Court Opinion

ID: 9811428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:20:14.630388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:53.347085
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.,
dissenting: I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the Court in this case. The decision of the United States Supreme Court leaves, it open to us to say whether the plaintiff, as a *111matter of law, assumed the risk of injury from the defective water-glass. That question was not passed upon, and if it had been, upon the facts as then presented that would not prevent a consideration of the question upon this appeal, when the facts showing assumption of risk are much stronger.
The United States Supreme Court reversed our judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with their opinion.
Mr. Justice Pitney states the law of this case as follows: “When the employee does know of the defect, and appreciates the risk that is attributable to it, then if he continues in the employment without objection, or without obtaining from the employer or his representative an assurance that the defect will be remedied, the employee assumes the risk, even though it arise out of the master’s breach of duty. If, however, there be a promise of reparation, then during such time as may be reasonably required for its performance, or until the particular time specified for its performance, the employee, relying upon the promise, does not assume the risk unless at least the danger be so imminent that no ordinarily prudent man under the circumstances would rely upon such promise.” Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Horton, 233 U. S., 492.
Applying this rule to the undisputed evidence, I am of opinion that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury and is not entitled to recover.
Plaintiff was operating an engine equipped with a Buckner water-glass, which is so constructed that a thick guard-glass is placed over the front of the water-glass to protect the engineer from injury in the event the inner glass should explode. The engine was also equipped with another method of determining the amount of water in the boiler, that is, by means of gauge cocks placed on the head of the boiler. Plaintiff made the first trip from Raleigh to Aberdeen on 27 July, returning in the evening of 28 July, and he was'returning from the third trip to Aberdeen when he sustained the injury to his eye by the explosion of the water-glass, on 4 August. It required two days to make the round trip.
On the morning plaintiff was called to take this engine for the first trip to Aberdeen, he noticed before leaving Raleigh that there was no shield or guard on the water-glass. Without making complaint of the condition of the glass, plaintiff made the trip to Aberdeen and return. Upon his arrival in Raleigh at the end of his round trip, he made a written report of the condition of his engine upon forms provided for that purpose, and in accordance with the defendant’s requirements he placed the report on file in the roundhouse or put it in a box there, for that purpose. This, according to the plaintiff’s evidence, was the way provided by the company for procuring repairs. Plaintiff, and a num*112ber of defendant’s witnesses, said that these work reports were required to be in writing, that they were filed and distributed among the workmen for the purpose of making the required repairs. It appears in evidence that plaintiff made a written report on this engine at the return of each round trip, and noted every defect in his engine except the absence of the guard-glass.
On 4 August, while engaged in shifting cars at Apex, N. 0., the water-glass exploded and injured his eye. Immediately after the explosion plaintiff cut off the gauge-glass at top and bottom, and the engine was operated to Raleigh with the gauge cocks as the means of determining the amount of water in the boiler.
The guard-glass referred to as part of the Buckner equipment is a thick piece of glass, 1 or 2 inches wide and 8 or 9 inches long, with a thickness of about one-half of an inch. Plaintiff testified that the piece of glass in front of the tube is to prevent the flying glass from hitting the engineer in case the inner tube should burst; that the insertion of this glass will prevent flying glass from striking the engineer or other persons in the cab if the tube explodes. In answer to questions on cross-examination, plaintiff testified: “Yes, it is dangerous to run it (the engine) without a guard-glass. You see, the tube might explode. The guard-glass is put there to prevent the explosion of the inner tube injuring the engineer. The purpose of the guard-glass is to make it safe for the engineer to operate his engine with the Buckner water gauge.” Plaintiff further testified that at the time of the accident the steam pressure in the unprotected glass tube in the Buckner gauge was 200 pounds, and that it was liable to explode at any time. He said: “I knew tliat with that guard-glass out that the tube was liable to explode with the 200 pounds pressure on it. I knew that it was liable to explode, but I could not tell when.” At the time of his injury plaintiff was sitting on the left-hand side of the cab, facing the glass, which was within a few feet of his face. He said: “I was going to cross over on the fireman’s side to see the conductor, whether he was ready to couple up, and that put me directly facing the glass, with my eye directly opposite that slit,” and while in this position the explosion occurred. Plaintiff gave an estimate of the dimensions of the inner tube, as follows: “12 or 14 inches long and about three-eighths of an inch thick, and one-half inch in diameter.”
Plaintiff described the method of gauging the water in the boiler by the three gauge cocks, and said that Benton, his fireman, brought the engine in from Apex to Raleigh, using the gauge cocks to tell how much water he had in the boiler. This was immediately after the accident. He said that he did not cut out the water gauge and use the gauge cocks on any of the three trips he made with this engine; that he did not *113attempt to run tbe engine without tbe water-gauge glass. On a former occasion a water-glass exploded and injured plaintiff’s eye, while be was employed on one of defendant’s engines.
Ernest Horton, plaintiff’s witness, testified: “Tbe water-glass and gauge cocks are right upon tbe bead of tbe boiler, right at band, and be has to use them in running bis engine — not constantly, though. They are there all tbe time for bis use. By turning those three gauge cocks you can gauge somewhere near about tbe water in tbe boiler, but you cannot tell tbe perfect level. Tbe guard-glass on the Buckner water gauge is to prevent tbe glass from spattering in your face when tbe inner tube bursts that comes out with tbe water and steam. This glass is put in there to prevent tbe glass from sputtering out in ease that glass bursts.”
