Court Opinion

ID: 9722212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:20:17.396655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:31.984923
License: Public Domain

*127ROGOSHESKE, JUSTICE
(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority opinion in my view interferes without justification in the authorized, required, and orderly processes of defendant city’s civil service system and is without support in the case law of this state.
As the majority indicates, it is fundamental that a provisional appointment under civil service cannot become permanent merely by lapse of time. State ex rel. Florrell v. Mangni, 230 Minn. 518, 42 N. W. 2d 529 (1950); Crnkovich v. Independent School Dist. No. 701, 273 Minn. 518,142 N. W. 2d 284 (1966). Plaintiffs herein were regularly employed on a provisional basis, did not take a competitive examination before beginning their workj" and were at all times aware of their status as temporary or emergency employees of the city. Under the rule set forth in Mangni, therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to special preference on the civil service examination and can only be regarded as original applicants. See, also, Vaccaro v. Board of Education of City of New York, 54 Misc. 2d 206, 282 N. Y. S. 2d 881 (1967).
Section 21 of the Personnel Rules for the city of St. Paul provides that classified civil service employees who have qualified as candidates for promotion must be given priority over original entrants in filling vacancies. In State ex rel. Coduti v. Hauser, 219 Minn. 297, 17 N. W. 2d 504 (1945), we indicated that civil service rules have all the force and effect of statutory law and should be sustained unless violative of constitutional guarantees, state regulations, or the charter. No such violation is present here. Instead, § 21 embodies a rational employment policy which prefers full-time, classified civil service employees over temporary, unclassified employees who have never taken or passed an open, competitive civil service examination. Similar promotion preferences and arrangements are not uncommon in most, if not all, civil service systems to serve the important function, among others, of offering full-time, classified employees the promise *128of possible future promotions in exchange for their loyal and extended service.
The majority characterizes the application of the priority preferences of § 21 in this case as illogical, inefficient, and arbitrary because the city is discharging experienced truckdrivers whose performance has been satisfactory in favor of hiring inexperienced employees. Although the effect of establishing an eligibility list of classified truckdrivers will result in less demand for plaintiffs as experienced temporary and emergency drivers, that effect, in my view, cannot properly be characterized as a discharge. Moreover, while it is true that the city may incur some transitional expenses in training those employees who prevail in the merit competition and are found to be entitled under § 21 to fill the new vacancies, these transitional expenses are no greater than those that necessarily attend all job promotions and transfers in the civil service.
In my view, the majority’s disposition of this case can only be explained as a response to the apparent inequity of releasing plaintiffs after they have served the city of St. Paul well for several years in a temporary, unclassified capacity. While I share the majority’s concern for plaintiffs’ future welfare, I am persuaded that § 21 embodies a reasonable employment policy which we are not at liberty to overturn.
Otis, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rogosheske.
Peterson, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rogosheske.