Court Opinion

ID: 9398768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 07:00:26.089413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:36.308844
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JAMES THOMAS RYAN,                              DOCKET NUMBERS
                  Appellant,                         DC-1221-14-0323-B-1
                                                     DC-1221-14-0378-B-1
                  v.                                 DC-1221-14-0434-B-1
                                                     DC-1221-14-0700-B-1
     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DC-1221-16-0177-W-2
                 Agency.                             DC-1221-16-0178-W-2
                                                     DC-1221-16-0179-W-2

                                                     DATE: May 30, 2023

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           James Thomas Ryan, Bel Air, Maryland, pro se.

           Elizabeth E. Pavlick, Esquire, and Lundi McCarthy Shafiei, Esquire,
             Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision
     in this individual right of action (IRA) appeal, which denied his request for

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     corrective action.   Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpre tation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).              After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
     address the appellant’s claim that he disclosed a violation of an agency rule, we
     AFFIRM the remand initial decision.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The Board remanded this IRA appeal to the regional office, finding that the
     appellant established jurisdiction over his claim that the agency had taken several
     personnel actions in reprisal for his January 4 and April 5 , 2013 disclosures to the
     agency’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). Ryan v. Department of
     Defense, MSPB Docket Nos. DC-1221-14-0323-W-1, DC-1221-14-0378-W-1,
     DC-1221-14-0434-W-1, DC-1221-14-0700-W-1, Remand Order (Feb. 4, 2016)
     (Remand Order). 2 The appellant subsequently filed three additional IRA appeals
     alleging that the agency had taken additional personnel actions in reprisal for the

     2
       The appellant originally filed four separate IRA appeals, MSPB Docket Nos.
     DC-1221-14-0323-W-1, DC-1221-14-0378-W-1, DC-1221-14-0434-W-1, and DC-1221-
     14-0700-W-1, which the administrative judge joined for adjudication because he found
     that they all “arise from the same or related underlying events, and involve aspects of
     the same whistleblowing claim.” Remand Order, ¶ 5 n.2.
                                                                                      3

     same disclosures, 3 and the administrative judge joined those appeals with the
     remanded appeals for a hearing on the appellant’s claim that the agency took six
     personnel actions in retaliation for his January 4 and April 5, 2013 disclosures.
     Ryan v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-14-0323-B-1,
     Remand File (RF), Tabs 12, 59; Tab 72, Remand Initial Decision (RID) at 5-6.
¶3        The appellant’s disclosures concern four separate incidents involving the
     same coworker, who was a fellow police officer. RID at 7. The administrative
     judge carefully analyzed the appellant’s disclosures concerning each alleged
     incident to determine whether the appellant had proved by preponderant evidence
     that a disinterested observer, with knowledge of the essential facts known to and
     readily ascertainable to him, could reasonably conclude that his disclosure
     evidenced a violation of law.     RID at 7-18; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i);
     Baldwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 12 (2010)
     (discussing this standard at the jurisdictional stage of an IRA appeal) . As set
     forth below, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to establish
     by preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8). RID at 7-18.
¶4        The appellant’s January 4, 2013 memorandum to OPR recounts three
     separate incidents. RF, Tab 21 at 12-13. Concerning the first incident, which
     allegedly occurred during an honor guard assignment in June or July 2012 at the
     Raven Rock Mountain Complex, the appellant contended that another officer had
     intentionally given him conflicting commands in an effort to embarrass him. Id.
     The administrative judge found no evidence, save for the appellant’s assertion,
     that the other officer had done so.   RID at 8.   Even crediting the appellant’s
     account of the incident, the administrative judge determined that the actions
     described failed to satisfy the elements of an assault, finding no evidence of a
     threat or attempt of violence or injury.   Id. Moreover, even if the appellant’s
     3
       Ryan v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket Nos. DC-1221-16-0177-W-2,
     DC-1221-16-0178-W-2, and DC-1221-16-0179-W-2.
                                                                                       4

