Court Opinion

ID: 9948532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 16:05:00.903317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:30:04.743691
License: Public Domain

The summaries
     The   summaries of  of the
                            the Colorado
                                 Colorado Court
                                             Court of of Appeals
                                                         Appeals published
                                                                   published opinions
                                                                               opinions
  constitute no
  constitute   no part
                   part of
                        of the
                           the opinion
                                 opinion ofof the
                                              the division
                                                    division but
                                                              but have
                                                                  have been
                                                                        been prepared
                                                                              prepared byby
  the division
  the  division for
                 for the
                     the convenience
                         convenience of   of the
                                             the reader.
                                                   reader. The
                                                             The summaries
                                                                  summaries maymay not
                                                                                     not be
                                                                                         be
    cited or
    cited  or relied
              relied upon
                      upon asas they
                                they are
                                      are not
                                           not the
                                                 the official
                                                      official language
                                                               language of
                                                                         of the
                                                                            the division.
                                                                                 division.
  Any discrepancy
  Any   discrepancy between
                       between thethe language
                                       language in  in the
                                                       the summary
                                                            summary andand in
                                                                            in the
                                                                               the opinion
                                                                                    opinion
            should be
            should   be resolved
                        resolved in in favor
                                        favor of
                                               of the
                                                  the language
                                                       language inin the
                                                                     the opinion.
                                                                         opinion.

                                                                            SUMMARY
                                                                         March 7, 2024

                                     2024COA25

No. 23CA0073, Hobbs v. City of Salida — Public Health and
Environment — Noise Abatement — Maximum Permissible
Noise Levels — Preemption; Municipal Law — Noise Ordinances

      The division addresses, for the first time in a published

opinion, the interplay between the general noise standards set by

Colorado’s Noise Abatement Act (Act), see §§ 25-12-101 to -110,

C.R.S. 2023, and noise standards authorized through amplified

noise permits issued by local governmental entities. The majority

concludes that the plain language of section 25-12-103(11) provides

municipal entities, such as the City of Salida, with the authority to

issue amplified noise permits to private entities to hold cultural,

entertainment, athletic, or patriotic events, including, but not

limited to, concerts and music festivals on the permittee’s property.
     The dissent argues that the plain text of section 25-12-

103(11), considered in context, and, alternatively, the legislative

history of that section, mandate a conclusion that the exemption

only authorizes a political subdivision of the state, such as a

municipality, to issue amplified noise permits to entities which will

use property that is used by that municipality.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                          2024COA25

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0073
Chaffee County District Court No. 22CV30020
Honorable Dayna Vise, Magistrate

Matthew K. Hobbs,

Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

v.

City of Salida and Drew Nelson, in his official capacity as City of Salida
Administrator,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

Giant Hornet LLC, d/b/a HighSide! Bar and Grill,

Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

                             JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

                                  Division III
                          Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
                           Hawthorne*, J., concurs
                             J. Jones, J., dissents

                           Announced March 7, 2024

Mathew K. Hobbs, Salida, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee

Wilson Williams LLP, Geoffry T. Wilson, Erica Romberg, Louisville, Colorado,
for Defendants-Appellees City of Salida and Drew Nelson

Anderson Law Group, Thomas H. Wagner, Salida, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellee and Cross-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.
¶1    Plaintiff, Matthew K. Hobbs, appeals the district court’s order

 entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants,

 Giant Hornet LLC, d/b/a High Side! Bar and Grill (High Side), and

 the City of Salida and its administrator, Drew Nelson (collectively,

 Salida). In resolving the parties’ contentions, we address for the

 first time in a published opinion the interplay between general noise

 standards set by Colorado’s Noise Abatement Act (Act), see §§ 25-

 12-101 to -110, C.R.S. 2023, and noise standards authorized

 through permits issued by local governmental entities.

¶2    We conclude that the amplified noise permits that Salida

 issued to High Side do not conflict with the Act. Accordingly, we

 conclude that the district court correctly entered judgment as a

 matter of law in favor of Salida and High Side and against Hobbs.

                           I.   Background

¶3    Salida is a statutory city located along the Arkansas River. It

 was the first municipality in Colorado to form a creative arts

 district, which supports vibrant art and live music venues

 downtown. See generally § 24-48.5-314(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2023 (“A

 creative district is a well-recognized, designated mixed-use area of a

 community in which a high concentration of cultural facilities,

                                   1
 creative businesses, or arts-related businesses serve as the anchor

 of attraction.”).

¶4    Hobbs owns a home just north of the Arkansas River across

 from downtown Salida. His southern property line is approximately

 570 feet from High Side’s outdoor patio. Between High Side and

 Hobbs’s home, which is located in an industrial zone, are a

 developed walking path, the Arkansas River, a railroad line, and a

 county road. Hobbs is an attorney and often works from home in

 the evenings.

¶5    High Side opened in August 2020, during the COVID-19

 pandemic. The bar and restaurant routinely featured a variety of

 live musicians. During the summer, it sponsored outdoor concerts

 on its patio, which abuts the edge of the walking path located along

 the southwestern bank of the Arkansas River.

¶6    Salida adopted an ordinance authorizing it to issue amplified

 noise permits, which allow local businesses to hold “special events

 or activities, including, without limitation, musical performances or

 other entertainment events, fireworks displays, parades and

 seasonal commercial activities.” Salida Mun. Code § 10-90-80(a).

 Pursuant to the ordinance, no noise is permitted in excess of 85

                                   2
 db(A)1 and the authorized activity must end at 10 p.m. absent prior

 special approval from the city.

¶7    Salida’s amplified sound permits allow the permittee to hold

 musical events between May 2 and October 31. Absent

 circumstances not present here, Salida may issue no more than

 sixty permits per season to the same permittee. Thus, during a

 typical season, a permittee could hold approximately three outdoor

 musical events per week. In 2022, Salida issued amplified sound

 permits to a total of thirty-nine applicants within the community.

¶8    The Act generally limits the sound level for residential

 neighborhoods to 50 db(A) between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. § 25-12-

 103(1), C.R.S. 2023. But Salida and High Side contend that the Act

 also authorizes cities to issue amplified sound permits. See § 25-

 12-103(11).

