Court Opinion

ID: 9796081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:48:09.875529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:57.515874
License: Public Domain

McFarland, C.J.,
dissenting: I dissent from that part of the majority’s decision holding that this lawsuit can proceed against a defendant identified only generically as “the Administrator of the Estate of Francisco J. Baltazar,” without the necessity of a formal *412amendment under K.S A. 60-215(c) to specifically identify by name the individual who serves as the representative for tire estate.
The majority holds:
“Instead of requiring an amended pleading to relate back to the original petition, we hold that the Administrator’s post-limitations capacity cures the prelimitations lack thereof. There is no need to formally change the name of the original defendant, ‘Administrator of the Estate of Francisco J. Baltazar,’ to ‘Steven Horak, Administrator of the Estate of Francisco J. Baltazar.’ Cf. K.S.A. 60-102 (provisions of Code of Civil Procedure shall be liberally construed and administered to secure tire just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding); K.S.A. 60-209(a) (It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to be sued or the audiority of a party to be sued in a representative capacity); K.S.A. 59-2201 (no defect in form of pleadings in probate proceeding shall impair substantial rights). Consequently, there is no resultant need to amend. Nor is there any need to attempt substitution as in Williams because die party remains the same.”
This analysis fails to recognize that tire capacity problem in this case is two-fold. The fact that the petition named the “the administrator” of the estate as a defendant when, in fact, there was no person or entity existing in that capacity is only the first of the two-part problem. Vorhees addressed that problem by getting an administrator appointed. The second part of the problem is the fact that the petition fails to identify a legally existent party with the capacity to be sued.
Individuals and corporations are the only legal entities capable of suing and being sued, absent a statute providing such capacity. Kansas Private Club Ass’n v. Londerholm, 196 Kan. 1, 3, 408 P.2d 891 (1965) (in every cause of action there must be a plaintiff which is either a natural or an artificial person having a legal entity, and individuals and corporations are our only strictly legal entities in the absence of qualifying statutes). As the majority acknowledges, in order for a decedent’s estate to be liable for the decedent’s alleged negligence, it is necessary to bring an action against the executor or administrator of the estate. However, a personal representative of an estate has to be an individual, or a bank, a savings and loan, or other corporation. See K.S.A. 59-1701 (concerning appointment of banks, savings and loans associations, or other corporations to act as fiduciary); K.S.A. 59-705 (listing persons to *413whom administration may be granted). Moreover, a petition must identify the parties by name. K.S.A. 60-210(a) (petition shall include the names of all of the parties). Accordingly, a defendant only genetically identified as the “Administrator of the Estate of Francisco J. Baltazar” is not a legal entity capable of being sued, regardless of the fact that such an individual exists and has been served.
The only way this defect can be corrected is by an amendment to the petition specifically identifying by name the individual or entity person which serves in the representative capacity for the estate. In the event an amendment is necessary to change the name of a party after the statute of limitations has expired, as it has in this case, the amended petition would only relate back to the date of the original petition if the requirements of K.S.A. 60-215(c)(2) are met: (1) the claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading; and (2) within the statute of kmitations, including the period for service of process, the party to be brought in by amendment (a) received notice of the action, and (b) knew or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party the action would have been brought against the party.
If Vorhees had amended his petition to name the appointed administrator, Steven Horak, after he was appointed, the amendment might have related back under K.S.A. 60-215(c). But Vorhees never sought to amend the petition. The majority concludes, however, that a formal amendment naming Steven Horak as the administrator would be “pointless” and, thus, is not necessary. In support, the majority relies on a single case arising out of Texas, Austin Nursing Center, Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 2005).
Lovato is distinguishable from the situation before us. In Lovato, the plaintiff filed a survival action on behalf of her deceased mother. In the petition, Lovato alleged that she was the “Personal Representative of the Estate of Margarita Torres Wilson.” 171 S.W.3d at 852. She had not been so appointed however, and in fact, no administrator had been appointed. 171 S.W.3d at 847. She was eventually appointed as the administrator of her mother s estate, but not until after the statute of limitations had expired. The *414defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations because it was not filed by a party with capacity before the expiration of the limitations period. 171 S.W.3d at 847. Lovato then filed an amended petition in which she alleged she was the “Independent Administratrix” of her mothers estate. 171 S.W.3d at 847. Lovato then responded to the summary judgment motion, arguing that the amended petition related back to the original filing date, making the suit timely. 171 S.W.3d at 847. The trial court granted summary judgment.
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Lovato had cured her defective capacity by being appointed as administrator and that the amended petition related back to the original filing date. 171 S.W.3d at 847. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds. The court concluded that because Lovato’s original petition alleged that she was the personal representative of the estate, her appointment as representative cured the prelimitations defect in her capacity, without the necessity of an amended petition:
“Generally, cases involving post-limitations representative capacity involve an amended pleading alleging that capacity for the first time. [Citations omitted.] In such cases, the issue is usually whether the plaintiff s post-limitations amendment, altering the plaintiffs capacity, can relate back to the plaintiffs pre-limitations pleadings. This case is somewhat unusual, however, because Lovato has alleged representative status on behalf of the estate in every petition filed with the trial court. Her original petition asserted that she was the ‘Personal Representative of the Estate of Margarita Torres Wilson.’ This allegation, though apparently untrue, asserted that Lovato was bringing suit in her capacity as the estate’s representative. Thus, the issue here is not whether her amended pleadings relate back to her original petition — as every petition alleges her representative status — but whether her post-limitations capacity cures her pre-hmitations lack thereof. We conclude that it does.
