Court Opinion

ID: 9385322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 16:05:02.673254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.976308
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                    No. 321PA21

                                 Filed 6 April 2023

DAVID SCHAEFFER

              v.
SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC, SINGLECARE SERVICES, LLC, RXSENSE
HOLDINGS, LLC, RICHARD A. BATES, and DARCEY SCHOENEBECK

      On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous,

unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, No. COA20-427, 2021 WL 2426202

(N.C. Ct. App. June 15, 2021), reversing an order entered on 22 November 2019 by

Judge Susan Bray in Superior Court, Orange County. Heard in the Supreme Court

on 7 February 2023.

      Kornbluth Ginsberg Law Group, P.A., by Joseph E. Hjelt and Michael A.
      Kornbluth, for plaintiff-appellant.

      Julia C. Ambrose, Charles B. Leuin, pro hac vice, and Mark S. Eisen for
      defendant-appellee.

      Sam McGhee, Lauren O. Newton, Jennifer D. Spyker, and David G. Schiller for
      North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.

      EARLS, Justice.

      It is axiomatic that “where individuals ‘purposefully derive benefit’ from their

interstate activities . . . it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to

account in other States for consequences that arise proximately from such activities.”

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1985) (quoting Kulko v. Cal.
                      SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                   Opinion of the Court

Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978)). But when a defendant’s conduct in a forum is not

so robust as to give rise to general jurisdiction, to conclude that the defendant has

“purposefully derive[d] benefit from their interstate activities,” the defendant must

have “purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum . . . and the

litigation [must] result[ ] from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those

activities.” Id. at 472–73 (cleaned up).

      At its heart, this case presents the question of which of a defendant’s activities

matter. Defendants here—both corporate entities and individuals—take the position

that, in evaluating which forums’ courts may exercise specific jurisdiction with

respect to claims arising from an alleged breach of an employment agreement, only

activities that occurred prior to or at the time of the execution of the relevant

agreements bear on the analysis. However, such a position would require a court to

turn a blind eye to activities a defendant conducts in a new forum after agreements

are negotiated and executed. Because this position would “allow [defendants] to

escape having to account in other States for consequences” that arise from their own

intentional conduct, we decline to adopt this unduly narrow approach to specific

jurisdiction. Id. at 474. Determining whether specific jurisdiction exists does not—

and has never—required a court to treat a discrete, temporally-limited set of events

as dispositive to the exclusion of all other activities that occur throughout the

evolution of a relationship. Instead, we consider all of Defendants’ activities,

including those that occurred after the employment agreements were executed, and

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                      SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                   Opinion of the Court

hold that Corporate Defendants intentionally reached out to North Carolina to

conduct business activities in the state, and the claims at issue in this litigation arise

from or are related to those activities. See Beem USA Ltd.-Liab. Ltd. P’ship v. Grax

Consulting LLC, 373 N.C. 297, 307 (2020) (rejecting Business Court’s specific

jurisdiction analysis as “requir[ing] too strict a temporal connection between” the

defendant’s forum-directed contacts and the plaintiffs’ claims).

                             I.   Factual Background

      Plaintiff David Schaeffer, a North Carolina resident, brought this action

against defendants SingleCare Holdings, LLC; SingleCare Services, LLC; RxSense

Holdings, LLC, Darcey Schoenebeck, and Richard A. Bates (collectively, Defendants).

SingleCare Holdings, SingleCare Services, and RxSense (Corporate Defendants) are

Delaware limited liability companies with their principal offices in Massachusetts.

Schoenebeck and Bates (Individual Defendants) are citizens and residents of

Minnesota    and   Massachusetts,     respectively.       Corporate   Defendants   provide

pharmacy benefit management and medical benefit management services. Bates is

the Chief Executive Officer of each of the Corporate Defendants and Schoenebeck is

the Executive Vice President of Business Development for SingleCare services.

