Court Opinion

ID: 9959651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:06:20.561644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:43.149285
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 22–0892

           Submitted December 14, 2023—Filed February 23, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellee,

vs.

SYDNEY LEIANN SLAUGHTER,

      Appellant.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.

Lekar, Judge.

      The State seeks further review of a court of appeals decision reversing the

defendant’s conviction for gambling, false claim of winnings. DECISION OF

COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
      Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Waterman,

McDonald, and May, JJ., joined. Mansfield, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, in which Oxley and McDermott, JJ., joined.

      Martha Lucey, Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy (argued),

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.
                                        2

CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice.
      The defendant was convicted of gambling, false claim of winnings,

pursuant to Iowa Code section 99F.15(4)(h), a class “D” felony, for falsely telling

casino employees that she was the winner of a slot machine $4,000 jackpot when

her boyfriend was the rightful winner. The court of appeals reversed the

defendant’s conviction. On further review, we affirm the defendant’s conviction

and conclude that there was sufficient evidence to show the defendant had the

requisite intent to defraud and had not made a wager contingent on winning a

gambling game.

      I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      Anthony McNeese and Sydney Slaughter arrived together at the Isle of

Capri Casino early in the morning on November 29, 2020. McNeese entered the

casino at approximately 3:20 a.m., and Slaughter entered at approximately

3:45 a.m. Surveillance video showed Slaughter and McNeese together on the

casino floor several times throughout the morning. Sometimes they were leaning

against one another or hugging, and occasionally, they were sitting in the same

chair or Slaughter was sitting on McNeese’s lap.

      At approximately 4:26 a.m., Slaughter joined McNeese at a slot machine.
McNeese was sitting in the chair in front of the slot machine, and Slaughter was

standing to McNeese’s left. Other than the slot machine McNeese was in front of,

there were no other machines directly next to Slaughter. At 4:28 a.m., McNeese

abruptly moved to a slot machine two seats down from the original machine.

Slaughter then sat in McNeese’s old seat. Almost simultaneously, the light on

the top of the machine signaled a jackpot had been won. The jackpot was $4,000.

      When a single winning of over $1,200 is won, casino employees are alerted,

and the machine “freezes up” and becomes unusable until reset by an employee.
Slot machine attendant Danielle Rademaker arrived at the machine and asked,
                                       3

“[W]ho’s my lucky winner? Who hit the button to initiate the spins or the

jackpot?” Slaughter replied that she had pushed the button and won the money.

Rademaker then began to fill out the slot request form that logs information

about the machine the jackpot was won on, including, but not limited to, where

on the floor the machine was located, the specific machine itself, and how many

credits were played. Further, the winner of the jackpot is required to provide

casino employees with their social security number to be included on the

document, and they must also sign the slot request form.

      A few minutes prior to responding to the jackpot, Rademaker had walked

past McNeese playing on the slot machine. Because of her observation,

Rademaker and the casino service supervisor shift manager, Jessee McCarvel,

had the jackpot reviewed. The casino’s surveillance team reviewed the footage

and determined that McNeese had in fact been the one to win the jackpot, not

Slaughter. McCarvel then asked Slaughter, “[W]ere you the one that . . . hit this

jackpot? Like, were you the one that . . . hit the button?” McCarvel noted that

Slaughter appeared flustered and out of sorts. McCarvel explained that it was

against the law to claim somebody else’s jackpot. Slaughter then stated that

McNeese had hit the jackpot, and she was claiming it for him. Because McNeese
was the true winner, he was required to provide his personal information to the

casino employees so they could complete a new slot request form for the $4,000

jackpot.

      The slot request form includes a section that requires the patron to decide

what to do with their winnings. 5% of the winnings are automatically withheld

for state income tax, but the patron determines what portion of the remaining

95% will be attributed to federal tax withholdings, if any, and what amount will

be taken home. If a jackpot is won, casino employees are required to check a
database that contains information on individuals who have unpaid financial
                                        4

obligations. This is called an offset. The system autogenerates a letter that

outlines the obligations contained in the database, and the letter is provided to

the winner. If an individual has an offset, the casino is required to withhold some

or all of the net winnings (the jackpot minus the mandatory state income tax

withholding) to credit the outstanding financial obligation. However, if the patron

chooses to withhold the remaining 95% of the jackpot for federal taxes, no money

will go toward the offset.

      Between July 20 and November 29, McNeese won seven jackpots worth a

total of $19,460. On November 28, the day prior to the incident in question,

McNeese won a jackpot of $1,250 and designated the remaining 95% of the

winnings to federal taxes. The November 29 slot request form for the jackpot at

issue showed McNeese designated the remaining 95% of the jackpot ($3,800) to

go toward federal tax withholdings. Therefore, none of the jackpot was paid

toward the $42,832 in outstanding financial obligations that McNeese owed to

the Linn County Clerk of Court and for child support. Slaughter also won a

jackpot on November 28 and voluntarily designated $1,050 of the winnings to be

withheld to pay her outstanding financial obligation to the Linn County Clerk of

Court. When Slaughter filled out the slot request form for the jackpot in question,
like McNeese, she designated the remaining 95% of the winnings to go toward

federal tax withholdings.

