Court Opinion

ID: 9896936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:18.027567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:53.758671
License: Public Domain

***********************************************
    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-
ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-
lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was
released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-
ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions
and petitions for certification is the “officially released”
date appearing in the opinion.

   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut
Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of
discrepancies between the advance release version of an
opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to
be considered authoritative.

   The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the
opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and
bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not
be reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica-
tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
***********************************************
        IFTIKAR AHMED v. OAK MANAGEMENT
                  CORPORATION
                    (SC 20677)
              Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                    Ecker, Alexander and Prescott, Js.*

                                    Syllabus

The plaintiff employee, A, sought to vacate, and the defendant employer,
   O Co., a venture capital firm, sought to confirm, an arbitration award
   of approximately $57 million in damages and fees that was made in
   connection with a dispute between the parties. The parties’ employment
   agreement contained an arbitration clause that provided that arbitration
   would take place in Connecticut, be governed by Delaware law, and be
   administered under the Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation
   Procedures of the American Arbitration Association (AAA rules). After
   federal criminal charges were filed against A for insider trading that
   was unrelated to A’s employment with O Co., O Co. investigated A’s
   employment related transactions and uncovered certain fraudulent
   activities. O Co. subsequently terminated A’s employment, seized the
   earnings of A that were in O Co.’s possession, and shared the results
   of its investigation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
   The SEC then brought a civil enforcement action against A, alleging
   that A had fraudulently misappropriated approximately $65 million from
   O Co. and its investors. Meanwhile, in violation of the conditions of his
   bail in the criminal insider trading case, A fled to his native country, India,
   where he was arrested and detained for having used invalid documents
   to enter the country. A federal court rendered judgment for the SEC in
   the civil enforcement action and ordered A to pay approximately $63
   million in disgorgement and civil penalties, plus interest. Thereafter, O
   Co. filed an arbitration complaint against A, claiming breach of contract,
   breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. A denied the allegations and asserted
   various affirmative defenses and counterclaims. A also sent numerous
   emails seeking to dismiss or delay the arbitration, claiming, inter alia,
   that he was being held by the government in India and was unable to
   leave the country, that illness prevented him from participating in a
   preliminary hearing conference call, and that he could not comply with
   the arbitrator’s procedural deadlines because he did not have access to
   a personal computer because of India’s nationwide shutdown in
   response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Ultimately, the arbitrator set a
   deadline for the filing of dispositive motions, by which time A filed
   motions for summary judgment and to dismiss, and O Co. filed a motion
   for an order prohibiting A from viewing certain purportedly confidential
   documents and a motion seeking the application of the fugitive disenti-
   tlement doctrine, an equitable doctrine that limits access to the courts
   by fugitives from justice. Before A responded to O Co.’s motions, the
   arbitrator granted O Co.’s motions and denied A’s motions. Relying on
   AAA Rule R-47 (a), which was incorporated into the parties’ agreement
   and which permits an arbitrator to grant any remedy or relief that he
   ‘‘deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the
   parties,’’ as authority to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the
   arbitrator dismissed A’s counterclaims, struck his affirmative defenses,
   and barred him from contesting O Co.’s allegations. The arbitrator also
   prohibited A from accessing purportedly confidential documents in O
   Co.’s possession and scheduled a hearing in damages, which A again
   sought to postpone because he allegedly was quarantined as a result
   of testing positive for COVID-19. The arbitrator denied A’s request to
   postpone the proceedings, conducted the damages hearing using remote
   technology without either A or his representative present, and thereafter
   issued the approximately $57 million award in favor of O Co. In his
   application to vacate the award filed in Superior Court, A relied on,
   inter alia, each of the statutory grounds for vacatur set forth in the state
   statute (§ 52-418 (a)) governing the vacating of arbitration awards and
   the corresponding provisions in the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.
   § 1 et seq.). He also claimed that the award violated public policy because
    the arbitrator decided the matter on an ex parte basis, denying him the
    opportunity to refute O Co.’s allegations and any semblance of fairness
    or due process. The trial court rendered judgment denying A’s applica-
    tion to vacate and granting O Co.’s motion to confirm. On A’s appeal
    from the trial court’s judgment in favor of O Co., held:

1. A could not prevail on his claim that the arbitration award should have been
     vacated pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4) on the ground that the arbitrator
     had exceeded his authority, insofar as the AAA rules and Delaware law
     both required the arbitrator to provide the parties with a full and fair
     hearing, and on his claim that the arbitrator had no authority to apply
     the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, thereby abrogating A’s right to a
     full and fair hearing:

   A’s claims were premised on the argument that it was improper for the
   arbitrator to rely on AAA Rule R-47 as authority for applying the fugitive
   disentitlement doctrine because the arbitration clause in the parties’
   agreement did not expressly authorize that specific type of equitable
   relief and that such relief therefore was not ‘‘within the scope of the
   agreement of the parties’’ for purposes of that AAA rule.

   Nevertheless, numerous courts have interpreted that language in AAA
   Rule R-47 as permitting relief or remedies in the absence of an express
   limitation on such relief or remedies, rather than as requiring an express
   authorization of such relief or remedies, and this court’s review of Dela-
   ware law revealed that the courts of that state, which have recognized
   the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, would follow that approach.

   Moreover, no court in Delaware or anywhere else has barred the applica-
   tion of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in the context of arbitration.

   To the extent that A claimed that the arbitrator had misapplied the
   fugitive disentitlement doctrine as a matter of law, he could not prevail
   on that claim because, even if he were correct, vacatur pursuant to § 52-
   418 (a) (4) cannot be based on mere legal error but only on manifest
   disregard of the law, and A did not claim that the arbitrator’s actions
   satisfied that onerous standard.

   Furthermore, the lack of an explicit reference to the fugitive disenti-
   tlement doctrine in the parties’ agreement was immaterial, as the question
   was not whether the parties specifically anticipated application of the
   fugitive disentitlement doctrine in name but whether the arbitrator drew
   the essence of that equitable remedy from the underlying contract.

   In addition, arbitrators are afforded greater flexibility in fashioning reme-
   dies than are courts, nothing in the parties’ agreement explicitly restricted
   the arbitrator’s remedies to fewer than those available to the courts,
   AAA Rule R-47, as incorporated into the parties’ agreement, recognizes
   that a party might engage in conduct that justifies an arbitrator’s issuance
   of an order that impairs or abrogates the party’s right to present his
   case, and whether the arbitrator struck the proper balance in issuing
   such an order was not a question of whether the arbitrator exceeded his
   authority but of whether the arbitrator properly exercised his discretion.

   In the present case, the arbitrator crafted orders that benefited O Co.,
   which had timely prepared to present its case in the agreed on forum,
   to the detriment of A, who had flouted the law and then attempted to
   use his absence to delay the proceedings, the arbitrator, in crafting such
   orders, reasonably could have considered A’s failure to satisfy certain
   conditions that would have allowed him to fully participate through
   counsel, and the substance of A’s filings, both in the arbitration and in
   the civil enforcement proceeding, reasonably could have raised doubts
   as to whether A really lacked the services of counsel.

   Accordingly, this court could not conclude that the arbitrator, in invoking
   the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, did not draw the essence of his
   arbitration award from the parties’ agreement, including the AAA rules
   incorporated into that agreement, or that the award necessarily fell
   outside the scope of the arbitrator’s authority, in light of the unusual
   and challenging circumstances facing the arbitrator in this case, which
   were precipitated by A’s own actions.

2. There was no merit to A’s claim that the arbitration award should have been
    vacated pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (3) on the grounds that the arbitrator
    had declined to hear pertinent and material evidence and had engaged
    in prejudicial misconduct by preventing A from defending himself and
    pursuing a counterclaim, and by reviewing the evidence against him:

   A’s claim that the arbitrator’s refusal to hear pertinent and material
   evidence constituted a ground for vacatur under § 52-418 (a) (3) was
   unavailing, insofar as a party challenging an award on the basis of such
   a refusal must prove that he was deprived of a full and fair hearing by
   virtue of an adverse evidentiary ruling, and the disentitlement order was
   not an evidentiary ruling.

   Moreover, although this court has described the prejudicial misconduct
   ground for vacatur in § 52-418 (a) (3) as applying to procedural irregulari-
   ties, the disentitlement order could not be characterized as a procedural
   irregularity in light of this court’s determination that the arbitrator did
   not exceed his authority in issuing that order, and the order did not
   implicate the fundamental fairness of the proceeding in light of A’s own
   dilatory conduct that was itself frustrating the fairness of the proceeding.

   Furthermore, A failed to establish that he was substantially prejudiced
   by the arbitrator’s misconduct, as nothing in the record or in A’s appellate
   brief indicated what evidence A would have offered at a hearing on
   liability if the fugitive disentitlement doctrine had not been applied, A
   made no representation that he would have testified as to any material
   fact that could have cast doubt on his culpability for the acts alleged,
   A did not claim that he had any other basis to contest O Co.’s allegations
   against him, and, to the extent that A identified topics on which he would
   have offered argument or evidence, each of them pertained to damages,
   and he could have made those arguments at the hearing in damages if
   he had opted to participate.

   With respect to the arbitrator’s order barring A from accessing purport-
   edly confidential materials in O Co.’s possession, there was no basis to
   conclude that A’s concerns could not have been raised at the hearing
   in damages, in which he did not participate, and A could have sought
   independent review of the alleged overbreadth of the confidentiality
   determinations made by O Co., which had been given unilateral authority
   to designate which documents were confidential.

   In addition, this court rejected A’s claim that he was not required to
   establish that he had been prejudiced by the arbitrator’s alleged miscon-
   duct on the ground that the arbitrator’s actions constituted structural
   error and, therefore, were prejudicial per se, as A failed to identify any
   case in which structural error has been applied to any ground for the
   vacating of an arbitration award, and, although it might be reasonable
   to presume prejudice when a party is deprived of a hearing on the merits,
   the exceedingly unusual circumstances of the present case demonstrated
   that such a presumption would have been easily overcome.

3. A could not prevail on his claim that the arbitration award violated the
    public policy of fundamental fairness in arbitration proceedings, as he
    failed to identify a clearly established public policy that was violated
    by virtue of the award’s having been given effect:

   Even if statements in case law may constitute the expression of a well-
   defined and dominant public policy, A’s reliance on case law standing
   for the proposition that parties to an arbitration must be afforded an
   opportunity to know the evidence against them and to present evidence
   in their favor was misplaced, as that case law did not hold that those rights
   were immutable such that no conduct could justify their impairment or
   forfeiture, especially when AAA Rule R-47, which was incorporated into
   the parties’ agreement, acknowledges an arbitrator’s authority to issue
   an order that has such an effect under certain circumstances.

   Moreover, certain statements in this court’s cases recognizing the broader
   public policy of upholding the integrity of the arbitration process simply
   embodied a policy justifying the extraordinary statutory grounds on
   which an award may be vacated, and there was no indication of an
   intention to articulate a public policy that would allow courts to vacate
   an award in light of the presumption that the arbitrator correctly interpre-
   ted the parties’ agreement to authorize the relief ordered.

4. A could not prevail on his claim that the arbitration award should have
    been vacated pursuant to certain provisions (9 U.S.C. § 10 (a) (3) and
    (4)) of the Federal Arbitration Act:
   This court has recognized that the federal grounds for vacatur in 9 U.S.C.
   § 10 (a) (3) and (4) are virtually identical to those enumerated in § 52-
   418 (a) (3) and (4), A identified no case law that supported a different
   interpretation of the federal provisions, and this claim was based on the
   same arguments that A asserted in support of his grounds for vacatur
   under state law, which were rejected.

5. This court declined A’s invitation to remand the case to allow the trial
    court to modify the amount of the arbitrator’s award, which A argued
    was necessary to prevent an impermissible multiple recovery by O Co.
    for the same conduct:

   The statute (§ 52-419 (a) (1)) on which A relied authorizes the trial court
   to modify an award when there has been a ‘‘miscalculation of figures,’’
   which constitutes a mathematical rather than a legal error, and, although
   A claimed that O Co. stood to obtain a ‘‘remarkable windfall,’’ any pur-
   ported error in this regard was legal in nature, rather than a miscalcu-
   lation.
                (Three justices dissenting in one opinion)
    Argued November 15, 2022—officially released October 17, 2023

                            Procedural History

   Application to vacate an arbitration award, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-
Norwalk, where the defendant filed a motion to confirm
the award; thereafter, the case was tried to the court,
Hon. Kenneth B. Povodator, judge trial referee, who,
exercising the powers of the Superior Court, rendered
judgment denying the plaintiff’s application to vacate
and granting the defendant’s motion to confirm, from
which the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
  Gregory Dubinsky, pro hac vice, with whom were
Zachary J. Phillipps, Andrew Chang, pro hac vice, and,
on the brief, Vincent Levy, pro hac vice, and Daniel
M. Young, for the appellant (plaintiff).
 David K. Momborquette, pro hac vice, with whom
was David T. Grudberg, for the appellee (defendant).
                          Opinion

