Court Opinion

ID: 9387097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 18:05:30.277312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.781136
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Wright State Univ. v. Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Wright State Chapter, 2023-Ohio-1238.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        GREENE COUNTY

 WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY                                :
                                                        :
       Appellant                                        :     C.A. No. 2022-CA-54
                                                        :
 v.                                                     :     Trial Court Case No. 2022 CV 0214
                                                        :
 WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY                                :     (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
 CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN                                :     Court)
 ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY                              :
 PROFESSORS                                             :

       Appellee

                                                 ...........

                                                 OPINION

                                        Rendered on April 14, 2023

                                                 ...........

GEORGE S. CRISCI and SCOTT H. DEHART, Attorneys for Appellant

BROOKS W. BORON, Attorney for Appellee

                                               .............

WELBAUM, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Wright State University (“WSU”) appeals from a judgment of the Greene

County Court of Common Pleas, which denied its motion to vacate an arbitration award

and granted the motion of the American Association of University Professors, Wright
                                                                                         -2-

State University Chapter (“the Chapter”) to confirm and enforce the arbitration award. At

issue was the grievance of Dr. Marlese Durr, a tenured professor at WSU, who had taught

classes in the Sociology and Anthropology Department full-time since 1994. For reasons

discussed below, WSU had imposed disciplinary actions on Durr in July 2020. Because

we conclude that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the parties’

collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and

the arbitration award is vacated.

       {¶ 2} In late fall 2019, WSU received numerous complaints about Durr. Multiple

students reported through an online portal that Durr had been rude in class and had

threatened to withhold student grades. An anonymous academic advisor also reported

that four or five students had indicated that they “experienced discomfort and uncertainty”

in Durr’s class. Faculty Affairs Program Manager and Ombudsperson Shannon Norton

complained that a student had reported that Durr was late for an exam; Norton also

reported that Durr had been rude to her and to others. Executive Assistant to the Provost

Becky Traxler complained that Durr had been rude to her on the phone.

       {¶ 3} These complaints found their way to Dr. Cheryl Meyer, then Vice Provost for

Faculty Affairs.   Meyer prepared a “Notice of Complaint and Investigation,” which

described the complaints, placed Durr on administrative leave, and requested a

disciplinary hearing in accordance with the CBA (Joint Exhibit 2); Meyer sent this notice

to Durr on January 2, 2020.

       {¶ 4} Durr had applied and been approved for family medical leave for the spring

semester of 2020; she had informed the human resources department that she would be
                                                                                        -3-

using her paid accrued sick leave while on FMLA leave. However, in early July 2020,

Meyer sent Durr a second notice of complaint and investigation, which also requested a

meeting. The second notice alleged that Durr had failed to report her paid sick leave

usage during her FMLA leave, citing Article 28.6 of the CBA (Joint Exhibit 3).

      {¶ 5} On July 21, 2020, Durr’s disciplinary meeting pursuant to Article 14 of the

CBA was held on both complaints. On July 31, 2020, Douglas Leaman, Interim Provost,

issued a “Written Statement of Outcome” (Joint Exhibit 4), which stated in part:

             In summary, I find that, through your comments and actions, you

      have provided an environment that makes students feel unsafe and fearful

      of retaliation, in violation of University Policy.

             I also find that your repeated failure to report paid sick leave usage,

      despite numerous directives to do so, also violated University Policy and

      the CBA.

             As discipline for these violations, per Article 14 and section 14.5.4 in

      particular:

      ● This letter shall serve as a letter of reprimand/warning and will be placed

      in your personnel file.

      ● You must participate in and complete a series of civility/anger

      management training courses * * * in the next 30 days.

      ● You are denied the opportunity for summer teaching; however, because

      you did not teach this current summer (2020) due to being on administrative

      leave status pending resolution of this Article 14 proceeding, we will apply
                                                                                         -4-

       this discipline retroactively to Summer 2020.

       ● You are suspended without pay for three days, which will be debited from

       your August paycheck on a pro rata basis.

