Court Opinion

ID: 9399480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-04 07:11:44.518595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:01.646588
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 1, 2023

                                           In The

                       Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                                   NO. 14-22-00206-CR

                        ANTHONY CASTANEDA, Appellant

                                              V.
                          THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                      On Appeal from the 228th District Court
                              Harris County, Texas
                          Trial Court Cause No. 1505705

                                         OPINION

       Appellant Anthony Castaneda appeals his conviction for continuous sexual
abuse of a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02. We affirm.

                                       BACKGROUND1

       Appellant sexually assaulted the Complainant, his biological daughter, on a

       1
         Because appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction, we include only those facts necessary to provide background for his issues raised in
this appeal.
continuous basis from the time she was seven until she was thirteen. While
appellant started sexually abusing Complainant when she was three or four years
old, the first incident Complainant remembered occurred when she was seven.
Complainant testified at length regarding the details of appellant’s sexual abuse.
Complainant testified that appellant sexually assaulted her a hundred or more
times. Complainant stated that appellant sexually assaulted her almost every other
weekend from the time she was seven years old until she was eleven.
Complainant explained that she never told anyone about the abuse because
appellant had threatened that if she told anyone he would hurt her and the members
of her family. Complainant said she was terrified of appellant because he was big
and muscular and would sometimes smother her and her brother with a pillow to
control them.

         As a result of appellant’s threat, Complainant did not tell anyone about the
abuse until she was thirteen. Even then, she only told her mother after her younger
brother (“Brother”) asked her directly if appellant had touched her inappropriately.
Brother then encouraged Complainant to tell their mother, which Complainant did.
Complainant’s mother (“Mother”) subsequently took Complainant to the police.
Complainant later underwent a sexual assault examination at the Children’s
Assessment Center. Complainant also attended therapy with Katherine Turner, a
licensed professional counselor, to address the trauma caused by appellant’s sexual
abuse.

         At trial, Mother testified as an outcry witness. Appellant objected to this
testimony because he claimed the State had not provided notice as required by
Article 38.072 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 38.072, §2(b) (requiring at least 14 days’ notice of intent to use outcry
witness). The trial court overruled appellant’s objection after the State established

                                           2
that it had timely filed its outcry notice and had also served the outcry notice on
appellant the same day.

      During her testimony, Mother detailed what Complainant had told her about
appellant’s sexual abuse. Mother reported the sexual abuse to the police the next
morning. When asked about her marriage with appellant, Mother testified that
their relationship was normal in the beginning but, when she was six or seven
months pregnant with the complainant, appellant became physically abusive and
controlling. Appellant objected that the “line of inquiry is totally improper.” The
trial court sustained appellant’s objection. Appellant then asked the trial court to
instruct the jury to disregard the objectionable testimony, which the trial court did.
Appellant then moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.

      Turner, Complainant’s therapist, also testified during appellant’s trial.
Turner learned about appellant’s sexual abuse of Complainant when Turner was
assessing and treating her. Turner testified that she met with Complainant fourteen
times to diagnose Complainant’s mental health and then treat the trauma caused by
appellant’s sexual abuse.     Turner further testified that, during their sessions,
Complainant reported that appellant had sexually assaulted her on multiple
occasions.

      Brother also testified during appellant’s trial.      Brother testified about
appellant’s sexual abuse of Complainant that he directly observed. Brother also
testified that he saw appellant take Complainant, his eleven-year-old daughter, into
his bedroom and Brother heard Complainant scream at the top of her lungs.
Brother said that appellant would take Complainant into his room on a regular
basis and stay in the room with her for up to an hour and a half. Brother also told
the jury that Complainant would cry every day because appellant made her call
him after school. According to Brother, this is what led him to ask her if appellant

                                          3
was touching her inappropriately. When Complainant answered yes, Brother told
her that she needed to tell their mother. Complainant’s outcry happened soon
thereafter.

      Brother further testified that appellant, his biological father, sexually
assaulted him starting when he was four years old. Brother further testified that the
sexual abuse lasted until he was ten. Brother testified about the details of the
sexual abuse before stating that he never told anyone about the abuse because he
was afraid of appellant.

      During the trial, the State also called twin sisters, Angela and Stephanie,2
who lived in appellant’s house when they were five to seven years old. Angela
explained that they moved into appellant’s house along with their mother after
their mother started dating appellant. Both Angela and Stephanie testified they
observed appellant sexually abuse Complainant. Each twin also testified about
appellant sexually abusing them. Additionally, Stephanie told the jury that she did
not tell anyone about the abuse at the time because appellant told her if she said
anything she would be taken away from her mother.

