Court Opinion

ID: 9384043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 17:02:37.033718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.936349
License: Public Domain

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                          303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
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            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

ADAM PHILLIP IVES,
                                                     Court of Appeals No. A-13900
                           Petitioner,             Trial Court No. 3AN-21-06756 CR

                    v.
                                                              OPINION
STATE OF ALASKA,

                           Respondent.                No. 2742 — March 31, 2023

             Petition for Review from the District Court, Third Judicial
             District, Anchorage, David Nesbett, Judge.

             Appearances: Tristan Bordon, Assistant Public Defender, and
             Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
             Petitioner. Heather Stenson, Assistant Attorney General, Office
             of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney
             General, Juneau, for the Respondent.

             Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison,
             Judges.

             Judge HARBISON.

             On January 15, 2020, Adam Phillip Ives was arrested on a fugitive from
justice warrant based on information that he had committed a crime in the state of
Washington and had fled to Alaska.1 The case was dismissed ninety-one days later,
when Washington failed to secure a governor’s warrant. But in September 2021, Ives
was again arrested and charged with being a fugitive based on the same Washington
arrest warrant. The district court found that Ives’s first case had no bearing on whether
he could be committed in the second fugitive case, and the court ordered Ives to post
bond in order to be released from custody.
              Ives filed a bail appeal, arguing that the bail set by the district court was
excessive. Ives also argued that AS 12.70.140 and AS 12.70.160 limit an accused
person’s detention without a governor’s warrant to a single ninety-day period at most,
not renewable ninety-day periods accomplished by re-arresting and re-charging a
previously discharged prisoner.
              While Ives’s bail appeal was pending before this Court, the district court
reduced Ives’s bail and Ives was released from custody. We declined to exercise our
discretion to review the district court’s bail order.
              However, we recognized that Ives’s appeal raised an important question of
law that justified immediate review: whether the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
(UCEA) authorizes the commitment of a defendant on a fugitive from justice warrant
after the defendant was previously committed for ninety days based on the same
allegation.2 We accordingly converted the bail appeal into a petition for review and
accepted the petition in order to address this question.3 Approximately two months after

   1
      See AS 12.70.120 (authorizing the issuance of an Alaska arrest warrant for a fugitive
from another state).
   2
       Alaska R. App. P. 402(b)(4).
   3
       Ives v. State, 2021 WL 4963601 (Alaska App. Oct. 22, 2021) (unpublished bail order).

                                           –2–                                        2742
we granted Ives’s petition, before the briefing was complete, a governor’s warrant was
issued and Ives was extradited to Washington.
              Although Ives’s case is moot because he was extradited to Washington
while this petition was pending,4 we have determined that his case raises an important
question of law that is capable of repetition but evading review.5 For the reasons
explained in this opinion, we conclude that, under Alaska law, a fugitive from justice
may be committed without a governor’s warrant for a maximum of a single ninety-day
period and that such a “commitment” includes both incarceration and bail restraint.

       The extradition procedure set out by Alaska’s UCEA
              Under the extradition clause of the United States Constitution, when a state
locates a fugitive from justice within its jurisdiction, the locating state must deliver the
fugitive to the state from which the fugitive fled upon request of the executive authority
of the requisitioning state.6 Alaska, like a majority of other states, has adopted the
UCEA, which sets out a mechanism by which states may comply with this constitutional
mandate.
              The UCEA is codified in Alaska as AS 12.70.010 through AS 12.70.290.
Under these statutes, a fugitive from justice may be arrested and detained in Alaska
based on information from the requisitioning state that the fugitive has been charged with

   4
      See Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass’n, Loc. 1324 v. Fairbanks, 48 P.3d 1165, 1167
(Alaska 2002) (explaining that a claim is moot if it no longer presents a live controversy).
   5
       State v. Roberts, 999 P.2d 151, 153 (Alaska App. 2000) (holding that, under the public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine, a court may resolve an otherwise moot issue
“when the issue is one of public interest which is capable of repetition and may repeatedly
circumvent review”).
   6
       U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.

