Court Opinion

ID: 9648439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:20:40.970807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:00.747333
License: Public Domain

*240CAPPY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe that the majority fails to employ the appropriate legal standard in this matter as set forth in Udvari v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (USAIR, Inc.), 550 Pa. 319, 705 A.2d 1290 (1997).
In Udvari, this court was faced with the situation where the employer’s medical expert merely recognized that the claimant complained of pain. This court determined that in that instance, an employer satisfies its burden of proof in a termination proceeding if the expert unequivocally testifies that it is his opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the claimant is fully recovered, can return to work without restrictions and that there are no objective medical findings which either substantiate the claims of pain or connect them to the work injury. Udvari, 550 Pa. at 322, 705 A.2d at 1291.
The majority was careful to distinguish the situation in Udvari from those cases in which an employer’s expert acknowledges, attests to or supports the existence of a claimant’s ongoing or continuous pain. The majority in Udvari recognized that when an employer’s medical expert acknowledges that the claimant suffers from pain, then it is incumbent upon the expert to opine that the pain was not work related for the employer to be successful in its attempt to terminate benefits. Thus, if pain exists, and no proof establishes that it is unrelated to the work injury, the employer fails to meet its burden. This standard derives from, and is required by, the employer’s burden to prove that all work-related disability has ceased. Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Division, 526 Pa. 25, 584 A.2d 301 (1990).
Therefore, two legal standards emerge from this court’s decision in Udvari, one applicable when the employer’s medical expert merely recognizes a claimant’s complaints of pain, and one when the expert acknowledges that the claimant is suffering from pain.
*241It becomes evident from the above that the majority applied the wrong standard in this case. The majority erroneously applied the test to be used when an employer’s medical expert merely recognizes a claimant’s complaints of pain, i.e., the test applied in Udvari, because in this matter the employer’s expert acknowledged that the claimant was suffering from pain.
The testimony of Consolidated’s expert, which was credited by the Workmen’s Compensation Judge, clearly establishes that the expert acknowledged that Mr. Jordan suffered from pain.
Q. But you’re also, I think, recognizing that he had some level of pain for the reasons that you just explained; is that correct?
A. He was still complaining of his back discomfort mildly, but yes.
Majority Opinion at p. 1066.
This testimony by the employer’s medical expert, that Mr. Jordan suffered from some level of pain, was not accompanied by testimony that the pain was unrelated to the work injury. Thus, the Commonwealth Court properly found that because there was no affirmative, credited testimony that the pain experienced by Jordan was unrelated to his work injury, a termination of benefits was improper.1 The resolution of this matter by the Commonwealth Court is entirely consistent with a proper application of this court’s decision in Udvari.
For the above stated reasons, I believe that a correct application of this court’s Udvari decision to the matter before *242us leads to an affirmance of the result reached by the Commonwealth Court.
NIGRO, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. The failure or inability of Consolidated’s expert to testify that Mr. Jordan’s pain was not work-related, coupled with a finding that Mr. Jordan could return to work without restriction, merely changed the focus of the matter from the propriety of a termination of benefits to the propriety of a suspension of benefits. Because Mr. Jordan’s time-of-injury position was no longer available, the Commonwealth Court correctly found that a suspension of benefits was not appropriate, thus, the court reversed the termination order and remanded solely for determining costs.