   D’AURIA, J. This appeal arises under highly unusual,
perhaps unprecedented, circumstances, involving the
application of the ‘‘fugitive disentitlement doctrine’’1 in
an arbitral proceeding but implicates settled law on the
limits of judicial review of arbitral awards. The plaintiff,
Iftikar Ahmed, appeals2 from the trial court’s judgment
denying his application to vacate an arbitration award
rendered in favor of the defendant, Oak Management
Corporation (Oak), and granting Oak’s motion to con-
firm the award.3 Ahmed contends that the trial court
erroneously declined to vacate the award because the
arbitrator had deprived him of the full and fair hearing
to which he was entitled, in violation of governing law,
public policy, and the parties’ arbitration agreement.
Specifically, Ahmed contends that the arbitrator improp-
erly applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to pre-
vent him from asserting counterclaims or defenses, con-
testing Oak’s allegations, and viewing the evidence against
him. After considering the grounds he has raised for
vacating the award, we conclude that, notwithstanding
the gravity of the arbitrator’s rulings, Ahmed has not
satisfied any of the legal standards required for reversal
of the judgment. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
                             I
  Oak, a Delaware corporation with its primary place
of business in Connecticut, is the manager of various
venture capital investment funds. From 2004 to 2015,
Oak employed Ahmed as an investment professional
and a managing member of entities that served as gen-
eral partners of certain Oak funds. Among other things,
Ahmed was responsible for identifying companies in
which Oak might invest, recommending investments,
and negotiating the terms of investments with those
companies. Oak compensated Ahmed with a base salary
and payments tied to the performance of the companies
for which he had investment responsibilities.
   Ahmed’s employment agreement included an arbitra-
tion clause. The agreement provided that the arbitration
would (1) take place in Fairfield County, Connecticut,
(2) be governed by Delaware law, and (3) be adminis-
tered under the 2013 Commercial Arbitration Rules and
Mediation Procedures of the American Arbitration Associ-
ation (AAA). The agreement also provided that the
‘‘arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding to the
fullest extent permitted by law.’’
   The issues in the present arbitration arose in connec-
tion with other civil and criminal cases that were brought
against Ahmed. It is important that we place the undis-
puted facts and procedural history of the present case
in the context of those cases.
                             A
Criminal and Civil Actions Brought in Federal Court
   In April, 2015, while employed by Oak, Ahmed was
arrested for insider trading, in violation of federal secu-
rities law, unrelated to his employment by Oak. See
United States v. Kanodia, Docket No. 15-10131-NMG,
2016 WL 3166370, *1 (D. Mass. June 6, 2016); see also
United States v. Ahmed, 414 F. Supp. 3d 188, 189 (D.
Mass. 2019), appeal dismissed, Docket No. 19-2214, 2020
WL 2950646 (1st Cir. March 23, 2020), and appeal dis-
missed, Docket No. 19-2213, 2020 WL 2944997 (1st Cir.
April 13, 2020), cert. denied,        U.S.     , 141 S. Ct.
1386, 209 L. Ed. 2d 127 (2021). At about the same time,
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) brought a civil enforcement action against
Ahmed based on the same alleged conduct that gave
rise to his criminal prosecution. See United States Secu-
rities & Exchange Commission v. Kanodia, 153 F.
Supp. 3d 478, 480 (D. Mass. 2015); see also United States
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ahmed, Docket
No. 15-cv-13042-ADB, 2021 WL 916266, *1 (D. Mass.
March 10, 2021).
  When Oak learned of those allegations, it placed
Ahmed on leave and undertook an investigation into
his employment related transactions. That investigation
led Oak to discover what it believed to be fraudulent
activities in connection with several investments. Oak
shared the fruits of its investigation with the SEC.
   In early May, 2015, the SEC brought a second civil
enforcement action against Ahmed (civil fraud action).
See Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ahmed, 123
F. Supp. 3d 301, 305 (D. Conn. 2015), aff’d sub nom.
Securities & Exchange Commission v. I-Cubed Domains,
LLC, 664 Fed. Appx. 53 (2d Cir. 2016). This action
alleged that Ahmed had engaged in a decade-long fraud
that resulted in the misappropriation of approximately
$65 million from Oak and its investors. Id. The SEC
alleged that Ahmed, among other things, had misrepre-
sented the price of an investment he advised Oak to
make, engaged in self-dealing by misrepresenting or
concealing his personal stake as the counterparty in
various transactions he entered into on Oak’s behalf,
and funneled the illicit proceeds into bank accounts he
claimed belonged to parties to the deals but that, in
fact, he had opened and secretly controlled. Id. The
United States District Court for the District of Connecti-
cut granted the SEC’s motion to freeze all of Ahmed’s
assets, up to approximately $118 million, until the con-
clusion of the civil fraud action. Id., 314–15. The court
also stayed all civil proceedings, including arbitration,
that sought to secure assets subject to the freeze. Id.,
315; see United States Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion v. Ahmed, Docket No. 3:15cv675 (JBA), 2020 WL
4333570, *1 (D. Conn. July 28, 2020). Shortly after the
SEC filed the civil fraud action, Oak terminated
Ahmed’s employment for cause and, under a claim of
forfeiture pursuant to the parties’ employment agree-
ment, seized his earnings that were in Oak’s possession.
  In mid-May, 2015—just weeks after Ahmed’s arrest
on the federal charges, the SEC brought its two civil
actions, and Oak initiated the investigation that led to
the termination of his employment—Ahmed fled the
United States for his native country, India, violating the
conditions of his bail in the criminal insider trading
case. See Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ahmed,
supra, 123 F. Supp. 3d 306 and n.1. Shortly after his
arrival, officials in India purportedly arrested Ahmed
for using invalid documents to enter the country and
detained him until bail was posted.4 See id., 306 n.1;
see also United States Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion v. Ahmed, Docket No. 3:15cv675 (JBA), 2016 WL
10568257, *1 and n.3 (D. Conn. February 18, 2016).
   In June, 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Ahmed
on criminal charges related to the allegations in the
civil fraud action, and a criminal complaint was filed in
August, 2015.5 See United States Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Ahmed, supra, 2016 WL 10568257, *1.
Ahmed could not formally be charged due to his absence
from this country. See id., *3.
   Litigation in the civil fraud case, however, continued
over the next few years, in the course of which the effect
of Ahmed’s ‘‘fugitive’’ status arose during discovery.
Ahmed had moved for an order requiring the SEC to
grant him full access to its investigative file, which
included purportedly confidential Oak documents. See
United States Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Ahmed, Docket No. 3:15-CV-675 (JBA), 2016 WL
10572640, *1 (D. Conn. August 22, 2016), vacated in part
on other grounds, 72 F.4th 379 (2d Cir. 2023); see also
United States Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Ahmed, Docket No. 3:15cv675 (JBA), 2017 WL 5525837,
*1 (March 3, 2017). The SEC opposed the motion. The
District Court denied Ahmed’s request because of the
confidential nature of the materials and the court’s
inability to limit effectively his use of the materials
through a protective order while he ‘‘ ‘remain[ed] a fugi-
tive.’ ’’6 United States Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion v. Ahmed, supra, 2017 WL 5525837, *1. The court
cited its inherent power over discovery and the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine as authority to deny the request.
United States Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Ahmed, supra, 2016 WL 10572640, *1–2. The court held
that Ahmed could renew his request ‘‘if and when he
return[ed] to the United States and execute[d] appro-
priate protective orders.’’ Id., *2. The District Court later
denied Ahmed’s requests to compel Oak to produce ‘‘a
multitude of confidential documents, which [the court
had] already decided . . . it [would] not permit him
access to while he remain[ed] outside of its jurisdic-
tion.’’ United States Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion v. Ahmed, Docket No. 3:15cv675 (JBA), 2018 WL
1541902, *3 (D. Conn. March 29, 2018); see Securities &
Exchange Commission v. Ahmed, Docket No. 15 CV
675 (JBA), 2017 WL 3169059, *2 (D. Conn. July 26, 2017);
United States Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Ahmed, supra, 2017 WL 5525837, *1.
   Ahmed invoked his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and declined to testify or participate
in discovery the SEC sought in the civil fraud case. See
United States Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Ahmed, 308 F. Supp. 3d 628, 638 (D. Conn. 2018). In
2018, the District Court rendered summary judgment
in favor of the SEC as to liability. See id., 673. After
separate proceedings, the court entered a financial
order directing Ahmed to pay the SEC approximately
$63 million in disgorgement and civil penalties, plus
interest. See United States Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Ahmed, 343 F. Supp. 3d 16, 39 (D. Conn.
2018), vacated in part, 72 F.4th 379 (2d Cir. 2023).
Ahmed’s appeals in the civil fraud case are pending
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit.
                             B
                       Arbitration
   After the rendering of judgment in the civil fraud
case, approximately four years after Oak terminated
Ahmed’s employment, Oak successfully moved in fed-
eral court for an order lifting the litigation stay to allow
it to pursue the present arbitration action. See United
States Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ahmed,
Docket No. 3:15cv675 (JBA), 2019 WL 11824929, *1–2
(D. Conn. May 21, 2019) (noting Oak’s representation
that arbitration claims that it sought to assert were
largely based on same conduct underlying civil fraud
case but that damages that Oak sought had not been
sought by or awarded to SEC in its action against
Ahmed). In June, 2019, Oak filed an arbitration com-
plaint, asserting claims of breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, and common-law fraud. Ahmed filed
an answer denying the allegations and asserted affirma-
tive defenses and counterclaims.7 Oak filed a response
asserting, among other things, that Ahmed’s status as
a fugitive from justice barred him from seeking affirma-
tive relief. On several occasions, Ahmed disputed his
fugitive status to the AAA or the arbitrator, claiming
that no court had made this legal determination and that
none could because his absence was due to his deten-
tion by Indian authorities.
  In fact, in the criminal insider trading case, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
expressly made this legal determination in November,
2019. Specifically, in granting the government’s motion
for forfeiture of Ahmed’s appearance bond, the court
found: ‘‘At some time in May, 2015, [Ahmed] absconded,
apparently to India. . . . [Ahmed] has deliberately
flouted his bail conditions. He has failed to appear in
court, has not reported to a probation officer and is a
fugitive. His refusal to return to Massachusetts has
prevented the government from prosecuting him.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis added.) United States v.
Ahmed, supra, 414 F. Supp. 3d 189–90.
  From late 2019 to early 2020, Ahmed sent numerous
emails to the AAA, arguing that the arbitration com-
plaint should be dismissed or the proceedings delayed.
These matters were left for resolution by the subse-
quently appointed arbitrator, Robert B. Bellitto, who
scheduled a ‘‘preliminary hearing’’ conference call for
March 6, 2020. In response to emails, purportedly from
Ahmed’s legal advisor in India, stating that Ahmed
would be unable to participate in the call because of
an ‘‘emergency development’’—he claimed to have
become seriously ill and to have been ordered seques-
tered for one month’s bed rest8—the arbitrator gave
Ahmed an opportunity to submit proper medical docu-
mentation on the record in support of that claim. After
Ahmed failed to provide documentation that satisfied
the arbitrator, the conference call went forward on
March 20, 2020, with Ahmed representing himself.
   The arbitrator directed the parties to submit briefs,
by April 3, 2020, addressing Ahmed’s argument that the
arbitration should be postponed because Ahmed would
be prejudiced due to ‘‘his [inability] to attend an in-
person hearing, or otherwise [to] participate therein, by
reason of the fact that he is currently in India, prevented
from leaving said country, by reason of his being held
there under order of its [g]overnment . . . .’’ Ahmed
did not file a brief and instead sent a lengthy email to
the AAA, purportedly from his phone, seeking to delay
the arbitration. He stated that he could not comply with
the arbitrator’s deadline because he had no personal
computer and could not access one due to India’s
twenty-one day nationwide shutdown in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Oak argued in reply that Ahmed’s
assertions should not be credited, given his prior mis-
representations aimed at delaying the proceedings and
his contemporaneous filings in the civil fraud action,
which demonstrated that he had access to technology
that would permit him to submit a timely response to
the order.
  On April 1, 2020, the arbitrator issued a scheduling
order, setting a May, 2020 deadline for dispositive
motions and July, 2020 dates for the hearing on the
merits. The order initially provided: ‘‘If [Ahmed] chooses
not to appear in person or by a formally appointed
representative, the hearing will proceed without his
participation.’’ The order further advised that ‘‘[n]either
party is authorized to file any additional motions with-
out first requesting permission from the [arbitrator],
clearly stating therein the scope of said motion and the
reasons for its necessity.’’
   After additional communications from Ahmed press-
ing his arguments for postponing the arbitration, the
arbitrator informed the parties that he was denying the
request for postponement and ordered Ahmed ‘‘not to
file ANY writings beyond those that are addressed by
this [o]rder and previous [o]rders.’’ (Emphasis in origi-
nal.) Over Ahmed’s objection, the arbitrator simultane-
ously granted Oak’s request for permission to file a
motion for a protective order shielding confidential doc-
uments from Ahmed’s access. The arbitrator directed
Oak to include legal briefing in that motion concerning
Ahmed’s right to view the evidence against him to ensure
a fair hearing as compared to the need for confiden-
tiality.
   Within days after the arbitrator directed Ahmed not to
file further motions without permission, he sent several
letters to the AAA seeking the arbitrator’s disqualifica-
tion for violating due process and the procedures
required under AAA rules. In response, Oak argued
that Ahmed’s disqualification arguments were baseless,
recycled, and constituted merely another delay tactic,
and that any obstacles that he encountered as a result
of his detention in India were of his own making. The
arbitrator did not respond to the filings but did amend
his scheduling order to make clear that Ahmed could
appear at the hearing on the merits through Skype or
another remote platform.
                             C
                         Liability
  On May 15, 2020, the deadline for filing dispositive
motions in the arbitration, Ahmed filed a motion for
summary judgment and a motion to dismiss. He claimed
that Oak’s claims were untimely, that Oak had unclean
hands or was contributorily negligent, and that Oak had
waived its right to arbitrate by bringing its allegations
to the SEC in violation of the employment agreement.
Ahmed appended a statement of ‘‘undisputed’’ facts and
approximately 200 pages of exhibits, primarily tran-
scripts from other legal proceedings involving Oak.
   Simultaneously, Oak filed the two motions that gave
rise to the issues in the present appeal. In its ‘‘Motion
for Entry of an Order Prohibiting [Ahmed] from Access
to Confidential Documents,’’ Oak asserted that its evi-
dence ‘‘contains confidential information that is subject
to the federal protective orders currently in place,’’
which prohibited Ahmed from accessing confidential
materials while he remained outside of the court’s juris-
diction. In its memorandum of law in support of its
‘‘Motion for an Order Applying the Fugitive Disenti-
tlement Doctrine,’’ Oak claimed that, by becoming a
fugitive from justice, Ahmed waived his ‘‘ ‘due process
rights’ ’’ in any action relating to the facts that gave rise
to his fugitive status. Oak advanced legal support for its
argument that arbitrators may apply the disentitlement
doctrine, that Ahmed’s confinement in India did not
alter his status as a fugitive from both the fraud and
insider trading actions, civil and criminal, and that
applying the doctrine would not offend notions of fair-
ness or equity. Oak asked the arbitrator to apply the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine to its fullest extent and,
therefore, to strike Ahmed’s counterclaims, to dismiss
his affirmative defenses, and to bar him from contesting
Oak’s allegations.
   The arbitrator’s scheduling order did not set a dead-
line for either party to respond to the other’s dispositive
motions or otherwise indicate that responses were per-
mitted. The arbitrator had, however, previously set a
deadline of June 8, 2020, for Ahmed to respond to Oak’s
motion for a protective order.
   Ahmed had provided no response as of May 22, 2020,
when the arbitrator issued a written order disposing
of the pending motions. In his summary of facts and
procedural background, the arbitrator discussed the
allegations of criminal conduct by Ahmed and the sev-
eral legal actions brought against him. The arbitrator
cited the protective orders issued in the civil fraud case
and the determination in the criminal case that Ahmed
