Court Opinion

ID: 9881388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-02 13:00:43.044516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:44.167799
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1201    Document: 36     Page: 1   Filed: 10/02/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

            STIMSON LUMBER COMPANY,
                  Plaintiff-Appellant

                             v.

                    UNITED STATES,
                    Defendant-Appellee
                  ______________________

                        2022-1201
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:18-cv-00983-NBF, Senior Judge Nancy B. Fire-
 stone.
                  ______________________

                 Decided: October 2, 2023
                 ______________________

     THOMAS SCOTT STEWART, Stewart Wald & Smith, LLC,
 Kansas City, MO, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also rep-
 resented by ELIZABETH MCCULLEY.

    KATELIN SHUGART-SCHMIDT, Environment and Natural
 Resources Division, United States Department of Justice,
 Denver, CO, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
 sented by TODD KIM.
                  ______________________

   Before DYK, REYNA, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
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 2                            STIMSON LUMBER COMPANY v. US

 CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
     This appeal originates from a rails-to-trails conversion
 in the state of Oregon, where Stimson Lumber Company
 (“Stimson”) owns property subject to an easement. Stim-
 son brought suit against the government in the United
 States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”), seeking
 compensation for an alleged taking arising from the opera-
 tion of the National Trails System Act Amendments of
 1983 (“Trails Act”), 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Stimson claimed
 that the issuance of a Notice of Interim Trail Use (“NITU”)
 allowing interim trail use and railbanking constituted a
 Fifth Amendment taking. The Claims Court held that in-
 terim trail use and railbanking was within the scope of the
 easement; the easement was not abandoned; and no taking
 occurred. See Loveridge v. United States, 148 Fed. Cl. 279,
 283, 295 (2020) (“Decision I”); Loveridge v. United States,
 150 Fed. Cl. 143, 145, 150–51 (2020) (“Decision II”); 1 J.A.
 53 (Rule 54(b) Judgment). We affirm.
                      I.   BACKGROUND
     On October 13, 1905, Articles of Incorporation were ex-
 ecuted for the Pacific Railway and Navigation Company
 (“Railroad”) with the plan of “construct[ing], equip[ping]
 and operat[ing] a line of railroad in the State of Oregon.”
 J.A. 546–47, 550. On July 22, 1907, the Western Timber
 Company (“Western Timber”) executed a deed transferring
 to the Railroad the land right relevant to this appeal. J.A.
 198. The deed (“Stimson’s deed”) states in relevant part:
     Western Timber Co. . . . does hereby bargain, sell,
     grant, convey and confirm to the Pacific Railway
     and Navigation Company, a Corporation, and to its

     1   These decisions also involved other landowners,
 deeds, easements, properties, and other issues that are not
 at issue in this appeal. See Decision I at 286–94; Decision
 II at 146, 151.
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     successors and assigns forever, all of the following
     described real property situate in the County of
     Washington, State of Oregon, to-wit: – [description
     of the land]
     ...
     Together with the tenements, hereditaments and
     appurtenances thereunto belonging, or in anywise
     appertaining. Reserving, however, unto the said
     Western Timber Co., its successors and assigns, the
     right to cross said right of way at any point or
     points where such crossing is desired. TO HAVE
     AND TO HOLD unto the said Pacific Railway and
     Navigation Company, and to its successors and as-
     signs forever.
 Id. Stimson and the government agree that Stimson owns
 land in Oregon covered by Stimson’s deed and that the deed
 provided the Railroad with an easement for the land rele-
 vant to this appeal. See Appellant’s Br. 4–5; Appellee’s Br.
 8. The Port of Tillamook Bay Railroad (“POTB”) later took
 over ownership of the railroad line. See Decision I at
 282–83; J.A. 335–36.
     A storm caused severe damage to the railroad line
 tracks in 2007. See Decision II at 145; J.A. 330, 353. In
 2009, the POTB decided not to repair the damage caused
 to the tracks by the 2007 storm. See Decision II at 145; J.A.
 353. The 2007 storm also led to the disbandment of the
 Oregon Tillamook Railroad Authority (“OTRA”) in 2014 be-
 cause the storm damage to the tracks impeded its goal of
 bringing the railroad up to certain track safety standards.
 See Decision II at 145–46; J.A. 354–55. The next year, the
 POTB entered into an inter-governmental agreement with
 numerous Oregon governmental entities to establish the
 Salmonberry Trail Intergovernmental Agency (“STIA”), to
 construct “a new multi-use trail”—the Salmonberry Trail—
 that would “connect[] to a wide network of existing
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 4                             STIMSON LUMBER COMPANY v. US

