Court Opinion

ID: 9531784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:14:28.783963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:34.809021
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting from opinion of October 5, 1983, and dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing.
The petition for rehearing should be granted. As forecast in my opinion of October 5,1983, and as made abundantly clear by the petition for rehearing, the majority opinion of October 5 did duck the issues decided by the trial court and raised on the appeal.
Compounding such error in appellate jurisprudence, the majority now avoids the issue squarely presented on the petition for rehearing. The parties did stipulate to the procedure, which was followed. The majority’s view is that parties cannot do so, citing a broad general statement from Corpus Juris Secundum and one case from the Missouri Court of Appeals which here stands for nothing:
“So far as can be determined from the record, the alleged error in awarding attorney fees was not called to the attention of the trial court for corrective action, no appeal was taken therefrom; Rule 84.04, on the content of briefs, and Rule 81.04 on “Appeals When and How Taken”, have not been complied with. This court, clearly, is not bound by a stipulation entered into between the parties which in effect provides that an issue be determined on appeal in a manner contrary to its own rules. Under the circumstance the point has not been preserved for review.”
Smithart v. Sportsman, 614 S.W.2d 310, 322 (Mo.App.1981).
Counsel for respondents will likely not see either the general statement or the Missouri case as any authority for the majority’s denial of their petition. The Missouri case clearly cuts against the action today taken by the Court. The Missouri appellate court simply held that it was not bound by a stipulation of parties changing appellate procedure. On the other hand, as is clearly and concisely pointed out by respondents in their petition for rehearing, Judge Norris accepted the stipulation and court and counsel proceeded in accordance therewith:
“An agreement was reached between the parties prior to trial concerning the use of evidence in addition to the administrative record. This was because of the inadequacy of that record. This stipulation is reflected in the transcript on appeal.
*718“The agreement is contained in the transcript on appeal at Tr., page 3, lines 1 — 11. Judge Norris states in reference to the stipulation:
‘As to the issues of this case on appeal, I have conversed and confirmed with counsel this morning the issues to be treated are as follows:
Also, according to this letter which helps narrow down the issues, although there will be some evidence that there was a moratorium, emergency moratorium put into effect by the Payette County Commissioners, the County will not assert the moratorium against the plaintiff.
I think in that letter there is a misdescription there of the name of the party. Also that there will be a limited number of witnesses. Ordinarily there are not witnesses, and only by special permission may there be witnesses, and only by special permission may there be witnesses on an administrative appeal of this type.’
“It is clear that the matter of additional testimony through a ‘limited number of witnesses’ was considered and stipulated to between the parties. For that reason, there was no assignment of error asserted on appeal by the appellant relating to this evidence nor was the matter argued to this court. This issue simply was not presented on appeal.
“The general rule concerning stipulations is stated in 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations at Section 8. This indicates very clearly, that stipulations are generally binding upon a trial and appellate court in the absence of a valid ground for refusing their enforcement. See also, Houska v. Houska, 97 Idaho 316 [543 P.2d 869] (1975). In this case, both counsel had agreed that there would be additional evidence produced and that the trial court would not be bound solely to the record. Again, this is because the record below was totally inadequate. We know of no legal or equitable basis for ignoring this stipulation. We think that this fact, standing alone, requires a reconsideration of the opinion of this honorable court.
“This matter was not, therefore, an issue presented to the trial court. It was not urged as an assignment of error on appeal. Therefore, we believe that it should not now be used as a basis for reversing the lower court. McNeil v. Gisler, 100 Idaho 693 [604 P.2d 707] (1979).
“The Idaho court has long adhered to the general rule that matters that are not objected to at trial nor urged on appeal are abandoned and will not be considered by the appellate court. Yellowpine Water Users Association v. Imel [105 Idaho 349, 670 P.2d 54], 83 ISCR 1357 (1983); Lomas and Nettleton Company v. Tiger Enterprises, Inc., 99 Idaho 539 [585 P.2d 949] (1978); Chugg v. Chugg [94] 95 Idaho 45 [480 P.2d 891] (1971); Harmon v. Noland, 90 Idaho 494 [413 P.2d 897] (1966).
CONCLUSION
“The Respondents are requesting that this court reconsider its previous decision reversing the determination by the lower court. The basis for the determination was disposed by stipulation and was not an issue on appeal.
“Indeed, by agreeing to the stipulation on evidence in the transcript, appellant waived any right to assert any such argument. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that the argument was not made at any time during the appeal.
“The parties should have the ability to rely upon stipulations entered into. We are asking this court to reconsider its opinion and reinstate the decision of the trial court.”
Petition for Rehearing, pp. 2-4 (emphasis added). The ambivalence of my opinion of October 5, 1983, is brought to rest by the majority opinion on denial of the petition for rehearing. I now dissent from the opinion of the majority and its denial of a rehearing, at the same time lamenting that the course of action taken by this Court does not serve the administration of justice, but delays it.
*719While counsel truly cannot bind a court by counsel’s stipulation as to procedure, it is entirely up to the court whether or not to accept the stipulation. Here the court did.