was a ‘‘fugitive from justice.’’9 The arbitrator noted Ahmed’s
claim that he ‘‘cannot’’ reenter the United States because
he had lost his passport, a claim that was inconsistent
with the court’s finding in the criminal case that he had
refused to return to the United States, preventing the
government from prosecuting him. See United States
v. Ahmed, supra, 414 F. Supp. 3d 190. The arbitrator
also noted that ‘‘[Ahmed] claims he is not represented
by an attorney. [He] further states that he communi-
cates with this tribunal and the [federal] [c]ourts utiliz-
ing a cell phone. He also denies any access to legal
research tools; however, all of the documents that he
has filed in this [a]rbitration are in a legal format, utiliz-
ing properly sized paper; presented with proper cap-
tioning; presenting legal theories associated therewith;
and citing case[s] and legal authority in support thereof,
in conformity with accepted legal procedure.’’
  The legal analysis section of the arbitrator’s order
contained the following principles and conclusions:
   ‘‘C. Fugitive disentitlement is an equitable [d]octrine
that operates as a waiver of a fugitive’s due process
rights in any action that is related to the facts giving
rise to said fugitive’s status, barring said fugitive from
asserting both affirmative claims and contesting allega-
tions against the related proceedings. Its intent is to
prevent such person from seeking relief from a judicial
system that said fugitive has evaded. . . . The [d]oc-
trine originally applied to criminal appeals but has been
extended to related civil proceedings. . . . Originally,
the [d]octrine was limited to appeals, but it has been
extended to be applied to trial levels also. . . .
  ‘‘D. Pursuant to AAA [Rule R-47] (a), an arbitration
may grant any remedy or relief if deemed justified and
equitable.
   ‘‘E. By reason of the application of the aforemen-
tioned [d]octrine, the [p]leadings filed by [Ahmed] ought
to be denied.
  ‘‘F. Notwithstanding the effect of said [d]octrine, the
merits of [Ahmed’s] motions [for summary judgment
and to dismiss] would fail . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.)
   The arbitrator explained that Ahmed’s absence tolled
the statute of limitations, that the facts Ahmed asserted
were not undisputed simply because he said so, and
that his allegations were legally insufficient to justify
dismissal: ‘‘The entirety thereof is a conclusion of [Ahmed]
that he may have committed his actions that [led] to
this action because the upper management of [Oak] did
not properly supervise him.’’
  The order then directed as follows:
   ‘‘1. [Oak’s] [m]otion for an [o]rder prohibiting [Ahmed]
from access to confidential documents is granted.
[Ahmed] is prohibited from accessing, in any manner,
confidential documents and information in this pro-
ceeding.
   ‘‘2. [Oak’s] [m]otion for an [o]rder applying the fugi-
tive disentitlement doctrine is granted. [Ahmed’s] coun-
terclaims filed against [Oak] are dismissed; the affirmative
defenses filed by [Ahmed] against [Oak] are stricken.
  ‘‘3. [Ahmed] is barred from contesting the allegations
contained within [Oak’s] [s]tatement of [c]laim.
  ‘‘4. [Ahmed’s] [m]otions are denied in their entirety.
  ‘‘5. This case will proceed to hearing as previously
scheduled [July 21 through July 24] as a hearing in
damages.’’ (Emphasis added.)
   Ten days after the arbitrator issued that order, Ahmed
sent the AAA a thirty-four page motion, in legal format
with legal citations, seeking to disqualify the arbitrator
on the grounds of bias and prejudice. Ahmed claimed
that the arbitrator had, ex parte, granted Oak’s motions
in their entirety and ordered all relief requested in those
orders without allowing Ahmed to respond to those
motions. He further contended that applying the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine to deprive him of any opportu-
nity to participate in the proceedings violated the law,
principles of equity, and the terms governing the arbitra-
tion. The AAA thereafter notified the parties that it had
determined that the arbitrator should not be disqualified.
                             D
                        Damages
  Several weeks before the damages hearing, Oak pro-
vided Ahmed with copies of two of the exhibits it planned
to introduce. Both exhibits were court rulings in the
SEC civil fraud action that were matters of public
record. Oak informed Ahmed that the rest of its exhibits
were confidential. It does not appear that Oak submit-
ted a document, like a privilege log, generally describing
the exhibits and the basis for shielding them.
  Approximately one week before the hearing, Ahmed
again emailed the AAA, this time seeking an indefinite
or unspecified postponement of the arbitration. He con-
tended that he was unable to participate either in person
(due to his inability to leave India) or remotely (due to
the COVID-19 pandemic and a lack of funds to hire
counsel). Oak objected to Ahmed’s request. On July 18,
2020, the arbitrator informed the AAA, which, in turn,
informed the parties, that the damages hearing would
go forward on July 21, 2020, but, due to COVID-19
restrictions, would instead be conducted remotely via
the Zoom platform.
  The morning of the damages hearing, an email was sent
to the AAA, again under the name of the same attorney
in India; see footnote 8 of this opinion; asserting that
Ahmed ‘‘is currently quarantined in a care facility due
to [a] positive [COVID-19] test with no access to com-
puters or devices to be able to join any hearing via
video. He is under the supervision of medical care.
He is not able to attend any hearings whatsoever. My
understanding of your AAA [r]ules is that [Ahmed] is
entitled to attend any and all hearings.’’ (Emphasis
omitted.)
   In response to a query by the AAA, Oak objected to
postponement: ‘‘Putting aside credibility issues with
respect to [Ahmed’s] health, much if not all of the testi-
mony today concerns confidential information that
[Ahmed] would not be permitted to access.’’ Ahmed’s
‘‘attorney’’ replied that ‘‘[t]he confidentiality issues are
irrelevant to whether or not [Ahmed] can attend the
hearing.’’ The arbitrator denied the request to postpone
the damages hearing.
   Neither Ahmed nor any representative of his partici-
pated in the July 21, 2020 damages hearing. Two weeks
after the hearing, Oak provided Ahmed with copies of
the posthearing brief and affidavits the arbitrator had
ordered Oak to submit in support of its request for
damages and attorney’s fees; both contained substantial
redactions. The arbitrator did not direct Ahmed to file
a posthearing brief, and Ahmed made no request to do
so before the hearing was declared closed. On August
20, 2020, the AAA notified the parties that the arbitrator
had declared the hearings closed as of August 11, 2020.
The following day, Ahmed sent an email to the AAA
opposing the closure of the hearing and any award
in favor of Oak. He contended that the proceedings
contravened due process and AAA rules by failing to
provide him with any opportunity to respond to Oak’s
motions or to provide pertinent and material evidence.
Ahmed did not apply to the arbitrator to open the hear-
ing, as permitted by AAA Rule R-40. See generally Amer-
ican Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration
Rules and Mediation Procedures (October 1, 2013)
(AAA Rules).
   Five days later, the arbitrator issued an award in
favor of Oak. The award noted that Ahmed ‘‘ha[d] failed
to appear after due notice by mail in accordance with
the [r]ules of the American Arbitration Association
. . . .’’ The award later stated that Ahmed, ‘‘by reason
of the [common-law] doctrine of fugitive disentitlement
. . . having been previously applied, was not present
and did not participate.’’ The arbitrator awarded Oak
approximately $57 million in damages and fees, $33.3
million of which constituted reimbursement for all com-
pensation Oak had paid Ahmed during his term of
employment as equitable disgorgement. The arbitrator
found Ahmed to have engaged in ‘‘malicious, outra-
geous’’ conduct, and to have evidenced an ‘‘evil motive
and reckless indifference to the rights of his clients and
employer, for which he . . . has shown little or no
remorse.’’ Despite these findings, the arbitrator limited
the punitive damages award to $2 million, a small frac-
tion of the amount sought by Oak, on the ground that
Oak had exercised little or no oversight in contravention
of its fiduciary obligations to its investors and, there-
fore, did not discover the fraud for almost eleven years
despite little effort by Ahmed to conceal aspects of his
fraudulent scheme.
                             E
              Postarbitration Proceedings
  Ahmed filed an application in the Superior Court to
vacate the award; see General Statutes § 52-418; and
Oak filed a motion to confirm the award. See General
Statutes § 52-417. Ahmed claimed that the court should
vacate the award on each of the statutory grounds in
§ 52-418 (a), the corresponding provisions in Delaware
statutes, and the corresponding provisions in the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. See 9
U.S.C. § 10 (2018). Ahmed also claimed that the award
violated public policy, in that the arbitrator effectively
decided the matter on an ex parte basis, denying Ahmed
any opportunity to refute Oak’s allegations and any
semblance of fairness or due process.
   The trial court denied Ahmed’s application to vacate
the award and granted Oak’s motion to confirm the award.
The court expressed concerns about whether the crimi-
nal action that preceded Ahmed’s flight from the United
States was related to the arbitration, justifying the appli-
cation of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, and whether
the doctrine, if applicable, could be applied in such a
‘‘draconian’’ manner: to preclude not only efforts to obtain
affirmative relief but also efforts to defend against Oak’s
claims in the absence of a showing of necessity.
   The trial court, however, cited several impediments
to vacating the award. First, it pointed to Ahmed’s fail-
ure to present any credible evidence proving his pur-
ported inability to return to this country; see footnote
4 of this opinion; and questioned why any such inability,
if it existed, should not be considered a problem of his
own making due to his initial, illegal departure from this
country. It also noted that the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine, although most often applied in criminal litiga-
tion, is a recognized exception to the opportunity to be
heard in both criminal and civil contexts. The court
concluded that ‘‘[t]he orders may have been extreme,
and approached [the] outer limits of reasonable applica-
tion, but the court cannot conclude that limits were
crossed, under the circumstances presented.’’ The court
particularly emphasized the deference afforded to an
arbitrator’s contractual interpretation and inferred from
the AAA’s posthearing decision rejecting Ahmed’s motion
to disqualify the arbitrator that the arbitrator’s interpre-
tation of the governing principles was within proper
bounds.
   Specifically with regard to the damages hearing, the
trial court observed that the arbitrator’s confidentiality
ruling had allowed Oak to shield every matter of sub-
stance from Ahmed, including information that plainly
was not confidential (e.g., information about Ahmed’s
compensation). Nonetheless, the arbitrator could have
discredited Ahmed’s excuses for his inability to partici-
pate in the proceedings. Consequently, the court viewed
Ahmed’s failure to participate in the damages hearing
remotely, as he had been invited to do so and as had
become customary during the pandemic—to assert
objections, present evidence, and cross-examine Oak’s
witnesses to the extent he would have been permitted
to do so, as volitional and, therefore, a waiver of certain
claims. This appeal followed.
                             II
   Well settled principles guide our review. ‘‘[Judicial]
review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined. . . .
Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling
private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbi-
tration awards in a manner designed to minimize inter-
ference with an efficient and economical system of
alternative dispute resolution.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Board of Education v. New Milford Educa-
tion Assn., 331 Conn. 524, 531, 205 A.3d 552 (2019).
   Specifically, ‘‘[u]nder an unrestricted submission, the
[arbitrator’s] decision is considered final and binding;
thus the courts will not review the evidence considered
by the [arbitrator] nor will they review the award for
errors of law or fact. . . . A submission is deemed
restricted only if the agreement contains express lan-
guage restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit
rights, or conditioning the award on court review.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id. When the agreement
contains no such restrictions, as in the present case,
‘‘[a] court sits to determine only whether the arbitrator
did his job—not whether he did it well, correctly, or
reasonably, but simply whether he did it.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Wachovia Securities, LLC
v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 2012).
   ‘‘We have, however, recognized certain grounds for
vacating an award even when the parties have commit-
ted a particular question to the authority of an arbitrator,
including that: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality
of a statute . . . (2) the award violates clear public
policy . . . or (3) the award contravenes one or more
of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) AFSCME, Council 4, Local
1303-325 v. Westbrook, 309 Conn. 767, 777, 75 A.3d 1
(2013). This court reviews a trial court’s decision de
novo when that decision addresses whether an arbitra-
tion award violates the proscriptions § 52-418 or a clear
public policy. See, e.g., Bridgeport v. Kasper Group,
Inc., 278 Conn. 466, 475, 899 A.2d 523 (2006). We do
so mindful that the arbitrator’s decision itself is subject
to a form of de novo review. See, e.g., Harty v. Cantor
Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 84, 881 A.2d 139 (2005);
Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecti-
cut, P.C., 252 Conn. 416, 431–32, 747 A.2d 1017 (2000).
   As the analysis that follows makes clear, what this
de novo review encompasses depends on which ground
for vacating an award is at issue. Irrespective of which
ground is at issue, however, a court must afford substan-
tial deference to the arbitrator’s interpretation of the
scope and meaning of the agreement’s terms. See Schoon-
maker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C.,
supra, 252 Conn. 432. ‘‘Because the parties bargained
for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement, an
arbitral decision even arguably construing or applying
the contract must stand, regardless of a court’s view
of its (de)merits.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 569,
133 S. Ct. 2064, 186 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013); see also
AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1303-325 v. Westbrook, supra,
309 Conn. 780–81. Further, we must bear in mind when
reviewing the award and determining whether the arbi-
trator ‘‘ ‘even arguably’ ’’ construed or applied the con-
tract; Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, supra, 569;
that, absent a statute or contractual provision providing
to the contrary, ‘‘no findings of fact or conclusions of
law are required.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn.
178, 190–91, 530 A.2d 171 (1987). In fact, ‘‘[a]n explana-
tion of the means by which [the arbitrator] reached the
award is not needed, and, in fact, has been held to be
superfluous.’’ Id., 191; see also Bic Pen Corp. v. Local
No. 134, 183 Conn. 579, 585, 440 A.2d 774 (1981).
  We now turn to the present case. Ahmed claims on
appeal that we must order the vacatur of the award
because (1) the arbitrator exceeded his authority in
violation of § 52-418 (a) (4) by violating his due process
rights to a full and fair hearing and by applying the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine, (2) the arbitrator declined
to hear pertinent and material evidence and engaged
in prejudicial misconduct in violation of § 52-418 (a)
(3), (3) the award violated public policy—fundamental
fairness in arbitral proceedings, i.e., the right to present
evidence, and the upholding of the integrity of the arbi-
tration process, and (4) the award violated the FAA on
grounds similar to those in § 52-418 (a) (3) and (4).
   Two predominant themes emerge from Ahmed’s claims:
first, that he was deprived of any semblance of the fair
hearing of his defenses and counterclaims to which he
was entitled (violation of ‘‘due process right’’),10 and,
second, that the arbitrator could not, as a matter of law,
apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to deprive
him of that right. Before turning to the specific legal
grounds he invokes for vacatur of the award, it is important
to dispel certain misimpressions that may arise from
the dual themes of Ahmed’s claims.
   First, the record belies Ahmed’s characterization of
the arbitrator’s actions as completely depriving him
of any ability to participate in the proceedings. For
example, the arbitrator did, in fact, consider Ahmed’s
motion to dismiss and his motion for summary judg-
ment, rejecting them on the merits. The arbitrator’s
decision to limit punitive damages because of Oak’s
contributory negligence, i.e., Oak’s failure to exercise
reasonable oversight that could have revealed aspects
of Ahmed’s fraudulent activities, manifests that the arbi-
trator considered the arguments and supporting exhib-
its in Ahmed’s motions. The record does not establish
that the arbitrator precluded Ahmed from participating
in the damages hearing. In fact, Ahmed’s requests to
postpone that hearing, as well as his provision of exhib-
its to Oak that he intended to submit at that hearing,
clearly demonstrate that Ahmed himself did not inter-
pret the arbitrator’s disentitlement order at the liability
stage to bar his participation at the damages hearing.11
   We agree with the trial court that, because the arbitra-
tor could have discredited Ahmed’s claims that ill health
prevented his attendance, Ahmed waived his right to
participate in the damages hearing by failing to appear
