Court Opinion

ID: 9952108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 19:00:55.39703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:38:03.440712
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12338    Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 03/19/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12338
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JAYSON E. WRIGHT,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 7:20-cr-00033-WLS-TQL-1
                           ____________________

        Before BRANCH, GRANT, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                         22-12338

        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
                Jayson Wright appeals his criminal conviction after pleading
        guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of
        producing child pornography by a parent or legal guardian in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b) and (e), and one count of producing
        child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e).
        Wright was sentenced to a total of 720-months’ imprisonment. For
        the ﬁrst time on appeal, Wright contends that the district court
        violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
        taking his guilty plea on the § 2251(a) charge because (1) there was
        not an adequate factual basis supporting his guilty plea and (2) the
        district court did not adequately explain the nature of Wright’s
        charge.
               Wright, charged in the § 2251(a) count with taking
        pornographic images of a sleeping minor girl, argues that the
        minor needed to have volitionally participated in the sexual act to
        sustain his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). 1 Because
        the district court did not mention a volitional requirement during
        the plea colloquy, and because Wright would not have pleaded
        guilty had he known about what he contends is the volitional
        requirement, Wright argues that he was prejudiced and his
        conviction should be reversed. Because we have held that 18 U.S.C.
        § 2251(a) does not require the minor to volitionally participate in

        1 Wright does not challenge his § 2251(b) conviction in this appeal.
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        22-12338                    Opinion of the Court                                   3

        the sexual act, Wright’s challenge fails. Accordingly, after careful
        review, we aﬃrm.
                                      I.      Background
               On August 17, 2020, Wright’s biological daughter, J.W.,
        alerted a family friend that her parents had been sexually abusing
        her.2 The family friend alerted police, who interviewed Wright and
        his wife, searched their phones, and seized other electronic devices
        from their house. The search of their electronic devices revealed
        many images and videos depicting child pornography. Twenty-
        eight videos were found depicting oral, vaginal, and anal sex
        between J.W. and her parents over a two-year period. Wright also
        had additional images of other minors—friends of J.W.—who had
        slept over in the home, where Wright took photos of the minors
        sleeping. In the photos, Wright is seen pulling the sleeping minors’
        underwear to the side to expose their genitals and posing nude with
        an erect penis near the exposed portions of their bodies. Finally,
        other images of child pornography (not involving Wright, his wife,
        or J.W.) were discovered, including 3,111 videos and 316 photos
        depicting oral sex, anal sex, vaginal sex, bondage, and bestiality
        involving minors.

        2 We take the undisputed facts from the presentence investigation report and

        from Wright’s plea colloquy. See United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 844 (11th
        Cir. 2009) (“[A] failure to object to allegations of fact in a PSI admits those facts
        for sentencing purposes and precludes the argument that there was error in
        them.”) (quotation omitted)).
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                    22-12338

               J.W. stated during her interview that Wright began sexually
        abusing her when she was ﬁve years old, and that by 2020, when
        she was twelve, Wright was forcing her to have sex with him 15 to
        20 times per month. J.W. said that her mother also participated in
        the sexual abuse and would try to calm her down during the abuse.
               Wright was indicted on six counts of producing child
        pornography involving his own minor daughter and other minors,
        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (b), and (e). 3 Wright reached a
        written plea agreement, under which he pleaded guilty to one
        count of producing child pornography of his daughter, J.W.
        (Count 1), and one count of production of child pornography of
        an unrelated minor victim, M.L. (Count 4), in exchange for
        dismissal of the remaining four counts.
              Only Count 4 is at issue in this appeal. Count 4 involved
        fourteen photographs that Wright took of M.L., a friend of J.W.’s
        whom J.W. had invited to their house to spend the night. While
        M.L. was sleeping, Wright moved her underwear to the side and
        took photos of her exposed vagina. In one of the photos, Wright
        placed his bare, erect penis close to M.L.’s exposed vagina. M.L.
        was nine years old at the time.
              At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court conﬁrmed
        that Wright had received a copy of the indictment and that

        3 The government also charged J.W.’s mother with three counts of production

        of child pornography while being the parent of the minor victim in violation
        of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b) and (e). She later pleaded guilty to one count and
        received a sentence of 360-months’ imprisonment.
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        22-12338              Opinion of the Court                        5

