Court Opinion

ID: 9908086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 18:02:56.321356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:29.255266
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/7/23 P. v. Prince CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                         B319849

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                    Super. Ct. No. PA009207)
         v.

THOMAS RAVON PRINCE,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed.
      Paul Kleven, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S.
Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                ________________________
                       INTRODUCTION

       Thomas Ravon Prince was convicted of first degree murder,
with a true finding on the special circumstance of robbery, and
second degree robbery in 1993. The jury also found Prince used a
firearm during the commission of both offenses. Prince received a
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal in People v.
Prince (June 17, 1994), B075641 (non-pub. opn.).
       In 2021 Prince petitioned for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1170.95,1 now section 1172.6,2 and requested
appointment of counsel. The superior court appointed counsel
and set a hearing to assess Prince’s prima facie showing under
the statute in 2022. The People opposed resentencing, arguing
Prince was the “actual killer,” relying on the factual summary in
this court’s opinion deciding Prince’s direct appeal, among other
evidence. Prince’s appointed counsel did not file any argument or
evidence supporting the petition, and at the hearing “submitt[ed]
on the People’s response and the Court of Appeal decision.” The
superior court denied the petition, ruling that Prince failed to
make a prima facie showing he was eligible for relief under the
statute because he was the “actual killer.”
       Prince appeals arguing the superior court improperly
considered the factual summary from our prior appellate opinion.
We affirm.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2       On June 30, 2022 the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 without substantive change; it is now
section 1172.6. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708,
fn. 2.)

                                2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Facts at Prince’s Murder Trial
      In June 1992 Prince was charged by information with first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with the special circumstance
allegation that the murder was committed during the commission
of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Prince was also charged with
second degree robbery. (§ 211). The information alleged Prince
used a firearm in the commission of both offenses.3 (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a).)
      Prince proceeded to trial. At trial, the People introduced
evidence Prince and another man, Ricky Simuel, robbed a jewelry
store and fatally shot the owner, Norm Schumow.4 Arriving in a
stolen white Oldsmobile Cutlass sedan, Prince and his accomplice
entered The House of Time Jewelry Store. Prince held a gun; the
other man held a sledgehammer. The store manager, Donald
Everette, moved to sound the store alarm, but Prince told him to
stop and ordered everyone in the store to get on the ground. The
other robber smashed the jewelry case open with the
sledgehammer. As Schumow moved to the front of the store,
Prince told Schumow, “I’m not kidding. Get down on the ground,”
and gunshots rang out. Schumow died of gunshot wounds.
Another bystander to the robbery, Mollie Kallick, was shot in the
ribs and survived. Approximately $6,000 of jewelry was taken.
Law enforcement found the white Oldsmobile Cutlass sedan

3     Prince was also charged with attempted murder, but this
count was dismissed before conclusion of the trial.
4     We summarize the factual background from our previous
opinion affirming Prince’s convictions on direct appeal.

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abandoned near the scene, and it contained a sledgehammer and
other tools used in the robbery, but not the gun.
       Several months later, a detective interviewed Prince, who
claimed he did not know Simuel and that he entered the jewelry
store to buy a wedding ring. Viewing stills from surveillance
footage in the jewelry store, Prince ultimately admitted, “He
[Schumow] rushed me. The gun went off. He grabbed me. He
ran up on me.” Prince also stated he threw the gun away.

B.     The Jury Instructions
       The trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder
(CALJIC No. 8.10), first degree felony murder (CALJIC No. 8.21),
the special-circumstance allegation of murder during the course
of a robbery (CALJIC Nos. 8.80.1, 8.81.17), personal use of a
firearm in the commission of a felony (CALJIC No. 17.19), and
aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.00).

C.      The Jury Convicts Prince of First Degree Murder
        The jury returned a guilty verdict on first degree murder
and second degree robbery, finding the murder was committed
during the commission of a robbery and Prince personally used a
firearm in the commission of both offenses. Prince was sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

D.    Prince’s Petition for Resentencing
      In October 2021 Prince filed a petition for resentencing in
pro per, under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.
Prince checked the box declaring he was not the actual killer.
The court appointed counsel for Prince.

                                 4
       In March 2022 the People filed their opposition arguing
Prince was the actual killer. In support, the People submitted:
(1) this court’s 1994 opinion affirming Prince’s convictions on
appeal; (2) the jury instructions; (3) the sentencing transcript;
and (4) the jury verdict. Recounting the factual summary from
the appellate opinion, the People contended the record of
conviction established as a matter of law that Prince actually
killed Schumow.
       Prince’s counsel did not file any response or offer any
argument supporting the resentencing petition.
       On March 18, 2022 the superior court held a hearing on
Prince’s prima facie showing under section 1172.6. The following
exchange took place at the hearing between the superior court,
Prince’s counsel, and the deputy district attorney:

[Prince’s counsel]: “I’m submitting on the People’s response and
                    the Court of Appeal decision.

Court:             “Okay. So the People’s position is the
                   defendant was the actual killer, and I guess
                   he was the only one with a gun and he said
                   the gun went off. And—is that correct,
                   [deputy district attorney]?

[People]:          “Yes.

