Court Opinion

ID: 9766225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:37:27.867384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:20.496293
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge
(dissenting):
The only issue raised by appellant is whether the lower court had jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence.
Appellant was sentenced to three and a half to seven years’ imprisonment on a charge of assault with intent *418to kill] 18 P.S. § 4710,1 and to two and a half to five years’ imprisonment on a charge of assault with intent to maiih, 18 P.S. § 4712.2 The Commonwealth apparently concedes that the two offenses merged for sentencing purposes. The Commonwealth argues that because the issue was not previously litigated on direct appeal, Commonwealth v. McCabe, 229 Pa.Super. 758, 325 A.2d 641 (1974), the issue of the legality of the sentence was waived and cites Commonwealth v. Walker, 234 Pa.Super. 433, 340 A.2d 858 (1975); Commonwealth v. Tisdale, 233 Pa.Super. 77, 334 A.2d 722 (1975); and Commonwealth v. Rispo, 222 Pa.Super. 309, 294 A.2d 792 (1972), in support of that proposition.
Commonwealth v. Walker, supra, has subsequently been reversed by the Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Walker, Pa. - — , 362 A.2d 227 (filed July 6, 1976). In Walker, the Supreme Court disposed of the issue of waiver of an illegal sentence as follows: “As stated above, only one issue is presently before this Court. Our inquiry is limited to whether the imposition of separate but concurrent prison sentences on the rape conviction and the statutory rape conviction constitute duplicitous sentences in the constitutional sense where both cohvictions grew out of the same and single act of intercourse. Initially, the Commonwealth contends that this issue has been waived since Walker failed to object to the sentences when imposed. See Commonwealth v. Tisdale, 233 Pa.Super. 77, 334 A.2d 722 (1975). However, unlike the appellant in Tisdale, Walker is not attacking the propriety of being twice convicted for a single act and, as such, is not making a disguised attack on the validity of the convictions underlying the sentences. On the contrary, Walker’s challenge is directed exclusively at the lawfulness of the sentences imposed upon these convictions. As such the claim *419has not been waived and is properly before us. Commonwealth v. Rispo, 222 Pa.Super. 309, 294 A.2d 792 (1972), allocatur refused, 222 Pa.Super. xxxii (1972).” (Slip opinion at 2-3) (footnotes omitted).
As the Majority concedes, “ . . .it would appear that Walker controls.” (At -). The Majority attempts to distinguish Walker from the instant case as follows: although Walker did not object when the sentence was imposed, he raised the issue on direct appeal; the appellant failed to raise the issue on direct appeal and thereby waived the issue.
The Supreme Court in Walker reaffirmed the long standing principle that an accused never waives an illegal sentence. The majority is correct that this Court has evolved an exception to that principle. See Commonwealth v. Tisdale, supra; Commonwealth v. Rispo, supra. That exception was most clearly stated in Commonwealth v. Rispo, supra at 311-12, 294 A.2d at 793-794: “In an apparent effort to avoid the bar of waiver applicable to post-conviction proceedings, defendant has styled his challenge as directed at the lawfulness of his sentences. However, we have examined the bills of indictment and the sentences imposed thereon and we conclude that the sentences are per se lawful, each sentence being within the prescribed limits applicable to the offense charged. The gravamen of defendant’s complaint, therefore, is not that the sentences are unlawful in themselves, but that the convictions from which they arise are invalid. The cases cited by defendant, which hold non-waivable an attack upon the lawfulness of a sentence, are not in point; they are cases involving sentences unlawful per se. The present appeal, on the other hand, presents a different situation: We are asked to determine the propriety of defendant’s being thrice convicted on related facts, not the per se lawfulness of the resulting sentences. This necessarily entails a factual examination of the trial record. As defendant’s counsel conceded at the hearing, *420the claim turns upon the evidence. Such a claim, unlike a pure unlawfulness-of-sentence claim, is precisely the type of claim that is subject to waiver.”
Rispo impliedly recognized that the waiver doctrine did not apply to a claim of unlawfulness of a sentence, even though not raised on direct appeal. If an unlawful sentence cannot be waived, it cannot be waived by failing to raise it on direct appeal. Thus, the Majority's attempt to distinguish the instant case from Walker simply does not withstand analysis.
The Majority also distinguishes Walker on the ground that in Walker, the reviewing court did not have to review the record to decide the merger issue, whereas we would have to review the record to determine the merit of appellant’s claim. I recognize that the waiver doctrine is grounded in notions of judicial economy, and that review Of the record does require additional judicial effort. However, I find no support in Walker for the Majority’s distinction. In addition, the Majority cites no cases in support of its proposition — there are none. Finally, as discussed above, we have created only one exception to the rule that an unlawful sentence is never waived. As stated in Rispo, a litigant cannot raise a challenge to the validity of the underlying conviction under the rubric of an unlawful sentence. Appellant contends that two offenses for which he was convicted — although either conviction standing alone would be valid — should have merged. That claim does not come within the express terms of the narrow exception created by Rispo.
Therefore, I dissent and would remand for resentenc-ing.
SPAETH, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The Penal Code, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 710.

. The Penal Code, supra, § 712.