Court Opinion

ID: 9648241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:11:07.640064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:57.771794
License: Public Domain

MIRABAL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
In this summary judgment case, the majority specifically does not decide whether a fact issue exists regarding appellees’ duty in this case, or regarding whether the applicable standard of care was breached. The holding of the majority is: even if appellees breached the applicable standard of care, there was no causation of Mrs. Burgess’ death as a result of that breach, as a matter of law. The majority bases this holding on the affidavit of Dr. John Stroehlein filed in support of appellees’ motion for summary judgment. In my opinion, the portion of Dr. Stroehlein’s affidavit dealing with causation is strictly conclusory, and therefore it is incompetent summary judgment evidence on the issue of causation.
Focusing only on the portion of Dr. Stroehlein’s affidavit that deals with causation, the affidavit states:
I have reviewed the medical records of Cheryl Ann Burgess....
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[I]t is my expert opinion that, based upon a reasonable degree of medical probability, no act or omission by San Jacinto Methodist Hospital or The Methodist Hospital System, or any of their respective employees or agents, caused Cheryl Ann Burgess’ death.
In my opinion, this affidavit is insufficient because it does not include the basis for the doctor’s opinion — it is conclusory only. The affidavit does not set out the nature of Mrs. Burgess’ medical condition, either on the day she was admitted into the hospital (September 4), or on the day she was placed in intensive care and her primary care physician decided she needed to be transferred (September 6), or on the day she was transferred to a tertiary care facility (September 8), or at the time she was finally operated on (approximately midnight on September 8). We do not know if, by his affidavit testimony, Dr. Stroehlein meant that even if Mrs. Burgess had been transferred to a tertiary care facility promptly, she would have had no better chance of survival than she did when she finally received specialized care two and one-half days later. Or perhaps the doctor meant, in light of the balance of his affidavit, that because in his opinion the appellees complied with the applicable standard of care regarding transfer, no acts of negligence on their part proximately caused Mrs. Burgess’ death.1 Or perhaps Dr. Stroehlein meant that the acts or omissions of the doctors, or nurses, or the life flight helicopter crew, or someone else, caused Mrs. Burgess’ death, notwithstanding any acts or omissions of the appellee hospitals and their staff. We are left completely to conjecture regarding the meaning of Dr. Stroehlein’s affidavit testimony regarding causation.2
Conclusory statements made by an expert witness are insufficient to support summary judgment. Anderson v. Snider, 808 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Tex.1991). An expert opinion that a plaintiff suffered no damages or legal injury as a result of professional representation, without stating the basis or reasoning behind the opinion, is wholly conclusory, rendering the expert opinion incompetent to support summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. Further, if the meaning of an expert witness’ statement in an affidavit is unclear with respect to the issue of in-fact causation of injury, the expert testimony does not meet the express requirement of Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c) that expert opinion evidence be “clear” in order to support a summary judgment. Cloys v. Turbin, 608 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, no writ).
*363The majority opinion in the present case cites the White and Wheeler cases in support of the conclusion that Dr. Stroehlein’s affidavit is sufficient to sustain summary judgment based on lack of causation. However, White and Wheeler are distinguishable by the nature of the affidavits involved; in each case, the affiant doctor set out in detail the relevant medical history and treatment of the plaintiff patient. White v. Wah, 789 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ); Wheeler v. Aldama-Luebbert, 707 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
Because appellees did not negate the causation element of appellants’ cause of action as a matter of law, we should address the other points of error to determine if appel-lees’ other ground for summary judgment was established as a matter of law. The majority has declined to address the merits of appellants’ other points of error, and I therefore also decline to do so.
O’CONNOR, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. Appellant has specifically attacked the sufficiency of the summary judgment evidence regarding appellees' compliance with the applicable standard of care.

. I also note that Dr. Stroehlein's affidavit only addresses the causation of Mrs. Burgess’ death. Appellants allege, under the survival cause of action, that Mrs. Burgess suffered damages before her death as a result of appellees’ negligence, including physical pain, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Appellees presented no summary judgment evidence negating causation of pre-death injuries.