after the denial of his postponement request. See 16D
C.J.S. 37, Constitutional Law § 1736 (2005) (‘‘[T]he due
process rights to notice and hearing prior to judgment
are subject to waiver. An employer who fails to attend
an arbitration of grievances proceeding is not deprived
of due process by the ex parte arbitration . . . .’’ (Foot-
notes omitted.)); see also Youngs v. Haugh, Docket No.
4:08-CV-528-Y, 2009 WL 701013, *5 (N.D. Tex. March 18,
2009) (denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitra-
tion, filed in response to action commenced by plain-
tiffs, on ground that defendants’ refusal to participate in
arbitration previously initiated by plaintiffs constituted
default or waiver); UniFirst Corp. v. Stronger Collision
Center, LLC, 336 So. 3d 1283, 1286 (Fla. App. 2022),
review denied, Florida Supreme Court, Docket No.
SC22-683 (June 20, 2022); UniFirst Corp. v. Stronger
Collision Center, LLC, supra, 1286 n.5 (when party
elected not to participate in arbitration after receiving
demand, arbitration was governed by AAA rule permit-
ting ‘‘the arbitration [to] proceed in the absence of any
party or representative who, after due notice, fails to
be present or fails to obtain a postponement’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).12
   Although Ahmed contends on appeal that his partici-
pation would have been futile because Oak’s unilateral
confidentiality determination had effectively shielded
all of Oak’s evidence from him, we are not prepared
to arrive at such a speculative conclusion. If he had
participated, Ahmed could have requested independent
review of the evidence, as he managed to do in the SEC
civil fraud action, even while purportedly in India. See
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ahmed, supra,
2017 WL 3169059, *1 (District Court ordered magistrate
judge, following Ahmed’s motion, to conduct ‘‘an inde-
pendent review . . . to compare redacted and unre-
dacted transcripts [of deposition of Oak officer] to
determine whether the portions redacted as confiden-
tial [were] in fact confidential’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Insofar as Ahmed contends that his failure
to participate in the hearing is immaterial because he
raised objections to that hearing to the AAA, after the
hearings had been declared closed, he has provided
us with no authority to support that proposition. See
generally 21 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts (4th Ed.
2001) § 57:94, pp. 522–24 (explaining when arbitration
may proceed when party who has been given due notice
is absent).
   Second, it is important to make clear that we address
only claims that Ahmed both distinctly raised before
the trial court and has adequately raised and briefed in
this court. For example, although Ahmed raised and
extensively briefed in the trial court a claim that the
arbitrator made his award in manifest disregard of the
law by dismissing his claims and counterclaims under
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, his appellate brief
neither refers to manifest disregard nor cites it as an
exceptionally deferential standard of review. See Blondeau
v. Baltierra, 337 Conn. 127, 161–62, 167–68, 252 A.3d
317 (2020); see also AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663
v. Dept. of Children & Families, 317 Conn. 238, 251
n.7, 117 A.3d 470 (2015) (manifest disregard of law is
‘‘a claim on which litigants have yet to prevail in our
courts’’). We therefore consider this claim abandoned.
Having chosen to abandon the claim, Ahmed cannot
circumvent the onerous manifest disregard standard
simply by labeling a claim of legal error as some other
ground for vacating the award. Cf. AFSCME, Council
4, Local 1303-325 v. Westbrook, supra, 309 Conn. 788
(‘‘[A] party [challenging] an arbitral award may not suc-
ceed in receiving de novo review merely by labeling its
challenge as falling within the public policy exception
to the normal rule of deference. The substance, not the
form, of the challenge will govern.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)). Further, as our discussion will dem-
onstrate, we have no occasion to consider whether the
facts of the present case justified the arbitrator’s appli-
cation of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine or the
extent to which that doctrine was properly applied.13
   The dissent takes a different tack. It takes the view
that we should interpret Ahmed’s claims more expan-
sively, to glean their essence, informed not only by
what Ahmed actually argues in his brief but by reading
between the lines and even looking beyond the brief if
necessary. For example, the dissent posits that Ahmed’s
statement that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
depriving Ahmed of his procedural rights under the
AAA rules is ‘‘broad enough for us to consider all of
the AAA rules that the arbitrator’s conduct may have
violated’’; (emphasis added); and, thus, we should not
limit our review to the specific rules that Ahmed actu-
ally cites and analyzes in his brief.14 Similarly, this
expansive reading allows the dissent to elevate a single
sentence footnote in Ahmed’s brief, a statement of fact
unadorned by legal authority or analysis, to an indepen-
dent ground for vacatur, which is a central feature of the
dissent.15 See, e.g., Burton v. Dept. of Environmental
Protection, 337 Conn. 781, 804–805, 256 A.3d 655 (2021)
(issue was inadequately briefed when plaintiff provided
neither citation to any legal authority nor meaningful
analysis). Oak, unsurprisingly, did not read between the
lines of Ahmed’s brief and therefore did not address
these expansively interpreted arguments in its brief.
Under similar circumstances, we would not afford such
a liberal interpretation to even a self-represented liti-
gant, a status that Ahmed does not hold in this appeal.
See, e.g., Markley v. Dept. of Public Utility Control,
301 Conn. 56, 75, 23 A.3d 668 (2011) (‘‘our liberal policy
toward [self-represented] parties is severely curtailed
in cases [when] it interferes with the rights of other
parties’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although
we have responded to a select few of the numerous
arguments the dissent poses that Ahmed has not made,
our doing so does not cure the lack of notice to Oak.
   Making arguments that a litigant does not make for
himself is particularly unfitting when a court reviews
an arbitration award. As we discuss in greater detail in
the sections that follow, we afford an unparalleled level
of deference to the arbitrator and construe the grounds
for vacatur quite narrowly. ‘‘In effect’’ de novo review
is quite different from the de novo review applied in
judicial review of cases that originate in our trial courts.
In such cases, we may be more flexible in distinguishing
between an unraised claim, for which review is some-
times, but not always, improper, and an unraised legal
argument in support of a claim that has been raised,
for which review may be proper. See, e.g., Meribear
Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 340 Conn. 711, 732, 265 A.3d
870 (2021).
   Arbitration is different. The parties did not bargain
for a black-robed decision maker in the first instance,
let alone for appellate jurists doggedly scouring the
record, the contract, and the AAA rules to uncover a
basis for vacatur that the plaintiff does not assert for
himself. See Groton v. United Steelworkers of America,
254 Conn. 35, 51, 757 A.2d 501 (2000) (Declining to
apply certain rules that are traditionally applied in civil
actions and administrative proceedings, and stating:
‘‘This differentiation . . . is premised on the notion
that, because arbitration is essentially a private ordering
scheme for resolving disputes, those authorities should
not be extended to that private scheme. Voluntary arbi-
tration is a method by which parties freely determine
that their disputes will be resolved, at least in the first
instance, not by public officials such as judges or admin-
istrators, but by arbitrators.’’); see also Blondeau v.
Baltierra, supra, 337 Conn. 161 (‘‘As an essential com-
ponent of [the parties’] choice [to arbitrate their dis-
pute], they have agreed to bypass the usual adjudicative
apparatus, including its conventional appellate features,
for the advantages that accompany private arbitration.
. . . Review by a judicial authority is not forfeited
entirely, but it is conducted under a different and far
less rigorous level of scrutiny.’’).
  Having clarified the issues and circumstances before
us, we turn to the specific grounds Ahmed has raised
on appeal for vacating the award. We note that, although
the trial court largely eschewed crediting either of the
parties’ diametrically opposed characterizations of
Ahmed’s actions and motivations in assessing these
grounds, consistent with the deferential standard of
review applied in this context, we interpret the evidence
in the light most favorable to supporting the award.
                            A
   We begin with Ahmed’s claim that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority in violation of § 52-418 (a) (4)
because AAA rules and Delaware law both require an
arbitrator to provide parties with a full and fair hearing;
see Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 5706 (2) (2013);16 AAA Rule
R-32 (a); and arbitrators have no authority to apply
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to abrogate those
rights. Specifically, Ahmed contends that the arbitrator
improperly relied on AAA Rule R-47 (a) for authority
to apply the doctrine. That subsection provides: ‘‘The
arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbi-
trator deems just and equitable and within the scope
of the agreement of the parties, including, but not lim-
ited to, specific performance of a contract.’’ AAA Rule
R-47 (a). Ahmed claims that the arbitrator failed to
recognize that the AAA rules require not only that the
remedy or relief must be ‘‘just and equitable’’—the part
of the rule cited in the arbitrator’s order—but that the
remedy or relief must be ‘‘within the scope of the agree-
ment of the parties . . . .’’ Id. Ahmed contends that
the parties’ agreement must expressly authorize the
relief to come ‘‘within the scope of the . . . agreement
. . . .’’17 Id. Because no express language of the agree-
ment authorizes application of the fugitive disenti-
tlement doctrine, Ahmed claims that its application is
contrary to laws and rules incorporated into the arbitra-
tion agreement. We conclude that Ahmed’s claim falters
on its fundamental premise.
  The legal principles governing our review are well
settled. ‘‘[A] claim that the arbitrators have exceeded
their powers may be established under § 52-418 in either
one of two ways: (1) the award fails to conform to the
submission, or, in other words, falls outside the scope
of the submission; or (2) the arbitrators manifestly dis-
regarded the law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Blondeau v. Baltierra, supra, 337 Conn. 155. As we
previously indicated, Ahmed does not assert a claim of
manifest disregard of the law on appeal.
   ‘‘If the parties have agreed in the underlying contract
that their disputes shall be resolved by arbitration, the
arbitration clause in the contract is a written submission
to arbitration.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Lemma v. York & Chapel, Corp., 204 Conn. App. 471,
494, 254 A.3d 1020 (2021). ‘‘The standard for reviewing
a claim that the award does not conform to the submis-
sion requires what we have termed in effect, de novo
judicial review. . . . The de novo label in this context
means something very different from typical de novo
review because review under this standard and in this
setting is limited to a comparison of the award to the
submission. Our inquiry generally is limited to a deter-
mination as to whether the parties have vested the
arbitrators with the authority to decide the issue pre-
sented or to award the relief conferred. With respect
to the latter, we have explained that, as long as the
arbitrator’s remedies were consistent with the agree-
ment they were within the scope of the submission.
. . . In making this determination, the court may not
engage in fact-finding by providing an independent
interpretation of the contract, but simply is charged
with determining if the arbitrators have ignored their
obligation to interpret and to apply the contract as
written.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Blondeau v. Baltierra, supra,
337 Conn. 155.
   The challenge for a reviewing court is to put aside
its judicial sensibilities because ‘‘the question is not
whether the arbitrator or arbitrators erred in interpre-
ting the contract; it is not whether they clearly erred in
interpreting the contract; it is not whether they grossly
erred in interpreting the contract; it is whether they
interpreted the contract.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers &
Trainmen, General Committee of Adjustment, Central
Conference v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 719 F.3d 801,
803 (7th Cir. 2013). ‘‘[M]isinterpretation of contractual
language, no matter how clear, is within the arbitrator’s
powers; only a decision to ignore or supersede language
conceded to be binding allows a court to vacate the
award.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United
Food & Commercial Workers, Local 1546 v. Illinois-
American Water Co., 569 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 2009);
cf. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1303-325 v. Westbrook,
supra, 309 Conn. 780 (‘‘It is not [the court’s] role to
determine whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement was correct. It is
enough . . . that such interpretation was a good faith
effort to interpret the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). ‘‘[I]t
is only when the arbitrator must have based his award
on some body of thought, or feeling, or policy, or law
that is outside the contract . . . that the award can be
said not to draw its essence from the [parties’ agree-
ment]. . . . In such cases, the [United States] Supreme
Court has said that the arbitrator is dispens[ing] his
own brand of industrial justice. [United Steelworkers
of America v.] Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
[593, 597, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1960)].’’
(Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) United Food & Commercial Workers,
Local 1546 v. Illinois-American Water Co., supra, 755;
see also Island Creek Coal Co. v. District 28, United
Mine Workers of America, 29 F.3d 126, 129 (4th Cir.)
(‘‘[a]n award may be overturned only if the arbitrator
must have based his award on his own personal notions
of right and wrong, for only then does the award fail
to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1019, 115 S. Ct. 583, 130 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994).
  As we previously explained, Ahmed’s excess of
authority claim in the present case rests on the premise
that equitable relief is ‘‘within the scope of the agree-
ment of the parties’’ under AAA Rule R-47 (a) only if
the agreement expressly authorizes that relief. This
same provision is routinely incorporated into contrac-
tual agreements to arbitrate. Some courts have adopted
Ahmed’s interpretation; see, e.g., InterChem Asia 2000
Pte. Ltd. v. Oceana Petrochemicals AG, 373 F. Supp. 2d
340, 357–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Eberle v. BMCA Insulation
Products, Inc., Docket No. 95 Civ. 10378 (SAS), 1996
WL 337262, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1996); see also Beacon
Towers Condominium Trust v. Alex, 473 Mass. 472,
474, 476–77, 42 N.E.3d 1144 (2016) (attorney’s fees were
not ‘‘within the scope of the arbitration agreement’’
when agreement also provided that such fees were per-
mitted when ‘‘ ‘authorized by law’ ’’ and contract pro-
vided no express authority for such fees); but many
other courts have interpreted this provision to permit
relief or remedies in the absence of an express limita-
tion.18 See, e.g., Wisconsin Automated Machinery Corp.
v. Diehl Woodworking Machinery, Inc., Docket No. 07
C 6840, 2008 WL 4889012, *4–5 (N.D. Ill. August 7, 2008);
In re Arbitration Between Prudential-Bache Securi-
ties, Inc. & Depew, 814 F. Supp. 1081, 1083–84 (M.D.
Fla. 1993); Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima
International, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 357 (N.D. Ala.
1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985); see also
Schmidt v. Schmidt, Docket No. 1 CA-CV 12-0701, 2014
WL 3882178, *6–7 (Ariz. App. August 5, 2014); Winkel-
man v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 279 Wis. 2d 335, 342–43, 347,
693 N.W.2d 756 (App.), review denied, 282 Wis. 2d 720,
700 N.W.2d 272 (2005). This is so even when the agree-
ment provides that a particular state’s law shall govern
and that state’s law bars awarding the relief. See Bonar
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1386–87
(11th Cir. 1988).
   We conclude from our review of Delaware law that
the courts of that state would follow the latter approach.
See Malekzadeh v. Wyshock, 611 A.2d 18, 22 (Del. Ch.
1992) (In declining to vacate an award that ordered
relief not expressly authorized by the arbitration agree-
ment, the court stated: ‘‘[T]he United States Supreme
Court has held that the award of relief not previously
conceived of by the parties is not grounds for vacating
an [a]rbitrator’s award. . . . An arbitration award is
deemed to be outside the scope of the parties’ agree-
ment only when it manifests a clear infidelity to the
[a]rbitrator’s obligation of drawing the essence of the
award from the [underlying contract].’’ (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). We note that
Delaware courts recognize the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine; see, e.g., Cooper ex rel. Frazier v. Villaburdi,
Docket No. Civ.A. 00C-08-174JEB, 2001 WL 1198933, *2
(Del. Super. October 2, 2001) (noting that ‘‘principles
of deference counsel that the [d]octrine of [f]ugitive
[d]isentitlement must be used reasonably and with
restraint’’ and concluding that it was unnecessary to
consider whether dismissal under doctrine was appro-
priate because court was granting motion to dismiss),
aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Villaburdi, Docket No. 550,
2001, 2002 WL 442398 (Del. March 19, 2002) (decision
without published opinion, 793 A.2d 310); see also Red-
den v. State, 418 A.2d 996, 997 (Del. 1980) (‘‘[a]n escapee
