Court Opinion

ID: 9563175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:37:31.040001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:45.752110
License: Public Domain

GRABER, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority thwarts the legislature’s intent by overlooking part of the context of ORS 742.504-(2)(g)(B) and by misreading the relevant legislative history.
THE CONTEXT OF THE STATUTE POINTS AWAY FROM THE MAJORITY’S INTERPRETATION
ORS 742.504(2)(g) provides:
“ ‘Phantom vehicle’ means a vehicle which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of a motor vehicle accident which is caused by an automobile which has no physical contact with the insured or the vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time of the accident, provided:
“(A) There cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or the owner of such phantom vehicle.
“(B) The facts of such accident can be corroborated by competent evidence other than the testimony of the insured or any person having an uninsured motorist claim resulting from the accident, and
“(C) The insured or someone on behalf of the insured shall have reported the accident within 72 hours to a police, peace or judicial officer, to the Department of Transportation of the State of Oregon or to the equivalent department in the state where the accident occurred, and shall have filed with the insurer within 30 days thereafter a statement under oath that the insured or the legal representative of the insured has a cause or causes of action arising out of such accident for damages against a person or persons whose identity is *107unascertainable, and setting forth the facts in support thereof.” (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs read subparagraph (B) of that provision as foreclosing corroboration by “any person having an uninsured motorist claim resulting from the accident” at the time the person testifies. Defendant argues that the phrase in question forecloses corroboration by “any person having an uninsured motorist claim resulting from the accident” at the time of the accident. Both readings require an implicit addition to the statute. Both are plausible in grammar and in context.
As the majority recognizes, the statute that we are called on to construe is ambiguous. The “immediate context” on which the majority relies to support its reading as being the more persuasive one, however, is not plausible. 319 Or at 100-01.
ORS 742.504(2)(g) sets out three requirements for uninsured motorist coverage for a “phantom vehicle” accident. Nothing in the structure or logic of paragraph (g) requires that all three requirements relate to the same time. Subparagraph (C) requires that, within specified time periods after an accident, a report and a filing relating to the accident be made to the appropriate entities. The fact that that provision focuses on a time other than the time of the accident reflects, not a choice on the part of the legislature, but merely recognition of the practical reality that such reporting and filing requirements could not physically be met at the time of the accident. That practical consideration is irrelevant to the determination of the legislature’s intent in enacting the requirement, in subparagraph (B), relating to corroborating testimony. Similarly, the requirement established in sub-paragraph (A), relating to ascertainment of the identity of the operator or owner of the vehicle, is substantively unrelated to, and therefore sheds no light on, the requirement set out in subparagraph (B). In short, the three requirements relating to accidents involving phantom vehicles, set out in ORS 742.504(2)(g), are so different from one another that the requirements in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of that provision do not provide a meaningful context for interpreting the requirement in subparagraph (B).
*108Another portion of the uninsured motorist coverage statute — which the majority does not discuss — provides somewhat more insight into the proper interpretation of ORS 742.504(2)(g)(B). ORS 742.504(2)(f) provides for uninsured motorist coverage for accidents involving “hit-and-run” vehicles, that is, vehicles “which cause[] bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such vehicle [s] with the insured or with a vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time of the accident.” In order for uninsured motorist coverage to apply under that statute, three requirements must be met: the identity of either the operator or the owner ofthe vehicle must be unascertainable, ORS 742.504(2)(f)(A); the insured must meet certain reporting and filing deadlines relating to the accident, ORS 742.504(2) (f)(B); and, at the insurer’s request, the insured must make available for inspection the vehicle which the insured was occupying at the time of accident, ORS 742.504(2)(f)(C).
Two of the three requirements of the hit-and-run vehicle statute directly parallel the requirements of the phantom vehicle statute: the requirements relating to unascertainability of the identity of the owner or operator of the vehicle and the reporting and filing requirements. In addition, the third requirement in the hit-and-run vehicle statute — the requirement that the vehicle be made available for inspection — arguably also parallels the third requirement in the phantom vehicle statute — the requirement that a certain category of witness corroborate the facts ofthe accident. That is because each of those requirements involves a means of corroborating the occurrence and circumstances of the accident. The fact that the means of corroboration relating to accidents involving hit-and-run vehicles involves an examination of circumstances as they existed “at the time of the accident” suggests that the means of corroboration relating to a phantom vehicle accident also properly relates to the circumstances ofthe accident, at the time it occurred. Corroborative testimony for phantom vehicle accidents is the functional equivalent of physical contact for hit-and-run accidents.
