Court Opinion

ID: 9717916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:12:55.025483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.098128
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.1 Since I am convinced that the trial court findings were not clearly erroneous and not affected by any error of law, I am of the opinion that the judgment denying habeas corpus relief should be affirmed for the following reasons (their order does not reflect their relative merit ranking):
(1) The Miranda warning was not necessary.
At the time Sheriff Berg questioned Sat-ter there was no known crime and Satter was not a suspect. Sheriff Berg was at the investigatory (not the accusatorial) stage of the proceedings. (Remember, too, that there is no claim or evidence of police misconduct or coercion.)
A suspect has a right to counsel at any custodial interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) reh’g denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981). In United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368 (10th Cir.1985), the court stated that “interrogation” for purposes of determining whether Miranda warnings are required, “is best viewed as an umbrella term encompassing *431words or actions that police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id. at 379. See also United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.1985) cert. denied 473 U.S. 913, 105 S.Ct. 3540, 87 L.Ed.2d 663 (1985), providing that not every question posed in a custodial setting is equivalent to interrogation requiring Miranda warning.
The facts here indicate that Sheriff Berg had received an anonymous phone call advising him that there were bodies in a rock pile south of the town of Kranzburg, South Dakota. The caller told Sheriff Berg that if he could not find the bodies himself he should talk to Satter, who was then being held in jail on burglary charges. The caller indicated nothing further. Sheriff Berg searched the general area described by the caller, but was unable to find anything. He then went to the jail and talked to Satter about some burglaries that Satter and another man had allegedly committed. He then asked Satter “if he knew anything about two bodies that were supposed to be buried somewhere around the Watertown area.”
In the circumstances of this case, Sheriff Berg was not required to give a Miranda warning. His inquiry regarding the location of alleged dead bodies was not accusatory and could not generally be said to lead to incriminating responses, and thus Sheriff Berg’s question did not constitute “interrogation” invoking Satter’s Miranda rights. Gay, supra. I also note and distinguish that the defendants in both Elstad, infra and Holland, infra, (cases heavily relied upon by the majority) were suspects and/or charged with a crime for which they were being interrogated. Whereas here, Satter was not even a suspect for any crime concerning the bodies. See also (8)(a) of this dissent.
(2) Satter knew, understood and waived his Miranda rights.
First, nowhere does Satter claim that at the time he gave the statement to Sheriff Berg he was not aware of his Miranda rights. Rather, he urges the technical omission of the exercise of giving the warning on April 1, 1973.
The determination of whether an “accused” has knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights depends on the facts of each case. Stumes v. Solem, 752 F.2d 317 (8th Cir.1985) cert. denied 471 U.S. 1067, 105 S.Ct. 2145, 85 L.Ed.2d 502 (1985) citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). Although not referred to in the majority opinion, we set forth the test for waiver in State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302, 305 (S.D.1984), stating:
A defendant can waive his privilege against self-incrimination and the rights that go along with it, provided that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Miranda, supra. To determine whether the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, we must look to the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background experience, and conduct of the accused, (citations omitted) We must also consider whether the defendant knew of the nature of the offense for which he was charged or suspected. ...
See also State v. Albright, 418 N.W.2d 292 (S.D.1988); Stumes, supra.
Satter was no stranger to the criminal justice system. He had been convicted of four prior felonies. More importantly, however, at the time he gave the statement to Sheriff Berg he was in custody regarding burglary charges and probation violation (possession of a firearm) and had previously been Mirandized regarding those charges. In fact, he had met many times with law enforcement officers during March and was Mirandized before each interview. Satter’s trial testimony reveals that he was articulate and intelligent. He clearly was aware of his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, etc. as regarded by Miranda.
Sheriff Berg did not know if any dead bodies existed. Satter clearly was unaware of any murder charge at the time he talked to the sheriff. Certainly Satter was not suspected of, nor charged with, any criminal offense relating to the bodies at that *432time. More importantly, in Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that a suspect’s awareness of all the crimes about which he could be questioned was irrelevant in determining the validity of the decision to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and, therefore, the failure to inform the defendant of the subject matter of an interrogation could not have affected his decision to waive the privilege.
For the above reasons, and all of the other reasons included herein,2 it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to conclude, after scrutinizing the totality of the circumstances, that Satter waived his Fifth Amendment rights, as the statements were voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. State v. Bult, 351 N.W.2d 731 (S.D.1984); Holland, supra; Stumes, supra.
(3) The story Satter gave Sheriff Berg was an untrue fabrication.
Satter did not give Sheriff Berg a statement implicating himself with the killings. Rather, he advised Sheriff Berg that a named individual from Minnesota had come to Watertown to collect a percentage of proceeds from some burglaries that had been committed by two other individuals, and had shot these two men after he learned that they had spent his share of the money. Satter advised Sheriff Berg that this individual offered him $1,000 to go out and burn up the two bodies with a cutting torch, but he indicated he could not bring himself to do so.
As stated earlier, nothing about that statement incriminated the defendant with the offense of murder, thereby eroding any fruit of the poisonous tree concepts. See generally, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).
