Court Opinion

ID: 9780866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 03:05:10.827781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:18.826594
License: Public Domain

BLACKWELL, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
No one disputes that the evidence at trial is sufficient to prove that Corey Keaton was enjoined to keep away from the home of his estranged wife,13 that he violated this injunction repeatedly, and that he violated it again on September 12, 1998, when he went to the home and raped his wife. To prove that Keaton committed aggravated stalking in violation of OCGA § 16-5-91 (a), at least according to the clear and unambiguous terms of that statute, the State needed to prove nothing more.14 But in Division 1 of its opinion, the majority15 adopts an interpretation of the statute that is inconsistent with the plain meaning of those clear and unambiguous terms and *26that amounts to nothing less than a judicial rewrite of the statute. Moreover, I think that sufficient evidence supports Keaton’s conviction for aggravated stalking even under the misconstruction of the statute adopted in the majority opinion. For both of these reasons, I respectfully dissent from Division l.16
1. I begin with the well-settled principle that, “[i]n all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly.” OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). But as our Supreme Court has instructed, the search for legislative intent must begin with the words of the statute, and if those words are clear and unambiguous, the search also must end there. See Six Flags Over Ga. II v. Kull, 276 Ga. 210, 211 (576 SE2d 880) (2003) (“Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden.”); see also Opensided MRI of Atlanta v. Chandler, 287 Ga. 406, 407 (696 SE2d 640) (2010) (When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we must give those words their plain meaning.); Chase v. State, 285 Ga. 693, 695 (2) (681 SE2d 116) (2009) (“Where the language of a statute is plain and susceptible to only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.”) (footnote omitted). Put another way, when we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the legislature meant what it said and said what it meant.17 Northeast Atlanta Bonding Co. v. State of Ga., 308 Ga. App. 573, 577 (1) (707 SE2d 921) (2011). We cannot “substitute by judicial interpretation language of [our] own for the clear, unambiguous language *27of the statute, so as to change the meaning.” Frazier v. Southern R. Co., 200 Ga. 590, 593 (2) (37 SE2d 774) (1946). See also Anthony v. American Gen. Financial Sucs., 287 Ga. 448, 450 (1) (a) (697 SE2d 166) (2010) (“It is not the place of this Court to rewrite statutes. . . .”).
With these principles in mind, I turn to OCGA § 16-5-91 (a), which defines the offense of aggravated stalking as follows:
A person commits the offense of aggravated stalking when such person, in violation of a bond to keep the peace posted pursuant to Code Section 17-6-110, temporary restraining order, temporary protective order, permanent restraining order, permanent protective order, preliminary injunction, good behavior bond, or permanent injunction or condition of pretrial release, condition of probation, or condition of parole in effect prohibiting the behavior described in this subsection, follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.
For the violation of an injunction to amount to aggravated stalking, the majority opinion says, the injunction must be one “in effect prohibiting the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)],” which is, of course, “following], placing] under surveillance, or contact-ting] another person at or about a place or places without consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.”18 The majority, I think, simply misreads the statute.
Contrary to the interpretation of the majority, the clear and unambiguous words of the statute quite plainly do not require an injunction “in effect prohibiting the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)].” The statute begins with two distinct lists of decrees, the violation of which may amount to aggravated stalking. The first list consists of a “bond to keep the peace posted pursuant to Code Section 17-6-110, temporary restraining order, temporary protective order, permanent restraining order, permanent protective order, preliminary injunction, good behavior bond, or permanent injunction,” and the use of the disjunctive “or” immediately preceding the reference to “permanent injunction” indicates the conclusion of this *28first list. “Permanent injunction” is followed by another disjunctive “or,” which signals a second, distinct list. And the second list consists of a “condition of pretrial release, condition of probation, or condition of parole.” The qualifying adjective phrase at issue in this case — “in effect prohibiting the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)]” — follows immediately after the second list. While the majority concludes that the qualifying phrase applies to both lists, such a construction conflicts with the rules of grammar and renders meaningless the statute’s division of predicate decrees into two distinct lists.
According to the rule of the last antecedent, which is an accepted convention of English grammar, “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26 (II) (124 SC 376, 157 LE2d 333) (2003). See also 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 47:33, p. 369 (6th ed. 2000) (“Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent.”). The United States Supreme Court has observed that “construing a statute in accord with the rule is ‘quite sensible as a matter of grammar,’ ” Barnhart, 540 U. S. at 26 (II) (citation omitted), and the rule is, in fact, routinely applied by courts in the interpretation of statutes. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration &c. Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 342-345 (II) (A) (125 SC 694, 160 LE2d 708) (2005); Allard K. Lowenstein &c. Project v. Dept. of Homeland Security, 626 F3d 678, 681 (2d Cir. 2010); Judge v. Quinn, 612 F3d 537, 550 (2) (c) (7th Cir. 2010); Carroll v. Sanders, 551 F3d 397, 399 (II) (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Park, 536 F3d 1058, 1063 (II) (A) (9th Cir. 2008); American Gen. Finance v. Paschen, 296 F3d 1203, 1209 (III) (11th Cir. 2002). The last antecedent of “in effect prohibiting the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)]” is the second list, “condition of pretrial release, condition of probation, or condition of parole.”19