       ● Given your demonstrated lack of understanding of the power differential,

       for a period of one year you will not be permitted to hold any leadership

       positions at Wright State University. These include any current leadership

       positions in the Organization for Black Faculty and Staff or as coordinator

       of the African-American Studies Program.

       ● As noted above, any future actions which violate University policies will

       not be tolerated and will almost certainly result in commencement of Article

       15 proceedings.

       {¶ 6} In response to this discipline, on September 8, 2020, Durr filed a “Step One”

grievance in accordance with the provisions of the CBA. She identified Leaman as the

WSU administrator whose actions she grieved.           With respect to the nature of her

grievance, Durr cited Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of Article 3 of the CBA. Section 3.2 states, in

pertinent part, that the University shall not discriminate on the basis of race. Similarly,

Section 3.3 states that the University will not tolerate any form of harassment based on

race (among other categories). Durr alleged that her discipline was discriminatory based

on her race. Durr’s proposed resolution of the grievance was that she accept a letter of

reprimand in her file and complete the civility/anger management training (which she had

already done) but that she be paid for teaching in the summer of 2020, that her

suspension be revoked and her three-days without pay be restored, and that the
                                                                                           -5-

restriction on her holding leadership positions be removed.

       {¶ 7} On October 8, 2020, after a hearing, Barry Milligan, the Interim Dean of the

Graduate School, denied Durr’s grievance, finding no evidence that the disciplinary

process or its results were disproportionate to other cases or that the alleged “inequities”

were based upon Durr’s race. Milligan also found no evidence of harassment.

       {¶ 8} On October 28, 2020, Durr filed a “Step Two” grievance, again asserting that

WSU had discriminated against her based upon her race; she named Leaman and

Milligan as the administrators whose actions she grieved. After a hearing, Travis Doom,

Associate Dean of the College of Engineering and Computer Science, determined that

no “substantial evidence” had been provided at the Step-Two grievance hearing that had

not already been considered during Step One and that the preponderance of the evidence

did not support a finding of discrimination or harassment based on race in violation of

Article 3.2 or Article 3.3 of the CBA. See Joint Exhibit 8.

       {¶ 9} Doom’s conclusions noted that Durr’s Chapter representative had argued

that “nuances” between past practices and Durr’s case, such as placing her on paid leave

prior to the initial disciplinary meeting, were “punitive and excessive.”              Durr’s

representative also asserted that Durr had been denied due process at the initial

disciplinary hearing because she had not been given access to “a written file of student

complaints.”

       {¶ 10} In response to the due process arguments, Doom found:

               Due process in a university setting allows the faculty an opportunity

       to respond to potential concerns in a formal or informal meeting. Due to
                                                                                         -6-

       the nature of the power differential, it is not unusual for students’ concerns

       to be anonymous and/or verbal. Students often fear retribution, particularly

       when (due to the nature of their chosen area of study) they may have little

       choice but to interact with a faculty member again in the future. Faculty

       have a right to hear concerns and respond to them, but not necessarily to

       know the source, not to have access to details that might identify the source.

       The result of the process depends on the credibility of the source and the

       response.   Perhaps the individual and anonymous concerns should be

       considered more skeptically by administration than in-person verbal or on-

       the-record concerns from multiple credible witnesses, but, in any event, the

       university process does not (and should not) guarantee that the faculty

       member face students as accusers, only that they are able to face and

       respond to accusations/concerns. These opportunities take place during

       informal meetings * * * as well as more formal disciplinary meetings.

       [There] is not a preponderance of the evidence that reasonably suggests a

       failure in due process, let alone due to a protected characteristic of the

       grievant.

Doom also concluded that the application of different sanctions in different circumstances

was warranted by “differing details” of situations and that there was not a preponderance

of the evidence to suggest that “a protected characteristic of the grievant” played any role

in such differences.

