Court Opinion

ID: 9556997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 13:04:00.298813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:50.830371
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: August 21, 2023

                        S23A0647. DEMURO v. THE STATE.

        ELLINGTON, Justice.

        A Chatham County jury found Joshua DeMuro guilty of

murder in the shooting death of Kevin Gilman. 1 DeMuro challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that the State failed to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fatal shooting was not

justified. DeMuro also contends that the trial court gave incomplete

jury instructions on witness credibility, impeachment, and

        1The shooting occurred on March 19, 2018. On April 18, 2018, a
Chatham County grand jury returned an indictment charging DeMuro with
malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault
(Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 3). Following a December 2021 trial,
a jury found DeMuro guilty on all three counts. On December 20, 2021, the
trial court sentenced DeMuro to serve life in prison on Count 1. Count 2 was
vacated by operation of law, and Count 3 merged with Count 1 for sentencing.
DeMuro filed a timely motion for a new trial, which, through new counsel, he
amended on October 21, 2022. The trial court denied DeMuro’s motion for a
new trial on February 1, 2023. DeMuro filed a timely notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed in this Court to the April 2023 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
justification and that the trial court erred in refusing to send written

jury instructions out with the jury. For the reasons explained below,

we affirm.

     1. DeMuro contends that the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the fatal shooting was not justified, and he

argues that no evidence supported an inference of either malice or

implied malice. When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a

matter of constitutional due process, the proper standard of review

is whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). “This Court will

uphold the jury’s verdict as long as there is some competent

evidence, even if contradicted, to support each fact necessary to

make out the State’s case.” Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 150 (1)

(886 SE2d 818) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). “When a

defendant presents evidence that he was justified in using deadly

force, the State bears the burden of disproving the defense beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). “It is the

                                   2
role of the jury to evaluate the evidence and, when doing so, the jury

is free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and

to accept the evidence that the shooting was not done in self-

defense.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

     (a) Viewed according to this standard, the evidence presented

at trial showed the following. Dylan Cribbs (“Dylan”) and Philipo

Mihailidis each testified about an encounter between the two of

them on March 19, 2018, in downtown Savannah that led to a fist

fight on Hurst Avenue. Dylan and Mihailidis had been acquainted

for years, beginning when Mihailidis lived near the Cribbses’ home

on Hurst Avenue. Dylan testified that, at the time of the encounter,

they were not on friendly terms. That night, Dylan drove downtown

to pick up his girlfriend, Brianna Bedgood, from work, and was

headed home when they encountered Mihailidis, who was driving in

that area with his girlfriend, Madison Brundage. Dylan testified

that Mihailidis began driving aggressively, trying to run him off the

road. Mihailidis testified that it was Dylan who tried to run his

vehicle off the road. Mihailidis testified that he followed Dylan’s

                                   3
vehicle to Hurst Avenue, “to find out why [Dylan] had a problem

with [him].” Along the way, Mihailidis called Gilman, his best friend,

who was like a brother and mentor to him, and explained that he

was having an issue with Dylan and was headed to Hurst Avenue.

Gilman agreed to meet him there. Meanwhile Dylan called his

brother, Cody Cribbs (“Cody”), as he drove “[j]ust to be there, just in

case [Mihailidis] tried to come attack [him] or anything like that.”

Dylan testified that he reached his house, and then Cody and his

friend, DeMuro, pulled up in DeMuro’s truck. Dylan testified that

he and Cody confronted Mihailidis, where he was parked down the

street, while DeMuro stayed back at the house. A fight ensued.

Dylan and Mihailidis both testified that Gilman arrived in his car

and joined the fight. Dylan testified that Gilman knocked him

unconscious. When he came to, Cody and Mihailidis were still

fighting, and DeMuro was struggling with Gilman. Dylan testified

that he ran home and did not see the shooting. Mihailidis testified

that Gilman got DeMuro and Dylan “in a headlock” and took them

to the ground. Mihailidis testified that, as they fell, he saw a

                                  4
handgun in DeMuro’s back pocket. While DeMuro was on the

ground, “the first shot went off.” Mihailidis testified that, after that

shot, Gilman got up, said to DeMuro, “Whoa, whoa . . . stop,” ran

back to his car, and turned to open the door. Mihailidis testified that

DeMuro then “unloaded,” shooting repeatedly in Gilman’s direction.

