Court Opinion

ID: 9907250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 00:06:07.925636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:35.193822
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Six, 2023-Ohio-4361.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               MARION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                                CASE NO. 9-23-14

       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

DEBRA SIX,                                                    OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                     Appeal from Marion County Municipal Court
                               Trial Court No. CRB2101916B

                                          Judgment Affirmed

                            Date of Decision: December 4, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Kyle Phillips for Appellant

        Mark Russell for Appellee
Case No. 9-23-14

MILLER, P.J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Debra Six (“Six”), appeals the conviction entered

against her by the Marion Municipal Court following a jury’s guilty verdict on one

count of vehicular manslaughter. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶2} On September 6, 2020, at around 3:00 p.m., Six was driving westbound

on East Farming Street in Marion, Ohio and stopped at a stop sign at the intersection

with North State Street. Joshua Richards (“Richards”) was traveling northbound on

North State Street while riding a motorcycle. Vehicles traveling northbound on

North State Street, like Richards’ motorcycle, have no traffic control device at the

intersection with East Farming Street. Six moved into the intersection and was

struck by Richards’ motorcycle. Richards later died as a result of the crash.

       {¶3} On September 16, 2021, the State filed a criminal complaint against Six

(the “Complaint”). The body of the document states, in full:

       CHARGE:       VEHICULAR           MANSLAUGHTER              –    ORC
       2903.06(A)(4)

       Complainant, Sergeant Keith G. Smith, Ohio State Highway Patrol,
       being duly sworn states that Debra D. Six, within Marion County Ohio
       upon a public highway, on or about the 6th day of September 2020,
       did while operating or participating in the operation of a motor
       vehicle, cause the death of another, as the proximate result of
       committing a violation of any provision of any section contained in
       Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor misdemeanor, in
       violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.06(A)(4), a misdemeanor of
       the 2nd degree.
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The Complaint was signed by Sergeant Smith and a notary public.1 The State never

amended the Complaint, and Six never challenged the sufficiency of the Complaint.

On October 12, 2021, Six served Defendant’s Request for Discovery, but did not

request a bill of particulars.

        {¶4} Following a two-day jury trial commencing on December 6, 2022, the

jury found Six guilty of vehicular manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(4).

On February 6, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Six to

90 days in jail and a $750 fine, with 30 days of jail time and $500 of the fine

suspended on the condition that Six obey the law for five years. Additionally, the

trial court suspended her license for five years, required her to perform 80 hours of

community service, and required her to pay court costs and $612.10 in restitution.

The next day, the trial court filed its journal entry. This appeal followed.

II.     ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

        {¶5} Six raises three assignments of error for our review:

                                      First Assignment of Error

        Appellant’s conviction was not supported by the manifest weight of the
        evidence.

                                     Second Assignment of Error

        The trial court erred to the substantial prejudice of Defendant-
        Appellant Debra Six and deprived Appellant of a fair trial when the
        court conducted its own examination of Appellant’s expert, Robert

1
 On the same day, Sergeant Smith filed another, separate criminal complaint against Six that charged her
with vehicular homicide under R.C. 2903.06(A)(3)(a). The vehicular homicide charge was dismissed and is
not at issue in this appeal. (Feb. 13, 2023 Journal Entry).
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Case No. 9-23-14

       Burch, in the presence of the jury and permitted Appellee’s [sic] to
       conduct a voir dire examination of Mr. Burch, in the presence of the
       jury.

                               Third Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred to the substantial prejudice of Defendant-
       Appellant Debra Six and deprived Appellant of a fair trial in permitting
       multiple Criminal Rule 16 discovery violations to occur which denied
       and kept material evidence from Defendant-Appellant.

III.   DISCUSSION

       A.     First Assignment of Error

       {¶6} In her first assignment of error, Six contends her conviction was not

supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. She makes two main arguments.

