Court Opinion

ID: 9925414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 18:07:52.235984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:34.241492
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Petitto, 2024-Ohio-186.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      OTTAWA COUNTY

State of Ohio                                     Court of Appeals No. OT-23-005

         Appellee                                 Trial Court No. 21 CR 061

v.

Jade L. Petitto                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT

         Appellant                                Decided: January 19, 2024

                                             *****

         James J. VanEerten, Ottawa County Prosecuting Attorney, and
         Thomas A. Matuszak, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

         Brian A. Smith, for appellant.

                                             *****

         SULEK, J.

         {¶ 1} Appellant, Jade Petitto, appeals the February 24, 2023 judgment of the

Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas convicting her of two counts of felonious assault,

three counts of failure to comply with the order of a peace officer, and a seatbelt

violation. Because any errors in the indictment are not prejudicial and Petitto’s

convictions are supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of
the evidence, they are affirmed. The trial court’s erroneous imposition of postrelease

control requires a limited remand.

                            I. Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 2} On April 1, 2021, the Ottawa County Grand Jury indicted Petitto on charges

stemming from a high-speed police chase in Ottawa County, Ohio. Relevant to this

appeal, the state secured an indictment against Petitto charging her with two counts of

felonious assault, R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), as follows:

              Count One Felonious Assault -F1, § 2903.11(A)(2), 2903.11(B)

              The jurors of the Grand Jury of the State of Ohio, within and for the

       body of Ottawa County, on their oaths, IN THE NAME AND BY THE

       AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF OHIO, do find and present:

              Jade L. Petitto, on or about March 13, 2021, at the county of Ottawa

       aforesaid, did knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another

       by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, to wit: a motor

       vehicle/automobile in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.11(A)(2),

       2903.11(B), Felonious Assault, F1.

              FURTHERMORE, the victim of the offense was a peace officer.

              The offense is contrary to the form of the statute in such case made

       and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio.

              Count Two Felonious Assault-F2 §2903.11(A)(2), 2903.11(B)

2.
              The grand jurors, on their oaths, further find and present that:

              Jade L. Petitto, on or about March 13, 2021, at the county of Ottawa

       aforesaid, did knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another

       by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, to wit: a motor

       vehicle/automobile in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.11(A)(2),

       2903.11(B), Felonious Assault, F2.

              The offense is contrary to the form of the statute in such case made

       and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio.

       {¶ 3} At Petitto’s April 5, 2021 arraignment, the trial court found her indigent and

appointed her counsel; Petitto then waived a reading of the applicable law and penalties

and pleaded not guilty to the charges. On April 15, 2021, Petitto’s retained counsel

entered an appearance prompting the withdrawal of appointed counsel. On June 9, 2021,

retained counsel requested leave to withdraw citing Petitto’s lack of cooperation. Petitto

retained a third attorney.

       {¶ 4} On February 8, 2022, Petitto changed her plea to not guilty by reason of

insanity and requested a psychiatric evaluation. Following a competency hearing, the

trial court found Petitto competent to stand trial. Petitto subsequently made oral request

for an indigency determination and appointed counsel. On June 30, 2022, Petitto was

again appointed counsel.

3.
       {¶ 5} At the December 2 and 22, 2022 bench trial, Ottawa County Sheriff’s

Sergeant Brandon Amory testified that on March 13, 2021, at approximately 1:41 p.m.,

he was on road patrol in a marked vehicle and observed Petitto eastbound on S.R. 2 in a

vehicle with no discernable license plate. Amory activated his overhead lights and siren

to initiate a traffic stop. Petitto sped away leading Amory on a high-speed chase.

