Court Opinion

ID: 9487351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:14:24.76942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:13.354042
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting, in which KRAVTTCH, HATCHETT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, join:
Introduction
The majority errs in denying due process to Georgia prisoners entitled to parole consideration. The court fails to follow controlling United States Supreme Court precedent. Then, it holds that a Georgia administrative agency (the Parole Board) can ignore a controlling statute passed by the Georgia legislature.
The Supreme Court, as will be discussed below, has unequivocally held that a state by legislative action may create a due process right in its parole system. A state does not have to establish a parole system; when it does, it may elect whether to provide for due process protection or leave parole to the unguided discretion of the paroling authority, who may be the Governor, an agency appointed by the Governor, or an agency staffed as prescribed by the legislature.
Due process protects prisoners entitled to parole consideration from decisions of a paroling authority mistakenly made, infected by discrimination or lack of equal protection, resulting from bribery or political influence, or from some other unjustifiable cause. Due process provides protection from unaccountable arbitrary action on the part of government (invisible people), which is what this country is all about.
Some of these evils led the Governor and legislature of Georgia in 1980 to change the existing system. For reasons not clear, the majority of the court decides to ignore the unequivocal change made in the 1980 law (O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40). The majority holds that the Parole Board has the same unbridled and arbitrary discretion that it had before the 1980 legislation.
*1507The 1980 statute mandates implementation of a parole guidelines system, mandates the specified criteria that the system must take into consideration, and mandates use of the system in determining parole actions. In response to the mandates of O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40, the Board promulgated Guidelines that require application of particularized criteria, which determine an inmate’s Tentative Parole Month. The Guidelines describe the Tentative Parole Month as the month “during which the offender may expect to be released.”1 Notwithstanding the mandatory language, the particularized criteria that guide decisionmaking, and the explicit language of expectancy of release, the majority concludes that the Georgia parole scheme does not give rise to a liberty interest in parole. In so concluding, the majority makes three fundamental mistakes, which I discuss separately below. First, the majority fails to compare the Georgia parole scheme with the parole schemes at issue in the two seminal Supreme Court cases, Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,2 and Board of Pardons v. Allen.3 Such a comparison demonstrates that the Georgia parole scheme necessarily creates a liberty interest in parole. Second, the majority erroneously interprets O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42 as a presumption against parole, rather than as a further indication of the legislative intent to cabin the discretion of the Board. Finally, the majority erroneously defers to the Board’s purported reservation of unfettered discretion to ignore the Guidelines for any reason or for no reason at all. The Board’s position is nonsensical, patently unreasonable, and contrary to the history, the purpose, and the mandates of O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40. Accordingly, I dissent.
I. Under Greenholtz and Its Progeny, the Georgia Parole Scheme Creates a Liberty Interest In Parole
A state creates a protected liberty interest “by placing substantive limitations on official discretion.”4 The most common means by which a state creates such an interest is “by establishing ‘substantive predicates’ to govern official decisionmaking, and, further, by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met.”5 Thus, “the repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest.”6 The “substantive predicates” necessary to create a liberty interest have been described as “ ‘particularized standards or criteria [that] guide the State’s decisionmakers.’”7
Greenholtz is the seminal case on liberty interests in parole. The Nebraska parole statute at issue in Greenholtz provided, in pertinent part:
“Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because:
“(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
“(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for the law;
“(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
“(d) His continued treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will substantially enhance his ca-*1508parity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date.”8
The statute further provided a list of 15 factors that the Board was obligated to consider in reaching a parole decision. Factor number 15 read: “Any other factors the board determines to be relevant.”9 The Supreme Court concluded that this statute gave rise to an “expectancy in release”10 protected by the due process clause.
Some years later, in Board of Pardons v. Allen, the Supreme Court passed upon the Montana parole statute, which provided, in pertinent part:
