Court Opinion

ID: 9363329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 21:00:45.803763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:31.236234
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10569    Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 01/13/2023    Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10569
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        HAYWOOD JACKSON MIZELL,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        THE CITY OF OZARK,
        Municipality,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00110-ECM-JTA
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10569

                                ____________________

        Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Haywood Mizell appeals from the District Court’s grant of
        a motion to dismiss his complaint alleging due process violations
        by the City of Ozark (“the City”). The District Court granted the
        City’s motion to dismiss Mizell’s claim for equitable relief based on
        lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doc-
        trine. 1 The District Court dismissed Mizell’s claim for monetary
        relief with prejudice as being barred by the statute of limitations.
        Because Mizell does not address either ground for the District
        Court’s dismissal in his brief, but instead reasserts his due process
        claim, we affirm the District Court’s grant of the City’s motion to
        dismiss Mizell’s claim for monetary relief. However, the District
        Court erred in holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied
        to Mizell’s equitable claim. We vacate the District Court’s order in
        that respect.
                                               I.
               In February 2021, Haywood Mizell, pro se, filed suit against
        the City, alleging that the City seized his property at 285 Broad
        Street in Ozark, Alabama—the historic “Holman House”—for

        1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is named for two Supreme Court cases:
        Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923), and District of
        Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).
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        22-10569               Opinion of the Court                       3

        public use without just compensation, in violation of his due pro-
        cess rights. The bulk of Mizell’s complaint focuses on allegedly
        fraudulent conduct by Wells Fargo, the mortgage holder, and a
        wrongful foreclosure action Wells Fargo initiated against Mizell in
        2013. The City purchased the property at the subsequent (and al-
        legedly fraudulent) 2013 foreclosure sale. Mizell requested just
        compensation for what he claims was the illegal seizure of his prop-
        erty by the City.
                The City filed a motion to dismiss Mizell’s claims under
        Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The motion to dismiss argued (1) the
        District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mizell’s
        claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) that Mizell’s claims
        were barred by Alabama’s statute of limitations; (3) that Mizell’s
        claims were barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collat-
        eral estoppel; and (4) that Mizell failed to state a claim for which
        relief could be granted.
               The matter was referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to
        28 U.S.C. § 636. The magistrate judge’s report and recommenda-
        tion (“R&R”) recommended that the District Court grant the City’s
        motion to dismiss and dismiss Mizell’s complaint without preju-
        dice. The R&R stated that Mizell’s claim for equitable relief was
        barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Mizell’s injury
        was caused by and inextricably intertwined with state court rul-
        ings—namely the state proceedings that twice upheld the validity
        of the foreclosure deed against Mizell. As such the District Court
        lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The R&R also stated that
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-10569

        Mizell’s claim for monetary relief was barred by Alabama’s two-
        year statute of limitations. The R&R did not reach the City’s other
        arguments.
              Both parties objected. Mizell objected to the magistrate
        judge’s recommendation to dismiss his claims; the City objected to
        the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss Mizell’s claims
        for monetary relief without prejudice.
               The District Court determined that two of Mizell’s objec-
        tions to the R&R merited de novo review: Mizell’s objection to dis-
        missal of his equitable claim under Rooker-Feldman and his objec-
        tion to dismissal of his claim for monetary damages.
                With respect to the former, the District Court held that “it
        is clear that [Mizell] seeks injunctive and declaratory relief from a
        2013 foreclosure proceeding in state court that resulted in the De-
        fendant purchasing the property at issue.” Mizell v. City of Ozark,
        2022 WL 463107, at *1 (M.D. Ala., Feb. 15, 2022). The District
        Court found Rooker-Feldman applicable to Mizell’s equitable
        claim because Mizell’s injury was caused by the underlying state
        court proceeding that permitted the City to purchase Mizell’s fore-
        closed property and that Mizell sought to have the District Court
        reverse that state court decision. Id. at *2. As such, the Court did
        not have subject matter jurisdiction.
               Regarding the latter objection, the District Court agreed
        with the R&R that Mizell’s claim for monetary damages was barred
        by Alabama’s two-year statute of limitations. Id. According to the
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        22-10569                Opinion of the Court                           5

        Court, that statute of limitations began to run on February 19,
        2013, when the City purchased the foreclosed property, because
        that is when Mizell knew that he had been injured. Id. The District
        Court differed from the R&R, however, in one respect: the District
        Court opinion sustained the City’s objection to dismissing Mizell’s
        claim for monetary relief without prejudice because the statute of
        limitations had run. Id. The Court thus adopted the R&R but
        modified it to dismiss Mizell’s claim for monetary damages with
        prejudice. Id. Mizell timely appealed.
                                           II.
                Generally, we would review both Mizell’s equitable and
        monetary claims de novo, viewing the facts in a light most favora-
        ble to the plaintiff. Parise v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 141 F.3d 1463, 1465
        (1998) (reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter ju-
        risdiction de novo); Henderson v. McMurray, 987 F.3d 997, 1001
        (11th Cir. 2021) (reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state
        a claim de novo). However, a legal claim or argument that has not
        been briefed is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be ad-
        dressed. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330
        (11th Cir. 2004).
               An issue is also considered abandoned when “a party seeking
        to raise a claim or issue on appeal [fails] to plainly and prominently
        so indicate.” United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1284 n.8
        (11th Cir. 2003). An appellant abandons a claim when: (a) he makes
        only passing references to it, (b) he raises it in a perfunctory manner
        without supporting arguments and authority, (c) he refers to it only
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10569

