Court Opinion

ID: 9389480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 18:01:17.896163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:27.711902
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                  FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                       ___________

                           No. 23-1193
                           ___________

                        DANIEL L. SPUCK,
                                     Appellant

                                 v.

            COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
             JANE/JOHN DOE, LEADER/HEAD OF
            COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

             ____________________________________

           On Appeal from the United States District Court
              for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                      (D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00341)
              District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
            ____________________________________

           Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                         On April 25, 2023

Before: SHWARTZ, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

                   (Opinion filed: April 25, 2023)
             ____________________________________
                                      ___________

                                       OPINION *
                                      ___________

PER CURIAM

    Daniel Spuck, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for a preliminary injunction

and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm

the judgment of the District Court.

    Spuck filed a complaint against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Jane/John

Doe, “Leader/Head” of the Commonwealth. Spuck sought compensatory and punitive

damages for various claims relating to criminal and civil state court proceedings. 1 Dkt.

No. 3 at 4-6. Spuck also requested that the District Court enjoin the Commonwealth from

recovering debts he owes and pursuing contempt charges against him. 2 Id. at 6; Dkt. No.

4. The District Court, over Spuck’s objections, adopted the Report and Recommendation

of a Magistrate Judge, denied Spuck’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and dismissed

*
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
  Our review is limited to the record before the District Court, which did not include spe-
cific information about the state court proceedings. See In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.’s
Application for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 1990). We do not
search unspecified state court records in an attempt to clarify an appellant’s arguments.
2
 Although Spuck categorized the debts as restitution, the state court order accompanying
his motion for a preliminary injunction indicated that he owes no restitution. Dkt. No. 4-
1. The history of Spuck’s debt is unclear.

                                            2
the complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dkt. No. 7. Spuck filed

this timely appeal.

    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the

District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Spuck’s complaint. Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d

366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020). We review the District Court’s denial of Spuck’s motion for a

preliminary injunction for “abuse of discretion, an error of law, or a clear mistake in the

consideration of proof.” Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir.

2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

         On appeal, Spuck challenges only the District Court’s denial of his requests for in-

junctive relief. C.A. Dkt. No. 5 at 2-3. To the extent Spuck requested that the District

Court intervene in a pending criminal contempt proceeding against him, the District Court

correctly determined that it must abstain from doing so. 3 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

37, 45 (1971) (explaining that federal courts have power to enjoin state officers from insti-

tuting criminal actions only “where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and imme-

diate”). The extraordinary circumstances that would allow such interference do not exist

here, and we discern no abuse of discretion by the District Court in denying Spuck’s re-

quest.

         Spuck also asks that we direct the Commonwealth to suspend the collection of his

debts while his contempt proceeding is pending. C.A. Dkt. No. 5 at 3. However, Spuck’s

3
  Spuck’s filings do not reveal the exact nature of the Commonwealth’s contempt pro-
ceedings. Regardless, even if Spuck’s request for intervention was related to civil con-
tempt proceedings, that, too, is squarely barred by Younger. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78-79 (2013).
                                              3
vague assertions regarding this request are void of any information demonstrating that in-

junctive relief is warranted. See Kos Pharms., 369 F.3d at 708 (explaining a party’s burden

in seeking a preliminary injunction).

       Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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