Court Opinion

ID: 9958228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 16:02:14.804765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.746999
License: Public Domain

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                                         State v. Diaz

             STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GONZALO DIAZ
                          (SC 20720)
                      Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                            Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

                                           Syllabus

         Convicted of the crimes of felony murder, burglary in the first degree,
            conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree, attempt to commit
            robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a firearm in
            connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed
            to this court. At trial, one of the defendant’s accomplices, D, testified
            pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the state. D testified that, on
            the night of the murder, she had driven her boyfriend, J, and J’s friend,
            who allegedly was the defendant and went by the name ‘‘E,’’ to the
            victim’s house to buy drugs. Once they arrived, J informed D that they
            were going to rob the victim. D and E approached the house while J
            waited across the street. When the victim opened the door, E drew a
            gun and barged into the victim’s house. D was scared and ran back to
            the car, where she met J. According to D, she heard a gunshot as she
            fled. The defendant testified in his own defense. Although he admitted
            that he went to the victim’s house with J and D to buy drugs, he testified
            that he stayed near the car while J and D approached the house and
            that, after ten to fifteen minutes, he heard a gunshot. According to the
            defendant, J handed D a gun when J reentered the car. While cross-
            examining the defendant, the prosecutor indicated that a video recording
            of the defendant’s interviews with the police, in which the defendant
            made certain statements that were inconsistent with his trial testimony,
            would be played at a later point in the trial. The video recordings,
            however, ultimately were not offered into evidence. During rebuttal
            argument, the prosecutor remarked on D’s credibility, stating that either
            D or the defendant was ‘‘completely wrong’’ because their testimony
            was not consistent. The prosecutor also made remarks regarding the
            fact that the defendant, during his testimony, did not express outrage
            toward others who had implicated him or who had testified against him,
            and then proceeded to ask the jurors how they would feel if they were
            being accused of the crimes for which the defendant was being tried.
            The trial court issued a general credibility instruction that was applicable
            to all of the witnesses, an instruction applicable to accomplices that
            named D by name, and an instruction concerning the defendant’s testi-
            mony in particular. The court specifically instructed the jurors to assess
            the defendant’s credibility in the same manner as that of other witnesses
            and that they could consider ‘‘his interest in the verdict’’ in assessing
            his credibility. On appeal, the defendant claimed, for the first time, that
            the trial court had committed plain error by instructing the jury that it
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                                       State v. Diaz
           could consider the defendant’s interest in the outcome of the trial and
           that the prosecutor had made certain improper remarks during his cross-
           examination of the defendant and during rebuttal argument. Held:

       1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had
           committed plain error by instructing the jury that it could consider his
           interest in the outcome of the trial in assessing the credibility of his
           trial testimony:

          In State v. Medrano (308 Conn. 604), this court exercised its supervisory
          authority over the administration of justice and directed trial courts to
          refrain from instructing the jury that, when a defendant testifies, it may
          specifically consider the defendant’s interest in the outcome of the case
          and the importance to him of the outcome of the trial, and, although
          this court agreed, and the state conceded, that the trial court’s instruction
          in the present case violated the directive in Medrano in an obvious and
          readily discernible manner, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the
          erroneous instruction resulted in manifest injustice.

          The fact that a trial court’s jury instruction, by commission or omission,
          fails to comply with a supervisory rule does not, in and of itself, establish
          the existence of manifest injustice necessary for plain error, and, instead,
          the defendant must establish that the evidence adduced at trial, the
          disputed factual issues before the jury, and the instructions as a whole
          gave rise to the danger of juror misunderstanding or confusion that
          prompted the court to adopt the rule that the trial court failed to
          implement.

          In the present case, although the trial court included a sentence that
          improperly made a specific reference to the defendant’s interest in the
          outcome of the trial, the erroneous instruction was brief and immediately
          preceded and followed by qualifying language, which the defendant did
          not challenge on appeal and which required the jury to evaluate the
          defendant’s testimony as it would the testimony of any other witness,
          and, viewing the jury charge in its entirety, this court concluded that
          the erroneous instruction did not mislead the jury.

          Moreover, this court could not conclude that the erroneous jury instruc-
          tion so affected the fairness and integrity of, and public confidence in,
          the judicial proceedings so as to require reversal of the judgment, as the
          jury was free to infer from the evidence presented at trial, including the
          defendant’s admission that he traveled with J and D to the victim’s home
          to purchase drugs from a known drug house and evidence that he was
          in that area at the time the victim was killed, that the defendant was a
          ready and willing participant in the criminal activity that resulted in the
          victim’s death, and also to infer that the defendant’s behavior following
          the crimes, particularly changing his cell phone number and lying to the
          police, was inconsistent with innocence and indicative of consciousness
          of guilt.
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                                          State v. Diaz
             There was no merit to the defendant’s contention that the erroneous
             instruction likely misled the jury by placing the defendant on equal
             footing with D for purposes of the jury’s credibility determination, the
             trial court’s instructions having carefully distinguished between the spe-
             cial credibility rules governing the testimony of an accomplice and the
             general credibility rules governing the testimony of all other witnesses
             who might have an interest in the outcome of the case, including the
             defendant, and the trial court explicitly informed the jury that the defen-
             dant’s testimony should be assessed in accordance with its general credi-
             bility instruction governing the testimony of all other witnesses, whereas
             D’s testimony was governed by the special credibility instruction unique
             to the testimony of accomplices.

         2. There was no merit to the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor had
             engaged in certain improprieties during his cross-examination of the
             defendant and during rebuttal argument because none of the prosecu-
             tor’s remarks was improper:

             a. The prosecutor did not improperly comment on D’s credibility, during
             rebuttal argument, when he stated that either D or the defendant must
             be ‘‘wrong’’:

             Contrary to the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s comment
             improperly implied that the jury could not find the defendant not guilty
             unless it found that D had lied, the prosecutor’s isolated remark did not
             make a direct connection between the defendant’s guilt and D’s credibil-
             ity or misrepresent the state’s burden of proof.

             Moreover, because D only identified her accomplices as J and E, and
             never identified the defendant as E, the jury was not required to find that
             D had lied in order to find the defendant not guilty of the charged crimes.

             b. The prosecutor did not make an improper golden rule argument when,
             during rebuttal argument, he commented on the defendant’s lack of
             outrage toward his accusers and asked the jurors how they would feel
             if they had been accused of the crimes for which the defendant was
             on trial:

             The prosecutor’s observation about the defendant’s lack of outrage and
             his question to the jurors did not appeal to the jurors’ passions or emo-
             tions but, instead, asked the jurors to use their common sense and
             experience to infer that an innocent person accused of the crimes charged
             would have exhibited some outrage or anger on the witness stand, and
             such an argument fell within the permissible bounds of fair comment
             on witness credibility.

             c. The prosecutor did not argue facts not in evidence during his cross-
             examination of the defendant:
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                                     State v. Diaz
         Certain questions the prosecutor asked the defendant about threats he
         allegedly made to D’s son were not improper because those questions
         were designed to test the defendant’s credibility and to rebut, impeach,
         modify, or explain the defendant’s direct testimony, and the defendant
         did not claim that the prosecutor lacked a good faith basis to ask those
         questions or that the questions themselves or the information sought
         was inflammatory, inadmissible, unduly prejudicial, or in violation of a
         court order.

