Court Opinion

ID: 9667070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:34:20.239192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:34.682221
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
DISSENT
I respectfully dissent.
While I agree with the court that Clark’s conviction must be reversed, I believe the court’s decision to remand for a new trial is error. My review of the record leads me to the conclusion that the corroborating evidence relied on by the court is insufficient as a matter of law and therefore may not be used to support Clark’s conviction. Because I further conclude that the remaining evidence, absent the accomplice testimony, is legally insufficient to support Clark’s conviction, I would reverse Clark’s conviction outright and not remand for a new trial.
Clark claims that his conviction should be reversed and that he should receive a new trial because Trimble was an accomplice whose testimony at trial was not corroborated. Clark did not request an accomplice instruction nor did he object to the admission of her testimony on those grounds. When a defendant fails to object to a trial court’s erroneous omission of a jury instruction regarding accomplice testimony, our review is for plain error. State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572, 584 (Minn.2007). For there to be plain error, the trial court must have committed (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Minn.2006). If each of these factors of the plain error test is met, we then consider the additional factor of whether the unobjected-to error needs to be addressed to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial process. Id. at 302. An error is considered “plain” if it is “clear” or “obvious.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn.2002) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). If the error “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct,” jit usually is clear or obvious. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. Generally the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on the third factor. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 301-02.
A conviction may not rest on uncorroborated accomplice testimony because such testimony is “inherently untrustworthy.” Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 689; see also Minn.Stat. § 634.04 (2006). Therefore, a trial court has a “duty to instruct juries on accomplice testimony in any criminal case in which it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to be an accomplice.” Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 689. The “test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice for purposes of section 634.04 is whether he could have been indicted and convicted for the crime with which the accused is charged.” State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Minn.2004).
The corroborating evidence does not have to be sufficient to support a conviction, but it must both (1) “affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony” and (2) “point to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree.”1 Reed, 737 *263N.W.2d at 584 (quoting State v. Sorg, 275 Minn. 1, 5, 144 N.W.2d 788, 786 (1966)). Circumstantial evidence “indicating the defendant’s participation in the crime is sufficient to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony.” State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 532 (Minn.1995) (citing State v. Jones, 347 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn.1984)). A defendant’s “entire conduct” may be looked to for corroborating circumstances. State v. Adams, 295 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Minn.1980). The “quantum of corroborative evidence needed necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case.” Id. Although we review the corroborating evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 727 (Minn.2000), whether the evidence sufficiently corroborates the accomplice’s testimony is a legal question that we review de novo. See, e.g., id. (concluding that the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated and pointed to the defendant’s guilt); Adams, 295 N.W.2d at 534 (concluding that the accomplice testimony was adequately corroborated); State v. Mathiasen, 267 Minn. 393, 401-02, 127 N.W.2d 534, 540 (1964) (concluding that the accomplice testimony was not adequately corroborated).
In Reed, we concluded that Trimble was an accomplice as a matter of law and that the admission of her testimony at trial without giving the jury an accomplice instruction was error that was plain. 737 N.W.2d at 582-83. For all of the reasons discussed in Reed, Trimble is also an accomplice as a matter of law in this case. As such, the trial court here committed an error, which was plain, when it failed to give an accomplice instruction. We further concluded in Reed, however, that the failure to give the accomplice instruction did not affect Reed’s substantial rights “[gjiven the extent of corroborating evidence in the record.” Id. at 584-85. In reaching that conclusion, we looked at “the weight of [the non-accomplices’] collective testimony.” Id. at 585. Notably, at Reed’s trial, Garrett, a trained sharpshooter, testified that Reed tried to recruit him for help in “bringing down the first pig”; Trimble testified that she and Reed made the call; Foster testified that Reed’s behavior shortly after the shooting was dejected and abnormal; and John Griffin testified that, in the early 1980s, Reed told him that “when [Reed] put a bead on that officer ... he felt powerful,” but “when he seen the bullet hitting him, he said he never felt more f[* * *]ed up in his life.” Id. at 578-79, 585 (third alteration added).
