Court Opinion

ID: 9497580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:54:35.250512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:16.726926
License: Public Domain

POOLER,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe we should affirm the district court’s finding that Doe presented a credible claim of actual innocence. This panel should not second guess the trial judge’s credibility findings where no compelling extrinsic or other evidence compels a .different conclusion. In holding otherwise, the majority supplants the district court’s reasoned factual findings with its own speculations and conjectures. More importantly, the majority glosses over the most unusual and disconcerting aspect of this case: here,, the alleged victim of a violent sexual assault has come forward and testified, that the crime never occurred. It is my view that no reasonable juror, faced with a witness, found highly credible by the district court, who emphatically testifies that he was never victimized, could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of that same crime. This is therefore one of the few cases “where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocentf.]” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2689 (1986).
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In order to demonstrate actual innocence in a collateral proceeding, a petitioner must present “new rehable evidence” that was not presented at trial and show “that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (quotation marks omitted). Where the defendant pleaded guilty, the standard nevertheless remains the same. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998).
Here, the district court found that Edwin and Doe credibly testified that the crime for which Doe was convicted never occurred. It then found that Doe “exercise[d] reasonable diligence in pursuing his actual innocence claim once he became able to pursue it at all.” Doe v. Menefee, No. 01 Civ. 10782, slip op. at 22 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2003). “In reviewing factual findings,.we owe particularly strong deference where the district court premises its findings on credibility determinations.” United States v. Monzon, 359 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 64 (2d Cir.1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). The “clearly erroneous” standard, applied to factual determinations made by the district court, is derived from Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), which provides, in pertinent part, that “[fjindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to -the opportunity of the trial court to'judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id: (emphasis added). In Anderson, the Supreme Court- held that the circuit court overstepped its bounds in finding that the district court’s factual conclusions were clearly erroneous. In so holding, the Court reiterated that this *180standard sets an exceedingly high threshold:
If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504 (citations omitted). Recognizing the superior position that trial courts occupy in making factual determinations, the Court noted that trial courts are particularly able to assess the credibility of testifying witnesses:
When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court’s findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.
Id. 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
This circuit has repeatedly relied on Anderson in finding that a “district court’s factual findings based on the testimony of witnesses are distinctly the province of the district court, and we will not lightly overturn such assessments.” United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 642 (2d Cir.1993) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 52 (2d Cir.1998) (“We grant particular deference to the district court when its factual findings are based upon the court’s observation of testimony.”).
Although the majority notes that, under certain circumstances, this Court has “reversed factual findings where the trial court incorrectly assessed the probative value of various pieces of evidence[,]” Op. at 165, the circumstances illustrated by these cases do not involve situations where the evidence at issue was witness testimony. Instead, the majority cites to United States v. Rizzo, where this Court primarily evaluated documentary evidence before the district court, and the district court’s conclusions with respect to this evidence. 349 F.3d 94, 100-02 (2d Cir.2003) (concluding that the district court clearly erred in finding “that the documents used by [the defendant] were obtained through theft[.]”). Rizzo did not comment on the reliability or credibility of any testifying witness. Similarly, in Jiminez v. Mary Washington College, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court drew unreasonable conclusions with respect to documentary evidence, specifically student evaluations. 57 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir.1995). Finally, in Ortega v. Duncan, this Court found that the lower court erred in drawing unreasonable conclusions based on testimony which the lower court had found to be credible. 333 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir.2003). In so holding, we did not disturb the lower court’s finding that the prior testimony of the witness, which was the recantation of a previous statement, was not credible, and in fact, we specifically noted that we gave “deference to [the lower court’s] evaluation of the credibility of his recantation.” Id.
None of the cases cited by the majority involve an appellate court subverting the lower court’s assessment of a witness’s testimony and I was unable to find any case where this Court refused to abide by a district court’s credibility findings. As the following discussion makes clear, the facts of this case are not such that a departure from this established line of cases is warranted.
*181II. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING ACTUAL INNOCENCE

A. Standard for Determining Actual Innocence

I agree with the majority that the district court misapprehended the standard for determining actual innocence. Op. at 161. The district court incorrectly held that it was “satisfied on the totality of the record before [it] that [Doe] has established his innocence by a preponderance of the credible evidence. He has also met the lesser standard mentioned in the mandate, of having presented a credible claim of actual innocence. On the evidence presented, a reasonable juror would have to find a reasonable doubt as to [Doe’s] guilt.” Doe, No. 01 Civ. 10782, at 20. The district court based this conclusion on the erroneous assumption that “[ijnnocence need only be demonstrated to be more likely than unlikely.” Id. at 5.
Our inquiry, however, is not whether Doe established his innocence by a preponderance, but rather, whether the new evidence, when considered in conjunction with the entire record, establishes that it is “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851.

