Court Opinion

ID: 9945873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 18:01:20.630501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:16.920899
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10206    Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 02/28/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10206
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        JAMES LESTER WILLIAMS, JR.,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        POLK COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-02842-WFJ-SPF
                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                23-10206

        Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               In this employment discrimination case, the district court
        granted the Polk County Board of County Commissioners’ motion
        for summary judgment on James Lester Williams’s claims of race
        discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and age
        discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
        (“ADEA”). Williams then moved for reconsideration, pointing to
        allegedly newly discovered evidence. The district court denied the
        motion, finding that Williams had not exercised reasonable
        diligence.
              On appeal, Williams offers no argument for why summary
        judgment was improper, and he fails to show that the district court
        abused its discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration.
        We therefore affirm.
                                 I.     Background
                Williams was hired as a Veterans Services Officer in Polk
        County’s Health and Human Services Division in 2016. Williams
        is a black male and was around 40 years old at the time. In 2019,
        Williams successfully applied for a promotion to Veterans
        Supervisor.
              Not long after Williams was promoted, Williams’s
        subordinates began complaining about his managerial style to his
        supervisor, Director of the County Health and Human Services
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        23-10206               Opinion of the Court                        3

        Division Marcia Andresen. They described him as “authoritarian,
        demeaning, and disrespectful.” Williams does not dispute that
        these complaints “were in no way related to or based on his race or
        age.”
               Williams argued below, however, that these poor reviews
        and institutional corrections were unfair. For example, according
        to Williams, one employee refused to accept any direction from
        Williams and would go over his head to discuss work matters with
        Andresen. Another was chronically late and would not accept
        coaching. Williams sought support from Andresen, but he claims
        she took the employees’ side and refused to intervene. Over time,
        Williams received a series of written evaluations in which he was
        praised for good performance in some areas, but was criticized for
        his performance as a manager and team builder.
               Williams’s issues with his subordinates, and their
        complaints, “escalated,” with employees “expressing desires to quit
        their jobs because the supervision was so authoritarian and
        demeaning.” Williams went to Andresen to tell her that he could
        not be an effective supervisor if she undermined his authority with
        subordinates and refused to support him.
              Around this time, two of Williams’s subordinates allegedly
        asked two black employees to help get Williams fired so that
        Williams’s termination would not appear discriminatory.
               After receiving the last of the critical evaluations, Williams
        took the matter to the Employee Relations Manager. Williams was
        told that his concerns were legitimate and that Andresen should
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                       23-10206

        not have been intervening as she was, but the Employee Relations
        Manager “[did] not have any authority to tell [Andresen] what to
        do,” and so he would have to ask the Director of Human Resources
        to talk to Andresen. There is no indication in the record of whether
        the Director of Human Resources did so.
              Williams was fired on December 11, 2019, a little more than
        a month after the last critical evaluation. Williams appealed the
        termination, arguing that his subordinates “teamed up” against
        him to get rid of him. Williams never claimed that his firing had
        anything to do with race or age. The Appeals Council upheld the
        termination.
               Williams sued the County in December 2020. Williams
        alleged that the County had discriminated against him because of
        his race, and age, and in retaliation for protected activity under
        Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a),
        3(a), and the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 1
                During discovery, Williams acknowledged that he never
        complained to human resources or risk management about age or
        race discrimination. He explained that he believed that he was the
        victim of age and race discrimination because the County hired
        someone younger than he to replace him, and the refusal to
        support him in his management style showed that “they allowed a
        . . . [white] supervisor to enforce [County] policies to [blacks], but

        1 Williams also alleged a hostile work environment claim, but the district court

        dismissed that claim and Williams does not challenge the dismissal on appeal.
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        23-10206                  Opinion of the Court                               5

        when [blacks] enforced [County] policies to [whites], then there’s
        a problem.”
                In a thorough order, the district court granted the County’s
        motion for summary judgment. As to Williams’s claim of racial
        discrimination, the district court found no direct evidence of
        discrimination, it rejected all of Williams’s proposed comparators,
        and it concluded that even if Williams had shown a prima facie case
        of race discrimination, Williams could not show that the reason the
        County gave for his firing was pretextual. The district court
        acknowledged that Williams had shown a prima facie case of age
        discrimination, but it rejected his ADEA claim because he had no
        evidence to show that age was the but-for cause of his termination,
        rather than his poor subordinate management. Finally, as to the
        retaliation claim, the district court found that even if Williams
        believed he had been discriminated against, the record did not show
        that he challenged any practice as discriminatory or showed a link
        between such protected activity and his termination. The district
        court therefore granted summary judgment. The court entered
        judgment on November 21, 2022.
               On December 19, 2022, Williams moved to alter or amend
        the court’s judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and
        for relief from the judgment under Rule 60. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
        59(e), 60(b). 2 He asked the court to consider four new affidavits,

