Court Opinion

ID: 9632478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:16:25.870915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:48.879405
License: Public Domain

FISHER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting
The majority concludes that the District Court was correct in declining to abstain under Younger from reaching the merits of Judge Kendall’s appeal, and that the District Court properly held that the Virgin Islands Legislature (the “Legislature”) violated the separation of powers principle of the Virgin Islands Revised Organic Act of 1954 (the “ROA”) in enacting Act 3876 (the “Act”), thereby empowering the Commission on Judicial Disabilities (the “Commission”) to remove judges from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. I respectfully dissent. In my view, the District Court should have abstained under Younger principles, which require federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state or territorial proceedings, and therefore should not have reached the merits of the instant case.
I.
The ROA states that “[t]he judicial power of the Virgin Islands shall be vested in a court of record designated the ‘District Court of the Virgin Islands’ established by Congress, and in such appellate court and lower local courts as may have been or may hereafter be established by local law.” 48 U.S.C. § 1611(a). The ROA provides that the District Court of the Virgin Islands has appellate jurisdiction over the territorial courts of the Virgin Islands, id. § 1613a(a), but that, upon the Legislature’s establishment of a local appellate court, “all appeals from the decisions of the courts of the Virgin Islands established by local law not previously taken must be taken to that appellate court.”11 Id. § 1613a(d). The Legislature created the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands (the “V.I. *1040Supreme Court”) on October 29, 2004, pursuant to Act 6687, which reads in part: “The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court, or as otherwise provided by law.”12 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 32(a); see also id. §§ 32-33. Thus, the Virgin Islands territorial judicial system now includes the Superior Court and the V.I. Supreme Court. Consequently, the V.I. District Court will cease to serve as an appellate tribunal once it finishes its review of any appeals taken prior to the passage of Act 6687. See 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d).
The ROA also provides that “[t]he rules governing the practice and procedure of the courts established by local law and those prescribing the qualifications and duties of the judges and officers thereof . . . shall be governed by local law or the rules promulgated by those courts.” Id. § 1611(c). Correspondingly, the Legislature adopted the Act on September 9,1976, which created, inter aha, the Commission and granted it the power to initiate removal proceedings against territorial judges “[o]n its own initiative, or upon complaint of any person” under certain circumstances. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 657(b)(1); see also id. § 656(a)(2). The Act further states that “such removal . . . become[s] effective upon affirmance of an appeal from an order of removal filed in the district court by the Commission (or upon expiration of the time within which such an appeal may be taken).” Id. § 656(a)(2)(C). Once the Commission files an order of removal or involuntary retirement, the aggrieved judge “shall have twenty days within which to petition the district court to review such order,” in which case the court “shall review the proceedings giving rise to such order and shall either affirm or reverse the order or remand the cause to the Commission for further proceedings in accordance with its order.” Id. § 659. During this process, the reviewing court shall follow the “[r]ules of procedure governing appeals in civil actions.” Id. Thus, the ROA gave the Legislature the authority to regulate the conduct of the *1041local judiciary, which it exercised by creating the Commission, and the ROA also established the V.I. District Court as the court with jurisdiction over local matters until the creation of territorial courts.
II.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-43, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), held that, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts must abstain from enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions, based on principles of equitable relief, federalism, and comity.13 Younger “and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State BarAss’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982). “The policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved. The importance of the state interest may be demonstrated by the fact that the noncriminal proceedings bear a close relationship to proceedings criminal in nature . . . .” Id. at 432 (citations omitted); see also Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that “the national policy against enjoining pending state court proceedings has since been extended to noncriminal judicial proceedings” and administrative proceedings). Middlesex specifically extended Younger principles to administrative proceedings (in that case, state attorney disciplinary proceedings). 457 U.S. at 425.
As the majority notes, “[ajbstention under Younger is appropriate only if (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.” Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Middlesex, 457 *1042U.S. at 432). My assessment of these three factors in the context of the instant appeal leads me to conclude that the District Court erred by not abstaining.
A.
