Court Opinion

ID: 9746304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:11:27.309513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:11.848637
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe the statements made by the prosecutor to the jury during closing argument constituted improper prosecutorial misconduct that deprived Appellant of a fair and impartial verdict, I dissent.
It is recognized that a claim of prosecutorial misconduct will only constitute grounds for relief when, in viewing all of the circumstances of the case, the unavoidable effect of the contested comments was to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the accused, so as to hinder an objective weighing of the evidence and impede the rendering of a true verdict. Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 683 A.2d 1181 (1996). Not every intemperate or improper remark by the prosecutor requires a new trial. Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 482 Pa. 598, 394 A.2d 483 (1978). Generally, comments made by a prosecutor do not constitute reversible error, and prosecutorial misconduct will not be found, where comments are based on the evidence or proper inferences therefrom. Commonwealth v. Chester, 526 Pa. 578, 599-600, 587 A.2d 1367, 1377, cert denied, 502 U.S. 959, 112 S.Ct. 422, 116 L.Ed.2d 442 (1991). In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 516 Pa. 527, 533 A.2d 994 (1987), this court stated that
[i]n broad terms, we have drawn the first and brightest line at the point where the language and inferences of the summation no longer relate back to the evidence on the record. In effect, the prosecutor is bound by our law to *358argue only those inferences which derive reasonably from the evidence of the trial.
516 Pa. at 530, 533 A.2d at 996 (emphasis added).
While recognizing the foregoing dictate and the fact that the prosecutor’s comments strayed from the evidence, op. at 411, 412, the majority, nevertheless, concludes that because the prosecutor interspersed references to the evidence in his closing, along with his improper comments, the overall effect of his summation was not prejudicial. I cannot agree.
The prosecutor continually urged the jury to consider matters outside the evidence in an attempt to improperly appeal to the juror’s fears and emotions:
In this case, ladies and gentlemen, let’s get back to why I am standing up here talking to you. Sometimes I realize that there are people who are happy in their jobs, there are children who are happy, there are people able to go to sleep without locking their doors, where young ladies can walk the street at night and not be afraid, and where young ladies could, in fact, be young ladies.
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Mr. Mandell mentioned motive. Must there be a motive? Are we coming to a situation of the haves against the have nots? Are we coming to a situation that when you get up in the morning and decide what to wear, what jewelry to wear, that you put a target on your chest and on your back? ’Cause this is what this case is about.
This case is about right and this case is about freedom. We’re talking about the right that is right. We’re talking about the right to take public transportation. We’re talking about the right to be able to use public transportation without the fear of someone waiting to get paid, someone waiting to rip you off. ’Cause this is what this case is about, ladies and gentlemen. It’s not about race, it’s not about size and height. What it’s about, ladies and gentlemen, is this. A young lady named Chedell Williams. Another way of *359putting it would be something such as this. That my best witness is not here. That’s why I’m standing here.
(N.T. October 15, 1992, 87-88, 89-90).
The majority cites to our decisions in Commonwealth v. Thompson, 538 Pa. 297, 648 A.2d 315 (1994), and Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 460 Pa. 686, 334 A.2d 588 (1975), as support for the proposition that this court has permitted references to societal problems and the impact that the accused’s behavior has on society.
While the majority correctly notes that in Thompson and Hamilton we reviewed claims of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the prosecution’s references to the problems of society in general and the impact of the defendants’ behavior thereon,1 in Hamilton, we specifically cautioned against utilizing such references in the future:
We caution prosecuting attorneys that reference to unsafe conditions on the city’s streets, rampancy of crime, etc. are inappropriate. They a,re irrelevant, and have no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Even when not improperly motivated, but calculated to exhort the jurors not to shirk their responsibility of returning a verdict of guilty when the evidence so warrants, arguments in this vein appeal to the fears of jurors, and tend to im,pute the wrongdoing of others to the present defendant. Hence, they should be meticulously avoided.
