Court Opinion

ID: 9701166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:08:09.51192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:20.231658
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Justice SCOTT
Concurring in part and Dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent on the issue of whether Leslie Emerson’s statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy to murder Appellant, Vicki Monroe’s, husband. In my opinion, the trial court properly admitted those statements under KRE SOlACbjCS),1 commonly known as the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. I would therefore affirm Appellant’s conviction for complicity to commit murder.
We should take guidance from federal case law in determining whether a particular statement was made in furtherance of the conspiratorial objective. This Court recently noted that “[o]ne of the objectives of the drafters of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence was to achieve uniformity with the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) to the extent possible and to depart from the Federal Rules only for good reason.” Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 747, 753 (Ky.2005). Federal courts adopt a broad construction of this furtherance requirement. United States v. Magee, 821 F.2d 234, 244 (5th Cir.1987) (“The phrase ‘in furtherance of the conspiracy’ must not be applied too strictly or the purpose of the coconspirator exception will be defeated.”); United States v. Bentley, 706 F.2d 1498, 1506 (8th Cir.1983) (observing that the furtherance requirement is “afforded a broad construction”).
In accordance with this broad interpretation, federal courts hold that statements which identify the participants and their roles in the conspiracy are made in furtherance of that conspiracy. United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1342 (6th Cir.1994) (codefendant’s out of court statements to girlfriend that defendant helped him in the bank robbery and “didn’t have the stomach for it” were in furtherance of the conspiracy, where statements clearly identified codefendant as a participant and commented on codefendant’s inadequate *79performance of his role); Magee, 821 F.2d at 244 (hearsay statement of coconspirator that defendant was the primary buyer of marijuana was made in furtherance of the conspiracy); United States v. Handy, 668 F.2d 407, 408 (8th Cir.1982) (in prosecution for mail fraud and conspiracy in connection ■with murder to collect proceeds of life insurance policy, statements of coconspirator that defendant would help him in the scheme and statement following murder indicating that defendant had driven car the day of the killing were made in furtherance of the conspiracy). Emerson’s statements indicate that Appellant agreed to pay him to kill her husband. Thus, these statements clearly identified Appellant and Emerson as participants in the conspiracy. Therefore, consistent with our previous pronouncement in Gerlaugh, and that of the federal courts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements under KRE 801A(b)(5).
MINTON, J., joins this concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion.

. KRE 801 A(b)(5) provides that “[a] statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the statement is offered against a party and is ... [a] statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”