Court Opinion

ID: 9609392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:26:42.967686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:25:30.194798
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. The 19-page attorney retainer agreement drafted by defendant’s attorneys created, from the moment of its inception, irreconcilable conflicts of interest which fully justified the trial court’s action in recusing the attorneys. In my view, as between defendant’s right to counsel of choice and the court’s duty to assure defense representation free of conflicting interests, the latter is more important.
The retainer agreement in question contains several troubling features: (1) Attorneys are given the full ownership, “irrevocably, absolutely and forever,” of defendant’s life story, unlimited as to type of story, nature of media use, geographic territory for exploitation, and duration, and covering “all events,” past, present and future in Maxwell’s life (¶ 28); (2) the attorneys are to receive 85 percent of the net proceeds realized from defendant’s life story, and 15 percent is to go to defendant (¶ 39); (3) the attorneys’ services do not include an appeal (¶ 24); (4) defendant’s obligation for compensation arises immediately and vests in the attorneys irrevocably (¶ 22); (5) defendant waives the “attorney-client privilege and any and all other privileges and rights which would prevent the full, immediate and complete exercise and exploitation of the rights granted to lawyers” (¶ 37); and (6) defendant waives all claims for defamation for intrusion on his privacy or “anything else by reason of anything contained in [his life] story” (¶ 38).
There are several reasons why such an agreement should not be sanctioned. It contains both the reality and the appearance of fatally conflicting interests. The terms of the contract, if performed, would deny defendant significant present and future procedural protections. Contracts of this kind have been widely condemned on general ethical grounds. If implemented, such agreements would seriously erode the integrity of the judicial system. The contract should be invalidated as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.
The Right to Chosen Counsel
While defendant’s right to counsel of his own choice is an important right it is neither constitutionally ordained nor absolute. It must yield to weightier considerations when necessary to preserve judicial integrity and assure public respect for the administration of justice. Due process *627principles require that assistance of counsel must be “effective.” (Reece v. Georgia (1955) 350 U.S. 85, 90 [100 L.Ed. 77, 83, 76 S.Ct. 167], italics added; see Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 70 [86 L.Ed. 680, 699, 62 S.Ct. 457].) Moreover, “We have repeatedly held that constitutional and statutory guarantees are not violated by the appointment of an attorney other than the one requested by defendant.” (Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, 934 [106 Cal.Rptr. 506 P.2d 1007], cert. den., 414 U.S. 979 [38 L.Ed.2d 223, 94 S.Ct. 272]; People v. Hughes (1961) 57 Cal.2d 89, 98-99 [17 Cal.Rptr. 617, 367 P.2d 33].) In reaching this conclusion courts have stressed two major “values” integral to the judicial system. An appellate court aptly observed recently: “[T]he right of an accused to retain defense counsel of his choice is not absolute, there being other values of substantial importance which may also demand recognition.... One such value is the preservation of public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our criminal justice system, and here it should prevail.” (People v. Municipal Court (Wolfe) (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 714, 719-720 [138 Cal.Rptr. 235].) Emphasizing a second vital consideration, a federal opinion has noted: “The right to effective representation by counsel whose loyalty is undivided is so paramount in the proper administration of criminal justice that it must in some cases take precedence over all other considerations, including the expressed preference of the defendants concerned and their attorney.” (United States v. Corrigan (2d Cir. 1976) 543 F.2d 1053, 1058, conc. opn. Lumbard, J.)
Defendant faces the most serious of criminal charges with the gravest of possible consequences. He requires counsel, not only of unquestioned professional competence (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 423-425 [152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1]), but also counsel whose allegiance to him is total and unalloyed, free of the subtle, opposing magnetic pull of self-interest or adverse pecuniary advantage. This, the majority refuses to assure.
The Conflicting Interests
What are the conflicting interests which are created by this retainer agreement? The agreement itself frankly acknowledges that it “may create a conflict of interest between Maxwell and the lawyers, and that the provisions of this agreement may give the lawyers a monetary interest adverse to the interests of Maxwell.” Interestingly, counsel in *628paragraph 14 in novel and clinical fashion describe three specific areas of conflict:
“a. The lawyers may have an interest to create publicity which would increase the money which they might get as a result of this agreement, even if this publicity hurt Maxwell’s defense.
