Court Opinion

ID: 2963858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:16:20.210081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:47.281082
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          February 8, 1996  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2260
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,
                                          v.

                                  GEORGE H. BENNETT,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________
        No. 94-2300

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,

                                          v.
                                   LIONEL LUSSIER,

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The opinion of this Court,  issued on February 1, 1996, is amended
        as follows:

            On page 9, line 7, replace "then had no reason to lie" with  "they
        had no reason to lie".

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________
        No. 94-2260

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,

                                          v.
                                  GEORGE H. BENNETT,

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2300
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,
                                          v.

                                   LIONEL LUSSIER,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The opinion of this Court, issued  on February 1, 1996, is amended
        as follows:

            On  page  8, 3rd  line of  2nd  paragraph, insert  a period  after
        "1986)" and delete "which appears pretty closely in point."

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2260
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  GEORGE H. BENNETT,

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                 ____________________
        No. 94-2300
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   LIONEL LUSSIER,

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
                     [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                          Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges,
                                            ______________
                             and Saris,* District Judge. 
                                         ______________
                                 ____________________

            Malcolm J. Barach for appellant Bennett. 
            _________________
            William Maselli for appellant Lussier.
            _______________
            F. Mark Terison,  Assistant United States  Attorney, with whom Jay
            _______________                                                ___
        P.  McCloskey, United States  Attorney, was on  consolidated brief for
        _____________
        the United States.
                                 ____________________

                                   February 1, 1996
                                 ____________________

                            
        ____________________

        *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                 BOUDIN,  Circuit Judge.   George  H. Bennett  and Lionel
                          _____________

            Lussier   were  each  charged   with  conspiracy  to  possess

            marijuana  with  intent  to  distribute,  21  U.S.C.     846;

            carrying or using a firearm during and in relation to  a drug

            trafficking  offense,  18  U.S.C.    924(c)(1);  and unlawful

            possession of a  firearm by  a convicted felon,  18 U.S.C.   

            922(g)(1).   The charges  stemmed from  a bizarre March  1994

            episode in  which  Bennett, Lussier,  and  Gary King,  in  an

            attempt to avenge a  previous drug-related attack and robbery

            against mutual  friend Ronald Madore,  mistakenly entered the

            wrong home and  assaulted the occupants,  ultimately shooting

            one of them through the finger.  

                 Madore and King were indicted for various offenses; both

            pled guilty,  cooperated with the prosecution,  and testified

            against  Bennett and Lussier.  After a five-day jury trial in

            August 1994, Bennett and Lussier were convicted on all counts

            and sentenced, respectively, to 360 and 378 months in prison.

            In  this consolidated  appeal, Bennett and  Lussier challenge

            their convictions and sentences on many  grounds.  We address

            the more  colorable of these claims,  setting forth pertinent

            facts as necessary.

                 First.    Both   Bennett  and   Lussier  challenge   the
                 _____

            sufficiency of  the  evidence supporting  conviction on  each

            count.  Neither denies participating in the assault  but they

            dispute issues  of  intent  and their  precise  role  in  the

                                         -2-
                                         -2-

            events.  Our  familiar task  on review of  sufficiency is  to

            consider  the record as a whole and to determine, viewing the

            evidence in the light most  favorable to the verdict, whether

            a rational  jury could find guilt beyond  a reasonable doubt.

            United States  v. Luciano-Mosquera,  63 F.3d 1142,  1149 (1st
            _____________     ________________

            Cir. 1995).

                 A  conspiracy  conviction  can be  supported  by  either

            direct or circumstantial evidence of an illegal agreement--in

            this  case to  possess marijuana  with intent  to distribute.

            See United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 506 (1st Cir. 1990).
            ___ _____________    ____

            At trial, there was testimony that on the day of the mistaken

            raid,  Bennett,  Lussier,  and  King, along  with  two  other

            friends, drank  and discussed seeking revenge  for a previous

            attack  in which  mutual friend  Ronald Madore,  a small-time

            marijuana dealer, was beaten  and robbed of marijuana, money,

            and  guns.   The  group  continued their  drinking  and their

            discussion that evening at Madore's house.

