relief."  Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 255.
                                              ________

                    Although  it  does not  affect  the  outcome, it  would

          appear  that the motion to dismiss was  converted to a motion for

          summary judgment  since  the district  court  plainly  considered

                                         -2-

          "matters  outside  the  pleadings."    Fed.  R.  Civ.  P. 12(c).1

          Plaintiffs   in  fact   argue  in   their  brief   that  due   to

          representations  made  to  them  by  defendants'  attorney,  they

          postponed filing an opposition  to defendants' motion to dismiss,

          and they  were therefore not afforded  a "reasonable opportunity"

          to present  Rule 56 material.  See Br. for Appellants at 12.  The
                                         ___

          answer to this  argument, of course,  is clear: even  considering

          this  Rule  56  material, see  supra  note  1,  we conclude  that
                                    ___  _____

          plaintiffs demonstrated no genuine issue of material fact.

                                   II.  BACKGROUND
                                   II.  BACKGROUND

                    The  instant  case  stems   from  a  dispute  over  the

          circumstances under which a Quadrennial Assembly (the "Assembly")

          of  the  AEELA  was  held  on  July  8,  1995.    The  AEELA  has

          approximately 180,000 members, all of whom are  regular or former

          employees  of the government of  Puerto Rico.   Of these members,

                              
          ____________________

          1    These "matters"  included the  following:  1) the  AEELA was
          created as a quasi-public entity to provide financial services to
          government employees, which is a traditional government function;
                                                       __________
          2)  membership in the  AEELA is  mandatory for  most Commonwealth
          employees  as is  the 3%  payroll deduction  to fund  the AEELA's
          operations; 3) the AEELA's  operations and delegate elections are
          heavily  regulated  by  statute  (e.g.,  number  of  members  per
          delegate);  4)  heads  of  government   departments  appoint  the
          Election Committee to run the delegate elections; 5) the Board of
          Directors  and  the  Election  committee members  often  work  on
          government time, and use  government facilities and equipment; 6)
          the  AEELA's  finances  are  supervised  by  the   Commonwealth's
          Comptroller; 7) the AEELA  is exempt from state taxation;  8) the
          Commonwealth collects  the 3%  membership  fee for  the AEELA  by
          making payroll deductions; 9) the AEELA may make investments only
          "on advice" from the  Commonwealth's Treasury Department; 10) the
          AEELA's  employees participate  in the  Commonwealth government's
          pension  plan; 11) the Commonwealth provides  the AEELA with some
          services  free of charge; and 12) the AEELA's members, delegates,
          and directors are all government employees.

                                         -3-

          75%  are required by law to participate  in and be members of the

          AEELA,  and are  required to  provide 3%  of their  salary  to be

          administered by the AEELA.  Only employees of public corporations

          and municipalities may participate in the AEELA.

                    Plaintiffs contend,  and this court  must assume, given

          our  procedural posture,  that Defendants have  exercised control

          over  the AEELA  since 1987,  and used  this control  to handpick

          delegates  to the Assembly in question in order to maintain their

          control, and that  of the Popular Democratic  Party ("PDP"), over

          the AEELA.   We must further infer  that Defendants impermissibly

          notified only those delegates  who shared their political beliefs

          that  the Assembly  would  be  held,  and  refused  to  take  the

          necessary  measures  to  notify  or  confirm  the  membership  of

          delegates who do not support the PDP.  Furthermore, we infer that

          Defendants  denied  Plaintiff-Appellant  Nieves  a  list  of  the

          certified delegates,  thus hindering her candidacy  for President

          of the AEELA's Board of Directors.

                    Plaintiffs charge that these actions amount  to illegal

          political discrimination  in violation of their  rights under the

          Due Process Clause  of the Fourteenth Amendment  and the enabling

          law  of  the Commonwealth  Employees  Association,  3 L.P.R.A.   

          862(b).   They  also  contend, contrary  to  the  district  court

          opinion dismissing their claim  under 28 U.S.C.   1983,  that the

          acts of Defendants are state action.