At Clark’s trial, Trimble testified that, at Reed’s request, she placed the false emergency phone call on the night Officer Sack-ett was shot. Her testimony also placed *264Clark both at his home, which was approximately 102 feet from where Officer Sack-ett was shot, and in Reed’s company around the time of the shooting. Further, she testified that she did not see a rifle at Clark’s house or in the car when Reed drove her to the phone booth and to Clark’s house. Trimble also claimed that Clark was waiting outside for them when she and Reed arrived at Clark’s house.
Although on the surface the voice print analysis evidence seems to corroborate Trimble’s testimony that she made the false emergency call, the voice print analysis lacks any probative value on the issue of whether Trimble’s testimony was truthful because she only admitted making the telephone call after the police confronted her with the voice print analysis. The fact that Trimble conceded a fact proven by independent tangible evidence can hardly be said to establish truthfulness. In addition, that evidence does not directly or circumstantially corroborate her claim that Reed asked her to make the call or any of her other testimony.2 Nor does it point to Clark’s guilt to any degree, substantial or otherwise.
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, none of the evidence affirms the truth of Trimble’s testimony that there was no rifle in car, that she and *265Reed drove to Clark’s house after she made the phone call, and that Clark was standing outside his back door when they arrived. The evidence includes testimony: (1) that Clark was present at group meetings at which Reed advocated killing a police officer; (2) that Clark apparently agreed with Reed’s statements about killing a police officer, self-defense, and black power; (3) that Clark made statements about black power and self-defense; and (4) that Clark had a close relationship with Reed. None of this evidence in any way affirms the truth of Trimble’s testimony, nor does it point to Clark’s guilt except to the extent it raises the improper inference of guilt by association.
In addition, there was evidence that Clark and Reed were involved in the shooting of a police officer during the Nebraska bank robbery and that there was a false emergency call summoning police to 867 Hague Avenue two days before the shooting of Officer Sackett at 859 Hague. This evidence does not in any way affirm the truthfulness of any of Trimble’s testimony.
There was also evidence that Clark was seen shortly before the shooting walking with Reed, who was carrying a rifle, in the direction of Clark’s house and the location of the shooting. This evidence does not affirm the truth of any of Trimble’s testimony. Indeed, notwithstanding the State’s argument and the court’s conclusion to the contrary, this evidence sheds no light on that testimony. On these facts, the use of what was seen by Harper to corroborate the testimony of Trimble about what was not seen by Trimble at a different time and in a different place for the purpose of supporting an inference to be drawn from Trimble’s testimony creates an impossible hurdle for a criminal defendant to overcome. As there is no way for Clark to challenge what Trimble did not see, there is essentially no way to challenge the inference the State would have drawn from that evidence.
Additionally, it is worth noting, although certainly not dispositive, that none of the evidence relied on by the State puts Clark at home or with Reed at the time of the sho'oting or suggests that the rifle seen earlier was not in the car used in driving Trimble to make the phone call.3 Thus, the evidence relied on does not either directly or circumstantially “affirm the truth” of Trimble’s testimony that there was no rifle in the car, that she and Reed drove to Clark’s house after she made the phone call, and that Clark was standing outside his back door when they arrived.
Nor does any of the evidence when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict point to Clark’s guilt in some substantial degree. The court contends that the evidence “plac[es] the men in proximity to the crime scene under unusual circumstances.” See Sorg, 275 Minn. at 5, 144 N.W.2d at 786 (emphasis added). Here, while Harper claimed that he saw Reed and Clark walking toward Clark’s house, that is hardly an unusual circumstance. In addition, the record contains evidence that it was not unusual for Reed and Clark to be seen together with a rifle present. While there is considerable evidence that Clark associated with Reed, none of this evidence suggests Clark jointly participated in, or even was aware of, a plan to shoot Officer Sackett on May 22, 1970. Further, although there is evidence Reed possessed a rifle, no one ever testified that Clark was in possession of the *266rifle used to commit the offense, much less any other rifle on the day in question.
