Court Opinion

ID: 9377332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 17:00:49.031978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:12.961307
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-9548    Document: 010110822502       Date Filed: 03/07/2023       Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          March 7, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  JOSE IVAN ORTEGA-MARTINEZ,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                         No. 22-9548
                                                         (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND,
  United States Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MORITZ, EID, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Jose Ivan Ortega-Martinez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

 of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board or BIA) denying his

 motion to reconsider its earlier denial of a motion to remand. Before this court,

 rather than filing an opening brief, Mr. Ortega-Martinez filed a motion to remand and

 then a conditional motion to dismiss, both of which the Attorney General opposed.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-9548     Document: 010110822502        Date Filed: 03/07/2023     Page: 2

 Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we deny both motions, and we deny

 the petition for review.

                                    BACKGROUND

       An immigration judge denied Mr. Ortega-Martinez relief under the Convention

 Against Torture (CAT) and post-conclusion voluntary departure. While that decision

 was on appeal before the Board, Mr. Ortega-Martinez married a United States citizen.

 He moved to remand so he could seek adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the

 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), stating (1) his mother was the

 beneficiary of an approved I-130 petition; (2) he is a derivative beneficiary of that

 petition; and (3) as a grandfathered noncitizen due to that petition, he is eligible to

 adjust his status under a new I-130 petition filed by his spouse.

       On November 24, 2021, the Board upheld the denial of CAT relief and

 voluntary departure. In considering voluntary departure, it acknowledged

 Mr. Ortega-Martinez’s positive equities. But it also recognized that he had a “2013

 conviction, at age 25, for sexual battery against a 15 year old.” R. Vol. 1 at 10. Like

 the immigration judge, the Board considered that conviction to weigh heavily against

 the positive factors, and ultimately it “agree[d] with the Immigration Judge that

 [Mr. Ortega-Martinez] does not warrant post-conclusion voluntary departure in the

 exercise of discretion.” Id. The Board also denied the motion to remand, stating that

 Mr. Ortega-Martinez had not shown prima facie eligibility for relief under § 245(i)

 because his mother’s I-130 petition had to be filed on or before April 30, 2001, but it

 showed a receipt date of May 25, 2001.

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       Mr. Ortega-Martinez did not file a petition for review of the November 24,

 2021, decision. Instead, he moved the Board to reconsider. The motion to reconsider

 did not challenge the Board’s determinations regarding the CAT claim or voluntary

 departure. Instead, it focused on the denial of the motion to remand, asserting that

 the Board erred in assessing the filing date of his mother’s petition. Mr. Ortega-

 Martinez contended that the petition’s priority date, which was earlier than April 30,

 2001, demonstrated he was prima facie eligible for protection under § 245(i).

       On June 17, 2022, the Board denied the motion to reconsider. It assumed

 Mr. Ortega-Martinez was correct about the petition date. Nevertheless, it held he still

 failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. “[I]n seeking a

 remand, the respondent must establish prima facie eligibility for relief, and where, as

 here, the ultimate relief is discretionary, he must show that he warrants such relief as

 a matter of discretion.” R. Vol. 1 at 4. “Prima facie eligibility is shown where the

 evidence reveals a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief

 have been satisfied and that there is a reasonable likelihood that relief will be granted

 in the exercise of discretion.” Id. The Board noted that Mr. Ortega-Martinez had not

 challenged its determination, in the November 24, 2021, decision, that he did not

 warrant voluntary departure in the exercise of discretion. Further, he did not

 “otherwise present evidence showing a reasonable likelihood that his application for

 adjustment of status would be granted in the exercise of discretion, particularly in

 light of his conviction for sexual battery as discussed in our November 24, 2021,

 decision.” Id. at 5. The Board therefore denied the motion to reconsider.

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                                      DISCUSSION

        The only order before us for review is the June 17, 2022, denial of the motion

 for reconsideration, which we review for abuse of discretion, see Zapata-Chacon v.

 Garland, 51 F.4th 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2022). Because the underlying relief sought

 is adjustment of status under § 1255(i), our review is limited by 8 U.S.C.

 § 1252(a)(2)(B), which divests this court of jurisdiction to review “any judgment

 regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1255.” Under § 1252(a)(2)(D),

 however, we retain jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law.”

 “The Board abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Banuelos v. Barr,

 953 F.3d 1176, 1179 (10th Cir. 2020).

        Mr. Ortega-Martinez contends the court should remand because the Board

 legally erred in assessing the filing date of his mother’s I-130 petition. But the filing

 date was the Board’s reason for denying the motion to remand, which we lack

 jurisdiction to review. In contrast, in denying the motion for reconsideration, the

 Board assumed that Mr. Ortega-Martinez was correct about the filing date of the

 petition and instead denied relief on the discretionary aspect of the prima facie case

 for adjustment of status. Given that our review is limited to the denial of the motion

 for reconsideration, we need not consider whether the Board erred in assessing the

 filing date of the I-130 petition.

        Mr. Ortega-Martinez raises two challenges to the Board’s reasons for denying

 reconsideration. He suggests that the Board improperly concluded he failed to show

 a reasonable likelihood of a favorable exercise of discretion because (1) under

                                             4
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 Mena-Flores v. Holder, 776 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2015), the agency must “first rule

 on statutory eligibility before diving into discretionary determinations,” Mot. to

 Remand at 14, and (2) it was the task of the immigration judge, not the Board, to

 make the discretionary determination in the first instance. Neither argument,

 however, supports a remand.

        Mena-Flores recognized that in considering adjustment of status, the

 immigration judge must determine whether the noncitizen “satisfies the eligibility

 requirements” (a non-discretionary determination) and “merits the favorable exercise

 of discretion by the court” (a discretionary determination). 776 F.3d at 1161. But it

 did not hold that the agency must tackle those issues in that order.

        Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized “at least three independent

 grounds on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen,” INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94,

 104 (1988), which also apply to a motion to remand, see Galeano-Romero v. Barr,

 968 F.3d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir. 2020) (“The same legal standard applies to motions to

 reopen and motions to remand.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).

 Two of those grounds are relevant here. The Board “may hold that the movant has

 not established a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.”

 Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104. Also, in cases such as adjustment of status, “in which the

 ultimate grant of relief is discretionary . . . the BIA may leap ahead, as it were . . .

 and simply determine that even if [the two threshold concerns] were met, the movant

 would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief.” Id. at 105. Accordingly,

 we do not fault the Board for considering whether Mr. Ortega-Martinez established a

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 prima facie case, or for leaping over the question of statutory eligibility to rely on

 discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration.

       For these reasons, we deny the motion to remand. That leaves the conditional

 motion to dismiss, in which Mr. Ortega-Martinez requests that we dismiss this matter

 if we deny the motion to remand. Although we deny the motion to remand, we

 decline to grant Mr. Ortega-Martinez’s conditional motion to dismiss.

                                     CONCLUSION

       We deny the motion to remand and the motion to dismiss. Because

 Mr. Ortega-Martinez concedes any other challenges to the Board’s denial of

 reconsideration,1 we also deny the petition for review.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Nancy L. Moritz
                                              Circuit Judge

       1
         Filing a motion to remand for additional administrative proceedings
 “suspends the briefing schedule unless the court orders otherwise.” 10th Cir.
 R. 27.3(C). The motion to remand cited Rule 27.3(C). The motion to dismiss,
 however, disclaimed any intent to seek an extension of the briefing schedule and
 indicated that Mr. Ortega-Martinez did not intend to bring any challenges to the
 denial of reconsideration other than the arguments in the motion to remand.
                                             6