Court Opinion

ID: 9649642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:04:20.739981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:44.205095
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
I join the result reached by the majority. I distance myself from the analysis set forth therein and write separately to *374fully explain my view regarding appropriate appellate review in PCRA litigation.
I supported Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517 (2001), a majority opinion, not only because it echoed the frustration I felt in conducting appellate review of post-conviction appeals in capital cases, but also, because it provided a rational and balanced means for resolving that frustration. I write now only to provide my unvarnished view of what Williams means to the conduct of litigation brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. (hereinafter the “PCRA” or the “Act”).
Williams placed great emphasis on the function of the PCRA court as a gatekeeper in the arena of post-conviction litigation. In Williams, this court provided a roadmap for the post-conviction review process in capital cases, by putting meat on the bones of the process described in the PCRA. Essentially, we instructed the bench and bar that before this court will undertake appellate review in a PCRA matter the level of advocacy must meet the requirements of pleading and proof demanded by the. Act, the decisional law following therefrom, and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal and Appellate Procedure.
This author anticipated that there would be a learning curve until the framework of Williams became absorbed into the regular course of post-conviction practice. In recognition of that learning curve, I anticipated that some PCRA capital cases would require a remand. Remand is not needed in those instances where the PCRA court carried out its function by conducting a merits review of the pleadings, holding a hearing where necessary, and explaining the reasons for its rulings. A remand is only necessary in those cases where the PCRA court failed to meet its obligations as gatekeeper. It is essential that the PCRA court force petitioners to prepare all collateral claims in accordance with the provisions of the Act for it is only if such compliance is mandated in a consistent manner that practitioners can fully understand what is expected of them. As gatekeeper, the PCRA court has the responsibility to explain where and how a PCRA petition is deficient, *375to provide the opportunity for amendment to correct those deficiencies, to supply a forum for the full and fair opportunity to litigate evidentiary claims when needed, and to file an opinion adequately setting forth the reasons for its rulings.1
Let me put this bluntly: until the PCRA courts and practitioners prepare these cases in accordance with the dictates of Williams, we should continue to remand them and require that they be done correctly. Capital petitioners in this Commonwealth should receive the process to which they are due, no more, no less. Appellate review of PCRA matters can only proceed after the PCRA court has properly laid the groundwork so that the evenhanded distribution of justice will not threatened.
Although, initially, in attempting to groom the PCRA practice in Pennsylvania criticism could attach to the “remand approach”, it is my view that if we stay the course as set forth in Williams, it will not be long before a reasoned and expeditious methodology is firmly rooted. Jurisprudentially, this is the goal, I believe, all of my colleagues aspire to in the realm of capital PCRA appellate review. Once sufficient time has passed for the dictates of Williams to become entrenched, the necessity to remand these matters will cease. Thereafter, we will enjoy a post-conviction practice that allows expeditious, meaningful and efficient appellate review of capital PCRA *376claims, a procedure, which complies with both the law and the spirit of due process.
Applying this concept to the case at bar, I would affirm the denial of the PCRA petition. In this case a further remand is not required for an evidentiary hearing and the PCRA court filed an adequate opinion permitting sufficient basis for appellate review. See Commonwealth v. (Roy) Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167 (1999).

. Although this is not a traditional layering case, experience teaches that most PCRA claims are couched in terms of layered allegations' of ineffectiveness of counsel. At the collateral stage, il is essential lo consider the independent actions of all prior counsel at each stage of the proceeding, as they relate to the current claim of error in the collateral proceeding. 11 is not enough for a petitioner to argue the merits of the underlying claim and the prejudice suffered. At the PCRA stage, a petitioner must go the next step and elucidate how the underlying claim of error was handled by, or overlooked by, each intervening attorney in order to present a cognizable claim for collateral relid. Prior to Williams, this court permitted a merits review of the underlying claim of error by the PCRA court if the petitioner provided a boilerplate allegation of layered ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202 (2000). Post -Williams, where a petitioner initially fails to set forth a claim that is cognizable under the Act, or to adequately develop such claim in a manner that affords substantive review, the trial court must identify the deficiencies and, where necessary, permit amendment.