Court Opinion

ID: 9677621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:56:23.956046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:57.136863
License: Public Domain

HAMLIN, Justice:
Defendant appeals from a judgment of the trial court in favor of the Parish of Jefferson and against Louis M. Sowers,1 ' Director of the Louisiana Department of Corrections, which forever enjoined, restrained, and prohibited Sowers and his successors in office from purchasing the site and facilities known as the “House of The Good Shepherd,” containing approximately thirty acres of land on the River Road, Parish of Jefferson, and declared sub-section 4 of Sec. 902 of Act 353 of 1970, Act 452 of 1970, and Sec. 834 of Act. 192 of 1968, unconstitutional.
Act 192 of 1968 amended Chapter 7 of.’ Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, of 1950 by adding thereto a new part to be: designated as Part III-A thereof to contain R.S. 15:821 through 15:839, relative-to prisons and correctional institutions. It provided for the merger of the Louisiana Board of Institutions and the Department of Institutions and consolidated the functions thereof into the Louisiana Department of Corrections (hereinafter referred to as the Department). LSA-R.S. 15:-834 was enacted to read in part as follows:
“Sec. 834. Lands under control of department; lease, rights of way, purchase
“ * * * The director shall also have the authority, with the approval of the Board of Corrections and the Governor, to buy lands needed for the proper use of any institution under the jurisdiction of the department; and also to sell and transfer to any other state agency real property belonging to the state and under the jurisdiction of the department.”
Act 246 of 1968 provides in part:
“To amend Chapter 7 of Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 by adding thereto a new Part, to be des*1069ignated as Part IV-A thereof and to contain R.S. 15:891 through 15:894, relative to prisons and correctional institutions; to authorize the Louisiana State Department of Institutions to create and establish a juvenile correctional institution, a women’s correctional facility, an adult correctional institution and a diagnostic and treatment center, and to provide with respect to the personnel for said center.
“Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:
“Section 1. Part IV-A of Chapter 7 of Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, comprising R.S. 15:891 through R.S. 15:894, is hereby enacted to read as follows:
“PART IV-A. ADDITIONAL INSTITUTIONS
“§ 891. Juvenile correctional institution
“The Louisiana State Department of Institutions is hereby authorized to create, establish, operate and maintain a juvenile corectional institution in the greater New Orleans area for children under seventeen years of age who have been or shall be legally adjudged delinquent or neglected juveniles, as defined by law, by a juvenile court of Louisiana or by the • district courts sitting as juvenile courts.”
Act 353 of 1970 provides in part:
“To amend Chapter 7 of Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 by adding thereto a new Part to be designated as Part IV-B thereof to contain R.S. 15:901 through 15:907, and to repeal Sections 891, 911 through 918, 971 through 978 and 1011 through 1018 Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, all relative to juvenile institutions operated by the Louisiana Department of Corrections; to establish a juvenile reception and diagnostic center; to provide for the commitment of juveniles to the said department of corrections; to require the examination of all such juveniles at the juvenile reception and diagnostic center; to provide for the assignment by the said department of corrections of juvenile offenders to the several juvenile institutions operated by the said department of corrections; and to provide with respect thereto.
“Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:
“Section 1. Part IV-B of Chapter 7 of Title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 is hereby enacted to read as follows:
“ * * *
“§ 902. Juvenile institutions
“The department of corrections shall establish, operate and maintain the Lou*1071isiana Training Institute for juveniles, with the following branches:
«* * *
“(4) the Louisiana Training Institute, to be located in the greater New Orleans area.” (Emphasis ours.)
Act 452 of 1970 provides:
“To authorize Louisiana Department of Corrections to purchase the site and facilities known as the House of the Good Shepherd, containing approximately thirty acres of land on the right descending bank of the Mississippi River located on the river road, near ‘Bridge City’ in the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana; and to establish on said site the juvenile correctional institution authorised by the provisions of Act No. 246 of 1968, and otherwise to provide with respect thereto.
“Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:
“Section 1. The Louisiana Department of Corrections is hereby authorized to purchase the site and facilities known as the House of the Good Shepherd, containing approximately thirty acres of land on the right descending bank of the Mississippi River, located on the river road near ‘Bridge City’ in the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana; and to establish on said site the juvenile correctional institution authorized by the' provisions of Act No. 246 of 1968.
“Section 2. The Louisiana Department of Corrections is authorized to expend out of funds available to it such sums as may be necessary for the implementation of this Act.
“Section 3. All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.
“Section 4. The necessity of the immediate passage of this Act having been certified by the Governor to the Legislature while in session, in accordance with Section 27 of Article III of the Constitution of Louisiana, this Act shall become effective immediately upon approval. by the Governor.2” (Emphasis ours.)
By virtue of the legislation supra, the Department commenced negotiations for the purchase of the property herein involved— the “House of The Good Shepherd,” located in Jefferson Parish but embraced in the Greater New Orleans Area. It is stipulated that the Governor of the State of Louisiana signified his consent to the negotiations for the purchase of the property.
■ Mr. Hugh Ford, Planning Director of the Department of Planning, Parish of Jefferson, testified that the “House of The Good Shepherd” area was originally zonéd as “Single Family Residential” when the first Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance was *1073adopted by the Parish Council in 1958. In 1959-or 1960, the property was reclassified “R-3” for the specific purpose of allowing .a private institution which could not be located on the site if it were zoned “R-l”— single family residential — to be located in the area. The property was reclassified in 1969 to “R-2,” which permits single family structures; two-family structures; churches; schools; buildings used exclusively by local, State, and Federal Offices, except penal and correctional institutions. Presently, the non-conforming use under which the ■“House of The Good Shepherd” operates is permitted by Section XIX of the Comprelrensive Zoning Ordinance.3
Alleging violations of the zoning ordinances of Jefferson Parish and numerous constitutional violations with respect to the alleged purpose (establishment of a juvenile correctional institution) for which the Department would use the “House of The Good Shepherd” if purchased, the Parish of Jefferson instituted the present injunction proceedings in which it prayed that the Department be enjoined from “(1) Purchasing the site and facilities known as the ‘House of The Good Shepherd’ in the Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana; and (2) Establishing on said site the juvenile correctional institution that was authorized by Act No. 246 of 1968.” It also prayed that certain parts of the legislation supra be declared unconstitutional.
The Sisters of the Good Shepherd intervened in the proceedings in support of the position of the defendant who asked that plaintiff’s demands be rejected. Intervenor averred that it had agreed to sell its property to the State of Louisiana through its Department of Corrections on certain terms and conditions.
With the permission of the trial court, counsel for the defendant recalled prefatory and peremptory exceptions previously filed. Counsel consented that the issues go to trial on both the Rule for Preliminary Injunction and on the Merits of the Application for a Permanent Injunction.
Initially, we find that the trial court had the authority to try this matter. We agree with its statement that, “There is no question in the Court’s mind that the Court has a right and a duty to invoke injunctive relief in cases dealing with the constitutionality of the State Statutes. The Court cites as authority for this, the case of Carso vs. Board of Liquidation of State Debt, 205 La. 368, 17 So.2d 358; and the Court also cites the case of city of Natchitoches v. State of Louisiana, Third Circuit 1969 [La.App.], 221 So.2d 534.”
*1075In its reasons for judgment the trial court stated that it was concerned with the effect of LSA-R.S. 15:891, as set forth in Act No. 246 of 1968, supra. The question, “was this Section 891 the law immediately after the passage of Act 452 of 1970 and immediately after the passage of Act No. 353 of 1970?” was posed and was answered as follows:
“It is quite clear from ACT No. 353 that Section 891 of ACT No. 246 of 1968 was repealed relative to the creation of a Juvenile Correctional Institution in the Greater New Orleans Area.
