Court Opinion

ID: 9458473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:52:57.754687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:46.717187
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
My disagreements with the foregoing opinion are that it finds no error in the admission in evidence at trial of the identification of Neverson outside the jail in Virginia,1 the immediately ensuing lineup identification inside, and the absence of findings by the trial court, respecting both these identifications. The outside identification I conclude violated due process, and should have been excluded under United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). The lineup identification I conclude violated both the Fifth Amendment (due process) and the Sixth Amendment (right to counsel), under both Wade and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967), and our en banc decision in Clemons v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 408 F.2d 1230 (1968). The absence of findings I think constituted error under the court’s en banc decision in United States v. Ash, 149 U.S.App.D.C.-, 461 F.2d 92 (1972), and well-established general principles of law.
THE VIRGINIA PRE-LINEUP IDENTIFICATION
Some two weeks after the robbery in this city, appellant was arrested in Virginia for a crime committed there. Circumstances referred to in the court’s opinion quite naturally led the Virginia authorities to communicate with the authorities in Washington that the man held in Virginia, Neverson, might be the one sought for the Washington robbery. Accordingly, Lieutenant White, of Washington, arranged for Mr. Herbert A. Wheeler, a witness to the Washington robbery, to accompany him to Manassas where Mr. Neverson was being held.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress the lineup identification Mr. Wheeler testified on cross-examination as follows:
Q Mr. Wheeler, when you went to Virginia, did you at any time see the defendant before the line-up ?
A Yes, I did.
Q When did you see him ?
A They were taking him from the jail to the courthouse.
Q Was that the same day as the line-up ?
A Same day.
Q Just before the line-up ?
A Yes.
•>:- * * * * *
Q Did Lt. White mention anything to you as you saw the defendant walking across the courtyard ?
A Yes. He say he was supposed to be down there at 10:00 o’clock for a *1233line-up, but they were taking him to a trial or something.
Q And he pointed out the defendant?
A No, he did not.
Q Did you get the impression that it was the defendant that they were taking to the trial?
A Just like I say, I had seen the man before.
* * * * * *
THE COURT: And you say you saw this man, the defendant, that is, here, you saw him before you got to the place where they were having the line-up that day?
THE WITNESS: I saw him before I ever went into the jail. We were coming into, I guess you say, the parking lot. And they were going across to jail to the courthouse, I guess.
THE COURT: How many people were going across when you say “They”?
THE WITNESS: It was with two policemen and this one man or two more men were with him.2
* # -x- * * -X-
THE COURT: Including this one?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: This gentleman and somebody else ? Is that right ?
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma’am.
->:• -x- * -x- * -x-
THE COURT: Did you recognize the man at that time or not ?
THE WITNESS: Yes, ma’am. I have seen that man before. So when we got in the parking lot, he say, Sgt. White says that we may be late, because it looks like they were taking them to the courthouse for something.
X X X X X • X
Q When Sgt. White mentioned to you that it looked like the line-up would be late, because they were leading him over to a hearing, was this at the same time that the defendant was being led over by these gentlemen to the hearing ?
A Yes, it was the same day.
Q Did Lt. White sort of indicate that there he was, they were leading him to the hearing?
A No, he did not.
At the trial, the pre-lineup incident outside is described by Mr. Wheeler on cross and on re-direct as follows :
On Cross:
Q When you went out to the lineup, did you see the defendant at all before the line-up?
A Yes, I did.
* * * -x- * -»
Q While he was walking across the outside of the line-up room ?
A Yes.
•X * * * * •*
Q Did you recognize him at all while he was walking there ?
A Yes, I recognized him.
On Re-direct:
Q When you said you went down to Virginia to view this line-up, you said you saw the man earlier.
* * * * * *
Q You just recognized him there in the courtyard or whatever it was?
A I recognized him, yes.
This identification in my opinion not only precluded the validity of the lineup identification which almost immediately ensued, to be discussed more fully, but because of its impermissibly suggestive circumstances was itself inadmissible. The court’s reliance upon the unplanned character of the encounter seems quite contrary to United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 229, 87 S.Ct. at 1933, where it is said, “Suggestion can be created intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle ways,” and, of course, in unsubtle ways.
