Court Opinion

ID: 9668971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:34:38.564797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:50.739177
License: Public Domain

On Second Petition to Bebear 349 S. W. 2d 793.
PEE CUBIAM.
Mr. Justice Burnett, obviously out of bis regard for tbe ability, integrity and sincerity of counsel for tbe petitioner and due to tbe importance of tbe question herein, granted a second petition to rehear in these cases. Tbe questions presented originally bave again been thoroughly considered and investigated by tbe majority of this Court, and after doing so we are in a position to answer this second petition.
It must be kept in mind that these cases came to us on their dismissal by tbe trial judge wherein be sustained a demurrer to tbe declarations.
All that has been decided by tbe two previous opinions herein, and that is to be determined by this opinion, is that tbe question of negligence is one to be decided by tbe jury, based on their determination from tbe evidence in tbe case of tbe question of foreseeability upon which tbe proximate cause depended.
 To bold, as is tbe contention of tbe petitioner, that tbe injuries herein were due solely to tbe negligent operation, by an unauthorized person, of this automobile appears to beg tbe question, because to bold this way assumes that tbe misappropriation of tbe car was unfore*73seeable. The statute (sec. 59-863, T.C.A.), itself, is based in part on the likelihood that cars left unattended in violation of this statute will be taken, and implies a degree of foreseeability of that result. It follows that violation of the statute could be found to be an act of negligence which created a foreseeable risk of the ear being taken and driven off. If that occurred, and a party was injured by the negligence of such driver, the injury could be held to have been proximately caused by the negligent act of leaving the car unattended.
The statute (sec. 59-863, T.C.A.) is a safety device because to do the things that it requires all result in preventing interference with the automobile’s stationary condition and mechanical immobility. It is protection to life and property which might otherwise be affected by improper movement of the automobile. The Legislature in enacting this statute provided in the very first sentence of the caption of the Act that the purpose of this Act is “to promote highway safety by regulating the operation of vehicles in Tennessee, * * Pub.Acts 1955, c. 329. We must ascribe to the Legislature a desire to effect a purposeful end by the language used, and in so doing, its language should be given its ordinary meaning, the meaning which all of us give to the use of words, without distortion.
The Court of Appeals, Middle Division, in Beene v. Cook, 43 Tenn.App. 692, 311 S.W.2d 596, 600, apparently ascribed this purpose to the statute. After quoting the statute (sec. 59-863, T.C.A.) that court says:
“While this last section probably does not apply where the vehicle is parked off a public road or street, nevertheless, it is indicative of what constitutes due *74care in parking and leaving a vehicle unattended, especially at a place frequented by the public as in the case here.”
Certiorari was denied by this Court in that case on March 4,1958.
It is true that the case of Morris v. Bolling, 31 Tenn. App. 577, 218 S.W.2d 754, cited in the original opinion and in the opinion on the first petition to rehear, does not have in it either a statute or city ordinance, but the case was cited for the reason that the question there determined was determined exactly as the majority of this Court has determined this question; that the question of foreseeability was a fact question to be determined by the trier of facts.
Foreseeability cases of this kind cannot be summarily rejected. The degree of risk or likelihood that such car would be taken will vary with circumstances, such as the time and place where the car is left, the section of the city, the kind of neighborhood, etc. “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, * * Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 100, 59 A.L.R. 1253 (Cardozo, J.). See also 2 Restatement, Torts, sec. 302(b), 303.
After a thorough reconsideration of the questions herein presented we are satisfied that the right result has been reached. The second petition to rehear must accordingly be overruled.