Court Opinion

ID: 9805613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 18:05:03.795459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:45:52.344421
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 356
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION II
                                       No. CR-23-69

                                             Opinion Delivered August 30, 2023

JACOB TOWNSEND
                            APPELLANT        APPEAL FROM THE HEMPSTEAD
                                             COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V.                                           [NO. 29CR-21-223]

                                             HONORABLE JOE SHORT, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
                              APPELLEE       REVERSED AND DISMISSED

                       STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

       Jacob Townsend appeals the revocation of his suspended imposition of sentence (SIS)

by the Hempstead County Circuit Court. He argues that the revocation must be reversed

and dismissed because it was based on alleged violations that occurred prior to entry of the

sentencing order. We agree.

       Townsend was charged with possession of methamphetamine (less than two grams)

on December 1, 2021. In a hearing on January 10, 2022, Townsend pleaded guilty to the

charge in exchange for a five-year SIS. The sentencing order reflecting the guilty plea and

the five-year SIS was filed on February 4, 2022. On January 25, 2022, the State filed a

petition to revoke Townsend’s SIS, alleging that on January 13, 2022, Townsend committed

the offenses of possession of methamphetamine or cocaine with intent to deliver and
tampering with physical evidence, and he was in possession of methamphetamine and drug

paraphernalia.

       On August 16, Townsend moved to dismiss the revocation petition, arguing that as

of the date of the filing of the revocation petition, no sentencing order had yet been filed.

At the revocation hearing on September 19, Townsend’s counsel argued that while the

legislature had amended Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-307(a) (Supp. 2021) in 2019

to provide that a period of SIS commences to run when the circuit court pronounces the

probation or sentence in the courtroom or upon entry of a sentencing order, whichever

occurs first, caselaw and Administrative Order No. 2 do not allow revocation for a sentence

for which an order had not yet been entered. The State argued that the legislature amended

the statute as a matter of public policy and that Administrative Order No. 2 was significant

only for administrative purposes. The circuit court denied Townsend’s motion to dismiss,

finding that the amended statute, most likely promulgated in response to Burnett v. State,

2018 Ark. App. 220, superseded Administrative Order No. 2. The revocation hearing

proceeded, the circuit court revoked Townsend’s SIS, and Townsend was sentenced to five

years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

       On appeal, Townsend makes the same argument he made in his motion to dismiss—

that the revocation of his SIS must be reversed and dismissed because it was based on alleged

violations that occurred before the judgment was filed because Administrative Order No. 2

and caselaw are clear that an SIS does not begin until the judgment is filed, regardless of the

existence of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-307(a).

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       In Bradford v. State, 351 Ark. 394, 94 S.W.3d 904 (2003), Bradford, pursuant to a

negotiated plea agreement, entered a plea of guilty to three separate felonies; the prosecutor

recommended five years’ incarceration on each charge, with the sentences to run

concurrently. In open court, the circuit court pronounced judgment of five years on each

count, with the sentences to be served concurrently, but no judgment and commitment

order was filed. Ten days later, the circuit court revisited its decision in Bradford’s case,

ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, and entered a judgment and commitment

order to that effect. Bradford appealed, arguing that he was entitled to rely on the sentence

pronounced in open court pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-65-121 (Supp.

2001), which provided, “All judgments, orders, and decrees rendered in open court by any

court of record in the State of Arkansas are effective as to all parties of record from the date

rendered and not from the date of entry of record.” In rejecting Bradford’s argument, our

supreme court held that the statute at issue had been superseded in civil matters by Arkansas

Rule of Civil Procedure 58, which provides that a judgment is effective upon entry of record

and that the same principle held true for criminal judgments, citing Johnison v. State, 330

Ark. 381, 953 S.W.2d 883 (1997). Our supreme court held that, in accordance with

Administrative Order No. 2, judgment and commitment orders are effective upon entry of

record and that because section 16-65-121 conflicted directly with appellate rules,

Administrative Order No. 2, and our caselaw, it was superseded.

       In Burnett, supra, Kabal Burnett appealed the revocation of her probation for acts

committed hours before the sentencing order was entered; the State conceded error, and

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this court reversed and dismissed the revocation. In so holding, this court cited Bradford,

supra, which held that judgment and commitment orders, in accordance with Administrative

Order No. 2, are effective upon entry of record. In reversing and dismissing Burnett’s

revocation, this court also cited Garduno-Trejo v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 779, 379 S.W.3d 692,

a case in which the circuit court revoked Garduno-Trejo’s probation and SIS for conduct

that occurred after he pleaded guilty to two drug offenses but two days before the judgment

and disposition order was entered; the revocation was reversed on appeal, with this court

holding that the suspended sentence and probation were not in effect on the day they were

violated because the judgment was not entered of record until two days later.

