Court Opinion

ID: 9394522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 18:00:30.681668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.750850
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 15 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SELINA KEENE; MELODY FOUNTILA,                  No.    22-16567

                Plaintiffs-Appellants,          D.C. No. 4:22-cv-01587-JSW

and
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MARK MCCLURE,

                Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO,

                Defendant-Appellee,

and

LONDON BREED; CAROL ISEN,

                Defendants.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of California
                    Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted April 18, 2023
                            San Francisco, California

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: CALLAHAN and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON,** District
Judge.

      Appellants Selina Keene and Melody Fountila, two recently retired

employees of the City and County of San Francisco (CCSF), were denied religious

exemptions to CCSF’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement. Appellants filed a

lawsuit against CCSF in March 2022, claiming CCSF had violated Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act

(FEHA) by failing to accommodate their religious beliefs. In May 2022,

Appellants moved for a preliminary injunction requiring CCSF to, inter alia,

accommodate their religious beliefs by allowing them to work from home or wear

personal protective equipment at work. The district court denied preliminary relief,

finding that Appellants had not made a prima facie case of discrimination; that

their “loss of employment” did not constitute irreparable harm; and that the public

interest in increasing the vaccination rate weighed “sharply in favor of denial of an

injunction.” Appellants challenge each conclusion on appeal. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a), and we reverse and remand.

      “We review a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of

discretion.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.

      **
             The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

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2011). A district court abuses its discretion when it utilizes “an erroneous legal

standard or clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (quoting Lands Council v.

McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). A factual finding is clearly

erroneous if it is “illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may

be drawn from the facts in the record.” M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 725 (9th

Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009)

(en banc)).

      A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish (1) a likelihood of

success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm absent preliminary

relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in the movant’s favor; and (4) the injunction

is in the public interest. Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res.

Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). “When the government is a party,” the third

and fourth factors “merge.” Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). Likelihood of

success on the merits “is the most important” Winter factor. Garcia v. Google, Inc.,

786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

      1.      To establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination under a

failure-to-accommodate theory, an employee must show “(1) [s]he had a bona fide

religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty; (2) [s]he

informed h[er] employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer

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discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected h[er] to an adverse employment

action because of h[er] inability to fulfill the job requirement.” Berry v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); Metoyer v.

Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 941 (9th Cir. 2007) (courts evaluate FEHA claims under

the Title VII framework), abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l Ass’n of African

Am.-Owned Media v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 915 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2019). A

bona fide religious belief is one that is “sincerely held.” See U.S. Equal Emp.

Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC-CVG-2021-3, Section 12: Religious Discrimination,

§ 12–I(A)(2) (Jan. 15, 2021) (EEOC Guidance).

      The record shows that Appellants swear that they are Christians who

“believe in the sanctity of life.” The record before the district court also reflects

that COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers used “[f]etal cell lines . . . grown in a

laboratory . . . [that] started with cells from elective abortions that occurred several

decades ago” to at least test vaccine efficacy.1 COVID-19 Vaccine: Addressing

Concerns, UCLA Health, https://www.uclahealth.org/treatment-options/covid-19-

info/covid-19-vaccine-addressing-concerns [https://archive.is/WqUPW] (last

visited Apr. 28, 2023). After CCSF mandated that all non-exempt employees

1
 The Pfizer and Moderna vaccines used such fetal stem cells early in the
development process to test “proof of concept,” or how a cell takes in mRNA to
create immunity to COVID-19. See COVID-19 Vaccine and Fetal Cell Lines, L.A.
Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Health (Apr. 20, 2021) (LA County Guidance).

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receive a COVID-19 vaccine, Appellants requested religious exemptions, which

CCSF denied for reasons absent from the record. Under threat of termination for

failure to vaccinate, Appellants retired from CCSF, as they swore that they could

not receive a vaccine “derived from murdered children” without violating their

religious beliefs.

      The district court erroneously concluded that “[n]either Plaintiff has

demonstrated that their religious beliefs are sincere or that those beliefs conflict

with receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. There are no grounds upon which to assert

the mistaken conclusion that the FDA-approved vaccines contain fetal cells or are

otherwise derived from murdered babies.” However, the record reflects that the

COVID-19 vaccines are, albeit remotely, “derived” from aborted fetal cell lines.

Id.; LA County Guidance. This directly contradicts the district court’s conclusion.

See Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1263.

      Beyond the district court’s factual error, its decision reflects a

misunderstanding of Title VII law. A religious belief need not be consistent or

rational to be protected under Title VII, and an assertion of a sincere religious

belief is generally accepted. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)

(“[T]he resolution of [whether a belief is religious] is not to turn upon a judicial

perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not

be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit

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First Amendment protection.”); Doe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th

1173, 1176 n.3 (9th Cir. 2021) (“We may not . . . question the legitimacy of

[Appellants’] religious beliefs regarding COVID-19 vaccinations.” (citing

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731

(2018))), recons. en banc denied, 22 F.4th 1099 (9th Cir. 2022); EEOC Guidance,

§ 12–I(A)(2) (“[T]he sincerity of an employee’s stated religious belief is usually

not in dispute and is generally presumed or easily established.” (cleaned up)).

      The district court did not explain its conclusion that Appellants had not

established sincerity beyond stating that there are “no grounds upon which to assert

the mistaken conclusion that the FDA-approved vaccines . . . are . . . derived from

murdered babies” and generally stating that personal preferences are not sincere

religious beliefs. And CCSF offered no argument or evidence that Appellants’

beliefs are insincere. Absent any indication otherwise, it seems that the district

court erroneously held that Appellants had not asserted sincere religious beliefs

because their beliefs were not scientifically accurate. Remand is warranted for the

district court to reevaluate Appellants’ claims applying the proper failure-to-

accommodate inquiry. 2

2
 As the district court may consider any noticed documents on remand, CCSF’s
Motion to Take Judicial Notice is DENIED AS MOOT. Dkt. 17.

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      2.     The district court also found that Appellants’ “loss of employment”

did not constitute irreparable harm, but it never considered Appellants’ argument

that they lost the opportunity to pursue their “chosen profession,” which we have

recognized as irreparable harm under certain circumstances. E.g., Chalk v. U.S.

Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 710 (9th Cir. 1988); Enyart v. Nat’l Conf. of Bar Exam’rs,

Inc., 630 F.3d 1153, 1156, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2011). Nor did it consider

Appellants’ argument that CCSF “g[ave] [Appellants] a Hobson’s choice: lose

your faith and keep your job, or keep your faith and lose your job.” Given the lack

of analysis below regarding Appellants’ purported loss of career and the pressure

on Appellants to violate their faith, we suspect the district court’s errors in

analyzing the likelihood of success on the merits infected its analysis of irreparable

harm as well.

      3.     Lastly, the district court failed to properly balance the equities and

evaluate the public interest. The district court considered the public interest in

increased vaccination against the COVID-19 virus, but there is no indication that

the district court considered the public interest in enforcement of civil rights

statutes. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2009);

Enyart, 630 F.3d at 1166–67 (concluding that public interest was served by

requiring entities to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act). We remand

for the district court to extend its analysis. See Roman Catholic Diocese of

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Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020) (“Before [restricting religious

practice due to COVID-19], we have a duty to conduct a serious examination of

the need for such a drastic measure.”).

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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