Court Opinion

ID: 9395803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 17:03:44.432154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:11.526307
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/18/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                          B312583

         Plaintiff and Respondent,    (Los Angeles County
                                      Super. Ct. No. BA457318)
         v.

 KAYLA JUANITA MIDDLETON,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.
      Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                      _______________________
                        INTRODUCTION

       A jury convicted Kayla Juanita Middleton of human
trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex act (Pen. Code,
§ 236.1, subd. (c)),1 misdemeanor false imprisonment (§ 237,
subd. (a)), and forcible rape in concert of a minor 14 years or older
as an aider and abettor (§ 264.1, subd. (a)). On appeal, Middleton
contends the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions
and the judgment should be reversed on the basis of instructional
error. We affirm.
       Section 236.1, subdivision (c), prohibits the human
trafficking of a minor and attempted human trafficking of a
minor. Middleton was convicted under the attempt prong.
Relying on People v. Moses (2020) 10 Cal.5th 893 (Moses I), she
contends the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the
People had to prove specific intent as to age, and by instructing
the jury that mistake of fact as to age is not a defense to the
attempt charge.
       We hold there was no instructional error: A defendant
violates section 236.1, subdivision (c), when the defendant
attempts, but fails, to traffic an actual minor, even if the
defendant lacks specific intent regarding the victim’s age.
Mistake of fact as to age is not a defense to attempted human
trafficking under section 236.1, subdivision (c), when the victim is
a minor. (§ 236.1, subd. (f).) Also, substantial evidence supports
her conviction for trafficking.

1    Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise noted.

                                 2
       We also hold there was no instructional error on the rape-
in-concert charge. Under section 264.1, subdivision (a), a
defendant commits the crime of rape in concert “when the
defendant, voluntarily acting in concert with another person, by
force or violence and against the will of the victim, committed an
act described in Section 261 . . . , either personally or by aiding
and abetting the other person.” (Italics added.) The jury was
instructed that to convict Middleton of rape in concert it had to
find she “voluntarily aided and abetted someone else who
personally committed forcible rape.” The jury would understand
“forcible rape” to mean “rape by force,” and thus the instruction
was not erroneous. Substantial evidence supported the rape-in-
concert conviction.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.     The Information
       In February 2018, the People filed a 19-count information
against Middleton and codefendants Malcolm Boles and
Christopher Sangalang, alleging the following charges against
Middleton: human trafficking of a minor through use of force,
fear, and coercion, in violation of section 236.1, subdivision (c)(2)
(Count 9); forcible rape in concert in violation of section 264.1,
subdivision (b)(2) (Count 10); and kidnapping in violation of
section 207, subdivision (a) (Count 17). The People additionally
alleged the rape was committed upon a minor 14 years old or
older (§ 264, subd. (c)(2)); the rape was committed by way of
kidnapping; and Middleton administered a controlled substance
against the victim’s will within the meaning of section 667.61,
subdivisions (a), (d), and (e).

                                  3
B.     Prosecution Evidence
       1.    Chelsea Disappears with Sangalang and Middleton
       The alleged victim was Chelsea B., a 16-year-old girl. At
approximately 3:45 p.m. on February 2, 2017, Chelsea’s mother
dropped Chelsea off at a friend’s house to get her hair braided.
The mother planned to pick Chelsea up about four to five hours
later. Chelsea’s mother described Chelsea as a “childlike” girl
who required adult supervision and assistance with basic self-
care. She found it difficult to read social cues and to recognize
unsafe situations.
       Chelsea spent the appointment texting with Sangalang,
whom she had met on Facebook and considered a potential
boyfriend. Sangalang told Chelsea he would pick her up to go to
the mall and asked her for money to buy food. Sangalang had
previously instructed Chelsea to pack extra clothes before the
appointment because they would be going to a hotel together.
Sangalang had also told her she could make a lot of money doing
sex work and live a “rich, nice life” with lots of cars and a fancy
house. Chelsea believed Sangalang was talking about just the
two of them.
       Before the hair appointment, she had met Sangalang in
person twice. He had come to her bedroom window and had
asked for money, and she had given him money and her ATM
card. Chelsea had told Sangalang she was 16. Chelsea had also
communicated with Boles on Facebook and told him she was 16.
       Near the end of the appointment, Sangalang showed up
outside Brea Persley’s house, where Chelsea was having her hair
braided. Sangalang was accompanied by Middleton, whom
Chelsea had never met. Persley testified that she told Chelsea it
was wrong to invite people over and that she was going to call

                                 4
Chelsea’s mother. Sangalang demanded Chelsea give him money
and stated angrily “Come on. Let’s go.” When Chelsea asked
Sangalang who Middleton was, he told her Middleton was his
“homegirl.” Later Sangalang told Chelsea Middleton worked for
him as his “ho” and “prostitute,” but in a police interview
Middleton stated she did not have a pimp and worked alone for
herself as a prostitute.
      Chelsea told Persley she would be back later that night or
the next day. Persley testified she went inside to get her phone,
and while Persley was inside, Chelsea left with Sangalang and
Middleton. Persley called Chelsea’s mother and reported what
happened, and they both called the police to report Chelsea
missing. Chelsea’s mother and Persley texted and called Chelsea
repeatedly, but she did not respond. Chelsea’s mother testified
she circled the neighborhood in her car then drove to the
Compton sheriff’s station when she could not find Chelsea. The
police and Chelsea’s mother went to Persley’s house, and they all
searched for Chelsea until 3:00 a.m.

