Court Opinion

ID: 9925319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 15:03:27.0361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:02.274465
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                            MARK CIPOLLINA,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

                            JUDITH CIPOLLINA,

                                Appellee.

                               No. 2D22-28

                             January 19, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Maria Ruhl, Judge.

Angela D. Flaherty of Flaherty Law Firm, Sarasota, for Appellant.

Judith Cipollina, pro se.

BLACK, Judge.

     Mark Cipollina, the former husband, appeals from the order
modifying the award of alimony to Judith Cipollina, the former wife. The
former husband contends that the evidence at the hearing on the former
wife's modification petition does not support the court's findings and that
the former wife failed to establish a change of circumstances. We agree.
     The parties were divorced in 2019. In the final judgment of
dissolution, as relevant to this appeal, the trial court ordered unequal
distribution of marital assets in favor of the former wife and found that
the former wife was entitled to and had a need for permanent periodic
alimony, that the former husband was not voluntarily unemployed at the
time of the dissolution and had been terminated from his employment
because his job had become "redundant" as the result of technological
advancement, and that the former husband had no ability to pay
alimony. The court therefore awarded nominal alimony to the former
wife. Neither party appealed from the final judgment of dissolution.
     In 2020, the former wife filed the subject petition to modify the
award of nominal alimony set forth in the dissolution judgment. She
sought to establish a greater amount of permanent periodic alimony and
alleged that since the entry of the dissolution judgment, the former
husband had not made "good faith effort[s] to find comparable income in
the field of his expertise, i.e., banking and finance, where he consistently
earned at least $500,000 per year for the majority of the parties'
marriage." She further alleged that although the former husband had
opened a franchise location of handyman services where he earned $200
per week, the former husband had significant income from other sources.
At no point in the petition for modification did the former wife allege that
since the entry of the dissolution judgment there had been a substantial
and unanticipated material change in circumstances.
     At the evidentiary hearing on her petition for modification, the
former wife testified that her need for alimony has not changed since
entry of the dissolution judgment. The former husband's financial
information was admitted into evidence; however, the former wife
presented no testimony concerning the former husband's ability to pay

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based on that evidence. The former wife presented no evidence regarding
available jobs in the former husband's prior work sector; in fact, she
testified that she "did not know what the banking opportunities [were] in
Naples" and that she was not aware of any jobs that would provide the
same income that the former husband had previously earned.
     The former husband did not contest the former wife's need; rather,
he contended that his ability to pay had not changed and that the
modification standard could not be satisfied. The former husband
presented evidence and testimony regarding his franchise of "Mr.
Handyman," a general contractor entity. He submitted his business's tax
return for 2020, establishing negative taxable income of $101,686 and
compensation to the former husband of $12,600. The business's 2019
tax return was also submitted, establishing a similar negative income
and compensation to the former husband. He testified that his age and
the advancements in technology in the financial sector, as well as not
having the client base or certifications necessary for continued financial
work in the United States, precluded him from gaining employment in
that sector. He further testified that he had taken a substantial portion
of his equitable distribution to purchase the franchise. The former
husband testified that he has approximately $500,000 invested in his
franchise, comprised of loans and his retirement funds, and that he is
not yet breaking even. He was questioned about depreciation line items
on his business tax documents, but no expert testified. He was also
questioned about his portion of the equitable distribution available as
income.
     In closing, the former wife asked for $2,300 in monthly alimony
based on the former husband's monthly expenses of $4,952 and monthly
income of $7,634, which was approximated from the former husband's

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business records and his financial affidavit without consideration of the
testimony that he paid his expenses from funds allocated to him as part
of the equitable distribution (including deferred compensation). The trial
court granted the former wife's petition and ordered the former husband
to pay monthly alimony of $2,500 and retroactive alimony totaling
$50,725.85.
        On review of an order on an alimony modification petition, "[w]e
review the trial court's factual determinations for an abuse of discretion
and its legal conclusions de novo." Vuchinich v. Vuchinich, 373 So. 3d
15, 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (citing Jarrard v. Jarrard, 157 So. 3d 332,
337-38 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)). Section 61.14(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2021),
provides for the modification of alimony when "the circumstances or the
financial ability of either party changes" and explains that the court has
the authority to decrease or increase alimony "as equity requires, giving
due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability of the
parties." It is the burden of the party moving for modification to
establish "(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances, (2)
the change was not contemplated at the time of the final judgment of
dissolution, and (3) the change is sufficient, material, permanent, and
involuntary." Vuchinich, 373 So. 3d at 16 (quoting Jarrard, 157 So. 3d at
336).
        The former husband argues on appeal that the former wife "simply
failed to meet her burden of proving there had been a substantial change
of circumstances so as to establish the [f]ormer [h]usband now has the
ability to pay support." We agree. None of the former wife's evidence
established a substantial, material change warranting modification. The
evidence established that the former husband's handyman business is
operating at a loss; and the former wife presented no evidence that the

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depreciation values should not be considered. The testimony and
evidence presented by the former wife established that there has been no
change as required by the statute, and "while the trial court may
properly consider the former husband's assets in determining his ability
to pay, the court cannot require the former husband to deplete assets to
make alimony payments." See Galligar v. Galligar, 77 So. 3d 808, 812
(Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
     The former wife failed to establish a change in circumstances. See
Jarrard, 157 So. 3d at 336-37. Accordingly, the court abused its
discretion in modifying alimony. Cf. Girard v. Girard, 351 So. 3d 27, 29
(Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (concluding that the court abused its discretion in
imputing income "in the absence of evidence that there was a substantial
and permanent change in circumstances since the final judgment"). The
order granting the petition for modification of alimony is reversed.
     Reversed.

SILBERMAN and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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