      The State charged Slaughter with making a false claim of winning a jackpot

under Iowa Code section 99F.15(4)(h) (2020). After a three-day trial, a jury

convicted Slaughter of the charged offense. The district court sentenced

Slaughter to a five-year term of incarceration, suspended the sentence, and

placed her on probation for a period of two to five years. Slaughter timely

appealed. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which reversed the
conviction. We granted the State’s application for further review.
                                          5

      II. Standards of Review.

      We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for the correction of errors at

law. State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). In reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence, “we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict.” Id. If

the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence, it binds this court. Id.

Evidence is substantial if it is “sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “We view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the State, ‘including legitimate inferences and

presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record

evidence.’ ” Tipton, 897 N.W.2d at 692 (quoting State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23,

27 (Iowa 2005)). However, we must also consider all evidence in the record, not

only the evidence supporting guilt. Id.

      Generally, we review a district court’s evidentiary and trial objection

rulings for abuse of discretion. Kurth v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 628 N.W.2d 1, 5

(Iowa 2001) (en banc). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court

exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an

extent clearly unreasonable.” Tipton, 897 N.W.2d at 690 (quoting State v.

Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 50 (Iowa 2003)). “A ground or reason is untenable
when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an

erroneous application of the law.” Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638

(Iowa 2000) (en banc). If an abuse of discretion is found, we will not reverse

unless prejudice is shown. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d at 690.

      III. Analysis.

      The State raises three issues on further review. First, the State contends

that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Slaughter had the intent to defraud.

Second, the State asserts that Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation Special
Agent John Bergman’s testimony at trial regarding what constitutes a “wager”
                                         6

was permissible. Finally, the State argues that the evidence was sufficient to

establish Slaughter did not make a “wager.”

      As a threshold matter, we must first address Slaughter’s argument that

regardless of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Slaughter had

an intent to defraud, the charged provision, Iowa Code section 99F.15(4)(h), only

applies “to circumstances where a person claims they won when they did not, or

where they claim they won an amount larger than they actually won,” not to a

circumstance where “winnings legitimately won by one person are passed to be

claimed by another person.” Slaughter argues that such circumstance is

encompassed in Iowa Code section 99F.15(4)(o) (2023), a provision added by a

2022 statutory amendment two years after the incident at issue, which states

one commits a prohibited activity where the person “[k]nowingly or intentionally

passes a winning wager or share to another person or provides fraudulent

identification in order to avoid the application of a setoff as provided in

section 99F.19.” See 2022 Iowa Acts ch. 1143, § 7 (codified at Iowa Code

§ 99F.15(4)(o) (2023)).

      In effect, Slaughter is arguing that her conduct does not amount to the

offense charged in the trial information. Under Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.11(6)(a) (2021), “If it appears from the indictment or information . . .

that the particulars stated do not constitute the offense charged in the

indictment or information . . . the court may and on motion of the defendant

shall dismiss the indictment or information . . . .” Slaughter did not file a motion

to dismiss the trial information; therefore, the district court did not have the

opportunity to review the trial information under rule 2.11(6)(a). Generally, when

reviewing matters, “we will not decide a case based on a ground not raised in the

lower court.” State v. Petersen, 678 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 2004). Thus, we find
                                        7

Slaughter did not properly preserve her argument, and we will not consider this

issue for the first time on appeal.

      A. Intent to Defraud. The State contends that there was sufficient

evidence to prove Slaughter had the “intent to defraud” as required under Iowa

Code section 99F.15(4)(h) (2020). As marshaled to the jury, the State had to

prove the following three elements to convict Slaughter of gambling, false claim

of winnings:

             1. On or about the 29th day of November, 2020, Sydney
      Slaughter or someone Sydney Slaughter aided and abetted,
      conspired with, or entered into a common scheme of design with,
      did claim, collect or take or attempt to claim, collect or take money
      from a gambling game.

            2. Sydney Slaughter or someone Sydney Slaughter aided and
      abetted, conspired with, or entered into a common scheme of design
      with had the specific intent to defraud.

            3. The money was claimed, collected or taken or was
      attempted to be claimed, collected, or taken without Sydney
      Slaughter having made a wager contingent on winning a gambling
      game.

      Slaughter conceded that element one was satisfied. Relevant to this

analysis is element two, which requires Slaughter to have had the specific intent

to defraud. As correctly marshaled to the jury, “specific intent” means “not only
being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it

with a specific purpose in mind.” See State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 247

(Iowa 2018). “Defraud” is not defined in Iowa Code chapter 99F, and we have not

previously defined an “intent to defraud” in the context of the gambling statutes.