      Schaeffer was jointly employed by SingleCare and RxSense as the Senior Vice

President of Business Development for SingleCare from 1 May 2017 until his

termination on 22 October 2018. On 13 June 2019, Schaeffer brought this action

against Defendants, alleging various tort and contract claims arising from his

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                                   Opinion of the Court

termination. Specifically, Schaeffer alleged that Defendants revoked fully vested

shares that they promised Schaeffer during employment negotiations to incentivize

him to accept his position. Schaeffer argues that he accepted the business

development position based on Defendants’ promises that he would be granted equity

in SingleCare, a promise that Defendants reiterated throughout employment

negotiations and during Schaeffer’s employment.

      Schaeffer lived in California during contract negotiations with Defendants and

for the first several months of his employment. In 2018, he sought approval from

Defendants to move to North Carolina, where he would continue to carry out his

duties remotely.1 According to Schaeffer, Defendants not only approved his request

to move to North Carolina but helped facilitate his move. For example, Defendant

Schoenebeck sent a letter to Schaeffer’s North Carolina-based mortgage lender to

confirm his authorization to work remotely.

      After Schaeffer’s move, he alleges that he “substantially performed [his work

duties] in North Carolina.” In his brief to this Court, he explains that he “made efforts

to expand and further the Corporate Defendants’ business in North Carolina,”

received reimbursements for work-related travel to and from North Carolina and for

other expenses associated with his work in the state, and engaged in regular

communications from North Carolina to carry out his sales duties. As a result of these

      1  Schaeffer also worked remotely during the period of his employment when he was
living in California.

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                                    Opinion of the Court

activities, he argues that “Corporate Defendants derived revenue from services

rendered . . . in his capacity as Senior Vice President on their behalf in North

Carolina.”

       While Schaeffer was employed by Corporate Defendants and living in North

Carolina, Corporate Defendants maintained other connections to the state. For

example, they employed at least three other individuals in North Carolina, solicited

applicants for business development positions in various cities within the state

through LinkedIn posts that highlighted SingleCare’s goal of hiring sales

representatives in “all major U.S. cities,” and provided North Carolina consumers

with pharmacy discounts. Corporate Defendants also paid Schaeffer in North

Carolina, paid state taxes based on his employment, and mailed tax documents to his

North Carolina address.

       Schaeffer was officially terminated from his position on 22 October 2018. On

13 June 2019, he brought an action against Defendants, alleging fraud,

misrepresentation, and breach of contract, among other claims. On 19 August 2020,

Defendants filed Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(b)(2) motions to dismiss. See N.C.G.S. §

1A-1, Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) (2021). Relevant here, the Rule 12(b)(2) motion

argued that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendants for nine of

Schaeffer’s ten claims.2 The trial court denied the motions, and Defendants timely

       2The Rule 12(b)(2) motion challenged jurisdiction only as to the first nine counts of
the complaint.

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                                       Opinion of the Court

appealed the denial of the Rule 12(b)(2) motion.

      The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the trial court’s denial of

Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(2) motion in an unpublished opinion issued on 15 June 2021

and denied Schaeffer’s subsequent Petition for Rehearing. The Court of Appeals

concluded that Schaeffer’s contacts with North Carolina that were relevant to the suit

were the result of his own unilateral actions and explained that “Defendants’

acquiescence      with   Plaintiff’s   move      to   North   Carolina,   and   subsequent

communications with Defendant in North Carolina, do not create personal

jurisdiction.” Schaeffer v. SingleCare Holdings LLC, No. COA20-427, 2021 WL

2426202, at *4 (N.C. Ct. App. June 15, 2021). The court recognized that some of

Corporate Defendants’ contacts with North Carolina weighed in favor of finding

specific jurisdiction, including Corporate Defendants’ solicitation of business and

services, recruitment of employees, and operation of a third-party administrator in

the state. Schaeffer, 2021 WL 2426202, at *4. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals

concluded that these activities “alone [were] not sufficient to establish specific

jurisdiction” and held that Schaeffer’s claims “[did] not arise out of, or even relate to,

the alleged contacts between Defendants and North Carolina.” Schaeffer, 2021 WL

2426202, at *5.

