Court Opinion

ID: 9387034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 16:01:30.283179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:10.820199
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAIRO ALBERTO MEJIA VEGA,                 No. 16-56795
          Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                            D.C. No.
 v.                                      2:15-cv-07765-
                                            ODW-SS
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
Department of Homeland Security;            OPINION
LAURA ZUCHOWSKI, Acting
Director, Vermont Service Center,
United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services; ALEJANDRO
MAYORKAS, Secretary, Department
of Homeland Security; MERRICK
GARLAND, Attorney General;
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
Department of Justice,
               Defendants-Appellees.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
          for the Central District of California
       Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding
         Argued and Submitted February 6, 2023
               San Francisco, California
                  Filed April 14, 2023
2                      MEJIA VEGA V. USCIS

    Before: Paul J. Watford, Michelle T. Friedland, and Mark
                    J. Bennett, Circuit Judges.

                   Opinion by Judge Watford

                          SUMMARY *

                          Immigration

    The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, of an action brought by Jairo
Alberto Mejia Vega, a native and citizen of Colombia,
seeking to compel the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) to reconsider its denial of his
request for a waiver of inadmissibility in conjunction with
his petition for a U-visa.
     Mejia Vega entered the United States in 1981 and
became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. He has been
married to his U.S. citizen wife, with whom he has two U.S.
citizen children, since 1993. After being convicted of
possession of a controlled substance for sale under
California law, he was ordered removed in absentia and
deported in 1999. He reentered the United States without
authorization shortly thereafter to help care for his two
young children and his wife, who had been diagnosed with
multiple sclerosis and was experiencing medical
complications. In 2008, during a school festival, Mejia Vega

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                     MEJIA VEGA V. UCIS                    3

tackled an active shooter, knocked his gun away and helped
restrain the shooter till law enforcement arrived.
    In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security
apprehended Mejia Vega and reinstated his 1996 removal
order. To avoid removal, Mejia Vega applied for a U-visa
and a waiver of inadmissibility, in part under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(3)(A)(ii), which provides that an otherwise
inadmissible noncitizen “may be admitted into the United
States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the
Attorney General.” USCIS denied Mejia Vega’s request for
a waiver of inadmissibility as a matter of discretion and
subsequently denied his U-visa application on account of his
inadmissibility.
    The panel held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which bars
judicial review of discretionary determinations involving the
agency’s exercise of “pure” or “unfettered discretion,”
precludes judicial review of USCIS’s denial of a waiver of
inadmissibility under § 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) because the latter
statute commits the decision to the agency’s sole
discretion. The plain terms of section 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii)
invoke the agency’s discretion and the statute does not
contain language that qualifies the agency’s exercise of
discretion—the statute lacks governing standards or
statutory guidelines restricting decision-making. Thus, the
statute contains no meaningful standard that would suggest
the agency was not exercising its “pure” or “unfettered”
discretion.
    The panel found unavailing Mejia Vega’s argument that
Matter of Hranka, 16 I. & N. Dec. 491 (BIA 1978),
establishes a legal standard for review of waiver of
inadmissibility determinations under § 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii),
and that USCIS failed to properly apply Matter of Hranka’s
4                    MEJIA VEGA V. USCIS

standards in adjudicating his waiver request. The panel
stated that this court’s precedents require that the legal
standard appear expressly in the statute at issue for a decision
to be reviewable. Because § 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) itself does
not specify a governing standard for the waiver
determination, Matter of Hranka could not be read to supply
one.
    The panel rejected Mejia Vega’s contention that the
district court had jurisdiction to hear his claim because
§ 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) does not explicitly state that waiver of
inadmissibility determinations are unreviewable. The panel
noted that courts have routinely found discretionary
decisions to be unreviewable despite the fact that the
underlying statute did not state as much.
    The panel concluded that by all accounts, Mejia Vega
demonstrated remarkable courage by intervening to stop an
active shooter, and his efforts to care for his wife were
equally worthy of praise. But however compelling his
objections to USCIS’s denial of a waiver of inadmissibility
may be, judicial review of that decision was barred by 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

