Court Opinion

ID: 9486429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:47:49.422046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:43.227815
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I accept, for the purposes of this dissent, the statement of law set forth by the majority that Parham and Johnson must establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution before discovery can be compelled and that the appropriate standard of review is clear error.1 The district court found that Parham and Johnson had not established a prima facie case. The majority holds that this finding was not clearly erroneous. I disagree. In my view, the two black men made out a clear prima facie case of selective prosecution on the basis of race, and the decision of the district court to the contrary is clearly erroneous.
Parham and Johnson were prosecuted by the Department of Justice and convicted of violating the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by conspiring to provide false information on eighteen absentee ballots cast for a losing black candidate in the 1990 general election *849in Phillips County, Arkansas.2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1978i(c) and (e).3 The Department of Justice, however, failed to prosecute white political rivals who violated the same section of the Voting Rights Act in the same county and in the same election.4
The majority candidly outlines in footnote three of its opinion the “serious and pervasive” irregularities in the 1990 general election in Phillips County perpetrated by the rival white faction. It argues, however, that “egregious as they are, the [irregularities] are not sufficiently similar to the acts of voter fraud for which Parham and Johnson were prosecuted to constitute a prima facie case of selective prosecution.” I find no support in the case law or logic for that proposition. The fact that the white rivals violated subdivision (b) of section 1973i rather than subdivisions (c) or (e) is not a basis to distinguish the violations.5 Both the white and the black political factions had one goal in mind: win the election. The black defendants acted illegally in attempting to achieve that end by conspiring to vote more than once and to falsify absentee ballots, seeking to ensure a larger black vote. The white faction intimidated and harassed black voters, seeking to assure a smaller black vote. The conduct of both factions was illegal and reprehensible and both should have been charged with voter fraud.
All that is necessary to satisfy the “selectivity” requirement for a prima facie case of selective prosecution is that the offenses be similar, not identical. The majority cites a single case, Attorney General of the United States v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928 (D.C.Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172, 103 S.Ct. 817, 74 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1983), to support its view that the black defendants and the white accused are not “similarly situated” because the types of voter fraud in which they engaged are not sufficiently similar. In Irish People, however, the court posed the question of whether “similarly situated” persons had not been prosecuted for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The decision did not turn on whether persons violated the same subdivision of the same section of the statute.
Parham and Johnson have also presented sufficient evidence of improper motive to establish their prima facie case. The government’s choice to prosecute the blacks but not the whites for Voting Rights Act violations is “very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds.” See United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1987), rev’d in part on other grounds on reh’g, 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1265, 109 S.Ct. 28, 101 L.Ed.2d 979 (1988) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2049, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). The conspiracy of which Parham and Johnson were convicted involved eighteen absentee ballots. Their affidavits contain evidence *850of voting violations by whites that would likely affect at least that number of votes. The main distinguishing feature between the case that was prosecuted and the eases that were not investigated and prosecuted is not the scale of the alleged violations nor the severity of the conduct. Rather, the determinative factor appears to be the race of the defendants and the fact that the two black men who were prosecuted were seeking to maximize black votes while the efforts of the white persons who were not prosecuted were aimed at discouraging black voting.
This evidence, when put in the context of the local history of discrimination against blacks in voting, is sufficient to raise a strong inference that the government was motivated by race in bringing this prosecution. This court has previously noted the long history of discrimination against blacks in primary and general elections, particularly in the Arkansas Delta where Phillips County is located. See Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 211 (8th Cir.), aff'd mem., 459 U.S. 801, 103 S.Ct. 33, 74 L.Ed.2d 47 (1982); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.Supp. 196, 204, 210 (E.D.Ark.1989), aff'd mem., 498 U.S. 1019, 111 S.Ct. 662, 112 L.Ed.2d 656 (1991); Smith v. Clinton, 687 F.Supp. 1310, 1317 (E.D.Ark.1988). Notwithstanding the long history of discrimination, the Justice Department has never brought a criminal prosecution for voter fraud against a white resident of Phillips County. It is ironic that, after years of intimidation by white citizens of black men and women seeking to vote, the first prosecution for voting fraud should be against black defendants. The Department of Justice is to be commended for finally realizing the importance of suppressing voter fraud; now it must evenhandedly prosecute such fraud.
Having made a prima facie case of selective prosecution, Parham and Johnson are entitled to discovery and a hearing on the question of whether the government action of singling them out for prosecution was based on race. It is for the district court to decide whether the questions asked by the defendants are relevant to this inquiry.
For the foregoing reasons, I would remand this matter to the district court for action consistent with this dissent. After discovery has been completed and an evidentiary hearing held, the district court would have to decide whether or not the defendants established a case of selective prosecution. If it found in the affirmative, it would have to dismiss the prosecution. If not, the conviction would stand.
I concur with the majority’s opinion in all other respects.

. There is a split in the circuits as to whether a defendant must establish a prima facie case or only a colorable claim of selective prosecution before an evidentiary hearing is required. See United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). There is also a dispute as to whether the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous. See United States v. Moody, 778 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.1985).

. They were also charged with substantive offenses for the same conduct but were acquitted of those charges.

. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) reads as follows:
Whoever knowingly or willfully gives false information as to his name, address, or period of residence in the voting district for the purpose of establishing his eligibility to register or vote, or conspires with another individual for the purpose of encouraging his false registration to vote or illegal voting, or pays or offers to pay or accepts payment either for registration to vote or for voting shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both: Provided, however, That this provision shall be applicable only to general, special, or primary elections held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the United States Senate, Member of the United States House of Representatives....

. The defendants also presented affidavits outlining equally egregious violations of the Voting Rights Act in Chicot, Lee, and Lincoln counties, all adjacent to Phillips County in the Arkansas Delta. In my view, these affidavits provide additional support for the view that the defendants established a prima facie case of selective prosecution.

. Subdivision (b) reads as follows:
No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for exercising any powers or duties under sections 1973a(a), 1973d, 1973f, 1973g, 1973h, or 1973j(e) of this title.