Court Opinion

ID: 9387696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 18:02:32.534612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.992462
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/18/23 Marriage of Ghazaryan CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

In re Marriage of SAMVEL and                                B321151
SIRANUYSH GHAZARYAN.
                                                            (Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. No. VD087018)

SAMVEL GHAZARYAN,

         Appellant,

         v.

SIRANUYSH GHAZARYAN,

         Respondent.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Maria Puente-Porras, Judge. Affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

         Decker Law and James D. Decker for Appellant.
     Law Offices of Varoujan Agemian, Varoujan Agemian and
Anahid Agemian for Respondent.
                 ______________________________

       In this marital dissolution case, appellant Samvel
Ghazaryan (Samvel)1 appeals from the trial court’s March 16,
2022, postjudgment order dividing the proceeds from the sale of
the community home. Samvel contends that (1) the court erred
in determining that a $35,000 mechanics lien was his separate
debt rather than a community liability; and (2) the accounting
report relied upon by the court contained errors regarding cash
outs Samvel received from refinances of the community home,
leading to an improper division of the proceeds from its sale. We
reject Samvel’s first contention but find merit in the second.
                          BACKGROUND
The Marriage
       Samvel and respondent Siranuysh Ghazaryan (Siranuysh)
were married in 2008 and separated in 2015. They had two
children, who are still minors.
Judgment of Marital Dissolution
       The trial court entered a judgment of marital dissolution on
November 19, 2019 (the judgment), which incorporated the
parties’ settlement agreement.
       According to the judgment, certain real property located on
Colima Road in Whittier (the Colima property) was community

1     Because the parties to this appeal share the same last
name, we refer to them by their first names for ease of
identification. No disrespect is intended.

                                2
property, with Samvel and Siranuysh each taking a one-half
interest subject to certain conditions. Among those conditions,
Samvel was entitled to a credit of $54,795 for the down payment;
Samvel was prohibited from “further encumber[ing] the property,
including adding any additional amounts to the current
mortgage”; and, absent an equalization payment from Samvel to
Siranuysh, the Colima property was to be sold. Upon the sale of
the Colima property, the judgment provided that “after payment
of broker’s commissions, encumbrances, and other costs of sale,
the net proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties
except that any lien or encumbrance incurred by either party
alone, which is not a community obligation, shall be charged only
to that party’s share of the proceeds.”
      The judgment entitled Samvel to the exclusive use and
possession of the Colima property until its sale. Samvel was
required to pay “all costs of ordinary maintenance and repair of
the property.” As for “[e]xtraordinary maintenance and repair,”
the judgment provided that the costs “may be shared between the
parties only with the written consent of the other party or further
court order.”
Mechanics Lien
      On March 15, 2020, the CEO of NH Management Inc. (NH
Management) executed a claim of mechanics lien against the
Colima property for $35,415 plus interest for “emergency water
restoration and repairs.”2
July 2020 Refinance
      Samvel refinanced the Colima property in July 2020
(July 2020 refinance). As part of that refinance, NH

2     The record does not disclose if the mechanics lien was ever
recorded.

                                 3
Management was paid $35,000. Samvel received a $61,143.92
cash out.
Order to Sell the Colima Property
       In November 2020, Siranuysh filed a request for order
(RFO) “[t]o enforce [the] [j]udgment . . . by [o]rdering the sale of
real property, accounting, and distribution of proceeds.”
       Following a hearing in June 2021, the trial court ordered
the Colima property to be sold. The court ordered that Samvel
was to receive a $55,500.91 credit, and that all proceeds from the
sale were to be held by the escrow company or in a joint trust
account until the distribution of the funds was determined by
written agreement of the parties or by court order.
       The trial court also found “that the parties ha[d] already
agreed to the joint retention of an accountant, . . . Mark
Falkenhagen [(Falkenhagen)], to assist the parties and the
[c]ourt with respect to the accounting as necessary.”
July 2021 Refinance
       Samvel refinanced the Colima property again in July 2021
(July 2021 refinance). This time, he received $104,090.57 in
cash.
Samvel’s RFO
       In August 2021, Samvel filed an RFO seeking, inter alia,
the “determination” of the mechanics lien and reimbursement for
child support and a $55,500 equalization payment given to
Siranuysh. In an accompanying declaration, Samvel stated:
       “In the judgment, I was ordered to preserve the family
residence. I was having trouble with the shower handle in the
bathroom, having to use a pair of pliers for a while, until [I]
called a plumber to fix the problem. The plumber had to cut into
the drywall from the opposite side of the shower wall from the

