Court Opinion

ID: 9549163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:14:19.263796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:56.256173
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice
(concurring in result):
I am able to concur only in the result in this case because I hold a different view of the appropriate role and function of the writ of habeas corpus in our criminal justice system. That view, however, does not in this case compel me to a result different on the merits from that reached in the plurality decision.
Nevertheless, I think it appropriate to set forth my view on one crucial point raised by appellant Andrews. Andrews argues that United States Supreme Court decisions decided subsequent to our affirmance of the *826sentence of execution require the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Andrews contends, inter alia, that the intervening opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), requires the issuance of a writ and the setting aside of the sentence of execution. Andrews states that it has never been alleged or proved that he personally took a life or intended to take a life, and he argues that Lockett stands for the proposition that capital punishment in such circumstances is unconstitutionally cruel and disproportionate to the crime and that the sentence of death must therefore be set aside. It is true that the evidence in this case does not sustain a finding that Andrews himself actually took a life. However, the holding of Lockett does not in fact sustain the major premise of appellant’s argument. Justice White’s opinion, which represents only his views, is to the effect that one must, in order to be subject to the death penalty, have personally intended that a murder be committed even though he himself did not take a life.
I agree with the proposition stated by Justice White that “it violates the Eighth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] to impose the penalty of death without a finding that the defendant possessed a purpose to cause the death of the victim.” 438 U.S. at 624, 98 S.Ct. at 2983. I also believe that Article I, § 9 of the Utah Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, imposes the same requirement; and so does the Utah criminal code, see § 76-5-202, U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
Human experience is simply rife with instances, especially with young people, where group activities evolve into unlawful conduct and one or more persons go beyond the intention of other members of the group and commit an act which cannot and should not be attributed to every person in the group.
Capital punishment simply should not be imposed on the basis of a constructive intent or mens rea. This does not mean that a person could not be subjected to capital punishment for engaging in a criminal conspiracy to intentionally take the life of another or for aiding or abetting such an endeavor, as long as the jury is instructed that a person not directly responsible for the actual killing must have had the purpose and intention that another be killed and the evidence supports that proposition. Indeed, it should be noted that murder in the first degree is defined by § 76-5-202 as a criminal homicide in which “the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another . . . In short, an imputed mens rea is insufficient under the Utah statute, and in my view under the Utah and the United States Constitutions, to support capital punishment.
In the instant case, however, the trial judge instructed the jury with great care that the death penalty could be imposed only if the jury found that each defendant personally intended that one or more of the victims be killed. In my view the evidence in this case amply supports the implied jury finding that the appellant did in fact harbor such an intention.