Court Opinion

ID: 9459606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:25:34.583369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:14.455512
License: Public Domain

WILSON, District Judge
(dissenting).
As I read the record in this case, I find what I interpret to be substantial evidence to sustain the decision of the District Court. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
This case presents the not infrequent claim of disability based upon a combination of lung and back impairments. While, in light of the claimant’s age, limited education, employment experience and medical history, I agree with the majority opinion when it states that a prima facie case of disability was made out by the claimant, I nevertheless find in the record what I believe to be quite substantial evidence to support the Hearing Examiner’s findings, as approved by the District Court, namely, that the claimant was not under such “disability” as to be entitled to disability benefits under the Social Security Law.
Substantial evidence, while admittedly a rather subjective standard, is nevertheless definable. As usually defined, “substantial evidence (is) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion . enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict . . .” National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300, 59 S. Ct. 501, 83 L.Ed. 660 (1939). See also Miracle v. Celebrezze, 351 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1965). Stated in other terms: “Substantial evidence means more than a scintilla; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Combs v. Gardner, 382 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1967). Applying either or both of these definitions to the record in this case, I find substantial evidence to support the decision of the lower court.
The medical record upon which this case must largely be decided consists of the report of three medical doctors, two doctors of osteopathy, two radiologists and one doctor of Chiropractic. As I analyze those reports, the reports of Dr. Lauretti, M.D., and Dr. Scheerer, D.O., would support the claim of disability. All the remainder of the reports, including all clinical findings other than those stated in Dr. Lauretti’s report, would support a claim for partial disability only. For example, Dr. Clawson, M.D., who made the most recent medical examination of the plaintiff (April 27, 1971), reported in part that:
“. . . If he takes his time he can walk any distance. He can’t run more than half a block . . . Heart is normal in size, regular sinus rhythm, without murmur and all peripheral pulsations are present and equal *657. The back functions seem to be normal and the straight leg raising test is negative . . . The chest x-ray revealed no pulmonary active disease and no cardiac enlargement The pulmonary function studies were considered to be normal There is no acute change and no evidence of a former infarction
Relying principally upon the case of Whitson v. Finch, 437 F.2d 728 (6th Cir. 1971), the majority opinion, as I read it, would disregard all medical and clinical findings adverse to the plaintiff’s claim as well as the testimony of the vocational specialist, upon the ground that the medical witnesses failed to express any opinion upon the work disability of the claimant. I would prefer to confine the holding in the Whitson case to the facts of that case. To the extent that the case purports to establish a rule that medical witnesses must express an opinion of work disability or otherwise have their findings discounted as insubstantial evidence, I believe the holding in the Whitson ease to be in direct conflict with an applicable regulation duly adopted by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. See 20 C.F.R. 404.-1526, wherein it is provided:
The function of deciding whether or not an individual is under a disability is the responsibility of the Secretary. A statement by a physician that an individual is, or is not, “disabled,” “permanently disabled,” “totally disabled,” “totally and permanently disabled,” “unable to work,” or a statement of similar import, being a conclusion upon the ultimate issue to be decided by the Secretary, shall not be determinative of the question of whether or not an individual is under a disability. The weight to be given such physician’s statement depends on the extent to which it is supported by specific and complete clinical findings and is consistent with other evidence as to the severity and probable duration of the individual’s impairment or impairments.
I believe the foregoing regulation is a lawful and valid one. If so, it is binding upon this Court. Public Utilities Commission v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 78 S.Ct. 446, 2 L.Ed.2d 470, reh. denied 356 U.S. 925, 78 S.Ct. 713, 2 L.Ed. 2d 760; Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 83 S.Ct. 426, 9 L.Ed.2d 292. If this line of reasoning is valid, as I believe it is, I would confine Whitson v. Finch, supra, to the facts of that case and either overrule the rule of evidence therein announced or modify that rule to accord with 20 C.F.R. 404.1526. I would also affirm the decision of the District Court in this case as being supported by substantial evidence upon the record before us.