Court Opinion

ID: 9891465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 18:00:37.704586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:26.273023
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2478
CYNTHIA FULLER,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

DENIS R. MCDONOUGH, Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
                                     Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
            No. 1:19-cv-01325 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.
                     ____________________

 SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 8, 2023 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2023
                 ____________________

   Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and KIRSCH, Circuit
Judges.
   KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. While Cynthia Fuller worked for the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), another employee, who
was dating one of Fuller’s supervisors, sexually harassed her.
Around the time the harassment started, Fuller requested an
accommodation for mental health disabilities and made an-
other accommodation request nearly a year later. Following
2                                                   No. 22-2478

unrelated workplace misconduct, the VA terminated Fuller.
Relevant to this appeal, Fuller sued under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791, alleging retaliation. The district
court granted summary judgment for the VA, concluding that
Fuller did not suffer any material adverse employment action
and could not establish causation. Because the reprimand she
received was not an adverse employment action, and Fuller
cannot establish causation for her two other retaliation theo-
ries, we affirm.
                                I
   We construe the facts in the light most favorable to Fuller.
See McCann v. Ogle County, 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018).
Fuller began work at the Jesse Brown VA Medical Center as a
medical instrument technician in 2006. She primarily assisted
physicians during colonoscopies and endoscopies, stocking
the procedure room with sterile instruments. She also inter-
acted with patients.
    Fuller began treatment for adjustment disorder, anxiety,
and depressed mood in 2016. In August 2016, a patient sent a
letter to the Medical Center, complaining about how Fuller
had treated him. Fuller’s supervisor issued her an admonish-
ment for unprofessional and inappropriate conduct, which
was later reduced to a written letter of counseling. In Septem-
ber 2016, Fuller requested an accommodation from the VA for
four weeks of leave to address her mental health.
   In the year following her request, Fuller engaged in, and
was the victim of, workplace misconduct. Sometime in fall
2016, Vincent Saulsberry, a VA employee who was dating
Fuller’s second-level supervisor (Dana Beatty), made sexual
No. 22-2478                                                  3

remarks to Fuller. Fuller complained to VA management
about the comments sometime in 2016 or 2017 (the timing of
her complaints does not affect the resolution of this appeal).
Fuller’s direct supervisor, Kelli Goshay, testified that Beatty
was out to get Fuller by November 2016 and wanted her dis-
ciplined for anything she did.
    In January 2017, Fuller was part of a workplace dispute
with a coworker, in which she called her coworker a “trick”
(slang for prostitute). She received a letter of reprimand for
inappropriate conduct in March 2017, following an investiga-
tion. In June 2017, a nurse reported that Fuller failed to pre-
pare a procedure room, which caused a delay, and that she
had been intimidating and rude. That same month, Sauls-
berry again made sexual remarks to Fuller, and she com-
plained to management a second time. And in July 2017,
Fuller had a disagreement with a coworker in front of a pa-
tient.
    Fuller submitted a written request for an accommodation
in August 2017, asking to be transferred out of her nursing
service because of her mental health conditions. In September
2017, Ronald Fought, the nurse executive, wrote in an email
that he was concerned that Fuller’s accommodation request
had not been timely addressed. The VA sought clarification
of the request that same day and later decided to transfer
Fuller to sterile processing services, where Fuller would work
under a different supervisor. But Fuller was reported for vio-
lating the protocol for scope sterilization, and she was tempo-
rarily reassigned to volunteer services. In October 2017,
Fought issued Fuller a notice of proposed removal. The notice
stated that her proposed removal was based on her (1) failure
to follow the scope protocol; (2) failure to carry out assigned
4                                                  No. 22-2478

work, which caused a delay in patient care; and (3) conduct
unbecoming a federal employee.
    Fuller received a removal letter, accompanied by a last
chance agreement, in November 2017. In the last chance
agreement, the VA promised to hold her removal in abeyance
for two years if Fuller made various promises, including to
waive her right to bring existing or future claims against the
VA and her right to use the Equal Employment Opportunity
complaints procedure. Fuller rejected the last chance agree-
ment in a letter, refusing to waive those rights. She stated in
the letter that she was rejecting the agreement because it
would both expressly and effectively waive those rights and
because it did not guarantee that she would be treated the
same as other employees in disciplinary or termination deci-
sions.
    Fuller began pre-complaint counseling with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission after receiving the re-
moval letter, and a few days later, she presented her letter re-
jecting the last chance agreement to the chief nursing officer.
She was then terminated.
    In January 2018, she filed a formal complaint with the
VA’s Office of Resolution Management, alleging discrimina-
tion and retaliation. The EEOC investigated the complaint but
found no discrimination. In February 2019, Fuller sued the
VA. Relevant to this appeal, she alleged retaliation in viola-
tion of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. Both the VA and
Fuller moved for summary judgment, and the district court
granted the VA’s motion and denied Fuller’s. Fuller appealed.
No. 22-2478                                                       5

