Court Opinion

ID: 9535203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:46:44.028222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:11.330757
License: Public Domain

*427Markman, P. J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur fully with the majority opinion’s treatment of the Headlee Amendment issue. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a number of provisions of 1996 PA 374 must be stricken from the act as violative of the constitutional separation of powers. Const 1963, art 3, § 2. In my judgment, any potential separation of powers concerns are not yet ripe for decision.
The Judicial Attorneys Association (jaa) and the Government Administrators Association (GAA) contend that the coemployment relationship between local funding units and the courts created by Act 374 violates the constitutional separation of powers. Const 1963, art 3, § 2. The trial court found that the provisions of Act 374 for the sharing of authority over court employees violates the constitutional separation of powers because it “creates the potential for overreaching by the County.” (Emphasis supplied.)1 Similarly, the majority strikes down several provisions of Act 374 as violative of the constitutional separation of powers on the basis of a potential for overreaching by the local funding unit.
However, “under established rules of statutory construction, statutes are presumed constitutional, and courts have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Mahaffey v Attorney General, 222 Mich App 325, 344; 564 NW2d 104 (1997). Here, the presumption of con*428stitutionality is particularly strong because the Michigan Constitution specifically empowers the Legislature to “enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees, except those in the state classified civil service.” Const 1963, art 4, § 48. To make a successful facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, as plaintiffs attempt here, the challenger must establish that “ ‘no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid.’ ” Council of Organizations & Others for Ed About Parochiaid v Governor, 455 Mich 557, 568, 602; 566 NW2d 208 (1997), quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745; 107 S Ct 2095; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987). Here, the specific provisions struck down by the majority may well allow the possibility of overreaching by the legislative branch, but there has been utterly no demonstration that “no set of circumstances exists” under which Act 374 would be valid under the constitutional architecture of Michigan. That it is conceivable that a constitutional violation might occur — indeed, even that it is more conceivable that it might occur than it was before the enactment of Act 374— is not equivalent to finding that a constitutional violation must necessarily occur.2
*429Const 1963, art 3, § 2 states:
The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.
In Employees & Judge of the Second Judicial Dist Court v Hillsdale Co, 423 Mich 705, 717; 378 NW2d 744 (1985), the Michigan Supreme Court stated:
Each branch of government has inherent power to preserve its constitutional authority.
“It was certainly never intended that any one department, through the exercise of its acknowledged powers, should be able to prevent another department from fulfilling its responsibilities to the people under the Constitution.” [O’Coin’s, Inc v Worcester Co Treasurer, 362 Mass 507, 511; 287 NE2d 608 (1972).]
However, an indispensable ingredient of the concept of coequal branches of government is that “each branch must recognize and respect the limits on its own authority and the boundaries of the authority delegated to the other branches.” United States v Will, 449 US 200, 228; 101 S Ct 471; 66 L Ed 2d 392 (1980).
In People v Trinity, 189 Mich App 19, 22-23; 471 NW2d 626 (1991), this Court held:
The separation of powers doctrine has never been interpreted in Michigan as meaning there can never be any overlapping of functions between branches or no control by one branch over the acts of another. Soap & Detergent Ass’n v *430Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728, 752; 330 NW2d 346 (1982).
Addressing separation of powers, the United States Supreme Court stated in Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 380-381; 109 S Ct 647; 102 L Ed 2d 714 (1989):
Separation of powers . . . “d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,” but rather “that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.” The Federalist No. 47, pp 325-326 (J. Cooke ed 1961) (emphasis in original).
The constitutional separation of powers is concerned with “ ‘the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other,’ ” Mistretta, supra at 382 (citation omitted), and with disruptions of the “proper balance” between the branches that prevent one branch from “accomplishing its constitutionally-assigned functions . . . .” Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 695; 108 S Ct 2597; 101 L Ed 2d 569 (1988).
Clearly, whenever an activity involves the functioning of more than one branch of government, the constitutional separation of powers is implicated and care must be taken to avoid running afoul of Const 1963, art 3, § 2. While the constitutional separation of powers forbids the sharing of powers by different branches, it does not in any way forbid two branches of government from exercising their own powers over the same subject matter. The different duties of the separate branches may sometimes require them to act upon the same set of circumstances. Indeed, this rou*431tinely occurs when, for example, the legislative and executive branches engage in negotiations over legislative measures, the former in pursuit of its authority under Const 1963, art 4, § 1 and the latter in pursuit of its authority under Const 1963, art 4, § 33, or art 5, §§ 17-20. In such cases, the powers of each branch remain discrete — the Legislature is exercising the legislative power and the executive is exercising the executive power — but they are brought to bear upon the same set of circumstances. There is no blending of powers but only a blending of governmental operations. The constitutional separation of powers does not prohibit the exercise of distinct powers by separate branches jointly in pursuit of a common end; rather, it only forbids one branch from exercising the powers of another branch. The separated powers of the branches do not overlap; however, the exercise of these powers often does. That is, the separate and distinct powers of two branches may often be focused on the same subject areas, and the operation of government may occasionally involve a blending of governmental responsibilities, but there is never a blending of powers or functions. The legislative branch always exercises the legislative power, the executive branch always exercises the executive power, and the judicial branch always exercises the judicial power.
Nor are the branches entitled to operate with absolute independence in those subject-matter areas in which other branches also possess a legitimate interest. I agree with the majority that the judicial branch, like the other branches, has ancillary inherent powers. But the majority, ante at 412, quoting the superseded original opinion of the Court in Wayne Circuit *432Judges v Wayne Co, 383 Mich 10, 21; 172 NW2d 436 (1969), opinion of the Court superseded and the opinion by Dethmers and Black adopted as the opinion of the Court on rehearing, 386 Mich 1; 190 NW2d 228 (1971), seamlessly moves from the proposition that the branches have “ ‘some ancillary inherent capacity to do things which are normally done by the other departments’ ” to the conclusion that such inherent authority is both “inherent and exclusive.” Ante at 413. The majority assumes without authority that inherent powers are necessarily exclusive, despite the fact that such powers will generally relate to governmental matters over which another branch may also possess power. The branches are only entitled to exercise their own powers with independence, not the powers of other branches.3 Thus, the only issue here is whether Act 374 results in one branch’s impinging on another branch by exercising the other’s function.
Both the local funding unit (the legislative branch) and the trial court (the judicial branch) have legitimate responsibilities relating to the operation of the trial courts that derive directly from the constitution and laws of Michigan. In whatever manner the legislative and judicial branches exercise their responsibilities with regard to the operation of the trial court system, there may be potential concerns that either branch will overstep its proper boundaries and attempt to exercise or usurp the functions of the other. But these are no different than the constitu*433tional tensions that exist with respect to other subject matters regarding which the legitimate interests of separate branches intersect. To name but a few, these would include: tensions between the legislative and executive branches over the latter’s implementation of the former’s regulatory enactments, tensions between the executive and judicial branches over the latter’s supervision of public institutions pursuant to affirmative injunctions, and tensions between the executive and legislative branches over spending restrictions in appropriation measures. Such tensions are a routine part of a constitutional system in which governmental powers are dispersed among separate branches in order to impose checks and balances upon, and thereby to limit, the exercise of governmental power.4
As noted by the majority, the Michigan Supreme Court considered the separation of powers implications of Act 374 and set forth guidelines for implementing it in Administrative Order No. 1997-6, which states in pertinent part:
The principle of separation of powers requires that the fundamental and ultimate responsibility for all aspects of trial court operations, including personnel matters, resides within the judicial branch. . .. Effective management of the operation of a trial court, however, also requires a positive working relationship between chief judges and the local funding units of their courts in the exercise of shared *434responsibility to the public. In addition to protecting the managerial responsibilities of the judiciary over its branch of government, the principle of separation of powers protects local funding units in their own area of fundamental responsibility: the appropriation of public dollars. Given the separate responsibilities of the judiciary and the court’s funding units, the application of the principle of separation of powers to the operation of trial courts requires a practical reconciliation of the separate constitutional spheres of the legislative and judicial branches where those spheres intersect.
