Court Opinion

ID: 9470831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:16:57.031187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:07.377593
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the court in affirming the denial of Nichols’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ■ I write separately because I fail to understand how the trial court committed an error, let alone an error of “constitutional magnitude”, in failing to give to the jury the attempted rape instruction requested. Once a defendant has been convicted of a crime in a state court and has gone through the state appellate system and has had that conviction affirmed, absent a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, federal courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the highest court of the state. It is unnecessary for this court to address constitutional issues that need not be considered in the resolution of the instant appeal. Such constraint lends stability to our decisions and “lessens the threat of ‘untoward practical ramifications’ ... not foreseen at the time of decision.” Illinois v. Gates, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2325, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (citation omitted).
In order to state a cognizable habeas corpus claim, a petition must allege that the trial court’s instructions deprived the petitioner of a constitutionally protected right. 28 U.S.C. section 2254(a). See Davis v. Greer, 675 F.2d 141, 144 (7th Cir.1982). In his application to the federal district court, Nichols challenged his conviction for rape on the ground that his due process rights were violated when the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted rape. From my review of the record, I am convinced that the petitioner’s due process rights were in no way violated and the petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied by the district court.
In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a sentence of death could not be imposed after a jury verdict of guilt of a capital offense, when the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of a lesser included non-capital offense, provided that the evidence would have supported such a verdict. The Court in Beck expressly reserved judgment on whether the due process guarantees of the Constitution required the giving of lesser included offense instructions in non-capital cases. We need not decide this question as even assuming Beck applies to the instant case it is clear that the Wisconsin law pertaining to lesser included offense instructions in effect at the time of Nichols’ trial, and in effect today, conforms with applicable constitutional standards.
*1273In Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982), the Court had an opportunity to review Beck in another capital case. The Court reiterated that:
“The Beck opinion considered the alternatives open to a jury which is constrained by a preclusion clause and therefore unable to convict a defendant of a lesser included offense when there was evidence which, if believed, could reasonably have led to a verdict of guilt of a lesser offense.”
102 S.Ct. at 2052 (emphasis added).
“Beck held that [in a capital case] due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction. But due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. The jury’s discretion is thus channelled so that it may convict a defendant of any crime fairly supported by the evidence. Under Alabama law, the rule in non-capital cases is that a lesser included offense instruction should be given if ‘there is any reasonable theory from the evidence which would support the position’ ... The Alabama rule clearly does not offend federal constitutional standards, and no reason has been advanced why it should not apply in capital cases.”
102 S.Ct. at 2049 (emphasis added).
Likewise, it is clear that the Wisconsin rule (concerning the inclusion of a lesser included offense instruction) applied to Nichols does not offend the applicable federal constitutional standards. The standard to be applied in Wisconsin in determining whether a “lesser included” instruction should be given to a jury was clearly stated in Ross v. State, 61 Wis.2d 160, 169, 211 N.W.2d 827, 831 (1973). The majority purports to recognize Ross as controlling but only paraphrases the standard for inclusion of a lesser included offense instruction stating that “[u]nder the law of Wisconsin an instruction on a lesser included offense is proper only if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for conviction of that offense.” The majority’s paraphrase is simply not a complete statement of the appropriate state standard set forth by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Ross and subsequently reaffirmed in State v. Williford, 103 Wis.2d 98, 307 N.W.2d 277 (1981), because it completely ignores one of the two sub-issues involved. Contrary to the majority opinion, under the law of Wisconsin “there must be a reasonable ground in the evidence for acquittal on the greater charge and for conviction on the lesser charge,” Ross, 61 Wis.2d at 169, 211 N.W.2d 827 (emphasis added), to justify submitting a lesser included charge.
This rule, however, does not suggest that submission of lesser included offenses is automatic upon request:
“The key word in the rule is ‘reasonable.’ The rule does not suggest some near automatic inclusion of all lesser but included offenses as additional options to the jury. Only if ‘under a different, but reasonable view,’ the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt of the lower degree and also leave a reasonable doubt as to some particular element included in the higher degree but not the lower should the lesser crime also be submitted to the jury ...”
