Court Opinion

ID: 9787050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:09:23.512593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.679161
License: Public Domain

BURKE, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 28] I respectfully dissent. The majority reverses Defendant's five felony convie-tions on the basis that he had "the right to be present at the competency/taint hearing under the cireumstances of this case." I disagree. Defendant has not established that he had the right, constitutional or otherwise, to be present at the hearing. In addition, I am troubled by the lack of meaningful guidance for future cases. If the decision to exclude is dependent on the cireumstances, this Court should provide clear guidance to trial courts for deciding when exclusion is permissible. If exclusion is never permissible, the opinion should state so unequivocally.
[¶ 29] This is a case of first impression for this Court. We are called upon to decide whether a defendant has the constitutional right to be present at a hearing to determine a child victim's competency to testify regarding alleged sexual crimes. The basis for the majority's resolution of that issue is difficult to discern. On one hand, the opinion indicates that the defendant had the "absolute *855right" to be present, suggesting that the right is constitutional in nature. The majority does not specify the basis of that right, but it appears to be either the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand, the holding of this opinion is specifically limited to the "cireumstances of this case," suggesting that the right is not absolute. If it is not absolute, then every decision to exclude a defendant from a competency hearing necessarily requires the balancing of the defendant's right to be present against the need for protection of the child victim.
[¶ 30] Defendant contends that, because the hearing took place during trial, his pres-enee was required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-202 and W.R.Cr.P. 48(a). Both provide: "The defendant shall be present at ... every stage of the trial." The majority quotes the statute and the rule but does not specifically rest its determination on either. It also indicates that the competency hearing should have taken place prior to trial. The timing of the hearing, however, should not be dis-positive.
[v81] As we have previously recognized, a competency hearing may be held before or during trial. Emglish, 982 P.2d at 147 n. 2. Further, it makes little sense to determine the existence of constitutional rights based upon the timing of the hearing. As the Supreme Court recognized in Stincer:
Distinguishing between a "trial" and a "pretrial proceeding" is not particularly helpful here, however, because a competency hearing may well be a "stage of trial." In this case, for instance, the competency hearing was held after the jury was sworn, in the judge's chambers, and in the presence of opposing counsel.... Instead of attempting to characterize a competency hearing as a trial or pretrial proceeding, it is more useful to consider whether excluding the defendant from the hearing interferes with his opportunity for effective cross-examination.
482 U.S. at 789-40, 107 S.Ct. at 2664. The Supreme Court in Stincer concluded that the defendant's exelusion from the competency hearing did not infringe upon either his confrontation or his due process rights. Id. at 744-45, 107 S.Ct. at 2667.
[¶ 32] The result reached by the majority appears to be the first of its kind. The majority has not identified any case from any jurisdiction reversing a conviction because the defendant was excluded from a child victim's competency hearing.4 The majority attempts to find support in Sttncer, 482 U.S. 730, 107 S.Ct. 2658. Properly analyzed and applied, however, Stineer does not support the decision reached by the majority.
[¶ 33] The procedural format of the Stincer competency hearing was remarkably similar to the procedure utilized in the instant case.
After a jury was sworn, but before the presentation of evidence, the court conducted an in-chambers hearing to determine if the two young girls were competent to testify. Over his objection, respondent, but not his counsel ..., was excluded from this hearing.... [The judge, the prosecutor, and respondent's counsel asked questions of each girl to determine if she were capable of remembering basic facts and of distinguishing between telling the truth and telling a lie.
Id. at 732-33, 107 S.Ct. at 2660 (footnote omitted). The issue presented in Stncer was nearly identical to the question facing this Court. The Supreme Court stated the issue this way:
The question presented in this case is whether the exclusion of a defendant from a hearing held to determine the competency of two child witnesses to testify violates *856the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 732, 107 S.Ct. at 2660.