has no right to appellate procedures while he remains
a fugitive’’); and we are unaware of any case in which
a Delaware court (or any court, for that matter) has
expressly barred the application of the fugitive disenti-
tlement doctrine to arbitration. Insofar as Ahmed’s posi-
tion is that the arbitrator misapplied the doctrine as a
matter of law because Delaware courts would reach a
different conclusion as to whether or to what extent
the doctrine should apply if they were confronted with
the present circumstances, he cannot prevail even if he
is correct. As we previously explained, vacatur cannot
be based on mere legal error but only on manifest disre-
gard of the law in violation of § 52-418 (a) (4). See
McCann v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 288
Conn. 203, 220, 952 A.2d 43 (2008); id., 214–15 (‘‘arbitra-
tors generally are laypersons who bring to these pro-
ceedings their technical expertise and professional
skills, but who are not expected to have extensive
knowledge of substantive law or the subtleties of evi-
dentiary rules’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). As
we also previously noted, Ahmed does not claim that
the arbitrator’s actions meet this onerous standard.
   The fact that the agreement does not refer explicitly
to this doctrine is immaterial. The question is not
whether the parties specifically anticipated application
of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in name but
whether the arbitrator drew the essence of the equitable
remedy from the underlying contract. See United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
supra, 363 U.S. 597 (‘‘When an arbitrator is commis-
sioned to interpret and apply the collective bargaining
agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear
in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is
especially true when it comes to formulating remedies.
. . . The draftsmen may never have thought of what
specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular
contingency.’’); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Phoenix
Mailers Union Local 752, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 989 F.2d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 1993) (‘‘[a]s
long as a plausible solution is available within the gen-
eral framework of the agreement, the arbitrator has the
authority to decide what the parties would have agreed
on had they foreseen the particular item in dispute’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
   Two points warrant emphasis. The first is that ‘‘arbi-
trators are generally afforded greater flexibility in fash-
ioning remedies than are courts’’; Benihana, Inc. v.
Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 902 (2d Cir.
2015); and no provision in the parties’ agreement explic-
itly restricts the arbitrator’s remedies to fewer than
those available to a court. The second is that the agree-
ment is intended to promote fairness to both parties.
The sanctions rule incorporated into the agreement,
although not drafted with the present circumstances
specifically in mind, recognizes that a party might
engage in conduct that justifies the arbitrator’s making
orders that impair or even abrogate that party’s right
to present his case.19 This provision reflects the reality
that treating both parties fairly requires weighing com-
peting interests. Whether the arbitrator struck the
proper balance in the present case, crafting orders that
benefited Oak, the party that was timely prepared to
present its case in the agreed on forum, to the detriment
of Ahmed, the party who flouted the law and then
attempted to use his absence to delay the proceedings,
is not a question of exceeding authority but of exercis-
ing discretion. See, e.g., Bano v. Union Carbide Corp.,
273 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2001) (‘‘[w]e review a district
court’s determination whether to apply the fugitive dis-
entitlement doctrine for abuse of discretion’’); see also
Galeas Figueroa v. Attorney General, 998 F.3d 77, 85
(3d Cir. 2021) (‘‘[d]ismissal [of appeal] under the fugitive
disentitlement doctrine remains discretionary’’); May-
dak v. United States Dept. of Education, 150 Fed. Appx.
136, 138 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissal of plaintiff’s action
pursuant to Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
et seq., under fugitive disentitlement doctrine ‘‘was not
an abuse of discretion’’). Although it is not for a reviewing
court to determine whether the arbitrator struck the
proper balance, we note that the arbitrator reasonably
could have considered Ahmed’s failure to satisfy condi-
tions that would have allowed his full participation
through counsel. Cf. United States Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Ahmed, supra, 2016 WL 10572640, *1
(because Ahmed was represented by counsel in civil
insider trading action, court’s protective order author-
ized counsel to have access to confidential materials
and to discuss those materials with Ahmed). The Dis-
trict Court declined to grant Ahmed’s request to
unfreeze assets for the purpose of retaining arbitration
counsel because Ahmed failed to provide the informa-
tion that the court required to support his request.20
Moreover, the form and substance of Ahmed’s filings
in that action and in the arbitration reasonably could
have raised doubts as to whether he in fact lacked the
services of counsel.
   In light of these facts, we cannot conclude that, in
invoking the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the arbi-
trator did not draw the essence of his award from the
parties’ arbitration agreement, including the AAA rules
incorporated into the agreement. The test is whether he
was ‘‘ ‘even arguably’ ’’ construing the contract. Oxford
Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, supra, 569 U.S. 569. The
fact that his award (and the underlying disentitlement
order) may not have recited every provision on which
he relied or explained how his interpretation authorized
his actions in light of the facts is not just unnecessary
but superfluous. See American Universal Ins. Co. v.
DelGreco, supra, 205 Conn. 190–91; 2 M. Domke on
Commercial Arbitration (3d Ed. 2003 & Supp. 2009)
§ 34:7, pp. 34-18 through 34-25.
   ‘‘Given our limited role in reviewing arbitral deci-
sions, we conclude that the [arbitrator did not exceed
his authority]. The arbitrator did not disregard the con-
tractual language and dispense his own brand of indus-
trial justice, nor did he exceed his authority in rendering
his decision. Instead, the arbitrator confronted a situa-
tion that was not expressly contemplated by the parties,
interpreted the agreement, and reached a conclusion.’’
United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 1546 v.
Illinois-American Water Co., supra, 569 F.3d 755. Mind-
ful of the unusual and challenging circumstances facing
the arbitrator, and precipitated by Ahmed’s own
actions, we cannot conclude that the award necessarily
falls outside the scope of the arbitrator’s authority. See,
e.g., ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. of New York v. EMC
National Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2009) (Second
Circuit has ‘‘consistently accorded the narrowest of
readings to [the exceeded powers] provision of [federal
arbitration] law . . . in order to facilitate the purpose
underlying arbitration: to provide parties with efficient
dispute resolution, thereby obviating the need for pro-
tracted litigation’’ (citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted)).
   The dissent concludes otherwise, contending that
AAA Rule R-47 (a) does not provide authority to issue
the disentitlement order and pointing to two rules not
cited by the arbitrator as evidence that the arbitrator
exceeded his authority by relying on Rule R-47. Specifi-
cally, the dissent contends that the arbitrator’s disenti-
tlement order (1) violated AAA Rule R-32 (a), which
requires that ‘‘the parties are treated with equality’’ and
that each party ‘‘is given a fair opportunity to present
its case,’’ and (2) contravened AAA Rule R-58, which,
in the dissent’s view, permitted the arbitrator to issue
a sanction in only two circumstances (violation of an
AAA rule or an order of the arbitrator), neither of which,
according to the dissent, provided the basis for the
arbitrator’s order in the present case. The dissent’s reli-
ance on these rules is misplaced.
   AAA Rule R-32, titled ‘‘Conduct of Proceedings,’’ sim-
ply prescribes the procedures that generally govern
arbitration. Although this rule acknowledges each par-
ty’s right to present its case, it does not provide that
these rights are inviolate and cannot be waived by
engaging in conduct injurious to the fairness of the
proceedings and the rights of the other party. Rather,
it rests on the presumption that a party has not, by
act or omission, engaged in conduct that justifies the
impairment of these rights. Cf. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co.
of New York v. EMC National Life Co., supra, 564 F.3d
84, 88 (The arbitrators did not exceed their authority
by ordering one party to pay the other party’s arbitration
and attorney’s fees as a sanction despite a provision in
arbitration agreement stating that each party ‘‘ ‘shall
bear’ ’’ the expenses of their own arbitrator and their
own attorneys because that provision ‘‘is fairly under-
stood to reflect the parties’ agreement as to how fees
are to be borne, regardless of the arbitration’s outcome,
in the expected context of good faith dealings. . . .
Nothing in the section, however, signals the parties’
intent to limit the arbitrators’ inherent authority to sanc-
tion bad faith participation in the arbitration.’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis omitted.)). Other AAA rules incorpo-
rated into the agreement reflect this distinction, provid-
ing the arbitrator with flexible tools to meet conditions
that may arise. See AAA Rule R-23 (‘‘Enforcement Pow-
ers of the Arbitrator’’) (‘‘[t]he arbitrator shall have the
authority to issue any orders necessary . . . to other-
wise achieve a fair, efficient and economical resolution
of the case’’); AAA Rule R-31 (‘‘Arbitration in the
Absence of a Party or Representative’’) (‘‘[u]nless the
law provides to the contrary, the arbitration may pro-
ceed in the absence of any party or representative who,
after due notice, fails to be present or fails to obtain a
postponement’’); AAA Rule R-58 (‘‘Sanctions’’) (author-
izing sanctions for party’s failure to comply with its
obligations under AAA rules or arbitrator’s order,
including limiting party’s participation and adverse
determination of issues); see also AmeriCredit Finan-
cial Services, Inc. v. Oxford Management Services, 627
F. Supp. 2d 85, 95–96 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (arbitrator’s dis-
missal of counterclaim as sanction for defendant’s
destruction of evidence was authorized under broad
grant of authority in arbitration agreement to resolve
any dispute arising out of or related to agreement when
no language in agreement expressly prevented arbitra-
tor from dismissing claim on that basis, and rejecting
defendant’s reliance on provision stating that ‘‘the arbi-
trator has no power or authority to make awards or
issue orders of any kind except as expressly permitted
by the [a]greement, and in no event may the arbitrator
have the authority to make any award that provides for
punitive or exemplary damages’’ (emphasis omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted)).
   Although the equitable remedy of disentitlement fairly
may be characterized as a sanction, the dissent’s reli-
ance on AAA Rule R-58 (‘‘Sanctions’’) as a constraint
on the arbitrator’s authority in the present case and a
reason to vacate the award is misplaced for several
reasons. Ahmed has made no argument in his brief to
this court in reliance on this rule: his brief does not
cite Rule R-58, quote any language from Rule R-58, or
even paraphrase key language in Rule R-58. Oak, in
turn, had no reason to address in its brief, and therefore
did not address, the impact, if any, of Rule R-58 on the
arbitrator’s authority.21
  In addition to these briefing concerns, nothing in
AAA Rule R-58 expressly prohibits the arbitrator from
ordering any remedy or relief that is punitive in effect
under any circumstance other than the violation of an
order or an obligation under an AAA rule. If that were
the case, then it might be fair to conclude that the
arbitrator had exceeded his authority by disregarding
express contractual language. See, e.g., Harty v. Cantor
Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn. 99–100 (arbitrator
exceeded authority by awarding attorney’s fees when
agreement expressly prohibited ‘‘punitive damages,’’
and attorney’s fees and costs provide ‘‘the same relief
and serve the same function as would be afforded by
common-law punitive damages’’); see also Kashner
Davidson Securities Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 77–79
and n.7 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that arbitral panel’s
dismissal of appellants’ counterclaims and third-party
claims as sanction in contravention of explicit terms
of code governing securities dealers, which specified
that dismissal may occur only after lesser sanctions
have been imposed and proven ineffective, could satisfy
either manifest disregard of law or excess of authority);
A. Campbell, annot., ‘‘Construction and Application of
§ 10 (a) (4) of Federal Arbitration Act (9 USCS § 10 (a)
(4)) Providing for Vacating of Arbitration Awards Where
Arbitrators Exceed or Imperfectly Execute Powers,’’
136 A.L.R. Fed. 183, 219–20, § 2 (a) (1997) (‘‘Courts
have occasionally vacated the awards in commercial
arbitrations on the grounds that the arbitrators have
exceeded their powers in granting remedies which they
were not authorized to grant. . . . Generally, however,
the courts have been reluctant to vacate commercial
arbitration awards on this ground, especially where
there is no express restriction on the remedies an arbi-
trator is authorized to award in the arbitration agree-
ment . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.)).22
   The arbitrator also may have inferred from the broad
authority conferred under AAA Rules R-23, R-31 and R-
47 that Rule R-58 is not the exclusive source of authority
for ordering a remedy or relief that is punitive in effect
under any circumstance other than the violation of an
order or an obligation under an AAA rule. We can easily
envision circumstances in which the arbitrator would
need authority to impose sanctions for conduct that
does not violate a rule or an order (e.g., fabrication of
evidence, destruction of evidence, lying to the arbitra-
tor) to ensure the integrity of the arbitral process and
fairness to the party acting in good faith. Cf. Forsythe
International, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Texas, 915 F.2d
1017, 1023 n.8 (5th Cir. 1990) (‘‘Misconduct, even when
deemed irrelevant to the merits, may nevertheless sub-
ject offenders to other sanctions. Arbitrators may, for
example, devise appropriate sanctions for abuse of the
arbitration process.’’).
  We are of course speculating. The arbitrator was not
obligated to explain why AAA Rule R-58 did not control;
see Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1215
(2d Cir. 1972) (‘‘[a]rbitrators . . . need not give their
reasons for their results’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)); and there are various possibilities as to why
he may have determined that it did not. Without an
explicit statement in the award to the contrary, we must
assume that the arbitrator adopted any interpretation
(or misinterpretation) of the agreement that could sup-
port the award. See Kurke v. Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc.,
454 F.3d 350, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (‘‘when the arbitrators
give no explanation for their decision, as commonly
occurs in arbitration . . . [a court] must confirm the
award ‘if any justification can be gleaned from the
record’ ’’); Feibelman v. F.O., Inc., 604 A.2d 344, 345
(R.I. 1992) (‘‘when a party claims that the arbitrators
have exceeded their authority, the claimant bears the
burden of proving this contention, and every reasonable
presumption in favor of the award will be made’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). Even if we were to con-
clude that AAA Rule R-58 implicitly precluded the
disentitlement order, our disagreement with the arbitra-
tor’s interpretation of the agreement is not a basis for
concluding that he exceeded his authority.23 By conclud-
ing otherwise, the dissent not only advances arguments
not made by Ahmed, but it impermissibly treats the
present case as if we are reviewing a restricted arbitral
submission, entitling this court to order vacatur for
errors of law that do not rise to the level of manifest
disregard of the law.
                            B
   Ahmed also contends that the arbitrator failed to
provide him with a full and fair hearing in violation of
§ 52-418 (a) (3). That subdivision provides in relevant
part that an arbitration award shall be vacated ‘‘if the
arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing
to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown
or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy or of any other action by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced . . . .’’ Gen-
eral Statutes § 52-418 (a) (3). Eschewing any argument
that the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause shown, a claim Ahmed made to the trial
court, Ahmed relies on the second and third grounds
contained in subdivision (3) of § 52-418 (a). Specifically,
he contends that the arbitrator’s orders constituted a
refusal to hear any evidence and amounted to prejudi-
cial misconduct by preventing Ahmed from defending
himself, pursuing a counterclaim, and reviewing the
evidence against him. An essential premise of his claim
under § 52-418 (a) (3) is that the arbitrator could not
properly apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to
achieve this end, and, therefore, the doctrine was effec-
tively irrelevant.24 We conclude that Ahmed cannot pre-
vail on either of the misconduct grounds that he invokes.
   We begin by observing that, as previously interpreted
and applied by this court, the alleged ‘‘misconduct’’ of
the arbitrator does not fall within either ground invoked.
This court has explained that ‘‘a party challenging an