State v. Bergenthal, 47 Wis.2d 668, 675, 178 N.W.2d 16 (1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972, 91 S.Ct. 1657, 29 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971).
As noted by the district court in denying Nichols’ habeas request:
“At the petitioner’s trial he testified that the woman whom he was accused of raping agreed voluntarily to have intercourse with him but he was unable to achieve an erection. The woman testified that the petitioner forced her to submit and that penetration was accomplished although the petitioner’s erection was weak. The petitioner’s argument is that the jury might have believed the woman’s testimony that she was forced, but have also believed his testimony that he was *1274unable to achieve an erection, and under those circumstances that an instruction on attempted rape was appropriate.
The district court concluded that it would have required “an unlikely construction of the evidence for a reasonable jury” to have accepted the petitioner’s argument. I agree that it was unlikely that a reasonable jury would have accepted the petitioner’s convoluted assessment of the facts. I am confident that the evidence presented at trial certainly did not supply “a reasonable ground ... for acquittal on the greater charge and for conviction on the lesser charge.” Ross, 61 Wis.2d at 169, 211 N.W.2d 827 (emphasis added).
Throughout his testimony, the petitioner maintained that the complainant readily and voluntarily complied with his sexual advances. At no time, according to Nichols, did the complainant resist or struggle. According to the testimony of the complainant, her encounter with the petitioner constituted rape (penetration achieved by force and without the victim’s consent, Baldwin v. State, 59 Wis.2d 116, 122-23, 207 N.W.2d 630 (1973)). The testimony of the petitioner, if believed, provided a complete defense to a rape charge (consensual involvement). I cannot agree with the majority’s acceptance of the petitioner’s hybrid account of the encounter noting that “[sjince both testified to Nichols’ difficulty in achieving an erection, the evidence that Mrs. Greena-myer was forced was inherently stronger than the evidence that she was raped.” Such mental gymnastics are not consistent with Wisconsin’s long-accepted reasonable evidence test for the inclusion of lesser included offense instructions nor required by a logical reading of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
It is well-settled that when the evidence, considered in its entirety, does not provide a rational basis for a jury to acquit on the greater charge and convict on the lesser charge, the trial court should exclude the lesser-included instruction. See United States v. Neiss, 684 F.2d 570, 571 (8th Cir. 1982) and United States v. Elk, 658 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir.1981).
In United States v. Sinclair, 444 F.2d 888, 890 (D.C.Cir.1971), the court stated that the “refusal to give the lesser-included offense instruction is not error when [the] defendant’s testimony is completely exculpatory and, if believed, could only lead to acquittal.” The situation referred to by the Sinclair court is exactly that which is presented herein. Thus, there was no rational basis in the instant case for instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted rape and hence I find no error and agree with the trial court’s refusal to give the requested instructions. See United States v. Collins, 652 F.2d 735, 742 (8th Cir.1981). Neither due process nor any other constitutional guarantee is offended by a trial judge’s refusal to charge the jury on a matter not reasonably supported in the evidence. See Hallowell v. Keve, 555 F.2d 103, 107 (3d Cir.1977).
Additionally, only limiting review in the instant ease to the standard enunciated by this court in United States ex rel. Peery v. Sielaff, 615 F.2d 402, 404 (7th Cir.1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2163, 64 L.Ed.2d 794, reh’g denied, 448 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 29, 65 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1980), and reiterated in Davis v. Greer, 675 F.2d 141 (1982), it is clear that Nichols’ petition was properly denied by the district court. The evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to support a lesser included jury charge of attempted rape, and the trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendant’s tendered instruction. Nichols has failed to prove that the evidence of a forcible, non-consensual attempt at intercourse was “so unequivocally strong that [the] failure to give the instruction amounted to a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Davis, 675 F.2d at 145.