[¶ 34] The Court in Stincer first addressed the confrontation issue. Although the defendant had been excluded from the competency hearing, the Court found no confrontation violation because there was no restriction of the defendant's ability to cross-examine the child victims at trial. The Court explained:
[tlhe two children ... testified in open court.... [They] were subject to full and complete cross-examination, and were so examined. Respondent was present throughout this cross-examination and was available to assist his counsel as necessary. There was no Kentucky rule of law, nor any ruling by the trial court, that restrict, ed respondent's ability to cross-examine the witnesses at trial. Any questions asked during the competency hearing, which respondent's counsel attended and in which he participated, could have been repeated during direct examination and cross-examination of the witnesses in respondent's presence. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. [149], 159, 90 S.Ct. [1980], 1985[, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) ] ("[Thhe inability to cross-examine the witness at the time he made his prior statement cannot easily be shown to be of crucial significance as long as the defendant is assured of full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial").
Id. at 740, 107 S.Ct. at 2664-65 (record citations omitted). The Court rejected the defendant's confrontation claim: "[Wle conclude that respondent's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by his exelusion from the competency hearing of the two girls." Id. at 744, 107 S.Ct. at 2667.
[¶ 85] If we apply the Stincer analysis to Defendant's confrontation claim, we must reach the same conclusion. Defendant was present at trial and the child victim was cross-examined at length by defense counsel. Cross-examination was not restricted in any manner at trial. Any questions asked by defense counsel during the competency hearing could have been asked again during trial, in Defendant's presence. There was no violation of Defendant's confrontation rights.
[¶ 36] Defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated. A defendant has a constitutional due process right to be "present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure." Id. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2667. The majority essentially concludes that the competency hearing was a critical stage of the trial because, if the child victim was not competent to testify, conviction would have been unlikely. This approach was rejected by the Supreme Court in Stine-er:
We note once again that the Kentucky Supreme Court held that respondent's confrontation rights were violated because the competency hearing was a "crucial phase of the trial." 712 SW.2d, at 940. It is true that the hearing was crucial in the sense that respondent may not have been convicted had the two girls been found incompetent to testify. Nevertheless, the question whether a particular proceeding is critical to the outcome of a trial is not the proper inquiry in determining whether the Confrontation Clause has been violated. The appropriate question is whether there has been any interference with the defendant's opportunity for effective cross-examination. No such interference occurred in this case. Of course, the fact that a stage in the proceeding is critical to the outcome of a trial may be relevant to due process concerns. Even in that context, however, the question is not simply whether, "but for" the outcome of the proceeding, the defendant would have avoided conviction, but whether the defendant's presence at the proceeding would have contributed to the defendant's opportunity to defend himself against the charges.
Id. at 744 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. at 2667 n. 17.
[¶ 37] The Supreme Court in Stincer ultimately rejected the defendant's due process challenge because he failed to establish that "his presence at the competency hearing in this case would have been useful in ensuring a more reliable determination as to whether *857the witnesses were competent to testify." Id. at 747, 107 S.Ct. at 2668. The Court explained:
He has presented no evidence that his relationship with the children, or his knowledge of facts regarding their background, could have assisted either his counsel or the judge in asking questions that would have resulted in a more assured determination of competency. On the record of this case, therefore, we cannot say that respondent's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by his exelusion from the competency hearing. As was said in United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 527, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 148[5], 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (per curiam ), there is no indication that respondent "could have done [anything] had [he] been at the [hearing] nor would [he] have gained anything by attending."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
[¶ 38] The same analysis applies here. Defense counsel did not, at any time before or during the hearing, assert that Defendant's presence was necessary to aid counsel in formulating questions or additional lines of inquiry. Defense counsel did not seek leave to confer with his client prior to ending his questioning. Other than the initial objection to the State's request, defense counsel did not raise the subject of Defendant's absence from the hearing again. Defendant identifies no question that went unasked because of his absence during the competency hearing. The defendant here is in exactly the same position as the defendant in Stincer. He has failed to demonstrate that his presence at the competency hearing would have benefitted his defense in any way. If Stincer is the guide, the inescapable conclusion is that the defendant has failed to establish any violation of his due process rights.
