Court Opinion

ID: 9744404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:02:06.555332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:49.025837
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Thompson, dissenting: I cannot accept the views as expressed in the majority opinion without respectfully dissenting, especially in view of the emphasis placed in the opinion and its reliance on so-called voluntary and nonvoluntary settlement cases. The majority opinion proceeds upon the theory that this being a nonvoluntary settlement case, there is an existing presumption the delivery is invalid. This is not in harmony with the rule where we have held that stronger presumptions of delivery obtain in cases where the conveyance is a voluntary settlement than in cases of deeds of bargain and sale. The presumption is weaker where the grantee is an adult than where he is a minor, but the presumption of delivery arises out of the relationship of the parties. Johnson v. Fleming, 301 Ill. 139; Baker v. Hall, 214 Ill. 364; Cline v. Jones, 111 Ill. 563. The law does not presume, as held in the majority opinion, that the delivery is invalid, but the presumption in favor of delivery of deeds is stronger in voluntary settlement cases than in ordinary cases of bargain and sale. In voluntary settlement cases there is a more liberal presumption in regard to the delivery of deeds and the same formality and strict compliance with the rule as to delivery is not required. The presumption in nonvoluntary settlement cases is such that arises in any case between the parties and, of course, the relationship of the parties must be considered and the presumption of delivery arises out of such relationships. The closer the relationship between the parties, even if the deed be considered a bargain and sale, the greater is the presumption of delivery. To follow the opinion’s line of reasoning, as applied to the facts in this case will, instead of elucidation, further complicate the already existing conflict in the many cases pertaining to the rules applicable to the delivery of deeds. The primary question to be determined in each and every case, whether it be a voluntary settlement or bargain and sale, is whether the deeds executed have been delivered. Proof must be made of such delivery, and while presumptions frequently aid in meeting such burden, they are unimportant in cases where the intention of the grantor is shown by the evidence. The delivery of a deed is an essential part of its execution and in determining whether there has been a delivery, the intention of the grantor is the controlling factor. A delivery may be made by acts without words, by words without acts, or by both words and acts, and anything which clearly manifests the grantor’s intention that the deed becomes operative and effectual. We must not lose sight of the intention, as disclosed by the evidence, and inject questions pertaining to presumptions. This has not pointed the way to clarification of the law as to the delivery of deeds and has left more or less conflict in the decisions on this question. The question of intention, if carefully pursued and kept in the foreground, will point the way to a correct determination of the issues in such cases. We find here, from an examination of the record, that William H. Mason was a retired Presbyterian minister and, with his wife, was the owner of the real estate in question. On September 23, 1941, they signed and, two days later, acknowledged before a notary public, a warranty deed, conveying the east one-half of the land owned by them in section 29 to their daughter, Bessie Mason Alexander. Subsequently, on February 25, 1945, they signed and acknowledged two other warranty deeds, one purporting to convey to the American Bible Society the west half of the land in section 29, and the other purporting to convey to Blackburn University, the six-acre tract in section 22. On February 7, 1945, they executed a joint will. Thereafter, at some time in the month of February, in the same year, the will in a sealed envelope, with an endorsement thereon indicating it contained their will, and the three deeds in another sealed envelope endorsed in the writing of Mason “To be filed in the Recorder’s office at Sullivan, Illinois, immediately upon the decease of both William H. Mason and Wife,” were delivered by Mason, in the presence of his wife, to Russell Younger, who was vice-president of the Shelby Loan and Trust Company. Russell Younger testified that about the month of February, 1945, he called at Mason’s home at his request, and while there Mason, in the presence of his wife, handed witness the two envelopes, stating to him, in substance, “Here are two envelopes. The instructions are written on the outside and when we die, follow the instructions on the envelopes.” How could the written language more clearly disclose the intention of the parties, aside from the fact they had gone before a notary public and by a warranty deed had conveyed this property to the grantees. The instructions were “when we die, follow the instructions on the envelopes.” How could there be any intention on the part of the grantors to retain any control over the documents when the instructions were clear and explicit, “when we die, follow the instructions on the envelopes.” No restrictions or restraint surrounded the instructions. No attempt was ever made by either of the parties to, in any way, interfere with the specific instructions they had given. Applying the rule that we must consider anything that clearly manifests the grantor’s intention, the deeds became operative and effective. Surely such instructions point the way to a complete delivery. Further, when the deeds were given to him with the instructions, Younger placed the envelopes containing the deeds in one of the drawers of the vault of the Shelby Loan and Trust Company, where the same remained under his supervision until after the death of both Mason and wife. The drawer in the vault where the deeds were kept was not accessible to anyone, other than the officers of the bank, and neither Mason nor his wife had access thereto. The majority opinion relies upon the case of Lange v. Cullinan, 205 Ill. 365, where it was held the deeds were not delivered. A careful reading of this opinion will immediately disclose the situation and facts are not comparable. There, the grantor, when asked as to whether the deed should be delivered to grantee, made the emphatic reply, “No.” This, of course, did not show that he had relinquished all control over the instrument, that being the question, and further, there was no direction as to delivery. In the instant case, specific directions were given as to the delivery of the deeds. The case of Herrin v. McCarthy, 339 Ill. 530, relied on by the majority opinion, is so dissimilar in facts that it affords no probative value. The facts there disclosed that the deed was placed by the grantor in his own safety-deposit box, and while later the grantee was given a key, the possession of the key by the grantee did not give her access to the box and did not deprive the grantor of the right of access and the power of control and right to reclaim the deed. Another thing pertinent to the delivery of these deeds was the fact that the grantors, immediately after they executed the three deeds before a notary public, made a joint will in which this statement was' made, in clause 3: “Having decided to convey all our real estate by Warranty deeds and the said deeds properly safeguarded and placed in the care of The Shelby Loan and Trust Co. with instructions.” In Callerand v. Piot, 241 Ill. 120, it was held that deeds executed by a testator contemporaneously with a will, which referred to the deeds as having been executed and delivered to a third person, for delivery to the respective grantees upon the testator’s death, were well delivered and passed title. It was also held there, that while the notary to whom the deeds were delivered by the grantor, to be delivered to the grantees at the grantor’s death, testified that he would have given the deeds back to the grantor if he had wanted them, as he felt the grantor had a right to control his property, this was merely the view of the witness and would not tend to show the grantor did not intend to part with all control over the deeds. It was further said in this case that the deeds there were well delivered, for the reason there was nothing to show the grantor intended to retain any control over the deeds after delivering them to the notary, though he kept possession of the lands until death. While this case might fall within the category of a voluntary settlement case, nothing is said in the opinion that the determination was made, other than a finding as to the intention of the grantor, without any recourse to presumptions. It might be added that in the instant case the three deeds, one of which went to the grantor’s daughter, and the other two to The American Bible Society and Blackburn University, were all delivered at the same time. How the severance of the intention of the grantor could be determined by a presumption as to one and not the other, when all of the deeds were delivered at the same time in the same sealed envelope, held by the same party for delivery, presents, it seems to me, a question which affords some difficulty of solution, concerning which we have had no light. No evidence can be found in this record indicating any intent to reserve, in any way, control over the instruments. The reservation of control is entirely inconsistent with the instructions of the grantors and their acts attending the delivery. There was positive evidence of intent to deliver, they were delivered, were held and disposed of in accordance with specific directions. The intention of the grantor is clear and, as it is the controlling element on the question of delivery, the decree of the circuit court of Moultrie County, confirming the master’s findings, should be affirmed.