Court Opinion

ID: 9364867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 16:00:28.775345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.876353
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13202   Document: 44-1    Date Filed: 01/20/2023    Page: 1 of 11

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-13202
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        SARA DANESHPAJOUH,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        SAGE DENTAL GROUP OF FLORIDA, PLLC,
        a Florida corporation,
        SAGE DENTAL MANAGEMENT, LLC,
        a Florida corporation,
        SAGE DENTAL OF POMPANO BEACH, P.A.,
        a Florida corporation,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.
USCA11 Case: 21-13202        Document: 44-1       Date Filed: 01/20/2023       Page: 2 of 11

        2                        Opinion of the Court                    21-13202

                               ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-62700-RAR
                             ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Sara Daneshpajouh sued her former employer, Sage Dental
        Group of Florida, PLLC, 1 alleging that she was terminated due to
        her pregnancy and in retaliation for protected activity under Flor-
        ida and federal law. The district court granted summary judgment
        in Sage Dental’s favor, and we affirm.
                             FACTUAL BACKGROUND
               Daneshpajouh started working for Sage Dental—then Gen-
        tle Dental of Pompano Beach, P.A.—in 2012. She was Sage Den-
        tal’s main dentist in its Pompano Beach office, where she worked
        under the supervision of Dr. Antonio Cruz and, later, under Dr.
        Miguel Montilla. Dr. Cruz had several conversations with Danesh-
        pajouh about complaints he had received from other employees
        about her behavior in the workplace, as well as reports of

        1
          Daneshpajouh also sued several other related entities: Sage Dental Manage-
        ment, LLC, and Sage Dental of Pompano Beach, P.A. We refer to these enti-
        ties collectively as Sage Dental, as do the parties.
USCA11 Case: 21-13202     Document: 44-1     Date Filed: 01/20/2023    Page: 3 of 11

        21-13202              Opinion of the Court                       3

        dissatisfied patients who felt that Daneshpajouh aggressively pro-
        posed expensive treatment plans after speaking with them for only
        a few minutes. Out of eleven other dentists who worked at Sage
        Dental in a similar timeframe, Daneshpajouh had the lowest rates
        of patient retention and treatment acceptance. In his deposition,
        Dr. Cruz described Daneshpajouh as “abrasive” with staff and pa-
        tients and said that she “wasn’t a team player.” Dr. Montilla had a
        similarly difficult time with Daneshpajouh. He began to advocate
        terminating her in the summer of 2017.
                Aside from these interpersonal issues, Daneshpajouh’s Pom-
        pano Beach office had financial troubles when she was the lead den-
        tist there—a twenty-five percent revenue loss from 2016 to 2017.
        Drs. Cruz and Montilla believed that Daneshpajouh was responsi-
        ble for these revenue losses.
               In July 2017, Daneshpajouh learned that she was pregnant.
        Before Daneshpajouh had announced her pregnancy, Sage Dental
        hired a new office manager in the Pompano Beach office. Danesh-
        pajouh did not get along with the new office manager, and she at
        least once complained to Dr. Montilla that the office manager was
        violating federal medical privacy laws by inadequately protecting
        patients’ medical information.
               By October 3, 2017, management at Sage Dental was look-
        ing to replace Daneshpajouh. Two days later, Sage Dental had al-
        ready hired Daneshpajouh’s replacement, and Dr. Montilla
        planned to meet with Daneshpajouh on October 18 to inform her
USCA11 Case: 21-13202     Document: 44-1      Date Filed: 01/20/2023    Page: 4 of 11

        4                      Opinion of the Court               21-13202

        she would be terminated. But before he had the chance to do so,
        Daneshpajouh told him that she was pregnant.
               When Dr. Montilla learned about Daneshpajouh’s preg-
        nancy, he decided not to tell her she was being fired. Instead, he
        recommended to Sage Dental’s CEO and the other management
        that Daneshpajouh be transferred from the Pompano Beach office
        to the Parkland office. Dr. Montilla later explained in an email to
        other Sage Dental management that he would follow through with
        Daneshpajouh’s termination after she had given birth.
               Daneshpajouh had to take leave due to a complication with
        her pregnancy between October 27 and November 3; Sage Dental
        told her this leave would count against her accrued vacation time.
        When Daneshpajouh returned on November 6, Dr. Montilla told
        her he was transferring her to the Parkland office, which she con-
        sidered a demotion and agreed to only if she received a salary guar-
        antee. The next day, Sage Dental’s Regional Vice President of Op-
        erations emailed Dr. Montilla and notified him that the Pompano
        Beach office’s projected appointment revenue for that coming Fri-
        day had declined from $11,000 to around $6,000. Dr. Montilla felt
        that Daneshpajouh’s behavior was responsible for the cancelled ap-
        pointments.
              Sage Dental terminated Daneshpajouh two days later on
        November 9. Dr. Montilla told her that she was being terminated
        because she was unprofitable.
USCA11 Case: 21-13202      Document: 44-1      Date Filed: 01/20/2023     Page: 5 of 11

