Court Opinion

ID: 9608074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:05:33.737996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:43.645301
License: Public Domain

POOLING, J.—
I dissent. My associates agree with me that, apart from the alleged admission by failure to deny the accusatory statement of the codefendant Herron, the evidence is not sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and does no more than to create or arouse a bare suspicion of guilt. The evidence shows that the defendant Herron after each of the robberies fled in an automobile similar to that owned by appellant and when arrested appellant had in his possession the pistol used by Herron in the commission of the robberies. No witness identified appellant as the driver of the automobile nor was he otherwise identified as a participant in either robbery. The case is therefore one in which the evidence, apart from the alleged admission by conduct in the face of his eodefendant’s accusation, is insufficient to support the conviction. (People v. Seawright, 72 Cal.App. 414 [237 P. 796] ; People v. Enriquez, 39 Cal.App.2d 168 [102 P.2d 770].)
In People v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699 [172 P.2d 18], the majority of the Supreme Court deliberately engaged in a reexamination and reappraisal of the field covering the admissibility of accusatory statements and the conduct of a defendant in the face of such statements. Their conclusion is that the mere failure of a defendant to deny an accusation made in his presence is not under all circumstances admissible in evidence against him, because under certain circumstances the failure to deny an accusation cannot legally be construed as a tacit admission of its truth. Specifically, as applied to the facts of this case, the court expressly stated in the Simmons case that if a defendant refuses to affirm or deny his guilt because of a desire to stand on his constitutional right against self-incrimination, his conduct in so doing constitutes no evidence of guilt and for that reason may not be placed in evidence. The majority opinion in that case says at page 719:
“No violation of the privilege against self-incrimination can be sanctioned.” The later case of People v. Spencer, 78 *53Cal.App.2d 652 [178 P.2d 520], expressly holds the accusatory statement and the conduct of the appellant in that case in refusing to deny it inadmissible on the ground that it there appeared that in refusing to deny, appellant was standing on his constitutional right.
The testimony of Police Officer 0 ’Leary in this ease is that while under arrest appellant was confronted by Herron who accused him of complicity in the robberies, and on being asked what he had to say, appellant replied: “I have nothing to say, I remain mute.” This language in my judgment indicated an intention on the part of appellant to exercise his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The expression “I remain mute” is a term of art in criminal law sufficient to indicate that appellant had his constitutional rights in mind.
It is true that the evidence of the accusatory statement and appellant’s reply were admitted without objection; but the very basis of the rule requiring their exclusion if it appears that a. defendant in refusing to answer the charge was standing on his constitutional right is that such conduct constitutes no evidence of guilt. If it constitutes no evidence of guilt it adds nothing to the case against the appellant.
The appellant here has been convicted of a crime with no more substantial evidence than his failure to deny the accusation of a lunatic (it being an admitted fact that Herron was adjudged insane) and that while he was exercising his constitutional right against incriminating himself.
The judgment and order denying appellant’s motion for a new trial should be reversed.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 20, 1947. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a hearing.