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                      SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                   Opinion of the Court

                                  II.    Analysis

A. Standard of Review

      “When the parties have submitted affidavits and other documentary evidence,

a trial court reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule

12(b)(2) must determine whether the plaintiff has established that jurisdiction exists

by a preponderance of the evidence.” State ex rel. Stein v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &

Co., 382 N.C. 549, 555 (2022). “As an appellate court, we consider whether the trial

court’s determination regarding personal jurisdiction is supported by competent

evidence in the record.” Id. at 556.

B. Legal Standard

      It is well established that “whether a nonresident defendant is subject to

personal jurisdiction in this State’s courts involves a two-step analysis.” Id. at 556.

First, North Carolina’s long-arm statute, N.C.G.S. § 1-75.4, must authorize a court to

exercise jurisdiction. See Beem USA Ltd.-Liab. Ltd. P’ship, 373 N.C. at 302; N.C.G.S.

§ 1-75.4 (2021). This statute “make[s] available to the North Carolina courts the full

jurisdictional powers permissible under federal due process.” Dillon v. Numismatic

Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 676 (1977). Thus, the second step in the inquiry

addresses the determinative issue: whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause permits a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. See

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021).

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                        SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                     Opinion of the Court

         Due process permits a state’s courts to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state

defendant when the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state]

such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice.” See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)

(cleaned up). Minimum contacts are established through “some act by which the

defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the

forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Beem USA Ltd.-

Liab. Ltd. P’ship, 373 N.C. at 303 (quoting Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114,

133 (2006)). “In giving content to that formulation, the [U.S. Supreme] Court has long

focused on the nature and extent of ‘the defendant’s relationship to the forum State.’

” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1024 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct.

of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)). To demonstrate this

relationship, “the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant deliberately

‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploit[ing] a market’ in the forum

State or entering a contractual relationship centered there.” Mucha v. Wagner, 378

N.C. 167, 171 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at

1025).

         Minimum contacts may give rise to one of two forms of jurisdiction: general or

specific jurisdiction. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,

919 (2011). General jurisdiction requires that a defendant’s “affiliations with the

State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the

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                                   Opinion of the Court

forum State.” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317). When a defendant’s conduct in

a state is not so extensive, however, jurisdiction may still be proper if “the litigation

results from the alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to the defendant’s

activities.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (cleaned up).

Jurisdiction that is based on this relationship is known as specific jurisdiction.

Because Schaeffer asserts only that the trial court has specific jurisdiction over

Defendants, our analysis is limited to this kind of personal jurisdiction.

      “Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum

contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other

factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport

with fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 476 (cleaned up). These factors are:

             ‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the forum State’s interest in
             adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff’s interest in
             obtaining convenient and effective relief,’ ‘the interstate
             judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
             resolution of controversies,’ and the ‘shared interest of the
             several States in furthering fundamental substantive
             social policies.’

Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292

(1980)).

      The purpose of the Due Process Clause’s limitations on personal jurisdiction is

to “treat[ ] defendants fairly,” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025, by providing them

with “fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction of a

foreign sovereign,” allowing them to “structure their primary conduct with some

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                       SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                     Opinion of the Court

minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to

suit.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472 (cleaned up) (first quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,

433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977); then quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at

297).

C. Discussion

        Applying this framework to the facts of this case, we conclude that specific

jurisdiction exists over Corporate Defendants because they purposefully availed

themselves of the privileges of conducting various business-related activities in North

Carolina, and Schaeffer’s claims arise out of or are related to those activities. 3 We

further conclude that exercising jurisdiction in this case is constitutionally

reasonable.

        The same cannot be said for Individual Defendants, however, because

Schaeffer’s evidence fails to demonstrate that their conduct directed at North

Carolina was sufficient to permit the trial court to exercise specific jurisdiction over

them in this litigation.

   1. Corporate Defendants

        Schaeffer urges that Defendants’ suit-related activities in North Carolina are

sufficient to enable the trial court to exercise specific jurisdiction in this litigation.

        3 Note that we do not address the separate question of whether any Defendants have
consented to jurisdiction in this case or whether registering to do business in North Carolina
is a valid basis for personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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                        SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                     Opinion of the Court

But in Defendants’ view, which was adopted by the Court of Appeals, Schaeffer’s

decision to move was his own unilateral choice, and “Defendants’ acquiescence with

Plaintiff’s move to North Carolina, and subsequent communications with Defendant

in North Carolina, do not create personal jurisdiction.” Schaeffer, 2021 WL 2426202,

at *4.

