Court Opinion

ID: 9919535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 18:03:42.906083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:28.984009
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/24 P. v. Schaffner CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081160

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. JCF005245)

ROY EMIL SCHAFFNER,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County,
Michael Domenzain, Judge. Affirmed.
         Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

         Roy Emil Schaffner appeals the judgment sentencing him to prison
after a jury found him guilty of drug and firearm offenses. He contends
admission at trial of statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) requires reversal. We disagree and affirm.
                                      I.
                               BACKGROUND
A.    Arrest
      While on patrol, Imperial County Deputy Sheriff Pedro Velasquez saw
Schaffner driving after Velasquez had learned earlier that day Schaffner had
no valid driver’s license and possessed multiple firearms. He followed
Schaffner into a gas station and confirmed with dispatch that his license had
been suspended. Velasquez contacted Schaffner and, after noticing a
passenger in the vehicle, put Schaffner in handcuffs and called for backup.
Another deputy sheriff arrived about an hour later. While waiting for backup
to arrive, Velasquez decided to impound Schaffner’s vehicle and to do an
inventory search. He asked Schaffner whether there were any guns and
drugs in the vehicle, and Schaffner responded affirmatively. After the other
deputy arrived and stood by Schaffner and his passenger, Velasquez searched
the vehicle and found a handgun, a rifle, ammunition, bags of
methamphetamine, a bag of marijuana, plastic baggies, a scale, and needles.
Velasquez arrested Schaffner and took him to the sheriff’s station. During
the encounter at the gas station, he did not give Schaffner the warnings

required by Miranda.1

1      “[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning, . . . [h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 478–479.)

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B.    Interview
      At the sheriff’s station, Velasquez conducted a recorded interview of
Schaffner. Before asking Schaffner any questions about the items found in
the vehicle, Velasquez read from a card the following advisements: (1) “You
have the right to remain silent”; (2) “Anything you say may be used against
you in court”; (3) “You have the right to the presence of an attorney before
and during questioning”; and (4) “[I]f you cannot afford an attorney, one will
be appointed for you free of charge before any questioning if you want.”
Velasquez paused after each advisement and asked Schaffner whether he
understood it, and he either nodded affirmatively or said, “Yup.” Velasquez
then told Schaffner he wanted to ask some questions about what he found in
Schaffner’s vehicle, and Schaffner responded, “Go ahead.” During the
subsequent questioning, Schaffner admitted the firearms and the
methamphetamine were his.
C.    Criminal Proceeding
      The People charged Schaffner with two counts of possession of a
controlled substance while armed with a loaded firearm (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.1, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2)); unlawful transportation of a controlled
substance (id., § 11379, subd. (a); count 3); two counts of possession of a
firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 4 & 5); and one
count of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11378; count 6). Schaffner pled not guilty to all counts.
      Schaffner moved in limine to exclude the statements he made to
Velasquez at the gas station and at the sheriff’s station on the ground they
had been obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The People opposed the
motion. The trial court held a hearing at which Velasquez testified, granted

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the motion as to the statement Schaffner made at the gas station, and denied
the motion as to the statements he made at the sheriff’s station.
      At trial, the People played portions of the recording of Velasquez’s
interview of Schaffner at the sheriff’s station for the jury. On the People’s
motion during trial, the court dismissed count 2. The jury found Schaffner
guilty on the remaining counts.
      The trial court selected the conviction on count 1 (possession of a
controlled substance while armed with a firearm) as the principal offense and
sentenced Schaffner to prison for the middle term of three years. (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a).) The court imposed consecutive prison terms
of one-third the prescribed middle term on each of the other convictions (Pen.
Code, § 1170.1, subd. (a)) and stayed their execution (id., § 654).
                                       II.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Schaffner argues the incriminating statements he made at the sheriff’s
station should have been excluded because they were not preceded by
adequate warnings or a valid waiver under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436.
He also argues the statements were inadmissible because they were “tainted”
by Velasquez’s earlier elicitation of a similar incriminating statement at the
gas station before he was given Miranda warnings. Schaffner finally argues
the admission of the statements he made at the sheriff’s station was not
harmless, because the People cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt the
statements did not contribute to the jury’s verdicts. He asks us to reverse the
judgment and to remand the matter to the trial court with directions to
exclude at any retrial the incriminating statements he made to Velasquez.

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A.    Waiver of Miranda Rights
      Schaffner first argues he did not validly waive his Miranda rights. He
asserts he “did not execute a written waiver,” and complains Velasquez
“simply read [him] his rights and said, ‘okay’ and then did not pause to insure
[he] understood his rights and wished to waive them.” Schaffner contends
the subsequent questioning was “infirm” and his responses should have been
suppressed. We disagree.
      A suspect in law enforcement custody can waive the rights to remain
silent and to have an attorney present for any questioning. (Maryland v.
Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 104; Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.) Any
such waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Montejo v.
Louisiana (2009) 556 U.S. 778, 786; Miranda, at p. 444.) Where, as here, an
interview is recorded, we independently determine from the totality of the
circumstances whether the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights. (People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 843.)
      The circumstances of Velasquez’s interview of Schaffner establish a
valid waiver. Although Schaffner did not sign a waiver form, a waiver of
Miranda rights need not be in writing. (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441
U.S. 369, 375–376 & fn. 5; People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 585.) A
waiver may be implied by conduct inconsistent with assertion of those rights.
(Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 385; People v. Gonzales (2012)
54 Cal.4th 1234, 1269.) “When a suspect ‘ “having heard and understood a
full explanation of his or her Miranda rights, then makes an uncompelled
and uncoerced decision to talk, he or she has thereby knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently waived them.” ’ ” (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 302
(Krebs).) That was the situation in this case.