     2.     Chelsea Is Raped by Boles at Middleton’s Apartment
            Complex and Instructed in Street Prostitution by the
            Three Codefendants and Another Individual
      Chelsea testified that after she left Persley’s house, she
followed Sangalang and Middleton to a van driven by
Sangalang’s grandmother. Two little girls and Boles were also in
the van. Sangalang yelled at her to get in and told her to sit in
back next to Boles. Boles began touching Chelsea persistently,
wrapping his arm around her waist, pulling her close, squeezing
her face, and grabbing her thigh and knee. She repeatedly moved
Boles’s hands off her and told him “no, don’t touch me,” and to

                                5
stop and get away. Boles told her to stop playing “hard to get”
and said he had to “fix her attitude.” Sangalang moved into the
back row on her other side and grabbed her other thigh. Chelsea
told Sangalang to stop. Chelsea heard Boles tell Sangalang that
Chelsea was going to make them a lot of money.
       They arrived at a shopping center, and Sangalang told
Middleton to watch Chelsea in the van. Sangalang and Boles got
out of the van, along with the grandmother and little girls. After
they left, Chelsea introduced herself to Middleton. She asked
why Sangalang told Middleton to watch her; Middleton looked
away and changed the subject. Chelsea told Middleton she was
16 years old. When the others returned, Boles continued to rub
her thigh and ignored Chelsea’s requests to stop.
       Sangalang’s grandmother dropped Sangalang, Chelsea,
Middleton, and Boles near a gas station. Chelsea asked
Middleton where they were going, but Middleton did not reply.
Chelsea then asked Sangalang where they were going; he told
her, “Don’t worry about it.” The group walked to a smoke shop
then to the house of one of Sangalang’s friends, where they all
smoked marijuana with some other people in a parked van.
       Chelsea said she wanted to return to Persley’s house.
Sangalang replied they were going to Middleton’s house first.
Before they left for Middleton’s house, a young woman named
Perfection arrived who Sangalang said was going to fix Chelsea’s
attitude. Sangalang instructed Chelsea to walk with Perfection
and meet them at Middleton’s house later. Sangalang, Boles, and
Middleton took Chelsea’s backpack, purse, and cell phone with
them as they left, and told her she would get the items back later.
       Middleton had spoken earlier with Chelsea about
commercial sex work, instructing her what to charge and not to

                                6
accept less than she was told. Middleton warned Chelsea if she
did not make money Sangalang would get mad. Perfection also
told Chelsea that Sangalang expected her to make money for him
by having sex with men. Chelsea said she did not want to have
sex for money, and Perfection said Sangalang would be angry and
would hurt Chelsea if she refused. Perfection described what to
charge for different sex acts and took Chelsea to walk an area
called “the blade” in search of clients. One man offered them
each $100 for sex, but Chelsea told Perfection she did not want to
have sex. Perfection then called Sangalang, and he told Chelsea
he would beat her unless she made money for him. Around
11:00 p.m. a friend of Perfection’s picked them up and dropped
Chelsea off at Middleton’s apartment complex.
       Middleton met Chelsea at the entrance and took her to the
complex’s laundry room where Boles and Sangalang were
waiting. Chelsea’s phone was dead. She asked for a charger, but
no one gave her one. She asked Middleton, Sangalang and Boles
if she could use their phones to contact her mother, but they
refused.
       Middleton and Chelsea left to go across the street to a gas
station to get snacks. Before Middleton and Chelsea left,
Sangalang told Middleton to watch Chelsea so “no pimp [would]
get [her],” and told Chelsea she could not tell men that she was
16 because it was illegal for men to have sex with people under
18. Men in the store flirted with Chelsea and Middleton, asking
their names and ages, and Middleton and Chelsea stated they
were 20 years old. Another man asked Chelsea for her name,
age, and number. She did not respond, but Middleton told him to
give Middleton his number and she would have Chelsea call him.

                                7
       Middleton and Chelsea returned and rejoined Sangalang
and Boles in the laundry room. They all smoked more marijuana,
and Sangalang gave Chelsea a pill that made her feel dizzy and
unable to walk. Middleton told Chelsea she had to lose her
virginity with Boles or Sangalang. Chelsea told Middleton she
was willing to have sex with Sangalang but not Boles. She also
told Middleton she did not want to lose her virginity that night,
but Middleton told her older guys did not want to have sex with a
virgin. Chelsea told Middleton and Sangalang she did not want
to have sex with Boles, but Sangalang told her she had to.
Middleton told the police interviewer she knew Chelsea did not
want to have sex with Boles.
       Middleton and Sangalang left the laundry room and closed
the door, leaving Chelsea alone with Boles. Chelsea told him,
“Don’t touch me” and pushed him away. Boles rubbed her thighs,
ripped her shorts, pushed her to the ground, and got on top of
her. Chelsea screamed Middleton’s and Sangalang’s names
loudly for help, but they remained outside. Boles got mad and
roughly pulled down her shorts, scratching the side of her thighs
and rubbing his penis on her leg. She pushed him off and ran out
of the room, slamming the door shut. When Chelsea ran out, she
was scared, angry and crying. She told Middleton and Sangalang
that she could not have sex and wanted to go home.
       Sangalang told Chelsea he would calm Boles down and tell
him to go slow. Sangalang went into the laundry room.
Middleton told Chelsea everything would be all right and
Sangalang would talk with Boles. Sangalang came back and told
Chelsea that Boles agreed to be gentle because it was her first
time. Chelsea repeated she did not want to have sex with Boles.

                               8
       Middleton and Sangalang walked Chelsea back into the
laundry room and stayed in the room while Boles continued
assaulting Chelsea over the following one to two hours. Boles
yelled at Chelsea, took off her shirt and bra, and called her a
“bitch” when she continued resisting. Sangalang came over and
told Chelsea to relax. Boles took off his clothes and lay on top of
Chelsea, pinning down her wrists. Boles shoved his fingers into
her vagina. Chelsea repeatedly said he was hurting her and told
him to stop, but he did not. When she looked toward Middleton
and Sangalang for help, they were having sex with each other.
Boles asked Sangalang for a condom, which Sangalang brought
him. Boles put his penis in Chelsea’s vagina; she was crying in
pain and told him repeatedly to stop and that it hurt. She tried
to push him off but could not because his body was on top of hers.
He got off her and took off the condom and said he was “[going] in
raw.” She told him not to, but Boles laughed, lay on top of her,
pinned her arms about her head, and put his penis in her again,
telling her to relax and calling her a crybaby when she cried.
Chelsea screamed Sangalang’s name and continued to try to push
Boles off, telling him he was hurting her and to stop.
       Boles demanded oral sex and tried to shove his penis in her
mouth. Sangalang told Chelsea to relax her lips and open her
mouth when she resisted. Boles put his penis in her mouth and
told her to relax. Boles told her she had to call him and
Sangalang “Daddy.” Chelsea refused, and Boles then choked her
and threatened to put a gun to her head and shoot her. In her
police interview, Middleton stated that Chelsea made a lot of
noise and had repeatedly told Boles to stop, and that Middleton
told Boles to leave Chelsea alone but he ignored her.

