Court Opinion

ID: 9863087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:04:45.818439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:54.410841
License: Public Domain

MATHIAS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
At issue in this case is whether a motorist who halts his own lane of traffic and signals to another driver to proceed across his lane can be liable to a third party who collides with the signaled driver in an adjacent lane beyond. This is a question of first impression in Indiana.13 While the majority and I analyze these facts under the rubric set forth in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.1991), the majority concludes that, under the circumstances of this case, Key assumed a duty to Hamilton by signaling Owens to proceed. I disagree.
The Legal Effect of Undisputed Facts is a Pure Question of Law
I first note that, here, we review a motor vehicle accident case in which, at the time of Hamilton’s motion for summary judgment, there were no genuine issues of material fact with regard Key’s behavior prior to the accident. And where there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is an appropriate stage of trial to determine duty, or its absence, as a matter of law. See Hammock v. Red Gold, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 495, 498 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (the existence of a legal duty is a pure question of law and only becomes a mixed question of law and fact where factual questions are present); see also Masick v. McColly Realtors, Inc., 858 N.E.2d 682, 692 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (where there is no genuine issue of material fact, assumption of a duty may be determined as a matter of law). Because there were no genuine issues of material fact the trial court should have found no duty on the part of Key as a matter of law under Webb v. Jarvis and *587should have granted Key’s motion for summary judgment. The same avenue was open to the trial court at the close of Hamilton’s ease-in-chief on Key’s motion for judgment on the evidence, and at the close of all evidence, on Key’s motion for directed verdict.

