Court Opinion

ID: 9391124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-30 07:11:44.683905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.616885
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 25, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-21-00588-CR

                 JUSTIN ROBERT FLETCHER, Appellant

                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 212th District Court
                          Galveston County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 20-CR-0745

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found appellant guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon
and assessed punishment at eight years’ confinement. In two issues, appellant
complains about the replacement of a juror with an alternate juror and the
admission of evidence. We affirm.
                                I.     ALTERNATE JUROR

       In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by appointing
an alternate juror to the duties of a juror who failed to appear. He contends further
that the trial court erred by “pressuring” appellant to waive his right to a
continuance to have the original juror hear and decide the case. He cites no cases
in support of his arguments.

A.    Background

       On the day of trial, appellant was out of jail on bond. The court announced
that appellant was late for the trial. The court recessed until appellant arrived over
an hour later. The court announced that one of the twelve original jurors had also
communicated to the court that she would be out of town on the trial date for a
scheduled vacation.1 When the court indicated its intent to replace the missing
juror with the alternate, appellant’s counsel initially objected that the juror was not
unable to serve or disqualified, citing Article 33.011 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. See Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. art. 33.011. When the court asked counsel
if he was requesting a continuance, counsel asked to “adjourn the proceedings until
we can get the proper 12 jurors in.” After an off-the-record discussion, counsel
said that appellant wanted to “withdraw that request and to go forward with the 12
that are here.”      But he premised this withdrawal: “Based upon the Court’s
statement that he would go into custody at the end of today if the case is
continued.”

       A colloquy ensued. The court explained, “So don’t put this back—based on
my taking him into custody that that’s somehow forcing him to waive his jury—or

       1
          The jury was empaneled in July, but the case was reset to September. Five days before
the trial was to start, the Galveston County Jury Administration office emailed jurors advising
them of the trial date.

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waive the alternate.”         The court explained that it heard appellant decide to
withdraw the request for a continuance “long before I said anything about revoking
his bond, just so the record is completely clear.” The court said it would grant the
continuance and issue a writ of attachment for the missing juror if appellant wanted
it. The court continued, “But I’m not going to let this proceeding go forward if
your client feels pressured that somehow—that this Court is applying undue
pressure to get you to waive it. So if this is a voluntary request on behalf of your
client, I will entertain that. But it has to be voluntary. Otherwise, he is going to
have his bond revoked.”

       After counsel spoke with appellant off the record, counsel reiterated a desire
to go forward with the alternate juror:

       Counsel:        He has informed me that his voluntary request is to go
                       forward today.
       The Court: Okay. So you are withdrawing your objection—that’s
                  my understanding—to use the alternate to complete the
                  panel; correct?
       Counsel:        Yes.
The case proceeded to trial with the alternate juror.

B.     Analysis

       Assuming without deciding that the right to proceed to trial with an original
juror rather than an alternate is a waivable-only right under the Marin2 framework,3
the record reflects that appellant voluntarily waived this right.

       2
           Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
       3
         Cf. Trinidad v. State, 312 S.W.3d 23, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (assuming without
deciding that right to twelve-member jury is waivable-only under Marin framework). But see
Payton v. State, No. 14-20-00175-CR, 2021 WL 4472522, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Sept. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that error was not preserved when the
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       Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.      Garcia v. State, 429 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Generally, a waiver of rights must be “voluntary.” See Joseph v. State, 309
S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (noting that a waiver of Miranda4 rights
must be done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily); Kniatt v. State, 206
S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that a guilty plea constitutes a
waiver of the right to a jury trial, so it must be entered knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily). Regarding the waiver of Miranda rights, courts have held that
“voluntary” means, in part, the waiver was “the product of a free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 25
(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). In the context of a guilty
plea, which involves the waiver of a jury trial, the waiver must be “the expression
of the defendant’s own free will and must not be induced by threats,
misrepresentations, or improper promises.”             Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664.            We
assume without deciding that these principles apply to appellant’s waiver of his
right to continue the trial with the original juror rather than the alternate.