Because I believe, as a matter of law, that Trimble’s testimony lacks corroboration, I conclude that Clark’s conviction cannot rest on that testimony. Given the nature of the remaining evidence, I also conclude that the failure to give the accomplice instruction affected Clark’s substantial rights and that fairness and the integrity of the judicial process require reversal of Clark’s convictions.
Even though none of the evidence discussed above both affirms the truth of Trimble’s testimony and at the same time points to Clark’s guilt in some substantial degree, the court concludes that a reasonable jury could conclude that Trimble’s testimony is corroborated. In essence, the court has concluded that there is sufficient evidence in the record to corroborate Trimble’s testimony, a conclusion with which I obviously disagree.4 Notwithstanding that conclusion, the court correctly concludes that reversal of Clark’s conviction is required because the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice instruction was plain error.
Having concluded that Clark’s convictions must be reversed, the next question is whether we should remand for a new trial. The court concludes that we should. The answer to that question for me turns on whether, absent Trimble’s testimony, there is otherwise sufficient evidence to sustain Clark’s convictions. The general rule is that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not bar the retrial of a defendant who has been successful in having his or her convictions set aside for error in trial proceedings. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964)). An exception to that general rule was recognized in Burks v. United States. 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). In Burks, the Court held that retrial is barred when the sole basis for the reversal is insufficiency of the evidence. Id. In holding that double jeopardy does not bar retrial of a defendant whose conviction is overturned because of ordinary trial errors, the Court in Lock-hart noted that the Court in Burks
was careful to point out that a reversal based solely on evidentiary insufficiency has fundamentally different implications, for double jeopardy purposes, than a reversal based on such ordinary “trial errors” as the “incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence.” 437 U.S. at 14-16, 98 S.Ct. 2141. While the former is in effect a finding “that the government has failed to prove its case” against the defendant, the latter “implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant,” but is simply “a determination that [he] has been convicted *267through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect.” Id. at 15, 98 S.Ct. 2141.
Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40, 109 S.Ct. 285 (citing Burks, 437 U.S. at 14-16, 98 S.Ct. 2141).
The trial error here was the failure to give the accomplice testimony instruction, which explains in relevant part that the jury
cannot find the defendant guilty of a crime on the testimony of a person who could be charged with that crime, unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence that tends to convict the defendant of the crime. Such a person who could be charged for the same crime is called an accomplice.
10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice — Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 3.18 (5th ed.2006). On the surface, this error would appear to be the kind of ordinary trial error for which retrial would not be barred by double jeopardy. But the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice instruction is not the only problem with the accomplice testimony. While it is true that the failure to give the instruction is an ordinary trial error, there is the further problem that as a matter of law Trimble’s testimony is not sufficiently corroborated so as to be available to support Clark’s conviction. Because Trim-ble’s testimony is unavailable to support the conviction, we are left with a question of evidentiary sufficiency. That question is the same question we would have to confront if the accomplice instruction had been properly given, the defendant had been convicted, and on appeal we held that the accomplice testimony was insufficiently corroborated and therefore unavailable to support the conviction. Thus, under Burks, we must determine whether the available evidence as a whole is sufficient as a matter of law to affirm the conviction. For the reasons discussed below, I conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the conviction, and therefore outright reversal of Clark’s conviction is required.5
