Court Opinion

ID: 9394694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 13:03:19.543838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:01.891707
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
 Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
 opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
 prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
 official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: May 16, 2023

               S23A0090, S23A0091. THE STATE v. HARRIS.

        BETHEL, Justice.

       Lorenzo Harris was indicted for malice murder and other

offenses arising from the shooting of Larry Jones. Pursuant to

OCGA § 5-7-1 (a), the State appeals the trial court’s pretrial rulings,

which were not reduced to writing, granting Harris’s motion in

limine to exclude evidence of two prior incidents and his motion to

suppress identification evidence. In the absence of a written order

from the trial court regarding the appealed rulings, we directed the

parties to brief the issue of this Court’s jurisdiction. Upon review,

we conclude that we have jurisdiction over these appeals, vacate the

trial court’s rulings, and remand for further proceedings.

       1. According to the affidavit supporting the warrant for

Harris’s arrest, Jones was shot on March 26, 2019, in the parking
lot of an apartment building at 20 Vanira Avenue in Atlanta. 1

Surveillance video recordings 2 of the parking lot captured around

the time of the incident show a man leaving the apartment of Shirley

Ndetti and entering a red truck. The man then shot Jones in the

back and drove away. Jones died as a result of his injuries. Three

.40-caliber shell casings were recovered at the scene of the shooting.

      During their investigation, police interviewed Ndetti and

showed her a single photograph of Harris. She confirmed that the

person depicted in the photograph, whom she knew as “Low,” visited

her apartment the night of the shooting and left shortly before

Ndetti heard gunshots. The State indicated at pretrial hearings that

      1 The background facts set forth in this opinion concerning the crime and
the evidence that was excluded under Rule 403 were drawn from the affidavit
supporting the warrant for Harris’s arrest, a police report, and discussions
between the trial court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor during the pretrial
hearings. However, the facts concerning the identification were supported by
a recording of the interview and a witness who was called at the hearing on
the motion to suppress. The trial court did not issue written orders containing
any findings of fact. Our recitation is solely for the purpose of establishing
context and nothing in this opinion should be understood as establishing or
resolving any disputed fact.
      2 The video recordings were not tendered as exhibits to the motion to

suppress or the motion in limine and are not part of the record before this
Court.
                                       2
it intends to introduce evidence at trial showing that Harris owns a

red truck, as well as Harris’s phone records, which place him in the

area around the time of the shooting.

     Before trial, the State sought an order confirming the

admissibility of evidence related to prior shootings, which allegedly

linked Harris to Jones’s shooting, as intrinsic evidence. At pretrial

hearings, counsel for both Harris and the State proffered the

following account of the two prior shootings. The first incident 3 (the

“Almond Incident”) occurred in September 2019; the victim, Mario

Almond, was robbed at gunpoint by three men while conducting a

jewelry sale with Harris, and Almond alleged that Harris

orchestrated the robbery. The second incident (the “Hank Aaron

Incident”) occurred on March 7, 2019, and arose from a shooting

incident involving damage to property at 942 Hank Aaron Drive, one

block from where Jones was shot. Police recovered 13 .40-caliber

     3 We use “first” and “second” to denote the order of the argument.
Chronologically, the Almond Incident occurred five to six months after Jones
was shot. Meanwhile, the Hank Aaron Incident appears to have taken place
just under three weeks before Jones was shot.

                                     3
cartridge casings at that location, which were forensically

determined to have been fired by the same gun that was used

nineteen days later during the Jones shooting. 4

      Among other pretrial filings, Harris filed a motion in limine to

exclude evidence of the prior shootings as “inadmissible, prejudicial,

inflammatory and not relevant.” He also filed a motion to suppress

Ndetti’s identification of Harris, arguing that the use of a single-

photograph lineup was improper. The trial court held hearings on

these motions, excluded evidence of two prior shootings, relying on

OCGA      §   24-4-403     (“Rule    403”),   and    suppressed      Ndetti’s

identification. It is from these rulings that the State appeals.