     assertion that the other officer intended to embarrass, mock, or disparage him
     were true, the administrative judge found that the appellant could not have
     reasonably believed that such conduct constituted an assault. Id.
¶5        In the second incident, which allegedly occurred on August 28, 2012, in
     Mitchellville, Maryland, the appellant claimed that the other officer placed his
     left hand on the appellant’s chest and pushed him, stating “get out the way” in a
     taunting manner. RF, Tab 21 at 12-13; Hearing Transcript (HT) at 9 (testimony
     of the appellant). Because the appellant’s testimony on this point was unrebutted,
     the administrative judge found it more likely than not true that some manner of
     physical contact occurred between the appellant and the other officer . RID at 10.
     Nevertheless, citing the lack of any other evidence in support of the appellant’s
     version of the incident, particularly considering how many officers were present
     when it allegedly happened, the appellant’s failure to raise the incident with
     anyone until January 2013, and his history of making unfounded accusations
     against his coworkers, the administrative judge found that the appellant could not
     have reasonably believed that the other officer’s actions amounted to an assault.
     RID at 10-11.
¶6        Concerning the third incident, which occurred on January 4, 2013, the
     appellant recounted an argument with the other officer over the volume of the
     radio in an agency vehicle. RF, Tab 21 at 12-13. Following the argument, when
     retrieving their equipment from the back of the vehicle , the appellant alleged that
     the other officer then made unnecessary physical contact with him, laughed and
     smirked, and said to him “[y]ou better leave that alone or you’ll get smacked.”
     Id. at 12. The administrative judge found that, even if he assumed the contact
     was intentional, the appellant had consistently interpreted the episode as an
     affront to his dignity and not a threat of bodily harm by force or violence ,
     observing that the appellant’s reactions, as well as his hearing testimony,
     undermined his assertion that the other officer either caused him apprehension or
     intimidated him. RID at 14-16. Thus, the administrative judge found that the
                                                                                            5

     appellant also failed to show that he reasonably believed he was assaulted by the
     other officer on January 4, 2013. RID at 16.
¶7        In his April 5, 2013 memorandum to OPR, the appellant recounted a fourth
     alleged assault, asserting that when he was entering an agency facility earlier that
     day, the other officer had stared at him with a “scorn[ful]/resentful/angry
     expression on his face.”    Ryan v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No.
     DC-1221-14-0434-W-1, Initial Appeal File (0434 IAF), Tab 10 at 5.                    The
     appellant, who was off-duty at the time, remarked that the other officer was in
     possession of an agency firearm, and he asserted that the look he received was an
     attempt by the other officer to intimidate him with physical force.            Id.     In
     reviewing   the   appellant’s   allegations,    the   administrative   judge   cited   a
     memorandum issued by the Chief of OPR concerning OPR’s review of security
     camera footage of the alleged incident, which did not support the appellant’s
     version, and found that the record contained no evidence as to what, if anything,
     took place. RID at 16-17; RF, Tab 67 at 4. Nevertheless, the administrative
     judge found that, even if the appellant’s allegations were true, he could not have
     reasonably believed that the other officer’s expression of scorn caused him to
     suffer an assault. RID at 18. Accordingly, the administrative judge found that
     the appellant failed to establish that his January 4 and April 5, 2013 disclosures
     were protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id.
¶8        In his petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge
     misinterpreted his allegations and used too restrictive a definition of assault in
     finding that his January 4 and April 5, 2013 disclosures were not protected.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.         He also challenges the administrative
     judge’s factual and credibility determinations. Id. He asserts that he reasonably
     believed that the June or July 2012 incident evidenced “a security violation (a
     violation of [Department of Defense (DOD)] regulation                  [Administrative
     Instruction (AI)] 30,” rather than an assault. Id. at 5-6. The agency has filed a
                                                                                            6

      response to the appellant’s petition for review, and the appellant has filed a reply
      to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 2, 4.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶9          After establishing the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal , an appellant
      must establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation by proving by
      preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure that was a contributing
      factor in a personnel action taken against him. 4       5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Lu v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (2015).               As noted
      above, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove at least
      one element of this burden—that the relevant disclosures were protected. RID
      at 7-18. This decision will be similarly focused.
¶10         A protected disclosure is one that an appellant reasonably believes
      evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a
      gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
      to public health or safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); Chavez v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 18 (2013). The test for determining if an
      employee’s belief regarding the disclosed matter is reasonable is whether a
      disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known and readily

      4
        This appeal involves events occurring both before and after the December 27, 2012
      effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA).
      Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 202, 126 Stat. 1465, 1476. Because the changes made by the
      WPEA do not affect the outcome of this appeal, we find it unnecessary to resolve
      whether it applies here.
      Similarly, during the pendency of this appeal, the National Defense Authorization Act
      for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on
      December 12, 2017.          It expanded the activities protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C) to include cooperating or disclosing information to “any . . . component
      responsible for internal investigation or review.” Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(c)(1)(A),
      131 Stat. 1283, 1618. That expansion does not affect the outcome of this appeal
      because all of the relevant events occurred prior to December 12, 2017. Edwards v.
      Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 29-33 (finding that the changes to section
      2302(b)(9)(C) do not apply retroactively).
                                                                                          7

      ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the action s of the
      agency evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, or one of the other
      conditions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Baldwin, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 12.

