Court Opinion

ID: 9446370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:52:57.958291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:37.775273
License: Public Domain

HAMLEY, Circuit Judge
(concurring)
_ in addition to paragraph 12 of the lease, quoted in the opinion of the court, the lease contained a paragraph 8 which reads as
"The GOvernment shall have the right, during the existence of this * ’ * , lease, to make a-terations, attach fixtures, and erect additions, structures, or signs, in or upon the premises hereby leased (provided such alterations, additions, structures, or , , ’ . , . , signs shall not be detrimental to or . ... , , inconsistent with the rights granted , ,, , , , to other tenants on the property or in the building in which said premises are located); which fixtures, additions, or structures so placed in or upon or attached to the said premises shall be and remain the property of the Government and may be removed therefrom by the Government prior to the termination of this lease. * * * ”
The nub of appellant’s contention is that, under paragraph 8, the Government was authorized to remove all of a particular fixture, addition, or structure, including the concrete foundations thereof, but that it could not remove a part of any such fixture, addition, or structure, leaving portions which were unusable and expensive to remove. Appellant poses the question: “If the Ap-pellee had removed the roof from each of the buildings, wouldn’t the Court be justified in saying that it must pay for the removal of the remaining part?” Acknowledging that there was no express covenant to complete the removal of any structures, • appellant argues that such a covenant is to be implied,
The leage in question gave the Gov_ ernment the right to remove improvements at the expiration of the lease, but not the duty to do g0_ There ig no express covenant requiring the Government to restore the premises to the same condition as that existing at the beginning of the term. Under these circumstances, there is no implied covenant of the kind suggested by appellant. n.w. Z age occasioned by reason of partial removal of improvements, unless there was negligence in accomplishing such removal.
The Iefal principle just stated finds support m a great many cases. See, „ , ^ i • for example, Duvanel v. Sinclair Refining Co., 170 Kan. 483, 227 P.2d 88, 23 A.L.R.2d 649; Fox v. Cities Service Oil Co., 201 Okl. 17, 200 P.2d 398; Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., v. Connellee, Tex.Civ.App., 39 S.W.2d 99. In each of the cited , , . . , cases, the tenant removed improvements, . . . . , ,. , ,, , leaving concrete foundations and blocks,
No negligence incident to the removal of the structures and the leaving of the concrete foundations was charged by appellant, or found by the court, The Government had good reason for removing the one and leaving the other, The structures could be used elsewhere and the foundations could not. The lack of reasonableness and the indications of wantonness, which are suggested by apPellant’s “horrible example” of removius^ roo^s’ *s absent here,
Under the rule referred to above, the Government would be free of liability even in the absence of a covenant expressly relieving it of responsibility for restoring the premises. But here there is such a covenant — paragraph 12 *883of the lease. A covenant to restore could not possibly be implied in the face of this express covenant to the contrary, As stated in Brimmer v. Union Oil Co. of California, 10 Cir., 81 F.2d 437, 440, 105 A.L.R. 454, “an express covenant upon a given subject deliberately entered into without fraud or mutual mistake, excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature.”