Court Opinion

ID: 9897878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:26:37.299194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:04.415119
License: Public Domain

FILE                                                                   THIS OPINION WAS FILED
       IN CLERK’S OFFICE                                                          FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON                                                   SEPTEMBER 7, 2023
       SEPTEMBER 7, 2023
                                                                                     ERIN L. LENNON
                                                                                  SUPREME COURT CLERK

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

         WAHKIAKUM SCHOOL DISTRICT                          No. 101052-4
         NO. 200,
                               Appellant,
                                                            EN BANC
                v.
         STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                            Filed: September 7, 2023
                               Respondent.

               GORDON MCCLOUD, J.— “It is the paramount duty of the state to make

        ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders,

        without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.” WASH.

        CONST. art. IX, § 1. And our court has clearly held that article IX, section 1 places

        an affirmative duty on the State to amply fund that “education.” Seattle Sch. Dist.

        No. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); McCleary v. State, 173 Wn.2d

        477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012).

               We must now decide whether the “education” that the State has a

        “paramount” constitutional “duty” to “ampl[y]” fund includes school capital

        construction costs. The plain language of article IX, section 1 does not alone

        answer this question. But reading that provision in the context of the Washington

        State Constitution as a whole and its development since the state’s founding shows
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

that the constitution (1) treats school capital construction costs differently than it

treats other education costs and (2) requires the State and local school districts to

share the responsibility for those school capital construction costs. For that reason,

we hold that the constitution does not include capital construction costs within the

category of “education” costs for which the State alone must make “ample

provision.”

        We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss.

                                   FACTUAL HISTORY

   I.      In Seattle School District and McCleary, this court held that (1) the
           legislature has a “paramount” duty to “ampl[y]” fund the “education”
           defined in article IX, section 1 and (2) the legislature had failed to
           discharge that duty

           A. In 1978, Seattle School District ruled that article IX, section 1 requires
              the State to make ample provision for education through “dependable
              and regular” tax sources and that forcing school districts to rely on
              local levies violated that duty. We didn’t explicitly include capital
              construction in the definition of an article IX, section 1 education

        This court interpreted article IX, section 1 for the first time in Seattle School

District. 90 Wn.2d 476.

        In the years before that case was filed, the Seattle School District (District)

lacked sufficient state funds to fully educate all of its students. It tried to

supplement those funds. The legislature had authorized school districts to

supplement insufficient state funding through special excess levy elections, and in

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Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

1975, the District asked the voters to approve two separate special excess levy

proposals to support the District’s schools. Id. at 485.

       Both levy propositions failed. Id. The District faced a continuing budget

shortfall.

       The District then sued the State, claiming that the State failed to discharge

its article IX, section 1 duty to make “‘ample provision for the education’” of its

resident children.1 Id. at 486. Following a nine week trial, the trial court entered

detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 486-87. Critically, the trial

court ruled that “the District’s children have a constitutional right to an adequately

funded educational program of instruction.” Id. at 487. The trial court continued

that article IX, section 1 places a paramount duty on the State to fund that

educational program and that “the level of funding provided by the Legislature for

the 1975-76 school year was . . . insufficient to comply with the State’s paramount

duty.” Id.

       The State appealed directly to this court, and we affirmed. We held that

article IX, section 1 imposes a judicially enforceable affirmative duty on the State

to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its

       1
         The District also brought a claim under article IX, section 2, alleging that the
State failed to “‘provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.’” Seattle
Sch. Dist., 90 Wn.2d at 486.

                                              3
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

borders. Id. at 520. We continued that this right is “paramount,” which means that

it is “superior in rank, above all others, chief, preeminent, supreme, and in fact

dominant.” Id. at 511. We further explained that “‘ample’ . . . means liberal,

unrestrained, without parsimony, fully, sufficient’” and that “‘provision’ . . . means

preparation, measures taken beforehand; for the supply of wants; measures taken

for a future exigency.’” Id. at 516 (quoting the trial court’s judgment).

      Importantly, this court defined the term “education” broadly and did not

explicitly include capital construction costs within that definition. We stated that

“education” means

      “all that series of instruction and discipline which is intended to
      enlighten the understanding, correct the temper, and form the manners
      and habits of youth, and fit them for usefulness in the future. In its
      most extended signification it may be defined, in reference to man, to
      be the act of developing and cultivating the various physical,
      intellectual, aesthetic and moral faculties.”

Id.

      We acknowledged that this definition of education is not stagnant and that

what constitutes ample education at one time might not suffice at another time. Id.

We also acknowledged that this education need not be “total” but must be a “basic

education.” Id. at 519-20. But we clearly held that this “basic education” must go

“beyond mere reading, writing and arithmetic” and must also include “broad

educational opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip our children

for their role as citizens and as potential competitors in today’s market as well as in
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Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

the marketplace of ideas.” Id. at 517 (citing Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515,

303 A.2d 273 (1973); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S. Ct.

675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967)). Finally, we held that the legislature has the duty to

give substantive meaning to the word “education.” Id. at 519.

      Our court in Seattle School District then turned to the type of funding that

the constitution requires for this “education.” We held that the state constitution

requires the State to provide ample funding for a basic education by means of

“dependable and regular” tax sources and that the State cannot force school

districts to rely on special excess levies. Id. at 520. We explained that such levy

funding depends on the outcome of local elections and the assessed valuation of

taxable real property within a district—so it is neither “dependable” nor “regular.”

Id. at 525.