 1 A db(A) is a weighted scale that is measured with a sound meter

 using the A-Weighting network. § 25-12-102(2), C.R.S. 2023. The
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention state that sounds that
 are 85 db(A) require an individual to raise their voice to be heard by
 someone who is three feet away. Ctrs. for Disease Control &
 Prevention, Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health, Noise and
 Occupational Hearing Loss, https://perma.cc/PT34-5X9U. For
 example, printing presses, lawn mowers, and power tools produce
 noise levels between 85 and 90 db(A). Id.

                                   3
¶9     On August 17, 2021, Hobbs filed a noise complaint with

  Salida, asserting that the decibel level emanating from concerts on

  High Side’s patio exceeded the statewide limit. He alleged that High

  Side had held multiple events throughout the summer that were

  excessively loud. Shortly before contacting Salida, Hobbs

  monitored noise levels coming from High Side with a smart phone

  application. According to Hobbs, he measured noise levels on his

  property in the range of 51-78 db(A) between 7 and 9:30 p.m.

¶ 10   Over the next several months, Hobbs, High Side, and Salida

  worked informally to address Hobbs’s concerns. The parties did not

  reach a mutually acceptable resolution.

¶ 11   In February 2022, Salida considered revisions to its amplified

  noise ordinance. Salida received comments from Hobbs and

  numerous other citizens. After considering the public’s input and

  staff recommendations, Salida amended its ordinance to increase

  the available number of amplified sound permits from eighteen to

  sixty events per location.

¶ 12   That summer, Hobbs filed a complaint naming Salida and

  High Side as defendants. Hobbs requested the entry of a

  declaratory judgment that the Act preempts Salida’s sound

                                   4
  amplification ordinance and, therefore, the sound amplification

  permits issued to High Side were null and void. The complaint also

  sought injunctive relief prohibiting Salida from issuing permits

  pursuant to the amplified sound ordinance and prohibiting High

  Side from hosting concerts that exceed the general limits set by the

  Act.

¶ 13     In response to Hobbs’s complaint, Salida and High Side filed

  separate, but nearly identical, combined motions to dismiss for

  failure to join indispensable parties and for judgment as a matter of

  law on Hobbs’s claim for declaratory relief. The district court

  denied the motions to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties.

  But the court granted Salida’s and High Side’s motions for

  judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Hobbs’s claims fail as a

  matter of law.

¶ 14     Hobbs appeals the district court’s entry of judgment on the

  pleadings. High Side cross-appeals the district court’s denial of its

  motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties. Because we

  determine it is dispositive, we first address the district court’s entry

  of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Salida and High Side.

                                     5
           II.        The Act Does Not Preempt Salida’s Ordinance

¶ 15   Hobbs contends that the district court incorrectly concluded

  that section 25-12-103(11) allows Salida to issue amplified noise

  permits and instead argues that section 25-12-108, C.R.S. 2023,

  preempts Salida’s ability to issue any sound permits that exceed the

  limitations set forth in the Act.

                 A.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 16   The district court determined that the entry of judgment in the

  defendants’ favor was appropriate because Hobbs’s claims failed as

  a matter of law but noted that dismissal was also appropriate under

  C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for the same reasons. See Hess v. Hobart, 2020

  COA 139M2, ¶ 33 n.5 (noting that supreme court precedent states

  that the entry of judgment is appropriate when a declaratory

  judgment claim fails as a matter of law, but affirming dismissal of

  such claims against the plaintiff because the effect was the same).

¶ 17   We conclude that “in a declaratory judgment action in which

  the court rules against the position of the plaintiff, it should enter a

  declaratory judgment and not sustain a motion to dismiss.” Karsh

  v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 176 Colo. 406, 409-10, 490 P.2d 936, 938

                                        6
  (1971). Thus, we review the district court’s order to determine

  whether the entry of judgment against Hobbs was appropriate.

¶ 18   A district court may enter judgment in the defending party’s

  favor if the material facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff’s claim

  fails as a matter of law. See Tomar Dev., Inc. v. Friend, 2015 COA

  73, ¶ 24 (approving dismissal of declaratory judgment claims that

  fail as a matter of law). No party is contending that any of the facts

  relevant to the district court’s judgment were disputed. Thus, the

  sole question before us is a question of law: whether the Act

  preempts Salida’s ordinances and therefore renders void the

  permits Salida issued to High Side. See §§ 25-12-101 to -110.

¶ 19   We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Nieto v.

  Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 12. In interpreting a statute, our

  primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the General

  Assembly’s intent. See Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18. First,

  we look at the statute’s plain language, reading words and phrases

  in context and construing them according to the rules of grammar,

  syntax, and common usage. Broomfield Senior Living Owner, LLC v.

  R.G. Brinkmann Co., 2017 COA 31, ¶ 17. If the statute’s meaning is

  clear from the language alone, our analysis is complete, and we

                                     7
  apply the statute as written. See OXY USA Inc. v. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of

  Comm’rs, 2017 CO 104, ¶ 16.

¶ 20   When interpreting a statute, we generally avoid a construction

  “that would render any words or phrases superfluous or lead to

  illogical or absurd results.” Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 31

  (quoting Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barriga, 2018 CO 42, ¶ 8). But

  these canons do not enable us to rewrite a statute to achieve a

  different result than that dictated by the legislature’s selected

  language. People v. Bice, 2023 COA 98, ¶ 32. Thus, “courts must

  approach rejecting a statute’s plain language to avoid creating an

  absurd result very cautiously.” Oracle Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue,

  2017 COA 152, ¶ 41 (“[T]he absurd results ‘rule’ of construction

  typically is merely ‘an invitation to judicial lawmaking.’” (quoting

  Barrow v. City of Detroit Election Comm’n, 836 N.W.2d 498, 506

  (Mich. Ct. App. 2013))), aff’d, 2019 CO 42.

¶ 21   The absence of a statutory definition does not create ambiguity

  if the undefined phrase is one of common usage and the court can

  discern its usual and ordinary meaning. Dillabaugh v. Ellerton, 259

  P.3d 550, 552 (Colo. App. 2011). When assessing whether a word

  or phrase has more than one reasonable meaning and is therefore

                                     8
  ambiguous, we must also consider the meaning of the word or

  phrase in the context of the statutory language. Dep’t of Transp. v.

  Amerco Real Est. Co., 2016 CO 62, ¶ 12. Words and phrases

  cannot be separated from the broader context and the way they are

  used in the sentence in which they appear. Id.

¶ 22   Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase is

  known by the company it keeps. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v.

  A.R.L., 2014 CO 33, ¶ 22; see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S.

