Court Opinion

ID: 9548237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:00:21.416406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:40.894518
License: Public Domain

WELCH, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority opinion which allows recovery of exemplary damages or punitive damages in this case. I do not think that the record justifies the conclusion stated in the majority opinion “that lessee was motivated by oppression or malice”. I think rather that the lessee was motivated by a desire, and was making effort, to dispose of the salt water.
It seems there was substantially more salt water here involved than is usually encountered in drilling operations of this size, but I think when the lessee has compensated plaintiff in full for all actual damages, that there is no sufficient basis for assessing further damages against defendant as punitive damages.
The only authority cited by plaintiff to sustain his right to exemplary or punitive damages is our former decision in Oden v. Russell, 207 Okl. 570, 251 P.2d 184. It requires but a casual examination of that decision to see that the cases are sharply different. It is at once apparent that under the facts there shown the recovery of exemplary or punitive damages was fully justified, but no such malicious or oppressive action or conduct is shown in this case.
In the case of Tinker v. Scharnhorst, 129 Okl. 118, 263 P. 645, we held in paragraph 5 of the syllabus as follows:
“Exemplary damages are imposed by the law on the theory of punishment to the offender, for the general benefit of society, and as a restraint to the transgressor, and are allowed only in cases where malice, fraud, oppression, or gross negligence enter into the cause of action.”
I agree with the rule of law stated in paragraph 2 of the majority opinion here, but on the stated facts in the majority opinion I think the requirements of the rule of law are not met in this case. I therefore think the majority opinion does not do even justice in this case, and is not sound as a precedent for future cases where similar facts are presented. I therefore dissent.