Court Opinion

ID: 9902213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:04:31.7533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.667733
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals

                     NO. 2022-CA-1536-MR

LAURA MCCARTY AS
THE ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF
LEAH CARTER                                          APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE DAVID L. WILLIAMS, JUDGE
                   ACTION NO. 19-CI-00080

JAMES WILLETT AND SCOTT
WILLETT AS CO-EXECUTORS
OF THE ESTATE OF TOM
ROBERT WILLETT, III; RICKY
BARTLEY, ROGER DECKARD,
ALONZO FORD, KAREN GORDON,
MITCHELL PAGE, JAIME VEACH,
RICKY GRAVES, AND MARK
WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES
AS MONROE COUNTY MAGISTRATES;
LARRY GRAVES, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SUPERVISOR OF THE COUNTY
ROADS OF MONROE COUNTY;
MONROE COUNTY FISCAL COURT;
ARNOLD CONSULTING SERVICES, INC.;
AND QK4, INC.                                        APPELLEES
                               OPINION
                        AFFIRMING IN PART AND
                   REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Laura McCarty, as the Administratrix of the Estate of Leah

Carter (“the Estate”), appeals from the Monroe Circuit Court’s findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and order granting summary judgment. McCarty’s daughter,

Leah Carter, drowned after flood waters swept her car from a bridge in Monroe

County. The Estate brought a wrongful death suit against multiple defendants,

including the Monroe County Judge Executive, several members of the Monroe

County Fiscal Court, the Monroe County road supervisor, and the two engineering

companies who designed the bridge. The trial court held that the Monroe County

defendants were entitled to legislative and qualified official immunity. It further

held that the engineering firms were protected by the county’s sovereign immunity

and by qualified official immunity, and that the removal of a portion of the

guardrail on the bridge was a superseding act that absolved them of any potential

liability. Upon careful review, we affirm in part, we reverse in part the grant of

summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

                                         -2-
                                BACKGROUND FACTS

                In 2012, Monroe County received a $500,000 HUD1 grant to repair

and improve county roads that had been damaged in flooding. The county decided

to use most of the funds to replace the Lyons Road ford over the East Fork of the

Barren River. The ford, which consisted of several pipes covered with gravel,

flooded when it rained and had been deemed unsafe. The Monroe County Fiscal

Court held a special meeting to consider three different consulting firms to oversee

the construction of the bridge; they chose Arnold Consulting Engineering Services,

Inc. (“ACES”). The fiscal court thereafter entered into a contract with ACES to

manage the project. ACES obtained the necessary permits from the Army Corps

of Engineers and the Kentucky Division of Water, performed the surveying and the

hydrologic modeling, and reviewed the bids submitted for construction. ACES

designed the road approaches to the bridge and sub-contracted with QK4, Inc.

(“QK4”) to design the actual bridge structure. Do-All Construction was hired to

build the bridge.

                Kent Gilley, the engineer who designed and coordinated the bridge

project for ACES, testified in his deposition that the height of the bridge was

limited by the county’s budget. He explained that constructing a bridge high

enough to withstand a 100-year flood event would have cost $2 million to $3

1
    (Department of) Housing and Urban Development.

                                             -3-
million and that even a bridge costing $1 million would have been overtopped with

water. ACES provided the fiscal court with several less expensive options. The

County Judge Executive at the time, Tommy Willett, selected a design for a two-

lane prestressed box beam bridge that could possibly withstand a two or five-year

flood event.

               Gilley determined where the guardrails would be placed on the

approaches to the bridge. He explained that the guardrail on the right side was

extended to prevent cars from exiting outside of the curve where the stream

widened on the downstream end of the bridge. He testified that this was its

function during normal conditions and that the guardrails were not intended or

designed to keep a motor vehicle on the bridge during flood conditions. He

explained that the bridge was not designed to be driven over at all during flood

events and that this was why advanced warning signs, advising motorists not to

cross in flood conditions, were placed on both ends of the approaches to the bridge.

               The plans for the bridge provided for three permanent signs to be

installed on the approach to the bridge: “Flood Area Ahead,” placed at 750 feet

before the bridge; “Impassable During High Water” at 550 feet before the bridge;

and “Do Not Enter When Flooded” at 200 feet before the bridge.

               Jeff Arnold, the president of ACES, which he founded in 2006,

testified that the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet had been one of his company’s

                                          -4-
bigger clients until three or four years before; more recently, his clients included

the developer of the Dollar General Stores and Realty Link, a company located in

Greenwell, South Carolina, which performs commercial, retail, and residential

work.

