Court Opinion

ID: 9742491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:14:56.162711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:46.831072
License: Public Domain

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 78. (dissenting). The majority concludes that the provision of food, including the power to select a food service provider, does not fall within the constitutional powers and duties of the office of sheriff. Majority op., ¶¶ 4, 66. The majority opinion lacks our traditional constitutional analysis that is necessary to determine whether feeding the prisoners falls within the constitutional powers and duties of the sheriff. However, when undertaken, such analysis demonstrates that the constitutional powers and duties of the sheriff include the care and custody of prisoners in the county jail, which duty encompasses the duty to feed them. Accordingly, a collective bargaining agreement cannot detach from the office of sheriff those constitutional duties that the people have elected the sheriff to undertake. Because the majority opinion takes away from the office of sheriff part of its constitutional power and gives that power to those who were not elected by the people, I respectfully dissent.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 79. AFSCME Local 1901 (Local 1901), which represents county employees, filed a complaint in June 2004 with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Corn-*304mission (WERC) against Brown County, in regard to the means by which the Brown County Sheriff, Dennis Kocken, chose to provide meals to jail prisoners. The complaint alleged that Brown County had committed a prohibited labor practice in violation of Wis. Stat. § 111.70(3)(a) (2003-04),1 because it refused to bargain with Local 1901 on Sheriff Kocken's decision to subcontract the provision of meals for jail prisoners.
¶ 80. Sheriff Kocken had contracted with a private party, Aramark, to provide meals to jail prisoners. According to Sheriff Kocken, his decision was intricately related to many aspects of running the jail. He explained it would save Brown County $1,000,000, provide food-service training for jail prisoners, improve prisoner morale and improve jail safety.
¶ 81. Prior to 2001, food for jail prisoners was provided by the Brown County Sheriffs Department employees. They were not members of Local 1901, and they were assisted in meal preparation by jail prisoners. In 2001, in anticipation of county construction projects, the Brown County Sheriff decided to consolidate food service for the jail with that for the County Mental Health Center and the County Work Release Center. As a result of this food preparation consolidation, Local 1901 became the bargaining unit for the food service providers and prisoner involvement in food preparation was discontinued.
¶ 82. When the anticipated construction, for which the food service was consolidated, did not occur, Sheriff Kocken decided to employ Aramark to provide prisoner meals because doing so would save Brown County $1,000,000, and Aramark would train and uti*305lize the services of jail prisoners in food preparation. The prisoners also would receive sentence credit for the hours worked, which would increase prisoner morale and jail safety. It is this entire program that Local 1901's complaint affects.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 83. This case involves a question of constitutional interpretation that we review independently. Schilling v. Crime Victims Rights Board, 2005 WI 17, ¶ 12, 278 Wis. 2d 216, 692 N.W.2d 623.
B. Wisconsin Constitution, Article VI, Section 4
¶ 84. The constitutional provisions that relate to sheriffs are contained within Article VI, Section 4 of the Wisconsin Constitution. It provides in relevant part:
[S]heriffs shall be chosen by the electors of the respective counties .. . for the term of 4 years. ... Sheriffs may not hold any other partisan office. ... Sheriffs may be required by law to renew their security from time to time, and in default of giving such new security their office shall be deemed vacant. . .. The governor may remove any [sheriff] ... giving to [the sheriff] . .. a copy of the charges and an opportunity of being heard. ... When a vacancy occurs in the office of sheriff, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment of the governor, and the person appointed shall serve until his or her successor is elected and qualified.
¶ 85. When we interpret the Wisconsin Constitution, we do so to give effect to the "intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it." Schilling, 278 *306Wis. 2d 216, ¶ 13 (citations omitted). In so doing under our traditional constitutional analysis,2 we examine three sources: the plain meaning of the words, in context; the practices as they existed at the time the constitution was written; and the earliest interpretations of the constitutional provision under consideration. Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶ 44, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612 (citations omitted).
¶ 86. The constitutional directives that apply to the office of sheriff provide for the election of sheriffs and fix the term of office, but they do not describe the constitutional powers and duties of that office. Because of this lack of specificity, questions in regard to sheriffs' powers and duties have been addressed by Wisconsin courts for more than 100 years. See State ex rel. Kennedy v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 412 (1870).
