Court Opinion

ID: 9855140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:20:06.516144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:42.001641
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
The majority holds that Joanne Conte’s (Conte) petition was “continuously filed,” for the purposes of the statutory requirements, every day from July 18, 1994, until August 2, 1994. Maj. op. at 965. I disagree. Section *967l-4-802(l)(g), IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), is clear and unambiguous, and mandates that a candidate be registered at least twelve months prior to the date of filing of the petition. The Uniform Election Code requires independent candidates to meet its statutory mandate before their names can appear on the ballot. Since Conte failed to meet that mandate, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Candidates who wish to run on an independent ticket for state office must submit a petition for nomination. See §§ 1-4-403, 1-4-503,1-4-802, IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Section 1-4-802 of the Uniform Election Code governs the petition procedure for independent, or “unaffiliated,” candidates. Under that section, the petition must contain the candidate’s name and address, and the name of the office sought. See § 1 — 4—802(l)(b), IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). The petition for nomination must then be signed by eligible electors in the candidate’s district. See § 1-4 — 802(l)(e), IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.).3
Section l-4-802(l)(g) further requires each independent candidate to be registered as an independent elector on the books of the county clerk and recorder. The section of that statute, which is at issue here, reads as follows:
No person shall be placed in nomination by petition ... unless the person was registered as unaffiliated, as shown on the books of the county clerk and recorder, for at least twelve months prior to the date of filing of the petition....
Once the petition requirements are met, the candidate must file the petition with the Secretary of State of Colorado (the Secretary). See § l-4-802(l)(f), IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Petitions must be filed by 3:00 p.m. on the Tuesday before the primary election. Id. Petitions may be filed before the statutory deadline. However, petitions cannot be circulated for signatures prior to forty-nine days before the primary election. See § 1-<U802(l)(d), IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.).
The facts of this case are undisputed. On April 30, 1993, Conte submitted a candidate affidavit to the Secretary, declaring herself a Democratic candidate for State Representative in House District 29. On August 2, 1993, Conte submitted a revised affidavit, declaring that she was an unaffiliated candidate for the same office. On the same day, August 2, 1993, Conte registered as an unaffiliated elector with the Jefferson County Clerk and Recorder.
Conte circulated a petition for nomination for State Representative to House District 29, and collected the names and signatures of 1,423 individuals who stated that they were registered voters in the district. Conte completed the petition form, and certified on her petition that she was registered as an unaffiliated elector as of August 2, 1993.
Sometime prior to fifing, Conte reviewed her petition with employees at the elections office, and was told that her petition appeared to be in compliance with the law. Conte then filed her petition with the Office of the Secretary on July 18,1994. Under the statute, however, the earliest that Conte could file her petition was twelve months after August 2, 1993, the same date as the deadline for fifing those petitions, August 2, 1994.4
On July 27, 1994, Conte received a transmission by facsimile from the Secretary, confirming that her name would appear on the November 8, 1994, ballot as a candidate in House District 29. Unfortunately, that confirmation notice was erroneously sent. After the Secretary’s office issued the confirmation, they discovered that Conte had not been registered as an unaffiliated elector for twelve months preceding the fifing of her petition. Accordingly, on August 12, 1994, the Secretary notified Conte that she was ineligible to hold the office of State Representative under section 1 — 4—802(l)(g), IB *968C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), and that her name would not appear on the November ballot.
Conte challenged the Secretary’s decision in federal district court, seeking to have her name returned to the November 1994 ballot. On September 7, 1994, the federal court denied Conte’s request for relief, stating that she had an adequate remedy in state court under section 1-1-113, IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Conte then filed suit in Denver District Court, seeking declaratory and injunc-tive relief. In its judgment, the trial court sympathized with Conte, but held that the statutory language of section l-4-802(l)(g) was unambiguous, evidencing a legislative intent requiring independent candidates to be registered as independent for twelve months before filing of the petition. The trial court also rejected Conte’s argument that she had a statutory right to cure defects in the petition. Her estoppel argument was similarly rejected. Conte appealed the judgment to this court pursuant to section 1-1-113(3), IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.).
II.
Conte raised three issues in her appeal: (1) whether she was an eligible candidate under the statute; (2) whether the Secretary deprived Conte of the right to “cure” her deficient petition; and (3) whether the Secretary was estopped, because of her actions, from withholding Conte’s name from the ballot. The majority addresses only one of these arguments. Maj. op. at 965.
The majority holds that Conte’s petition was “continuously filed,” for the purposes of the statute, through August 2, 1994. In other words, the majority holds that Conte’s filing was “close enough,” despite the unambiguous statutory language barring Conte from appearing on the ballot if she filed her petition when she had been registered as an unaffiliated elector for less than twelve months.
In my judgment, this statute is clear and unambiguous. Section 1^4-802(l)(g) frames the twelve-month affiliation requirement as an imperative:
No person shall be placed in nomination by petition ... unless the person was registered as unaffiliated ... for at least twelve months prior to the date of filing of the petition.
See Sargent Sch. Dist. No. RE-33J v. Western Servs., Inc., 751 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo.1988) (“Where the word ‘shall’ is used in a statute, it is presumed to be mandatory.”).5
From this language, the majority states that the legislature intended only that the candidate be registered as unaffiliated for twelve months “prior to the last date upon which applications must be filed.” Maj. op. at 965 (emphasis added). The majority holds that the legislative intent of the statute is “clear,” yet goes on to construe the statute contrary to its plain language.
In my opinion, it is inappropriate to engage in statutory construction when, as here, the meaning of the statute is patently clear. East Lakewood Sanitation Dist. v. District Court, 842 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo.1992) (holding that, when statutory language is unambiguous, it can be presumed that the legislature intended what it said); Husson v. Meeker, 812 P.2d 731, 732 (Colo.App.1991) (“A statute free from ambiguity leaves no room for interpretation or construction.”). The majority “construes” the twelve-month registration requirement out of the statute, rather than enforcing the statute as written.
The mandatory language of the statute as it pertains to political affiliation is supported by our decision in Ray v. Mickelson, 196 Colo. 325, 327-28, 584 P.2d 1215, 1217 (1978). In Ray, the Democratic County Assembly designated two primary candidates for the office of Sheriff of Larimer County: Ray and Mickelson. After Ray won the primary election, Mickelson discovered that Ray had not met the statutory requirements for his eligibility as a designated candidate. Section 1-14-204(4), 1B C.R.S. (1973), provided:
No person shall be eligible for designation by assembly as a candidate for nomi*969nation at any primary election unless such person has been affiliated with the political party holding the assembly for a period of at least twelve months immediately preceding the date of the assembly....[6]
Mickelson filed a complaint in district court alleging that Ray had not been a registered Democrat for twelve months preceding the date of the assembly, and that Ray was therefore ineligible to be the Democratic candidate in the general election. The district court agreed with Mickelson, and Ray appealed.
On appeal, we held that Ray was ineligible to be designated the Democratic primary candidate and ineligible to participate in the general election, solely because he had not been a registered Democrat for twelve months preceding the date of the assembly. Ray, 196 Colo. at 327-28, 684 P.2d at 1217. We therefore affirmed the district court’s finding that there was a vacancy in the Democratic party designation for the office of sheriff, even though Ray had already been selected as a candidate by the voters. We reasoned as follows:
Section l-14r-204(4) makes it clear that unless the person choosing to be a candidate has been registered as a member of the political party he seeks to represent [for twelve months], he may not be designated as a party candidate by the assembly. It folloivs that he may not be the party candidate, even though he may have been mistakenly designated by the county assembly as a primary nominee and even though he may have been selected by the voters at the primary election to be the party candidate.
Id. (emphasis added).
The statutory language at issue here is as clear as it was in Ray. Likewise, Conte is ineligible under section l-4-802(l)(g) to be placed on the ballot.
Furthermore, the twelve-month registration requirement is not a mere technicality, but serves an important state purpose. When this same disaffiliation requirement was challenged on constitutional grounds, we said that it serves our state’s “compelling interest in ‘maintaining the integrity’ of its ballot access system,” and held that the statute was constitutional. Colorado Libertarian Party v. Secretary of State, 817 P.2d 998, 1004 (Colo.1991) (emphasis added), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1670, 118 L.Ed.2d 390 (1992);7 see also Thournir v. Meyer, 708 F.Supp. 1183 (D.Colo.1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the same statute), aff'd, 909 F.2d 408 (10th Cir.1990). By failing to adhere to the plain language of the statute, the majority effectively side-steps the compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of our ballot access system that the statute was designed to protect.8
Finally, the majority infers that the office of the Secretary somehow prevented Conte from attempting a “cure” of her deficient petition, by notifying Conte of the deficiency after the filing deadline.9 However, there is no statutory provision allowing candidates to cure petitions which fail to meet the affilia*970tion requirement of section l-4-802(l)(g). Furthermore, nothing in the statute requires the Secretary to provide candidates with adequate time to cure a deficient petition.
Conte shoulders the ultimate responsibility for seeing that her petition is statutorily sufficient, particularly since the statute’s requirement is so plain. While I am not unmindful of the unfortunate string of events leading to the Secretary’s refusal to place Conte’s name on the ballot, I nonetheless agree with the district court that the requirement of section 802(l)(g) is a prerequisite to an independent candidate’s nomination. Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to say that SCOTT, J., joins in this dissent.

