Court Opinion

ID: 2963923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:17:27.517721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:48.171703
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          February 29, 1996     [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                            UNITES STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1750

                                     PETER WHITE,

                                Petitioner, Appellant,

                                          v.

                               SHEILA HUBBARD, ET AL.,

                               Respondents, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                  [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, Chief U.S. District Judge]
                                         _________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                          Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            Peter White on brief pro se.
            ___________
            Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and William J. Duensing,
            _________________                        ___________________
        Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau, on brief for appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.  In  this habeas corpus proceeding  under 28
                 __________

            U.S.C.    2254,  petitioner  Peter White  complains that  the

            Massachusetts Parole Board abridged his due process rights by

            waiting some eleven years before executing a parole violation

            warrant  against him.    During that  period, petitioner  was

            first awaiting  trial on, and then  incarcerated for, several

            federal offenses.  We  agree with the district court  that no

            constitutional claim has been presented.  

                 Petitioner is  mistaken in arguing that  he was entitled

            to a revocation  hearing prior  to his  release from  federal

            custody  in 1992.    Prior thereto,  as the  Magistrate-Judge

            observed,  petitioner  was never  "taken  into  custody as  a

            parole violator by execution  of the warrant"--the event that

            triggers  the right to a prompt revocation hearing.  Moody v.
                                                                 _____

            Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976); accord, e.g.,  United States
            _______                          ______  ____   _____________

            v.  Chaklader, 987 F.2d 75,  77 (1st Cir.  1993) (per curiam)
                _________

            (noting that  the speedy revocation  hearing protection under

            the  Due Process Clause is "not triggered when the warrant is

            placed  as a detainer at an institution where the ... parolee

            is already in custody  awaiting disposition of an intervening

            charge or serving a  sentence for a crime committed  while on

            [parole]") (quoting United States  v. Wickham, 618 F.2d 1307,
                                _____________     _______

            1309 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979)).

                 Also misplaced is the  related contention that the delay

            between issuance  and execution  of the  warrant here was  so

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            unreasonable  as to have resulted  in a waiver  of the parole

            board's  authority  to  return  petitioner to  prison.    See
                                                                      ___

            generally, e.g., Bennett  v. Bogan, 66 F.3d  812, 818-19 (6th
            _________  ____  _______     _____

            Cir. 1995); United  States v.  Tippens, 39 F.3d  88, 90  (5th
                        ______________     _______

            Cir.  1994) (per  curiam); United  States v.  Hill, 719  F.2d
                                       ______________     ____

            1402, 1403-05 (9th  Cir. 1983);  In re Zullo,  420 Mass.  872
                                             ___________

            (1995).  Petitioner  insists that the warrant could have been

            served  between the time he was released  on bail in 1981 and

            the time he commenced his federal incarceration in 1983.  Yet

            it is difficult to conclude that the board acted unreasonably

            in deferring action while  the federal charges were pending--

            especially since state  law called  for such a  result.   See
                                                                      ___

            Mass. Gen. L. ch. 127,   149 (1981); see, e.g.,  In re Zullo,
                                                 ___  ____   ___________

            37  Mass. App. Ct. 371,  373 (1994), vacated  and remanded on
                                                 ________________________

            other grounds,  420 Mass. 872  (1995); Smith v.  State Parole
            _____________                          _____     ____________

            Board, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 145, 150 n.12 (1983). 
            _____

                 Petitioner in  any event has failed  to demonstrate that

            he was prejudiced by the delay.  No suggestion has been  made

            that  deferral of  the revocation  hearing  "undermine[d] his

            ability to contest the  issue of the violation or  to proffer

            mitigating  evidence."   Tippens, 39  F.3d at  90.   Instead,
                                     _______

            petitioner  contends  only  that   he  was  deprived  of  the

            opportunity   to  serve  his   federal  and  state  sentences

            concurrently.  Virtually the identical argument was  rejected

            in Moody, where  the Court noted  that the parole  commission
               _____

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            retained  the  discretion   "to  grant,  retroactively,   the

            equivalent  of  concurrent  sentences  and  to   provide  for

            unconditional  or  conditional release."    429  U.S. at  87;

            accord,  e.g., Tippens, 39 F.3d at 90; Chaklader, 987 F.2d at
            ______   ____  _______                 _________

            77;  United States v. Fisher,  895 F.2d 208,  211 (5th Cir.),
                 _____________    ______

            cert. denied, 495 U.S.  940 (1990).  That the board  here, in
            ____________

            the  end, chose not to exercise its discretion in this manner

            is  without   constitutional   significance.     See,   e.g.,
                                                             ___    ____

            Chaklader, 987 F.2d at 77.
            _________

                 Affirmed.
                 _________

             

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