When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, our review is “limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach their verdict.” State v. Hatfield, 639 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Minn.2002). We give circumstantial evidence the same weight we give any other kind of evidence. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 477 (Minn.2004). However, “if a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, a higher level of scrutiny is warranted.” Id. Like convictions based on other types of evidence, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence will be affirmed so long as “the circumstances are both consistent with the hypothesis that the defendant is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Hatfield, 639 N.W.2d at 376 (citing State v. Walen, 563 N.W.2d 742, 750 (Minn.1977)). That is, the circumstantial evidence must “ ‘form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a *268reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn.1980)). We have stated that “the circumstantial evidence must do more than give rise to suspicion of guilt; ‘[i]t must point unerringly to the accused’s guilt.’ ” State v. Scharmer, 501 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Minn.1993) (quoting State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 281, 204 N.W.2d 404, 409 (1973)). Mere presence at the crime scene is insufficient evidence from which to infer complicity. See State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 682 (Minn.2007). Nor is mere association with those who commit a crime sufficient to “raise any rational inference of guilt.” State v. Buchwald, 293 Minn. 74, 82 n. 4, 196 N.W.2d 445, 450 n. 4 (1972); see also State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn.1998) (“mere association” with suspected drug dealer insufficient to support probable cause for being frisked); State v. Blacksten, 507 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn.1993) (“mere association” with Mend near time of robbery insufficient to support probable cause for arrest). The State bears the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt on each element of a, charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Conspiracy to Commit FirsP-Degree Premeditated Murder
In order to convict Clark of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, the State was required to prove, among other things, that Clark was part of a conspiracy. Under our law, “[w]hoever conspires with another to commit a crime and in furtherance of the conspiracy one or more of the parties does some overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy” is guilty of conspiracy. Minn.Stat. § 609.175, subd. 2 (2006). To establish a conspiracy, the State must provide evidence “that objectively indicates an agreement” between the defendant and another to commit the crime. Hatfield, 639 N.W.2d at 376. Generally, when there is evidence of “a common plan, concerted conduct, or prior involvement with the alleged co-conspirator,” it is reasonable to infer that there was an agreement. Id. at 377.
The State’s theory of the case at trial was that on the night that Officer Sackett was shot, Reed, along with Clark, followed through with Reed’s previously stated desire to kill a police officer. According to the State, Reed, carrying a bolt-action rifle, walked with Clark from Day’s apartment to Clark’s house, where they stored the rifle. Reed then picked up Trimble and drove her to make the false emergency phone call. Then Reed, along with Trimble, drove to Clark’s house to retrieve the rifle, at which point either Reed or Clark or both left Clark’s house and carried out the shooting of Officer Sackett. The shooter then returned to Clark’s house after which Reed drove Trimble home.
According to the State, the evidence supporting Clark’s conspiracy conviction includes evidence:6 (1) that Clark was present at group meetings at which Reed advocated killing a police officer; (2) of Clark’s apparent agreement with Reed’s statements about killing a police officer, self-defense, and black power; (3) that Clark made statements about black power and self-defense; (4) that Clark had a close relationship with Reed; and (5) that Clark was seen shortly before the shooting walking with Reed, who was carrying a rifle, in the direction of Clark’s house and the location of the shooting. The State also argues that evidence of Clark and *269Reed’s involvement in the shooting of a police officer during the Nebraska bank robbery supports the element of intent. Finally, the State argues that the conspiracy conviction is supported by the evidence of the false emergency call summoning police to 867 Hague Avenue two days before the shooting of Officer Sackett at 859 Hague.
All of the evidence that the State contends supports Clark’s guilt is circumstantial. The question that must be answered is whether this circumstantial evidence when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict points “unerringly” to Clark’s guilt. I conclude that it does not. First, the evidence of Clark’s presence at United Black Front meetings, his agreement with Reed’s statements about killing a police officer, statements of his .own about black power and self-defense, and Clark’s close relationship with Reed, standing alone, does nothing more than suggest that Clark is guilty because of his association with Reed. Without more, this evidence is insufficient because “mere association with an individual engaged in an illegal enterprise does not make a person a conspirator.” United States v. Moss, 591 F.2d 428, 435 (8th Cir.1979). Moreover, this evidence does not point unerringly to Clark’s guilt or “exclude beyond a reasonable, doubt any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.”
