Court Opinion

ID: 9403241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 18:09:29.219522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:05.732455
License: Public Domain

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                                   2023 PA Super 110

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                v.                             :
                                               :
    ELISABELL V. BERRIOS                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1094 MDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 17, 2022,
              in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000298-2022.

BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                      FILED: JUNE 20, 2023

        Elisabell V. Berrios appeals from the judgment of sentence imposing two

to twelve months’ incarceration after a jury convicted her of open lewdness.1

Because Berrios exposed her breasts to inmates at a county jail from the street

below their cell windows, her public, sexually explicit misconduct violated the

open-lewdness statute. Additionally, the language of that statute withstands

Berrios’ constitutional challenge for vagueness, and we affirm.

        Around 10:10 p.m. on September 16, 2021, Berrios drove her car to

Lancaster County’s jail, where her boyfriend, Fermina Vega, was incarcerated.

The jail is in a residential neighborhood of Lancaster. She parked on the side

of the street opposite the jail.       Berrios’ best friend and her two daughters

(ages eight and twelve) accompanied her in the vehicle. The daughters exited

the vehicle and began playing around the car.
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901.
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      At 10:12 p.m., Vega called Berrios from an app on a jail-provided tablet.

The jail’s IT department automatically recorded the call. See N.T., 6/13/22,

at 94-95; see also Commonwealth’s Ex. 5. Vega and Berrios’ began a sexual

conversation, while Berrios climbed on the hood of her car. See id. Berrios

laid with her back against the car’s windshield and continued to converse with

Vega. The call lasted over 14 minutes.

      A guard, performing a perimeter check, heard children laughing and

making playing sounds, which struck him as odd for that time of night. He

also heard the voices of the inmates drifting down from their windows. They

were yelling and “getting riled up.” Id. at 83-84.

      The guard rounded a corner of the jail and saw Berrios lying on the car,

with a phone in her right hand. With her left hand, she pulled down the top

of her shirt to expose “her entire breast.” Id. 71. At first, this only exposed

one breast, but, as the guard watched, “she moved it over, and [he] saw her

other breast in its entirety, as well.” Id. at 72.

      The guard then radioed his supervisor and called county dispatch. He

remained in the vicinity and activated his body camera while waiting for law

enforcement. See Commonwealth’s Ex. 2. Despite knowing the guard was

present and observing her, Berrios exposed her breasts “at least two, if not

more” times. N.T., 6/13/22, at 79.

      Soon, four local police officers arrived. One of the officers walked over

to Berrios, who was still lounging on her windshield. The officer informed her

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that they had received a call concerning “a female on top of a hood, exposing

herself to the inmates of the prison.” Commonwealth Ex. 7 at 1:07.

       Berrios stated, “Exposing myself? . . . I mean, if showing my stomach

is exposing myself, officer, then - - I’m guilty.” Id. at 1:14.

       “I wasn’t here; I didn’t see it. This is being reported,” the officer said.

Id. at 1:22.

       “Okay. Then it’s basically a he-said-she-said . . . I mean, if showing my

shoulders and showing my stomach is - - is - - then I’m guilty,” Berrios replied.

Id. at 1:25.

       Shortly after interacting with Berrios, the police left the scene. Three

weeks later, they charged her with open lewdness and other offenses not at

issue in this appeal.2

       Berrios filed a pretrial motion to quash the open-lewdness charge. She

asserted that the “statute proscribing open lewdness, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901, is

so vague as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution.”            Motion to Quash at 1.   The trial court

denied Berrios’ motion, and the matter proceeded to trial.

       The jury only convicted Berrios of open lewdness. The court sentenced

Berrios as described above, and she filed post-sentence motions, which were

denied. This timely appeal followed.

____________________________________________

2See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4304(a)(1) (endangering the welfare of children) and
5503(a)(4) (disorderly conduct).

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      Berrios raises three issues, which we have reordered as follows for ease

of disposition:

         1.       [Whether] the evidence . . . was insufficient to prove
                  [Berrios’] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of open
                  lewdness?