Although the foregoing context is helpful, and although it supports defendant’s reading ofthe statute somewhat, it is not conclusive. Therefore, like the majority, I next *109examine the legislative history of ORS 742.504(2)(g). See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (if the text and context of statute do not make clear the intent of the legislature, this court considers the legislative history of statute).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY POINTS AWAY FROM THE MAJORITY’S INTERPRETATION
In 1959, the Legislative Assembly enacted Oregon’s first statute requiring every motor vehicle liability insurance policy to contain uninsured motorist coverage. Or Laws 1959, ch 413, § 1. That statute (former ORS 736.317, repealed by Or Laws 1967, ch 482, § 5) did not define “uninsured motorist” or “uninsured vehicle.” “As a result, the definition of the term ‘uninsured motorist’ or ‘uninsured vehicle’ was frequently litigated.” Lund v. Mission Ins. Co., 270 Or 461, 464, 528 P2d 78 (1974). Typically, uninsured motorist policies required physical contact by a “hit-and-run” vehicle before coverage was afforded. See 8, 488 P2d 406 (1971) (describing “hit- and-run” provisions of a standard uninsured motorist policy).
In 1967, the legislature responded by enacting a comprehensive revision of the uninsured motorist statutes, House Bill 1506. Or Laws 1967, ch 482, § 3. The bill provided a statutory definition of “uninsured vehicle.” See Lund v. Mission Ins. Co., supra, 270 Or at 465 (discussing legislative history of the uninsured motorist statutes).1 In addition, it defined two separate categories of uninsured vehicles, the identity of the operator or owner of which could not be ascertained — “hit-and-run vehicles” and “phantom vehicles” — and eliminated the requirement of physical contact in accidents involving the latter. See Farmers Insurance Exch. v. Colton, 264 Or 210, 214-16, 504 P2d 1041 (1972) (noting that change and discussing reasons for it). As a replacement for the requirement of physical contact, the legislature imposed an equivalent requirement, now codified at ORS 742.504(2)(g)(B), relating to testimony by a disinterested witness. The purpose of that requirement, like the purpose of *110the requirement of physical contact, was to discourage and prevent fraudulent claims. See Farmers Insurance Exch. v. Colton, supra, 264 Or at 215-17 (discussing the 1967 amendments to the uninsured motorist statute).
The House Financial Affairs Committee held a hearing on HB 1506 on May 2, 1967, during which committee members engaged in extensive discussion of the proposed wording of the amendment relating to phantom vehicle accidents.2 Representative Skelton explained the need for the amendment as follows:
“Let me explain to you again what the phantom car is. The phantom car is a car which forces another car off the highway, causes damages and injuries to the car which was forced off the highway, there is no contact of any cars and the phantom car disappears. Now, theoretically, both the phantom car theory and the hit-and-run theory are aberrations of the uninsured motorist theory. The uninsured motorist theory is that you get into an accident with some other guy * * * and then you are unable to collect from him. * * * The uninsured motorist theory assumes that you are able to find him and bring him to some sort of bar and then he is financially unable to pay. Now the hit-and-run provisions which are put in this * * * law * * * say that if you are hit by a car that then disappears and you never find the identity of him, you can still collect under the uninsured motorist [provision]. The phantom car thing take[s] us one step further and says that if the accident is caused by this guy, whether there is contact between the two of them is a fiction. If he actually caused the accident, * * * the hit-and-run theory should be extended * * * to this situation where the accident actually was caused by this person who disappeared. Now, the hazard in it is there has been collusion and the hazard is not being able to prove it. If you have a hit-and-run at least you have damage to the car. I want to suggest to you however that if the person really is interested in collecting under the uninsured motorist [provision], he could always go out and hit his car after [the accident] with a sledge hammer creating the fiction of the hit-and-run. An honest man who says, ‘No, he didn’t scrape me when he ran me off the highway, hut he just missed me by a fraction of an inch and I missed him, but in dodging to miss him, I struck the * * * *111corner light.’ I have got a case down on my desk right now * * * where this man was * * * at a four-corner right-angle intersection, a car pulled out in front of this, this other car. The car that had the right of way swerved to miss him, hit a telephone pole, turned around, hit another telephone pole. There were three serious injuries in the car but no contact between the two of them and the car that caused the accident disappeared. * * * If there had been just a fraction of a contact between these two cars, he could have collected. Now there is no contact, and no recovery.”
