Court Opinion

ID: 9775704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:07:40.012366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.515482
License: Public Domain

ENOCH, Chief Justice,
dissenting.1
Today, the majority virtually eliminates the State’s right to peremptory challenges. Therefore, I dissent.
There are two aspects of the majority’s decision which are troubling. The first is the majority’s disregard of decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Both those courts have ruled quite plainly that the State is not required to explain the reasons for its exercise of peremptory strikes until after a defendant has made a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), opinion after abatement, 749 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). There is good reason for this rule: to require the State to explain peremptory strikes before a defendant has made a prima facie showing of unlawful discrimination is to deny the State such strikes altogether, for a strike that must be explained is, by definition, not peremptory. See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. ANN. art. 35.14 (Vernon 1966). The United States Supreme Court expressly refused to abolish peremptory strikes by the State:
Nor do we think that this historic trial practice, which long has served the selection of an impartial jury, should be abolished because of an apprehension that prosecutors and trial judges will not perform conscientiously their respective duties under the Constitution.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 23, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 23. Nevertheless, the majority, without acknowledging this rule or the au*876thorities and reasons which support it, hold:
An accused, when going forward with his burden of producing evidence of a prima fade case of discrimination, should have the right to adduce evidence sufficient to establish the criteria required by Batson. This right should include the opportunity to call witnesses, including the prosecutor as an adverse witness for direct examination, in the accused’s attempt to satisfy the prima facie burden imposed upon him.
Maj.op. at 874 (emphasis added). In other words, the majority hold that a defendant is entitled in every case to summon the prosecutor to the stand and compel him to explain his exercise of peremptory strikes before the defendant has even made a prima facie showing of unlawful discrimination. The majority do not cite, nor can I find, a single case from any jurisdiction in this country that goes so far. At least two courts have rejected the majority’s holding. Moreover, every court of which I am aware, including the highest courts of this state and nation, the highest court of at least one other state, and many federal appeals courts, have uniformly left to the trial courts the formulation of appropriate procedures for determining whether the State has unlawfully exercised its peremptory strikes. I would join them.
This brings me to the second troubling aspect of the majority’s decision. Removing from trial judges the exercise of their discretion and imposing upon them a procedure which no other court in this country has prescribed displays a lack of trust in trial judges to enforce the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court does not share this lack of trust:
We have no reason to believe that prosecutors will not fulfill their duty to exercise their challenges only for legitimate purposes. Certainly, this Court may assume that trial judges, in supervising voir dire in light of our decision today, will be alert to identify a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 23, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 23. Neither does the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals:
The Supreme Court was confident that the trial judiciary, experienced as it is in voir dire, would be able to determine whether the prosecutor’s use of challenges created a prima facie case of discrimination.
Keeton, 724 S.W.2d at 66. Neither do I.
I find nothing in this case to justify a sweeping pronouncement that trial courts must follow certain procedures in all Bat-son hearings. I would leave formulation of those procedures to the sound discretion of the trial courts in each case. I find nothing in the record in this case to indicate that the trial court in any way denied Williams a fair opportunity to show that the State’s exercise of its peremptory strikes was racially motivated. I would therefore overrule Williams’ fifth point of error and proceed to consider her remaining complaints.

I. Facts of Jury Selection

Williams’ claimed right to cross-examine the prosecutor must be viewed in context. Six members of the venire in this case were black, the same race as Williams, but only four of them were among the first 45 members of the panel actually considered for selection to the jury. One of the four, Mr. Graham, seated 21 in the array, was excused for cause. Another, Ms. Douglas, seated 38 in the array, was selected for the jury. The other two, Mr. Adams and Ms. Moore, seated, respectively, 27 and 35 in the array, were peremptorily challenged by the State. Only one of the two, Ms. Moore, was, Williams complains, challenged for racially discriminatory reasons.