         2.       [Whether] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901 is void for vagueness?

         3.       Did the [trial] court . . . abuse its discretion in
                  fashioning [Berrios’] sentence by relying on improper
                  factors?

Berrios’ Brief at 17.

1.    Sufficient Evidence of Lewdness

      First, we consider Berrios’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

She argues that exposing the female breast is not “lewd” as that word is used

within the open-lewdness statute. Berrios observes that no appellate court in

Pennsylvania has held exposing female breasts in public constitutes open

lewdness.     She contends the statute is reserved for public displays of the

genitalia. See id. at 35.

      Alternatively, Berrios claims that the evidence did not prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that she actually exposed her breasts below the top of the

nipple. See id. at 39. She believes that the jury could not reasonably find

that she revealed her nipple from the guard’s testimony that she exposed her

“entire breast.” Id. at 40.

      When reviewing a claim that the evidence does not sufficiently support

a conviction, “our standard of review is de novo; however, our scope of review

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is limited to considering the evidence of record, and all reasonable inferences

arising therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as the verdict winner.” Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 416, 420–21

(Pa. 2014). “The test for the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is

whether the evidence is sufficient to prove every element of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 A.2d 1161, 1162

(Pa. Super. 1990).

      Here, the jury convicted Berrios of open lewdness. A person commits

that crime “if [s]he does any lewd act which [s]he knows is likely to be

observed by others who would be affronted or alarmed.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901.

Berrios has limited her appellate argument to the phrase “lewd act” and

contends that the exposing of the female breasts in public is not lewd.

      There are certainly circumstances where that statement is true.      For

example, our General Assembly has explicitly excluded breastfeeding an infant

from criminality under the Health and Safety Code. The legislature provided

that, “The act of breastfeeding shall not be considered (1) Indecent exposure

as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127[;] (2) Open lewdness as defined in 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 5901[;] (3) Obscenity or sexual conduct as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5903[; or] (4) A nuisance as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6504 . . . .” 35 P.S.

§ 636.4.

      Clearly, the legislature found it necessary to exclude breastfeeding from

the reach of the open-lewdness statute. The enactment of such an exception

strongly indicates a legislative intent that the exposure of the female breast,

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and the nipple with which one breastfeeds, falls within the scope of the

conduct that Section 5901 of the Crimes Code forbids. Otherwise, the General

Assembly would have had no need to enact 35 P.S. § 636.4(2) to exempt

breastfeeding from the open-lewdness statute.

      Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Statutory Construction, we may not

interpret 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901 so narrowly as to render 35 P.S. § 636.4(2)

meaningless, because “Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give

effect to all its provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). Given that the legislature

enacted 35 P.S. § 636.4(2) specifically to exclude the exposure of the nipple

for breastfeeding from criminality under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901, we infer that

the General Assembly intended the exposure of the nipple to constitute open

lewdness, at least in certain circumstances.

      While there may be circumstances, other than breastfeeding, where the

public exposure of a female’s entire breast does not amount to open lewdness,

like the trial court, we hold that this case is a circumstance in which the

General Assembly intended to ban the exposure of a female’s nipples from

public view.

      At common law, the crime of open lewdness “was defined as an act of

gross and open indecency which tends to corrupt the morals of the

community.” Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d 244, 247 (Pa. 1976)

(citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Commonwealth

v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & R. 91, 100 (Pa. 1815); IV BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES

ON THE   COMMON LAW 64 n. 38 (W. Lewis ed. 1898); 53 C.J.S. Lewdness, p. 4

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(1948)). Our General Assembly codified the common-law offense with minor

alterations in the language but with “no difference in meaning.” Id. Thus, 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 5901 “must be read as restating the established, common-law

standard which has long existed in this Commonwealth.” Id.

      Subsequent to Heinbaugh, and building upon its jurisprudence, this

Court faced a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim regarding the open-lewdness

statute in Williams, supra. There, a man was convicted of open lewdness

for walking around an apartment parking lot while wearing only a T-shirt and

tight underwear.

