Court Opinion

ID: 9797658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:26:55.774864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:44.508507
License: Public Domain

LANDAU, J.,
dissenting.
The collective bargaining agreement unambiguously provides for arbitration of employee grievances only. It spells out a four-step grievance process. Arbitration is the fourth step, but it is expressly contingent on the completion of the other three steps, each of which is limited to employee grievances. Thus, arbitration is not generally available to resolve any dispute arising under the agreement. It is applicable *97only to employee grievances that cannot be resolved by completion of the first three steps of the dispute resolution process that the contract details. The majority ignores the language of the agreement in concluding that it provides for a “generally applicable grievance procedure” for all disputes arising under the agreement. I therefore dissent.
The controlling legal principles are straightforward enough. A collective bargaining agreement is a contract, which we must review in accordance with basic principles of contract construction. OSEA v. Rainier School Dist. No. 13, 311 Or 188,194, 808 P2d 83 (1991). That means that our first task is to determine whether, as a matter of law, the agreement is ambiguous, that is, whether it is reasonably capable of more than one interpretation. North Pacific Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 332 Or 20, 25, 22 P3d 739 (2001).
In determining whether an agreement is ambiguous, we must do more than assess whether a particular disputed term is, in the abstract, capable of more than one meaning; rather, we must determine that, in the context of the agreement as a whole, that is the case. Id.; see also Yogman v. Parrott, 325 Or 358, 363, 937 P2d 1019 (1997). Similarly, we may not simply juxtapose two portions of an agreement that, when taken from their context, are arguably inconsistent; rather, we must construe the contract as a whole. New Zealand Ins. v. Griffith Rubber, 270 Or 71, 75, 526 P2d 567 (1974). Only when we cannot reconcile conflicting provisions in their context may we conclude that an agreement is ambiguous. See, e.g., LaPointe’s, Inc. v. Beri, Inc., 73 Or App 773, 778, 699 P2d 1173 (1985) (agreement was ambiguous because “we cannot, by looking at the agreements as a whole, reconcile the inconsistency”); Far West Reforesters, Inc. v. Dept, of Forestry, 61 Or App 138,143, 656 P2d 374 (1982) (agreement was ambiguous because court could not, “by simply looking at the contract as a whole, reconcile the inconsistent portions”). If, and only if, we conclude the agreement is ambiguous, we may resort to maxims of construction, including the familiar rule that doubts about arbitrability are resolved in favor of arbitration. Joseph Education Assn. v. Joseph Sch. Dist. No. 6,180 Or App 461, 467, 43 P3d 1187 (2002).
*98The language of the arbitration article of the collective bargaining agreement in this case is clear. It begins by reciting that its purpose is “[t]o promote better employer-employee relationships.” Consistently with that end, it provides a procedure for the resolution of disputes between the city and an aggrieved employee. That four-step process is declared to be “the sole procedure” for resolving disputes arising out of the application of the agreement. The first step in that process is:
“The aggrieved employee or the Association, with or without the employee, may take up the grievance or dispute with the employee’s supervisor outside the bargaining unit within five (5) working days of its occurrence.”
Thus, the dispute or grievance must involve an aggrieved employee and must be submitted to “the employee’s supervisor.” Either the employee or the Association may take up the grievance, but, at all events, it must involve an employee and must be taken up with the employee’s supervisor. If the Association could take up any dispute, whether or not it involves an aggrieved employee, then the reference to taking up the dispute with “the employee’s supervisor” makes no sense. If there is no aggrieved employee, there is no employee’s supervisor with whom to take up the grievance or dispute as the first step of the process — which, once again, is the “sole procedure” for arbitrating covered disputes — requires.
The second step provides that, “[i]f the matter is not settled within ten (10) working days of reference to the supervisor, the matter shall be reduced to writing * * * and presented to the Chief.” Thus, the second step — presentation of the grievance to the Chief — is triggered by the inability to settle by “reference to the supervisor.” That obviously refers back to the language of the first step, which requires the grievance to be taken up “with the employee’s supervisor.” Once again, if the grievance does not involve an employee, there is no employee’s supervisor, and the second step detailed in the collective bargaining makes no sense.
In the third step, grievances that cannot be settled by reference to the employee’s supervisor or the Chief are referred to the employee’s personnel director, who is required *99to make a recommendation to the City Commissioner-in-charge. The fourth step then provides that grievances that cannot be settled by reference to the employee’s supervisor, the Chief, the personnel director, or the Commissioner-in-charge may be submitted to arbitration.
