Court Opinion

ID: 9641446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:32:06.521375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:13.111415
License: Public Domain

JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting on rehearing, joined by HOLMAN, J.
I concur with the majority’s holding that gross negligence is a covered claim under the language of Admiral’s insurance contract with PeopleCare, and I agree that the question of whether it is now against public policy to insure punitive damages is not before us. I dissent, however, to the majority’s advisory opinion holding that it was not against public policy to insure against punitive damages on or before 1995.
To invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court for the purpose of deciding whether it was against public policy for Admiral to insure PeopleCare’s punitive damages on or before 1995, the party challenging the legality of insuring punitive damages, Admiral, must have standing to assert the complaint.1 Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction and stems from two constitutional limitations on that jurisdiction: the separation of powers doctrine and the open courts provision.2 The separation of powers doctrine prohibits courts from issuing advisory opinions.3 The distinctive feature of an advisory opinion is that it decides an abstract question of law without binding the parties. Rather than remedying an actual or imminent harm, an advisory opinion addresses only a hypothetical injury.4 Texas courts have no jurisdiction to render such opinions.5
Standing is also an aspect of the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution, which contemplates access to the courts for those litigants suffering an injury. Specifically, the open courts provision provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, ... shall have remedy by due course of law.6
Thus, there must be an actual, not merely hypothetical or generalized, grievance.7
As a ground for its motion for partial summary judgment, Admiral argued that Westchester is precluded from recovering on its Stowers8 action against Admiral for negligently refusing to settle the Cagles’ gross negligence claim against PeopleCare, because it was against public policy to insure punitive damages at that time. Admiral contends that punitive damages were uninsurable at that time because the underlying social purpose of punitive damages was, and is, to punish wrongdoers and prevent similar behavior against society in the future-an objective that would be frustrated if wrongdoers were permit*199ted to insure against their own grossly negligent conduct or willful injury to another. The trial court expressly granted Admiral’s motion on this ground declaring:
[IJnsurance coverage for punitive damages, now and at the time in question, violates the public policy of the State of Texas. Accordingly, coverage for punitive damages under the Admiral insurance policy is void.
In reversing the trial court’s judgment, a majority of this court has rendered the following pronouncement:
Whether or not the party against whom punitive damages are imposed actually pays (or its insurance company pays) such an award is irrelevant when the purpose of the award is to make an example of the party. It is the mere fact that the damages are assessed that sets the example to the public and other similarly situated parties.... In addition, the insurance code listed numerous entities that were prohibited from obtaining such coverage, but for-profit nursing homes were not listed. Consequently, we cannot say that coverage for such damages under Admiral’s policy was void as against public policy at that time.9
I do not believe we have jurisdiction to make this public policy decision because Admiral has no standing in this case to challenge the insurability of punitive damages on public policy grounds. I, therefore, dissent to this part of the majority’s opinion.
The question decided by the trial court — whether “insurance coverage for punitive damages ... at the time in question, violates the public policy of the State of Texas” — is an abstract question of law that has no binding effect on either party to this case. No insured of either insurance company is a party to the case and no party is seeking a judgment that would allow or deny coverage of an insured’s punitive damage award.10 Consequently, the trial court’s judgment remedied no actual or imminent harm to the public, or to a party, resulting from the potential coverage or noncoverage of a punitive damage award. It was, therefore, an advisory judgment which the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to render.
“Our jurisdiction over the merits of an appeal extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken.”11 Because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the hypothetical question of whether insurance coverage for punitive damages violated public policy on or before 1995, so do we.12
The only real issue between the parties to this case is whether Westchester is entitled under Stowers to recover damages from Admiral for its alleged negligence in refusing to settle a claim covered by the language of Admiral’s insurance contract with PeopleCare. Whether Admiral violated public policy when it agreed to insure PeopleCare against its own gross negligence is immaterial to Westchester’s right to recover against Admiral under Stowers.
The majority misunderstands the nature of the standing problem. The issue is not whether Westchester has standing to bring *200its Stowers action, as the majority believes, but whether Admiral has standing to challenge the legality insuring PeopleCare against punitive damages prior to 1995. Admiral cannot rely on Westchester’s standing to bring a Stowers action for the separate standing Admiral must have to challenge the legality of insuring People-Care’s punitive damages. Westchester’s Stowers action may involve a justiciable controversy, but Admiral’s pre-1995 public policy challenge does not.
Moreover, it is difficult to understand what the majority means by its statement that this opinion “confuses Admiral’s standing with Admiral’s failure to raise its public policy scope of coverage issue sooner. That is a question of estoppel, not standing.”13 This issue, which the majority has raised sua sponte, has no relevance to Admiral’s standing to challenge the in-surability of punitive damages. Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be waived.14 Because Admiral had no standing to challenge the legality of PeopleCare’s insurance contract on pre-1995 public policy grounds, the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to decide the issue whether Admiral was estopped from asserting it or not.15
I would hold that gross negligence is a covered claim under the language of Admiral’s insurance contract, and that West-chester, as PeopleCare’s equitable subro-gee, is entitled to pursue recovery on its Stowers action for any excess damages it paid on that claim as a result of Admiral’s negligence. I would further hold that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment against Westchester on public policy grounds because Admiral has no standing to challenge the insurability of punitive damages under the facts of this case. Because the trial court had no subject matter jurisdiction to decide the public policy question, I would vacate and set aside the trial court’s judgment16 and remand the case for trial on the remainder of Westchester’s Stowers action against Admiral.
HOLMAN, J. joins.

. Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex.2001). Although Westchester has not raised this issue, standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be waived by the parties. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex.1993).

. Id. at 443; see Tex. Const, art. II, § 1; Tex. Const, art. I, § 13.

. Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 302; Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex.1968).

. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).

. Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex.2000).

. Tex. Const, art. I, § 13 (emphasis supplied).

. Brown, 53 S.W.3d at 302.

. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Com.App.1929, holding approved).

. Maj. Op. at 189 (citation omitted).

. Admiral has not argued that public policy would be violated by allowing Westchester, as a Stowers plaintiff, to recover excess on a gross negligence claim, only that it was against public policy to insure punitive damages on or before 1995.

. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shores, 128 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).

. Id.

. Westchester Fire Ins. v. Admiral Ins., 152 S.W.3d 172, 190 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. filed) (op. on reh’g).

. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445.

. The majority's holding that Westchester is barred from claiming Admiral is estopped from challenging the insurability of punitive damages is yet another advisory ruling by the majority because neither party raised the issue of estoppel.

.Mobil Oil Corp., 128 S.W.3d at 722 (holding that if the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, “we only have jurisdiction to set the trial court’s judgment aside”).