Court Opinion

ID: 9778688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:16:23.579839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:12.619694
License: Public Domain

HUTSON-DUNN, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant’s first point of error raises the issue of whether § 1305 of the Airline Deregulation Act preempts its state tort law causes of action.
In 1978, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). 49 U.S.C.A.App. §§ 1301-1389 (West 1976 & Supp.1994). To ensure that the States would not undo federal- deregulation with regulation of their own, Congress included a preemption provision, prohibiting the States from enacting or enforcing “any law ... relating to rates, routes or services of any air carrier....” 49 U.S.C.A.App. § 1305(a)(1). An analysis of the interpretation and scope of this clause should begin with a thorough review of the *506U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2081, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992).
The Morales case dealt with the question of whether the ADA preempts the States from prohibiting allegedly deceptive airline fare advertisements through enforcement of their general consumer protection statutes. The Court emphasized that preemption can be either “express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly constrained in its structure or purpose.” Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2036. The Court also noted that the issue is one of statutory intent, in which case it must address the specific language used by Congress under the assumption that “the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Id It is clear from the language employed by Congress that § 1305 expressly preempts the states from enacting or enforcing “any law ... relating to rates, routes or services of any air carrier_” Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2036-37. Having determined that § 1305 provides for express preemption, we must address the scope of such preemption.1
In determining the scope of § 1305 preemption, the Court concentrated on the meaning of the phrase “relating to.” Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2037. In order to ascertain the meaning of “relating to,” the Court looked at both the ordinary meaning of such words and the meaning ascribed to them in the context of the similarly worded preemption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), which provides for preemption of “all State laws insofar as they ... relate to any employee benefit plan.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court recognized that the ordinary meaning of “relating to” is a broad one, “to stand in some relation; ... refer; to bring into association with or connection with,” (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)), such that the phrase expresses a broad preemptive purpose. Id. The Court further noted that it has held that a state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan, and is preempted by ERISA, “if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.” Id (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97-98, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2900, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)). The Morales Court then concluded that since the relevant language of the ADA is identical to that of ERISA, it is appropriate to adopt the same standard to such language. Hence, it held that any state laws having “a connection with or reference to airline ‘rates, routes, or services’ are preempted under 49 U.S.C.App. § 1305(a)(1).” Morales, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2037.
The Court did, however, recognize a limit to the broad preemptive effect of the language used in § 1305(a)(1). It noted that some state actions, despite “relating to” “rates,” may affect airline fares “in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to have preemptive effect.” Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2040 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 101, 103 S.Ct. at 2901). The Court then refrained from expressing an opinion as to where it would be appropriate to draw the line, since the facts before it, as in Shaw, plainly did not present a borderline question. Therefore, we must address both whether appellant’s state tort-law claims have a “connection with” or “reference to” airline “rates, routes, or services”; and, if so, whether said relation is too tenu-' ous, remote, or peripheral to have a preemptive effect.
Appellant asserted a state common-law negligence cause of action, alleging that a Continental flight attendant dropped a bag from an overhead storage bin onto appellant’s head. Appellee contends that such a claim “relates to” “services” and thus is preempted by § 1305(a)(1). In order to determine whether this state-law tort claim is indeed preempted, we must ascertain the scope of the term “services” as used in § 1305(a)(1). Although the term “services” is not defined within the ADA, it is not, as the appellant contends, ambiguous; therefore, we need not scurry to the legislative history in order to derive its meaning.2 As *507Morales instructs, we may assume that the ordinary meaning of the specific language used by Congress accurately expresses the legislative purpose. The ordinary meaning of the term “service” is: “help, use, benefit; contribution to the welfare of others.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1076 (1991). Appellant, though, contends that § 1305 states the term “services” in the context of the specific terms “rates” and “routes” such that the former term should be controlled by the latter terms. However, appellant offers no explanation as to how such terms would precisely alter the ordinary meaning of the term “services”; rather, appellant merely asserts that the ADA was-intended to address economic issues only. I fail to see how the terms “rates” and “routes” require us to ascribe any meaning to the term “services” other than its aforementioned ordinary meaning.
Athough no reported Texas cases have addressed the scope of the term “services” within the context of § 1305(a)(1), numerous federal district and circuit courts have. The cases are fairly evenly divided between those holding that the claim was “related to” “services” and therefore preempted by § 1305,3 and those holding precisely the opposite.4 Three of the cases involved factual settings almost identical to the case sub judice.
In Margolis, a passenger who was allegedly struck by a luggage carrier which fell from an overhead bin brought a state-law negligence claim against the airlines and its employees. Apparently content with skirting the inconvenience of attempting to apply the precise language expressed in the statute, the court concluded that such claim was not preempted under § 1305(a)(1); asserting that Congress did not intend to preempt this type of common-law claim. Margolis, 811 F.Supp. at 322. As support for this contention, the court emphasized that the passenger would otherwise be left without a remedy.5 Id. However, it is well settled that “where Congress has expressly preempted state common law damages actions ... its failure to provide a federal remedy will not defeat its intent to preempt state law.” Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 86, 126 L.Ed.2d 54 (1993); see also Caterpillar Inc., v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, *508392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987).6
