Court Opinion

ID: 9400780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 14:07:20.474147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.917723
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 2, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                  TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                Court of Appeals

                   NO. 2021-CA-0490-MR

BRANDON BLAIR                                    APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.       HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE
                 ACTION NO. 20-CR-00206

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                          APPELLEE

AND

                   NO. 2021-CA-0535-MR

BRANDON BLAIR                                    APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.       HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE
                 ACTION NO. 20-CR-00204

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                          APPELLEE

AND
                     NO. 2021-CA-0536-MR

BRANDON BLAIR                                    APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE
                   ACTION NO. 20-CR-00205

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                          APPELLEE

AND

                     NO. 2021-CA-0537-MR

BRANDON BLAIR                                    APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE
                   ACTION NO. 20-CR-00207

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                          APPELLEE

                          OPINION
                         AFFIRMING

                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: DIXON, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

                             -2-
MCNEILL, JUDGE: Brandon Blair (“Blair”) appeals from four separate

judgments of the Johnson Circuit Court convicting him of four counts of first-

degree bail jumping and sentencing him to ten years’ imprisonment.1 In what

appears to be an issue of first impression in Kentucky, Blair argues his multiple

bail jumping convictions due to one missed court appearance violate double

jeopardy. The Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“KACDL”)

has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Blair’s position. For the reasons

below, we hold the unit of prosecution for bail jumping is each charge for which a

defendant fails to appear, not the number of missed court appearances. Therefore,

we affirm.

              On September 5, 2020, Blair was scheduled to appear in court on five

related felony drug trafficking indictments.2 When he failed to do so, Blair was

indicted for five counts of first-degree bail jumping in separate indictments

corresponding to the five underlying drug trafficking cases. Blair moved to

dismiss four of the indictments, arguing his multiple bail jumping charges for one

missed court appearance violate double jeopardy. The trial court denied the

1
 Blair was convicted of five counts of bail jumping in five separate cases, one count in each
case. Blair appealed from the judgments in Johnson Circuit Court case numbers 20-CR-00204,
20-CR-00205, 20-CR-00206, and 20-CR-00207. Blair did not appeal from the judgment in 20-
CR-00203.
2
 Johnson Circuit Court case nos. 19-CR-00225 through 19-CR-00229. The facts of these
underlying cases are unclear because the case records were not included on appeal.

                                             -3-
motion and Blair entered conditional guilty pleas preserving his right to appeal the

double jeopardy issue. Blair was convicted on five counts of first-degree bail

jumping and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Blair appealed four of the five

convictions.

                Blair argues his multiple bail jumping convictions based upon a single

missed court appearance violate double jeopardy, specifically, KRS3 505.020(1)(c).

While Blair did not make this statutory argument below, “under our longstanding

rule, double jeopardy questions may be reviewed on appeal, even if they were not

presented to the trial court.” Terry v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Ky.

2007). Further, we review issues related to violations of double jeopardy de novo.

See Watkins v. Kassulke, 90 F.3d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 1996).

                “Generally, the prohibition against double jeopardy . . . prohibits

multiple punishments for the same offense.” McNeil v. Commonwealth, 468

S.W.3d 858, 866 (Ky. 2015) (citation omitted). “With respect to multiple

punishments, however, the effect of the double jeopardy clauses is limited, do[ing]

no more than prevent[ing] the sentencing court from prescribing greater

punishment than the legislature intended.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). “A court’s task, then, when determining the permissibility of

3
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -4-
imposing multiple punishments for a single transaction or course of conduct is

simply to determine the legislature’s intent.” Id. at 866-67 (citation omitted).

