Court Opinion

ID: 9756852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:04:12.614682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:32.221897
License: Public Domain

KLEIN, J.,
Dissenting:
¶ 11 respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 Although the majority correctly recognizes that a transfer to a minor within the Pennsylvania Uniform Transfer to Minors Act10 (“PUTMA”)11 is irrevocable, the majority concludes that evidence showing that assets were deposited into a PUT-MA account conclusively establishes that a *743“transfer” -within the meaning of the Act has been made. However, that view ignores the question of whether a transfer was ever intended and diverges from other states’ interpretation of the uniform act. I therefore must disagree.
¶ 3 The “transfer” the PUTMA refers to is essentially a gift.12 Section 5301 conclu-sorily defines a “transfer” as “a transaction that creates custodial property under section 5309 (relating to manner of creating custodial property and effecting transfer).” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301. Section 5309 in turn sets forth methods of denominating property as being held in custody for a minor. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5309.
¶4 Rather than setting forth all that needs to be shown to establish that a minor was given assets as a gift, section 5309 merely regulates the delivery of the gift when it is placed in a custodial account. Pennsylvania common law has long held that the irreducible elements of an inter vivos gift are intent plus delivery. See Hera v. McCormick, 425 Pa.Super. 432, 625 A.2d 682, 686 (1993); In re Chappie’s Estate, 332 Pa. 168, 2 A.2d 719, 720 (1938); Reese v. Philadelphia Trust, Safe Deposit & Ins. Co., 218 Pa. 150, 67 A. 124, 126 (1907); Lyon v. Marclay, 1 Watts 271, 1832 WL 3063, at *3 (Pa.1832). Under the common law, once the putative donee establishes prima facie that he or she received an inter vivos gift, the burden shifts to the putative donor to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was not an inter vivos gift. See Lanning v. West, 803 A.2d 753, 765 (Pa.Super.2002); see also Lochinger v. Hanlon, 348 Pa. 29, 33 A.2d 1, 3-4 (1943).
¶ 5 I cannot agree that the General Assembly intended to create a sort of strict liability and eliminate the common law requirement that the transferor must have actually intended to give a gift. Admittedly, the maxim that “statutes in derogation of the common law are to be narrowly construed” does not, strictly speaking, apply here because the Statutory Construction Act only applies it to statutes that came into force before 1937. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(a); see also Commonwealth v. Chiappini, 566 Pa. 507, 782 A.2d 490, 492 (2001).
¶ 6 But the Statutory Construction Act does not end there. It continues on to say that “[a]ll other provisions of a statute shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice.” 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1928(c).
¶ 7 Eliminating the intent requirement for a PUTMA transfer is patently unfair. This is so because no one would expect that if one did not intend to give something to another, the holder would get to keep the property.13 Perhaps even more so than in other areas of the law, it is imperative that the law of property generally follow average individuals’ reasonable expectations. Otherwise, the law loses its mooring in social realities and, in direct proportion, its authority.
¶ 8 Moreover, decisional law interpreting the PUTMA retains both the common law requirement of intent and even employs a similar burden-shifting analysis. Although I have found no Pennsylvania case controlling this issue,14 other states uniformly hold that evidence of a transfer into a custodial account simply raises a rebutta-*744ble presumption that a transfer was intended.15 Of course, the usual rules of controlling precedent do not command us to follow other states’ lead. However, when dealing with a uniform law, the Statutory Construction Act does. In that Act, to keep uniform laws uniform throughout the states, the General Assembly has instructed us to interpret Pennsylvania’s uniform laws in step with other states’ like enactments:
Construction of uniform laws. Statutes uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted and construed to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact them.
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1927; see also Burke v. Valley Lines, Inc., 421 Pa.Super. 362, 617 A.2d 1335, 1338 n. 1 (1992); Centennial Station Condo. Ass’n v. Schaefer, 800 A.2d 379, 384 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (“Uniform statutes are to be interpreted and construed to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of the states that enact them”).16
¶ 9 For example, New York courts have repeatedly held that documentary evidence *745of a transfer following UGMA17 procedures raises only a rebuttable presumption that a transfer was intended. Most recently, in Estate of Ajamian, 270 A.D.2d 724, 705 N.Y.S.2d 704 (N.Y.App.Div.2000), the decedent father had established UGMA accounts in his children’s names in the early 1980s. Over the years he transferred funds between the UGMA accounts, and in the two years before he died, he transferred all of the funds in the UGMA accounts into his own accounts. The court explained:
As with any irrevocable inter vivos transfer, a gift made under the UGMA will be found valid where there is evidence of delivery and donative intent. Here, there is no dispute that the funds decedent used to establish the UGMA accounts were delivered, as the forms executed by decedent to open each account followed the procedures required in the statute. Moreover, such properly established UGMA accounts constitute prima facie evidence that a gift was intended. This prima facie showing was subject to rebuttal by extrinsic proof that the donor did not possess the requisite intent at the initial establishment of the UGMA accounts because the essential element of donative intent refers to the grantor’s initial intent at the time of the conveyance.
Id. at 707-08 (quotation and citations omitted). The Appellate Division ultimately held that in that case the rebuttal evidence was insufficient because the evidence only showed the decedent’s attitude toward the accounts after he established them, not when he created them. Id.; see also Gordon v. Gordon, 70 A.D.2d 86, 419 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688-89 (N.Y.App.Div.1979) (stating re-buttable presumption but holding concluso-ry allegations in affidavit insufficient to overcome presumption), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 773, 436 N.Y.S.2d 621, 417 N.E.2d 1009 (1980). A number other states have interpreted their UGMA statutes similarly. See, e.g., Gulmen v. Culmen, 913 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Mo.App.1995); Heath v. Heath, 143 Ill.App.3d 390, 97 Ill. Dec. 615, 493 N.E.2d 97 (1986); Golden v. Golden, 434 So.2d 978, 979 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 128 Cal.App.3d 273, 180 Cal.Rptr. 234 (1982).
¶ 10 Ohio and Indiana decisions confirm that we should properly apply this principle under the PUTMA. In State v. Keith, 81 Ohio App.3d 192, 610 N.E.2d 1017 (1991), the question of whether a gift had been made arose in the context of a criminal forfeiture action. The defendant had pled guilty to criminal charges, and as part of the plea, agreed to forfeit certain property under Ohio’s anti-racketeering statute. The property she agreed to forfeit included a PUTMA account she held as *746custodian for her daughter. The daughter petitioned to determine the validity of the forfeiture arguing that the money was a gift and did not originate in her mother’s criminal activities. The trial court denied the petition, holding that her mother had not complied with the Ohio Transfers to Minors Act.18 610 N.E.2d at 1018.
¶ 11 The Court of Appeals affirmed. Citing Gordon, Jacobs, Heath, and Golden, the court adopted the rule expressed in those cases, and applied it to the Ohio Transfers to Minors Act:
All the case law we have found agrees that under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (predecessor to the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act) there must in fact be a gift. Without donative intent, no gift has been made.
The opening of a bank account pursuant to this Act is prima facie evidence of donative intent. Extrinsic evidence may be introduced to demonstrate contrary intent.
Id. at 1019 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that the mother had lacked dona-tive intent, citing the mother’s withdrawal of $20,000 from the account for personal use. “By treating the money as her own, Keith’s claim of a gift to [her daughter] was drawn into serious doubt.” Id.19
¶ 12 In In re Hendricks, 681 N.E.2d 777 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), the Indiana Court of Appeals also had no trouble applying the presumption and burden-shifting analysis under UTMA. In an appeal from an equitable distribution decree, the wife had used joint marital funds to purchase stocks through an account on which she was named as custodian for the couple’s minor child. She later sold the stock and deposited the proceeds into an account she held jointly with her husband. She testified that the money was intended for educational purposes and she had used the UTMA account to avoid tax consequences. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that the evidence did not rebut the presumption that she intended a gift. The court looked to cases decided under the UGMA because “[t]he UTMA validates all transfers made under its predecessor, the UGMA, and applies to those transfers except to the extent that its application would impair vested rights.” Id. at 780 n. 1. The court ultimately agreed that evidence that the wife intended to use the money for the child’s education did not indicate a lack of donative intent. Indiana’s UTMA, like Pennsylvania’s, allows the parent to use the UTMA assets to benefit the child, and that a parent used such a scheme to avoid taxes said little about whether a gift was actually intended. Id., 681 N.E.2d at 782; compare Ind.Code § 30-2-8.5-29 with 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5314.
¶ 13 Applying the rebuttable presumption to the case before us, I would affirm. The trial court found that Father never intended to give the money to his daughter,20 which is amply supported by evi*747dence in the record. At best, he considered himself a joint owner with his daughter. Shortly after creating the account, he began withdrawing funds, and could not afford to part with such a large sum of money. The trial court further found as a matter of credibility that the Father’s actions were simply the result of ignorance, not an expression of bad faith. He largely used the account as a tax-avoidance maneuver. Because the evidence supports the conclusion that Father lacked donative intent at the time he created the account, rather than discounting the importance of that finding, I would affirm.