Mihailidis fled in his truck, with Brundage. Mihailidis testified that,

throughout the incident, he never saw Gilman holding a gun.

     Brundage also testified about the “road rage kind of thing”

between Mihailidis and Dylan that preceded the fight on Hurst

Avenue. She testified about the first part of the fight, involving the

Cribbs brothers and Mihailidis, and testified that DeMuro “jumped

in” after the fight was in progress. Brundage testified that Gilman

arrived and put DeMuro and Dylan in a “headlock.” Brundage

testified that she heard Mihailidis yell, “There’s a gun.” She heard a

single gunshot and then more shots as Mihailidis drove them away,

but she did not see who was shooting or being shot.

     Several neighbors called 911 to report hearing shots fired.

DeMuro immediately surrendered to the first responding officer and

                                   5
said, “I shot him[.]” The officer asked, “[W]here is the gun?” DeMuro

answered, “I put them in the truck.” The forensics team located two

guns on the front seat of DeMuro’s truck, a Glock 30-S, which was

unloaded, and a Glock 20, which contained a fully loaded magazine.

On the night of the shooting, an investigator contacted a neighbor,

who lived a few houses down and had two security cameras mounted

on the front of his house. That neighbor’s security system recorded

the shooting and events surrounding it, and the security footage was

played for the jury. Because of the limited illumination, the video

did not show small objects, such as any weapon, and does not show

details such as facial features. The video showed a few people

fighting and then a flash. After the flash, the people began to walk

or run away from each other; there was another flash in proximity

to one person; and another person fell to the ground. The first person

approached the second person, who was still on the ground, and

stopped near him. Then there were several flashes between the first

person and the second person.

                                  6
     A forensic pathologist testified that he performed an autopsy

on Gilman’s body and found five penetrating gunshot wounds, plus

one graze wound, to Gilman’s face and torso. All of the wounds were

deemed wounds of indeterminate range, meaning the weapon was

fired from at least 18 inches away. There were no exit wounds; five

bullets were recovered from Gilman’s body. All of the penetrating

wounds traveled in an upward direction. One entrance wound was

on Gilman’s left upper back; the bullet traveled upward and across

the midline toward the right. That bullet did not strike any organs,

vertebrae, or other bones, and lodged in muscle tissue at the back of

Gilman’s neck, at the level of the seventh cervical vertebra, on the

right. Although the entrance wound was on Gilman’s back, the path

of travel of that bullet indicated that Gilman was shot from the side.

One wound to Gilman’s face caused serious injuries to his brain.

There were also two entrance wounds on Gilman’s chest, one on the

right and one on the left; a graze wound on his left chest; and an

entrance wound on his right upper abdomen. In response to a

hypothetical question, the pathologist testified that the injuries

                                  7
were consistent with the wound to Gilman’s back being the first

inflicted. In addition, the pathologist testified that a person who

received such a wound by itself and who received prompt medical

attention most likely would have recovered.

     A firearms examiner testified that three of the bullets removed

from Gilman’s body had been fired by the .45-caliber Glock 30-S that

had been seized from DeMuro’s truck; two of the bullets were too

damaged for comparison. The firearms examiner testified that ten

.45-caliber cartridge casings that had been collected at the location

of the shooting were fired by that same weapon.

