Court Opinion

ID: 9658684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:08:24.084132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:57.858536
License: Public Domain

DIANE S. SYKES, J.
¶ 32. (dissenting). I re*89spectfully dissent. The majority concludes that "the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the grant of summary judgment limiting liability based on public policy factors." Majority op., ¶¶ 1, 30. I disagree. The court of appeals properly evaluated the public policy limitations on liability in this case, and properly did so in advance of trial, affirming the circuit court's order of summary judgment.
¶ 33. As the majority notes, negligence law in Wisconsin is based on the dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101-05 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting), in which Judge Andrews of the New York Court of Appeals described negligence as a breach of the duty shared by all members of society to "refrain[ ] from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others." Majority op., ¶ 13; see also A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483-84, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974) (describing Wisconsin's adoption of the Palsgraf dissent). This is the duty of ordinary care, and it is measured by reference to a "reasonable person" standard, which is applied to evaluate the nature and foreseeability of the risk of harm associated with the conduct in question in order to determine whether a defendant was negligent. Majority op., ¶¶ 14, 19; see also Wis JI—Civil 1005.
¶ 34. The duty of ordinary care can be breached (that is, a person can be negligent) by either an act or an omission, if a reasonable person under similar circumstances would recognize that the act or omission creates an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to another.1 *90The determination of negligence is followed by a determination of causation and damages.2 Although these are generally factual questions for the jury, there are some circumstances, not implicated here, under which the determination of negligence involves a mixed question of fact and law. Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 418-19, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995).
¶ 35. However, it is not always true that negligence + causation + damages = liability. Considerations of public policy may preclude the imposition of liability even where the facts establish that a negligent act or omission on the part of the defendant was a cause of the plaintiffs damages. This is purely a question of law for the court. Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶ 42, 251 Wis. 2d 171, 197, 641 N.W.2d 158 ("The application of public policy considerations is a function of the court."); Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 425 ("A finding of nonliability made in terms of public policy is a question of law which the court alone decides.").
¶ 36. Accordingly, we observed last term that "in Wisconsin, common law limitations on liability are determined not by reference to the absence of a duty, *91but as a matter of public policy." Stehlik v. Rhoads, 2002 WI 73, ¶ 52, 253 Wis. 2d 477, 645 N.W.2d 889. This is because "[a]ll members of society are 'held, at the very least, to a standard of ordinary care in all activities.'" Id. (quoting Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶ 22, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906). The public policy limitations on liability are as follows:
When determining whether or not to limit a defendant's tort liability on public policy grounds, this court has identified a number of factors that must be considered. Recovery against a negligent tortfeasor can be denied on the grounds of public policy when (1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the tortfeasor's culpability; (3) in retrospect it- appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm; (4) allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the tortfeasor; (5) allowing recovery would be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims; or (6) allowing recovery would have no sensible or just stopping point.
Stephenson, 251 Wis. 2d 171, ¶ 43 (citing Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 426).
¶ 37. This distinction between the determination of negligence and the imposition of liability is consistent with the Palsgraf dissent: "As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes many years ago, '[t]he measure of the defendant's duty in determining whether a wrong has been committed is one thing, the measure of liability when a wrong has been committed is another.'" Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 102 (quoting Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 52 N.E. 747, 748 (Mass. 1899)).
¶ 38. The majority recites the public policy limitations on liability but refuses to apply them, concluding that "[t]his case requires a full factual resolution *92before application of a public policy analysis." Majority op., ¶¶ 17, 20. In this regard, the majority asserts that "Ci]t is desirable to have a full trial to precede the court's determination [of public policy] because the issues in this case are complex and the factual connections attenuated." Majority op., ¶ 21. I disagree.
¶ 39. I recognize that we have said it is usually "better practice" or "generally better procedure" to await resolution of the factual issues in a negligence case before submitting it to public policy analysis. Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶ 26 (lead opinion); id., ¶ 83 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (majority opinion on this issue); Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 265, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998). However, we have also said that "[t]he assessment of public policy does not necessarily require a full factual resolution of the cause of action by trial." Stephenson, 251 Wis. 2d 171, ¶ 42; see also Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 265; Hass v. Chicago and, N. W. Ry. Co., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 326-27, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970). More specifically:
The application of public policy considerations is solely a function of the court. . . and does not in all cases require a full factual resolution of the cause of action by trial before policy factors will be applied by the court. There may well be cases, of course, where the issues are so complex, or factual connections so attenuated, that a full trial must precede the court's determination. Here, however, the question of public policy is fully presented by the complaint and demurrer.