         Defendants contend that the only relevant activities that give rise to Plaintiff’s

claims, such as the contract negotiations that took place between Schaeffer and

Defendants and the execution of Schaeffer’s employment-related agreements,

occurred in another forum, and “SingleCare’s contacts with Schaeffer after he moved

to North Carolina have no bearing on the analysis.” In short, Defendants argue that

they did not voluntarily reach out to North Carolina to conduct suit-related activities

here. Further, Defendants argue that their “contacts with North Carolina are limited

and entirely unrelated to the claims at hand,” meaning the activities “do not support

jurisdiction . . . in North Carolina for all employment-related suits.” But Defendants’

position on both points ignores the import of Corporate Defendants’ voluntary

conduct in North Carolina in response to and following Schaeffer’s move and

misstates the character of Corporate Defendants’ other North Carolina-directed

activities.

         First, we address whether Corporate Defendants purposefully availed

themselves of the privileges of conducting business-related activities in North

Carolina. It is true that the “unilateral activity of another party or a third person is

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                                  Opinion of the Court

not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has

sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an assertion of jurisdiction.”

Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984).

Defendants assert that “SingleCare did not reach out to a citizen of North Carolina”

because Defendants recruited Schaeffer and initiated his employment when he was

a resident of California and “Schaeffer unilaterally moved to North Carolina” prior to

his termination. But there is no legal basis for hinging the whole of the analysis on

the forum in which the relationship was established (i.e. California) to the exclusion

of the forum in which Corporate Defendants perpetuated the relationship.

      Corporate Defendants emphasize the idea that “SingleCare created a . . .

relationship with Schaeffer well before he moved to North Carolina” or “before

SingleCare even knew Schaeffer would move to North Carolina.” In Defendants’ view

then, there seems to be only one forum in which specific jurisdiction might exist—the

forum in which the relationship was established. Under this approach, so long as

Schaeffer’s move was his own decision, there are very few subsequent activities

Corporate Defendants could conduct in a new forum that would allow the new forum’s

courts to exercise jurisdiction over the claims at issue here. For example, Defendants

could continue to employ Schaeffer in North Carolina for the next twenty years.

Shaeffer could continue to grow Defendants’ business in the state, and

representatives of the company could visit him regularly to oversee his work. But

because Defendants initially “reach[ed] out” to Schaeffer when he was a resident of

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                       SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                    Opinion of the Court

California, none of those details would matter, even if Schaeffer’s presence and work

in North Carolina far exceeded any of his activities in California. Though the forum

in which a contractual relationship began is certainly relevant in determining where

jurisdiction is proper, it is not the only event that is pertinent to this analysis.

      Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court “long ago rejected the notion that personal

jurisdiction might turn on ‘mechanical’ tests or on ‘conceptualistic theories of the

place of contracting or of performance.’ ” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 478–79

(cleaned up) (first quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319; then quoting Hoopeston

Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943)). And though “prior negotiations” and

“contemplated future consequences” are relevant “in determining whether the

defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum,” so too is “the

parties’ actual course of dealing.” Id. at 479.

      Burger King demonstrates that the purposeful availment inquiry is a “flexible”

one. Universal Leather, LLC v. Koro AR, S.A., 773 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2014). As

the Fourth Circuit has recognized, it “depends on a number of factors” that should be

considered “on a case-by-case basis.” Id. Relevant here,

             [i]n the business context, those factors include, but are not
             limited to, an evaluation of: (1) whether the defendant
             maintains offices or agents in the forum state; (2) whether
             the defendant owns property in the forum state; (3)
             whether the defendant reached into the forum state to
             solicit or initiate business; (4) whether the defendant
             deliberately engaged in significant or long-term business
             activities in the forum state; (5) whether the parties
             contractually agreed that the law of the forum state would
             govern disputes; (6) whether the defendant made in-person

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                      SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                   Opinion of the Court

             contact with the resident of the forum in the forum state
             regarding the business relationship; (7) the nature, quality
             and extent of the parties’ communications about the
             business being transacted; and (8) whether the
             performance of contractual duties was to occur within the
             forum.

