Court Opinion

ID: 9396625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 13:12:17.273246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.446306
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges AtLee and Friedman
              Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia

              ELIZABETH HARING
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0778-22-4                                   JUDGE FRANK K. FRIEDMAN
                                                                                   MAY 23, 2023
              THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, F/K/A
               THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS
               SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO JP MORGAN CHASE BANK,
               NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR
               STRUCTURED ASSET MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS II

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
                                              James E. Plowman, Jr., Judge

                              Henry W. McLaughlin (Law Office of Henry McLaughlin, P.C., on
                              briefs), for appellant.

                              Ronald J. Guillot, Jr. (E. Edward Farnsworth, Jr.; Samuel I. White,
                              P.C., on brief), for appellee.

                     This appeal arises from an action for unlawful detainer filed by the Bank of New York

              Mellon (“BONY”) against Elizabeth Haring. Haring appealed the case from the general district

              court to circuit court and posted an appeal bond. On March 7, 2022, the circuit court issued a

              written order granting summary judgment to BONY, awarding possession of the property to

              BONY, and ordering the clerk of court to record the order among the land deeds. This order

              resolved all the claims raised in the litigation. However, the order also stated that the case was

              being continued to resolve Haring’s motion to have the appeal bond returned to her. More than

              30 days later, on April 25, 2022, the court issued another written order stating that the appeal

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
bond was to be disbursed to BONY as the prevailing party and ordering that the case be closed.

Haring then appealed to this Court within 30 days of the April 25 order.

          We find that the March 7 order was the final order in this case. Accordingly, Haring’s

notice of appeal submitted after the April 25 ruling was not timely filed with respect to the

summary judgment rulings. Accordingly, we cannot reach her arguments on the merits issues.

We further find that the circuit court’s award of the bond to BONY, while timely appealed, was

proper.

                                           I. Background

          In December 2018, the Bank of New York Mellon (“BONY”) filed an action for

unlawful detainer against Elizabeth Haring in the General District Court of Loudoun County.

BONY stated that it was the record owner of a residence in Leesburg, Virginia, having purchased

the property at auction; the bill of particulars included a copy of the trustee’s deed for the

property. BONY averred that a notice to quit and demand for possession was sent to Haring in

November 2018, but Haring continued to “detain the [p]roperty,” thereby denying BONY its

right to possession. Haring responded in a written pleading that there was “a break in the chain

of title” and that, therefore, BONY was not entitled to the property and the general district court

had no subject matter jurisdiction. The general district court granted possession of the home to

BONY.

          Haring appealed and paid a $5,100 appeal bond. In circuit court, BONY moved for

summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Haring’s claim of a break in the chain of

title failed as a matter of law.1 BONY also argued that Haring did not have standing to challenge

the assignments of the deed of trust because she was not a party to the assignments.

          1
        BONY describes the chain of title as Haring obtaining a loan from Continental
Mortgage Corporation, which then assigned the deed of trust to Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (“MERS”); MERS then assigned the deed of trust to BONY. BONY appointed
                                             -2-
       On March 7, 2022, the circuit court issued a written order granting BONY’s motion for

summary judgment, awarding possession of the disputed property to BONY, and ordering the

clerk of court to accept a copy of that order “for recordation among the land records of this

court.” The March 7 order concludes: “it is ordered that this action is continued to March 25,

2022 at 10:00 a.m. for review/status of appeal bond.”2

       On March 11, 2022, Haring filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the order granting

summary judgment. This motion was denied by written order entered March 15, 2022. On April

8, 2022, Haring filed a written motion for the return of her appeal bond from general district

court. BONY filed a written opposition to that motion.

       On April 25, 2022, the circuit court issued a written order denying Haring’s motion to

have her bond returned to her. The order states that the motion is denied, that the appeal bond

“shall be paid over” to BONY, and directs the clerk of court to disburse the appeal bond to

BONY’s counsel. The order concludes: “This order is Final and this matter may be stricken

from this [c]ourt’s docket.” Haring appealed from this April 25, 2022 order, filing her notice of

appeal on May 25, 2022.

