Court Opinion

ID: 9897713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:24:06.36285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:42.213847
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Ortiz and Friedman
UNPUBLISHED

              BRIAN KENNETH ROBINSON, II
                                                                               MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.         Record No. 1018-22-1                                      PER CURIAM
                                                                                 OCTOBER 24, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                             FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
                                               James C. Lewis, Judge

                               (Scott F. Hallauer; Hallauer Law Firm, on brief), for appellant.
                               Appellant submitting on brief.

                               (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Leah A. Darron, Senior
                               Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee
                               submitting on brief.

                     Brian Kenneth Robinson, II, appeals the circuit court’s judgment revoking his previously

              suspended sentence and imposing five years’ active incarceration. He contends that the circuit court

              abused its sentencing discretion because the five-year active sentence was excessive and did not

              account for his mitigating evidence. Both parties waived oral argument. Code § 17.1‑403(ii).

              Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

                                                         BACKGROUND

                     On October 23, 1996, the circuit court convicted Robinson of first-degree murder upon

              his guilty plea. Consistent with a written plea agreement, on January 7, 1997, the circuit court

              sentenced him to 40 years’ incarceration with 17 years suspended conditioned on successfully

              completing supervised probation and paying court costs. On November 22, 2018, Robinson’s

              probation officer reported that he was arrested for driving while intoxicated and had tested

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
positive for using marijuana and cocaine. In addenda, the probation officer reported that

Robinson had an additional pending charge for reckless driving and had tested positive for

marijuana six more times. On July 17, 2019, the circuit court found Robinson in violation of the

terms of his suspension, revoked and resuspended all but 30 days of his previously suspended

sentence, and returned him to supervised probation.

       On November 4, 2021, Robinson was convicted of possessing a firearm after being

convicted of a non-violent felony and sentenced to five years’ incarceration with one year and

four months suspended. Robinson’s probation officer reported the conviction to the circuit court,

which issued a show cause capias on March 4, 2022. Robinson was arrested on the capias on

March 8, 2022.

       At the revocation hearing, Robinson stipulated that he had violated the terms of his

probation and the circuit court found him in violation. During sentencing, the circuit court

considered the discretionary probation violation sentencing guidelines, which recommended

imposing between six months and one year and six months’ incarceration. Additionally,

Robinson proffered that he was only 17 years old when the circuit court convicted him of

first-degree murder and, since then, he had been working as a “Class A truck driver.” Robinson

argued that he had “taken responsibility for his actions” and asked the circuit court to impose an

active sentence within the sentencing guidelines’ recommended range.

       The circuit court found that Robinson’s firearm conviction demonstrated that he

remained a “danger to the community.” Accordingly, the circuit court revoked and resuspended

all but five years of Robinson’s previously suspended sentence. Robinson appeals.

                                           ANALYSIS

       “On appeal, ‘[w]e “view the evidence received at [a] revocation hearing in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, including all reasonable and legitimate

                                               -2-
inferences that may properly be drawn from it.”’” Green v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 69, 76

(2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 266, 274 (2018)).

“‘[T]he trial court’s “findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear

showing of abuse of discretion.”’” Id. (quoting Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535

(2013)).

       After suspending a sentence, a trial court “may revoke the suspension of sentence for any

cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation period, or within the

period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). “If the court, after hearing, finds

good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension, then the court may

revoke the suspension and impose a sentence in accordance with the provisions of § 19.2-306.1.”

Code § 19.2-306(C). Robinson does not challenge the circuit court’s revocation of his previously

suspended sentence. Rather, he contends that the circuit court abused its sentencing discretion

by imposing five years’ active incarceration. He emphasizes that the five-year sentence

exceeded the period of incarceration recommended under the discretionary probation violation

sentencing guidelines, as well as the active sentence he received for his firearm conviction.

Additionally, Robinson contends that the circuit court failed to consider that he “expressed

remorse,” “accepted responsibility” for the violation, and was gainfully employed, which he

asserts demonstrates that his sentence was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

       As relevant here, Code § 19.2-306.1(B) provides that “[i]f the court finds the basis of a

violation of the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence or probation is that the defendant

was convicted of a criminal offense that was committed after the date of the suspension, . . . then

the court may revoke the suspension and impose or resuspend any or all of that period previously

suspended.” The record demonstrates that Robinson incurred a new criminal conviction during

the suspension period. Thus, it was within the circuit court’s discretion to “impose or resuspend

                                                -3-
any or all” of the previously suspended sentence. Id. It was equally within the circuit court’s

purview to weigh any mitigating factors appellant presented, such as his employment and

expression of remorse. See Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000). The circuit

court was not obligated, however, to explain the specific weight it afforded to each piece of

evidence, as Robinson implies. Indeed, “[a]bsent a statutory requirement to do so, ‘a trial court

is not required to give findings of fact and conclusions of law.’” Bowman v. Commonwealth,

290 Va. 492, 500 n.8 (2015) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 627 (1982)).

        The record establishes that while on probation for first-degree murder, Robinson incurred

yet another criminal conviction for a violent offense by unlawfully possessing a firearm. “The

statutes dealing with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give the trial court

valuable tools to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, suspension of all or part

of a sentence, and/or restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 737, 740 (2007).

Robinson’s conduct supports the circuit court’s finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation.

“When coupled with a suspended sentence, probation represents ‘an act of grace on the part of the

Commonwealth to one who has been convicted and sentenced to a term of confinement.’” Hunter

v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 582, 587 (2010) (quoting Price v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App.

443, 448 (2008)). Robinson disregarded the “grace” that had been extended to him by continuing to

commit offenses.

        To the extent Robinson contends that his sentence was an abuse of discretion because it

exceeded the probation sentencing guidelines’ recommended range, it is well-established that

those sentencing guidelines “are discretionary, rather than mandatory.” West v. Dir., Dep’t of

Corrs., 273 Va. 56, 65 (2007). “Accordingly, a circuit court’s failure to follow the guidelines is

‘not . . . reviewable on appeal.’” Fazili v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 239, 248-49 (2019)

(alteration in original) (quoting Code § 19.2-298.01(F)). Similarly, to the extent Robinson’s

                                                 -4-
argument challenges the proportionality of his sentence, this Court declines to engage in a

proportionality review in cases that do not involve life sentences without the possibility of

parole. Cole v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 642, 654 (2011). We noted in Cole that the United

States Supreme Court “has never found a non-life ‘sentence for a term of years within the limits

authorized by statute to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual punishment’ in violation of the Eighth

Amendment.” Id. at 653 (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372 (1982) (per curiam)). Cf.

Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 243 (2016) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to

133-year active sentence because the sentence was imposed for “eighteen separate crimes”).

Accordingly, we decline to conduct a proportionality review in this case. Cole, 58 Va. App. at

653.

       “For probation to have a deterrent effect on recidivism, real consequences must follow a

probationer’s willful violation of the conditions of probation.” Price, 51 Va. App. at 449. Upon

review of the record in this case, we conclude that the sentence the circuit court imposed was a

proper exercise of judicial discretion. See Brittle v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 505, 520 (2009)

(affirming the court’s imposition of a five-year sentence with three years suspended for third offense

larceny).

                                          CONCLUSION

       For the above reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

                                                -5-