     An audio-video recording of DeMuro’s custodial statement on

the night of the shooting was played for the jury. In that statement,

DeMuro said that Gilman slammed him into Mihailidis’s truck,

knocking off his glasses. DeMuro stated that he is “about legally

blind without [his] glasses.” DeMuro said Gilman “bear-hugged” him

and took him to the ground and was choking him to the point that

DeMuro was “probably going to pass out,” so he drew his .45-caliber

Glock 30-S from his holster and fired a round in the air when the

                                 8
gun was very close to his and Gilman’s heads. DeMuro thought, “I

just disorient[ed] him. I can go,” and he got up and walked a few feet

away. At that point, he “had this whitewashed feeling come over”

him, and he wondered where his second gun, the 10mm Glock 20,

was. DeMuro stated, “I turn around. My gun was in [Gilman’s] hand

. . . and I just unloaded every round I had in that magazine.” Before

DeMuro fired at Gilman, Gilman was “just standing there,” looking

“disorient[ed],” with the Glock 20 “still pointed at the ground,” but

DeMuro felt he needed to shoot Gilman because Gilman had come

and “just started assaulting people” and was now holding a loaded

weapon. DeMuro had heard “before from other people around town

that Kevin Gilman was kind of mental, kind of always liked

fighting.” DeMuro stated, “I tried everything in my power to try to

avoid a deadly situation like this.” When DeMuro fired the first shot

at Gilman, Gilman “was broadside” to DeMuro, not facing him. After

emptying his Glock 30-S in Gilman’s direction, DeMuro picked up

the Glock 20, which was still fully loaded, from the ground where it

had “dropped right next to” Gilman and put it and the now-empty

                                  9
Glock 30-S he used to shoot Gilman in his truck. DeMuro stated, “I

hated to do it, but, honestly, I feared for my own life. I was already

assaulted pretty bad and I just thought, ‘There’s fifteen rounds in

that gun. He could kill everybody here.’” DeMuro did not know how

many shots he fired but stated, “[A]s I saw the gun in his hand[,] . .

. it was just instinct[,] and I said, ‘Just shoot and kill until he’s

dead,’” and, “I just shot him until I just knew he was dead because .

. . he had one good firearm and there were other people and the only

thing I could think of, like, ‘I’m not letting my . . . friends die because

somebody wanted to follow my friends from downtown.’”

     At trial, DeMuro testified in support of his sole defense that the

shooting was justified in defense of himself and others and largely

reiterated his custodial statement. DeMuro testified that, on the

night he shot and killed Gilman, he and his friend, Cody, were

relaxing at DeMuro’s house on Hurst Avenue, several doors down

from the Cribbses’ home, watching a movie, when Cody received a

phone call, “and he seemed quite frantic” and “distraught.” Cody

said it was something with his little brother, and said, “We’ve got to

                                    10
go.” Cody grabbed DeMuro’s keys and ran out the door. DeMuro, who

had a concealed-carry permit and described himself as being

“passionate” about guns, was already carrying his .45-caliber Glock

30-S, loaded with 10 rounds of ammunition, inside his waistband in

a “belly holster.” Before following Cody out the door, DeMuro picked

up his 10mm Glock 20, loaded with 15 rounds, and stuck it in his

back pocket.

     DeMuro testified that Cody drove DeMuro’s truck and stopped

beside Mihailidis’s truck in the middle of Hurst Avenue, and Cody

and Mihailidis exchanged “heated words” through their windows.

Cody then parked at the Cribbses’ house. Dylan was already at their

house. The two brothers ran down the street to where Mihailidis was

still parked a few houses down. DeMuro testified that he initially

hung back at the Cribbses’ house, and he told Bedgood and her

brother, Tim Treadwell, who were standing outside the house, to call

the police. DeMuro testified that he saw that Cody and Dylan were

fighting Mihailidis. Bedgood and Treadwell urged DeMuro to “go

down there,” and he responded that he could not do that. But then,

                                11
DeMuro testified, he saw that “somebody was on the ground

probably getting hurt and so [he] wanted to go and try and stop it.”

He again told Bedgood and Treadwell to call the police and then

“proceeded to walk back down the street.” DeMuro verbally tried to

break up the fight but did not get physically involved in the scuffle

at first. Then Gilman arrived in his car; DeMuro testified that he

was familiar with Gilman only by reputation around the

neighborhood, which was “[t]hat he had a very violent attitude.”