B. Evidence That Can Be Considered In Determining Actual Innocence

Schlup makes clear that, in assessing actual innocence, the district court must reach its decision in “light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial.)” Id. at 328, 115 S.Ct. 851 (quoting Henry Friendly, “Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,” 38 U. Chi. L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)). More recently, however, the Court further specified the type of evidence that should be considered in assessing actual innocence. In its directive to the district court on how to assess an actual innocence claim that may arise on remand, the Supreme Court in Bousley stated that “the Government is not limited to the existing record to rebut any [actual innocence] showing that petitioner might make. Rather the Government should be permitted to present any admissible evidence of petitioner’s guilt even if that evidence was not presented during petitioner’s plea colloquy.” 523 U.S. at 624, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (emphasis added); see also Fountain v. United States, 357 F.3d 250, 255 (2d Cir.2004) (reciting the Bousley “admissible evidence” standard for determining actual innocence in a case involving conspiracy to launder proceeds of wire fraud). Thus, the only evidence that this Court should consider in determining actual innocence is evidence that would have been admissible at trial, and not patently inadmissible evidence such as hearsay testimony or highly prejudicial evidence with little probative value. See Rosario v. United States, 164 F.3d 729, 733-34 (2d Cir.1998) (finding that defendant failed to establish actual innocence under Bousley because the evidence in the record, minus the hearsay testimony by the confidential informant, established defendant’s guilt). The majority dismisses Bousley’s directive that a court may consider only admissible evidence as “mere dictum,” Op. at 163. While it is true that the Court did not strictly have to reach the evidentiary issue because the actual innocence claim was not directly before it, we should not ignore such an explicit directiye from the highest court. Moreover, a contrary reading would cause an inconsistency with the actual innocence standard, which uses as its benchmark the reasonable juror. This hypothetical juror would plainly *182not have access to inadmissible evidence. Accordingly, as intimated by Bousley, in determining whether the reasonable juror would have found the petitioner to be actually innocent, this Court may not rely on evidence that would have been plainly unavailable to this hypothetical juror. The majority’s implicit suggestion that there is a two-step process ■ that neatly separates the evidentiary analysis from the reasonable juror analysis is not supported by case law.
III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
I respectfully find that the majority improperly substituted its own view of the evidence over that of the district court’s when it concluded that “the district court’s finding that the hearing testimony of Doe and Edwin constitutes reliable evidence of Doe’s actual innocence was clearly erroneous.” Op. at 165. Instead, I find that the district court’s assessment of Doe’s and Edwin’s testimony was reasonable, and its “account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504. Thus, this Court’s reversal of the district court on this issue is not appropriate.

(a) No Physical Evidence Supported The Allegation .That Edwin Had Been Assaulted

The majority disregards the district court’s role as the finder-of-facts when it sets aside the lower court’s assessment of Edwin’s testimony. In discounting his testimony, the majority relies1 not on solid extrinsic evidence, but instead, on testimony by other witnesses. Such testimony was oftentimes hearsay, conjectural, or directly refuted by other testimony. Thus, the alleged victim’s testimony was not contradicted by any extrinsic evidence; instead, the majority chooses to credit the testimony by other witnesses over the testimony by the victim. This choice, however, is not for us to make. As held by the Supreme Court in Anderson, “when a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.” 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504.
Here, there was no forensic evidence or trustworthy eyewitness accounts establishing that Doe had in fact assaulted Edwin. Indeed, there was no admissible evidence that corroborated the testimony by former pi'osecutors in the Westchester District Attorneys Office (“D.A.’s Office”), aside from handwritten notes created by the prosecutor herself. Therefore, pursuant to Anderson, the district court’s ruling should not be disturbed unless there is extraordinary evidence that directly undermines the district court’s assessment of the victim’s testimony. No such evidence exists in this case.

