Court Opinion

ID: 9946755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 14:03:22.261117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:36.350140
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D22-2707
                 LT Case No. 2021-DR-000093-A
                 _____________________________

LISA LOWRY,

    Appellant,

    v.

MARK LOWRY,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On Appeal from the Circuit Court for St. Johns County.
Joan Anthony, Judge.

William S. Graessle, of William S. Graessle, P.A., Jacksonville,
for Appellant.

Michael J. Korn, of Korn & Zehmer, P.A., Jacksonville, for
Appellee.

                          March 1, 2024

LAMBERT, J.

     Lisa Lowry (“Former Wife”) timely appeals the amended final
judgment of dissolution of marriage rendered by the trial court
after trial that terminated her marriage to Mark Lowry (“Former
Husband”). We find that one of the issues raised by Former Wife—
the trial court’s failure to award to her exclusive use and
possession of the marital home until the parties’ youngest child
reaches the age of majority or becomes emancipated—is
meritorious and requires reversal. The final judgment is otherwise
affirmed without further discussion.

     The parties have four children from the marriage, two of
whom were minors at the time of trial. Prior to trial, the parties
reached an agreement, approved by the trial court, that resolved
matters between them pertaining to child support, as well as the
shared parental responsibility and time-sharing of the children.
They agreed that Former Wife would have the majority of the time-
sharing with the children. At the time of trial, Former Wife and
the two youngest children were living in the marital home; and, in
her counterpetition for dissolution of marriage, Former Wife
sought exclusive use and possession of the marital home during
the children’s minority to minimize the effects of the dissolution of
marriage on the children.

     Former Husband disagreed and, as set forth in his earlier
petition, separately sought the partition and sale of the marital
home. His position was that the children would be more amenable
to and comfortable during their time-sharing with Former
Husband in a house, rather than in Former Husband’s post-
separation apartment where he was residing. 1

     The trial court appeared to have accepted Former Husband’s
argument. It granted Former Husband his requested partition
and sale, finding that though there would “be substantial cost to
the parties to buy [separate] homes to replace the marital home,”
there was at least $800,000 in equity in the marital home and the
proceeds from the sale would provide each party with the ability to
purchase new homes.

     The general rule that has developed in Florida in these cases
on whether the marital home should be partitioned and sold or
whether exclusive possession should be awarded to one party
during the children’s minority is that “a trial court should award
the primary residential parent exclusive use and possession of the

    1 Neither child testified at the trial.

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marital residence until the youngest child reaches majority or is
emancipated, or the primary residential parent remarries, unless
there are special circumstances.” Coristine v. Coristine, 53 So. 3d
1204, 1204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citations omitted); see also
Schumaker v. Schumaker, 931 So. 2d 271, 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
(“Absent compelling financial reasons, the custodial parent should
be awarded exclusive use and possession of the marital residence
until the children reach majority or become emancipated or the
custodial parent remarries.” (citing Dehler v. Dehler, 648 So. 2d
819, 820 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995))).

      The abuse of discretion standard of review is applied to a trial
court’s decision that orders the partition and sale of the marital
home in lieu of awarding to the spouse having the majority of time-
sharing the exclusive use and possession of the home until the
parties’ youngest child reaches the age of majority. Coristine, 53
So. 3d at 1204. Thus, we are tasked with resolving whether the
trial court here abused its discretion in essentially concluding that
“special circumstances” existed to order the sale of the marital
home. Our court has explained that, contextually, such “‘[s]pecial
circumstances’ exist where the parties’ incomes are inadequate to
meet their debts, obligations, and normal living expenses, as well
as the expenses of maintaining the marital residence.” Id. at 1205
(citing Pineiro v. Pineiro, 683 So. 2d 148, 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)).

     In Coristine, we affirmed the trial court’s final judgment,
concluding that no abuse of discretion occurred in the trial court’s
ordering the partition and sale of the marital home instead of
awarding exclusive use and possession of the home to the wife until
the parties’ youngest child reached the age of majority. Id. at 1204.
In doing so, we wrote that the evidence before the trial court
showed that the parties’ financial conditions had changed
dramatically by the time of trial. Id. at 1205. Specifically, the
parties had virtually no liquid assets, the wife “had done little to
become self-sufficient” during the parties’ four-year separation,
and she had claimed debts of approximately $100,000. Id.
Additionally, the wife had borrowed money from family members
to pay the property taxes on the marital home for several years
during the separation. Id.

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     In stark contrast to the facts in Coristine, the trial evidence
here had no such special circumstances. Former Husband is a
successful organizational psychologist who owns a consulting
business that provides coaching and team building services for
many businesses. Former Husband’s net annual income for the
year prior to trial was over $300,000, and his financial affidavit
filed not long before trial reflected a monthly income of $22,494.92.
Former Husband also testified at trial to having approximately
$230,000 in his checking account and his brokerage account. 2

    We find that, under these circumstances, the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to award Former Wife the exclusive
use and possession of the marital home until the parties’ youngest
minor child reaches the age of majority or becomes emancipated,
whichever first occurs. On remand, the trial court is directed to
amend the final judgment accordingly.

     AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED, with
directions.

SOUD and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

    2  Former Husband’s post-judgment financial condition was
additionally buttressed by the trial court’s denial of Former Wife’s
claim for alimony, which we have affirmed here. Moreover, during
the course of this appeal, one of the parties’ children reached the
age of majority, which, under the parties’ agreement, resulted in a
reduction of Former Husband’s court-ordered monthly child
support obligation.

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