Court Opinion

ID: 9898461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:51.323781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:07.492787
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                     Washington State
                                                                                     Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Division Two

                                                                                       June 21, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                       DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                             No. 56966-3-II

                              Respondent,

        v.

 TYLER WALLACE ELKINS,                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                              Appellant.

       CRUSER, J. — Tyler Wallace Elkins made verbal threats to kill a security guard. The State

charged Elkins with one count of felony harassment. Following a bench trial, the trial court

convicted Elkins. On appeal, Elkins argues that there was not sufficient evidence to convict him

of felony harassment because the guard’s fear that Elkins would follow through on his threat was

not objectively reasonable.

       We disagree and affirm Elkins’ conviction.

                                            FACTS

A. BACKGROUND

       Luis Zuno, a security guard, was patrolling the County-City Building in Tacoma,

Washington, when he received a dispatch call notifying him that an individual was attempting to

enter the building.

       Zuno, who had experienced previous encounters with Elkins, asked Elkins to leave. Elkins

told Zuno that he was trying to access the building to get money he had left behind in the
No. 56966-3-II

courthouse. Zuno informed Elkins that he had to leave, but he could return in the morning to collect

his money. Elkins then left and Zuno continued with his patrol.

          An hour or two later, Zuno received another dispatch informing him that Elkins had

returned. Zuno found Elkins at the County-City Building and reminded him that he would have to

return in the morning when the building opened. Elkins became angry, got very close to Zuno’s

face, and threatened to kill him. Zuno retreated and called 911. Several officers arrived and arrested

Elkins.

          The State charged Elkins with one count of felony harassment under RCW

9A.46.020(2)(b). Elkins waived his right to a jury trial and the case proceeded to a bench trial.

B. EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL

          To convict Elkins of felony harassment, the trial court had to find that Elkins, without

lawful authority, knowingly threatened to kill Zuno immediately or in the future, and that his words

or conduct placed Zuno in reasonable fear that the threat to kill would be carried out.

          Zuno testified at trial. He explained that when he drove back to the County-City Building

for a second time that night, he saw Elkins climbing on planters on the sidewalk. According to

Zuno, after he advised Elkins to get down, Elkins, who appeared to be agitated, began shouting

profanities at him. Zuno again told Elkins he would have to return in the morning, which appeared

to anger Elkins even more. Zuno testified that Elkins then got right in front of Zuno’s face and

continued to shout profanities at him. Zuno began to back away from Elkins to de-escalate and

avoid further confrontation.

          Zuno testified that Elkins then positioned himself approximately four to five inches away

from his face and began messing with his belt and putting his hands inside the front of his pants

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No. 56966-3-II

while whispering either “I’m going to kill you, I’m going to take your vehicle, there’s nothing you

can do” or “I want to kill you, I want to take the vehicle and there’s nothing you can do about it.”

Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (May 12, 2022) at 77, 79. After seeing Elkins reach into his pants,

Zuno was afraid he would be stabbed. As a former corrections officer, Zuno knew inmates would

hide their knives or shivs in the front of their underwear, so he feared Elkins had a knife.

       As Zuno learned to do when facing someone he feared may attack, Zuno began to walk

backwards, away from Elkins, only turning his back when he needed to use his badge to open a

gate to enter the building. As Zuno walked backwards, Elkins followed him toward the gate but

turned once he saw Zuno get to the scanner for the gate. At this point, Zuno had abandoned his car

since he felt that his life was more important than the vehicle.

       Zuno testified that during the encounter, he believed Elkins would try to kill him. Once

behind the gate, Zuno testified that he called 911 and informed them of a person trespassing on the

courthouse property. Once officers arrived and arrested Elkins, Zuno was informed that officers

found no weapon on Elkins.

       Following a bench trial, the court found evidence to support each element of felony

harassment beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted Elkins of felony harassment. The court found

that Zuno’s conduct reflected his fear and that his fear was reasonable under the circumstances.

