Court Opinion

ID: 9555747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 00:00:34.228713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:55.071278
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60457     Document: 00516856733          Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/14/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                    Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                     FILED
                                                                            August 14, 2023
                                  No. 22-60457                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                     Clerk

   Pieter Teeuwissen; Anthony R. Simon; Simon &
   Teeuwissen, P.L.L.C.,

                                                            Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                       versus

   Hinds County, Mississippi, by and through its Board of Supervisors;
   David Archie, individually and in his official capacity; Credell
   Calhoun, individually and in his official capacity; Robert Graham,
   individually and in his official capacity; John Does I-V, each individually
   and in his official capacity; Mississippi Association of
   Supervisors Insurance Trust,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Mississippi
                             USDC No. 3:22-CV-9
                  ______________________________

   Before Smith, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:
          Mississippi common law generally forbids local-government officers
   from using contracts to bind their successors-in-office. As a result, newly
   elected officers typically have unilateral authority to void any contracts that
   they find in effect upon taking office. But the Mississippi Supreme Court also
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   recognizes an exception to the general rule. If the prior officers had “express
   statutory authority” to bind their successors, then the successors must honor
   any contracts that their predecessors agreed to using that authority.
          A Mississippi statute empowers boards of supervisors to contract “by
   the year” for legal counsel. The Hinds County Board of Supervisors hired
   Pieter Teeuwissen and his law firm to perform legal work for the County.
   Teeuwissen’s contracts with the County were each for a one-year term. But
   before the year was up, an election flipped the board’s composition, and the
   new board terminated both contracts. Teeuwissen sued, arguing that the con-
   tracts required the County to pay him a fixed sum for the full year—even if
   the County no longer wanted his legal services. The district court granted the
   County’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that no statute expressly authorized
   the old board to bind the new one. On appeal, Teeuwissen argues that the
   statutory phrase “by the year” gave the old board “express authority” to
   bind the new board. We agree, and we therefore REVERSE and REMAND
   for further proceedings.

                                         I
          Pieter Teeuwissen and Anthony R. Simon are members of the law firm
   Simon & Teeuwissen (together, “Teeuwissen”). The Board of Supervisors
   for Hinds County, Mississippi entered into two “employment contracts”
   with Teeuwissen in the fall of 2019. The first contract named Pieter
   Teeuwissen as the Board Attorney for the Board of Supervisors, while the
   second designated the law firm as Special Counsel for the County. Each
   contract began on October 1 and terminated one year later. And each contract
   contained a clause requiring the County to pay Teeuwissen for a full year’s
   worth of work even if the board terminated the contract early. All told, these
   contracts were worth about $250,000 per year, to be paid in installments.

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          About three months into the contracts’ one-year term, an election
   occurred, and a new board took office. A majority of the new board members
   voted to terminate the contracts. Despite the early-termination clauses, and
   even though the contracts had about nine months remaining, the County
   stopped paying Teeuwissen.
          Teeuwissen sued Hinds County and the individual board members
   who voted for termination (together, “the County”). He argued that the
   early termination and stalled payments “deprived [him] of [his] property
   interest, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
   Constitution . . . and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” He also asserted several state-law
   theories. He asked the district court for damages, and for related injunctive
   and declaratory relief against the County.
          The County moved to dismiss, arguing that the new board had
   unilateral authority to terminate the contracts and to ignore the early-
   termination clauses. The County’s argument relied on a Mississippi
   common-law rule that prohibits members of a local government from using
   contracts to bind their successors-in-office. The County acknowledged that
   this rule yields when a statute expressly authorizes members of a local
   government to bind their successors. Even so, the County argued that no
   statute expressly authorized the old board to bind the new board to the
   contracts with Teeuwissen. Citing Mississippi Code § 19-3-47, Teeuwissen
   responded that the legislature has expressly authorized the board to hire local
   counsel “by the year.” According to Teeuwissen, this language allowed the
   old board to bind the new board, and therefore required the new board to pay
   the early-termination fee that the contracts called for.
          The district court granted the County’s motion to dismiss. It held that
   the contracts were voidable because Section 19-3-47 “authorizes the Board
   to contract for one-year terms, but it does not explicitly authorize them to

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   bind successors.” Since the contracts were voidable, the district court held
   that Teeuwissen had “failed to state a protected property interest,” and it
   rejected his federal causes of action. The court also declined to exercise
   supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Teeuwissen timely
   appealed.

