Court Opinion

ID: 9743640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:39:12.642942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:50.658588
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING JUSTICE NASH delivered the opinion of the court: In its petition for rehearing the State requests we reconsider our order vacating defendant’s conviction and sentence for rape under count 1 of the indictment and, instead, vacate the armed violence offense charged under count 17 in which rape was alleged, in part, as a predicate. The State agrees both convictions cannot stand in conjunction with one another (People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 556, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844-45, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 894, 54 L. Ed. 2d 181, 98 S. Ct. 273), and suggests that in such cases judgment should be entered and sentence imposed only for the offense based upon the more specific statute on the subject matter, citing People v. Clark (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 381, 420, 389 N.E.2d 911, 939; People v. Velleff (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 820, 825-26, 419 N.E.2d 89, 93; People v. Crawford (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 888, 889-90, 414 N.E.2d 25, 27; see also People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 261, 278, 422 N.E.2d 627, 634; People v. Jones (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1034, 412 N.E.2d 683, 687, appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 559. Count 17 of the present case, however, charged armed violence predicated on the commission of aggravated kidnaping while armed; it was not principally predicated upon the offense of rape as suggested by the State’s argument. Rape was alleged in count 17, but only as the aggravating element enhancing the kidnaping of the victim to the more serious form of that offense.  A comparison of the statutes dealing with rape and kidnaping demonstrates they are not in pari materia (see, e.g., People v. Scheib (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 244, 390 N.E.2d 872), as they define separate offenses and prohibit different kinds of conduct. For that reason we may not apply to these offenses the rule of statutory construction urged by the State that a more specific statute will govern over a general statute dealing with the same subject matter. Compare People v. Jones (armed robbery is a more specific offense than is armed violence predicated upon armed robbery) and People v. Crawford (rape is more specific than armed violence predicated upon rape). Nor do we find any basis in this circumstance to consider whether either of these offenses may be more serious than the other. (See People v. Donaldson (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 164, 170, 435 N.E.2d 477, 479.) As charged in count 17, defendant was convicted of armed violence as a Class X felony and rape charged in count 2 is also in Class X. The State has also requested we clarify whether a new sentencing hearing will be required in the trial court to carry out the direction on remand to impose sentences for armed violence under counts 15 and 16. Yes, a sentencing hearing is required at which the trial court may consider those matters offered at the original sentencing hearing and any relevant additional evidence offered by the State or defendant. Accordingly, we adhere to the opinion and rehearing is denied. REINHARD and VAN DEUSEN, JJ., concur.