The trial court imposed a sentence of nine months of confinement. Elkins appeals.

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No. 56966-3-II

                                           DISCUSSION

       Elkins argues that we should reverse his conviction and dismiss the charge for felony

harassment under RCW 9A.46.020(2)(b) because the State did not prove that Zuno’s fear that

Elkins would carry out his threat was objectively reasonable, which is an essential element of

felony harassment. Elkins argues there was no evidence he was capable of carrying out the threat

and that Zuno had the knowledge and skills to defend himself.

       When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to the State and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). A

claim that the evidence was insufficient admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all reasonable

inferences drawn from that evidence. Id.

       Under RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i), a person is guilty of misdemeanor harassment when a

person without lawful authority knowingly threatens to cause bodily injury immediately or in the

future to the person threatened or to any other person. State v. C.G., 150 Wn.2d 604, 608, 80 P.3d

594 (2003). The offense is elevated to a felony when the threat involves a threat to kill. RCW

9A.46.020(2)(b)(ii); State v. Mills, 154 Wn.2d 1, 12, 109 P.3d 415 (2005). In Mills, the court

recognized that although the requirement of “reasonable fear” appears in the section addressing

misdemeanor harassment, it clearly applies to felony harassment. 154 Wn.2d at 12. Thus, in order

to convict Elkins of felony harassment under RCW 9A.46.020(2)(b), the State had to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that Elkins, without lawful authority, knowingly threatened to kill Zuno

immediately or in the future and that his words or conduct placed Zuno in reasonable fear that the

threat to kill would be carried out. C.G., 150 Wn.2d at 612.

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No. 56966-3-II

       Elkins does not dispute that there was proof that Elkins verbalized a threat to kill Zuno.

Elkins told Zuno either “I’m going to kill you, I’m going to take your vehicle, there’s nothing you

can do” or “I want to kill you, I want to take the vehicle and there’s nothing you can do about it.”

VRP (May 12, 2022) at 77, 79. The only element in dispute in this case is whether Elkins’ words

or conduct placed Zuno in reasonable fear that the threat to kill would be carried out.

       In State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 474-75, 28 P.3d 720 (2001), the Washington Supreme

Court affirmed a conviction of felony harassment where a juvenile told two fellow students he

would kill the principal of his middle school, and the principal heard about the threat from one of

the students. The principal knew the defendant had disciplinary problems at school but had never

seen the student in possession of any weapons. Id. at 475. Similarly, in State v. E.J.Y., 113 Wn.

App. 940, 953, 55 P.3d 673 (2002), Division One held that testimony that a school employee was

a “ ‘little frightened’ ” by a juvenile’s threat was sufficient evidence to prove that the juvenile’s

words or conduct placed the school employees in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried

out.

       Here, like in J.M., Elkins made an express threat to kill. Zuno found Elkins jumping on

planters, Elkins appeared agitated, and he began shouting profanities at Zuno. Elkins came within

inches of Zuno’s face, whispered a threat to kill him, and put his hands in his pants.

       In Zuno’s prior experience working in corrections, he was often exposed to inmates who

would carry their knives or shivs in the front of their underwear. So, when Elkins started moving

towards Zuno with his hands in his pants, Zuno reasonably feared that Elkins had some sort of

knife or other weapon hidden there, which caused Zuno to start walking backwards towards the

gate, abandoning his vehicle. When the prosecutor asked Zuno at trial whether he thought Elkins

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No. 56966-3-II

might actually try to kill him, Zuno responded, “Try to, yes.” VRP (May 12, 2022) at 90. Zuno

reasonably feared that Elkins was reaching for a weapon.

       In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the facts presented here

are of the same character as those made in J.M. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s

finding that Elkins’ words and conduct placed Zuno in reasonable fear of the threat being carried

out.

                                        CONCLUSION

       We affirm Elkins’ conviction.

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                   CRUSER, J.
 We concur:

 GLASGOW, C.J.

 CHE, J.

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