Whatever the undeniable potential for friction between the legislative and judicial branches in exercising their separate spheres of authority over the trial courts, Administrative Order No. 1997-6 recognizes that there is, in fact, a history in Michigan of reasonable cooperation between the two branches with respect to this responsibility.5 In circuits and districts with a history of financing by the local unit (such as a county board of commissioners), the precise relationship between the local unit and the court, and the exact allocation of responsibilities, has differed considerably from court to court. Yet only a *435small handful of the variety of relationships so worked out has been the subject of prior constitutional challenge. The majority nonetheless concludes that Act 374 prescribes an unconstitutional relationship between the local unit and trial court without considering the full range of these relationships, the vast number of which would be compatible with the act. There is no single method by which the branches must structure their relationships in order to avoid violating the constitutional separation of powers. The constitutional separation of powers does not inhibit experimentation and innovation in addressing subject matters regarding which different branches possess intersecting responsibilities. It only requires that whatever relationship is devised does not impinge on the constitutional function of any branch by allowing another branch to exercise its powers.
Indeed, I note that before the enactment of Act 374, the employees of both the Third Circuit Court and the 36th District Court were employed by the State Judicial Council. The State Judicial Council consisted of the State Court Administrator, a constitutional officer of the judicial branch, Const 1963, art 6, § 3, Wayne Circuit Judges, supra, 386 Mich 9; two judges each from the circuit court, the probate court, and the district court, appointed and removable for cause by the Chief Justice; and the director of the Department of Management and Budget, a gubernatorial appointee serving at the pleasure of the Chief Executive, Const 1963, art 5, § 3; MCL 18.1121 and 18.1123; MSA 3.516(121) and 3.516(123). MCL 600.9101; MSA 27A.9101 (repealed by Act 374). The judicial members of the council, in exercising their statutory responsibilities, particularly including the negotiation *436of collective bargaining agreements with employees of the Third Circuit Court, the Recorder’s Court, and the 36th District Court, were required to vote as a bloc in order to preclude the possibility of a veto by the director of the Department of Management and Budget. MCL 600.9104(2); MSA 27A.9104(2) (repealed by Act 374). Further, the Legislature specifically provided that no increase in compensation under a collective bargaining agreement could be implemented if either house of the Legislature rejected it within sixty days of transmittal of the agreement. MCL 600.9107(1); MSA 27A.9107(1) (repealed by Act 374).6 Thus, at least since 1981, the employees at issue were the employees of an entity representing a combination of the judicial and executive branches, in which the executive had a partial veto power, over which the legislative branch reserved a one-house veto power with regard to economic issues, and with respect to which, even in the absence of a legislative veto, the Governor possessed a line-item veto over any appropriation. Const 1963, art 5, § 19. Accordingly, it is hard to understand why these employees should now claim that Act 374 undermines the constitutional separation of powers when they operated under the previous arrangement without apparent objection or difficulty.7
*437The presumption that statutes are constitutional, Mahaffey, supra, and the requirement that “no set of circumstances exist” under which Act 374 would be valid before it can be declared facially unconstitutional, Council of Organizations, supra, clearly require more than a mere potential for overreaching in order for provisions of Act 374 to be struck down as violative of the constitutional separation of powers. Similarly, the ripeness doctrine requires that there be an actual and live existing controversy, rather than merely a potential one, before a court may exercise its judicial powers. Ripeness is a constitutional doctrine that exists as a limitation on the judiciary’s authority to address and adjudicate constitutional questions.8 It is a function both of prudential *438limitations on constitutional adjudication and the “case or controversy” limitations on judicial jurisdiction imposed by US Const, art III, § 2 and Const 1963, art 6, § 1, New York v Ferber, 458 US 747, 767-768 & n 20; 102 S Ct 3348; 73 L Ed 2d 1113 (1982); Request for Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1997 PA 108, 402 Mich 83, 86; 260 NW2d 436 (1977). Only the judicial power is bestowed upon the judiciary. As the United States Supreme Court has observed:
The power of courts ... to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. A hypothetical threat is not enough. . . . The Constitution allots the nation’s judicial power to the federal courts. Unless these courts respect the limits of that unique authority, they intrude upon powers vested in the legislative or executive branches. Judicial adherence to the doctrine of the separation of powers preserves the courts for the decision of issues, between litigants, capable of effective determination. Judicial exposition upon political proposals is permissible only when necessary to decide definite issues between litigants. When the courts act continually within these constitutionally imposed boundaries of their power, their ability to perform their function as a balance for the people’s protection against abuse of power by other branches of government remains unimpaired. Should the courts seek to expand their power so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues, they would become the organ of political theories. Such abuse of judicial power would properly meet rebuke and restriction from other branches. By these mutual checks and balances by and
*439between the branches of government, democracy undertakes to preserve the liberties of the people from excessive concentrations of authority. [United Public Workers of America (CIO) v Mitchell, 330 US 75, 89-91; 67 S Ct 556; 91 L Ed 754 (1947).]
The Michigan Supreme Court stated in General Motors Corp v Attorney General, 294 Mich 558, 568; 293 NW 751 (1940):
The court will not go out of its way to test the operation of a law under every conceivable set of circumstances. The court can only determine the validity of an act in the light of the facts before it. Constitutional questions are not to be dealt with in the abstract. Bandini Petroleum Co v Superior Court, 284 US 8 (52 S Ct 103, 78 ALR 826) [1931]; 11 Am Jur p 753, § 111, and cases cited in note 18.
Here, Act 374 could be construed or applied in many ways, in many combinations and permutations, anticipated and unanticipated, some of which would engender no serious constitutional difficulties and others of which might be inconsistent with Const 1963, art 3, § 2 in whole or in part. Is there no arrangement of responsibilities between the local unit and the court possible under Act 374 that the majority would find consistent with the Michigan Constitution? Is it at all relevant that this Court has not yet been presented with an intractable dispute between the two branches under Act 374?9 Can the majority truly conceive of no circumstances under which the two branches could cooperatively structure their court system without *440running afoul of the constitution?10 Where a constitu*441tional issue is presented anticipatorily, the Court is required to decline to rule with regard to the question. Sullivan v Michigan State Bd of Dentistry, 268 Mich 427, 429-430; 256 NW 471 (1934).
Neither the parties nor the majority points to any existing controversy between the Third Circuit Court, or its chief judge, and the Wayne County Board of Commissioners, with respect to the compensation, fringe benefits, pensions, holidays, or leave policies applicable to nonclerical employees of the Third Circuit Court. The chief judge remains wholly unfettered in deciding whom to appoint, promote, demote, or discharge, what positions to create and the responsibilities and functions to be assigned, when the work day starts and ends, the time allowed for meals or rest breaks, the number of employees, whether they shall be employed on an at-will, just-cause, or some other basis, their personnel hierarchy, including to whom they shall report, and all other such details of the employer-employee relationship. To the extent that it is able to demonstrate that a particular level of compensation, or package of fringe benefits, pension benefits, holidays, and leave allowances are necessary to fulfill the minimum demands of the court in terms of adjudicating its caseload of civil and criminal litigation, the circuit court also has full authority over economic issues as well. Wayne Circuit Judges, supra. Once those minimum requirements are met, however, the court, whether it or the county is the formal “employer” of the court’s employees, must structure the compensation, fringe benefits, pension benefits, holidays, and leave allowances of those employees within the constraints of its budgetary appropriation from the county. Whatever the “inherent” powers of *442the judiciary, to this extent they are transcended by the Legislature’s power of the purse. Univ of Michigan Regents v Michigan, 395 Mich 52, 70-71; 235 NW2d 1 (1975).
Outside the context of the First Amendment, “[generally, facial challenges to legislation are disfavored.” Michigan Up & Out of Poverty Now Coalition v Michigan, 210 Mich App 162, 170; 533 NW2d 339 (1995). However, the majority nonetheless strikes down a number of provisions of Act 374 that are plainly not ripe for decision.11
First, the majority, ante at 415, strikes down subsection 593a(3) of Act 374, contending that it is an *443“outright takeover of the court’s employees.”12 Subsection 593a(3) states that employees serving in the court are employees of Wayne County (given the failure of the Wayne County Board of Commissioners to create a Wayne County Judicial Council).13 This is merely a declaration of status and must be read in the larger context of Act 374; to render this declaration of status dispositive of the present constitutional controversy, without considering the surrounding structure and language of the statute, is to subordinate substance to form. See Johnston v Livonia, 177 Mich App 200, 208; 441 NW2d 41 (1989). Subsections 593a(4)-(9) of Act 374 clearly indicate the court’s continuing authority over employees serving in the court despite the formal designation of Wayne County as the “employer” of these employees.14 Accordingly, *444whether the designation in subsection 593a(3) of Wayne County as “employer” violates the constitutional separation of powers, in my judgment, will not be ripe until Wayne County takes some action regarding an employee to which the court objects, the two branches are subsequently unable to negotiate a resolution, Wayne County proceeds unilaterally in reliance on this provision, and the court initiates a lawsuit against the county. This has not yet occurred. Whether this provision violates the constitutional separation of powers turns on whether one branch is preventing another branch from exercising its constitutionally assigned function.15 Here, while Act 374 *445designates Wayne County as the “employer,” it clearly contemplates a critical role for the judiciary in exercising authority over employees serving in the judiciary, including a role in collective bargaining.16 While the form of a governmental relationship is relevant in assessing the extent to which it comports with the constitutional separation of powers, so too is the substance of such a relationship.