DeMuro testified that Gilman ran up to Dylan, and knocked him out

with a punch to the face. From “several feet away,” DeMuro “asked

[Gilman] to stop. [Gilman] look[ed] at [DeMuro] and [said], ‘You

want some, too?’” DeMuro said, “no,” and backed away with his

hands raised. DeMuro testified that Gilman ran at him, slammed

him twice into the side of Mihailidis’s truck, causing DeMuro’s

glasses to fly off into the back of the truck, and then threw DeMuro

to the ground.

     DeMuro testified that Gilman began choking him and he began

to lose consciousness. Fearing for his life, DeMuro “had to figure out

                                 12
a way to get [Gilman] to stop choking [him].” DeMuro drew his Glock

30-S out of his belly holster and “made the decision at that point not

to shoot anybody but to simply fire a warning shot in the only safe

direction that [he] thought was possible at that time, which was

straight [up] in the air.” After that shot, Gilman let go of DeMuro

and said, “Whoa.” DeMuro testified that he remained on the ground,

“trying to regain [his] faculties, [his] breathing and [his] vision. And

after a few seconds [he] began to stand and at that point [he] realized

that the weapon that was in [his] back pocket, the Glock 20, was no

longer there.” DeMuro testified that he observed that Gilman was

“broadside” of him, “facing the people behind and around

[Mihailidis’s] vehicle,” with “a pistol in his hand.” DeMuro testified

that, Gilman “[i]nitially” had the gun “pointed at the ground,” and

he never pointed it at DeMuro.

     DeMuro testified that he decided to shoot at Gilman, because

he “had no indication that . . . [Gilman] was abandoning the fight

and now he was armed.” Gilman had driven up to the fight, knocked

out Dylan, attacked DeMuro, slammed him into the vehicle two

                                  13
times, knocking off his glasses, thrown him to the ground, placed

him in a choke-hold until he nearly lost consciousness, and then

obtained his second handgun, “and it was based on all of those things

that [DeMuro] assumed that [Gilman] was going to use that firearm

to continue the fight.” DeMuro testified that, after he fired at Gilman

“broadside,” Gilman “hit the ground,” but “appeared to be getting

up,” and DeMuro could clearly see that Gilman still had the weapon

in his hand. DeMuro testified that, “[a]t that point [he] perceived

[Gilman] to still be a threat, and[,] considering now that [Gilman]

had been shot, [DeMuro] thought surely [Gilman] would shoot [him]

or somebody else. . . . That is why [DeMuro] fired the additional

rounds” while walking toward Gilman. DeMuro fired at Gilman

until he “dispensed the whole magazine” and Gilman “was no longer

a threat.” DeMuro testified that, after shooting Gilman, he walked

back to the Cribbses’ house and called 911 on Bedgood’s phone. He

decided to pick up his Glock 20 handgun that was on the ground

near Gilman “for safety reasons” because it was loaded. DeMuro put

                                  14
the Glock 20 and the Glock 30-S he used to shoot Gilman in his truck

and waited for the police to come.

     (b) Under OCGA § 16-3-21 (a),

     a person is justified in using force which is intended or
     likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he or she
     reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
     prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or herself
     or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible
     felony.

Under OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (1), “[a] person is not justified in using

force . . . if he . . . [i]nitially provokes the use of force against himself

with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm

upon the assailant[.]” And under OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (3), a person is

not justified in using force if he “[w]as the aggressor or was engaged

in a combat by agreement unless he withdraws from the encounter

and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do

so and the other, notwithstanding, continues or threatens to

continue the use of unlawful force.”

     The only evidence that Gilman ever held a gun was DeMuro’s

custodial statement and trial testimony that – while being “about

                                     15
legally blind” because his glasses were knocked off, trying to recover

his breathing because Gilman had been choking him, and just after

DeMuro fired a warning shot with his .45-caliber gun very close to

his head – he saw Gilman holding his gun. But the jury was free to

reject DeMuro’s version of the facts in favor of witness testimony

that Gilman was unarmed.

