Court Opinion

ID: 9664546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:21:08.599903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:07.151176
License: Public Domain

SHRUM, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
When the United States Supreme Court considers pre-emption, it starts “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Wisconsin v. Public Intervenor v. Mortier, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2476, 2482, 115 L.Ed.2d 532 (1991). Most recently in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) the Supreme Court said:
(W)e must construe these provisions [preemptive provision in cigarette advertising legislation] in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations. This presumption reinforces the appropriateness of a narrow *67reading of [the pre-emptive provision] .... (T)here is no general, inherent conflict between federal pre-emption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state common law damages actions.
In a concurring portion of his separate opinion in Cipollone, Justice Blackmun further explained the presumption against preemption as follows:
The principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that underlie the Court’s reluctance to find preemption where Congress has not spoken directly to the issue apply with equal force where Congress has spoken, though ambiguously. In such cases, the question is not whether Congress intended to pre-empt state regulation, but to what extent. We do not, absent unambiguous evidence, infer a scope of pre-emption beyond that which is clearly mandated by Congress language.
— U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2625. And in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 1033, 91 L.Ed. 1234 (1947), Justice Jackson observed:
Since Congress can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the full extent of the far-reaching Commerce Clause, Congress needs no help from generous judicial implications to achieve the supersession of State authority_ Any indulgence in construction should be in favor of the States, because Congress can speak with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full federal authority, completely displacing the States.
Here the FIFRA pre-emption clause, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), only provides that the states “shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from” those requirements imposed by FIFRA. No reference is made in § 136v(b) to the preemption of state common law remedies. The simplest and most obvious explanation for such statutory silence is that Congress never intended to displace state common law claims. If it had intended to do so, it could have said so simply and in unambiguous language. By finding federal pre-emption in this case the majority eliminates a critical component of Missouri’s traditional ability to protect the health and safety of its citizens. Lest we forget, the fundamental premise of Missouri products liability law, as announced in Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Company, 445 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Mo. banc 1969) is that “the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are [to be] borne by the manufacturers ... that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.” I believe that the radical readjustment of federal-state relations in this area is warranted only if there is clear evidence that Congress intended that result. Because I believe that 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1982) (FIFRA) does not evidence such a clear congressional intent, I respectfully dissent.
The majority relies primarily on Arkansas-Platte & Gulf v. Van Waters & Rogers, 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.1992), which held that “state tort actions based on labeling and alleged failure to warn are impliedly preempted by FIFRA as a matter of law.” Id. at 164. The Arkansas-Platte court based its finding upon its “plain reading of the statute” which revealed a “specific intent to occupy the field in labeling and packaging, § 136v(b),” Id. at 160, and upon obiter dicta in Mortier that “Congress had impliedly preempted state regulation in the more narrow area of labeling." 959 F.2d at 163.
My plain reading of the statute, my examination of Mortier1 in which the Court reaffirmed the long-standing presumption against pre-emption, and my reading of Cipollone in which the Court extended the *68presumption against pre-emption2 leads me to conclude that Arkansas-Platte was wrongly decided. I believe there is ambiguity concerning the scope of 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b); accordingly I feel Cipollone compels a holding that the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of preserving state power, e.g. by finding that a common law tort action is not pre-empted by the legislation.
I am persuaded by the views expressed in, for example, Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C.Cir.1984), and Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F.Supp. 1339 (D.Mont.1991). As the Ferebee court noted,
“The purposes of FIFRA and those of state tort law may be quite distinct. FI-FRA aims at ensuring that, from a cost-benefit point of view, [the product] as labelled does not produce “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.” State tort law, in contrast, may have broader compensatory goals; conceivably, a label may be inadequate under state law if that label, while sufficient under a cost-benefit standard, nonetheless fails to warn against any significant risk. In addition, even if the ultimate purposes of federal and state law in this area are the same, a state (acting through its jurors) may assign distinct weight to the elements which go into determining whether a substance as la-belled is of sufficient net benefit as to warrant its use.... [A] state may choose to tip the scales more heavily in favor of the health of its citizens than EPA is permitted to by FIFRA.
736 F.2d at 1540.
