Court Opinion

ID: 9410747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 07:08:24.651682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:00.129637
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-22-00024-CR
     ___________________________

  JAMES ARTHUR PRESTON, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 297th District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 1543103D

  Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                    I. INTRODUCTION

       A grand jury charged Appellant James Arthur Preston with two counts of

aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child by

contact. A jury convicted Preston on all counts and assessed his punishment at

eighteen years’ confinement for each count of aggravated sexual assault of a child and

five years’ confinement for the indecency count. Preston has appealed his convictions

and sentences and briefed two issues for our review. Because neither issue presents

reversible error, we will affirm.

                                    II. BACKGROUND

       Because Preston does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

his convictions, we will summarize only the facts relevant to his appellate issues.

A. Allegations against Preston and Subsequent Investigation

       Preston was in a relationship with Mother1 for about twenty years. Mother’s

three children—T.L., D.L., and R.M.—called him “Sock” or “Stepdad.” To T.L.,

Preston was her stepfather. One day in 2016, T.L. reported that Preston had touched

her inappropriately. She first contacted her mother, who then called 911. T.L. told

Officer Dustin Durham of the Arlington Police Department that Preston “had

       1
        We refer to the complainant and family members by aliases to protect the
minors’ privacy. See Perez v. State, 562 S.W.3d 676, 680 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018,
pet. ref’d).

                                            2
touched her down there.” Officer Durham clarified that T.L. meant Preston had

touched her vagina. She said that Preston then pulled her panties to the side, licked

her vagina, and penetrated her vagina with his fingers. T.L. told Officer Durham that

Preston went and checked on D.L., and while he was gone, she texted her mother to

tell her what had happened. She then told Officer Durham that Preston came back

and “did the same thing again.”

      Later that day, another officer escorted the family to a local hospital, where

T.L. was examined by a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE). Based on what T.L.

told her, the SANE collected swabs of T.L.’s vaginal area. DNA testing on two swabs

from T.L.’s sexual assault kit revealed a mixed DNA profile that had a major female

contributor and a minor male contributor.

B. Preston’s Apprehension and Additional DNA Evidence

      Eventually, Preston was arrested.2 By then, a new detective, Morgan Spear, had

taken over the case. She obtained a search warrant and collected DNA from Preston

      2
         It is not clear from the record why it took so long to apprehend Preston or
even when exactly he was apprehended. Police interviewed T.L. and her mother and
brother on October 11, 2016. T.L. testified at trial that she remembered the police
“trying to figure out where he was and still [not being able to] find him” that day. She
also testified that “a couple of months” after that, Preston moved back in with them,
and they all lived together for “a year . . . or so” at a different location. However,
Mother testified that she had not cohabitated with Preston since October 2016. The
original detective assigned to this case testified that he had “obtained an arrest warrant
on November 26th.” The indictment in this case was filed on July 20, 2018. The
search warrant for Preston’s DNA was dated September 6, 2018, and another
detective testified that, at that point, a suspect had been arrested. The first detective
testified that he believed Preston “was arrested in ’18.”

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by swabbing the inside of his mouth with buccal swabs. The same technologist who

performed the testing on the known DNA samples taken from T.L. also performed

testing on Preston’s DNA sample. Those test results were then analyzed by a forensic

DNA analyst, who reported that Preston “could not be excluded as the minor

contributor” in the mixture on the swabs from T.L.’s labia majora and that “Preston

or any male patrilineal relative could not be excluded as the contributor” of the Y

chromosome DNA profile obtained from both the labia majora and labia minora

swabs.

C. Trial

         At trial, Detective Spear testified that she had executed a search warrant for

Preston’s DNA by taking two buccal swabs from the inside of his mouth. She

identified State’s Exhibits 4 and 4A as the envelope in which she had packaged the

buccal swabs “and then [the] buccal swabs themselves,” respectively. She testified

that the buccal swabs themselves looked familiar but that she did not write any of the

writing on the back of the swab packaging. When the State first offered Exhibits 4

and 4A into evidence, Preston objected that “the chain of custody ha[d no]t been fully

established.” The trial court sustained the objection.

