Court Opinion

ID: 9493510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:10:23.357254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:52.951882
License: Public Domain

TROTT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
My able colleagues’ astringent reading of “the arresting officer” in § 5033 is patently wrong as illustrated by its strange consequences. It turns the law into a formalistic dance where the importance of the form becomes where one puts one’s foot rather that what the dance is intended to convey. I respectfully believe that who notifies an arrestee’s parents or a consulate is unimportant; what matters is the timing and the content of the message.
The context of this case and the discrete issue we address encompasses parents who live outside the United States and who most probably do not speak English, yet according to my colleagues, only the “arresting officer” may talk to them. Delegation is not lawful, even from an arresting officer who does not speak the requisite language to someone who does. Apparently, the “investigating officer” to whom the “arresting officer” reports, or for that matter the arresting officer’s partner or immediate supervisor, is now legally prohibited — short of undefined exigent circumstances — from taking over the task because — and only because — that person is not the “arresting officer.” If I the arresting officer ask my Spanish speaking partner to make the call, and she gets through and accomplishes the notification, is it defective because I, the “arresting officer,” did not do the talking? What happened to common sense? To agency? To the real world? The reason for restricting the notification duty to “the arresting officer” escapes me. What is the principle behind this rule? We have found lurking in the penumbra of this case a new enemy of the law — double delegation.
Section 5033 says also that the “arresting officer” “shall immediately notify the Attorney General,” does this mean Officer Ox has to talk personally to Janet Reno? We have construed in other contexts “the Attorney General” to mean her representatives, but we do extend that minimal courtesy to arresting officers. For example, in 8 U.S.C. § 1326 prosecutions for illegal reentry into the United States after deportation following conviction for an aggravated felony, one of the elements of the crime is that the entry be “without the express consent of the Attorney General for such entry; ... ”. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). Notwithstanding this tight language calling for the express consent of the Attorney General, courts have uniformly allowed the delegation by the Attorney General of this function to the INS. United States v. Blanco-Gallegos, 188 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Oris, 598 F.2d 428, 430 (5th Cir.1979). With all respect to the distinguished author of the majority opinion in this ease, at the very least we would be well-served by attempting to distinguish Blanco-Gallegos, published by a panel of which she was a member. Given Blanco-Gallegos, the majority’s reliance on Chevron and “plain language” is not convincing. Delegation per se is simply not a problem in these cases. “Ceded the responsibility” certainly sounds indiscrete, but such an innocuous act is appropriate in many situations, including this one.
The majority here disclaim any responsibility for this outlandish holding, asserting that they are merely following precedent. They point to a sentence in our opinion in United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.1999) {“Doe III”) as the culprit. In Doe III, we noted in discussing § 5033 that “the text requires the arresting officer — not a subsequent official who might handle the judicial phases of the matter — to carry out all of the notification requirements listed in the lead paragraph of § 5033.” Id. at 1167.
There are two problems with the majority’s reliance on this sentence.
First, it is not a holding that only the arresting officer may handle the notification. The clear point of the sentence is *749timing, i.e., it’s too late if the notification is handled by a “subsequent official handling the judicial phases of the matter.” The issue being addressed in Doe III was not who had to accomplish the notification, but whether “ § 5033 requires the government to inform the juvenile’s parents of the juvenile’s Miranda rights.” Id. Our answer to this question was “yes,” because (1) children need parental involvement during interrogation; and (2) the information the parents most need at that moment is contained in Miranda advisement. Thus, the sentence upon which the majority relies is inappropriately used by them out of context to support their holding.
To erase any lingering doubt about what Doe III stands for, I have retrieved and examined the briefs filed in that case and confirmed and discovered the following.
As described in the opinion, the “arresting officer” in Doe III, one Agent Plitt, did contact the juvenile’s mother in that case and told her that he had arrested Doe in connection with a vehicle loaded with narcotics that her son was driving. What Agent Plitt did not do was advise the juvenile’s mother of the juvenile’s Miranda rights. The relevant issue in Doe III was whether the law and § 5033 required Plitt to include Miranda information in £he parental notification. Doe III held that such information was required. The issue of who must accomplish the notification appeal’s nowhere in the briefs, nor could it in view of the fact that the arresting officer was the one who made the contact. Moreover, Agent Plitt told the juvenile, as the panel’s opinion recommends, that he would see an attorney within one or two days of his arrest, depending upon who prosecuted him. This wayward advice explains the panel’s reference to a “subsequent official who might handle the judicial phases of the matter.... ” To quote the panel, “Plitt’s response [to the juvenile] addressed when, in the course of the judicial process, Doe would be appointed counsel.” (Emphasis added).
The second problem is simply that if this sentence is a holding that binds us as precedent, it is dead wrong. As Doe III recognizes, all the purposes of parental and surrogate consular notification are accomplished in the substance, content, and timing of the notification, not in who actually speaks to the parents. Can anyone imagine an opinion by a panel of this court reversing a conviction because the arresting officer’s partner instead of the arresting officer called the juvenile arrestee’s parents at the very moment of the arrest and fully notified them of everything required by the law? Of course not, but this odd result is precisely what would be required by this case. My colleagues’ holding gives new meaning to “form over substance.”
In passing, I would note that Agent Plitt, the arresting officer, did not actually talk to the “parents” as required by the statute, but to a second family member who served as an interpreter. Under my colleagues’ approach, I would assume that this deviation, too, from the statutory language would be a fatal defect. After all, the statute says “parents,” not “or their interpreter.”
Finally, the “failure” to notify in this case was harmless beyond all doubt. Buried in the majority’s opinion is a telling fact: Gutierrez knew how to reach her parents but told “the arresting officer” that she did not want them involved. It was RRA-A who kept her parents out of this case, not the agents. Her wishes and her state of mind were the combined independent cause of her confessions, not “the violation.” The district court specifically found her to be mature and intelligent, and not timid. During the inspection, for instance, she was calm and collected as she sought to divert the inspector from the marijuana, while her cohorts were visibly nervous. She knowingly and voluntarily waived her rights. This “-error” was harmless because it had no effect on her confession. I respectfully dissent.