                                   III.  DISCUSSION
                                   III.  DISCUSSION

                    "Title  42   U.S.C.     1983  provides   a  remedy  for

                                         -4-

          deprivations of rights  secured by the  Constitution and laws  of

          the United States when that  deprivation takes place 'under color

          of  any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,  or usage, of any

          State or Territory . .  . .'"  Rockwell, 26 F.3d  at 256 (quoting
                                         ________

          Lugar v.  Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982)).  To state
          _____     _________________

          a claim  under   1983,  a plaintiff must  make two  showings: the

          existence of a federal  or statutory right; and a  deprivation of

          that  right by a  person acting under  color of state  law.2  See
                                                                        ___

          id.; Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1993).
          ___  _________    ____

                    The district court  addressed only the second  showing,

          dismissing  this action on the ground that Defendants did not act

          under color of state law when they scheduled the general assembly

          for July 8,  1995.  We note  in passing that at  least two courts

          have  already  concluded  that  the  AEELA  is   not  an  agency,

          department or  instrumentality of the Government  of Puerto Rico,

          suggesting  that  the AEELA's  actions and  those of  its members

          cannot  be labeled state action.  Morales v. Chaves, No. 75-1087,
                                            _______    ______

          slip op. at  2 (D.P.R. Dec. 9, 1975) (noting  that while "[i]t is

          true  that  the  Association  was  created  by  statute  and only

          government employees may be members . . . there all relation with

          the  Commonwealth ceases");  Association of  Employees  of Puerto
                                       ____________________________________

          Rico v. V squez-P rez,  92 JTS  52, slip  op. at  26 (P.R.  1992)
          ____    _____________

                              
          ____________________

          2   For the  purposes of  section 1983,  "Puerto Rico enjoys  the
          functional  equivalent of  statehood," and  thus the  term "state
          law" includes Puerto Rico law.   Mart nez v. Col n, 54 F.3d  980,
                                           ________    _____
          984  (1st Cir. 1995); see  Playboy Enters., Inc.  v. Public Serv.
                                ___  _____________________     ____________
          Comm'n of P.R., 906 F.2d 25, 31 n.8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498
          ______________                                  ____________
          U.S. 959 (1990).

                                         -5-

          (official trans.)  (stating, in  the context of  deciding whether

          the AEELA was subject to the Truth in Lending Act, that "although

          the  Association is  a  highly regulated  entity  created by  the

          government, whose objective is to implement the government policy

          of  . .  . encouraging  saving among  public employees  . .  . it

          cannot  be  considered   as  a  government   agency,  department,

          instrumentality or public corporation").   While persuasive as to

          certain points,  these cases  do not represent  binding authority

          for this court.  As a  result, like the district court before us,

          we conduct our own inquiry into the issue.

                    Because  section 1983 does  not reach  private actions,

          the key issue  before us is whether the conduct  at issue in this

          case may  be "'fairly  attributable to  the State,'"   Rodr guez-
                                                                 __________

          Garc a v. D vila, 904 F.2d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Lugar,
          ______    ______                                           _____

          457 U.S. at 937);  see Ponce v. Basketball Fed'n  of Puerto Rico,
                             ___ _____    ________________________________

          760  F.2d 375, 377 (1st Cir. 1985).   The state action inquiry is

          "'necessarily  fact-bound.'"   Id.  (quoting Lugar,  457 U.S.  at
                                         ___           _____

          937).   "In  cases  under     1983,  'under  color'  of  law  has

          consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action'

          required under the Fourteenth Amendment."  Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
                                                     _____________    ____

          457 U.S. 830,  838 (1982).   "The ultimate  issue in  determining

          whether  a person  is subject to  suit under    1983  is the same

          question posed  in cases arising under  the Fourteenth Amendment:

          is   the   alleged  infringement   of   federal   rights  'fairly

          attributable to the  State?'"   Id. (quoting Lugar,  457 U.S.  at
                                          ___          _____

          937).

                                         -6-

                    On  appeal, Plaintiffs  contend  that the  AEELA is  an

          extension of the  government of the Commonwealth  of Puerto Rico,

          and  that the conduct  at issue may  be fairly  attributed to the

          state  on  that basis  as  direct state  action.   Alternatively,

          Plaintiffs   argue  that  even   if  the   AEELA  is   a  private

          organization,  the actions that give rise to the instant case may

          still be fairly attributed to the state as indirect state action.

          Ultimately, a finding  of either direct or indirect  state action

          would suffice  to sustain Plaintiffs'  section 1983 action.   See
                                                                        ___

          Rodr guez-Garc a, 904 F.2d at 95.
          ________________

                               A.  Direct State Action 
                               A.  Direct State Action

                    Plaintiffs  contend  that  Defendants' actions  may  be

          fairly  attributed to the state because, they claim, the AEELA is

          a  public  corporation  and  therefore, an  "arm  of  the state."

