Court Opinion

ID: 9779588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:05:28.425485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:22:03.816011
License: Public Domain

SHEDD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The appellant convinced the district court to transfer this case to another district court, in the District of Columbia. Having received the transfer, the appellant now appeals to this circuit court for a reversal of the original district court’s decision not to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. I would dismiss this appeal because under the rales governing jurisdiction in transferred cases, I do not think we have appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority correctly notes, our appellate jurisdiction analysis begins with the general rale: when a case has been properly transferred (as here) by a district court, “the transferor court — and the appellate court that has jurisdiction over it— loses all jurisdiction over the case and may not proceed further with regard to it.” 15 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3846 (4th ed.2007); see also Wilson-Cook Medical, Inc. v. Wilson, 942 F.2d 247, 250 (4th Cir.1991) (describing the general rale). However, as the majority also coxreetly notes, we have recognized an exception to this general rule. See TechnoSteel, LLC v. Beers Constr. Co., 271 F.3d 151 (4th Cir.2001). The majority concludes that the reasoning that underlies the TechnoSteel exception should be applied broadly. I disagree. In my opinion, TechnoSteel is not a new general rule on transfer jurisdiction, but merely an exception to the general rale. I believe the reasoning of TechnoSteel, when understood in context, is inapposite, and therefore inapplicable, to the present appeal.
In TechnoSteel, we concluded that the transfer principles generally applicable to interiocutoxy decisions were “unsuitable in the quite different context of timely filed appeals from immediately appealable deci*218sions of our district courts.” Id. at 154. In reaching that conclusion, we acknowledged that courts have adhered to the general rule that a transfer contemplates a plenary transfer of the entire case. Id. at 160. However, under the facts presented in TechnoSteel, we concluded that application of the general rule to immediately appealable decisions of the transferor court rendered the general rule “unworkable and unfair.” Id.
Our decision in TechnoSteel was largely a pragmatic one, based in part on our desire to avoid “frantic appellate procedure[s],” such as racing to file an appeal before the file was transferred or seeking a retransfer from the transferee court before the time for appeal ran in the transferor court. Id. at 161. Perhaps more importantly, we also recognized, based on the specific facts in TechnoSteel and based on a review of the law of the transferee court,1 that the transferee circuit would likely not review the decision. Thus, under the general rule, there would have been no appellate review available, and such a result would have been unfair. Id. at 160-61.
Those practical concerns are absent here. Admittedly, an order denying sovereign immunity (which determines the issue of subject matter jurisdiction) is an immediately appealable collateral order, which is required for the TechnoSteel exception. However, while the presence of such an immediately appealable collateral order is necessary under TechnoSteel, such an order, alone, should not be sufficient to ignore our general rule. The underlying issue in this appeal is subject matter jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by either party, or sua sponte by the court, at any time. See, e.g., In re Kirkland, 600 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir.2010) (“Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived, and can be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any time prior to final judgment.”); see also Athens Community Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C.Cir.1982) (same). Further, a “federal court has an independent obligation to assess its subject-matter jurisdiction.” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir.2005). Therefore, regardless of our decision on the question presented in this appeal— whether subject matter jurisdiction exists — the parties or the transferee court may at any time (and perhaps the court must, if it has any question about its authority in a case) re-address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction as this case proceeds there. Thus, this appeal based on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction does not implicate any of the practical problems the TechnoSteel decision sought to avoid.2
*219TechnoSteel also justified its exception to the general rule in transferring jurisdiction because under those facts the general rule would have been “unworkable and unfair.” TechnoSteel, 271 F.3d at 160. Here, however, it is the application of the TechnoSteel exception which would make the result unfair and potentially unworkable. The majority’s ruling would clearly create a tenuous situation if the courts in the District of Columbia were to find that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist. Astonishingly, this would create a circuit split on the same case. Moreover, the possibility of such differing views would encourage forum shopping when a party, with a case which does not have subject matter jurisdiction under the precedent of the appropriate circuit, could file in another circuit which is more likely to provide a favorable ruling. Surely, such litigation tactics should be discouraged. On the other hand, had the majority reversed the district court on the merits, we would remand this case to a district court which no longer has jurisdiction and in which venue is statutorily improper. To me, both of these results are unworkable.
Nor is the application of the general rule on transfer jurisdiction unfair in this case. To the contrary, it is the application of the TechnoSteel exception under these facts which is not fair. First, in TechnoSteel, the defendant sought a transfer, received it, and then sought to eliminate the plaintiffs appeal rights. Thus, the party whose transfer request was granted sought to eliminate the other party’s rights. That clearly is unfair. In contrast, here the defendant sought and received a transfer and now appeals a separate adverse ruling in the case in an effort to win on the merits in this, the transferor circuit. While attempting to get this “first bite” of the apple in our circuit, the defendant is in no way prohibited from seeking a “second bite” in the District of Columbia (the transferee court) if he loses before us on the merits. To disallow this “double bite” strategy created by the defendant3 is not unfair at all; rather, it would be unfair to subject the plaintiff to such a double appeal.
The majority apparently believes these problems concerning workability and fairness will be addressed by the law of the case doctrine. Such a view overstates that doctrine, especially in the context of subject matter jurisdiction. The law of the case “is a prudential rule rather than a jurisdictional one,” Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739-40 (D.C.Cir.1995), and it “merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power.” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (quoting Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It “is not absolute nor inflexible.” Capital Invs. Co. v. Executors of Estate of Morrison, 584 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir.1978). This is particularly true with regard to determinations of subject matter jurisdiction:
[Law of the case] does not and cannot limit the power of a court to reconsider an earlier ruling. The ultimate responsibility of the federal courts, at all levels, is to reach the correct judgment under law. Though that obligation may be tempered at times by concerns of finality and judicial economy, nowhere is it *220greater and more unflagging than in the context of subject matter jurisdiction issues, which call into question the very legitimacy of a court’s adjudicatory authority.
American Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir.2003).4
Therefore, because the exceptional concerns addressed by TechnoSteel are not present in this case and because the application of TechnoSteel would lead to a result that is “unworkable and unfair,” I find no reason to apply its exception. Accordingly, because the case has been properly transferred, I believe we are divested of jurisdiction to review this appeal.5