         Moreover, the prosecutor’s comments that allegedly inconsistent state-
         ments the defendant made during his video-recorded police interroga-
         tions would be played at a later point during the trial did not constitute
         improprieties, insofar as the jury was aware of the existence of the
         recordings and of the fact that many of the defendant’s statements therein
         were inconsistent with his trial testimony, the defendant did not claim
         that the inconsistent statements were inadmissible for impeachment
         purposes or that the prosecutor lacked a good faith intent to play them
         at the time he made the challenged remarks, and the record did not
         reflect that the prosecutor’s comments were delivered in a sarcastic,
         provocative, or aggressive manner.
            Argued November 14, 2023—officially released April 9, 2024

                                  Procedural History

          Substitute information charging the defendant with
       the crimes of felony murder, manslaughter in the first
       degree with a firearm, burglary in the first degree, con-
       spiracy to commit burglary in the first degree, attempt
       to commit robbery in the first degree, and criminal
       possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court
       in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the charges
       of felony murder, manslaughter in the first degree with
       a firearm, burglary in the first degree, conspiracy to
       commit burglary in the first degree, and attempt to
       commit robbery in the first degree were tried to the
       jury before Schuman, J.; verdict of guilty of felony
       murder, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm,
       burglary in the first degree, conspiracy to commit bur-
       glary in the first degree, and attempt to commit robbery
       in the first degree; thereafter, the charge of criminal
       possession of a firearm was tried to the court; finding
       of guilty; subsequently, the court vacated the conviction
       as to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm
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                                            State v. Diaz

         and rendered judgment of guilty of felony murder, bur-
         glary in the first degree, conspiracy to commit burglary
         in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the
         first degree, and criminal possession of a firearm, from
         which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
           Shanna P. Hugle, deputy assistant public defender,
         for the appellant (defendant).
            Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
         whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s attor-
         ney, and Don E. Therkildsen and Amy Sedensky, super-
         visory assistant state’s attorneys, for the appellee
         (state).
                                              Opinion

            ECKER, J. In this direct appeal,1 the defendant, Gon-
         zalo Diaz, raises two unpreserved claims challenging
         his conviction of felony murder, burglary in the first
         degree, conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree,
         attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and crimi-
         nal possession of a firearm. First, he claims that the
         trial court committed plain error when it instructed the
         jury that it may consider his interest in the outcome of
         its verdict when assessing the credibility of his trial
         testimony, contrary to our statement in State v. Medrano,
         308 Conn. 604, 631, 65 A.3d 503 (2013), that such an
         instruction should not be given. Second, he claims that
         the prosecutor made improper remarks during cross-
         examination and rebuttal argument, in violation of his
         due process right to a fair trial. We affirm the trial
         court’s judgment.
           The jury reasonably could have found the following
         facts. The victim, Denise Rogers-Rollins, and her son
         sold drugs out of their home on Wall Street in Water-
         bury. During the early morning hours of December 7,
         2019, the victim was shot and killed in her home. The
             1
                 See General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).
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                               State v. Diaz

       police investigation into the victim’s death led to the
       questioning of Shavonnah Draper, whose car was spot-
       ted parked nearby at the time of the shooting. Draper
       initially lied to the police regarding her involvement
       in the crimes but later admitted that she drove her
       boyfriend, Howard Jefferson, and his friend, E, from
       Bridgeport to the victim’s residence on Wall Street in
       Waterbury to buy drugs on the night of the shooting.
       Pursuant to Jefferson’s instructions, Draper did not
       park in front of the victim’s home but, instead, parked
       nearby on Shelley Street. When Draper, Jefferson, and
       E exited the vehicle, Jefferson informed Draper that
       they ‘‘were going to rob the place, and [Draper was going
       to be] the one to get the door open.’’ Draper participated
       in the planned robbery because she was afraid of Jeffer-
       son, who regularly abused her physically.
          Draper and E approached the victim’s residence while
       Jefferson waited across the street. Draper knocked on
       the door, and the victim asked who was there. Draper
       answered: ‘‘[I]t’s me.’’ The victim asked Draper if she
       had called beforehand, and Draper responded that there
       had been ‘‘no answer.’’ When the victim opened the
       door, E pulled out ‘‘a dark colored gun’’ and ‘‘bum-rushe[d]
       her’’ inside. Scared, Draper ran back to the car, where
       she met Jefferson. Draper heard the victim screaming
       and the sound of a gunshot as she ran to the car. Draper
       entered the driver’s seat of her vehicle, and Jefferson
       got into the passenger’s seat. Draper started the car
       and turned around to proceed down Shelley Street away
       from Wall Street. As she was driving away, Draper saw
       E walking down Shelley Street. Jefferson instructed
       Draper to pick up E, and Draper complied. After E
       entered the car, Jefferson asked E, ‘‘[w]hat the fuck
       happened?’’ E replied, ‘‘I don’t know. I don’t know. I
       hit her, and [the gun] went off.’’ Draper drove back to
       Bridgeport and dropped E off near State Street and
       Lee Avenue.
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                                 State v. Diaz

            The defendant was interviewed by the police twice,
         once on December 20, 2019, and again on January 7,
         2020. During his first interview, the defendant identified
         himself as E after viewing video surveillance footage
         depicting Jefferson and E near Wall Street on the night
         of the victim’s death. The defendant subsequently was
         arrested and charged in a six count substitute informa-
         tion with (1) manslaughter in the first degree with a
         firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a (a),
         (2) felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
         54c, (3) burglary in the first degree in violation of Gen-
         eral Statutes §§ 53a-8 and 53a-101 (a) (3), (4) conspiracy
         to commit burglary in the first degree in violation of
         General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-101 (a) (3), (5)
         attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in viola-
         tion of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-134
         (a) (2), and (6) criminal possession of a firearm in
         violation of General Statutes § 53a-217 (a) (1). The
         defendant elected a jury trial on the first five counts
         and a bench trial on the sixth count.
            Testifying at trial pursuant to a cooperation agree-
         ment, Draper provided a version of events consistent
         with the facts set forth in the preceding paragraphs.
         She acknowledged that she had been unable to identify
         the defendant as E from a photographic array con-
         ducted shortly after the incident, and she never identi-
         fied the defendant as E at trial.
            The defendant testified in his own defense. He admit-
         ted that, on the night of the shooting, he traveled from
         Bridgeport to Waterbury with Jefferson and Draper to
         buy drugs, but he denied any knowledge of, or involve-
         ment in, the attempted robbery, burglary, and killing of
         the victim. According to the defendant, Draper parked
         her car on Shelley Street, and he, Jefferson, and Draper
         exited the vehicle. Jefferson informed the defendant
         that ‘‘he had to take care of something. He [was] going
         to this trap house, [where] he [knew] this lady that lives
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                                         State v. Diaz

