Court Opinion

ID: 9486134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:38:53.323758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:32.635527
License: Public Domain

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree that we must affirm the district court’s revocation of supervised release on count I and reverse the revocation of Ross’ probation on count II. I am constrained to write separately, however, because the majority countenances what, to my mind, is a violation of Ross’ fifth amendment rights. I thus join the court’s judgment but not Part 2 of its opinion.
I would affirm the revocation of Ross’ supervised release on the ground that he failed to appear for appointments with his probation officer and lied to the district court about his access to an automobile. The district court observed at the October 20, 1992 hearing that this constituted “a separate and independent basis” for the probation revocation (Oct. 20,1992 Tr. at 12), and the government asks that we affirm on this ground without reaching the fifth amendment question. The majority has “no doubt that this ... could be an adequate basis for the [district] court’s action” but then refuses to so limit its decision, expressing “substantial doubt” that the district court ultimately deemed these alternative grounds “independent and adequate ... for the revocation of [Ross’] supervised release.” (Ante at 1189 (emphasis added).) I respectfully submit that whether or not the district court ultimately relied on this ground is inconsequential, as we may affirm on any basis that finds support in the record (United States v. Ewings, 936 F.2d 903, 907 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Thomas, 934 F.2d 840, 843 (7th Cir.1991)), and we all agree that revocation was appropriate on this independent ground. If we are able to resolve an appeal without reaching a difficult constitutional question, we certainly should do so. See, e.g., Robbins v. Lady Baltimore Foods, Inc., 868 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir.1989) (“It is well established that federal courts must not rule on constitutional issues where other, nonconstitutional disposi-tive grounds are available.”); Indiana Port Comm’n v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 835 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir.1987).
The majority has nonetheless reached the constitutional issue, and in my view has resolved it incorrectly. The fifth amendment plainly forbids the revocation of supervised release in response to Ross’ invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination. It is well established that the fifth amendment “not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973). As the Court explained in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1146, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984):
A State may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect his probationary status; such a requirement, without more, does not give rise to a self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution.
(emphasis added). Indeed, Murphy observed that the Court’s precedents “have made clear that the State could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id. at 438, 104 S.Ct. at 1148; see also United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 661 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1515, 117 L.Ed.2d 651 (1992); United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463 (1st Cir.1989). That “classic penalty situation” is precisely what confronted Ross here. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435, 104 S.Ct. at 1146.
*1196Justice Marshall’s dissent in Murphy synthesizes the fifth amendment principles announced by the Court:1
[T]he‘ power of a State to compel a probationer to answer a given question varies depending upon the manner in which the probationer’s answer might incriminate him. If a truthful response might reveal that he has violated a condition of his probation but would not subject him to criminal prosecution, the State may insist that he respond and may penalize him for refusing to do so. By contrast, if there is a chance that a truthful answer to a given question would expose the probationer to liability for a crime different from the crime for which he has already been convicted, he has a right to refuse to answer and the State may not attempt to coerce him to forgo that right. As the majority points out, if the answer to a question might lead both to criminal sanctions and to probation revocation, the state has the option of insisting that the probationer respond, in return for an express guarantee of immunity from criminal liability. Unless it exercises that option, however, the State may not interfere "with the probationer’s right “to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will,” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
Id. at 441^2, 104 S.Ct. at 1150 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also id. at 435 & n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 1146 & n. 7 (“Orn-eases indicate, moreover, that a state may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, so long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incarceration ”) (emphasis added); Mace v. Amestoy, 765 F.Supp. 847, 850 (D.Vt.1991).
