Court Opinion

ID: 9387274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-17 15:03:18.952232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.490994
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                        Docket No. 48117

 STATE OF IDAHO,                                 )
                                                 )    Filed: April 17, 2023
        Plaintiff-Respondent,                    )
                                                 )    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
 v.                                              )
                                                 )    THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
 JASON EDWARD CLARK,                             )    OPINION AND SHALL NOT
                                                 )    BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
        Defendant-Appellant.                     )
                                                 )

       Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho,
       Washington County. Hon. Susan E. Wiebe, District Judge.

       Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, vacated; and case
       remanded.

       Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
       Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

       Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
       General, Boise, for respondent.
                 ________________________________________________

BRAILSFORD, Judge
       Jason Edward Clark appeals from the judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1). Clark argues the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. We reverse the denial of the suppression motion, vacate Clark’s
conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                                 I.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In August 2019, Officer Stratton initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle after observing it make
a U-turn in the middle of the highway without headlights or brake lights. Officer Stratton contacted
the vehicle’s driver, Clark; activated the body camera; and asked for Clark’s identification.

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       As Clark was getting his identification, Officer Stratton observed a second identification
card in Clark’s wallet and asked for it too. As Clark was getting the second identification card,
Officer Stratton questioned Clark about what was in a case in his vehicle. Clark told Officer
Stratton the case contained sunglasses. Officer Stratton responded it did not look like a sunglasses
case and asked to look inside, but Clark declined to open the case. Officer Stratton then questioned
Clark about the discrepancy in the length of hair between the two identification photographs, and
Clark explained he sometimes grows his hair out.
       After obtaining Clark’s documents, Officer Stratton spoke about the sunglasses case to
Sergeant Singleton, who was also on the scene as a cover officer and an on-scene supervisor.
Officer Stratton told Sergeant Singleton that Officer Stratton asked Clark what was in the case; he
would not open it; and “there’s drugs in there.” Both Officer Stratton and Sergeant Singleton
returned to Officer Stratton’s patrol vehicle, at which time Officer Stratton contacted dispatch to
perform a driver’s check on Clark.
       While in the patrol vehicle, Officer Stratton continued to discuss with Sergeant Singleton
Officer Stratton’s belief the sunglasses case contained drugs, his desire to search the case, and
whether they should call a drug dog to the scene. Thereafter, Officer Stratton’s body camera stops
recording. The camera begins recording again approximately three and a half minutes later and as
Officer Stratton approaches Clark to inform him that his driver’s license is expired.
       Officer Stratton then returned to his patrol vehicle and discussed with Sergeant Singleton
the discrepancies between Clark’s two identifications, including the weight discrepancies1 and that
the photographs appeared to depict two different people. Based on the discrepancies, Officer
Stratton contacted dispatch and attempted to obtain a recent booking photograph of Clark. Officer
Stratton continued investigating the discrepancies between Clark’s identifications until the drug
dog arrived.2 Thereafter, the dog alerted on Clark’s vehicle, and methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia were discovered in the vehicle.

1
        One identification card indicated Clark weighed 275 pounds and another issued six months
later indicated he weighed 175 pounds. In support of his suppression motion, Clark filed a
declaration stating that Officer Stratton never questioned Clark about this weight discrepancy and
that he believed the difference was a clerical error.
2
        The district court found the drug dog took twenty minutes to arrive on the scene. Both
parties dispute this finding, however, and agree the videos from the officers’ body cameras show
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       The State charged Clark with possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia.
Clark filed a motion to suppress, arguing the State could not establish reasonable suspicion to
justify an extension of the traffic stop and seeking to suppress “all evidence, oral or tangible,
obtained from [Clark].” During the suppression hearing, both Officer Stratton and Sergeant
Singleton testified, and the videos from their body cameras were admitted into evidence.
Importantly for purposes of this appeal, Officer Stratton testified about contacting the drug-dog
handler during the traffic stop, stating “I called [the drug-dog handler] on my cell phone as he was
off, and he was at home.” Likewise, Sergeant Singleton testified Officer Stratton called a drug
dog to the scene.
       After the hearing, the district court issued a written decision denying Clark’s suppression
motion. The court found that, Officer Stratton “used his cell phone to call for the [drug dog]”;
“this call does not appear on the video”; and “there is a break in Officer Stratton’s body camera
video after about 5 minutes of recording.” Further, the court found that, although “it is unclear
exactly when Officer Stratton called for a [drug dog], it likely occurred approximately 5 minutes
into the stop, after the second discussion between the officers of suspected narcotics.” As relevant
to this appeal, the court concluded that “the inquiry into the availability of a [drug dog] did not
constitute the abandonment of the traffic stop, and was therefore lawful.” In support, the court
quoted the rule in State v. Still, 166 Idaho 351, 356, 458 P.3d 220, 225 (Ct. App. 2019), overruled
by State v. Karst, 170 Idaho 219, 220, 509 P.3d 1148, 1149 (2022), that “a radio call to inquire if
a drug dog is available does not constitute [an] abandonment” of the traffic stop’s mission under
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
       After the district court denied his suppression motion, Clark pled guilty to possession of a
controlled substance and reserved his right to appeal the denial. Clark timely appeals.
                                                II.
                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
       The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a

