Court Opinion

ID: 9476652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:01:37.675302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:26.104295
License: Public Domain

LAY, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority commits both legal and factual error in holding that the district court’s dismissal of the indictment with prejudice was an abuse of discretion. First, the majority indicates that the district court lacked an adequate factual record upon which to exercise discretion. If this is so, then there is not a factual predicate for this court to exercise its “discretion,” either, and a proper course of action would be to remand the case to the trial court.
The fundamental error of the majority is that it concludes that on this record there is only one way the trial court could have exercised its discretion, that is, to dismiss the case without prejudice. The statute does not contemplate such a one-sided judgment. The majority concedes that the statute is silent as to whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice; the statute says only what factors should be weighed. If the trial court failed to pass on the statutory criteria or if it lacked an adequate record, then the case should be remanded for the court to weigh the proper factors or build the record. This court was not delegated the role of decision maker under the Speedy Trial Act. The district court was.
The majority also errs in its analysis of the factors listed for consideration.1 One critical mistake by the majority is on the issue of prejudice to the defendant. It is implicit in the Speedy Trial Act’s design and purpose that defendants are automatically prejudiced by any delay. While courts have stated that a showing of preju*1180dice to the defendant may be properly considered in finding that a dismissal should be with prejudice, see, e.g., United States v. Stayton, 791 F.2d 17, 21-22 (2d Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir.1983)); United States v. Bittle, 699 F.2d 1201, 1208 (D.C.Cir.1983) (citing legislative history), to interpret the defendant’s failure to demonstrate prejudice as mandating a dismissal without prejudice overemphasizes the probative value of this factor. The defendant’s burden under the Act is only to present proof supporting the motion for dismissal itself. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
Moreover, the majority's analysis fails to consider some of the factual allegations made to the district court regarding prejudice to the defendant. For example, the defendant resigned from his subsequent position as director of a public works project because of the continuing uncertainty created by the various lengthy delays in his case. Alvin August Kramer is a 61-year-old man who has lived for over three years with the threat of an indictment and the injurious delays in bringing the case to trial. As the Supreme Court stated in Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973):
The speedy trial guarantee recognizes that a prolonged delay may subject the accused to an emotional stress that can be presumed to result in the ordinary person from uncertainties in the prospect of facing public trial or of receiving a sentence longer than, or consecutive to, the one he is presently serving — uncertainties that a prompt trial removes.
Id. at 439, 93 S.Ct. at 2263.
Once again, the majority’s finding that the defendant will suffer no additional prejudice from the delay in prosecution slights the decisions made by the district court as the first-hand observer of the “impact of a reprosecution on the administration of [the Act] and on the administration of justice.”
The majority’s view of the “facts and circumstances leading to dismissal” is similarly misguided and incomplete. In its order denying reconsideration of its dismissal with prejudice, the district court acknowledged its own fault in “placing personal wellbeing [sic] ahead of the demands imposed by the circumstances surrounding the final scheduling of this particular case.” The district court’s actions were not the only ones involved, however. Earlier, the then-newly-appointed chief judge of the district court had disqualified himself from serving on the case. If the judge was disqualified to try the case, he clearly was disqualified from entering any order which would have substantive repercussions on the case. Yet the government failed to object to the order of the disqualified judge continuing the case, an act that resulted in the denial of the defendant’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act. The factual circumstances surrounding this case also include a long delay caused by the government, for alleged political reasons, by its failure to proceed before the grand jury until months after the investigation had commenced.2
Notwithstanding these facts, the government urges that it was not at fault in causing the Speedy Trial Act violation and that any blame lies solely with the district court. The government stresses that it was ready for trial, but no trial judge was available. However, it was the burden of the government to protect its own record and to insure that the defendant’s speedy *1181trial rights were not violated.3 The chief district judge may have erred in granting the continuance sought by the government and in not providing a district judge to hear the case. But the alleged error of the district court could have been obviated if the government had petitioned the chief judge of this court to designate a district judge to sit. See 28 U.S.C. § 292(b) (chief judge of circuit may, in public interest, designate any district judge of circuit to hold a district court in any district within the circuit); id. § 291(b) (chief judge of circuit may, in public interest, designate any circuit judge to hold district court within circuit). Instead, the government has sought to have the district court and now this court serve as guardian angels to prevent the government from committing error prejudicial to itself. For the government to avoid its own responsibilities by dwelling on the alleged wrongdoing of the district court is so dissembling that it approaches sheer hypocrisy.
Upon close analysis, it is clear that the majority has erroneously failed to recognize both the government’s culpability and the obvious prejudice to the defendant in this case. The majority opinion additionally undermines the policy behind the Speedy Trial Act by holding, in effect, that the district court has abused its discretion unless it resolves all factual issues in the way that the court of appeals desires. This approach belittles the delegation of statutory discretion to Article III district judges by Congress.
The concerns expressed by the American Bar Association’s Speedy Trial Task Force are accurate here:
[T]he remedy for failure to bring a defendant to trial before the running of time for trial should be absolute discharge. * * * [I]f, following undue delay in going to trial, the prosecution is free to commence prosecution for the same offense subject only to the running of the statute of limitations, the right to a speedy trial is largely meaningless. Moreover, prosecutors who are free to commence another prosecution later have not been deterred from undue delay.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 12-4.1, commentary at 12-43 (1978).4
Given the factual setting in which this case arose, I would endorse the views expressed by the Second Circuit in Stayton:
[Njeither the Speedy Trial Act nor the administration of justice in general would be advanced by excusing the type of administrative neglect that occurred here. * * * “As a deterrent to other would-be offenders, [the dismissal of this prosecution] seems relatively insignificant. Of greater significance to the administration of justice is the salutary effect of this Court’s reaffirmance of Congress’ basic purpose in enacting the Speedy Trial Act.”
791 F.2d at 22 (quoting Caparella, 716 F.2d at 981).
The majority’s reversal here is a plain miscarriage of justice. The district court’s dismissal with prejudice is not a simple example of letting the criminal go free because the constable has blundered. Rather, this is a case of government dereliction that violated the basic right of a presumedly-innocent accused to a speedy trial, as specifically provided by Congress in the Speedy Trial Act.

