Court Opinion

ID: 9788708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:16:07.906853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:16.131797
License: Public Domain

SCHUMAN, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the result in this case follows necessarily from our recent decision in State v. Garrett, 187 Or App 201, 66 P3d 554 (2003). Garrett establishes that a trial court may not compel the state to accept a defendant’s offer to stipulate that he or she has been convicted of an earlier crime when that conviction is an element of the crime for which the defendant is currently on trial. That being the case, if the state does not accept the stipulation voluntarily, the court may not exclude evidence of the fact of the prior conviction, because that evidence is necessary to prove the element. Id. at 204-05. The probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice. Id. at 205.
I dissent because Garrett was wrongly decided. In that case, the entire discussion of defendant’s stipulation to a prior conviction consisted of two sentences:
*320“[Defendants stipulation, if accepted by the state, would have established the fact of his prior conviction. However, the state was not required to accept defendants offer to stipulate to his prior conviction. See State v. Wolfs, 119 Or App 262, 850 P2d 1139, rev den, 317 Or 163 (1993).”
Garrett, 187 Or App at 204-05 (footnote omitted). To support the key proposition that the state was not required to accept the stipulation, the opinion provides only an indirect citation to Wolfs. In that case, the entire discussion of the issue is this:
“Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the state to withdraw a stipulation that it made in open court. The stipulation was that the state would not introduce evidence of defendant’s earlier convictions for felonies, but would accept instead defendant’s admission of the convictions. It also stipulated that it would not call a witness who had seen defendant with a gun on a prior occasion. After the stipulation and presentation of some evidence, the court granted a mistrial on defendant’s motion. Just before the retrial began the next day, the state said that it was withdrawing the stipulation. The trial court ruled that the mistrial terminated the prior proceedings, including the stipulation.
“Defendant argues that the state had an agreement that the court must enforce. He contends that he was prejudiced by withdrawal of the stipulation. The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state to withdraw the stipulation. Defendant had not changed his position and has not demonstrated any prejudice.”
119 Or App at 267 (footnote omitted). Wolfs, it is clear, offers no support whatsoever, not even indirect support, for the proposition that, as a matter of law, a trial court may not unilaterally accept a defendant’s offer to stipulate to the existence of a prior conviction. The case holds that a stipulation in one proceeding does not bind the state in a later one, and, more importantly, it strongly implies that, even in that situation, the stipulation could not be withdrawn if withdrawal caused prejudice.
A somewhat better citation would have been State v. Leland, 190 Or 598, 630, 227 P2d 785 (1951), affd, 343 US 790, 72 S Ct 1002, 96 L Ed 1302 (1952). In that murder case, *321the defendant apparently made admissions regarding certain “gruesome” evidence for the purpose of preventing the jury from seeing it. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, explaining:
“The fact that these items of evidence were cumulative, that possibly the case could have been sufficiently proved without them, is not controlling. Nor was the state bound to content itself with admissions made on the trial [sic] by defendant’s counsel for the purpose of keeping out this damaging evidence. As long as the defendant’s plea of not guilty stood, the state had the right to prove its case up to the hilt and to choose its own way of doing so, subject only to the rules of evidence and the standard of fair play which should govern the prosecution of every criminal case. There is no rule which requires the district attorney to be mealy-mouthed or to withhold material evidence * *
190 Or at 630 (citations omitted). One problem with Leland as support for Garrett (over and above issue-begging phrases like “the standard of fair play”) is that it does not deal with a defendant’s offer to stipulate to an element of the crime so as to render evidence supporting that element irrelevant to any issue before the jury. In fact, introduction of such evidence would be contrary to the rules of evidence and therefore not subject to Leland’s imprimatur. A more basic problem with Leland, however, is that its pronouncement on accepting stipulations has been repudiated in a subsequent case. In State v. Zimmerlee, 261 Or 49, 492 P2d 795 (1972), the court held:
“Although we have held that the state may prove its case ‘to the hilt,’ that privilege is not open to the state in circumstances where its exercise would unnecessarily expose a defendant to prejudice.”
