Court Opinion

ID: 9862306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:06:25.095581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:01.542290
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KAPALA, dissenting: I believe that defendant failed to establish that the jury was exposed to a prejudicial outside influence that deprived him of a fair trial. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial. The majority’s determination that we are permitted by way of procedural default to consider the juror’s testimony about his personal thought process violates the well-established rule that a jury verdict cannot be impeached by a juror’s statement about the motive, method, or process by which the jury reached its verdict. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Jurors may testify as to the occurrence of improper outside influences. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 457-58 (1998); People v. Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d 507, 512-14 (1978). However, it is well settled that a juror’s testimony about the effect of those outside influences or communications on the mental processes of the jurors is inadmissible. People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 241 (2004); Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 458; Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d at 514. “[Bjecause the actual effect of the conduct on the minds of the jurors cannot be proved, the standard to be applied is whether the conduct involved ‘ “such a probability that prejudice will result that it is [to be] deemed inherently lacking in due process.” ’ ” Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 458, quoting Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d at 514, quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, 550, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 1633 (1965). Accordingly, the trial court erred when it asked juror Sawicki questions eliciting information concerning the effect that his improper visit to the crime scene had on his mental processes, and abused its discretion in admitting that part of Sawicki’s testimony. After doing so, however, it is clear that the trial court properly gave this testimony no weight and concluded that defendant’s right to a fair trial was not prejudiced by the juror’s visit to the crime scene. In contrast, the majority uses the improperly admitted evidence in its analysis, concludes that defendant’s right to a fair trial was prejudiced, and reverses the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. In considering the improperly admitted evidence in its analysis, the majority has abandoned the well-established rule that facts which tend to show the deliberative process of the jury in reaching its verdict cannot be used to impeach the jury verdict (People v. Towns, 157 Ill. 2d 90, 112 (1993)). The majority takes the position that because the State did not object to the admission of the improper evidence regarding juror Sawicki’s mental processes, the trial court did not err in giving the evidence its natural probative effect. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 178-79. The majority cites various authorities for the proposition that a party’s failure to object to hearsay testimony presented at trial allows such evidence to be considered by the trier of fact and to be given its natural probative effect. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 178-79. The majority concludes that the rule precluding inquiry into the mental processes of a jury is a rule of evidence and not a substantive limitation on how a verdict can be impeached. I come to a different conclusion. The rule allowing jurors to testify about their exposure to an improper outside influence but prohibiting their testimony regarding the effect of such outside influences on their mental processes is a rule of evidence, as it establishes what evidence regarding the outside influence is admissible and what evidence is inadmissible. However, in addition to being an evidentiary rule, it is also a component of the abstract analytical framework set out in Hobley, that is: “A jury verdict will be set aside as a result of outside influences or communications only if the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the improper communication or outside influence. [Citations.] In order to demonstrate such prejudice, jurors may testify as to the nature of outside influences or communications, but evidence relating to the effect of such influences on the mental processes of the jurors is inadmissible. [Citation.] Accordingly, because the actual effect of the conduct on the minds of the jurors cannot be proved, the standard to be applied is whether the conduct involved ‘ “such a probability that prejudice will result that it is [to be] deemed inherently lacking in due process.” ’ ” Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 458, quoting Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d at 514, quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 542-43, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 550, 85 S. Ct. at 1633. I agree with the majority’s observation that this inquiry focuses on the relationship between the extraneous information and the issues at trial in a rather abstract sense. As this analytical procedure is abstract, it centers on the probability of prejudice, not whether prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial actually occurred. The abstract analytical procedure serves to implement the general rule that a jury verdict may not be impeached by statements of jurors after they have rendered their verdict, have been polled, and are discharged from service (Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 457). The sound policy reason for this rule has been repeatedly stated. Were the rule otherwise: “ 1 “Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation — to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.” ’ ” Williams, 209 Ill. 2d at 239, quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 119-20, 97 L. Ed. 2d 90, 105-06, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2747 (1987), quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68, 59 L. Ed. 1300, 1302, 35 S. Ct. 783, 784 (1915). See also Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 457, quoting Tanner, 483 U.S. at 119-20, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 105-06, 107 S. Ct. at 2747, quoting McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267-68, 59 L. Ed. at 1302, 35 S. Ct. at 784. Accordingly, even if the State’s failure to object to Sawicki’s testimony regarding the effect of his visit to the crime scene on his mental process allows us to give this improperly admitted testimony its natural probative effect, it is clear that it has no probative effect because it is irrelevant. The actual effect of the improper outside influence on Sawicki’s mind cannot be considered and such evidence is not a part of the analysis applicable to this issue. The fact that the trial court erroneously admitted such evidence does not change the applicable analytical procedure that serves the sound policy of protecting jurors, the certainty of their verdicts, and, in turn, the integrity of our jury system. The majority also takes the untenable position that because the State argued that the trial court should consider Sawicki’s testimony, it is precluded from arguing on appeal that this evidence was improperly admitted. See 351 Ill. App. 3d at 179. The majority’s position is untenable because its premise is erroneous. The State did not argue before the trial court that it should consider Sawicki’s testimony regarding the effect that his visit to the crime scene had on his deliberative process. At the hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial court conducted the examination of juror Sawicki. The trial court asked Sawicki questions submitted by the parties. In response to those questions, Sawicki related that he had visited the area of Sheridan Road and Martin Luther King Jr. Drive in North Chicago after the first day of trial testimony. Sawicki said that he did not use any information that he learned from his visit to lead jury deliberations and did not inform the other jurors that he had gone to the scene until after deliberations were complete and the jury had rendered its verdict. Next, the trial court asked the following question sua sponte: “Did your visit to the crime scene on the second day of trial aid you in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant?” Counsel for defendant objected to the question as an improper inquiry into the mental processes of the jury. The trial court explained that it would be unable to determine if the outside influence at issue was improperly brought to bear upon Sawicki unless Sawicki was asked the question. The assistant State’s Attorney asserted: “Judge, just as to that question, you wonder how you’re going to find if it’s prejudicial. Judge, the State has found People verses [sic] Hobley where there was a standard that was set out for use. And that’s at 636 N.E.2d 313, 162 Ill. 2d 404. So it is a Supreme Court case. So the Supreme Court said as to can the juror be questioned as to anything in the deliberating process, anything into what they discussed or what their state of mind was during the deliberation, Hobley states the standard to be applied is whether the conduct involved such a probability that prejudice will result that it is to be deemed inherently lacking in due process. That is the standard that the courts must apply because they cannot go into the deliberation process itself.” After these comments, the trial court said that it was not going into the deliberation process, and the assistant State’s Attorney replied, “I’m not saying that you’re going into the deliberation process.” Thereafter, the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the question. Sawicki then answered the trial court’s question as is set out in the majority opinion. See 351 Ill. App. 3d at 177-78. Based on the foregoing, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the State encouraged the admission of evidence concerning the effect of Sawicki’s visit to the crime scene on Sawicki’s mental process. The assistant State’s Attorney demonstrated her awareness of the Hobley decision and specifically stated that courts cannot go into the deliberation process itself. When the majority quotes the assistant State’s Attorney as posing the question, “ ‘[H]ow is [the impact of the extraneous information to be assessed] if jurors cannot be questioned as to their exact deliberation process?’ ” (351 Ill. App. 3d at 178), it takes the assistant State’s Attorney’s question out of context such that its meaning is altered. The exact quote of the assistant State’s Attorney, in context, is as follows: “So if the extraneous information in this case weighs directly on an issue in the case is what it boils down to. That is the burden that the State in this case must show did not happen. It switches over to us basically, Judge. And that’s in Birch verses [sic] Drummer. Now, how is this proven if jurors cannot be questioned as to their exact deliberation process? And as I stated earlier, the standard to be applied is whether the conduct involved such a probability that prejudice will result that it is to be deemed inherently lacking in due process.” Clearly, rather than a statement indicating that the State felt that it was permissible to ask juror Sawicki whether his visit to the crime scene aided him in determining defendant’s guilt or innocence, the assistant State’s Attorney’s question was rhetorical and was followed by an answer, specifically her recitation of the appropriate analysis to be applied. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the State never took the position before the trial court that it was permissible for the trial court to consider the effect of Sawicki’s visit to the crime scene on his mental deliberative process. Accordingly, I cannot agree that the State has taken a position on appeal that is inconsistent with a position it took before the trial court. It is apparent to me that the trial judge, like the assistant State’s Attorney and defense counsel, was aware of the applicable analytical procedure. The trial judge understood that inquiry into the mental processes of the juror was impermissible. The trial court’s error was its apparent conclusion that the question regarding the effect of the visit to the crime scene on the juror’s determination of guilt or innocence did not intrude into the juror’s deliberative process. In any event, based on the comments made by the trial court in ruling on defendant’s motion for a new trial, I believe that it properly concluded that defendant’s right to a fair trial was not compromised: “In this particular case the jury had already received photographs, aerial photos and a map, not a map, but aerial photos and the photographs at the time when they went back to deliberate. I find that the scene — that what the juror went to see at the scene was merely cumulative as set out by the testimony he gave before this court. It wasn’t any different when he saw it. He also testified he never shared that with any of the jurors. The scene in the opinion of this court was not crucial to the issue of self-defense. It did not play a role in determining the guilt of [szc] innocence of the defendant. He used it, as he stated, in my mind I knew what it looked like. So the next day he basically says then when they were talking about it, I knew what they were talking about. Based upon the testimony of Mr. Zawicki [szc], based upon the case law that I’ve read, the court is denying the defendant’s motion.” What is not clear from these comments is whether the trial court found that defendant failed to meet his initial burden of alleging a prejudicial outside influence or that, after the burden shifted to the State to establish harmlessness, the State did so. In Hobley, our supreme court wrote: “Long ago, the United States Supreme Court recognized that ‘[p]rivate communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear.’ [Citations.] The standard to be applied in such a situation was explained by this court in People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274 (1992): ‘ “It is well settled in Illinois that any communication with a juror during trial about a matter pending before the jury is deemed presumptively prejudicial to a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Although this presumption of prejudice is not conclusive, the burden rests upon the State to establish that such contact with the jurors was harmless to defendant. [Citations.] A verdict will not be set aside where it is obvious that no prejudice resulted from a communication to the jury, either by the court or by third persons outside the presence of the defendant.” ’ ” Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 459-60, quoting Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d at 341, quoting People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 132 (1988). Recently, our supreme court in Williams held that “[t]he lesson of Hobley is that a juror affidavit alleging exposure to ‘prejudicial outside influences’ (emphasis added) (Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 459), is sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice and to shift the burden to the State to establish that such contacts were harmless.” Williams, 209 Ill. 2d at 241. The court went on to conclude that the juror’s affidavit at issue did not establish that the improper conversation between the juror and her husband about an issue in the case was prejudicial, because it contained nothing more than the mere assertion that an improper conversation occurred, without evidence that the alleged conversation was prejudicial in any respect. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d at 241-42. Accordingly, the first determination to be made in this case is whether the admissible and properly considered portions of juror Sawieki’s testimony amounted to sufficient allegations of a prejudicial outside influence as is required to raise a presumption of prejudice under Williams. Clearly, it was proper for Sawicki to testify that he went to the location, when he went there, and what he did while there. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 458 (in order to demonstrate prejudice from improper outside influence, jurors may testify to the nature of outside influence). This portion of Sawicki’s testimony, however, amounts to nothing more than an assertion that Sawicki indeed went to the scene of the crime after the first day of trial testimony and walked the half-block in the vicinity of the intersection of Sheridan Road and Martin Luther King Jr. Drive. The only disputed issue in this case was whether defendant acted in justifiable self-defense when he stabbed Jamie Hernandez five times, thereby causing Hernandez’s death. The evidence presented by the State established that defendant and Hernandez, both naval recruits on liberty, agreed to fight behind a liquor store located on the west side of Sheridan Road across from gate four of the Great Lakes Naval Training Center in North Chicago. Five or ten minutes after going behind the liquor store, Hernandez came running out from behind the building, followed by defendant, who was carrying a silver knife. Defendant put the knife in his pocket and was heard to yell, “I’m going to get you” as he emerged from behind the liquor store. No witnesses observed blood on Hernandez’s body at that time and he did not appear injured. Defendant