      We therefore concluded that the then-current system of funding for basic

education violated article IX, section 1 of our constitution because it forced local

school districts to rely on such undependable levies. Id. at 537-38.

      This court, however, declined to retain jurisdiction. Instead, we stated that

we had “every confidence the Legislature will comply fully with the duty

mandated by [article IX, sections 1 and 2] within the time specified in the

judgment as here modified.” Id. at 539.

                                          5
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

           B. In 2012, McCleary reiterated that article IX, section 1 requires the
              State to make ample provision for education through dependable and
              regular tax sources, held that the State was still violating that duty,
              and retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance. We still didn’t include
              capital construction in the definition of an article IX, section 1
              education

       Thirty-four years later, another set of parents filed another legal claim

asserting that the state legislature was still violating its article IX, section 1 duty to

fully and amply fund education. In McCleary, the McClearys and Venemas 2

brought suit on behalf of their children, who were enrolled in the state’s public

school system. Id. at 511-12. They asserted that despite the decision in Seattle

School District, their children—and all children in the state’s K-12 system—were

still suffering from decades of inadequate funding and legislative stalemates. See

id. at 487-512. They sought declaratory relief.

       The bench trial lasted eight weeks, consisted of testimony from dozens of

fact and expert witnesses, and included over 500 exhibits. Id. at 512-13. At the end

of that complex litigation, the trial court agreed with the parents. It ruled that the

State had failed to comply with its constitutional duty under article IX, section 1.

Id. at 513.

       2
          The Network for Excellence in Washington School, a statewide collection of
school districts, education organizations, and community groups, was also a plaintiff in
this suit. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 511-12.
                                            6
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

      On direct appeal to our court, we affirmed. We held that the State had still

failed to comply with its article IX, section 1 duty to make ample provision for the

education of all children in Washington. Id. at 484.

      This court’s decision in McCleary began by detailing the education reforms,

recommendations, and issues identified by the legislature during the time between

the Seattle School District decision and the McCleary bench trial. See id. at 487-

511. This court explained that the legislature had hired consultants to perform a

comprehensive study (the Picus and Odden study3) of Washington’s K-12 finance

system. Id. at 501-02. That study concluded that the state’s K-12 finance system

should move to a “prototypical school model,” and it recommended across-the-

board reforms to bring the finance system into alignment with that newer model.

Id.

      Our decision then addressed the significance of recent legislation that had

“laid the foundation for comprehensive reforms to the program of basic education

and the K-12 funding system”—Engrossed Substitute House Bill (ESHB) 2261. Id.

at 505-06; LAWS OF 2009, ch. 548. ESHB 2261 adopted the prototypical school

model, but it stopped short of setting out the details of this new funding structure.

Instead, it created a work group to do so. Id. at 506. A year later, the legislature

      3
        Study conducted by professors Lawrence Picus of the University of Southern
California and Allan Odden of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
                                           7
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

enacted the details of the new prototypical school model in Substitute House Bill

(SHB) 2776. Id. at 509; LAWS OF 2010, ch. 236. Those details included class sizes,

staffing ratios, materials, supplies, operating costs, transportation funding, and

increased access to full-day kindergarten. Id. at 509-10.

       Neither ESHB 2261 nor SHB 2776 nor the prototypical school model

provided for capital expenditures. 4 Our decision in McCleary nevertheless

explained how important this legislation was to achieving the goal of amply

funding education.

       But our decision also explained that the legislature had failed to fund many

of the reforms it outlined in ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776. That is what prompted the

McClearys’ and Venemas’ lawsuit. Id. at 511. And that is what formed the basis

for our decision.

       Our decision reaffirmed much of Seattle School District’s conclusions about

the meaning of article IX, section 1. See id. at 520-26. We reiterated that the

       4
         To be clear, both ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776 mention capital expenditures. But
neither bill funded or required those expenditures. SHB 2776 created a work group “to
develop options for a new system of supplemental school funding through local school
levies and local effort assistance” and to create a phase-in plan. SHB 2776, 61st Leg.,
Reg. Sess., § 6(1), (3)(a) at 13 (Wash. 2010). This work group was also tasked with
examining “local school district capacity to address facility needs associated with
phasing-in full-day kindergarten across the state and reducing class size in kindergarten
through third grade.” Id. at § 6(3)(a) at 13 (emphasis added). Additionally, ESHB 2261’s
statement of “intent” says, “Significant increases in resources for staffing and class size
reduction will have detrimental impact on student learning if school districts hire
unprepared teachers and lack facilities to house them.” ESHB 2261, 61st Leg., Reg.
Sess., § 1(4), at 2 (Wash. 2009) (emphasis added).
                                             8
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

legislature bears the responsibility for providing the specific details of the

constitutionally required “education.” Id. at 517, 526. We affirmed the trial court’s

decision that the evidence presented at trial concerning the current system of

school funding showed that the State had failed to meet its constitutional duty to

fund that “education.” See id. at 529-37. We summarized that that evidence

showed that the State was impermissibly relying on undependable local levies,

rather than on stable and dependable statewide funding sources, to provide the

article IX, section 1 required program of basic education that the legislature itself

had defined. Id. at 539.

      Then, in crafting a remedy, we looked to ESHB 2261 as a guide for defining

the State’s specific duties. Id. at 543. We relied on trial testimony that “full

implementation and funding for ESHB 2261 [would] remedy the deficiencies in

the prior funding system.” Id. We set a deadline of 2018 for the legislature to

implement the reforms. Id. at 484. And we retained jurisdiction to monitor the

legislature’s implementation of ESHB 2261 to comply with the State’s paramount

duty. Id. at 545-46.

