Court Opinion

ID: 9579629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:51.132107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:38.154669
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I respectfully dissent. I believe *37that the verdict against the seller, Addy-Morand should be reinstated because I' believe that no error occurred with respect to Addy-Morand. Additionally, I believe that the evidentiary points of error with respect to the verdict against the manufacturer, Cincinnati Incorporated, were either unpreserved or harmless.
i
The majority properly states that in an action against a nonmanufacturer seller, the plaintiff must "prove that a defect existed at the time of sale . . . .” Riley, J., ante at 34. Yet, the majority reverses "regardless of the instruction that restricted the jury’s consideration to the time when the press left Addy-Morand’s control.” Id. at 34-35. The majority reasons that postmanufacture evidence tainted the jury’s verdict.
However, Addy-Morand was never mentioned in the substance of the trial. It was only mentioned during voir dire and in the jury instructions, and there was no independent evidence relating solely to Addy-Morand. More importantly, none of the postmanufacture evidence related to Addy-Morand. Further, the jury instructions relating to Addy-Morand clearly restricted the jury’s focus to the moment of the point-of-sale. Additionally, Addy-Morand never objected to anything that may have been confusing in the jury instructions. I would hold that no error occurred with respect to the verdict against Addy-Morand. Consequently, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the verdict.
ii
I will turn now to the verdict with respect to the *38manufacturer, Cincinnati Incorporated. In this negligent-design products liability case, postsale evidence about advancements in safety technology and about the manufacturer’s conduct was presented to the jury as part of a continuing duty theory. However, I do not believe that the postsale evidence was used to support a theory that the product should have been made safer by technology discovered post sale. If that were, the case, then clearly the "continuing” duty theory would have been improperly presented.1 However, after a thorough review of the trial transcript, I believe that this was not the rationale for using the postsale evidence.
The plaintiff sought to show that as early as the 1890s, the industry knew that unguarded controls could cause serious injuries. The plaintiff also introduced, a great deal of evidence concerning technology that was available in the 1950s. All of which, of course, was presale. The plaintiff presented substantial evidence that this press brake was defective, that is, it was unreasonably dangerous, at the point of sale. The plaintiff’s theory was that Comstock v General Motors Corp, 358. Mich 163; 99 NW2d 627 (1959), recognized a continuing duty to rectify an unreasonable risk that was present at the date of sale. The postsale evidence therefore was relevant with regard to the standard of care. I would conclude that this theory was not erroneous.2 As the amicus curiae, Michigan Trial *39Lawyers Association, suggests, there is
a continuum of possible post-sale duties which the law might impose, ranging from a duty to warn or a duty to issue a recall to an affirmative duty to repair a defect. There are, in addition, numerous other facts which would have to be assessed on an individual, case-by-case basis in determining the appropriate scope of a manufacturer’s post-sale duty—the original price of the product, the number of units sold, the manufacturer’s knowledge of the present users of the product, the nature of the defect discovered after the date of sale and, perhaps most important of all, the magnitude of the danger which has been exposed since the sale date.
Once the jury determines that the product was unreasonably dangerous at the point of sale, it would then have to determine the standard of care and whether the defendant’s actions were reasonable, in light of that unreasonable dangerousness.
In this case, the trial court erred because it did not clarify in the jury instructions that the jury first had to determine that the product was unreasonably dangerous at the time of sale, before it could consider the postsale evidence in determining whether Cincinnati breached the standard of care. However, Cincinnati is also partly at fault for confusing the issues by presenting postsale evidence and theories to the jury. I find that the bulk of the postsale evidence was presented by the defense. The defense’s theory was to try to shift the blame for a dangerous machine onto the owner of the machine, who was the employer of the plaintiff. This was trial strategy. Much of the evidence pertained to Michigan osha requirements, which of course did not apply to the defendants, but instead applied to Sheet Metal Indus*40tries, the owner of the machine and the employer of the plaintiff.
hi
A review of the highlights of the trial where the postsale references occurred is instructive.
During motions in limine, the defendant3 objected to any theory of continuing duty. The trial court stated:
The Court has instructed defendant in that respect, to make his objections at any time that such evidence or comment is offered even if it is unfortunately at a point in which he must interrupt an opening statement.
Therefore, the obligation was on the defense to object to the particular evidence or comment in order to preserve its objection.
