Court Opinion

ID: 9610391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:40:30.626514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:58.676642
License: Public Domain

TOM GRAY, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
As the Court of Criminal Appeals is accustomed to by now, the majority has decided to reverse a conviction on a theory not argued by the appellant; that is, that the Texas due course of law provision offers more protection than the federal due process clause. It will serve no useful purpose for me to pontificate on the similarities or distinctions between the due process clause of the United States Constitution and the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution as my colleagues do.1 The opinion has the requisite *284two votes to become the law of this district, so I will not delay the disposition of Pena’s appeal. See In the Interest of S.A.P., 135 S.W.3d 165, 177. (Tex.App.-Waco 2004) (Gray, C.J., dissenting), rev’d, 156 S.W.3d 574 (Tex.2005); Jacobo v. Bimar, 70 S.W.3d 330, 339-344 (Tex.App.Waco 2002) (Gray, J., dissenting), rev’d, 135 S.W.3d 646 (Tex.2004).
But I must, nevertheless, comment on several things that struck me as I went through the majority’s opinion, the briefs, and the record. The majority opinion states that “Pena argues in his first issue that he was denied due process and due course of law because the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.” Pena did not argue that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress — he argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence. There is a difference.
Was there a motion to suppress filed? Sort of — it was a canned motion included within various other requests. The whole “motion,” in this record, is as follows
The Defendant requests a hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine the admissibility of any physical evidence recovered during the investigation of this cause and which the District Attorney intends to offer as evidence herein, and would request that the Court suppress this evidence if the Court determines that the evidence was obtained in violation of the United States Constitution or the Texas Constitution.
Did Pena argue the due course of law clause in that motion? Clearly, no. Did he argue any distinction between the United States and Texas Constitutions in that motion? Clearly, no.
Okay, then, was there a heariñg and what happened there? Counsel for Pena brought up the motion at a pre-trial hearing, but the trial court decided to carry it with the trial. At that time, at the pretrial hearing, the trial court still did not know Pena was making an argument under the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution.
During the trial, when the court decided the qualifications of the expert testifying about the seized marijuana, outside the presence of the jury, Pena brought up additional objections about the admissibility of the testimony about the marijuana. Counsel stated, “Additionally, the objection would be under the due process rights of the accused and due course of law, which- would be the Fifth and Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Note counsel’s specifically referenced amendments are all federal, constitutional references. After the trial court next overruled a confrontation clause objection, counsel stated, “I would address the due process rights of the accused and due course of law, additionally, Judge.” Note this was not an objection, and so no ruling was made. At *285that point, the parties began questioning the expert who tested and weighed the marijuana.
After the expert’s testimony, the trial court noted that “the defendant must show that the prosecution acted in bad faith when it failed to preserve the evidence to show [a] violation of due process or due course of law.” Further testimony was taken, but no arguments were made. No discussion was had of the standard under the due course of law provision and whether it was any more stringent than the due process provision. The trial court ruled that the lost evidence was material but that there was no bad faith or willful misconduct on the part of the State in losing the evidence.
Pena then “re-urge[d] everything set out in the motion to suppress.” In this record, that wasn’t much. Of course, there was no “physical evidence recovered” that was being introduced, so there was nothing to suppress. After re-urging his motion, then counsel added
The confrontation clause, I think, is a big issue here from the defense standpoint. So I would object under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article One, Section Nine of the Texas Constitution under due process. Article One, Section Nineteen of the Texas Constitution and the Fifth and' Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution under the rights of the accused, and Article One, Section Ten of the Texas Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
I would object under due course of law and object under 1.04,1.051 and 1.06 of the Code of Criminal Procedure .... [Tjhose would address the issue of this nonexistent evidence being presented.
The trial court overruled Pena’s objections. The court did not specifically rule on the motion to suppress.
So the words “due course of law” and section 19 of the Texas Constitution were used. It did not notify the court of anything more than the general ground of the complaint; nothing specific. It did not notify me of anything more than that either. But it certainly would not have put anyone on notice that the Texas Constitution’s due course of law provision provided broader protection than the United States Constitution’s due process clause.
Pena claims in his brief that his counsel “based his objections on due process rights guaranteed under both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions, ...”. He mentioned both in his objection, but he did not argue that the two were any different. He did not make this argument at trial, and he did not make this argument in his brief.
Although Pena claims on appeal that he was denied due process and due course of law by the State’s failure to provide material evidence before and during trial, he does not present any argument or authority as to the protection of the Texas Constitution or how that protection differs in any way from that offered by the United States Constitution. Only three Texas cases are cited by Pena in his brief and none discuss the due course of law provision. In fact, Pena specifically argues that his case falls within the parameters of Youngblood, a federal due process standard. Without argument or any briefing, the majority takes it upon itself to raise the possibility of a difference in the level of protection between the Texas and United States Constitutions and proceeds to determine the expansiveness of the due course of law provision in the Texas Constitution.
What are we doing? We’ve been told not to reverse convictions on theories not *286raised on appeal or in the court below. Hailey v. State, 87 S.W.3d 118 (Tex.Crim. App.2002); Gerron v. State, 97 S.W.3d 597 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). Yet we continue to do so. See Hackett v. State, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 1116 (Tex.App.-Waco March 10, 2005, no pet. h.) (Gray, C.J., concurring, Feb. 9, 2005); Olivas v. State, 153 S.W.3d 108 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, no pet.) (Gray, C.J., dissenting); Conde v. State, 135 S.W.3d 252 (Tex.App.-Waco 2004, no pet.) (Gray, C.J., concurring).
And, where a party fails to argue a distinction between the Texas and United States Constitutions, the Court of Criminal Appeals routinely declines to make the argument for the party in that situation. Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 364 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (“Appellant makes no distinction between his rights under the Texas and federal constitutions. Therefore we will treat them as being the same in this context.”); Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838, 847 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (“Appellant proffers no argument or authority of how the protection offered by the Texas Constitution differs from the protection guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, [citations omitted]. We are not inclined to make appellant’s arguments for him.”); Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (“We decline to pursue appellant’s Texas Constitutional arguments for him.”). So should we.
I dissent.

. I do note, notwithstanding that it arises in a different context, that the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution and the due process clause of the United States Constitution have been compared in the past and the Texas Supreme Court has consistently held the two provisions to be equivalent. See Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Advocates of Tex., 136 S.W.3d 643, 658 (Tex.2004) ("[W]e generally construe the due course clause in the same way as its federal counterpart.”); United States Gov’t v. Marks, 949 *284S.W.2d 320, 326 (Tex.1997) ("[W]e have traditionally followed contemporary federal due process interpretations of procedural due process issues in applying our state constitutional guarantee of due course of law.’’); University of Tex. Medical Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex.1995) ("While the Texas Constitution is textually different in that it refers to 'due course’ rather than 'due process’, we regard these terms as without meaningful distinction.”). Even the interpretive commentary from the Texas Constitution views the provisions as the same. Tex Const. Ann. art. I, § 19 (Vernon 1997) (Interpretive Commentary) at pg 100 ("It has been held by Texas courts that the clause of the Texas Constitution, to the extent that it is identical with the fourteenth amendment, has placed upon the powers of the state legislature the same restrictions as those which have been held to be imposed by the language of that amendment of the Federal Constitution. Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 3 S.W. 249 (1887).”). I find no reason to depart from that interpretation.