Court Opinion

ID: 9776361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:31:38.190024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.860235
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. I agree with the majority court that judicial immunity can be extended to a qualified therapist and that the issue of judicial immunity is an issue of law. In reading the record, it appears the chancery judge’s appointment of Dr. Harold Stern under his order and decree entered on June 22, 1993, and April 18, 1994, gave Dr. Stern absolute immunity as a matter of law unless a factual issue exists concerning whether Dr. Stern exceeded his quasi-judicial functions. In other words, Dr. Stern’s actions were integral to the judicial process. The broad definition of judicial process includes all the acts of a court from the beginning to the end of its proceedings in a given cause. Black’s Law Dictionary 1205 (6th ed. 1990). And the term integral, in its ordinary usage, means a part or a constituent component which is necessary or essential to complete the whole. Id. at 809. In the instant case, the chancehor in his June 22 order directed that a qualified therapist counsel the divorcing parties and their children relative to the divorce proceedings and conduct all necessary evaluations; the therapist was to report his or her findings and observations to the court. The parties agreed that Dr. Stern would perform this role. In his April 18 decree, the chancellor appointed Dr. Stern to resolve visitation problems and visitation was to be made pursuant to Dr. Stern’s direction, pending further order of the court. The court’s appointment of Dr. Stern and the chancellor’s directives were clearly made during and within the divorce proceedings involving David and Debra Chambers and their children, and such appointment and directives were intended to aid the chancellor in the resolution of visitation issues. It is important to note that the chancellor’s orders authorized Dr. Stern to counsel the Chambers family. Whether the appointed therapist performed his or her judicial function by conducting evaluations or employing treatment is of little import, since both are cognizable skills used by such professionals when counseling parties. In contrast, if a therapist had been court appointed to provide evaluations of or counseling to divorcing parties and their children, and during the course of that appointment, the therapist hit or struck one of the parties, the therapist could be found to have acted outside his or her quasi-judicial functions and therefore would not be entitled to immunity. Nor would a court-appointed therapist enjoy such immunity if he or she engaged in unethical sexual intimacies with one of the divorcing parties. In conclusion, while I agree with the majority court that a court appointed therapist like Dr. Stern is entitled to judicial immunity, I disagree with the court’s opinion that the trial court here is required to make any further findings to determine whether Stern acted within the scope of his quasi-judicial functions. That legal issue and supporting evidence was fully before the trial court and in my view, the record supported the circuit judge’s ruling awarding Dr. Stern absolute immunity. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.