¶ 87. In Brunst, the inspector of the Milwaukee house of correction sought a writ to direct the Milwaukee County Sheriff to turn over all prisoners confined to the jail. The inspector based his demand on an 1870 *307statute that named the house of correction as the county jail and the inspector as the jailor, ex officio. Id. at 413. The sheriff refused to comply with the demand, claiming that the care and custody of the prisoners of the jail were "duties from time immemorial belonging to [the office of sheriff]." Id. We reasoned that the framers of the constitution "had reference to the office [of sheriff] with those generally recognized legal duties and functions belonging to it in this country, and in the territory, when the constitution was adopted." Id. at 414. Important to our decision was the following rationale:
It would certainly be a very idle provision of the constitution, to secure to the electors the right to choose their sheriffs, and at the same time leave to the legislature the power to detach from the office of sheriff all the duties and functions by law belonging to that office when the constitution was adopted, and commit those duties to some officer not elected by the people. For this would be to secure to the electors the right to choose a sheriff in name merely, while all the duties and substance of the office might be exercised by and belong to an officer appointed by some other authority.
Id. at 414-15.
¶ 88. Based on the common law legal duties and functions of a sheriff in 1848 when the Wisconsin Constitution was ratified, we concluded that it was constitutionally impermissible to grant to another the common law functions and duties of the sheriff. Id. at 415. Therefore, the legislature was without power to detach from the office of sheriff those powers and duties a sheriff held at common law. Because our decision in Brunst was issued only 22 years after the Wisconsin Constitution was ratified and is the earliest interpretation of the constitutional provisions relating to the *308sheriff, its reasoning is the foundation of all subsequent opinions that have addressed the constitutional powers and duties of sheriffs.3
¶ 89. Brunst identified the sheriffs constitutional powers and duties at the time the constitution was ratified. They include: (1) having custody and the care of the jail and the prisoners therein; (2) preservation of the public peace; (3) execution of writs and other service of the courts. Id. at 413-14. Our reasoning in Brunst about the scope of the common law powers and duties of a sheriff and how we identified those same powers and duties as the constitutional powers and duties of a sheriff when the Wisconsin Constitution was ratified is important to understanding the issues presented for our review in the case before us. Our analysis in Brunst is the traditional, constitutional analysis that we have continued to use for more than 100 years to determine the meaning of a constitutional provision.4 Brunst's analysis also is cited in the well-respected treatise, Walter H. Anderson, Anderson on Sheriffs, Coroners and Constables 37 (Dennis & Co., Inc. 1941), which concurs in our analysis.
¶ 90. As has been explained in learned treatises that examine the office of sheriff, the common law powers and duties that the sheriff held also included "the powers necessary for their performance." William L. Murfree, Sr., Law of Sheriffs and Other Ministerial Officers 21 (2d ed. 1890). Accordingly, if a sheriff had a *309particular duty at common law, such as the care of the prisoners, he also had all of the powers necessary to perform that duty.
¶ 91. In State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. Buech, 171 Wis. 474, 177 N.W. 781 (1920), we again construed the constitutional powers and duties of a sheriff. We addressed the question of whether a sheriffs dismissal of a deputy could be regulated by the legislature through the civil service laws or whether the constitution prohibited that regulation. Id. at 476. In our review of the question presented, we did not use the terms "constitutional duties and functions" as we had in Brunst. Instead, we described the sheriffs common law "duties" that were constitutionally based as those "immemorial principal and important duties that characterized and distinguished the office." Id. at 482. We opined that while at common law the sheriff possessed the general power to appoint deputies, such power was not "peculiar to the office of sheriff' because many other officers also had a general power of appointment. Id. Many other public officers also had the power to fire employees, so that firing employees was not a task "peculiar to the office of sheriff." However, we specifically avoided determining whether the sheriff had been deprived of a constitutional power of appointment of deputies by legislative action because we determined that the civil service laws that governed the qualification of deputies were only a reasonable regulation upon the sheriffs power. Id. at 482-83.
¶ 92. In Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n (WPPA) v. County of Dane, 106 Wis. 2d 303, 316 N.W.2d 656 (1982) (WPPA I), we addressed whether a collective bargaining agreement between Dane County and the Teamsters Union Local 695 could limit the person whom the sheriff could select as a "court officer" to *310attend upon the courts on behalf of the sheriff. Id. at 305. We concluded that while a collective bargaining agreement authorized by the legislature may limit a sheriffs power that is purely statutory, "it provides no basis for so limiting the powers and duties of the sheriff which are based upon his constitutional status." Id. at 319.
