Court Opinion

ID: 9691648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:55:57.934445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:44.148082
License: Public Domain

WISDOM, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I concur in the holding that the Act is-constitutional and that the Administrative Procedure Act is inapplicable. I feel compelled, however, to dissent from the holding that under Greene v. McElroy the rules of the Commission are-ultra vires.
I.
The Commission’s rules may be inadequate, in terms of traditional safeguards accorded a defendant in a criminal trial, but they are the rules Con*829gress authorized for hearings by the Civil Rights Commission.
This case differs radically from Greene v. McElroy. Here, Congress took pains to set out in the Act, in its delegation of authority, mandatory rules of procedure to be followed by the Commission. The Commission’s rules follow the language of the statute or are based on the intent of the statute.1
2Thus, on the important issue of the right of cross-examination, the Commission rule provides : “Interrogation of witnesses at hearings shall be conducted only by authorized staff personnel.”3 This is based on the statutory provision, Section 102 (c): “Witnesses at the hearings may be accompanied by their own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights.” The limitation of the activities of a lawyer to giving advice to his client on constitutional rights is just a way of saying that the lawyer (or his client) cannot cross-examine an adverse witness.
A central issue in the controversy over civil rights legislation was whether witnesses should have the traditional safeguards of notice, confrontation, and cross-examination. The 1956 Civil Rights Bill, H.R. 627, as reported by the. House Judiciary Committee, contained no special rules of procedure. H. Rep. No. 2187, 84 Cong. 2d Sess. It was amended on the floor of the House by the addition of elaborate safeguards which Representative Dies of Texas proposed. 102 Cong. Rec. 13542, 13548. This amendment required notice of the subject of the inquiry and confrontation, and allowed limited cross-examination. The bill passed the House, but no action was taken on it in the Senate. In 1957 several bills were introduced containing the same procedural provisions as the 1956 bill, as amended. One of these was S. 83, the subject of Senate hearings in 1957.3 The position of the Department of Justice, as stated by the Attorney General, was that “it would be a mistake to make [civil rights legislation] the vehicle for experimenting with new rules”. Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, 85 Cong., 1st Sess., p. 14. In the House hearings on the 1957 Civil Rights proposal Senator, then Representative, Keating asked Attorney General Brownell if the Department would object to the Committee inserting in the bill a provision “similar to those set up in the rules of the House for the conduct of congressional committees”. General Brownell stated that the Department had no objection to such rules of procedure. H.R. 6127, adopted into law as the Civil Rights Act of 1957, incorporated the House “Fair Play Rules4 ” as Section 102 of the Act5.
The action of Congress in refusing to adopt a particular bill and adoption of another bill is often an unreliable guide to congressional intent. But the circumstances in which H.R. 6127 became law, rather than S. 83 or H.R. 627, make it clear that Congress, after careful deliberation, made a choice of procedures. Congress rejected the traditional safeguards accorded a defendant in a criminal trial and accepted the House “Fair Play Rules”.
The House “Fair Play Rules” were drawn for the conduct of congressional investigating committees. They were the indirect product of innumerable legal articles, judicial dicta, and editorials 6. *830They were the direct product of careful study 7. It is safe to say that when the House “Fair Play Rules” were adopted as Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 every member of the House and Senate regarded that action as an explicit declaration that Congress affirmatively rejected rules extending to witnesses the rights of notice, confrontation, and cross-examination ; that, instead, Congress authorized and directed the Civil Rights Commission to follow its more limited “Fair Play Rules”.
This background distinguishes the case from Greene v. McElroy. There, the majority’s reasoning was the President and Congress would not have delegated to the Department of Defense the power to deprive a man of his job as a result of a hearing in which he has no right of confrontation or cross-examination, without including in the delegation express authorization to by-pass the traditional due process safeguards. Here, Congress expressly authorized the by-pass.
•II.
I therefore reach the issue of the constitutionality of the procedure.
A hearing subjecting a subpoenaed witness to public opprobrium, loss of reputation, loss of a job, and possible state and federal prosecution based on testimony brought out at the hearing, carries sanctions no less severe than a criminal trial. Fundamental fairness would seem to require that such a witness have the opportunity to assert the rights of notice, confrontation, cross-examination, and other due process safeguards. No court however has gone that far.
Mr. Justice Clark, the only member of the Supreme Court who reached the constitutional issue in Greene, stated: “(T)his Court has long ago and repeatedly approved administrative action where the right of cross-examination and confrontation were not permitted.” 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1423.
*831Without exception, the courts have drawn a distinction between investigative and adjudicative proceedings. Witnesses in investigative hearings do not have the constitutional rights of a witness in an adjudicative hearing. The Fifth Amendment gives a witness protection in an investigation; the opportunity to assert all due process rights in any later adjudicative proceeding is a sufficient protection8. In re Groban, 1957, 352 U.S. 330, 77 S.Ct. 510,1 L.Ed.2d 376; Bowles v. Baer, 7 Cir., 1954, 142 F.2d 787; Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 1932, 288 U.S. 294, 53 S.Ct. 350, 77 L.Ed. 796.