“In looking at the Title of ACT No. 353 and in dealing with the provision for the assignment of juvenile offenders, in ACT 353 of 1970, the TITLE indicated that these juvenile offenders were to be assigned to the several juvenile institutions OPERATED by the said Department of Corrections. It did not seem to indicate in the Title that they were referring to anything but Juvenile Training Institutes — institutes which were already in being. It says ‘OPERATED.’ That to the Court’s mind did not refer to any institutions to be CREATED.
“Then we are faced with [the] proposition that in this same ACT No. 353 of 1970 there is legislative intention by the repeal of Section 89.1 of ACT No. 246 to abolish the CREATION of a Juvenile Correctional Institution in the Greater New Orleans Area. This appears as part of ACT No. 353, being Section 3 of said Act. Yet in the same Act under Section 902 of ACT No. 353 the Legislature-states : ‘The Department of Corrections shall establish, operate and maintain the-Louisiana Training Institutes for Juveniles at the following branches in Section 4, Louisiana Training Institute to be-located in the Greater New Orleans Area.’ Yet Section 902, sub-section 4 of Act No. 353 is not provided for in the-Title to said Act. Accordingly, the Court feels that this is broader than the Title- and hereby declares Section -902 of ACT No. 353 of 1970, sub-section 4, is HEREBY DECLARED TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.”
The trial court also found, as stated supra, Act 452 of 1970 unconstitutional and stated:
“It is the Court’s opinion that this Act refers to its authority for the creation of a Juvenile Correctional Institution as ACT No. 246 of 1968. As of today and when ACT No. 452 of 1970 became law, then ACT No. 246 of 1968 which provides for the CREATION of a Juvenile Correctional Institution is no longer in being. Therefore, the authority which the Preamble of this Act uses as its authority for the establishment or the purchase of this property no longer exists. Since this authority no longer exists, and since the Court has found that Section 906, sub*1077section 4 of ACT No. 353 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, the Court further concludes that ACT No. 452 of 1970 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.”
In this Court appellant assigns four errors to the judgment of the trial court. We find them to be with merit and shall dis■pose of them infra. Amicus curiae briefs in defendant’s behalf were filed by the Louisiana AFL-CIO and the Greater New Orleans Federation of Churches, and the issues presented therein shall also be discussed infra.
Herein the Parish of Jefferson submits that this Court should affirm the judgment rendered by the trial court and maintain the permanent injunction granted in force against the Department.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 1
“The trial court erred in holding that Act 452 of 1970 is unconstitutional on the asserted grounds that the authority for the operation of the juvenile training institute in the Greater New Orleans area, as authorized by R.S. 15:891 of Act 246 of 1968, was repealed by Act of 1970.”
The issue to be determined under this Specification of Error is whether Act 452 of 1970 is to be rendered unconstitutional because it made reference to the juvenile correctional institution authorized by the provisions of Act No. 246 of 1968, said act being repealed in part by Act 353 of 1970.
Act 353 of 1970 repealed only that part of Act 246 of 1968, LSA-R.S. 15 :891, supra, which provided for the creation, establishment, operation, and maintenance of a juvenile correctional institution in the Greater New Orleans area for children under seventeen years of age. Act 353 of 1970 provided that the Department shall establish, operate, and maintain the Louisiana Training Institute to be located in the Greater New Orleans Area, LSA-R.S. 15:-902. Act 452 of 1970 — it became law at the same time as Act 353 of 1970 — authorized the Department to purchase the “House of The Good Shepherd” facilities for the establishment on said site of a juvenile correctional institution authorized by Act No. 246 of 1968.
