Court Opinion

ID: 9862469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:14:21.187088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:36.904585
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority because I believe that it was within the province of the Board to determine whether the plaintiff’s conduct amounted to a violation of the Department’s rule prohibiting insubordination. The plaintiff was sent a letter informing him that his service-connected time off relating to an injury which occurred in 1984 was being discontinued as of August 1, 1985. The letter contained the name of a person the plaintiff could contact if he had any questions. Ten months later, without informing anyone, the plaintiff took additional service-connected time off relating to that injury. As a result, he was suspended for violating the Department’s rule against insubordination, which provides that “officers should promptly obey any lawful orders of a superior.” The majority examined the language of the letter and concluded that as a matter of law it did not constitute an order. It is true, as the majority asserts, that a reviewing court is not bound by an agency’s conclusion of law. However, administrative agencies are afforded substantial discretion by a reviewing court in construing and applying their own rules, and a court will interfere only where the agency’s interpretation is plainly erroneous. (Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Human Rights Comm’n (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1047, 547 N.E.2d 499; Scheffki v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 971, 973, 320 N.E.2d 371.) In the context of disciplinary action taken by a police department, deference is accorded the agency because, as a part of the executive branch of government, it has both the responsibility and expertise in matters relating to the enforcement of standards which concern the maintenance of discipline and morale within the department. (Taylor v. Police Board (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 486, 489, 378 N.E.2d 1160.) A reviewing court’s only obligation is to determine whether the agency’s interpretation of its own rules has a reasonable basis in law. Taylor, 62 Ill. App. 3d 486, 376 N.E.2d 1160. In the case at bar, I believe that it was within the Board’s power to determine whether the plaintiff’s conduct violated the rule prohibiting insubordination. As was stated in Zinser v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1961), 28 Ill. App. 2d 435, 439, 172 N.E.2d 33, the absence of formal language is not in itself determinative of whether a particular communication constitutes an order. The need for discipline and obedience is inherent in the operation of a paramilitary organization such as the Illinois Department of State Police. CPhillips v. Hall (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 409, 419, 447 N.E.2d 418.) In light of that need, I believe that the Board should be accorded great deference in setting standards of acceptable conduct for Department personnel. In my view, the conclusion of the Board that the plaintiff’s conduct constituted insubordination has a reasonable basis in law and should not be overturned.