Court Opinion

ID: 9739349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:12:46.182182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.781435
License: Public Domain

Corrigan, J.
(concurring). Although I concur with Justice Kavanagh’s opinion, I write separately to address Judge Jansen’s concurring opinion. I cannot agree with my colleague’s suggestion that the present case represents a "growing trend of the wcac to exceed its administrative reviewing authority,” ante at 57, nor do I agree that we should entertain an issue of alleged bias that was not even- presented until plaintiff moved for reconsideration after the Supreme Court initially denied his application for leave to appeal. I would not excuse plaintiff from the duty to make a record because it is "extremely doubtful that the panel member would concede such an assertion.” Ante at 59.
I. TREND TO EXCEED ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWING AUTHORITY
I cannot agree that this case presents an appro*61priate vehicle to chastise the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission, much less to recognize a trend toward excess in that agency. Because this Court does not enjoy general supervisory authority over the wcac or any other agency, I would leave the analysis of trends to the commentators and decide only the merits of this particular controversy.
But if this case somehow represents a "growing trend” of the wcac to "exceed its administrative reviewing authority,” that realization certainly escaped a significant number of appellate judges before it reached this panel. A three-judge panel of this Court (Neff, P.J., and Murphy and Weaver, JJ.) originally denied plaintiffs application for leave to appeal from the unanimous wcac opinion, citing Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257; 484 NW2d 227 (1992). All seven justices of our Supreme Court thereafter denied plaintiffs application for leave to appeal. Illes v Jones Transfer Co, 444 Mich 897 (1993). Only on plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, when plaintiff first presented his claim that one of the commissioners was biased, did the Supreme Court remand this case for consideration as on leave granted.1 Illes v Jones Transfer Co, 444 Mich 977 (1994). That the wcac exceeded its reviewing authority did not strike ten judges who are generally attuned to issues of agency excess.
In any event, I see no "trend to excess” in this case. In my view, the problem of causation in reinjury cases ranks among the most difficult questions in worker’s compensation litigation. The problem is further magnified when an aged worker *62like Mr. liles suffers from a preexisting, ordinary disease of life such as diabetes, arthritis, and degenerative joint disease. Competent adjudicators can legitimately differ, and can even commit error, about such questions of causation without exceeding their lawful authority. Cf. Altman v Nelson, 197 Mich App 467; 495 NW2d 826 (1992).
By July 10, 1986, sixty-nine-year-old John liles had a long history of disease and injury. That history included chronic (but mild) diabetes, colon cancer, an irregular heartbeat, diffuse degenerative joint disease, arthritis, two hernias, and a fractured leg. He also apparently suffered from as yet undiagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome, ulnar nerve entrapment, and spinal stenosis. On July 10, 1986, plaintiff was injured when he fell thirteen feet from the top of a truck trailer.2 He experienced persistent pain in his back, legs, neck, arms, hands, and shoulders and was treated with pain medication, whirlpool therapy, and advised to use a cane. He was also treated by a chiropractor.
Plaintiff never returned to work after July 10, 1986, despite his thirty-two years’ seniority as a diesel mechanic at defendant Jones Transfer. In August and October 1986, however, two doctors pronounced him recovered and fit to return to work. One doctor recommended work restrictions, the other did not. One of those doctors related plaintiff’s multiple health problems to aging and not to his employment. Both doctors who examined plaintiff found degenerative joint disease or arthritis, while one found calcification in the arteries in plaintiff’s right leg.
Compensation was voluntarily paid from July 10, 1986, through January 15, 1987. It was termi*63nated on the basis of Dr. Lamb’s November 24, 1986, examination of plaintiff. The doctor found plaintiff able to return to work. Dr. Lamb noted that plaintiff had much to complain about medically, but did not relate the symptoms to work.
Unfortunately, on January 10, 1987, plaintiff fell in his yard at home and broke his left leg. He later claimed that his right leg gave out, although he never reported this cause at the time. Plaintiff broke his left leg in exactly the same place as a 1975 break during an accident on the family farm. The January 10, 1987, fracture of the left leg did not heal, although the leg was placed in a cast four times. Thereafter, plaintiff was finally diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and ulnar nerve entrapment.