                                                II
           The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
   appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the grant of a
   12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as true
   and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” 1

                                                III
           “The first inquiry in every due process challenge . . . is whether the
   plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in property or liberty.” 2
   “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must . . . have a
   legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” 3 “Such entitlements are ‘not created
   by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
   defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent

           _____________________
           1
             Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted).
           2
            McClelland v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 63 F.4th 996, 1014 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted).
           3
            Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
   408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972)).

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   source such as state law.’” 4 “A ‘benefit is not a protected entitlement if
   government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.’” 5
           Here, the parties agree that Mississippi law supplies the standards that
   we must use to determine whether Teeuwissen’s contracts were a
   discretionary benefit versus a protected entitlement. Mississippi’s common
   law holds that members of a local government “may not bind their successors
   in office by contract, unless expressly authorized by law.” 6 Under Section 19-
   3-47 of the Mississippi Code: “[A] board of supervisors shall have the power,
   in its discretion, to employ counsel by the year at an annual salary at an amount
   that it deems proper . . . .” 7
           The phrase “by the year” has meaning only if it allows a board to bind
   successors. Otherwise, it is surplusage. And indeed, the Mississippi Supreme
   Court’s leading case on this issue lists several other statutes in which a length
   of time was the kind of explicit authorization that the district court said was
   missing from Section 19-3-47. That case, Northeast Mental Health-Mental
   Retardation Commission v. Cleveland, guides our decision here. 8 The district
   court’s contrary view amounts to a test that no Mississippi statute meets.
           For all those reasons, we conclude that the statutory phrase “by the
   year” is an express grant of authority that allows the board of supervisors to

           _____________________
           4
               Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976)).
           5
            Harrison v. Young, 48 F.4th 331, 341 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Town of Castle Rock
   v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005)).
           6
            Ne. Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm’n v. Cleveland, 187 So. 3d 601, 604
   (Miss. 2016).
           7
               Miss. Code Ann. § 19-3-47 (emphasis added).
           8
               187 So. 3d 601 (Miss. 2016).

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   bind successors-in-office. 9 Because the contract was binding, Teeuwissen
   had a protected property interest in the money that the contracts’ early-
   termination provisions guaranteed him under Mississippi law. 10

                                                 A
           We begin with the statute’s plain text. Under Mississippi law,
   “[e]very word, sentence, phrase, or clause in a statute must be given a
   meaning.” 11 The phrase “by the year” has meaning only if it allows the board
   to bind successors. To see why, consider what the statute would look like
   without that phrase:
           [A] board of supervisors shall have the power, in its discretion,
           to employ counsel by the year at an annual salary at an amount
           that it deems proper, not to exceed the maximum annual
           amount authorized by law for payment to a member of the
           board. 12

           Teeuwissen argues that this three-word phrase “is the exact
   authorization which does authorize the board of trustees to bind a successor
   board.” Teeuwissen’s statutory interpretation gives the phrase “by the
   year” independent meaning within Section 19-3-47, because deleting it

           _____________________
           9
             See Cleveland, 187 So. 3d at 609 (“[O]rdinarily a new statute will not be
   considered as reversing long-established principles of law and equity unless the legislative
   intention to do so clearly appears.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Thorp
   Commercial Corp. v. Miss. Road Supply Co., 348 So.2d 1016, 1018 (Miss. 1977)).
           10
              See, e.g., Mollaghan v. Varnell, 105 So. 3d 291, 304 (Miss. 2012) (suggesting that
   private individuals would suffer a “deprivation of a property right” if their “employment
   contracts were . . . terminated early” or if they were less than “fully compensated under
   their contracts” with a governmental entity).
           11
             Jones Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 352 So. 3d 1123, 1132 (Miss.
   2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
           12
                Miss. Code Ann. § 19-3-47 (alterations added).

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   would change that Section’s meaning (from a meaning that allows the board
   to bind successors, to a meaning that doesn’t). By contrast, the County
   argues that the Section gives the board “statutory authority to . . . contract”
   but “does not allow that municipality to bind successors.” But if the
   County’s view were correct, its interpretation would remain valid even if the
   phrase “by the year” disappeared.
           Teeuwissen’s interpretation is superior because it saves “by the year”
   from being surplusage. If the board has authority to agree to one-year
   contracts for legal services, it necessarily (if implicitly) has authority to agree
   to a one-year contract at any point in time—even if that point is near an
   election. Nor are elections the only events that can bring a successor board
   into existence. A board member might choose to resign; or every member
   might make that same choice. Seen from this vantage, a “successor” board
   is (at least theoretically) standing around every corner. But no matter when a
   successor board arrives, or how, Section 19-3-47 requires it to honor the
   balance of any annual contracts for legal services that a predecessor board
   agreed to. 13 If it were otherwise, then the phrase “by the year” would not be
   doing any work—an interpretation that Mississippi law disfavors. 14
           Teeuwissen’s interpretation also makes good sense. Without power
   to bind successors, a board might struggle to hire counsel. Taking the
   contract would be risky during an election year, when the board’s
   membership might flip, but it would be risky during other years too (because

