Court Opinion

ID: 9721329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:56:40.436755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:24.940233
License: Public Domain

DICKSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Defendant White received a 180 day suspended sentence on 10/14/87 after pleading guilty to battery, a Class A misdemean- or. The trial court later revoked White's probation, before 180 days elapsed, due to his non-performance of 10 days of alternative service within the time deadline orally set by a community service coordinator. The Court of Appeals reversed because the trial court never informed White orally or in writing that the alternative service was to be completed by a specific date, in accordance with Harder v. State (1986), Ind.App., 501 N.E.2d 1117. The Harder court held that failure to inform the defendant of the specific date on which his user's fees were due was error in that it was not sufficiently specific to fully inform him of the conditions of his probation.
The majority position is inconsistent with the following statutory provisions then in effect governing probation which required:
Ind.Code § 85-88-2-l(a). Whenever it places a person on probation, the court shall specify in the record the conditions of the probation.
Ind.Code § 85-88-2-2(b). When a person is placed on probation, he shall be given a written statement of the conditions of his probation.
These statutes clearly contemplate that the defendant at sentencing be notified as to all conditions of probation, which necessarily include completion dates of alternative service. The majority's interpretation of "supervised probation" grants an unintended discretion to the probation officer to set deadlines, where the court has not imposed any, and serves to obliterate the notice-giving purpose of the probation statutes.
Here, neither the plea agreement nor the sentencing record reflect that White was to complete the alternative service prior to April 15, 1988, the time at which his probation was to terminate. If the trial court had intended to specify a deadline as to the completion of alternative service, the statutes appear to require the court to do so at sentencing and to provide the defendant with a written statement of the condition. However, two recent cases have relaxed the requirement of a writing if the written record contains the court's full oral explanation of conditions and the defendant's acknowledgement. Kerrigan v. State (1989), Ind.App., 540 N.E.2d 1251; Ratliff v. State (1989), Ind.App., 546 N.E.2d 309.
In the present case, however, there was no such oral explanation by the trial court. *49Its failure to specify a date for completion of alternative service did not sufficiently inform White of a condition of his probation. White thus had until April 15, 1988, the expiration of probation, to complete his alternative service. The trial court prematurely revoked his probation on March 22, 1988, and thereby denied him the opportunity to satisfy the requirement of alternative service. The Court of Appeals is correct. I would deny transfer.
DeBRULER, J., concurs.