                                 II
    We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. See McCann, 909 F.3d at 886. To establish a Title VII
or Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim, Fuller must show that:
“(1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she
suffered an adverse action by her employer; and (3) there is a
causal link between her protected expression and the adverse
action.” Scaife v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 49 F.4th 1109, 1118
(7th Cir. 2022); see Burks v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Transp., 464 F.3d
744, 758 n.16 (7th Cir. 2006). On appeal, Fuller argues three
retaliation theories, which we address in turn.
                                 A
    Fuller first argues that the VA retaliated against her in vi-
olation of Title VII, in response to her complaint about Sauls-
berry’s sexual harassment, by (1) reprimanding her in March
2017 and (2) skipping suspension in October 2017, moving di-
rectly from reprimand to proposal of removal.
   But the March 2017 reprimand was not a material adverse
employment action. As we have noted, “a documented repri-
mand alone is not an adverse action absent some tangible job
consequence.” Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1119 (cleaned up). The repri-
mand here “did not come with a low performance rating or
even a pay cut.” Id. It only stated that it could be used in de-
termining an appropriate penalty if further misconduct oc-
curred.
   Fuller argues that the reprimand was an adverse action be-
cause it served as a building block for her later termination.
But we have held that oral or written reprimands received by
an employee under an employer’s progressive discipline sys-
tem do not implicate job consequences tangible enough to
6                                                     No. 22-2478

establish an independent basis for Title VII liability. Oest v.
Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2001), rev’d on
other grounds, Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th
Cir. 2016). In Oest, each oral or written reprimand an em-
ployee received brought her closer to termination, but she did
not point to “any immediate consequence of the reprimands,
such as ineligibility for job benefits like promotion, transfer to
a favorable location, or an advantageous increase in responsi-
bilities.” Id. Indeed, “job-related criticism can prompt an em-
ployee to improve her performance and thus lead to a new
and more constructive employment relationship.” Id. Fuller
does not identify any immediate consequence of the repri-
mand other than it brought her closer to termination. Without
more, the reprimand was not an adverse action, and Fuller’s
first retaliation theory fails, as it relates to the reprimand.
    As to Fuller’s theory premised on the disciplinary progres-
sion to proposed removal, it fails because she cannot establish
causation. We therefore need not address whether the pro-
gression constituted an adverse action. The parties agree that
Fuller engaged in protected expression when she reported
Saulsberry’s sexual harassment. But though Goshay testified
that Beatty wanted Fuller disciplined, Fuller offers no evi-
dence that Beatty was involved with the progression to pro-
posed removal. Instead, other individuals—namely Fought—
participated in the decision to issue a proposed removal. And
after the reprimand, but before the progression to proposed
removal, Fuller engaged in serious misconduct when she vio-
lated the scope sterilization protocol. Fuller’s retaliation the-
ory fails.
No. 22-2478                                                    7

                               B
    Fuller’s second retaliation theory is that the VA retaliated
against her in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, because of
her August 2017 accommodation request, by proposing her
removal in October 2017. But Fuller also cannot establish cau-
sation for this theory. Nearly three months passed between
Fuller’s accommodation request and the proposal of removal.
During that time, Fuller violated the scope sterilization proto-
col, breaking any causal chain between the request and pro-
posal.
    Fuller argues that evidence she was treated differently
than similarly situated employees supports causation, but
there are no employees similarly situated to her. To establish
that other employees are similarly situated, Fuller must show
that they are “directly comparable to her in all material re-
spects.” Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680
(7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Fuller points to several em-
ployees, arguing they are similarly situated to her because
they also misused scopes and requested accommodations.
But those employees had no prior disciplinary history, unlike
Fuller, and are thus not comparable to her in all material re-
spects. And there is also no evidence that Fought intended to
retaliate against Fuller. Instead, he wrote in a September 2017
email that he was concerned that her accommodation request
had not been timely addressed, and the VA sought clarifica-
tion of the request the same day. Because Fuller cannot estab-
lish causation, her Rehabilitation Act theory fails.
                               C
   Fuller’s third retaliation theory is that the VA retaliated
against her in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act
8                                                  No. 22-2478

by terminating her because she rejected the waiver provision
in the last chance agreement. This theory fails too because she
cannot establish that her rejection of the waiver provision
caused her removal. The parties agree that Fuller’s removal
was an adverse action, but they dispute whether Fuller’s re-
fusal to sign the waiver provision in the last chance agreement
is protected expression, and they dispute causation. We need
not reach whether the refusal is protected expression because
Fuller cannot establish causation.
    Fuller does not need to show but-for causation, just that
retaliatory intent played a part in her termination. See Huff v.
Buttigieg, 42 F.4th 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2022). But the VA termi-
nated Fuller for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons: her viola-
tion of the scope protocol, her failure to carry out assigned
work and the resulting delay in patient care, and conduct un-
becoming a federal employee. The VA had already made the
decision to terminate Fuller when it sent her the removal let-
ter and the last chance agreement. And because the VA termi-
nated Fuller for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons, the clause
requiring a waiver of her right to bring future claims does not
affect the outcome of this appeal, even though the VA con-
ceded that the clause was not legally enforceable. See Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (“[T]here can
be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title
VII.”). Fuller thus cannot establish that her rejection of the
waiver provision caused her termination, and her third retal-
iation theory fails.
    Because Fuller cannot establish a prima facie case for re-
taliation on any of her theories, the district court properly
granted summary judgment for the VA.
                                                     AFFIRMED