Plaintiffs have done little more in their pleadings than invoke the county’s status as the “employer” of court personnel. They have done nothing to demonstrate that such status by itself will undermine the ability of the courts to carry out the judicial function or that such status presupposes some relationship that will undermine this ability. Nor have they demonstrated that the statute does not advance the legitimate interests of the counties in performing their legislative function. Accordingly, I do not believe that *446the designation in subsection 593a(3) of Wayne County as the “employer,” on its face, impinges on the judiciary by enabling the legislative branch to usuip the judicial function. While the judiciary understandably would prefer that Act 374 designate the court as the sole employer of employees serving in its branch, the issue before us is whether subsection 593a(3) violates the constitutional separation of powers. Facially, subsection 593a(3) does not violate the constitutional separation of powers; whether, in practice, a local unit will impinge on the judiciary’s constitutional functions by virtue of this provision is an issue that is not currently ripe for adjudication.
The majority, ante at 418, next strikes down subsection 593a(4) because it allows the county “to share the court’s inherent and exclusive authority over all personnel matters” and subsection 593a(5) because it “divides the inherent managerial powers of the judiciary between the court and the county.” Section 593a(4) states that the “employer” designated in subsection 593a(3), in concurrence with the chief judge, has authority (a) over personnel policies relating to specified subject matters and (b) to enter into collective bargaining agreements. That Wayne County, in concurrence with the court, has some authority over employees serving in the judiciary becomes potentially problematic only if the two branches disagree over some matter. Subsection 593a(5) sets forth a division of authority between the local funding unit and the court in the event of an impasse regarding the subject matters listed in subsection 593a(4)(a). In order for the question of the constitutionality of subsections 593a(4) and (5) to be ripe, the local unit and the court would have to reach an impasse that would *447lay the groundwork for invoking subsection 593a(5) and the legislative and judicial representatives would then have to disagree on their respective limits of authority to the extent that one entity sued the other. This has not yet occurred. In any event, I note that, although the impasse provisions of subsection 593a(5) appear to place certain subjects relating to employees serving in the court beyond the authority of the court in the event of an impasse, a closer look at this division of authority demonstrates that the subject matters committed to the authority of the local unit are those strictly relating to finances — the legitimate legislative concern of the local unit — while all other authority regarding personnel is committed to the court.17 These provisions represent a good-faith effort by the Michigan Legislature to roughly restate presently recognized spheres of authority on the part of local units and the judiciary in the operation of the trial courts.18 The majority would reach beyond the *448necessities of the present case to strike down this attempt to forestall future conflicts between these branches.
None of the events necessary to transform these potential separation of powers concerns into actual and concrete “cases and controversies” (US Const, art III, § 2) has occurred, yet they are prematurely decided here by the majority.19 There is currently no ripe separation of powers controversy for this Court to decide. See Michigan Up & Out of Poverty Coalition, supra at 170, n 5. Accordingly, I conclude that the constitutionality of Act 374 ought not to be resolved on this record, at this time. When and if a conflict arises between a local funding unit and a *449court that they are unable to resolve among themselves, the determination of any constitutional separation of powers violation will turn on the precise contours of the dispute. The admittedly experimental effort by the Legislature to minimize potential conflicts between counties and courts by mandating joint involvement in the collective bargaining process should be given an opportunity to play itself out in the real world; only if an irreconcilable conflict between the branches occurs, or otherwise if there is evidence that the performance of the judicial function has been undermined, should this Court presume to address the constitutional questions raised here.
There is nothing on the face of Act 374 or the particular provisions struck down by the majority that makes it certain, or even more likely than not, that any discrete judicial function of the trial court will be impaired. Under Act 374, the legislative branch retains complete control over its constitutional functions and the judiciary retains complete control over its constitutional functions with respect to operation of the trial courts. If, in practice, that does not prove to be true, this Court should be vigilant in striking down such usurpations. Obviously, the relationship between the branches described in Act 374 raises the potential that constitutional separation of powers disputes may arise in the future. These, however, are less a function of Act 374 than they are a function of the constitution’s apportionment of powers between the legislative and judicial branches. For the present, the arising of such disputes remains speculative and uncertain. The “potential” for such disputes, expressly set forth by the trial court as the standard for assessing violations of art 3, § 2 and implicitly adopted here *450by the majority, is widespread throughout our constitutional system. It often may be the case that one branch will have to assert itself in order to ensure that potential conflicts do not ripen into actual conflicts; further, when actual conflicts, in fact, arise, it is normally the political rather than the judicial process that works out such conflicts. Only when such conflicts prove too stubborn to be politically resolved, and when the ability of a branch to perform its constitutional obligations is thereby undermined, is the dispute typically transformed into a justiciable controversy into which the courts must be drawn. Second Dist Court, supra at 724-725.20
It will be in its actual implementation across the state that the constitutional parameters of Act 374 will be determined. Accordingly, I do not believe that there is currently any basis for transforming potential violations into actual violations. See Second Dist Court, supra at 722, in which the Court held that there was no basis on the record before it for determining under what circumstances the judiciary could compel expenditures beyond those appropriated because it was undisputed that the court was then functioning at a satisfactory level. Further, I note that neither the local units nor the trial courts have challenged the statute on separation of powers grounds. That neither of the affected branches of government *451is raising separation of powers concerns is significant evidence that there is no present separation of powers issue to adjudicate.21 For these reasons, while caution and judgment must be exercised in the implementation of Act 374 to avoid separation of powers violations of the sort foreseen in Administrative Order No. 1997-6, I believe that the constitutional claims raised here axe not currently ripe for adjudication.22
*452The majority nonetheless addresses the separation of powers claims and strikes down a number of provisions of Act 374 as unconstitutional. The majority then concludes that these provisions, cumulatively, can be severed from the remainder of the statute and that Act 374, even with these provisions deleted, remains effective. Respectfully, I question whether Act 374 has not been so substantially altered by the majority that to sustain what is left of it following their surgery would be contrary to the intent of the Legislature.
As stated by the majority, when a statutory provision is found unconstitutional, a determination regarding its severability from the rest of the statute is required. MCL 8.5; MSA 2.216 states:
In the construction of the statutes of this state the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, that is to say:
If any portion of an act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances shall be found to be invalid by a court, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid portion or application, provided such remaining portions are not determined by the court to be inoperable, and to this end acts are declared to be severable.
*453The law enforced after an invalid portion of an act is severed must be “reasonable in view of the act as originally drafted.” Citizens for Logical Alternatives & Responsible Environment v Clare Co Bd of Comm’rs, 211 Mich App 494, 498; 536 NW2d 286 (1995). The Michigan Supreme Court has indicated that it is appropriate for a court to remedy a constitutional defect in a statute when it can do so “with no damage to the overall statutory scheme.” Day v W A Foote Memorial Hosp, 412 Mich 698, 709; 316 NW2d 712 (1982).