      The appellant failed to prove that his disclosure about the June or July 2012
      incident was protected.
¶11          In his January 4, 2013 memorandum to OPR, the appellant asserted that his
      coworker gave him conflicting orders during an honor guard ceremony in June or
      July 2012 and then mocked him for being out of step, all in an effort to embarrass
      the appellant. RID at 7-8; RF, Tab 21 at 12. The administrative judge found it
      more likely that any misstep on the part of the appellant was the result of “his
      own mistake, simple miscommunication, or other unremarkable cause .” RID at
      8-9.   He concluded that, even assuming the appellant’s coworker gave the
      appellant a false or conflicting command as claimed, the appellant could not have
      reasonably believed that he was assaulted. RID at 7-9.
¶12          On review, the appellant presents two brief but distinct arguments about
      this disclosure.    First, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s
      definition of assault, arguing that the administrative judge should have used the
      state law definition of assault, rather than one from Black’s Law Dictionary. 5
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. Second, the appellant argues that the June or July 2012
      incident amounted to a violation of a particular agency policy regarding
      workplace violence. Id. at 5-6.
¶13          Regarding this disclosure and the concept of an “assault,” we note that t he
      underlying incident took place in Pennsylvania.         HT at 8 (testimony of the
      appellant). Pennsylvania defines simple assault, in pertinent part, as “attempts by

      5
       The appellant argued that the Maryland or Virginia definitions should have been used.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. Because the incident occurred in Pennsylvania, we infer that he
      meant to refer to Pennsylvania law. He also claims that an assault is a threat of
      unwanted touching but notably does not claim that any threat of touching occurred. Id.
                                                                                           8

      physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury .” 6
      18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2701(a)(3); see Baldwin, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶¶ 18-21
      (considering the various definitions of assault, including under South Carolina
      law, in finding that an appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he reasonably
      believed that his coworker’s action of waving a box cutter at him in a threatening
      manner was an assault).
¶14         The appellant has not alleged that he believed his fellow officer intended to
      cause him fear of bodily injury.       The appellant testified that the other officer
      deliberately misdirected him to “embarrass” and “taunt.” HT at 69 (testimony of
      the appellant). This allegation is not something a reasonable individual with the
      appellant’s knowledge in law enforcement would believe was an assault.             See
      Schlosser v. Department of the Interior, 75 M.S.P.R. 15, 22 (1997) (considering
      that the appellant was a police officer in determining the reasonableness of his
      belief that he disclosed a violation of law).      Accordingly, we agree with the
      administrative judge’s finding that the appellant did not believe, and a
      disinterested observer in his position would not believe, that his fellow officer
      intended to cause him fear of bodily harm. RID at 9. This is true under the more
      generalized definition of “assault” used by the administrative judge as well as the
      definition specific to Pennsylvania.
¶15         As previously stated, the appellant argues, in the alternative, that his
      disclosure revealed a violation of AI 30, which he describes as making it a
      “security violation . . . to cause someone embarrassment in the workplace because
      it is a sign of workplace violence.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. The appellant also
      raised this claim during the hearing below. HT at 8 (testimony of the appellant).
      The administrative judge did not address this argument, and we modify the initial

      6
        The appellant has not alleged that his fellow officer actually harmed him or intended
      to harm him. RF, Tab 21 at 12; see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2701(a)(1)-(2) (setting
      forth alternative definitions of “assault”).
                                                                                                9