  561, 575 (1995). We rely on this rule to avoid ascribing a meaning

  to one word that is inconsistent with its accompanying words.

  Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 575.

                              B.   The Act

¶ 23   In 1971, the General Assembly adopted the Act to establish

  standards regulating the degree of noise pollution in Colorado:

            The general assembly finds and declares that
            noise is a major source of environmental
            pollution which represents a threat to the
            serenity and quality of life in the state of
            Colorado. Excess noise often has an adverse
            physiological and psychological effect on
            human beings, thus contributing to an
            economic loss to the community. Accordingly,
            it is the policy of the general assembly to
            establish statewide standards for noise level
            limits for various time periods and areas.

                                    9
          Noise in excess of the limits provided in this
          article constitutes a public nuisance.

§ 25-12-101. Section 25-12-103(1) sets forth Colorado’s general

noise abatement standards:

          Every activity to which this article is applicable
          shall be conducted in a manner so that any
          noise produced is not objectionable due to
          intermittence, beat frequency, or shrillness.
          Sound levels of noise radiating from a property
          line at a distance of twenty-five feet or more
          therefrom in excess of the db(A) established for
          the following time periods and zones shall
          constitute prima facie evidence that such noise
          is a public nuisance:

          Zone              7:00 a.m.       7:00 p.m.
                            to next         to next
                            7:00 p.m.       7:00 a.m.

           Residential      55 db(A)        50 db(A)
           Commercial       60 db(A)        55 db(A)
           Light            70 db(A)        65 db(A)
           industrial
           Industrial       80 db(A)        75    db(A)

§ 25-12-103(1). Hobbs points to this section to support his claim

that Salida’s noise amplification ordinance, and the related permits

Salida issued to High Side, conflict with state law. Hobbs argues

that the conflicting noise ordinance is preempted by section 25-12-

108, which provides that “this article shall not be construed to

                                 10
  preempt or limit the authority of any municipality or county to

  adopt standards that are no less restrictive than the provisions of

  this article.”

¶ 24    In contrast, Salida and High Side argue that Salida’s

  ordinance and the subject permits are exempted from the Act’s

  general standards based on the following language, which the

  General Assembly added to the Act through an amendment in

  1987:

              This article is not applicable to the use of
              property by this state, any political subdivision
              of this state, or any other entity not organized
              for profit, including, but not limited to,
              nonprofit corporations, or any of their lessees,
              licensees, or permittees, for the purpose of
              promoting, producing, or holding cultural,
              entertainment, athletic, or patriotic events,
              including, but not limited to, concerts, music
              festivals, and fireworks displays. This
              subsection (11) shall not be construed to
              preempt or limit the authority of any political
              subdivision having jurisdiction to regulate
              noise abatement.

  § 25-12-103(11).

¶ 25    Generally, a local ordinance that conflicts with a state statute

  is void; however, contrary provisions in an ordinance and a state

  statute do not necessarily indicate a conflict. Minch v. Town of

                                     11
  Mead, 957 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Colo. App. 1998). If possible,

  ordinances and statutes must be reconciled, and effect should be

  given to both. Id.

¶ 26   In entering judgment against Hobbs, the district court

  reconciled the Act with Salida’s ordinance and resulting permits,

  reasoning that the Act unambiguously exempts Salida’s actions:

  “[T]he plain language of section 25-12-103(11) clearly states the

  legislative intent that the noise level limits established in the statute

  do not apply to political subdivisions or their permittees when

  holding music and cultural events.”

                               C.   Analysis

¶ 27   Hobbs does not dispute, and we agree, that Salida is a political

  subdivision of the state. See, e.g., § 29-1-202(2), C.R.S. 2023

  (defining “political subdivision” to mean “a county, city and county,

  city, town, service authority, school district, local improvement

  district, . . . or any other kind of municipal, quasi-municipal, or

  public corporation organized pursuant to law”). Nor does he

  dispute that High Side is a permittee of Salida, or that musical

  concerts are one of the activities contemplated by the statutory

  exception. But Hobbs argues that the exemption language of

                                     12
  section 25-12-103(11) applies only to concerts that occur, as

  relevant here, on property used by a city, or a city’s permittees

  using property owned by the City. Therefore, Hobbs argues, section

  25-12-103(11) does not authorize Salida to issue amplified sound

  permits to for-profit entities such as High Side to hold concerts on

  private property.

¶ 28   In response, High Side and Salida argue that the exemption

  contemplated by section 25-12-103(11) is not limited to concerts

  performed on property Salida owns, but rather applies to all

  property for which a permit is issued. Additionally, High Side and

  Salida argue that the ordinance is not limited to concerts or musical

  festivals performed by nonprofit entities, but rather extends to

  Salida’s permittees, whether they conduct business for profit or

  otherwise. Based on these premises, Salida and High Side argue

  that the ordinance and resulting permits are authorized by the Act

  and that Hobbs’s preemption argument fails as a matter of law.

¶ 29   We address the parties’ differing interpretations in turn.

                                    13
   1.   The Exemption Is Not Limited to Concerts Performed on Land
                             Owned by Salida

¶ 30    We agree with Salida and High Side that section 25-12-103(11)

  is not ambiguous. We also agree that its clear language authorized

  Salida to issue the disputed permits to High Side.

¶ 31    Hobbs points to the following language: “This article is not

  applicable to the use of property by . . . any political subdivision of

  this state, . . . or any of [its] . . . permittees, for the purpose of . . .

  holding . . . concerts.” § 25-12-103(11) (emphasis added). Hobbs

  seizes on the “use of property by . . . any political subdivision”

  language to argue that permits may only authorize concerts on

  property Salida owns. But the statute contains no such limitation.

¶ 32    The statute does not contain any limitation, express or

  implied, that a political subdivision may only authorize permits for

  performances on land it owns. Rather, the statute refers broadly to

  the “use of property” without any restriction with respect to who

  owns the property. And the permitted property users include the

  political subdivision’s permittees. Surely, if the legislature had

  intended for the exemption to only apply to events held on land

  owned by the state, its political subdivisions, or nonprofit entities, it

                                        14
  knew how to say that. See, e.g., People v. Griffin, 397 P.3d 1086,

  1089 (Colo. App. 2011) (“If the legislature had wanted offenders to

  register where they merely intend to reside, it certainly knew how to

  say so.”). But it did not.