         Detective Spear identified State’s Exhibit 4 as the evidence envelope that she

had filled out for the buccal swabs.       She recognized the envelope by her own

handwriting, her name, her badge number, and Preston’s name. She identified State’s

Exhibit 4A as the sealed cotton swabs that she had torn open, as well as the swabs

                                            4
inside the swab packaging. Detective Spear believed the writing on the packaging to

be “from the lab.” The State again moved to admit Exhibits 4 and 4A, and Preston

objected that “someone else ha[d] opened . . . and handled this.”3 The trial court

sustained the objection as to State’s Exhibit 4A but admitted State’s Exhibit 4, the

envelope. Detective Spear then testified that State’s Exhibits 4 and 4A were unique

items based on the writing on the outside of the envelope that she recognized, which

she reaffirmed was her handwriting. She also testified that nothing about State’s

Exhibit 4A appeared to have been altered.

         The State’s next witness was Farrah Plopper, the forensic DNA analyst who

had tested the swabs from T.L.’s labia minora and labia majora, had obtained the

DNA profiles from those swabs, had analyzed the results, and had compared the

results to Preston’s buccal sample.     She testified that the markings on State’s

Exhibit 4A were unique and had been put on there by her lab, the University of

North Texas Center for Human Identification. The State then offered State’s Exhibit

4A again, but after Plopper testified that she had not put the markings on Exhibit 4A

and that someone else had handled it, Preston objected “that the proper chain of

custody ha[d] not been established as to the item of evidence.” The trial court

sustained the objection.

         This time, Preston limited his objection to State’s Exhibit 4A, the buccal
         3

swabs.

                                            5
      Plopper then testified that she “did not actually handle the swab” within the

lab. However, she also testified that her case file contained the chain of custody for

the buccal swab collected from Preston, that there were no concerns in the way that

the piece of evidence was handled and processed throughout the lab, that she did not

have any concerns that the item marked as State’s Exhibit 4A was a buccal swab

collected from Preston, and that the buccal swab “was compared to profiles obtained

from the sexual assault kit.” The State again moved to admit Exhibit 4A, and Preston

renewed his objection “as to not establishing the chain of custody.”

      The trial court then, outside the jury’s presence, admitted State’s Exhibit 4A for

the record only. While the jury was out, Plopper testified that the markings on State’s

Exhibit 4A were the “case number and item number, but it also [had] the initials of

our technologist that did the test.” After hearing from the State, the trial court asked

Preston to clarify that his objection was “just chain,” and Preston responded, “Yes,

there’s other people in this chain of custody that she cannot vouch for herself. Again,

it is conclusory.” The trial court sustained that objection.

      The trial court then brought the jury back in, and Plopper identified the

markings on State’s Exhibit 4A as “the case and item number, 16-2772.4, as well as

the initials DY and the date, 10-8-18.” Plopper testified that she knew that “DY” was

Darice Yoshishige, a technologist in the lab. Plopper further testified that Yoshishige

“would have cut approximately half of one of the swabs [marked as State’s

Exhibit 4A], performed DNA extraction on it, . . . and then amplified the DNA and

                                            6
loaded it on the genetic analyzer.” The State then offered Exhibit 4A one final time,

and Preston renewed his objection “as to the chain of custody since that witness has

not been here to testify as to what she did.” The trial court overruled the objection

and admitted State’s Exhibit 4A. Plopper was allowed to testify about her DNA

analysis and comparison of the profiles that she had obtained from the labial swabs to

the known DNA samples of T.L. and Preston. The jury found Appellant guilty of all

three counts submitted to it.

      The jury heard more testimony and arguments at the trial on punishment and

assessed Preston’s punishment at eighteen years’ confinement for each count of

aggravated sexual assault of a child and five years’ confinement for indecency with a

child by contact.4 The State made an oral motion “to stack the verdicts under Texas

Penal Code [Section 3.03](b)(2)(A),” and the trial court ordered Preston to serve his

sentences consecutively in order of the counts.         See Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 3.03(b)(2)(A).

                                  III. DISCUSSION

      On appeal, Preston argues that the trial court erred (1) by allowing the State to

admit into evidence the DNA swabs taken from Preston when the State failed to

properly authenticate the evidence and (2) by stacking the sentences in violation of

      4
       The jury assessed no fine on all three counts.

                                           7
Preston’s Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. For

the reasons that follow, we reject these arguments.

A. No Abuse of Discretion in Admitting State’s Exhibit 4A

      In his first issue, Preston argues that the trial court erroneously allowed the

State to admit State’s Exhibit 4A, the buccal swabs, into evidence when the State

failed to properly authenticate the evidence. The State responds that the trial court

did not err by overruling Preston’s “objection that the State had failed to authenticate

the buccal swab.”