“b. The lawyers may have an interest not to raise certain defenses which would question the sanity or mental capacity of Maxwell because to raise these defenses might make this agreement between the lawyers and Maxwell void or voidable by Maxwell.
“c. The lawyers may have an interest in having Maxwell be convicted and even sentenced to death so that there would be increased publicity which might mean that the lawyers would get more money as a result of this agreement.” Counsel then promise (¶ 14(d)), however, that they will not take advantage of defendant or pursue any adverse interests, but rather will diligently serve him. I have no doubt that they will try to do so. Moreover, I do not question their good faith in testing the permissible ethical limits of the instrument which they have drawn, although I deplore the very lengthy procedural delay thereby caused to the trial of the merits of this case.
Nonetheless, the agreement crosses the line of propriety. The solemn assurances expressed in paragraph 14(d) to resist the commercial opportunities do not purge the instrument of its taint. Such promises are simply commitments to do what the law already requires, adding nothing to counsel’s continuing, preexisting fiduciary duties. The opportunity for, and the appearance of, mischief are the twin evils here. The pressure of self-interest is generated by an agreement which provides that counsel’s only compensation will come from the commercial exploitation of defendant’s life story. This self-interest thus created at the inception of the contract is ever present to sway, if unconsciously, the numerous decisions of counsel both pretrial and during trial.
Very recently a similar tension arising from divided loyalties prompted us in People v. Barboza (1981) 29 Cal.3d 375, 381 [173 Cal.Rptr. 458, 627 P.2d 188], to disapprove a contractual relationship which by its own terms created personal financial interests opposing professional obligation. We stressed that it is necessary that counsel avoid “‘any relation which would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his *629client’s interests,’. . .” (Id., at p. 379, quoting Anderson v. Eaton (1931) 211 Cal. 113, 116 [293 P. 788].) In invalidating an agreement with a public defender we emphasized that “the contract places him in a situation with grave consequences and implications for the administration of justice. Not only is there an ‘appearance of impropriety,’ there is also a real and insoluble tension, created by the contract between the defender’s conflicting interests.” (Id., at p. 381.) Similar reasoning applies where, as here, the personal financial interests of counsel are at stake.
In like fashion, examining posttrial a similar literary agreement between counsel and client, the court in People v. Corona (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 684, 720 [145 Cal.Rptr. 894], reversed a conviction stating; “[I]t is indisputable that by entering into the literary rights contract trial counsel created a situation which prevented him from devoting the requisite undivided loyalty and service to his client. From that moment on, trial counsel was devoted to two masters with conflicting interests—he was forced to choose between his own pocketbook and the best interests of his client, the accused.”
The scope of the conflicts “built in” to the agreement exceeds those acknowledged by the attorneys themselves in paragraph 14. The real vice of the arrangement appears most clearly in considering certain tactical decisions which may confront trial counsel. Suppose that before trial, through a plea bargain, defendant’s life may be saved by an informed entry of a guilty plea to certain of the multiple counts, including murder, with which he is charged. Should counsel recommend such a bargain? Perhaps they should, but would they, knowing that the sales value of a book or television manuscript would decline if there was no dramatic trial testimony elicited? How really objective will counsel be in exploring the opportunities for avoiding trial without any attendant publicity if the commercial value of defendant’s life story is thereby reduced or destroyed? If defendant is tried, should he be called as a witness to tell his “story,” or exercise his constitutional right to remain silent, thereby putting “the prosecution to its proof”? Surely, the sales value of defendant’s story would be affected by the decision. If defendant takes the stand during trial would the areas of his direct examination be affected, however subtly, perhaps unknowingly, by counsel’s financial interest in the drama and salability of his testimony? As anticipated in paragraph 14(b), would the existence of the contract affect a decision to assert an insanity defense with its inherent threat to the validity of the agreement?
*630In summary, decisions and strategy may be affected by motives which are antithetical to defendant’s basic right to effective counsel. Moreover, there is no clear evidence that defendant fully understands the legal implications of his purported waiver.
