Court Opinion

ID: 9744582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:07:59.397657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:50.130213
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: McNamara and Morrissey, Montgomery’s attorneys, are, by all accounts, respected and able members of the bar. There is no basis in the record for suggesting that they would manufacture testimony against Judge Samuels. Judge Samuels, on the other hand, had very compelling reasons for reneging on his promise to McNamara and Morrissey and then disavowing that a promise had been made. Having been caught by the assistant State’s Attorneys engaging in ex parte communications with McNamara and Morrissey, Judge Samuels may have believed that imposition of the death penalty and denial of impropriety were his best defense against investigation by the Judicial Inquiry Board. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “[a] judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” 155 Ill. 2d R. 62(A). The Code further provides that “[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding.” 155 Ill. 2d R. 63(A)(4). A trial judge has an obligation to assure the public that justice is administered fairly because the appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence as would be the actual presence of bias or prejudice. People v. Bradshaw, 171 Ill. App. 3d 971, 975-76 (1988). The situation before us provides a useful illustration of this. Regardless of what was actually said or done in Judge Samuels’ chambers, the circumstances of the conversations have left an indelible taint on the proceedings. The integrity of the process has been fatally compromised. In a normal case, this would require that we vacate the judgment and remand the matter for a new trial. See, e.g., In re Wheatley, 297 Ill. App. 3d 854 (1998); People v. Sumner, 40 Ill. App. 3d 832 (1976). I fail to see how we can order anything less where, as here, a man’s life hangs in the balance. On retrial, the State should not be permitted to seek the death penalty against Montgomery. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XTV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (111. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). It is therefore void and unenforceable.