          Although "[t]he Act which creates the Association does not define

          whether  it is an agency,  a department, an  instrumentality or a

          public corporation," V squez-P rez, slip  op. at 24, both federal
                               _____________

          and state courts have held  that the AEELA is not  a governmental

          agency,  see Morales,  slip op.  at 2  (noting that  "the Supreme
                   ___ _______

          Court of Puerto Rico has, since 1932, consistently ruled that the

          Employees Association is not a part of the Government"); V squez-
                                                                   ________

          P rez, slip op. at 26.
          _____

                    Admittedly, technical  labels are not dispositive.   In

          Lebr n v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct.
          ______    _____________________________

          961 (1995), the Supreme  Court addressed direct state  action and

          technical labels, ruling that,  despite a statutory disclaimer of

                                         -7-

          agency status,  the National Railroad Passenger  Corp. ("Amtrak")

          was nonetheless a government entity.  In deciding that Amtrak was

          a  state actor when  it refused to lease  advertising space to an

          artist's  display because  it was  "political," the  Court stated

          that "it is  not for Congress to make the  final determination of

          Amtrak's  status   as  a   government  entity  for   purposes  of

          determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its

          actions."  Id. at 971.   The Court, in dicta, indicated  that the
                     ___

          issue of state action and technical labels that it was addressing

          also had relevance to the states, stating that "it cannot be that

          government,  state or federal, is  able to evade  the most solemn

          obligations imposed  in the  Constitution by simply  resorting to

          the  corporate form [since] [o]n  that thesis, Plessy v. Ferguson
                                                         ______    ________

          can  be resurrected by  the simple device of  having the State of

          Louisiana  operate   segregated  trains  through   a  state-owned

          Amtrak."  Id. at 972 (citations omitted).
                    ___

                    While  the logic of Lebr n applies to the present case,
                                        ______

          we conclude  that it does not  avail Plaintiffs.   The Court held

          that where

                      the Government creates  a corporation  by
                      special  law,  for  the   furtherance  of
                      governmental objectives,  and retains for
                      itself permanent authority  to appoint  a
                      majority   of   the  directors   of  that
                      corporation, the corporation  is part  of
                      the Government for purposes of  the First
                      Amendment.

          Id. at 974-75.  The Supreme Court in Lebr n focused on the degree
          ___                                  ______

          of  control  that the  federal government  had  over Amtrak.   In

          contrast, neither party  in the instant  case has contended  that

                                         -8-

          the Government  of Puerto  Rico has retained  permanent authority

          over  the  directors of  the  AEELA.   This  distinction  becomes

          clearer  when we  compare  the facts  surrounding Amtrak  and the

          AEELA.     The  President  appoints  the   majority  of  Amtrak's

          directors,  the federal  government owns  all of  Amtrak's voting

          stock, and the government subsidizes Amtrak's "perennial losses."

          Id. at 967.  By contrast, the government of Puerto  Rico does not
          ___

          retain the  power  to  appoint  any  of  the  AEELA's  directors.

          Instead, the  directors are  elected by delegates  who themselves

          are elected by the AEELA's membership at large.  Furthermore, the

          AEELA's  losses, if  any,  are not  regularly  subsidized by  the

          government of  Puerto  Rico.   As  a result  of  these facts,  we

          conclude that the AEELA  does not constitute an extension  of the

          government of Puerto Rico,  and so Defendants must be  treated as

          private parties.   Thus, direct  state action is  not present  in

          this case.

                              B.  Indirect State Action
                              B.  Indirect State Action

                    We  therefore  turn  to  the question  of  whether  the

          conduct at issue, while not that of the government of Puerto Rico

          directly, may be nonetheless  fairly attributed to the state.   A

          private entity's conduct is not actionable under section  1983 if

          the challenged action results from the exercise of private choice

          and  not  from  state influence  or  coercion.   See  id.  at 980
                                                           ___  ___

          (O'Connor,  J.,  dissenting)  (concluding  that  Lebr n  did  not
                                                           ______

          involve direct state action,  and therefore, unlike the majority,

          inquiring  as to  indirect state  action);  San Francisco  Arts &
                                                      _____________________

                                         -9-

          Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547
          _______________    ___________________________

          (1987) (stating  that "[t]here  is no  evidence that  the Federal

          Government  coerced or encouraged the USOC in the exercise of its

          right  [to deny use of  its copyright]"); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S.
                                                    _____________

          at  841 (holding  that discharge  decisions of  largely publicly-

          funded private school for  troubled students were not subject  to

          constitutional   challenge  because   those  actions   "were  not

          compelled or even influenced by any state regulation").