             Like Gilley, Arnold testified that the Lyons Road bridge was not

designed to be driven over by motorists during flood conditions and that the

guardrails on the bridge were not designed to keep a motor vehicle on the bridge

during flood conditions.

             Roger Wade, the chief structural engineer at QK4 who performed the

structural design work on the bridge itself, was asked the following question in his

deposition: “Are guardrails designed and installed on bridges to keep motorists on

the road when the motorist may attempt to pass when water is over the bridge? Is

that the intent or purpose of the guardrails?” He responded, “What I would say is

the intent is to protect the motorists from when they impact, to keep them on the

bridge. I don’t know how – if water is included in that analysis. I’ve never done

one where water was included in the analysis of the impact.” He was then asked,

“If water were over the guardrails, would that keep a motorist from passing – or

from washing off the bridge?” He replied, “It would not.”

             Evidence was elicited that modifications were made to the design of

the bridge during construction that were not approved by ACES. Changes were

                                          -5-
made to the vertical grade of the bridge and the materials used on the bridge; for

example, ACES’s design called for sloped rock abutments but the bridge was built

using sloped concrete abutments. ACES did not have adequate funding to perform

periodic inspections and consequently the county road supervisor, who was not an

engineer, supervised the construction. Neither ACES nor QK4 had any

involvement with the bridge after it was completed in 2014.

             Soon after the completion of the bridge, the county began receiving

complaints that debris and trash were collecting in the guardrail and preventing

water from flowing through. According to Gilley, he had anticipated this problem

and feared that debris would get trapped by the guardrail and damage it. The

county road supervisor had to employ his road crew with backhoes and other heavy

equipment to remove and haul off the debris. This occurred almost every time it

rained and resulted in the road being closed on multiple occasions.

             At some point between 2015 and 2017, Willett, the County Judge

Executive at that time, decided that forty feet of guardrail would be removed on the

east approach to the bridge to allow the debris to flow through more freely. Willett

claimed he spoke with Magistrate Alonzo Ford about removing the guardrail,

although Ford did not recall the conversation. Willett did not consult ACES or

QK4, the Transportation Cabinet, or the Army Corps of Engineers regarding the

removal of the guardrail. The road supervisor and his crew shortened the guardrail

                                         -6-
by approximately forty feet. Gilley testified that the county officials did not need

his approval to remove that portion of the guardrail, but, if they had consulted him,

he would have told them not to do so.

             On December 31, 2018, Leah Carter, who was nineteen years of age,

left her parents’ home at approximately 6:30 p.m. to have New Year’s Eve dinner

with her boyfriend’s family. The accident report states that it had rained that day

and the Lyons Road bridge was flooded. As she drove across the bridge, her car

was carried off the bridge by flood waters. She was able to place distress calls to

911 and to her mother, but first responders were unable to find her or her vehicle

until five days later. Her cause of death was drowning.

             At the time Carter approached the bridge, the sign placed 200 feet

before the bridge reading “Do Not Enter When Flooded” had been removed. It is

not known who removed the sign or exactly when the removal occurred. The two

remaining signs – “Flood Area Ahead” and “Impassable During High Water” –

were affixed to one pole rather than separate poles.

             The Estate filed a wrongful death action alleging negligence relating

to the design, construction, and maintenance of the Lyons Road bridge and the

adequacy of the warning signs. The defendants included the Monroe County

Fiscal Court; the Monroe County Judge Executive Tommy Willett in his individual

and official capacity (Willett passed away during the proceedings and James

                                         -7-
Willett and Scott Willett as the co-executors of his estate were substituted as

parties); eight Monroe County Fiscal Court representatives, in their individual and

official capacities; the Monroe County Road Supervisor, Larry Graves; Do-All

Construction, Inc., QK4; and ACES. During the course of discovery, the Estate

settled its claims against Do-All Construction and an agreed order was entered

dismissing it as a defendant. The Estate named two additional defendants in its

first amended complaint: Norm Fertig and Michael Vickers, both individually and

in their official capacities as inspectors for QK4, as retained by the Kentucky

Department of Transportation.

             On November 29, 2022, the trial court granted summary judgment to

all the remaining defendants with the exception of Fertig and Vickers. It

designated its opinion and order as final and appealable, there being no just cause

for delay, in accordance with Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 54.02.

The opinion held that the Monroe Fiscal Court was entitled to sovereign immunity,

and the County Judge Executive, the Fiscal Court members and the road supervisor

were entitled to sovereign immunity in their official capacities and qualified

official immunity in their individual capacities. It further held that the County

Judge Executive and Magistrates were entitled to absolute legislative immunity. As

to ACES and QK4, the trial court held that they were cloaked with the county’s

                                         -8-
sovereign immunity and that the removal of the guardrail constituted a superseding

cause that absolved them of any liability.