     Furthermore, even DeMuro never claimed to see Gilman

pointing the gun anywhere except the ground. DeMuro’s statements

and testimony showed that Gilman was turning away from him

when he first fired in Gilman’s direction. Mihailidis’s testimony

indicated that, between DeMuro’s warning shot and the next shot,

Gilman was running away from DeMuro, trying to get in his car.

The jury could infer from the security video that the flashes were

gunfire; that the first shot to strike a person caused that person to

fall to the ground; and that multiple shots were fired at that person

when he was on the ground. The evidence was sufficient for the jury

to find that any belief on DeMuro’s part that it was necessary to

shoot Gilman was not a reasonable belief and therefore could not

                                 16
serve as a basis for justification under OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). The

evidence was also sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable

doubt that DeMuro provoked any threat of the use of deadly force as

an excuse to shoot Gilman, or that he shot Gilman after Gilman was

trying to withdraw from the conflict, either or which would preclude

a justification defense pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-21 (b).2

      Furthermore, pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-1, malice in the killing

of another may either be express, a “deliberate intention unlawfully

      2 See Williams, 316 Ga. at 150-151 (1) (The evidence was sufficient to

authorize the jury to reject the defendant’s self-defense claim where the jury
could have concluded from a video recording of the incident that the victim was
walking to his girlfriend’s truck to leave the apartment complex where a fight
involving the defendant had taken place, when the defendant approached the
victim from the side, fired his gun at the victim, and then walked away.); Huff
v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 563 (1) (883 SE2d 773) (2023) (The jury was authorized
to reject the defendant’s self-defense claim where the jury could have concluded
from a video recording of the shooting that the victim’s conduct “did not give
rise to a reasonable belief that [the victim] was threatening to physically harm
[the defendant].”); Jackson v. State, 315 Ga. 543, 551 (1) (b) (883 SE2d 815)
(2023) (The jury was authorized to reject the defendant’s self-defense claim in
part because the first victim was not within close range of the defendant and
was walking away from the defendant’s porch toward his car when the
defendant shot him and the first victim’s girlfriend was merely getting out of
the car and walking to where the first victim lay, injured, and was not
threatening the defendant in any way at the time he shot her.); Gobert v. State,
311 Ga. 305, 309 (1) (a) (857 SE2d 647) (2021) (The jury was authorized to
reject the defendant’s defense of self and defense of others theory where the
defendant shot at the victims as they fled in a car and no one was “in any
danger or in any imminent threat of harm at that point.”).

                                      17
to take the life of another human being which is manifested by

external circumstances capable of proof[,]” or implied, “where no

considerable provocation appears and where all the circumstances

of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” The malice

necessary to establish malice murder “may be formed in an instant,

as long as it is present at the time of the killing. It is for a jury to

determine from all the facts and circumstances whether a killing is

intentional and malicious.” Coates v. State, 310 Ga. 94, 97-98 (849

SE2d 435) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Evidence that

DeMuro shot Gilman in the back as Gilman was walking or running

away and then continued shooting Gilman as he lay motionless on

the ground until, as DeMuro stated, he knew Gilman was dead was

sufficient to support the jury’s finding of malice. 3

     3 See Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 720-721 (1) (873 SE2d 166) (2022) (The

evidence authorized the jury to find malice where the defendant argued with
the victim, became angry, and shot the victim multiple times, despite the
victim raising his hands and where the defendant admitted that the victim was
“unarmed and unthreatening.”); Williams v. State, 306 Ga. 674, 675 (1) (832
SE2d 843) (2019) (The evidence authorized the jury to find malice where the
defendant “shot at an unarmed man who was driving away, following an
argument,” and the jury was entitled to reject the defendant’s argument that
he was overcome with emotion and fired at the victim as a result of a sudden,