       {¶ 6} Travelling over 90 m.p.h., Petitto exited S.R. 2 at the S.R. 53 south off-

ramp. Her vehicle “lurched” sharply to the right, up on two wheels, and came back

across into Amory’s lane of travel striking the front and driver’s side of his vehicle and

pushing both vehicles against the guardrail. Sergeant Amory testified that Petitto

“continued to rev her engine at that point in time and was lurching forward, inching,

stretching forward.” Amory put his vehicle in reverse to disengage but Petitto

“accelerated” and “smashed” into the passenger side of his vehicle. Amory stated that

the impact was “definitely a jolt” but that the airbags did not deploy. He admitted that

the maneuver was not necessarily directed at hitting him and that it could have been that

she was trying to disengage and flee. Amory radioed an injury accident.

       {¶ 7} Petitto continued northbound on S.R. 53 towards the city of Port Clinton.

Sergeant Amory stated that initially his patrol vehicle failed to accelerate due to the crash

but that his pursuit resumed after the engine “kicked in.” Disregarding all traffic signals

and driving in excess of 90 m.p.h., Petitto entered the Port Clinton city limits. She

navigated a sharp curve at 60-65 m.p.h. and turned left, or northbound, at Harrison and

4.
Fremont Streets. The chase ended following a collision between Petitto and a vehicle

driven by S.R., incapacitating both vehicles.

       {¶ 8} Sergeant Amory radioed a second injury accident. He ordered Petitto out of

the vehicle and handcuffed her. He testified:

               At that point in time I kind of collapsed backwards for a second

       because I had gotten jolted back there at the intersection. But my

       adrenaline was kicking, too, and I kind of gathered myself. I ended up

       getting up at that point in time.

               ***

               [T]he jolt had pushed me into my printer, my printer is on my

       console in the center for printing citations. * * * I had taken that jolt and it

       jolted into the side of me. That was part of the pain into the rib area. And

       at that point in time, I kind of collapsed. A lady who was an EMT came up.

       Asked me if I’m okay. I said, I’m fine. Go check on the other victim,

       basically.

       {¶ 9} Amory’s collapse was captured by the body cam video. He admitted that he

was medically cleared for service without any time off and that he did not take any

medications.

       {¶ 10} Sergeant Amory’s pursuit of Petitto spanned seven to eight miles with a

maximum speed of 104 m.p.h. He stated that he did not activate his body cam until after

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the initial collisions. The balance of the pursuit and arrest were recorded and played for

the court. Also played and admitted into evidence was surveillance video from a nearby

business capturing the collision involving S.R. Photographs depicting the crash sites and

damage to the vehicles were admitted into evidence.

       {¶ 11} Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Eric Mentis responded to the second

crash site. Reviewing the crash photographs, Mentis testified regarding his observations

of the damage to the vehicles involved. He authored the second crash report which was

admitted into evidence.

       {¶ 12} Trooper Mentis took Petitto’s and S.R.’s statements which were admitted

into evidence. In her statement, Petitto admitted that during the incident she failed to

obey all traffic signals and was not distracted by anything during the incident.

       {¶ 13} The driver involved in the second crash, S.R., and her husband, T.R.,

testified. S.R. testified that prior to the crash she had rods and screws lining her back

from multiple spine surgeries and a neck surgery to correct scoliosis. Following the

accident she was bedridden for two weeks in excruciating pain and that as of the date of

trial, she had chronic back pain and was still seeing an oral surgeon for pain management.

       {¶ 14} S.R. stated that she saw Petitto’s vehicle approach just before impact and

thought she was going to die. She had no memory of the actual collision. S.R. testified

that her six-month-old car was totaled and had to be replaced. T.R., S.R.’s husband,

6.
stated that the crash impacted S.R.’s mobility and limited her ability to travel. She could

no longer perform any household tasks.

       {¶ 15} On January 6, 2023, the trial court filed its verdict finding Petitto guilty of

Counts 1-6 and dismissing Count 7 at the state’s request. At Petitto’s February 24, 2023

sentencing hearing, the court noted that Counts 1 and 2, as first and second-degree

felonies, were subject to indefinite sentencing under R.C. 2929.144, and that Counts 3-5

merged. The state elected to proceed on Count 5.

