Court Opinion

ID: 9927944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 16:12:49.701802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:32:11.010545
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court

                                                     No. 2022-353-Appeal.
                                                     (PM 19-102)
 The Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a :
The Bank of New York, as Trustee for
the certificateholders of CWALT, Inc.,
  Alternative Loan Trust 2006-31CB,
 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
            Series 2006-31CB

                 v.                   :

       Ronald A. Gosset et al.        :

          NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
          before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
          are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
          Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
          Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
          Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
          or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
          made before the opinion is published.
                                                          Supreme Court

                                                          No. 2022-353-Appeal.
                                                          (PM 19-102)
     The Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a :
    The Bank of New York, as Trustee for
    the certificateholders of CWALT, Inc.,
      Alternative Loan Trust 2006-31CB,
     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
                Series 2006-31CB

                     v.                    :

           Ronald A. Gosset et al.         :

              Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.

                                     OPINION

        Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The defendants, Mellissa Gosset and

Verity Gosset,1 appeal from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, The

Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the

certificateholders of CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2006-31CB, Mortgage

Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-31CB.2 The Superior Court granted the

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and for leave to conduct a foreclosure sale

on a property encumbered by a mortgage that the defendants signed with their father,

Ronald A. Gosset, who died before the plaintiff’s motion was filed. This case came

1
  Two spellings of the defendant Mellissa Gosset’s first name appear in the record.
We use the spelling that appears in the defendants’ prebriefing statement.
2
  Two additional defendants named in the complaint, Stewart Title Guaranty
Company and Oliphant Financial Corp., are not involved in this appeal.

                                        -1-
before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and

show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided.

After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record,

we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without

further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the

judgment of the Superior Court.

                                          I

                                  Facts and Travel

      In August 2006, Ronald A. Gosset signed a promissory note for $275,000,

plus interest, in exchange for a loan. As security for the note, he granted a mortgage

on his property at 42 Sherman Street, Newport, Rhode Island, which he owned as a

joint tenant with his daughters, Mellissa Gosset and Verity Gosset. Mellissa and

Verity3 also signed the mortgage and, like their father, are designated as “Borrowers”

under its terms. The daughters did not, however, sign the underlying note. Section

13 of the mortgage provides, in relevant part, that

             “any Borrower who co-signs this Security Instrument but
             does not execute the Note (a ‘co-signer’): (a) is co-signing
             this Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and
             convey the co-signer’s interest in the Property under the
             terms of this Security Instrument; (b) is not personally
             obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security
             Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any other

3
 To avoid confusion, we refer to the members of the Gosset family by their first
names. No disrespect is intended.

                                        -2-
             Borrower can agree to extend, modify, forbear or make
             any accommodations with regard to the terms of this
             Security Instrument or the Note without the co-signer’s
             consent.”

In 2014, Verity transferred her interest in the property to her father and sister, both

of whom remained joint tenants with rights of survivorship until Ronald’s death in

May 2021.

      The plaintiff was assigned the mortgage in 2012 and, in 2019, filed a

complaint in Providence County Superior Court alleging that all three Gossets had

defaulted on the note and mortgage. According to the complaint, the Gossets had

been in continuous default since July 2017 and, as of December 2018, owed plaintiff

$454,626.87.    The plaintiff therefore asked the Superior Court to authorize a

foreclosure sale and “Enter Judgment in favor of Plaintiff for the sums due and

owing from [the Gossets] in connection with the Note and the Mortgage * * *.”

      The defendants denied plaintiff’s allegations, and the case languished until

March 2022, when plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and for leave to

conduct a foreclosure sale. In its supporting memorandum, plaintiff alleged once

again that all three Gossets had defaulted on the note and mortgage by failing to

make “principal and interest payments as required by the terms of the Note” and, as

of December 2018, owed plaintiff $454,626.87. In response, defendants filed a

motion to stay proceedings and an opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment. The motion to stay proceedings included a suggestion of death on the

                                         -3-
record, which provided notice that Ronald had died on May 28, 2021, and it

requested a stay of proceedings until a representative of his estate filed a motion for

substitution pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil

Procedure. In their opposition to summary judgment, which was filed two months

after the motion to stay proceedings, defendants Mellissa and Verity argued that

plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because neither defendant

had signed the note. “As such,” defendants claimed, “neither Mel[l]issa Gosset nor

Verity Gosset are in default since they have no contractual or financial obligations

owed to the Plaintiff.” Furthermore, because the one defendant who signed the note,

Ronald, was deceased, defendants contended that a “proper claim [could not be]

asserted against his estate” until a substitution of the parties had taken place.