       there that use[s] drugs . . . and her son sell[s] drugs.’’2
       The defendant stayed with the car and smoked a ciga-
       rette while Jefferson and Draper went to the trap house
       on Wall Street.
         The defendant testified that, after waiting by the car
       for approximately ten to fifteen minutes, he heard a
       gunshot. He walked to the corner of Wall and Shelley
       Streets and looked around but did not see anything. He
       then walked back to the car, only to discover that it
       was locked. The defendant returned to the corner of
       Wall and Shelley Streets, where he saw Draper walking
       down the street with Jefferson following fifteen to
       twenty feet behind her. Draper reached the car and got
       into the driver’s seat, and the defendant sat in the back.
       Jefferson waved Draper along and kept walking down
       Shelley Street in the opposite direction. Draper turned
       the car around and drove down Shelley Street, where
       she picked up Jefferson. Jefferson entered the front
       passenger seat of the vehicle and handed Draper ‘‘a
       small, black,’’ semiautomatic gun, which Draper placed
       in the center console.
         According to the defendant’s testimony, he ‘‘could
       see a cop car coming’’ and heard sirens as Draper was
       driving away. Although it was ‘‘obvious something [had]
       happened,’’ the defendant did not ask Draper and Jeffer-
       son what had occurred because he ‘‘didn’t want to be
       involved.’’ Draper drove back to Bridgeport, where she
       dropped the defendant off near State Street and Lee
       Avenue.
         The defendant acknowledged that he had changed
       his cell phone number approximately one week after
       the death of the victim. He said that he did so because
       Draper had been arrested, Jefferson had stopped com-
       municating with him, and he ‘‘felt like [he] was being
        2
            The defendant testified that a trap house is ‘‘[a] place that sells drugs.’’
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                                       State v. Diaz

         set up.’’ The defendant therefore ‘‘cut [his] ties with [Jef-
         ferson].’’
            The defendant also admitted that he had lied to the
         police multiple times during the two interviews regard-
         ing the incident. The defendant initially told the police
         that, on the night of the victim’s death, he had traveled
         from Bridgeport to Waterbury with ‘‘one of [his] boys’’
         and denied going to the Wall Street area. Additionally,
         the defendant initially informed the police that, although
         he had met up with Jefferson in Waterbury that night,
         it was just the two of them, and no one else had joined
         them. When the police advised the defendant that they
         had video surveillance footage of him in a car with Jeffer-
         son and Draper, the defendant admitted that he had
         gone back to Bridgeport with Jefferson and Draper
         but still denied traveling to Waterbury with them. The
         defendant also originally denied going to the Wall Street
         area with Jefferson and Draper, informing the police
         that the couple had left him ‘‘for [one-half] hour to forty-
         five minutes when they went somewhere.’’ Later, the
         defendant admitted to the police that he had traveled
         to Waterbury with Jefferson and Draper and went with
         them to the Wall Street area but denied ever exiting
         the car, adamantly stating that he was ‘‘positive’’ that
         he ‘‘stayed in the car the whole time . . . .’’ When
         informed by the police that there were eyewitnesses
         who saw three people exiting Draper’s car on Shelley
         Street,3 the defendant changed his story and stated that
         he got out of the car on Shelley Street, but only to
         smoke a cigarette.
           On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the jury found
         the defendant guilty of felony murder, manslaughter in
         the first degree with a firearm, burglary in the first
           3
             Although there was an eyewitness who testified that she saw three or
         four individuals returning to a gray car parked at the corner of Wall and
         Shelley Streets after the shooting, no eyewitness testified regarding who
         exited the gray car after it first parked on Shelley Street.
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                                       State v. Diaz