        2 We note that Williams’s motion was filed 28 days after the entry of
        judgment, which is timely under Rule 59(e). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (allowing
        a party to move to alter or amend a judgment “no later than 28 days after the
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                       23-10206

        arguing that the affidavits demonstrated there was “a plan to keep
        [black employees] out of leadership.” In particular, one of the
        affiants claimed to have overheard a conversation in which an
        unidentified woman in professional attire, believed to be Andresen,
        said that she was working on getting a black employee “out of
        here” and ensuring that there would be “no more blacks in
        leadership roles.”
              The district court treated Williams’s motion as a motion for
        reconsideration and denied it. The district court found (among
        other things) that Williams had not shown he could not have
        obtained and submitted the evidence before the summary
        judgment ruling issued.
               Williams, proceeding pro se, appealed. 3
                                       II.     Discussion
                   A. Williams abandoned any argument that the district
                      court erred in granting summary judgment.
               Though Williams includes a section in his brief stating that
        the grant of summary judgment was error, he fails to offer any
        argument to that end on appeal. Instead, he merely recites the
        applicable law that governs summary judgment. While we

        entry of the judgment”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1) (explaining that, “[w]hen the
        period” under the rules “is stated in days” the count of days should “exclude
        the day of the event that triggers the period.”)
        3 We note that, although Williams is proceeding pro se on appeal, he had counsel

        throughout the district court proceedings.
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        23-10206                   Opinion of the Court                             7

        liberally construe the filings of pro se parties, “issues not briefed on
        appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v.
        Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). An appellant’s brief
        must include an argument containing “appellant’s contentions and
        the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the
        record on which the appellant relies[.]” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A)
        (emphasis added). Indeed, to obtain reversal of a district court
        judgment that, like this one, “is based on multiple, independent
        grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated ground
        for the judgment against him is incorrect.” Sapuppo v. Allstate
        Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). An appellant’s
        failure to challenge even one of the grounds on which the district
        court based its judgment deems the challenge abandoned on
        appeal, “and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Id.
                Williams’s brief fails to present any basis for reversal of the
        summary judgment decision. Williams’s merits discussion begins
        on page 9 and ends on page 13 (the last three pages dealing with
        the motion for reconsideration)—and although he cites the general
        legal standards applicable to summary judgment motions, he
        provides no explanation or discussion of how the district court
        erred. Instead, the only substantive discussion in his brief focuses
        on the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration and
        its refusal to consider the newly submitted affidavits. 4 Accordingly,

        4 Williams’s reply brief suffers from the same infirmities.But of course, even
        raising pertinent arguments for the first time in the reply brief would not be
        sufficient to preserve them. Timson, 518 F.3d at 874 (“we do not address
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        8                           Opinion of the Court                          23-10206

        he has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s summary
        judgment ruling.
                    B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
                       denying Williams’s motion for reconsideration.
              Williams’s only real argument on appeal is that the district
        court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
        reconsideration because it erred in finding that he could have
        submitted four new affidavits earlier in the proceedings. He
        maintains that he did not receive the affidavits until after the court
        granted summary judgment, and that his counsel promptly
        submitted them after that. We see no error.
               Williams moved for relief under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)(2).
        Rule 59(e) provides that “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment
        must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”
        “The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are newly-
        discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” Arthur v.
        King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration adopted)
        (quotation omitted). Similarly, under Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 60(b)(2), a party may move for relief from a final order
        if there is “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
        diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a
        new trial under Rule 59(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). This rule
        requires the movant to show: (1) newly discovered evidence;

        arguments raise for the first time in a . . . reply brief” even if the litigant is pro
        se).
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        23-10206                    Opinion of the Court                                   9

        (2) due diligence by the movant to discover the new evidence;
        (3) that the evidence is “not . . . merely cumulative or impeaching”;
        (4) that the evidence is material; and (5) that the evidence “would
        probably produce a new result.” Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
        235 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000). We review the denial of a
        motion under either rule only for abuse of discretion. Farris v.
        United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (Rule 60(b);
        Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.
        2001) (Rule 59(e)). 5
                As we have said before, “[a] motion for reconsideration
        cannot be used to . . . raise argument or present evidence that could
        have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Cummings v. Dep’t
        of Corr., 757 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted).
        “Unexcused failure to produce the relevant evidence . . . can be
        sufficient, without more, to warrant the denial” of such a motion.
        See Taylor v. Texgas Corp., 831 F.2d 255, 259 (11th Cir. 1987)
        (quoting Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,
        549 F.2d 368, 391 (5th Cir. 1977)); see also Fisher v. Kadant, Inc., 589
        F.3d 505, 513 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that a party seeking relief

        5 Because orders on motions under both rules are reviewed for abuse of

        discretion, and both require newly discovered evidence to be introduced only
        on a showing of due diligence or timeliness, Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
        235 F.3d 1307, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000) (Rule 60(b)); see Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village
        of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005) (Rule 59(e)), we do not parse
        the difference here. See Finch v. City of Vernon, 845 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir.
        1988) (explaining that courts have “recogniz[ed]” that Rules 59(e) and 60(b)
        “appear to overlap somewhat”).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                23-10206

        based on newly discovered evidence must “offer a convincing
        explanation as to why he could not have proffered the crucial
        evidence at an earlier stage of the proceedings” (quotation
        omitted)).
                Williams’s argument on appeal shows only that he did not
        receive the affidavits before judgment, not that he could not have,
        had he exercised due diligence. Williams has therefore failed to
        meet his burden, and the district court did not abuse its discretion
        in denying Williams’s motion for reconsideration based on new—
        but not diligently discovered—evidence. See Grange Mut. Cas. Co.
        v. Slaughter, 958 F.3d 1050, 1059–60 (11th Cir. 2020) (concluding the
        district court “properly rejected” an attempt “to introduce new
        evidence” in a motion for reconsideration “that was available at the
        summary judgment stage”).
                                  III.   Conclusion
             In sum, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment and its denial of Williams’s motion for reconsideration.
              AFFIRMED.