       {¶ 11} On December 17, 2020, Durr filed an amended grievance (Joint Exhibit 9),
                                                                                           -7-

again naming Leaman and Milligan. She again claimed a lack of due process, excessive

punishment, and discrimination and harassment based on race. On January 11, 2021,

La Fleur Small, Interim Vice Provost for Faculty Affairs, responded to the amended

grievance (Joint Exhibit 10), noting that Durr had “added new arguments and/or repeated

old ones” in support of her grievance, but she had not “change[d] or add[ed]” specific

provisions of the CBA that she claimed had been violated. Small therefore concluded

that Durr’s amended grievance was not a proper usage of Article 16.9 of the CBA, which

sets forth specific bases for the filing of an amended grievance; Small denied the

amended grievance and affirmed the prior decisions. Additionally, Small concluded that,

even if the “additions” to Durr’s argument were considered, the result would be the same,

finding “ample ‘due process’ ” and no basis for overturning the prior decisions.

       {¶ 12} On February 4, 2021, the Chapter filed a request for arbitration with the

Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (“FMCS”). WSU objected to the demand,

asserting that the Chapter had not complied with the terms of the CBA because: 1) the

Chapter had failed to provide WSU with adequate notice of its election of arbitration, and

2) the Chapter had missed the 30-day deadline for electing arbitration. WSU agreed to

submit the narrow jurisdictional issue to the arbitrator before a hearing on the merits.

       {¶ 13} On April 18, 2021, the arbitrator issued a preliminary decision finding that

the grievance was arbitrable. Specifically, the arbitrator found that the Chapter’s request

for arbitration had not been untimely, because WSU’s response to Durr’s amended

grievance constituted a “new Step Two answer” from which the 30-day period to request

arbitration ran. The arbitrator also found that the CBA did not explicitly require the
                                                                                           -8-

Chapter to inform WSU of its election before requesting a panel of arbitrators. The

arbitrator stated that he was “uncomfortable implying a notice requirement” when the

language of the CBA did not specifically provide for one, “especially in a CBA like this

which explicitly and in significant detail imposes notice requirements in other contexts.”

The arbitrator also noted that, in his experience, it was common practice for a union to

elect arbitration by requesting a panel of arbitrators from FMCS or another association of

arbitrators without first notifying the employer of its election, unless there was an explicit

requirement of prior notice.

       {¶ 14} On January 21, 2022, the arbitrator issued the decision on the merits after

a hearing on Durr’s grievance. Broadly, the arbitrator’s award found that the Chapter

had provided evidence of race discrimination and that WSU had been “vindictive and

petty” toward Durr, had given undue weight to anonymous student complaints, and had

used the student complaints as a “pretext” to discipline Durr for “other, perhaps invidious,

reasons.” Specifically, the arbitrator concluded that: 1) WSU had shown “no just cause

for discipline,” such that the letter of reprimand should be rescinded and removed from

Durr’s personnel file; 2) WSU must compensate Durr for six hours of teaching for the

summer 2020 term; 3) WSU must compensate Durr for her three-day unpaid suspension;

and 4) the “current Provost or President” of WSU must “apologize in writing” to Durr for

the University’s having interfered with her leadership opportunities.” The arbitrator found

the anger management training to be “moot” since Durr had completed the requirement.

       {¶ 15} In his decision, the arbitrator also noted that the “chain of custody” of the

complaints had not been established (i.e., it was unclear at the arbitration hearing who
                                                                                          -9-

had retrieved the anonymous complaints from the online portal and how the complaints

made their way to the decisionmakers), and he commented critically on the fact that WSU

had not introduced the complaints about Durr through direct “witness testimony” but

“through affidavits sworn by persons other than the authors of the complaints.”

       {¶ 16} On April 21, 2022, WSU filed a motion in the common pleas court to vacate

the arbitrator’s award, asserting that the arbitrator had “exceeded his powers” and

“imperfectly executed them” under R.C. 2711.10.

       {¶ 17} Regarding the jurisdictional issues, WSU argued that at no time after it

issued a response to Durr’s amended grievance did the Chapter, “within 30 days or

otherwise,” inform WSU that it elected arbitration.        Rather, WSU Deputy General

Counsel Michael Manzler received an email from FMCS with a panel of proposed

arbitrators. WSU asserted that it had “consistently maintained” that the Chapter had

failed “to follow the explicit CBA provisions for properly and timely taking a grievance to

arbitration” and, as such, the grievance was “moot” and the arbitrator had no jurisdiction

to address its merits.

