Court Opinion

ID: 9943594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 21:03:00.001283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:25.042923
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 Grayton v. County of San Diego CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 MAURICE GRAYTON,                                                     D081684

           Plaintiff and Appellant,

           v.
                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,                                                 00023740-CU-NP-CTL)

           Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Matthew C. Braner, Judge. Affirmed.
         Maurice Grayton, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Michael P. Masterson, Office of County Counsel, for Defendant and
Respondent.
         Maurice Grayton appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the trial
court sustained a demurrer to his complaint against the County of San Diego
(the County) without leave to amend. He asserts the trial court erred in
concluding a public library is not a business establishment as defined by the
Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.) (the Unruh Act).1 We
conclude that Grayton has not met his burden to establish error and affirm
the judgment.
            I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The record on appeal does not contain a copy of the complaint, the
County’s demurrer, or Grayton’s response. We therefore derive the facts
primarily from the trial court’s minute order sustaining the County’s
demurrer, which is in the record on appeal.
      Grayton filed a civil complaint against the County of San Diego in June
2022. The complaint asserts the following causes of action: fraud and deceit,
assault, negligence, violation of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA),
the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and the Unruh Act. The County demurred and,
according to the trial court, Grayton failed to respond to the majority of the
County’s arguments.
      It appears that the Unruh Act claim was the only cause of action for
which Grayton contested the demurrer in the trial court. Although we do not
have a copy of the complaint in the record on appeal, the parties agree that
Grayton’s Unruh Act claim was based on an allegation that Grayton was not
permitted to utilize the “Teen Study Room” in a public library. They also
agree that, at the time of the incident, signs were posted on the door of the
Teen Study Room stating that it was reserved for teen use only after 2 p.m.
on weekdays and all day on Saturday.
      In its demurrer, the County asserted that the Unruh Act applies only to
businesses or commercial entities, and the library was not acting as either at
the time of the alleged discrimination. Grayton argued, to the contrary, but

1     Further unspecified statutory references are to the Civil Code.

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“without citation to any authority that the public library at issue is a private
business.” The trial court was not persuaded. It concluded that the library
was not acting as a business or commercial enterprise at the time of the
alleged incident and sustained the demurrer as to the Unruh Act cause of
action.
      After also sustaining the demurrer as to each of the other causes of
action stated in Grayton’s complaint, including the causes of action under the
ADA and FHA, the trial court concluded: “With all due respect to the
discomfort and/or embarrassment [Grayton] apparently suffered, and
acknowledging the expectations he formed after sitting in the Teen section of
the library in the days preceding the incident described in the complaint, no
legally cognizable duties arise from the conduct [Grayton] alleges.
Notwithstanding [Grayton’s] arguments to the contrary, no good faith
amendment can subvert this conclusion.” The trial court sustained the
County’s demurrer without leave to amend, and subsequently entered a
judgment of dismissal.
      Grayton filed a timely notice of appeal.
                               II. DISCUSSION
      Grayton’s primary assertion on appeal is that the trial court erred by
concluding a public library is not a commercial enterprise and therefore is not
subject to the Unruh Act. As a result, he contends the trial court erred in
sustaining the demurrer to his Unruh Act cause of action. He also asserts
that the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrers to his ADA and FHA
causes of action, and points this court to a provision of the Unruh Act that
states that a violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of the Unruh
Act. (§ 51, subd, (f).)

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      We review an order sustaining a demurrer under a de novo standard of
review but begin with the presumption that the trial court’s judgment is
correct. (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162;
Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is the appellant’s
burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. (Bianco v. California Highway
Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125.) As the party asserting error, the
appellant “must provide argument and legal authority for the positions
taken. ‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to
support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the
point as waived.’ ” (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 857, 862 (Nelson); see In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [“The absence of cogent legal argument or citation
to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived”]; Dabney v.
Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384 [court disregards argument for
which no authority is furnished].)
      Grayton’s status as an in propria persona litigant does not exempt him
from the rules of appellate procedure or relieve his burden on appeal. (Nwosu
v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) We treat in propria persona
litigants like any other party, affording them “ ‘the same, but no greater
consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Ibid.) As with any other
litigant, “[w]e are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply
arguments for [Grayton].” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) “ ‘Nor [are we] required to consider alleged error where
the appellant merely complains of it without pertinent argument.’ ” (Berger
v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119.)
      Here, in addressing Grayton’s cause of action under the Unruh Act, the
trial court explained: “As to the final cause of action (Unruh Civil Rights