The majority’s excision of large portions of § 593a, because it finds subsection 593a(3) and related provisions, i.e., subsections 593a(4)-(6), (8), (10)-(13), unconstitutional, is highly problematic. Section 593a attempts to establish a cooperative relationship between the counties and the courts in administering the courts and exercising authority over their employees. It is intended, in part, to resolve any ambiguity concerning the identity of the employer, given a long history of contention dating back at least to Wayne Circuit Judges, supra, 383 Mich 10, 386 Mich l.23 Because court administration is a subject matter regarding which legislative and judicial functions intersect, and in light of the history of contention *454regarding the branches’ respective roles in administering the courts, it is logical for the Legislature to address these concerns in the context of court reorganization legislation. Section 593a, in which the Legislature lays out its plan for court administration, contains significant provisions of Act 374. The majority would delete most of the provisions of § 593a without seriously evaluating whether the Legislature would have enacted Act 374 in the absence of such provisions. I question whether these provisions can be severed from the act “with no damage to the overall statutory scheme,” Day, supra at 709, and whether enforcement of the act after severance of most of § 593a is “reasonable in view of the act as originally drafted.” Citizens for Logical Alternatives, supra at 498.
The majority-amended version of Act 374 gives no apparent effect to the clear legislative intent to involve both the local unit and the court in exercising authority over and collectively bargaining with employees serving in the court. Indeed, the majority-amended statute does not indicate at all which party is authorized to enter into a collective bargaining contract with the employees at issue. Additionally, by removing the local units from any clear role with respect to these responsibilities, I believe that the majority is giving inadequate consideration to the political processes that led to the instant statute. Specifically, it is unclear whether reorganization of the courts under Act 374 would have garnered sufficient political support without the provisions setting forth a role for the local funding units in court administration. I do not believe that this Court can altogether *455disregard the political realities surrounding the enactment of a statute where we strike down important provisions of the statute while seeking to maintain the viability of the remaining provisions.24 But for the *456adoption of the provisions of § 593a that the majority strikes down, it is not at all certain that the remainder of Act 374 would have been adopted in its present form or, indeed, that it would have been adopted at all. Evaluation of the “manifest intent of the legislature,” MCL 8.5; MSA 2.216, while principally focused on the objective, statutory work product, must in fairness to the processes of the Legislature and to the interests involved therein, attempt at least some rudimentary analysis of the extent to which the stricken provisions contributed to the Legislature’s approval of the statute. While admittedly such an analysis may often prove difficult, the essence of the severability analysis, in my judgment, is whether a legislative measure both would have and could have been adopted had it been cast in its judicially amended form. For these reasons, I do not believe that the majority has adequately addressed the severability issue and am considerably less confident than the majority that the Legislature would have enacted Act 374 in the form resulting from this Court’s action.25
*457In light of my conclusion that the provisions in Act 374 for joint authority over employees by the local unit and court are not facially violative of the constitutional separation of powers and, therefore, that constitutional issues arising under the act are not ripe for adjudication, I must address the claim regarding the public employment relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq. The jaa and the GAA contend that the trial court erred in finding that § 593a did not violate the pera. The PERA is the principal state law regulating public employment relations; it generally prevails over conflicting laws that do not specifically address collective bargaining. Local 1383, Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v City of Warren, 411 Mich 642, 655; 311 NW2d 702 (1981). “A primary goal of the [pera] is to resolve labor-management strife through collective bargaining.” Port Huron Ed Ass’n v Port Huron Area School Dist, 452 Mich 309, 311; 550 NW2d 228 (1996). Under the pera, a public employer must bargain collectively with representatives of its employees regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. MCL 423.215(1); MSA 17.455(15)(1); Port Huron, supra at 317. Here, the jaa and the GAA assert that § 593a strips their members of this statutory right to collectively bargain over the terms and conditions of their employment.
*458First, the jaa and the GAA argue that the party designated by Act 374 as their employer, Wayne County, has no control over some of the mandatory subjects of bargaining. Subsection 593a(4)(b) provides that the county, in conjunction with the chief judge, has the authority to make and enter into collective bargaining agreements with representatives of its employees. Under subsection 593a(6), both the county and the chief judge may appoint an agent for collective bargaining purposes. Subsection 593a(7) indicates that the chief judge may elect not to participate, but Administrative Order No. 1997-6 requires a chief judge choosing not to directly participate in collective bargaining to designate a representative of a local funding unit to act on the court’s behalf for purposes of collective bargaining. Even if choosing not to participate in the collective bargaining process, the chief judge’s decisions regarding individual employees must be made in accordance with personnel policies and procedures and the collective bargaining agreement under subsection 593a(8). Upon review of this division of authority, the trial court determined that the coemployer relationship did not violate the pera because the jaa and the gaa did not demonstrate that the coemployer relationship affected their ability to assert and enforce their rights under the pera.
In St Clair Prosecutor v AFSCME, Local 1518, 425 Mich 204, 233; 388 NW2d 231 (1986), the Michigan Supreme Court recognized a coemployer status in collective bargaining. A “co-employer” is treated as an employer only for purposes of bargaining about areas within its control. Id. 224, n 2. In St Clair Prosecutor, the Court noted that the coemployer concept is espe*459dally relevant in matters of county government, where separately elected constitutional officers are given statutory authority to make personnel decisions with regard to their assistants. Id. at 233. The Court determined that the fact that coemployers require the bargaining unit’s representative to bargain with more than one person did not appear to impose an undue burden on the collective bargaining process. Id. Contrary to plaintiff jaa’s assertion, members of different branches of government may be considered coemployers for purposes of the pera. St Clair Prosecutor involved a coemployer relationship between a county prosecutor, who is a member of the executive branch, People v Trinity, supra at 22; People v Potts, 45 Mich App 584, 589; 207 NW2d 170 (1973) (partial concurrence by Holbrook, P.J.), and a county, which in those circumstances was operating within the legislative sphere, Alan v Wayne Co, 388 Mich 210, 245; 200 NW2d 628 (1972). Moreover, as earlier discussed, that both the local unit and the court have authority over employment matters neither inherently violates the constitutional separation of powers nor infringes on the court’s inherent powers. Accordingly, a coemployer relationship between two different branches is not facially constitutionally infirm.
Here, under § 593a, the county and the court are coemployers for purposes of the pera. Section 593a provides roles for both the local unit and the court in collective bargaining; thus, there is, in fact, more than one “public employer” for purposes of the PERA. See St Clair Prosecutor, supra at 233. Contrary to the JAA and the gaa’s assertion, the chief judge and the court will be bound by any collective bargaining agree-*460merit — or at least would have before the majority transformed § 593a. Subsection 593a(4)(b) requires that the county and the chief judge concur in the decision to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. Because the division of general authority to set terms of employment applies only to personnel policies and procedures established under subsection 4(a), not collective bargaining agreements entered into under subsection 4(b), subsection 593a(5) does not limit the range of issues subject to collective bargaining. Accordingly, the co-employer status set forth in Act 374 does not impose an undue burden on the collective bargaining process, in my judgment.
Further, the gaa asserts that its members cannot assert their pera rights because the court cannot be bound by the collective bargaining agreement under the terms of Act 374. According to the gaa, Act 374 establishes a de facto coemployer relationship between Wayne County and the court but at the same time creates a de jure prohibition against recognition of this relationship. Subsection 593a(9) states that the “state” is not a party to the contract. Plaintiff GAA contends the court is clearly a state entity under Const 1963, art 6, § 1 and, therefore, cannot be recognized as a party to the collective bargaining agreement.26 The goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. VanGessel v *461Lakewood Public Schools, 220 Mich App 37, 40; 558 NW2d 248 (1996). Particular provisions of a statute should be read in the context of the entire statute. Id. at 41. Subsection 593a(9) states that the chief judge of the Third Circuit Court is the “principal administrator of the officers and personnel of the court,” although he is not a representative of a source of funding. Subsection 593a(8) states that the chief judge is to exercise his authority in accordance with any applicable collective bargaining agreement. Subsection 593a(4)(b) states that the county, “in concurrence with the chief judge of the appropriate court” has authority to enter into collective bargaining agreements. As evidenced by the limits placed on the chief judge’s authority and the requirement that the chief judge and the county concur in any collective bargaining agreement, the Legislature clearly intended that the courts be bound by the collective bargaining agreements even though the “state” is not a party to the contract. Accordingly, because the statute does not limit plaintiffs’ members ability to collectively bargain over all the terms and conditions of their employment and ensures that the court and the chief judge will be bound by any resulting agreement, § 593a is not, in my judgment, inconsistent with the PERA.27
*462For these reasons, I, like the majority, would reverse the orders of the trial court determining that Act 374 violates the Headlee Amendment in both Docket No. 201850 and Docket No. 201852. However, in Docket No. 201852,1 would also reverse the part of the trial court’s order finding that Act 374 violates the constitutional separation of powers and I would affirm the part of the order finding that Act 374 does not violate the pera.