It is true that the rule of the last antecedent “is not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning,” Barnhart, 540 U. S. at 26 (II), but no contrary indicia of meaning appear in OCGA § 16-5-91 (a) that suggest the qualifying adjective phrase should apply to the first list. Instead, the other indicia of meaning confirm that applying the qualifier to the first list would misconstrue the statute. The General Assembly elected to separate *29the predicate decrees in OCGA § 16-5-91 (a) into two distinct lists, and I cannot conceive of what purpose the separation might serve, other than to make clear that the qualifying adjective phrase applies to the second list and not to the first. The majority, in fact, does not even attempt to offer an alternative explanation of the separation,20 presumably because there is no other plausible explanation. If the qualifier applied to all the predicate decrees, there would have been no reason whatsoever to divide the decrees into two lists, and the statute would have been written more simply, with a single, integrated list of predicate decrees.
To apply the rule of the last antecedent is to honor the choice of the General Assembly to precede and follow the term “permanent injunction” with the disjunctive “or,” rather than a mere comma. To read the statute as the majority does is to reject that choice and twice replace the disjunctive “or” with a comma.21 Because we cannot properly rewrite an enactment of the General Assembly, we must, I think, give effect to this choice and construe the qualifier at issue — “in effect prohibiting the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)]” *30— as applying only to a “condition of pretrial release, condition of probation, or condition of parole.” Because this qualifier simply does not apply to an injunction, the injunction that Keaton violated when he went to the home of his estranged wife and raped her properly forms the basis for an aggravated stalking conviction, regardless of whether the injunction is one “in effect prohibiting the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)].”
2. In any event, even if the General Assembly had provided in the statute that a person commits aggravated stalking only if he violates an injunction (or one of the other predicate decrees in the first list) that “in effect prohibit[s] the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)],” it would be wrong to conclude that the injunction in this case is not such an injunction. It is true that the injunction in this case — which enjoined Keaton from “going to [his estranged wife’s] home except to exercise his visitation rights with the children of the parties” — did not use the precise words found in OCGA § 16-5-91 (a): “following], plac[ing] under surveillance, or contact-ting] another person at or about a place.” But to require those or similar words to appear in such an order would elevate form over substance. Moreover, it would ignore the command that the order need only “in effect prohibit[ ]” such conduct.22 And it would be inconsistent with cases in which we have affirmed convictions for aggravated stalking, based on a violation of an order that merely required the defendant to keep away from the location of the victim, without any reference to “following], plac[ing] under surveillance, or contacting]” the victim. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 283 Ga. App. 460, 461 (1) (641 SE2d 671) (2007) (defendant enjoined “from approaching within 100 yards of (his wife) and/or the minor children of [his wife]”) (punctuation omitted).
Although the injunction that Keaton violated does so only implicitly, it “in effect prohibit[ed]” Keaton from having a certain kind of contact with his estranged wife at or about a specific place. Under the terms of the order, he could not have in-person, face-to-face contact with his wife at their home — unless, of course, he were exercising his right of visitation with their children at the time — without violating the order. That the order does not “in effect *31prohibit^ Y’ all contact with Keaton does not mean that it is not an order “in effect prohibiting the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)].” The majority opinion makes much of the fact that the injunction did not prohibit Keaton from telephoning his estranged wife or otherwise contacting his wife, so long as he did not go to her home. But in the very cases cited in the majority opinion, we affirmed aggravated stalking convictions, notwithstanding that the orders on which the convictions were premised allowed some forms of contact. See, e.g., Bray v. State, 294 Ga. App. 562, 562-563 (1) (669 SE2d 509) (2008) (order permitted defendant to telephone home of victim to have phone visitation with children); Ford, 283 Ga. App. at 460-461 (1) (order permitted defendant to come within 100 yards of wife “during exercise of visitation [with his children]”).
Decided July 14, 2011.
McGee & McGee, James B. McGee III, for appellant.
Richard E. Currie, District Attorney, Michelle C. Mclntire, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
In the end, the majority seems to focus most on the purpose of the injunction, which, the majority apparently perceives, was merely to keep Keaton away from the marital home, not to keep him away from the victim. That might well have been the purpose of the injunction, but its purpose has nothing to do with whether a violation of it can give rise to an aggravated stalking charge. The qualifying adjective phrase at issue does not focus on the purpose of the order; it focuses on its effect. See OCGA § 16-5-91 (a) (“in effect prohibiting the behavior described in this subsection”). To require that a predicate decree have been issued with a specific purpose is to rewrite the statute to promote policies that are expressed nowhere in the statute. Because we ought not do such a thing, see Anthony, 287 Ga. at 450 (1) (a), I respectfully dissent.

