Court Opinion

ID: 9895180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 00:29:58.243716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:32.965989
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                        OF TEXAS
                                        NO. WR-95,035-01

                           EX PARTE JAMES RENFRO, Applicant

                ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
              CAUSE NO. 2013-437,890-A IN THE 140TH DISTRICT COURT
                            FROM LUBBOCK COUNTY

       Per curiam. YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. KEEL, J., filed a dissenting opinion
in which KELLER, P.J., and SLAUGHTER, J., joined.

                                          OPINION

       Applicant pleaded guilty to continuous sexual abuse of a child and was sentenced to thirty

years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction. Applicant filed this application for a writ

of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.

       Applicant contends that his plea was involuntary because he had an incorrect understanding

of the plea bargain, specifically as it pertained to the applicable punishment range and parole

consequences of his plea. In support, Applicant argues that the trial court erroneously admonished

him during the plea hearing as to the punishment range for the offense and to his parole eligibility.
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Applicant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) erroneously advising him as to the

punishment range and his parole eligibility, and (2) failing to correct the trial court’s erroneous

admonishments during the plea hearing. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law

and recommends that relief be denied based on laches or, alternatively, on the merits. We disagree.

We do not believe that laches should bar relief in this particular case because the record shows that

Applicant’s guilty plea was involuntary.

        Trial counsel filed an affidavit alleging he accurately advised Applicant regarding the parole

consequences of pleading guilty. Applicant alleges that, at the time he entered his guilty plea, he

incorrectly believed that he was pleading to a thirty-year sentence with the possibility of parole after

serving fifteen years when in reality that he was pleading to a thirty-year sentence that had to be

served day-for-day. The transcript from the plea hearing supports Applicant’s, not trial counsel’s,

allegations. It shows that the trial court affirmatively misadvised Applicant that he would be eligible

for parole after serving half of his sentence when he was in fact ineligible for parole, that Applicant

confirmed that this was his understanding, and that trial counsel (as well as the State) not only failed

to correct the trial court’s erroneous admonishment but affirmed its accuracy. Applicant credibly

asserts that the difference between his understanding and reality regarding his parole eligibility was

a “deal breaker”; He would have exercised his right to a jury trial had he been advised and

admonished correctly about parole.

        Relief is granted. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The judgment in cause

number 2013-437,890 in the 140th District Court of Lubbock County is set aside, and Applicant is

remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Lubbock County to answer the charges as set out in the

indictment. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant within ten days from the date of
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this Court’s mandate.

       Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional

Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Delivered: NOVEMBER 01, 2023
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