       The record reflects that the trial court intended to revoke appellant’s bond
because he did not show up for trial, not because appellant initially objected to
replacing the missing juror with the alternate juror. Appellant does not contend
that the court would have erred by revoking the bond due to appellant’s failure to
appear on time for trial. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 17.09, § 3. The
mere fact that appellant learned his bond would be revoked does not demonstrate
that appellant’s acquiescence to the alternate juror was involuntary. Cf. Kniatt, 206
S.W.3d at 662–65 (holding that trial court could have reasonably concluded that

appellant waited until after deliberations to complain about the second alternate rather than the
first alternate having assumed the duties of a juror under Article 33.011).
       4
           Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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the appellant entered a guilty plea voluntarily, despite the fact that the trial court
“admitted in its findings of fact that it had ‘sanctioned’ [the defendant], by
revoking his bond, for his decisions to renege on the plea bargain and replace his
counsel”; noting that although the defendant testified he subjectively felt pressured
to change his plea to guilty because he did not want to “sit in jail without a bond
for who knows how long,” there was no evidence that at the time he pled guilty he
was “so gripped by fear of incarceration that, even with the assistance of counsel,
he could not rationally weigh the advantages of pleading guilty against the
disadvantages of going to trial”); Lee v. State, 39 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (holding that the defendant’s plea of no contest
was voluntary because there was no evidence that the defendant was pressured into
the plea because her bail was revoked for an invalid reason).

       After the initial objection, appellant repeatedly informed the court of a desire
to proceed with the alternate juror. When asked by the trial court to confirm that
this decision was voluntary and not the result of “pressure” from the court,
appellant again made a “voluntary request . . . to go forward today” with the
alternate juror.

       The record shows that appellant waived his right to proceed with the original
juror and that this waiver was not induced by any undue pressure, threat,
intimidation, or coercion. Accordingly, the waiver was voluntary. Appellant’s
first issue is overruled.

                            II.   ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

       In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing a
witness to testify that a shotgun found in appellant’s truck had a “silencer” on it.
He contends that the evidence was irrelevant, it was improper character evidence,
and the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the
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danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. He cites
only Rules 401 to 404 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. He cites no cases.

      At trial, appellant did not argue that the evidence was irrelevant, improper
character evidence, or prejudicial. He argued only that the witness did not have
scientific knowledge about silencers.5

      As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record
must show that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request,
objection, or motion that stated the grounds for the ruling sought from the trial
court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint. See
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; see also Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). A complaint on appeal
must comport with the specific complaint that the defendant timely lodged in the

      5
          Appellant made the following objections:
      Counsel:         Your Honor, I’m going to object. There’s not—there’s insufficient
                       foundation that he has scientific knowledge to determine what is
                       and what is not a silencer.
      The Court:       Objection for scientific knowledge is overruled.
      ....
      Counsel:         The same objection, Judge. They haven’t established that he has
                       any scientific knowledge about silencers. Actually, the correct
                       term is a suppresser, not a silencer. So I object to laying an
                       improper foundation.
      The Court:       Overruled.
Appellant asked to take the witness on voir dire, which the trial court allowed. Appellant
questioned the witness about his scientific knowledge relating to how silencers operate.
Appellant again objected to the witness’s testimony based on lack of scientific knowledge:
      Counsel:         I guess before the jury comes in, I would object to him testifying
                       that it is a—what they call a silencer. It’s really a suppressor. It’s
                       a muzzle device at best, but without him being able to explain the
                       scientific changes in the sound waves out and without doing an
                       inspection to confirm there is actually the baffling he was talking
                       about, I would object to calling it a silencer or suppressor.
      The Court:       Overruled.

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trial court. Bleimeyer v. State, 616 S.W.3d 234, 250 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2021, no pet.); see Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009).   The appellant must have conveyed to the trial court the particular
complaint raised on appeal, including the precise and proper application of law as
well as the underlying rationale. Bleimeyer, 616 S.W.3d at 250; Penton v. State,
489 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d).

      Because appellant’s arguments on appeal do not comport with his objections
during trial, he failed to preserve any error regarding the admissibility of the
evidence under Rules 401 to 404 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. Appellant’s
second issue is overruled.

                               III.   CONCLUSION

      Having overruled both of appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

                                      /s/       Ken Wise
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Hassan.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

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