Court Opinion

ID: 9558800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:17:05.404687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:36.179291
License: Public Domain

McFarland, J.,
dissenting: I disagree with the majority opinion’s construction of both art. 15, § 3 and art. 15, § 3c.
Since the admission of Kansas to the Union in 1861, art. 15, § 3 has provided: “Lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets are forever prohibited.”
In determining what the prohibited conduct is, the applicable principles of constitutional construction must be stated. These were summarized in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Board of Morton County Comm'rs, 247 Kan. 654, 660, 802 P.2d 584 (1990), as follows:
“In Board of Wyandotte County Comm'rs v. Kansas Ave. Properties, 246 Kan. 161, 786 P.2d 1141 (1990), we held:
‘In ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision, the primary duty of the courts is to look to the intention of the makers and adopters of that provision.’ Syl. ¶ 2.
‘In interpreting and construing the constitutional amendment, the court must examine the language used and consider it in connection with the general surrounding facts and circumstances that cause the amendment to be submitted.’ Syl. ¶ 3.
A constitutional provision is not to be narrowly or technically construed, but its language should be interpreted to mean what the words imply to men of common understanding. State, ex rel., v. Highwood Service, Inc., 205 Kan. 821, Syl. ¶ 4, 473 P.2d 97 (1970). A constitution should not be interpreted in any refined or subtle sense, but should be held to mean what the words imply to the common understanding of men. State v. Sessions, 84 Kan. 856, Syl. ¶ 1, 115 Pac. 641 (1911). When interpreting the constitution, each word must be given due force and appropriate meaning. State, ex rel., v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 304, 182 P.2d 865 (1947).”
*657The importance of understanding the intentions of the makers and adopters was emphasized in Hunt v. Eddy, 150 Kan. 1, 90 P.2d 747 (1939), as follows:
“ ‘The polestar in the construction of constitutions is the intention of the makers and adopters.’ (11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 61.)” Syl. ¶ 2.
“Where tire purpose of the framers of constitutional provisions is clearly expressed it will be followed by the courts. Where terms of such provisions are not entirely free from doubt, they must be construed as nearly as possible in consonance with the objects and purposes in contemplation at the time of their adoption, and the words employed should be given a practical interpretation which will give them effective operation and suppress the mischief at which they were aimed.” Syl. ¶ 3.
The basic scheme of lottery has remained unchanged at all times pertinent hereto. Illustrative of such definition is the following from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1338 (1986):
“1: a scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance; esp: a scheme by which prizes are distributed to the winners among those persons who have paid for a chance to win them usu. as determined by the numbers on tickets as drawn at random (as from a lottery wheel) — see DUTCH LOTTERY, INTEREST LOTTERY 2: the occasion of selection of prizes by lot.”
An excellent discussion of the history of lotteries in America is found in Clotfelter and Cook, Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America (1989). The authors, in chapter 3, The Fall and Rise of Lotteries, document the following sequence of events. In 1566 Queen Elizabeth I chartered the first English government lottery. The Virginia Company’s Jamestown settlement was, in part, financed by a lottery held in 1612. In colonial America, lotteries were a popular means of financing public projects. All the colonies had lotteries. Between 1766 and 1775, Rhode Island authorized 43 such lotteries. Construction of some of the buildings at Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Columbia was financed by lotteries. During the Revolutionary War, lotteries were used to supply and support the troops. Lotteries were viewed as a sort of “voluntary tax” with a contingent profitable return.
Between 1790 and 1833, Pennsylvania authorized 60 lotteries to benefit most religious denominations. Increasingly, however, lotteries were run by private individuals, with a resultant increase *658in abuse and fraud. Opposition to lotteries spread rapidly in the early 1800’s.
In Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168, 12 L. Ed. 1030 (1850), the Court stated:
“Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the widespread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and places, but the latter infests the whole community; it enters every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor; and it plunders the ignorant and simple.”
One of the interesting aspects of the Phalen decision is that, while concerned with the legality of Virginia’s authorized lottery, no effort was made to define lottery, presumably because the term was so well understood.
