Court Opinion

ID: 9939785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 19:09:10.151786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:55.088074
License: Public Domain

J-A05034-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  SHANE D. REYNOLDS, INDIVIDUALLY :             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF     :                  PENNSYLVANIA
  SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS      :
                                  :
                                  :
            v.                    :
                                  :
                                  :
  ESSENTIA INSURANCE COMPANY      :             No. 2074 EDA 2023
                                  :
                 Appellant        :

                 Appeal from the Order Entered July 3, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 210801568

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2024

       Essentia Insurance Company (“Essentia”) appeals from the order which

granted, in part, and denied, in part, the motion for partial summary judgment

filed by Shane D. Reynolds (Reynolds).1 We quash the appeal as interlocutory.

       The facts underlying this insurance coverage dispute are uncontested.

On June 30, 2018, Reynolds was involved in a motor vehicle accident while

operating his 2003 Harley-Davidson motorcycle. The accident occurred when

a vehicle operated by Christopher Heasley (“Heasley”) struck Reynolds,

causing him to sustain serious and permanent injuries. The vehicle operated

by Heasley was insured under a policy issued by Erie Insurance Exchange

____________________________________________

1 Although the caption suggests that this is a class action, no class certification

has yet been made in the action.
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(“Erie”), which provided liability insurance coverage to Heasley in the amount

of $100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident. Reynolds made a claim under

the liability provisions of the Erie policy and received $85,000 in full settlement

of his claim. Reynolds determined that the settlement amount was insufficient

to compensate him for the injuries and damages he sustained in the accident;

accordingly, he sought to recover additional insurance benefits.

      In this regard, Reynolds tendered a claim for underinsured motorist

(“UIM”) benefits under a Classic Automobile Policy issued by Essentia (“the

Essentia policy”), which insured two classic vehicles owned by Reynolds: a

1970 Chevrolet Corvette Coupe; and a 1967 Chevrolet Chevelle SS Coupe.

The Essentia policy provided uninsured motorist (“UM”) and UIM benefits in

the amount of $25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident.                  The UIM

endorsement to the Essentia policy included the following definition of an

“insured” for purposes of UIM benefits:

      B. “Insured” as used in this endorsement means:

       1. Any person “occupying” “your covered auto[;]”[]

       2. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover of
          “bodily injury” to which this coverage applies sustained by a
          person described in b.1 above.

Essentia Policy, Endorsement No. 13 37 05 16, at 1.

      The UIM endorsement to the Essentia policy additionally included, in

relevant part, the following household exclusion:

      A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for “bodily
         injury” sustained:

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         1. By you:

         a. While “occupying” any motor vehicle owned by or furnished
            for the regular use of you or any “family member” which is
            not insured for this coverage under this policy. . . .

Essentia Policy, Endorsement No. 13 37 05 16, at 2.

      Given that Reynolds sustained his injuries while operating a vehicle

which was not insured under the Essentia policy, Essentia denied Reynolds

claim for UIM benefits on the following bases: (1) the definition of “insured”

required Reynolds to be an occupant of a vehicle insured by the Essentia policy

to recover UIM benefits; and (2) the household exclusion excluded UIM

benefits for any bodily injury sustained by Reynolds while occupying any

motor vehicle not insured under the Essentia policy. See Denial of Coverage

Letter, 8/28/18, at 3-4.

      Reynolds thereafter initiated the present action against Essentia. In his

amended complaint, Reynolds asserted four claims for relief: Count I

declaratory relief—invalidity of definition of “insured;” Count II declaratory

relief—household exclusion; Count III compensatory relief—UIM benefits; and

(4) Count IV injunctive relief—seeking an order enjoining Essentia from

asserting either the definition of “insured” or the household exclusion as a

defense to claims for UM or UIM benefits. Essentia subsequently withdrew its

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denial of coverage based on the household exclusion.2           Thus, the sole

remaining basis for Essentia’s denial of UIM benefits to Reynolds was the

definition of an “insured” under the UIM endorsement to the Essentia policy.

