Court Opinion

ID: 9675857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:07:45.408031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:39.931018
License: Public Domain

CROTHERS, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 29] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 30] The Majority correctly recognizes that we must interpret statutes according to their plain meaning and that we not disregard the letter of the law in pursuit of the spirit. Majority opinion at ¶ 16 (citing N.D.C.C. §§ 1-02-03 and 1-02-05). However, I do not believe the Majority has followed those legislative mandates, nor the mandate in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46, which is the controlling statute in this case.
[¶ 31] Section 28-01-46, N.D.C.C., requires that most actions for medical negli*786gence “be dismissed without prejudice on motion unless the plaintiff serves upon the defendant an affidavit containing an admissible expert opinion to support a prima facie case of professional negligence within three months of the commencement of the action.” These words are clear. The statute mandates dismissal if plaintiffs complying affidavit has not been served within three months of commencement of the action.
[¶ 32] Here, an affidavit was required and Scheer did not meet the 90-day deadline. Scheer did not request an extension of time to serve the affidavit prior to defendants’ motion to dismiss. Therefore, the action was properly dismissed according to the plain terms of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46.
[¶ 33] Instead of applying the plain words of the law, the Majority expends significant time and energy discussing the perceived effect of the defendants not having immediately moved to dismiss upon expiration of plaintiffs 90-day deadline and the effect of plaintiffs motion for an extension made after defendants’ motion was filed. The simple answer is that defendants who wait to file their motion to dismiss beyond 90 days waive their right to have the court strictly enforce N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46. As a result, when the defendants here did not immediately move to dismiss, Scheer was still able to serve a conforming affidavit before defendants made their motion to dismiss. However, under terms of the statute, Scheer waited at her peril to serve her affidavit beyond the 90-day deadline because she did not have a court order extending her time for compliance. The result is that the action was properly dismissed by the district court when the defendants moved to dismiss before Scheer either served her conforming affidavit or obtained an extension.
[¶ 34] Mine is not a novel approach. A nearly identical decision was reached in Weasel v. St. Alexius Medical Center, 230 F.3d 348 (8th Cir.2000), based on a substantially similar version of section 28-01-46, N.D.C.C. There the court stated:
Whatever the merits of their reasons for noncompliance may have been, the court could not have considered it. It had to dismiss the case on motion of the Appellees. If the district court could consider the request for the extension despite the request being untimely, it would render the mandatory dismissal language and the three month deadline in § 28-01-46 useless. We decline to read the statute in that fashion.
Weasel, at 353 (emphasis in original).
[¶ 35] I am mindful of the impact on the plaintiff if the Court adopts my interpretation of section 28-01-46, N.D.C.C. However, the result I would reach is that directed by the Legislature. In that regard, I again agree with the court in Weasel:
We do agree with the dissent that this case presents a set of facts that cry for compassion. But as to the legal issues presented in the case, we are bound by the intent of the legislature as expressed in the plain wording of the statute. Adopting the dissent’s interpretation of the statute, however, would force this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the North Dakota legislature. We decline to embark on such an unconstitutional task.
Id. at 353.
[¶ 36] Daniel J. Crothers