Court Opinion

ID: 9628586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:25:26.922504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:42.783292
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hall
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
During the trial, Dr. MacDonald was called as a witness for the People to testify as to the defendant’s then mental condition-—sane or insane. He expressed it as his opinion that the defendant was sane. After describing certain acts and conduct of the defendant, the witness stated:
*571tt * =>= * ajq these things are certainly peculiar and odd, but. they are not consistent with the picture of a true mental disorder. Q. Isn’t it a possibility he - could be making these statements for some other purpose? A. That is quite possible. «Q. Like what purpose? A. Well, for the purpose of appearing insane. I think this would be an understandable psychological reaction, under the circumstances.”
When we consider the questions and answers together, it is at once apparent that the witness only stated that it is “quite possible” defendant’s statements were made “Well, for the purpose of appearing insane.”
In his closing argument, the district attorney, addressing the jury, called to their attention the qualifications of Dr. MacDonald, the contacts which he had with the defendant, and his opportunities for observing his conduct, and then stated, referring to Dr. MacDonald: “He said he is feigning insanity.”
After this statement was made the record discloses the following:
“Mr. Ginsberg: I challenge that statement. That is entirely untrue. Mr. Keating: Well, let’s read the last statement of the witness, if you want to, or if the Court cares to. Mr. Ginsberg: That is a very definite misstatement of fact. The Court: The jury will recall what he said. Mr. Keating: Again I say, gentlemen, you heard his testimony. You draw your conclusion from his demeanor on the stand and— Mr. Ginsberg: May it please your Honor, at this time, I want to make a record. I want to make a record that counsel has deliberately made a misstatement of fact, known by him to be a misstatement, -for the purpose of prejudicing this jury. I take exception thereto, and I will ask that the jury be instructed to disregard his statement. Mr. Keating: Which, of course, I deny, if the Court please. The Court: The objection will be overruled. You may proceed.”
Indeed it is unfortunate that the district attorney made this bald statement of fact clearly contrary to the *572record. Equally unfortunate that the trial' judge, when defendant objected and requested that the jury be instructed to disregard the statement, overruled the objection and made no effort to correct the misstatement. Such failure of the trial court may well have been considered by the jury as adding verity to the misstatement and conduct of the district attorney. The offensive statement made by the district attorney to the jury was not true —it was false, though in all probability not intentionally so.
To state that parties in litigation are entitled to a fair trial is only to state the obvious. A fair trial means fair at all stages of the proceedings. In my opinion fairness and falseness cannot coexist; one is the antithesis of the other — falseness precludes fairness.
Problems presented by misconduct on the part of . district attorneys in presenting evidence, argument and other matters during the course of trial proceedings are not new to trial courts and courts of review. Such problems are presented much too often. The problem in this case should never have arisen.
It is argued that even though the statement made was not literally true, yet no prejudice arose therefrom. I doubt if the jury’s verdict would-have been any• different had the statement not been made — I doubt, I do not know; and I decline to sanction the taking of a human life where the basis for so doing is predicated in whole or in any part on conjecture. ■; ■
My views are well expressed in State v. Reeder, 46 Wash. (2d) 888, 285 P. (2d) 884, a case in which a murder conviction was reversed because of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney, where the court said:
“ * * * We realize that attorneys, in the heat of a trial, are apt to become a little ovér-enthüsiastic in their remembrance of the testimony. However, they have no right’to mislead the'jury. This is especially true'of a prosecutor, who is a quasi-judicial officer whose duty it is *573to see that a defendant in a criminal prosecution is given a fair trial. * * *. ”
‡ ‡ ‡
From Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405, the court quotes:
“ ‘Unfair means may happen to result in doing justice to ^he,. prisoner in the particular case, yet, justice so attained is unjust and dangerous to the whole community.’ ” and continues with the following from State v. Montgomery, 56 Wash. 443, 105 Pac. 1035, 1037, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1119:
“ * * The safeguards which the wisdom of ages has thrown around persons accused of crime cannot be disregarded, and such officers are reminded that a fearless,. ■ impartial discharge of public duty, accompanied by a spirit of fairness toward the accused, is the highest commendation they can hope for. Their devotion to duty is not measured, like the prowess of the savage, by the number of their victims.’ ”
For the reasons above stated the judgment should be reversed and a new and fair trial had.
Mr. Justice Moore and Mr. Justice Frantz concur in this dissenting opinion.