Court Opinion

ID: 2770422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-01-15 22:07:02.723519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:40.162385
License: Public Domain

J-S77030/14

IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION            :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO E.A.F., Jr.        :          PENNSYLVANIA

                                          :
APPEAL OF E.A.F., Sr., FATHER             :
                                          :            No. 1990 EDA 2014
                                          :

                 Appeal from the Decree entered June 13, 2014,
                 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,
                     Orphans’ Court Division, at No. A2013-54

BEFORE: STABILE, JENKINS, AND STRASSBURGER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:                         FILED JANUARY 15, 2015

        E.A.F., Sr. (Father), appeals from the decree of the Court of Common

Pleas of Lehigh County, entered on June 13, 2014, that terminated his

parental rights to his son, E.A.F., Jr., born in July of 2011, pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).         We

affirm.

          The record supports this recitation of the facts of this case. Lehigh

County Office of Children and Youth Services (LCOCYS) first became aware

of this family on September 12, 2011, when it received a referral alleging

domestic violence between Mother and Father. LCOCYS received a second

referral on September 29, 2011, when Child was approximately two months

old, that Child had been hospitalized with dehydration and constipation. He

was diagnosed with “Hirschprung's Disease” and underwent surgery to

correct the condition.     Another incident of domestic violence occurred on


    Retired Senior Judge assigned to Superior Court.
J-S77030/14

November 9, 2011, when Father struck Mother in the face while she was

holding Child. Father was charged with simple assault.

        Child was hospitalized again on December 5, 2011, with bacterial

infections that required strict adherence to a particular treatment regimen.

Mother voluntarily placed Child in the custody of LCOCYS when she was

unable to care for Child’s medical needs. The trial court adjudicated Child

dependent on February 9, 2012, and placed him in the legal and physical

custody of LCOCYS. Neither parent was present for the Adjudication.

        The adjudication order required the parents to submit to drug testing

once a week for three months; schedule and undergo a drug and alcohol

evaluation and follow through with all the recommendations of that

evaluation; attend all of Child’s medical appointments; attend all meetings at

SafeStart regarding Child; attend visits with the Child two times per week

for two hours each; engage in parenting classes; continue to attend Lehigh

Valley Community Mental Health for mental health treatment and sign a

release of information to provide their treatment records to LCOCYS; obtain

legal    employment     and   stable   housing;   and   follow   through   with

recommendations made by the LCOCYS.

        The trial court held the first permanency review hearing in this matter

on May 3, 2012.        Father attended but Mother, who was aware of the

hearing, did not.      The trial court found that there had been minimal

compliance with its order by Father, no compliance by Mother, and that

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neither parent had made any progress toward alleviating the circumstances

that necessitated Child’s placement.     Of twenty-four visits scheduled with

Child, Father attended two and Mother attended one.           Neither parent had

submitted to drug testing.

      The trial court held a second permanency review on August 9, 2012.

Neither parent attended that hearing.        The trial court found that neither

parent had made any progress toward alleviating the circumstances that led

to Child’s placement, nor had either parent complied with the permanency

plan or visited with Child. The whereabouts of the parents were unknown

and neither had any contact with LCOCYS. The trial court ordered services

for the parents to remain as previously ordered.

      In August 2012, LCOCYS assigned caseworker Heather Hudson to

Child’s case. At trial, Ms. Hudson testified about her attempts to engage the

parents in services and the parents’ failure to participate successfully in any

court-ordered services. N.T. 11/28/13, at 7-9.

      LCOCYS filed a motion for aggravated circumstances on January 30,

2013, alleging the parents’ failure to maintain substantial and continuing

contact with Child for a period of more than six months.          The trial court

heard the motion for aggravated circumstances at a permanency review

hearing   held   on   February   14,   2013,    and   found    that   aggravated

circumstances existed. Father appeared at this hearing, but Mother did not.

The trial court again found neither compliance with, nor progress by, either

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parent in the court-ordered reunification services or in rectifying the

circumstances that led to Child’s placement.

      On April 11, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on LCOCYS’ request to

modify Child’s placement by placing him in kinship care with his Paternal

Grandmother, T.P. The trial court denied the request on the ground of the

bond that Child had developed with his foster parents and foster sibling after

sixteen months of placement in their home.

      At a permanency review hearing on September 23, 2013, the trial

court found that neither parent had complied with the permanency plan, and

that neither had made any progress toward reunification. By this time, Child

had been in the custody of LCOCYS and had been placed with the same

foster family for twenty-one months.

