Court Opinion

ID: 9576789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:28:28.815799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:49.190337
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
The majority defines the crucial issue in this case as “whether Alberti’s testimony was unworthy of belief as a matter of law.” In framing the issue this way, however, the majority misplaces its focus. As is the case in all appeals reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial, the dispositive issue is whether the Commonwealth succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Holland v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 32, 39, 55 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1949). “The evidence must be such that it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 676, 679, 74 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1953) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 453, 461, 65 S.E.2d 528, 533 (1951) (citations omitted)).
It is true that in Virginia “an accused may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 525, 527, 298 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1982). However, this does not alter the fact that the evidence must be sufficient to prove “the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ward v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 921, 923, 252 S.E.2d 349, 350 (1979). When assessing the weight of the evidence, the trier of fact should weigh with great care and caution the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice because “the source of accomplice testimony is tainted with the temptation to exculpate oneself by laying the crime upon another.” Dillard v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 820, 821, 224 S.E.2d 137, 139 (1976) (citation omitted). The testimony of an accomplice will be considered corroborated only when it is confirmed “in material facts” which tend to establish guilt of the accused. Id. at 823, 224 S.E.2d at 140.
There is not a scintilla of evidence to corroborate Alberti’s allegation that Yates was waiting to drive the getaway vehicle. By Alberti’s own testimony, Yates was not present in the van but was *146waiting in the K-Mart lot. Mallory did not see Yates, and could not have seen him if Alberti is to be believed. Except for the testimony of Alberti, there was neither physical evidence nor testimony that tended to connect Yates with the crime. Furthermore, the conflict between Alberti’s testimony (that the van became disabled and was abandoned in the few blocks between the shopping mall parking lot and the K-Mart lot) and Showalter’s testimony (that the van was discovered abandoned after the robbery in the northside of Richmond, several miles from the robbery scene), raises the probable and reasonable inference that Alberti’s recollection of the mode of escape on May 14, 1982, and thus, the link to Yates, was faulty.
In order to find Yates guilty from the proven facts, the fact finder either had to disregard Showalter’s testimony or infer that someone moved the disabled, stolen van from the roadside between the shopping mall and K-Mart in Chesterfield County to the northside of Richmond. Showalter was a witness for the Commonwealth; his testimony with respect to the physical evidence was positive, affirmative, and not inherently improbable. Certainly the trier of fact was not entitled to disregard any part of his testimony regarding the location of the abandoned van. See Chesson v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 827, 832, 223 S.E.2d 923, 926, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 927 (1976); Boone v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 686, 688, 187 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1972).
Inferences may be made from proven circumstances only to the extent that those inferences are reasonable and justified. Webb v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 34, 129 S.E.2d 22, 29 (1963). Moreover, “[wjhere inferences are relied upon to establish guilt, they must point to guilt so clearly that any other conclusion would be inconsistent therewith.” Dotson v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 514, 518, 199 S.E. 471, 473 (1938) (citation omitted). It strains logic and reason to conclude that the disabled van, which Alberti testified was abandoned by him and his confederates within a block or two of the robbery scene as they ran to the waiting car, would reappear after the robbery miles away from the scene. This evidence, however, is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that Alberti was unable to reconstruct accurately the events as they occurred on May 14, 1982. The location of the van, as established through Showalter’s testimony, raises the justifiable and reasonable inference that the perpetrators of the robbery drove the van to *147the northside of Richmond without using another car at K-Mart to effect their getaway. The only evidence which links Yates to the Mallory robbery is Alberti’s testimony that he waited for the participants in an escape vehicle at K-Mart; thus, the Commonwealth’s evidence, showing that the vehicle was found abandoned after the robbery several miles away in the northside of Richmond, contradicts Alberti’s testimony as to Yates’ presence. His presence cannot rationally be inferred in view of proof that contradicts the premise upon which the Commonwealth relied.
Where, as here, the proved facts are equally susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the appellant, the trier of fact is not at liberty to adopt arbitrarily the interpretation which incriminates appellant. Williams v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 764, 772, 71 S.E.2d 73, 77 (1952); Mansfield v. Commonwealth, 146 Va. 279, 282, 135 S.E. 700, 701 (1926). Alberti, by his own admission, participated in many similar robberies. Alberti testified that Yates participated in several similar robberies with him involving the snatching of bank bags. Yates denied Alberti’s allegations. Investigator Showalter testified that in 1983, when Alberti implicated Yates in several robberies, Alberti “was somewhat sketchy on the very fine details.” Alberti told Showalter in 1983 that Yates was in the van along with Billy Morgan and Alberti when Mallory was robbed; however, immediately prior to the trial of this case in 1984 Alberti told Showalter, “after he thought about it . . . there was a third party in the van, he was unsure at that time of the individual’s name and . . . [Yates] was sitting across in the K-Mart lot . . . waiting to pick them up.” The evidence, thus, points to a strong probability that Alberti confused circumstances of various robberies.
When the evidence presented at trial is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, Higgenbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975), there is a reasonable doubt as to Yates’ participation in the robbery of Mallory. For this reason, I would reverse the conviction.