      2. Before reaching the merits of the State’s appeal, we must

consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal in the

      4 The State represented at pretrial hearings that it expects the evidence
at trial to show that Harris is linked to the shell casings recovered from the
Hank Aaron Incident through an August 2018 shooting of Daniel Troutman
(the “Troutman Incident”). The shell casings recovered from the Troutman
Incident were a forensic match to both the casings recovered from the Hank
Aaron Incident and the Jones shooting. Troutman initially identified Harris as
the shooter, but he later testified under oath at an evidentiary hearing in
another case that Harris was not the shooter. The Troutman Incident is not at
issue on appeal because the trial court declined to make a ruling as to the
admissibility of its evidence at the pretrial hearings.
                                      4
absence of a written order from the trial court with respect to the

rulings at issue in this case. See Woods v. State, 279 Ga. 28, 28 (608

SE2d 631) (2005) (“It is incumbent upon the Court to question its

jurisdiction in all cases in which jurisdiction may be in doubt.”). We

conclude that this appeal is properly before us.

     Substantively, three oral rulings made at separate hearings

are at issue here. At the first hearing on May 4, 2022, the trial court

orally granted Harris’s motion in limine with respect to the Almond

Incident, and the State orally requested that the trial court enter a

written order memorializing its ruling. At that time, the trial court

indicated that it would not prepare and enter its own order, instead

informing counsel that it would file a written order only when a

party prepared a draft order and submitted it for the court’s

consideration. At the second hearing on May 27, 2022, the trial court

excluded the evidence of the Hank Aaron Incident. Before doing so,

the trial court asked if counsel for either Harris or the State could,

either collaboratively or independently, submit a proposed order

reflecting its prior rulings. Neither the State nor Harris’s counsel

                                  5
submitted a proposed order. At the final hearing on June 9, 2022,

the trial court orally granted Harris’s motion to suppress Ndetti’s

identification, but the State did not request a written order for the

ruling on the motion to suppress at that hearing.

     The next day, on Friday, June 10, 2022, the State filed a “notice

of need for written orders on pretrial motions,” which specifically

requested that the trial court enter written orders memorializing its

oral rulings on Harris’s motion in limine and motion to suppress “so

that the State may exercise its statutory rights of appeal on those

orders.” In a written order entered that afternoon, the trial court

acknowledged the State’s request for written orders, but rather than

memorializing its oral rulings, it indicated that the State’s filing

failed to state the statutory basis for an appeal and noted that the

State would be permitted to provide an amended filing specifying

the statutory basis for appeal. With the case scheduled for trial only

three days later, on Monday, June 13, 2022, the State did not

respond to the trial court’s order and instead filed its notice of appeal

after the close of business that day (the last business day before the

                                   6
jury was scheduled to be selected), appealing the trial court’s rulings

on the motion in limine excluding evidence of the prior shootings and

the motion to suppress Ndetti’s identification of Harris under OCGA

§ 5-7-1.

     As an initial matter, we address whether the State waived its

right to appeal by failing to comply with the trial court’s requests for

a proposed order. A trial court may – and routinely does – request,

or even mandate, that a party submit a proposed order

memorializing the court’s oral rulings. But such requests will not

absolve the trial court of its duty to issue written orders; the

ultimate responsibility for entering a written order rests with the

trial court. See Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 462 (591 SE2d

774) (2003) (recognizing the trial court’s “clear legal duty to enter a

written order”); State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152, 153 (3) (635 SE2d 716)

(2006) (same). Thus, the fact that the trial court in this case

requested that the parties submit a proposed order and that the

                                   7
State failed to do so does not preclude the State’s appeal.5

      OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) authorizes the State to appeal a trial court’s

order, decision, or judgment under certain circumstances in a

criminal case. Ordinarily, “an order is not appealable [under OCGA

§ 5-7-1 (a)] unless it is in writing.” Morrell, 281 Ga. at 152 (2). But

an exception to this general rule arises where “the transcript

affirmatively shows that the State requested the trial court to put

the oral order in written form and that the trial court refused to do

so.” Id. See also State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98, 99 (686 SE2d 244) (2009)

(authorizing the State’s appeal of an oral ruling suppressing

evidence where, in response to the State’s request for a written

order, “the trial court stated that ‘the record speaks for itself’ and

never entered a written order”). This exception is grounded in the

State’s statutory right to appeal and serves to prevent the State’s

statutory right to appeal from being frustrated. See OCGA § 5-7-1

(a). Absent such an exception, the State’s ability to exercise its right

      5Of course, where the trial court directs counsel to prepare a draft order
and counsel fails to do so, the trial court is not without remedy, including the
contempt power, to require its orders be fulfilled.
                                       8
to appeal in any given case would depend on whether the trial court

timely carried out its duty to file a written order, effectively leaving

the State’s right to appeal to the trial court’s discretion. But the

statute allows the trial court no such role in approving the State’s

appeal; the Morrell exception simply recognizes as much. Here, the

focus is on the application of that exception at the intersection of the

absence of a requested written order and the expiration of the right

under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), (5), when jeopardy attaches.