Plaintiff subsequently claimed total and permanent disability and loss of the industrial use of his hands, arms, and legs. The magistrate found a causal relationship between the July 10 accident and the January 10, 1987, injury. The magistrate found that plaintiff had not lost the use of his upper extremities, but had lost the industrial use of his lower extremities. On appeal, the wcac rejected the magistrate’s conclusion of work-relatedness. The decision fairly can be read as an attempt to apply the "significant manner” standard to plaintiff’s claims. MCL 418.301, 418.401; MSA 17.237(301), 17.237(401). A finding of fact is conclusive on the wcac if it is supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, as stated in Doom v Brunswick Corp, 211 Mich App 189, 195; 535 NW2d 244 (1995):
Findings of fact made by a magistrate are conclusive on the wcac if they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. MCL 418.861a(3); MSA *6417.237(861a)(3). Judicial review is of the findings of fact made by the wcac, not those made by the magistrate. The findings of fact made by the wcac are conclusive if there is any competent evidence in the record to support them. Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257, 263; 484 NW2d 227 (1992).
The medical testimony obviously was in conflict. Seven doctors either saw plaintiff or reviewed his case. One doctor aptly testified that he found it very difficult to sort out just what factors had caused or aggravated plaintiff’s conditions. I share his belief. In this tough case, I have approved the reasoning in Justice Kavanagh’s opinion. But I do not agree that our decision to reverse warrants criticism of the wcac’s decisional process in this or any other case.
II. BIAS OF WCAC MEMBER
Because the issue of alleged pro-employer bias of one commissioner has not been preserved for appellate review, it is not properly before us. Preservation requirements serve overriding juridical interests, including notice, an opportunity to be heard, economy, and efficiency. If error is corrected when it is first claimed, an appellate remedy is unnecessary. My colleague would excuse plaintiff from the duty to preserve his claim of bias because it is extremely doubtful that the commissioner involved would concede that he is biased.
A golden thread in our tradition of justice is an accused person’s right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. A judicial officer who is accused of bias should also be entitled not only to the courtesy of notice, but also to a fair chance to respond to the charges. Our canons of ethics seem *65to bar judicial officers from responding to attacks in the public arena. Thus, the official record provides the only means by which a judicial officer can answer a claim of disqualifying bias. My concurring colleague would seem to foreclose even this limited opportunity to respond.
Moreover, we should not consider an untested statistical compilation of instances of alleged bias. The statistics plaintiff offers us for the first time on appeal have not been subjected to any form of adversary testing. Nor has plaintiff even attempted to show that the underlying cases were wrongly decided.
Finally, even if plaintiff successfully proved that the commissioner has some statistically measurable bias against claimants, he has not established a deprivation of due process. Even generalized hostility to a certain class of claimants does not present disqualifying bias. Aetna Life Ins Co v Lavoie, 475 US 813, 820-821; 106 S Ct 1580; 89 L Ed 2d 823 (1986). In Williams v Hofley Mfg Co, 430 Mich 603; 424 NW2d 278 (1988), our Supreme Court saw no constitutional impediment to a system in which members of the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board were appointed as representatives of employer or employee interest groups, or of the public, even though two panel members might be made up of an employer or employee representative and a presumably neutral general public representative. As our less gender-neutral Supreme Court then observed:
Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine. [Williams, supra at 616.]
*66As Williams noted, to condemn an adjudicator as a representative of á particular interest group "is to foreclose experience as a criterion for appointment.” Id. at 615.
The accused commissioner should have a right to present a defense, and not merely to concede the charge. For these reasons, I fully concur with the observation in the lead opinion that the claim of bias has not been preserved for appellate review.

 The Supreme Court again entered a form order that gives our Court not a glimmer of guidance, a practice that I have previously criticized. Feldbauer v Cooney Engineering Co (On Remand), 205 Mich App 284; 517 NW2d 298 (1994).

 Plaintiffs hand previously was injured at work on May 1, 1986. He was off work for a few weeks and received worker’s compensation benefits during that time.