(4) After being Mirandized, Satter latter told the same fabricated story to a DCI agent.
Sheriff Berg contacted other law enforcement authorities after the bodies were located. DCI Agent Delbert Peterson (Peterson) went to Watertown, advised Satter of his Miranda rights and was told a similar fabrication concerning an offer by persons from Minneapolis to dispose of the bodies.
First, I disagree with the majority’s analysis of Elstad, supra. The majority quotes from Elstad as follows:
Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda.
470 U.S. at 307, 105 S.Ct. at 1292, 84 L.Ed.2d at 231.
The majority, however, overlooks or disregards other significant language in El-stad, holding that only compelled testimony is prohibited for the State’s case-in-chief. The Court stated:
Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn ... solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.
470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. at 1293, 84 L.Ed.2d at 232.
We must conclude that, absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and intelligent choice to waive or invoke his rights.
*433470 S.Ct. at 314, 105 S.Ct. at 1296, 84 L.Ed.2d at 235.
Here, Satter was Mirandized many times regularly throughout March, 1973, and before the April 1 statement to Sheriff Berg. Satter was “an old hand” with the criminal justice system. He had visited with an attorney several times in March, 1973, but did not retain one. As stated earlier herein, Satter’s trial testimony reveals that he was articulate and intelligent. Finally, after Satter posed the hypothetical question about the dead bodies to Sheriff Berg and was informed that if he had knowledge of their location he could be charged with some criminal offense, he later voluntarily returned to the subject of the location of the bodies after his discussion with Berg had turned to other topics. Thus, Satter was sufficiently warned before giving the April 1 statement and his rights were voluntarily waived and the same rationale applies to the statement to Peterson.
Furthermore, there has been no showing of police coercion. There is nothing in the record indicating any police misconduct or coercive tactics at the April 1, interview or at any other time. Neither Sheriff Berg nor Peterson employed physical or emotional pressure to elicit the statement from Satter. Nor was Satter worn down by improper interrogation tactics, lengthy questioning, trickery, or deceit. See Colorado v. Spring, supra; Elstad, supra. (See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, -, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 486 (1986), wherein it is stated that “[t]he sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda [is] based, is governmental coercion.”) Therefore, any presumption of coercion was rebutted by State.
The giving of Satter’s subsequent statement to Peterson, after appropriate Miranda advice (and the subsequent written Mirandized confessions), also supports the voluntary nature of Satter’s statements. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1298, 84 L.Ed.2d at 238. Thus, to require a retrial simply by excluding the same statement previously given to Sheriff Berg would be an idle act.
Even if the April 1 statement would be inadmissible under Elstad, which I certainly do not concede, the admission in State’s case-in-chief was harmless error due to Satter’s subsequent statement to Peterson and confessions, which were voluntarily given after valid Miranda warnings. Albright, supra. (See discussion below.)
(5) The subsequent statements and confessions were not fruit of any poisonous tree.
I also disagree with majority’s statement on page 5, stating: “... the admissions made to Sheriff Berg were involuntary and any evidence resulting therefrom could be subject to the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine.”
First, the trial court’s finding of volun-tariness and waiver, as stated earlier herein, is not clearly erroneous. Subsequent to the statements to Sheriff Berg and Peterson, Satter executed Mirandized written admissions of killing the victims. These subsequent statements and “Confession[s] cannot be ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ because the tree itself [was] not poisonous.” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. at -, 107 S.Ct. at 856, 93 L.Ed.2d at 964.
The majority overlooks or disregards the holding in Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. at 1293, 84 L.Ed.2d at 232, in which the United States Supreme Court said:
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn ... solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made. (Emphasis added.)
Since there is no doubt that the subsequent statement (to Peterson) and the written confessions were voluntarily made and appropriately allowed into evidence, the ad-
*434mission of the April 1 statements during the State’s case-in-chief was, at worst, harmless error. “No further purpose is served by imputing ‘taint’ to subsequent statements obtained pursuant to a voluntary and knowing waiver.” 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1298, 84 L.Ed.2d at 238. (See discussion in 8(b) of this dissent regarding alleged promise of confidentiality for the subsequent statements.) Finally, as Elstad noted, the subsequent confessions could have been utilized for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. See also State v. Williamson, 349 N.W.2d 645 (S.D.1984).
Therefore, the subsequent statements were not involuntary nor were they “fruit” of any “poisonous tree” under the clear holding of Elstad, supra. See also Colorado v. Spring, supra.
(6) Satter did not confess to the killing until he failed the polygraph examination.
During the course of the investigation, Satter was Mirandized approximately twenty times. He ultimately took a polygraph examination, which he failed. It was not until then that he admitted to killing the victims, asserting that he did so in self-defense. No statements prior to that time in any manner implicated him in the killing of the victims, but rather implicated him in other possible charges.
(7) Self-defense was the real issue.
Throughout the trial, Satter asserted that he shot the victims in self-defense after an argument. He and the victims had committed a number of burglaries together in South Dakota and Minnesota. Satter was angry with them because one of the victims had taken some nude pictures of Satter’s sister. At no time did Satter assert that he did not shoot the victims, rather he claimed that he did so in self-defense. The jury heard all of the facts and concluded that he had committed murder. State v. Albright, supra.