¶ 33    We presume the General Assembly acts intentionally when

  selecting the words used in a statute. See, e.g., People v. O’Neal,

  228 P.3d 211, 213 (Colo. App. 2009) (we presume the General

  Assembly did not use language idly). We do not add to, or subtract

  from, the words chosen by the General Assembly. Nieto, ¶ 12. And

  if the statutory language is clear, we must apply it as written.

  Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 2011).

  Section 25-12-103(11) has no words restricting the issued permits

  use to the issuing political subdivision’s property. Thus, we

  conclude the district court did not err by rejecting Hobbs’s

  argument that the authorized permits are restricted to property

  owned by Salida.

   2.   Section 25-12-103 Does Not Preclude Issuing Permits to For-
                             Profit Entities.

¶ 34    Hobbs also argues that section 25-12-103(11) only authorizes

  Salida to issue permits to nonprofit entities. Specifically, he argues

                                    15
  that by not applying such a restriction, the district court failed to

  give effect to the statute’s nonprofit language. We disagree.

¶ 35   As Hobbs correctly notes, just as we may not add words to a

  statute, neither may we ignore the words selected by the General

  Assembly. Nieto, ¶ 12. Relying on this principle, Hobbs argues that

  the district court ignored the phrase “or any other entity not

  organized for profit, including, but not limited to, nonprofit

  corporations.” § 25-12-103(11). Hobbs contends that this language

  dictates a conclusion that a political subdivision may only issue

  amplified sound permits to nonprofit entities, but not for-profit

  entities like High Side. But that is not what the statute’s plain

  language says.

¶ 36   The statute applies broadly to the state, its political

  subdivisions, and nonprofit entities. But the statute also applies to

  “any of their lessees, licensees, or permittees.” § 25-12-103(11).

  The statute does not limit or define what type of entities fall within

  the permittee’s status. More specifically, it does not provide that

  only nonprofit entities may be issued permits. And for the reasons

  previously stated, we may not add such words. See Nieto, ¶ 12.

                                    16
¶ 37   Contrary to Hobbs’s argument, this construction of the statute

  does not ignore or fail to give effect to the phrase “or any other

  entity not organized for profit, including, but not limited to,

  nonprofit corporations.” That language exempts nonprofit entities

  from the Act’s noise standards.

¶ 38   Though not clearly expressed by Hobbs, we also reject any

  implicit argument that the phrase “any of their lessees, licensees, or

  permittees” modifies only the immediately preceding phrase

  referring to nonprofit entities. Permits are defined as “a written

  warrant or license granted by one having authority.” Merriam-

  Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/56QE-RDR6; see also

  Black’s Law Dictionary 1376 (11th ed. 2019) (defining permittee as

  “[s]omeone who has permission to do something”). Permits are

  commonly issued by governmental entities, such as the state or its

  political subdivisions. Licenses are also frequently issued by the

  state or its political subdivisions. A licensee is defined as “[o]ne to

  whom a license is granted: someone who has official permission to

  do something.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 1105.

¶ 39   Applying noscitur a sociis, which gives phrases meaning by

  looking at the words and phrases that surround them, and by

                                     17
  utilizing traditional grammatical conventions and syntax, we

  conclude that the phrase “any of their lessees, licensees, or

  permittees” modifies each of the preceding entities: the state,

  political subdivisions of the state, and nonprofit entities. See St.

  Vrain, ¶ 22; see also Est. of David v. Snelson, 776 P.2d 813, 818

  (Colo. 1989) (“When a referential or qualifying clause follows several

  words or phrases and is applicable as much to the first word or

  phrase as to the others in the list, . . . the clause should be applied

  to all of the words or phrases that preceded it.”).

¶ 40   The primary definition of both licensee and permittee is

  someone who has been granted permission to do something.

  Although both terms are also sometimes used in the real estate

  context, their primary definition relates to the receipt of official

  permission to engage in some type of activity. See, e.g., § 44-4-

  103(2), C.R.S. 2023 (“‘License’ means a grant to a licensee to sell

  fermented malt beverages or fermented malt beverages and wine at

  retail . . . .”); § 24-21-602(25), C.R.S. 2023 (“‘License’ means any

  license or certification issued by the licensing authority” to operate

  bingo or raffle games.); § 13-51.5-102(1), C.R.S. 2023

  (“‘Development permit’ means any zoning permit, subdivision

                                     18
  approval, certification, special exception, variance, or any other

  similar action of a governmental entity that has the effect of

  authorizing the development of real property.”); § 42-1-232(1)(c),

  C.R.S. 2023 (“‘Permit’ means authority for an organization to

  employ people to verify information . . . that may be required to

  register a commercial vehicle . . . .”).

¶ 41   Particularly in the regulation of noise emissions, the term

  “permit” is frequently used to refer to the authority a local entity

  grants to exceed a particular noise limit. See, e.g., Salida Mun.

  Code § 10-9-80(a) (“A permit to vary or temporarily waive the

  maximum allowable noise levels as specified in this Article may be

  applied for and obtained from the City . . . .”); City of Wheat Ridge,

  Amplified Sound Event Permit Application, https://perma.cc/B67F-

  8M58 (“No outdoor amplified sound event permit may be issued for

  an event outside of the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. Sunday

  through Thursday, and 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. Friday and

  Saturday. Within this time range, outdoor amplified sound events

  may be limited in duration as determined by the approving

  authority.”); Colo. Springs Mun. Code § 9.8.109 (“Applications for a

  permit, for other than vehicular traffic, for relief from the noise level

                                      19
  designated in this part on the basis of undue hardship may be

  made to the Mayor. Any permit granted by the Mayor shall contain

  all conditions upon which the permit has been granted and shall

  specify a reasonable time for which the permit shall be effective.”).

¶ 42    We acknowledge that the word “lessee” typically refers to a

  leasehold interest in real estate. But that does not limit or qualify

  the typical meaning of licensees or permittees. The use of the word

  lessees nevertheless serves an important function under 25-12-

  103(11). It extends the exemption to those who lease property from

  a state, its political subdivisions, and other nonprofit entities,

  provided the lessees comply with the applicable permitting process

  of the local jurisdiction in which the property is located.

