Court Opinion

ID: 9630765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:20:01.215358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:43.276371
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
DANIELS, J.:
¶ 1 Here, Appellant was charged with two counts of criminal homicide (18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2501) 9. She was also charged with: two counts of arson endangering persons (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)(l)(i) and (ii))10, and one count each of causing a catastrophe (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3302(a))11, arson endangering property (18 Pa.C.S.A. *1094§ 3301(c)(2))12, cruelty to animals (18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5511 (a)(1)©)13, and criminal conspiracy (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1))14.
¶ 2 After a jury trial, Appellant was acquitted of the criminal homicide charges, the criminal conspiracy charge, and the charge of arson endangering persons (pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A § 3301(a)(1)®), which required a finding that Appellant “recklessly place[d] another person in danger of death or bodily injury” for conviction. However, she was found guilty of one count each of causing a catastrophe, arson endangering property, cruelty to animals, and arson endangering persons (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)(1)(h)), which required a finding that Appellant had “commit[ted] the act with the purpose of destroying or damaging an inhabited building or occupied structure of another” for conviction15. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to a term of eighteen (18) to sixty (60) months of imprisonment based upon such convictions.
¶ 3 Appellant has maintained, all along, that the statute of limitations barred her prosecution for the non-homicide related offenses. Her omnibus pre-trial motion to dismiss all charges was denied, as was her post-trial motion to set aside the guilty verdicts on the non-homicide charges. This appeal addresses the issue of the trial court’s failure to set aside the jury’s guilty verdicts — on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations as to each bars these convictions.
¶4 Nevertheless, the majority has affirmed Appellant’s convictions for one count each of three felonies: arson endangering persons pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)(ii), arson endangering property, and causing a catastrophe. As noted above, Appellant had also been charged with second-degree murder pursuant to the felony-murder doctrine, but the jury acquitted her of that crime, as well as of the alleged crime of arson endangering persons pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)©.16 Because I believe that the felonies of which Appellant was convicted by the jury were time-barred, I most respectfully dissent.
*1095¶ 5 I do not dispute that the felonies here were, in the language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5551(4), “alleged to have been perpetrated in connection with” the homicide charges. I do, however, most strenuously take issue with the majority’s conclusion that the Appellant’s acquittal on the homicide charges is irrelevant to whether these other “alleged felonies” were time-barred.
¶ 6 The majority relies upon Commonwealth v. Cardonick, 448 Pa. 322, 292 A.2d 402 (1972), for the proposition that the commencement of prosecution, rather than judicial conclusion of the same, is the key point in determining whether the statute of limitations may be ignored with regard to the felonies “alleged” to have been perpetrated in connection with a murder of the first or second degree. However, it should be noted at the outset that Cardon-ick did not deal with first or second degree murder at all, but rather with allegations of forgery and attempted tax evasion. Additionally, the question in Cardonick was whether an initial set of indictments, although subsequently quashed, tolled the statute of limitations such that a second set of indictments, which would otherwise have been time-barred, were not violative of the statute of limitations. These two aspects of Cardonick alone make it inappo-site to the factual context in the case at Bar. Finally, we note that in Cardonick, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania not only expressed the view that statutes of limitations are to be liberally construed in favor of defendants and against the Commonwealth, but ultimately reversed this Court’s orders affirming the judgments of sentence and found in favor of the defendants in that case. Cardonick, 448 Pa. at 330, 292 A.2d at 407.
¶ 7 Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed this very issue, and I find their decisions and reasoning to be most compelling. In People v. Nunez, 319 Ill.App.3d 652, 253 Ill.Dec. 516, 745 N.E.2d 639 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.2001), defendant was charged with two counts each of first degree murder and felony murder predicated upon an underlying felony of aggravated battery. Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of only the underlying felony of aggravated battery. He appealed based upon his claim that the prosecution for aggravated battery was time barred. The Appellate Court of Illinois addressed, at length, the issue of whether or not defendant had waived his right to raise the defense of the statute of limitations as to the aggravated battery charge, but once it decided that he had not in fact waived that right, it reversed his conviction by stating:
We are mindful that the murder statute has no statute of limitations; however, ... [wjithout such waiver, defendant was improperly subjected to criminal liability when the trial court entered a finding of guilty on the lesser included offense of aggravated battery ... Defendant was acquitted on the charges of murder and felony murder; therefore, double jeopardy prohibits retrial on these charges. Further, defendant’s conviction of the lesser included offense of aggravated battery violates the statute of limitations.
Nunez, 253 Ill.Dec. 516, 745 N.E.2d at 645, 646, 647 (Emphasis Added).
¶ 8 Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed this issue in State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 618 A.2d 316 (N.J.1993). In that case, the defendant was indicted for murder and the jury was instructed on the murder charge, as well as on the lesser included manslaughter offenses (which, at that time, was subject to a five-year period of limitations). The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the defendant to “preserve his right under the applicable statute of limitations not to be convicted *1096for manslaughter in the event that the jury returned a verdict of guilty on a form of manslaughter.” Short, 618 A.2d at 320. In that connection, the Supreme Court of New Jersey observed:
[I]n New Jersey, the statute of limitations in a criminal statute is tantamount to an absolute bar to the prosecution of the offense ... the statutory bar would apply when manslaughter is sought to be charged as a lesser included or alternative offense to a greater or still more serious crime.
[W]e are unable to conclude that the Legislature intended to weaken the strength of the bar of the statute of limitations in criminal causes generally or, more specifically, to do so with respect to un-indicted lesser included offenses.
