Court Opinion

ID: 9387160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-15 00:02:09.520727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.199701
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/14/23 P. v. Boyle CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084686
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF188854A)
                    v.

    ELIZABETH BOYLE,                                                                      OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Chad A. Louie,
Judge.
         Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Smith, J.
       Appointed counsel for defendant Elizabeth Boyle asked this court to review the
record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of her right to file a supplemental brief
within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. We
dismiss the appeal as moot.
                                     BACKGROUND
       On May 25, 2022, after criminal proceedings were suspended, the trial court found
defendant incompetent to stand trial and ordered her committed to the State Department
of State Hospitals pursuant to Penal Code section 1370.1 On July 21, 2022, defendant
filed a notice of appeal.
       While this appeal was pending, however, defendant was restored to competency
and, on September 15, 2022, she pled no contest to criminal threats (§ 422). The
remaining charges against her were dismissed. On October 14, 2022, the trial court
imposed the agreed-upon low term of 16 months, a term satisfied by defendant’s
presentence custody credits, and released her on parole.
                                      DISCUSSION
       “ ‘ “[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be
maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events.
A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore
be dismissed.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486.) In
the criminal context, appeal is permitted where a defendant who has completed his or her
sentence has an interest in clearing his or her name, or where, as a result of the sentence,
the law imposes “disadvantageous collateral consequences” on the defendant. (People v.
Lindsey (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 742, 744 (Lindsey); see 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal
Law (4th ed. 2022) Criminal Appeal, § 187.)

1      All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                             2.
       In Lindsey, the defendant was found insane in 1971 within the meaning of
sections 1367 to 1370. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings and committed the
defendant to a state hospital for care and treatment. The defendant appealed the finding
of insanity, but, during the pendency of the appeal, he was certified sane. He was
returned to the court and criminal charges were set for trial. (Lindsey, supra, 20
Cal.App.3d at p. 743.)
       The Lindsey court, holding that the appeal was moot, explained: “The order of
commitment made May 21, 1971, is an appealable judgment. [Citation.] Since a person
committed under … section 1370 must be held until he becomes sane, such a
commitment may result in a permanent deprivation of liberty. In this case the
superintendent’s certification of sanity terminates the commitment, leaving no prejudicial
consequences which could be ameliorated by a successful appeal…. [¶] … [¶] [T]he
[commitment] order appealed from determined nothing except that, as of May 1971,
defendant was disabled mentally to the extent that it would be unfair to require him to
defend himself against the pending charges of crime. This decision did not determine
that defendant was insane in any other use of the term, or that he was suffering from any
particular type of mental illness or defect. [Citation.] The certificate of [sanity] …
attests that defendant is no longer under … a [mental] disability. The law imposes no
disadvantageous collateral consequences upon one whose trial has had to be postponed
by reason of such a temporary disability. In the event defendant is convicted, the fact that
he had been so disabled in May 1971 should not affect the kind of sentence imposed by
the trial court. If defendant’s mental state is considered in future proceedings, the issue
will turn upon what that state is found to be as of the relevant time, and not the fact that
an order was [previously] made under … section 1370. If any social opprobrium is
thought to attach by reason of the commitment, that is nothing which is likely to be
relieved by an appellate decision. The temporary commitment is nothing from which

                                              3.
defendant needs to ‘clear his name.’ ” (Lindsey, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at pp. 743–745;
see People v. Delong, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 489, citing Lindsey.)
      In this case, as in Lindsey, the May 25, 2022 incompetency finding imposes no
disadvantageous collateral consequences on defendant, even though it caused a
temporary delay in the disposition of her criminal case while her competency was being
restored. No meaningful relief can be provided through a review of the incompetency
finding and thus this appeal is moot. (Lindsey, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at pp. 744–745.)
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
                                      DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed as moot.

                                            4.