Court Opinion

ID: 9723737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:29:33.11592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:51.409660
License: Public Domain

WORK, Acting P. J.
I concur in the majority opinion except for part V; as to the denial of attorney fees, I dissent.
The trial court obtained an admission from the district attorney that the misdemeanor arraignment proceedings were discussed in a conference between the parties to the writ proceeding and the presiding judge of the Imperial County Municipal Court (Municipal Court). This conference was at the suggestion of the trial court as a direct result of this writ proceeding. The conference resulted in constructive accomplishments, i.e., correction of the major objections to the Municipal Court arraignment proceedings. The trial court conferred with the parties off the record and was apprised of the nature of the changes and, after receiving facts which, unfortunately, it did not articulate on the record, evaluated the public benefit as justifying a $1,000 attorney fee plus deposition costs. The record substantially supports the award of fees and costs.
In addition, Judge Wien’s order specifically sets forth his findings which are supported by the record; that following the conference ordered as a result of the writ proceedings, the Municipal Court modified its advisement procedures in a manner agreed upon by the parties.
Where the trial court makes no findings of fact, we must infer all findings necessary to support the judgment. Therefore, the failure of the trial court to be more specific in its findings is irrelevant. (Beach Colony II Limited v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 106, 110 [212 Cal.Rptr. 485].) It was incumbent on the County (appealing party on the fee issue) to augment the record with the documents examined by Judge Wien, and to transcribe the essence of his “off-the-record” conference, if it wished to attack the sufficiency of his findings and order. It has the burden on this appeal and has provided no evidence to rebut the order for attorney fees which was unquestionably based in part on documents and proceedings not produced here by the county for us to review. We must presume the omitted material supports the court’s order.
*581Further, there is no support for the view attorney fees may be denied merely because the litigation gave future Imperial County misdemeanants only half a loaf. The thrust of the writ proceedings was to provide misdemeanor arraignment procedures which would insure defendants would be advised of and provided their constitutional rights in a meaningful manner. That this was accomplished by procedures adopted by the judiciary in response to the writ proceeding, rather than by institutionalizing consulting attorneys, is irrelevant. The public benefited as a result of the time, efforts and cash outlay for expenses put forth by Macias’ lawyer.
Having said the above, I point out that the rationale used to reverse the awarded fees has been rejected by our Supreme Court in Northington v. Davis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 955, 960 [154 Cal.Rptr. 524, 593 P.2d 221], fn. 2. There, citing prior authority, the court states that “voluntary” corrective action induced by the litigation may be compensated under the Attorney General theory. Although this comment cites cases where settlements ensued obviously resulting in less than full relief requested including a judicial resolution having precedential value, there is no meaningful difference here. (See also Comment, The Private Attorney General in California—An Evolution of the Species (1981) 18 San Diego L.Rev. 843, 860, 861.)
The petition of plaintiff and appellant for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 21, 1986. Bird, C. J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.