Court Opinion

ID: 9908825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 21:00:48.367318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:31.902807
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0512n.06

                                        Case No. 22-6005

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                                                  FILED
                                                                                Dec 11, 2023
                                                      )                 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      )
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                            )
                                                      )     ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v.                                                    )     STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
                                                      )     THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
JONATHAN CASEY BRYANT,                                )     TENNESSEE
       Defendant-Appellant.                           )
                                                      )                                  OPINION

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; STRANCH and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

       MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Jonathan Bryant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession

of a firearm and ammunition. At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level sentencing

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) after finding that Bryant possessed a firearm “in

connection with another felony offense.” Bryant contends that the district court procedurally erred

in doing so. For the reasons below, we affirm.

                                                 I.

       On August 6, 2021, McMinnville police officers received a report of alleged child abuse

and responded to the River Park Hospital. There, Dawn Cooper informed the officers that her two-

year-old daughter was in the hospital and that she suspected the child had been abused. Cooper

told officers that she left the child at home with her ex-boyfriend, Bryant, for about an hour. When
No. 22-6005, United States v. Bryant

Cooper returned home, she confronted Bryant about her daughter’s injuries and Bryant, in

response, threatened to kill himself and left the residence with a handgun.

          Cooper informed officers of Bryant’s suspected whereabouts: in the field behind the Mystic

Market in McMinnville. Officers responded to the area and saw Bryant running through the field

behind the store. They ordered him to the ground and took him into custody. On his person,

officers discovered a bag of marijuana, two sets of digital scales, rolling papers, and at least two

baggies containing 3.14 grams of methamphetamine.1

          Approximately ten yards from where the officers arrested Bryant, officers found a

backpack that contained a picture of Bryant’s daughter and a flashlight inscribed with his initials.

Under the backpack, they discovered a loaded Hi-Point Firearms, Model CF380, .380 caliber pistol

with an obliterated serial number.

          Following his arrest, a federal grand jury indicted Bryant on one count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).2 On June 15, 2022,

Bryant pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession charge without a plea agreement.

          At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level enhancement to Bryant’s offense level

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), finding that Bryant possessed a firearm in furtherance of a

drug-trafficking offense. Specifically, the court found that the enhancement applied because

Bryant possessed a firearm in close proximity to drugs and drug paraphernalia. The district court

sentenced Bryant to a within-Guidelines sentence of 63 months’ imprisonment. Bryant timely

appealed.

1
    It is unclear from the record below whether Bryant possessed two or three baggies of methamphetamine.
2
 A state grand jury indicted Bryant on multiple charges, including possession of 0.5 grams or more of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver.

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No. 22-6005, United States v. Bryant

                                                 II.

       We review sentences under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Bryant challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence.

Specifically, Bryant contends that the district court erred by applying the firearm enhancement

under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).        In essence, he argues that the district court improperly

calculated his Guidelines range. See id.

       “In the specific context of the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) firearm enhancement, we review the

district court’s factual findings for clear error and accord due deference to the district court’s

determination that the firearm was used or possessed in connection with the other felony, thus

warranting the application of the . . . enhancement.” United States v. Seymour, 739 F.3d 923, 929

(6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417,

432 (6th Cir. 2011)). This standard recognizes that “the district court’s determination that the

firearm was used or possessed ‘in connection with’ the . . . felony . . . is a ‘fact-specific inquiry.’”

Taylor, 648 F.3d at 431 (quoting United States v. McKenzie, 410 F. App’x 943, 946 (6th Cir.

2011)); see United States v. Shanklin, 924 F.3d 905, 919 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing cases). A district

court’s factual finding “is clearly erroneous when ‘although there is evidence to support it, the

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction’ that the district

court made a mistake.” United States v. Ellis, 938 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United

States v. Vasquez, 352 F.3d 1067, 1070 (6th Cir. 2003)).

       For a defendant convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, a district court should

increase the defendant’s offense level if the defendant “used or possessed” the firearm “in

connection with another felony offense.”         U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).        As the Sentencing

Commission’s commentary explains, the enhancement applies “if the firearm . . . facilitated, or

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No. 22-6005, United States v. Bryant

had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.” Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A). “Another

felony offense” includes federal or state felony offenses. Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(C).

                                                A.

       We must first determine whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Bryant

committed another felony offense—namely, a drug-trafficking offense. Under Tennessee law, it

is a felony to knowingly possess “with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell” more than 0.5 grams

of methamphetamine. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-434(a)(4); id. § 39-17-417(c)(1).

       At sentencing, the district court found that Bryant committed the felony drug-trafficking

offense of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver or sell. This finding was not

clearly erroneous. For one, Bryant possessed 3.14 grams of methamphetamine—multiple doses—

packaged into at least two baggies. See United States v. Vaughn, 781 F. App’x 444, 446–47 (6th

Cir. 2019) (finding that district court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 firearm enhancement was

proper where officers also found the defendant in possession of a firearm, three bags of

methamphetamine weighing a total of three grams, twenty-five small baggies, and a digital scale).