        Wright’s lawyer had explained the charges to him. The district
        court then read the charge in Count 4 to Wright and explained each
        element of the charge. In pertinent part, the district court
        explained that the government would have to prove beyond a
        reasonable doubt (1) that Wright did or attempted to either
        “employ, use, induce, entice, [or] coerce” M.L. (2) “to engage in
        sexually explicit conduct.” The district court did not deﬁne what it
        meant “to engage in sexually explicit conduct.” The district court
        asked Wright if he understood this charge and gave him a chance
        to ask questions. Wright conﬁrmed that he understood the charge
        and did not have any questions.
               The government then recited the facts relevant to Count 4,
        namely that Wright took explicit photos of M.L. while she was
        having a sleep over with J.W., and that the photographs depicted
        M.L.’s exposed vagina and Wright’s erect penis positioned over
        M.L.’s vagina. Wright admitted these facts and that the
        government could prove them beyond a reasonable doubt if the
        case went to trial. Accordingly, the district court found that there
        was an adequate factual basis for Count 4. Wright at no point
        objected to the district court’s explanation of the elements of
        Count 4, the factual basis for Count 4, or otherwise challenged the
        validity of his plea.
              The district court sentenced Wright to 360 months for both
        Count 1 and Count 4 to run consecutively for a total sentence of
        720-months’ imprisonment. Wright now appeals his conviction as
        to Count 4.
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                     22-12338

                                   II.     Discussion
               Wright argues, for the ﬁrst time on appeal, that the district
        court violated Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(G) and
        (b)(3) in accepting his guilty plea.4 The two asserted violations
        stem from the same alleged error. Wright argues that to convict
        him under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), the government needed to prove
        that M.L. volitionally participated in the sexually explicit conduct.
        Because the district court did not discuss a volitional requirement
        when instructing Wright on the nature of his charge or require the
        government to make a factual showing that M.L. volitionally
        participated in the conduct, Wright argues that the district court
        violated the requirements of Rules 11(b)(1)(G) and (b)(3) in taking
        his guilty plea. And because M.L. was sleeping when Wright
        photographed her, Wright argues he would not have pleaded guilty
        if he knew M.L. had to have volitionally participated in the sexually
        explicit conduct.
               Wright asserts these Rule 11 errors for the ﬁrst time on
        appeal, so we review them for plain error only. See United States v.
        Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2015). On “plain
        error review, [Wright] bears the burden of establishing that

        4 Although Wright’s plea agreement contained an appeal waiver, he argues

        that the appeal waiver does not prevent this appeal because his claims would
        render the plea agreement invalid and unenforceable. The government
        agrees. The parties are correct that Wright’s appeal waiver does not bar the
        instant appeal. See United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1284–85
        (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that asserted violations of Rule 11(b)(1)(G) and
        Rule 11(b)(3) “are not barred by [an] appeal waiver in [a] plea agreement”).
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        22-12338                Opinion of the Court                            7

        (1) there is an error; (2) that is plain or obvious; (3) aﬀecting his
        substantial rights in that it was prejudicial and not harmless; and
        (4) that seriously aﬀects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
        of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Aguilar-Ibarra, 740 F.3d
        587, 592 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). As for the second
        requirement, “a district court’s error is not ‘plain’ or ‘obvious’ if
        there is no precedent directly resolving [the] issue,” United States v.
        Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation
        omitted), or if the error is not “plain . . . in view of the
        unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule.” Aguilar-Ibarra, 740
        F.3d at 592. Moreover, “[a]n error cannot be plain if neither the
        Supreme Court nor this Court has ever resolved the issue, and
        other circuits are split on it.” United States v. Bobal, 981 F.3d 971, 975
        (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted).
               Rule 11(b)(1)(G) requires a district court, before accepting a
        guilty plea, to “inform the defendant of, and determine that the
        defendant understands . . . the nature of each charge to which the
        defendant is pleading.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). The purpose
        of this nature-of-the-charge rule is to “ensure that a defendant’s
        guilty plea is knowing.” United States v. Lopez, 907 F.2d 1096, 1099
        (11th Cir. 1990). A district court’s approach to this task is not
        governed by mechanical rules, and it “may be done in diﬀerent
        ways depending on various factors.” United States v. Wiins, 131
        F.3d 1440, 1443 (11th Cir. 1997). We have said that what is required
        varies based on the complexity of the charge; ranging from reading
        the indictment and allowing the defendant to ask questions for
        simpler charges, to explaining the oﬀense like that given to the jury
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12338