                                 9
       Chelsea screamed at the top of her lungs during the attack.
Middleton told her to stay quiet because people in her apartment
building would hear her and call the police. Sangalang and Boles
also told Chelsea to stop screaming and shoved a towel in
Chelsea’s mouth. Boles went back and forth between vaginally
and orally copulating her for one or two hours. Boles finally
ejaculated on Chelsea’s forehead then told her to wipe her face
and get dressed. Boles told Middleton to stay with Chelsea, and
Boles and Sangalang left the laundry room.
       Middleton took Chelsea to her apartment and let her use
the bathroom with the door open, saying she could not leave her
alone. Chelsea was in too much pain to wipe herself and began
crying when she saw she was bleeding. Middleton refused to let
Chelsea shower, saying they had to hurry up to leave. Perfection
then picked up Chelsea, Middleton, Sangalang and Boles and left
them near a fast food restaurant, where Sangalang gave them all
pills that made Chelsea feel high and numb.
       They then walked to a burger stand where Middleton
instructed Chelsea how to conduct commercial sex work on the
street. Middleton ordered food for herself and the two men but
not for Chelsea; Sangalang told Chelsea they would feed her after
she was done working. Middleton told Chelsea she should be
able to make lots of money because many cars had been honking
at her which meant they wanted to have sex with her. Middleton
told Chelsea what to charge for different sex acts and that she
was to give the money she earned to Sangalang and he would
give some back to her. Middleton instructed Chelsea on types of
men to avoid and told Chelsea not to go home with men but have
them order a room close to Sangalang, Middleton, and Boles so
they could pick her up. Middleton gave her condoms and told her

                               10
to make sure she used them. Middleton told her if she did not
have sex with men for money, Sangalang would hurt her.
       Middleton directed Chelsea to work certain locations along
Figueroa Street and Gage Avenue and to call Boles or Sangalang
if there was any trouble. Middleton told her to avoid police and
not talk to men who did not want to pay for sex. Boles told her to
walk slowly and pay attention to the cars. In her police
interview, Middleton stated she told Chelsea to have sex with
men for money and what to charge; however, Chelsea just walked
and did not do anything she was instructed to do. Sangalang left,
and Middleton and Chelsea went to Gage Avenue and walked
together for a while with Boles behind them, then took a bus to
Figueroa Street.

       3.    Chelsea Is Found the Day After Her Disappearance
       Around 3:00 a.m. on February 3, 2017, Chelsea’s mother
published a missing person post on Facebook with a photo of
Chelsea in the red plaid flannel shirt she was wearing when she
went missing. Around 10:00 a.m., Chelsea’s mother received a
phone call from a person who reported seeing Chelsea in the
same shirt on 66th and Figueroa Streets. Chelsea’s father
testified he drove to the area and a woman on the street told him
she had seen a young lady in a red flannel shirt with two other
people at a nearby convenience store. As he drove southbound
past the store, Chelsea’s father saw Chelsea walking with
Middleton and Boles, who were unfamiliar to him. He stopped
his car and heard Middleton and Boles both command Chelsea to
“[k]eep your fucking head down.” Chelsea’s father jumped out
and yelled at Chelsea to get in the car while he chased Middleton
and Boles, who fled.

                               11
      Chelsea was crying. Her eyes were red, and her voice was
shaking. She looked “like she was on something.” She said, “I’m
sorry Daddy. I don’t know what happened.” She said, “I was
scared. I’m scared.”
      Chelsea was taken to the hospital for a sexual assault
examination. Chelsea’s underwear was torn, and she reported
vaginal pain and pain in her back, hip, and neck. Chelsea had
abrasions to her arms and legs and bruising to her legs. The
opening of her vagina was torn, and her hymen was torn and
bruised. The nurse practitioner was unable to use the speculum
as Chelsea was in too much pain. Chelsea described being
sexually assaulted by “Mac” on the laundry room floor, providing
details consistent with those summarized above.
      Swabs from Chelsea’s vulva, anus, and rectum tested
positive for blood. Swabs from her right and left cheeks, mouth,
right breast, left breast, chest, neck, vulva, anus, vagina, and
back tested positive for semen. DNA tests of the semen samples
matched Boles and excluded Sangalang. Chelsea reported she
consumed marijuana and two pills. Chelsea’s urine sample
showed the presence of marijuana, hydrocodone, hydromorphone,
amphetamine, and methamphetamine.

C.    Defense Evidence
      Middleton did not testify in her own defense. Forensic
interview specialist Susy Flores, who interviewed Chelsea on
February 8 and 10, 2017, testified that Chelsea told her
Middleton and Sangalang could hear but not see her and Boles
during the rape. Chelsea stated that during the rape she was
screaming or yelling and that it hurt her. Chelsea further said
she told Boles to “stop and stuff,” and that she was scared of

                               12
Boles. She stated Boles pinned her down with his hand on her
chest, told her to call him “Daddy,” and choked her when she
refused, but did not tell Flores that Boles threatened to shoot her.
Chelsea stated there was a towel in her mouth during the attack.
Chelsea stated Sangalang also told her to do certain things.
       Chelsea did not tell Flores that Middleton was in charge of
watching her. Chelsea said she did not call her mother because
she did not want her to know she was hanging out with friends,
and she did not say she was kept from using her cell phone.
Chelsea told Flores about Perfection, but not that she had come
to “fix” Chelsea’s attitude.
       Middleton’s father testified that on February 2 or 3, 2017,
between midnight and 4:00 a.m. Middleton brought a friend
inside their apartment to use the bathroom. After that,
Middleton left for a couple of days; he did not know where she
went. At no time that night or any other night did he hear
screaming or yelling around the laundry room or in the
courtyard.

