Court Opinion

ID: 9548803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:08:52.313243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:26.188926
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — This case comes to us as an appeal from a dismissal of the complaint because of failure to comply with the statute of limitation. As both the Court of Appeals and the majority agree, substitute service statutes must be strictly construed. They further agree there was in fact no evidence defendant Marvin L. Meier had ever departed from the state. The majority goes on, however, to hold that where "plaintiff had a basis for a good faith belief, which was reasonable under the circumstances, that defendant had departed the state" and had also "exercised due diligence in attempting to locate and serve defendant", substituted service under RCW 46.64.040 will be sufficient. Majority, at 482.
Although I agree, with some reluctance, to its good faith belief/due diligence formulation, I cannot agree with the holding of the majority.
*484Given legislative intent and the difficulty in proving a person in fact has departed the state, this rule may be appropriate as a general proposition. I cannot accept, however, the majority's holding there was valid service. Although the rule propounded by the majority is a rule of law, whether there was a good faith belief and due diligence are factual questions. Until the majority spoke, no one in this case knew the structure or rationale of the new rule. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding plaintiff had failed to comply with the statute of limitation. The trial court made no findings of fact. The Court of Appeals held, since substitute service statutes must be strictly construed (a proposition concurred in by the majority, at 479), RCW 46.64.040 requires that the defendant must have departed the state. Since there was no evidence defendant had ever departed the state, the attempt to gain jurisdiction by RCW 46.64.040 failed.
While the new rule may provide fairness to plaintiffs in serving hard-to-locate defendants and not unduly prejudice defendants, it is grossly unfair to this defendant for the court in this case to become the trier of fact as well as the declarer of law. It is particularly egregious that the fact-finding engaged in by the majority is based wholly on affidavits. Surely it is inappropriate for this court to determine what well may be a contested factual matter simply on the affidavit of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the Supreme Court is not authorized by the constitution to make findings of fact where none has been made by the tried court. State v. Marchand, 62 Wn.2d 767, 770, 384 P.2d 865 (1963). Factual disputes are to be resolved by the trial court, in which the constitution (Const, art. 4, § 6) exclusively vests this power. Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 56 Wn.2d 957, 959, 350 P.2d 1003, 353 P.2d 671 (1960). Irrespective of the constitution, however, even a modest sense of fairness would allow a factual hearing so the trial judge, who is the trier of fact, could make the initial determination as to whether plaintiff meets the requirements of the new rule. The proper remedy should be to remand this case *485to allow the trial court to make findings of fact. State v. Marchand, supra at 770-71.
The fundamentally unfair position of the majority as to the need for a factual determination is bad enough. Its assault on the constitutional fact-finding function of the trial court is compounded by its wholly unjustified limiting, as a matter of law, any consideration as to when, during the statutory period, the plaintiff attempted service. Majority, at 479-80. Contrary to the majority, I believe this very well may have a bearing on good faith belief and due diligence. At the very least, it should not be barred from any consideration as the majority would do. As the defendant aptly observes, it has always been true that if a plaintiff's attorney knows the location of the defendant but makes the decision not to serve the defendant and waits 3 years, the attorney takes the risk the defendant cannot be located in time to cut off the statute of limitation. Particularly in this case, since defendant in fact had not departed the state, the time of filing ought to be open to consideration on the issues of good faith belief and due diligence.
Thus, while I would agree with the majority in reversing the Court of Appeals and remanding the matter back to the trial court, in contrast to the majority I would not find valid service but rather direct a further hearing by the trial court to determine whether in fact plaintiff acted in a good faith belief and exercised due diligence.
Dore and Callow, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.