      The Superior Court heard the parties’ motions on August 17, 2022. During

the hearing, defendants Mellissa and Verity repeated their argument that neither was

in default, nor subject to a monetary judgment, because neither had signed the note.

As for the claims against their father, “to the extent that he has defenses,” defendants

argued, “that defense would have to be asserted by an administrator or by a

fiduciary.”   Contrary to the arguments made in its complaint and supporting

memorandum, plaintiff claimed during the hearing that the living defendants’

alleged default was not on the note, but only on the mortgage. “Mr. Gosset is on the

Note,” plaintiff said, “but as to the Mortgage, if payments are not made, you[ are]

                                          -4-
also in default of the Mortgage.” The plaintiff further argued that Ronald’s death

did not change “the nature of the default and the ability to exercise the public sale.”

      In his bench decision, the hearing justice said that “plaintiff has presented

uncontested evidence demonstrating that defendants are currently in default of the

Mortgage.”     To prevent summary judgment, the hearing justice explained,

“defendants would have had to prove by competent evidence the existence of a

disputed issue of material fact.” And here, where “the critical issue to be decided is

whether the defendants defaulted on the Mortgage,” the hearing justice noted that

“[t]he undisputed facts and evidence demonstrate that the Mortgage was defaulted

on, and that plaintiff is the current holder of the Note and Mortgage.”

      A week after the hearing, on August 22, 2022, the Superior Court entered a

judgment and order that granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

authorized plaintiff to conduct a foreclosure sale. The defendants filed a motion to

vacate the judgment and order, in part because plaintiff, which submitted a proposed

judgment to the Superior Court the day after the hearing, did not provide defendants

with an advance copy of the proposed judgment. The defendants also characterized

the judgment and order as “inaccurate in critical aspects,” particularly in finding that

all three Gossets had defaulted on both the note and the mortgage by failing to make

“principal and interest payments as required by the terms of the Note and Mortgage.”

                                         -5-
      On September 8, 2022, the parties filed a stipulation that the judgment and

order should be vacated and a new one be filed. The Superior Court then entered a

revised judgment and order, which states, in relevant part, that

             “Defendant, Ronald A. Gosset, is in default in the
             performance of the terms and conditions of the Note and
             Mortgage by reason of his failure to timely tender
             principal and interest payments as required by the terms of
             the Note and Mortgage. Mel[l]issa Gosset and Verity
             Gosset are in default of the terms of the Mortgage.”

Notably, the revised judgment and order attributes the daughters’ default on the

mortgage solely to their father’s failure to make payments on the loan. The revised

judgment and order further states that, as of December 2018, Ronald A. Gosset owed

plaintiff $454,626.87 in connection with the note and, moreover, that “Mel[l]issa

and Verity are co-mortgagors, but not obligated on the Note.” The defendants filed

a timely notice of appeal on September 29, 2022.

                                         II

                                Standard of Review

      “This Court will review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo,

employing the same standards and rules used by the hearing justice.” Apex

Development Company, LLC v. Rhode Island Department of Transportation, 291

A.3d 995, 998 (R.I. 2023) (quoting Nelson v. Allstate Insurance Company, 228 A.3d

983, 984-85 (R.I. 2020)). “We will affirm a trial court’s decision only if, after

reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

                                        -6-
party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Nelson, 228 A.3d at

985). “Furthermore, the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving by competent

evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact and cannot rest upon mere

allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions.” Id.

(quoting Nelson, 228 A.3d at 985).

                                         III

                                     Discussion

      On appeal, defendants argue that (1) the revised judgment and order is

appealable under an exception to the final-judgment rule, (2) the Superior Court

lacked personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying case against Ronald

because he was deceased and no personal representative had been appointed as a

substitute, and (3) the Superior Court erred in finding that Mellissa and Verity were

in default on the mortgage.

      We first address defendants’ argument that the revised judgment and order is

an appealable judgment notwithstanding that it is both interlocutory and in violation

of the separate-document rule set forth in Rule 58(a)(2) of the Superior Court Rules

of Civil Procedure. We note that the revised judgment is clearly interlocutory in that

it contemplates by its very terms that, after any foreclosure sale but prior to

conveying title, plaintiff shall file a motion “seeking final judgment and approval of

                                        -7-
its sale.” Also, Rule 58(a)(2) provides that a “judgment shall be set forth on a

separate document” and signed by the clerk in order to be final. Super. R. Civ. P.

58(a)(2).   The defendants’ principal argument regarding this question is that,

according to G.L. 1956 § 9-24-7, interlocutory orders or judgments ordering the sale

of real or personal property are appealable in the same manner as a final judgment.

Therefore, even if the revised judgment and order did not amount to a final judgment,

defendants argue that § 9-24-7 applies because the revised judgment and order

authorizes plaintiff to foreclose on the property.