          C. After our decision in McCleary, this court issued a series of
             unpublished orders. We ultimately terminated sanctions and
             jurisdiction without explicitly requiring capital construction
             expenditures

      We issued a series of unpublished orders over the next several years while

we retained jurisdiction and monitored the State’s compliance. Several of those
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Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

unpublished orders concluded that the State was failing to make sufficient progress

toward complying with its constitutional obligations. Ords., McCleary v. State, No.

84362-7 (Wash. Dec. 20, 2012) [https://perma.cc/43WR-3XYA], (Wash. Jan. 9,

2014) [https://perma.cc/J6W7-V3ME], (Wash. June 12, 2014)

[https://perma.cc/EFL4-3-3C8G]. Eventually, we held the State in contempt for its

failure to comply and then imposed a $100,000 a day sanction until the State did

comply. Ords., McCleary, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Apr. 30, 2015)

[https://perma.cc/7HYM-42BD], (Wash. June 8, 2015) [https://perma.cc/X99S-

V9RC], (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015) [https://perma.cc/6WAL-3KVA].

      Then, in 2017, we issued an order acknowledging that the State had passed

legislation that, when fully implemented, would bring it into compliance with its

constitutional duties according to the basic education identified in ESHB 2261.

Ord., McCleary, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Nov. 15, 2017),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/McCleary/McClearyOrder11152

017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ7Z-YYJH]. Finally, after the legislature fixed the

deadline for the new minimum state salary allocations, the court determined that

the State had fully complied with its duty to implement its new program of basic

education. Ord., McCleary, No. 84362-7 (Wash. June 7, 2018)

[https://perma.cc/EJP5-L7FP]. We terminated jurisdiction and lifted future

sanctions. Id.

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Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

          D. Today, local school districts and the State share the responsibility for
             funding school capital costs

      In practice today, both the State and the local school districts provide

funding for school capital construction costs. The State provides its funding

assistance to local school districts primarily through the School Construction

Assistance Program (SCAP). This program provides grants to school districts to

assist with construction and modernization. Ch. RCW 28A.525; see School

Construction Assistance Program (SCAP), WASH. OFF. OF SUPERINTENDENT OF

PUB. INSTRUCTION (last visited Aug. 29, 2023) https://www.k12.wa.us/policy-

funding/school-buildings-facilities/school-construction-assistance-program-scap.

      This program assumes that the State and the local districts share the

responsibility for funding school capital construction costs. To be eligible for a

SCAP grant, a school district must provide local funding “equal to or greater than

the difference between the total approved project cost and the amount of state

funding assistance.” RCW 28A.525.162(2). But even when the State contributes

funds to a school construction project, the school district retains ownership of the

school buildings and property and the board of directors of each school district

maintains exclusive control of the property. RCW 28A.335.090.

      In 2022, the legislature appropriated additional funds to support SCAP and

other specific school construction, modernization, and repair projects. See LAWS OF

2022, ch. 296, §§ 5001-5012, at 2306-14. This included a $515,000 appropriation
                                          11
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

to the Wahkiakum School District (WSD) “for a facilities accessibility and security

improvement project.” LAWS OF 2022, ch. 296, § 5010(9), at 2313.

   II.      The WSD alleges that the State is violating article IX, section 1 by failing
            to provide ample funds for school-related capital construction costs

         In this action, the WSD alleges that the State has “fail[ed] to amply fund the

[WSD]’s needed facilities [and] infrastructure.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 1. WSD

argues that this failure violates article IX, section 1. Id. at 3. The complaint

explains the impact of this lack of ample funding for facilities and infrastructure:

“The [WSD] is a poor, rural school district located along the banks of the

Columbia River. It has less than 500 students. Approximately 57% of its students

are low income. It has less than 3500 registered voters. And the per capita income

of its voters is approximately $29,000.” Id.

   The WSD’s complaint makes four broad allegations:

   (1) “The [WSD] does not have the facilities needed to safely provide all its

         students a realistic and effective opportunity to obtain the knowledge and

         skills encompassed within the word ‘education’ in Article IX, §1.” Id. at 22.

   (2) “The funding that the State provides to the [WSD] does not correlate to the

         real cost of providing the safe facilities needed to amply provide all [WSD]

         students a realistic and effective opportunity to obtain the knowledge and

         skills encompassed within the word ‘education’ in Article IX, §1.” Id. at 23.

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Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

   (3) “The funding that the State provides to the [WSD] does not correlate to the

      level of resources needed to provide all [WSD] students the safe facilities

      needed to provide them a realistic and effective opportunity to meet

      Washington’s state learning standards.” Id.

   (4) “The funding that the State provides to the [WSD] does not correlate to the

      level of resources needed to provide all [WSD] students the safe facilities

      needed to provide them a realistic and effective opportunity to gain the

      knowledge and skills outlined in RCW 28A.150.210(1)-(4) and

      Washington’s state learning standards.” Id. at 24.

The WSD sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Id. at 24-28.

Specifically, the WSD requested that the State pay the cost of rebuilding its

elementary, middle, and high schools; it estimated more than $50 million in

construction costs. Id. at 27-28.

                               PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      The WSD filed its complaint on December 28, 2021. Id. at 1.