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      At the sheriff’s station, Velasquez read Schaffner each of his Miranda
rights (see fn. 1, ante), briefly paused after each one to ask Schaffner whether
he understood it, and obtained from him an affirmative response to each one.
When Velasquez next told Schaffner he wanted to ask some questions about
the items found in Schaffner’s vehicle, Schaffner told him to proceed and
answered the questions. The recorded interview shows the questioning was
not coercive, deceptive, or overbearing, and Schaffner was under no physical,
psychological, or emotional duress. We thus conclude Schaffner validly
waived his Miranda rights. (See Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1268–
1269 [valid waiver when “defendant both nodded his head and mouthed the
word ‘yes’ when asked if he understood the Miranda warnings” and
“proceeded to answer the questions posed to him”]; People v. Sully (1991) 53
Cal.3d 1195, 1233 [same when defendant “was informed of his Miranda
rights, expressly affirmed his understanding of those rights, and then
proceeded to answer questions and to make statements he knew were being
tape-recorded”].)
B.    Taint from Prior Unwarned Statement
      Schaffner next argues the incriminating statements he made at the
sheriff’s station after he received Miranda warnings were inadmissible
because they were “tainted” by the incriminating statement he made at the
gas station before he received the warnings. He contends the United States
Supreme Court “disapproved of these ‘two-step interrogation tactics[’] ” in
Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 (Seibert), and under that decision the
trial court should have excluded his postwarning statements. We are not
persuaded.
      A suspect’s incriminating statements made after receipt of Miranda
warnings are not inadmissible simply because the suspect made a related

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incriminating statement before receipt of the warnings. “[A]bsent
deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement,
the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not
warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of
Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned
statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded
admission of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact
may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and intelligent
choice whether to waive or invoke his rights.” (Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470
U.S. 298, 314 (Elstad).) The trial court found the questioning at the gas
station was not coercive, and Schaffner has not challenged that finding. We
have rejected his claim that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights before making the incriminating
statements at the sheriff’s station. Thus, those statements were not subject
to exclusion as having been obtained in violation of Miranda. (See Elstad, at
p. 309 [“Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be
suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in
these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily
made.”].)
      Schaffner argues Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298, does not control because
this “case has shades of Seibert.” In that case, the United States Supreme
Court considered “a police protocol for custodial interrogation that calls for
giving no warnings of the rights to silence and counsel until interrogation has
produced a confession, . . . follow[ing] it with Miranda warnings[,] and then
lead[ing] the suspect to cover the same ground a second time.” (Seibert,
supra, 542 U.S. at p. 604 (plur. opn.).) The high court held inadmissible a
postwarning confession obtained under such circumstances. (Ibid. (plur.

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opn.); id. at p. 618 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) The facts of this case are not
comparable to those of Seibert.
      Schaffner identifies no evidence that when Velasquez asked him at the
gas station whether there were drugs or guns in his vehicle Velasquez was
following an official protocol designed to obtain incriminating evidence in
violation of Schaffner’s Miranda rights. (See Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 310
[distinguishing Seibert based on lack of protocol].) It appears Velasquez
asked the question in preparation for impounding the vehicle and taking an
inventory of its contents, not as part of a custodial interrogation of Schaffner
on drug or firearm offenses. (Cf. id. at p. 311 [distinguishing Seibert based on
detective’s unawareness suspect was in custody and warnings were
required].) Although Velasquez was the only questioner at the gas station
and at the sheriff’s station, “there was no extended questioning before
Miranda warnings were given”; Schaffner’s prewarning statements “were
nonspecific and lacking in detail”; and there was a substantial lapse of time
and “a change of setting before he gave the detailed confession that was
ultimately used against him at trial.” (Krebs, at p. 310.) Seibert thus does
not require exclusion of the statements Schaffner voluntarily made at the
sheriff’s station after he received Miranda warnings. (See id. at p. 312;
People v. Delgado (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1108 [“Because defendant’s
warned statements were voluntary and there was no plan to bypass Miranda,
the warned statements were admissible under Seibert and related cases.”].)
C.    Harmless Error
      Schaffner’s last argument is that the erroneous admission of the
statements he made at the sheriff’s station was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and so requires reversal of the judgment. Given our
conclusion the statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda, supra,

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384 U.S. 436, however, the trial court did not err by admitting them.
Because there can be no prejudicial error requiring reversal without error
(People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 618), there is no ground for
reversal here.
                                     III.
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                    IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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