Court Opinion

ID: 9379155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 20:02:24.754926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.096790
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/23 Nararrete v. Rotter CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

IRMA B. NAVARRETE,                                             2d Civ. No. B318422
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 56-2021-
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                               00558386-CU-HR-VTA)
                                                                (Ventura County)
v.

SAM ROTTER,

     Defendant and Appellant.

        Sam Rotter appeals a civil harassment restraining order
issued in favor of Irma B. Navarrete, respondent. He also
appeals from an order denying his special motion to strike the
petition for a restraining order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd.
(i).)1 In the trial court and on appeal, both parties appeared in

       Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to
         1

the Code of Civil Procedure.
propria persona. We affirm because appellant has failed to carry
his burden on appeal.
                         Procedural History
       In September 2021 respondent filed a petition for a civil
harassment restraining order against appellant. The trial court
issued a temporary restraining order. In November 2021
appellant filed a special motion to strike the petition pursuant to
section 425.16, commonly known as the anti-SLAPP statute.
       A court trial was conducted in December 2021. The court
denied appellant’s special motion to strike. It issued the
requested restraining order. The order will expire on December
30, 2023.
                           Trial Testimony
       Appellant did not testify and did not call any witnesses.
Respondent testified as follows: She rented a room in her house
to appellant. He moved in on October 31, 2020. Five days later,
she asked him to move out. Appellant threatened, “‘I will beat
you up.’” On November 27, 2020, he again threatened to beat her
up.
       On December 3, 2020, appellant came to the house in the
evening. He was accompanied by police officers. “[H]e start[ed]
yelling and screaming that [respondent] took his belongings out
[of his room].” He told the police that she had “kick[ed] him out
when he already paid for the room.” Appellant kicked the front
door of the house and threw a rock at it. The rock broke a glass
window in the door.
       The officers appeared to leave. Using a metal object,
appellant shattered two windows on the side of the house. He
said to respondent, “I’m going to kill you.” Respondent called
911. Appellant was arrested.

                                 2
       Two days later, between 10:00 p.m. and midnight appellant
parked his car outside respondent’s house. When respondent
walked outside, appellant drove away.
       A few days later, respondent’s car was vandalized. In April
2021 someone shot a BB gun at her car and broke the windshield.
In December 2021 her residence was “egged.”
       Respondent’s neighbor, Lenny Dillon, testified on her
behalf. At about 7:00 p.m. on December 3, 2020, he saw
appellant throw an approximately 7-inch x 5-inch x 2-inch piece
of concrete at respondent’s house. It hit the front door. The
police were there, and they told appellant to leave the property.
Appellant left, but he returned about three minutes later after
the police had departed. He “grabbed a dolly from the side of the
house.” The dolly had two wheels. Using the dolly, he broke two
of the house’s windows. He yelled that he “was going to kill” the
people inside the residence. He struck respondent’s
“roommate . . . with the dolly.” The police arrested appellant.
                         Trial Court’s Ruling
       The trial court stated that respondent’s testimony had been
corroborated by her neighbor’s testimony and a video of the
December 3, 2020 incident. The court continued, “Here, there’s a
landlord/tenant relationship, but that does not justify the act of
vandalism of throwing that rock . . . at the front door and then
moments later . . . breaking the windows of the house. [¶] There
was no corroboration to the BB gun allegation on the car, to the
egging. But those acts of vandalism [throwing the rock and
breaking the house’s windows] and the threat made [have] been
sufficiently corroborated. The petitioner has met the requisite
burden of proof. The restraining order against [appellant] is
granted.”

                                3
        Requests to Augment the Record and For Judicial Notice
         On September 27, 2022, appellant filed a motion to
augment the record on appeal with two exhibits attached to the
motion. The motion is denied because the exhibits were not
before the trial court in the present action. (Vons Companies,
Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3
[“Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with
materials not before the trial court”].)
         On December 8, 2022, respondent filed a request to take
judicial notice of clear copies of exhibits attached to her request
for a restraining order filed on September 27, 2021. The same
exhibits appear in the Clerk’s Transcript at pages 12-40. We
grant the request. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
                          Appellant’s Contentions
         Appellant contends:
         (1) The evidence is insufficient to support the restraining
order. “This case concerns a landlord . . . committing a SELF-
HELP eviction . . . on a 73 year old senior citizen (Rotter)
expecting to get away with it by foisting a cock and bull story of
self-inflicted homelessness and then turning an attempted tenant
reentry into a SLAPP harassment Restraining order.” “There are
no statutes or cases that can support [respondent’s] criminality.
She has only her fabrications muckraking and vituperations to
fall back on.”
          (2) The trial court erroneously denied appellant’s anti-
SLAPP motion. “The cause of action motivating the ANT[I]-
SLAPP motion . . . was to fight a matter of public significance,
‘SELF-HELP EVICTION’.” “So essentially the protected activity
. . . is appellant’s right to petition against the Public Issue of
‘SELF-HELP EVICTION’ perpetrated by [respondent].”