       {¶ 18} With respect to the merits of the arbitrator’s decision, WSU asserted that

the arbitrator had shown “a willful blindness to the substantial and severe allegations that

formed the basis for WSU’s subsequent personnel actions” and had insinuated that “these

[student] complaints did not exist, or worse, were fabricated by the University” as a pretext

for disciplining Durr on the basis of her race, notwithstanding that the parties had

stipulated to an exhibit that contained the verbatim text of each of these complaints.

WSU’s objections included that the Chapter had sought discovery of the “original
                                                                                       -10-

complaints” against Durr -- to which it was not entitled under the CBA and which WSU

had refused to provide -- because it did not want to “expose students, and potentially

other bargaining unit members or staff, to the specter of retaliation – by someone who

had already, by numerous accounts, threatened retaliation.” WSU also described its use

of the “EthicsPoint” website to allow anonymous reporting of concerns at the school.

WSU asserted that Milligan had authenticated the printouts of the EthicsPoint complaints

as true and accurate copies of WSU business records. Further, WSU argued that Durr

admitted to threatening to withhold grades in the pre-disciplinary process.         WSU

asserted that, in finding that the Chapter was entitled to certain documents in discovery,

the arbitrator had “cit[ed] a CBA section that had no relevance to arbitration proceedings

(Section 16.8)” and improperly “read into the CBA a non-existent discovery framework.”

      {¶ 19} With respect to the FMLA issue, WSU asserted that Durr had engaged in

policy violations during her FMLA absence by failing to record her use of accrued paid

sick leave after the expiration of the 12 weeks of FMLA. WSU also asserted that Durr

had requested FMLA leave for surgery, but despite never having the surgery, she

submitted certification that she was cleared by her physicians to return to work on May 5,

2020. WSU argued that the disciplinary meeting on July 21, 2020, was arguably “the

core element of the CBA’s disciplinary process,” but that the arbitrator said “virtually

nothing about this meeting * * * [or] about Dr. Durr’s uncontested admissions against

interest at the meeting.” WSU further asserted that Durr had admitted her failure to

record her sick leave usage. WSU argued that the consequences imposed upon Durr

were “specifically contemplated” by Article 14 of the CBA.
                                                                                         -11-

       {¶ 20} WSU argued that although Durr’s grievance alleged a violation of Article 3,

the CBA’s non-discrimination provisions, she had “identified no evidence indicating any

particular discriminatory treatment, let alone any evidence of racial (or other unlawful)

motivation for any such alleged differential treatment.”

       {¶ 21} WSU argued that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by rewriting the

parties’ CBA to revive the Chapter’s untimely grievance and to excuse the Chapter from

satisfying an explicit contractual condition precedent to arbitration. According to WSU,

the arbitrator “ignored express, mandatory deadlines and procedural steps in the parties’

negotiated CBA language” related to arbitration.           WSU further contended that the

arbitrator exceeded his authority by fashioning ultra vires remedies, in that his directives

to rescind Durr’s letter of reprimand, to compensate her for six hours of teaching for the

summer of 2020, and to issue a written apology to Durr were unlawful and exceeded the

arbitrator’s authority under the CBA. WSU argued that the arbitrator “had no authority

under the CBA to decide whether WSU had discriminated against, harassed, or retaliated

against Dr. Durr in violation of federal or state civil rights laws.” According to WSU, the

arbitrator “issued findings concerning WSU’s alleged liability for systemic race

discrimination and unfair labor practices. This is a textbook example of dispensing his

own brand of industrial justice.”

       {¶ 22} The Chapter filed an application to confirm and enforce the arbitrator’s

award on May 4, 2022.

       {¶ 23} In overruling WSU’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, the trial court

stated:
                                                                                         -12-

              After review, the Court finds insufficient evidence to vacate the

       arbitrator’s award in this case. It is clear there is a rational nexus between

       the applicable collective bargaining agreement and the arbitrator’s award.

