Court Opinion

ID: 9700962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:55:18.209384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:25.684021
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
The primary issue in this case is not whether the Recorder of Deeds is a public employer within the meaning of Act 1951 (the Public Employer Relations Act) nor whether the Recorder of Deeds could enter into negotiations as representative for Allegheny County and reach a collective bargaining agreement with the representative of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). Our cases, and the relevant legislation [Act 195 and section 1620 of the County Code2], have established that the Recorder of Deeds, judges and other county row officers are "public employers" under Act 195 as to matters affecting the hiring, discharge and supervising of public employees, and that the County Commissioners are the exclusive representatives of the public employer who, although prohibited from unilaterally bargaining so as to "affect the hiring, discharging and supervising rights and obligations" of the judges and county row officers, must nevertheless bargain on behalf of (and in cooperation with) those judges and county officers with respect to those subjects. See Commonwealth ex rel. Bradley v. PLRB, 479 Pa. 440, 388 A.2d 736 (1978) and companion cases, and County of Lehigh v. PLRB, 507 Pa. 270, 489 A.2d 1325 (1985). Thus, as the majority states, the "Memorandum of Agreement" entered into by the Recorder of Deeds (and other Allegheny County row officers) only, without approval of or ratification by the County Commissioners, is not a valid collective bargaining agreement under Act 195. (The majority holds: "the County Commissioners are the sole managerial representatives possessing authority to enter into collective bargaining agreements with unions under the terms of PERA." At 809.)
*359However, unlike the majority, I do not believe our inquiry ends there. We must now determine whether a public employer who is not the managerial representative commits an unfair labor practice in refusing to submit a dispute as to discharge of employees to arbitration, where such grievance arbitration procedure is provided for under Act 195 as well as by mutual agreement between that public employer and the employees. I agree with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board and the Commonwealth Court in this case, that the Recorder of Deeds did commit such an unfair labor practice in failing to abide by its agreement, even though it was an agreement which was not adopted as a valid collective bargaining agreement. Not every unfair labor practice stems from breach of a specific provision of a collective bargaining agreement. The unfair labor practices found by the Board in the instant case were section 1101.1201(a)(1) and (5), 43 P.S. § 1101.1201(a)(1) and (5) which provide that public employers are prohibited from: "Interfering, restraining or coercing employes in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Article IV of this Act." and from "Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith . . . including but not limited to the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative." These unfair labor practices arose from the obligation of a public employer to arbitrate grievances, an obligation found within the Act itself, id. at § 1101.903, as well as in the mutual agreement of the parties. As we stated in Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Committee v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66, 74, 391 A.2d 1318 (1978):
Here, there is no question that there was a mutual agreement to arbitrate future disputes. Equally as clear is that there is no challenge to the capacity of the Authority to enter into an agreement providing for arbitration. Furthermore, the parties operated under this agreement for a period of three and one-half years. In this posture the lower court properly refused to reach the merits of appellant's claim of lack of capacity. Am*360bridge Borough Water Authority v. Columbia, supra, 458 Pa. [546] at 551, 328 A.2d [498] at 501.
In the instant case the challenge is directed to the capacity of the employer to submit this particular subject to arbitration. This distinction however does not require a different result. The relationship between the public employer and the designated bargaining unit is one which must be sustained for years, during which a number of contract negotiations will occur. To sustain a harmonious relationship it is necessary for each of the parties to be pliable and willing to recognize the other’s position. Nothing could be more disruptive to such a relationship than a demonstration of bad faith bargaining on the part of one of the parties.
We have already stressed the importance of grievance arbitration in facilitating the development and maintenance of harmonious relationships between the public employer and employee. It is even more supportive of a favorable employment climate where this dispute resolution mechanism arises from the good faith bargaining of the parties rather than being required by statute. To permit an employer to enter into agreements and include terms such as grievance arbitration which raise the expectations of those concerned, and then to subsequently refuse to abide by those provisions on the basis of its lack of capacity would invite discord and distrust and create an atmosphere wherein a harmonious relationship would virtually be impossible to maintain. (emphasis added).
For the foregoing reasons, I agree with the decision of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board that the Recorder of Deeds committed an unfair labor practice in refusing SEIU’s request to submit a grievance relating to discharge of three of its members to arbitration, and I would, therefore, affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court which reversed the Court of Common Pleas and reinstated the final order of the Board.

. Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301 (Purdon's Supp. pamphlet 1987).

. Act of August 9, 1955, P.L. 323, § 1620, as amended, 16 P.S. § 1620 (Purdon's Supp.1987).