Court Opinion

ID: 9645687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:32:45.367041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:46.682423
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part on State’s Petition for Discretionary Review.
I concur in the resolution of the first ground for review but dissent to the resolution of the second ground for review.
I.
Only the fourth paragraph of the instant indictment is relevant to this opinion. That paragraph alleged that appellee:
... did then and there intentionally subject [the victim] to sexual harassment by making unwelcome sexual advances and/or making request for sexual favors, submission to which was expressly and implicitly made a term and condition of the exercise and enjoyment by the said [victim] of a right and/or privilege, to-wit: the right and/or privilege to obtain access and use of the motor vehicle under the care, custody and control of the said [the victim], and the defendant was then and there acting under the color of his office and/or employment as a public servant, namely a police officer for the City of Wichita Falls, Texas.
Appellee contended the paragraph should be quashed because it faded to provide notice of the manner and means of the alleged unlawful conduct and/or to further describe or define “unwelcome sexual advances” and “request for sexual favors.” The trial judge granted appellee’s motion and quashed the fourth paragraph of the indictment. The State appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Edmond, 903 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1995).
The Court of Appeals held:
Because the terms “unwelcome sexual advances” and “requests for sexual favors” do not fairly or adequately notify Edmond of the specific act or acts that form the basis of the accusation against which he must defend himself, and because those terms as used in the indictment bar any later prosecution for the same offense, the trial court correctly granted Edmond’s motion to quash.
Id., 903 S.W.2d at 862.
The majority reverses, holding the indictment is sufficient because it tracked the stat*131utory definition of sexual harassment which includes “unwelcome sexual advances” and “requests for sexual favors” and, therefore, is sufficiently specific to provide appellee with notice of the charged offense. Ante, 933 S.W.2d at 128. For the following reasons, I disagree.
II.
An accused’s right to notice of the accusation against him is premised upon constitutional principles, both federal and state, and several statutory provisions. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. Art. I, § 10 of the Texas Constitution guarantees an accused the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him. And, the Legislature enacted statutes to protect this right. See, Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 21.02(7) (“The offense must be set forth in plain and intelligible words.”); art. 21.03 (“Everything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.”); art. 21.04 (“The certainty required in an indictment is such as will enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any prosecution for the same offense.”); art. 21.11 (An indictment is sufficient if it gives “the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged, and enable[s] the court ... to pronounce a proper judgment_”); art. 21.15 (Indict ment charging recklessness or criminal negligence must set forth the “act or acts relied upon to constitute recklessness or criminal negligence_”); art. 21.19 (An indictment shall not be insufficient if any defect of form does not “prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.”); and, art. 21.23 (The statutes pertaining to allegations in an indictment also apply to informations.).
Long ago, to protect this right'to notice, we held:
Our statutes only require such certainty in indictments as will enable the accused to plead the judgment rendered thereon in bar of any subsequent proceeding. Our decisions hold ... that the indictment should set out the particular offense charged with such certainty as that a presumptively innocent man seeking to know what he must meet may ascertain fully therefrom the matters charged against him.1
Hardin v. State, 85 Tex.Crim. 220, 211 S.W. 233, 236 (1919). See also, Castillo v. State, 689 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (“[T]he question presented is whether the face of the indictment or charging instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense.”); Swabado v. State, 597 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); and, Earl v. State, 33 Tex.Crim. 570, 28 S.W. 469 (1894). More recently we held:
... an [indictment] must allege facts sufficient to give the accused notice of the particular offense with which he is charged.... It is not sufficient to say that the accused knew with what offense he was charged; rather, we must inquire as to whether the face of the instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense.
Haecker v. State, 571 SW.2d 920, 921 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). See also, Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Beck v. State, 682 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); McBrayer v. State, 642 SW.2d 504 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Evans v. State, 623 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Moore v. State, 532 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
An accused is not required to anticipate any and all variant facts the State might hypothetically seek to establish. Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Therefore, in the face of a motion to quash, an indictment must “allege on its face the facts necessary (1) to show that the offense was committed, (2) to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, and (3) to give the defendant notice of precisely what he is charged with.” Terry v. State, 471 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). See also, DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (It is improper to look to the record of the case to determine whether the defendant had notice.); and, Beck, 682 *132S.W.2d at 554 (“[A]n offense should be charged in plain and intelligible words with such certainty as to enable an accused to know what he will be called upon to defend against and to enable him to plead judgment that may be given as it is in bar of any further prosecution for the same offense.”).