“Prisoners eligible for parole. (1) Subject to the following restrictions, the board shall release on parole ... any person confined in the Montana state prison or the women’s correction center ... when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community!;.]
“(2) A parole shall be ordered only for the best interests of society and not as an award of clemency or a reduction of sentence or pardon. A prisoner shall be placed on parole only when the board believes that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.”11
Relying on the use of “mandatory language” and “substantive predicates,” the Supreme Court concluded that this statute, like the Nebraska statute at issue in Greenholtz, created a liberty interest in parole. As further support for its conclusion, the Court pointed to the legislative history of the Montana statute: the statute quoted above was enacted in 1955 to replace a 1907 statute that had granted absolute discretion to the Board. The Court saw the 1955 change in the law as an “indication of a legislative intent to cabin the discretion of the Board.”12
It is inconceivable that the Nebraska and Montana statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen create a liberty interest in parole while the Georgia parole scheme does not. The Georgia statute, which is entitled “Parole guidelines system,” provides:
(a) The board shall adopt, implement, and maintain a parole guidelines system for determining parole action. The guidelines system shall be used in determining parole actions on all inmates, except those serving life sentences, who will become statutorily eligible for parole consideration. The system shall be consistent with the board’s primary goal of protecting society and shall take into consideration the severity of the current offense, the inmate’s prior criminal history, the inmate’s conduct, and the social factors which the board has found to have value in predicting the probability of further criminal behavior and successful adjustment under parole supervision.
(b) The guidelines system required by subsection (a) of this Code section shall be adopted by rules or regulations of the board. The rules or regulations shall be adopted in conformity with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.”13
Certainly the language of this statute is no less “mandatory” than that of the Nebraska or Montana statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen. The Georgia statute mandates implementation of a parole guidelines system, mandates use of the system in making parole decisions, and mandates the criteria that the system must take into consideration.
Likewise, the criteria that guide the Board’s decisionmaking under the Georgia parole scheme are no less “particularized”14 than the criteria in the Nebraska or Montana statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen. Under the Georgia scheme, the Board must arrive at each parole decision by following a step-by-step procedure. First, the Board must assign the inmate a Crime Severity Level, which is determined by reference to a table that lists dozens of specific crimes, with each crime assigned a level between I and VII.15 Second, the Board must assign the *1509inmate a Parole Success Likelihood Score. This score is calculated based on the following eight factors:
(a) Age at First Commitment;
(b) Prior Juvenile and Adult Convictions;
(c) Prior Incarcerations Since Age 17;
(d) Probation/Parole Failure;
(e) Use, Possession, or Attempt to Obtain Heroin or Opiate Drugs;
(f) Commitment Offense Involved Burglary or Forgery;
(g) Fully Employed During the Six Months Prior to Current Offense.16
Each of these eight factors is designated a numerical scoring system designed to reflect the inmate’s success or lack thereof as to that factor. The numerical scores for each of the eight factors are added together to arrive at the Parole Success Likelihood Score, which ranges from zero to 20.17 Third, the Board must take the Crime Severity Level and the Parole Success Likelihood Score and apply the Parole Decision Grid to determine the number of months the inmate must serve:
The [Parole Success Likelihood Score] shall be used in conjunction with the Crime Severity Level finally to determine a recommended number of months to serve from the Parole Decision Guidelines grid.
PAROLE DECISION GRID. The Parole Decision Grid is the final component of the Parole Decision Guidelines, the application of which determines the months-to-serve recommendation.18
As this detailed procedure demonstrates, the criteria that guide the Board under the Georgia scheme are far more detailed and particularized, and go much farther in limiting the Board’s discretion, than the criteria in the Nebraska and Montana statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen. For example, under the Nebraska statute, the Board could consider “[a]ny ... factors the board determines to be relevant,”19 while the criteria set out in the Georgia statute and Guidelines grant the Board no such discretion. Likewise, the criteria in the Montana statute were very few and very general, thus permitting the Board far more discretion than the very particularized criteria in the Georgia scheme.
Finally, the Georgia Guidelines, like the Nebraska and Montana statutes, contain mandatory language that “ ‘creat[es] a presumption that parole release will be granted’ when the designated findings are made.”20 The Guidelines provide:
TENTATIVE PAROLE MONTH. The Tentative Parole Month, during which the offender may expect to be released, absent new information or other cause to cancel the Board’s tentative release decision, shall be calculated by adding the recommended months-to-serve to the compute-from date of the controlling sentence.21