                                           –3–                                          2742
a crime, has escaped, or has broken the terms of bail, probation, or parole.7 The warrant
used to effectuate the fugitive’s initial arrest is known as a “fugitive warrant.”8 But the
fugitive cannot be extradited to the requisitioning state until that state formally submits
a demand to the governor of Alaska, and the governor of Alaska signs a warrant of
arrest.9 This warrant is commonly referred to as a “governor’s warrant.”10
              Because a fugitive may not be released to the requisitioning state until a
governor’s warrant has been issued and served, there is necessarily a lapse in time
between when a fugitive is arrested on a fugitive warrant and when the fugitive may
lawfully be released to a representative of the requisitioning state for extradition. The
UCEA thus requires that, upon arrest, the fugitive must be committed “to jail” for a
period of up to thirty days during which the requisitioning state may perfect the process
for securing a governor’s warrant.11 This commitment may be extended for, at most, an
additional sixty days if the requisitioning state has been unable to obtain a governor’s
warrant within the initial thirty-day period.12 Under the UCEA a fugitive is entitled to

   7
        AS 12.70.120; see also Ford v. Moses, 606 P.2d 795, 795 (Alaska 1980). Under
Alaska law, a fugitive from justice is defined as “a person who, having committed or been
charged with a crime in one state, has left its jurisdiction and is found within the territory of
another when it is sought to subject him to the criminal process of the former state.” Brown
v. State, 518 P.2d 770, 773 (Alaska 1974).
   8
       See Laverty v. State, 963 P.2d 1076, 1077-78 (Alaska App. 1998). Alaska Statute
12.70.130 also authorizes the warrantless arrest of a fugitive in limited circumstances not
applicable to Ives’s appeal.
   9
        AS 12.70.020-.070.
   10
        See Ford, 606 P.2d at 796.
   11
        AS 12.70.140.
   12
        AS 12.70.160.

                                             –4–                                            2742
be released on bail during this period, unless the underlying offense of extradition is a
capital crime.13

        The UCEA allows the court to commit a defendant for a single maximum
        period of ninety days prior to the service of a governor’s warrant
              In his petition, Ives contends that the UCEA only allows for a single
commitment of up to ninety days pending the service of a governor’s warrant.
According to Ives, once that period has been exhausted, a fugitive may not be re-arrested
for the same out-of-state conduct unless the requisitioning state has obtained a
governor’s warrant. Ives notes that to allow otherwise would permit a fugitive to be
subjected to potentially “indefinite detention via a continuous cycle of catch-and­
release,” effectively circumventing the statutory time-frame established by
AS 12.70.140 through AS 12.70.160.
              The State agrees with Ives, and we conclude that the State’s concession is
well-founded.14
              When interpreting a statute, Alaska’s courts employ a “sliding scale”
analysis under which a court considers the legislature’s intent as well as the language of
the statute itself.15 In accordance with this principle, we first consider the UCEA’s plain
language, and we conclude that the meaning of the statutory language is clear. It
provides for an initial thirty-day confinement period pending service of a governor’s

   13
        AS 12.70.150.
   14
      See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (requiring an appellate court to
independently evaluate any concession of error by the State in a criminal case).
   15
      See, e.g., State v. Fyfe, 370 P.3d 1092, 1094-95 (Alaska 2016); Anchorage v. Beezley,
435 P.3d 978, 981 (Alaska App. 2018).