To determine whether an indictment provides adequate notice we look at the indictment as a whole, from the defendant’s perspective. DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 67 (Court will focus on the indictment as a whole to determine if it sufficiently charges an offense.); Dennis v. State, 647 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Court focuses on the indictment as a whole.); Jeffers v. State, 646 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (Court reviews indictment from the defendant’s perspective.); Gorman v. State, 634 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (Court considers the indictment from the defendant’s perspective.); Drumm, 560 S.W.2d at 946 (We examine “the criminal accusation from the perspective of the accused....”); and, Swabado, 597 S.W.2d at 364 (“The accused must be given information upon which he may prepare his defense and this information must come from the face of the indictment.”).
A motion to quash an indictment should be granted where the language concerning the defendant’s conduct is so vague or indefinite as to deny the defendant effective notice of the acts he allegedly committed. DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 67. See also, Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (Opinion on Rehearing); Lindsay v. State, 588 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Cruise v. State, 587 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); and, Haecker, 571 S.W.2d at 920. As a general rule, an indictment which tracks the statutory language is sufficient. Daniels, 754 S.W.2d at 218; Castillo, 689 S.W.2d at 448; Beck, 682 S.W.2d at 554; Evans, 623 S.W.2d at 925; May v. State, 618 S.W.2d 333, 341 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Haecker, 571 S.W.2d at 921; and, Ducree v. State, 681 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984). And, it is rare when an indictment, drafted in the language of a penal statute, is insufficient to provide a defendant notice of the offense charged. Daniels, 754 S.W.2d at 218; Beck, 682 S.W.2d at 554; Evans, 623 S.W.2d at 925; and, May, 618 S.W.2d at 341. This is because the State is not normally required to plead the pure evidentiary facts upon which it will rely. Daniels, 754 S.W.2d at 218; Beck, 682 S.W.2d at 554; Ducree, 681 S.W.2d at 158; May, 618 S.W.2d at 341; Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); and, Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966).
But there are two exceptions to the general rule that indictments drafted in the statutory language are sufficient. First, where an indictment contains a necessary allegation of an act by the defendant which comprises more than one statutorily defined means of its performance, but the indictment fails to specify which of the statutory definitions of the act is relied upon, the indictment fails to provide the constitutionally required notice. Gibbons v. State, 652 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Gorman, 634 S.W.2d at 682-683; Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (Opinion on Rehearing); Mullinax v. State, 756 S.W.2d 40, 42-43 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1988); Jackson v. State, 743 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1985); and, Bertram v. State, 670 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1983). But see, Reese v. State, 712 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Indictment for aggravating kidnapping did not have to further define “restrain.”).
In Geter v. State, 779 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), the defendant was charged with theft, namely appropriating United States Currency without the effective consent of its owner. The defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment because it failed to provide her notice of how her consent was not effective. The trial judge denied her motion. At the time the Texas Penal Code defined consent as follows:
“Effective Consent” includes consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner. Consent is not effective if:
(A) induced by deception or coercion;
(B) given by a person the actor knows is not legally authorized to act for the owner;
(C) given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect, or intox*133ication is known by the actor to be unable to make reasonable property dispositions; or
(D) given solely to detect the commission of an offense.
Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 31.01(4) (Since amended and now appearing at Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 31.01(3).). We reversed, holding the indictment was insufficient to provide the defendant notice of which definition the State would rely upon to prove she had no effective consent. Geter, 779 S.W.2d at 407. See also, Haecker, supra (Indictment for cruelty to animals which failed to allege among the many definitions of “torture” was insufficient.).