If a word is not defined in the statute, “we look to precedent, similar statutes,

dictionaries, and common usage to define the term.” Sanford v. Fillenwarth,

863 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Iowa 2015).
                                         8

        In State v. Hoyman, in the context of the crime of fraudulent practices,
we recognized a distinction between “deceit” and “defraud” and agreed that
“to deceive means to mislead, whereas to defraud means to mislead with the
further purpose of obtaining some gain from the victim of deceit.” 863 N.W.2d
1, 9–10 (Iowa 2015). We found this distinction to be consistent with the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350 (1987), superseded by statute on other grounds, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994),
where the Court explained that “[t]he words ‘to defraud’ commonly refer to
‘wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes, and
usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane,
or overreaching.’ ” Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d at 9 (quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at
358).
        Black’s Law Dictionary defines “defraud” to mean “[t]o cause injury or loss

to (a person or organization) by deceit; to trick (a person or organization) in order

to get money.” Defraud, Black’s Law Dictionary 535 (11th ed. 2019). Similarly,

Merriam-Webster defines “defraud” as “[t]o deprive of something by deception or

fraud.” Defraud, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/defraud

[https://perma.cc/F57H-BEV2]. “Fraud” is an “[i]ntentional perversion of truth in
order to induce another to part with something of value or to surrender a legal

right; [a]n act of deceiving or misrepresenting.” Fraud, Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fraud      [https://perma.cc/6SM9-Y8GF].

Finally, Merriam-Webster defines “deception” as “the act of causing someone to

accept as true or valid what is false or invalid; the act of deceiving.” Deception,

Merriam-Webster,        https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deception

[https://perma.cc/HUF2-WCEJ].

        These definitions are consistent with our holding in Hoyman. Thus, we
hold that “defraud” in the context of Iowa Code section 99F.15(4)(h) means to
                                         9

cause injury or loss of something with value, either to a person or organization,

through deceit or trick, or to bring about some benefit to oneself. Our definition

is consistent with the definition of “defraud” outlined by circuit courts in the

context of different crimes. See United States v. Yates, 16 F.4th 256, 264 (9th Cir.

2021) (holding that in the context of bank fraud, “[a] scheme to defraud ‘must be

one to deceive the bank and deprive it of something of value,’ that is, money or

property” (quoting Shaw v. United States, 580 U.S. 63, 72 (2016))); United States

v. Klopf, 423 F.3d 1228, 1240 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Intent to defraud has often been

defined as ‘the specific intent to deceive or cheat, for the purpose of either

causing some financial loss to another, or bringing about some financial gain to

one’s self.’ ” (quoting United States v. Peden, 556 F.2d 278, 280 (5th Cir.1977)));

United States v. Godwin, 566 F.2d 975, 976 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (“Intent

to deceive and intent to defraud are not synonymous. Deceive is to cause to

believe the false or to mislead. Defraud is to deprive of some right, interest or

property by deceit.”). Therefore, to prove that Slaughter had an intent to defraud,

or aided and abetted McNeese who had an intent to defraud, it must be shown

that either Slaughter or McNeese desired to cause injury or loss of something

with value, either to a person or organization, through deceit or trick, or bring a
benefit to themselves.

      Generally, intent cannot be proved by direct evidence. State v. Crawford,

974 N.W.2d 510, 518 (Iowa 2022). Instead, proof of intent is usually shown

through “circumstantial evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the

circumstances.” Id. An individual’s actions and the surrounding circumstances,

including one’s conduct before and after the alleged crime, are relevant in

determining whether there was substantial evidence to prove specific intent. See

id. at 519. Additionally, we look to whether the defendant actively encouraged,
participated, or assented to the crime. See id.
                                         10

         Here, McNeese and Slaughter arrived at the casino together. Whether they

were affiliated with each other prior to the evening in question, it is clear from

the video footage that they were affiliated with one another that day, as the video

footage showed them hugging and sitting with one another several times

throughout the early morning. When McNeese began using the slot machine,

Slaughter was not by his side. It was not until later that Slaughter joined

McNeese at the slot machine. Once the $4,000 jackpot was won, McNeese moved

to a seat two chairs down from the original machine, and Slaughter quickly took

McNeese’s spot. When asked by casino employees who had won the jackpot,

Slaughter immediately stated she had and provided the employees with her

social security number and signed the slot request form in order to claim the

prize.

         Because she had won a jackpot the prior day and paid the winnings toward

her outstanding financial obligations, Slaughter was aware that any jackpot

winnings may be applied to an offset. While no direct evidence was entered to

show that Slaughter knew McNeese owed an offset or that Slaughter was

specifically intending to defraud McNeese’s creditors, that is not necessary. All

that is necessary is that Slaughter intended to cause an injury or loss of
something with value, either to a person or organization, through deceit or trick,

or aided McNeese in doing so.

         Slaughter argues that had she had the intent to defraud someone or cause

a benefit to herself, she would not have allocated all the winnings to federal taxes.

However, it is important to note that if all the winnings are allocated to federal

taxes, that does not mean the jackpot winner will never receive any of the

winnings. When an individual income tax return is filed at the end of the fiscal

year showing how much money one earned and how much money was paid in
taxes, if one paid more taxes than was owed, one will receive a check from the
                                        11

Internal Revenue Service totaling the amount overpaid. The same concept is true

here. If Slaughter put all the winnings toward federal taxes and paid more taxes

than she owed, she would receive a return with the money she overpaid, thereby

benefiting herself. Similarly, if she had outstanding federal tax obligations and

the winnings were applied to such outstanding obligations, Slaughter would still

receive a benefit from allocating the winnings to her federal taxes.