      LCOCYS filed its petitions for the involuntary termination of the

parental rights of Mother and Father on May 7, 2013. The trial court held a

hearing on those petitions on October 28, 2013. Testifying at that hearing

were caseworker, Heather Hudson; casework supervisor, Rhoda Stoudt;

SafeStart childhood development manager, Dana Henry; Child’s court-

appointed special advocate, Beverly Walton; Mother; and Father.       On June

13, 2014, the trial court entered its Decree terminating the parental rights of

Mother and Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8),

and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Father filed a timely notice of appeal on July 8,

2014, and a notice of appeal amended to include his statement of errors

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complained of on appeal on July 9, 2014. Mother did not file an appeal and

she is not a party to this appeal.

      Father raises the following questions on appeal:

      1. Did the lower court err when it found that [LCOCYS] had
      proven by clear and convincing evidence that the paternal rights
      of [Father] should be terminated?

      2. Did the lower court err when it found that termination of the
      parental rights of [Father] served the best interests of [Child],
      when the circumstances that necessitated the original placement
      of [Child] into the custody of [LCOCYS] no longer existed and
      [Father] had an appropriate family member willing and able to
      take custody of [Child]?

Father’s Brief, at 5.

      Our standard of review is as follows:

      In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our
      scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
      presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal
      conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will
      reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial
      court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked
      competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s
      decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

      Further, we have stated:

            Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by
      competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court
      even though the record could support an opposite result.
            We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have
      adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not
      evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible
      evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of
      the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all
      credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.
      Though we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and

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     deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve
     errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial
     court’s sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

     Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are

governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:

     § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

     (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
     may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

                                    ...

        (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
        six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
        either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
        parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
        parental duties.

        (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
        or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
        essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
        his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
        causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
        will not be remedied by the parent.

                                    ...

        (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
        by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
        for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
        to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
        the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
        a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
        reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
        the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
        child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
        the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
        of the child.

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                                     ...

       (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
       by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
       agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
       removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
       removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
       termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
       and welfare of the child.

                                     ...

     (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
     developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
     child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
     the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
     furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
     beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
     filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
     consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
     described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
     giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

     In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need

only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to

subsection (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en

banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).

     It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights

bears the burden of proving the grounds to do so by “clear and convincing

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct,

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

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J-S77030/14

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In

re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004). Further,

      A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
      parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in
      resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-
      child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting
      for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental
      responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her
      physical and emotional needs.

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal

citations omitted).

      To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), the

person or agency seeking termination must demonstrate through clear and

convincing evidence that, for a period of at least six months prior to the

filing of the petition, the parent’s conduct demonstrated a settled purpose to

relinquish parental rights or that the parent has refused or failed to perform

parental duties.      In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.

Super. 2003).

      With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held:

      Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
      duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the
      court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s
      explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment
      contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the
      effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
      Section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 550 Pa.595, 602, 708 A.2d 88, 92

(1988). Further,

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     the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case
     and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.
     The court must examine the individual circumstances of each
     case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing
     termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the
     evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly
     warrants the involuntary termination.

In re N.M.B., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

     The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and

welfare of the child.”   23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).    The Act does not make

specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but

our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 533
Pa. 115, 620 A.2d 481 (1993). However, this Court has held that the trial

court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding

evaluation performed by an expert.    In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533

(Pa. Super. 2008).

     Before we address the merits of Father’s appeal, we must address

certain shortcomings in his brief.   In the argument section of his brief,

Father argues the claims that he makes in his questions presented, i.e., that

LCOCYS failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his

parental rights should have been terminated, that the termination of his

rights was not in Child’s best interests, and that a family member is

available to care for Child. Father also argues, however, that LCOCYS came

to the litigation with unclean hands, and that the trial court terminated his

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rights pursuant to the wrong subsections of the statute.          We will not

consider the question of kinship care for Child or the question of LCOCYS’

unclean hands on the ground that Father has waived these issues by failing

to raise them in his statement of errors complained of on appeal.          See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 542 (Pa. Super.