In asserting the constitutionality of the legislation herein involved, defendant pertinently argues:
“Act 353 was a general revision of the statutory general law dealing with juvenile institutions and the creation of a state-wide Louisiana Training Institute.4 It would have been inappropriate to incorporate therein the special provisions dealing with the purchase of property and the specific location of this branch of the Louisiana Training Institute on *1079the property to be purchased from the Order of the Good Shepherd, so a separate Act was decided upon — -Act 452 of 1970. In Act 452 the legislature could not refer to Act 353 of 1970 for the purpose of making it clear that the institution provided for in Act 452 was one and the same as that which they had previously provided for in Act 246 of 1968 for the greater New Orleans area because Act 353 was not yet an Act; so they referred to Act 246 of 1968 solely for the purpose of making it clear that the institution to be established on the property known as the House of the Good Shepherd was one and the same as the institution which had been authorized in Act 246 of 1968, the authorization for which was transferred into Act 353 of 1970. If Act 353 had failed to pass in the 1970 session, Act 452 would still have been whole and complete and this badly needed institution could still have been brought into existence.” 5
“In construing a statute, the primary object is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute. Since the meaning is to be determined from a general consideration of the act as a whole, all parts, provisions or sections must be read together; each must be considered with respect to, or in the light of, all the- other provisions, and construed in harmony with the whole. The intent as deduced from the whole will prevail over that of a particular part considered separately; meaning should be given, if possible, to' each and every section, and the construction placed on one portion should not be such as to obliterate another; so, in determining the meaning of a word, phrase or clause, the entire statute is to be considered.” Fruge v. Muffoletto, 242 La. 569, 137 So.2d 336, 339 (1962). Courts should construe statutes so as to give them the meaning intended by the Legislature; they should not construe them so rigidly as to give them preposterous or odd meanings. Hayes v. Orleans Parish School Board, 256 La. 677, 237 So.2d 681; Webb v. Parish Council of Parish of East Baton Rouge, 217 La. 926, 47 So.2d 718. “It is well established that in the construction of statutes absurd results should be avoided, and when the literal construction would produce such a result, the letter of the law must give way to its spirit and the statute should be construed so as to produce a reasonable result.” Bradford v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 189 La. 327, 179 So. 442, 446. See, LSA-C.C. Art. 18; Frey v. Central Mutual Insurance Company, La.App., 150 So.2d 822.
Act 353 of 1970 reincorporated in great part LSA-R.S. 15:891, supra, by enacting LSA-R.S. 15:902. No authority granted the Department by Act 246 of 1968 ■ was' *1081taken away from it by Act 353. In fact, Act 353 strengthened the Department’s authority by using the mandatory phrase “shall establish.”
Act 452 of 1970 is a companion act to Act 353 of 1970. The latter establishes the basis for the authorized purchase of the property identified in Act 452 of 1970. A reading of the involved leglislation makes clear the intention of the 1970 Legislature to authorize the Department to purchase the instant thirty acre site in Jefferson Parish and establish thereon a juvenile correctional institute. LSA-R.S. 15:834, enacted as a part of Act 192 of 1968, supra, which empowered the Director of the Department with the approval of the Department and the Governor to buy lands was not repealed. (The trial judge declared it unconstitutional.) Certainly, the Legislature did not intend to do a vain and useless thing when it passed Act 452 of 1970; its referral to Act 246 of 1968 indicates an intent to identify and describe.
We conclude that the acts involved under this Specification of Error — those parts repealed and those in force and effect —are all in pari materia and must be construed with a reference to each other. “Laws in pari materia are required to be construed together. Abercrombie v. Gilfoil, La.App., 205 So.2d 461. ‘The Legislature is presumed to have enacted each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. The meaning and intent of a statutory provision, therefore, is to be determined by a consideration of the statute in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter, and a construction should be placed on the provision in question which is consistent with the express terms of the statute and with the obvious intent of the Legislature in enacting it. * * * ’ Legros v. Conner, La.App., 212 So.2d 177, 180.” State v. Seals, 255 La. 1005, 233 So.2d 914, 918 (1970). See, LSA-C.C. Art. 17; Arata v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, 254 La. 579, 225 So.2d 362; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. J. Thos. Driscoll, Inc., 194 La. 935, 195 So. 497; Schwartz Supply Company v. Zimmerman, 228 La. 861, 84 So.2d 438.
We conclude that Act 452 of 1970 is not unconstitutional on the ground that in its title it refers to Act No. 246 of 1968, repealed in part by Act 353 of 1970.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 2
“The trial court erred in holding that Act 353 of 1970, with regard to R.S. 15:902, sub-section 4 thereof, was unconstitutional as violative of La.Const. Art. 3, Sec. 16, in that Act 353 of 1970 did not have a title indicative of its object as related to R.S. 15 :902.”
