Court Opinion

ID: 9719757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:02:33.719839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:09.742327
License: Public Domain

Dethmers, C. J.
I concur with Mr. Justice Yoelk,er’s holding that no case of nuisance was made-against either defendant and that the trial court’s finding of no cause for action against defendant hank is not against the clear preponderance of the evidence, and, therefore, must be affirmed.
I do not agree that plaintiff should be granted a new trial against defendant Abraham.
At the Conclusion of the proofs the defendant hank calmly awaited the court’s decision. The court, as-trier of the facts without a jury, found, as stated by Mr. Justice Voelicer, “that there was insufficient evidence to connect the defendant bank in any manner with the accident” and accordingly rendered judgment for it of no cause for action.
At the conclusion of plaintiff’s proofs counsel for defendant Abraham, with less display of patience, made a motion to dismiss. The trial judge, after reviewing and commenting upon the pertinent evidence, granted the motion, stating “I think, even, regarding the testimony in the most favorable light for the plaintiff, that the defendant Abraham is not involved here at all.” From this it is clear that the-judge did not, as now gathered, apply any rule that defendant Abraham’s testimony was binding on-plaintiff and must he given added weight because' he was called as plaintiff’s witness under the statute. On the contrary, the judge indulged no weighing-process with respect to his testimony whatsoever,. *342but, instead, regarded the testimony in the case in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
The finding which the trial judge made as to both defendants was the same, namely, that there were no proofs to connect them with the accident. Plaintiff can scarcely complain of the fact that the court arrived at that determination as to defendant Abraham by applying to the testimony in the ease the test most advantageous to plaintiff, namely, the “most favorable view” test rather than the “clear preponderance” test. How can it profit him to remand the case for. new trial and application of the latter test, less favorable and more difficult for him? It is no answer to “suggest the possibility that someone in this case,” presumably defendant Abraham, “might have been lying'” and to say that this presented an issue of fact to be tried as such and not as one of law. As already stated, with respect to the truth of testimony and determination of what were the facts, plaintiff had the benefit of the most favorable test available to him.
The constitutionally guaranteed right to trial by jury presents involvements in jury cases when the court undertakes to direct a verdict or enter judgment non obstante veredicto. There the problem arises whether the court, in thus deciding a question as though it were a question of law, has erred in so doing because the question actually was one of fact which should have been left to the jury, the court thereby having deprived the losing party of his constitutional right to determination of that question by jury. When, as here, the parties have waived their rights to jury trial by voluntarily submitting their case to the judge without a jury, that problem' is absent. When the judge, sitting as trier of the facts, has found as a fact that 1 of 2 defendants was not shown by the proofs to be connected with the accident and we affirm that finding as not against *343the clear preponderarme of the evidence, no constitutional or other right of plaintiff is infringed by the mere fact that that selfsame judge, in making the identical finding, on those proofs, with respect to the other defendant, inadvertently and in response to counsel’s ill-conceived motion, employs the nomenclature and terminology and applies the test, more favorable to plaintiff, applicable to determination of questions of law. In the final analysis, the conclusion cannot be escaped that when the judge, as above noted, made the same finding in respect to and in favor of both defendants, he was, in both instances, making a finding of fact which was in accord with the clear preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff is not entitled to a second determination of this factual question. There being no proof on the record that connects either defendant with the accident or responsibility therefor, the action of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs to defendants.
Carr, Kelly, Smith, and Edwards, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, C. J.