      The fact that Slaughter intended to deprive someone, whether it was

McNeese, McNeese’s creditors, the casino, or another individual or entity, of the

$4,000 jackpot or was aware of McNeese’s intention to deprive someone of the

jackpot is a reasonable inference that can be fairly drawn from the circumstantial

evidence presented. Otherwise, what was the purpose of Slaughter taking

McNeese’s place and attempting to claim the jackpot? Her demeanor when

claiming the jackpot and the fact that she later retracted her statement upon

finding out it was a crime to falsely claim the jackpot provide further support

that she had an intent to defraud or aided and abetted McNeese, who had an

intent to defraud. A jury could also have reasonably inferred that by attempting

to claim the jackpot, regardless of the fact that she allocated 95% of the winnings

to federal taxes, Slaughter intended to bring about some financial gain to herself.
Therefore, we find the evidence was sufficient to prove Slaughter had an intent

to defraud.

      While it is possible the jury could have come to an alternate conclusion, it

is not within the province of our court “to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to

pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of

explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.” State v.

Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d

758, 761 (Iowa 2006)); Williams, 695 N.W.2d at 28; see also State v. Dohlman,
725 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 2006) (“Evidence is not insubstantial merely because
                                       12

we may draw different conclusions from [the evidence]; the ultimate question is

whether it supports the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would

support a different finding.” (alteration in original) (quoting Fischer v. City of

Sioux City, 695 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Iowa 2005), abrogated on other grounds by

Breese v. City of Burlington, 945 N.W.2d 12 (Iowa 2020))). The jury found

Slaughter had the intent to defraud or aided and abetted McNeese, who had the

intent to defraud, and such verdict is supported by substantial evidence.

      B. Wager. On further review, the State urges that Special Agent Bergman’s

testimony regarding the definition of “wager” was admissible. The State further

contends that the court of appeals incorrectly defined “wager” and that its

proffered definition does not apply in the context of slot machines. Additionally,

the State argues that there was sufficient evidence to prove Slaughter did not

make a wager contingent on winning a gambling game as required under Iowa

Code section 99F.15(4)(h).

      1. Special Agent Bergman’s testimony. The State contends that the court

of appeals erred in finding that Special Agent Bergman’s testimony about what

constitutes a “wager” was inadmissible. The court of appeals took no issue with

Special Agent Bergman discussing his prior work experience with the gaming
bureau and the relevant investigation; however, it held that “his definition of

wager fell outside the scope of admissible testimony by providing an opinion on

a legal standard essential to the charged offense.” We disagree.

      Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.702 (2021), expert opinion testimony is

permissible “if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

issue.” We generally favor a “liberal view on the admissibility of expert

testimony.” Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Sols., LLC, 897 N.W.2d 553, 600
(Iowa 2017) (quoting Ranes v. Adams Lab’ys, Inc., 778 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Iowa
                                        13

2010)). It is within a trial court’s discretion as to whether “a witness may testify

as an expert with reference to a particular topic.” Heinz v. Heinz, 653 N.W.2d

334, 341 (Iowa 2002). An expert is not permitted to testify about “whether a

particular legal standard has been satisfied or to ‘the defendant’s guilt or

innocence.’ ” State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 153–54 (Iowa 2015) (quoting

State v. Smith, 522 N.W.2d 591, 593–94 (Iowa 1994)). However, “[a]n opinion is

not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Iowa R. Evid.

5.704.

      The issue here is whether Special Agent Bergman was permitted to testify

as to the definition of “wager.” At trial, the prosecution asked Special Agent

Bergman, “When is a wager actually placed?” In response, Special Agent

Bergman testified:

      A wager is placed -- in the context of a slot machine, the wager is
      placed when the machine is caused to go into its, for lack of a better
      term, I’ll say spin. So it could be when a button is pushed to cause
      that machine to play, or maybe in the case of a machine with a
      handle that’s pulled, it would be when the handle is deployed. It’s
      not when the credits are inserted into the machine. It’s when the
      button is actually pushed.

      Slaughter objected to his testimony, stating that it called for Special Agent

Bergman to draw a legal conclusion, which is for the jury to decide, not Special

Agent Bergman. On cross-examination, Slaughter inquired about the basis of

Special Agent Bergman’s testimony, and the following exchange took place:

            Q. Okay. Now, you told us that a wager is placed when the
      credits are deployed; correct?

            A. Fair. Yes.

            Q. And that is your opinion of when a wager is placed?

            A. No, ma’am. There is -- there are case law that specifically
      defines when a wager is -- when a wager has occurred.
                                        14

             Q. Well, you would agree with me, Agent, that it is not your
      job to tell the Jury today what the law they should follow is; is that
      right?

            A. That’s not my job.

             Q. So when you tell them that’s when a wager is placed, you
      are not telling them that is the law they should be following. Is that
      fair to say?

             A. I’m telling them that in my 22 years of experience in my job,
      that’s the definition of when a wager is placed.

In general, experts are not automatically barred from testifying as to the

definitions of certain words. See United States v. Anderson, 446 F.3d 870, 875

(8th Cir. 2006) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Kyle

to describe generalized gambling operations and terminology.”); Atl. Mut. Ins. v.