      After the State rested, appellant’s attorney had appellant take the stand
outside the presence of the jury. Appellant’s attorney then asked appellant how he
pled on the extraneous offenses that Brother and the twin sisters testified about.
Appellant stated he was “not guilty” of each extraneous offense. Appellant’s
counsel then explained to the trial court that he wished to have appellant deny the
extraneous offenses in front of the jury without subjecting appellant to cross-
examination by the prosecution. The trial court explained to appellant that if he
took the stand, he would waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The
trial court also admonished appellant that if he took the stand and refused to
      2
          These names are pseudonyms used to protect the identifies of the minor witnesses.

                                                4
answer questions on cross-examination, he could be held in contempt for each
question he refused to answer. Appellant confirmed that he understood, but he told
the trial court that he still wished to take the stand.

       The jury returned to the courtroom and appellant took the stand where he
denied committing the extraneous offenses. Appellant then refused to answer any
of the State’s questions on cross-examination as he had been instructed to do by his
attorney. As a result of appellant’s refusal to answer the prosecution’s questions,
the trial court held appellant in contempt twenty-two separate times.                     At the
conclusion of the trial, the jury found appellant guilty of continuous sexual abuse
of a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02. The trial court subsequently
sentenced appellant to serve 55 years in prison. The trial court elected not to
punish appellant for contempt because appellant had relied upon the advice of his
attorney when he refused to answer the State’s questions. This appeal followed.

                                            ANALYSIS

       Appellant raises five issues on appeal. We address them in order.

I.     The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s
       motion for mistrial.
       In his first issue appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion for mistrial made after Mother, the first witness in the
trial, testified appellant was physically abusive toward her while she was pregnant
with Complainant.3          Appellant objected that Mother’s testimony was “totally

       3
           This issue arises out of this exchange between the prosecutor and Mother:
Q.     And tell me a little bit about that relationship early on, the very first, at the beginning.
Tell me about it.
A.     The very beginning it was okay. It was like any normal relationship. We got along.
Once I was pregnant with [Complainant], probably at seven - - six or seven months along, then
he became abusive physically and from there it was just he became more controlling.

                                                 5
improper.” The trial court sustained the objection. Appellant then asked the trial
court to instruct the jury to disregard Mother’s testimony, which the trial court
promptly did. Appellant then moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.
On appeal, appellant argues the denial of his motion for mistrial was an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. We disagree.

       We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Jackson
v. State, 495 S.W.3d 398, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d).
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and will
uphold the ruling if it falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Ocon, 284
S.W.3d at 884. A mistrial is an extreme remedy reserved for a narrow class of
cases in which the error is highly prejudicial and incurable. Id.; see Hawkins v.
State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Only in extreme
circumstances, where the prejudice is incurable, will a mistrial be required.”). The
grant of a mistrial is proper “when error is so prejudicial that expenditure of further
time and expense would be wasteful and futile.” Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999).       To determine whether a mistrial is warranted, we
consider the prejudicial effect, any curative measures taken, and the certainty of
conviction absent the prejudicial event. Crayton v. State, 463 S.W.3d 531, 535
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at
77).

       Testimony that improperly refers to extraneous offenses allegedly
committed by a defendant may generally be cured by a prompt instruction from the
trial court to disregard the testimony. See Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 571; Phillips v. State,
130 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) aff’d, 193 S.W.3d
904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). An exception to this general rule exists if “the

                                          6
improper testimony is clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and is of
such a character to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression
produced on the minds of the jury.” Jackson, 495 S.W.3d at 421 (citing Hudson v.
State, 179 S.W.3d 731, 738 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).

      We conclude that the prejudicial effect of Mother’s testimony was low
because the challenged testimony was brief, non-specific, and not repeated by the
State throughout the remainder of the trial. In addition, the information was not
solicited by the State because Mother’s answer exceeded the scope of the State’s
initial question. Finally, any prejudicial effect Mother’s testimony may have had
was mitigated by the fact the same information was introduced, without objection,
during appellant’s cross-examination of Complainant. See Rogers v. State, 200
S.W.3d 233, 238 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (concluding
any error in denial of mistrial was harmless because same information was
introduced without objection later during trial); Harris v. State, 164 S.W.3d 775,
783 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (stating that inadmissible
evidence can be rendered harmless if other evidence is admitted without objection
and it proves the same fact that inadmissible evidence sought to prove).