 recreation[al] trails and parks, educational opportunities,
 and heritage sites” over portions of the railroad line. J.A.
 356–57, 361; see Decision II at 146.
     In May 2016, the POTB filed with the Surface Trans-
 portation Board (“STB”) a notice of intent to “terminate
 (abandon) service” of the portions of the railroad line at is-
 sue. 2 J.A. 329; see Decision II at 145. Shortly thereafter,
 the STIA filed with the STB a request for issuance of a
 NITU under the Trails Act. See J.A. 333–34; Decision II at
 146. The POTB and STIA executed a trail use agreement
 on April 6, 2018. See J.A. 376–77, 403; see also Decision II
 at 146; J.A. 378–402.
     Stimson filed a complaint at the Claims Court against
 the government, alleging that the creation of the Salmon-
 berry Trail gave rise to a taking under the Fifth Amend-
 ment. See J.A. 59–61. After the Claims Court found that
 Stimson’s deed conveyed an easement such that Stimson
 had a potential claim for compensation, both parties filed
 motions for partial summary judgment concerning the
 scope of the conveyed easement. See Decision I at 282–83.
 The Claims Court granted the government’s partial sum-
 mary judgment motion and denied Stimson’s partial sum-
 mary judgment motion, finding railbanking and interim
 trail use to be within the scope of the easement. See id. at
 283, 295. The parties then filed cross motions for partial
 summary judgment on whether a taking nonetheless oc-
 curred due to abandonment. See Decision II at 145. The
 Claims Court granted the government’s motion and denied
 Stimson’s motion, finding that Stimson failed to show
 abandonment for all purposes and therefore no taking

     2    The effective date of the notice of intent was July
 28, 2016. J.A. 329. The STB has regulatory authority over
 rail carriers who intend to discontinue or abandon any part
 of their railroad line. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10501(b), 10903.
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 STIMSON LUMBER COMPANY v. US                               5