Samuel White as substitute trustee, and later appointed Professional Foreclosure Corporation of
Virginia (“PFC”) as substitute trustee. PFC then conducted a foreclosure sale on the home, and
BONY was the high bidder. BONY then filed a notice to quit, and later the unlawful detainer.
       2
          Haring initially attempted to appeal the March 7 order to this Court. That appeal was
dismissed for failure to timely file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the circuit court. While
that notice of appeal was improperly filed, BONY suggests that the attempt shows that Haring
was aware that the March 7 order was the final order in the case, thus triggering the applicable
appellate deadlines.
                                                  -3-
                                       II. Notice of Appeal

       The first issue we must address is whether Haring’s notice of appeal was timely filed.3

Additionally, we must determine whether the circuit court retained jurisdiction to issue the April

25 order. As explained below, we find that the March 7 order was the final order from the circuit

court and that Haring’s appeal of the merits of that decision was not timely filed. We further

find that the circuit court retained jurisdiction to issue the April 25 order because the award of an

appeal bond is a ministerial execution of a court’s judgment, order, or decree. See Rule 1:1(b).

                                  A. Circuit Court’s Final Order

       Haring was required to file her appeal to this Court within 30 days of the entry of final

judgment by the circuit court. Rule 5A:6(a); Code § 8.01-675.3. Thus, the timeliness of

Haring’s notice of appeal depends on which order was the final order from the circuit court—the

March 7 order granting summary judgment, or the April 25 order disbursing the appeal bond. If

the March 7 order was the final order, then Haring’s appeal of the summary judgment award was

not timely filed. This question is subject to de novo review because it is a pure question of law.

Carrithers v. Harrah, 60 Va. App. 69, 73 (2012).

       “An order is final if it disposes of the ‘entire action.’” Kosko v. Ramser, 299 Va. 684,

688 (2021) (quoting Super Fresh Food Mkts. of Va., Inc. v. Ruffin, 263 Va. 555, 560 (2002)).

“The action is the claim or claims in the complaint and any counterclaims.” Id. “A final order is

one which ‘disposes of the entire action and leaves nothing to be done except the ministerial

superintendence of execution of the judgment.’” Id. at 687 (quoting Super Fresh, 263 Va. at

560). Additionally,

               [a]n order sustaining a plea in bar or sustaining a plea in bar with
               prejudice or without leave to amend is sufficient to dispose of a
               claim(s) or cause(s) of action subject to the plea in bar, as is an

       3
         BONY filed a motion to dismiss Haring’s first three assignments of error, alleging that
she failed to timely appeal the circuit court’s order of March 7, 2022.
                                                 -4-
               order granting a motion for summary judgment, even if the order
               does not expressly dismiss the claim(s) or cause(s) of action at
               issue or enter judgment for the moving party.

Rule 1:1(d) (emphasis added).

       Here, the unlawful detainer action, which awarded possession of the home to BONY, was

the claim at issue. The March 7 order granted summary judgment in favor of BONY, awarded

BONY possession of the home, and ordered the clerk of court to record that order in the land

deeds. Thus, the March 7 order disposed of the substantive claims in this proceeding.

               [W]hen a trial court enters an order, or decree, in which a judgment
               is rendered for a party, unless that order expressly provides that the
               court retains jurisdiction to reconsider the judgment or to address
               other matters still pending in the action before it, the order renders
               a final judgment and the twenty-one day time period prescribed by
               Rule 1:1 begins to run.

Super Fresh, 263 Va. at 561.

       “The filing of ancillary motions for the recovery of costs or the filing of other post-trial

motions does not suddenly transform an otherwise final order into a nonfinal order.” Kosko, 299

Va. at 689. Otherwise, “anytime a litigant seeks other kinds of recoverable costs, or for that

matter files any post-trial motion, there would, by definition, remain something to be done.