      decision to do so.      We find that the appellant did not prove he reasonably
      believed that his coworker violated AI 30.
¶16         As an initial matter, we find that the appellant has proven that AI 30
      constitutes a “rule” for purposes of determining if the agency violated a “law,
      rule, or regulation.”     Although the WPEA does not define “rule,” it includes
      established or authoritative standards for conduct. See Rusin v. Department of
      the Treasury, 92 M.S.P.R. 298, ¶¶ 15-17 (2002) (citing dictionary definitions of
      the word “rule”). In finding that this pro se appellant met his burden, we have
      broadly construed the whistleblower reprisal statutory scheme in his favor. See
      Rusin, 92 M.S.P.R. 298, ¶ 17 (acknowledging that the Whistleblower Protection
      Act is a remedial statute intended to improve protections for Federal employees
      and should be broadly construed in favor of those whom it was intended to
      protect); Melnick       v. Department of        Housing     and    Urban    Development,
      42 M.S.P.R. 93, 97-98 (1989) (explaining that the Board construes pro se
      pleadings liberally, and parties that are pro se are not required to plead issues
      with legal precision), aff’d, 899 F.2d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Table). There is no
      de minimis exception to the protection afforded disclosures of the violation of a
      law, rule, or regulation.        See Fisher v. Environmental Protection Agency,
      108 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 9 (2008).
¶17         We have been unable to find AI 30 in the record.               This contrasts with
      another agency policy, AI 8, along with some legal definitions of assault, which
      the appellant submitted into evidence. 7       RF, Tabs 46-47. However, the absence
      of this policy from the record is not fatal to the appellant’s claim. An appellant
      is not required to identify the law, rule, or regulation that was violated “by title
      or number, when [his] statements and the circumstances surrounding the making

      7
        Although the appellant’s updated exhibit list identifies AI 8 as Exhibit M, RF, Tab 56
      at 4, his exhibit list does not include AI 30, and, as noted above, he fails to identify the
      document on review. Further, we were unable to access AI 30, which is listed as a
      controlled     document,      on     the   internet.       DOD     Issuances,     AI     30,
      https://www.esd.whs.mil/Directives/issuances/admin_inst/ (last visited May 26, 2023).
                                                                                          10

      of those statements clearly implicate an identifiable violation of law, rule, or
      regulation.” See Chavez, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 19 (quoting Langer v. Department
      of the Treasury, 265 F.3d 1259, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). Thus, we conclude that
      AI 30 is an agency “rule” for purposes of the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal
      claim.
¶18         The appellant described AI 30 as a workplace violence policy that protects
      against embarrassment.      PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6; HT at 8 (testimony of the
      appellant). He testified that his coworker committed a “security violation” by
      “deliberately caus[ing the appellant] embarrassment in front of a group of
      people.” HT at 70 (testimony of the appellant). We find that the appellant failed
      to prove that he reasonably believed that his coworker deliberately embarrassed
      him. 8 The appellant’s coworker testified that he gave the same verbal commands
      to the entire honor guard, “and everyone did the same move except for [the
      appellant].” HT at 138 (testimony of the accused officer). The administrative
      judge concluded that the appellant’s missteps during the ceremony were due to
      “his own mistake, simple miscommunication, or other unremarkable cause.” RID
      at 8-9.   In so finding, the administrative judge credited the testimony of the
      appellant’s fellow officer regarding the June or July 2012 incident after holding a
      hearing. RID at 7-9. The Board defers to an administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe
      v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We find no such
      sufficiently sound reasons here.
¶19         The administrative judge did not specifically address whether the appellant
      reasonably believed his coworker acted deliberately. We find that the appellant
      failed to provide evidence supporting such a claim. The appellant has the burden
      8
        In light of this finding, we need not reach the issue of whether the appellant proved
      that he reasonably believed AI 30 prohibited deliberately embarrassing someone.
                                                                                       11

      of proving that it is more likely than not that he reasonably believed, as relevant
      here, that his coworker deliberately embarrassed him in violation of AI 30. See
      Lu, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (setting forth an appellant’s burden to prove his claim
      on the merits by preponderant evidence); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q) (defining
      preponderant evidence as the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
      person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
      contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue). He gave speculative and
      conclusory testimony that his coworker gave him conflicting instructions “for the
      purpose of causing [him] embarrassment” and “intentionally miscommunicat[ed]
      information to [him].” Id. (testimony of the appellant). He provided no details
      supporting these conclusions, and we find that the appellant’s testimony does not
      meet his burden of proving by preponderant evidence that he reasonably believed
      his coworker was motivated to embarrass him.
¶20        For the first time on review, the appellant asserts that his coworker “told
      [the appellant] privately to march in a wheel pattern when [the coworker] gave
      [the appellant] the command to ‘march.’” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.           The Board
      generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for
      review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not
      previously available despite the party’s due diligence. Clay v. Department of the
      Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016). We have been unable to locate in the record
      below that the appellant claimed or provided evidence that his coworker gave him
      a private order to walk in a wheel pattern when ordered to march. For example,
      the appellant did not testify regarding any such order or refer to it in his
      January 4, 2013 disclosure.    HT at 8, 68-70 (testimony of the appellant); RF,
      Tab 21 at 12.
¶21        The appellant argues on review that he did not previously challenge his
      coworker’s testimony regarding the June or July 2012 incident because while his
      coworker testified that he gave the same “command” to all members of the honor
      guard, he gave the appellant a different “order.”     PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.     The
                                                                                             12

