Court Opinion

ID: 9860067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:09:04.810033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:37.768391
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON, dissenting: Contrary to what the majority believes, Whitfield is not controlling in this case. Whitfield is distinguishable both substantively and procedurally. Substantively, the facts are different. Procedurally, Whitfield involves a first postconviction petition while the present case involves a successive postconviction petition. Accordingly, the dismissal of the defendant’s petition should be affirmed. Substantively, in Whitfield, the court determined that the defendant’s improper-admonishment claim was not waived for two reasons. First, there was no waiver because the defendant could not have been expected to object at trial to his lack of admonishment. Specifically, the Whitfield court stated: “[I]t would be incongruous to hold that defendant forfeited the right to bring a postconviction claim because he did not object [at trial] to the circuit court’s failure to admonish him. To so hold would place the onus on defendant to ensure his own admonishment in accord with due process.” Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 188. Second, the court determined there was no waiver because the defendant’s claim could not have been presented any earlier, i.e., in a motion to withdraw his plea or in a direct appeal. Specifically, the Whitfield court stated: “Moreover, defendant alleges that it was not until he was in prison that he learned that his sentence had been increased by a three-year period of MSR. Therefore, he could not have raised the error in a motion to withdraw his plea or a direct appeal.” Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 188. Applying Whitfield in the present case, the defendant’s argument cannot be considered waived for his failure to object at trial to his improper admonishment. See Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 188. However, the defendant’s argument is waived here because, in contrast to Whitfield, there is no indication in the present case that the defendant could not have presented the improper-admonishment claim in either his direct appeal or his first postconviction petition. The defendant’s amended successive postconviction petition states only that the defendant was never properly admonished and that this violated his constitutional right to due process. The defendant’s affidavit indicates only that he would not have accepted the guilty plea agreement offered to him had he known of the obligation to serve a three-year term of MSR. There is no indication in either the successive postconviction petition or the defendant’s affidavit that he did not learn of the required three-year term of MSR until after he had filed his direct appeal and his first postconviction petition. The defendant’s improper-admonishment claim is waived because he has failed to show that he could not have raised his claim earlier. Whitfield is, therefore, distinguishable. See Newman, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 290 (distinguishing Whitfield on the basis that the Newman defendant made no allegation as to when he learned about his improper admonishment). For this reason, the dismissal of the defendant’s successive postconviction petition should be affirmed. The majority essentially interprets Whitfield to mean that a defendant can never know about an improper admonishment if he was never admonished and, therefore, there can never be a procedural default of this issue. However, this is not what the Whitfield court held and it is not the reality of the matter. Even if a defendant is not admonished by the trial court, generally the three-year term of MSR will be reflected on the mittimus or a defendant will be advised by the Illinois Department of Corrections of his release date. The majority fails to recognize that the Whitfield court conducted a waiver analysis and specifically considered whether or not the defendant in that case could have raised his claim earlier. The Whitfield court apparently determined that because the defendant did not learn about his three-year term of MSR until he was in prison, he could not have raised his claim in a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or on direct appeal because one or the other must be filed in relatively short order, i.e., within 30 days of sentencing. Despite the majority’s interpretation, the “clear holding oí Whitfield” (376 Ill. App. 3d at 708) is not that an improper-admonishment claim can never be waived. See Newman, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 290 {Whitfield did not hold that all improper-MSR-admonishment claims were immune from forfeiture). Moreover, it is inappropriate to so broadly interpret the Whitfield decision. Years of MSR and years in prison are not comparable. People v. Jarrett, 372 Ill. App. 3d 344, 351 (2007). MSR is not a static period of supervision, and the Prisoner Review Board has the discretion to release a prisoner from MSR before his term has expired (730 ILCS 5/3 — 3—8(a), (b) (West 2004)). Jarrett, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 351. Many courts have expressed concern over the Whitfield decision. See People v. Jolly, 374 Ill. App. 3d 499, 506 (2007) (stating that the Whitfield decision does not amount to a “ ‘Get-Out-Of-Jail-Free card’ ”); People v. Borst, 372 Ill. App. 3d 331, 334 (2007) (indicating concern over Whitfield); Jarrett, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 351 (expressing “serious concerns” about both the analysis and the remedy in Whitfield). Whitfield is also procedurally distinguishable from the present case. In Whitfield the defendant did not file a direct appeal and raised his omitted-MSR-admonishment claim for the first time in an original postconviction petition. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 180. In the present case, the defendant filed a direct appeal and an original postconviction petition. However, the defendant did not raise the present claim until he filed this successive postconviction petition. Successive postconviction petitions elicit unique policy considerations that are not implicated by the filing of an original postconviction petition. People v. McDonald, 364 Ill. App. 3d 390, 393 (2006). The majority fails to consider the procedural differences between Whitfield and the present case. See People v. Adams, 373 Ill. App. 3d 991, 995 (2007) (because the case involved a successive postconviction petition, the defendant’s reliance on Whitfield was misplaced). The purpose of a proceeding brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 2004)) is to resolve allegations that constitutional violations occurred at trial, when those allegations have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999). “In an initial post[ ]conviction proceeding, the common law doctrines of res judicata and waiver operate to bar the raising of claims that were or could have been adjudicated on direct appeal.” People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 458 (2002). In this context, the doctrine of waiver is a rule of administrative convenience, not a jurisdictional or absolute bar to procedurally defaulted claims. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 458. In the context of a successive postconviction petition, the procedural bar of waiver is not merely a principle of judicial administration; it is an express requirement of the statute. 725 ILCS 5/122 — 3 (West 2004) (any claims not raised in an original postconviction petition are waived); People v. Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d 530, 539 (2003) (because there is less interest in providing a forum for the vindication of defendant’s constitutional rights in a successive proceeding, “waiver, which would be a procedural affirmative defense for purposes of the first petition, becomes a substantive consideration going to the merits of a successive postconviction petition”). The Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition. People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 153 (2004). “Only when fundamental fairness so requires will the strict application of this statutory bar be relaxed.” Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 458. Under the circumstances in this case, the cause-and-prejudice test is the analytical tool that is to be used to determine whether fundamental fairness requires that an exception be made to section 122 — 3 of the Act so that a claim raised for the first time in a successive postconviction petition may be considered on its merits. See Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 459 (different standard may be applied in a case involving a claim of actual innocence or the death penalty). It is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate both cause and prejudice for each claim raised in his successive petition. McDonald, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 393. “For purposes of this test, ‘cause’ has been defined as an objective factor external to the defense that impeded counsel’s efforts to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding.” People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 153 (2004). “ ‘Prejudice’ exists where the defendant can show that the claimed constitutional error so infected his trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.” Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d at 154. The cause-and-prejudice test is composed of two elements, both of which must be established for the defendant to prevail. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464. By enacting section 122 — 1(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(f) (West 2004)), our legislature adopted the cause-and-prejudice test as defined in Pitsonbarger as a procedural hurdle that a defendant must overcome before filing a successive postconviction petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1(f) (West 2004). Section 122 — 1(f) requires a defendant to obtain leave of court as a condition precedent to filing a successive postconviction petition. People v. LaPointe, 365 Ill. App. 3d 914, 921 (2006). Until the court grants such leave, a successive petition is not properly on file and may not be considered on its merits. LaPointe, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 921. The legislature intended to require a defendant seeking to file a successive petition to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test before he could obtain a ruling on the merits of the petition itself. People v. Brockman, 363 Ill. App. 3d 679, 688 (2006). If a defendant fails to obtain leave of court prior to filing his successive petition, the court, whether sua sponte or on the State’s motion, should dismiss any such petition. People v. DeBerry, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1060 (2007). In the present case, the defendant did obtain leave to withdraw his section 2 — 1401 petition and file a successive postconviction petition. However, the defendant never obtained leave pursuant to section 122 — 1(f) of the Act. The defendant never set forth any argument as to why he passed the cause-and-prejudice test. At oral argument, for the first time, defense counsel argued that unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel, in failing to raise the improper-admonishment issue in the defendant’s first postconviction petition, was “cause.” However, the supreme court has held that “cause” “must flow from something other than the purported ineptitude or inadequacy of the prior post-conviction attorney.” People v. Szabo, 186 Ill. 2d 19, 42 (1998). Moreover, we cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 508-09 (2004). The defendant has essentially treated section 122 — 1(f) as if it did not exist. For this reason as well, the dismissal of the defendant’s postconviction petition should be affirmed. See DeBerry, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 1060 (courts should not consider anything in a postconviction petition that violates section 122 — 1(f) of the Act); LaPointe, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 921 (“[Ujntil the trial court grants such leave [to a defendant under section 122 — 1(f) of the Act], a second or subsequent petition is not properly on file and may not be considered on its merits. To hold otherwise would be to treat section 122 — 1(f) as though it did not exist”); see also Jolly, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 506 (the Whitfield decision does not amount to a “ ‘Get-Out-Of-Jail-Free card,’ ” which a defendant may use whenever and however he wishes; defendants who wish to vindicate their rights to proper MSR admonishments must do so in accordance with the requirements of the Act).