Court Opinion

ID: 9453556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:17:17.445818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:42.669423
License: Public Domain

SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
While I fully concur in that portion of the majority opinion which grants relief to Holly, Price and Newberry, I am not satisfied that denial of relief to the remaining complainants is justified. Especially in the cases of Segers and Peterson, I am of the view that the limited measure of relief granted them is inadequate.
The issue presented is whether the failure to continue the employment of the nine Negro teachers resulted from racial discrimination, as the plaintiffs contend, or from a fair and impartial evaluation of their qualifications, as the School Board insists. This issue assumes increasing importance as more school systems move to bring themselves into compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in order to qualify for benefits under Health, Education & Welfare Department regulations adopted pursuant to Title 4 of that Act. Unfortunately a not uncommon side effect of school desegregation plans has been the immediate loss of employment by Negro teachers.
Confronting this problem, our court only recently enunciated the doctrine that “in the face of the long history of racial discrimination * * * and the failure of the public school system to desegregate until forced to do so by litigation * * * the sudden disproportionate decimation in the ranks of Negro teachers raise [s] an inference of discrimination which thrust\_s~\ upon the School Board the burden of justifying its conduct by clear and convincing evidence.” Chambers v. Henderson City Board of Education, 364 F.2d 189, 192 (4 Cir. 1966) (emphasis added). The mandate of Chambers is plain; it is that the School Board must demonstrate, with “clear and convincing evidence,” that its decision to release the Negro teachers was in no way motivated by racial considerations. The Board has fallen far short of meeting this burden.
As the majority correctly concludes, the record in the instant case demonstrates a pattern of discrimination that refutes, in varying degrees, the asserted good faith of the Asheboro School Board in its decision to retain some teachers while dismissing others. The criteria on which the Board’s determination. was made are certainly suspect, for the evalu*747ation process was highly subjective. According to the uneontroverted testimony of Dr. E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., Professor of Education at Columbia University Teachers College, the procedure had “within it some serious flaws of invalidity, unreliability, and arbitrariness when weighed against generally accepted standards of personnel administration.” Professor Reutter specifically challenged the Board’s primary reliance on principals’ evaluations, stating that this procedure was “not sufficiently formalized to carry out standards at á minimum level in the school system * *
Superintendent Teachey, testifying for the defendant, recounted that the Board, in making its evaluations, relied heavily on the teacher’s classroom performance as reflected in the principal’s highly subjective evaluations. Yet he admitted that in the case of the Negro teachers little weight was accorded the favorable recommendations of the principal of the previously all-Negro school, because he was deemed “less qualified” than the other principals in the system. No further explanation of this principal’s alleged deficiency is offered. Placing almost exclusive reliance on the recommendations of school principals throughout the system, and then virtually ignoring the Negro principal’s observations and recommendations, the Board all but eliminated the possible reemployment of the Negro teachers. The contrasting practices in respect to the recommendations of white and Negro principals operated uniformly to the disadvantage of the Negro teachers. If it was bad personnel administration, as Professor Reutter noted, to rest heavily on principals’ evaluations in respect to white teachers, it was doubly wrong and indefensible to depart from the practice in the case of the Negroes.
After arriving at its decisions in the manner described, the Board sent a letter to the Negro teachers informing them that they would not be rehired. Notably, the letter was sent only to the Negro teachers, and this strongly supports the appellants’ contention that they were dealt with as a distinct group. Fundamentally, the dispute before this court concerns the fairness of the evaluation, and the letter furnishes an additional insight into the central question of whether the Board looked upon the teachers as one group or two.
Analysis of the dismissals of the nine Negro teachers further contributes to the aura of discrimination that permeates the entire record. In the case of Mr. Holly, as the majority acknowledges, the decision was made on a purely discriminatory basis. Then too, teachers Price and Newberry were compared with and found less qualified than new applicants despite the stated policy against subjecting teachers already in the system to that type of comparison. That these three should be granted immediate relief, as the majority orders, I wholeheartedly agree. But we must not view the remaining cases in isolation. We have already referred to Dr. Reutter’s condemnation of the criteria used in the teacher evaluations. The majority explicitly declares that these evaluations were premised on the very assumption that was condemned in Chambers: that with the coming of integration, Negro teachers would lose their jobs — the teaching of Negro pupils —and that they therefore were to be considered as new applicants for jobs in the newly integrated system. Finally, the majority itself is convinced in the cases of Holly, Price and Newberry that the evaluation was conducted in a discriminatory manner. Surely then, in light of “the long history of racial discrimination” in the Asheboro School System and the proven discrimination relating to the above mentioned plaintiffs, coupled with “the sudden disproportionate decimation in the ranks of Negro teachers,” the court should not so readily embrace the School Board’s disavowal of discrimination in the cases of the remaining plaintiffs.