¶ 93. We also explained in WPPA I that when analyzing whether a particular power is constitutionally grounded, we examine "the nature of the job assigned rather than the general power of job assignment." Id. at 312 (emphasis added). This explanation distinguished our WPPA I analysis from that which we used in Buech because in Buech we focused on a general power, rather than on the assignment of a specific job.
¶ 94. In WPPA I, we determined that " 'Attendance on the Court' is in the same category of powers inherent in the sheriff as is running the jail." Id. at 313. It is "among the principal and important duties which characterized the office of sheriff so that the sheriff may not he restricted as to whom he appoints." Id. at 312. When a power of the sheriff is bottomed in the sheriffs constitutional authority, a "collective bargaining by the county board and a union [cannot] deprive the sheriff of his authority." Id. at 313.
¶ 95. In Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n v. Dane County, 149 Wis. 2d 699, 439 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1989) (WPPA IP, the court of appeals addressed another union complaint against a sheriff. In WPPA II, the union claimed that the sheriff had violated the collective bargaining agreement with the county by contract^ ing with the U.S. Marshal's Service for the interstate conveyance of prisoners, rather than assigning a union member to the task. Id. at 702-03. The sheriff contended that it cost less to transport prisoners with the *311U.S. Marshal's Service than it did using bargaining unit members, and because prisoner transportation was within his constitutional power to attend upon the courts, his choice of how to complete that task could not be changed by a collective bargaining agreement. Id.
¶ 96. As it began its analysis, the court of appeals pointed out that a court should focus on "the nature of the sheriffs duty in light of the sheriffs constitutional powers . .. not the way in which the sheriff carries out the duty." Id. at 701. The court explained that one of the sheriffs constitutional duties was attending upon the court. Id. at 707. The court of appeals said that when a sheriff transports a prisoner in execution of an arrest warrant issued by the court, he is performing part of that constitutional duty. Id. Because the duty of attending upon the court was a duty that "characterized and distinguished the office of sheriff at common law, the sheriff 'chooses his own ways and means of performing it.'" Id. at 710 (citing WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 314 (quoting Andreski v. Indus. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 234, 240, 52 N.W.2d 135 (1952)).
¶ 97. In Manitowoc County v. Local 986B, 168 Wis. 2d 819, 484 N.W.2d 534 (1992), Local 986B complained that the sheriff had violated a collective bargaining agreement by assigning an officer as an undercover drug agent without posting the position. We concluded that the sheriff was operating within his constitutional authority to preserve the peace when he made the appointment. Id. at 828. We explained that keeping the peace was one of the "immemorial principal and important duties" of the sheriff at common law, hut it was not necessary that such a duty also be "unique" to the office of sheriff. Id. We explained that there "is no reason why the constitution should protect only those *312traditional duties which were 'unique' to the office of sheriff at common law." Id. at 829.
¶ 98. We said that "[c]itizens of a county have a right to elect a sheriff to perform certain traditional duties regardless of who else may also have performed them at common law." Id. at 824. This reasoning, bottomed on the right of the electors to choose a sheriff who will carry out duties and perform functions traditional to the office of sheriff, was the foundation of our first interpretation of the constitutional role of the sheriff. See Brunst, 26 Wis. at 415 (explaining that it would be a hollow constitutional right if the electors could choose a sheriff, but could not have him perform his traditional duties and functions, as that would be electing a sheriff in name only).
¶ 99. In Washington County v. Washington County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n, 192 Wis. 2d 728, 531 N.W.2d 468 (Ct. App. 1995), the court of appeals analyzed whether the sheriff had the constitutional power to utilize non-bargaining unit law enforcement personnel to help maintain law and order in anticipation of a public event that the sheriff anticipated would draw large numbers of people into Washington County. The court of appeals began by noting that maintaining law and order was a historic duty of the sheriff. Id. at 738. The court then used the same test as it had in WPPAII: If the nature of the job assigned was for the purpose of law enforcement and preserving the peace, then the sheriff had the constitutional power to choose the "ways and means of performing those duties." Id. at 738-39.