D.    Jury Verdict, Motion for New Trial, and Sentencing
      Middleton was tried together with Boles and Sangalang,
but before a separate jury. The jury convicted Middleton of
human trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex act through
use of force and fear (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(2)), misdemeanor false
imprisonment (§ 237, subd. (a)) as a lesser included offense to
kidnapping, and forcible rape in concert of a minor 14 years or
older on the basis that Middleton aided and abetted someone who
personally committed the rape (§ 264.1, subd. (a)). The jury
found not true the section 667.61 allegations that the rape was
committed by kidnapping and through administration of a

                                13
controlled substance against the victim’s will. On Middleton’s
motion for new trial, the superior court ruled there was no
significant evidence of force or fear on the human trafficking
count, and ordered Middleton sentenced under section 236.1,
subdivision (c)(1), instead.
       The court sentenced Middleton to the lower term of seven
years on the rape-in-concert count. The court ruled that it
selected the lower term “for the reason that the defendant does
not have a criminal record, had a minor role in the crime and was
ultimately induced by others to commit the crime; the factors in
mitigation outweigh the factors in aggravation.” The court
imposed a consecutive term of two years eight months (one-third
the middle term) on the human trafficking count and a
concurrent term of one year for false imprisonment, for an
aggregate prison term of nine years eight months.
       This appeal followed.

                          DISCUSSION

A.     Conviction for Human Trafficking
       1.     The Superior Court Did Not Err in Its Human
              Trafficking Instructions
        The crime of human trafficking of a minor for a commercial
sex act is defined in section 236.1, subdivision (c), which provides
in part: “A person who causes, induces, or persuades, or attempts
to cause, induce, or persuade, a person who is a minor at the time
of commission of the offense to engage in a commercial sex act,
with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section . . .
266h [pimping], 266i [pandering] . . . is guilty of human
trafficking.”

                                14
       Subdivision (f) of section 236.1 provides: “Mistake of fact as
to the age of a victim of human trafficking who is a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense is not a defense to a
criminal prosecution under this section.”
       As noted, a person violates section 236.1, subdivision (c),
when he or she, among other things, “attempts to . . . induce . . . a
person who is a minor . . . to engage in a commercial sex act.”
(Italics added.) Middleton contends to prove she violated this
section, the People had to prove Middleton had the specific intent
to enlist a minor to engage in commercial sex (not just the intent
to induce a person who happened to be a minor to engage in
commercial sex). Middleton contends the trial court erred by not
instructing the jury that the People had to prove specific intent
as to age and by instructing that mistake of fact as to age is not a
defense to the attempt charge. Middleton argues this conclusion
is compelled by Moses I, supra, 10 Cal.5th 893 and the general
law regarding attempted crimes.
       “‘[A] claim that a court failed to properly instruct on the
applicable principles of law is reviewed de novo.’” (People v.
Dearborne (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 250, 260 (Dearborne).) “It is
settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a
trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to
the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury's
understanding of the case.” (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th
620, 667, quotation marks omitted.)
       In Moses I, the Supreme Court considered whether a
defendant could be convicted of human trafficking of a minor
under section 236.1, subdivision (c), if the individual the
defendant believed was a minor was actually an adult undercover
police officer. (Moses I, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 895-896.) The

                                 15
parties agreed “that attempting to induce a police decoy posing as
a minor to commit a commercial sex act is a punishable offense.
They disagree[d] whether the crime falls under the provisions of
section 236.1(c), or the traditional attempt statutes, sections 21a
and 664.” (Id. at p. 902.) The distinction was important because
if the crime could be punished only under the attempt statutes,
the maximum punishment would be only half of what it would be
under section 236.1, subdivision (c)(1). (Moses I, at p. 902.)
       Moses argued the plain language of section 236.1 requires
that the victim actually be a minor and thus the defendant could
not be convicted directly under that section. The court rejected
that argument, concluding the word “attempt” as used in
section 236.1 had to be interpreted in accordance with the
“peculiar and appropriate meaning” it has acquired under the
law. (Moses I, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 903). The “peculiar and
appropriate” meaning of “attempt” is embodied in section 21a,
which requires two elements: “a specific intent to commit the
crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its
commission.” (§ 21a; see Moses I, at p. 908.) Thus, the court
concluded a defendant could be convicted under the attempt
prong of section 236.1, subdivision (c)(1), if the defendant had the
specific intent to commit the crime, including specific intent
regarding the age of the victim, even if the person at whom the
attempt was directed was not a minor but an adult decoy.
       The court summed up its holding regarding the operation of
section 236.1, subdivision (c), as follows: “To be convicted of the
completed crime of inducing a minor to engage in a commercial
sex act, the person induced must be a minor. To commit the
crime of attempting to induce a minor, the defendant must act
with the “‘specific intent to commit the [completed] crime’”

                                16
[citation], i.e., the intent to cause, induce, or persuade a minor to
engage in a commercial sex act, at least when no actual minor
victim is involved. The defendant must act with the additional
intent to effect or maintain a violation of one of the offenses
enumerated in the statute. If these elements are met, the fact
that the particular target of his efforts is not actually a minor is
not a defense.” (Moses I, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 912-913, italics
added, fn. omitted.)
       In reaching that conclusion, the court considered whether
the result was inconsistent with section 236.1, subdivision (f), but
concluded the subdivision did not apply when the target of the
defendant’s attempts was not a minor. Subdivision (f)
“eliminates a mistake of age defense if the defendant successfully
induces a minor, even if acting under a mistake of fact. It does
not speak to the converse situation, when the defendant attempts
to induce a person the defendant actually believes to be a minor
but who is in fact an adult. Under the provisions of section 236.1,
subdivision (c), and the law of attempt, such conduct is
punishable as human trafficking so long as the defendant
intended to induce a minor to engage in such conduct. There is
no inconsistency between disallowing a mistake of age defense
when the victim is an actual minor and requiring a specific intent
to induce a minor when the defendant unwittingly targets a
police decoy. Nothing in subdivision (f) speaks to the latter intent
requirement.” (Moses I, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 909.)
       The court declined to reach the issue we face now, stating:
“We are not called upon here to determine the interplay between
section 236.1, subdivision (f) and the specific intent required for
the attempt prong of subdivision (c) when the defendant attempts,
but fails, to induce an actual minor to engage in a commercial sex

