Court Opinion

ID: 9743956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:51:00.226239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:45.921068
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DiVITO, dissenting: I write in respectful dissent because of the effect of the majority’s opinion on the two central issues in this case — a plaintiff’s burden, in the face of a Rule 103(b) challenge, to show reasonable diligence in effecting service, and the deference we should give to a trial court’s exercise of discretion — and because of my belief that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint given that plaintiff has utterly failed to meet her burden. As the majority recognizes, and as our supreme court held in Segal v. Sacco (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 282, 555 N.E.2d 719, an essential purpose of Supreme Court Rule 103(b) is to promote the expeditious handling of lawsuits by giving trial courts wide discretion to dismiss a complaint when service is not effected with reasonable diligence. When the grant of “wide” (albeit sound) discretion is combined with the principle that a plaintiff has the burden of showing reasonable diligence in effecting service to survive a Rule 103(b) motion (Segal, 136 Ill. 2d at 286), it is difficult to understand the majority’s reversal of the circuit court’s judgment. Here, plaintiff’s suit was filed on November 7, 1988, four days before the expiration of the applicable four-year statute of limitations and at least three years after plaintiff was aware of the injury that allegedly was caused by Dini’s malpractice. Plaintiff caused summons to issue on November 18, 1988, and the sheriff unsuccessfully attempted service four times in December 1988. The return of summons, dated December 12,1988, bore the notation “avoiding service.” That notation did not establish that Dini was avoiding service;2 rather, its significance was to alert plaintiff to the need to extend greater effort in her attempts at service. Nevertheless, plaintiff made no effort whatsoever to serve Dini again until the issuance of the alias summons on August 3, 1989 — nearly eight months later. This summons too was returned unserved, with the notations that Dini was no longer at that location and that he had not been served because he had moved. Plaintiff then waited V-k months to request a second alias summons, and, inexplicably, did so for the same address. When the process server’s affidavit again informed plaintiff that Dini had moved, plaintiff delayed yet another IV2 months before requesting another alias summons. It was only then that Dini was served, across the street from the address supplied on the summons, more than 13 months after both the filing of suit and the expiration of the statute of limitations. In this case, plaintiff presented no evidence of her efforts to effect service on Dini other than the above history of service attempts. Although the record reflects her inactivity and inattention, it is silent concerning whether she checked local phone directories, the post office, the State registration board, medical associations, hospitals, the Secretary of State, or any other source in an attempt to ascertain Dini’s home or business address. In short, plaintiff did not merely fail to meet her burden to show reasonable diligence in effecting service, she presented no evidence concerning her efforts. Given this lack of proof, the circuit court’s order of dismissal can in no way be deemed an abuse of discretion. In reversing, the majority emphasizes that “two separate motions to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint were pending at different times during most of” the nearly eight-month period when no effort was made to serve Dini. (226 Ill. App. 3d at 87.) The majority refers to “the lingering question of whether [plaintiff was properly in court at all” and states that, “[ujntil [September 6, 1989], the survival of plaintiff’s cause of action had been uncertain, regardless of whether or not Dini was or would have been served with summons.” (226 Ill. App. 3d at 88.) The majority somehow deems plaintiff’s efforts to defend her complaint against the hospital’s motions to be sufficient justification for her failure to exercise any effort to serve Dini. The majority explicitly states that “[t]he seven-month period of alleged ‘inactivity,’ during which plaintiff’s complaint was stricken and refiled and a second motion to dismiss remained pending for four months, cannot comprise the basis of a finding that plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in serving Dini.” (226 Ill. App. 3d at 88.) I disagree. The majority’s holding applies a new spin to the principles applicable here. The critical inquiries are whether plaintiff has shown reasonable diligence in effecting service and whether, given plaintiff’s evidence, dismissal was an abuse of discretion. They are not, as the majority opinion appears to hold, whether a plaintiff must be excused for doing nothing if her counsel is otherwise occupied, and whether not excusing such a plaintiff is an abuse of discretion. By its holding, the majority, without cited authority, provides new and unwarranted grounds for failure to exercise reasonable diligence in the service of summons. In essence, the majority holds that plaintiff’s involvement with one defendant’s motions attacking the complaint justifies inaction in serving another defendant. We should not countenance that principle because it assumes full and justifiable absorption in defending the complaint, something contrary to common sense and experience generally, and something not remotely borne out by the record in this case. The principle of waiver is also applicable here. Nowhere has plaintiff presented the argument that the majority finds so persuasive here. Defense of her complaint or the “lingering question of whether she was properly in court at all” was cited by plaintiff neither in the response she filed in the circuit court to the motion to dismiss, nor in her argument to the circuit court before the motion was granted, nor in either her opening or reply briefs in this court, nor at oral argument. Although she did rely upon the five-day period during which no complaint was on file, that contention appears unsupportable in light of the supreme court’s holding in Catlett v. Novak (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 63, 506 N.E.2d 586, that a circuit court may consider the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff’s service of process on the original as well as a refiled complaint, and by the fact that the majority explicitly states that this is not the basis for its decision. Moreover, the almost eight months of plaintiff’s inactivity are not the only example of her overall lack of reasonable diligence in this case. Other instances include plaintiff’s failure to be even more attentive to service after the “avoiding service” notation and the issuance of summons for the same address, IV2 months after being informed by the process server that Dini had relocated. In my opinion, decisions such as this one send the wrong signals to bench and bar. Our decisions, and the rulings and indulgences of trial judges, do much to shape the local legal culture in which we and all litigants function. We therefore should support trial courts in their efforts to manage heavy dockets and to require attorney vigilance in prosecuting cases. When, however, we say, as the majority does here, that a plaintiff’s lack of diligence was reasonable, we encourage practices that are in grave conflict with good case management and attorney professionalism. In my opinion, such rulings unduly infringe upon the efforts of trial courts as they seek to discharge their duties fairly and expeditiously. See O’Connell v. St. Francis Hospital (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 273, 283, 492 N.E.2d 1322. Given the record in this case, particularly plaintiff’s failure to provide any evidence of reasonable diligence, the circuit court’s exercise of sound judicial discretion in dismissing the case should be affirmed.  Indeed, the evidence, summarized by the majority, showed that Dini was not avoiding service, and plaintiff offered no evidence that indicated he was.