In Heller, a passenger brought a negligence claim, alleging that the airlines’ negligence caused a bag to fall from an overhead compartment onto her head. The court followed Margolis, agreeing that § 1305(a)(1) “does not go so far as to require preemption of a common-law negligence claim against an airline” arising out of “such an incident.” Heller, WL 330093 at 2. The court concluded from the language and purpose of § 1305, that it “was not intended to be an insurance policy for air carriers against their own negligence.” Id. (citing Margolis, 811 F.Supp. at 324). As noted above, the Margolis court failed to apply the Supreme Court’s standard of broad preemption enunciated in Morales. Furthermore, the court erroneously relied on the prospect of leaving the passenger without a legal remedy in determining the preemptive effect of § 1305. Since Heller relies exclusively on Margolis, I find it to be unpersuasive as well.
In Zachary, a passenger, who was allegedly struck during flight by a suitcase which fell from an overhead compartment, brought a claim asserting that the airlines and its flight attendants rendered negligent services. The court noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that by enacting § 1305, Congress intended to preempt state law claims relating to the services of an air carrier. Zachary, 1991 WL 487289 at 2 (citing O’Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir.1989)).7
The majority takes notice of both O’Carroll and Baugh, but contends that since the former is distinguishable and the latter follows the former, neither control the disposition of this case. The majority asserts that O’Carroll involved alleged wrongful exclusion from a flight, an “entirely different variety of injury than at issue here.” Although true, such difference does not render O’Carroll distinguishable. The O’Carroll court concluded that the state-law negligence claims were preempted by § 1305(a)(1) because they related to services. See O’Carroll, 863 F.2d at 12-13. I believe that the case stands for the general proposition that negligence claims are preempted by § 1305 if they are “related to” “services”; and the court in Baugh evidently agreed. In Baugh, the court noted that the issue was whether § 1305 “preempts a state law action of negligence relating to services aboard a commercial aircraft.” Baugh, at 2. The court then concluded that since “O’Carroll ... is controlling, we find that it does.” Id. In support of such conclusion, the court asserted that “since Baugh alleges her injury occurred during a flight and was caused by a flight attendant in the course of employment, the negligence action arises out of the services afforded passengers” by the air carrier. Id. at 3.
After dispensing of O’Carroll and Baugh, the majority then addresses the cases which it finds to be persuasive. The majority begins by citing three cases8 which were wholly silent on the issue of preemption. It asserts that such silence indicates that the personal injury claims before those courts were not preempted by § 1305. One need not reflect at length to conclude that such an assertion, if adopted by this court, would set a dreadful precedent.9 The only thing that *509ought to be inferred from these cases is that if a party fails to raise the issue of preemption, the claims asserted against it cannot not be preempted. It is thus clear that the majority’s reliance on said cases is misplaced as they are inapposite.
In West, a ticket holder, who was denied a seat on an overbooked flight, sued Northwest Airlines for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Montana law. The Ninth Circuit, purporting to apply the reasoning in Morales, held that West’s claim for punitive damages under state contract and tort law was preempted by § 1305, but his claim for compensatory damages was not. West, at 151-52. The West majority opined that “the state contract and tort laws under which West seeks relief are within that range of statutes too tenuously connected to airline regulation to trigger preemption under the ADA, what the Morales court called ‘borderline questions.’ ” Id. Since the Morales court did not address where it would be appropriate to draw the line, the West majority determined that it should look to agency regulations for guidance. Id. The West majority then noted that “if Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.” Id. The court cited a regulation as expressly contemplating that an injured passenger may seek relief in court for being bumped from an overbooked flight. Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 250.9(b) (1990)). The court concluded that this option would be eviscerated if it were to hold that West’s claims were completely preempted. Id. at 152-53. I would choose not to follow West because of its misapplication of Morales. As the dissent in West noted, the court must first resort to the express language of the preemption statute and the Morales Court made clear that the “relating to” language is to have a very broad scope. Id. at 153; Morales, — U.S. at ---, 112 S.Ct. at 2036-37. The dissent then emphasized that the claim is thus preempted “unless we can say that West’s action to recover damages for his being bumped from the flight does not “relate to” airline services.” West, at 153. The West majority, however, pounced on the caveat at the end of Morales and baldly concluded that the claims asserted were so tenuous as to present a “borderline question.” Id. at 151. I fail to see how the West court was presented with a “borderline question.” 10 In any event, as will be explained below, we are certainly not presented with a “borderline question” in this case.
In Salley, state-law claims and a federal claim under § 1374 were brought based on the airline’s refusal to transport plaintiffs. The district court initially granted partial summary judgment, holding that the state-law claims were preempted under § 1305. Upon Salleys’ motion for reconsideration, however, the court held that such claims were not preempted on two grounds: 1) the Salleys would otherwise be left without a cause of action; and 2) the claims were not in conflict with any provision of the ADA. Salley, 723 F.Supp. at 1166. As I have noted above, the presumption against preemption of state-law remedies where no federal remedy exists arises only in the context of implied preemption. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1425; see also Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. at 2429. Since § 1305 clearly provides for express preemption, I do not address the possible lack of a cause of action in determining whether appellants’ state-law claims are preempted. The second ground relied upon in Salley has been expressly rejected in Morales. The Morales court held that “nothing in the language of § 1305(a)(1) suggests that its ‘relating to’ preemption is limited to inconsistent state regulation; and once again our ERISA cases have settled the matter: ‘The preemption provision ... displacéis] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA’s substantive requirements.’ ” Morales, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2038.
