Court Opinion

ID: 9716014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:23:27.644253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:40.634453
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: The majority characterizes the trial evidence as reflecting a factual disagreement between two expert witnesses, and therefore presenting a question that must be resolved by the trier of fact rather than by a court of review. (142 Ill. 2d at 190, 196-97.) Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, however, there was no conflicting testimony on the matter that is essential to the resolution of the present appeal. Because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the hydraulic press was unreasonably dangerous for the task it was performing at the time of the plaintiff’s accident, I would affirm the appellate court and enter judgment for the defendant. To prevail on a claim sounding in strict liability, a plaintiff must prove that his injury resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was unreasonably dangerous, and that it existed when the product left the manufacturer’s control. (Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623.) Although a manufacturer has a nondelegable duty to produce a reasonably safe product (Rios v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 79, 84-85), a manufacturer is not an absolute insurer of the safely of its products (Suvada, 32 Ill. 2d at 623). Upon review of the record in the present case, I would conclude that the plaintiff failed to show that the hydraulic press manufactured by the defendant was unreasonably dangerous. The press was equipped with a number of safety features when it left the defendant manufacturer’s control. The press was activated by dual palm buttons, which were spaced in such a way that an operator had to apply both hands to use the machine. In addition, guards located around the buttons prevented their accidental operation. The press was also equipped with an anti-tie-down feature, which prevented an operator from overriding one or both of the palm buttons, and an anti-repeat feature, which prevented the press from engaging in more than a single cycle without being reactivated by the operator. A warning on the front of the press advised operators not to place their hands in the area of the die, and the instruction manual warned against use of the press by more than one person at a time. The plaintiff’s employer, Chrysler Motors, originally used the press to install bushings in the rear springs of automobiles. At the time of the plaintiff’s accident, however, the press was being used to lodge bearings in steering knuckles. As the press was first used, pieces were fed into the work area, or point of operation, from the side; as the press was used at the time of the plaintiff’s accident, however, pieces were fed into the point of operation from the front. As the majority opinion recognizes, the parties’ experts agreed that the appropriateness of a particular safety device depends on the particular use made of a machine, and that a manufacturer’s ability to equip a machine with suitable safety devices depends in large part on the manufacturer’s knowledge of the intended function of the machine. (142 Ill. 2d at 190-91.) In their testimony at trial, both parties’ experts stated that a manufacturer would not normally install barrier guards or sensing devices around the point of operation of a general purpose, or multifunctional, press, but that a manufacturer would do so on a press being built to perform a specific function. Accordingly, the primary dispute at trial centered on the question whether the defendant knew of Chiysler’s intended use of the machine. The plaintiff’s expert witness, James Des Jardins, believed that the press was designed to meet a specific purpose. Des Jardins based his conclusion on an examination of the specifications furnished by Chrysler to the defendant at the time of manufacture. The defendant’s expert witness, Ralph Barnett, disagreed with that assessment and concluded that the press was a general purpose machine. Barnett noted that the press was manufactured without a point of operation, and that Chrysler employed the press for different functions at different times. To sustain the plaintiff’s theory that the press was unreasonably dangerous because the defendant did not equip it with a protective barrier or sensor around the point of operation, the majority labors to establish that the defendant knew how Chrysler originally used the press. The relevant question in this appeal, however, is not whether the defendant manufacturer knew how the press was first used, but whether the defendant could have foreseen the use made of the press at the time of the plaintiff’s accident, and could have equipped the machine with protective devices suitable for that particular task. At trial, the plaintiff attempted to establish only that the defendant was aware of Chrysler’s first use of the press; the plaintiff failed to present testimony demonstrating that Chrysler’s eventual use of the press was also foreseeable, and that the defendant could have equipped the press with additional protective guards suitable for that later function. Although a manufacturer is not free to dispense with all safety devices simply because a product is intended to serve a variety of functions, the multifunctional nature of a product is a relevant consideration in determining what safety measures are appropriate, and whether the product is unreasonably dangerous. (Rios v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 79, 86-87.) In the present case, the defendant manufacturer equipped the press with several all-purpose safety features and provided warnings concerning operation of the press. Chrysler’s use of the press changed over time, however, and there was no evidence that the defendant manufacturer knew or should have foreseen the way in which the press was being used at the time of the plaintiff’s accident. Nor was there any evidence that the defendant could have equipped the press with additional protective devices that would have prevented that occurrence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, I would conclude that judgment in favor of the defendant would be appropriate. (See Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510.) For that reason, I respectfully dissent.