“If, as we have held, a plaintiff s amended pleading alleging representative capacity satisfies the relation-back requirements, an original petition that alleges the correct capacity should suffice for limitations purposes, provided that capacity, if challenged, is established within a reasonable time. . . .
“In any event, it would be pointless to require that the plaintiff file an ‘amended’ pleading containing the same allegations of capacity that were stated in the original petition. The estate commenced the suit before limitations expired; Lovato cured *415the defect in her capacity before the case was dismissed. Under those circumstances, the estate had standing and was ultimately represented by a person with capacity to pursue the claim on its behalf.” 171 S.W.3d at 852-53.
Lovato does not support the conclusion that no amendment is necessaiy in our case. Critical to the court’s decision in Lovato was the fact that the original petition specifically named Lovato as the entity bringing the suit as the personal representative of the estate. Although the allegation of her representative status was not true and, thus, she had no capacity at the time of filing, that defect was cured when she was subsequently appointed as the administrator. The court further held that because the petition had identified Lovato as the personal representative, a formal amendment to the petition was not necessary. Under those circumstances, the court recognized that no useful purpose would be served by requiring an amended petition that would simply restate the allegation already contained in the original petition.
In Lovato, then, there was only one problem with capacity — the entity named as the personal representative did not actually have that capacity at the time of filing. In the instant case, on the other hand, as discussed above, the petition suffered from a two-fold capacity problem. The appointment of Steven Horalc cured the problem that no legal entity with the capacity to be sued existed. The second part of the problem, which did not exist in Lovato, remained unresolved — the petition failed to identify a specifically named individual as the defendant. In Lovato, anyone looking at the petition could determine who the parties were. That is not true in the case before us. Under these circumstances, requiring an amendment to formally identify and name Steven Horak as the administrator of the estate is not “pointless,” but, rather, is mandatory.
The rule requiring that lawsuits specifically identify the parties involved by name “is not merely one of administrative convenience. It also serves society’s interest in having access to the facts of the lawsuit, among which are the actual names of the precise parties involved.” A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J. Super. 494, 500, 660 A.2d 1199 (1995). It is important for purposes of res judicata, judgment enforcement, and public records that there be a clear record of *416who are tire parties to a lawsuit. We recently discussed the public’s interest in knowing the identity of litigants in the context of pseudonymous litigation in Unwitting Victim v. C. S., 273 Kan. 937, Syl. ¶ 7, 47 P.3d 392 (2002):
“This court recognizes the strong public interest militating against pseudonymity in pleadings — the public right of access to civil judicial records and proceedings. The public right of access to civil judicial proceedings has as its bases constitutional law, the common law, and public policy. The public’s right to know the true identity of the parties is concomitant with the right of public access to judicial proceedings and records.”
Compliance with this important requirement cannot be excused under K.S.A. 60-102, requiring liberal construction of the provisions of the civil procedure code “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.” As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals expressed when considering whether the federal counterpart to K.S.A. 60-102 applied to excuse the premature filing of an appeal:
“We are not oblivious of the trend away from those niceties which so often in the past harassed both litigants and the courts. But we are not here insisting upon mere satisfaction of barren formal technicalities. Howsoever liberal we may wish to be, it cannot be gainsaid that certain formalities are indispensable to just, speedy, and inexpensive’ litigation, and these attributes of our federal judicial system are forthcoming only upon adherence to, rather than upon rejection of, the Rules.” Healy v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 181 F.2d 934, 936-937 (3d Cir. 1950).
Additionally, K.S.A. 60-209(a), which ehminates the necessity of pleading capacity, does not ehminate the necessity of properly identifying a specifically named individual serving in a representative capacity as a party defendant:
“This rule does not abolish the necessity of identifying in the pleading the corporate character of the party, the fact of partnership, the identity of the nature of the fiduciary or vicarious relationship, as the case may be, but it does abolish the necessity of pleading the facts from which capacity to bring the particular action arises, or the fact of capacity itself. In odrer words die fact of capacity is initially assumed in all areas, the same as it has always been assumed that an individual plaintiff has mental capacity or has reached die age of majority.” 4 Gard and Casad, Kansas Code of Civil Procedure Annotated § 60-209, p. 48 (4th ed. 2003).
*417For compliance with the statute, Vorhees would only have been required to amend his petition to identify the administrator by name. This is a simple task which, initially, would not have required leave of court. Vorhees did not follow the required statutoiy procedure. As previously stated, there are good reasons for the statutory requirements, yet the majority opinion approves the failure to follow these requirements for no legally sufficient reason. In-order to identify the defendant herein, the majority would require the public to scour the substance of the documents filed in the case or cross-search court records for the genetically identified estate simply to determine the identity of the defendant. This task would be all the more difficult in this case because, initially, there was no estate case and, subsequently, the estate proceedings were not even in the same county as the tort case. .
I would reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court.
Allegrucci, J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.