(b) Edwin’s Testimony

At the hearing before the district court, Edwin testified that he was 22 years old, worked for Wal-Mart, had one son, and resided in upstate New York (Arkville). Regarding the events at issue, Edwin stated that he never engaged in sexual relations with Doe, forcible or otherwise, and that he was never alone with Doe when he went to see him. He also stated that Doe never refused to take him home or put his hands on him. He testified unequivocally that, although “I was young at the time ... I knew right from wrong. And I wasn’t going to let a man or any other man try to touch me.” Tr. at 16. ■ He also testified that he never told investigators *183from the D.A.’s Office that he had been assaulted by Doe. He said that he told investigators details about Doe’s apartment, but that was because he had been inside the apartment on other occasions with his friend Edward and his cousin Abamelay.
On cross examination, Edwin testified that he did not previously know that Doe had a preference for young men. He instead explained that Doe had been a positive role model for him, and wanted him to stay in school and out of trouble.1 He also responded on cross-examination that Doe never gave him any presents, not even on his birthday.
The district court found Edwin to be forthright, direct and responsive in answering the questions posed. No motivation appears from the record that would justify an inference that he was lying. He left the stand with a strong impression on the part of this Court that he was a truthful witness, that he had socialized with [Doe] and some of his friends, but had not personally engaged in any sexual activity with [Doe] or any other man.
Doe, No. 01 Civ. 10782, at 10.
This assessment of Edwin’s testimony was not clear error. It is without dispute that Edwin had no discernable motive to lie. This is, of course, notwithstanding respondents’s best efforts to disparage Edwin’s character and motives. Respondents suggested that Edwin was testifying because he was homophobic, and was uncomfortable with the insinuation that he was the victim of a homosexual attack. To this Edwin responded that homosexuality does not bother him, and that his brother was in fact gay. Respondents likewise suggested that Edwin had a lengthy criminal history. However, Edwin’s criminal record consisted of a conviction for a domestic dispute, an arrest for not paying the fare when riding the subway, and an arrest for possessing a .paint-ball gun. Respondents accused Edwin of testifying out of loyalty to Doe, because in the past Doe had been a friend to him. To this Edwin responded that he did feel loyal to Doe, because “he never did anything wrong to me.” Tr. at 30. Finally, Edwin testified that he had not been promised anything nor was he getting any benefit in exchange for his testimony. Instead, he stated simply that “I feel that the truth needs to be told, and I’m going to tell the truth. That’s all.” Tr. at 52-53.
The majority’s rejection of Edwin’s testimony rests on an adverse factual inference, contrary to that permissibly drawn by the trial judge. It discredits Edwin’s testimony based on its speculation that Edwin misrepresented his relationship with the “Boy Lovers” group and that this relationship was actually a close one. The majority anchors this conclusion solely on the fact that Edwin responded, “yeah” when asked whether he knew that Angel was “Bill O’Rourke’s boy?” This answer does not indicate when Edwin first learned of this information or whether he was *184aware of the implications of his response. Additionally, the majority relies on the fact that investigator Pat Storino testified that he received a telephone call from FBI Agent Kyle on or about February 10th or 12th, 1994 indicating that “Edwin had been reaching out, thr[ough] Bill 0’R[ourke] and others, to see [Doe]. Edwin and Edward [R.] spoke with 0’R[ourke] and were coached on what to say to thwart the investigation.” Op. at 171. This factual contention, however, had a great potential to discredit Edwin’s testimony. It seems strange that respondents did not directly question Edwin or Doe about this significant issue.
Moreover, the majority admits that “Storino’s testimony on this issue and his notes rest on the hearsay statements of O’Rourke and Kyle.” Op. at 170 n. • 20. Relying on Schlup, the majority dismisses this concern, finding that it may properly consider Storino’s testimony in assessing Doe’s claims of actual innocence. ’ The majority, however, loses sight of the fact that the standard for determining actual innocence is whether' a reasonable juror would have found it beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was actually innocent. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. As discussed supra, Section II, under Bous-ley, evidence that would be inadmissible at trial should not be considered in an actual innocence determination. Accordingly, since Storino’s testimony regarding what O’Rourke told FBI, Agent Kyle would not have been admissible, see Fed. R. Evid. 802, this court should not use this evidence as a basis for discounting Edwin’s testimony.
Finally, a potential to confuse the boys involved was great. There were numerous similarly aged boys involved with the “Boy Lover” group, and one of the main boys’ name was Edward R., who was also known as Eddie R., and who lived across the street from Edwin. Coincidentally, both Edwin’s and Edward’s mother was named Gladys, a fact that took respondents by surprise at the hearing.2
I am not convinced that the two events cited by the majority are sufficient to render Edwin’s testimony “internally inconsistent.” See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504. Accordingly, it is not appropriate for this Court to second guess the trial judge’s assessment of Edwin’s testimony and to substitute its view of the evidence “as a whole” for that of the lower court’s.

