Court Opinion

ID: 9624351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:59:22.776486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:44.719061
License: Public Domain

HINES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the opinion of the majority incorrectly determines the merits of the present appeal, and in so doing, undermines long-standing precedent to distort the very nature and purpose of an action for declaratory judgment.
There is little question that a declaratory judgment action can be an appropriate vehicle for ascertaining a party’s rights and duties under a contract and decree of divorce. Weaver v. Jones, 260 Ga. 493 (1) (396 SE2d 890) (1990). But not every support dispute arising from the terms of a final judgment and decree of divorce is appropriately resolved by seeking declaratory relief under OCGA § 9-4-1. Indeed,
[a] declaratory judgment is not the proper action to decide all justiciable controversies. To proceed under a declaratory *635judgment a party must establish that it is necessary to relieve [the party] of the risk of taking some future action that, without direction, would jeopardize [the party’s] interests.
(Emphasis supplied.) Porter v. Houghton, 273 Ga. 407 (542 SE2d 491) (2001). In the present case, even assuming ambiguity or controversy in the child support increase provision necessitating its judicial construction, Acevedo’s petition does not allege the uncertainty or risk of taking any present, much less future, action. Rather, it seeks a judicial pronouncement only of child support obligations which had already accrued. Acevedo sought construction of the child support provision in the parties’ 1996 final judgment and decree of divorce solely for the purpose of “establishing the fixed amount of [his] support obligation for the last eight (8) years.”
As a general matter, a prayer for relief is not deemed to constitute part of the cause of action. Holloman v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 241 Ga. App. 141, 146 (3) (524 SE2d 790) (1999). However, in the case of a petition seeking declaratory judgment, the relief sought must be considered in determining the legal sufficiency of the suit. This is so because of the very nature of declaratory judgment; in a declaratory judgment petition one must ask for a declaration of rights — that is the essence of the action. This Court has recognized that the sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint ostensibly seeking declaratory judgment must be examined in light of the requested relief. See Kirkland v. Morris, 233 Ga. 597 (212 SE2d 781) (1975); Gay v. Hunt, 221 Ga. 841 (148 SE2d 310) (1966). Indeed, in Gay v. Hunt, it was expressly determined that the purported petition for declaratory judgment “[did] not allege a cause of action for any of the relief sought.” Id. at 845 (2). And so it is in the present case. The allegations of the complaint are not sufficient for a declaratory judgment because there is no asserted necessity for a determination to guide and protect Acevedo from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the propriety of some future act or conduct, which act or conduct, without such judicial direction might reasonably jeopardize his interests. Id. at 845 (2) (a).
It is plain that only support arrearages are at issue in this action; yet, without citing any legal authority therefor, the majority seeks to sustain the declaratory judgment by characterizing the accrued debt in futurity by virtue of the fact of the future payment of the debt. Under such reasoning, when there is a support arrearage due and owing, and even if the amount has already been determined by the trial court, an action for declaratory judgment would lie. This is not the current state of the law, nor should it be. The logical consequence of this contrived construction would be the seeking of declaratory *636judgment as a defense to the payment of any found obligation or debt, thus spawning unnecessary and spurious litigation. Nor would such an approach avoid a contempt proceeding, which is another voiced concern of the majority. The facts of this case plainly demonstrate the fallacy of attempting to fit a dispute over past due support into the framework of a declaratory judgment. As already noted, plaintiff Acevedo is not at risk of taking some future action regarding the arrearages; he simply must pay them in order to avoid sanction. Nor is Acevedo, or any litigant for that matter, forced into a determination of his or her support obligations in the context of a contempt action. If in doubt, a party must timely seek guidance. Acevedo had eight years to ask for a judicial clarification of his support obligations, but instead, chose to default, risk contempt, and effectively attempt to mount a defense to the contempt by filing the present action for declaratory judgment. Furthermore, if Acevedo has genuine uncertainty as to his future obligations, he can certainly petition for declaratory relief regarding such obligations, but again, he has not done so in the present action.
Even more disturbing than the majority’s artifice is the fact that it has wholly ignored the very hallmark of a declaratory judgment. “The distinctive characteristic of a declaratory judgment is that the declaration stands by itself and does not seek execution or performance by the defendant. Ordinary judgments, on the other hand, grant consequential or curative relief in some form.” Kirkland v. Morris, supra at 598. This Court recently focused on this distinction in an action for declaratory judgment in a dispute regarding child support and contempt in Gelfand v. Gelfand, 281 Ga. 40 (635 SE2d 770) (2006). In Gelfand, the wife divorced the husband, and the trial court incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement into the divorce decree. Approximately four years later, the wife petitioned for an upward modification of child support, and that the husband be held in contempt for making unauthorized deductions in his support and alimony payments. Thereafter, the wife amended her complaint to add a request for a judicial declaration about the meaning of purportedly ambiguous provisions in the settlement agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order finding certain of the language in the settlement agreement unambiguous and ordering the husband to provide financial information relating to the child support request; the court did not resolve the contempt or make a final determination regarding the modification request. Even though this Court initially granted a discretionary appeal to resolve whether the court’s declaratory ruling was appealable as a final judgment, this Court determined that it need not address that issue because the wife’s request for declaratory relief “was not truly an action for declaratory judgment.” Id. Once again, this Court stressed *637that the determinative characteristic of a declaratory judgment is the declaration itself and that it must “[stand] by itself’ and “does not seek execution or performance by the defendant.” We concluded that inasmuch as the wife sought guidance with respect to language in the settlement agreement in order to compel husband to provide her with additional funds, “her action was not truly one for declaratory judgment.” Id.
Decided November 3, 2008
Reconsideration denied November 17, 2008.
John W. Roper, for appellant.
The fatal infirmity of the present action as one for declaratory judgment is starkly illustrated by the fact that the trial court made no declaration whatsoever regarding the construction of the support provision, and, in fact, logically could not; it merely awarded the relief sought, that is, a monetary amount principally representing the support arrearages owed by Acevedo.
While, by its terms the declaratory judgment act, OCGA § 9-4-1 et seq., is to be given a liberal construction, today the majority applies it so broadly and indiscriminately so as to render it beyond recognition. Simply, Acevedo’s purported petition for declaratory judgment failed to state a viable claim for declaratory relief. Consequently, it did not serve to invoke the superior court’s initial subject matter jurisdiction over resolution of the child support arrearage dispute. Nor can the judgment of the superior court be sustained as the resolution of Kim’s counterclaim. A defendant cannot obtain affirmative relief by way of a counterclaim in an otherwise nonviable declaratory judgment action. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 198 Ga. App. 190 (1) (400 SE2d 694) (1990).
While by its ruling, the trial court may have been attempting to take a just and expeditious route by granting to Kim the needed support for her children in this action rather than awaiting the adjudication of the contempt action against Acevedo, it could not ignore the law to do so; this Court should not follow suit. I fear that today’s holding by the majority illustrates the adage, “bad facts make bad law.” Calculation of the money past due and owed by Acevedo for the support of his children, which is the only issue in this action and the only ruling made by the trial court, does not invoke declaratory relief. Perceived justice for the litigants should not be obtained at the cost of injustice to the law.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justice Benham join in this dissent.
*638Leslie L. Cohn, for appellee.