Court Opinion

ID: 9411548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 23:03:35.085712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:07.368648
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/26/23 In re M.K. CA2/3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 In re M.K., et al., Persons Coming                              B307066
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                 Los Angeles County
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              Super. Ct. Nos.
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                          18CCJP04153I,
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                            18CCJP04153J,
                                                                 18CCJP04153K,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                             18CCJP04153L,
                                                                 18CCJP04153M,
           v.                                                    18CCJP04153N,
                                                                 18CCJP04153O,
 L.K., et al.,                                                   18CCJP04153P

           Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Martha Matthews, Judge. Dismissed.

      Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant L.K.

      William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant S.R.
      Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Stephen Watson, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _________________________

      Father and mother separately appealed from the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings and orders declaring their three
children dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).1 Mother also appealed from
the court’s orders declaring five of her other children dependents.
We originally issued an opinion in this case on July 15, 2021.
We dismissed the appeals as moot because the juvenile court
had terminated its jurisdiction over the children, and the
jurisdictional findings were not the basis of any current order
adverse to either parent.
      On October 20, 2021, the California Supreme Court
granted parents’ petitions for review and deferred further action
on the matter pending its decision on a related issue in In re D.P.
(S267429). On January 19, 2023, the California Supreme Court
issued its opinion in In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 273 (D.P.),
concluding the Court of Appeal erred in reasoning a parent
seeking discretionary review of a moot appeal “ ‘must
demonstrate the specific legal or practical negative consequences
that will result from the jurisdictional findings they seek to
reverse.’ ” On April 19, 2023, the court transferred the case
back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider
the cause in light of D.P.

1       Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

                                  2
       We now vacate our original opinion and issue this new
opinion again dismissing parents’ appeals as moot.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.     Petition and event leading to its filing
       Mother has nine children. From oldest to youngest they
are: I.W. (born March 2003)—who was dismissed from the case;
M.M.K. (born December 2004)—her father is deceased; J.D.A.
(born April 2007), M.Y.A. (born May 2010), M.N.A. (born August
2014), and N.A. (born April 2017)—their father is Derek A.2
(collectively, the A. children); and A.P.R. (born January 2018),
B.K. (born November 2018), and A.R. (born February 2020)—
their father is father (collectively, the R. children).
       In February 2020, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a juvenile
dependency petition under section 300, subdivision (b) on behalf
of all nine children following events surrounding A.R.’s birth at
a Kaiser hospital. The petition—as the juvenile court amended
and ultimately sustained it—alleged: mother “has mental
and emotional problems including, combative and disorderly
behavior, which renders the mother incapable of safely providing
regular care for the children”; mother was involuntarily
hospitalized for “the evaluation and treatment of [her] psychiatric
condition” about two days after A.R.’s birth; father and Derek A.
“knew or reasonably should have known of . . . mother’s mental
and emotional problems and failed to protect” their respective
children by allowing her to have unlimited access to the children
and by father also having allowed mother to live in his children’s
home; and mother’s mental and emotional problems as well as

2     Derek A. is not a party to this appeal.

                                 3
Derek A.’s and father’s failure to protect the children endangered
the children’s physical health and safety and placed them at
risk of serious physical harm.
       The day after A.R. was born, the Department received a
referral alleging mother had been “extremely aggressive during”
A.R.’s birth. Paramedics had brought mother to a Kaiser
hospital. She had not received any prenatal care and had
“dangerously high blood pressure.” She was having a “hard time”
complying with her blood pressure treatment. Mother had been
advised to stay in the hospital until her blood pressure stabilized,
but she wanted to leave. Mother also tested positive for
marijuana at the time of delivery. The reporting party claimed
mother was not allowing the nurses to check the baby’s vital
signs or urine, and she had been co-sleeping with the baby
against medical advice.
       The Department interviewed hospital staff, the family,
and others. A hospital social worker described mother as
“displaying behavior of paranoia.” A nurse noted mother said
she knew better than the doctors how “to give birth from her
body.” Mother was “very belligerent” and kicked the obstetrician
during the delivery. The charge nurse said, “mother was not
lying down during the birth of her child,” and at one point “stood
up on the labor and delivery table.” The nurse had difficulty
in attending to mother “due to her combative behavior.” The
hospital staff confirmed mother had not had any prenatal care,
had had preeclampsia, and was suffering from very high blood
pressure that was not going down.
       At one point, mother told hospital staff “she [was] leaving
the hospital without anyone stopping her.” The hospital social
worker thought mother was showing signs of delusions and might