The title of Act 353 of 1970 states that the Act amends the Louisiana Revised Statutes by adding a new part designated as Part IV-B, containing R.S. 15:901 *1083through 15:907. The title also states that certain sections of Title 15 are repealed, all relative to juvenile institutions operated by the Department. The title further states that the Act provides for the assignment by the Department of juvenile offenders to the several juvenile institutions operated by the Department. The title concludes with the phrase “and to provide with respect thereto.”
As stated supra, the trial judge was of the opinion that Section 902, sub-section 4 of Act No. 353 of 1970, is not provided for in the Act’s title. He also found that the title of the Act only referred to institutions in operation and not to those to be created. Thus, the trial judge found that Act 353 of 1970 with regard to LSA-R.S. 15 :902, subsection 4, violates Art. Ill, Sec. 16, La. Const, of 1921.6
Section 16 of Article III was discussed in detail in Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service, 200 La. 341, 8 So.2d 49 (1942). Wc said that in order to judicially determine whether a statute is violative of the section, it is necessary to first examine the body of the act in order to ascertain its purpose or aim. In examining the body of an act in relation to its title, we noted, “It is not the purpose of this article [Sec. 16] to require that the title be an index to the contents of the act, or that every end and means convenient or necessary for the accomplishment of the general object of the act be set out at length in the title, but it is deemed sufficient, under the article, that the act contain but one object and that the object be fairly stated, although it be expressed in general terms, in the title of the act. All things proper or necessary to carry out the general object, so stated in the title, are deemed to be within the scope of the title. * * * ” Southern Hide Co. v. Best, 176 La. 347, 145 So. 682 (1933).
In Ricks, after citing and quoting numerous authorities,7 we quoted with ap*1085proval the following from Peck v. City of New Orleans, 199 La. 76, 5 So.2d 508, 516: “It is the well-settled jurisprudence of this State that, where an Act contains more than one object and only one of those objects is expressed or indicated by the title, the entire statute will not be held unconstitutional on that score unless the object, which is not expressed in the title, is so wholly dependent upon the expressed object that it cannot be separated therefrom without destroying the intention manifested by the Legislature in passing the Act. * * * )>
We found, supra, under Specification of Error No. 1 that Act 452 of 1970 is constitutional and that it is a companion act to Act 353 of 1970. We therefore have two acts of 1970, which, when read in pari materia — as we found supra that they must be — specifically set forth the program of the Department with respect to juvenile offenders and delinquents. Moreover, we find that under the above jurisprudence Act 353 of 1970 meets the tests therein set forth. In substance, Act 353 of 1970 provides for the establishment of diagnostic and reception centers for juvenile offenders and delinquents and for the assignment of such juveniles to certain institutions. The establishment, operation, and maintenance of the Louisiana Training Institute in the Greater New Orleans Area is a matter necessary and proper to the accomplishment of the general object of the Act; consequently, there was no need for the title to recite the provisions of LSA-R.S. 15 :902. We conclude that Act 353 of 1970 meets the requirements of Art. Ill, Sec. 16, La. Const, of 1921; sub-section 4 of Sec. 902— LSA-R.S. 15:902 — of Act 353 of 1970 is therefore constitutional.
The cases of State v. Jackson, 137 La. 741, 69 So. 158; Altom v. Mt. Vernon Oil & Gas Co., 174 La. 775, 141 So. 457; Sullivan v. Minden Lumber Co., 135 La. 331, 65 So. 479; A. & M. Pest Control Service, Inc. v. LaBurre, 247 La. 315, 170 So.2d 855; and, Airey v. Tugwell, 197 La. 982, 3 So.2d 99, cited by plaintiff, are not apposite. The bodies of the acts involved in those cases were unconstitutionally broader or broader in part than the title of the acts.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 3
“The trial court erred in holding that Act 192 of 1968 is unconstitutional with respect to R.S. 15:834, as created by said Act, on the asserted grounds that the title to said Act was not indicative of the contents of R.S. 15 :834.”