During the voir dire of the jury panel, the prosecutor asked, “Is there anyone that has any kind of moral or religious or conscience reasons why they feel they couldn’t sit in judgment of someone else?” Three members of the array, Mr. Graham, Ms. Moore, and Mr. Adams, responded affirmatively and were questioned further by the prosecutor. Ms. Moore, who listed her reli*877gious preference as “Holliness [sic] Pentecost”, responded as follows:
Q [By the Prosecutor]: Okay. Ms., let’s see, it’s Ms. Moore, right? You are raising your hand?
A [By Ms. Moore]: Yes, I have my hand. My religion is the one thing that requires me not to swear, and but I could serve on it but I could sit in judgment of someone. I wouldn’t set a judgment of death on no one.
Q Well, you are saying that you could judge someone but — I didn’t hear the last part?
A I wouldn’t set death on someone for penalty for anyone.
Q Okay.
A But I think a person, if they committed a crime, can prove if they committed it they are supposed to be punished, but I don’t swear.
Q All right. So you are saying that you could follow the range of punishment in this case which does not include a death penalty. It’s from five to life, right?
A Uh-huh.
Q But you would have a problem with swearing to tell the truth or what are you saying?
A I’ll tell the truth.
Q You said you don’t swear; I assume that meant taking an oath?
A No, based on the Bible that you are not supposed to swear, but I will tell the truth.
Q All right.
Later, at the bench, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: Ms. Moore.
Q [By the Prosecutor]: Hello, Ms. Moore. I had asked you a question and I believe you had indicated to me that you may have some maybe religious reasons or some moral reasons why you felt you wouldn’t be able to judge somebody in a trial?
A [By Ms. Moore]: No, I didn’t say I wouldn’t be able to judge anybody, I just said I didn’t swear, I didn’t believe in the death penalty. That’s the only things I said.
Q What do you mean?
THE COURT: Excuse me just a minute. I think I can clear this up.
[The Prosecutor]: Okay.
THE COURT: Ms. Moore, if you are on the jury you have to take an oath; however, I will form — the words of that oath will be, “Do you solemnly swear or affirm that you would follow the evidence and render a verdict based only on the law and the evidence so help you God.” Now that oath, you could take that one, could you not?
A [By Ms. Moore]: Yeah, I can take that one.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
Q [By the Prosecutor]: So you don’t have any problems as far as being able to vote if you were chosen as a juror and be able to render a verdict either guilty or not guilty.
A No, I wouldn’t have any trouble at all.
Q I’m sorry.
A I said no, I wouldn’t have any trouble.
Q Okay. I’ll pass the witness.
[Williams’ Counsel 1]: No questions.
[Reed’s Counsel2]: No questions.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. Moore.
Following the voir dire examination of the jury panel, and before the jury was sworn, Williams filed a written motion for “a hearing to determine the State’s basis for striking [certain] jurors from the panel.” The trial court summarily denied the motion, apparently for the sole reason that one of the jurors seated was black. Later, however, after Williams filed an offer of proof containing the facts we have summarized in the first paragraph above, the trial court reconsidered and granted Williams’ motion, and the following proceedings occurred:
THE COURT: Let the record reflect this is outside the presence and hearing of the jury. Prior to the jury being *878sworn in, the Defendant Williams moved for a hearing under Batson versus Kentucky. The motion was joined by Defendant Reed. At that time the motion for hearing was denied by the Court. Upon re-consideration the Court now grants the defendant’s motion for hearing under Batson versus Kentucky.
Does the State wish to present evidence?
[The Prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: In what form?
[The Prosecutor]: Well, the State — in response to the motion my understanding—
THE COURT: Well, it actually would be in response to the defendant’s offer of proof, unless you wish to put on something else....
. [Williams’ Counsel 2]: Judge, if there is any response to the offer of proof, we would have to put something on. If there in not, then we will stand on the offer of proof.
THE COURT: All right.
[The Prosecutor]: Could I have just a moment, Your Honor, to see the offer?
THE COURT: You may.
[The Prosecutor]: State would call [myself] to testify.
THE COURT: Raise your right hand. (Witness sworn.)
