Court Opinion

ID: 9858538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:27:08.626665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:43.554410
License: Public Domain

FITZGERALD, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In its first issue, the State argues the Plano officer actually stopped Kurtz within the boundaries of the officer’s geographic jurisdiction. I agree with the majority that the intra city agreements, as they were offered at trial, did not establish the officer’s jurisdiction included the City of Frisco. However, I agree with our sister courts in Houston and Fort Worth that the Plano officer’s jurisdiction by law was county-wide. See Dogay v. State, 101 S.W.3d 614, 617 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); Brother v. State, 85 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. filed). The majority’s argument against county-wide jurisdiction stresses the 1995 repeal of certain statutory provisions related to Type A general law municipalities. However, no action by the 1995 Legislature addressed the geographical jurisdiction of an officer in a home-rule municipality (like Plano) in any manner. Indeed, the legislative history of the 1995 amendments, discussed in both Dogay and Brother, supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended only to broaden the authority of police officers throughout the State, not to limit it. Accordingly, I would conclude that a municipal police officer retains the county-wide jurisdiction he presumptively held before 1995, and that this officer had the authority to stop Kurtz for the traffic violation.
I would also conclude that the officer appropriately stopped Kurtz for an intoxication offense. Kurtz’s prolonged and dangerous driving pattern certainly sufficed to give the officer reasonable suspicion to detain him for driving while intoxicated. See, e.g., Townsend v. State, 813 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref'd). However, the majority opines that an out-of-jurisdiction officer must have probable cause rather than mere reasonable suspicion to stop and detain for the offense of driving while intoxicated; I disagree. The authority to arrest necessarily includes within it the authority to perform appropriate acts necessary for an arrest. The authority to stop and conduct an investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion is within the authority of a police officer and is part of the same process as an arrest. See Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (differences between arrests and in*324vestigative detentions are merely degree of intrusion involved and different legal justifications required of each). This is a judicial doctrine, not a legislative one, grafted onto the right to arrest through federal and state case law. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
The majority disposes of the State’s second issue concerning the driving-while-intoxicated detention in a single sentence: “Article 14.03 does not authorize officers to investigate possible breaches of the peace outside their jurisdiction only on reasonable suspicion.” Op. at 322 (citing Gerron v. State, 57 S.W.3d 568, 571 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 97 S.W.3d 597 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Yeager v. State, 23 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 104 S.W.3d 103 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Garner v. State, 779 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1989), pet. ref'd per curiam, 785 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Thomas v. State, 864 S.W.2d 193,196 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, pet. ref'd)). But the code of criminal procedure does not generally address the authority to detain when it identifies grounds for arrest. Indeed, article 14.03(g) does not address probable cause either, and yet there is consensus that probable cause is the appropriate standard for an arrest under the article. See, e.g., Yeager, 23 S.W.3d at 572; Op. at 323.
The purpose of article 14.03(g) is clear on its face: to expand the range of criminal conduct from which an out-of-jurisdiction officer can protect the community. In the absence of any provision to the contrary, I would conclude the Legislature intended the out-of-jurisdietion officer to follow the same well-settled constitutionally based procedures he would follow for any other arrest, including probable cause to arrest and reasonable suspicion to detain.
Finally, the Legislature has specifically authorized an out-of-jurisdiction peace officer to make a warrantless arrest for a breach of the peace committed in his presence. While I believe that Kurtz’s prolonged pattern of dangerous driving, in and of itself, constituted a breach of the peace for which the officer had authority to stop and arrest him under article 14.03(d), this Court need not rest its decision on that ground. It is sufficient to record my opinion that this issue was properly before the trial court and is before this Court on appeal, and to stress my opinion that an offense can qualify as a breach of the peace, so long as the conduct is sufficiently threatening by its nature, even if no identifiable individual is directly threatened.
For all of these reasons, I would reverse the order of the trial court and remand this cause.