Court Opinion

ID: 9712551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:56:10.770228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.981865
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McNAMARA, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority holding which reverses defendant’s conviction. I would affirm the conviction. The statements made by defendant’s mother, Jeanette Hill, constitute relevant non-hearsay evidence of defendant’s mental state at the time of the murder. The prosecutor’s comments on this evidence in closing argument were not improper. Furthermore, the prosecutor properly examined the psychiatric experts using Hill’s description of defendant’s mental state and the Psychiatric Institute intake report, both of which fall within the types of information reasonably relied upon by psychiatrists in forming opinions regarding insanity. In Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322, cert. denied (1981), 454 U.S. 836, 70 L. Ed. 2d 117, 102 S. Ct. 140, our supreme court adopted, without reservation, Rules 703 and 705 (Fed. R. Evid. 703, 705). Under Rule 703, an expert may base an opinion upon facts or data which need not be admissible in evidence, but only if the facts are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field in forming opinions upon the subject. Under Rule 705, an expert may testify as to an opinion without prior disclosure of the underlying facts, but disclosure of the basis may be required during cross-examination. The majority bases its Rule 703 analysis on the incorrect premise that Rule 703 is an exception to the hearsay rule. The majority holds that Hill’s statements reflect the kind of testimony “that the hearsay rule was designed to exclude,” and therefore the statements cannot “qualify for the hearsay exception of Wilson.” Rule 703, however, is not an exception to the hearsay rule. (People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485, cert. denied (1986), 479 U.S. _, 93 L. Ed. 2d 713, 107 S. Ct. 658.) Rule 703 functions much like a hearsay exception in some practical aspects. Unlike evidence admitted under a hearsay exception, however, the contents of reports relied upon by an expert are not offered for their truth and may be disclosed only for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of the expert witness’ opinion. People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 3d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485; Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322; Mayer v. Baisier (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 150, 497 N.E.2d 827; see also Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43. The key, then, is whether the facts underlying the expert opinion are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. This inquiry involves the review of several factors, and whether the underlying information is hearsay is only one of the factors to be considered. The trustworthiness of the underlying facts should be at least the equivalent of evidence admitted under a hearsay exception. (See Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43.) In the present case, Hill’s statements are at least equal to the reliability of a hearsay exception because her statements are non-hearsay. The majority finds that Hill’s statements are “inherently unreliable” and inadmissible hearsay. Hill’s statements, however, were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The statements were not offered as proof, e.g., that defendant actually asked his mother for money; that defendant attempted to harm his sister; that his sister hid in a closet; that defendant knocked his mother down; or that he left home with a butcher knife. The police found defendant holding the knife as he stood next to the victim, who collapsed on the street with a fatal chest wound. The only issues at trial concerned defendant’s mental state, i.e., both his belief that self-defense was necessary and his sanity. Statements made out of court are not hearsay where they are not offered for their truth, but instead are offered to show defendant’s mental condition. (People v. Williams (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 115, 230 N.E.2d 224; People v. Jackson (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 626, 495 N.E.2d 1207; People v. Vanda (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 551, 444 N.E.2d 609, cert. denied (1983), 464 U.S. 841, 78 L. Ed. 2d 130, 104 S. Ct. 136; People v. Muskgrove (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 381, 358 N.E.2d 336.) Thus, Hill’s out-of-court statements were circumstantial proof of defendant’s mental state rather than proof of the literal truth of Hill’s assertions. See People v. Vanda (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 551, 444 N.E.2d 609; People v. Ortiz (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 525, 382 N.E.2d 303. Another factor to be considered is the relevance of the material to be disclosed. An expert must be permitted to repeat contents of reports upon which he has relied if they are relevant to explaining his opinion to the jury. (People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485.) When defendant relies on the theory of self-defense, his state of mind at the time of the incident is a material issue. People v. Ortiz (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 525, 382 N.E.2d 303. In addition, when sanity is an issue at trial, evidence of defendant’s mental state is crucial. (People v. Vanda (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 551, 444 N.E.2d 609.) “ ‘[A]ny and all conduct of the person is admissible in evidence. There is no restriction as to the kind of conduct. There can be none; for if a specific act does not indicate insanity it may indicate sanity. It will certainly throw light one way or the other upon the issue.’ ” (People v. Vanda (1982), Ill. App. 3d 551, 556, 444 N.E.2d 609, quoting 2 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 228, at 9 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).) Where the accused’s sanity is in dispute, the trial court should allow great latitude in admitting evidence regarding his mental condition. In the present case, the alternate theories of insanity and self-defense depended completely on evidence tending to show defendant’s mental state at the time of the occurrence. Another factor indicative of the reasonableness of an expert’s reliance on the underlying material involves an inquiry regarding the particular field itself. The nature of the field of psychiatry necessitates the use of materials such as social history reports containing facts reported by the patient’s family. (People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485; People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171.) One purpose of Rule 703 is to bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court by recognizing that data relied upon by the experts may be derived from numerous sources of considerable variety, including statements by relatives and reports by other professionals in related fields. See Fed. R. Evid. 703, Advisory Committee Note, at 11 (1982); People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485. Unquestionably, psychiatrists may rely on reports of other health professionals. (People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485; People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171.) A psychiatric case history is essential to effective mental health treatment and a psychiatrist