Court Opinion

ID: 9663750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:49:56.55292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:56.138919
License: Public Domain

McCÓ'WN, J.,
dissenting.
The objective standard for determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure without a warrant set out in the majority opinion comes directly from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889. The words: “* * * would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the •action taken was appropriate?” are followed immediately by the following statement: “Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. * * * And simple ‘ “ good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.” * * * If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” only in the discretion of the police.’ ”
In this case, the prior stop of the automobile at North Bend, Nebraska, had identified the automobile, verified its description and registration; and revealed the names of the two occupants of the car and the driver’s license. A radio check then revealed the criminal records of the two men. At the time officer Robertson later stopped the automobile again on U.S. Highway No. 30, there was ho traffic violation or other suspicious conduct. He knew of no burglary or any other crime which might have been committed' in' the vicinity. He knew thé *667identity of the occupants of the automobile and that the registration and driver’s license were in order. Officer Robertson admitted that the only reason the officers stopped the automobile was because the two occupants were known burglars.
Under these facts, the majority opinion holds that a “known” criminal may be stopped and “frisked” or “searched” at any time solely because he is a “known” criminal. At least as long ago as 1933, the Supreme Court held that criminal reputation standing alone cannot justify the issuance of a search warrant. See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159. The fact that an individual is “known” to the police as a criminal does not destroy his constitutional right to be secure “against unreasonable searches arid seizures” guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.