      Here, the transcripts of the pretrial hearings, reflecting the

interaction between the trial court and the State, provide some

context for the trial court’s failure to enter written orders. But,

standing alone, the transcripts are insufficient to establish the trial

court’s refusal to enter written orders. The record, 6 however,

affirmatively shows that the trial court refused the State’s request

      6 Morrell stated that the exception applies when the “transcript
affirmatively shows” that the trial court refused the State’s request for a
written order. (Emphasis supplied.) 281 Ga. at 152 (2). Yet today we apply this
exception where the record affirmatively shows that the trial court refused the
State’s request for a written order. We do not read the language in Morrell to
limit the exception only to refusals shown in the transcript. Rather, refusals
otherwise reflected in the record will suffice.
                                      9
for a written order. See Lynch, 286 Ga. at 99. Specifically, the trial

court’s June 10 order, which pointed to the State’s failure to allege

its statutory basis for appeal, affirmatively effectuates such refusal.

     Although the trial court’s June 10 order does not articulate an

unequivocal refusal to enter written orders, the substance of the

order combined with the circumstances under which the order was

entered operated as a refusal. Critically, in addition to having

requested a written order for the trial court’s ruling on the

admissibility of the Almond Incident at the hearing on May 4, the

State filed its motion for written orders – which made explicit the

State’s intent to appeal all three of the trial court’s rulings and,

therefore, its immediate need for written orders – on Friday, June

10, the last business day before the trial’s scheduled start date of

Monday, June 13. Given the impending trial, any further delay in

entering written orders would have rendered nugatory the State’s

right of appeal. See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5) (requiring that the order

decision or judgment be “ruled on prior to the impaneling of a jury

or the defendant being put in jeopardy”). But despite its awareness

                                  10
of the imminent trial, the trial court failed to fulfill its duty to

memorialize in writing its oral rulings and instead, only hours

before the close of business, entered a non-responsive order to the

State’s time-sensitive request. Here, we conclude that the denial of

a motion for a written order, when entered on the Friday afternoon

before a trial scheduled for the next Monday, operates as a refusal

for purposes of the exception articulated in Morrell. As a result,

under the particular facts presented here, the Morrell exception is

satisfied.

     Given our determination that an appeal is proper under

Morrell, we must also determine whether it was timely. OCGA § 5-

7-1 (a) (5) (A), which applies only to the trial court’s rulings on

motions to exclude evidence to be used by the State at trial, requires

the State’s notice of appeal to be “filed within two days of such order,

decision, or judgment[.]” The trial court’s May 4 and May 27 oral

rulings on Harris’s motion in limine occurred more than two days

before the State’s June 10 notice of appeal was filed. The trial court’s

refusal to issue written orders, however, occurred on June 10, the

                                  11
same day that the State filed its notice of appeal. This case thus

highlights an open question about when the two-day filing period

commences under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5) (A) in the absence of a

written order. In other words, does the clock start when the trial

court issues the oral ruling or when the trial court refuses the State’s

request for a written order?

     Morrell generally mandates a written order, and it follows that

the two-day filing period should commence at the time of the order’s

entry. But in the absence of a written order, as here, the two-day

filing period must commence with the trial court’s refusal of the

State’s request to provide a written order. In determining the precise

time of the refusal, the appellate court must engage in a case-specific

factual inquiry, asking at what point, as affirmatively shown by the

record, the trial court refused the State’s request. Here, the clock

started on June 10 when the trial court declined to issue written

orders in response to the State’s request earlier that day. Therefore,

the State’s June 10 notice of appeal was timely.

                            Case No. S23A0090

                                  12
      3. We now turn to the State’s contention that the trial court

abused its discretion by excluding evidence of two prior shootings.

Because the record reflects that the trial court’s analysis under Rule

403 employed an erroneous legal standard, we agree.

      The State sought to admit evidence of the Almond and Hank

Aaron Incidents as intrinsic evidence. 7 The trial court relied on Rule

403 to grant Harris’s motion in limine and exclude the evidence of

both incidents. In excluding the evidence of the Almond Incident,

the trial court explained that the State was “not charging [Harris]

with a crime spree.” When asked to elaborate on the “legal basis” of

its decision, the trial court stated that the evidence was “highly

prejudicial” and “not probative.” When excluding the evidence of the

Hank Aaron Incident, the trial court reasoned that the evidence “is

more prejudicial than probative,” the evidence “goes to bad

character,” and the facts are not “intrinsically intertwined to the

charges that are related to this case.”

