Court Opinion

ID: 9757777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:58:35.242947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:44.106715
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I join parts 1 and 4 of the majority opinion, finding that the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to accept appellant’s guilty plea, and finding no support for appellant’s argument concerning ineffective assistance of counsel. I also concur in the result reached by the majority in Part 2 as to the denial of the pre-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. As to the issue relating to the illegality of appellant's sentence, I am compelled to register my dissent.
With respect to the illegality of appellant’s sentence, the majority holds as follows: *253At 249-250 (footnotes 4 and 5 omitted). I cannot agree with the majority. I recognize that the clause repealing acts inconsistent with the Sentencing Code would operate as an express repeal of prior legislation that is inconsistent with its provisions. However, I find no inconsistency between Section 9761(a) and 61 P.S. § 331.21a that would warrant the application of the repeal clause. A comparison of these two provisions will illustrate my position.
*252According to appellant, 61 P.S. 331.21(a) forbids the lower court from directing that his sentence for burglary be served concurrently with his earlier sentence. This argument lacks merit. Section 9761 of the Sentencing Code specifically recognizes the sentencing judge's authority to impose a sentence “which is to run concurrently with a [sentence] which hás been previously imposed.” To the extent that 61 P.S. 331.21(a) is inconsistent with Section 9761, it has therefore been repealed.6
*253I begin by considering Section 331.21a(a), which specifically addresses the order of sentences to be served by a defendant sentenced to imprisonment for a crime committed while on parole. In pertinent part, it reads as follows:
§ 331.21a Commission of crime during parole; other violations of terms of parole
(a) Convicted Violators. Any parolee under the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Board of Parole released from any penal institution of the Commonwealth who, during the period of parole ..., commits any crime punishable by imprisonment, ... to which he pleads guilty ... at any time thereafter in a court of record, may, at the discretion of the board, be recommitted as a parole violator. If his recommitment is so ordered, he shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the term which said parolee would have been compelled to serve had he not been paroled,
If a new sentence is imposed upon such parolee, the service of the balance of said term originally imposed shall precede the commencement of the new term imposed in the following cases:
(1) If a person is paroled from any State penal or correctional institution under the control and supervision of the Department of Justice and the new sentence imposed upon him is to be served in any such State penal or correctional institution.
(2) If a person is paroled from a county penal or correctional institution and the new sentence imposed upon him is to be served in the same county penal or correctional institution.
*254In all other cases, the service of the new term for the latter crime shall precede commencement of the balance of the term originally imposed.
61 P.S. § 331.21a(a). Through this provision the General Assembly enacted into law a mandatory order for the service of the sentences of a defendant/parole violator. It has been consistently held that the General Assembly, by mandating the order of service of sentences, clearly intends that a defendant/parole violator must serve his sentences consecutively, see e.g. Commonwealth ex rel. Haun v. Cavell, 190 Pa.Super. 346, 154 A.2d 257 (1959); Commonwealth ex rel. Salerno v. Banmiller, 189 Pa.Super. 156, 149 A.2d 501 (1959); Commonwealth ex rel. Dion v. Martin, 183 Pa.Super. 310, 131 A.2d 150 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Backus v. Burke, 174 Pa.Super. 83, 99 A.2d 910 (1953), notwithstanding the contrary intentions of a sentencing judge. Commonwealth ex rel. Sanders v. Maroney, 202 Pa.Super. 202, 195 A.2d 882 (1963). Recent case law, some of which is cited in the majority opinion, slip op. at 9 n. 8, has followed this rule without question. E.g. Young v. Commonwealth Board of Probation and Parole, 29 Pa. Cmwlth. 268, 370 A.2d 813 (1977); Commonwealth v. Draper, 222 Pa.Super. 26, 293 A.2d 614 (1972).
In comparison, when Section 9761(a) is closely examined it is apparent that it addresses an entirely different matter than does Section 331.21a(a). In pertinent part, Section 9761(a) reads as follows:
§ 9761. Computation and order of service of sentences
(a) Order of service of sentences.—If a minimum sentence imposed by the court which is to run concurrently with one which has been previously imposed would expire later than the minimum of such a previously imposed sentence..., the defendant shall be imprisoned at least until the last imposed minimum sentence has been served.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9761(a) (Clause omitted). The manifest intent of this portion of the provision is to mandate only that a defendant who has received concurrent terms of imprison*255ment shall serve the last of the minimum sentences imposed upon him if it will expire later than prior ones.
Section 9761(a)’s language does not refer to any particular context. Thus, it cannot be said that it was specifically intended to apply to parole violation situations. It does not state directly that a sentencing judge may direct that his sentence may run concurrently with any previously imposed sentence. It merely describes the occurrence to indicate the context in which it applies. I do not regard this descriptive language as a legislative recognition of a sentencing judge’s unbridled authority to direct that his sentence may run concurrently with any previously imposed sentence irrespective of statutory law to the contrary. As I read Section 9761(a), it merely specifies one particular consequence of concurrent sentences without purporting to address whether the separate sentences of imprisonment may legally be served concurrently or consecutively. To answer that question one must look beyond Section 9761(a).
Upon comparing both provisions, I find that the legislative directive of each provision to be entirely different from one another. Section 331.21a has been interpreted to require consecutive sentences for a defendant/parole violator because it mandates the order in which he must serve both the sentence from which he has been paroled and any new sentences he may receive. In contrast, Section 9761(a)’s thrust is the service of minimum sentences when concurrent sentences have been imposed. For a true inconsistency with Section 9761(a) to exist, another act must dictate that a defendant serving legal concurrent sentences does not have to serve the entire length of the minimum sentence last imposed when it is longer than previously imposed minimum sentences. That clearly is not the mandate of Section 331.21a(a). I find no conflict between Section 9761(a) of the Sentencing Code and Section 331.21a(a).
It has long been held that a clause repealing inconsistent acts is an explicit recognition by the General Assembly that those acts not inconsistent with the act the clause protects are to remain in force. E.g. Commonwealth v. Reese, 293 *256Pa. 398, 143 A. 127 (1928) In re McCann ’$ Adoption, 104 Pa.Super. 196, 159 A. 334, (1931); Commonwealth ex rel. Matthews v. Lomas, 302 Pa.Super. 97, 153 A. 124 (1930). Therefore, I conclude that Section 331.21(a) is to remain intact.
In sum, I find no reason to believe that the General Assembly, in enacting Section 9761(a), intended to change the longstanding policy of this Commonwealth found in Section 331.21a. If the General Assembly had intended to make such a fundamental change in the sentencing law, it would have done so clearly and directly.
Since it is evident from the record that Section 331.21a(a) squarely applies to appellant, the new sentence imposed upon him, pertaining to the burglary we have considered in this appeal, must run consecutively with his prior sentence. Consequently, the sentencing judge erred in directing that appellant will serve his new sentence concurrently. Because the sentencing judge erred and it was his intention not to have appellant serve a consecutive sentence of the same length as the erroneous sentence, I would vacate sentence and remand for resentencing.

 The note to 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9701 states that “Section 2(b) of Acts 1974, Dec. 30, P.L. 1052, No. 345 provides that: ‘All acts and parts of acts are repealed in so far as they are inconsistent herewith.’ ’’