Court Opinion

ID: 9404950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 19:09:44.173513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:18.272436
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Rath, 2023-Ohio-2118.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                        CASE NO. 2023-L-004

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                      Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                        Court of Common Pleas

MICHAEL D. RATH,
                                                      Trial Court No. 2022 CR 000712
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                               OPINION

                                           Decided: June 26, 2023
                                            Judgment: Affirmed

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Jennifer A. McGee, Assistant
Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490,
Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Adam Parker, The Goldberg Law Firm, LLC, 323 West Lakeside Avenue, Suite 450,
Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendant-Appellant).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant, Michael Rath, appeals his conviction and sentence for

Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs.               For the following reasons, Rath’s conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

        {¶2}     On August 15, 2022, the Lake County Grand Jury returned an eight-count

Indictment against Rath for Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs, Aggravated Possession of

Drugs (two counts), Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession of Cocaine, Trafficking in Heroin,

Possession of Heroin, and Possessing Criminal Tools.
      {¶3}   On September 20, 2022, Rath filed a Motion to Suppress.

      {¶4}   On November 3, 2022, a hearing was held on the Motion to Suppress.

      {¶5}   On November 4, 2022, the trial court issued its written decision denying the

Motion to Suppress:

                     Detective Ryan Butler (“Det. Butler”) and Detective Matthew
             Jacob (“Det. Jacob”), both of the Mentor Police Department, testified
             at the hearing. Det. Jacob testified that on June 28, 2022 he received
             a tip that Defendant was staying at the Woodspring Suites Hotel
             (“Hotel”) in Mentor with a female who appeared to be intoxicated.
             Det. Butler testified that he followed Defendant and his companion,
             later identified as Kel[c]ey Music (“Music”), as Defendant made
             several short-duration stops, including at the home of Devon Brooks
             (“Brooks”), who has a criminal history for drug trafficking. Defendant
             also engaged in evasive driving tactics. Det. Jacob pulled over
             Defendant for a marked lanes violation and questioned him outside
             of his vehicle. Defendant tried to buy time before answering each
             question and appeared nervous; he was sweating and breathing
             heavily. Defendant consented to a pat down, but when Det. Jacob
             asked to search him Defendant said he did not think it was necessary
             for a routine traffic stop. Det. Jacob explained that it was more than
             a routine stop, and that if Defendant had nothing to hide then the
             sooner he searched Defendant the sooner Defendant could leave;
             Defendant responded “go ahead and search me man.” The entire
             exchange lasted approximately one minute, and was well within the
             average of 10 to 15 minutes that Det. Jacob testified would be
             needed for a marked lanes violation stop. No threats or promises
             were made to Defendant, and while Defendant questioned the need
             for a search he never said “don’t search me.” Defendant had four
             white prescription pills in his wallet not in their original packaging,
             and a large wad of cash in both his wallet and his shorts pocket. As
             a result Det. Jacob detained him by handcuffing him and putting him
             in the back of his patrol car.

                    While Det. Jacob was speaking to Defendant, Det. Butler
             questioned Music, who admitted that she had methamphetamine in
             her purse and was arrested.        Mentor Police then searched
             Defendant’s vehicle, including a backpack that had been within
             Music’s reach while she was in the passenger seat, and found
             narcotics inside the backpack. Later that day Det. Butler obtained a
             search warrant for Defendant’s hotel room, where he found
             additional narcotics.

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Case No. 2023-L-004
                      ***

                     The court finds that Defendant consented to the search of his
             person. The exchange with Det. Jacob took approximately one
             minute, did not include any threats or promises, did not extend the
             stop, and took place during daylight hours in a public area with
             people walking past. There were no indications (and Defendant does
             not argue) that Defendant did not understand Det. Jacob’s request.
             Defendant questioned the need to be searched, but never stated
             “don’t search me.” And although there were multiple officers present,
             those officers did not threaten Defendant or have their guns drawn.
             Accordingly, based on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant’s
             consent was freely and voluntarily given. * * *

                    Defendant’s only challenge to the narcotics found in his
             vehicle and his hotel room is that they are fruit of the poisonous tree
             because he did not voluntarily consent to the search of his person. *
             * * Even if Defendant had challenged the search of his vehicle, or
             opening the backpack during the search, the motion would be
             denied. Based on the totality of the circumstances – including that
             Defendant was staying at a Hotel that was known for drug trafficking,
             he made several short-duration stops, he made evasive driving
             measures, and he stopped at a known drug trafficker’s house for 5-
             10 minutes; and Music admitted to having methamphetamine in her
             purse and had access to the backpack in the vehicle – the court finds
             that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and the
             backpack.