      7 The State also sought to admit this evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-
404 (b), and the trial court denied its motion. The State does not challenge that
ruling on appeal, and we do not address it.
                                       13
     On appeal, the State maintains that the evidence from the two

prior shootings is admissible as intrinsic evidence and that the trial

court’s exclusion of the evidence was an abuse of discretion. We

review a trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of evidence

as intrinsic for an abuse of discretion. See Harris v. State, 310 Ga.

372, 378 (2) (b) (850 SE2d 77) (2020). But a trial court does not have

discretion to apply an incorrect legal standard. See Welbon v. State,

301 Ga. 106, 109-110 (2) (799 SE2d 793) (2017) (“Where the trial

court has used a wrong standard in reaching its conclusion, a

remand may be appropriate[.]”). See also State v. Jackson, 351 Ga.

App. 675, 677 (832 SE2d 654) (2019) (“[W]hile the abuse-of-

discretion standard presupposes a range of possible conclusions that

can be reached by a trial court with regard to a particular

evidentiary issue, it does not permit a clear error of judgment or the

application of the wrong legal standard.”).

     Evidence may be admitted “as intrinsic evidence, rather than

extrinsic evidence subject to Rule 404 (b), when it is (1) an

uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of

                                 14
transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete the

story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence

regarding the charged offense.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Harris, 310 Ga. at 377 (2) (b). “Intrinsic evidence must also satisfy

Rule 403.” Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 (IV) (d) (807 SE2d

350) (2017). Whether the trial court concluded that the evidence at

issue was intrinsic evidence or assumed as much and simply moved

to analyze whether the evidence should be excluded under Rule 403

is unclear. But we need not review whether the trial court found the

evidence to be intrinsic because the trial court erred by applying an

incorrect standard in its application of Rule 403.8

      Under Rule 403,

      [r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value
      is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
      prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury

      8 We note that, as to the Hank Aaron incident, the trial court commented
that the evidence “basically is bad character evidence.” That conclusion,
standing alone, is not grounds to deem intrinsic evidence inadmissible because,
as this Court has explained, “intrinsic evidence remains admissible even if it
incidentally places the defendant’s character at issue.” (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Harris, 310 Ga. at 378 (2) (b). If, on remand, the trial
court determines that this evidence is not admissible as intrinsic evidence, we
note further that the trial court already considered and determined that the
evidence was not admissible as extrinsic evidence under Rule 404 (b).
                                      15
     or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
     needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

     The trial court never recited the correct standard under Rule

403. Rather, in both rulings, the trial court applied a different,

incorrect standard in determining whether to exclude the evidence

under Rule 403. First, the trial court stated that the evidence of the

Almond Incident was “highly prejudicial” and “not probative.” But it

is not enough that the trial court considered the evidence to be

“highly prejudicial”; rather, the court must assess the danger of

unfair prejudice. See OCGA § 24-4-403; Middlebrooks v. State, 310

Ga. 748, 751 (2) (b) (854 SE2d 503) (2021) (“[A]ll inculpatory

evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is only when unfair prejudice

substantially outweighs probative value that the rule permits

exclusion.” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in

original)). See also Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 238, 263 (3) (a) (875 SE2d

659) (2022) (“Rule 403’s term ‘unfair prejudice’ speaks to the

capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder

into declaring guilt on an improper basis rather than on proof

                                  16
specific to the offense charged.”).

     Second, the trial court stated that the evidence of the Hank

Aaron Incident is “more prejudicial than probative.” But the proper

standard requires the trial court to determine whether “the

probative value [of the evidence] is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 24-4-

403. See, e.g., Jackson, 351 Ga. App. at 677 (remanding because the

trial court erred in applying the wrong standard under Rule 403

when it determined that the probative value was not outweighed –

rather than not substantially outweighed – by the danger of unfair

prejudice).

     Accordingly, the trial court erred when it incorrectly applied

Rule 403 to exclude the evidence of the Almond Incident and the

Hank Aaron Incident. The trial court’s order must therefore be

vacated and the case remanded for the trial court to reconsider the

motion under the correct legal standard and consistent with the

directions of the Court. See State v. Atkins, 304 Ga. 413, 423 (2) (c)

(819 SE2d 28) (2018).

