Court Opinion

ID: 9693808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:01:18.891079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:18.491947
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                 No. 22-10203

             Plaintiff-Appellee,            D.C. No.
                                         2:05-cr-00473-
 v.                                          WBS-1

ARNOLD RAY TAYLOR,
                                           OPINION
             Defendant-Appellant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Eastern District of California
      William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

         Argued and Submitted May 10, 2023
              San Francisco, California

                 Filed August 25, 2023

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Morgan Christen, and Daniel
               A. Bress, Circuit Judges.

              Opinion by Judge Christen
2                         USA V. TAYLOR

                          SUMMARY *

                         Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed the special conditions of supervised
release imposed by the district court in a case in which
Arnold Ray Taylor argued that the district court
(1) unconstitutionally delegated its judicial authority to
Taylor’s probation officer to determine the duration of the
substance abuse treatment required in Special Condition 2,
and (2) erred because it imposed an above-Guidelines
sentence and failed to specifically explain its reasons for
doing so.
    The panel held that the district court, which ordered a
specific time range for Taylor’s inpatient substance
treatment with a hard upper limit of one year, did not
unconstitutionally delegate its judicial authority by ordering
the probation officer to supervise Taylor’s progress in
inpatient treatment, and allowing the probation officer the
discretion to reduce—but not increase—the duration of his
inpatient treatment in consultation with Taylor’s care
provider.
    The panel held that the district court’s imposition of
Special Condition 2 in addition to a high-end Guidelines
sentence did not constitute an upward variance. The panel
explained that the Sentencing Guidelines permit community
confinement to be imposed for longer than six months when,
as here, intended to achieve successful drug rehabilitation
(U.S.S.G. § 5F1.1 cmt. nt. 2); and that inpatient treatment

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                       USA V. TAYLOR                      3

does not fit within the Guidelines definition of home
detention, which may only be imposed as a substitute for
imprisonment (U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2).

                       COUNSEL

Douglas J. Beevers (argued), Assistant Federal Public
Defender; Heather E. Williams, Federal Defender; Federal
Public Defender’s Office, Sacramento, California; for
Defendant-Appellant.
Alstyn Bennett (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;
Camil A. Skipper, Assistant United States Attorney,
Appellate Chief; Phillip A. Talbert, United States Attorney;
Eastern District of California, United States Attorney’s
Office, Sacramento, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
4                      USA V. TAYLOR

                        OPINION

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:

    Arnold Ray Taylor challenges the sentence he received
after violating several conditions of his supervised release.
Taylor first argues that the district court unlawfully
delegated its judicial authority to his probation officer to
determine the duration of his inpatient substance abuse
treatment. His second argument is that the court erred
because one year of inpatient treatment, plus the prison time
he was sentenced to serve, exceeds the maximum
recommended sentence for his offense, and the district court
failed to explain what Taylor considers an upward variance.
Finding no error, we affirm the special conditions of
supervised release imposed by the district court.
                             I
    Taylor was convicted of drug- and firearm-related
offenses in 2006 and sentenced to 117 months in prison with
a 60-month term of supervised release. He was released
from prison in 2014, but the district court revoked his
supervised release in 2018 because Taylor violated the
conditions of his release by possessing a firearm and failing
to notify his probation officer of a contact with law
enforcement. The district court sentenced Taylor to 27
months in prison followed by another term of supervised
release, this one for 33 months. This second term of
supervised release commenced on April 16, 2020. The
conditions of release were modified several times to address
Taylor’s “stressors at home” and continued use of
methamphetamine.
                        USA V. TAYLOR                        5