                                 4
be “a true detriment” to herself and her baby. After mother
refused a psychiatric evaluation, she was placed on a 72-hour
hold. Law enforcement restrained mother so hospital staff could
medicate her. Mother’s high blood pressure led the hospital
social worker to believe she might be suffering from post-partum
psychosis.
       Two days after A.R.’s birth, the Department social worker
tried to interview mother, but she told him to “get out of [her]
hospital room.” Father told the social worker he and mother
lived together with their three children (including the new baby)
and mother’s oldest daughter M.M.K. The A. children lived
with Derek A. Father had been in the ambulance with mother
and present at A.R.’s birth. He said he had never seen mother
exhibit any psychotic behavior or episodes. He denied any past
substance abuse in the family and agreed to take a drug test.
       Father said mother was not mentally ill. She was frantic
and a “bit out of control” because she was in a lot of pain and
overwhelmed with the pregnancy and “being [at]tended to by
too many people.” He told the social worker mother was “very
smart and really in tune with her body and was trying to tell
the hospital staff that information.” Father believed the hospital
was reacting the way it was because mother refused any shots or
vaccines for her child. He said mother did not believe in Western
medicine; she did not want any of her children to be vaccinated.
He reiterated mother was not “ ‘crazy’ ”—she had very strong
opinions and “is not one to conform to pressure from anyone.”
       Father also said mother was not responding well to the
medication the doctors had given her. The nurses constantly
coming in and out of her hospital room “really overwhelmed
and agitated” her because she was not feeling well.

                                5
        The hospital staff was “worried that mother w[ould] hurt
herself and/or the baby if she [were] released.” Ultimately, the
hospital removed the baby from mother’s hospital room “due to
safety concerns” based on mother’s refusal to take psychotropic
medication or medication for her high blood pressure.
        After initially refusing to speak to the Department, mother
requested an interview. Mother told the social worker she did
not want to talk to him when he first contacted her because she
was losing a lot of blood and was not ready to speak to anyone,
“especially a [Department] worker.” She said she was “in a
slew of lawsuits” against the Department, her last employer,
and another business. Mother denied any mental health issues.
She said she was not combative during the birth of her child but
was in a “heightened state.” She was in pain and the hospital
refused to follow her birth plan.
        Derek A. also told the social worker mother was not
“ ‘crazy.’ ” He and mother were together for 12 years. He had
no concerns about her mental health and denied present or
past substance abuse or domestic violence in the family. Their
children stay with mother while Derek A. works. She watches
their youngest child—under three years old at the time—“all
of the time,” and the other children when they are not in school.
        The older A. children, M.Y.A., age nine at the time, and
J.D.A., age 12 at the time, said they felt “fine” with mother.
They felt safe in both Derek A.’s and mother’s homes and said
they had enough food and clothing at both homes. M.M.K.,
age 15 at the time, also had no concerns about mother. She said
her relationship with mother was “ ‘just alright’ ” and she was
“ ‘fine’ ” with it. I.W., age 16 at the time, said he felt comfortable
and safe when with mother, but he primarily lived with paternal

                                  6
grandmother. The children all denied having witnessed any
physical confrontations between mother and anyone in the home
or having received or seen any physical discipline.
       The Department social worker also interviewed the
property manager for mother’s apartment, before and after
the detention hearing. The manager described the following
complaints about mother: Mother tried to get into another
apartment to fight the resident’s daughter whom she believed
was having an affair with father; law enforcement was called.
(The social worker later met with father; he denied having an
affair and did not know why mother believed he had.) Mother
accused maintenance staff of “doing things with the gas in her
apartment.” Mother had complained of a gas leak, but when
she would not allow the gas line worker to enter her apartment,
law enforcement was called. And, mother’s neighbors had told
the manager they could hear a baby cry for “a prolonged period of
time” and were concerned about who was “attending to the child.”
       On February 13, 2020, Kaiser transferred mother to a
psychiatric hospital. The psychiatric hospital was unable to
treat mother’s high blood pressure, however, and transferred
her to San Gabriel Valley Medical Center. Mother received
a psychiatric evaluation there.
       The evaluation notes state mother was agitated after
Kaiser staff gave her newborn a vitamin K injection against
her wishes. Mother then was given an injection of Haldol.
The examining doctor at San Gabriel found mother was “alert,
oriented to time, place, and person, quite pleasant and speaks
clearly and quite rational.” The notes state mother was “[g]oing
through significant issues with Kaiser Hospital” and “fe[lt] that
she was mistreated and they violated the HIPAA. The patient

