Court Opinion

ID: 9840187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 15:11:55.553711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:37.510181
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                               September 15, 2023
                                                                                  EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                              SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                   OF WEST VIRGINIA

Sharon C. Anderson,
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 22-0382 (Wood County 18-C-220)

Judy Wright and Michael Crites,
Defendants Below, Respondents

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Sharon C. Anderson appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Wood County,
entered on April 19, 2022, approving the judicial sale of real property and the distribution of the
net proceeds to the parties. 1 Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and
that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App.
P. 21.

        The parties each owned a one-third undivided interest in the real property located at 683
Wayside Farm Road in Parkersburg, West Virginia. The parties’ ownership of the real property
was subject to the interest of a life tenant who lived in the residence. After the life tenant’s death,
the parties disputed the real property’s maintenance and upkeep. Accordingly, petitioner filed a
complaint in the circuit court asking for a partition of the real property.

       Following a bench trial, the circuit court, by amended order entered on October 8, 2021,
found that the real property was not susceptible to a partition in kind and that none of the parties
were willing to purchase the real property through allotment. Accordingly, the circuit court
determined that the real property should be sold with the net proceeds distributed to the parties. In
making this determination, the circuit court found that “there exists a great deal of animosity
between [Respondent] Wright and [petitioner] and to a lesser extent between [Respondent] Crites
and [petitioner].”

      The circuit court appointed a special commissioner 2 and provided that the special
commissioner could attempt to sell the real property in a private sale before proceeding with an
       1
        Petitioner appears by Justin M. Raber. Respondents Judy Wright and Michael Crites are
each self-represented.
       2
         The circuit court entered its October 8, 2021, amended order to correct the name of the
special commissioner in its original order.

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auction of the property. Therefore, by order entered on November 19, 2021, the circuit court
authorized the special commissioner to list the real property with a realtor. The realtor
subsequently received a written bid of $70,000 for the real property, and the special commissioner
accepted it as the high bid.

         At the March 31, 2022, confirmation hearing, the special commissioner informed the
circuit court that the $70,000 bid was a commercially reasonable offer given the real property’s
appraised value of $80,000. However, the special commissioner noted that, shortly after he
accepted the $70,000 offer as the high bid, “I received a report, and I don’t know whether
[petitioner] called or how I found out, but someone said there was a higher offer that would be
made.” As the special commissioner told the bidder who made the $70,000 offer, any sale would
not become final until it was confirmed by the circuit court. Rather, the circuit court could reopen
the bidding in effort to obtain the highest bid possible for the real property. Accordingly, the circuit
court heard testimony from two witnesses presented by petitioner as to whether she made an upset
bid for the real property in the amount of $72,500. 3 When the realtor was called as a witness, she
testified that, while she received oral bids for the real property, the special commissioner accepted
only those bids made in writing. The realtor further testified that she did not recall any bid being
made by petitioner but that “somebody from the family” called her and offered to buy the property
for $72,500. Petitioner’s next witness was her husband. Petitioner’s husband testified that he
offered $72,500 for the real property but did not “make a written offer.” Rather, petitioner’s
husband “made a phone call” to the realtor who informed him that the bidding process was closed.

         Although petitioner also called Respondent Wright as a witness, Respondent Wright
testified that she did not believe that the additional $2,500 petitioner was offering for the real
property constituted a sufficient increase in the price to justify a reopening of the bidding process.
Respondent Crites did not testify, but expressed in argument his satisfaction with the $70,000 bid
accepted by the special commissioner. Thus, the circuit court (1) found that petitioner “never made
a written offer” and (2) approved the sale of the real property for the $70,000 bid accepted by the
special commissioner as commercially reasonable. Petitioner moved the circuit court to stay the
real property’s sale during the pendency of any appeal, which motion the court denied. Therefore,
the circuit court, by order entered on April 19, 2022, directed the special commissioner to sell the
real property and distribute the net proceeds to the parties. 4

       Petitioner appeals the circuit court’s April 19, 2022, order rejecting her upset bid and
approving the sale of the real property for $70,000. Regarding upset bids, we have held:

              1. Prior to confirmation, the decision whether to set aside a judicial sale and
       accept an upset bid is within the sound discretion of the circuit court.

       3
        Petitioner also introduced documentary evidence showing that she and her husband
obtained the necessary financing to make the $72,500 bid.
       4
       Petitioner states that the real property has now been sold to the bidder who made the
$70,000 offer pursuant to the circuit court’s April 19, 2022, order that is the subject of this appeal.

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               2. “‘Whether a sale of land shall be confirmed or the property again offered
       for sale, upon the filing of an upset bid, depends upon circumstances of the
       particular case, and the action of the trial court thereon will not be disturbed on
       appeal unless plainly wrong.’ Syllabus Point 2, State v. Hatfield, 136 W.Va. 342,
       67 S.E.2d 529 (1951).” Syllabus Point 1, Old Nat’l Bank of Martinsburg v.
       Hendricks, 181 W.Va. 537, 383 S.E.2d 502 (1989).

Syl. Pts. 1 & 2, Smith v. Rusmisell, 205 W. Va. 261, 517 S.E.2d 494 (1999); see also Syl. Pt. 7, in
part, Eakin v. Eakin, 83 W. Va. 512, 98 S.E. 608 (1919) (“Before confirmation the rights of the
purchaser are inchoate, and upon a showing of inadequacy of price, or upon an offer of a higher
bid, properly secured, it is discretionary with the court whether it will confirm the sale or set it
aside and direct a resale.”).

       On appeal, petitioner raises a single assignment of error: the circuit court erred in not
accepting petitioner’s purported upset bid, which she alleges was the highest bid at the March 31,
2022, confirmation hearing. 5 Respondents counter that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
in approving the $70,000 bid accepted by the special commissioner. We agree with respondents.

        Rule 52(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that,
when a court sits without a jury, “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Accordingly, based upon
our review of the March 31, 2022, hearing transcript and the other evidence in the appendix record,
we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting petitioner’s purported upset
bid. See State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995) (“An appellate
court may not decide the credibility of witnesses or weigh evidence as that is the exclusive function
and task of the trier of fact.”). Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court’s confirmation of the
sale of the real property for $70,000 was not plainly wrong.

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s April 19, 2022, order approving the
judicial sale of real property and the distribution of the net proceeds to the parties.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

       5
         To the extent that petitioner mentions issues that she does not assign as errors, we decline
to address any such issues. Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides, in pertinent part, that “[petitioner’s] brief must contain an argument exhibiting clearly
the points of fact and law presented, the standard of review applicable, and citing the authorities
relied on, under headings that correspond with the assignments of error.” See also State v. LaRock,
196 W. Va. 294, 302, 470 S.E.2d 613, 621 (1996) (“Although we liberally construe briefs in
determining issues presented for review, issues which are not raised, and those mentioned only in
passing but are not supported with pertinent authority, are not considered on appeal.”); State v.
Lilly, 194 W. Va. 595, 605 n.16, 461 S.E.2d 101, 111 n.16 (1995) (finding that cursory treatment
of an issue is insufficient to raise it on appeal).
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ISSUED: September 15, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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