460 Pa. at 698-699, 334 A.2d at 594 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). We declined to grant the appellant a new trial in Hamilton, noting that, based on the record before us, we *360could not say that the prosecutor’s improper remarks unavoidably prejudiced the jury.2
Following our decision in Hamilton, we addressed the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in a context similar to the case at bar in Commonwealth v. Cherry, 474 Pa. 295, 378 A.2d 800 (1977). In Cherry, we granted a new trial where the prosecutor, in his summation, asked the jury to put themselves in the place of his key witness and think about how they would feel if they were questioned about inconsistencies in their testimony. Additionally, the prosecutor in Cherry stated:
Please tell the people of Philadelphia that where (sic) one, even though he doesn’t pull the trigger, takes part in and knows ahead of time that there is going to be a robbery, knows that at least one of the men has a gun, knows all that, goes along with it,' tell everybody by your verdict that you are not going to put up with shootings on the street like the wild west.
474 Pa. at 301, 378 A.2d at 803. Based on the prosecutor’s comments, we determined that the grant of a new trial was warranted. We noted that the prosecution’s argument “was an invitation to the jurors to shift their inquiry from the guilt or innocence of appellant to the need to make an example of someone accused of participating in a public shooting.” Cherry, 474 Pa. at 305, 378 A.2d at 805. We relied on our decision in Commonwealth v. Harvell, 458 Pa. 406, 411, 327 A.2d 27, 30 (1974), wherein the prosecutor stated, “[m]en are afraid to walk the streets themselves,” “[pjeople don’t want to go out at night,” and “it might be you next time. It might be you.” In Harvell, we granted the appellant a new trial, noting that such statements “divert[ed] the inquiry from the pursuit of truth” and invited the jury “to give vent to visceral and unreasoned responses.” Id.
*361Here, the prosecutor did not limit such remarks to the foregoing passages. The prosecutor stated the following:
In an urban situation, Ladies and Gentlemen, it’s now popular to use cliches. Back in a drug epidemic, somebody said, ‘just say no.’ And all the citizens were up in arms following ‘just say no.’ Then at another time, someone said, ‘get involved.’ And then what people call the ghetto code, I don’t see anything, I don’t know anything, I don’t want to become involved.
And believe me, Ladies and Gentlemen, at this time when the male role in the community is questioned, it is refreshing to see two men like Mr. Cameron and Mr. Bertha stand up, out of outrage, stand up, because someone has to stand up, with the degree that our young people are laid down.
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Two finger rings, one gold chain, earlobes bleeding from where the earrings were snatched. Did she leave a legacy? I hope she did. And it’s not in a — it’s not in a slogan or cliche, don’t wear jewelry. It’s not in a slang and it’s not in a cliche, if you wear jewelry go in a group. What this is about, ladies and gentlemen, is stopping the person from trying to take advantage. Wearing earrings when they sell you those earrings, they don’t put a sign on them that says, wearing these earrings might be hazardous to your life. But that’s the reality under which we now live.
(N.T. October 15, 1992, 92, 94, 97-98). Again, the prosecutor, in the foregoing passages, improperly encouraged the jury to “get involved” in a manner similar to the witnesses that had testified, but unlike inhabitants of “the ghetto,” and help right the wrongs that are faced by young people in urban society.
Finally, in this vein, the prosecutor again improperly characterized the jury as vindicators of general societal problems:
As I sit down, ladies and gentlemen, the buck stops right here. And I’m not talking about the buck that goes up and *362down, I’m talking about the buck that you are. You are this community. You are the Commonwealth. This case is entitled the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania versus James Dennis. These are your streets. This is your town. The victims, the witnesses, and the defendants are products of a system that we all support. Mr. Lincoln said, ‘judgment falls on a person when there’s something within that person we cannot abide.’ I would submit to you that’s greed and murder. If you believe the witnesses and if you believe them when they say James Dennis is the man, that’s the man, that’s his face, it was a gun like this, he had a gun like this in his waistband, forget the would have, should have, could haves and deal with it.... In this case, I submit to you, Miss Williams suffers in any final solution. Miss Williams is dead, and the evidence shows that James Dennis killed her. The Commonwealth asks you for a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. We will not compromise where, I submit to you, that was a cold blooded act of murder, willful, deliberate, and intentional, based on the testimony of the witnesses and the doctor. Thank you. And as I said in my opening, stick a fork in him and turn him over. He will be done when you say he is done.