Short, 618 A.2d at 320, 321 (Emphasis Added).
¶ 9 Here, as noted above, Appellant never waived her right to assert the defense of the statute of limitations. She raised it in her omnibus pre-trial motion to dismiss all charges against her, which was denied by the trial court prior to the commencement of trial. She reasserted such defense once again in her post-trial motion to set aside the jury’s guilty verdicts on the non-homicide related charges of which she was found guilty by the jury. As the Illinois and New Jersey cases referenced above, as well as others17, illustrate, the defense of the statute of limitations is a significant one that may not be “blithely ignored” by courts. State v. Short, 618 A.2d at 320. Here, both the majority opinion and the opinion of the trial court “blithely ignore” the jury’s verdict, which acquitted Appellant of the criminal homicide charges and the “reckless endangerment of another person” arson charge referenced at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)(1)(i)18. Far from “changing” the applicable statute of limitations (Trial Court Opinion, p. 4), the jury’s verdicts of not guilty on the homicide and “reckless endangerment of persons” arson charges mandate that the applicable statute of limitations as to the other non-homicide related charges (of which Appellant was found guilty by the jury) be upheld and legally enforced.
¶ 10 The jury’s verdict of not guilty on the criminal homicide charges triggered Appellant’s right to re-assert the defense of the statute of limitations with regard to the underlying (non-homicide) felony charges. In the words of this Court, the statute of limitations became a “material element” of judicial inquiry following the jury’s not guilty verdicts as to the homicide charges in this case. Commonwealth *1097v. Munchinski, 401 Pa.Super. 300, 585 A.2d 471, 483 (1990). The statute of limitations for causing a catastrophe is two years; arson and conspiracy charges must be prosecuted within five years.19 Thus, the time within which Appellant could have been prosecuted for these crimes, but for the Commonwealth’s decision to prosecute her for felony-murder in connection therewith, would have expired in July, 1992 and July, 1995, respectively. Thereafter, in this writer’s view, any prosecution on these non-homicide charges was time barred. It would be manifestly unfair and a distortion of the law to hold otherwise.
¶ 11 From the standpoint of interpreting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5551(4), I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion. The majority’s interpretation and reasoning would permit the prosecution, at any time, of “any felony alleged to have been perpetrated in connection with a murder of the first or second degree ... ”. The majority writes that “it is apparent that the Commonwealth may, at any time, initiate a prosecution for a felony that it asserts was committed in connection with a murder of the first or second degree.” Because, the majority continues, “any criminal charge constitutes an ‘allegation’ until proven at the conclusion of trial ... it is clear that the non-homicide felonies charged in this case were ‘alleged to have been perpetrated in connection with’ the second-degree murder charges already charged against Appellant.” Such conclusion, in my reasoning, “puts the cart before the horse”.
¶ 12 My reading of Section 5551(4) focuses on the statute’s use of “alleged” in only one instance — to refer to the non-murder felony or felonies at issue. Interestingly, the statute does not also use “alleged” to refer to the murder at issue. If, instead, the statute were to say that prosecution could be commenced at any time for “any felony alleged to have been perpetrated in connection with an alleged murder of the first or second degree” (Emphasis Added), then its words would appropriately mirror the facts here. However, such is not the case. As it now reads, the statute is clearly ambiguous without the use of an additional “alleged”. As such, this ambiguous statutory language should thus be construed in favor of the defendant and against the Commonwealth until such time as the legislature may choose to clarify the language of the statute.
¶ 13 Put another way, the language of Section 5551(4) pre-supposes that the substantive crime of first or second degree murder will be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to support the conviction of any felony that has been “alleged” to have been perpetrated in connection with the murder of the first or second degree. Absent such a conviction of first or second degree murder, the “felony alleged” should rise or fall on the basis of its own substantive statute of limitations. For, absent that allegation in the first instance, a stale or time-barred felony prosecution would not withstand the jurisdictional challenge of the statute of limitations. The prosecution would then enjoy an unlimited period of time within which to achieve a conviction of such “alleged felonies”, even if the murder charge itself could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 14 Finally, the jury acquitted Appellant on the form of arson endangering persons as embodied in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)(1)(i), which, as noted above, requires a showing of mens rea on the part of the defendant, specifically “recklessness”. This must be viewed in contrast to the form of arson endangering persons that Appellant was, in fact, convicted of, as *1098embodied in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)(l)(ii). This latter variation does not require such a showing of mens rea. This distinction is of some import here, as it represents the jury’s conclusion that not only was Appellant not guilty of the second-degree murder of the two children, but she was also not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have had the reckless intent to place the children in harms way, nor of or any mindset whatsoever thereof.
¶ 15 Consequently, there is no rhyme or reason in permitting a conviction for an “alleged felony” to stand, beyond its own period of limitation, if the murder in the first or second degree itself is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the fact finder. For, to reason otherwise would permit a prosecutor to selectively allege that felonies “[had] been committed in connection with a murder of the first or second degree,” without any reasonable belief that the murder itself could be proven, in order to support a conviction of “any felony alleged to have been perpetrated” in connection with a charge of first or second degree murder, even if it were clear that the murder charge itself could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 16 Such would set a very dangerous precedent, in my view. Nor do I believe that the Pennsylvania Legislature intended to create such a “Catch-22”, absent the Commonwealth’s ability to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first or second degree murder as a predicate to obfuscating such defendant’s right to raise the jurisdictional defense of the statute of limitations as to those felonies that would, in fact, be time barred.
¶ 17 Thus, I respectfully and most vociferously dissent.

