Court Opinion

ID: 9526767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:23:49.28132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:49.582247
License: Public Domain

MATTINGLY-MAY, Judge,
dissenting.
Because many of the factors that determine the amount of Highhouse's bonus are unrelated or related only indirectly to services he performed for MOI, I believe there is a question of fact regarding whether Highhouse is entitled to the bonuses after his resignation, and if so, in what amount. Partial summary judgment for Highhouse is therefore improper and I must respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority's general premise that an employee's right to a bonus becomes vested "at the time he performed the services upon which the bonus payments are based." Op. at 1011, emphasis supplied. Highhouse's bonus is *1015based on four factors, but only one, "Employee's productivity," (App. to Br. of Appellant at 60), appears to be directly related to the services Highhouse performed for MOI. The other three factors that determined the amount of the bonus are "collection of accounts, office expenses for the offices located in Richmond, Indiana, and Connersville, Indiana, and the net income" of those offices. Id. Those three factors appear cither unrelated to the work Highhouse performed or only indirectly related.
More specifically, the Agreement defines one of the four factors, "net income," as the gross receipts MOI collects that "are attributable to professional services rendered by all physicians of [MOI] at all locations, reduced by the ordinary and necessary business expenses which are attributable to the operation of all business locations of [MOI]." Id. (emphasis supplied).3 Furthermore, while Highhouse's activities as an employee might have had some indirect impact on MOT's ability to collect its accounts and on its office expenses, the record does not reflect whether or to what extent those two factors depended on Highhouse's performance.
Because the designated evidence gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or to what extent Highhouse "performed the services upon which the bonus payments are based," I believe summary judgment for Highhouse is improper.
The majority's decision is further premised at least in part on its determination that Highhouse's bonus was a "wage." I do not believe it can be so characterized, and summary judgment for Highhouse is improper for that reason as well. The majority correctly notes that a payment denominated as a "bonus" may in fact be part of an employee's "wage" if it is compensation in addition to the employee's salary, is paid on a regular, periodic basis, is related directly to the time worked, and is not predicated on the financial success of the employer. Gurnik, 587 N.E.2d at 709.
While Highhouse's bonus satisfies some of the Gurnik factors, it was explicitly predicated in part on the financial success of MOLI. I would therefore decline to characterize the bonus as part of Highhouse's "wage" insofar as the bonus amount is based on MOT's collection of accounts and office expenses and is "attributable to professional services rendered by all physicians of [MOI] at all locations" where MOI operated.
I would remand for a trial on the merits.

. - Highhouse does not mention in his brief the language of this provision of the Agreement. Rather, he describes the bonus as "based upon MOT's collections of fees attributable to his services, minus certain expenses." (Br. of Appellant at 3.) He also states "MOI did not consider the profitability or production of any office, or any other person, in calculating Dr. Highhouse's annual bonus." Id. Highhouse does not address the apparent inconsistency of this characterization with the explicit language of the Agreement.