It is within the context of the entire record that the dismissal of Segers and Peterson should be evaluated. Prior to the reshuffling of faculties in the Ashe-boro system, both of these teachers were *748considered qualified to teach seventh and eighth graders, despite the fact that their certifications did not include those grades. Suddenly, with the advent of desegregation, the Board discovered a necessity to employ new certified teachers to fill their positions. This course was pursued although the only established hiring policy before the initiation of the desegregation plan was to retain teachers unless their principals made adverse recommendations. It appears that both Peterson and Segers had been recommended for reappointment.
Although the majority accepts the Board’s contention that employing a teacher outside his areas of certification may adversely affect the school system’s accreditation, it is plain that exceptions have been made.1 And while the majority unquestionably is correct in saying that the record “does not develop the extent to which, in law, teachers having only subject certifications are permitted to teach entire grades; * * * nor does the record reflect the effect, if any, upon accreditation if the practice is followed,” it is fair to observe once more that the Chambers rule casts upon the Board, not the teachers, the burden of clarifying these factors. Why should the court assume in the absence of plain proof, that to retain a seventh and an eighth grade teacher would suddenly endanger the accreditation of the entire system? One cannot refrain from asking what is the meaning of the apparently unprecedented rigorous insistence of full certification at the moment student populations are being integrated and the faculties should be. Why this newborn concern about accreditation? Since the system is fully accredited, and Peterson and Segers had been teaching in the seventh and eighth grades for a number of years, it would seem that this practice had absolutely no effect on the system’s accreditation.
Significantly, in other instances new teachers were employed and assigned to teach in fields outside their areas of certification. One illustrative case is that of a new physical education teacher who, though not certified to teach mathematics, was employed to fill a vacancy in that department. Why was the position not offered to Holly, who, while not certified in mathematics was considered an excellent teacher, or Newberry who had thirteen years of teaching experience and a certificate in science, or to Price with his seven years of experience and a certificate in science, or even to Miss Peterson with her background in business education ? Any of these four would appear to be at least as qualified to teach mathematics as a new teacher certified only in physical education. The failure of the Board to offer the position to any of these plaintiffs or to make a similar exception for either Segers or Peterson further reflects on its good faith.
Teachers Segers and Peterson are in fairness entitled to immediate reinstatement. Putting them on a waiting list is no sufficient remedy and only encourages the conduct complained of. By the time an opening arises, these teachers will probably be in no position to accept an offer of reinstatement and will have suffered irreparable damage. Our brother Craven objects that Peterson and Segers are given a qualified preference by being put on a waiting list, subject to call if in the future there occurs a vacancy which they are qualified to fill. He suggests that they are thus being favored in a manner unwarranted under State law. The short answer is that the majority merely undertakes to redress a denial of a federal constitutional right, although in my view the remedy is less than complete. Far from being favored, they are still left at a distinct disadvantage, for it is plainly evident from this *749record that if they were white their contracts would have been renewed automatically. They would not have been disturbed and would not find themselves in their present predicament. On any reading of the record, they have, without fault on their part, sustained severe injury from the action belatedly taken by the Board to rectify a gross, long-standing constitutional wrong to members of their race. I submit that the remedy accorded them is not as thorough-going as the occasion demands. A court of equity has ample latitude to fashion a complete remedy for persons like these admittedly qualified teachers. We should strive to prevent injustice to Negro teachers as the price of integrating the schools.
