Court Opinion

ID: 2964413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:25:15.716583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:24.288208
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1045

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellant,

                                          v.

                                 BRIAN A. PETTIFORD,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                      Aldrich and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                          _____________________

                                 ____________________

            James C.  Rehnquist, Assistant United  States Attorney, with  whom
            ___________________
        Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellant.
        _______________
            George F. Gormley  with whom John D. Colucci and Gormley & Colucci
            _________________            _______________     _________________
        were on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  November 25, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      ALDRICH,  Senior  Circuit  Judge.   In  March  1991
                                ______________________

            appellee  Brian  A.  Pettiford  (hereinafter  defendant)  was

            convicted  of being  a  felon-in-possession of  a firearm  in

            violation of  18 U.S.C.    922(g)(1).   Because  he had  nine

            prior state  convictions for violent felonies,  he received a

            minimum mandatory  sentence of fifteen years  pursuant to the

            Armed Career  Criminal Act  ("ACCA"), 18  U.S.C.   924(e)(1).

            In 1994, all but one of the prior convictions were vacated by

            the  Massachusetts state  courts,  and in  1995 the  district

            court granted  federal habeas  corpus relief under  28 U.S.C.

              2255 in the  form of  a sentence reduction,  on the  ground

            that  the ACCA was now  inapplicable to the  computation.  On

            the government's appeal, we affirm.

                                    I. Background
                                       __________

                      Approximately   two   years   after   his   federal

            sentencing,  defendant  requested audiotapes  of  his earlier

            guilty pleas  and sentencings  in Boston Municipal  Court and

            Dorchester District Court.   He was unsuccessful in obtaining

            useful tapes, post, and subsequently attempted to reconstruct
                          ____

            the proceedings  through the use of  affidavits.  Ultimately,

            the courts vacated eight of the nine convictions.  The Boston

            Municipal Court judge, finding no record that the trial judge

            had engaged in any colloquy with the defendant at the time of

            his  guilty plea, vacated the convictions  on the ground that

            the Commonwealth had  failed to carry its burden of producing

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            a  "contemporaneous record  affirmatively [showing]  that the

            defendant  waived his rights  voluntarily and  knowingly," as

            required  under the  federal  Constitution and  Massachusetts

            law.  The Dorchester District Court apparently did the  same.

            On  the  habeas petition,  our  district  court, taking  what

            would, initially, seem to us the equitable view,  granted the

            relief and resentenced defendant to the term served, four and

            one half years.

                      The government  appeals, and with  indignation: the

            state action had been  a "windfall;" the government  had been

            "sandbagged."   In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  mandatory

            enhancement  was based  entirely upon  the state's  action in

            convicting,1  and  not simply  a  case  where enhancement  is

            permitted for  charges with no findings,  see, e.g., U.S.S.G.
                                                      ___  ____

              4A1.3(e),  to  complain of  state windfalls  and government

            sandbagging  is strong language.   The  government criticizes

                                
            ____________________

            1.  18 U.S.C.   924(e)(1) reads:

                           In the case of a person who violates
                      section  922(g)  of  this  title  and has
                      three previous convictions  by any  court
                      referred to in  section 922(g)(1) of this
                      title  for a violent  felony or a serious
                      drug  offense,  or  both,   committed  on
                      occasions  different  from  one  another,
                      such person shall be  fined not more than
                      $25,000  and  imprisoned  not  less  than
                      fifteen  years, and,  notwithstanding any
                      other  provision of law,  the court shall
                      not  suspend the sentence  of, or grant a
                      probationary  sentence  to,  such  person
                      with  respect  to  the  conviction  under
                      section 922(g).

                                         -3-

            the  state's procedure  as  if the  vacated convictions  were

            federal  property, and the defendant as if he were attempting

            a  trespass.   We  are induced  to  start with  the  opposite

            approach.   First, however, we must consider  a Supreme Court

            case, United States  v. Custis, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S. Ct. 1732
                  _____________     ______

            (1994), decided after the  imposition of defendant's original

            sentence  and  its affirmance  on  appeal,  United States  v.
                                                        _____________

            Pettiford, 962 F.2d 74 (1st Cir. 1992).
            _________

                             II. United States v. Custis
                                 _______________________

                      In May 1994, the Supreme Court  in Custis held that
                                                         ______

            under   924(e),  unless a  defendant in a  federal sentencing

            proceeding was claiming a violation  of his right to counsel,

            he  had no right at that time  to make a collateral attack on

            prior state  convictions.  114 S.  Ct. at 1738.   Rather, the

            Court observed at the end of the opinion,

                           We  recognize,  however, as  did the
                      Court of  Appeals . . .  that Custis, who
                      was  still "in  custody" for  purposes of
                      his state convictions at  the time of his
                      federal  sentencing  under   924(e),  may
                      attack his state sentences in Maryland or
                      through  federal  habeas  review.     See
                                                            ___
                      Maleng v. Cook, 490  U.S. 488 (1989).  If
                      ______    ____
                      Custis is successful  in attacking  these
                      state  sentences, he  may then  apply for
                      reopening   of   any   federal   sentence
                      enhanced  by  the  state  sentences.   We
                      express  no  opinion  on the  appropriate
                      disposition of such an application.