*1234As we have seen, Mr. Wheeler testified of this encounter that he was aware that the authorities were taking Never-son from the jail to the courthouse. To repeat, “just before the line-up,” Lieutenant White mentioned to Mr. Wheeler that “he (White) was supposed to be down there by 10 o’clock for the line-up but they were taking him to a trial or something,” obviously referring to Neverson. Although it is not clear whether Lieutenant White actually mentioned Neverson’s name, it seems inescapable that the reference to Neverson, as he was being led across the courtyard a short distance from Lieutenant White and Wheeler, was Lieutenant White’s confirmation of the identity of the man Wheeler testified he then recognized and a little later picked out in the lineup. The situation in Long v. United States, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 424 F.2d 799 (1969), cited by the court, was altogether different. The fortuitous elevator-lobby identification there was not accompanied by police commentary upon the identity of Long. Here Lieutenant White indicated that the suspect was being taken “to a trial or something.” Moreover, the trial judge made no finding about this identification. I think a finding of no impermissible suggestiveness could not be made. Be that as it may none was made. The admission of this identification at trial seems clearly to have violated due process of law under Wade and our decisions, aside from the necessity of findings offered to support a contrary position.
THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION
1. The lineup followed upon the heels of the courtyard identification of Never-son by Wheeler. The immediately preceding identification alone, in my opinion, precluded the admissibility of the lineup identification. One of the impermissibly suggestive procedures enumerated in Wade is when “the suspect is pointed out before or during a lineup.” 388 U.S. at 233, 87 S.Ct. at 1935. This, as we have seen, is effectively what had occurred' here.
The lineup technique is designed to insure trustworthiness arising from its own arrangements. Ordinarily it must consist of an array of persons from which a witness might identify the perpetrator of an offense. The desired trustworthiness is lost when the suspect in police custody is identified, as here, quite independently just prior to the lineup. If this is permissible, as the court now holds, it would seem to destroy the lineup technique as a means of obtaining admissible evidence consistently with due process of law. No authority is advanced to support the admission at trial of such an identification.
2. Apart from the above, as I shall try to explain, the substantive right of the suspect to counsel at a lineup identification was not granted as Wade holds the Sixth Amendment requires. Preliminarily, reference is made to the recent en bane decision of this court in United States v. Ash, 149 U.S.App.D.C. at-, 461 F.2d at 92, where United States v. Allen, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 408 F.2d 1287 (1969), is cited approvingly, and on its authority the court suggests again that out of “an abiding concern for an interest in ensuring a combination of fairness and intelligent and effective technique in law enforcement,” as a means of safeguarding the fairness of identification procedures, counsel should be given prior to the lineup any description of the suspect given to the police by the lineup witness. See also Spriggs v. Wilson, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 419 F.2d 759 (1969). Allen also sets out other steps which, if taken, would contribute to the trustworthiness of a lineup:
First, we note that the presence of counsel at a lineup serves not only to allow an informed challenge to be made to identification evidence at trial, but also “to minimize the likelihood of an unduly suggestive confrontation.” 7 It would seem that appellant’s counsel might best be able to serve his client’s interest and the interest of justice if he is given in advance of the lineup the names of the witnesses who would attend; the *1235time, place and nature of the crimes involved; and the descriptions of the suspect, if any, which the witnesses had given to the police. Counsel also might be allowed to have a role in setting up the lineup and proposing changes to avoid suggestive features. If such a procedure were followed, it might well be that, absent plain error or circumstances unknown to counsel at the time of the lineup, no challenges to the physical staging of the lineup could successfully be raised beyond objections raised at the time of the lineup. (Footnote omitted)
133 U.S.App.D.C. at 86, 408 F.2d at 1289.
“Substitute” counsel was called for the Manassas lineup. What occurred is quite remarkable. Not only was substitute counsel not given in advance of the lineup (1) the name of the witness who would attend, (2) the time, place and nature of the crimes involved, (3) nor any descriptions of the suspect which the witnesses have given to the police, the attorney’s testimony, now to be quoted, clearly negates the substantive right to counsel. Mr. Davenport was the counsel. He testified for the defense on the motion to suppress the lineup identification. This is what he said: He practiced law in Manassas directly across the street from the courthouse and jail, and then,
A I was in my office [on May 28, 1968] when I received a call to come over to the jail with regard to Mr. Neverson. And I went over to the jail to find out what I was wanted for.
Q What happened when you received this call, then, to go over to the jail? When you got there, what did you see ?
