Court Opinion

ID: 9770188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:54:01.702545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:15.685576
License: Public Domain

POFF, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the granting of the summary judgment. I cannot agree with the majority’s determination that the evidence offered by the employees of Pogo was readily controvertible. I do agree that the Pogo employees are interested witnesses, for Pogo, as the owner of an overriding royalty in the Meadows lease, has a direct interest in the outcome of this suit. If the contested release is held to be a valid release, Pogo will lose its overriding royalty interest.
I also agree with the majority that the question to be resolved is not the knowledge or intent of Mr. Good, the signator of the release, but rather the question to be resolved is “did an employer of Pogo mistakenly and inadvertently prepare the release for Good’s signature.” I disagree that the question is susceptible of objective proof or disproof.
In explaining the basis for preparing the release, Pogo’s employees stated in their depositions that the Meadows lease file did not contain the Pogo assignment to E.T.S. Enterprises, nor did the file contain any information concerning the commencement of drilling on the Meadows lease. The sum of Pogo’s evidence was that the Meadows lease file indicated a dormant lease, which was subject to being released. Pogo’s employees also deposed that the failure to file an assignment, and the failure to note in a lease file drilling activity or production was a departure from Pogo’s standard operating procedure.
The majority opines that, whether the release was properly due, whether the preparation of the release was the result of a breakdown in standard operating procedures and what defect in those procedures caused the release to be signed, are matters susceptible of objective proof or disproof. I do not agree, for I fail to see how Hayes et al. could have objectively disproved what knowledge Pogo’s employees possessed at the time of the preparation of the release, nor do I envision any manner in which Hayes could recreate the status of the Meadows lease file as it existed at the time in question. The basis for the preparation of the release and the facts upon which these actions were taken lies solely within the knowledge of the actors, the interested witnesses. The truth or falsity of E.T.S. Inc.’s evidence stands solely on the credibility of the interested witnesses. An affidavit by an interested witness to a matter which the adversaries have no knowledge or real means of confirmation does no more than raise an issue of fact. Lewisville State Bank v. Blanton, 525 S.W.2d 696, (Tex.1975).
Not being present at Pogo’s office at the time of the preparation of the release and not having access to what facts and knowledge was possessed by Pogo’s employees when they prepared the release, Hayes had no basis upon which to dispute their story. The only eyewitnesses are Pogo employees. All physical or documentary evidence was under the exclusive control of Pogo. In this case, I can envision no outside or independent source Hayes could have mustered to controvert Pogo’s explanation for the preparation of the release. The facts presented by Pogo’s employees were not subject to outside objective verification nor was there a basis upon which to offer opinion or expert testimony. I envision Hayes’ only option to have been the filing of a counter affidavit disputing E.T.S. *661Inc.’s evidence. Such a counter affidavit would have at best been based on assumptions and conjecture and at worst it would have been perjurious.
The majority finds E.T.S.’s summary judgment evidence similar to that summary judgment proof offered in Channel 4, KGBT v. Briggs, 759 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.1988), and concludes that the evidence goes far beyond state of mind to establish an objective explanation for the mistake. In Briggs, which was a libel suit, the Supreme Court found the technical procedures for the production of the telecast (such procedures being claimed by Channel 4 to be the basis for the technical mistake) to be subject to investigation. The technical process (by which Channel 4 alleged the news special was dubbed over a political file tape from which Briggs’ image had not been completely erased) was such that it could have been disputed by third parties testifying on Briggs' behalf.
I do not find the actions of Pogo’s employees in allegedly failing to file or note the E.T.S. assignment, to be a technical mistake subject to investigation, or possible disproof by extraneous sources. I find the mistake and the explanation to be more similar to the mistake made in James T. Taylor, Etc. v. Arlington Ind. School Dist., 160 Tex. 617, 335 S.W.2d 371 (1960); wherein a contractor attempted to explain that his bid was incorrect, due to his failure to properly carry a digit while adding his cost and preparing his bid. Taylor’s employee’s affidavit setting out the mistake was held not to be sufficient summary judgment proof. The court opined the affidavit was evidence from an interested party which could not be readily controverted if untrue. In such cases, the credibility of the witness is presented and a summary judgment is improper. Evidence resting solely on the credibility of the interested witness is more effectively tested in court at trial than by sterile affidavits at a summary judgment hearing. The trier of fact is uniquely qualified to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as well as his responses, and to test the credibility of the witnesses.
I therefore cannot agree that the evidence offered by the interested witnesses was sufficient evidence upon which to grant the summary judgment. I therefore cannot join in the majority opinion.