[¶ 391 Before leaving the due process discussion, it should be noted that the Supreme Court in Stineer did not hold that a defendant has a constitutional due process right to attend the competency hearing of a child victim. At most Sttncer indicated, in some situations, a due process violation may occur if a defendant is excluded from a competency hearing. This is not one of those situations.
[¶ 40] In determining whether a defendant should be excluded, the trial court must balance the defendant's role in assisting in his defense against the risk of injury to the child victim. Id. at 746 n. 20, 107 S.Ct. at 2668 n. 20. The majority opinion fails to recognize the importance of protecting the child victim as a factor to be considered in that balancing test. That result is not justified by any authority cited in the majority opinion. In fact, the opinion favorably references legal authority that mandates exclusion of the defendant from the competency hearing.
[¶ 41] The majority recognizes that the law in this area is "steadily maturing," and identifies a federal statute as a "useful model" for future development of competency hearing procedures. That statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(4) and (5), was enacted in 1990, three years after the Stincer decision was issued, as part of the Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights Act. The statute bars a defendant from attending the competency hearing of a child victim.5 The existence of the mandatory exclusion in the federal statute calls into question the validity of any due process challenge based upon a defendant's exclusion from the hearing. If a defendant can be barred from a competency hearing by federal statute, how can it be error of a constitutional magnitude for a defendant to be excluded from a similar competency hearing in a Wyoming district court? The constitutional guarantees at issue are *858the same in both situations. Defendant has not asserted that the Wyoming Constitution affords him more rights in this area than he is guaranteed under the United States Constitution.
[¶ 42] Our legislature has not provided the same protections to child victims as Congress did in the Child Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights Act. In Wyoming, a trial judge must still balance a defendant's due process rights against the need to protect child victims. While exclusion might be appropriate in some situations, less restrictive protections may be appropriate in other cases. Because a defendant's confrontation rights are not at issue in a competency hearing of a child victim, eye contact and face to face confrontation between the child and the defendant are not required.6
[¶ 48] The majority opinion appears to conclude that Defendant's rights were violated because questions relating to substantive testimony were asked or might have been asked during the competency hearing. But every competency hearing presents that possibility. Among the factors to be considered when determining the competency of a child victim are whether the child has "a memory sufficient to retain an independent recolleetion of the occurrence, [and] the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence." English, 982 P.2d at 146 (emphasis added). When demonstrating a recollection of the occurrence and expressing it in words, it is always possible that the witness may testify about the incident. Additionally, the majority fails to recognize that the trial court must determine whether exclusion is appropriate at the beginning of the competency hearing. The "cireumstances" cited by the majority in support of its decision all occurred during the hearing.
[¶ 44] The opinion also suggests that the timing of the hearing (during trial), the length of the hearing (opportunity to fully explore competency and taint), and the differing perceptions of the trial court and counsel regarding the purpose of the hearing {competency versus taint) all played a role in its decision. I am unable to find any legal or factual support for those assertions. Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, Defendant has not asserted any error in this appeal relating to any of those factors. He contends only that error occurred because he was excluded from the competency hearing.
[¶ 45] As mentioned previously, there is no legal basis for challenging the timing of the hearing. See English, 982 P.2d at 147 n. 2. Defendant did not object to the scheduling of the hearing at trial and does not contend that he was restricted in any fashion from exploring competency and taint in detail at the competency hearing. Counsel and the district court clearly understood the significance and purpose of the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court indicated that it felt that competency was a close question and briefly took that issue under advisement before rendering a decision finding the child victim competent to testify. As for taint, the district court had no difficulty concluding that taint had not been established. Defense counsel essentially abandoned his claim of taint and relied solely upon his contention that the witness was incompetent:
[PROSECUTION]: Well, I'm not sure of what ... the Court wants the procedure to be here. I know we were doing a competency slash taint bearing. I didn't hear argument whatsoever as far as taint is concerned. So maybe we're just talking about strict competency.
THE COURT: I don't think there's any ... the defense is required, quote, to make the showing of some evidence that the victim's statement[s] were the product of suggestive or coercive interview techniques.