First, she argues she presented substantial evidence that Richards’ motorcycle was

traveling at an unlawful speed and, therefore, Richards had forfeited the right-of-

way at the time of the crash. Second, she argues the State failed to charge and

convict her with a predicate offense under Title XLV of the Revised Code, as

required by R.C. 2903.06(A)(4).

              i.     Standard of review for manifest weight of the evidence

       {¶7} The “manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to the

state’s burden of persuasion.” State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-

4562, ¶ 26. “To evaluate a claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving

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Case No. 9-23-14

conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a new trial.”

State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168, citing State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Yet, “[o]nly in

exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’

should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d

Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio

St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119; see also Thompkins at 387.

              ii.    Applicable law

       {¶8} The vehicular manslaughter statute states, in relevant part: “No person,

while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle, * * * shall cause

the death of another * * * [a]s the proximate result of committing a violation of any

provision of any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor

misdemeanor * * *.” R.C. 2903.06(A)(4). Thus, commission of “a violation of any

provision of any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor

misdemeanor” is a predicate offense, and that predicate offense is an element of

vehicular manslaughter. In re Neill, 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-04-08 and 8-04-09, 160

Ohio App.3d 439, 2005-Ohio-1696, ¶ 6 (“in order to find [defendant] guilty of

vehicular manslaughter, the trial court was first required to find [defendant] guilty

of a minor misdemeanor, which in this case is the failure-to-yield charge”); State v.

McHenry, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170671, 2018-Ohio-3383, ¶ 12 (the predicate
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Case No. 9-23-14

offense, violating R.C. 4511.202 by failing to operate the vehicle with reasonable

control, “was a basic element of the offense of vehicular manslaughter under R.C.

2903.06(A)(4)”).

       {¶9} Regarding a failure-to-yield offense, “a driver with the right of way has

an absolute right to proceed uninterruptedly in a lawful manner, and other drivers

must yield to him.” In re Neill at ¶ 10. “Conversely, the driver with the right of

way forfeits this preferential status over other drivers if he or she fails to proceed in

a lawful manner.” Id. In this context, “right of way” means the right of a vehicle

“to proceed uninterruptedly in a lawful manner in the direction in which it” is

moving, in preference to another vehicle approaching its path from a different

direction. R.C. 4511.01(UU). Within Title XLV of the Revised Code, R.C.

4511.43(A) “provides, in part, that after stopping at a stop sign, drivers must yield

to the right of way of any vehicle that constitutes an immediate hazard.” State v.

Huffman, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 14AP0052, 2016-Ohio-8093, ¶ 14. Generally,

violating R.C. 4511.43(A) is a minor misdemeanor. See R.C. 4511.43(C).

       {¶10} A defendant who asserts that an opposing driver’s right of way has

been forfeited is required to present evidence rebutting the presumption of lawful

operation. In re Neill, 2005-Ohio-1696, at ¶ 10. A driver proceeds in a lawful

manner by complying with Ohio traffic laws. Id. Additionally, “evidence of speed

in excess of a posted speed limit alone is not conclusive that a vehicle is proceeding

unlawfully and has forfeited its right of way.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 13. When a
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Case No. 9-23-14

defendant has “initially rebutted the presumption that an opposing vehicle was

proceeding lawfully because it was traveling in excess of a posted speed limit, the

trial court must further determine whether the speed of the opposing vehicle was

‘reasonable given the surrounding conditions.’” Id., quoting Fremont v. Tilson, 6th

Dist. Sandusky No. S-92-25, 1993 WL 306564, *3 (June 30, 1993).

              iii.   Analysis

       {¶11} Evidence at the trial proved that, for vehicles traveling northbound on

North State Street (like Richards’ motorcycle), the speed limit changes from 25

miles per hour to 35 miles per hour approximately 130 feet south of the intersection

with East Farming Street. (Dec. 6, 2022 Tr. at 151-53; Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 381).

Thus, the speed limit for a vehicle traveling northbound on North State Street is 35

miles an hour at the intersection where the crash occurred. Additionally, the road

conditions at the time of the crash were good: the roadway was dry, there was no

fog, and it was not cold.

