Court Opinion

ID: 9765246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:57:05.335592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:06.935228
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
dissenting.
Because evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the defense was prejudiced here, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s erroneous conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to bar their trial.
As the trial court and the majority correctly conclude, neither defendant suffered from oppressive pre-trial incarceration or excessive anxiety. See, e.g., Bowling v. State, 285 Ga. 43 (1) (d) (673 SE2d 194) (2009). However, the majority and the trial court claim that the condemnation of the apartment complex where the crime took place “made it impossible for the defense to investigate the case in any *378meaningful manner, and that this ‘actual’ prejudice was due entirely to the State’s failure to have returned an indictment until nearly four years after the arrests of Gleaton and Clark.” Maj. Op. at 377. This statement is not supported by the record. Indeed, the defendants were arrested shortly after September 8, 2005, and there was nothing preventing the defense from interviewing witnesses and beginning the preparation of their defense at this time.2 Nor is there any evidence of record as to exactly when the apartment complex was “condemned,” leaving the majority only to speculate as to when any “meaningful” investigation would have been cut off, and to speculate as to how the State’s delay would have had anything to do with the timing of the defense initiating its own investigation.
In any event, to the extent that the defense conducted any witness interviews and had information in 2005 on the witnesses that it would need, it is of little significance that the witnesses may no longer have been living at the apartment complex four years later.
The possibilities that “memories will dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and evidence be lost” are inherent in any extended delay, and, “these possibilities are not in themselves enough to demonstrate that the appellant cannot receive a fair trial.” [United States v.] Marion, 404 U. S. [307,] 326 [(92 SC 455, 30 LE2d 468) (1971)]; State v. Madden, 242 Ga. 637, 638 (250 SE2d 484) (1978).
(Punctuation omitted.) Wooten v. State, 262 Ga. 876, 880 (3) (426 SE2d 852) (1993). The defendants here have not pointed to any specific witnesses who are no longer available and who the defense could not have located back in 2005 but for the State’s negligent delay, nor have they shown any prejudice that would not have resulted from the natural passage of time. Accordingly, this Court “cannot find that the prejudice alleged by the [defendants] is sufficient to require dismissal of the indictment.” Id.
Indeed, the deteriorating condition of the apartment complex over time has nothing to do with impeding an investigation by the defense that could have, and should have, taken place in 2005 while the case was still fresh and being investigated by the police. See Bowling, supra, 285 Ga. at 46-47 (1) (d) (defendant could not show prejudice to defense from destruction of van where murder took place where evidence from van was made available to defense and *379defendant’s brother never claimed van after it had been impounded). Nor does the delay have anything to do with impeding the defense from launching an investigation at any time over the course of the next few years while the apartment complex ostensibly continued to deteriorate. In short,
[although greater pretrial delays simultaneously increase the degree of prejudice presumed and decrease the expectation that the defendant can demonstrate tangible prejudice to his or her ability to present a defense, [the defendants here] made no specific showing as to how [their] defense was impaired as a result of the . .. delay.
(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 106, 110 (1) (d) (610 SE2d 32) (2005). Accordingly, the trial court here “abused its discretion in granting [the defendants’] motion to dismiss the indictment” (State v. Stallworth, 293 Ga. App. 368, 370 (2) (667 SE2d 147) (2008)), and I would reverse the trial court’s decision. Id.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham and Justice Nahmias join in this dissent.

 In this regard, the State had no problem locating and interviewing witnesses during the first few weeks of the investigation. There is no indication in the record that the defendants were prevented from interviewing these same witnesses or investigating additional witnesses to prepare their defense following their arrest.