Thus, the collective bargaining agreement does not vaguely refer to the arbitrability of disputes generally. It spells out a detailed grievance process, in four clearly enumerated steps. Only if the first three steps fail may a dispute be submitted to arbitration. The first step applies only to employee grievances that have been referred to “the employee’s supervisor.” Only if the employee grievance cannot be resolved by reference to the employee’s supervisor is it subject to arbitration. That requirement is plainly stated in the agreement. It is subject to no other reasonable construction.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority does not suggest that the requirement of submitting a grievance to an employee’s supervisor is capable of any other reasonable construction. The majority simply holds that the requirement must be ignored, because it is inconsistent with other language in the agreement that the majority believes more generally provides for the arbitration of any disputes, whether or not they involve employees. I intend to examine the majority’s reasoning in detail, so I begin by quoting it in full:
“Read as a whole, Article 14 provides for a generally applicable grievance procedure, which has arbitration as its final level of dispute resolution. Article 14, section 1, provides, in part:
“ ‘To promote better employer-employee relationships, both parties pledge their immediate cooperation to settle any grievance or complaints that might arise out of the application of this Agreement and the following procedure shall be the sole procedure to be utilized for that purpose.’
“Additionally, the final paragraph of Article 14 provides that ‘[t]he parties agree that the grievance procedure is the exclusive remedy for disputes regarding issues covered by *100the bargaining agreement.’ ” 181 Or App at 93 (emphasis in original).
Thus, the majority’s first point is that Article 14 provides for a “generally applicable grievance procedure.” To begin with, I cannot find the quoted language anywhere in the agreement and, frankly, I do not know what the phrase means. The agreement certainly spells out a grievance procedure. But the grievance procedure that it describes consists of four specific steps that are required to be completed in sequence. Only step 4 of that procedure involves arbitration, and that is available only if the other three steps do not avail. Those other three steps, as I have noted, apply only to employee grievances.
Next, the majority refers specifically to Article 14, section 1, and highlights the reference to the intention of the parties to settle “any grievance or complaints” that arise out of the agreement by the grievance procedure described in that agreement. According to the majority the reference to the term “any” used in reference to grievances that are arbitrable is dispositive. At the outset, I note that the majority glosses over the opening clause of the sentence: “To promote better employer-employee relationships,” the parties agree that any grievances may be resolved by the means of the specified grievance procedure. To me, that clause telegraphs the subject of the wording that follows, namely, disputes between employer and employees. Aside from that, the majority again ignores the fact that the agreement provides that “any” grievance is to be resolved not by a “generally applicable grievance procedure,” as the majority suggests, 181 Or App at 93, but by “the following procedure.” What is “the following procedure”? The agreement spells that out in the immediately succeeding paragraphs, which detail the four steps that I have described above and which plainly provide that they apply only to employee grievances.
Next, the majority relies on the final paragraph of Article 14, which it reads to require generally arbitration of “issues covered by the bargaining agreement.” What the agreement actually says, however, is that “the grievance procedure” that is described in the agreement is the exclusive *101remedy for disputes regarding issues covered by the agreement. Again, “the grievance procedure” requires referring the dispute to an employee’s supervisor.
In short, the majoritys reasoning amounts to nothing more than question begging; it simply assumes away the very matter that is in issue, namely, what the agreement means when it says that disputes are resolved not by a “generally applicable procedure,” but rather by a specific “grievance procedure.” I maintain that, by referring to the resolution of disputes by means of a specific “grievance procedure,” the agreement clearly requires, as the first step in that procedure, that the disputes be referred to the grieved employee’s supervisor, which can only occur if there is a dispute involving an employee. The majority offers no other construction of that language. The majority simply ignores it.
The majority contends that, at best, we are confronted with conflicting interpretations that render the collective bargaining agreement “ambiguous.” 181 Or App at 94. As I have noted, however, the case law makes clear that simply saying a contract is ambiguous does not make it so. In particular, simply saying that a contract contains conflicting provisions does not make it ambiguous. It first must be established that the agreement cannot be read in a manner that resolves the supposed conflict. LaPointe’s, Inc., 73 Or App at 778; Far West Reforesters, Inc., 61 Or App at 143.