           _____________________
           13
             We note that some secondary sources have recognized that: “Respecting the
   binding effect of contracts extending beyond the terms of officers acting for the
   municipality, there exists a clear distinction in the judicial decisions between governmental
   and business or proprietary powers.” 10A McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 29:103 (3d ed.).
   But the County does not invoke this distinction, and we therefore decline to address it.
           14
                See Jones, 352 So. 3d at 1132.

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   members might resign at any point). And because Section 19-3-47 caps
   payment at “the maximum annual amount authorized by law for payment to
   a member of the board,” the County cannot compensate those concerns with
   a higher salary (at least not where it needs to hire a full-time Board
   Attorney). 15
          The County does not address this plain-language argument, and
   neither did the district court, but the only plausible alternative readings fail.
   For example, it cannot be that phrase “by the year” relates solely to salary—
   not to tenure. Because if that were the case, then Section 19-3-47’s separate
   reference to an “annual salary” would be superfluous. 16 We also do not read
   “by the year” as setting only a ceiling on the attorney’s tenure, or only a
   floor. Indeed, the Mississippi Attorney General has rejected both views.
   When a board hires an attorney but neglects to document the employment
   term, the Attorney General has concluded that the hire is automatically “for
   a one year term.” 17 This indicates that the employment contracts cannot
   stretch beyond a “one” year ceiling. 18 Likewise, the Attorney General says
   that boards cannot negotiate alternative fee arrangements, such as an hourly
   fee basis. 19 This indicates that employment contracts have a one-year
   minimum.

          _____________________
          15
               Miss. Code. Ann. § 19-3-47.
          16
               Id.
          17
             Employment of Counsel, Miss. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2002-0404, 2002 WL
   31169204, at *1 (Miss. A.G. Aug. 9, 2002) (emphasis added).
          18
               Id.
          19
             Employment of Counsel, Miss. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2004-0286, 2004 WL
   1379968, at *1 (Miss. A.G. May 7, 2004).

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           As the district court noted, Mississippi law does not treat the Attorney
   General’s opinions as binding. But they are often “persuasive authority.” 20
   And neither the County nor the district court identified any errors in the
   Attorney General’s reasoning. Those opinions are therefore a persuasive
   source of textual analysis confirming that boards of supervisors do have
   express authority to bind their successors.

                                                  B
           Caselaw confirms this conclusion. The Mississippi Supreme Court
   has already held that lengths of time can constitute explicit statutory
   authorization to bind successors.
           The parties agree that Cleveland is the most closely analogous
   precedent. There, a contractor built a facility on land that a regional health
   commission owned. 21 In exchange, the commission agreed to lease the
   building from the contractor 99 years, at $18,000 per month. 22 But later, the
   commission stopped making payments and voted to void the agreement. 23
   The commission sued, seeking a judgment declaring that the lease was invalid
   under the common-law rule against binding successors. 24 The Mississippi
   Supreme Court agreed. 25 Summarizing the line of cases that discuss “the rule
   against binding successors,” it recognized that courts have used the rule “to

           _____________________
           20
              Basil v. Browning, 175 So. 3d 1289, 1293 (Miss. 2015); see State of Fla. ex rel. Shevin
   v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1976) (treating state attorney general’s view of
   state law as “persuasive”).
           21
                Cleveland, 187 So. 3d at 602.
           22
                Id. at 603.
           23
                Id.
           24
                Id.
           25
                Id at 604.

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   void all types of agreements.” 26 Drawing on those cases, the court held that
   the commissioners (who served only four-year terms) could not bind their
   successors unless “expressly authorized by law.” 27 The court distinguished
   between “statutory authority to lease or contract” and “statutory authority
   to bind successors.” 28 Thus, even where a local government has authority to
   enter contracts, that authority is not by itself sufficient to authorize the
   government officials to bind their successors-in-office.
          Cleveland is important foremost because it gives examples of the kinds
   of “express” language that can authorize a local government to bind
   successors:
          [T]he Legislature expressly has authorized state institutions of
          higher learning to enter into long-term leases that do not
          exceed thirty-five years. Miss.Code Ann. § 37–101–41
          (Rev.2014). Airport authorities may enter into leases not to
          exceed fifty years. Miss.Code Ann. § 61–5–11 (Rev.2013).
          Section 31–8–3 of the Mississippi Code permits counties and
          municipalities to enter into lease agreements for facilities not
          exceeding twenty years. Miss.Code Ann. § 31–8–3 (Rev.2010).
          (See also Oktibbeha Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Town of Sturgis, 531
          So.2d 585 (Miss.1988)) (voiding a ninety-nine-year lease
          because the county was granted authority only to enter into a
          twenty-five-year, not a ninety-nine-year, lease). 29