                                7
denies any psychotic symptoms.” The doctor found mother’s
“mental status examination is unremarkable.” The doctor listed
mother’s diagnosis as “Adjustment disorder with anxiety.” The
notes state, “The plan is [to] discontinue the hold. Continue
medical treatment. Can be discharged home when medically
stabilized.”
       The Department assessed the children as being at future
risk of harm based on “mother potentially having a mental
illness that has been undiagnosed and not believing she needs
treatment.” As a result, the Department obtained a removal
order for all of mother’s children. Mother agreed to move out
of the home she shared with father so their children could stay
there with him. The Department placed M.M.K., who was not
father’s daughter, in foster care.
       In its detention report, the Department described six
earlier referrals it had received about mother between 2008 and
2019. Every referral except one was deemed “unfounded” or
“inconclusive.” The Department “substantiated” a May 2018
allegation that mother failed to bring A.P.R., who was born
prematurely, to medical appointments to look for risks of
retinal detachment and failed to update M.M.K.’s immunizations
causing her to miss school. The Department filed a section 300
petition on behalf of the children alleging mother physically
abused M.M.K. and J.D.A., mother and father engaged in
domestic violence in front of the children, and mother and
father medically neglected A.P.R. In August 2018, the
juvenile court dismissed that petition with prejudice.
       A more recent October 2019 referral alleged mother had
emotionally abused her children. M.M.K.’s school reported
mother verbally abused M.M.K. over the phone when mother

                               8
called the school after M.M.K. left home without permission.
M.M.K. and mother both denied any abuse. Derek A. also
said there was no abuse. He said his children were with him
90 percent of the time, and mother was a “good mom.” The
Department concluded the allegations were unfounded as to
M.M.K. and inconclusive as to the other children.
2.    Detention
      At the February 24, 2020 detention hearing, the juvenile
court detained mother’s youngest children from her and ordered
monitored visitation; released the three R. children to father and
the youngest A. children, M.N.A. and N.A., to Derek A.; released
the two older A. children, J.D.A. and M.Y.A., to both parents;
and released M.M.K. to home of mother on the condition the
Department assess the safety of maternal aunt’s home, where
mother was living. (Ultimately, M.M.K. was placed in foster
care and detained from mother with monitored visitation.)
      I.W. was arrested the next day for robbery. Mother
reportedly was screaming in the lobby of the police station and
at someone on her phone. A detective told the social worker
mother “was behaving hysterically and making outlandish
claims.” Officers turned on their body cameras in response
to mother’s disruptive behavior.
3.    Continued investigation
      The Department interviewed the family again in late
February and early March 2020. The older children continued
to deny any physical or substance abuse in the home or that
mother had mental health problems. Mother, father, and
Derek A. did too. Derek A. said mother “just has a personality
that rubs people the wrong way.”

                                9
      Derek A. also mentioned he had been getting upset with
mother because she was not picking the children up from school
or feeding them when they went to her home. They sometimes
were dirty when they returned to him. He felt mother’s current
mental status had something to do with her relationship with
father. Mother told him she didn’t have money for food and
father was “starving her.” She told him father was saving his
money and was about to leave her. Derek A. also felt mother
might have had postpartum depression after delivering M.Y.A.
and M.N.A. He said mother had come from a dysfunctional
family, and she and her sister were abused by their stepfather.
      The Department learned that in January 2020, M.M.K.
had called the police alleging father had assaulted mother.
The police responded and were told it was only a verbal
argument. They did not see any battery.
4.    Jurisdiction
      Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the adjudication hearing
was continued from March to June 2020. In its last minute
information, the Department reported it had followed up with
the hospital social worker who recalled mother yelled at I.W.
when he visited her at the hospital, “ ‘Do something! You should
protect me!’ ” She described mother as “ ‘a bully.’ ” The social
worker also said that—according to 2018 medical records Kaiser
obtained—at the birth of her eighth child mother had acted
erratically, was argumentative and non-compliant, and tested
positive for marijuana.
      M.M.K told the social worker that, during a call with
mother, mother “ ‘talked deviously’ ” about her caregiver. M.M.K.
said mother was making false accusations about the caregiver
and M.M.K. defended her. She ultimately hung up on mother.