       degree, conspiracy to commit burglary in the first
       degree, and attempt to commit robbery in the first
       degree, while the trial court found him guilty of criminal
       possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the trial court
       vacated the defendant’s manslaughter conviction but
       otherwise rendered judgment in accordance with the
       jury’s verdict and the court’s finding.4 The trial court
       sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence
       of forty-five years of imprisonment,5 and this direct
       appeal followed.
                                             I
         The defendant claims that the trial court committed
       plain error by instructing the jury that, in assessing the
       credibility of his trial testimony, it ‘‘necessarily [could
       consider] his interest in the verdict that [it] will [return].’’
       The state concedes that this instruction plainly was
       erroneous in light of State v. Medrano, supra, 308 Conn.
       604, in which we ‘‘exercise[d] . . . our supervisory
       authority over the administration of justice . . . [to]
       direct our trial courts in the future to refrain from
       instructing jurors, when a defendant testifies, that they
       may specifically consider the defendant’s interest in the
       outcome of the case and the importance to him of
          4
            With the agreement of the defendant, the state moved to vacate the
       defendant’s manslaughter conviction because there was only one homicide,
       and it would violate the defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy
       to convict the defendant of both felony murder and manslaughter in the
       first degree with a firearm. The trial court granted the state’s motion and
       vacated the defendant’s manslaughter conviction without prejudice to rein-
       statement if his felony murder conviction is reversed or vacated on appeal.
          5
            The trial court sentenced the defendant to forty years of imprisonment for
       the crime of felony murder and imposed the following concurrent sentences:
       twenty years of imprisonment for burglary in the first degree, twenty years
       of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree, and
       twenty years of imprisonment for attempt to commit robbery in the first
       degree. Additionally, the trial court sentenced the defendant to five years
       of imprisonment for the crime of criminal possession of a firearm, to run
       consecutively to the other sentences, for a total effective sentence of forty-
       five years of imprisonment.
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          the outcome of the trial.’’ Id., 631. The state contends,
          however, that the defendant’s claim fails under the sec-
          ond prong of the plain error test because the defendant
          has failed to demonstrate that the erroneous instruction
          resulted in manifest injustice. We agree.
             The following additional information regarding the
          trial court’s jury instructions is relevant to our resolu-
          tion of this claim. The trial court instructed the jury as
          follows with respect to the defendant’s testimony in
          particular: ‘‘In this case, the defendant testified. An
          accused person having taken the stand, [he] stands
          before you like any other witness. He is entitled to the
          same considerations and must have his testimony tested
          and measured by you by the same factors and standards
          as you would judge the testimony of any other witness.
          That necessarily involves consideration of his interest
          in the verdict that you will render. Of course, you have
          no right to disregard his testimony, or to disbelieve his
          testimony, merely because he is accused of a crime.
          You will consider my earlier instructions on the general
          subject matter of credibility that obviously pertain to
          the defendant’s testimony, as well as the testimony of
          any other witness.’’6 (Emphasis added.)
             In its general instructions on witness credibility, the
          trial court informed the jury that, in ascertaining the
          facts, ‘‘you must decide which testimony to believe and
          which testimony not to believe. You may believe all,
          none, or any part of any witness’ testimony. In making
          that decision, you may take into account a number of
          factors, including the following: (1) Was the witness
          able to see, or hear, or know the things about which
          that witness testified? (2) How well was the witness
          able to recall and describe those things? (3) What was
          the witness’ manner while testifying? (4) Did the wit-
            6
              The defendant challenges only the italicized portion of the trial court’s
          jury charge.
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       ness have an interest in the outcome of this case, or any
       bias, or prejudice concerning any party or any manner
       involved in the case? (5) How reasonable was the wit-
       ness’ testimony considered in light of all the evidence
       in the case? And (6) was the witness’ testimony contra-
       dicted by what that witness has said, or done, at another
       time, or by the testimony of other witnesses, or by other
       evidence? Of course, you should use your common
       sense and good judgment in applying these factors.’’
         This instruction continued: ‘‘In deciding whether or
       not to believe a witness, keep in mind that people some-
       times forget things. You need to consider, therefore,
       whether a contradiction is an innocent lapse of memory
       or an intentional falsehood, and that may depend on
       whether it has to do with an important fact or with
       only a small detail. Remember, also, that it is not uncom-
       mon for two honest people to witness the same event
       yet perceive or recall things differently. If you should
       think that a witness has deliberately testified falsely in
       some respect, you should carefully consider whether
       you should . . . rely [on] any or all of the remainder
       of his or her testimony. These are some of the factors
       you may consider in whether to believe testimony.’’
          The trial court also instructed the jury regarding the
       law governing certain specified categories of witnesses,
       including police officers, expert witnesses, and accom-
       plices. With respect to the latter category of witnesses,
       the trial court identified the defendant’s alleged accom-
       plice, Draper, by name and informed the jury that, ‘‘[i]n
       weighing the testimony of . . . Draper, you should
       consider the fact that she is facing charges as an accom-
       plice to the crimes charged in this case. It may be that
       you would not believe a person who has committed a
       crime as readily as you would believe a person of good
       character. In weighing the testimony of an accomplice
       who has not yet been sentenced or whose case has not
       yet been disposed of, you should keep in mind that she
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          may, in her own mind, be looking for some favorable
          treatment in the sentence or disposition of her own
          case; therefore, she may have such an interest in the
          outcome of this case that her testimony may have been
          colored by that fact. Therefore, you must look with
          particular care at the testimony of an accomplice and
          scrutinize it very carefully before you accept it. You
          should also bear in mind, however, that there are many
          offenses that are of such a character that . . . the only
          persons capable of giving useful testimony are those
          who are, themselves, implicated in the crime. It is for
          you to decide what credibility you will give to an accom-
          plice and whether you will believe or disbelieve the
          testimony of a person who by her own admission has
          committed or contributed to the crimes charged by the
          state here. Like all other questions of credibility, this
          is a question you must decide based on all the evidence
          presented to you.’’
             Defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s
          instruction regarding consideration of the defendant’s
          interest in the outcome of the trial. On appeal, the
          defendant now claims for the first time that this instruc-
          tion constitutes plain error. To prevail on this unpre-
          served claim, the defendant must satisfy the two-
          pronged plain error test. First, the defendant must
          establish that ‘‘there was an obvious and readily dis-
          cernable error . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
          ted.) State v. Blaine, 334 Conn. 298, 306, 221 A.3d 798
          (2019). Second, the defendant must establish that the
          obvious and readily discernable ‘‘error was so harmful
          or prejudicial that it resulted in manifest injustice.’’
          (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In sum, reversal
          is required only if the alleged error is ‘‘both so clear
          and so harmful’’ that it affects the fairness and integrity
          of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.
          (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
          ted.) State v. Sanchez, 308 Conn. 64, 78, 60 A.3d 271
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       (2013); see also State v. McClain, 324 Conn. 802, 812,
       155 A.3d 209 (2017) (‘‘plain error . . . is reserved for
       truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence
       of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness
       and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial
       proceedings’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
          The defendant’s plain error claim rests on the fact
       that the challenged portion of the charge violated this
       court’s clear directive in State v. Medrano, supra, 308
       Conn. 604. The trial court in Medrano gave a jury
       instruction similar to the one under consideration in
       this case, informing the jury that, in assessing the testi-
       mony of the defendant, Rafael Medrano, the jury could
       ‘‘consider the importance to him of the outcome of the
       trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 624. On
       appeal, Medrano claimed for the first time that the trial
       court’s instruction undermined the presumption of his
       innocence and deprived him of his due process right
       to a fair trial. Id., 622. We concluded that Medrano’s
       unpreserved constitutional claim was reviewable under
       State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823
       (1989), but that no constitutional violation occurred
       pursuant to State v. Williams, 220 Conn. 385, 397, 599
       A.2d 1053 (1991), in which we held that a comparable
       instruction emphasizing a defendant’s interest in the
       outcome of the trial and the need to evaluate the defen-
       dant’s testimony in the same fashion as the testimony
       of other witnesses was not unduly repetitive and did
       not overstep the bounds of evenhandedness. See State
       v. Medrano, supra, 622–26. Because the trial court’s
       instruction did not dilute the presumption of innocence
       or deprive Medrano of a fair and just trial, his claim
       failed under Golding. See id., 630–31.
          Although we affirmed Medrano’s conviction, we expressed
       concern ‘‘that instructions regarding the defendant’s
       interest in the outcome of a case, when viewed in isola-
       tion from the qualifying language concerning evaluating
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          the defendant’s credibility in the same manner as the
          testimony of other witnesses, could give rise to a danger
          of juror misunderstanding.’’ Id., 629–30. We therefore
          exercised our supervisory authority over the adminis-
          tration of justice prospectively to ‘‘direct our trial courts
          in the future to refrain from instructing jurors, when a
          defendant testifies, that they may specifically consider
          the defendant’s interest in the outcome of the case
          and the importance to him of the outcome of the trial.
          Instead, we instruct[ed] the trial courts to use the gen-
          eral credibility instruction to apply to a criminal defen-
          dant who testifies.’’ Id., 631.
             The state concedes that, pursuant to Medrano, the
          first prong of the plain error test is satisfied in the
          present case because the trial court erred in giving the
          challenged instruction regarding the defendant’s inter-
          est in the outcome of the trial, and the error was plain,
          in the sense that it was patent, readily discernable,
          obvious, and not debatable. See, e.g., State v. Jamison,
          320 Conn. 589, 596, 134 A.3d 560 (2016). We agree and
          pause to repeat the mandatory directive issued in
          Medrano: a trial court’s jury charge must not single out
          a criminal defendant’s testimony for special treatment
          based on the defendant’s interest in the result of the
          jury’s verdict or the importance to him of the outcome
          of the trial.
             The remaining issue is whether the error resulted
          in manifest injustice. The fact that a trial court’s jury
          instruction, by commission or omission, fails to comply
          with a rule issued pursuant to our supervisory authority
          ‘‘does not, in and of itself, establish the existence of
          manifest injustice necessary for plain error.’’ State v.
          Sanchez, supra, 308 Conn. 83; see id., 82–87 (trial court’s
          failure to issue eyewitness identification instruction
          contrary to supervisory rule adopted in State v. Ledbet-
          ter, 275 Conn. 534, 575, 881 A.2d 290 (2005), cert. denied,
          547 U.S. 1082, 126 S. Ct. 1798, 164 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2006),
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       did not result in manifest injustice); see also State v.
       Smith, 275 Conn. 205, 237, 239–40, 881 A.2d 160 (2005)
       (erroneous jury instruction on intent to cause death
       contrary to supervisory rule adopted in State v. Aponte,
       259 Conn. 512, 522, 790 A.2d 457 (2002), did not result
       in manifest injustice); State v. Nims, 70 Conn. App. 378,
       385, 797 A.2d 1174 (jury instruction on ingenuity of
       counsel contrary to supervisory rule adopted in State
       v. Delvalle, 250 Conn. 466, 475–76, 736 A.2d 125 (1999),
       did not affect ‘‘the fairness and integrity of the proceed-
       ings’’ or result in ‘‘manifest injustice’’), cert. denied, 261
       Conn. 920, 806 A.2d 1056 (2002). To prove manifest
       injustice, the defendant must establish that the evidence
       adduced at trial, the disputed factual issues before the
       jury, and the instructions as a whole actually gave rise,
       in the particular case under review, to the danger of
       juror misunderstanding or confusion that prompted the
       court to adopt the rule that the trial court failed to
       implement. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, supra, 82–84.
          Reviewing the trial court’s charge in its entirety, we
       conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that
       the erroneous instruction resulted in manifest injustice.
       Although the trial court included a sentence in its charge
       that improperly made a specific reference to the defen-
       dant’s interest in the outcome of the trial, it also
       instructed the jury in clear and direct terms that the
       jury’s assessment of the defendant’s testimony must be
       ‘‘tested and measured . . . by the same factors and
       standards as you would judge the testimony of any
       other witness.’’ The trial court cautioned the jury that
       it had ‘‘no right to disregard [the defendant’s] testimony,
       or to disbelieve his testimony, merely because he is
       accused of a crime’’ and directed the jury specifically to
       consider its ‘‘earlier instructions on the general subject
       matter of credibility that obviously pertain to the defen-
       dant’s testimony, as well as the testimony of any other
       witness.’’ Those earlier instructions on general credibil-
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          ity permitted the jury to consider whether any witness
          (which, as the trial court later explained, included the
          defendant) ‘‘[had] an interest in the outcome of this
          case, or any bias, or prejudice concerning any party or
          any manner involved in the case . . . .’’ Because the
          erroneous instruction was brief and immediately pre-
          ceded and followed by qualifying language that is not
          challenged by the defendant on appeal requiring the
          jury to evaluate the defendant’s testimony as it would
          the testimony of any other witness, we are confident
          that the jury was not misled.7
            Our conclusion in this regard is reinforced by the
          evidence adduced at trial, which established that the
          defendant traveled from Bridgeport with Jefferson and
          Draper to purchase drugs in Waterbury and was in the
          vicinity of the victim’s home on Wall Street, a known