. I agree with the majority’s analysis of only one factor — the seriousness of the offense. See supra at II-A. Even then, while misapplication of bank funds is a serious offense, especially when large amounts are involved, the present case does offer some mitigating factors. First, the government concedes that the defendant did not profit from any misapplication of funds. Second, criminal charges were brought by the bank quite reluctantly. The misapplications allegedly took place prior to August 24, 1984, when the defendant was forced to resign. An audit was finalized shortly thereafter, but the bank declined to make any claim on its employee dishonesty bond. According to the defendant, the bank eventually brought charges only upon pressure by the North Dakota Department of Banking, and only in order to collect on the fidelity bond.

. The government states that the defendant’s former counsel, a former governor of the state of North Dakota, requested a delay of the indictment for fear that it would jeopardize funding of the Garrison Diversion project, a public works project in the state for which the defendant at that time served as director. The defendant's former counsel denies this allegation, and states that his interest was only in persuading the government not to indict the defendant at all. If in fact the government did delay bringing the indictment for political reasons, as it seems to admit, then serious concerns of misprision of the prosecution’s office are raised.
In any event, the majority asserts that this preindictment delay is irrelevant to the present Speedy Trial Act analysis. I disagree; the delay is probative in the necessary consideration of what prejudice Kramer has suffered and will suffer if reprosecuted. The preindictment delay was one episode in an ongoing nightmare for the defendant, which apparently has contributed to his physical, professional, and emotional distress. The Speedy Trial Act was enacted in part to alleviate this type of harm.

. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of governmental culpability in the Sixth Amendment context in Strunk:
Unintentional delays caused by overcrowded court dockets or understaffed prosecutors are among the factors to be weighed less heavily than intentional delay, calculated to hamper the defense, in determining whether the Sixth Amendment has been violated but * * * they must "nevertheless ... be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant."
Id. at 436, 93 S.Ct. at 2262 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)) (emphasis added).

. It is true that jn passing the Speedy Trial Act Congress rejected the ABA call for mandatory dismissal with prejudice. However, in the present context, the rationale underlying the ABA position remains persuasive.