In Groban a majority of the Supreme Court went very far indeed in denying the right to counsel. An Ohio statute, authorizing the State Fire Marshal to investigate the cause of fires, conferred broad powers on the investigating officer. He could hold the investigation in private, exclude counsel, punish witnesses who refuse to testify by summarily committing them to jail, and, if he believed the evidence would warrant a conviction for arson or a similar crime, he could arrest the witness after the investigation. The appellants, who were called upon to testify concerning the cause of a fire at their place of business, refused to testify in the absence of counsel. They were committed to jail. In a habeas corpus proceeding, they contended that they had a constitutional right to counsel under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held, five to four, that appellants had no constitutional right to counsel in giving testimony before an investigative body that does not adjudicate legal rights and responsibilities. If Groban was not entitled to counsel and to protections encompassed in the concept of due process, no witness is entitled to due process in an investigation.
Taking the law as it is, the Commission’s rules are constitutional.
III.
The rub in this case comes from the Act itself. It comes from the incongruity of a legislative commission of inquiry investigating specific complaints against individuals accused of crimes9. To my mind, the creation of such a commission carries grave danger of legislative usurpation. It is of questionable legislative propriety, at best.
The investigation of specific violations of the law is for grand juries, not legislative commissions. With all deference to Congress, a commission, constituted to investigate a broad problem of national interest, has no business holding hearings that must inevitably develop into legislative trials of individuals. When a subpoenaed witness accused of a crime may be subjected to trial by exposure, a fact-finding determination and punishment, he should have the same rights of notice, confrontation, cross-examination, and all the other hard-earned rights embodied in due process that anyone accused of breaking the law is entitled to when he is tried by a jury before a judge. The Commission does not formally adjudicate guilt or impose a formal sentence, but an individual against whom a complaint is made to the Commission may be exposed to all the hardships of a trial and to punishment in many forms.
The House “Fair Play Rules” are a step in the proper direction — for congressional committees. Procedures suitable for Congress’ own committees, however, are less than adequate for a trial by an autonomous commission to which *832Congress has delegated its power of inquiry.
The high purposes animating the creation of the Civil Rights Commission do not diminish the inherent dangers in hearings apt to degenerate into legislative trials. They simply obscure the dangerous means used to attain the ends of the legislation.
These, however, are considerations for Congress10, as long as Groban and Greene v. McElroy (as I read it) state the law.
Appendix A
Rules of Procedure of the Commission
Sec. 102(a) The Chairman or one designated by him to act as Chairman at a hearing of the Commission shall announce in an opening statement the subject of the hearing.
(b) A copy of the Commission’s rules shall be made available to the witness before the Commission.
(c) Witnesses at the hearings may be accompanied by their own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights.
(d) The Chairman or Acting Chairman may punish breaches of order and decorum and unprofessional ethics on the part of counsel, by censure and exclusion from the hearings.
(e) If the Commission determines that evidence or testimony at any hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person, it shall (1) receive such evidence or testimony in executive session; (2) afford such person an opportunity voluntarily to appear as a witness; and (3) receive and dispose of requests from such person to subpoena additional witnesses, (f) Except as provided in sections 102 and 105(f) of this Act, the Chairman shall receive and the Commission shall dispose of requests to subpena additional witnesses.
(g) No evidence or testimony taken in executive session may be released or-used in public sessions without the consent of the Commission. Whoever releases or uses in public without the consent of the Commission evidence or testimony taken in executive session shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year.
(h) In the discretion of the Commission, witnesses may submit brief and pertinent sworn statements in writing for inclusion in the record. The Commission is the sole judge of the pertinency of testimony and evidence adduced at its hearings.
(i) Upon payment of the cost thereof, a witness may obtain a transcript copy of his testimony given at a public session or, if given at an executive session, when authorized by the Commission.
(j) A witness attending any session of the Commission shall receive $4 for each day’s attendance and for the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the same, and 8 cents per mile for going from and returning to his place of residence. Witnesses who attend at points so far removed from their respective residences as to prohibit return thereto from day to day shall be entitled to an additional allowance of $12 per day for expenses of subsistence, including the time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance. Mileage payments shall be tendered to the witness upon service of a subpena issued on behalf of the Commission or any subcommittee thereof.
(k) The Commission shall not issue any subpena for the attendance and testimony of witnesses or for the production of written or other matter which would require the presence of the party subpenaed at a hearing to be held outside of the State, wherein the witness is found or resides or transacts business.
Appendix B
In addition to these statutory provisions, the Commission has adopted the *833following supplementary Rules of Procedure :