       Further, the award at issue flows rationally from the terms of the collective

       bargaining agreement and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. * * *

       {¶ 24} WSU asserts one assignment of error on appeal:

              THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE

       ARBITRATOR       HAD     NOT     EXCEEDED       HIS    POWERS       OR      SO

       IMPERFECTLY EXECUTED THEM THAT A MUTUAL, FINAL, AND

       DEFINITE AWARD UPON THE SUBJECT MATTER WAS NOT MADE, IN

       ACCORDANCE WITH R.C. 2711.10(D).

       {¶ 25} WSU’s arguments on appeal are similar to those raised in the trial court.

WSU asserts that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by rewriting the CBA to revive the

Chapter’s untimely grievance and to excuse the Chapter from satisfying an explicit

contractual condition precedent to arbitration. WSU argues that the arbitrator exceeded

his authority by imposing ultra vires remedies and making findings related to racial

discrimination and labor practices. According to WSU, the arbitrator unlawfully ordered

the purging of public records and ignored uncontroverted evidence in awarding summer

compensation to Durr, and he imposed an extracontractual remedy that constituted

compelled speech.

       {¶ 26} “After an award in an arbitration proceeding is made, any party to the

arbitration may file a motion in the court of common pleas for an order vacating, modifying,
                                                                                        -13-

or correcting the award as prescribed in sections 2711.10 and 2711.11 of the Revised

Code.” R.C. 2711.13. R.C. 2711.10 provides: “In any of the following cases, the court

of common pleas shall make an order vacating the award upon the application of any

party to the arbitration if:   * * * (D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so

imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter

submitted was not made.” “R.C. 2711.10 is ‘substantively equivalent’ to 9 U.S.C. 10, a

provision of the Federal Arbitration Act, and we have often used federal law in aid of our

application of the Statute.’ ”   Portage Cty. Bd. of Dev. Disabilities v. Portage Cty.

Educators’ Assn. for Dev. Disabilities, 153 Ohio St.3d 219, 2018-Ohio-1590, 103 N.E.3d

804, ¶ 20.

       {¶ 27} When “reviewing a decision of a common pleas court confirming, modifying,

vacating, or correcting an arbitration award, an appellate court should accept findings of

fact that are not clearly erroneous but decide questions of law de novo.” Id. at ¶ 26.

“The question whether an arbitrator has exceeded his authority is a question of law that

we review de novo.” Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967, 974 (6th Cir. 2000).

       {¶ 28} “An arbitrator is confined to interpreting the provisions of a CBA as written

and [must] construe the terms used in the agreement according to their plain and ordinary

meaning.” Internatl. Assn. of Firefighters, Local 67 v. Columbus, 95 Ohio St.3d 101, 103,

766 N.E.2d 139 (2002), citing Ohio Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp.

Assn., Local 11, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 59 Ohio St.3d 177, 180, 572 N.E.2d 71 (1991).

The Ohio Supreme Court stated:

              In United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
                                                                                       -14-

      [363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960)], the United States

      Supreme Court cautioned that “ * * an arbitrator is confined to interpretation

      and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to

      dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look * * * for

      guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it

      draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the

      arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no

      choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.” Id. at 597 * * *. Thus, we

      will accord considerable latitude to an arbitrator, but we recognize his

      powers are not unlimited in the resolution of labor disputes. “The arbitrator

      is confined to the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining

      agreement, and although he may construe ambiguous contract language,

      he is without authority to disregard or modify plain and unambiguous

      provisions.” Detroit Coil Co. v. Internatl. Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace

      Workers, Lodge No. 82 (C.A.6, 1979), 594 F.2d 575, 579; * * *.

      Accordingly, it is our duty to determine whether the arbitrator's award was

      reached in a rational manner from the collective bargaining agreement. See

      Detroit Coil, supra; * * *.

Ohio Office of Collective Bargaining at 179-180.

      {¶ 29} As noted by the Sixth Circuit:

             An award fails to derive its essence from the agreement when: (1) it

      conflicts with express terms in the agreement; (2) it imposes additional
                                                                                      -15-

      requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement; (3) it is not

      rationally supported by or derived from the agreement; or (4) it is based on

      “general considerations of fairness and equity” instead of the exact terms of

      the agreement.

Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co., Inc. v. General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local

Union No. 89, 972 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir.1992).

