Court Opinion

ID: 9698597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:55:38.314184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.118082
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HEFFERNAN
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I conclude that this court intended SCR 81.02 (1988) to be directory. I disagree with the other concurring opinion, however, that the majority's holding violates the separation of powers doctrine.
I disagree with the majority opinion that SCR 81.02 (1988) is mandatory. To hold that SCR 81.02 (1988) is mandatory conflicts with the manifest intent of this court, which is to leave considerable discretion with the trial judge who appoints the attorney. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has always recognized that the appointing judge is in the best position to determine what constitutes appropriate compensation in a given case.
This court stated on a previous occasion that trial judges may be justified in reducing the total compensation figure which would otherwise result from using the mandatory rates of compensation in SCR 81.02 (1988). In Matter of Estate of Trotalli, 123 Wis. 2d 340, 358-59, 366 N.W.2d 879 (1985). This court recognizes that situations may arise, as here, where a judge is justified in departing from the rates set forth in SCR 81.02 (1988). Therefore, SCR 81.02 (1988) must be read as directory..
I disagree with the assertion that the majority's holding violates the separation of powers doctrine because it replaces a statute with a substantially differ*16ent court rule. The problem with this conclusion is that it assumes that this court derives its authority to fix fees in cases where the court appoints an attorney from the legislature, and not from the constitution. In addition, this conclusion ignores the fact that the legislature has always recognized that setting attorney's fees is a judicial function.1
In Wisconsin, the authority to appoint counsel and set fees has traditionally been considered a judicial function. Long before the legislature enacted any statute providing indigents with counsel, this court declared that it had the inherent authority to appoint counsel in such cases and to hold the county liable for the services of the appointed attorney. Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 249 (*275) (1859). When the legislature passed a statute in 1860 which declared that counties were not in fact liable to pay for court-appointed attorneys, this court declared that statute void because it was inconsistent for the legislature to recognize the court's authority to order the appointment of attorneys and, at the same time, infringe on the obligation to pay for those services. County of Dane v. Smith, 13 Wis. 654 (*585) (1861).
In State v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 385 (1929), this court commented on the broad powers conferred upon this court:
[W]hen the people by means of the constitution established courts, they became endowed with all judicial powers essential to carry out the judicial *17functions delegated to them. The courts established by the constitution have the powers which are incidental to or which inhere in judicial bodies, unless those powers are expressly limited by the constitution. But the constitution makes no attempt to cata-logue the powers granted. It is the groundwork upon which the superstructure of government is raised by the exercise of those powers which are essential to carry out the functions imposed upon each department of government. These powers are known as incidental, implied, or inherent powers, all of which terms are used to describe those powers which must necessarily be used by the various departments of government in order that they may efficiently perform the functions imposed upon them by the people.
Later, in State v. Kenney, 24 Wis. 2d 172, 128 N.W.2d 450 (1964), this court affirmed that the court, not the legislature, has the ultimate responsibility in setting fees for services provided by a court-appointed attorney. The court stated that, while the state bar minimum-fee schedule was evidence of reasonable compensation, courts were not bound to apply those rates in setting fees. In that case, the court rejected the argument that sec. 256.49, Stats., required the court to apply the full minimum bar rates to services rendered by court-appointed counsel. The court, after all, is the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes reasonable compensation.
Other jurisdictions recognize that setting compensation for attorneys appointed by the court is a task which falls within the exclusive authority of the judicial branch. Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 764, 394 A.2d 834 (1978). The New Hampshire Supreme Court declared a statute which set maximum fees for the compensation of court-appointed attorneys unconstitutional.
*18In the absence of an agreed-upon price, what constitutes reasonable compensation for performed services is, and has historically been, a matter for judicial determination, [citations omitted] Moreover, it is peculiarly within the judicial province to ascertain reasonable compiensation when the person who performs the services is acting under court appointment as an officer of the court. We view it implicit in the constitutional scheme that the courts of this State have the exclusive authority to determine the reasonableness of compensation for court-appointed counsel. The statutes in question intrude upon this judicial function in violation of the constitutional separation of powers mandate. [Citations omitted.]
Smith, 118 N.H. at 769.
I conclude that the decision of the majority does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, because this court has the authority to fix attorney's fees in cases where the court appoints counsel. By adopting a supreme court rule which sets compensation for court-appointed attorneys, the court is continuing to carry out its traditional role as the branch of government which determines what is an appropriate amount of compensation for an attorney appointed by, and serving the needs of, the court.

I object to the characterization that sec. 757.49, Stats. 1979-80, the precursor to SCR 81.01, "authorized" courts to establish reasonable rates of compensation for court-appointed attorneys. In fact, sec. 757.49 and its predecessor, sec. 256.49, Stats., 1975 are legislative declarations that the issue of compensation is up to the discretion of the individual judge who appointed the attorney.