                         COUNSEL

Stacy Tolchin (argued) and Megan A. Brewer, Law Offices
of Stacy Tolchin, Pasadena, California, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Jonathan A. Robbins (argued), Trial Attorney, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Civil Division; Joseph D. Hardy, Trial
Attorney; Jane T. Schaffner, Senior Litigation Counsel;
                      MEJIA VEGA V. UCIS                      5

Papu Sandhu, Assistant Director; Brian Boynton, Acting
Assistant Attorney General; Office of Immigration
Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

                          OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

    Jairo Alberto Mejia Vega, a native and citizen of
Colombia, seeks to compel the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) to reconsider its denial of his
request for a waiver of inadmissibility in conjunction with
his petition for a U-visa. The district court held that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction
over Mejia Vega’s challenge to the agency’s discretionary
denial of a waiver. We agree with this conclusion and
accordingly affirm.
     Mejia Vega entered the United States in 1981 and
became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. He has been
married to his U.S. citizen wife, with whom he has two U.S.
citizen children, since 1993. After being convicted of
possession of a controlled substance for sale under
California law, he was ordered removed in absentia and
deported in 1999. He reentered the United States without
authorization shortly thereafter to help care for his two
young children and his wife, who had been diagnosed with
multiple sclerosis and was experiencing medical
complications from the recent birth of their son.
    In May 2008, Mejia Vega volunteered at a school festival
in Granada Hills, California. A shooter began firing at
attendees of the festival, and Mejia Vega tackled him and
6                        MEJIA VEGA V. USCIS

knocked his gun away. He also helped other good
samaritans restrain the shooter and detain him until law
enforcement officers arrived. Following the shooting, Mejia
Vega cooperated with law enforcement and provided
investigators with information about the crime, which led to
the ultimate conviction of the shooter on counts of attempted
murder, assault with a firearm, and felon in possession of a
firearm.
    In December 2010, the Department of Homeland
Security apprehended Mejia Vega and reinstated his 1996
removal order. To avoid removal, Mejia Vega applied for a
U-visa. To be eligible for a U-visa, an applicant must be
admissible to the United States or obtain a waiver of
inadmissibility. 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(a)(3)(i). Because Mejia
Vega’s past deportation, unauthorized reentry, and criminal
convictions rendered him inadmissible, he applied for a
waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii),
which provides that an otherwise inadmissible noncitizen
“may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a
nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General,”
and for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(14), which provides that the Secretary of Homeland
Security may waive grounds of inadmissibility if it is “in the
public or national interest to do so.” 1 USCIS denied his
request for a waiver of inadmissibility as a matter of
discretion and subsequently denied his U-visa application on
account of his inadmissibility.

1
  Although Mejia Vega applied for waivers of inadmissibility under both
§ 1182(d)(3)(A) and 1182(d)(14), he abandoned below the argument that
§ 1182(d)(14) provides a basis for federal court jurisdiction, and thus we
do not consider it now. See Momox-Caselis v. Donohue, 987 F.3d 835,
841–42 (9th Cir. 2021).
                     MEJIA VEGA V. UCIS                    7

    Mejia Vega challenged USCIS’s decision by filing this
action in the district court. The only claim at issue here
alleges that Matter of Hranka, 16 I. & N. Dec. 491 (BIA
1978), establishes a legal standard for review of waiver of
inadmissibility determinations and that USCIS failed to
properly apply Matter of Hranka’s standards in adjudicating
his waiver request. In particular, Mejia Vega asserts that
USCIS did not properly consider his disarmament of the
gunman and his wife’s medical conditions.
    The district court dismissed Mejia Vega’s complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).      The court concluded that the
jurisdictional bar imposed by that provision supersedes the
default rule that agency actions are reviewable pursuant to
federal question jurisdiction and the Administrative
Procedure Act.
   Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides:

       [No court shall have jurisdiction to review]
       any other decision or action of the Attorney
       General or the Secretary of Homeland
       Security the authority for which is specified
       under this subchapter to be in the discretion
       of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
       Homeland Security, other than the granting
       of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.