Between 1833 and 1860, lotteries were abolished in all but three states. In this historical context, it is not surprising that Kansas saw fit to forever prohibit lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets. Due to the well-established nature of lotteries, prohibiting just lotteries would not wholly remedy the ills as a lottery could be held far from the borders of Kansas with its tickets being sold in Kansas. Prohibition of both lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets was, therefore, necessary. The use of the term lottery tickets is significant as other forms of gambling do not involve the sale of tickets.
The majority opinion relies on our case law to reach its conclusion that:
“[a] lottery, as that term is used in art. 15, § 3 of the Kansas Constitution, means any game, scheme, gift, enterprise, or similar contrivance wherein persons agree to give valuable consideration for the chance to win a prize or prizes.” Syl. ¶ 1.
This definition could equally serve as a definition of gambling. Inherent in any gambling activity is the risking of something of lesser value for the chance to obtain something of greater value. A lottery is a form of gambling, but not all gambling involves a lottery. As Justice (now Chief Justice) Holmes stated in his dissent in State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 225 Kan. 13, 37, 587 P.2d 844 (1978):
“Certainly no one can argue with the statement that a saloon is a place that sells liquor. However, to say, as the majority does, that because a saloon *659sells liquor, all places that sell liquor are saloons, is tantamount to saying that because chickens have feathers, all birds with feathers are chickens.”
The majority opinion discusses the various cases in which art. 15, § 3 has been construed. It is important to go through those cases from a different perspective. The first such case is State ex rel. v. Mercantile Association, 45 Kan. 351, 25 Pac. 984 (1891). The activity in question therein was “playing policy.” For the payment of money, a person received a lead pencil and the opportunity to select three numbers. Later, in another location, a drawing would be held from a wheel. If the three numbers selected were drawn, the participant won money far in excess of his or her purchase cost.
This court construed the word lottery “in the popular sense, with a view to remedying the mischief intended to be prevented.” 45 Kan. at 353. In holding this was a lottery and that the lead pencil was not the object of the “purchase,” this court relied on Wilkinson v. Gill, 74 N.Y. 63 (1878), which had invalidated a similar scheme on the basis it was a lottery. The New York court stated:
“The word ‘lottery’ has no technical legal meaning. ... It is defined by Webster, ‘a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance, or the distribution itself,’ and he defines ‘lot’ as ‘that which causes, falls or happens; that which in human speech is called chance, fortune, hazard,’ and ‘to draw lots’ is ‘to determine an event by drawing one thing from a number, whose marks are concealed from the drawer, and thus determining an event.’ Worcester defines ‘lottery’ as ‘a hazard in which sums are ventured for a chance of obtaining a greater value.’ The language of FOLGER, J., in 56 N.Y. 424 [1874], may be adopted as a result of the accepted definitions. ‘Where a pecuniary consideration is paid, and it is determined by lot or chance, according to some scheme held out by the public, what and how much he who pays the money is to have for it, that is a lottery.’ ” 74 N.Y. at 66.
The significant aspect of Mercantile Association and Wilkinson is that both involved true lotteries. The same can be said of State v. Broton, 173 Kan. 166, 244 P.2d 1190 (1952); State, ex rel., v. Fox Kansas Theatre Co., 144 Kan. 687, 62 P.2d 929 (1936); and Davenport v. City of Ottawa, 54 Kan. 711, 39 Pac. 708 (1895). There was no need in any of them to fine tune the definition of lottery or to distinguish it from other forms of gambling.
*660The issue in the above cases was whether the lottery scheme in question was a prohibited gambling endeavor. Without all three basic gambling elements — consideration, prize, and chance — the lottery scheme was not prohibited. Not all lottery-type operations involve gambling. For example, a drawing for a door prize is a lottery arrangement but is not gambling if no consideration is paid.