          drug house, when the victim was shot and killed. The
          defendant did not dispute that he was with Draper and
          Jefferson near Wall Street at the time of the attempted
          robbery, burglary, and killing of the victim but testified
              7
                To support his claim to the contrary, the defendant relies on United
          States v. Solano, 966 F.3d 184, 186, 193 (2d Cir. 2020), in which the Second
          Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was plain error to instruct a jury that
          a defendant’s interest in the outcome of the trial created a motive to testify
          falsely. In arriving at its conclusion, the Second Circuit relied on its prior
          case law—including United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2006),
          and United States v. Brutus, 505 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2007)—in which it expressly
          ‘‘ ‘denounce[d] any instruction . . . that tells a jury that a testifying defen-
          dant’s interest in the outcome of the case creates a motive to testify falsely’ ’’
          because, among other reasons, ‘‘ ‘a defendant does not always have a motive
          to testify falsely. An innocent defendant has a motive to testify truthfully.’ ’’
          (Emphasis omitted.) United States v. Solano, supra, 194, quoting United
          States v. Gaines, supra, 246. In Medrano, we found Gaines and Brutus to
          be distinguishable because the trial court did not ‘‘explicitly [state] that
          [Medrano’s] interest in the case gave him a motivation to testify falsely.’’
          State v. Medrano, supra, 308 Conn. 629. Likewise, in the present case, the
          erroneous instruction did not inform the jury that the defendant’s interest
          in the outcome of the trial created a motive to testify falsely. The instruction
          at issue, read as a whole, directed the jury to assess the defendant’s testimony
          as it would that of any other witness. Accordingly, the defendant’s reliance
          on Solano is misplaced.
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       that he had no knowledge of or involvement in those
       crimes. Despite the defendant’s testimony, the jury was
       free to infer that he was a ready and willing participant
       in the criminal activity that resulted in the victim’s
       death. See State v. Patrick M., 344 Conn. 565, 576, 280
       A.3d 461 (2022) (‘‘[t]he jury is permitted to rely on its
       common sense, experience and knowledge of human
       nature in drawing inferences . . . and may draw fac-
       tual inferences on the basis of already inferred facts’’
       (internal quotation marks omitted)). Additionally, the
       defendant’s behavior following the crimes, particularly
       changing his cell phone number and lying to the police,
       was inconsistent with innocence and indicative of con-
       sciousness of guilt. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 181 Conn.
       App. 535, 564, 187 A.3d 454 (2018) (evidence that, after
       crime was committed, defendant changed his cell phone
       number, evaded police, and lied about his identity sup-
       ported inference of consciousness of guilt), aff’d, 334
       Conn. 660, 224 A.3d 129 (2020). On the present factual
       record, we cannot conclude that the erroneous jury
       instruction ‘‘so affected the fairness and integrity of
       and public confidence in the judicial proceedings as to
       require reversal of the judgment.’’ State v. Sanchez,
       supra, 308 Conn. 84; see also State v. Kyle A., 348 Conn.
       437, 450–51, 307 A.3d 249 (2024) (in reviewing jury
       instruction for plain error, court must evaluate evidence
       adduced at trial to determine whether manifest injus-
       tice occurred).
          The defendant contends that the erroneous instruc-
       tion likely misled the jury because it placed the defen-
       dant on equal footing with Draper for purposes of the
       jury’s determination of credibility. To the contrary, the
       trial court explicitly informed the jury that the defen-
       dant’s testimony should be assessed in accordance with
       its general credibility instruction governing the testi-
       mony of all other witnesses, whereas Draper’s testi-
       mony was governed by the special credibility instruction
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          unique to the testimony of accomplices. Indeed, the
          trial court specifically informed the jury that it had ‘‘no
          right to disregard [the defendant’s] testimony, or to
          disbelieve his testimony, merely because he is accused
          of a crime.’’ Draper, in contrast, had confessed to her
          involvement in the crimes and was ‘‘facing charges as
          an accomplice,’’ and the trial court accordingly instructed
          the jury that it might not believe her testimony ‘‘as
          readily as [it] would believe a person of good character.’’
          The trial court tailored its accomplice instruction to the
          specific risk posed by accomplice testimony, explaining
          that an accomplice like Draper, ‘‘who has not yet been
          sentenced or whose case has not yet been disposed of
          . . . [may] be looking for some favorable treatment
          in the sentence or disposition of her own case,’’ and,
          therefore, accomplice testimony must be examined
          ‘‘with particular care . . . and scrutinize[d] . . . very
          carefully’’ before it is accepted. The trial court’s instruc-
          tions thus carefully distinguished between the special
          credibility rules governing the testimony of an accom-
          plice and the general credibility rules governing the
          testimony of all other witnesses who might have an
          interest in the outcome of the case, including the defen-
          dant. We have no reason to think that the trial court’s
          erroneous instruction resulted in manifest injustice
          necessitating the reversal of the defendant’s conviction.
                                                II
            The defendant claims on appeal, for the first time,
          that the prosecutor committed multiple improprieties
          during his cross-examination of the defendant and dur-
          ing rebuttal argument,8 which deprived the defendant
             8
               We observe that the prosecutor’s closing argument was extremely brief
          and that he reserved the bulk of his time for rebuttal. No claim of error is
          raised with respect to this tactic, but we repeat the concern that we articu-
          lated in State v. Gonzalez, 338 Conn. 108, 257 A.3d 283 (2021): ‘‘Prosecutors
          should avoid structuring their closing arguments in a manner that reserves
          the entirety of their summation for rebuttal, which could implicate a defen-
          dant’s constitutional rights. Of course, under such circumstances, trial judges
          have discretion and are in the best position to fashion an appropriate remedy,
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       of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Specifically, the
       defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly (1)
       commented on Draper’s credibility, (2) appealed to the
       jurors’ emotions, and (3) argued facts not in evidence.
       The state responds that the defendant’s claims are unre-
       viewable because the alleged improprieties that occurred
       during cross-examination are unpreserved evidentiary
       claims and the alleged improprieties that occurred dur-
       ing rebuttal argument were waived.9 Alternatively, the
       state argues that the prosecutor’s remarks were not
       improper and, even if improper, did not deprive the
       defendant of a fair trial. We need not decide whether
       the defendant’s prosecutorial impropriety claims are
       unpreserved evidentiary claims, or whether they were
       waived, because we agree with the state that none of
       the prosecutor’s remarks was improper. See, e.g., State
       including providing the defendant with an opportunity to make additional
       closing arguments to the jury.’’ Id., 141 n.20.
          9
            The state does not dispute that unpreserved prosecutorial impropriety
       claims alleging the violation of a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial
       generally are reviewable even when raised for the first time on appeal. See,
       e.g., State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563, 572–73, 849 A.2d 626 (2004). The state
       claims, however, that defense counsel affirmatively waived any challenge
       to the alleged improprieties committed during rebuttal argument because,
       after completing his argument, the prosecutor asked in open court whether
       the trial court or defense counsel had ‘‘any objections to any of [his] state-
       ments in closing,’’ and defense counsel responded that she ‘‘did not have
       any objections . . . [but] would have expressed them.’’ With respect to the
       alleged improprieties that occurred during cross-examination, the state,
       quoting State v. Graham, 344 Conn. 825, 857, 282 A.3d 435 (2022), contends
       that the defendant’s claims are ‘‘nothing other than unpreserved and unre-
       viewable evidentiary issues’’ because ‘‘ ‘ ‘‘[s]imply posing an objectionable
       question does not amount to an actionable impropriety.’’ ’ ’’ See id., 858
       (declining to address ‘‘an unpreserved evidentiary claim masquerading as
       a claim of prosecutorial impropriety’’).
          Although we need not address the merits of the state’s waiver claim, we
       note that, to the extent that a prosecutor has a concern or question about
       the propriety of any remarks made during closing and rebuttal arguments,
       the proper procedure is to identify the area of concern and to ask the trial
       court to inquire of defense counsel whether he or she wishes to be heard
       on that particular issue. This procedure avoids any appearance, after the
       fact, that the prosecutor may have been seeking to solicit a blanket waiver
       of any claims of alleged impropriety.
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          v. Michael T., 338 Conn. 705, 718–19, 259 A.3d 617 (2021)
          (declining to decide whether defendant’s claim was
          prosecutorial impropriety claim or unpreserved eviden-
          tiary claim because challenged remark was not improper);
          State v. Wilson, 111 Conn. App. 614, 631 and n.8, 960
          A.2d 1056 (2008) (declining to decide whether defen-
          dant’s prosecutorial impropriety claim was waived because
          prosecutor’s remark was not improper), cert. denied,
          290 Conn. 917, 966 A.2d 234 (2009).
             It is well established that ‘‘[p]rosecutorial impropriety
          can occur during both the cross-examination of wit-
          nesses and in the course of closing or rebuttal argu-
          ment.’’ State v. Long, 293 Conn. 31, 37, 975 A.2d 660
          (2009). ‘‘In analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropri-
          ety, we engage in a two step analytical process.’’ (Inter-
          nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courtney G., 339
          Conn. 328, 340, 260 A.3d 1152 (2021). First, we examine
          whether an impropriety occurred. Id. If the prosecutor’s
          remarks were improper, then we move on to the second
          step and examine whether the impropriety deprived the
          defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Id.
          ‘‘[T]he burden is on the defendant to show, not only that
          the remarks were improper, but also that, considered
          in light of the whole trial, the improprieties were so
          egregious that they amounted to a denial of due pro-
          cess.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
                                               A
             We first address whether the prosecutor improperly
          commented on Draper’s credibility during rebuttal by
          arguing that ‘‘[s]omeone is completely wrong, either
          . . . Draper or [the defendant], because both events
          don’t line up.’’10 The defendant claims that this comment
            10
               The defendant also claims that the prosecutor improperly expressed
          his own personal opinion on Draper’s credibility when he stated, ‘‘[i]f you
          believe [Draper’s] testimony, she’s the least culpable person, she’s the most
          credible and least culpable person in this [case].’’ (Emphasis added.) This
          claim lacks merit because the prosecutor was not expressing his personal
          opinion on Draper’s credibility. Instead, the prosecutor explicitly condi-
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       violated the rule set forth in State v. Singh, 259 Conn.
       693, 712, 793 A.2d 226 (2002), because it implied that
       the jury could not find the defendant not guilty unless
       it found that Draper had lied. We do not agree.
           In Singh, we held that it is improper for a prosecutor
       essentially to argue during closing that, ‘‘in order to
       find the defendant not guilty, the jury must find that
       witnesses had lied . . . .’’ Id., 712. We explained that
       ‘‘[t]he reason for this restriction is that [t]his form of
       argument . . . involves a distortion of the govern-
       ment’s burden of proof’’ and ‘‘preclude[s] the possibility
       that the witness’ testimony conflicts with that of the
       defendant for a reason other than deceit.’’ (Internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Id., 709–10. We later held, in
       State v. Albino, 312 Conn. 763, 97 A.3d 478 (2014),
       that, in closing argument, there is a distinction between
       characterizing a witness’ testimony as a lie and charac-
       terizing it simply as wrong. ‘‘[W]hen the prosecutor
       argues that the jury must conclude that one of two
       versions of directly conflicting testimony must be
       wrong, the state is leaving it to the jury to make that
       assessment [of the witness’ veracity]. . . . [B]y fram-
       ing the argument in such a manner, the jury is free to
       conclude that the conflict exists due to mistake (misper-
       ception or misrecollection) or deliberate fabrication.’’
       Id., 787. Nonetheless, the mere ‘‘use of the term ‘wrong’
       instead of ‘lying’ ’’ will not always be proper if the prose-
       cutor’s ‘‘ ‘closing arguments provid[e], in essence, that
       in order to find the defendant not guilty, the jury must
       find that witnesses had lied . . . .’ ’’ (Emphasis in origi-
       nal.) Id., quoting State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 712.
         The prosecutor’s isolated remark did not make a
       direct connection between the defendant’s guilt and
       tioned his observations about relative culpability on the jury’s decision
       whether to believe Draper’s testimony. See, e.g., State v. Ciullo, 314 Conn.
       28, 41, 100 A.3d 779 (2014) (‘‘[a] prosecutor’s mere use of the words ‘honest,’
       ‘credible,’ or ‘truthful’ does not, per se, establish prosecutorial impropriety’’).
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          Draper’s credibility; nor did it misrepresent the state’s
          burden of proof. See State v. Albino, supra, 312 Conn.
          788. Notably, Draper was unable to identify the defen-
          dant as E, the individual who ‘‘bum-rushe[d]’’ the victim
          with a gun and committed the charged crimes, and
          the jury was informed of that fact on more than one
          occasion. Given that Draper never identified the defen-
          dant as her accomplice, the jury was not required to
          find that Draper had lied to find the defendant not guilty.
          See State v. Pjura, 200 Conn. App. 802, 830, 240 A.3d
          772 (‘‘[T]he prosecutor’s comments . . . did not impli-
          cate a core justification for the Singh rule because they
          did not force the jury to find the defendant not guilty
          only if it first concluded that the other witnesses had
          lied. . . . The jury . . . could have found the defen-
          dant guilty on the basis of his testimony alone.’’), cert.
          denied, 335 Conn. 977, 241 A.3d 131 (2020); State v.
          McCoy, 171 Conn. App. 311, 320, 157 A.3d 97 (2017)
          (prosecutor’s argument that, ‘‘in order for the jurors to
          find that [a witness] had received a secret plea deal,
          they would need to find that several of the other wit-
          nesses had lied’’ was not improper under Singh because
          it ‘‘did not improperly present the jury with a choice
          between believing the state’s witnesses and [finding]
          the defendant [not guilty]’’), rev’d in part on other
          grounds, 331 Conn. 561, 206 A.3d 725 (2019). We there-
          fore conclude that the challenged remark was not
          improper.
                                       B
             The defendant contends that the prosecutor’s remarks
          regarding the defendant’s testimonial demeanor consti-
          tuted an improper golden rule argument. The prosecu-
          tor argued: ‘‘Consider, if only this, when he testified,
          I’m only talking about his testimony, his demeanor on
          the stand, his appearance on the stand. Was he out-
          raged? Was he mad at Draper? Was he outraged people
          were saying these things about him? Nah. Kind of matter
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                               State v. Diaz