              This appeal by the Estate followed.2

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

              In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our inquiry focuses on

“whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any

material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996); CR 56.03. The trial

court is required to view the record “in a light most favorable to the party opposing

the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.”

Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).

On the other hand, “a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment

motion cannot defeat it without presenting at least some affirmative evidence

showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Id. at 482. “An

appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision on summary judgment

and will review the issue de novo because only legal questions and no factual

findings are involved.” Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 705

(Ky. App. 2004).

2
  The Estate filed a notice of appeal which included Fertig and Vickers as named appellees. It
subsequently filed an amended notice of appeal deleting these names, presumably to reflect the
fact that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment did not apply to these defendants.

                                              -9-
                                     ANALYSIS

             As a preliminary matter, the Estate does not challenge the trial court’s

ruling that the Monroe County Fiscal Court, Judge Executive, Magistrates, and

road supervisor are entitled to sovereign immunity in their official capacities. The

trial court’s judgment is affirmed in this respect.

I. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment to
the Judge Executive and Magistrates on the basis of legislative immunity

             The trial court ruled that the Monroe County Judge Executive and

Magistrates are entitled to absolute legislative immunity, in their official and

individual capacities. The Estate argues that (1) these appellees waived the

defense of absolute legislative immunity by failing to plead it as an affirmative

defense in a timely manner; (2) absolute legislative immunity does not apply to

county officials; and (3) even if legislative immunity does apply, the actions of

these appellees were not legislative in character.

              “As a general rule, a party’s failure to timely assert an affirmative

defense waives that defense . . . unless the circuit court allowed it to be presented

later.” American Founders Bank, Inc. v. Moden Investments, LLC, 432 S.W.3d

715, 722 (Ky. App. 2014) (citing Bowling v. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections, 301

S.W.3d 478, 485 (Ky. 2009)); CR 8.03).

             The Estate filed its complaint on September 27, 2019, and its first

amended complaint on February 21, 2020. The Monroe County appellees did not

                                         -10-
raise the affirmative defensive of legislative immunity in their answers. In the

memorandum supporting their motion for summary judgment, filed on September

2, 2021, the Monroe County appellees argued for the first time that they were

entitled to legislative immunity. In its sur-reply filed on October 20, 2021, the

Estate disputed the availability of legislative immunity. The Estate filed a motion

for leave to file its second amended complaint on October 15, 2021. The Monroe

County appellees filed an answer to the second amended complaint on February

28, 2022, asserting the affirmative defense of legislative immunity. The trial

court’s order granting summary judgment was entered on November 29, 2022.

             Upon careful consideration, we conclude that the Monroe County

appellees did not waive the affirmative defense of legislative immunity. Although

the defense was only asserted for the first time in their motion for summary

judgment, the Estate was given an adequate opportunity to respond to the assertion

of the defense and the trial court allowed it to do so.

             Legislative immunity applies to members of Congress and to

members of the Kentucky General Assembly, under the terms of the United States

Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution.

                   Legislative immunity is derived from the Speech
             or Debate clause found in the U.S. Constitution, Article I,
             Section 6. See also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
             372-73, 71 S. Ct. 783, 786, 95 L. Ed. 1019 (1951). The
             U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the clause
             immunizes congressmen from suits for either prospective

                                         -11-
            relief or damages. Eastland v. United States
            Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-503, 95 S. Ct.
            1813, 1821, 44 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1975). The purpose of this
            immunity is to insure that the legislative function may be
            performed independently without fear of outside
            interference. In other words, to preserve legislative
            independence, “legislators engaged ‘in the sphere of
            legitimate legislative activity’ should be protected not
            only from the consequences of litigation’s results but also
            from the burden of defending themselves.” Dombrowski
            v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85, 87 S. Ct. 1425, 1428, 18 L.
            Ed. 2d 577 (1967) (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376, 71
            S. Ct. at 788).

                   Similarly, Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution
            explicitly protects “any speech or debate” of members of
            the General Assembly that is made within the confines of
            the Senate or House of Representatives. Kentucky
            Revised Statutes (KRS) 83A.060(15), formerly KRS
            84.050(5), further states: “For anything said in debate,
            legislative body members shall be entitled to the same
            immunities and protections allowed to members of the
            general assembly.” Thus, our General Assembly
            intended to grant an absolute privilege to “legislative
            body members” while performing the functions of the
            office.

