Court Opinion

ID: 9839120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 19:04:08.111501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:59.564623
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/11/23
                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                           DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of C.D. and              2d Civil No. B318718
G.D.                                  (Super. Ct. No. D388847)
                                          (Ventura County)

C.D.,

     Respondent,

v.

G.D.,

     Appellant.

     When issuing custody and visitation orders, a trial court’s
paramount concern is the best interests of the child. (Fam.
Code, 1 § 3020, subd. (a).) To determine those interests, the court
must consider whether the parent seeking custody or visitation
has a history of abusing the child. (§ 3011, subd. (a)(2)(A)(i).) If
there are sexual abuse allegations, the court may order an expert
to evaluate those allegations. (§ 3118, subd. (a).) But such an
evaluation is not the only evidence that can support a finding of

        1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Family Code.
sexual abuse; rather, all “relevant, admissible evidence submitted
by the parties” should be considered when determining whether a
parent sexually abused a child. (§ 3044, subd. (e).)
       G.D. (Father) appeals from the judgment approving the
dissolution of his marriage to C.D. (Mother), granting her full
custody of their minor daughters, and barring all visitation.
Father contends the custody and visitation orders attached to the
judgment should be vacated because the trial court did not order
an evaluation into whether he sexually abused his daughters.
We affirm.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                             Pretrial events
       Father and Mother married in 2013. Their twin daughters,
F.D. and S.D., were born four years later. By 2019, Mother began
to suspect that Father was sexually abusing their daughters.
The trial court dissolved the marriage the following year. It
reserved the determination of custody and visitation issues for a
future trial.
       Prior to that trial, and pursuant to a stipulation between
Father and Mother, the court appointed a private child custody
evaluator to make “recommendations to the parties and the [trial
court] regarding a parenting plan that provides for the needs and
best interest[s] of the children.” The evaluator noted that he had
only been authorized to conduct a general custody evaluation
pursuant to section 3111, not an evaluation of sexual abuse
allegations pursuant to section 3118. He told Father and Mother
that if a section 3118 evaluation “were desired then [it] would
need to be ordered by the court.” But “[n]either party requested
[the evaluator] to expand the scope of the evaluation to include
the components of a [section] 3118 evaluation.” Instead, “rather

                                2
than pursue [such an] evaluation, [Mother and Father] stipulated
to [F.D. and S.D.] participating in therapy.”
       Mother filed a trial brief on custody and visitation issues in
July 2021. She also requested an order compelling Father to be
deposed. The trial court granted Mother’s request.
       Father failed to appear for his court-ordered deposition. In
response, the trial court sanctioned Father by prohibiting him
from: (1) introducing evidence and testimony at trial, (2)
cross-examining most witnesses, and (3) making objections on
child custody and visitation issues. The only exception to these
sanctions permitted Father to “cross-examine medical
professionals, representatives of Child Protective Services[,] and
representatives of law enforcement agencies.” Father concedes
these sanctions were “imminently reasonable.”
                                 Trial
                 1. The “timeline” of Father’s abuse
       Mother testified that she kept a timeline of her daughters’
unusual behaviors. The timeline was admitted into evidence.
The first entry is from May 2019, when F.D. and S.D. were not
yet two years old. It states that while lying on a changing table
S.D. “took her favor[ite] stuffed animal and [made it] repeatedly
kiss[] her crotch.” On the same day, as F.D. lay undressed on the
changing table, she “point[ed] to her crotch and said boo boo.”
       A “particular[ly] significan[t]” incident occurred the
following September. While getting undressed for a bath, S.D.
grabbed F.D.’s throat with one hand and “spread her [own] crotch
open” open with the other. S.D. then “started inserting her
finger” and “tickling herself.”
       Another entry from the timeline states that S.D. came
home from a visit with Father in January 2021 and told Mother

