Court Opinion

ID: 9551394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:52:38.319232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:41.791691
License: Public Domain

Hamilton, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part) —On January 5, 1968, a committee, composed of three taxpayers, tendered for filing in the office of the Secretary of State, a proposed initiative measure seeking to have the voters call a constitutional convention. The tender of this proposed measure was made pursuant to RCW 29.79.010 and 29.79.030, which provide in pertinent part:
If any legal voter or organization of legal voters of the state desires to . . . submit a proposed initiative measure to the people, . . . he or they shall file in the office of the secretary of state five printed or typewritten copies of the measure proposed, .... RCW 29.79.010.
The secretary of state shall give a serial number to each initiative or referendum measure, using a separate series for initiative and referendum measures, and forthwith transmit one copy of the measure proposed bearing its serial number to the attorney general. RCW 29.79.030.
The Secretary of State refused to file the proposed initiative measure upon the grounds that it was unconstitutional and would be a nullity even if passed by the voters at the next general election. This position on the part of the Secretary of State was prompted by the provisions of Const, art. 23, § 2, which reads:
Whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature shall deem it necessary to call a convention to revise or amend this Constitution, they shall recommend to the electors to vote at the next general election, for or against a convention, and if a majority of all the electors voting at said election shall have voted for a convention, the legislature shall at the next session, provide by law for calling the same; and such convention shall consist of a number of members, not less than that of the most numerous branch of the legislature.
The question suggested by this constitutional provision is whether the method of calling a constitutional convention *90thereby delineated is exclusive. In short, the query is whether a constitutional convention can be called for by way of an initiative measure.
The Attorney General has applied for a writ of mandate praying that this court direct the Secretary of State to accept the proposed initiative for filing, and seeks a ruling of this court upon the foregoing question.
In conjunction with the application for the writ, the Attorney General sought issuance of an interlocutory order authorizing the Secretary of State to file the proposed initiative measure pending a final hearing and determination by this court of the questions of (a) whether this court would pass upon the validity of the proposed measure and/or (b) whether the proposed measure was a valid measure.
The Chief Justice, with the concurrence of the members of this court, ordered a preliminary hearing before the court upon the issue of whether the requested interlocutory order would issue, and, if so, what its effect would be upon the viability of the issues sought to be raised by the original petition.
In support of his request for the intermediate order, the Attorney General submitted a short brief. Due to the limits of time, and presumably in deference to the narrowness of the issue to be presented at the preliminary hearing, counsel for respondent did not file a responsive brief.
Thus, the immediate and only issue properly before the court at the preliminary hearing was whether or not some form of intermediate order directing the Secretary of State to file the proposed initiative measure could and would be entered. Except as otherwise channeled by questions from the bench, the arguments of counsel were generally addressed and limited to this issue.
Against this background, the majority have hurdled the preliminary character of the proceeding at this stage, and peremptorily proceeded to the conclusion that this court cannot and will not pass upon the constitutional validity of the proposed measure until such time as the people have by their vote approved it. In reaching this conclusion, the ma*91jority have not discussed, or otherwise mentioned the cases of State ex rel. Miller v. Hinkle, 156 Wash. 289, 286 Pac. 839 (1930); State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 181 Pac. 920 (1919); and State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 16, 159 Pac. 92 (1916), wherein this court did consider and pass upon the validity of proposed initiative or referendum measures prior to their submission to the people.
While I may or may not agree with the majority’s conclusion in this respect, I cannot agree upon the manner in which the issue is reached and disposed of. To say the least, orderly, traditional, and customary judicial procedure should permit litigants to properly brief and argue an issue which is vital to their controversy. Anything short of this is tantamount to denying them their day in court.
Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which peremptorily forecloses further presentation and consideration of the questions of (a) whether this court should pass upon the constitutionality of the proposed measure and/or (b) whether the measure is valid.
In my judgment the only appropriately briefed, argued, and submitted question now before this court is whether the Secretary of State should be directed to perform the ministerial act of filing and processing the proposed initiative measure as required by statute. In this regard, I agree with the majority that he should do so, and that a writ of mandate to that end should issue. I would, however, in granting the writ, reserve judgment upon those issues which are not squarely before the court and which have not been fully and adequately presented in this purely preliminary proceeding.
Finley, C. J., concurs with Hamilton, J.
Hunter, J., concurs in the result reached by Hamilton, J.
February 1, 1968. Petition for rehearing denied.