Court Opinion

ID: 9662283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:04:45.800628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:38.341180
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
(dissenting on motion for rehearing).
My brethren hold that under the statute law of this state (Art. 1008a, C.C.P.) a charge in the demanding state by information supported by an affidavit made before a non-magistrate will support and authorize interstate extradition.
What my brethren hold, then, is that the Constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress authorizing and regulating interstate extradition are not exclusive and that a state may authorize interstate extradition of citizens of that state or persons found therein upon any ground or for any reason the state may deem proper to enact or promulgate. My brethren expressly hold that a state statute that authorizes interstate extradition for reasons not set forth in or covered by the Federal statute is valid.
To these conclusions I do not agree, and therefore enter my dissent.
Art. IV, Sec. 2, of the Constitution of the United States reads, in part, as follows:
*250“A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.”
To carry into effect that constitutional provision, Congress passed what is now Title 18, Sec. 3182, U.S.C.A., as follows:
“Fugitives from State or Territory to State, District or Territory
“Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person SO’ charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.”
In addition to the foregoing statute and in order to effectuate interstate extradition, Congress made it a Federal offense for one to flee from one state to another for the purpose of avoiding prosecution in certain cases. 48 Stat. 782.
The right of interstate rendition must, of necessity, be founded upon and controlled by the Federal constitution and statutes mentioned.
The Federal constitution provided the authority. Congress provided the implements for making effectual the extradition of fugitives from justice from one state to another.
It is clear that the matter of interstate extradition is what it purports to be — that is, a matter between the states and therefore interstate. But, also, the Congress has fully and completely preempted that field and taken over the right to control *251interstate extradition. 35 C.J.S., Sec. 2, Extradition, p. 318, furnishes the authority for the conclusion expressed.
Prior to such pronouncement by my brethren, I never heard that interstate extradition is a matter within the control of the individual states. My understanding of the rule is stated in 35 C.J.S., Extradition, Sec. 3, p. 319, as follows:
“While constitutional and statutory provisions relating to interstate extradition should be liberally construed to effect their purposes, their essential elements and requirements must be strictly followed. State legislation on the subject is valid only to the extent to which it aids and is not inconsistent with the federal Constitution and statutes.”
The holding of my brethren is directly contrary to the rule just stated.
The authorities my brethren cite in support of their conclusion relate in no particular to interstate extradition, but refer entirely to a matter of comity between the states touching persons who are not fugitives from justice.
Interstate extradition applies only to fugitives from justice. 35 C.J.S., Extradition, Sec. 10, p. 324.
Parolees going from one state to another by and with the consent of the state are not fugitives from justice.
My conclusion, therefore, is that there is no basis for the holding of my brethren that the legislature of this state may, by statute, make “less strenuous requirements than those set forth in the Federal rendition statute” and that there is no basis for their conclusion that such a statute does not conflict with the Federal law. To the contrary, that conclusion is contrary to all the law heretofore written on the subject and clothes the states not only with the power to control interstate matters by legislation but also with the power to take from Congress control over a field of legislation which it has preempted.
So then, under the holding of my brethren it is within the power of the legislature of this state to prescribe by law for one’s extradition upon a charge in the demanding state entirely different from and inconsistent with the requirement of the Federal statute (Sec. 3182).
*252Applying that holding here, my brethren destroy the mandatory provision of said Sec. 3182, which limits extradition only to instances where the accusation in the demanding states is by indictment or affidavit made before a magistrate, and now authorize extradition where the accusation in the demanding state is by an affidavit before a non-magistrate.
By the same rule, the legislature of this state would be empowered to authorize an extradition where the accusation in the demanding states is by information only.
We have always held that extradition could not be accomplished when the charge in the demanding state is by information only. Ex parte Cherry, 155 Texas Cr. R. 324, 234 S.W. 2d 1011.
Indeed, if the legislature has the power to authorize extradidition upon such conditions as to it may seem proper, then it could dispense entirely with a requirement of an accusation in the demanding state and authorize the rendition upon a warrant issued by the demanding state.
A warrant has been held to be insufficient to authorize extradition. Ex parte Shillings, 124 Texas Cr. R. 482, 63 S.W. 2d 853.
In keeping with the innovation and hitherto unheard-of rule, my brethren conclude that under the statute law of this state this appellant is to be extradited not upon an indictment or affidavit made before a magistrate but upon an affidavit made before one not a magistrate.
This holding defeats the Federal statute on the subject and destroys interstate rendition by federal authority.
Unless and until an accused is charged in the demanding state by indictment or affidavit made before a magistrate, the right to extradite him is not shown. Such is the mandate of the Federal statute. The power does not lie with the legislature of this state to destroy that statute.
Not being charged in the demanding state by indictment or affidavit made before a magistrate, appellant is entitled to be discharged from arrest and custody under the warrant of the Governor of this state extraditing him to the state of Arkansas.