                               10
       On June 22, 2020, the court convened the contested
jurisdiction hearing. Father testified. He said mother had
never acted erratically or aggressively in front of him and to
his knowledge had never been diagnosed with a mental health
condition. He testified about the events at Kaiser, including
that mother was in more pain than normal during A.R.’s birth
and believed something was wrong. He also said mother never
prevented the staff from checking on the baby but asked them
to come back after she finished feeding him. He said mother was
trying to leave the hospital when placed on the psychiatric hold.
       After hearing father’s testimony and argument by all
counsel, the court agreed that, if the incident at Kaiser were the
only evidence, it would not be sufficient to sustain the petition.
“The problem” was that the Kaiser incident “[wa]sn’t the only
evidence in the case.” The court found, in addition to mother’s
“conflicted situation with Kaiser” that could have harmed her
baby, there was “quite a bit of evidence” demonstrating mother
had a “pattern of behavior involving sort of serious explosive
conflicts with various other people” that affected the safety
of her children.
       The court described at length the evidence it found
supported sustaining the petition. The court was “quite
concern[ed]” by the fact mother did not believe in Western
medicine and did not want her baby to have “any shots or
vaccines.” The court noted mother’s dispute with Kaiser over
giving A.R. an injection that “Kaiser believed was necessary
for the baby’s wellbeing” and that she potentially placed him
at “a great deal of risk” by failing to receive prenatal care.
Kaiser also had difficulty monitoring A.R.’s wellbeing “[i]n the
midst of all of this conflict” with mother. The court observed

                                11
mother “actively resisted getting healthcare” and that refusal
“could have caused harm to the baby,” presumably referring to
Kaiser trying to treat mother’s high blood pressure. The court
mentioned mother yelled at I.W. in the hospital as if the situation
were his fault and screamed and acted aggressively at the police
station when he was arrested.
      The court also remarked on the various conflicts mother
had with others, her attempt to fight with another tenant,
and her estrangement from one of her sisters. The court noted
M.M.K. called the police alleging mother and father had been
in an altercation, and Derek A. reported mother had been
inconsistent in picking up their children from school and
sometimes returned them to him dirty and hungry. Mother
also had failed to get a birth certificate for N.A.
      The court sustained the count (as amended) based on
mother’s mental health issues and dismissed with prejudice
the two counts concerning mother’s and father’s marijuana use.
The court noted mother’s February psychiatric evaluation
revealed she did not have a diagnosable mental health condition.
At mother’s request, the court set the disposition hearing
for August 6, 2020, to give her time to obtain a mental health
evaluation to assess whether there were any issues that would
prevent her from being able to care for her children safely.
5.    Post-jurisdiction and disposition
       On August 4, 2020, the appointed forensic psychologist
evaluated mother in a clinical interview and psychologically
tested her with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.
Mother’s personality test was “entirely within normal limits.”
The testing showed mother was “more assertive than the typical
woman.” The psychologist characterized mother as “impassioned,

                                12
but not paranoid” and having “some inclination to be litigious.”
She opined, “Childbirth is clearly a very stressful time, with
biological and sometimes psychiatric changes. However, given
the current test results, it does not appear that [m]other has
psychological/psychiatric symptoms that would make a return
to the minors risky.”
       The psychologist concluded there was no current support
for “the presence of a delusional disorder, any other major
mental health disorder, . . [or] . . . personality disorder.” The
psychologist could not opine on what happened at Kaiser but
concluded mother currently “functions within normal limits
psychologically.”
       At the August 6 disposition hearing, the juvenile court
found the mental health evaluation to be “quite explicit about
finding that . . . mother does not suffer from any ongoing mental
health disorder or personality disorder and . . . although, she
presents as someone who perhaps gets into conflict with people
and sort of sticks up for her right or her position, . . . that is
within normal psychological limits.” The court found the
psychologist’s report consistent with the fathers’ reports
that mother is “an unusual person” and “does get into conflicts
with people,” and that neither thought she wasn’t a “safe
caregiver” for the children. The court also noted the children
denied having been abused or neglected by mother or seeing
any “sort of strange behavior” by her.
       The court concluded the Department had not met its
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the
children could not safely be returned to mother. It released
the A. and R. children to home of parents and M.M.K. to home
of mother. The court explained, “It’s not that there haven’t