During the plaintiff’s opening statement, counsel asserted:
[W]e contend that the unguarded foot pedal . . . and unguarded point of operation were design defects and that . . . Cincinnati . . . knew or should have known that such design flaws could cause the type of injury that Mr. Gregory suffered both prior to selling the press to Sheet Metal Industries from 1964 and at all times from 1964 until the day that Michael Gregory was injured. [Emphasis added.]
There was no objection.
Continuing later, the plaintiff’s counsel stated:
Then we come to the key point. After the government required this in the early ’70’s, made this *41a matter of law in the early ’70’s, the government placed a duty with respect to the employers, Cincinnati Machine did not in itself go back at this point and offer to fix the machines which it knew or should have known were in fact . . . defective. Instead it offered, for a price, ... to come in and add two hand controls and a guarded foot switch which would have prevented this accident from occurring. . . . The evidence will show . . . conclusively that there is no real dispute, that they never offered once to recall the machine ....
Their case boils down to a sacred issue, and the plaintiffs expect the evidence to show that the defendant Cincinnati Machine had a duty to fix the machine ....
The evidence will show that between 1964 and that fateful date in 1986 when Michael lost much of his hands that Cincinnati learned time and again that this unguarded foot pedal and that the unguarded point of operation was smashing workers’ fingers and hands but it did nothing, it stood back and denied its duty to guard the direct path which it had created. [Emphasis added.]
There was no objection.
During the defense’s opening statement, counsel contended:
As the case is presently framed you are going to be asked to judge whether the machine was defective in 1964, that is whether it’s unreasonably dangerous, was it safe to operate.
If we get into this post ’64, if that turns out to be the case, that’s up until the date of the accident which I said was ’86, then no longer is the focus on the machine and whether it was dangerous or whether it was safe, but now the focus will be the actions of Cincinnati Incorporated and whether their actions were negligent or not; completely different focus. So if we get into this area, ’64 to ’86, our proposition to you and our suggestion to you will be we acted reasonably and we acted *42prudently. The risk of injury to someone like Mr. Gregory didn’t change from ’[6]4 to ’86, it remained the same. We are going to say that other manufacturers did nothing different than our manufacturers, nor did we refer to any codes that were referred to. In fact, what you may find, if it comes into the case, is between those two dates is Cincinnati offered to this company dual palm buttons. We believe—I am not sure if it will come in or not so my words you will have to check at the end of the case whether this comes in or not—in about 1978 this company asked about an update and they asked ... us about dual paul [sic] buttons. And this company, this man’s employer, eight months before the accident, we gave them a quotation; the quotation included dual palm buttons to take this machine from the operation of their foot pedal now to the operation of two buttons and they declined, though they chose to buy from us originally apparently. [Emphasis added.]
Therefore, the defense also indicated that it would counter with postsale evidence.
The plaintiff called as an adverse witness the defendant’s product services coordinator, Dennis Cloutier. The plaintiff asked a question that was not fully responded to:
Do you agree that a manufacturer has an obligation, has a[n] obligation to keep abreast and keep informed with[] the developments within the industry and safety of [the] design of press brake[s]?
The witness responded that he guessed that a reasonable designer would. Note, the question could have pertained strictly to presale obligations; moreover, there was no objection.
Later, the witness testified:
Q. When did [Cincinnati] first manufacture[ ] two hand controls?
*43A. I believe it first showed up on some experimental machines in the ’40’s, 1948, ’47.
Q. When did it first use electronic presence on the devices, press brakes?
A. Those were first introduced in this country in 1971 and that’s when they were first used.
Q. When were they first used in Cincinnati’s Machine subsidiary in Scotland.
Mr. Goebel [Defense Counsel]: I am going to object that’s not relevant to 1971 [sic 1964?].
The Court: I will allow it.
The Witness: I believe there were a few machines in East Kilbrite Factory, East Kilbrite, Scotland. Some of the machines middle ’60’s, ’67, ’68 had some photo devices from Europe being put[ ] on them over there.
Q. Sir, moving forward to a period after 1964, did there ever come a time that the U[nited] S[tates] Department of Labor made it a matter of law that press brakes have foot pedal guards and two-handed controls?
A. My familiarity with the Occupational Safety and Health Act is that it does not specify the type of safeguarding .... [Emphasis added.]