                                      17
                                Case No. S23A0091

      4. The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

granting     Harris’s    motion     to    suppress     Ndetti’s    out-of-court

identification of Harris because her identification was merely

“confirmatory.” Because we cannot determine whether the trial

court applied the correct legal standard, we vacate its grant of the

motion to suppress and remand for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

      Police investigators interviewed Ndetti with her husband,

Sammie Glenn, on two occasions. The trial court was informed

through the representations of defense counsel that during the first

interview, the investigators were “impermissibly suggestive,

aggressive, [and] intimidating” toward Ndetti and Glenn. 9 The

second interview began with a different investigator, Detective

Danny Agan, asking if Ndetti or Glenn were familiar with the

      9The audio recording of this first interview is not contained in the record.
Instead, the interaction was only described by Harris’s counsel during the
pretrial hearings.

                                         18
shooting. 10 Ndetti said yes and explained that on the day Jones was

shot, a person named “Low”11 came to her apartment to give money

to Glenn. Shortly after “Low” left the apartment, Ndetti heard

gunshots. She described “Low” as a “big man” and explained that

over the past year, he had periodically brought money to Glenn. Just

before the interview concluded, Detective Agan showed Glenn and

Ndetti a single photograph depicting Harris and asked “Who is that

right there?” Ndetti responded “That’s him” and Detective Agan

confirmed that she was referring to the man she knew as “Low.”

     In a pretrial motion, Harris moved to suppress the out-of-court

identification. The trial court granted Harris’s motion, finding that

the “identification was highly suggestive” and that it “also meets the

second prong.” The court further noted that it “got the impression

that [the witnesses] were being steered toward a certain outcome,”

it was sure the witnesses knew “more than one big guy,” “no other

     10  Unlike the first interview, the trial court heard testimony from
Detective Agan about the second interview and an audio recording of the
interview.
      11 Ndetti referred to the shooter as “Low” and “Felipe,” Harris’s

reportedly recognized nicknames.
                                   19
photos were presented,” and “the answers were fed, or suggested, to

them by the detective.”

     On appeal, the State argues that this ruling was erroneous

because although the investigator only used one photograph, Ndetti

was merely confirming a known acquaintance. We review a trial

court’s ruling on a motion to suppress identification evidence for an

abuse of discretion. See Newton v. State, 308 Ga. 863, 866 (2) (843

SE2d 857) (2020).

     “Evidence of an out-of-court identification violates due process

and is inadmissible at trial if the identification procedure is so

impermissibly suggestive that it could result in a substantial

likelihood of misidentification.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Id. at 865 (2). “An identification procedure is unduly suggestive

when it leads the witness to the virtually inevitable identification of

the defendant as the perpetrator, and is equivalent to the

authorities telling the witness, ‘This is our suspect.’” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Id.

     The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that

                                  20
Detective Agan’s use of a single photograph was impermissibly

suggestive. See Leeks v. State, 309 Ga. App. 724, 727 (2) (710 SE2d

908) (2011) (“[D]isplaying a single photograph to a witness is

impermissibly suggestive.”). But even where the identification

procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the identification may be

excluded only if a substantial likelihood of misidentification exists.

Newton, 308 Ga. at 867 (2).

      In determining whether there is a substantial likelihood of

misidentification, a trial court must look to the “totality of the

circumstances[.]” State v. Hattney, 279 Ga. 88, 89 (610 SE2d 44)

(2005). Several factors are considered when determining the

likelihood of misidentification, including:

      (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the accused at the
      time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention; (3)
      the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of accused;
      (4) the witness’ level of certainty at the confrontation;[12]

      12We note an apparent discrepancy between the factor concerning “the
witness’ level of certainty at the confrontation” and our holding in Brodes v.
State, 279 Ga. 435 (614 SE2d 766) (2005). In Brodes, we instructed that trial
courts should “refrain from informing jurors [that] they may consider a
witness’s level of certainty when instructing them on the factors that may be
considered in deciding the reliability of that identification.” Id. at 442. While it

                                        21
      and (5) the length of time between the crime and the
      confrontation.

Lewis v. State, 314 Ga. 654, 670 (6) (b) (878 SE2d 467) (2022).

“Moreover, whether the witness knows the defendant is a critical

factor in determining the reliability of an identification.” Id.