The first Middlesex factor is whether “there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature.” Id. For an ongoing state action that is not in a typical court setting, some “traditional indicia of a judicial action” include the filing of a complaint to initiate a removal proceeding against a state court judge, using rules of procedure, employing a burden of proof, and having the qualities of a proceeding “adjudicative in nature.” Coruzzi v. New Jersey, 705 F.2d 688, 690 (3d Cir. 1983). The availability of appellate review of the proceeding by a state court is an additional indicia of a judicial action. Zahl, 282 F.3d at 209. We have further made clear that state administrative proceedings may be judicial in nature. Id. I will first discuss the “traditional indicia” mentioned in Coruzzi and then turn to the availability of judicial review, at the center of this case.
1.
As noted earlier, removal proceedings can be initiated “upon complaint of any person.” V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 657(b)(1). If the Commission begins an investigation into possible misconduct by a judge, it must first hold a hearing, of which the judge must receive notice and at which he shall “be represented by counsel, [and be able to] offer evidence in his own behalf, and confront and cross-examine witnesses against him.” Id. § 657. The Commission must keep a record of the hearing and may administer oaths; order the inspection of books and records; subpoena witnesses, testimony, or documents; and order depositions. Id. Additionally, all of the Commission’s expenses and its members’ salaries are paid from funds appropriated to the judiciary and it has access to judicial facilities and employees. Id. § 655. These aspects of the Commission overlap substantially with the “traditional indicia of a judicial action” identified in Coruzzi and strongly suggest that the Commission’s proceedings are “adjudicative in nature.”
2.
Moreover, judicial review of the Commission’s orders is available. As described in detail below, I believe the judiciary has the power to make *1043final decisions regarding removal of judges on account of misconduct, “persistent failure to perform judicial duties,” or “other conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice,” because the Act expressly provides that orders of removal “become effective upon affirmance of an appeal from an order of removal filed in the district court by the Commission (or upon expiration of the time within which such an appeal may be taken).” Id. § 656(a)(2). Pursuant to the Act’s language, and following the enactment of Act 6687, the Commission must file all orders of removal in the V.I. Supreme Court, which must affirm any appealed orders before they become effective. Upon review, the V.I. Supreme Court follows the “[rjules of procedure governing appeals in civil actions,” and must then affirm, reverse, or remand the action to the Commission. Id. § 659. Because the majority disagrees that appellate review of Commission decisions exists, I will explain in detail the reasons for my conclusion.
The majority concludes that the Commission cannot meet the Middlesex test because judicial review of Commission decisions is unavailable. Judge Kendall argues, and the District Court agreed, that the creation of the V.I. Supreme Court did not amend the Commission’s authorizing statute and therefore the V.I. District Court remains the only venue for the Commission to file removal orders. Judge Kendall contends that under Estate of Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, 923 F.2d 258, 261 (3d Cir. 1991), the Legislature could not vest jurisdiction for review of Commission orders in the V.I. District Court through the Act because this amounts to an expansion of a federal court’s jurisdiction, and only Congress has such power. Following from this, the majority concludes in Part II.A. 1 of its opinion that this would amount to an improper expansion of the V.I. District Court’s jurisdiction. However, unlike most federal district courts, the V.I. District Court doubled as the court with appellate jurisdiction over purely local matters. Therefore, the Legislature was simply acknowledging that, at the time of the Act’s adoption, the V.I. District Court functioned as the proper appellate tribunal over territorial courts, and was not granting the V.I. District Court power it did not already have.
Furthermore, based upon an analysis of our precedent and a plain reading of the ROA at 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d), I believe the statute authorizing the Commission was implicitly amended upon the creation of the V.I. Supreme Court, and that the Commission must now file all orders *1044of removal in the V.I. Supreme Court. In Berne v. Boschulte, which related specifically to the creation of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, the district court acknowledged that “[unfortunately, the legislature has never taken the trouble to make technical, conforming amendments to all the code provisions which previously implemented the District Court’s local civil jurisdiction.” 6 F. Supp. 2d 443, 444, 39 V.I. 217 (D.V.I. 1998). Berne then cited several cases, including one of our decisions, recognizing that the V.I. District Court’s “divestiture ... of jurisdiction over all local civil actions has nevertheless repeatedly been recognized.” Id.; see also Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. v. Rawlins, 70 E3d 270, 273, 33 V.I. 280 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[Bjecause the amended section [granting the Superior Court original jurisdiction in certain actions] divests the district court of jurisdiction over purely local matters, it also implicitly repealed [the section allowing appeal of administrative actions to the V.I. District Court] as it pertains to local matters.”).
