Court Opinion

ID: 9560474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:49:38.194835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:56.302719
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority as I believe Agent Johnson did not have the requisite probable cause in order to expand a brief Terry (v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968)) stop into a seizure of Alex’s person. While the majority affirms the *758trial court’s denial of Alex’s motion to suppress, I would reverse it.
In light of the proper standard, I would find that a brief stop of Alex was reasonable; however, “[i]n order to ‘expand the scope’ of intrusion by a law enforcement officer, . . . the officer must have either probable cause or the voluntary consent of the individual detained.” Scott v. State, 253 Ga. 147, 149 (317 SE2d 830) (1984). Alex’s refusal to consent to a search and his indication that he had to catch his flight was sufficient to conclude the initial stop. When Alex was detained, Agent Johnson had some knowledge of the following: Alex was traveling on a cash one-way ticket from Los Angeles to Mobile; the call-back number given with the ticket reservation was incorrect; Alex’s wallet had been stolen in Los Angeles; Alex sent his luggage by Federal Express or Western Union; and Alex was extremely nervous.
The present case is similar to Miranda v. State, 189 Ga. App. 218, 219 (375 SE2d 295) (1988), where the arresting officer was aware of the following: the defendant arrived in Atlanta on a one-way ticket from Miami purchased with cash; the defendant changed clothes from a loose fitting blouse to a tight tank top; the defendant’s ticket had no baggage claim tickets attached to it; and the defendant could not produce any identification. In determining that the officer lacked probable cause to detain the defendant we stated that “[t]hose facts, which the officer explained in light of his experience to be typical of drug couriers, are also equally susceptible of perfectly innocent explanation.” Id. at 220-221.
“The seven primary characteristics of the drug courier profile are: (1) arrival from or departure to an identified source city; (2) carrying little or no luggage, or large quantities of empty suitcases; (3) unusual itinerary, such as rapid turnaround time for a very lengthy airplane trip; (4) use of an alias; (5) carrying unusually large amounts of currency in the many thousands of dollars, usually on their person, in briefcases or bags; (6) purchasing airline tickets with a large amount of small denomination currency; and (7) unusual nervousness beyond that ordinarily exhibited by passengers.
“The secondary characteristics are (1) the almost exclusive use of public transportation, particularly taxicabs, in departing from the airport; (2) immediately making a telephone call after deplaning; (3) leaving a false or fictitious call-back telephone number with the airline being utilized; and (4) excessively frequent travel to source or distribution cities.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 575 (300 SE2d 126) (1983).
Comparing these factors to the present case, I believe that although Alex arrived from a source city, he explained his lack of luggage and identification. Although we are aware that Agent Johnson was told by “a cooperating individual at the airport” that Alex’s ticket was purchased with cash, we know nothing about the cooperat*759ing individual, the basis of this person’s knowledge, or whether this person has given reliable information in the past. The only other characteristic that might apply is the false call-back number; however, the agents did not question Alex regarding the accuracy of the number which they apparently received from the cooperating individual. Based on our holding in Miranda, supra, I would find that the agents did not have sufficient cause to seize Alex. Therefore, Agent Johnson’s attempt to keep Alex from boarding his plane was an illegal seizure, which Alex was authorized to resist. See Brooks v. State, 206 Ga. App. 485, 489 (425 SE2d 911) (1992). I believe the trial court was clearly erroneous in denying Alex’s motion to suppress.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.