      We indicated that all “the reported Pennsylvania cases on open lewdness

involved public masturbation or public displays of genitalia.” Williams, 574

A.2d at 1163. In overturning the conviction, this Court held that 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5901 “extends only to conduct that: 1) involves public nudity or public

sexuality, and 2) represents such a gross departure from accepted community

standards as to rise to the level of criminal liability.” Id. Because Williams’

conduct involved neither public nudity nor public sexuality, the evidence was

insufficient to convict him of open lewdness.

      Here, unlike in Williams, the conduct of Berrios was overtly sexual in

nature. She received a call from her boyfriend, an inmate in the county jail

and they had a nearly 15-minute conversation that was sexually explicit. They

discussed his ability to see her exposing her entire breast to him and the other

inmates housed on that side of the jail. Thus, Berrios’ conduct involved a

public display of sexuality, even though it did not involve her genitals. The

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clear purpose of Berrios displaying her breasts to the jail was to stimulate

Vega’s lustful interests. And, based on the response of the other inmates, it

was clear to Berrios and the guard that she was riling them up, as well.

Berrios displayed her entire breasts to the inmates for a sexual purpose.

Therefore, her conduct was a “lewd act,” as that term is used in Section 5901

of the Crimes Code.

      Also, her claim that the Commonwealth offered insufficient evidence

that she exposed her nipples is unavailing.       The guard testified that she

exposed her “entire breast” to the inmates on a public street, in the middle of

residential neighborhood of Lancaster. N.T., 6/13/22, at 71.

      From this testimony alone, the jury could reasonably find that Berrios

completely uncovered both of her breasts, which, as matter of basic anatomy,

included her nipples. Berrios’ insistence that the Commonwealth needed to

provide specifics of what parts of her breasts made up her “entire breast” is

absurd.

      The first appellate issue affords Berrios no relief.

2.    Constitutional Challenge Vagueness

      Next, we address Berrios’ constitutional challenge to the statute.

      She argues that the language of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901 is so vague that

to sustain her conviction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the federal constitution. Berrios contends “women of common

intelligence must necessarily guess at [the statute’s] meaning and differ as to

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its application.” Berrios’ Brief at 26 (quoting Connally v. General Const.

Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)) (some punctuation omitted).

       Furthermore, she relies upon Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City of

Fort Collins, Colorado, 916 F.3d 792, 795 (10th Cir. 2019).           There, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court’s

preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of an ordinance that made it

illegal for females to expose their breasts in public. The court’s decision rested

on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the

Equal Protection Clause applies nationwide, Berrios argues “it strains credulity

that the language of Section 5901 could be deemed sufficiently definite to

have notified [her] that the conduct that Commonwealth proved at trial would

make her guilty of this crime.” Berrios’ Brief at 26-27.

       Finally, she contends the common law, upon which the legislature based

Section 5901, provided her with no notice that exposing her breast in public

was illegal. Citing a litany of cases involving men whom the Commonwealth

has tried for open lewdness, Berrios asserts that she could find only one case

where a woman faced such a charge, Commonwealth v. Brewington, 2015

WL 6828138 at *2 (Pa. Super. 2015) (non-precedential decision).3              The

defendant in that case pleaded guilty to open lewdness for running fully naked

through a large picnic.       Because she found no case where a woman was
____________________________________________

3 We note that Berrios’ decision to include Commonwealth v. Brewington,
2015 WL 6828138 (Pa. Super. 2015) (non-precedential decision), in her brief
violates the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, because this Court
decided it prior to May 2, 2109. See Pa.R.A.P. 126.

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convicted for only exposing her breasts, Berrios believes her conviction under

Section 5901 “falls outside notions of fair play and settled rules of law.”

Berrios’ Brief at 32 (quoting Connally, 269 U.S. 391).

      We begin by asking whether Berrios waived her Equal Protection Clause

argument, based on Free the Nipple, supra. “The issue of waiver presents

a question of law, and, as such, our standard of review is de novo, and our

scope of review is plenary.” Trigg v. Children's Hosp. of Pittsburgh of

UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020).

