Court Opinion

ID: 9750372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:54:50.184104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:06.866468
License: Public Domain

*635CHASANOW, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that a drug dealer who leaves an unlocked bag containing over $75,000 worth of drugs at the home of a “friend” is the victim of an unlawful search when the friend authorizes the police to determine whether there are drugs on her premises. I would affirm the trial judge’s ruling that the search was valid for any or all of the following reasons: First, Ms. Gardin could give valid consent to a search of the bag. Second, even if Ms. Gardin lacked actual authority to consent to the search of the bag, the police acted reasonably when they searched based on Ms. Gardin’s apparent authority to consent. Third, under the circumstances in the instant case, Owens had no reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag.
I. MS. GARDIN’S CONSENT
We should affirm the trial judge’s holding that Ms. Gar-din had the authority to consent to a search of this bag. The bag was left unlocked in Ms. Gardin’s exclusive possession. It could be opened by simply unzipping a zipper. Ms. Gardin was never told she should not open the bag. She had no indication of when Owens would retrieve the bag, and the bag was not even accessible to Owens unless Ms. Gardin allowed him into her home.
In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 249-50 (1974), a case involving consent to search given by a woman with whom the accused lived, the Supreme Court held that a third party may consent to a warrantless search where the third party possesses “common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” Thus, a host, as the person who has the primary right of occupancy of the premises, may consent to a search of the area occupied by a guest over which he er she has common authority. United States v. Buckles, 495 F.2d 1377, 1381 (8th Cir.1974). In Buckles, the host validly consented to a search of her home, including the search of a jacket found *636therein that belonged to her guest, the defendant. Similarly, in State v. Martin, 261 N.W.2d 341 (Minn.1977), the search of a closed tackle box was deemed proper. Martin, by virtue of his status as a guest, had “no reasonable expectation of privacy viz-a-viz [the host] as to any items he left in her apartment. Thus as long as the tackle box was in her apartment she could validly consent to its search.” Id. at 344. In addition, see United States v. Miroff, 606 F.2d 777 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 1315, 63 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980), where the hosts validly consented to a search of their home, including a room temporarily occupied by guests. Police found stolen goods in shopping bags and in a closed garment bag belonging to the guests. The court noted that the hosts had previously requested of their guests that no stolen property be brought into their home and they were so assured. The guests were found to have “assumed the risk that one with whom they shared the common area might properly permit that common area to be searched, particularly when the sharer was the dominant or controlling party in the general premises.” Id. at 779. See also United States v. Carter, 569 F.2d 801, 805 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 1618, 56 L.Ed.2d 66 (1978) (defendant’s employer and owner of truck validly consented to search where police found gun wrapped in a coat liner behind seat; “it was reasonable to recognize that [the owner] had the right to permit inspection and that Carter had assumed the risk that [he] might so do”).
I believe that the search of Owens’s bag was not violative of his Fourth Amendment rights. Ms. Gardin had sole authority and control over the bag when the police confronted her with their suspicion that contraband was in her home. She should be able to consent to the seizure and search of a bag left in her living room. See United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir.1985), where defendant’s brother validly consented to a search of the premises, that consent extended to the playing by law enforcement officials of a cassette tape labelled “ ‘Confidential, Do Not *637Play.’ ” The court concluded that the labelling evinced the defendant’s
“subjective expectation that what was on the tape would be safe from inspection by his brother or anyone his brother might permit to listen to it. That expectation, however, was objectively unreasonable. The tape was not locked away, hidden or sealed____ [His brother’s] access to and control over the tape was absolute. He could have played it at any time.... We hold that, once the agents were justified in seizing the tape, no additional authority was necessary for the agents to play the tape.”
Id. at 1476. See also White v. United States, 444 F.2d 724 (10th Cir.1971) (co-occupant of motel room had authority to consent to search of defendant’s zippered bag). Owens had no access to the apartment or to the bag within the apartment, except with the permission of Gardin. Owens’s bag was left unattended and unlocked. Gardin could have opened it herself or allowed anyone else to do so. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with a similar situation in U.S. v. D’Antoni, 856 F.2d 975 (7th Cir.1988). The court concluded:
“The defendant had moved his belongings into the apartment[] essentially for storage____ It is reasonable to believe that during this time the residents of the apartment who paid the rent and, it appears, were there continuously, could have found it necessary to move the defendant’s belongings for a variety of reasons convenient to them. Had the defendant been concerned about the inviolability of his possessions he would not have left them unattended and unsecured. We believe that the residents of the apartment were fully able to consent to a search of the entire premises, including the bedroom where the defendant occasionally stayed.”
Id. at 983.