      appellant appears to distinguish between a proper command, which he implicitly
      concedes his coworker gave him, and a “conflicting order[],” which he is now
      asserting his coworker gave him privately. Id. We do not find the appellant’s
      stated distinction between orders and commands to be a reason fo r failing to
      exercise the basic due diligence of raising this argument below or giving a
      complete version of what occurred in June or July 2012 during his testimony.
      Further, we observe that the appellant is, in essence, attempting to impeach his
      coworker’s credibility, and such evidence is not a basis for granting review.
      Bucci v. Department of Education, 42 M.S.P.R. 47, 55 (1989) (explaining that
      evidence offered merely to impeach a witness’s credibility is not generally
      considered new and material). Accordingly, we find that the appellant failed to
      prove that he reasonably believed his fellow officer deliberately embarrassed him
      in violation of AI 30.

      The appellant failed to prove that his disclosure about the August 2012 incident
      was protected.
¶22         Unlike the one discussed above, the second incident recounted in the
      appellant’s January 4, 2013 memorandum, which he alleged occurred in Maryland
      on August 28, 2012, did involve physical touching. RF, Tab 21 at 12. For the
      following reasons, we also agree with the administrative judge that the appellant
      failed to establish that he reasonably believed that he disclosed conduct th at
      comprised an assault. 9 RID at 11. The appellant testified that the other officer
      pushed him, knocked him off balance, and told him to “get out of the way.” HT

      9
        The appellant alleged in his disclosure concerning this incident that he believed, based
      on his coworker’s behavior, that he was a “habitual drunkard,” which he characterized
      as “conduct unbecoming.” RF, Tab 21 at 12. In his hearing testimony, the appellant
      corrected this statement, indicating that he meant to allege that his coworker had a
      drinking problem. HT at 17, 76-77, 80-83 (testimony of the appellant). The appellant
      restates his belief that his coworker had a drinking problem on review. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 10, 26. However, he does not appear to have argued below or on review that he made
      a protected disclosure as to the other officer’s alleged drinking problem. RID at 12-13
      n.4; PFR File, Tab 1 at 26.
                                                                                       13

      at 8-9, 70 (testimony of the appellant). The appellant explained that if he had not
      retreated, “sooner or later I would have toppled over,” but he went on to assert
      that, “because I was standing on a hill and I had a good footing to begin with ,” he
      did not fall. Id. at 74-75. The administrative judge found that “some manner of
      physical contact occurred.” 10   RID at 10.      However, he did not credit the
      appellant’s assertion that he believed his coworker’s conduct amounted to an
      assault. RID at 11. In so finding, the administrative judge considered, among
      other factors, the appellant’s history of making unfounded accusations against his
      coworkers. Id.
¶23        On review, the appellant argues that this consideration was improper. We
      disagree. Evidence of a witness’s character, particularly as to his veracity, is an
      appropriate consideration for credibility determinations. Smith v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 93 M.S.P.R. 424, ¶ 18 (2003); Hillen v. Department of the
      Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987). The appellant also offers information in
      support of his prior claims of coworker misconduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-13.
      We decline to consider this information on review. See Avansino v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980) (explaining that, under 5 C.F.R.
      section 1201.115, the Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for
      the first time with the petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable
      before the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence).
¶24        The appellant further argues that the administrative judge failed to apply
      Maryland law when determining that the appellant did not reasonably believe his
      coworker assaulted him.       PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10.             Second-degree or
      misdemeanor assault in Maryland includes the intent-to-frighten if (1) the
      defendant commits an act with the intent to place a victim in fear of immediate

