Court Opinion

ID: 9701320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:15:23.259994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:22.353469
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Pomeboy:
I agree completely with the majority opinion except in its conclusion that the “acceptance” of the reduced verdicts, being conditional, was not in fact an acceptance, and that the judgments entered on the reduced verdicts must accordingly be stricken. The court argues that since the “acceptance” was not unqualified, in that it sought to preserve the right to have the remittiturs reviewed on appeal, it is therefore not the equivalent of “full satisfaction of the claims”; hence it must be ignored altogether. I disagree.
The difficulty I have with this result is that it not only is contrary to the clearly expressed intention of the plaintiffs, but is not necessary to preserve the integrity of the remittitur practice as it is known in Pennsylvania, and which I agree has sound justification and practical value. The plaintiffs’ acceptance was “without prejudice to whatever rights plaintiffs might have to have the remittiturs reviewed on appeal.” It *159is as if the plaintiffs had said, “We accept the reduced verdicts; but if there is now a right to have the amount of the reduction reviewed on appeal, we are not waiving such right.” The Court now concludes, correctly I think, that there is no such right of review. The remittiturs are not being reviewed. Thus, the acceptance was without prejudice to the exercise of a right which is nonexistent. This should not, in my opinion, render the entire act of acceptance nugatory. Rather, the conditional words should be treated as surplusage and disregarded, and the acceptance of the remittiturs, and the judgments entered thereon, should be allowed to stand.
In this view of the case, the proper disposition of the appeals taken by plaintiff, Lillian Reis Corabi, at Nos. 499 and 529 would be to dismiss them.