Court Opinion

ID: 9797506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:22:26.366437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:56:27.600790
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, Judge
(dissenting):
4 22 I dissent from the majority opinion. I cannot agree that the circumstances here were sufficient to constitute the "exceptional cireumstances" required for disturbing a sheriff's sale, see Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1991).
123 First, as recognized by the majority, there was no irregularity in the sale itself. And even if my colleagues are correct that *719the term "irregularities attending the sale" can include a purchaser's conduct after the sale, I do not agree that such irregularities were present here. Indeed, the two cases relied on for this point involve some kind of affirmative actions or representations directly aimed at impeding redemption, not the mere failure to do something as minor as return telephone calls. See Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d 644, 648 (1954) (relying on "the facts that [the purchaser] knew that the judgment for costs could easily have been satisfied from a levy of personal property known by him to be owned by [the debtor], and which he was very careful not to direct the sheriff to levy wpon and sell, plus his and his attorney's studious stlence after the quitclaim deed had been received about their intention to collect the judgment for costs even though they saw [the debtor] and his attorney on several occasions before and after the execution sale" (emphases added)); Young v. Schroeder, 10 Utah 155, 37 P. 252, 256 (1894) ("[The plaintiff was assured by [the purchaser], before the period for redemption had expired, that the statutory period would not be insisted upon[.]" (emphasis added)), aff'd, 161 U.S. 334, 16 S.Ct. 512, 40 L.Ed. 721 (1896). Had Bond or Dortus made some sort of affirmative representation to induce Pyper to forgo redemption, I would be inclined to coneur in part with the decision reached by the majority. But I simply do not believe that Bond and Dorius's alleged omission in not returning telephone calls rises even to "slight cireumstances of unfairness," see Young, 37 P. at 254. See generally Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1288 (1986) (defining "unfair" as "marked by injustice, partiality, or deception").1
24 Moreover, a purchaser at a sheriff's sale is under no obligation to communicate with the judgment debtor at all-a point that the majority apparently concedes, see supra 18. And I do not see that Bond and Dori-us's position as Pyper's former counsel changes this rule, particularly under these circumstances. Although duties of confidentiality and loyalty continue beyond representation, I do not see how this requires Bond and Dorius to ascertain and correct Pyper's misunderstandings of the legal process, particularly when Pyper was both aware that there was some deadline for redeeming the property and was, apparently, represented by different legal counsel. Pyper could have easily obtained the necessary redemption information from the district court and could have paid the court in order to exercise his right of redemption, all without any assistance from Bond and Dorius. Indeed, he eventually, although belatedly, did just that.
125 Absent an irregularity of a nature heretofore described, the low bid is irrelevant. Indeed, the remedy for such a low-ball bid is the right of redemption, which a judgment debtor has six months to exercise. See Utah R. Civ. P. 690. Thus, the very fact that the amount of the bid was so low actually benefitted Pyper. He had six months to tender a mere $329 to redeem his property, thereby rendering it unavailable to satisfy the judgment, yet he failed to do so.
26 In sum, this case sets unwise precedent. Now all a judgment debtor need do to have the sheriffs sale set aside is, after sitting idly by for ninety percent of the redemption period, allege that he made several unreturned telephone calls in the final two weeks and, any time after the sheriff's deed is delivered, attack the sale. Under the reasoning of the majority, virtually any sheriffs sale is now vulnerable, as is the sheriff's deed and any deeds to subsequent grantees. I would therefore reverse the decision of the district court.

. The majority reasons that Bond and Dorius's actions implicitly represented a willingness to participate in the redemption process. See supra 18. I do not agree, and in any event, I disagree that any such implicit message would be sufficient to meet the standard here. More importantly, the majority's reasoning about an implicit representation is not supported by the findings and conclusions of the district court. Instead, the district court simply determined that irregularities existed because "[Bond and Dorius] did not return [Pyper]'s telephone calls and did not inform him that once the property was sold, the judgment could not be paid off to redeem the property."