Court Opinion

ID: 9897895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:26:51.609649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:29.330373
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                 DIVISION ONE
                     Respondent,
                                                 No. 84547-1-I
              v.
                                                 PUBLISHED OPINION
 ROBERT TERRANCE JACKSON,

                     Appellant.

      DWYER, J. — In the Sentencing Reform Act of 19811 (SRA), our legislature

directed that two or more current offenses and all prior offenses are presumed to

be counted separately in calculating an offender score. Only when the

sentencing court enters a finding that any such offenses encompass the same

criminal conduct may the offenses be counted as a single offense. In addition,

our Supreme Court has made clear that the defendant bears the burden to prove

that current or prior offenses encompass the same criminal conduct. When the

defendant does not attempt to meet this burden, the sentencing court does not

err by counting all offenses separately in calculating the offender score. Rather,

in so doing, the sentencing court rules in accordance with the presumption

established by the SRA.

      Here, Robert Jackson appeals from the exceptional sentence imposed on

resentencing. He asserts that the superior court erroneously calculated his

      1 Ch. 9.94A RCW.
No. 84547-1-I/2

offender score because the court did not sua sponte conduct a “same criminal

conduct” analysis of his prior offenses. We disagree. Jackson did not assert on

resentencing that any of his prior offenses encompassed the same criminal

conduct. Thus, in counting separately Jackson’s myriad prior offenses, the

resentencing court impliedly recognized that he had not met his burden of

proving that any such offenses should be counted as one offense. Indeed, by

having not attempted to meet his burden, Jackson cannot demonstrate that the

resentencing court erred in calculating his offender score by counting his prior

offenses separately, thus giving effect to the applicable statutory presumption.

       Jackson additionally asserts that his exceptional sentence must be

reversed because, he contends, the aggravating circumstance of rapid recidivism

is unconstitutionally vague. He further asserts that the evidence is insufficient to

support a finding that he committed the offenses “shortly after being released

from incarceration,” RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t), and, thus, that the court erroneously

imposed an exceptional sentence based on the rapid recidivism aggravator. On

both accounts, we disagree.

       Because a person of reasonable understanding would not have to guess

that reoffending only three months after release from incarceration—as did

Jackson—qualifies as “shortly after” release, the aggravating circumstance is not

unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, a rational fact finder could conclude that

Jackson committed the current offenses “shortly after” his release. Accordingly,

sufficient evidence supports the application of the rapid recidivism aggravator.

                                         2
No. 84547-1-I/3

Having concluded that Jackson’s claims of error are without merit, we affirm the

exceptional sentence imposed by the resentencing court.

                                         I

       On November 11, 2015, Robert Jackson crashed his vehicle into a large

power vault while driving under the influence of alcohol. Lindsay Hill, the

passenger in the vehicle, died instantly from “skull fractures and brain avulsion”

as a result of the “extremely high speed crash.” The vehicle was traveling at

nearly 80 miles per hour, significantly higher than the posted 25 mile per hour

speed limit, when the collision occurred. Jackson’s blood alcohol content was

later calculated to have been between .135g/100mL and .22g/100mL. Jackson

fled the scene without reporting the collision or seeking medical care for Hill. He

evaded police until the next morning, when he “aggressively resisted arrest.”

       Following a bench trial, Jackson was convicted of vehicular homicide and

felony hit and run. The superior court found that these offenses had occurred

“shortly after” Jackson’s release from incarceration on August 10, 2015.

Accordingly, the court determined that, as to both convictions, the aggravating

circumstance of rapid recidivism applied. At the time, Jackson had two prior

convictions of “most serious offense[s],” including a conviction of second degree

robbery. See former RCW 9.94A.030(33) (2016). Based on these prior

convictions, the court determined that Jackson was a persistent offender and

sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole.

       In 2019, our legislature removed the offense of second degree robbery

from the list of “most serious offense[s].” LAWS OF 2019, ch. 187. The legislature

                                         3
No. 84547-1-I/4

thereafter enacted a statute requiring resentencing when an offender has been

sentenced as a persistent offender based on a conviction of second degree

robbery. RCW 9.94A.647(1).

       Jackson’s resentencing hearing occurred on September 30, 2022. Based

on an offender score of 22, Jackson’s standard range sentence for the vehicular

homicide conviction was a minimum of 210 to a maximum of 280 months of

incarceration. His standard range sentence for the hit and run conviction, based

on an offender score of 23, was a minimum of 120 to a maximum of 120 months

of incarceration.2 The State sought an exceptional sentence of 620 months

based both on the rapid recidivism finding of the superior court and on Jackson’s

high offender scores, which, the State argued, would result in the hit and run

offense going unpunished if an exceptional sentence was not imposed. See

RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t)3 (rapid recidivism aggravating circumstance); RCW

9.94A.535(2)(c)4 (“free crimes” aggravating circumstance).

