Court Opinion

ID: 9566978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:46:05.145233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:01.925892
License: Public Domain

VAN DYKE, P. J.
I dissent.
I think we do not reach the question of the liability of Cardinal and Del Pero-Mondon for the condition of the floor of the produce market in so far as liability is predicated upon the leases and the business relations set up among the lessees. I think the plaintiff failed to prove a sufficient case of negligence on the part of anyone. The liability of a possessor of land—and herein I refer to Cardinal, Del Pero-Mondon and Rose—for bodily harm caused to business visitors, can be well stated by quoting from Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 343:
*840“A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them, and . . . invites or permits them to enter or remain without exercising reasonable care to make the condition reasonably safe, or to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm. ...”
Even though it is generally a question of fact as to whether negligence has been made out in cases such as this, nevertheless there must be a factual showing by the plaintiff from which the jury can reasonably infer that the conditions of liability existed. Putting it another way, if the proof extends no further than to show slipping upon a foreign matter on the floor a prima facie case of land possessor liability to invitees has not been made out. In such a case there is nothing to go to the jury.
Under the evidence here the following was shown: Appellant, having shopped at the meat counter and in the grocery, walked into the produce area and, walking normally, went directly to the south part of that area where carrots were displayed. There she picked up a bunch of carrots; then, wanting to obtain a bag in which to carry them, she put the carrots down and walked toward the bag rack. On the way there she slipped and fell. She said that the time she had been in the produce area was a matter of a few seconds. A Doctor Riggs was in the produce area for a minute or two before he saw appellant fall. He saw nothing on the floor before the fall. The only other witness of the accident was Rose, who was called under section 2055 and testified that he had swept the floor about 4 o’clock, some 20 or 30 minutes before the accident, and that the floor was clean after sweeping and he saw nothing on it before appellant fell. There were a number of shoppers in the area. Rose said that it was neither a slack period nor a rush period, but he and his clerks were busy checking out purchases and carrying parcels to parked cars. All three witnesses testified that the only thing that they found on the floor after the appellant slipped was a skid mark, made apparently by her left heel, which was about 6 to 10 inches long and a quarter of an inch wide. On her heel there was a small piece of vegetable matter about the size of a quarter of a dollar.
*841While “the exact time the condition must exist before it should, in the exercise of reasonable care, have been discovered and remedied, cannot be fixed, because, obviously, it varies according to the circumstances” and while “a person operating a grocery and vegetable store in the exercise of ordinary care must exercise a more vigilant outlook than the operator of some other types of business where the danger of things falling to the floor is not so obvious” (Louie v. Hagstrom’s Food Stores, Inc., 81 Cal.App.2d 601, 608 [184 P.2d 708]), nevertheless we are dealing with a lapse of time long enough to afford a reasonable inference that within that time the possessor ought to have discovered its presence. Of course, while this interval of time may be proved by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence like any other fact to be proved, nevertheless there must be some proof of a lapse of time before a jury has anything upon which to base an inference that negligence in failing to discover occurred. (There is in this case no proof of actual knowledge and nothing from which actual knowledge could be inferred.) On this question of the interval of time I think the ease of Hale v. Safeway Stores, Inc., cited in the majority opinion, goes as far as it is possible to go in submitting to a jury a set of facts as legally affording basis for an inference. But there was in that case at least definite proof of an interval of time, short though it was, and further circumstances, from which it could be inferred that a longer interval of time had elapsed after the vegetable matter had been dropped on the floor.
In this case plaintiff proved nothing more than that she slipped on foreign matter and fell. On what then can a trier of fact base an inference of any considerable lapse of time at all? The last customer ahead of appellant may have dropped it. Seconds only may have passed before appellant fell. I think there is nothing affording ground for the trier of fact to embark upon the inquiry as to whether or not a sufficient time had elapsed to support an inference of negligence. I know of no case where proof such as was offered in the case has been declared sufficient to sustain a verdict.
While the briefs on appeal herein have been confined mainly to a discussion of the liability of Cardinal and Del Pero-Mondon if Rose was liable, nevertheless the motions for non-suit were also grounded upon want of proof of negligence and therefore, of course, this court cannot reverse judgments based upon orders of nonsuit unless negligence was shown.
*842I think the appellant failed to make a case for the jury against any of the defendants and, therefore, I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 7, 1958, and the opinion and judgment were modified to read as printed above. Van Dyke, P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondents’ petitions for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied February 5, 1958. Spence, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.