Court Opinion

ID: 9537259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:14:59.134177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:18.480606
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, C.J.,
dissenting.
Although I have some difficulty in seeing the knock and announce rule as having constitutional proportions, the U. S. Supreme Court has so evaluated it and therefore I must start with that premise.
The premise, stated broadly, is that the requirement of the Fourth Amendment that a search be reasonable is not met unless the officer making the search first knock and then announce his authority and purpose. Since the rule is derived from the Fourth Amendment it necessarily must be explained in terms of the interest of privacy which the amendment purports to protect. Armed with a valid warrant the officer is privileged to invade the occupant’s enclave of privacy once a proper entry is made. However, at the threshold of the entry the officer must make his presence and mission known so that he does not make the encounter with the occupant any more offensive to his dignity than is necessary. If this is the interest the courts are charged with protecting, I do not see how it can be said that the requirement of knocking and announcing can be obviated through ruse, subterfuge or deception, as some of the cases cited in the principal opinion have held.
It is strange doctrine to say that a man has a right to know who seeks entry to his home, unless he can be cheated out of it by the agents of government. In circumstances where the officer’s safety would be endangered by an announcement of his purpose, he should be permitted to enter without making it. But *70short of that, the occupant should be entitled to have warning of the nature of the business which brings the visitor to his door. It may be argued that this treats too delicately the owner’s interest in privacy. If this is so, then there is no reason to give the knock and announce rule constitutional status. But as long as we bring the rule under the Fourth Amendment it should be applied consistent with the purpose it is intended to serve.
Even if the ruse exception were to be recognized by us, the facts in the present case do not bring it within the exception. The officers who entered after Holm had departed did not gain entrance as a result of anything that had any relation to Holm’s departure. Tested by any theory advanced for the knock and announce rule, the entry made by the officers in this case was no different than if Holm had never left the room.
Even if the rule is regarded as being founded in part upon the theory that it will tend to avoid unnecessary violence, the circumstances of entry in the present case created as much danger as if Holm had not taken part in the episode.
I wish to incorporate in this opinion the dissenting opinion of Judge Fort when this case was decided in the Court of Appeals.
McAllister, J., joins in this dissent.