Court Opinion

ID: 9645297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:19:58.38926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:26.798149
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge
(dissenting):
Two elderly District of Columbia women have been deprived of the home that they have struggled, financially, for twenty-three years to maintain. The loss of their domicile — representing a personal investment of over $20,000 — has come approximately one year after the mortgage was paid in full, and as a result of a sale for delinquent taxes netting the District of Columbia $294.09. These two “delinquent taxpayers” did not receive any personal notice of the pendency of the sale which took place three months earlier than the date which, for forty years, had been the customary date for tax sales. Their loss is one which the majority dismisses as not “ris[ing] to the level of a due process deprivation.” I respectfully disagree.
One would find it hard to believe, from the majority’s recitation, that appellants have never received actual notice of the sale of their home or the expiration date for redemption.1 The fact is that the only notice given appellants of the actual date fixed for the sale was by newspaper publication. Such notice was concededly in compliance with Section 47-1001 of the D.C.Code. It does not follow that such notice, under the circumstances presented here, comports with due process.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), the Supreme Court considered the constitutional sufficiency of notice by publication prior to depriving known persons, whose whereabouts are also known, of substantial property rights, and found such notice incompatible with the requirements of due process. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process ... is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 339 U.S. *141at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657. “[P]rocess which is a mere gesture is not due process,” and “[i]t would be idle to pretend that publication . . . is a reliable means” of informing someone that a certain matter is pending, so that he or she may decide how to respond. Id. at 315, 70 S.Ct. at 657.
The general rule that emerges from Múlleme is that notice by publication is unacceptable with respect to a person whose name and address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected by the action in question. “Where the names and post-office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency.” Id. Accord, Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 213, 83 S.Ct. 279, 9 L.Ed.2d 255 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115-16, 77 S.Ct. 200, 1 L.Ed.2d 178 (1956); New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 344 U.S. 293, 296, 73 S.Ct. 299, 97 L.Ed. 333 (1953).2
I think the decision in the case before us is controlled by the rule enunciated in Mul-lane and applied ofttimes since. I would hold that the notice (by publication) given appellants prior to the tax sale of their home was constitutionally deficient and that the tax sale was therefore invalid.3
The sale, under the circumstances here, is, moreover, contrary to the scheme and purpose of statutory enactments. Thus D.C.Code 1973, § 47-903, states that:
No family dwelling-house occupied by the owner thereof shall be sold for delinquent personal or real-estate taxes or special assessments unless notice has been personally served upon such owner or sent by registered mail, addressed to him at such dwelling-house, not less than thirty days prior to the date of such sale.
However, appellees argue, and the majority seems to agree, that Section 47-903 is inapplicable to appellants by virtue of Section 47-905:
This chapter shall be deemed as applying only to such occupant and owner as shall have filed with the assessor of the District of Columbia an affidavit as to domicile and ownership. The form of the affidavit shall be prepared by the assessor of the District of Columbia, and shall show the beginning of domicile, the time when ownership began, the street number, the number of the square and lot, and all trusts, if any, against the property.
Appellees’ restrictive reading of Section 47-905 exalts form over substance. Moreover, it exposes the tax sale procedure to grave constitutional attack since by its operation, homeowners are denied any notice of sale other than by publication. But the statute’s constitutionality can be upheld and the intent of Congress furthered by a common sense interpretation. The provisions of Title 47, Chapter 9, directed to “Family Dwellings Occupied by Owners,” reflect a special concern for resident homeowners. The evident congressional intent was to prevent forfeiture whenever possible. Such intent, however, is totally defeated by *142the interpretation adopted by the majority. In order for Section 47-903 to have the effect Congress clearly intended, Section 47-905’s statement that “The form of the affidavit shall be prepared by the assessor of the District of Columbia . . must, I think, be read as placing on the District the burden of notifying resident homeowners of the provisions of Chapter 9 or at the very least providing them with the requisite affidavit.4
Certainly all of the information required by the affidavit was available in the Tax Assessor’s Office. Ms. Coleman went to that office in 1960 after her aunt’s death specifically to ensure that all official records were accurate. Moreover, she has visited that office many times since. It is inherently and grossly unfair for the District now to assert that her home can be sold without prior notice to her because she failed to file a paper which only it could provide.5
For all these reasons I am singularly unimpressed by the majority’s assertion that it feels constrained to affirm because of two prior decisions of this court, Dodson v. Scheve, D.C.App., 339 A.2d 39 (1975), and Moore v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 749 (1975). Neither decision is controlling here. Moore involved a challenge by nonresident heirs whose names did not appear as record owners in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds nor in the Office of the Tax Assessor, and the government showed that in that instance a notice of the impending tax sale had been sent to the record owner (decedent) at his last known address. In Dodson v. Scheve, the court expressly declined to reach either of the two grounds on which I would base reversal, namely, the constitutional sufficiency of notice prior to the sale and the proper construction of Sections 47-903 and 47-905.6
I share the sentiments expressed by Judge Pair in Dodson:
I perceive basic unfairness in the system which on the one hand frustrates, in effect, the will of the Congress as expressed in D.C.Code 1973, § 47-903, and on the other gives aid and comfort to those who are permitted to profit a thousandfold at the expense of the poor, the ignorant and the less alert.7
[Dodson v. Scheve, supra, 339 A.2d at 42 (Pair, Associate Judge, Retired, concurring and dissenting).]
I would reverse.