      We first note that we are unsure whether Preston has preserved a complaint

regarding the admissibility of this evidence. To preserve a complaint for our review, a

party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion

sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if not apparent from the context, for the

desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Preston’s objections to State’s Exhibit 4A at trial all regarded

the chain of custody. “Absent evidence of tampering, issues regarding the chain of

custody bear on the weight, rather than on the admissibility, of evidence.” Davis v.

State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). On appeal, both parties treat

Preston’s “chain of custody” objection as an authentication objection. See Tex. R.

Evid. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of

evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that

the item is what the proponent claims it is.”). Citing a case from another court of

                                           8
appeals, Preston contends that a “chain of custody” challenge “is really an attack on

the authenticity of the evidence under Rule 901 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.” See

Davis v. State, 992 S.W.2d 8, 10–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.)

(“An objection to the chain of custody is similar to an objection to inadequate

authentication or identification in that both objections complain of the lack of the

proper predicate to admitting the item in question.”). We have reviewed “chain of

custody” complaints as complaints that evidence was not authenticated under

Rule 901, even when the appellant’s trial objection did not mention authentication or

the rule. See LopezGamez v. State, 622 S.W.3d 445, 457–58 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2020, pet. ref’d); Washington v. State, No. 02-13-00526-CR, 2015 WL 505172, at *5–6

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 5, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). In keeping with that practice, we will review Preston’s first appellate

issue as though he preserved a complaint that State’s Exhibit 4A was inadmissible

because the State failed to authenticate it under Rule 901.

      We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.

Wright v. State, 618 S.W.3d 887, 890 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.). Under

this standard, the trial court’s decision to admit evidence will be upheld as long as it

was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id.

      Proof of the beginning and end of the chain of custody will support admission

of the evidence barring any showing of tampering or alteration.           Hall v. State,

13 S.W.3d 115, 120 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted,

                                           9
46 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Preston contends that “the State failed to

properly establish either the beginning or the end of the chain of custody for State’s

Exhibit 4A.” We disagree. Detective Spear’s testimony—and the envelope admitted

without objection as State’s Exhibit 4—established that she had torn open a package

of cotton swabs, had swabbed the inside of Preston’s mouth with the swabs, had

sealed the swabs (in their original packaging) inside an evidence envelope, and had

written distinctive identifying information on the outside of the envelope.       She

identified Preston as the person from whom she had collected the buccal swab.

Generally, tagging an item of physical evidence at the time of its seizure and then

identifying it at trial based upon the tag is sufficient for admission barring any

showing by the defendant of tampering or alteration. Sneed v. State, 875 S.W.2d 792,

794 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no pet.). Here, there was no showing that Exhibit

4 or 4A was tampered with in any way, and Preston does not claim otherwise. The

only “alteration” to either exhibit was the cutting of one of the swabs for testing

purposes and the writing on the swab packaging, both done by Darice Yoshishige.

There is nothing apparent from the record to intimate, suggest, or otherwise indicate

that the buccal swabs admitted as State’s Exhibit 4A were anything other than what

the State claimed they were—swabs of Preston’s DNA collected by Detective Spear

and then tested by the lab at the Center for Human Identification.

      Preston argues that Spear and Plopper never “conclusively” testified to the

predicate facts the State needed to authenticate or identify State’s Exhibit 4A. His

                                         10
argument attempts to impose a burden on the State that the Rules of Evidence do not

require. Rule 901 does not require the State to “conclusively” establish that an item

of evidence is what the State claims it is; in fact, we have said that the rule “does not

require the State to prove anything.” State v. Webb, 980 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1998) (op. on reh’g), aff’d, 12 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “It

requires only a showing that satisfies the trial court that the matter in question is what

the State claims; once that showing is made, the exhibit is admissible.” Id. at 925–26.

If a trial court finds that a reasonable juror could find that the evidence was

authenticated, then the evidence should be admitted. See Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d

577, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

      Preston relies on Brown v. State, 240 S.W.2d 310, 310–11 (Tex. Crim. App.