The case is before us pretrial. Accepting counsel’s good faith assurances that they will not exploit any opportunities afforded them by their agreement, how will we know if they so restrain themselves? The United States Supreme Court, focusing on the attorney’s role in the plea bargaining function alone, noted in Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 490-491 [55 L.Ed.2d 426, 438, 98 S.Ct. 1173], “[I]t would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney’s representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney’s options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible.” In similar fashion, how is a trial court, honestly and fairly, to identify and trace the motives, selfish or altruistic, hidden or express, behind the myriad decisions pretrial and at trial made by counsel in a multiple murder case? The inescapable fact is that defendant will have no way of knowing, and neither the trial nor appellate court is in a better position to judge.
Rule 5-101, Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, binding on all California lawyers, provides in relevant part: “Avoiding Adverse Interest. A member of the State Bar shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless (1) the transaction and terms in which the member of the State Bar acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in manner and terms which should have reasonably been understood by the client, (2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel of the client’s choice on the transaction, and (3) the client consents in writing thereto.” (Italics added.)
The majority of the Court of Appeal rejected the present agreement and applied the “fair and reasonable” strictures of the foregoing rule 5-101 to the contract’s paragraph 37 which recites: “Maxwell does hereby agree to waive upon demand by Lawyers the so called attorney-client privilege and any and all other privileges and rights which would prevent the full and complete exercise and exploitation of the rights granted to Lawyers herein.” The appellate court appropriately noted that paragraph 37 provides for “an advance waiver [which] *631might well inhibit Maxwell from fully disclosing to his retained lawyers all information that could be helpful in his defense. The confidential relationship between attorney and client is at the heart of a proper functioning of our judicial system. A compelled waiver of this privilege for the purpose of advancing the fee interest of the attorney cannot be tolerated.”
Although the majority (ante, p. 610, fn. 1) recites that “counsel conceded that [¶ 37] ... overreaches,” neither the extent nor the effect of the concession is clear. Moreover, paragraph 33 of the contract remains. In it defendant “promises, covenants and agrees to assist the lawyers at any and all times and in any and all ways permissible by law in the protection, exercise, and exploitation of their rights to the Story.” Defendant additionally agrees fully to disclose any relevant material to the lawyers or their designated agents to further the lawyers’ rights to his story. Thus, there remains the substance of a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
Further, I am unable to reconcile the language and spirit of paragraph 33 with the following mandate of Business and Professions Code section 6068: “It is the duty of an attorney: ... [¶] (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets, of his client.”
Finally, another inescapable fact remains—attorneys have agreed to represent Maxwell only during trial. What is to prevent them from publicly utilizing every bit of information that they have gleaned during trial preparation and trial at the same time that defendant is appealing from a judgment of conviction? The appellate briefs of the second attorney may be filed simultaneously with a book of the first attorneys aimed at the best seller list. Aside from the profound implications such a situation would have for the judicial system in general, what is there to protect defendant’s rights during the appellate process and any subsequent retrial? At that point he will no longer be the “owner” of his life story, which will instead be in the hands of his former attorneys whose only remaining interest may be the promotion of sales.
Erosion of Judicial and Professional Integrity
As a consequence of the intrinsic ethical difficulties raised by the contract, it seems to me self-evident that its judicial approval will inevi*632tably damage the integrity of both bench and bar. Not only does the contract permit, indeed invite, legal and tactical decisions which may be self-serving and contrary to the client’s best interests, but the appearance of impropriety further taints the arrangement. As noted, an ethical shadow is cast over the lawyer-client relationship.
Both the reality and the image of the financial arrangement between attorneys and client are suspect, human nature and temptation being what they are. Contracts of the type herein presented will appear to the eye and ear of the average layman as indistinguishable from run-of-the-mill commercial or public relations agency agreements. In my view, the engrafting of this device on the judicial process will inevitably dilute public acceptance and understanding of legal advocacy founded on a fiduciary relationship of complete trust and confidentiality between attorney and client which is directed solely toward the advancement and vindication of the client’s legal rights, not counsel’s fiscal advantage. Counsel cannot simultaneously wear the hat of a literary or theatrical agent whose goal is commercial promotion and the hat of a counselor at law who is guided by strict ethical constraints.