The strongest evidence against Clark is Harper’s testimony that he saw Clark, along with a rifle-carrying Reed, leave Day’s apartment walking in the direction of Clark’s house and the location of the shooting. The State argues that the inference to be drawn from this evidence is that Reed and Clark were on their way to carry out the shooting. The State further argues that this evidence supports not only an agreement to shoot a police officer, but also action by the two men in furtherance of that agreement, which goes beyond mere association. However, based on other evidence in the record indicating that Reed and Clark had been seen together on a number of occasions with a rifle in their possession without anyone being shot, it is equally possible to infer that Clark did not know of Reed’s plan to shoot a police officer that evening. This inference leads to a rational hypothesis other than guilt. Absent a showing that Clark had knowledge of Reed’s plan, an agreement to be part of the plan cannot be inferred. Without other evidence that Clark knew of Reed’s plan, the fact that Clark was seen in Reed’s company shortly before the shooting becomes mere presence. See Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d at 682. That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, while there is evidence of Clark being in Reed’s company approximately 15 to 30 minutes before Officer Sackett was shot, it is undisputed that Clark and Reed separated after Harper saw them leaving Day’s apartment together and there is no available evidence placing Clark and Reed together again that night. Nor is there evidence placing Clark at or near the scene of the shooting at the time of or after the shooting. Indeed, while Reed, Day, Harper, and Garrett were seen immediately after the shooting near the scene, there is no evidence in the record that Clark was seen after- Officer Sackett was shot, either with Reed or near the crime scene. Therefore, it cannot be said that the fact that Reed and Clark were seen together with a rifle the night Officer Sackett was shot leads unerringly to the conclusion that an agreement to conspire existed between Reed and Clark.
The State also suggests that Clark’s guilt can be inferred from the proximity of Clark’s house to 859 Hague, the location where Officer Sackett was shot, and 867 Hague, the location identified to which the police responded as a result of the un*270founded call two days before the shooting of Officer Sackett. Other than establishing that Clark lived in close proximity to those locations, the location of Clark’s house, without more, sheds no light on Clark’s involvement, if any, in Officer Sackett’s shooting. Like mere presence, mere proximity to the crime scene is insufficient to support the inference that Clark conspired with Reed and/or others to carry out the shooting.
Finally, the State asserts that Reed’s and Clark’s convictions for the Nebraska bank robbery, which occurred five months after Officer Sackett’s shooting and during which an off-duty police officer was shot, evidence Clark’s intentional involvement in Officer Sackett’s shooting. I will assume for purposes of argument that evidence of the bank robbery was properly admitted as Spreigl evidence. At trial, the State argued that the evidence that Clark and Reed were convicted of shooting with intent to kill, wound, or maim during the bank robbery was necessary to prove Clark was more than merely present at his house with Reed the night of the shooting. The State also argued that the bank robbery evidence was necessary to rebut suggestions that the State’s witnesses lied at trial. The State’s theory was that Reed and Trimble did not accidentally go from the phone booth to Clark’s house the night Officer Sackett was shot and that Clark was not accidentally waiting outside his house when Reed and Trimble arrived. Given that Trimble’s uncorroborated accomplice testimony putting Reed and Clark together at Clark’s house near the time of the shooting is, as a matter of law, unavailable to support the conviction, the State’s assertion that Clark was intentionally present at his house the night of the shooting is not supported by the record.
To the extent that part of the State’s argument was or is that Reed’s and Clark’s intent to engage in a conspiracy to shoot Officer Sackett can be inferred from the intentional shooting of the police officer during the bank robbery, that argument fails. The fact that Reed and Clark, during a bank robbery, shot a security guard who happened to be an off-duty police officer after the guard attempted to thwart the robbery does not shed light on any agreement that Clark and Reed may have had five months earlier to shoot Officer Sackett for the purpose of obtaining permission to start a local Black Panther chapter. I therefore conclude that Clark’s involvement in the bank robbery does not either by itself or in combination with the other evidence provide sufficient evidentia-ry support for Clark’s conspiracy conviction.

Aiding and Abetting First-Degree Premeditated Murder

As for Clark’s conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder, in order for Clark to be convicted of aiding and abetting first-degree murder, the State had to prove that Clark intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with “or otherwise proeure[d] the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05 (2006). If a defendant plays a “knowing role” in the commission of a crime and [takes] no steps to thwart it, he is guilty of aiding and abetting. State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 924 (Minn.1995). To show that Clark played a knowing role in the shooting, the State had to prove that Clark knew that his accomplice, in this case Reed, was going to shoot Officer Sackett and that Clark “intended his presence or acts to encourage or further the completion of the crime.” Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d at 682. Intentional presence at or near the scene of the crime alone is insufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting. Id.