             KRS 505.020 sets forth the General Assembly’s intent regarding

multiple punishments. “KRS 505.020 . . . bars conviction for multiple offenses

arising from a single course of conduct when the offense is designed to prohibit a

continuing course of conduct, as opposed to prohibiting separate and distinct

offenses.” Early v. Commonwealth, 470 S.W.3d 729, 737-38 (Ky. 2015) (citing

KRS 505.020(1)(c)). “Under this provision, whether separate and distinct offenses

arise from a particular course of conduct depends on how a legislature has defined

the allowable unit of prosecution.” Id. at 738 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

             Blair argues the unit of prosecution for bail jumping is each missed

court appearance, observing the statute punishes a defendant who is released “upon

condition that he will subsequently appear at a specified time and place” and then

“fails to appear at that time and place.” KRS 520.070(1). He also points to the

statute’s commentary which notes bail jumping provisions are “designed to compel

a defendant’s attendance following his conditional release from custody[.]” KRS

520.070 (1974 cmt.).

             The Commonwealth, meanwhile, argues the unit of prosecution is

each underlying charge for which a defendant fails to appear. It contends the act

                                         -5-
being punished is not simply the failure to appear at a specified time and place, but

failing to appear “in connection with a charge of having committed a felony[.]” It

notes the statutory language “when[] having been released from custody by court

order” and argues that Blair was released from custody on five separate orders in

five felony cases and that each failure to appear is a separate violation because

Blair was obligated to appear before the court in each underlying case.4 KRS

520.070(1).

              Blair responds the phrase “in connection with a charge of having

committed a felony” merely functions to establish the degree of the offense, first or

second, and notes the second-degree bail jumping statute, KRS 520.080, uses the

same language but substitutes misdemeanor for felony. At a minimum, Blair

argues, the statute is ambiguous as to the unit of prosecution and the rule of lenity

requires that any ambiguity be resolved in his favor. The KACDL contends the

clause “when having been released from custody by court order” is merely a

predicate circumstance to the proscribed conduct: intentional failure to appear.5

4
  The Commonwealth’s appellate brief, while acknowledging the statutory language “in
connection with a charge of having committed a felony,” relies more upon the phrase “when
having been released from custody by court order” to argue the unit of prosecution for bail
jumping is failure to appear pursuant to a particular court order, tied to a particular felony
offense. As explained below, we hold the unit of prosecution is each charge for which a
defendant fails to appear. While related, the Commonwealth’s focus is on the failure to appear
pursuant to each court order rather than each charge.
5
  The Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ amicus curiae brief primarily
responds to the Commonwealth’s argument that the unit of prosecution for bail jumping is failure

                                              -6-
               Turning to our analysis, whether Blair’s conduct in failing to appear

was a single offense or multiple offenses “depends on how the statute defines the

offense and the unit of prosecution intended by the legislature as reflected in the

plain language of the statute.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 491, 495

(Ky. 2005). The statute in question provides:

               A person is guilty of bail jumping in the first degree
               when, having been released from custody by court order,
               with or without bail, upon condition that he will
               subsequently appear at a specified time and place in
               connection with a charge of having committed a felony,
               he intentionally fails to appear at that time and place.

KRS 520.070(1) (emphasis added).

               The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that the unit of

prosecution for first-degree bail jumping is each felony charge for which a

defendant fails to appear. The act being punished is not simply the failure to

appear, but the failure to appear to answer a specific charge. The legislature

specifically chose the terms “a” charge and “a” felony, indicating that each felony

charge could serve as the basis for a first-degree bail jumping conviction. If the

legislature only wanted to punish the act of failing to appear, it could have said, for

example, “in connection with one or more charges of having committed a felony.”

to appear pursuant to a particular court order. Because our holding relies upon different statutory
language, we decline to address this argument specifically.

                                               -7-
See Early, 470 S.W.3d at 738-39 (noting that when the legislature intends to bar a

continuing course of conduct, it specifies certain acts or quantities that may be

included in a singular crime, such as KRS 218A.1412, stipulating specific

quantities “or more,” and “any quantity”).

             While Blair argues the unit of prosecution is each missed court

appearance, this interpretation of the statute would lead to incongruous results. For

example, a defendant who had both a felony and a misdemeanor case scheduled for

court on the same day and missed their court appearance could be convicted of two

counts of bail jumping, one first-degree under KRS 520.070 and one second-

degree under KRS 520.080, but a defendant who had two felony cases could only

be convicted of one count of bail jumping. “A statute should not be interpreted so

as to bring about an absurd or unreasonable result.” Kentucky Indus. Util.

Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 983 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Ky. 1998).

             In support of his interpretation, Blair cites several cases from other

jurisdictions which hold that multiple convictions for a single missed court

appearance violate double jeopardy. See Lennon v. United States, 736 A.2d 208

(D.C. 1999); Bristow v. Oklahoma, 905 P.2d 815 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); McGee

v. Florida, 438 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). However, other courts’

interpretations of similar statutes are at best persuasive authority and not binding

on this Court. See Epsilon Trading Co. v. Revenue Cabinet, 775 S.W.2d 937, 941

                                         -8-
(Ky. App. 1989). Further, the bail jumping statutes in those cases differ from

Kentucky’s in potentially significant ways.6

              We are more persuaded by the reasoning in Connecticut v. Garvin,

682 A.2d 562, 565 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), aff’d, 699 A.2d 921 (Conn. 1997),7

cited by the Commonwealth. In Garvin, the Appellate Court of Connecticut held

that a defendant’s two convictions for first-degree bail jumping based upon one

missed court appearance did not violate double jeopardy. Connecticut’s bail

jumping statute is substantially similar to Kentucky’s. It provides in relevant part:

              A person is guilty of failure to appear in the first degree
              when (1) while charged with the commission of a felony
              and while out on bail or released under other procedure
              of law, such person wilfully fails to appear when legally
              called according to the terms of such person’s bail bond
              or promise to appear . . . .

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-172 (West, Westlaw through 2022 Sess.).

              Interpreting the above language, the Connecticut Court of Appeals

held the unit of prosecution for bail jumping under the statute was each specific

charge for which a defendant failed to appear. The Court noted that, pursuant to

6
  For example, Kentucky has separate statutes for felony and misdemeanor bail jumping, while a
single statute in Lennon and McGee covered both. Further, the statutes in Lennon and McGee
were structured differently, with structure specifically influencing the Lennon Court’s
interpretation of its statute. See Lennon, 736 A.2d at 210 (distinguishing between the statute’s
first clause setting forth the essence of the offense and the ensuing penalty provisions).

7
 On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the Appellate Court on
different grounds. Nonetheless, we are persuaded by the analysis and logic of the Appellate
Court’s opinion.

                                              -9-
the statute, bail jumping requires proof of an underlying crime and pointed to the

language, “while charged with a commission of a felony,” as evidence of the

legislature’s intent to punish individuals who willfully fail “to appear in court to

answer to a specific criminal charge[.]” Garvin, 682 A.2d at 566. The Court also

looked to the state’s two bail jumping statutes, one felony and one misdemeanor,

as further evidence that had the legislature “merely intended to punish the act of

failure to appear, it would not have created separate statutes and imposed different

penalties for those individuals refusing to appear for a felony as opposed to a

misdemeanor.” Id.

             Kentucky also has separate felony and misdemeanor bail jumping

statutes, lending support to our interpretation that the legislature’s intended unit of

prosecution for bail jumping is each specific charge for which a defendant fails to

appear, not the mere failure to appear itself. If the legislature had only wanted to

punish the act of failing to appear, without regard to the underlying charge, it

would not have created separate statutes with separate penalties for felony and

misdemeanor bail jumping. There would be one statute with one punishment.

“We presume that the General Assembly intended for the statute to be construed as

a whole, for all of its parts to have meaning, and for it to harmonize with related

statutes.” Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011)

(citation omitted).

                                         -10-
             Because the legislature’s intended unit of prosecution for bail jumping

is each charge for which a defendant fails to appear, Blair’s conviction for five

counts of first-degree bail jumping based upon five underlying felony charges in

five separate cases did not violate double jeopardy. Therefore, the judgments of

the Johnson Circuit Court are affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Ryan D. Mosley                              Daniel Cameron
Prestonsburg, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Kristin L. Condor
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE FOR
KACDL:

J. David Niehaus
Louisville, Kentucky

Bradley Clark
Union, Kentucky

                                          -11-