Court Opinion

ID: 9797512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:22:37.568905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:56:33.446760
License: Public Domain

Judge J. JONES
specially concurring.
I concur in the majority's resolution of defendant's claims on appeal, though I consider the question whether the United States and Mexican officials were engaged in a joint venture for Miranda purposes to be somewhat close. Nonetheless, I would affirm the district court's denial of defendant's suppression motion for the reason the district court's finding that there had been no interrogation is supported by the record. And even were we to assume that the statements defendant made to the Mexican officials at and shortly after his arrest should have been suppressed, I would conclude that any error in admitting those statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Absent interrogation, a Miranda advisement is not a prerequisite to the admission of a defendant's statements at trial during the prosecution's case-in-chief. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (warnings are required when an individual is subject to custodial interrogation); see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 *1026(1980); People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010, 1014-15 (Colo.2008). In this context, "[iln-terrogation includes 'any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." " Madrid, 179 P.3d at 1014 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682).
Here, the prosecution argued at the suppression hearing that there had been no interrogation. The district court found that there had been no interrogation. On appeal, defendant acknowledges that finding but does not make any specific argument why it was incorrect.
Based on my review of the record of the suppression hearing, see Moody v. People, 159 P.3d 611, 614 (Colo.2007), I conclude that the district court's finding is supported by the evidence. Defendant volunteered statements to the Mexican officials and asked them questions, to which they merely responded in a straight-forward way without inviting additional responses from defendant. See Madrid, 179 P.3d at 1015; People v. Rivas, 13 P.3d 315, 320 (Colo.2000); People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 242-43 (Colo.1999). Therefore, the lack of Mirando warnings was no impediment to the admission of defendant's statements.
In any event, any error in admitting defendant's statements to the Mexican officials was harmless. A constitutional error is harmless if the evidence properly received is so overwhelming that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Bartley v. People, 817 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Colo.1991); People v. Larson, 97 P.3d 246, 251 (Colo.App.2004). In making such a determination, we necessarily look at the strength of the evidence against the defendant, but the ultimate question we must decide is whether the guilty verdict was surely not attributable to the error. People v. Harris, 43 P.3d 221, 230 (Colo.2002); Larson, 97 P.3d at 251.
Defendant did not contest any of the salient facts established by the prosecution. He admitted he was the shooter and offered no justification for his actions. Instead, he sought conviction on lesser charges of reckless conduct because, he claimed, he did not knowingly cause the death of the slain officer, intend to kill the officer who survived, or knowingly attempt to cause the death of the officer who survived, but rather intended only to seare the officers.
The evidence, however, was overwhelming that defendant specifically targeted the two officers, intended to shoot them, and shot each of them multiple times. One shot struck the deceased officer onee in the head. Witnesses testified (without objection) that defendant was very angry, said he wanted to return to the party and shoot the officers, and said that he wanted to kill one of the officers. Defendant himself testified that he intended to shoot the officers and that he aimed for them.1 His bare assertion that he believed he would not seriously harm the officers because he thought they were wearing bullet-proof vests was, under the cireum-stances, singularly unpersuasive.
For these additional reasons, I concur in affirming the judgment.

. Because defendant testified and denied intending to seriously harm the officers, his voluntary statements to the Mexican officials, which bore on his state of mind, would have been admissible to impeach him regardless whether a Miranda advisement was required or given. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); People v. Trujillo, 49 P.3d 316, 321 (Colo.2002).