                 Madore testified that Bennett, Lussier, and King planned

            to beat up the  man Madore suspected was behind  the previous

            attack,  one Wayne Hathorne, take any marijuana he had (along

            with  any money) and give the marijuana to Madore so he could

            sell it  and share the proceeds.   King's testimony regarding

            the plan was  less definitive;  he stated at  one point  that

            they only intended to beat Hathorne, but elsewhere  that both

                                         -3-
                                         -3-

            discussed  stealing  Hathorne's marijuana  and  giving  it to

            Madore because "[h]e deals in it."

                 It is  undisputed that shortly  after this  conversation

            the  four men--the appellants, Madore and King--left Madore's

            house in Bennett's  car and  drove to a  trailer home,  which

            they mistakenly believed was Hathorne's.  While Madore waited

            in the car, Bennett, Lussier and King entered the trailer and

            terrorized  occupants  David Wing,  Michelle Morin  and their

            children, physically  assaulting Wing  and Morin while  a gun

            was  held  to Wing's  head.   There was  testimony, described

            later in this opinion, that all four men knew of the proposal

            to  bring a gun and that  first King and then Lussier carried

            the weapon.

                 Wing testified that during the attack all three men were

            shouting "[w]here  is our  dope?"; Morin heard  them shouting

            about drugs  but did  not specify  whether it was  particular

            individuals  or  all of  them.   Wing and  Morin, who  had no

            drugs, tried  to convince their assailants they had the wrong

            house.  These pleas were met with a  threat to kill Wing.  In

            an ensuing struggle  for the  gun Wing was  shot through  the

            finger.  Bennett, Lussier and King immediately fled the scene

            without taking anything.  

                 Appellants now insist, as they  argued to the jury, that

            the  plan was  merely to  beat Hathorne  and did  not include

            seizing drugs, and that  much of the testimony of  Madore and

                                         -4-
                                         -4-

            King was false.  But such credibility assessments are for the

            jury  and  nothing  here  justifies  disturbing   the  jury's

            rational conclusion that Bennett and Lussier joined in a plan

            to, among other things, steal marijuana and give it to Madore

            to sell.  

                 As to the section 924(c)(1) charge of carrying  or using

            a  gun during a drug  crime, Lussier concedes the sufficiency

            of  the evidence  against him,  while Bennett  maintains that

            nothing showed that he had carried or used  a gun in relation
                                __

            to the marijuana  conspiracy.  But  Bennett was also  charged

            with aiding and abetting the carry or use offense.  Thus, his

            conviction  can be sustained under  18 U.S.C.    2 if Bennett

            knew a firearm would  be carried or used by  a co-conspirator

            in  the  drug trafficking  offense  and  willingly took  some

            action to facilitate the  carriage or use.  Luciano-Mosquera,
                                                        ________________

            63 F.3d at 1150.

                 At  trial there was testimony  that the gun  used in the

            attack  was taken  from  a  couch  in  Madore's  house  under

            circumstances  where  Bennett could  have  seen  it.   Madore

            testified  that he told  the other three they  did not need a

            gun, but  each said he would  rather take it.   King held the

            gun on the ride to Wing's home while sitting in the passenger

            seat beside driver Bennett; King said that he did not conceal

            the gun in the car, although he conceded he may at some point

                                         -5-
                                         -5-

            have  placed it in his waistband.   It was his impression the

            others were aware he had the gun.  

                 From this evidence  a jury could find  that Bennett knew

            that one of  his companions  was carrying the  gun when  they

            committed   the  attack,  and   facilitation  is  essentially

            undisputed  since  Bennett  provided  his  car  to  transport

            himself,  his co-conspirators,  and  the gun  to execute  the

            raid.  In Luciano Mosquera, we upheld  an abetting conviction
                      ________________

            because the defendant provided a house for meeting where guns

            were  displayed and  discussed,  and later  used during  drug

            trafficking crime.  63 F.3d at  1150.  In sum, once knowledge

            on the part of the aider and abettor is  established, it does

            not take much to satisfy the facilitation element.  

                 With respect  to adequacy  of evidence on  the felon-in-

            possession charge, 18 U.S.C.   922(g)(1), Bennett and Lussier

            make only  the  narrow  claim that  the  evidence  failed  to

            establish that the gun  had travelled in interstate commerce,

            the  jurisdictional element of that offense.  The gun was not

            introduced into evidence since it had  been discarded by King

            and  Madore.  But from direct testimony the jury was entitled

            to  find that it was a .22 caliber "Single-Six" made by Sterm

            Ruger and that Sterm Ruger was an out-of-state manufacturer.