The final case upon which the majority relies is the Stewart case. In Stewart, the nose wheel of the aircraft deflated during flight causing a passenger to be jostled back and forth and allegedly suffer injuries. Said *510passenger brought state-law tort claims, asserting that American negligently maintained and operated the aircraft. Although the court did indeed hold that said claims were not preempted by § 1305, the majority fails to take notice of the reasoning underlying such holding; reasoning I find to be particularly persuasive. The Stewart court opined: “it is far from clear that, in the instant case, Plaintiffs claims relate to “services” within the meaning of § 1305. First, those cases which have held that a Plaintiffs claims were claims relating to “services” and therefore preempted by § 1305 all involved services provided by individual airline employees directly to passengers, such as ticketing, boarding, in-flight service, and the like.” Stewart, 776 F.Supp. at 1197 (emphasis added).11 The court then concluded that: “In the instant case, Plaintiffs claims are more like those arising out of an air crash than those considered in O’Cawoll and Smith. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant negligently provided such services as boarding, ticketing, and the like. Rather, he simply alleges that he was injured when the airplane malfunctioned during the course of his flight, and that Defendants’ negligent maintenance and operation was the legal and proximate cause of his injuries.” Id. at 1198.12
As noted above, Morales instructs us that claims “relate to” “services” if they have a “connection with” or “reference to” “services.” In our case, appellant brought a state law negligence claim, alleging that a Continental flight attendant dropped a bag from an overhead storage bin onto her head. In light of Morales and the aforementioned ordinary meaning ascribed to the term “services,” I fail to see how one can determine that such a claim does not have a “connection with” or “reference to” “services.” As in Baugh, the alleged injury here occurred during a flight and was caused by a flight attendant in the course of employment, such that the negligence action arises out of the services provided by the airline. Baugh, at 3. Furthermore, as noted above, the cases which have held that a plaintiffs claims were related to services and thus preempted all involved “services provided by individual airline employees directly to passengers, such as ticketing, boarding, in-flight service, and the like.” Stewart, 776 F.Supp. at 1197. If a negligence claim arising out of a flight attendant’s retrieval of a passenger’s bag does not “relate to” services, I cannot imagine what would.
Our last task is to address whether the negligence claim asserted by appellant, although related to services, affects airline services in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to be preempted by § 1305. Morales, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2040. The majority concluded, as did the Morales majority, that the facts before us do not present a borderline question. Although I agree with the majority that we are not presented with a borderline question, I believe that the facts before us take us to the opposite side of the border. The claim at issue directly affects airline services because it immediately arises from the allegedly inadequate provision of such services. Williams v. Express Airlines I, Inc., 825 F.Supp. 831, 833 (W.D.Tenn.1993). In addition, the claim has the potential either to increase the cost of providing such services or coerce airlines *511into discontinuing them.13 I also note that those cases14 which have held that a claim did not relate to services, or that such relation was too tenuous, involved claims which arose from allegedly negligent maintenance, operation or design of aircraft or airport facilities.15
I must address one final issue which has not been addressed in any reported case dealing with § 1305 preemption. Section 1371(q)(l) of the ADA, in pertinent part, provides: “No certificate shall be issued or remain in effect unless ... the air carrier ... complies with regulations or orders issued by the Board governing the filing and approval of policies of insurance ... which are conditioned to pay, within the amount of such insurance, amounts for which such ... am carrier may become liable for bodily injuries to or the death of any person ... resulting from the operation or maintenance of aircraft under such certificate.” 49 U.S.C.A.App. § 1371(q)(l) (West Pamph. 1993). Appellant contends that since § 1371(q)(l) of the ADA requires airlines to carry liability insurance, it would be nonsensical to conclude that Congress intended to preempt personal injury claims under § 1305(a)(1). I agree that in expounding a statute the court must consider the provisions of the whole law. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1555, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987). I disagree, however, that the aforementioned sections are conflicting. The United States Supreme Court has said: “[Wjhere Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). Section 1305(a)(1) refers to “rates, routes, or services,” while § 1371(q)(l) refers to bodily injury or death “resulting from the operation or maintenance of aircraft.” Had Congress intended to require liability insurance for bodily injury resulting from “services,” it presumably would have referred to “services” expressly in § 1371 as it did in § 1305. Likewise, had Congress intended to preempt state laws relating to the operation or maintenance of any air carrier, it presumably would have expressly done so in § 1305. Since Congress employed different language in the two sections, I would refrain from concluding that such language has the same meaning in each. Id. As did the Russello court, I do not ascribe this difference to a mere mistake in draftsmanship. Id.
Section 1305(a)(1) unambiguously provides for express preemption of state law claims “relating to” “services.” See Morales, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2037. As many courts have instructed, we must “take the intent of Congress ... to be that which its language clearly sets forth.” See, e.g., United States v. Evinger, 919 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir.1990) (citing Horton v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 352, 81 S.Ct. 1570, 1573, 6 L.Ed.2d 890 (1961)). I am thus compelled by both Morales and the rules of statutory construction to conclude, as did the *512trial court, that appellant’s state-law negligence claims are preempted.
I respectfully dissent.