       The resentencing court determined that an exceptional sentence was

appropriate and imposed a sentence of 400 months of incarceration—the high

end of the standard range for each conviction run consecutively. The

resentencing court stated that the trial court’s finding of rapid recidivism was the

basis for the exceptional sentence. The court then stated that an additional basis

       2 The maximum sentence for the conviction of hit and run, a class B felony, is a term of

10 years of incarceration. See RCW 9A.20,021(1)(b); RCW 46.52.020(4)(a).
        3 RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t) authorizes the imposition of a sentence above the standard range

when “[t]he defendant committed the current offense shortly after being released from
incarceration.”
        4 RCW 9.94A.535(2)(c) authorizes the imposition of a sentence above the standard range

when “[t]he defendant has committed multiple current offenses and the defendant’s high offender
score results in some of the current offenses going unpunished.”

                                               4
No. 84547-1-I/5

for the exceptional sentence was “that in essence there would be no penalty for

the hit-and-run were the . . . sentences not to run consecutive to each other

because otherwise it . . . just gets subsumed in the . . . vehicular homicide.”

       In written findings and conclusions, the resentencing court made findings

of both the rapid recidivism and “free crimes” aggravating circumstances. The

court found that “unless an exceptional sentence is imposed, some of the current

offenses will go unpunished.” The court additionally concluded that

               [e]ach one of these aggravating circumstances is a
       substantial and compelling reason, standing alone, that is sufficient
       justification for the length of the exceptional sentence imposed. In
       the event that an appellate court affirms at least one of the
       substantial and compelling reasons, the length of the sentence
       should remain the same.

       Jackson appeals.

                                          II

       Jackson asserts that his exceptional sentence must be reversed because

the resentencing court calculated his offender score without conducting a “same

criminal conduct” analysis of his prior convictions. We disagree. It is presumed

in calculating an offender score that two or more current and all prior offenses

are separately counted. Jackson, as the party who would benefit from a finding

that his prior offenses encompass the same criminal conduct, has the burden of

establishing the facts necessary to support such a finding. Because he did not

attempt to meet that burden, Jackson cannot demonstrate error by the

resentencing court in counting separately his myriad prior convictions. Indeed, in

                                          5
No. 84547-1-I/6

calculating Jackson’s offender score, the resentencing court both ruled

consistent with and gave effect to the presumption set forth in the SRA.

         In nevertheless asserting that RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i) requires a

sentencing court to sua sponte perform a “same criminal conduct” analysis of

prior offenses before calculating an offender score, Jackson misapprehends the

pertinent sentencing scheme. Moreover, the decisional authority on which

Jackson relies does not compel the interpretation of the statutory language that

he seeks. The resentencing court did not err by ruling in accordance with the

presumption that prior offenses are counted separately in calculating an offender

score.

                                         A

         We will reverse an exceptional sentence only upon determining “[e]ither

that the reasons supplied by the sentencing court are not supported by the

record which was before the judge or that those reasons do not justify a sentence

outside the standard sentence range for that offense” or “that the sentence

imposed was clearly excessive or clearly too lenient.” RCW 9.94A.585(4).

Interpretation of the SRA, chapter 9.94A RCW, is a question of law that we

review de novo. State v. Jones, 172 Wn.2d 236, 242, 257 P.3d 616 (2011).

“Only an illegal or erroneous sentence is reviewable for the first time on appeal.”

State v. Nitsch, 100 Wn. App. 512, 523, 997 P.2d 1000 (2000).

         A sentencing court must determine the standard range sentence by

calculating an offender score in accordance with the SRA. RCW 9.94A.525; see

RCW 9.94A.510, .530. Our legislature has directed that “whenever a person is to

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No. 84547-1-I/7

be sentenced for two or more current offenses, the sentence range for each

current offense shall be determined by using all other current and prior

convictions as if they were prior convictions for the purpose of the offender

score.” RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Current offenses may be counted as one crime

only “if the court enters a finding that some or all of the current offenses

encompass the same criminal conduct.” RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Thus, extant in

the sentencing scheme of the SRA is a presumption that two or more current

offenses and all prior offenses are counted separately in calculating an offender

score. In re Pers. Restraint of Markel, 154 Wn.2d 262, 274, 111 P.3d 249 (2005)

(“Under this sentencing scheme, a ‘same criminal conduct’ finding is an

exception to the default rule that all convictions must count separately.”); State v.