     In April 2022, Taylor’s probation officer filed a petition
alleging that Taylor had again violated the conditions of his
supervised release by failing to complete a residential
reentry program, acquiring a new law violation for
misdemeanor battery against his wife and daughter, and
failing to provide notice of his arrest. Taylor admitted the
new law violation and the failure to notify.
    The Government filed a memorandum joining the
probation officer’s recommendation that the district court
revoke Taylor’s term of supervised release and sentence him
to 14 months in custody followed by 24 months of
supervised release. The Government also endorsed the
probation officer’s recommended special conditions for this
third term of supervised release, including the requirement
that Taylor participate in an inpatient substance abuse
treatment program for up to 365 days under the supervision
of his probation officer (Special Condition 2) and reside in a
residential reentry center for up to 180 days (Special
Condition 6). The probation officer’s recommendation
stated that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range for Taylor’s
conduct—a Grade C violation—was 8 to 14 months. The
Government argued that a high-end Guidelines sentence was
appropriate because “Taylor ha[d] failed to meaningfully
participate in several opportunities for drug treatment and
instead ha[d] engaged in an escalating pattern of behavior,
resulting in his arrest.”
    Taylor objected to the probation officer’s recommended
sentence on two grounds. He first argued that the imposition
of Special Condition 2 would constitute an unlawful
delegation of judicial authority. Separately, he argued that a
14-month sentence of imprisonment, coupled with Special
Conditions 2 and 6—which respectively imposed up to one
year of inpatient treatment and up to 180 days in a residential
6                           USA V. TAYLOR

reentry center—would constitute an unjustified upward
variance from the Guidelines range. Taylor’s second
argument was premised on his contention that, pursuant to
the Guidelines, both of the proposed special conditions
restrict liberty so significantly that they are akin to
imprisonment. 1
    At Taylor’s revocation hearing, the district court found
that Taylor had violated the conditions of his supervised
release. The court revoked Taylor’s supervised release and
imposed a sentence of 14 months to serve in prison, along
with an additional 24-month term of supervised release. The
district court indicated that a high-end Guidelines sentence
and Special Condition 2 were appropriate because Taylor

1
  The parties use the terms “upward departure” and “upward variance”
interchangeably. We explained the difference between a departure and
a variance in United States v. Cruz-Perez:
         A “departure” is typically a change from the final
         sentencing range computed by examining the
         provisions of the Guidelines themselves. It is
         frequently triggered by a prosecution request to reward
         cooperation, or by other factors that take the case
         “outside the heartland” contemplated by the
         Sentencing Commission when it drafted the
         Guidelines for a typical offense. A “variance,” by
         contrast, occurs when a judge imposes a sentence
         above or below the otherwise properly calculated final
         sentencing range based on application of the other
         statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
567 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Applying these
definitions, Taylor’s argument is that the district court applied an upward
variance, not an upward departure, because he does not allege that the
district court relied on any of the Guidelines’ provisions to change the
Guidelines range. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 5K2.0
(U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021).
                       USA V. TAYLOR                        7

had committed a serious crime, he had relapsed several
times, and he had repeatedly violated the conditions of his
supervised release, in part due to drug and alcohol abuse.
    At the revocation hearing, Taylor’s counsel continued to
argue that the imposition of Special Conditions 2 and 6
constituted an unwarranted upward variance from the
Guidelines range because Special Conditions 2 and 6 were
comparable to imprisonment. Ultimately, the court declined
to impose Special Condition 6 (the residential reentry
program), but it rejected the premise that inpatient treatment
and residential reentry programs are as restrictive of liberty
as prison, and it adopted Special Condition 2 as articulated
in the presentence report. That condition required:

       You must participate in an inpatient
       substance abuse/alcohol abuse treatment
       program and follow the rules and regulations
       of that program, for a period of up to 365
       days, and up to 10 additional days for
       substance abuse detoxification services if
       deemed necessary. The probation officer, in
       consultation with the treatment provider, will
       supervise your participation in the program.