1951), to support his contention that the “beginning of the chain of custody was not

established, and State’s Exhibit 4A was not properly authenticated.” In Brown, a blood

specimen was taken from the defendant by a nurse in the presence of a police officer,

who testified that it was placed in a tube by the nurse and left at the hospital. Id. at

310. A doctor testified that “the blood specimen was called to his attention by . . . a

laboratory technician in his employ, after it had been labeled with the name N. Brown

and sealed with paraffin, and that he sent it to Austin for analysis.” Id. A chemist for

the Department of Public Safety testified over objection that the specimen received

by mail from the doctor and labeled with the name of “N Brown” contained

“3.6 milligrams of alcohol per cc.” Id. at 310–11. The results of the blood test were

                                           11
admitted over multiple objections, including that it had not been shown that the

specimen examined by the chemist was that taken from the defendant. Id. at 311.

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the doctor’s testimony, “excluding the

hearsay statements offered over objection,” was not sufficient to establish that the

specimen taken by the nurse was the same specimen that was forwarded by the doctor

to the Department of Public Safety at Austin. Id.

      Brown is distinguishable. The nurse who drew the blood in Brown did not

testify. Id. at 310. Here, Detective Spear testified that she had swabbed the inside of

Preston’s mouth with two buccal swabs, and she identified the buccal swabs marked

as State’s Exhibit 4A as the swabs she had taken from Preston. Also, Preston did not

make a hearsay objection to her testimony or to Plopper’s testimony.5 “Inadmissible

hearsay admitted without objection may not be denied probative value merely because

it is hearsay.” Tex. R. Evid. 802.

      Even if Brown supported Preston’s argument, the Court of Criminal Appeals

has since said that the State is not required to prove a chain of custody if a witness

could authenticate the exhibit by other means, such as its distinctive characteristics.

Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 292–93 n.35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Here, Plopper

identified the distinctive markings on the swab packaging, and Detective Spear

identified her own handwriting and the identifying information on the outside of the

      5
        After the buccal swabs were admitted, Preston made a hearsay objection to a
different exhibit, a copy of Plopper’s forensic DNA report issued in 2018.

                                          12
envelope in which she had placed the buccal swabs. Testimony that an item is what it

is claimed to be, a nonexpert’s opinion that handwriting is genuine (based on a

familiarity with it that was not acquired for the current litigation), and distinctive

characteristics of the item all satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying

an item of evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(1), (2), (4).

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted State’s Exhibit 4A.

We overrule Preston’s first issue.

B. Punishment Argument Not Preserved

      In his second issue, Preston argues that the trial court violated his Eighth

Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment by stacking his

sentences. The State responds that Preston failed to preserve this issue for appeal.

We agree with the State.

      Generally, an appellant may not complain about his sentence, other than an

illegal-sentence claim, for the first time on appeal. Burg v. State, 592 S.W.3d 444, 451

(Tex. Crim. App. 2020); Bonilla v. State, 452 S.W.3d 811, 817–18 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Mercado v. State,

718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). To preserve for appellate review a

complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual

punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or

motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a);

Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d).

                                           13
      Nothing in the record indicates that Preston ever presented his sentencing

complaint to the trial court. He did not object—or make any counterargument—

when the State asked the trial court to stack his sentences. Before pronouncing

sentence, the trial court asked, “Is there any legal reason why this defendant should

not now be sentenced at this time?” Preston said only, “No legal reason, Judge.” He

did not object after the trial court ordered that his sentences would “run consecutively

in order of the counts,” nor did he make the argument that he now makes on appeal

in the motion for new trial filed ten days after he was sentenced.6 Under these

circumstances, Preston has failed to preserve his claim. Cf. Sample v. State, 405 S.W.3d

295, 304 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d).             Accordingly, we overrule

Preston’s second issue.

                                   IV. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled Preston’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

      6
        Even if we determined a disproportionality did exist between the gravity of
Preston’s offense and the punishment assessed, there is no evidence in the record
reflecting sentences imposed for similar offenses on criminals in Texas or other
jurisdictions—necessary information for a reviewing court to conduct a proper Eighth
Amendment cruel-and-unusual-punishment analysis. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
292, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3011 (1983) (explaining that disproportionality analysis includes
comparison of the sentence received to sentences for similar crimes in the jurisdiction
and sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions); see also Hulsey v. State, No. 02-
12-00205-CR, 2013 WL 627019, at *2 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 21, 2013, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

                                            14
                                /s/ Dana Womack

                                Dana Womack
                                Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: July 20, 2023

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