Court Opinion

ID: 9452822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:52:54.149079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:22.235218
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
With respect to appellant’s statement to the police officer when he was cornered in the alley, I would follow the procedure set forth in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. In-man.1 Under that procedure, the court has a duty to hold a hearing on volun-tariness even in the absence of any objection; and if the confession is then admitted, the court must instruct the jury on the law governing the issue, whether or not it is requested to do so.
The duty of the court to act sua sponte in determining the question of volun-tariness is implicit in this court’s decisions in Proctor v. Anderson2 and Curtis v. United States.3 In each we remanded for a hearing on voluntariness although there had been no objections made on that ground at any point during the trial. No preliminary hearing on the voluntariness of the confession was requested or held. However, even in the *133absence of objection, the court did instruct the jury on the issue. If there had been no obligation on the court to introduce the issue sua sponte by a hearing and instructions, the court’s instructions would have been a sheer gratuity to the defendant and our remand for a hearing inappropriate.
Contrary to the majority’s presupposition, a defendant need not testify at the voluntariness hearing; he can rely upon the testimony and cross-examination of other witnesses to establish coercion.4 Furthermore, he may testify at the hearing to the circumstances which surrounded the making of an alleged statement while at the same time denying that he did in fact make the statement. He thus can avoid the impeachment problem which the majority posits as inevitable.
But even if, as the majority asserts, a defendant’s inculpatory testimony at the hearing could be the basis for his impeachment at trial, the Supreme Court has long since given him the right to so testify. In Lee v. State of Mississippi5 the defendant denied at trial that he had made an admission of guilt when apprehended, yet at a preliminary hearing on voluntariness he took the stand. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that “one accused of crime cannot be heard to say that he did not make a confession at all, and at the same time contend that an alleged confession was made under the inducement of fear.” 6 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that “a conviction resulting from * * * use of a coerced confession * * * is no less void because the accused testified at some point in the proceeding that he had never in fact confessed, voluntarily or involuntarily. Testimony of that nature can hardly legalize a procedure which conflicts with the accepted principles of due process.” 7 The continuing vitality of Lee is confirmed by Boles v. Stevenson,8 where the defendant took the stand during the trial and denied having made an admission of guilt. Yet the Supreme Court invalidated the conviction on the ground that the absence of a preliminary examination on voluntariness and appropriate jury instructions resulted in a procedure “not ‘fully adequate to insure a reliable and clear-cut determination of the volun-tariness of the confession.’ ” 9
Since the court affirms the conviction, it would serve no useful purpose to discuss the admissibility of the other statements made by appellant.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. 352 F.2d 954 (1965).

. 124 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 361 F.2d 557 (1966) (per curiam).

. 121 U.S.App.D.C. 283, 349 F.2d 718 (1965) (per curiam).

. See, e. g., Pyles v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 362 F.2d 959 (1966), where only the arresting officer testified at the voluntariness hearing. It is true that “to substantiate a defendant’s contention that his confession was involuntary, it is generally necessary for him to take the stand.” Wright v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 45, 250 F.2d 4, 13 (1957). (Emphasis supplied.) But this means only that normally a defendant may find it difficult to establish coercion in the absence of his own highly relevant testimony, not that his testimony is essential to the hearing itself. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389 n. 16, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) ; United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38, 72 S.Ct. 97, 96 L.Ed. 48 (1951).

. 332 U.S. 742, 68 S.Ct. 300, 92 L.Ed. 330 (1948).

. Lee v. State, 201 Miss. 423, 435, 30 So.2d 74, 75 (1947).

. 332 U.S. at 745, 68 S.Ct. at 301. It is significant that the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the defendant had in fact admitted during his testimony at the hearing that he had made the confession. See id. at 744 n. 1, 68 S.Ct. at 301.

. 379 U.S. 43, 85 S.Ct. 174, 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964) (per curiam).

. Id. at 45, 85 S.Ct. at 176, quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).