When making this ruling, the district court stated that it had
“considered all the statutory provisions, including all of the
sentencing factors in section 3583(e) as well as the policy
statements issued by the sentencing commission.” Taylor
timely appealed.
                             II
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo the district court’s construction of the U.S.
8                      USA V. TAYLOR

Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. Harris, 999 F.3d
1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 2021), as well as claims that conditions
of supervised release violate the Constitution, United States
v. Gibson, 998 F.3d 415, 418 (9th Cir. 2021).
    We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). The district
court abuses its discretion if it commits procedural error by
“fail[ing] adequately to explain the sentence selected,
including any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United
States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008); see also
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. To impose a non-Guidelines sentence,
district courts “must consider the extent of the deviation and
ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to
support the degree of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50;
see also Carty, 520 F.3d at 991–92. However, if a district
court does not adequately state its reasons for varying from
the Guidelines and no objection is raised, we review the
sentence for plain error. United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d
1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.
Halamek, 5 F.4th 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2021).
                             III
                              A
    Taylor argues that the district court delegated the
authority to decide the length of his inpatient treatment in
violation of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Because
Taylor challenged Special Condition 2 as an unlawful
delegation before the district court, we review de novo. See
Gibson, 998 F.3d at 418; cf. United States v. Vieke, 348 F.3d
811, 813 (9th Cir. 2003).
    Drawing most heavily on our decisions in United States
v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), and
                        USA V. TAYLOR                        9

United States v. Nishida, 53 F.4th 1144 (9th Cir. 2022),
Taylor contends that the district court impermissibly
delegated its judicial authority to his probation officer
because the court tasked the probation officer with
supervising Taylor’s progress in inpatient substance abuse
treatment for a period of up to one year. In Taylor’s view,
Special Condition 2 delegated to the probation officer the
unfettered authority to decide “whether to choose a program
of one day or up to one year.” We read our case law, and the
condition the court actually imposed, differently.
    In United States v. Stephens, we considered whether a
district court may lawfully allow a probation officer to “set
the maximum number of non-treatment-program drug tests”
for a defendant on supervised release. 424 F.3d 876, 882
(9th Cir. 2005). Concerns regarding the separation of
powers dictated our conclusion that “a probation officer may
not decide the nature or extent of the punishment imposed
upon a probationer” because the imposition of punishment is
an exercise of judicial authority. Id. at 881 (quoting United
States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005)); see U.S.
Const. art. III. Stephens also concluded that it is permissible
to delegate ministerial tasks to the probation officer such as
deciding “the details of where and when [a] condition will
be satisfied.” Id. at 880–81 (emphases added). In United
States v. Esparza, we elaborated on the rule from Stephens
and held that a district court may not impose a condition of
supervised release that allows a probation officer to choose
between inpatient and outpatient treatment because such a
decision implicates the nature of punishment. 552 F.3d at
1091; see also Nishida, 53 F.4th at 1151.
   The district court did not run afoul of Esparza when it
imposed Special Condition 2 in Taylor’s case because the
court unambiguously directed that the nature of Taylor’s
10                     USA V. TAYLOR

punishment would include inpatient substance abuse
treatment. The question presented by Taylor’s case is
whether the district court violated the rule from Stephens by
delegating to Taylor’s probation officer the discretion to
decide the “extent” of Taylor’s inpatient treatment. See 424
F.3d at 881.
     We addressed a somewhat similar issue in United States
v. Nishida, 53 F.4th 1144. There, the district court did not
specify any duration for a special condition requiring
participation in a substance abuse treatment program, but the
defendant did not object in the trial court. Id. at 1148, 1150
n.2.    On appeal, Nishida argued that the condition
improperly “allow[ed] the probation officer to impose an
indefinite term” of substance abuse treatment. Id. at 1151.
We reviewed for plain error only and rejected Nishida’s
argument that the condition allowed the probation officer to
impose an indefinite treatment term. Id. We reasoned that
“the probation officer’s authority [wa]s necessarily cabined
in by the defined duration of supervision.” Id. Nishida is
relevant to the question presented by Taylor’s appeal, but it
provides limited guidance because our review in Nishida
was for plain error, and we expressly resolved only Nishida’s
specific argument on appeal: that the district court had
authorized an indefinite term of treatment. See id.
    Here, we conclude that the district court did not err
because it ordered a specific time range for Taylor’s
inpatient substance abuse treatment with a hard upper limit
of one year. The probation officer was granted the authority
to allow less than one year of inpatient treatment, but
contrary to Taylor’s suggestion, Special Condition 2 did not
give the probation officer unbridled discretion. The district
court expressly required that the probation officer act only
“in consultation with [Taylor’s] treatment provider,” and the
                        USA V. TAYLOR                        11