      {¶ 30} In this case, Article 14 of the CBA governed discipline. It provided:

      14.1 The University has and retains the right to apply discipline up to and

      including termination of a Bargaining Unit Faculty Member pursuant to

      Articles 14, T15, and N15. The University subscribes to the principles of

      progressive discipline except when summary action is necessary and

      appropriate. In determining whether or not to impose discipline and the

      severity of such discipline the University shall consider the severity of the

      Bargaining Unit Faculty Member’s conduct and his or her disciplinary

      record, and the provisions of Article 5, “Academic Freedom and

      Professional Responsibilities.”

      ***

      14.2 The University will not impose discipline except for just cause.

      14.3 When in the judgment of the President or a provost the presence of

      a Bargaining Unit Faculty Member on University premises presents a threat

      to the health or safety of any person in this University community or

      represents a threat of disruption of or interference with any normal and
                                                                                       -16-

      lawful activities of the University, its staff or students, the President or a

      provost may suspend the Member pending the disposition of the disciplinary

      process provided for under Articles 14, T15, and N15. Such suspension

      shall be with pay * * *.

      ***

      14.5.5   For serious or repeat offenses, discipline the University might

      impose includes but is not restricted to the following measures: required

      training (such as diversity or anger management); denial of summer

      teaching opportunities pursuant to Section 7.8.1; adjustments to the weights

      applied for annual evaluation pursuant to Section T11.2.6 or N11.2.6; paid

      suspension; unpaid suspension for three days pursuant to this Article 14, or

      longer unpaid suspension pursuant to Article T15 or N15 * * *; and

      termination pursuant to Article T15 of N15. * * *

      {¶ 31} Article 16 of the CBA governed grievances and arbitration.         Article 16

provided as follows:

      16.1 The parties recognize and endorse the importance of establishing a

      prompt, fair and efficient mechanism for the orderly resolution of complaints

      and agree to make every effort to encourage the informal resolution of

      complaints before they become formal grievances. Any formal or informal

      resolution achieved must be consistent with the terms of this Agreement.

      The procedures set forth in this Article shall be the sole and exclusive

      method of disposing of grievances.
                                                                                  -17-

16.2.6   Unless extended by mutual consent, in writing, the time limit

specified herein will be the maximum time allowed. If the University fails

to comply with the time limits to respond, the Grievant may advance the

grievance to the next step by sending a letter of notification to the

administrator at the next step.     Failure to advance the grievance shall

render the grievance moot.

***

16.4 Grievance Step One: A Bargaining Unit Faculty Member(s) or the

[Chapter] may file a grievance with the Associate Provost for Faculty and

Staff Affairs not later than forty (40) days after the event giving rise to the

grievance or no later than forty (40) days after the Grievant knew or

reasonably should have known of the event giving rise to the grievance.

16.4.1 The Grievant shall state clearly on the grievance form in Appendix

F the nature of the grievance, the contractual provision(s) allegedly violated,

the name of the University administrator whose actions are being grieved

(if known), the dates when the alleged act or omission giving rise to the

grievance occurred, and the remedy sought. The Grievant shall also sign

the form and submit it to the Associate Provost with a copy to [the Chapter].

***

16.4.2 The University shall inform [the Chapter] of any grievance meeting

and [the Chapter] has the right to be present at any grievance meeting. * * *

16.4.3 A Dean or provost shall hold a meeting with the Grievant and [the
                                                                                        -18-

      Chapter’s] representative (if the [Chapter] elects to be present) at a mutually

      agreeable time and location within ten (10) days after the grievance was

      filed and shall then respond in writing to the Grievant and the [Chapter] no

      later than fifteen (15) days after the completion of the grievance meeting(s).

      If the Grievant or the [Chapter] does not accept the Step One answer, either

      may, within fifteen (15) days, file a Step Two grievance with the Associate

      Provost.

      ***

      16.5 Grievance Step Two: Upon receiving a Step Two grievance, the

      Provost or Associate Provost1 shall hold a meeting with the Grievant and

      the [Chapter’s] representative * * * at a mutually agreeable time and location

      within ten (10) days after the Associate Provost has received the grievance.