THE COURT: [Ms. Prosecutor], it’s the Court’s intention that the Court will inquire of [the prosecutor] in regard to certain matters... .3
******
In regard to the venireman [Ms. Moore] ..., what was your reason for peremptorily challenging that venireman?
[The Prosecutor]: When the State asked the entire panel if anyone had a religious, moral or personal reason that they felt they would not be able to sit in judgment of these defendants either at guilt/innocence or punishment, three people raised their hand, Ms. Moore, Ms. Adams and Mr. Morgan — no, I’m sorry,
Mr. Graham. Mr. Graham, of course, was excluded by the Court for cause and Mr. Adams was also struck by the State peremptorily, as I testified earlier.
Ms. Moore raised her hand, said she had a religious problem with sitting in judgment, and then after further questioning at the bench, she said that she couldn’t swear, something to that nature. I wasn’t convinced after questioning that she would be able to sit in judgment based on her religious problems and her other responses as far as punishment.
THE COURT: Do you have any further evidence to present?
[The Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: [Williams’ Counsel 2]?
[Williams’ Counsel 1]: May I inquire of [the prosecutor]?.
THE COURT: I’m sorry, I will not allow cross-examination of the Assistant District Attorney. If you have further evidence to present, [either counsel for the defense], I’ll hear that.
[Williams’ Counsel 1]: Yes, Your Hon- or, I would like to testify just a little bit.
(Witness sworn.)
[Williams’ Counsel 1]: ... I am one of the attorneys representing Donna Williams in the case now on trial before the Court. In regard to jury selection which commenced on May 18th, 1987, and which was concluded on May 19th, 1987, [Ms. Moore] ... was stricken peremptorily by the State from the jury panel. Ms. Moore, during the Voir Dire Examination of the State of Texas, made a reference to not being able to sit in judgment on people but also referred at that time to something having to do with the death penalty and further inquiry was not made by the State concerning exactly what she meant. She also made some reference at that time to not being able to swear. There was no inquiry at that time or at the bench by the State concerning her ability to consider the full range of punishment to my recollection, and upon inquiry by the Court, specific inquiry that is.
*879Upon inquiry of the Court of the general panel and of the general panel by [the prosecutor], Ms. Moore did not respond that she could not consider the full range of punishment. Further, at the bench after Voir Dire of the general panel had been concluded, Ms. Moore stated that she could not assess the death penalty, and upon being advised by the Court that this was not a death penalty case, she unequivocally stated that she could sit in judgment of the defendants in this case and would be able to participate fully as a juror with respect to this case, and also upon explanation by the Court that she would be required to either swear or affirm to tell the truth — or to render a true verdict, Ms. Moore unequivocally indicated that she could take that oath and act as a juror.
Therefore, given the statements of the prosecutor with respect to answers to punishment questions and sitting in judgment and taking an oath, there is no evidence or no conclusion can be drawn other than Ms. Moore was struck — one moment, Your Honor. Strike the last few words.
There are other individuals who are on this jury panel who were white members of that panel who responded similarly to that of Ms. Moore ... throughout the Voir Dire Examination and therefore, given Ms. Moore’s affirmative response to being able to consider the full range of punishment, her affirmative response that she could sit in judgment in this case and her affirmative response that she was able to take the oath to be administered by the Court, it may. only be concluded that she was stricken because she is a black woman; therefore, a member of a cognizable racial minority which denies to Donna Williams her rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article One, Section 19 of the Texas State Constitution. We object to this jury on that ground.
[The Prosecutor]: Your Honor, may I put something else on the record—
THE COURT: Well—
[The Prosecutor]: —when he’s through?
THE COURT: Is there anything further?
[Williams’ Counsel 2]: And with regard to — not in a situation of further evidence on the part of the Defense, on the part of Ms. Williams, we would object to the failure of the Court to allow us to cross-examine [the prosecutor] for the reason that such denies Ms. Williams her opportunity to test the statements made by [the prosecutor], and it denies her her right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article One, Section 10 of the Texas State Constitution.
THE COURT: Your objection is overruled. Do you have anything further?
[Williams’ Counsel 1]: Nothing further, Your Honor.