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Act), and notwithstanding the host of other issues raised by [Grayton], for the
Unruh Act to apply, there must be arbitrary discrimination by a business
based on proscribed classifications enumerated in the Act. (See Lazar v.
Hertz Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1502.) In order to be a business
within the meaning of the Act, an entity must operate as a business or
commercial enterprise when it discriminates. (Brennon B. v Superior Court
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 681 (Brennon B.).) Plaintiff insists without citation to
any authority that the public library at issue is a private business. The
Court is unpersuaded; a public library is not a business.”
      In Brennon B., on which the trial court relied, our high court considered
the meaning of the phrase “all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever” as used in the Unruh Act in the context of claims against a
public school district. (Brennon B., supra, 13 Cal. 5th at p. 672, italics
omitted.) The Court found that the phrase “conveys reference to commercial
entities, those whose principal mission is the transactional sale of goods or
services.” (Id. at p. 674.) The Court acknowledged that a public school does
provide a service to members of the public, but explained that “a school
district’s provision of public education is not generally understood as being
carried out in the commercial, transactional manner that is characteristic of
a ‘business establishment.’ ” (Ibid.) The Court then went on to consider the
legislative history of the Unruh Act and concluded that the purpose of the
Unruh Act was to prohibit “ ‘discrimination by privately owned services and
enterprises,’ ” as opposed to state actors, school districts, or any other public
entity or governmental agency. (Brennon B., at pp. 676, 678.) Accordingly,
the Court held that the plaintiff there could not maintain a cause of action for
violation of the Unruh Act against a public school district.

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      We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion here that Grayton may
not maintain a cause of action based on discrimination that allegedly
occurred at a public library for the same reasons. In our view, Brennon B.
directly supports the trial court’s conclusion that a public library is not a
business establishment as the phrase is used in the Unruh Act. Grayton has
not established otherwise on appeal.
      Grayton concedes that the Unruh Act applies specifically to “business
establishments,” and that the legislative history of the Unruh Act suggests
that it does not apply to public entities that provide public services. (§ 51,
subd. (b).) But he maintains that this rule does not apply to public libraries.
Grayton does not provide any authority of his own to support this conclusion.
Instead, he argues that a public library is different from a public school for
several reasons, including that “there is a bar to the distribution of
association newsletters containing political matter through Public School
District’s mailboxes,” and that public libraries only supply education services
while public schools also provide “academic achievements.” He asks us to
consider these “ ‘clues’ ” to determine whether the Unruh Act applies to
libraries. While we acknowledge that there are in fact many ways in which
public libraries differ from public schools, none of the differences raised by
Grayton suggest that a public library is a business establishment subject to
the Unruh Act.
      As a final matter, Grayton asserts the trial court also erred in
sustaining the demurrer as to his causes of action under the ADA and FHA.
In its order sustaining the demurrer, the trial court explained that Grayton
provided no response to the arguments made by the County as to these
causes of action, and that it agreed with the County that Grayton had not
stated a claim under either statute. On appeal, Grayton contends,

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summarily, that the trial court should have overruled the demurrers on the

ADA and FHA claims,2 and repeatedly states that section 51, subdivision (f)
of the Unruh Act specifies that any violation of the ADA by a business
establishment is also a violation of the Unruh Act. (See § 51, subd. (f) [“A
violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . shall also constitute a violation of this section.”].)
      It is unclear whether Grayton is relying on section 51, subdivision (f) to
assert that the trial court should have found that he stated a claim under the
Unruh Act based on his ADA claim, or that he adequately stated a claim
under the ADA and/or FHA based on his Unruh Act claim. Regardless,
neither assertion has merit. As an initial matter, Grayton has waived the
argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. (Santantonio v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102, 113 [arguments
not asserted below are waived and will not be considered for the first time on
appeal].) And, in any event, the trial court concluded that Grayton did not
establish a cause of action under the ADA, the FHA, or the Unruh Act. For
the reasons we have already explained, Grayton does not establish otherwise
on appeal and, therefore, he cannot use either claim to support the other.
      Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not err in
sustaining the County’s demurrer without leave to amend, or in entering the
subsequent judgment of dismissal.

2     To the extent that Grayton is attempting to argue that the trial court
erred in evaluating the substantive nature of his claims under the ADA or
FHA, he fails to develop the argument and we therefore treat it as waived.
(See Nelson, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.)

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                            III. DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.

                                                                KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

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