        21-13202               Opinion of the Court                         5

                            PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               Daneshpajouh sued Sage Dental in October 2019. Her
        amended complaint alleged five counts: pregnancy-based sex dis-
        crimination in violation of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act
        (count one); retaliation, in violation of the same two statutes, based
        on Sage Dental’s offer to transfer Daneshpajouh (count two); inter-
        ference with Daneshpajouh’s rights under the Family and Medical
        Leave Act, for counting her time off in October 2017 against her
        accrued vacation time (count three); retaliation under the Family
        and Medical Leave Act (count four); and retaliatory discharge un-
        der the Florida Whistleblower Act, for Daneshpajouh’s complaints
        about the office manager’s handling of client data (count five). Af-
        ter discovery had ended, Sage Dental moved for summary judg-
        ment on all claims. The district court granted Sage Dental’s mo-
        tion in its entirety.
                As to count one, the district court found Daneshpajouh had
        not shown direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination. The dis-
        trict court also concluded that Daneshpajouh failed to show cir-
        cumstantial evidence of pregnancy discrimination, as her supervi-
        sors had consistently testified that Daneshpajouh’s manners and
        performance issues motivated their decision. As to count two, the
        district court concluded that Daneshpajouh had not shown evi-
        dence of retaliation under Title VII or the Florida Civil Rights Act
        because Sage Dental had contemplated firing Daneshpajouh earlier
        in October 2018—before its staff knew about Daneshpajouh’s preg-
        nancy and before she objected to being transferred.
USCA11 Case: 21-13202      Document: 44-1      Date Filed: 01/20/2023     Page: 6 of 11

        6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13202

                As to count three, the district court held that Daneshpajouh
        could not show interference with her rights under the Family and
        Medical Leave Act because the Act permitted Sage Dental to count
        her accrued vacation time toward her medical leave. And as to
        counts four and five, the district court concluded that Daneshpa-
        jouh’s retaliation claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act and the
        Florida Whistleblower Act failed for the same reasons her Title VII
        retaliation claim failed: Daneshpajouh didn’t show that her pro-
        tected activity was causally related to her termination. The district
        court therefore entered final summary judgment on all claims in
        Sage Dental’s favor. Daneshpajouh timely appealed.
                            STANDARD OF REVEIW
               “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
        novo, viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual
        inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Stephens v. Mid-
        Continent Cas. Co., 749 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2014). “Sum-
        mary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no
        genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
        to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
        A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under
        governing law,” and a dispute is genuine where “the evidence is
        such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmov-
        ing party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
        (1986).
USCA11 Case: 21-13202        Document: 44-1        Date Filed: 01/20/2023       Page: 7 of 11

        21-13202                  Opinion of the Court                             7

                                      DISCUSSION
               Daneshpajouh appeals the district court’s summary judg-
        ment on her: (1) discrimination claims under Title VII and the Flor-
        ida Civil Rights Act; and (2) retaliation claims under Title VII, the
        Florida Civil Rights Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the
        Florida Whistleblower Act. 2 We address each category of claims
        in turn.
                                 Discrimination Claims
              Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against
        an employee on the basis of sex, including on the basis of preg-
        nancy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(k). Daneshpajouh’s dis-
        crimination claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act is governed by
        the same standards as her Title VII claim. See Holland v. Gee, 677
        F.3d 1047, 1054 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012).
               Daneshpajouh argues that she showed “a convincing mosaic
        of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer inten-
        tional discrimination.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d
        1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
        To show a convincing mosaic, a plaintiff must point to “evidence
        that demonstrates, among other things, (1) ‘suspicious timing, am-
        biguous statements . . . , and other bits and pieces from which an
        inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn,’ (2)

        2
         Daneshpajouh does not appeal the district court’s order as to her Family and
        Medical Leave Act interference claim. So we don’t discuss it any further.
USCA11 Case: 21-13202     Document: 44-1      Date Filed: 01/20/2023    Page: 8 of 11