       {¶ 16} The court stated it considered the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.11

and 2929.12. As to Count 1, felonious assault of a peace officer, the court sentenced

Petitto to a prison term of 8 to 12 years; on Count 2, felonious assault, 8 years of

imprisonment, to be served concurrently with Count 1. On Count 5, failure to comply

with the order of a police officer, Petitto was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment to

be served consecutively to the sentences on Counts 1 and 2 for a total of 11 to 15 years of

imprisonment. Petitto was fined $30 for the seatbelt violation, Count 6.

       {¶ 17} The court then gave Petitto the following postrelease control notification:

“You will be required to serve a mandatory five-year term of post-release control

following your release from prison.” The February 24, 2023 sentencing judgment entry

similarly stated: “The Court explained the concepts of post release control and advised

that the Defendant would be subject to a mandatory period of five (5) years of post

release control upon release from prison.”

7.
     {¶ 18} This appeal followed.

                              II. Assignments of Error

     {¶ 19} Petitto raises five assignments of error for review:

            Assignment of Error I: Counts One and Two of the indictment

     against Appellant were defective because they failed to track the language

     of R.C. 2903.11 naming Felonious Assault as a criminal offense and as a

     first and second-degree felony, respectively, in violation of Appellant’s

     right to Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

     United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio

     Constitution, and Appellant’s right to indictment under Article I, Section 10

     of the Ohio Constitution.

            Assignment of Error II: The failure of Appellant’s trial counsel to

     file a Motion to Dismiss with respect to Counts One and Two of the

     Indictment constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of

     Appellant’s right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to

     the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio

     Constitution.

            Assignment of Error III: Appellant’s convictions for Felonious

     Assault were not supported by sufficient evidence.

8.
              Assignment of Error IV: Appellant’s convictions were against the

       manifest weight of the evidence.

              Assignment of Error V: The trial court’s sentence of Appellant was

       contrary to law for incorrectly stating Appellant’s term of post-release

       control.

                                       III. Discussion

                                    A. The Indictment

       {¶ 20} Petitto’s first assignment of error asserts that the felonious assault counts,

Counts 1 and 2, in the indictment were defective because they failed to track the statutory

language.

       {¶ 21} Crim.R. 12(C) provides that “[p]rior to trial, any party may raise by motion

any * * * objection * * * that is capable of determination without the trial of the general

issue. The following must be raised before trial: * * * (2) Defenses and objections based

on defects in the indictment[.]” “‘By failing to timely object to a defect in an indictment,

a defendant waives all but plain error on appeal. Crim.R. 12(C)(2).’” State v. Bey, 2019-

Ohio-423, 130 N.E.3d 1031, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d

466, 2010-Ohio-3830, 935 N.E.2d 26, paragraph three of the syllabus. Petitto

acknowledges her failure to raise the alleged defects in the indictment prior to trial limits

her to a plain error review.

9.
      {¶ 22} Crim.R. 7(B) set forth the requirements of an indictment or information and

relevantly provides:

             The indictment shall be signed in accordance with Crim.R. 6(C) and

      (F) and contain a statement that the defendant has committed a public

      offense specified in the indictment. * * *. The statement may be made in

      ordinary and concise language without technical averments or allegations

      not essential to be proved. The statement may be in the words of the

      applicable section of the statute, provided the words of that statute charge

      an offense, or in words sufficient to give the defendant notice of all the

      elements of the offense with which the defendant is charged. It may be

      alleged in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed

      the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more

      specified means. Each count of the indictment or information shall state

      the numerical designation of the statute that the defendant is alleged to have

      violated. Error in the numerical designation or omission of the numerical

      designation shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or

      information, or for reversal of a conviction, if the error or omission did not

      prejudicially mislead the defendant.

(Emphasis added.)