Id. at 54 (footnote citing Leland omitted).
Oregon cases, then, not only fail to support the holding of Garrett, they support the contrary proposition, that is, that the trial court may accept a stipulation when failing to do so would cause prejudice to the defendant. Accord Old Chief v. United States, 519 US 172, 117 S Ct 664, 136 L Ed 2d 574 (1997); United States v. Orena, 811 F Supp 819 (EDNY *3221992). But see United States v. Gilliam, 994 F2d 97 (2nd Cir), cert den, 510 US 927 (1993). That inference finds more direct support from other sources as well.
Defendant has a right under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution to waive jury trial, subject only to the discretion of the trial court judge.
“[Article I, section 11] establishes both that it is the criminal defendant who is entitled to insist on a jury or to waive that right and sets out the specific circumstances in which that choice may be restrained. Specifically, the provision grants to only one person the power to defeat a defendant’s choice to be tried by the court sitting without a jury—the trial judge. The power to withhold consent is not granted to any other person or institution.”
State v. Baker, 328 Or 355, 359-60, 976 P2d 1132 (1999). The state cites no authority that would prohibit defendant from exercising that right with regard to specific elements, so long as the exercise did not create confusion or otherwise prejudice the prosecution, nor can I find any.
In fact, the history of the part of Article I, section 11, at issue here—the clause giving a defendant the right to waive a juiy trial—suggests that the primary concern in enacting it was to conduct trials “ ‘speedily, economically and fully protecting the right of the accused.’ ” Baker, 328 Or at 363 (quoting Official Voters’ Pamphlet, General Election, Nov 8,1932, 6). The ability of a trial court to accept a judicial admission that removes a single element from the jury’s consideration, where the defendant has conclusively admitted that element, is consistent with promoting speedy and economical trials and with protecting the right of the accused. Judicial economy is served by allowing the accused, with the court’s permission, to reduce the elements to be tried to those that are actually contested. The rights of the accused are protected by allowing the trial court to limit the danger of unfair prejudice, where, as here, it determines that no legitimate purpose would be served by admitting evidence on the element that the accused has conceded.
Once the trial court accepted defendant’s admission, based on his stipulation, the question remains whether the *323court erred by excluding all evidence of defendant’s prior conviction. I would conclude that the court did not err. In determining whether “other crime” evidence is admissible,
“ ‘the court should look at all of the issues in the case to see if the evidence is relevant to some issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit certain acts.’ [State v.] Dunn, 160 Or App [422, 426, 981 P2d 809 (1999), rev den, 332 Or 632 (2001)]. The tests to determine whether the evidence of other crimes is relevant * * * apply only when the purpose for which the evidence is offered is something other than propensity. Balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, to the degree that that is proper under OEC 404(4) when the evidence is offered against a criminal defendant, comes into play only if the court first determines that the evidence is relevant for a permissible purpose.”
State v. Osborne, 174 Or App 88, 91, 25 P3d 356 (2001) (citations omitted). “Relevant evidence” is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” OEC 401. Once the trial court accepted defendant’s binding admission that he had the prior conviction specified in ORS 163.160(3)(a), no evidence could possibly make that fact more probable. The evidence was not relevant and therefore no balancing needed to occur in order to determine that it was not admissible.1
In sum, I dissent because the present case is built on Garrett's holding that the trial court may not accept an admission when doing so has the effect of compelling the state to accept a stipulation, and that holding is wrong. Precedent compels an opposite conclusion. Under Article I, section 11, defendant had a right to waive a jury trial. A fortiori, he had a right partially to waive a jury trial, that is, to judicially admit to the prior conviction. Having effected that *324waiver, evidence of the prior conviction was no longer relevant for any permissible purpose, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in suppressing it.

 The state does not argue that the evidence is relevant to some other element of the crime beyond the fact of the prior conviction, for example that it is relevant because, independently of that element, it tends to show that defendant is the kind of person who is likely to commit assault. Even if it had made that argument, however, it should be rejected; use of “other crime” evidence to show character is not a “permissible purpose,” notwithstanding OEC 404(4). Osborne, 174 Or App at 92.