Court Opinion

ID: 9942951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 15:06:44.593261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:25.523572
License: Public Domain

20230264
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                           IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                        CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                             FEBRUARY 22, 2024
                                                                         STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                    IN THE SUPREME COURT
                    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                 2024 ND 31

Stephanie J. Nelson,                                     Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Travis C. Nelson,                                    Defendant and Appellant
      and
State of North Dakota,                         Statutory Real Party in Interest

                                No. 20230264

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District,
the Honorable Steven E. McCullough, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Kristen A. Hushka, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Kimberlie M. Larson, West Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellant.
                          Nelson v. Nelson, et al.
                              No. 20230264

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Travis Nelson appeals a district court’s order granting Stephanie
Nelson’s motion to relocate their children to the Minneapolis, Minnesota area
and the subsequent amended judgments. Travis Nelson appeals several of the
court’s findings of fact and argues it misapplied the law when interpreting
Stout-Hawkinson factors one, two, and four. He also argues that the court
placed too much significance on Stephanie Nelson’s new marriage, which
creates a “super factor” outside the Stout-Hawkinson factors. We affirm.

                                      I

[¶2] Travis and Stephanie Nelson divorced in November 2018. The couple
have two children, A.J.N. and L.J.N. Stephanie Nelson received primary
residential responsibility and Travis Nelson received weekly parenting time.
Travis and Stephanie Nelson remained in the Fargo area after the divorce. In
early 2020, A.J.N. and L.J.N. attended weekly counseling sessions, but at the
time of trial attended biweekly counseling sessions.

[¶3] In September 2021, Stephanie Nelson married Brady Rupard. Rupard
lives and works in Forest Lake, Minnesota, and has a career as a “trouble”
lineman for a major energy company. Stephanie Nelson and Rupard maintain
two households. In September 2022, Stephanie Nelson made a motion to
relocate to the “North metro area of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area of
Minnesota” to live with Rupard. Travis Nelson challenged the motion.

[¶4] On January 31, 2023, the district court commenced a two-day
evidentiary hearing, found relocation is in the children’s best interests, and
granted Stephanie Nelson’s motion to relocate. The court found Stout-
Hawkinson factors one and two outweighed factors three and four. The court

                                      1
amended its original judgment to adjust Travis Nelson’s parenting time and to
allow relocation.

[¶5] Travis Nelson timely appealed and moved to stay enforcement of the
judgment to relocate. The district court denied the motion for a stay.

                                        II

[¶6] “A district court’s decision on a motion to relocate is a finding of fact,
which will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.” Green v.
Swiers, 2018 ND 258, ¶ 4, 920 N.W.2d 471 (citing Larson v. Larson, 2016 ND
76, ¶ 21, 878 N.W.2d 54). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced
by an erroneous view of the law, there is no evidence to support it, or, if there
is some evidence to support the finding, on the entire record we are left with a
definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Graner v. Graner, 2007
ND 139, ¶ 12, 738 N.W.2d 9. “In applying the clearly erroneous standard, we
will not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, retry a custody case, or
substitute our judgment for the trial court’s decision merely because this Court
may have reached a different result.” Norby v. Hinesley, 2020 ND 153, ¶ 5, 946
N.W.2d 494. This Court also held “that a trial court may draw inferences from
facts presented and may make a finding of fact based upon an inference
supported by the evidence.” Id.

