Court Opinion

ID: 9926721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 16:09:07.069476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:28.889440
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re S.D-S, 2024-Ohio-255.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE S.D-S.,                                 :
                                              :          No. 113010
Minor Child                                   :
                                              :
[Appeal by Mother]                            :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 25, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                               Case No. AD-20-903409

                                        Appearances:

                 Dunham Law, LLC, and Michael P. Dunham, for
                 appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J.:

                   Appellant-Mother (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s

decision awarding permanent custody of her minor child, S.D-S., to the Cuyahoga

County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or the “agency”) after
a hearing on the agency’s motion to modify temporary custody to permanent

custody. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision.

I.   Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

               In her first assignment of error, Mother contends that the juvenile

court’s judgment was not supported by clear and convincing evidence

demonstrating there were adequate grounds to grant permanent custody and that

the decision was therefore against the manifest weight of the evidence. She also

contends that the juvenile court’s judgment violated her due process rights.

      A. R.C. 2151.414 Factors

               Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414, a juvenile court may grant permanent

custody of a child to an agency if, after a hearing, the court determines by clear and

convincing evidence that one of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)

through (e) applies, and that an award of permanent custody is in the child’s best

interest. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that produces in the mind of the

trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. In re

T.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99931, 2014-Ohio-2051, ¶ 28.

               The proper standards of review to apply in cases involving a juvenile

court’s decision under R.C. 2151.414 to award permanent custody of a child and to

terminate parental rights are the sufficiency-of- the-evidence and manifest-weight-

of-the-evidence standards, depending on the nature of the arguments raised by the

parties. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 18. Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of

adequacy, while weight of the evidence depends on its effect in inducing belief. Id.
at ¶ 13, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

When applying a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a reviewing court should

affirm a trial court when the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict

or trial court judgment as a matter of law. Id. at ¶ 13. When reviewing for manifest

weight, “the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,

consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a

miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”

Id. at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972

N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20.

               As reflected in its judgment entry granting permanent custody, upon

considering the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) factors, the juvenile court found that S.D-S. had

been in agency custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period

(R.C. 251.414(B)(1)(d)). This finding is supported by the record, which reflects that

S.D-S. was removed from Mother’s care in December 2019, shortly after she was

born, and remained in agency custody continuously since that time. Indeed, Mother

does not contest the trial court’s “12-of-22” finding or its applicability to this matter.

(Mother’s brief, p. 15.)

               The juvenile court also found that S.D-S. cannot be placed with either

of her parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

(R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)). In order to make this finding, the juvenile court was

required to find that one or more of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E) was
applicable. The juvenile court found pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) that following

the placement of S.D-S. outside the home, and notwithstanding reasonable case

planning and diligent efforts by the agency, the parents had failed continuously and

repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions that caused S.D-S. to be placed

outside the home.

               The court also found pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) that Mother has

a chronic mental illness that is so severe that it renders her unable to provide an

adequate, permanent home for S.D-S. at the present time and within one year after

the hearing on the matter. The court also found that Father (who has not appealed

the juvenile court’s judgment) has a chronic chemical dependency that makes him

unable to provide an adequate, permanent home for S.D-S. at the present time or

within one year after the hearing.

               The juvenile court further found pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) that

both parents had demonstrated a lack of commitment to S.D-S. and an

unwillingness to provide a permanent home for her; Mother by failing to regularly

support, visit, or communicate with the child, find stable housing, and complete her

case plan; and Father by his unwillingness to provide space in his home for the child

to live.

               Mother does not contest any of these findings. Rather, she challenges

the trial court’s “best interest” determination.
      B. Best Interest Determination

               Having determined pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) that S.D-S.

had been in agency custody for 12 of 22 months of a consecutive period, and

pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that S.D-S. could not be placed with either parent

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, the trial court

was then required to make a “best interest” determination pursuant to R.C.

2151.414(D).

