Court Opinion

ID: 9550177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:30:53.749963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:21.364554
License: Public Domain

*1007JACKSON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The first question for decision in this case is whether there is any verdict-impeaching value in the affidavits and testimony of the jurors H and G. In Volume 11, West’s Oklahoma Digest, New Trial, ®=>143(1), 143(2), 143(3), 143(4), 144, and 145, at least thirty decisions are cited from this court wherein we have held that “affidavits, depositions, or oral testimony of jurors are inadmissible to impeach their verdict.
However, in Carter State Bank v. Ross, 52 Okl. 642, 152 P. 1113, after stating the rule we concluded that the testimony of jurors may be admissible to establish facts connected with the deliberations of the jurors that tend to show improper influence or conduct that may have led to an unjust verdict to prove something that does not inhere in the verdict, such as an overt act, open to the knowledge of all of the jury. The Carter State Bank decision was followed in Missouri, O. & G. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 55 Okl. 12, 155 P. 233.
In Egan v. First Nat’l Bank of Tulsa, 67 Okl. 168, 169 P. 621, L.R.A.1918C, 145, we again held that affidavits or testimony of jurors will not be received for the purpose of impeaching their verdict and specifically overruled Carter State Bank v. Ross, 52 Okl. 642, 152 P. 1113, supra, insofar as the holding in Carter Bank is in conflict with the views expressed in Egan.
In Harrod v. Sanders, 137 Okl. 231, 278 P. 1102, we again followed what we called “the qualification to the general rule”, as expressed in Missouri, O. & G. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 55 Okl. 12, 155 P. 233, supra, and concluded as in Carter State Bank v. Ross, 52 Okl. 642, 152 P. 1113, supra, that the testimony of the juror to impeach the verdict was proper.
However, in the second paragraph of the syllabus in Wolff v. Oklahoma Railway Co., 184 Okl. 374, 87 P.2d 671, we held:
“The case of Harrod v. Sanders, 137 Okl. 231, 278 P. 1102, insofar as it holds that the testimony or affidavit of a juror is competent evidence to impeach the verdict of the jury for misconduct outside or inside the jury room is expressly overruled.”
Except for the three decisions above mentioned which have been overruled, it now appears that in all former decisions wherein the question was considered, we have held that affidavits, depositions and oral testimony of jurors are not admissible to impeach their verdict.
Our attention has been invited to decisions of this court hereinafter to be discussed.
In Williams v. Pressler, 11 Okl. 122, 65 P. 934, the jury prepared and signed a statement in the jury room concerning the manner in which they reached their verdict. The statement was considered by this court in reversing the judgment. The question of the propriety of a jury impeaching its verdict in this manner was not considered.
In Garvin v. Harrell, 27 Okl. 373, 113 P. 186, 35 L.R.A.,N.S., 862, a litigant entertained four of the jurors by paying for their dinners at a restaurant. This court reversed, but the opinion does not disclose whether the proof was made by the jurors or others.
In Jones v. Frank, 62 Okl. 26, 161 P. 795, one of the litigants treated the jury to dinner during the progress of the trial. The point was raised that the jurors were not competent witnesses to prove these facts. This court found it unnecessary to pass upon the question because the evidence of the restaurant keeper was sufficient to establish the facts. In Merrell v. City of Stillwater, 207 Okl. 344, 249 P.2d 715, we noted that all proof of the conduct of the jury was made by testimony of witnesses other than the jurors.
In Negrate v. Gunter, Okl., 285 P.2d 194, the facts were presented by stipulation and it does not appear from our decision that any of the jurors were called upon to give evidence.
In Horn v. Sturn (1965), Okl., 408 P.2d 541, we concluded that it was error for the trial court to consider affidavits of jurors to impeach their verdict and stated that *1008the presently controlling (1965) rule is announced in Dillard v. Star Drilling Machine Co., 180 Okl. 14, 66 P.2d 928.
Since the affidavits and testimony of jurors H and G may not be utilized to impeach their verdict, under the decisions of this court, I am unable to conclude that the affidavit and testimony of adjuster S concerning his discussion with juror H about the case, standing alone, is sufficient to justify a reversal of the trial court’s decision.
It may be that the rule that “affidavits, depositions, or oral testimony of jurors are inadmissible to impeach their verdict” should be re-examined and exceptions made in proper cases. In 33 Am.Jur., Trial, Sections 1105-1116, the question of permitting jurors to impeach their verdict is discussed at considerable length and it is apparent that there is a great diversity of opinion and practice among the courts. In Section 1113, supra, it is said:
“Misconduct of Third Persons. — While the decisions are not in accord as to the competency of jurors to testify or to make affidavits as to the improper acts of third persons (outside the jury room and apart from their deliberations), the view that their affidavits, depositions, or testimony may be received in evidence for this purpose is supported by considerable authority.”
I am of the view that we should not change the rule in our disposition of this case without first giving careful consideration to the authorities and annotations cited under Sec. 1113, supra.