As for the remaining plaintiffs to whom no relief was granted, Brooks and Foster were dismissed on the basis of their principal’s or supervisor’s recommendation, while the record shows that Stone, a white teacher, was retained despite an adverse recommendation by his principal. It may be worth noting that the Negro principal whose favorable recommendations were cast aside because he was deemed “less qualified,” was qualified enough to warrant the Board in following his unfavorable recommendations as to Negro teachers. Finally, the majority summarily dismisses as moot the case of Mr. Kilgore because he accepted employment outside the Asheboro system. The record, however, indicates that his plans were made only after he was informed that many of the Negro teachers would not be reemployed the following year.
Despite the majority’s demonstration seriously discrediting the overall good faith of the Asheboro School Board, the court fails to follow through by ordering relief to Brooks, Foster, Kilgore and Palmer, and gives only a bare shadow of relief to Peterson and Segers. The conclusion I regretfully draw is that the burden of proof doctrine, given wise and forthright recognition in Chambers, though not laid aside in so many words— for it is solemnly repeated — is nevertheless denied effective application. This result is made possible by the re-introduction, probably not even conscious, of the traditional requirement of specific proof of bias and arbitrariness in the case of each of the plaintiffs as if the entire background of general discrimination were irrelevant and the burden had not shifted from the plaintiffs, or been lightened. Thus the theoretical shifting of the burden of proof to the Board is effectively canceled out. I trust that this represents no permanent retreat from Chambers, which made amply clear that a background of discrimination raises a presumption against school boards and thrusts upon the officials the burden of proving the reasonableness of their actions by “clear and convincing evidence.” We must not sap this salutary doctrine of its vitality.
This case has an importance greater than the fate of a few individuals. Discriminatory dismissal of Negro teachers has too often been a supplemental technique in the persistent resistance to school desegregation. When, as in Ashe-boro, pupil desegregation comes about after long delay, we see it accompanied by refusal to renew the contracts of Negro teachers who would otherwise not have been dislodged from their jobs. This injustice has wide ramifications. With rare exceptions, compliance with Brown v. Board of Education was not begun willingly, and one of the reasons frequently asserted in defense of inaction has been that the Negro parents themselves did not want to end the existing segregation. It was generally insisted that nothing need be done by school officials until Negro children or their parents moved to invoke the law. This insistence bore heavily upon the Negroes because of the many obstacles placed in their way.
In the very nature of the situation thus created, Negro teachers could be expected to have an influence in their communities to counsel and guide parents in the assertion of their legal rights. But if the result of any successful move is to deprive these teachers of their means of *750livelihood, their influence will certainly not be effectively exerted to encourage demands for desegregation. It is not reasonable to demand of Negro teachers a degree of fortitude and altruism not ordinarily found in any other segment of the human race. The fate of these teachers is an unmistakable warning to others to go slowly. In this fashion the injustice to the individual plaintiffs adds one more pressure to the many, both crude and subtle, that operate to block school integration.
For all of these reasons it must be insisted that bland assertions by the School Board that its decisions were free of racial considerations do not suffice to discharge its burden. In this case, the Board’s decision resulted in the wholesale dismissal of a group of teachers, some of whom were able to adduce explicit proof of discrimination. The Board has not met the burden resting upon it in these circumstances of proving that its decisions were not racially motivated. There was no showing, as there should be, that records subjected to comparison were compiled before the purported evaluations and that decisions were based on previously established objective criteria. By casting about among several criteria, relying first on one, then on another, always to the detriment of the Negro being compared,2 the Board has not satisfied the legal standard of objectivity.
I would order the plaintiffs reinstated and award them compensation for lost wages from the time they were deprived of their positions until they are so reinstated.

. While it is difficult to determine from the record the precise number of teachers employed outside their area of certification, it appears that for the school year in question at least six teachers not certified in mathematics were employed in that area and that a teacher certified in library science and Bible was assigned to teach language arts. Three of these seven were newly hired teachers in the system.

. As the majority opinion clearly indicates, the School Board relied alternatively on experience, graduate degrees and principals’ recommendations when comparing the Negro applicants with their white competitors. Dominant weight was always given to the criterion that operated in favor of the white and against the Negro teacher. For example, Mrs. Se-gers, with the same degree and the same certificate as her white competitor, failed to be retained because, it was pointed out, the latter had longer experience. Miss Peterson, on the other hand, lost her job to a white teacher with the same degree and the same certificate who had less experience, but in this case the experience factor yielded to the “better” recommendation given by the white principal.