Lopez, 142 Wn. App. 341, 351, 174 P.3d 1216 (2007) (“In determining a

defendant’s offender score under the [SRA], two or more current offenses and

prior offenses are presumed to count separately unless the trial court finds that

the current offenses encompass the same criminal conduct.”). It is only when the

sentencing court finds that the offenses are sufficiently similar that two or more

offenses may be counted as one crime.5

       The SRA additionally sets forth the circumstances in which multiple prior

convictions, which are presumed to count separately in calculating an offender

score, will be counted as one offense. RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i). It provides that

       5 “‘Same criminal conduct’ . . . means two or more crimes that require the same criminal

intent, are committed at the same time and place, and involve the same victim.” RCW
9.94A.589(1)(a).

                                               7
No. 84547-1-I/8

       [p]rior offenses which were found, under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a), to
       encompass the same criminal conduct, shall be counted as one
       offense, the offense that yields the highest offender score. The
       current sentencing court shall determine with respect to other prior
       adult offenses for which sentences were served concurrently or
       prior juvenile offenses for which sentences were served
       consecutively, whether those offenses shall be counted as one
       offense or as separate offenses using the “same criminal conduct”
       analysis found in RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a), and if the court finds that
       they shall be counted as one offense, then the offense that yields
       the highest offender score shall be used.

RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i). When a defendant has argued to the sentencing court

that certain of his prior convictions encompass the same criminal conduct, we

have held that the sentencing court “must apply the same criminal conduct test to

multiple prior convictions that a court has not already concluded amount to the

same criminal conduct. RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i). The court has no discretion on

this.” State v. Torngren, 147 Wn. App. 556, 563, 196 P.3d 742 (2008), abrogated

on other grounds by State v. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531, 539, 295 P.3d

219 (2013).

       Here, Jackson contends that, even when a defendant does not assert in

the sentencing court that prior convictions encompass the same criminal

conduct, the court is nevertheless required to conduct a “same criminal conduct”

analysis. This is so, he asserts, due to the prescriptive language in the statute,

which provides that the “current sentencing court shall determine” whether

certain prior offenses are counted as one offense or separate offenses. RCW

9.94A.525(5)(a)(i) (emphasis added). Jackson is incorrect.

       Significantly, Jackson bore the burden to establish in the resentencing

court that any of his prior convictions encompassed the same criminal conduct.

                                         8
No. 84547-1-I/9

This is because “[t]he burden is on a moving party to come forward with sufficient

facts to warrant the exercise of discretion in his or her favor.” State v. Hoffman,

116 Wn.2d 51, 74, 804 P.2d 577 (1991). Thus, during sentencing, the State

bears the burden to prove the existence of prior convictions. Aldana Graciano,

176 Wn.2d at 539. The existence of such convictions favors the State by

increasing the offender score. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d at 539. “In contrast,

a ‘same criminal conduct’ finding favors the defendant by lowering the offender

score below the presumed score.” Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d at 539.

Accordingly, the burden is on the defendant to establish that the offenses

encompass the same criminal conduct. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d at 539.

“The [sentencing] scheme—and the burden—could not be more straightforward:

each of a defendant’s convictions counts toward his offender score unless he

convinces the court that they involved the same criminal intent, time, place, and

victim.” Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d at 540.

       Jackson made no attempt to meet this burden. Rather, he failed to

identify any factual dispute regarding whether his prior offenses constituted the

same criminal conduct and, thus, failed to request that the resentencing court

exercise its discretion on this basis.

       However, Jackson now asserts that, by not sua sponte conducting a

“same criminal conduct” analysis, the resentencing court improperly calculated

his offender score. This is not so. The resentencing court’s offender score

calculation is an “implicit rejection” of the notion that any of Jackson’s prior

offenses encompassed the same criminal conduct. Nitsch, 100 Wn. App. at 525.

                                           9
No. 84547-1-I/10

In calculating Jackson’s offender score, the resentencing court ruled consistent

with—and gave effect to—the SRA’s presumption that two or more current

offenses and all prior offenses are counted separately in offender score

computation. RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i), .589(1)(a). When a defendant has not

sought to overcome the SRA’s presumption that offenses are counted

separately, the sentencing court meets its obligation pursuant to the SRA by

giving credence to that presumption. The resentencing court did so here. There

was no error.

                                           B

       Our conclusion is consistent with decisional authority addressing this

question in the context of current convictions. Pursuant to that authority, a

defendant may not assert for the first time on appeal that a sentencing court

erred by not considering whether two or more current convictions encompass the

same criminal conduct. In re Pers. Restraint of Shale, 160 Wn.2d 489, 494, 158

P.3d 588 (2007); Nitsch, 100 Wn. App. at 519.

