Court Opinion

ID: 9964309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 17:01:31.621202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:17.634491
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 29 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COMMITTEE TO RECALL DAN                         No.    23-35107
HOLLADAY; et al.,
                                                D.C. No. 3:20-cv-01631-YY
                Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

JAKOB WILEY, City Recorder for the City
of Oregon City, in his official capacity,

                Defendant-Appellee,

STATE OF OREGON,

                Intervenor-Defendant-
                Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the District of Oregon
                  Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted April 4, 2024
                               Portland, Oregon

Before: OWENS and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and RAYES,** District Judge.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The Honorable Douglas L. Rayes, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
      Plaintiffs Jeana Gonzales, Adam Marl, and the Committee to Recall Dan

Holladay (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal the dismissal of their lawsuit

challenging under the federal and Oregon constitutions the 90-day signature-

gathering deadline for Oregon recall petitions imposed by Oregon Revised Statute

§ 249.875(1). Although the Complaint fails to state a claim under federal law, the

district court’s reasons for denying leave to amend on that claim were erroneous,

as were its reasons for holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the state law claim

and the federal claim for nominal damages and declaratory relief. We therefore

remand for the district court to reconsider whether to grant leave to amend on the

federal claim, whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claim, and whether to certify any question related to Plaintiffs’ state law claim to

the Oregon Supreme Court.

      1. Defendant, the City Recorder of Oregon City, is not entitled to sovereign

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment or Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Local government officials are not ordinarily

entitled to sovereign immunity. See Lake Country Ests., Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan.

Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979). Neither party contends that the City is an arm

of the state under Kohn v. State Bar of California, 87 F.4th 1021 (9th Cir. 2023)

(en banc), cert petition docketed, No. 23-6922 (Mar. 7, 2024), or any other test, so

Defendant cannot benefit from the sovereign immunity accorded to arms of the

                                           2
state.

         Nor do any of the other cases upon which Defendant relies show that

Defendant has sovereign immunity. The test articulated in McMillian v. Monroe

County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), analyzes whether a municipal official was acting as a

final policymaker for the state or the municipality for the purposes of determining

whether to hold the official’s local government employer liable for that official’s

actions under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978). See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 784-86; see also, e.g., Weiner v. San

Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000). Even assuming Defendant is

correct that our court has expanded this test to the sovereign immunity context, that

would simply mean that a person acting as a final policymaker for the state is

entitled to sovereign immunity. Here, no party argues that Defendant was acting as

a final policymaker, either for the State or the City, when applying the 90-day

deadline. Neither Oregon Revised Statute § 249.875(1) nor Oregon City Charter

Chapter VI, § 26 suggests that the City Recorder had any discretion in this context.

See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986).

         The test in Buffin v. California, 23 F.4th 951 (9th Cir. 2022), also does not

show that Defendant has sovereign immunity. In Buffin, we articulated a test to

determine whether a state could be held liable for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 and did not apply that test to determine whether any official was entitled to

                                            3
sovereign immunity. Id. at 960, 963 n.5. Our court has never subsequently applied

that test to determine whether an official was entitled to sovereign immunity.

      2. Because Defendant is not entitled to sovereign immunity and because

Plaintiffs have requested nominal damages in addition to declaratory and

injunctive relief, this case is not moot as to any claim by any Plaintiff. See

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 802 (2021).

      3. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the First Amendment. We

have treated the test in Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012), as binding

in previous election cases. See Pierce v. Jacobsen, 44 F.4th 853, 860-66 (9th Cir.

2022); Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition v. Norris, 782 F.3d 520,

534, 536 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). The logic underlying the Angle test applies

equally to laws regulating recall petitions as to laws regulating initiatives, so the

same test should apply to both contexts. Recall elections affect the total quantum

of speech on a particular issue by affecting the timing and context of an election—

therefore causing voters to focus on different topics—as well as by increasing the

number of elections in many situations.

      Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to subject the 90-day deadline to

strict scrutiny under the Angle test because their allegations fail to show that the

deadline “significantly inhibit[s] the ability of [recall] proponents to place [a recall]

on the ballot.” Angle, 673 F.3d at 1133. Plaintiffs would need to show that, “in

                                           4
light of the entire statutory scheme regulating ballot access, ‘reasonably diligent’”

recall proponents cannot “normally gain a place on the ballot,” and instead “will

rarely succeed in doing so.” Id. (quoting Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1035

(9th Cir. 2008)). But the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint show

only that Plaintiffs faced significant barriers to collecting enough signatures within

the 90-day deadline under the specific circumstances they faced at the time—

during the COVID-19 pandemic, under emergency orders that limited public

gatherings and required social distancing—which is insufficient to support their

facial challenge. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552

U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (explaining that “a plaintiff can only succeed in a facial

challenge by ‘establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act

would be valid,’ i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications”

(cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987))).

Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that “it is well-established that most recall

campaigns fail to obtain the requisite number of petition signatures,” and “[t]his is,

in large (and obvious) part, due to lack of adequate time to gather signatures” are

also insufficient to allow Plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

      The 90-day deadline survives “less exacting review” because it “furthers ‘an

important regulatory interest.’” Angle, 673 F.3d at 1132, 1135 (quoting Prete v.

                                            5
Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)). Whether a law furthers an

important regulatory interest is a question that may be decided at the motion to

dismiss stage. See, e.g., Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d 1008, 1012,

1017-19 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Caruso v. Yamhill County ex rel. Cnty. Comm’r,

422 F.3d 848, 861-62 (9th Cir. 2005).

      The 90-day deadline serves the important regulatory interest of ensuring that

the recall effort has sufficient grassroots support before holding a recall election.

See Angle, 673 F.3d at 1135. The 90-day deadline serves this purpose by ensuring

that there are enough people at some given time who support recalling the official.

      The 90-day deadline also serves the important regulatory interest of

preventing abuse of the recall process. See John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186,

197 (2010). Without the deadline, recall proponents could collect signatures and

then wait to submit them, either to use them as a threat against the official or to

time the recall election to manipulate the outcome.

      4. The district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. See AE

ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding

that a district court abuses its discretion by denying leave to amend “unless

amendment would be futile or the plaintiff has failed to cure the complaint’s

deficiencies despite repeated opportunities” and explaining that “[a] district court

also abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law”).

                                           6
      Two of the district court’s reasons for holding that amendment would be

futile—sovereign immunity and mootness—were legally erroneous. As we have

explained, Defendant is not entitled to sovereign immunity, and this case is not

moot as to any claim by any Plaintiff.

      The district court’s reliance on the letter sent from Plaintiffs’ counsel to

Defendant during the signature-gathering period was also erroneous. The fact that

Plaintiffs were confident, given the levels of public support for their particular

recall effort, that they would be able to gather the signatures under non-COVID

conditions does not render it impossible for Plaintiffs to allege facts showing that

recall proponents in general will not normally be able to collect enough signatures

because of the 90-day deadline.1 See Angle, 673 F.3d at 1133.

      The district court’s only other reason, that the data Plaintiffs would add

“would not establish the link between failed petitions and the alleged severe

burden of the 90-day time restriction,” was also an abuse of discretion. Because

Plaintiffs asserted that their data would show such a link, this is not a ground on

which we can affirm the denial of leave to amend absent explanation from the

      1
        The district court was permitted to consider the letter because it was
attached to the complaint and is therefore treated as part of the complaint. See
Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Hal Roach
Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir.
1989).

                                           7
district court, which was lacking.2 We therefore vacate the denial of leave to

amend and remand for further proceedings in which the district court should either

grant leave to amend on the federal claim or provide a clear explanation for not

doing so.

      As we explained above, the district court’s dismissal of the state law claims

on Pennhurst grounds was erroneous. But whether the district court will ultimately

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim may depend on whether

it grants leave to amend on the federal claim or, if so, dismisses the federal claim

again after amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). On remand, the district court

should therefore first reconsider whether to grant leave to amend on the federal

claim, then determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state

law claim in light of that decision, and, if so, whether to certify Plaintiffs’ state law

question to the Oregon Supreme Court.

      For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM dismissal of the Second Amended

Complaint but VACATE the denial of leave to amend and REMAND for further

proceedings.

      2
       Plaintiffs also have not been given repeated chances to amend their
complaint to cure the current deficiency.

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