Court Opinion

ID: 9633199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:37:52.243196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:15.433009
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING
IRWIN, Justice:
On rehearing, proponent contends that if contestant were legitimized by Robert’s conduct pursuant to 10 O.S.1971, § 55, under the specific language of that statute, contestant’s status was “that of a child adopted by regular procedure of court.” Proponent then argues that contestant, having the status of an adopted child, lost the right to inherit from Robert, his first adoptive parent, by reason of the"'subsequent adoption of contestant by Georgia Jones.
In In re Talley’s Estate, 188 Okl. 338, 109 P.2d 495, we held:
“Where a child was adopted by first adoptive parents and was thereafter adopted by second adoptive parent prior to death of either of first adoptive parents, who thereafter made a mutual will in which he was not provided for, he did not inherit from the estate of one of said first adoptive parents thereafter dying.”
In Talley we said that one cannot occupy the status of an adopted child to two different sets of adoptive parents at the same time, while, on the contrary, he can be and is the adopted child of his adoptive parents and the natural child or issue of his natural parents at the same time.
Sec. 55, supra, as originally enacted provided that if the father of an illegitimate child complied with the requirements therein set forth and otherwise treated the child “as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth”. The statute was amended in 1911 by adding the following language: “The status thus created is that of a child adopted by regular procedure of court.”
In Colpitt v. Cheatham, Okl., 267 P.2d 1003, we said that the result of the 1911 amendment was “ * * * merely to affect the status of the child legitimated with regard to inheritance. Prior to such amendment, by the terms of section 55 a legitimated child was ‘deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth.’ After such amendment, its status was that of an adopted child, and it could not inherit"- property expressly limited to the heirs of the body of the parent who was not a natural parent; neither could it take from the collateral or lineal kindred of such parent by right of representation. By this interpretation, the amendment made the status of a child with reference to inheritance from his father similar to that of a child acknowledged pursuant to the requirements of 84 O.S.1951 § 215, when the natural parents shall not have intermarried.”
In Jameson v. Jameson, 111 Okl. 82, 238 P. 426, we said the 1911 amendment “consists of the one sentence: ‘The status thus created is that of a child adopted by regular procedure of court.’ That status is fixed by section 8057, [§ 55, supra] which, as to inheritance, gives it the same status as if born to them in wedlock, except that he shall not be capable of taking property *575expressly limited to the body or bodies of the parents by adoption, nor property from the lineal or collateral kindred of such parents by right of representation. * * * ” (emphasis ours).
The italicized portion appears to follow the language in 10 O.S.19S1 § 52, which was repealed in 1957. We find it unnecessary to consider the effect of our Uniform Adoption Act of 1957 [10 O.S.1971 §§ 60.-1-60.23], as such enactment is not material to the issue here presented.
In In re Chews Estate, 200 Okl. 317, 193 P.2d 572, we said the policy of the law is to favor legitimation of children born out of wedlock, and by statute and judicial construction, the severity with which the law formerly dealt with such unfortunates has been tempered and softened.
Adoption, properly construed, refers to people who are strangers to the blood; legitimation to persons where the blood relation exists. Allison v. Bryan, 21 Okl. 557, 97 P. 282. Under § 55, supra, the status created is not only that of a child adopted by regular court proceedings but the child is deemed legitimate from the time of its birth. Our general adoption statutes do not contain the language that an adopted child “is deemed legitimate from the time of its birth”.
Assuming, arguendo, that subsequent to the legitimizing of contestant by his father, contestant was validly adopted by Georgia Jones, at the time of the adoption by Georgia Jones, contestant not only' had the status of an adopted child of Robert but he was also deemed for all purposes the legitimate son of Robert from the time of his birth. Being the legitimate son of Robert, the subsequent adoption of contestant by Georgia Jones did not deprive contestant of the right to inherit from his father.
DAVISON, C. J, WILLIAMS, V. C. J., and BERRY, HODGES, LAVENDER, BARNES and SIMMS, JJ., concur.