period of inpatient treatment was to be no more than one
year. We conclude the district court did not unlawfully
delegate its judicial authority or give the probation officer
unbridled discretion by tasking the probation officer with
supervising Taylor’s treatment progress and by authorizing
the probation officer (in conjunction with Taylor’s treatment
provider) to allow less than one full year of inpatient
treatment. See United States v. Ortega, 19 F.4th 831, 833–
34 (5th Cir. 2021) (upholding delegation of authority to
probation officer to decide how long defendant would reside
in an inpatient reentry center within range of four to twelve
months).
    In addition to finding that the court sufficiently specified
the duration of Taylor’s treatment, several practical
considerations support our conclusion. First, we recognize
that district court judges are often dependent upon the
professional advice of treatment providers to determine
when the rehabilitative objectives of treatment programs
have been accomplished. A district court cannot predict
whether an individual will make progress in a treatment
program, nor the rate of any individual’s progress, at the time
the court formulates conditions of supervised release. If we
were to rigidly require that trial courts specify the precise
length of inpatient treatment without regard to the progress
made once treatment is underway, courts might be
incentivized to err on the side of selecting lengthier periods
of treatment to maximize the odds of successful outcomes.
That would result in greater deprivation of liberty than
necessary for some defendants, and would simultaneously
reduce the availability of treatment resources for others in
need of them.
    If district courts were required to evaluate each
defendant’s treatment progress and decide whether early
12                        USA V. TAYLOR

release is warranted, courts would frequently need to
schedule hearings or receive and review interim progress
reports on a defendant-by-defendant basis. That prospect
would surely consume an enormous amount of resources
from treatment providers (to prepare reports or provide
testimony), as well as from judges, court staff, and probation
officers (to receive and review reports and testimony). This
sort of resource-intensive approach is warranted in select
circumstances, 2 but requiring intensive court monitoring for
every defendant undergoing substance abuse treatment
would place a heavy burden on an already-overworked
system.
    Having considered the record in this case and the
consequences of the rule Taylor advocates, we reject his
contention that the district court unconstitutionally delegated
its judicial authority by ordering the probation officer to
supervise Taylor’s progress in inpatient treatment, and
allowing the probation officer the discretion to reduce—but
not increase—the duration of his inpatient treatment in
consultation with Taylor’s care provider.
                                 B
   Taylor next argues that the district court erred because it
imposed an above-Guidelines sentence and failed to
specifically explain its reasons for doing so. This issue turns
on whether the imposition of Special Condition 2 constituted
an upward variance. If it did, the court was required to
explain its variance. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 993; see also
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court was unpersuaded by

2
  See, e.g., Drug Courts, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Off. of Just. Programs,
https://www.ojp.gov/feature/drug-courts/overview
[https://perma.cc/D3BC-4RH8] (last modified May 16, 2023).
                        USA V. TAYLOR                       13

