Court Opinion

ID: 9580956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:10:33.094394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:37.401087
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Robert C., Judge,
dissenting
After careful review, I dissent from the majority opinion because I disagree with the majority’s position on the definition of “work.” *642While we give deference to the City Board of Adjustment’s (“BOA”) own interpretation of its ordinances, we are not required to accept that interpretation, under de novo review, if it is arbitrary or constitutes an error of law. Here, the BOA committed an error of law when it accepted Kevin Krouse’s (“Krouse”) claim that “work” means construction. Work should not be so narrowly defined and can include actions that do not result in construction on the site. Under these circumstances I would remand this case to the trial court with instructions to remand to the BOA to determine if petitioner had begun “work” under a broader definition. If petitioner had begun work within six months after the sign permit was originally issued, then the subsequently renewed building permit would have been valid at the time the sign was relocated.
Facts
On or about 11 July 2005, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (“DOT”) filed a Notice of Taking and Complaint for a road widening project, which effectively condemned a portion of Gastonia Highway where Fairway’s billboard was located. The roadway contract was expected to be awarded on 19 June 2006. Fairway was required by DOT to move the billboard to a new location by 15 March 2006.
On 26 August 2005, Fairway applied for a City of Bessemer City Zoning Permit (the “sign permit”), which was then issued on 31 August 2005. On 21 November 2005, Fairway applied for a Gaston County Building Permit (the “building permit”), which was then issued on 13 December 2005. Fairway contends that after the permits were issued, it continued negotiations with DOT regarding the exact location of the road widening project and where the billboard could be relocated. Fairway also claims that negotiations were taking place between Fairway and the land owner for a new lease agreement. Additionally, a “NAPA” building was also located on the proposed right of way and there was some uncertainty as to where that building would be relocated on the parcel.
On 2 March 2006, Fairway generated a Work Order to take down the existing billboard on 13 June 2006.. On 9 March 2006 Fairway sent a letter to DOT stating that it “would like to schedule the removal of this sign for (No Later Than) Tuesday, June 13th 2006. ”3 On 28 April 2006, Fairway entered into a new lease for the *643relocated billboard with the land owner on the same parcel of land along Gastonia Highway.
On 8 June 2006, Fairway received a renewal of its building permit. On 12 June 2006, the City of Bessemer (the “City”) adopted a new ordinance banning billboards within the City’s zoning jurisdiction. At that point, Fairway’s existing billboard became a nonconforming sign. On 13 June 2006, Fairway removed the billboard from its original location and stored it. On 6 December 2006, Fairway completed relocation of the billboard. On 16 January 2007, Fairway received the first notice of violation from the City’s attorney.
Discussion
Pursuant to Bessemer City Ordinance § 155.163(A), a building permit cannot be issued “until a sign permit for same has been issued . ...” A valid sign permit was issued to Fairway on 31 August 2005. Ordinance § 155.207 states:
If the work described in any compliance or sign permit has not begun within six months from the date of issuance thereof, the permit shall expire. Upon beginning a project, work must be diligently continued until completion with some progress being apparent every three months. If such continuation or work is not shown, the permit will expire.
The BOA held that the sign permit expired six months after it was issued because Fairway had not begun any work under Ordinance § 155.207, and, therefore, the building permit that was renewed in June 2006 was not valid. The majority holds that without a valid building permit, Fairway does not have a statutorily vested right pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-385(b) (2007) to relocate the sign. It follows that if Fairway had begun work within six months of the issuance of the sign permit, the renewed building permit would be valid and Fairway would have a vested right to relocate the sign as mandated by DOT.
The term “work” is not defined in the City’s ordinances. At the hearing before the BOA, Krouse, the City Zoning Administrator, testified that, pursuant to his interpretation of the ordinance, work meant “construction.” Fairway admits that no construction occurred during the six months after the sign permit was issued because they did not have a new lease signed and final negotiations with DOT had not taken place; however, Fairway contends that “work” does not necessarily mean that a physical alteration must occur at the site. I agree.
*644“Zoning regulations are in derogation of common law rights and they cannot be construed to include or exclude by implication that which is not clearly their express terms.” Cumulus Broadcasting, LLC v. Hoke County Bd. of Comm’rs, 180 N.C. App. 424, 427, 638 S.E.2d 12, 15 (2006) (quoting Yancey v. Heafner, 268 N.C. 263, 266, 150 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1966)); see also Lambeth v. Town of Kure Beach, 157 N.C. App. 349, 354, 578 S.E.2d 688, 691 (2003) (“Zoning ordinances derogate common law property rights and must be strictly construed in favor of the free use of property.”).