      10
         The appellant argues that the administrative judge should have credited his sworn
      statement that his coworker touched him over his coworker’s denial. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 7-8; RID at 9-10; HT at 8-9; RF, Tab 21 at 101, Tab 37 at 22-23. Because the
      administrative judge found that the alleged physical contact occurred, we discern no
      basis to disturb his finding.
                                                                                             14

      physical harm; (2) the defendant has the apparent ability, at the time, to bring
      about the physical harm; and (3) the victim is aware of the impending physical
      harm. 11 Jones v. State, 103 A.3d 586, 589 (Md. 2014) (internal quotations and
      citations omitted); see Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 3-203 (prohibiting
      second-degree assault and identifying it as a misdemeanor).
¶25         Even applying this definition, we find no error in the administrative judge’s
      finding that the appellant did not reasonably believe that the incident in question
      amounted to criminal assault. RID at 11. The administrative judge found that the
      appellant’s claim of assault was not credible because the incident allegedly
      occurred in front of fellow officers and the appellant claimed he responded only
      by stating “don’t do that” and did not report the incident until 6 months later.
      RID at 10-11; RF, Tab 62 at 12-13. Further, the appellant denied that his fellow
      officer was angry but rather asserted that he was “[h]aughty,” “[c]ondescending,”
      and “[s]uperior.” RF, Tab 62 at 32; RID at 11. Thus, the appellant’s behavior
      during and after the incident, and his characterization of his coworker’s frame of
      mind, support the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant did not
      reasonably believe his coworker intended to cause him immediate ph ysical
      harm. 12 RID at 11.
¶26         The appellant also        argues that his      fellow officer committed the
      misdemeanor of “simple assault” because the appellant responded to his fellow
      officer’s actions by telling “him not to do it.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 10; HT at 9

      11
          First-degree assault involves an intentional “cause or attempt to cause serious
      physical injury.” Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 3-202. Because the burden to prove
      first-degree assault is higher, we will focus on the lower burden of proving
      second-degree assault.
      12
         As to both the August 28, 2012 and April 5, 2013 incidents, the appellant observed
      that the other officer had an agency firearm in his possession during the alleged assault.
      0434 IAF, Tab 10 at 5; HT at 8-9 (testimony of the appellant). The appellant and his
      coworker were both police officers and were required to carry guns as part of their jobs.
      We are not persuaded that a disinterested observer in the appellant’s position would
      have found his coworker’s possession of a firearm unusual or, without more,
      threatening.
                                                                                      15

      (testimony of the appellant). It is unclear on what the appellant bases his belief
      that his warning converted his coworker’s actions into an assault. In any event,
      the appellant has cited to no legal authority for his claim, and we are unable to
      locate any.
¶27        On review, the appellant also questions the administrative judge’s reliance
      on his 6-month delay in reporting the incident as a factor in determining the
      reasonableness of his belief that he was assaulted. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. The
      Board has found, in the context of a chapter 75 adverse action, that in deciding
      whether an agency has proven that an employee made a threat, it applies the
      reasonable person standard, considering the listeners’ reactions, the listeners’
      apprehension of harm, the speaker’s intent, any conditional nature of the
      statements, and any attendant circumstances.        Metz v. Department of the
      Treasury, 780 F.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Rose v. U.S. Postal Service,
      109 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 8 (2007).      As in a chapter 75 action, we find that the
      administrative judge’s consideration of the appellant’s response to his coworker’s
      actions, including his delay in reporting them, was appropriate. In addition, we
      agree that the appellant’s delay in reporting the incident undermines his claim
      that a reasonable person in his position would have found that his fellow officer’s
      behavior evidenced an intent to cause physical harm.
¶28        The appellant also argues that agency officials essentially believed him
      because they started an investigation into his allegations of assault and did not
      accuse him of making a false statement. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. We decline to
      infer that the appellant reasonably believed he was assaulted because the agency
      started an investigation based on his then-unchallenged allegations. RF, Tab 37
      at 21-23; see Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
      (explaining that an employee’s “purely subjective perspective” is insufficient to
      establish the reasonableness of his belief of Government wrongdoing “even if
      shared by other employees”). Nor do we view the agency’s decision not to take
      action for alleged false statements as undermining the administrative judge’s
                                                                                         16

      finding that a reasonable person would not have viewed the incident as an assault.
      RID at 11.

