Court Opinion

ID: 9566551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:40:47.934092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:26.789676
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge, dissenting.
In my opinion the plaintiff in the trial court did not prove a valid order for any amount of crushed stone. The only order that I can find in the record in this case is an order placed by an attorney at law for the plaintiff which is a standing order. Even if the attorney had authority to purchase goods for the plaintiff, the standing order was revocable at any moment; it was not limited to the requirements of the plaintiff and it did not specify what size and price stone was ordered.
On September 21, 1945, Consolidated Quarries Corporation *375instituted an action under the Georgia Declaratory Judgment Act against Stone Mountain Grit Company, seeking a declaration of its rights under the contract involved in this case. This court on a consideration of the case dismissed the writ of error on the ground that the questions raised were moot, and the court stated in the opinion in that case that the writ of error was dismissed without prejudice as to the questions adjudicated below. See Consolidated Quarries Corp. v. Davidson, 79 Ga. App. 248 (53 S. E. 2d 231). In that case the following interrogatories were made of the jury and the jury made the finding shown at the conclusion of each interrogatory:
“Consolidated Quarries Corporation vs. Stone Mountain Grit Company.
No. 11,037
DeKalb Superior Court.
“Interrogatories to the juiy.
“1. Did the parties in this case intend the document bearing the date August 20, 1943, signed by C. L. Davidson for the Stone Mountain Grit Company and by G. A. Austin for Consolidated Quarries Corporation to constitute a contract between the Parties?
“Yes.
“2. At the time the letter of August 20, 1943, attached to the original petition as Exhibit ‘B’, was written, did the parties to this case have in mind the amount of stone that the plaintiff, Consolidated Quarries Corporation, was obligated to sell, and the defendant, Stone Mountain Grit Company was obligated to buy during the period beginning August 20, 1943, and ending September 1, 1948?
“Yes—total requirements.
“3. If the parties to this case did have in mind the amount of stone that the plaintiff, Consolidated Quarries Corporation, was obligated to sell and the defendant, Stone Mountain Grit Company, was obligated to buy during the period beginning August 20, 1943, and ending September 1, 1948, at the time the letter of August 20, 1943, was written, what was such amount?
“20,000 to 80,000 tons yearly.
*376“4. Did the parties to said agreement of August 20, 1943, contemplate that the defendant, Stone Mountain Grit Company, was obligated to buy from Consolidated Quarries Corporation all of the stone that it would use during the period beginning August 20, 1943, and ending September 1, 1948?
“Yes.
“5. If your answer to the preceding question is yes, then do you find that the parties intended that the contract be divisable?
“Yes.
“6. Did the Stone Mountain Grit Company on August 20, 1943, have an established business requiring the use of crushed stone?
“Yes.
“7. If the answer to the preceding question is yes, were the future requirements of the Stone Mountain Grit Company for crushed stone for its own use capable of approximate estimation?
“Yes.
“8. Did the Stone Mountain Grit Company, on August 20, 1943, have an established business for the re-sale of crushed stone?
“Yes.
“9. If the answer to the preceding question is yes, were the future requirements of the Stone Mountain Grit Company for crushed stone for re-sale capable of approximate estimation?
“Yes.
“10. If the answer to the preceding question is yes, what amount of crushed stone would supply the requirements of the Stone Mountain Grit Company for re-sale?
“Approximately 5% of total requirements.
"11. Did the defendant, Stone Mountain Grit Company, make the offer to the plaintiff, Consolidated Quarries, contained in the letter dated April 19,1944, that is attached to the original petition in this cause as Exhibit ‘C’ or was such letter a counter-proposal to a proposal made to the defendant, Stone Mountain Grit Company by the plaintiff, Consolidated Quarries Corporation?
"Counter-proposal.
“12. Did the plaintiff, Consolidated Quarries Corporation, fill all orders that it received from the defendant, Stone Mountain *377Grit Company, prior to the receipt by the defendant, Stone Mountain Grit Company of the letter of April 30, 1945, withdrew the offer of the plaintiff, Consolidated Quarries Corporation contained in the document of August 20, 1943?
“No.
“V. G. Shearer, Foreman.
Sept. 5, 1947.”
The evidence in this case did not show facts from which a jury could ascertain what the parties meant in the contract by the “plaintiff’s requirements”. It was decided in the declaratory judgment action what the requirements of the plaintiff were. The findings in the declaratory judgment action, with one exception, were not binding on the court in the instant case. The exception referred to is the finding that the contract was a binding one between the parties. This question was involved in the question whether the petition was subject to general demurrer and the judgment overruling the general demurrer controls as to the proposition that the contract between the parties was binding. Any other ruling in the declaratory judgment action, other than is involved on a ruling in a demurrer, was not binding in this action. It is true that the judge, in ruling on the demurrers to the redrafted petition on August 27, 1956, made some statements in his order with reference to the declaratory judgment action which were not germane to his ruling on the demurrers, and the failure to except to these matters which were not germane to the ruling on demurrers does not bind the defendant in this case. Said judgment is set forth by the majority on motion for a rehearing and need not be quoted here. The plaintiff in error contends that all the findings in the declaratory judgment action are binding on the parties in this case for the reason that the findings have not been reversed or set aside. I think that the principle of law that where an appellate court dismisses a writ of error because the questions involved have become moot, the rulings of the court reviewed are not binding on the parties is as basic and fundamental as the principle that an appellate court will not decide moot questions. The philosophy of the first principle stated above is that in such cases the appealing party, through no fault of his own, has not had the *378right to have the appellate court review, decide and determine the questions brought in issue by the appeal. I think that the legal consequence of such a dismissal of a writ of error is that the judgments of the court whose judgments are being reviewed are not binding on the parties whether the appellate court so specifically states in its judgment or opinion, (or both) or not. Restatement of the Law, Judgments, 315, § 69: “Where a party to a judgment cannot obtain the decision of an appellate court because the matter determined against him is immaterial or moot, the judgment is not conclusive against him in a subsequent action on a different cause of action.” 157 A.L.R. 1043; 34 C.J. 790, § 1207, 893, § 1300; 50 C.J.S. 74, §§ 640, 641; Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Monroe, 22 Ga. App. 190 (95 S. E. 731). But whatever the legal consequence of the dismissal of a writ of error because of moot questions, the appellate court assuredly has jurisdiction and authority to.give direction to the effect that the judgments of the trial court are not binding. Henderson v. Hoppe, 103 Ga. 684 (30 S. E. 653); Gallaher v. Schneider, 110 Ga. 322 (35 S. E. 321); Davis v. Mayor &c. of Jasper, 119 Ga. 57 (45 S. E. 724); Bigham v. Yundt, 158 Ga. 600 (123 S. E. 870); Blackwell v. Farrar, 209 Ga. 420 (73 S. E. 2d 203), and cases cited. In such a case the dismissal on the ground of moot questions itself becomes binding. Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Monroe, 22 Ga. App. 285 (3) (96 S. E. 500). So my conclusion in this case is that none of the rulings in the case mentioned at the beginning of this division of the opinion, except the ruling that the contract was binding, is binding.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in Northern Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Almand, 210 Ga. 243 (78 S. E. 2d 788) is not authority for a contrary conclusion. The point in that case is a rather difficult one to understand. The decisions of this court and the Supreme Court speak for themselves. When all is said and done, the matter resolves itself into the question whether this court or the Supreme Court correctly interpreted the ruling of this court in Almand v. Northern Assurance Co., Ltd., 87 Ga. App. 193 (73 S. E. 2d 101). This court interpreted its ruling as one that the lower court did not decide the case on its merits, and that this court dismissed the writ of error on its own motion because *379the matter to be decided was moot. The Supreme Court interpreted our ruling to mean that this court dismissed the writ of error because the lower court ruled on the merits and that this court dismissed the writ of error on the merits of the appeal and not because this court was faced with a moot question. No matter which court is right the cases involved do not hold contrary to what is here expressed.