Comm’r, 111 F.3d 1056, 1060 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The expert testimony here makes

clear that the term “reserve strengthening” as used in section 1023(e)(3)(B) is

subject to more than one interpretation.”), aff’d, 523 U.S. 382 (1998);

Ga. Operators Self-Insurers Fund v. PMA Mgmt. Corp., 143 F. Supp. 3d 1317,

1339 (N.D. Ga.) (“As an experienced and licensed adjusting expert, McCoy helped

define terms, explain relevant concepts, and identify standards of performance.”

(emphasis added)), aff’d, 631 F. App’x 730 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam);
United States v. King, No. 5:10–HC–2009–FL, 2012 WL 4447577, at *31 (E.D.N.C.

Mar. 1, 2012) (“Although the statute does not provide a definition for “serious,”

the testifying experts in this case all interpret it to mean . . . .”), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 5:10–HC–2009–FL, 2012 WL 4447451 (E.D.N.C.

Sept. 25, 2012), aff’d, 539 F. App’x 235 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Ways v.

City of Lincoln, 206 F. Supp. 2d 978, 991 (D. Neb. 2002) (“[E]xpert testimony that

purports to explain the legal meaning of a term is forbidden . . . , but testimony

defining a term of art as it is used within a given field may be allowed.”);
Cacioppo v. Eagle Cnty. Sch. Dist. Re-50J, 92 P.3d 453, 466 (Colo. 2004)
                                         15

(en banc) (“The trial court heard expert testimony concerning the nature and

definition of a so-called ‘phased-in’ tax . . . .”); Wisner v. Vandelay Invs., L.L.C.,

916 N.W.2d 698, 726 (Neb. 2018) (“The definition of a mental disorder provided

by the experts appears to be broader than the standard required by the statute.”);

Hutchins v. Town of Colton, No. 116349, 2004 WL 3425347, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

2004) (“It is important to note that while no statutory definition of ATV ‘areas

and trails’ exists, Respondents’ expert provides an expansive definition therefor

. . . .”); Traxler v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 742, 746 (Tex. 2012)

(“Traxler offered expert testimony regarding the meaning of transmission and

distribution lines.”); Xerox Corp. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 772 N.W.2d 677, 688

(Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he Commission concluded that the words as used in the

statute . . . were not technical words, and therefore rejected Xerox’s argument

that the undisputed industry definitions provided by its experts should apply.”

(emphasis added)).

      The issue with experts providing definitions of words arises when the word

being defined, or the opinion being provided, is couched in legal terms. In such

circumstance, the opinion is excludable if the “terms used by the witness have a

separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the law different from that present
in the vernacular.” In re Det. of Palmer, 691 N.W.2d 413, 420 (Iowa 2005) (quoting

Torres v. County. of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1985)), overruled on

other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016).

However, opinion testimony that uses legal terms may be admissible if the legal

definition and the meaning of the term in common usage are the same or similar.

See id. For example, in In re Detention of Palmer, we held that an expert was

permitted to testify as to whether a pedophile was “likely” to reoffend because

the popular meaning of “likely” was nearly the same as the legal meaning. Id. at
421. However, the expert was not permitted to testify regarding the statutory
                                        16

terms “predatory” and “sexually violent offenses,” as those were terms with

separate and distinct legal meanings. Id.

      Here, Special Agent Bergman provided his opinion on when a “wager” is

placed based on the specialized knowledge he has gained through his twenty-two

years of experience working in the gaming bureau. His opinion was that in the

context of a slot machine, a “wager” occurs when the button is pushed that sends

the machine into play, not when the coin or token is inserted into the machine.

The average layman would understand the term “wager” and would likely

“ascribe to [it] essentially the same meaning intended by the expert witness,”

United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), as simply

putting the coin or token into the machine does not generate the possibility of

winning, only pushing the button begins the game of chance. Additionally, for

the State to succeed in its case, one of the elements it had to prove was that

Slaughter did not place a “wager.” Thus, Special Agent Bergman’s testimony

regarding “wager” was testimony that would aid the jury in determining an

ultimate fact at issue. It was not testimony that opined on the jury’s ultimate

decision: Whether Slaughter had made a wager or not. As a result, Special Agent

Bergman’s testimony regarding the definition of “wager” was admissible. See
Palmer, 691 N.W.2d at 421.

      Slaughter additionally takes issue with Special Agent Bergman’s testimony

that his definition was in accordance with caselaw. While such testimony was

inappropriate and should have been stricken from the record, we only find

reversible error if “the admission of improper evidence affects a party’s

substantial rights.” State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180, 204 (Iowa 2013)

(quoting In re Det. of Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d 690, 708 (Iowa 2013)). We find the trial

court’s error in admitting Special Agent Bergman’s reference to caselaw was
harmless for three reasons.
                                        17

      First, Slaughter offered no rebuttal evidence of her own as to the definition

of “wager” and did not suggest a definition to be included in the jury instructions,

and when asked if she had any objection to the jury instructions that did not

include a definition of “wager,” Slaughter stated she had no objection. See

Mensink v. Am. Grain, 564 N.W.2d 376, 382 (Iowa 1997) (noting that an expert’s

testimony was not inappropriate when it did not go to the jury’s ultimate

decision, the jury was free to disregard the testimony altogether, and the

defendants could have attacked the testimony on cross-examination or through

rebuttal evidence).

