Court Opinion

ID: 9768632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:12:57.97367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:42.687592
License: Public Domain

STERNBERG, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinions which uphold the constitutionality of the norfault insurance law are dangerously bottomed on the case of Wells v. Jefferson County, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 462. Undoubtedly, much has been written and much more could be written eulogizing the Kentucky Constitution and deriding its unsavory mastication. Regardless of my strong feelings in that respect, it is not my purpose at this time to do either. It is only my wish to analyze the Workmen’s Compensation Act in its relation to employer and employee; to analyze the effect of the 1952 amendment which gave rise to the Wells case, supra; and to analyze the true legal issue which it presented and determined. Wells does not constitute an un-surmountable obstacle which shields no-fault from a successful constitutional attack.
To get to the real issue in Wells, we must consider the purpose of workmen’s compensation. In Morrison v. Carbide, 278 Ky. 746, 129 S.W.2d 547, in discussing the purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, we said:
“For a proper understanding of the questions presented for determination it is necessary to look not only to the express provisions of the compensation law but to the causes that led to its enactment, its spirit and purposes and the ends sought to be attained. A lengthy discussion of those matters would be mostly unnecessary restatement of a subject already thoroughly covered by courts and text writers. It is sufficient to say that our compensation law is neither cumulative nor supplemental to the common law with respect to personal injuries growing out of industrial occupations. It practically abolished the common law relating to the subject of tortious liability as between the employer and the employee and that abolition carried with it the harsh and as often applied, inhuman rules of assumed risk, fellow servant and contributory negligence which an old school of thought and economics had engrafted into the common law. It was in effect a compromise between the employer and the employee to avoid the expense, vexatious delay and uncertainty of actions at law; and for its superior advantages to them, both surrendered some rights under the common law. However, it was *785enacted not only for their benefit but in the public interest since the costs of maintenance of courts fell upon the public and the injured, indigent employee and his dependents often became public charges. Under the modern, more humane and enlightened conception, growing out of the long controversy and thought, and embodied in the act, liability is no longer dependent upon negligence, tortious conduct, contributory negligence or assumed risk, but as between an employer and employee who bring themselves within the terms of the act, the former, however blameless he may be, is nevertheless liable to the employee for accidental injury arising out of his employment. By the act the state has declared a public policy the wisdom of which is no longer a matter of doubt. It provides a method of speedy, inexpensive determination of the rights and liabilities as between the employer and the injured employee who come within its provisions and clearly bespeaks a purpose and intention to make the method and procedure prescribed exclusive.”
We must bear in mind that prior to the 1952 amendment the contract of employment between the employer and the employee included as a part and parcel of the contract the workmen’s compensation law only, and only, if the employee in writing accepted the provisions of the Act. The 1952 amendment made the Workmen’s Compensation Act part and parcel of the contract of employment unless, and only unless, the employee in writing rejected the Act. The law considers the employer and the employee as dealing at arms length. The employer can hire on terms and conditions which make the Workmen’s Compensation Act a part of the contract of employment. The employee can accept employment on the terms and conditions that make the Workmen’s Compensation Act a part of the contract or he can refuse such employment. By acceptance of work the employee makes all of the provisions of the workmen’s compensation statute a part of his contract of employment.
In Wells, supra, we said:
“ * * * The question now before us is whether a waiver of the constitutional rights may be effected by means of the failure of the employe to elect affirmatively to retain those rights.”
In other words, in effect we said in Wells that the question before us was whether a waiver of the constitutional rights may be effected (in the contract of employment) by means of the failure of the employee to elect affirmatively to retain those rights. By Wells this court made the Workmen’s Compensation Act a part of the contract of employment, which thereby contained a waiver of constitutional rights, unless the employee by a writing elected to retain them.
In the case at bar, there is no contract between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and any one relative to the use of Kentucky highways. The operation of a motor vehicle on the highways of this Commonwealth is a privilege and not a right. Sturgill v. Beard, Ky., 303 S.W.2d 908; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, Ky., 355 S.W.2d 686. The state is not without limitation, however, even in the exercise of its police power in controlling the use of its highways. In Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra, we said:
“Our court has likewise held that to operate a motor vehicle on a public road is not a natural or unrestricted right but rather is a privilege granted by the statute and subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the state. * * *7?
It will serve no useful purpose to further delineate the distinction in the case at bar from the Wells case. The difference is apparent.
As I read the majority opinions, in the absence of Wells this court would be constrained to say that the provisions of the no-fault insurance law run afoul of our constitution. The Commonwealth, as well as its citizens, is limited by the constitution;
*786and without Wells as a shield, it could hardly be contended that no-fault is constitutional.
I have great fear and much misgiving of the impetus that the majority opinions in this case will give to other and similar-type legislation, controlling by implied consent each and every profession, calling, or endeavor. To me, the encroachment of implied consent into our judicial philosophy is a monster, so great that its disastrous effect is unpredictable.
Be it ever remembered that the majority opinions of this court upholding the constitutionality of the no-fault insurance law came about through no fault of the writer of this dissent.
I have unequivocably concurred in the minority opinion which was written by Justice Lukowsky, and still do; but having such deep apprehensions of the results of implied consent philosophy being injected into legal jurisprudence, I feel it necessary to write this separate dissenting opinion.