Court Opinion

ID: 9687703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:42:47.18222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:30.205688
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
dissenting.
The majority has ignored our standard in reviewing a bench trial of a law action: “ ‘ “[T]he Supreme Court does not reweigh evidence but considers the judgment in the light most favorable to the successful party Zeller v. County of Howard, 227 Neb. 667, 670, 419 N.W.2d 654, 656 (1988), quoting Lynn v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 225 Neb. 121, 403 N.W.2d 335 (1987). The trial court observed the demeanor of the witnesses, took into account their interests in the litigation, considered the corroborative value of their testimony, and weighed their credibility. The majority, by selecting pieces of *43evidence and bits of testimony, uses these facts to find that the plaintiff’s decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In so holding, the majority finds that the trial court was clearly wrong. I cannot agree.
Among the facts which the majority chooses to accept is the allegation that the plaintiff’s decedent was aware of the conditions of the road because his mother testified that she discussed the road conditions with him. However, evidence also was presented which showed that the condition of the road and the placement of warning signs varied as construction proceeded from one phase to the next. The majority apparently believes that mere awareness of road construction can be construed as a factor in finding contributory negligence.
The majority has also chosen to believe the testimony of Nebraska State Patrol Sgt. Dennis Richard, who stated that the decedent’s car left the pavement approximately 200 yards east of a sign indicating a sharp dropoff at the pavement edge. However, Sergeant Richard did not investigate the accident scene until the day following the accident. In accepting Richard’s testimony, the majority overlooks the testimony of another driver, who reported that she saw no sharp dropoff signs before the accident, but did observe some the next day. Richard also observed the accident scene in the light of day, while other drivers and a highway superintendent reported that the new asphalt soaked up the light and made the pavement edge difficult to see at night.
The majority adopts the confusing testimony of Nebraska State Trooper Thomas Parker. While Parker testified that he saw no evidence of braking by the decedent, his testimony indicates that the decedent was traveling at 67 miles per hour when his car left the pavement. Parker also states that he agreed with the plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert that the decedent was traveling 52 miles per hour when his vehicle started to roll.
The majority gives little credence to the testimony of Ronald Hensen, the plaintiff’s expert, who stated that a common reaction of the driver in a dropoff accident is to attempt reentry, since the driver is surprised and responds in fear. Hensen stated that reentry requires greater steering effort, and often the *44vehicle will roll over or dart back across the road, spin around, and hit another car. Since most drivers have never experienced this type of accident, they are operating on adrenaline during such an accident, Hensen said.
The testimony of other drivers who had experienced dropoff accidents at the same site and of the witnesses who indicated the lack of warning signs is also disregarded by the majority.
The contributory negligence found by the majority relies on evidence which they interpret to indicate that the decedent was speeding, even though no evidence was presented which indicated that any advisory speed limit signs were posted in any part of the construction area.
The majority reaches a conclusion as to “[t]he reasonably prudent thing for the plaintiff’s decedent to have done----” It is mere conjecture for the court to determine what the decedent should have done. The entire accident took place in less than 7 seconds. As the trial court noted, the decedent was placed in a sudden emergency. The trial court’s finding is not clearly wrong based on the evidence before us.
From this day forward, any individual who fails to react appropriately to a sudden emergency within a matter of seconds will be contributorily negligent. I cannot accept such a rule and would affirm the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff. I dissent.
Shanahan, J., j oins in this dissent.