Court Opinion

ID: 9812935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:52:12.667169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:16.927242
License: Public Domain

*419MerrimoN, C. J.
(dissenting): It seems to me that in this case the Court adheres too strictly to the mere letter of the statute interpreted without adverting sufficiently to its spirit and purpose, and thus reach an erroneous conclusion. The statute prescribes that “when any cattle or other live stock be killed or injured by the cars running upon a railroad, it shall be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the company in an action for damages against said company,” &c. It will be observed that its terms, as to the cattle and live stock so killed or injured, are general, without specifying anything as to the circumstances or condition of the stock at the time the injury was done. Are such terms to be taken in their broadest and literal sense? Does the statute extend to every such killing? Does it embrace the case where the owner of stock shall drive his cattle covertly on the road to be killed, to the end he may recover damages on account of the same? Does it extend to such killing of a horse, or mule, or ox, while the owner was riding or driving the same? I think not. The object and purpose of the statute show clearly that it was not intended that it should apply to stock killed, or injured, while bridled, harnessed or yoked, and under the immediate guidance and control of the owner thereof, or some other person.
In an action for damages for such injury to cattle, there being proof of the injury, the statute at once, in effect, declares that it was the result of negligence on the part of the defendant railroad company, unless it can prove there was no negligence on their part. This it is required to prove negatively. The statute thus applies only to such stock. Why is it so limited? Why was it not made to apply to the like killing of, or injury, to a person? Why not to injury so done to properly of any kind ? These questions are pertinent and significant. There was a strong, practical reason for so limiting its application. In this State such stock have generally been allowed to run loose, *420unrestrained, day and night, in the fields and forests through which railroads were located. Such roads, in this State, have not been fenced, or otherwise enclosed. Cattle so at large went upon them unrestrained, and were, in many instances, recklessly and negligently killed or injured by cars passing rapidly over such roads — sometimes in the night, sometimes in the day. No person saw the killing, or knew of the circumstances attending the same, except the engineer' or other agents of the railroad company, and he alone knew that there was, or was not, negligence of the company, and he had strong motives to testify that there was no negligence. Hence, it was difficult, in many cases wholly impracticable, for the injured party to prove negligence, when, in fact, it existed. This became a serious public grievance. It, and no more, constituted the mischief to be remedied, and hence the statute. It properly applies, and was intended only to apply, to such cases. There was no necessity or reason why it should apply to such cases where a horse or other animal was so killed, or injured, in the presence and under the control of the owner, or some person in charge of them. In that case, the party injured, or some other person for him, saw and knew the circumstances of the killing, or injury, and could testify in a proper action as to the same — -could prove the negligence of the company, if, indeed, there was negligence. There was no more reason in such case for the statute than in a case of the like killing of a man — indeed, in some instances, not so much, and the same may be said as to the like injury to property generally. This Court has, in effect, so repeatedly decided. In Doggett v. Railroad Co., 81 N. C., 459, the late Chief Justice said: “Where injury to stock straying off is done by trains running at night, as well as by day, and known only to the defendant’s employees, this (to make proof of negligence) was an almost impossible requirement. The owner would not know how, when, or where *421the iujury was done, while the servants of the road would possess knowledge of the facts. Hence, the General Assembly enacted the statute cited above, thus shifting the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant, and requiring the latter to show the circumstances and repel the legal presumption. But when the facts are fully disclosed, and there is no controversy as to them, the Court must decide whether they make out a case of negligence, and if they fail to do this the defendants are not to be held liable. Such, we understand, to be the purpose and effect of the statute, and that, all the facts appearing, the defendant is charged or acquitted as negligence appears or is disproved.” To the like effect are Durham v. W. & W. R. R. Co., 82 N. C., 352, and State v. Roten, 86 N. C , 701; Pippen v. Railroad Co., 75 N. C., 54.
Where words having a general and comprehensive meaning, as in this case, are employed in a statute, they must be taken, applied, and their meaning ascertained, in connection with the reason and purpose of it, and they may be enlarged or narrowed as to the scope of their meaning in order to effectuate the legislative intent clearly appearing. The subject, the reason and purpose of the statute indicate the sense in which the Legislature employed such words, and give them point and particular force and effect. 1 Bl. Com. 61; Pot. Dwar. on Stats., 175, 184, 185; Hart v. Cleis, 8 John, 44; Brewer v. Blaugh, 14 Ret. 178.
Unquestionably, the Court shall hot make or unmake a statute, but it is its province — -its duty — to give it just and reasonable interpretation and effect, according to the legislative intent thus appearing.