Continuing later:
Q. Now, did Cincinnati Machine, with the knowledge of the hazards associated with the use of a guarded point of operation and unguarded foot pedal, did you ever in fact offer to provide this particular manufacturer [sic, owner] with two-handed controls and an electric foot switch?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. As to guarding?
Mr. Goebel [Defense Counsel]: Same objection as to relevance, it’s post 1964.
The Court: I will allow it.
A. I believe we initially sent correspondence to Sheet Metal Industries in 1976. And subsequent to *44that in 1978, they requested a quotation to update and convert their machine and we quoted it again in 1978. [Emphasis added.]
This particular point was preserved by objection. Questioning continued regarding the price that Cincinnati quoted and whether it in fact ever recalled the machine.
The next day, questioning by defense counsel continued:
Q. Mr. Cloutier, there may be a claim in this case that after the date of sale of this machine but before Mr. Gregory was hurt that Cincinnati should have done something to help prevent the accident?
A. Yes, I have heard that.
The defense’s questions continued about the nature and timing of mailings from Cincinnati to Sheet Metal through the 1970s, osha requirements, and a new safety development, a photoelectric device. This new device came out in 1970, and Cincinnati mailed information to Sheet Metal about it. Defense counsel also extensively questioned the witness about post-1964 service calls.
The plaintiff called Paul Youngdahl as an expert witness. Most of the testimony concerned pre-1964 technology and knowledge of risks. At the conclusion of direct examination, plaintiff asked about a breach of duty. The witness answered:
A. In my opinion if Cincinnati had not discovered the hazard and risk of injury in 1964, and thus didn’t provide any point of operation protection and then discovered that hazzard [sic] and risk at some later time, in my opinion they had a duty to correct that defect in the machine. I am not saying that they should have corrected it necessarily at zero cost, but I believe they should *45have corrected it at minimal cost to the purchaser of the machine.
Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty as to whether Cincinnati’s failure to correct the defects on [the] number nine press brake on which Michael Gregory was injured, caused or contributed to Michael Gregory’s hand to be crushed?
A. I have an opinion.
Q. What is your opinion?
A. In my opinion, if Cincinnati had corrected the defects in this press brake by putting on two-hand controls, as an example, any time prior to the injury, the accident . . . would not have happened. [Emphasis added.]
There was again no objection.
On cross-examination by defense counsel, the plaintiff’s expert testified:
Q. I assume your opinion is, since the buttons or some other operator protection were not on in 1964 that the machine was not reasonably safe to operate?
A. Yes.
Q. You’re critical of Cincinnati between ’64 and ’86 because they didn’t do something about that?
A. I am.

Q. Let’s assume for the sake of argument the machine is defective, Cincinnati is wrong. Let’s take this argument, assume that, okay. Doesn’t somebody who buys a machine in ’64 and has it for 22 years have a responsibility to update that machine?

A. I think . . .
Q. In fact, that’s what the law [is], isn’t it?
A. I don’t know about the law but it’s my opinion they should.
Q. You know about osha, don’t you?
*46A. Yes.
Q. You know that osha came into effect in approximately 1971?
A. I do.
Q. Well, let’s put it a different way. Certainly well before 1986 the requirement under the Federal regulations was for the use[r] to bring it up to standard. You would agree with that?
A. I would agree if they have a dangerous machine, osha said put protection on it. [Emphasis added.]
Continuing, later, defense again asked:
Q. So not only does that document that you have in front of you, but osha says the employer, the person who owns the machine and sets it up and is going to make the parts has a responsibility to provide this point-of-operation protection; is that not true?
A. Yes, osha has no jurisdiction over the manufacturer. [Emphasis added.]
The defense’s strategy was to shift the blame to the owner-employer, Sheet Metal.
At the close of the plaintiff’s proofs, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on two grounds. First, that the continuing duty theory should not go to the jury. Second, that the proofs failed regarding a defect in 1964. The court denied both grounds. As to the first, the trial court stated:

Evidence was introduced to point out that safety standards were changed by law at some point after the machine left the manufacturer and before the . . . accident involved in this case, and that’s one of the factors that might lead a reasonable trier of fact to determine that there was continuing duty of some sort.