Court:             “And the defense . . . you are submitting on
                   that?

[Prince’s counsel]: “I am.

                                5
Court:             “All right. Thank you. So the petition is
                   denied for failure to state a prima facie case.”

       In the minute order memorializing its decision, the
superior court noted the petition was denied because “petitioner
is the actual shooter,”5 and “petitioner has failed to state [a]
prima facie case.”
       Prince timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

      Prince’s central argument on appeal is that his petition
should not have been denied because the superior court
improperly considered the facts in our prior appellate opinion.
He also contends his trial counsel was ineffective under the Sixth
Amendment and the California Constitution.

A.     Standard of Review
       We review de novo a denial of a section 1172.6 petition for
failure to make a prima facie showing. (People v. Williams (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.) A denial at the prima facie stage
“‘“is appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates that
‘the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.’”’”
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) We independently
review the record to assess the superior court’s denial of the
petition as a matter of law. (See People v. Pickett (2023)

5      The court’s full statement was: “The court finds the
petitioner is the actual shooter.” Prince makes no argument the
superior court engaged in any improper factfinding.

                                 6
93 Cal.App.5th 982, 989, review granted October 11, 2023,
S281643.)

B.     Legal Background
       In 2018 the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437,
which “limited the scope of the felony-murder rule.” (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) As amended, section 189 now
“require[s] that the perpetrator of a felony murder was either
(1) the actual killer; (2) aided and abetted the killer with the
intent to kill; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(People v. Guillory (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 326, 330.)
       “Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural
mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek
retroactive relief under the law as amended.” (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) Section 1172.6, formerly
section 1170.95, “authorizes an individual convicted of murder
based on . . . the felony-murder doctrine to petition the superior
court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any
remaining counts if the petitioner could not now be convicted of
murder because of the changes made by the new law.” (People v.
Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 988.)
       Section 1172.6 details the procedures for ruling on
resentencing petitions. First, a petitioner must file a facially
sufficient petition for relief under section 1172.6, declaring he
was convicted of murder but “could not presently be convicted”
because of changes to the Penal Code made by Senate Bill
No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a), (b); People v. Pickett, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 988.) If the petition meets these
requirements, section 1172.6, subdivisions (b) and (c), “require[]

                                 7
the court to appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if
requested; to direct the prosecutor to file a response to the
petition and permit the petitioner to file a reply; and to determine
if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is
entitled to relief.” (People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854,
863; § 1172.6, subds. (b), (c).) In their briefing, “the parties can,
and should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in
reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
case for relief.” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)
       Assessing the petitioner’s prima facie showing, the court
must accept the petitioner’s factual allegations as true, unless the
record contains facts “‘“refuting the allegations made in the
petition.”’” (People v. Mancilla, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 863.)
The court should deny the petition for failure to state a prima
facie case if “the record of conviction conclusively establishes,
with no factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility
determinations,” that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. (People v. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14;
accord, People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966.) If the
petitioner does establish a prima facie showing for relief, “the
court shall issue an order to show cause” why the petitioner
should not be resentenced and hold an evidentiary hearing
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
pp. 708-709.) The prima facie stage thus serves to “distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless.” (People v. Lewis, at p. 971.)
       Section 1172.6 also circumscribes the type of evidence that
may be considered in a resentencing proceeding. (See generally
§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) At the time Prince filed his petition in
2021 under former section 1170.95, the statute allowed “‘[t]he

                                 8
prosecutor and the petitioner [to] rely on the record of conviction’”
at the evidentiary hearing. (Former § 1170.95, subd. (d)(3); see
also People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292.) The
Supreme Court interpreted the “record of conviction” to include a
prior appellate opinion in the petitioner’s case but cautioned that
at the prima facie stage, “In reviewing any part of the record of
conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 972, quoting People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 980.)
      In Senate Bill No. 775, effective January 1, 2022, the
Legislature narrowed the evidence that may be considered in
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearings, amending the statute to
provide that the resentencing court “may also consider the
procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate
opinion.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) Several courts have
interpreted this amendment to mean superior courts cannot
consider the factual recitation in an appellate opinion as evidence
at an evidentiary hearing. (See People v. Cooper (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 393, 400, fn. 9 [“Senate Bill 775 prevents a trial
court from relying on facts recited in an appellate opinion to rule
on a petition under section 1170.95.”]; People v. Clements, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 292 [observing the “specificity” of Senate Bill
No. 775 “indicates the Legislature has decided trial judges should
not rely on the factual summaries contained in prior appellate
decisions”].) Some courts have extended this reasoning to hold
the facts from an appellate opinion may not be considered “at the
prima facie stage.” (See, e.g., People v. Flores (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [reasoning that if the factual summary
in an appellate opinion “may not be considered at an evidentiary

                                 9
hearing to determine a petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for
resentencing, we fail to see how such evidence could establish, as
a matter of law, a petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing at the
prima facie stage”]; accord, People v. Bratton (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1113.)