Thus, we have previously encountered the issue of implicit repeal of the V.I. District Court’s jurisdiction as a result of the creation of the V.I. Superior Court. See Walker v. Gov’t of the V.I., 230 E3d 82, 85, 43 V.I. 265 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the V.I. District Court’s original jurisdiction to hear local matters was implicitly repealed by the placement of original jurisdiction over all local civil actions into the hands of the territorial court); see also 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a), (d) (providing for the expiration of the V.I. District Court’s appellate jurisdiction upon the establishment of a local appellate court). Nonetheless, if we revisit the issue now, in this analogous context, we may find a repeal by implication “if (1) provisions in two acts are in irreconcilable conflict or (2) it is clear that an earlier act was intended to be replaced by a subsequent act completely covering the same subject. In any event, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.” In re Guardianship of Penn, 15 F.3d 292, 295, 29 V.I. 396 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gov’t of the V.I. v. Mills, 935 F.2d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1991)). As my discussion indicates, here I would find the second prong satisfied and that Act 6687 implicitly repealed the V.I. District Court’s grant of appellate jurisdiction over Commission decisions.
Finally, Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 49 V.I. 1133 (3d Cir. 2007), provides the clearest support for the logical inference that the V.I. Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all appeals previously within the *1045appellate jurisdiction of the V.I. District Court. Edwards acknowledges that the creation of a territorial appellate court supersedes the appellate division of the V.I. District Court:
“The Revised Organic Act of 1954 granted the District Court ‘appellate jurisdiction to review the judgments and orders of the inferior courts of the Virgin Islands to the extent now or hereafter prescribed by local law.’ In 1984, the Revised Organic Act was amended to provide that when the Virgin Islands legislature established an appellate court, that court would supercede the appellate division of the District Court with respect to new appeals.”
“The Virgin Islands legislature has now provided for the establishment of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, see Russell v. DeJongh, 491 F.3d 130[, 131-33, 48 V.I. 1062] (3d Cir. 2007), and it has repealed the prior statute establishing the Appellate Division of the District Court. The appellate division of the District Court will cease existence when the last case pending is decided.”
Id. at 359 n.2 (emphasis added in first paragraph) (citations omitted). Here, the District Court erred in concluding that there is no procedure for appellate review of the Commission’s findings; on the contrary, the Act has been amended implicitly, thereby requiring the Commission to file any order of removal in the V.I. Supreme Court, and allowing the affected judge to obtain review of the order by the V.I. Supreme Court.
Implicit amendment of the Act is further supported because Act 6687 vests appellate review of Superior Court decisions, and those otherwise provided by law, in the V.I. Supreme Court. This is in accord with the Act, which clearly provides for appellate review of Commission decisions, and naturally called upon the only court that, at the time of the enactment, had appellate jurisdiction over local matters to engage in this review (i.e., the V.I. District Court). See In re Guardianship of Penn, 15 F.3d at 296 n.10 (“It is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the new provision is presumed in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marlowe v. Bottarelli, 938 F.2d 807, 813 (7th Cir. 1991))). Any contrary interpretation of the *1046interaction between Act 6687 and the Act would render § 1613a(d) of the ROA meaningless because it specifically provides that all appeals must be taken to the V.I. Supreme Court once it is created, instead of the V.I. District Court. See United States v. Cooper, 396 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is a well known canon of statutory construction that courts should construe statutory language to avoid interpretations that would render any phrase superfluous.”).
In United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court heard an appeal that claimed the Federal Magistrates Act (“FMA”) violated Article III of the Constitution. The FMA provided that a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations would be subject to a de novo determination “ ‘by the judge who . . . then [exercises] the ultimate authority to issue an appropriate order.’ ” Id. at 682 (alterations in original) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-625, at 3 (1976)). Under the FMA, “ ‘[the] authority — and the responsibility — to make an informed, final determination . . . remains with the judge.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271, 96 S. Ct. 549, 46 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976)). The U.S. Supreme Court held that the “delegation does not violate Art. Ill so long as the ultimate decision is made by the district court.” Id. at 683.
