Court Opinion

ID: 9565837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:28:54.110228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:54.632496
License: Public Domain

McInnis, Acting Associate Justice,
dissenting:
The majority finds that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying SCE&G’s motion to intervene. I respectfully disagree.
*193This conflict is a contractual dispute between Berkeley-Electric and Mount Pleasant concerning the validity of then-franchise agreement. The agreement pertains solely to the rights between those parties which can be determined without the intervention of SCE&G.
The majority applies the Sagebrush Rebellion four-prong test to the motion. Excluding the first prong, from which no disagreement arises, the trial judge properly considered the appellant’s possible avenues of intervention and denied the motion under the same standards. He came to a sound determination within his discretion and should be affirmed. Thomasson v. Ocean Point Golf, Inc., 300 S.C. 29, 386 S.E. (2d) (Ct. App. 1989).
The second prong requires the proposed intervenor assert “an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action.” The subject of the action is the contract between Mount Pleasant and Berkeley Electric. The appellant is neither a signatory nor third-party beneficiary to the contract and, therefore, has no interest in the subject of the action. SCE&G claims rights under a separate, independent agreement entered into six years after the purported agreement between Berkeley Electric and Mount Pleasant in 1982. Elements which could be injected by SCE&G would not be necessary to determining the validity of the 1982 contract between Berkeley and Mount Pleasant, nor should the effect of the outcome of this litigation upon SCE&G be a consideration in weighing the merits of the case.
The potential intervenor must prove that his ability to protect his interest will be impaired or impeded if he is not allowed to intervene. If the appellant has an interest at all, it is in the outcome of the litigation between Berkeley Electric and Mount Pleasant.
In TPI Corp. v. Merchandise Mart of S.C., 61 F.R.D. 684 (D.S.C. 1974), the court stated:
Literally Rule 24(a) requires practical impairment of the ability to protect an interest and not practical impairment of the ability to assert an interest.
If need be, SCE&G can assert a cause of action against Mount Pleasant after the dispute between Berkeley and Mount Pleasant has been resolved. Intervention under Rule *19424(a)(2) was not warranted because the appellant does not have an interest in this action to protect, merely an interest it might assert if a decision in Berkeley’s favor is rendered. Any purported interest of SCE&G is contingent upon a determination of whether or not Mount Pleasant had a right to enter into the 1988 agreement which created SCE&G’s alleged rights.
The majority finds that a determination in Berkeley’s favor may impair or impede SCE&G’s ability to serve its customers and protect its investments. Following the reasoning of the majority, a potential party could trespass on disputed property, create an interest by erecting or constructing its own fixture, and then move to intervene.
I do not, nor apparently the trial judge, consider Rule. 24 to stretch this far. Although the rule calls for liberal interpretation, the trial judge has the perfect right to be as liberal in one direction as the majority would rule in the other.
Finally, SCE&G must prove that their cause is not adequately represented by the parties involved in the action. S.C. Tax Commission v. Union City Treasurer, 295 S.C. 257, 368 S.E. (2d) 72 (Ct. App. 1988).
. . . The burden of showing an inadequacy of representation is minimal. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538, 92 S. Ct. 630, 30 L. Ed. (2d) 686 (1971) (ftn 10) [However when] the party seeking intervention has the same ultimate objective as a party to the suit, a presumption arises that its interests are adequately represented against which the petitioner must demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion or nonfeasance. Ordnance Container Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 478 F. (2d) 844 (5th Cir. 1973); Commonwealth of Virginia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 542 F. (2d) 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1976).
Is there any doubt that both Mount Pleasant and SCE&G have the “same ultimate objective”? Both want the trial court to find the Berkeley Electric agreement invalid. Both will benefit from a decision in Mount Pleasant’s favor.
A favorable decision for Mount Pleasant will release Mount Pleasant from any liability of breach of contractual obligations to Berkeley. Likewise, a favorable decision will free *195Mount Pleasant to carry out the agreement it has with SCE&G. SCE&G fails to prove that Mount Pleasant does not protect SCE&G’s interests as it protects its own.
The trial judge is vested with the discretion to determine the appropriateness of the appellant’s motion for intervention. Judicial expediency is favored and encouraged when practical and appropriate, but it cannot and should not be the controlling factor in every situation. After weighing the factors in accordance with the law, the trial judge came to a reasonable determination and his decision should be given deference by the appellate court. I would affirm.
Finney, J., concurs in results only of dissenting opinion.