       Reynolds moved for partial summary judgment on his remaining claim

for declaratory relief at Count I of the amended complaint. In his prayer for

relief, Reynolds requested that the trial court enter an order declaring: (1)

Reynolds was eligible to recover UIM benefits under the Essentia policy; and

(2) the restrictions in the definition of an “insured” in the UIM endorsement to

the Essentia policy were void and unenforceable under the Pennsylvania Motor

Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701, et seq.

Essentia filed a response to Reynolds’ motion for partial summary judgment.3

Reynolds filed a reply brief in support of his motion for partial summary

judgment in which he reiterated that he sought partial summary judgment on

his “claim for declaratory relief,” and requested a declaration that the

definition of “insured” in the Essentia policy was void and unenforceable as

violative of the MVFRL, and that he was therefore “eligible” to recover UIM

____________________________________________

2 The practical effect of Essentia’s decision to withdraw its denial of coverage

based on the household exclusion was to render as moot Count II of the
amended complaint. Thus, the only claim for declaratory relief remaining in
the action was Count I, which sought declaratory relief regarding the invalidity
of definition of “insured.”

3 Although styled as a “Cross-Motion and Response,” Essentia’s filing did not

include any “motion,” and did not seek any ruling or relief from the trial court.
Rather, in its filing, Essentia simply admitted or denied the assertions made
by Reynolds in his motion for partial summary judgment.

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benefits under the Essentia policy. Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, 8/1/22, at 9-10; see also Reynolds’ Answer to Cross[-

]Motion for Summary Judgment, 8/1/22, at 1 (clarifying that he was seeking

“Partial Summary Judgment in his favor on the claim for declaratory relief”).

       On July 3, 2023, the trial court entered an order granting, in part, and

denying,     in   part,   Reynolds’    motion    for   partial   summary     judgment.

Specifically, the trial court ruled: (1) in favor of Essentia and against Reynolds

regarding Reynolds eligibility to recover UIM benefits; and (2) in favor of

Reynolds and against Essentia regarding the limitations in the definition of

“insured.”    See Order, 7/3/23.        The trial court explained that, although it

found the definition of “insured” in the UIM endorsement to the Essentia policy

to be void and unenforceable, it could not grant the additional declaratory

relief requested by Reynolds regarding his eligibility for UIM benefits under

the Essentia policy because Reynolds had not demonstrated that he had first

sought     UIM    benefits   from     Progressive   Preferred    Insurance   Company

(“Progressive”),4 in compliance with section 1733(a) of the MVFRL.5 The trial

court reasoned:

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4 At the time of the accident, the motorcycle operated by Reynolds was insured

under a policy issued by Progressive (“the Progressive policy”).  The
Progressive policy provided UIM benefits in the amount of $25,000 per
person/$50,000 per accident.

5 Section 1733(a) sets forth the priority of sources for payment for UM and

UIM benefits when multiple insurance policies apply to a claim for benefits:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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             [B]ased [on the MVFRL], this court is denying Reynolds[’]
       claim for declaratory judgment regarding his specific entitlement.
       Even though the provision at issue is void, this court will not go
       as far as to grant Reynolds declaratory judgment regarding
       his ability to collect UIM benefits on the policy. In fact,
       based on the MVFRL, this court finds that he has not followed the
       proper statutory protocols and is unable to.

             To reiterate, section 1733(a) sets forth priority of recovery
       of uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits[.]

                                         ****

             At the time of the accident, Reynolds was operating his
       motorcycle. Reynolds has not alleged nor does the record suggest
       that Reynolds ever made a claim upon Progressive . . . for the
       underinsurance associated with the motorcycle involved in the
       accident. However, that policy would be the first priority policy to
       make claim on in accordance with the MVF[R]L. Reynolds may
       also not circumvent statutory channels and protocol and like
       Essentia, is bound by the plain text of the statute. Pennsylvania
       Supreme Court precedent supports this reading of the statute. ln
       Burnstein[ v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 809 A.2d 204
       (Pa. 2002)], the Court explained section 1733 saying: injured
       claimants must first recover UM and UIM coverage from any policy
       covering the motor vehicle occupied by the injured person at the
       time of the accident. Thereafter, as a secondary source of
       recovery, claimants may recover from a policy covering a motor
       vehicle not involved in the accident.