2008). We must also reject Father’s “unclean hands” claim on the ground

that he failed to support it with any reference to our law, and has thusly

failed to develop an adequate argument.           “The failure to develop an

adequate argument in an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim

under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.” Commonwealth v. Beshore, 916 A.2d 1128, 1140

(Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citation omitted). “[A]rguments which are not

appropriately   developed   are   waived.       Arguments   not   appropriately

developed include those where the party has failed to cite any authority in

support of a contention.”   Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (internal citations omitted).     See Chapman-Rolle v. Rolle,

893 A.2d 770, 774 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating, “[i]t is well settled that a

failure to argue and to cite any authority supporting an argument constitutes

a waiver of issues on appeal”) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 90

(Pa. Super. 2005)).

     Finally, we decline to consider Father’s complaint that the trial court

erred when it terminated his parental rights pursuant to subsections 23

Pa.C.S.A. 2511(a) (2), (5) and (a)(8).       He asserts subsections 2511(a)(5)

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and (8) do not apply to the facts of this case and asserts the court erred in

applying subsection 2511(a)(2) because father’s mother was willing and able

to care for Child. Appellant’s Brief, at 14-17.     The trial court decision

thoroughly addresses subsections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), in addition to

subsection 2511(a)(1). We, however, need only agree with the trial court’s

analysis pursuant to one subsection, and we have chosen to analyze its

determination pursuant to subsection (a)(1). See Z.S.W., supra.

      Our review of the record reveals that the trial court’s decision to

terminate Father’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§2511(a)(1) and (b),

and to permit Child’s adoption without notice to or consent from Father, is

supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that there was no abuse of

the trial court’s discretion.

      We have carefully read the trial court opinion in this matter and are

fully satisfied that it ably addresses the issues Father has raised on appeal.

Therefore, rather than conduct our own analysis of those issues, we will

affirm the trial court’s decree on the basis of the concise, thoughtful, and

well-written opinion of the Honorable Carol H. McGinley.

      Decree affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/15/2015

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                                                                             ,                           901 A.2d 502, 508 (pa. Super. 2006). First, the

Court looks at the parent's conduct. ld. The petitioner has the burden of showing by clear and

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 In re: Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights 10 E.A.F., Jr.
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 convincing evidence that a statutory reason for termination exists. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.

 745 (1982). Second, once the court has determined a statutory ground for termination has been

established, the court focuses on the child's needs and welfare. In re Adoption 0/ R.J.S., supra.

         All children are entitled to certain irreducible minimum requirements from their parents,

including adequate housing, clothing, food, love, and supervision. In Re: J. w., 578A.2d 952

(pa. Super. 1990). In addition, a parent must exhibit reasonable firmness in attempting to

overcome any barriets or obstructive behavior of others and affirmatively demonstrate love,

protection and concern for the child. In Re: C.MS., 832 A.2d 464 (pa. Super. 2003).

         The Court must examine the circumstances of the case and also consider all explanations

offered to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants

involuntary termination. Matter ofAdoption a/Charles E.D.M, II, 550 Pa. 595,601,708 A.2d

88,91 (Pa. 1998), The petitioner has the burden of producing evidence that is so clear, direct,

weighty and convincing so as to enable the court to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitation of the truth of the precise facts at issue. In re: Child M, 681 A.2d 793 (pa. Super.

1996).

MOTHER

         When B.A.F., Jr. was two months old, he experienced a serious medical condition

requiring surgery and several hospitalizations. The Child was discharged to the care of his

parents after the first few hospitalizations. The medical complications continued to increase and

the parental responsibility grew to include training to administer medication to the child. Neither

parent completed the training. Mother was overwhelmed by the responsibility of caring for the

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Child, which included the care required in tending to his medical needs: and, on December 12,

2011, Mother voluntarily placed E.A.F., Jr. with LCOCYS. Father's whereabouts at that time

were unknown.

        On February 9, 2012, at approximately six months old, E.A.F., Jr. was adjudicated

dependent. Since the adjudication, Mother has been ordered to: submit to drug testing once a

week for three months; schedule and undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow through

with those recommendations; attend all medical appointments for the' Child; attend meetings at

SafeStart regarding the Child; attend visits with the Child two times a week for two hours;

engage in parenting classes; attend mental health treatment; obtain legal employment; obtain

stable housing; and follow through with recommendations ofLCOCYS.

       Mother has had the same court-ordered requirements since February 9, 2012. Her

compliance has been almost non-existent. Since the adjudication of dependency, Mother visited

the Child one time on January 24, 2012, and attempted a visit at the hospital on June 6, 2012, but

left after a few moments and did not return. An Aggravated Circumstances Order was entered

on February 19, 2013. The Order found that the identity and whereabouts of the parents are

known and both Mother and Father failed to maintain substantial and continual contact with the

Child for a period of six months. Mother did not visit the Child since the Aggravated

Circumstances Order.