(c) Doe’s Testimony

Doe testified that he did not have any physical or sexual contact with Edwin. He testified that, contrary to Edwin’s testimony, he was alone with Edwin once at his apartment and the two were there for less than 10 minutes before they left for an arcade. He testified that, while there, he did not attempt to forcibly have sex with Edwin. The district court observed that “Doe’s emphatic denial of guilt in connection with [Edwin] presents a difficult call for this [c]ourt.” The court then concluded that Doe’s testimony, that he had never assaulted Edwin, “has the ring of truth.” Doe, No. 01 Civ. 10782, at 19.
The majority disbelieves Doe’s protestations of innocence, finding his testimony to be self-serving and lacking in credibility. As support for its position, the majority *185points to three discrepancies in Doe’s testimony. First, it points to the fact that Doe attempted to minimize his pedophilic tendencies during his testimony before the district court. According to the majority, Doe testified that he socialized with Edwin and other boys merely because he enjoyed doing so, and not because he was sexually involved with them. The majority notes that, although Doe testified that “he was not aware that Bagarozy was actually having sex with Edward R. and other boys,” in truth, he was “enmeshed in the Boy Lovers’ activities and was close friends with Bagarozy, with whom he shared underage sex partners, exchanged child pornography, and discussed methods of seducing young boys.” Op. at [35-36]. It is, however, without dispute that Doe was a pedophile. The majority’s observation that Doe may have been involved with other boys is not evidence that Doe necessarily assaulted Edwin in the summer of 1993, the crime for which he was convicted.
Second, the majority contends that Doe’s testimony was unreliable because it contravened statements made by him during the September 15,1993 proffer session. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that Doe may have exaggerated his relationship to Edwin and Edwin’s alleged relationships with other “Boy Lovers” during the proffer session. Although the notes memorializing this meeting are extensive, Doe only mentions Edwin in one sentence where he claims to have also had sex with Edwin “at his residence just in the last couple [of] months and the sex included oral copulation and masturbation.” Appendix for the Respondent-Ap-pellee (“RA”) 267. Significantly, in subsequent federal proffer sessions, Doe was not questioned about Edwin.3 See Laura Kaplan Aff. ¶ 5 (June 8, 2000) (“[a]t no time during the October 4, 1993 proffer session did the defendant discuss his relationship with Edwin [ ].”); see also James A. Kyle Aff. ¶ 6 (June 16, 2000) (the Oct. 4, 1993 proffer session “did not include any discussion of any relationship between [Doe] and a boy named ‘Edwin.’ ”).
Moreover, even though Doe supposedly claimed at the September 15, 1993 proffer session that there were rumors that Edwin was having sex with O’Rourke, and that Edwin was also “one of Richard Bagaro-zy’s ‘main boys,’ ” RA 267. Laura J. Kap-lan, the assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) for the District of New Jersey who was the lead prosecutor in the Bagar-ozy/Federowicz case, acknowledged that “Edwin ... was not one of the children involved in the case being investigated as part of the Bagarozy/Federowicz case.” Kaplan Aff. ¶ 5 (June 8, 2000). Further, Edwin was not mentioned in Doe’s testimony in the Bargarozy trial even though Doe discussed several boys that he, Bagar-ozy and Federowicz had assaulted. Thus, the fact that Edwin was never again mentioned, aside from the one mention at the first proffer session, indicates that the prosecution found Doe’s initial assertions regarding his relationship with Edwin, and Edwin’s relationship with other Boy Lovers, to be tenuous. Thus, it is equally plausible that Doe exaggerated his relationship with Edwin at the initial proffer session in order to gain the benefits of cooperation.
