Court Opinion

ID: 9761867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:57:19.45357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:26.935473
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Judge,
dissenting:
I believe that a reasonable employee in Mr. Reilly’s position would have construed Stroehmann’s promise to arbitrate employee dismissals as a promise to alter the existing at-will employment relationship. I further believe that Stroehmann received valuable consideration for this promise. For these reasons, I dissent.
The handbook language at issue here differs from the more vague policy pronouncements at issue in past cases. For example, the handbook before us in Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 354 Pa.Super. 199, 511 A.2d 830 (1986), contained nothing more than an illustrative list of typical employee misconduct that would warrant dismissal. We concluded that the handbook was “an aspirational statement by the employer listing actions that generally will not *423be tolerated.” Martin, supra, 354 Pa.Superior Ct. at 214, 511 A.2d at 838. We added that the book served only “an informational function.” Id. Likewise, the handbook at issue in Richardson v. Charles Cole Memorial Hosp., 320 Pa.Super. 106, 108, 466 A.2d 1084, 1085 (1983), contained the bare promise that the employer would “provide continual employment to all employees whose work proves satisfactory.” This promise, as we later observed in Banas v. Matthews Int’l Corp., 348 Pa.Super. 464, 469 n. 1, 502 A.2d 637, 648 n. 1 (1985) (en banc), was “hardly a promise at all” because it reserved to the employer the discretion “to determine what measure of performance was satisfactory.” On the other hand, the neutral arbitration provision in the Stroehmann handbook is more than merely a statement of general employment policy or an aspirational pledge to abide by a subjective standard of “fairness” or “just cause.”
Stroehmann could not have relinquished more thoroughly its right to dismiss its employees at-will. The company promised to subject all non-union employee dismissals to the objective and independent scrutiny of a third party. It further promised to abide by that third party’s determination of whether the dismissal in question was “fair.” Under the terms of the neutral arbitration provision, the arbitrator has “final and binding” authority to order the reinstatement of an improperly discharged employee. Stroehmann neither retained control over the ultimate decision nor reserved to itself the power to veto the arbitrator’s order. It expressly abandoned its right to discharge its employees “for any or no reason.” In place of that right, it established a specific “program” that would ensure “a fair, consistent and completely impartial handling of such matters.”
The neutral arbitration provision, moreover, is not a mere gratuity. Stroehmann expressly limited availability of the procedure to non-union employees. Thus, in exchange for the neutral third-party arbitration of discharge disputes, *424Stroehmann expected its employees to continue their employment without the benefits of union representation or membership. A reasonable employee would understand the terms of the bargain: Stroehmann promised to forego one of its rights as a means of inducing its employees to forego one of theirs. We can reasonably infer1 from the allegations in the complaint that Mr. Reilly continued to work for Stroehmann as a non-union employee during the period between publication of the handbook and termination of the employment relationship.2 We should not allow Stroehmann to reap the benefits of the bargain without also requiring it to fulfill the obligations of the bargain.
As our President Judge recently observed in Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 363 Pa.Super. 534, 526 A.2d 1192 (1987), the at-will employment doctrine is nothing more than a presumption. It enables the fact-finder to assume the existence of an at-will employment relationship only in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It does not allow us to ignore the parties’ intent, which remains the lodestar of all contract analysis and construction. If a court fails to enforce that intent, “it violates the cannons of contract law as well as the very policies upon which the doctrine of at-will employment is based.” Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., supra, 363 Pa.Superior Ct. at 555, 526 A.2d at 1202. I would therefore reverse the order of the Blair County Court of Common Pleas in this case.

. As the majority correctly observes, Mr. Reilly is entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences that we can reasonably deduce from the complaint.

. Of course, Mr. Reilly appears to have worked as a non-union employee since he began with Stroehmann in 1965. We can only speculate about the reasons why Stroehmann decided in 1982 to offer neutral arbitration of employee dismissals. Perhaps the company sought to discourage an attempt to unionize its employees. A performance is adequate consideration for a promise "if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981). Courts ordinarily do not pursue the highly speculative inquiry into the adequacy of consideration. See id. at § 79 comment