Court Opinion

ID: 9387716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 19:03:25.977693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:08.111548
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LAURIE SCIOCCHETTI,

                    Plaintiff,                  C.A. No. N20C-11-027 SPL

       v.

KAREN SPRING and JOSEPH                         TRIAL BY JURY OF
SCHARF,                                         TWELVE DEMANDED

                    Defendants.

                            Submitted: January 3, 2023
                             Decided: April 18, 2023

                                      ORDER

    Upon Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment: DENIED

      1.     The plaintiff in this case was injured in a motor vehicle accident

allegedly caused by one of the defendants. The parties offer contradicting evidence

as to the specific date on which the accident occurred. With discovery complete, the

defendants now seek summary judgment on the basis that there is no genuine issue

of material fact that the accident occurred more than two years before the plaintiff

filed her complaint. The defendants therefore contend the plaintiff’s claims are time-

barred under Delaware’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

For the reasons that follow, the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment

because a genuine material factual dispute exists as to the specific date the accident

occurred.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        2.      In November 2018, Laurie Sciocchetti (“Plaintiff”) was involved in an

automobile accident with Defendant Karen Spring (“Spring”).1 Plaintiff alleges the

accident occurred on or about November 6, 2018, and she sustained severe and

permanent injuries because of the accident.2 On November 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a

complaint in this Court seeking damages.3

        3.      In Count I, Plaintiff claims Spring negligently failed to operate and

control her vehicle in a safe and proper manner.4 In Count II, Plaintiff claims

Defendant Joseph Scharf (“Scharf”) negligently entrusted his vehicle to Spring when

he knew or should have known she was unfit to drive.5

        4.      On March 5, 2021, Spring and Scharf (collectively, “Defendants”)

moved for summary judgment (the “Motion”) on the basis that Plaintiff’s complaint

was not filed in a timely manner.6 Defendants argued the accident occurred on

November 1, 2018. Under Delaware law, a party seeking to recover for personal

injuries must file suit within two years of the date on which the alleged injuries were

1
  Compl. ¶ 5.
2
  Id.
3
  D. I. 1.
4
  Id. ¶ 7(a). A full list of Plaintiff’s allegations can be found in Compl. ¶ 7(a-j).
5
  Id. ¶¶ 14-16.
6
  Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J.

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sustained.7 Defendants contended if the accident occurred on November 1, 2018,

Plaintiff’s claim would be time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations.8

       5.     Plaintiff opposed Defendants’ Motion on the basis that the question of

when the accident in fact took place is a factual issue to be resolved by the jury.9 On

May 5, 2021, this Court denied Defendants’ Motion because discovery was needed

to identify the date of the motor vehicle accident.10

       6.     On October 28, 2022, after discovery was complete, Defendants

renewed their Motion on the same statute of limitations grounds.11 On January 3,

2023, Defendants filed a letter with the Court explaining the parties had agreed to

resolve this matter in binding arbitration.12 Counsel, however, asked the Court to

rule on the pending renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.13 The pending motion

then was referred to the undersigned judicial officer for resolution because the

previously assigned judge had retired from the Court.

ANALYSIS

       7.     Under Superior Court Civil Rule 56, a party is entitled to summary

judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is

7
  Id. ¶ 7.
8
  Id.
9
  Pl.’s Resp. Opp. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 13.
10
   D.I. 9.
11
   Id. 22.
12
   Id. 26.
13
   Id.

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entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.14 A material issue of fact exists if “a

rational finder of fact could find some material fact that would favor the non-moving

party in a determining way[.]”15 The initial burden is on the moving party to

demonstrate there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.16 If the moving party meets the initial

burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that a genuine issue of

material fact is in dispute.17

       8.      Where the moving party produces an affidavit or other evidence in

support of its motion and the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on its

own pleadings, but instead must provide evidence of a genuine issue of material fact

to be resolved at trial.18 If, after discovery, the non-moving party cannot make a

sufficient showing of the existence of an essential element of the case, summary

judgment must be granted.19

       9.      A court deciding a summary judgment motion must identify disputed

factual issues whose resolution is necessary to decide the case, but the court may not

resolve any such disputed issue.20 The court must evaluate the facts in the light most

14
   Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).
15
   Deloitte LLP v. Flanagan, 2009 WL 5200657, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2009).
16
   Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
17
   Id. (citing Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979)).
18
   Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
19
   Thou v. Motiva Enters, LLC, 2009 WL 1515602, at *4 (Del. Super. May 29, 2009).
20
   Merrill v. Crothall-Am., Inc., 606 A. 2d 96, 99 (Del. 1992).

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favorable to the non-moving party.21 Summary judgment will not be granted where

the record reasonably indicates that a material fact is in dispute or if it seems

desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application

of law to the circumstances.22

       10.     Defendants present evidence supporting their position that the accident

occurred on November 1, 2018. That evidence includes photographs Defendants

took at the accident scene with metadata indicating they took the pictures on

November 1, 2018, transcripts from recorded telephone interviews Plaintiff and

Spring gave to the Defendants’ insurance carrier stating the accident occurred on

November 1, 2018, and a copy of the record of the Plaintiff’s first visit to her

chiropractor on November 5, 2018, where she told the doctor the accident happened

on November 1, 2018.23

       11.     During discovery, Plaintiff testified she had no recollection of the exact

date of the accident because almost four years had elapsed, but she remembered it

was “around the 5 or 6” of November.24 In her response to Defendants’ renewed

Motion, Plaintiff presented evidence supporting her recollection that the accident

allegedly took place on either November 5 or 6, 2018. Plaintiff represented to her

21
   Gruwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 988 A.2d 945, 947 (Del. Super. Feb. 27, 2009).
22
   Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del. 1962).
23
   Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Exs. A-C.
24
   Pl.’s Dep. at 25.

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counsel and her treating physician that the accident occurred on November 6, 2018.25

During treatment with her chiropractor, Plaintiff also stated the accident happened

on November 5, 2018.26

       12.     Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

an issue of material fact remains as to whether the accident occurred on November

1, 2018, or November 5 or 6, 2018.27 Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to

establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the date of the

accident. Although Defendants present compelling evidence in support of their

position, the Court cannot weigh conflicting evidence.28 Weighing evidence is

within the exclusive province of the jury. Summary judgment therefore is not

warranted.

CONCLUSION

       13.     For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

is DENIED.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                      /s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
                                                     Abigail M. LeGrow, Judge

25
   Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B, Ex. C.
26
   Id. Ex. D.
27
   For purposes of applying the statute of limitations in this case, there is no difference between
November 5 or 6.
28
   Thou, 2009 WL 1515602, at *6 (citing Merrill, 606 A.2d at 99).

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