In addition, Ms. Gardin was at most a gratuitous bailee. She should have the right to rescind that bailment when told by the police that someone may have secreted drugs in her apartment. After being notified by the police that they *638believed drugs had been left in her apartment, if Ms. Gardin did not take some affirmative action, she may thereafter be an accomplice in the possession of these drugs. It is only reasonable that Ms. Gardin should be able to demonstrate her innocence by authorizing the police to ascertain whether, in fact, there were drugs in her apartment and, if so, to remove them. She has the sole and exclusive possessory right in the apartment and a legitimate interest in defending the integrity of her home. People should not be expected to subject themselves to potential criminal penalties for knowingly possessing contraband after being put on notice by the police that a bag left in their house by a casual friend is believed to contain drugs. It is reasonable to expect that they would authorize, if not insist on, a search of the bag and removal of controlled dangerous substances.
II. POLICE COULD REASONABLY RELY ON MS. GARDIN’S CONSENT
The police acted reasonably in searching the bag based on Ms. Gardin’s consent. Ms. Gardin was left in the sole and exclusive possession of an unlocked zippered bag. Although acknowledging that the bag was left with her by someone else, Ms. Gardin freely consented to its search. She never indicated either a reluctance to consent or the lack of authority to consent to the search. The police were reasonable in assuming that she had authority to open the unlocked bag or to consent to its search to determine whether she was the unwitting and unwilling repository of contraband. When Ms. Gardin learned of the police suspicion that the bag contained drugs, she could have removed the suspect bag from her apartment. Likewise, she could have demanded that the police remove the offending bag. Under the circumstances of this case, the police were entitled to assume she could authorize the search of the bag. The trial judge was not in error in finding that, since the bag was in Ms. Gardin’s living room, in her exclusive possession, and secured only by a zipper, she had sufficient indicia of joint control over the bag to authorize its search. *639Where the police reasonably, although incorrectly, believe that a third party has the authority to consent to a search, the search will nevertheless be upheld because the officers’ actions in relying on such authority were reasonable. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. -, -, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2800-01, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 160-61 (1990). See also White v. United States, supra, where woman consenting to search held herself out as defendant’s wife and, thus, police reasonably believed she could consent to search.
In United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837 (9th Cir.1986), a mobile home was parked in the driveway of a house and attached to the house by an electrical cord. Agents asked for and obtained permission from the homeowner to search the mobile home. Actually, the mobile home belonged not to the homeowner, but to the homeowner’s son. The 9th Circuit held that the agents could, in good faith, rely on the homeowner’s apparent authority to consent to the search of the mobile home.
The Supreme Court in Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684, 694 (1969), refused to engage in “metaphysical subtleties” when a defendant argued that the third party who consented to the search of the defendant’s entire duffel bag had actual permission to use only one compartment of the bag. The defendant was found to have “assumed the risk that [the third party] would allow someone else to look inside.” Id. The Court’s reasoning may be applied to the facts of the instant case. When Gardin consented to a search of her premises, the police were not required to engage in “metaphysical subtleties” in order to determine whether Gardin enjoyed unlimited access to the unlocked gym bag on the floor of her own living room. Gardin had apparent authority to consent to the search of Owens’s bag, and the police acted reasonably when they searched based on her consent.
III. EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
The majority seems to summarily dismiss the fact that Ms. Gardin may have been given sufficient dominion or *640control over the bag to be able to consent to a search. If so, her consent is valid regardless of any subjective expectation of privacy Owens may harbor. His expectation may be a factor in determining whether Ms. Gardin had sufficient authority to consent, but it is not controlling. It is acknowledged by the majority that “[a]n expectation of privacy ... is legitimate if it is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” 322 Md. 616, 626, 589 A.2d 59, 63; Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. -, -, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 92 (1990). The majority, however, fails to consider that if the police search was based on a reasonable good faith belief that Ms. Gardin had the authority to consent, the search would be lawful regardless of whether she actually possessed the authority to consent, and regardless of any subjective expectation of privacy Owens may have harbored. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2800-01, 111 L.Ed.2d at 159-61. In Rodriguez, the Court said, “what is at issue when a claim of apparent consent is raised is not whether the right to be free of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be free of unreasonable searches has been violated.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 2801, 111 L.Ed.2d at 161.
Owens’s expectation of privacy is only relevant if Ms. Gardin could not validly consent to a search of Owens’s bag or if the police could not reasonably rely on her apparent authority to consent. Even if there was no consent or no apparent authority to consent, I would find that Owens had no reasonable or justifiable expectation of privacy.
There is no question that current law generally provides one with an expectation of privacy in a bag, like the one in the instant case, even if it is unlocked. The police must have a search warrant before they may open it unless the search falls within one of the warrant requirement exceptions (e.g. consent). The expectation of privacy we protect, however, must be reasonable and legitimate. Olson, supra.