       3.   The Act Does Not Preempt Salida’s Sound Amplification
                                 Ordinance

¶ 43    Hobbs’s reliance on the preemption language of section 25-12-

  108 is also misplaced. Section 25-12-103(11) expressly states that

  the Act is “not applicable to the use of property by . . . any political

  subdivision of this state, . . . or any of [its] . . . permittees.” Thus,

  the Act’s noise standards are not applicable to Salida or its

                                      20
  permittee — High Side. Accordingly, the preemption language of

  section 25-12-108 also does not apply to the present dispute.

                            4.   Legislative History

¶ 44   Finally, we acknowledge that Hobbs argues the district court’s

  statutory construction is inconsistent with the Act’s legislative

  history or the amendment that created section 25-12-103(11). But

  where, as here, the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, it

  is neither necessary nor appropriate to resort to legislative history

  to interpret the statute.2 See, e.g., Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes,

  Inc., 230 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Colo. 2010). Rather, we apply the

  statute as written. Id.

  2 Similarly, the amendment’s title is irrelevant absent a statutory

  ambiguity. As the supreme court recently explained,

             [A] title cannot limit the plain meaning of a
             more specific provision within a statute. See
             Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457,
             483 (2001). Instead, the title is useful for
             purposes of statutory interpretation only when
             it “shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or
             phrase in the statute itself.” Id. (alteration
             omitted) (quoting Carter v. United States, 530
             U.S. 255, 267 (2000)).

  Arvada Vill. Gardens LP v. Garate, 2023 CO 24, ¶ 14.

                                      21
¶ 45   Even if we were to conclude that the amendment is

  ambiguous, the legislative history does not support Hobbs’s

  contention that the statutory exemption for permittees should be

  limited to events occurring on property owned by the state, its

  political subdivisions, or nonprofit entities. As the dissent notes,

  the legislative history supports the conclusion that the amendment

  was prompted by a desire to ensure that the Act would not prohibit

  the development and use of Fiddler’s Green Amphitheatre in

  Arapahoe County. And it is also true that at various legislative

  hearings, there were references to performances held at other public

  venues, such as Folsom Field and the State Fair.

¶ 46   But the hearings contain no statements by any person that

  the amendment was intended to apply to permittees only if the

  permittees were using property owned by the state, its political

  subdivisions, or nonprofit entities. Rather, Representative Schauer

  — the amendment’s sponsor — stated unequivocally that “what [the

  amendment] does is provide the opportunity for that, on public or

  private property, . . . for cultural, entertainment, athletic, or

  patriotic events.” Hearing on H.B. 1340 before the H. Fin. Comm.,

  56th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 1, 1987). Obviously,

                                     22
  private property does not include property owned by the state or its

  political subdivisions. And Representative Schauer’s reference to

  private property was not restricted to property owned by nonprofit

  entities. To the contrary, this statement reflected the legislative

  intent that the amendment would apply to duly permitted uses on

  all public or private property.

¶ 47   We also reject Hobbs’s contention that the district court’s

  interpretation of the statute leads to an absurd result because it

  renders the Act completely ineffectual. We disagree. The Act

  applies to all areas of Colorado except those that the General

  Assembly has expressly excluded from its application. And, of

  course, the exception created by section 25-12-103(11) is limited to

  “cultural, entertainment, athletic, or patriotic events, including, but

  not limited to, concerts, music festivals, and fireworks displays”

  that are duly permitted by the local jurisdiction. Thus, the Act

  continues to serve its laudatory purposes across the bulk of the

  state.

¶ 48   The legislative history makes clear that the amendment was

  intended to provide local governments with the flexibility and

  control to apply local standards to regulate cultural, entertainment,

                                    23
  athletic, or patriotic events, rather than subject these events to a

  statewide, unbending mandate. Indeed, local control was a central

  theme in the legislative hearings. When various legislators

  expressed concerns about the potential impact on adjacent

  landowners, Representative Groff stated that all the amendment

  does “is allow the local government to issue the permits and to

  issue what those noise standards would have to be in those

  particular open air concerts.” 2d Reading on H.B. 1340 before the

  H., 56th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 13, 1987). As

  Representative Groff recognized, the final sentence of 25-12-103(11)

  maintains and reiterates the authority of counties, cities, and towns

  to regulate noise issues within their jurisdictions: “This subsection

  shall not be construed to preempt or limit the authority of any

  political subdivision having jurisdiction to regulate noise

  abatement.”

¶ 49   The legislature’s foresight also alleviates the parade of

  absurdities envisioned by Hobbs and the dissent. Our

  interpretation of the statute does not enable nonprofit entities to

  issue noise permits that exceed the statewide limit. This argument

  conflates the limited exemption granted by section 25-12-103(11)

                                    24
  with a grant of authority to issue amplified noise permits. Political

  subdivisions of the state — counties, cities, and towns — control

  the issuance of amplified noise permits, a reality that section 25-12-

  103(11) recognizes.

¶ 50   Thus, the forecasted absurdities are not legally possible

  because notwithstanding the exemption created by section 25-12-

  103(11), the amendment does not allow doctors, lawyers, or those

  who hold a driver’s license to exceed the applicable noise limits. To

  the contrary, the last sentence of the amendment preserves “the

  authority of any political subdivision having jurisdiction to regulate

  noise abatement.” § 25-12-103(11).

¶ 51   Finally, the General Assembly’s decision to defer to the

  discretion of local governmental entities in setting noise levels does

  not leave the public without a remedy. Concerned residents, such

  as Hobbs and other interested parties, were allowed to participate

  in the amendment process. Based on their concerns, Salida’s

  elected officials modified the sound amplification ordinances in a

  manner that they thought best met the needs of Salida’s residents.

  The fact that such a remedy does not always lead to the particular

                                    25
  result desired by a particular party does not mean that the statute,

  or the political process that it contemplates, is absurd.

¶ 52   We perceive no error in the district court’s conclusion that

  Hobbs’s claims failed as a matter of law.

                         III.    Necessary Parties

¶ 53   High Side argued, in the alternative, that the district court

  erred by denying its motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary

  parties. Because we have concluded that the district court correctly

  entered judgment in High Side’s and Salida’s favor under section

  25-12-103(11), we do not need to address High Side’s alternative

  argument. Thus, we express no opinion whether other parties

  holding noise permits were necessary parties to Hobbs’s claims.

                           IV.    Attorney Fees

¶ 54   Both Salida and High Side request an award of attorney fees

  against Hobbs. Neither of them, however, cites any legal authority

  or develops any argument in support of its requests. We therefore

  decline to further address their claims. See C.A.R. 39; Foster v.