                                 17
act. We offer no view on whether a mistake of fact as to the
victim’s age would be a defense in that situation.” (Moses I,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 909, fn.10, italics added.)
       It is the interplay between subdivisions (c) and (f) of
section 236.1 we must address here, and specifically whether the
language in subdivision (f) means the specific intent requirement
in section 21a does not apply when the defendant attempts but
fails to induce an actual minor.
       As discussed, under subdivision (c), a person is guilty of
human trafficking if, among other things, he or she “causes,
induces, or persuades, or attempts to cause, induce, or persuade,
a person who is a minor . . . to engage in a commercial sex act,
with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section . . .
266i.” (Italics added.) Middleton argues the Moses I court’s
statutory analysis applies equally when the object of the attempt
is an actual minor, and therefore, specific intent regarding age is
an element of all attempt charges under subsection (c). We reject
this argument. Subdivision (f) makes clear specific intent
regarding the victim’s age is not an element of the attempt prong
of subdivision (c) when the alleged victim is an actual minor.
       Again, subdivision (f) provides: “Mistake of fact as to the
age of a victim of human trafficking who is a minor at the time of
the commission of the offense is not a defense to a criminal
prosecution under this section.” (§ 236.1, subd. (f), italics added.)
This subdivision does not distinguish between the two ways
section 236.1, subdivision (c), can be violated, that is, when a
person (1) actually “induces a minor to engage in a commercial
sex act; or (2) attempts to induce a minor to engage in such an
act.” (Moses I, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 902 [setting forth the two
ways the statute can be violated].) From the plain language of

                                 18
the statute, we therefore conclude subdivision (f) applies to both
offenses. Mistake of fact regarding the age of the victim is not a
defense to either the completed crime or the attempted crime.
       The question is whether the unavailability of the mistake-
of-fact defense necessarily means that specific intent regarding
age is not an element of the attempt charge when the victim is a
minor. Mistake of fact “is often described as a ‘defense’ to [a]
charge. [Citation.] But the term is somewhat misleading,
because mistake of fact is, generally speaking, ‘not a true
affirmative defense.’ [Citation; fn. omitted.] It is, rather, an
assertion by the defendant that a particular factual error in his
perception of the world led him to lack the mens rea required for
the crime. (See Pen. Code, § 26, par. [3] [persons are not capable
of committing crimes if they ‘committed the act . . . under an
ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal
intent’]; [People v.] Lawson [(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 108,]
111 [‘The mistake-of-fact defense operates to negate the requisite
criminal intent or mens rea element of the crime’]; People v.
Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 996-998 [citation] [same
conclusion with respect to similar ‘defense’ of accident]; see also,
e.g., State v. Sexton (1999) 160 N.J. 93 [733 A.2d 1125, 1128-
1130] [discussing the relationship between mistake of fact and
mens rea].).” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 940
(Hendrix).)
       Hendrix explained: “Say a defendant is charged for theft of
a box of oranges. [Citation.] He claims he mistakenly thought
the oranges were his. If the defendant indeed believed the
oranges were his, it is necessarily true that he did not intend to
steal them from someone else. His mistake of fact claim, then, is
simply one particular way of saying he lacked the mens rea

                                 19
required for theft. [Citation.] In this way mistake of fact
operates as a kind of failure-of-proof defense, reflecting a
defendant’s attempt to suggest the prosecution failed in its
burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
acted with the criminal intent required for the offense.”
(Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 940.)
      Accordingly, saying a defendant established a mistake-of-
fact defense is the equivalent of saying the People failed to prove
defendant acted with the requisite intent. As the Hendrix Court
expressly recognized, those are two ways of saying the same
thing: the defendant lacked the requisite state of mind. (Hendrix,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 941.)
      Applying this logic, we conclude the phrase “[m]istake of
fact as to the age of the victim . . . who is a minor . . . is not a
defense” is just another way of saying that specific intent as to
the age of the victim is not an element of the offense when the
victim is a minor. Since there is nothing in the language of
section 236.1, subdivision (f), distinguishing between actual and
attempted inducement, subdivision (f) thus necessarily
eliminates the specific intent element regarding age when a
defendant attempts, but fails, to induce a person who is actually
a minor to engage in commercial sex acts, even if the defendant
believes the victim is an adult. (See Moses I, 10 Cal.5th at
pp. 911-912 [at least to completed offenses, subdivision (f) “holds
the defendant liable for targeting an actual minor victim even if
the defendant believes the victim is an adult”].) “Precluding [the
mistake-of-fact] defense renders the defendant’s mental state
regarding the victim’s minority or majority immaterial.”
(People v. Moses (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 14, 22 (Moses II) [on
remand from Supreme Court].)

                                20
       This conclusion is consistent with Moses I. As previously
discussed, the court concluded subdivision (f) had no relevance to
a situation where the person who the defendant believed was a
minor was actually an adult. (Moses I, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 909.) As the court explained: “There is no inconsistency
between disallowing a mistake of age defense when the victim is
an actual minor and requiring a specific intent to induce a minor
when the defendant unwittingly targets a police decoy. Nothing
in subdivision (f) speaks to the latter intent requirement.” (Ibid.)
       In sum, there was no instructional error on the human
trafficking charge.

