Court Opinion

ID: 9368956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 17:02:28.304512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:11.927162
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RODERICK MUMFORD,                       §
                                        §     No. 49, 2021
               Defendant Below,         §
               Appellant,               §     Court Below—Superior Court
                                        §     of the State of Delaware
               v.                       §
                                        §     Cr. ID No: 1608020942A (S)
STATE OF DELAWARE,                      §
                                        §
               Appellees.               §

                            Submitted: January 11, 2023
                            Decided:   February 7, 2023

Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, AND TRAYNOR, Justices.

                                      ORDER

     This 7th day of February, 2023, after consideration of the parties’ briefs and

the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

     (1)       Roderick Mumford was convicted of drug dealing, money laundering,

and related charges in 2017 and sentenced to ten years of incarceration at Level V

for the lead drug-dealing charge.

      (2)      On direct appeal, we summarized the facts underlying Mumford’s

convictions:

      Mumford was seen leaving a suspected “stash house,” and arrested by
      the police. During searches of both that house and a second house
      connected to Mumford, the police found large quantities of illegal
      drugs, supporting an inference that Mumford had an intent to deal. The
      police also found over $1,000 in cash in the first house and keys to two
      safety deposit boxes in the second house. The boxes, jointly owned
      by Mumford and others, contained over $100,000 in cash.
       Mumford was indicted for a slew of drug-related offenses in addition
       to money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering.1

       (3)     In December 2017, while his direct appeal was pending, Mumford filed

a Motion for Modification of Sentence. Mumford argued that the ten-year sentence

for the Tier 4 drug-dealing charge far exceeded the two to five year SENTAC

guideline range, even factoring in a 25% increase for aggravating circumstances.2

Mumford contended that his sentence should be reduced to six years and three

months, reflecting a 25% increase over the high range—five years—of the SENTAC

guidelines.3 The Superior Court deferred its decision on Mumford’s Rule 35(b)

motion pending this Court’s decision on Mumford’s direct appeal.4 By order dated

October 17, 2018, we affirmed Mumford’s convictions.

1
  Mumford v. State, 196 A.3d 412, 2018 WL 5096074 at *1 (Del. Oct. 17, 2018) (TABLE).
2
  For the proposition that the existence of aggravating factors justified only a 25% increase of the
SENTAC presumptive sentence, Mumford quotes an introductory comment from the SENTAC
Benchbook 2017: “Aggravating and mitigating factors are to be used to explain a sentence
imposed either above or below the presumptive sentence. Other factors, which do not appear on
this list, may be utilized at the discretion of the sentencing judge. Although the increased or
decreased penalties for most aggravating/mitigating circumstances are not specified, the “up to
25%” increase/decrease guide should be utilized whenever suitable.” App. to Opening Br. A33–
34. But this “up to 25% increase/decrease guide” appears to refer to SENTAC Statement of Policy
No. 25 found at page 29 of the 2017 Benchbook, which cabins the “25% increase/decrease guide”
to non-violent felonies. See SENTAC—Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission
Benchbook              2017,           available          at            https://cjc.delaware.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/61/2017/06/2017_Benchbook_Revision_RTK121516LastPDF-min.pdf. In
2017, Drug Dealing in a Tier 4 Quantity, the lead charge on which Mumford was sentenced, was
classified as a Class B violent felony. And, in any event, the SENTAC guidelines are not binding
on the Superior Court. See Turner v. State, 820 A.2d 373, 2007 WL 187802, at *1 (Del. March 4,
2003) (TABLE).
3
  Id.
4
  Although the dockets of this Court and the Superior Court do not indicate that either court stayed
consideration of Mumford’s motion, the Superior Court’s January 22, 2021 letter order denying
the motion notes that the motion was filed “while the matter was pending before the Supreme
                                                 2
       (4)    Mumford took no action regarding his motion in the two years

following this Court’s resolution of his direct appeal. Then, in December 2020,

Mumford filed a Supplemental Motion for Reduction of Sentence, contending that,

because he contracted COVID-19 while incarcerated, resulting in a chronic heart

condition for which he needs lifelong medical care, “he is unable to obtain regular

monitoring by medical professionals” while incarcerated.5 In his supplemental

motion, Mumford also requested that a requirement of his release—completion of

the Key-Crest continuum—be removed from the sentence because the DOC no

longer offers that program.6 Mumford’s supplemental motion was accompanied by

a letter from his counsel, alerting the court to the pendency of Mumford’s original

motion, which “had already been timely filed . . . , but not ruled upon . . . .” 7

       (5)    In a January 22, 2021 order, after first noting that Mumford had not

promptly asked the court to decide his motion after his direct appeal was decided in

October 2018—a failure that had resulted in inaction by the court, which understood

Mumford to have abandoned the motion—the Superior Court denied the motion for

two reasons. First, the court observed that it had sentenced Mumford with the

benefit of a presentence investigation containing Mumford’s criminal history,

Court,” and that, therefore, while the appeal was pending the Superior Court “[did] not have
jurisdiction to entertain such a request.” Opening Br. Ex. A.
5
  App. to Opening Br. at A42.
6
  Id. at A43.
7
  State v. Mumford, No. 1608020942A (Del. Super. Ct.) D.I. 89.
                                             3
employment history, and substance-abuse history and “remain[ed] satisfied that the

sentence imposed is reasonable and appropriate.”8 Secondly, the court rejected

Mumford’s COVID-related supplemental motion “absent documentation from the

Department of Correction advising they are unable to provide for Mr. Mumford’s

medical needs.”9 Referring to press releases issued by the Department of Correction,

the court expressed satisfaction with the Department’s response to “the COVID-19

situation.”10 The court also directed Mumford’s attention to the statutory provisions

and remedies set forth in 11 Del. C. §§ 4217 and 4221 relating to early release and

sentence modifications necessitated by an inmate’s serious illness or infirmity.

