Court Opinion

ID: 9941176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 00:02:00.563888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:19.375882
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/15/24 P. v. Philyaw CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B321244

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BA447321)
         v.

ANTHONY Q. PHILYAW,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Reversed.
      Mary Jo Strand, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    I.     INTRODUCTION

      Defendant Anthony Q. Philyaw contends that the trial
court, after granting his petition for habeas corpus, erred by
denying his post-conviction motion for a full resentencing. We
agree and reverse.

                     II.    BACKGROUND

A.    Conviction and Sentence

      In 2016, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of assault
with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code1, § 245, subd. (a)(1), counts 1
and 2), two counts of making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a),
counts 4 and 5), false imprisonment by violence (§ 236, count 7),
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), count 9),
and misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd (a), count 10).
The jury found true the allegations that defendant personally
used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and committed the crimes
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court found
true the allegation that defendant had served six prior prison
terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), and
sustained a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony within
the meaning of the Three Strikes law.
      On January 31, 2017, the trial court sentenced defendant to
31 years and four months in prison, plus 364 days in any penal
institution. On count 1, the court sentenced defendant to the
upper term of four years, doubled to eight years pursuant to the

1     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Three Strikes law, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement
and five years for the gang enhancement. The court then
sentenced defendant to a five-year term for his prior serious
felony enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
On count 2, the court sentenced defendant to a consecutive term
of three years, and four months, consisting of: two years for the
offense (one-third the middle term of one year, doubled pursuant
to the Three Strikes law), and one year, four months for the
firearm enhancement (one-third the middle term of four years).
Finally, the court sentenced defendant to a consecutive term of
364 days in any penal institution for count 10. The court stayed
the sentences on counts 4, 5, 7, and 9, as well as any prior prison
term allegations, pursuant to section 654.
       On appeal, a prior panel of this court affirmed the
judgment, but remanded for the trial court to consider whether to
exercise its discretion pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620 to strike
the firearm enhancements. (People v. Philyaw (Apr. 2, 2018,
B280789) [nonpub. opn.].)
       On October 23, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on
remand and declined to strike the firearm enhancements.

B.    Writ Petition

      On March 25, 2021, defendant filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the trial court. He argued that the five-year
prior serious felony enhancement was an unauthorized sentence
because that enhancement had not been pled in the information.
On June 1, 2021, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
(District Attorney) filed an informal response in which he
conceded the error and stipulated that the enhancement should

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be stricken from the judgment. Defendant subsequently filed a
reply, requesting that the court vacate the enhancement, appoint
him counsel, and order a resentencing pursuant to Special
Directive 20-14 of the District Attorney.
       On July 20, 2021, the trial court granted the writ petition
as follows: “In light of the People’s response, this court concludes
that no purpose would reasonably be served by the issuance of an
order to show cause. Thus, the court grants the habeas with
respect to only striking the . . . section 667[, subdivision] (a), five
year prior, previously imposed.”2 The court appointed counsel “to
represent defendant at sentencing.”
       On March 31, 2022, defendant filed a motion to reconsider
his entire sentence pursuant to former section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1) and section 1385, arguing that he was entitled to the
benefit of certain recently enacted ameliorative statutes.
       On April 12, 2022, the trial court held a hearing. The court
denied defendant’s motion for a full resentencing, finding that it
lacked jurisdiction to resentence defendant as it was granting the
habeas petition “on a very limited issue.” The court then struck

2      The Attorney General contends that the trial court erred by
failing to issue an order to show cause. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.551(a)(5) [“The court must issue an order to show cause or deny
the petition within 45 days after receipt of an informal response
requested under (b)”].) We disagree. “Upon being served with a
copy of the petition, or upon receiving a request from the court for
informal opposition . . . , the petitioner’s custodian may stipulate
to the truth of the petition’s allegations and to the requested
relief. Should this occur, the court in which the habeas corpus
petition is pending may grant relief without issuing a writ of
habeas corpus or an order to show cause.” (People v. Romero
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740, fn. 7.)

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the five-year enhancement and sentenced defendant to a total
term of 21 years, 4 months in prison.3 Defendant appealed.

                       III.   DISCUSSION

       “[W]hen part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand
for resentencing ‘a full resentencing on all counts is appropriate,
so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of
the changed circumstances.’” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th
857, 893.) Moreover, with exceptions not applicable here, “when
a trial court corrects one part of a sentence on remand, it is
obligated to address the effect of subsequent events that render
other parts of that sentence legally incorrect. By correcting one
part of the sentence, the trial court is resentencing the defendant
and, in so doing, is not only permitted, but also obligated to look
at the facts and the law in effect at the time of that resentencing,
including ‘“any pertinent circumstances which have arisen since
the prior sentence was imposed”’ and whether they render a
different part of the sentence legally incorrect. [ Citations.] And
where the facts and law in effect at the time of resentencing
dictate that some other component of the sentence is incorrect
and hence unauthorized, the trial court is required to correct that
component as well. [Citations.] That is because a criminal
sentence is, like an atom, indivisible: ‘[A]n aggregate prison term
is not a series of separate independent terms, but one term made
up of interdependent components. The invalidity of one

3      In a prior order, this court granted another writ petition
filed by defendant in part, and stayed the five-year gang
enhancement. (In re Philyaw (Oct. 18, 2019, B298890) [nonpub.
order].)

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component infects the entire scheme.’ [Citations.]” (People v.
Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 205–206, fn. omitted.)
      Here, the trial court granted defendant’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus and struck a portion of his sentence but declined to
resentence defendant on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to
do so. Having struck a portion of defendant’s sentence, the court
was required to consider whether other portions of the sentence
were also incorrect. (See People v. Walker, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 205–206.) Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial
court to conduct a full resentencing.

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                      IV.   DISPOSITION

       The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for the
trial court to conduct a full resentencing.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                        KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

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