       In Nitsch, the defendant asserted for the first time on appeal that his

offender score had been improperly calculated because the sentencing court had

not sua sponte considered whether his two convictions encompassed the same

criminal conduct. 100 Wn. App. at 518-19, 520. We acknowledged that illegal or

erroneous sentences may be challenged for the first time on appeal. Nitsch, 100

Wn. App. at 523. We explained, however, that the issue was not one of “pure

calculation error,” but of a failure, by the defendant, “to identify a factual dispute

                                          10
No. 84547-1-I/11

for the [sentencing] court’s resolution and a failure to request an exercise of the

court’s discretion.” Nitsch, 100 Wn. App. at 520.

        In declining to consider the claim of error for the first time on appeal, we

explained that

        the effect of permitting [such] review . . . is to require sentencing
        courts to search the record to ensure the absence of an issue not
        raised. In the same criminal conduct context, such a search
        requires not just a review of the evidence to support the State’s
        calculation, or a review to ensure application of the correct legal
        rules, but an examination of the underlying factual context in every
        sentencing involving multiple crimes committed at the same time.
        Because this is not the legislature’s directive, the trial court’s failure
        to conduct such a review sua sponte cannot result in a sentence
        that is illegal. The trial court thus should not be required, without
        invitation, to identify the presence or absence of the issue and rule
        thereon.

Nitsch, 100 Wn. App. at 524.6

        Our Supreme Court thereafter adopted this reasoning. See Shale, 160

Wn.2d at 495-96. There, the defendant had agreed to the offender scores as

part of his plea bargain and had not challenged the offender score computations.

Shale, 160 Wn.2d at 495. On appeal, our Supreme Court recognized that,

although a defendant cannot agree to punishment resulting from a miscalculated

        6 In a decision predating Nitsch, our court, without explanation, reviewed an unpreserved

assertion that the sentencing court erred by not considering whether two current offenses
encompassed the same criminal conduct. See State v. Anderson, 92 Wn. App. 54, 960 P.2d 975
(1998). In Nitsch, we distinguished the decision in Anderson on the basis that, in that case, the
defendant had not affirmatively acknowledged his standard range sentence. 100 Wn. App. at
521-22. We noted in Nitsch that, in contrast to Anderson, the defendant there had “affirmatively
alleged” his standard range sentence in a presentence report, thus implicitly admitting to the
offender score calculated by separately counting the offenses. 100 Wn. App. at 522.
         Here, as in Nitsch, Jackson filed a presentence report admitting to the standard range
sentences applicable based on the offender scores calculated by the resentencing court. Such
affirmative assent, however, is not a basis for our holding. Assent to an offender score may
evidence that the defendant did not attempt to meet the burden to establish that offenses
encompass the same criminal conduct. However, the absence of such assent does not
demonstrate that the defendant met that burden.

                                               11
No. 84547-1-I/12

offender score, “waiver can be found where the alleged error involves an

agreement to facts, later disputed, or where the alleged error involves a matter of

trial court discretion.” Shale, 160 Wn.2d at 494 (citing In re Pers. Restraint of

Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 873, 50 P.3d 618 (2002)). The court reasoned that

the defendant had “failed to ask the court to make a discretionary call of any

factual dispute regarding the issue of ‘same criminal conduct’ and . . . did not

contest the issue at the trial level.” Shale, 160 Wn.2d at 496. Accordingly, the

court held, the defendant’s offender scores were not subject to challenge on

appeal on that basis. Shale, 160 Wn.2d at 496.

       Jackson does not address this authority. He does assert, though, that it is

the statutory language of RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i)—which pertains to the

calculation of offender scores based on prior offenses—that requires a

sentencing court to sua sponte conduct a “same criminal conduct” analysis.

However, whether an offender score is calculated based on two or more current

offenses or based on prior offenses, the burden remains with the defendant to

establish that any such offenses should be counted as one crime. In either

circumstance, a “same criminal conduct” finding benefits the defendant by

reducing the presumed offender score. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d at 539.

Thus, in either circumstance, “it is the defendant who must establish [that] the

crimes constitute the same criminal conduct.” Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d at

539.