D.F. Bailey, Inc. v. GRW Engineers, Inc., 350 S.W.3d 818, 821 (Ky. App. 2011).

            Legislative immunity has been extended to city officials by KRS

83A.060(15), which states: “For anything said in debate, [city] legislative body

members shall be entitled to the same immunities and protections allowed to

members of the General Assembly.”

            There is no comparable statute extending legislative immunity to

county officials. The Monroe County appellees rely on Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523

                                       -12-
U.S. 44, 118 S. Ct. 966, 140 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1998), which holds that “[l]ocal

legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from [42 United States Code

(“U.S.C.”)] § 1983 liability for their legislative activities.” 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.

Ct. at 972. The Bogan Court reasoned that, “[r]egardless of the level of

government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by

judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability.” Id. at 52, 118 S.

Ct. at 971. But Bogan, by its own terms, applies only to federal § 1983 actions, not

to Kentucky tort claims.

             Whether county officials are protected by legislative immunity or not,

the defense is not available to the Monroe County Judge Executive and Magistrates

because their actions were not legislative in nature. “[L]egislative immunity

applies if an act is both legislative in form and legislative in substance.” 4th Leaf,

LLC v. City of Grayson, 425 F. Supp. 3d 810, 823 (E.D. Ky. 2019). “Legislative

immunity attaches [only to] actions taken ‘in the sphere of legitimate legislative

activity.’” Bogan, 523 U.S at 54, 118 S. Ct at 972. Recently, the Kentucky

Supreme Court cautioned that legislative immunity is not unlimited:

             Broad though the ambit of protection for the legislative
             sphere has become, it does not cover everything
             lawmakers do. Legislative immunity does not apply to
             activities that are casually or incidentally related to
             legislative affairs but not part of the legislative process
             itself. For instance, even under the broad scope of the
             federal speech or debate clause, legislative immunity
             does not protect the political activities of legislators, nor

                                          -13-
             does it protect legislators engaged in criminal activity,
             even if the criminal activity is committed in furtherance
             of legislative activity.

Stivers v. Beshear, 659 S.W.3d 313, 324 (Ky. 2022) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

             The Fiscal Court serves as the legislative body for Monroe County, as

established pursuant to Kentucky Constitution, Section 144 and KRS 67.040 et

seq. but that does not mean that every action or decision its officials take is

legislative in character. See Lincoln Trail Grain Growers Association, Inc. v.

Meade County Fiscal Court, 632 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Ky. App. 2021). In other

words, the Monroe County Judge Executive and Magistrates are not entitled to

legislative immunity simply by virtue of being elected officials.

             In the federal context, “[i]t is the defendants’ burden to establish the

existence of absolute legislative immunity.” Canary v. Osborn, 211 F.3d 324, 328

(6th Cir. 2000). The Estate’s claims against the County Judge Executive and

Magistrates concern their alleged failure to get the requisite approval for

modifications of the bridge, to maintain required signage at the bridge, and their

decision to remove a section of the guardrail. These actions or omissions do not

exhibit “all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.” Grayson, 425 F. Supp. 3d at

823. There is no evidence that the Fiscal Court as a body ever discussed any of

these actions or held a formal vote on them. Willett’s decision to remove a portion

                                         -14-
of the guardrail was apparently made after an informal, personal conversation with

one of the Magistrates, who did not remember the interchange.

             The trial court held that the appellees’ actions were inherently

legislative based on KRS 67.080, which gives the fiscal court the power, among

other things, to “cause the construction, operation, and maintenance of all county

buildings and other structures, grounds, roads and other property[.]” KRS

67.080(2)(b). But these duties are not purely legislative; they are executive and

administrative. The fiscal court exercises legislative and ministerial powers as

well as powers quasi-judicial in their nature. Shelton v. Smith, 284 Ky. 236, 144

S.W.2d 500, 501 (1940). KRS 67.080 does not bestow blanket immunity on the

appellees for every action taken in connection with the construction, operation, or

maintenance of the bridge.

             Based on the evidence before us, the County Judge Executive and

Magistrates’ alleged failure to get requisite approval for the modifications of the

bridge, failing to maintain signage at the bridge, and removing a section of the

guardrail do not qualify as legislative acts and, consequently, the trial court erred

as a matter of law in holding that these acts were protected by legislative

immunity.

                                         -15-
II. The Monroe County appellees were not entitled to qualified official
immunity because the maintenance of the signs and guardrail was a
ministerial duty

             The Estate argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the Monroe

County appellees were entitled to qualified official immunity in their individual

capacities from the negligence claims stemming from the removal of a portion of

the guardrail on the bridge and failure to maintain the signage leading up to the

bridge.

