Court Opinion

ID: 9564601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:04:03.02092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:33.101257
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, J.
(dissenting).
I vote to REVERSE and REMAND. In the case sub judice, Julie Wilkinson Cowens, the former wife of Terry Lee Grace (“Appellant”), testified she was “the most stable force” in the family and the victim of abuse by Appellant. In response to her averments, Appellant attempted to question Cowens about her previous suicide attempts and arrest for criminal domestic abuse. The circuit judge refused to admit any of this testimony. This was error.
I. The Rule: Criminal Defendant’s Right to “Meaningful” Cross Examination
A trial court’s ruling on the proper scope of cross examination will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discre*30tion. State v. Mitchell, 330 S.C. 189, 498 S.E.2d 642 (1998). This rule, however, is subject to the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a defendant’s right to “meaningful ” cross examination. Id.; see also State v. Cheeseboro, 346 S.C. 526, 544, 552 S.E.2d 300, 309 (2001), cert. denied (“The right to meaningful cross-examination of an adverse witness is included in the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.”) (citations omitted). In Mitchell, the Supreme Court articulated the necessary showing required from an appellant who asserts an infringement on his right to meaningful cross examination:
[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby “to expose to the jury the facts from which the jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.”
Id. at 196, 498 S.E.2d at 645-46 (quoting State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 551-52, 446 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1994)).
II. Cowens’ Prior Suicide Attempts
During cross examination by Appellant, Cowens testified that in regard to her family’s home life, she was “the most stable force in [the] relationship.” Appellant then attempted to question Cowens about her two prior suicide attempts. The solicitor objected and the jury was immediately excused. At that time, Appellant proffered testimony in which Cowens admitted she had attempted suicide on two separate occasions by taking sleeping pills. Following the proffer, the trial judge sustained the State’s objection to the admission of this testimony, and stated: “In my view, [the testimony concerning the suicide attempts] does not go to the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness.”
Rule 608(b), SCRE provides:
Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of *31the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
This Court has stated the focus of Rule 608(b) is not on the type of evidence that is admitted; rather, the focus of the rule is on the purpose for which the evidence is introduced. Mizell v. Glover, 339 S.C. 567, 529 S.E.2d 301 (Ct.App.2000), cert. granted (emphasis added). The trial judge’s exclusion of testimony regarding Cowens’ prior suicide attempts under Rule 608(b) was error. Appellant only attempted to elicit this testimony to rebut Cowens’ declaration that she was “the most stable force in [the] relationship.”
Generally, “any matter is [a] proper subject of cross-examination which is responsive to testimony given on direct examination, or which is material or relevant thereto, and which tends to elucidate, modify, explain, contradict or rebut testimony given in chief by the witness.” State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 174, 508 S.E.2d 870, 878 (1998) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Additionally, “[t]he cross-examination of matters which were addressed in direct-examination is not objectionable, even if the answers affect a witness’ credibility and character.” Id. at 174-75, 508 S.E.2d at 878 (citation omitted). Cowens testified during direct examination that she had a nervous breakdown after finding Appellant and the victim in bed together. She also discussed her diagnosis and longtime history of depression. Notwithstanding these experiences, Cowens claimed to be “the most stable force in [the] relationship,” thus implying Appellant was unstable. Evidence of her prior suicide attempts was therefore relevant.
Appellant’s theory of the case was that Cowens’ mental instability and physical abuse motivated the victim to make the allegation of sexual abuse in a desperate attempt to escape from Cowens. Cowens’ testimony that she was “the most stable force in [the] relationship” contradicted Appellant’s theory. Therefore, testimony regarding Cowens’ prior suicide attempts should have been admitted because it was probative as to the issue of stability within the home. See State v. *32Finley, 300 S.C. 196, 200, 387 S.E.2d 88, 90 (1989) (reciting the rule that a criminal defendant’s right to “confront and cross examine witnesses against him and to present a full defense to the charges makes relevant [the] evidence which tends to establish motive, bias, and prejudice on the part of the prosecuting witness.”). Cowens’ mental condition was relevant; concomitantly, instances of her conduct that illustrated her state of mind were within the proper scope of cross examination.