. The lack of actual notice has been the basis of appellants’ claim from the beginning. The majority recitals as to purported mailings of notices by the District do nothing ,to diminish this claim. As the majority recognizes (likewise in a footnote) the trial court made a specific finding that appellant Coleman did not receive .the notice of expiration “courtesy” letter which is a part of the record. The purported “tax-sale notice” — described by a witness at first as a document which “would have been . . . mailed” and later as having been “mailed” — is not a part of the record and thus understandably was not treated in the trial court’s memorandum opinion, holding, “regrettably,” that compliance with publication requirements resulted in effective transfer.

. “Notice by publication is a poor and sometimes a hopeless substitute for actual service of notice. Its justification is difficult at best.” New York v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., supra at 296, 73 S.Ct. at 301.

. Accord, Scoggin v. Schrunk, 344 F.Supp. 463 (D.Ore.1971), rev’d on other grounds, 622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066, 96 S.Ct. 807, 46 L.Ed.2d 657 (1976); Johnson v. Hock, 19 Ariz.App. 283, 506 P.2d 1068 (1973); Laz v. Southwestern Land Co., 97 Ariz. 69, 397 P.2d 52 (1964) (en banc); Chapin v. Aylward, 204 Kan. 448, 464 P.2d 177 (1970); Pierce v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Leavenworth County, 200 Kan. 74, 434 P.2d 858 (1967). See also Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 352 U.S. 948, 77 S.Ct. 324, 1 L.Ed. 2d 241 (1956) (per curiam), on remand, 275 Wis. 121, 81 N.W.2d 298 (1957); Wager v. Lind, 389 F.Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.1975). See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings, 84 Yale L.J. 1505 (1975).

. According to the trial testimony of Mr. Alfred L. Richards of ,the D.C. Department of Finance and Revenue, Assessment Services Division, the District of Columbia Government makes no effort to inform citizens of • any of the special provisions of Title 47, Chapter 9.

. Appellees suggest that the harshness of the result here is somehow mitigated by the fact that Ms. Coleman was familiar with tax sale and redemption procedures. It seems to me that the fact that she or other homeowners had for many years taken advantage of the two year redemption period is an added reason why personal notice was required, particularly when the sale date was changed after forty years.

. See Dodson v. Scheve, supra 339 A.2d at 40 and nn. 1 & 3.

. When Ms. Coleman called appellee Scheve to implore him to allow her to redeem her property, Mr. Scheve flatly rejected her request and instead offered to permit her to buy it back from him at its current market value or, alternatively, to lease it from him for two hundred dollars ($200.) per month. As noted above, Mr. Scheve paid $294.09 for the property.