Court Opinion

ID: 9577014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:30:55.324789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:49.895153
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority reverses the trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside the final judgment and decree of divorce entered on December 1, 1997. In so holding, the majority determines that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Mr. Wright had “notice that was reasonably designed to insure he had notice of the trial date, an essential element of due process in this case.” In discovering the *232abuse of discretion necessary to support reversal, the majority concludes that the
“November 1 subpoena [did not] give Mr. Wright adequate notice of the trial date. Even if it gave him reasonable notice of a proceeding which he was [entitled] to attend as a witness, see OCGA § 24-10-25 (a), it gave him no notice that a final hearing was to be held at which he would be expected to try matters such as equitable division, alimony, child custody, visitation, and support. Due process requires that he be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on these issues. [Cits.]”
(Majority Opinion, p. 231.)
Because I believe that the subpoena gave Mr. Wright adequate notice and thus satisfied due process concerns, I dissent. I think that by attaching as Exhibit A to this dissent an actual copy of the subpoena served on Mr. Wright, I can best illustrate why I conclude that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding that Mr. Wright had sufficient notice. I think that it is important to note that the subpoena is captioned “In the Superior Court of Barrow County State of Georgia,” styled in the divorce case of “Linda M. Wright, Plaintiff [v.] Stephen L. Wright, Defendant,” and contains the correct Civil Action File Number for the divorce case. I also point out the language included in the body of the subpoena commanding the defendant to appear at the Barrow County Courthouse at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, November 3, 1997. The subpoena also lists the financial information to be brought with him and expressly directs that he bring said documents at the time and on the date specified, “at which time you shall have with you and produce for use as evidence by the Plaintiff” (Emphasis supplied.) The only thing which the majority contends is missing from this subpoena describing the evidence which Mr. Wright must bring with him to be used on the date and time specified is an express statement that such evidence will be so used at a “final hearing” in the very divorce case in which the subpoena is styled and to which Mr. Wright is a party. While due process certainly requires sufficient, adequate and reasonable notice, I believe that the burden of detail which the majority places upon a party in litigation involving pro se defendants would be so onerous as to be absurd. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside and I dissent to the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
*233[[Image here]]
*234Decided November 23, 1998.
Walter R. Finch III, for appellant.
N. David Wages, for appellee.