Second, if the statutory language is not completely descriptive, merely tracking the language of the statute is insufficient to provide the constitutionally required notice to the defendant. Haecker, 571 S.W.2d at 921-922; and, Conklin v. State, 144 Tex.Crim. 343, 162 S.W.2d 973 (1942). For example, in Swabado, the defendant was charged with tampering with a government record and filed a motion to quash the indictment, contending it was vague and ambiguous. Id., 597 S.W.2d at 363-363. The trial judge denied the motion. We held the trial judge erred in denying the motion because the indictment failed to identify what government records were allegedly tampered with. The defendant, a nursing home administrator for several years prior to the indictment, routinely prepared and filed government records. Id., 597 S.W.2d at 363. We further held the date alleged in the indictment could not be used to identify the government records because the State was entitled to prove that the offense was committed at any time prior to the return of the indictment which was within the period of limitation. Ibid. See, Hill v. State, 544 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); and, Nees v. State, 402 S.W.2d 186 (Tex.Cr.App.1966). Thus, the statutory language was insufficient to provide the defendant with notice of the offense for which he was charged. Swabado, 597 S.W.2d at 363. See, Olurebi v. State, 870 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Tex.Cr.App.1994) (Indictment which fails to notify the defendant of the manner in which a credit card is fictitious, is insufficient.); Castillo, 689 S.W.2d at 448 (Indictment which failed to allege the manner in which the defendant “started a fire” was insufficient.); Miller v. State, 647 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Indictment which failed to allege the manner and means by which the defendant destroyed property was insufficient.); Jeffers, 646 S.W.2d at 187-188 (Indictment which failed to allege the manner by which the defendant received bets or offers to bet was insufficient.); and, Ex parte Davis, 642 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982) (Indictment which failed to provide duplication of the allegedly forged instrument was insufficient to provide constitutionally required notice.). But, Ozack v. State, 646 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Statutory language was descriptive of the “offer to engage in sexual conduct.”); and, Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 695 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (Indictment did not have to define “peace officer.”).
III.
Sexual harassment is defined as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person’s exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 39.03(c). Paragraph four alleges appellee made “unwelcome sexual advances” and/or requests “for sexual favors.”
The State contends the instant allegations are sufficient because the indictment specifies which of the terms within the statutory definition of sexual harassment are relied upon to convict. According to the State, the Gibbons, Geter and Ferguson, first exception is not applicable. The majority agrees and so do I.
However, the majority does not address the holding of the Court of Appeals or appellant’s contention under the second exception, namely that the terms “are susceptible to an almost endless list of possible meanings.” Appellee’s Brief, pg. 12. Appellee contends that “unwelcome sexual advances” and “requests for sexual favors” are not completely descriptive of the offense. Stated different*134ly, appellee contends the statutory definition of sexual harassment is insufficient to satisfy his constitutional and statutory rights to notice of the charges against him. I agree.
Appellee is not required to “anticipate any and all variant facts the State might hypothetically seek to establish.” Drumm, 560 S.W.2d at 947. And, even though the “unwelcome sexual advances” and “requests for sexual favors” are parts of the statutory definition of sexual harassment, those terms are too general to provide appellee notice of the particular offense for which he is charged or to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. See, Terry, 471 S.W.2d at 852. In the early words of our Court, it would be all but impossible for the “presumptively innocent man .. to ascertain fully [from this indictment] the matters charged against him.” Hardin, 211 S.W. at 233. Indeed, the acts or omissions which might constitute “unwelcome sexual advances” or “requests for sexual favors,” both implicitly or explicitly are countless. As the Court of Appeals noted:
There is no statutory definition of “unwelcome sexual advances” or “request for sexual favors.” [Both terms] potentially encompass an extremely broad spectrum of behavior. Offering to give a ride home to or pay for lunch could be interpreted as “unwelcome sexual advances,” as could an endless variety of behavior other than that which is overtly sexual in nature. Likewise, a “request for sexual favors” need not mean a lewd proposition involving an ultimate sex act. Instead, such a “request” could include an obscene joke or a request that someone arrange a “date” with a third party.
Edmond, 903 S.W.2d at 861.
Because the instant indictment fails to provide the notice guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and art. I, § 10 of the Texas Constitution, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
TV.
I join the majority opinion as it relates to the first ground for review but I dissent to the resolution of the second ground for review.

. AH emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.