Court Opinion

ID: 9583170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:35:38.408152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:52.254991
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Officer Dodd came to the school and was informed of the facts, including the fact that Farmer had been searched and no marijuana was found. Dodd advised Damron, the school official, to swear out a warrant against Farmer for simple assault, as there was not enough evidence to arrest him for marijuana possession. While in the principal’s office, Farmer was asked continually by Damron if he was in the restroom selling marijuana. Thereafter, in a separate room (Dodd and Farmer only being present) Dodd, without any request from school officials or anyone else, strip-searched Farmer , on his (Dodd’s) own authority as a police official. Dodd found two cigarette packages containing handrolled cigarettes hidden in appellant’s underwear. Damron, the school official, testified Farmer was not under arrest until arrested by Dodd. The majority presumed that at the time of the strip-search conducted by Officer Dodd he was acting on behalf of the school officials, under the loco parentis doctrine. State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488 (216 SE2d 586) (1975). I find no evidence of such agency, expressed or implied.
The threshold question as raised by the appellant is really whether Farmer was under lawful arrest at the time of the search. I think not. Code Ann. § 27-207 provides that an arrest for a crime may be made by an officer without a warrant if the offense is committed in his presence, or the offender is attempting to escape, “or for other cause there is likely to be [a] failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant.” Our Supreme Court has held that these are the only instances in which an officer may make an arrest without a warrant. Napper v. State, 200 Ga. 626, 629 (1) (38 SE2d 269) (1946). This court has held that “[w]here the defendant has committed no crime in the *841presence of the arresting officer, and the latter has no valid warrant, the arrest without a warrant will not justify the search, the result of which forms the basis of the charge.” Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 925 (219 SE2d 636) (1975). The evidence is clear that the offense was not committed in Dodd’s presence, and Farmer was not attempting to escape. The “arrest” occurred about 9:00 a.m. on a weekday morning, “and there is not a particle of evidence to warrant the conclusion or to even arouse a suspicion that there was ‘likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant.’ ” Napper, supra. In fact, Damron, the school official, had already agreed to go downtown with Dodd and sign an affidavit to obtain a warrant. Thus, the arrest was not authorized.
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that the arrest was lawful, the search was not authorized under the facts of this case, because it did not come within the parameters of Code Ann. § 27-301. That code provision sets forth the only instances where a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest is authorized. I am aware of State v. Handspike, 240 Ga. 176 (240 SE2d 1) (1977); however, that opinion did not address itself to the four instances authorizing a warrantless search which are set forth in Code Ann. § 27-301, supra.
One of appellant’s contentions is that the trial court erred in ruling that because there was a proper warning pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694), Farmer’s confession was voluntary and therefore admissible.
Setting aside for the moment the issue of Farmer’s request for counsel and the Miranda warning, we turn to the question of whether the confession was tainted by the illegal search; i.e., does the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine” apply to the confession? This rule provides that any evidence acquired by the police through exploitation of information obtained by means of unlawful conduct is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (83 SC 407, 9 LE2d 441) (1963). Such evidence is considered tainted, and once shown to exist, the prosecution must show that the evidence was not a product of exploitation of the illegally obtained information. Applying this rule to the instant case, the burden is on the prosecution to show that the confession was not obtained as a result of the illegal search of Farmer; i.e., it was procured from an independent source. In Wong Sun, supra, it was held that one factor applicable to situations where the derivative evidence consists of a verbal statement is whether the subsequent statement is “an act of free will.” 371U. S. at 486. Other factors to be considered were set forth in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (95 SC 2254, 45 LE2d 416) (1975): (1) whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any confessions; (2) the “temporal proximity” of the illegal *842police conduct and the verbal statements; (3) the presence of intervening circumstances or events; and (4) the “purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” None of these factors, in and of themselves, are determinative of the issue, but are guidelines for determination of the issue. Considering these guidelines, plus the fact that appellant is a mentally dull person who has never passed a reading course in high school (he failed 10 of 13 language arts courses) and that he wanted a lawyer but was given no opportunity to secure one prior to questioning, we do not believe the state has carried its burden of establishing that the confession was not tainted by the illegal search. The record does not disclose any independent derivative evidence obtained by the police; the connection between finding the evidence and the confession was not so attenuated as to remove the taint; immediately after the search Farmer was taken directly to the police station; the confession was obtained approximately one and one-half hours after the marijuana was found, during which time Farmer was placed in a cell by himself; and the Miranda rights were given to Farmer to read, even though he was mentally dull and had never passed a reading course in high school. Hence, under the circumstances of this case, it seems almost axiomatic that Farmer made a statement because he had been “caught with the goods”; in my opinion the statement flowed directly from the illegal search and seizure, and thus was inadmissible under the rule laid down in Wong Sun, supra. Accordingly, it was error to rule the confession was admissible solely on the ground that Farmer was advised of his Miranda rights and thereafter made a knowing and intelligent waiver of such rights.
I would rule the confession inadmissible in evidence and would reverse the denial by the trial court of the motion to suppress.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Smith concurs in this dissent.