Court Opinion

ID: 9927393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 22:02:53.301226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:50.757246
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2024 IL App (3d) 220523-U

                                         Order filed January 26, 2024

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2024

      In re MARRIAGE OF                      )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                             )     of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
      MOROUNKEJI AKIN-OLUGBEMI,              )     Du Page County, Illinois.
                                             )
            Petitioner-Appellee,             )     Appeal No. 3-22-0523
                                             )     Circuit No. 19-D-644
            and                              )
                                             )
      TOLULOPE AKIN-OLUGBEMI,                )     The Honorable
                                             )     Linda E. Davenport
            Respondent-Appellant.            )     Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Holdridge and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________
                                              ORDER

¶1          Held: The trial court did not adequately notify an unrepresented party that participation
                  in the pretrial conference would result in the waiver of his right to trial.

¶2          The mother, Petitioner Morounkeji Akin-Olugbemi, filed a complaint against the father,

     Respondent Tolulope Akin-Olugbemi, seeking a re-allocation of parenting time and child

     support. After holding a pretrial conference, the trial court entered orders on both matters. The

     father, who was not represented by counsel, appealed. We reverse and remand for additional

     proceedings.
¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶4          At the time the parties’ marriage was dissolved on December 21, 2020, the trial court

     reserved any ruling on the issue of child support because “[t]he parties [were] equally sharing

     parenting time and based upon the income of the parties, child support is not warranted at this

     time.” After the father moved to the United Kingdom in June 2021, however, the parties no

     longer shared equal parenting time. As a consequence, the mother filed a Petition to Set Child

     Support and For Other Relief in January 2022. Subsequently, both parties sought to modify the

     court’s original allocation of parenting time. In March 2022, the trial court entered an agreed

     order temporarily requiring the father to pay $813 per month in child support for the parties’ sole

     minor child, pending the final resolution of the mother’s support petition.

¶5          On November 22, 2022, a hearing was scheduled to address the issues of child support

     and the re-allocation of parenting time, as well as other matters not at issue here. The father was

     self-represented at that hearing, while the mother was represented by counsel. After seeking to

     obtain the permission of the parties, the trial court conducted a pretrial conference on the issues

     of child support and parenting time. At the conclusion of that proceeding, the court modified the

     prior allocation of parenting time and ordered the father to pay $1,000 in monthly child support,

     retroactive to the entry of its prior support order. The retroactive nature of the new support order

     resulted in an arrearage of $4557. The father filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶6                                            II. ANALYSIS

¶7          The father raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the court’s November 22 orders were

     against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (2) whether the court erred by failing to include

     certain business expenses claimed by the mother in calculating her income for purposes of

     establishing child support.

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¶8           At the outset, we note that it is unclear precisely which of the trial court’s November 22

     multiple orders the father is challenging in his first issue on appeal. In its entirety, his argument

     asserts that:

             “The court order issued is against the manifest weight of the evidence because no exhibits

             were admitted into evidence, [he] had no opportunity to challenge documents presented

             by the [mother’s] attorney during the pretrial conference because they were not admitted

             into evidence, there were no testimony was given [sic] under oath during the pretrial

             conference.”

¶9           In this instance, we will overlook the paucity of citation and substantive argument to

     address the question of whether the father was adequately informed that he was waiving his right

     to trial and would be bound by the decision rendered by the trial court at the end of the pretrial

     conference. The record shows that, at the start of a previously scheduled hearing, the mother’s

     counsel suggested that the court conduct a pretrial conference to expedite the resolution of the

     case. Agreeing with that suggestion, the trial court attempted to obtain the parties’ permission to

     conduct the pretrial conference, stating,

            “Let me explain what that means. Sometimes we drop into lawyer speak. Let me tell you

            what that means. Although both of are you familiar with me and how I operate my

            courtroom after the [dissolution] trial that we went through, a pretrial conference is where

            we talk. It's going to be on the record. It's recorded. But people talk about why it's

            important, what you think needs to change and why. And then I'm going to listen to you

            both, and then I'm going to try to make a recommendation. Both of you or either of you

            are free to say no, no, no, I want my day in court, I want to be heard with evidence and

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             cross-examination; or you can say could we talk, and then you can step outside and try to

             speak.

                      You need to understand, sir, [the mother’s attorneys] are not your lawyers. They

             have no obligation to protect your interests, but they do have an obligation to talk and to

             listen. So what I'm going to do is, if it's acceptable to you, we're going to do this right out

             here sitting and listening, and you tell me why you filed and, ma'am, why you filed. You

             can allow your attorneys to do it if you want, but you can do it on your own. And then I'll

             tell you what my thoughts are based upon my history and my knowledge of the case as

             well as what you told me today.

                      But I need to get permission to do that.”

       The court then asked the mother and the father whether they agreed to proceed with the pretrial

       conference, and both responded affirmatively.

¶ 10          Initially, we must examine the sufficiency of the trial court’s explanation of the pretrial

       conference to determine whether it adequately informed the father, who was not represented by

       counsel, that his participation would act as a waiver of his right to a trial on the contested issues.

       Because that presents a legal question addressing the fundamental fairness of the proceeding,

       which implicates the father’s due process rights, we review it de novo. In re Bernice B., 352 Ill.

       App. 3d 167, 174–75 (2004).

¶ 11          In reviewing the language used by the trial court, we first note that the court never

       expressly informed the father that its decision at the end of the pretrial conference would be

       conclusive and that he would be barred from rejecting it and proceeding to trial. Indeed, the trial

       court couched its explanation of the outcome of the pretrial conference in language that strongly

       suggested that the pretrial conference would merely be a casual discussion and that its decision

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       would be nonbinding. As the court explained early on, “a pretrial conference is where we talk

       *** about why it's important, what you think needs to change and why.” At the conclusion of

       that “talk,” the court was then “going to try to make a recommendation.” None of those

       statements suggests to a reasonable listener that the court’s “recommendation” would, in fact, be

       a binding judgment.

¶ 12           Moreover, in the very next sentence, the court stated, “Both of you or either of you are

       free to say no, no, no, I want my day in court, I want to be heard with evidence and cross-

       examination.” (Emphasis added.) The placement of that sentence immediately after the court’s

       explanation that it would “try to make a recommendation” would lead a reasonable person to

       believe that either party could reject that “recommendation” and proceed to trial, where a full

       complement of evidentiary rules and cross-examination would apply. The trial court reinforced

       that idea further by concluding its explanation with the statement that the parties would “tell [the

       court] why you filed and, ma'am, why you filed. *** And then I'll tell you what my thoughts

       are.” The court’s expression of its “thoughts” is not equivalent to a binding judgment in common

       parlance and, necessarily, does not carry the same weight of authority. In our view, the father

       could have, and most likely did, conclude that, based on the court’s explanation as a whole, he

       would have the option to reject the court’s “thoughts” and “recommendation” at the conclusion

       of the pretrial conference and proceed to trial if he so chose.

¶ 13           After reviewing the trial court’s explanation, we hold that the trial court failed to

       adequately inform the father that his participation in the pretrial conference would act as a

       waiver of his right to a full trial, with all its inherent procedural safeguards, and result in the

       entry of a binding judgment. Therefore, we reverse the orders re-allocating the parties’ parenting

       time and establishing child support and remand the cause for further proceedings. Because of our

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       disposition of the notice issue, we need not address the merits of the father’s remaining

       contentions on appeal.

¶ 14                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 15          For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s November 22, 2022, orders re-

       allocating parenting time and setting forth the father’s child support obligation.

¶ 16          Reversed and remanded.

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