Court Opinion

ID: 9839800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 00:00:35.873318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:29.850408
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-51041         Document: 00516894190             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/13/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 22-51041
                                     Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                     ____________                             September 13, 2023
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
   Melanie Mason; Dolores Mason,                                                       Clerk

                                                                     Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                             versus

   Helping Our Seniors, L.L.C.,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 5:21-CV-368
                      ______________________________

   Before Davis, Willett, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Plaintiffs-Appellees, Melanie Mason and her mother, Dolores Mason,
   sued Defendant-Appellant, Helping Our Seniors, L.L.C., for retaliatory
   discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After a bench trial,
   the district court 1 granted judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, awarding money
   damages for lost wages, compensatory mental anguish damages, and punitive
          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
          1
              The parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge.
Case: 22-51041      Document: 00516894190          Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/13/2023

                                    No. 22-51041

   damages, as well as authorizing an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.
   Defendant appeals, arguing that the district court erred on numerous
   grounds. As set forth below, we AFFIRM.
                               I. BACKGROUND
          Defendant is in the business of providing in-home, non-medical care
   and companion services to senior citizens in the San Antonio metropolitan
   area. The company is owned by Martha and Patrick Cave and operated by
   Martha, who runs the business out of the couple’s home. Plaintiffs worked
   for Defendant as both caregivers and office employees over a period of
   several years.
          Melanie testified that she repeatedly complained to Martha that
   Patrick created a sexually hostile work environment by loudly watching
   pornography on Sunday mornings during Melanie’s office shift. Melanie
   further testified that she was the only other person present in the home office
   on Sunday mornings and that she felt extremely uncomfortable and offended
   by Patrick’s extracurricular activity. Melanie testified that she complained
   to Martha in January 2018, March 2018, and finally on April 6, 2018, the day
   before she was fired. Melanie’s testimony that she complained about sexual
   harassment was corroborated by her mother and Victor Blalock, the
   company’s financial administrator.
          The district court found that Melanie complained to her employer
   regarding conduct that could constitute sexual harassment in the workplace
   and that these complaints were based on her good-faith reasonable belief that
   Patrick’s conduct violated federal law. The district court further found that
   Melanie had engaged in protected activity under Title VII when she called
   the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on the
   afternoon of April 6, 2018, the day before she was terminated, to inquire
   about filing a charge of sexual harassment against Defendant. The court

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   additionally found that Dolores had standing to sue because she was an
   “aggrieved person” under Title VII, due to her close association with her
   daughter Melanie.
          After being terminated, Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that they were
   discharged from employment in retaliation for the complaints Melanie made
   to Martha and the EEOC regarding sexual harassment in the workplace.
   After conducting a bench trial, the district court rendered judgment in favor
   of Plaintiffs, awarding Melanie $2,080 in lost wages, $10,000 in
   compensatory mental anguish damages, and $5,000 in punitive damages, and
   awarding Dolores $51,802 in lost wages, $10,000 in compensatory mental
   anguish damages, and $5,000 in punitive damages. The district court also
   authorized the award of reasonable attorney’s fees. Defendant timely filed a
   notice of appeal.
                                      II. DISCUSSION
          “When we review a district court’s decision following a bench trial,
   we apply a standard of clear error to the court’s findings of fact and review
   legal issues de novo.” 2
          Defendant first argues that it was not subject to Title VII because it
   did not employ the requisite number of employees. An employer is subject
   to Title VII if it employs “fifteen or more employees for each working day in
   each of twenty of more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
   year.” 3 Defendant contends that it employed fewer than ten employees in
   its office and that the approximately fifty or more caregivers who provided

          _____________________
          2
              Hess Corp. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 26 F.4th 229, 232-33 (5th Cir. 2022).
          3
              42 U.S.C. § 2000(b).

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                                             No. 22-51041

   care to its clients were not employees, but independent contractors. We
   disagree.
           As the district court noted, this Court applies the hybrid “economic
   realities/common law control test” to determine whether an individual is an
   “employee” under Title VII. 4 We have explained that “[t]he economic-
   realities portion of the test asks whether putative employees, as a matter of
   economic reality, are dependent upon the business to which they render
   service.” 5 We have further stated that “[t]he common law control portion
   of the test, which courts should emphasize over the economic realities
   portion, assesses the extent to which the one for whom the work is being done
   has the right to control the details and means by which the work is to be
   performed.” 6 The focus is “on whether the alleged employer has the right
   to hire and fire the employee, the right to supervise the employee, and the
   right to set the employee’s work schedule.” 7
           The evidence presented at trial supports the district court’s finding
   that the caregivers were employees under the common-law-control factors.
   Specifically, Defendant hired and fired caregivers and set their work
   schedules. Although, as Defendant argues, Defendant did not directly
   supervise its caregivers while they were providing in-home services to its
   clients, Defendant exercised substantial control over the details and means
   by which the work was performed.                     New caregivers had to undergo

           _____________________
           4
              See Diggs v. Harris Hosp.-Methodist, Inc., 847 F.2d 270, 271-73 (5th Cir. 1988)
   (adopting and summarizing the “economic realities/common law control test” (citing
   Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
           5
             Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
           6
               Id. (setting forth eleven factors) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
           7
               Deal v. State Farm Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex., 5 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 1993).

