Court Opinion

ID: 9496026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:16:11.075591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:19.786501
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in parts I through III of the majority opinion. However, because the district court committed plain error when it did not vacate one of Earl Shorter’s duplicative convictions for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and an unlawful user of controlled substances, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (3), I respectfully dissent from part IV. Shorter is guilty of only one § 922(g) offense, yet two convictions for this offense are recorded on his judgment. If we cannot exercise our discretion to correct this error, we are failing.
Section 922(g) makes it unlawful for a person in one of nine specific classes (for example, convicted felons, fugitives, and illegal drug users) to possess any firearm. A person who is a member of more than one disqualifying class only violates § 922(g) once for each act of possession. United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 389 (4th Cir.1998). Moreover, the simultaneous possession of multiple firearms in the same location constitutes only one violation of § 922(g). Id. at 390. When a person receives two convictions for conduct that warrants just one conviction under the applicable statute, “the only remedy consistent with the congressional intent is for the District Court ... to exercise its discretion to vacate one of the underlying convictions.” Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985). See also United States v. Murphy, 326 F.3d 501 (4th Cir.2003) (vacating multiplicative contempt convictions); United States v. Bennafield, 287 F.3d 320, 324 (4th Cir.2002) (same for convictions for possession of a controlled substance); Dunford, 148 F.3d at 390 (firearms possession); United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir.1979) (receipt of firearms and making false written statements).
Shorter — a convicted felon and illegal drug user who had two guns in his house— was charged in two counts (eight and nine) of violating § 922(g). Although it is undisputed that Shorter was guilty of only one § 922(g) offense, the judgment entered in his case reflects that he “is adjudged guilty” of counts “Eight and Nine (merged for sentencing purposes)” (emphasis added). Shorter did not object in district court, and that court failed to vacate one of the convictions. Because the district court sentenced Shorter for only one § 922(g) offense, the majority holds that he “stands convicted of only one 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g) offense.” Ante at 173 (emphasis added). I disagree and would use plain error analysis to correct the mistake. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).
First, there is error in the judgment entered by the district court. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The judgment states that Shorter “is adjudged guilty” of counts eight and nine, which were duplicative § 922(g) charges for one offense. The majority holds that there was no duplicative conviction (and hence no error) because the district court merged counts eight and nine for sentencing purposes and imposed a special assessment for only one § 922(g) offense. The majority contends that its holding is in line with United States v. Jones, 204 F.3d 541 (4th Cir.2000), but Jones does not support the proposition that merging the § 922(g) counts for sentencing means that Shorter has only one gun conviction. In Jones, where the defendant was sentenced on convictions for possession of crack with the intent to distribute and the lesser included *175offense of possession, we vacated the sentence on the possession count. The discussion in Jones is cryptic, but its citation to Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), reveals that we were enforcing the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition on multiple punishments for the same offense. See Jones, 204 F.3d at 544. Here, the questions are whether Shorter actually committed two offenses and whether two convictions may be noted on his judgment; the question is not (as it was in Jones) whether the defendant’s two offenses warranted multiple punishments. Because Dunford makes clear that Shorter’s conduct constituted only one § 922(g) violation, see 148 F.3d at 388-90, recording two convictions was error, regardless of how the sentence was structured.
Second, the error in the judgment is plain, that is, the error is “clear under current law.” See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. It is not enough that the district court merged Shorter’s § 922(g) counts for sentencing and that it imposed only one special assessment. These measures do not change the number of convictions reflected on the face of the judgment. Shorter still stands convicted of two counts of firearms possession. The Supreme Court said in Ball that when a person has been convicted of duplicative offenses, the “only remedy” is to vacate one of the convictions. Ball, 470 U.S. at 864, 105 S.Ct. 1668. By failing to follow Ball’s clear instruction, the district court committed plain error.
Third, the error affects Shorter’s substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Merging the duplicative convictions for sentencing cures much of the prejudice, but “[t]he separate conviction ... has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.” Ball, 470 U.S. at 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668 (emphasis omitted). See also Bennafield, 287 F.3d at 324. I recognize that insofar as the federal sentencing guidelines are concerned, the second conviction is not likely to affect Shorter in the future. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1-.2 (2002) (determining criminal history category by length of sentence, not number of convictions). Nevertheless, the extra conviction might render Shorter eligible for enhanced sentencing under a state repeat offender statute. In addition, any prosecutor, probation officer, prospective employer, or reporter looking at Shorter’s record will see two convictions. The extra conviction will be available “to impeach [his] credibility and [will] certainly carr[y] the societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction.” Ball, 470 U.S. at 865, 105 S.Ct. 1668.
Finally, I firmly believe that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 735-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted), and we should exercise our discretion to correct it. Shorter was convicted twice for a crime he only committed once. There is no public good to be served by allowing the extra conviction to stand. Retaining the conviction is unfair to Shorter, and it makes our system look bad. Because all of the requirements for plain-error relief are satisfied, I would vacate one of Shorter’s § 922(g) convictions.