Court Opinion

ID: 9674031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:22:02.276332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.291158
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
FONES, Chief Justice.
The New Jersey Zinc Company, defendant-appellant, much aggrieved by the opinion of the Court, petitions for a rehearing and reversal of our holding and that of the learned Chancellor.
First, complaint is made that we erroneously based our finding that the occupational disease had its origin and cause in a risk connected with employment by defendant, upon the pre-employment examination made for the company by Dr. Milligan, with no testimony in the record to show what his findings were.
Plaintiff testified, without objection or contradiction, that he was examined by Dr. Milligan as a prerequisite to being employed in 1956 and that the examination included x-rays of the chest. Plaintiff was not denied employment as a result of the examination and worked for defendant for the next sixteen (16) years following the examination, in a zinc mine described as heavily laden with dust, powder, diesel fumes and other injurious substances.
The Chancellor’s findings implicitly, if not explicitly, included a finding that the disease from which plaintiff suffers had its origin and cause in a risk connected with that employment period. Our review is limited to a determination of whether there is any material evidence to support that finding.
“If the findings are supported by inferences which may fairly be drawn from the evidence, even though the evidence be susceptible of opposing inferences, the reviewing court will not disturb the award.” (citations omitted).

The rule of reasonable inference, where the evidence was circumstantial, has been recognized by this court in numerous compensation cases . . . .” (citations omitted). Hartwell Motor Co., Inc. v. Hickerson, 160 Tenn. 513, 520, 26 S.W.2d 153, 156 (1930).
The reasonable inferences to be drawn from plaintiff’s testimony were that the examination was for the purpose of determining whether or not plaintiff was physically able to perform work in defendant’s zinc mine and that if the examination had disclosed any evidence of an occupational disease he would not have been accepted for employment. In our view, this placed the burden on defendant to go forward with the evidence, if any existed, contrary to the reasonable inferences favorable to plaintiff, naturally flowing from said testimony. The record shows Dr. Milligan was still a company doctor in 1972, and of course defendant’s officials were available to prove the company policy that existed in 1956 with respect to the purpose, extent, etc. of the required physical examination. Standing undisputed and uncontradicted, the inferences provide some material evidence on the issue under discussion, and foreclose further review by this Court.
*253Next defendant says there is no positive testimony in the record that plaintiff was disabled by reason of pulmonary fibrosis or anthracosis and that we failed to deal with the aspects of defendant’s original assignments of error numbers two and three asserting that the Chancellor’s opinion was based on speculation and conjecture.
We quote the following from Maryland Casualty Company v. Miller, supra:
“When there is medical testimony, it need not necessarily establish positively the nature and etiology of a disease. For example this Court affirmed an award based on the theory that a strain, accompanied by a sharp pain at the base of the neck, and followed by continuous pain, caused or accelerated a cancer that later led to the workman’s death. In this case the doctors all admitted that the cause of cancer was not known. Two of the doctors testified that the strain probably aggravated the cancer and that was enough to support the award. Boyd v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S.W.2d 10. We cite this case because it was the sequence of events that was convincing. The argument there made was as here that any conclusion is ‘pure conjecture’.” 210 Tenn. at 306, 307, 358 S.W.2d at 319.
Later in the opinion, Mr. Justice Burnett quotes the following from Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation, Volume 2, Section 80.-32:
“ ‘It is a common experience of compensation and personal injury lawyers to find that the more distinguished the medical witness is, the more tentative and qualified are his statements on the witness stand.’ ” 210 Tenn. at 307, 358 S.W.2d at 319.
In our opinion released on December 22, 1975, we have quoted what we deem to be material medical evidence to support the award, to the degree of exactness required it a workmen’s compensation case and appellant’s contention merely reargues its original position, which is not permitted under Rule 32 of this Court.
Next defendant takes issue with the rule we adopted in section five of our opinion and complains that it is in conflict with Neas v. Snapp, 221 Tenn. 325, 426 S.W.2d 498 (1968), Banks v. Southern Potteries, Inc., 30 Tenn.App. 199, 204 S.W.2d 382 (1946), and Tevis v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 21 Tenn.App. 494, 113 S.W.2d 64 (1937).
We acknowledge that the sentence immediately preceding the statement of the rule is incomplete and we condemn it to oblivion. We should have said, and we say now, that this Court has not expressly dealt with the precise factual situation involving an attending physician who obtains reports of other doctors or hospital technicians and uses them in the diagnosis and/or treatment of his patient and predicates his expert opinion on such hearsay reports and his own examination.
In that context, the rule stated in the paragraph that follows the questionable sentence is exactly as it was intended to be, and was formulated after careful examination of the cases referred to by the defendant, as well as many other cases.
In Neas v. Snapp, supra, the widow of an employee, seeking recovery for the death of her husband alleged to have occurred in a work related accident, testifying as a lay witness, was allowed to introduce as an exhibit to her testimony an autopsy report prepared by a pathologist. On appeal this Court held that the admission into evidence of the autopsy report was error. Defendant wholly fails to point out to us any analogy between that case and the factual situation to which we have limited the exception of the rule regarding hearsay reports. The same may be said with respect to Banks v. Southern Potteries, Inc., supra.
In Tevis v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., supra, it is true that Dr. Stoechinger was a treating physician, who sent his patient to Dr. Spurling from whom he obtained a report, based upon which he eliminated any consideration of a diagnosis *254of syphilis. The Court of Appeals held that testimony with respect to Dr. Spurling’s report was correctly excluded by the trial court, and concluded its discussion of that issue with the following observation:
“But aside from these specific objections to the introduction of the testimony, we fail to see where it could have aided the cause of plaintiff to any great extent if admitted. As we view the testimony, it would have proved nothing, and its exclusion could not have seriously injured plaintiff.” 21 Tenn.App. at 502, 113 S.W.2d at 70.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, which insofar as precedent is concerned, is a concurrence in result only. To the extent that the rule we have announced here is in conflict with Tevis v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., supra, that case is overruled. We have not overruled the general principles applicable to the use by expert witnesses of the hearsay reports of others, beyond the exception stated.
We are of the opinion that courts are justified in admitting in evidence, to be given such probative value as the trier of fact deems appropriate, those hearsay reports that a treating physician obtains in aid of his own treatment and diagnosis and by the use of which he necessarily places at stake, the well-being of his patient and his own professional liability and reputation.
The petition to rehear is denied.
COOPER, HENRY and HARBISON, JJ, and HYDER, Special Justice, concur.
BROCK, J., not participating.