      2.      The Human Trafficking Conviction Is Supported by
              Substantial Evidence
       Middleton argues there was insufficient evidence to support
her conviction under section 236.1, subdivision (c), for
“attempt[ing] to cause, induce, or persuade[] a person who is a
minor at the time of commission of the offense to engage in a
commercial sex act[] with the intent to effect or maintain a
violation of Section . . . 266h [pimping], 266i [pandering].”
       In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction, “we review the whole record to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose
substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in

                                 21
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] . . . We
resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we
look for substantial evidence. [Citations.] A reversal for
insufficient evidence is unwarranted unless it appears that upon
no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support the jury’s verdict.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th
327, 357, quotation marks omitted.)
       Middleton first argues the evidence is insufficient because
there was no evidence presented whether Middleton had the
requisite specific intent regarding Chelsea’s age. As discussed,
specific intent regarding the victim’s age is not an element of the
attempt prong of section 236.1, subdivision (c), when the victim
actually is a minor. In any event, even if there were such a
requirement, the sufficiency challenge would fail. Chelsea
testified she told Middleton how old she was, and Middleton was
present when Sangalang told Chelsea to lie about her age to
potential customers.
       Middleton next argues the evidence is insufficient to
support a finding that Middleton acted with “the intent to effect
or maintain” a violation of section 266i, which outlaws pandering.
(See § 236.1, subd. (c) [person engages in human trafficking by
attempting to induce a minor to engage in a commercial sex act
“with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of Section . . .
266i”].) As the court instructed, in order to find the requisite
intent to pander, the jury had to find that Middleton intended to
use “promises, threats, violence or any device or scheme to cause,
persuade, encourage, or induce Chelsea B. to become a prostitute,
although the defendant’s efforts need not have been successful,”

                                22
and that “[t]he defendant intended to influence Chelsea B. to be a
prostitute.” (See § 266i, subd. (a)(2).)
       There is ample evidence to support a finding that
Middleton intended to use “threats” or a “device or scheme” to
persuade, encourage, or induce Chelsea to become a prostitute
and that she intended to influence Chelsea to become a
prostitute. Courts have interpreted those terms broadly.
(People v. Hashimoto (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 862, 866 [the language
in section 266i is meant to “‘cover all the various ramifications of
the social evil of pandering and include them all in the definition
of the crime, with a view of effectively combatting the evil sought
to be condemned’”].) Viewed in the light most favorable to the
judgment, the evidence shows Middleton attempted to persuade,
encourage, or induce Chelsea to become a prostitute. Middleton
educated Chelsea on the practices of street prostitution and made
multiple affirmative attempts to facilitate Chelsea’s engagement
with potential clients. Middleton told Chelsea she had to have
sex with Boles because she needed to lose her virginity before she
could engage with commercial sex clients. She declined to assist
Chelsea with calling her mother prior to the rape, and interacted
with multiple potential clients on Chelsea’s behalf, including
taking the number of a man who flirted with Chelsea and telling
him Chelsea would call him later.
       After the sexual assault, Middleton supervised Chelsea
closely. She took Chelsea to a street where commercial sex
workers congregated and instructed her on how to attract and
evaluate potential clients. She told Chelsea she should be able to
make lots of money because so many cars had been honking at
her, meaning they wanted to have sex with her. Then Middleton
and Chelsea “walked the blade” together at different locations

                                23
with the goal of encountering clients to have sex with Chelsea for
money. Middleton instructed Chelsea to pace back and forth in
front of a certain car shop for potential clients to notice her.
Middleton gave Chelsea condoms and instructed her to use them
with clients.
       The evidence is also sufficient to show Middleton used a
device or scheme to induce Chelsea into sex work based on
Middleton’s entire course of conduct over the entire night,
including by refusing to allow Chelsea to call her mother, by
facilitating the rape by Boles, by withholding food until she made
some money, and by keeping her under close watch during the
night. Middleton makes no particular argument regarding the
meaning of the words “device or scheme” and no particular
argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish this
element of the offense.
       Middleton also argues the evidence was insufficient to
support this charge because Middleton herself was a victim of
trafficking and she was under the control of Sangalang and
Boles. Middleton also contends evidence that she tried to comfort
Chelsea both before and after the rape establishes that Middleton
did not intend to pander Chelsea. Middleton is simply asking us
to reweigh the evidence and to make different factual findings
than the jury made. As to whether she was under the control of
Sangalang and Boles, Middleton told investigators she worked for
herself as a prostitute, not for Sangalang, Boles, or anyone else.
As to the evidence Middleton tried to comfort Chelsea, the
evidence is subject to conflicting inferences, and the jury could
conclude the evidence supported the conclusion that Middleton
was attempting to influence Chelsea by gaining her trust.

                               24
B.     Conviction for Rape in Concert
       1.    The Superior Court Did Not Err in Its Rape-in-
             concert Instructions
       Under section 264.1, subdivision (a), a defendant commits
the crime of rape in concert “when the defendant, voluntarily
acting in concert with another person, by force or violence and
against the will of the victim, committed an act described in
Section 261 . . . , either personally or by aiding and abetting the
other person.” (Italics added.)
       Section 261, subdivision (a)(2) provides in part: “(a) Rape is
an act of sexual intercourse accomplished under any of the
following circumstances: [¶] . . . (2) If it is accomplished against a
person’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.”
(Italics added.)
       The court instructed the jury on rape in concert using
CALCRIM No. 1001, which provided in relevant part: “Middleton
is charged in Count Ten with committing rape by acting in
concert in violation of Penal Code section 264.1. [¶] To prove
that a defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
that: [¶] 1. The defendant personally committed forcible rape
and voluntarily acted with someone else who aided and abetted
its commission; [¶] OR [¶] 2. The defendant voluntarily aided
and abetted someone else who personally committed forcible
rape. [¶] To decide whether a defendant committed rape, please
refer to the separate instruction that I have given you on
that·crime. To decide whether a defendant aided and abetted
rape, please refer to the separate instructions that I have given
you on aiding and abetting. You must apply those instructions

                                 25
when you decide whether the People have proved rape in
concert.”
      The separate instruction regarding rape was based on
CALCRIM No. 1000. It stated in part:

     “Defendant Malcolm Boles is charged in Counts Two and
     Four with rape by force in violation of Penal Code
     section 261(a). [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of
     this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
     defendant had sexual intercourse with a female; [¶] 2. He
     and the female were not married to each other at the time
     of the intercourse; [¶] 3. The female did not consent to the
     intercourse; AND [¶] 4. The defendant accomplished the
     intercourse by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
     immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the female or to
     someone else. [¶] . . . .

