Court Opinion

ID: 9963393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 15:01:13.964065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:48.172694
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11556      Document: 42-1         Date Filed: 04/25/2024   Page: 1 of 5

                                                        [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                         In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                      No. 23-11556
                             Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

       GLENN MICHAEL O'NEAL, JR.,
                                       Plaintiﬀ-Counter Defendant-Appellant,
       versus
       CITY OF HIRAM,
       JODY PALMER,
       in his individual capacity,

                                     Defendants-Counter Claimant-Appellees,

       TODD VANDE ZANDE,
       in his individual capacity,
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11556

                                                                  Defendant.

                             ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00177-TWT
                           ____________________

       Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             Glenn O’Neal appeals the district court’s grant of summary
       judgment to Jody Palmer, the City Manager for the City of Hiram,
       Georgia (“the City”), on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging retalia-
       tion based on his exercise of his First Amendment freedom of
       speech. After careful consideration, we affirm.
              We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
       novo. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th
       Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genu-
       ine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to
       judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deter-
       mining whether the movant has met this burden, courts view the
       evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Alvarez,
       610 F.3d at 1263–64.
             A response to a summary judgment motion cannot create a
       new claim or theory of liability. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v.
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       23-11556               Opinion of the Court                         3

       United States, 716 F.3d 535, 559 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Monaghan
       v. Worldpay U.S., Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 859 (11th Cir. 2020). Instead,
       at the summary judgment stage, the proper proceeding for amend-
       ing a complaint is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).
       Miccosukee Tribe, 716 F.3d at 559.
              State actors can be liable for depriving persons of any rights
       secured by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This means that a
       government employer may not demote or discharge a public em-
       ployee in retaliation for speech protected under the First Amend-
       ment, but a public employee’s right to freedom of speech is not
       absolute. Hubbard v. Clayton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1264, 1266
       (11th Cir. 2014). First Amendment retaliation claims brought pur-
       suant to § 1983 are governed by a four-part analysis. Moss v. City of
       Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d 613, 617 (11th Cir. 2015). As an initial mat-
       ter, the district court must determine (1) whether the plaintiff’s
       speech was made as a citizen and related to a matter of public con-
       cern, (2) whether his First Amendment interests outweighed the
       government’s interests in regulating speech to promote the effi-
       ciency of the public services it performs through its employees, and
       (3) whether his speech played a substantial or motivating role in
       the government’s decision to take the alleged adverse employment
       action. Id. at 617–18. As to the third prong, close temporal prox-
       imity can suggest a causal relationship. Akins v. Fulton Cnty., 420
       F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir. 2005).
             If the plaintiff makes this showing, the burden shifts to the
       government to prove (4) that it would have taken the same adverse
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11556

       action even in the absence of the employee’s speech. Moss, 782
       F.3d at 618. Whether the government would have made the same
       decision is a question of fact for a jury, unless the facts are undis-
       puted. Id. When evaluating summary judgment involving the
       same-decision prong, we will engage in a “case-by-case approach
       based upon the particular facts of each case in order to determine
       whether the defendant would have fired the plaintiff absent the
       protected speech.” Stanley v. City of Dalton, 219 F.3d 1280, 1294
       (11th Cir. 2000). In each case, we look to the particular evidence in
       the summary judgment record. Id. at 1293. To establish that it
       would have made the same decision regardless of an employee’s
       protected conduct, the government must show “that the legitimate
       reason would have motivated it to make the same employment de-
       cision.” Id.; see also Warren v. DeSantis, 90 F.4th 1115, 1134 (11th
       Cir. 2024).
               As an initial matter, the sole act of retaliation O’Neal alleges
       in his complaint is that of his termination, and he may not now, in
       his brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judg-
       ment, attempt to functionally amend his complaint by alleging acts
       of retaliation beyond that. See Miccosukee Tribe, 716 F.3d at 559.
              As to the merits of his claim, regardless of whether O’Neal’s
       constitutionally protected speech played a substantial or motivat-
       ing role in his termination, the undisputed facts in the summary
       judgment record unequivocally show that Palmer had other rea-
       sons for terminating him. It is undisputed that O’Neal’s leave be-
       gan on October 2, 2017. In Palmer’s letter informing O’Neal of his
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       23-11556               Opinion of the Court                        5

       termination, Palmer referenced the City’s Employee Handbook,
       which “contemplates that any leave of absence shall not exceed
       twelve (12) months.” In his deposition, O’Neal admitted that he
       had been unable to work for a year and could not return to work a
       year after October 2, 2017, the date on which his leave began, and
       he could not say with certainty when he would be able to return to
       work even at the time of his deposition almost two years later.
       Palmer also testified that O’Neal’s termination was based on the
       policy found in the City’s Employee Handbook.
               Undisputed evidence in the summary judgment record
       therefore shows that O’Neal would have been terminated regard-
       less of his protected speech. See Moss, 782 F.3d at 618; Stanley, 219
       F.3d at 1293. Because no genuine issue of material fact exists that
       the City met its burden in establishing that it would have taken the
       same adverse action even in the absence of O’Neal’s speech, the
       district court correctly granted summary judgment to the defend-
       ants on O’Neal’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Alvarez, 610
       F.3d at 1263.
             AFFIRMED.