 The trial court relied in large part on Berrien Co Probate Judges v Michigan AFSCME Council 25, AFL-CIO, 217 Mich App 205; 550 NW2d 859 (1996); however the Michigan Supreme Court subsequently ordered that this opinion shall “have no precedential force or effect.” 454 Mich 906; 564 NW2d 46 (1997).

 If we had an actual case or controversy ripe for decision, there would be a concrete dispute between the county and the chief judge over a particular economic issue — presumably with the chief judge wishing to accede to some employee demand for a concession and the county balking at the expense. We would then be asked to decide whether the county’s position was preventing the court from fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities. If we decided in the affirmative, we would rule that the chief judge could approve the concession notwithstanding the county’s objections and that the county would have to fund the resulting agreement; if we decided in the negative, the chief judge could not agree to the demand without obtaining an equivalent savings elsewhere and then convincing the county to approve the package on a “bottom line” basis. See Judges of the 74th Judicial Dist v Bay Co, 385 Mich 710, 726-727; 190 *429NW2d 219 (1971). However, we have no such concrete dispute before us, still less one in which the disputants are the county on the one hand and the chief judge on the other, each contending that the other branch is attempting to intrude on its own prerogatives.

 An “hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.” Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 121; 96 S Ct 612; 46 L Ed 2d 659 (1976).

 “Checks and balances” can be defined in effect as the overlapping application of the separate powers of the branches to a common subject matter. While the concept of “checks and balances” contemplates a less than “pure” form of separation of powers, it does not contradict this constitutional principle but rather complements it. Without the ability to withstand encroachments, a branch might be unable to perform the functions assigned to it within a governmental structure characterized by a separation of powers.