Dave Campbell, an engineer of ten years experience, testified that an engineer can operate an engine in safety by tbe use of tbe gauge cocks; that if bis water-glass guard is missing, it would be bis duty to cut out tbe glass and use tbe gauge cocks.. He said: “It is very dangerous to use the Buckner water gauge without tbe guard-glass, because it has a tendency to throw tbe glass in a certain direction if it explodes. That glass tube on tbe Buckner water gauge is liable to explode. I have shut off tbe water gauge and run on tbe gauge cocks many a time.” Lewis Archer testified for tbe defendant that be has been in tbe railroad business since 1882; that be is familiar with tbe construction and operation of tbe Buckner water-glass. “It is a safe water-glass with tbe guard-glass in place. With tbe guard-glass out of place, it is one of tbe most dangerous things you could have on an engine, on account of that slot; when tbe glass breaks, it throws tbe glass out of that one place. You can operate an engine without a water gauge with safety, by using the gauge cocks. I consider that the safest plan of operation.”
In my opinion, tbe only conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that no man of ordinary prudence would have continued to work in tbe face of so great and so imminent a danger. Tbe defendant moved for judgment of nonsuit at tbe conclusion of tbe evidence and requested tbe court to instruct tbe jury that if they believed tbe evidence they would answer tbe issue of assumption of risk “Yes.” This has tbe effect of a request to withdraw tbe case from tbe jury.
It is said to be well settled by tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States that it is tbe duty of tbe trial court to withdraw a case from tbe jury where tbe evidence is undisputed or is so conclusive that tbe court, in tbe exercise of its discretion, must set aside a verdict returned in opposition to it. Randall v. R. R., 109 U. S., 478; R. R. v. Converse, 139 U. S., 469. This rule has been applied by tbe Court in an action involving tbe *114defense of assumption of risk, where it appeared from plaintiff’s evidence that he assumed the risk. Butler v. Frazee, 211 U. S., 459.
In the case of District of Columbia v. McElligott, 117 U. S., 622, the United States Supreme Court has applied the doctrine which, in my judgment, sustained the defendant’s right to an instruction that plaintiff assumed the risk of injury. In that case the plaintiff, who was in the employ of the District, was injured while at work on a bank of gravel. The evidence tended to show that he discovered that there was danger of the bank caving in, and went to the supervisor for more men to do the work, and for one man to watch the bank, and that he received the information that such assistance would be sent. Before the assistance arrived the bank caved in, causing his injury. The Court said: “Assuming that the District might be responsible under some circumstances for injuries resulting from the negligence of its supervisor, it certainly would not be liable if the danger which the plaintiff apprehended from the beginning was so manifest as to prevent a reasonably prudent man from risking it upon a promise or assurance by the proper authority that the cause from which the peril arose would be removed. . . . If he failed to exercise such care, if he exposed himself to dangers that were so threatening or obvious as likely to cause injury at any moment, he would, notwithstanding any promises or assurances of the District supervisor of the character alleged, be guilty of such contributory negligence as would defeat his claim for injuries so received.” Roccia v. Coal Co., 121 Fed., 451; Attleton v. Mfg. Co., 5 Ga. App., 779; R. R. v. Watson, 114 Ind. In Alteriac v. Coal Co., 161 Ala., 435, it is held: “Where a miner of many years experience saw a pot- or bell-shaped rock in the roof of a mine, and knew that it was more or less disconnected and liable to fall without warning at any moment, and after telling his superior of it, and that he would not work without timbers, but who returned to the work under the pot- or bell-shaped rock on being told to do so, and on the promise that the timber would be sent at once, assumed the risk incident to his return and work thereunder.” In Erdman v. Steel Co., 59 Wis., 6, the Wisconsin Supreme Court holds: “An experienced servant cannot recover if he continues, even for an hour or two, to encounter the obvious and immediate danger of using a cracked saw to cut steel plates.” In the case of McAndrews v. R. R., 39 Pac., 85, in which the plaintiff continued to use a defective hand-car which was likely to jump the track at any moment, the Supreme Court of Montana says: “If the machinery is not only defective, but so obviously dangerous that no ordinarily prudent man would assume the risk of using it, and the employee does use it, knowing its absolutely and obviously dangerous condition, and the dangers of using it, the master is not liable, notwithstanding the promise to remedy the defect.”
*115These cases illustrate the rule that after promise to repair the workman assumes the risk if the danger is such that a prudent man would not continue to work in the face of it. That the danger in this case is of that character appears to me to require no argument.
I am of opinion, also, that defendant’s request for instruction that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence should have been given. This is a question of law when the facts are undisputed. Strickland v. R. R., 150 N. C., 4; Aerkfetz v. Humphries, 145 U. S., 418. Plaintiff used the defective water-glass when he had at hand a safe way to operate his engine, that is, with the gauge cocks. This was contributory negligence. Covington v. Furniture Co., 138 N. C., 74; Whitson v. Wrenn, 134 N. C., 86.
There are other exceptions in the record which are discussed in defendant’s brief, raising important questions, hut which I will not discuss. What I have written presents my views upon the main questions.