 occurred. See id. at 145, 150–51. Accordingly, the Claims
 Court concluded that Stimson had no compensable prop-
 erty interest in the land to which the deed pertained and
 entered a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
 cedure 54(b) in favor of the government. See J.A. 53.
    Stimson timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
     “Whether a taking has occurred is a question of law
 based on factual underpinnings.” Chi. Coating Co., LLC v.
 United States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (cita-
 tion omitted). However, summary judgment is “in all re-
 spects reviewed de novo.” Cienega Gardens v. United
 States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omit-
 ted). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving
 party demonstrates that “there is no genuine dispute as to
 any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
 as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Chi. Coating,
 892 F.3d at 1169. Additionally, “[t]he nature or scope of a
 compensable property interest in a takings analysis is a
 question of law,” which we review de novo. Casitas Mun.
 Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
 2013) (citations omitted).
                       III. DISCUSSION
     On appeal, Stimson raises two arguments. First, Stim-
 son argues that Stimson’s deed granted an easement lim-
 ited to railroad purposes. See Appellant’s Br. 15. Second,
 Stimson argues that the Railroad abandoned the easement
 prior to the NITU. See id. at 40–41. We address each ar-
 gument in turn.
                   A. Scope of Easement
     Stimson argues that the deed conveyed an easement
 for railroad purposes only. See id. at 15. Stimson first
 urges us to look to the surrounding circumstances at the
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 time of the grant to find the easement restricted to railroad
 purposes only. See id. at 20–21. Stimson further contends
 that an easement must be made for a particular purpose
 and an easement to a railroad company must be for rail-
 road purposes. See id. at 29–31. The government counters
 that the text of the deed expresses a clear intent to convey
 a broad, unambiguous right of way easement not limited to
 railroad purposes. See Appellee’s Br. 14–16. Thus, the gov-
 ernment contends that Stimson’s reliance on other legal
 sources cannot overcome this clear intent under Oregon
 law. See id. at 18–21. The government also disagrees with
 Stimson’s argument that an easement to a railroad com-
 pany must be restricted to railroad purposes. See id. at
 21–22. Because the easement is unrestricted, the govern-
 ment argues that railbanking and interim recreational
 trail use falls within the scope of the easement. See id. at
 22–23. We agree with the government.
      “We analyze the property rights of the parties in a
 rails-to-trails case under the relevant state law,” here, Or-
 egon law. Rogers v. United States, 814 F.3d 1299, 1305–06
 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d
 1525, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“Preseault II”)). The
 first step is “to declare the meaning of what is written in
 the instrument.” Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 964 P.2d 1015,
 1019 (Or. 1998) (citation omitted). “If those terms clearly
 express the easement’s purpose, our analysis ends.” Wat-
 son v. Banducci, 973 P.2d 395, 400 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (ci-
 tations omitted); see Tipperman, 964 P.2d at 1019. Indeed,
 “if an easement is granted in general and unlimited terms,
 the parties intended the easement to include unrestricted
 reasonable use.” Stone v. CCXL, LLC, 506 P.3d 1167, 1178
 (Or. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Criterion Ints., Inc. v. Deschutes
 Club, 902 P.2d 110, 113 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)). But if ambi-
 guity remains after examining the easement’s express lan-
 guage, Oregon courts “look to relevant surrounding
 circumstances” for parties’ intent, including “the ease-
 ment’s purpose, the circumstances existing at the time of
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 the grant, and the manner in which the original parties
 used the easement.” Watson, 973 P.2d at 400 (citations
 omitted); see Stone, 506 P.3d at 1178.
     The crux of the parties’ arguments as to the scope of
 the easement is whether the purpose of the deed is clear
 from its express terms, or whether we must turn to sur-
 rounding circumstances to illuminate the deed’s purpose.
 We find that the purpose of the deed here is clear from its
 express terms and plainly covers unrestricted reasonable
 use. See Criterion, 902 P.2d at 113. The deed states in
 pertinent part:
    Western      Timber   Co. . . . bargain[s], sell[s],
    grant[s], convey[s] and confirm[s] to the Pacific
    Railway and Navigation Company, . . . all of the
    following described real property . . . [t]ogether
    with the tenements, hereditaments and appurte-
    nances thereunto belonging, or in anywise apper-
    taining.    Reserving, however, unto the said
    Western Timber Co., . . . the right to cross said
    right of way at any point or points where such
    crossing is desired.
 J.A. 198 (emphases added). Because the deed conferred an
 easement for a right of way “written in general terms with-
 out limitations,” the express terms of the easement allow
 “unlimited reasonable use.” Criterion, 902 P.2d at 112–13
 (quoting Verzeano v. Carpenter, 815 P.2d 1275, 1278–79
 (Or. Ct. App. 1991)).
     In cases where the deed at issue contained a similar
 express grant without any limitations, Oregon courts have
 repeatedly found the easement’s purpose to be unre-
 stricted. For example, in Long v. Sendelbach, the Oregon
 Court of Appeals found that an easement “contained no re-
 strictions of any kind” when the deed provided for “[t]he
 grantor herein to have the use of said right of way and of
 the bridge which the grantee herein agrees to build on said
 right of way.” 641 P.2d 1136, 1137–38 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
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 Similarly, in Verzeano, the deed reserved an easement,
 stating “reserved for road purposes for access [and] egress
 to and from lands belonging to the grantor.” 815 P.2d at
 1276. Moreover, the easement was not limited to agricul-
 tural purposes and instead permitted “unlimited reasona-
 ble use.” Id. at 1278–79. In Criterion, the court found a
 deed conveying “the right to use, at any and all times, [an
 easement over the hill road]” constituted an easement for
 access, but “the purposes for which the grantee may invoke
 its right to access [we]re unambiguously left unrestricted.”
 902 P.2d at 111, 113 (first alteration in original). The deed
 here employs a similarly unrestricted conveyance.
     Our conclusion is further supported by differences in
 the deed language governing other easements for the same
 railroad that are not at issue in this appeal, where the
 Claims Court found those easements to be restricted to
 railroad use. For example, the Claims Court found that the
 Carstens 72/530 deed and Turner 72/528 deed “explicitly
 convey[ed] easements for a ‘railway and transportation
 purpose.’” Decision I at 286–87 (explaining that the deeds
 state, in pertinent part, “as long as used and operated for
 railway and transportation purposes”). Likewise, the By-
 rom 5/310 source deed explicitly identified the purpose of
 the easement as “the right to build, maintain and operate
 thereover a railway and telegraph line.” Id. at 289. Ex-
 press language limiting the purpose of the easement is
 lacking in Stimson’s deed.
     Stimson’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
 First, we are not convinced by Stimson’s argument that
 this court must look at the circumstances under which the
 deed was granted, which allegedly merit a finding that the
 easement’s scope covers railroad use only. See Appellant’s
 Br. 20–22. Stimson urges us to look at the 1905 Articles of
 Incorporation of the Railroad, which states that the pur-
 pose of the formation of the Railroad was “to construct,
 equip and operate a line of railroad in the state of Ore-
 gon . . . and to acquire the necessary rights of way and
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 STIMSON LUMBER COMPANY v. US                                 9