The Greenholtz decision turned upon the Supreme Court’s finding that language of the Nebraska statute created an “expectancy of release” on parole.22 The provision quoted above, coupled with the mandated procedure by which the Board must arrive at the recommended months-to-serve, creates more of an “expectancy of release” than the Nebraska and Montana statutes at issue in Green-holtz and Allen. Other provisions in the Guidelines confirm this “expectancy of release.” For example, in a section setting out the benefits of the system, the Guidelines provide: “By eliminating the uncertainty of release dates, inmate morale and sincere participation in rehabilitation programs is enhanced.” 23 The Guidelines eliminate uncertainty by mandating that an inmate’s Tentative Parole Month, during which he may *1510expect to be released, be set by applying the Parole Decision Grid to the inmate’s Crime Severity Level and Parole Success Likelihood Score. Thus, like the statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen, the Georgia parole written procedures use mandatory language that requires the Board to apply particularized criteria to arrive at a parole decision. Under Greenholtz and Allen, the Georgia scheme creates a liberty interest in parole.
The majority’s reasoning is not grounded in the Greenholtz and Allen decisions. I give three specific examples. First, the majority begins its discussion of the Georgia parole system with the statement: “we must keep in mind that our analysis is inherently subjective.” 24 The majority does not cite and I am not aware of any authority to support the proposition that a Greenholtz-tjpe analysis is “inherently subjective.” Under Greenholtz and its progeny, we must look to the language of the state parole scheme and determine whether that language places “substantive limitations on official discretion.”25 I see nothing “inherently subjective” in this analysis.
Second, the majority concedes that “the Guidelines provide a set of particularized criteria that the Board must consider in making parole determinations.”26 Nevertheless, the majority concludes that this “set of particularized criteria” does not indicate the existence of a liberty interest because “the Guidelines leave the Board significant discretion in applying the various factors.... The Guidelines do not envision the rote application of specific criteria and a predetermined outcome if those criteria are met.”27 In so concluding, the majority ignores the teaching of Allen, in which the Supreme Court distinguished between two types of discretion:
In essence, the Court [in Greenholtz ] made a distinction between two entirely distinct uses of the term discretion. In one sense of the word, an official has discretion when he or she “is simply not bound by standards set by the authority in question.” R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 32 (1977). In this sense, officials who have been told to parole whomever they wish have discretion. In Greenholtz, the Court determined that a scheme awarding officials this type of discretion does not create a liberty interest in parole release. But the term discretion may instead signify that “an official must use judgment in applying the standards set him [or her] by authority”; in other words, an official has discretion when the standards set by a statutory or regulatory scheme “cannot be applied mechanically.” Dworkin, supra, at 31, 32; see also id., at 69 (“[W]e say that a man has discretion if his duty is defined by standards that reasonable [people] can interpret in different ways”). The Court determined in Green-holtz that the presence of official discretion in this sense is not incompatible with the existence of a liberty interest in parole release when release is required after the Board determines (in its broad discretion) that the necessary prerequisites exist.28
The discretion upon which the majority relies in concluding that the “particularized criteria” in the Guidelines do not indicate the existence of a liberty interest is clearly the second type of discretion described by the Court in Allen. The majority fails to recognize that this type of discretion is not incompatible with the existent of a liberty interest. Just as a liberty interest may exist when “the standards set by a statutory or regulatory scheme ‘cannot be applied mechanically,’ ”29 so a liberty interest may also exist when “[t]he Guidelines do not envision the rote application of specific criteria....”30
Finally, the majority fails to recognize the significance of the 1980 change in the Georgia law. In Allen, the Supreme Court relied on a change in the Montana parole statute to support its conclusion that the new statute created a liberty interest in parole. Noting that the old statute granted absolute discre*1511tion to the Board, the Court found that the new statute provided an “indication of a legislative intent to cabin the discretion of the Board.”31 Similarly, prior to 1980 in Georgia, there was no statutory requirement that the Board exercise its parole powers in accordance with any specific guidelines or regulations. The Georgia statutes did not place limits on the Board’s discretion to determine when an eligible inmate was to be released on parole. In 1980, however, the Georgia legislature enacted O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40, thereby mandating that such parole determinations be made in accordance with a parole guidelines system. Under Allen, this change in the law is at least some indication of legislative intent to “cabin the discretion of the Board.”32
