Court Opinion

ID: 9472322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:56:37.443495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:51.893645
License: Public Domain

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
One matter is of utmost importance in this case: This case was dismissed without appellants having the opportunity to prove facts in support of their claims. The type of statistical data developed in other cases, cited by the majority, to support the presumptions in those cases from other circuits, is absent from this record. The district court and the majority rule that the five-time incompetence presumption is valid without consideration of statistical, expert, or other evidence. We do not know what has been the result of the five-time limitation rule and the limited review provision. We must ask: Would a two-time examination limitation with limited review be constitutional? Under the majority’s analysis, since facts are not important, any maximum number of times set by Alabama Bar officials for taking the Alabama Bar Examination with a limited right of review would be constitutional. Clearly, this case should not have been dismissed on its complaint. A finding of no violation of due process, like any other finding, must be based on facts developed, argued, and analyzed.
My position in this case is simply stated and supported by all of the law on the subject: Applicants who fail a state’s bar examination must have either the right to full review of their examinations (a hear*1005ing), or have the right to unlimited times to retake the examination.1
I dissent from the majority opinion because the limited right of review granted to Alabama bar applicants, combined with the five-time limitation on taking the bar examination, violates due process. The majority bases its holding of no violation of due process on a misinterpretation of Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940, 96 S.Ct. 2660, 49 L.Ed.2d 393 (1976).
In Brewer v. Wegmann, 691 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.1982), the Fifth Circuit clarified its reasoning in Tyler by holding that the Louisiana Bar examination procedure prohibiting failing applicants from obtaining review of their examinations satisfied due process requirements because the applicants had an unqualified right to retake the examination. The Brewer court concluded that Tyler’s holding that an unqualified right to retake the bar examination constitutes an adequate substitute for a due process hearing controlled its decision. Brewer, 691 F.2d at 217. While other circuits have followed the Fifth Circuit’s rationale, the majority today deviates from this binding precedent.
In Whitfield v. Illinois Board of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir.1974), the Seventh Circuit held that procedural due process did not require that a bar applicant be permitted to see his examination papers and compare them with others and model answers where he had the right to retake the examination. Whitfield, 504 F.2d at 476-78. In Whitfield, besides being entitled to retake the examination, the bar applicant could also discuss his performance .with one of the examiners. The Seventh Circuit held that “[gjiven the availability of these alternative procedures,” the applicant was not entitled to see his examination papers and compare them with model' answers. Whitfield, 504 F.2d at 477-78. In Poats v. Givan, 651 F.2d 495 (7th Cir.1981), the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its holding that the possibility of reexamination satisfies due process. Poats, 651 F.2d at 497.
In Lucero v. Ogden, 718 F.2d 355 (10th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 *1006S.Ct. 1308, 79 L.Ed.2d 706 (1984), the Tenth Circuit upheld the Colorado rule barring review of a bar applicant’s results, but permitting an applicant an absolute right to retake the bar examination for an unlimited number of.times. The Tenth Circuit held that the absolute unqualified right to retake the examination constituted an adequate substitute for a due process hearing. Lucero, 718 F.2d at 359. See also Singleton v. Louisiana State Bar Association, 413 F.Supp. 1092 (E.D.La.1976) (the district court upheld the Louisiana Bar rule prohibiting a post-examination review of failing papers. The district court relied on the Louisiana Bar rules providing liberal standards for retaking the bar examination).
The above cases illustrate the majority’s incorrect reading of Tyler v. Vickery. Where an unlimited right to retake the bar examination exists, due process is satisfied although the rules bar a full hearing. If, however, no unlimited right to retake the bar examination exists, a due process hearing must be held because the mechanism providing a substitute for the due process hearing no longer exists. In this case, an Alabama Bar applicant who has failed the bar examination five times cannot retake the examination. The applicant’s right to review consists of reviewing his paper, the three top papers, and the model answers. Without a right to retake the examination, this limited review fails to satisfy due process.2
The Seventh Circuit has held that “merely seeing [an] .examination or comparing it with others” fails to satisfy due process. Whitfield, 504 F.2d at 478. That court further held that due process could only be satisfied if the applicant could “confront the bar examiners and obtain from them explanations of their grades.” Whitfield, 504 F.2d at 478 (footnote omitted). While in Whitfield, the Seventh Circuit held that no due process hearing was required because a right to retake the examination existed, its rationale applies to the instant case where no right to retake the examination after failing it five times exists. The applicant must be able to discuss his examination with the bar examiners and attempt to obtain an explanation of the grades. See Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir.1976), on rehearing en banc, 563 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 1606, 56 L.Ed.2d 59 (1978) (reexamination may not be a more effective remedy than a due process hearing)-
Since no unlimited right to retake a bar examination exists in this case, I dissent from the majority’s holding that the limited right of review for an Alabama Bar applicant who has failed the examination five times satisfies due process. Without an absolute right to retake the examination, due process mandates a broader review procedure.
Most regrettably, the majority takes the Supreme Court holding in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), which held that “disproportionate impact ... standing alone, ... does not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny” to justify denial of the appellants’ claims on the ground that they did not allege that those who adopted and now administer the five-time rule are chargeable with intentional racial discrimination. Of course, they have made no such charge; no' such charge can ever be made. Because present officials cannot be charged with past intentional discrimination does not mean that a court need not consider the effects of past intentional, discrimination upon applicants in competitive endeavors. In fact, this circuit has long considered as relevant disparate impact due to past intentional discrimination.3
In Debra P. By Irene P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir.1984), the Eleventh *1007Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that the Florida Functional Literacy Examination could be used as a diploma sanction only after 1982. The district court had issued a four-year injunction against the test for two reasons. The reason relevant to this case is that the students in the high school class of 1983 would be the first to have attended physically integrated schools for all twelve years of their educational careers. We held that use of the test as a diploma sanction would be permissible only if the state satisfied the test set forth in McNeal v. Tate County School District, 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir.1975). The state had to demonstrate either (1) that the disproportionate failure of blacks was not caused by the present effects of past intentional segregation, or (2) that the use of the test as a diploma sanction would remedy those effects. McNeal, 508 F.2d at 1020; Debra P., 730 F.2d at 1414. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, this test should have been utilized in this case in determining whether the Alabama Bar Examination rule is constitutional in light of its disproportionate impact on blacks due to past intentional discrimination. The appellants were ready to prove that a disproportionate number of blacks fail the Alabama Bar examination, and therefore, the McNeal test should have been applied to developed facts. Instead, the district court and the majority accept a five-time examination rule as constitutionally adequate (without review procedures) because Alabama Bar officials say so. The appellants’ serious constitutional claims, supported by an abundance of case law, are summarily dismissed.4

