Court Opinion

ID: 9625423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:40:34.995074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:14.189855
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
dissenting.
I also must dissent. As Presiding Justice Fletcher has previously *260noted,4 Georgia’s Habeas Corpus Act was enacted with the specific intent of strengthening “ ‘state courts as instruments for the vindication of constitutional rights.’ ”5 The majority’s unnecessarily rigid adherence to the procedural requirements set forth in OCGA § 9-14-52 (b) will defeat that laudable goal, as this Court will now dismiss most of the applications for certificates of probable cause that are filed before us.
The majority opinion fails to consider that most of the men and women who file habeas applications with this Court are ill-suited for the daunting task of proceeding pro se in one of the most complex arenas of the law. In fact, an inordinate number of these petitioners are functionally illiterate, and they will largely be unable to comply with the majority’s requirements. The majority’s position thus results in an injustice to a segment of our society that is not able to adequately represent itself, and it does so, in my view, without a single state interest to support its position. In fact, interpreting our laws to facilitate a resolution on the merits of as many applications for certificates of probable cause as possible, while a somewhat tedious and time consuming exercise by the members of this Court, benefits the state’s interest in efficiently handling habeas corpus cases,6 and is consistent with “the strong public policy of this state favoring resolution of cases on their merits.”7
Moreover, even assuming that habeas petitioners can manage to comply with the conditions imposed by the majority, forcing a petitioner to file both a notice of appeal in the trial court and an application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal in this Court within 30 days of the entry of an order denying him relief is cumbersome, difficult, and unnecessary. The purpose of requiring a notice of appeal to be filed in the habeas court is to enable the clerk of that court to prepare the habeas record. As recognized by the General Assembly, that record is necessary in order for this Court to be able to “consider fully the request for a certificate.”8 Similarly, it is necessary for a habeas petitioner to review the record in order to competently present his grounds for relief to this Court. But, requiring the habeas petitioner to file his application for a certificate within 30 days of the order denying him relief will force the petitioner, in most cases, to simultaneously file both his notice of appeal in the habeas court and his application for a certificate of probable cause in this *261Court. Thus, the petitioner is forced to file his application for certificate of probable cause before the habeas record has even been prepared. Because the petitioner will not have the benefit of the record of his habeas proceedings in preparing his application, that application cannot possibly adequately present his constitutional claims. This result is entirely unnecessary, as this Court will have no record by which to review the application when it is filed. Instead, before reviewing the application, this Court must wait for the habeas court clerk’s office to forward the record to it. Clearly, then, even if a habeas petitioner manages to comply with the majority’s rule, that rule undermines the purpose of our habeas statutes of having this Court serve “as [an] instrument [] for the vindication of constitutional rights.”9 There is an old cliche that “hard cases make bad law,” and therefore the law must be left as it is.10 It is also said that “bad law makes hard cases,” and therefore the law must be amended. The real truth lies somewhere between. The unfortunate circumstances of a particular case should never be an excuse for weakening a law that is sound.11 But a law like § 9-14-52 (b), which is now being construed in such a manner as to create hard cases, is not worth preserving.12
Decided June 1, 1999
Reconsideration denied July 6, 1999.
Stacy Fullwood, pro se.
John C. Pridgen, District Attorney, for appellee.
I have long admired both our justice system’s moral abhorrence against unconstitutional incarceration, and our system of laws designed to right such wrongs. Because the majority opinion unfortunately undermines this system, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins in this dissent.

 Davis v. Thomas, 266 Ga. 835, 839 (471 SE2d 202) (1996) (Fletcher, P. J., concurring specially).

 Davis, 266 Ga. at 839 (Fletcher, P. J., concurring specially (quoting OCGA § 9-14-40)).

 See Davis, 266 Ga. at 839 (Fletcher, P. J., concurring specially).

 Exxon Corp. v. Thomason, 269 Ga. 761 (1) (504 SE2d 676) (1998).

 OCGA § 9-14-52 (b).

 OCGA § 9-14-40.

 See A. P. Herbert, Uncommon Law, 1936.

 Id.

 Id. Moreover, because the majority fails to properly construe the requirements of § 9-14-52 (b), I encourage the General Assembly to modify § 9-14-52 (b) by only requiring the filing of an application for a certificate of probable cause within 30 days of the date the habeas record is docketed in this Court.