Court Opinion

ID: 9954091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:03:05.143883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.118385
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 LePage v. Safeway CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THOMAS LEPAGE,                                                                                C097333

                    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       (Super. Ct. No. 34-2019-
                                                                                   00260800-CU-WT-GDS)
           v.

 SAFEWAY INC.,

                    Defendant and Respondent.

                                          SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL
         Following his termination from his position as a store manager/director for
Safeway, Inc. (Safeway), plaintiff Thomas LePage filed an action against defendants
Safeway, Helen Carver, Tina Jump, Jeff Mason, and Doe defendants. Carver served as
LePage’s district manager. Jump is a regional human resources manager for Safeway.
Mason is the vice president of human resources for Safeway. The complaint alleged 17
causes of action.
         Safeway filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted,
finding none of LePage’s claims had merit, and that Safeway was entitled to summary
adjudication of each of them.

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       On appeal, LePage argues the trial court erred when it granted the motion for
summary judgment with respect to his second cause of action, which alleged Safeway
engaged in disability discrimination that is prohibited under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a); see also Gov.
Code, § 12900 [“This part may be known and referred to as the ‘California Fair
Employment and Housing Act’ ”]).
       We affirm the judgment on the grounds that Safeway has demonstrated it had a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate LePage, and LePage cannot show that
stated reason served as a pretext for discrimination.

                      FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
       The following is a summary of the undisputed facts and evidence admitted on the
motion in the trial court.

       LePage’s General Employment Background and Training on Policies

       Safeway hired LePage in 1977, where he began his career with the company as a
food clerk. In September 1999, LePage became a store manager at a Safeway store in
Elk Grove. In January 2015, LePage was transferred to a Safeway store in Rancho
Cordova, and he remained the store manager there until he was terminated in July 2018.
       As a store manager, LePage was an at-will employee.
       LePage was trained on Safeway’s policies prohibiting discrimination, harassment,
and retaliation. As a store manager, LePage was expected to comply with and enforce
these policies. LePage understood these policies prohibited discrimination and
harassment on any legally protected basis including race, age, or disability. LePage also
understood these policies applied to conduct by or against employees, customers, and
vendors. Conduct that violates Safeway’s polices against discrimination, harassment, and
retaliation is grounds for disciplinary action, up to and including immediate termination.

                                             2
       LePage last acknowledged receipt of Safeway’s Northern California Division
Employee Policy Handbook and At-Will Employment Policy in May 2017. When
deposed, LePage reviewed a copy of Safeway’s Northern California Division Employee
Policy Handbook and admitted to signing an acknowledgment of receipt of the handbook.
       The handbook contains a section entitled, “Policy [A]gainst Harassment &
Discrimination and Reporting Procedures.” LePage admitted to being familiar with this
policy. The policy states Safeway has zero tolerance for harassment or discrimination by
any employee, customer, vendor, or third party based on an individual’s actual or
perceived race, color, religious creed, age, physical or mental disability, medical
condition, gender, gender expression, or any other characteristic protected by law. It
states that employees “must promptly report concerns of harassment, discrimination or
retaliation,” and provides a list of Safeway personnel to whom concerns can be directed.
The policy states that retaliation for reporting complaints or participating in an
investigation or proceeding related to a complaint is strictly prohibited, and that any
perception of retaliation “should be reported immediately . . . so that the matter may be
immediately investigated and remedied.”
       Safeway has a policy regarding “Courtesy, Dignity and Respect” that encourages
employees to “conduct themselves professionally and in a manner that is respectful of
other employees, customers, and vendors.” Safeway also has a Code of Business
Conduct that requires store managers to “act with the highest degree of honesty and
integrity,” treat others with “dignity and respect,” ensure compliance with Safeway’s
policies and procedures, and handle complaints of misconduct in a prompt and
appropriate manner. The Code of Business Conduct also requires employees to
cooperate with internal investigations and “make complete and truthful disclosures when
questioned about matters relating to [Safeway’s] business about which the employee is
aware.” The Code of Conduct provides that a violation of its provisions is grounds for

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termination. LePage acknowledged receiving copies of the Courtesy, Dignity, and
Respect Policy and the Code of Business Conduct.

       Complaints Prior to 2018

       When he was deposed, LePage was asked if while he was employed at Safeway at
least two people lodged complaints against him for sexually inappropriate comments.
LePage said that in the 40 plus years he worked for Safeway, “there was a couple of
instances that were ridiculous.”
       LePage admitted that there was an incident when he asked an employee the
meaning of the term “DILF” (dad I’d like to fuck). LePage agreed he signed a copy of a
June 20, 2008, warning letter regarding the alleged incident. LePage included a copy of
this letter with the evidence he submitted in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment. According to the letter, LePage had acknowledged asking a female employee
the meaning of the term “DILF,” but denied other allegations the employee had made
regarding his conduct, namely that he also had asked the employee to place an olive on
her finger so he could bite it off. The warning letter states, “[i]t is believed that your
account of the conversation was not truthful and as a result you are being presented with
this written warning.” The letter reminded LePage that it was his responsibility to
“support and promote a workplace free from all forms of harassment or discrimination”
and that “[a]ny future behavior of this or a similar nature will result in further
disciplinary action up to and including termination.”
       During his deposition, LePage reviewed an August 18, 2010, final written warning
regarding an incident during a meeting that took place on May 24, 2010. LePage agreed
he had refused to sign the warning, and he stated he had refused to sign it because he
thought it was “absurd.” LePage provided a copy of the letter with his opposition papers,
and his counsel declared it to be a true and correct copy. According to the letter, during a
meeting at which Safeway’s participation in the San Francisco AIDS walk was discussed,