             Qualified official immunity applies to shield only “the negligent

performance by a public officer or employee of (1) discretionary acts or functions,

i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal

deliberation, decision, and judgment . . . ; (2) in good faith; and (3) within the

scope of the employee’s authority[.]” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky.

2001) (citations omitted). “[A]t their core, discretionary acts are those involving

quasi-judicial or policy-making decisions.” Marson v. Thomason, 438 S.W.3d

292, 297 (Ky. 2014). Immunity is provided for discretionary acts because the

“courts should not be called upon to pass judgment on policy decisions made by

members of coordinate branches of government in the context of tort actions,

because such actions furnish an inadequate crucible for testing the merits of social,

political or economic policy.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 519.

                                         -16-
             By contrast, immunity from tort liability is not afforded to

government officials “for the negligent performance of a ministerial act.” Patton

v. Bickford, 529 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Ky. 2016), as modified on denial of rehearing

(Aug. 24, 2017). “[A] duty is ministerial ‘when the officer’s duty is absolute,

certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act arising from

fixed and designated facts.’” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] government official

performing a ministerial duty does so without particular concern for his own

judgment; . . . the act is ministerial ‘if the employee has no choice but to do the

act.’” Id. at 724 (citations omitted). “Of course, whether a ministerial act was

performed properly, i.e., non-negligently, is a separate question from whether the

act is ministerial, and is usually reserved for a jury.” Marson, 438 S.W.3d at 297.

             The trial court ruled that the removal of a portion of the guardrail was

a “judgment call” made in response to numerous complaints about the

accumulation of debris and trash and concluded on that basis that it was a

discretionary act. The trial court further held that the record was clear that

advanced warning signs were present on the date of the accident to warn motorists

not to cross the bridge during heavy rains and, for this reason, the Estate’s claim of

inadequate warning failed as a matter of law.

                                         -17-
             Under our case law, the removal of the portion of the guardrail and the

failure to replace the missing warning sign were ministerial acts or omissions for

which the Monroe County defendants are not afforded qualified official immunity.

             In Estate of Clark ex rel. Mitchell v. Daviess County, 105 S.W.3d 841,

846 (Ky. App. 2003), the Court held that the alleged failure of county employees to

replace a missing highway warning sign was ministerial in nature. If a case

“involves the maintenance or repair of existing sections of roadway, rather than a

decision to erect signs or guardrails on same, such action or inaction may be

considered ministerial.” Hammers v. Plunk, 374 S.W.3d 324, 330 n.3 (Ky. App.

2011). The maintenance of county roads and bridges is ministerial rather than

discretionary. Shearer v. Hall, 399 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1965). The Monroe County

defendants had a ministerial duty to maintain the guardrail once it was put in place

and, consequently, they are not entitled to qualified official immunity for claims

relating to its partial removal.

             Similarly, they had a ministerial duty to maintain the warning signs

once those signs were put in place. The trial court’s holding that the claim of

inadequate warning fails as a matter of law because the advanced warning signs

were present on the date of the accident does not accurately reflect the evidence in

the record. The “Do Not Enter When Flooded” sign was missing on the date of the

accident and the other two signs were affixed to one pole, rather than to separate

                                        -18-
poles placed at different distances from the bridge. The Estate claims that this

arrangement was in violation of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

for Streets and Highways, the requirements of the design plans, and the standard of

care for the industry. This argument is supported by the opinions of the Estate’s

expert witnesses. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the claim relating to

the adequacy of the warning signs as a matter of law because genuine issues of

material fact remain about the number and placement of the signs.

III. Private contractors are not entitled to sovereign or qualified immunity
simply because they are performing work for a county and QK4 and ACES
are not entitled to sovereign immunity under the facts of this case

             The Estate challenges the trial court’s ruling that the two private

contractors, ACES and QK4, were entitled to the same immunity as the county

itself. KRS 322.360(1) provides that “Neither the state nor any of its political

subdivisions shall engage in the construction of any public work involving

engineering, unless the plans, specifications, and estimates have been prepared and

the construction executed under the direct supervision of a professional engineer or

a licensed architect.” Because Monroe County does not have its own civil or

structural engineer, due to the scarcity of engineering professionals in rural

counties, it engaged ACES and its subcontractor QK4 to develop the plans,

specifications and estimates for the bridge design. The trial court reasoned that, as

                                         -19-
the county’s appointees, ACES and QK4 were entitled to the same sovereign

immunity as the county itself.