____________________________________________

       (a)    General rule – Where multiple policies apply, payment shall
              be made in the following order of priority:

              (1)    A policy covering a motor vehicle occupied by the
                     injured person at the time of the accident.

              (2)    A policy covering a motor vehicle not involved in the
                     accident with respect to which the injured person is
                     an insured.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1733(a).

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             Reynolds has failed to provide evidence that he attempted
      to recover in the order the statue mandates. For that reason, he
      is not entitled to declaratory judgment regarding his own benefits.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/23, at 12-13 (footnote and unnecessary capitalization

omitted, emphasis added).

      Reynolds filed a timely motion for reconsideration in which he

represented to the trial court that he had tendered a claim to Progressive, and

that Progressive had paid its UIM policy limits of $25,000 to Reynolds.

Reynolds further explained that he had also tendered claims to Erie under two

household policies (a personal auto policy and a commercial auto policy), and

that Erie had paid its UIM policy limits of $25,000 available under each policy,

for a total payment of $50,000. Reynolds attached a copy of the executed

release agreement with Progressive for the $25,000 in UIM benefits it paid to

Reynolds, copies of two checks for $25,000 each issued by Erie to Reynolds

for UIM benefits, and an affidavit wherein Reynolds attested to these facts.

See Motion for Reconsideration, 7/20/23, at Exhibits A, B, C, F. Reynolds

argued that, because he had recovered UIM benefits from Progressive, as the

insurer of the motorcycle, he was eligible to seek UIM benefits under the

Essentia policy as a secondary source of UIM benefits.

      While the motion for reconsideration was pending, and before the trial

court entered any ruling on that motion, Essentia filed a timely notice of

appeal. The trial court ordered Essentia to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal.      Essentia complied with that

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order. Thereafter, the trial court authored a Rule 1925(a) opinion in which it

explained that the evidence which Reynolds presented in his motion for

reconsideration “suggests that [he] did first make claim on the primary policy

involved in the accident.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/23/23, at 15-16. In light of

this new evidence, the trial court requested that this Court affirm, in part, its

July 3, 2023 order, and remand the case in light of the new facts provided by

Reynolds. See id. at 16.6

       In this Court, Reynolds filed a motion to quash the appeal as

interlocutory. Therein, Reynolds argued that his motion for partial summary

judgment pertained solely to Count I of the amended complaint (declaratory

relief—invalidity of definition of insured), and that no ruling was made as to

Count III of the amended complaint (compensatory relief—UIM benefits),

which remained pending.          See Motion to Quash, 8/17/23, at ¶¶ 10, 13.

Essentia opposed the motion to quash on the basis that the July 3, 2023 order

was appealable pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act (“the Act”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 7532. This Court denied the motion to quash. However, the order

denying the motion to quash indicated that “this Order does not preclude the

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6 Generally, issues raised in a motion for reconsideration are beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court and, thus, may not be considered by this Court on
appeal. See Rabatin v. Allied Glove Corp., 24 A.3d 388, 391 (Pa. Super.
2011); see also Prince George Center, Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 704 A.2d
141, 145 (Pa. Super. 1997) (holding that “issues raised initially in [a] petition
for reconsideration are . . . beyond the scope of our [appellate] jurisdiction
and we decline to consider them”). Thus, this Court is unable to consider the
evidence presented by Reynolds in his motion for reconsideration.

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panel of this Court that will decide the merits of the appeal from raising and

addressing the issue . . . sua sponte.” Order, 10/5/23.

      Essentia raises the following issue for our review:

      Specialty antique/classic-car policies like Essentia’s limit
      [UM/UIM] benefits to covering persons injured only while they are
      occupying the insured antique/classic cars, and also require the
      insured to maintain for general transportation a regular-use
      vehicle with a separate regular-use-vehicle policy. In St. Paul
      Mercury Ins. Co. v. Corbett, . . . 630 A.2d 28 ([Pa. Super.]
      1993) (en banc), this Court held that such specialty
      antique/classic-car policies are enforceable under [the MVFRL]
      and Pennsylvania’s public policy in light of the special nature of
      such    low-premium       policies  for    limited-use,   low-risk
      antique/classic cars.    Should this Court continue to follow
      Corbett?