. It should be noted the majority also recognizes that § 1305 provides for express preemption.

. In Morales, the dissent looked beyond the express language of § 1305 to determine the congressional intent. The majority here, apparently *507finding such approach persuasive, also chose to review the legislative history of the statute. However, in response to the dissent’s excursion, the Morales majority remarked that “legislative history need not confirm the details of changes in the law effected by statutory language before we will interpret that language according to its natural meaning.” Morales, - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2038.

. Baugh v. Trans World Airlines, No. 90-2074, slip op. (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 1990) (unpublished); Anderson v. USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49 (D.C.Cir.1987); Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir.1984); Smith v. America West Airlines, Inc., 1991 WL 296832 (S.D.Tex., Aug. 30, 1991), aff'd 4 F.3d 356 (5th Cir.1993); Von Anhalt v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 735 F.Supp. 1030 (S.D.Fla.1990); Williams v. Express Airlines I, Inc., 825 F.Supp. 831 (W.D.Tenn.1993); Lawal v. British Airways, PLC, 812 F.Supp. 713 (S.D.Tex.1992); Howard v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 793 F.Supp. 129 (S.D.Tex.1992).; Zachary v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 1991 WL 487289 (S.D.Tex., Mar. 22, 1991). In addressing Baugh, the majority contends that Fifth Circuit local rule 47.5 indicates that opinions go unpublished when the court determines they have no precedential value. This contention, although technically accurate, is quite misleading. Local Rule 47.5 provides that the "publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession” (Emphasis added.) Hence, it is clear that the Baugh court determined that its opinion was decided on the basis of "well-settled principles of law.”

