Court Opinion

ID: 9850506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:58:26.528333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:38.315860
License: Public Domain

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
(concurring). I join in that portion of the majority's opinion relying on State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). I agree with the majority's conclusion that "Moats was denied his constitutional rights when the trial court prohibited introduction of prior sexual assaults perpetrated upon B.J.C. for the limited purpose of establishing an alternative source for her sexual knowledge." Majority op. at 103.
Because I conclude that the majority erred when it holds that an unconstitutionally obtained confession constituted, in itself, sufficient evidence to bind the defendant over for trial, I am obliged to disagree with that portion of the opinion and, therefore, can only concur in the mandate to reverse and remand for trial.
While I agree for practical purposes that an unconstitutionally obtained confession is admissible at a preliminary examination, I do not agree that it alone may constitute sufficient evidence to bind a defendant over for trial.1 The majority asserts that, if a defendant is *116bound over for trial based solely on evidence which would be inadmissible at trial, the purpose of a preliminary examination is not adversely affected.
•The purpose of a preliminary examination is to protect the defendant from hasty, improvident or malicious prosecution and to discover whether there is a substantial basis for bringing the prosecution and further denying the defendant his right to liberty. Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 189 N.W. 539 (1922). Allowing a prosecution to proceed based solely on evidence which would not be admissible at trial defeats the purpose of having judicial intervention at this stage of the criminal proceeding.
The majority justifies its holding by relying on sec. 971.31(5)(b), Stats., and on federal grand jury and federal preliminary examination cases. Section 971.31(5)(b) provides that objections to the constitutionality of evidence shall not be made until after the preliminary examination. While sec. 971.31(5)(b) provides support for the majority's determination that a confession obtained in violation of the constitution is admissible at the preliminary examination, this statute does not address the sufficiency of the evidence to bind a defendant over for trial. In addition, the majority asserts that, because tainted evidence suffices to indict a defendant at the federal level, therefore tainted evidence is sufficient to bind over a defendant charged with a felony in Wisconsin. While the federal grand jury, federal preliminary examination, and Wisconsin's preliminary examination all serve a pretrial screening function, they are not equivalents. Few procedural safeguards apply to grand jury proceedings. See Alexander and Portman, Grand *117Jury Indictment Versus Prosecution by Information—An Equal Protection-Due Process Issue, 25 Hastings L.J. 997 (1974). The grand jury is a secret proceeding of lay persons, with no presiding magistrate, where even the prosecutor may be excluded. Only the prosecutor is available to provide legal advice to the grand jurors should they request it. Persons subsequently charged do not have the right to have counsel present at a grand jury proceeding. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976). They do not have the right to be present or the right to cross-examine witnesses at a grand jury proceeding, nor do they have the right to present any evidence.
To the contrary, in Wisconsin, a defendant has a statutory right to a preliminary examination. See sec. 970.03, Stats., and State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984). A magistrate must preside over the preliminary examination and is available to resolve evidentiary issues. Defendants have the right to cross-examine witnesses and to present exculpatory evidence at the preliminary examination. Section 970.03(5), Stats. Defendants have a right to counsel at a preliminary hearing because the preliminary hearing is a "critical stage." Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970). (Chief Justice Burger noted in his dissent that it was anomalous to provide counsel at a preliminary hearing, but not at a grand jury indictment.) None of these important rights inure to persons charged by a grand jury.
Evidentiary requirements to establish probable cause at grand jury proceedings and federal preliminary examinations are relaxed when compared with Wisconsin's preliminary examination. The rules of evidence do not apply to grand jury proceedings. See Rule 911.01(4)(b), Stats., and Fed R. Evid 1101(d)(2) (rules of evidence other than with respect to privileges do not *118apply to grand jury proceedings); see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (upholding indictment founded solely on hearsay); cf. United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 80 (1967). A grand jury indictment may indeed be founded solely on hearsay. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). The probable cause finding at a federal preliminary examination may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part. Rule 5.1 Fed. R. Crim. Proc. (evidentiary standards at the preliminary examination are relaxed in order to decrease pressure upon United States Attorneys to abandon the preliminary examination in favor of the grand jury indictment). See Moore's Federal Practice, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5.1, p. 34 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has refused to extend constitutional exclusionary rules to grand jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (upholding validity of indictment based on evidence obtained as a result of illegal search and seizure which would have been excluded from trial). The sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury is not reviewable. Costello, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