The majority is able to reach the conclusion it does only by ignoring both the statutes at issue in Greenholtz and Allen and the teachings of those two cases. Under Green-holtz and its progeny, the Georgia parole scheme gives rise to an expectancy of parole that is protected by the due process clause.
II. O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42 Is Consistent with a Liberty Interest in Parole
The majority relies heavily on O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42, which it interprets as creating a “presumption against parole.”33 A cursory review of the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen indicates that this interpretation is flawed. O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42 is very similar to a portion of the Montana statute at issue in Allen. O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42 provides, in part:
No inmate shall be placed on parole until and unless the board shall find that there is reasonable probability that, if he is so released, he will live and conduct himself as a respectable and law-abiding person and that his release will be compatible with his own welfare and the welfare of society.
Similarly, the Montana statute at issue in Allen provided, in part:
A prisoner shall be placed on parole only when the board believes that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.34
O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42 further provides, in part:
[N]o person shall be released on pardon or placed on parole unless and until the board is satisfied that he will be suitably employed in self-sustaining employment or that he will not become a public charge.
Similarly, the Montana statute provided, in part:
A parole shall be ordered only for the best interests of society and not as an award of clemency or a reduction of sentence or pardon.35
The Supreme Court in Allen did not read the Montana statute as creating a presumption against parole. To the contrary, it read the portions of the statute quoted immediately above as a fiirther constraint on the discretion of the Board, preventing a decision in favor of release when a prisoner is unable “to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.”36 Likewise, O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42 can only be interpreted as a further constraint on the discretion of the Board, not as a presumption against release. Consistent with the purpose and intent of the Georgia parole guidelines system, O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42 prohibits the Board from releasing a prisoner who cannot “live and conduct himself as a respectable and law-abiding person.” Thus, O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42 is compatible with the liberty interest in parole created by the Georgia parole scheme. Any other conclusion flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen.
III. The Board’s Position that It Retains Absolute Authority to Ignore the Guidelines is Contrary to the History, the Purpose, and the Mandates of the Georgia Parole Guidelines System
In addition to O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42, the majority also relies heavily on Georgia Rule 475-3- 05(5) and on a portion of the Guidelines that the majority refers to as Annexure *15122. Relying solely on these two provisions, the majority states that “several of the rules and regulations expressly provide for departure [from the grid recommendation].”37 The majority is correct to the extent that Georgia Rule 475 — 3—.05(5) purports to reserve the Board’s discretion to “disagree” with the Guidelines, and Annexure 2 purports to reserve the Board’s decision to “depart” from the Guidelines.38 Nevertheless, neither of these provisions nor any other provision in the Guidelines even mention either a procedure to follow or criteria to consider in effecting such a departure. Thus, the Board purports to reserve for itself the discretion to make a decision independent of the Guidelines, that is, to simply ignore the Guidelines, for any reason or for no reason at all. I cannot accept, as the majority does, the Board’s expansive interpretation of its own discretionary powers.
The Board’s position, when considered in the context of the Georgia parole scheme as a whole, is nonsensical. The Georgia legislature, with O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40, mandated that the Board implement and use Guidelines that take into consideration certain specified factors. The Guidelines promulgated pursuant to this mandate set out a detañed procedure, including the application of numerous particularized criteria, by which the Board must arrive at an inmate’s Tentative Parole Month. The Guidelines also set out a procedure by which the Board may adjust the Tentative Parole Month prior to an inmate’s release; such adjustments may be based on the inmate’s institutional behavior or on new information not previously avaüable.39 The Guidelines do not, however, provide a procedure for departures. That is, there is absolutely nothing in the Guidelines to indicate when or how the Board is to go about disagreeing with, or departing from, the Tentative Parole Month. Neither do the Guidelines indicate what factors or criteria the Board should consider in determining whether departure is appropriate. Rather, the Guidelines simply declare, in Annexure- 2, that “the Board may depart from the Guidelines recommendation and make an independent decision_” It is inconceivable that the Georgia legislature intended to establish a detaüed and particularized system for arriving at an inmate’s Tentative Parole Month, “during which the offender may expect to be released,”40 only to grant the Board the unfettered discretion to completely disregard the system.