Cases could be placed on indefinite hold by the filing of post-trial motions. Such an approach

has little to commend it.” Id.4

       Here, while the language of the March 7 order indicated that the case was being

“continued” to settle the matter of the appeal bond, the order did not include language explicitly

retaining the circuit court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Vokes v. Vokes, 28 Va. App. 349, 357 (1998)

       4
         We note that there are procedures litigants may follow to seek a tolling of the 21-day
period in Rule 1:1. For example, they may request that the trial court “enter an order that
expressly modifies, vacates, or suspends the judgment,” Super Fresh, 263 Va. at 562, or they
may ask the trial court to “includ[e] specific language [in the final order] stating that the court is
retaining jurisdiction to address matters still pending before the court,” Johnson v. Woodard, 281
Va. 403, 409-10 (2011).
                                                  -5-
(finding that a court order stating that the case “shall remain on the docket . . . for further

hearing” was insufficient to toll the 30-day period of Rule 5A:6(a) “[d]espite the trial court’s

apparent intention to the contrary”); City of Suffolk v. Lummis Gin Co., 278 Va. 270, 274 (2009)

(finding that a court order stating that the case “shall remain on the docket for the Court to

determine issues concerning attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred” did not allow the trial

court to retain jurisdiction past 21 days because the granting of a nonsuit was a final judgment

for purposes of Rule 1:1); Carrithers, 60 Va. App. at 74 (finding that despite a post-judgment

directive to the parties to file additional briefs on the ancillary issue of attorney fees and costs,

the trial court’s order disposing of the merits of the case was a final order).

        By contrast, in Johnson v. Woodard, 281 Va. 403, 407 (2011), the trial court successfully

retained jurisdiction by issuing an order that granted a nonsuit and stated that “for purposes of

Rule 1:1, this is not a final order, in that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter to

consider any application for attorney’s fees and costs and such other relief as may be sought.”

Thus, Virginia case law is clear that “even if an order granting a final judgment on the merits of a

case contains express language indicating that the trial court intends to rule” at a later time on a

still-pending motion, this language “is insufficient to negate the finality of an order rendering a

final judgment on the merits of a case.” Carrithers, 60 Va. App. at 74-75.

        Applying these principles to Haring’s appeal confirms that she failed to timely appeal the

merits rulings. Rule 1:1 states that when a court grants summary judgment the ruling “is

sufficient to dispose of” a claim. The March 7 order granting summary judgment was the final

order of the circuit court because it fully resolved all the claims and counterclaims of the parties.5

The appeal bond disbursement issue was not part of the claim against Haring nor a counterclaim

        5
         As noted above, Haring attempted to appeal the March 7 order, but failed to comply
with the requirement of filing a notice in the circuit court within 30 days.
                                                 -6-
against BONY—and the circuit court’s March 7 order did not include express language retaining

jurisdiction in the matter. See Johnson, 281 Va. at 409-10. Accordingly, for Haring to appeal

the final order on the merits, she needed to file her notice of appeal within 30 days of the March

7, 2022 order. She failed to do so. We conclude that Haring’s assignments of error regarding

the court’s substantive rulings are barred as having not been timely appealed, and we cannot

reach the merits of her arguments.

                      B. The Court’s Jurisdiction to Enter the April 25 Order

       The circuit court’s April 25 order was issued more than 21 days after the March 7 final

order, thus raising questions about its validity under Rule 1:1. However, we find that the April

25 order, which dealt exclusively with the disbursement of the appeal bond, was a purely

ministerial execution of the circuit court’s prior March 7 judgment. See Rule 1:1(b) (“[u]nless

otherwise provided by rule or statute, a judgment, order, or decree is final if it disposes of the

entire matter before the court, including all claim(s) and all cause(s) of action against all parties,

gives all the relief contemplated, and leaves nothing to be done by the court except the

ministerial execution of the court’s judgment, order, or decree”).

       “Once a final written order is entered, a trial court has twenty-one days to enter a new

written order or to enter a written order modifying, suspending, or vacating the prior order to

allow the court sufficient time to address the post-trial motion.” Kosko, 299 Va. at 689. “Once

the twenty-one-day period of Rule 1:1 has expired without an intervening order tolling the

running of the time period, every action taken by a court thereafter to alter or vacate the final

order is a nullity unless one of the limited exceptions to the preclusive effect of Rule 1:1

applies.” Vokes, 28 Va. App. at 358.

