Court Opinion

ID: 9661902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:54:20.813071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:34.993564
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). I agree with Judge Gillis as to defendant Woodfork but disagree as to defendant Langston.
I respectfully suggest that Judge Gillis is in error when he quotes in his opinion, as part of the trial judge’s instructions, a portion of the trial court’s statement of defendant Langston’s theory of the case. In his charge to the jury, the trial judge set forth what he clearly identified as "de*637fendant Calvin Langston’s theory of the case”. As part of this theory the court discussed Langston’s claim regarding the defense of insanity, correctly stating the people’s burden of proof. However, the judge commenced his statement of the claim with the words, "It is the further contention of defendant Calvin Langston, by his attorney Ivor R. Jones * * * ”, and concluded discussion of the theory by declaring, "That is the theory of Mr. Langston”. I do not believe that the remedial impact upon the jury of a correct statement of law embodied within a discussion which the trial court has explicitly described as defendant’s theory of the case is sufficient to rectify a subsequent erroneous statement of law made by the trial court itself.1
After giving defendant’s theory, the trial judge correctly stated that the burden of proving defendant sane is upon the people, but failed to specify the quantum of proof required. He then gave the correct instruction set forth in the excerpt from the trial court’s charge quoted by Judge Gillis. It will be noted that the correct instruction appears at the beginning of the paragraph and that at the end of this paragraph the trial judge allocates to the prosecution the burden of establishing sanity but again says nothing about the quantum of proof. Immediately thereafter, the trial judge gave the erroneous instruction quoted in Judge Gillis’ opinion. This is the last time the court dealt with the issue of insanity. There is language at two subsequent places in the charge dealing with the people’s duty to prove defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt but in neither instance does this language relate to the specific issue of insanity.
*638The rule expressed in People v Eggleston, 186 Mich 510, 514-515 (1915), that "where conflicting instructions are given, one erroneous and the other without error, it may be presumed that the jury followed that instruction which was erroneous”, has been consistently followed. People v Kanar, 314 Mich 242 (1946); People v Clark, 340 Mich 411 (1954); People v Sangster, 33 Mich App 712 (1971); People v Schafer, 36 Mich App 316 (1971). Furthermore, in People v Geiger, 10 Mich App 339 (1968), an instruction identical to that in the instant case was held to be reversibly erroneous despite the fact that a correct instruction had previously been given.
In People v Neumann, 35 Mich App 193 (1971), this Court reversed and remanded the case due to an erroneous insanity instruction which was not objected to at trial. The Court stated (p 196):
"Usually, instructional error will not occasion such 'manifest injustice’ unless the incorrect instruction pertains to a basic and controlling issue in the case. In the case at bar, the erroneous charges dealt with the burden of proof with respect to insanity. Any misstatement of the law on this point would be directed to the very essence of the case. ’’(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, in the present case the erroneous statement of law regarding the quantum of proof required to prove defendant sane was "directed to the very essence of the case”.
I vote to affirm the conviction of George Wood-fork. I vote to reverse the conviction of Calvin Langston and remand his case for a new trial.

 See Milauckas v Meyer, 1 Mich App 500, 508 (1965), in which this Court stated: “The distinction may be made, therefore, between the court’s comments on the positions of the opposing parties and the court’s statements of the law”.