Court Opinion

ID: 9709166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:41:47.775676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:46.547394
License: Public Domain

SHIELDS, Presiding Judge,
concurring in result.
I agree that Bryce has waived the issue the majority addresses in Issue I. I also agree the trial court erred in admitting State's Exhibit 1 in evidence over Bryce's hearsay objection and that any error in admitting State's Exhibit 2 is waived. Finally, I agree the trial court did not err when it revoked Bryce's probation.
The trial court complied with IC 35-88-2-1(a) (1988) when it entered its written "Order Setting Conditions of Probation II" at Bryce's sentencing.1 That order also contains Bryce's acknowledgment that he received a copy of the order and agreed to abide by the stated conditions. Thus, Bryce's argument that the trial court failed to specify the conditions of probation on the record at sentencing is without merit.
Also, there is no merit to Bryce's argument that his probation was erroneously revoked because, contrary to the mandate of IC 85-88-2-2(b), "it cannot be said that [a written statement of the conditions of his probation] was provided [to him] at the time of sentencing because his signature is not dated." Appellant's Brief at 15. That argument is fallacious because the "Order Setting Conditions of Probation II," entered in the record on October 27, 1987 as part of the sentencing order, bears his signature. Bryce necessarily signed the order contemporaneous with his sentencing.
*1100Finally, the evidence supports the trial court's revocation of Bryce's probation. The stated ground for revocation was Bryce "being unsuccessfully terminated from drug treatment [sic]." Record at 107. The evidence is that Bryce's treatment was "closed unsuccessful" by the program in which he was enrolled.2 Record at 128, State's Exhibit 5, part 1. A reasonable fact finder could conclude that by no longer participating in a drug treatment program, Bryce was violating the condition of probation that he "participate in [a] drug treatment ... program." Record at 58. Until being released from that condition, Bryce was obligated to continue participating in the assigned program.

. The order book entry of October 27, 1987 reads:
And afterwards towit on October 27th, 1987, being the 1987 year Term of said Court before the Honorable A.A. Cordingley Judge thereof, the following further proceedings were had herein towit:
B1087-5773-Defendant in person and by counsel. Plea of guilty to Count B entered. Court determines plea is voluntary and factual basis exists for it pursuant to IC 35-35-1-3. Court finds defendant guilty as charged in Count B. Possession Of Marijuana under 30 grams. Fine $7.00, and costs $103.00. Defendant sentenced to 365 days in Marion County Jail. 365 days suspended. Probation Order entered as follows: Alcohol Drug treatment. State dismisses Count A.
Record at 52. This entry is followed by the "Order Setting Conditions of Probation II" in full text. Bryce did not contest the rule of the program and termination for violating an unreasonable rule of the program.

. Bryce did not contest the reasonableness of his termination by the program in which he was enrolled except to contest the sufficiency of the evidence that he tested positive for cocaine in April, 1988. Specifically, he did not dispute that a positive test was a violation of a disclosed, reasonable rule of the program. The sufficiency of the evidence of the violation is for the fact finder, not this court.