. West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 995 F.2d 148 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1053, 127 L.Ed.2d 374 (1994); Stewart v. American Airlines, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 1194 (S.D.Tex.1991); Heller v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 1993 WL 330093 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 25, 1993); In re Air Disaster, 819 F.Supp. 1352 (E.D.Mich.1993); Butcher v. City of Houston, 813 F.Supp. 515 (S.D.Tex.1993); Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F.Supp. 318 (E.D.Mich.1993).

. The court in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 4 F.3d 350, 354 (5th Cir.1993), felt that preemption should not apply in a case such as the one before this Court. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Congress failed "to provide any federal remedy for persons injured by such conduct,” and recognized a narrow definition of services. See note 6.

. The majority also expresses concern that were we to preempt appellant’s state law claim, appellant (and others similarly situated) would be left with no legal remedy for her injuries. Unfortunately, it is clear that in determining whether a claim is preempted, this concern may only be addressed in the context of implied preemption. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1425.

. In O’Carroll, the Fifth Circuit held that § 1305 preempted a ticket holder's state-law negligence claims for alleged wrongful exclusion from a flight, as such claims related to services. See O'Carroll, 863 F.2d at 13. The Fifth Circuit subsequently followed this decision in Baugh, a case involving facts similar to ours. In Baugh, a passenger brought a state-law action of negligence, alleging that a flight attendant stomped on her foot. The case is discussed in further detail below.

. Duchesne v. American Airlines, Inc., 758 F.2d 27 (1st Cir.1985); Smith v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 728 F.Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y.1989); Plagianos v. American Airlines, Inc., 912 F.2d 57 (2nd Cir.1990).

. We were to adopt such a proposition, any case could be interpreted as indicating that any and all defenses not addressed by the court in its opinion are implicitly invalid. In effect, we would be penalizing Continental here, for the apparent oversight of the airlines' counsel in the cited cases.

. As the dissent in West noted, "an airline's boarding practices certainly come within the ambit of the "airline services” which it provides to its customers. We expressly recognized this in our original opinion.” Id. at 153.

. The Stewart court then cited O'Carroll, Smith, Anderson and Von Anhalt as examples of such cases. Id.

. The court observed that several courts have held that claims arising out of an "air crash” were not preempted. Id. (citing Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int’l Airport, 635 F.2d 67, 74 (2d Cir.1980); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, 734 F.Supp. 1425, 1428 (N.D.Ill.1990); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, 721 F.Supp. 1185, 1187 (D.Colo.1988)). Id. at 1198. Each of these courts relied on the § 1506 "savings clause” to conclude that the claims were not preempted. The Morales court, however, has since expressly rejected this argument in holding that Congress did not intend "to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a general savings clause.” Morales, - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2037; see also Baugh, at 4-5; O’Carroll, 863 F.2d at 13. Although we concur in the result in those cases, in light of Morales we would reach such result on different grounds. Apparently, each case involved claims arising out of maintenance and operation of the aircraft, rather than "services” directly provided to passengers by an airline employee. Therefore, as was decided in Stewart, the claims would not be preempted by § 1305(a)(1).

.The court in Hodges states that the Airline Deregulation Act was concerned solely with economics and not with safety deregulation citing the Civil Aeronautics Board's conclusion that "preemption extends to all of the economic factors that go into the provision of the quid pro quo for passenger’s [sic] fare, including flight frequency and timing, liability limits, reservation and hoarding practices, insurance, smoking rules, meal service, entertainment, [and] bonding and corporate financing.” Hodges, 4 F.3d at 354-55. Then the court stated that enforcement of state tort remedies would not have the forbidden significant effect on airline service. Id. at 355. This is a contradiction within itself since a large verdict from a state cause of action can definitely affect the cost of services furnished by the airlines.

. Other than West, Heller and Margolis, which we have found to be unpersuasive for the aforementioned reasons.

. Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 294-95 (11th Cir.1993). (design defect claims unrelated to airline rates, routes or services and thus not preempted); In re Air Disaster, 819 F.Supp. 1352, 1363 (E.D.Mich.1993) (negligence claims against airline and pilot arising out of plane crash related to airline services in too tenuous a manner to warrant preemption); Butcher v. City of Houston, 813 F.Supp. 515, 518 (S.D.Tex.1993) ("services” does not contemplate maintenance of one’s building or terminal space).