Court Opinion

ID: 9738637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:59:17.481376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:07.448670
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). As the majority notes, by agreement of the parties, the lesser included offenses under count I did not include attempt charges on any of the listed felonies. Nor, we are told at oral argument, was an attempt defined for the jury in connection with the felony-firearm charge because it was not requested. The defendant attaches to his brief the jury instructions in connection with count II, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2):
"(1) The defendant is also charged with having com*756mitted the separate offense of committing or attempting to commit a felony while carrying or having in his possession a firearm.
"(2) A firearm is defined as any weapon from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled by using explosives, gas or air, as a means by propulsion.1
"(3) Before you may convict, you must be convinced of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
"(4) First, that the defendant committed or attempted to commit (the felony) (or one of the felonies I have previously defined).
"(5) Second, that at the time of (the felony) (or one of the felonies I have previously defined) he carried or had in his possession a firearm.2
"USE NOTE 1: When relevant the following language should be included, 'Except any smooth bore rifle or handgun designed and manufactured exclusively for propelling BBs not exceeding .177 calibre by means of spring’. MCLA 8.3t [MSA 2.212(20)].
"2: Where there is some question on possession an instruction on the meaning of possession should be prepared.”
The principal argument of the prosecutor is that the jury wanted to exercise its power of lenity in favor of this 17-year-old defendant and therefore arrived at a compromise verdict. The majority says there was a fatal flaw in that "the commission of or attempt to commit a felony, was specifically rejected by the jury verdict on the other count”. This is not, as I view the record, correct. The jury did not have before it the question of attempt in count I. Why are we compelled to expressly reject the reasonable implication that the jury predicated its finding on count II on the grounds that defendant attempted to commit a felony, one of the felonies charged in count I?
It seems to me that the rational basis rule relied on by the majority would bear reexamination by the Supreme Court as it may be obsolete. I do not *757think it can be convincingly argued that the defendant would not have been entitled to instructions on attempts as to included and cognate offenses if they were requested. In the Court’s reasoning in People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408, 426; 236 NW2d 473 (1975), the juries’ broad latitude was noted:
"Juries in criminal cases often find defendants not guilty or find persons who have committed the charged greater offense guilty of only a lesser offense in the face of the evidence for reasons satisfactory to them.”
It seems to me that the question of inconsistency ought to be reexamined by the Supreme Court, perhaps in the light of Emerson’s admonition about consistency. The automatic instruction (sometimes called laundry list) rules which have developed since People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), and Chamblis, supra, have increased the potential for inconsistent verdicts by increasing the scope of alternatives.
I am aware of the recent decision of a panel of this Court in People v Vaughn, 92 Mich App 742; 285 NW2d 444 (1979), which reversed a jury verdict of guilty of felonious assault for inconsistency because the same jury had returned a not guilty verdict on the felony-firearm count. I would respectfully record my disagreement with the decision in that case. I believe it far more logical to assume that 12 jurors were unable to vote unanimously on the felony-firearm charge because one or more was philosophically opposed to the felony-firearm statute than to assume they agreed on the nonexistence of the firearm as a predicate for the not guilty verdict on that count. The verdict on the felonious assault count was clearly supported by the evidence and would have been unassailable had it been tried before the effective date of the *758felony-firearm statute. Can we not take judicial notice that some jurors will on occasion refuse to follow instructions? The Chamblis court quoted Justice Holmes in Dunn v United States, 284 US 390, 394; 52 S Ct 189; 76 L Ed 356 (1932):
" 'That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.’ ” 395 Mich at 426.
The Dunn court affirmed the conviction and I would do likewise in this case.