Court Opinion

ID: 9945813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 17:00:46.343794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:16.653261
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                                                                          FEB 28 2024
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL MARTIN SANDERS,                         No.    21-15333

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                2:18-cv-01471-JAT-DMF
 v.

TRINITY SERVICES GROUP                          MEMORANDUM*
INCORPORATED; et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted February 9, 2024
                                Phoenix, Arizona

Before: BERZON, HURWITZ, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

      Michael Sanders is an Arizona state prisoner. In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action,

he asserts Eighth Amendment violations arising from (1) Order 705 of the Arizona

Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry (“ADCRR”), which

mandates the use of four-point restraints on certain prisoners being treated in non-

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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ADCRR medical facilities, and (2) an allegedly inadequate prison diet. The district

court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We have jurisdiction over

Sanders’ appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

       1.    Sanders first raises a procedural argument, contending that the district

court abused its discretion in declining to further extend the deadline to respond to

the defendants’ summary judgment motions. We disagree. The court originally

extended the deadline by 63 days, warning Sanders that it was “not inclined to grant

further extensions.” When Sanders requested an additional 30 days to respond, the

court extended the deadline by another 11 days despite finding that Sanders had not

demonstrated diligence or provided good cause. Sanders nonetheless failed to file

by the extended deadline; indeed, his eventual response would have been untimely

even if the court had granted the additional 30-day extension he requested. For the

same reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Sanders’ late

filings.1

       2.    The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of

Charles Ryan, the former ADCRR director, and Chris Moody, the former warden of

the Lewis Prison, on Sanders’ claim that Order 705 violates the Eighth Amendment.

Ryan and Moody are the only defendants named in this claim, and Sanders does not

1
     The court nonetheless treated the firsthand allegations in Sanders’ verified
complaint as true when considering the defendants’ summary judgment motions.

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assert that either official made any specific decisions about the use of restraints

during his hospitalization. Rather, he contends that Order 705 is unconstitutional

because it prevented ADCRR guards from modifying his restraints when he

allegedly experienced painful post-surgery muscle cramps, and that Ryan and

Moody are liable for promulgating and enforcing the Order.

      We reject Sanders’ claim. Order 705.10.1.7.1 expressly allows ADCRR

personnel to modify or partially remove a hospitalized inmate’s restraints when a

medical need “is documented by a doctor.” Order 705.10.1.7.1.2 specifies that

“authorization from the Warden or Deputy Warden” is required only if “complete

removal of restraints for a medical need” is requested. The Order is therefore not on

its face “deliberately indifferent” to inmates’ health and safety. See Mendiola-

Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1258 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming a summary

judgment in favor of a county medical center on a prisoner shackling policy that

allowed medical personnel to “ask to have restraints loosened or removed as

necessary”). Sanders was regularly attended to by medical staff, including nurses,

during his four-day hospitalization. No provider documented a medical need for

restraint modification because of muscle cramping, and nurses occasionally adjusted

the restraints to prevent skin irritation and ensure proper blood flow.

      3.     The cursory allegations in the operative complaint do not plausibly state

a failure-to-train claim against Ryan or Moody. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

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679 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The

complaint simply asserts that Ryan was generally “responsible for . . . staff hiring,

supervision, deployment, and training,” and that Moody “failed to train his

subordinates” on the “obvious physical condition” exception in the restraint policy.2

There is no assertion that either defendant had anything more than “general

supervisory” authority over training, including any responsibility for creating or

approving training materials or for carrying out training. Coal. to Def. Affirmative

Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n

v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992)).3

      4.     Finally, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on

Sanders’ inadequate nutrition claim.      The Eighth Amendment forbids prison

nutrition so inadequate as to amount to “the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting

2
      Order 705.10.1.5.3 allows restraints to be modified by ADCRR guards when
an inmate is “obviously injured” or suffers from an “obvious physical condition.”
Ryan and Moody claim that this exception did not apply to Sanders’ alleged muscle
cramps. Their position is consistent with the text of Order 705.10.1.5.3, which
excuses the use of four-point restraints when an inmate has an “obvious physical
condition” such as “contracture of an extremity” or “deformity of an extremity” that
“prevents the application and use of usual restraints.” Although Sanders alleges that
his cramps were “obvious,” he does not assert that his pain “prevented” the
application of restraints.
3
      In any event, the failure-to-train allegations focus on the “obvious physical
condition” exception in Order 705.10.1.5.3, which does not appear to apply to
Sanders’ claims. See supra n.2.

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Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Sanders did not allege that the

dietician-approved menu designed by Trinity Services Group fell below that

forgiving standard. In addition, no evidence establishes that any of Sanders’s alleged

medical conditions were caused by his ADCRR diet. To the contrary, medical

records confirm that he has regained nearly all the weight he lost after his hip-

replacement surgery and describe him as “well developed and well nourished.”

      AFFIRMED.

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