Court Opinion

ID: 9570982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:28:06.676818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:26.219179
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
On August 14, 1989, Harry Mann petitioned this Court for a rehearing. Mr. Mann contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it granted Senior Towers Associates’ motion for a directed verdict.* Mr. Mann asserts that he will not be able to collect his judgment unless Senior Towers Associates is a party to the proceeding.
In an order dated October 27, 1989, we granted Mr. Mann’s petition and directed both parties to respond to the following issues: “(1) whether the trial court committed reversible error by directing a verdict in favor of Senior Towers Associates; and (2) whether one party who has erroneously been directed out of the case at the conclusion of all the evidence can still be bound on the judgment if it can be shown as a matter of law that such party’s liability is the same as that of co-defendants who have been found liable by the jury.”
We find that the law is clear that a partner acting on behalf of the partnership binds the partnership, and, if such partner is found liable to a third party for such acts, then the partnership is also liable. See W.Va. Code, 47-8A-9(1) and -13 (1953). See also Belmont County Nat’l Bank v. *528Onyx Coal Co., 177 W.Va. 41, 43 n. 2, 350 S.E. 552, 554 n. 2 (1986); Pruitt v. Fetty, 148 W.Va. 275, 134 S.E.2d 713 (1964). See generally Rowley, The Law of Partnership § 9.0(3) (2d ed. 1960); 59A Am.Jur.2d, Partnership § 647 (1987 & Supp.1989).
Here, the facts are not in dispute. The partnership agreement provides that the signature of a general partner on a contract is binding on the partnership. The contract between Mr. Mann and the appellees was signed by Sidgo Realty Company, a general partner. Moreover, it is clear that the contract was executed for the benefit of the partnership. Finally, neither party asserts that the general partner acted outside of the scope of its authority. In light of the foregoing, we find that Senior Towers Associates was a party to the contract and would be liable for breach of the contract as a matter of law once liability was established against a partner.
The partnership, Senior Towers Associates, was directed out of the case at the close of all the evidence. This was done after the trial court converted Mr. Mann’s chosen remedy of damages to a request for specific performance, i.e., who was entitled to possession of the promissory notes. The trial court found that since the partnership did not have the notes in its possession, the remedy of specific performance was unavailable against it.
In the foregoing opinion, we found this action on the part of the trial court to be error. We held that the plaintiff was entitled to obtain damages equal to the value of the notes plus interest. With the partnership liability established as a matter of law, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the case.
In the past where an error of law has been made on a conclusive factual record, we have rectified the error by entering a proper judgment on appeal. For example, in Estate of Bayliss by Bowles v. Lee, 173 W.Va. 299, 315 S.E.2d 406 (1984), the trial court, based upon a stipulation of the facts, had rendered judgment against one of the parties. On appeal, we concluded that the trial court had committed several legal errors and that, based on the stipulated facts and the law, the other party was entitled to judgment. We then entered judgment for the appellant and stated in Syllabus Point 5:
“ ‘When, upon the trial of a case, the evidence decidedly preponderates against the verdict of a jury or the finding of a trial court upon the evidence, this Court will, upon review, reverse the judgment; and, if the case was tried by the court in lieu of a jury, this Court will make such finding and render such judgment on the evidence as the trial court should have made and rendered.’ Syllabus Point 9, Bluefield Supply Co. v. Frankel’s Appliances, Inc., 149 W.Va. 622, 142 S.E.2d 898 (1965).”
See also Huntington Dev. & Gas Co. v. Topping, 115 W.Va. 364, 176 S.E. 424 (1934); McKown v. Citizens’State Bank of Ripley, 91 W.Va. 716, 114 S.E. 271 (1922).
Here the evidence regarding the partnership’s liability was not in dispute. The only reason the partnership was dismissed from the case was the trial court’s erroneous decision to convert the plaintiff’s case from a suit for damages to one seeking recovery of the promissory notes.
In order to rectify the error in our initial opinion, we award the plaintiff damages equivalent to the value of the notes together with interest. For the reasons set out on this rehearing, we award a similar judgment against the partnership, Senior Towers Associates.

 See note 9, supra.