Court Opinion

ID: 9667667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:51:53.260939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:39.735251
License: Public Domain

DOGGETT, Justice, concurring.
Oral argument in this cause was heard on November 28, 1990. The delay in announcing the majority’s opinion has been totally unnecessary and unjustified. It cannot be attributed to the complexity of the issues — this cause presents a single question for review — nor by the size of the record — we are asked to review a summary judgment transcript consisting of motions and a single three-page affidavit. Nor for that matter does the opinion suggest that the legal issue itself is a difficult one requiring extensive research and analysis— the majority relies primarily on a single writing of the United States Supreme Court that predates oral argument in this cause by two years. Only four other authorities are mentioned. A dilatory resolution of the issue presented not only dis-serves the litigants before us, but also breaches the public’s trust in performing the duties of the judiciary in a timely and responsible manner.
In defense of this indefensible situation, it is urged that the “traditions” of this court are more important than the people to whom it is supposed to afford justice. At 64 (per curiam). When “traditions” require a woman, who is a rape victim relying on an uneontested three-page affidavit, to wait seventeen months after argument only to be given a misleading answer, I refuse to be silent. When the “traditions” of this court cannot produce expeditious and fair resolution of litigation, they must be changed.1
There is no justification for why this woman’s claim must take last place in the majority’s priorities.2 Though insensitive to her, the majority is hypersensitive to this writing. So grave is their concern that in an unprecedented move, the same justices in the same case feel “compelled” to issue not one but two opinions — a majority opinion and its peculiar twin, the “per curiam.” They offer a standard bureaucratic response: (1) it’s not really a problem; (2) it’s not our fault; (3) it’s classified; (4) it’s always been that way; (5) take your complaint somewhere else.3 Everyone would be better served by fewer excuses and more leadership in getting the important work of this court accomplished.
The majority’s last refuge is in the Code of Judicial Conduct. In no way because of that Code are “they [not able to] ethically respond” to Andrea Delaney for what happened here. Id. at 58. Indeed, they conveniently disregard another Code requirement that “[a] judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.” Texas Supreme Court, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, pt. A(7). Like the majority’s recent delay in another case, “jus*62tice delayed [has been] justice denied.” Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 538 n. 1 (Tex.1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting) (noting failure to release opinion forcing taxpayers to pay unconstitutional property taxes until the passage of several deadlines, including that for payment of taxes).
Andrea Delaney has quite simply told the court that one cause of a brutal rape was the failure of a governmental unit to repair the lock on her dormitory door, despite her repeated pleas. All we needed to decide was whether the intentional tort exception in the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.057(2), bars a student’s claims that in operating a dormitory the state was negligent, breached a contract and warranties and violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices — Consumer Protection Act, Tex.Bus. & Com.Code §§ 17.41-.61. There has not been the slightest doubt that the court of appeals erred in giving an affirmative answer.
This very limited issue is all that is presented for our review. When the order granting summary judgment explicitly states the grounds therefor, and the underlying motion contains other independent grounds for the same relief, the summary judgment can be affirmed only on the grounds specified in the trial court’s order. See John Hill Cayce, Jr., Preserving Error on Appeal: A Practical Guide for Civil Appeals in Texas, 23 St. Mary’s L.J. 15, 73 n. 395, 77-78 n. 420 (1991); David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 20 St. Mary’s L.J. 243, 282 (1989). It is simple enough to state the one issue and proceed to answer it. Then why has it taken so long?
Perhaps because a large portion of the rather convoluted opinion is dedicated to professing what the majority does not decide and listing excuses for that failure. One excuse for deliberately ducking “[t]he legal arguments [Delaney] makes [is that they] are sufficiently difficult that it would be unwise to attempt to resolve them without a firmer factual footing.” Id. at 58. Faulting Delaney for her affidavit,4 the only factual evidence in this summary judgment record, the majority pollutes the waters of Clear Creek. It apparently loses sight of the fact that Delaney is the non-movant, and that under previously unassailed precedent of this court, the summary judgment evidence favorable to her must be taken as true, with all doubts resolved in her favor. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979). Casually stating that it is simply “not inclined” to address these other issues, the majority concludes its nondis-cussion by refusing to “express [any] view of the other matters discussed in [the court of appeals’] opinion.” At 59. These far-ranging sidetrips are unnecessary to the disposition of this cause, unless they constitute some veiled signal to the trial court to follow the court of appeals’ opinion on these other issues. The correct approach would reject any writing by the intermediate court on grounds other than the single one recited in the order granting summary judgment.
Another possible reason for the tardy release of this decision is the suggestion that it is somehow related to LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Disk, 835 S.W.2d 49 (Tex.1992). Any alleged symmetry or “consisten[cy]” between the majority’s action in this cause and that in Le-Leaux is entirely contrived. The legal issue presented by Ms. Delaney has nothing to do with that of Ms. LeLeaux.
No party in this action has suggested that the employment status of the rapist is of the slightest importance to the resolution of this cause. Nevertheless, the majority views this factor as decisive. Today’s opinion insists that the term “governmental employee” must be read into section 101.057(2). Under the majority’s writ*63ing, Ms. Delaney’s action is barred if the state employee who was dispatched to repair the lock chose instead to rape her. On the other hand, if the state’s negligence in failing to repair facilitates rape by a non-employee intruder, her action is not barred.
To justify its strange “job based” qualification to the intentional tort exception of the Texas Tort Claims Act, the majority performs rather delicate surgery on Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 108 S.Ct. 2449,101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988). Having concluded that the key criterion in applying section 101.057(2) is whether “the tort-feasor [is a] governmental employee whose conduct is the subject of the complaint,” at 59, the majority claims that “the United States Supreme Court has adopted this same view of similar language in the Federal Tort Claims Act.” Both the facts and the language of Sheridan belie this conclusion. There the intentional tortfeasor was a governmental employee, yet the Court nonetheless permitted suit to be brought under the federal act. The critical factor was the existence of a separate act of negligence by the government that was a cause of the harm, not the employment status of the person committing the assault. The Court explicitly stated:
[I]t would seem perverse to exonerate the Government because of the happenstance that Carr [the intentional tort-feasor] was on a federal payroll.
487 U.S. at 402, 108 S.Ct. at 2456. This view was reiterated:
The Government’s responsibility for an assault may be clear even though the identity of the assailant is unknown.
Id. at 402 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. at 2456 n. 7 (discussing with approval Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220 (1988)).
A careful reading of Sheridan proves it to be quite a different case than represented in today’s writing, both as to its holding and as to its claimed support for the majority’s analysis. Most patently misleading is the claim that the Supreme Court believed “that the intentional tort exception could not be circumvented merely by alleging that the government was negligent in supervising the employee-tortfeasor.” At 60. What the majority really does is to disregard Sheridan in favor of the view taken by the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Winters in the lower court.5 Today’s opinion contrasts sharply with the actual conclusion of the United States Supreme Court, which stated in no uncertain terms that the issue of negligent supervision was not presented:
Because Carr’s employment status is irrelevant to the outcome, it is not appropriate in this case to consider whether negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or negligent training may ever provide the basis for liability under the [Federal Tort Claims Act] for a foreseeable assault or battery by a Government employee.
487 U.S. at 403 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. at 2456 n. 8. In short, the discussion of Sheridan bears as little resemblance to what the United States Supreme Court actually wrote as it bears relevance to the sole issue presented here. In fact, under today’s opinion, a person in the same position as Sheridan, who prevailed before the United States Supreme Court, would lose before this Texas Supreme Court.6
Who raped Ms. Delaney is a question raised by the majority to avoid addressing the sole question presented here. An event may have more than one proximate cause; intentional conduct and negligent conduct may combine to produce one injury. Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex.1985); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448 (1965). Nothing in the Tort *64Claims Act bars an action against the state for its negligence which contributed to an injury even though the intentional conduct of a third party may have contributed to the same event.
I agree that the intentional tort exception in the Texas Tort Claims Act does not bar Delaney’s claims. When a negligent act and an intentional act contribute to cause an injury, the negligent actor should not escape liability for the harm caused. This principle remains true even when the government is the negligent party and the Tort Claims Act is applicable.
I concur in the judgment but vigorously disapprove of both the majority’s writing and its mishandling of this entire cause.
MAUZY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