[¶7] “A parent with primary residential responsibility for a child may not
change the primary residence of the child to another state except” when the
other parent consents or by decree or court order that allows for parenting time
with the non-moving parent. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-07(1). “The parent moving for
permission to relocate has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the move is in the child’s best interests.” Larson, 2016 ND 76, ¶ 21. A
district court, in determining whether relocation is in the child’s best interests,
must apply the Stout-Hawkinson factors. Green, 2018 ND 258, ¶ 5. The Stout-
Hawkinson factors include:

                                        2
      “1. The prospective advantages of the move in improving the
      custodial parent’s and child’s quality of life,

      2. The integrity of the custodial parent’s motive for relocation,
      considering whether it is to defeat or deter visitation by the
      noncustodial parent,

      3. The integrity of the noncustodial parent’s motives for opposing
      the move,

      4. The potential negative impact on the relationship between the
      noncustodial parent and the child, including whether there is a
      realistic opportunity for visitation which can provide an adequate
      basis for preserving and fostering the noncustodial parent’s
      relationship with the child if relocation is allowed, and the
      likelihood that each parent will comply with such alternate
      visitation.”

Green, at ¶ 5. “No single factor is dominant, and what may be a minor factor
in one case may have a greater impact in another.” Stai-Johnson v. Johnson,
2015 ND 99, ¶ 6, 862 N.W.2d 823. When the moving “parent desires to move to
live with a new spouse, we conclude that fact becomes dominant in favor of
allowing the move.” Norby, 2020 ND 153, ¶ 12.

                                        A

[¶8] Travis Nelson argues the district court erred by finding Stout-
Hawkinson factor one favored relocation.

[¶9] The first factor considers, “[t]he prospective advantages of the move in
improving the custodial parent’s and child’s quality of life.” Green, 2018 ND
258, ¶ 5. “In analyzing the first Stout-Hawkinson factor, ‘the district court must
balance the advantages of the move, while recognizing the importance of
maintaining continuity and stability.’” Norby, 2020 ND 153, ¶ 8. The court
must weigh economic and noneconomic advantages for the move. Id. The
information the court may consider includes:

                                        3
      “The custodial parent’s proposed employment at the relocation
      site, whether the custodial parent’s and child’s health and well-
      being are benefitted, whether the custodial parent has remarried
      and requests to move to live with the new spouse, whether the
      custodial parent will have more time to spend with the child,
      whether there are family members who will provide a support
      network, the child’s reasonable preference, and educational
      opportunities.”

Id. “Analysis of the first factor also requires focus on the importance of
maintaining continuity and stability in the custodial family.” Id. at ¶ 12
(cleaned up).

[¶10] The district court found several advantages of relocation for Stephanie
Nelson, including that residing in a single, family home with Rupard would be
beneficial. Rupard and Stephanie Nelson currently reside in different
households with duplicative expenses. The court found the couple would
benefit financially from having a single, family home because Rupard works
70 hours a week to meet the expenses of the two households. The court also
found that a single, family home would allow Rupard to have more time with
A.J.N. and L.J.N.

[¶11] The district court found relocation would benefit A.J.N. and L.J.N. The
children’s benefits include establishing a relationship with Rupard’s children
and Stephanie Nelson’s extended family. The relocation would negatively affect
relationships of friends and Travis Nelson’s extended family in the Fargo area.
Moreover, the court found that A.J.N. and L.J.N.’s maternal grandmother
planned on moving to Minnesota and would give the children a familiar face in
the area. The children’s counselor testified she is “not sure” if the outcome of
the relocation hearing would affect the children.

[¶12] The district court found some coinciding benefits for Stephanie Nelson
and the children. The court heard testimony that if it denied the motion to
relocate, Stephanie Nelson would obtain a part-time job to assist in covering
expenses. Stephanie Nelson is a stay-at-home parent. If the court denied the

                                       4
motion, she would spend less time with the children. Furthermore, Stephanie
Nelson provided an exhibit about the potential cities where she plans to
relocate. The exhibit included crime statistics, schools, parks, counselors, and
other amenities from Cambridge, Forest Lake, and North Branch, Minnesota.
Her research also compared Fargo crime statistics to these potential relocation
sites. The court found the relocation sites to be safe with good schools and
amenities for the children.

[¶13] The district court’s findings were not induced by an erroneous view of
the law, evidence exists to support the finding, and, on the entire record, this
Court is not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake was made. The
court did not err in its application of the facts or law in the analysis of the first
Stout-Hawkinson factor.