       {¶12} There was conflicting evidence at trial regarding how fast Richards

was driving his motorcycle. The State’s expert witness, Sergeant John Banta

(“Sergeant Banta”), was a crash reconstruction supervisor with the Ohio State

Highway Patrol deployed to respond to the crash. Sergeant Banta opined that, based

on his investigation, “[t]he speed at the start of the skid was, again, 29 to 32, and

that was within a 35 mile-per-hour zone.” (Dec. 6, 2022 Tr. at 153-54). Sergeant

Banta concluded that Six was the party at fault for the crash. The State also called
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Case No. 9-23-14

Greg Meade, who lived two houses south from the intersection where the crash took

place. At the time, Meade was sitting on his porch observing traffic. He testified

that Richards’ motorcycle drew his attention when it passed in front of his house

because, although that portion of the street is “known as a raceway,” Richards’

“motorcycle was actually going quite slow.” (Dec. 6, 2022 Tr. at 224, 227). He

testified that, in his “opinion, it seemed like the motorcycle was going 15, 20, 25

tops, if even 25” miles per hour. (Id. at 224-25). He also testified that it would be

a “lie” if someone said the motorcycle was going 50 miles an hour or more. (Id.)

       {¶13} On the other hand, Six’s expert witness (Robert Burch, who had

experience in accident investigations and reconstruction) opined that, based on his

investigation, Richards’ motorcycle was traveling at least 59 miles per hour at the

time of the collision. (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 367). Burch concluded Six had acted

properly when she entered the intersection after stopping at the stop sign and that

Richards’ failure to drive at a reasonable speed caused the crash. Six also called

Jared Kaufman, who was on South State Street approximately three to four blocks

from where the crash took place. Just prior to the collision, Kaufman observed

Richards on his motorcycle and estimated it was traveling around 60 miles per hour

at the place where Kaufman observed him. (Id. at 398). Kaufman heard a bang

from the collision approximately 45 seconds after he had observed Richards pass

him on his motorcycle.

                                         -8-
Case No. 9-23-14

       {¶14} “When the jury hears testimony from competing experts with opposite

opinions, such that the evidence was susceptible to more than one interpretation, as

here, the jury’s verdict is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v.

Garrett, 171 Ohio St.3d 139, 2022-Ohio-4218, ¶ 139; compare In re Neill, 2005-

Ohio-1696, at ¶ 11-13 (all testimony, from both parties, indicated the victim had

been traveling at least five miles per hour above the posted speed limit, so the

defendant initially rebutted the presumption that the victim’s vehicle was

proceeding lawfully). Each party provided conflicting expert opinions regarding

whether the decedent or Six was the party at fault, and each party provided evidence

through both expert testimony and eyewitness testimony regarding the speed of

Richards’ vehicle at the time of the incident. The jury was free to determine which

expert was more credible, and we allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on

matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.

State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). We also note that

the State’s eyewitness’ testimony came from someone who was only a couple of

houses from where the crash occurred, while Six’s eyewitness’ testimony came

from someone who was three or four blocks from where it occurred. The jury’s

verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Legg, 5th Dist.

Licking No. 04 CA 63, 2005-Ohio-2376, ¶ 16-19 (where defendant’s expert opined

the victim had been traveling above the posted speed limit at the time of impact, but

both the victim and the investigating trooper opined the victim was traveling below
                                         -9-
Case No. 9-23-14

the posted speed limit, the defendant’s traffic conviction for failure-to-yield was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence or an error of law); Huffman, 2016-

Ohio-8093, at ¶ 15-18 (jury’s conviction for vehicular manslaughter, with a failure-

to-yield predicate offense, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence).

              iv.    Analysis of the Complaint’s sufficiency

       {¶15} We now turn to Six’s second argument within her first assignment of

error. Six claims the State failed to properly charge the predicate offense of failure-

to-yield because the State failed to cite its statute number or otherwise reference the

predicate offense of failure-to-yield in the charging document. She indicates that

she is challenging the sufficiency of the Complaint and also says the State never

provided her with a bill of particulars listing the predicate offense. Therefore,

according to Six, the conviction is not supported by the manifest weight of the

evidence and must be reversed.

