Court Opinion

ID: 9594670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:31:50.791191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:35.214898
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent.
The majority holds that Mutual of Enumclaw's objection to the estoppel instruction was sufficient to preserve its right to argue that giving such instruction was error. The record does not support the majority's holding. MOE failed to comply with the requirements of CR 51(f); therefore, the estoppel instruction became the law of the case and is not subject to challenge in a post-trial motion or on appeal. As MOE failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal, I would not reach the merits of this case.
Estoppel Instruction
The trial court instructed the jury on the doctrine of estoppel. Instruction 50; Clerk's Papers, at 1682. The court also provided the jury with a special verdict form. Special interrogatory 1 provides:
Question No. 1: Did the defendant [Cox] commit fraud or false swearing regarding any matter relating to his insurance?
Clerk's Papers, at 1721. The jury found that Cox committed fraud, and was then directed to answer interrogatory 4 which states:
Question No. 4: Is the insurance company estopped by its acts and conduct from voiding the insurance policies?
*655Clerk's Papers, at 1721. The jury answered this question in the affirmative. Thus, the instructions permitted the jury to find that MOE is estopped from voiding the policies even if it found that Cox committed fraud.
MOE's counsel, in excepting to the trial court's estoppel instruction, merely stated: "plaintiff believes under the evidence there is no[t] sufficient evidence of estoppel to warrant that being submitted to the jury." Report of Proceedings vol. 19, at 1667-68. MOE took no exception to the special interrogatories incorporating Cox's estoppel argument.
CR 51(f) provides that in objecting to instructions, counsel "shall state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection ..." The rule requires that exceptions to instructions apprise the trial judge of the precise points of law or questions of fact in dispute and the reason why giving the instruction would be error. The purpose of the rule is to enable the trial judge to correct any mistakes before the case is submitted to the jury. Stewart v. State, 92 Wn.2d 285, 298, 597 P.2d 101 (1979); Nelson v. Mueller, 85 Wn.2d 234, 237-38, 533 P.2d 383 (1975).
The majority holds that a challenge to an instruction on a ground different from that argued at trial can serve as the basis upon which a trial court can grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Majority, at 651-52. This is not the law.
The law is settled. An objection must apprise the trial judge of the precise points of law involved and when it does not, those points cannot serve as a basis for a post-trial motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mt., Inc., 93 Wn.2d 127, 134, 606 P.2d 1214 (1980); Bitzan v. Parisi, 88 Wn.2d 116, 125, 558 P.2d 775 (1977); Agranoff v. Morton, 54 Wn.2d 341, 346, 340 P.2d 811 (1959); see Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 93 Wn.2d 5, 6-7, 604 P.2d 164 (1979). Here, MOE's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was based on a different objection to the estoppel instructions from that argued at trial. At trial, MOE argued that the evidence did *656not support the estoppel instruction. After a verdict for Cox, MOE argued that instructing on estoppel was error as a matter of law because the jury's finding that Cox committed fraud precluded his right to claim estoppel. The trial court committed reversible error when it granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on an objection to instructions that was not first raised at trial. See Bitzan, at 126; Agranoff, at 347.
The majority concedes that MOE's objection failed to satisfy the requirements of CR 51(f). Majority, at 651. The majority nonetheless contends that MOE has properly preserved the issue of estoppel for consideration on appeal. The majority reasons that the trial judge knew MOE's position with respect to estoppel and therefore MOE's failure to properly object is a "harmless technical error". Majority, at 651.
The majority first argues that MOE preserved this issue for appeal because MOE in a pretrial motion moved to bifurcate the fraud action and the bad faith counterclaim on the ground that Cox's fraud would void the policy. The majority ignores the fact that the pretrial motion to bifurcate was argued before a judge other than the trial judge. The majority next argues that MOE's failure to properly object should be excused because the trial judge instructed MOE to draft the special interrogatories incorporating the estoppel theory. This argument is without merit. Although MOE prepared the special interrogatories at the court's direction, this does not relieve MOE of its duty to properly except to the court's instructions and to provide the court with instructions that accurately state the applicable law. Harris v. Groth, 99 Wn.2d 438, 447, 663 P.2d 113 (1983). Finally, the majority points out that MOE did object to the estoppel instruction. MOE's objection at trial was inadequate. It did not specifically apprise the court that Cox was not, as a matter of law, entitled to an estoppel instruction if the jury concluded that he committed fraud.
I find no support in law or the facts for the majority's holding that MOE properly preserved its right to object to *657the estoppel instruction. The trial judge was never adequately advised of the precise points of law involved or given the opportunity to correct the error before the case was submitted to the jury and a verdict returned. As a result, this court is precluded from considering the estoppel issue on appeal. Stewart, at 298; Haslund v. Seattle, 86 Wn.2d 607, 614, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976); see RAP 2.5(a).
MOE took no exception to the special verdict form and its objection to the estoppel instruction was inadequate. The jury's finding of estoppel, therefore, became the law of the case. Garcia v. Brulotte, 94 Wn.2d 794, 797, 620 P.2d 99 (1980); Bitzan, at 125; see Seattle v. Harclaon, 56 Wn.2d 596, 597, 354 P.2d 928 (1960). Consequently, the law in this case is that Cox is entitled to claim estoppel as an affirmative defense and that MOE is estopped from voiding the policies based upon Cox's fraud. Because MOE is estopped from voiding the policies, the jury's verdict for Cox awarding damages under the policies and the Consumer Protection Act must be reinstated.
Conclusion
Under CR 51(f), an objection to an instruction based on grounds not argued at the time of trial cannot be considered by either a trial court on a post-trial motion or by this court on appeal. Yet this was precisely the same factual situation here. The trial court cannot grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on grounds not argued during the trial. This was prejudicial error and such motion should be set aside.
I would reverse the trial court's judgment and reinstate the verdict for Cox.
Pearson, C.J., and Brachtenbach and Andersen, JJ., concur with Dore, J.
Reconsideration denied July 15, 1988.