               R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires that in determining the best interest of

the child, the court must consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to

those listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Although a trial court is required to consider

each of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors in making its permanent custody

determination, “there is not one element that is given greater weight than the

others.” In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56.

Further, this court has stated that only one of the enumerated factors needs to be

resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody. In re T.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 110130, 2021-Ohio-2448, at ¶ 25, citing In re Moore, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

76943, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3958, 12 (Aug. 31, 2000).

               In its judgment entry granting permanent custody to the agency, the

juvenile court noted that upon considering the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors —

including S.D-S.’s relationship with her parents and foster caregivers, her wishes as

set forth by her guardian ad litem (“GAL”), her custodial history, and her need for a

legally secure placement — the court found by clear and convincing evidence that a
grant of permanent custody was in S.D-S.’s best interest. Our review demonstrates

that the record supports the juvenile court’s determination.

               The record reflects that following the child’s removal, the agency

developed case plans for both Mother and Father, with the goal of reunification.

Mother was referred for mental health services, but during the course of the

proceedings was not compliant with those services.           The agency’s caseworker

testified at the permanent custody hearing that Mother did not engage in mental

health services or consistently take her medication from October 2022 through

January 2023, and only sporadically engaged in mental health services from

January through April 2023. At the time of trial in June 2023, Mother still had not

been consistently attending mental health appointments or taking her medication.

She was also inconsistent in communicating with her caseworker, despite the

caseworker’s efforts to contact Mother to discuss case plan services and arrange for

home visits. Mother also failed to maintain stable and adequate housing during the

proceedings. She had periods of incarceration, as well as commitments to mental

health hospitals, during the proceedings, and resided intermittently with her mother

and the child’s father. At the time of trial, she was living in a shelter.

               The caseworker testified that Mother had made only limited progress

on her case plan objectives, still needed to establish stable housing, and was

inconsistent in addressing her mental health issues, noting that Mother “would go

months at a time without addressing her mental health.” The caseworker testified

that given this demonstrated lack of progress, the agency did not believe that Mother
would resolve these issues in the foreseeable future, explaining that “the child’s been

in agency custody for a little over three and a half years and throughout that time

[Mother] has not consistently addressed her mental health.” The caseworker

testified that even in the month prior to trial, Mother had cancelled or “no-showed”

several appointments for mental health services.

               The caseworker testified further that Mother did not consistently take

advantage of opportunities to visit S.D-S., and even when she did have visits with

the child, her interaction with the child was limited. When she was living with

Father, Mother would often sleep during the child’s regular visits at Father’s home.

               The caseworker testified that Father was referred to services to

address concerns regarding his substance abuse and the appropriateness of housing

for the child, but did not follow through with a referral for a drug assessment. She

testified further that despite her efforts to have him submit to drug testing so he

could be considered as a potential candidate to care for S.D-S., Father was “very

evasive” and “very aggressive verbally.” She said that Father did not want to speak

with her and was not willing to participate in any services. She said that S.D-S. had

weekly two-hour visits with Father in his home, but these visits were never increased

because Father would not submit to drug screens. The caseworker said that she

repeatedly asked Father to take the steps necessary to demonstrate his ability to care

for S.D-S. long term, but he refused all her efforts from July through December

2022.
               The caseworker testified that Father lived in a home with his mother

and although he claimed to have access to the upstairs unit of the home where he

lived, he never allowed the caseworker to inspect that unit, which Father said needed

some remodeling, to determine its suitability. The caseworker said that when she

visited Father’s home on June 6, 2023, shortly before trial, he still had not obtained

a bed for the child and although Mother, who sometimes lived with Father, had

moved to the shelter, her belongings were still in the bedroom, so there was no room

for S.D-S. in the home.

               S.D-S.’s maternal grandmother testified that S.D-S. had been living

with her for about three years at the time of trial. She described Mother’s mental

health struggles that led to her hospitalization in 2017 and the loss of custody of her

two older children. She said she had tried to assist Mother with her mental health

struggles since 2017, noting that Mother had been hospitalized for mental health

issues at least two times a year, and that her last such hospitalization was in 2022.

