Court Opinion

ID: 9585164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:57:06.592248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:22.908682
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
{dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court herein because I am convinced that the judgment rendered by the circuit court for Kenosha county under date of April 9, 1941, in the prior action to quiet title, wherein Sunset Ridge, Inc., was plaintiff and H. D. Weber was one of the defendants, is res adjudicata as to the controversy now before the court in the instant action. Such judgment adjudged Sunset Ridge, Inc., to be the owner of the cemetery lots in parcel No. 2, title to which is at issue on this appeal, and further decreed:
“That the defendant H. D. Weber, also known as Harriet D. Weber, and all persons claiming under her subsequent to the filing of the notice of the pendency of this action, to wit: The 31st day of July, 1940, be and the same are hereby barred from any and all claim of right or title to said premises or lien thereon or any part thereof. . .
Whenever title is put in issue and adjudicated, the judgment is res adjudicata upon such issue of title in any subsequent action between the same parties, subject to the exception that the defeated party has not subsequent to the judgment acquired a new title, which is “independent” of *130the interest or claim of title possessed at the time of the judgment, and not merely “confirmatory” of such former interest or claim of title. Austin v. Ballard (1911), 84 Kan. 619, 114 Pac. 1084; and 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.), pp. 1507, 1509, secs. 714, 715.
It clearly appears from the memorandum opinion and findings of the learned trial court that the conveyance which H. D. Weber received from her two brothers subsequent to the judgment of April 9, 1941, was not “independent” of her claim to the lots which she had at the time of entry of such judgment, but was merely “confirmatory” thereof. In his memorandum opinion Judge HaNSon stated:
“The testimony in this case convinces the court that title to the lots mentioned in the third cause of action herein was placed in the names of William D. Weber and Kurt D. Weber solely as an accommodation for the plaintiff, H. D. Weber, otherwise known as Harriet D. Weber. That no consideration was actually paid for the transfer of title; that title was in effect in PI. D. Weber, but was placed in the names of her two brothers solely as an accommodation and for the use and benefit of said PI. D. Weber, otherwise known as Harriet D. Weber. That as a result of there being no consideration for the transfer, and by reason of the fact that under the plaintiff’s own testimony she admits that it was a family arrangement on her money deals, and that she had control of the property at all times, the plaintiff therefore was the real party in interest in the transaction rather than her brothers; and, further, that the brothers never paid anything to Hillcrest Cemetery Association; and that there is lack of proof of any kind that the plaintiff herein paid any consideration for the transfer of the property into the names of her brothers. That the actual control of the lots was at all times in the plaintiff.
“The court is of the opinion that the transaction of the conveyance to the brothers was in effect fraudulent, designed to create and cover up corporate assets in the hope that the assets might have some value at some future date. The plaintiff herein had the property under her control at all times, *131even though title was in her brothers’ names, and she could therefore designate who it was to be transferred to and how it was to be handled.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, when the two brothers conveyed title to the lots to their sister, H. D. Weber, they were merely carrying out the prior verbal agreement which existed between them when the prior judgment of April 9, 1941, was entered. The majority opinion herein brushes this aside as of no consequence on the ground that, as between H. D. Weber and her brothers, such verbal agreement was unenforceable, and states in effect that in order for an interest in lands to be eligible to be barred in a suit to quiet title such “interest must, of course, be an enforceable, legal one.” An examination of the authorities convinces me that this is not a correct statement of the law.
In Pritchard v. Lewis (1905), 125 Wis. 604, 104 N. W. 989, this court held that an interest in land based upon a mortgage executed by one not the owner of the premises was such an interest as might be barred in a suit to quiet title. Surely such interest was not “an enforceable, legal one.” Furthermore, asserted titles not evidenced by any writing have been held to be subject to barring in suits to remove clouds from title. Anno. 78 A. L. R. 24, at pages 57, 58.
Furthermore, the Weber brothers did carry out their verbal agreement and convey title to their sister H. D. Weber. Because of the fact that the agreement was executed, it logically would seem to be immaterial whether or not such verbal agreement was legally enforceable. The apparent title she received by reason of the deed from her brothers was the result of such agreement and not due to some independent act on their part disassociated therewith.
For these reasons the judgment of April 9, 1941, should be held to be res adjudicata as to the issue of title raised in *131athe instant action, and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Fairchild concurs in this dissent.