                                13
been issues, it’s just that there really isn’t any indication that
whatever mother’s challenges are have actually led to any
harm or concrete risk of harm to her children.”
6.     Appeals
       Father and mother separately appealed from the
adjudication of their children as dependents under section 300.
They argued the court’s jurisdictional findings were in error
because mother’s behavior at Kaiser was an isolated incident,
and the evidence showed the children were never harmed or at
risk of harm as a result of mother’s alleged mental and emotional
problems (or father’s alleged failure to protect). During the
pendency of their appeals, on March 2, 2021, the juvenile court
entered orders finding the conditions that “would justify the
initial assumption of jurisdiction under WIC [section] 300
no longer exist and are not likely to exist if supervision is
withdrawn” over the children. The court terminated its
jurisdiction and awarded mother and father joint custody
of their children, mother and Derek A. joint custody of
their children, and mother sole custody of M.M.K.3
       At our request, the parties provided additional briefing4
as to why parents’ appeals should not be dismissed as moot,
in light of the juvenile court’s termination of its jurisdiction
and return of the children to their parents’ custody. As noted,
in an opinion filed on July 15, 2021, a different panel of this court
dismissed parents’ appeals as moot. (In re M.K. (July 15, 2021,

3     On March 5, 2021, we granted mother’s request for judicial
notice of the juvenile court’s March 2, 2021 orders.
4    Mother and father filed responsive letter briefs; the
Department did not respond.

                                 14
B307066) [nonpub. opn.].) As directed by the California Supreme
Court, we now have vacated our prior decision and reconsidered
the matter in light of D.P.5
                            DISCUSSION
1.    Parents’ appeals are moot under D.P.
      As our high court reiterated in D.P.:
            “A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide
            actual controversies by a judgment which can
            be carried into effect, and not to give opinions
            upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
            or to declare principles or rules of law which
            cannot affect the matter in issue in the case
            before it.” ’ [Citation.] A case becomes moot
            when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible for [a]
            court, if it should decide the case in favor of
            plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’
            [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
            requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff
            must complain of an ongoing harm. Second,
            the harm must be redressable or capable of
            being rectified by the outcome plaintiff seeks.”
            (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276 [mootness
            rule applies in dependency context].)
      We must “ ‘ “decide on a case-by-case basis whether
subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter make a case
moot and whether [our] decision would affect the outcome in
a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)

5    Neither mother nor father filed supplemental briefing
under rule 8.200(b) of the California Rules of Court.

                                15
“[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency appeal
is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any effective
relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 53, 60, cited by D.P., at p. 276.) “[R]elief is effective
when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’
conduct or legal status.’ ” (D.P., at p. 277, quoting In re I.A.
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490.) Thus, “to show a need for
effective relief, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she
has suffered from a change in legal status.” (D.P., at p. 277.)
       In this case, we again conclude we can give no effective
relief to parents. The juvenile court has terminated its
jurisdiction. Its custody orders are favorable to both mother
and father: they share joint custody of their children, and
mother shares joint custody with Derek A. of their children
and sole custody of M.M.K. In other words, the court returned
the families to their status quo before the Department filed
the section 300 petition. Thus, parents cannot show they
suffered a change in legal status.
       In her previously-filed supplemental letter brief, mother
nevertheless argued reversal and vacation of the jurisdictional
findings would provide her with effective relief by removing
“[a]ny shadow of doubt about the stability of the safety of [her]
home, cast by the history in this matter.” In his supplemental
letter brief, father argued the juvenile court’s purported
erroneous jurisdictional findings could have severe and unfair
consequences to parents in a future dependency or family law
proceeding: they could serve as a basis for a detriment finding
under section 361.2 if a non-custodial parent seeks custody;
be used to bypass parents for services under section 361.5 in a
future dependency proceeding or to formulate their case plans;

                                 16
or be considered in a family law proceeding by a court
determining visitation or custody rights.
       Parents have not demonstrated a favorable ruling from
this court would have a tangible effect on their legal status.
As the court in D.P. stated, “Although a jurisdictional finding
that a parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally
stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to
sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect
on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being redressed
by a favorable court decision.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.)
Mother has not demonstrated how any stigma associated with
the court’s jurisdictional findings is adversely affecting her legal
rights or status. Those findings are not the basis of any current
or proposed order restricting either parent’s rights. (Cf. In re
Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547–1548 [appeal from
jurisdictional findings not moot where the juvenile court had
entered “restrictive visitation and custody orders” adverse to
appellant father based on those findings before terminating
its jurisdiction].)
       Moreover, parents only can speculate about future harm
they might suffer in hypothetical future proceedings due to
the jurisdictional findings. Father specifically relied on In re
Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 716, in asserting parents’
appeals are not moot because the juvenile court’s purported error
“could have severe and unfair consequences” on parents in the
future. Our high court, however specifically disapproved of In re
Daisy H. “to the extent it held, contrary to [the court’s] opinion
[in D.P.], that speculative future harm is sufficient to avoid
mootness.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278.) As neither parent
has shown the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are under