        in the “statement of the case” or “summary of the argument,” (d)
        the references to the issue are mere background to the appellant’s
        main arguments or are buried within those arguments, or (e) he
        raises it for the first time in his reply brief. Sapuppo v. Allstate Flo-
        ridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681-683 (11th Cir. 2014).
               Mizell proceeded pro se in this appeal. While we read briefs
        filed by pro se litigants like Mizell liberally, issues not briefed on
        appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned, just as if Mizell
        had had counsel. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.
        2008). Neither do we address arguments raised for the first time in
        a pro se litigant’s reply brief. Id.
                Here, Mizell abandons any argument he had that the District
        Court erred in dismissing his claims for equitable and monetary re-
        lief. The District Court based its dismissal of Mizell’s equitable
        claim on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its dismissal of his mon-
        etary claim on the statute of limitations. Mizell did not substan-
        tively address either ground for dismissal in his principal brief. Ra-
        ther than responding to the actions of the District Court, the bulk
        of Mizell’s argument was focused on claims of fraudulent and de-
        ceitful conduct by Wells Fargo and City of Ozark officials. While
        Mizell arguably does address the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in his
        reply brief, we do not address arguments raised for the first time in
        a reply brief. Mizell has, therefore, abandoned any argument that
        the District Court erred in its dismissal of his claims.
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        22-10569               Opinion of the Court                        7

                                        III.
               In its brief, the City encourages this Court to examine the
        District Court’s reliance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in dis-
        missing Mizell’s equitable claim. We review de novo a district
        court’s determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
        a plaintiff’s claim in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Good-
        man ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001).
               The City acknowledges that it based much of its motion to
        dismiss Mizell’s equitable claim on the theory that the District
        Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman.
        According to the City, however, that motion was filed before this
        Court decided Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206 (11th Cir. 2021). In
        light of Behr, the City no longer believes Rooker-Feldman applies
        and instead requests that this Court vacate the District Court’s
        “without prejudice” dismissal of Mizell’s equitable claim based on
        Rooker-Feldman and remand the action to the District Court with
        instructions to dismiss the entire action with prejudice based on the
        statute of limitations. Appellee’s Br. at 15-16.
                Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts
        cannot review or reject state court judgments rendered before the
        district court litigation began. Id. at 1210. The scope of the doc-
        trine is narrow, confined to “cases brought by state-court losers
        complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
        before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting dis-
        trict court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10569

        Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517,
        1521–22 (2005).
               Rooker-Feldman “does not prioritize form over substance,”
        meaning it bars all appeals of state court judgments in district
        courts whether the plaintiff admits to filing a direct appeal or tries
        to call the appeal something else. Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211 (citing May
        v. Morgan Cnty., 878 F.3d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 2017)). The injury
        to the plaintiff must be caused by the judgment itself. Id. at 1211.
        The question is not whether the whole complaint seems to chal-
        lenge a previous state court judgment, but whether the resolution
        of each individual claim requires review and rejection of a state
        court judgment. Id. at 1213. In Behr, we warned that “district
        courts should keep one thing in mind when Rooker-Feldman is
        raised: it will almost never apply.” Id. at 1212.
                Here, Mizell’s injury was not caused by the two Alabama
        state judgments that upheld the foreclosure, but by the 2013 fore-
        closure itself. Further, Mizell did not invite the District Court to
        review and reject either of those judgments in his due process
        claim. Instead, he requested compensation for what he deemed to
        be a taking in violation of his due process rights. Therefore, the
        District Court had jurisdiction over Mizell’s equitable claim and
        erred in applying Rooker-Feldman.
               The City requests that this Court vacate the District Court’s
        “without prejudice” dismissal of Mizell’s equitable claim based on
        Rooker-Feldman and remand the action to the District Court with
        instructions to dismiss the entire action with prejudice based on the
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        22-10569               Opinion of the Court                        9

        statute of limitations. The City correctly notes that an “appellee
        may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree any
        matter appearing in the record, although his argument may in-
        volve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court or an insist-
        ence upon matter overlooked or ignored by it.” Appellee’s Br. at
        15 (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479, 481,
        96 S. Ct. 2158, 2159 (1976)). However, “an appellee who does not
        cross-appeal may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarg-
        ing his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his ad-
        versary.” Lopez v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 914 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir.
        2019) (quoting Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271, 275, 135 S. Ct.
        793, 798 (2015)). The City does just that.
                Under the District Court’s order, Mizell’s equitable claim
        was dismissed without prejudice. In other words, Mizell was free
        to refile his equitable claim. The City argues that this Court should
        vacate that order and instruct the District Court to convert its dis-
        missal without prejudice into a dismissal with prejudice, meaning
        that Mizell would no longer be able to refile his claim. We cannot
        grant the City’s request because to do so would lessen Mizell’s
        rights and enlarge the City’s without a cross-appeal.
               However, the District Court did err in determining that it
        did not have jurisdiction to hear Mizell’s equitable claim under the
        Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The District Court does have jurisdic-
        tion to hear that claim. As such, we vacate the District Court’s or-
        der in that respect.
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10569

                                         IV.
               The District Court order is AFFIRMED insofar as it dis-
        misses Mizell’s claim for money damages as barred by the statute
        of limitations and dismisses that claim with prejudice. The District
        Court’s order is VACATED with respect to its dismissal of Mizell’s
        claims for equitable relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction un-
        der the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the matter is REMANDED
        to the District Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this
        opinion.