Court Opinion

ID: 9584822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:53:01.425014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:22.197183
License: Public Domain

Johnson, Judge,
dissenting.
I do not agree that the affidavit upon which the warrant to search Clark’s home was based established probable cause. Officer Young’s affidavit omitted critical information and contained false statements. Young admitted on cross-examination that in obtaining the warrant he led the magistrate to believe that the informant made the “hand to hand” purchase at Clark’s residence when in reality the informant never went inside. Young gave no indication in the affidavit that only the unknown driver entered Clark’s home. Young also admitted at the suppression hearing that because officers did not continue their surveillance of the informant once he left the car wash, the buy in this case was not, contrary to his assertion in the affidavit, a controlled one. See, e.g., Sullivan v. State, 178 Ga. App. 769, 770 (344 SE2d 737) (1986). Under the authority of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (98 SC 2674, 57 LE2d 667) (1978), the false testimony cannot be used to establish probable cause. Peters v. State, 213 Ga. App. 488, 489 (445 SE2d 290) (1994); see Daniels v. State, 183 Ga. App. 651, 652 (359 SE2d 735) (1987). Once a court determines an affidavit contains false statements or omissions as set out in Franks, the false statements must be deleted, the omitted truthful material included, and the affi-
*119davit reexamined to determine whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant. Peters, supra at 489-490. In determining whether an affidavit sufficiently establishes the probable cause necessary for issuance of a warrant, all of the circumstances set forth in the reformed affidavit must be considered, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information. See Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 577 (422 SE2d 426) (1992); Wood v. State, 214 Ga. App. 848 (449 SE2d 308) (1994). “The ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis applies also in situations in which there are two informers.” Munson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 80, 81 (438 SE2d 123) (1993). In this case, the information that there was cocaine inside Clark’s residence could only have been provided by the unidentified driver. It is undisputed that his reliability is unknown. A deficiency created by the fact that the reliability of either source has not been established can be corrected by the corroboration of the information, thereby providing a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Id. at 82. Here, there was no corroboration of the claim that cocaine was being sold from Clark’s residence. “No matter how truthful or sincere the information from the reliable source, the crucial question is the unidentified third-party’s reliability, and that is simply not established in the affidavit.” Wood, supra at 849. In my opinion, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side and previously omitted material included, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause. See Daniels, supra. Compare State v. Thomas, 203 Ga. App. 623, 624 (417 SE2d 328) (1992). Therefore, I believe the trial court erred in denying Clark’s motion to suppress evidence found in his residence. See Talley v. State, 200 Ga. App. 442, 445 (3) (d) (408 SE2d 463) (1991).
Similarly, I must dissent from the holding in Division 4.1 believe the trial court erred in denying Clark’s motion to suppress evidence found at his place of business because his consent stemmed from an illegal arrest and unauthorized search of his residence. Sheriff Charles Durst detained Clark in his residence for one-and-one-half hours while waiting for Officer Young to obtain the search warrant. Durst testified that Clark was not free to leave and would have been arrested had he attempted to do so. When Young did arrive with the warrant, Clark was asked if he would consent to a search of his place of business, which he did. However, consent is not valid if it is the product of an illegal detention. See generally VonLinsowe v. State, 213 Ga. App. 619, 622 (2) (445 SE2d 371) (1994). I realize that officers may detain occupants of a residence while the premises are being secured pursuant to a search warrant. Harrison v. State, 213 Ga. App. 174, 176 (444 SE2d 354) (1994). Here, however, I do not believe there was a valid search warrant. Moreover, the prolonged detention in this case amounted to an arrest and, to be lawful, must have been supported by probable cause. See State v. Corbett, 205 Ga. App. 554, 556 *120(423 SE2d 38) (1992). Probable cause to arrest Clark did not exist prior to the search. Because the officers had no valid warrant authorizing a search of Clark’s home and no probable cause to arrest him, his detention was illegal and his consent to search the store tainted. In my opinion, the trial court erred in denying Clark’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in the search of his business.
Decided March 17, 1995
Reconsideration denied March 30, 1995
Solomon & Edgar, M. Theodore Solomon II, Alan P. Layne, for appellant.
Richard A. Malone, District Attorney, S. Hayward Altman, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Blackburn, Judge Smith, and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.