Other provisions of the Guidelines are inconsistent with the Board’s position that it has unfettered discretion to depart. For example, the Guidelines provide a procedure by which an inmate may request reconsideration of his months-to-serve calculation.41 The Guidelines specifically provide, however, that such requests “are limited to alleged errors in the Crime Severity Level and/or the Parole Success Factor scores.”42 Thus, under the Guidelines, an inmate may request reconsideration of the two factors that determine his Tentative Parole Month, but he may not request reconsideration or otherwise contest the Board’s decision to depart from this Tentative Parole Month. It makes no sense to provide a procedure for contesting the determination of the Tentative Parole Month but not provide for contesting the decision to depart therefrom.
Another example of the Guidelines’ incompatibility with the Board’s position is ¶ 8-12.01, which provides that an inmate’s Crime Severity Level shall be determined “based on actual convictions of record, without reference to original arrest or booking charges, or allegations in accusations or indictments for which an actual conviction was not obtained.” 43 Notwithstanding this provision, it is the Board’s position that it may consider any information in deciding, in its unfettered discretion, whether to depart from the Guidelines. Sultenfuss is a ease in point. On *1513Sultenfuss’s parole rating summary sheet are the following comments:
[Mjajor drug dealer of cocaine in Macon for years and always claims entrapment. Will have numerous lawyers telling us he’s a great fellow. Paroled on cocaine charges revoked based on new cocaine charge received maximum sentence of 15 years to serve. This is a small quantity case which is out of character for him.44
Thus, the Board certainly considered “accusations ... for which an actual conviction was not obtained” in reaching its decision to depart from the Guidelines in Sultenfuss’s case. To prevent the Board from considering certain information during the calculation of the Tentative Parole Month, when the inmate may challenge the information, but then permit the Board to consider the very same information during the departure decision, when the inmate has no recourse, defies logic and common sense. The Board’s interpretation of its own discretion is contrary to the construction of the Guidelines as a whole.
The Board’s position is completely at odds with the history and the purpose of the 1980 change in Georgia law governing parole decisions. A bit of background here is helpful.45 In 1978, a federal investigation disclosed widespread corruption in the Tennessee parole system. The scandal reached the Governor, Ray Blanton, and three individuals from his office were eventually convicted of accepting bribes for influencing the granting of pardons and paroles.46 As this scandal became national news, the institution of parole came “under siege.”47 Some suggested abolishing parole altogether, while others suggested strengthening the standards that govern the way parole boards operate.48
A year later, in 1979, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles was widely criticized for a number of its decisions.49 One of the Board’s decisions even led to a grand jury investigation of the Board’s actions and, later, to a state court ruling that certain Board proceedings were unconstitutional.50 Specifically, the state court held that the Board must cease its practice of conducting secret proceedings.51
*1514In 1980, in the wake of the Tennessee scandal and the controversies over the Georgia Board’s decisions, the Georgia legislature enacted O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40, mandating that the Georgia Board establish and use a guidelines system in rendering parole decisions. This new system was touted as a “scientific approach” to parole decisions. A contemporaneous newspaper report reads:
Gov. George Busbee announced Thursday that a new “scientific approach” will be implemented to help determine whether inmates in Georgia prisons ought to be paroled, thus avoiding the controversy that surrounded such paroles as the recent release of convicted kidnapper Gary Steven Krist.
“No longer,” said Busbee, “will the parole board’s decision-making process be a myth to the public.... The (new) parole rating guidelines will bring the Pardons and Paroles Board into the 20th Century.”
“The parole rating guidelines will fulfill two critical needs in the criminal justice system,” said the governor. “It will bring about greater fairness, consistency and openness in the parole decisions-making process and will allow us to expand the use of paroles as an alternative to incarceration.”
The new program will involve “the careful development of two charts as grids,” Busbee explained.
“One chart — the crime-severity index— will rank in fine detail the seriousness or severity of each category of crime as determined by input from board members. The second chart takes into account social factors, including work history and criminal history, which serve as indicators of the offender’s chance for success on parole,” he said.
Once in place, the criteria used in making decisions will be available for public review, the governor said. This will increase “the credibility of the system,” he said.52
