Court Opinion

ID: 9514739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:25.552345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.446395
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 22.] SDCL 32-12-65 provides that “[a]ny person who drives a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state at a time when his privilege” is revoked, sus*633pended or canceled is subject to a misdemeanor offense. SDCL 32-33-2 provides, in part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided, whenever a person is arrested for a violation of any provision of this title punishable as a misdemeanor, the arresting officer shall take the name and address of the person and the license number of his motor vehicle and driver’s license and issue a summons or otherwise notify him in writing to appear at a time and place to be specified in the summons or notice.... The arresting officer shall upon the person’s written promise to appear, release him from custody.
(emphasis added). SDCL 32-12-65 classifies the offense of driving with a suspended, revoked or canceled license as a misdemeanor. Because that statute is not specifically exempted, SDCL 32-33-2 applies to Brassfield.
[¶ 23.] The majority opinion states, however, that what the legislature intended, in drafting SDCL 32-33-2, was that a driver produce a “valid” driver’s license number. It concludes that a suspended or expired driver’s license number is not “valid” and therefore, contrary to the statutory language, the driver does, not have to be released upon the driver’s written promise to appear.
[¶ 24.] The interpretation of statutes is subject to a de novo standard of review. In so doing, we must look at the wording of the statutes in question and interpret them according to their plain meaning:
‘The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used. Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and the Court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed. Since statutes must be construed according to-their intent, the intent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject.’
Moss v. Guttormson, 1996 SD 76, ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d 14, 17 (quoting U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 505 N.W.2d 115, 122-23 (S.D.1993)) (emphasis added).
[¶ 25.] In confining ourselves to the language used, the meaning of SDCL 32-33-2 is clear. The legislature could have very easily included the word “valid" as a modifier to the phrase “driver’s license.” However;-it chose not to. The legislature also could have exempted SDCL 32-12-65 from the application of 'SDCL 32-33-2, but again it chose not to. See SDCL 32-33-2.1, -A (specifically exempting the application of SDCL 32-33-2). Therefore, the production of a driver’s license number, whether suspended or expired, is in strict compliance with SDCL 32-33-2. As stated above, “[t]he intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said. ”
[¶ 26.] Setting aside the plain meaning of this statute, the majority opinions’ construction of SDCL 32-33-2 also violates our rules governing statutory interpretation. SDCL 32-12-65 provides that it is a misdemeanor offense to drive without a “valid” license. Again, the legislature did not exempt this statute from the application of SDCL 32-33-2, which provides that those who are arrested for misdemeanor offenses shall be released from custody once they give a written promise to appear. By inserting the word “valid” as a modifier to “driver’s license,” this court renders the reconciliation of these statutes impossible and circumvents what the legislature chose not to do. In other words, we *634judicially exempt the entire statute, SDCL 32-12-65, from the application of SDCL 32-33-2. This exemption was clearly not intended by the legislature, otherwise they would have done it themselves by “specifically providing” so. The majority opinion overlooks: (1) the legislative classification of these crimes as misdemeanors; (2) the clear language and application of SDCL 32-33-2; and (3) the fact that SDCL 32-12-65 is not legislatively exempted from the application of 32-33-2 to arrive at the conclusion that anyone driving with an “invalid” license is vulnerable to a custodial arrest and subsequent search of his vehicle. Obviously, the legislature did not intend this result (or the use of “valid” as a modifier); if it had, it would have employed its own language - “EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED.” Because our rules of interpretation prohibit us from reaching a result that was obviously unintended by the legislature, the majority opinion’s analysis is dead wrong.
[¶ 27.] The majority opinion is also concerned that “the [police] officer would have violated his duty as a law enforcement officer had he allowed Brassfield to sign a promise to appear and simply drive away.” The police officer already violated his “duties” by not complying with SDCL 32-33-2. Furthermore, Brassfield would not be allowed to “simply drive away.” This conclusion is absurd. However, it would have been his problem to either have someone come and drive his car for him or pay for towing expenses if the police officer deems it is improperly parked in a restricted area (SDCL 32-30-3).
[¶ 28.] I vote to reverse and remand.