¶ 100. On June 26, 1995, we decided two cases that addressed the issue of the sheriffs constitutional powers: Heitkemper v. Wirsing, 194 Wis. 2d 182, 533 N.W.2d 770 (1995) and Brown County Sheriffs Dep't v. Brown County Sheriffs Dep't Non-supervisory Employ*313ees Ass'n, 194 Wis. 2d 265, 533 N.W.2d 766 (1995). Both cases address firing a deputy who had served in a sheriffs department for many years. Each case specifically pointed out that it did not address the sheriffs power to appoint a deputy who previously had not been hired by the sheriff. Heitkemper, 194 Wis. 2d at 185 (concluding that "the issue in this case is not whether a collective bargaining agreement can usurp [the sheriffs] power to appoint a deputy"); Brown County, 194 Wis. 2d at 269 (concluding that the issue is whether the sheriffs constitutional power extends to the "power to dismiss or not to reappoint a previously appointed deputy"). It is important to note that neither Heitkemper nor Brown County turned on, or addressed, the constitutional power of a sheriff to decide how to perform tasks undertaken within the scope of one of the sheriffs constitutional duties. Both cases focused only on the general power to terminate an employee, a power that did not distinguish the office of sheriff at common law.
¶ 101. In the most recent appellate decision addressing the constitutional powers of a sheriff, Dunn County v. WERC, 2006 WI App 120, 293 Wis. 2d 637, 718 N.W.2d 138, the court of appeals reviewed several provisions in a collective bargaining agreement upon the complaint of the sheriff that the provisions were illegal on their face because they violated the constitutional powers of the office of sheriff. Id., ¶ 3. In analyzing the claims of the sheriff, the court of appeals applied the same two-part test we began in WPPA I and the court of appeals continued in WPPA II. It first analyzed whether the duty impacted by the collective bargaining provision was one of the "immemorial principal and important duties that characterized and distinguished the office of sheriff at common law." Id., *314¶ 10 (citation omitted). If it was, then "the sheriff may choose the ways and means of performing the duty and [the sheriffs choice] cannot be limited by a collective bargaining agreement." Id.
¶ 102. One of the contract provisions directed who would be a court security officer and provided that the sheriff must "delegate" his power to schedule that person to the clerk of courts. Id., ¶ 3. In applying the test it had recited, the court of appeals first noted that attending upon the court was a constitutional duty of the sheriff. Id., ¶ 13. Therefore, the sheriff has the constitutional power to choose the "ways and means" of performing that duty. Id. Citing our decision in Manitowoc County, the court of appeals pointed out that "[w]hen performing his common law duties, the sheriff 'represents the sovereignty of the State and he has no superiors in his county.'" Id., ¶ 14 (quoting Manitowoc County, 168 Wis. 2d at 827). Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the collective bargaining agreement could not affect whom or how the sheriff selected the court security officers. Id., ¶ 15.
¶ 103. When all the above cited cases are considered together, it becomes apparent there are two types of cases that address the constitutional powers and duties of the sheriff: (1) those involving the sheriffs choice about how to perform a specific task within the ambit of one of the sheriffs constitutional duties when another entity is attempting to change the sheriffs choice5 and (2) those dealing with a general power *315possessed by other elected officials, such as the power to dismiss a previously appointed employee.6
¶ 104. In the case before us, Sheriff Kocken contends that the choice of the means by which to feed the prisoners in the county jail is embraced within his constitutional power and duty to care for and have custody of jail prisoners. He asserts that at common law no other person had the duty to care for and have custody of the prisoners. He explains that his choice of the means by which to provide meals to prisoners is interwoven with other aspects of running the jail. For example, the choice Sheriff Kocken made in how to perform his duty to feed the jail prisoners will save the people of Brown County $1,000,000. It will provide training to the prisoners in food preparation; it will give sentence credit to participating prisoners, thereby moving them out of institutional care more rapidly; and it will improve prisoner morale, which impacts jail safety.
*316¶ 105. I agree with Sheriff Kocken's position. His position is consistent with the constitutional analysis we have employed since 1870, beginning with our decision in Brunst. It is beyond question that the sheriff has the constitutional power and duty to run the jail. Operation of the jail and the care and custody of the prisoners therein have been immemorial principal and important duties that have characterized and distinguished the office of sheriff since 1848 when the Wisconsin Constitution was ratified. No other person had those duties at common law. Brunst, 26 Wis. at 415. It should be self-evident that no sheriff can "care for" a person who is in his custody in a locked facility without feeding him.
¶ 106. Accordingly, the nature of the job assigned, feeding the jail prisoners, falls squarely within the sheriffs constitutional power to care for the prisoners. It does so in the same way as: (1) the sheriffs choice to hire the U.S. Marshal's Service for interstate transportation of prisoners comes within the sheriffs constitutional duty to attend upon the courts;7 (2) the sheriffs choice to hire non-bargaining unit personnel to help police a large event comes within the sheriffs constitutional power to maintain the public peace;8 and (3) the sheriffs choosing an undercover drug agent without posting the position comes within the sheriffs duty to maintain the peace.9
