Court Opinion

ID: 9682439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:11:25.725644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:39.382505
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring.
I believe that the principal opinion properly responds to the issue of defendant’s counsel’s refusal to participate in the trial.
By reason of § 565.014, RSMo 1978, initial appellate jurisdiction is vested in this Court and we have not only the authority but the duty to decide all issues properly presented by the case, including issues arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
A collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is appropriate only when the remedies provided by state law have been exhausted. The statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
⅜: * * * * *
The procedure suggested by the dissent could produce a procedural treadmill which we should avoid by deciding the matters properly brought before us.