The majority further argues that Doe’s proffer statements must have been truthful because Doe had no motive to lie about having sex with Edwin. The focus of this *186meeting was to ascertain Doe’s knowledge of the. other Boy Lovers’s activities. Doe’s personal conduct “was at most an ancillary issue.” Op. ■ at 167. The majority concludes that Doe must have mentioned having sex with Edwin because it was true. The majority’s speculation regarding Doe’s supposed motive for discussing Edwin is dubious. There is no evidence to suggest that Doe did not feel the need to implicate himself. To the contrary, notes from the proffer session were replete with self-incriminating information, such as Doe’s statement that he paid two young boys to pose naked for photographs, that he traveled to Baltimore, Maryland in 1989 and 1990 to engage in sex with young boys, and that he took boys to a certain hotel frequented by Boy Lovers. Indeed, it is equally likely that he mentioned these events as an attempt to exaggerate his experience as a Boy Lover, which thereby increased his usefulness to the prosecution, rather than volunteered information because of some desire to confess all of his past deeds.
Third, the majority contends that Doe’s testimony was unreliable because it contravened statements made by him during his guilty plea allocution in February 1995. The fact that Doe admitted to sodomizing Edwin in order to obtain the benefits of a plea bargain is not conclusive evidence of guilt. The district court correctly acknowledged that, in the real world, “people yield their honor and principles to overwhelming force and will say, even under oath, what satisfies their instinct for survival.” Doe, No. 01 Civ. 10782, at 17. As noted by the district court, in this case, if Doe accepted the plea, he would have been sentenced to a non-custodial sentence of probation. On the other hand, if he did not accept the plea, or if his plea was rejected for failure to allocute, he could not testify in the federal Newark case and he would have been charged and tried in Westchester for the more serious charge of forcible sodomy, a Class B violent felony, which would subject him to a prison sentence of up to 25 years. The likelihood that he would be convicted if he failed to plead was great. He was allegedly informed by Elizabeth Cronin4 that she had a written statement from the victim and that the victim intended to testify against him. Murray Richman, Doe’s attorney during these events, testified that Cronin “definitely” represented to him that she had a signed statement from the alleged victim. Tr. at 18-19. Cronin denies that this representation was made. Further, Richman most likely informed Doe that a child’s testimony regarding a sexual assault can be devastating and irrebutable. Further, individuals convicted of child molestation have a difficult time in prison. Thus, as found by the district court, “[f]aced with the alternatives known to him, and as might be expected, [Doe] decided to accept the highly favorable plea bargain and to say whatever he needed to say in order to do so.” Doe, No. 01 Civ. 10782, at 18.
Moreover, Doe persuasively argues that AUSA Kaplan pressured him to take the *187plea. Doe testified that he informed Kap-lan that he was averse to the idea of pleading guilty because, “not only hadn’t I committed the underlying crime, but I have never in my life done anything like take somebody and throw them down on a bed or have any violent connection with them involving ... sex, ever.” Tr. at 124. He claims that AUSA Kaplan responded, “You have a problem. You told them in the federal proffer that you had had some contact, and you, in that case, will have to either go back to that or you will have to take the Fifth Amendment on the stand. If you take the Fifth Amendment on the witness stand during my trial ... I will not be a happy camper.” Tr. at 124. Thus, based on these considerations, Doe entered the plea on February 6, 1995, one day before he was originally scheduled to testify in the federal ease. Accordingly, the district court’s decision to credit Doe’s testimony was not so unreasonable that this Court is compelled to reverse.