*859The only information that came out about that particular element is that [the victim] said that he told [S.] and [E.] and the others what happened rather than having somebody suggest to him what happened. So I am satisfied that his testimony has not been tainted.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, if I can speak to that. I would say that I couldn't even question-have any effective questioning about taint with him. I asked questions and he didn't respond to a number of things about who he talked to, about who told him to say whatever, even understanding the difference between right and wrong, he had no answer. The difference between a truth and a lie, he had no answer until led by [the Prosecutor] about the tie situation.
But concerning the taint hearing, I think it was evident that we couldn't even have a taint hearing with this witness because he couldn't answer questions about who he had spoken to and what was said to him. I asked him questions about what was told to you by anyone.
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THE COURT: I'm talking now only about the taint issue.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: guess the point is, Your Honor-Yeah. I
THE COURT: He can be incompetent to testify, but I want you to focus on now whether first of all you made a showing of some evidence that the statements were the product of suggestive or coercive interview techniques. Now it may well be that you could provide some showing from some source other than the victim. What I have now is that there is no showing of coercive interview techniques or the victims' statements were the product of suggestive techniques.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And I agree, Your Honor, but from this witness we weren't even able to question him about that because he wouldn't respond. So from this witness-
THE COURT: But you're not limited to him.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right, I understand that, and I would present other evidence as far as discovery goes with respect to that. If you want me to address that now, I certainly would.
THE COURT: Well, this is the taint hearing, it's your only opportunity.
(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel did not call any additional witnesses.
[¶ 46] The district judge in this case properly balanced the important factors. It was aware of the young age of the child, the serious nature of allegations against the defendant, and the risk that the child would be traumatized if confronted by the defendant. It had the opportunity to observe the child and the defendant prior to ruling on the State's request to exclude the defendant. Based upon the information provided, the district court concluded that the defendant should be excluded from the hearing. I find no error in that decision.
[¶ 47] I would also affirm the district court's determination that the child victim was competent to testify. We have previously recognized that a district court's determination of competency will not be disturbed unless clearly erroncous. Sisneros v. State, 2005 WY 139, ¶ 33, 121 P.3d 790, 801 (Wyo.2005). In evaluating whether that decision was clearly erroneous, an appellate court may review the entire record, including the trial testimony. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 743 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. at 2666 n. 15. After reviewing the entire record, including the child's trial testimony, I conclude that the district court's competency determination was not clearly erroneous.

. In Stincer v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 939 (Ky.1986), quoted in paragraph eight of the majority opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed a conviction because the defendant was excluded from the competency hearing of the child victims. That decision, however, was overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 107 S.Ct. 2658. The majority also cites People v. Stroud, 208 Ill.2d 398, 281 Ill.Dec. 545, 804 N.E.2d 510, 517 (2004) and People v. Lofton, 194 Ill.2d 40, 251 IIl.Dec. 496, 740 N.E.2d 782, 798-801 (2000). Neither of those cases involves the determination of a child victim's competency to testify.

. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)(4) and (5) provides:
(4) Requirement of compelling reasons. A competency examination regarding a child may be conducted only if the court determines, on the record, that compelling reasons exist. A child's age alone is not a compelling reason. (5) Persons permitted to be present. The only persons who may be permitted to be present at a competency examination are-
(A) the judge;
(B) the attorney for the Government;
(C) the attorney for the defendant;
(D) a court reporter; and
(E) persons whose presence, in the opinion of the court, is necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child, including the child's attorney, guardian ad litem, or adult attendant.

. It is also worth noting that the confrontation challenge raised by Defendant here is vastly different than that presented in Bowser, 205 P.3d 1018. In Bowser, the trial testimony of the child victim was presented by video deposition. The defendant was permitied to attend the deposition but was shielded from the child victim. The procedure utilized did not meet statutory requirements for the use of the deposition testimony and we found that the defendant's confrontation rights were violated. We reversed the conviction. In this case, the challenge is to the procedure used at the competency hearing. Competency hearing testimony is not trial testimony. The testimony presented at the competency hearing was not used at trial.