Court Opinion

ID: 9808172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:29:33.432189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:38.728330
License: Public Domain

*603Clare, J.
dissenting: The language used by counsel in characterizing the witnesses was not supported by anything in the evidence. It was calculated to destroy any credit which otherwise might have been given to their testimony. When appealed to by counsel, the Judge merely remarked, “Proceed,” and neither then, nor in his charge, cautioned the jury. This might well mislead the jury into understanding the Judge to hold that the language was unobjectionable. It went to the jury with the impress of his assent, if not, indeed, of his approbation. When the evidence justifies it, counsel have the right to criticise in strong terms the testi-mon}'', character or bearing of witnesses within legal limits. But it is due to the witnesses themselves, as well as to the party who calls them, that they should not be assailed in abusive terms and gross epithets when the evidence does not justify the language used in regard to them. In such cases the Judge should ex mero motu, even if not appealed to, intervene to protect the witness and the party whose cause is damaged when the credit of his witness is thus shaken without evidence. It is true the party cannot assign as error the abuse of privilege by counsel unless he object at the time and give the Judge an opportunity to correct the matter. State v. Suggs, 89 N. C., 527; Hudson v. Jordan, 108 N. C., 10, and cases cited; Clark’s Code (2d Ed.), 363, But here the matter was instantly brought to the attention of the Judge, who not only did not intervene, but told the counsel to proceed. Courts are held for the orderly, impartial investigation of controversies, and witnesses should feel that they are entitled there, as elsewhere, to respectful consideration. They are under the protection of the Court, which should not permit them to be unwarrantably assailed in language calculated to wound either their reputations or their feelings. While in such matters much is properly left to the discretion of the presiding Judge, the language here used was of such a nature that the refusal of the Judge to interfere, when appealed to, was calculated to *604prejudice the defendant (State v. Noland, 85 N. C., 576; Holly v. Holly, 94 N. C, 96), and should entitle it to a new trial. State v. Underwood, 77 N. C., 502. I do not concur as to other exceptions. Especially the instruction, in effect, that there was no evidence of contributive negligence seems to me clearly erroneous.
Shepherd, C. J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.