Court Opinion

ID: 9773842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:00:49.267484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:14.032790
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     AUG 29 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.   22-10086

                  Plaintiff-Appellee,            D.C. No.
                                                 1:20-cr-00207-JLT-SKO-1
    v.

LANE KELLY WHITTENBERG,                          MEMORANDUM*

                  Defendant-Appellant.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of California
                    Jennifer L. Thurston, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted August 25, 2023**
                              San Francisco, California

Before: BUMATAY, KOH, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

         Lane Whittenberg pleaded guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1), Felon in Possession of a Firearm. Whittenberg was sentenced to 70

months of imprisonment. He appeals the district court’s enhancement of his

sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.)

         *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
         **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). He also claims that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were

violated by the government’s introduction of new evidence at sentencing and its

late disclosure of discovery. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm.

1.    The district court did not abuse its discretion in enhancing Whittenberg’s

sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Whittenberg raises three challenges

relating to the enhancement: (A) whether the district court applied the appropriate

burden of proof; (B) whether the district court should have held an evidentiary

hearing; and (C) whether the evidence showed that he committed the alleged

crimes.

      A.     The district court applied the correct burden of proof. Before the

district court, Whittenberg conceded that the proper burden of proof was

preponderance of the evidence. However, he now asserts that a heightened burden

applies. We review for plain error. United States v. Depue, 912 F.3d 1227, 1234

(9th Cir. 2019). “As ‘a general rule,’ factual findings underlying a sentencing

enhancement need only be found by a preponderance of the evidence.” United

States v. Lonich, 23 F.4th 881, 910 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). However, in

some circumstances, we have applied a heightened burden when “the enhanced

sentence is four or more offense levels higher” and the enhanced sentence is “more

than double the initial sentencing range.” Id. at 911–12 (outlining the factors to be

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considered but noting that the determination turns on these two factors). In this

case, the enhancement increased the offence level by four, not more. Further, the

length of the sentence was not doubled. With the enhancement, the sentencing

guideline range increased to 63–78 months from 41–51 months. Thus, there was no

plain error in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard.

      B.     Regardless of whether plain error or abuse of discretion applies, see

United States v. Berry, 258 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2001) (standard of review), the

district court was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve any

alleged factual disputes. The district court recognized that there were some

discrepancies in the victims’ statements but concluded that the video evidence

confirmed the witnesses’ narratives about the alleged felony offenses of criminal

threats and discharging a firearm with gross negligence. Therefore, an evidentiary

hearing would not have altered the district court’s findings. Accordingly, the

district court did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error in not holding an

evidentiary hearing.

      C.     The district court did not clearly err in finding that Whittenberg

committed the felony offenses of discharging a firearm with gross negligence and

criminal threats. Even though both of these offenses are “wobblers” under

California law, “a ‘wobbler’ is presumptively a felony and ‘remains a felony

except when the discretion is actually exercised’ to make the crime a misdemeanor.

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Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 16 (2003) (quoting People v. Williams, 163 P.2d

692, 696 (Cal. 1945)). Thus, the district court properly considered the conduct to

be felony offenses.1

      The videos and the police reports support the district court’s conclusion that

Whittenberg discharged a firearm with gross negligence. California Penal Code

section 246.3(a) provides:

      any person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent
      manner which could result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a
      public offense.

To be subjected to a four-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), a defendant must have “used or possessed any firearm or

ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” Thus, the district court

must find that the defendant committed another felony offense using the firearm in

a manner that “facilitated or had the potential of facilitating” the defendant’s

felonious conduct. See United States v. Routon, 25 F.3d 815, 817 n.1 (9th Cir.

1994). Alternatively, a defendant can be subjected to the enhancement if he or she

“possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or

reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another

1
 Because only one felony is required for the four-level enhancement to apply, we
need not address the findings for both felony offenses. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Therefore, we only address discharging a firearm with gross
negligence.

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felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). In other words, a defendant need not

have actually committed another felony, if there is “evidence to show that he had a

‘firm intent’ to use the [firearm] in connection with another felony.” United States

v. Noster, 590 F.3d 624, 634 (9th Cir. 2009).

      Whittenberg challenges the district court’s findings that he committed this

felony offense. Whittenberg relies upon Noster and United States v. Jimison, 493

F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2007), to assert that, because an element of the crime is gross

negligence, which cannot be committed purposefully, there was no evidence of

intent to use the gun to commit the felony. This argument lacks merit. Intent is not

relevant when a defendant actually committed the felony offense. Both Noster and

Jimison involved defendants who had not actually committed another felony

offense but were alleged to have had the intent to commit another felony. See

Noster, 590 F.3d at 635 (noting that Noster “planned to use the incendiary devices

to bomb companies or commodities in a scheme to make money” (emphasis

added)); Jimison, 493 F.3d at 1151 (explaining that there was insufficient evidence

that the defendant had “formed a firm intent” to commit a felony offense). Here,

the district court found that Whittenberg’s discharge of the firearm was willful,

and, in discharging the firearm, he placed other people at risk because it was a

“populated area.” Thus, Whittenberg actually committed this felony, therefore his

intent to commit a felony was not relevant. See Noster, 590 F.3d at 634.

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       Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding Whittenberg

committed this felony offense and did not abuse its discretion in enhancing

Whittenberg’s sentence.

2.     The government did not violate Whittenberg’s Fifth Amendment right to due

process or his Sixth Amendment right to notice. The government argued at

sentencing that Whittenberg’s actions of firing a gun towards an unknown

individual was not accounted for in the Presentence Report (PSR). The government

also submitted evidence that a bullet had gone through a window on the night of

the incident. Even assuming that government’s speculative comments amounted to

improper conduct, the district court did not accept the government’s assertions

when it imposed its sentence. Thus, there was no harm to Whittenberg. See 28

U.S.C. § 2111 (outlining that “the court shall give judgment after an examination

of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial

rights of the parties”).

       To the extent that Whittenberg asserts that the government’s late disclosure

of evidence violated his rights, any error was harmless. Whittenberg obtained the

discovery prior to his guilty plea, yet he did not make any objections and

proceeded to change his plea. At sentencing, Whittenberg noted that the

government turned over the discovery late, but admitted that an earlier disclosure

would not have “changed anything in light of the underlying offense.” Thus,

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Whittenberg has failed to establish any prejudice. See United States v. Dupuy, 760

F.2d 1492, 1497 (9th Cir. 1985).

      AFFIRMED.

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