Court Opinion

ID: 9828036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:02:12.228948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:42.022542
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
Upon consideration of this motion, we think we were in error in holding that the return upon the citation in Baker v. Myer discloses invalid service.
[8, 9] The attack on the judgment in this case is collateral. The judgment failing to recite that there was a valid service, it devolved upon interveners to show affirmatively from the record in that cause that the publication was insufficient. The sheriff’s return upon the citation states that it was published in a certain paper once in each week for eight successive weeks previous to the return day thereof. Then follows: “Said publication was made, respectively, on the 15th and 25th days of May, 6th day of July, 1900.” The latter part of the return is inconsistent with the other statement that the publication was once in each week for eight successive weeks. Therefore, instead of the return showing affirmatively an insufficient service, it, to say the most, left the matter uncertain, which condition of the record would not warrant a court in declaring as a fact, in a collateral proceeding, that the service had was imperfect. One of the duties of the court in that case was to pass on its jurisdiction to render the judgment against the absent defendants; and it will be presumed to have discharged this duty, when *840tile record falls to show clearly and affirmatively that the jurisdiction was wanting. This question was substantially before the Supreme Court of Missouri, in the case of Fleming v. Tatum, 232 Mo. 678, 135 S. W. 64. The presumption that the court had jurisdiction to render the judgment, not being overcome by the record, in the matter of service, the judgment in Baker v. Myer should be sustained as a valid judgment of partition. This view necessitates our considering the reasons given by the trial court for holding the sheriff’s sale to Eva Walker void.
[10] The first is that the petition in Baker v. Myer contained no prayer for costs, and the citation did not show that a claim for costs was made, or that an effort would be made to fix a lien on the defendants’ land. The prayer, as evidenced by the citation, was for judgment against defendants for plaintiffs’ land and for partition, and for general and special relief. It is our opinion that it was not necessary for the petition or citation to show a demand in terms for an adjudication as to costs. Our statutes provide for the adjudication of costs, and in suits involving partition the court is required to adjudge the costs to be paid by each party to whom a share has been allotted in proportion to the value of such share. Whatever power the court possessed to adjudicate and enforce the payment of costs in a suit of that character, notice thereof was necessarily conveyed by notice of the character of the proceeding.
[11] The second reason is that the effort of the court to fix a lien against the share allotted defendants, for the purpose of collecting such costs, was without warrant of law; there being no statute of this state conferring such power on the district court. This reason is not in accord with the decisions. Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185, 7 Sup. Ct. 165, 30 L. Ed. 372; Taliaferro v. Butler, 77 Tex. 578, 14 S. W. 191; Gillon v. Wear, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 44, 28 S. W. 1014; Freeman v. Preston, 29 S. W. 495.
We conclude on this subject that the court had power to adjudicate costs against the absent defendants, including the fee allowed to the attorney appointed to represent them (article 1212 omitted from Revised Statutes as published by mistake, but is found in 1 Sayles’ Rev. St., on page 450), and to make such costs a lien on the land allotted to them. The judgment was against them for one-third of the costs, and, in addition to this, the fee of $75 allowed the attorney appointed to represent them, and declaring the costs as adjudged should be a lien against the respective shares, for which order of sale shall issue. In the final decree of partition, after the commissioners had reported, the lien for costs was repeated, and an order of sale authorized to issue against the respective shares of the land; the same “to be duly executed as by law provided by the officer to whom it may be directed, and he shall sell thereunder a sufficient portion of said land to pay in full all unpaid costs, and said sale shall be made subject to the approval of this court, and shall be referred to this court for approval.” The judgment was substantially in conformity with the procedure laid down in Taliaferro v. Butler. It appears, also, that an order of sale was issued, directing the sheriff to sell a sufficient portion of the land allotted to the defendants to satisfy the costs adjudged against them; and the report of the sheriff to the court shows said officer, in pursuance of said order of sale, advertised and offered the land for sale “as directed by law and by the judgment,” which resulted in a sale to Eva Walker for $110 for the entire tract; she being the highest and best bidder the officer could procure therefor.
The sale was reported to the court, and was duly considered and confirmed as fairly made, and the deed directed to be made to the purchaser, which was done. The order of sale was for $91.13, together with the costs of executing the order of sale, which it seems lacked something of amounting to the sum of $110. It is contended by appel-lee that what was said in Taliaferro v. Butler on the subject of fixing and enforcing a lien on the respective shares of the parties for costs was obiter dictum; and that, without a statute authorizing such procedure, it is unwarranted and void in a proceeding against absent defendants.
The proceeding having the nature of a proceeding in rem, the property is subject to the court’s jurisdiction to enforce the payment of the costs out of the property. The decision in Freeman v. Alderson is sufficient authority for exercising the jurisdiction in such cases. The rule of procedure stated in Taliaferro v. Butler has been referred to with approval in later eases, above cited. We conclude that the judgment as to costs was not void for the reasons given by the trial judge, nor void for the reason that we have no statute prescribing a lien for such costs; and that the sale as ordered and as made, and as approved by the court, was a substantial compliance with the rule of procedure referred to in Taliaferro v. Butler, so that neither the judgment nor the sale thereunder can be pronounced void.
It is true that the entire land was sold and brought $110, and this was slightly in excess of the amount ordered to be realized; but, in our opinion, the judge must be considered as having heard and determined all questions relating to the propriety of the sale as made in approving it, so far as the interest of the absent defendants required protection under the then existing circumstances. If it took a sale of all the land to satisfy the costs, the court had power to approve such a sale. The power existed in the court to have the entire tract sold to satisfy the costs. The specific procedure prescribed as proper *841in the opinion in Taliaferro v. Butler did not affect the power of the court to satisfy the costs out of the entire property — only the exercise of it. Upon an appeal from the action of the judge approving the sale, or upon a writ of error from such adjudication, or upon a bill of review, or any direct proceeding, the proceeding might properly he declared error and relieved against, but in a strictly collateral proceeding it cannot be declared void.
Before concluding this opinion, we should mention a contention of appellant, which is that article 1346, Sayles’ Rev. St., provides that in publication cases the court shall file in the papers of the cause as a part of the record thereof a statement of the evidence; that this has reference only to the evidence adduced at the trial, and does not authorize the citation and return to be so made a part of the record. We have not passed on this question for the reason that, assuming the contention to be wrong, the return, as evidenced by the statement of facts, does not disclose with certainty that the service was insufficient.
As stated in the main opinion, the appellant holds the title acquired by Eva Walker at the sheriff’s sale; therefore, in accordance with the views herein expressed, the judgment of affirmance will be set aside, and judgment here rendered for appellant, but on the attorney’s fee referred to in the former opinion will remain disallowed.