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LePage had told employees to expect to see celebrities and a lot of “ ‘fruitcakes’ ” at the
event. According to the warning, LePage refused to acknowledge that the word
“fruitcake” has any negative connotation. The warning reminded LePage that he had
been issued a warning in 2008. The warning found that LePage’s argument that the use
of the word was not inappropriate to be “troubling” and that it suggested he did not
understand the importance of his role as store manager in abiding by company policies
and setting the correct tone for the store. At his deposition, LePage acknowledged he had
used the word “fruitcake” in relation to the AIDS walk and maintained that he could not
see how some might see the term as anti-gay.
       The August 18, 2010, warning also states that during the same meeting, when
LePage was asked about posting service information in the store in other languages, he
responded with something to the effect of, “[i]f you live in America, you should learn to
speak English.” The warning observed that even if employees speak English, if it is their
second language, their ability to provide better service to customers can be facilitated by
providing materials in their first language. The warning reminded LePage that he must
treat employees, customers, and vendors with professional and businesslike behavior at
all times. It stated that future behavior of a similar kind could result in disciplinary action
up to termination.
       During his deposition, LePage admitted to being investigated regarding allegedly
inappropriate sexual remarks sent in a text message in 2010. LePage acknowledged a
female employee had filed a complaint stating LePage had sent her a text message
asking, “[w]ho’s got penis breath?” LePage acknowledged initialing his interview notes
regarding the allegations. As part of his opposition papers, LePage also submitted what
his counsel declared to be a true and correct copy of the investigative report and a true
and correct copy of the interview notes regarding this complaint. According to the
interview notes, LePage did not recall sending the text. Other documents in the report
include a statement signed by the female employee, where she describes the text as

                                              5
beginning with a voice asking, “[w]ho’s got penis breath” and ending with a finger
pointing to the recipient and saying, “[y]ou got penis breath.” There is also an e-mail
from another employee who describes the female employee receiving a text from LePage
like the one the female employee alleged he sent.
       In July 2017, Myron Naylor, one of LePage’s subordinate employees, complained
that LePage and other Safeway supervisors were more lenient with white employees than
black employees. The complaint was corroborated as to the other employees, who were
terminated, but not to LePage.

       January through June 2018 Complaints, Incidents, and Investigation

       From January through May 2018, LePage was the subject of various complaints
made by Naylor and customers.
       Both parties included with the evidence they submitted on the motion a copy of a
document entitled “Tom LePage: 2018 Complaint Summary Investigation Conclusions”
(Complaint Summary), which includes a summary of these complaints and the
investigative conclusions made by Mason regarding those complaints. The Complaint
Summary concludes with Mason’s recommendation to Carver that LePage be terminated.
The Complaint Summary begins by looking at the history of complaints and disciplinary
actions against LePage. This includes notes on the aforementioned complaints and others
and says that some incidents were not corroborated as to LePage or otherwise not found
in violation of the law, this latter referring to an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission investigation.
       LePage also produced what his counsel represented to be true and correct copies
of (1) a July 20, 2018, incident report that included what appears to be transcripts of
various interviews with Safeway human resources (HR) personnel and witnesses to some
of the alleged complaints (incident report); (2) a May 1, 2018, customer complaint; and
(3) a record of an interview between Mason and LePage on May 10, 2018.

                                             6
       The 2018 complaints and incidents that were pending investigation when Mason
prepared the report are as follows:

                January 2018 Complaint

       In January 2018, Naylor made a complaint alleging LePage denied his requested
days off and accommodated a white employee’s requests for time off. Mason testified in
a deposition that he directed an HR manager to investigate the complaint.
       According to the Complaint Summary, an assistant store director reported that
LePage had acknowledged he knew Naylor wanted Saturdays off, but said that Naylor
could just “keep calling in sick if that’s what he wants to do.” The Complaint Summary
also states the assistant store director reported the store had enough employees to work in
Naylor’s department on Saturdays. Notes of an interview between Jump and the assistant
store director contained in the incident report support that the assistant store director said
these things.
       According to the Complaint Summary, LePage explained he set the schedule for
the department using a specific software program, mySchedule, and tried to
accommodate handwritten requests for time off, and Naylor never used the software to
seek time off. The Complaint Summary states HR determined Naylor was not using the
software because he did not have a computer, and then they assisted Naylor to request
days off on the store’s computer. According to the Complaint Summary, Naylor’s
request for Saturdays off was then accommodated. According to the Complaint
Summary, a division trainer said he shows all store managers how to manually enter
employee requests for days off and that they should accommodate employees who don’t
use the software.
       In interview notes contained in the incident report, it appears Naylor explained to
Jump that he had tried to take Saturdays off in part of 2017 to coach t-ball, but he had to
call in sick sometimes to get the Saturdays. He said he had not put in a request for 2018

                                              7
yet, because he believed a black man was not going to get the time off he needed. He
also reported making a verbal request to get January 5 and 6, 2018, (a Friday and
Saturday) off with an employee named Kieman, but then did not get them. The interview
notes also reflect Jump providing Naylor with a booklet on how to use mySchedule and
telling him he could call a help desk or her if he needed help using the program.
       In the interview notes for LePage’s interview by Jump, LePage states he did not
know Naylor wanted January 5 and 6 off, and that Naylor had not spoken with him about
his coaching needs in 2018.
       In a Friday, December 29, 2017, e-mail contained in the incident report, LePage
wrote he was not aware that Naylor wanted the Friday and Saturday off until he was told
about it from a union representative after Naylor called the representative to complain.
LePage wrote in the e-mail, “ ‘REQUESTED DAY OFF’ was never written on the paper
schedule my produce manager turned in, only the word ‘OFF’ was written and [Naylor]
never requested the days off in the ‘mySchedule’ program as all employees are required
to do so that the manager can approve or decline them.”
       Regarding this complaint, the Complaint Summary concludes that LePage “was
aware that [Naylor] wanted Saturdays off. He discussed this with [an assistant store
manager]. Yet, he relied on [the software program] and did not proactively meet with
[Naylor] to find out why [Naylor] was not using [the software] nor [to] discuss an
alternative method by which [Naylor] could communicate his schedule preferences.
[LePage] failed to offer support and guidance to an employee he was aware wanted
Saturdays off.”

