Court Opinion

ID: 9862116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:01:25.731194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:12.608043
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent. Specifically, I -disagree with the conclusion that defendant’s conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault (count IV) should be vacated. With respect to the indictment, I believe that defendant was on notice of the need to defend against multiple charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault. In all, defendant was charged with four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. While two of the counts alleged vaginal penetration, the other two alleged oral penetration. Count IV alleged that defendant, while displaying a knife, forcibly placed his penis in M.J.’s mouth. Count VI alleged that defendant caused her bodily harm by forcibly placing his penis in her mouth. Unlike the charges in Crespo and Olivieri, the aggravated criminal sexual assault charges here specifically referenced the sexual penetration. Based on these facts, it is my opinion that the charging instrument was sufficiently specific to put defendant on notice that he was being charged with two separate offenses qf forcible oral sex. Consequently, I believe that the indictment in this case satisfied Crespo, and I disagree with Justice McLaren’s conclusion that defendant here did not have notice prior to trial that he was being charged with multiple offenses. In addition, I do not believe that a detailed notice of a defendant’s specific acts prior to trial is the only manner in which to satisfy Crespo’s due process requirement. Justice McLaren appears to place great weight on the preliminary hearing in Olivieri to support his position that Crespo requires that a defendant have notice prior to trial that the State is seeking separate convictions. In his view, there was no preliminary hearing in this case and Olivieri is therefore distinguishable on that basis alone. However, I believe that this interpretation ignores the analysis in both Crespo and Olivieri discussing the State’s treatment of the crime at trial. In my opinion, Crespo allows consideration of the State’s treatment of the crime at trial. In Crespo, it is clear that the court based its decision on the indictments as well as the way in which the crime was argued to the jury. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 344. Similarly, in Olivieri, the court considered the charging instruments and the preliminary hearing, as well as the State’s presentation of evidence to the jury, in finding that the defendant had fair notice that the State was prosecuting for three separate acts. Accordingly, in determining whether a defendant was informed of the nature and cause of the criminal accusations against him, it is appropriate to consider the indictments, as well as the State’s treatment of the crime both before and during trial. Here, I believe that the State’s treatment of the crime at trial informed defendant that he was being prosecuted for separate acts. First, in the opening statement, the State stated that defendant “pull[ed] out his penis and he force[d] [M.J.] to give him oral sex.” The State continued that defendant took M.J. to the kitchen, where he grabbed two beers, and then returned to the bedroom. “And then he goes to [M.J.] again and says, make me come, and again he takes out his penis and again forces it into [M.J.’s] mouth. But this time she throws up and she throws up all over his shorts.” Second, in its closing argument, the State treated defendant’s conduct as separate acts. For example, the prosecutor stated the following: “The last offenses I will talk about are those of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault, and once again, there are four counts of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault; and in relation to those four counts, there are two different theories and I will also talk about the verdict forms that go with the theories. Clearly — I talked about this already and I apologize if I keep repeating myself — threats were issued from the point that he put the cord around [D.J.’s] wrists and put the pillow case over his head. That’s when he began demanding [M.J.] to perform oral sex on him, and that’s when the defendant began saying, I am going to kill you if you don’t — kill your husband if you don’t do it, I am going to kill you, I am going to kill your children, I am going to have sex with your children. In this case there are two different types of sexual penetration that are charged: one, penis to mouth; and, two, penis to vagina. The evidence here is overwhelming that the defendant, while displaying the knife, repeatedly forced [M. J.] to perform oral sex on him. She started to cry initially. That’s when he started to threaten. He, numerous times, placed his penis in her mouth; even on one occasion causing her to throw up, causing her to vomit in his shorts. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that the defendant committed acts of sexual penetration, in that he placed his penis in her mouth while displaying a weapon.” (Emphasis added.) In support of her position, Justice Gilleran Johnson isolates individual comments made by the State that are not reflective of the overall treatment of defendant’s conduct at trial. When viewed in its entirety, the State’s closing argument clearly treated defendant’s conduct as separate acts. Finally, the jury was carefully instructed by the trial court regarding all four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Specifically, the verdict form submitted to the jury with respect to counts IV and VI stated as follows: “We, the jury, find the [defendant] not guilty of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault, displaying dangerous weapon and placed penis in the mouth of [M.J.]; we, the jury, find the [defendant] guilty of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault, displaying dangerous weapon and placed penis in mouth of [M.J.], We, the jury find the [defendant] not guilty of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault, caused bodily harm to [M.J] and placed penis in mouth of [M.J.]; and we, the jury, find the [defendant] guilty of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault, caused bodily harm to [M.J.] and placed penis in mouth of [M.J.].” Thus, I disagree with Justice Gilleran Johnson’s conclusion that the trial court did not sufficiently instruct the jury that defendant was being charged with two separate acts of forcible oral sex. Moreover, as mentioned previously, isolating individual statements made by the State or the trial court results in an inaccurate view of the overall treatment of defendant’s conduct at trial. In sum, both counts IV and VI specifically referenced the sexual penetration, and the State presented and argued the case to the jury as separate acts of forcible oral sex. For these reasons, I believe that defendant was informed that the acts were being treated as separate offenses, and I would affirm the convictions on both counts.