  Plock, 2016 COA 41, ¶ 63.

¶ 55   Hobbs requests an award of attorney fees against Salida and

  High Side, asserting that their arguments for declaratory relief

                                     26
  based on section 25-12-103(11) were frivolous and groundless, and

  that High Side’s argument for dismissal based on the failure to join

  indispensable parties was also frivolous and groundless. Because

  Hobbs develops this request with citations to authority and

  argument, we address it on the merits.

                           A.   Applicable Law

¶ 56   Section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2023, provides that a court shall

  award attorney fees against any party who has defended a civil

  action, in whole or in part, that lacked substantial justification.

  § 13-17-102(2), (4). As used in the statute, the phrase “‘lacked

  substantial justification’ means substantially frivolous,

  substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.” Id.

¶ 57   A defense is substantially frivolous if “the proponent can

  present no rational argument based on the evidence or law in

  support of [it].” Mulberry Frontage Metro. Dist. v. Sunstate Equip.

  Co., 2023 COA 66, ¶ 42 (alteration in original) (quoting City of

  Aurora v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 620 (Colo. 2005)). A

  defense is substantially groundless if it is not supported by any

  credible evidence. Id. (citing City of Aurora, 105 P.3d at 618). A

                                    27
  defense is substantially vexatious if it is brought or maintained in

  bad faith or to annoy or harass another. Id.

                             B.   Application

¶ 58   Contrary to Hobbs’s assertion, Salida’s and High Side’s

  motions to dismiss were not substantially frivolous, groundless, or

  vexatious. Indeed, we have affirmed the district court’s conclusion

  that Salida and High Side are entitled to judgment as a matter of

  law on all of Hobbs’s claims. And although we did not need to

  resolve the merits of High Side’s necessary parties defense, we are

  satisfied that the defense did not lack substantial justification.

¶ 59   Accordingly, we reject Hobbs’s request for an award of

  attorney fees against Salida and High Side.

                             V.   Disposition

¶ 60   The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

       JUDGE HAWTHORNE concurs.

       JUDGE J. JONES dissents.

                                    28
       JUDGE J. JONES, dissenting.

¶ 61   The City of Salida gave High Side! Bar and Grill (High Side), a

  privately owned, for-profit food and beverage establishment, permits

  to exceed noise limits established by section 25-12-103, C.R.S.

  2023, despite the fact Salida doesn’t have any property interest in

  the property on which High Side operates. The majority concludes

  that Salida has the authority to issue such permits under section

  25-12-103(11). Because I disagree with that conclusion, and

  because I conclude that the district court didn’t err by declining to

  dismiss Matthew Hobbs’ complaint for failure to join indispensable

  parties (an issue High Side raises on cross-appeal), I respectfully

  dissent.

                            I.   Background

¶ 62   The General Assembly has declared that “noise is a major

  source of environmental pollution which represents a threat to the

  serenity and quality of life in the state of Colorado.” § 25-12-101,

  C.R.S. 2023. So it established “statewide standards,” id., for noise

  limits, which can be found in section 25-12-103. The highest such

                                    29
  noise limit is 80 db(A).3 That limit applies only to “[i]ndustrial”

  zones, and only then between the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. § 25-

  12-103(1).4

¶ 63   The permits Salida issued to High Side allowed noise up to

  85db(A) at nighttime, when the limit at High Side, a commercial

  establishment, would otherwise be 55 db(A). See id.5 This would

  seem to run afoul of sections 25-12-101, 25-12-103(1), and 25-12-

  108, C.R.S. 2023, the latter of which says that nothing in title 25,

  article 12 shall “be construed to preempt or limit the authority of

  any municipality or county to adopt standards that are no less

  restrictive than the provisions of [title 25, article 12].” (Emphasis

  added.) In other words, a municipality like Salida may adopt noise-

  level standards that are more restrictive than the state standards,

  but not standards that are less restrictive than the state standards:

  the state statutory standards for noise levels are the ceilings.

  3 Section 25-12-102(3), C.R.S. 2023, describes this “decibel” unit of

  noise measurement.
  4 During the hours between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m., noise may exceed

  the usual limit by 10 db(A) for no more than fifteen minutes of each
  hour. § 25-12-103(2), C.R.S. 2023.
  5 As discussed in section 25-12-102(3), such a 30 db(A) difference

  is, to put it mildly, substantial.

                                     30
¶ 64   But that brings us to section 25-12-103(11), which exempts

  some entities from the statewide standards. It provides as follows:

             This article is not applicable to the use of
             property by this state, any political subdivision
             of this state, or any other entity not organized
             for profit, including, but not limited to,
             nonprofit corporations, or any of their lessees,
             licensees, or permittees, for the purpose of
             promoting, producing, or holding cultural,
             entertainment, athletic, or patriotic events,
             including, but not limited to, concerts, music
             festivals, and fireworks displays. This
             subsection (11) shall not be construed to
             preempt or limit the authority of any political
             subdivision having jurisdiction to regulate
             noise abatement.

¶ 65   The majority concludes that High Side qualifies as a

  “permittee” of a “political subdivision of this state” under this

  exemption simply because Salida gave High Side permits to exceed

  the statewide statutory noise limits. With respect, that

  construction of section 25-12-103(11) fails to account for that

  section’s language as a whole and that of the related statutory

  scheme, renders language in that section superfluous, leads to

  illogical and absurd results, and is inconsistent with the statute’s

  legislative history.

                                     31
                           II.   Hobbs’ Appeal

              A.   Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 66   We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.

  Edwards v. New Century Hospice, Inc., 2023 CO 49, ¶ 14.

¶ 67   Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to give effect to

  the General Assembly’s intent. Id. To determine that intent, we

  first look to the plain and ordinary meanings of the words and

  phrases used in the statute. Krol v. CF & I Steel, 2013 COA 32,

  ¶ 15. But we do so considering those words and phrases “in the

  dual contexts of the statute as a whole and the comprehensive

  statutory scheme, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible

  effect to all of the statute’s language.” Id. And “[w]e must avoid any

  constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous

  or that would lead to illogical or absurd results.” Dep’t of Revenue

  v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41, ¶ 16.

¶ 68   If, after applying these principles, we conclude that the

  language is susceptible of but one reasonable interpretation, we

  stop there and enforce the statute as written. Antero Res. Corp. v.