(d) The Respondents’s Case

The majority holds that it was patently unreasonable for the district court to have credited Edwin’s and Doe’s testimony because their testimony was contradicted by the testimony of former employees of the D.A.’s Office, Elizabeth Cronin, Greg Bernhard, and Pat Storino. There are, however, four reasons why this evidence was not so compelling that the district court’s decision to credit Edwin’s and Doe’s testimony was not clear error.
First, the D.A.’s Office’s case against Doe was poorly developed. The only evidence supporting Doe’s guilty plea, aside from Doe’s own statements, was the recollection of members of the D.A.’s office regarding what a 12-year-old boy had told them during one or two interviews. Cronin’s interview with Edwin was not tape recorded or otherwise memorialized except for her handwritten notes. Further, the same alleged victim now testifies that he never made these statements to investigators and that the underlying crime never occurred. Thus, this is certainly not the case where the district court, in choosing to credit the victim’s testimony, turned its back on a wealth of damming evidence.
Second, when Cronin prosecuted this case, she had not sufficiently corroborated Edwin’s alleged statement that he had been assaulted by Doe. On direct examination, she was asked whether she took any steps to corroborate the details of what Edwin told her. She responded that Edwin had also given her information such as “what [Doe’s] apartment looked like, what [his] car looked like, and ... what [Doe] looked like.” Tr. at 157. These facts, however, establish very little. It is without question that Edwin was familiar with Doe and had been inside his car and apartment on several occasions. The fact that Edwin knew what Doe looked like hardly establishes the issue of whether Doe sexually assaulted him.
On cross-examination, when again asked “what other independent evidence did you have at the time to substantiate or corroborate the statements of Edwin,” Cronin responded “Well, I wouldn’t have had to corroborate his statements, because he was old enough to testify.” Tr. at 182. She then responded that, aside from Edwin’s description of Doe, Doe’s apartment, and Doe’s car, she had wiretaps of conversations by “men in this group about Edwin.” Tr. at 183. Significantly, the wire tap evidence primarily consisted of conversations by other individuals involving what Doe had said, or what they speculated was Doe’s relationship with Edwin. Again, much of this evidence consisted of hearsay testimony that would not have been admissible at trial. Thus, a reasonable juror *188could not consider this evidence in evaluating Doe’s claim of actual innocence.
As a final matter, certain aspects of Cronin’s testimony regarding what Edwin allegedly told her during the two' interviews are inconsistent. She claims that Edwin told her that he had been violently assaulted by Doe on two occasions at his apartment. The first time, Doe forcibly threw Edwin onto his bed, Edwin allegedly struggled against him, and shouted “I want to go, I want to go.” Tr. at 151-53. Doe responded, “You have no other way to get home, because I brought you here.” Id. at 153. Approximately one or two months later, Edwin returned to Doe’s apartment. On this second occasion, Doe supposedly attacked Edwin again, and this time, put his mouth on Edwin’s penis. It is unclear, however, why Edwin would return to Doe’s apartment or even continue associating with Doe after the first violent attack occurred. Indeed, even after the second attack, Edwin continued to go to places with Doe such as the arcade. When asked on cross-examination whether Cronin thought it was odd that, after Edwin had been violently attacked, he would continue to meet with Doe, Cronin responded, “I wouldn’t say I considered it odd, but I did consider it something that I needed to talk to him about.” Tr. at 183.
Third, the time line of the alleged events is also suspicious. Cronin testified that Edwin met Doe “sometime in May [1993], and then the sexual stuff didn’t actually happen until July or August.” Tr. at 185. Edwin’s introduction to Doe in May 1993 was corroborated by Cronin’s notes. Thus, Edwin had associated with Doe for a short amount of time before the alleged assault occurred. Moreover, during July and early August of 1993, Doe was traveling with his chorus group in Europe, a fact attested to in the Bagarozy/Federowiez trial in 1995, and again at the 2003 hearing before the district court. This unappreciated fact has two serious implications: First, prior to the alleged assaults, Edwin had not associated with Doe for a continuous four-month period. ■ Given the brief amount of time that Edwin had known Doe, it seems unlikely that Edwin would have developed such a strong sense of loyalty or comfort level with Doe that he would have returned to Doe’s apartment soon after he was initially attacked, would meet with Doe at an arcade after the second attack, and then would lie on the witness stand for Doe several years later. Second, and more importantly, the fact that Doe was away from New York in July and early August of 1993 is concerning because he plead guilty to assaulting Edwin “on or about and between July 1st of 1993 and August 13th of 1993.” Op. at [11]. Thus, the fact that Doe may have been out of the country when the alleged attacks occurred further supports Doe’s claims of innocence.
