Court Opinion

ID: 9666941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:30:33.521012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:34.417357
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. I would first address the matter of “territorial jurisdiction” discussed in the majority opinion. Generally, territorial jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to hear only cases that have some relationship to the geographical boundaries of that court’s jurisdiction. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 4 (1982). Lack of territorial jurisdiction will undisputedly void the judgment. That situation is clearly distinguishable from the one we have here where the court has proper jurisdiction in the above respect, but the trial itself is simply held in some other physical location. Under the latter circumstances, the judgment is not reviewed under that jurisdictional analysis. See Lasky v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 265 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1976) So for example, this case is distinguishable from Sexon v. Municipal Court of Springdale, 312 Ark. 261, 852 S.W.2d 308 (1993) and Auditor v. Davis, 2 Ark. 494 (1840), cited by the majority, where there was a true problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction. When this distinction is made, it is clear that the statutes and constitutional provisions the majority relies on refer only to limiting territorial jurisdiction, and not to the physical location of the trial itself. The language of those provisions simply does not dictate the physical location of a proceeding.1  The majority also relies on Williams v. Reutzel, 60 Ark. 155, 29 S.W.2d 374 (1895) (which does address only the physical location of trial) for the proposition that where the court otherwise has jurisdiction, but the case is not heard in the established geographic place for that court, that judgment is void. That explanation of Reutzel is only partly correct. In that case the voters had specifically refused to change the county seat from Greenwood to Fort Smith. The orders being challenged in that case were from the court holding forth in Fort Smith. We found the orders void but acknowledged that this was a deviation from the general rule that such judgments could not be attacked collaterally: It has, however, been held that the judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and of the subject matter of the suit will not be held void, in a collateral proceeding, upon proof being made that it was rendered at a place other than the established seat of justice of the county, “when it is shown that all the houses at the latter place had, before rendition of the judgment had been destroyed by fire and that the court had accepted as a temporary seat of justice, the place at which the judgment was rendered.” It was so held because the county court in that case whose duty it was to provide a place for the holding of courts, had secured and set apart for that purpose the house in which the court was held and having done so in the exercise of its jurisdiction. [Our emphasis.] Reutzel at 159. Reutzel was distinguished from this general rule on the basis that the electorate had clearly denied Fort Smith as the county seat and the court being held there was contrary to law. Our cases have consistently recognized the propriety of an alternative place to holding court, where the court otherwise has jurisdiction, see Warren v. State, 241 Ark. 264, 407 S.W.2d 724 (1966); Mell v. State, 133 Ark. 197, 202 S.W. 33 (1918); Hudspeth v. State, 55 Ark. 323, 18 S.W. 183 (1892); and Lee v. State, 56 Ark. 4, 19 S.W. 16 (1892). For example, in Warren v. State, supra, the defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the circuit court because of where it was heard. The electorate had voted to change the county seat to Ash Flat because of consolidation of two districts and the county seat was no longer at Hardy or Evening Shade. However, at the time of the defendant’s trial, the move had still not been made to Ash Flat. The court acknowledged the recognized exception to the place of holding court, and held the trial was conducted by the court with proper jurisdiction. This approach is in keeping with federal law. FRCP 77(b) provides: (b) Trials and Hearings; Orders in Chambers. All trials upon the merits shall be conducted in open court and so far as convenient in a regular courtroom. All other acts or proceedings may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers, without the attendance of the clerk or other court officials and at any place either within or without the district-, but no hearing, other than one ex parte, shall be conducted outside the district without the consent of all parties affected thereby. [Our emphasis.] And see Lasky v. Quinlan, supra. Our own Ark. R. Civ. P. 77(b), which is similar, does not touch on the subject of place of trial, but only requires that the trials be public. Ark. R. Civ. P. 77(b) and Commentary thereto. In the absence of statutory pronouncement on the matter of the place of trial, case law has provided the rule. See Reutzel, supra. And see also 18. A.L.R.3d 572 (1968) (which discusses the location of trial, which indicates that while there is no consensus whatsoever on this question, there are jurisdictions that are in line with Reutzel). The majority also relies on Red Bud Realty Co. v. South, 145 Ark. 604, 224 S.W.2d 964 (1920). In that case the matter was heard by the appropriate judge, but at a location outside the judicial district. We found that that hearing was authorized by statute, but the authorization was limited to regular judges, and the judge in that case was a special judge. However that case is immediately distinguishable because that matter was heard on direct appeal and here it is being collaterally attacked. In any case, the opinion clearly limited the prohibitions of the special judge’s action to rendering the decree and did not otherwise invalidate the proceedings. The case was remanded to the jurisdictionally correct court, “for further proceedings as if no appeal had been taken.” Under Arkansas law then under a collateral proceeding, there is no problem in moving the place of holding court, if the court otherwise has jurisdiction, and the move is not in contradiction of an express law to the contrary. Reutzel. Here, by the parties consent, the court (and judge) which otherwise had jurisdiction of the case, heard the case outside the district, and it is only now being attacked collaterally. There being no express law to the contrary the judgment should stand. Reutzel, supra. The other problem in this case is the signing of the judgment by a judge who clearly did not have any jurisdiction to hear the case. The majority relies on Hobson v. Cummings, 259 Ark. 717, 546 S.W.2d 132 (1976), for holding that only the special judge could sign the judgment. That is not what the case says. It merely provides that after the regular judge had disqualified and a special judge appointed, the regular judge no longer had authority to sign any orders. The majority also claims that “the record does not reflect any color of authority whatsoever for Judge McNeil to act as a circuit judge.” While that may be true, such a signing does not void or invalidate the judgment, nor has the majority cited any authority. To the contrary, all the authority I have found indicates the signing of the judgment is not a jurisdictional matter and, hence, not subject to a collateral attack. See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 68 (1969); Voyles v. Voyles, 311 Ark. 186, 842 S.W.2d 21 (1992); Standridge v. State, 290 Ark. 150, 717 S.W.2d 796 (1986). Nor have I found any authority in Arkansas requiring a signature of the judge. In fact, the only authority touching on the subject, Ark. R. Cr. P. 36.4, requires pronouncement, but no signature. And see Shipmore v. State, 261 Ark. 559, 550 S.W.2d 454 (1977) which suggests that a signature is not a jurisdictional requirement. Glaze, J., joins.   And see Gibbons v. Bradley, 239 Ark. 816, 394 S.W.2d 489 (1965) for a fuller explanation of the companion statute to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-210 (1987).