       Accordingly, the reasoning set forth in Shale, 160 Wn.2d 489, and Nitsch,

100 Wn. App. 512, is applicable here. That the sentencing court “shall” conduct

                                         12
No. 84547-1-I/13

a “same criminal conduct” analysis regarding certain prior offenses, RCW

9.94A.525(5)(a)(i), does not relieve the defendant of the burden to identify a

factual dispute regarding “same criminal conduct” and to request an exercise of

the sentencing court’s discretion. Rather, the statute requires that, when the

defendant meets that burden, the sentencing court must conduct the specified

analysis. See Torngren, 147 Wn. App. at 563 (holding that the sentencing court

“has no discretion” to conduct a “same criminal conduct” analysis when the

defendant had asserted in the sentencing court that certain prior convictions

encompassed the same criminal conduct). On the other hand, when the

defendant does not attempt to meet that burden, the sentencing court does not

err by calculating the offender score in accordance with the statutory

presumption that offenses are counted separately. We no more expect the

sentencing court to meet the defendant’s burden to establish “same criminal

conduct” than we expect the court to meet the State’s burden to prove the

existence of prior offenses. The sentencing court is neither the defendant’s nor

the State’s attorney.

       Jackson urges us to remand to the superior court with instructions to

conduct the very analysis that, if he believed his prior convictions encompassed

the same criminal conduct, he was required to ask the court to perform on

resentencing. Jackson bore the burden to request that the resentencing court

exercise its discretion in the first instance. He did not do so. As our courts have

previously held, Jackson—having failed to request that the court exercise its

discretion to conduct a “same criminal conduct” analysis at sentencing—cannot

                                        13
No. 84547-1-I/14

now challenge the calculation of his offender score on that basis.7 Shale, 160

Wn.2d at 496; Nitsch, 100 Wn. App. at 524.

                                                 C

        We further note that the decisional authority on which Jackson relies does

not support his claim of error. See State v. Williams, 176 Wn. App. 138, 307

P.3d 819 (2013), affirmed, 181 Wn.2d 795, 336 P.3d 1152 (2014); Torngren, 147

Wn. App. 556; State v. Reinhart, 77 Wn. App. 454, 891 P.2d 735 (1995).

        In Reinhart, the sentencing court believed that it was bound by a previous

sentencing court’s determination that three prior offenses did not encompass the

same criminal conduct. 77 Wn. App. at 457. The court thus counted the

offenses separately in calculating the defendant’s offender score. Reinhart, 77

Wn. App. at 457. Division Two of this court concluded that the pertinent statutory

language—which stated that the “‘current sentencing court shall’” determine

whether the offenses encompassed the same criminal conduct—required the

sentencing court to conduct an independent assessment. Reinhart, 77 Wn. App.

at 458-59 (quoting former RCW 9.94A.360(6)(a) (1999)). Based on this legal

error, the court remanded to the sentencing court to conduct its own analysis.

Reinhart, 77 Wn. App. at 459. Here, Jackson does not assert a legal error in

        7 This holding is consistent with decisional authority permitting a defendant to assert for

the first time on appeal that an out-of-state conviction was improperly included in calculating an
offender score. See State v. Lucero, 168 Wn.2d 785, 230 P.3d 165 (2010). The pertinent
distinction is which party bears the burden of proof. As we have discussed, the State bears the
burden to prove the existence of prior convictions, while the defendant bears the burden to prove
that specific convictions encompass the same criminal conduct. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d at
539. Thus, while a defendant may challenge for the first time on appeal the inclusion of an out-of-
state conviction in calculating an offender score, Lucero, 168 Wn.2d at 788-89, the defendant
cannot challenge for the first time on appeal an offender score calculated consistent with the
presumption that offenses are counted separately.

                                                14
No. 84547-1-I/15

calculating his offender score. See Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d at 874 (recognizing that

“[w]hile waiver does not apply where the alleged sentencing error is a legal error

leading to an excessive sentence, waiver can be found . . . where the alleged

error involves a matter of trial court discretion”). Rather, Jackson asserts that the

resentencing court was required to sua sponte conduct a “same criminal

conduct” analysis, notwithstanding that he neither “identif[ied] a factual dispute

for the court’s resolution [nor] . . . request[ed] an exercise of the court’s

discretion.” Nitsch, 100 Wn. App. at 520. Accordingly, Jackson’s reliance on

Reinhart is unavailing.

       The same is true of his reliance on Torngren, in which Division Three of

this court pronounced that a sentencing court “must apply the same criminal

conduct test to multiple prior convictions that a court has not already concluded

amount to the same criminal conduct.” 147 Wn. App. at 563 (citing RCW

9.94A.525(5)(a)(i)). There, the defendant asserted that the sentencing court “had

to consider whether prior convictions constitute the same criminal conduct.”

Torngren, 147 Wn. App. at 562. Implicit in this assertion, it appears, was the

defendant’s belief that the court had not conducted such an analysis, as the court

had stated that the convictions “‘did not merge.’” Torngren, 147 Wn. App. at 563.

