Court Opinion

ID: 9403733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 16:09:13.59631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:09.090742
License: Public Domain

J-S17034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    MAGED IBRAHIM RAYA                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :        No. 948 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 26, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006530-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                   FILED: JUNE 21, 2023

        Appellant, Maged Ibrahim Raya, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench

trial conviction for terroristic threats.1 We affirm.

        The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case as follows:

           The credible evidence adduced at trial established that on
           May 28, 2021, [Victim] was working at his car dealership.
           At some point that day, [Appellant] came to the dealership.
           [Victim] had never personally met [Appellant] but he did
           know [Appellant] by name and that he was the [then-
           boyfriend] of [Victim’s] niece. … After [Appellant] pulled
           his vehicle into [Victim’s] car lot, [Appellant] called for
           [Victim]. [Victim] approached the vehicle. [Appellant] was
           very angry and was foaming at the mouth. [Appellant] told
           [Victim] that he was going to rape [Victim’s] wife. He also
           told [Victim] that he knew his wife drove a white BMW
           automobile and that she was currently in the Shadyside area
           of the City of Pittsburgh, all of which were true. [Appellant]
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1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1).
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           then told [Victim] that he was going to rape his 13 year-old
           daughter until she died. He referred to the daughter by
           name. [Appellant] then told [Victim] that he was going to
           ruin his life and that he would kill [Victim’s] wife.
           [Appellant] then drove away. As he was driving away,
           [Victim] called the police. Surveillance video showed…a
           vehicle owned by [Appellant] entering the car lot and driving
           off after a few minutes. [Victim] testified that the incident
           had a substantial impact on him. He felt threatened and
           was very upset. After the threats, he traded his wife’s BMW
           vehicle for a different vehicle. He lost approximately 60
           pounds since the incident. [Appellant] testified at trial that
           the incident did not occur and he did not make the
           statements attributed to him. He further testified that
           [Victim] did not like him because of his ethnicity and he did
           not comport with devout Muslim teachings.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/2/22, at 1-2).

      Following a bench trial, the court convicted Appellant of terroristic

threats.   The court sentenced Appellant on May 26, 2022, to 1-2 months’

imprisonment, plus four years’ probation.        Appellant timely filed a post-

sentence motion on June 3, 2022, which the court denied on June 6, 2022.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 6, 2022. On July 18, 2022,

the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which Appellant timely filed on

October 5, 2022, following the grant of an extension of time.

      Appellant raises one issue for our review:

           Was the evidence sufficient to support the conviction for
           Terroristic Threats as the Commonwealth failed to establish
           the required mens rea?

(Appellant’s Brief at 5).

      Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a

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reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent to terrorize, as required by

the statute. Appellant emphasizes the religious and/or cultural differences

between himself and Victim, and claims that Victim “has blown any altercation

between the parties out of proportion.” (Id. at 12). Appellant asserts that

Victim testified that Appellant drove to his automotive business and

immediately began yelling at Victim, threatening to kill Victim and his wife and

to rape and murder Victim’s young daughter. Appellant highlights, however,

that the video evidence shows only a green BMW car2 and does not show the

driver of the vehicle or any interaction between the driver and Victim.3

Appellant insists that he has never met Victim and has never been to his

business before. Appellant maintains there are two conflicting stories here

and no objective evidence of any crime.          Appellant contends that Victim’s

“story is absurd and just doesn’t make sense” and that Victim’s “testimony,

viewed by a dispassionate jurist, could not have been an accurate factual

review of the objective evidence[.]” (Id. at 20). Appellant concludes there

was no evidence from which a reasonable jurist could conclude that the

evidence sufficiently proved his intent to terrorize Victim beyond a reasonable

doubt, and this Court must overturn Appellant’s conviction. We disagree.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant admitted at trial that he owned a green BMW similar to the one
depicted in the video but claimed that he bought it for his then-girlfriend
(Victim’s niece) and that he never drove the vehicle.

3   The video cuts off due to poor quality before the interaction occurred.

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      In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

          As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency
          claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most
          favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the
          benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
          evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the
          verdict when it establishes each material element of the
          crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused,
          beyond a reasonable doubt.              Nevertheless, the
          Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
          certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
          resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
          and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of
          fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

          The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
          wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that
          the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a
          crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where
          the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn
          therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence.
          Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that
          of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced,
          accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
          demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s
          crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s
          convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super.