 Keaton was permitted to go to the home to exercise his right of visitation with their children, but there appears to be no contention here that Keaton was visiting his children when he went to the home on September 12, 1998.

 There seems to be no dispute in this case that Keaton’s course of conduct amounts to a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior. See State v. Burke, 287 Ga. 377, 379 (695 SE2d 649) (2010); Louisyr v. State, 307 Ga. App. 724, 728-729 (1) (706 SE2d 114) (2011).

 Because the opinion of Judge Adams represents the views of the unanimous Court as to Divisions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6,1 refer to that opinion as the “majority” opinion. I note, however, that no opinion commands a majority of the votes of the Court as to Division 1, although six judges concur in the judgment reversing Keaton’s aggravated stalking conviction.

 I concur fully in the other divisions of the majority opinion.

 The majority decries my “undue emphasis” upon the actual text and structure of the statute at issue and instead chooses to focus upon the “legislative purpose behind it,” which the majority identifies mostly by reference to a report of an interview with a single legislator. The approach of the majority brings to mind the cautionary words of Justice Nahmias:
[Wjhen judges start discussing not the meaning of the statutes the legislature actually enacted, as determined from the text of those laws, but rather the unexpressed “spirit” or “reason” of the legislation, and the need to make sure the law does not cause “unreasonable . . . consequences,” we venture into dangerously undemocratic, unfair, and impractical territory. . . . [T]his approach usually leaves unanswered just how the “intention” of a multi-member legislative body is to be determined, if not from the text of the laws that it actually passed. The legislative history of a statute and the debates regarding it, along with many other sources like contemporary dictionaries and prior use of terms in statutes and cases, may help us to understand the meaning of the various terms used in the final text on which the legislature voted. But how, putting aside the text, are we to figure out what “intention” was in the head of the legislators when they voted? And are we searching for the intention of the entire legislature? A majority of the members who voted? Just the key members or sponsors of the bill or others who spoke or wrote about the bill at some point before (or after) passage, in some way that was publicly reported? What if no majority of members voted on it with the same intention? And what of the intention of the Governor who signed the bill?
Merritt v. State, 286 Ga. 650, 656-657 (690 SE2d 835) (2010) (Nahmias, J., concurring).