                                 3
about the “open your tootie” game she played with Father. 2 She
got on her hands and knees in the bathtub, opened and closed her
knees, and repeatedly said, “Open your tootie.” S.D. also told her
therapist about the game.
       The following April, F.D. said that Father told her to lie
about “bottoms, tooties[,] and poop.” F.D. also said that she liked
to touch Father’s tootie, referring to his penis.
       During a May therapy session, F.D. drew figures
representing herself, Father, and S.D. F.D. looked at the
drawing and said, “[Father] touches my tootie. He touches my
tootie . . . [a]nd in the crack of my bottom. He touches his tootie
when he’s touching my tootie.”
               2. Testimony from F.D. and S.D.’s relatives
       Mother’s sister, C.M., and their mother, P.M., also testified
at trial. C.M. said she saw F.D. and S.D. exhibit inappropriate
sexual behavior “more instances than [she could] count.” She
also witnessed a “handful” of the incidents on Mother’s timeline.
       Among those was an incident from September 2019, during
which S.D. stood by the bathtub, “pull[ed] apart her private
parts” with one hand, and “us[ed] the other hand to touch
herself.” C.M. tried to distract S.D., but S.D. then “proceeded to
sit down and do the same thing” again.
       In April 2021, S.D. described the “open your tootie” game to
C.M. She also demonstrated the game by opening and closing her
legs while lying on her back. S.D. said that Father had taught
her the game.
       P.M. testified that F.D. and S.D. spent a lot of time at her
house. She witnessed “some very inappropriate play with bath
toys and also with each other at times.” It was a “regular

      2 F.D. and S.D. referred to vaginas as “tooties.”

                                 4
occurrence” for F.D. and S.D. to fondle themselves; they did it
nearly “[e]very time they were undressed. Even if they got on the
potty seat[] [t]hey would be touching themselves. Even their rear
ends[.]” The fondling was “definitely” of a sexual nature.
             3. Testimony from F.D. and S.D.’s therapist
       F.D. and S.D.’s therapist testified that she started
providing therapy to the girls when they were about two years
old. She was retained to “get some clarity” about the reasons
they “exhibit[ed] and display[ed] sexual behaviors” that were
“outside the norm . . . for [such] young children.”
       The therapist said F.D.’s and S.D.’s behaviors were
“absolutely outside the norm for this stage and age of
development.” She said that the girls disclosed that Father (and
only Father) had touched them inappropriately. They also
showed her the “tootie game.”
       When asked what could cause the sexual behaviors she had
described, the therapist replied that either F.D. and S.D. had
been “directly exposed through a molestation or touching by an
adult or someone else[,] [o]r they’ve been exposed to pornography,
sexual behavior in the home[,] or other hyperstimulating sexual
stimuli. Those are the only—those are the only options.” She
also testified that while it was not unusual for children to
masturbate, “[t]hese girls are different. They not only touch
themselves but they touch each other. They open . . . their legs.
They put things in their vagina[s]. They put things in their
anus[es]. And so clearly they have a sophistication that . . . no
young child[ren] should have.”
                       4. Additional evidence
       In January 2021, S.D. visited her pediatrician. S.D. told
the pediatrician that Father would tell her to “open [her] tootie.”

                                 5
       After returning from a visit with Father in July, F.D. said
that her bottom hurt when she sat down and that there was blood
when she wiped herself. The pediatrician told Mother to take
F.D. to the emergency room if anything similar happened in the
future.
       A week later, after another visit with Father, F.D. told
Mother that her bottom hurt the same as “last time.” She said
that Father had “put his finger inside [her] bottom and . . . told
[her] it would make [her stomachache] feel better.” He then put a
toy inside her rectum. Mother took F.D. to the emergency room.
       A sheriff’s deputy spoke with F.D. at the hospital. F.D. told
the deputy “that [Father] had put his finger in her anus and that
it caused pain to her bottom.” She also said that Father had
“placed a toy there[,] telling her that it would help her feel
better.” Father stopped when F.D. said that she did not like it.
Her anus “still hurt” while she spoke with the deputy.
                        The trial court’s decision
       In its statement of decision, the trial court found F.D.’s and
S.D.’s statements reliable and credible. The court also credited
the statements the girls made to their therapist, S.D.’s
statements to her pediatrician, and F.D.’s statements to the
sheriff’s deputy. It found Mother’s timeline of events reliable,
and credited the testimony of Mother, C.M., and P.M.
       Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded that
Father “abused the minor children and perpetrated domestic
violence against them from May 8, 2019[,] through August 13,
2021, by . . . [¶] [t]ouching them in a sexual manner on numerous
occasions during his supervised and unsupervised custodial time.
These acts included but are not limited to [Father] inserting his
fingers and objects into their bodies both vaginally and anally.”

