Court Opinion

ID: 9600153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:24:45.95265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:35.144578
License: Public Domain

Tyson, Judge
dissenting.
The majority’s opinion holds “some” competent evidence exists to support the Commission’s findings of fact, which in turn support its conclusions of law, and affirms the Commission’s opinion and award. There is no evidence to sustain the Commission’s findings of fact. The majorities’ opinions from the Commission and here are erroneous as a matter of law. I respectfully dissent.
I. Standard of Review
The Commission is the sole judge of issues of fact. Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683-84 (1982). The Commission’s findings of fact are binding on appeal when supported by competent evidence, Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553, and prevail “even though there is evidence that would support a finding [of fact] to the contrary.” Mica Co. v. Board of Education, 246 N.C. 714, 717, 100 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1957) (citations omitted). The Commission’s findings must support its conclusions of law. Creel v. Town of Dover, 126 N.C. App. 547, 552, 486 S.E.2d 478, 480 (1997) (citing Moore v. Davis Auto Service, 118 N.C. App. 624, 627, 456 *541S.E.2d 847, 850 (1995)). We review “the Commission’s conclusions of law . . . de novo.” McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 701 (2004) (citing Grantham v. R.G. Barry Corp., 127 N.C. App. 529, 534, 491 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1997), disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 671, 500 S.E.2d 86 (1998)). Our de novo review also applies to mixed questions of fact and law. Campbell v. N.C. Dep’t of Transport., 155 N.C. App. 652, 667, 575 S.E.2d 54, 64, disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 386 (2003).
II. De Novo Review
Both the opinion and award of the deputy commissioner and Chairman Lattimore’s dissenting opinion from the Commission’s opinion and award properly found plaintiff’s right knee injury was a preexisting condition “which was aggravated” by the 31 January 2000 accident and is “compensable as a part of that injury.” No evidence before the Commission supports a contrary finding or conclusion.
A. Aggravation of Pre-existing Injury
“An injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment which accelerates or aggravates a pre-existing disease or infirmity, thus proximately contributing to the . . . disability of the employee, is compensable.” Leonard T. Jernigan, North Carolina Workers’ Compensation, § 12:8, at 138 (4th ed. 2004) (citations omitted). “Because employers must accept employees as they find them, employers can potentially be liable for total disability benefits if an on-the-job injury aggravates or accelerates a pre-existing condition to such an extent that it causes complete disability.” Id., § 18:1, at 213 (citations omitted); Brown v. Family Dollar Distrib. Ctr., 129 N.C. App. 361, 364, 499 S.E.2d 197, 199 (1998) (“Our courts have held that when an accident arising out of employment materially accelerates or aggravates a pre-existing condition and proximately contributes to disability, the injury is compensable.”) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2 (1991); Anderson v. Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E.2d 265 (1951); Buck v. Procter and Gamble Co., 52 N.C. App. 88, 278 S.E.2d 268 (1981); and Wilder v. Barbour Boat Works, 84 N.C. App. 188, 352 S.E.2d 690 (1987)). Undisputed here is that Richmond Community College was plaintiff’s employer at the time her 1994 pre-existing injury was aggravated in January 2000.
Our Supreme Court stated in Vause v. Equipment Co.,
[t]he hazards of employment do not have to set in motion the sole causative force of an injury in order to make it compensable. By *542the weight of authority it is held that where a workman by reason of constitutional infirmities is predisposed to sustain injuries while engaged in labor, nevertheless the leniency and humanity of the law permit him to recover compensation if the physical aspects of the employment contribute in some reasonable degree to bring about or intensify the condition which renders him susceptible to such accident and consequent injury. But in such case the employment must have some definite, discernible relation to the accident.
233 N.C. 88, 92, 63 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1951) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
In Hoyle v. Carolina Associated Mills, this Court stated:
The work-related injury need not be the sole cause of the problems to render an injury compensable. Kendrick v. City of Greensboro, 80 N.C. App. 183, 186, 341 S.E.2d 122, 123, disc. review denied, 317 N.C. 335, 346 S.E.2d 500 (1986). If the work-related accident “contributed in ‘some reasonable degree’ ” to plaintiffs disability, she is entitled to compensation. Id. at 187, 341 S.E.2d at 124. “ ‘When a pre-existing, non-disabling, non-job-related condition is aggravated or accelerated by an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment ... so that disability results, then the employer must compensate the employee for the entire resulting disability even though it would not have disabled a normal person to that extent.’ ” Wilder v. Barbour Boat Works, 84 N.C. App. 188, 196, 352 S.E.2d 690, 694 (1987) (quoting Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1, 18, 282 S.E.2d 458, 470 (1981)).