        8                      Opinion of the Court               21-13202

        systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees,
        and (3) that the employer’s justification is pretextual.” Lewis v.
        City of Union City, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019)
        (quoting Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 734 (11th Cir.
        2011)).
               On appeal, Daneshpajouh points to four bits and pieces of
        evidence she says add up to a convincing mosaic: (1) she was fired
        within a month of telling her bosses that she was pregnant; (2) non-
        pregnant employees were treated better than she was; (3) any per-
        formance issues happened years earlier; and (4) the company de-
        cided to transfer her to the Parkland office. But none of this evi-
        dence, alone or together, would allow a jury to infer intentional
        discrimination.
               First, as to the timing of her termination, the undisputed
        summary judgment evidence showed that the decision to fire
        Daneshpajouh was made before she told her supervisors that she
        was pregnant. Sage Dental could not have intentionally discrimi-
        nated against Daneshpajouh if it didn’t know she was pregnant
        when it made the decision to take an adverse employment action
        against her. See Lubetsky v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 1301,
        1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (no intentional discrimination where “all of
        the evidence indicated Bardakjy, the individual who made the de-
        cision to rescind Appellant’s conditional job offer, was unaware of
        Appellant’s religion”); Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231
        F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A decision maker cannot have been
        motivated to retaliate by something unknown to him.”).
USCA11 Case: 21-13202      Document: 44-1      Date Filed: 01/20/2023     Page: 9 of 11

        21-13202               Opinion of the Court                         9

                Second, as to Sage Dental’s treatment of other employees,
        Daneshpajouh hasn’t pointed to another employee that was simi-
        larly situated to her. To create an inference of intentional discrim-
        ination, comparator evidence, even under a convincing mosaic the-
        ory, has to be “similarly situated.” See Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1185
        (quoting Silverman, 637 F.3d at 734).
               Third, as to her job performance, the summary judgment
        evidence was undisputed that Daneshpajouh’s supervisors viewed
        her as “abrasive” with staff and patients, and not “a team player.”
        Of Sage Dental’s eleven offices, hers was the worst for patient re-
        tention and treatment acceptance. Even if Daneshpajouh’s super-
        visors were wrong about her performance, “[t]he question is
        whether her employers were dissatisfied with her for these or other
        non-discriminatory reasons, even if mistakenly or unfairly so.” Al-
        varez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010).
        Here, the undisputed evidence was that that they were.
               And fourth, whether Daneshpajouh was going to be trans-
        ferred to the least profitable office or fired, the undisputed sum-
        mary judgment evidence showed that Sage Dental decided to take
        an adverse employment action against her before she announced
        her pregnancy. Sage Dental could not have intentionally discrimi-
        nated against Daneshpajouh if it decided on an adverse action be-
        fore knowing about her pregnancy. See Cotton v. Cracker Barrel
        Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2006)
        (“When an employer contemplates a given action before the har-
        assment takes place, temporal proximity between the action and
USCA11 Case: 21-13202     Document: 44-1      Date Filed: 01/20/2023     Page: 10 of 11

        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13202

        the incident of harassment alone will not suffice to show causa-
        tion.”).
                                 Retaliation Claims
                Daneshpajouh alleges that she was retaliated against in vio-
        lation of four different statutes. The elements for each claim are
        essentially identical. See Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 948 F.3d
        1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020) (Title VII); Brungart v. Bellsouth Tele-
        comms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 798 (11th Cir. 2000) (Family and Medi-
        cal Leave Act); Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 853 So. 2d
        1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (applying elements from Title VII
        retaliation claim to Florida Whistleblower Act). To establish a
        prima facie case of retaliation, Daneshpajouh must show that: (1)
        she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an ad-
        verse action; and (3) the first two elements were causally con-
        nected. Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1325.
                The third element is the only one at issue on appeal.
        Daneshpajouh argues that she established causation through tem-
        poral proximity between her statutorily protected activity and her
        termination. She complained about potential violations of pa-
        tients’ privacy on October 23, for example, and took medical leave
        on October 27, before she was fired a few weeks later on Novem-
        ber 9.
               But “in a retaliation case, when an employer contemplates
        an adverse employment action before an employee engages in pro-
        tected activity, temporal proximity between the protected activity
USCA11 Case: 21-13202     Document: 44-1     Date Filed: 01/20/2023    Page: 11 of 11

        21-13202               Opinion of the Court                      11

        and the subsequent adverse employment action does not suffice to
        show causation.” Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir.
        2006). Here, the undisputed summary judgment evidence showed
        that Sage Dental already planned to terminate Daneshpajouh be-
        fore she engaged in any protected activity—before she complained
        about patient privacy, or her leave, or her transfer. Thus, the dis-
        trict court did not err in granting summary judgment on the retal-
        iation claims.
              AFFIRMED.