Court Opinion

ID: 9516833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:53:38.486325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:28.770245
License: Public Domain

WHITE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The Conceal and Carry Act is clearly unconstitutional for violating the Hancock Amendment and, being unconstitutional on that basis, the principal opinion inappropriately and needlessly reaches the issue with regard to the constitutional construction of article I,' section 23 of the Missouri Constitution.
*852When analyzing the uncontroverted evidence from Jackson, Greene, Cape Girar-deau, and Camden counties, the majority opinion determined that each of these counties had standing to bring a claim under Hancock and would incur additional costs associated with implementation of the Conceal and Carry Act. Based upon this determination, the principal opinion holds that the “Act” violates the Hancock amendment with respect to these four counties and holds that none of these counties is required to comply with the Act. While the majority reaches the correct result with regard to these four counties, it fails to truly address the issue that this newly created state mandate must be fully financed by the state. I would hold that no Missouri county is required to comply with the Act as a result of the unfunded mandate for which the State, and only the State, is required to “fully fínance.”
The principal opinion is incorrect in its assertions that the state-imposed increased costs incurred by the counties must be greater than de minimis and that disposition of this case as to the remaining counties and political subdivisions of Missouri is premature. Article X, section 16 provides in pertinent part:
The state is prohibited from requiring any new or expanded activities by counties and other political subdivisions without full state financing, or from shifting the tax burden to counties and other political subdivisions.
Article X, section 21, states in pertinent part:
A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the general assembly or any state agency of counties or other political subdivisions, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the county or other political subdivision for any increased costs.
Nothing contained in sections 16 or 21 of article X require a showing that increased costs by the State’s newly required activities must be greater than de minimis. The de minimis language in City of Jefferson v. Mo. Dept. of Natural Resources, as referenced by the majority, is merely dicta.1 Hancock requires full state funding, period. Full state funding means funding from state revenue, and the $100 license fee authorized by the Act for county revenue is totally irrelevant.2
All of Missouri’s remaining counties will incur an unfunded mandate to satisfy the Act’s requirements for background checks, fingerprint analysis, and the associated administrative labor costs and record keeping each time an applicant applies for a *853license to carry a concealed firearm.3 The State essentially concedes this point and does not argue that the Act does not create additional services and activities increasing county expenditures, but rather urges that the evidence presented at trial demonstrates that the application fee authorized by the legislature will pay for those additional expenses.
The majority opinion claims that it is not addressing the issue as to whether or not a county’s governing body can elect to fund the “increased costs” on a voluntary basis from other sources of county revenue, or from the fee authorized by the legislature.4 And, in order to avoid the issue of the State’s responsibility to fully fund its newly created mandate, the principal opinion miseharaeterizes Cross-Appellant Brooks’s arguments.5 The opinion states that Brooks is only challenging the adequacy of the application fee authorized by the legislature to pay for the increased costs associated with implementing the Act. However, Brooks repetitively raises the comprehensive allegation that the State has faded to fully fund the mandate from any source of state revenue in violation of Hancock.6 It is irrelevant whether the fee authorized is constitutional or even if it can be applied to cover part of the newly created costs. The argument, clearly presented by Brooks, is that the State’s mandate is not fully funded by the State as Hancock requires. This is not a new issue raised by this dissent; it is clearly before the Court today.
*854Hancock requires the State, and only the State, to fully fund this mandate. The individual counties and political subdivisions do not have legal authority to saddle their taxpayers with the unfunded mandate by drawing funds from other sources of county revenue. Any money diverted and expended by a county or political subdivision to finance the implementation of the Conceal and Carry Act, that is not provided directly from state revenue by a state appropriation, is money directly taken from the county taxpayers, each of whom has independent standing for injunc-tive relief. The principal opinion’s delay in requiring compliance with Hancock for the remainder of Missouri’s counties will merely result in unnecessary adjudications in the remaining Missouri counties not enjoined by today’s holding.7
Former U.S. Representative Mel Hancock, the very author of the Hancock Amendment, has asserted that “It’s pretty obvious that it [the concealed weapons law] is an unfunded mandate ... unless the state provides the money to do it, then that’s an unfunded mandate.”8 I would hold that until a specific appropriation is made by the state to cover the unfunded mandate imposed by the Act that no county need comply with implementing the Conceal and Carry Act.9
*855I would affirm the judgment of the trial court, finding sections 50.535, 571.030 and 571.094, as currently enacted, to be unconstitutional because they violate the Hancock Amendment by imposing an unfunded mandate upon the taxpayers of Missouri.10 Finding the Act to be unconstitutional on this basis, negates the need for this Court to reach the issue with regard to the constitutional construction of article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution.

. 916 S.W.2d 794, 795 (Mo. banc 1996) (City of Jefferson II). A judicial opinion should be read in light of the facts pertinent to that case, it being improper to give permanent and controlling effect to statements outside the scope of the real inquiry of the case. State v. Miles Laboratories, 365 Mo. 350, 282 S.W.2d 564, 573 (Mo. banc 1955). "[S]tatements ... are obiter dicta [if] they [are] not essential to the court's decision of the issue before it.” Richardson v. QuikTrip Corp., 81 S.W.3d 54, 59 (Mo.App.2002); State ex rel. Anderson v. Hostetter, 346 Mo. 249, 140 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Mo. banc 1940).