*47There has also be[en] evidence submitted, mostly by the defendant, that would indicate that the defendant apparently felt some duty to inform owners of its machines that laws had changed and technology had changed and that it was prepared to offer a price and a procedure for making those changes. And all of those things I believe add up to enough to present that question of fact to the trier of fact. [Emphasis added.]
The trial court was in error regarding a duty arising because of changing safety standards. However, this statement occurred out of the presence of the jury.
The defense called Donald Wandling, a consulting engineer. On direct examination, he testified:
Q. Let me ask you, between ’64 and ’86 there is in evidence Exhibit 12, a number of mailings by Cincinnati to Sheet Metal Industries. Do you have an opinion whether it was reasonable for Cincinnati to have sent those types of mailings to this gentleman’s employer?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your, what’s your opinion?
A. It was reasonable to do so.
Q. Let me [m]ake a hypothetical question? . . . Hypothetically this machine in ’64 is unsafe, it’s defective, doesn’t have something that it should have and it’s not safe for operation. I am going to work from that premise, okay?
A. Yes.
Q. And I want to work also from an assumption that in 1971 approximately the Federal government passed a regulation regarding safety use and operation of press brakes. I want you to assume that also?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have an opinion whether the owner of the machine has the responsibility to bring this machine up to then current safety standards?
*48A. Yes.
Q. What’s your opinion?
A. My opinion is that the, the owner does have a responsibility to do that .... [Emphasis added.]
Again, this was the defense’s trial strategy.
On cross-examination, the witness was asked, without objection, how many injuries Cincinnati knew of with respect to this machine before 1986. He was also questioned about mailings from Cincinnati to Sheet Metal in the 1970s.
The defense also called by subpoena Charles Collier, a Michigan Department of Labor employee who was an occupational safety inspector. He was questioned about regulations in the 1970s and as existing in 1986.
The conference discussion regarding proposed jury instructions occurred before closing arguments. The defense objected to the court’s failure to include instructions that would have stated that the duty ends at the time of sale. The defendant in particular objected to the following proposed instructions that the court did not give:
[Proposed] Jury Instruction No. 7: When you deliberate to determine whether the evidence proves that there was any defect with the product, it is your duty to determine if the product was defective when it left the possession of Cincinnati Incorporated in 1964. Cincinnati Incorporated is not to be judged by the state of the art, industry practices, or evidence produced or made known subsequent to the sale of the product in 1964.
No. 8: The plaintiff has alleged that the press brake was defective in 1964. In order to prove this claim, plaintiff must prove that Cincinnati Incorporated was negligent or the product was defective when it leñ Cincinnati in 1964, based upon the knowledge and standards existing in 1964. [Emphasis added.]
*49The court reasoned that the Michigan cases indicated that there was a continuing duty theory. I believe the court erroneously failed to give these instructions. They would have clarified that the jury first had to find a defect in 1964 before turning to the issue of standard of care after 1964.
During closing argument, the plaintiff referred to the post-1964 evidence as pointing to the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable steps in correcting the defect. The defense basically countered that the steps that it took were reasonable.
At the start of the jury instructions, the trial court thanked the jurors and gave them the usual instructions about their duty to examine the evidence, the use of circumstantial evidence, the proper use of inconsistent statements, etc. The court then defined negligence, ordinary care, proximate cause. The court continued:
However, if you decide that the only proximate cause of the injury was the conduct of Sheet Metal Industries, which is not a party to this suit, then your verdict is for the defendant.
The employer Sheet Metal Industries has a statutory duty to furnish a place of employment free from recognized hazards causing or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.
After explaining the burden of proof and comparative negligence, the court continued:
When I use the words "implied warranty” as to Add[y][-]Morand Company, I mean a duty imposed by law which requires that the seller’s product be reasonably fit for the purposes and uses intended or reasonably foreseeable by the seller. We will talk about the burden of proof as to this claim of breach of implied warranty.
The plaintiff h[a]s the burden of proof on each of the following as to Add[y][-]Moran[d] Company:
*50First, that the press brake was not reasonably fit for the uses or and [sic] purposes anticipated or reasonably foreseeable by Add[y][-]Moran[d] Machinery Company in one or more of the ways claimed by the plaintiif.
Second, that the press brake was not reasonably fit for the uses or purposes anticipated or reasonably foreseeable by Add[y][-]Moran[d] Machinery Company at the time it left Addjy][-]Moran[d]’s control.