I find the Commission to be similar to the review system upheld in Raddatz: it must file orders with the judicial branch, judges subject to removal orders may petition the court for review, and, upon a judge filing a petition, the court must review the proceedings giving rise to the order and then affirm, reverse, or remand the action to the Commission. See V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 4, § 659. Further, when hearing the petition, the judiciary must follow the same rules of procedure as those followed in civil actions. Id.
As Judge Kendall notes, approximately forty U.S. jurisdictions have judicial review bodies outside the judicial branch. He argues, however, that the powers of those other commissions are “limited to investigating and making a recommendation to a court,” which then has “complete plenary review” of any recommendation. But, it is only logical that the V.I. Supreme Court considers the Commission’s orders under a de novo *1047standard.14 And, as stated above, I would conclude that the final decision on the removal of a judge for misconduct rests in the hands of the judiciary, through the V.I. Supreme Court, and not with the Commission. Accordingly, I would hold that Act 6687 implicitly amended the Act’s language directing appeals to the V.I. District Court, and that the V.I. Supreme Court currently has the same power of review over the Commission’s decisions that the Appellate Division of the V.I. District Court previously had.
As a result, I would conclude that Judge Kendall’s current appeal relates to an ongoing state proceeding that is judicial in nature and, accordingly, the first Middlesex factor is satisfied.
B.
Neither the District Court nor the majority disputes the satisfaction of the second factor — whether the Commission’s proceedings implicate important territorial interests — and I agree. I will therefore move directly to the third factor.
C.
Finally, Younger abstention requires “an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. Federal courts are not to suspect that a state court would preclude an aggrieved plaintiff from raising his federal constitutional claims, because such an assumption “would reflect negatively on the state’s willingness to enforce federal constitutional principles. Avoiding just such an intimation . . . lies at the heart of the Younger doctrine.” Coruzzi, 705 F.2d at 691. The Supreme Court has made clear that “the burden on this point rests on the federal plaintiff to show ‘that state procedural law barred presentation of [its] claims.’ ” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987) (alteration in original) *1048(quoting Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 432, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979)). The majority concludes that the lack of any judicial review results in no meaningful chance for a judge under investigation to raise federal constitutional challenges and that, even if a judge could raise those arguments before the Commission, the Commission’s local administrative process does not amount to a full and fair opportunity to litigate such claims. I disagree with both conclusions.
In Middlesex, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by the argument that the state court judge facing disciplinary proceedings had no opportunity to raise his federal constitutional claims when he had never attempted to raise those claims in the state proceedings. 457 U.S. at 435. Likewise, Judge Kendall did not attempt to raise constitutional claims before the Commission, and argues that it is “unclear” whether the Commission would refuse to entertain such claims. Even assuming the Commission was unable to consider such arguments, this would not be fatal. We have stated that “[t]he third part of the [Middlesex] test ‘is satisfied in the context of a state administrative proceeding when the federal claimant can assert his constitutional claims during state-court judicial review of the administrative determination.’ ” Zahl, 282 F.3d at 210 (quoting O’Neill v. City of Phila., 32 F.3d 785, 792 (3d Cir. 1994)). As in Schall, the Legislature has not placed any limitations on issues appealable from Commission proceedings, and I do not perceive any. See 885 F.2d at 107. The Pennzoil Court further stated that:
“Article VI of the United States Constitution declares that ‘the Judges in every State shall be bound’ by the Federal Constitution, laws, and treaties. We cannot assume that state judges will interpret ambiguities in state procedural law to bar presentation of federal claims. Accordingly, when a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.”
481 U.S. at 15 (citation omitted). As discussed, I would conclude that the V.I. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the Commission’s decisions and that, upon review, it may also consider the appellant’s federal constitutional claims, which it is fully equipped to consider. Therefore, the third Middlesex factor is satisfied, as there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal constitutional challenges.
*1049D.
Judge Kendall argues that even if we conclude that all three Middlesex factors are met, we should still refuse to abstain under Younger from reaching the merits because “other extraordinary circumstances exist, such as proceedings pursuant to a flagrantly unconstitutional statute, such that deference to the state proceeding will present a significant and immediate potential for irreparable harm to the federal interests asserted.” Schall, 885 F.2d at 106. He thus contends that the Commission’s proceedings are unconstitutional and threaten to cause him irreparable injury.
