Court Opinion

ID: 9421487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:58:29.575898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.449177
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., petitioner, and Patricia Vanderbilt, respondent, were married in 1948. They separated in 1952 while living in California. The wife moved to New York where she has resided since February 1953. In March of that year the husband filed suit for *417divorce in Nevada. This proceeding culminated, in June 1953, with a decree of final divorce which provided that both husband and wife were “freed and released from the bonds of matrimony and all the duties and obligations thereof . ...” 1 The wife was not served with process in Nevada and did not appear before the divorce court.
In April 1954, Mrs. Vanderbilt instituted an action in a New York court praying for separation from petitioner and for alimony. The New York court did not have personal jurisdiction over him, but in order to satisfy his obligations, if any, to Mrs. Vanderbilt, it sequestered his property within the State.2 He appeared specially and, among other defenses to the action, contended that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution 3 compelled the New York court to treat the Nevada divorce as having ended the marriage and as having destroyed any duty of support which he owed the respondent. While the New York court found the Nevada decree valid and held that it had effectively dissolved the marriage, it nevertheless entered an order, under § 1170-b *418of the New York Civil Practice Act,4 directing petitioner to make designated support payments to respondent. 207 Misc. 294, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 222. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the support order. 1 N. Y. 2d 342, 135 N. E. 2d 553. Petitioner then applied to this Court for certiorari contending that § 1170-b, as applied, is unconstitutional because it contravenes the Full Faith and Credit Clause.5 We granted certiorari, 352 U. S. 820.
In Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, this Court decided that a Nevada divorce court, which had no personal jurisdiction over the wife, had no power to terminate a husband’s obligation to provide her support as required in a preexisting New York separation decree. The factor which distinguishes the present case from Estin is that here the wife’s right to support had not been reduced to judgment prior to the husband’s ex parte divorce. In our opinion this difference is not material on the question before us. Since the wife was not subject to its jurisdiction, the Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish any right which she had under the law of New York to financial support from her husband. It has long been the constitutional rule that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.6 Here, the Nevada divorce court *419was as powerless to cut off the wife’s support right as it would have been to order the husband to pay alimony if the wife had brought the divorce action and he had not been subject to the divorce court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the Nevada decree, to the extent it purported to affect the wife’s right to support, was void and the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not obligate New York to give it recognition.7
Petitioner claims that this case is governed by Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551. For the reasons given in a concurring opinion in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U. S. 568, 575, at 580-581, the Thompson case, insofar as it held that an ex parte divorce destroyed alimony rights, can no longer be considered controlling.

Affirmed.

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

 It seems clear that in Nevada the effect of this decree was to put an end to the husband’s duty to support the wife — provided, of course, that the Nevada courts had power to do this. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 42 Nev. 431, 438-439, 179 P. 638, 639-640; Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 68, 25 P. 2d 378, 380. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 547.

 See Pennington v. Fourth Natl. Bank of Cincinnati, 243 U. S. 269; Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215.

 Art. IV, § 1. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” Congress has provided that judgments shall have the same force and effect in every court throughout the United States that they have in the State where they were rendered. 28 U. S. C. § 1738.

 “In an action for divorce, separation or annulment, . . . where the court refuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding by the court that a divorce . . . declaring the marriage a nullity had previously been granted to the husband in an action in which jurisdiction over the person of the wife was not obtained, the court may, nevertheless, render in the same action such judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of the wife.” Gilbert-Bliss’ N. Y. Civ. Prac., Vol. 6A, 1956 Cum. Supp., § 1170-b.

 The petition for certiorari also raised a number of other contentions. We have considered them and find that they do not justify reversing the decision below.

 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 726-727. If a defendant has property in a State it can adjudicate his obligations, but only to *419the extent of his interest in that property. Pennington v. Fourth Natl. Bank of Cincinnati, 243 U. S. 269; Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215.

 A concurring opinion in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U. S. 568, 575, and the authorities collected there, set forth in greater detail the reasons underlying this holding. Cf. Meredith v. Meredith, 96 U. S. App. D. C. 355, 226 F. 2d 257, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1497.
“A state lacks judicial jurisdiction to absolve a spouse from any duty of support which, under the law of a second state, he may owe the other spouse in the absence of personal jurisdiction over the latter.” Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 116 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953), and see Comment f to § 116.