Court Opinion

ID: 9535284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:47:42.811572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:12.662575
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
dissenting:
Although I agree with the majority that the results of polygraph tests should generally not be admitted into evidence, this case presents unique facts that warrant admission of the results. The defendant wants the examination results of her answers admitted even though they clearly indicate that she was present at the time of the shooting, knew who shot the victim, but did not kill John Dufresne herself.
The State, through its own expert, administered the test on September 19, 1975, but the defendant was not indicted until April *5051977. A trial that year resulted in a mistrial and a denial of defendant’s request to have the results of the September 19 test admitted. On retrial before a second judge and jury, the judge ruled that the examiner, Corporal Heon, was an expert polygraph operator and expressly stated that he was persuaded to allow in the evidence. See State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975). Nevertheless, because of his predecessor’s ruling excluding the results, the second judge felt that he was “in a box.” Although the second judge cited State v. Laro, 106 N.H. 500, 213 A.2d 909 (1965), to support his ruling, that case is inapposite. I am aware of no rule or case that would have bound the second judge to the previous trial judge’s ruling on this issue. The testimony presented about the polygraph, the test, and the operator constitutes the record that was lacking in State v. Stewart, 116 N.H. 585, 364 A.2d 621 (1976). The second judge stated that he would have admitted the evidence, but incorrectly excluded the evidence because he thought that he was bound by the prior trial judge’s ruling.
The second judge’s exclusion of this evidence allowed the prosecutor to summarize the evidence by pointing to some “very damaging admissions” made to the police before the September 19 examination and to claim that certain “statements are a good indication of deception” on defendant’s part. The prosecutor could do this secure in the knowledge that the test taken under the supervision of his office relating to the defendant’s credibility would not be presented to the jury. I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.