              March 15, 2018, Complaint

       On March 15, 2018, Naylor made a complaint of discrimination and retaliation
alleging that LePage refused to sign his sick leave form in retaliation for his prior
complaints of discrimination against the defendant. In his deposition, Mason testified he

                                              8
directed an HR manager to look into this complaint, and he recalled speaking with both
Carver and the HR manager about it.
       The Complaint Summary says the following regarding the incident and
investigation into it: Naylor alleged when he arrived to work on March 15 at 5:00 a.m.,
he gave LePage a doctor’s note excusing an absence and asked LePage to sign a sick
leave form, which LePage needed to sign for Naylor to be paid for a sick day. Naylor
said he needed the form back at 10:00 a.m. when his shift ended, but when Naylor
clocked out at 10:39 a.m., the form had not been prepared. Naylor waited outside the
breakroom, knowing LePage was inside. Naylor called the union and then clocked back
in at 11:22 a.m. According to Naylor, he then looked in the breakroom and slammed the
door. Carver reported she asked LePage “what was that?,” and LePage told her Naylor
was upset because Naylor wanted LePage to sign a sick leave form “and I don’t have
time.” Carver said she told LePage to just go take care of it, but instead LePage stayed
and had a second piece of cake, only leaving the breakroom once another employee
alerted LePage that Naylor was still on the clock. Naylor alleged that when he and
LePage had a heated discussion about the note LePage asked him, “are you serious?”
referred to him as “Boy,” and said, “I’m sick of you guys.” LePage denied calling
Naylor “Boy” or saying, “I’m sick of you guys.” LePage said it takes him between five
and 30 minutes to fill out a sick leave form, while an assistant store manager stated forms
can be completed in five to 10 minutes.
       After the incident, Naylor complained to HR that LePage had delayed preparing
the form to retaliate against Naylor and to upset him. Naylor also said LePage was
collecting statements about the incident. When asked if he was collecting statements,
LePage said Jump had directed him to. Jump denied making this recommendation and
said she only asked for the statements after LePage reported having them. In another
interview, with Jump present, LePage said it was Jump or Carver who told him to collect

                                             9
statements, or possibly neither of them. LePage denied conducting his own investigation
and said he collected statements because it was what he had always done.
       In interview notes which are contained in the incident report reflecting Jump’s and
Carver’s interview with LePage as to this complaint, LePage said it could take five to 30
minutes to fill out the form. He said Naylor did not tell him when he needed the note
when he tried to hand it to him, and LePage said he has never been told the paperwork
needs to be done immediately for someone. When asked if it would have been a good
idea to just fill out the paperwork, LePage said he would not have done it for other
employees.
       In interview notes reflecting an interview between the assistant store manager and
Jump, which are contained in the incident report, the assistant store manager estimated
the form Naylor needed takes five to 10 minutes to fill out.
       The incident report also contains a handwritten note that appears to be taken while
someone watched a video that showed at 11:10 a.m. LePage was in the breakroom and
Naylor saw him. According to the note, LePage remained in the breakroom, eating a
second piece of cake, and left at 11:24 a.m.
       The incident report also contains a copy of interview notes that appear to be from
an interview of Carver by Jump. According to the notes, on March 15, 2018, while in the
breakroom, Carver heard a thud at the door and when she asked what was going on,
LePage told her it was Naylor, who was upset because he wanted LePage to sign his sick
leave form and LePage did not have time. Carver reported she told LePage to “Just go
sign it, just go take care of it.” Carver said LePage said Naylor was getting in his face,
but she felt LePage escalated the situation. She thought LePage was irritated that Naylor
stayed on the clock and that he should have just filled out the form. She did not hear
LePage say, “are you serious” and “I’m sick of you guys.”
       With respect to this incident, the Complaint Summary concluded that while
initially LePage may have been busy, by the time Naylor entered the breakroom it was an

                                               10
hour after his shift and LePage knew he was upset. Carver told LePage to leave and go
sign the form, but LePage stayed on until another employee told him Naylor was on the
clock. The Complaint Summary states that LePage’s “poor judgment escalated the
situation leading to a confrontation that could have been avoided.” The Complaint
Summary also concludes LePage was “less than forthcoming” when he estimated it could
take 30 minutes to complete the form, and that he had used poor judgment in collecting
third party statements about Naylor’s behavior instead of leaving that task to a neutral
third party.

               Naylor’s Other March 2018 Complaints

       In March 2018, Naylor made additional complaints about LePage, alleging further
mistreatment by LePage based on race, and raising concerns about LePage’s management
style and the way he treated people. At his deposition, Mason said he directed an
investigation into these complaints, and said he had reviewed the investigation and the
conclusions of the investigation.
       According to the Complaint Summary most of these complaints were “[n]ot
corroborated.” However, with respect to a report regarding LePage’s interactions with
two women employees, the Complaint Summary concludes that LePage had “used poor
management style and did not treat these employees professionally, with courtesy,
dignity and respect.” With respect to another incident, it concluded LePage had
“participated in a conversation with at least one non-management employee concerning a
sensitive and confidential subject matter and started or furthered a rumor circulating in
his store. Far from trying to ‘stop gossiping,’ [LePage] participated in it.” The
conversation concerned a rumor that store managers at another location who had been
terminated had been set up.
       Interview notes contained in the incident report show that the two women told HR
representatives that LePage had said things to them that made them cry. One of the

                                            11
women reported that LePage treats men and women differently, having an attitude with
women but treating men with respect. According to the interview notes, she said she tries
to stay away from LePage because he makes her anxious and nervous. According to the
notes, the other woman said she had some concerns with LePage, and that with him,
“[t]he more you fight it the worse it is going to be.”
       According to the notes from Jump’s interview with the assistant store manager, the
assistant store manager saw LePage speak with one of the two women, and the assistant
store manager said LePage had said to the employee that she was lucky he was not there
when she was on probation, because she would not have passed. The assistant store
manager felt there was no reason for LePage to say that to the employee, and that it was
rude, taking on the tone of a threat that he was going to keep a close eye on her work.
       According to what LePage’s counsel represented to be a true and correct copy of a
record of an interview between Mason and LePage on May 10, 2018, when Mason
interviewed LePage, LePage admitted to speaking with an employee about a rumor that
employees at another store who had been fired after a noose was found in the office had
been set up.

