Court Opinion

ID: 9691817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:13:24.546925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:25.885873
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.,
dissenting:
Although I concur with the result of the majority decision I cannot agree that the standards of voluntariness required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 will not apply to a retrial of this case. The majority interprets Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 86 S. Ct. *371772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, which held that Miranda would not apply to cases brought to trial before June 13, 1966 to refer to original trials only and not to retrials.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court had several alternatives. It could, of course, have applied the classic doctrine of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (on right to counsel) that a court’s decision is completely retroactive; or it could have applied the same rule it had applied in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, which held that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (on Search & Seizure) was applicable to all cases in which a state court decision had not become final prior to announcement of Mapp; or it could have applied the rule it subsequently applied in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, which held that United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926 and Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, (on line-ups) were applicable only to line-ups conducted after the announcement of Wade and Gilbert.
Instead of applying any of these rules Johnson adopted the middle ground, which permitted a prosecutor not to introduce confessions that had been procured in violation of Miranda rules, but at the same time did not disturb completed trials. It seems apparent that the Supreme Court did not adopt the Stovall rule because it regarded improper confessions as more serious than improper line-ups; and it did not adopt the Gideon rule because it regarded improper confessions less seriously than a trial without counsel.
All of the majority’s reasoning for adopting its rule on retrials is equally applicable to subsequent trials pursuant to indictments filed before June 13, 1966; yet, they do not go so far. I quite agree that they should not go so far because such a holding would be contrary to the express language of Johnson. I think that it is equally clear that Miranda applies to a retrial as well as an original trial after the magic date. The majority of the members of this court reject the views of the majority of the courts 1 by stating, in curious language, that these cases *38“contain little, if any, discussion of the problem and we do not find them persuasive.” The majority of the courts are merely carrying out the directions laid down in Johnson; therefore, they feel that little discussion is necessary. Those applying the contrary doctrine do discuss it at length because they are trying to avoid the obvious.
If the majority could give, or if I could think of, one reason why Miranda should not apply to retrials which is not equally applicable to a trial under an indictment filed prior to June 13, 1966, I would agree with them. Since there is no such reason, I must dissent.

. See cases collected in the majority opinion.