Court Opinion

ID: 9584052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:44:12.366129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:32.642315
License: Public Domain

Judge WYNN
dissenting.
In Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90 S.E.2d 898 (1956), Justice Parker writing for our Supreme Court stated that “it is well understood that a dedication is never complete until acceptance.” Id. at 368, 90 S.E.2d at 901. North Carolina has recognized three modes of acceptance of an offer of dedication: (1) by formal or express acts of public authorities; (2) by implication by acts of public authorities; or (3) by implication from user by the public for the purpose for which the property was dedicated.
I take issue with the majority’s conclusion that North Carolina does not recognize “public user” as a legal manner of acceptance of an offer of dedication. In Draper v. Conner & Walters Co., 187 N.C. 18, 121 S.E. 29 (1924), our Supreme Court found that mere permissive use by the public will not show a dedication to the public when an owner of land constructs a road for his own convenience. Id. at 20, 121 S.E. at 30. The Court also stated, however, that user by the public is a valid mode of acceptance of an offer of dedication when intent to dedicate is not at issue:
“[T]he right to a public way cannot be acquired by adverse user, and by that alone, for any period short of twenty years. It is also established that if there is a dedication by the owner, completed by acceptance on the part of the public, or by persons in a position to act for them, the right at once arises, and the time of user is no longer material. The dedication may be either in express terms or it may be implied from conduct on the part of the owner; and, while an intent to dedicate on the part of the owner is usually required, it is also held that the conduct of the owner may, under certain circumstances, work a dedication of a right of way on his part, though an actual intent to dedicate may not exist. These principles are very generally recognized and have been applied with us in numerous and well considered decisions.”
Id. at 21, 121 S.E. at 31 (quoting Tise v. Whitaker-Harvey Co., 146 N.C. 374, 375, 59 S.E. 1012, 1013 (1907)). See Milliken v. Denny, *369141 N.C. 224, 53 S.E. 867 (1906); Boyden v. Achenbach, 79 N.C. 539 (1878).
Admittedly, it appears that the “public user” mode of acceptance recently has been disregarded in our Courts’ analysis of dedication cases. See, e.g., Owens v. Elliott, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962). In Emanuelson v. Gibbs, 49 N.C. App. 417, 271 S.E.2d 557 (1980), this Court explained the confusion concerning “public user”:
Confusion in the law of acceptance of dedication by a public authority has resulted from consolidation of all cases dealing with dedication regardless of the goals of the litigants. In the early law of dedication in North Carolina where a private citizen sought to prevent a subdivision developer from blocking access to a street by withdrawing the offer of dedication of the street pursuant to G.S. 136-96, he could prove dedication to the public use through the theory of public user — that is, by showing an offer of dedication and an acceptance of the offer by the public in that the street was traveled by the general public. However, if the litigant sought to impose a duty of maintenance of a street upon a public authority, more than mere use by the public was required to prove dedication. The courts sought to protect public authorities from unreasonable burdens of maintenance by requiring some act signaling acceptance of the duty by the authority.
Id. at 420, 271 S.E.2d at 559. See Town of Blowing Rock, 243 N.C. at 368, 90 S.E.2d at 901 (“This acceptance may be shown not only by formal action on the part of the authorities having charge of the matter, but under certain circumstances, by user as of right on the part of the public . . . .”); Note, Dedication-Acceptance of Streets in Subdivision — Public User, 41 N.C. L. Rev. 875, 878-80 (1963) (Public user is a valid mode of acceptance except when a party attempts to use public user to impose a duty of public maintenance.).
Because I believe that “public user” is a valid mode of acceptance as an offer of dedication, I conclude that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to have excluded the deed during the trial of this case.