Court Opinion

ID: 9673619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:15:25.486851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:23.155437
License: Public Domain

Stuart, J.
I must dissent. I do not quarrel with the statement of the law set forth in the majority opinion that in the absence of statute or ordinance defendant has no duty “to insulate or adopt safeguards for their wires everywhere but only at places where people may legitimately go for work, business *615or pleasure — that is, where they may reasonably be expected to come in proximity to them.” I cannot, however, agree with the conclusion that the defendant could have reasonably anticipated persons were likely to come in contact with these wires at this location.
The line met or exceeded the requirements of the National Electrical Safety Code. No ordinances establishing specifications for insulation have been enacted by the City of Des Moines. The superintendent of defendant’s gas operations knew the water department was laying a water main to the Meredith plant west of the bridge shown in exhibit B. The superintendent of the electrical operation did not testify as to any knowledge of this particular construction work. He testified only that it was common for clamshell buckets and backhoes to be used close to overhead conductors and that there had been a considerable amount of sewer and water main construction around the area of Des Moines. There was no evidence of any request to move the wires or turn off the electricity or of any contact with defendant by plaintiff or anyone else connected with this construction operation.
Even if we assume defendant had sufficient knowledge of this particular construction work, I am unable to see what bearing this could have on the charge of failing to insulate its wires. Insulation by isolation is an accepted practice in the electrical utility field. This is recognized in the safety code and the heighth of the wires here exceeded the minimum requirement. There was nothing about this location which would cause defendant to anticipate compliance, with the safety code would not be sufficient. Knowledge of construction work could not make the original installation negligent if it was not negligently installed. “Unless the company was already negligent in its manner of construction and maintenance, it did not become negligent by the mere act of another.” Dilley v. Iowa Public Service Co., 210 Iowa 1332, 1337, 227 N.W. 173. Knowledge might have had a bearing on the duty to warn, shut off the current or temporarily move the line, but not, in my opinion, on the failure to insulate in the first place.
The trial court carefully limited its decision to the circumstances of this case and this fact was emphasized by the majority *616opinion. However, neither points out the circumstances which set this particular location apart from any other in which a

transmission line runs along a highway. The picture included herewith, exhibit B in the trial, shows the location at which the *617majority holds the trier of fact could find defendant should have reasonably anticipated someone might come into contact with its electric lines.
I have studied all the Iowa cases and the annotations in 14 A. L. R. 1018, 1023, 56 A. L. R. 1011, 1021, and 69 A. L. R.2d 93. There is a clear trend toward enlarging the liability of electrical utilities, but none seems to have gone so far as we are going under these facts. Defendant asserts this decision, in effect, will require insulation of all its transmission lines and I am inclined to agree, at least those within the Des Moines city limits.
We are, in effect, permitting the fact finder to impose strict liability on the defendant under instructions which impose liability only for fault. This is not fair to the litigants or the trier of facts and leads to greatly divergent results under similar factual situations. A jury which conscientiously applies the instructions and searches for fault or proximate cause will in all likelihood return a defendant’s verdict. Another jury might look at the social aspects of the lawsuit and impose liability on defendant as a risk of engaging in this particular business.
While I do not believe this is a case for the imposition of strict liability, there is no question but what “the dangers arising from the production, transmission, storage and use of electricity are among the greatest and most subtle known to mankind.” Toney v. Interstate Power Co., 180 Iowa 1362, 1370, 163 N.W. 394. If we are going to let the fact finder impose strict liability, we should do it under appropriate instructions and bring about greater uniformity in the results and so advise the bench and the bar.
Under the facts here, I would reverse.
Justice Snell joins in this dissent.