Court Opinion

ID: 9482839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:02:24.837085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:14.601304
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the court. The court’s reading of Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) is compatible with our earlier decisions in somewhat analogous contexts. See United States v. Anderson, 896 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 841, 110 S.Ct. 126, 107 L.Ed.2d 87 (1989). It is also in accord with the weight of authority in the other circuits. See United States v. Wood, 958 F.2d 963, 969-71 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Miller, 952 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Porter, 807 F.2d 21, 23-24 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048, 107 S.Ct. 2178, 95 L.Ed.2d 835 (1987).
It must be admitted, however, that our result today does not follow inexorably from Richardson. As Judge Baldock’s thoughtful opinion in Wood notes,
Richardson’s, broad language suggests that an event which terminates jeopardy is a condition precedent to a defendant’s assertion of a double jeopardy claim. However, Richardson gives us little guidance on what events, other than an acquittal, terminate jeopardy.
Wood, 958 F.2d at 969. Indeed, as our colleague from the Tenth Circuit’s opinion amply demonstrates, the present state of double jeopardy jurisprudence is hardly a seamless garment. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth with some elaboration in Wood, I must conclude that, given the available signposts in the case law, the result we reach here is consistent with Richardson.