arbitration award [under § 52-418 (a) (3)] on the ground
that the arbitrator refused to receive material evidence
must prove that, by virtue of an evidentiary ruling, he
was in fact deprived of a full and fair hearing before the
arbitration panel.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) McCann v. Dept. of Environmental
Protection, supra, 288 Conn. 215; accord Bridgeport
v. Kasper Group, Inc., supra, 278 Conn. 475; O & G/
O’Connell Joint Venture v. Chase Family Ltd. Partner-
ship No. 3, 203 Conn. 133, 149, 523 A.2d 1271 (1987);
see also Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d
16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (interpreting same ground in federal
law ‘‘to mean that except where fundamental fairness
is violated, arbitration determinations will not be opened
up to evidentiary review’’ (emphasis added)). We have
characterized misconduct that the statute describes as
‘‘any other action by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced’’; General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (3); to
apply to ‘‘other varieties of procedural irregularity’’;
(emphasis in original) Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual
Assurance Co., 326 Conn. 638, 647, 165 A.3d 1228 (2017);
such as ex parte actions. See O & G/O’Connell Joint
Venture v. Chase Family Ltd. Partnership No. 3, supra,
146–47 (providing examples of impropriety satisfying
this ground, including participation in ex parte commu-
nications, ex parte receipt of evidence as to material
fact without notice to party, holding hearings or con-
ducting deliberations in absence of member of arbitra-
tion panel, and undertaking independent investigation
into material matter after close of hearings and without
notice to parties). In light of Ahmed’s own dilatory
conduct that was itself frustrating the fairness of the
proceeding, we cannot conclude that the arbitrator’s
disentitlement order in the present case implicated the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding. Our determina-
tion that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by
issuing this order inexorably leads to the conclusion
that the order cannot be characterized as a proce-
dural irregularity.
   Although there are cases in which other courts have
construed these misconduct grounds to extend to cir-
cumstances other than those this court has thus far
identified,25 we need not consider in the present case
whether we also should construe these grounds more
expansively and whether a more expansive scope of
either ground would extend to the present circum-
stances. Regardless of which misconduct ground is
invoked, to justify vacating the award on this basis,
Ahmed must establish that he was substantially preju-
diced by the arbitrator’s misconduct. See Bridgeport v.
Kasper Group, Inc., supra, 278 Conn. 476; Hartford
Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at
Lloyd’s & Cos. Collective, 121 Conn. App. 31, 59–60,
994 A.2d 262, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 918, 996 A.2d 277
(2010); Wallingford v. Wallingford Police Union Local
1570, 45 Conn. App. 432, 440, 696 A.2d 1030 (1997); see
also Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 149
(4th Cir. 1994) (‘‘the party seeking a vacation of an award
on the basis of ex parte conduct must demonstrate that
the conduct influenced the outcome of the arbitration’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1112, 115 S. Ct. 903, 130 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1995). We
conclude that Ahmed has failed to meet this burden.
   Nothing in the arbitration record indicates what evi-
dence, if any, Ahmed would have submitted had the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine not been applied, other
than the exhibits appended to his motions that the arbi-
trator considered and deemed legally insufficient. His
brief to this court identifies no evidence, documentary
or testimonial, that he had been prepared to offer if
a hearing on liability had taken place. He makes no
representation that he would have testified as to any
specific material fact that could have cast doubt on his
culpability for the acts alleged. Nor does he claim that
he had any other basis, through cross-examination or
otherwise, to impeach Oak’s allegations.
   Ahmed’s brief to this court does identify several top-
ics on which he would have offered argument or unspec-
ified evidence, but each of them relates to whether, or
to what extent, Ahmed should have to pay damages as
a consequence of his wrongful actions.26 He presumably
could have made those very arguments, however, had
he chosen to participate in the damages hearing. As
previously noted, we decline to speculate that Ahmed
would have been barred from presenting evidence or
argument at that hearing.
   A similar problem arises from Ahmed’s complaints
about the arbitrator’s order granting Oak’s request to
shield confidential documents. The arbitrator appar-
ently accepted Oak’s argument that ‘‘granting [Ahmed]
access to confidential information in this arbitration
would permit [Ahmed] to make an end run around the
protective orders currently in place [in] the [federal
action] by granting him access to the same confidential
materials he is expressly prohibited from viewing in
that matter.’’ Ahmed argues in his brief to this court
that the protective orders in that action did not bar Oak
from using its own documents and that doing so would,
in turn, trigger Ahmed’s legal right to see that evidence.
Ahmed further complains that the arbitrator gave Oak
unilateral authority to designate documents as confi-
dential, which Oak then used to shield documents that
were not subject to the federal court’s protective order
and/or did not contain confidential information. The
arbitrator found that Ahmed failed to participate in the
damages hearing, however, and there is no basis to
conclude that he could not have raised any of these
contentions at that hearing. We have already held that
we have no occasion to upset this finding or to order
that the award be vacated on this basis. Similarly, we
cannot order the award vacated on the basis of Ahmed’s
claim that the arbitrator was mistaken about the legal
effect of the protective order. Finally, insofar as Ahmed
contends that Oak’s assessment of confidentiality was
overbroad, he could have sought independent review,
just as he did in federal court. See Securities &
Exchange Commission v. Ahmed, supra, 2017 WL
3169059, *1–2.
   To avoid the previously mentioned deficiencies, Ahmed
argues that the arbitrator’s actions should be deemed
structural error, prejudicial per se, thus relieving him
of the burden of proving that he was prejudiced by
the arbitrator’s alleged misconduct.27 Ahmed has not
directed our attention to any cases in which structural
error has been applied to any ground for vacating an
arbitration award. Although it might be reasonable to
presume prejudice when a party has been deprived of
a hearing on the merits—indeed, the dissent cites case
law from other jurisdictions supporting such a proposi-
tion—the exceedingly unusual circumstances of the
present case clearly demonstrate that any such pre-
sumption easily would be overcome.
   It is important to reiterate certain facts previously
noted. The arbitrator originally had scheduled the liabil-
ity hearing to take place on July 21, 2020, the same
date on which he conducted (remotely) the damages
hearing. The morning of July 21, Ahmed claimed, via
an email purportedly sent by his attorney in India, that
he was not ‘‘able to join any hearing’’ because he was
‘‘currently quarantined in a care facility due to [a] posi-
tive [COVID-19] test with no access to computers or
devices . . . .’’ Neither Ahmed nor his representative
attended the July 21 hearing. Ahmed makes no claim
on appeal that the arbitrator improperly refused to post-
pone the hearing. Nor does he make the bizarre con-
tention that (a) he would not have claimed to be unable
to attend a July 21 hearing had the hearing proceeded
as one for liability rather than damages, or (b) he still
would have claimed to have been unable to attend but
nonetheless would have attended if the hearing was to
determine liability. In the absence of any rational basis
on which to base an assumption that Ahmed would
have attended the July 21 hearing if the disentitlement
order had not been issued, there is no basis to presume
that the disentitlement order prejudiced Ahmed.
Indeed, the AAA rules explicitly contemplate that, under
such circumstances, the matter may proceed without
a party who fails to attend. See AAA Rule R-31 (‘‘[u]nless
the law provides to the contrary, the arbitration may
proceed in the absence of any party or representative
who, after due notice, fails to be present or fails to
obtain a postponement’’).28
  In sum, Ahmed cannot satisfy § 52-418 (a) (3) unless
the arbitrator’s order constituted misconduct and
Ahmed suffered prejudice from that misconduct. Because
prejudice is not demonstrated by this record, Ahmed
cannot prevail even if the arbitrator’s application of the
fugitive disentitlement doctrine to the arbitration, or the
extent to which he applied it, constituted error.
                            C
   Ahmed also contends that the award violated the well
established public policy of fundamental fairness in
arbitral proceedings, i.e., the right to present evidence,
and the policy of upholding the integrity of the arbitra-
tion process. We disagree.
  ‘‘A challenge that an award is in contravention of public
policy is premised on the fact that the parties cannot
expect an arbitration award approving conduct which
is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial
endorsement any more than parties can expect a court
to enforce such a contract between them. . . . When
a challenge to the arbitrator’s authority is made on public
policy grounds, however, the court is not concerned
with the correctness of the arbitrator’s decision but
with the lawfulness of enforcing the award. . . . Accord-
ingly, the public policy exception to arbitral authority
should be narrowly construed and [a] court’s refusal
to enforce an arbitrator’s interpretation of [an agree-
ment] is limited to situations [in which] the contract
as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy
that is [well-defined] and dominant, and is to be ascer-
tained by reference to the laws and legal precedents
and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local
3144, 338 Conn. 154, 171–72, 257 A.3d 947 (2021). ‘‘In
determining whether an arbitral award violates a well-
defined public policy, this court has looked to a variety
of sources as embodiments of such policies: criminal
statutes . . . noncriminal statutes . . . city charters
. . . as well as the [R]ules of [P]rofessional [C]onduct
governing attorneys.’’ (Citations omitted.) AFSCME,
Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, 298 Conn.
824, 837–38, 6 A.3d 1142 (2010).
   Applying these principles to the present case, we
must presume that the arbitrator correctly interpreted
the agreement to authorize his application of the fugi-
tive disentitlement doctrine. See Marlborough v.
AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052, 309 Conn. 790,
805, 75 A.3d 15 (2013) (‘‘the sole question that the court
must decide . . . is whether, under the arbitrator’s pre-
sumptively correct interpretation of the contract, the
contract provision violates a well-defined and dominant
public policy’’ (emphasis omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Eastern Associated Coal Corp.
v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, 531
U.S. 57, 62, 121 S. Ct. 462, 148 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2000)
(when employer seeks vacatur of arbitration award on
public policy grounds, ‘‘[court] must treat the arbitra-
tor’s award as if it represented an agreement between
[the employer] and the union as to the proper meaning
of the contract’s words ‘just cause’ ’’). Ahmed therefore
must identify some source external to the agreement
embodying a clearly established public policy that is
violated by giving effect to the award.29
   Ahmed points to case law stating that parties to an
arbitration proceeding must be afforded an opportunity
to know the evidence against them and to present rele-
vant evidence in their favor. Putting aside the fact that
we have not considered statements in case law to con-
stitute the expression of a well-defined and dominant
public policy, Ahmed’s reliance is misplaced because
this case law does not hold that these rights are immuta-
ble such that no conduct could justify the impairment
or forfeiture of these rights. As we have previously
noted, the AAA sanctions rule, which the parties’ agree-
ment incorporates by reference, plainly acknowledges
the arbitrator’s authority to make orders that have such
an effect under certain circumstances. See footnote 17
of this opinion. Although neither party contends that
Ahmed’s disentitlement was a sanction governed by
this rule; see footnotes 13 and 15 of this opinion; the
AAA’s formal endorsement of sanctions belies Ahmed’s
per se policy argument.
   Insofar as Ahmed points to certain statements from
this court’s decision in Economos v. Liljedahl Bros.,
Inc., 279 Conn. 300, 306–307, 901 A.2d 1198 (2006),
which he claims recognizes a broader public policy in
‘‘upholding the integrity of the arbitration process,’’ his
reliance is misplaced for different reasons. That case
acknowledges that judicial approval of certain practices
would undermine confidence in the legitimacy of the
arbitral process. See id. Even if we assume that these
statements reflect an explicit, well-defined and domi-
nant public policy, Ahmed ignores the fact that they
simply embody the policy justifying the extraordinary
statutory grounds on which an award may be vacated.
See id. (addressing this concern in context of claim of
manifest disregard of law in violation of § 52-418 (a)
(4)); O & G/O’Connell Joint Venture v. Chase Family
Ltd. Partnership No. 3, supra, 203 Conn. 148 (addressing
this concern in context of claim of refusal to consider
pertinent and material evidence in violation of § 52-418
(a) (3)). Nothing indicates an intention to articulate a
public policy that would allow courts to vacate an award
when we presume that the arbitrator has correctly inter-
preted the parties’ agreement to authorize the relief
ordered.
                            D
  Ahmed also claims that we should vacate the award
because it violates 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a) (3) and (4) of the
FAA. He contends that vacatur is required under the
FAA because the arbitrator (1) was ‘‘guilty of miscon-
duct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy’’ and ‘‘other misbehavior by
which [his rights] have been prejudiced’’; 9 U.S.C. § 10
(a) (3) (2018); and (2) ‘‘exceeded [his] powers . . . .’’
9 U.S.C. § 10 (a) (4) (2018). We disagree.
   This court has recognized that these federal grounds
are virtually identical to those in § 52-418 (a) (3) and
(4), our statutory provisions governing the vacatur of
arbitration awards. See Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn.
1, 8 n.7, 612 A.2d 742 (1992) (§ 52-418 (a) (4)); O & G/
O’Connell Joint Venture v. Chase Family Ltd. Partner-
ship No. 3, supra, 203 Conn. 150 n.12 (§ 52-418 (a)
(3)). Ahmed has identified no case law that supports a
different interpretation of the federal provisions than
our cases have previously discussed. Cf. Tempo Shain
Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., supra, 120 F.3d 20 (interpreting 9
U.S.C. § 10 (a) (3) to mean that, ‘‘except where funda-
mental fairness is violated, arbitration determinations
will not be opened up to evidentiary review’’ (emphasis
added)). Because Ahmed’s arguments rehash the same
contentions he has asserted in support of his state law
grounds, his claims under the FAA fail for the reasons
previously articulated.
                               E
  Finally, Ahmed contends that, if this court determines
that vacatur of the award is unwarranted, we should
nevertheless issue a limited remand under General Stat-
utes § 52-419 (a) (1) so that the trial court can modify
the arbitrator’s award to prevent Oak’s ‘‘impermissible
multiple recovery’’ for the same conduct. Specifically,
he claims that the $56.6 million arbitration award ‘‘over-
laps with (1) the forfeited assets, which are worth more
than $35 million and were seized by Oak four years
before the arbitration commenced, and (2) the SEC
judgment (currently on appeal), totaling at least $64.1
million, which the SEC has represented would be given
to Oak. . . . Thus, all together, Oak stands to obtain
over $155 million—in truth, a remarkable windfall.’’
(Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Oak vigorously
contests both the facts asserted and their legal signif-
icance.
    We conclude that a remand would not be proper in
this case. Section 52-419 (a) (1) authorizes the trial
court to modify an award ‘‘[i]f there has been an evident
material miscalculation of figures . . . .’’ ‘‘In [ordinary]
English, a ‘miscalculation of figures’ refers to mathe-
matical, not legal, errors.’’ Mid Atlantic Capital Corp.
v. Bien, 956 F.3d 1182, 1191 (10th Cir. 2020); Grain v.
Trinity Health, Mercy Health Services, Inc., 551 F.3d
374, 378 (6th Cir. 2008) (‘‘ ‘an evident . . . miscalcula-
tion of figures’ concerns a computational error in determin-
ing the total amount of an award’’), cert. denied, 558
U.S. 820, 130 S. Ct. 96, 175 L. Ed. 2d 30 (2009); Apex
Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., 142 F.3d 188,
194 (4th Cir.) (‘‘[w]here no mathematical error appears
on the face of the award . . . an arbitration award will
not be altered’’ as miscalculation of figures (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 876,
119 S. Ct. 178, 142 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1998); CLP Toxicology,
Inc. v. Casla Bio Holdings, LLC, Docket No. 2018-0560-
TMR, 2019 WL 1233458, *1 (Del. Ch. February 18, 2019)
(‘‘[a]n ‘evident material miscalculation’ is one ‘of mathe-
matical or computational error,’ rather than ‘a substan-
tive conclusion of the arbitrator’ that is ‘largely based
on fact’ ’’). If a purported error exists in the present
case, it is legal in nature, not a ‘‘ ‘miscalculation.’ ’’30 See
LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322 Conn. 828, 860 n.10, 144 A.3d
373 (2016) (trial court properly modified award to cor-
rect ‘‘material miscalculations of figures and mistakes