      “Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Indeed, “issues, even those

of constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court. A new

and different theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first

time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 884

(Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 211 A.3d 644 (Pa. 2019).

      Here, Berrios filed a pretrial motion to quash the count of open lewdness

and only asserted that the language of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901 violated the Due

Process Clause of the Fourth Amendment. See Motion to Quash at 1. She

did not assert in the trial court that that statute, if applied to prohibit the

public of exposure of female breasts but not the public exposure of male

chests, would violate the Equal Protection Clause.

      Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States:

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         No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
         the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
         nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
         property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
         person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
         laws.

U.S. Const. amnd. XIV, § 1.

      Although the two Clauses appear consecutively in the amendment, the

Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause give rise to different

constitutional analyses. While similar in aim and scope, their protections and

jurisprudence are not to be conflated. As the Supreme Court of the United

States has explained, the “‘equal protection of the laws’ is a more explicit

safeguard of prohibited unfairness than ‘due process of law,’ and, therefore,

we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases.” Bolling

v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v.

Board of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, (1955).

      Here, the two clauses are not interchangeable, because Berrios’ Equal

Protection claim is an assertion that the Commonwealth’s application of

Section 5901 to her is rooted in a discriminatory classification of women. She

claims that Section 5901 would not be applied to prohibit men from exposing

their chests in public. Thus, Berrios alleges that Pennsylvania’s application of

Section 5901 to her conduct discriminates on the basis of her sex.

      However, the constitutional challenge that she raised in the trial court

focused solely upon vagueness. This is a purely Due Process challenge, with

no connection to concepts of gender-based discrimination.

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       Thus, we conclude that Berrios’ Equal Protection challenge is not

interchangeable with her Due Process challenge that she raised below.

Accordingly, we dismiss her Equal Protection challenge as waived under

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). This Court reserves for a future day the question of whether

convicting a woman for exposing her breasts in public is discrimination on the

basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.4

       We now turn to the Due Process challenge that Berrios preserved for

our review: namely, that the language of Section 5901 is so vague that it

provided her no notice that exposing her entire breasts in public was illegal.

       “As the constitutionality of a statute presents a pure question of law,

our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Brooker, 103 A.3d 325, 334 (Pa. Super. 2014).

       When considering a constitutional challenge for vagueness “Absent the

assertion of an infringement of First Amendment freedoms, the specificity of

a statute must be measured against the conduct in which the party challenging

the statute has engaged.” Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d at 245 (footnote omitted).

In other words, Berrios asserts an as-applied challenge to the statute, rather

than a facial one.

       “A criminal statute must give reasonable notice of the conduct which it

proscribes to a person charged with violating its interdiction.” Id. at 246.
____________________________________________

4 Furthermore, Berrios made no claim of heightened protections under the
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). Hence, we limit our decision to the
federal constitution.

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“Statutes which are so vague that they fail to provide such notice violate the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.” Id. “The fact that the legislature might without difficulty have

chosen clear and more precise language equally capable of achieving the end

which it sought does not mean that the statute which it in fact drafted is

unconstitutionally vague.”   Id. (some punctuation omitted).      “Rather, the

requirements of due process are satisfied if the statute in question contains

reasonable standards to guide the prospective conduct.” Id.

      In Heinbaugh, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected a Due

Process challenge to Section 5901 based on vagueness. There, a man faced

a charge of open lewdness, because he “did expose and exhibit his genital

organs in a lewd manner openly in a certain place situate at the Kroger parking

lot . . . [and] was masturbating in plain view.” Id. 245 n.2. The trial court

quashed the indictment due to vagueness, and the Commonwealth appealed.

      Reversing, the High Court held that, “when an ascertainable standard is

present in a statute, the violator whose conduct falls clearly within the scope

of such standard has no standing to complain of vagueness.”        Id. at 247.