          All of these “express” authorizations appear as terms of years, and
   none of them includes any separate, additional language authorizing the

          _____________________
          26
               Id. at 605.
          27
               Id. at 604.
          28
               Id. at 605.
          29
               Id. at 608.

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   entities to bind successors. 30 Rather, the legislature takes the necessary
   “further steps” by “granting specific entities the power to enter into long-
   term agreements that exceed their governing members’ terms.” 31
          It is true that Cleveland’s examples do not map the entire territory of
   express authorizations, and that the lengths of time in these examples are
   different in magnitude from the one-year authorization at issue here. But
   Cleveland explains that an express authorization exists whenever a statute
   both (1) gives a local government the power to enter contracts, and (2)
   separately specifies an approved length for the contracts. The statute at issue
   in Cleveland met the first condition but failed the second. Here, by contrast,
   Section 19-3-47 meets both conditions: the County can (1) “employ counsel”
   (2) “by the year.” 32
          The County’s response mistakenly treats these conditions as one and
   the same. Statutory authority to contract may not always bring with it the
   separate authority to bind successors, but the County’s argument on that
   score responds only to a strawman. Teeuwissen is not arguing that the
   board’s general authority to contract automatically brings with it the specific
   authority that allows it to bind successors. Instead, he is arguing that the
   board has authority to contract, and that the separate phrase “by the year”
   allows the board to bind successors (for that year). Cleveland gives
   Teeuwissen’s argument very strong support.

          _____________________
          30
               See id.
          31
               Id.
          32
               See id.; Miss. Code Ann. § 19-3-47.

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                                               C
          We are also persuaded by the apparent fact that no Mississippi statute
   would survive the district court’s stringent test for express authorization.
   The district court dismissed Teeuwissen’s claims because “Mississippi
   Code § 19-3-47 authorizes the Board to contract for one-year terms, but it
   does not explicitly authorize them to bind successors.” 33 This reasoning
   misunderstands Cleveland, at least to the extent that it calls for statutory
   language that directly authorizes a local government to bind successors. There
   is no “magic words” requirement. Not even Cleveland’s examples contain
   the kind of language that the district court seemed to be looking for. 34
          Our research has revealed no statutes that would satisfy the standard
   that the district court relied on for express authorization. On the contrary,
   the Mississippi statute books are rife with laws that apparently would allow
   individual officers to bind their successors under Cleveland’s test but
   apparently would not allow officers to bind successors under the district
   court’s test. Here are a few, in addition to those that Cleveland gave (all
   emphases added):

          • The state board of education has authority to lease
            “sixteenth section or lieu lands classified as agricultural . . .
            for a term not exceeding five (5) years.” 35
          • “The Mississippi Fair Commission and the Mississippi
            Department of Agriculture and Commerce shall have the
            authority to enter contracts for the sale of the

          _____________________
          33
             Teeuwissen v. Hinds Cnty., Mississippi, No. 3:22-CV-9-CWR-LGI, 2022 WL
   3443336, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 8, 2022).
          34
               Cleveland, 187 So. 3d at 608.
          35
               Miss. Code Ann. § 29-3-81 (emphasis added).

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                 aforementioned exclusive rights for a term not exceeding
                 twelve (12) years per contract.” 36
          • “The board of supervisors may lease the lot or landing for
            a term not exceeding five years[.]” 37

          The County’s attempts to resolve this issue miss the point. The
   County argues that both Cleveland and the district court required express
   authorization. That much is correct. But the County never explains what the
   legislature must do to give express authorization. Instead, it says only that the
   words here are not enough. We disagree. The phrase “by the year” is the
   kind of express authorization that Cleveland calls for. Any other reading
   leaves the phrase “by the year” as surplusage.

                                              IV
          We hold that Section 19-3-47 expressly authorized the board to bind
   successors, and we therefore REVERSE the district court’s final judgment
   and REMAND for further proceedings.

          _____________________
          36
               Miss. Code Ann. § 39-17-5 (emphasis added).
          37
               Miss. Code Ann. § 59-19-15 (emphasis added).

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