She said she had observed Mother’s erratic behavior, unclear thinking, and lack of

medication compliance, and testified that based on her experience and knowledge

of Mother’s issues, she did not believe that Mother was capable of providing

appropriate care for S.D-S. Despite her misgivings about Mother and Father, the

grandmother testified that she would allow Mother and Father to have continued

contact with S.D-S. if their visits did not put her or S.D-S.’s welfare at risk.

               The agency caseworker testified that CCDCFS was seeking permanent

custody because Mother did not have stable housing and had not been consistently
addressing her mental health issues or completing her case plan, and Father had not

shown that he was committed to S.D-S. She said that S.D-S. had been living with

her grandmother since June 2020, was bonded with her, and was able to see her

siblings every two weeks at her grandmother’s house.

              The child’s GAL recommended that it would be in S.D-S.’s best

interest to grant permanent custody to the agency. The GAL noted that S.D-S. had

spent about 75 percent of her life with her maternal grandmother and was “thriving”

in the grandmother’s home. The GAL also noted that although S.D-S. looked

forward to visits with her father, Father had demonstrated a lack of commitment to

the child because “after three and a half years, if you can’t follow through, for

whatever the reason may be, you’re not committed to this child as her primary

caregiver.”

              On this record, we find that the trial court’s determination that

permanent custody is in S.D-S.’s best interest is supported by clear and convincing

evidence. Father offered no evidence at trial to rebut any of the agency’s evidence,

and although Mother testified in her own defense, she offered nothing more than a

brief statement that she had made progress in dealing with her issues and she

believed that S.D-S. should be with her biological parents. The agency’s evidence,

however, overwhelmingly demonstrated that a grant of permanent custody to the

agency was in S.D-S.’s best interest because Mother had been inconsistent about

addressing her mental health issues, did not have adequate housing, was unwilling

to complete her case plan, and demonstrated her lack of commitment to S.D-S. by
failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with her. Father likewise had

failed to demonstrate his commitment to S.D-S.

               Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated that S.D-S. had been in

agency custody for nearly three years. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) instructs a court to

consider a child’s need for a legally secure placement and whether such placement

can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody. As this court has recognized,

“neglected and dependent children are entitled to stable, secure, nurturing and

permanent homes in the near term, and are not required to languish in legally

insecure placements for years while natural parents are unwilling or unable to

correct serious parenting deficiencies.” In re T.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92816,

2009-Ohio-5496, ¶ 35, citing In re Mayle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 76739 and 77165,

2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3379 (July 27, 2000). In light of Mother’s repeated failures

over the lengthy proceedings to complete her case plan and address the issues that

led to S.D-S.’s removal, it is apparent that S.D-S.’s need for a legally secure

placement could not be satisfied other than by a grant of permanent custody to the

agency.

      C. Due Process

               Mother also contends that the termination of her parental rights

violated her due process rights because the juvenile court “used her mental

disability, her child’s disability, and her poverty against her in terminating her right

to care for her child.” (Mother’s brief, p. 16-17.) Mother’s argument is without merit.
              Mother was not denied due process in any of the proceedings. She

was provided with court-appointed counsel and a guardian ad litem, with notice and

an opportunity to be heard, and all process due her in relation to the permanent

custody hearing and other proceedings.

              Moreover, Mother’s unsupported claim that the juvenile court relied

on the child’s disability in terminating Mother’s parental rights fails to account for

the record, which established that S.D-S. had medical issues when she was born but

those issues had long been resolved at the time of the permanent custody hearing.

Indeed, S.D-S.’s grandmother testified that although S.D-S. was born with a hole in

her heart, the cardiac issue had been resolved and S.D-S. was healthy and “doing

very well.” Likewise, there is no indication in the record that the agency’s case was

at all reliant on a claim of Mother’s poverty, nor did the trial court even allude to

such a finding in its judgment. Mother’s reference to testimony regarding her

inconsistent housing to support her claim that “financial resources were considered

by the trial court” (Mother’s brief, p. 20) fails to acknowledge that there was no

suggestion that Mother’s housing instability was due to a lack of financial resources

as opposed to her chronic mental instability.