       We note that there is a difference between an ancillary motion, coming after resolution of

the claims raised by the pleadings, and a motion requesting the ministerial execution of a final

                                                 -7-
order. Ancillary motions, such as post-judgment requests for attorney fees, see Lummis Gin Co.,

278 Va. at 277, costs, see Kosko, 299 Va. at 689, or petitions for rehearing, see Hutchins v.

Talbert, 278 Va. 650, 654 (2009), require active jurisdiction of the trial court. In other words,

ancillary motions must be ruled upon within the 21-day period of Rule 1:1, or the trial court will

lose jurisdiction to make such a ruling. Vokes, 28 Va. App. at 358.

        Motions requesting the ministerial execution of a final order, however, are administrative

in nature. Such motions may stem from the final order itself, such as requesting a ruling on a

written statement of facts or requesting modification of the terms of the security for an appeal.

These type of administrative actions are not subject to the 21-day requirement of Rule 1:1. See

Rule 5A:8(c) (requiring the filing of a written statement of facts within 60 days after the final

judgment); see also Code § 8.01-676.1 (allowing modification by the trial court of the terms of

the security for an appeal or for suspension of execution of a judgment “at any time until the

Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court acts upon any similar motion”). Similarly, disbursement

of an appeal bond after full resolution of a case stems from the final judgment of the case and is

administrative in nature. This issue naturally arises after the trial court’s final judgment has been

issued.6 When a purely ministerial action is required after the final judgment has been entered,

Rule 1:1’s 21-day requirement does not prevent such a ministerial action. Here, such a bar could

lead to the untenable situation of the circuit court holding the appeal bond in perpetuity, unable

to disburse it to any party.

        While the April 25 order was entered more than 21 days after the final March 7 order, we

find that the April 25 action taken by the circuit court—ruling on the appeal bond—was not a

        6
         Indeed, a motion for reconsideration or to modify a judgment can be filed up to 21 days
after judgment. Resolution of the disbursement of the bond generally would not occur until the
merits are resolved. Moreover, if a matter is appealed, a bond may remain undisbursed pending
resolution of the appeal.
                                               -8-
nullity. The resolution of the appeal bond issue was a ministerial extension of the circuit court’s

March 7 order and judgment. Therefore, we conclude that the order granting the appeal bond to

BONY was valid under Rule 1:1(b).

               III. The Circuit Court Properly Awarded the Appeal Bond to BONY

        While Haring’s notice of appeal on the merits of the circuit court’s ruling was filed late,

her notice was timely to appeal the circuit court’s granting of the appeal bond to BONY.

However, we find that the circuit court’s judgment on this issue was proper.

        Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Robinson v.

Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 602, 606 (2018). When interpreting a statute, “our primary

objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, which ‘is initially found in the

words of the statute itself.’” Chaffins v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 293 Va. 564, 568 (2017)

(quoting Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Hill, 254 Va. 88, 91 (1997)).

        The requirement of an appeal bond from general district to circuit court is governed by

Code §§ 16.1-107 and 8.01-129. Haring’s arguments rely solely on Code § 8.01-129, which

states in pertinent part:

                When the appeal is taken by the defendant, he shall be required to
                give security also for all rent which has accrued and may accrue
                upon the premises, but for not more than one year’s rent, and also
                for all damages that have accrued or may accrue from the unlawful
                use and occupation of the premises for a period not exceeding
                three months.

        Haring argues that the bond should be returned to her for two reasons. First, she notes

that the home was not a rental property and therefore no rent had accrued; and second, she argues

that because BONY did not expressly sue for damages, it could not obtain a judgment for

damages. However, these arguments ignore the language of Code § 16.1-107:

                A. No appeal shall be allowed unless and until the party applying
                   for the same or someone for him shall give bond, in an amount
                   and with sufficient surety approved by the judge or by his clerk
                                                  -9-
                    if there is one, or in an amount sufficient to satisfy the
                    judgment of the court in which it was rendered. Either such
                    amount shall include the award of attorney fees, if any. . . .