             In determining whether an entity is an arm, agent, or alter ego of a

county in order to share in its immunity, we consider the origins of the entity and

the nature of the function it carries out. Comair v. Lexington-Fayette Urban

County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 99 (Ky. 2009). For example, in Autry v.

Western Kentucky University, SLF Inc., which owned a dormitory at Western

Kentucky University (“WKU”), was held to be an alter ego of WKU because it

existed only to serve the university and consequently was entitled to share its

immunity. 219 S.W.3d 713 (Ky. 2007). The Court explained, “WKU is a

governmental agency fulfilling the public purpose of higher education by

providing residence halls to its students which it manages and controls. It uses

SLF as an agent to own property for WKU’s purposes. This is all that SLF does.

Thus, while SLF is an incorporated entity, it exists only to serve WKU, and derives

its immunity status through WKU.” Id. at 719.

             By contrast, Monroe County did not create ACES or QK4 as a

governmental agency, nor did it designate either of them as the county’s agent or

alter ego. See Shadrick v. Hopkins County, Ky., 805 F.3d 724, 746 (6th Cir. 2015).

These entities are private, for-profit companies that do not exist only to serve

Monroe County. The president of ACES testified that the company has numerous

                                         -20-
clients including commercial companies like Dollar General and Realty Link. The

status of ACES and QK4 is analogous to that of Southern Health Partners, Inc.

(“SHP”), a for-profit company providing medical services to jails and detention

centers, including the Hardin County Detention Center (“HCDC”). After an

inmate brought a medical negligence claim against HCDC, this Court held in an

unpublished opinion that SHP and its nurses were not entitled to qualified official

immunity because SHP is a private corporation that operates in twelve different

states and does not exist solely to serve the HCDC and is not its alter ego.

Sietsema v. Adams, No. 2013-CA-001159-MR, 2015 WL 4776304, at *7 (Ky.

App. Aug. 14, 2015), reversed on other grounds by Adams v. Sietsema, 533

S.W.3d 172 (Ky. 2017). The Court’s analysis of SHP’s status, although not of

precedential value, applies equally to ACES and QK4:

                    SHP was not created by the state of Kentucky or
             any of its agencies, but is a private, for-profit
             corporation. Simply because it provides services to a
             state agent does not automatically entitle it to official
             immunity. In fact, Kentucky and Federal case law find
             that an independent contractor who performs services for
             the government is liable for his own negligence and is
             “responsible just as he would be on private work.”
             Taylor v. Westerfield, 233 Ky. 619, 26 S.W.2d 557, 561
             (1930). See also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399,
             117 S. Ct. 2100, 138 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1997) (prison guards
             employed by a private company are not entitled to
             immunity); McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696 (6th Cir.
             2012) (a psychiatrist employed by an independent, non-
             profit organization who worked part-time for a county
             prison is not entitled to qualified immunity); Harrison v.

                                        -21-
             Ash, 539 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2008) (nurses employed by a
             private medical provider to provide medical services in a
             jail are not entitled to qualified official immunity).

Sietsema, 2015 WL 4776304, at *7. The fact that the county is required by statute

to employ an engineer or architect in the construction of public works does not

extend governmental immunity to that individual or entity; under KRS 441.045,

detention facilities are required to provide medical care for inmates but entities like

SHF which provide these services are not cloaked with governmental immunity.

ACES and QK4 are not entitled to governmental immunity and consequently their

officials are not entitled to qualified official immunity.

             ACES argues that it was entitled to summary judgment on other than

immunity grounds. It contends that because it designed the bridge as a reasonable

engineer would under similar circumstances, its design does not violate the

applicable standard of care, and that the standard of care may be relaxed on

projects such as this one where funding is limited. “[A]n expert witness is required

to establish the standard of care in professional negligence cases in Kentucky,

unless the standard is within the general or common knowledge of laypersons.”

Boland-Maloney Lumber Co., Inc. v. Burnett, 302 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Ky. App.

2009). The design of a bridge and its approaches is certainly not within the

common knowledge of laypersons. These factual determinations preclude the

grant of summary judgment to ACES.

                                          -22-
            QK4 argues that, in addition to being entitled to the same immunity as

the county, it was further cloaked with immunity when the county approved its

structural design. QK4 contends that when the Monroe County Fiscal Court

approved the bridge design, the fiscal court immunized QK4 from any personal

injury claims. It contends that QK4 could not make the legislative decision for the

fiscal court as to which design to implement based on the limited budget available

and that QK4’s design achieved the objectives of supporting traffic and staying

standing during a flood. QK4 argues that there is no evidence of any kind that its

design did not meet Kentucky engineering standards and perform as Monroe

County had intended.