Id. (emphasis added) (cleaned up). Defendants would have us forgo this flexible

analysis and establish a rigid, per se rule that touches on few of these factors. Such

an approach ignores decades of case law from both this Court and the U.S. Supreme

Court that evaluates a range of activities to determine whether a defendant

intentionally reached out to the forum state, and it would subvert the purpose of the

protections afforded by personal jurisdiction doctrine. See, e.g., Burger King Corp.,

471 U.S. at 479–82; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295–98; Int’l Shoe Co.,

326 U.S. at 319–20; Mucha, 378 N.C. at 172–73; Beem USA Ltd-Liab. Ltd. P’shp, 373

N.C. at 306; Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 367 (1986).

       Rather, as described above, to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists,

we examine the totality of the circumstances that this case presents. In response to

Schaeffer’s decision to move, Corporate Defendants purposefully availed themselves

of the privilege of conducting business in North Carolina, voluntarily engaging in a

wide range of activities within the state.

      The crux of the purposeful availment analysis is whether a defendant

“ ‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploit[ing] a market’ in the forum

State or entering a contractual relationship centered there.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S.

Ct. at 1025 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)). The contacts cannot

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                      SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                   Opinion of the Court

simply be “random, isolated, or fortuitous[,]” Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S.

770, 774 (1984), and they must be such that the defendant has “fair warning that a

particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” Burger

King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472 (cleaned up). In short, the defendant’s contacts with the

forum state must be voluntary, and it must be foreseeable that the defendant could

be hailed to court in that particular forum as a consequence.

      Here, Defendants first approved Schaeffer’s request to move to North Carolina

where he would continue to carry out his work remotely. After approving Schaeffer’s

request to move, Schaeffer explains in his brief that Defendants “helped him purchase

a house in North Carolina” by sending a letter to his “North Carolina mortgage lender

in order to facilitate [his] move to the state.” These activities are not, without more,

enough to conclude that Corporate Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the

North Carolina market. But they demonstrate that Corporate Defendants supported

the transition, which becomes more significant in light of their subsequent North

Carolina-targeted activities.

      Once Schaeffer moved to North Carolina, Corporate Defendants paid state

taxes based upon his work here, mailed tax documents to his North Carolina address,

and paid him in the state. Defendants communicated frequently with Schaeffer

through phone calls and emails as part of his employment and reimbursed him for

expenses he incurred as a result of working in North Carolina, including for travel to

and from the state and office maintenance costs. Based on business directives

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                                   Opinion of the Court

Defendants issued, Schaeffer argues that “[he] furthered Defendants’ pharmacy

benefit management business and pharmaceutical benefit card services in North

Carolina, which were targeted at North Carolina businesses and residents.” For

example, as part of his North Carolina-focused work and operating under the

instructions of Defendants, Schaeffer sold services related to a third-party

administrator—Towers Administrators LLC—that is both licensed in North Carolina

and wholly owned by Corporate Defendants.4 Due to his efforts, “Corporate

Defendants derived revenue from services rendered by Schaeffer in his capacity as

Senior Vice President on their behalf in North Carolina.” Finally, Corporate

Defendants terminated Schaeffer with the knowledge that he was a North Carolina-

based employee.

      These actions demonstrate that Corporate Defendants voluntarily and

knowingly engaged with a North Carolina-based employee to support and expand his

work in the state. Due to their own directives, Corporate Defendants reaped the

business benefits of work that Schaeffer conducted in North Carolina. This work was,

at least in part, targeted at the North Carolina market. Based on the extent of the

communications and the various forms of support Corporate Defendants voluntarily

provided Schaeffer to enable his work in North Carolina coupled with the profits and

other benefits Corporate Defendants expected to gain as a result of that support,

      4 Towers Administrators LLC holds itself out as “SingleCare Administrators” and is
described on SingleCare’s website as its “licensed discount medical plan organization.”

