Court Opinion

ID: 9572277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:40:18.720409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:13.484698
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(dissenting in part). Plaintiff’s principal claim is grounded upon subsection (h)(iii) of § 103 of the Civil Rights Act, which includes within its definition of "[discrimination because of sex” unwelcome sexual advances when "[s]uch conduct . . . has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment ... or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive . . . environment.” MCL 37.2103(h)(iii); MSA 3.548(103)(h)(iii). Because I believe the cause of action contemplated under subsection (h)(iii) requires more than a brief single incident of the kind alleged here, I respectfully dissent.
In considering the parameters of a "hostile environment” claim, the United States Supreme Court explained in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 67; 106 S Ct 2399; 91 L Ed 2d 49 (1986), that "[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ” Quoting Henson v Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 904 (CA 11, 1982). As the majority correctly states, ante at 394, the prevail*400ing view is that "an isolated sexual advance, without more, does not satisfy the requirement that an employee asserting a cause of action for hostile environment discrimination demonstrate an abusive workplace environment.” Chamberlin v 101 Realty, Inc, 915 F2d 777, 783 (CA 1, 1990).1
This view was recognized by our Court of Appeals in Langlois v McDonald’s Restaurants of Michigan, Inc, 149 Mich App 309; 385 NW2d 778 (1986), wherein a plaintiff’s co-worker made a verbal sexual advance and "then briefly placed his hand on her breast and 'grabbed’ her buttocks.” 149 Mich App 311. While acknowledging that the co-worker was properly terminated from his employment and "should have faced criminal responsibility for his actions,” id. at 316, the Court explained that on the basis of its "reading of the federal cases, and especially the district court cases construing the severity and pervasiveness of conduct which must be established ..., we conclude that the act does not allow ... a remedy under these facts.” Id.2
*401In this case, however, it appears that the majority has devised what amounts to a sliding scale of severity "because the perpetrator of the alleged conduct was the employer . . . Ante at 395. While I agree with the majority that defendant Everett’s employer status satisfies the respondeat superior requirement,3 I do not believe it follows that this relationship or the "closely knit working environment” makes the particular conduct in question more severe or pervasive.4 Id. Moreover, even if it would have been fruitless to complain to the employer, as the majority asserts,5 this consideration, in and of itself, does not increase the severity or pervasiveness of the conduct.
Following the episode alleged by plaintiff in this case, she finished her shift without further incident. However, she resigned the next morning and never returned to her job. Under these circumstances, plaintiff has no way of knowing what the work environment would have been like had she returned.6
Although the principal focus of plaintiff’s com*402plaint is on the claim of a hostile work environment, I do not discount the possibility that a separate claim under subsection (h)(iii) might have been asserted on the ground that defendant’s conduct substantially interfered with plaintiff’s employment.7 If otherwise available, a single incident that is unusually severe could be the basis for a claim of substantial interference with an individual’s employment.
However, because plaintiff chose to resign rather than return to work, any claim of substantial interference with her employment could only be premised upon a constructive discharge theory.8 To prevail on such a theory, a plaintiff must establish either that the employer intended "to make things difficult for an employee, thus forcing him or her to resign,” LeGalley v Bronson Community Schools, 127 Mich App 482, 487; 339 NW2d 223 (1983), or that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would feel compelled to resign. Held v Gulf Oil Co, 684 F2d 427 (CA 6, 1981).
In this case, plaintiff does not allege that her employer intended to force her resignation. Although she alleges that a reasonable person in her position would have resigned, such an assertion is severely undercut by her own deposition testi*403mony. She conceded that before this episode she had worked for the defendant for 4 Vi years with no prior incident of offensive conduct, that she had a good relationship with defendant, was happy in her work with defendant, was not concerned about being alone with him, and that it was possible that he mistakenly believed she wanted him to kiss her.9 Under these circumstances, it was not reasonably foreseeable that she would resign when he did (unsuccessfully) attempt to kiss her.
In this case, the circuit judge found that the "acts attributed to Defendant Everett do not rise to the level of severity and persistence which would permit recovery under the act.” Because I conclude that the circuit judge ruled correctly, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court._

 In Chamberlin, the court failed to find that even five verbal sexual advances were sufficient to create a hostile environment. 915 F2d 783. See also Babcock v Frank, 783 F Supp 800, 808 (SD NY, 1992). The majority also notes that "federal courts have also recognized that a very severe single incident can be sufficient to constitute a violation of title VII.” Ante at 394, n 40. However, in none of the cases cited in note 40 did the court actually find that a single incident was sufficient to create a hostile environment. See King v Bd of Regents of Univ of Wisconsin System, 898 F2d 533, 540 (CA 7, 1990) ("This is not the case of a single, innocent, sexual query. Instead, we have repeated, unwelcome advances, fondling, and a physical attack.”); Del Valle Fontanez v Aponte, 660 F Supp 145, 149 (D PR, 1987) (an incident where the plaintiff’s supervisor pressed his body against her and she felt his erect sexual organ "would not have been so sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environment”); Vermett v Hough, 627 F Supp 587, 607 (WD Mich, 1986) ("only one of the alleged incidents of sexual harassment actually occurred .... I find, however, that under the cited definitions and standards, this was not an act of sexual harassment, nor was it an act based upon sex”).

 As the majority correctly notes, ante at 381-382, federal case law, while not binding, is persuasive precedent in our consideration of civil *401rights issues. Sumner v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505, 525; 398 NW2d 368 (1986).

 See, e.g., Vance v Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co, 863 F2d 1503, 1512 (CA 11, 1989): "[W]here the harasser is himself the plaintiff’s employer, or an agent of the employer, the employer is directly, rather than indirectly liable for the harassment.”

 While I recognize that this relationship may be relevant in determining whether the conduct "has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s employment ... or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive. . . environment,” MCL37.2103(h)(iii); MSA 3.548(103)(h)(iii), I do not agree that this relationship automatically allows plaintiff a jury determination on this issue.

 Unlike the majority, I am not prepared to assume that resort to the employer would be fruitless in all such cases, however.

 While I agree with the court in Carrero v New York City Housing Authority, 890 F2d 569, 578 (CA 2, 1989), that "[a] female employee need not subject herself to an extended period of demeaning. and degrading provocation before being entitled to seek the remedies provided” under the Civil Rights Act, I do not believe that a departure from the requirements outlined in Vinson is justified in this case. Such a departure creates a risk of "blurring beyond recognition any *402meaningful distinction between hostile environment and quid pro quo discrimination.” Chamberlin, supra, 915 F2d 783.

 Upon questioning by the Court at oral argument, counsel for both parties apparently conceded that the statutory language "substantially interfering with an individual’s employment... or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive . . . environment” describes a hostile environment cause of action, rather than two separate theories of recovery.

 The majority concludes that a finding of sexual harassment is a "necessary predicate,” ante at 372, n 1, to plaintiff’s claim that she was constructively discharged. Because plaintiff quit her job and thus did not experience the hostile environment she says was created, I would view establishment of constructive discharge as a "necessary predicate” in this case to a claim of substantial interference with employment under subsection (h)(iii).

 Plaintiff also testified that before defendant attempted to kiss her, he caressed her back, told her "he really liked me,” and said, " 'Oh, come on, you can’t tell me you don’t feel the same way about me.’ ” Plaintiff’s reply indicated that she did feel the same way. However, she testified "out of fear, I lied ... I told him what I thought he wanted to hear.”