Court Opinion

ID: 9784761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:53:20.575598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:58.765724
License: Public Domain

REIF, J.,
dissenting,
1 1 I do not find the support alimony provision to suffer from either patent or latent ambiguity, nor is it "silent as to the parties' intent vis-a-vis the law that applies to them [ie., statutory termination of alimony]." Dickason v. Dickason, 1980 OK 24, ¶ 10, 607 P.2d 674, 677 (footnote omitted). The express language of the support alimony provision reflects that the parties considered and addressed in detail the cireumstances under which termination would and would not occur. In specifying the cireumstances for termination and non-termination, the parties reflected a clear intent that support alimony would terminate in those cireumstances alone and no others. Significantly, they affirmatively chose one of the statutory grounds-death. By specifying and limiting the circumstances for termination, I believe the parties expressly exercised their power to modify applicable law by contract, and effectively excluded remarriage as a ground for termination, even though they did not specifically mention remarriage. Id. at ¶ 10, 607 P.2d at 677.
{2 It is well settled that "mere ambiguity will not affect a judgment's validity, unless none of its terms is susceptible to construction which will make it conformable to law." Jackson v. Jackson, 2002 OK 25, ¶ 18, 45 P.3d 418, 428 (citation omitted). "An unclear judgment should be construed so as to carry out its evident purport and intent, rather than defeat it, and a court should consider the situation to which it was applied and the purpose sought to be accomplished." Id.
13 I would reverse the denial of Wife's motion for new trial and remand with directions to enforce the payment of support *967alimony in accordance with the provisions in the decree.