                                           –5–                                        2742
warrant, which may be extended for an additional sixty days, but it does not authorize
any further extensions.16
              Furthermore, legislative intent supports this interpretation. When the
legislature adopted the UCEA, it explicitly stated that the act should be “so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate the general purposes to make uniform the law of those
states that enact it.”17 Thus, we must interpret the language of the act as consistently as
possible with the courts of other adopting jurisdictions.18         And all of the other
jurisdictions to have considered this question agree that the act allows only for a single
commitment of no more than ninety days prior to the service of a governor’s warrant.
              For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that “the outer
limit of time for which a demanded person may be held in custody pending issuance and
service of a governor’s rendition warrant is the 90-day limit (initial 30 days, plus further
60 days) mandated by the UCEA.”19 The West Virginia Supreme Court has similarly
held that “a defendant incarcerated under a fugitive warrant . . . may not be held solely
on that warrant for a period exceeding the aggregate of ninety days.”20 Courts in

   16
        AS 12.70.140, .160.
   17
        AS 12.70.270.
   18
      See Evans v. State, 820 P.2d 1098, 1100 n.2 (Alaska App. 1991); Laverty v. State, 963
P.2d 1076, 1079 n.8 (Alaska App. 1998).
   19
        State v. Phillips, 587 N.W.2d 29, 36 (Minn. 1998).
   20
        State ex rel. Games-Neely v. Sanders, 641 S.E.2d 153, 159 (W. Va. 2006).

                                           –6–                                         2742
Florida,21 Montana,22 Nebraska,23 New York,24 Ohio,25 Oklahoma,26 Pennsylvania,27
Texas,28 Vermont,29 and Wisconsin30 have all similarly concluded that the ninety days
prescribed by the UCEA is the outer limit of a state’s authority to hold a fugitive pending
the issuance of a governor’s warrant.31

   21
        Orton v. State, 431 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. Dist. App. 1983).
   22
        State v. Holliman, 805 P.2d 52, 53-54 (Mont. 1991).
   23
        Bell v. Janing, 199 N.W.2d 24, 25 (Neb. 1972).
   24
        People ex rel. Brandolino v. Hastings, 421 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
   25
        State v. Haynes, 456 N.E.2d 1279, 1283-84 (Ohio App. 1982).
   26
        Carter v. State, 708 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Okla. 1985).
   27
        Commonwealth ex. rel. Coffman v. Aytch, 361 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa. Super. 1976).
   28
        Lanz v. State, 815 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. App. 1991).
   29
        In re Hval, 537 A.2d 135, 139 (Vt. 1987).
   30
        State ex rel. Lykins v. Steinhorst, 541 N.W.2d 234, 238, 240 (Wis. App. 1995).
   31
        The ninety-day statutory time limit is tolled for periods where the fugitive’s
confinement is justified by charges pending in Alaska. See Paley v. Bieluch, 785 So. 2d 692,
695 (Fla. Dist. App. 2001) (“Petitioner’s allegations indicate that for most of the time in
question, he was held on local charges as well as the fugitive warrant. There is no indication
that he has been held in excess of the statutory period solely on the fugitive warrant.”); In re
Lane, 845 P.2d 708, 710 (Kan. App. 1992) (“[T]he district court did not err in allowing Lane
to be detained for more than 90 days because the filing of the local charges tolled the running
of the 90-day period for so long as he was held on those charges.”); State ex rel. Ehlers v.
Endicott, 523 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Wis. App. 1994) (“[T]he thirty-day and optional sixty-day
extension periods for detention only pertain to those fugitives who are not already in custody
pending other charges or serving other sentences. Ehlers was already incarcerated, serving
a sentence for the conviction of another crime, and therefore the time limits are inapplicable.”
(citation omitted)).

                                             –7–                                           2742
              We accordingly join these courts in concluding that, under the UCEA, a
fugitive may not be committed for a period of time greater than ninety days while
awaiting the issuance and service of a governor’s warrant. We also conclude that, once
the initial commitment has expired, the fugitive may not again be committed based on
the same out-of-state conduct, except upon the service of a governor’s warrant.