              Finally, in addition to considering Mother’s mental illness and its

resulting negative effects on S.D-S. in determining that S.D-S. cannot or should be

placed with Mother, the trial court found that Mother had neglected S.D-S. by failing

to regularly visit, communicate with, or support her, or obtain adequate housing to

provide a permanent home for her. R.C. 2151.414(E)(4). The juvenile court also
found that Mother had demonstrated her unwillingness to provide basic necessities

to S.D-S. or prevent her from suffering emotional and mental neglect by her

unwillingness to complete her case plan so she could provide care for the child. R.C.

2151.414(E)(14). Any one of these factors alone is sufficient for the juvenile court to

find that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or

should not be placed with either parent. In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107708,

2019-Ohio-1343, ¶ 29. Accordingly, although the trial court considered Mother’s

mental illness in granting permanent custody of S.D-S. to the agency, it was not the

sole determining factor in the court’s permanent custody decision.

               Thus, Mother’s citation to In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-

1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, is misplaced. In In re D.A., the Ohio Supreme Court noted

that R.C. 2151.414 does not allow for the termination of parental rights based on a

parent’s cognitive abilities alone. Id. at ¶ 20. Here, it is apparent that the juvenile

court’s determination that S.D-S. could not be placed with Mother within a

reasonable time or should not be placed with her was based on factors other than

only her mental health issues.

               In sum, we find that the juvenile court’s determinations that S.D-S.

could not or should not be placed with Mother and that permanent custody was in

S.D-S.’s best interest were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. The first assignment of error is

therefore overruled.
II. Pretrial and Evidentiary Rulings

              In her second assignment of error, Mother contends that the trial

court abused its discretion by allowing “most” of the pretrial hearings to be

conducted in her absence while she was in prison.

              Only two hearings were held while Mother was incarcerated; the

dispositional review hearing held on March 5, 2021, at which time the court ordered

the first extension of temporary custody; and the dispositional review hearing held

on November 23, 2021, at which time the trial court ordered the second extension

of temporary custody. The record demonstrates that Mother was not incarcerated

when the other hearings in the case occurred, although she sometimes failed to

appear.

              With respect to the two hearings held while Mother was incarcerated,

this court is without jurisdiction to review any issues relating to these proceedings

because Mother did not timely appeal the final appealable orders issued after the

hearings. “An appeal of an adjudication order of abuse, dependency, or neglect and

the award of temporary custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(2) must be filed

within 30 days of the judgment entry pursuant to App.R. 4(A).” In re H.F., 120 Ohio

St.3d 499, 2008-Ohio-6810, 900 N.E.2d 607, syllabus. Likewise, an order granting

a motion for extension of temporary custody is also a final appealable order. See

R.C. 2151.353(F)(2) (upon the filing of a motion for extension of temporary custody,

the court shall hold a hearing upon the motion as if the hearing were the original

dispositional hearing). Because the orders extending temporary custody were never
appealed, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Mother’s claims about the

hearings. In short, Mother cannot now raise issues relating to those orders in an

appeal from a subsequent order. And even if we did have jurisdiction, we note that

although the hearings proceeded in Mother’s absence, she benefited from the

juvenile court’s orders after the hearings continuing S.D-S. in temporary custody

because they afforded her additional time to engage in case plan services.

Accordingly, Mother was not prejudiced when the hearings proceeded during her

incarceration.

                 Mother also challenges various pretrial evidentiary rulings made by

the juvenile court.     As discussed above, we lack jurisdiction to consider any

arguments relating to such pretrial rulings because Mother did not timely appeal

from the juvenile court’s adjudication of S.D-S. as neglected and its disposition

awarding temporary custody to the agency, or from the orders extending temporary

custody. The only proceedings we can review in this appeal are those relating to the

permanent custody order, which Mother timely appealed.