      The State moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim (CR 12(b)(6)) and for

lack of jurisdiction (CR 12(b)(1)). Id. at 32-58. In support of its CR 12(b)(6)

motion, the State argued, “[F]unding for school construction and other capital

expenditures is governed by entirely different constitutional and statutory

provisions that primarily look to local school districts themselves, with the State

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Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

providing funding assistance. As such, WSD fails to state a claim on which relief

can be granted . . . .” Id. at 42-43. It also argued that the court could not award

monetary damages because the legislature has not created a private right of action

and monetary damages would violate separation of powers principles. Id. at 54-56.

In support of its CR 12(b)(1) motion, the State argued that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction over the monetary damages claim because the WSD failed to submit a

tort claim to the Office of Risk Management before filing suit. Id. at 56-57.

       The WSD conceded that it failed to file a tort claim form and thus that its

claim for monetary damages was barred. Id. at 89.5

       The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. Id. at 160. The

WSD appealed directly to our court. Id. at 161, 164. We retained the case.6

       5
         The trial court dismissed all claims without specifying the basis for its dismissal.
CP at 160. In briefing before our court, the WSD does not withdraw its concession. It
seeks only to preserve its right to file a tort claim, and then amend its complaint
accordingly thereafter, if it prevails on the other grounds in our court. It has not prevailed
on those other grounds; we therefore do not address the WSD’s briefing about whether it
could file such a tort claim now, if it did otherwise state a claim.
       6
        Ord., Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. State, No. 101052-4 (Wash. Nov. 30,
2022). Amicus briefs were filed by the Washington State School Directors’ Association,
the Washington Association of School Administrators, and Attorneys for Education
Rights.
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                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

      We review CR 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo. Trujillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc.,

183 Wn.2d 820, 830, 355 P.3d 1100 (2015). Dismissal is appropriate if the court

concludes that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would justify recovery. Id.

We presume that the factual allegations of the complaint are true and draw all

reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor. Gorman v.

City of Woodinville, 175 Wn.2d 68, 71, 283 P.3d 1082 (2012) (citing Reid v.

Pierce County, 136 Wn.2d 195, 201, 961 P.2d 333 (1998)).

                                       ANALYSIS

   I. Neither McCleary nor Seattle School District explicitly address whether
      article IX, section 1 includes capital construction costs within the definition
      of “education” that the State, alone, must amply fund

      Article IX, section 1 of the Washington Constitution provides that “it is the .

. . duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children . . . .”

Seattle School District and McCleary interpreted this provision and gave broad

meaning to terms like “ample” and “education.” But neither opinion explicitly

decided whether capital construction costs are included within the educational

costs that article IX, section 1 requires the State, alone, to amply fund.

      Our court did issue one unpublished, postopinion order in 2017 that

addressed this point. That order stated that the McCleary decision “did not address

capital costs or suggest that capital expenditures are a component of basic

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Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

education for purposes of article IX, section 1, such that the State must fully fund

capital costs attendant to the basic education program.” Ord., McCleary,

[https://perma.cc/KZ7Z-YYJH], supra, at 31. That was correct: the McCleary

opinion based its holding on a set of specific, detailed facts developed in a lengthy

trial. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 512-13. This court’s chosen remedy, to enforce the

implementation of ESHB 2261 and the prototypical school model, was based on

the evidence presented at trial and the then-current state of legislative funding and

research. Id. at 546-47. Neither ESHB 2261 nor the prototypical school model

required the State to fund capital costs. But neither did they explicitly exclude

capital costs.

      Our court did terminate jurisdiction in McCleary when we determined that

the legislature had complied with article IX, section 1 without requiring the

legislature to provide for capital costs. But, as stated above, the McCleary decision

did not address or require capital costs in the first instance—in large part because

the legislative scheme enacted in ESHB 2261 did not address this. So our decision

to terminate jurisdiction in McCleary still did not directly answer the question of

whether capital costs are included in the “education” required by article IX, section

1. Instead, our decision to terminate jurisdiction meant that we agreed that the

legislature had complied with the specific requirements of our 2012 decision. Ord.,

McCleary, [https://perma.cc/EJP5-L7FP], supra, at 1-2, 4 (“The court has

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Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

measured progress specifically according to the areas of basic education identified

in Engrossed Substitute House Bill (ESHB) 2261 (LAWS OF 2009, ch. 548) and the

implementation benchmarks established by Substitute House Bill (SHB) 2776

(LAWS OF 2010, ch. 236).”, “The court concludes that the State has complied with

the court’s orders to fully implement its statutory program of basic education by

September 1, 2018, and has purged its contempt.”).

         As a result, we must still decide whether capital expenditures are a

component of the “education” that article IX, section 1 requires the State, alone, to

amply fund.

   II.      Interpreting article IX, section 1 in the context of the Washington
            Constitution compels the conclusion that capital construction costs are
            not a component of the “education” that the State, alone, must amply
            fund

         “The ultimate power to interpret, construe and enforce the constitution of

this State belongs to the judiciary.” Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wn.2d at 496; Wash.