     “Intercourse is accomplished by force if a person uses
     enough physical force to overcome the female’s will.

     “Duress means a direct or implied threat of force, violence,
     danger or retribution that would cause a reasonable person
     to do something that she would not do otherwise. When
     deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress,
     consider all the circumstances, including the female’s age
     and her relationship to the defendant.

     “Retribution is a form of payback or revenge.

                               26
      “Menace means a threat, statement, or act showing an
      intent to injure someone.

      “Intercourse is accomplished by fear if the female is
      actually and reasonably afraid.”

       Middleton did not object to these instructions and did not
ask for a clarifying instruction.
       Middleton argues that to convict her of rape in concert, the
jury had to find Middleton aided and abetted Boles in raping
Chelsea “by force or violence”; rape by means of duress, menace
or fear is not enough. Middleton further argues that by directing
the jury to CALCRIM No. 1000 to decide whether a defendant
committed rape, the jury was improperly instructed that rape in
concert could be based on a rape committed by means of duress,
menace or fear.
       As noted, the jury was instructed that to convict Middleton
it had to find she “voluntarily aided and abetted someone else
who personally committed forcible rape.” The jury would
understand from this that it had to find rape by force. In
Dearborne, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 262, the court was faced
with the same instructions that were used here and concluded
there was no instructional error. As the court explained: “[T]he
word ‘force’ does not have a technical legal meaning in this
context, and is instead used in its ordinary sense. Accordingly,
the court was only required to tell the jury that the rape had to
be by force. It did so by telling the jury the rape had to be
‘forcible.’” (Ibid.)
       Further, as Dearborne concluded, to the extent the use of
CALCRIM No. 1000 rendered the rape-in-concert instruction

                                27
“unclear or confusing,” Middleton forfeited the argument by
failing to object at trial. (Dearborne, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
p. 262 [“A trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve
upon an accurate statement of law without a request from
counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification of an
otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for
purposes of appeal.”].) We reach the same conclusion here:
There was no instructional error.
       But even if we were to construe the instructions as
Middleton construes them, in order to find instructional error we
would have to conclude a rape “accomplished against a person’s
will by means of . . . duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the person or another” as those terms
are used in section 261, subdivision (a)(2), would not constitute a
rape committed with “force or violence and against the will of the
victim” under section 264.1, subdivision (a).
       Although we need not resolve this issue here, we note there
is strong support for the conclusion that a rape under section 261,
subdivision (a)(2), is a rape committed with “violence.” The
Legislature has repeatedly stated rape under section 261,
subdivision (a)(2), is a crime of violence under the law. For
example, section 667.5 provides for “[e]nhancement of prison
terms” for new “violent felonies” “because of prior prison terms.”
Subdivision (c) of that section provides: “The Legislature finds
and declares that the following specified crimes merit special
consideration when imposing a sentence to display society’s
condemnation for these extraordinary crimes of violence against
the person.” (Italics added.) “Violent felony” is defined to include
rape in section 261, subdivision (a)(2), which again includes rapes
“accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, violence,

                                28
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury
on the person or another.” (§ 667.5, subd. (c).)
       Many other statutes are in accord. (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 6600, subd. (b) [A “[s]exually violent offense” is defined as
a felony violation of section 261 (among other sections) “when
committed by force, violence, duress, menace, fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.”];
§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I) [“sexually violent offense” as defined
in § 6600, subd. (b), is a super strike offense]; § 667, subd. (d)(1)
[violation of section 261, subdivision (a)(2), is a “serious” and
“violent” felony]; § 292 [for purposes of bail, a violation of
section 261, subdivision (a)(2), “shall be deemed to be a felony
offense involving an act of violence and a felony offense involving
great bodily harm”].) Given this, it would be anomalous to
conclude a violation of section 261, subdivision (a)(2), does not
constitute a violent rape for purposes of section 264.1.
       The conclusion that a rape accomplished by means of
“duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury”
is no less a violent crime than a rape by “force” would also be
consistent with reasoning in People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th
1015. There, the court held that “in order to establish force
within the meaning of section 261, subdivision (2), the
prosecution need only show the defendant used physical force of a
degree sufficient to support a finding that the act of sexual
intercourse was against the will of the victim.” (Id. at pp. 1023-
1024, quotation marks and brackets omitted.) “The gravamen of
the crime of forcible rape is a sexual penetration accomplished
against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury. . . . The
Legislature has never sought to circumscribe the nature or type

                                 29
of forcible conduct that will support a conviction of forcible rape,
and indeed, the rape case law suggests that even conduct which
might normally attend sexual intercourse, when engaged in with
force sufficient to overcome the victim’s will, can support a
forcible rape conviction.” (Id. at pp. 1027-1028.) Further,
“‘[b]ecause the fundamental wrong is the violation of a [person’s]
will and sexuality, the law of rape does not require that “force”
cause physical harm. Rather, in this scenario, “force” plays
merely a supporting evidentiary role, as necessary only to insure
an act of intercourse has been undertaken against a victim’s
will.’” (Id. at p. 1025.) Force, duress, menace, and fear are
alternative ways the will of the victim can be overcome; rape
accomplished by any of these means is considered to be “forcible
rape” under the law. (Ibid.) All are rapes involving violence.
       We recognize this interpretation would render the word
“force” in the phrase “force and violence” in section 264.1
redundant. Similarly, if all rapes accomplished by means of
force, duress, menace, or fear were also rapes of violence, there
would be no reason to include the word “violence” in section 261,
subdivision (a)(2). (See § 261, subd. (a)(2) [forcible rape includes
rape by “force, violence, duress, menace, or fear”].) In
interpreting a statute, we attempt “[i]f possible” to give
“significance . . . to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an
act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” (People v. Cruz
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 782, quotation marks omitted.) However,
“‘like all . . . interpretive canons, the canon against surplusage is
a guide to statutory interpretation and is not invariably
controlling.” (People v. Raybon (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1056, 1070,
fn. 10.) We will not apply the canon to defeat legislative intent,
as gleaned from all relevant sources. (Cruz, at pp. 782-783.)