 I do not assume, as the majority opinion implicitly does, that the legislative branch, in carrying out its legitimate responsibilities under Act 374, will feel compelled in every instance to exercise the fullest measure of its power where such exercise may approach or even cross the dividing line between its primary responsibilities and those of the judicial branch. It is not at all inconsistent with the constitutional separation of powers that one branch may decide, as a policy matter, to use restraint in the exercise of its powers in order to avoid conflict and confrontation with another branch or to promote cooperative decision making. See Univ of Michigan Regents v Michigan, 395 Mich 52, 70-71; 235 NW2d 1 (1975). “While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 635; 72 S Ct 863; 96 L Ed 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J, concurring).

 The council was abolished by repeal of these provisions of the Revised Judicature Act by Act 374.

 I am cognizant that the constitutionality of this previous arrangement is not before this Court. My sole purpose in mentioning the arrangement is to note the anomaly of the present separation of powers challenge to Act 374 in the context of a history of acceptance of a previous arrangement that was marked by considerable involvement on the part of the legislative and executive branches in personnel matters relating to employees serving in the judiciary. The majority, ante at 423, n 26, seeks to explain the lack of objection to the prior arrangement on the basis of “the *437state fully funding the operations of the participating courts, relieving local government of a sizable financial burden.” While this point is historically accurate, it is entirely unrelated to the collective bargaining issues involved in the present lawsuit because the county and the city, who now must shoulder the burdens of funding the courts, are not plaintiffs and have not raised any challenge to the Legislature’s division of collective bargaining responsibilities. Neither the jaa nor the gaa can have any legally cognizable interest in the identity of the funding source, state or local, for the employee remuneration and benefits that they are able to negotiate on behalf of their members. Their sole legitimate interest is in being able to collectively bargain in a binding manner — something they may not be able to do now that the majority, albeit at the jaa and gaa’s invitation, has denied the county any role in the collective bargaining process. See infra, n 23.

 A cardinal limitation on the judicial power of constitutional review is “ ‘never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it . . . .’ ” Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia Steamship Co v Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 US 33, 39; 5 S Ct 352; 28 L Ed 899 (1885), quoted in United States v Raines, 362 US 17, 21; 80 S Ct 519; 4 L Ed 2d 524 (1960). Because ripeness is a limit on a court’s authority to adjudicate, it is appropriate for a court to consider ripeness sua sponte even if the parties do not raise it. This Court is under standing orders, as it were, to always inquire into the bona fides of our jurisdiction sua sponte. Fox v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 375 Mich 238, 242; 134 NW2d 146 (1965). That refusing to consider an issue on the basis of lack of ripeness might, as the majority asserts, ante at 423, be viewed as *438“inviting litigation” at some future date, if and when the issue becomes ripe, is no argument for not honoring the ripeness doctrine. Indeed, such an argument would effectively vitiate the doctrine altogether because it is hard to conceive of a circumstance in which it could not be invoked.

 A fundamental precept of constitutional law is that when two branches of government pursue a common policy on the basis of mutual agreement, the strongest presumption of constitutionality attends their actions. Youngstown, n 5, supra at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). See n 2, supra.

 To answer the majority’s inquiry regarding how the statute could conceivably operate in a constitutional manner, I suggest the following possible situations in which subsection 593a(5) could arguably operate without running afoul of separation of powers concerns:
1. The county, pursuant to subsection 593a(6), appoints the chief judge as its agent for collective bargaining, and subsequently ratifies the contract as negotiated;
2. The chief judge, pursuant to subsection 593a(6), appoints the county (or the county’s representative) as agent for collective bargaining, and subsequently ratifies the contract as negotiated;
3. The county and the chief judge are separately represented, but as each issue for negotiation arises, these agents confer and reach accord regarding the position to be taken;
4. The county and the chief judge are separately represented, and with regard to some noneconomic issue their respective representatives differ; the chief judge prevails under subsection 593a(5)(b), which even the majority concedes must be constitutional (because it identifies a constitutional imperative pursuant to which the chief judge must be able to act unilaterally);
5. The county and the chief judge are separately represented, and with regard to some economic issue their respective representatives differ; if the chief judge can make a compelling case to establish that the funding necessary to implement his position is minimally required for the court to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities, the chief judge prevails under Wayne Circuit Judges, supra;
6. The county and the chief judge are separately represented, and with regard to some economic issue their respective representatives differ; the chief judge is unable to make a compelling case to establish that the fending necessary to implement his position is minimally required for the court to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities; the county allows the chief judge full leeway to resolve the problem as he chooses within the parameters of a lump sum budget; again, there is no constitutional difficulty Ottawa Co Controller v Ottawa Probate Judge, 156 Mich App 594, 603-604; 401 NW2d 869 (1986).
There may well be additional categories of situations where constitutional difficulties would not necessarily arise. And, of course, when an actual problem does arise, a justiciable constitutional controversy will then be ripe for decision. Until that time, “wisdom demands abstention until a specific impasse is presented.” Univ of Michigan Regents, n 8, supra at 70.
Further, notwithstanding the majority’s suggestion in n 27, ante, p 423, that it is inconsistent to conclude both that the constitutional issues here are not ripe for review and that Act 374 is not facially invalid, it is hard to understand how the former conclusion could ever be drawn absent some inquiry into the latter.

 The majority appears to conclude that the constitutional challenge based on separation of powers is ripe because it perceives that the mere existence of subsection 593a(5)(a) so alters the political balance between the judiciary and applicable funding units — in this instance, between the Third Circuit Court and the Wayne County Board of Commissioners — that it constitutes an affront to Const 1963, art 3, § 2. A similar argument was made by disgruntled members of Congress (the constitutional principals in that case in contrast to the constitutional “proxies” involved in the instant case) in Raines v Byrd, 521 US_; 117 S Ct 2312, 2316; 138 L Ed 2d 849, 857 (1997), where challenged legislation was attacked as creating “unanticipated and unwelcome subservience” by one branch of government to another solely by virtue of its enactment, even though the statute (the line item veto) had not yet been invoked. In rejecting the argument as unripe, the United States Supreme Court explained that ripeness is a corollary of standing, and noted that
our standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional. ... As we said in Allen [v Wright, 468 US 737, 752; 104 S Ct 3315; 82 L Ed 2d 556 (1984)], “the law of Art in standing is built on a single basic idea — the idea of separation of powers.” [Raines, supra, 521 US_; 117 S Ct 2317-2318; 138 L Ed 2d 858.]
Thus, it is ironic that, by addressing the merits of the instant controversy in order to declare that the statute violates the constitutional separation of powers, the majority itself has arguably run afoul of this same principle.

 The majority also strikes down portions of subsections 593a(6), (8), (10), (11), (12), and (13) because they depend on the definition of “employer” in subsections 593a(3).

 I note, as does the majority, that § 593a is constructed similarly to provisions of Act 374 that are not at issue in the instant litigation, specifically §§ 591(4), 8271(6) and 8274(5).