      The appellant failed to prove that his disclosure about the January 2013 incident
      was protected.
¶29         The third incident set forth in the appellant’s January 4 , 2013 letter
      occurred in Virginia on the same day. RF, Tab 21 at 12-13; 0434 IAF, Tab 10 at
      5; RID at 16. It began with a disagreement between the appellant and his fellow
      officer regarding the volume of a car radio. RF, Tab 21 at 12. About 30 minutes
      later, while the appellant was removing his equipment from the rear of the
      vehicle, he alleged that his fellow officer “intentionally made unnecessary
      physical contact with the right side of his body to the left side of [the appellant’s]
      body (assault) as if [the appellant] was not standing there and started to laugh
      (taunt) with a smirk on his face.” RF, Tab 21 at 12, Tab 62 at 5. The appellant
      described his coworker’s contact as a “nudge.” RF, Tab 62 at 6 .
¶30         The appellant also asserted that he responded to the nudge by asking, “Did
      you see me standing there?”      RF, Tab 21 at 12; HT at 10 (testimony of the
      appellant). Apparently referring to the earlier dispute over the radio, the fellow
      officer then stated “leave that alone or you’ll get smacked,” which the appellant
      testified that he interpreted as a threat. RF, Tab 21 at 12; PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-8;
      HT at 70-71 (testimony of the appellant).            During the resulting agency
      investigation, the appellant indicated that he responded to his coworker’s conduct
      by laughing. RF, Tab 6 at 5. The administrative judge found that the evidence
      suggested that any contact during the episode was inadvertent on the other
      officer’s part, and he found that the appellant’s own reactions undermined his
      assertion that the other officer had intimidated him.      RID at 15.    Instead, the
      appellant’s description of the incident indicated that he was a participant, not a
      victim.   For example, he claimed in his testimony that he and his coworker
      essentially “locked horns.” HT at 70 (testimony of the appellant); RID at 12-16.
                                                                                      17

¶31         The appellant disputes the administrative judge’s conclusion that his fellow
      officer’s contact was likely inadvertent. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17; RID at 14.
      When, as here, an administrative judge’s findings are “intertwined with issues of
      credibility and an analysis of [the appellant’s] demeanor at trial,” the Board
      affords them “special deference.”     Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      838 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016); HT at 140, 143-44 (testimony of the
      accused officer). The Board may overturn such determinations only when it has
      “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.      Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301.       The
      appellant’s arguments simply reweigh the various factors relevant to credibility
      determinations.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17; see Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R. at 458
      (identifying the factors an administrative judge must consider in resolving
      credibility issues). We are not persuaded by the appellant’s assertions, which
      include giving weight to his own unsubstantiated testimony that his coworker
      “does not like white people.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17; HT at 72 (testimony of
      the appellant).
¶32         Under Virginia law, an assault is “an attempt with force and violence, to do
      some bodily hurt to another, whether from wantonness or malice, by means
      calculated to produce the end.” United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 512
      (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Montague v. Commonwealth, 684 S.E.2d 583, 588
      (Va. 2009)).      The appellant’s conclusory statement on review that the other
      officer’s actions were “unwanted, offensive, physical contact” again falls short of
      conduct that a reasonable person would view as an assault. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16.
      In addition, his characterization of his laugh as “incredulous” does not undermine
      the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s laughter and other behavior
      following the incident undermined his claim that he felt intimidated. Id. at 19-20;
      RID at 15. In fact, as the administrative judge observed, the appellant indicated
      that his immediate response of asking if his coworker saw him was to attempt to
      obtain an “incriminating statement” from his coworker in front of their superiors.
      RID at 15-16; HT at 10-11 (testimony of the appellant). On review, the appellant
                                                                                        18

      defends this behavior as “a common law enforcement tactic .” PFR File, Tab 1
      at 21.     We therefore agree with the administrative judge that the appellant ’s
      response did not reflect surprise or alarm. RID at 15; PFR File, Tab 1 at 21. We
      further agree that the appellant failed to establish that he reasonably believed that
      he was disclosing an assault. RID at 16.
¶33            The appellant also argues that the reasonableness of his belief that he was
      assaulted is supported by the fact that a Virginia magistrate judge charged the
      other officer with a crime based on that officer’s “own written statement
      containing his admission of making a threatening statement to me.” 13 PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 11-12. The documents that the appellant cites in support of this claim
      involve:      (1) the Citizen’s Criminal Complaint that he initiated in Virginia
      General District Court, in which he alleged that the other officer had assaulted
      him; and (2) an email from the other officer to an agency investigator, in which
      that officer recounts his version of the incident.      RF, Tab 33 at 5-11.      The
      documents also show that the judge who heard the case found the other office r not
      guilty of assault.    Id. at 4-5.   The appellant’s claim that the magistrate judge
      believed any particular fact is without support in the record, and the appellant’s
      allegations in his Citizen’s Criminal Complaint are similar to the nonfrivolous
      allegations for which the Board found that the appellant established jurisdiction
      over his claim and remanded it for adjudication.       Remand Order, ¶¶ 3, 14-16.
      Nevertheless, in order to establish his claim, the appellant must show by
      preponderant evidence that a reasonable person would have believed that he
      disclosed conduct that amounted to an assault. E.g., Langer, 265 F.3d at 1265
      (finding that in an IRA appeal, “[t]he standard for establishing subject matter
      jurisdiction and the right to a hearing is assertion of a nonfrivolous claim ,” while
      “the standard for establishing a prima facie case is preponderant evidence ”). We