  Airport Land Partners, Ltd., 2023 CO 13, ¶ 13. But if we conclude

  that the statute is susceptible of multiple reasonable interpretations

                                    32
  — that is, it is ambiguous — then we may look to other indicators of

  legislative intent, such as the object sought to be obtained, the

  legislative history, the consequences of a particular construction,

  and the legislative declaration of purpose. § 2-4-203, C.R.S. 2023;

  see State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 501 (Colo. 2000).

                              B.    Analysis

¶ 69   As I see it, the majority’s reasoning falters most fundamentally

  by failing to read the statutory language as a whole. The majority

  construes the term “permittees” in isolation, without considering

  the language preceding it. See Lewis v. Taylor, 2016 CO 48, ¶ 20

  (we don’t read statutory words in isolation, but in context).

  Subsection (11) begins by saying article 12 isn’t applicable to “the

  use of property” by three types of entities — the state, political

  subdivisions of the state, and “any other entity not organized for

  profit.” It then identifies three subcategories of property users —

  “their lessees, licensees, and permittees” — for each of the three

  categories of not-for-profit property users.6 § 25-12-103(11). But

  6 The subsection’s use of the term “their” clearly refers to the state,

  political subdivisions of the state, and other entities not organized
  for profit.

                                     33
  under the majority’s construction of subsection (11), even though

  lessors, licensees, and permittees are subcategories of the state,

  political subdivisions of the state, and other entities not organized

  for profit (a proposition even High Side concedes),7 the property they

  may use for the purposes identified in subsection (11) isn’t limited

  to “property used by” the entities in the primary categories. In

  other words, the majority deems the statutory limitation to the “use

  of property” by entities in the three primary categories inapplicable

  to entities in the three subcategories. If that is what the General

  Assembly intended, it had a strange way of saying so. Indeed, that

  construction leads to absurd results.

¶ 70   The majority’s construction would allow Salida to issue a

  “permit” to anyone — without limitation — to violate the statewide

  noise standards, without any limitation as to noise level, duration,

  or frequency, as long as the noise is caused by one of the statutorily

  7 “When a referential or qualifying clause follows several words or

  phrases and is applicable as much to the first word or phrase as to
  the others in the list, . . . the clause should be applied to all of the
  words or phrases that preceded it.” Est. of David v. Snelson, 776
  P.2d 813, 818 (Colo. 1989); see § 2-4-214, C.R.S. 2023 (abrogating
  the “last antecedent” rule, whereby qualifying phrases were deemed
  to apply only to the last antecedent to which they were closely
  connected).

                                     34
  identified events. That result can’t be squared with the purpose of

  the statute as expressed in section 25-12-101 and emphasized by

  the preemption provision, section 25-12-108. And, more absurdly,

  that power would apply not only to the state and political

  subdivisions of the state — like Salida — but to “any other entity

  not organized for profit”: any nonprofit entity, “including, but not

  limited to, nonprofit corporations,” § 25-12-103(11), could issue a

  permit to anyone anywhere in the state to violate the statewide

  noise standards for the statutorily identified events — again,

  without any limitation as to noise level, duration, or frequency.

¶ 71   The majority’s construction also fails to consider and give

  effect to all three subcategories of property users, in various ways.

¶ 72   First, no entity would give a lease to someone to exceed the

  statewide standards. Yet, one subcategory of property users is

  “lessees” of the state, political subdivisions of the state, and any

  other entities not organized for profit. The term obviously applies to

  those who lease property from one of those three categories of

  entities. So any such lessee isn’t subject to the statewide

  standards, and without any need for a license or permit; otherwise,

  “lessees” is redundant. See § 2-4-201(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023 (we must

                                     35
  presume that “[t]he entire statute is intended to be effective”);

  Wolford v. Pinnacol Assurance, 107 P.3d 947, 951 (Colo. 2005) (we

  must avoid a statutory interpretation that renders any provision

  redundant or superfluous).

¶ 73   Second, the ramifications of the majority’s interpretation of the

  term “permittees” on the adjacent term “licensees” are profound. If

  “licensees” is construed without regard to context — like the

  majority construes “permittees” — only two results, both seemingly

  impermissible, are possible: (1) anyone to whom the state or any of

  its political subdivisions has issued a license of any kind isn’t

  subject to the statewide standards or (2) the state or any of its

  political subdivisions (and any other entity not organized for profit)

  may issue a license to anyone to exceed the statewide standards.

  The first result is absurd. Think of all the licenses issued by the

  state — licenses to practice law or medicine, for example, or to

  drive. The legislature could not have intended such licensees to be

  allowed to hold events excluded from the noise limitations. The

  second result renders “licensees” redundant of “permittees.” After

  all, what would be the difference between a license to exceed the

  statewide standards and a permit to do so? This result, which the

                                    36
  majority adopts, see supra ¶ 40, violates the well-established canon

  of statutory construction that we presume the legislature means

  different things when it uses different words. See Colo. Med. Bd. v.

  Off. of Admin. Cts., 2014 CO 51, ¶ 19 (“[T]he use of different terms

  signals the General Assembly’s intent to afford those terms different

  meanings.”); Wolford, 107 P.3d at 951.

¶ 74   The only way, then, to read the exception in subsection (11) in

  a sensible way that gives effect to all of its parts is to construe it as

  limited to property used by the state, political subdivisions of the

  state, and any other entity not organized for profit, and any other

  entity that uses property used by those three primary categories of

  entities — whether by lease, license, or permit.8

  8 A common definition of a “licensee” was, when section 25-12-

  103(11) was enacted, “a person who has a privilege to enter upon
  land arising from permission or consent, express or implied, of the
  possessor of land but who goes on the land for his own purpose
  rather than for any purpose or interest of the possessor.” Black’s
  Law Dictionary 830 (5th ed. 1979); see also § 13-21-115(5)(b),
  C.R.S. 1990 (defining “licensee” for purposes of the Premises
  Liability Act as “a person who enters or remains on the land of
  another for the licensee’s own convenience or to advance his own
  interests, pursuant to the landowner’s permission or consent”).
  This definition of licensee sensibly applies to the real property-
  focused exemption of section 25-12-103(11), particularly in light of
  the alternative meaning (e.g., a driver’s license), which would be
  extraordinarily (indeed, absurdly) broad.

