Court Opinion

ID: 9740593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:38:06.877003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.056762
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: The issue before this court is whether the complaint states a cause of action. The trial court said “no” and I agree, for several reasons. First, the plaintiffs have no standing to sue under the laws or judicial precedents in IUinois. None of the cases cited by the majority stands for the proposition that private parties or private not-for-profit corporations may initiate proceedings to recover a money judgment on a cause of action held by the State. Rather, the private parties in the cited cases were aHowed to bring actions to enjoin misapplication of State funds. Without passing on the desirability of the cause of action the plaintiffs seek to establish or the possible harm to society in the activities they seek to discourage, the creation of a new cause of action of this magnitude should be by the legislature, not this court. Second, the allegations of the complaint are conclusory in nature and fail to allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action. Even if we set aside the lack of standing and the deficiency of the pleadings, what plaintiffs seek here is an opportunity to act in a private capacity as “attorneys-general” for the State. Illinois has no provision for such private attorneys-general. Moreover, this particular case is unusual in that plaintiffs’ allegations, if true, charge the crime of bribery. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, § 33 — 1.) Plaintiffs admit that the Attorney General has been asked to take action in this case and has refused; consequently, to allow the plaintiffs to act would be to allow them to usurp the powers of the Attorney General or the State’s attorney in his role as enforcer of criminal laws. Finally, I note that an essential allegation — that the defendants used their power and influence to benefit the individual who made this stock available to them — is supported by no factual allegations. Throughout the stated period, there were no significant changes in statutes governing harness racing. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959 through 1989, ch. 8. § 37s. et seq.) Thus, the defendants, as legislators, could have favored Mrs. Everett’s interests only in collusion with the governor, who appoints to the Illinois Racing Board, the Senate, which confirms such appointments, and the Board members themselves, who actually assign racing dates. No such conspiracy is alleged. T would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of this complaint.