                 With respect to the permanent custody hearing, Mother contends

that the trial court should have declared a mistrial when the original trial date was

continued after Father appeared without a lawyer shortly after trial began. The trial

court continued trial so that Father could obtain counsel and then began trial anew

at a later date so that Father’s newly appointed counsel could be present and hear

all the testimony in the proceedings. We find no error in the juvenile court’s

continuance of trial.
               And despite Mother’s argument otherwise, no “ex parte testimony”

was presented at the original trial and then later relied upon by the court in

rendering its permanent custody decision. An “ex parte communication” is defined

as “[o]n one side only; by or for one party; done for, on behalf of, or on the

application of, one party only.” Dutton v. Dutton, 127 Ohio App.3d 348, 352-353,

713 N.E.2d 14 (7th Dist.1998), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 576 (6th Ed.1990).

Thus, an ex parte proceeding is one that is usually held without notice to the

opposing side. Dutton at id. Here, the testimony in question was given at trial and

all parties were given notice and an opportunity to be heard. The fact that a party

failed to timely appear does not render the testimony ex parte. Furthermore, there

is no indication the juvenile court relied on any of the brief testimony given at the

first trial that was interrupted by Father’s appearance and then continued. Rather,

the record reflects that trial began anew at a later date after Father obtained counsel.

               Mother also contends that the trial court allowed improper hearsay

evidence at trial.   Mother raised no hearsay objections at trial, however, and

therefore we review only for plain error. “Plain error is found where a substantial

right is affected through the erroneous admission of obvious and prejudicial

testimony that serves to undermine confidence in the verdict.” In re M.H., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 80620, 2002-Ohio-2968, ¶ 47.              In other words, even if the

complained of testimony is hearsay, we will not reverse the juvenile court on this

issue absent prejudice to the outcome. Id.
              Hearsay is not permissible in permanent custody hearings because

they are adjudicatory in nature and require compliance with the rules of evidence.

Id. at ¶ 48, citing In re Brofford, 83 Ohio App.3d 869, 878, 615 N.E.2d 1120 (10th

Dist.1992). However, even if improper hearsay was admitted by the trial court,

Mother must show that the court actually relied on that evidence in its judgment. In

re Fountain, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76650, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 672, 18 (Feb.

24, 2000). A trial judge is presumed to be capable of disregarding improper

testimony. Id. “The erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is harmless if other

evidence, apart from the erroneously-admitted evidence, has been offered to prove

that which the challenged evidence was offered to prove.” In re M.H. at ¶ 73, citing

In re Decker, 20 Ohio App.3d 203, 485 N.E.2d 751 (3d Dist.1984).

              Most of Mother’s hearsay challenges relate to testimony about her

mental health issues. But other than her unsupported argument that “there would

be insufficient evidence to sustain the court’s judgment without admissible evidence

being admitted,” (Mother’s brief, p. 25), she has not demonstrated that the court

relied on any inadmissible hearsay testimony about her mental health issues in

rendering its judgment. As discussed above, the record reveals ample evidence

other than Mother’s mental health issues that supports the court’s award of

permanent custody to the agency. Indeed, the juvenile court cited such evidence in

its judgment entry; i.e., Mother’s neglect of S.D-S. by failing to visit, communicate

with, or support her; Mother’s residence in a shelter, thereby demonstrating her

unwillingness to provide an adequate, permanent home for S.D-S.; and Mother’s
unwillingness to complete her case plan so that she could provide food, clothing, and

shelter for S.D-S.

               Mother’s argument that the trial court improperly allowed the

agency’s caseworker to give lay opinion testimony about Mother’s mental health

issues is without merit because such opinion testimony is allowed. State v. McKee,

91 Ohio St.3d 292, 296,744 N.E.2d 737 (2001) (witnesses with firsthand knowledge

are permitted to offer lay testimony where they have a reasonable basis, grounded

in experience or specialized knowledge, for arriving at the opinion expressed).

