Court Opinion

ID: 9416317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:40:44.946298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:43.605974
License: Public Domain

Mr Justice M’Lean,
dissenting.
This cause was removed from the district court of Louisiana by a writ of error; and a reversal of the judgment is prayed for, on the errors assigned.
The suit was originally brought in the parish court of the parish of New Orleans, and was removed to the district court of the United States, which exercises the powers of a circuit court.
In. their petition, the plaintiffs below state that one Eben Fiské, as agent at New Orleans for William Parsons, the defendant, residing ht Boston, purchased from the plaintiffs large quantities of tobacco, and drew bills on the defendant in payment, which he refused to honour. The plaintiffs claim 10,000.
The defendant, in his answer, denies the material facts set forth in the petition. A jury was impannelled, and a verdict rendered for $6484. On the trial, the bills of exchange were produced, and a great number of business letters be'tween Parsons and Fiske were read.. -
Fiske -was sworn as a witness, though objected to on the *450ground of interest; but a.release removed the objection to his competency.
The first assignment of errpr relied on is, that from the facts apparent on the record, the plaintiffs had no right of action against the defendant, and that, therefore this court will decree a judgment to be entered in favour of the defendant.
2. That they will, at least, reverse this judgment, and award á new trial, for one of the following reasons:
1. Because the court refused to direct the evidence to be put upon the record.
2. Because the whole question Was a question of law, and. the decision was against law.
3. It is not.strictly a common law proceeding ; but a proceeding under the peculiar system of Louisiana;.and according to that system, the court has power to reverse the judgment, under circumstances which would not give it that power where the trial had been according to the common law.
As this cause involves a constitutional question, which has not been settled by this court, and as,I am so unfortunate as to differ in opinion with a majority of the members of the court, I shall, with great deference, present my views of the case..
In the state of Louisiana, the principles of the common .law are not recognized; neither do the principles of the civil law of Rome furnish the basis of their jurisprudence. They have a system peculiar to themselves, adopted by their statutes, which embodies much of the civil law, some of the principles of the common law, and, in a few instances, the statutory provisions of other states. This system may be called the civil law of Louisiana, and is peculiar to that state.
The modes of proceeding in their courts are more nearly assimilated to the forms of chancery than to those of the common law. The plaintiff files his petition, in which- he sets forth the ground of complaint and the relief prayed for. Process issues against tlie defendant; and when he is in court, he is ruled to answer the bill. The answer is filed, in which he admits, denies, or avoids the facts set forth in the petition, *451the same as in a suit in chancery; and he, is permitted, in his answer, to set up a dernand against the plaintiff, which he may recover if sustained.
When the cauáe is brought to a hearing, the court decides the facts and the law, if neither party requires a jury. The testimony is taken down at the trial, and either party may move for a new trial, or take an appeal to the superior court.
If an appeal be taken, the testimony forms a part of the record, and is re-examined by the appellate court. Either party has a right to require a jury in the inferior court, and also to demand that the testimony be taken down at the trial; so that it may form a part, of the record, and be considered by the appellate court, should an appeal be taken.
If either party desires what is called in the statute a special verdict, each party makes a statement of facts, which exhibit the grounds of controversy; and these statements are submitted to the jury with the testimony, in the case. In this casfe, also, if either party requires it, the testimony must be taken down at. the trial.
The facts found by the jury are examined by the appellate court, and its judgment is given on the facts without tLe intervention of a jury.
Such is the outline of the course of practice in the courts of Louisiana. A court of chancery there is as little known, and the rules of its proceedings as little regarded, as are those of a court of common law. Redress is sought in substantially the same manner-for an injury done to the person, his property or character. Whether he seeks to recover a debt,or asks the specific execution of a contract, orto avoid a contract on the ground of fraud or accident, the mode of proceeding is the same; he files his petition, and the defendant must answer.
In thus repudiating the forms and principles of the common law, the state of. Louisiana has pursued a course different from her sister states. .This has resulted from the views of jurisprudence derived by the great mass of her citizens from the foreign governments with which they were recently connected.
It is no doubt a wise policy to adapt the principles of *452government to the moral and social condition of the governed. This is no less true in a judicial than it is in a political point of view ; and where an intelligent people possess the sovereign power, they will not fail to secure this first object of a good government.
By an act of congress, of the 26th of May 1824, it is provided that the mode of proceeding in civil causes in the courts of the United States, that now are, or hereafter may be established in the state of Louisiana, shall be conformable to the laws directing the mode of practice in the district courts of the said statq: provided, that the judge of-any such court of the United States may alter the times limited or allowed for different proceedings in the state courts, and make, by rule, such other provisions as may be necessary to adapt the said laws of procedure to the organization of such court of the United States, arid to avoid any discrepancy, if any such exist, between such state laws and the laws of the United States.
There is no evidence, before the court that the power given to the district judge-in this proviso has been exercised : the first part of the section, which adopts in the district court of the United States the same mode of proceeding in civil actions as is established in the courts of the state, musttherefore.be considered as in force. And until this power be exercised, this section is a virtual repeal of so much of the judiciary act of 1789, and all other acts prior to 1824, which came within its provisions.- It is contended, that whatever may be the rules of practice in the district court of Louisiana, they do not confer jurisdiction on this court. The force of this objection is admitted.
Any law regulating the practice of an inferior court does not confer jurisdiction on an appellate court; but where such court has jurisdiction of the case, it must be governed in its decision by the rules of practice in the court below.
This court has jurisdiction by writ of error to revise the final judgment, in any civil action, of a circuit court of the United States where the matter in controversy exceeds two thousand dollars. Whether this judgment be obtained by the forms of the civil or the common law is immaterial. *453The only essential requisites to give jurisdiction are, that it be a civil action, involving a matter in controversy exceeding two thousand dollars ; .and that the judgment be final.
The forms of. proceeding adopted under the Louisiana practice, in the district courf, constitute no objection tú a revision of it's final judgments by writ Of error.
In the case of Parsons against Armor, brought to this court by writ of error from Louisiana, and decided the present term, the court has sustained its jurisdiction. That case in no respect diifers in principle from this, except that the amount due was ascertained by the court in that cause, and in this by a jury. Both causes were brought against Parsons to recover the price of certain quantities of tobacco sold to Fiske, the alleged agent of the defendant. The same testimony was used in both causes, with the exception of the bills of exchange.
In the case of Armor, the court looked info the testimony, which was certified as a part of the record. From this testimony it appeared that Fiske acted as the factor of Parsons, and in no other respect as his agent; that Parsons looked to Fiske for the faithful disbursement of the funds placed in his hands, and the purchases were made in.his name, and the payments sometimes in drafts, and at others in cash; that the credit was given to Fiske and not to Parsons by the vendors of the articles purchased. The court therefore reversed; the judgment obtained agarnst Parsons in the district court.
The testimony, thus examined by the court, was not made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions, but was taken down at the trial. Had this been don'e in a case at common law, the court would not have considered the testimony as' a part of the record; and consequently they could not have looked into it in deciding the cause. But the practice of the district'court, under the sanctions of the act of 1824, was considered as presenting the testimony in that cause as fully to the consideration of this court., as in a case at common law, where it is embodied in a bill of exceptions. The facts being ascertained by the court, on weighing the testimony the law was pronounced in its judgment..
*454The law of Louisiana: requires the testimony to-.be taken down, if demanded by either party, as well where a jury is impannelled as where the cause is submitted to the court. But in the case under consideration, the court, at the -trial, refused to order the testimony to be taken in writing, although a motion to that effect was made. This refusal is the principal ground on which the plaintiff in error reliesjor the reversal of this judgment. He claimed a right sécured to him by law, which was refused; and he seeks redress by writ of error.
This redréss cannot be given, it is urged; because, if the testimony had been taken down, it could haVe been of no advantage to the plaintiff in error, as this court copld not examine it. And why may not this, testimony be examihed by the court, the same as in the case of Armor. The facts, are the same, and no difference exists in the merits of the claims.
The" reply is, that in this case a jury passed upon the claim, and in the other the court, exercising the-functions of.a jury, decided both the fact and the law. The difference then, consists in this; that the jury found the facts in the one case, and the court in the other; and in both'cases the law was pronounced by the court.
This difference in the mode of decision, it would seem, ought not to affect the judgment of this court, unless there be some positive provision of law which must control it.
The seventh article of the amendment of the constitution is referred to as conclusive on the point. It reads, “ in all suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”
To this objection an answer may be given, which to me is satisfactory.
This is not a suit at common law, and therefore does not come strictly within the provision of the article.
In what respect can this action be compared to a suit at common law?
*455It was commenced by petition, and in all the stages through which it has been carried, no step has been taken in conformity to the common law; unless it be that the matter in controversy was submitted to a jury, and a bill of exceptions taken. Does this make it a common laiy proceeding 1 A jury is often called to try matters of fact in a chancery case, and in. the admission of evidence, the rules of the common law are observed. But does this make the principal pro feeding an action at law % Surely not. And can the same mode of trial under the statute of .Louisiana have that effect *? The proceedings under this statute are as dissimilar to the common law process, as are the rules of chancery. The whole proceeding under fhe statute is in derogation of the common law. How then can it be called a common law proceeding If it contain one feature of the common law, that does not change the character of the suit. The mode of redress is, under the special provisions of the statute, a remedy created by the law of the staté. Can this procedure be called a suit at common law.
The words in the latter clause of the seventh article, “ and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States,” refer to the first clause of the sentence, which limits the trial to “ suits at common law.” If this were not the true construction of the sentence, facts. found by a jury in an issue directed by a court of chancery, would be conclusive-on the chancellor. The verdict has. never been so considered, and especially in the appellate courts of chancery. If the intervention of a jury in this case do not change its character, so as to make it a common law proceeding, then there is no difference in principle between this case and that' of Armor. As the court in that cause looked into the testimony to ascertain the facts, so as to apply the principles of law, why not do the same in this. In that case the judgment of the circuit court was reversed . a reversal in this case would render it proper to send down the cause for trial.
But the circuit court in.this case refused to order the testimony to be taken down at the trial. This is undoubtedly error, if this court could examine the testimony, as it did in *456Armor’s case. Had that case been considered by. the court as a suit at common law, it must have been dismissed, or the judgment affirmed. It was under the particular practice of the district court that this court considered itself authorised to look into the testimony which formed a part of the record in that cause, and by this procedure established the fact, that it was not strictly an action at common law. This appears to me to relieve the case under considération from difficulty. For, if the siiit of Armor was not a common law proceeding, neither is this suit; and consequently it is free from any constitutional objection in this court.
The objection made, that if congress by adopting the practice of the Louisiana courts may evade- the provisions of the seventh amendment, and that they may abolish the trial by jury in the courts of the United States, by creating special remedies • not known to the common law; is answered by saying, that congress have the power to do much, which it is not probable they will do. Have they not power to repeal the acts which confer jurisdiction on the courts of the United States, and which regulate their practiced This would not only take away the right of trial by jury in such courts, but'all trials of every description. Is it at all probable that this power will be exercised ? The answer must be in the negative; and so must the aifswer to an inquiry whether congress, by creating new remedies, will dispense with the trial by jury.
Is this article of the constitution to be construed to mean, by the words “ suits- at common law,” all suits which are not properly called cases of equity, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction? Under the practice of Louisiana, how are such suits to be distinguished *?. The form of action is the same in equity as at law; and if in all cases where a. legal right could be prosecuted in other states, at the common law, they, are to be denominated actions at law in Louisiana, the design of congress in adopting the Louisiana practice is defeated. The actmf 1824 intended to relieve the parties to a suit in the district court in Louisiana from the forms of the common law, or the special regulations of *457the judiciary acit of 1789, because they , were not adapted to the modes of proceeding in that couft
. Suppose congress had specially provided, that -in all trial's before the district court of Louisiana, the testimony should be taken down,-and that it should form a part of the record, so as to present the facts to the supreme court- in the same manner as though they had been embodied in a prayer for special instructions to the jury, and brought up.by bill of. exceptions ; might not (his couri determine the questions of law-arising in the case'? This, it appears to me., is neither moré-nor less than has been done, by the act of 1824.
-Are all thé -laws of the different states for' the'valuation of improvements - by commissioners; where a- recovery for land is. bad against a bona fine occupant who claimed title, .-unconstitutional *? If suit be brought in the state courts, .these laws are .enforced as constitutional; but,'if broughtin thé circuit court of tW Unitéd States, they are unconstitutional.- This .would make the constitutionality of .acts'depend, not-upon a construction-of the constitution, but upon the jurisdiction where the action is brought. It would give rédress in the state courts, which in the. United States courts would be unconstitutional. '
This would be the inevitable consequence, if the--provision in the seventh article be restricted in its application to the .courts of-the United States, and-be construed .to-embrace every species of action where a.legal right is prosecuted; And, if to . escape this,consequence, the provision of the article-be. extended-to embrace .all cases which, come within the above construction, without reference-to the jurisdiction where.the remedy is sought; then all laws extending-the jurisdiction of. justices of the peace above twenty dollars are unconstitutional; and also every arbitration system, which does not require a jury. An appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace will not evade the constitutional objection; for the judgment is final, and the question involves the right of thé justice to give judgment in the case, without the intervention of a jury.
Suppose congress, for the purpose of adjusting land titles in a . district of country, should establish, a special court, *458called commissioners, to examine and determine between the different claimants; would their proceedings be valid,.under the seventh amendment of the constitution “? This mode has been adopted by congress to settle claims to lands under the Louisiana treaty; and the acts of the commissioners have been confirmed. If such a proceeding was to be denominated the prosecution of a legal right, and consequently a .suit at common law, because it was not a case in equity; the decision was void under the seventh article, and also any act. of legislation confirming it.
From the foregoing considerations I am brought to the conclusion, that this case is not strictly a suit at common law; and that this court may, under the act 6f 1824, as it did in .the case of Armor, look into the record, and, from the facts there set forth, determine the. question of .law: and as the court below refused to order the testimony to be taken down ; I think the defendant has been deprived of . a right secured to him by law; and that for this error, the judgment should be reversed, and the cause sent down for further proceedings ; with instructions to the district court to order the testimony to be taken down at the trial.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript ol the record from the district.court of the United States for the district of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel ; on consideration whereof, it. is ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of. the said district court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs and damages at the rate of six per centum per annum.