(8)Other issues should be addressed.

Because of its holding on one issue, the majority did not discuss the other issues which were raised by Satter. In my view we should discuss and dismiss those issues as not meritorious.
(a) Request for Counsel
Satter knew and understood his right to counsel and- was negotiating with private counsel to represent him. At no time did he request to have an attorney with him when Sheriff Berg talked to him, even though it seems clear from the record that he understood his right. In my view, he waived his right to counsel. Stumes, supra. Furthermore, the admission of statements made by a criminal suspect before any formal charges or indictment has been issued does not violate the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel because that right has not yet attached. See generally Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (“Incriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment has not yet attached are, of course, admissible at the trial of those offenses.” 474 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. at 490, 88 L.Ed.2d 499 fn. 16). Regarding a Fifth Amendment right to counsel, see Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied Fairman v. Espinoza, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3240, 97 L.Ed.2d 745 (1987). As stated earlier in this dissent, Satter waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel on the burglary charges.3 It is not a requirement to re-Mirandize for a different crime after securing a valid waiver on earlier charges. Espinoza, supra citing Colorado v. Spring, supra.
(b) Promised Confidentiality
Satter principally asserts that Sheriff Berg had promised that their conversation *435regarding the dead bodies would be confidential. Sheriff Berg did not recall having made any such assurance. The trial court resolved that conflict in favor of the State, and in my view such holding was not clearly erroneous. Albright, supra.
(c) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
After having reviewed the transcript of the habeas corpus hearing and the trial, I am convinced that Satter was not represented by ineffective counsel. Unfortunately, Attorney Hackett is no longer living to defend himself. In my view, he did a laudable job of representing Satter at trial and on appeal. I believe Satter’s assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel totally lack merit. The United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), set forth the standard to employ when examining an ineffective assistance claim. A defendant claiming such must show
that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698.
Satter's principal argument is that Hack-ett failed to move to suppress the statements and confessions. Hackett did object at trial to the statement but used the confession to support the self-defense claim. This offer of Satter’s written statements was a part of Satter’s and Hackett’s legitimate trial tactics and strategy to show that Satter killed in self-defense. It is not this court’s function to second-guess the tactical decisions of counsel nor to substitute its own theory of defense. Jibben v. State, 343 N.W.2d 788 (S.D.1984).
Satter also argues that Hackett was deficient because he did not seek to excise a portion of his written confession which referred to another polygraph examination. First, we have no way to determine what, if any, impact that portion of the statement had upon the jury. Further, its admission clearly seems to coincide with the totality of Satter’s and Hackett’s overall strategy. Even if Hackett erred in failing to make such a motion, I am convinced that the oversight did not rise to the Strickland standards. As stated earlier, the total issue was self-defense and the jury simply did not buy it.
I conclude that Attorney Hackett’s representation was anything but causal. Hack-ett raised proper objections, vigorouly presented the self-defense claim and preserved all meritorious issues.
I conclude by asserting that it would be a manifest injustice to require a retrial of this case. The defendant, after being properly advised of his rights, admitted to the shootings yet claimed that he did so in self-defense. Now after his attorney has died, he attempts to collaterally attack the conviction on a number of grounds which in my view are not meritorious.
The judgment denying habeas corpus relief should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that WUEST, C.J., joins in this dissent.

. I do agree with the majority’s analysis regarding Instructions 5 and 15.

. Specifically note the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to counsel issues under (8)(a) of this dissent.

. The facts here are distinguishable from Holland wherein defendant, who was in an Oregon jail on Oregon charges, had retained South Dakota counsel for the South Dakota charge. Here, Satter had not retained counsel and waived his right, nor had any formal murder charges been filed. See Edwards v. Arizona, supra; Espinoza, supra citing Colorado v. Spring, supra.