While the trial court agreed Appellant’s inquiry into Cow-ens’ past suicide attempts was relevant, he ruled the testimony was inadmissible because “the prejudicial effect outweigh[ed] the probative value.” This determination was also an improper basis on which to exclude the testimony. Cowens’ testimony was neither .misleading nor confusing; rather, it gave a complete picture as to the'issue of her stability and significantly impacted on her statement that she was “the most stable force in [the] relationship.” The only party to suffer prejudice was Appellant. This is because the trial judge’s exclusion of Cowens’ testimony denied him the opportunity to fully present his defense. See State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 444, 453, 513 S.E.2d 385, 389 (Ct.App.1999) (“Unfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to evidence which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis.”) (citations omitted).
III. Cowens’ Arrest for Criminal Domestic Violence
Appellant additionally attempted to question Cowens regarding an incident of domestic violence between her and Appellant, which ultimately resulted in her arrest. The State objected to this questioning and Appellant proffered Cowens’ testimony outside the presence of the jury. Appellant asserted this testimony was relevant because of Cowens’ previous assertion that she was “the most stable force in [the] relationship” and that she had been the victim of abuse by Appellant. The trial judge ruled the testimony was inadmissible under Rules 403 and 608:
In my view, I do not think that that is admissible as being probative of the issues in this case. I don’t think that it is admissible under 608, as impacting on truthfulness or un*33truthfulness, and I don’t think you can make that quantum leap of saying that somebody that’s arrested for criminal domestic violence is unstable.
So in my view, under Rule 60803) and under 403(b) that— I just think the probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial [ejffect, so I’m not going to allow the testimony about the release, the arrest and release, for CDV from — of this lady.
“A trial judge has considerable latitude in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and his rulings will not be disturbed absent a showing of probable prejudice.” State v. Kelley, 319 S.C. 173, 177, 460 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1995) (citation omitted). “Evidence is relevant if it tends to establish or to make more or less probable some matter in issue upon which it directly or indirectly bears.” State v. Schmidt, 288 S.C. 301, 303, 342 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1986) (citation omitted). The trial judge committed prejudicial error when he excluded relevant testimony regarding Cowens’ arrest for criminal domestic violence, which Appellant offered to show her capacity for violent behavior.
Appellant’s credibility was essential to his defense. Any error that substantially damages a criminal defendant’s credibility cannot be held harmless where such credibility is essential to his defense. State v. Outlaw, 307 S.C. 177, 414 S.E.2d 147 (1992). In the case at bar, there was no physical evidence to support the victim’s claims of Appellant’s sexual abuse; thus, the State relied primarily on the credibility of the witnesses. Appellant’s right to present a defense mandates that he be permitted to freely cross examine the witnesses about the credibility issues relevant to his defense.
Cowens professed that she was “the most stable force in [the] relationship.” Additionally, she testified “there [were] times of abuse ... violence. [Appellant was] more of a verbal abuser, very controlling.” This testimony presented a picture that Appellant was abusive toward Cowens, an allegation similar to the charge leveled against him by the State in the instant case. Cowens’ statements that Appellant abused her therefore arguably bolstered her testimony that she was the “the most stable force in [the] relationship.” However, Cow-*34ens’ arrest for criminal domestic violence was evidence of her abusive nature, which Appellant attempted to have admitted as part of his defense. This evidence was relevant because it rebutted Cowens’ testimony concerning her stability and Appellant’s history of abuse towards her. Moreover, it impacted directly on her credibility. The trial judge’s exclusion of testimony relating to Cowens’ arrest resulted in prejudicial error to Appellant.
CONCLUSION
Cowens placed at issue her mental stability and own capacity for violence when she averred she was “the most stable force in [the] relationship” and the victim of abuse by Appellant. Appellant was therefore entitled to question her about this statement and test her veracity, and reliability as a witness under the aegis and ambit of the Sixth Amendment and Rule 608(b). By refusing to admit testimony regarding Cowens’ prior suicide attempts and arrest for criminal domestic violence, the trial judge impermissibly prejudiced Appellant. I would vote to REVERSE Appellant’s conviction and REMAND for a new trial.