¶ 107. The Brown County Sheriff has chosen the "ways and means" of feeding the prisoners, and no collective bargaining agreement can deprive the sheriff *317of his constitutional authority to make this choice. Manitowoc County, 168 Wis. 2d at 828-30 (concluding that the sheriffs assignment of an undercover agent without posting the position could not be affected by a collective bargaining agreement because the assignment was part of the sheriffs constitutional power and duty to keep the peace); WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 312-15 (concluding that when analyzing whether a particular duty is constitutionally grounded, we look at the nature of the job assigned rather than the general power of job assignment and if the nature of the job was within the power and duty of the sheriff at common law, the sheriffs choice cannot be affected by a collective bargaining agreement); Brunst, 26 Wis. at 414-15 (concluding that it is constitutionally impermissible to separate from the office of sheriff the duties the sheriff held at common law); Dunn County, 293 Wis. 2d 637, ¶¶ 10-14 (concluding that the sheriffs power to decide who will be the court security officer was within the sheriffs constitutional duty to attend upon the court and therefore it could not be affected by a collective bargaining agreement); Washington County, 192 Wis. 2d at 738-39 (concluding that the sheriffs choice of method by which to fulfill his duty to maintain the peace at a public event could not be affected by a collective bargaining agreement); WPPA II, 149 Wis. 2d at 701-03 (concluding that the sheriffs decision about using the U.S. Marshall's Service for the interstate conveyance of prisoners in order to save money for the county was within the sheriffs constitutional power to attend upon the courts so that it could not be changed by a collective bargaining agreement).
¶ 108. The majority opinion is a significant departure from precedent both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, it does not apply the analysis we have utilized for more than 100 years in addressing the *318constitutional powers and duties of the sheriff. It merely concludes that the sheriffs choice of how to feed the jail prisoners' is simply a hiring and firing of personnel. Majority op., ¶ 4. It characterizes the feeding of jail prisoners as "mundane and commonplace" and therefore outside of the sheriffs constitutional powers and duties. Id. However, that conclusion ignores our precedent. We have already concluded that the constitution preserves to the office of sheriff those duties that were traditionally performed by the sheriff even if they were not uniquely preformed by the sheriff. Manitowoc County, 168 Wis. 2d at 829 (concluding that there "is no reason why the constitution should protect only those traditional duties which were 'unique' to the office of sheriff at common law"). And even if one were to assume that the task under review could be accurately described as "mundane," that description does not cause it to be excluded from the constitutional duty of the sheriff to "care for" jail prisoners. At common law, it was the sheriff who was responsible for feeding the jail prisoners.
¶ 109. The majority opinion's discarding of our traditional constitutional analysis when faced with the question of whether a job falls within the constitutional powers and duties of the sheriff permits the majority opinion to reach a substantive result that is contrary to the constitutional powers and duties of the sheriff as explained in multiple cases. That is, the majority opinion ignores our repeated teaching that if the job falls within the scope of a constitutional power and duty of the sheriff at common law, the sheriffs choice about to how to perform that job cannot be regulated by a collective bargaining agreement.10
*319¶ 110. The majority opinion removes from the sheriff the power to perform certain constitutional duties that the people of Wisconsin elected sheriffs to perform. In so doing, the majority opinion transfers portions of the sheriffs constitutional power to non-elected union representatives and members of the WERC, who are not subject to review by the electorate.
¶ 111. From our first consideration of the constitutional powers of the sheriff, we stressed how important it was not to remove from the office of sheriff the duties that the people had elected the sheriff to perform. We explained that were we to do so, we would:
secure to the electors the right to choose a sheriff in name merely, while all the duties and substance of the office might be exercised by and belong to an officer appointed by some other authority.
Brunst, 26 Wis. at 415. The majority opinion permits non-elected persons to direct the sheriff on the ways and means the sheriff can employ in fulfilling his constitutional duty to run the jail and care for the prisoners. This impairs the rights of the electorate, as well as those of the sheriff.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 112. Therefore, because the majority opinion overturns more than 100 years of precedent and in so doing removes from the sheriff a duty the people of Wisconsin elected the sheriff to perform, I respectfully dissent.
*320¶ 113. I am authorized to state that Justices JON E WILCOX and DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent.