       {¶16} In Ohio, a complaint is the basic charging instrument in criminal

proceedings. State v. Miles, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-18-06, 2018-Ohio-3317, ¶ 11.

“‘The purpose of a complaint filed in a criminal case is to provide reasonable notice

to the defendant of the nature of the offense.’” State v. Hill, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-

17-07, 2018-Ohio-1345, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Smith, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-

21, 2017-Ohio-9283, ¶ 21. The rules of criminal procedure provide:

       The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting
       the offense charged. It shall also state the numerical designation of

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Case No. 9-23-14

       the applicable statute or ordinance. It shall be made upon oath before
       any person authorized by law to administer oaths.

Crim.R. 3(A). The rules also provide that the written statement “may be in the

words of the applicable section of the statute, provided the words of that statute

charge an offense, or in words sufficient to give the defendant notice of all the

elements of the offense with which the defendant is charged.” Crim.R. 7(B); see

also State v. Grimes, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-01-22, 2001 WL 1626938, * 2 (Dec.

19, 2001), fn. 1 (text of Crim.R. 7(B) “has been broadened to apply to complaints

as well” as to indictments or informations); State v. Mays, 104 Ohio App.3d 241,

245, 661 N.E.2d 791 (2d Dist.1995) (“[a]lthough Crim.R. 7(B) applies to

indictments or informations, * * * it may by implication also be said to apply to

complaints”).

       {¶17} Therefore, generally, a complaint must (1) contain a written statement

of the essential facts constituting the offense charged, and that written statement

may be in the words of the applicable section of the statute or in words sufficient to

give the defendant notice of all the elements of the offense with which the defendant

is charged; (2) state the numerical designation of the applicable statute or ordinance;

and (3) be made upon oath before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.

Hill at ¶ 15; State v. Jones, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2015-A-0068, 2016-Ohio-

6987, ¶ 18; Crim.R. 3(A); Crim.R. 7(B).

                                         -11-
Case No. 9-23-14

         {¶18} Here, although the Complaint is “in the words of the applicable section

of the statute” for vehicular manslaughter, it does not identify a predicate offense.

Crim.R. 7(B). In other words, it does not identify which provision within Title XLV

of the Revised Code is the one the State alleged Six violated and resulted in

Richards’ death.

         {¶19} As stated above, generally, a complaint may be in the words of the

applicable section of the statute or in words sufficient to give the defendant notice

of all the elements of the offense with which the defendant is charged. Hill, 2018-

Ohio-1345, at ¶ 15; State v. Ebraheim, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-14-1157, 2015-Ohio-

4055, ¶ 25, 31 (despite not citing the statutory number of the predicate offense, the

complaint properly charged appellant with vehicular manslaughter in violation of

R.C. 2903.06(A)(4) where, regarding the predicate offense, “the complaint stated

that appellant ‘failed to yield the right of way’ to [victim’s] motorcycle”). However,

merely reciting the words of the vehicular manslaughter statute, without identifying

the specific predicate offense in any way, is insufficient.2 State v. Reinhart, 3d Dist.

Van Wert No. 15-06-07, 2007-Ohio-2284, ¶ 18 (the information did not charge the

defendant with vehicular manslaughter because it failed to properly charge a

predicate offense).

