Court Opinion

ID: 9594058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:26:46.979527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:22.715337
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I write separately because the majority has lowered the threshold determination of disability under subsection 301(4) of Michigan’s Worker’s Compensation Act, despite the Legislature’s attempts to raise that threshold in 1981 and 1987.1 The majority *666holding effectively returns disability analysis to its pre-1981 and 1987 state.2 Further, the majority’s three-part test to establish a “compensable disability” fails to account for over forty years of wage-loss analysis. Thus, I dissent from the majority’s analysis of subsection 301(4) and wage loss.
i
Subsection 301(4) as amended in 1987 states:
As used in this chapter, “disability” means a limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training resulting from a personal injury or work related disease. The establishment of disability does not create a presumption of wage loss.
The plain language of subsection 301(4) defining disability in the worker’s compensation act is composed of two inquiries: first, whether there is a work-related injury or disease, and, second, whether that work-related injury or disease resulted in “a limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications.” I believe that the employee has the burden of proof with respect to both inquiries.3
*667My approach to subsection 301(4) is criticized as ignoring the import of the second sentence of subsection 301(4). As will be addressed in part IV, I believe that the second sentence states the basic premise that Michigan’s worker’s compensation system is a wage-loss system. Wage loss establishes entitlement to benefits. However, the question of wage loss is reached only after the threshold question of eligibility for benefits under subsection 301(4) has been proven.
The first inquiry under subsection 301(4), the existence of a work-related injury or disease, is typically a straightforward one. In these cases there is no dispute regarding the existence of work-related injuries. However, the Court has struggled to articulate the nature and scope of the plaintiff’s burden regarding the second inquiry. Thus, the focus of this opinion is on interpreting “a limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications.”
n
A “limitation” is defined as “some factor in [a person’s] makeup which restricts the scope of a person’s activity or accomplishment.” Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d ed). While a limitation may be purely physical, it would be inconsistent with the plain language of subsection 301(4) to conclude that the Legislature intended “a limitation” to mean nothing more than a physical limitation because the words “a limitation” cannot be considered separately from their restrictive clauses “of an employee’s wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training.” To prove that a disability exists, the statute requires proof of both a work-related injury or *668disease and “a limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training.” Thus, the employee must prove more than the work-related disease or injury.
I believe that the most basic interpretation of “wage earning capacity” is that it describes an employee’s ability to earn wages. Perhaps because an employee is theoretically able to earn wages in a great variety of ways, the Legislature restricted consideration to “work suitable to [an employee’s] qualifications and training.” Where an employee is qualified and trained in more than one job, then his wage-earning capacity includes consideration of all those jobs under the plain meaning of subsection 301(4). Whether “a limitation” exists in an individual’s “wage earning capacity” where that individual is qualified and trained in more than one job therefore requires consideration of the effect of the work-related disease or injury on earning capacity in all those jobs in which the individual is qualified and trained.4 The statute does not state or imply that inability to perform one job within the individual’s qualifications and training necessarily results in “a limitation [in] wage earning capacity.” Thus, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that “an employee is disabled if there is at least a single job within his qualifications and training that he can no longer perform.” Ante, p 643. I believe the majority’s conclusion fails to consider whether the overall wage-earning capacity of the individual was actually limited and, therefore, is not true to the plain language of subsection 301(4).
*669“[I]n work suitable to his or her qualifications and training” is a restrictive clause that modifies “a limitation [in] wage earning capacity.”5 What work is suitable will obviously depend on the qualifications and training of the employee in each case. The reference to an employee’s qualifications and training restricts the types of employment that can be considered to determine wage-earning capacity. Thus, it would be inconsistent with the language of the clause to find that an injured electrician’s wage-earning capacity included menial labor or unskilled labor.6 Nor would it be consistent to assume that the electrician could maintain his wage-earning capacity by adopting a new career requiring some additional training.
Evidently relying entirely on a footnote in Michales v Morton Salt Co, 450 Mich 479, 490-491, n 17; 538 NW2d 11 (1995), the majority concludes that Michales held that “an employee is disabled whenever he is rendered unable to perform a single job within the category of jobs he is suited to perform, even if the number he continues to be able to perform is numerous and equally well paying,” and therefore, that Michales is consistent with the plaintiff’s theory of disability. Ante, p 651. This strained reinterpretation of Michales deserves rebuttal.