                                 17
consideration in another proceeding as a basis for an adverse
action against him or her—and there are no continuing adverse
orders against either parent that depend on the validity of
those findings—they have failed to demonstrate “a specific
legal consequence that a favorable judgment could redress.”
(Id. at pp. 272, 278–282 [concluding stigma and mere possibility
of inclusion in California’s Child Abuse Central Index too
speculative to overcome mootness of appeal from jurisdiction
findings based on neglect resulting in child’s injury after court
terminated its jurisdiction].) Their appeals from the court’s
jurisdictional findings thus are moot.
2.    We consider whether to exercise our discretion to
      review the merits of the appeals in light of D.P.
      a.   Applicable law
       “Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of a dispute.” (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) In our original opinion, we
declined to exercise our discretion to review the merits of
parents’ appeals because neither had shown any adverse effects
from the purportedly erroneous jurisdictional findings. As our
high court in D.P. explained, however, “[w]hether or not a parent
has demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that
would be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings
is what determines whether the case is moot or not moot[,] . . .
not what determines whether a court has discretion to decide
the merits of a moot case.” (Id. at p. 283, italics added.) The
court noted that, “[b]ecause dismissal of an appeal for mootness
operates as an affirmance of the underlying judgment or order
[citation], such dismissals may ‘ “ha[ve] the undesirable result
of insulating erroneous or arbitrary rulings from review.” ’ ”

                                18
(Id. at p. 285.) The court went on to discuss a variety of factors
appellate courts “have properly considered” in “opt[ing] to
exercise their inherent discretion to decide certain challenges
to juvenile court jurisdictional findings.” (Ibid.)
       For example, courts may consider whether challenged
jurisdictional findings could prejudice the parent, potentially
affect the current or future dependency proceedings, or have
other consequences for the parent beyond jurisdiction. (D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285.) Our high court also noted “[t]he
exercise of discretionary review may . . . be informed by whether
the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly pernicious
or stigmatizing conduct. [Citations.] Though stigma alone
will not sustain an appeal, a court may consider the nature
of the allegations against the parent when deciding whether
discretionary review is proper. The more egregious the
findings against the parent, the greater the parent’s interest
in challenging such findings.” (Id. at pp. 285–286.) Finally,
the court explained “[a] court may also consider why the appeal
became moot,” noting where, as there, “the case becomes moot
due to prompt compliance by parents with their case plan,
discretionary review may be especially appropriate.” (Id. at
p. 286.) Thus,“[p]rinciples of fairness may . . . favor discretionary
review of cases rendered moot by the prompt compliance or
otherwise laudable behavior of the parent challenging the
jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (Ibid.) In so concluding,
the court noted, “It would perversely incentivize noncompliance
if mootness doctrine resulted in the availability of appeals from
jurisdictional findings only for parents who are less compliant
or for whom the court has issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)

                                 19
       As our high court stated, however, “Ultimately, in deciding
whether to exercise its discretion, a court should be guided
by the overarching goals of the dependency system: ‘to provide
maximum safety and protection for children’ with a ‘focus’ on
‘the preservation of the family as well as the safety, protection,
and physical and emotional well-being of the child.’ [Citations.]
Given the short timeframes associated with dependency
cases and the potentially significant, if sometimes uncertain,
consequences that may flow from jurisdictional findings,
consideration of the overarching purposes of the dependency
system may counsel in favor of reviewing a parent’s appeal
despite its mootness.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 286–287.)
3.     We decline to exercise our discretion to conduct
       a merits review here
       Although parents’ arguments were insufficient to
demonstrate their appeals were not moot, we consider them
in deciding whether to exercise our discretionary review
under the guidance of D.P. As noted, parents challenged
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as “unsubstantiated
by evidence and the law.” In her letter brief, mother asserted
the Department’s arguments did not provide a basis for
dependency—that mother’s reactions during a painful childbirth,
while she had high blood pressure due to pre-eclampsia, and
to the arrest of her son, demonstrated she did not react well in
stressful situations, and her children should be removed because
of her “ ‘distrust[ ] of certain agencies.’ ” She essentially argued
this court should review the “[e]rroneous juvenile dependency
orders,” so that she and her family will be reflected “in the
correct light” and protected “from future prejudice and bias cast
by uncorrected agency recommendations and judicial decisions