            QK4’s argument elides immunity derived from a governmental body

with common law liability for negligence. Its contention that consulting engineers

are protected by “derivative sovereign immunity” based on the “government

contractor defense” is not in our case law. As we have already determined, QK4 is

not entitled to governmental immunity derived from the county. The case upon

which QK4 relies, Rigsby v. Brighton Engineering Company, 464 S.W.2d 279, 281

(Ky. 1970), contains a straightforward negligence analysis that does not extend

sovereign or governmental immunity to the contractor. In designing a bridge for

the Kentucky Department of Highways, Brighton Engineering was required to

comply with the Department’s binding criteria that guardrails would not be

                                       -23-
installed around the bridge piers. A motorist and his family were killed when they

struck one of the piers. The Court held that Brighton was not liable for the absence

of guardrails, stating:

             The Commonwealth, Department of Highways has a staff
             of engineers with wide experience and expertise in the
             design and construction of highways. It had adopted
             criteria which were binding upon Brighton. It appears a
             recommendation that guardrails be installed at this point
             would have been futile as well as contrary to the
             directions of the Commonwealth. Under these
             circumstances it cannot be said that Brighton's failure to
             recommend guardrails was negligent.

Rigsby, 464 S.W.2d at 281.

             In McCabe Powers Body Company v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky.

1980), another case cited by QK4, a worker was injured after he fell out of the

open side of a cherry picker. He filed a personal injury suit against the

manufacturer, McCabe, alleging that the bucket was unreasonably dangerous.

                    McCabe had constructed this aerial boom in exact
             accordance with the specifications of the Kentucky
             Division of Purchases contained in the invitation to bid.
             The specifications were detailed and complete with a
             warning to the bidders that a departure from the
             specifications would result in no payment and refusal of
             delivery. The specifications specifically required that the
             bucket on the boom have one open side. It was through
             this open side that [the worker] fell when he slumped
             unconscious in the bucket.

Id. at 593. The Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to

McCabe on negligence principles, not immunity: “We conclude that ordinarily

                                        -24-
where a product is manufactured according to plans and specifications furnished by

the buyer and the alleged defect is open and obvious, the manufacturer is protected

from liability for injuries occasioned by use of the product.” Id. QK4 may

certainly invoke this defense against liability, but the fact that QK4 was employed

by ACES, a contractor for the county, does not create a form of derivative

sovereign immunity that absolutely shields QK4 from liability for negligence.

             As with ACES, an expert opinion is required in order to determine

whether QK4 performed its work negligently and consequently summary judgment

is not appropriate at this stage. QK4 argues that the structural elements of the

bridge were not “causative” of Leah Carter’s injuries, but this has not been

definitively established. The Estate argues that QK4 designed a bridge that should

have been closed to the traveling public when water overtopped it, yet never

communicated this expectation to those who would be responsible for protecting

the public – the fiscal court, judge executive, and/or county road supervisor.

Whether this argument has merit or not, it creates an issue of material fact which

precludes summary judgment at this stage.

IV. Issues of fact remain as to whether the removal of a portion of the
guardrail was a superseding act absolving ACES and QK4 of liability

             Finally, the Estate challenges the trial court’s ruling that the removal

of a portion of the guardrail by the county was a superseding act that absolved

ACES and QK4 of any liability for Carter’s death. In the trial court’s view, even if

                                         -25-
ACES or QK4 were negligent in any way in their design of the bridge and its

approaches, the removal of the guardrail was a superseding cause absolving them

of any liability. A superseding cause “breaks the chain of causation so that an

otherwise negligent actor is relieved from liability. While the act of a third-party

may be an intervening cause, it is a superseding cause only when the act is

‘extraordinary’ and of an ‘unforeseeable nature.’” Howard v. Spradlin, 562

S.W.3d 281, 287 (Ky. App. 2018) (citation omitted). A superseding cause has the

following characteristics:

             1) an act or event that intervenes between the original act
             and the injury;

             2) the intervening act or event must be of independent
             origin, unassociated with the original act;

             3) the intervening act or event must, itself, be capable of
             bringing about the injury;

             4) the intervening act or event must not have been
             reasonably foreseeable by the original actor;

             5) the intervening act or event involves the unforeseen
             negligence of a third party [one other than the first party
             original actor or the second party plaintiff] or the
             intervention of a natural force;

             6) the original act must, in itself, be a substantial factor in
             causing the injury, not a remote cause. The original act
             must not merely create negligent condition or occasion;
             the distinction between a legal cause and a mere
             condition being foreseeability of injury.