A There seemed to be some urgency, so I completed the telephone call, the other call I was on, and immediately trotted across the street and went into the jail room, that is, the jailer’s room which is right outside of the lock up. And a gentleman approached me and, if I remember correctly, identified himself as a Deputy Marshal, I believe he said, from D.C. And told me that he would like me to be present, since Neverson was there, and, if I recall correctly, I am not sure that he used his name.
In any case, he said there was to be a line-up and it was required that an attorney be present when a line-up was held.
[The room was then described]
-X- * * *X* * *
I was conscious of him [Neverson] standing over here near this door. And when the Marshal told them to line up, he ended up on this end and then there was some shuffling. I am afraid I couldn’t quote the exact words, but, in any case, as I recall, it was indicated that Mr. Neverson should move from where he was over into the center.
The witness who was the identifying witness was present during all of this. And Mr. Neverson was shifted around, then, and put in the center of the line-up.
-K -X- * -X- ■» *
I do not recall that there was any use of names. But he was singled out to change his position.
BY MR. WARREN:
Q Now it is your recollection that the witness, the individual who was later identified as the witness, was present in the room at this time when all this took place?
A Yes, sir. He was standing near this gentleman who identified himself to me as the Deputy Marshal.
And I was also conscious of the fact that I had a house full of people waiting back at the office.
* -x- * * * -x-
Q Did you talk to Mr. Neverson, Gregory Neverson, at all during this procedure, either before or after ?
A I talked to him after that. And I had talked to him before that, yes.
*1236Q With regard to the line-up at all?
A Negative.
* * * * «• *
I remember questioning the Deputy Marshal as to why it was being conducted right now in such a big rush and also the manner in which it was done. But this all happened within a matter — very quickly after I came in the room.
There wasn’t any explanation given to me, before it was done.
Q How long did the whole proceeding take, as best as you can remember?
A I think I was back in my office in five minutes, maybe eight. Of course, it only takes me about 30 seconds to walk across the street.
Q Were there any questions asked of you as to the composition of the line-up or if you agreed or disagreed with the way it was done?
A Negative. The only explanation that was given was that it was necessary for an attorney to be present. The only comment that I made was, “You are going to have it right here?” I believe I did say that. At that point it was in the middle of it. And they were shuffling people around.
THE COURT: Where do you customarily have your line-ups over there ?
THE WITNESS: We do not have a line-up room. And in my six years as a Prosecutor and defense attorney for about another 10 or 12 after that, I don’t recall attending a line-up.
THE COURT: You don’t customarily have them?
THE WITNESS: No, ma’am.
BY MR. WARREN:
Q From your observation, do you feel that once you stepped in the door of that jail that you could then see or hear everything that went on in the small room ?
A Yes. I was conscious of the fact that they were waiting for me. And, as soon as I arrived, things started moving.
* -X- * * * -X-
On cross-examination by the United States I find nothing of added significance except the following:
Q How far were you at any one time from the identifying witness that was brought down from Washington?
A Probably standing right alongside of him.
* * * * -X- 'X*
Q So your testimony today is your reliance on remembering this for over a year’s period of time, isn’t it ?
A Yes. You must recall, as I pointed out, it was the only one I ever attended. It does stand out.
* * * * -x- *
A When I was first conscious of him [Neverson], he was standing at the end of the group that subsequently were put into a line.
Q Did you watch him the rest of the time, until he was put in the line?
A I am not sure I know what you mean by watching.
Q Were you watching them arrange the line and that sort of thing from the time you first saw Mr. Neverson and so on?
A That is what I was there for.
Q You weren’t watching the identifying witness then, were you ?
A We were within a matter of three or four feet of each other. I wasn’t paying that much attention to him, no.
Q He was back to your side or rear, was he not? The identifying witness ?
A I have no idea.
Q You have no idea where he was while they were arranging the line?
A That was my testimony.
*1237Q For all you knew, he could have been back in the radio room while the line was being arranged, couldn’t he?
A That is possible. There was a man, as I told you, standing alongside the Deputy Marshal when I first went in and he later turned out to be the man who identified Mr. Neverson. What happened to him in the minute or so in between, I don’t know.
In addition to Mr. Davenport’s version of the conduct of the lineup, was the testimony of Mr. Wheeler, the witness, Lieutenant White, appellant’s father, and, finally, appellant himself. Wheeler testified that he was not in the room where the suspects were being arranged for the lineup, that he waited in an adjacent room sipping coffee. He further testified that he spoke to no one prior to the lineup and that he noticed no suggestive activity by the authorities. Lieutenant White also testified that Wheeler waited in the adjacent room and that Wheeler neither spoke to anyone prior to the lineup nor witnessed any of the shuffling.
