Court Opinion

ID: 9625100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:27:49.211998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:00.814376
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
*48Wayne A. Williamson and Mantz, Souther, Spaulding, Denecke & Kinsey, Portland, for appellant.
Hutchinson, Schwab & Burdick and Cake, Jaureguy & Hardy, Portland, for the petition.
Neis Peterson et al. filed a brief as amici curiae.
On Respondent’s Petition por Rehearing
TOOZE, J.
Our original opinion in this case was handed down June 13, 1956. The plaintiff has filed a petition for *49rehearing in which he alleges that we committed manifest error in onr opinion in the following respects:
“I
“In stating the facts and in quoting the law.
“II
“In holding that the driver of the bus was not negligent when he was
“ (1) Not keeping a lookout,
(2) Driving at an unreasonable speed and
(3) Driving out of control.
“Ill
“In not determining that there was a question of proximate cause for the jury.”
Plaintiff has also filed a 30-page typewritten brief in support of his petition. Also, in support of the petition a printed brief has been filed by a large number of prominent trial attorneys as amici curiae.
A careful examination of those briefs reveals that counsel have misconstrued our opinion. For example, at the outset of his discussion of point II of his petition for rehearing, the plaintiff makes the following statement:
“Incredibly, the court holds that as to persons proceeding against traffic on a one-way street, any other driver can:
“ (1) Go at any speed,
“(2) Be out of control,
“ (3) Keep no lookout,
and such conduct is not actionable negligence.
“In other words, the one-way traffic ordinance offender is a trespasser.”
Plaintiff in his brief, as well as the attorneys appearing as amici curiae in their brief, assert that we *50quoted with apparent approval an instruction given by the trial court in the case of Johnson v. Updegrave, 186 Or 196, 201, 206 P2d 91. They correctly point out that this instruction so quoted was rejected in the Updegrave case and caused a reversal of the judgment in that action. Counsel insist that we have, in effect, overruled our decision in the Updegrave case, as well as our decision in the later case of Walker v. Penner, 190 Or 542, 227 P2d 316, and have returned to the rule established in the case of Schassen v. Columbia Gorge Motor Coach System, 126 Or 363, 270 P 530. In Walker v. Penner, supra, we set forth the rule applicable in this state and as established in the Updegrave opinion, which rule is quoted at length in our original opinion in the instant litigation, and we expressly overruled the decision in the Schassen case.
In writing our original opinion we had no intention of disturbing the rule announced in the Updegrave and Penner cases. That rule is now established as the law of this state. It will be observed that under that rule a motor vehicle operator, although he need not anticipate negligence on the part of any other person and may at all times assume until he has notice to the contrary, or until by the exercise of due care on his part he should and would have known to the contrary, that other persons using the highway will exercise due care and obey the law, and to act accordingly, yet he is not relieved of his continuing duty to maintain such a lookout as a reasonably prudent person would maintain in the same or similar circumstances. Ordinarily whether such a lookout has been maintained, and the matter of proximate cause, are questions of fact for jury determination.
However, ‘ ‘ a prudent driver, upon approaching a street which he knows to be a one-way street, looks for *51traffic in the direction in which it is supposed to travel and he cannot, by any rule of law or reason, be expected to anticipate that anyone is going to violate the law by proceeding into the intersection from the wrong way.” Daly v. Employers Liability Assur. Corporation, Ltd., 15 S2d 396, 399. This is particularly true at a blind corner such as was involved in the instant litigation. This does not mean, however, that a driver of a motor vehicle approaching a one-way street is relieved of his duty to also maintain a lookout ahead and observe what is entering, or is in and at, the intersection. It is argued by counsel, and we agree, that there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding of negligence on the part of defendant, in that there is evidence of excessive speed, lack of control, and failure to maintain a proper lookout ahead, on the part of the bus driver. But that does not necessarily mean that plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from defendant on account thereof; nor does it mean that plaintiff is entitled to have the question of defendant’s liability submitted to a jury as one of fact. Under all the facts and circumstances of this case, the question of defendant’s liability is one for the court to determine as a matter of law.
Let it be distinctly understood that this court had no intention in its original opinion, nor does it now have such intention, to render one who has been guilty of a traffic violation a trespasser upon the highway. Although undisputably violating the law by traveling against traffic upon a one-way street and entering a through highway without first stopping, yet plaintiff was not a trespasser and subject to be treated as such.
However, in traveling on a one-way street against traffic and in entering a through street without first stopping, plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a *52matter of law. This negligence attended him as he proceeded across the intersection in the wrong direction. It was with him when the actual collision occurred. It constituted contributory negligence on his part as a matter of law, which, under the issues as formed by the pleadings in this case, bars his right to a recovery, no matter how negligent the defendant may have been. As we said in Senkirik v. Royce et al., 192 Or 583, 600, 235 P2d 886, “obviously, one cannot be in the exercise of due care and negligent at one and the same time.” In the Senldrik case the question of whether plaintiff was actually violating the law was one of fact to be determined by the jury; here, the fact of plaintiff’s violation was undisputed. See also Leap v. Royce et al., 203 Or 566, 576, 279 P2d 887.
To the extent that this opinion is not in harmony with our original opinion in this case, the latter will be deemed withdrawn. We adhere to the result reached in our original opinion.
The petition for rehearing is denied.