                                     18
      For the foregoing reasons, this claim of error fails.

      2. DeMuro contends that the trial court erred in instructing the

jury. Specifically, he argues that the jury did not receive a complete

set of instructions before retiring to deliberate, because the jury

could not hear certain words and phrases in the court’s recitation of

the jury charge due to conditions in the courtroom. DeMuro points

to multiple notations by the court reporter that words or phrases

were “inaudible,” including during portions of the jury instructions

relating to witness credibility, impeachment, and justification.4

DeMuro concedes that, because he did not object to the jury

instructions as given, we review the alleged instructional error

under the plain-error standard of review. See Smith v. State, 315

Ga. 357, 362 (3) (882 SE2d 289) (2022).

violent, and irresistible passion.); Moran v. State, 302 Ga. 162, 164 (1) (b) (805
SE2d 856) (2017) (The evidence authorized the jury to find malice where the
defendant shot the victim in the back of the head at close range and where the
defendant admitted that she shot at the victim as he tried to escape and was
begging for his life.).
      4 The court reporter noted at the beginning of the transcript that

“[n]otations of ‘(inaudible)’ indicate individuals speaking over each other
and/or background noise obscuring the spoken words and ‘(indiscernible)’
indicates that an individual is either speaking too rapidly or too softly as to not
be discernable.

                                        19
      Review for plain error means that we will reverse the trial
      court only if there was an instructional error that was not
      affirmatively waived, was obvious beyond reasonable
      dispute, likely affected the outcome of the proceedings,
      and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
      reputation of judicial proceedings. [The appellant] has the
      burden of showing a clear or obvious error and further
      making an affirmative showing that the error probably
      did affect the outcome below.

Id. (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Dolphy v. State, 288

Ga. 705, 710 (3) (707 SE2d 56) (2011) (Where “there was no

reversible error, . . . it follows that there could be no plain error

either (since plain error does not exist in the absence of reversible

error).”).

      The    trial   court’s   charge   on   witness   credibility   and

impeachment was transcribed, in pertinent part, as follows:

           [T]he jury must determine the credibility of the
      witnesses. In deciding this, you may consider all of the
      facts and circumstances of the case, including the
      witnesses’ manner of testifying, the witnesses’ means and
      opportunity of knowing the facts about which they testify,
      the nature of the facts about which they testify, the
      probability or improbability of their testimony, the
      witness[es]’ interest or lack of interest in the outcome of
      the case, and the witness[es]’ personal credibility insofar
      as may be shown in your presence and by the evidence,
      any evidence of bias towards a witness, any (inaudible) or

                                   20
     motive to testify as shown by the evidence, and that would
     provide your authorized decision of any pending
     prosecution or (inaudible due to construction noise).
          Whether a witness has been impeached: The
     question of whether a witness has been impeached is
     whether you, the jury, believe the witness has been
     proven unworthy of belief. A witness may be impeached
     by disproving the facts to which the witness testified.
     Ladies and Gentlemen, in determining the credibility of
     witnesses and any testimony by them in court, the
     admission of facts or the (inaudible), you may consider
     more acceptable (inaudible) in terms of the credibility or
     the believability of any such witness. This may include,
     Ladies and Gentlemen, evidence that proves that the
     witness has been convicted of a felony offense. A felony
     offense is one punishable of one year or more in prison.
          I further charge you, to determine the credibility of
     any witness, their credibility has been attacked, cast
     doubt upon or challenged as I’ve described above, any
     testimony (inaudible) court, you may consider where
     applicable evidence helping to support the credibility or
     believability of any such witness.

     The charge on justification was transcribed, in pertinent part,

as follows:

          [T]he State has the burden of proving beyond a
     reasonable doubt Defendant’s actions were not justified.
     If you decide Defendant’s actions were justified or the
     State has failed to prove his actions were not justified
     beyond a reasonable doubt, then your duty is to find the
     Defendant not guilty.
          I further charge you that Defendant is not justified
     in the felony use of force if he provokes a threat for use of