. "The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals would not entertain an appeal from the South Carolina district court’s denial of TechnoSteel's petition to compel arbitration.” TechnoSteel, 271 F.3d at 156 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 986 n. 5 (11th Cir.1982)).

. TechnoSteel specifically dealt with a different jurisdictional context as well. TechnoSteel involved a district court's discretionary authority to transfer a case "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice” under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Here, because the district court found that Wye Oak failed to establish venue in the Eastern District of Virginia, the transfer was statutorily required under § 1391(f)(4). Accordingly, the district court transferred the case to the District of Columbia, which is the default venue for actions against foreign states. That finding has not been appealed by either party, and is therefore not before us. Thus, not only is venue improper in the district court below, but under the facts of this case, the federal courts in the District of Columbia are the only courts where venue is proper.

. I agree with the majority that the district court could have taken steps — for example, staying the transfer pending our review of this appeal — to avoid the “somewhat anomalous circumstances’’ presented in this appeal. However, the Republic of Iraq also bears responsibility for the odd procedural posture.

. The only time law of the case would prevent revisiting subject matter jurisdiction would occur when a superior court had decided the issue and then the case was placed back before a lower court over which the superior court had binding authority. That scenario is not present here.

. Even if we had appellate jurisdiction in this case, I would decline to exercise it for prudential reasons in order to avoid the problems — real and potential' — which would be created by our ruling on the merits of this appeal. See, e.g., Qingyun Li v. Holder, 666 F.3d 147 (4th Cir.2011) (finding jurisdiction over an immediately appealable order from the Board of Immigration Appeals but nonetheless declining to exercise jurisdiction for prudential reasons). The majority's approach is particularly troubling where, as here, courts have differed on the appropriate standard to use when analyzing the question of subject matter jurisdiction with regard to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA”). Compare Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C.Cir.1994) (adopting the "core functions” test), with First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983) (“Bancec"), and Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.1992) (relying on the Bancec analysis). Thus, it seems especially prudent to leave a determination on subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit which unarguably has jurisdiction over the case in order for that circuit to apply its own relevant precedent. This is not because the "law or facts involved are complicated or unsettled,” ante at 211, but for reasons of comity. Recognition of this principle of comity underlies other federal jurisdiction doctrines. See, e.g., Martin v. Stewart, 499 F.3d 360, 363 (4th Cir.2007) (noting the principle of comity underscores abstention doctrines); see also Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir.1982) (noting the generally recognized doctrine of federal comity underscores the first-to-file rule); Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Modern Welding Co., Inc., 502 F.2d 178, 180 n. 2 (4th Cir.1974) (applying the "first to file” rule).