      Turning to the curative measures taken, the trial court sustained appellant’s
objection and then promptly instructed the jury to disregard the State’s question
and Mother’s answer. A prompt instruction to disregard will usually cure any
prejudice resulting from improper testimony regarding extraneous offenses.
Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Austin v. State, 222
S.W.3d 801, 815 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). Appellate
courts generally presume that a jury follows a trial court’s instruction to disregard
the improper testimony. Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005). This presumption is refutable, but the appellant must rebut the presumption

                                         7
by pointing to evidence in the record indicating that the jury failed to follow the
trial court’s instructions.   Pena v. State, 554 S.W.3d 242, 251 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d). Appellant has not pointed to any evidence
in the record, and we have found none in our own search, suggesting that the jury
failed to follow the trial court’s instruction to disregard. Because appellant has not
rebutted the presumption that the jury followed the trial court’s instruction, we
must presume that the jury followed it. Thrift, 176 S.W.3d at 224; Pena, 554
S.W.3d at 251 (concluding appellant had not rebutted presumption because he did
not point out evidence in record demonstrating that the jury did not follow trial
court’s instruction).

       Finally, we turn to the certainty of appellant’s conviction absent the
prejudicial event. The uncorroborated testimony of a child sexual assault victim
alone is legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 38.07; Green v. State, 607 S.W.3d 147, 153 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Here, in addition to the complainant, three other
witnesses testified that they observed appellant sexually abuse the complainant on
multiple occasions. We conclude that the State presented overwhelming evidence
of appellant’s guilt and it is highly likely the jury would have reached the same
verdict even without Mother’s stricken testimony.

       After considering all three factors, we hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion for mistrial. See Hawkins, 135
S.W.3d at 85 (concluding, after balancing three factors, that trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion for mistrial). We overrule
appellant’s first issue.

II.    The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the outcry
       witness to testify.

                                          8
         Appellant argues in his second issue that the trial court abused its discretion
when it permitted Mother to testify as an outcry witness because he allegedly did
not receive timely notice of the State’s intent to call Mother as the outcry witness.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.             38.072(2)(b) (establishing fourteen-day
notice requirement for hearsay exception to apply). We disagree.

         Article 38.072 creates a hearsay exception that allows an outcry witness to
testify. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.072(2). For an outcry witness to
testify under this statute, the party intending to offer the outcry statement must,
among other requirements not at issue here, notify the adverse party “on or before
the 14th day before the date the proceedings begin.” Id. We review a trial court’s
determination that an outcry statement is admissible under Article 38.072 for an
abuse of discretion. Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990);
Nino v. State, 223 S.W.3d 749, 752 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no
pet.).

         Asserting that he did not receive the required fourteen-day notice, appellant
objected to Mother testifying as an outcry witness. The State then produced a
written “Notice of Intention to use Child Abuse Victim’s Hearsay Statement”
which identified Mother as the outcry witness filed approximately four years
before appellant’s trial commenced. The notice also contained a certificate of
service demonstrating that the State served the notice on appellant the same day it
was filed. “A certificate of service creates a presumption that a document properly
sent is received by the addressee.” Webb v. State, 36 S.W.3d 164, 177 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). Appellant has offered no evidence
rebutting the presumption that he received the outcry witness notice. See Prosper
v. State, 788 S.W.2d 625, 626 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet.
ref’d) (“Unsworn statements by counsel are not proper evidence.”). We therefore

                                            9
conclude that the record establishes the State timely served appellant with the
required outcry witness notice. We overrule appellant’s second issue.

III.   Appellant did not preserve his third issue for appellate review.

       The State called Turner, a licensed professional counselor, to testify during
appellant’s trial. The State called Turner to testify regarding what Complainant
told her during therapy sessions addressing the trauma caused by appellant’s sexual
abuse. At the beginning of Turner’s testimony, the State asked Turner if having
her notes available during her testimony would help her to testify. Turner believed
her notes would help. Appellant did not object to Turner’s use of her notes. When
Turner began testifying about what Complainant told her during therapy sessions,
appellant lodged a hearsay objection. The State responded Turner’s testimony was
admissible because it fit within an exception to the hearsay rule, specifically that
Complainant’s statements were made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
treatment.    See Tex. R. Evid. 803(4).        The trial court permitted the State to
establish the predicate information for the exception and the State then continued
to ask Turner substantive questions about what Complainant reported during her
therapy sessions. Appellant lodged one additional hearsay objection but never
obtained a ruling on either hearsay objection. Appellant also did not object to the
trial court’s failure to rule.

