Court Opinion

ID: 9714092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:30:21.890418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:23.319325
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Justice,
concurring in part and concurring in result.
I concur in sections 1 through 8 of the majority opinion.
In this appeal, the defendant does not challenge the constitutionality or the appropriateness of his death sentence or the procedures (except to the extent discussed in issues 5 and 6 above) by which it was imposed. Nevertheless, a death sentence cannot be imposed in this state “until it has been reviewed by this Court and found to comport with the laws of this State and the principles of our state and federal constitutions.” Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 416 N.E.2d 95, 102 (1981).
This Court has regularly upheld the constitutionality of the Indiana death penalty statute, including challenges to the version of the statute in effect at the time these crimes were committed.1 See Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528 (Ind.1996); Lambert v. State, 643 N.E.2d 349 (Ind.1994), aff'd on reh’g, 675 N.E.2d 1060 (Ind.1996), cert. denied — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2417, 138 L.Ed.2d 181 (1997); Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind.1994); Roche v. State, 596 N.E.2d 896 (Ind.1992). I find no basis not to reaffirm those decisions.
As to the appropriateness of the death penalty in this ease, the statute guides this Court’s review by setting forth standards governing imposition of death sentences. Following completion of the guilt phase of the trial and the rendering of the jury’s verdict, the trial court reconvenes for the penalty phase: Before a death sentence can be imposed, our death penalty statute requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance listed in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(12) of the statute. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9. Here the State supported its request for the death penalty with the following aggravating circumstances: (1) that the defendant intentionally killed Marie Meitzler while committing or attempting to commit robbery, Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(l)(G); (2) that the defendant intentionally killed Harchand Dhaliwal while committing or attempting to commit robbery, id.; and (3) that the defendant committed multiple murders (Marie Meitzler and Harchand Dhaliwal), Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(8).
To prove the existence of these aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase of the trial, the State relied upon the evidence from the earlier guilt phase of the trial (with respect to which the jury had found the defendant guilty of the two murders and the two robberies). I join the majority in rejecting an attack on the sufficiency of this evidence in section 6 of this opinion.
The death penalty statute requires that any mitigating circumstances be weighed against any properly proven aggravating circumstances. The majority opinion accurately describes the evidence of mitigation here and I repeat it in the interest of completeness:
In the penalty phase, the evidence regarding the offender25 included testimony that the defendant was generous with friends, driving one friend to and from work weekly because the friend did not have any transportation. The defendant was described as being non-violent and not abusive in any way. He had lost his sixth-month-old child a year before the murders occurred, learning of the child’s impending death while attending his grandfather’s funeral, a man whom he regarded as a father figure. The mother of his children testified that they had been dating since high school and that he was never violent towards her or anyone else unless they pro*1155voked him. He also helped out her family whenever needed. His own mother testified that she and the defendant had an extremely close relationship. She told the jury that he always set a good example for the rest of her children and that he was a good student, graduating from high school and then going into the Marine Corps. However, the record also contains the mother’s testimony at the suppression hearing that she often searched the defendant’s bedroom looking for drugs the defendant may have hidden and that he was AWOL from the Marines when she required that he vacate her apartment the night before he was arrested.
Majority op. at 1153.
The jury subsequently returned a unanimous recommendation that a sentence of death be imposed.
Once the jury has made its recommendation, the jury is dismissed, and the trial court has the duty of making the final sentencing, determination. First, the trial court must find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the aggravating circumstances, listed in the death penalty statute exists. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(e)(1). Second, the trial court must find that any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(e)(2). Third, before making the final determination of the sentence, the trial court must consider the jury’s recommendation. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(e). The trial court must make a record of its reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes. Ind.Code § 35-38-1-3 (1988).
In imposing the death sentence, the trial court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the charged aggravating circumstances listed in the death penalty statute — that the defendant had intentionally committed the murder of Marie Meitzler and of Harchand Dhaliwal while committing or attempting to commit robbery and that the defendant had committed multiple murders. The record and the law supports these findings.
The trial court found no mitigating circumstances to exist. My own review of the record leads me to conclude (as it did this Court in the other Peterson case) that there were mitigating circumstances — defendant’s difficult childhood, his emotional disturbance, his graduation from high school, his service in the Marines, his age, and his caring relationship with his child and her mother. Cf. Peterson, 674 N.E.2d at 543. As this Court did in the other Peterson case, I find the mitigating weight warranted for each of these considerations to be in the low range, individually and cumulatively.
As required by our death penalty statute, the trial court specifically found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The trial court also gave consideration to the jury’s recommendation. The trial court imposed the sentence of death.2
Based on my review of the record and the law, I agree that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt aggravating circumstances authorized by our death penalty statute and that the mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstances. I conclude that the death *1156penalty is appropriate for defendant’s murder of Marie Meitzler and of Harchand Dhal-iwal.

. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9 (Supp.1990). Statutory references in this separate opinion are. to the 1990 Supplement to the Indiana Code unless otherwise noted.

 This Court extensively considered this defendant in our review of his death sentence resulting from the murders of the Balovski brothers. See Peterson, 674 N.E.2d at 542 (involving the imposition of the death sentence in the context of a contrary jury recommendation).

. In prior cases we have set forth requirements for sentencing findings in capital cases that are more stringent than in non-capital sentencing situations. See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1262 (Ind.1995) (setting forth the requirements), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 307, 136 L.Ed.2d 224 (1996); Evans v. State, 563 N.E.2d 1251, 1254 (Ind.1990) (same). It appears to me that here the trial court employed the sentencing order procedures typical of non-capital cases. However, just as the defendant does not assert that sentencing order errors require vacation of the sentence, neither do I so conclude. First, the aggravating circumstances were clearly proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, I have carefully reviewed the mitigating circumstances asserted to exist in this case (and, to the extent relevant, the prior Peterson case), the specific facts and reasons given in support thereof, and evaluated and balanced their weight against that of the aggravating circumstances. Third, I have concluded that the sentence is appropriate for this offender and this crime. As such, I would hold the requirements for capital sentencing have been satisfied.