10.
       {¶ 23} “The purposes of an indictment are to give an accused adequate notice of

the charge, and enable an accused to protect himself or herself from any future

prosecutions for the same incident.” State v. Buehner, 110 Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-

4707, 853 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 7, citing Weaver v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 415, 417, 183 N.E.2d

373 (1962), and State v. Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 170, 478 N.E.2d 781 (1985);

Horner at ¶ 11.

              “An indictment meets constitutional requirements if it ‘first, contains

       the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the

       charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an

       acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.’”

       State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 558, 564-565, 728 N.E.2d 379 (2000),

       quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41

       L.Ed.2d 590 (1974).

State v. Troisi, 169 Ohio St.3d 514, 2022-Ohio-3582, 206 N.E.3d 695, ¶ 22.

       {¶ 24} Petitto argues prejudice in the omission of the statutory penalty language in

R.C. 2903.11(D)(1)(a), and the improper inclusion of R.C. 2903.11(B) (felonious assault

where an accused engaged in sexual conduct without disclosing the accused’s HIV

positive status). Petitto claims that these errors contravene the Civ.R. 7 requirement that

she be adequately notified of the charges and what the state intends to prove at trial.

11.
       {¶ 25} Here, the indictment indicates that Count 1, felonious assault, was in

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), and that Petitto “caused or attempted to cause physical

harm” to a peace officer by the use of an automobile and that the count was a first-degree

felony. Similarly, Count 2 lists felonious assault as a violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2)

and specifies that the charge was a second-degree felony. There is no indication that the

absence of the specific penalty section prejudiced Petitto as the felony degree was

indicated. Further, although the inclusion of the HIV subsection was incorrect, the

indictment specifies that Petitto’s felonious assault charges stemmed from the use of her

automobile as a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.

       {¶ 26} Upon review, Petitto was neither prejudiced nor misled by any error or

omission in the indictment and her first assignment of error is not well-taken.

       {¶ 27} Petitto relatedly argues in her second assignment of error that trial

counsel’s failure to raise the defective indictment issue denied her effective assistance of

counsel. An attorney is constitutionally ineffective where serious errors are made and the

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Proof of prejudice requires a showing “that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694; State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d

136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraph three of the syllabus.

12.
       {¶ 28} Because there is no prejudice as to Petitto’s first assignment of error, it

follows that Petitto’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the issue. Petitto’s

second assignment of error is not well-taken.

                  B. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

       {¶ 29} Petitto’s third and fourth assignments of error contend that her felonious

assault convictions are based on insufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight

of the evidence. The arguments are related and will be jointly addressed.

       {¶ 30} “Insufficiency and manifest weight are distinct legal theories.” State v.

Fenderson, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-21-018, 2022-Ohio-1973, ¶ 73. “In reviewing a record

for sufficiency, ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id., quoting State v. Jenks, 61

Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶ 31} In contrast, when reviewing a manifest weight claim,

              “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all

       reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines

       whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way

       and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must

       be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a

13.
       new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the

       evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”

Id., quoting State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 220,

quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

       {¶ 32} At issue are Petitto’s felonious assault convictions in violation of R.C.

2903.11(A)(2), which provides that “no person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause or attempt

to cause physical harm to another * * * by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous

ordnance.” Petitto contends that the state failed to present sufficient evidence of the

knowingly, mens rea element, failed to demonstrate physical harm, and failed to prove

that Petitto’s vehicle was a dangerous weapon or ordnance.

       {¶ 33} R.C. 2901.22(B) defines the “knowingly” mental state as follows:

              A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is

       aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will

       probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances

       when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When

       knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,

       such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is

       a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a

       conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.

14.
       {¶ 34} To prove Petitto acted knowingly, the state needed to demonstrate that

serious physical harm was a reasonable and probable result of her conduct. State v.