             B. In all civil cases, except trespass, ejectment, unlawful detainer
                against a former owner based upon a foreclosure against that
                owner, or any action involving the recovering rents, no
                indigent person shall be required to post an appeal bond. In
                cases of unlawful detainer against a former owner based upon a
                foreclosure against that owner, a person who has been
                determined to be indigent pursuant to the guidelines set forth
                in § 19.2-159 shall post an appeal bond within 30 days from
                the date of judgment.

             C. In cases of unlawful detainer for a residential dwelling unit,
                notwithstanding the provisions of § 8.01-129, an appeal bond
                shall be posted by the defendant with payment into the general
                district court in the amount of outstanding rent, late charges,
                attorney fees, and any other charges or damages due, as
                contracted for in the rental agreement, and as amended on the
                unlawful detainer by the court. If such amount is not so paid,
                any such appeal shall not be perfected as a matter of law. . . .

             D. If such bond is furnished by or on behalf of any party against
                whom judgment has been rendered for money or property or
                both, the bond shall be conditioned for the performance and
                satisfaction of such judgment or order as may be entered
                against such party on appeal, and for the payment of all costs
                and damages which may be awarded against him in the
                appellate court. If the appeal is by a party against whom there
                is no recovery except for costs, the bond shall be conditioned
                for the payment of such costs and damages as may be awarded
                against him on the appeal.

             E. In addition to the foregoing, any party applying for appeal
                shall, within 30 days from the date of the judgment, pay to the
                clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken the amount of
                the writ tax of the court to which the appeal is taken and costs
                as required by subdivision A 13 of § 17.1-275, including all
                fees for service of process of the notice of appeal in the circuit
                court pursuant to § 16.1-112.

(Emphasis added).

                                                - 10 -
       Code § 16.1-107 clearly requires that the appealing party post a bond, with the simple

requirement that the amount be approved by the general district court judge or clerk.7 The

language of subsection (D) reveals the purpose of the appeal bond: “the bond shall be

conditioned for the performance and satisfaction of such judgment or order as may be entered

against such party on appeal, and for the payment of all costs and damages which may be

awarded against him in the appellate court.” In other words, appeal bonds are “designed to

protect the judgment rights of successful litigants.” Greer v. Dillard, 213 Va. 477, 479 (1973).

“An appeal bond provides assurances that any judgment that may be rendered on appeal, if

perfected, will be satisfied.” Mahoney v. Mahoney, 34 Va. App. 63, 67 (2000) (en banc).

       Here, both Haring and BONY agreed in circuit court that the general district court had

“deemed” the amount of the appeal bond to be “the amount of damage to the plaintiff for the

continued inability to possess the property pending an appeal.” The circuit court then ordered

that the appeal bond be given to BONY as “damages” for their inability to possess the property

for a lengthy period.8

       A foreclosure purchaser who is unable to possess the purchased property suffers

legitimate financial damages. As BONY notes on brief, a foreclosure purchaser in this position

is financially obligated to cover the costs of insurance, depreciation, and taxes, and is unable to

rent or sell the property. The circuit court’s award of the appeal bond to BONY sought to

compensate BONY for at least some of these damages. We find that this was appropriate, and

we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

       7
        In circuit court, Haring made lengthy arguments that the amount of the appeal bond was
erroneous. As she does not repeat these arguments on appeal, we do not address the amount of
the bond here.
       8
          BONY, in fact, presented documentation of much higher damages given its prolonged
inability to access the premises.
                                            - 11 -
                                         IV. Conclusion

       Because the March 7 order disposed of the entire action between the parties, and because

the request for the appeal bond was not part of either a claim or counterclaim, we find that the

March 7 order was the final order in the case and that Haring’s first three assignments of error

are therefore dismissed. We additionally find no error in the circuit court’s award of the appeal

bond to BONY.

                                                           Affirmed in part, and dismissed in part.

                                               - 12 -