       On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
permitted Turner to testify using her notes over his hearsay objection. As a
prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show
that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or
motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Because appellant did not object when the
State asked Turner about using her notes, we conclude that he has not preserved his
argument about Turner’s use of her notes for appellate review. Id. To the extent

                                          10
appellant is arguing on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it
permitted Turner to testify about what the complainant told her during her therapy
sessions, we conclude that he also failed to preserve this argument for appellate
review. While appellant did lodge a hearsay objection, he failed to obtain a ruling
on that objection. As a result, he has not preserved this part of his third issue for
appellate review. See id.; Smith v. State, 499 S.W.3d 1, 5–6 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016) (noting admission of evidence does not preserve error without adverse ruling
on the record); Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“To
preserve error for appellate review, the complaining party must make a specific
objection and obtain a ruling on the objection.”).

      Appellant also argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion
because the State failed to qualify Turner as an expert. When appellant’s counsel
expressed confusion over whether the State was offering Turner as an expert
witness who would offer opinion testimony, he broached the possibility of a
Daubert hearing to establish Turner’s expertise. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (establishing procedure to establish credentials
of proposed expert witness); Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006) (“[B]efore admitting expert testimony under Rule [of Evidence] 702,
the trial court must be satisfied that three conditions are met: (1) the witness
qualifies as an expert by reason of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education; (2) the subject matter of the testimony is an appropriate one for expert
testimony; and (3) admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the fact-finder
in deciding the case.”). The State explained it was not offering Turner as an expert
who would render opinion testimony.           The State continued that Turner was
testifying exclusively as a fact witness who would testify under the 803(4) hearsay
exception to what Complainant told her during therapy sessions. At that point, the

                                         11
trial court asked appellant’s counsel if he still needed a Daubert hearing.
Appellant’s counsel responded that “we have nothing further at this point.”
Appellant therefore lodged no objection in the trial court that the State failed to
qualify Turner as an expert. Because Turner did not testify as an expert, appellant
has presented nothing for review in this part of his third issue. Even if Turner had
testified as an expert, appellant failed to preserve any argument regarding her
qualifications because he did not make an objection on this basis or obtain a ruling
from the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). We overrule appellant’s third
issue.

IV.      This court does not have jurisdiction over the issue raised in appellant’s
         fourth issue.
         In his fourth issue, appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it
threatened to hold appellant in contempt in front of the jury. Having reviewed the
record, we conclude that appellant has misstated the trial court’s action. The trial
court did not threaten appellant with contempt, it instead held appellant in
contempt after he took the stand and answered his counsel’s questions, but then
refused to answer the State’s cross-examination questions.           No matter how
appellant attempts to artfully argue around the fact the trial court held him in
contempt, his ultimate complaint in his fourth issue is that the trial court held him
in contempt for his refusal to answer the State’s questions. The validity of a
contempt judgment can be attacked only by way of habeas corpus. Collins v.
Kegans, 802 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see Ex parte Eureste, 725
S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“There is no remedy or right of appeal
from an order of contempt.”); Ex parte Rose, 704 S.w.2d 751, 752, n.1 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984) (“In contempt proceedings there is no remedy by appeal.”); Gonzalez
v. State, 187 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.). We therefore are
without jurisdiction in this appeal to address appellant’s fourth issue.
                                          12
V.    The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the twin
      sisters to testify about extraneous offenses committed by appellant.
      In his fifth issue on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it permitted the twin sisters, Angela and Stephanie, to testify
regarding appellant sexually abusing them. Specifically, appellant asserts their
testimony was not relevant and that its probative value was substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect in violation of Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of
Evidence. We address each argument in turn.

      We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A
trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision is so clearly wrong as to lie
outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree. Taylor v. State,
268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

      To be admissible, a trial court must first determine that the evidence is
relevant. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Relevant
evidence is evidence that has a tendency to make a fact more or less probable than
it would be without the evidence that is also of consequence in the action. Tex. R.
Evid. 401; Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 83.

      Here, each twin testified that appellant, who they were living with along
with their mother, sexually assaulted them on multiple occasions when they were
younger. This evidence is relevant to the specific charge against appellant at issue
here because he was charged with continuously sexually assaulting Complainant in
similar ways and at a similar age.      We hold that the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that the twins’ testimony was directly relevant to the charge
against appellant and therefore did not abuse its discretion when it overruled
appellant’s relevance objection and admitted the twins’ testimony. See Caston v.

                                        13
State, 549 S.W.3d 601, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)
(rejecting defendant’s Rule 403 argument because the extraneous offense evidence
that the defendant sexually assaulted another child “is relevant to whether the
defendant sexually abused the child-complainant in the charged case”).

