Court Opinion

ID: 9788252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:33:22.759143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:06.511579
License: Public Domain

Judge FURMAN
specially concurring.
I agree with the majority that the Department of Revenue properly revoked licensee's driver's license. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority's premise that in civil driver's license revocation proceedings, a licensee may properly raise issues concerning the legality of the initial investigatory stop.
The majority follows Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830 (Colo.App.1992), which concluded that evidence of the driver's intoxication may be challenged in driver's license revocation proceedings when the arresting officer lacks reasonable suspicion to initiate the initial stop. The division reasoned that the then-in-effect express consent statute, which required an officer to have probable cause for a driving under the influence arrest before requesting a driver to submit to aleohol testing, "by implication" required the arresting officer to have reasonable suspicion for the initial stop. 888 P.2d at 831. I disagree with the division in Peterson, however, because the court-created exclusionary rule should not apply in civil driver's license revocation proceedings, and Colorado's driver's license revocation statutes do not require the arresting officer to have reasonable suspicion for the initial stop.
I. The Exclusionary Rule
"The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy intended to protect the constitutional right of privacy by deterring illegal police conduct." Ahart v. Colorado Dep't of Corr., 964 P.2d 517, 519 (Colo.1998). The rule, applied in state criminal trials, excludes evidence from trial that the police obtained by violating a defendant's Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. Id. at 519-20.
The United States Supreme Court, however, instructs states to apply the rule in civil proceedings "only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.'" Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). In Ahart, the Colorado Supreme Court explained:
The assessment of the deterrent benefits requires a fact-specific analysis that usually involves two considerations: (1) whether the illegal agency conduct is "inter-sovereign" or "intra-sovereign"; and (2) whether the proceedings may be characterized as "quasi-criminal."
An intra-sovereign action occurs when the same governmental agency that committed the constitutional violation seeks to use the illegally obtained evidence. An intra-sov-ereign action supports the application of the exclusionary rule because the exelusion of the evidence "punishes" the agency for its unlawful actions. On the other hand, when a violation is inter-sovereign, that is, when the agency that committed the violation is not the same entity seeking to introduce the evidence, applying the rule results in only marginal deterrence because the punishment imposed upon a different agency is indirect.
*155Just as the intra-sovereign nature of a violation supports the application of the exclusionary rule by increasing the likelihood that the rule will result in deterrence, so does classifying the civil proceeding as quasi-criminal or punitive in nature. A proceeding is quasi-eriminal if it provides for punishment but is civil in form.
964 P.2d at 520 (citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than eriminal trials." Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 524 U.S. at 363, 118 S.Ct. 2014 (exclusionary rule does not apply to parole revocation proceedings); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) {exclusionary rule does not apply to civil deportation proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (exclusionary rule does not apply in civil tax proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings).
I conclude extending the exclusionary rule to civil driver's license revocation proceedings has minimal deterrence benefits that do not outweigh the substantial social costs of excluding evidence relevant to driving under the influence of alcohol. Individuals driving under the influence of alcohol pose a great danger to the public, and restrictions on the state's ability to remove such individuals from its highways carry great costs to society. See Powell v. Sec'y of State, 614 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Me.1992). Section 42-2-126(1)(a), C.R.S.2009, states one purpose of the revocation statute is to "provide safety for all persons using the highways of this state by quickly revoking the driver's license of any person who has shown himself or herself to be a safety hazard by driving with an excessive amount of alcohol in his or her body."
Moreover, driver's license revocation proceedings are inter-sovereign civil proceedings. See Nefzger v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, 739 P.2d 224, 228 (Colo.1987)(driver's license revocation statute is a remedial statute calculated to ensure public safety on the highways, and the statute evidences a legislative intent to treat separately the administrative and criminal consequences of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor).
Finally, the deterrence benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to driver's license revocation proceedings are minimal because the application of the rule in eriminal trials already serves to deter unconstitutional stops by police. Scott, 524 U.S. at 364, 118 S.Ct. 2014 (application of the rule in criminal trials already deters unconstitutional searches).
Numerous other state courts share my conclusion that the exclusionary rule should not extend to driver's Heense revocation proceedings. Nevers v. State, 123 P.3d 958 (Alaska 2005), Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38, 743 A.2d 1110 (1999); Martin v. Kansas Dep't of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 176 P.3d 938 (2008); Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 739 A.2d 58 (1999); Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331 (Mo.1999); Chase v. Neth, 269 Neb. 882, 697 N.W.2d 675 (2005); Lopes v. Dir., 145 N.H. 222, 761 A.2d 448 (2000); Beller v. Rolfe, 194 P.3d 949 (Utah 2008).
Nefzger does not lead to a different conclusion. While Nefeger stated police officers must have reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist, the opinion did not identify the exelusionary rule as a remedy in driver's license revocation proceedings for stops conducted without reasonable suspicion. 789 P.2d at 229. Nefger, like Peterson, preceded Ahart, and thus did not apply factors identified in Akart to determine whether to apply the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings.
II. Colorado's Driver's License Revocation Statutes
Colorado driver's license revocation statutes do not require the exclusionary rule be applied in driver's license revocation proceedings. The revocation statute, section 42-2-126(5), C.R.S.2009, requires officers to have "probable cause" to believe a driver should be subject to revocation proceeding "for excess BAC or refusal." Further, the expressed consent statute, section 42-4-18301.1(2)(a)(I), C.R.S.2009, clarifies that the "probable cause" necessary to require testing is an officer's belief "the person was driving a *156motor vehicle" while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
Moreover, these statutes do not mandate a reasonable suspicion standard for an officer stopping DUI suspects and do not mandate the exclusionary rule as a remedy in driver's license revocation proceedings when an officer lacks such reasonable suspicion.
Thus, I conclude that in civil driver's license revocation proceedings, a defendant may not challenge the legality of the initial investigatory stop.