Court Opinion

ID: 9589302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:43:28.567397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:41.533033
License: Public Domain

Ness, Associate Justice
(concurring and dissenting);
I concur in the majority opinion that prejudicial error was committed at trial. I also believe the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. I would reverse and order a judgment of acquittal.
The crucial issue presented by the motion for a directed verdict is whether the deceased, Paul Stewart, was shot and killed at 8:00 p.m. on the evening of the homicide. It is undisputed that his wife, the appellant, was at home at that time.
The State concedes its case rests solely on circumstantial evidence, the crucially disputed essential circumstance is whether the victim was shot and killed at 8:00 p.m. If this *305circumstance were established by competent proof it would be proper to submit the issue of appellant’s guilt to the jury. On the other hand, if this proof was based on surmise, conjecture and speculation, the evidence would be insufficient and erroneous to submit the case to the jury.
The primary testimony relied on by the State to establish the time of death at 8:00 p.m. was the testimony of Dr. Sandra Conradi, a forensic pathologist.
On direct examination, Dr. Conradi testified she examined the body of the deceased at 12:00 noon on the day following the homicide, and estimated that death had occurred between twelve and twenty-four hours earlier, with sixteen hours as a good estimate, thus speculating that the death occurred at 8:00 p.m. Her testimony was, (Tr. 195 ff. 13-25);
Q. And could you tell us in your medical opinion how long the body had been dead?
A. I estimated the body had been dead between twelve and twenty-four hours with sixteen hours as a good estimate in my opinion as to the length of time.
Q. So from 12:00 o’clock when you examined the body, you said sixteen hours before that?
A. Yes, sir.
On cross examination, Dr. Conradi testified: Tr. 203 f. 15, Tr. 204 f. 4:
Q. Now, you have narrowed down, you said, that you examined him at 12:00 o’clock, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The following day?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you said the cause of death was somewhere between twelve and twenty-four hours?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you say sixteen is that because you are taking the middle? The average?
A. Oh, sixteen, sixteen would be in my opinion a good estimate as to the time, a little closer to the twelve than the twenty-four.
Q. Could it vary as much as — could it vary sixteen hours either way?
A. It could, but in my opinion it may vary two hours either way. (emphasis added)
*306From a review of this testimony, it is obvious that the conclusion reached by Dr. Conradi as to the time of death was based purely upon surmise, conjecture and speculation. This proof offered by the State to establish the time of death at 8:00 p.m. is insufficient to support the conviction.
We have uniformly held where the State relies solely upon circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, as it does here, “it is necessary that every circumstance be proved beyond a reasonable doubt----It is not sufficient that they create a probability, though a strong one,” and, “on a motion for a directed verdict the trial judge ... should not refuse to grant the motion where the evidence merely raises a suspicion of guilt.” State v. Littlejohn, 228 S. C. 324, 89 S. E. (2d) 924 (1955); State v. Jones, 241 S. C. 271, 128 S. E. (2d) 114 (1962).
Reviewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State as required by the “any” evidence rule, State v. Bailey, 253 S. C. 204, 170 S. E. (2d) 376 (1969), I am convinced that the record is without “any” evidence to support appellant’s conviction.
Moreover, viewing the evidence in accordance with the standard of appellate review mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. (2d) 560 (1979), it is even more convincing the trial judge erred in refusing appellant’s motion for a directed verdict. This standard of appellate review requires us to consider not whether there is “any” evidence to support the conviction, but whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is inconceivable that a rational trier of fact could j ustify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based upon the evidence of record, because of the following:
1. The speculative nature of Dr. Conradi’s testimony relating to the crucial issue as to the time of death;
2. The testimony relating to the broken window pane through which anyone could gain entrance into the home by unlocking the door;
3. The testimony of the impartial witness, Syphrett, that he heard five gunshots at 10:15 p.m., conclusively rebut*307ting the speculative conclusion by Dr. Conradi as to the time of death;
4. The strange activity of the State’s witness, Pinkston, on the evening of the homicide, that angry remarks were directed to Pinkston’s girlfriend by the deceased for messing up the yard;
5. The testimony concerning car doors slamming in the victim’s yard about 10:00 p.m.;
6. The uncontradicted testimony of the three witnesses that appellant was in Columbia about the time the gunshots were heard;
7. The testimony of Judge Brown that the weapon used by the appellant to fire at a snake in the neighbor’s yard had been lost by the Stewarts for several years before the homicide;
8. The inability of any witness to verify that the bullet dug up from the neighbor’s yard was the same one fired by the appellant at the snake;
9. The testimony that the bullets taken from the victim’s body and the matching bullet dug up from the neighbor’s yard could have been fired from either a .357 Ruger Security 6 or a Manuel Escoden, as well as a .38 caliber.
I would reverse and remand with direction to enter judgment for appellant.