                                         B

[¶14] Travis Nelson argues the district court erred in finding Stephanie
Nelson’s motion to relocate does not lack integrity because she allegedly
hampered his ability to meet with the children. He also alleges Rupard did not
fully investigate relocating to Fargo.

[¶15] The second Stout-Hawkinson factor requires inquiry into “[t]he integrity
of the custodial parent’s motive for relocation, considering whether it is to
defeat or deter visitation by the noncustodial parent.” Green, 2018 ND 258, ¶ 5.

[¶16] The district court found that Stephanie Nelson did not make the motion
to relocate to affect Travis Nelson’s parenting time, but to solidify her personal
life. The record does not show any serious attempts of blocking Travis Nelson’s
parenting time outside of a few incidents. These incidents do not indicate
future problems with his ability to maintain a relationship with A.J.N. and
L.J.N. The court made comments about Travis and Stephanie Nelson’s ability
to co-parent. The court said, “this is some of the mildest disagreement I’ve ever
seen in these cases.” Moreover, “[t]here’s always friction when there’s a divorce.

                                         5
Nobody agrees with everything the other side does.” Finally, the court said,
“you guys are getting along great.”

[¶17] Rupard testified the Fargo branch of his employer does not have a
“trouble” lineman department similar to the one he works at in the
Minneapolis area and he is unable to transfer from his current position to one
in Fargo. Rupard testified that he does not know if similar employers in the
Fargo/Moorhead area have “trouble” lineman departments. Rupard earned
$260,019 in gross wages for 2022, and he testified he would not receive as great
of earnings in Fargo. Rupard testified that moving to Fargo and earning
$104,000 would affect his ability to meet his financial obligations, including
$4,000 in monthly child and spousal support.

[¶18] The district court’s findings on the second Stout-Hawkinson factor were
not induced by an erroneous view of the law, evidence exists to support the
findings, and, on the entire record, this Court is not left with a definite and
firm conviction a mistake was made. The court did not err in its application of
the facts or law in the analysis of the second Stout-Hawkinson factor.

                                       C

[¶19] Travis Nelson claims the district court erred in interpreting the fourth
Stout-Hawkinson factor. He argues the court erred in finding the fourth factor
“can only mandate denial of relocation if the court determines the relocating
parent will not foster the parent-child relationship of the other parent.”
Loosely, he argues this Court should expand the definition of “exceptional
circumstances” to include certain facts that weigh in his favor.

[¶20] The fourth Stout-Hawkinson factor considers:

      “The potential negative impact on the relationship between the
      noncustodial parent and the child, including whether there is a
      realistic opportunity for visitation which can provide an adequate
      basis for preserving and fostering the noncustodial parent’s
      relationship with the child if relocation is allowed, and the

                                       6
      likelihood that each parent will comply with such alternate
      visitation.”

Green, 2018 ND 258, ¶ 5.

[¶21] “When considering the potential negative impact on the relationship
between the [non-moving] parent and the child, the ability to restructure
parenting time to preserve the relationship is relevant.” Green, 2018 ND 258,
¶ 10. “A relocation should be denied based on the fourth factor only in
exceptional circumstances, including when the court finds” the parent with
residential responsibility “would not foster the child’s relationship with the
[non-moving] parent and would not comply with any [parenting time] the court
could order.” Hruby v. Hruby, 2009 ND 203, ¶ 23, 776 N.W.2d 530. The fact a
non-moving parent “will not be able to maintain the same [parenting time]
schedule is not, alone, a basis for denying permission to” the parent with
residential responsibility “to leave the state with the child.” Negaard v.
Negaard, 2002 ND 70, ¶ 16, 642 N.W.2d 916. “Distance alone is not a sufficient
basis to deny relocation; it must be considered in the context of the ability to
refashion a visitation schedule that can foster” the relationship between the
child and the non-moving parent. Norby, 2020 ND 153, ¶ 22.

