Court Opinion

ID: 9726435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:48:50.766505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:27.039293
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER, specially concurring: While I agree with the majority that the trial court’s order should be affirmed, I must disagree with its decision regarding whether or not the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) may be represented by private counsel. I believe it cannot be so represented. The majority fails to deal with this problem, merely stating that there is no violation of section 1 — 21 of the Juvenile Court Act because the record indicates that special counsel appeared as “co-counsel” with the State’s Attorney of Hancock County and that both appeared on behalf of DCFS. However, the record belies this assertion. The State’s Attorney, Mr. Corcoran, specifically stated he was not in court on behalf of DCFS. Nor did the State’s Attorney participate in the proceeding in any respect. Therefore, the private counsel for DCFS can in no way be considered to be co-counsel with the State’s Attorney for DCFS. The second amended petition for DCFS was filed by private counsel, who did not purport to be anything other than private counsel. Further, the funds to pay the private counsel came from DCFS, not the State’s Attorney’s office. Under these circumstances, I do not believe that the State’s Attorney can be said to have consented to an appointment of private counsel by DCFS. Thus, we are confronted by the question of whether it was proper for DCFS to be represented by private counsel. I believe it was not proper. This case is virtually identical with Environmental Protection Agency v. Pollution Control Board (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 394, 372 N.E.2d 50. In that case the court held that the Pollution Control Board could not be represented by private counsel in the absence of appointment of such counsel by the court or the Attorney General and that the appointment must be made for reasons listed in section 6 of “An Act in regard to attorneys general and state’s attorneys” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 14, par. 6). The court reasoned that, under the 1970 Constitution, the Attorney General is “ ‘the law officer of the people, as represented in the State government, and its only legal representation in the courts.’ ” (69 Ill. 2d 394, 398, quoting Fergus v. Russel (1915), 270 Ill. 304, 337.) Neither the legislature nor the judiciary may deprive the Attorney General of his common law powers under the Constitution. Thus, the court stated, permitting private counsel to represent the Board would deprive or lessen the Attorney General’s powers or duties and could not be permitted. In the instant case, DCFS is a department of the government of the State of Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 2.) Section 1 — 21 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 701 — 21) permits the State’s Attorney of the county to represent the People in these proceedings. Thus, only the Attorney General or the State’s Attorney may represent the department in the absence of special circumstances enumerated in section 6 of “An Act in regard to attorneys general and state’s attorneys” (Ill Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 14, par. 6). This section states: “Whenever the attorney general or state’s attorney is sick or absent, or unable to attend, or is interested in any cause or proceeding, civil or criminal, which it is or may be his duty to prosecute or defend, the court 606 may appoint some competent attorney to prosecute or defend such cause * * *.”Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 14, par. 6. In the instant case, none of the above circumstances are present nor did the Attorney General or State’s Attorney consent to special counsel. Therefore, it is clear that DCFS could not be represented by private counsel. Although DCFS could not be represented by private counsel, I do not believe that this prejudiced appellant and would not reverse the trial court for this reason alone. Therefore, I also vote to affirm the trial court’s order.