. It is apparent that Alabama has simply not stayed abreast of the developing law in this area. A review of the rules from the other two states in this circuit show Florida and Georgia have both brought their rules in compliance with controlling law.
Article 6, section 9 of the Florida Bar Admission Rules provides:
Section 9. (a) An applicant must successfully complete the General Bar Examination and the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within 25 months from first submitting to any portion of the examination in Florida. An applicant who fails four times to pass any part of the General Bar Examination or who fails to pass both the General Bar Examination and the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within 25 months shall be ineligible to sit for any part of the examination until the passage of at least 1 administration of the General Bar Examination and the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) from the close of the 25-month period. At the end of that period, the applicant must again successfully complete the General Bar Examination and the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) in their entirety regardless of whether a part has been successfully completed in the past.
Although the state of Georgia allows only a limited review of examination papers, its rules do not limit the number of times an applicant may take the examination. The pertinent rule regarding review provides:
Section 16. Review of Examination Papers. Neither the Board of Bar Examiners nor any member thereof shall conduct post examination interviews with applicants nor shall applicants’ papers be retained beyond the commencement date of the succeeding examination. The Director of Bar Admissions may conduct post examination interviews with applicants but he shall not review individual questions or answers with an applicant, nor shall he allow inspection of either questions or answers following the giving of an' examination; provided, however, that an applicant may make duplicate copies of his answers at the time of taking the examination and may retain copies of questions with the exception of questions on that portion of any examination prepared for the Board by or under the supervision of the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
Supreme Court of Georgia Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law as Approved April 24, 1984.

. In passing it is worth noting that review of the "top three papers” is useless. For comparison purposes, the three papers above the pass-fail cut-off line are crucial.
Experience in these matters teaches me that oftentimes 50 to 60 applicants will fail or pass on differences of less than 1 point.

. The appellant Varner clearly alleges that past intentional racial discrimination in Alabama has caused a disproportionate impact on him of *1007Alabama’s five-time rule. Clearly, this claim should not have been dismissed without any evidence being taken.

. Aside from the dictates of case law, states now allow unlimited times to take bar examinations because they realize the frivolity in an argument asserting that one who passes an examination on the fifth attempt is competent to represent the public, but one who passes an examination on a sixth attempt is not competent to represent the public. When such an argument is made in the shadow of a history where no bar examination was required for many years, or graduation from an accredited law school is not required for the practice of law, such an argument becomes even more frivolous.