. The suggestion that I could have taken Justice Hecht's writing assignment away from him to obtain a more prompt resolution is made with the full knowledge of the futility of such a task. The implication that the “remarks [contained in this opinion have not been previously presented] to the Court collectively" is inaccurate. At 64.

. Nor has she been the only victim of unreasonable delay. Already, with at least some justification, this court has received a rebuke from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Amberboy v. Societe de Batique Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793, 800 n. 11 (Doggett, J„ concurring and dissenting). My writing today follows my own inability to resolve this problem through administrative rules and procedures.

.They also insist on "the spirit of professionalism" mentioned in the Texas Lawyer's Creed, at 64, forgetting that a judge should owe the public the same "diligence, candor [and] punctuality” that this Creed demands of lawyers. Texas Lawyer’s Creed — A Mandate for Professionalism (adopted November 7, 1989). Moreover, the overriding obligation of the Creed is "the profession’s broader duty to the legal system." My commitment is to a legal system that provides litigants a just and timely resolution of their disputes.

. While claiming to "rely[ ] entirely upon Delaney’s affidavit,” the majority in fact rejects her statement as "not supply[ing] a sufficient predicate. ... The only evidence that the University ever contracted with her, or made representations or warranties to her, or acted in some proprietary way, is her own affidavit, which does not establish any of these facts with certitude." At 58.

. 487 U.S. at 397, 108 S.Ct. at 2453 ("Where no reliance is placed on negligent supervision or respondeat superior principles....") (quoting Sheridan v. United States, 823 F.2d 820, 824 (C.A.4 1987) (Winter, C.J., dissenting)).

. The harm created by the majority’s view is most apparent in their refusal to disapprove Townsend v. Memorial Medical Ctr., 529 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1975, writ refd n.r.e.), barring a rape victim’s claim under Section 101.057(2). In both that case and this one, separate acts of negligence leading to the injuries sustained were asserted. The sole distinction is the employment status of the rapist. Application of the true holding of Sheridan would require that Townsend be disapproved.