                                  21
      force against himself, intending to use that threat of force
      as an excuse to harm the other person. It’s the initial
      presence unless he withdraws from the encounter and
      clearly communicates to the other person his intent to
      withdraw, and the other person continues or a threat is
      continued for use of unlawful force.[ 5]
            Ladies and Gentlemen, for Defendant’s threat for
      use of force to be justified: (1) Defendant must believe his
      felony use of force is necessary; (2) That belief must be
      reasonable, that is, a reasonable person would also
      believe that the threat of use of force be necessary; and (3)
      The Defendant’s legal belief must be what prompted him
      (inaudible) of use of force.
            I further charge you a person who is not the
      aggressor does not require (inaudible) before being
      justified in using force if he reasonably believes he
      (inaudible). Defendant’s use of deadly force is justified
      even when there has not been any physical contact or
      injury. Defendant’s action as alleged is sufficient beyond
      a reasonable doubt, Defendant’s or other (inaudible) in
      imminent danger, Defendant on the -- is the Defendant in
      imminent danger of serious bodily injury or in a forcible
      felony (inaudible), then Defendant’s use of deadly force
      may be justified. Worry is alone never justified in the use
      of deadly force no matter how (inaudible). Even though

      5 This appears to be a transcription error. Based on the court’s statement

at the jury charge conference about the instructions the court intended to give,
it appears that the court’s instruction here was modeled on the pattern
instruction regarding circumstances in which a defendant is not justified in the
use of force, including when he is the initial aggressor, unless he withdraws
from the encounter and clearly communicates to the other person his intent to
withdraw and the other person continues or threatens to continue the use of
unlawful force. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal
Cases, § 3.10.10 (4th ed., 2022).

                                      22
     (inaudible) accompanied by some menacing action, may
     justify the use of deadly force.
           A forcible felony is a felony involved in the use of
     force or (inaudible) against another.
           Again, aggravated assault as used in this situation,
     is a forcible felony and (inaudible) as defined here.

As noted above, DeMuro did not object to the jury charge as given,

on the basis that any part of the court’s verbal instructions were

hard to hear or on any other basis. Neither did the prosecutor raise

any issue about the audibility of the instructions. Likewise, no juror

voiced any concern about having difficulty hearing during the

charge. During jury deliberations, the jury sent a single note to the

court, which was a request to review specific trial exhibits. The jury

did not request written instructions or repetition of any particular

instructions.

     DeMuro argues that it is error to give the jury an incomplete

charge and that the defect in the charge is not subject to dispute

because the transcript shows that the instructions were incomplete.

He argues that it is speculative to assume that the jury heard words

that the court reporter did not hear and record in the transcript.

                                 23
DeMuro contends that this error affected his substantial right to a

fair trial because the subjects on which the jury was inadequately

charged (justification, witness credibility, and impeachment)

impacted how the jury considered his sole defense of justification

and the testimony from witnesses who were impeached. DeMuro

argues that this Court should exercise its discretion and reverse his

convictions because allowing them to stand seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings.

     We conclude, however, that DeMuro fails to meet the plain-

error standard. He has not shown, and we cannot assume, that the

jurors could not hear the words or phrases that the court reporter

was unable to transcribe, especially since the jury did not ask for

repetition or clarification of any instruction, and there is no

indication in the record that counsel for the State or for DeMuro

were unable to hear the instructions. Under the circumstances, it is

not “obvious beyond reasonable dispute” that the verbal instructions

delivered by the trial court were actually incomplete in the respect

indicated by the court reporter’s inability to transcribe certain words

                                  24
and phrases. See Smith, 315 Ga. at 362 (3). DeMuro has not met his

burden of establishing that the designated portions of the jury

charge constitute plain error, and this claim of error fails. See Sapp

v. State, 290 Ga. 247, 250 (2) (719 SE2d 434) (2011) (In the case of

allegedly incomplete jury instructions, the appellant’s burden under

the plain-error test includes showing that the designated omission

constituted an error that was clear or obvious, rather than one

subject to reasonable dispute.).6

      3. DeMuro contends that the trial court erred by not sending

written jury instructions back with the jury. He argues that the

transcript shows that acoustics were poor during the trial, partly

because of Plexiglas barriers in place and people sitting further

apart than usual as part of precautions taken due to the COVID-19

      6 The case DeMuro cites, Essuon v. State, 286 Ga. App. 869 (650 SE2d

409) (2007), even if it were binding on this Court, is distinguishable, in that
the appellant in that case showed that the jury charge at issue entirely omitted
two essential elements of the crimes charged. See id. at 872 (2) (Reversal of
convictions of criminal solicitation to commit a felony, the underlying felony
being murder, was required because the trial court failed to instruct the jury
on the legal definitions of “felony” and “murder,” which were essential elements
of the crime charged.).