Webb v. Jarvis

For more than twenty years, the touchstone of duty analysis in negligence cases in Indiana has been Webb v. Jarvis.14 In that case, Jarvis was shot by Dr. Webb’s patient, Neal, who at the time was allegedly under the influence of anabolic steroids that Webb had prescribed for him. Jarvis claimed that Webb’s negligence in the over-prescription of that medication for Neal proximately caused uncontrollable rage in Neal, which ended in Neal’s shooting of Jarvis. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of Webb’s motion for summary judgment, this court held that Webb owed a duty to Jarvis to refrain from negligently overprescribing steroids to his patient Neal, that Webb need not have had actual knowledge that Jarvis was a potential victim because of the risk of physical injury to Jarvis, and that Jarvis was a foreseeable plaintiff. Webb v. Jarvis, 553 N.E.2d 151, 155-56 (Ind.CtApp.1990), trans. granted.
On transfer, our supreme court reaffirmed that the underlying existence of a duty is a question of law. Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 995. Proceeding to the facts before it, the court held that, in order for the court to impose a duty at common law, three factors must be balanced: (1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) public policy concerns. Id. As did our supreme court in Webb, I believe the question of duty in the case before us is best resolved by considering each of these three factors in turn.
1. The Relationship Between the Parties.
Hamilton, Key, and Owens were all motorists on an Indiana highway. Specifically, Key was stopped at an intersection, but more specifically, he was stopped by stalled traffic in the lane ahead of him. The collision at issue occurred when Owens passed beyond Key’s lane of traffic and entered the lane of traffic Hamilton was travelling in after being motioned through by Key. Clearly, there was no privity between Key and Hamilton. However, as the Webb court noted, the lack of privity between Key and Hamilton does not mandate a conclusion that there was no duty on the part of Key running in favor of Hamilton. See id. at 995-96 (noting that privity between the parties is no longer required in order to impose a duty of reasonable care).
*588Our supreme court’s ensuing discussion of Indiana’s common law concerning duty to “unidentified and unknown” third parties was framed by the context of the duty owed by a professional to third parties. See id. at 996 (citing Walker v. Lawson, 514 N.E.2d 629 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), rev’d on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d 968 (Ind.1988); Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 F.Supp. 1231 (N.D.Ind.1989)). The Webb court concluded by referring to a case holding that a land surveyor owed no duty to a subsequent purchaser of the real estate surveyed. Id. (citing Essex v. Ryan, 446 N.E.2d 368 (Ind.Ct.App.1983)). Noting that Jarvis had not alleged that he knew of or relied upon Webb’s professional services to Neal, the court held that the relationship needed to impose a duty on Webb was lacking. Id.
Similarly, in the case before us, Hamilton alleged no special relationship with Key or any reliance on Key. Instead, he simply alleged that Key “waved out John Owens to make his left hand turn and proceed north,” and that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the negligence of [Key],” Hamilton was injured. Appellant’s App. pp. 18-19. Comparing these allegations to the Webb court’s discussion of duties to “unidentified and unknown” third parties, I believe it is apparent that Hamilton is precisely the type of “unidentified and, unknown” third party the Webb court was concerned about.
It is clear from the record that Key never saw Hamilton, even though he looked for drivers like him before motioning Owens through the intersection. And there is no indication that Hamilton ever saw Key and relied upon his conduct. Had Key seen and acknowledged Hamilton, and had Hamilton seen Key directing traffic, one might reasonably allege a relationship upon which a new duty could be premised, and it is doubtful that the accident would have occurred. But because there was no recognition by either driver of the other, I believe that Hamilton’s claim of duty is brought up short by this lack of recognition and subsequent lack of any relationship.
Indiana statutes are also instructive regarding the relationship between a driver on the highway and a person signaling such a driver. Drivers are required to obey only the signals of certain, authorized persons, such as a police officer directing traffic15 and a flagman in a construction zone.16 There is no statutory duty to obey any other driver’s traffic signals. I would argue that these statutes presuppose an underlying relationship between the drivers based upon the driver’s and signaler’s recognition of each other.
In sum, the non-existent relationship between Hamilton and Key does not support finding a duty on the part of Key in favor of Hamilton.
2. Foreseeability of Harm to the Injured Person
“The law requires every person to exercise due care to avoid foreseeable injury to others.” Stapinski v. Walsh Construction Co., 178 Ind.App. 623, 383 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 272 Ind. 6, 395 N.E.2d 1251 (1979); see also Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 41 Ind.App. 435, 84 N.E. 25 (1908). “‘The *589duty of reasonable care is not, of course, owed to the world at large, but rather to those who might reasonably be foreseen as being subject to injury by the breach of the duty.’ ” Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 997 (quoting Thiele v. Faygo Beverage, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 562, 574 n. 4 (Ind.Ct.App.1986)).
As famously expressed by Justice Cardozo, then chief judge of the New York State Court of Appeals, “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.” (Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)). Indiana follows this “foreseeability-relationship” formulation of the question of whether the defendant in a negligence case owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Thiele, 489 N.E.2d at 574 n. 4; see also Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 997 (in analyzing the foreseeability component of duty, a court should focus on whether the person actually harmed was a foreseeable victim and whether the type of harm actually inflicted was reasonably foreseeable). As explained in Webb:
Imposition of a duty is limited to those instances where a reasonably foreseeable victim is injured by a reasonably foreseeable harm. Thus, part of the inquiry into the existence of a duty is concerned with exactly the same factors as is the inquiry into proximate cause. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 53 (5th ed. 1984). Both seek to find what consequences of the challenged conduct should have been foreseen by the actor who engaged in it. We examine what forces and human conduct should have appeared likely to come on the scene, and we weigh the dangers likely to flow from the challenged conduct in light of these forces and conduct. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, The Law of Torts Vol. 3 § 18.2 (2d ed. 1986).
575 N.E.2d at 997.
The risk of a collision at an intersection is, in a sense, always foreseeable. But there is no indication here that the collision was more foreseeable than in any other circumstance. In fact, to say that it was foreseeable that a collision would occur is to effectively say that Key should have foreseen that Owens would pull his vehicle into Hamilton’s path. With this I disagree.
As the majority correctly notes, the relevant traffic statutes require a driver such as Owens to stop at an intersection with a through highway and yield to oncoming traffic. See Ind.Code § 9-21-8-31 (2004); Ind.Code § 9-21-8-32 (2004). Thus, our General Assembly has seen fit to place the duty on a driver such as Owens to yield the right-of-way to oncoming drivers. And, as noted above, the legislature has required drivers to obey the signals of certain authorized persons, such as a police officer directing traffic and a flagman in a construction zone. However, there is nothing in the relevant Indiana Code provisions that suggests that a driver may delegate her or his statutory duty to, or share his or her statutory duty with, another driver.