I think the evidence demanded the finding that there was a market for the stone in DeKalb County and I do not think that the defendant’s letter to the plaintiff stating, “Confirming our telephone conversation with you this morning, we will be glad to fill your order for ten cars of crushed stone, No. 23, at our list price, provided cars are available. Since there has been some discussion between us about a purported contract, we wish it understood that this shipment is made simply in compliance with the above order because we do not recognize the existence of any contract with yov,” (emphasis added) in which letter the defendant suggested or required the plaintiff to sign the following statement, “We agree to the shipment of the above order in accordance with the foregoing terms”, means what the majority holds it does. I do not think that the acceptance of the order on condition that it was agreed by the plaintiff that the order would be accepted in accordance with the foregoing terms means that in so doing the plaintiff acknowledged that no valid contract existed. In view of the divergence of opinion between the parties as to whether a valid contract existed or not, it was the intention of the defendant to make it clear that it was shipping goods under the list price and was not recognizing the contract as a valid one. The only condition required to be accepted in ordering stone was that the defendant did not recognize the existence of a contract and not that no valid, contract in fact existed. This did not prevent the plaintiff from ordering stone from the defendant at list or market price and from holding the defendant liable for the difference between the contract and market price if it finally turned out that the contract was binding. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the plaintiff sold crushed stone in the open market itself and this was sufficient to show a market price in DeKalb County. Even if this *380is not true, the plaintiff would be held to the market in DeKalb County established by the defendant unless the plaintiff placed valid and complete orders for crushed stone with the defendant at the market price and the defendant refused to ship it.
The evidence demanded a verdict for the defendant because there was no evidence from which the jury could with any degree of certainty ascertain the amount of damages due. Williams & Templeton v. Brewer, 93 Ga. App. 603 (1) (92 S. E. 2d 586); Estridge v. Janko, 96 Ga. App. 258 (99 S. E. 2d 682). The plaintiff made no effort to purchase its requirements of crushed stone at any market price anywhere. The evidence does not disclose what size stone the plaintiff ordered from the defendant, if it ordered any, or at what times, so as to show by which of the defendant’s price lists the damage was to be arrived at. The defendant’s price lists showed ten sizes of stone at several prices. For example, the following is a price list dated January 1, 1941:
“Crushed Stone
Price list—effective January 1, 1941.
Prices are per net ton in open cars F.O.B. Lithonia, Ga.
Sizes are Georgia State Highway Specifications.
Modified to conform with specifications dated Jan. 1, 1942.
Size Grading Price
2 2" -1" __________________________________________________________________________$1.10
4 1%"- %" __________________________________________________________________________ 1.10
7 %"-10 mesh -------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.10
46 1" - 4 mesh -------------- 1.10
246 2" - 8 mesh _________________________________________________________________1.10
356 14 mesh ____________________________________________________________________ 1.10
5 %" __________________________________________________________________________ 1.20
6 4 mesh ____________________________________________________________________ 1.20
56 %■"- 4 mesh -------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.20
10 Minus 10 mesh__________________________________________________________________ .30
Box car loading—extra net per ton__________________________________________ .15
Truck loading—extra per net ton .............................................05
Special sizes to order”
The contract allowed plaintiff 30 per cent discount on all sizes but No. 7 and the discount on it was 10 percent. The defendant had four price lists covering the period involved in this case: *381one dated January 1, 1941; one dated June 15, 1945; one dated January 1, 1947, and one dated January 1, 1948. The petition specifically alleged that the plaintiff ordered its requirements from the defendant during the entire period involved and there is not sufficient evidence to support the allegations in order that the jury could with any degree of certainty determine the damage suffered. For instance, if a great majority of stone ordered by the plaintiff was No. 7, the damage for failure to deliver would be much less than if some other sizes were ordered, because on the first the discount under the contract was only 10 percent while on all other sizes it was 30 percent.
If we assume that the finding in the declaratory judgment action as to what the plaintiff’s requirements were, between 20,000 and 80,000 tons a year, is binding in this case, what this finding means is beyond me. It would seem to mean that the requirements could be shown by the plaintiff to be somewhere between 20,000 and 80,000 tons a year. If it does mean that, there is no evidence in this case from which the jury could determine on any figure in between 20,000 and 80,000 tons a year.