Court Opinion

ID: 9714972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:50:26.898416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:30.066015
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s decision with the exception of the framework it applies for determining whether Janik’s out-of-court statements were testimonial. The majority concludes that the objective intent of the police officer is determinative because the statements were the result of law enforcement interrogation. 233 Ill. 2d at 112. As set forth in my partial dissent in Stechly and my special concurrence in Rolandis G., I believe the declarant’s intent should always be the focus of the testimonial analysis. The inquiry should be whether a reasonable adult in the declarant’s position would anticipate his or her statement likely would be used in a criminal prosecution. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 324-25 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 48 (2008) (Kilbride, J., specially concurring). I write separately only to express my continued disagreement with the testimonial analysis adopted by the court. As noted by the majority, the Stechly plurality concluded that the objective intent of the questioner is determinative when the statement is produced by law enforcement questioning. 233 Ill. 2d at 111, citing Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 284-85. If the statement is not produced by law enforcement questioning, the objective intent of the declarant is the focus of the inquiry. 233 Ill. 2d at 111, citing Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 289. Thus, the Stechly plurality devised a test that shifts the focus from the declarant’s intent to the questioner’s intent depending on the circumstances. The shifting focus was based on the plurality’s reading of Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 267-68. While the Stechly plurality recognized that many authorities had determined the focus of the testimonial analysis is always the declarant’s intent in giving a statement, the plurality nevertheless concluded that Davis indicated the intent of the officer is determinative when a statement is produced by law enforcement questioning. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 267, 289-91. As explained more fully in my dissent in Stechly, I do not believe Davis altered the focus of the inquiry for determining whether a statement is testimonial. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 324-25 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To the contrary, Davis indicated that the declarant’s point of view remains the focus. In particular, Davis states, “even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.1, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237 n.1, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1. Additionally, the Stechly plurality acknowledged “ultimately it is the declarant’s intent to which the confrontation clause looks.” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 290. Thus, I continue to believe that the declarant’s intent is the proper focus in the testimonial analysis. I acknowledge, however, that a majority of this court has clearly adopted the Stechly plurality’s framework for determining whether an out-of-court statement is testimonial. See In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d at 25. Accordingly, while I disagree with that framework, I agree it is now the applicable test in the absence of further direction from the Supreme Court.