122 N.C. App. 462, 465-66, 470 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1996).
In Mabe v. Granite Corp., the defendant argued certain factors are “beyond the control of an employer and cannot be considered in determining an employee’s disability.” 15 N.C. App. 253, 256, 189 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1972). This Court responded, “The answer to this is that an employer accepts an employee as he is. If a compensable injury precipitates a latent physical condition, such as heart disease, cancer, back weakness and the like, the entire disability is compensable and no attempt is made to weigh the relative contribution of the accident and the pre-existing condition.” Id. (citing 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 59.20, p. 88.109).
“ ‘When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows *543from the injury arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own intentional conduct.’ ” Roper v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 65 N.C. App. 69, 73, 308 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1983) (quotation omitted), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 309, 312 S.E.2d 652 (1984).
B. Analysis
Undisputed evidence from the record shows plaintiff’s preexisting right knee injury was “aggravated” by the 31 January 2000 accident. Plaintiff was working full-time as a custodian for Richmond Community College while undergoing treatment for her right knee. Her position required “climbing stairs, bending, stopping, and prolonged standing and walking, all of which were in excess of her restrictions.” Plaintiff continued working until her accident in January 2000.
The Commission found “plaintiff’s condition stabilized until she slipped at work on an ink pen [in June 1997] and suffered a patella sprain to the right knee” and after treatment “the right knee pain resolved . . . .” However, after the 31 January 2000 accident, the Commission found: (1) “[p]laintiff used her left leg to compensate for her right knee, and would use her left leg to pull up her right leg when climbing stairs;” (2) “plaintiff could not favor her right knee by relying on her left knee;” and (3) “Dr. Oakley, the treating physician for both knee injuries, . . . opined that the [January] 2000 left knee injury was the straw that broke . . . that put her over the edge.”
Plaintiff admitted the aggravation of injuries to her right knee after the 31 January 2000 accident: “Well, it’s got worse. It’s got more painful from — I guess, from having to switch back and forth on legs like I have to do.” She testified her right knee worsened after the surgery on her left knee: “[I]t wasn’t long after the surgery because I was having to use . . . my right knee more, you know. Like I said, to walk and all, I was putting more weight on it, and . . . that’s when my [right] knee really started giving me a lot more problems." (emphasis supplied).
Undisputed evidence shows plaintiff’s previously existing right knee injury was “materially accelerated and aggravated” by the 31 January 2000 accident while employed at Richmond Community College. Brown, 129 N.C. App. at 364, 499 S.E.2d at 199. Prior to the accident, plaintiff performed her employment duties and exceeded the work restrictions imposed by her physicians. Plaintiff was unable *544to physically compensate for her injured right knee as a “natural consequence” of her accident at Richmond Community College, and its condition worsened. See Roper, 65 N.C. App. at 73, 308 S.E.2d at 488 (“When the primary .injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own intentional conduct.”). Richmond Community College “accepted” plaintiff with her pre-existing right knee injury. As her employer at that time, Richmond Community College is liable for the “aggravation” of plaintiff’s pre-existing injury.
Plaintiff relinquished all her claims against Richmond Community College pursuant to the settlement agreement approved by the Commission. As Chairman Lattimore’s dissenting opinion noted, “[p]laintiff should not be permitted to settle with Richmond Community College, then recover from defendants in this case that which would be paid by Richmond Community College but for the settlement agreement.”
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff’s accident on 31 January 2000 is “compensable,” but not by defendants at bar. The injury to her left knee in 2000 “aggravated” her pre-existing right knee injury from 1994, “accelerated” its failure, and led to her eventual total disability. Jernigan, supra § 12:8, at 138. Additional injury to plaintiff’s right knee was a “natural consequence” of the accident in the course of her employment with Richmond Community College. Roper, 65 N.C. App. at 73, 308 S.E.2d at 488. As her employer, Richmond Community College accepted plaintiff as it found her with the previously injured right knee. The majorities’ opinions both at the Commission and at this Court erroneously places liability on defendants at bar. That liability rightfully and legally belongs to Richmond Community College. I respectfully dissent.