Court Opinion

ID: 9420432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:54:30.751869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:46:20.255151
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Minton,
dissenting.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Jackson, and I are unable to agree with the majority in this case. The husband’s earnings are community property under § 161a, California Civil Code. The wife has a vested interest in one-half of such earnings. United States v. Malcolm, 282 U. S. 792; Bank of America v. Mantz, 4 Cal. 2d 322, 49 P. 2d 279; Cooke v. Cooke, 65 Cal. App. 2d 260, 150 P. 2d 514.
If the premiums on a policy in a private insurance company had been paid out of community property without *662the wife’s consent, the wife could claim her proportionate share of the insurance. Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P. 2d 841; Cooke v. Cooke, supra; Bazzell v. Endriss, 41 Cal. App. 2d 463, 107 P. 2d 49; Mundt v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 35 Cal. App. 2d 416, 95 P. 2d 966.1
It is claimed that the exemption provision of the federal statute prevents the same rule from applying here. This provision, 49 Stat. 609, 38 U. S. C. § 454a, provides:
“Payments of benefits due or to become due . . . shall be exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary.”
What did Congress contemplate by the enactment of this provision? I think the statute presupposes that the beneficiary is the undisputed owner of the proceeds, and that a creditor has sought to reach the fund on an independent claim. Under those circumstances the remedy is denied, for the statute immunizes the fund from levy or attachment. That is not the case before us. The nature of this dispute is a claim by the wife that she is the owner of a half portion of these proceeds because such proceeds are the fruits of funds originally hers.
And recognition of her status as an owner glaringly reveals the irrelevancy of the choice of beneficiary provision. 54 Stat. 1010, 38 U. S. C. § 802 (g). Congress stated that the serviceman was to have the right to designate his beneficiary. When he has done so all other persons than the *663one selected are foreclosed from claiming the proceeds as beneficiary. No further effect has the statute. Here the wife makes no claim to rights as a beneficiary. I am not persuaded that either the choice of beneficiary or the exemption provision should carry the implication of wiping out family property rights, which traditionally have been defined by state law. Fully to respect the right which Congress gave the serviceman to designate his beneficiary does not require disrespect of settled family law and the incidents of the family relationship. As noted in the opinion of the Court, analogous occasions have found courts expressing greater reluctance to obliterate rights recognized by the states.2
Even accepting the Court’s view that the exemption provision applies to the wife, it was intended to protect the fund from attachment, levy, or seizure only so long as it could be identified as a fund. No attachment, levy, or seizure is attempted here. This was an action at law for a money judgment. Appellee obtained a judgment for one-half of the payments that had been collected by the beneficiaries and for one-half of those to be collected thereafter. Payments received under the policy are only the measure of the recovery.
To allow such a judgment does not interfere with the fund or the free designation of the beneficiary by the serviceman. I cannot believe that Congress intended to *664say to a serviceman, “You may take your wife’s property and purchase a policy of insurance payable to your mother, and we will see that your defrauded wife gets none of the money.” Certainly Congress did not intend to upset the long-standing community property law of the states where it was not necessary for the protection of the Government in its relation to the soldier or to the integrity of the fund from “attachment, levy, or seizure.” These are words of art. They have a definite meaning and usage in the law. This usage is not present here. I find nothing in the section that prohibits the beneficiary from being sued at any time on a matter growing out of the transaction by which the soldier acquired the insurance, at least where there is no attempt to attach, levy, or seize the fund. It was the fund Congress was interested in protecting, not the beneficiary. I would affirm.

 “ . . . the only test applied to this problem has been whether the premiums (on a policy issued on the life of a husband after coverture) are paid entirely from community funds. If so, the policy becomes a community asset and the nonconsenting wife may recover an undivided one-half thereof . . . without regard to the disproportionate size of the premium when compared with the face of the policy.” Mundt v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 35 Cal. App. 2d at 421, 95 P. 2d at 969.

 The Court has sought to distinguish, unsuccessfully I think, the many cases holding that payments received as pension, disability insurance, or veterans’ compensation are not exempted from claims for alimony or family support by exemption statutes in the pattern of § 454a. Exhaustive discussions may be found in In re Bagnall’s Guardianship, 238 Iowa 905, 29 N. W. 2d 597; Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 71 App. D. C. 350, 112 F. 2d 177. See also Gaskins v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. App. 2d 409, 86 P. 2d 681; Hollis v. Bryan, 166 Miss. 874, 143 So. 687. Cf. Note, 11 A. L. R. 123 and succeeding annotations.