Court Opinion

ID: 9950210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 16:02:50.83638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:10.098752
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/24 P. v. Edwards CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                            THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    (San Joaquin)
                                         ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098225

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        (Super. Ct. Nos.
                                                                                STKCRFECOD20150006708,
           v.                                                                          SF131698A)

 TRENTON PHILLIP EDWARDS,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In 2018, defendant Trenton Phillip Edwards pleaded no contest to robbery (Pen.
Code, § 211; statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated); attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)); and admitted enhancements
alleging that he used a firearm in the attempted murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that he
caused great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
         In 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.
The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage of the proceedings.

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         Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) Defendant filed his petition under former
section 1170.95, but we will cite to the current section 1172.6.
         On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred when it relied on the factual basis
stated at the plea hearing to conclude he was the actual perpetrator of the attempted
murder and therefore ineligible for resentencing. We affirm the trial court’s order.

                       FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
         From the 10 substantive counts and various enhancements alleged in the
information, defendant pleaded no contest to robbery (§ 211); attempted murder
(§§ 664/187, subd. (a)); and admitted enhancements that he used a firearm in the
attempted murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and caused great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd.
(a)). In exchange for his plea, the trial court agreed to sentence him to 16 years in prison.
Defendant was the sole defendant identified in the information as to the attempted murder
charge. At the request of the People, the trial court struck the language in the information
defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation.
         During the plea colloquy, when the trial court asked for a factual basis for the plea,
the prosecutor recited the following: “With regard to [the attempted murder], . . . on
August 6th, . . . defendant did take a video game console by force and shot the victim,
[S.M.], one time in the abdomen, inflicting a gunshot wound.” The court asked defense
counsel if she concurred, and she responded that she did.
         In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 16
years.
         In 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.
The trial court appointed counsel for defendant, received briefing, and held a hearing. At
the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court denied the petition. The trial court
found defense counsel, after consulting with defendant, stipulated to the factual basis for

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the plea. The trial court found that plea and its factual basis demonstrated defendant was
the sole perpetrator of the attempted murder and thus defendant could not demonstrate a
prima facie entitlement to resentencing.
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                       DISCUSSION

                                              I

       Defendant argues the trial court erred in determining he is ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6. The court did not err.
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) was enacted “to amend the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder,
to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did
not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 “amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by
adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed
to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(3),
added by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51.)
This language eliminated the use of the natural and probable consequences doctrine in
murder prosecutions. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846.)
       Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1172.6 to expand its
reach to include those convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine . . . .” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; § 1172.6, subd. (a); People v.
Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.)
       The application of the natural and probable consequences doctrine requires
multiple actors to participate in the crime. “Under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, ‘an accomplice is guilty not only of the offense he or she directly aided or

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abetted (i.e., the target offense), but also of any other offense committed by the direct
perpetrator that was the “natural and probable consequence” of the crime the accomplice
aided and abetted (i.e., the nontarget offense).’ [Citation.] In the case of a homicide,
then, ‘[s]o long as the direct perpetrator possessed malice, and the killing was a natural
and probable consequence of the crime the defendant aided and abetted,’ the defendant
was culpable for murder regardless of ‘whether the defendant intended to kill or acted
with conscious disregard for human life.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Fisher (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1026-1027.) Thus, as defendant concedes, when there is no
accomplice, the actual perpetrator of attempted murder is ineligible for resentencing
under this provision as their mental state is not predicated on the acts or mental states of
another. (People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 656-657, review granted June 28,
2023, S279670 [sole assailant who pleaded no contest to attempted murder is ineligible
for section 1172.6 relief]; see also, People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233
[defendant not entitled to relief because he was the “actual killer and the only participant
in the killing”]; People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 47-48 [actual killer is not
eligible for relief under section 1172.6].)
       Section 1172.6 creates a petition process for an eligible defendant to ask for
resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Section 1172.6, subdivisions (b) and (c) set forth the
process for evaluating the petition. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960-962.)
       First, the trial court must determine whether the petition is facially sufficient under
section 1172.6, subdivision (b). (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) If the
petition is facially sufficient, the court must appoint counsel (if requested) and follow the
briefing schedule set forth in the statute. (Id. at p. 966.) Following the completion of this
briefing, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie showing that he are entitled to relief. (Ibid.; § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
       As our Supreme Court explained, “[w]hile the trial court may look at the record of
conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a

