Court Opinion

ID: 9755027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:21:38.504595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:01.485030
License: Public Domain

FABE, Justice,
dissenting.
Today the court affirms the superior court's decision that Branwen was not entitled to a hearing on her motion to modify custody. I agree with the court that there was no need for a hearing regarding modification of legal custody. But because Bran-wen did show a sufficient change of cireum-stances based on changes in her work and school schedule, I would remand the case for a hearing and determination of whether there should be modification of the parties' shared physical custody schedule, also referred to as the visitation schedule.
Branwen requested modification of both legal and physical custody based on three alleged changed circumstances. Two of her allegations were related to Will's conduct. But apart from her allegations regarding Will's conduct, Branwen argued that the current visitation schedule had become "even more problematic because of [her] work and school schedule." Branwen noted that the current schedule allowed her only one weekend with Zada each month. She explained that the parties had agreed to this schedule at a time when she was still in school and worked on weekends, but that because she had changed to a normal weekly work schedule, "there is no longer any reason why Will should have more non-work time with [Zada] than her mother should." Branwen added that she "now has classes for her Master's degree on two of her searce evenings with [Zada]" and that she thought it "highly unlikely" that Will would agree to change scheduled evenings to allow Branwen an additional "free" evening with Zada. Finally, Branwen noted that because "Will takes no responsibility for things like the dental appointments during his time with [Zada,] [alll the mundane, necessary tasks must be done on Branwen's time."
The trial court expressly stated that it was denying Branwen a hearing on the issue of physical custody based on its view that Bran-wen's unilateral job and school schedule changes could not provide support for a change in physical custody. As the court explains, this view was erroncous because "our case law is clear that [unilateral and voluntary] changes can form the basis for custody modification." 1 But the court exeus-es the trial court's error as harmless because Branwen's motion "sought more than a reallocation of ... time" and Branwen did not show that her changed schedule justified a modification of physical custody.2
It is true that Branwenn requested a change in the physical custody arrangement that would have given her a larger percentage of time with Zada than Will; such a request would require a heightened changed circumstances burden.3 But physical custody has two components-(1) the allocation of the percentage of time that each parent has custody of the child, and (2) the schedule of where the child resides at a particular time.4
*412Here, even if Branwen's allegations as a whole were not sufficient to justify a change in the percentage of time she had physical custody, the separate question whether Branwen's changed schedule justified a change in how the shared custody time was scheduled, in other words, a change in the visitation schedule, remained, and that discrete issue merited a hearing.5 Put another way, the arguments in Branwen's motion established her entitlement to a hearing and review of the visitation schedule, even if the percentages remained even and physical custody remained shared. Because it is the child's best interests that are at stake, I do not favor the court's technical reading of the motion and implied conclusion that Branwen was required to frame an express stand-alone or alternative argument that a new visitation schedule was necessary.6
Because the basis for the parties' original physical custody schedule was the flexible weekday schedule Branwen had as a student, her schedule change to full-time employment was a sufficient change of cireumstances to warrant a hearing on her motion to modify physical custody to the extent she requested a change in the arrangement of shared physical custody. And Branwen's express argument that her revised work and school schedule, which left her with only one weekend a month with Zada, caused the custody arrangement to be "even more problematic" placed the issue of the visitation schedule squarely before the superior court. I would remand the case for a hearing on the parties' visitation schedule and I therefore respectfully dissent.

. Op. at 407-08.

. Op. at 407-08.

. The court allows that "if Branwen had sought modification of the custody schedule only ... a lesser change in circumstances would have been required to entitle her to a hearing." Op. at 408. See also Havel v. Havel, 216 P.3d 1148, 1151 n. 6 (Alaska 2009).

. I recognize that Branwen requested modification of both of these components, and I do not believe that Branwen "only hoped to gain a more equal allocation of weekend time." Op. at 409. *412But in my view a party is not required to choose between these two forms of relief in requesting modification of physical custody.

. Even if a trial court denies a parent's motion to modify legal and physical custody based on changed circumstances, the trial court may modify the parents' visitation schedule to accommodate those changed circumstances. See Pearson v. Pearson, 5 P.3d 239, 242 (Alaska 2000).

. Op. at 408-09.