    This jurisdiction-stripping bar precludes judicial review
of certain discretionary decisions. As a general rule,
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of discretionary
determinations involving the agency’s exercise of “pure” or
“unfettered” discretion. ANA International, Inc. v. Way, 393
F.3d 886, 891–92, 894 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Spencer
8                    MEJIA VEGA V. USCIS

Enterprises., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 690, 692
n.4 (9th Cir. 2003)). It does not, however, bar judicial
review of discretionary determinations involving statutory
provisions that restrict or qualify the agency’s exercise of its
discretion. Id. We hold that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes
judicial review of USCIS’s denial of a waiver of
inadmissibility under § 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) because the latter
statute commits the decision to the agency’s sole discretion.
    Section 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) states that a noncitizen “may
be admitted into the United States temporarily as a
nonimmigrant in the discretion of” USCIS. The plain terms
of the statute invoke the agency’s discretion. The statute
uses “may” instead of “shall” or “must.” This permissive
language “brings along the usual presumption of discretion.”
Poursina v. USCIS, 936 F.3d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 2019).
    In addition, § 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) does not contain
language that qualifies the agency’s exercise of discretion.
It lacks governing standards or statutory guidelines
restricting decision-making. See Spencer Enterprises, 345
F.3d at 690. The statute contains no “meaningful standard”
that would suggest the agency is not exercising its “pure” or
“unfettered” discretion. ANA International, 393 F.3d at 891,
894.
    Mejia Vega argues that Matter of Hranka’s discretionary
guidelines set out a legal standard for waiver of
inadmissibility determinations under § 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii),
and that this standard has been incorporated into the statute
because Congress amended the statute after Matter of
Hranka was decided, without making any revisions to
disagree with the agency’s interpretation announced there.
This argument is unavailing. As we noted in Spencer
Enterprises, “if the statute specifies that the decision is
                      MEJIA VEGA V. UCIS                      9

wholly discretionary, regulations or agency practice will not
make the decision reviewable” and exempt from
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 345 F.3d at 691. Similarly, in ANA
International, we reaffirmed that agency practice is not an
independent source of law and does not create a legal
standard that permits review. 393 F.3d at 893. Because
§ 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) itself does not specify a governing
standard for the waiver determination, Matter of Hranka
cannot be read to supply one. Our court’s precedents require
that the standard appear expressly in the statute at issue for a
decision to be reviewable.
    Mejia Vega argues that we should apply
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only to provisions stating that a decision
is    discretionary   and      unreviewable.          Because
§ 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) does not explicitly state that waiver of
inadmissibility determinations are unreviewable, Mejia
Vega contends that the district court had jurisdiction to hear
his claim. We disagree.
    Courts have routinely found discretionary decisions to be
unreviewable despite the fact that the underlying statute did
not state as much. In Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233
(2010), for example, the Supreme Court cited 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1157(c)(1), 1181(b), and 1182(a)(3)(D)(iii)—three
provisions that do not specify that decisions under them are
unreviewable—as examples of “decisions specified by
statute ‘to be in the discretion of the Attorney General,’ and
therefore     shielded      from      court    oversight    by
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” 558 U.S. at 248. Similarly, in Spencer
Enterprises, we cited § 1158(b)(1), § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), and
§ 1229b(b)(2)(D) as examples of provisions under which
decisions are unreviewable, even though none contains the
word “unreviewable.” 345 F.3d at 690. And in Poursina,
we held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) barred review of a
10                   MEJIA VEGA V. USCIS

discretionary decision to deny a national interest waiver
under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i), a provision that also lacks
express language stating that decisions under it are
unreviewable. 936 F.3d at 871–72. Mejia Vega’s
interpretive argument cannot be reconciled with these
precedents.
                      *       *       *
    By all accounts, Mejia Vega demonstrated remarkable
courage by intervening to stop an active shooter, and his
efforts to care for his wife are equally worthy of praise. But
however compelling his objections to USCIS’s denial of a
waiver of inadmissibility may be, judicial review of that
decision is barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly granted
USCIS’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
     AFFIRMED.