                    As  a result,  this  court must  determine whether  the

          conduct  of Defendants, as private parties, rises to the level of

          state  action.   As this  court has  previously spelled  out, the

          relevant inquiries consist of whether there was

                      (1) .  .  .  an  elaborate  financial  or
                      regulatory nexus between [Defendants] and
                      the  government  of  Puerto   Rico  which
                      compelled  [Defendants]  to  act as  they
                      did, (2) an assumption by [Defendants] of
                      a  traditional public function,  or (3) a
                      symbiotic   relationship   involving  the
                      sharing of profits.

          Rodr guez-Garc a, 904 F.2d at 96; see Ponce, 760 F.2d at 377.  We
          ________________                  ___ _____

          examine each  test in  turn, as  satisfaction of  any one of  the

          three tests requires that we find indirect state action.

                                  1.  Nexus Analysis
                                  1.  Nexus Analysis

                    As both parties acknowledge, "the challenged  action of

          the  regulated entity . . . may be  fairly treated as that of the

          State itself .  . . only  when it can be  said that the  State is

          responsible  for  the specific  conduct  of  which the  plaintiff

          complains."  Blum v. Yaretsky,  457 U.S. 991, 1004  (1982), cited
                       ____    ________                               _____

          in Rodr guez-D vila,  904 F.2d  at 97.   The test is  whether the
          __ ________________

                                         -10-

          government exercised coercive power  or provided such significant

          encouragement  that the complained-of  misconduct surrounding the

          Assembly and the Board elections must be deemed to be the conduct

          of the government.  Id., 904 F.2d at 90.
                              ___

                    We  emphasize  that  our  examination  focuses  on  the

          government's  connection  to the  complained-of  action, not  the

          government's  connection to the AEELA itself.  See Blum, 457 U.S.
                                                         ___ ____

          at 1004.  As  a result, we find extraneous  Plaintiffs' arguments

          highlighting  the facts that the  AEELA was created  by law, that

          its members  and Directors  are  public employees,  and that  the

          elective process is regulated  by law, except to the  degree that

          these facts  demonstrate government coercion  or encouragement of

          the complained-of conduct.

                    Plaintiffs  contend  that   Defendants  derived   their

          authority  to schedule  the Assembly  and election from  a Puerto

          Rico  law,  3  L.P.R.A.     862(d),   and  that  Defendants  were

          government employees who  performed their  duties during  working

          time  and using  government  equipment and  materials.   However,

          Plaintiffs have  hung their claim on the  proposition that state-

          granted authority suffices to find  state action, since they have

          failed to  allege that the  government coerced or  encouraged the

          specific election rigging that gives rise to their complaint.  We

          believe that the state's grant of authority  alone cannot justify

          a conclusion of state action in this case.

                    We  draw  this  conclusion  by  comparing  two  of  our

          previous cases.  First, like the district court, we are persuaded

                                         -11-

          by  our holding in Rockwell,  26 F.3d at  258, that state-granted
                             ________

          authority  making possible  a private  party's actions  does not,

          without more,  sufficiently show  that the specific  action taken

          under that authority constitutes state action.  Id.  In Rockwell,
                                                          ___     ________

          we  concluded   that  the  fact  that   a  Massachusetts  statute

          authorized  public health  professionals  to hospitalize  persons

          believed to present  a likelihood  of serious harm  by reason  of

          mental illness,  did  not suffice  to  create a  sufficient  link

          between the state  and the plaintiff's own  detention to classify

          the hospital as a state actor.  Id. By contrast,  in Rodr ques v.
                                          ___                  _________

          Furtado,  950  F.2d 805,  814  (1st Cir.  1991), we  held  that a
          _______

          physician "functioned as a state actor" where he performed a body

          cavity search of the  plaintiff pursuant to a search warrant.  We

          justified  our  conclusion  on  the  ground  that the  scope  and

          motivation  for the  specific conduct  occasioning the  complaint

          "were established  solely by the state's  investigatory goals and

          justified solely by the search warrant."  Id. at 814.
                                                    ___

                    We  conclude  that  to  the  extent that  state-granted

          authority can  justify a finding of state  action, that authority

          must be connected  to the  aim of encouraging  or compelling  the

          specific  complained-of conduct.   Because  we conclude  that the

          district court correctly found  that no state-linked financial or

          regulatory nexus compelled Defendants to act as they did, we find

          no state action under the nexus test.