                 Appellants argue that the gun  could have been a replica

            fashioned by  an in-state gunsmith.   This remote possibility

            had  only the  most  tenuous evidentiary  support, namely,  a

                                         -6-
                                         -6-

            witness or  two said such  a gun could  be fabricated  but at
                                             _____

            significant cost.  The  overwhelming probability was that the

            gun was authentic and  had been transported--at some time--in

            interstate  commerce.   Certainly the jury's  conclusion that

            the gun was  genuine and had previously  traveled in commerce

            was  not irrational.  Cf.  United States v.  Kirvan, 997 F.2d
                                  ___  _____________     ______

            963, 966-67 (1st Cir. 1993).

                 Second.    Shortly  into  its  deliberations,  the  jury
                 ______

            requested the testimony of victims Wing and Morin.  The trial

            judge conferred with counsel and then  instructed the jury to

            use  their recollections,  adding that  he would  provide the

            requested  testimony if  the jury  still found  it necessary.

            After  further  deliberations the  jury  asked  for only  the

            direct testimony of Wing and Morin.  Over defense objections,

            the judge then  had the  direct testimony of  Wing and  Morin

            read  back to the jury.  Immediately after the read-back, the

            judge asked jurors as a group whether they would also like to

            hear  the cross or other testimony of the two witnesses; none

            did.  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was denied.

                 The appellants  concede that  it would have  been within

            the  trial judge's discretion to have read to the jury all of
                                                                   ___

            Wing and Morin's testimony; but they say that providing  only

            the     direct    examination     was    prejudicial--indeed,

            unconstitutional--because   the    unread   cross-examination

            responses of both witnesses  were at "striking variance" with

                                         -7-
                                         -7-

            their testimony on direct.  No examples of such variances are

            mentioned.   No case law is provided to suggest that the jury

            may not select what it wishes to hear.

                 The  trial judge's  decision whether or  not to  grant a

            request  to  read  back  testimony requested  by  a  jury  is

            reviewed for  abuse of discretion, United  States v. Akitoye,
                                               ______________    _______

            723 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 1991); and we think  that this is

            equally true of the judge's decision whether  the jury should

            be made to hear  additional, related testimony that the  jury

            made  clear it  did  not need  to  rehear.   Of  course, such

            discretion is not  unlimited.  And certainly the  trial judge

            should  exercise great  care when  the testimony  the defense

            counsel wants the  jury to hear  is the cross-examination  of

            the very witnesses whose full  direct testimony has just been

            reread.

                 But no inflexible rule exists that the cross must always

            be read.  United  States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d  161, 174
                      ______________    _____________

            (3d Cir. 1986).  In plenty of cases, the direct testimony  of

            another witness might be  far more relevant in  assessing the
            _______

            testimony of the witness  whose testimony the jury requested.

            Each case  must  be  decided on  its  facts, and  it  is  the

            appellant's  burden  to  show  that  the  trial  judge  acted

            unreasonably.  Here on appeal,  with ample leisure to compare

            the direct and cross of Wing and Morin, appellate counsel has

            still made  no specific showing  as to  why it was  unfair in
                           ________                                    __

                                         -8-
                                         -8-

            this case  for the  district court to  omit cross-examination
            _________

            that the jury did not want.

                 Because this is a criminal case, we have read the direct

            and cross-examination of the two witnesses in order to assure
            ___

            ourselves that the district court's  action did not cause any

            miscarriage of  justice.  We  have found  nothing to  suggest

            that the  cross-examination was vital or  contained more than

            the customary measure of minor variations or inconsistencies.

            Prior  to requesting  the  read-backs, the  jury could  quite

            reasonably have  concluded that it  credited these witnesses'

            direct testimony--they had no  reason to lie--and then sought

            the read-back to refresh the  jury's own recollection on some

            specific points.

                 There  is no merit in two other related claims of error.

            Appellants  now say that the jury  was confused or bewildered

            by the trial  judge's offer to have the cross reread; but the

            trial judge found otherwise.   We have read the  colloquy and

            find  no  reason  to  doubt  the  trial  judge's  conclusion.

