Court Opinion

ID: 7809487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:11:06.09477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:25.736482
License: Public Domain

HART, J., (on rehearing). It is earnestly insisted by counsel for appellant that, under the terms of the contract, the appellant might abandon his contract of purchase at .any time he chose to do so. The provision referred to is as follows: “Now, upon the payment of the above designated installments at the time and in the manner therein set forth, the said party of the first part obligates itself, successors and assigns, to convey to said party of the second part the land hereinbefore described. But if the purchase money for said land is not paid at the time and in the manner herein specified, upon the second default made in said payments, all of said installments remaining unpaid shall at once become due and payable, and the obligation resting on the party of the first part shall become null and void, and the money therefore paid on account of the said purchase shall remain with and be the property of the party of the first part, and shall be considered as so much rent paid by said party of the second part for the use of said property from the date of this instrument to the date of such default in payment; but nothing herein contained shall release the party of the second part from his obligation to pay the balance owing by him on his subscription contract, notwithstanding such default on his aforesaid purchase contract, and in case of default, as above, the party of the first part shall have at once a right of action upon the subscription contract against the party of the second part for the balance owing thereon, without any obligation resting upon it to further perform its contract by conveying to the party of the second part the real estate above described.” The contention of counsel for appellant is not sound for two reasons. In the first place the contract provides that upon the second default made in the payments, the obligation resting on the party of the first part shall become null and void and the money theretofore paid on account of said purchase shall remain with and be the property of the first party, and shall be considered as so much rent paid by the party of the ■second part. Now, the Little Bock Chamber of Commerce is the party of the first part, and Murrey is the party of the second part. This stipulation in the contract was for the benefit of the Chamber of Commerce, and it had the right to waive it if it chose to do so. Therefore the original opinion, instead of being in conflict with the cases of Ish v. Morgan, McRae & Co., 48 Ark. 413, and Murphy v. Myar, 95 Ark. 32, is in accord with them. Again it will be noticed that the stipulation, above referred to provides that nothing in the contract shall release Murrey from his obligation to pay the balance owing by him on his subscription contract and that in case of default the Chamber of Commerce shall have a right of action against him upon the subscription contract without any obligation resting upon it to further perform the contract by conveying the real estate to him. It follows that the motion for rehearing will be denied.