2013)).

      The Crimes Code defines the offense of terroristic threats, in relevant

part, as follows:

          § 2706. Terroristic threats

          (a) Offense defined.—A person commits the crime of

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          terroristic threats if the person communicates, either
          directly or indirectly, a threat to:

          (1) commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1). “Neither the ability to carry out the threat nor a

belief by the person threatened that it will be carried out is an essential

element of the crime.”         Commonwealth v. Fenton, 750 A.2d 863, 865

(Pa.Super. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “Rather,

the harm sought to be prevented by the statute is the psychological distress

that follows from an invasion of another’s sense of personal security.” Id.

       “The purpose of [Section 2706] is to impose criminal liability on persons

who make threats which seriously impair personal security or public

convenience. It is not intended by this section to penalize mere spur-of-the-

moment threats which result from anger.”4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706, Comment.

Nevertheless, “[b]eing angry does not render a person incapable of forming

the intent to terrorize.” Fenton, supra. In evaluating intent, the court must

consider “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the threat

was a result of a heated verbal exchange or confrontation.” In re J.H., 797

A.2d 260, 263 (Pa.Super. 2002).

       Instantly, the trial court reasoned:

          The evidence in this case was clearly sufficient to convict.
          As noted on the record, this [c]ourt believed [Victim]
____________________________________________

4On appeal, Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence based
on making a “spur-of-the-moment” threat. Rather, Appellant denies being at
Victim’s car dealership and making any threats at all.

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          testified credibly. [Appellant’s] testimony was simply not
          credible. There was evidence that [Appellant] did appear at
          [Victim’s] place of business and made threats toward
          [Victim]. Video surveillance showed a vehicle owned by
          [Appellant] entering [Victim’s] car lot and remain there for
          a few minutes.       Evidence at trial establish[ed] that
          [Appellant] harbored ill-will toward [Victim] based on
          circumstances involving his niece. [Appellant] made vile,
          personal threats to [Victim] that he was going to commit
          violent crimes against his wife and children. In the course
          of making the threats, [Appellant] demonstrated that he
          knew personal details about [Victim’s] family members. He
          knew the type of vehicle driven by [Victim’s] wife and her
          current location. He knew the daughter’s name. He
          threatened to rape and kill them. [Appellant] knew that
          [Victim] was a devout Muslim and that he abhorred
          violence. The serious, vile threats of rape and murder were
          clearly intended to terrorize [Victim].

(Trial Court Opinion at 3-4). The record supports the court’s analysis. Viewed

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, the

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to show that               Appellant

threatened Victim with the intent to terrorize him.5 See Sebolka, supra; 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1). See also Fenton, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

____________________________________________

5 To the extent Appellant’s issue on appeal can more properly be construed as
a challenge to the weight of the evidence, based on Appellant’s contention
that the court should have credited Appellant’s testimony over the testimony
of Victim, the trial court rejected this claim as follows:

          The verdict in this case is not shocking to any sense of
          justice. As set forth above, the [c]ourt here concluded that,
          after considering and weighing all the evidence, [Victim’s]
          testimony was credible and totally truthful. His testimony
          supported the verdict. Inasmuch as [Appellant] asserts that
          this [c]ourt should have given credence to his account of
          what transpired, this [c]ourt specifically determined that

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       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/21/2023

____________________________________________

          [Appellant’s] testimony was incredible. The evidence relied
          on by this [c]ourt in finding [Appellant] guilty was supported
          in the record and the verdict was not against the weight of
          the evidence.

(Trial Court Opinion at 5). We see no reason to disrupt the court’s denial of
any challenge to the weight of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs,
981 A.2d 274 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 607 Pa. 690, 3 A.3d 670
(2010) (explaining that when challenge to weight of evidence is predicated on
credibility of trial testimony, our review of court’s decision is extremely
limited; moreover, where trial court has ruled on weight claim below, appellate
court’s role is not to consider underlying question of whether verdict is against
weight of evidence, but to whether trial court palpably abused its discretion in
ruling on weight claim).

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