In this case, the agreement is perfectly capable of being read without any conflict among its provisions. As I have noted, when the agreement says that “the grievance procedure is the exclusive remedy for disputes regarding issues covered by the bargaining agreement,” it reasonably may be taken to mean exactly that. In other words, “grievance procedure” is the one spelled out in the agreement, and “issues covered by the bargaining agreement” are issues raised by an aggrieved employee. No violence is done to any provision. We are required to ignore nothing.
Certainly, “issues covered by the bargaining agreement,” viewed in isolation, could be read to mean any issues, whether they involve employees or not. But we are not permitted to manufacture conflicts in contractual language by construing terms in isolation. We are enjoined to construe *102them in context, giving meaning to all terms, if possible. Yogman, 325 Or at 363. In this case, the phrase “issues covered by the bargaining agreement” is part of a complete sentence, consideration of which makes its meaning clear: “The parties agree that the grievance procedure is the exclusive remedy for disputes regarding issues covered by the bargaining agreement.” Because “the grievance procedure” clearly refers only to employee grievances, it is apparent that “issues covered by the bargaining agreement” refers to issues that can be resolved by “the grievance procedure.” And, because “the grievance procedure” applies only to employee grievances, it follows that “issues covered by the bargaining agreement” likewise refers to issues that are subject to that procedure, that is, issues involving aggrieved employees.
Similarly, the collective bargaining agreement provides that “any grievance or complaints that might arise out of the application of this Agreement” must be resolved by “the following procedure,” namely the four-step procedure that it then sets forth. Certainly, in the abstract, “any grievance or complaints” could refer literally to any grievance or complaint, whether or not it involves an aggrieved employee. But, once again, the word may not be taken out of context to manufacture a conflict. We must construe it in context, giving meaning to all terms, if possible.
In this case, the beginning of the sentence in which the “any grievance or complaints” wording occurs states that its subject is the promotion of “employer-employee relationships.” The reference to “any grievance or complaints” cannot be read without keeping that stated purpose in mind. In addition, “any grievance or complaints” must be resolved by “the following procedure,” referring to the four-step process that follows. Because that four-step process applies only to employee grievances, the “any grievance or complaints” wording must be construed in that context; it apparently refers to any grievance or complaints that are capable of resolution by “the following procedure,” that is, any grievance or complaints initiated by an aggrieved employee.
The majority ignores the fact that it is possible to construe all of the relevant provisions in a way that gives meaning to all. According to the majority, the agreement *103must be read to require arbitration of any disputes concerning the application of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, whether or not the dispute involves an employee. That raises a number of interesting questions.
Query # 1: Where is a nonemployee grievance to be filed? The majority does not say. According to the agreement, the first step is to file with the employee’s supervisor. But if there is no employee, there is no employee’s supervisor with whom to file the grievance.
Query #2: If the nonemployee grievance need not be filed with the employee’s supervisor, is there a second step to the grievance process, and, if there is, precisely when is it triggered? According to the agreement, the second step is to file with the Chief within ten days of reference to the employee’s supervisor. If there is no reference to the employee’s supervisor, how is the timing of the second step calculated?
Query # 3: Are all three preliminary steps detailed in the agreement simply to be ignored? That is, are all nonemployee grievances directly arbitrable, without any preliminaries? If so, what of the language in the agreement that “the grievance procedure” — the four-step process that applies only to employee grievances — “is the exclusive remedy” for “any” disputes arising under the agreement? The majority’s construction of the collective bargaining agreement clearly is untenable.
The majority alternatively complains that, if the Association cannot arbitrate this dispute, “there would be no remedy” for violations of the city’s obligations under the agreement regarding retiree benefits. 181 Or App at 93. The majority’s resort to argumentum ad terrorum simply will not bear scrutiny, however. The only issue in this case is whether a particular remedy — arbitration—is available to the Association to resolve this particular dispute. The fact that the agreement does not provide for arbitration does not mean that there is no remedy at all.
To sum up: The agreement contains no conflicting provisions, no ambiguities regarding the arbitrability of this dispute. It provides that arbitration is available only when *104employee grievances cannot be resolved by other dispute resolution procedures detailed in the agreement. This case did not satisfy the prerequisites for arbitration clearly described in the agreement. It is therefore not subject to arbitration. The majority errs in concluding otherwise.
Edmonds, Linder, and Kistler, JJ., join in this dissent.