      13
        Although not entirely clear, it appears that this argument concerns the Janua ry 4,
      2013 incident because the statement the appellant references concerned that incident.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12; RF, Tab 33 at 11.
                                                                                        19

      are not persuaded that the fact that a magistrate allowed th e appellant’s complaint
      to proceed is relevant to our determination on this issue.
¶34         Finally, the appellant argues that the administrative judge should have
      granted his request for the testimony of two agency employees who determined
      that the appellant’s description of the January 4, 2013 incident was sufficient to
      open an agency investigation. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17. However, the appellant did
      not offer these witnesses for that purpose.      RF, Tab 27 at 36.      Further, the
      witnesses’ perception of the appellant’s belief as to his fellow officer’s intention,
      based on the appellant’s own description of the event to those witnesses, has little
      probative value.     Under the circumstances, we decline to find that the
      administrative judge abused his discretion in finding that their testimony was not
      relevant.   RF, Tab 59 at 3; see Lee v. Environmental Protection Agency,
      115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶¶ 16-17 (2010) (finding that an administrative judge did not
      abuse her broad discretion by excluding a witness who supervised the appellant
      during a period that ended more than a year prior to the performance
      improvement period at issue in his removal).

      The appellant failed to prove that his disclosure about the April 2013 incident
      was protected.
¶35         As to the fourth incident, the appellant alleged that on April 5, 2013, his
      fellow officer looked at him with scorn, resentment, or anger while on duty and in
      possession of his agency firearm. 0434 IAF, Tab 10 at 5. The administrative
      judge found that no reasonable person could perceive his coworker’s look as an
      assault. RID at 18. The appellant argues that he provided a sworn statement to
      OPR that his coworker “tr[ied] to intimidate [him] with physical force” on April
      5, 2013. PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-25. He asserts that because the only statement
      rebutting his account is unsworn, the administrative judge erred in failing to
      credit his version of the incident.    Id. at 22-23, 25.     We are not persuaded.
      Contrary to the appellant’s claim on review, his statement is also unsworn. 0434
      IAF, Tab 10 at 5.    In any event, the administrative judge did not rely on the
                                                                                         20

      description of the incident provided by the agency. RID at 18; RF, Tab 67 at 4-5.
      Rather, in finding no reasonable person could have perceived an assault , he
      assumed the appellant’s statement was true. RID at 18. We decline to disturb
      this finding.
¶36         The appellant next argues that the administrative judge should have
      analyzed whether the appellant proved that his disclosures were contributing
      factors in the agency’s actions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 29. We disagree. Because
      the administrative judge properly determined that the appellant failed to pro ve he
      made a protected disclosure, he was not required to conduct such an analysis.
      See Fisher v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶¶ 8-10 (finding that
      an appellant failed to prove that his protected activity was a contributing factor
      in his separation as the result of a reduction-in-force, and therefore it was
      unnecessary to make further findings regarding his whistleblower reprisal claim).
¶37         Finally, the appellant attaches a one-page log that his supervisor completed
      of his performance in June and July 2015. PFR File, Tab 1 at 31. He does not
      explain the significance of the document, or why he could not have offered it
      during the proceedings below. We decline to consider it, as it is not relevant to
      the issue of whether the appellant made protected disclosures in 2012 and 2013.
      Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (finding that the
      Board generally will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent
      a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome differe nt from that
      of the initial decision); Avansino, 3 M.S.P.R. at 214.
¶38         Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s decision to deny
      corrective action. 14

      14
        We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                     21

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 15
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

15
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       22

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                23

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, th e
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                      24

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 16   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

16
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law b y the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of c ompetent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           25

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.