State Highway Comm’n v. Pac. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 59 Wn.2d 216, 222, 367 P.2d

605 (1961) (“The construction of the meaning and scope of a constitutional

provision is exclusively a judicial function.”). “When interpreting constitutional

provisions, we look first to the plain language of the text and will accord it its

reasonable interpretation.” Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass’n v. Yarbrough, 151

Wn.2d 470, 477, 90 P.3d 42 (2004) (citing Anderson v. Chapman, 86 Wn.2d 189,

191 543 P.2d 229 (1975)). We also consider the provision at issue in the context of
                                           17
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

the rest of the constitution. See Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 288, 892 P.2d

1067 (1994) (“When construing a statute or constitutional provision, the context in

which the language arises should also be considered.” (citing Dawson v. Daly, 120

Wn.2d 782, 791, 845 P.2d 995 (1993)); Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wn.2d at 510

(“Careful examination of our constitution reveals that the framers declared only

once in the entire document that a specified function was the State’s paramount

duty.”). If the plain language of the provision in context is ambiguous, we may

look to the historical context of the constitutional provision for guidance; this can

include the legislative history surrounding a constitutional amendment and material

in the official voters’ pamphlet. Wash. Water Jet Workers, 151 Wn.2d at 477;

Zachman v. Whirlpool Fin. Corp., 123 Wn.2d 667, 671, 869 P.2d 1078 (1994)

(citing Wash. Econ. Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Grimm, 119 Wn.2d 738, 743, 837 P.2d 606

(1992)).

      We therefore start with the plain language of article IX, section 1.

           A. Article IX, section 1’s plain language, “education,” alone does not
              resolve whether the State’s duty to amply fund education includes a
              duty to amply fund all capital costs

      “It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the

education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or

preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.” WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. As

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Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

stated above, Seattle School District defined the term “education” as used in article

IX, section 1 as one that

      “comprehends all that series of instruction and discipline which is
      intended to enlighten the understanding, correct the temper, and form
      the manners and habits of youth, and fit them for usefulness in the
      future. In its most extended signification it may be defined, in
      reference to man, to be the act of developing and cultivating the
      various physical, intellectual, aesthetic and moral faculties.”

90 Wn.2d at 516. In addition, we held that that education “must prepare our

children to participate intelligently and effectively in our open political system,” it

“must prepare them to exercise their First Amendment freedoms both as sources

and receivers of information,” and it “must prepare them to be able to inquire, to

study, to evaluate and to gain maturity and understanding.” Id. at 517-18; U.S.

CONST. amend. I.

      McCleary expanded on that definition of article IX, section 1’s plain

language. It held that “education” means “the basic knowledge and skills needed

to compete in today’s economy and meaningfully participate in this state’s

democracy.” 173 Wn.2d at 483. McCleary also explained that this right to

education is a right to educational opportunities, not a right to guaranteed

educational outcomes. Id. at 524-25.

      Thus, McCleary and Seattle School District both provide broad definitions

of the constitution’s term “education.”

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Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

      But both courts also explicitly stated that the legislature plays a key role in

defining the reach of that term. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wn.2d at 518-19; McCleary,

173 Wn.2d at 524 (“the legislature properly plays a key role in defining article IX,

section 1—though this court remains the final arbiter on questions of

interpretation”). In other words, this court has the duty to define the broad

constitutional guidelines of an education, and the legislature has the duty to give

substantive content to the program of basic education. McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at

526; Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wn.2d at 518-19.

      The legislature has done so. It defines a basic education as

      that which is necessary to provide the opportunity to develop the
      knowledge and skills necessary to meet the state-established high
      school graduation requirements that are intended to allow students to
      have the opportunity to graduate with a meaningful diploma that
      prepares them for postsecondary education, gainful employment, and
      citizenship. Basic education by necessity is an evolving program of
      instruction intended to reflect the changing educational opportunities
      that are needed to equip students for their role as productive citizens
      and includes the following:
             (a) The instructional program of basic education the minimum
      components of which are described in RCW 28A.150.220;
             (b) The program of education provided by chapter 28A.190
      RCW for students in residential schools as defined by RCW
      28A.190.005 and for juveniles in detention facilities as identified by
      RCW 28A.190.010;
             (c) The program of education provided by chapter 28A.193
      RCW for individuals under the age of eighteen who are incarcerated
      in adult correctional facilities;
             (d) Transportation and transportation services to and from
      school for eligible students as provided under RCW 28A.160.150
      through 28A.160.180; and

                                          20
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

             (e) Statewide salary allocations necessary to hire and retain
      qualified staff for the state’s statutory program of basic education.

RCW 28A.150.200(2). Additionally, RCW 28A.150.210 lists four basic education

goals. 7 The rest of chapter 28A.150 RCW provides details of the basic education

that the legislature outlines above. For example, RCW 28A.150.220 specifies

“minimum instructional requirements” that set the minimum hours of instruction.

      None of these definitions, goals, or details explicitly include capital

construction costs or buildings as an aspect of the basic education required by

article IX, section 1’s language. But these definitions don’t explicitly exclude

capital construction costs, either. And it is certainly true that students need

buildings, labs, and gyms to gain an education.

      7
          It lists four broad basic education goals:

             (1) Read with comprehension, write effectively, and communicate
      successfully in a variety of ways and settings and with a variety of
      audiences;
             (2) Know and apply the core concepts and principles of
      mathematics; social, physical, and life sciences; civics and history,
      including different cultures and participation in representative government;
      geography; arts; and health and fitness;
             (3) Think analytically, logically, and creatively, and to integrate
      technology literacy and fluency as well as different experiences and
      knowledge to form reasoned judgments and solve problems; and
             (4) Understand the importance of work and finance and how
      performance, effort, and decisions directly affect future career and
      educational opportunities.

RCW 28A.150.210.
                                               21
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

      We therefore conclude that the plain language of article IX, section 1, as

interpreted in McCleary and Seattle School District and as further described by the

legislature, does not alone provide an answer.

