Court Opinion

ID: 9450220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:38:54.947007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:12.155504
License: Public Domain

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In considering these appeals it should be remembered that count one — that which charged unauthorized use of the Dolinger automobile — accused the appellants of an offense unrelated to those of which they were accused in counts two and three, which charged unauthorized use and unlawful interstate transportation of the Wallace car. Consequently, the evidence introduced by the Government in support of the Dolinger count was quite different from that adduced by the Government under the Wallace counts; this is amply shown by the summaries of the evidence for the prosecution contained in the majority opinion. In no sense did the Government’s evidence on the Dolinger theft depend upon, include, or duplicate its proof under the Wallace counts. The only similarity was that both offenses involved car thefts by the appellants which were committed very close together in point of time. It is noted that neither appellant suggested any potential prejudice from the joinder and made no motion that the Dolinger count and the Wallace counts be tried separately.
I am not particularly concerned with the majority’s holding that there was error in the proceeding under count one, because it seems quite clear that the convictions under the second and third counts with respect to the unauthorized use and interstate transportation of the Wallace car should be upheld. That being true, error in the admission of evidence under the Dolinger count is immaterial, as each appellant received equal *278and concurrent sentences on all counts. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943). This court1 said in Gibson v. United States, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 81, 84-85, 149 F.2d 381, 384-385 (1945), that “[W]here separate sentences are imposed to run concurrently the judgment will not be set aside, although error may [be] committed under one count.”
Of course the majority do not contend otherwise. They say, however, that the Hirabayashi rule allows affirmance here “only if the jury’s consideration of counts two and three was not prejudiced by error on count one.” And they expressly concede that
* * [T]he extent, if any, to which the jury was influenced in its consideration of counts two and three would depend on the state of the evidence on those counts. Edwards v. United States, 265 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1959). If the evidence on those counts were overwhelming, the error could be considered harmless as to them. Farris v. United States, supra [24 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1928)] ; see Commonwealth v. Dyer, 243 Mass. 472, 509-510, 138 N.E.2d 296, 314 (1922). * * *” (My emphasis.)
From this it is clear that the majority themselves say any error under the Dolinger count should be considered harmless as far as the Wallace counts are concerned if the evidence under the latter counts was overwhelming. So, in the view of the majority, the applicability of the Hirabayashi case and the af-firmance of the convictions under counts two and three depended upon whether the evidence on those two counts was overwhelming. Having thus staked out the question, the majority state their conclusion with respect to it by saying:
“* * -x- But in this ease the evidence on counts two and three was not overwhelming: it consisted of a nighttime identification made from» a distance of twenty-five feet, which, was denied by the defendants, who-gave a somewhat plausible explanation of their presence in the vicinity:: that they were in the area for the-purpose of picking up Smith’s car, which had been left with a friend' for repairs. Having passed the intersection where they should have-turned, they made a U-turn, and drove up a hill. When they reached the top, Anderson’s car ran out of gas. They walked to a nearby gas station, and were returning with a can of gasoline when they were identified and arrested. * * * ”
Even the majority regard the story about appellants’ reason for being in this-secluded area as only “somewhat plausible.” But, plausible or not, the story does not explain their possession of the-Wallace automobile which had just been-stolen in the District of Columbia. The.majority agree, as they must under the. Bray case,2 that the jury properly inferred from their possession that they had transported it from the District to-Maryland, but say the inference “was by no means the only one which could, fairly have been drawn.” But they do-not suggest any other inference that could possibly have been drawn from the appellant’s possession in Maryland of the-car just stolen in the District of Columbia. There is nothing whatever in the-evidence from which the jury could have-inferred that their possession was innocent: I suggest it is sophistry to say that the inference drawn by the jury that, appellants had taken the car into Maryland “was by no means the only one-which could fairly have been drawn.”
As I have shown, the majority admit' that the convictions on the Wallace-counts two and three should be affirmed if the evidence with respect thereto was-overwhelming; they simply say it was-not overwhelming. For the purpose of considering the question whether the evi*279dence on counts two and three was overwhelming, I quote the statement of facts with respect to the theft of the Wallace car which appears in the majority opinion :
“ * * * Joanna Wallace testified that her maroon 1962 Chevrolet disappeared from its parking space in front of her house in the District of Columbia some time after 8:30 p. m., October 4,1962. James Bailey testified that on the same evening he and Elmer Williams, attracted by .a hammering sound near their homes on Sligo Mill Road, Prince Georges 'County, Maryland, investigated and saw a maroon 1962 Chevrolet parked with its hood lifted in a wooded area at the dead end of the road.3 The dome light inside the car was lit and there was a light on underneath the hood. Standing twenty-five feet from the car, he saw two men whom he identified as appellants, one ‘under the hood,’ and the other inside the •car. They fled when Williams shouted ‘Halt, police.’ Bailey and Williams pursued but were unable to catch the two men.