We then come to State, ex rel., v. Bissing, 178 Kan. 111, 283 P.2d 418 (1955), where, in my opinion, the train jumped the track. At issue was a statute which permitted parimutuel betting on greyhound races in Sedgwick County for a two-week period each year. The court held parimutuel dog racing was a lottery as it involved an undertalcing whereby persons pay a consideration for the chance to receive money or property. Such a conclusion, in my opinion, was erroneous. Skill, study, and experience do not increase one’s chances for winning a lottery. Lottery winning is wholly a matter of random selection — in other words, a matter of chance. It is true that a novice dog race bettor can be a winner based on pure luck, but the experienced professional has a far greater chance of winning. He or she will look over the field (usually eight dogs) and study the competition, the track records of each dog, the starting position of each dog, the condition of the track, how each dog normally runs (fast breaking vs. stretch runner, etc.), how recently each dog last raced, and innumerable other factors in making a knowledgeable estimate of the sequence in which the dogs will finish. This is a far cry from having only the hope and desire that the numbers he or she designated will be drawn out of a box or the right numbered pingpong balls will pop out of the machine. Dogs do not win races on the basis of random or chance selection. The basic elements of a lottery are absent in parimutuel betting on what are, essentially, sporting events.
The court in Bissing took the requirements for determining whether an activity involved gambling and made them the definition of lottery, which is only one form of gambling. This was error.
Next, chronologically, the majority cites State, ex rel., v. Highwood Service, Inc., 205 Kan. 821, 473 P.2d 97 (1970), authored by Justice Fontron. At issue was whether a Dialing for Dollars *661television program was a lottery. The court held it was not as no consideration was paid directly or indirectly by the participants. But for the lack of consideration, the Dialing for Dollars scheme contained the elements of a true lottery. Significantly, in discussing the art. 15, § 3 prohibition against lotteries, the court stated:
“But while the constitutional ban against lotteries may be self-executing, it is not self-defining. That function is judicial in nature, devolving upon the courts. We have heretofore had occasion to lay down general guidelines for its exercise. In Higgins v. Cardinal Manufacturing Co., [188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456 (1961)], we observed that a constitution is not to be narrowly or technically construed but its language ‘should be held to mean what the words imply to the common understanding of men’ (p. 18); that in ascertaining the meaning of constitutional provisions courts should consider what appears to have been the intendment and understanding of the people at their adoption. (See, also, State v. Sessions, 84 Kan. 856, 115 Pac. 641.)
“Our limited research has brought to light no lay or legal dictionary of an 1859 vintage, the year the Kansas Constitution was adopted by the Wyandotte Convention. However, in Abbott’s Law Dictionary, published in 1879, (a not too distant era) we have found this definition of a lottery:.
‘A scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance, among buyers of the chances.
‘Such schemes were formerly very common; were authorized by law, and were even set on foot, in many instances, by the authorities, for raising revenue for public or benevolent purposes. In view of the ill effects of the element of gambling involved, they are now very generally made unlawful.’
“Foremost among the citations appended to the text, the author has placed the following:
‘A lottery is a distribution of prizes by chance or lot, where a valuable consideration is given for the chance of drawing a prize. United States v. Olney, 1 Abb. U.S. 275.’ (1868.)
“Relying on the Abbott text, we feel justified in assuming that the common conception of a lottery about or near the time of the adoption of article 15, § 3; was much the same as it was in 1895, when the legislature enacted K.S.A. 21-1506 requiring the consideration from lottery participants to be ‘valuable.’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, (1964) conveys much the same idea as it defines lottery:
‘a scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance; esp.: a scheme by which prizes are distributed to the winners among those persons who have paid for a chance to win them, usu. as determined by the numbers on tickets as drawn at random (as from a lottery wheel).’
“To similar effect, see Oxford Illustrated Dictionary (1962) and The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, The Unabridged Edition (1967).” 205 Kan. at 825-26.
*662All of the lottery definitions contained in High-wood apply only to a true lottery, and the court concluded that such was their meaning of a lottery in 1859 when the Wyandotte Convention adopted art. 15, § 3.
