Court Opinion

ID: 9696466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:48:59.787613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:22.647443
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I agree with the majority that Section 301 of the Orphans’ Court Act of 1951 applies in this case. I disagree, however, with the conclusion that we must now dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
The majority’s construction of Section 301, of course, amounts to an overruling of this Court’s most recent decision in the area, Ellis v. Ellis, 415 Pa. 412, 203 A. 2d 547 (1964). In Ellis, this Court held that the question of whether - a decedent’s partners may *327purchase decedent’s interest in the partnership was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the orphans’ court. Today, without so much as mentioning Ellis, the majority is holding that the preliminary question of whether decedent had a partner (something conceded in Ellis) is properly for the orphans’ court. I think that the majority should at least give the profession some idea of where it thinks Ellis stands today. Certainly the litigants in the instant case deserve some explanation; they no doubt relied on Ellis when they chose their forum and litigated the issues without ever objecting to that forum.
I believe that Ellis should be expressly overruled. But because of the recent change in our constitution, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Section 4 of the schedule of the Judiciary Article, Article V, provides that the orphans’ courts shall be abolished and the courts of common pleas shall “exercise the jurisdiction of these courts.” Thus by constitutional mandate, the court of common pleas now has jurisdiction to hear this ease.
The majority’s decision to now dismiss this case constitutes, in my view, a failure of proper judicial administration. Neither party objected at trial or on appeal, and no claim of prejudice has been made. The procedures which would be used to re-try this case in the orphans’ court would not differ from the procedures which were in fact used to try this case. For example, in neither court would the parties in this controversy have had a right to a trial by jury. See also Orphans’ Court Rules §3, Rule 1 (unless otherwise provided by statute or local rule, pleading and practice in orphans’ court conforms to common pleas sitting in equity). It is senseless to force the parties to now take their case to what, under our new constitution, is merely a different division of the same court which originally tried *328the matter. I see absolutely no reason to now place this useless burden on both the litigants and the courts, and to thus further delay the proper resolution of this controversy.
Accordingly, I dissent.