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                         SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                       Opinion of the Court

Corporate Defendants’ activities in North Carolina were also sufficient to provide

them with ample notice that they may be subject to suit in the state.5

       On top of its activities in North Carolina as a result of employing Schaeffer,

Corporate Defendants voluntarily conduct many other activities in the state that

would fairly put them on notice of the possibility that litigation might arise in the

forum. Corporate Defendants employed at least three other individuals in North

Carolina, one of whom was a sales representative, and solicited candidates from

around the state for business development roles. Schaeffer argues that the positions

Corporate Defendants advertised in North Carolina “shared the same underlying goal

and responsibility held by Schaeffer: to ‘help drive growth’ in SingleCare.” Further,

SingleCare intentionally serves North Carolina consumers by providing them “with

access to pharmacy discounts at retail locations across the state, including major

grocery stores such as Harris Teeter, CVS, Walgreens, and Walmart.”6

       5  See, e.g. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 473–74 (“[W]here individuals ‘purposefully
derive benefit’ from their interstate activities . . . it may well be unfair to allow them to escape
having to account in other States for consequences that arise proximately from such
activities; the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid
interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.” (quoting Kulko v. Cal. Super. Ct.,
436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978))).
        6 In framing the California-directed activities as the only relevant events in the

purposeful availment analysis, Defendants ignore their North Carolina-directed activities,
brushing them off as irrelevant because they occurred after the employment relationship
initially formed. As part of this error, Defendants muddle the distinction between the
purposeful availment inquiry and the relatedness inquiry. For example, as part of their
purposeful availment analysis, they assert that “[w]ithout soliciting a relationship with a
North Carolina resident and the forum itself, there is no connection between the contracts at
issue and this forum.” At this point in the analysis, however, the task is to evaluate “the
nature and extent of ‘the defendant’s relationship to the forum State.’ ” Ford Motor Co., 141
S. Ct. at 1024 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 582 U.S. at 262). Whether there is a

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                                     Opinion of the Court

       Schaeffer’s claims further arise out of and are related to Corporate Defendants’

activities in North Carolina. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1026. Schaeffer’s claims

stem from an employment relationship that was partially carried out and allegedly

breached in North Carolina. Though the alleged promises that are the basis for the

claims were originally made in California, Schaeffer continued to act on Corporate

Defendants’ behalf in North Carolina based on those promises. The promises were

then broken in North Carolina when Corporate Defendants reclaimed the shares they

had allegedly granted Schaeffer, which is the event that gave rise to Schaeffer’s

claims. To be precise, the claims arise from, or were caused by, Corporate Defendants’

revocation of the shares. See id. at 1026 (explaining that the “arise from” language in

this standard “asks about causation”).

       Additionally, other activities conducted by Corporate Defendants are related

to Schaeffer’s claims. Corporate Defendants supported Schaeffer’s employment-

related needs and business efforts in North Carolina, directed Schaeffer to carry out

certain activities directed at the North Carolina market on their behalf, and they

terminated him when he was a North Carolina resident. It is one thing for Defendants

to argue that these activities are not sufficient to conclude that Corporate Defendants

purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of doing business in North Carolina

connection between the at-issue contacts and North Carolina is a separate question that does
not bear on whether the “quality and nature” of Corporate Defendants’ contacts are sufficient
to trigger specific jurisdiction. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

so as to establish minimum contacts—an argument that we have already rejected—

but there is simply no basis in law or logic to conclude that Schaeffer’s claims are not

related to these activities.

        The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ford Motor Co. supports this result. Ford

Motor Co. consolidated two product liability cases that arose after Ford-manufactured

cars malfunctioned, injuring individuals in the cars when the vehicles crashed. 141

S. Ct. at 1023. The accidents occurred in the states where the suits were brought, the

victims were residents of those states, and “Ford did substantial business in” both

states. Id. at 1022. Ford sought to dismiss the suits for lack of personal jurisdiction,

arguing that the state courts “had jurisdiction only if the company’s conduct in the

State had given rise to the plaintiff’s claims. And that causal link existed . . . only if

the company had designed, manufactured, or—most likely—sold in the State the

particular vehicle involved in the accident.” Id. at 1023. The U.S. Supreme Court

rejected this argument, highlighting that jurisdiction can be established when a

plaintiff’s claims arise from or are related to a defendant’s activities in the relevant

forum. Id. at 1026. Applying this distinction, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims

were related to Ford’s activities in their states, meaning the “ ‘relationship among the

defendant, the forum[s], and the litigation’—[was] close enough to support specific

jurisdiction.” Id. at 1032 (first alteration in original) (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at

284).

                                          -19-
                      SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Applying Ford Motor Co. to the facts of this case, just as jurisdiction there was

not limited “to where the car was designed, manufactured, or first sold,” 141 S. Ct. at

1028, jurisdiction here is not limited to where Schaeffer was first recruited or where

his contract was negotiated and executed. In Ford Motor Co., the Court recognized

that “Ford sold the specific products [that malfunctioned] in other states,” but it

explained that the plaintiffs’ claims were related to Ford’s activities anyway because

“the plaintiffs [were] residents of the forum States. They used the allegedly defective

products in the forum States. And they suffered injuries when those products

malfunctioned in the forum States.” Id. at 1031. Here, Schaeffer was a resident of

North Carolina, he carried out his employment obligations in North Carolina based

on both directives from Corporate Defendants and promises Corporate Defendants

allegedly made to him, and he claims he suffered an injury in North Carolina when

Corporate Defendants allegedly broke those promises. There is a clear connection

between Corporate Defendants’ activities in North Carolina—some of which were

conducted by Corporate Defendants themselves to accommodate and support

Shaeffer’s remote work in North Carolina while others were conducted by Schaeffer

at Corporate Defendants’ behest for their own benefit—and Schaeffer’s claims in this

litigation. This conclusion “is faithful to the United States Supreme Court’s

characterization of specific jurisdiction as being based on ‘case-linked’ contacts.” Beem

USA Ltd.-Liab. Ltd. P’ship, 373 N.C. at 307.

                                          -20-
                      SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                      Opinion of the Court

      To distort this straightforward analysis, Defendants again frame their

recruitment of Schaeffer and execution of his employment-related agreements—

activities that were completed in California—as their only relevant activities with

respect to Schaeffer’s claims. Through this narrow lens, Defendants assert that

“Schaeffer seeks to relitigate alleged representations made to him, and agreements

entered into, in California, and that have nothing whatsoever to do with North

Carolina or [Defendants’] alleged North Carolina contacts. The only connection

between the claims at issue and this forum is Schaeffer’s unilateral decision to

relocate to North Carolina.” This contention mischaracterizes Corporate Defendants’

activities in North Carolina as described above, and incorrectly focuses on a limited

set of events during the parties’ relationship to the exclusion of other relevant

considerations. As discussed, conduct that occurred in North Carolina following the

formation of the relationship between Schaeffer and Corporate Defendants is

pertinent to this analysis as well.

      Not only have Defendants purposefully established minimum contacts in

North Carolina that arise out of and are related to Schaeffer’s claims, but personal

jurisdiction is also constitutionally reasonable in that “the assertion of personal

jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Burger King

Corp., 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320). Most significantly,

Corporate Defendants already independently conduct extensive activities in North

Carolina apart from any activities they conducted in the state that were related to

                                             -21-
                      SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                   Opinion of the Court

Schaeffer. What is more, Defendants have not challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction

as to one of Schaeffer’s claims, so they are already subject to litigation in North

Carolina in this very matter. As a result, there is virtually no burden on Corporate

Defendants in litigating the additional claims in this state. Further, litigating all of

the claims against Corporate Defendants in North Carolina preserves judicial

resources, thereby promoting the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining an

efficient resolution of the case by consolidating the claims within a single court.

Finally, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that “North Carolina has

minimal interest in a contract negotiated outside of this State, formed between non-

resident parties, and substantially performed outside of this State,” Schaeffer, 2021

WL 2426202, at *5, North Carolina has a “ ‘manifest interest’ in providing its

residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state

actors.” Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 367 (citing Burger

King Corp., 471 U.S. at 473). All told, Corporate Defendants have established

“minimum contacts with [North Carolina] such that the maintenance of the suit does

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co., 326

U.S. at 316 (cleaned up).

