Court Opinion

ID: 9564768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:06:50.643802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:39.632178
License: Public Domain

Felton, Justice,
concurring specially. 1. It has been impossible for me to give as full consideration to this case as I do in ordinary circumstances. I have done the best I could under the existing situation. I first concurred in the opinion and judgment. On motion for rehearing in the limited time that I have, *509I wish to change my concurrence to a special one because at this moment I cannot agree with all that is said in the opinion and think that possibly more should have been said on some of the questions ruled on.
I belatedly discovered that the trial judge in his judgment stated: “Whether or not he may be disciplined, suspended, or disbarred ... by some rule authorized by the Supreme Court under its inherent power as stated in Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102 (166 SE2d 718) ... is not here decided or passed on.” It is contended by appellee that this court has no jurisdiction to pass on a question not ruled on by the trial court. I also think that the contention is without merit for the reason that the trial judge could not escape the fact that he was bound by the decision in the Wallace case by refusing to pass on the question of this court’s inherent power, and for the reason that the legal consequence of the trial court’s judgment is that this court does not have the prerequisite inherent power, because if this is not true he could not issue a legal and binding injunction, which necessarily meant that this court does not have that power. In this case, this court does have jurisdiction to do what it has done under the peculiar circumstances existing.
2. Even if this court stated that it was acting under legislative authority claimed to be unconstitutional, where a decision of this court holds that this court has inherent power to do the acts complained of, the authority of this court to so act renders moot the constitutionality of the legislative action purportedly acted on. This court has never said that it did not act on the basis of inherent power and if it could, and did, what it did is binding. Inherent power is the life of this issue and nothing that has happened has snuffed out that life and, indeed, nothing can except a new constitution. That also disposes of the provision in the Act or rules which provides that no change in the rules, or addition of new ones could be effected unless the State Bar instituted the action. This court had the inherent power to make such a rule, no matter how unwise some might think it to be. The court, in this field of operation, could experiment with such a rule. It could work, but if experience shows it to be wrong or unwise, the court can always change a rule if it is *510shown to be unwise or likely to do some harm to any person. My point is that it is not unconstitutional.