Court Opinion

ID: 9667144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:36:39.693025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:35.370196
License: Public Domain

DUNN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
In his first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in classifying separate property of appellant as community property. Specifically, appellant contends that the trial court erred in classifying the League City house, the Rockwell stock, and the Rockwell retirement fund as community property. In his fifth point of error, appellant contends that the trial court’s division of the community property was not “just and right.” The majority finds that the trial court did mischaracterize the property, but then determines that the mischaracterization was harmless error because appellant failed to demonstrate that the division of the community property was manifestly unjust, or that the mischar-acterization resulted in an inequitable division of the community property. I disagree with the majority’s conclusions that the mischaracterization was harmless error and that appellant failed to demonstrate the division of the community property was manifestly unjust.
The trial court awarded appellant an undetermined percentage of the community property. However, the trial court included the League City house, the Rockwell *537stock, and the Rockwell retirement fund in the community property. The trial court considered the value of the League City house, the Rockwell stock, and the Rockwell retirement fund in determining what property to award appellant to satisfy the percentage of community property the trial court intended to award appellant. If the trial court had properly excluded the League City house, the Rockwell stock, and the Rockwell retirement fund, the trial court may have awarded appellant other community property to satisfy the percentage the trial court intended to award appellant. See Cook v. Cook, 679 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ) (where trial court intended to award 60 percent of community assets to wife and 40 percent to husband, but because of mis-characterization of property, wife actually received only 38 percent and husband received 62 percent, appellate court determined that different division would have resulted if trial court had properly characterized property).
I would find that the trial court’s mis-characterization of the property was not harmless error, and the division of the community property was manifestly unjust. I would sustain appellant’s first and fifth points of error.
In his fourth point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding appellee $12,000 as reimbursement for improvements made to the League City house. The majority finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the right of reimbursement because the record showed the personal and financial contributions of the community estate and appellee’s separate estate outweighed any benefit received by the community estate. I disagree.
Appellant’s and appellee’s testimony established that mortgage payments on the League City house were made from a bank account that contained community funds and separate funds of appellee. In addition, appellant and appellee, by their own effort, made “improvements” on the house during the marriage; those “improvements” were paid for out of the bank account. Appellee’s testimony suggested the value of the house was enhanced by $25,-000 to $30,000. No evidence showed that the enhanced value was a result of any of the “improvements.”
However, both appellant and appellee testified that they lived in the League City house during their marriage. The community did not pay appellant’s separate estate rent for the use of the house during the marriage. The community received some benefit from living in the house rent-free. Appellee presented no evidence concerning the value of the benefit to the community. The trial court should not grant a right of reimbursement absent any evidence concerning the value of the offsetting benefit to the community. Fyffe v. Fyffe, 670 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1984, writ dism’d); see also Martin v. Martin, 759 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (when interest, taxes, and insurance on separate estate were paid out of community funds, no right to reimbursement was established unless expenditures by community were shown to be greater than benefits received); Rogers v. Rogers, 754 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (husband failed to meet his burden to establish right to reimbursement where he presented no evidence that value of community labor was greater than benefits received by community); cf. Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex.1984) (burden of proving right of reimbursement was on claimant); Allen v. Allen, 704 S.W.2d 600, 607 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (trial court did not abuse discretion in denying claim for reimbursement where wife failed to show expenditures by community estate on husband’s separate estate outweighed benefits received by community). Thus, in the present case, the trial court erred in granting appellee a right of reimbursement because she presented no evidence of the value of the benefit received by the community from living in the house. I would sustain appellant’s fourth point of error.
In his second and third points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in placing a lien on the League City house to secure appellee’s right of reim*538bursement. Since I would find the trial court erred in awarding appellee a right of reimbursement, I would find that the lien was improperly placed on the house.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for further proceeding.