Id. at 102-104.
I believe the foregoing commentary by the prosecutor was improper. Moreover, a review of the record leads this author to conclude that the unavoidable effect of the prosecutor’s improper commentary was to prejudice the jury, thereby preventing the rendering of a fair and impartial verdict.
This Court has observed that a prosecutor is in a unique position as both an administrator of justice and an advocate. Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492 (1971); Commonwealth v. Toney, 439 Pa. 173, 266 A.2d 732 (1970). Accordingly, we have stressed that prosecutorial conduct in argument is a matter of special concern because of the possibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor’s arguments, not only because there is a certain amount of prestige associated with the office, but also because of the fact-finding facilities presumably available to him. Cherry, *363474 Pa. at 303, 378 A.2d at 804. While a prosecutor must have reasonable latitude in presenting his case and must be free, as well, to make his arguments with “logical force and vigor,” Commonwealth v. Cronin, 464 Pa. 138, 143, 346 A.2d 59, 62 (1975), an unfortunate result of permitting such latitude is that some prosecutors have permitted an excess of zeal for conviction or a fancy for exaggerated rhetoric to carry them beyond permissible limits of argument. Cherry. I believe this is such a case.3
The prosecutor continually encouraged the jury to focus their attention not on the evidence, but on the larger problems of society in rendering their verdict. He consistently appealed to their fears and emotions, reminding them that some people, apparently not them, can go “to sleep without locking their doors,” and “walk the streets at night and not be afraid.” He stressed that the ease was about “right” and “freedom,” including “the right to take public transportation without the fear of someone waiting to get paid.” He implied that through their verdict, the jurors as “the community,” as “the Commonwealth,” could “get involved” and vindicate, not just the victim in this case, but all of society, reminding them that “these are your streets,” and “your town.”
All of these comments violate our warning in Hamilton, i.e., that these types of references are inappropriate, irrelevant and should be meticulously avoided. Moreover, it cannot be said that the finding of guilt in this case was not the product of fear or vengeance as advocated by the prosecutor. The role of the jury is to be the arbiters of fact concerning a particular defendant, not the authors of a general policy to correct social ills.
On this record, I would conclude that the unavoidable effect of the prosecutor’s comments was to prejudice the jury and *364prevent them from rendering a fair and impartial verdict in the case.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
FLAHERTY, C.J., and SAYLOR, J., join this Dissenting Opinion.

. In Thompson, we declined to grant a new trial where the prosecutor, at the penalty phase, stated, among other things, that "what we are really talking about is beyond those walls, beyond those windows, spilling out into the streets of North Philadelphia, where ordinary people walk, live, breathe and die, every day....” 538 Pa. at 313, 648 A.2d at 323. However, as noted, in Thompson the appellant complained of comments made by the prosecutor at the penalty phase, as opposed to here where the complained of commentary was made during the guilt phase. We have afforded the prosecution reasonable latitude in making arguments at the penalty phase given that the presumption of innocence is no longer applicable. Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 683 A.2d 1181 (1996).

. The appellant in Hamilton cited only two excerpts from the prosecution's summation wherein the prosecutor noted the difficulty of living in a community where crime has been so rampant and people are afraid to walk the streets, and where the prosecutor commented that if the jury were to let the defendant go free, then the victims would have died in vain and all others like them would die in vain.

. See also Section 5.8(d) of the American Bar Association project on Standards for Criminal Justice providing that
[t]he prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the jury’s verdict.