                                 6
The court granted Mother full custody of F.D. and S.D., and
ordered no visitation for Father. It also entered a restraining
order preventing Father from contacting Mother, F.D., or S.D. for
five years.
                             DISCUSSION
       Father contends the custody and visitation orders should be
vacated because there was insufficient evidence that he sexually
abused F.D. and S.D. To him, only an evaluation conducted
pursuant to section 3118 could provide the evidentiary basis
necessary to permit the trial court to find that he abused his
daughters.
       There are several problems with Father’s contentions.
First, the trial court’s decision not to order a section 3118
evaluation was made, at least in part, at Father’s behest. Prior
to trial, the child custody evaluator notified Father that no
section 3118 evaluation had been ordered in the case, and that if
he wanted such an evaluation he would need to ask the court to
order it. Father did not do so. Instead, he stipulated that the
evaluation was unnecessary because he and Mother had agreed
to send their daughters to therapy. He cannot now complain that
the court below erred by doing precisely what he stipulated
should be done. (See People v. Coffman & Marlow (2004) 34
Cal.4th 1, 49 [party cannot complain of error made at their
request].)
       Second, even if Father had not invited any error, he cannot
show prejudice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.; F.P. v. Monier (2017)
3 Cal.5th 1099, 1107-1108 [appellant must show prejudicial error
to obtain reversal].) As Father concedes, the trial court imposed
“imminently reasonable” sanctions on him for refusing to be
deposed. Among those sanctions was one prohibiting him from

                                7
proffering any evidence at the trial on custody and visitation
issues—a sanction that would have prevented him from offering
into evidence a favorable section 3118 evaluation had one been
prepared. Because he does not challenge that sanction, he cannot
show that the lack of a section 3118 evaluation resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.
        Third, no section 3118 evaluation was required here. If a
trial court appoints a child custody evaluator and “determines
that there is a serious allegation of child sexual abuse,” it must
order a section 3118 evaluation. (§ 3118, subd. (a).) The court
below did not determine there had been a serious allegation of
child sexual abuse. It was thus not required to order a section
3118 evaluation.
        Father counters that the trial court should have
determined there had been a serious allegation of child sexual
abuse because of the reports F.D., S.D., and Mother made to the
girls’ therapist, their pediatrician, and the sheriff’s deputy. (See
§ 3118, subd. (a) [defining “serious allegation of child sexual
abuse” as abuse reported to law enforcement, child welfare
services, and other mandatory reporters].) But “ ‘ “ ‘ “[t]he law
casts upon [a] party the duty of looking after [their] legal rights
and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of
them.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.)
Had Father wanted the court to make a serious sexual abuse
determination—a determination that would have triggered a
section 3118 evaluation—he was required to ask it to do so.
Because he did not, his complaint that the court erred by failing
to order the evaluation is forfeited. (Stowell, at p. 1114.)
        Fourth, even if there was no forfeiture, we would decline
Father’s invitation to adopt a rule that only a section 3118

                                 8
evaluation can provide the evidentiary basis for finding that a
parent sexually abused a young child. Section 3118 requires a
trial court to order an evaluation when it appoints a child custody
evaluator and determines there has been a serious allegation of
child sexual abuse. (§ 3118, subd. (a).) But section 3118 also
grants a court the discretion to order an evaluation when abuse
allegations arise in other contexts. (§ 3118, subd. (a) [court may
order evaluation “[w]hen an allegation of child abuse arises in
any other circumstances”].) Were we to adopt Father’s proposed
rule, we would transform that discretionary duty into a
mandatory one whenever a custody and visitation proceeding
involves alleged abuse of young children. Such judicial rewriting
of statutes is not permitted. (Siry Investment, L.P. v.
Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 366.)
       Father’s proposed rule also conflicts with other provisions
of the Family Code. It would require a trial court to ignore the
Code’s requirement to “look to all the circumstances bearing on
the best interest[s] of the . . . child” when making initial custody
and visitation determinations. (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996)
13 Cal.4th 25, 31-32.) It would also render null the Code’s
provision permitting independent corroboration of sexual abuse
allegations. (See § 3011, subd. (a)(2)(B).) And it would conflict
with the Code’s prohibition against finding that a parent
committed domestic violence 3 based “solely on conclusions
reached by a child custody evaluator” (§ 3044, subd. (e)), in turn
limiting the parent’s ability to rebut the allegations against them
(cf. id., subd. (a) [alleged abuser can rebut presumption that
custody would not be in child’s best interests]). In our view, that