[¶22] Travis Nelson is misinterpreting the district court’s order and the Stout-
Hawkinson factors. The court relied on Green to clarify “exceptional
circumstances.” 2018 ND 258, ¶ 10. In Green, this Court held that relocation
should be denied if a parent seeking the move does not foster a child’s
relationship with the non-moving parent or does not comply with court-ordered
parenting time. Id. at ¶ 15. Here, the court found Stephanie Nelson’s proposed
new parenting plan allows Travis Nelson significant time with the children,
but he would not receive the same amount of time as the initial divorce decree.
Stephanie Nelson’s proposed parenting plan for Travis Nelson includes two
weekends per month, all extended holiday weekends during the school year
with caveats for Christmas and Thanksgiving, and most of the summer except
a week in July that excludes Independence Day.

                                       7
[¶23] The district court also found Stephanie Nelson does not hinder Travis
Nelson’s ability to maintain a relationship with the children. The court found
Stephanie Nelson showed flexibility and allowed communication between
Travis Nelson and the children during his military deployments.

[¶24] The district court found that Travis Nelson was able to maintain a
relationship with his son from a previous relationship with a similar parenting
plan that split parenting time between Fargo and Minneapolis where the son
and former spouse lived. The court found the distance between the children
and Travis Nelson is not “automatically and irrevocably damag[ing] his parent-
child relationship.” The children’s counselor testified that she did not know the
impact on the children with less continuous time with their father. Travis
Nelson’s son from a previous relationship testified that his childhood would
have been easier if both parents lived in the same area. He also said that, based
on his experience, the distance between A.J.N. and L.J.N. with Travis Nelson
would not be beneficial. He also testified he has a good relationship with Travis
Nelson.

[¶25] Travis Nelson is asking this Court to expand “exceptional circumstances”
from Green. 2018 ND 258, ¶ 10. He argues “exceptional circumstances” exist
here because he now has nearly equal parenting time, attends the children’s
extracurriculars and counseling, has a loving fiancée, the children have a half-
brother, and has extended family nearby with similarly aged cousins. All these
circumstances are within the analysis of the other Stout-Hawkinson factors.
Thus, including these circumstances in factor four would be repetitive.

[¶26] The district court’s findings were not induced by an erroneous view of
the law, evidence exists to support the findings, and, on the entire record, this
Court is not left with a definite and firm conviction the district court made a
mistake.

                                       8
                                         D

[¶27] Travis Nelson claims the district court created a “super factor” by placing
too much emphasis on Stephanie Nelson’s marriage to Rupard.

[¶28] The district court must give credence to all Stout-Hawkinson factors, but
can give more weight to the relocating parent’s motion to relocate when it is an
attempt to be with a spouse. Norby, 2020 ND 153, ¶ 12. Here, the court applied
all the factors in its analysis. It found that factor three did not favor relocation.
Additionally, the court found that factor four did not outweigh “the strength of
the other factors in favor of allowing relocation.” The court noted in its findings
that “[t]he relocation will permit Stephanie to live with her new spouse and his
children in a single family unit.” The court did not solely rely on the new
marriage when granting relocation. The court did not create a “super factor” in
granting the motion to relocate. The court relied on all Stout-Hawkinson
factors to make its decision. The court’s findings were not induced by an
erroneous view of the law, evidence exists to support the finding, and, on the
entire record, this Court is not left with a definite and firm conviction the
district court made a mistake.

                                        III

[¶29] The district court did not err in applying the Stout-Hawkinson factors to
the facts. The court’s findings were not induced by an erroneous application of
the Stout-Hawkinson factors. The evidence from the record supports the court’s
findings. This Court is not left with a definite and firm conviction the district
court made a mistake when applying the Stout-Hawkinson factors. We affirm.

[¶30] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                                         9