Court Opinion

ID: 9445955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:42:10.89774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:28.012552
License: Public Domain

PARKINSON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) .
General Order in Bankruptcy 38, 11 U.S.C.A. following section 53, provides that the several forms annexed to the general orders shall ■ be observed and used, with such alterations as may be necessary to suit the circumstances of any particular case. Official Form No. 5 is that of a creditors’ petition with rhetorical paragraph 4 being as follows:
“Within four months next preceding the filing of this petition, the said...... ............committed an act of bankruptcy, in that he did heretofore, to-wit, on the......day of................. 19 ............................ it
I believe that petitioning creditors cannot completely ignore the mandate of that Order. I also believe it to be the law that an involuntary bankruptcy petition alleging in the language of the statute, without any specification of any of the facts claimed as a basis therefor, that the purported bankrupt had made transfers with intent to prefer creditors is fatally defective and, if amended to actually state a voidable preference, the date of the amendment must be taken as the date from which the four months period is to be calculated. In re Condon, 2 Cir., 1913, 209 F. 800; Hovland v. Farmers’ State Bank, 8 Cir., 1926, 10 F.2d 478; In re Fuller, 2 Cir., 1926, 15 F.2d 294; In re Gaynor Homes, 2 Cir., 1933, 65 F.2d 378; Dworsky v. Alanjay Bias Binding Corporation, 2 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 803.
The cases relied upon by the majority are, in my opinion, inapposite. In Shoe-smith the exact character of the amendment does not appear and in that case and in Harney Shoes the question was whether the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction in proceedings grounded upon a defective petition alleging an act of bankruptcy in the language of the statute and had the power to permit an amendment. There is no question but what the court in the instant case had jurisdiction and had the power to permit the filing of the amended petition, however, the question here is whether the four months period under Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 96(a), shall be calculated from the filing date of the original petition, which was ineffectual, or from that of the amended petition, which was valid. The statement by this court in Shoesmith that an amendment relates back to the filing of the original petition was obiter dictum.
In Claudon the original petition did allege a specific act of bankruptcy in that Claudon “committed an act of bankruptcy, in that he did heretofore, to wit, on the 9th day of September, A.D. 1927 permit attachments to be entered in the Circuit Court of Livingston County and levied upon property of the said A. B. Claudon.” The amended petition simply amplified the same act of bankruptcy. In Haskell a similar situation existed and this court held in both that the *720amendment related back. I agree with these decisions but they are not disposi-tive of the question in the case at bar.
I also agree that Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S.C.A., should be liberally construed but there is a point beyond which that liberality cannot be extended. Before the doctrine of relation back can have proper application it must appear that the pleader knew and attempted to state in his original petition some definite conduct, transaction or occurrence the imperfection whereof he seeks to cure by the amendment. In this case the motion for leave to file an amended petition shows upon its face that the petitioning creditor did not know of any definite act constituting a voidable preference at the time it filed the original petition, April 19, 1954, and did not learn the facts until examination of the bankrupt long after-wards. It was then that it entered the motion for leave to file an amended petition. The record conclusively shows that the original was a “shotgun” petition. Thus the record forecloses any pretense of asserting that the original petition set forth or attempted to set forth the same act of bankruptcy alleged in the amended petition. Under such a record as here there can be no relation back.
In the case of Dworsky v. Alanjay Bias Binding Corporation, 2 Cir., 1950, 182 F.2d 803, 805, the Second Circuit had before it the question of relation back under facts similar to those here in controversy and that court held that the amended petition did not relate back because to so hold would amount to amending Section 3 sub. b of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 21(b). In so doing it pointed out that it had earlier held the doctrine of relation back would apply only where there was a showing that the pleader knew and in his original petition had “attempted to state, some definite conduct, transaction or occurrence” complained of. The record here patently shows no such attempt was made.
In the case of International Bank v. Sherman, 1880, 101 U.S. 403, 25 L.Ed. 866, the alleged bankrupt transferred some of his assets after the original petition was filed and the court held that the filing of the original petition was a caveat to all the world and those who dealt with the property of the alleged bankrupt between the filing of the petition and adjudication of bankruptcy did so at their peril. The court further held that the amendment of the original petition related back and title vested in the assignee as of the date of the filing of the original petition but in that case there is no indication that the original petition was simply a skeleton or blank petition in the general language of the Act and that the amended petition was the only petition which was a valid one, as is the case here. Also in Sherman “the original petition was in nowise either dismissed or abandoned,” but here the motion of the alleged bankrupt to dismiss the original petition was sustained and the original petition did not initiate the proceedings. The District Court so concluded when it held that the amended petition filed on June 3, 1954 was the petition initiating the proceedings under Section 60, sub. a of the Act.
I regret to disagree with the majority but the record before this court affirmatively shows that the facts alleged in the amended petition were unknown to the petitioning creditor when it filed the original petition. The amended petition, therefore, declared upon an act of bankruptcy not alleged in the original petition. I believe the District Court was correct in concluding that the amended petition filed on June 3, 1954 was the petition initiating the proceedings under Section 60, sub. a of the Bankruptcy Act. I would affirm.