               Yelp! Review Incident

       In April 2018, an employee at the Rancho Cordova store reported to Safeway that
they read a September 2017 Yelp review in which the reviewer alleged that during a job
interview “manager tom” tried to touch her and refused her employment because she
denied his touch. In his deposition, Mason stated he personally interviewed LePage
about this incident.
       In the record of the May 10, 2018, interview between Mason and LePage, after
Mason presented the Yelp! review to LePage, LePage said he heard about it from an
employee and that the review was fabrication. He said the employee told him about it in
December or February 2018. When asked if he told Carver about the review, LePage

                                             12
said he did but that he did not recall the conversation. LePage said he was on leave and
“kind of blew it off.” LePage said he may have e-mailed Carver and would check his e-
mail file.
       In interview notes from a May 22, 2018, interview between Mason and LePage,
which are contained in the incident report, Mason brought up the review again. Mason
asked if LePage had found a copy of an e-mail to Carver reporting the Yelp! review.
LePage said: “When I looked at the dates, I realized it was the day my Grandson had
passed. I have a personal message that was sent to me. They had taken a picture of it and
sent it to me. I think I called her. And told her that I am not sure where this is coming
from.” He insisted he called Carver after Mason told him Carver had said he never
reported the Yelp! review to her—verbally or in writing. Mason pressed further, saying
Carver said she would have immediately turned the report over to another HR employee
and the database of incidents had no report of this. LePage said he was sure he did, but
given the circumstances with his grandson there was a 1 percent chance he had not.
       Mason’s conclusion, contained in the Complaint Summary, notes that HR was
unable to investigate the claim made in the Yelp! review. However, it states LePage “has
been trained that it is mandatory for Store Managers to report all complaints of sexual
harassment for investigation. He admits knowing he was accused of a sexual touching.
He was less than forthcoming when asked if he notified [Carver] about the complaint,
answering both yes, and that he blew it off (no?) [sic], and then that he was sure that he
had done so, followed by that he could not remember due to his family loss. We
conclude he took no action to report the complaint in violation of company policy
requiring he do so.”

              May 1, 2018, Customer Complaint

       On May 1, 2018, Safeway received a customer complaint of race discrimination in
which the customer alleged LePage did not allow her disabled black son to use the store’s

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motorized shopping carts. The customer further alleged that when she objected to
LePage’s actions, he called the police and had both her and her son removed from the
store. At his deposition, Mason testified he directed an HR manager to conduct an
investigation into this incident and personally spoke with LePage about this complaint.
In his deposition, LePage also acknowledged speaking with Mason about this complaint.
       According to the Complaint Summary, LePage said he asked the boy if he was
disabled, and the boy said yes. He said he questioned the boy because there was a history
of kids messing around with the carts while elderly customers waited. LePage
maintained the boy was not disabled because he had no outward appearance of disability,
and he was not paralyzed because he was moving his arms. According to the Complaint
Summary, LePage called the police because the mother was out of control and cursing—
police reporting says LePage said the customer “went off on him” and he wanted her
removed. The Complaint Summary states the police records reflect LePage did not report
seeing the customer misuse the cart or receiving customer complaints about it, and
LePage told the police he did not believe the customer’s statement that her son was
paralyzed.
       The record of a May 10, 2018, interview between LePage and Mason; notes from
a May 22, 2018, interview between Mason and LePage contained in the incident report;
and the copy of the customer complaint LePage submitted with his opposition papers
support Mason’s summarization of the incident and the various involved parties’
statements regarding it.
       With respect to this incident, the Complaint Summary concludes by noting that
LePage has been trained with a service animal policy that notes not all disabilities are
visible. It concluded the customer’s son did not misuse the cart. It also concluded, “[t]o
provide good customer service, [LePage] should have worked to defuse the situation
when the boy’s mother complained and confirmed her son’s disability, including
apologizing to the customer for his misunderstanding.”

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              May 2, 2018, Customer Complaint

       On May 2, 2018, Safeway received a customer complaint of race discrimination in
which the customer alleged that LePage denied the customer’s Hispanic 12-year-old son
the use of the restroom in the store’s fuel center because he had not yet purchased fuel.
Mason testified at his deposition that he directed an HR manager to investigate this
incident. The record of the May 10, 2018, interview between LePage and Mason, and the
interview notes reflecting a second meeting between the two dated May 22, 2018, also
suggest Mason personally spoke with LePage about this complaint.
       According to the Complaint Summary, the customer said LePage told him the
restroom was for customers only and there had been a problem with the homeless. The
customer said when he tried to explain he was a regular customer, LePage cut him off
and directed him to leave the premises. The Complaint Summary quotes an interview
with LePage, in which he says there is no written notice in the store about restroom use,
just at the fuel station. LePage said there is a sign at the fuel station saying the restroom
is for customers only. He said recently there had been a complaint that a customer could
not use the restroom, and LePage said he told the customer he had given his son the key.
According to the Complaint Summary, LePage said he inherited the sign posted at the
fuel station, he never discussed the sign with Carver, and the Sacramento District
Attorney wants him to keep those restrooms locked to keep out the homeless.
       The Complaint Summary concludes that LePage used poor judgement and gave
poor service to a customer, strictly enforcing a supposed policy without hearing the
customer out. The Complaint Summary concluded LePage should have listened to the
customer and apologized to him.

              May 2, 2018, Issue with a Vendor Employee

       According to the Complaint Summary, on May 2, 2018, LePage told Carver he
had told a supervisor for a third-party vendor that one of the vendor’s employees had

                                              15
engaged in suspicious behavior and should not be returned to the store. LePage had
forwarded an e-mail from the vendor in which the vendor sought a brief statement from
LePage, and LePage asked Carver if he could comply with the request. In the e-mail to
Carver, LePage wrote, “I was told it was not for sure but her actions were very suspicious
in nature. I had the supervisor call me so I could ask him to not have this person return to
my store for future resets and now he sent me this e-mail. I explained we had no exact
proof but that his own people witnessed her leaving the store holding her coat low, going
to her car, opening the trunk and something being put into it.” According to the
Complaint Summary, LePage said he did not ask the vendor supervisor to call him, but
told the on-site lead that he did not want the employee assigned to his store, which
resulted in the supervisor calling him. He did not feel the request that she not be assigned
to his store without further investigation was improper, because he was only reporting
what the vendor’s on-site lead reported to him, and he did not want her at his store
because she was acting suspiciously and not doing her job.
       At his deposition, Mason testified he was personally involved in the investigation
into this matter, interviewing LePage, an asset protection manager, and the vendor
supervisor. The notes contained in the incident report from Mason’s May 22, 2018,
interview with LePage supports Mason’s summary of the facts in the Complaint
Summary.
       The Complaint Summary concludes, regarding this incident, that LePage used
poor judgment in communicating to the vendor that an employee suspected of theft
should not be returned to his store. The Complaint Summary notes LePage’s actions
could have led to that employee’s termination, which would have exposed Safeway to
legal claims.

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       Incidents During the Investigation into Complaints

       Carver instructed LePage not to discuss the complaints made against him—
including the complaints made against him by Naylor—with his employees.
       According to the Complaint Summary, on June 14, 2018, Naylor alleged that he
had a conversation with LePage in which LePage said he could not believe Naylor was
accusing him of racism, and that he was not worried about the investigation because he
had done nothing wrong. According to the report, Naylor said LePage said something to
him of the effect that “we never had this conversation.”
       At his deposition, LePage discussed a one-on-one conversation he had with
Naylor, though he was unclear on the exact date of the conversation. LePage testified
that Jump had asked LePage if he had ever just sat down with Naylor to talk. He said
sometime after that, Naylor came in the office and sat down, and they both got emotional.
According to LePage, during the conversation he was doing what he thought Jump
wanted him to do to try to settle the issues between him and Naylor. LePage said he told
Naylor that Naylor did not know him or his life. He told Naylor about how his daughter
had a black high school boyfriend whose mom kicked him out. LePage said he and his
then-wife brought the boy into their home, and when they found out he had gotten into
Brown they bought his plane ticket and supplies, and paid for his first semester of school.
LePage said he told Naylor that because of this he could not believe that Naylor would
think LePage was the issue. LePage said he told Naylor his problem was with Safeway,
not LePage, and that he told Naylor he should do what he needed to do if he was being
treated unjustly, but it was not LePage. LePage testified that it was on the day of this
personal conversation when he said he was not a racist. LePage testified that it was
during this conversation that he said he wasn’t worried because he hadn’t done anything
wrong. LePage testified he did not know if he said, “[w]e’re not supposed to have this
conversation,” but he did tell Naylor that “[Jump] had said we should sit down and talk,

                                             17
see if [they] could talk this out. . . . And that, ‘They advised [him] that [he] shouldn’t
talk to [Naylor], but [they] got to get this settled.’ ” LePage then changed direction,
saying it was Naylor who had said, “[w]e need to talk. We need to get this settled.”
Later, LePage testified that he was told by Jump and Carver he shouldn’t discuss the case
with Naylor, but believed he was getting mixed signals. He clarified that Jump did not
instruct him to sit down with Naylor, but had asked if he had ever sat down and talked to
Naylor one-on-one.
       LePage refers to a June 14, 2018, conversation between him and Naylor in the
declaration he submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. According
to the declaration, Naylor approached LePage to discuss his grievances against LePage
and Safeway in general. LePage told Naylor he felt he had done nothing wrong in his
conduct with Naylor or any other employee. According to the declaration, LePage did
not say, either explicitly or implicitly, that Safeway would take no disciplinary action
against him.
       The Complaint Summary concludes that LePage violated the instruction he
admitted to receiving to not discuss Naylor’s complaints with anyone but Carver and HR.
It concludes LePage’s statements were contrary to Safeway policies, including those
regarding retaliation, and insubordinate as they disregarded an instruction to not discuss
the investigation.
       On June 15, 2018, after LePage had a conversation with Naylor, Naylor reported
to Safeway that LePage made an inappropriate remark to him. Naylor refused to disclose
the substance of the remark. According to LePage’s declaration, all that happened in the
conversation was that, as LePage was headed out to a meeting at Safeway’s district
office, he stopped and thanked Naylor for working overtime on a project and shook
Naylor’s hand.
       On June 15, 2018, Carver and Jump met with LePage and placed him on
administrative leave pending completion of the investigation into the complaints against

                                             18
him. Carver and Jump instructed LePage not to contact store employees while he was out
on administrative leave pending the completion of the investigation.
        After LePage was placed on paid administrative leave, Safeway granted his
request for a medical leave due to his back pain from June 18, 2018, through July 31,
2018. LePage submitted a copy of the June 24, 2018, e-mail he received from Mason
granting his request for medical leave.
        According to the Complaint Summary, while LePage was on leave, LePage called
the store to say he was on a medical leave of absence. A booth clerk reported LePage
called and asked for Assistant Manager Heather and when Heather was not available told
the clerk he was on medical leave. According to the Complaint Summary, LePage
refused to participate in a phone interview regarding the new allegation, citing his leave
status. A document in the incident report suggests that Naylor called Jump on June 21,
2018, to report that LePage had called the store and reported to an employee that he
would be out until July 2018 due to a back injury. In an e-mail to Mason, which LePage
submitted in opposition to the motion, LePage said he could not take calls from Mason
due to his medical condition, and said he would discuss work matters when he returned to
work.

        Other Details Regarding LePage’s Employment History

        Prior to 2018, LePage took approved leaves of absence from Safeway (1) from
August 9, 2003, through November 3, 2003; (2) December 15, 2010, through January 4,
2011; (3) December 14, 2016, through January 7, 2017; and (4) October 1, 2017, though
December 28, 2017.
        Safeway granted LePage’s request for time-off to care for his mother-in-law even
though caring for a parent-in-law is not a qualifying reason for family leave under the
Family and Medical Leave Act or the California Family Rights Act. This leave of
absence was the one LePage took in October through December 2017.

                                            19
       In his deposition LePage admitted that he was unaware of any derogatory
statement about his alleged disability made by any employee, manager, or supervisor
with Safeway.

       Decision to Terminate LePage

       After considering the various complaints made against LePage, the Complaint
Summary concludes, “[d]espite his prior training and experience, store manager [LePage]
demonstrated a complete lack of judgment and that he is unwilling or unable to treat
people (employees and customers alike) in a professional manner, with courtesy, dignity
and respect. It should also be noted that [LePage] has received prior complaints about his
inappropriate behavior that resulted in warning notices issued to him. [¶] Most
concerning is that [LePage] violated an instruction not to discuss a pending investigation
with anyone other than HR and district manager Helen Carver and he told [Naylor]
nothing would happen to him as a result of his complaint. [¶] [LePage’s] conflicting and
changing versions of events also strongly suggests he was not being truthful during
investigation interviews; he seemed to be telling us what he thought was the correct
answer rather than the truth, which is what we require in the Code of Business Conduct.
. . . . [¶] Trust is essential to the employment relationship; yet, we have lost trust and
confidence in [LePage’s] ability to perform his management role in a way that is
consistent with Safeway’s policies and conduct standards. [¶] Based on the above, I
recommend the termination of [LePage’s] employment.”
       On July 12, 2018, Mason sent Carver an e-mail with the Complaint Summary,
recommending Safeway terminate LePage due to various violations of company policy.
Carver agreed with the recommendation.
       As part of their moving papers, Safeway submitted a copy of the July 17, 2018,
termination letter Carver wrote to LePage. LePage also submitted a copy with his
opposition papers.