Because the open-lewdness statute simply codified the common-law crime of

the same name, Section 5901 stands “on a footing somewhat different than

statutes which attempt to circumscribe conduct newly proscribed.” Id.

      The language of a statute based upon the common law “need not be

drawn with the precision that a newly conceived interdiction might require.”

Id.   “Thus, statutes which embody common-law definitions have generally

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survived attacks on the grounds of vagueness.” Id. Section 5901 survived

constitutional   attack   when   applied   to   Heinbaugh’s   actions,   because

masturbating in a grocery store parking lot rendered him “a hard core violator

. . . .” Id. at 248 (some punctuation omitted).

      Still, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania conceded that the “broadening

of sexual permissiveness, which is an undeniable aspect of contemporary

American society, may have served to shrink the perimeters of community

morality . . . .” Id. at 248. While public masturbation remains an “indecency

. . . there might be other conduct, clearly punishable at the time of Blackstone,

which could not today be constitutionally punished under the statutory

standard” of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901. Id. Berrios asserts that her conduct falls

in the latter category. She believes that, unlike Heinbaugh, she is not “a hard

core violator . . . .” Id. at 248 (some punctuation omitted).

      The flaw in Berrios’ argument is that she presumes that the Heinbaugh

Court established an either/or test. In her view, one is either a hard core

violator to whom the statute may constitutionally apply, or one is not a hard

core violator to whom the statute may not constitutionally apply.

      In our view, Heinbaugh did not create such a clear-cut dichotomy. We

read Heinbaugh as merely holding that hard core violators may not bring a

successful, void-for-vagueness challenge to common-law based statutes. It

does not explicitly require the Commonwealth to establish that a defendant is

a “hard core violator” to satisfy the precepts of Due Process. Thus, we need

not find either that Berrios is a hard core violator or acquit her.

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      Instead, the test is one of reasonableness under the circumstances of

each case. Was it reasonably foreseeable to someone in Berrios’ position that

the law forbade her conduct? Should she “reasonably understand that [her]

contemplated conduct [was] proscribed”? United States v. Mazurie, 419

U.S. 544, 553, (1975).

      In Mazurie, the district court convicted Martin and Margret Mazurie of

“introducing spirituous beverages into Indian country, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1154.”   Id. at 545.    The appellate court reversed on the basis that the

statute was void for vagueness.     Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court,

Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed and reinstated their convictions.          He

explained that the Tenth Circuit was too concerned with the lack of specificity

in the statute for the word “Indian,” because the Mazuries knew which people

in the reservation were Indians.    Thus, they would have had no difficulty

following the law, if they had desired to do so.

      “The record plainly establishes that, in the circumstances of this case,

the distinction between Indians and non-Indians was generally understood.”

Id. at 553, n.10. “Those who testified about the housing and school surveys

displayed no difficulty in making such classification. Nor did Mr. Mazurie.” Id.

“He testified that, when there was trouble at his bar, he would call the county

sheriff to deal with a non-Indian, but [he] would call the tribal police to deal

with an Indian.”    Id.   “When his counsel questioned him as to how he

determined which was which, he simply replied: ‘Because I knew them.’” Id.

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The Mazurie’s vagueness challenge was futile, because they knew which

people to whom they could not legally sell liquor.

      Like the Mazuries, Berrios knew the law’s command, but she chose to

break it anyway. Her interaction with the responding police officer reveals

that she knew that exposing her breasts on a public street was against the

law. When the officer approached her to inquire into her actions, Berrios lied

to him. Instead of saying she exposed her entire breasts, she told the officer

that she only exposed her shoulders and her stomach.

      In fact, she stated, “It’s basically a he-said-she-said . . . I mean, if

showing my shoulders and showing my stomach is - - is - - then I’m guilty,”

Berrios replied. Commonwealth’s Ex. 7 at 1:25. From this statement, the

record reveals that Berrios believed that exposing her shoulders and stomach

was not a crime. From her tone of voice and body language in the video, it is

clear that she meant “then I’m guilty” to be sarcastic. Id.