                                      25
pandemic. 7 In addition to the court reporter’s inability to completely

transcribe the jury instructions, as discussed in connection with the

previous claim of error, DeMuro points to multiple times that the

judge expressed difficulty hearing what was said by counsel or

witnesses and multiple times others expressed difficulty hearing the

judge. DeMuro argues, based on multiple instances where someone

expressed difficulty hearing another person speaking, “it was, or

should have been, apparent to the trial court that everyone in the

courtroom was having a hard time hearing what was being said

throughout the trial” and that the jury would need written

instructions during deliberations.

      The transcript shows that, during the jury charge conference,

the judge expressed an inclination not to send a copy of the written

charge out with the jury. The prosecutor agreed. DeMuro’s counsel

stated, “I come from a different school of thought on that, Judge. I

don’t see any reason why they can’t have the law. It probably saves

      7 We note that, in addition to references to Plexiglas barriers, the court

and counsel also referred to problems with hearing jurors during voir dire due
to the wearing of masks.

                                      26
us some time in briefing meetings.” DeMuro’s counsel did not

comment on any acoustical issues that may have interfered with the

jury’s ability to hear the court’s charge. The trial court then

announced, “Initially I’m not going to give a copy of the charge to the

jury, but if they come back and request to have them recharged, I’ll

give it at that point.” DeMuro’s counsel did not object to that plan,

object at the end of the charge to any of the instructions, or

subsequently request that written instructions be sent out with the

jury. We assume without deciding that, despite DeMuro’s failure to

object, plain-error review is authorized on the basis that the failure

to provide the jury with written instructions constituted in this case

“a failure to charge the jury[.]” See OCGA § 17-8-58 (a), (b).8

     8 OCGA § 17-8-58 provides:

            (a) Any party who objects to any portion of the charge to the
     jury or the failure to charge the jury shall inform the court of the
     specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury
     retires to deliberate. Such objections shall be done outside of the
     jury’s hearing and presence.
            (b) Failure to object in accordance with subsection (a) of this
     Code section shall preclude appellate review of such portion of the
     jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes
     plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties. Such
     plain error may be considered on appeal even if it was not brought

                                      27
     We have held that “there is no requirement under Georgia law,

either statutory or otherwise, that the jury be given a written copy

of the court’s instructions for use in deliberations. Though trial

courts clearly have the authority to do so, they are not required to

do so.” Franklin v. State, 298 Ga. 636, 642 (4) (784 SE2d 359) (2016)

(citation omitted). DeMuro has not identified any precedent holding

that a trial court’s decision not to send written jury instructions out

with the jury is reversible error, even if the transcript ultimately

shows that courtroom acoustics were not ideal or that the court

reporter was unable to transcribe every word of particular

instructions. See Stewart v. State, 311 Ga. 471, 476 (1) (b) (858 SE2d

456) (2021) (Although the jury instructions at issue, in particular

the verdict form, deviated from the pattern instructions, the

instructions were not erroneous in view of the unequivocally clear

words of a statute or court rule or in view of controlling precedent.

In the absence of controlling authority establishing that any error in

     to the court’s attention as provided in subsection (a) of this Code
     section.

                                     28
the jury instructions at issue was obvious beyond reasonable

dispute, the appellant could not meet the second prong of the plain-

error test.). Therefore, DeMuro again has not met the plain-error

standard, and this claim of error fails. See id.; see also Walter v.

State, 304 Ga. 760, 767 (3) (b) (822 SE2d 266) (2018) (“An error is

plain if it is clear or obvious under current law. An error cannot be

plain where there is no controlling authority on point.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                 29