Court Opinion

ID: 9705510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:09:47.350964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:12.111123
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE PINCHAM, dissenting: I dissent. Petitioner, as the mother of the decedent, was his next of kin and was entitled to recover damages for his death from defendants pursuant to section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 2). An action for wrongful death is brought by the personal representative of the estate of the decedent for the exclusive benefit of the decedent’s surviving spouse and next of kin. (In re Estate of Edwards (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 635, 638, 435 N.E.2d 1379.) The amount recovered in a wrongful death action is distributed to the surviving spouse and next of kin of the decedent according to the court’s determination of their actual dependency. (Rust v. Holland (1957), 15 Ill. App. 2d 369, 373, 146 N.E.2d 82.) In the construction of section 2 of the Act, as it existed prior to the 1955 legislative amendment, the amount recovered in an action for wrongful death was distributed to the surviving spouse and next of kin of the decedent according to intestate provisions of the statute of descent and distribution. Wilcox v. Bierd (1928), 330 Ill. 571, 579, 162 N.E. 170. The present statutory language of section 2 clearly permits the surviving spouse and next of kin to recover in the same wrongful death action according to their dependency upon the decedent. (Rusher v. Smith (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 889, 894, 388 N.E.2d 906.) Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the function of the court is to apply the law as enacted by the legislature. It is improper for the court to depart from the plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations or conditions that conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. (Carswell v. Rosewell (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 168, 172, 501 N.E.2d 695.) We must presume that when the legislature modified the procedure for distributing judgments for wrongful death, it was aware of judicial decisions concerning prior and existing law; (See Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 211, 218, 447 N.E.2d 394.) The amendatory language in section 2 of the Act modified the procedure for distribution of the amount recovered in a wrongful death action so that it was no longer based on the statute of descent and distribution as applied to an intestate but upon the actual dependency of the surviving spouse and next of kin as determined by the court. The flaw in the analysis of the majority is its construction of the phrase next of kin, which relies upon Wilcox. However, as I have noted, the Wilcox construction applied to the preamended version of section 2 of the Act. Additionally, it was uncontested that petitioner herein was dependent upon decedent, who had provided her regular monthly financial assistance before his death. Decedent’s widow, the personal representative of the estate, acknowledged that dependency by giving petitioner $800 after his death. Further, by filing her petition to vacate the settlement order within a month after she learned of the entry of the order, petitioner proceeded with diligence. Her claim was meritorious. The judgment should be vacated and the court remanded to permit the trial court to redistribute the amount recovered to plaintiffs and the petitioner on the basis of their actual dependency upon decedent. Based on the foregoing reasoning, I dissent.