Court Opinion

ID: 9625194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:30:50.531725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:02.657695
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority opinion in this case. It holds the word “receiving” in clause 10 of the will is so indefinite and uncertain as to render the entire clause ambigious and void. No such contention was advanced by either party and the case was not tried in the lower court or briefed in this court on such a theory. All parties to this action assumed that the clause is valid and applied to the legacy of each child and the children of the deceased daughter up to $30,000, but they disagreed as to whether it applied to the residue or remainder in excess of $30,000.
Furthermore, I cannot agree that the word “receiving” is ambiguous. It is not a little-used scientific word nor is it one that has several possible meanings in normal, customary usage. Rather, the word “receiving” is a common English word constantly used by English-speaking peoples everywhere. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “receive” as “to take into possession and control; accept custody, of.” The Century Dictionary defines the word “receive” as “to take into one’s hand or one’s possession.”
84 O.S.1951 § 158, provides:
“The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be collected, and that other can be ascertained.”
There is certainly nothing in the will in question which would indicate any intention of the testatrix to use the word “receiving” in any sense other than its ordinary and grammatical one. We are therefore required by the statute above quoted to attribute to the use of the word “receiving” its ordinary and grammatical sense, which is something that can be readily ascertained, if not already known, and the word could therefore not possibly be ambiguous.
The majority opinion further holds that the word “receiving”, as used in the clause in the will providing for lapse of legacies in case of legatee’s death before legacy is received, is inconsistent and repugant to the words of absolute gift and the clause is, therefore, void for ambiguity. The vice in this holding is that there are no words of absolute gift in the will in question with regard to the part of the estate in controversy. In this connection, it should be noted that paragraph eight of the will devises and bequeaths all of the remainder of the estate to Waldemar N. Dannenburg, son *353of testatrix, to be held by him in trust for the uses and purposes set out in the will. There are no words of absolute gift so far as the beneficiaries of the trust are concerned. The only words of gift, in so far as said beneficiaries are concerned, are found in the direction to the trustee to convert the property into cash and divide or pay the same over at a future time to the specified beneficiaries. Under such circumstances, the almost universal rule is that the interest of the beneficiaries is future, not immediate, and contingent, not vested. See 33 Am.Jur. 568. Furthermore, this rule, usually referred to as the “divide and pay over rule”, is one that is applied as a rule of construction in cases where the intention of the testator is not clear or is not expressed in the will. It is not even necessary in the case at bar to rely on this rule of construction, since the will in question very plainly expresses the intention of the testatrix in simple, ordinary English words which are not subject to more than one reasonable construction.
It is fundamental that the construction of a will is to be determined by ascertaining the intention of the testator and by carrying that intention into effect and that the intention is to be gathered from the whole instrument, the language used and the sense in which it is employed. Cunningham v. Fidelity Nat. Bank of Okl., 186 Okl. 429, 98 P.2d 57; 33 Am.Jur. 557.
The will in question is set out in full in the majority opinion. By paragraphs eight and nine testatrix devised and bequeathed all her property in trust to be distributed as directed in paragraph nine and subsequent paragraphs. By paragraph ten she disposed of any portion of the specific $30,-000 legacies (or such specific and the residuary legacies depending upon one’s interpretation of the paragraph) remaining undistributed upon the death of any-of her children or the Todds. By paragraph eleven she disposed of any residuary portion of her estate. By paragraph twelve she directed “that any disposition by any beneficiary of any share prior to actual distribution shall be absolutely null and void, and that no liens either voluntary or by operation of law can be made to bind the share of any beneficiary prior to distribution by the trustee * * *(Emphasis ours.)' Testatrix thereby and by devise and bequest to her trustee son in paragraph 8 and by other provisions of her will and codicils thereto, to my mind, demonstrated beyond peradventure of a doubt that she wanted her children to “receive” portions of her property only upon condition they were living to have same distributed to them.
This is borne out particularly in paragraph second of the second codicil wherein, after referring to the “specific bequest” to her daughter, Alice, testatrix says, “This is done to equalize the bequests to each of the other children and grandchildren. I also direct that the children of a deceased child of mine shall take the share of such child by right of representation, that is the share which would have gone to such deceased child of mine, shall pass to and vest in, the child or children of such deceased child of mine by right of representation”. (Emphasis ours.)
Note the change in paragraph twelve and paragraph second of the second codicil from use of “legacy” and “bequest” to “share”.
Truly and through, the will expresses the intention of the testatrix that the interest of the named beneficiaries be future, not immediate, and contingent, not vested, by making further disposition of the share of any beneficiary remaining undistributed upon the death of such contingent beneficiary. Such provisions are in the nature of a “condition precedent”, and are specifically authorized by statute. 84 O.S. 1951 §§ 179, 180 and 181, provide that where a testamentary disposition is made upon a condition precedent nothing vests until the condition is fulfilled. I am of the opinion that the effect of the majority opinion is to say that a testator cannot make provision in his will for a condition precedent or a future vesting of an interest in property bequeathed or devised, and that such holding is in direct contravention of statute.
In the case of Davis v. District Court of Tulsa County, 129 Okl. 236, 264 P. 176, 177, 57 A.L.R. 72, we said:
“No court has power to ignore an act of the Legislature. Hayne v. ¡Justice’s *354Court, 82 Cal. 284, 23 P. 125, 16 Am.St. Rep. 114 * *
The majority opinion does not mention the paragraphs from which the above quotations are taken although the effect of the opinion is to strike them, respectively, from the will and second codicil. Henry W. G. Dannenburg died testate prior to receiving all of his share of the estate. He attempted to dispose of the undistributed share by will and this court has now held such disposition valid in the face of explicit provisions in the will and codicils to the contrary. The effect of the holding is to take the residuary share which would have gone to a son, had he lived, away from the grandson and blood-heir of the testatrix and give it to the second wife of such deceased son of testatrix, which is obviously just the opposite of the distribution intended by testatrix.
I am of the opinion that the trial court correctly construed the will in question in accordance with the plainly expressed intention of the testatrix as revealed by the four corners of the will and that the judgment should therefore be affirmed.
I therefore respectfully dissent.