Publicly, at least, the Board purported to embrace the new guidelines system as a means to repair its tainted image. Another contemporaneous newspaper report reads:
To repair its image, the board set about codifying its parole procedures. Reviews of past cases had revealed wide disparities in the board’s decisions. “We were not the most consistent people in making decisions,” [board director] Morris said. “As we looked at eases we would find that, for example, a person serving for an offense would be paroled. Four months later, a person serving for the same offense with the same background would not be paroled.”
To deal with charges of capriciousness, the board and its staff ... began developing a new way of dealing with the cases. Advertised as a “scientific” way of managing parole, the plan took effect in January.53
Thus, by mandating the implementation and use of the guidelines system, the legislature intended to prevent the perversion of the system that had occurred in Tennessee and instill public confidence in the Georgia Board by insuring that parole decisions were made equitably, objectively, and openly. This intent is embodied in the Guidelines. For example, ¶ 8-1.02 provides, in pertinent part:
The Parole Decision Guidelines System shall be utilized to promote the following policy goals of this Board:
(a) Objective and equitable use of the clemency power in determining appropriate lengths of imprisonment for individual inmates;
(b) Equitable and consistent terms of imprisonment for all inmates sharing similar personal behavior histories and convictions for similar crimes....
The Board’s position that it retains unfettered discretion to depart from the Guidelines for any reason or for no reason at all is at odds with these stated goals. Rather than encouraging equitable, objective, and consis*1515tent decisions under the guidelines system, the Board’s position permits arbitrary departures.
By enacting O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40, the Georgia legislature mandated that the Board implement the guidelines system and use the system in determining parole actions. The majority concludes that the Board’s position is not inconsistent with this mandate because “[t]he Board’s decision to depart from the grid recommendation does not mean that the Guidelines were not used in determining parole action.”54 The majority fails to acknowledge, however, that under the Board’s interpretation, the Guidelines are meaningless. If the Board has the unfettered discretion to arbitrarily depart from the Guidelines, then the Guidelines play no meaningful role in the final parole decision; and if the Guidelines play no meaningful role in the decision, they are not “used in determining parole actions” as mandated by the statute. The Board’s purported retention of unfettered discretion to arbitrarily depart from the Guidelines, without notice or response from, the inmate, is nothing more than a cavalier attempt to avoid the mandate of the Georgia legislature.
This purported retention of discretion is not the only cavalier response the Board has had to the legislature’s mandate. O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40(b) specifically requires that the guidelines system be adopted by rules or regulations of the Board and that these rules or regulations “be adopted in conformity with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the ‘Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.’ ” Under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, the Secretary of State “shall compile, index, and publish all rules adopted by each agency....”55 Rules may be omitted from the Secretary of State’s official compilation provided the “compilation contains a notice stating the general subject matter of rules so omitted and stating how copies thereof may be obtained.”56 Notwithstanding these requirements, the Guidelines discussed in this opinion are not published in the Secretary of State’s official compilation of rules, and there is no notice “stating how copies thereof may be obtained.” It is the Board’s position that the Guidelines are a part of an “internal operating manual”57 that has not been made available to this court for review. By failing to make the Guidelines available to the public as mandated by law, the Board does nothing to dispel the stereotype of the parole board as a shadowy body making arbitrary and capricious decisions outside the realm of public scrutiny.
While an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with implementing is entitled to deference, “administrative construction should be restricted to eases in which the meaning of the statute is really doubtful and must be disregarded where its invalidity is apparent.”58 Here, the Board’s self-serving interpretation of the Georgia parole scheme is contrary to the Georgia statute and, therefore, invalid. The majority errs in deferring to the Board instead of following the law established by the Georgia legislature.
IV. Conclusion
Under Greenholtz and its progeny, the language of the Georgia parole statutes and Guidelines creates a liberty interest in parole. Nothing in the Georgia parole scheme is inconsistent with this liberty interest except the Board’s self-serving attempt to reserve for itself the unfettered discretion to arbitrarily depart from the Guidelines. The Board’s interpretation is without any basis; indeed, it is contrary to the mandates of the Georgia legislature and is, therefore, entitled to no deference. I dissent.