 other property therefor.” J.A. 546; see Appellant’s Br. 23–
 24. Stimson argues that the Railroad’s Articles of Incorpo-
 ration provides important context to understanding the
 parties’ underlying manifest purpose because the deed was
 executed less than two years after the Railroad executed
 the Articles of Incorporation. Appellant’s Br. 24. Stimson
 further cites Oregon statutes concerning a railroad’s acqui-
 sition of land as evidence of circumstances. See Appellant’s
 Br. 25 n.18 (citing OR. CODE §§ 5074, 5075, 5095 (1902));
 id. at 27–28 (citing OR. ANN. CODE § 5095 (1902)). Because
 the deed “clearly express[es] the easement’s purpose,” this
 court need not consider other evidence as to the surround-
 ing circumstances. Watson, 973 P.2d at 400; see Criterion,
 902 P.2d at 113 (declining to consider evidence of the cir-
 cumstances when “no language in the easement limit[ed]
 the use for which access may be used”). Therefore, the Rail-
 road’s Articles of Incorporation and the Oregon statutes are
 irrelevant to this court’s interpretation of the scope of ease-
 ment.
     Nor are we persuaded by Stimson’s citation of several
 Oregon cases, which allegedly show that a court must ex-
 amine the surrounding circumstances at the time the rail-
 road was constructed when interpreting the deed at issue.
 See Appellant’s Br. 17, 21–25 (citing cases). In Bernards v.
 Link, the deed conveyed a right that was “for its use as a
 right of way for a railroad.” 248 P.2d 341, 342 (Or. 1952).
 Based on this clear statement of purpose, the court found
 that deed conveyed an easement.            Id. at 343–44. 3

     3   Stimson also relies on this court’s citation of Ber-
 nards in Preseault II. Appellant’s Br. 21 (quoting Preseault
 II, 100 F.3d at 1535). But this court’s discussion in Pre-
 seault II was premised on there having been a clear state-
 ment of purpose in the deed in Bernards. Preseault II, 100
 F.3d at 1535. Moreover, Preseault II’s discussion of how to
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 Similarly, in Watson, the court interpreted the easement’s
 scope to be limited to “a road . . . crossed by gates” because
 the easement contained a “purpose clause” stating the in-
 tent to convey “an easement for a gateway road.” 973 P.2d
 at 400. Here, Stimson’s deed lacks any unequivocal state-
 ment of purpose like those in Bernards and Watson. 4
      Stimson next contends that, as a matter of law, an
 easement must be made for a specific purpose, which
 means that an easement made to the Railroad must be
 made for railroad purposes. See Appellant’s Br. 29–33. But
 the authorities cited by Stimson for this proposition do not
 support that an easement to a railroad company must au-
 tomatically be for railroad purposes. 5 Nor was it an error
 for the Claims Court to find the easement to be for “right-