In Michales, the Court noted “a person is not compensably disabled within the meaning of the current definition if the employee remains able to perform the work suitable to the employee’s qualifications and *670training without limitation of wage-earning capacity.” Id., pp 493-494. There is no evidence that the Court based its conclusion that the plaintiff was not disabled solely on the fact that he remained able to perform the same duties after the injury as before. The Michales analysis repeatedly emphasized that the plaintiff had not proven a limitation in wage-earning capacity in work suitable to his qualifications and training. Michales noted:
The relevant inquiry is not whether there is a theoretical job in the employee’s general field of employment that the employee is no longer able to perform. Instead, the question is whether the employee’s wage-earning capacity, i.e., ability to earn wages, has been limited, considering the employee’s qualifications and training. [Id., p 493, n 19.]
As Justice Cavanagh succinctly stated in his Michales concurrence:
Although [the plaintiff] established a personal injury, he completely failed to introduce any evidence of a limitation in his wage-earning capacity. As required by MCL 418.401(1); MSA 17.237(401)(1), both an injury and a limitation in wage-earning capacity must be shown. A complete failure to introduce any evidence of a limitation in wage-earning capacity resulting from the injury simply precludes an award of benefits as a matter of law. [Id., p 496.][7]
While it is true that the plaintiff in Michales was able to perform the same job before and after the injury, this particular circumstance does not justify the *671majority’s dramatic move away from the language of subsection 301(4).
in
Applying my interpretation of subsection 301(4) to the cases presented suggests the following conclusions.8
In Bailey, the plaintiff was qualified and trained as a firefighter and an electrical contractor at the time of the injury. I believe that in order to prove disability under the act, Bailey needs to prove that his firefighting injury caused “a limitation [in] wage earning capacity” as both a firefighter and an electrical contractor. A limitation in wage-earning capacity is not simply presumed because he can no longer fight fires; rather, he must show that he has a limitation in his combined wage-earning capacity as a firefighter and an electrical contractor. In other words, I would require plaintiff to prove his inability, resulting from his firefighting-related injury, to earn as much as an electrical contractor as he earned doing both jobs at the time he was injured. Thus, I would find that Bailey has not proven a disability. However, I agree that it is appropriate to remand this case to the magistrate. See n 8.1 would instruct the magistrate to make an additional record regarding Bailey’s wage-earning capacity as an electrical contractor to determine whether the loss of the firefighting income caused a limitation in wage-earning capacity and thus a disability eligible for benefits under subsection 301(4).
*672In Haske, the plaintiff was qualified and trained as a truck driver. After his work-related injury, he eventually continued to work as a truck driver. However, physical restrictions resulting from his work-related injury may have affected his wage-earning capacity as a truck driver. It is unclear whether he was able to earn as much as he earned after the injury with the injury-related restriction as he earned before. Therefore, in order to be found disabled and eligible for benefits, Haske must demonstrate that his wageeaming capacity as a truck driver was limited as a result of the work-related injury. Thus, I dissent from the majority conclusion that Haske is partially disabled on the proofs presented, but I concur with the majority that the case should be remanded to the wcac. However, I would ask the wcac to make additional findings of fact from the record regarding Haske’s wage-earning capacity as a truck driver after the injury in order to determine whether Haske is eligible for benefits under subsection 301(4). If the record is insufficient regarding this necessary information, it would be appropriate to remand to the magistrate to make an additional record regarding Haske’s wage-earning capacity.
iv
I agree with the concurrence/dissent of Justice Riley that wage loss is the basic operative criterion for determining entitlement to compensation benefits. Post, pp 679-680. However, this fundamental understanding of Michigan’s wage-loss system does not logically support the concurrence/dissent’s conclusion that “subsection 301(4) must define a disability as an inability to perform at least a single job within an *673employee’s qualifications and training.” Id., p 680. The concurrence/dissent’s misinterpretation of disability appears to arise from the second sentence of subsection 301(4) that states, “[t]he establishment of disability does not create a presumption of wage loss.” I believe the concurrence/dissent misconstrues the purpose of the second sentence and the effect of my approach to disability. As will be shown below, and contrary to the concurrence/dissent’s assertion that my approach to subsection 301(4) will render the second sentence unnecessary,9 requiring proof of “a limitation of wage earning capacity in work suitable to [an employee’s] qualifications and training” to establish eligibility for benefits is not inconsistent with the concept and calculation of wage loss.