       The legislature amended Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-307(a) in 2019 to

provide, “[A] period of suspension or probation commences to run when the circuit court

pronounces the probationer’s sentence in the courtroom or upon the entry of a sentencing

order, whichever occurs first.”

       Townsend argues that the holdings in Bradford and Burnett mandate that the

revocation of his SIS must be reversed and dismissed because a judgment is effective on entry

of record, which occurs when the judgment is filed, and the sentencing order placing him

on SIS was not entered of record at the time the alleged conduct that the revocation was

based on occurred.

       The State argues that Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-307(a) is not superseded

by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and Administrative Order No. 2 because, unlike the

statute superseded in the Bradford decision, this statute does not conflict with the rule or the

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order, nor does it compromise their primary purpose and effectiveness. The State argues

that section 5-4-307(a) “relates in no way to when a judgment, order, or decree is considered

entered or effective.” We agree; this statute only determines when a period of SIS or

probation begins, not when it becomes effective for revocation purposes. While it is true

that the SIS could begin when announced in open court even if the sentencing order was

not entered until a month later, the order is not considered entered or effective for purposes

of revocation proceedings until the sentencing order is filed.

       The State next argues that if there is a conflict between section 5-4-307(a) and our

appellate court rules and administrative orders, we must defer to the legislature on public-

policy grounds. This argument has no merit. First, as stated above, section 5-4-307(a) does

not conflict with Administrative Order No. 2 or our caselaw. Second, even if there was a

conflict, the appellate courts do not defer to statutes that are at odds with our appellate court

rules. In State v. Sypult, 304 Ark. 5, 7–8, 800 S.W.2d 402, 404 (1990), our supreme court

discussed the dissonance with statutes conflicting with court rules:

               In Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990), and St. Clair v. State,
       301 Ark. 223, 793 S.W.2d 835 (1990), we reaffirmed our inherent rule-making power
       as identified in Ricarte [v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 717 S.W.2d 488 (1986)]; however, we
       went on to say that we share this power with the General Assembly and that we will
       defer to its authority where legislation involving matters of public policy conflicts with
       court rules. See also Lyons v. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc., 301 Ark. 559, 785 S.W.2d
       220 (1990).

              Section 12-12-511(a) is clearly grounded in strong public policy—the protection
       of child-abuse victims. So, once again, we are faced with sharing our rule-making
       powers with the legislature—this time involving the physician and psychotherapist-
       patient privilege. In doing so, we retreat from the positions we have taken in Curtis

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       and St. Clair, supra, and redefine the parameters of our “shared” rule-making power
       with the legislature.

               It is obvious that, in the interests of promoting important public policies and
       interests of the state, legislation enacted in this spirit will, on occasion, bring about
       conflict with rules of the court. It is equally obvious, however, that literal application
       of our decisions in Curtis and St. Clair to cases such as the one before us, could well
       open the door to total abrogation of the rules of evidence and procedure we deem
       vital to the interests and policies inherent in the judicial process. To protect what we
       hold inviolate we now declare that we will defer to the General Assembly, when
       conflicts arise, only to the extent that the conflicting court rule’s primary purpose and
       effectiveness are not compromised; otherwise, our rules remain supreme.

       The State next argues that to the extent Administrative Order No. 2 and Rule 58 of

the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure supersede Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-

307(a), they only do so as to probation. This is untrue. The statute clearly refers to a period

of suspension or probation, and we do not find that there is a conflict between Arkansas

Code Annotated section 5-4-307(a), which states when the time period begins, and

Administrative Order No. 2, which states when the order is effective. The order must be

effective before the period of probation or suspended imposition of sentence may be

revoked.

       Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-307(a) as amended is not in direct conflict with

Administrative Order No. 2 and our caselaw. Townsend’s SIS cannot be revoked because at

the time of the conduct that was used to revoke his SIS, the sentencing order was not entered

of record. Although his SIS commenced upon pronouncement in the courtroom, it may

not be revoked unless the sentencing order is entered of record. Therefore, the revocation

is hereby reversed and dismissed.

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Reversed and dismissed.

GLADWIN and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Walker K. Hawkins, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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