Court Opinion

ID: 9927318
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Date Created: 2024-01-26 20:01:01.620349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:07.946575
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USCA11 Case: 22-10416    Document: 68-1      Date Filed: 01/26/2024    Page: 1 of 14

                                                                [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10416
                           ____________________

        ROBERT FRANKLYN LODGE,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
                                                               Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A043-215-757
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10416

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and HULL,
        Circuit Judges.
        WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
               This petition for review challenges the constitutionality of a
        federal law about derivative citizenship. Robert Franklyn Lodge, a
        native and citizen of Jamaica, was born out of wedlock. Lodge’s
        mother abandoned him, and his father moved to the United States
        and became a naturalized citizen. Lodge’s father later brought him
        here as a lawful permanent resident. After Lodge was convicted of
        aggravated felonies, the Department of Homeland Security sought
        to remove him. Lodge argued that he had derived citizenship from
        his father under a since-repealed statute. The immigration judge
        ordered Lodge removed to Jamaica, and the Board of Immigration
        Appeals dismissed his appeal. Lodge argues that the former statute
        discriminated against unmarried fathers based on sex and against
        black children based on race. He maintains that he derived citizen-
        ship because the statute, cured of its constitutional defects, would
        have permitted his father to transmit citizenship to him. Because
        we conclude that Lodge lacks standing to raise these constitutional
        challenges, we dismiss his petition for review and deny as moot his
        motion to transfer.
                               I. BACKGROUND
              Born in 1979, Robert Franklyn Lodge is a native and citizen
        of Jamaica. His father, Robert Francis Lodge, was born in Jamaica
        and became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1989. And
        Lodge’s mother, Lorna Wyndham, has never been a citizen of the
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        22-10416                Opinion of the Court                           3

        United States. Lodge’s parents never married. But their names ap-
        pear on Lodge’s “birth registration form” as his father and mother.
               Lodge’s mother abandoned him when he was a child. She
        left Jamaica to reside in London. Lodge’s father became his sole
        “guardian” and “provide[d] everything” for him. He “maintained a
        continuing and close relationship” with Lodge, “support[ing] him
        fully and completely.” Lodge’s father brought Lodge to the United
        States, where he was admitted as a lawful permanent resident in
        1992.
               The Department of Homeland Security began removal pro-
        ceedings against Lodge after he was convicted of aggravated felo-
        nies in 2016. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Lodge argued before
        the immigration judge that he was a citizen of the United States.
        The Department responded that Lodge was not a citizen.
               The immigration judge found that Lodge was not a citizen
        of the United States. When Lodge’s father naturalized and Lodge
        became a lawful permanent resident, the Immigration and Nation-
        ality Act provided several pathways to derivative citizenship for
        children born abroad to alien parents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1994),
        repealed by Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395,
        § 103, 114 Stat. 1631, 1632 (2000). Although Lodge would have de-
        rived citizenship under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, which
        repealed and replaced those pathways, that new law is not retroac-
        tive, and Lodge did not satisfy its terms on its effective date. See 8
        U.S.C. § 1431(a); United States v. Arbelo, 288 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
        2002). The immigration judge explained that Lodge did not meet
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10416

        the statutory conditions for naturalization under former sec-
        tion 1432(a). The immigration judge rejected Lodge’s requests for
        withholding of removal and for relief under the Convention
        Against Torture and ordered him removed to Jamaica. Lodge ap-
        pealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his
        appeal.
               Lodge petitioned this Court pro se for relief. He argued that
        the second clause of section 1432(a)(3)—which allowed natural-
        ized unmarried mothers, but not naturalized unmarried fathers, to
        transmit citizenship to their children when other conditions were
        met—violated the equal protection guarantee of the Due Process
        Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminated based on
        sex and race. We dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution but
        reinstated it after Lodge obtained counsel.
                Lodge moved to transfer the proceeding to the Northern
        District of Georgia. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B). He argued that ad-
        judication of his argument about race discrimination requires fact-
        intensive inquiry into the legislative purpose and the effect of the
        second clause of section 1432(a)(3) and that this Court may not de-
        cide issues of material fact about nationality. See id. We carried the
        motion with the case.
                         II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review de novo our subject-matter jurisdiction. Clement v.
        U.S. Att’y Gen., 75 F.4th 1193, 1198 (11th Cir. 2023).
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        22-10416               Opinion of the Court                          5