This brings me to the final case cited by the majority, State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 439, 502 P.2d 841 (1972). The case came before this court as follows: Criminal charges were filed against the defendants after they were caught in a gambling raid at an American Legion Club. Slot machines were present. Two defendants were charged with gambling and the third with operating a gambling establishment. At the time, K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 21-4302 exempted from criminal anti-gambling statutes any bingo game or a game of chance with comparable characteristics if operated by a tax-exempt organization. The sole issue presented was whether slot machines had comparable characteristics to bingo and, thus, were within the bingo exception. No constitutional issue was raised or argued. Over the vigorous disagreement of Justice Kaul, the majority raised, sua sponte, the constitutional issue of whether the bingo exemption statute was violative of art. 15, § 3. The majority, with no discussion of the intent in the adoption of art. 15, § 3, chronologically listed earlier cases and stated, “It has been firmly established from these cases as the law of this state that a lottery has three essential elements; namely, (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance.” 210 Kan. at 444. On this basis, the court held bingo had all three elements and could not be exempted by statute from art. 15, § 3. Thus, whether or not slot machines had comparable characteristics as bingo really became irrelevant. Here again, the court confused the elements of gambling with the requirements of a specific form of gambling, a lottery. Under its circumstances, little precedential value should be afforded to Nelson. Interestingly, one of the cases cited in Nelson in support of its decision under art. 15, § 3 is State, ex rel., v. Fair Association, 89 Kan. 238, 131 Pac. 626 (1913), which was an effort to shut down a racetrack bookmaker under the anti-bookie criminal statute. The Supreme Court found such an operation was not lawful. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled on appeal. The opinion contains no reference to art. 15, § 3, although it was decided in a much closer time frame *663to 1859 than was the other animal racing case, State, ex rel., v. Bissing, 178 Kan. 111.
In my opinion, Bissing is an aberrant decision, and should be overruled or, at least, criticized and not followed herein. Following State, ex rel., v. Highwood Service, Inc., 205 Kan. 821, which is not inconsistent with any of the earlier cited cases when analyzed, except for Bissing, I would construe lottery to be what it was intended to be at the time of its adoption — a true lottery, not a synonym for gambling in general, as the majority opinion asserts.
If my position on art. 15, § 3 had been adopted by the majority, there would be no reason to discuss Issue No. 2, construction of art. 15, § 3c. However, the majority has not, so I turn to art. 15, § 3c, which provides:
“State-owned and operated lottery. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3 of article 15 of the constitution of the state of Kansas, the legislature may provide for a state-owned and operated lottery, except that such state-owned lottery shall not be operated after June 30, 1990, unless authorized to be operated after such date by concurrent resolution approved by majority of all of the members elected (or appointed) and qualified of each house and adopted in the 1990 regular session of the legislature. The state shall whenever possible provide the public information on the odds of winning a prize or prizes in a lottery game.”
Even with the majority’s construction of art. 15, § 3, there are independent grounds for holding that § 3c applied only to a state-owned and operated lottery, which is a true lottery and, thus, like art. 15, § 3a and § 3b, is a narrow exception to the broadly defined lottery in art. 15, § 3. In determining the intent of the makers and adopters of § 3c in 1986, we are in an area of first impression, as the same has not been previously construed.
As would be expected on a controversial issue, the legislative record is extensive. Proponents and opponents were vigorous in their respective presentations. Proponents argued for it as a new source of badly needed state revenue. Opponents felt that a state-run lottery was an unacceptable way to raise state funds and presented figures that it would not raise as much money for state coffers as the proponents argued it would. Statistics from other states having experienced state-run lotteries were introduced. In determining legislative intent, it is necessary to view all of the *664record objectively and not engage in “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.” Mortier v. Town of Casey, 154 Wis. 2d 18, 39, 452 N.W.2d 555 (1990). It can truthfully be said that there is not even a suggestion or even hint, in the vast amount of material presented on this issue, that passage of art. 15, § 3c would authorize the State to own or operate any form of gambling other than a true lottery.
Here again, Clotfelter and Cook’s book Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America, assists in setting the stage. The following statistics and comments therefrom are pertinent. The book was published in 1989. Chapter 8, page 139, State Politics and the Lottery Bandwagon, begins:
“For the first six decades of the twentieth century lotteries were prohibited throughout the United States. New Hampshire broke the ice in 1963, and first New York and then the rest of the Northeast followed by the mid-1970s. During the 1980s states in every region adopted lotteries, and by 1988 two-thirds of the nation’s population lived in states that were actively promoting the sale of a commodity that had been illegal twenty-five years earlier.”