      Hence, if Berrios had truly no notice or knowledge that the law forbade

her from exposing her breasts in public, she would have treated her exposed

breasts as she treated her exposed shoulders and stomach. She would have

admitted to exposing them to the officer along with her shoulders and stomach

and then sarcastically said “then I’m guilty.” Instead, Berrios hid the fact that

she had publicly exposed her breasts from the officer in a clear indication of

her consciousness of guilt.

      Berrios’ consciousness of guilt establishes that, even in her own mind,

showing the entire female breast in public and attempting to rouse the sexual

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interests of county inmates are “actions which, even by contemporary mores,

must be deemed, as at common law, indecencies which tend to corrupt the

morals of the community.” Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d at 248 (some punctuation

omitted). In short, Berrios knew she had committed a “lewd act which [s]he

[knew was] likely to be observed by others who would be affronted or

alarmed.”    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5901.       Accordingly, her void-for-vagueness

challenge fails.

      We dismiss her second appellate issue as meritless.

3.    Application to Review Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

      Finally, we come to Berrios’ challenge to the discretionary aspects of her

sentence. Before reaching the merits of that issue, we must decide whether

to grant her petition for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of

sentence.

      According to the legislature, “The defendant . . . may file a petition for

allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence for a felony or

a misdemeanor to the appellate court that has initial jurisdiction for such

appeals.”   42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781. “Allowance of appeal may be granted at the

discretion of the appellate court where it appears that there is a substantial

question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under this chapter.”

Id.

      Thus, there is no right of appeal regarding the discretionary aspects of

one’s sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lebarre, 961 A.2d 176, 178

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(Pa. Super. 2008).    To decide whether to hear such an issue, this Court

conducts a four-part analysis as follows:

         (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2)
         whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or
         in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether
         appellant’s brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is
         a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is
         not appropriate under the sentencing code.

Id.

      Berrios complied with the first three prongs of the test, but the

Commonwealth contends that she does not present a substantial question.

See Commonwealth’s Brief at 20. As such, we focus our inquiry solely upon

the fourth prong.

      According to Berrios, her two-months-to-one-year sentence raises a

substantial question, because the trial court “fixated upon the seriousness of

the offense as it perceived it.” Berrios’ Brief at 21. She makes this claim

despite the fact that that court sentenced her within the standard range, in

light of the gravity of the offense and her prior convictions.

      The Commonwealth responds:

         [A] Rule 2119 (f) Statement will be deemed sufficient to
         raise a substantial question to trigger review of the
         discretionary aspects of sentence only when it articulates
         the manner in which the sentence violates: either a specific
         provision of the sentencing code, or a particular
         fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.
         Commonwealth v. Mouzon, [812 A. 2d 617 (Pa. 2002)].
         [Berrios] has not met this burden.

              [She] has not established that there was a violation of
         the sentencing code, or a particular fundamental norm

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         underlining the sentencing process. The sentence imposed
         was within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines;
         thus, the sentence was appropriate under the sentencing
         code. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A. 2d 162, 171 (Pa.
         Super. 2010). At sentencing, the court considered the
         penalties authorized by the legislature, and the sentencing
         guidelines. To determine the suggested sentence for each
         conviction, sentencing courts must determine the
         defendant’s prior record score and the offense gravity score
         for each offense. See, Commonwealth v. Hand, 252
         A.3d. 1159, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2021). Open lewdness has an
         offense gravity score of one. [Berrios] had a prior record
         score of two. The standard sentencing range for open
         lewdness is restorative sanctions to two months
         incarceration. (See, 1925 (b) Opinion of the Trial Court).
         [Berrios] received a sentence of two to twelve months’
         incarceration. This sentence was within the standard range
         of the Sentencing Guidelines.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 20-21.

      We agree with the reasoning of the Commonwealth and, therefore,

conclude that Berrios’ sentence does not raise a substantial question.          We

decline to assert appellate jurisdiction over Berrios’ third and final issue.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 06/20/2023

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