                                III. DISCUSSION
                Lodge presents two constitutional challenges. First, he ar-
        gues that the second clause of former section 1432(a)(3) excluded
        him from derivative citizenship based on an unconstitutional sex
        classification. Second, he argues that the same clause excluded him
        from derivative citizenship for a racially discriminatory purpose.
        We may address these challenges only if Lodge has standing.
               Former section 1432(a) automatically conferred citizenship
        on a “child born outside of the United States of alien parents . . .
        upon fulfillment of ” three conditions. 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a). The first
        condition, which appeared in the second clause of sec-
        tion 1432(a)(3), required “the naturalization of the mother if the
        child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has
        not been established by legitimation.” Id. § 1432(a)(3). The second
        condition required that “[s]uch naturalization take[] place while
        such child is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years.” Id.
        § 1432(a)(4). And the third condition required that “[s]uch child . . .
        begin[] to reside permanently in the United States while under the
        age of eighteen years.” Id. § 1432(a)(5).
               Lodge acknowledges that he did not derive citizenship under
        the statute. Although Lodge began to reside permanently in the
        United States before he turned 18 and was unmarried and under 18
        when his father became a naturalized citizen, the second clause of
        section 1432(a)(3) provided derivative citizenship only if his mother,
        not his father, naturalized. His mother never did so.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10416

               Lodge challenges the constitutionality of the second clause.
        When the conditions in sections 1432(a)(3), 1432(a)(4), and
        1432(a)(5) were satisfied, he argues, the second clause of sec-
        tion 1432(a)(3) “confer[red] automatic citizenship on the child of
        an unmarried mother, but not of a similarly situated unmarried fa-
        ther.” Lodge argues that the sex classification in the second clause
        was the basis for denial of his defense of citizenship. He maintains
        that the clause unconstitutionally discriminated based on sex be-
        cause it treated unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers une-
        qually based solely on the “outmoded stereotype[]” that “an unwed
        father is more likely to be ‘out of the picture’ than an unwed
        mother.” And he contends that the “disparate treatment of unmar-
        ried fathers” is unconstitutional too because the second clause was
        enacted with the purpose, and had the disparate effect, of limiting
        the number of black children who could derive citizenship.
                For us to consider his constitutional challenges, Lodge must
        first establish that he has standing under Article III of the Constitu-
        tion. See Walters v. Fast AC, LLC, 60 F.4th 642, 647 (11th Cir. 2023).
        He must prove that he has suffered an injury-in-fact, fairly traceable
        to the challenged sex classification, that a favorable decision likely
        would redress. See TocMail, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 67 F.4th 1255, 1262
        (11th Cir. 2023). His injury must be “particularized” and “actual.”
        Walters, 60 F.4th at 648 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
        ted). And the sex classification must be the “likely cause[]” of his
        injury. See id. at 647 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
        ted).
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        22-10416                Opinion of the Court                          7

               Lodge must establish his standing even though he is assert-
        ing his father’s right to equal protection. “Because [the second
        clause of section 1432(a)(3)] treats sons and daughters alike,
        [Lodge] does not suffer discrimination on the basis of his [sex].” See
        Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1688 (2017). “He com-
        plains, instead, of [sex]-based discrimination against his father.” Id.
        That is, Lodge argues that the sex classification in the second clause
        “clearly injure[s]” “his father” and that he has third-party standing
        “to assert his [father’s] constitutional claims.” A litigant ordinarily
        may not assert the rights of third parties. See Elend v. Basham, 471
        F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2006). But a petitioner may have third-
        party standing to challenge a sex classification in a statute govern-
        ing derivative citizenship to “vindicate his father’s right to the equal
        protection of the laws.” Sessions, 137 S. Ct. at 1689. Yet even a peti-
        tioner who invokes third-party standing must establish his own
        constitutional standing. See Mata Chorwadi, Inc. v. City of Boynton
        Beach, 66 F.4th 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[E]xceptions to the pro-
        hibition against asserting third-party rights . . . do not alter the re-
        quirements of standing under Article III.” (citation omitted)). So
        although Lodge asserts his father’s right to equal protection, he still
        must prove that the challenged sex classification was the “factual
        caus[e]” of an actual injury to him that a favorable decision likely
        would redress. See Walters, 60 F.4th at 650 (emphasis omitted).
               Lodge suffered an actual injury. He is subject to removal be-
        cause he was convicted of aggravated felonies. See 8 U.S.C.
        § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The “risk of removal” is “sufficient to create an
        actual or imminent injury” under Article III. Gonzalez v. United
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10416

