Court Opinion

ID: 999928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:32:47.494617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:22.582520
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 99-4065

MARK NATHANIEL CHAPMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-97-478)

Submitted: August 17, 1999

Decided: September 29, 1999

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Kenneth Michael Robinson, THE ROBINSON LAW FIRM, Wash-
ington, D.C.; William Jackson Garber, Washington, D.C., for Appel-
lant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Deborah A.
Johnston, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Mark Nathaniel Chapman of being a felon in pos-
session of a firearm. On appeal, Chapman alleges that the district
court erred by enhancing his base offense level for obstruction of jus-
tice pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1.1 Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.

Maryland State Trooper Samuel Bell stopped Chapman and his
passenger for speeding during the early morning hours of September
21, 1997. A routine check of Chapman's driver's license revealed that
there was a warrant for his arrest. Pursuant to standard operating pro-
cedures, Bell waited for a backup officer ("Breck") to arrive before
again approaching Chapman's vehicle. Bell then asked Chapman to
exit the vehicle and placed him under arrest, while Breck watched the
passenger.

Bell testified that after he placed Chapman in his cruiser, Chapman
informed him that there was a gun on the floor behind the front pas-
senger seat of his (Chapman's) vehicle. The officers drew their weap-
ons and ordered the passenger out of the vehicle. Once the passenger
was secure, Bell went immediately to the rear passenger door and
found a handgun under the floor mat. Bell testified that when he
informed Chapman of the discovery, Chapman admitted that the fire-
arm was his. Breck's testimony substantially corroborated Bell's.
Although she could not hear the content of the conversations between
Bell and Chapman, she confirmed that these conversations took place.

Chapman testified in his own defense and completely contradicted
the officers' testimony. Specifically, Chapman testified that Bell
placed him in his cruiser prior to Breck's arrival. He also denied hav-
_________________________________________________________________
1 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1998).

                    2
ing any conversations with Bell concerning the location or ownership
of the firearm. Finally, Chapman testified that Bell entered the vehicle
from the driver's door to conduct his search, eventually coming out
with a handgun.2 Throughout his testimony, Chapman denied any
ownership interest in the weapon or knowledge that it was even in the
vehicle.

During sentencing, the district court determined that Chapman's
testimony was more than simply an artful attempt to create reasonable
doubt. Rather, the court found that Chapman's testimony was so con-
tradictory that it constituted a material misrepresentation, which was
intended to "trick" the jury. In making its findings, the district court
expressly stated that it found Chapman's testimony incredible.

On appeal, Chapman alleges that the district court erroneously con-
cluded that he committed perjury during his testimony, but he does
not challenge the applicability of USSG § 3C1.1 to his conduct.
Accordingly, we review the district court's factual determination for
clear error, and we find none. See United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d
1161, 1165 (4th Cir. 1995). Chapman's claim is based on his assertion
that the district court erroneously believed that both officers testified
that Chapman told Bell about the location of the handgun and that he
admitted ownership of the weapon.

Our review of the trial and sentencing transcripts leads us to con-
clude that Chapman's position is without merit. We find that the dis-
trict court made its decision based on Chapman's testimony as a
whole. We further find that the court's comments concerning the con-
flict between Chapman's testimony and the officers' regarding his
conversations with Bell refer to the fact that Chapman denied that the
conversations ever took place; whereas both officers testified that
they did. We find nothing in the record suggesting that the district
court mistakenly believed that both officers testified as to the content
of the conversations or that this factor alone lead the court to apply
the enhancement.

Accordingly, we affirm Chapman's sentence. We dispense with
_________________________________________________________________

2 Chapman suggested that Bell may have "planted" the weapon.

                     3
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    4