Stevens, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1219, 2020-Ohio-6981, ¶ 27, citing State v. Laney, 6th

Dist. Williams No. WM-18-004, 2019-Ohio-2648, ¶ 19. Petitto’s state of mind, may be

“‘inferred from the totality of circumstances surrounding the incident.’” Id., quoting

State v. Rodriquez, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-02-046, 2003-Ohio-3453, ¶ 36, citing State

v. Booth, 133 Ohio App.3d 555, 562, 729 N.E.2d 406 (10th Dist.1999).

       {¶ 35} “When a defendant evades police and crashes a vehicle into a police

cruiser, the defendant is usually deemed to have acted knowingly because it is likely that

the officer would suffer physical harm from the collision.” State v. Wells, 4th Dist.

Washington No. 21CA16, 2022-Ohio-3793, ¶ 24, citing State v. Taylor, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 90001, 2008-Ohio-3455, ¶ 68. Wells further relies on cases from the

Third, Ninth, and Tenth Appellate Districts upholding felonious assault convictions

where the defendant accelerated and struck or rammed a police vehicle. See State v.

Allsup, 3d Dist. Hardin Nos. 6-10-06, 6-10-07, 2011-Ohio-405; State v. Gibson, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 23881, 2008-Ohio-410; State v. Beatty, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-52,

2008-Ohio-5063.

       {¶ 36} Here, as to Sergeant Amory, the evidence demonstrates that Petitto led

Amory on a high-speed chase causing two collisions with his patrol vehicle. Similarly, as

to S.R., Petitto, travelling at high rates of speed and disregarding traffic signals, collided

15.
with her vehicle. It is reasonable and probable that her actions would physically harm

others.

          {¶ 37} Petitto next argues that insufficient evidence supported a finding that her

vehicle was used as a dangerous weapon when her intent was to evade police, not cause

or attempt to cause physical harm.

          {¶ 38} A vehicle can be a deadly weapon, “when used in a manner likely to

produce death or great bodily harm.” State v. Belcher, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-13-1250,

L-13-1252, 2014-Ohio-5596, ¶ 29, citing State v. Gimenez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

71190, *7 (Sept. 4, 1997). In determining whether a vehicle was used as a deadly

weapon, “[t]he intent of the user, manner of use, and actions of the user are among the

factors that must be examined.” Belcher at ¶ 29, citing Giminez at *7. Intent to cause the

specific harm is not required. State v. Stevens, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1003, 2010-

Ohio-4718, ¶ 25. See State v. Nastal, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-21-042, 2022-Ohio-970, ¶

20.

          {¶ 39} Here, Petitto’s actions belie her argument. As previously set forth, Petitto

led Sergeant Amory on a high-speed chase spanning several miles. Following the first

two collisions, Petitto continued her flight toward the city limits while disregarding all

traffic signals. The chase ended only after her vehicle was disabled by the third collision.

Viewing the evidence in the state’s favor, the dangerous weapon element was supported

by sufficient evidence.

16.
       {¶ 40} Petitto next contends that insufficient evidence supports the serious

physical harm element as to Sergeant Amory. Petitto argues that Amory suffered only

minor injuries, if any. Physical harm is defined as “any injury, illness, or other

physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(3).

Physical harm “requires some manifestation of harm to the [victim], whether it be in the

form of a visible or objective injury, or in the form of pain.” State v. Jasso, 6th Dist.

Fulton No. F-22-001, 2023-Ohio-209, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Brown, 6th Dist. Lucas No.

L-18-1140, 2020-Ohio-1650, ¶ 20.

       {¶ 41} Sergeant Amory testified that the impact of the collision “was definitely a

jolt.” After the chase ended and the adrenaline rush waned, Amory stated that the pain in

his side from being shoved into the citation printer in the patrol vehicle console caused

him to fall to the ground. This testimony was sufficient to demonstrate that Amory

suffered physical harm. See Jasso at ¶ 29.

