Court Opinion

ID: 9885043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:28:22.407029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:43.459227
License: Public Domain

CRIPPEN, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellants did not meet their burden of proving fraudulent concealment. They did, however, raise factual issues with respect to the elements of equitable estoppel.
Whether it was reasonable for appellants to rely on respondent’s offer to forgive hospital bills in exchange for a release of liability or whether respondent’s decision to suspend collection action on their bill prevented appellants from bringing the action are questions of fact. The original trial judge stated in the first summary judgment motion in this case:
Analyzing the record in view of the above-stated standard requires the Court to deny Defendant’s motion for Summary Judgment. There exist sufficient facts to support a finding of * * * equitable estoppel.
sfc * ⅝ jfc jjs ⅜
After her fall Gladys and her husband Jake considered bringing a claim against the hospital. Gladys indicated to Grace Boe, a Director of Patient Representatives, that she would be talking to a friend who was an attorney about the matter. Additionally, Jake Tackleson talked with Dr. David Hickok, a staff physician at Abbott-Northwestern, who assured Jake that Gladys’ fall was the hospital’s fault and that the hospital had insurance that would pay the bills. Furthermore, it appears that Marlowe Senske, an assistant administrator at Abbott-Northwestern at the time, talked with Dr. Hickok about the matter. Abbott-Northwestern responded by offering to forgive Gladys’ bills if she would sign a general release. Gladys refused to sign a release. Abbott-Northwestern did not seek to aggressively bill or collect the accounts, but continued to negotiate a release. By failing to treat the bills as a normal collection account, a trier of fact could reasonably find that Abbott-Northwestern was not pursuing the maG ter. This coincides with Dr. Hickok’s representations to Jake Tackleson. A trier of fact could further find that Abbott-Northwestern’s actions induced Gladys Tackleson to refrain from suing out the matter.
Although an affidavit filed for purposes of the second summary judgment motion established that Dr. Hickok was never actually employed by the hospital, the hospital’s actions and appellant’s reliance still justify denial of the summary judgment motion.
The hospital’s treatment of the case raises significant questions of fact. The notes of Grace Boe, Director of Patient Representation and Director of Risk Management, indicate that she was aware of Dr. Hickok’s involvement in the case. In addi*737tion, the hospital’s collection records indicate an aggressive approach to have appellants sign a general release. When appellants refused to sign the release, Boe’s notes reflect a continuous monitoring of the billing situation and contain several notes not to send the Tackleson’s bill to a collection agency. Finally, Marlene Senske, an administrator for the hospital, admitted in an affidavit that it “could have” been a purpose of the hospital’s decision not to send Mrs. Tackleson’s bill to a collection agency to induce appellants not to pursue legal action.
Whether appellants relied on the hospital's actions is also a question of fact. Gladys Tackleson’s affidavit stated that she would have sought legal assistance much earlier had she known the hospital would not honor her understanding that the hospital would cover all past and future medical bills relating to medical treatment for her leg.
Although the evidence presented by the parties on this issue of equitable estoppel may favor defendant, the purpose of a motion for summary judgment is not to resolve factual issues but to determine if they exist. Because there is some question as to the representations of the hospital and the reasonableness of the reliance of appellants, the question of equitable estop-pel should be presented to a factfinder.
I respectfully dissent.