2
  The charging document need not give notice of the predicate offense’s own elements. State v. Buehner,
110 Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, syllabus (“[a]n indictment that tracks the language of the charged
offense and identifies a predicate offense by reference to the statute number need not also include each
element of the predicate offense in the indictment”). “[I]t is the predicate offense itself and not the elements
of the predicate offense that is an essential element of the charged offense.” Id. at ¶ 12.
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Case No. 9-23-14

       {¶20} Not only does the Complaint here fail to cite the statute number or

elements of the predicate offense, but its lack of naming or otherwise identifying

the predicate offense results in it failing to provide “words sufficient to give the

defendant notice of all the elements of the offense with which the defendant is

charged.” Crim.R. 7(B). Therefore, the Complaint is lacking because it neither

identifies the predicate offense (an element of vehicular manslaughter) by reference

to its statute number nor contains words sufficient to give Six notice of the predicate

offense. See Hill, 2018-Ohio-1345, at ¶ 15; Ebraheim at ¶ 27, 31; Buehner, 110

Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, at ¶ 12. However, this does not end the analysis.

              v.     Analysis of waiver and plain error regarding the
                     Complaint’s sufficiency

       {¶21} Because this issue was never raised by Six in the trial court, she has

waived all but plain error. State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 598, 734 N.E.2d 345

(2000) (where an element of a charged offense was missing from the indictment and

defendant argued he therefore did not have notice of the charges against him, but he

never challenged the sufficiency of the indictment at any time before or during his

trial, “such error [was] waived absent plain error”); State v. Jones, 1st Dist.

Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 22, 27-28 (where

defendant argued the criminal complaint was defective because it failed to allege all

elements of the offense, “[b]ecause [defendant] failed to object to the complaint on

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Case No. 9-23-14

this basis before the trial court, he has waived all but plain error”), citing State v.

Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, ¶ 46.

         {¶22} The State argues in its brief that Six never requested a bill of

particulars and “waived her right to raise the issue on appeal [regarding whether the

Complaint properly charged the predicate offense of failure-to-yield] by failing to

challenge the error in the trial court.” (Appellee’s Brief at 6). Six replies in her

briefing that she did request a bill of particulars. However, Six is mistaken. Despite

serving requests for discovery, Six did not also request a bill of particulars in that

document.        In fact, there is no evidence in the record that Six ever requested a bill

of particulars.3 Additionally, nothing shows Six ever moved to dismiss or otherwise

challenged the sufficiency of the Complaint. Ultimately, there is no indication Six

ever raised the issue of the Complaint’s sufficiency with the trial court—whether

before, during, or after the trial. Therefore, this error regarding the Complaint’s

sufficiency is waived absent plain error.

         {¶23} Under Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial

rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”

To qualify for plain-error relief, the appellant must establish: (1) occurrence of an

error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule; (2) the error was plain, i.e., it was an obvious

3
 Tellingly, Six fails to identify any request for a bill of particulars in the record; instead, she infers she made
a request for a bill of particulars by quoting a portion of the State’s response to the Defendant’s Request for
Discovery, contending that “the Complaint filed in this case is sufficient for the Bill of Particulars.”
However, that portion of the State’s response, regardless of why it was made, is obviously not a request for
a bill of particulars and Six did not challenge that response in the trial court.
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defect in the trial proceedings; and (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial

rights, meaning that the error “must have affected the outcome of the trial.” State

v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, ¶ 36; see also Carter at 598

(“[p]lain error does not exist unless, but for the error, the outcome at trial would

have been different”). Yet, even when an appellant establishes those three prongs,

“[n]otice of plain error under CrimR. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution,

under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of

justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three

of the syllabus; see also State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 23

(“even if an accused shows that the trial court committed plain error affecting the

outcome of the proceeding, an appellate court is not required to correct it”).

       {¶24} Even assuming, without deciding, the Complaint’s insufficiency

constituted error that was plain, Six has not established that the error affected the

outcome of her trial. She does not show that the failure to charge a specific predicate

offense in the Complaint impeded her ability to defend against the charge. For

example, Six neither demonstrates nor argues that the Complaint’s failure to identify

the predicate offense resulted in her not obtaining relevant evidence during the

discovery period.

       {¶25} From our review of the record, it is evident the trial court and both

parties understood the predicate offense committed by Six was her failure to yield.

