Court Opinion

ID: 9696421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:47:23.093068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:22.143882
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I disagree with the Court’s conclusion as to the admissibility of defendant’s fingernail for identification purposes.
In People v Tobey, 401 Mich 141, 145; 257 NW2d 537 (1977), and People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352; 255 NW2d 171 (1977), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its reliance on the test for admissibility of scientific evidence espoused in Frye v United States, 54 US App DC 46, 47; 293 F 1013 (1923). Under this test, scientific evidence is admissible when the technique gains "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”.1_
*250As I view the testimony offered to establish admissibility, it appears that the prosecutor’s expert did establish the general acceptance of fingernail identification necessary for its admission. The majority characterizes witness Bisbing as having "a specialty in human hair comparisons”, presumably to suggest that he was testifying concerning an area outside the scope of his professional expertise. However, a closer look at Bisbing’s testimony discloses that he had a more general professional interest in the "biological individuality” of the human species and that fingernail identification was "an extension of [his] study of the human being individuality”. As such, Bisbing could offer a more informed opinion than the restrictive view of the majority would permit. Also, the majority’s reference to courts in prior cases refusing to accept voiceprint identifications, Tobey, supra, and polygraph results, Barbara, supra, despite testimony verifying their scientific acceptance, is not persuasive. Unlike the polygraph and voiceprint methods, the instant method of identification relies upon a direct comparison of body parts and thus more closely resembles fingerprint identifications.
In this case, after reviewing the results of his own limited tests and the more extensive results of tests conducted and reported in various scientific journals as early as 1957, witness Bisbing stated his belief that fingernail identification had gained recognition and acceptance in the field of forensic identification. We have previously held that the *251relevance of evidence offered for admission is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. See Aetna Life Ins Co v Brooks, 96 Mich App 310, 314; 292 NW2d 532 (1980), citing Jarecki v Ford Motor Co, 65 Mich App 78, 83; 237 NW2d 191 (1975), holding that "[admissibility rests within the trial court’s discretion and his determination will not be set aside unless there has been an abuse of discretion”. The decision below appears to me to have been a rational one based upon the credibility of the expert testimony supporting admission. The trial court’s decision ruling such evidence admissible should, therefore, not be disturbed.
I also write separately to note a possible shift in the United States Supreme Court’s thinking regarding multiple convictions and punishments therefor. In Whalen v United States, 445 US 684; 100 S Ct 1432; 63 L Ed 2d 715 (1980), the Court analyzed a statute governing the imposition of cumulative punishments committed in the District of Columbia. The statute provides:
" 'A sentence imposed on a person for conviction of an offense shall, unless the court imposing such sentence expressly provides otherwise, run consecutively to any other sentence imposed on such person for conviction of an offense, whether or not the offense (1) arises out of another transaction, or (2) arises out of the same transaction and requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’” DC Code § 23-112 (emphasis in original).
The High Court majority initially interpreted this provision as a legislative codification of the rule of Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932), which held that " '[t]he applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to *252determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ” Whalen, supra, 692. Thus, presumably, offenses subject to the Blockburger rule could not produce cumulative punishments. However, in ruling out cumulative punishments in Whalen, the Court did not rely on its constitutional rule. Instead, the Court left open the possibility for cumulative punishments for offenses considered the same under Blockburger if Congress so chose:
"We think that the only correct way to read § 23-112, in the light of its history and its evident purpose, is to read it as embodying the Blockburger rule for construing the penal provisions of the District of Columbia Code. Accordingly, where two statutory offenses are not the same under the Blockburger test, the sentences imposed 'shall, unless the court expressly provides otherwise, run consecutively.’ And where the offenses are the same under that test, cumulative sentences are not permitted, unless elsewhere specially authorized by Congress.” Whalen, supra, 693. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Court has apparently withdrawn from its position in prior cases making constitutionally impermissible the imposition of cumulative punishments for the "same offense”. See North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711, 717; 89 S Ct 2072; 23 L Ed 2d 656 (1969), citing Ex parte Lange, 85 US (18 Wall) 163; 21 L Ed 872 (1874), and holding that "the constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense” requires a defendant, convicted upon retrial, to be given full credit for time served after the original conviction. Under Whalen, a state legislature, despite the restrictions of the Double Jeopardy Clause, would be able to impose cumulative punishments for the *253same offense upon a sufficient indication of legislative intent.
The confusion brought about by Whalen was discussed at some length in a recent opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court, Hunter v State, 420 A2d 119, 130 (Del, 1980). The Delaware Court, interpreting a statute bearing some factual similarity to our own felony-firearm law, noted that it was faced with a question of validity under the Double Jeopardy Clause when the legislature intends multiple punishments for the same offense. The Court held:
"We are of the opinion that the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to prevent double punishment regardless of the procedural context in which it is found. We can find no sound basis, in Whalen or elsewhere, to exempt the Legislature from adherence to this constitutional doctrine in the instant case. Multiple sentences in the same trial for the same act are equally as abhorrent to the constitutional guarantee, in our view, as multiple sentences for the same act resulting from multiple trials.
"We are not convinced that Whalen controls the instant case in view of the ambiguities contained therein which we find in unexplained conflict with prior double jeopardy principles which we thought settled. We are unwilling to abandon those principles until the United States Supreme Court has more clearly and definitely abandoned them.”
I would join the Delaware Supreme Court in its critical view of the Whalen decision. To suggest on one hand that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies a constitutional ban against cumulative punishments for the same offenses, Pearce, supra, Ex parte Lange, supra, and then to apparently withdraw from this position without specific mention of the prior decisions, Whalen, supra, suggests more *254of an oversight than a turnabout in constitutional analysis. As I view it, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized the proper scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause in People v Martin, 398 Mich 303, 310; 247 NW2d 303 (1976), and People v Stewart (On Rehearing), 400 Mich 540; 256 NW2d 31 (1977), each case applying the constitutional proscription to both multiple convictions and sentences for the same offense.
The facts surrounding the instant case are largely parallel to those in Whalen. In effect, proof of the greater offense (felony murder in both instances) would necessarily prove all the elements of the underlying felony (kidnapping in this case, rape in Whalen). Under the Blockburger test, the offenses in either case thus constitute the "same offense”. Until the United States Supreme Court affirmatively disavows its position prohibiting multiple punishments for conduct violative of more than one statute, I would question the validity of a Whalen alternative.

 A recent Iowa Supreme Court ruling has criticized the Frye test and announced that it will not be followed. In State v Hall, 297 NW2d 80 (Iowa, 1980), the majority announced four criticisms of the rule summarized at 28 Criminal Law Reporter 1018 (1980), as follows:
"First, the Frye rule imposes a standard of admissibility not required of other areas of expert testimony. Second, the rule appears inconsistent with modern concepts of evidence that allow an expert to testify about any area of knowledge so long as the testimony assists the trier of fact.
*250"Third, * * * that [the Iowa Supreme Court] has difficulty distinguishing some scientific evidence from nonscientific evidence.
"Fourth, scientific acceptance seems a 'nebulous’ concept since scientists disagree among themselves as to a method’s acceptance.”
The opinion concludes that proffered evidence " 'need not wait an assessment by the scientific community; the foundation evidence of reliability and the inherent understandability of the evidence itself provided sufficient bases for its admission’ ”.