   2. Individual Defendants

      Importantly, foreign corporate officers, directors, or representatives are not

subjected to jurisdiction simply because their employer-corporation is subject to suit

in a particular forum. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“Petitioners[’]

                                          -22-
                      SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                   Opinion of the Court

. . . contacts with California are not to be judged according to their employer’s

activities there.”); see also Robbins v. Ingham, 179 N.C. App. 764, 771 (2006)

(“ ‘[P]laintiffs may not assert jurisdiction over a corporate agent without some

affirmative act committed in his individual official capacity.’ ”) (emphasis added)

(quoting Godwin v. Walls, 118 N.C. App. 341, 348, disc. review allowed, 341 N.C. 419

(1995)). Imputing a corporation’s contacts to individuals employed by the corporation

would ignore that specific jurisdiction turns on “the relationship between the

defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Mucha v. Wagner, 378 N.C. 167, 174 (2021)

(emphasis added) (cleaned up). Nevertheless, we do not conclude that any foreign

corporate representative acting solely within their official capacity is shielded from

jurisdiction, as such a blanket rule would itself risk ignoring the forum-directed

activities of the individual defendant. But “more than mere participation in the

affairs of the corporation is required.” King v. Prodea Sys., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 7, 16

(D. Mass. 2019) (cleaned up). We instead conduct the same minimum contacts test

for Individual Defendants as we have for Corporate Defendants. With respect to the

relatedness inquiry, one particularly relevant consideration is whether Individual

Defendants were “primary participants in the alleged wrongdoing intentionally

directed at a [North Carolina] resident.” Calder, 465 at 790.

      Schaeffer’s pleadings and affidavit do not provide a factual basis to conclude

that Individual Defendants themselves engaged in sufficient activities giving rise to

or related to the subject matter of the claims to be subjected to jurisdiction in North

                                          -23-
                      SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                  Opinion of the Court

Carolina courts. Though Schaeffer’s affidavit alleges, among other minor activities,

that Defendant Schoenebeck “participated in [his] termination” and “[he] believes

that” he was terminated “at the direction of Defendant Bates,” Schaeffer does not

make sufficiently specific allegations regarding the North Carolina-directed activities

Individual Defendants themselves engaged in or the connection between those

activities and his claims, such as by alleging their individual roles in bringing about

the injuries he suffered. For example, while it might be the case that Defendant

Schoenebeck participated in his termination, she may have had nothing to do with

the decision to terminate him and did not necessarily know that his shares were being

revoked. Without more, these general allegations are insufficient to conclude that the

exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate as to Individual Defendants.

                               III.   Conclusion

   Personal jurisdiction doctrine has necessarily evolved over time to account for “the

fundamental transformation of our national economy.” Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285

N.C. 700, 704 (1974). “Today[,] many commercial transactions touch two or more

States and may involve parties separated by the full continent.” Id. In the same vein,

as technological innovation flourishes, remote work has become increasingly

common. In the face of these advances, courts must balance the importance of a

foreign defendant’s “liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of

a forum in which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations,” with

the reality that such contacts are more easily and more widely cultivated today. See

                                         -24-
                       SHAEFFER V. SINGLECARE HOLDINGS, LLC

                                    Opinion of the Court

Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 471–72 (cleaned up). Indeed, “because modern

transportation and communications have made it much less burdensome for a party

sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity, it usually

will not be unfair to subject him to the burdens of litigating in another forum for

disputes relating to such activity.” Id. at 473–74 (cleaned up).

       Though our rapidly changing world has perhaps made it easier to hold foreign

defendants to account for alleged wrongdoings in a variety of forums, our decision

today breaks no new ground. It simply analyzes the whole of Schaeffer’s relationship

with Defendants, rather than focusing only on a narrow and discrete set of events.

Because Corporate Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of

conducting various business-related activities in North Carolina and those activities

arise from or relate to Schaeffer’s claims in this litigation, we hold that the trial court

may exercise personal jurisdiction over Corporate Defendants pursuant to the Due

Process Clause. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision in this case as

to Corporate Defendants, affirm its decision with respect to Individual Defendants,

and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

       AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

                                           -25-