 construe the purpose of railroad’s acquisition of land is lim-
 ited to “Vermont cases.” Id. (emphasis added).
      4   Stimson’s citation to Egaas v. Columbia County is
 also unavailing. Appellant’s Br. 25 n.19. Egaas discussed
 the interpretation of a condemnation judgment rather than
 a deed similar to the one at issue here. 673 P.2d 1372,
 1374–75 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
      5   Oregon Railway & Navigation Co. v. Oregon Real
 Estate Co. and Capelli v. Justice discussed whether the
 deeds conveyed easements. 10 Or. 444, 445–46 (1882); 496
 P.2d 209, 213 & n.2 (Or. 1972). Ward v. South Pacific Co.
 and sections of Oregon legislation addressing criminalizing
 walking on a railroad right-of-way were relevant to tres-
 passing, not easements. 36 P. 166, 168 (Or. 1894); Or. Rev.
 Stat § 164.255 (2003). Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v.
 United States does not support that an easement to a rail-
 road must automatically be for railroad purposes. 572 U.S.
 93, 104–05 (2014). Clark v. Kuhn found the deed language
 specified that the easement was “for right-of-way purposes”
 and thus supports our conclusion. 15 P.3d 37, 41 (Or. Ct.
 App. 2000).
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 of-way” not limited to a particular use. See, e.g., Long, 641
 P.2d at 1138–39 (finding easement was “for a right of way”
 not limited to agricultural use).
     Lastly, Stimson cites several cases that are readily dis-
 tinguishable. See Appellant’s Br. 34–39. For example, in
 Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, the Su-
 preme Court explicitly declined to “decide whether a taking
 occurred.” 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (“Preseault I”). In Toews
 v. United States, this court applied California law to ana-
 lyze an easement that expressly specified railroad uses as
 its purpose in the deed. 376 F.3d 1371, 1373, 1376 (Fed.
 Cir. 2004). And although the deeds in Preseault II did not
 state a purpose, this court, applying Vermont law, found
 that the instruments “incorporate[d] the purposes specified
 in the [Vermont] incorporation Act.” 100 F.3d at 1534–37,
 1541. By contrast, as Stimson conceded, Stimson’s deed
 does not incorporate by reference the Railroad’s charter or
 Articles of Incorporation. See Oral Arg. at 2:00–09,
 https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=
 22-1201_12062022.mp3.         Accordingly, Stimson’s cited
 cases do not dictate a different outcome.
     Therefore, we affirm the Claims Court’s grant of the
 government’s partial summary judgment motion and de-
 nial of Stimson’s partial summary judgment motion. Deci-
 sion I, at 282–83, 295.
            B. Non-Abandonment of Easement
     Stimson argues in the alternative that a taking has
 nonetheless occurred because the Railroad has abandoned
 the purported easement prior to the NITU. See Appellant’s
 Br. 40–41. The government contends that Stimson failed
 to show clear intent by the Railroad to abandon the ease-
 ment or conduct consistent with that intent. See Appellee’s
 Br. 26–29. We again agree with the government.
    Under Oregon law, an easement can be terminated by
 abandonment. Cotsifas v. Conrad, 905 P.2d 851, 852 (Or.
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 Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted). “A party claiming aban-
 donment must show in addition to non-use ‘either [a] ver-
 bal expression of an intent to abandon or conduct
 inconsistent with an intention to make further use.’” Con-
 ner v. Lucas, 920 P.2d 171, 174 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting
 Abbott v. Thompson, 641 P.2d 652, 654 (Or. Ct. App. 1982))
 (alteration in original); see Wiser v. Elliott, 209 P.3d 337,
 341 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). The party alleging abandonment
 must demonstrate abandonment by “clear and convincing
 evidence.” Johnston v. Cornelius, 218 P.3d 129, 135–36
 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). Courts “rarely find”
 intent to abandon, and “when they do it is because the acts
 manifesting the intent have so fundamentally changed the
 landscape that further use of the easement is deemed im-
 possible.” Shields v. Villareal, 33 P.3d 1032, 1035 (Or. Ct.
 App. 2001) (citations omitted).
     We agree with the Claims Court that Stimson has not
 met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence
 that the Railroad abandoned the easement. Decision II at
 148–51. Stimson raises numerous instances of potential
 abandonment of the easement, including but not limited to
 the POTB’s filing of its notice of intent to abandon the rail
 line with the STB in 2016, the POTB’s 2009 decision not to
 pursue repairs to the tracks damaged in the 2007 storm,
 the 2014 disbandment of the OTRA organization, and ref-
 erences to the “former railroad line” in the STIA agree-
 ment. See Appellant’s Br. 42–44, 47 (citing J.A. 329–31,
 347–53, 354–55, 356–65). But all these examples are di-
 rected to potential abandonment for railroad use only. Be-
 cause the easement is broad enough to encompass both
 railroad use and non-railway use, an intent to discontinue
 railroad use alone does not constitute “either [a] verbal ex-
 pression of an intent to abandon or conduct inconsistent
 with an intention to make further use” for trail use. Wiser,
 209 P.3d at 341–42 (finding intent to switch from using
 railway for “operating purposes” to “non-operating”
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 STIMSON LUMBER COMPANY v. US                              13