            Appellants also say that the jury  should have been cautioned

            not to give the direct testimony special weight, e.g., United
                                                             ____  ______

            States v. DeSoto, 885  F.2d 354, 363 (7th Cir.  1989), but no
            ______    ______

            such request was made at trial.

                 Third.   In  closing, the  prosecutor  referred  several
                 _____

            times,  without objection,  to the  "selective focus"  of the

            defense.   In  rebuttal, the  prosecutor described  a defense

                                         -9-
                                         -9-

            argument as a "diversion" that "doesn't  pass the laugh test"

            and  again  referred  to  the  defense's  "selective  focus."

            Defense  counsel  immediately  objected  to  the  "diversion"

            remark.   After the  summations, defense counsel  requested a

            curative instruction that the jury disregard these remarks to

            the  extent that  they "degraded  legitimate defenses."   The

            judge found  the comments  unobjectionable and gave  only the

            standard  instruction  that  arguments  of  counsel  are  not

            evidence.

                 Appellants now  maintain that both  of the  prosecutor's

            remarks improperly denigrated defense  counsel as well as the

            defense strategy.  The prosecutor is expected to refrain from

            impugning, directly or through  implication, the integrity or

            institutional  role of  defense  counsel.   United States  v.
                                                        _____________

            Boldt,  929  F.2d 35,  40 (1st  Cir.  1991).   But "selective
            _____

            focus" remarks were  part of  a larger metaphor  used by  the

            prosecutor in urging the  jury to "act as a camera"  and keep

            "focused" on  the evidence.   In context, the  remarks merely

            echo  the truism  that  lawyers highlight  helpful facts  and

            retreat from unfavorable ones.

                 The prosecutor  edged closer to trouble  in his rebuttal

            remarks by calling a defense argument a "diversion" that does

            not  "pass the  laugh test."   But  summations in  litigation

            often have  a rough and tumble  quality; in fact,  one of the

            defense  summations here  twice referred to  the government's

                                         -10-
                                         -10-

            "desperation" to prove charges "they can't prove."  We do not

            think  that the prosecutor's remarks on this case crossed the

            line.   See generally United States  v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996
                    _____________ _____________     ________________

            F.2d  436, 440-41 (1st Cir.  1993), cert. denied,  114 S. Ct.
                                                _____ ______

            1366  (1994).   Nor  was the  refusal  to give  the specially

            requested instruction reversible error;  indeed, a jury would

            not have made much sense of the requested language.

                 Fourth.  At trial Bennett and Lussier sought access to a
                 ______

            police  interview  report  with  a  government witness,  Pete

            McFarlane,  a  friend of  the  appellants who  was  with them

            before  and  immediately after  the  attack.   The  interview

            report, the  defendants believed, might have  some bearing on

            McFarlane's  testimony that  Lussier  admitted  in the  post-

            attack  meeting that  he was  holding the  gun when  Wing was

            shot.   Defendants urged that  the interview report  might be

            discoverable  under Fed. R. Crim.  P. 16, the  Jencks Act, 18
                                                           ______

            U.S.C.   3500, or Brady v. Maryland,  373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
                              _____    ________

            The trial judge reviewed  the report in camera and  concluded
                                                 _________

            that it was not discoverable.

                 On  appeal, all  three bases  for disclosure  are urged.

            Rule  16  does not  apply  since  its pertinent  language  is

            directed  to  statements  made  by  a  defendant  to  a known

            government agent,  United States v.  Burns, 15 F.3d  211 (1st
                               _____________     _____

            Cir. 1994), and a statement by Lussier or  any co-conspirator

            to McFarlane immediately after the event is not even arguably

                                         -11-
                                         -11-

            in that category.  Appellants suggest that Burns demands more
                                                       _____

            of the  government than  the bare minimum  prescribed in  the

            rule; but  that is not what  Burns says.  Compare  15 F.3d at
                                         _____        _______

            215-16 n. 2.   The  Jencks Act requires inter alia production
                                                    __________

            of  writings that  are "substantially  verbatim"  recitals of

            pre-trial statements  made by  a government witness  and that

            relate  to the subject of  the witness' trial  testimony.  18

            U.S.C.   3500(e)(2).  We  have reviewed the interview  report

            at issue which contains only a few isolated direct quotations

            (none  pertinent here)  and which  is neither  structured nor

            phrased as  a verbatim report.   In our view the  trial court

            did  not commit clear error in refusing to treat the six-page

            report  as  a  substantially   verbatim  recordation  of  the

            interviewee's own  words.   See United  States v.  Foley, 871
                                        ___ ______________     _____

            F.2d 235, 238-39 (1st Cir. 1989).