The authors then state, at page 150:
“In terms of the specific politics of lottery adoption, regional influence is enhanced by the fact that a lottery in one state will attract players from neighboring states. Until Indiana and Wisconsin established their own lotteries, for example, Illinois lottery outlets had numerous customers from those neighboring states; for those out-of-state players who did not want to make the trip themselves, ‘runners' ensured that Illinois tickets were available in the state office buildings in Indianapolis and from certain bus drivers in Madison. Thus when one state adopts a lottery, the effect is to undercut arguments against adoption in neighboring states. Since their residents can now play (albeit inconveniently), and do, moral concerns and public interest arguments seem moot. And if state residents are going to play the lottery anyway, why should the neighboring state enjoy the benefits? Hence the dominoes begin falling in the region. Governor John Carlin of Kansas, grumbling about the new lottery in Missouri, explained his change of heart this way: ‘I’ve never backed a lottery before. But not having one when your neighbor has one is like tying one hand behind your back.’ ”
Let us now look at the specific language of art. 15, § 3c which provides:
“State-owned and operated lottery. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3 of article 15 of the constitution of the state of Kansas, the legislature may provide for a state-owned and operated lottery, except that such state-*665owned lottery shall not be operated after June 30, 1990, unless authorized to be operated after such date by concurrent resolution approved by majority of all of the members elected (or appointed) and qualified of each house and adopted in the 1990 regular session of the legislature. The state shall whenever possible provide the public information on the odds of winning a prize or prizes in a lottery game.”
(1) If lottery, as used in art. 15, § 3 was considered to be a synonym of gambling, a self-executing amendment exempting state-owned or operated gambling enterprises — a simple “art. 15, § 3 shall not apply to state-owned or operated gambling operations or games” — would accomplish the purpose, or (2) if it was intended that the State be exempted from art. 15, § 3 and that the legislature be left to determine what forms of gambling would be permitted, the proposed amendment could have so provided. Instead, § 3c provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3 of article 15 . . . the legislature may provide for a state-owned and operated lottery, except that such state-owned lottery . . . .” The amendment permits a lottery and refers to that one lottery as stick lottery. Even authority to operate the one lottery would have expired in 1990 unless its operation was authorized by the concurrent resolution.
The enabling legislation, codified as the Kansas Lottery Act, K.S.A. 74-8701 et seq., is totally harmonious with the construction that only true lottery games were authorized, listing as it does the types of lottery games (K.S.A. 74-8710) referred to in the majority opinion.
The majority opinion states Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Board of Morton County Comrrirs, 247 Kan. 654, 802 P.2d 584 (1990), could be the “cornerstone of our decision.” I disagree therewith. In Colorado Interstate, we were construing a constitutional provision which exempted merchants’ and manufacturers’ inventory from ad valorem tax. The pipeline companies were in the business, inter alia, of buying and selling natural gas. During seasonal periods of slack demand, the excess would be stored for sale during peak demand times. This stored gas was held to be inventory and the pipelines were construed to be merchants as to such stored gas. This result required neither a strained construction of “merchant” or “inventory” — just ordinary meanings. In the case before us, an erroneous interpretation of art. 15, § 3 *666is being held to control the language of the clearly worded art. 15, § 3c, where all of its legislative history supports giving the words employed their common and ordinarily understood meanings. I would construe art. 15, § 3c to mean just what it says— the State is exempted from art. 15, § 3 only to own and operate a lottery.
A lottery is a commonly understood term. If someone walked into a room full of people and yelled he had just won $100 in the lottery, no one would interpret this to mean the speaker had just had a lucky day at the dog track, a great night playing poker or blackjack, or a lucky streak playing slot machines. Lottery is not a legal term. Its usage in art. 15, § 3c should be given its commonly understood meaning which is consistent with its entire legislative history.
My position may be summarized as follows. At the time of the adoption of art. 15, § 3 in 1859, lottery had a well-established common meaning. Participants pay for the opportunity to have a chance to win something of greater value. A participant selects his or her numbers. If these numbers are selected at a future drawing (or other random means), the holder of the ticket, wins. Winning numbers may be predetermined at random in scratch-off or punchboard versions. The early cases decided by this court involved what were clearly lottery schemes. The issue was whether they had the necessary elements of gambling in them. Not all lottery-type activities involve gambling. The elements of gambling are consideration, prize, and chance. Drawings for door prizes are, for example, lottery arrangements, but are not gambling where no consideration is paid. The Dialing for Dollars scheme in the Highwood Service, Inc., case, was a lottery but did not involve gambling, as the element of consideration was missing.