                      2.  Traditional Public Function Analysis  
                      2.  Traditional Public Function Analysis

                    "[F]or a private actor to be deemed to have acted under

                                         -12-

          color of state  law, it is  not enough to  show that the  private

          actor  performed a public function."   Rockwell, 26  F.3d at 258.
                                                 ________

          Rather,  "[t]he  plaintiff  must  show that  the  private  entity

          assumed  powers  'traditionally   exclusively  reserved  to   the

          State.'"   Id.  (quoting  Rodr ques,  950  F.2d  at  813).    The
                     ___            _________

          exclusive  function test  screens for  situations "where  a state

          tries  to  escape  its  responsibilities by  delegating  them  to

          private  parties."  Id. at 258; see Johnson v. Pinkerton Academy,
                              ___         ___ _______    _________________

          861  F.2d 335,  338 (1st  Cir. 1988).   If  the convening  of the

          AEELA's assembly or  the election of  its board are  traditional,

          exclusively sovereign functions which have merely  been delegated

          to private  actors, then  the state cannot  escape responsibility

          for  constitutional deprivations caused by private parties acting

          pursuant to the delegation.  Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258.
                                       ________

                    In Rendell-Baker,  457 U.S.  at 352, the  Supreme Court
                       _____________

          discussed the "public  function" analysis of  state action.   The

          Court concluded  that although the education  of maladjusted high

          school  students is a public function for which the state intends

          to provide  services at public expense,  that "legislative policy

          choice in no way  makes these services the exclusive  province of

          the State . . . . That a private entity performs a function which

          serves the public  does not makes its  acts state action."   Id.;
                                                                       ___

          see also Ponce, 760 F.2d at 381.
          ________ _____

                    Plaintiffs contend  that for public  interest purposes,

          the  government of  Puerto Rico  has delegated  to the  AEELA the

          traditional  activity  of  promoting  savings   among  government

                                         -13-

          employees, and  providing them benefits such  as loans, insurance

          and medical  services.  We  agree with Plaintiffs  that providing

          such  benefits  to public  employees  probably  does promote  the

          public interest.   However,  these services cannot  reasonably be

          characterized  as  the exclusive  province  of  the State,  since

          banks, credit unions,  savings and loans  associations, brokerage

          firms, mutual funds, and  insurance companies traditionally  have

          existed to promote savings, loans and health and other insurance.

          As a result, we conclude that Defendants cannot be found  to have

          engaged in  state action under the  "traditional public function"

          test. 

                             3.  Symbiotic Relationship  
                             3.  Symbiotic Relationship  

                    State  action  can be  found  by  way  of  a  symbiotic

          relationship.   Under  this test,  a  private party's  acts  "are

          attributable  to the  state only  if the  government 'has  so far

          insinuated itself  into a  position of interdependence  with [the

          private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant

          in the  challenged activity .  . . .'"   Ponce,  760 F.2d at  381
                                                   _____

          (quoting Burton v.  Wilmington Parking Auth.,  365 U.S. 715,  725
                   ______     ________________________

          (1961)).  While "one of the key factors in determining  whether a

          symbiotic  relationship  exists  is certainly  whether  the state

          shared  in any profits made," the lack of a financial partnership

          is not  necessarily dispositive.   Rodr guez-Garc a, 904  F.2d at
                                             ________________

          98-99  (listing  several factors  relevant to  finding "symbiotic

          relationship").

                    In Burton, the Court found state action where the state
                       ______

                                         -14-

          leased  public  property  to  a  private  restaurant  owner,  who

          maintained a  racially discriminatory policy, acknowledged  to be

          indispensable to the success of the venture.  Burton, 365 U.S. at
                                                        ______

          723-24.  In contrast, there is no evidence that the government of

          Puerto Rico  somehow profited from  the allegedly  discriminatory

          actions of  Defendants.  Even  though the AEELA  receives legally

          mandated funds from public employees, no contention has been made

          that  this money  becomes  the  property  of  the  AEELA  or  the

          government.   In fact,  Plaintiffs have  not disputed  that, upon

          termination of employment,  public employees  receive back  their

          funds.   While  the Puerto  Rico Secretary  of the  Treasury does

          approve  the investments  made  by the  AEELA  with these  funds,

          Plaintiffs  have not contended that  these funds are somehow used

          to  the benefit  of the  government of  Puerto Rico,  rather than

          invested at a market  rate of return.  Also,  Plaintiffs have not

          even  attempted  to link  the  alleged election  rigging  to some

          financial gain to the government of Puerto Rico, in  the way that

          the discrimination  in Burton was  linked to the  state's returns
                                 ______

          from the venture.  Thus, whatever financial success the AEELA may

          achieve is not shared with the government of Puerto Rico.