Taylor’s contention that inpatient treatment is akin to serving
prison time, so the court did not accept the premise that the
cumulative sentence it imposed (14 months of prison time
plus inpatient treatment of up to one year) exceeded the
maximum sentence recommended by the Guidelines. As a
result, the district court did not provide an explanation for
any variance.
    The Government suggests that Taylor failed to preserve
this argument and it urges us to review for plain error. We
are not persuaded. Taylor clearly argued in memos filed
before the revocation hearing, and in argument presented at
the revocation hearing, that imposing Special Condition 2
would constitute an impermissible upward variance. We
therefore review the district court’s decision to impose
Special Condition 2, in addition to a high-end prison term,
for an abuse of discretion. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.
    Taylor argues Special Condition 2 constituted an upward
variance for two separate reasons. First, he observes that the
application notes for Guideline 5F1.1 define “community
confinement” to include “residence in a[n] . . . alcohol or
drug rehabilitation center,” and the application notes
recommend that community confinement “not be imposed
for a period in excess of six months.” USSG § 5F1.1 cmt.
nts. 1–2. Both Taylor and the Government recognize that
Special Condition 2 is a form of community confinement,
but that does not end the inquiry. The Guideline notes state
that community confinement “generally should not be
imposed for a period in excess of six months,” but they also
provide that “[a] longer period may be imposed to
accomplish the objectives of a specific rehabilitative
program, such as drug rehabilitation.” Id. § 5F1.1 cmt. nt. 2
(emphasis added). Here, the record makes clear that the
district court permissibly imposed Special Condition 2 for
14                      USA V. TAYLOR

longer than six months because Taylor had failed to
successfully complete the previously imposed terms of
supervised release due to his chronic and ongoing substance
abuse. The condition was intended to achieve successful
drug rehabilitation.
    Next, Taylor asserts that in addition to constituting
“community confinement,” inpatient substance abuse
treatment also qualifies as “home detention,” which
Guideline 5F1.2 states may only be imposed as a “substitute
for imprisonment.” Id. § 5F1.2. Again, we disagree. An
application note to this Guideline defines “home detention”
as entailing “a program of confinement and supervision that
restricts the defendant to his place of residence continuously,
except for authorized absences.” Id. § 5F1.2 cmt. nt. 1
(emphasis added). Though the “place of residence . . . need
not be the place where the defendant previously resided” and
“may be any place of residence, so long as the owner of the
residence . . . agrees to any conditions that may be imposed
by the court,” id. § 5F1.2 cmt. nt. 3 (emphasis added), this
definition clearly contemplates a private residence, as
opposed to an inpatient treatment center.              Another
application note makes this apparent. It specifies that home
detention must be “enforced by appropriate means of
surveillance by the probation office,” such as electronic
monitoring, and “the defendant is required to be in his place
of residence at all times except for approved absences.” Id.
§ 5F1.2 cmt. nt. 1.
    In sum, we are persuaded that Special Condition 2
constitutes community confinement, but we reject Taylor’s
argument that Special Condition 2 qualifies as both
community confinement and home detention. Inpatient
treatment does not fit the definition of home detention, and
accepting Taylor’s interpretation would entirely blur the
                          USA V. TAYLOR                            15

distinction between two terms the Guidelines take care to
define separately. 3 While the Guidelines specify that home
detention can be imposed “only as a substitute for
imprisonment,” the Guidelines include no such limit on the
imposition of community confinement. Compare id.
§ 5F1.1, with id. § 5F1.2; see also id. § 5D1.3(e)(1)–(2).
   Because the Guidelines allowed Special Condition 2 to
be imposed for longer than six months, and Special
Condition 2 does not constitute home detention, the
imposition of Special Condition 2 in addition to a high-end
Guidelines sentence did not constitute an upward variance.
The district court did not err by imposing Special Condition
2.
    AFFIRMED.

3
   The application notes for Guideline 5F1.1 define “community
confinement” as “residence in a community treatment center, halfway
house, restitution center, mental health facility, alcohol or drug
rehabilitation center, or other community facility.” USSG § 5F1.1 cmt.
nt. 1. Defendants subject to community confinement are allowed to
leave the facility during non-residential hours for facility-approved
programs. Id. The definition of community confinement makes no
mention of surveillance or electronic monitoring.