      Second, by instructing the jury that they were permitted to disregard

expert testimony, the trial court helped protect against the chance of the jury

misconstruing Special Agent Bergman’s testimony. See id.; see also United States

v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198, 1203–04 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he trial court’s

admonitions to the jury to accord no unusual deference to expert testimony and

to take the court’s instructions as the sole source of applicable law . . . helped

protect against the jury’s misconstruing [the expert’s] statement.”). Further,

Special Agent Bergman later testified that it was not his job to tell the jury what

the law was and that his definition was derived from his work experience.
      Finally, as described in more detail below, there was ample evidence to

show that Slaughter did not make a “wager,” regardless of what definition was

proscribed to the term. See State v. Brotherton, 384 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Iowa 1986)

(en banc) (“Opinion testimony erroneously admitted into evidence is without

prejudice when it is unlikely any juror’s understanding was altered or in any way

affected by the opinion.”). Therefore, we find that Special Agent Bergman’s

testimony regarding the definition of “wager” was permissible, and while the trial

court erred in admitting the testimony that his definition was in accordance with
caselaw, such error was harmless.
                                       18

      2. Whether Slaughter made a wager contingent on winning a gambling

game. Finally, the State contends that there was sufficient evidence to prove

Slaughter did not make “a wager contingent on winning a gambling game” as

required under Iowa Code section 99F.15(4)(h). “Wager” is not defined in Iowa

Code section 99F.15 or Iowa Code chapter 99F. However, regardless of how

“wager” is defined, it is evident that Slaughter did not make a wager.

      McNeese was playing at the slot machine alone before Slaughter joined

him. The claim slips that were entered into evidence show that only one coin (or

credit) was played on the machine that won the jackpot. If only one coin was

played from the time McNeese first began using the machine to when Slaughter

claimed the jackpot, it necessitates a finding that McNeese was the one who

inserted the coin, not Slaughter. Throughout all the times McNeese and

Slaughter were seen together during the morning in question, there was no

indication that Slaughter gave McNeese money or that the coin McNeese put in

the slot machine was Slaughter’s. The video surveillance footage depicts McNeese

playing the slot machine, not Slaughter. Further, Slaughter even admitted to

McNeese being the true winner of the jackpot.

      Simply because the jury could have drawn a different conclusion from the
evidence does not mean the evidence was insufficient. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d

at 430. The question is whether the evidence “supports the finding actually

made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding.” Id. (quoting

Fischer, 695 N.W.2d at 34, abrogated on other grounds by Breese v. City of

Burlington, 945 N.W.2d 12 (Iowa 2020)). Here, the jury found Slaughter did not

make a wager, and such finding is supported by substantial evidence.
                                      19

      IV. Conclusion.

      For these reasons, we affirm Slaughter’s conviction for gambling, false

claim of winnings.

      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN
PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
      Waterman, McDonald, and May, JJ., join this opinion. Mansfield, J., files

an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Oxley and

McDermott, JJ., join.
                                           20

                                                         #22–0892, State v. Slaughter

MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
      I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree there was sufficient evidence

to sustain a conviction. But I vigorously dissent from the majority’s conclusion

that a Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent could testify as an “expert”

on the meaning of the criminal statute at issue. The court of appeals got this

issue right: “Even under our liberal view of expert testimony, Bergman’s opinion

on when a wager is placed did not assist the jury in deciding if Slaughter violated

the statute.” Our legal system does not allow law enforcement officers to tell the

jury how to interpret the controlling law in criminal cases.

      Sydney Slaughter’s primary defense at trial was that the State failed to

prove it wasn’t her money in the machine. As her attorney explained in closing

argument,

      Isn’t it entirely possible and reasonable, Members of the Jury, that
      she might have said, I have this 25 dollars left, but you’re luckier
      than me. You put that into the machine and play it, and if it wins,
      I’ll take it. Imagine a group of friends who go to a casino. They’re
      going to go, and a different friend says, I would love to, but I’m broke.
      I can’t afford it. Another friend says, I’ll -- I’ll spot ya. I’ll give you 50
      dollars. You can play. Well, if that friend wins thousands of dollars,
      who gets to keep that money? Is it not reasonable that the first friend
      might say, no, that’s mine. I gave you that money.

             It’s not our burden to prove to you, Members of the Jury, that
      that is what happened. It was the State’s burden to prove to you that
      it wasn’t, to prove that she had the specific intent to defraud, but
      you’ve heard no testimony about that. You’ve seen no evidence
      showing you whose money was placed into that machine, and
      because the State has simply provided you with a story, they have
      failed to meet their burden when it comes to showing that
      Ms. Slaughter had the specific intent to defraud.

             ....

            So Members of the Jury, is it reasonable to think
      that Ms. Slaughter could have believed she made a wager if it was
                                       21

      her money placed into that machine? If her money was placed into
      that machine and she thought, if this wins, that’s my money. I made
      that wager. I paid for that game. Well, then she has made a wager
      contingent on winning, and the State has not met their burden.

            As we discussed, you didn’t hear any evidence to tell you
      whose money was in there, so maybe it was Ms. Slaughter’s, maybe
      it wasn’t.