Division Three concluded, however, that the sentencing court had conducted a

“same criminal conduct” analysis, notwithstanding the merger language

employed by the court. Torngren, 147 Wn. App. at 563. The court upheld the

sentencing court’s determination that the convictions did not encompass the

same criminal conduct. Torngren, 147 Wn. App. at 565. Torngren does not

                                          15
No. 84547-1-I/16

support Jackson’s assertion that a sentencing court is required to sua sponte

conduct such an analysis.

       Jackson’s reliance on Division Three’s decision in Williams, 176 Wn. App.

138, is similarly misplaced. There, the defendant challenged the sentencing

court’s decision to count his prior burglary and robbery convictions separately in

calculating his offender score. Williams, 176 Wn. App. at 139-40. The defendant

did not, however, assert that the sentencing court was required to sua sponte

conduct a “same criminal conduct” analysis. Rather, the defendant asserted that

the court had erred as a matter of law by applying “the burglary antimerger

statute to the exclusion of the same criminal conduct test.” Williams, 176 Wn.

App. at 140. Division Three agreed, holding that “the burglary antimerger

statute’s plain language applies solely to current offenses before a current

sentencing court.” Williams, 176 Wn. App. at 143. The court concluded that the

sentencing court had “applied the wrong legal standard” and, thus, had abused

its discretion. Williams, 176 Wn. App. at 144. The court determined that,

because the prior sentencing court had imposed concurrent sentences for the

pertinent offenses, “the current sentencing court needed to apply the same

criminal conduct test.” Williams, 176 Wn. App. at 142.8

       8 In dissent, Judge Korsmo concluded that there was “no need to discuss the burglary

antimerger statute and its application to [the] case,” as the defendant had not presented
argument in the sentencing court suggesting that the offenses satisfied the “same criminal
conduct” standard. Williams, 176 Wn. App. at 145-46 (Korsmo, C.J., dissenting). Thus, Judge
Korsmo would have affirmed the sentence “for the simple reason that [the defendant] never
attempted to meet his burden” of establishing that the offenses encompass the same criminal
conduct. Williams, 176 Wn. App. at 146.

                                             16
No. 84547-1-I/17

       Our Supreme Court affirmed Division Three’s decision, defining the issue

presented as “whether sentencing courts have discretion to count prior

convictions separately under the burglary antimerger statute notwithstanding a

finding that they encompass the same criminal conduct under the SRA.” State v.

Williams, 181 Wn.2d 795, 796, 336 P.3d 1152 (2014). The court determined that

the legislature had not “intended the burglary antimerger statute to supersede the

SRA’s more recent directive that prior convictions encompassing the same

criminal conduct ‘shall be counted as one offense.’” Williams, 181 Wn.2d at 801

(quoting RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i)). Thus, the court held “that the burglary

antimerger statute does not obviate the need for a sentencing court to examine

whether prior convictions constitute the same criminal conduct under RCW

9.94A.525(5)(a).” Williams, 181 Wn.2d at 801.

       Neither our Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed in

Williams the issue presented here—whether a defendant may challenge on

appeal the sentencing court’s calculation of an offender score in accordance with

the presumption that offenses count separately, when the defendant never

requested that the sentencing court exercise its discretion to conduct a “same

criminal conduct” analysis. Indeed, significantly, our Supreme Court indicated

that the defendant in Williams had “debated the accuracy of the State’s [offender

score] calculation” in the sentencing court, “insist[ing] that his [prior] robbery and

burglary convictions count[ed] as a single offense.” Williams, 181 Wn.2d at 797.

In short, the decisional authority cited by Jackson does not support his contention

                                          17
No. 84547-1-I/18

that RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i) compels a sentencing court to sua sponte conduct a

“same criminal conduct” analysis prior to calculating an offender score.

       Our legislature has directed that, in calculating an offender score, two or

more current offenses and all prior offenses are presumed to count separately.

Only when a sentencing court determines that such offenses constitute the same

criminal conduct may they be counted as a single crime. Jackson, as the party

who would benefit from such a finding, had the burden to establish that any of his

offenses should be so counted. He did not do so. When a defendant has not

sought to overcome the presumption that offenses are counted separately in

calculating an offender score, the sentencing court meets its obligation by giving

credence to that presumption. Here, the resentencing court did so. There was

no error.

                                         III

       Jackson next asserts that RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t), which establishes as an

aggravating circumstance the commission of an offense “shortly after” release

from incarceration, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of his case.