                                      37
¶ 75   This interpretation is strongly — I would say conclusively —

  supported by the legislative history of subsection (11).9 That

  exception was added to section 25-12-103 in 1987. The title of the

  bill adding the exception was “AN ACT CONCERNING THE

  EXEMPTION OF PROPERTY USED BY NOT FOR PROFIT ENTITIES

  FOR PUBLIC EVENTS FROM STATUTORY MAXIMUM

  PERMISSIBLE NOISE LEVELS.” Ch. 212, 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws

  1154.10 This indicates that the exception was intended to apply

  only to property used by not-for-profit entities. See City of Ouray v.

  Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (court may consider the title of

  legislation in resolving uncertainties concerning legislative intent;

  holding the title of the legislation there at issue — “[A]n act

  concerning compensation of county employees” — indicated that it

  was intended to apply only to county employees).

  9 If the statutory language doesn’t clearly support my interpretation,

  it is at least ambiguous, justifying consideration of legislative
  history. See § 2-4-203, C.R.S. 2023.
  10 All three categories of primary entities in subsection (11) are not-

  for-profit entities. Recall, subsection (11) identifies those entities as
  “this state, any political subdivision of this state, or any other entity
  not organized for profit.” § 25-12-103(11) (emphasis added).

                                     38
¶ 76   At hearings before House and Senate committees and in

  readings of the bill before the House and Senate, the bill’s sponsors,

  Representative Schauer and Senator Bird, and other legislators,

  indicated the following:

           Representative Schauer told the House Finance

            Committee that the bill would apply to concerts at, for

            example, Washington Park in Denver and Fiddler’s Green

            Amphitheatre. Immediately after Representative Schauer

            explained that the bill would “provide the opportunity for,

            on public or private property, for cultural, entertainment,

            athletic, or patriotic events,” Representative Groff, in a

            moment of levity, asked facetiously whether H.B. 1340

            was “the Fiddler’s Green Bill.” Everyone laughed.

            Representative Schauer confirmed that Fiddler’s Green,

            which was in his district, was the impetus for the bill,

            and referred to Fiddler’s Green as being owned by a

            “private, nonprofit facility.” (Emphasis added.) Another

            representative mentioned fireworks at the State Fair

            Grounds in Pueblo. Representative Thiebaut said it

            would allow the Air Force Academy Band to perform at

                                    39
          Memorial Park in Colorado Springs. Representative

          Schauer confirmed that the city could issue a “permit” for

          such a performance. Hearing on H.B. 1340 before the H.

          Fin. Comm., 56th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 1,

          1987).

         During second reading of the bill in the House,

          Representative Schauer said the bill was intended to deal

          with “open air concerts that would be performed at any

          property, whether that be state, city or county, or a

          nonprofit facility.” 2d Reading on H.B. 1340 before the

          H., 56th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 13, 1987)

          (emphasis added).11 The impetus for the bill was

          anticipated development at Fiddler’s Green Amphitheatre

          in Arapahoe County (which, as noted, was owned by a

          private, nonprofit entity). Representative Schauer also

          mentioned Washington Park in Denver as a covered

          venue. Representative Groff also spoke about concerts at

11 The majority opinion doesn’t acknowledge this statement, which

contradicts the majority’s assertion that Representative Schauer
didn’t limit his references to private property to such property used
by not-for-profit entities.

                                 40
          Washington Park, such as those given by the “Denver

          Symphony Orchestra,” and said the bill would allow the

          city to “issue the permits” to allow performances at such

          places for “those particular open-air concerts.” Id.12

         During a hearing before the Senate State Affairs

          Committee, Senator Bird said the bill would apply to

          venues such as Washington Park, Folsom Field at the

          University of Colorado in Boulder, and Fiddler’s Green

          Amphitheatre. In response to a question by a committee

          member, Senator Bird said that the bill would allow for a

          for-profit rock concert at Folsom Field because Folsom

          Field is owned by a nonprofit entity (the state). Hearing

          on H.B. 1340 before the S. State Affairs Comm., 56th

          Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 27, 1987).13

12 Though the majority opinion relies on the statement by

Representative Groff, it omits the first part of her statement, which
was about “Denver Symphony Orchestra” concerts at Washington
Park, a city-owned property. It was those concerts Representative
Groff was clearly referring to when she mentioned “those particular
open-air concerts.” 2d Reading on H.B. 1340 before the H., 56th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 13, 1987) (emphasis added).
13 The majority opinion does not acknowledge this statement.

                                  41
           Senator Bird said at a reading of the bill in the Senate

             that it would apply to venues such as Fiddler’s Green

             Amphitheatre and the State Fair Grounds in Pueblo (to

             allow for a concert by, for example, Willie Nelson). 2d

             Reading of H.B. 1340 before the S., 56th Gen. Assemb.,

             1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 30, 1987).

¶ 77   To me, all of these statements indicate that the real property

  subject to the bill is limited to that real property used by the state,

  a political subdivision of the state, or any other not-for-profit entity.

  There was nary a mention during any hearing on or reading of the

  bill of potential applicability to private property not owned by a not-

  for-profit entity, such as High Side.

       Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s

  interpretation of section 25-12-103(11).

                      III.   High Side’s Cross-Appeal

¶ 78   High Side cross-appeals the district court’s denial of its motion

  to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties — specifically,

  thirty-eight other entities to which Salida has issued permits to

  exceed statewide noise standards. I would affirm that aspect of the

  district court’s judgment.

                                     42
¶ 79   Accetta v. Brooks Towers Residences Condominium Ass’n, 2019

  CO 11, is the Colorado Supreme Court’s most recent

  pronouncement on how courts should determine whether a

  nonparty is indispensable and must be joined. That case, like this

  one, was a declaratory judgment action. The court held that joinder

  isn’t required when a present party adequately represents the

  interests of an absent party. In this case, Salida and High Side’s

  interests are aligned with those of any other permittees such that

  they can be expected to have made the absent party’s arguments,

  Salida and High Side are capable of and willing to make those

  arguments, and any absent permittee wouldn’t offer any necessary

  element to the proceedings that Salida and High Side would neglect.

  See id. at ¶ 19. Therefore, the district court didn’t err by refusing to

  dismiss Hobbs’ complaint for failure to join indispensable parties.14

                             IV.   Conclusion

¶ 80   In sum, I would reverse the judgment and remand for entry of

  appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief.

  14 I also observe that Salida issues its permits for very short periods

  of time. Those holding permits on a particular day change
  frequently, perhaps daily. This would make joinder as advocated by
  High Side a practical impossibility.

                                    43