      3 A parent who sexually assaults a child commits domestic
violence. (§ 3044, subd. (c).)

                                 9
is not the law. (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 [a
finding that a parent committed abuse “ ‘does not limit the
evidence cognizable by the court’ ”]; see also Keith R. v. Superior
Court (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1057 [discussing types of
evidence that may be introduced to rebut presumption].)
       Father’s proposed rule similarly conflicts with caselaw and
statutes outside the Family Code. It would upend longstanding
California law that “[a] trial court is not required to accept . . .
expert opinion at face value” (In re Marriage of Battenburg (1994)
28 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1345), a principle that permits the court to
deviate from an expert’s custody and visitation recommendations
(see, e.g., Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 436)
instead of acting as a “mere rubber-stamp” for what the expert
thinks best (In re Marriage of deRoque (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th
1090, 1096). It could also require a court to discount testimony
from a young abuse victim—even though the law makes “ ‘no
distinction . . . between the competence of young children and
that of other witnesses.’ ” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294,
315; see also Evid. Code, § 700 [“every person, irrespective of age,
is qualified to be a witness” (italics added)].)
       Rather than adopting Father’s proposed rule, we conclude
that a trial court should “consider any relevant, admissible
evidence submitted by the parties” when determining whether a
parent has sexually abused a child and making appropriate
custody and visitation orders. (§ 3044, subd. (e).) The court
below did just that. And that evidence was more than sufficient
to uphold its finding that Father sexually abused F.D. and S.D.
(Cf. In re Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497
[factual findings underlying custody and visitation orders
reviewed for substantial evidence].)

                                10
      The timeline admitted into evidence at the trial on custody
and visitation issues described dozens of instances of F.D. and
S.D. behaving unusually, often after visiting Father: rubbing
stuffed animals on their vaginas, complaining of pain to their
vaginas and anuses, incidents of masturbation, details of the
“open your tootie” game Father allegedly forced the girls to play,
and allegations that Father touched their vaginas while touching
his penis. Mother, C.M., and P.M. all witnessed these behaviors.
So did the girls’ therapist, who deemed them “outside the norm”
for such young children and testified that they could only be
learned by being exposed to molestation, pornography, or some
other sexual stimuli. The girls’ pediatrician and a sheriff’s
deputy were indirect witnesses, with S.D. telling the former
about the “open your tootie” game and F.D. telling the latter that
Father had inserted a finger into her anus.
      The trial court found all this evidence reliable and credible.
And because Father could not object to it, the evidence can
properly be considered in support of the judgment. (People ex rel.
Department of Public Works v. Alexander (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d
84, 98.) So can F.D.’s and S.D.’s statements. (People v. Harlan
(1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 451-454.) Substantial evidence
supports the court’s custody and visitation orders.

                                 11
                          DISPOSITION
       The judgment, including the attached orders granting C.D.
full custody of F.D. and S.D. and barring G.D. from all visitation,
is affirmed. Respondent C.D. shall recover her costs on appeal.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                     BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

      GILBERT, P. J.

      YEGAN, J.

                                12
                    Jeffrey G. Bennett, Judge

                Superior Court County of Ventura

                 ______________________________

      Taylor, McCord, Praver & Cherry, Patrick G. Cherry;
Ventura Coast Law and Douglas K. Goldwater for Appellant.
      Law Offices of Jeffrey A. Slott, Jeffrey A. Slott; The Law
Office of Greg May and Greg May for Respondent.