Court Opinion

ID: 9577285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:33:37.503578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:17.915190
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur completely in the majority opinion and write only to emphasize the factual basis upon which we have determined that Kelley did not, in fact, raise the affirmative defense of insanity.
“A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act . . . the person did not have mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such aci[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-3-2. However, in the face of defense evidence that an indicted act did not even occur, a defendant’s mental state in relation to such non-existent act does not matter. Clearly, whether one knows if an indicted act was right or wrong is irrelevant if one did not commit the act. See generally Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629 (266 SE2d 466) (1980). It is for this reason the affirmative defense of insanity requires the admission of the act in order to make relevant the defendant’s mental state in relation to the act and in order to carry the burden of proof with regard thereto.
However, here, the defendant took the stand at trial and flatly denied — repeatedly — that he committed the indicted act of pointing a pistol at a police officer:
[Q:] Did you ever aim the gun at either officer?
[A:] I never aimed the gun at either officer. . . .
[Q:] And you pointed the gun at the policemen in the hopes they would shoot and kill you. True or False?
[A:] False. I never pointed the gun at the police officers.
[Q:] Where did you point the gun?
[A:] Over the neighbor’s house. . . .
[Q:] Did you commit a crime back on March 5th?
[A:] Only against myself.
[Q:] What do you mean?
[A:] Well, I attempted to kill myself. I believe that’s —
[Q:] Let me rephrase my question. Did you commit the crime of aggravated assault of police officer —
[A:] No, sir; I did not.
A review of Kelley’s trial testimony shows that he was adamant that he had committed no crime; that he was holding the gun because he was suicidal; that the officers had shot at him for no reason; that when he realized that the police were shooting at him, he fell on the ground and threw the gun under a nearby car; and that it was the police officers who had mishandled the situation: “I think if they *181would have handled it a little less coarsely this all would have been settled with no shots being fired at me or anybody.”
Decided November 9, 1998.
Sharon S. Whitwell, for appellant.
William T. McBroom III, District Attorney, Daniel A. Hiatt, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Further, the defense called Dr. Jack Farrar, a clinical psychologist, who interviewed Kelley two weeks prior to trial. Dr. Farrar testified that at the time of the incident, Kelley did not know right from wrong. However, this testimony was directed only to Kelley’s desire to kill himself. As to the indicted act, Dr. Farrar specifically testified that Kelley “was not at all doing anything aggressive toward the officers.” When asked directly (and without objection) by the trial court whether Kelley committed the act of aggravated assault, i.e., pointing a pistol at the officers, the doctor replied, “I don’t believe he did.”1
In this case, the defense to the indicted act of pointing a pistol at a police officer was not insanity; it was a denial that the indicted act even occurred. Accordingly, as a defense, Kelley’s mental state in relation to an act that he denied doing was irrelevant and thus was not the proper subject of a charge to the jury. Gill v. State, 229 Ga. App. 462, 465 (494 SE2d 259) (1997).

 The other two witnesses called by the defense, Kelley’s girlfriend and his mother, testified that Kelley was a “good man” who would never do the indicted act. “If you’d give him all the money in the world to pull a trigger he wouldn’t have done it on anyone but himself.”