The majority acknowledges that the relevant statutes impose a non-delegable duty upon drivers such as Owens to yield the right-of-way to oncoming drivers on the through highway.17 Given this non-delega-*590ble duty on the part of Owens, I believe that the only foreseeable consequence of Key’s act of signaling to Owens was that Key would not hit Owens and that Owens could therefore safely proceed through Owens’s lane of traffic. Indeed, it has been held that such a hand signal indicates only that the signaling motorist is yielding his or her own right-of-way, i.e. “I won’t hit you.” Dawson v. Griffin, 249 Kan. 115, 816 P.2d 374, 379 (1991); see also Van Jura, 191 N.E.2d at 538 (noting that signaling motorist’s hand signal was an “act ... of courtesy”). Simply said, it is unreasonable for any motorist to rely upon a signal by another motorist as a guarantee that it is safe to proceed through an intersection, allowing the proceeding motorist to ignore her or his statutory duty to yield to oncoming traffic.
For all of these reasons, I do not think it was foreseeable to Key that Owens would proceed into Hamilton’s lane of traffic without comporting with his own non-dele-gable duty to assure that there was no oncoming traffic. To say otherwise is to say that motorists must foresee that other drivers will be derelict in the observance of their duties, and improperly transfers some of Owens’s non-delegable duty onto Key. In short, the foreseeability prong of the Webb analysis also disfavors finding a duty on the part of Key vis-a-vis Hamilton.
3. Public Policy Concerns
Perhaps most importantly, public policy concerns weigh heavily in favor of a finding of no duty on the part of signaling drivers such as Key.18 The majority acknowledges, but minimizes, what I consider to be extraordinarily compelling public policy concerns. The Webb court aptly quoted Prosser and Keeton in this regard: “Duty is ... an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.” Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 997 (citing Prosser and Keeton at § 53). Here, various public policy considerations further support the conclusion that Key owed no duty to Hamilton.
First among these considerations is the behavior of drivers. Indiana law should seek to foster courteous behavior by motorists. To hold that a signaling driver who yields his or her own right-of-way might be liable to a third party who collides with the signaled motorist will discourage such courteous behavior. And beyond such discouragement, such a holding might well foster an increase in the already troublesome level of “road rage” frequently acted out in traffic jams. As the California Court of Appeals wrote in Gilmer v. Ellington: *591159 Cal.App.4th 190, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 893, 900 (2008).
*590[Tjhere would be reactive negative consequences to the community by imposing a duty on the yielding driver; most notably, a relaxed vigilance by left-turning drivers who may rely unthinkingly on ambiguous signals from other drivers, or at least claim to have done so. At a time when “road rage” is unhappily common, the added duty may further erode what infrequent civility is left on the roads. If the common courtesy of yielding the right-of-way results in lawsuits, we can expect further egocentric driving.
*591Hoosiers can be rightfully proud that the courtesy of yielding to other drivers is still rather commonplace in Indiana. We should do nothing that would cause such courtesy to dimmish for fear of resultant liability. In fact, I think that ordinary Hoosiers would be shocked to learn that they might be held liable to an unknown driver for the act of yielding their own right-of-way to another driver at an intersection.
Admittedly, Key did more than simply wave Owens through in front of him, in that he checked the adjacent lane for oncoming traffic before doing so. Key’s behavior in this regard was laudatory. Indeed, waving another motorist through an intersection without looking for oncoming traffic seems to me to be behavior far more egregious than at least attempting to look for oncoming traffic before signaling. Yet the majority opinion effectively penalizes drivers such as Key, who at least try to discern whether there is any oncoming traffic, by exposing them to liability for any resulting collision between the signaled driver and a third party. On the other hand, the majority would insulate from liability a driver who casually waves another motorist through an intersection without looking for oncoming traffic. This is contrary to sound public policy.
I am further concerned that imposing a duty on signaling drivers such as Key effectively diminishes the responsibility of signaled drivers such as Owens. As noted above, I believe that no motorist may reasonably rely upon a hand signal by another motorist as a guarantee that “all is clear.” Hoosier motorists’ daily experiences confirm this. As a corollary, I think it is reasonable for one motorist to signal to another motorist to indicate that the signaling driver is yielding his or her right-of-way.19 But it is unreasonable for any motorist to rely upon such a signal by another motorist as a guarantee that it is safe to proceed through an intersection, and it is doubly irresponsible for an unknown, third-party driver to rely upon another unknown, third-party driver who allegedly signals yet another unknown, third-party driver all is clear, by word or by conduct.
4. Analysis of the Webb Factors
In short, none of the three factors of the Webb analysis favors a finding of a duty on the part of a driver such as Key to a third party such as Hamilton. Key and Hamilton had no relationship that would support the finding of a duty, Hamilton was not a foreseeable plaintiff injured by a foreseeable risk, and public policy concerns weigh against the finding of a duty on the part of drivers such as Key.
If this court were to adopt the position of no duty as a matter of law, Indiana would be in good company. As detailed in the majority opinion, courts in several other states have held that a signaling driver owes no duty to a third-party driver as a matter of law. The cases from these courts — notably including those from our neighbors in Ohio and Michigan — hold, as would I, that a signaling driver owes no duty to a third-party motorist because a signaling driver does not and should not share in the duty of the signaled driver to operate his vehicle in a safe manner and in accordance with all applicable law. See *592Gilmer, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d at 899-900; Duval v. Mears, 77 Ohio App.3d 270, 274, 602 N.E.2d 265 (1991); Peka v. Boose, 172 Mich.App. 139, 431 N.W.2d 399, 401 (1988); Arnold v. Chupp, 93 Ga.App. 583, 92 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1956).
Conclusion
Based upon my consideration of the Webb factors, I would hold that, as a matter of law, a driver who signals to another driver to proceed through an intersection owes no duty to a third party with whom the signaled driver collides. Applying this holding to the designated facts of the present case at the time of Key’s motion for summary judgment, I believe that Key owed no duty to Hamilton as a matter of law. It was Owens’s statutory and common law duty to ensure that the intersection was clear before entering; and statute, public policy and common sense all support the conclusion that this duty is one that cannot be delegated to another, well-meaning and courteous motorist.
Because I am of the opinion that Key did not owe a duty to Hamilton, I would reverse, holding that the trial court should have granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant Key. I believe that the evidence adduced at trial even more strongly confirms Key’s lack of duty as a matter of law and that either Key’s motion for judgment on the evidence or his motion for directed verdict should have been granted, as well. At every procedural step in this case, duty was a matter of law for determination by the court, and to be resolved in Key’s favor under Webb v. Jarvis, rather than a question of fact for the jury.