Third, that the plaintiif was injured.
Fourth, that the lack of operator protection was a proximate cause of the injuries to the plaintiif complained of.
Cincinnati Incorporated had a duty to use reasonable care at the time it designed and manufactured its press brake so as to eliminate unreasonable risks of harm or injury which were reasonably foreseeable. This duty includes guarding against misuse, when misu[s]e is reasonably anticipated.
However, the defendant had no duty to design and manufacturen its press brake to eliminate reasonable risk of harm or injury or risks that were not reasonably for[e]seeable. The law does not impose a duty on a manufacturer to make an accident-proof machine.
Reasonable care means that degree of care which a reasonably prudent manufacturer would exercise under the circumstances which you find existed in this case. It is for you to decide, based on the evidence, what a reasonably prudent manufacturer would do or not do under those circumstances.
A failure to fulfill the duty to use reasonable care is negligence.
A manufacturer has a further duty to [k]eep abreast of and be informed of the developments in the held of safety, design and manufacture and to reasonably incorporate new advances in safety technology into the design and manufacture of its *51product. There is no obligation on the part of the manufacturer to provide every possible new device which might possibly have been conceived or invented.
Further, a manufacturer who learns of a design defect after the product has been sold has a duty to take reasonable actions to correct the defect. It is for you to determine what constitutes reasonable actions. [Emphasis added.]
I believe that the duty to keep abreast of developments could clearly be interpreted as pertaining to presale obligations. The latent defect instruction is arguably straight from the Comstock case. Therefore, I would hold that the instructions were not improper—just incomplete.
The trial court continued with instructions on comparative negligence. It then gave instructions on damages that were applicable to both Cincinnati and Addy-Morand. It concluded with instructions on how the jury should deliberate and how to fill out the special verdict form.
Five of the six jurors agreed that Addy-Morand was liable, that Cincinnati was liable, that the total damages were $1.5 million, and that the plaintiff was thirty-three percent at fault.
iv
In conclusion, I believe that preserved error occurred because the trial court did not clarify the jury instructions with regard to the manufacturer, Cincinnati Incorporated. The court failed to give the defense’s proposed instructions that would have limited the determinative point for a design defect to the point of sale. Further, the trial court did give an instruction that a manufacturer has a duty to take reasonable steps after a design defect is discovered, i.e., a latent defect. While this latter *52point is arguably correct, it confused the issue because the plaintiff’s theory was that the defect existed at the point of sale. The court should have more clearly emphasized that postsale conduct related to the standard of care—not to the original finding of defectiveness at the point of sale.
However, I believe that any error was harmless because there was substantial evidence that the press brake was unreasonably dangerous under the prevailing standards in 1964,4 and because the postsale evidence was presented primarily by the defense as trial strategy, or was presented by the plaintiff without objection. The one or two preserved evidentiary points of error, relating to post-1964 technology, were arguably waived by the defense’s opening statement, or were waived by the defense’s trial strategy of using postsale safety standards to support its theory that the owner of the press brake, Sheet Metal, had a duty to update the press brake with this postsale safety technology.
Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the verdicts against both Cincinnati Incorporated and Addy-Morand.
Mallett, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 See Romero v Int’l Harvester Co, 979 F2d 1444, 1446 (CA 10, 1992):
[A] manufacturer has no duty to notify previous purchasers of its products about later-developed safety devices, or to retrofit those products when the products were non-defective under standards existing at the time of manufacture.

 This Court stated in Gerkin v Brown & Sehler Co, 177 Mich 45, *3960; 143 NW 48 (1913), that there is a duty to warn of concealed dangers and "to exercise a reasonable precaution for the protection of others commensurate with the peril involved.”

 Cincinnati and Addy-Morand were represented during the substance of the trial by a single attorney.

 The majority admits that "there was some proof offered of negligent design as of 1964.” Riley, J., ante at 29. At oral argument, defense counsel also admitted that there was sufficient evidence that the press brake was defective in 1964. More importantly, the jury also determined that the press brake was actionable as of 1964, as evidenced by its verdict that Addy-Morand breached an implied warranty that the press brake was reasonably fit for its intended uses at the time it left Addy-Morand’s control—in 1964.