Court Opinion

ID: 9547523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:48:24.801628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:49.853480
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
The majority finds meritorious the claimant’s allegation that an emergency existed *551at the time she sought medical treatment from Dr. M. Neither party presented any evidence of such emergency, nor did the court address the issue in its findings, and I therefore dissent to the portion, of the opinion which supports an allegation raised for the first time on appeal.
I also dissent from the finding that 85 O.S. 1981 § 14 permits retroactive approval of a change in physician after the claimant has exercised her initial unqualified right to choose a doctor. I find Burns v. Southwestern Preferred Properties, 580 P.2d 986 (Okl.1978) indistinguishable and dispos-itive with respect to the proper construction of 85 O.S. 1981 § 14.
The following two sentences in § Í4 present the problem here at issue:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section the employee may select a physician of his choice to render necessary medical treatment, at the expense of the employer, provided, however, that the attending physician so selected by the employee shall notify the employer and/or the insurance carrier within a reasonable time after examination or treatment was first rendered ... [hereinafter referred to as sentence one]. The Court shall have authority on application of employee or employer or the insurance carrier to order a change of physicians at the expense of the employer when, in its judgment, such change is desirable or necessary, [hereinafter sentence two].
Since these two sentences appear to contradict one another, the question becomes one of construing these provisions to render each meaningful without obviating the other. Does sentence one override all other language for all purposes, or does sentence two limit a claimant’s right to choose an attending physician, without first making application to the court, to the claimant’s initial choice of physician?
If sentence one controls by virtue of the phrase “[notwithstanding any other provision ...”, then the claimant may at any time select a physician at the employer’s expense as long as the treatment is necessary and the employer receives reasonable notice. Sentence two becomes meaningless when subjected to this construction.
This court considered both of these statutory provisions in Burns v. Southwestern Preferred Properties, 580 P.2d 986 (Okl.1978). In Burns, the claimant desired to return to his initial treating physician after having undergone treatment by a second doctor, and did so without making application to the Workers’ Compensation Court. The court recognized the claimant’s right to be treated by this physician in the future, but disallowed expenses incurred without authorization of the court and proper notice.
In reconciling the two troublesome sentences cited previously, the Burns court interpreted sentence two as a mandatory condition which requires claimants to apply to the Workers’ Compensation Court in order to change physicians after receiving treatment from a doctor of their choice. The court construed both sentences and ruled that it did “not believe § 14 as amended1 has eliminated the obligation of claimant to make application to the industrial court to change physicians. If we would allow a claimant carte blanche in replacing a physician, it could encourage ‘doctor shopping’ at the expense of the employer and insurance carrier.” Burns at 989. (emphasis added).
Under Burns then, a claimant has an unqualified right to make the initial choice of treating physician. Once the employee exercises that right, future treatment by self-procured physicians may be allowable if the court on application orders a change of physician. The facts here at issue clearly indicate that Ms. Iwunoh exercised her initial right to elect a treating physician when she underwent treatment by Dr. C. on advice of counsel.
According to this interpretation of § 14, and since she failed to apply to the court to change physicians, Ms. Iwunoh must invoke the emergency provisions of the stat*552ute in order for liability for self-procured medical treatment to rest with her employer. Section fourteen provides that “the injured employee, or another in his behalf, may obtain emergency treatment at the expense of the employer where such emergency treatment is not provided by the employer.” 85 O.S. 1981 § 14.
Claimant indeed urges the emergency exception arguing that the pain from her injury became so intense that she required immediate attention. However, she adduced no evidence at either hearing represented in the present record on appeal to support finding of emergency, and the Workers’ Compensation Court made no finding that an emergency existed. While it is true that under § 14, “neither notice nor request is required”, the question of “[wjhether an emergency existed is [one] of fact for the State Industrial Court.” Womack v. Boston Fisheries, 527 P.2d 1368, 1371 (Okl.1974).
The order of the Workers’ Compensation Court entered July 27, 1982 reflects only that claimant filed a Form 19 requesting payment of medical expenses to Dr. M., and that “the charges of $426.00 are reasonable and based on the rates prevailing in the community and the services rendered were necessary for the proper medical care of Darla B. Iwunoh.” These findings, which were affirmed by the court en banc, are insufficient to support a finding of emergency on appeal.
This Court is firmly committed to the rule that the Industrial Court is required to make specific findings of the ultimate facts responsive to the issues as well as conclusions of law upon which an order is made granting or denying an award to a claimant, and they should be sufficiently definite to enable this Court to pass intelligently upon the correctness or incorrectness of such orders based upon the facts. Where the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Industrial Court are too indefinite and uncertain for judicial interpretion, this Court, on review, will vacate the order for further proceedings. Gleason v. State Industrial Court, 413 P.2d 536, 538 (Okl.1966).
Unless Bums is overruled, I find that it controls in this case. Therefore, the only means of imposing liability on the employer for Ms. Iwunoh’s self-procured medical expenses is through the emergency provision of § 14. Since the findings of the Workers’ Compensation Court as manifested in its orders provide insufficient information upon which to render an appellate decision on this issue, I would vacate the orders of both the Workers’ Compensation Court and the Court of Appeals and remand for proceedings to determine if Ms. Iwunoh’s medical needs throughout the four week period during which she received treatment from Dr. M. constituted an emergency. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Vice Chief Justice SIMMS joins me in this dissent.

. This amendment altered the notice period required from seven days to reasonable notice.