The majority similarly misconstrues the second sentence of subsection 301(4) where it states:
[T]he definition of disability in subsection 301(4) cannot then be logically interpreted as a reduction of wage-earning capacity as long as wage loss is also measured by a reduction in wage-earning capacity. . . . Subsection 301(4)’s second sentence eliminates the possibility that disability and wage loss are defined the same way .... [Ante, pp 654-655.]
However, the majority goes further by compressing the questions of disability and wage loss into a combined three-step analysis made entirely out of whole cloth. Id., pp 634 and 662. This three-step test effectively transforms wage loss into mere consideration of actual wages lost. The majority’s three-part test to establish a “compensable disability” fails to account *674for over forty years of wage-loss analysis that this Court has consistently interpreted to mean more than simply actual wages lost. Wage loss requires consideration of loss of earning capacity. Sobotka v Chrysler Corp (After Remand), 447 Mich 1, 24-25; 523 NW2d 454 (1994); Leizerman v First Flight Freight Service, 424 Mich 463; 381 NW2d 386 (1985); Kidd v General Motors Corp, 414 Mich 578, 591-592; 327 NW2d 265 (1982); Pigue v General Motors Corp, 317 Mich 311, 316; 26 NW2d 900 (1947). Further, it is unclear what effect the three-part test has on the majority holding that a disability is a work-related injury or disease plus the inability to perform a single job.
The second sentence of subsection 301(4), “[t]he establishment of disability does not create a presumption of wage loss,” underscores the basic premise that Michigan’s worker’s compensation system is, and has always been, a wage-loss system. Sobotka, supra at 6 (Boyle, J., lead opinion). Under the wage-loss approach, an employee may prove a disability under subsection 301(4) and thus be eligible for benefits and yet not be entitled to benefits because of other factors.
The concept of wage loss is reflected by provisions of the worker’s compensation act such as subsection 301(5)(a), which disqualifies an eligible, disabled employee if the employee has refused favored work, and subsection 301(5)(c), which disqualifies an eligible, disabled employee who earns as much or more after the injury as before, for the duration of such earning. Thus, where an employee effectively removes himself from the workforce by refusing favored work or where he earns more than before the injury, the employee is not entitled to benefits *675because he has effectively suffered no wage loss. The wage-loss approach is further demonstrated by provisions that adjust the benefits of an eligible employee to reflect the employee’s actual earning after the injury. Subsections 301(5)(b), (d), and (e).
However, wage loss requires more than consideration of actual wages lost; it requires consideration of loss of earning capacity. Sobotka, supra at 24-25; Leizerman, supra. This general principle for wage-loss calculation is stated in subsection 371(1).10 The actual amount of wage-loss benefits to which an employee is entitled, once eligibility is proven, is determined under subsections 351(l)11 or 361(1).12 *676The majority and the concurrence/dissent of Justice Riley lower the threshold regarding disability (eligibility for benefits) because the language of subsection 371(1) includes consideration of “the proportionate extent of the impairment of the employee’s earning capacity . . . Presumably the reasoning relates to the substance of the second sentence of subsection 301(4).
It is my conclusion that the second sentence of subsection 301(4) means that an injury resulting in “a limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity” will not always result in a wage loss or entitlement to benefits. I do not believe that my approach to disability violates the mandate of subsection 301(4) that “[t]he establishment of disability does not create a presumption of wage loss.” There may be some redundancy of proof required for “a limitation of an employee’s wage earning capacity” under subsection 301(4) and “the proportionate extent of the impairment of the employee’s earning capacity” under subsection 371(1); however, the two provisions are not identical in meaning. Subsection 301(4) arguably encompasses a wider range of potential employments than subsection 371(1), because subsection 371(1) expressly limits the wage-earning calculation to those employments that the employee was actually working at the time of the injury. There may well be a situation in which an employee’s current qualifications and *677training include work or employments that he was not actually doing at the time of the injury. If the magistrate so finds, and finds also that the employee’s earning capacity at work is equal to what he was earning at the time of the injury, then the employee would not be disabled and therefore not eligible for benefits. The question of entitlement to wage-loss benefits would simply not be reached.
While it is perhaps a rare set of facts that there would be found “a limitation of an employee’s wage-earning capacity” and yet no wage loss, I prefer to follow the plain language of the statute.
For these reasons, I concur that these cases should be remanded; however, I would offer different instructions on remand. I dissent from the majority’s reasoning and its conclusion that Haske has proven that he is eligible for benefits under subsection 301(4). I would also find that Bailey has not proven a disability under subsection 301(4) on the proofs presented.
Brickley, J., concurred with Weaver, J.

