Court Opinion

ID: 9574819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:08:43.305063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:17.747736
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting, with whom MACY, Chief Justice, joins.
I am compelled to dissent from the resolution of this case by the majority. Insofar as the majority opinion finds no error, I am in complete accord with what it says. I am satisfied, however, that no error occurred in this case with respect to the admission of the prior conviction under WYO.R.EVID. 404(b) and, while subject to criticism, the evidence relating to the airplane would not, in and of itself, justify a reversal. Consequently, I would affirm Dean’s conviction.
It seems to me the majority opinion correctly identifies the conundrum in this ease. I quote from the majority opinion:
Identity was an issue at trial. Appellant claimed he was not involved in the conspiracy, that his son committed the crimes. In other words appellant is claiming, “it wasn’t me, it was my son.”
Op. at 607.
The facts in this case point to both the actions of Jay Dean, Sr. and Jay Dean, Jr.
Many of the documents, including car titles, list simply the name “Jay Dean,” without specifying Jr. or Sr. The switching of vehicle identification plates could have been accomplished by either of these individuals. This is also true with respect to the removal *615of the embossed identification numbers that were ground off of the vehicles. One individual who dealt with the Deans in the purchase of a Ford van was confused about who owned the van and who was selling the van. Indeed, the situation may be described as one in which, if Jay Dean, Sr. and Jay Dean, Jr. were tried in separate trials and each blamed the criminal acts on the other, both might be acquitted.
The shortfall I perceive with the majority approach is that, instead of properly applying WYO.R.EVID. 404(b) to this situation, there is a failure to discern the distinction between a situation in which identity must be solved in the context of a universal population, which involves a so-called “signature crime,” and the situation presented in this case in which it is clear that the issue of identity and, therefore, culpability, involved simply a selection between two people, Jay Dean, Sr., and Jay Dean, Jr. This is an entirely different situation from that presented in Pena v. State, 780 P.2d 316 (Wyo.1989), where the issue of identification of the perpetrator was being solved by showing a modus operandi in connection with uncharged bad acts.
In this situation, the evidence of a prior conviction clearly was admissible because it met the demands of the:
Special rule of relevancy demanding that the proponent satisfy the trial court that the evidence does make more probable, than it would be without the evidence, the existence of a fact of consequence in the determination of the action * * *.
Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99, 103 (Wyo.1987).
It cannot be denied the evidence of the prior conviction made it more probable, than it would have been without this evidence, that the perpetrator here was Jay Dean, Sr.
Jay Dean, Sr. was more than forty years old, and he previously had been convicted of an almost identical crime. Jay Dean, Jr. was seventeen years old, and he did not have that peculiar background. His prior bad acts included shoplifting, auto theft, (convicted and sent to the Indiana Boys Reform School), theft (no conviction), leaving the scene of the accident, aggravated assault and no driver’s license (no charges filed), driving while under the influence, driving with no tail fight, and driving while under suspension (dismissed). On the other hand, Jay Dean, Sr.’s statement made under oath to an investigator for the Division of Criminal Investigation on November 24,1982 related the precise details of the criminal activity that was in issue here.
For me, it is a major departure from the logical symmetry described in the quote in the footnote on page 10 of the majority opinion to say that “in this case, evidence of appellant’s prior conviction sheds no fight on the identity of the perpetrator without relying on the impermissible inference that appellant did it once; therefore, he must have done it this time.” Slip op. at 6. While the claim that these are common techniques used in the commission of this kind of crime might well be true if one were trying to identify a perpetrator from a universal population by reliance upon a “signature crime,” there is an entirely different dynamic present here. The only identity issue in this ease is to choose between two individuals. Under those circumstances, it seems clear Jay Dean Sr.’s prior conviction does shed fight on the identity of the perpetrator in this crime, and the jury reached an ineluctably correct result. Logical symmetry in the application of the decisions of this Court is of at least equivalent import to logical symmetry in the application of WYO.R.EVID. 404(b) in a given case as described by Professor Imwinkel-ried.
With respect to the choice of the rule made from the quoted material in footnote 3, the majority has chosen the rule that most favors the criminal. It is antithetical to a well-known rule of appellate review in this court that we will sustain a decision of the trial court on any correct ground. “On appeal, we give great deference to a trial court’s determination concerning admissibility of 404(b). So long as there is a legitimate basis for the court’s decision we cannot say that there was an abuse of discretion.” Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 848, 851 (Wyo.1990) (citing Pena v. State, 780 P.2d at 318. The majority approach is illustrative of the danger in delegating the judicial role to academic writers. The academician has no obligation to society *616to decide anything; the academician s role is to present dialogue and debate with respect to different views. The members of the judiciary should remember that most academicians are advocates, however carefully they may guard their language, and quotations from academic works are similar to quotes from the briefs of the parties.
While I indeed would be the last to deny the importance of the procedure described at pages 9-10 of the majority opinion (see Coleman ), we are applying a new requirement in a situation in which the participants had every justification to believe they had proceeded properly. I cannot explain why the State chose to emphasize knowledge and argument, but there is no question the evidence was proffered at trial in the issue of identity, and it clearly can be sustained on the issue of identity. The demand of the “special rule of relevancy” was met because the evidence of the prior conviction made it more probable than not that Jay Dean, Sr. was the perpetrator of these crimes, an issue of identity.
I can see no basis to distinguish this case from the instances found in Grábill v. State, 621 P.2d 802 (Wyo.1980), and Longfellow, 803 P.2d 848, both of which are cited in the majority opinion. In those cases, evidence of prior bad acts was used to. identify one person out of a set of two as the one who had committed the crime. All the evidence in the death of each child demonstrated it was due to abuse committed by one of two people, the parent of the victim or another person. In both instances, we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of instances of abusive treatment by the defendant on prior occasions. The evidence tended to demonstrate which of two persons had committed the crime and clearly met the demands of the special rule of relevancy described in Coleman.
Under the circumstances, I can discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in this instance. The admission of proof of another crime to demonstrate identity of the defendant as a perpetrator of the offense charged does not demand the two episodes be factually the same in every detail. The inquiry is only as to whether the two crimes have enough characteristics in common to justify a cautious judgment that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. 3 MARK S. Rhodes, ORField’s Criminal Prooedure under the Federal Rules § 26:380 (2d ed. 1986).
In my judgment, the trial court provided a proper limiting instruction in this case, and the circumstances justified the detail in which the prior criminal conduct was described. These factors did not contribute to any conclusion of an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The essential reason for not admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is that the evidence is not relevant to establish the conduct in question. No one quarrels with that approach. In a case like this one, in which the evidence of the prior conduct is relevant to assist the jury in deciding the issue of identity, such evidence clearly is admissible. In this instance, the court has achieved an incorrect result simply for the purpose of making a point with the attorneys representing the State of Wyoming.
I would affirm Jay Dean Sr.’s conviction.