My colleagues approve a contractual arrangement which has been specifically condemned by the American Bar Association (ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility. The ABA code, Ethical Consideration (EC) could not be more explicit; “EC 5-4 If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permitted to receive from his client a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to the subject matter of the employment, he may be tempted to subordinate the interests of his client to his own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a criminal case who obtains from his client television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other publication rights with respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of his publication rights to the prejudice of his client. To prevent these potentially differing interests, such arrangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the termination of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the employment, even though his employment has previously ended.” (Italics added.)
Similarly, the latest Discussion Draft of ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, insists upon substantially higher professional standards. The proposed rules prohibit outright this form of contractual arrange*633ment, declaring: “An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary rights concerning the subject matter of the representation involves incompatible standards for the lawyer’s performance, one being effectiveness in representing the client and the other being performance that has literary value.” (Comment, Proposed Rule 1.9(d), 48 U.S.L.Week, No. 32, p. 8, Feb. 19, 1980, italics added.) One federal court recently described life-story arrangements between attorney and client as “a practice which deserves judicial condemnation.” (United States v. Hearst (N.D.Cal. 1978) 466 F.Supp. 1068, 1083 [53 A.L.R. Fed. 110], affd. in part and vacated in part (9th Cir. 1980) 638 F.2d 1190, cert. den., sub nom., Hearst v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 938 [68 L.Ed. 2d 325, 101 S.Ct. 2018], italics added.)
The rejection of such contracts is not new. Ten years ago the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, Approved Draft 1971, supplement section 3.4 provided: “It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer, prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employment, to enter into any agreement or understanding with a client or a prospective client by which he acquires an interest in publication rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment or proposed employment.” (Italics added.)
To me, these collective ethical judgments are strongly persuasive. We should not affix our seal of judicial approval on that which “should be scrupulously avoided,” or on that which “involves incompatible standards.” We cannot sanction as “fair and reasonable to the client” under California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 5-101, that “practice which deserves judicial condemnation” and which involves “unprofessional conduct for a lawyer.” California citizens are entitled to ethical standards for their lawyers which are no lower than those of practitioners nationwide.
The maintenance of judicial integrity has been a fixed principle in our jurisprudence. (Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, 215 [4 L.Ed.2d 1669, 1676, 80 S.Ct. 1437].) In California we have recently emphasized that “‘It is essential that the public have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice.’” (People v. Superior Court (Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 268 [137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164], quoting from People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180, 185 [115 Cal.Rptr. 235, 524 P.2d 363].)
*634The majority’s conclusion is also contrary to recent decisions by both this court and the federal courts. In People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 739 [170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837] (cert. den., sub nom., California v. Chadd (1981) 452 U.S. 931 [69 L.Ed.2d 431, 101 S.Ct. 3066]) we were faced with the question whether a defendant in a capital case could plead guilty without the concurrence of counsel. The Chadd majority placed heavy emphasis on the public interest involved, adding that “before Faretta [v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525)] this court squarely held that a capital defendant has no right to waive his automatic appeal: ‘It is manifest that the state in its solicitude for a defendant under sentence of death has not only invoked on his behalf a right to review the conviction by means of an automatic appeal but has also imposed a duty upon this court to make such a review. We cannot avoid or abdicate this duty merely because defendant desires to waive the right provided for him. In other contexts it has been held that a defendant’s waiver or attempted waiver of a right is ineffective where it would involve also the renunciation of a correlative duty imposed upon the court.' (People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 833 [80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889]; accord, People v. Teron (1979) ... 23 Cal.3d 103, 115, fn. 7 [151 Cal.Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773].)” (P. 752, italics added.)
California courts have repeatedly emphasized that “Although a defendant may waive rights which exist for his own benefit, he may not waive rights which belong also to the public generally.” (People v. Werwee (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 494, 500 [246 P.2d 704]; People v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d 820, 833-834 and cases cited therein.) We have previously adhered to the basic principle enunciated in Massie v. Sumner (9th Cir. 1980) 624 F.2d 72, 74 (cert. den. (1981) 449 U.S. 1103 [66 L.Ed.2d 828, 101 S.Ct. 899]) and cited approvingly in Chadd (28 Cal.3d, at p. 753) that: “‘The state of California has a strong interest in the accuracy and fairness of all its criminal proceedings.’” The majority now approves, however, a defendant’s choice, over trial court rejection, of counsel whose legal representation of him is steeped in conflict—both potential and actual—by virtue of the retainer agreement. The result of the majority’s new standard is to elevate a defendant’s choice of counsel above the court’s “correlative duty,” emphasized by us in Stanworth, to assure that he has effective counsel free of conflict.