 The majority opinion says that it always has been understood that aggravated stalking requires a violation of an injunction or other predicate decree that “in effect prohibits] the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)].” But the only supports that the majority offers for this proposition are a law review article and some passing references in judicial opinions that, as the majority admits, did not even purport to address the issue presented here.

 It could be said, of course, that only “condition of parole” is the last antecedent of the qualifying phrase. But as the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, a qualifying phrase may apply to all the parts of a “single, integrated list” that immediately precedes the qualifying phrase, consistent with the rule of the last antecedent. See Jama, 543 U. S. at 344 (II) (A), n. 4. The second list in OCGA § 16-5-91 (a) is a “single, integrated list.”

 The special concurrence attempts to explain the separation, but its explanation is no more convincing than the silence of the majority. According to the concurring opinion, the predicate decrees in the first list must specifically prohibit stalking, whereas those in the second list need only effectively prohibit it. That is, rather than just read a couple of disjunctives out of the statute as the majority does, the special concurrence would read an entirely new requirement into it. This is “statutory construction” in a literal sense: we are not construing a statute but making a new one.

 We will not follow the literal language of a statute if it leads us to an absurd conclusion, In the Interest of D. H., 285 Ga. 51, 54 (3) (673 SE2d 191) (2009), but it is not absurd to give meaning to the General Assembly’s decision to include two lists of predicate decrees with a qualifying adjective phrase that applies only to the second list. I do not know why the General Assembly drafted the statute in this way, but I can conceive of at least one possibility. Conditions of pretrial release, conditions of probation, and conditions of parole sometimes include broad prohibitions that have rehabilitative (or, in the case of conditions of probation, punitive) purposes and are unrelated to any protective purpose. For instance, these conditions frequently include a prohibition of the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Perhaps the General Assembly thought that a stalker ought not be subjected to punishment as a felon simply because he was consuming a beer as he was stalking his victim, in violation of a condition of pretrial release, condition of probation, or condition of parole. The decrees identified in the first list, on the other hand, issue only upon a showing that they are reasonably necessary to protect some other person from harm, whether harm to their person, their property, or some other cognizable interest. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 9-11-65 (b) (1) (temporary restraining order issued only upon showing “that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant”); 16-5-94 (c) (temporary stalking protective order issued “to protect the petitioner or a minor of the household from stalking” and only upon showing “that stalking by the respondent has occurred in the past and may occur in the future”); 17-6-110 (a) (bond to keep peace issued only “[ulpon the information of any person, under oath, that he is in fear of bodily harm to himself or his family, or of violent injury to his property from another person”); 19-13-3 (b) (temporary family violence protective order issued “to protect the petitioner or a minor of the household from violence” and only upon showing “that family violence has occurred in the past and may occur in the future”); Danbert v. North Ga. Land Ventures, 287 Ga. 495, 498 (2) (697 SE2d 204) (2010) (injunctive relief requires showing of irreparable harm).

 One might wonder whether “in effect,” as those words are used in the statute, means that the decree that is violated must he effective at the time of the violation. But because it is nonsense to say that an order can be violated at a time when it is not effective, such a construction would render “in effect” mere surplusage. Moreover, if “in effect” were intended to mean that the decree must be effective at the time of the violation, a qualification distinct and separate from the qualification that the decree must be one “prohibiting the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)],” surely the General Assembly would have instead written “in effect and prohibiting the behavior described in [OCGA § 16-5-91 (a)].” “[I]n effect” is more reasonably understood, I think, to mean “effectively.”