       Mother did not submit to urinalysis to demonstrate sobriety; did not attend any drug or

alcohol treatment: Mother did not complete a parenting class; she did not attend mental health

treatment since July of2012; and she did not obtain legal employment. She is currently living

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 with Father at Father's uncle's residence.

        Mother's conduct for the entire duration ofE.A.F., Jr.'s dependency, has clearly

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to the Child. She .has failed to

perform any parental duties including maintaining contact via visitation. She has not provided

for the Child in any manner: no emotional, social, educational or financial support exists in the

record of this case. Mother'S utter lack of involvement has caused the Child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence for his physical and mental well-being and Mother

has not demonstrated that she will remedy her refusal to parent in the future. Accordingly, we

find Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for involuntary

termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 I (a)(1) and (2) have been met as to Mother.

        In addition, the Child has been removed from Mother for more than two years. The

"condition" that led to the Child's placement was Mother's mental state and inability to meet the

Child's medical needs. Mother was "overwhelmed" by the requirements of motherhood.

       The extreme medical care that was required when Mother placed the Child into care has

since ceased, but there is nothing to suggest that removing the initial medical conditions resolved

the problems that caused Mother to be overwhelmed. The general stress of raising a toddler

remains along with the additional stress of rearing a child with special dietary restrictions due to

allergies. Further, Mother is now faced with her own serious medical conditions.

       Mother has failed to attend mental health services which would have assessed her stress

and anxiety and which would have provided her with coping skills to remedy the condition that

caused E.A.F., Jr'splacement. There is nothing left to offer Mother that would remedy the

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  condition within a reasonable period oftime. In addition, as discussed more fully below,

  termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare ofthe Child. Accordingly,

  we find Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for

  involuntary termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 I (a)(5) and (8) have been met as to

  Mother.

         Finding that LCOCYS has established statutory grounds for terminating Mother's

 parental rights, we turn now to our primary consideration: the needs and welfare of the child. 23

 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 I (b). In addressing the needs and welfare of the child, it is necessary to consider

 the emotional bond between the parent and the child. In Re: E.M, 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993). "A

 court, in considering what situation would best serve the child's needs and welfare, must

. examine the status of the natural parental bond to consider whether terminating the natural

 parents' rights would destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial." In Re:

 P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522 (pa. Super. 1990). Further, parents cannot solely rely on their natural ties

 to their child. In Re: Stickler, 356 Pa. Super. 56,60,514 A.2d 140,142 (1986).

        Mother voluntary placed the Child when he was less than five months old. Today E.A.F.,

 Jr. is nearly three years old. From the time of placement until the time of the first termination

 hearing date, a period of twenty-two months, Mother visited with Child twice. At the time of the

 termination hearing, Mother had not seen the Child for sixteen months. She has Dot provided for

the Child in any fashion; all ofE.A.F., Jr.'s needs are met by his foster family.and his paternal

 grandmother. Any bond thatmay have existed when E.A.F., Jr. was a baby has been severed due

 to the lack of contact between Mother and the Child. The only remaining tie that exists between

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 Cuse No.,' A2013-0054

them is a biological one. Therefore, terminating E.A.F. Jr. 's relationship with Mother will not

destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial to him; it will simply maintain the

status quo. It is in E.A.F. Jr. 's best interest to have the opportunity to be raised in a stable, loving

and permanent home. The needs and welfare ofE.A.F. Jr. dictate termination of Mother's

parental rights in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 25 I l(b).

FATHER

        On November 9,2011, Father struck Mother in the face while she was holding the Child;

he was charged with simple assault. At the time the Child was placed with LCOCYS, Father's

whereabouts were unknown and there was a warrant out for his arrest. Father had the same

court-ordered requirements as Mother pursuant to the Adjudication Order of February 9, 2012:

submit to drug testing once a week for three months; schedule and undergo a drug and alcohol

evaluation and follow through with those recommendations; attend all medical appointments for

the Child; attend meetings at Safe Start regarding the Child; attend visits with the Child two

times a week for two hours; engage in parenting classes; attend mental health treatment; obtain

legal employment; obtain stable housing; follow through with recommendations of LCOCYS.

       From February 9, 2012 until the time of the termination hearing held on October 28,

2013, Father submitted one urine screen and it was positive for marijuana and ethyl glucoronide.

