Court Opinion

ID: 9839678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 19:04:07.783404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:58.967807
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/13/23 P. v. Smith CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A166955
 v.
 MICHAEL REDELL SMITH, JR.,                                              (Alameda County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No. 175211)

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION
         Defendant Michael Redell Smith, Jr., appeals from a September 2022
order summarily denying his petition for resentencing under former Penal
Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 His appointed counsel filed a
brief identifying no arguable issues and requesting that we conduct an
independent review of the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
and People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Defendant filed a
supplemental letter brief. We have evaluated the arguments raised in that

         1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion.  (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. We
refer to the statute by its current number. Our brief summary of the facts
underlying defendant’s conviction—derived from our unpublished opinion in
his prior appeal (People v. Smith (May 17, 2018, A149655))—is intended
solely for context.

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brief, and we have exercised our discretion to independently review the
record for arguable issues. (Delgadillo, at pp. 226–230, 232.) We find no
merit to defendant’s arguments, but we conclude the unpaid balance of the
probation investigation fee imposed under former section 1203.1,
subdivision (b) must be vacated.
        The prosecution charged defendant with first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)). At trial, the prosecution offered evidence that defendant
approached the victim and—from a few inches away—shot him in the throat.
The victim died from multiple gunshot wounds. Defendant testified he fired
his gun in self-defense. In 2016, a jury convicted defendant of second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true an allegation that he personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The
trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years to life in prison, comprised of 15
years to life on the murder conviction and 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement. Defendant appealed. We reversed the sentence imposed for
the firearm enhancement and remanded to permit the lower court to exercise
its discretion to strike or dismiss the enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (h). In all other respects, we affirmed.
        At a December 2018 resentencing hearing, the trial court set aside the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement, and it exercised its discretion
to impose a determinate 10-year prison term under subdivision (b). The court
reduced defendant’s sentence to 25 years to life, awarded him additional
presentence credits, and ordered him to pay a $250 probation investigation
fee.2

        2 At the 2018 resentencing hearing, the prosecutor recounted the

evidence offered at trial establishing defendant shot—and killed—the victim;
the prosecutor also noted the jury rejected defendant’s self-defense claim.
Additionally, the trial court and counsel discussed the date defendant would

                                        2
      In late 2021, defendant petitioned for resentencing under section
1172.6. The court appointed counsel for defendant and ordered the
prosecution to file a response. The prosecution argued defendant was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he was prosecuted as a “direct
actor in the crime. There was no suggestion malice was, or could have been,
imputed and no instructions allowing vicarious liability for the crimes. . . . In
fact, the instructions given to the jury demonstrate [he] was the actual
killer . . . .” The prosecution’s response attached the jury instructions given
at defendant’s trial. Defense counsel, by contrast, asserted defendant was
convicted under a theory of natural and probable consequences because the
prosecutor mentioned that doctrine during closing argument when urging the
jury to reject defendant’s self-defense claim.
      At a hearing on the resentencing petition, the trial court concluded
there were “no theories” of felony murder or aiding and abetting “at play,”
and the jury was not instructed on “aiding and abetting or imputed liability.”
In rejecting defense counsel’s argument that defendant was convicted under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the court noted section
1172.6 referred to “the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding
and abetting . . . , not that phrase as [it] is used for an implied malice second-
degree murder when a person is the actual killer . . . .” The court explained
that the jury had determined defendant was the “actual killer,” and “[a]ctual
killers” are not entitled to relief under the statute. Accordingly, the court
summarily denied the petition on the basis that the record of conviction
established defendant was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of
law. Defendant appealed.

be eligible for parole. In April 2023, the court awarded defendant additional
presentence custody credits.

                                        3
      Here, the record of conviction unequivocally establishes defendant “was
the actual killer and the only participant in the killing.” (Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 233; see People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 58
[jury implicitly found defendant was the “ ‘actual killer’ ” by convicting him of
second degree murder and finding true a § 12022.53, subd. (d) allegation].)
Defendant offers no argument—or evidence—to the contrary. Resentencing
under section 1172.6 is “unavailable if the defendant was . . . the actual
killer . . . .” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710; People v. Garcia
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 969.)
      The arguments raised in defendant’s supplemental letter brief do not
persuade us the trial court erred by summarily denying his resentencing
petition. For example, defendant insists he was prosecuted under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine because the court instructed the jury
with CALCRIM No. 520. We disagree. In defining implied malice—which
remains a valid basis for a second degree murder conviction—the instruction
uses the words “natural and probable consequences,” but it does not invoke
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, “a theory of vicarious
liability under which ‘[a]n aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended,
or target, crime but also of any other crime a principal in the target crime
actually commits (the nontarget crime) that is a natural and probable
consequence of the target crime.’ ” (People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
666, 677, fn. 4; see People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 144.) Here, the
court did not instruct the jury on the imputation of malice under accomplice
liability. (See People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 204–206.) The
prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument do not, as defendant claims,
establish he was prosecuted under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Id. at pp. 203–205.)

                                        4
      Defendant’s other contentions lack merit. The felony murder standard
is not being misapplied to his case. His suggestion that appellate counsel did
not exercise diligence in preparing the Delgadillo brief is unsupported by the
record or persuasive authority. (See Upshaw v. Superior Court (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 489, 504, fn. 7.) Defendant’s complaint that the trial court
“ignored” him and “failed to remain impartial” is belied by the record.
Finally, his suggestion that the court erred by failing to give an unspecified
jury instruction is not cognizable in this appeal. (People v. Farfan (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
      We have evaluated defendant’s arguments, and we have conducted our
own independent review of the record. We agree with the trial court that
defendant failed to make a prima facie showing for relief under section
1172.6. (People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 889–993.) Accordingly,
the court properly denied his petition for resentencing without issuing an
order to show cause. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) The
judgment, however, must be modified as ordered post.
                               DISPOSITION
      The September 2022 order denying defendant’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed. The judgment is modified to strike any unpaid
balance of the $250 probation investigation fee imposed under former section
1203.1. (See § 1465.9, subd. (b).) The trial court is directed to amend the
abstract of judgment to reflect this modification and to send a copy of the
amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

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                                                  _________________________
                                                  Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Simons, J.

_________________________
Chou, J.

A166955/People v. Michael Redell Smith, Jr.

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