Court Opinion

ID: 9390996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 21:01:26.202766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:38.721561
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4534      Doc: 37         Filed: 04/27/2023    Pg: 1 of 3

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4534

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        CHRISTOPHER EDMOND JONES,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:21-cr-00356-LCB-5)

        Submitted: April 25, 2023                                         Decided: April 27, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Mark E. Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. Kyle David Pousson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
        OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Christopher Edmond Jones pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to two

        counts of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); carjacking, in violation

        of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1); and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of

        18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The district court sentenced him to a total term of 188 months’

        imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

        U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning

        whether Jones’ sentence is substantively reasonable. Jones was informed of his right to

        file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. The Government moves to dismiss

        Jones’ appeal pursuant to the appellate waiver in his plea agreement. We affirm in part

        and dismiss in part.

               “We review an appellate waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is

        enforceable” and “will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls

        within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir.

        2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant

        enters it “knowingly and intelligently, a determination that we make by considering the

        totality of the circumstances.” Id. “Generally though, if a district court questions a

        defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P. 11] colloquy

        and the record indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of the waiver,

        the waiver is valid.” United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record, including the plea agreement and the

        transcript of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, confirms that Jones knowingly and

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USCA4 Appeal: 22-4534      Doc: 37          Filed: 04/27/2023     Pg: 3 of 3

        intelligently waived his right to appeal his convictions and sentence, with limited

        exceptions not applicable here. We therefore conclude that the waiver is valid and

        enforceable and that the sentencing issue counsel raises falls squarely within the scope of

        the waiver.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no potentially meritorious issues outside the scope of Jones’ valid appellate waiver.

        We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss the appeal as

        to all issues covered by the waiver. We otherwise affirm.

               This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to petition the

        Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Jones requests that a petition be

        filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move

        in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that

        a copy thereof was served on Jones. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

        legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

        would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                               AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                               DISMISSED IN PART

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