          B. In the context of the full constitution, however, article IX, section 1
             makes capital construction costs a shared funding responsibility of the
             school districts and the State, not an exclusive funding responsibility
             of the State

      We therefore examine article IX, section 1 in the context of the rest of the

Washington Constitution. Several constitutional provisions address capital

construction costs. Taken together, these constitutional provisions (1) treat school

capital construction funding differently than they treat other education funding and

(2) make it easier for local school districts to raise funds for school capital

construction funding than for other education funding.

      First, article VII, section 2(a) provides an extension of up to six years for

local levies to provide support for school construction and modernization. WASH.

CONST. art. VII, § 2(a). But it treats local levies for noncapital school costs

separately; it provides an extension of up to only four years for levies to support

those nonconstruction costs.

      Article VII, section 2(b), also lists capital costs separately. WASH. CONST.

art. VII, § 2(b). It permits taxing districts to exceed the general levy limit of one

                                           22
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

percent of the value of property for the purpose of making required payments of

principal and interest on general obligation bonds issued for “capital purposes.”

      In addition, article IX, section 3 treats school capital construction costs

differently. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3. It establishes a common school

construction fund exclusively to fund the construction of facilities for common

schools. The fund draws financing from the sale of timber, from interest accrued

on the permanent school fund, and from “such other sources as the legislature may

direct.”

      Finally, article VIII, section 6 treats school capital construction costs

differently from other education costs. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6. It generally

limits a municipality’s ability to incur debt to one and one-half percent of the value

of taxable property without the assent of three-fifths of the voters. And even with

the assent of three-fifths of the voters, a municipality cannot exceed five percent

indebtedness on the value of taxable property. But it contains two exceptions to

this limit: it permits a locality to incur debt greater than the five percent limit of the

value of taxable property for water, light, and sewer supplies and for a school

district’s “capital outlays.”

                                           23
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

       The State argues that these provisions show that the constitution treats

school capital costs as a shared responsibility between the State and local school

districts. 8 State of Wash.’s Resp. Br. at 30.

       We agree.

       Most of the constitutional provisions summarized immediately above

provide for sharing capital construction costs between the local school district and

the State. They create a workable scheme (with State guaranties) for local school

districts to float levies and issue bonds for capital construction costs. And they give

local school districts more flexibility to raise funds for capital construction than for

other education funding needs.

       In other words, when we interpret article IX, section 1 in the context of the

rest of the constitution, it is clear that the constitution as a whole treats funding for

school capital costs differently than it treats funding for other education costs. In

general, the constitution provides greater flexibility for local districts to raise funds

for school capital construction—creating a scheme in which the State and local

districts share the responsibility for funding school capital construction.

       8
          There is one provision that seemingly applies to both school construction costs
and general school costs. Article VIII, section 1(e) states that the “state may pledge the
full faith, credit, and taxing power of the state to guarantee the voter approved general
obligation debt of school districts in the manner authorized by the legislature. Any such
guarantee does not remove the debt obligation of the school district and is not state debt.”
WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e).

                                             24
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

          C. The Washington Constitution treated school capital costs differently
             from other education costs from the earliest days

      We can also look to the historical context and development of a

constitutional provision for guidance. Wash. Water Jet Workers, 151 Wn.2d at 477;

Zachman, 123 Wn.2d at 671. The historical context shows that the constitution, the

legislature, and the people have historically treated capital construction costs

differently from other education costs. And the burden of funding those costs has

always been shared between the State and the locality.

      First, the development of article IX, section 3 shows that historically—from

the time of statehood until the middle of the 20th century—school construction

costs were a local obligation. Article IX, section 3 of our state constitution creates

both a common school fund and common school construction fund. However, the

common school construction fund was not added until 1966.

      One early case from our court, Sheldon v. Purdy, interpreted the original text

of article IX, section 3—that is, the language that created the common school fund

before the common school construction fund was added to article IX, section 3. 17

Wash. 135, 140, 49 P. 228 (1897). The issue in Sheldon was whether funds held

by the county treasurer that originated from both the constitutional common school

fund as well as a county common school tax could be used to pay interest on bonds

a school district issued for the purpose of constructing a school. Id. at 136-38. We

held, in part, that the common school funds could not be used for such a purpose:
                                          25
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

      This fund, under the constitution, is devoted to the support of the
      public schools. That portion coming from the irreducible common
      school fund is devoted to the payment of current expenses. The
      building of new school houses and the purchase of school house sites
      do not come within any authorized signification of “current
      expenses.” Neither do they come within any well-defined acceptation
      of “support of the common schools.” Both the terms “support” and
      “current expenses,” when applied to the common schools of this state,
      mean continuing regular expenditures for the maintenance of the
      schools. Building a new school house and purchasing a site, while at
      times necessary and proper, are unusual and extraordinary
      expenditures; and the legislature, in consonance with the constitution,
      has evidently had this in mind. Two methods have been provided for
      building school houses—the first by a special tax levied by the district
      as provided in § 818, and the second as prescribed by § 2697—the
      bond act. In both ways the school district, alone and locally, assumes
      the responsibility of the expenditure; and it may not divert taxes raised
      for other purposes by the county commissioners, and paid by a general
      tax of the county, and aided by appropriations from the state to the
      payment of its special local debt.

Id. at 140-41.