During opening statements, the State indicated Six failed to yield the right-of-way.
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Case No. 9-23-14

The trial transcript shows Six expected and was fully-prepared to address the State’s

assertion that the predicate offense was failure-to-yield. For example, in Six’s

opening statement, her counsel argued Six had properly stopped at the intersection,

looked toward North State Street and saw no one, proceeded across the intersection,

and was struck by a motorcycle traveling at a high rate of speed. Indeed, Six’s

counsel even stated in his opening statement: “I’m sure we’ll talk about right-of-

way throughout this case * * * [b]ut the right-of-way is forfeited if you are

speeding,” and “[i]t will be in your jury instructions” that “if you are traveling at a

high rate of speed, the law tells you it’s forfeited.” (Dec. 6, 2022 Tr. at 73).

Additionally, during cross-examination of the State’s expert witness, Six’s counsel

attacked the State’s evidence regarding the failure-to-yield offense. (See, e.g., id. at

184). Six’s counsel argued during closing arguments that Six had presented the jury

“a case where [Richards] hasn’t proceeded lawfully” because “he was speeding.”

(Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 495-96).        Also during closing arguments, Six’s counsel

referenced the jury instructions regarding right-of-way and losing the right-of-way

by not proceeding lawfully. (Id.) Finally, the jury instructions themselves included

sections regarding the predicate offense of failure-to-yield. (Id. at 504-07). This

included the following:

       A driver that has failed to stop at a stop sign or failed to yield the right-
       of-way to any vehicle in the intersection after stopping at the stop sign
       has committed a minor misdemeanor violation. On the other hand,
       the law considers the other driver’s operation of his vehicle. Although
       the other driver has an absolute right to proceed uninterruptedly upon
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       the highway, the other driver can forfeit the right-of-way if he
       unlawfully operates his vehicle at a speed more than the posted limit.

(Id. at 506-07).

       {¶26} Thus, throughout the trial, Six argued the State could not and did not

prove the predicate offense of failure-to-yield. This runs counter to Six’s claim of

plain error. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d at 598 (no plain error where, despite defendant’s

argument he had no notice of the charges against him and was unable to defend

himself, the record revealed defendant vigorously defended against the charge,

including challenging the State’s forensic experts on evidence that supported the

charge); State v. Cochran, 2d Dist. Clark No. 94-CA-80, 1995 WL 766014, *5 (Dec.

29, 1995) (despite error in indictment by failing to identify an element of the offense,

no plain error where the defendant’s attorney prepared an adequate defense, which

included his argument that the omitted element had not been committed; the

appellate court could not “conclude that, but for the error, the outcome of the trial

would have clearly been different”).

       {¶27} Six has not demonstrated that, but for the error in the Complaint, the

outcome at trial would have been different. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d at 598; State v.

Batich, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2006-A-0031, 2007-Ohio-2305, ¶ 22, 26-38

(insufficient showing that, but for the error in the indictment of failing to contain a

required element, the outcome of the trial would have been different or that there

was a manifest injustice in the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the element

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of the offense). We do not find exceptional circumstances that would necessitate

preventing a manifest miscarriage of justice. Six is not entitled to plain-error relief.

       B.     Second Assignment of Error

       {¶28} In her second assignment of error, Six argues the trial judge erred by

allegedly conducting her own examination of Six’s expert, Burch, in the jury’s

presence and by permitting the State to conduct a voir dire examination of Burch in

the jury’s presence. Six argues the judge committed plain error that deprived her of

a fair trial. She claims the trial court “impermissibly cast its own opinions and

doubts regarding Mr. Burch’s knowledge and experience to the jury and prejudiced

Ms. Six.” (Appellant’s Brief at 13).

              i.      Standard of Review

       {¶29} Typically, we would review this alleged error under an abuse of

discretion standard. See Yurkowski v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

