Court Opinion

ID: 9847742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:06:50.210494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:30.089397
License: Public Domain

STILWELL, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I believe that Addison was entitled to the requested charge and the denial of his request was reversible error.
Addison maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury that the State must disprove self-defense and cites the recent case of State v. Wiggins, 830 S.C. 538, 500 S.E.2d 489 (1998), for that proposition. In Wiggins, the supreme court stated “current law requires the State to disprove self-defense, once raised by the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 544, 500 S.E.2d at 492-93.
The majority refers to this as an isolated sentence that is dicta and maintains that the law cited in support of that proposition does not support the statement. While I agree that the statement may well be an erroneous summary of the law, I do not think it was dicta under the circumstances of the Wiggins case. Therefore, I believe it is current law by which both this court and the trial courts are bound. Generally, a defendant is entitled to a requested jury charge as long as it is a correct statement of law on an issue raised by both the indictment and evidence presented at trial. State v. Austin, 299 S.C. 456, 458, 385 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1989). Therefore, I would reverse Addison’s ABIK conviction and remand for a new trial on that count.