Court Opinion

ID: 9860541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:25:38.936925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:16:17.554019
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RAKOWSKI,. dissenting: For the following reasons I would reverse the decision of the circuit court. "In 36 States, intoxication is a separate statutory defense to a workers’ compensation claim, and statutes in three other States provide for a reduction in compensation benefits in the case of intoxication; the statutes describe in varying terms the causal relationship between intoxication and injury that will defeat a claim or reduce an award. (See 1A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 34.31, at 6—89 through 6—92 (1985).) Unlike the majority of States, Illinois has no statute specifically recognizing intoxication as a defense to a workers’ compensation claim or as grounds for a reduction in workers’ compensation benefits.” Paganelis v. Industrial Comm’n (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 468, 481, 548 N.E.2d 1033. According to Professor Larson: "Voluntary intoxication which renders an employee incapable of performing his work is a departure from the course of employment. Otherwise, apart from special statute, evidence of intoxication at the time of injury is ordinarily no defense, at least unless intoxication was the sole cause of injury.” 1A A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation § 34.00, at 6—64 (1985). In accordance with the above, Illinois has fashioned the following test: "In order for compensation to be denied on the basis that an employee was intoxicated, 'the employee must be so intoxicated, as shown by the evidence, that the court can say as a matter of law, that the injury arose out of his drunken condition and not out of his employment. [Citations.] Whenever an employee is so drunk and helpless that he can no longer follow his employment he cannot be said to be engaged in his employment, and when injured in that condition his injury does not arise out of his employment. But intoxication which does not incapacitate the employee from following his occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of compensation although the intoxication may be a contributing cause of his injury. Our statute was not designed to ■make contributory negligence of the employee, or a defense of that nature, a bar to his recovery under the Workmen’s Compensation [A]ct, where, as in this case, his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. [Citation.]’ ” District 141, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Industrial Comm’n (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 544, 557-58, 404 N.E.2d 787, quoting Hahnemann Hospital v. Industrial Board (1918), 282 Ill. 316, 327. In applying the above law to the facts sub judice, I can understand how one could come to the conclusion that the claimant was intoxicated. I cannot, however, conclude as a matter of law that she was so intoxicated that she was incapacitated from following her occupation. All occurrence witnesses testified to the contrary. They all said that claimant was serving drinks, making change, keeping the bar clean and closing the bar. While Dr. Wolf and Dr. Kale said that, according to the blood test, claimant was intoxicated, neither said she was incapable of doing her work. Dr. Wolf specifically stated that some persons may have a rather high blood-alcohol level and still be capable of performing a bartender’s duties. The only testimony supporting the employer’s position came from Dr. Kale, who stated that in his opinion the petitioner’s fall was caused by her intoxication. In my view, such testimony from a doctor who did not see the claimant performing her job, did not see the stairs in question, did not see the shoes or dress the claimant was wearing, and who only relied on a blood-alcohol level is far from the "as a matter of law” standard required by Illinois case law. I would also point out that in many of the cases where benefits have been denied, the claimant was driving a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.10%. In such a situation, public policy strongly militates against an award. Justice Ryan suggests that a different standard apply in that type of case. See Paganelis, 132 Ill. 2d at 487 (Ryan, J., concurring). Nor do I agree with the method used by the majority to distinguish Lock 26 Constructors v. Industrial Comm’n (1993), 243 Ill. App. 3d 882, 612 N.E.2d 989. The Lock 26 Constructors majority held that because the claimant introduced evidence that he was able to perform his work after consuming alcohol, it could not be said as a matter of law that intoxication was the sole cause of the injury. It was only Justice McCullough in his specially concurring opinion that based his decision on the drinking-after-the-accident evidence. While Justice McCullough’s argument that a 0.29% blood-alcohol level should, in itself, preclude recovery may have some appeal, I suggest that such a decision should come from the legislature and not from the judiciary. If anything, Lock 26 Constructors is support for the claimant’s position. It distinguishes Paganelis by pointing out that there the record did not contain any evidence that claimant was able to perform his work after he became intoxicated. (See Paganelis, 132 Ill. 2d at 485.) In the case sub judice, we have the opposite; there is no evidence other than her tripping on the stairs that she could not perform her job. I respectfully submit that the majority opinion confuses the concept of intoxication with a situation where it can be said, as a matter of law, that an employee is so drunk and helpless that he can no longer follow his employment. Again, like the specially concurring opinion in Lock 26 Constructors, such a rule may have appeal. I suggest, however, that the change should come from the legislature as it has in at least 39 other States and not from the court. RARICK, J., concurs in dissent.