Court Opinion

ID: 9582936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:32:55.428432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:45.859549
License: Public Domain

J. P. Noecker, J.
(concurring). The trial court found, solely on the basis of the ages of the children, that the children were of insufficient age to express a preference as to custody.1 In Flaherty v Smith, 87 Mich App 561; 274 NW2d 72 (1978), a panel of this Court held that in a close case it would be "clear legal error on a major issue”, as is contemplated by MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8), for the trial court to conclude, solely on the basis of the child’s age, that the child was incapable of expressing a preference as to custody. The implication of that case and of In re Custody of James B, 66 Mich App 133; 238 NW2d 550 (1975), was that the trial court must exercise, rather than abdicate, its discretion with respect to the determination of whether a child is of sufficient age to express a preference.
In addition, several panels of this Court have held that the trial court must evaluate each of the "best interest” factors of MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3) when deciding a custody issue. Arndt v Kasem, 135 Mich App 252; 353 NW2d 497 (1984); Williamson v Williamson, 122 Mich App 667; 333 NW2d 6 (1982). Thus, this writer would conclude that it is legal error to conclude, solely on the basis of a child’s age, that the child is incapable of *794expressing a preference. Yet, the majority concludes that there was no legal error with respect to the custody determination. In this writer’s opinion, the summary conclusion by the trial court that the children were of insufficient age to express a preference was error, but does not amount to clear legal error on a major issue.
In both In re Custody of James B, supra, and Flaherty, supra, the Court noted that the custody issue was a close one. In the case at bar, the trial court found that the best interest factors preponderated heavily in favor of the mother. This writer, and the majority, agree with that conclusion. It is quite clear that the outcome of this case would not have been affected had the trial judge determined that the children expressed a preference to live with their father.
Where the best interest factors, other than the preference of the children, weigh heavily in favor of one party and where the age of the children is such that their preferences, albeit expressible, cannot overcome the other factors, this writer would conclude that the failure to exercise discretion to determine whether the children are of sufficient qge to express a preference is not "clear legal error on a major issue”. The stated purpose of that standard limiting appellate review is to "expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication”. MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8). That purpose would be ill-served if reversal were required by the trial court’s failure to inquire as to a child’s capacity to express a preference, under circumstances where the expression of a preference would not affect the outcome.
This writer agrees that the trial court did not err in awarding $25,000 in alimony in gross on the basis of defendant’s obtaining two advanced degrees during the course of the parties’ marriage. This *795conclusion is not based on the premise that an advanced degree is properly Considered as property. Woodworth v Woodworth, 126 Mich App 258; 337 NW2d 322 (1983), lv den 419 Mich 856 (1984). Nor does it run afoul of the. view that an advanced degree is not properly considered as property. Olah v Olah, 135 Mich App 404; 354 NW2d 359 (1984). Rather, it is based on the principle that marital property divisions should be equitable. While the effort at the semantical characterization of the path to that result might be interesting, the conclusion that the path is a "property” path or an "alimony” path should not change the appellate review of the results. The division of marital property in this case is equitable, and such a result should be affirmed.

 During the course of the trial, one child was ten years old and the others attained the ages of seven and five. While this writer might agree that a child might, at some point, be incapable of expressing a preference solely because of his age, that cannot be said of the children in this case. Children of these ages are capable of expressing a preference, although the weight given to those expressions might be reduced by the age or immaturity of the particular child.