. "[Tjotal state revenue” is the sum (total) of "taxes, excises, customs, duties, and other sources of income” the state receives into its treasury in a given fiscal year. Except as to “credits not related to actual tax liabilities,” this is a cash basis accounting definition because it requires actual receipt of the revenue by the state. Moneys not paid into the treasury, see Mo. Const, art. IV, sec. 15 (defining nonstate funds), or not received in the fiscal year in question are not part of "total state revenues.” Missourians for Tax Justice Educ. Project v. Holden, 959 S.W.2d 100, 106 (Mo. banc 1997).

. See section 571.094.

. Principal opinion, page 10.

. Principal opinion, page 6.

. Cross-Appellant’s Brief (pages 80-81) lays out the constitutional requirements of Hancock and the core of Brooks’s argument. “They [article X, sections 16 and 21] prevent the State from requiring counties or other political subdivisions to perform new or increased activities or services without providing a means for funding the increased costs caused by each mandated service or activity.” (Page 81). Cross-Appellant’s Brief pages 82-85, identifies all of the new activities mandated by the legislature in the newly enacted section 571.094.5. “None of these activities, services, expenditures or risks can be funded under the Act because the General Assembly limited expenditure of the application fees to 'the purchase of equipment and to provide training.' Section 50.535.2.” (Page 85-86). “Even the State's witnesses admitted that they will be required to perform new or increased activities or services which will result in increased time and costs to their counties. The Act, as written, violates the Hancock Amendment because it requires new or increased activities or services of counties and other political subdivisions without any way to pay for them, through application fees or any state appropriation.” (Pages 86-87). “Thus, by its plain language, a violation of Art. X, § 21 exists if both (1) a new or increased activity or service is required or a political subdivision by the State, and (2) the political subdivision experiences increased costs in performing that activity or service.” (page 87). “Brooks, et ah, produced substantial evidence not only of new or increased activities or services mandated by the Act, but also of increased costs required to pay for these activities or services.” (Page 87) Brooks, et al., also fully develops the argument as to what the words "any,” “service” and "activity” mean in relation to how they are used in the Hancock Amendment on page 88 of their brief and concludes this portion of the brief with the argument that, “[b]ecause the General Assembly failed to appropriate funds that can be used to pay for such new and increased activities and services, the Act is clearly unconstitutional.” (page 90). Perhaps the majority opinion focuses solely on the detailed argument in Cross-Appellant’s reply brief that specifically attacks the applicability of the authorized license fee, and has overlooked Brooks’s initial briefing of this issue. However, even in that specific argument Cross-Appellant argues that "... the Act prohibits what the Missouri Constitution requires — full funding of all new or increased activities and services.” (Reply brief, page 13).

.Following today’s holding, once an application for a concealed firearms license is filed by a single individual, in each of the remaining "unenjoined” counties, a single taxpayer in that same county need only seek a declaratory judgment that the Conceal and Carry Act violates the Hancock Amendment and demonstrate any additional cost to the county resulting from the Act to succeed in enjoining its enforcement. The principal opinion’s decision to unnecessarily delay application of Hancock to all of Missouri's counties will result in saddling these taxpayers with the unnecessary expense of the litigation involved and illustrates, with emphasis, the timeworn maxim, that justice delayed is justice denied. It should be noted, however, that, while the delay comes with a high cost in terms of lost time and judicial resources, the applicable unit of government named in the suit will be responsible for reimbursing the plaintiff for his or her costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in maintaining such suit. Article X, section 23. Thus, today's delay will merely inflict unnecessary expense upon the individual counties and political subdivisions to defend suits they can not possibly win. The majority opinion dictates this result by laying out the law of the case — that any evidence of increased costs imposed by the Act demonstrates an unfunded mandate (principal opinion, page 10). Should those governmental entities appeal their certain losses, will this Court grant transfer to the over 100 separate cases that will result, and then decide, one case at a time, the single issue it can decide with one opinion today? Today’s holding gives new meaning to the concept of judicial economy — that new meaning negates this concept entirely. The principal opinion states that this matter can be resolved in a single additional suit while at the same time asserting that nothing less than particularized evidence is required from each county for each individual claim to become ripe — only then will the Court agree to recognize the obvious Hancock violation on a county by county basis, (principal opinion, page 9). Perhaps a few of these cases may be consolidated, but that does not alter the fact that there is one case here before this Court today that could decide this clearly presented issue and that the delay caused by the principal opinion is totally unnecessary. Brooks, et al. makes clear to this Court that there is a facial violation of the Hancock Amendment, i.e., there is no state funding anywhere in the Act to finance the state mandate, yet the principal opinion declines to address this issue. (See footnote 6). A speedy and authoritative decision would avoid the intolerable confusion created by the principal opinion’s holding, which partially implements an unconstitutional law.

. Tim Hoover, Amendment ‘could undo' conceal-carry. The Kansas City Star, January 25, 2004.

. See Rolla 31 School Dist. v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. banc 1992).

. When trial court's decision is correct, even if based upon different reasoning, that decision will not be disturbed because the trial court gave a wrong or insufficient reason for it. American Standard Ins. Co. v. Hargrave, 34 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Mo. banc 2000).