Court Opinion

ID: 9883908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:24:46.545797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:32.960576
License: Public Domain

Griffin Smith, Chief Justice, dissenting. The decision undertakes to soften an abrupt departure from conflict with the statute by saying that “. . . where the aggression of the claimant is so violent as to come within the express legislative exceptions of wilful misconduct or wilful intent to injure, [then the claimant] may not recover, even though the assault arises out of the employment. ’ ’ Prom this the conclusion is drawn that ‘ ‘ an impulsive or instinctive punch with the fist or similar thoughtless acts which are trivial in origin though serious in result” are not of a character injecting into the record a question of fact. The Act provides that "there shall be no compensation where the injury . . . was solely occasioned . . . by wilful intention of the injured employe to bring about injury. ...” It is now determined that the wage of physical aggression is not a factual matter for the Commission’s consideration, but that "impulsive reaction” accompanied by an assault falls within the realm of legal gradation. We or the circuit court — but not the Commission— appraise motives, actions, and reactions; and where a worker is injured by a fellow servant whom he assaulted (and in the base at bar there was a return to the scene of strife) the transaction may be treated as "horseplay” without factual signification. It is inconceivable that a man of spirit and courage would fail to react when assaulted; and if the person who thus invites retaliation should happen to misjudge the quality of his victim and come out at the hospital end of disaster, nevertheless he is entitled to compensation because, as here, he "impulsively and without deliberation” returned to the scene of disagreement. There, in a brotherly mood and without intentional volition, premeditation, animus or reflection, he made the assault that no doubt had an unexpected ending. To say the least of it Johnson vindicated his valor at the expense of his physical person, and he now receives compensation through judicial forgiveness and a "liberal” construction of the Act. I can conceive of disagreements so trivial that a reasonable person would not be expected to anticipate retaliation, but where, as here, the claimant has embarked on a punitive expedition that terminated contrary to his expectations, I think it is error to draw the legal conclusion that the master’s purposes were being served, or that the digression from duty was not a self-willed undertaking that relieved the employer of liability for the result.