Court Opinion

ID: 9827067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:06:46.579721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:22.117113
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee, on motion for rehearing, assails the conclusions stated in our original opinion, holding that the fund involved in this litigation should not bear interest and be paid to appellee, White, less all legitimate costs and expenses of administration, and contends that the judgment of the court below, decreeing to appellee, White, the full amount, “with interest thereon from April 19, 1932, until paid, at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum,” should be affirmed, and that a deduction for the expenses of administration should not be allowed by this court. These contentions were raised on motion for rehearing in the related ease of Olga Mae Kelby Hurley, Administratrix, v. Nora V. Hirsch, 66 S.W.(2d) 387, this day decided adversely to appellee’s contentions; thus, applying the coriclusions therein reached, precludes further discussion here.
In our original opinion in this case, we stated that the “judgment of the district court * * * directs * * * the administration on the estate of David F. Kelby be closed, and the administratrix be discharged,” and on such finding concluded that “the administration should be continued until further orders of the county court.” Our attention has been called to the fact that the quoted action of the lower court was made in the cited kindred case, supra, and not in the instant case. We have reviewed the record in both cases and find that appellee’s contention in this respect is correct; therefore our finding that the district court judgment in this case is so stated is here withdrawn, and our conclusion based thereon “that the administration be continued until further order of the county court” is also withdrawn.
The record reveals that on February 1, 1932, Olga Mae Kelby Hurley was duly appointed temporary administratrix of the estate of David F. Kelby, deceased, and the order of the probate court, making the appointment, directs that the ‘‘power of Olga Mae Kelby Hurley, as such temporary ad-ministratrix, shall cease on the 7th day of March, 1932”; that on March 7, 1932, the-powers previously granted in the appointment of the administratrix were, by the court, “continued in full force and effect for a period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof.” - No further orders extending the powers of the administratrix appears of record, nor does it appear that the administration was ever made permanent. On April 19, 1932, the temporary administratrix, by virtue of an order of said court, expended the entire fund belonging to said estate.
Articles 3380 and 3381, R. S. 1925, provide:
“Art. 3380. At the expiration of the time for which a temporary administrator has been appointed, he shall file with the clerk of the court, duly verified, a list of all property of the estate which has come to his hands, a return of all sales made by him, and a full exhibit and account of all his acts as such administrator.
“Art. 3381. The list, return, exhibit and account filed by the temporary administrator, shall be acted upon by the court, and whenever temporary letters shall expire, or cease to be of effect from any cause, the court shall immediately, either in term time or vacation, enter an order upon the probate minutes requiring such temporary administrator to forthwith deliver the estate rer maining in his possession to the person legally entitled to the possession of the same.”
The administration being closed by operation of law and the very terms of the order of the court making the appointment, and no appeal therefrom, a judicial decree is not available to continue the administration, or to direct the administrator to further act. The district court, in certiorari proceedings to review probate matters, is confined to á retrial of the issues involved on the appeal; as disclosed in the application for the writ of certiorari, and must make such orders as the probate court should have made, and certify its action to said court for observance. If the administration be closed, the order of the district court thus made is the final decree to be entered, by the probate court, in the administration. The application iri the case at bar involves probate orders. dis¿’ tributing the entire funds of the estate, and the approval of the administratrix’s final account, in effect, closes the administration, and the judgment of the district court, as reformed by this court, directing the orders *396of the probate court to be vacated, and decreeing that Olga Mae Kelby Hurley, admin-istratrix. pay to W. D. White, administrator, of the estate of Nell Ann Kelby, the sum of $9,428.50, less the legitimate costs and expenses of administration, is the judgment for the district court to certify to the county court for observance, and is the final judgment in the administration.
The costs on this appeal are taxed against appellee, White, administrator, and, as in our decision on the motion for rehearing in the cited related case, supra, all costs intended on our original opinion bear evidence only of the costs on this appeal; costs in the district court follow its judgment, and are taxed against appellant.
Overruled.