The pivotal role of the judiciary in preserving unimpaired the fidelity of the justice system has been recently stressed by the United States *635Supreme Court which put it this way: “In an adversary system of criminal justice, there is no right more essential than the right to the assistance of counsel. But that right has never been understood to confer upon defense counsel the power to veto the wholly permissible actions of the trial judge. It is the judge, not counsel, who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and lawful trial. ‘“[T]he judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct (Lakeside v. Oregon (1978) 435 U.S. 333, 341-342 [55 L.Ed.2d 319, 326-327, 98 S.Ct. 1091].)
Defendant insists he wants particular counsel, and counsel want to represent him. Why do not defendant and counsel ask the trial court to appoint counsel with compensation for their services on the basis of standard fees? If the reason for refusing to follow this procedure is because of the loss of pecuniary gain to counsel from the contract, it is at this point, in my view, that the trial court, sensitive to the conflicting interests created by the agreement, watchful both for defendant’s interests and the functioning reality and appearance of the criminal justice system was fully justified in declining to accept the agreement.
Not only is it the court which must make the ultimate decision, but as we have previously summarized: “[Ultimately the issue involves a conflict between a client’s right to counsel of his choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility. ‘The preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount .... [The client’s recognizably important right to counsel of his choice] must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integrity of our judicial process.’” (Comden v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 906, 915 [145 Cal.Rptr. 9, 576 P.2d 971, 5 A.L.R. 4th 562], cert. den., 439 U.S. 981 [58 L.Ed.2d 652, 99 S.Ct. 568].) The foregoing principle, expressed in a civil case, has even greater force when applied, as here, to a defendant who is faced with the most serious of criminal charges.
Faretta
I find unpersuasive the majority’s argument, by analogy to Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, that because an independent right of self-representation exists, a defendant may therefore compel the trial court to accept his waiver of conflict-free counsel. Here defendant does *636not waive counsel, but desires it. Unlike Faretta, the issue is a trial court’s power to insist that defendant’s representation be conflict-free.
Conclusion
Long ago we established for California a very clear ethical position, which has guided the bench and bar ever since. This standard should be firm, fixed and immovable, mandating that “One of the principal obligations which bind an attorney is that of fidelity, the maintaining inviolate the confidence reposed in him by those who employ him, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his client. [Citations omitted.] This obligation is a very high and stringent one.... By virtue of this rule an attorney is precluded from assuming any relation which would prevent him from devoting his entire energies to his client’s interests. Nor does it matter that the intention and motives of the attorney are honest. The rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose between conflicting duties, or be led to an attempt to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than to enforce to their full extent the rights of the interest which he should alone represent.” (Anderson v. Eaton, supra, 211 Cal., at p. 116, italics added.) These principles are as sound today as they were 50 years ago and we seriously err when we depart from them.
It is not enough for the majority to insist that it “does not approve ‘life story’ contracts.” (Ante, p. 621.) With due respect, it seems to me inescapable that the majority does approve and sanction the agreement. Surely, the contract and defendant’s “waivers” will be binding on defendant after trial if we condone them here. If the majority does not “approve” and declares invalid the present agreement, it should in candor so declare in order that the interested parties, both defendant and counsel, should be under no misapprehension.
Believing that both the public and those charged with criminal offenses in California are entitled to greater protection, I would invalidate and disapprove any and all similar attorney retainer agreements as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. (People v. Barboza, supra, 29 Cal.3d, at p. 381; People v. Rhodes, supra, 12 Cal.3d, at pp. 186-187; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 461 [105 Cal.Rptr. 305, *637503 P.2d 1313]; People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 442 [310 P.2d 661].)
Accordingly, I would sustain the action of the trial court in relieving counsel for defendant’s protection.