We disagree. A person of reasonable understanding would not have to guess

that reoffending only three months after release from incarceration, as Jackson

did, qualifies as commission of an offense “shortly after being released from

incarceration.” RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t). Accordingly, the rapid recidivism

                                         18
No. 84547-1-I/19

aggravating factor is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the circumstances

presented here.9

        We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. State

v. Zigan, 166 Wn. App. 597, 603, 270 P.3d 625 (2012). “Vagueness challenges

to enactments which do not involve First Amendment rights are to be evaluated

in light of the particular facts of each case.” City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115

Wn.2d 171, 182, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). Statutes are presumed to be

constitutional, “and the party challenging a statute’s constitutionality has the

burden of proving otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Pers. Restraint of

McNeil, 181 Wn.2d 582, 590, 334 P.3d 548 (2014).

        “The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that

citizens be afforded fair warning of proscribed conduct.” Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at

178. “A statute is unconstitutionally vague if (1) ‘it fails to define the offense with

sufficient precision that a person of ordinary intelligence can understand it,’ or (2)

‘it does not provide standards sufficiently specific to prevent arbitrary

enforcement.’” State v. Murray, 190 Wn.2d 727, 736, 416 P.3d 1225 (2018)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Duncalf, 177 Wn.2d 289,

296-97, 300 P.3d 352 (2013)). To comport with due process, a statute need not

        9 We note that this claim of error is a nonissue pursuant to State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d

448, 458, 78 P.3d 1005 (2003). There, our Supreme Court explained that sentencing guideline
statutes, including those allowing for exceptional sentences, “do not define conduct nor do they
allow for arbitrary arrest and criminal prosecution by the State.” Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d at 459.
Thus, the court held that “the due process considerations that underlie the void-for-vagueness
doctrine have no application in the context of sentencing guidelines.” Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d at 459.
Although we assume that Baldwin remains good authority, the State does not rely on it here.
Accordingly, we do not address it further. The Supreme Court might do well by clarifying
Baldwin’s precedential status. See State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 487, 681 P.2d 227 (1984).

                                               19
No. 84547-1-I/20

enable an individual “to predict with complete certainty the exact point at which

his or her actions would qualify as prohibited.” Murray, 190 Wn.2d at 736.

Rather, “[t]he test for vagueness is whether a person of reasonable

understanding is required to guess at the meaning of the statute.” Duncalf, 177

Wn.2d at 297.

       Pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t), a sentencing court may impose an

aggravated exceptional sentence based on a finding that “[t]he defendant

committed the current offense shortly after being released from incarceration.”

The term “shortly after” is nowhere defined in the statute. “When a statute does

not define terms alleged to be unconstitutionally vague, we ‘may look to existing

law, ordinary usage, and the general purpose of the statute to determine whether

the statute meets constitutional requirements of clarity.’” State v. Williams, 159

Wn. App. 298, 319, 244 P.3d 1018 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting State v. Hunt, 75 Wn. App. 795, 801, 880 P.2d 96 (1994)). In Murray,

our Supreme Court relied on the dictionary definitions of “short” and “shortly” to

determine whether the rapid recidivism aggravator was unconstitutionally vague

as applied to the circumstances presented therein. 190 Wn.2d at 737. “Short”

means “not extended in time,” while “shortly” is defined as “in a short time:

PRESENTLY, SOON.” W EBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2102,

2103 (2002). See also Murray, 190 Wn.2d at 737.

       In Zigan, Division Three of this court addressed whether the rapid

recidivism aggravator was unconstitutionally vague as applied when the

defendant had reoffended “just over two months” after his release from

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No. 84547-1-I/21

incarceration. 166 Wn. App. at 605. The court reasoned that, although the

statute “requires some subjective evaluation,” a “law that requires subjective

evaluation to determine whether the enactment has been violated does not mean

the law is unconstitutional.” Zigan, 166 Wn. App. at 605. The court concluded

that “[n]o reasonable person could believe that the circumstances presented

[t]here constitute[d] anything other than ‘[t]he defendant committed the current

offense shortly after being released from incarceration.’” Zigan, 166 Wn. App. at

605 (last alteration in original) (quoting RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t)).

       Here, Jackson committed the current offenses on November 11, 2015,

after being released from incarceration on August 10, 2015—a period of 93 days.

At his initial sentencing, the superior court found that the offenses were

committed “shortly after his release from incarceration” and, thus, applied the

rapid recidivism aggravator. The resentencing court imposed an exceptional

sentence based, in part, on the rapid recidivism aggravator found at trial. Now,

on appeal, Jackson contends that the rapid recidivism aggravator is void for

vagueness as applied to his case. However, he nowhere explains why this is so.

Rather, Jackson simply asserts that, other than the statutory language of the

aggravator itself, “[n]o further guidance is given.”10

       However, a statute is not unconstitutional simply because an individual

cannot “predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his or her actions

would qualify as prohibited.” Murray, 190 Wn.2d at 736; see also Zigan, 166 Wn.