                    Similarly, while  the lack  of financial enrichment  is

          not dispositive, and  "[t]he test is  one of interdependence  and

          joint  participation,"  we agree  with  the  district court  that

          Plaintiffs have  failed to contest the proposition that the AEELA

          is essentially independent in  the conduct of its  daily affairs.

          And no  attempt has been  made to link  the government of  Puerto

                                         -15-

          Rico to the  decisions of when  to hold the  Assembly and how  to

          conduct  Board elections.    As a  result,  we conclude  that  no

          symbiotic relationship exists  between the  government of  Puerto

          Rico and the AEELA.

                    In  passing,  we  observe  that in  the  instant  case,

          Plaintiffs  have not  premised their  claim on a  private party's

          specific act, directed  by the government  of Puerto Rico,  which

          somehow benefits the government via a symbiotic relationship with

          the private actor.   This point can be illustrated  by comparison

          with  the symbiotic relationship that  led to a  finding of state

          action in Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 565 F.
                    _________    __________________________________

          Supp.  963, 974,  stay denied,  572 F.  Supp. 957  (D.P.R. 1983),
                            ___________

          vacated  on other grounds Romany v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto
          _________________________ ______    _____________________________

          Rico,  742 F.2d  32 (1st  Cir. 1984)  (holding that  the district
          ____

          court should have abstained from reaching the merits of the First

          Amendment claims until  the Puerto Rico  Supreme Court decided  a

          pending controversy).  In  Schneider, the plaintiffs charged that
                                     _________

          Puerto  Rico laws  forcing them  to be  members of  Puerto Rico's

          integrated bar  association violated their rights  to free speech

          and  free association, since those laws forced them to belong to,

          and  financially  support,  an organization  (the  Colegio) which

          promoted  ideological  and  political causes  contrary  to  their

          personal beliefs.  Id. at 965-66.  The court found state  action,
                             ___

          noting  not  only  that Puerto  Rico  law  required  attorneys to

          maintain  membership in  the Colegio,  but also  emphasizing that

          required  membership  aided  the  Colegio's  public  function  of

                                         -16-

          regulating  lawyers,  from  which  the government  was  found  to

          benefit.  Id. at  973-74.  Essentially, the government  of Puerto
                    ___

          Rico was found to be advantaged  by the specific act on which the

          complaint was grounded, namely, forced membership in the Colegio.

                    By  contrast, plaintiffs  in  the instant  case do  not

          mount a  facial challenge to  the laws that  create the  AEELA or

          require that it  hold elections.   Instead, they  argue that  the

          AEELA's    leadership    committed    discretionary    acts    of

          discrimination, and did so  while exercising authority granted by

          the  government of  Puerto Rico.   But  plaintiffs fall  short of

          Schneider in at least two ways.  First, the conduct they complain
          _________

          of --  discrimination -- is  not specifically mandated  by Puerto

          Rico law, as forced  membership in the Colegio was for lawyers in

          Schneider.  Unlike the plaintiffs in Schneider, Plaintiffs do not
          _________                            _________

          challenge conduct  specifically directed by Puerto  Rico law; for

          example, their forced membership in the  AEELA or the requirement

          that  the   AEELA  hold  assemblies  and   elections.    Instead,

          Plaintiffs complain of the  manner in which the assembly  and the
                                      ______

          elections  were held -- this  manner is not  directed by statute.
                                        ______

          Second, Plaintiffs  have failed  to link  these specific  acts of

          discrimination in  the holding of AEELA's  assembly and elections

          to  any symbiotic  relationship by  which the  government profits

          from these specific discriminatory acts.  No  allegation has been

          made  that the government of Puerto Rico is somehow advantaged by

          the  alleged  misconduct in  AEELA's assembly  or elections.   By

          contrast, in  Schneider, bar  membership required by  Puerto Rico
                        _________

                                         -17-

          law constituted  the conduct complained of, and  also was alleged

          to  benefit  the  government  of Puerto  Rico,  since  compulsory

          membership made possible the  Colegio's regulatory functions.  As

          a  result of these distinctions,  we conclude that Schneider does
                                                             _________

          not avail Plaintiffs.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    To maintain a Section 1983 action, state action must be

          present.   Because we conclude that, reading the pleadings in the

          best light for  Plaintiffs, they can  prove no set of  facts that

          would implicate state action, the judgment of the district  court

          is

          affirmed.
          affirmed.
          ________

                                         -18-