Court Opinion

ID: 9396072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 14:06:29.277621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:13.692819
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 12, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                   Commonwealth of Kentucky
                              Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2021-CA-1169-MR

ANTONIO D. ADAMS                                                               APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 21-CI-00365

KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD;
DANIEL AKERS, WARDEN OF THE
LEE ADJUSTMENT CENTER; DANIEL
CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; KENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
MARY NOBLE AND COOKIE CREWS,1
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
CABINET; AND RANDY WHITE,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS                                                                     APPELLEES

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

1
 Appellant’s notice of appeal states that the “appellee shall be all respondents.” Although not
named specifically in the notice of appeal, Cookie Crews filed an appellee’s brief herein. We
have included Crews in this Opinion pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Appellate (“RAP”) 2(B)(2).
BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Antonio D. Adams (“Adams”) appeals the order

dismissing his petition for declaration of rights by the Franklin Circuit Court. We

affirm.

                Adams pled guilty to robbery in the first degree2 and was sentenced to

twenty-four years’ imprisonment. Under KRS 439.3401(1)(n), he was designated

a violent offender, requiring him to serve eighty-five percent of his sentence. KRS

439.3401(3)(a). Adams, pro se, petitioned the circuit court for a declaration of

rights, arguing KRS 439.3401, the violent offender statute, is unconstitutional

because it violates his right to equal protection under the law. The court dismissed

his action under CR3 12.02(f). This appeal followed.

                “We review dismissals under CR 12.02(f) de novo.” Hardin v.

Jefferson County Board of Education, 558 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. App. 2018) (citation

omitted). When considering dismissal, the pleadings must be “liberally construed

in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,” and we must assume all allegations in the

complaint are true. Littleton v. Plybon, 395 S.W.3d 505 (Ky. App. 2012) (citation

omitted).

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 515.020, a Class B felony.
3
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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               On appeal, Adams, pro se, argues KRS 439.3401 violates his right to

equal protection because (1) it differentiates between individuals convicted of

robbery in the first degree and those convicted of burglary of the first degree, and

(2) it treats sex offenders more favorably than individuals convicted of robbery in

the first degree.4

               The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantee individuals equal

protection under the law.

               [E]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of
               legislative classification only when the classification
               impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
               fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
               disadvantage of a suspect class. Unless a classification
               requires some form of heightened review because it
               jeopardizes the exercise of a fundamental right or
               categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect
               characteristic, the equal protection clause of the federal
               constitution requires only that the classification rationally
               further a legitimate state interest.
Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Ky. 1998) (citing Massachusetts

Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520

(1976)). Examples of suspect classes are those based on alienage, ancestry, or

race. Id. Individuals convicted of robbery in the first degree have no inherently

4
 Adams requested the circuit court enjoin the Attorney General but did not state any grounds
upon with relief could be granted. On this basis, the circuit court granted the Attorney General’s
motion to dismiss. Adams has abandoned this argument on appeal.

                                               -3-
suspect characteristics. Furthermore, inmates have no fundamental right to parole.

Stewart v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Ky. 2005).

             Because KRS 439.3401 does not infringe on a fundamental right or

disadvantage a suspect class, a rational basis review is appropriate. “Under the

rational basis test, a classification must be upheld against an equal protection

challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a

rational basis for the classification.” Howard, 969 S.W.2d at 703 (citing Heller v.

Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993)). Under rational

basis analysis, a legislature is not required to have actually articulated the rationale

for creating classifications. Zuckerman v. Bevin, 565 S.W.3d 580, 596 (Ky. 2018)

(citation omitted).

             Adams’ equal protection rights are not violated by KRS 439.3401.

First, the General Assembly’s differentiation between robbery in the first degree

and burglary in the first degree is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

Any person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to robbery in the first degree

is classified as a violent offender. KRS 439.3401(1)(n). Only persons convicted

of or who have pled guilty to burglary in the first degree, which is accompanied by

either “the commission or attempted commission of an assault described in KRS

508.010, 508.020, or 508.060[,]” or the “commission or attempted commission of

                                           -4-
kidnapping as prohibited by KRS 509.040” are classified as violent offenders.

KRS 439.3401(1)(l) and (m).

             Robbery in the first degree requires the person to use or threaten “the

immediate use of physical force upon another person with the intent to

accomplish the theft[.]” KRS 515.020(1) (emphasis added). A nonparticipant is

always present and placed at risk during a robbery in the first degree. Conversely,

burglary in the first degree does not require the presence of a nonparticipant in the

crime. See KRS 511.020(1). Because robbery in the first degree always places a

nonparticipant at risk, it was rational for the General Assembly to classify the

offense under the violent offender statute. On the same basis, some burglary

offenses involving nonparticipants are also classified under the violent offender

statute. These classifications rationally further the legitimate state interest of

requiring offenders who risk the safety of others to serve greater portions of their

sentences before qualifying for parole.

             Furthermore, under KRS 439.3401, sex offenders are not treated more

favorably than individuals convicted of robbery in the first degree. Individuals

who have committed sexual offenses are classified as violent offenders. See KRS

439.3401(1)(f)-(h). Adams argues that the sex offender treatment program

(“SOTP”) allows offenders to circumvent the violent offender statute and receive

parole after serving only twenty percent of their sentences. This is incorrect. Sex

                                          -5-
offenders are classified as violent offenders and must meet the requirements of

KRS 439.3401 before becoming eligible for parole. Sex offenders must also

complete SOTP before being eligible for parole. KRS 197.045(4).

             Based on the foregoing, Adams’ equal protection challenge must fail.

The order of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
                                          ATTORNEY GENERAL DANIEL
Antonio D. Adams, pro se                  CAMERON:
Beattyville, Kentucky
                                          Daniel Cameron
                                          Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Courtney E. Albini
                                          Assistant Solicitor General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                                          BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
                                          KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF
                                          CORRECTIONS, MARY NOBLE
                                          AND COOKIE CREWS:

                                          Allison R. Brown
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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