“Officer Brown of the Prince ‘Georges Police testified that he responded to a call and observed the .1962 Chevrolet and a 1955 Buick -parked about fifty yards away. .About fifteen minutes after his ar-rival, Brown saw the appellants approaching the Buick carrying a gasoline can; Bailey and Williams told him these men were ‘the ones they 'had chased from the ’62 Chevrolet.’ When Brown questioned the appellants, they denied any knowledge of the Chevrolet, stated they had run -out of gasoline in the Buick, and proceeded to pour the gasoline they -were carrying into the Buick. [He] ".then arrested the appellants.
“The 1962 Chevrolet was later identified as the car stolen from Joanna Wallace * *
This is a brief résumé of the evidence under the Wallace counts which the majority say was not overwhelming because
“ * * * it consisted of a nighttime identification made from a distance of twenty-five feet, which was denied by the defendants * *
There was not the slightest equivocation in the “nighttime” identification; one of the appellants was seen in the lighted interior of the Wallace car, and the other was seen “under the hood” with a light. As the darkness necessarily accentuated the lights which were shining on the appellants, the witnesses of course had no difficulty in recognizing them from the short distance of 25 feet.
Although the majority say the “nighttime” identification “was denied by the defendants,” the fact is that it was not denied by them at all, except that Anderson said he was not near the Wallace car at the time of the identification and that he had not driven that particular car out to Maryland. Smith made no reference whatever to the Government’s proof under the Wallace counts except to say that he did not on October 4, 1962, “take an automobile that belonged to Joanna Wallace.” These unelaborated denials that they stole the Wallace automobile, which were the appellants’ only references to that subject, can hardly be characterized as “somewhat plausible” testimony. Their affirmative testimony did not relate to the Wallace counts, but was a complicated story in which they attempted to refute the Government’s testimony about the theft of the Dolinger car.
In contrast to the majority’s opinion that the Government’s proof on the Wallace counts “was not overwhelming,” I suggest that District Judge Hart, the able and experienced judge who tried the case, had quite a different view. He evaluated the Government’s evidence as “the most open and shut — the tightest case” he had ever seen, “assuming the jury believes the identification.” At the *280close of the Government’s case, the following occurred at the bench:
“Mr. Burton [attorney for defendants] : If Your Honor please, at this time I would like to make a motion for judgment of acquittal as to both defendants on all counts of the indictment. In regard to the automobile that belonged to Joanna Wallace, certainly there has been no evidence here that would indicate that either of these defendants drove the automobile or at least took the automobile from her, in front of her premises, out to Maryland. There has been no identification, no prima facie evidence of interstate transportation.
“The Court : There is present the evidence that it was stolen in D. C. and shortly after it was stolen, these two people had it out in the woods in Maryland, getting ready to strip it, trying to strip it. There is plenty of evidence of that.
“MR. Burton: The case, if Your Honor please, of course, requires a more strict proof. It requires some ■ — not only recent possession — that is the presumption that the Government is going on in this case, but certainly as the evidence has been unfolded here, it is not sufficient prima facie for a case of UUV [unauthorized use of a vehicle] as to these two individuals and as to the interstate transportation.
“The Court : When a car is stolen in the District and very shortly thereafter the ear is in a wooded area in the possession of two people, being stripped, I do not know how you would ever get better evidence of UUV and interstate transportation, because of being stolen in the District and found out in Maryland.
“As a matter of fact, it is the most open and shut — the tightest case, assuming the jury believes the identification, that I have ever seen in my life. I do not know how you make a better UUV case with interstate transportation unless you had someone standing on the state line watching as they passed by.”
Later in the discussion the court said:
“The Court: I think the Government more than met the burden in •this case. To my mind they have presented one of the most classic cases in this UUV interstate transportation that I have ever seen. I have been fascinated to listen to it.”
With such convincing evidence presented by the prosecution on the Wallace counts alone, which was entirely unconnected with its proof under the Dolinger count, the jury found the appellants guilty of stealing the Wallace car and transporting it across a state line. Yet, the majority say, “[W]e cannot be certain that a jury considering the Wallace counts alone would not have had a reasonable doubt of defendants’ guilt.” I suggest we can be certain that a jury considering the Wallace counts alone would not have had a reasonable doubt of the defendants’ guilt, because the jury which actually considered those counts separately, as the trial judge instructed it to do, had no such doubt.
If the majority’s uncertainty as to what a jury would do with the Wallace counts alone is based on the fact that another and unrelated charge of car theft was tried at the same time, their position is wholly unwarranted because no point as to improper joinder was made in the trial court.
From what has been said, I conclude that the proper way to dispose of these cases is to affirm the convictions under counts two and three; this would make it unnecessary to consider the alleged error in the admission of evidence under the unrelated first count. The majority’s statement that the Government’s evidence under the Wallace counts was not overwhelming is, as I have indicated, glaringly wrong, and is not a proper basis for their action. Decisions like this, which I regard as giving undue comfort to convicted ariminals, have come to be common place in this court.
For the reasons stated, I dissent.

. Judges Groner, Edgerton and Arnold.

. Bray v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 136, 306 F.2d 743 (1962) (Judges Edgerton, Bazelon and Bastian).

. A stolen- car could be stripped there .without much risk of interruption. (This note is not a part of the quotation from, the majority opinion.)