approximately thirteen minutes passed from the time Officer Stratton turned off his body camera
and called for the drug dog until it arrived on the scene.
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suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
                                                 III.
                                            ANALYSIS
       Clark challenges the district court’s order denying his suppression motion, arguing “Officer
Stratton unlawfully extended the traffic stop to request a drug-dog unit without reasonable
suspicion to justify the extension.” The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of
the vehicle’s occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561,
916 P.2d at 1286. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate
possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers,
131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998).
       The tolerable duration of an officer’s inquiries during a traffic stop is measured in reference
to the stop’s mission. State v. Riley, 170 Idaho 572, 578, 514 P.3d 982, 988 (2022). That mission
includes, without limitation, addressing the traffic violation; determining whether to issue a traffic
citation; and making ordinary inquiries incident to the stop, such as checking the driver’s license
and proof of insurance. Id. The officer’s authority for the seizure ends when the officer has
completed or reasonably should have completed the tasks related to the stop’s mission. Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
       An officer may conduct certain unrelated checks during a traffic stop without independent
reasonable suspicion, so long as the check does not prolong the stop. Riley, 170 Idaho at 578, 514
P.3d at 988; see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356-58. Although a drug-dog sniff is not part of the
stop’s mission, such a sniff is constitutionally permissible if executed in a reasonable manner that
does not infringe on a constitutionally protected privacy interest, Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10,
and does not prolong the stop. Riley, 170 Idaho at 578, 514 P.3d at 988.
       The critical question in determining whether a drug-dog sniff unconstitutionally extended
a traffic stop is whether the sniff “prolonged or added time to the overall duration of the traffic

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stop.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Karst, 170 Idaho at 227, 509 P.3d at 1156. “[A] dog
sniff does not prolong the stop where one officer pursues the original objective of the stop while
another officer conducts the dog sniff.” Riley, 170 Idaho at 579, 514 P.3d at 989. If, however, an
officer without independent reasonable suspicion deviates or detours from the stop’s mission for a
sniff, he may unconstitutionally delay the stop. Id. For example, “a dog sniff unlawfully prolongs
the stop where the officer detours from the stop to radio for a drug dog, even if it only extends the
seizure by mere seconds.” Id.; Karst, 170 Idaho at 227, 509 P.3d at 1156 (concluding nineteen-
second call to request drug dog unconstitutionally extended traffic stop’s duration).
       In this case, the district court ruled that Officer Stratton did not unlawfully extend the traffic
stop’s duration because “the inquiry into the availability of a [drug dog] did not constitute the
abandonment of the traffic stop, and was therefore lawful.” In support, the court relied on the
ruling in Still that “a radio call to inquire if a drug dog is available does not constitute [an]
abandonment” of the stop’s mission. Still, 166 Idaho at 356, 458 P.3d at 225. As Clark notes,
however, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Still after the district court in this case denied Clark’s
suppression motion in reliance on Still. Karst, 170 Idaho at 227, 509 P.3d at 1156.
       In Karst, Sergeant Hyle stopped a vehicle for minor traffic violations. Id. at 221, 509 P.3d
at 1150. Karst, a passenger in the vehicle, was not wearing her seatbelt. Id. After Sergeant Hyle
requested Karst’s and the driver’s information and as Sergeant Hyle was returning to his patrol
vehicle, “he stopped and radioed dispatch to request that a drug-dog unit respond to the scene.”
Id. He testified that “he requested a drug-dog unit because the truck was coming from a suspected
drug location and the [driver’s] name had come up in connection with drug investigations.” Id.
“The time it took to request the drug-dog unit was about nineteen seconds.” Id. Thereafter,
Sergeant Hyle returned to his vehicle and conducted activities related to the traffic stop’s mission,
including gathering information from dispatch, inquiring about insurance and a suspended driver’s
license, and writing citations. Id. During this time, a drug dog arrived at the scene, conducted a
sniff around the vehicle, and alerted on the vehicle as Sergeant Hyle exited his patrol vehicle to
serve the citations. Id.
       On appeal of the denial of Karst’s suppression motion, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled
Still concluding it “improperly required ‘abandonment’ of the traffic mission for a stop to become
unlawfully extended.” Id. at 225, 509 P.3d at 1154. The Court ruled:

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       [T]he proper focus . . . is whether the dog sniff “prolonged” or “added time to” the
       traffic stop. Whether the officer “abandoned” the traffic stop is not determinative.
       [T]here is no de minimis intrusion justification for prolonging the traffic stop.
Id. at 223, 509 P.3d at 1152.
       Clark asserts Karst controls in this case, and he focuses his analysis on the delay Officer
Stratton caused when he deviated from the traffic stop’s mission to call for a drug dog. We agree
that under Karst, Officer Stratton unlawfully extended the traffic stop by taking the time necessary
to call for a drug dog. At the suppression hearing, Officer Stratton and Sergeant Singleton both
testified that Officer Stratton called for a drug dog during the stop. This call was a deviation from
the stop’s mission and was not supported by reasonable suspicion.
       Although the record is unclear how long Officer Stratton’s call to request a drug dog took,
this lack of clarity does not foreclose the conclusion that Officer Stratton unlawfully extended the
traffic stop. As both officers testified and the district court found, Officer Stratton called for a
drug dog at some point during the traffic stop. The only portion of the traffic stop not recorded on
the officers’ body camera videos is approximately five minutes after the stop commenced and after
the officers’ second discussion about whether the sunglasses case contained drugs. At that time,
Officer Stratton turned his body camera off. As the court’s findings indicate, Officer Stratton’s
call to the drug-dog handler “likely occurred approximately 5 minutes into the stop” when Officer
Stratton turned off his body camera video.3 Officer Stratton’s call undoubtedly took at least “mere
seconds.” See Riley, 170 Idaho at 579, 514 P.3d at 989 (“[A] dog sniff unlawfully prolongs the
stop to radio for a drug dog, even if it only extends the seizure by mere seconds.”). Accordingly,
Officer Stratton unlawfully delayed the traffic stop by deviating from the stop’s mission to call for
a drug dog.
       The State acknowledges that “Officer Stratton did not have reasonable suspicion to detain
Clark based on [the officer’s] personal belief that Clark possessed drugs” and that under Karst “an
officer’s call for a [drug dog]--without more--would illegally extend this stop.” The State asserts,
however, that Officer Stratton did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop because his “call for a
drug dog did not add time to the traffic stop” but rather “was contemporaneous with his

3
        The State appears to acknowledge on appeal that Officer Stratton called for a drug dog
when he turned off his body camera, stating “the body-cam videos show that the earliest Officer
Stratton called for a drug-dog was 1:39:00 (when [his video] stopped).”

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investigation into Clark’s inconsistent [identifications].” See I.C. § 18-5413(2) (criminalizing
giving false information to law enforcement); I.C. § 49-331 (criminalizing use of fraudulent
driver’s license).
        An officer may develop reasonable suspicion during a traffic stop of other criminal activity
and investigate that activity based on that new reasonable suspicion. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605,
609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016); State v. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545, 550, 415 P.3d 954, 959 (Ct. App.
2018). The record in this case, however, does not support the State’s assertion that Officer Stratton
was pursuing an investigation into a false identification contemporaneously with calling the drug-
dog handler during the traffic stop. The record is silent as to what Officer Stratton was doing after
he turned off his body camera, other than calling the drug-dog handler. Further, the State
acknowledges:
        The record is silent as to whether the officer wrote Clark a citation for driving with
        an expired license (or any other offense/infraction) contemporaneously with his call
        for a drug-dog, or if he was doing some other task within the purpose of the traffic
        stop at the time.
        This silence, however, does not inure to the State’s benefit. Rather, the State had the burden
to show that Officer Stratton’s call for a drug dog did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop because
he was contemporaneously conducting an alternative investigation for which he had reasonable
suspicion when he made the call. See State v. Marshall, 149 Idaho 725, 727, 239 P.3d 1286, 1288
(Ct. App. 2008) (noting State has burden to prove applicability of exception to warrant
requirement). Having failed to meet this burden, the State failed to establish that Officer Stratton’s
call for a drug dog did not unlawfully extend the stop.
        We decline to remand the case, as the State requests, for further factual findings regarding
whether Officer Stratton was simultaneously performing tasks in furtherance of his investigation
into a false identification when he was calling for a drug dog. At the suppression hearing, the State
argued Officer Stratton had reasonable suspicion to investigate a false identification but failed to
present any facts that he was actually investigating either the traffic violations or the false
identifications after he turned his body camera off. The State offers no explanation for failing to
present such evidence in support of its assertion that Officer Stratton was pursuing an alternate
investigation for which he had reasonable suspicion when he called the drug-dog handler during
the traffic stop. Although the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Still after the district court ruled on
Clark’s suppression motion, the rule of law on which the State relies--i.e., that an officer may

                                                  7
develop reasonable suspicion during a traffic stop of other criminal activity and investigate that
activity based on that new reasonable suspicion--was well established before Clark filed his
suppression motion. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-55 (noting officer may investigate another
crime during traffic stop if he acquires reasonable suspicion of that crime); Linze, 161 Idaho at
609, 389 P.3d at 154 (noting “new reasonable suspicion or probable cause” justifies “seizure’s new
purpose”); Renteria, 163 Idaho at 550, 415 P.3d at 959 (noting “Subsequent observations and
events can give rise to legitimate reasons for investigation of criminality differing from that which
initially prompted the stop.”).
       This Court exercises free review over the district court’s determination whether
constitutional requirements are satisfied under the facts found. Karst, 170 Idaho at 222, 509 P.3d
at 1151. Substantial evidence supports the district court’s factual findings. Based on those
findings, we hold Officer Stratton unlawfully extended the traffic stop under Karst by calling to
request a drug dog without reasonable suspicion of drug activity.
                                             IV.
                                         CONCLUSION
       We reverse the district court’s order denying Clark’s suppression, vacate the judgment of
conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
       Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.

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