Court Opinion

ID: 9599641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:20:20.727916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:45.917597
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice,
dissenting, with whom ROSE, Justice, joins.
I dissent.
With the adoption of comparative negligence, old, musty doctrines, replicas of the dinasaur age when contributory negligence — no matter how slight — was a complete defense, have been held no longer valid or appropriate. We held that after adoption of comparative negligence, assumption of risk was no longer an absolute defense in a negligence action. Brit-*1096tain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532, 534 (1979); Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir.1982). We eliminated gross negligence as a separate consideration in most circumstances, stating:
“The category of ‘gross negligence’ will no longer be pertinent except in a few isolated circumstances. The obsolescence of the term ‘gross negligence’ will be no great loss toward the attainment of equity. The term has been characterized as ‘an unhappy term of ill-defined content.’ Prosser, Torts 4th Ed., p. 10 (1971).” (Footnote omitted.) Danculovich v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187, 192-193 (1979).
We also eliminated as a doctrine entitled to separate consideration, last clear chance, when we said:
“Wyoming has recognized the doctrine of ‘last clear chance’ as a defense to contributory negligence. * * *
“ * * * However, there is no practical basis to the rationale used to retain the doctrine of last clear chance in face of a comparative negligence statute. Such rationale is that the doctrine is premised on the fact that defendant’s failure to avail himself of the last clear chance to avoid the accident made such failure the sole proximate cause of the injury and plaintiff’s negligence was therefore only a remote cause. * * *
“The apportionment of damages under the comparative negligence statute makes unnecessary the doctrine of last clear chance.” Danculovich v. Brown, supra at 194-195.
Thus, we have said that the doctrines of gross negligence, assumption of risk, and last clear chance are no longer recognized and are unnecessary because of the adoption of comparative negligence. If gross negligence, assumption of risk, and last clear chance are outmoded, why not intervening cause? In this case it is a defense involving plaintiff’s own negligence. In Sherman v. Platte County, Wyo., 642 P.2d 787, 790 (1982), we said:
“Comparative negligence * * * abrogated absolute defenses involving the plaintiff’s own negligence in bringing about his or her injuries.”
These special defenses which still haunt us merely serve to confuse and make what ought to be simple, extremely difficult, even incomprehensible. I confess that I am unable to accept a proposition cast in stone that one who creates a condition, no matter how dangerous or likely to cause injury when acted upon by a third person, is not liable because it was a condition. In this case a rancher ordered gasoline for use in his hay baler; the dealer negligently delivered diesel fuel to the baler and the gasoline storage tank at the ranch. The mistake in delivering diesel fuel was discovered almost immediately. Appellant called the dealer who admitted the misdelivery. He did not offer, however, to correct the condition he had negligently created. Because the baler would not run on diesel fuel, appellant had to drain the diesel fuel from the baler and disconnect and purge the fuel lines. The fire occurred during appellant’s effort to correct the problem created by appellee. I cannot agree that as a matter of law or fact appellee was not in any way at fault for this occurrence. I much prefer the simplicity of comparative negligence under which the fact finder simply determines the percentage of negligence of the respective parties rather than the confusion of old incomprehensible doctrines left over from a different era.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse and remand.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
This case came on before the Court upon the Petition for Rehearing filed on behalf of the Appellant, and the Court, having carefully considered the case and the Petition for Rehearing, finds that the Petition for Rehearing should be denied, and it therefore is
ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing, filed in this case on behalf of the appellant be, and the same hereby is, denied.
CARDINE, J., would grant the Petition for Rehearing in this case.
ROSE, J., comments that he continues to feel strongly that the majority opinion is in error but finds no grounds to grant the petition for rehearing.