(a) All the provisions of Section 102 of Public Law 85-315, incorporated in Rule 2 above, shall be applicable to and govern the proceedings of all subcommittees appointed by the Commission pursuant to Section 105(f) of Public Law 85-315, incorporated in Rule 1 above.
(b) At least two members of the Commission must be present at any hearing of the Commission or of any sub-committee thereof.
(c) The holding of hearings by the Commission or the appointment of a subcommittee to hold hearings pursuant to the Provisions in Rule 1 above must be approved by a majority of the members of the Commission or by a majority of the members present at which at least a quorum of four members is present.
(d) Subpenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of written or other matter may be issued over the signature of the Chairman of the Commission by the Chairman or by the Chairman upon the request of a member of the Commission.
(e) Subpenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of written or other matter may be issued over signature of the Chairman of a subcommittee appointed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1 above by the Chairman or by the Chairman upon the request of a member of the subcommittee.
(f) An accurate transcript shall be made of the testimony of all witnesses in all hearings, either public or executive sessions, of the Commission or of any subcommittee thereof. Each witness shall have the right to inspect the record of his own testimony. A transcript copy of his testimony may be purchased by a witness pursuant to Rule 2(i) above. Transcript copies of public sessions may be obtained by the public upon payment of the cost thereof.
(g) Any witness desiring to read a prepared statement in a hearing shall file a copy with the Commission or subcommittee 24 hours in advance. The Commission or subcommittee shall decide whether to permit the reading of such statement.
(h) The Commission or subcommittee shall decide whether written statements or documents submitted to it shall be placed in the record of the hearing.
(i) Interrogation of witnesses at hearings shall be conducted only by members of the Commission or by authorized staff personnel.
(j) If the Commission pursuant to Rule 2(e), or any subcommittee thereof, determines that evidence or testimony at any hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person, it shall advise such person that such evidence has been given and it shall afford such person an opportunity to read the pertinent testimony and to appear as a voluntary witness or to file a sworn statement in his behalf.
(k) Subject to the physical limitations of the hearing room and consideration of the physical comfort of Commission members, staff, and witnesses, equal and reasonable access for coverage of the hearings shall be provided to the various means of communications, including newspapers, magazines, radio, news reels, and television. However, no witness shall be televised, filmed or photographed during the hearing if he objects on the ground of distraction, harassment, or physical handicap.
Appendix C S. 83
Rights of Persons Adversely Affected by Testimony
(q) a person shall be considered to be adversely affected by evidence or testimony of a witness if the Commission determines that; (i) the evidence or testimony would constitute libel or slander if not presented before the Commission or (ii) the evidence or testimony alleges crime or misconduct or tends to disgrace or otherwise to expose the person to public contempt, hatred, or scorn.
(r) Insofar as practicable, any person whose activities are the subject of investigation by the Commission, or about *834whom adverse information is proposed to be presented at a public hearing of the Commission, shall be fully advised by the Commission as to the matters into which the Commission proposes to inquire and the adverse material which is proposed to be presented. Insofar as practicable, all material reflecting adversely on the character or reputation of any individual which is proposed to be presented at a public hearing of the Commission shall be first reviewed in executive session to determine its reliability and probative value and shall not be presented at a public hearing except pursuant to majority vote of the Commission.
(s) If a person is adversely affected by evidence or testimony given in a public hearing, that person shall have the right; (i) to appear and testify or file a sworn statement in his own behalf, (ii) to have the adverse witness recalled upon application made within thirty days after introduction of such evidence or determination of the adverse witness’ testimony, (iii) to be represented by counsel as heretofore provided, (iv) to cross-examine (in person or by counsel) such adverse witness, and (v), subject to the discretion of the Commission, to obtain the issuance by the Commission of subpenas for witnesses, documents, and other evidence in his defense. Such opportunity for rebuttal shall be afforded promptly and, so far as practicable, such hearing shall be conducted at the same place and under the same circumstances as the hearing at which adverse testimony was presented.
Cross-examination shall be limited to one hour for each witness, unless the Commission by majority vote extends the time for each witness or group of witnesses.
(t) If a person is adversely affected by evidence or testimony given in executive session or by material in the Commission files or records, and if public release of such evidence, testimony, or material is contemplated, such person shall have, prior to the public release of such evidence or testimony or material or any disclosure of or comment upon it by members of the Commission or Commission staff or taking of similar evidence or testimony in a public hearing, the rights heretofore conferred and the right to inspect at least as much of the evidence or testimony of the adverse witness or material as will be made public or the subject of a public hearing.
(u) Any witness (except a member of the press who testifies in his professional capacity) who gives testimony before the Commission in an open hearing which reflects adversely on the character or reputation of another person may be required by the Commission to disclose his sources of information, unless to do so would endanger the national security.