crossed to the east side of Sheridan Road while Hernandez remained on the west side of Sheridan Road. Both men walked parallel to one another in a southerly direction on opposite sides of Sheridan Road until each began to cross Sheridan Road toward the other at the intersection of Sheridan Road and Martin Luther King Jr. Drive. A physical altercation took place in the street, from which Hernandez emerged with five fatal stab wounds to his chest, abdomen, and groin. Defendant walked past Hernandez’s friends as he left the area and was heard to say, “your friend’s a bitch, and he was running from me the whole time.” Defendant, on the other hand, testified that when he agreed to go behind the liquor store for the purpose of fighting Hernandez, he had no weapon of any kind and he assumed that Hernandez was also unarmed. Defendant said that he and Hernandez entered the alley behind the liquor store and got into a fistfight. According to defendant, during the fight Hernandez produced a knife, causing defendant to believe that he was going to be stabbed. Defendant said that he grabbed Hernandez’s right hand (the hand holding the knife), wrestled Hernandez, and gained control over the knife. As the fight continued, defendant feared that Hernandez would regain control of the knife, so defendant stabbed Hernandez once in Hernandez’s left side. Defendant said that while he still had the knife, he and Hernandez ran from the alley. According to defendant, Hernandez walked south along the west side of Sheridan Road while he, fearful of Hernandez and in an attempt to stay away from Hernandez, crossed to the east side of Sheridan Road and headed toward his friends who were standing near gate four on the east side of Sheridan Road. Defendant testified that as he approached the railroad tracks in front of gate four, Hernandez came up behind him and struck him in the eye and then hit him twice more. Defendant said that he was frightened and, acting in self-defense, stabbed Hernandez again. Defendant maintained that he did not intend to kill Hernandez or to do him great bodily harm but admitted that he stabbed Hernandez a total of five times. The jury was instructed that, in addition to proving the other elements of first-degree murder, the State had to prove that defendant was not justified in using the force which he used. The jury was instructed further: “A person is justified in the use of force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself against the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the imminent death or great bodily harm to himself.” See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 24 — 25.06 (4th ed. 2000). With respect to defendant’s claim of self-defense, the important disputed issues of fact were whether Hernandez had already been stabbed when he ran out from behind the liquor store, and whether the second physical altercation was initiated by defendant in the intersection or by Hernandez near the railroad tracks when he approached defendant from behind and punched defendant in the eye. Additionally, defendant’s claim that he acted in justifiable self-defense would be negated if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the type and amount of force used by defendant was unnecessary under the circumstances. See People v. Belpedio, 212 Ill. App. 3d 155, 161 (1991). The testimony of the eyewitnesses to this incident was vital to the determination of these disputed issues; the physical characteristics and layout of the vicinity of the crime scene were not. The party attempting to impeach the verdict with an improper outside influence need show only that the unauthorized information relates directly to an issue in the case and may have improperly influenced the verdict. Birch v. Township of Drummer, 139 Ill. App. 3d 397, 409 (1985). Sawicki’s testimony made no such showing. Sawicki’s testimony that he merely visited the vicinity of the crime scene had no direct relation to the determination of these issues. Sawicki did not testify that he checked lighting conditions, vantage points from which witnesses viewed the incident, or distances between locations within the vicinity. In other words, Sawicki did not testify to facets of his visit that could possibly bear on the credibility or perception of the witnesses who testified at trial. Like the affidavit at issue in Williams, which concerned an improper conversation between a juror and her husband but contained no information about the content of that conversation (Williams, 209 Ill. 2d at 241-42), Sawicki’s testimony contained no information about the content of his visit to the crime scene. Accordingly, Sawicki’s testimony did not amount to an allegation of a “prejudicial outside influence” (Williams, 209 Ill. 2d at 241) and, therefore, defendant failed to meet his initial burden and his motion for new trial was properly denied. Even assuming arguendo that the admissible portion of Sawicki’s testimony was sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice, I would find that the State succeeded in establishing that the visit to the crime scene was harmless. I agree with the trial court’s determination that Sawicki’s mere visit to the crime scene, without further investigation, exposed him only to extraneous evidence that was cumulative of the aerial photographs depicting the vicinity of Sheridan Road and Martin Luther King Jr. Drive that were presented by the State at trial. Moreover, counsel for defendant conceded at oral argument that, apart from Sawicki’s testimony about the effect that his visit to the crime scene had on his determination that defendant was guilty, defendant was not prejudiced by the improper visit. For these reasons, I would hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for new trial and I would proceed to an analysis of defendant’s remaining appellate contention that his sentence was excessive.