            Id. at 1739.  The district court, noting this dicta, held, in
            ___

            an  extensive opinion,  Pettiford v.  United States,  1995 WL
                                    _________     _____________

            464920  (D.  Mass. 1995),  that defendant's  enhanced federal

                                         -4-

            sentence  was  now in  violation  of the  Constitution.   The

            government has a variety of objections.

                                  III.  Jurisdiction
                                        ____________

                      The  district court concluded from the Custis dicta
                                                             ______

            that   2255 was the appropriate  vehicle by which to proceed.

            The  government  objects  on  the ground  that  this  section

            applies only  to prisoners incarcerated "in  violation of the

            Constitution  or  laws  of  the  United  States."   While  we

            believe,  post,   that  defendant  has  such   a  claim,  the
                      ____

            government's attempt to limit the availability of   2255 that

            permeates its  case, is  surprising.  Section  2255 reads  as

            follows:

                           A prisoner in custody under sentence
                      of a court established by Act of Congress
                      claiming  the right  to be  released upon
                      the  ground that  [1]  the  sentence  was
                      imposed in violation of  the Constitution
                      or laws of the United States, or that [2]
                      the  court  was  without jurisdiction  to
                      impose  such sentence,  or  that [3]  the
                      sentence was  in  excess of  the  maximum
                      authorized by  law, or [4] is   otherwise
                                             __________________
                      subject  to  collateral attack,  may move
                      ______________________________
                      the  court which imposed  the sentence to
                      vacate, set aside or correct the sentence
                      . . . .

            (emphasis supplied.)   Item  4 stands by  itself sufficiently

            without our having to resort  to the familiar principle  that

            additional  language  is  presumably   separately  meaningful

            rather than redundant.  Indeed, we  have previously held that

            the   fourth  prong   of     2255   encompasses  other   than

            constitutional or statutory error.   See, e.g., United States
                                                 ___  ____  _____________

                                         -5-

            v. DiRusso, 548 F.2d 372, 374-75 (1st Cir. 1976) (noting that
               _______

              2255 is often a vehicle for correcting sentences based upon

            errors made  by the sentencing  judge).  However,  whether on

            constitutional  or  grounds otherwise  subject  to collateral

            attack, we  concur with  the district court's  recognition of

            federal habeas jurisdiction.

                   IV. Timing of Determination of Criminal History
                       ___________________________________________

                      18   U.S.C.     921(a)(20),   the  statute   hereto

            appertaining, provides in relevant part:

                           What  constitutes  a  conviction  of
                      such  a  crime  shall  be  determined  in
                      accordance   with   the   law    of   the
                      jurisdiction  in  which  the  proceedings
                      were held.  Any conviction which has been
                      expunged, or  set  aside or  for which  a
                      person has been pardoned or has had civil
                      rights restored shall not be considered a
                      conviction for purposes  of this  chapter
                      . . . .

            The government contends that the past tense phrases "has been

            expunged" and  "has been  pardoned," indicate that  only past

            offenses  vacated  prior to  the  federal  proceeding may  be

            discounted by  the court,  in effect etching  the defendant's

            criminal history  record in stone as  of that moment.   We do

            not agree.  The wording would read equally well if applied to

            convictions   expunged,  etc.,  subsequent   to  the  federal

            sentencing.

                      Thus with the rule of lenity,  see United States v.
                                                     ___ _____________

            Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
            _____                                    ____________

            Ct. 263, 65 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 07, 1996) (No. 96-5631),

                                         -6-

            the government is on the short end.  And  with the procedural

            rule announced in Custis, that it is only after sentence that
                              ______

            a defendant  may attack  the convictions that  contributed to

            it,  what sense would it make to  say that he may attack pre-

            sentence convictions, but  not one whose flaw  did not appear

            until  after the  federal  sentence?   Obviously this  is the

            situation  every time  it  is defendant  who establishes  the

            flaw.  The district court was correct.  United States v. Cox,
                                                    _____________    ___

            83  F.3d 336 (10th  Cir. 1996).   See  also United  States v.
                                              ___  ____ ______________

            Bacon, 94 F.3d 158, 162 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996); Young v. Vaughn,
            _____                                        _____    ______

            83 F.3d  72, 77 (3d Cir.),  cert. denied, 117 S.  Ct. 333, 65
                                        ____________

            U.S.L.W.  3285  (U.S. Oct.  15,  1996)  (No. 96-217);  United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Hofierka, 83 F.3d 357, 364 (11th Cir.), modified on
            ______    ________                                ___________

            other grounds on  denial of  reh'g, 92 F.3d  1108 (11th  Cir.
            __________________________________

            1996).  No circuit has indicated otherwise.