        A fugitive is committed for purposes of Alaska’s UCEA if they are
        physically incarcerated or if they are restrained on bail or bond
              Given that the UCEA allows for only a maximum period of ninety days of
“commitment” prior to the service of a governor’s warrant, the next question raised by
this case is whether “commitment” refers to both incarceration and release on bail, or
only to incarceration.
              Alaska Statute 12.70.140 provides that a fugitive arrested on an out-of-state
warrant in Alaska shall be committed “to jail for not more than 30 days . . . unless the
accused gives bail . . . or until legally discharged.” But under AS 12.70.150, a fugitive
from justice shall be released on bail during this period unless the underlying crime of
extradition is a capital offense. Furthermore, if the requisitioning state does not obtain
a governor’s warrant within the initial thirty-day period, the court “may discharge the
accused or may recommit the accused for a further period of not more than 60 days, or
. . . may again take bail . . . but within a period of not more than 60 days after the date
of the new bond or undertaking.”32
              In the briefs submitted to this Court, Ives contends, and the State agrees,
that these and other references to “commitment” in the UCEA refer both to incarceration
and to bail release. We conclude that the State’s concession is again well-founded.

   32
        AS 12.70.160.

                                           –8–                                        2742
              As the State points out, when AS 12.70.140 is read in isolation, it could
suggest that the thirty-day limit on commitment is only applicable if the fugitive is in jail,
but not if they have been released on bail. However, when we engage in statutory
construction, we must, whenever possible, “interpret[] each part or section of a statute
with every other part or section, so as to create a harmonious whole.”33 And as the State
acknowledges, when AS 12.70.140 is read in conjunction with the following two
provisions of the statute, the more compelling interpretation is that the statutory time
frame (the mandatory thirty-day commitment and the discretionary sixty-day extension)
applies regardless of whether the fugitive is incarcerated or released on bail.
              This is also the approach taken by the overwhelming majority of other
UCEA jurisdictions.34 Indeed, we have found only a single case to the contrary.35

   33
        Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 761 (Alaska 1999).
   34
        See, e.g., Orton v. State, 431 So.2d 236, 237 (Fla. App. 1983) (holding that UCEA
requires discharge of the accused “from custody or bond” after the expiration of the
aggregate ninety-day statutory time period); Stynchcombe v. Whitley, 242 S.E.2d 720, 721
(Ga. 1978) (“If the warrant is not executed during the 90-day maximum detention period, the
accused is clearly entitled to be discharged from jail or bail.”); State v. Phillips, 587 N.W.2d
29, 34, 36 (Minn. 1998) (“Under the clear language of the UCEA and the facts of this case,
the district court was without the authority to hold Phillips in custody and to continue his
bond beyond 90 days from his . . . arraignment. . . . . Demanded persons have the right . . .
to be confined for only reasonable periods of time, be it through incarceration or bail.”); In
re Colasanti, 249 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1969) (“The sections only limit the time
during which one arrested as a fugitive may be kept in jail (or on bail in lieu thereof) pending
the completion of extradition proceedings and the issuance of the governor’s arrest
warrant.”); Carter v. State, 708 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Okla. 1985) (same); Lanz v. State, 815
S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. App. 1991) (“[Texas’s UCEA] outlines the procedure to be utilized
in the issuance of a fugitive warrant and provides that an individual arrested pursuant to such
a warrant shall not be committed or held to bail for a longer time than ninety days.”).
   35
        People v. Williams, 391 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (N.Y. Crim. 1977) (“[The dictionary]
                                                                         (continued...)

                                             –9–                                           2742
             Because the legislature’s express intent in adopting the UCEA was that the
law should be interpreted as consistently as possible with other jurisdictions, we give
significant weight to the near-unanimity of the approach taken by other jurisdictions.
Given that this approach is in accord with our interpretation of the statute’s plain
language, we now hold that “commitment” for purposes of the UCEA refers to both
incarceration and constraint on bail.

        Conclusion
             For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that, under the
UCEA, any commitment to await the issuance and service of a governor’s warrant is
limited to a single period of up to ninety days. We also conclude that commitment
includes both incarceration and release on bail or bond.

   35
       (...continued)
defines ‘commitment’ as a ‘consignment to a penal or mental institution.’”). Contra, e.g.,
Jones v. People, 404 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526 (N.Y. Cnty. 1978) (“It is apparent that this 90 day
limit would be the maximum time that the fugitive could be detained or held on bail.”).

                                         – 10 –                                      2742