. Criminal homicide:
(a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being.
(b) Classification. — Criminal homicide shall be classified as murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter.

. Arson endangering persons:
(1) A person commits a felony of the first degree if he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, or if he aids, counsels, pays or agrees to pay another to cause a fire or explosion, whether on his own property or on that of another, and if:
(i) he thereby recklessly places another person in danger of death or bodily injury, including but not limited to a firefighter, police officer or other person actively engaged in fighting the fire; or
(ii) he commits the act with the purpose of destroying or damaging an inhabited building or occupied structure of another.

.Causing or risking catastrophe:
(a) Causing catastrophe. — A person who causes a catastrophe by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of building, release of poison gas, radioactive material or other harmful or destructive force or substance, or by any other means of causing potentially widespread injury or damage, including selling, dealing in or otherwise providing licenses or permits to transport hazardous materials in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. Ch. 83 (relating to hazardous materials transportation), commits a felony of the first degree if he does so intentionally or knowingly, or a felony of the second degree if he does so recklessly.

. Arson endangering property:
A person commits a felony of the second degree if he intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or that of another, or if he aids, counsels, pays or agrees to pay another to cause a fire or explosion, and if:
(2) he thereby recklessly places an inhabited building or occupied structure of another in danger of damage or destruction.

. Killing, maiming or poisoning domestic animals or zoo animals, etc.:
(1) A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he willfully and maliciously:
(i) Kills, maims or disfigures any domestic animal of another person or any domestic fowl of another person.

. Criminal conspiracy:
(a) Definition of conspiracy.- — A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

. As will be discussed infra, the distinction between the two forms of "arson endangering persons” is of moment here in that the jury's verdict of not guilty on the "personal injury” form of arson complements the jury’s verdicts of not guilty on the homicide charges. Thus, not only was Appellant found not guilty of the killing of the two children, but she was also found to have been not guilty of the necessary mens rea to establish the recklessness of placing them in harm’s way with respect to the "arson endangering persons” charge, ás well.

. The distinction between the two statutory forms of “arson endangering persons”, discussed supra in footnotes 2 & 7, is a significant one within the context of this case and will also be further addressed, infra, in this Dissenting Opinion.

. See also Cowan v. People, 14 Cal.4th 367, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 458, 926 P.2d 438 (1996) (holding that in the plea agreement context, a defendant may intentionally waive his or her otherwise protected right to claim the statute of limitations defense for a lesser offense such as manslaughter in order to avoid prosecution for a more serious murder offense that lacks a limit for prosecution.); People v. Verbrugge, 998 P.2d 43 (Colo.Ct.App.1999) (holding that in the retrial context, if the second jury has acquitted the defendant of a felony murder charge, the trial court cannot enter judgment on the first jury’s conviction on lesser non-included offense where the statute of limitations for that offense had expired.); People v. Jung, 2001 Guam 15 (Guam 2001) (implying that the defense of statute of limitations is available and valid as long as indictment for greater offenses occurs after the limitations period for the lesser offenses has expired); and State v. Seagraves, 837 S.W.2d 615 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) ("In jurisdictions which adhere to the lesser included offense doctrine, the indicted offense only embraces the lesser included offenses that are actionable. The greater offense does not embrace a lesser included offense which is barred by the statute of limitations.”).

. See footnote no. 2, supra.

. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552.