      If the witness was acquainted or otherwise personally familiar

with the suspect before making an out-of-court identification, then

there is not a substantial likelihood of misidentification regardless

of an impermissibly suggestive procedure. See Hattney, 279 Ga. at

90 (“If the trial court determines that [the witness] had known [the

suspects] for a sufficient period of time so that his out-of-court

identification of them pursuant to the single photograph show-ups

seems incompatible that a trial judge should consider the witness’s level of
certainty when determining the likelihood of misidentification but the jury
may not be instructed to consider the witness’s level of certainty when
determining the reliability of the identification, no one has asked us to
reconsider our decision in Brodes, and the trial court’s consideration of this
factor is expressly sanctioned under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, see Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 199 (III) (93 SCt 375, 34 LE2d 401) (1972). See Pearson
v. State, 311 Ga. 26, 29 n.5 (2) (855 SE2d 606) (2021) (noting that despite our
holding in Brodes, “Georgia courts have continued, as we are obliged to do on
matters of federal constitutional law, to follow the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Neil”). Additionally, because no one has asked us to consider
this issue as a matter of due process under the Georgia Constitution, we decline
to do so today.
                                       22
was   reliable        and   not   subject   to    a   substantial   risk   of

misidentification, then evidence of the out-of-court identification

would be admissible.”). See, e.g., Newton, 308 Ga. at 867 (concluding

that the defendant failed to show a substantial likelihood of

misidentification where the witness told investigators that he knew

the defendant for two years prior to the shooting and that he saw

him near the scene of the crime that night); Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga.

745, 751-752 (15) (514 SE2d 639) (1999) (concluding that there was

no substantial likelihood of misidentification regardless of whether

the photographic lineup was impermissibly suggestive because the

witness testified that she recognized the defendant as a regular

customer at her store and that she remembered seeing him at the

store on the night of the murder). Rather, the use of photographs

under such circumstances functionally serves the purpose of

confirming the suspect’s identity. See Gibson v. State, 283 Ga. 377,

378-379 (2) (659 SE2d 372) (2008) (“[S]howing [the witness] a single

photograph       of    defendant    merely       confirmed   her    previous

identification of him.”). See also Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 693

                                      23
(3) (763 SE2d 704) (2014) (concluding that presenting a single

photograph to a witness to confirm the defendant’s identity “created

no substantial likelihood of misidentification” because the witness

testified that she knew the defendant for 11 years, spent a lot of time

with his family, and saw the defendant on the day of the shooting);

Lewis, 314 Ga. at 670-671 (6) (b) (concluding that the investigator’s

use of a single photograph “did not create a substantial likelihood of

misidentification” where the witness told the investigator that he

knew the defendant, placed the defendant at the scene of the crime

that night, provided a description of the defendant, and rejected

three prior photos of other men); Williams v. State, 272 Ga. 828, 829

(2) (537 SE2d 39) (2000) (“Given [the witness’s] testimony that she

had seen appellant in the neighborhood on several prior occasions,

knew him by his nickname, knew where his family lived, and had

clearly seen his face during the commission of the crime, we find that

the in-court identification was independent of the pretrial

photographic identification thereby indicating its reliability.”).

     But, here, it is not clear to what extent the trial court

                                  24
considered the “critical factor” of substantial likelihood of

misidentification despite significant evidence of Ndetti’s familiarity

with Harris, including her statement that he periodically visited her

home and left her apartment moments before the shooting. Indeed,

the trial court simply mentioned that the “second prong” was met

and that the trial court was “sure [the witnesses] know more than

one big guy,” with no apparent consideration of Ndetti’s familiarity

with Harris. We decline to consider in the first instance whether

Ndetti’s familiarity required the trial court to determine, as a matter

of law, that there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification.

Rather, we vacate the trial court’s grant of Harris’s motion to

suppress Ndetti’s identification and remand for the trial court to

reconsider the motion under the standards set forth above.13

     Judgments vacated and case remanded with direction in Case
Nos. S23A0090 and S23A0091. All the Justices concur.

      13 After the trial court granted Harris’s motion to suppress, it discussed
and left open the possibility of an in-court identification by Ndetti or Glenn.
We note that if, upon remand, the trial court again grants Harris’s motion to
suppress Ndetti’s out-of-court identification, it cannot, despite its suggestion
to the contrary, allow an in-court identification by Ndetti. See Hattney, 279 Ga.
at 90.
                                       25