Court Opinion

ID: 9797229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:15:47.72446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:53:31.994551
License: Public Domain

Judge VOGT
specially concurring.
I concur in the judgment reversing defendant’s conviction. However, because I believe we should not decide issues that do not need to be decided, see, e.g., People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 910, 915 (Colo.1985), I would not reach the “rape fantasy” issue on which my colleagues disagree.
To resolve the question presented in this appeal, it is not necessary to decide whether evidence of the victim’s rape fantasy constituted evidence of sexual conduct for purposes of the rape shield statute. As made clear in defendant’s offer of proof and written proposed questions, the evidence defendant sought to introduce consisted of the victim’s fantasy about being raped by defendant and the occasions on which she and defendant acted out that fantasy. Thus, even if we were to assume that a rape fantasy can be considered sexual conduct, the evidence would not be barred under the rape shield statute in any event because it falls within *259the exception set forth in section 18-3-407(l)(a), C.R.S.2007.
As evidenced by the authority cited by Judge Bernard, whether sexual fantasies are deemed sexual conduct is an issue on which the courts have differed. I would not decide the issue for purposes of Colorado’s rape shield statute until we are presented with a case in which it needs to be decided.