*271The evidence the State relies on to support Clark’s aiding and abetting conviction is the same circumstantial evidence the State relies on in support of Clark’s conspiracy conviction. Again, there is no direct evidence of Clark’s involvement in Officer Sackett’s shooting. As discussed above, the evidence of Clark’s presence at United Black Front meetings, his agreement with Reed’s statements about killing a police officer, statements of his own about black power and self-defense, and Clark’s close relationship with Reed, standing alone, does nothing more than suggest that Clark is guilty because of his association with Reed and is insufficient to support an inference that Clark played a knowing role in the shooting of Officer Sackett.
Moreover, Harper’s testimony that Reed and Clark were seen leaving Day’s apartment establishes nothing more than Clark’s mere presence in Reed’s company some 15 to 30 minutes before the shooting. That evidence does not, however, place Clark in Reed’s company at the time of or after the shooting. Nor does it lead unerringly to the conclusion that Clark knew of the plan to shoot a police officer that night or that he played a knowing role in the plan. Further, the record is silent with respect to any action taken by Clark at anytime in furtherance of Officer Sack-ett’s shooting. Finally, for the same reasons discussed above, the Nebraska bank robbery evidence is also insufficient to support the conclusion that Clark played a knowing role in the shooting of Officer Sackett or took any actions in furtherance of that crime.
Having concluded that Trimble’s uncorroborated accomplice testimony cannot be used to support Clark’s convictions and that the remaining evidence is insufficient to support Clark’s convictions for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and for aiding and abetting first-degree murder, I conclude that Clark’s convictions must be reversed outright. As we stated in Bernhardt, on a record with more available evidence to support the conviction than is present here, “[i]f our standard on circumstantial evidence means anything, it means [that, in this case, Clark] cannot be convicted on this record that does not exclude other rational hypotheses.” 684 N.W.2d at 479. The same is true here.7

. We have stressed that "[t]he connection between the defendant and the crime must be established by corroborating evidence which affirms the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and points to the guilt of the defendant in some substantial degree.” State v. Mathiasen, 267 Minn. 393, 398, 127 N.W.2d 534, 538 (1964). The court appears to read the statement to mean that an accomplice's testimony is corroborated if there is at least one piece of evidence pointing to the truth of the testimony and at least one other piece of evidence point*263ing to the defendant’s guilt. However, we also have said that the "proper test” for determining whether evidence corroborates an accomplice’s testimony is "whether it tends in some reasonable degree to confirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony as to defendant’s guilt.” State v. LaJambe, 300 Minn. 539, 541, 219 N.W.2d 917, 919 (1974) (emphasis added).
Other than State v. Guy, 259 Minn. 67, 105 N.W.2d 892 (1960), the court has identified no cases that use one piece of evidence to affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and another piece of evidence that points to the defendant’s guilt. Nor have I found any such cases. As for Guy, as explained in some detail later, that case involved accomplice testimony corroborated by evidence from at least two non-accomplices that affirmed the truth of the accomplices' testimony as to the defendant's guilt.
Finally, in the absence of case law to the contrary, I note that the policy underlying the rule requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony is not furthered by the court’s reading of our accomplice corroboration rules. Merely requiring that the truth of some part of the accomplice's testimony be affirmed and that some other evidence point to the defendant’s guilt hardly "restores confidence” in the accomplice’s testimony. See State v. Houle, 257 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Minn.1977).

