Court Opinion

ID: 9858422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:23:17.471204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:16.766197
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear.
The basis of the petition to rehear is that this Court misunderstood appellant’s assignment of error No. 3 in that (quoting from the petition):
‘ ‘ The factual situation from which said assignment of error arises is clear, definite and undisputed; and the gist of said assigned error is that the learned Trial Court erred in allowing the State to ask the plaintiff-in-error’s character witnesses, over his objection, whether it was part of the plaintiff-in-error’s general reputation that he had, less than a year ago, *419cut one Roy Hashbarger with a knife and left Mm for dead, toithout limiting the purpose for which the jury was to consider the evidence so adduced, hut allowing said evidence to go to the j%iry without any limitation whatever as to its scope, its meaning or its purpose for consideration.”
Counsel relies upon the next to the last paragraph of the case of Tucker v. State, 149 Tenn. 98, on page 115, 257 S. W. 850, on page 855, which was referred to in the original opinion wherein the Court said:
“We are therefore of the opinion that the trial judge erred in failing to sharply make before the jury the distinction above pointed out, and in failing to tell the jury that questions asked on cross-examination were merely for the purpose of testing the accuracy and credibility of the character witnesses, and that the evidence thus developed was not substantive evidence of good or bad character.”
As to this particular point in the case the opinion does not disclose whether or not there was a special request for a charge containing this distinction but further over in the opinion it appears that the Trial Judg-e in his charge failed to make another distinction and that is between the general character of the defendant before and after the homicide, and on page 122 of 149 Tenn., last paragraph, on page 857 of 257 S. W., it was said:
“While, as is pointed out by the state, no request was made in this behalf, we think that it was incumbent on the court under the facts of this case to clear up the confusion which must have existed in the minds of the jury by a concise statement of the applicable rule.”
Inferentially, therefore, we may assume that there were *420no special requests with respect to either phase of this evidence on reputation adduced on cross-examination.
It is, therefore, insisted by petitioner that it was not necessary in the instant case for counsel to have tendered a special request to the Trial Court to point out this distinction in his charge, that is, that the evidence adduced in the instant case on cross-examination was competent only for the purpose of testing- the credibility of the witness but not competent as substantive evidence of the crime charged.
Examination of the entire opinion discloses that there was apparently considerable confusion in the minds of the Trial Judge and of counsel on the several questions of evidence that arose in the case, that there was much partisanship and an inflamed state of public opinion and as said on pages 122 and 123 of 149 Tenn., on page 857 of 257 S.W.:
“A large portion of the damaging evidence adduced on cross-examination related to the character of the defendants since the homicide. To charge the jury generally under the facts of this particular case, and in view of the court’s erroneous rulings already mentioned, that ‘you should consider all the evidence both for and against their general reputation,’ etc., was to leave an erroneous impression on the minds of the jury.” (Italics ours.)
So that as a result of all these things, this court saw fit to reverse and remand for a new trial despite Chapter 32', of the Acts of 1911, Code Section 10654.
We think the ruling made in the above case was made because of the particular facts above mentioned and that such ruling is not in accord with the general rule applied over the years, the latest expression of this Court *421being in Turner v. State, 188 Tenn. 312, 322, 219 S.W. (2d) 188, 193, where the Court said:
“ (3) No assignment of error on the Judge’s charge to the jury, either for omission or inadequacy, will be considered unless a special request was tendered, pointing out the defendant’s contention as to the error. Code sec. 11750; State v. Becton, 66 Tenn. 138; Powers v. State, 117 Tenn. 363, 370, 97 SW. 815.”
In State v. Becton, the Judge failed to instruct the jury that they might commute the punishment to imprisonment for life, this being a capital case, and it was held that the Judge failed to perform his duty in that regard, but that the same was not reversible error because no request to charge further was made.
In Powers v. State, supra, [117 Tenn. 363, 97 S.W. 817] the Judge charged simply:
“ ‘ Dying declarations made by the deceased in this case have the same weight and sanctity as evidence testified to under oath. ’ ’ ’
He gave this instruction in answer to a general request upon the part of counsel to charge upon the subject, but no special request was made to the Court formulating the instruction desired. Held, — not reversible error.
Since there was no special request in the instant case we are of the opinion that assignment of error No. 3 is not well taken and the petition to rehear is, accordingly, overruled.