Court Opinion

ID: 9592815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:17:11.725795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:47.879360
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I do not believe that the existing court rules and applicable statutes contemplate allowing a defendant to represent himself on an appeal from his criminal conviction and, in the case of an indigent, allowing him access to a transcript prepared at public expense for such a purpose nor do I believe such a result is constitutionally mandated. For these reasons, I would retain the existing procedures for vindicating indigent defendants’ rights to seek review of their criminal convictions. Alternatively, since there is apparently no legislative prohibition of pro se appeals at public expense, rather than find that this defendant has been denied any existing right to proceed pro se, I would suspend the rules in the defendant Seifert’s case to allow him to proceed with his appeal pro se and handle further requests on a case by case basis. I would also refer the matter to the Advisory Committee on rules of Criminal Procedure for further study.
I must state at the outset that I am disturbed at the inescapable implication in the majority opinion that the current practice of the State Public Defender is in violation of existing state law. The State Public Defender has done nothing but what he was required to do under statute and court rule. The express legislative and judicial policy of this State, at least up until this point, could not be more clear. Minn.Stat. § 611.25 provides in relevant part:
The state public defender shall represent, without charge, a defendant or other person appealing from a conviction or pursuing a post conviction proceeding after the time for filing an appeal has expired when the state public defender is directed to do so by a judge of the district court, of the court of appeals or of the supreme court * * * * (emphasis added).
Minn.R.Crim.P. 28.02, subd. 5(5) provides in relevant part:
If [an indigent defendant seeking review of his conviction] is [financially] eligible then the State Public Defender shall represent him * * * * and the State Public Defender is automatically appointed for that purpose without order of the court, (emphasis added).
This language clearly and unambiguously requires the State Public Defender to represent indigent persons seeking review of *375their criminal convictions. Resort to any canons of construction is unnecessary.1 Moreover, the history of these provisions does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that these provisions mean anything other than what they say. The only reference to a potential right of self-representation in the prior version of Rule 28.02, subd. 5 [then codified as Rule 29.02, subd. 7.6] was deleted from the current rule.
As to whether there is any constitutional right of self-representation on appeal, I would conclude that there is no such mandate. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court ruled that an individual has a right, under the Sixth Amendment as applied to the States under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to represent himself at trial. Yet nothing in Faretta indicates that the right to proceed pro se at trial extends to a right to proceed pro se on appeal. Not only does the absence of language indicating such a right exists imply that it does not exist, but this conclusion can be otherwise inferred from the opinion and interpretations thereof. The Faretta holding is based in large part on a conclusion that the framers intended the right to proceed pro se at trial be implied in the Sixth Amendment. The Judiciary Act of 1789, passed one day before the Sixth Amendment was proposed, provided that parties to actions in federal courts “may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of * * * counsel * * * ” Id. at 813, 95 S.Ct. at 2530. There is no corresponding legislation in Minnesota. Id. Of greater significance, there is no constitutional right of appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3312, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894). Compare, Appeal of O’Rourke, 300 Minn. 158, 220 N.W.2d 811 (1974). Thus, there is no historical basis for concluding that a right to proceed pro se on appeal was intended by the framers of the Constitution.
The distinction between the situation of an accused at trial and that of an appellant challenging a conviction has significance beyond the historical analysis of the Sixth Amendment. Since there exists no independent constitutional right to appeal, the constitutional rights guaranteed to indigent criminal appellants are grounded primarily in equal protection considerations. The Sixth Amendment considerations discussed in Faretta in the context of a criminal trial cannot be easily applied to a criminal appeal:
At the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, the right of an indigent defendant to counsel is fundamental and binding upon the States by virtue of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 [83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799] (1963). But there are significant differences between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal proceeding. The purpose of the trial stage from the State's point of view is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To accomplish this purpose, the State employs a prosecuting attorney who presents evidence to the court, challenges any witnesses offered by the defendant, argues rulings of the court, and makes direct arguments to the court and jury seeking to persuade them of the defendant’s guilt. Under these circumstances “reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.” Id. at 344 [83 S.Ct. at 796].
*376By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the State’s prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilty made by a judge or jury below. The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him against being “haled into court” by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt. This difference is significant for, while no one would agree that the State may simply dispense with the trial stage of proceedings without a criminal defendant’s consent, it is clear that the State need not provide any appeal at all. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 [14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867] (1894). The fact that an appeal has been provided does not automatically mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigent defendants at every stage of the way. Douglas v. California [372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) ], supra. Unfairness results only if indigents are singled out by the State and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty. That question is more profitably considered under an equal protection analysis.
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-611, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2443-2444, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). Compare Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948) (no absolute right to be present at appellate proceedings, in contrast to constitutional prerogative of being present at each significant stage of a felony prosecution).
Two Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded that there is no constitutional right of self-representation on appeal. In United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549 (4th Cir.1985), the court rejected a defendant’s motion to handle his appeal on a pro se basis. In explaining the distinction from a trial where a defendant’s right of self-representation is clear, the court stated:
In constitutional analysis, however, the rights to counsel and self-representation on appeal (emphasis in original) stand on a different ground. Unlike the right to trial, which is also guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, there is no constitutional right to an appeal, [citation omitted] Rather, where the right to appeal a criminal conviction exists, it exists only by statute, [citation omitted] Once the right to appeal is granted, however, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses command that an indigent defendant has a right to appointed counsel [citation omitted] and access to the courts, [citations omitted]
Although a convicted defendant has a right to counsel on appeal, his implicit Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial does not carry over to the appeal.
United States v. Gilles, 773 F.2d at 559-560.2 In Lumhert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239 (7th Cir.1984), the Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion, finding it:
conceptually difficult to imply in the “equal protection right” to counsel on direct appeal a correlative right of self-representation on direct appeal. And, although the due process principle of fundamental fairness requires that an indigent be provided with counsel on direct appeal, it provides no basis for finding a correlative right of self-representation on direct appeal.
Id. at 246.
The issue then comes down to whether, as a matter of policy, the existing procedures should be changed so that pro se appeals are permitted and the pro se defendant will have access to a transcript of the trial and other lower court proceedings prepared at public expense.
Under existing policy, the procedure that an indigent defendant must follow to seek review of his conviction is clear and it has *377served the ends of justice well. When a defendant seeks review of his conviction, the State Public Defender is automatically appointed and handles the initial screening to determine in forma pauperis eligibility. Additionally, each defendant desiring review is interviewed by an attorney knowledgeable in criminal law and appellate procedure and is given an assessment as to the relative merits of his case. In cases where the defendant chooses to proceed, the State Public Defender assures that proper procedural notices are served and filed in a timely fashion, arranges for necessary transcripts to be prepared and purchased out of funds appropriated to the office for that purpose, and prepares a brief for the appellate court that comports with format requirements of the rules and is filed within the time constraints of those rules. Additionally, as history has shown over the 20 years that the State Public Defender’s Office has represented indigent defendants, the briefs that we receive from that office are of the highest quality. The defendant receives a copy of his brief when it is filed as well as the prosecutor’s brief when it is filed.3 If he is dissatisfied, he has the opportunity to file a supplemental pro se brief to voice whatever additional concerns he may have.4 To assure that the pro se brief comports with our rules, the State Public Defender takes responsibility for duplicating, binding, and serving these supplemental briefs. This is a system which I do not feel needs major alteration except that I would prospectively allow the defendant limited access to a transcript for purposes of preparing the pro se supplemental brief. See Eling v. Jones, 797 F.2d 697 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 1371, 94 L.Ed.2d 687 (1987).
If, however, it is the collective will of this court to change existing policy and procedure, then I believe the better course would be to simply suspend the rule requiring State Public Defender representation in the defendant Seifert’s case. Minn.R.Crim.P. 29.01, subd. 3. I would then, as the majority proposes, invite the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure to study the situation and draft appropriate rules if necessary.
Presumably under the majority opinion it would seem that anyone following the procedural steps of Seifert could proceed pro se and obtain whatever transcript he desired, all without regard to whether he was literate or illiterate and without a showing to some responsible authority that a particular transcript is necessary to raise a particular claim. Obviously, if the State Public Defender is no longer representing the defendant, that office is not in a position to ascertain what transcripts are necessary, nor can it fairly be asked to take responsibility for ascertaining such issues as the competency of the individual inmate to proceed pro se.5
The problems do not end here. Just because an inmate gets his transcript, he still *378must write the brief. While we can say that it is the inmate’s problem that he finds himself without adequate resources to research and write an effective brief, the true result more likely will be that when an appellate judge reads an incomprehensible pro se brief, that judge will be forced, out of conscience, to wear two hats — that of judge and that of advocate — in order to assure the integrity of our reviewing function.6 This will also be true of our law clerks doing research and preparing bench memos, when issues and cases have not been adequately briefed. Do we have the resources to do this and is it appropriate for us to do so? Moreover, when the clerk’s office receives a pro se brief that is nonconforming, whether in format, number of required copies or proof of service, are we going to be as hardline as the majority claims since none of these defects is truly jurisdictional to the appeal?
There are more problems but I do not think it is necessary to elaborate further. If we are to make a policy change, it seems to me we should be extremely cautious and do no more than to allow Seifert to proceed pro se on appeal and to evaluate further requests to proceed pro se on appeal on an individual basis.
In conclusion, I would retain the existing system because it is not constitutionally deficient and it has worked well. Moreover, as I read the criminal rules, they do not contemplate pro se litigation on appeal at public expense. The only change I would make would be to allow defendants temporary, limited access to already prepared transcripts for pro se supplemental brief preparation. In the alternative, if there is to be a change, we should only suspend the current rules so as to allow Seifert to proceed pro se with access to the transcripts that have already been prepared. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee should then be directed to study the issue and draft any proposed changes, having in mind that there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that there be any change.7
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority opinion contains language at footnote 3 which invites the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure to redraft the rules if the majority’s interpretation is not in accord with the Committee’s intent. While the Committee might be pleased to find it has the power to legislatively overrule this court, this is not the case. While the Criminal Rules were proposed by the Advisory Committee, they were promulgated by this Court and it is this Court’s responsibility to interpret them.