      {¶6}   On November 8, 2022, Rath entered a plea of “No Contest” to the count of

Aggravated      Trafficking    in     Drugs       and     “Guilty”   to    accompanying

Contraband/Instrumentalities Forfeiture and Currency Forfeiture Specifications.        The

remaining counts of the Indictment were dismissed at sentencing.

      {¶7}   On December 20, 2022, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry of

Sentence, ordering Rath to serve a prison term of a minimum of five years to a maximum

of seven and one-half years for Aggravated Trafficking.

      {¶8}   On January 10, 2023, Rath filed his Notice of Appeal. On appeal, he raises

the following assignments of error:

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Case No. 2023-L-004
              [1.] Mr. Rath received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial
              counsel failed to challenge probable cause for the search of his
              vehicle.

              [2.] The trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.

              [3.] The trial court plainly erred in imposing an unconstitutional
              sentence under the Reagan Tokes Act.

       {¶9}   The assignments of error will be considered out of order. Under the second

assignment of error, Rath argues that the trial court erred by finding that his consent to

the search of his person was voluntary.

       {¶10} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.

“[A]n appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by

competent, credible evidence,” but “must then independently determine, without

deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal

standard.” Id.

       {¶11} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for “[t]he

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” “Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution

affords the same protection as the Fourth Amendment in felony cases.” State v. Jones,

143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 12. “The Fourth Amendment

proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio

St.3d 368, 2018-Ohio-201, 96 N.E.3d 262, ¶ 17. “[S]earches conducted outside the

judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment–subject only to a few specifically established and well-

delineated exceptions.” Id., quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct.
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Case No. 2023-L-004
507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). “Consequently, evidence obtained in a warrantless search

is generally inadmissible, and under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, such

evidence cannot serve as probable cause to support a subsequent warrant.” State v.

Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427, 534 N.E.2d 61 (1988).

       {¶12} “A search based on consent is one exception to the Fourth Amendment’s

general warrant requirement.” State v. Ferrell, 2017-Ohio-9341, 91 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 12

(11th Dist.); State v. Penn, 61 Ohio St.3d 720, 723-724, 576 N.E.2d 790 (1991). “In order

to waive his Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures,

the accused must give a consent which is voluntary under the totality of all the surrounding

circumstances.” State v. Childress, 4 Ohio St.3d 217, 448 N.E.2d 155 (1983), paragraph

one of the syllabus. “[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody,” the State must

“demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress

or coercion, express or implied.” State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 242-243, 685

N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S.Ct.

2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75

L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (“the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was

obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by

showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority”).

       {¶13} Rath argues that the facts of the present case demonstrate that his consent

was not voluntary: “When Mr. Rath agreed to the search of his person, he was surrounded

by numerous officers. He had been informed that he was not just stopped for a traffic

violation, but was actually the subject of a narcotics investigation. His initial refusal to

consent to a search did not stop detectives from repeatedly asking for permission to

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Case No. 2023-L-004
search. Officers also indicated to him that he would need to agree to a search in order to

end the interaction with law enforcement.” Brief of Appellant at 5. We disagree.

       {¶14} As noted above, consent to search is valid if it is voluntarily given under the

totality of the circumstances. Although seven officers were present at the scene, only a

couple were actively engaged with Rath. Although reluctant to consent to the search, the

interaction between Rath and the police was cooperative rather than confrontational,

occurred in a public space, and was of brief duration. The fact that Rath was under

investigatory detention when he gave his consent does not ipso facto render the consent

involuntary. “The fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a

coerced confession or consent to search.” State v. Riedel, 2017-Ohio-8865, 100 N.E.3d

1155, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.), quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820,

46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); State v. Fouch, 5th Dist. Licking No. 14 CA 71, 2015-Ohio-1784,

¶ 28 (the fact that defendant was in custody “did not affect the voluntariness of [her]

consent to search”); compare Robinette at 241 (“[v]oluntary consent * * * may validate an

otherwise illegal detention”). Here, Detective Jacob presented Rath with an accurate

description of the situation so as to render his consent informed rather than coerced. Rath

was the subject of a narcotics investigation and had been observed engaging in activity

that caused the police to have reasonable (and justified) suspicions that he was

trafficking. Detective Jacob’s statements that these suspicions would have to be eased

before Rath could leave simply reflected the actual circumstances of the situation. “[I]f

the officer’s statement simply advises the suspect of his [or her] precise legal situation,

such a ‘threat’ is not coercion.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Williams, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 28550, 2020-Ohio-3903, ¶ 50, ¶ 51 (“Det. Hemingway simply advised Williams of

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Case No. 2023-L-004
what the police had observed [a suspected drug transaction] and the choices that were

involved [if consent were not given a warrant would be obtained]”).

