Court Opinion

ID: 9784911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:57:31.142108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:01.006072
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
121 I agree with the portion of the main opinion holding that payment of the filing fee is not jurisdictional. I disagree, however, with the main opinion's determination that © we cannot reach the alternative basis for affirmance presented by appellee because it was not raised below. This position is contrary to Utah case law, which provides:
"The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower counrt."
Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 28 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 298 n. 2 (1969) (emphasis added) (quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1464(1)). Thus, under controlling Utah law, an alternative ground for affir-mance need not be raised in or considered by the trial court. Accordingly, we must address the alternative ground for affirmance that appellee has presented on appeal.
122 Appellant attempted to pay the filing fee by personal check when she filed her complaint on November 24, 1997. The check was returned to the court clerk for insufficient funds on December 29, 1997. It is unclear from the record exactly when appellant received notice that her check had bounced. It may have been as early as December, but it was certainly no later than March 10, 1998. This later date was when appellant attempted to pay the filing fee with a second check, but the court clerk insisted on another form of payment because the first check had bounced. In any event, appellant allowed an additional five months to elapse before she finally paid the filing fee on August 11, 1998. In my opinion, waiting more than five months to pay the filing fee after being informed that a check has bounced is unreasonable, as a matter of law.
{ 23 I would therefore affirm the dismissal of the complaint on the alternative ground that, after receiving notice that the original payment was returned for insufficient funds, a litigant must pay the mandatory filing fee within a reasonable time. Seq, eg., Truitt v. County of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 648-49 (6th Cir.1998) (waiting 120 days to pay filing fee after receiving notice of denial of in forma pauperis application unreasonable); Williams-Guice v. Board of Educ., 45 F.3d 161, 165 (7th Cir.1995) (108 day delay unreasonable); Jarrett v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 22 F.3d 256, 259 (10th Cir.1994) (five month delay unreasonable). Appellant clearly did not pay the filing fee in this case within a reasonable time.