In contrast, the rules of evidence govern Wisconsin's preliminary examination. Mitchell v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 325, 267 N.W.2d 349 (1978). Hearsay is not even admissible at the preliminary hearing. Courts reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence presented at a preliminary examination make an independent determination of whether the probable-cause standard has been met. State v. Williams, 104 Wis. 2d 15, 22, 310 N.W.2d 601 (1981).
This court has candidly stated that, on similar evidence, probable cause may be easier to find in a grand jury proceeding than in a preliminary examination. *119State ex rel. Welch v. Waukesha Co. Cir. Court, 52 Wis. 2d 221, 225, 189 N.W.2d 417 (1971). In recognition of this difference, in 1979 the Wisconsin legislature provided that defendants were entitled to a preliminary hearing even if already indicted by a grand jury.2 This in itself demonstrates that the legislature does not view these pretrial procedures as being duplicative or identical in terms of the rights afforded to a defendant. Given the significant differences between the federal grand jury and preliminary examination and Wisconsin's preliminary examination, I disagree with the majority that the federal cases upon which they rely are instructive, let alone determinative, on an issue concerning procedural safeguards and the sufficiency of the evidence at Wisconsin's preliminary examination.
Even though unconstitutional evidence may be admissible at the preliminary examination, tainted evidence alone is insufficient to constitute probable cause for binding a defendant over for trial. The majority suggests that, because in State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983), a divided court concluded that a misdemeanor criminal complaint can be based upon unconstitutionally obtained evidence, a felony defendant should likewise be bound over for trial based *120solely on unconstitutionally obtained evidence. This conclusion renders the preliminary examination meaningless by equating the probable-cause standard required to bind a defendant over for trial with the probable-cause standard required for issuance of a criminal complaint. Relying exclusively upon evidence which cannot be used at trial does not satisfy the purpose of the preliminary examination. Courts require the threshold showing of probable cause in order to save the defendant from the humiliation and anxiety involved in an unwarranted public prosecution and to discover whether there are substantial grounds upon which a prosecution may be based.3 In addition, requiring a showing of probable cause provides a check on the prosecutor to ensure that public money is being spent wisely and not being wasted on litigation where there is insubstantial evidence. The majority states that it would be ethically suspect for a prosecutor to use a tainted confession at a preliminary examination when that was the only evidence available for trial. This leaves the determination of when a defendant should be bound over for trial within the discretion of the prosecutor. To the contrary, it is for the courts to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to bind a defendant over for trial. If, at the preliminary examina*121tion, a prosecutor presents only evidence which would be inadmissible at trial, quite simply, there should be no trial.
The majority asserts that defects in evidence are properly remedied at trial. However, due to the propensity to use plea bargaining as a substitute for the criminal trial, it is naive to presume that defendants will always receive these procedural protections. See Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 Mich. L.R. 463 (1980). Furthermore, the preliminary examination is mandated to protect the defendant before trial. I therefore conclude that a judicial magistrate cannot reasonably find probable cause or conclude that a defendant should be bound over for trial where no evidence is presented at the preliminary examination which could be introduced at trial. Because the reasoning of the majority completely subverts the fundamental purpose of the preliminary examination, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that there was a legally valid bindover. I do, however, agree with the majority's ultimate decision to reverse and remand on the basis of the rationale of State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990), and, therefore, I concur in the mandate.
I am authorized to state that Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson joins in this concurrence.

 recognize that a presiding judge will not know whether a confession was obtained in violation of the constitution until after that issue has been determined at a suppression hearing. If, after a suppression hearing has been held, a confession is deter*116mined to be unconstitutional, then an appropriate and fair procedure should require the arraignment judge to make an independent determination of whether or not probable cause exists to bind the defendant over for trial.

Chapter 291, Laws of 1979, created sec. 968.06, Stats., which provides:
Indictment by grand jury. Upon indictment by a grand jury a complaint shall be issued, as provided by s. 968.02, upon the person named in the indictment and the person shall be entitled to a preliminary hearing under s. 970.03, and all proceedings thereafter shall be the same as if the person had been initially charged under s. 958.02 and had not been indicted by a grand jury.
See also Emerson and Ames, The Role of the Grand Jury and the Preliminary Hearing in Pretrial Screening, National Institute of Justice, p. 8 (1984).

Because I decide that this case is resolved on the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, it is unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the defendant has been denied a liberty interest without due process because he has been bound over for trial on insufficient evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (defendant denied due process if conviction based on insufficient evidence); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (the right to due process is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee); and Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (due process historically provided protection against unjustified intrusions on personal security).