The Supreme Court has stated that in this context “ ‘[t]he accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.’ ” Younger, 401 U.S. at 45 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44, 46 S. Ct. 492, 70 L. Ed. 927 (1926)). I read this to imply that federal courts should be mindful of their role vis-á-vis state courts. Though the majority’s conclusions regarding the merits of the instant appeal are not without some persuasive force, I decline to reach the merits in this dissent because I believe it is precisely this type of inquiry that the Virgin Islands judiciary should undertake itself and I cannot view the Act, on its face, as “flagrantly unconstitutional.”
Moreover, irreparable injury is an “insufficient” ground for a federal court to interfere with a state proceeding “unless it is both great and immediate.” Id. at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted). This requires a heightened showing of injury from that required for a permanent injunction or for standing purposes. It must exceed harm related simply to “cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution.” Id.; see also Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[Sjimply being indicted and forced to stand trial is not generally an injury for constitutional purposes . . . .”); Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66, 69, 261 U.S. App. D.C. 334 (D.D.C. 1987) (“Although it is surely true that an innocent person may suffer great harm to his reputation and property by being erroneously accused of a crime, all citizens must submit to a criminal prosecution brought in good faith so that larger societal interests may be preserved.” (as quoted in Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 184)). Harm to reputation based on criminal *1050charges certainly outweighs the reputational harm Judge Kendall claims on the basis of the Commission’s judicial review proceedings. Because Judge Kendall cannot meet the high burden of demonstrating irreparable harm with concerns merely to his reputation and social relationships, I do not believe we should refuse to abstain on irreparable injury grounds.
III.
In conclusion, I would abstain under Younger from reaching the merits of Judge Kendall’s case because all three factors of the Middlesex test are present. In my view, the Commission is not trying a case, it is simply tasked with determining whether a territorial court judge can continue to serve. There is no need for the federal courts to reach the merits of this case when the Commission may not find that Judge Kendall engaged in any misconduct. Congress gave the V.I. Legislature the power to prescribe the qualifications and duties of judges, and I would allow the Commission and the V.I. Supreme Court to determine for themselves whether the Commission violates the separation of powers doctrine of the ROA. I therefore respectfully dissent. Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the District Court.

 I will refer to the Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands, which previously had jurisdiction to review appeals from Virgin Islands territorial courts, as the “V.I. District Court” throughout this opinion. The V.I. District Court continues to have jurisdiction to decide the same types of cases as any typical federal district court (e.g., federal question and diversity cases).

 Although the majority concludes that the Commission is not a “court” within the meaning of 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d), which lists the bodies over which the V.I. District Court has jurisdiction, see Majority Op. at Part H A. 1,1 believe this does not end our inquiry. Given the express provision for appellate review of Commission decisions in the Act, I would hold that Act 6687 granted the V.I. Supreme Court jurisdiction over Commission decisions when it stated that the V.I. Supreme Court has jurisdiction “over all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court, or as otherwise provided by law." V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 32(a) (emphasis added); see also discussion infra Part H.A.2.

 Our sister courts of appeals have recognized that Younger abstention principles apply in territorial proceedings as well. See, e.g., Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2004) (applying Younger abstention principles to administrative proceedings in Puerto Rico); see also Att’y Gen. of Guam v. Torres, 419 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005), withdrawn sub nom. as moot, Att’y Gen. of Guam v. Thompson, 441 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “proceedings in Guam’s courts may be treated as ‘state judicial proceedings,’ ” and therefore applying Younger abstention principles). I therefore undertake my analysis much as we would under any traditional argument that we should abstain pursuant to Younger.

 Though not completely analogous for separation-of-powers concerns, the Virgin Islands has an Ethics and Grievance Committee (the “Committee”) to review attorney misconduct. The Committee may not disbar an attorney without a court order following the Committee’s findings and recommendations. The court’s review in this scenario is “virtually de novo, except [it] do[es] not hear and consider anew live testimony”; it may adopt the Committee’s disciplinary recommendation or impose its own. V.I. Bar ex rel. Ethics & Grievance Comm. of the V.I. Bar v. Brusch, 49 V.I. 409, 412 (V.I. 2008).