Court Opinion

ID: 9734482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:36:11.840843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:48.466561
License: Public Domain

PELLEGRINI, Judge,
concurring.
While I agree with the majority that Pe-tron’s teaching certificate should be reinstated, I would not address the issue of whether he was deprived of due process when his *1095teaching certificate was suspended once he was indicted either after probable cause was found at a preliminary hearing or because he waived that hearing.
Petron was arrested on charges of simple assault and endangering the welfare of children. Because the charges were for crimes involving moral turpitude, the Department of Education (Department) filed a Notice of Charges and a motion for summary judgment with the Professional Standards and Practices Commission (Commission) seeking to suspend Petron’s teaching certificate pursuant to Section 5(a)(ll) of the Teacher Certification Law (Law).1 Under that section, the Commission has the power to suspend the teaching certificate of any professional educator indicted for a crime involving moral turpitude. Because Petron had been accepted into the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition Program (ARD Program), he responded by arguing that the charges against him had been disposed of by his acceptance into the ARD Program, and that the suspension of his teaching certificate violated his due process rights because he had been suspended without a hearing. The Department filed a motion for summary judgment which the Commission granted. Petron filed an application for reconsideration which the Commission denied, but it vacated its previous order and ordered the suspension of his teaching certification with automatic reinstatement upon his successful completion of the ARD Program. Petron then appealed to this Court arguing that because he was accepted into the ARD Program, the charges against him were postponed unless he violated a condition of that program and, therefore, his teaching certificate could not be suspended. He also argued that because Section 5(a)(ll) of the Law mandated the suspension based solely upon the indictment, it violated his due process rights by depriving of him of either a pre-or post-deprivation hearing.
Addressing the first issue, the majority disagrees with Petron and instead concludes that even while in the ARD Program, the charges against him remained pending and his suspension was proper pursuant to Section 5(a)(ll) of the Law. However, the majority then goes on to determine that Petron was improperly suspended when he was suspended pursuant to Section 5(a)(ll) without a hearing and deprived of his due process rights. I disagree with the majority that Petron’s suspension was required by Section 5(a)(ll) of the Law, and because it was not required, I would not reach the issue of Petron’s deprivation of due process rights.
Section 5(a)(ll) of the Law provides in relevant part:
(a) The ... Commission shall have the power and its duty shall be:
(11) to suspend the certificate of any professional educator indicted for a crime involving moral turpitude ... and to revoke the same upon conviction thereof...
The purpose of Section 5(a)(ll) of the Law is to protect children from the alleged perpetrator during the pendency of the litigation so as not to allow them to be subject to the crimes involved.
The majority points out that although prosecution on the charges against Petron is postponed while he participates in the ARD Program, the charges against him are not dismissed until he successfully completes the program. However, I do not believe that is the type of “indictment” envisioned by Section 5(a)(ll) of the Law because the matter, for all intents and purposes, has been resolved.
The authority for the ARD Program comes from our Supreme Court which, pursuant to its authority to supervise the trial courts, created the ARD rules in 1972 consisting of Pa.R.Crim.P. 175-186. Commonwealth v. Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 495 A.2d 928 (1985). In Lutz, our Supreme Court explained that the ARD Program:
is a pretrial disposition of certain eases, in which the attorney for the Commonwealth agrees to suspend prosecution for an agreed upon period of time in exchange for the defendant’s successful participation in a rehabilitation program, the content of which is to be determined by the court and applicable statutes.
*1096Under the ARD rules ... the district attorney has the discretion to refuse to submit a case for ARD, and if the case is submitted for ARD, the court-must approve the defendant’s admission. These rules ... also provide that the defendant must agree to the terms of the ARD, and that after he has completed the program successfully, the charges against him will be dismissed, upon order of court. If he does not complete the ARD successfully, he may be prosecuted for the offense with which he was charged. The district attorney’s utilization of ARD is optional under the rules.
Id. at 303, 495 A.2d at 931. The purpose of participation in the ARD Program was previously explained by our Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Krall, 290 Pa.Super. 1, 434 A.2d 99 (1981), when it stated:
[T]he thrust of the A.R.D. Program is to enable a defendant, before he has been convicted of a crime, to enter into a program which hopefully will result in his rehabilitation without the necessity of trial and conviction. If the program does not succeed the Commonwealth may then proceed on the charges. In effect, admission into the A.R.D. Program places the criminal proceedings in abeyance, subject to being reactivated under certain conditions.
Id. 434 A.2d at 100-101. Essentially, the ARD Program is utilized to resolve cases without having additional court proceedings, but that is not to say that there is no judicial resolution of a case. When an individual participates in an ARD Program, the matter is resolved one way or the other — either the individual successfully completes the program and the charges are dropped, or he doesn’t and there is a subsequent conviction. While technically, there is still an outstanding indictment during this process, as a practical matter, it is “deactivated” while a person is in th'e ARD Program. As a result, it is not the type of active indictment that the General Assembly meant in Section 5(a)(ll) of the Law because there is nothing further that the court has to do at that time. If a local school district believes that a teacher’s conduct warrants disciplinary action, nothing precludes it from taking such action as it deems appropriate, including removal, but once ARD is entered into, the 5(a)(ll) automatic suspension no longer applies.
Because we can resolve this case on a non-constitutional basis, I would not address the due process issue.2

. Act of December 12, 1973, P.L. 397, as amended, 24 P.S. § 2070.5(a)(11).

. For resolution of the due process issue, see Slater v. Pennsylvania Department of Education, 725 A.2d 1248 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999).