       {¶ 42} Construing the evidence most favorably for the state, sufficient evidence

supports the elements of felonious assault. This includes evidence of intent, that serious

physical harm was a probable—as opposed to a merely likely—result of Petitto’s

conduct, and that her vehicle was properly categorized as a deadly weapon or ordnance.

Petitto’s third assignment of error, therefore, is not well-taken.

       {¶ 43} Petitto makes near-identical arguments in support of her fourth assignment

of error by arguing that her felonious assault convictions were against the manifest

17.
weight of the evidence because the evidence failed to establish the elements of intent,

physical harm, and the use of a deadly weapon or ordnance.

       {¶ 44} Reviewing the entire proceeding, the trial court did not lose its way or

create a manifest injustice in weighing the evidence or resolving any conflicting

evidence. This includes Amory’s testimony that the collisions with his vehicle may have

been the result of Petitto’s attempt to escape, not her intent to hit his patrol vehicle and

his testimony regarding whether the collisions caused him injury. The trial court was free

to infer that Petitto’s actions, including her high rate of speed and disregard of traffic

signals, evidenced her intent to cause physical harm and the use of her vehicle as a

dangerous weapon or ordnance. Sergeant Amory testified regarding the jolt caused by

the collision and the body cam video depicts him falling to the ground from the pain in

his side. Victim, S.R., testified as to her chronic pain and decreased quality of life

resulting from the accident. Thus, Petitto’s felonious assault convictions were not against

the manifest weight of the evidence and her fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.

                                   C. Postrelease Control

       {¶ 45} Petitto’s fifth assignment of error is that her sentence is contrary to law due

to the trial court’s failure to properly impose postrelease control. The state has conceded

error pursuant to 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 10(H)

       {¶ 46} “‘[S]entencing errors in the imposition of postrelease control render the

sentence voidable, not void, and the sentence may be set aside if successfully challenged

18.
on direct appeal.’” State v. Sprouse, 6th Lucas No. L-22-1230, 2023-Ohio-2983, ¶ 24,

quoting State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 42.

“‘And if a court improperly imposes postrelease control on a sentence imposed on or

after July 11, 2006, it may correct the sentence in accordance with the procedures set

forth in R.C. 2929.191, which provides that a court must hold a hearing before issuing the

correction.’” Id., quoting State v. Schleiger, 141 Ohio St.3d 67, 2014-Ohio-3970, 21

N.E.3d 1033, ¶ 15.

       {¶ 47} R.C. 2967.28(B) requires that the court impose mandatory postrelease

control terms based on the degree of felony. It provides:

              [A] period of post-release control required by this division for an

       offender shall be of one of the following periods:

              (1) For a felony sex offense, five years;

              (2) For a felony of the first degree that is not a felony sex offense, up

       to five years, but not less than two years;

              (3) For a felony of the second degree that is not a felony sex offense,

       up to three years, but not less than eighteen months;

              (4) For a felony of the third degree that is an offense of violence and

       is not a felony sex offense, up to three years, but not less than one year.

       {¶ 48} Petitto’s felonious assault conviction is a first-degree, non sex offense,

felony. Thus, R.C. 2967.28(B)(2) applies and requires the imposition of a two-to-five-

19.
year postrelease control term. Accordingly, the trial court’s sentence of Petitto to a

“mandatory” five-year postrelease control term was erroneous. Petitto’s fifth assignment

of error is well-taken.

                                      IV. Conclusion

       {¶ 49} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Ottawa County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. The portion of the judgment

imposing postrelease control is reversed and vacated. The remaining portions of the

judgment are affirmed. The case is remanded for the limited purpose of resentencing of

postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2929.191(C). Pursuant to App.R. 24, costs of this

appeal are to be divided evenly between the parties.

                                                                Judgment affirmed, in part,
                                                                     and reversed, in part,
                                                                           and remanded.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                            ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                                ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, P.J.                                  JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE

20.
       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

21.