Court Opinion

ID: 9773798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:59:09.269266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:57.821495
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion says that an ambiguous policy of insurance is construed against the insurer. That is true beyond serious dispute.
The majority opinion says that the policy under our review is ambiguous. The policy contains the following exception to its general liability coverage provisions.
This insurance does not apply to ...
g. “Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any ... ‘auto’ owned or operated by ... any insured.
This language is not ambiguous. The majority does not claim otherwise (to the contrary). But the policy contains a special events endorsement.
IT IS HEREBY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT THE FOLLOWING SHALL BE INCLUDED AS THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS POLICY:
SPECIAL EVENTS SHALL INCLUDE ... PARADES ...
******
Subject otherwise to all the terms, limits and conditions of the Policy.
For the majority, the addition of the word “otherwise” between “subject” and “to” creates an ambiguity. This is because, the majority reasons, “otherwise” can mean “in different circumstances.”
I disagree with the majority’s finding that this policy is ambiguous. In this circumstance, “otherwise” means “in other ways.” The World Book Dictionary 1472 (1988). When defined in a manner consistent with this common meaning and considering the intent of the policy read as a whole while reading the words in context, it is clear that the phrase “subject otherwise to” is intended to invoke the exceptions to the policy previously and unambiguously set out. The use of the word “otherwise” does not void those exceptions or render the meaning of the policy uncertain.
It takes diligent searching through a dictionary to find a non-scientific English word carrying a single meaning. The simple word “the” has nearly two thousand words devoted to its possible meanings, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2368-9 (1976), and the single letter “a” has over five hundred words devoted to its possible uses and definitions. Id. at 1.
For one intent on finding ambiguity, the dictionary provides an ample basis for rendering every insurance contract meaningless in the face of injury or need. The simple phrase “subject otherwise to all terms of the policy” could mean “the person under the rule of the king [subject] in different circum*818stances [otherwise] included [to] only [all] the court’s sessions [terms] during [of] the [the] conduct of public affairs [policy].” But we know better, understanding innately Wittgenstein’s teaching that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 43.
With respect, the phrase “subject otherwise to” does not render this otherwise (in other respects) unambiguous insurance contract ambiguous. If this Court wishes to read the words of the policy in context and assign the words used in the policy the meaning normally associated with insurance policies, it will discover as did the court of appeals that the policy is not ambiguous. After all, communication in a language as rich in nuance as English is ever dependent on the context in which words are used. Otherwise (or else) we could not communicate at all.
I would declare the policy unambiguous as a matter of law and reverse the judgment of the trial court. Under my reading of the law and this insurance contract, I would not reach the Fuller appeal because the conclusion that the policy is clear denies that appeal of necessity.