       of fact. . . . Any outrage? How would you feel if you
       were there being accused of this? Would you be upset?
       Be mad? Or just, ah, it happens?’’ We reject this claim.
          A golden rule argument ‘‘urges jurors to put them-
       selves in a particular party’s place . . . or into a partic-
       ular party’s shoes. . . . Such arguments are improper
       because they encourage the jury to depart from neutral-
       ity and to decide the case on the basis of personal
       interest and bias rather than on the evidence.’’ (Internal
       quotation marks omitted.) State v. Long, supra, 293
       Conn. 53–54. The principle underlying the prohibition
       on golden rule arguments is that jurors must ‘‘decide
       cases on the basis of the facts as they find them, and
       reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, rather
       than by any incitement to act out of passion or sympathy
       for or against any party’’ by imagining themselves as a
       party in the case. Id., 57–58.
          As with many questions involving the propriety of
       arguments to the jury, the precise boundaries of fair
       play are not always easily articulated. ‘‘[N]ot all argu-
       ments that ask jurors to place themselves in a particular
       party’s situation implicate the prohibition on golden
       rule argument[s].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
       State v. Williams, 172 Conn. App. 820, 839, 162 A.3d
       84, cert. denied, 326 Conn. 913, 173 A.3d 389 (2017).
       The appellate courts of this state ‘‘repeatedly [have]
       held that a prosecutor does not violate the golden rule
       by using the pronoun ‘you’ or by asking the jurors to
       place themselves in the position of the witness if the
       prosecutor is using these rhetorical devices to ask the
       jury to assess the evidence from the standpoint of a
       reasonable person or to employ common sense in evalu-
       ating the evidence.’’ Id., 839–40; see, e.g., State v. Long,
       supra, 293 Conn. 58 (prosecutor did not make improper
       golden rule argument because his remarks ‘‘were not
       intended to unduly arouse the jurors’ emotions or to
       elicit the jurors’ sympathies; rather, they were intended
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                                         State v. Diaz

