Court Opinion

ID: 9853467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:49:22.300659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:49.489228
License: Public Domain

*505Eberhabdt, Judge,
dissenting. It is my view of this matter that because of a waiver or of an estoppel by reason of the conduct of plaintiff’s counsel there was an abuse of discretion in the ■court’s refusal to open the default.
The evidence leads inescapably to the conclusion that counsel for the defendant honestly and in good faith believed that counsel for the plaintiff had orally waived the default and consented to the late filing of defensive pleadings.1 When, as here, the ■defensive pleadings are tendered and filed 36 days after service and defendant may open the default as a matter of right by doing nothing more than paying the accrued court costs, reason for declining to waive the late filing and insisting upon payment of the costs is not compelling, and experience indicates that often it is not done.
It was not so specified in Code § 38-2301, the applicable statute prior to CPA, as it is not specified in the provisions of CPA relative to the taking of depositions that issue be joined prior to the taking of them, but the Supreme Court held in Realty Construction Co. v. Freeman, 174 Ga. 657, 659 (163 SE 732) that “Before depositions can be taken under this section, there must be a joinder of issue, or some issue must be raised by the pleadings,” and we apprehend that this requisite survives the repeal of § 38-2301 and attaches to its successor, § 81A-126. When counsel for the plaintiff participated in the taking of the depositions it was tantamount to an acknowledgment by him that the answer had been timely filed, or a waiver of the late filing, and that the case was thus at issue. Cf. McRae v. Boykin, 50 Ga. App. 866, 879 (179 SE 535).
This important circumstance was calculated to lead counsel for the defendant into the security of a belief that there had been a waiver, and thus to mislead him to defendant’s injury, for he was bound to know that it involved the accrual of an inequitable expense on the defendant if the case stood in default *506and the evidence could not be utilized in making a defense. Smith v. Jones, 185 Ga. 236 (1) (194 SE 556).
While there is a conflict as to whether there was acquiescence by plaintiff’s counsel in the late filing of defensive pleadings by a telephone conversation with defendant’s counsel, it is undisputed that defendant’s counsel participated in the taking of the several depositions which defendant expected to use on the trial of the case and that he remained silent as to his intention to insist upon a default until shortly before the trial was scheduled to take place. Consequently, Bowman v. Winn, 16 Ga. App. 546 (1), supra, and Morgan v. Goldstein, 20 Ga. App. 115 (2), supra, do not require an affirmance.
If counsel for the plaintiff intended to insist upon the default it was incumbent upon him to make that fact known before completing arrangements for and participating in the taking of the depositions so that the accumulation of an unneeded and wasteful expense and trouble might have been avoided. To put it another way, we think plaintiff is estopped to assert the default. H. C. Whitmer Co. v. Petty, 54 Ga. App. 377 (187 SE 908); Watkins Co. v. Rivers, 37 Ga. App. 559 (2) (140 SE 770). “There are methods of expressing agreement other than by word of mouth. Conduct can be as articulate as language. An old adage declares that actions speak louder than words. The books are full of instances where parties were estopped though they were speechless at the time.” Smith v. Jones, 185 Ga. 236, 241, supra. “In order to create an equitable estoppel it is not necessary that there should be an intentional moral wrong, (but that) negligence, when there is a duty cast upon a person to disclose the truth, may supply the place of intent. . .” City of East Point v. Upchurch Packing Co., 58 Ga. App. 829, 831 (200 SE 210). “Conduct likely to lead to injury must not be allowed to justify itself. . .” Griffin Grocery Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 93 Ga. App. 546, 549 (92 SE2d 254).
When counsel for the defendant learned that the default would be insisted upon, the costs were paid.
The defense set out in the pleadings which were on file, if established, appears to be meritorious.
“Punctuality is a virtue of high order, but truth and justice *507are even more exalted; hence the demand for punctuality in pleading should not be so strict as to prevent inquiry into truth and to deny justice where the delinquency is reasonably excusable. Therefore, while the law makes requirements of punctuality in pleading, it also usually makes provision for relieving against the penalties imposed for a lack of this virtue, when the interests of truth and justice require it.” Bass v. Doughty, 5 Ga. App. 458, 460 (63 SE 516). And see Brawner v. Maddox, 1 Ga. App. 332, 337 (58 SE 278); Butler & Co. v. Strickland-Tillman Hdw. Co., 15 Ga. App. 193 (82 SE 815); First Nat. Ins. Co. v. Thain, 107 Ga. App. 100 (129 SE2d 381).
“[T]he above Code section (now § 81A-155 (b)) 'providing for the opening of defaults, should be given a liberal construction, in the promotion of justice and the establishment of the truth; and the discretion of the trial judge in opening a default and permitting the defendant to plead will not be interfered with by this court unless manifestly abused, to the injury of the plaintiff.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Strickland v. Galloway, 111 Ga. App. 683, 685 (143 SE2d 3), and citations.
It is our view that the interests of truth and justice do require the opening of the default here, and especially in view of the delay in letting it be known that the default would be insisted upon and the attendant incurring of trouble and expense in taking depositions for use at what was thought to be the upcoming trial.
There can be no injury to the plaintiff in opening the default here, for the defensive pleadings were filed at a time when they could have been filed as a matter of right, simply by the payment of the accrued costs. There is no substantial delay in informing the plaintiff of the nature of the defense. He is put to no disadvantage in preparing for trial of the case.
Denial of the motion was error.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Bell and Judge Whitman join in this dissent.

 It is to be noted that under CPA § 81A-108 (c) the requirement that waiver or estoppel be set forth affirmatively applies only when “pleading to a preceding pleading,” which a motion to open a default does not.