Court Opinion

ID: 9581653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:17:08.921247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:09.465990
License: Public Domain

Benton, X,
dissenting.
In its case-in-chief, the Commonwealth was permitted to prove, over objection, that several months before James Matthew Miller shot *309Dean Scott Phillips, Miller was present in a classroom with Michael Waters and Matthew Scott Benson. Benson testified that the following occurred:
A We had a free day and we were just sitting around, talking. Us three guys were in a group, just talking, and we just brought it up. I believe I said something to the effect of how easy it might be to, you know, kill somebody and get away with it because we always talked about kind of weird stuff. Then the conversation just got rolling and went on for maybe five or six minutes.
Q Did the defendant participate in the discussion?
A Yes, he did.
Q What were the conclusions, if you will, or the things that you discussed about how to kill someone and get away with it?
A Well, what I remember of this conversation, I remember talking about the body being taken to the woods. I remember something about trying to make sure there are no witnesses. That is about all I can remember of that conversation.
Waters was less specific in his recollection of the discussion:
A We were discussing the group and I believe that Benson mentioned — I can’t remember the exact words. He brought up the subject. I can’t remember the exact words.
Q And the subject was what?
A The way one could commit a murder and get away with it.
Q Now who was there in this discussion?
A The defendant, Matthew Benson, and myself.
Q Did the defendant take part in the discussion?
A Yes.
Q What was the result of the discussion? What did the group decide one should do to commit a murder and get away with it?
A There wasn’t really a conclusion. It was tossed back and forth.
Q What were some of the ideas?
*310A One would use an unregistered weapon. It was assumed, I should add — it was assumed that it would be a shooting with a gun. One would use an unregistered weapon to avoid ballistic tracing. One should not have any weapon. And, dispose of the body in an area where it wouldn’t be found.
Each of the witnesses recalled specific comments by Benson. However, no evidence proved that Miller made any statements during the discussion. In addition, no evidence proved that Miller advocated a point of view in this discussion or that he even recalled the discussion several months later when he killed Scott. By proving that a person other than Miller made statements that suggested a scenario bearing some vague resemblance to the incident in which Miller killed Scott, the Commonwealth was permitted to offer irrelevant but highly prejudicial evidence.
This evidence bears a close resemblance to the proof that this Court found impermissible in Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 65, 415 S.E.2d 439 (1992). In Hall, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of Hall’s knowledge that a friend, Carter, was alleged to have shot his wife, Mrs. Carter, in the head in Northern Virginia and then drove to New York for the purpose of making several telephone calls to establish an alibi. Id. at 67-68, 415 S.E.2d at 441. The Commonwealth claimed that Hall, in an attempt to establish an alibi for himself, similarly had telephoned his daughter from his home the night his wife, died. This Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that “the evidence was relevant because it revealed a method of developing an alibi defense.” Id. at 68, 415 S.E.2d at 441. The Court found, instead, that the evidence had little probative value because Hall knew Carter’s alibi had failed, alibis are commonly employed in criminal defense, and proving a personal contact is a routine element of an alibi defense. The Court went on to note:
The principal effect of the description of Carter’s crime was to suggest guilt by association. The prejudicial effect of that suggestion far outweighed any probative value that might be found in the suggestion that Hall might have learned from his friend’s example.
Id. at 69, 415 S.E.2d at 442.
*311In this case, the Commonwealth claims the boys’ conversation revealed that Miller plotted Phillips’ murder and, thus, supported an inference of premeditation. This contention is unsupported by the evidence introduced. The conversation took place several months before Phillips’ death. There is no indication that Miller said anything during this conversation or what he thought of his friends’ theories. While Phillips’ death bore some general characteristics of the bantering described by one of the other boys, killings often occur with a minimal number of witnesses. Moreover, it is unremarkable that a young person who suddenly and unexpectedly found himself involved in a great wrong instinctively might have tried to hide the evidence of his wrong before confessing.
“Evidence of one occurrence may be received to prove another separate occurrence, if it is shown that some logical connection exists between the two, such that the existence of the one makes the existence of the other more probable.” Hall, 14 Va. App. at 68, 415 S.E.2d at 441. Nonetheless, “the existence of intent cannot be based upon speculation or surmise.” Adkins v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 437, 440, 229 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1976).