                                 4
kitchen side. After cutting the wall, the plumber gave me an
estimate of between $1250 to $1500 to fix the problem, which was
too expensive for me. Because a portion of the drywall was
already cut, I decided to fix the problem my[]self. I had done
simple plumbing jobs around the house before and I went to
Home Depot to get the parts I needed to do the repair and started
repairing the bathroom, after shutting off the water. It was a
difficult job and I couldn’t finish the job in one day. Although I
thought the work I did was tempora[r]y and would hold, I turned
the water back on[] and I would finish the job the next day. The
pipe was leaking, but not too much and I put a plastic container
in the wall to collect the leaking water. During the night, the
water leak had increased and the house became flooded. [¶] . . .
[¶] In the morning I shut off the water supply and got the
number for NH Management, . . . who came to the house to fix
everything, which cost $35,000.”
Sale of the Colima Property
       The parties sold the Colima property in October 2021 for
$600,000.
Siranuysh’s Response to Samvel’s RFO; Samvel’s Reply
       In November 2021, Siranuysh filed a declaration in
response to Samvel’s RFO. Siranuysh contended that the
$35,000 mechanics lien was “another tactic by . . . [Samvel] to
shortchange [her] share in the property proceeds.” According to
Siranuysh, NH Management was a suspended corporation at the
time of the alleged water restoration services in 2020.
       Siranuysh’s counsel filed a declaration with an attached
accounting report prepared by Falkenhagen, the accountant
retained jointly by the parties.

                                5
       In his reply, Samvel submitted a supplemental declaration
in which he stated that at the time he hired NH Management he
did not know that its license had been suspended. He contended
that “[t]he repairs were legitimate and the costs were real.”
Hearing
       The hearing on Samvel’s RFO was held on February 16,
2022. In addition to the specific issues raised in the RFO, the
trial court received evidence and considered the broader issue of
the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the Colima
property.
       Falkenhagen testified as an expert accountant, explaining
the methodology underlying his accounting report and his
conclusions regarding the proper distribution of the sale
proceeds. This included allocating between the parties various
expenses related to the refinances of the Colima property. In
Falkenhagen’s opinion, Samvel was entitled to $42,038.75 and
Siranuysh was entitled to $138,304.60.
       Samvel also testified. He stated that, in 2020, a bathroom
pipe began to leak at the Colima property. Unable to fix it
himself, he called a plumber. The plumber provided an estimate
that “was very expensive”; Samvel thus “refuse[d] his service.”
Samvel eventually called NH Management to repair the property,
which cost over $35,000. A mechanics lien was placed on the
property after Samvel “refused to pay” NH Management. Samvel
did not recall having any invoices or receipts from NH
Management or taking any photos from before or after the work
was performed.
       Following Samvel’s testimony, the trial court stated:
“[T]his very articulate, thoughtful, detail-oriented individual
would like this court to believe that some 35,000-dollar

                               6
mechanic’s lien is warranted to be community debt given that he
has nothing to support it. I got to tell you I’m not buying that.
So at this point in time, the court’s tentative is not to make that
community property. And if in fact those damages did occur, he
was the user of the house. He’s responsible for them. But I don’t
believe that those things occurred.”
       Later in the hearing, the trial court reiterated its position
regarding the mechanics lien. “The court remains in the same
mind-set that the mechanic’s lien is definitely not community
property. The court has zero, other than the petitioner’s
testimony, zero evidence that would give it any kind of
opportunity to consider that this is something other than a bill.
And the court has already articulated the petitioner’s credibility
is quite suspect given that again he was very articulate in
everything else and to have nothing in court today, to have not
taken any photographs, to have not memorialized that troubling
situation where he contended that this pipe burst in the middle of
the night—in fact I remember reading the declaration that he
tried to fix it and then he realized he couldn’t fix it—and nothing
to support this. Nothing. And he carries the burden to prove
that that is exactly what happened.”
       The trial court also explained why it would make some
adjustments to Falkenhagen’s calculations to account for closing
cost credits received in connection with the July 2021 refinance,
attorney fees, and accountant fees.
       Throughout the hearing, Samvel contended that
Falkenhagen’s accounting report did not accurately reflect his
refinance cash outs.