      Ordinarily evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not
admissible to prove the person acted in accordance with that character or trait on a
particular occasion.   Tex. R. Evid. 404(a)(1).      Article 38.37 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is an exception to rule 404(a)(1).         Romano v. State, 612
S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). This article
applies to certain types of sex-based offenses, including continuous sexual abuse of
a young child. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37, § 2(a)(B); Lara v. State, 513
S.W.3d 135, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). If the statutory
requirements of article 38.37 are met, evidence that ordinarily would be
inadmissible under rule 404(a)(1) becomes admissible. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
38.37, § 2(b); Lara, 513 S.W.3d at 141.

      Appellant, recognizing that article 38.37 allows the admission of testimony
like that of the twins, nevertheless argues that the trial court abused its discretion
because it should have sustained his Rule 403 objections. Rule 403 authorizes a
trial court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, misleading the jury, undue delay, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 403; Ryder v. State, 581
S.W.3d 439, 453 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). On appeal,
appellant argues only that the extraneous offense evidence was unfairly prejudicial.

      Rule 403 favors the admission of probative evidence and it is presumed that
relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Ryder, 581 S.W.3d at
453. An appellate court considers the following factors when analyzing a Rule 403

                                          14
challenge on appeal: (1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential to
impress the jury in some irrational yet indelible way; (3) the time needed to
develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the challenged evidence.
Id.

      We conclude that the extraneous offense evidence was highly probative. It
was offered to support a disputed fact: that appellant sexually assaulted
Complainant on a continuing basis. In addition to denying the accusations against
him, appellant pursued a defensive theory that Complainant fabricated the
accusations against him in support of Mother’s efforts to regain custody of her
youngest daughter. Testimony that appellant sexually assaulted two other children
in a similar manner and at a similar age was highly probative to rebut appellant’s
defense that Complainant fabricated her allegations. Id.; Caston, 549 S.W.3d at
612. This factor weighs in favor of admitting the evidence.

      The second Rule 403 factor requires us to consider whether the extraneous
offense evidence had the potential to irrationally impress the jury.       Here, the
extraneous offenses were similar to the charged offense.             “Whenever the
extraneous offense is similar to the charged offense, there is always a potential that
the jury may be unfairly prejudiced by the defendant’s character conformity.”
Beam v. State, 447 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no
pet.). But the impermissible inference of character conformity was minimized by
the inclusion of a limiting instruction informing the members of the jury that they
could only consider the extraneous offenses if they believed beyond a reasonable
doubt that the appellant committed the extraneous offenses. See Wishert v. State,
654 S.W.3d 317, 334 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d) (“Therefore, any
potential harm to [defendant] would be further mitigated by the trial court’s
limiting instruction.”). Also, while evidence of sexual abuse of children is often

                                         15
considered inherently inflammatory, in this case appellant has not demonstrated
how the challenged extraneous offense evidence was any more heinous or
inflammatory than the evidence pertaining to the charged offense. See Robisheaux
v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 220 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref’d) (holding any
potential to suggest a decision on an improper basis was ameliorated somewhat by
the fact that the extraneous offense testimony was “no more serious than the
allegations forming the basis of the indictment”). This factor weighs in favor of
admission.

      The third factor examines the time needed to develop the evidence. Here,
the combined testimony, direct and cross-examination, of the twins took
approximately one and a half hours of trial time and 86 pages of the reporter’s
record of a multi-day trial in which the State presented nine witnesses.
Considering the length of the trial and the overall number of witnesses, we
conclude that the two witnesses did not consume an inordinate amount of time.
This factor weighs in favor of admissibility.

      The fourth and final factor examines the proponent’s need for the extraneous
offense evidence.    Here, the State’s need was strong because the challenged
evidence had bearing on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant
and acts performed in conformity with that character, as well as to rebut
appellant’s defensive theory that Complainant’s accusations were fabricated. See
Caston, 549 S.W.3d at 612 (concluding State had great need for extraneous
evidence because it was relevant to whether defendant sexually abused the child-
complainant in the charged case and also because it rebutted defendant’s defensive
theory); Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 521 (holding that need for extraneous offense
evidence is greatest when the evidence supported an element of a “hotly contested
issue”). This factor weighs in favor of admission.

                                         16
      After balancing the Rule 403 factors, we conclude that the trial court acted
within the zone of reasonable disagreement when it determined that the probative
value of the extraneous offense evidence was not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. We overrule appellant’s fifth issue.

                                     CONCLUSION

      Having overruled each of appellant’s issues raised in his appeal, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.

                                       /s/     Jerry Zimmerer
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Wilson.
Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                          17