. I agree with the majority that Claxton v. Hutton, 615 N.E.2d 471 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), is factually distinguishable from the present case in that Claxton dealt with the question of whether the signaling driver assumed a duty to the signaled driver, whereas here the question is whether the signaling driver assumed a duty to the third party who collided with the signaled driver. I would also note that the Claxton court did not engage in an analysis of the Webb v. Jarvis factors.

. The three-part Webb test has been criticized by former Indiana Supreme Court Justice Boehm, who advocated against the concept of "duty” as an independent element of a negligence action:
[T]he traditional formula of duty, breach, causation and harm is in most cases better understood as proceeding on the assumption that all of us are obliged to take reasonable steps to avoid harm to others in the activities we undertake and can control. The issue of “duty" then resolves itself to an inquiry into whether there is some reason in policy why the law should nevertheless pre-elude recovery. That reason may arise from, inter alia, the nature of the plaintiff, the nature of the defendant, the relationship between them, the nature of the activities giving rise to the claim, or the nature of the harm alleged.
Honorable Theodore R. Boehm, A Tangled Webb-Reexamining the Role of Duty in Indiana Negligence Actions, 37 Ind. L.Rev. 1, 19 (2003) (emphasis added). I think many of Justice Boehm's points are well taken. Nevertheless, our supreme court has not adopted Justice Boehm’s view, and I therefore proceed under the traditional Webb analysis.

. See Ind.Code § 9-21-8-1 (2004) ("It is unlawful for a person to knowingly fail to comply with a lawful order or direction of a law enforcement officer invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic”).

. See Ind.Code § 9-21-8-56 (2007) (making it a criminal offense to "recklessly fail[] to obey a traffic control device or flagman ... in the immediate vicinity of a highway work zone when workers are present[.]”).

. The majority nevertheless insists that the pertinent question is not whether Owens had a duty to yield at the intersection, but whether Key assumed a duty to Hamilton through his actions. I respectfully disagree with the premise underlying the question. If Owens had a non-delegable duty to yield at the intersection and to not proceed unless it was clear, I believe it is difficult to say that Key's signal to Owens to proceed through the intersection *590can be the basis of imposing an additional duty on Key. To me, it is axiomatic that a duty that cannot be delegated also cannot be transferred. I believe that the majority's rationale that Key assumed a duty to Hamilton effectively transfers some of Owens's non-delega-ble duty from Owen to Key.

. See Justice Boehm’s discussion of the core importance of public policy considerations in determining whether to impose liability for parties’ conduct. Boehm, supra, at 19.

. In the terms of Justice Boehm's article cited above, even if I were to conclude that Key acted unreasonably, I still think that the overwhelming public policy concerns weigh heavily against imposing liability on Key under the facts and circumstances of this case, and under similar circumstances, i.e., where the signaled driver collides with a third party. See Boehm, supra, at 15.