                                 7
Findings and Order After Hearing
       In the findings and order after hearing filed on March 16,
2022, the trial court distributed the remaining proceeds of
$176,041.41 from the sale of the Colima property, with
$45,252.01 going to Samvel, $130,789.40 going to Siranuysh, and
$3,000 going to Siranuysh’s attorney from Samvel’s share.
Appeal
       Samvel filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s
March 16, 2022, order.
                            DISCUSSION
I. Standards of Review
       A trial court’s characterization of property as either
community or separate is a factual finding that we review for
substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Campi (2013)
212 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1572.) “[T]he court has broad discretion to
determine the manner in which community property is divided
and the responsibility to fix the value of assets and liabilities in
order to accomplish an equal division. [Citations.] The trial
court’s determination of the value of a particular asset is a
factual one and as long as that determination is within the range
of the evidence presented, we will uphold it on appeal.
[Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th
617, 631–632.)
       But where “‘“the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof
at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the
evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of
law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’
and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a

                                 8
finding.’”’ [Citations.]” (SwiftAir, LLC v. Southwest Airlines Co.
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 46, 59 (SwiftAir).)
       This case also requires us to interpret the terms of the
judgment, which incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement.
We do so de novo. (In re Marriage of Belthius (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 1, 9 [appellate court construes de novo the terms
of a stipulated judgment of marital dissolution not involving
extrinsic evidence].) “Marital settlement agreements
incorporated into a dissolution judgment are construed under the
statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts
generally. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Iberti (1997)
55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439.) “When the language of the judgment
incorporating the marital settlement agreement is clear, explicit,
and unequivocal, and there is no ambiguity, the court will enforce
the express language. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
II. Characterization of Mechanics Lien
       Samvel challenges the trial court’s conclusion that NH
Management’s $35,000 mechanics lien was his separate debt
rather than a community liability. He contends that the debt
incurred was necessary to preserve the Colima property as a
community asset and, therefore, the debt should be borne by the
community.
       Under the judgment, Samvel had exclusive use and
possession of the Colima property until its sale. While Samvel
was required to pay “all costs of ordinary maintenance and repair
of the property[,]” the judgment provided that costs of
“[e]xtraordinary maintenance and repair may be shared between
the parties only with the written consent of the other party or
further court order” (italics added). Samvel does not contend that
Siranuysh ever consented to share the costs of NH Management’s

                                9
work. Thus, under the plain language of the judgment, the lien
could only be attributed to the community if it was for
“[e]xtraordinary maintenance and repair” and so ordered by the
trial court.
       Based on Samvel’s declaration and live testimony, the trial
court made a credibility finding that Samvel’s account of the
circumstances of the mechanics lien was untrue. The court did
not “believe that those things occurred.” We must defer to that
determination. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403 [“it is
the exclusive province of the . . . [factfinder] to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon
which a determination depends”].) The court implicitly found a
lack of evidence that the lien was for services constituting
“[e]xtraordinary maintenance and repair” that could be shared by
the community.
       Apart from Samvel’s testimony, which the trial court
explicitly rejected, the only evidence presented by Samvel to
support his claim that the community should be responsible for
the debt to NH Management was the mechanics lien itself, which
only described the associated services as “emergency water
restoration and repairs.” Given the evidence that NH
Management was a suspended corporation at the time of its
alleged services in 2020, the court was entitled to discount this
cursory characterization. With no evidence compelling a finding
that the lien constituted a legitimate debt attributable to the
community as a matter of law (see SwiftAir, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 59), the court did not err in finding that it
was Samvel’s personal debt.
       Our conclusion is unaffected by In re Marriage of Reilley
(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1119 (Reilley), a case upon which Samvel