          to encourage the jurors to draw inferences from the
          evidence of [the victim’s] actions that were presented
          at trial on the basis of the jurors’ views as to how a
          reasonable [person] would act under the circumstances’’);
          State v. Bell, 283 Conn. 748, 773, 931 A.2d 198 (2007)
          (same).
             We conclude that the prosecutor’s argument did not
          appeal to the jurors’ passions or emotions but, instead,
          asked the jurors to use their common sense and experi-
          ence to infer that an innocent man accused of the crimes
          charged would have exhibited some outrage or anger
          on the witness stand. Such an argument falls ‘‘within the
          permissible bounds of fair comment on witness credibil-
          ity.’’ State v. Courtney G., supra, 339 Conn. 345 n.7;
          see id., 347–48 (prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s
          testimonial demeanor and ‘‘ ‘lack of outrage’ ’’ on witness
          stand was not improper because prosecutor ‘‘implicitly
          urged the jurors to infer, on the basis of their common
          sense and experience, that an innocent man falsely
          accused of sexually assaulting a child would have exhib-
          ited outrage while testifying’’).11
                                               C
            Lastly, the defendant claims that the prosecutor improp-
          erly referred to facts not in evidence during cross-exam-
             11
                The defendant argues that a prosecutor’s reliance on a criminal defen-
          dant’s testimonial demeanor is problematic because it invites the ‘‘jury to
          depart from neutrality and emotionally assess [a defendant’s] credibility and
          culpability based on what [it considers] to be [a] normal’’ reaction to an
          allegation of criminal conduct. (Emphasis omitted.) The dilemma faced by
          testifying defendants of color is particularly acute, the defendant argues,
          because such defendants are subject to an attack on their credibility if they
          appear overly calm on the witness stand but may also feed ‘‘into biases that
          persons of color are usually more aggressive’’ if they appear to be outraged.
          The defendant does not ask us, however, to reconsider and overrule our
          case law holding that a prosecutor properly may comment on a criminal
          defendant’s testimonial demeanor. See, e.g., State v. Courtney G., supra,
          339 Conn. 348; State v. Luster, 279 Conn. 414, 440, 902 A.2d 636 (2006);
          State v. Dupigney, 78 Conn. App. 111, 124–25, 826 A.2d 241, cert. denied,
          266 Conn. 919, 837 A.2d 801 (2003). We reject the defendant’s argument in
          light of this unchallenged precedent.
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       ination when he asked the defendant questions about
       threats the defendant allegedly made to Draper’s son12
       and commented that allegedly inconsistent statements
       made during the defendant’s video-recorded police
       interrogations would be played later.13 We find no merit
       to these claims on this record.
          The defendant’s challenge to the prosecutor’s ques-
       tions fails because it is entirely appropriate to ask prop-
       erly phrased questions on cross-examination that relate
       to the credibility of a criminal defendant’s direct testi-
       mony, even if those questions exceed the scope of the
       questioning on direct examination and refer to facts
         12
            During the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant, the follow-
       ing colloquy took place:
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Have you ever met at a parking lot? You remember
       you told [Jefferson] to keep his girl’s mouth shut?
         ‘‘[The Defendant]: Never.
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Never? You never threatened [Draper’s] son . . . ?
       You know where [her son] goes to school?
         ‘‘[The Defendant]: No, I don’t.
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: [Do] you remember telling . . . Jefferson that?
         ‘‘[The Defendant]: Nope.’’
         13
            During the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant, the prose-
       cutor asked about alleged inconsistencies between the defendant’s trial
       testimony and his video-recorded interrogations with the police:
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And you said [Jefferson and Draper] both got in the car?
         ‘‘[The Defendant]: I don’t remember saying that.
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: But you could have said it?
         ‘‘[The Defendant]: Maybe, yeah.
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. We’ll play it out later.
                                              ***
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Didn’t you tell [the police] later on you saw [Jefferson]
       getting out of the car with a gun?
         ‘‘[The Defendant]: I assumed he got out with a gun in his hand.
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You said you saw it in the waistband, sir. You recall
       that?
         ‘‘[The Defendant]: I don’t recall that.
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: I’ll play that for you, too.
                                              ***
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You told the police you saw him get out of the car
       with a gun on Wall Street, correct? In his waistband?
         ‘‘[The Defendant]: I never said that. I don’t recall saying that.
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. We’ll play that for you. You don’t recall that?
         ‘‘[The Defendant]: No.’’ (Emphasis added.)
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          not in evidence. See State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651,
          657, 491 A.2d 345 (1985). A cross-examiner may ask
          questions that are ‘‘designed to rebut, impeach, modify,
          or explain any of the defendant’s direct testimony’’;
          (internal quotation marks omitted) id.; ‘‘if he or she
          has a good faith belief that a factual predicate for the
          question exists.’’ State v. Barnes, 232 Conn. 740, 747,
          657 A.2d 611 (1995); see also State v. Annulli, 309 Conn.
          482, 492, 71 A.3d 530 (2013) (‘‘[t]he law in Connecticut
          on impeaching a witness’ credibility provides that a
          witness may be cross-examined about specific acts of
          misconduct that relate to his or her veracity’’). Our
          review of the record reveals that the prosecutor’s ques-
          tions were designed to test the defendant’s credibility
          and to rebut, impeach, modify, or explain the defen-
          dant’s direct testimony. The defendant does not claim
          that the prosecutor lacked a good faith basis to ask the
          challenged questions or that the questions themselves
          or the information sought was inflammatory, inadmissi-
          ble, unduly prejudicial, or in violation of a court order.
          We therefore conclude that the prosecutor’s questions
          were not improper.
            The prosecutor’s commentary indicating that the
          inconsistent statements in the defendant’s video-recorded
          interrogations would be played later presents a closer
          question. Gratuitous commentary14 during cross-exami-
          nation can be improper, particularly if it is sarcastic,
          provocative, or aggressive. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 308
          Conn. 412, 443–44, 64 A.3d 91 (2013) (‘‘the prosecutor’s
          sarcastic ‘congratulations,’ offered three times over
          defense counsel’s objection, constituted ‘an excessive
          and inappropriate use of sarcasm’ ’’); State v. James R.,
          138 Conn. App. 181, 192, 50 A.3d 936 (state acknowl-
          edged that prosecutor’s editorial comment ‘‘ ‘[o]f course
          you do’ ’’ during defendant’s cross-examination was
            14
               Gratuitous commentary includes, but is not limited to, statements,
          remarks, and asides that are argumentative or editorial in nature.
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                                 State v. Diaz

