Court Opinion

ID: 9570619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:24:41.918877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:09.641271
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s categorization of Wynn v. J.R. Simplot Company, 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983), and the majority’s view of the commission’s application of Wynn in the instant case.
The Court stated in Wynn:
“The sole question presented is whether, as held by the Commission, the claimant failed to establish that his condition was caused by an ‘accident’ i.e., a distinct mishap or event.
“At a precise time on a precise day, i.e., 7:30 p.m. on March 17, 1980, claimant-appellant Wynn suffered a ‘documented left C-3-4, soft disc herniation,’ which the uncontroverted testimony of his attending physician indicated occurred ‘while he was working his front end loader’ when, ‘in my medical opinion, forces exerted on his C-3-4 ligamentous structure, at that point in time, exceeded their limits and he suffered the resultant disc protrusion and disability.’ ”
The only evidence in Wynn was presented by the claimant and the Court said:
“The uncontradicted evidence is contrary to the Industrial Commission’s finding that claimant’s symptoms were not caused by a ruptured disc ... Hence, there is no evidence to support the finding of the Commission that claimant’s symptoms were not caused by a disc rupture and that finding is reversed.”
The Court’s decision in Wynn concluded with the statement:
“In sum, this is not a case in which the Industrial Commission made findings and drew conclusions from controverted evidence, in which event we would ordinarily sustain the Commission. Rather, in the instant cause the evidence was uncontradicted and reveals that the claimant Wynn was injured while working at his usual and ordinary labor and the stress of that work overcame the resistance of his body which was admittedly predisposed to such injury. The injury produced the symptomatology and the disability from which claimant suffered.”
In contrast to the facts of Wynn, it is my view that the medical testimony in the instant case was at best inconclusive in establishing that claimant’s disability resulted from an accident, mishap, or event occurring during employment, or whether there had been a “general progression” of a problem. The medical testimony was further controverted by a medical opinion that the claimant “had a gradual onset of disc disease from wear and tear of the ordinary activities of life.”
Hence, it is my opinion that the findings and conclusions of the referee which were adopted by the commission are supported by the evidence in this case and should not be overturned.
APPENDIX B
Ercil R. Bowman, Jr., M.D.
Orthopaedic Surgery
6 April 1984
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Re: Myrtle Hazen MTB & B File # 13-989
Dear Sirs:
Mrs. Myrtle Hazen was seen in my office on 2 April 1984 because of back surgery performed on 29 August 1983. She stated that everything is fine “Except I can’t lift anything without pain”. She repeated variations of this statement throughout the course of the interview. The history obtained, as far as this occurrence, is that she had a gradual onset of pain at work without any specific date of injury. She states “After a couple of months or so I went to a chiropractor”. She saw him for two months and then saw Dr. Michael O’Brien *995who referred her to Dr. Cindrich “Who did the surgery”. She states that pain occurs on lifting. As little as ten pounds will cause it. The pain is lumbosacral and she states “Got rid of all my leg pain”. She states her right leg initially was worse than the left. She states further “Same on the left but more continual on the right”. This, of course, being her pre-operative state. She has a prescription for pain medication but doesn’t use them unless she lifts and lifting is the only thing that causes pain. She had a post-op CT scan. She has had no x-rays since that time until seen in this office. She specifically denies any prior problems. She works in a convenience store gas station and now has to lift objects. Apparently she feels that her problems came on when the gas station became more than a gas station and became a convenience store. She has had no change in her condition in the past two months.
She has no known allergies, takes no medications regularly. She uses no tobacco, rarely uses alcoholic beverages. She has only been hospitalized for the back surgery and a hysterectomy. She denies any other known medical problems.
Examination reveals a five foot four inch tall, 164 pound lady who stands normally with minimal spasm and has a normal gait. She is tender over both posterior superior iliac spines and paravertebrally in the lumbar area. There is an equivocal decrease in motion in flexion in her back and she apparently has some pain on full flexion. Straight leg raising tests are negative while sitting, they are positive at eighty (80) degrees on the right and sixty (60) degrees on the left while supine. In a supine position she will not flex her hips past ninety (90) degrees even though the knee is flexed.
X-ray examination reveals that she has narrowing of the facet joints at L5, SI and less so at L4, 5. Generally speaking there is a minimal amount of arthritis considering age and past history.