. As Chief Justice Warren stated:
The ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35, 85 S.Ct. 783, 789-790, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965) (rule requiring government consent before a defendant can waive a jury trial held constitutional).

. The majority opinion at footnote 1 incorrectly implies that it is only defendants who seek to file a pro se supplemental brief that are given a copy of the briefs when in fact all public defender clients are mailed a copy of the briefs in their cases when they are filed with the court. Arrangements are made to read the briefs to inmates who are illiterate and translate them for those who do not understand English.

. Case v. State, 364 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn.1985). This answers any concern that a defendant might have about raising issues his appointed counsel would choose in the exercise of professional discretion not to address and negates any claim that the indigent defendant is being denied the opportunity to address the court in his appeal. Chamberlain v. Ericksen, 744 F.2d 628 (8th Cir.1984) cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1008, 105 S.Ct. 1368, 84 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985); Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.1981) cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 3545, 77 L.Ed.2d 1394 (1983) (ability to file supplemental brief satisfies any hypothetical right to proceed pro se on appeal).

.There obviously would be the problems of breach of client confidences to the extent that the State Public Defender would be relying on information it received while still in an attorney-client relationship in making these assessments or reporting potential problems to the involved court ruling on the request to proceed pro se. More fundamentally, because that office would be discharging a ministerial function rather acting in a traditional role of counsel in handling requests to proceed pro se on appeal, it would be exposed to federal civil rights suits over its discharge of that function and forced to defend no matter how frivolous the claim might be.

. I, for one, do not believe that the majority of the pro se briefs we will receive will be the product of the individual defendant himself as opposed to some inmate writwriter, notwithstanding any certification to the contrary signed by the defendant upon filing of the brief. No one could be so naive as to believe that those writwriters offer their services out of the goodness of their heart, and I am concerned for those easily manipulated inmates who will be preyed upon as a result.

. Recognition from the outset that any procedure permitting self-representation on appeal is only by leave of this court and not a matter of statutory or constitutional right will hopefully also serve as fair warning to pro se defendants that abuse of any privilege afforded them in this regard may well lead the court to revert back to the current procedure.