Court Opinion

ID: 9770809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:22:11.695306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:21.007829
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Believing that the majority misconstrues the purpose and effect of cash deposited in lieu of a supersedeas bond, I respectfully dissent.
The only requirement of a supersedeas bond, other than being “good and sufficient,” being made payable to the judgment creditor in the required amount and being approved by the clerk, is that it be “conditioned that the judgment debtor shall prosecute his appeal or writ of error with effect and, in case the judgment [on appeal] shall be against him, he shall perform its judgment ... and pay all such damages and costs as said court may award against him.” Tex.R.App.P. 47(a).
Where an appellant prosecutes his appeal with effect, there can be no judgment on the supersedeas bond. Martinez v. Southwest Bitulithic Co., 119 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1938), rev’d on other grounds, 135 Tex. 347, 143 S.W.2d 116 (1940). If the appellant has been successful in setting aside a part of the judgment, even though the amount of the judgment remains the same, the rule remains the same. Id. It follows without question that since Gill Savings secured a reversal of a portion of the adverse judgment on appeal, the appeal was prosecuted with effect and there was no liability on the super-sedeas bond. The majority apparently agrees with these principles and further apparently agrees that had a supersedeas bond instead of cash in lieu of bond been filed, the trial court could not have ordered the cash (guaranteed by the bond) deposited into the registry of the court. (See opinion, p. 550).
However, the majority states that a different rule applies where cash is deposited in lieu of the filing of a supersedeas bond. The majority reaches this conclusion by *555holding that to apply the same rule to the deposit of cash instead of a written super-sedeas bond “would render the Rule 48 requirement of conditional language meaningless.” (opinion, p. 551).
Rule 48, Tex.R.App.P., merely provides that in lieu of filing a bond, the party may deposit cash or certain negotiable securities “in the amount fixed for the surety bond, conditioned in the same manner as would be a surety bond for the protection of other parties.” Rule 48 does not provide for any other or different conditions than those required by Rule 47 for a written bond.
In both Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1971, no writ) and Robertson v. Land, 519 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1975, no writ), the Tyler court stated that there was not any good or logical reason for the intent and purposes of the supersedeas bond to be altered in any way by a deposit of cash in lieu of the bond and, accordingly held that “the same principles and rules of law would apply had these appellants filed a supersedeas bond rather than cash in lieu of the bond.” The majority errs in refusing to follow Am-West, a federal district court opinion cited and distinguished in the majority opinion, and these Texas appellate court opinions.
In another case very similar to this one, the Beaumont court reached a conclusion consistent with this dissent. Wheeler v. Pavlic, 290 S.W.2d 754 (Beaumont 1956, writ ref d n.r.e.). There, a personal injury and damage suit had been previously instituted by Pavlic against two persons: Hudi-burgh, the owner of the automobile involved in the accident and Adams, the driver. The insurance carrier for Hudiburgh assumed responsibility for defending the suit. Pavlic recovered judgment against both Adams and Hudiburgh, and both defendants appealed. Adam’s appeal was on an affidavit of inability to pay costs and, in lieu of an appeal and supersedeas bond, the insurance carrier, on behalf of Hudiburgh, deposited cash with the clerk. The appellate court affirmed the judgment as to Adams but reversed and rendered the judgment as to Hudiburgh. After mandate issued, the trial court clerk did not immediately issue process as required by then Rule 369, Tex.R.Civ.Proc. (now Rule 87(a) Tex.R.App.P.).
While the funds were still on deposit with the district clerk, the insurance carrier was placed in receivership. Thereafter, Pavlic filed suit against the receiver; the receiver demanded a return of the cash that had been deposited in lieu of superse-deas, but the demand was refused. The trial court rendered judgment for Pavlic and ordered the clerk to pay the judgment from the cash on deposit (that which had been deposited in lieu supersedeas bond). On appeal the receiver argued that the trial court erred in ordering the money released to Pavlic. The court agreed, stating, as it relates to the issue here presented:
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the trial court exceeded its authority and committed error in ordering the money applied to the payment of the judgment in the case at bar. The money was originally deposited only for the purpose of perfecting Mrs. Hudiburgh’s appeal and of superseding the judgment that had been rendered against her, and when the judgment against her was reversed and rendered and had become final and the mandate had been returned to the trial court, appellant became entitled to have the money released and paid over.
290 S.W.2d at 757. The fact that the judgment was there reversed and rendered, but here only reversed in part, is of no consequence because in both cases the appeal was prosecuted “with effect.”
The trial court further erred in ordering the money deposited into the registry of the court because Chair King has no enforceable right to the money on deposit. Miller v. First State Bank, 551 S.W.2d 89, 102 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth, 1977), affd as modified [on another point], 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.1978). Once the purpose of the cash deposited in lieu of supersedeas bond had served its purpose (prosecution of the appeal with effect) it should have been returned to the depositor. The trial court has unquestionably abused its discretion *556and the judgment should therefore be reversed and rendered.