                                10
relies heavily. In Reilley, a husband used his separate earnings
to remodel a community property while he and his wife were
separated. (Id. at p. 1121.) In the judgment of marital
dissolution, the trial court ordered that the husband be
reimbursed for the entire amount he had separately expended to
improve the property. (Id. at p. 1122.) The Court of Appeal
agreed that the husband was entitled to reimbursement but
concluded that the proper amount of reimbursement was not
necessarily the entire amount he had paid. (Id. at p. 1123.)
       Samvel argues that if the “discretionary remodel work
warranted reimbursement in Reilley, then certainly Samvel’s
necessary plumbing repairs” should too. The premise of this
argument is flawed, as the trial court rejected Samvel’s version of
events and nothing in the record compels a finding that the
repairs were necessary to preserve the community asset.
       Moreover, the circumstances in Reilley are markedly
different than those of the instant case. Among other things, in
Reilley, there was no evidence that reimbursement from the
community had been discussed before the renovations
commenced. (Reilley, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1121.) Here,
the judgment, which predated the mechanics lien, specified that
Samvel was required to pay for ordinary maintenance and repair
of the Colima property and merely permitted the sharing of costs
for extraordinary maintenance and repair.
III. Distribution of Sale Proceeds
       Samvel also argues that Falkenhagen’s accounting report
contained errors, which were ultimately used by the trial court to
order an improper division of the proceeds from the sale of the

                                11
Colima property.3 Samvel disputes the reduction of his share by
$37,608.31, caused by erroneously including a deduction of
$98,732.62 for the cash out from an “August 2021 Refinance”
while erroneously excluding the $61,124.31 cash out he received
from the July 2020 refinance.4
      Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we agree with
Samvel that irreconcilable errors relating to the refinance cash
outs appear in the accounting report. No refinance occurred in
August 2021, and the evidence does not support an inference that
Falkenhagen actually meant to refer to the July 2020 or July
2021 refinances. A deduction for the July 2021 refinance cash
out already appears in the report (albeit erroneously labeled as
being for the July 2020 refinance)5 in the amount of $104,224.38.6

3       The trial court did not adopt Falkenhagen’s calculations in
full, instead making some adjustments to account for closing cost
credits and professional fees. These deviations are not at issue
here.
4     According to the closing disclosure from the July 2020
refinance, Samvel received $61,143.92 in cash. The estimated
closing statement for that refinance indicated that Samvel would
receive $61,124.31.

5     Although mislabeled, it is clear from other information,
including the name of the escrow company, that the deduction
labeled “Cash out July 2020 Refinance” actually refers to the
July 2021 refinance.
6     The actual cash out from the July 2021 refinance was
$104,090.57. Although not clear from the appellate record, the
slightly larger number used by Falkenhagen may have been from
an estimate.

                                12
For the actual July 2020 refinance, Samvel received a $61,143.92
cash out—a substantially different sum than $98,732.62. In
short, it is entirely unclear what the $98,732.62 deduction from
Samvel’s share of the sale proceeds is meant to represent.7
Further, as Samvel acknowledges, the actual amount of the
July 2020 refinance appears to have been excluded from the
deductions. Because we cannot reconcile the amounts used to
calculate the parties’ shares, we conclude that substantial
evidence does not support the trial court’s distribution of the
proceeds from the sale of the Colima property.
      On remand, the trial court must recalculate the parties’
share of the proceeds from the sale using accurate values for
Samvel’s cash outs from the July 2020 and July 2021 refinances.
                           DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s finding that NH Management’s $35,000
mechanics lien was Samvel’s separate debt rather than a
community liability is affirmed.
      The trial court’s March 16, 2022, order distributing the
remaining proceeds from the sale of the Colima property is
reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for the sole
purpose of recalculating each party’s share using accurate values
for Samvel’s cash outs from the July 2020 and July 2021
refinances.

7     Siranuysh’s respondent’s brief does not provide any
assistance in this respect, stating that “[t]here is nothing in
[Falkenhagen’s] accounting which is amiss” and that any error
benefitted rather than prejudiced Samvel.

                               13
     The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                       _____________________, J.
                                       ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

                                  14