Court Opinion

ID: 9737993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:39:28.843688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.044327
License: Public Domain

Heffernan, J.
(dissenting). Three facts must be established to trigger the statutory presumption under sec. 891.45, Stats. The fireman must have been found to be free of any respiratory disease at the time of hiring, he must have served a total of five years as a fireman, and his disability or death must have been caused by a respiratory disease. If all three factors are present, there is “presumptive evidence that such defect or disease was caused by such employment.”
In this case, Schroeder was disease-free at the time of his employment, and he served more than five years as a fireman. These two factors are undisputed. There is also positive, undisputed documentary evidence that Schroeder died of a respiratory disease. The death certificate gives the cause of death as “Bronchopneumonia . . . associated with bronchogenic carcinoma . . . .”
In accordance with sec. 227.12, Stats., the decision of the department included “a statement of facts and ultimate conclusions relied upon in rejecting the recommendations of the hearing officer.”
*174The department found, and the circuit judge agreed, that the cause of death was “pneumonia.” The writer of this dissent finds no contrary finding in the recommended findings of the examiner. He acknowledged that death was caused by pneumonia. The fact that the examiner relied upon the testimony of Dr. Russo, who concluded that cancer, induced by cigarette smoking, was the probable cause of the pneumonia, is irrelevant.
It is irrelevant, because that is not the finding the department made. Had the department found that the deceased contracted the disease from cigarette smoking and not from his occupation, there would have been substantial evidence to support that finding. Dr. Russo’s testimony was not incredible. The question is not whether there was substantial credible evidence to support a finding that was not made, but whether there was substantial credible evidence to support the finding that was made. Unruh v. Industrial Comm. (1959), 8 Wis. 2d 394, 398, 99 N. W. 2d 182. Hence, it is clear that, in order to sustain a finding based on credible evidence, there need not be a finding or conclusion that the evidence not relied on was incredible.
Accordingly, the evidence before the department — the evidence of Dr. Russo, which the majority contends should have been further analyzed in company with the examiner to determine its credibility — was before the department unchallenged as to credibility.
On the other side of the coin was the statutory presumption under sec. 66.191, Stats. 1971. The credible evidence of Dr. Russo tended to rebut that presumption. However, we stated in Sperbeck v. ILHR Department (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 282, 174 N. W. 2d 546, even were there a credible contradiction of the presumption, an inference remains that is sufficient to support a finding of an employment-related injury. Hence, under Sperbeck, there was probative and credible evidence to sustain the finding *175the department made. It had the choice either to accept the finding postulated by Dr. Russo’s credible testimony or to accept the finding that followed from the inference that remained.
We said in Robertson Transportation Co. v. Public Service Comm. (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 653, 658, 159 N. W. 2d 636:
“Substantial evidence is not equated with preponderance of the evidence. There may be cases where two conflicting views may each be sustained by substantial evidence. In such a case, it is for the agency to determine which view of the evidence it wishes to accept. Likewise, there are cases where only one view can be supported by substantial evidence and the determination depends upon the credibility of witnesses.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that, in this case, we deal with the first type of situation discussed in Robertson — the situation in which there are alternative findings, each supported by substantial credible evidence.
Under these circumstances, the rationale of Braun v. Industrial Comm. (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 48, 153 N. W. 2d 81, and Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. ILHR Department (1969), 43 Wis. 2d 398, 168 N. W. 2d 817, is irrelevant. The credibility of Dr. Russo is not challenged. No. due process question arises. Under the law, the department was obliged either to award compensation or not make an award. Either conclusion would have found support in the evidence determined by the examiner.
The legislature has seen fit to create a presumption which, under Sperbeck, supra, will result in a surviving inference that will always support an award if the three criteria of sec. 66.191, Stats., are met.
Whether this is wise legislative policy is not for this court to decide, but it is policy we must follow. It is not a proper function of this court to thwart the legislative *176will under the guise of a dubious claim of due process. The award should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Wilkie and Mr. Justice Day join in this dissent.