                                 30
        Again, we do not need to decide here (and do not decide)
whether all forms of rape under section 261, subdivision (a)(2),
would constitute rape by “force or violence” under section 264.1
because, as previously explained, we conclude the jury would
have understood from CALCRIM No. 1001 it had to find rape by
force.2 However, we encourage the Legislature to consider
clarifying the language in section 264.1 to eliminate any possible
ambiguity that rape under section 261, subdivision (a)(2), should
be considered a violent rape for purposes of that statute.
        In any event, any instructional error would have been
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, Middleton argues
the jury was erroneously instructed it could convict her of rape in
concert if it found she aided and abetted a rape by duress,
menace, or fear as an alternative to finding she aided and abetted
a rape by force or violence. Even assuming the jury was so
instructed and even assuming such an instruction was erroneous,
it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would still have
found Middleton guilty of rape in concert if it had been given only
the “correct” instruction, which (according to Middleton) would
have limited the definition of rape by force to only rape by force
or violence. (See People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 9, 13
[when a jury is instructed on two theories of guilt, one legally
adequate and one legally inadequate, the standard of review in
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [87 S.Ct. 824,
17 L.Ed.2d 705] applies]; In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 568.)

2      Given this, we do not address the cases Middleton relies on,
In re Jose M. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470 and People v. Mom
(2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1217, disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at page 1028.

                                31
       The evidence is overwhelming that the rape here was a
rape by force; Middleton does not seriously contest that point. In
convicting Middleton of rape in concert, the jury necessarily
found that Middleton aided and abetted the rape that was
actually committed, that is, a rape by force. There is no evidence
the rape was committed by any means other than force. (In re
Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 568 [In determining whether an
alternate theory error is harmless under Chapman v. California,
supra, 386 U.S. 18, “a reviewing court may hold the error
harmless where it would be impossible, based on the evidence, for
a jury to make the findings reflected in its verdict without also
making the findings that would support a valid theory of
liability”].)

      2.     The Rape-in-concert Conviction Is Supported by
             Substantial Evidence
      To be found guilty of rape in concert, a defendant must,
while “voluntarily acting in concert with another person,” commit
the crime of rape “by force or violence and against the will of the
victim,” “either personally or by aiding and abetting the other
person.” (§ 264.1, subd. (a); People v. Keovilayphone (2005)
132 Cal.App.4th 491, 496 (Keovilayphone).) To find a defendant
guilty of rape in concert on an aiding and abetting theory, the
jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, (1) a perpetrator
committed a rape by force or violence and against the will of the
victim; (2) the defendant knew the perpetrator intended to
commit the rape; (3) before or during the commission of the rape,
the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in
committing the crime; and (4) the defendant’s words or conduct

                                32
did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the rape.
(CALCRIM No. 401; see also Keovilayphone, at p. 497.)
       Middleton does not contest that Boles committed a rape by
force or violence against Chelsea’s will. Instead, she contends
there is insufficient evidence to prove the other elements. There
was substantial evidence that Middleton knew Boles intended to
commit rape by force or violence. Middleton told Chelsea she had
to have sex with either Boles or Sangalang, and Chelsea told her
she did not want to do it. Middleton led Chelsea to the laundry
room in her complex where she knew Sangalang and Boles were
waiting. After the attack had begun, Chelsea ran from the
laundry room in great distress and told Middleton she did not
want to have sex with Boles. In Middleton’s presence, Sangalang
told Chelsea that Boles would be more gentle, making clear that
Boles intended to continue the attack. Based on this evidence,
the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Middleton
knew Boles intended to rape Chelsea by force or violence.
       There is also substantial evidence Middleton intended to
and did aid and abet the commission of the offense. Much of the
same evidence that showed knowledge also constituted evidence
that Middleton aided and abetted Boles, including that Middleton
told Chelsea she had to have sex with Boles even though Chelsea
did not want to do so; that Middleton led Chelsea into the
laundry room where she knew Boles was waiting; and that
Middleton walked Chelsea back into the laundry room after
Chelsea had originally escaped, knowing Boles intended to
continue the attack. Further, after the attack resumed,
Middleton remained in the laundry room while Chelsea was
raped and told Chelsea to be quiet because the people who lived
in her apartment would hear her and call the police.

                               33
       Middleton contends the evidence is insufficient to establish
she acted voluntarily. Instead, she contends she “was also very
much a victim of human trafficking and acted purely at the
behest of the two codefendants with no personal motive or
intent.” “The word ‘voluntarily’ in section 264.1 means that the
defendant acted freely of his own volition, and not accidentally,
unintentionally or out of fear or coercion.” (Keovilayphone, supra,
132 Cal.App.4th at p. 496.) “It follows that as long as the
defendant acts (1) voluntarily and (2) in concert with others in
committing an act of sexual intercourse against the victim’s will
by using force or violence, the elements of section 264.1 have been
satisfied.” (Id. at pp. 496-497.) There was sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable jury could so find. As noted, Middleton
stated in her police interview that she worked for herself as a
prostitute, not for Sangalang or anyone else. Middleton points to
no evidence that compels the conclusion that she did not act
voluntarily; instead, the evidence Middleton cites is subject to
conflicting inferences.

                                34
                       DISPOSITION

     The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

                            ESCALANTE, J.*

We concur:

     PERLUSS, P. J.

     SEGAL, J.

*     Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                              35