Court Opinion

ID: 9950324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 19:04:41.975585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:37.113102
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/24 P. v. Hurst CA4/1

                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                      DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081990

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCD287570)

PATRICK DORIEN HURST,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Affirmed.
         Richard J. Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
         The People in a second amended information charged Patrick Dorien

Hurst with robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211; count 1) and alleged that under the
“Three Strikes” law he had suffered a serious felony prior (§§ 667, subd.
(a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)) and two strike priors (§§ 211, 667, subds. (b)-(i),

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
668, 1170.12). The People also alleged as aggravating circumstances that
Hurst had served a prior prison term (California Rules of Court, rule
4.421(b)(3)) and his performance was unsatisfactory while on probation or
parole (California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(5)).
      The jury convicted Hurst of robbery, and found true the allegations
under the Three Strikes law as well as the aggravating circumstances.
      The court sentenced Hurst to the upper term of five years on count 1,
struck the two strike priors under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497, and struck the serious felony prior because Hurst committed
it as a juvenile.
      Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) indicating he has been unable to identify any arguable
issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks the court to review the record for
error as mandated by Wende. We offered Hurst the opportunity to file his
own brief on appeal. He responded with a one-paragraph note that does not
include any substantive legal argument: “My name is Patrick Dorian Hurst.
The attorney that represented me on [a]ppeal is Richard Jay Moller. Right
now I am claiming inaffective [sic] assistance of counsel due to him currently
being on vacation in Hawaii, and rushing through my case and filing a Wende
brief. I recently had a hip replacement surgery on 10/24/23. I have issues
that need to be addressed.”
                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      At one point, the court granted Hurst’s motion to represent himself
under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). It later granted his
motion seeking appointment of counsel.
      On August 29, 2022, the day before trial began, the court granted
Hurst’s renewed request to represent himself.

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      At trial, a female manager who was working alone at a gym testified
that in 2020, Hurst entered the gym and she asked if she could help him.
Hurst did not respond but approached an area where merchandise was
displayed for sale, including headphones and gloves. Hurst ripped a pair of
headphones from its lock, and took a pair of gloves and put them on his lap.
The manager urged Hurst to return the items and promised not to call the
police. Hurst refused, sat in his wheelchair, and pushed it against her body
while attempting to leave. Hurst told her, “Move, bitch, or I will fucking
move you myself.” He exited the gym.
      The manager called police, who arrived shortly afterwards, recovered
the merchandise, and detained Hurst. Minutes later, the manager identified
Hurst in a curbside lineup.
      Much of the incident was caught on videotape and played for the jury.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Appellate counsel in his Wende brief asks the court to independently
review the record for error. To assist the court in its review, and in
compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), counsel
has identified one possible issue in evaluating the potential merits of this
appeal: Whether the trial court erred in granting Hurst his right to
represent himself the day before trial began. This issue has no arguable
merit.
      Hurst represented himself under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806 after he
filled out a form entitled “Acknowledgement Regarding Self-Representation
of Waiver of Right to Counsel,” and after the court reviewed the Faretta
waiver form with Hurst. The court explained the disadvantages of self-

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representation and urged Hurst to allow trial counsel to continue to represent

him. Hurst insisted on representing himself.2
      Defendants have a constitutional right to defend themselves if they
elect to do so in a timely, unequivocal, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
fashion. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 834-836.) “On appeal, we
independently examine the entire record to determine whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel.” (People v. Burgener
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 241.) “ ‘Courts must indulge every reasonable
inference against waiver of the right to counsel.’ ” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1041, 1069.) Review is not limited to the transcript of the hearing for
the Faretta motion. (Koontz, at p. 1070.) Our review includes proceedings
that occurred after the purported invocation of the right of self-
representation. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 24.) We conclude
the court did not err in granting Hurst his constitutional right to represent
himself.
      Under People v. Kelley (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 120-121, we interpret
Hurst’s note as asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To

2      In part of a colloquy with Hurst, the court probed whether Hurst was
knowingly electing to represent himself:
       “[The court]: Mr. Hurst, do you want to go ahead and represent
yourself then?
       “[Hurst]: Yes.
       “[The court]: Any doubts in your mind if you are doing the right thing
for yourself?
       “[Hurst]: No.
       “[The court]: And you understand that I disagree with you? I think
you are doing a very foolish thing, but the law says you can do it, if you would
like to, and you understand my position, correct?
       “[Hurst]: Yes.
       “[The court]: All right. Good enough. Counsel, thank you very much.
I will relieve you[.]”
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establish such a claim, a defendant has the burden of demonstrating that
counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and he or
she was prejudiced by that deficiency. (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960,
966.) We conclude Hurst has failed to carry his burden to establish that his
appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by filing a Wende brief. To
the contrary, we have reviewed the entire record as required by Wende,
supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, and have not
discovered any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. We also conclude
competent counsel has represented Hurst in this appeal.
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                      O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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