He did not obtain the required drug and alcohol evaluation nor comply with recommendations.

Father did not attend most of the Child's doctor's appointments. He did attend an allergist

appointment on April 2, 2013, although Father was unable to state a comprehensive list ofwhat

the Child is allergic to at the tennination hearing. Father did not attend SafeStart; did not engage

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 in parenting classes; did not attend mental health treatment; and did not obtain legal

 employment. Father has maintained housing with his uncle.

        Regarding visits, Father last saw the Child at the April 2; 2013 allergist appointment;

Father could not remember any prior visits. He did have two prior visits during the period

between February 9, 2012 and May 3,2012, and he subsequently visited the Child on June 6,

2012, while the Child was in the hospital. This amounts to four total visits in twenty months.

        Such minimal contact with the Child and such a lack of progress over such a lengthy

period of time clearly evidences Father's refusal and failure to perform parental duties. Other

than consistently living with his uncle, a home not appropriate for the Child, Father has made no

progress in accomplishing any of the court-ordered requirements for reunification. Father

testified that he knew of the tasks that he was required to complete in order to get his son back.

His reasons for not completing those tasks were that: "(s]ometimes I just didn't think that I

should have to g6" and that there were too many things to accomplish simultaneously, N,T,

October 29, 2013, p, 102, Father's refusal to accept any parental responsibility has caused the

Child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for E.A,F" Jr, 's

physical and mental well-being, He has not supported his son in any manner and all the Child's

needs are being met by the foster family and by the paternal grandmother. Accordingly, we find

Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for involuntary

termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 I (a)(I) and (2) have been met as to Father.

       At the time of the first termination hearing, E.A.F., Jr. had been removed from Father's

care for a period of twenty months, At the time the Child was placed into LCOCYS's care,

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lit re: lltvolulttary Termmatiolt ofParel/tal Rights to B.A.F., Jr.
Case No.: A2013-0054

Father's whereabouts were unknown and he had an outstanding warrant for assaulting Mother.

Since February 9, 2012, Father was court-ordered to complete specific tasks to establish sobriety,

stability and a relationship with the Child. There is no evidence to suggest that Father will now

remedy the problems that he has for so long ignored or that any available services would remedy

the problems within a reasonable period of time. In addition, as more fully discussed below,

termination of Father's parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the Child.

Accordingly, we find Petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the

grounds for involuntary termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 25! 1(a)(5) and (8) have been met

as to Father.

         As previously discussed regarding Mother, fmding that LCOCYS has established

statutory grounds for terminating Father's parental rights, we turn now to our primary

consideration: the needs and welfare of the child. 23 PaC.SA § 251 I (b). In addressing the

needs and welfare of the child, it is necessary to consider the emotional bond between the parent

and the child. In Re: E.M, 620 A.2d 481 (pa. 1993). "A court, in considering what situation

would best serve the child's needs and welfare, must examine the Status of the natural parental

bond to consider whether terminating the natural parents' rights would destroy something in

existence that is necessary and beneficia!." In Re: P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522 (pa. Super. 1990).

Further, parents cannot solely rely on their natural ties to their child. In Re: Stickler, 356 Pa.

Super. 56,60,514 A.2d 140, 142 (1986).

       Father attended the Child's allergist appointment on April 2, 2013. At the appointment,

the Child did not approach Father and did not want to engage with Father. Father tried to talk

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In re: Involuntary Termination ofParental Rights to E.A.F., Jr.
Case No.: A2013c0054

with the Child, but the Child just clung to the foster mother. Prior to the April 2, 2013 visit,

Father's last contact with the Child was ten months earlier on June 6, 2012; Father could not

recall that visit. The Child's behavior towards Father demonstrates no bond exists between the

two. It is reasonable to infer that a twenty-seven-month-old child would not have a relationship,

bond or, very possibly, a memory ofa person who he has only seen four times in twenty months.

The Child's behavior towards Father confirms such lack ofrelationship. Terminating the rights

of Father would not destroy anything in existence that is necessary and beneficial to E.A.F., Jr.

It would best serve the needs and welfare of the Child to terminate Father's rights and 10 be

given the opportunity to be raised in a stable, loving and permanent home where he is permitted

to continue the nurturing relationships with the people to whom he is firmly bonded, namely his

foster family and paternal grandmother. The needs and weJfare ofE.A.F., Jr. dictate termination

of Father's parental rights in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 25 11 (b).

                                                      z~
                                                      CAROL K. McGINLEY, P.J.

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