Court Opinion

ID: 9943049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:01:35.289355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:00.022379
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 22 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HENRY EALY III; et al.,                         No.    22-35962

                Plaintiffs-Appellants,          D.C. No. 3:22-cv-00356-HZ

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
ROBERT REDFIELD, former Director of
the US Center for Disease Control, in his
individual capacity; et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the District of Oregon
               Marco A. Hernandez, Chief District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted December 5, 2023**
                               Portland, Oregon

Before: NGUYEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and MONTALVO,*** District
Judge.

      Plaintiffs-Appellants Dr. Henry Ealy III and Oregon State Senators Dennis

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable Frank Montalvo, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
Linthicum and Kim Thatcher appeal the district court’s dismissal of their case for

lack of Article III standing.

        We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the district

court’s decision regarding standing de novo.” Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285

F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.

        Appellants sought prosecution of Robert Redfield, Rochelle Walensky, Alex

Azar, Xavier Becerra, and Brian Moyer for, allegedly, committing fraud against

the nation by failing to ensure the accuracy of collected COVID-19 data, and/or

manipulating the data between 2020 and 2022. Appellants collected evidence that

they believe illustrates this alleged fraud and sent it to every United States

Attorney. All declined to prosecute or present the gathered evidence to a grand

jury. Appellants then decided to petition the district court to impanel a special

grand jury or allow them to show their evidence to an already impaneled grand

jury.

        1. As a preliminary matter, Appellants argue for the first time in their reply

brief that because a grand jury is not an adversarial proceeding, they need not

satisfy the requirements of Article III standing. Because they did not raise this

argument before the district court, nor in their opening brief, it is forfeited. See

Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[We] will not

ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued

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in appellant’s opening brief.”).

      2. To have Article III standing, plaintiffs must show, (1) they have suffered

an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is both concrete

and particularized, (2) which is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the

defendant, and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defs.

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). If the party seeking federal redress fails

to establish these elements, then an Article III court is without jurisdiction to hear

the matter. See id.

      Appellants contend they have a legally protected interest to impanel and

present their evidence before a grand jury. Assuming, arguendo, the validity of

these legal interests, Appellants’ interests are not “sufficiently concrete” as to

satisfy standing. To be “concrete,” an injury must be “de facto” that is, it must

actually exist. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016). Put another way,

there must be a tangible or intangible harm that a plaintiff personally suffered.

“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected

by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to create Article III standing.” Summers v.

Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009).

      This concept is illustrated in Robins, where Spokeo, Inc. violated the Fair

Credit Reporting Act by posting incorrect information about Robins; however,

violation of the statute alone was not enough. In order to establish a “concrete”

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injury in fact, Robins had to show how the incorrect information actually harmed

him. See Robins, 578 U.S. at 342–43. Conversely, in Fed. Election Comm’n v.

Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998), a “concrete” injury in fact existed because the

plaintiffs were denied the ability to obtain information. Thus, the infringement of

the plaintiffs’ rights resulted in the denial of a tangible benefit (the information).

      Here, Appellants failed to show how they were personally harmed by the

district court’s dismissal of their petition. The denial of their supposed right to a

grand jury, without more, is insufficient to create an injury in fact. At most,

Appellants may have been denied the “right to be heard” by a grand jury.

However, a right to due process, including the right to be heard, “does not exist in

the absence of some ‘underlying substantive interest’ that ‘rises to the level of a

legitimate claim of entitlement.’” Johnson v. Ryan, 55 F.4th 1167, 1192 (9th Cir.

2022) (quoting Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005)). As

Appellants concede, they do not have an underlying interest, for Article III

purposes, in the prosecution of defendants. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.

614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the

prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”).

      Appellants also have a redressability problem. Even assuming a sufficient

injury in fact, the district court cannot facilitate the relief that Appellants seek. The

statute that Appellants rely upon states, “[a]ny such attorney receiving information

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. . . from any other person . . . shall, if requested by such other person, inform the

grand jury.” 18 U.S.C. § 3332(a) (emphasis added). Only a U.S. Attorney or

assistant attorney can conceivably supply the relief sought. Appellants “did not

seek . . . to compel a prosecutor to present evidence to a grand jury.”

      Because Appellants cannot establish a cognizable interest, let alone an injury

in fact, that the courts can redress, they do not establish Article III standing.

      3. Lastly, Appellants argued before the district court that the Petition Clause

of the First Amendment gives them standing. However, in their opening brief,

Appellants merely state, “[a]s Petitioners have shown, they have a judicially

cognizable interest in having their allegations presented to a grand jury.”

Therefore, they effectively conceded that their Petition Clause argument is

derivative of their other arguments for Article III standing. Because Appellants

have not established Article III standing, their Petition Clause argument is

foreclosed.

      AFFIRMED.

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