App. at 605 (recognizing that a law is not unconstitutionally vague because it

       10 Br. of Appellant at 22.

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No. 84547-1-I/22

“requires subjective evaluation to determine whether [it] has been violated”).

Moreover, it is Jackson’s burden to demonstrate that, as applied to his case,

RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t) is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. See

McNeil, 181 Wn.2d at 590. To do so, Jackson must demonstrate that a person of

reasonable understanding would have to guess that reoffending 93 days after

release from incarceration would subject the defendant to an exceptional

sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t). See Duncalf, 177 Wn.2d at 297.

Jackson has not done so. Accordingly, the rapid recidivism aggravator is not

unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case.

                                         IV

       Jackson further asserts that there was insufficient evidence of rapid

recidivism for the resentencing court to find this aggravator proved. Again, we

disagree. Similarity of the current and prior offenses is not necessary for a rapid

recidivism finding. Rather, the gravamen of the aggravator is disdain for the law.

Here, a rational fact finder could conclude that Jackson demonstrated disdain for

the law by committing the current offenses “shortly after” his release from

incarceration. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports the rapid recidivism

finding.

       “The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of

fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119

Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992); see also State v. Gordon, 172 Wn.2d

671, 680, 260 P.3d 884 (2011) (applying the sufficiency of the evidence test in

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No. 84547-1-I/23

the context of a challenge to an aggravating factor). The “rapid recidivism”

aggravating circumstance authorizes a sentencing court to impose an

aggravated exceptional sentence based on a finding that “[t]he defendant

committed the current offense shortly after being released from incarceration.”

RCW 9.94A.535(3)(t). The “gravamen” of the rapid recidivism aggravator is a

“disdain for the law” that renders the defendant particularly culpable in

committing the current offense. State v. Combs, 156 Wn. App. 502, 506, 232

P.3d 1179 (2010) (citing State v. Butler, 75 Wn. App. 47, 54, 876 P.2d 481

(1994)).

       Jackson asserts that the State presented insufficient evidence of the rapid

recidivism aggravator because he committed “impulse crime[s]” that are

unrelated to his prior offenses.11 According to Jackson, this indicates that the

commission of the current offenses “did not reflect a demonstrable, repeat

disdain for the laws governing driving while intoxicated or hit and run.”12

However, in committing the current offense, the defendant need not demonstrate

disdain for a specific law to support a finding of rapid recidivism—RCW

9.94A.535(3)(t) “does not require a connection between the offenses.” Combs,

156 Wn. App. at 506. Rather, any similarities between the current and prior

offenses are “simply additional evidence of disregard for the law.” Combs, 156

Wn. App. at 506.

       11 Br. of Appellant at 17.
       12 Br. of Appellant at 15.

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No. 84547-1-I/24

        Here, Jackson committed offenses while highly intoxicated that resulted in

the violent death of another person. He then sought to avoid accountability by

fleeing the scene and aggressively resisting arrest when later discovered. He did

so only 93 days after his release from incarceration. Whether Jackson’s conduct

constituted rapid recidivism is a question for the finder of fact. See RCW

9.94A.535(3) (listing aggravating circumstances that must be found by the jury).

Plainly, some rational fact finders could conclude that Jackson committed the

current offenses “shortly after” his release from incarceration, and that such

conduct evidenced disdain for the law, rendering Jackson particularly culpable in

committing those offenses. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports the

resentencing court’s rapid recidivism finding.13

        Affirmed.

        13 Jackson additionally asserts that reversal of his sentence is necessary if either

aggravator found by the resentencing court—the rapid recidivism aggravator or the “free crimes”
aggravator—was improper. Because we find no error in the resentencing court’s findings of
aggravating circumstances, we need not address this contention. However, we note that the
resentencing court’s written findings and conclusions explicitly state that either of the aggravators
alone is sufficient justification for the length of the exceptional sentence imposed.
         Jackson also asserts that neither aggravating factor found by the resentencing court is a
substantial and compelling basis for an exceptional sentence. See RCW 9.94A.535, .537(6)
(authorizing the imposition of an exceptional sentence only if the sentencing court determines that
there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying such a sentence). However, the finding of
an aggravating circumstance alone provides a sentencing court with a substantial and compelling
reason to impose an exceptional sentence. State v. Perry, 6 Wn. App. 2d 544, 556-57, 431 P.3d
543 (2018) (citing Duncalf, 177 Wn.2d at 296). In any event, Jackson’s assertion is premised on
his claims that insufficient evidence supported the rapid recidivism finding and that the
resentencing court was required to sua sponte conduct a “same criminal conduct” analysis.
Because the resentencing court did not err in either respect, his assertion is unavailing.

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No. 84547-1-I/25

WE CONCUR:

                   25