Appellant’s father, on the other hand, testified that Lieutenant White mentioned appellant’s name to Wheeler prior to the lineup and that both he and Wheeler watched the lineup arrangements. Appellant testified that both White and Wheeler appeared at the preliminary hearing, that both watched him being led handcuffed to his place in the lineup and that Wheeler witnessed the entire arrangement process, including hearing Lieutenant White call appellant by name.
It does not appear from Mr. Davenport’s testimony, or otherwise, that he had been even advised he was to be counsel for anyone at the lineup. He was frank and honest and is no doubt an able lawyer, but he was unacquainted with lineups. During his approximately sixteen years of experience as county prosecutor and defense attorney customarily lineups had not been held in Prince William County, Virginia. His undisputed testimony demonstrates that he had no opportunity to be helpful except to be able at the subsequent trial to testify to that effect. He had hastened across the street at the request of the Manassas police with the simple explanation by the deputy marshal, as quoted by Mr. Davenport, “It was required that an attorney be present when a lineup was held.” Wade requires the effective assistance of counsel because the Court recognized that this would be the best means of insuring against impermissible suggestiveness violative of due process. The requirement of counsel for purposes of giving advice to reduce suggestiveness, and for subsequently reconstructing the conduct of the lineup, so a trial court can measure its fairness, is a means to the end of fair lineups. And Gilbert makes it clear that due process does not tolerate the possibility of unfairness that accompanies uncounseled lineups outlawed by Wade, unless the lack of counsel results in error deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Davenport’s testimony amply demonstrates that the Manassas lineup was effectively uncounseled, and the record is replete with inconsistencies as to whether the lineup was otherwise fair. For all he was able to contribute to the fairness of the lineup — through no fault of his own — Mr. Davenport was simply a passive and ignored witness to what occurred. This I think fails to serve, through the Sixth Amendment, the underlying Fifth Amendment due process purpose of Wade.
THE ABSENCE OF FINDINGS
The District Court made no findings whatever as to the courtyard pre-lineup identification. As to the lineup identification, at the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress the identifications, the court ruled first that the earlier photographic identifications were not suggestive. Turning to the lineup identification the court then said:
I find that he was corroboratively identified in the line-up by one of the complaining witnesses. Therefore, motion to suppress identification is denied.
*1238That is all. It is an explicit finding that an identification was made at the lineup, which of course is not disputed. There is no implicitness about the finding. It seems quite exclusive of any finding that the pre-lineup identification was not impermissibly suggestive, or that the lineup identification was not impermissibly suggestive, or that Never-son was adequately represented by counsel, or that the lineup identification was not affected by the pre-lineup identification, or as to any of the disputes in the evidence as to how the lineup was arranged and held. Our court concludes that the finding that the lineup identification corroborated the photographic identifications, followed by admission of the evidence of that identification, is a resolution of all disputed factual issues essential to a conclusion that the lineup identifications were held consistently with due process of law and the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Not only was the courtyard identification not even referred to by the trial court, either in and of itself, or in its relation to the lineup identification, but the above conclusion reached by our court seems to me quite inconsistent with the recent holding of this court en banc in Ash, in a different but comparable situation, as follows:
Certainly the elements of suggestiveness were strong enough so that it cannot be assumed there was no undue suggestiveness, in the absence of explicit findings by the trial court.
149 U.S.App.D.C. at -, 461 F.2d at 92.
CONCLUSION
Under Clemons v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. at 34, 408 F.2d at 1237, I would hold that the admission at trial of the lineup identification requires a new trial under the per se exclusionary rule of Gilbert v. California, supra, unless the court is able to declare that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if we could say that the Gilbert per se exclusionary rule does not apply, the erroneous admission in evidence at trial of both the pre-lineup and lineup identifications would in my view require reversal, or at least remand for findings, unless the admission of the evidence were also deemed to be harmless error. The court, however, does not find harmless error. It finds no error either in the admission of the evidence of both the Manassas identifications, or in the absence of findings. I disagree.

. When this encounter occurred Neverson was being taken across an area in the vicinity of the jail and the courthouse. Whether he was going from the former to the latter or vice versa is immaterial. The testimony is not quite clear about that. It is clear he was being taken to the lineup in police custody.

. I note that at one point in his testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress he said there were three men, other than the two policemen, in answer to leading questions.