Court Opinion

ID: 9747804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:36:25.782092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:25.469200
License: Public Domain

RAYE, J., Dissenting.
Because I disagree with my colleagues in their application of basic principles of evidence and constitutional law, I must respectfully dissent. State v. Mayell (1972) 163 Conn. 419 [311 A.2d 60], cited by the majority for the proposition that exercise of a legal right to defend against extradition is not a proper basis for inferring an illegal state of mind, does not cut so broad a swath. The defendant in Maypll worked in New York and was charged with robbery in nearby Connecticut. The only evidence connecting defendant to the crime was his fingerprint on his New York employer’s car which was abandoned at the crime scene. Following his apprehension defendant refused extradition from New York. At trial the prosecution attempted to prove defendant “fled” from the scene of the crime. Defendant denied being at the crime scene and having any knowledge he was wanted by the police. Acknowledging that “[fjlight, when unexplained, tends to prove consciousness of guilt” (id. at p. 63), the court observed the only evidence of flight was the fact that defendant resisted extradition. Such evidence, according to the court, was “not a proper basis for inferring that the defendant fled from the police or possessed a consciousness of guilt . . . .” (Ibid.) The court’s conclusion was unremarkable. Unless one assumed the defendant’s guilt of the underlying offense, defendant’s arrest in a nearby city and refusal to waive extradition proved very little.
The mental state at issue in the present case is the intent to evade the process of the court. Defendant was well aware of the felony charge against *807him and the time fixed for him to appear in court. The fact that he was apprehended “half a continent away” and upon apprehension declined to voluntarily return is evidence of a continued intent to evade the process of the court. Unlike the defendant’s actions in Mayell, which were facially neutral, the very act of refusing extradition tends to prove the defendant in the present case intended to evade the process of the court.
The majority suggests several innocent reasons why defendant may have chosen to exercise his extradition rights and complains the probative value of defendant’s refusal to waive extradition is “limited.” However, the standard for admissibility is whether proffered testimony tends logically, naturally, or by reasonable inference to establish a material fact, not whether it conclusively proves it. (People v. Yu (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 358 [191 Cal.Rptr. 859].) That defendant’s exercise of extradition rights could have been prompted by other reasons does not preclude a finding that it in fact reflected a continued intent to evade the process of the courts.
The majority’s analysis of Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610 [49 L.Ed.2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240] also strays from the mark. The majority correctly notes that in Doyle the court held “Miranda warnings implicitly assure the arrestee that . . . silence will carry no penalty.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 802.) However, the implication arises from the express warning required by Miranda that anything a defendant says may be used against him. A warning that any statement made by a person may be used against the person logically implies that silence will not be so used. There is no indication in the record that rights extended fugitives under Nebraska extradition statutes are analogous to Miranda warnings. A warning that a fugitive has the right to refuse extradition does not imply the refusal cannot be used against the fugitive in later criminal proceedings.
People v. Jaspal (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1446 [286 Cal.Rptr. 337] is likewise inapposite. In Jaspal as in Doyle, defendant chose to exercise his Miranda right to remain silent. The court, not bothering to restate the Doyle rationale, simply declared “Any comment on, or impeachment use of, a defendant’s silence after warnings on his right to remain silent is improper.” (Id. at p. 1455.) While the right was exercised in the context of an extradition proceeding, that fact was of no moment. Jaspal adds nothing to Doyle's analysis of Miranda rights and provides no further enlightenment in resolving the issue presented in our case.
In most cases defendant’s refusal to waive extradition will be irrelevant and therefore inadmissible to prove guilt of an offense. Consequently, the constitutional issue raised by the present case will rarely arise. Where, as *808here, evidence of such refusal is otherwise admissible, considerations of due process do not preclude its use. The majority err in concluding otherwise.
In summary, the majority err in determining the refusal to waive extradition was of no probative value, and compound their error by deciding the admission of such evidence also offended due process. This conclusion finds no support in logic nor the cases cited.