Court Opinion

ID: 9595984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:44:59.257365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:31.865453
License: Public Domain

EARL B. STOVER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but for a different reason. Unlike the majority, I believe the Wrights’ counterclaim causes of action did arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the basis of the Matthews’ action. See North Am. Land Corp. v. Boutte, 604 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 1980, writ ref. n.r.e.) (Counterclaim on performance of contracts for sale of land arose out of same transaction or occurrence as the suit on the promissory note for purchase of land, and, thus, was not barred by statute of limitations.).
In them suit to quiet title, the Matthews pleaded that the Wrights “defaulted in the performance of them obligations under the terms of said Contract, and pursuant to the terms thereof, lost and forfeited any and all rights or claim of interest they may have had in and to said real property, without Defendants [Wrights] ever having obtained title to said real property, or any part thereof.” By their own pleadings in their suit to quiet title, the Matthews themselves put the Wrights’ performance under the 1983 contract at issue. Indeed, the Matthews’ suit to quiet title is founded on and is inextricably linked with the Wrights’ alleged failure to perform their obligations under the contract. For that reason alone, the counterclaims by the Wrights can be said to have arisen out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the basis of Matthews’ action. See generally Oliver v. Oliver, 889 S.W.2d 271, 272-73 (Tex.1994) (Because the actual duration of the marital relationship was central to husband’s divorce petition and because wife’s counterclaim for fraud arose out of the facts that determined the duration of the relationship, her counterclaim arose out of the “same transaction or occurrence” that was the basis of husband’s divorce action.).
Even though I believe the Wrights’ cause of action arose out of the “same transaction or occurrence,” I would nonetheless hold that their counterclaim causes of action are barred by the doctrine of laches and for that reason affirm the partial summary judgment. The elements of laches are: (1) unreasonable delay by one having legal or equitable rights in asserting them, and (2) a good faith change in position by another to his detriment be*580cause of the delay. See Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex.1989). Here the Matthews raised laches in their motion for summary judgment and attached sufficient summary judgment proof to support it. The Wrights delayed some thirteen years in asserting their rights under the contract; the Matthews submitted summary judgment evidence of their detrimental reliance on the delay. The Matthews’ summary judgment motion and proof are unrefuted by the Wrights. Consequently, I concur in the majority’s disposition of issue one and join in the rest of the opinion.