. The number of required signatures on the petition varies with the type of office sought. See § l-4-802(l)(c), IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). In this case, it is undisputed that Conte satisfactorily complied with this statutory requirement.

. The 1994 primary was on August 9, 1994, so the preceding Tuesday, August 2, 1994, was the filing deadline for petitions.

. See also § 1-4-501(1), IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), which provides as follows:
No person is eligible to be a designee or candidate for office unless that person fully meets the qualifications of that office as stated in the ... statutes of this state....

. This section was later repealed, effective January 1, 1981. Act approved Feb. 21, 1980, ch. 43, sec. 38, 1980 Colo.Sess.Laws 293, 418.

. Colorado Libertarian Party was decided under § l-4-801(l)(i), IB C.R.S. (1973), prior to the 1992 revision of the Uniform Election Code. That section is substantively identical to the revised statute, now found at § 1—4—802(1)(g), 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Act approved June 2, 1992, ch. 118, sec. 7, 1992 Colo.Sess.Laws 624, 684, 686.

. In Colorado Libertarian Party, 817 P.2d 998, 1003 (Colo.1991), we quoted Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1281-82, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974), with approval:
[The disaffiliation statute] protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot. It works against independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party fielding an "independent” candidate to capture and bleed off votes in the general election that might well go to another party.

.Section 1-4-912(1), IB C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), allows a candidate to amend a petition for nomination as an independent candidate. The relevant portion of that statute reads as follows:
In case a petition for nominating independent candidates is not sufficient, it may be amended once at any time prior to 3 p.m. on the Tuesday preceding a primary election....
(Emphasis added.)