               And Mother’s argument that the trial court allowed counsel for the

agency to improperly criticize Father for firing his first lawyer is a

mischaracterization of the record. The record reflects that counsel argued that

Father demonstrated a lack of commitment to S.D-S. because after he fired the

public defender in June 2022, Father did not return to court until April 2023.

Nowhere did counsel suggest, as Mother argues, that “the parents were unfit because

the prosecution does not like the father’s new lawyer.” (Mother’s brief, p. 28.)

               Upon our review of the record before us, we find no plain error in the

trial court’s determination that S.D-S.’s best interest was served by a grant of

permanent custody to the agency. The second assignment of error is therefore

overruled.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

               In her third assignment of error, Mother contends that the trial

court’s grant of permanent custody should be reversed because her trial counsel was

ineffective.

               To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mother must

demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient

performance prejudiced her so as to deprive her of a fair trial. State v. Trimble, 122

Ohio St.3d 297, 2009-Ohio-2961, 911 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 98, citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The failure

to prove either prong of this two-part test makes it unnecessary for a court to

consider the other prong. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52

(2000), citing Strickland at 697. This two-part test has been held applicable in

permanent custody proceedings. In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619, 627, 645 N.E.2d

812 (9th Dist.1994). In evaluating a claim of effective assistance of counsel, a

reviewing court must be mindful that there are countless ways for an attorney to

provide effective assistance in a given case, and it must give great deference to

counsel’s performance. Strickland at 689.

               Mother has failed to demonstrate that her counsel was ineffective.

First, although she claims alleged error regarding counsel’s handling of pretrial

proceedings, as noted above, this court is without jurisdiction to consider those

issues because Mother did not timely appeal the trial court’s orders of adjudication

and disposition. Moreover, even assuming counsel’s performance at the permanent
custody hearing was somehow deficient, Mother has failed to demonstrate that she

was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Indeed, Mother makes no argument that

the result of the permanent custody proceeding would have been different but for

counsel’s alleged errors, presumably because she cannot.

               At the time of the permanent custody hearing, S.D-S. had been in

agency custody for 12 of 22 consecutive months, thereby satisfying the first prong of

the permanent custody statute pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). Mother does not

dispute this finding. With respect to the trial court’s best interest determination, the

evidence was clear and convincing that Mother had failed to consistently engage in

referred services pursuant to her case plan and did not have adequate housing at the

time of trial. These facts alone required the court to find that S.D-S. cannot be placed

with Mother within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her. See R.C.

2151.414(E)(1) (if the court determines at a hearing, by clear and convincing

evidence, that following the placement of the child outside the child’s home, the

parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the

conditions that caused the child to be removed from his or her home, the court shall

enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable

time or should not be placed with either parent). Moreover, as discussed above, the

evidence was clear and convincing that it was in S.D-S.’s best interest for the court

to grant permanent custody to the agency.

               Because she has not demonstrated that she suffered any prejudice as

a result of counsel’s alleged deficiencies, Mother has not satisfied the two-prong test
for ineffective assistance of counsel. The third assignment of error is therefore

overruled.

IV. Cumulative Error

               In her fourth assignment of error, Mother contends that the juvenile

court’s judgment granting permanent custody of S.D-S. to the agency should be

reversed because the cumulative effect of the trial court’s evidentiary errors and

counsel’s ineffectiveness warrants reversal.

               “Under the cumulative error doctrine, ‘a conviction will be reversed

when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives the defendant of a fair trial

even though each of the numerous instances of trial-court error does not

individually constitute cause for reversal.’”    Daniels v. Northcoast Anesthesia

Providers, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105125, 2018-Ohio-3562, ¶ 66, quoting

State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 321. The

cumulative error doctrine applies in civil cases. Id.

               Having found no error in the trial court’s decision, we find no

cumulative error. The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR