Court Opinion

ID: 9590256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:53:08.832073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:05.728513
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In its motion for rehearing, Midland argues that the record in this case, as in Ramsey Winch, supra, renders the trial court’s failure to comply with the OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (Code Ann. § 81A-156) thirty-day rule harmless error. Midland asserts that the grounds for its motion were almost identical to the grounds for Cherokee’s motion and that appellants had ample time to respond to the Cherokee motion. However, it is important to note that the grounds upon which this court affirmed the grant of Cherokee’s motion differ completely from the grounds upon which Midland’s motion was based. Midland’s coverage is very similar to Cherokee’s “claims made” coverage. The definition of “insured” under both policies’ “claims made” coverage differs markedly from the definition of “insured” under the “personal injury” coverage contained in the Cherokee policy. As noted in Division 4 above, despite a less restrictive definition of “insured,” the “claims made” portion of the Cherokee policy could not be involved in this case because that coverage terminated prior to the time Scott commenced his action against Dixon. However, Midland’s policy was in force at the time Scott’s claim was made. Consequently, Midland’s motion was not based on either the policy definition of “insured” or the “claims made” feature of that coverage; rather, Midland alleged in its motion only that no “wrongful act,” as that term is defined under the policy, was committed by Dixon. Because the “claims made” feature of this coverage provides a clear and palpable basis for affirming the grant of that portion of Cherokee’s motion, we have not reached the question of whether Scott’s complaint alleged a claim based upon an alleged “wrongful act” committed by Dixon. Without exploring the substance of the latter issue, and certainly without intimating any opinion as to the merits of Midland’s motion, it is clear from a close reading of the policy language that Midland’s motion presents a more difficult question of policy interpretation with respect to the “claims made” coverage than did Cherokee’s motion. In the context of the record in this case, we do not feel that the Midland motion is based upon grounds so indisputable as to render patently specious any defense to the motion and the trial court’s failure to adhere to the thirty-day requirement harmless as a matter of law. Were we to rule otherwise in this case, we would in effect be holding that the failure to adhere to the thirty-day requirement is never a bar to appellate review of the merits of any judgment entered on a motion for *325summary judgment, a result which would render the requirement totally unenforceable.

Motion for rehearing denied.