 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version, unless otherwise noted.

 The majority opinion claims that its analysis is "traditional." Majority op., ¶ 43. However, it is only talking the talk, not walking the walk. The majority opinion does not analyze and rely on the powers and duties of the sheriff as they existed at the time the constitution was ratified or the earliest interpretations of the constitutional provision at issue, as we did in Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶ 44, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612; State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶ 10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; and Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996). It mentions State ex rel. Kennedy v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 412 (1870), the earliest interpretation of the constitutional powers and duties of the sheriff, but it ignores its conclusions, as it does the powers and duties of the sheriff at the time the Wisconsin Constitution was ratified.

I note that "[t]he position of sheriff is one of great antiquity and honor. He was the deputy of the king in his shire and was accountable to no one but the king." Andreski v. Indus. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 234, 239, 52 N.W.2d 135 (1952).

 See Dunn County v. WERC, 2006 WI App 120, ¶ 10, 293 Wis. 2d 637, 718 N.W.2d 138.

 See Kennedy, 26 Wis. 412 (1870) (location of jail's prisoners is within the sheriffs constitutional duty to provide for the care and custody of the jail's prisoners); Wis. Prof'l Police Ass'n (WPPA) v. County of Dane, 106 Wis. 2d 303, 316 N.W.2d 656 (1982) (WPPA I) (sheriffs selection of a court officer falls within his constitutional duty to attend upon the court); Wis. Prof l *315Police Ass'n v. Dane County, 149 Wis. 2d 699, 439 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1989) (WPPAII) (task of interstate transport of prisoners by U.S. Marshal's Service is within the sheriffs constitutional duty to attend upon the court); Manitowoc County v. Local 986B, 168 Wis. 2d 819, 484 N.W.2d 534 (1992) (sheriffs choice of whom to assign as undercover drug agent was embraced within the sheriffs constitutional duty to preserve the peace); and Dunn County, 293 Wis. 2d 637 (sheriffs choice of whom to assign as court security officer was within the scope of sheriffs constitutional duty to attend upon the court).

 See State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. Buech, 171 Wis. 474, 177 N.W. 781 (1920) (civil service commission could regulate the general power to dismiss a deputy); Heitkemper v. Wirsing, 194 Wis. 2d 182, 533 N.W.2d 770 (1995) (union's contract could affect under what conditions a sheriff could dismiss a deputy) and Brown County Sheriff's Dep't v. Brown County Sheriff's Dep't Non-supervisory Employees Ass'n, 194 Wis. 2d 265, 533 N.W.2d 766 (1995) (union's contract could affect the conditions under which dismissal of a deputy would be sustained).

 WPPAII, 149 Wis. 2d at 701.

 Washington County v. Washington County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n, 192 Wis. 2d 728, 738-39, 531 N.W.2d 468 (Ct. App. 1995).

 Manitowoc County, 168 Wis. 2d at 829.

 Manitowoc County, 168 Wis. 2d at 829; WPPA I, 106 Wis. 2d at 312; Brunst, 26 Wis. at 415; Dunn County,, *319293 Wis. 2d 637, ¶¶ 10-11; Washington County, 192 Wis. 2d at 738-39; WPPA II, 149 Wis. 2d at 701.