Court Opinion

ID: 9906278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 16:08:25.547228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:13.096286
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3708-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ABDUL WILLIAMS, a/k/a
EUGENE TUTLER,
ABDUL M. WILLIAMS,
and AKBAR WILLIAMS,

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Submitted November 27, 2023 – Decided December 1, 2023

                   Before Judges Sabatino and Mawla.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 95-07-2473,
                   99-08-2789, and 99-08-2790.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Anderson David Harkov, Designated
                   Counsel, on the brief).

                   Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Hannah Faye Kurt,
            Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
            Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Abdul Williams appeals the trial court's denial without an

evidentiary hearing of his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR").      We

affirm.

      Defendant's petition stems from a plea agreement he entered into twenty

years ago in February 2003. Through that agreement, defendant pled guilty to

a fourth-degree offense of possession of prohibitive devices, specifically

dumdum bullets. Two other counts in the indictment were dismissed.

      Consistent with the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced in April

2003 to a custodial term of eighteen months, concurrent to his sentences on

charges in two unrelated indictments. The eighteen-month term was satisfied

by time served.

      Fourteen years later in 2017, federal authorities arrested defendant and

charged him with a federal firearms offense. He was convicted of that federal

charge. Under the federal sentencing guidelines, defendant's 2003 state court

conviction on the bullets possession offense increased his federal sentencing

exposure.   He consequently received a ninety-two-month federal prison

sentence.

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      In his PCR petition filed in 2021—eighteen years after his 2003

sentencing—defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective in not advising

him that his sentencing exposure on a future federal charge would be higher

because of his guilty plea. Defendant further asserted his former attorney was

ineffective in failing to move to dismiss the indictment, which had been issued

eight years before his plea hearing. He also alleged his attorney ignored his

claims of innocence and coerced him to accept the State's plea offer.

      After considering the parties' submissions and oral argument, the PCR

judge issued an oral decision on June 22, 2022, denying defendant's petition.

The PCR judge concluded the petition was time barred and, furthermore, lacked

merit. This appeal ensued.

      In his brief on appeal, defendant presents the following points:

            POINT I

            THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
            GRANT DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN
            EVIDENTIARY     HEARING      BECAUSE
            DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT PLEA
            COUNSEL FAILED TO EXPLAIN THE FUTURE
            RAMIFICATIONS OF HIS PLEA AGREEMENT,
            WAS NOT CONTRADICTED BY THE RECORD
            BELOW AND WAS NOT REFUTED BY THE
            STATE.

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            POINT II

            THE TIME BAR OF [RULE] 3:22-12 SHOULD NOT
            HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO DEFENDANT'S
            PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
            BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS NEVER INFORMED
            OF HIS RIGHT TO FILE A PETITION FOR POST-
            CONVICTION RELIEF AND HE DID NOT KNOW
            HIS GUILTY PLEA IN THIS CASE WOULD
            RESULT IN A SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT IN
            FEDERAL COURT.

            POINT III

            THE FAILURE OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO ADVISE
            DEFENDANT THAT HIS GUILTY PLEA AND
            SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION IN STATE COURT,
            WOULD RESULT IN THE ENHANCEMENT OF
            ANY SENTENCE HE WOULD RECEIVE IN
            FEDERAL COURT, DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF
            HIS  CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO      THE
            EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

      Having considered these arguments, we concur with the PCR court that

defendant's petition was both procedurally barred as untimely and devoid of

merit. We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in the court's oral

decision. We add only a few brief comments.

      Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) plainly states that "no [PCR] petition shall be filed . . .

more than [five] years after the date of entry . . . of the judgment of conviction

that is being challenged." Here, defendant's judgment of conviction was entered

on April 24, 2003, thereby requiring his PCR petition to be filed on or before

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April 24, 2008. As we noted, defendant's petition was not filed until 2021, more

than twelve years after that five-year deadline had passed.

      As the PCR court correctly recognized, none of the exceptions to the five-

year time bar set forth in Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A) and (B) can salvage defendant's

late petition.   In particular, the PCR court reasonably rejected defendant's

contention that his lateness is justified by excusable neglect under Rule 3:22-

12(a)(1)(A). Defendant claims that he was not aware of his state post-conviction

rights until he arrived in federal prison in 2017. Even if that assertion were true,

defendant's ignorance of the applicable deadline does not comprise excusable

neglect. A defendant's lack of sophistication in the law does not establish

excusable neglect. State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000) (citing State v.

Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992)). Moreover, the burden to justify a late filing

of a PCR petition increases with the length of the delay, which in this case is

over twelve years. State v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486, 492 (2004).

      In addition, to meet this exception to the five-year deadline under the

Rule, defendant must also demonstrate that enforcing the time bar would "result

in a fundamental injustice." R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A). For the reasons we will

discuss next concerning the merits, no such injustice would be caused by

rejecting defendant's untimely petition.

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                                           5
      Turning to the substance of defendant's claims of ineffective counsel, we

apply well settled principles. In reviewing such claims, courts apply a strong

presumption that defense counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). The two-part Strickland

test requires defendants to prove (1) deficient performance by their former

counsel; and (2) resultant actual prejudice. Id. at 687; see also State v. Fritz,

105 N.J. 42, 54 (1987). In the present context in which a defendant is alleging

the ineffectiveness of plea counsel, the defendant must show a "reasonable

probability" that the result would have been different had the defendant received

proper advice from the trial attorney. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-63

(2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).

      Defendant's contentions of ineffectiveness fail to meet these requirements.

His contention that his attorney should have moved to dismiss the indictment

because of the time lag from his arrest in 1995 to his plea in 2003 is unavailing.

It is pure speculation that the court would have granted such a dismissal.

      Likewise, defendant's argument that his attorney should have forecast that

he would be sentenced more harshly if he committed a federal offense at some

future time, does not amount to deficient performance. This court rejected a

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similar claim in State v. Wilkerson, 321 N.J. Super. 219, 227 (App. Div. 1999),

in which we held that "[t]here is no constitutional requirement" for counsel to

advise a defendant pleading guilty to a current charge of the "possible or even

potential enhancement consequences of future aberrant conduct."

      Finally, defendant's claim that his former counsel coerced him to plead

guilty is belied by the transcript of the plea hearing, during which defendant

stated under oath that his attorney had reviewed the plea agreement with him,

that he was satisfied with the attorney's services, and that he was pleading guilty

voluntarily.

      No plenary hearing was required before the PCR court because

defendant's arguments do not present a prima facie case for relief. State v.

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992).

      Affirmed.

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