Court Opinion

ID: 9410465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 14:07:03.257973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:57.931455
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-582

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                ROBERT RIEDER.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a jury-waived trial in the District Court, the

 defendant was convicted of open and gross lewdness in violation

 of G. L. c. 272, § 16.       On appeal, he claims that his motion for

 a required finding of not guilty should have been allowed

 because the evidence was insufficient to prove that his alleged

 conduct actually caused one or more persons to experience shock

 or alarm.1    We affirm.

 1 The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the
 close of the Commonwealth's case and renewed his motion at the
 close of all the evidence. The defendant testified on his own
 behalf and denied engaging in any inappropriate or criminal
 behavior. Because the judge, as finder of fact, was entitled to
 reject the defendant's testimony in its entirety, the
 Commonwealth's case did not deteriorate with the presentation of
 the defendant's case. See Commonwealth v. Berry, 68 Mass. App.
 Ct. 78, 81 (2007). Therefore, we limit our discussion of the
 evidence to that presented by the Commonwealth in its case-in-
 chief.
    Background.     In considering a question of the sufficiency

of the evidence, "we must look at the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether any rational

jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt."    Commonwealth v. Ruci, 409 Mass. 94, 96

(1991), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677

(1979).    The judge, as finder of fact, could have found as

follows.

    During the early evening on July 13, 2020, S.T. was talking

on the phone with a friend in the back hallway of her apartment

located on Irving Street in Framingham.   From the hallway

windows, she had a clear view of the street below.     While

speaking on the phone, S.T. saw a maroon car drive by.       All of

the car's windows were open, and there was a dog in the

backseat.    The driver, later identified as the defendant, was

completely naked, and S.T. saw him stroking his penis.

Initially, S.T. laughed and told her friend what she had seen

and said that she was not surprised.    However, when the

defendant drove by a second time, S.T.'s reaction changed.       She

told her friend, "Oh shit.    I can't believe that I just saw

that."    S.T. became more concerned when she observed the

defendant slow down near a child riding a bicycle.     At this

point, S.T. left the apartment intending to obtain the

defendant's license plate number and follow his car.     Upon

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arriving outside, she saw the maroon car drive by a third time.

S.T. was worried that the defendant would keep coming around the

block and that he might "snatch a kid or something."

    S.T. got into her mother's car, called the police, and

began to follow the defendant until he stopped near a park.

Shortly thereafter, Framingham Police Officer Mason Brown

arrived in response to S.T.'s report.       He noticed a vehicle with

its hazard lights activated, and then saw S.T. "frantically"

waving and pointing at a maroon Volkswagen.       S.T. was physically

shaking, her voice was shaking, and Officer Brown tried several

times to calm her.

    Officer Brown also observed the defendant, who was sitting

in the driver's seat of the car.       The defendant appeared

disheveled.   He was wearing a pair of shorts and nothing else.

An open jar of coconut oil was in the cup holder next to the

driver's seat and a dog was in the car.       The defendant was

arrested and transported to the police station where, in

response to the officer's questions, he denied that he had been

masturbating and claimed he was using the coconut oil to massage

his legs.

    Discussion.      A conviction of open and gross lewdness

requires proof of five elements:       "that the defendant (1)

exposed genitals, breasts, or buttocks; (2) intentionally; (3)

openly or with reckless disregard of public exposure; (4) in a

                                   3
manner so 'as to produce alarm or shock'; (5) thereby actually

shocking or alarming one or more persons."     Commonwealth v.

Maguire, 476 Mass. 156, 158 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v.

Swan, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260-261 (2008).     As previously

noted, the defendant contends there was insufficient evidence as

to the fifth element only.     He agrees that the evidence was

sufficient to prove the first four elements and, consequently,

he concedes that the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of

proving the lesser included offense of indecent exposure.

Accordingly, he requests that we reverse his conviction and

remand the matter for entry of a conviction of the lesser

included offense of indecent exposure.     We decline to do so

because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove

the offense of open and gross lewdness beyond a reasonable

doubt.

       "The fifth element of proof requires the Commonwealth to

demonstrate that at least one person 'in fact' was 'alarmed or

shocked' by the defendant's exposure."     Maguire, 476 Mass. at

159.   "This requires evidence of strong negative emotions -- a

subjective inquiry -- most commonly corroborated by an immediate

physical response."    Id.   "Mere nervousness and offense has

never been held sufficient to warrant a finding that the viewer

was 'in fact alarmed or shocked.'"     Commonwealth v. Kessler, 442

Mass. 770, 774 (2004).

                                  4
    The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to

present sufficient evidence that S.T., or any other person, was

shocked or alarmed by his conduct because S.T.'s initial

reaction was to laugh and tell her friend that she was not

surprised.    This argument ignores evidence of S.T.'s emotional

state beyond her initial reaction.    See Commonwealth v.

Taranovsky, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 399, 403 (2018), quoting

Commonwealth v. Pereira, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 344, 347 (2012)

("'[T]he fact finder may consider not only the words used by the

witness, but also other indicia of the witness's emotional

state' in determining whether the observer suffered significant

negative emotions as a result of the defendant's actions").       As

noted, after seeing the defendant a second time, S.T.'s reaction

changed and she told her friend, "Oh shit.    I can't believe that

I just saw that."    She then became concerned when she saw the

defendant slow down near a child on a bicycle, and she began to

fear that the defendant might attempt to "snatch a kid or

something."

    Although the defendant is correct that concern for others,

standing alone, is insufficient to establish shock or alarm, see

Maguire, 476 Mass. at 160 ("Vicarious concern for other people

or even disgust does not convert any ordinary indecent exposure

case into one for open and gross lewdness" [quotation omitted]),

here, S.T. had a significant emotional reaction to the

                                  5
defendant's behavior independent from her concern for others.

Upon seeing the defendant drive around the block a second time,

S.T. decided to get into her mother's car and follow him in an

attempt to report his behavior to police.       See Taranovsky, 93

Mass. App. Ct. at 403 (one indicium of witness's emotional state

is whether the witness immediately reported incident).          By the

time Officer Brown arrived at the location of S.T.'s vehicle, he

observed her to be "completely frantic."        Officer Brown

testified that he "had to try numerous times to get her to calm

down."    This "evidence of strong negative emotions" on the part

of S.T. was sufficient for a rational finder of fact to conclude

that S.T. was shocked or alarmed by the defendant's behavior.

Maguire, supra at 159.       Accordingly, the judge did not err in

denying the defendant's motion for a required finding of not

guilty.

                                        Judgment affirmed.

                                        By the Court (Vuono, Hand &
                                          Hodgens, JJ.2),

                                        Clerk

Entered:    July 21, 2023.

2   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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