On examination this lady has a paucity of findings. In addition, her affect is quite interesting when she states that everything is all right except she can’t lift. This, of course, precludes her returning to her job at the convenience store. If we accept the history as given here in the office that this lady has had no prior back problems until, as it was given, — last spring — we have to conclude that she did not have a specific single incident. This was then a gradual onset thing perhaps secondary to repeated lifting and moving cases of food and beverage in a convenience store or some other unknown event. On the other hand, if this lady does have a prior history of back problems the logical conclusion to be reached is that she has had, in fact, an ongoing problem with the aging process which was aggravated by her occupation. In any event, at this point in time, it appears to me that her condition is stable and it appears that way from her history. Accordingly, according to the Manual for Orthopaedic Surgeons Evaluating Physical Impairment published by the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, she has a physical impairment rating of ten per cent (10%) whole body. This physical impairment, of course, is present irrespective of mode of onset of her problem that led to surgery. She is clinically stable.
Sincerely,
/s/ Ercil R. Bowman, Jr.
Ercil R. Bowman, Jr., M.D., P.A.
ERB:pa
APPENDIX C
IC 83-445831
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO
Sept. 25, 1984
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
The Commission assigned the above-entitled matter to Referee Aliza D. Bethlahmy, who conducted a hearing in the matter on April 12, 1984 in Boise, Idaho. The matter was then continued to permit the parties to take additional depositions. The depositions of Dr. O’Brien, Dr. Squire, and Dr. *996Bowman were taken and are admitted, respectively, as Exhibits # 7 through 9. After all of the evidence was submitted, a briefing schedule was established. The final brief having been submitted, the matter is now ready for decision.
Now, having considered all of the evidence submitted in this matter and having considered the parties’ post-hearing briefs, the Referee enters the following proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, which she recommends the Commission approve and adopt as its decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I
The Claimant, Myrtle Hazen, was born October 13, 1922. She has a ninth-grade education.
In January or February of 1980, the Claimant began working as a gas station cashier. After approximately one year, the station was changed to a Shell station. The Claimant’s duties remained the same; i.e., collecting money for the fuel.
In January of 1983, the station came under new ownership. The Claimant was retained as an employee by the new owner.
In early 1983, the Defendant-Employer expanded his business by constructing a convenience store on the same location as the gas station.
When the new building was completed, the cashier-clerks still sold gasoline, oil, and cigarettes, but they also sold groceries, beer, and pop. The employees’ lifting duties included lifting cases of beer and pop and moving them when stocking the merchandise. The store also had a fountain and, depending on the weather, the number of sixteen ounce cans and bottles it was necessary for the cashier-clerk to move would vary. The number of cylinders of pop the cashier-clerk would move each day also varied.
The Claimant testified that prior to May 13, 1983, she would move one or two cylinders of pop per day.
II
The general store’s grand opening was held on May 13, 14, and 15 of 1983. As part of the store’s grand opening, customers purchasing $2 worth of goods from the store were given a quart-size bottle of soda pop.
The Claimant only worked one of the three days of the store’s grand opening. She worked on Saturday, May 14, 1983. She also worked May 16 through May 19.
The Claimant testified that during the store’s grand opening, her duties included pulling cases of coke out of a delivery van and moving them to the front of the station and stacking them so they would be available for the customers. She testified that each case weighed approximately thirty to thirty-five pounds and that she moved approximately eighteen to twenty-four of the cases on Monday, May 16, 1983. The Claimant testified that she had not performed any unusual work on the 14th of May, but that on the mornings of May 16 and 17 she had to move the cases of pop. She also testified that she believed that she had moved cases of pop on Wednesday, May 18, 1983, but the Defendants testified that the van was moved from the premises of the general store on the afternoon of May 16, 1983.
The Claimant testified that in the evenings after performing her work in mid-May, 1983, she was tired and ached all over and had a sharp pain in her right leg. She also had a sharp pain in her hip and down the small of her back. At the hearing, the Claimant identified the onset of pain as being Tuesday, May 17 or Wednesday, May 18, 1983.
The Claimant’s pain subsequently changed to a constant aching pain and approximately three to four weeks after the initial onset of pain, the Claimant had a discussion with her supervisor about the pain she was experiencing in her legs. The two women discussed the problem on several occasions, and they thought the problem might be due to inadequate support for *997the Claimant’s legs. The Claimant and her supervisor thought that perhaps the type of shoes which the Claimant was wearing was the problem, and the Claimant purchased a pair of shoes with an arch support. She hoped that the arch support in the new shoes would alleviate the pain she was experiencing. The new shoes did not help.
The pain which the Claimant was suffering from did not affect her performance of her job duties, but she testified that she did not do anything at home after she left the job.
III
In the first part of August, 1983, the Claimant went to Dr. Squires, a chiropractor, because of the severity of the pain she was experiencing.
