Court Opinion

ID: 9578358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:44:29.560992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:43.126351
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. Mrs. Betty Conway sued Signal Oil & Gas Company for libel. Defendant answered, took the plaintiff’s depositions, and then filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the majority opinion of this court reverses.
Where defendant moves for summary judgment, the burden is on movant to pierce the material allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, and each essential allegation of said complaint stands as an established fact where not pierced by defendant. His mere denial by answer will not suffice. Watkins v. Nationwide &c. Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 801 (149 SE2d 749); Saunders v. Vikers, 116 Ga. App. 733 (2) (158 SE2d 324); Ga. Power Co. v. Reighard, 121 Ga. App. 737 (175 SE2d 77); Werbin & Tenenbaum, Inc. v. Heard, 121 Ga. App. 147 (2) (173 SE2d 114). Of course, the rule is well known that all matters, conclusions and inferences must be construed most favorably towards the party opposing the grant of said motion. Rader v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 328, 329 (181 SE2d 83); Candler General Hospital v. Purvis, 123 Ga. App. 334 (1) (181 SE2d 77).
*719A fair statement of the posture of this case, as it was presented to the trial judge, is as follows:
Signal Oil Company wrote to the employer of Mrs. Betty Conway, advising that she owed $210.22 as a balance on a gasoline account, because of her use of a gasoline credit card; and stated that it had sent her numerous letters and statements but without results. Her employer was requested to assist Signal Oil and to interview Mrs. Conway to learn why she had not paid the account. The contents of the letter were completely false, and Signal Oil knew they were false. It wrote the letter with the design and intent to interfere with her employment, and her employment was thereby interfered with. Signal Oil’s purpose was to intimidate Mrs. Conway and to deliberately defame her character and reputation and subject her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Signal Oil knew when it wrote the letter that it would adversely affect plaintiff’s economic position with her employer; and would be placed in her file; and adversely affect the business and personal relationship between Mrs. Conway and her employer. The deliberately false letter had an adverse effect on plaintiff in that it wounded her feelings; disturbed her happiness greatly; was detrimental to her mental and physical health; affected her economic position with her employer; unlawfully invaded and intruded into the realm of plaintiff’s employment; and caused her to lose the prestige of unblemished character she formerly enjoyed in her relation with her employer and co-employees.
If the majority opinion is correct; if indeed plaintiff is completely without remedy for such a flagrant and unwarranted violation of her rights, it is a great pity, and our laws are greatly in need of revision. The Georgia Code provides that "for every right there shall be a remedy.” Code § 3-105. What is Mrs. Conway’s remedy here? Surely the law of Georgia will not sanction the defendant’s conduct in seeking to intimidate this woman by falsely accusing her of owing money (which she did not owe) and failing to pay attention to the many statements and requests for payment (which had not even been sent to her) and in effect telling *720her employer that she was a dead-beat, for the purpose of extorting money from her and thus unjustly enriching the defendant corporation at her expense! Formerly the blackmail statute (Code § 26-1801) would seem to fit this kind of conduct, but it was repealed in 1968 and § 26-1804 was enacted in lieu thereof. But would criminal prosecution of defendant restore Mrs. Conway to her position before she was damaged? We do not see how it could, and yet she is entitled to a remedy. The majority opinion closes the doors in her face on the civil side of the court.
The majority opinion cites various opinions and authorities, which we maintain are not controlling. First of all, let it be observed that in many of these opinions, the authors have treated libel and slander as interchangeable terms, and have tried to fit the definitions of each to the other. But the two are vastly different. Of course, libel must be in writing, while slander is oral or by word of mouth. But slander is- much more restricted than libel, and a recovery for slander may be had only if one is falsely charged with a crime; or with having a contagious disorder; or committing a base act which would exclude him from society; or charges made as to his trade, office or profession calculated to injure him therein; or disparaging words productive of special damage. Code § 105-702.
But libel is much more comprehensive and all-inclusive. Recovery for libel may be had for any false written charge against another which tends to injure his reputation, and exposes him to public hatred, or contempt, or ridicule. Code § 105-701. The word "public” means any member of the public, other than the plaintiff; and a letter written to another person meets the definition of "public.” See Nelson v. Wainwright, 223 Ga. 429 (3) (156 SE2d 82).
Despite the clear distinction between libel and slander, many of the cases on libel reach over into the slander statute and attempt to measure libel by such statute, such as whether the article makes a charge as to one’s "trade, office or profession, calculated to injure him therein,” which words are peculiarly and solely applicable to the statute on *721slander. See Davis v. General Finance &c. Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708 (1) (57 SE2d 225). We repeat that slander and libel should not be confused or mixed together.
The majority opinion in the case sub judice falls into this error. In Division 1 it is stated that libel per se was not committed because those elements peculiar to the slander statute are not present.
The cases cited by the majority opinion must give way to and are controlled by certain earlier full-bench decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia, which have not been overruled, to wit: White v. Parks, 93 Ga. 633 (20 SE 78) and Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pritchett, 108 Ga. 411, 415 (34 SE 216). These cases are controlling in the case sub judice.
Under the rule of stare decisis we are bound by these earlier cases. Croker v. Smith, 225 Ga. 529 (169 SE2d 787); McCurry v. McCurry, 223 Ga. 334 (155 SE2d 378); Fidelity-Phenix Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 123 Ga. App. 108 (179 SE2d 525).
The majority opinion argues (p. 716) that it was a "reasonable inference” that Mrs. Conway had purchased gasoline on her husband’s credit card or she had assumed payment of the account. But a wife is not liable for her husband’s debt and Signal Oil has no right to assume she would become liable therefor unless she had notified it to that effect. The majority argues that "having received prior payments from her, the company might 'reasonably expect’ to receive further payments from her”—but that is not what Signal Oil told her employer; it falsely told the employer that Mrs. Conway owed it; falsely told that she had been notified about the account and paid no attention to its many demands.
The majority argues that it was "wholly reasonable” that the company make inquiry to the employer of the party from whom it had been receiving payment. Being "wholly reasonable” is not equivalent to piercing the allegations of a complaint in a motion for summary judgment by a defendant; further the company did not content itself with making inquiry; it communicated a falsehood to the effect that she owed the money and refused to pay or give any *722attention to its many demands (all of which was false).
The majority opinion seeks to distinguish White v. Parks, 93 Ga. 633, supra, by saying it is more like Southeast Bankcard v. Woodruff, 124 Ga. App. 478 (184 SE2d 191). Not so. These two cases cannot be equated with each other. The majority opinion does not comment upon the controlling case of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pritchett, 108 Ga. 411, 415, supra, which is a full-bench six judge decision.
The majority opinion argues that Mrs. Conway has not pleaded any special damages, but that is erroneous. She has pleaded that her employment was interfered with; her economic position with her employer was adversely affected; her business and personal relationship with her employer and fellow employees was adversely affected; that her mental and physical health were damaged; that she lost the prestige of unblemished character she formerly had with her employer and co-employees; that the letter wounded her feelings; disturbed her happiness; that the letter was placed in her file. Further, in her depositions she testified she had received a demotion in employment. She was not required to plead out-of-pocket expenses in order to plead special damage.
I, therefore, dissent and would affirm the trial court in overruling the motion for summary judgment.
I am authorized to state that Judges Pannell and Deen join in this dissent.