Court Opinion

ID: 9740093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:27:50.421789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.212849
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent to the majority in its finding the trial court erred in entering a judgment of conviction for confinement. I think the error of the majority is initiated by the finding the statute describes two different criminal acts. I think it would be more accurate to say the statute describes one criminal act that can be performed in two different manners. The word confinement suggests forcing a person to stay in a certain place and preventing him from going to another place. There is no question but in (1) the statute provides it is a crime to so contain a person against his consent. In (2) the statute provides one can commit *144confinement, not by forcing a person to stand or be confined in one place, but by force causing him to traverse to another or several other places. If this is done by force, threat, or fraud, it is also, of course, ° "without consent." In other words, one commits confinement if one either forces a person to stay in one place against his consent or forces him to leave the place where he is and go to other places without his consent. In a comparison or contrast of (1) and (2), it would seem that (2) includes (1), since during the whole course of events the person is being confined in a given place except that the place changes from time to time with the same force and the same lack of consent. It seems unrealistic to say that in simply charging confinement the State is limited to show only that the victim was confined to a given place and was not moved about. The evidence here was the victim was forced, at knifepoint, to go to several places. To say the jury was misled by the court's instruction does not seem realistic. The evidence was, in fact, that by use of a knife, the defendant forced the victim to go to several different places with him. He was confined in each and all of those places without his consent. I have difficulty understanding the reasoning of the majority when it states:
Unlike Dizon, where proof was not tendered to support the erroneous instruction, the jury in the instant case may well have concluded that the defendant was guilty only of the uncharged offense of confinement by removal rather than non-consensual confinement as charged, because of the great difference in size between the two, and defendant's physical handicap.
In the first place, this appears to be what the evidence revealed and it was up to the jury to decide whether or not it was eredi-ble. Second, it seems to me it would be easier for a smaller, weaker person to contain a larger, stronger person in a given area than it would to remove him by force and have him travel on foot and by automobile to different locations.
I would affirm the trial court.