The Claimant told Dr. Squires that she had no idea of the cause of the pain and that it had come on gradually. The only heavy lifting she had done was of the cylinders and the cases of beer and coke.
The Claimant saw the chiropractor from August 2,1983 to August 23,1983 when he referred her to Dr. O’Brien.
IV
The Claimant saw Dr. O’Brien, a neurologist, on August 25, 1983. He scheduled her for a CAT scan and myelogram on August 26, 1983.
The Claimant told her employer that she would not be in to work on August 26, 1983, that she had a herniated disc and needed surgery. August 24, 1983 was the Claimant’s last day of work at the general store. The Claimant underwent surgery on August 29, 1983.
V
Dr. Squires testified that he and the Claimant discussed the Claimant’s occupational role at the store, but they did not discuss a specific date or a specific cause of the Claimant’s injury. See Deposition of Dr. Squires, Page 12, Line 13 to 23.
Dr. Squires assumed that the Claimant’s problem was “occupationally related”, but he did not identify any specific incident. See Deposition of Dr. Squires, Page 17, Line 4 to 18, Page 18, Line 1 to 16.
VI
The history the Claimant gave Dr. O’Brien on August 25, 1983 was that she had had a problem with serious back pain for approximately two months prior to seeing him. The Claimant’s history was that the back pain had moved into her back for approximately a month before that time. See Deposition of Dr. O’Brien, Page 6, Line 15 to 24.
Dr. O’Brien’s opinion was that the Claimant’s injury was caused by her work; i.e., that the Claimant’s disc herniation was caused by the heavy lifting she did at work.
Dr. O’Brien indicated that he had been told that the Claimant had to lift heavy cylinders for the dispensing machines for the pop and the cylinders were quite heavy and apparently the Claimant told Dr. O’Brien that was her problem with the lifting. See Deposition of Dr. O’Brien, Page 32, Line 7 to 19.
Dr. O’Brien was unable to pinpoint the time of injury, but his view was that there was a general progression of the problem to where the Claimant needed surgery. See Deposition of Dr. O’Brien, Page 36, Line 24 to Page 37, Line 9.
Dr. O’Brien would give the Claimant a 13.3% whole man permanent partial impairment rating. See Exhibit # 8 attached to Deposition of Dr. O’Brien.
VII
Dr. Bowman testified in this matter and expressed the viewpoint that the Claimant’s activities in the middle of May, 1983, were not the cause of the Claimant’s injury *998which resulted in her undergoing surgery in August, 1983. He indicated that his opinion was that the Claimant had a gradual onset of disc disease from wear and tear or the ordinary activities of life.
In a letter dated April 6, 1984, Dr. Bowman would give the Claimant a rating of ten percent permanent partial impairment and wrote the following:
“If we accept the history as given here in the office that this lady has had no prior back problems until, as it was given,— last spring — we have to conclude that she did not have a specific single incident. This was then a gradual onset thing perhaps secondary to repeated lifting and moving cases of food and beverage in a convenience store or some other unknown event. On the other hand, if this lady does have a prior history of back problems the logical conclusion to be reached is that she has had, in fact, an ongoing problem with the aging process which was aggravated by her occupation.” See Deposition Exhibit # 1 of Bowman Deposition.
VIII
The Referee is persuaded by the bulk of the evidence whereby the Claimant testified she was not able to identify a specific incident and the various statements she told both the physicians and her supervisor at work that, in essence, the pain “came on gradually”, that the Claimant’s personal injury occurred over a substantial period of time.
The Referee finds that the Claimant’s herniated disc was not the result of an accident but rather occurred over a longer period of time and “came on gradually”.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I
The initial issue to be resolved in this matter is whether the Claimant has established that she suffered an "accident” within the meaning of the Idaho Workmen’s Compensation Act.
The Claimant argues that she suffered an accident, reasonably located as to its occurrence and is therefore entitled to receipt of workmen’s compensation benefits. Counsel for the Claimant relies heavily on the case of Wynn v. J.R. Simplot Company, 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983). The Referee believes that unlike the Wynn case, wherein the Supreme Court found that Mr. Wynn had suffered an accident and injury at a precise time on a precise day and was therefore entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits, the evidence presented in this case is distinguishable in that the Claimant’s injury occurred gradually over a period of time and was not caused by an accident as defined by Section 72-102(14), IDAHO CODE.
Inasmuch as the Claimant has proceeded under an “accident” theory and not an occupational disease theory and inasmuch as the Supreme Court has retained the requirement that in order to constitute an accident the Claimant must show that he suffered his injury at a particular time and at a particular place, the Referee concludes that the Claimant in this case has failed to meet her burden of proof.