that did not affect the merits of the controversy’’
(emphasis added)). Therefore, we decline Ahmed’s
alternative request to remand the case to the trial court.
   In closing, we acknowledge a modicum of discomfort
with the arbitrator’s failure to provide Ahmed an oppor-
tunity to respond before ruling on Oak’s motion for
disentitlement and with the aspect of that ruling barring
him from contesting Oak’s allegations.31 See Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Pharaon, 178 F.3d 1159, 1162–63
(11th Cir. 1999); see also id., 1162 (‘‘it is very different
to bar a fugitive from affirmatively seeking relief than
to bar a fugitive from defending civil claims brought
against him’’). We underscore, however, that we have
no occasion to determine whether the arbitrator’s award
and underlying rulings were legally correct or equitable.
‘‘[B]y including an arbitration clause in their contract,
the parties bargain for a decision maker [who] is not
constrained by formalistic rules governing courtroom
proceedings and dictating judicial results. . . . Put
simply, the parties bargain for the arbitrator’s indepen-
dent judgment and sense of justice . . . . [Therefore],
even if we disagree with the [arbitrator’s] reasoning
and the bases for [his] award, the award nevertheless
controls unless the [arbitrator’s] memorandum patently
shows an infidelity to [his] obligation . . . .’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) AFSCME,
Council 4, Local 1303-325 v. Westbrook, supra, 309
Conn. 780–81. On the basis of the grounds he has raised
in this appeal, we conclude that Ahmed has failed to
demonstrate that the arbitrator’s order and award mani-
fested such infidelity.
   The judgment is affirmed.
 In this opinion McDONALD, MULLINS and PRES-
COTT, Js., concurred.
   * This appeal originally was argued before a panel consisting of Chief
Justice Robinson, and Justices McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Alex-
ander. Thereafter, Judge Prescott was added to the panel. He has read the
briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument
prior to participating in this decision.
   1
     One court has described the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, also known
as the fugitive from justice rule, as follows: ‘‘The fugitive disentitlement
doctrine is an equitable doctrine that limits access to the courts by fugitives
from justice. . . . Although fugitive status does not strip the case of its
character as an adjudicable case or controversy . . . it disentitles the [fugi-
tive] to call upon the resources of the [c]ourt for determination of his claims.
. . . The fugitive disentitlement doctrine has been applied to dismiss fugi-
tives’ criminal and civil appeals, as well as fugitives’ affirmative claims
for relief.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Pharaon, 178 F.3d 1159, 1161 (11th
Cir. 1999); see also Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 214 (1st Cir. 2000) (‘‘Fugitive
disentitlement cases arise in three distinct procedural postures: [1] criminal
and civil appeals brought by the fugitive; [2] civil suits brought against the
fugitive (e.g., civil forfeitures); [3] civil suits brought by the fugitive (e.g.,
[actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983]). The [United States] Supreme Court has
considered cases in [only] the first two categories . . . .’’), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1159, 121 S. Ct. 1113, 148 L. Ed. 2d 982 (2001), and cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1159, 121 S. Ct. 1113, 148 L. Ed. 2d 982 (2001). Although the ‘‘original
reason for the fugitive dismissal rule [was] to ensure that courts don’t waste
time affirming a judgment that can’t be enforced against the absconder’’;
In re Kupperstein, 943 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2019); its purposes have evolved
to include the need to ‘‘avoid delay or prejudice to the other side, protect
the court’s ‘dignity,’ and deter flight [in future cases].’’ Id., 20. The parties
in the present case dispute the precise requirements for and limits of the
doctrine’s application. The issues raised on appeal, however, do not require
us to address those issues.
   2
     Ahmed’s appeal to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial
court was transferred to this court. See General Statutes § 51-199 (c); Prac-
tice Book § 65-1.
   3
     In the various other proceedings discussed in this opinion, Ahmed was
the defendant or the respondent. For clarity, we refer to the parties by name.
   4
     According to a copy of a document titled ‘‘Charge Sheet/Final Report,’’
dated July 5, 2018, that Ahmed submitted in the arbitration proceedings,
his arrest in India stemmed from the fact that, as an American citizen, he
was required to use his United States passport and an Indian visa to enter
that country but, instead, used his Indian passport, which had become invalid
by operation of law when Ahmed obtained United States citizenship. The
charge sheet also indicated that Ahmed had falsely reported that he lost
his United States passport and had applied for a temporary United States
passport and exit visa. It is unclear whether the arbitrator credited this
document, which does not appear to have been independently authenticated,
or when Ahmed submitted it in the proceedings. In his orders, the arbitrator
characterized some of Ahmed’s ‘‘claim’’ as to why he was unable to be
present in Connecticut in various ways that were not consistent with this
report but made no finding as to whether he credited any of these explana-
tions. Even if we assume the report’s authenticity, we note that it was issued
more than one year before the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts found that Ahmed had ‘‘refus[ed]’’ to return to Massachu-
setts and just shy of one year before Oak filed its arbitration complaint.
United States v. Ahmed, supra, 414 F. Supp. 3d 189. Ahmed submitted no
evidence regarding his inability to leave India after those events.
   5
     Ahmed was initially charged with money laundering relating to the trans-
fer of funds in connection with the civil fraud action. That indictment appar-
ently was superseded by an indictment alleging that Ahmed had committed
wire fraud and falsified tax returns in connection with the fraud alleged in
the civil fraud action.
   6
     The District Court conversely had ordered production of certain docu-
ments in the SEC’s investigative file in the civil insider trading action, in
which a protective order was a viable option because Ahmed was repre-
sented by counsel in that action and the court was able to order counsel
not to provide discovery to Ahmed, directly or indirectly. Ahmed represented
himself, however, in the civil fraud action.
   7
     Ahmed’s defenses included unclean hands and contributory negligence.
He based his counterclaims on allegations that Oak had violated his employ-
ment agreement by bringing its allegations to the SEC instead of litigating
them through arbitration, and that Oak had unlawfully seized his vested
assets that were in Oak’s possession and unlawfully withheld distributions
to him when it knew of and approved of his conduct.
   8
     Oak submitted an affidavit to the arbitrator in support of a claim that
Ahmed had misappropriated the name of an attorney in India to make it
appear as if someone other than Ahmed was sending the emails regarding
the obstacles to Ahmed’s participation.
   9
     We assume that the arbitrator was referring to the November, 2019 order
of the District Court in the criminal insider trading case. The arbitrator also
presumably referred to the other criminal indictment filed against Ahmed
shortly after he fled the United States by citing allegations that Ahmed had
engaged in money laundering and had failed to report the fraudulently
obtained money on his tax returns. See footnote 5 of this opinion.
   10
      We assume that Ahmed uses the term ‘‘due process’’ colloquially, as a
proxy for fundamental fairness. Constitutional due process rights do not
apply to a voluntary arbitration between private parties, notwithstanding
that a court confirms the award. See, e.g., MedValUSA Health Programs,
Inc. v. MemberWorks, Inc., 273 Conn. 634, 641–52, 872 A.2d 423, cert. denied
sub nom. Vertrue, Inc. v. MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc., 546 U.S. 960,
126 S. Ct. 479, 163 L. Ed. 2d 363 (2005); Schoonmaker v. Cummings &
Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., supra, 252 Conn. 427 n.5; see also Davis v.
Prudential Securities, Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 1995). Nonethe-
less, the grounds for vacating an award embody general principles of funda-
mental fairness, which sometimes are referred to as due process. See 21 R.
Lord, Williston on Contracts (4th Ed. 2001) § 57:84, pp. 491–92; see also
Kellogg v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 326 Conn. 638, 648, 165 A.3d
1228 (2017) (‘‘a challenge to an arbitration award under § 52-418 (a) (3) is
limited to whether a party was ‘deprived of a full and fair hearing before
the arbitration panel’ ’’).
   11
      Ahmed characterizes the sentence in the arbitrator’s order stating that
Ahmed, ‘‘by reason of the [common-law] doctrine of fugitive disentitlement
. . . having been previously applied, was not present and did not partici-
pate,’’ as an acknowledgment that the disentitlement order barred his partici-
pation in the damages hearing. In addition to the fact that Ahmed’s conduct
after the issuance of that order manifested a different interpretation of
the order, Ahmed does not read the sentence contextually. Immediately
preceding the sentence quoted, the order stated that Ahmed ‘‘ha[d] failed
to appear [at the damages hearing] after due notice by mail in accordance
with the [r]ules of the [AAA] . . . .’’ We are bound to give effect to both
statements and therefore interpret the latter to reflect the arbitrator’s
assumption that, because of the doctrine’s application at the liability phase,
Ahmed declined to participate in the damages hearing.
   12
      The parties’ agreement in the present case incorporates the same rule;
see AAA Rule R-31; and Ahmed does not direct us to any Delaware law that
expressly provides to the contrary.
   13
      The fact that we do not reach the question of whether the federally
created doctrine of fugitive disentitlement applies to arbitration proceedings
is not intended to suggest that we endorse the federal position as to the
application of the doctrine to judicial proceedings generally. This court
previously has applied the doctrine only in the limited context of a dismissal
of a criminal defendant’s appeal from the judgment of conviction; we have
never suggested that the doctrine applies to civil appeals or to trial proceed-
ings. See State v. Brabham, 301 Conn. 376, 381–87, 21 A.3d 800 (2011)
(extending prior case law permitting discretionary dismissal of fugitive crimi-
nal defendant’s appeal to cases in which defendant has been returned to
custody when his criminal appeal is heard but his flight has undermined
integrity, efficiency or dignity of appellate process, including potential reme-
dies in event of successful appeal).
   14
      Of course, we would never countenance or consider a claim that a trial
court’s order violated ‘‘the Practice Book’’ without the appellant’s identifica-
tion of the specific provisions implicated by the claim.
   15
      The argument section of Ahmed’s brief titled, ‘‘The Arbitrator Precluded
[Ahmed] from Defending Himself, Counterclaiming, and Seeing the Evidence
Against Him,’’ includes a footnote providing: ‘‘What’s more, the arbitrator
never even gave [Ahmed] a chance to respond to Oak’s motion requesting
disentitlement; despite setting a due date of June 8, 2020, for [Ahmed’s]
opposition, the arbitrator granted Oak’s motion on May 22, 2020.’’ Ahmed
does not raise this omission as a basis for vacatur in his brief to this court,
and we therefore do not consider whether he could have prevailed had he
done so. See footnote 31 of this opinion.
   16
      Section 5706 of title 10 of the Delaware Code provides in relevant part:
‘‘Unless otherwise provided by the agreement:
   ‘‘(1) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for the hearing and
cause notification to the parties to be served . . . . The arbitrators may
hear and determine the controversy upon the evidence produced notwith-
standing the failure of a party duly notified to appear. . . .
   ‘‘(2) The parties are entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to
the controversy and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.
. . .’’ Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 5706 (2013).
   The dissent addresses this Delaware statute in connection with its argu-
ments that the award satisfied the ground for vacatur under § 52-418 (3),
the ground we address in part II of this opinion. For the reasons contained
in part II of this opinion, this Delaware statute has no bearing on our
analysis of that ground. Insofar as the dissent appears to treat the arbitrator’s
purported violation of that statute as an independent basis to vacate the
award, there is no authority permitting vacatur on grounds other than those
prescribed by the statutes or the common law governing vacatur. Although
the arbitration was governed by Delaware law, the procedures for review
of the award and the grounds for vacatur are those provided under Connecti-
cut and federal arbitration law. Ahmed does not contend otherwise.
   17
      We note that Ahmed’s authority argument focuses only on one part of
AAA Rule R-47 (a) cited by the arbitrator—‘‘within the scope of the agree-
ment of the parties . . . .’’ Ahmed makes no claim that the ‘‘equitable’’
doctrine of fugitive disentitlement; see footnote 1 of this opinion; is not an
equitable remedy or equitable relief. Relatedly, although Ahmed mentions
in his brief to this court the United States Supreme Court’s reference to the
‘‘sanction of disentitlement’’ in his discussion of Degen v. United States,
517 U.S. 820, 828, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 135 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1996), he does not
characterize the doctrine as a sanction that would be governed by the
conditions for imposing sanctions contained in AAA Rule R-58, which we
quote in full in footnote 19 of this opinion. See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United
States, 507 U.S. 234, 246, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 122 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1993) (referring
to doctrine as sanction); Mastro v. Rigby, 764 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2014)
(same); United States v. Salcido, 475 Fed. Appx. 788, 789 (2d Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 885, 133 S. Ct. 299, 184 L. Ed. 2d 153 (2012). But see
Martin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) (characterizing
disentitlement as ‘‘ ‘tantamount to waiver or abandonment’ ’’); United States
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ahmed, supra, 2016 WL 10572640,
*1 (characterizing disentitlement as equitable remedy); United States v.
Nabepanha, 200 F.R.D. 480, 483 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (same); State v. Brabham,
301 Conn. 376, 379, 21 A.3d 800 (2011) (calling fugitive disentitlement doc-
trine common-law rule). As we explain in response to the dissent, we have
no occasion to consider whether characterizing the arbitrator’s order as a
sanction would make any difference in the present case. Cf. Seagate Technol-
ogy, LLC v. Western Digital Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 763 (Minn. 2014) (punitive
sanction can constitute remedy or relief).
   We also observe that, insofar as Ahmed’s argument focuses on the phrase,
‘‘within the scope of the [arbitration] agreement,’’ he makes no claim that
this phrase connotes that the equitable relief must be afforded in connection
with the arbitrable claims themselves and the factual allegations supporting
them, but not as relief for conduct unconnected to the merits of the claims.
Cf. USX Corp. v. West, 781 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. App. 1989) (Natural gas
buyer’s ‘‘claim for punitive damages against [the seller] arises from [the
seller’s] alleged[ly] wrongful acts in effecting a breach of the contract and
is within the scope of the contractual provision requiring arbitration; there-
fore, the issue of punitive damages is part of the ‘controversy’ before the
arbitrator. . . . [See AAA Rule R-43 (September 1, 1988) (‘[t]he arbitrator
may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable
and within the scope of the agreement of the parties . . . .]’).’’ (Citation
omitted.)).
   18
      The dissent contends that AAA Rule R-47 (a) ‘‘is concerned only with
the type of relief that the arbitrator can include in the final award’’ and
points to the fact that the cases we have cited all involve the question of
authority to award attorney’s fees or punitive damages, or to order specific
performance. Ahmed has not made this argument; see footnote 17 of this
opinion; but, in any event, AAA Rule R-47 (b) grants the arbitrator express
authority to make interim orders and interlocutory decisions, and Rule R-
47 (a) has been cited in support of such orders. See, e.g., Superadio Ltd.
Partnership v. Winstar Radio Productions, LLC, 446 Mass. 330, 337–39, 844
N.E.2d 246 (2006); id., 338 (arbitrator did not exceed authority by awarding
monetary sanction for discovery violation under rule mirroring AAA Rule
R-47 (a) and rule authorizing arbitrator to resolve discovery disputes, noting
absence of ‘‘language restricting the application of the broad remedial relief
of Rule [R-45] (a) [now Rule R-47 (a)] to final awards (and precluding the
grant of broad remedial relief to interim awards)’’); see also Clark v. Gar-
ratt & Bachand, P.C., Docket No. 344676, 2019 WL 3941493, *3 (Mich. App.
August 20, 2019) (assuming arbitrator would have authority under AAA Rule
R-47 (a) to award attorney’s fees as sanction for frivolous pleading); Minerals
Development & Supply Co. v. Superior Silica Sands, LLC, Docket No.
2012AP2328, 2013 WL 5943132, *9 (Wis. App. November 7, 2013) (decision
without published opinion, 352 Wis. 2d 246, 841 N.W.2d 580) (relying on
language of AAA Rule R-47 (a) as authority for imposing monetary sanction
against party for making frivolous arguments), review denied, 354 Wis. 2d