There is no question that Ross’ response to the district court’s inquiry could have led to a further criminal prosecution as well as to the revocation of supervised release. Ross was asked what he had done with a collection of over fifty guns. There are any number of possible criminal ramifications that might follow from Ross’ response. Under Murphy, therefore, the district court could not revoke Ross’ supervised release based on his failure to respond to the court’s inquiry without first granting him immunity. See Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 84-85, 94 S.Ct. at 326; United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 627 n. 6 (2d Cir.1990); see also Asherman v. Meachum, 957 F.2d 978, 986 (2d Cir.1992) (en banc) (Carda-mone, J., dissenting). Murphy explains that once an individual asserts his fifth amendment right, “he ‘may not be required to answer a question if there is some rational basis for believing that it will incriminate him, at least without at that time being assured that neither it nor its fruits may be used against him’ in a subsequent criminal proceeding.” 465 U.S. at 429, 104 S.Ct. at 1143 (quoting Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 473, 95 S.Ct. 584, 598, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975) (White, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis in original)). Ross’ counsel requested such a grant of immunity here, but it was not forthcoming. By revoking supervised release without first securing a grant of immunity from the government, the district court plainly infringed Ross’ constitutional rights.
The majority avoids this sensible conclusion by contending that the district court’s only interest in posing its question was to verify Ross’ compliance ‘with the legitimate conditions of his parole. The majority thus observes that “[tjhere is not the whisper of an echo in this record to suggest that the district court had an interest in ferreting out incriminating admissions to facilitate the further prosecution of the defendant.” {Ante at 1191.) Yet I find the district court’s intentions irrelevant. The fifth amendment analysis necessarily turns on the incriminatory potential of Ross’ answer, not on the purpose of the court’s question. The district court, after all, is not a prosecutor; it is the government that would decide what charges, if any, to bring against Ross based on his answer to the inquiry. In any event, so long as the court’s question calls for a response that could implicate the defendant in additional *1197criminal conduct, the defendant need not respond unless and until he is granted immunity-
The majority relies on the Second Circuit’s en bane decision in Asherman to support its conclusion, and I agree that case is analytically similar to this one. (See ante at 1189.) The Asherman court concluded that an adverse consequence may constitutionally be visited upon a “home detention” prisoner “so long as the consequence is imposed for failure to answer a relevant inquiry and not for refusal to give up a constitutional right.” 957 F.2d at 982. Applying that rationale here, the majority emphasizes the district court’s legitimate informational need in determining whether Ross was abiding by the conditions of his supervised release. The majority thus concludes that the district court posed its inquiries merely to ensure compliance with the legitimate conditions of Ross’ parole and that the revocation of supervised release had nothing to do with Ross’ invocation of his fifth amendment rights. (Ante at 1191.) As the dissenters in Asher-man observed, however, this is nothing more than a “tortured attempt” to avoid the result compelled by the fifth amendment. 957 F.2d at 988 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). I agree with Judge Cardamone that there can be no principled distinction between invocation of the fifth amendment and the failure to respond to a relevant inquiry:
[T]he two are inextricably intertwined. Asherman’s failure to answer a relevant inquiry was solely and directly the result of his invocation of the right to remain silent. In other words, his assertion of [the] right did not constitute a complete refusal to respond to relevant questions, as evidenced by his appearance at the appointed time to undergo the evaluation; instead Asherman refused to respond only insofar as to do so could incriminate him.
Id. (Cardamone, J., dissenting). The majority’s view essentially means that the right guaranteed by the fifth amendment automatically yields in the face of any relevant inquiry. This simply cannot be so, for the fifth amendment is itself “a fundamental limitation on a governmental agency’s ability to conduct such an inquiry.” Id. at 986, 988 (Carda-mone, J., dissenting); see also Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 628 (“citizens may not be forced to incriminate themselves merely because it serves a governmental need”); Mace, 765 F.Supp. at 852 (even if “the state has a legitimate rehabilitative purpose in demanding full disclosure, ... that does not make the disclosure any less incriminating”). It seems to me that this is the clear lesson of Murphy.
In my view, when Ross refused to answer a relevant inquiry on fifth amendment grounds and it was clear that his answer might have further criminal ramifications, the right to avoid self-incrimination trumped the governmental interest in the substance of the inquiry. Adverse action such as the revocation of probation or of supervised release was therefore prohibited unless the government provided an express grant of immunity. Thus, if it were necessary to reach the fifth amendment issue to affirm the revocation of supervised release, I would hold that Ross’ fifth amendment rights were violated.
Furthermore, I also cannot join Part 4 of the Court’s opinion, as the majority expressly states in Part 3 that the district court found Ross’ motion to vacate sentence inappropriate because the issue raised there was beyond the scope of the November 12 hearing and should be raised in a separate proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Ante at 1192.) The majority thus concludes that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Ross’ motion. (Id.) The court nonetheless proceeds to reach the merits of Ross’ argument that his conviction was constitutionally infirm. Again, the court has reached out to address a constitutional question that is unnecessary to resolution of this appeal and that, in this instance, is not properly before us. For these reasons, I join Part 3 but respectfully decline to join Part 4 of the Court’s opinion.

. Justice Marshall dissented not because he disagreed with those principles, but because he thought the majority had applied them erroneously in Murphy’s case. Id. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 1150 (Marshall, J., dissenting).