11AP-974, 2013-Ohio-242, ¶ 60 (“[b]ecause Evid.R. 614(B) permits the trial court

discretion to decide whether or not to question a witness, appellate courts must

review the trial court’s questioning under an abuse of discretion standard”); see also

Evid.R. 104(C); Evid.R. 611. However, because Six failed to timely object, Six

concedes we review the alleged error only for plain error. State v. Clark, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 19AP-300, 2021-Ohio-559, ¶ 64; Evid.R. 614(C) (“[o]bjections to * *

* interrogation by [the court] may be made at the time or at the next available

opportunity when the jury is not present”); Crim.R. 52. The plain-error standard is
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Case No. 9-23-14

set forth above in our discussion of the first assignment of error. In short, to qualify

for plain-error relief, the appellant must establish: (1) occurrence of an error, i.e., a

deviation from a legal rule; (2) the error was plain, i.e., it was an obvious defect in

the trial proceedings; and (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights,

meaning the error “must have affected the outcome of the trial.” Morgan, 153 Ohio

St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, at ¶ 36.

              ii.     Applicable Law

       {¶30} Under Evid.R. 702, a witness may only testify as an expert if certain

requirements are met. Among those requirements are that “[t]he witness’ testimony

either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay

persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons” and that “[t]he

witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony.” Evid.R.

702(A) and 702(B). The court determines “[p]reliminary questions concerning the

qualification of a person to be a witness.” Evid.R. 104(A). Hearings on any

preliminary matters other than the admissibility of confessions need only “be

conducted out of the hearing of the jury when the interests of justice require.”

Evid.R. 104(C). “[Q]ualification of experts is routinely done in the presence of the

jury.” Anousheh v. Planet Ford, Inc., 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 21960 and 21967,

2007-Ohio-4543, ¶ 62 (rejecting an argument that the trial court improperly

conducted an examination of the expert’s qualifications in the jury’s presence).
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       {¶31} Additionally, the rules of evidence allow the trial court to “interrogate

witnesses, in an impartial manner, whether called by itself or by a party.” Evid.R.

614(B). “Evid.R. 614(B) allows the trial court to fulfill its obligation to control the

proceedings before it, to clarify ambiguities, and to take steps to ensure substantial

justice.” R.T. v. Knobeloch, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-809, 2018-Ohio-1596, ¶

57. However, “[d]uring a jury trial, courts must be careful with their questioning of

witnesses because there is a potential for the jury to be prejudicially influenced by

the judge’s actions.” State v. Gervin, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-15-52, 2016-Ohio-

8399, ¶ 188. Absent a showing of bias, prejudice, or prodding a witness to elicit

partisan testimony, it is presumed the trial court acted with impartiality in its

questions from the bench in attempting to ascertain a material fact or to develop the

truth. Id. at ¶ 185; Yurkowski, 2013-Ohio-242, at ¶ 62. “A trial court’s questioning

of a witness is not impartial merely because it elicits evidence that is damaging to

one of the parties.” Clark, 2021-Ohio-559, at ¶ 63.

              iii.   Analysis

       {¶32} First, regarding conducting the voir dire examination of Burch in the

jury’s presence, the trial judge qualified Burch as an expert. Thus, even assuming,

arguendo, that Burch should have been qualified outside the presence of the jury,

any error was harmless. State v. Tilley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19198, 2002-

Ohio-6776, ¶ 24 (although the expert should have been qualified outside the

presence of the jury, the error was harmless “given the correctness of permitting
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[the person] to testify as an expert”); State v. Bolton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96385,

2012-Ohio-169, ¶ 62 (same).