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prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c)
is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the
court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations
were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A]
court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including
the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) Stated another way, a
petition for resentencing may be denied at the prima facie stage where the record of
conviction, including items such as the jury instructions and associated findings, establish
a defendant’s ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 459-461.) The plea colloquy and any factual basis stipulated to by the
defendant are also part of the record of conviction. (People v. Fisher, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1028-1029.)
       The relevant charge here was attempted murder. “[A]ttempted murder requires the
specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623.) As
noted by defendant, a no contest plea “admits the elements of the crime but does not
constitute an admission of any aggravating circumstances. [Citation.] ‘[I]f the prior
conviction was for an offense that can be committed in multiple ways, and the record of
the conviction does not disclose how the offense was committed, a court must presume
the conviction was for the least serious form of the offense.’ ” (People v. Learnard
(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1122, review granted Feb. 22, 2017, S238797.)
       Here, defendant pleaded no contest to attempted murder, admitted he personally
used a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury. The legal effect of his plea was to admit

                                              5
the elements of having the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but
ineffectual act towards the intended killing. In addition to this, defendant’s counsel
stipulated to the prosecutor’s factual basis that defendant shot the victim in the abdomen
with a gun. Neither defendant nor his counsel, at any time suggested defendant was
merely an accomplice to someone else, or that he did not have the intent to kill the victim
when he shot him in the stomach. This admission establishes defendant was the sole
perpetrator of attempted murder and therefore ineligible for resentencing.
       Defendant points out he was not required to personally admit the truth of the
factual basis for the plea which may be established by defense counsel’s stipulation to a
particular document and absent an indication defendant intended to make that admission,
the stipulation to the factual basis is not an admission for all purposes citing People v.
French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 50-51. Despite the fact he was not required to admit the
truth of the factual basis, defendant did so here directly through his duly appointed
attorney’s concurrence in the prosecutor’s statement as to those facts.
       Defendant attempts to avoid the consequence of his counsel’s stipulation by
pointing to People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967 and People v. Rivera (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 217, review granted June 9, 2021, S268405. Neither case affords him
comfort.
       In Eynon, the information alleged defendant and his codefendant “did wilfully,
unlawfully, and with deliberation, premeditation, and malice aforethought murder [the
victim].” (People v. Eynon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 971.) At the change of plea
hearing, defendant stipulated to the factual basis of his plea by stating he did “what Count
1 of th[e] information says [he] did, when it says [he] did it.” (Id. at p. 976.) In reversing
and remanding the denial of defendant’s 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage, the
appellate court concluded this generic admission did not demonstrate defendant admitted
he was the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill or was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Eynon, at p. 979.)

                                              6
       By contrast to the defendant in Eynon, defendant here admitted he is the one who
took the video game console by force and shot the victim in his stomach with a gun. This
was not a generic admission, but was a specific factual admission by defendant that he,
alone, attempted to kill the victim with a gun.
       Rivera does not assist defendant either. In Rivera¸ the defendant and his
codefendant were indicted for murder. (People v. Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
p. 223, review granted.) At his plea hearing, defense counsel stipulated to the factual
basis for the plea “on the basis” of the grand jury transcript (which was neither
summarized nor admitted). (Id. at pp. 225-226, review granted.) Not surprisingly, in
reversing the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 1172.6 petition for resentencing, the
appellate court determined that this nonspecific stipulation to the grand jury transcript did
not “admit to the truth of any of the evidence presented to the grand jury, and that
evidence therefore cannot be used to demonstrate that he admitted to acting with actual
malice.” (Rivera, at p. 235, review granted.) Again, defendant here admitted his actions
regarding the specific crime.
       We find People v. Fisher, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, instructive. There, the
defendant personally agreed to the factual basis set forth on the record by the prosecutor
that he was charged with shooting and killing two people and shooting and injuring a
third. (Id. at pp. 1028-1029.) Under those circumstances, the Fisher court rejected the
defendant’s argument that this admission coupled with his plea did not establish he had
the intent to kill. (Id. at p. 1029.) As the court noted, “Because he admitted he was the
direct perpetrator of the crimes, [the defendant] could not have been convicted under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, so malice could not have been imputed to
him under that theory.” (Ibid.)
       Here, defendant’s ineligibility was not based on a generic admission to the
information or to a grand jury transcript. Rather, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted
murder. He expressly admitted, through his counsel, the specific facts that he alone was

                                              7
the one who stole the video game console, and he alone is the one who fired the gun
wounding his victim. Defense counsel had “broad authority to stipulate to factual and
procedural matters on his client’s behalf.” (People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110,
118.) Defendant is bound by that stipulation and is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6.

                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MAURO, J.

RENNER, J.

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