. Contrary to the court's assertion, I would not require "the introduction of independent evidence to prove every aspect of the accomplice’s testimony that is probative of the defendant’s guilt.’’ I would only require, as we have in the past, that the corroborating evidence affirm at least some aspect of the truth of the accomplice’s testimony that is probative of the defendant’s guilt. In this case, there is no corroborating evidence affirming any aspect of the truth of Trimble’s testimony that is probative of Clark's guilt. The only non-accomplice evidence that arguably points to Clark’s guilt, although I do not concede that it does, is the testimony that Clark was seen with Reed and a rifle shortly before the shooting. However, that piece of evidence, like all of the other non-accomplice evidence, in no way points to or affirms the truthfulness of any of Trimble’s testimony; it does not affirm the truth of her testimony about making the call for Reed, not seeing the rifle in the car or Clark’s house, Clark waiting outside his house, or that she and Reed even went to Clark’s house the night of the shooting. Here, there is simply no evidence that is both probative of Clark’s guilt while at the same time probative of the truthfulness of Trimble’s testimony.
The court relies on State v. Guy, 259 Minn. 67, 105 N.W.2d 892 (1960), to support its claim that our precedent requires "that the evidence as a whole must both affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and point to the defendant’s guilt.” The court's reliance on Guy is misplaced and the court’s argument overreaches. In Guy, other-crimes evidence of a markedly similar check-cashing offense involving Guy, which was testified to by an "illiterate” witness who was not an accomplice to the charged offense, both affirmed the truth of the accomplice Archer’s testimony and pointed to Guy’s guilt, contrary to the court’s conclusion here. Id. at 70, 105 N.W.2d at 895-96. Also in Guy, while the testimony of the 11-year-old child witness was impeached, and the impeached testimony could not be used as substantive evidence of proof, it could nonetheless be used to provide corroboration of Archer's testimony. Id. at 72-73, 105 N.W.2d at 897; see also State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 94 (Minn.2002) (holding that jury could use impeached witness testimony to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony). The 11-year-old's testimony that he saw Guy with Archer and LeMon, that the three men stopped talking when he entered the room, and that one of the three men told him and his brother to go outside both affirms the truth of Archer’s testimony about meeting with Guy and points to Guy’s involvement in the check-cashing scheme. Although the court contends that the other-crimes testimony and the child's testimony do not both affirm the truth and point to Guy's guilt, they do when one considers them in light of all of the other evidence admitted against Guy. Thus, in Guy, looking at the evidence "as a whole," accomplice Archer’s testimony was corroborated by non-accomplice testimony, which affirmed the truth of Archer’s testimony as to Guy's guilt.

. The court, without explanation, asserts that the truthfulness of Trimble’s testimony is affirmed by the other evidence. Making the assertion, however, does not turn the assertion into fact.

. In order to reach this conclusion, it appears that the court has retreated on our longstanding requirement that in order for evidence to corroborate an accomplice's testimony it must have both some tendency to affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony and at the same time point to the defendant's guilt. See Sorg, 275 Minn. at 5, 144 N.W.2d at 786. As applied by the court in this case, the rule only requires that the evidence have some tendency to affirm the truth of the accomplice’s testimony or point to the defendant's guilt. Thus, for the court to conclude that an accomplice's testimony is sufficiently corroborated, it is enough if there are two pieces of evidence, one of which affirms the truth of the accomplice’s testimony but does not point to the defendant’s guilt, and the other of which points to the defendant’s guilt but does not affirm in any way the truth of the accomplice's testimony.

. Clark does not claim, nor do I conclude, that Trimble's testimony was inadmissible. I simply concluded that, under the facts of this case, Trimble’s testimony was not, as a matter of law, corroborated, and therefore Clark’s conviction could not rest on her testimony even if an accomplice instruction had been given. Therefore, if we were to remand for a new trial to "merely recreate!] the situation that would have been obtained" if the trial court had given the accomplice instruction, the jury would be put in the position of again considering Trimble’s uncorroborated accomplice testimony, which it could not use to convict. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 42, 109 S.Ct. 285.

. Having concluded, as a matter of law, that Trimble’s uncorroborated accomplice testimony is unavailable to support the conviction, I do not consider it here.

. Because I would reverse Clark's convictions, I would not reach the other issues raised by Clark on appeal.