        States, 981 F.3d 845, 852 (11th Cir. 2020). And citizenship is a defense
        to removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (only aliens may be removed).
        The injury that Lodge alleges—that is, the one that he asks us to
        remedy—is the immigration judge’s order to remove him because
        he is not a citizen under section 1432(a).
               Lodge argues that the sex classification in the second clause
        of former section 1432(a)(3) caused this injury. His theory of injury
        and traceability underpins his arguments about both sex and race
        discrimination. His theory of race discrimination is that the second
        clause “impermissibly benefits one class”—unmarried naturalized
        mothers—while “exclud[ing] another from the benefit”—unmar-
        ried naturalized fathers—based on a racially discriminatory pur-
        pose. And the “cure” for both “the sex- and race-based discrimina-
        tion” is to “allow fathers to bestow derivative citizenship on their
        nonmarital children” under former section 1432(a)(3).
               Lodge’s theories fail because his injury is not “fairly tracea-
        ble” to the sex classification in the second clause of former sec-
        tion 1432(a)(3). See TocMail, 67 F.4th at 1262 (citation and internal
        quotation marks omitted). Lodge would not have become a citizen
        under a sex-neutral version of the second clause of former section
        1432(a)(3). The second clause provided a pathway to derivative cit-
        izenship for a child born abroad to alien parents upon “the natural-
        ization of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the
        paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation.” 8
        U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3). To be sure, because his mother never natural-
        ized, Lodge did not derive citizenship under this statute. But he also
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        22-10416                Opinion of the Court                          9

        could not have derived citizenship under a sex-neutral version of
        the statute: a sex-neutral version of the second clause of sec-
        tion 1432(a)(3) would have conferred citizenship on children upon
        “the naturalization of one parent if the child was born out of wed-
        lock and the paternity or maternity of the other parent has not been es-
        tablished.” Or a sex-neutral version would have conferred citizen-
        ship upon “the naturalization of the mother if the child was born
        out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been estab-
        lished by legitimation or the naturalization of the father if the child
        was born out of wedlock and the maternity of the child has not been es-
        tablished.” Either way, because Lodge’s maternity has been estab-
        lished, he would not have derived citizenship from his father even
        under a version of the second clause that treated mothers and fa-
        thers the same.
               That Lodge’s defense of citizenship was rejected has nothing
        to do with the sex classification. He did not “suffer from a [sex]-based
        distinction” in the second clause. See Roy v. Barr, 960 F.3d 1175, 1182
        (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). So he cannot establish traceability.
        See Swann v. Sec’y, 668 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that
        an “alleged injury [i]s not fairly traceable” to a challenged provision
        if the claimant “would not have received” the benefit he sought
        “regardless” of whether his claim had merit).
               Lodge insists that the sex classification caused his injury. He
        asks us to “hold that [he] derived citizenship through his father”
        under the pathway to derivative citizenship provided in sec-
        tion 1432(a)(4), section 1432(a)(5), and a sex-neutral version of the
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10416

        second clause of section 1432(a)(3). He would have us remedy the
        alleged constitutional defects in the second clause by “allow[ing]
        the child of a similarly situated father . . . to obtain the same bene-
        fits” that the clause grants to children of naturalized, unmarried
        mothers. In Lodge’s view, a father “similarly situated” to a natural-
        ized mother whom the second clause benefits would be a father
        who “has legitimated the child and obtained exclusive legal cus-
        tody” over him. Lodge proposes that we construe the second clause
        to confer automatic citizenship—assuming that the conditions in
        sections 1432(a)(4) and 1432(a)(5) are met—upon the “naturaliza-
        tion of the mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the
        paternity of the child has not been established by legitimation or
        the naturalization of the father if the child was born out of wedlock and
        the child is in the legal custody of the father.”
                Lodge’s proposed amendment “does not simply correct a
        [sex] disparity—it rewrites the statute entirely.” See Roy, 960 F.3d at
        1182–83 (rejecting a similar proposed cure of the sex classification
        in the second clause of section 1432(a)(3)). By Lodge’s logic, the
        second clause would have allowed naturalized mothers to transmit
        citizenship if the child were born out of wedlock and the child were
        in the legal custody of the mother. But the second clause instead al-
        lowed mothers to transmit citizenship “if the child is born out of
        wedlock and the paternity of the child has not been established by legiti-
        mation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3). These conditions are not the same.
        A child can be in his mother’s legal custody even if his father has
        legitimated him. Whether a child is in his mother’s custody says
        nothing about whether the child’s paternity has been established.
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        22-10416               Opinion of the Court                        11