                                 20
made against law and fact.” As discussed, father also argued
the jurisdictional findings could prejudice him in future
dependency or family law proceedings.
       Stigma and potential adverse consequences are factors
a reviewing court may consider when deciding whether
discretionary review is proper. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 285–286.) We do not find they weigh in favor of exercising
our discretionary review, here, however. Although mother
was painted in a negative light, the jurisdictional findings were
not based “on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct”—
there were no findings of physical or sexual abuse, for example.
(Ibid.) Similarly, because there were no such findings—and
the children were returned to parents’ custody at disposition—
we find it highly unlikely, as father argues, the jurisdictional
findings here would serve as a basis for a detriment finding
under section 361.2, or to bypass reunification services under
section 361.5, in a hypothetical future dependency proceeding.
Nor did parents submit supplemental briefing on remand to
advise us of an imminent or pending dependency or family
law proceeding where the jurisdictional findings might come
into play. Moreover, as was the case in these proceedings,
parents’ history with the Department would be included in any
social worker reports filed in a future dependency proceeding.
Thus, even if we were to reverse the jurisdictional findings,
the underlying facts would remain part of the record.
       Nor do principles of fairness compel us to exercise
discretionary review of these moot appeals. True, the appeals
here became moot because the juvenile court terminated its
jurisdiction at a March 2, 2021 section 364 review hearing—
about seven months after the disposition hearing—after finding

                                21
the conditions that justified the court’s initial assumption of
jurisdiction over the children no longer existed and were unlikely
to exist if supervision were withdrawn. We can infer parents
participated in the services the Department provided and
cooperated with the social workers. We also can infer that,
had they not, the juvenile court would have retained jurisdiction
and possibly have made further orders. In that case, the appeals
would not have been moot. (See § 364, subd. (d) [if court retains
jurisdiction after section 364 hearing it “shall continue the
matter to a specified date, not more than six months from the
time of the hearing”].)
       Yet, we do not view a denial of discretionary review here
as allowing the “ ‘forfeiture[ ] of substantial rights on technical
grounds,’ ” as mother put it (quoting People v. Chapman (1971)
5 Cal.3d 218, 225), or “insulating erroneous or arbitrary rulings
from review,” as father put it (citing In re Marquis H. (2013)
212 Cal.App.4th 718, 724). The juvenile court did not base its
jurisdictional findings on mother’s reactions during childbirth
at Kaiser and behavior at the police station alone, as mother
appeared to argue in her letter brief. Indeed, the court stated
it would not be relying on mother’s reaction during the birth of
A.R. to sustain the petition. The court discussed other evidence
demonstrating a risk of harm to the children, as we set forth
above. And, by releasing the children to parents as part of its
disposition orders, the court essentially found the Department
had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the children
would be unsafe in mother’s care under the supervision of
the Department. Thus, we do not view the disposition order
returning the children, or the court’s later termination of
its jurisdiction, as somehow confirming the Department had

                                22
not demonstrated—by a preponderance of the evidence—
the children were at substantial risk of harm and, thus,
dependent children under section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
      Finally, when considering the “overarching goals of the
dependency system,” we do not conclude they “counsel in favor”
of our review here. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 286–287.)
There is nothing to indicate the children’s emotional or physical
well-being—or the preservation of their family life—would be
affected adversely if we decline to review the jurisdictional
findings here, as possibly would be the case where findings of
abuse remain unreviewed. (See ibid. [citing cases where courts
elected to review “pernicious” findings that parent exposed
children to a substantial risk of physical and sexual abuse].)
And, as we said, the children here were ordered returned to
mother and to parents at the disposition hearing, thus preserving
the family, as well as the children’s safety.
      Accordingly, having considered the relevant principles
and factors discussed in D.P., we conclude discretionary review
of parents’ moot appeals is not warranted under the specific facts
and circumstances present here.

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                       DISPOSITION
     The appeals are dismissed as moot.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                  EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

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