Essentia’s Brief at 4-5.

      As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether this Court has

jurisdiction to address the trial court’s July 3, 2023 order, as “the appealability

of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court asked to review the

order.” Knopick v. Boyle, 189 A.3d 432, 436 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal

citation omitted).   Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over

appeals taken from a final order. See In re Bridgeport Fire Litigation, 51

A.3d 224, 229 (Pa. Super. 2012). A final order is one that disposes of all the

parties and all the claims; or is entered as a final order pursuant to the trial

court’s determination under Rule 341(c). See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1), (3). An

appeal may also be taken from “an order that is made final or appealable by

statute or general rule, even though the order does not dispose of all claims

and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8).

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     Section 7532 of the Act provides, in relevant part:

     Courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have
     power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether
     or not further relief is or could be claimed. . . . The declaration
     may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such
     declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or
     decree.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7532.

     Although the Act provides that the declaration shall have the force and

effect of a final judgment or decree, a partial adjudication does not become

appealable merely because it is cast in the form of a declaratory judgment.

See Bolmgren v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 758 A.2d 689, 691 (Pa.

Super. 2000) (quashing an appeal as interlocutory where the order appealed

from provided a declaration of coverage but left unresolved remaining claims

for damages); see also Schmitt v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 245

A.3d 678 (Pa. Super. 2021) (following Bolmgren and quashing as

interlocutory an appeal from an order granting summary judgment on three

counts for declaratory relief and one count for compensatory damages, but

leaving unresolved two remaining counts for compensatory damages);

Bombar v. West American Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 85-86 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(following Bolmgren and holding that trial court’s initial order granting

summary judgment on a declaratory judgment count of complaint was not

final and appealable, where that order did not determine the amount of

damages for the remaining bad faith claim); Cresswell v. Pennsylvania

Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 820 A.2d 172, 176 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2003)

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(recognizing Bolmgren and determining trial court’s order granting partial

summary judgment in favor of appellee on declaratory judgment claim was

interlocutory and unappealable, where court’s order left unresolved additional

bad faith claim); Moore Motors, Inc. v. Beaudry, 775 A.2d 869, 870 (Pa.

Super. 2001) (per curiam) (following Bolmgren and quashing an appeal from

an order granting appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment as

interlocutory and unappealable where court’s order left unresolved counts II

and III of appellees’ counterclaim).7

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7 Although this Court has continued to apply Bolmgren, our Supreme Court

has issued a line of cases also dealing with the appealability of orders resolving
declaratory judgment claims, beginning with Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wickett, 763 A.2d 813 (Pa. 2000) (holding that an order sustaining the
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer of some defendants in a
declaratory judgment action, and dismissing those defendants from the case,
was a final, appealable order, even though claims against other defendants
remained outstanding). Relatedly, this Court issued a ruling in Titeflex Corp.
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 88 A.3d 970 (Pa. Super.
2014) (holding that an order declaring that the insurer had duty to defend the
corporation in underlying actions was appealable because the order resolved
the declaratory judgment action for all practical purposes). However, we
conclude that those cases are distinguishable and, hence, not controlling. As
this Court explained in Schmitt, “our courts have seemed to rely on Wickett
and its progeny to decide an order is immediately appealable in scenarios
where a trial court’s order in a declaratory judgment action either completely
dismissed a defendant from the case, see, e.g., Wickett, supra, or in the
context of whether a duty to defend/indemnify existed, and the underlying
action could not go forward until resolution of the declaratory judgment
claims, see, e.g., Titeflex, supra.” Schmitt, 245 A.3d at 685-86. Neither
of those situations is similar to the instant case. Additionally, while we are
mindful of the decision made by a prior panel of this Court in Pennsylvania
Services Corp. v. Texas Eastern Transmission, LP, 98 A.3d 624, 626 n.1
(Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 114 A.3d 1041 (Pa. 2015) (addressing the
merits of an appeal from a declaratory judgment action where non-declaratory
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Rather, within the context of declaratory judgment actions, our

Supreme Court has “provided a rather straightforward two-part test for

appellate courts to apply when considering whether an order declaring the

rights of parties is final and appealable[.]” Schmitt, 245 A.3d at 685 (quoting

Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Ass’n Ins. Co. v. Johnson Matthey, Inc.,

188 A.3d 396,399 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam)). Specifically, we must determine:

          (1) what is the effect of the lower court’s decision on the scope
          of the litigation; and (2) what practical effect does the court’s
          decision have on the ultimate outcome of the case. . . . If the
          order in question merely narrows the scope of the litigation and
          does not resolve the entirety of the parties’ eligibility for
          declaratory relief, then the order is interlocutory and not
          immediately appealable.