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   orientation at the time of hiring to learn Defendant’s policies, were quizzed
   on them, and had to initial their assent to them. The policies proscribed
   certain behaviors during caregiver-client interactions, dictated a dress code,
   and imposed rules about hours, scheduling, and pay days. Caregivers were
   also reviewed on an annual basis regarding their work performance, and they
   were subject to reprimand for failure to adhere to company policy or for
   performance issues. Finally, although caregivers had discretion to turn down
   a specific caregiving assignment, if they turned down several assignments,
   the company would no longer contact them. Based on the foregoing, the
   district court did not clearly err in finding that the caregivers were employees
   under the common-law-control factors.
          Plaintiffs’ evidence also supports the district court’s finding that the
   caregivers    were   employees     under    the    economic-realities   factors.
   Specifically, the evidence showed that the work of the caregivers was not
   performed by specialists and did not require any special skills typical of those
   provided by independent contractors.              There was no educational
   requirement, although the company preferred that a caregiver have a high
   school or general equivalency degree. Prior experience was also not required.
   Moreover, Defendant paid its caregivers on an hourly basis and reimbursed
   them for expenses such as mileage and parking. Caregivers did not provide
   any of their own supplies for their work and were not required to maintain
   liability insurance for the care they provided.
          Defendant argues, however, that certain factors weighed against a
   finding of employee status. Specifically, Defendant points out that it did not
   provide caregivers with annual leave or retirement benefits, nor did it pay for
   their Social Security taxes.       Additionally, each caregiver signed an
   “independent contractor” agreement. As Plaintiffs argue, however, the label
   on an agreement does not dictate whether an individual is an employee or
   independent contractor, and is “dispositive only to the degree that the label

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   mirrors the economic reality of the relationship.” 8 The focus is whether the
   “totality the circumstances” indicates that a caregiver was an employee. 9 In
   light of the evidence presented at trial, the district court did not err in
   determining that the caregivers were employees of Defendant and that,
   consequently, Defendant was subject to Title VII because it employed the
   requisite number of employees during the relevant time period.
          Defendant additionally argues that the district court erred in finding
   that Melanie was terminated for engaging in “protected activity” under
   Title VII. An employee has engaged in activity protected by Title VII if she
   has either (1) “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice
   by [Title VII]” or (2) “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
   any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing [under Title VII].” 10
   As the district court determined, Melanie testified that she spoke to Martha
   about Patrick’s behavior three times.                Dolores corroborated Melanie’s
   testimony, and Blalock also confirmed that Melanie complained of sexual
   harassment. The evidence also established that Plaintiffs were fired the day
   after Melanie called the EEOC to inquire about filing a charge of sexual
   harassment against Defendant. Although Martha denied that she was ever
   approached by Melanie or Dolores, and that she fired Plaintiffs because of
   “disruptive behavior,” the district court simply did not find her testimony
   credible. As we have noted, “[f]actual findings made during a bench trial
   deserve great deference,” and we grant “even greater deference to the trial

          _____________________
          8
              See Donovan v. Tehco, Inc., 642 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1981).
          9
            See id. (rejecting argument that putative employee’s discretion to choose job
   assignments, pay structure, and work patterns “counterbalance[d] the strong indicia of
   employee status” because “[t]he totality of the circumstances” showed that he “was not
   an independent businessman in any meaningful sense”).
          10
               42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

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   court’s findings when they are based on determinations of credibility.” 11
   Based on the foregoing, the district court did not err in determining that
   Plaintiffs were terminated from employment for Melanie’s “protected
   activity” under Title VII.
           Finally, Defendant argues that that the evidence at trial was
   insufficient to support the district court’s award of $10,000.00 in
   compensatory mental anguish damages and $5,000.00 in punitive damages
   each to Melanie and Dolores. We review the district court’s award of mental
   anguish damages under Title VII for abuse of discretion. 12 In light of Melanie
   and Dolores’s specific testimony detailing the depression and anxiety they
   suffered following their terminations, the district court did not abuse its
   discretion in awarding each $10,000 in mental anguish damages. 13
   Furthermore, Defendant’s challenge to the district court’s punitive damages
   award has no merit. “A Title VII plaintiff may recover punitive damages
   upon proof that the defendant acted with malice or with reckless indifference
   to the federal protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 14 The focus is on
   “the employer’s knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal
   law.” 15 Martha testified that she knew retaliation against an employee for
   complaining about sexual harassment or making a complaint to the EEOC
   violated federal law. Although Martha contended that she did not fire

           _____________________
           11
                Hess Corp., 26 F.4th at 233 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
           12
                Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1046 (5th Cir. 1998).
           13
             See id. (finding no abuse of discretion in $5,000 mental anguish award that was
   supported only by plaintiff’s testimony of “anxiety, sleeplessness, stress, marital hardship
   and loss of self-esteem”).
           14
              Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 23 F.4th 422, 439 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
           15
                Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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   Plaintiffs in retaliation, but instead based on their “disruptive behavior,” the
   district court did not find her testimony credible. As stated above, the district
   court’s credibility determinations are entitled to great deference. Based on
   the foregoing, punitive damages were warranted.
                                         III.
          For these reasons, and the reasons set forth by the district court in its
   thorough and well-reasoned opinion, we AFFIRM.

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