. Parole Decision Guidelines System ¶ 8-27.01 (emphasis added).

. 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979).

. 482 U.S. 369, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987).

. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983).

. Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1909, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (citation omitted).

. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472, 103 S.Ct. 864, 871, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983).

. Olim, 461 U.S. at 249, 103 S.Ct. at 1747 (quoting Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467, 101 S.Ct. 2460, 2465, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)).

. 442 U.S. at 11, 99 S.Ct. at 2106 (quoting Neb. Rev.Stat. § 83-1,114(1) (1976)).

. Id. at 18-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2109 (appendix).

. Id. at 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2106.

. 482 U.S. at 376, 107 S.Ct. at 2420 (quoting Mont.Code Ann. § 46-23-201 (1985)) (alterations in original).

. Id. at 381, 107 S.Ct. at 2422.

. O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40 (1991) (emphasis added).

. Olim, 461 U.S. at 249, 103 S.Ct. at 1747.

. Document entitled “Crime Severity Levels,” Rl-32 Exh. 3 Attach. B.

. Parole Decision Guidelines System ¶ 8-17.03.

. Id. at ¶ 8-17.02 through ¶ 8-25.02.

. Id. at ¶ 8-17.02 and ¶ 8-26.01 (emphasis added).

. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 18-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2109 (appendix).

. Alien, 482 U.S. at 377-78, 107 S.Ct. at 2420 (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2106).

. Parole Decision Guidelines System ¶ 8-27.01 (emphasis added).

. 442 U.S. at 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2106.

. Parole Decision Guidelines System V 8-2.01(b) (emphasis added).

. Majority Op. at 207.

. Olim, 461 U.S. at 249, 103 S.Ct. at 1747.

. Majority Op. at 207.

. Id. at 207.

. Allen, 482 U.S. at 375-76, 107 S.Ct. at 2419.

. Id. at 375, 107 S.Ct. at 2419.

.Majority Op. at 207.

. 482 U.S. at 381, 107 S.Ct. at 2422.

. Id.

. Majority Op. at 208.