might often have a specially trained social worker compile a social history report after a thorough investigation into all possible sources, including relatives of the patient. (See Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony Based in Part upon Information Received from Third Persons, 35 S. Cal. L. Rev. 193, 205, n. 77 (1962).) In addition, the psychiatric profession necessarily relies on information given by family members or other third persons. United States v. Lawson (7th Cir. 1981), 653 F.2d 299, cert. denied (1982), 454 U.S. 1150, 71 L. Ed. 2d 305, 102 S. Ct. 1017; see generally Diamond and Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1335 (1965), cited in People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485. The majority, I believe, confuses the dissimilar fields of psychiatry and medicine relating to physical illnesses. It finds “no basis for equating hospital records” or “routine, professional reports of objective data” with the types of statements made by Hill. Rule 703, however, restricts the reasonable reliance analysis to materials relied upon by experts in that particular field. The majority has ignored the needs and methods unique to the field of psychiatry, despite the numerous Illinois decisions highlighting these elements. See, e.g., People v. Gacy (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 1, 468 N.E.2d 1171, (1985), cert. denied (1985) 470 U.S. 1037, 84 L. Ed. 2d 799, 105 S. Ct. 1410 (psychiatrist relies on interviews with defendant’s relatives; court notes it is obvious that a psychiatrist would require more than a mere physical examination in order to reach a conclusion as to his sanity or insanity); People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171 (psychiatrist partially bases his opinion regarding defendant’s sanity on report given to social worker by defendant’s mother); In re Germich (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 626, 431 N.E.2d 1092 (psychiatrist bases opinion partially on information from patient’s father; court finds psychiatrists customarily rely on intake staff’s report); People v. Sharkey (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 257, 376 N.E.2d 464 (psychiatric expert relies on statement from mother; court finds such statements are necessary to treat patient). A further indication of the trustworthiness of the experts’ opinions is the fact that the psychiatric profession itself deems such underlying material reliable. (See United States v. Sims (9th Cir. 1975), 514 F. 2d 147, cert. denied (1975), 423 U.S. 845, 46 L. Ed. 2d 66, 96 S. Ct. 83; People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485.) Based on years of experience, the expert learns to use only sources of information which are of a type reasonably relied upon by his colleagues in arriving at opinions; consequently, the expert is fully capable of judging for himself what is a reliable basis for his opinion. (United States v. Sims (9th Cir. 1975), 514 F.2d 147.) The psychiatrist is aware that information provided by a patient’s family may be distorted and incomplete. The psychiatrist is especially trained to sort through the information, evaluate it, determine the weight of each fact or opinion, and arrive at a conclusion. (See Diamond and Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1335 (1965).) A court should not substitute its opinion for the experts’ opinions as to what is reasonably relied upon by other experts in that particular field. See Mannino v. International Manufacturing Co. (6th Cir. 1981), 650 F.2d 846. In addition, I believe the majority confuses questions of admissibility and weight. Our supreme court has held that it is "illogical and anomalous to deprive the jury” of the reasons supporting the expert’s opinion. (People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 495 N.E.2d 485, citing United States v. Harper (5th Cir. 1971), 450 F.2d 1032.) The majority finds that Hill’s statements are “singular, subjective interpretations of defendant’s actions and mental state.” This is a question of weight for the jury. (See People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485.) I believe the majority errs in severely restricting the bounds of the jury's inquiry into the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime. See People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485; People v. Wright (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 128, 490 N.E.2d 640. Additionally, the majority ignores the fact that Rules 703 and 705 were designed so as to place a heavy burden on the cross-examiner to probe the basis of an expert’s testimony. (Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 111. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322; see generally, M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence sec. 705.1, at 494 (4th ed. 1984).) The expert can be cross-examined as to the weight he gave any materials or statements, and his reason for relying on them. (People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171.) The parties can fairly apprise the jury of the sources of information forming the basis of the expert opinion. People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485; People v. DeWit (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 723, 463 N.E.2d 742. The majority also questions the State’s reliance upon Wilson v. Clark because the State cross-examined the defense expert, who did not rely on Hill’s statements in forming his opinion as to defendant’s sanity. The majority incorrectly reasons, “[W]e doubt that this [hearsay] exception can be invoked by prosecutors who wish to introduce data that have not formed the basis of an expert opinion.” 157 Ill. App. 3d at 119. A cross-examiner often probes the basis of an expert’s opinion by altering the facts upon which the expert actually relied. One commentator has noted that if the additional fact “has been or will be reasonably relied upon under Rule 703 by an expert called as a witness by the cross-examiner,” the cross-examination is proper. (Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 70.) In the present case, the prosecutor called as witnesses Drs. Reifman and Stipes, who both testified regarding their reliance on the Psychiatric Institute report. Moreover, the defense expert, Dr. Ziporyn, testified that he read police reports which included statements by defendant’s family, and he was aware of Hill’s statements because he read them in Dr. Reifman’s report. I would hold that the fact that Dr. Ziporyn may not have relied on the social history report did not prevent the trial court, in its discretion, from permitting cross-examination of. Dr. Ziporyn regarding the report in order to explore the strengths and weaknesses underlying his opinion. The majority finds further that the evidence of Hill’s statements was used improperly in closing arguments. I disagree. The prosecutor merely commented on the statements only within the limited purpose for which they were admitted, i.e., as evidence of defendant’s mental state. Finally, the majority holds that it was error to permit a State psychiatrist to testify that he partially based his opinion that defendant was sane on the fact that after defendant’s arrest he remained silent when informed of his right to do so. This alleged error was not. raised at trial or in the post-trial motion and thus was waived. Moreover, any error was harmless because the issue was never argued to the jury. For these reasons, I would affirm defendant’s conviction.