                     V.  Basis for Vacation of State Convictions
                         _______________________________________

                      As we have said,  defendant's motions to vacate the

            state  convictions were based on  the ground that  he had not

            been  furnished by  the courts,  before accepting  his guilty

            pleas,  the  information  necessary   for  his  pleas  to  be

            considered  voluntary,  a  constitutional requirement.    See
                                                                      ___

            Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); United States
            ______    _______                               _____________

            v. Houlihan,  92 F.3d 1271,  1279 (1st Cir.  1996).   For the
               ________

            Boston  Municipal   Court  cases  there   were  no   records,

            presumably because more than two and a half years had elapsed

                                         -7-

            since  the  plea  and they  had  been  destroyed pursuant  to

            permissive Rule  211A(4).   In the Dorchester  District Court

            there were  tapes, but they  were unintelligible.   One court

            demonstrably,   and   the  other   apparently,   applied  the

            Massachusetts  rule that the burden  is on the  state to show

            the voluntariness of the  plea, Commonwealth v. Duquette, 386
                                            ____________    ________

            Mass. 834, 841 (1982), and granted the motions to vacate.

                      This distresses the government, evoking the charges

            of  windfalls  and  sandbagging.2    It  makes  an  elaborate

            argument,  based on the fact that the state courts could have

            applied  a  presumption of  correctness  and  found the  plea

            hearings valid, see Parke  v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,  31 (1992),
                            ___ _____     _____

            and  that the  Massachusetts courts did  not go so  far as to

            hold  the convictions  unconstitutional.   Putting aside  the

            fact that the Boston Municipal Court judge specifically found

            a Boykin  violation, we  do not  attach consequences to  such
              ______

            recondite thinking.  The short answer is  that Congress chose

            to predicate sentence enhancement on state action.  Surely it

            is  not for the federal court to read the statutory language,

            "in  accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the

                                
            ____________________

            2.  See illuminating discussion  in United  States v.  Payne,
                                                ______________     _____
            894 F.  Supp. 534, 537  n.7 (D.  Mass. 1995).   The one  year
            limitation contained  in the recent amendment  of   2255 will
            diminish this  problem.  See the  Antiterrorism and Effective
                                     ___
            Death Penalty Act  of 1996,  Pub. L. No.  104-132, 110  Stat.
            1220 (April 24, 1996).

                                         -8-

            proceedings were held" as permitting us  to conclude that the

            Massachusetts lower court decisions were wrongly decided.

                      The  government  makes  a  further  point.   Before

            Custis,  it  was permissible  for  a defendant  to  raise the
            ______

            invalidity  of  his state  convictions  at  the time  of  his

            federal sentencing.  United  States v. Paleo, 967 F.2d  7, 11
                                 ______________    _____

            (1st Cir. 1992).   Because the defendant  did not do so,  the

            government  attempts   to  invoke  the  rule   of  cause  and

            prejudice.    See  Coleman v.  Thompson,  501  U.S.  722, 750
                          ___  _______     ________

            (1991).   It presses this  particularly because, federalwise,

            the  burden  would have  been on  the  defendant to  prove an

            inadequate plea colloquy, see United States v. Wilkinson, 926
                                      ___ _____________    _________

            F.2d 22, 28 (1st  Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S.  1211 (1991),
                                     ____________

            overruled on  other grounds by  Bailey v. United  States, ___
            ______________________________  ______    ______________

            U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1995), and having no memory on

            the subject one way or the other, he would have had no proof.

            Our  reaction is the opposite  of the government's.   With no

            memory  there  was   no  affirmative  waiver.     Exceptional

            circumstances may excuse a delayed making  of a claim, Knight
                                                                   ______

            v.  United  States, 37  F.2d 769,  773  (1st Cir.  1994), and
                ______________

            ignorance may be a factor.

                      Even if  Custis is not regarded  as retroactive, it
                               ______

            indicates the acceptability of this post-sentence proceeding.

            We are content to recognize the district court's discretion. 

                      Affirmed.
                      _________

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