Court Opinion

ID: 9444125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:42:53.673119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:43.888522
License: Public Domain

WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
It was shown beyond dispute in this case that three counterfeit twenty dollar bills of a certain type were passed in payment for gasoline at each of three filling stations in Kansas City in each instance by a man who remained sitting in a car while the employee at each station delivered the gas into the car tank. The only evidence that the defendant was the man who passed the counterfeits was the identification of him by the three filling station employees, each of whom took in one of the counterfeits. Neither of said employees ever had any acquaintance with defendant nor had either of them previously ever seen or had any contacts with him. Nor had either of them made a spontaneous identification of defendant upon subsequently meeting him in ordinary course. They had been taken in a body long after the occurrence to another town by officers and there picked defendant out of a line up of prisoners arranged by the officers. Their identification was solely upon comparison of the looks of defendant with such recollection as each witness had of the looks of the man who uttered the counterfeit to him. The defendant testified he was not at either of the filling stations at the specified times and that he had not uttered or had anything to do with the counterfeits. Kansas City business men of standing testified to his good reputation.
I do not doubt that there was a jury ■question whether or not defendant was the man who uttered the counterfeits and, of course, the jury had the exclusive power to decide that question against the defendant solely on such identification as was made of him. Every man is subject to and must endure the risk of becoming another victim of mistaken identity at the hands of a jury. Judges cannot change that.
But where, as in this case, the government has no evidence except such identification to connect a defendant with an uttering of counterfeit the record of conviction must show that it was the identification that satisfied the jury. Here the jury had no instruction to limit their inquiry to the question of identification although it presented the only real issue and I think there was error in the failure of the court to exclude inadmissible matter from their consideration.
I first observe in the record that the prosecutor argued to the jury in his closing, to which there could be no reply, as follows:
“You know the old saying that criminals return to the scene of the crime and there is testimony here that is what happened again * * * before the subpoenas were out * * * Mr. Gicinto and three of his friends were out there [to the oil stations] * * *. There is no way he could find out where those witnesses were unless he had guilty knowledge because there were no addresses out on the witnesses.”
This statement of the prosecutor went to the heart of the case. It supplied an addition to the identification that would justify a juror in feeling certain that defendant was guilty. If it was true that in addition to the identification defendant showed guilty knowledge of the circumstances of the uttering he should have been convicted. But we are assured it was not true. The prosecutor was mistaken. The evidence was that defendant had gone out to the government’s identifying witness Schroeder to test (as he says) whether Schroeder could really recognize him. But at that time the government had furnished the defense the names of the witnesses. Defendant’s go*13ing out there did not reflect guilty knowledge. The transcript here shows that defense counsel interrupted the prosecutor’s statement that defendant showed guilty knowledge by saying it was incorrect and producing and indicating the list of the names of the witnesses. The transcript reads:
“Mr. Cope [counsel for defendant] : There is the names of your witnesses (indicating).
“[The prosecutor]: I have seen it.
“Mr. Cope: Well, look at it.
“Thereupon the court charged the jury
Thus the jury carried the prosecutor’s statement with them to the jury room. He let it stand uncorrected and it was unfairly prejudicial.
It also seems to me that there was prejudicial error in permitting the issue concerning identification to be confused with evidence that a passport to travel in foreign countries had been issued to the defendant. A search of defendant’s home and person failed to produce anything related to counterfeits but the passport having been seized in the search was put in evidence over objection and the prosecutor argued to the jury, “Now this little deal here, the passport. I am very thankful to the good judge this was allowed to be introduced * * * that passport was a continuation of his method of escape * * *. The date on that passport (August 23rd, the day before the uttering) fits in just perfectly. Everything is all lined up. If there is any trouble passing these bills he has got a passport. That is not just a ticket out of the county. That is not a ticket out of the state. That is a ticket out of the territorial limits of the United States. As you know there is no place further than sixty hours I think by air. So just a matter of hours.”
It is obvious that defendant’s possession of a passport did not have the slightest tendency to throw light on the issue whether he was the man who passed the counterfeits in this case. But the foregoing as well as the prosecutor’s statement that defendant had demonstrated guilty knowledge tended to assure the jury that there was more against defendant than the identification and was unfairly prejudicial to defendant.
Furthermore I am unable to assume that the newspaper article about the defendant which was being distributed' in the lobby of the court house building where the case was being tried and was being talked about in the elevator carrying jurors up to the court room had nothing to do with the verdict. The article contained exactly the kind of addition to the identifications that would overcome a juror’s hesitation to act in the face of the well understood likelihood of mistaken identity. It does not seem credible to me that all of the jurors remained oblivious of the conspicuous lengthy item in their only daily paper about the particular matter they were all directly concerned with for days.
An outstanding lawyer in the civil practice was appointed to defend in this case on account of the defendant’s indigence and he undoubtedly did his best. He says he found himself out of place in the trial of this criminal case. But regardless of whether he properly made and preserved all the points he should have, the record on its face raises doubt in my mind that the competent evidence alone, to wit: the identifications, convinced the jury that defendant was the man who passed the counterfeit. There seems to me too much reason to conclude that improper matter contributed. I would award a new trial.