Court Opinion

ID: 9726181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:36:06.085289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:23.923207
License: Public Domain

HANSON, J.
I concur in the judgment.
I have no quarrel with the main body of the well reasoned majority opinion. However, I do not concur with footnote 4 insofar as it suggests that the State Supreme Court should reexamine its holding in Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60 [271 P.2d 23], and the “special circumstances” exception in light of the “empirical data” showing an epidemic of car thefts. I construe footnote 4 to thus imply that by reason of the “empirical data” referred to that the time has come to expand the basis for establishing civil liability of car owners whose cars are stolen within the factual context of the case at bench. I disagree. While the instant case focuses on a somewhat narrow issue in the field of tort liability, i.e., foreseeability of the risk of harm to third persons, broader legal and public policy considerations as hereafter discussed lead me to an opposite conclusion.
At the outset I note that traditionally whether or not a “Duty” is owed from one person to another (one of the necessary elements to es*106tablish civil liability for an unintentional tort) is primarily a question of law to be determined by the court and not a question for the trier of fact.
I further note that the Richards court must have been aware of that portion of Civil Code section 1714 (hereinafter § 1714) quoted in footnote 4 of the majority opinion since that code section was enacted in 1872. Moreover, the Richards opinion refers to the case of Ney v. Yellow Cab Co. (1954) 2 I11.2d 74 [117 N.E.2d 74, 51 A.L.R.2d 624], in which the State Supreme Court of Illinois addressed the problem of automobile thefts and the increase in juvenile delinquency and construed an Illinois state statute as one intended for the benefit of persons who might be injured by the operation of stolen cars. However, the lead opinion in Richards refused, in the absence of such a California statute, to impose such a duty on the part of California car owners.
In my view any judicially decreed expansion of civil liability of car owners beyond the perimeters of the “special circumstances” exception discussed in the majority opinion would constitute an improper invasion *107of the legislative function,1 which the Richards court specifically refused to do.
Car thieves break into locked cars and “hot wire” them in seconds. There is no question under those circumstances that no liability can attach to the owner of a stolen car for damages suffered by third parties while the stolen car is being driven by the thief. Yet it is suggested that liability may attach to a stolen car owner merely because he or she left the keys in the car which does violence to the principle that one may assume that others will obey the law. Query: If a housewife forgot to lock the door of her house when she went shopping and a thief entered and stole her husband’s gun, should she be held civilly liable to a third party who may be robbed and shot by the burglar who stole the gun in the first instance?
I paraphrase and concur in what Justice Schauer said in his concurring opinion in Richards: “A [car owner is] not bound to anticipate that any person would steal [his or] her car or commit any other crime in respect to it, and, accordingly, [a car owner] owe[s] no duty to anyone growing out of the unlawful taking and operation of the vehicle.” (Richards v. Stanley, supra, 43 Cal.2d 60, 69.)
It is certainly neither wise nor advisable for car owners to leave their keys in unattended cars. However, by subjecting car owners who do so to possible civil liability to third parties for damages caused while their cars are being operated by thieves smacks of accepting car thievery as a fact of life which an orderly society cannot accept. Thus, in the abstract, by subjecting car owners to such liability may in the long run adversely affect the public policy of insisting that the various branches of government and those governmental agencies charged with law enforcement properly perform their functions which includes bringing the car theft problem under control. The passing of the buck, as it were, to the long-suffering, tax-paying, insurance premium-paying, law abiding citizens, may provide a means for government officials to sidestep ac*108countability for failure to suppress the car theft epidemic, and would also tend to dampen efforts to energetically and realistically come to grips with the problem.2

I note that in 1978 the state Legislature amended section 1714 (referred to in fn. 4 of the majority opinion) to specifically abrogate the state Supreme Court’s holdings in Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153 [95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151]; Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313 [128 Cal.Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719]; and Coulter v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 144 [145 Cal.Rptr. 534, 577 P.2d 669], which had by judicial decree expanded the circle of civil liability to those furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person.

One of the primary duties and functions of our various levels of government is to provide security for the persons and property of its citizens from criminal activity. California citizens are entitled to expect no less. That is what citizens have bought and paid for-with their tax dollars.
in the not too distant past citizens were not afraid to go out at night and leave front doors open and unlocked because the law was enforced and their safety protected. Criminals who were apprehended were vigorously prosecuted and if convicted the punishment meted out told the law breaker and would-be criminals that the risk of getting caught wasn’t worth it.
But times have changed—housewives are mugged and kidnaped in broad daylight from supermarket parking lots and robberies, burglaries, rapes and car thefts continue to increase. In my opinion, one of the major contributing causes for this breakdown of respect for the law and rights of others is that social engineers and psychiatrists, good intentioned but short on common sense, have sold to legislators and judges a bill of goods by way of untested theory that society itself was really the culprit and rehabilitation, not punishment, of the convicted criminal was all that was needed.
The grand experiment hasn’t worked in the real world and it and other factors have combined to bring on the soaring crime rates. Due to rampant criminal activity, more and more citizens who already pay exorbitant taxes to the government for their protection are compelled to expend additional hard earned dollars in order to provide for their personal safety and have had to turn their private homes into fortresses by installing burglar alarms and steel bars on their doors and windows and hiring private security guards.
To subject California citizens, who are themselves victims of car thieves, to the added outrage of being haled into court as defendants in civil suits and possibly being held liable for damages caused by the acts of thieves who steal their cars is not only at odds with traditional concepts establishing and imputing civil liability but would constitute a colossal cop-out by those in government charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order. It would also be graphic evidence adding credence to those who assert that our criminal justice system is in a state of bankruptcy and in need of a major overhaul.