                 Lussier offers a  clever gloss on the Jencks Act, urging

            that  any  simple  statement  in  an  interview report--e.g.,
                                                                    ____

            "Lussier  held  the  gun"--must  because of  its  brevity  be

            essentially  verbatim and  thus discoverable  under  the Act.

            But  this attempt to divide up the document has been rejected

            even in  the case of  isolated direct quotations,  Foley, 871
                                                               _____

            F.2d at 238-39.  We note also that the report (a formal typed

            form) was clearly made after the interview and not during it.

            United States  v. Consolidated  Packaging, 575 F.2d  117, 129
            _____________     _______________________

            (7th Cir. 1978) (requiring a contemporaneous recordation).

                                         -12-
                                         -12-

                 The  Brady claim  is more  difficult for  the government
                      _____

            because the  interview report  does say that  Lussier carried

            the gun,  but attributes  that information to  Bennett rather

            than  Lussier.   The report  might thus  appear to  have some

            impeachment value, possibly qualifying  it as Brady  material
                                                          _____

            under United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677 (1985).  The
                  _____________    ______

            inference  is pretty limited in  this case: not  only was the

            meeting  a confusing one  but the  interview report  does not

            exclude--and  may  even  invite--the inference  that  Lussier

            acquiesced in the  suggestion that he  had been carrying  the

            gun.

                 In  all events, even if we assume that the report should

            have  been produced  under Brady,  the failure  to do  so was
                                       _____

            harmless.   At trial,  both Bennett  and King  testified that

            Lussier  had held the gun;  and while Bennett  had a personal

            interest  in  so testifying,  King  did  not.    Further,  if

            McFarlane had been "impeached" by the report in question, the

            jury  would have been told, once again, that Lussier had held

            the  gun.   At  the  post-attack meeting,  where  Lussier was

            present, Bennett had no reason to lie and  good reason not to

            do so.

                 Fifth.   The last  noteworthy issue concerns  the aiding
                 _____

            and abetting instructions.   Bennett and Lussier were charged

            in both firearms counts--the possession and the use  or carry

            counts--both  as principals  and  on an  aiding and  abetting

                                         -13-
                                         -13-

            theory under 18 U.S.C.   2.  As to both gun offenses, Bennett

            and  Lussier say  that  the aiding  and abetting  instruction

            permitted the  jury to convict without  the required scienter

            (for example,  even if the jury believed  that the assistance

            was unintentionally rendered).

                 On the  possession  count,  the  jury was  told  that  a

            defendant could  be convicted if he  "knowingly possessed the

            firearm . . . or aided and abetted such possession"; parallel

            language was  used on the companion count ("knowingly used or

            carried  a firearm or aided and abetted the use or carrying a

            firearm").  The appellants complain that the word "knowingly"

            was not used  immediately before "aided and  abetted" in each

            instance;  but   this  is  irrelevant  because   "aiding  and

            abetting" was  separately defined in the  instructions, which

            must be read as a whole.   United States v. Fontana, 948 F.2d
                                       _____________    _______

            796, 801 (1st Cir. 1991).  

                 In  the  aiding  and  abetting  definition  itself,  the

            district court charged in pertinent part that "the Government

            must  prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  a  defendant

            associated himself  with the  venture, participated in  it as

            something  that he wished to  bring about, and  sought by his

            actions to make it succeed."  This language obviously imports

            a scienter element  ("wished to bring about";  "sought by his

            actions"), and  it is the  precise language approved  by this

                                         -14-
                                         -14-

            court in prior cases.  E.g., United States v.  Loder, 23 F.3d
                                   ____  _____________     _____

            586, 590-91 (1st Cir. 1994).