 purposes did not show “an intent to not use the properties
 at all”). The “cessation of rail operations” alone did not
 “terminate [the Railroad’s] right under the easement”
 when the easement is not limited to railroad use. Roma-
 noff Equities, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.3d 809, 815 (Fed.
 Cir. 2016). 6
     As Stimson conceded at the oral argument, “there is no
 direct evidence that [POTB] intended to abandon [the ease-
 ment] for trail use.” Oral Arg. at 11:33–12:02. Although
 Stimson contends that the POTB has never used the land
 for trail use, id. at 11:49–54, non-use alone is not enough
 to show abandonment. Conner, 920 P.2d at 174–75. There-
 fore, Stimson has not met its burden to establish abandon-
 ment of the easement by POTB by clear and convincing
 evidence.
     Stimson’s conclusory statement that the Claims
 Court’s outcome is inconsistent with “overwhelming au-
 thority from the Oregon Courts as stated in Bernards, Ab-
 bott, Conner, [and Powers v.] Coos Bay” is also not
 persuasive. 7 Appellant’s Br. 46. Abbott found no abandon-
 ment because the parties did not submit any evidence of
 “intent to abandon or conduct inconsistent with an inten-
 tion to make further use.” 641 P.2d at 654. Conner, which

     6   Although Romanoff applied New York law, the
 court found that the easement at issue was not restricted
 to railroad purposes, just as we do here. 815 F.3d at
 812–15. Based on that finding, this court then found no
 abandonment because Romanoff only offered evidence of
 abandonment of railroad use. Id. at 815–16.
     7   Stimson also asserts that Wiser is inconsistent with
 the Claims Court’s conclusion on abandonment. Appel-
 lant’s Br. 46. As we discussed earlier in this opinion, Wiser
 supports the Claims Court’s finding. See 209 P.3d at
 341–42.
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 14                          STIMSON LUMBER COMPANY v. US

 undeniably found that the grantee had ceased using the
 property, nevertheless found no abandonment because the
 evidence did not show an intent to abandon the easement.
 920 P.2d at 174–75. And Bernards and Powers v. Coos Bay
 Lumber Co., 263 P.2d 913 (Or. 1953), support our conclu-
 sion that evidence of intent to abandon one use is insuffi-
 cient to show abandonment for all uses of an easement. See
 Bernards, 248 P.2d at 345–56 (finding no abandonment
 and explaining that “[t]he intention required in the aban-
 donment of an easement is the intention not to make in the
 future the uses authorized by it”) (emphasis added); Coos
 Bay, 263 P.2d at 943–44 (finding evidence of railroad aban-
 donment sufficient for easements that only included a rail-
 road right of way, but insufficient for easements that
 broadly covered “roads”).
     Having found Stimson failed to meet its burden, we af-
 firm the Claims Court’s denial of Stimson’s partial sum-
 mary judgment on abandonment and grant of the
 government’s cross motion for partial summary judgment.
 Decision II at 145, 150–51.
                      IV. CONCLUSION
     We have considered Stimson’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. We conclude that the ease-
 ment granted to the Railroad was broad enough to encom-
 pass interim trail use or railbanking. We also conclude
 that the Railroad did not abandon the easement in ques-
 tion and that no taking occurred. Therefore, we affirm the
 Claims Court’s denials of Stimson’s motions for partial
 summary judgment and grants of the government’s cross-
 motions for partial summary judgment. Decision I at 283,
 295; Decision II at 145, 150–51.
                       AFFIRMED