       improper commentary), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 940, 56
       A.3d 949 (2012). However, although objectionable, not
       all gratuitous prosecutorial commentary during cross-
       examination rises to the level of impropriety. See, e.g.,
       State v. Andrews, 313 Conn. 266, 292, 96 A.3d 1199
       (2014) (concluding that prosecutor’s remark, ‘‘ ‘[c]ome
       on,’ ’’ was not improper because it was intended ‘‘to
       encourage the defendant to testify truthfully as to his
       prior experience in giving, or understanding the pur-
       pose of, written statements to the police’’); State v.
       Grant, 154 Conn. App. 293, 322, 112 A.3d 175 (2014)
       (concluding that prosecutor’s remark ‘‘ ‘really?’ ’’ was
       not improper because it was ‘‘an attempt to confirm
       the truth or to clarify the defendant’s responses to his
       questions’’), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 928, 109 A.3d 923
       (2015). To determine whether an impropriety exists,
       we must ‘‘consider each alleged impropriety in the con-
       text in which it occurred,’’ while remaining aware that
       our review is ‘‘constrained by our inability to assess
       the tone and body language of the prosecutor . . . and
       the limitations necessarily imposed by our reliance on
       the cold, printed record.’’ State v. Andrews, supra, 284.
          Viewing the prosecutor’s comments (‘‘[w]e’ll play it
       out later,’’ ‘‘I’ll play that for you, too,’’ and ‘‘[w]e’ll play
       that for you’’) in the context of the entire trial, we
       conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that
       these remarks rose to the level of impropriety. It is
       true that the defendant’s video-recorded interrogations
       ultimately were not offered into evidence, but the jury
       was well aware of their existence and the fact that many
       of the defendant’s statements therein were inconsistent
       with his trial testimony. Indeed, on direct examination,
       the defendant candidly testified that he had lied to the
       police multiple times when he was interviewed regard-
       ing his involvement in the charged crimes. On cross-
       examination, the prosecutor questioned the defendant
       extensively about these inconsistencies, and the defen-
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          dant freely admitted to many inconsistent statements,
          although he could not recall making at least two of
          them. See footnote 13 of this opinion. The defendant
          does not claim that these two inconsistent statements
          were inadmissible for impeachment purposes or that
          the prosecutor lacked a good faith intent to play them
          at the time he made the challenged remarks. Addition-
          ally, the defendant does not claim, and the record does
          not reflect, that the prosecutor’s comments were deliv-
          ered in a sarcastic, provocative, or aggressive manner.
          We caution all lawyers, including prosecutors, that the
          purpose of cross-examination is to pose questions, not
          to interject argumentative commentary, but we cannot
          conclude on the present record that the prosecutor’s
          remarks constituted improprieties.
               The judgment is affirmed.
               In this opinion the other justices concurred.