862, 848 N.W.2d 858, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 873, 135 S. Ct. 246, 190 L. Ed.
2d 137 (2014). But even if the dissent’s interpretation of AAA Rule R-47 (a)
were correct, under well established arbitration principles, any misinterpre-
tation by the arbitrator would not justify vacating the award.
   19
      AAA Rule R-58 provides: ‘‘(a) The arbitrator may, upon a party’s request,
order appropriate sanctions where a party fails to comply with its obligations
under these rules or with an order of the arbitrator. In the event that
the arbitrator enters a sanction that limits any party’s participation in the
arbitration or results in an adverse determination of an issue or issues, the
arbitrator shall explain that order in writing and shall require the submission
of evidence and legal argument prior to making of an award. The arbitrator
may not enter a default award as a sanction.
   ‘‘(b) The arbitrator must provide a party that is subject to a sanction
request with the opportunity to respond prior to making any determination
regarding the sanctions application.’’
   We note that, although the trial court analogized the arbitrator’s disenti-
tlement order in the present case to a default judgment rendered by a court,
Ahmed does not claim that the arbitrator rendered a default award, as
prohibited by AAA Rule R-58 (a). A default award appears to be one rendered
in the absence of evidence, whereas Oak submitted evidence to the arbitrator
in support of its recovery in the present case.
   20
      To obtain the release of frozen funds to retain arbitration counsel, the
District Court had required that Ahmed provide (1) documentation to prove
his inability to retain counsel without a release of funds from the receivership
estate, (2) the identity of legal counsel he intended to retain, and (3) an
estimate by counsel of the cost of representing Ahmed in the arbitration.
See United States Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ahmed, supra,
2020 WL 4333570, *8; see also United States Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion v. Ahmed, Docket No. 3:15cv675 (JBA), 2021 WL 877501, *2 (D. Conn.
February 5, 2021). After initially failing to satisfy these conditions in connec-
tion with his request for a release of assets to obtain arbitration counsel,
and after obtaining a waiver of fees and costs to bring the present application
to vacate the arbitrator’s award, Ahmed complied sufficiently with these
conditions, and the District Court released assets to allow him to hire counsel
to represent him in connection with proceedings to vacate the award. See
United States Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ahmed, supra, 2021
WL 877501, *2.
   21
      That the decision not to make this argument was intentional is supported
by the fact that Ahmed’s counsel did refer, briefly, to AAA Rule R-58 in
argument before the trial court after noting that the rule had been overlooked
in Ahmed’s brief to that court. Specifically, counsel wanted to ‘‘give [the
trial court] a flavor of what the body of . . . rules incorporated by the
agreement requires’’ and, before discussing AAA Rule R-47 (a), which the
arbitrator had cited, pointed out that, under ‘‘[Rule R-58], the arbitrator may
not enter a default award as a sanction. So, that’s quite plain.’’ The omission
of any argument on appeal that the arbitrator’s order exceeded his authority
under Rule R-58 suggests that counsel concluded that this rule was immate-
rial to Ahmed’s arguments to this court or that counsel declined to rely on
it to avoid a concession that Ahmed had defaulted. In any event, it is fair
to presume that this omission was purposeful. The deferential standard
under which we review arbitration awards counsels against making argu-
ments for a party seeking to vacate an award.
   22
      Cases cited by the dissent that identify circumstances in which an
arbitrator exceeded his authority are consistent with our view. None of these
cases involved an arbitrator’s (mis)interpretation of the parties’ agreement.
Instead, they involved the arbitrator’s disregard of an express, unambiguous
and, importantly, unconditional prohibition/mandate in the agreement or
his consideration of matters beyond those limited matters submitted to the
arbitrator. See, e.g., Edstrom Industries,. Inc. v. Companion Life Ins. Co.,
516 F.3d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2008) (if parties’ agreement tells arbitrator ‘‘to
apply Wisconsin law, he cannot apply New York law’’), overruled in part
on other grounds by Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008); Apache Bohai Corp. LDC v.
Texaco China BV, 480 F.3d 397, 401, 401–402 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating
that, ‘‘[i]f the contract creates a plain limitation on the authority of an
arbitrator, [a court] will vacate an award that ignores the limitation,’’ and
citing example of arbitrator ignoring contractual limitation that ‘‘the parties
shall not have a right to seek correction of the award’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)), overruled in part by Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel,
Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008); Advanced Micro
Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal. 4th 362, 381, 885 P.2d 994, 36 Cal. Rptr.
2d 581 (1994) (‘‘arbitrators may not award remedies expressly forbidden by
the arbitration agreement or submission’’); Hoso Foods, Inc. v. Columbus
Club, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 4th 881, 890–91, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 594 (2010) (‘‘the
arbitrator acted in excess of his authority because no statute authorized
the exclusion of [the] appellant’s representative and [AAA] [R]ule [R-23]
. . . expressly restricted the arbitrator’s authority to exclude a party repre-
sentative’’), review denied, California Supreme Court, Docket No. S189861
(March 23, 2011); Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Exchange v. Gavin, 416
Mich. 407, 438, 331 N.W.2d 418 (1982) (citing case in which award was
deemed in excess of authority when panel’s decision was not unanimous
and arbitration agreement stipulated that arbitration panel’s decision must
be unanimous); In re New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union,
District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 34 App. Div. 3d 1161, 1162, 824
N.Y.S.2d 800 (2006) (‘‘[t]hese clear contractual provisions [barring use of
the criminal standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary
matter] were ignored, not interpreted, by the arbitrator so [the New York]
Supreme Court did not substitute its interpretation of the contract for that
of the arbitrator [by vacating the award]’’ (citation omitted)). As we explain
in this opinion, the right to present evidence as provided under Delaware
arbitration law and the terms of the parties’ agreement is not inviolate.
   23
      Our independent research has revealed a few cases in which a court
has pointed to the absence of a provision addressing sanctions when conclud-
ing that a broad grant of arbitration authority includes authority to sanction
bad faith conduct. See, e.g., ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. of New York v. EMC
National Life Co., supra, 564 F.3d 88–89; Seagate Technology, LLC v. Western
Digital Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 761 and n.8 (Minn. 2014). We do not interpret
these cases to hold that, if a sanctions provision is included in the parties’
agreement, an arbitrator necessarily would exceed his authority by issuing
a sanction other than one specified in the sanctions provision, regardless
of whether that provision included any limiting or prohibitory language.
See ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. of New York v. EMC National Life Co., supra,
89 (‘‘[O]ur holding today should not be understood to preclude parties who
wish to limit the scope of an arbitrator’s sanction authority to exclude
attorney’s fees or arbitrator’s awards from doing so. We require only that
they explicitly and clearly state that intent as part of their agreement to
arbitrate.’’ (Emphasis added.)) The dissent’s reliance on Seagate Technol-
ogy, LLC, for a more expansive view of the law is misplaced.
   24
      Ahmed asserts that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine could not justify
the arbitrator’s deprivation of his rights because this doctrine does not apply
(1) to arbitration generally, as the purpose of the doctrine is to protect the
integrity of judicial proceedings, or (2) to the present arbitration because
it is not related to the insider trading case from which Ahmed was deemed
a fugitive, and (3) to the present case because its application was not required
by or tailored to the circumstances, as required by Degen v. United States,
517 U.S. 820, 829, 116 S. Ct. 1777, 135 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1996).
   25
      See, e.g., Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 479–80 (4th
Cir. 2012) (rejecting claim that arbitral panel’s decision not to schedule
another day of hearings at which claimant could present evidence on ques-
tion of attorney’s fees deprived claimant of fundamentally fair hearing when
claimant missed deadline for filing brief on this issue and could have argued
in brief that hearing was required); National Casualty Co. v. First State
Ins. Group, 430 F.3d 492, 498 (1st Cir. 2005) (assuming that arbitrator
misconduct as ground for vacatur was not limited to refusal to consider
evidence and extended to claim that arbitrator improperly had failed to
compel party to produce material evidence); Gulf Coast Industrial Workers
Union v. Exxon Co., USA, 70 F.3d 847, 850 (5th Cir. 1995) (arbitrator declined
to hear evidence by misleading party into thinking it did not need to present
certain evidence); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 684–85 (11th Cir.) (court
was willing to consider claim that failure to compel testimony constituted
refusal to hear evidence under 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a) (3)) (overruled in part on
other grounds by First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
115 S. Ct. 1920, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995)), cert. denied sub nom. Robbins
v. PaineWebber, Inc., 506 U.S. 870, 113 S. Ct. 201, 121 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1992);
Newark Stereotypers’ Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397
F.2d 594, 597–600 (3d Cir.) (arbitration panel’s refusal to conduct inquiry
requested by union to determine whether refusal of union’s expert witness
to continue to testify was result of employer’s intimidation, based on ruling
that entire matter was irrelevant to issues presented for arbitration, was
considered under ground of refusal to consider pertinent and material evi-
dence), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954, 89 S. Ct. 378, 21 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1968);
Prudential Securities, Inc. v. Dalton, 929 F. Supp. 1411, 1416–18 (N.D. Okla.
1996) (arbitral panel improperly declined to hear material evidence when
it granted motion to dismiss without first providing claimant opportunity
to have previously filed motion to compel production of documents decided
and to present evidence in support of claim); Cofinco, Inc. v. Bakrie &
Bros., N.V., 395 F. Supp. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (The appellate arbitration
panel improperly ruled on the merits of the issues that had not been consid-
ered in the underlying arbitration proceeding, as the parties were never
afforded the opportunity to present evidence to the appellate panel and the
appellate panel had no authority to hear evidence: ‘‘The result of the short
circuit effected on appeal was a basic species of arbitral ‘misconduct’—‘in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy . . . .’
9 U.S.C. § 10 (c) [1970]. It makes no difference that the appellate panel may
have acted only in neglectful disregard rather than by explicitly ‘refusing’
to hear the evidence. The fundamental right to be heard was grossly and
totally blocked.’’); see also Kurley Dog Investments, LLC v. Buckley, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX, 2009 WL 1424701, *2–4 (Conn. Super. April 22, 2009)
(considering arbitral panel’s order dismissing party’s claim with prejudice
as sanction for failure to comply with discovery under misconduct ground
for vacatur but concluding that order was within panel’s discretion).
   26
      In his memorandum of law in the trial court in support of his application
to vacate the arbitration award and in his brief to this court, Ahmed contends
that he ‘‘would have advanced argument and evidence that the award consti-
tuted impermissible duplicative recovery,’’ that he ‘‘would have introduced
evidence that Oak already seized the forfeited assets, valued well north of
$35 million, pursuant to the parties’ contract,’’ that he ‘‘would have presented
additional evidence of Oak’s conduct, which would have further affected
the calculation of the damages award,’’ that he would have argued that ‘‘the
bulk of the arbitration award comprises disgorgement for gross compensa-
tion paid to [him] in the amount of $33.26 million,’’ a number that is ‘‘on
its face questionable,’’ and that ‘‘evidence of [the] lawful and profitable work
he did for Oak could have further altered the award.’’
   27
      Ahmed points to the principle that ‘‘structural defects . . . defy analysis
by [harmless error] standards’’ but asserts at the same time that, even if he
is required to show that his participation might have altered the outcome
of the arbitration, ‘‘this is easily done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
   28
      Ahmed’s demonstrated intention not to participate in whatever hearing
was conducted on July 21, 2020, aligns with his conduct in the closely related
civil fraud action—Oak’s allegations were taken largely from the District
Court’s findings in that action. Ahmed asserts in his brief to this court:
‘‘Critically, the District Court [in that case] did not apply the fugitive disenti-
tlement doctrine to bar [him] from contesting the case against him, putting
in evidence, or otherwise raising affirmative defenses and counterclaims.’’
(Emphasis omitted.) Yet, even in the absence of these impediments, Ahmed
declined to testify, to offer any evidence or to advance any argument in
that proceeding to establish that he did not commit the fraudulent acts
alleged. See United States Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ahmed,
supra, 308 F. Supp. 3d 637 (noting that Ahmed made no argument in opposi-
tion to SEC’s motion for summary judgment that he did not commit alleged
fraud, instead contending primarily that he should not be held liable because
‘‘(1) certain fraudulent acts are [time barred] by the statute of limitations,
(2) the fraud was not sufficiently connected to securities transactions, and
(3) the underlying securities transactions are not sufficiently domestic to
be within the reach of the United States securities laws’’); see id., 648, 652
n.18 (noting that Ahmed had invoked fifth amendment privilege not to testify
or to respond to SEC’s allegations and discovery requests, and made only
unsubstantiated assertions); see also United States Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Ahmed, Docket No. 3:15cv675 (JBA), 2018 WL 11458925,
*2–3 (D. Conn. March 29, 2018) (citing Ahmed’s admission in civil fraud
action that his allegations that Oak’s court filings included lies and misrepre-
sentations were ‘‘unsubstantiated’’ and his justification that this omission
was due to refusal of SEC and Oak to provide him with relevant evidence).
   29
      See, e.g., Stratford v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 407, 315 Conn. 49,
50–51, 105 A.3d 148 (2014) (considering ‘‘whether an arbitration award
reinstating a police officer, as opposed to the mandated dismissal of the
officer, violated a clearly discernible public policy against intentional dishon-
esty by police officers in connection with their employment’’); AFSCME,
Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction, supra, 298 Conn. 838 (consider-
ing ‘‘whether a public policy against using an application for and admission
to [an] accelerated rehabilitation program as evidence or an admission
of misconduct is clearly discernible under [General Statutes] § 54-56e’’);
Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., supra, 252
Conn. 442–51 (considering whether rule of professional conduct reflected
clear public policy that clients have unfettered right to select counsel of
their choice and whether that public policy was violated by arbitrator’s
enforcement of forfeiture upon competition provision, which conditioned
receipt of partner’s retirement benefits on abstention from practice of law).
   30
      The District Court rejected a similar duplicative recovery argument in
the civil fraud action, stating: ‘‘Ahmed argues that the [a]mended [f]inal
[j]udgment should be amended to reduce the disgorgement award by the
amount of ‘[Ahmed’s] [nonforfeited] assets already in the hands of the
purported victim,’ Oak. . . . [Ahmed] requests that the value of those [non-
forfeited] assets be determined first and credited against disgorgement’
. . . . [Ahmed] has repeatedly raised arguments regarding the status of and
claimed need to value assets held by Oak, and the [c]ourt has repeatedly
rejected those arguments.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.); United
States Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ahmed, Docket No. 3:15cv675
(JBA), 2019 WL 4187442, *2 (D. Conn. September 4, 2019).
  31
     We recognize that whether Ahmed was improperly deprived of an oppor-
tunity to respond to Oak’s disentitlement and confidentiality motions is a
question distinct from whether he was improperly deprived of an opportunity
to participate in the proceedings as a result of the rulings on those motions.
As we previously indicated; see footnote 15 of this opinion; Ahmed did not
raise the lack of opportunity to respond in his appeal, except in peripheral
references in his appellate brief—one sentence in his recitation of facts and
a one sentence footnote. We therefore have no occasion to address whether
vacatur would be warranted on this basis. We also note that Ahmed makes
no distinction in his appeal between being disentitled from defending against
Oak’s claims versus asserting affirmative claims.