Court Opinion

ID: 9529570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:52:05.906147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:50.946131
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of Kuhn’s conviction. The trial court committed prejudicial error when it summarily denied Kuhn’s objections to. the use of his prior convictions obtained upon guilty pleas. His objection asserted the pleas were unconstitutionally obtained.1 See, e. g., Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.
The majority, citing Hardin v. State ex rel. Van Natta (1978), Ind.App., 376 N.E.2d 518, terms this an impermissible collateral attack on the prior judgments. I disagree.2
A constitutionally invalid conviction may not be used to enhance punishment or establish guilt. U. S. v. Tucker (1972), 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592; Burgett v. Texas (1967), 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319. That is both the purpose and effect of the use of the prior convictions in this case.
Where the defendant fails to properly object to use of the prior conviction, he waives the constitutional issue. Nichols v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1977), 556 F.2d 1330. However when, as here, a timely objection is made, the court must conduct an evidentia-ry hearing to determine the validity of the conviction. Kelley v. U. S. (6th Cir. 1973), 487 F.2d 898 and the state has the ultimate burden of proof. Mitchell v. U. S. (5th Cir. 1973), 482 F.2d 289; U. S. ex rel. Lasky v. LaVallee (2d Cir. 1973), 472 F.2d 960.
For this error I would reverse and remand for a new trial although I agree with the majority that the other errors assigned by Kuhn are without merit.

. Kuhn also asserts the pleas were obtained in violation of the mandates of IC 35-4.1-1-3. To the extent the requirements of that statute exist apart from Kuhn’s constitutional rights, I would join the majority in finding the attempted collateral attack improper.

. The opinion in Hardin does not set forth the facts sufficiently to identify the claimed objections to the prior convictions. However, I believe the opinion must be restricted to application where no constitutional infirmity is claimed.