       {¶15} Assuming, arguendo, that the consent search was invalid, the error was

harmless. As discussed below, the search of Rath’s vehicle was supported by probable

cause independent of the pills or anything else discovered on his person. Anything

incriminating on or about Rath’s person would have been inevitably discovered following

the search of his vehicle. State v. Camp, 2014-Ohio-329, 24 N.E.3d 601, ¶ 35 (5th Dist.)

(“because the officers would have arrested Camp for the drug paraphernalia [found in his

vehicle] and would have conducted a full search incident to arrest, the officers inevitably

would have discovered the loaded heroin syringe in Camp’s pocket”).

       {¶16} The second assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶17} Under the first assignment of error, Rath argues that trial counsel was

ineffective for not challenging the search of his vehicle.

       {¶18} “Counsel’s performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until

counsel’s performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable

representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel’s performance.” State v.

Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus; State

v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 388-389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000). With respect to counsel’s

performance, the defendant must demonstrate that “counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d

674 (1984). The element of prejudice means “that counsel’s errors were so serious as to

deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. “Unless a

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Case No. 2023-L-004
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence

resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”

Id.

       {¶19} In addition to voluntary consent, an exception to the warrant requirement

exists for searches of automobiles based on probable cause. “Once a law enforcement

officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may

search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile

exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51, 734 N.E.2d

804 (2000); State v. Welch, 18 Ohio St.3d 88, 91, 480 N.E.2d 384 (1985), citing Carroll

v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-156, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (“a

warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police officers who had probable cause

to believe the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment”). In the context of an automobile search, probable cause has

been defined as “a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing

officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure

and destruction.” State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 208, 373 N.E.2d 1252 (1978),

quoting Carroll at 149. “The determination of probable cause is fact-dependent and turns

on what the officers knew at the time they conducted a search.” (Citation omitted.) State

v. Huber, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2018-L-033, 2019-Ohio-270, ¶ 20. “[I]f probable cause

justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the

vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” State v. Vega, 154

Ohio St.3d 569, 2018-Ohio-4002, 116 N.E.3d 1262, ¶ 13, quoting United States v. Ross,

456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

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Case No. 2023-L-004
       {¶20} Rath argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging “whether

the [police] officers had probable cause to conduct the search of the vehicle.” He

maintains that the probable cause determination to search the vehicle was based on the

discovery of unidentified pills in substitute packaging (a baggie) on his person during the

consent search, and that this determination rested on the mistaken belief that it is illegal

to carry prescription pills in an unmarked container. Brief of Appellant at 3-4. We

disagree.

       {¶21} As noted by the State, the trial court expressly stated that, even if the search

of the vehicle had been challenged, probable cause existed to search based on the facts

that “Defendant was staying at a Hotel that was known for drug trafficking, he made

several short-duration stops, he made evasive driving measures, and he stopped at a

known drug trafficker’s house for 5-10 minutes; and Music admitted to having

methamphetamine in her purse and had access to the backpack in the vehicle.” A review

of the record of the suppression hearing confirms that the pills were not part of the

probable cause determination to search the vehicle. Detective Butler, who conducted the

search of the vehicle, testified at the hearing that there were a “multitude of reasons” for

searching the vehicle: “Obviously based on everything that we witnessed today [sic] I got

my direct knowledge about the defendant, his history, his prior arrests, watching him leave

a high crime high drug area, Woodspring Suites, with Kelcey Music; them stopping at

multiple residences for short periods of time; him also committing multiple

countersurveillance tactics. And then ultimately the arrest of Kelcey Music, her admission

to her being in possession of methamphetamine as well as other paraphernalia.”

Compare Huber at ¶ 23 (“based on their knowledge, training, and experience [witnessing

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drug transactions], it was reasonable for the officers to conclude the driver was involved

in a drug transaction”).

       {¶22} Given that the search of the vehicle was not based on the discovery of the

baggie with pills or of any other contraband during the consent search, trial counsel was

not ineffective for failing to challenge the search of the vehicle on those grounds.

       {¶23} The first assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶24} Under the third assignment of error, Rath argues his indefinite sentence

imposed pursuant to R.C. 2967.271 is unconstitutional as violative of his rights to trial by

jury and due process as well as the separation of powers doctrine. This court has

previously rejected these arguments and the law with respect to the constitutionality of

the Reagan Tokes Act remains settled in this district. See State v. Reffitt, 11th Dist. Lake

No. 2021-L-129, 2022-Ohio-3371.

       {¶25} While appreciating the need to preserve the issues raised for further

appellate review, the third assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶26} For the foregoing reasons, Rath’s conviction and sentence for Aggravated

Trafficking in Drugs is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against the appellant.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur.

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