       (6)    Mumford now raises two issues on appeal. He first argues that the

Superior Court’s criticism of his failure to promptly request action on his motion

after his direct appeal was decided in 2018 and its consequent belief that Mumford

had abandoned his motion amounted to the improper imposition of a procedural

requirement—a request for judicial action—that simply does not exist.              In

Mumford’s eyes, the Superior Court’s denial of his motion was grounded in a

determination that the motion had been abandoned, and this determination was an

abuse of discretion. Mumford’s second contention is that “[t]he Court abused its

discretion by relying on Department of Correction press releases to determine Mr.

8
  Opening Br. Ex. A.
9
  Id.
10
   Id.
                                         4
Mumford’s post-COVID 19 medical conditions were being adequately addressed

and treated because precautions for preventing COVID-19 were in place.”11

       (7)    This Court reviews a denial of a request for modification of sentence

for abuse of discretion.12 This Court has held that “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs

when a court has exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances or so

ignored recognized rules of law or practice to produce injustice.”13 “This Court will

not interfere with the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for reduction of sentence

unless it is shown that the sentence imposed was beyond the maximum authorized

by law or was the result of an abuse of discretion by the sentencing judge.”14

       (8)    Mumford’s first argument—that the Superior Court improperly denied

his original motion as abandoned because he did nothing to request consideration of

the motion after his direct appeal was resolved—misapprehends the court’s ruling.

The sum total of the Superior Court’s comments on this issue is as follows:

             This case was appealed to the Supreme Court on October 20,
       2017. [Counsel] filed the Motion for Reduction of Sentence while the
       matter was pending before the Supreme Court. While an appeal is
       pending this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain such a request.
       The file and complete record have been transferred to the Supreme
       Court. Once the appeal is decided, the defendant or his/her attorney
       must submit a request otherwise, the request is considered to be

11
   Opening Br. at 3.
12
   State v. Lewis, 797 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Del. 2002).
13
   Harper v. State, 970 A.2d 199, 201 (Del. 2009) (quoting Culp v. State, 766 A.2d 486, 489 (Del.
2001)).
14
   Hewett v. State, 2014 WL 5020251, at *1 (Del. Oct. 7, 2014) (citing Conover v. State, 2005 WL
583746 (Del. Mar. 10, 2005)).
                                               5
         abandoned. In this case, [counsel] did not submit such a request.
         Therefore, it was considered to be abandoned.15

This statement, in our view, was nothing more than the Superior Court’s explanation

of why the motion had not been adjudicated in the two-plus years following

Mumford’s unsuccessful direct appeal. That it did not constitute the grounds for the

court’s denial of Mumford’s motion is confirmed by the Superior Court’s ensuing

consideration of the motion on its merits. We therefore reject Mumford’s contention

that the Superior Court abused its discretion by improperly placing an unjustified

procedural obstacle in his way and consequently denying his motion as abandoned.

         (9)    Mumford’s second argument—that the Superior Court abused its

discretion when it relied on Department of Correction press releases in support of its

denial of Mumford’s supplemental motion for the modification of his sentence on

medical grounds—is likewise unavailing.

         (10) First and foremost, we note that the Superior Court did not deny

Mumford’s supplemental motion on the basis of the press releases. Instead, the

principal reason for the court’s decision was the absence of “documentation from

the Department of Correction advising they are unable to provide for Mr. Mumford’s

medical needs[.]”16 By requesting this documentation, the court paid proper heed to

15
     Opening Br. Ex. A.
16
     Id.
                                          6
the statutory procedure for the modification of the sentence of an inmate whose

serious illness or infirmity renders further incarceration inappropriate.17

       (11) The court’s reluctance to act absent appropriate documentation is

understandable, moreover, given that Mumford himself did not allege with any

particularity in his supplemental motion that the Department was unable to meet his

medical needs. Instead, he merely alleged that he “has mostly recovered from

COVID-19[] . . . [but] now has a chronic heart condition.”18 This allegation, with

nothing more, does not suffice to require a sentence modification.

       (12) We are satisfied that the Superior Court thoughtfully considered

Mumford’s contentions regarding the length of his sentence, placing appropriate

emphasis on the facts reported in the presentence investigation. Likewise, we

conclude that the court fairly considered Mumford’s medical concerns and the

absence of any indication that Mumford’s medical needs were not being met.

Against this backdrop, we will not fault the court for its reference to press releases

describing the Department of Correction’s COVID-19 response, much less find it to

be an abuse of discretion.

17
   See 11 Del. C. § 4217 (authorizing a trial court to retain jurisdiction to modify a sentence for
good cause under certain circumstances, including the “serious medical illness or infirmity of the
offender”); see also 11 Del. C. § 4221 (addressing “[m]odification, deferral, suspension or
reduction of sentence for serious physical illness, injury or infirmity”).
18
   Opening Br. at 8.
                                                7
     NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

                                     BY THE COURT:

                                     /s/ Gary F. Traynor
                                           Justice

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