      The State relies on Sheldon to argue that article IX, section 1 excludes

school construction costs. State of Wash.’s Resp. Br. at 48-49. The State is correct

that the common school fund established by the original article IX, section 3 did

not provide state funding for school capital construction costs—as Sheldon stated

in the quoted passage above. It was not until 1966 that article IX, section 3 was

amended to create the fund specifically to provide state support for school

construction.

      This certainly shows that the State’s burden to support the construction of

schools increased over time. But it also shows that the State’s burden to support the
                                         26
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

construction of schools was always treated as separate from the State’s burden to

fund other education costs.

      The history of article VII, section 2(a) compels the same conclusion. It also

treated school capital costs and other school costs differently, and it also provided

the local districts with greater flexibility to raise funds for school capital costs than

for other school costs. As discussed above, article VII, section 2(a) was the one

that was amended in 1976 to add the exception giving local districts greater

flexibility to levy taxes for common schools. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 2(a)

(amend. 64). Then, in 1986, the provision was amended again so that local districts

could levy additional taxes for the construction or modernization of school

facilities. Id. (amend. 79).

      Article VIII, section 6 has a similar history. It was amended in 1952 to

include its current language, allowing indebtedness for school construction to

exceed the otherwise applicable one and a half percent debt limit. WASH. CONST.

art. VIII, § 6 (amend. 27).

      This history confirms that the Washington Constitution treats school

construction costs differently than it treats other school costs. It shows that the

constitution gives local school districts greater ability to raise local funds for

school capital costs than for other school purposes. Additionally, as article IX,

section 3 and Sheldon show, our constitution gave the State no constitutional

                                           27
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

obligation to assist in funding school capital costs at all until 1966—historically,

the local districts had to fund their own school construction projects.

          D. The Washington Constitution provides that the State shares the
             responsibility to fund school capital construction costs with local
             school districts

      The language, context, and development of the constitution confirm that that

document treats school capital costs differently from other education costs. This

language, context, and development also show that the State shares the

responsibility for such capital costs with the local districts. The State

acknowledges this shared responsibility. State of Wash.’s Resp. Br. at 30 (“the

Constitution treats such costs as a shared responsibility between the State and local

school districts,” 57 (the “State’s position in this case” is that “public school

construction is a shared responsibility between the State and local voters”).

      The WSD, however, does not. It has maintained throughout this case that

the State bears sole responsibility for funding school capital construction costs. CP

at 28 (complaint); WSD’s Opening Br. at 21-23, 19 (“‘the paramount’ duty does

not mean ‘a shared’ duty” (italics omitted)). As a result, the WSD did not address

how much responsibility the State might bear for school capital construction costs

if it were less than 100 percent of those costs.

      We therefore do not address whether there are constitutional parameters to

this shared responsibility. We hold only that the article IX, section 1 “education”

                                           28
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

for which the State, alone, must provide ample funding does not include school

capital construction costs.

                                     CONCLUSION

      The Washington Constitution (1) treats capital construction costs differently

from other educational costs, (2) provides local districts with greater flexibility to

raise funds for capital construction costs than for other educational costs, and (3)

allocates shared responsibility for school capital costs to the state and the local

districts. As a result, school capital construction costs are not a component of the

“education” that the State, alone, must amply fund under article IX, section 1.

      We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss.

                                          29
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 101052-4

WE CONCUR:

                                              O'Donnell, J.P.T.

                                         30
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. State

                                    No. 101052-4

      JOHNSON, J. (concurring)—The Wahkiakum School District argued only

that by not providing the full cost of school capital construction the State has not

met the burden set in article IX, section 1 of the Washington Constitution. The

majority opinion thus looked solely at this argument, assessing whether capital

costs are included in the paramount duty to provide education that we have

established belongs wholly to the State. I concur in the majority conclusion that

school capital construction costs are not a component of the education that the

State alone must amply fund under article IX, section 1. However, the parties did

not brief anything about whether article IX, section 3 provides any further

obligation regarding capital costs. On remand, the parties should examine how

much responsibility the State may bear for capital construction costs if it is not

solely responsible for such costs and whether article IX, section 3 creates an

obligation on the part of the State to spend money generated from the common

construction fund in a certain manner.
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. State, No. 101052-4
(Johnson, J., concurring)

       Article IX, section 31 first establishes the common school fund and lays out

sources of funding. It also establishes the common school construction fund, which