      * * * The provost who holds the meeting shall respond in writing to the

      Grievant and the [Chapter] no later than fifteen (15) days after the

      completion of the grievance meeting(s).

      16.6   Arbitration:   If the [Chapter] is not satisfied with the Step Two

      answer, it shall have the sole right to submit the grievance to arbitration by

      an external arbitrator, within thirty (30) days after receiving the Step Two

      answer. * * *

      16.6.1 If the [Chapter] elects to pursue external arbitration, representatives

      of the [Chapter] and of the Provost shall meet within ten (10) days to select

1
 As noted above, the “University Response to Step Two Grievance” was issued by
Doom, Associate Dean of the College of Engineering and Computer Science.
                                                                                      -19-

      an arbitrator.   In the event the parties are unable to agree upon an

      arbitrator, the parties shall ask either the American Arbitration Association

      (AAA) or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to provide

      fifteen names.   If the parties are unable to agree on which of the 15

      nominees shall serve as an arbitrator, then the arbitrator will be chosen by

      alternately striking names.

      ***

      16.9 No changes can be made to a grievance once it is filed under Section

      16.4 except as follows: After completing Step Two and before submitting a

      grievance to arbitration, the Grievant may change or add to the specific

      provision(s) of the Agreement allegedly violated. In such cases, the

      amended grievance will be resubmitted to the Provost, who no later than

      ten (10) days after receiving the amended grievance form shall reconfirm

      his or her original Step Two written response, offer an amended written

      response, or call another Step Two meeting in accordance with Section

      16.5.

(Footnote added.)

      {¶ 32} Regarding the arbitrator’s authority, the CBA provides as follows:

      16.6.4 Remedies.     An external arbitrator hearing a grievance shall be

      bound by the following restrictions:

      16.6.4.1 The arbitrator’s decision shall be limited to only the question or

      questions submitted for decision;
                                                                                           -20-

       16.6.4.2 The arbitrator shall not substitute a judgment for that of the

       University where the University’s judgment and actions do not violate the

       written provisions of this Agreement;

       16.6.4.3 The arbitrator shall have no authority to add to, subtract from, alter,

       change or modify any of the provisions of this Agreement;

       16.6.4.4 The arbitrator shall not render any decision which would result in

       the violation of state or federal law; and

       16.6.4.5 The arbitrator shall make no award that provides a Bargaining Unit

       Faculty Member compensation greater than would have resulted had there

       been no violation.

       {¶ 33} We begin by addressing WSU’s assertion that the arbitrator exceeded his

authority by “adding to and subtracting from the express terms of the CBA” and thereby

improperly exercising jurisdiction over Durr’s grievance.        Section 16.1 of the CBA

provides that the “procedures set forth in this Article shall be the sole and exclusive

method of disposing of grievances.” As noted above, Section 16.6 grants to the Chapter

the “sole right” to submit a grievance to arbitration, and Section 16.6.1 provides that if the

Chapter does elect to pursue arbitration, “representatives of [the Chapter] and of the

Provost shall meet within ten (10) days to select an arbitrator. In the event the parties

are unable to agree upon an arbitrator, the parties shall ask either the [AAA] or the [FMCS]

to provide 15 names.” In our view, the mention of representatives of both parties and

the plural usage of “parties” in Section 16.6 contemplates an initial collaborative effort to

agree on an arbitrator. However, in its brief, the Chapter acknowledges that on February
                                                                                         -21-

4, 2021, it “submitted the grievance to arbitration” and “requested a panel of arbitrators”

from FMCS without prior discussion of the matter with WSU; thereafter, WSU “received

written notification of the submission to arbitration,” after which the Chapter’s attorney

“followed up” with the University’s attorney about selecting an arbitrator from the list

provided by FMCS.

       {¶ 34} WSU produced several emails relevant to how the university learned of the

Chapter’s request for arbitration. In a February 4, 2021 email from FMCS to Michael

Manzler, Deputy General Counsel for WSU, FMCS provided the list of 15 arbitrators.

Manzler’s responsive email to FMCS stated: “Thank you for providing the attached panel.