                                 4
       (3) Respondent is not entitled to a restraining order
because she “came to the court with ‘Unclean Hands.’”
        (4) The litigation of respondent’s harassment claim was
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as “issue
preclusion.”
       (5) The trial court erroneously overruled appellant’s
objection “to the injection of a witness testimony during the
hearing.”
       (6) The trial court erroneously overruled appellant’s
objection “to the viewing of [a] doctored video . . . . The court cut
short [appellant’s] full explanation of the multiple reasons for
[his] objection which was a violation of judicial discretion.” “No
foundation was laid by the respondent of the DVD proving its
authenticity or explaining the circumstances of its editing.”
       (7) “The playing of that DVD represented a violation of
[Penal Code section] 632,” which makes it unlawful to record
confidential communications without the consent of all parties to
the communications.
       (8) Respondent “refused to provide” to appellant portions of
the video tape that were favorable to appellant. “[T]his
constitutes FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT and
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE.”
       (9) The trial court permitted a photo to be “distorted by
hand drawn non-existent street lights.” “When the appellant
tried to object and clarify that the pictures showed no street
lights the court cut [him] off . . . .”
          Appellant Failed to Carry His Burden on Appeal
       “‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed
correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error

                                  5
must be affirmatively shown. . . .’” (Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
       The California Rules of Court provide: “An appellant’s
opening brief must . . . [p]rovide a summary of the significant
facts limited to matters in the record.” (Id., Rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).)
Each factual reference must be supported “by a citation to the
volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears.” (Id., Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
       The requisite factual summary is missing from appellant’s
opening brief. Instead of setting forth the facts underlying
respondent’s harassment claim, he makes conclusionary
accusations such as, “The situation is that of a serial SELF-
HELP EVICTOR trying to evade her malevolent actions through
the arch typical means of a punitive concocted harassment
restraining order.”
       “An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the judgment must cite the evidence in the record
supporting the judgment and explain why such evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law. [Citations.] An appellant who
fails to cite and discuss the evidence supporting the judgment
cannot demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient.” (Rayii v.
Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.) By failing to cite and
discuss the evidence supporting the restraining order, appellant
has forfeited his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
       Appellant argues that respondent gave false testimony.
But her testimony was corroborated by Lenny Dillon’s testimony.
“‘The trial court was the trier of fact and the sole judge of the
credibility of witnesses. We are not in a position to weigh any
conflicts or disputes in the evidence. Even if different inferences
can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we may not

                                 6
substitute our own inferences or deductions for those of the trial
court.’” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 106.)
       As to appellant’s other contentions, there is no “meaningful
legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to
facts in the record . . . .” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396,
408, italics added.) Appellant cites authorities. Indeed, his
opening brief is replete with lengthy quotations from authorities
concerning general principles of law. But he fails to adequately
explain how these general principles of law support his
contentions. “[A] brief must contain ‘“meaningful legal analysis
supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the
record that support the claim of error”’ . . . or else we will deem
all points ‘to be forfeited as unsupported by “adequate factual or
legal analysis.”’” (Fernandes v. Singh (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 932,
942-943.)
       Appellant claims that the trial court committed various
errors. But it is not enough to assert that errors were made.
“[A]n appellant must show that the error was prejudicial to
compel reversal. [Citation.] . . . ‘To establish prejudice, a
party must show “a reasonable probability that in the absence of
the error, a result more favorable to [him] would have been
reached.” . . .’” (Guardianship of C.E. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th
1038, 1054.) Appellant has not carried his burden of showing
that the alleged errors prejudiced him.
                                Disposition
       The order denying appellant’s special motion to strike and
the judgment are affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on
appeal.

                                 7
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                  YEGAN, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                              8
                  William R. Redmond, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

     Sam Rotter, in pro. per., and for Defendant and Appellant.
     Irma Navarrette, in pro. per., and for Plaintiff and
Respondent.