                 But  our journey is not quite over.  The Loder language,
                                                          _____

            which  serves reasonably  well  in most  situations, may  not

            perfectly cover  abnormal ones.  Here,  a potential ambiguity

            exists: the term "venture" in Loder is intended  as catch-all
                                          _____

            for  the  notion  of  a  crime  committed  by  another  ("the

            principal")  for  which  the  government  aims  to  hold  the

            defendant  responsible as  an  aider or  abettor, making  the

            defendant  "punishable as a principal."  18 U.S.C.    2.  See
                                                                      ___

            generally 1  Sand, et.  al, Modern Federal  Jury Instructions
            _________          _______  _________________________________

            para. 11.01 (1995).   Where only a single crime  is involved,

            confusion is unlikely under Loder's language because there is
                                        _____

            only one venture.

                 Here, however, the defendants  were charged in the first

            count  with a drug possession conspiracy.  In theory the term

            "venture,"  used only as  part of  the general  definition of

            aiding  and abetting,  might lead  a jury  to think  that the

            venture  in  question was  the  drug conspiracy  and  not the

            possession or use-and-carry  offense.  If so, the  jury might

            also  think that it could  convict the defendant  who did not
                                                                      ___

            personally possess  or use  or carry  a gun,  so long  as the

            aider or abettor "wished to  bring about" the drug possession

            "and sought by his actions to make [that venture] succeed." 

                                         -15-
                                         -15-

                 The problem, needless to say, is not that any element of

            the offense was omitted from the charge, cf. United States v.
                                                     ___ _____________

            Lopez, No. 94-2277, slip op. at  12 (1st Cir. Dec. 14, 1995),
            _____

            but  that a  possible ambiguity  inhered in  the instruction.

            The defendants  made several timely objections  to the aiding

            and abetting  instructions at trial, although  their proposed

            solutions were of questionable use.  But any ambiguity in the

            charge was  irrelevant in Lussier's case  (the only evidence,

            obviously  accepted   by  the  jury,  was  that  he  was  the

            principal), and it was harmless in Bennett's case.

                 Given   the  evidence,  Bennett  could  only  have  been

            convicted as an aider and abettor.  But--as already related--

            Madore, who supplied the gun, testified that bringing it  had

            been discussed in advance and  that Bennett, Lussier and King

            all  said they  wanted  it brought;  King,  who sat  next  to

            Bennett in the  car, testified that he carried the gun in his

            lap  without  concealment  for  at least  part  of  the ride.

            Unlike Bennett, who claimed  to have had no knowledge  of the

            gun,  King and  Madore were not  on trial.   If  there was an

            ambiguity in the instruction, it did not affect the result.

                 Appellants' remaining claims have been considered but do

            not require discussion.  In a few instances, Bennett has made

            claims  that are  not fully  developed, such  as his  cursory

            attack  on  the  intoxication  instruction,  or  beyond   our

            jurisdiction (e.g.,  the refusal  of  a downward  departure).
                          ____

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            Other claims  made by  appellants are properly  presented but

            seem to  us  hopeless  on  the  facts  (e.g.,  that  perjured
                                                    ____

            testimony was knowingly presented) or the law (the claim that

            section  922(g)(1)  is  unconstitutional).    Scarborough  v.
                                                          ___________

            United  States,  431 U.S.  563  (1977)  (discussed in  United
            ______________                                         ______

            States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 919 (1995)).
            ______    _____

                 The case for  appellants here has been well presented by

            counsel, and we understand the practical pressure on lawyers-

            -especially in criminal cases--to  resolve doubts in favor of

            including  doubtful claims  along  with stronger  ones.   But

            cases  with difficult issues now crowd the dockets.  At least

            in opinion  writing, the  court's time  is best  reserved for

            colorable  claims.  Cf. McIntosh  v. Antonio, 71  F.3d 29, 37
                                ____________     _______

            (1st Cir. 1995).

                 Finally,  Bennett moved  earlier under  Fed. R.  App. P.

            28(i) to  incorporate Lussier's brief generally  as to "those

            facts, issues and  arguments . .  . that  may inure to  [his]

            benefit" and  to  adopt  particular  arguments  in  Lussier's

            brief.     The   motion,   previously   denied   subject   to

            reconsideration, is effectively moot  since none of Lussier's

            claims have  been accepted.   But  future counsel  using Rule

            28(i)  should be aware of  the need to  connect the arguments

            adopted  with the  specific facts  pertaining to  the movant.

            United States  v. Saccoccia, 58  F.3d 754,  763-64 (1st  Cir.
            _____________     _________

            1995).

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                 Affirmed.
                 ________

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