These cases were dealing with lottery-type operations. The question was essentially whether they were lotteries involving the elements of gambling. Other forms of gambling were not involved. State, ex rel., v. Bissing, 178 Kan. 111, 283 P.2d 418 (1955), came along and took the consideration, prize, and chance elements of gambling discussed in the earlier cases and applied them to decide that parimutuel dog races were lotteries. This is a gross misapplication of the earlier cases. In State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. *667439, this error was repeated. The result of this error is that under these two cases all types of gambling became lotteries. This was not the holding of the cases relied on in these decisions. I would simply apply the term lottery to the well-established specific type of gambling that it is as shown by the common understanding in State, ex rel., v. Highwood Service, Inc., 205 Kan. 821, 473 P.2d 97 (1970), and the historical material included herein.
Art. 15, § 3c should be construed to authorize just what its clear language provides — to permit the State to own and operate a lottery. To hold otherwise further compounds the error of Biss-ing and Nelson by carrying them over to a separate constitutional provision which is before us for the first time for judicial construction.
Before concluding, it is appropriate under the circumstances relative to how and why this action was brought to make some comments on issues 3 and 4, which the majority declined to determine. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. [1988]) requires a state to negotiate if it “permits” class III gaming. Section 1175 of the older Johnson Act (15 U.S.C. § 1171 et seq. [1988]) prohibits gambling devices in Indian country. The IGRA waives the Johnson Act if such devices “are legal” in the State in which the Indian land is located. Determination of both “permits” and “are legal” involves consideration of a state’s constitutional and statutory law. In Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Green, 995 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit held that the importation of video lottery terminals onto Indian land violates the Johnson Act and that the IGRA does not waive application of the Johnson Act because such gambling devices are not legal in the State of Oklahoma. The determination that the gambling devices were not legal was based wholly on the Oklahoma criminal statute prohibiting gambling devices. The “permits” and “are legal” requirements are the subject of considerable federal litigation relative to other states. The majority has determined that a federal court should decide these issues as to what Kansas permits and what gambling devices are legal in the State.
CONCLUSION
I would hold that art. 15, § 3 prohibits only lotteries and the sale of lottery tickets, and such prohibition does not include casino *668gambling. Casino gambling is, however, prohibited by the Kansas criminal statutes pertaining to: gambling (K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4303); commercial gambling (K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4304); permitting premises to be used for commercial gambling (K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4305); dealing in gambling devices (K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4306); and possession of gambling devices (K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4307).
Alternatively, if the terms “lotteries” and the “sale of lottery tickets” as used in art. 15, § 3 are construed to include casino gambling (as does the majority opinion), then art. 15, § 3c should be construed to be an exception to art. 15 § 3 (as are art. 15, § 3a and § 3b), which permits only a state-owned and operated lottery as that term is commonly understood and was intended by the makers of the amendment. This is consistent with the rule of construction that exceptions to a general provision are to be construed narrowly. See National Collegiate Realty Corp. v. Board of Johnson County Comm’rs, 236 Kan. 394, 690 P.2d 1366 (1984). Casino gambling would, therefore, be prohibited by art. 15, § 3 and the provisions of the Kansas Criminal Code stated in the preceding paragraph.
Finally, even if “lotteries” and “a lottery” as used in art. 15, § 3 and in art. 15, § 3c, respectively, are both construed broadly, as does the majority opinion, then casino gambling remains unlawful in Kansas. This result arises from the fact that art. 15, § 3c is not self-executing. The amendment states the legislature “may provide” for a state-owned and operated lottery. The enabling legislation is the Kansas Lottery Act, K.S.A. 74-8701 et seq. Under the Act, the State may operate only what are true lottery games. The exceptions in the Kansas Criminal Code relative to gambling which exempt the state-owned lottery activities are limited to the “lottery” operated under the Kansas Lottery Act. Thus, even if the Kansas Constitution is construed to permit the. legislature to authorize the State to own and operate casino gambling, the legislature has not done so. Therefore, casino gambling is unlawful in Kansas.
Holmes, C.J., and Abbott, J., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.