*1087After declaring unconstitutional Act 452 of 1970 and sub-section 4 of Section 902 ■of Act 353 of 1970, the trial court permitted plaintiff, with the consent of defend.ant, to amend its petition to include an -additional cause of action insofar as Section 834 of Act No. 192 of 1968 was concerned. Plaintiff alleged that the act was unconstitutional on the basis that the •preamble of the act does not mention the authority to purchase lands by the Director of the Department.
After the above amendment, the trial ■court stated:
“Well, I think it would be in order that the Court indicates that it is the feeling of the Court that Section 834 of ACT No. 192 of 1968, insofar as it provides for the Director of the Department of Corrections to purchase lands on behalf of the Department with the approval of the Board and the Governor, is unconstitutional and the Court hereby declares the same to be UNCONSTITUTIONAL for it is not provided for in the TITLE of ACT No. 192 of 1968.”
Supra, we discussed Act 192 of 1968. It is a detailed, broad, and lengthy act relative to prisons and correctional institutions. We find tha. the authorizing of the Director of the Department, LSA-R.S. 15:834, to buy lands needed for the proper use of any institution under the jurisdiction of the Department was a grant •of power to him which he needed to accomplish the general object of the act. Such authorization did not have to be mentioned in the title of the act. The authorities cited and quoted under Specification of Error No. 2, supra, are apposite to this Specification of Error. We conclude that Section 894, LSA-R.S. 15:894, of Act 192 of 1968 is constitutional and not violative of Article III, Section 16, La. Const, of 1921.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 4
“The trial court erred by failing to pass upon the question of law as to whether the zoning ordinances of the Parish of Jefferson, as authorized by La. Const. Art. 14, Sec. 29(a) apply to governmental institutions of the State of Louisiana.”
Because of its rulings, supra, and its findings of unconstitutionality of the legislation herein involved, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to pass upon the issue of zoning. However, plaintiff alleged in Article 21 of its petition that Act No. 452 of 1970 is unconstitutional in that the act “permits the Louisiana Department of Corrections to effect a change in use of property, which power is exclusive to Jefferson Parish, without first applying for a change in classification through the Planning Director of Jefferson Parish and without giving Jefferson Parish an opportunity to have a public hearing before the Jefferson Parish Council, all in violation of the Comprehensive *1089Zoning Ordinances of Jefferson Parish, thereby depriving plaintiff of the equal protection of the law and further depriving plaintiff of a property right without due process of law.” In other articles of its petition, plaintiff made allegations with respect to the operations of the “House of The Good Shepherd.” It also alleged that the use of the property authorized by Act 452- of 1970 was definitely different from that presently exercised by the Sisters of The Good Shepherd. Defendant denied the allegations of Article 21 of plaintiff’s petition and averred in Article 19 of its answer that, “the House of the Good Shepherd has been operating as a correctional home- for many years preceding the alleged zoning ordinance receiving commitments of juveniles from various courts within the Greater New Orleans area.”
We conclude that the matter of zoning was at issue in the trial court. Testimony was adduced with respect thereto, and exhibits^-zoning ordinances — were offered in evidence. Under the authority of Article 2164 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we. shall render a decision with respect to Specification of Error No. 4. Cf. Board of Com’rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Shushan, 197 La. 598, 2 So.2d 35.
Art. XIV, Sec. 29, La. Const of 1921, provides:
“The Parish óf Jefferson is authorized to zone its territory; to create residential, commercial and industrial districts, and to prohibit the establishment of pláces of business in residential districts.”
The foregoing section is a constitutional grant of part of the police power of the State of Louisiana. It is to be noted, however, that the grant- places no restriction upon the legislative power of the State Legislature, nor does it relinquish any power of the State Legislature to establish governmental institutions in territory zoned by the Parish of Jefferson.