. 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301-5320.

. In 1992, the General Assembly repealed the Pennsylvania Uniform Gifts to Minors Act ("PUGMA”) and adopted the revised uniform act, now called the Pennsylvania Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. See Act 1992, Dec. 16, P.L. 1163, No. 152, § 10 (repealer); see also 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301 (West Supp.2002) (short title and definitions). The revisions were effective immediately. Barring limited exceptions, the repealing act provided that transfers made under the repealed act would be governed by the new act. See Act 1992, Dec. 16, P.L. 1163, No 152, § 26(c). Under this provision, regardless of when the transfer was made, we apply the current act, the PUT-MA.

.When the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act ("the UTMA”) was proposed, "gift” was changed to "transfer” in both the name and terminology of the statute to avoid confusion with the prior uniform law and to reflect the broader permissible sources of assets. Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, Prefatory Note, 8C U.L.A. at 3 (2001).

. This notion is reflected in both the tort of conversion and the crime of theft.

. The majority points out that we have previously stated, “Assets transferred to a child by *744a parent pursuant to the Pennsylvania Uniform Gift to Minors Act belong to the child as a result of a completed gift.” Perlberger v. Perlberger, 426 Pa.Super. 245, 626 A.2d 1186, 1201 (1993) (Cirillo, J.) (emphasis added). The majority says it is citing Perlberger's observation “for relevance, not precedence” apparently because the former act was repealed. (Majority Opinion at 738, n.5.) As I explain below, see infra n.6, I would reapply interpretations of the UGMA on this issue to the UTMA because the changes do not affect the general scheme for making a custodial transfer and the PUTMA specifically validates all PUGMA transfers unless vested rights are affected. In any case, Judge Cirillo’s observation was dictum, as we were deciding whether a custodial parent could use the child’s PUGMA account assets to support the child. We decided the parent could, citing a specific PUGMA provision to that effect. 626 A.2d at 1200. Despite its claim that it was looking to Perlberger for guidance, however, the majority ignores our plain understanding in that case that the donor must have intended and delivered a gift (now termed a transfer) for PUG-MA (now PUTMA) to apply at all. Nor do I view Sutliff v. Sutliff, 515 Pa. 393, 528 A.2d 1318, 1323 (1987) as governing this issue. There, our Supreme Court was concerned with whether PUGMA assets "may be used to fulfill a parent's support obligation.” 528 A.2d at 1320. That is separate from determining whether complying with the formalities of the PUGMA or the PUTMA conclusively establishes that the assets were a gift.

. The majority observes that although sister states’ interpretations serve as persuasive authority, they do not bind us, and cites to that effect our decision in Commercial National Bank v. Seubert & Asocs., 807 A.2d 297, 303 (Pa.Super.2002). See Majority Opinion, at 742, n.9. But a fuller examination of that case belies the majority’s reliance on it. There, we were interpreting a section of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Because no Pennsylvania case decided the issue, we turned to other states’ decisions. In so doing, Judge Johnson, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, quoted our Supreme Court: "While it is a truism that decisions of sister states are not binding precedent on this Court, they may be persuasive authority, and are entitled to even greater deference where consistency and uniformity of application are essential elements of a comprehensive statutory scheme like that contemplated by the [UCC].” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Cent. Pa., 469 Pa. 188, 364 A.2d 1331, 1335 (1976)). After reviewing the decisions of the Bankruptcy Court in Massachusetts, applying Massachusetts law, as well as those of the New Jersey Superior Court and the Bankruptcy Courts for the Western District of Pennsylvania and for the District of Maine, we ultimately followed those other courts’ views. Seubert, 807 A.2d at 304. Rather than supporting the majority’s position, because we in fact embraced other courts’ interpretation, Seubert endorses following sister states’ interpretations of uniform laws.

. After recounting how the states adopted revisions to the UGMA piecemeal, the drafters of the UTMA had this to say about uniformity: "Uniformity in this area is important for the *745[National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws] has cited UGMA as an example of an act designed to avoid conflicts of law when the law of more than one state may apply to a transaction or a series of transactions.” UTMA Prefatory Note.

. Although the Appellate Division was interpreting the prior act, I would do as other states have done and interpret this aspect of the PUTMA the same as the PUGMA. I reach this result because the differences between the two acts do not affect the analysis of whether a transfer, as defined by the act, occurred at all. PUTMA’s revisions generally centered on resolving estate tax issues and removing limitations on the types of property that may be held in a custodial account. See Richard L. Stockton, 1 Est. & Pers. Fin. Plan. § 8:47 (2002); see also UTMA, Prefatory Note; id., § 11, Comment. In addition, nothing in the PUTMA’s revisions negates the conclusion that no transfer occurs unless the transferor intended it. Moreover, the act repealing the PUGMA specifically validates transfers under PUGMA procedures, unless vested rights are harmed or the custodianship extended, and enforces them under the PUT-MA. See Act 1992, Dec. 16, P.L. 1163, No. 152, § 26(c).

. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 1339.31-1339.39.

. Because it affirmed on the intent issue, the Court of Appeals did not reach the propriety of trial court’s holding that Keith had not complied with UTMA's formal requirements. Keith, 610 N.E.2d at 1019. The court also rejected the daughter's contention that the property was not statutorily subject to forfeiture because Keith had agreed to forfeiture as part of a plea bargain and because the daughter had no legal interest in the account. Id.

.The majority opinion states that "Father testified that the balance of the PUGMA account of $5,667.05 in March of 1997 was intended to be gifted to his daughter. N.T., 8/20/01, at 42-44." I cannot locate testimony to that effect. At most I find Father stating that he opened the account because he loved his daughter and wanted to put money in it for her. N.T., 8/20/01, at 42. The majority seems to be drawing an inference from the actual testimony at those pages. Since the *747trial court did not draw the inference, we cannot either.