                                          -26-
Id. (quoting NKC Hospitals, Inc. v. Anthony, 849 S.W.2d 564, 568 (Ky. App.

1993)).

             In Howard v. Spradlin, supra, Spradlin frequently left his truck in a

grocery store parking lot after hours. His wife worked at the store and Spradlin

was a friend of the store operators, the Howards. A third party broke into his truck

one night, stole some firearms, ammunition, and a toolbox, then burned the truck to

cover the crime. The grocery store caught fire and the building was destroyed.

The Court held that Spradlin was relieved of any liability: “Even if we assume

Spradlin breached any duty owed to the Howards, the intervening and superseding

intentional or criminal acts of the unknown third-party broke whatever weak chain

of causation the Howards could establish.” Id. at 289. The Spradlin Court held

that the criminal acts of the unknown third party were an intervening and

superseding act because they were not reasonably foreseeable. Id.

             The Estate argues that the removal of the guardrail was not a

superseding cause because, unlike the truck break-in and fire, it was reasonably

foreseeable. But the real difficulty here relates to the third characteristic listed

above: the intervening act or event must, itself, be capable of bringing about the

injury. In Spradlin, there was no doubt that the truck fire caused the grocery store

to burn down. In the record before us, issues of material fact remain as to whether

the removal of the guardrail brought about Carter’s injury.

                                          -27-
             The Estate’s experts opined that the guardrail would have kept

Carter’s car from being swept from the bridge. In his report, Dr. Blackler opined

that

             the maximum depths over the bridge during the peak of
             the storm were less than 3 feet. The guard rail that was
             cut, was designed to be 2 feet 4 inches tall (2.33 feet).
             Had this guard rail been in place, it would have been able
             to keep the vehicle from sliding off the road during
             overtopping and able to keep the car on the road through
             the duration of the storm event.

             Dr. Dorothy’s report opined that

             Guardrails are specifically designed to contain and
             redirect vehicles under conditions of significantly greater
             force than would be experienced by a vehicle sliding
             against the guardrail during an overtopping event. As
             such, it would clearly have had a positive impact of
             containing a vehicle on the approach and bridge until
             water reached a depth sufficient to either topple, slide, or
             float the vehicle over the guardrail. Since the depth of
             the water in the subject incident was not sufficient to do
             this, if the guardrail that had been designed and installed
             as part of the Lyons Bridge construction had been present
             at the time of the subject incident, it is more likely than
             not that Ms. Carter’s vehicle would have been contained
             on the bridge, allowing the rescue of Ms. Carter in a
             timely fashion, as opposed to the fatal result that befell
             Ms. Carter due to the unwarranted removal and
             foreshortening of the guardrail.

             On the other hand, Kent Gilley and Jeff Arnold of ACES testified that

the guardrail was not intended to keep cars on the bridge in the event of a flood.

Roger Wade, the designer of the bridge, had never considered water in his analysis

                                        -28-
of the function of the guardrails and testified that if the flood water was over the

guardrails, it would not keep a vehicle from washing off the bridge.

             Based on this contradictory evidence, issues of material fact exist as to

whether the removal of the guardrail was a substantial factor in causing Leah

Carter’s death such as to render it an intervening, superseding cause. The trial

court erred in granting summary judgment to ACES and QK4 on this basis.

                                  CONCLUSION

             The Monroe County Fiscal Court, County Judge Executive,

Magistrates, and road supervisor are entitled to sovereign immunity in their official

capacities. The County Judge Executive and Magistrates are not entitled to

legislative immunity; the County Judge Executive, the Magistrates, and the County

Road Supervisor are not entitled to qualified official immunity; ACES and QK4

are not entitled to sovereign, governmental, or qualified official immunity; and

finally, disputed issues of material fact remain as to whether a superseding act

absolved ACES and QK4 of potential liability. Consequently, the trial court’s

grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -29-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:        BRIEF FOR APPELLEES MONROE
                             COUNTY DEFENDANTS :
J. Dale Golden
Laraclay Parker              Charles E. English Jr.
Alexandra DeMoss-Campbell    Aaron C. Smith
Lexington, Kentucky          J.A. Sowell
                             Bowling Green, Kentucky

                             BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ARNOLD
                             CONSULTING AND
                             ENGINEERING
                             SERVICES, INC.:

                             B. Scott Jones
                             Louisville, Kentucky

                             BRIEF FOR APPELLEE QK4, INC.:

                             John D. “Chip” Clay
                             Louisville, Kentucky

                            -30-