“In this connection, it is well to observe that it is fundamental that the Legislature is supreme except when restricted by the Constitution and that, unlike Congress, which can do nothing that the Federal Constitution does not authorize, may do everything that the State Constitution does not prohibit. * * * Thus, in view of this basic principle, the fact that the Constitution, by special provision granted to municipalities the power to zone their territory, cannot be regarded as a tacit restriction or limitation on the legislative power to delegate such authority to other public subdivisions. Nor did the fact that the Legislature saw ■ fit to submit for approval of the electorate other constitutional amendments with respect to the creation of airport zones and, later, for zoning in certain parishes detract in any way from the plenary power of the Legislature to delegate by statute similar authority to other parishes not included in the constitutional amendments.” *1091Plebst v. Barnwell Drilling Company, 243 La. 874, 148 So.2d 584, 589, 590 (1963). See, Kane v. Louisiana Com’n on Governmental Ethics, 250 La. 855, 199 So.2d 900 (1967).
Because of the non-restrictive language employed in Section 29 of Article XIV, supra, and because of our findings, supra, that the legislation herein involved is constitutional, we conclude that the State Legislature is not subordinated to the Jefferson Parish Authorities with respect to zoning. The State Constitution does not prohibit the location of correctional institutions on the site selected by the State Legislature. Therefore, the Legislature was supreme in its selection.8
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and set aside. Plaintiff’s suit is dismissed at its costs.
DIXON, J., concurs in the result.
SUMMERS, J., dissents.
SANDERS, J., takes no part.

. Plaintiff reiterated by amended petition the allegations of its original petition and stated that it desired to amend its entire original by: (a) deleting all reference to the Louisiana Department of Cori-ections as the defendant; and, (b) by inserting in its place and stead, Louis M. Sowers, Director of the Louisiana Department of Corrections, as the defendant.

. The bill was submitted to the Governor; no action was taken within the time provided by the Constitution ; the bill became law without the approval of the Governor.'"

. Section XIX recites in part: “Any lawful building structure, building permit issued or use existing on or prior to the adoption of Ordinance Nó. 5687, or whon- .. .ever a district shall be changed by amendment to this Ordinance, may bo continued although such building, structure or use does not conform to the regulations! of the district in which it is located.’’

 In addition to providing for the Louisiana Training Institute to be located in the Greater New Orleans Area, the Act also provided for branches to be located in Rapides Parish, Ouachita Parish, and East Baton Rouge Parish.

. Acts 353 and 452 of 1970 both became law at 12:00 o’clock noon on July 29, 1970:'

. “Every statute enacted by tlie Legislature shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of its object. “The Legislature may, however, by means of a single statute, enact or revise a system of laws of a general or public nature, such as the general statutes, or a codification of laws on the same general subject matter, or both. Such a statute shall be deemed to embrace but one object and its title need only refer to the general purpose and scope of the statute.” Art. Ill, Sec. 16, La.Const. of 1921.

. “There is no necessity of the title being a complete index to every section of the act. It is only necessary that it shall, in genoral terms, direct attention to the purposes of the law; and if the different parts of the act lead to one conclusion, point to one object, it would not then be reasonable to set aside an act, in so far as requirements have been followed.” State v. Hincy, 130 La. 620, 58 So. 411 (1912); see, Wm. M. Barret, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 191 La. 945, 186 So. 741 (1939), which quoted Hincy.
“Under corresponding sections in preceding constitutions, it was required that the object of the law be ‘expressed’ in its title. The effect of the changing of the wording of the constitutional provision was to relax the previous requirement that the *1085statute must ‘express’ its object, so now all that is required is that the title of the statute should be ‘indicative’ of its object. The constitutional provision must be construed broadly rather than narrowly with a view of effectuating, not of frustrating, the legislative purpose. This is the n In prevailing everywhere for the construe', ion of such a constitutional provision. * >! ” Jackson v. Hart, 192 La. 1068, 190 So. 220 (1939), wherein the Court discussed Art. Ill, Sec. 16, La.Const. of 1921.

. Because of our finding, it is not necessary to discuss the use to which the property involved is to be put.