Id.

       In the instant matter, the trial court’s July 3, 2023 order merely

narrowed the scope of the litigation and did not resolve the entirety of

Reynolds’ eligibility for declaratory relief. Although the trial court determined

that Reynolds met the summary judgment standard—and was therefore

entitled to declaratory relief that the definition of “insured” was void and

unenforceable, the court conversely determined that Reynolds had not met

the summary judgment standard as to his eligibility for UIM benefits under

the Essentia policy. Indeed, the trial court stated: “this court will not go as

____________________________________________

judgment claims remained pending), we observe that this Court did not
conduct an analysis regarding either the Bolmgren or Wickett lines of cases.
Rather, this Court merely stated in a footnote that the appeal was proper
under section 7532. See id.

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far as to grant Reynolds declaratory judgment regarding his ability to

collect UIM benefits on the policy.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/3/23, at 12-13

(emphasis added).       The trial court’s decision to deny Reynolds’ motion for

partial summary judgment on the issue of his eligibility reflects an implicit

finding by the court that material issues of fact remained which prevented

summary resolution of the eligibility issue. See Siciliano v. Mueller, 149

A.3d 863, 864 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding that summary judgment is

appropriate only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law).8

Thus, issues of material fact remain in the action regarding Reynolds’ eligibility

for declaratory relief as to his eligibility to recover UIM benefits under the

Essentia policy in light of section 1733(a).

       Moreover, the trial court’s July 3, 2023 order did not address Count III

of the amended complaint, which sought compensatory damages in the form

of UIM benefits, or Count IV of the amended complaint, which sought

injunctive relief in the form of an order enjoining Essentia from asserting either

the definition of “insured” or the household exclusion as a defense to claims

____________________________________________

8 We do not equate the trial court’s decision to decline to grant the additionally

requested declaratory relief as to Reynolds’ eligibility to obtain UIM benefits
under the Essentia policy with a specific finding that Reynolds was not entitled
to UIM benefits under the Essentia policy. Indeed, that particular question
was not before the trial court, as Essentia did not request any relief, nor any
specific ruling by the trial court, in its response to Reynolds’ motion for partial
summary judgment.

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for UM or UIM benefits. Given the trial court’s ruling that the definition of

“insured” is void and unenforceable, and Essentia has withdrawn its only other

coverage defense, these claims remain viable and pending.

       In sum, Reynolds’ amended complaint sought ordinary civil relief,

injunctive relief, and remedies in the form of a declaration. The trial court’s

July 3, 2023 order resolved a portion of Reynolds’ remaining declaratory

judgment claim. However, the trial court left unresolved another portion of

that declaratory judgment claim, as well as Reynolds’ remaining claims for

compensatory damages and injunctive relief. Under these circumstances, and

in light of our well-established policy of avoiding piecemeal litigation, we

conclude that Essentia’s appeal is interlocutory. Pa. Bankers Ass'n v. Pa.

Dep't of Banking, 948 A.2d 790, 798 (Pa. 2008) (noting the Court’s well-

documented efforts to avoid piecemeal litigation, and explaining that

discouraging interlocutory appeals avoids piecemeal determinations and the

consequent protraction of litigation).         We therefore quash the appeal as

interlocutory.9

       Appeal quashed.

____________________________________________

9 Reynolds’ counsel has filed a motion to continue the appeal to the next
argument panel. We entered an order denying the motion, and counsel filed
a motion for reconsideration. We granted reconsideration. Given our decision
to quash the appeal, we now deny counsel’s motion to continue.

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Date: 2/12/2024

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