Fourth, the district court simply did not find Cronin’s testimony to be credible. It stated:
Without making any adverse credibility finding (as requested by [Doe]) I conclude that where [Edwin’s] testimony differs as to material facts, his version is entitled to greater weight.
Doe, No. 01 Civ. 10782, at 11. While the majority discounts Doe’s testimony as self-serving, at the same time, it ignores the fact that Cronin’s testimony was likewise tinged with self-interest. Doe accuses Cronin of committing misconduct in the prosecution of his case. He claims that she actively misled his attorney into believing that there was a signed victim’s statement when there was none. He also claims that the D.A.’s Office made assurances that if he cooperated with Westches-ter and federal law enforcement agents, he would not be prosecuted by the D.A.’s Office. Cronin therefore had an incentive *189to defend the choices that she made while prosecuting this case. Because her testimony could likewise be viewed as self-serving, it is not for this Court to decide which testimony is more believable on this basis.
The district court further found that this “case was but one of many sordid situations involving children dealt with by Ms. Cronin during her lengthy public service in the office of the District Attorney. Her recollection is based primarily on her notes, at least some of which are not contemporaneous records.” Id. The majority dismisses this observation as “pure speculation,” although it admits that only four out of seven pages of notes were dated. Op. at 172. It contends that “there was no testimony that Cronin routinely dealt with similar accusations.” Op. at 172. Cronin, however, testified that she was employed at the D.A.’s Office for 14 years, and for 12 of those years, she was assigned to the “Special Prosecutions Division.” She describes her position as the “Assistant D.A. in that office handling domestic child abuse cases.” Accordingly, because it is clear that she routinely dealt with child abuse cases, the majority’s discounting of the district court’s view of Cronin’s testimony on this basis was likewise improper.
The majority further suggests that the district court erred in failing to acknowledge the fact that Cronin’s testimony was “corroborated in full by the testimony of ADA Bernhard.” Op. at 172-73. There was, however, a seeming discrepancy between Cronin’s and Bernhard’s testimony. Bernhard, who was present at Cronin’s interviews with Edwin, testified about a single assault, while according to Cronin’s testimony and her notes, Edwin was allegedly assaulted twice. When asked on direct examination whether Bernhard remembered “how the coerced aspect of the conduct first came to be?” he responded that Edwin told him and Cronin that Doe took Edwin to his apartment, began “grabbing at [Edwin’s] legs ... [and that Doe] eventually pulled [Edwin] off of the chair and threw him on a bed and pulled down his pánts and put his mouth on Edwin’s penis.” Tr. at 198-99. The majority attempts to explain this discrepancy by stating that “Bernhard was asked only about Edwin’s second visit to the apartment, from which the sodomy charge arose.” Op. at 158 n. 14. This characterization of the question posed to Bernhard is inaccurate. Bernhard first discussed the assault, and then a few questions later, respondents returned to this line of questioning and made clear that Bernard was describing the second attack.5 Unfortunately, *190neither party sought to clarify this ambiguity.
* * * * * *
I conclude that the district court did not err in crediting Edwin’s and Doe’s testimony. Adopting the district court’s credibility findings, I find that. Doe has presented new reliable evidence of actual ipnocence and that it is more likely than not “that no reasonable juror would have found [Doe] guilty.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329, 115 S.Ct. 851. No reasonable juror would have found Doe guilty beyond a reasonable doiibt where Edwin, the alleged victim, credibly testified that no criminal act occurred, and no .damning, physical evidence or. eyewitness testimony exists to contradict this testimony.
IV. AEDPA TOLLING
Had I been able to convince the majority that this case presehted a credible claim of actual innocence, this panel would then have taken up the issue of whether AED-PA’s one year statute of limitations is tolled. Because the majority does not agree that this case does present a credible claim of actual innocence, I decline to consider that issue as a panel of one, as tempting as that opportunity may be, and leave for another day the resolution of this difficult issue.
V. ATTORNEY INCOMPETENCE
I do not dispute the majority’s affir-mance of the district court’s conclusions with respect to the attorney incompetence issue. For the reasons stated by the majority; I likewise find that Doe did not exercise reasonable diligence during the period he seeks to toll.