THE COURT: [The prosecutor]?
[The Prosecutor]: Yes, Your Honor. I believe the record will reflect that when the State asked that question regarding religious or moral reasons, there were only three people who raised their hands, all of which were of the minority distinction, being black. One was [Mr. Adams]. One was Ms. Moore and one was Mr. Graham, none of which appeared on the panel on the jury, [Mr. Adams] being struck by the State in addition to his problems with sitting in judgment, the aforementioned reasons of him having another conviction he did not admit to. Mr. Graham was struck for cause or released for cause, one of which being his religious reason and Ms. Moore, who also showed a hesitancy initially because of religious reasons to sit in judgment. ...
THE COURT: Anything further [from the prosecutor]?
[The Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: [Williams’ Counsel 1 or 2]?
[Williams’ Counsel 2]: Nothing.
[Williams’ Counsel 1]: Nothing.
THE COURT: The Court makes the following finding of fact in regard to the *880defendant’s motion: that the State did not exercise its peremptory challenges in a way to purposefully discriminate on the basis of race.
Anything further?
[Williams’ Counsel 1]: Nothing on this hearing, Your Honor.

II. Merits of Appeal

A. Two-step Batson Hearing
To determine whether the State has unlawfully discriminated on the basis of race in the exercise of its peremptory challenges, the trial court is to follow a two-step process. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1722-1724, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), opinion after abatement, 749 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). The first step is to afford the defendant the opportunity to “establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; see Keeton, 724 S.W.2d at 65. To do so, the defendant must show three things: (1) that he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that the State has excluded members of the same racial group from the jury by the exercise of its peremptory challenges; and (3) that the circumstances of the entire jury selection process raise an inference that the State’s exercise of its peremptory challenges was racially motivated. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-1723; Keeton, 724 S.W.2d at 65. There is no set formula for determining whether the defendant has met this initial requirement.
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a “pattern” of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor’s questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-1723. If and only if the trial court finds that the defendant has established a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination by the State, the trial court must, as the second step of the process, afford the prosecutor the opportunity to give a racially neutral explanation for his exercise of the State’s peremptory challenges. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-1724; Keeton, 12A S.W.2d at 65.
The two-step nature of this process is not a make-work formality; it is key to the balancing of a defendant’s equal protection right to a jury from which the State has not excluded members of the defendant’s racial minority group, and the State’s peremptory right to exclude from the jury whomever it chooses, among them persons who by nature may be less favorably disposed than others to its position. To require the State to justify its peremptory challenges without the defendant’s first raising at least an inference of racial discrimination would be, in essence, to deny such challenges to the State. By definition, a peremptory challenge is one made “without assigning any reason therefore.” TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 35.14 (Vernon 1966). The State is not required, any more than any other litigant, to defend the exercise of its peremptory strikes except when the defendant has not only charged but adduced some evidence from which it can at least be inferred that the State has unlawfully discriminated on the basis of race. Indeed, this Court has. held:
The State may, but should not be required to explain the reasons for its exercise of peremptory strikes merely out of an abundance of caution, but only after a finding of prima facie discrimination has been made.
Adams v. State, 740 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.).
*881In the instant case the trial court did not adhere to the two-step process directed by Batson and Keeton. Williams filed a motion for a Batson hearing alleging unlawful discrimination by the State in the most general terms. The trial court denied Williams’ motion. Williams later filed an offer of proof which showed no more than that, of the three blacks on the venire available to serve on the jury, two were struck by the State and one was seated. The trial court then reconsidered its prior ruling and granted Williams a hearing. When Williams elected at that hearing to “stand on the offer of proof” unless the State responded to it, the trial court should have determined whether Williams had established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Instead, the prosecutor, at the trial court’s invitation, proceeded to offer an explanation for her peremptory challenges. The trial court’s failure to follow the two-step procedure directed in Bat-son and Keeton, although improper, does not preclude appellate review of its finding that the State did not exercise its peremptory challenges unlawfully. See Adams, 740 S.W.2d at 62. Ordinarily, this Court would proceed to consider Williams’ complaint that the trial court erred in its finding.