 Section 593(a) both designates Wayne County as the “employer” of employees serving in the judiciary and states that the court has continuing authority over such employees. It clearly indicates a cooperative relationship between these two entities and a role for both in collective bargaining. Contrary to the majority’s contention, ante at 424, Act 374 does not leave plaintiffs “in need of direction regarding the identity of their employer.” Apart from this, however, it is difficult to understand the majority’s basis for viewing the collective bargaining process as one in which one party can be heard to object to the manner in which the opposite party chooses to be represented. Whether the chief judge appears personally or by agent, whether the Wayne County Board of Commissioners appears through a representative or in the person of its individual commissioners en masse, and whether the chief judge designates the same agent as the board of commissioners, the jaa and the gaa have only to sit down at the negotiating table and bargain with whomever, on behalf of the employer, appears. If no authorized representative appears, the unions may properly pursue an unfair labor practice charge before the appropriate administrative agency.

 I have discovered no cases that hold that a statute that makes one branch the employer of personnel working in another branch necessarily violates the constitutional separation of powers. Beadling v Governor, 106 Mich App 530, 536; 308 NW2d 269 (1981), held that the reinstatement by the executive branch of a discharged employee of the legislative branch violated the constitutional separation of powers. However, this holding turned on the fact that the position at issue was one “of some sensitivity within the legislative process” and that to permit executive overview of the position would “allow a dangerous incursion into the legislative realm.” Id. at 536. In Ottawa, n 10, supra at 603, this Court held that a court is “the employer of court personnel for purposes of salary negotiations” and has authority to set “reasonable salaries for its necessary employees in the first instance, as long as it remains within its total budget appropriation.” In reaching this conclusion, the Ottawa Court relied on Judges of the 74th Judicial Dist v Bay Co, 385 Mich 710; 190 NW2d 219 (1971), for the proposition that district courts rather than the local units have authority to set salaries and Livingston Co v Livingston Circuit Judge, 393 Mich 265; 225 NW2d 352 (1975), which the Ottawa Court contended extended the Bay Co holding to employees serving in the circuit and probate courts. Ottawa, supra at 602-603. However, Bay Co turned on statutory rather than constitutional analysis. Bay Co, supra at 726-727. That the Bay Co Court, supra at 727, stated that its holding was “consonant” with constitutional principles does not mean that its holding is constitutionally required. Livingston Co held only that the specific bargaining process that it considered — in which the judiciary bargained with the employees and the contract was submitted to the State Court Administrator for approval, with the local funding unit provided an opportunity to present its views to the administrator — did not violate the constitutional separation of powers. Finally, in Gray v Clerk of Common *445Pleas Court, 366 Mich 588, 594; 115 NW2d 411 (1962), the Court held that the common pleas court had authority “under the statute” to remove a bailiff. Further, there are a number of instances in which employees of one branch of government serve in another branch. County clerks are an example of employees who work closely with the judiciary, yet are not employees of the court. The county clerk is the clerk of every circuit court. Const 1963, art 6, § 14. Although county clerks and their deputies work closely with the judicial branch, their salaries may be fixed by the state or local legislature free from judicial interference. Bartkowiak v Wayne Co, 341 Mich 333, 342-344; 67 NW2d 96 (1954). The classification of deputy clerks within the classified civil service of the county executive does not violate separation of powers doctrines. Sabbe v Wayne Co, 322 Mich 501; 33 NW2d 921 (1948); Duncan v Wayne Co, 316 Mich 513; 25 NW2d 605 (1947). Administrative agencies are an example of entities that often act in a quasi-judicial capacity but are part of the executive branch. Bay Co, supra at 727.

 The majority’s primary concern appears to be authority over personnel matters. However, nothing in Act 374 restricts the judiciary’s authority over the core personnel matters of hiring, firing, and discipline. Further, Act 374 has no effect on any employees serving in the judiciary who are not subject to collective bargaining.

 Moreover, the subject matters listed in the event of impasse are defined broadly and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, while leave time is committed to the authority of the local unit, employee discipline, which is committed to the authority of the court, may involve the misuse of leave time. Similarly, compensation is committed to the authority of the local unit, but grievances, which are committed to the authority of the court, may involve compensation. Thus, the impasse provisions do not purport to prescribe in detail specific subject matters over which one of the two branches has exclusive authority but merely recognize the general interests that each branch has regarding court employees. In precisely those areas in which the interests of the branches most closely intersect, I believe that the impasse provisions are least clear in precisely ascertaining the branch in which a particular controversy is to be finally resolved. Thus, the division of authority set out in these provisions is not clearly inconsistent with the requirements of the constitutional separation of powers.

 Indeed, I see this portion of the statute as an effort to declare existing relationships between the legislative and judicial branches as established by prior case law. The legislative branch has the initial prerogative with regard to the matters that Act 374 confides to it. Only if, in the *448exercise of its prerogative over the purse strings, the local unit leaves the court with insufficient resources to carry out its judicial functions, or otherwise interferes with the judicial function, may the judiciary, under the inherent power doctrine, require the legislative branch to withdraw from an exercise of power. Second Dist Court, supra at 724. No such interference is reflected in the present record. That there may be a potential for separation of powers problems does not warrant this Court in resolving such thorny problems in the abstract, without a proper case or controversy. Univ of Michigan Regents, supra at 66-67, 69-70. Public confidence in any judicial resolution of such issues will be fostered by awaiting a proper record for further development of the constitutional question of separation of powers. Second Dist Court, supra at 725.1 am aware of no Michigan case in which a statute has been held to violate the constitutional separation of powers solely on the basis of the possibility of a potential conflict at some unspecified future date. This Court does not to have the power to issue advisory opinions and ought not to arrogate this extraordinary authority to itself. See Const 1963, art 3, § 8.

 The majority, ante at 422, n 25, suggests that I “mischaracterize” them as striking down several provisions of Act 374 on the basis of a potential for overreaching by the local funding unit. How else can their action be characterized in the absence of an actual case or controversy? In the absence of an actual case or controversy, any “case or controversy” must necessarily be, at best, potential. And a potential “case or controversy” is no case or controversy at all. While the majority may prefer to avoid the explicit use of the term “potential,” the decision of the trial court that they affirm in this regard correctly recognized that § 593 could only be rendered unconstitutional at this time on this basis.

 I note that Morrison, supra at 693, suggested that the relevant test for determining a separation of powers violation under the federal constitution was not whether one branch was exercising the function of another but whether an action “sufficiently” deprived one branch of control such that it “interfere[d] impermissibly” with a constitutional function. Here, I apply the more stringent and less deferential “exercising the function of another branch” test and still conclude that Act 374 is not unconstitutional on its face under Const 1963, art 3, § 2.