Hass, 48 Wis. 2d at 326-27. As a further example, in our seminal case on the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, we held:
The application of public policy considerations is a function solely of the court. While it is generally better *93procedure to submit negligence and cause-in-fact issues to the jury before addressing legal cause, that is, public policy issues,... the circuit court or this court may grant summary judgment on public policy grounds before a trial or a court may bar liability on public policy considerations after trial. When the pleadings present a question of public policy, the court may make its determination on public policy grounds before trial. In contrast, when the issues are complex or the factual connections attenuated, it may be desirable for a full trial to precede the court's determination.
In this case this court is determining public policy considerations before trial because the facts presented are simple, and because the question of public policy is fully presented by the complaint and the motion to dismiss.
Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 654-55, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994) (footnotes and citations omitted).
¶ 40. Thus, it is not uncommon for courts to decide on summary judgment that negligence liability should be limited based upon considerations of public policy. Some cases are factually uncomplicated and fully conducive to a pre-trial legal determination on the applicability of public policy limitations on liability. This is such a case.
¶ 41. The majority's rejection of pre-trial public policy analysis in this case is unwarranted. To the extent that it discourages the lower courts from evaluating public policy liability limitations on motions for summary judgment, it will produce two divergent effects: 1) there will be an increase in unnecessary trials and appeals (where the circuit or appellate courts would otherwise have precluded liability pre-trial but now consider themselves constrained to do it only post-trial *94because of the majority's decision here); and 2) there will be an expansion of liability (where the circuit or appellate courts consider themselves constrained against precluding liability on public policy grounds because of the presence of a jury verdict on negligence).
¶ 42. While I have no quarrel with the "better practice" general rule noted above, I do not agree that the facts of this case are so complex that the evaluation of public policy limitations on liability must await a jury verdict on negligence, cause-in-fact and damages. Judicial gate-keeping on this potentially dispositive legal issue is extremely important given the breadth and potential reach of the definition of negligence in this state. This was an important part of the Palsgraf dissent. What we in Wisconsin refer to as public policy limitations on liability, Judge Andrews catalogued as factors that govern the court's determination of legal or "proximate cause."
¶ 43. Judge Andrews said that the duty of ordinary care is owed to all who might be injured as a consequence of an unreasonably risky (i.e., negligent) act or omission, but he also said "there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with the negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former." Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103. The negligence, he said, might be "[a] cause, but not the proximate cause. What we [ ] mean by the word 'proximate' is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics." Id. This judicial line-drawing relies upon "common sense" and "fair judgment," and "endeavor[s] to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind." Id. at 104.
*95¶ 44. Public policy limitations on liability are decided by the court as a matter of law, but the majority nevertheless considers the "jury's opinion" to be an "aid" to the court in making that decision. Majority op., ¶ 19. In this regard, the majority seems to be suggesting that the jury should influence the court's assessment of whether public policy requires non-liability as a matter of law. Courts decide questions of law independently, without deference to the jury. As a practical matter, however, most judges find it difficult to throw out a jury verdict.
¶ 45. This case is amenable to a pre-trial application of the six-factor public policy analysis. The case is not complex, and the historical facts are undisputed. We do not need a jury verdict on negligence, causation, and damages in order to determine whether public policy requires nonliability as a matter of law. I agree with the court of appeals that the first public policy factor (remoteness) and the third (extraordinary result) preclude liability here, even if a jury were to find causal negligence on the part of the apartment owner and manager. I would also conclude that the second factor (disproportionality of culpability to injury) is implicated in this case.
¶ 46. Dora Alvarado's injury was unquestionably tragic and devastating. But the accident that caused it occurred because she mistook a firework for a candle, and lit that firework in the pilot light of an oven that she was cleaning, in an attempt to preserve the pilot light flame in case it went out while she was vacuuming the oven's interior. As a matter of law, such an injury is too remote from the alleged negligent inspection by the apartment owner and manager, as well as too extraordinary and too disproportionate to that alleged negligence. I would affirm the court of appeals.
*96¶ 47. I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER, JR. joins this dissent.

 Wisconsin juries are instructed on negligence as follows:
A person is negligent when [he or she] fails to exercise ordinary care. Ordinary care is the care which a reasonable person would use in similar circumstances. A person is not using ordinary care *90and is negligent, if the person, without intending to do harm, does something (or fails to do something) that a reasonable person would recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person or property.
Wis JI — Civil 1005.

 Causation is determined by reference to a "substantial factor" test. The jury determines whether the defendant's negligence was "a cause" — not "the cause" — of injury or damage to the plaintiff, because there can be more than one cause of a plaintiffs injury or damage. Wis JI — Civil 1500 (emphasis in original). A defendant's negligence is "a cause" of a plaintiffs injury or damage if it was a substantial factor in producing the injury or damage. Id.