        in its instructions for “charges of extreme complexity.” United
        States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). 5
               Relatedly, Rule 11(b)(3) requires a district court, before
        entering judgment on a guilty plea, to “determine that there is a
        factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). This rule
        “requires that the factual basis for each essential element of the
        crime be shown.” United States v. Boatright, 588 F.2d 471, 475 (5th
        Cir. 1979). “The purpose of this requirement is to protect a
        defendant who mistakenly believes that his conduct constitutes the
        criminal oﬀense to which he is pleading.” Lopez, 907 F.2d at 1100.
              In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) provides that “[a]ny
        person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces
        any minor to engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct for the purpose
        of producing any visual depiction of such conduct . . . shall be
        punished as provided under subsection (e).” (emphasis added).
               While Wright’s case was pending appeal, we rejected an
        identical argument to that made by Wright. We held that § 2251(a)
        does not require that the minor volitionally participate in the
        sexually explicit conduct. United States v. Dawson, 64 F.4th 1227,

        5 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)

        (holding that all decisions from the Fifth Circuit issued before the close of
        business on September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh
        Circuit).
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        22-12338                 Opinion of the Court                              9

        1236–39 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 144 S.Ct. 343 (2023). 6 In Dawson, we
        addressed
               whether an oﬀender ‘uses’ a minor in violation of
               § 2251(a) only by having the minor engage in sexually
               explicit conduct, or whether an oﬀender ‘uses’ a
               minor when the minor’s presence is the object and
               focal point of the oﬀender’s sexual desire as the
               oﬀender, not the minor, engages in the sexually
               explicit conduct.

        Id. at 1236. We held that the phrase “to engage in” in § 2251(a) does
        not require a minor “to be actively engaged in [the] sexually explicit
        conduct.” Id. Rather, the different verbs in the statute—“employs,
        uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces”—“suggest a
        continuum of participation by the minor covering a broad range of
        criminal conduct.” Id. at 1237. And “[o]n the passive end of the
        spectrum, . . . the verbs ‘employs’ and ‘uses,’ suggest[] the passive
        involvement of the minor, rather than the active engagement of
        the minor, in the offender’s sexually explicit conduct.” Id.
             Thus, even though the minor in Dawson sat passively
        unaware in the defendant’s presence while he ﬁlmed himself

        6 After the government filed a citation of supplemental authority pursuant to

        Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) addressing Dawson, we directed
        Wright to file a supplemental letter brief addressing whether Dawson
        foreclosed his argument. In that letter brief, Wright argues that Dawson is
        distinguishable because the minor victim in that case was awake, and Wright’s
        minor victim was sleeping. This difference is not meaningful. Based on
        Dawson and the plain language of § 2251(a), Wright’s argument fails.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                     22-12338

        masturbating, we upheld the defendant’s conviction under
        § 2251(a). Id. at 1238–39. We reasoned that the defendant’s
        “actions constituted the use of a minor to engage in sexually
        explicit conduct in violation of ” § 2251(a) because the minor served
        as “the object of [defendant’s] sexual desire as he engage[d] in
        sexually explicit conduct.” Id. at 1238.
               Dawson squarely forecloses Wright’s argument. Although
        M.L. was sleeping, it is clear that she was “employ[ed]” or “use[d]
        as the object of [Wright’s] sexual desire as he engage[d] in sexually
        explicit conduct.” Id. Because 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) “does not require
        the minor to be actively engaged in sexually explicit conduct,”
        Dawson, 64 F.4th at 1236, such a factual showing was not necessary
        under Rule 11(b)(3), nor was it part of the nature of the charge that
        the district court needed to explain to Wright under Rule
        11(b)(1)(G). Accordingly, the district court did not commit plain
        error in taking Wright’s guilty plea without ﬁnding M.L.
        volitionally participated in the sexual act.7
               AFFIRMED.8

        7 Wright also argues that the rule of lenity should apply to read § 2251(a) to

        exclude his conduct. But as we explained in Dawson, because “the traditional
        tools of statutory interpretation provide sufficient clarity on the meaning of
        § 2251(a)[,] . . . the rule of lenity does not apply.” 64 F.4th at 1239.
        8 This appeal was originally scheduled for oral argument, but the panel

        unanimously agreed to remove it from the oral argument calendar under 11th
        Circuit Rule 34-3(f).