. 482 U.S. at 376, 107 S.Ct. at 2420 (quoting Mont.Code Ann. § 46-23-201 (1985)).

. Id.

. Id. at 380, 107 S.Ct. at 2421.

. Majority Op. at 202; see also id. at 209.

. These two provisions also set out the Board’s opinion that the Georgia Parole Guidelines System does not create a liberty interest in parole.

. Parole Decision Guidelines System ¶¶ 8-4.01, 8-8.01(c), 8-30.01 through 8-32.01.

. Id. at ¶ 8-27.01.

. Id. at ¶¶ 8-29.01 through 8-29.04.

. Id. at ¶ 5.2.

. Id. ¶ 8-12.01 (emphasis added).

. Rl-33 Exh. 1 Attach. A.

. The newspaper articles to which references are made in footnotes 47-53 are not a part of the record in this case. The Georgia legislature does not maintain a Legislative History. It is not uncommon for a court to refer to a newspaper article which contains news about the subject upon which the court is writing. Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,-U.S.-,-n. 11, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2616 n. 11, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), which states:
For example, the California State Senate passed a total ban on both print and electronic cigarette advertisements. “California Senate Votes Ban On Cigarette Advertising,” Washington Post, June 26, 1969, p. A9.
See also Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 341 nn. 2, 4 & 5 (5th Cir.) cert. denied.,-U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 79, 126 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993).

. See United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072, 103 S.Ct. 494, 74 L.Ed.2d 635 (1982).

. Marie F. Ragghianti, Is Parole Still a Workable Concept, N.Y. Times, April 4, 1986, at A31.

. See id.

. See Sam Hopkins, ‘We’re Misunderstood,’ Parole Chief Complains, Atlanta Constitution, May 8, 1979, at Cl, C3 (reporting criticism of Board's decision to parole Gary Steven Krist, who was convicted of kidnapping Florida heiress Barbara Jane Mackle and burying her alive for 83 hours); Gail Epstein, Morris Defends Parole, ‘Spider’ Suspect Released in ’76, Atlanta Constitution, May 16, 1979, at Cl, C4 (reporting rape charges against suspect whom Board had released from prison three years earlier); Angry DA to Prosecute State Board of Paroles, Atlanta, Constitution, Oct. 21, 1979, at B3 (reporting district attorney’s anger over Board's decision to commute sentence of prisoner convicted of theft).

. Angry DA to Prosecute State Board of Paroles, Atlanta Constitution, Oct. 21, 1979, at B3 (reporting district attorney’s intent to prosecute members of the Board over decision to commute sentence of William Hubbard); Steve Johnson, Jury Will Probe Pardons Board, Atlanta Constitution, Oct. 30, 1979, at Cl, C2 (reporting grand jury investigation of action of Board in reducing sentence of William Hubbard); Erase Parole Board Powers, D.A. Urges, Atlanta Constitution, Nov. 16, 1979, at C2 (reporting motion filed by district attorney asking superior court judge to declare actions of the Board unconstitutional); Judge Questions Panel’s Authority, Atlanta Constitution, Nov. 19, 1979, at Cl, C2 (reporting hearing before superior court judge on district attorney’s motion).

. Board Stripped of Shroud of Secrecy, Extensive Effect Likely in Ruling on Parole Panel, Atlanta Constitution, March 23, 1980, at Bll.

. Beau Cutts, “Scientific" Parole Plan Aired, Atlanta Constitution, May 18, 1979, at Cl, C4.

. Chester Goolrick, Either Way, Potts Decision Likely to Stir Controversy, Atlanta Constitution, April 30, 1980, at Cl, C2.

. Majority Op. at 207.

. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-7(a).

. O.C.G.A. § 50-13-7(c).

. Majority Op. at 201 n. 1.

. Mousetrap of Atlanta, Inc. v. Blackmon, 129 Ga.App. 805, 201 S.E.2d 330, 332 (1973).