As pertinent to the provision requiring corroboration of an accident involving a phantom vehicle, Representative Skelton proposed that the witness offering corroborative testimony must be “disinterested” and “competent.” The committee considered how those terms would apply to “other passengers” in the car, including family members and unrelated persons. (Emphasis added.)
One member of the committee asked whether passengers “should be considered competent” to provide corroborating testimony. When the answer was that the unadorned requirement, in the draft amendment, that the person be “disinterested” was unclear, a member of the committee stated, “[P]ut that in. We should, we should sure specify * * * [sjurely, anybody in the car.” Another member of the committee stated that “those people in that car are sure interested and * * * I don’t think they should be considered to be disinterested.” A committee member responded, “There’s where your collusion would come in.” A committee member then stated, “I think what we ought to do is we ought to exclude any person who stands to get any money as a result.”
A member of the committee next suggested that relatives be foreclosed from providing corroboration. Another member objected to the proposal that all “claimants and relatives” be considered interested persons; the member noted the possibility that a relative could be “in another car following” the vehicle involved in the accident.
Further discussion ensued on the purpose of the requirements relating to phantom vehicle accidents. A member stated:
“If they’re gonna lie and cheat, they’ll do it * * *, but I think that we should try to tighten this up as tight as possible to *112avoid collusion because we do have some nasty cases of collusion under this [hit-and-run] coverage.” (Emphasis added.)
That member later repeated, “I’m not objecting to this endorsement but I just indicate it should be tied up as tight as possible to avoid collusion.”
After a brief discussion of the possibility of “leaving] it up to the court to decide who was interested and who was competent,” a member suggested the phrasing that now is codified at ORS 742.504(2)(g)(B). Another member suggested that the provision exclude “any person injured in the accident and making a claim under the uninsured motorist provisions.” (Emphasis added.) Without express discussion of the latter suggestion (which resembles somewhat the majority’s view in this case), the committee instead agreed to adopt the former.
Several themes emerge from that legislative history.3 One is that the drafters of the provision generally intended to exclude, from the category of corroborating witnesses, persons occupying the car at the time of the accident if they “stand[] to get any money as a result” of the accident. Another is the theme of timing. The committee discussed various categories of persons who should be foreclosed from providing corroboration. Discussion of all those categories of persons focused on their status and location at the time of the accident. Finally, and perhaps most important, the committee expressed strong concern that the provision be worded ‘ ‘as tight[ly] as possible,” so as to avoid collusion. Taken as a whole, the described legislative history suggests that the wording ultimately adopted by the legislature for ORS 742.504(2)(g)(B) was intended to exclude a person in the position of the witness in this case.
THE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS POINT AWAY FROM THE ONE CHOSEN BY THE MAJORITY
It bears noting that the majority’s interpretation would have the result of creating uncertainty and a lack of *113uniform outcomes for similarly situated insureds. At the time the insured and the passengers make claims, an insurer properly may deny coverage. If one claimant later settles, did the insurer deny coverage wrongfully to the others? If one claimant signs a waiver of claims the day after the accident, is the waiver effective to remove the insured and the other claimants from the effect of ORS 742.504(2)(g)(B)? If so, that insured is in a better position than the otherwise similarly situated insured whose passenger declines to sign a waiver of claims. By contrast, if the statute is interpreted to relate to the time of the accident, the application of the statute will be certain and uniform.
Moreover, the majority’s interpretation is likely to discourage insurers from settling claims like the one that was settled here. By contrast, if the statute is interpreted to relate to the time of the accident, the incentive to settle would remain.
CONCLUSION
In enacting ORS 742.504(2)(g), the legislature intended to foreclose corroboration of a “phantom vehicle” accident by any person having, at the time of the accident, an uninsured motorist claim resulting from the accident. The majority’s contrary reading of the statute is in error. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. Therefore, I dissent.

 The uninsured motorist statutes have been amended several times since 1967 and now are codified at ORS 742.500 to 742.504.

 All descriptions of, and quotations from, that hearing are based on Tape Recording, House Financial Affairs Committee, May 2, 1967, Tape 41.

 The majority rejects my reading of the legislative history, 319 Or at 102, but neither sets out that history nor explains why the majority’s cramped construction of it is accurate.