      “It is axiomatic that, with limited exceptions, a party can appeal only from ‘a

final judgment, decree, or order of the superior court.’” Coates v. Ocean State

Jobbers, Inc., 18 A.3d 554, 561 (R.I. 2011) (quoting § 9-24-1).         One of the

exceptions to this well-recognized final-judgment rule is when, “upon a hearing in

the superior court, * * * a sale of real or personal property [is] ordered * * *.”

Section 9-24-7. As we have previously held, an order authorizing a foreclosure sale

“can be interpreted as one ordering the sale of real property” and is therefore

reviewable on direct appeal pursuant to § 9-24-7. Note Capital Group, Inc.

v. Perretta, 207 A.3d 998, 1004 (R.I. 2019). We are satisfied, therefore, that

defendants’ appeal is properly before this Court.

      We now turn to defendants’ second and third arguments on appeal, which we

address in tandem. Because only their father was obligated to make payments on

                                         -8-
the note, defendants contend that only he could be made to answer for his alleged

default. The defendants direct our attention to the case of LesCarbeau v. Rodrigues,

109 R.I. 407, 286 A.2d 246 (1972), for the following proposition.

             “It is a basic common-law principle that if a party dies
             before a verdict or decision is rendered in an action against
             him, the action abates as to him and must be dismissed
             unless it is revived by substituting his personal
             representative. * * * When, however, there is no attempt
             to revive the action, the court lacks jurisdiction to enter
             any judgment against the deceased. * * * It should be
             noted that procedure for revival of an action by
             substitution of the personal representatives is not a mere
             technicality but rather it is the sole means by which the
             court obtains jurisdiction over the personal
             representative.” LesCarbeau, 109 R.I. at 410-11, 286 A.2d
             at 248.

The mortgage provides that, unlike their father, Mellissa and Verity are “not

personally obligated to pay the sums” to which plaintiff, as the present holder of the

note, is entitled. Mellissa and Verity did, however, agree to “mortgage, grant and

convey” their interest in the property, upon which plaintiff has the right to foreclose

in the event of default. This fact alone gave at least Mellissa, the property’s sole

remaining possessor, ample reason to refute plaintiff’s contention that the mortgage

was in default, given that her interest in the property hung in the balance.

      In the case before the Court, the revised judgment and order from which

defendants are appealing does not provide for an award of damages against any

defendant. Rather, it explicitly states that “[n]o monetary judgment is entered

                                         -9-
against the [d]efendants.” The relief provided is the authority granted to plaintiff to

“foreclose its mortgage encumbering the real property situated at [42] Sherman

Street, Newport, RI by following the procedures for statutory power of sale

foreclosures as set forth in [G.L. 1956] § 34-27-4.”4 Upon Ronald’s death, his

interest in said real estate passed to Mellissa by operation of law through the joint

tenancy. See Butler v. Gavek, 245 A.3d 750, 754 (R.I. 2021). Thus Ronald’s estate

possesses no interest in the real estate.

      Based upon our de novo review of the record, we are in agreement with the

hearing justice that the plaintiff presented uncontested evidence demonstrating that

the plaintiff is the holder of the note and mortgage, and that the note is currently in

default. Moreover, under the terms of the mortgage, that instrument is also in

default. What is more, the defendants executed the mortgage, and are specifically

referenced therein as “Borrowers.”          As the defendants have failed to present

evidence challenging these assertions, we are satisfied that there are no genuine

issues of material fact and that the plaintiff is entitled to conduct a foreclosure sale

on the property securing its promissory note.

4
  The revised judgment and order states that the property securing the note is located
at “45 Sherman Street.” According to the note and mortgage, however, the address
is 42 Sherman Street.

                                            - 10 -
                                        IV

                                    Conclusion

      For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the Superior Court is

affirmed. The papers in this case may be remanded to the Superior Court.

      Justice Lynch Prata did not participate.

                                       - 11 -
                                          STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                     SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                           Licht Judicial Complex
                                             250 Benefit Street
                                           Providence, RI 02903

                                 OPINION COVER SHEET

                                     The Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of
                                     New York, as Trustee for the certificateholders of
Title of Case                        CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2006-31CB,
                                     Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-
                                     31CB v. Ronald A. Gosset et al.
                                     No. 2022-353-Appeal.
Case Number
                                     (PM 19-102)

Date Opinion Filed                   January 30, 2024

Justices                             Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.

Written By                           Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal                     Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court    Associate Justice R. David Cruise

                                     For Plaintiff:

                                     Thomas J. Walsh, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
                                     For Defendants:

                                     Anthony E. Conte, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)