       1
           “SECTION 3 FUNDS FOR SUPPORT. The principal of the common school fund as
the same existed on June 30, 1965, shall remain permanent and irreducible. The said fund shall
consist of the principal amount thereof existing on June 30, 1965, and such additions thereto as
may be derived after June 30, 1965, from the following named sources, to wit: Appropriations
and donations by the state to this fund; donations and bequests by individuals to the state or
public for common schools; the proceeds of lands and other property which revert to the state by
escheat and forfeiture; the proceeds of all property granted to the state when the purpose of the
grant is not specified, or is uncertain; funds accumulated in the treasury of the state for the
disbursement of which provision has not been made by law; the proceeds of the sale of stone,
minerals, or property other than timber and other crops from school and state lands, other than
those granted for specific purposes; all moneys received from persons appropriating stone,
minerals or property other than timber and other crops from school and state lands other than
those granted for specific purposes, and all moneys other than rental recovered from persons
trespassing on said lands; five per centum of the proceeds of the sale of public lands lying within
the state, which shall be sold by the United States subsequent to the admission of the state into
the Union as approved by section 13 of the act of congress enabling the admission of the state
into the Union; the principal of all funds arising from the sale of lands and other property which
have been, and hereafter may be granted to the state for the support of common schools. The
legislature may make further provisions for enlarging said fund.
         “There is hereby established the common school construction fund to be used exclusively
for the purpose of financing the construction of facilities for the common schools. The sources of
said fund shall be: (1) Those proceeds derived from the sale or appropriation of timber and other
crops from school and state lands subsequent to June 30, 1965, other than those granted for
specific purposes; (2) the interest accruing on said permanent common school fund from and
after July 1, 1967, together with all rentals and other revenues derived therefrom and from lands
and other property devoted to the permanent common school fund from and after July 1, 1967;
and (3) such other sources as the legislature may direct. That portion of the common school
construction fund derived from interest on the permanent common school fund may be used to
retire such bonds as may be authorized by law for the purpose of financing the construction of
facilities for the common schools.
         “The interest accruing on the permanent common school fund together with all rentals
and other revenues accruing thereto pursuant to subsection (2) of this section during the period
after the effective date of this amendment and prior to July 1, 1967, shall be exclusively applied
to the current use of the common schools.
         “To the extent that the moneys in the common school construction fund are in excess of
the amount necessary to allow fulfillment of the purpose of said fund, the excess shall be
available for deposit to the credit of the permanent common school fund or available for the
current use of the common schools, as the legislature may direct.”

                                                 2
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. State, No. 101052-4
(Johnson, J., concurring)

is to be used exclusively for financing the construction of common school

facilities, and lays out the sources of funding. The section establishing the common

school construction fund was added by amendment in 1966. In the voters’

pamphlet, the amendment was proposed as one part of a three-part package

intended to provide immediate and long-term funds for local school construction.

The package was to fund school facility construction while easing the tax burden

on local property owners. The pamphlet, drafted by the legislature, specifically

noted that overburdened local school districts were facing significant hardships to

finance school construction, with some districts needing to increase local property

taxes as much as double. The amendment was passed as a way to avoid such tax

increases. The common school construction fund was intended to provide money

for new facilities to districts that required the State’s assistance. Today, that

assistance is out of reach for some of the districts that need it most.

       In the present day, local school districts access the funding from the common

school construction fund through the School Construction Assistance Program

(SCAP). Through SCAP, the State will provide funding assistance to help local

school districts pay for school facility construction. However, to receive that

funding, the school district must first raise revenues to demonstrate there is

matching local financial support for the proposed project (referred to as “local

                                             3
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. State, No. 101052-4
(Johnson, J., concurring)

validation”). WASH. OFF. OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, SCHOOL

CONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: SUMMARY HANDBOOK 9 (2021),

https://www.k12.wa.us/sites/default/files/public/schfacilities/pubdocs/SCAP%20Su

mmary%20Handbook%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DA4-DA9F]. Districts

raise local funds to finance capital improvements or construction through things

like the sale of bonds, sale of short-term obligations, voter-authorized capital

levies, proceeds from investments of capital project money, and mitigation and

impact fees. Most methods are funded through property taxes on real property in

the district. The State will not distribute any funds until the district has expended

its share of the costs for the project.

       For large counties, this is acceptable as income levels and population density

are relatively high. Those districts have more money and also more people to share

in the cost of school facility construction. For small districts, the requirement that

local districts raise matching funds first can be prohibitive. For Wahkiakum,

raising the necessary funds has not been possible, and voters have repeatedly

decided against the proposed measures.

       As the district has pointed out, Wahkiakum is a small and rural county.

Voters have a per capita income around $29,000, with 57 percent of students from

low-income households. They have been unable to raise local funding sources

needed to qualify for SCAP funding because the voters do not want to pay the

                                             4
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. State, No. 101052-4
(Johnson, J., concurring)

additional local taxes. Even if they could pass a measure to fund the necessary

construction, it would certainly be burdensome to local residents.

       Wahkiakum has been denied access to SCAP thus far. Because they cannot

access SCAP, the district’s only option is to apply for a small school district

modernization grant. The State notes that the capital construction fund has excess

funds available to districts without a showing of local support. Such grants are

intended for school districts of 1,000 students or fewer with school facilities that

have significant building system deficiencies. However, such grants are limited in

amount and are not accessible for districts where the facilities need to be replaced

or require extensive modernization. The existing fund distribution system does not

offer relief to Wahkiakum.

       In its briefing, the State said that the legislature has appropriated half a

billion dollars to support the SCAP fund, with an additional $3.9 billion projected

for future biennia. The fund for small school district modernization grants amounts

to $49.7 million. Essentially, the State is saying that the construction funds are

there, but districts like Wahkiakum are denied access to them. The way SCAP is

structured seems to be the exact opposite of what the construction fund was created

to provide. The existing program does not help the districts that need it the most

because they cannot pass the necessary bond. The State should not selectively deny

                                             5
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. State, No. 101052-4
(Johnson, J., concurring)

funds for high quality education environments based on the district’s lack of local

monetary support.

       As the majority and State point out, the district’s claim in this case was not

that the State must appropriate enough money so that certain school districts do not

fall below some unspecified threshold based on a school district’s voter base’s

willingness and practical ability to raise funds itself. The district should make that

argument. On remand, the parties should discuss how much responsibility the State

may bear for school capital construction costs if it is less than 100 percent of those

costs, and whether article IX, section 3 creates an obligation that the common

school construction fund be distributed in a manner that is accessible to the low-

income, rural districts.

                                                 ______________________________

                                             6