        Whether a child is in his father’s custody says nothing about
        whether the child’s maternity has been established. And that the
        child’s maternity has been established does not tell us whether he
        is in his father’s custody.
               Lodge misses the point when he argues that a paternal “cus-
        todial relationship” is “on all fours with the maternal relationship
        described in” the second clause of section 1432(a)(3) because “the
        unwed mother is presumed to have sole legal custody” over the
        child. The second clause does not allow transmission of citizenship
        by the mother with sole legal custody if paternity has been estab-
        lished by legitimation. Likewise, that a father might have sole legal
        custody would be, on the plain terms of the sex-neutralized statute,
        only half the story; establishment of maternity would be the other
        half.
                We agree with the government that it is “no coincidence”
        that Lodge’s proposed amendment would, instead of removing the
        sex classification from the second clause, “effectively render retro-
        active the derivative citizenship provisions” of the Child Citizen-
        ship Act. Under that law, which became effective in 2001, a child
        born abroad derived citizenship when, before he turned 18, he
        “resid[ed] in the United States” as a lawful permanent resident “in
        the legal and physical custody of [his] citizen parent.” 8 U.S.C.
        § 1431(a)(1)–(3); Arbelo, 288 F.3d at 1262. Lodge appears to have sat-
        isfied those conditions. But the Act is not retroactive. Arbelo, 288
        F.3d at 1263. And the pathway to citizenship that depends on the
        second clause of former section 1432(a)(3) is not, as Lodge
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10416

        contends, the new law plus a sex classification: the second clause of
        former section 1432(a)(3) makes no reference to custody.
               Lodge retorts that legitimation is an “inherently sex-based”
        concept and that his standing cannot turn on whether he satisfies
        an “inherently [sexist] part of an unconstitutional test.” We disa-
        gree. Although legitimation is often considered a mechanism for
        establishing paternity, not maternity, see Schreiber v. Cuccinelli, 981
        F.3d 766, 774 (10th Cir. 2020); Matter of Cross, 26 I. & N. Dec. 485,
        489 n.5, 492 (B.I.A. 2015), “both fathers and mothers can legitimate
        a child after the child’s birth,” Roy, 960 F.3d at 1183 (emphasis omit-
        ted). Yet most children are necessarily legitimated by their mothers
        by being born to them in a place where that fact is officially rec-
        orded. In any event, the removal of the sex classification from the
        second clause of section 1432(a)(3) would not need to involve the
        concept of establishment of maternity by legitimation.
               Lodge is wrong that maternity need never be established. In-
        deed, the authorities that he cites undermine his argument. The
        Supreme Court has stated, for example, that “[t]he mother’s status
        is documented in most instances”—not all—“by the birth certificate
        or hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her having given
        birth.” Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001) (emphasis added). An-
        other decision states that “[e]stablishing maternity is seldom”—not
        never—“difficult.” Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978) (emphasis
        added). And the Ninth Circuit has stated that “in most cases”—not
        all—“there is a reasonable expectation that the illegitimate child’s
        maternal descent will be easier to trace than her paternal descent.”
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        22-10416                Opinion of the Court                          13

        Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 805 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
        These authorities do not speak in categorical terms. That a child’s
        maternity has not been established is, even if improbable, “not im-
        possible.” Roy, 960 F.3d at 1182. “[A]n unmarried mother could give
        birth at her home and then leave the baby on the father’s doorstep.”
        Id. The father might confirm his own paternity with a test but not
        know the identity of the mother. Id. Lodge misses that the estab-
        lishment of maternity, like the establishment of paternity by legit-
        imation, is a legal proposition that attests a biological fact; it is not
        the biological fact itself. Were it otherwise, establishment of pater-
        nity would be no more meaningful a concept than establishment
        of maternity. In short, the law does not always know that a partic-
        ular mother has given birth.
                The sex classification in the second clause of former sec-
        tion 1432(a)(3) was not the “factual caus[e]” of Lodge’s injury. See
        Walters, 60 F.4th at 650 (emphasis omitted). He lacks standing to
        challenge its constitutionality. So we may not address the merits of
        his arguments about race and sex discrimination or whether he has
        third-party standing to assert his father’s right to equal protection.
        We also do not address Lodge’s motion to transfer. See 8 U.S.C.
        § 1252(b)(5)(B). Nor do we decide whether Lodge qualified as a
        “child” under section 1432(a)(3). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (1994) (de-
        fining “child” in section 1432(a)(3) to include a child born to un-
        married parents only if he was legitimated under certain condi-
        tions).
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        14                 Opinion of the Court              22-10416

                            IV. CONCLUSION
              We DISMISS Lodge’s petition for review, and we DENY
        his motion to transfer as moot.