Court Opinion

ID: 9885859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 15:15:27.326336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:49:18.082297
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing contains an assignment asserting that this Court erred in holding that the manner and method adopted by the General President in suspending the charter of Local 14 did not violate the requirements of “due process law.”
Our original view of the question of-the validity of the suspension order here involved was that the requisites of due process of law had been complied with, inasmuch as Local 14 had refused to abide by and recognize an order legally promulgated by the General President, and at a meeting of Local 14, the members present were informed that persistence in the adopted course of action would result in a suspension.
The general American rule is that when the constitution or laws of an unincorporated association provide for the suspension or revocation of the charter of a subordinate body (or the suspension or expulsion of a member), but do not provide for charges, notice and hearing relative to such action, the courts will recognize as valid only such actions taken under the association’s laws as are taken in pursuance of charges made, notice given and hearing had. Taboada v. Sociedad Espanola De Beneficencia Mutua, 191 Cal. 187, 215 P. 673, 27 A.L.R. 1508; 10 C.J.S., Beneficial Associations, § 52, p. 295; 63 C.J. 698. This rule may be stated by saying that the law writes into the constitutional or by-law provisions of the association relating to the suspension or revocation of a charter, the requirement that such suspension or revocation must be effected by “due process of law,” that is, upon charges, notice and hearing.
There is some diversity of opinion, however, as to what particular kind of notice and hearing is required. The New York Supreme Court holds that a hearing must be had prior to the suspension. “The trial referred to in the adjudicated cases, however, is a due trial upon charges before judgment, without the added burden of the presumption of correctness of a decision.” Neal v. Hutcheson, Sup., 160 N.Y.S. 1007, 1010. See also Kennedy v. Schroeder, Sup., 35 N.Y.S.2d 835. The Supreme Court of Minnesota takes a somewhat contrary view in Mixed Local, etc., v. Hotel and R. Employees, etc., 212 Minn. 587, 4 N.W.2d 771, and holds that the requirements of due process of law are complied with, provided adequate provision is made for an appeal and trial de novo before a superior appellate body of the association after an order of suspension has been entered by an inferior authority of the organization. This conflict of views is not involved here, because, even if the reasoning and holding of the Miqnesota Court be followed, it appears in the instant case that Local 14 did not obtain a hearing before the Executive Board of the United Brotherhood relating to the order of suspension, inasmuch as that body refused to accept and consider the Local’s attempted appeal.
The specific question presented here is whether or not a notice given by the general organization to a local subordinate association that if a certain action is taken by the local association a suspension will follow, satisfies the requirements of due process of law as to charges, notice and hearing, or is it necessary to the vali-ditj^oL'a suspension order that the general organization, upon the refusal of the local to abide by its order, go further and thereafter prefer charges against the local, give notice thereof and conduct a hearing to determine whether or not the local should be suspended.
Appellee cites Ellis v. American Federation of Labor, 48 Cal.App.2d 440, 120 P.2d 79, decided by one of the District Courts of *570Appeal of California. In this case it appears that Meyer Lewis, as personal representative of William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, had informed the Central Labor Council of Santa Clara County, California (a subordinate unincorporated body of the A. F. L.), not to seat a certain disputed delegation until a certain investigation could be completed. Lewis further notified the Central Labor Council that if said delegates were seated by the Council, he, Lewis (presumedly acting for and in behalf of William Green, president of the A. F. L.), would “jerk the charter” of the Central Labor Council. The Central Labor Council did seat the delegates and as a result its charter was removed by the president of the American Federation of Labor. The California Court held that the attempted removal or revocation of the charter was void. This holding was not based upon a decision of whether or not the Central Labor Council had “committed any breach of its obligations to the American Federation of Labor, or was guilty of any conduct which would justify the suspension or revocation of its charter,” but upon the ground that such action was void as having been accomplished without charges having been filed, notice thereof given, and a hearing had upon the charges preferred. The power of suspension was regarded as a quasi-judicial power. Taboada v. Sociedad Es-pañola de Beneficencia Mutua, supra.
We have concluded that the California case should be followed. Consistency in decision of the American authorities upon the point is desirable.
Our conclusions of law Nos. 2, 3 and 4, of the original opinion, are set aside. We conclude as a matter of law that the suspension order of April 20, 1943, was and is invalid.
Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law of this Court, set forth in this opinion as well as in the original opinion, an affirmance of the trial court’s judgment will be ordered, without prejudice to either party’s taking such further actions in regard to the matters in controversy, as they may deem advisable within the organization and under the constitution and laws thereof.
We sustain the first assignment contained in appellee’s motion for rehearing. Our former order reversing and remanding this cause is set aside. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.