Court Opinion

ID: 9473812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:40:22.537741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:44.662891
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in the opinion and judgment except as to the direction to dismiss the age discrimination claim with prejudice. In an area plainly involving trial court discretion, turning on matters of fact, Noonan v. Cunara Steamship Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir.1967), surely the district court, which observed the litigation and the evidence, is in the best position to determine whether appellee was simply avoiding an adverse decision. Indeed, the district court’s opinion — as well as appellee’s brief — indicates that the age discrimination claim was not frivolous. Moreover, I would reject appellant’s argument that this case resembles Williams v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 627 F.2d 158, 160 (8th Cir.1980), where the Eighth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion under Rule 41(a)(2) in a case in which plaintiff moved for dismissal without prejudice after the jury verdict in his favor but before the district court decided the defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In Williams, the plaintiff had the ability to appeal the district court’s decision on the judgment n.o.v. motion. Here, however, the trial had not finished, and we cannot review properly the merits of appellee’s age discrimination claim.
It is clear that the prospect of a second trial is insufficient legal prejudice to require dismissal with prejudice. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v. Leith, 668 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1981); 5 J. Moore, J. Lucas & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice K 41.05[1], at 41-62 (citing cases). While I might ask the trial court to review its ruling on remand, I think we step beyond our bounds in directing dismissal with prejudice.