 This Court has found that both the 1981 and 1987 amendments were intended to make disability more difficult to prove. See, e.g., Dean v Chrysler Corp, 434 Mich 655, 666; 455 NW2d 699 (1990), Michales v Morton Salt Co, 450 Mich 479, 490; 538 NW2d 11 (1995). As stated in Dean, “Although the dollar amount of benefits payable to workers eligible for compensation was increased, there can be no doubt that the Legislature . . . intended through its 1980 and 1981 reform efforts to narrow and restrict the eligibility qualifications.” Id., pp 666-667.

 The majority holding that “an employee is disabled if there is at least a single job within his qualifications and training that he can no longer perform,” ante, p 643, is in effect indistinguishable from pre-1981 cases such as Powell v Casco Nelmor Corp, 406 Mich 332, 350; 279 NW2d 769 (1979) (holding that disability is the inability to perform work the claimant was doing when injured), and Pigue v General Motors Corp, 317 Mich 311, 315; 26 NW2d 900 (1947) (finding total disability where an employee was unable to do the same work after the injury).

 The person seeking worker’s compensation benefits has traditionally carried the burden of establishing eligibility by proving a disability. See, e.g., Draper v Regents of Univ of Michigan, 195 Mich 449, 456; 161 NW 956 (1917), and Bachula v General Motors Corp, 191 Mich App 193, 194; 477 NW2d 486 (1991).

 The scope of this inquiry, practically, should be limited to that qualification and training that is current to the employee.

 By 1987 PA 28 the language “work suitable to his or her qualifications and training” replaced “the employee’s general field of employment.”

 However, if an employee is disabled, such subsequent employment would likely affect his wage loss, thereby reducing the benefits to which he is entitled.

 Subsection 401(1) at issue in Michales is part of Chapter 4 of the worker’s compensation act addressing occupational diseases. It is functionally equivalent to subsection 301(4).

 Although I would find that neither plaintiff has carried the burden of proof regarding disability because each has failed to show “a limitation of wage earning capacity,” it is appropriate and fair to remand these cases in light of the difficult language of 301(4).

 Post, p 681, n 5.

 Subsection 371(1) provides:
The weekly loss in wages referred to in this act shall consist of the percentage of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee computed according to this section as fairly represents the proportionate extent of the impairment of the employee’s earning capacity in the employments covered by this act in which the employee was working at the time of the personal injury. The weekly loss in wages shall be fixed as of the time of the personal injury, and determined considering the nature and extent of the personal injury. The compensation payable, when added to the employee’s wage earning capacity after the personal injury in the same or other employments, shall not exceed the employee’s average weekly earnings at the time of the injury.

 Subsection 351(1) provides in part:
While the incapacity for work resulting from a personal injury is total, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid as provided in this section, to the injured employee a weekly compensation of 80% of the employee’s after-tax average weekly wage, but not more than the maximum weekly rate of compensation, as determined under section 355. Compensation shall be paid for the duration of the disability.

 Subsection 361(1) provides:
While the incapacity for work resulting from a personal injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid to the injured employee weekly compensation equal to 80% of the difference *676between the injured employee’s after-tax average weekly wage before the personal injury and the after-tax average weekly wage which the injured employee is able to earn after the personal injury, but not more than the maximum weekly rate of compensation, as determined under section 355. Compensation shall be paid for the duration of the disability.