Mr. Owens’s expectation of privacy should be examined based on the totality of circumstances surrounding his *641leaving the bag with Ms. Gardin. That totality of circumstances should include such factors as the specific understanding between Owens and Ms. Gardin, the nature of their relationship, the nature of and security of the container, as well as Owens’s knowledge about the contents of the bag. His knowledge of both the contents of the bag and the jeopardy in which he was placing Ms. Gardin by leaving the bag in her home are components of the expectation Owens should have about the security and privacy this unlocked bag would enjoy while in the custody of Ms. Gardin. It is not unreasonable to consider the contents in determining one’s expectation of privacy in a container. For example, if one leaves a large box containing a dead body in the home of a friend, after the passage of time one should have no expectation of privacy in the contents, since a corpse may become quite malodorous and one should anticipate that the package may be opened to see what is causing the fetid aroma. In the instant case, the trial judge could properly have assumed Owens was aware of the contents of the bag he left in Ms. Gardin’s exclusive custody and control. In this limited situation, it is Owens’s action in depositing contraband, the possession of which is unlawful, with Ms. Gardin that placed her at risk of police scrutiny and possible arrest. Fundamental fairness requires that, if Owens placed Ms. Gardin at risk of being arrested for possession of the bag, she should be entitled to exonerate herself by assisting the police and authorizing a search of the bag. Society should expect, and Owens should expect, that if the police come to Ms. Gardin’s home and express their suspicion that someone may have left drugs in her home, she would say, “Please look and see, and if someone has left drugs in my home take those drugs away.” There is no good reason to elevate the privacy right of one who leaves an unlocked bag containing drugs in the home of a friend over the right of the friend to insure that his or her home is drug free. I believe society is not prepared to accept that Owens had a legitimate and reason*642able expectation of privacy when he left his bag of drugs in the home of a casual friend.
In United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 937, 87 S.Ct. 959, 17 L.Ed.2d 810 (1967), it was found that the custodian of a defendant’s property may consent to a search to prove that he is not involved in illegal activity. “It would be a harsh doctrine, indeed, that would prevent an innocent pawn from removing the taint of suspicion which had been cast upon him by a defendant’s cunning scheme.” Id. at 548. Botsch was ordering merchandise and having it sent through the mail to a shack that he had rented from Stein. Unbeknownst to Stein, the merchandise was obtained by fraud. Botsch asked Stein to place the items inside the shack when they arrived, told him to use his key to open the door, and gave him money to pay the delivery charges. When the authorities told Stein of the suspected scheme, he gave them access to the shack. The court reasoned that “[b]ecause Stein’s activities — though innocent — were inextricably intertwined with Botsch’s alleged scheme and cast suspicion upon him, we believe his authorization of the inspection when viewed in its full context rendered the search reasonable.” Id. at 548. An inculpable party who was simply “left holding the bag” should be able to consent to a seizure and/or search in order to clear his or her name. See also United States v. Gargiso, 456 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir.1972) (landlord who, along with all tenants in building, had access to basement area could allow a search for stolen goods in an effort to exculpate himself); United States v. Jones, 430 F.Supp. 219, 225 (W.D.Penn.1977), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1337 (3d Cir.1979) (“[p]ersons who are unwittingly thrust into the role of a participant in criminal activity may consent to a search of items which have been placed in their safekeeping in order to exculpate themselves from the alleged crime”).
Had Owens locked his bag, he would have had a greater expectation of privacy. When a container is locked, some courts have held that the host may consent to the seizure of the guest’s property, but the police, barring exigent circum*643stances, must obtain a warrant before opening the locked item and conducting an investigatory search. United States v. Diggs, 569 F.2d 1264, 1265 (3d Cir.1977) (“a gratuitous bailee of a locked box possibly containing contraband had a sufficient property interest in the box to surrender it to the authorities”); see also United States v. Potamitis, 564 F.Supp. 1484, 1488 (S.D.N.Y.1983), aff'd, 739 F.2d 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934, 105 S.Ct. 332, 83 L.Ed.2d 269, cert. denied sub nom., 469 U.S. 918, 105 S.Ct. 297, 83 L.Ed.2d 232 (1984) (third party delivered locked footlocker to FBI, who then obtained a search warrant and opened the locker; “a person who has been duped into holding stolen property has the right promptly to establish his innocent role in the transaction and to exculpate himself by voluntarily delivering the contraband to the authorities”). In Gieffels v. State, 590 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1979), a gratuitous bailee permitted the police to seize the defendant’s suitcase. The court did not have to determine whether the police could also search the suitcase, since the search was conducted pursuant to a search warrant, but the court stated that the bailee’s “right to exculpate himself and to avoid any possible involvement in the crime charged outweighed Gieffels’ right to have the privacy of his property protected.” Id. at 62.
People who come to suspect the presence of drugs in their homes should be expected to and have the right to enlist police assistance in ensuring that their premises are drug free. This right should transcend any expectations of privacy by someone who exposes a friend to criminal liability by leaving an unlocked bag of drugs in the home of that friend.
I would affirm the conviction. Judges RODOWSKY and SMITH have authorized me to state that they concur with the views expressed herein.