CONCLUSION

While there are conflicts between Doe’s and Edwin’s testimony on one hand, and Cronin’s, Storino’s, and Bernard’s testimony on the other, I believe the district court did not clearly err in finding Doe’s and Edward’s testimony to be more credible. It is inappropriate in all but the most extraordinary cases for this Court to second-guess a district court’s credibility findings. Nothing in the record convinces me that Cronin’s, Bernhard’s and Storino’s testimony was irrefutably more credible. The majority’s dissection of the district court’s decision departs from our precedents and wrongly supplants the lower court’s assessment of the evidence with its own factual inferences, never having seen or heard any of the testimony that it now seeks to discredit. Edwin’s testimony was not so inconsistent with other evidence in the record that this Court is compelled to discredit it. Accordingly, I must dissent.

.
Question: ... Your family didn't have a lot of money?
Edwin: No, sir.
Question: What did [Doe, Bill O’Rourke, Rich Federowicz] do for you?
Edwin: They didn’t do — they didn’t do anything. It wasn’t like I went out with them and I — I’m supposed to like let them touch me or anything like that. No. It’s just I met them, you know. And ever since I met [Doe], he’s been like a ... friend figure, because he’s always ... cared about like the things I’ve done, you know. Like he didn't want me to get into no trouble. He wanted me to stay in school.
Tr. at 29.

. Respondents were also confused regarding the identity of other boys. For example, at one point during the hearing, respondents confused Edwin and Edwin's brother, Xavier. On cross examination, respondents asked Edwin whether he ever represented himself to be Xavier, and Edwin responded: “No. That's my brother.’’ Respondents then asked, “That's your brother?” Edwin replied, “Yes, sir.” Tr. at 24.

. Although the majority held that there is no indication in the record of what Doe stated in the October proffer session, see Op. at [9 n. 8], affidavits submitted by AUSA Laura Kaplan and investigator Kyle clearly indicate that Edwin was not discussed at the second proffer session.

. Elizabeth Cronin is currently the Director of Legal Affairs for our Court of Appeals. In my memorandum of December 22, 2003 to. the Special Committee on Conflicts, I expressed my unease over this Court's retention of jurisdiction over this case because, in considering Doe’s petition, we are required to rule on the propriety of past prosecutorial conduct by Cronin, a senior member of our staff. RSP MEM. (Dec. 22, 2003); Op. at [45-46]. We are also required to assess the credibility of her recent testimony regarding these events before the district court. These circumstances may appear to create a conflict of interest. The committee considered at length these concerns and concluded that the conflict was not so severe as to necessitate our recusal. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Consideration of Doe v. Menefee No. 03-2432 (Feb. 4, 2004).

.
Question: Okay. Do you remember how the coerced aspect of the conduct first came to be? Was it suggested by you or Ms. Cronin or stated by the boy for the first time?
Bernhard: It was Edwin.
Question: He stated it himself, before—
Bernhard: He didn’t use the word force. But Edwin was the one who was telling us that [Doe] invited him into his apartment to use a computer game, and that, while he was on the computer, [Doe] was grabbing at his legs and trying to turn him away from the computer game, and that he eventually pulled him off of the chair and threw him on a bed and pulled down his pants and put his mouth on Edwin’s penis.
Question: Okay. For clarification’s sake, is it true that you’re basing your testimony here today on a combination of your own recollection and your review of notes prepared that you understand to be prepared by Ms. Cronin?
Question: So, in essence, just tell us what you understand — you recall Ed*190win to have said in regard to the second time that he went to [Doe's apartment]?
Bernhard: That he, in fact, was invited up to use the video game, to see a computer game, actually, and that [Doe] kept grabbing him, and he told him to cut it out, “Stop grabbing my leg.” that [Doe] put his mouth on his penis after [Doe] pulled [Edwin’s] pants down.
Tr. at 198-99.