       {¶33} Second, regarding Six’s assertion that the judge’s questioning of

Burch impermissibly prejudiced her, we likewise hold that any error in the judge’s

questioning—assuming there was error—was harmless. Contrary to Six’s assertion,

the judge’s questioning of Burch cannot be fairly labeled as the trial court

“impermissibly cast[ing] its own opinions and doubts regarding Mr. Burch’s

knowledge and experience to the jury.” (Appellant’s Brief at 13). Most of the

questions were simply for clarification purposes. Gervin, 2016-Ohio-8399, at ¶ 187

(no error in portion of trial court’s questioning where “the court was attempting to

clarify”). Additionally, all of the questions posed related to Burch’s background

and qualifications to be an expert so that the judge could determine whether to grant

Six’s counsel’s request that Burch be deemed an expert. Following questioning by

Six’s counsel, the State’s counsel, and the judge (all in front of the jury without

objection by Six), the judge qualified Burch as an expert. Any notion that the judge

implied to the jury she believed Burch did not possess the necessary qualifications

to be an expert is directly contradicted by the fact the judge qualified Burch as an

expert. Furthermore, in her instructions to the jury, the judge told the jury: “The

jury decides the disputed facts * * *. If during the trial I said or did anything that

you considered to be an indication of my view of the facts, you are instructed to

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disregard it.” (Dec. 7, 2022 Tr. at 499, 508). Because Six is not entitled to plain-

error relief, her second assignment of error is overruled.

       C.     Third Assignment of Error

       {¶34} In her third assignment of error, Six argues the trial court erred by

allegedly permitting multiple Crim.R. 16 discovery violations to occur that denied

her from obtaining material evidence. More specifically, she argues the State failed

to produce the “147 data points” allegedly gathered and relied upon by Sergeant

Banta and failed to produce the written eyewitness statement of Sean Galleher given

to an investigating officer. Six argues these failures caused her substantial prejudice

and deprived her of a fair trial.

       {¶35} Criminal Rule 16 relates to discovery and inspection.            The rule

requires an expert witness to “prepare a written report summarizing the expert

witness’s testimony, findings, analysis, conclusions, or opinion, and shall include a

summary of the expert’s qualifications.” Crim.R. 16(K). The rule also requires the

prosecutor, upon receipt of a written demand for discovery by the defendant, to

provide copies of “[a]ny written or recorded statement by a witness in the state’s

case-in-chief, or that it reasonably anticipates calling as a witness in rebuttal,” that

are “within the possession of, or reasonably available to[,] the state * * *.” Crim.R.

16(B)(7). “Violations of Crim.R. 16 by the prosecution may result in reversible

error only upon a showing that (1) the prosecution’s failure to disclose was a willful

violation of the rule, (2) foreknowledge of the information would have benefited the
                                         -22-
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accused in preparing a defense, and (3) the accused has suffered prejudice.” State

v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, ¶ 38.

       {¶36} In response to Six’s arguments in this assignment of error, the State

said that it “employs an ‘open discovery’ practice” and had fully complied with the

requirements of Crim.R. 16. (Appellee’s Brief at 8). The State stressed that

Sergeant Banta had only testified he believed he had submitted an excel spread sheet

containing the 147 data points to the prosecutor’s office, and the prosecutor’s office

never received a request for such a document and never possessed such a document.

The State also said that eyewitness Galleher likewise had only testified he believed

he had given a statement to a law enforcement officer (see Dec. 6, 2022 Tr. at 238),

and the prosecutor’s office never possessed a written statement from Galleher. The

State made a professional statement to the court that no such document has been

found or exists. (Appellee’s Brief at 9).

       {¶37} Six has not shown any failure to disclose by the State. Moreover, even

assuming she had shown a failure to disclose, Six has not shown that “the

prosecution’s failure to disclose was a willful violation of” Crim.R. 16. LaMar at ¶

38; see also State v. Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 458, 653 N.E.2d 285 (1995)

(affirming conviction where there was no indication that the failure to disclose was

willful). Six also has not shown she suffered prejudice. For these independent

reasons, there was no reversible error.

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IV.    CONCLUSION

       {¶38} For the foregoing reasons, Six’s assignments of error are overruled.

Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars assigned and

argued, we affirm the judgment of the Marion Municipal Court.

                                                              Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur

/eks

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