      My hunch is that this defense wouldn’t have carried the day anyway, but

Slaughter was entitled to assert it. Unfortunately, this defense was directly

undermined by Agent Bergman’s improper testimony, admitted over objection,

that the wager is placed “when the handle is deployed,” and “not when the credits

are inserted into the machine.” As Agent Bergman later admitted, his basis for

reaching this conclusion was purported “caselaw.” Such caselaw turns out to

have been nonexistent. The admission of this improper testimony was prejudicial

and necessitates a new trial.

      In theory, the judge is the sole authority on the law and its
      interpretation. This simple proposition is so basic to the common
      law system that it scarcely needs repeating. The corollary of this
      truism is that an expert witness may not give an opinion to the court
      or the jury on an issue of law.

Maury R. Olicker, The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony: Time to Take
the Final Leap?, 42 U. Mia. L. Rev. 831, 862 (1988). Of course, an opinion is not

objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue. See Iowa R. Evid.

5.704. In other words, opinions can be offered on factual matters that happen to

be ultimate issues. See State v. Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154, 155–56 (Iowa 1990)

(explaining that a police officer may opine on a defendant’s sobriety because Iowa

Rule of Evidence 704 allows opinions on an “ultimate fact issue”).

      But as the advisory committee note to Federal Rule of Evidence 704 makes

clear, other rules of evidence “exclude opinions phrased in terms of inadequately
explored legal criteria.” Thus: “Rule 702 prohibits expert witnesses from
                                          22

testifying to legal conclusions. An expert offers a legal conclusion when he

defines the governing legal standard or applies the standard to the facts of the

case.” United States v. Melcher, 672 F. App’x 547, 552 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation

omitted); see also United States v. Mosby, 626 F. Supp. 3d 847, 861 (D. Md.

2022) (“The Fourth Circuit has long reasoned that expert testimony as to the

proper interpretation of applicable domestic law is inadmissible.”); David H. Kaye

et al., The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence § 2.3.1, at 71

(3d ed. 2021) (“Opinions of experts as to the meaning of words in statutes or

other sources of domestic law typically are inadmissible.”); Benjamin J. Vernia,

Annotation, Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Questions of Domestic

Law, 66 A.L.R.5th 135 (1999) (“Although the modern view of expert testimony

suggests that it should be available to elucidate a wide variety of questions,

courts traditionally have restricted the use of expert testimony to factual, as

opposed to legal, questions.”).

      Until today, we have consistently followed that approach here in Iowa. See

In re Det. of Palmer, 691 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Iowa 2005) (“[A] witness cannot opine

on a legal conclusion or whether the facts of the case meet a given legal

standard.”), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d
699 (Iowa 2016); Terrell v. Reinecker, 482 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1992) (en banc)

(holding it was reversible error to allow an investigating police officer to testify to

the legal conclusion that plaintiff “failed to yield the right-of-way”).

      Legal interpretation under the guise of expert testimony is bad enough.

Worse yet when the purported expert is a DCI agent—not a specialist on gaming

law or even an attorney. I accept that Agent Bergman has spent a lot of time in

casinos. But so have thousands of Iowans whom we wouldn’t allow to offer legal

opinions on gaming law. And at least those other individuals, if they had testified,
wouldn’t have the same aura or mystique for the jury.
                                        23

      The majority struggles to defend a ruling that, in my view, is not defensible.

First, the majority string-cites irrelevant cases. Some of the cases are

unpublished, only one of the cases is criminal, and none involves the testimony

of a law enforcement officer as a purported legal expert.

      Next, the majority contends that there was no harm, no foul because the

average layperson would probably agree with Agent Bergman’s testimony. I

question that assertion: it seems plausible that the wager can be placed by the

person who pays for it. A leading dictionary defines “wager” as: “to make a bet,”

“to risk or venture on a final outcome,” and “to lay as a gamble.” Wager, Merriam-

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1405 (11th ed. 2003). Another defines the term

as: “Money or other consideration risked on an uncertain event; a bet or gamble,”

and “A promise to pay money or other consideration on the occurrence of an

uncertain event.” Wager, Black’s Law Dictionary 1893 (11th ed. 2019). These

definitions could certainly embrace paying someone else to operate the gaming

machine on your behalf.

      The majority also maintains that Agent Bergman’s testimony didn’t go to

the ultimate issue of “[w]hether Slaughter had made a wager or not.” This is

splitting hairs. Agent Bergman testified that the wager was placed when the
button was pushed rather than when the credit was inserted, and Slaughter’s

main defense was that there was no proof it wasn’t her credit. So Agent

Bergman’s testimony went to the ultimate issue, even if it didn’t mention

Slaughter by name. Regardless, the majority is confused about the governing

standard. Just as testifying on an ultimate issue isn’t necessarily a no-no,

testifying on a subsidiary issue isn’t necessarily a yes-yes. The relevant question

is whether the expert was offering an opinion on an issue of law.

      The majority further criticizes Slaughter for not introducing rebuttal
evidence of her own as to the definition of “wager.” The criticism is unfair to the
                                        24

criminal defendant. Slaughter had no prior notice of Agent Bergman’s expert

opinion from the minutes, and even if she had, what would be the point of

presenting someone else’s inadmissible opinion on the law to counter the

inadmissible opinion of a law enforcement agent? Our error preservation rules

do not require criminal defendants to try to minimize the effects of inadmissible

prosecution evidence by trying to scrape up inadmissible evidence of their own.

