Court Opinion

ID: 9733945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:21:03.729578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.661881
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
(dissenting). Were the facts as the majority relates them, I would agree with its result. However, Stauber was represented by two attorneys, not one. Attorney Staton testified that Stauber called him, and Staton agreed to become involved in the Illinois garnishment action. On cross-examination, he testified that he did so on behalf of Stauber. Staton also testified that Attorney Porter had agreed not to disburse the garnished funds until after the supreme court had decided the case in return for Staton's agreement to cease litigating the garnishment. The majority's assumption that only McDorman represented Stauber is therefore erroneous. Its conclusion depends upon its erroneous assumption, resulting in an incorrect mandate.
Though the trial court concluded as a matter of law that Stauber's first attorney was not entitled to rely upon Porter's statements, it did not consider the alleged agreement between Staton and Porter. The trial court's opinion reads: "The only evidence of Porter's 'acceptance,' however, is his October 2, 1981, letter, quoted in its entirety at p. 4, supra. The evidence is insufficient to establish an agreement for an express trust."
Because Staton's testimony, if believed, is evidence of an agreement between Staton and Porter, the trial judge's finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous. Noll v. Dimiceli's, Inc., 115 Wis.2d 641, 643, 340 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Ct.App. 1983). Because the majority does not consider Staton's testimony, it does not consider whether *95that testimony, if believed by the trial court, would support a judgment in Stauber's favor.
In Kramer v. Alpine Valley Resort, 108 Wis.2d 417, 422, 321 N.W.2d 293, 295-96 (1982), the court repeated the conditions necessary for a cause of action based upon promissory estoppel:
1. The promisor must make a promise which he should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee;
2. the promise must induce such action or forbearance; and
3. injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the promise. [Citation omitted.]
In Puttkammer v. Minth, 83 Wis.2d 686, 688-89, 266 N.W.2d 361, 363 (1978), the court repeated the elements of a cause of action in equity for unjust enrichment:
(1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under circumstances making it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value. [Citations omitted.]
Were the trial court to believe Staton, Stauber has proven causes of action in promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. Were I writing for the majority I would remand to the trial court with instructions to consider Sta-ton's and Porter's conflicting testimony, make a credibility determination and, based on that determination, either dismiss Stauber's complaint or enter judgment against Porter.