. See Appendix A and Appendix B.

. This is the rule invariably followed by committees of the House and Senate. It permits a form of cross-examination: submission of written questions to be put to the witness by the Chairman — for whatever that is worth as cross-examination.

. See Appendix C.

. Amendment to Bule XI (25) of the Buies of the House of Bepresentatives. Adopted March 23, 1955, 101 Cong.Bec. 3569-85; House Besolution 151, Bules and Manual, United States House of Bepresentatives, 1959, section 735(i)-(q).

. Section 102(a) through 102 (i) of the statute is identical with the House “Fair Play Buies”.

. For a discussion of the various proposals for a code of procedure before congressional committees, see Maslow, Fair Procedure in Congressional In*830vestigations: A Proposed Code, 54 Cal. L.Rev. 839 (1954). For the code proposed by the American Bar Association, see 40 Am.Bar Ass’n Journ. 900 (1954). See the following, some before and some after adoption of the Fair Play Rules, some dealing directly with the procedure before congressional committees and some dealing with the rights of witnesses generally in hearings before investigative or administrative bodies; Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 1953 (1928); Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 691 (1926); I-Ierweitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee, 33 Cal.L.Rev. 1 (1933); Morgan, Congressional Investigations and Judicial Review; Kilbourn & Thompson Revisited, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 556 (1949); Davis,. The Requirement of Opportunity to bo Heard in the Administrative Process, 51 Yale L.Journ. 1091 (1942); Liacos, Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees, 33 Bos.U.L.Rev. 337 (1953); Symposium on Legislative Investigations: Safeguards of Witnesses, 29 Notre Dame Law., 157 (1954); Keating, The Investigating Power of Congress, 14 Fed.Bar Jour. 171 (1954); Kefauver, A Code of Conduct for Congressional Investigations, 8 Ark.L.Rev. 369 (1954) ; Chase, Improving Congressional Investigations, 30 Temp.L.Q. 126 (1957) ; Davis, Requirements of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1956); McKay, The Right of Confrontation, Wash.U.L.Q. 122 (1959). See the following recent notes and comments: Due Process and the Right to Counsel, 33 St. John’s L.Rev. 67 (1957); The Civil Rights Act of 1957 and Contempt of Court, 48 Cornell L.Q. 661 (1958); Constitutional Limitations on the Legislative Power of Investigations, 7 Buffalo L.Rev. 267 (1958); Representation by Counsel, 58 Cal.L.Rev. 395 (1958). See also Barth, Government by Investigation (Viking Press., N.Y.1955) and Taylor, Grand Inquest (Simon & Schuster, N.Y.1955).

. In 1954 both houses of Congress held extensive hearings on the matter of committee procedures. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Legislative Procedure of the House Rules Committee, Legislative Procedure, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Rules of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, Rules of Procedure for Senate Investigating Committees, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). See also Report of Senate Committee on Rules and Administration to accompany S.Res. 17, Rules of Procedure for Senate Investigating Committees, 84th Cong., 1955.

. Proponents of the legislation emphasized repeatedly; “The Commission created by the proposal is purely investigatory and empowered only to make recommendations”. H.Rep. No. 291, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 6.

. Section 104(a) (1) of the Act (Duties of the Commission) provides: “The Commission shall — (1) investigate allegations in writing under oath or affirmation that certain citizens of the United States are being deprived of their right to vote and have that vote counted by reason of their color, race, religion, or national origin; which writing, under oath or affirmation, shall set forth the facts upon which such belief or beliefs are based;”

. The inclusion in the body of the statute of mandatory rules of procedure is unique in legislation setting up an investigatory commission. This, and the provision requiring application to a court for enforcement of process indicate congressional sensitivity to the problem.