 Because, in my judgment, it is unnecessary to the resolution of this case, I do not address the issue whether the gaa and the jaa have standing to raise a separation of powers claim, as they urge here, where neither of the affected branches themselves, or their individual members, is raising such a claim. Given its contrary resolution of the constitutional issues in this case, the majority opinion implicitly concludes that such standing exists. See Raines v Byrd, n 11, supra, regarding the importance of strict compliance with the standing requirement. As in Raines, n 11, supra at 521 US_; 117 S Ct 2322; 138 L Ed 2d 864, plaintiffs “have alleged no injury to themselves as individuals . . . the institutional injury they allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed . . . and their attempt to litigate this dispute at this time and in this form is contrary to historical experience. We attach some importance to the fact that [plaintiffs] have not been authorized to represent [the allegedly aggrieved branch of government] in this action . . . .”

 Even if one accepts arguendo the facial invalidity of subsection 593a(3), which declares that, given the failure to create the Wayne County Judicial Council, Wayne County, rather than the Third Circuit Court, shall be the “employer” of the nonclerical employees of the Third Circuit, there is little justification for also declaring unconstitutional other subparagraphs of § 593a. Having reached the conclusion that the Legislature was constitutionally obligated to declare the circuit court the “employer” of its nonclerical employees, the majority, in my judgment, fails to justify the extent to which this warrants striking down each of the provisions of § 593a. All that would be necessary is to recognize that any reference to “employer” in other portions of § 593a must be construed as referring to “the circuit court,” or, as appropriate, “the Recorder’s Court,” or the “chief judge” of either court. This does the least violence to the otherwise constitutional (indeed, unchallenged with regard to constitutionality) effort of the Legislature to extend collective bargaining to employees of the circuit courts. This also does the least violence to the efforts of the Legislature to authorize but not mandate the circuit court to establish personnel policies and procedures, subsections 593a(4)(a) and (b); to authorize but not mandate the circuit court or the chief judge to appoint an agent for collective bargaining, subsection 593a(6); and to provide, for the benefit of the employees subject to the collective bargaining process *452and personnel policy and procedure process, that the court shall adhere to such policies as it has opted to establish in appointing, supervising, disciplining, or dismissing its employees, subject to the requirements of any collective bargaining agreement, subsection 593a(8).
Notwithstanding the assertion in the majority opinion, ante at 425, n 29, that I “suggest” that § 593a be rewritten in any particular way, I have only suggested that, if the majority is determined to recast this section, then it would have been better for this Court to have recast this provision in a manner that “seek[s] to save what we can of the Michigan statutes.” People v Bricker, 389 Mich 524, 529; 208 NW2d 172 (1973). This is a constitutional principle “well recognized and applied in our state.” Id. at 531.

 Further clarification of this issue is provided by subsection 593a(9), which states that in no event shall such personnel be deemed employees of the state or the state be liable for the tortious misconduct of such governmental agents or for funding of their contractual claims. I express no opinion regarding the effect of which entity is designated as the employer of employees serving in the court on the issue of which entity is responsible for tort judgments involving court employees. See Cameron v Monroe Co Probate Court, 214 Mich App 681; 543 NW2d 71 (1995), lv gtd 454 Mich 892 (1997).

 Not the least of the considerations involved in judicial decisions to sever unconstitutional provisions from a larger statute is the extent to which unintended policy consequences may arise when the judicial branch effectively establishes its own processes as an alternative to the factfinding and decisionmaking processes of the legislative branch. One such problem potentially arises here with respect to the effect of the modified statute on the public employee collective bargaining process. Under 1996 PA 374 as enacted, when the collective bargaining process results in an agreement, that contract is legally enforceable, like any other contract, because government agencies, acting within their powers, can legally enter into contracts and sue and be sued thereon. However, now that the majority has removed the Wayne County Board of Commissioners from the equation, in an effort to give “direction” to the jaa and the gaa regarding the “identity of their employer,” any collective bargaining agreement will be merely hortatory unless and until the county independently decides to fund the agreement. 76th Judicial Dist Court v Teamsters Local 580, 1995 MERC Lab Op 160; Roxborough v Michigan Unemployment Compensation Comm, 309 Mich 505, 510; 15 NW2d 724 (1944); (“ ‘Public officers have and can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by law, and a State is not bound by contracts made in its behalf by its officers or agents without previous authority conferred by statute or the Constitution.’ ”) (citation omitted). It is at the behest of the collective bargaining representatives of these employees (“the persons represented by plaintiffs jaa and gaa are presently in need of direction regarding the identity of their employer,” ante at 424) that the majority declares the statute unconstitutional in part and thereby proceeds to render the collective bargaining process unsettled for the very beneficiaries of its decision. As Sittler v Michigan College of Mining & Technology Bd of Control, 333 Mich 681; 53 NW2d 681 (1952), explicitly establishes, the jaa and the gaa — as with anyone else wishing to enter into a contractual arrangement with a governmental agency — are required to ascertain the power of either the chief judge or his agent, or of the county or its representative, to negotiate and execute a binding collective bargaining agreement. They proceed at their risk, if they choose to conclude a contract with the chief judge alone, that the economic provisions of the contract will not be funded by the county. Whatever the majority’s view of the demands of the constitutional separation of powers, the “power of the purse” belongs exclusively to the legislative branch. Const 1963, art 4, § 1; Univ of Michigan Regents v Michigan, supra at 70-71. Concomitantly, if only the county is involved, and the chief judge has not designated the *456county as agent for the court, the unions may bargain conclusively over economic issues but questions of work schedules, discipline, grievances, personnel records, probation, hiring and termination practices, and other personnel matters may then be beyond the competence of the other side.
The majority, ante at 425, n 29, responds to all this by asking rhetorically: "What is new?” Well, of course, nothing at all is new. The problem merely is that the Legislature indicated that it wanted something new As the result of this decision, the Legislature has been rebuffed in this regard and an amended process by which court employees could collectively bargain — at least arguably, a more effective and expedited process — has been replaced by the status quo ante.

 The majority’s assertion, ante at 422, that, “[i]f the Legislature disagrees with our conclusion, it can repeal the remaining provisions of the act,” only reinforces this lack of confidence. It is a much different proposition to say that the Legislature would not have adopted a measure in *457the first instance than it is to say that they are capable of repealing such measure after it has been amended by this Court. Precisely because of this difference, it is our obligation in undertaking the severability analysis to assess the Legislature’s intent at the time of the enactment of legislation and not to reassure ourselves that Humpty Dumpty can be put together again in the form that the Legislature would have intended after we have transformed a statute.

 The fallacy of this contention may be made at least partly clear by noting that at no time have the employees of the circuit or district courts been paid by state warrants; they have always been paid by drafts or checks drawn on local accounts. A court can be an arm of the state without concomitantly requiring that court employees be regarded as state employees.

 If Act 374 were inconsistent with the pera, Act 374 would not, on that basis alone, be invalid. Rather, Act 374 would likely effect an amendment by implication of the pera, to the extent of any conflict. See Washtenaw Co Rd Comm’rs v Public Service Comm, 349 Mich 663, 680; 85 NW2d 134 (1957); Antrim Co Social Welfare Bd v Lapeer Co Social Welfare Bd, 332 Mich 224, 228; 50 NW2d 769 (1952); Atlas v Wayne Co Bd of Auditors, 281 Mich 596, 599; 275 NW 507 (1937).