      Lastly, the majority cites to the stock jury instruction that jurors should

treat the testimony of experts like that of other witnesses. Of course, if that

instruction were a panacea, then error could never be predicated on the improper

admission of expert testimony. That instruction is routinely given, and yet we

reverse cases when expert testimony has been improperly admitted. See, e.g.,

State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 167 (Iowa 2015).

      The majority disregards the relevant legal authority from Iowa and other

jurisdictions. For example, in State v. Breitbach, the defendant was charged with

the crime of escape. 488 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa 1992). We explained that it was

improper for two officers to have testified that the defendant was “in custody”

prior to his absconding. Id. at 447–48. As we put it, “Since ‘custody’ is a standard

fixed by law and a matter upon which the jury will ultimately have to draw its
own conclusion, conclusory expert testimony on this matter is not admissible.”

Id. at 448. Breitbach is directly on point and directly contrary to the majority’s

reasoning. See also State v. Droste, 232 N.W.2d 483, 488 (Iowa 1975) (“When a

standard . . . has been fixed by law, no witness . . . is permitted to express an

opinion as to whether or not the person or the conduct, in question, measures

up to that standard.”).

      Other courts have prohibited testifying police officers from defining legal

terms. A California case is illustrative. In People v. Torres, the defendant was
found guilty of murder charges. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 106 (Ct. App. 1995). The
                                          25

trial revolved around various gang-related issues. Id. An officer from the Los

Angeles Police Department’s gang unit was permitted to define “extortion” and

“robbery” while testifying. Id. at 107. The defendant appealed, arguing that “a

witness’s opinion about the meaning of a statute is an improper subject of expert

opinion and, therefore, it was improper for [the officer] to define the offenses . . .

for the jury.” Id.

      The California Court of Appeal agreed that the testimony was improper.

Id. It relied on caselaw that “held the definition of a statutory term is a matter of

law on which the court should instruct the jury; it is not a subject for opinion

testimony.” Id. Further, it stated that “[i]t is the court and not the witness which

must declare what the law is, it not being within the province of a witness, for

example, to testify as to what constitutes [various crimes].” Id. at 108 (quoting

People v. Clay, 38 Cal. Rptr. 431, 437 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964)). It noted that such

evidence is inadmissible because it would “leav[e] the definition of statutory

terms to be proved or disproved in every case” and harm the administration of

justice. Id. Additionally, “it is the duty of the trial judge to instruct the jurors on

the general principles of law pertinent to the case.” Id.; see also State v. Yip, 987

P.2d 996, 1007 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that law enforcement officer’s
testimony that the defendant was not engaged in social gambling “may have

improperly conveyed his ‘unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards

to the jury,’ and thus may have amounted to a ‘usurpation of the court’s

responsibility to determine the applicable law and to instruct the jury as to that

law’ ” but that any error was harmless because the defendant was not entitled

to the defense as a matter of law (quoting Create 21 Chuo, Inc. v. Sw. Slopes, Inc.,

918 P.2d 1168, 1178 n.4 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996))); State v. Merchant, 827 N.W.2d

473, 481 (Neb. 2013) (holding that a government official’s “testimony interpreting
the statutes was not relevant and was unfairly prejudicial”); Cotton v. State, 810
                                        26

N.W.2d 132, 138 (Neb. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that “[t]he district court did

not err when it excluded [trooper’s opinions] regarding the meaning of

‘apprehend’ as used in [a Nebraska statute]”).

      When testimony is improperly admitted, we must determine if the

evidentiary error was harmless. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.103 (“A party may claim error

in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial

right of the party . . . .”). I believe it was not. There was no jury instruction

defining “wager.” Thus, the only “evidence” filling in this gap was Agent

Bergman’s improper testimony. As I’ve already discussed, a jury could have

accepted the notion that S is making the wager if they provide the credit to the

machine even though M pushes the button, especially when the two of them are

a couple. Indeed, the Iowa Lottery has a page on their website devoted to “group

play”—where the prize belongs to a group rather than the specific individual who

bought the winning ticket. See Player Security: Some Reminders About Group

Lottery   Play,   Iowa   Lottery,   https://ialottery.com/Pages/PlayerSecurity/

GroupPlayReminders.aspx [https://perma.cc/4JN9-BJ4Q].

      Slaughter and Anthony McNeese were indisputably together that night at

the casino. Yet there was no evidence as to which of them was responsible for
funding the machine on which the jackpot was won. Slaughter initially claimed

the jackpot for herself. When confronted by the shift supervisor who asked,

“[W]ere you the one that had hit the button?” and who also told Slaughter it was

“against the law to claim somebody else’s jackpot,” Slaughter backed down. That

is, Slaughter said, “[N]o, it was actually Anthony that had hit it; that she was

claiming it for him.” But none of this amounts to an admission that the money

wasn’t hers.
                                        27

        For the foregoing reasons, I would find the evidence sufficient to sustain

Slaughter’s conviction, but I would reverse and remand for a new trial because

of the error in the admission of Agent Bergman’s legal opinion.

        Oxley and McDermott, JJ., join this concurrence in part and dissent in

part.