I am the University’s legal representative. I was not copied on the panel request that

was submitted to FMCS, however – would you please email me a copy of the form, letter,

email, or whatever else you received requesting this panel?”         FMCS responded to

Manzler stating: “* * * there isn’t paperwork to provide since the [Chapter] processed this

online electronically.”

       {¶ 35} WSU’s Step Two response to Durr’s grievance was issued on December

8, 2020. Section 16.6 clearly and unambiguously provides that the Chapter “shall have

the sole right to submit the grievance to arbitration * * * within thirty (30) days after

receiving the Step Two answer.” (Emphasis added.) Although the Chapter asserts that

the 30-day period began to run on January 11, 2021, when WSU responded to the

“Amended Grievance” that Durr filed on December 18, 2020 pursuant to CBA Section

16.9, this interpretation is contrary to the plain language of Section 16.6 referring to the

receipt of the Step Two answer.
                                                                                         -22-

       {¶ 36} This conclusion is further supported by our determination that Durr’s

amended grievance did not comply with Section 16.9, which prohibited changes to a

grievance form except that the grievant “may change or add to the specific provision(s)

of the agreement allegedly violated.” In her amended grievance, Durr cited Article 3.2

and 3.3 as the sections of the CBA that she believed had been violated; these were the

same sections she had cited in her Step One and Step Two grievances. We agree with

Interim Vice Provost Small’s finding that Durr did not “change or add” any sections that

she alleged had been violated; rather, Durr “added new arguments and/or repeated old

ones allegedly supporting” her grievance. Small properly concluded that the amended

grievance was “not a proper use of Section 16.9.” The arbitrator acted unreasonably and

exceeded his authority in interpreting WSU’s rejection of the amended grievance and a

“new Step Two answer” for purposes of calculating the time in which the Chapter had to

request arbitration.

       {¶ 37} Section 1.7 of Article 1 of the CBA provides: “Time limits referred to in this

Agreement as ‘days’ shall be defined as business days: Monday through Friday

throughout the calendar year, excluding Saturdays and Sundays, formal holidays

recognized by the University, and periods when the University is officially closed.” In

correspondence discussing the timeliness of the request for arbitration with the arbitrator,

Michael Manzler stated:

       * * * Carefully counting University business days only, per Section 1.7, i.e.

       excluding the holidays, winter break closure, and MLK day, means the 30th

       business day thereafter fell on January 29, 2021. (There were 11 business
                                                                                          -23-

       days, from 12/09/2020 to 12/23/2020, inclusive, before the University’s

       holiday/winter break started on 12/24/2020, and the University reopened on

       1/04/2021, so 19 more business days takes us to (and including) Friday

       1/29/21). * * *

       {¶ 38} Pursuant to Section 16.2.6, “[u]nless extended by mutual consent, in writing,

the time limit specified herein will be the maximum time allowed.” Further, Section

16.6.4.3 states that the “arbitrator shall have no authority to add to, subtract from, alter,

change or modify any of the provisions of this Agreement.” Even assuming that Durr’s

grievance was properly submitted to arbitration on February 4, 2021, when she requested

a panel of arbitrators from FMCS, it was undisputed that this was more than 30 business

days after the Step Two answer.        Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the

arbitrator exceeded the authority granted to him by the parties to the CBA in considering

the time-barred grievance. In other words, pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D), the arbitrator

lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Durr’s grievance, and the trial court erred in

concluding that the arbitrator’s award “flow[ed] rationally from the terms” of the CBA.

       {¶ 39} Finally, even if we were to conclude that the arbitrator did have jurisdiction

to consider Durr’s grievance, the arbitrator acted beyond his authority and exceeded the

restrictions in Section 16.6 of the CBA.        In ordering the removal of the letter of

reprimand/warning, ordering WSU to compensate Durr for summer teaching and the

three-day unpaid suspension, and ordering it to provide a written apology, the arbitrator

substituted his judgment for that of WSU where WSU’s judgment and actions did not

violate the written provisions of the CBA.
                                                                                     -24-

       {¶ 40} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and

the arbitrator’s award is vacated.

                                     .............

EPLEY, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.