The Referee therefore concludes that the Claimant has failed to establish that her herniated disc was caused by an accident within the meaning of the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Law.
II
Because of the Referee’s conclusion that the Claimant did not suffer an accident, she deems it unnecessary to address the issue of notice, but does wish to point out that even the testimony presented relative to the issue of notice establishes that the Claimant’s problem had a gradual onset, and when the Claimant and her supervisor discussed the Claimant’s problem, the discussion was in the context of the origin of the Claimant’s problem being unknown but that they assumed that the pain she was experiencing in her legs was caused by her *999general work and the standing at the general store. See Excerpt of Proceedings, Page 11, Line 2 to 6.
Regardless of that point, since the Referee concluded that the Claimant did not suffer an accident, there is no need to address the issue presented by Section 72-701, IDAHO CODE.
The Referee recommends that the full Commission approve the following order denying the Claimant’s application for workmen’s compensation benefits.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does order, that the Claimant’s application for workmen’s compensation benefits be, and the same is, hereby DENIED.
/s/ Aliza D. Bethlahmy Aliza D. Bethlahmy, Referee
ORDER
The Commission has reviewed the record and the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and hereby approves and confirms the same, and adopts them as the Decision and Order of the Commission. The Decision is ordered filed by the Secretary of the Commission.
DATED and FILED this 25 day of September, 1984.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
/s/ Will S. Defenbach Will S. Defenbach, Chairman
/s/ Gerald A. Geddes Gerald A. Geddes, Member
/s/ Lawrence G. Sirhall Lawrence G. Sirhall, Member
BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.
With the curtain dropping on Mrs. Hazen’s attempt to obtain the “sure and certain relief promised by the Workmen’s Compensation Law, I write one last time to lament the failure of this Court to see that justice is administered fairly and freely.
When we first heard the appeal, the controlling issue as stated by the surety was:
Is there substantial, competent evidence to support the finding of the Industrial Commission that claimant failed to carry her burden of proving that she sustained an “accident,” which means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred?
That issue was similarly stated in Mrs. Hazen’s brief:
Did the Commission err in holding that the Appellant-Claimant was required to prove that her accident happened at a particular place and at a particular time?
Much of the surety’s brief was addressed to Wynn v. J.R. Simplot Co., 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983), and cases from this Court which were concerned with repetitive trauma. That brief was mainly responsive to Mrs. Hazen’s brief wherein it argued that Wynn had been misapplied by the referee.
Our first opinion agreed that the referee erred in her reading of Wynn — and we held that her misapplication of law to the facts in evidence necessitated another hearing, and we expected that it would be the Commission itself who would preside thereat. Justice Bakes, however, did not believe that Mrs. Hazen should have that opportunity of going before the Commission itself. He suggested that, notwithstanding his continued agreement that the referee erred, Mrs. Hazen in his view had not shown an accident.
A rehearing was had and, by gamering a change of one vote, the surety has prevailed. Mrs. Hazen is wrongfully put out of court, so to speak, unless the Commission intercedes on her behalf and affords her the hearing which the Court once believed she should have — before one mind was changed. It is a clear case of manifest injustice — an injustice not occasioned by the surety, but by the Court in denying her a fair hearing. Observe the following:
*1000Nowhere in the majority opinion (nor in the referee’s, either) is Dr. Cindrich’s name mentioned. It appears that his reports have gone unnoticed and unconsidered, just as with the doctor himself. To most practitioners in this field, it will be incomprehensible that the operating surgeon is wholly ignored.
Worse yet, a rereading of a majority opinion commonly suggests that the author of the majority opinion has inadvertently assumed that Dr. Bowman — the mainstay witness in the eyes of the referee — was the operating surgeon. Not so, however, as was thought to have been pointed out. It was the testimony of this doctor that the referee chose over the treating physician’s. What was his testimony? Aught but an answer to a hypothetical question about the causes of the condition of a woman whom he had never seen until long after Dr. Cindrich performed the required surgery. Was Dr. Bowman impeached? Of course he was, giving an entirely different answer to the hypothetical question when counsel for Mrs. Hazen cranked in Mrs. Hazen’s version of her history.
The manifest injustice here is not urged as being that Mrs. Hazen is entitled to compensation. Not at all. But she is entitled to an error-free hearing where three experienced Commissioners give proper credence to the testimony of the treating doctors and to the answer to a hypothetical question of Dr. Bowman.
What happens in the ease of Mrs. Hazen is now to the competent discretion of the Commission.