Court Opinion

ID: 9843306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:32:52.796091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:37.990620
License: Public Domain

■LAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Credibility is the matrix of the factual dispute in this case. Specifically, genuine issues of material fact remain on Guerrero’s IWPCA claim that preclude summary judgment.
Both sides concede that if Guerrero actually worked through June 30, 2003 — the last day of the second fiscal quarter — she would be entitled to receive a bonus pursuant to company policy and Iowa law. In support of her position, Guerrero references statements she made in her sworn affidavit. In it, Guerrero contends that she “came to work the last day of the quarter” and was further paid for services rendered on that day.
The majority affords undue weight to two alleged admissions to support its ruling. The majority asserts that Guerrero conceded that she was terminated on June 27 when, in response to paragraph fourteen of J.W. Hutton’s statement of undisputed facts, she admitted that Bitner terminated her on June 27, 2003. However, Guerrero was merely setting forth a stipulation concerning Bitner’s subjective belief. The alleged admission in paragraph fourteen must be read in light of Guerrero’s denial set forth in paragraph nineteen. In paragraph nineteen, Guerrero disputed that she was fired on June 27 and asserted instead that she came to work on June 30 and was paid for work performed that day. Interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to Guerrero, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Guerrero’s favor, as we must, I am compelled to believe the alleged admission in paragraph fourteen *837was merely a stipulation to Bitner’s subjective intent. Moreover, there are additional factual disputes in this case that make summary judgment improper.
The majority cites a demand letter written by counsel for Guerrero which states that Guerrero “was terminated from her employment effective June 27, 2003.” Although this statement qualifies as an agency admission and could properly be introduced against Guerrero at trial, it is not conclusive evidence and may easily be explained. Murrey v. United States, 73 F.3d 1448, 1455 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that an extrajudicial admission is not conclusive evidence); see also Stolte v. Larkin, 110 F.2d 226, 233 (8th Cir.1940). The weight this evidence should be afforded is especially questionable considering the substance of the letter flatly contradicts Guerrero’s own sworn statements. If Guerrero was terminated on June 27, 2003, then why did she show up for work on June 30?
Given the obvious credibility issues involved, I cannot agree that summary judgment is the proper venue to decide the merits of Guerrero’s IWPCA claim. I would therefore reverse on this issue and submit the questions of fact to a jury for final resolution.