Court Opinion

ID: 9639718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:45:53.467732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:21.245876
License: Public Domain

ELLIS, Justice,
dissenting.
Finding myself in disagreement with the majority members of the panel, I record my respectful dissent. I would sustain appellant’s sole point of error and hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine in the pipe found on appellant.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Houston Police Officer Jerry Robi-nette testified that on May 25, 1989, he participated in an undercover police operation that resulted in the arrest of appellant for possession of cocaine. The undercover team consisted of one undercover officer, Officer Nichols, who purchased cocaine from two suspects; a spotting officer, Officer Beasley, who broadcasted the description of the suspects to the raid van; and Officer Robinette and other unnamed officers who were in the raid van.
On May 25, 1989, Nichols purchased cocaine from two individuals, Bell and Che-nenvert, in the 7200 block of Scott Street. Beasley radioed their descriptions and location to Robinette who was located nearby. Within a matter of seconds Robinette spotted appellant standing at the other end of the block, some 25 to 50 yards away from Bell and Chenenvert, the suspects who participated in the sale of drugs, and Nichols, the officer who purchased the drugs. Ap*341pellant was then placed under arrest for selling narcotics. While conducting a search of appellant, incident to appellant’s arrest, Robinette found a pipe containing cocaine residue located in appellant’s sock.
At the time in question, suspect Bell was 15 years old, five feet six inches tall and was wearing white pants with no shirt. Suspect Chenenvert was 17 years old, five feet six inches tall, and was wearing blue jeans and a white tee shirt. Appellant, however, did not appear to be 15-17 years old, was wearing a blue shirt and black pants and did not fit the description of suspects Bell or Chenenvert.
Appellant was never located near the suspects Bell and Chenenvert. Prior to his arrest, appellant had no contact with Nichols and was not involved in the sale of cocaine to Nichols. Robinette nor anyone else observed appellant commit any crime prior to his arrest. Robinette further testified he had never observed appellant prior to the moment of his arrest. Robinette relied exclusively on the information radioed to him by Beasley.
Robinette testified that he could not recall the descriptions that were radioed to him of the suspects to be arrested except that they were black males.
Nichols nor Beasley testified at the hearing. It is well settled that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest or search is not admissible.
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST, amend. IV.
The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of citizens against arbitrary invasion by government officials. Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).
Robinette arrested and searched appellant without a warrant. Appellant was under arrest at the time he was searched. In order for a warrantless search to be justified, the State must show that probable cause existed to arrest or search appellant. Fry v. State, 493 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Crim.App.1972); Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d at 108.
Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 14.01 (Vernon 1977) provides,
a) A peace officer or any other person, may, without a warrant, arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the public peace. (Emphasis added).
b) A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed with his presence or within his view. (Emphasis added).
At the time of appellant’s arrest, none of the officers involved saw appellant commit an offense. Robinette testified that he had never seen appellant prior to his arrest and did not see appellant commit an offense. He also testified that Nichols claimed appellant had not been involved in the sale of drugs.
As Beasley and Nichols did not testify at the hearing, the record does not reflect that either of them saw appellant commit an offense or that either officer had probable cause to arrest appellant. There was no evidence introduced to indicate that appellant committed any offense in the presence or view of any officer nor was there evidence introduced that there was probable cause to believe that appellant committed an offense. Therefore, the State may not rely on art. 14.01 to justify the war-rantless arrest and search of appellant.
Tex.Code Crim.ProC.Ann. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977) provides,
Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the offender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace officer may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused.
“Satisfactory proof” under the statute has been held to be the equivalent of proba*342ble cause. Salazar v. State, 688 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ); See Earley v. State, 685 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).
Nichols purchased cocaine from suspects Bell and Chenenvert. Appellant was not involved in this transaction and Nichols had no probable cause to arrest nor search him based on the drug sale. The State introduced no evidence that Nichols had probable cause to arrest or search appellant for any reason.
Robinette testified that he had not seen appellant commit any offense and he had never seen appellant prior to his arrest; therefore Robinnette had no probable cause, based on his personal knowledge, to arrest or search appellant.
In order to justify the warrantless arrest and search of appellant, the State must show the officer who requested the arrest be made had sufficient probable cause to arrest and search appellant. Brooks v. State, 707 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref’d).
Beasley was the officer who requested, by radio, that suspects Bell and Chenenvert be arrested. Robinette, acting solely upon Beasley’s request, arrested and then searched appellant, thereby finding the contraband in appellant’s possession. The State offered no evidence that Beasley had probable cause to arrest or search appellant as Officer Beasley did not testify at the hearing. Since the validity of the arrest is dependent upon the probable cause possessed by Beasley, who was not called to testify, the record does not reflect the probable cause for the warrantless arrest and the evidence seized cannot be justified as a result of a search incident thereto. Colston v. State, 511 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). While it is possible that Beasley possessed probable cause to arrest the individuals who sold contraband to Nichols, the State offered no evidence that Beasley had probable cause to arrest anyone, least of all appellant, who was not involved in the drug sale. Thus it has not been shown that Robinette had probable cause to arrest Bell, Chenenvert or appellant. Therefore, the State may not rely on art. 14.04 to justify the warrantless arrest and search of appellant.
The State could maintain the arrest of appellant was valid because the arresting officer mistakenly thought appellant was either suspect Bell or suspect Chenenvert. This argument is without merit.
Robinette had no personal knowledge of facts on which to base probable cause to arrest and search appellant. Any probable cause possessed by Robinette would be based on the probable cause possessed by Beasley. Brooks v. State, 707 S.W.2d 703; Colston v. State, 511 S.W.2d 10. Since the State offered no evidence that Beasley possessed probable cause to arrest Bell and Chenenvert, there was no evidence that Robinette possessed probable cause to arrest them. Since Robinette did not possess probable cause to arrest Bell and Chenen-vert, the suspects he intended to arrest, it cannot be argued that he possessed probable cause to arrest appellant, who he mistakenly thought to be Bell or Chenenvert. A mistake, even a reasonable one, cannot validate a warrantless arrest that is invalid for other reasons. Colston v. State, 511 S.W.2d 10, 12.
The State attempts to argue that Robi-nette had a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct an investigatory stop and detention during which a frisk would have revealed the contraband in appellant’s possession as authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). This argument also is without merit.
Robinette did not rely upon any unusual conduct on the part of appellant to conclude that criminal activity might be afoot. He had never observed appellant prior to searching him. Robinette might have relied on probable cause to stop and investigate possessed by Beasley, the officer who radioed for the arrests. However, Beasley did not testify and the record fails to reflect that Beasley had probable cause for an investigation of anyone, and certainly not of appellant. The State therefore has failed to show that the arresting officer had probable cause to conduct an investigatory stop and frisk of appellant. Colston *343v. State, 511 S.W.2d 10, 13. A search cannot be justified by what it uncovers. Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106. Probable cause for a warrantless arrest cannot be bolstered by the results or fruits of a subsequent search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to suppress the cocaine found in the pipe found on appellant.