B. No “Eight” to Cross-examination
However, before considering Williams’ complaint that the trial court erred in finding that the State did not unlawfully discriminate in exercising its peremptory strikes, the court must consider Williams’ complaint that she was denied a fair opportunity to prove unlawful racial discrimination by the State in peremptorily challenging Ms. Moore because the trial court refused to allow her to cross-examine the prosecutor during the Batson hearing. Williams contends, and the majority hold, that her constitutional rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel entitled her to such cross-examination.4
As noted above, a Batson hearing is structured to preserve as much as possible both the State’s right to exercise its peremptory challenges without interference and the defendant’s right to equal protection of the law. The responsibility for maintaining this difficult balance lies primarily with the trial judge who alone is best situated to discern, not only from what is said and done, but from what is left unsaid and undone, whether the defendant’s rights are surreptitiously being violated. The trial court must “make ‘a sensitive inquiry’ into ‘all relevant circumstances’ in determining whether purposeful discrimination is shown.” Adams, 740 S.W.2d at 61 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-99, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-1724). In my view, doubt that trial courts will fulfill this duty underlies the majority opinion and motivates their prescription of fixed procedures.
Consistent with its recognition that the trial court’s responsibility cannot be mechanically discharged, the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to prescribe procedures for the trial courts to follow beyond the basic two-step process. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. The formulation of appropriate procedures it left to the trial courts in each case. See United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 108 *882(4th Cir.1988); United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 340 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 1008, 107 S.Ct. 3234, 97 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). The duty imposed upon the trial court to discern and prevent racial discrimination in the jury selection process while preserving the State’s otherwise unrestricted freedom to exercise its peremptory challenges necessarily imports sufficient discretion to conduct any hearing on a defendant’s complaint in the manner best calculated to discharge that duty, within the constraints of the two-step procedure directed by Batson and Keeton, and subject to other requirements of law. In my view, the trial court should have the same latitude in determining what procedures to follow as it has in determining what conclusion to reach. I would follow the Supreme Court’s wisdom in not attempting to write rules for the myriad circumstances the trial courts face in discharging their responsibility under Batson. I would limit our review of the trial court’s conduct of a Batson hearing to whether it abused its discretion.
The authorities on the issue before the court are squarely and unanimously against the majority. This Court has itself held not long ago that a defendant has no right to cross-examine the prosecutor during the first step of a Batson hearing, before a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination has been established. Dewberry v. State, 743 S.W.2d 260, 266 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, pet. granted). The Court reasoned that cross-examination was unnecessary in that case because anyone present in the courtroom, not just the prosecutor, could have testified to what occurred there to lead to an inference of unlawful discrimination. The majority summarily overrule Dewberry. The only state supreme court that has, to my knowledge, addressed the issue has squarely held “that a defendant who makes a Batson challenge does not have the right to examine the prosecuting attorney.” State v. Jackson, 368 S.E.2d 838, 842 (N.C.1988). While I believe denying a defendant cross-examination of the prosecutor in all situations goes too far, I note simply that the weight of authority is against the majority’s rule allowing such cross-examination in every case. The only federal appeals court to have addressed the issue, to my knowledge, has twice held that a defendant is not absolutely entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and thus cross-examination of the prosecutor, on a Batson objection in every case. United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103 (4th Cir.1988). In addition, every federal appeals court to have considered the matter has held that trial courts must be allowed considerable discretion in conducting Batson hearings. United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 1008, 107 S.Ct. 3234, 97 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) (approved trial court’s in camera consideration of prosecutor’s reasons for exercising peremptory strikes); United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.1988) (approved trial court’s in camera consideration of prosecutor’s reasons for exercising peremptory strikes); United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir.1987) (refused to approve a trial court’s ex parte consideration of a prosecutor’s explanation for striking certain jurors absent some compelling justification for such procedure, but acknowledged the broad discretion of the trial court in conducting Bat-son hearings). The majority do not even acknowledge these cases or the reasoning they employ.