“[I]f the circumstances have no intimate connection with the main fact; if they constitute no link in the chain of evidence; then, supposing them innocent, their admission, to be sure, may do no harm, yet they ought to be excluded, because they are irrelevant; but if they denote other guilt, they are not only irrelevant, but they do injury, because they have a tendency to prejudice the minds of the jury; and for this additional reason they ought to be excluded.”
Copeland v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 450, 455, 412 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1991) (quoting Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574, 576-77 (1829)). It is impermissible to allow “the jury to grope in the realm of speculation for an inference or inferences not supported by facts proved from evidence presented.” Lugo v. Joy, 215 Va. 39, 42, 205 S.E.2d 658, 661 (1974).
The effect of allowing testimony of another boy’s hypothetical plotting months before the killing was to allow the jury to speculate about Miller’s predisposition to commit murder, not premeditation. It is well-established that evidence of other acts which tend to show a defendant’s “proclivity to crime or his attitude” is not admissible. Rees v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 850, 870, 127 S.E.2d 406, 420 (1962), *312cert. denied, 372 U.S. 964 (1963) (citing Day v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907, 86 S.E.2d 23 (1955), Barber v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 858, 30 S.E.2d 565 (1944), Limbaugh v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 383, 140 S.E. 133 (1927), Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 574 (1829)). “Evidence of other independent acts of an accused is inadmissible if relevant only to show a probability that the accused committed the crime for which he is on trial because he is a person of bad or criminal character.” Copeland, 13 Va. App. at 454, 412 S.E.2d at 470 (quoting Sutphin v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 241, 245, 337 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1985)). The testimony describing the conversation served no purpose but to allow the jury to conclude that a macabre discussion by a teenage boy who had no connection to the killing was actually part of a diabolical and murderous scheme created by Miller. Its admission served only to prejudice the minds of the jurors.
The trial judge also permitted the Commonwealth to prove, over Miller’s objection, that the weapon Miller used was stolen. The Commonwealth had asserted that “[t]he Commonwealth will argue that Miller stole the gun.” Using the fact that Miller possessed the stolen gun, the Commonwealth argued to the jury that it could find from the evidence “that [Miller] stole the gun.” While the majority concludes that this evidence is relevant to “whether [Miller] planned the killing,” the evidence does not tend to prove that assertion. Moreover, proof of the circumstances surrounding the theft of the weapon was irrelevant to any issues before the jury.
The majority posits that Miller’s plan to kill Phillips had its genesis in a conversation with Benson and Waters. During this conversation, another boy discussed the desirability of using an unregistered weapon. The majority states that “[although the weapon used was not unregistered, it had been stolen in an unsolved theft.” However, uncontroverted testimony proved that the weapon was stolen ‘ ‘eight or nine months” before the crime (in October or November of 1988). The other boy initiated the conversation in the late “spring of 1989.” The majority’s theory, thus, collapses because the actual theft of the weapon could have played no part in a plan that was originated by another person after the theft.
All evidence that Miller was, in fact, the person who stole the weapon is irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible “other crime” evidence. The circumstances of the weapon’s theft proved no matter that was at *313issue. Therefore, Robert Thacker’s testimony concerning the circumstances of the theft was inadmissible. The Commonwealth underscored this inadmissible evidence when it explained to the jury that the evidence had been offered to “establish . . . the conclusion that. [Miller] stole [the gun].”
The rule that forbids the introduction of evidence of other crimes, insofar as it establishes a criminal tendency on the part of the accused, is not a mere technical rule of law.
“It arises out of the fundamental demand for justice and fairness which lies at the basis of our jurisprudence. If such evidence were allowed, not only would the time of courts be wasted in the trial of collateral issues, but persons accused of crime would be greatly prejudiced before juries and would be otherwise embarrassed in presenting their defenses of the issues really on trial.”
Foster v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 316, 320-21, 362 S.E.2d 745, 747-48 (1987) (quoting Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1948)). Whether Miller stole the gun was not probative of any fact at issue. Its admission was reversible error.
Evidence which has no tendency to prove guilt, but only serves to prejudice an accused, should be excluded on the ground of lack of relevancy. For evidence to be admissible it must relate and be confined to the matters in issue and tend to prove an offense or be pertinent thereto. Evidence of collateral facts or those incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference on matters in issue, because too remote or irrelevant, cannot be accepted in evidence.
Bunting v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 309, 314, 157 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1967).
For these reasons, I would reverse the convictions and remand the case for a new trial.