C.     The Superior Court Did Not Err by Denying the Petition at
       the Prima Facie Stage Based on the Record Presented
       As noted above, Prince argues the superior court
improperly relied on facts from a prior appellate opinion under
the amended provisions of section 1172.6. The People contend
Prince forfeited this argument because his appointed counsel did
not object in the superior court to the use of facts from the prior
appellate opinion.
       Prince concedes his counsel failed to object to the use of
facts from the previous appellate opinion. In the superior court,
Prince’s counsel acquiesced in the use of the appellate opinion
and expressly stated she was “submitting on the People’s
response and the Court of Appeal decision.” Further, Prince’s
counsel submitted no evidence or argument in support of the
petition.
       Prince’s objection to the superior court’s use of the facts in
our appellate opinion was forfeited (when his counsel failed to
object to the People’s inclusion of the appellate opinion) if not
waived (when she expressly agreed to submit on the People’s
record, including the opinion).6 In either case, “a reviewing court

6      “[T]he loss of a right based on failure to timely assert it is
‘forfeiture,’” while “waiver is the ‘“intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.”’” (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th

                                  10
ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection
could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B.
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) “‘The purpose of this rule is to
encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial
court, so that they may be corrected.’” (In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 881.)
       In People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, the court
recently decided “when an appellate opinion is admitted at an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, without objection, it is
substantial evidence that the trial court can consider.” (Id. at
p. 714.) Because the petitioner in Vance “never claimed that our
[prior appellate] opinion misrepresented or omitted any material
part of the record[,]” the court affirmed the denial of the petition
despite the superior court’s consideration of facts from the
appellate opinion. (Ibid.)
       Prince’s own authority confirms this approach. Prince cites
People v. Cooper, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 393, which holds Senate
Bill No. 775’s amendment to section 1172.6 “prevents a trial court
from relying on facts recited in an appellate opinion to rule on a
petition under [former] section 1170.95.” (Id. at p. 400, fn. 9.)
But Cooper further noted that, on remand, “the trial court may
not rely on the opinion’s factual summary without [the
petitioner’s] acquiescence.” (Ibid.) It is clear from the record
Prince’s counsel provided this acquiescence in the superior court.

at p. 1293, fn. 2.) Without affirmative evidence Prince’s trial
counsel intentionally disclaimed an evidentiary objection to the
facts from the appellate opinion, we conclude forfeiture most
accurately describes counsel’s abandonment of this claim.

                                11
For this reason, we see no error in the superior court’s
consideration of the facts from our prior appellate opinion.7
      On the record presented by the parties, including the
appellate opinion, the superior court did not err by denying
Prince’s petition. The facts in the record established as a matter
of law Prince was the actual killer of Schumow. At trial, the
People’s evidence showed Prince and an accomplice robbed the
jewelry store together, with Prince holding a gun and his
accomplice holding a sledgehammer. The People introduced
witness testimony Prince threatened Schumow, then gunfire
sounded. Schumow was struck by two bullets and died of his
injuries. The evidence also included a confession from Prince:
“He [Schumow] rushed me. The gun went off. He grabbed me.
He ran up on me.” Prince’s trial defense counsel did not dispute
the People’s one-gunman theory. Instead, Prince argued he was
not involved in the robbery at all, and another man, Jamal Clark,
robbed the store with Simuel, held the gun, and shot Schumow.
As noted above, Prince’s appeal does not challenge the accuracy
or characterization of these facts from our prior appellate opinion.
(See People v. Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 714 [affirming
denial of petition by noting lack of objection to the accuracy or
completeness of the facts in the appellate opinion].)

7     In light of Prince’s forfeiture of the argument, we need not
decide whether a superior court may rely on facts in an appellate
opinion at the prima facie stage. (Compare People v. Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 13-14 [superior court may consider
“the underlying facts as presented in an appellate opinion” at the
prima facie stage], with People v. Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
p. 988 [“the factual summary in an appellate opinion is not
evidence that may be considered” at the prima facie stage].)

                                12
      “As a matter of law, resentencing relief under
section 1172.6 is not available to an ‘actual killer.’” (People v.
Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973.) The superior court did
not err by denying Prince’s petition at the prima facie stage.

D.     The Constitutional Right to Effective Counsel Attaches at
       the Section 1172.6 Evidentiary Hearing
       Prince contends his appointed counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for not objecting to admission of the facts from the
prior appellate opinion. The People respond that Prince cannot
assert a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at
the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 proceeding because the
right does not attach until the court finds the petition has merit,
issues an order to show cause, and proceeds to the evidentiary
hearing.
       Our Supreme Court has squarely held “there is no federal
constitutional right to counsel under subdivision (c) of
section 1172.6, and the right to counsel at [the prima facie] point
in the proceedings is purely statutory.” (People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 227.) Without a constitutional right to
counsel, “‘there is no constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel’ in state postconviction proceedings.” (See
id. at p. 226.) At most, Prince possessed a statutory right to
appointed counsel. (See § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3) [directing
appointment of counsel, upon petitioner’s request, when a
section 1172.6 petition is filed].) Accordingly, Prince has not
demonstrated a right to effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment or the state constitution.

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                        DISPOSITION

      The order denying the petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.

                                    MARTINEZ, J.
We concur:

     SEGAL, Acting P. J.

     FEUER, J.

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