                                             20
       Carver began the letter by reminding LePage that on June 15, 2018, it had been
alleged, and determined credible, that he had met with an employee who had made a
complaint about him and asked why the employee made the complaint while an
investigation into that employee’s complaints and two customer complaints were
pending. Carver wrote that during the conversation LePage had said to the employee
“ ‘we did not have this conversation.’ ” She noted that, as a result, it was determined
LePage could no longer be trusted to remain in the workplace pending the investigation.
       Carver continued, noting that it had been revealed that, contrary to instructions for
LePage not to contact store employees, LePage had called the store and spoken with at
least one employee while on leave.
       Carver wrote, “[b]ased on the investigation, including your admissions, we
conclude you have engaged in conduct contrary to numerous employee conduct standards
including the company’s harassment and retaliation policies, about which you have been
trained and warned. You have also demonstrated a lack of good judgment and
professionalism that is required of Safeway Store Directors and your conflicting and
changing versions of events, as well as your meeting with the complaining employee and
subsequent contact with your store, all contrary to explicit directions, further supports
you have violated Safeway’s Code of Business Conduct.”
       Carver wrote, “[t]rust is essential to the employment relationship. As a result of
the investigation conclusions, as well as your prior history of complaints, we have lost
trust and confidence in your ability to perform your management role in a way that is
consistent with Safeway’s policies and conduct standards.”

                                             21
                                        DISCUSSION

                                               I

             General Standards of Review on Motions for Summary Judgment

       A court must grant a motion for summary judgment when “all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
“[T]hat is,” the court must grant the motion if, “there is no issue requiring a trial as to any
fact that is necessary under the pleadings and, ultimately, the law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar); see also Martine v. Heavenly Valley
Limited Partnership (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 715, 721.) In moving for summary
judgment, defendants have the burden to show that the cause of action has no merit
because an essential element cannot be established or there is a complete defense. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at pp. 850, 861.)
       Our review of the record and the trial court’s decision is de novo, and we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposition to the motion. (Kahn v. East
Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003; see also Serri v. Santa Clara
University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 859 (Serri).) “We are not bound by the trial
court’s reasons for granting summary judgment because we review the trial court’s
ruling, and not its rationale.” (Avidity Partners, LLC v. State of California (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1192.) However, “[o]n appeal, the trial court’s judgment is
presumed correct, and the burden is on the Appellants to demonstrate reversible error.
[Citation.] This is true even on de novo review” of orders granting summary judgment.
(Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 708; see also
Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554-
555 [de novo review is limited to issues adequately raised and supported in an appellant’s
opening brief, and “ ‘ “[t]he most fundamental rule of appellate review is that an appealed

                                              22
judgment or order is presumed to be correct.” [Citation.] It is the appellant who bears
the burden of overcoming that presumption.’ [Citation.]”].) Thus, “[a]lthough our
review of a summary judgment is de novo, it is limited to issues which have been
adequately raised and supported in [the appellant’s] brief.” (See Reyes v. Kosha (1998)
65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6; Davies v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1086,
1096.)
         Thus, an appellant challenging a trial court’s granting of a motion for summary
judgment must comply with rule 8.204(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court. This rule
includes a requirement to “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation
to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” (Id. at
(a)(1)(C).) While the evidence submitted is important, “we will not scour the record on
our own in search of supporting evidence” and if a party fails to direct us to where in the
record we can find the necessary evidence, “they cannot complain when we find their
arguments unpersuasive.” (Sharabianlou v. Karp (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1149.)
         Citations to factual statements made in briefs in the trial court—particularly when
portions of those briefs themselves lack citations to specific pieces of evidence—do not
satisfy this burden. (Cf. Parker v. Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc. (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 285, 290-291 [refusing to consider arguments made in the trial court
incorporated by reference into appellate briefs due to lack of compliance with the
requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) which govern the need to
provide citations for arguments].)
         For example, LePage has not included a clearly labeled “Statement of Facts” in his
opening brief, but a “Case Summary” that he begins with a section that says following his
request for medical leave, Safeway began to investigate his alleged misconduct.
Presumably, this is the first place we are meant to look to determine if LePage has
satisfied the California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) requirement that an
appellant’s opening brief contain a summary of facts. The factual statements in this

                                              23
section often lack record citations to evidence. For example, LePage says that when
Safeway investigated allegations of his misconduct he “provided Safeway with an
explanation for his conduct that was consistent with Safeway’s corporate policies.” To
support this argument, he cites to his entire opposition brief to the motion for summary
judgment that he filed in the trial court. This did not satisfy his burden to cite to evidence
in the record to support this statement.

                                                 II

       FEHA and Motions for Summary Judgment of FEHA Discrimination Claims

       Under FEHA, “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice . . . [¶] [f]or an employer,
because of the . . . physical disability, . . . [or] medical condition . . . of any person, . . . to
discharge the person from employment . . . , or to discriminate against the person . . . in
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).)
       “In analyzing claims of discrimination under FEHA, California courts have long
used the three-stage burden-shifting approach established by the United States Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 [] for the analysis of
title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) employment discrimination claims. (See Reid v.
Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 520, fn. 2 []; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 317, 354 [] (Guz) [‘[b]ecause of the similarity between state and federal
employment discrimination laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent
when applying our own statutes’].) The McDonnell Douglas test ‘reflects the principle
that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must
usually be proved circumstantially. Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow
focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable
likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.’ (Guz, at p. 354; accord, Serri[,
supra,] 226 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 860 [].)” (Husman v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1181 (Husman).)

                                                 24
       Under the McDonald Douglas test in stage one, “the plaintiff must provide
evidence that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the
position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3) he suffered
an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available
job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 355; see also Husman, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1181; see also Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067-1068.) “If,
at trial, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination
arises.” (Guz, at p. 355.)
       Once an employee establishes a prima facie case and the presumption of
discrimination arises, in the second stage the employer must offer a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
pp. 355-356.) “If the employer sustains this burden, the presumption of discrimination
disappears.” (Id. at p. 356.)
       In the third stage of the analysis, “[t]he plaintiff must then have the opportunity to
attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination, or to offer any
other evidence of discriminatory motive. [Citations.] In an appropriate case, evidence of
dishonest reasons, considered together with the elements of the prima facie case, may
permit a finding of prohibited bias. [Citations.] The ultimate burden of persuasion on the
issue of actual discrimination remains with the plaintiff.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 356.)
       With a motion for summary judgment “[i]n an employment discrimination case,
the employer, as the moving party, has the initial burden to present admissible evidence
showing either that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case is lacking or
that the adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory
factors. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p); Caldwell v. Paramount Unified School Dist.
(1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 203 [].)

                                              25
       “In meeting its initial burden the employer need not rely upon the premise that the
plaintiff cannot demonstrate a prima facie case if the employer can set forth admissible
evidence of its reasons, unrelated to unlawful discrimination, for the adverse employment
action. (Guz[, supra,] 24 Cal.4th [at p.] 357 [].)” (Hicks v. KNTV Television, Inc. (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003 (Hicks).)
       “If the employer meets its initial burden [on a motion for summary judgment] in
this manner, the plaintiff then has the burden to produce ‘substantial evidence that the
employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action was untrue or
pretextual, or evidence the employer acted with a discriminatory animus, or a
combination of the two, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the employer
engaged in intentional discrimination.’ (Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997)
57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1005 [].)
       “The plaintiff must do more than raise the inference that the employer’s asserted
reason is false. ‘[A] reason cannot be proved to be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it
is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’ (St.
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, 515 [].) If the plaintiff produces no
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could infer that the employer’s true reason
was discriminatory, the employer is entitled to summary judgment. (Caldwell v.
Paramount Unified School Dist., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 203.)” (Hicks, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1003; see also Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 862 [“It is not
sufficient for an employee to make a bare prima facie showing or to simply deny the
credibility of the employer’s witnesses or to speculate as to discriminatory motive.
[Citations.] Rather it is incumbent upon the employee to produce ‘substantial responsive
evidence’ demonstrating the existence of a material triable controversy as to pretext or
discriminatory animus on the part of the employer. [Citations.]”].)
       “ ‘[T]he great weight of federal and California authority holds that an employer is
entitled to summary judgment if, considering the employer’s innocent explanation for its

                                             26
actions, the evidence as a whole is insufficient to permit a rational inference that the
employer’s actual motive was discriminatory.’ (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 360–361,
fn. omitted.)” (McGrory v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th
1510, 1531, fn. omitted.)

                                              III

        Safeway Met its Burden to Show a Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason

       An employer may satisfy its initial burden on a motion for summary judgment on
a discrimination claim arising from an employee’s termination by establishing it had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to terminate the employee. (See Wills v. Superior
Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 160.) “If, as here, the motion for summary judgment
relies in whole or in part on a showing of nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge, the
employer satisfies its burden as moving party if it presents evidence of such
nondiscriminatory reasons that would permit a trier of fact to find, more likely than not,
that they were the basis for the termination.” (Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005)
135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097-1098.) “[A]n employer need not have good cause to
terminate an at-will employee. The reason for termination need not be wise or correct so
long as it is not grounded on a prohibited bias. [Citation, fn. omitted.] [¶] An
employer’s burden can be met by producing evidence of one or more reasons for the
adverse employment action that were ‘unrelated to unlawful discrimination.’
[Citations.]” (McGrory, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1524, fn. omitted.)
       “ ‘[L]egitimate’ reasons . . . in this context are reasons that are facially unrelated to
prohibited bias, and which, if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination.”
(Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 358; see also Featherstone v. Southern California
Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158 (Featherstone).) “The
employer’s evidence must be sufficient to allow the trier of fact to conclude that it is
more likely than not that one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were the sole

                                              27
basis for the adverse employment action.” (Featherstone, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1158.)
       Here, the undisputed facts and evidence are sufficient for a trier of fact to conclude
it is more likely than not that Safeway terminated LePage because, at the completion of
its investigation into numerous complaints about LePage’s actions, Mason concluded
LePage had violated company policies and found Safeway could no longer trust LePage.
Both breaches of company policy and a loss in confidence in an employee are legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons to terminate an employee. (See King v. United Parcel Service,
Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 432-433 (King); Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 327, 352 (Arteaga); Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861; Zamora v.
Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 56.)
       In the argument section of his opening brief, LePage does not adequately dispute
that Safeway offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate him. Instead, he
focuses his discussion regarding the conclusion of Safeway’s investigation on efforts to
prove that Safeway’s conclusions were wrong, and, therefore, that these conclusions do
not provide enough evidence to support a finding on a motion for summary judgment that
he was not competent. But Mason’s conclusion the LePage had violated its policies and
finding that Safeway had reason to have lost confidence in LePage did not need to be
correct to be legitimate. An honest belief in those findings is enough. (See King, supra,
152 Cal.App.4th at p. 433 [“According to UPS’s evidence, the decision makers
entertained an honest belief that plaintiff had either personally falsified a driver’s
timecard or directed the driver to do so. For purposes of establishing the moving
employer’s initial burden of proof, it does not matter whether plaintiff actually did
commit an integrity violation as long as UPS honestly believed he did”]; see also
Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005 [“ ‘The [employee] cannot simply show that
the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is
whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is

                                              28
wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent’ ”]; accord Arteaga, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at
p. 343.)
       The evidence presented to the trial court established that Mason oversaw an
investigation into numerous complaints about LePage’s behavior in the first half of 2018,
where witnesses gave accounts of LePage engaging in behavior that Mason could fairly
conclude reflected poor judgment on LePage’s part. Mason also had reason to believe
that during the investigation, LePage acted contrary to directives and spoke with one of
the primary complainants about whether one could fairly accuse LePage of being a racist.
When Safeway placed LePage on leave pending the investigation and told him not to call
the store, he called the store. Indeed, in his deposition, LePage admitted he had some sort
of conversation regarding whether he could fairly be called a racist with Naylor, and
there is no dispute that LePage called the store while on leave. Mason’s fairly reached
conclusions supplied a legitimate reason to terminate LePage.

                                              IV

             LePage Has Failed to Demonstrate Safeway’s Reason is Pretext

       “Once an employer satisfies its initial burden of proving the legitimacy of its
reason for termination, the discharged employee seeking to avert summary judgment
must present specific and substantial responsive evidence that the employer’s evidence
was in fact insufficient or that there is a triable issue of fact material to the employer’s
motive. [Citations.] . . . [¶] While we must liberally construe plaintiff’s showing and
resolve any doubts about the propriety of a summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor,
plaintiff’s evidence remains subject to careful scrutiny. [Citation.] We can find a triable
issue of material fact ‘if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact
to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with
the applicable standard of proof.’ (Aguilar[, supra,] 25 Cal.4th [at p.] 850 [].) Moreover,
plaintiff’s subjective beliefs in an employment discrimination case do not create a

                                              29
genuine issue of fact; nor do uncorroborated and self-serving declarations. [Citations.]
And finally, plaintiff’s evidence must relate to the motivation of the decision makers to
prove, by nonspeculative evidence, an actual causal link between prohibited motivation
and termination.” (King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 433-434; see also Serri, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 861-862; Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1004-1005.) “The
stronger the employer’s showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger
the plaintiff’s evidence must be in order to create a reasonable inference of a
discriminatory motive.” (Featherstone, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1159.)
       “With direct evidence of pretext, ‘ “a triable issue as to the actual motivation of
the employer is created even if the evidence is not substantial.” [Citation.]’ ” (Morgan v.
Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 69.) In contrast,
“ ‘ “[c]ircumstantial evidence of ‘ “pretense” must be “specific” and “substantial” in
order to create a triable issue with respect to whether the employer intended to
discriminate’ on an improper basis.” ’ (Batarse v. Service Employees Internat. Union,
Local 1000 (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 820, 834.)” (Husman, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1182.)
       Here, there is no direct evidence that Safeway acted with a discriminatory motive.
(See Batarse v. Service Employees Internat. Union, Local 1000, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 834-835 [Direct evidence is evidence that if believed will prove the particular fact
in question without reliance upon inference or presumption. It may take the form of
admissions by a decision maker that the adverse employment action was taken because of
the employee’s membership in the protected class].)
       With respect to circumstantial evidence, the primary evidence LePage can offer is
the timing of his termination—he was terminated while on medical leave for his back
pain. Yet, “[a]lthough temporal proximity, by itself, may be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, it does not create a triable fact as to
pretext once the employer has offered evidence of a legitimate, nonprohibited reason for

                                              30
its action. This is especially so where the employer raised questions about the
employee’s performance before he engaged in protected activity, and the subsequent
discharge was based on those performance issues.” (Arteaga, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 334-335, 353; see also King, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 436 [“[A] disabled
employee has no greater prerogative to compromise his integrity than any other
employee. The mere fact that [the employer] found plaintiff had breached its integrity
policy shortly after returning to work is insufficient to raise an inference that his blood
disorder prompted his discharge”].)
       LePage began his medical leave for his back pain while already on paid
administrative leave to allow Safeway to finish its investigation while minimizing the risk
that he would compromise that investigation by speaking with store employees. While
on leave, he disobeyed directives and called the store. In this context the temporal
proximity between when LePage began medical leave and when Safeway terminated him
is not alone substantial enough evidence for LePage’s claim to survive summary
judgment.
       LePage tries to convince this court that the temporal proximity of his termination
is sufficient evidence in two ways, neither of which is persuasive. First, in the
introductory portion of his brief, he implies Safeway began taking a closer look at his
behavior following leaves of absence he took (1) in late 2016 to early 2017 to care for his
foot, and (2) in late 2017 to care for his mother-in-law. Thus, LePage suggests the leave
period we should look at as triggering Safeway’s actions is not just his June 2018 medical
leave, but also the earlier two periods of leave. But, to begin with, the citations LePage
provides regarding his late 2016 to early 2017 leave say nothing about the purpose of that
leave. And LePage took the late 2017 leave to take care for family, not due to a personal
medical condition or disability.
       Finally, even framed in the context of all 2017 and 2018 leave periods, LePage’s
argument is still rooted in the temporal proximity of when LePage took the periods of

                                              31
leave and when he was terminated. In the face of the strong evidence that shows
Safeway terminated LePage because it had lost confidence in him and he violated
Safeway policies—e.g., the Complaint Summary, the interview records in the incident
report, Mason’s testimony regarding his role in the investigations, and LePage’s
deposition—this temporal proximity alone does not carry LePage’s burden on summary
judgment. (See Featherstone, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1158-1159.)
       Next, LePage quotes the following from Arteaga, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pages
353-354 and argues he has satisfied his burden: “In the classic situation where temporal
proximity is a factor, an employee has worked for the same employer for several years,
has a good or excellent performance record, and then, after engaging in some type of
protected activity—disclosing a disability—is suddenly accused of serious performance
problems, subjected to derogatory comments about the protected activity, and terminated.
In those circumstances, temporal proximity, together with the other evidence, may be
sufficient to establish pretext.”
       LePage suggests his 41 years of employment, coupled with the fact that prior to
December 2017 he only had a record of four written warnings for policy violations offers
enough additional evidence to satisfy his burden to provide evidence other than temporal
proximity to support his claim of pretext. We disagree that this was enough. Indeed, the
evidence of prior incidents suggests both that (1) LePage had been warned of the
importance of carefully complying with Safeway’s policies and should have been more
cautious when the 2018 incidents arose; and (2) LePage’s behavior became more
careless, or at least more of a liability for Safeway, in 2018, when the number of
complaints made in a short period of time increased significantly. While LePage may
wish to characterize the 2018 complaints as “baseless,” there was ample evidence that
Safeway’s conclusions regarding those complaints were not baseless. These complaints
were made and the investigation into them had significantly progressed before LePage
took medical leave. The documents submitted reflect HR representatives and Mason

                                            32
interviewed the parties involved, and that Mason considered the substance of those
interviews in reaching his conclusions. And nothing in the record suggests someone with
authority to terminate LePage played a role in generating the complaints about LePage in
2018, or that LePage was actually subject to a like volume of complaints in prior years
and that Safeway ignored them.
       On this record, LePage could not show Safeway’s legitimate reasons to terminate
him were pretext.

                                        DISPOSITION
       We affirm the judgment. Safeway shall recover its costs on appeal under
California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).

                                                   HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

RENNER, J.

ASHWORTH, J.

 Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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