The majority aptly states that the interpretation of “work” is a question of law reviewed de novo, and whether Fairway’s actions constituted “work” is a question of fact that is reviewed using the whole record test. The majority is also correct in its assertion that the BOA’s interpretation of its own ordinance is entitled to some deference under a de novo standard of review. See Whiteco Outdoor Adver. v. Johnson Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 132 N.C. App. 465, 470, 513 S.E.2d 70, 74 (1999). “Therefore, our task on appeal is not to decide whether another interpretation of the ordinance might reasonably have been reached by the board, but to decide if the board acted arbitrarily, oppressively, manifestly abused its authority, or committed an error of law in interpreting the ordinance.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). I find that the Board in this case committed an error of law in defining “work” to be synonymous with construction.
In Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 55, 170 S.E.2d 904, 909 (1969), our Supreme Court held that the visible commencement of construction was not the only means by which a permit holder could preserve his or her rights under a zoning permit. Entering into contractual obligations, the purchase of building materials, expenditures of money, or other activities could preserve the permit holder’s rights even where there was no “visible change in the condition of the land.” Id. The Court reasoned that
[i]t is not the giving of notice to the town, through a change in the appearance of the land, which creates the vested property right in the holder of the permit. The basis of his right to build and use his land, in accordance with the permit issued to him, is his change of his own position in bona fide reliance upon the permit.
Id. Here, there was no visible change in the land before the billboard was physically moved; however, it is important to recognize that in this particular circumstance, aside from installing new “footings” and *645re-erecting the billboard, there was no construction that could have been performed on the new site. The old billboard was simply relocated, not fully reconstructed anew. This situation is different from the building of an office or other commercial property where construction visibly begins and continues for some time. In that circumstance most of the “work” conducted would be visible construction. That is not the case here. It appears from the record in this case that after the footings were installed, the billboard was re-erected in one day. The “work” involved in conducting that move was, arguably, performed behind the scenes.
In Flowerree v. City of Concord, 93 N.C. App. 483, 485, 378 S.E.2d 188, 189 (1989), this Court considered a non-conforming duplex under the City of Concord’s Zoning Ordinance, which stated that discontinuance of a non-conforming use for more than three months would result in loss of non-conforming rights. In that case, the tenants of the lawful nonconforming duplex had moved out and the utilities were turned off. Id. at 484, 378 S.E.2d at 189. This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to reverse the City of Concord’s denial of plaintiffs’ application for an occupancy permit and held, “[w]hile there was an interruption in occupancy, there was no ‘cessation of use within’ the meaning ... of the . . . Zoning Ordinance” since the “non-occupancy resulted from factors beyond petitioners [sic] control” and petitioners continued to look for tenants and made some repairs to the property to make it more marketable. Id. at 486, 378 S.E.2d at 190. In Flowerree, “cessation of use” was not synonymous with “unoccupied” where efforts were being made behind the scenes to comply with the ordinance. Similarly in the present case, “work” is not synonymous with “construction” as a matter of law.
Furthermore, “[w]hen statutory language is clear and unambiguous, ‘words in a statute must be construed in accordance with their plain meaning unless the statute provides an alternative meaning.’ ” Procter v. City of Raleigh Bd. of Adjust., 140 N.C. App. 784, 785-86, 538 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2000) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Village Council, 138 N.C. App. 79, 86, 530 S.E.2d 338, 343 (2000)). According to a common dictionary definition, “work” means “[p]hysical or mental effort or activity directed toward the production or accomplishment of something.” The American Heritage Dictionary 1554 (3rd ed. 1997). “Construction” is defined as “[t]he act or process of constructing” or “[t]he way in which something is built or put together.” Id. at 299. “Construction” is thus limited to physical acts of assembly while the plain meaning of “work” does not require a physical manifestation of *646one’s efforts. Contrary to the BOA’s determination, the two terms are not synonymous.
Additionally, the building permit states that the permit would expire if “work or construction authorized [was] not commenced within 6 months ...” (Emphasis added.) Clearly, a distinction was made between work and construction. Had the City wanted to require the sign permit holder to begin “construction” within six months, it should have used that term in the ordinance. In sum, I find that work is not synonymous with construction alone and may include other efforts or preparations that are not visible on the site.
Fairway claims that between August 2005 and February 2006 it was actively carrying out the steps necessary in order to begin the physical relocation of the Billboard. Fairway argues that the “work” performed included: (1) applying for a building permit and subsequent renewal thereof; (2) negotiating with DOT over the relocation and compensation for moving the billboard; and (3) re-negotiating its lease with the landowner. Fairway points out that it could not begin construction prior to renegotiating its lease and obtaining funding guarantees from DOT. Also, the NAPA building that was located on the same parcel had to be relocated as well, which further delayed Fairway’s relocation.
At this juncture, I decline to determine whether Fairway’s actions constituted work or whether it complied with Ordinance § 155.207; rather, I would remand this case to the trial court with instructions to remand it to the BOA so that it may re-examine the issue under a broader definition of work.

. DOT’S response is not included in the record.