Court Opinion

ID: 9600302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:25:49.370958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:51.640497
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Presiding Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion and concur in its judgment. I write simply to highlight the unfairness of the State’s position in this case. At the time that Agent Neal telephoned GMAC and told GMAC that it should repossess the vehicle, the State could have subjected the vehicle to forfeiture if it could have shown that the vehicle was “directly or indirectly” “intended for use in any manner to facilitate a [controlled substance] violation.”6 Agent Neal informed GMAC that the State did not have enough evidence to seize the vehicle under the foregoing standard. However, the State now asserts that, based on what Agent Neal told GMAC, GMAC at that time had enough evidence so that it “reasonably should have known” that the vehicle would be used for a controlled substance violation or that such a violation “was likely to occur.”7 The State relies on this assertion in its attempt to defeat GMAC’s interest in the property. However, if the State did not believe that it could have shown that the vehicle, even indirectly, was intended for use in any manner to facilitate a controlled substance violation, it is highly unfair for the State to assert that GMAC “reasonably should have known” that the vehicle would be used for that purpose. I do not rely on this lack of equity in the State’s position to join the majority opinion. Instead, I fully concur with the majority’s reasoning and with its conclusion that GMAC established that it was entitled to its status as an innocent interest holder under OCGA§ 16-13-49 (e) (1) (A).

 OCGA § 16-13-49 (d) (3).

 OCGA § 16-13-49 (e) (1) (A).