Court Opinion

ID: 9544045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:34.596698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:52.088234
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
Initially, the majority is mistaken when it characterizes Turner’s statement to police as a declaration against penal *266interest. Turner maintained that he drove Upshur and Miller without knowledge of their intent to rob the store. This is not a declaration against penal interest. It is not illegal to drive persons from one point to another. It may be illegal to drive them knowing that they intend to commit a crime when they arrive, but that is not what happened here. If the probable cause to arrest is to withstand scrutiny, it must be because “we have tended to credit information supplied by one who has some direct personal knowledge of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 480 Pa. 38, 44, 389 A.2d 74, 77 (1978).* Thus I concur with the majority in holding that the arrest warrant was valid, but only because it was supported by the personal knowledge of Mr. Turner.
Furthermore, and notwithstanding the foregoing, reference by a prosecution witness to having been approached by a detective for the purpose of being given a lie detector test constituted reversible error. This Court has held that references to lie detector tests, which raise inferences regarding the guilt or innocence of a defendant, are impermissible. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 441 Pa. 237, 272 A.2d 467 (1971). Although the testimony in question did not expressly reveal *267whether a lie detector test was ever arranged, or if it were arranged then what results were obtained, merely making known to the jury the existence of an attempt to conduct such a test created an inference that the test was, in fact, administered, and that the test results were favorable to the Commonwealth’s position. Hence, the witness’ testimony was incurably bolstered by the reference to the test, and the curative instruction was per se inadequate to remedy the error. Thus, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

 In Commonwealth v. Stokes, supra, this Court stated:
It is well-settled that even hearsay information is sometimes sufficient to establish probable cause. [Citation omitted]. However, before an officer may conclude there is probable cause to arrest based on hearsay information he must satisfy the two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), as explicated in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969): (1) he must know the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded the suspect participated in the crime; and, (2) he must have some reasonable basis for concluding that the informant is credible or that his information is reliable.
Id., 480 Pa. at 45, 389 A.2d at 77. The first requirement is met by virtue of Turner’s presence with the accused in the car where he overheard the remark, “Why did you have to shoot the man?” The second requirement is met because Turner’s story places him, albeit unwittingly, at a criminal transaction. Turner, having told his story, can expect, at a minimum, to be closely examined by the police as to whether he was really a willing participant. Turner’s declaration is not against penal interest, but it is such as to invite close scrutiny, and, as such, is reliable.