He also had two digital scales on his person which, to a reasonable factfinder, could indicate that

he planned to distribute the drugs. See United States v. Street, 614 F.3d 228, 236 (6th Cir. 2010)

(observing that digital scales are “often used by drug dealers”); United States v. Richardson, 510

F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing “the digital scale and the large quantity of marijuana” as

“evidence of drug distribution”).

       Bryant maintains that this evidence does not establish drug trafficking. He argues that the

evidence points equally to the conclusion that Bryant carried these items for his personal use and

because he was homeless. Notably, he does not dispute that the evidence could also support an

inference of the intent to distribute. And in circumstances “‘[w]here there are two permissible

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No. 22-6005, United States v. Bryant

views of the evidence,’ we are loath to accept the invitation to overturn a district court’s choice

between them.” United States v. Massey, 758 F. App’x 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in

original) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)); see United States

v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (“If the district court interprets the evidence in a

manner consistent with the record, we are required to uphold its decision even if we would have

reached the opposite conclusion.”). Based on the evidence, Bryant has not shown that the district

court clearly erred in finding that he trafficked in methamphetamine. See United States v.

Hampton, 769 F. App’x 308, 310–11 (6th Cir. 2019) (finding that while there was evidence that

defendant “may have been a user,” that did not foreclose the possibility that he was also a drug

trafficker, especially given officers’ discovery of a large quantity of drugs, baggies, digital scale,

and loaded firearm); Shanklin, 924 F.3d at 921 (finding that presence of multiple digital scales

near marijuana plants “strongly suggests” drug trafficking).

       Bryant asks us to consider United States v. Woods, a case where we found that the district

court erred in applying the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b) sentencing enhancement. 26 F. App’x 448, 452

(6th Cir. 2001). In that case, officers stopped Woods (a felon) and searched his vehicle, finding a

semi-automatic pistol and six small “nickel bags” of marijuana, which weighed 7.5 grams

collectively. Id. at 449. They did not find any drug paraphernalia or money. Id. But Bryant’s

efforts to compare the evidence in Woods to his case fall short. As we noted in Woods, “[t]he fact

that there was no drug paraphernalia recovered in the vehicle, such as a scale . . . weighs against

an inference that Woods intended to distribute the small amount of drugs.” Id. at 451. When

officers arrested Bryant, they found more than just drugs and a firearm: they also recovered drug

paraphernalia in the form of the digital scales.

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No. 22-6005, United States v. Bryant

       Bryant also argues that his prior state charges for drug trafficking do not support the

conclusion that he possessed methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver on the occasion at

issue. But we need not consider those prior offenses because the evidence of his possession of two

digital scales and more than three grams of methamphetamine in baggies is sufficient to establish

that Bryant engaged in a felony drug offense.

                                                 B.

       Next, we consider whether the district court erred in finding that Bryant possessed a firearm

in connection with the methamphetamine-trafficking offense. For the firearm enhancement to

apply, there must have been “a nexus between the firearm” and Bryant’s methamphetamine

trafficking. Taylor, 648 F.3d at 432 (quoting United States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318, 321 (6th Cir.

2009)). As the Guidelines commentary explains, the enhancement applies “in the case of a drug

trafficking offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing

materials, or drug paraphernalia.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B)(ii).

       We accord “due deference” to the district court’s determination that Bryant possessed a

firearm in connection with methamphetamine-trafficking. Seymour, 739 F.3d at 929 (quoting

Taylor, 648 F.3d at 432); see United States v. McQueen, No. 21-4211, 2022 WL 16848875, at *3

(6th Cir. Nov. 9, 2022) (“Although we have not set clear parameters around due deference, at the

very least it means that if the undisputed facts support the district court’s determination, we will

defer to it.”). However, “possession of firearms that is merely coincidental to the underlying felony

offense is insufficient to support the application of § 2K2.1.” United States v. Ennenga, 263 F.3d

499, 503 (6th Cir. 2001). “The proximity of the gun to the drugs and whether the defendant has

an innocent explanation for the firearm are both factors to be considered,” as are “the type of

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No. 22-6005, United States v. Bryant

firearm and whether it is loaded.” Taylor, 648 F.3d at 432–33; see also Shanklin, 924 F.3d at 920

(listing factors).

        The district court did not err in determining that Bryant possessed a firearm in connection

with a felony drug offense as the firearm was “found in close proximity to drugs, drug

manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia.” R. 48, PageID 379. Officers located the firearm

approximately ten yards away from where Bryant was ordered to the ground, outside of his

backpack and easily accessible. See Vaughn, 781 F. App’x at 446–47 (district court did not err in

applying enhancement when firearm was found over 150 yards away from drugs). The firearm

was loaded and the serial number was obliterated. Bryant had drugs and drug paraphernalia on his

person. This evidence supports the conclusion that Bryant intended to support and protect his drug

trafficking with the firearm.

                                               III.

        For these reasons, we AFFIRM the imposed sentence.

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