Moreover, tort recovery in a case such as this one may also promote legitimate regulatory aims. By encouraging plaintiffs to bring suit for injuries not previously recognized as traceable to pesticides ... a state tort action of the kind under review may aid in the exposure of new dangers associated with pesticides. Successful actions of this sort may lead manufacturers to petition EPA to allow more detailed labelling of their products; alternatively, EPA itself may decide that revised labels are required in light of the new information that has been brought to its attention through common law suits.
736 F.2d at 1541.
The Montana Pole opinion points out that the Ferebee court relied on alternative rationales for its decision: “1) Compliance with both federal and state law cannot be said to be impossible because the defendant can petition the EPA to allow the label to be more comprehensive; and 2) state common law damages would not serve as an obstacle to the accomplishment of FIFRA’s purpose.” 775 F.Supp. at 1344 n. 7. I believe both rationales are sound. As Justice Blackmun said in Cipollone, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2627-28:
The effect of tort law on a manufacturer's behavior is necessarily indirect. Although an award of damages by its very nature attaches additional consequences to the manufacturer’s continued unlawful conduct, no particular course of action (e.g., the adoption of a new warning label) is required. A manufacturer found liable on, for example, a failure-to-warn claim may respond in a number of ways. It may decide to accept damages awards as a cost of doing business and not alter its behavior in any way ... Or by contrast, it may choose to avoid future awards by dispensing warnings through a variety of alternative mechanisms, such as package inserts, public service advertisements or general educational programs. The level of choice that a defendant retains in shaping its own behavior distinguishes the indirect *69regulatory effect of the common law from positive enactments such as statutes and administrative regulations.... Moreover, tort law has an entirely separate function — compensating victims— that sets it apart from direct forms of regulation. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 237 U.S.App.D.C. 164, 175, 736 F.2d 1529, 1540, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 [105 S.Ct. 545, 83 L.Ed.2d 432] (1984).
In several recent cases the Supreme Court has declined to find the regulatory effects of state tort law so substantial and direct as to warrant pre-emption. See, e.g. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 84, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2278, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185, 108 S.Ct. 1704, 1712, 100 L.Ed.2d 158 (1988); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256, 104 S.Ct. 615, 625, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). In light of the recognized distinctions by the Supreme Court between direct state regulation and the indirect regulatory effects of common-law damages, I cannot agree that damages claims are clearly or unambiguously “requirements” imposed under state law. The plain language of 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) and (b) does not, in my opinion, bear the broad interpretation the majority would impart to it.
I would further observe that we should not proceed upon the presumption that the EPA is infallible. Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F.Supp. 1500, 1508 (W.D.Mo.1991). “Its method for registering pesticides is only as good as the data submitted by the registrant in its registration statement.” Id. at 1508-09. The fact that here it is alleged that William Yowell, Jr. died as a result of exposure to the pesticides Malathion and Orthene calls into question the adequacy of the label on each, despite the EPA’s approval of the labels and warnings. Id. at 1508.
I disagree with the observation in Payas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir.1991), cited by the majority, that a jury award would “disrupt the methods by which FIFRA protects man and the environment because it would inject irrelevant considerations into the EPA’s evaluation of a pesticide and its labeling ...” Id. at 1026. I am skeptical the EPA would even consider jury awards; I doubt the agency would be “disrupted” by them. Certainly, new information about pesticides generated as a result of common law litigation would not be “irrelevant” or disruptive if that information enhanced the EPA’s ability or the manufacturer’s ability to protect man and the environment. The fear expressed in Payas that a jury award would amount to a “second guess” of the EPA’s conclusions is not well-founded. On the contrary, I believe that some common-sense “second guessing” by a jury of twelve Missouri citizens would not hinder the EPA in its legitimate mission but would help insure that the compensatory goal of state tort law remains intact.
Finally, I agree with Judge Whipple’s concluding remarks in Riden, 763 F.Supp. at 1509:
FIFRA’s labeling scheme was created to help minimize the risks attendant to pesticide use by seeing to it that all pesticide labels contain certain essential information. The scheme was not created to dissuade manufacturers from revising their labels when new information suggests that further warnings or instructions are needed.
I would hold that Missouri common law claims based on a failure to warn theory are not pre-empted by FIFRA because the federal legislation at issue here does not provide the kind of unambiguous evidence of congressional intent necessary to displace Missouri’s common law damage claims. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.

. Mortier dealt with a local regulation of pesticide licensing and application by a small community in Wisconsin. Justice White, writing for the Court, said: "This case requires us to consider whether [FIFRA] ... pre-empts the regula*68tion of pesticides by local governments. We hold that it does not.”

. In his dissent in Cipollone Justice Scalia is critical of the new rule against pre-emption as expressed by the majority in that case. Quoting Justice Scalia: "To my knowledge, we have never expressed such a rule before.... When this second novelty is combined with the first, the result is extraordinary: The statute that says anything about pre-emption must say everything; and it must do so with great exactitude, as any ambiguity concerning its scope will be read in favor of preserving state power.” — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2634.