I stress that I would not deny a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecutor in every instance. For example, it seems to me that if the defendant were attempting during the first phase of a Bat-son hearing to raise an inference of discrimination by showing a course of conduct by the prosecutor in several trials, he should be entitled upon request and an explanation to the trial court of the purpose of his request, to examine the prosecutor, not about his reasons for his strikes in that case, but about his exercise of strikes in other cases. During the second phase of the hearing a defendant may make an even more compelling request to cross-examine the prosecutor who has just offered explanations for his strikes. To *883avoid unnecessarily delaying the trial, however, cross-examination should accomplish more than just rehash what has just occurred during the voir dire. If a defendant made a compelling request for cross-examination which the trial court nevertheless denied, I would review the denial for any abuse of discretion.
C. Cross-examination Subject to Discretion of Trial Court
The majority extend to defendants a constitutional right in every case to cross-examine prosecutors about their peremptory strikes whenever a defendant objects that the State has discriminated on the basis of race, even before the defendant has made a showing from which such discrimination can be inferred. The majority cite not one authority in support of their remarkable holding, nor can they, as all authority is to the contrary. The majority do what no other court has yet proposed: they tie the trial courts’ hands and require that they sit by while counsel engage in colloquy always unseemly and seldom productive. I am convinced the majority holding will only further delay the trial courts in their duties. If it provided greater assurance of no racial discrimination in jury selection, perhaps it would be worth it. I doubt, however, whether the outcome of many cases will turn on testimony elicited from a prosecutor on cross-examination in a Bat-son hearing.
In this case, although the trial court did not find that Williams made a prima facie case of discrimination, indeed, rather plainly failed to do so, it nevertheless invited the prosecutor to explain her peremptory challenges, which invitation she accepted. However, the prosecutor was examined, not by counsel for the State, but almost entirely by the trial court. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s testimony as to Ms. Moore merely recited what had happened during voir dire and added nothing to what a courtroom spectator would have known merely from listening to those proceedings. The prosecutor’s credibility was thus not placed in issue. Even had it been, the trial court as examiner had sufficient opportunity to test it. Finally, Williams never stated to the trial court, and has not told this court, what evidence she expected to elicit from the prosecutor by cross-examination that she could not obtain from other sources.
I would hold that whether to allow a defendant to cross-examine the prosecutor in a Batson hearing is a decision committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. I would find in this case no abuse of that discretion, and would therefore overrule Williams’ fifth point of error. Consequently, I dissent.

. This opinion was originally drafted by Justice Nathan L. Hecht. With Justice Hecht’s ascension to the Supreme Court of Texas prior to issuance of the opinions in this case and because of my agreement with this dissent, I have adopted it as my own.

. Williams' sister, Cheryl Reed, was a co-defendant.

. The discussion as to the State’s peremptory challenge to Mr. Adams is omitted inasmuch as Williams does not now complain of this challenge.

. Among the questions raised by the majority opinion is what it suggests about extending constitutional rights traditionally limited to trial on the merits to pretrial proceedings generally. There is little Texas authority on this issue, and our sister state courts are not in accord. The majority extend the right of cross-examination to the jury selection stage of trial because it "is of such vital importance to the accused” and “is part and parcel of the ‘adversarial’ nature of the trial on the merits.” Maj.op. at 874. If the test of when constitutional rights of confrontation and cross-examination attach is to be whenever the proceedings are "important” and "adversarial," I see little reason not to extend these rights to all pretrial proceedings. I doubt that the majority intend this result, but I see no way of avoiding it under their test. My view of this case does not require me to attempt any resolution of this larger issue because, as I explain, I believe that the nature and purpose of Batson hearings dictate that a defendant be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecutor only in some circumstances, within the sound discretion of the trial court. On this larger issue, I consider Justice Lagarde’s dissent to be well reasoned. Therefore, I join in her dissent to the extent there is not a right to cross-examine, although, in my view it may be an abuse of trial court discretion to deny defense counsel the opportunity, in certain cases, to cross-examine the prosecutor.