Court Opinion

ID: 9665663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:54:02.278094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:23.003628
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(dissenting).
I am unable for several reasons to concur in the majority decision.
A policy of liability insurance was issued in the name of Douglas Edwin Nelson to cover a vehicle described as a 1953 Chevrolet Bel Aire sedan. Plaintiff insured was driving a panel truck when he was involved in an accident. The trial court decreed that there was no coverage. The ground on which the majority base their decision and reversal is that the panel truck *41at the time of the accident was being used by plaintiff as a temporary substitute automobile under the terms of the policy insuring the Chevrolet sedan.
A "temporary substitute automobile" is defined in the policy as "any automobile * * * not owned by the named insured, while temporarily used as a substitute for the owned automobile * * * when, withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction." (Emphasis supplied). This language makes it clear that a temporary substitute automobile is one temporarily used by insured in the place of the automobile described in the policy when the insured automobile is withdrawn from its customary use because of its "breakdown" or other reason stated in the substitution provisions. Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. Addy, 132 Colo. 202, 286 P.2d 622; Erickson v. Genisot, 322 Mich. 303, 33 N.W.2d 803; Lewis v. Bradley, 7 Wis.2d 586, 97 N.W.2d 408; Harte v. Peerless Insurance Company, 123 Vt. 120, 183 A.2d 223; Grundeen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 8 Cir., 238 F.2d 750; Atlantic Insurance Company v. Gonzalez, Tex.Civ.App. 358 S.W.2d 716; Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 933. For example, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. Addy, supra, it was held that where the insured automobile was low on gasoline and had heavy snow chains on the tires there was no breakdown and the car which was used was not a substitute for the named automobile.
The provisions of the policy quoted are unquestionably as stated in the majority opinion designed for the benefit of the insured and not to defeat liability. However, the risk is not to be increased by construction beyond that contemplated. The views of the court in Gabrelcik v. National Indemnity Company, 269 Minn. 445, 131 N.W.2d 534, considering the same temporary substitute provisions, are here apropos: "The insurance contract represents the entire agreement between the parties. When the language of the policy is unambiguous, courts are not at liberty to use a process of judicial construction to graft into the plain language of a policy an intention to afford coverage when no such intention appears from the language of the policy or otherwise. Any construction of the policy must do no more than give effect to the plain meaning of the language."
*42The trial court found that the "Chevrolet having been damaged about three months prior thereto and plaintiff did not intend to repair it, the same not being worth repairing, and said Chevrolet was not out of use temporarily for repair or servicing nor was it lost or destroyed, and it was not temporarily withdrawn from normal use because of breakdown". The trial court applying the interpretation of the same substitution provisions in Munson v. Speck, 76 S.D. 599, 83 N.W.2d 479, concluded that because the Chevrolet had been abandoned the truck was not being used at the time of the accident as a "temporary substitute automobile".
The present case is not here reviewable de novo, but merely upon assignments of error for the correction of errors at law. The factual issues were for the trial court to determine. This court must indulge all reasonable intendments in support of the judgment including facts that may be fairly inferable from those stated in the findings.
In Munson v. Speck, supra, the insured automobile had not been destroyed as is the fact in this case, but the damaged car had been abandoned and turned over by plaintiff to the conditional seller. This court, speaking through Judge Rudolph, unanimously held:
"Under these circumstances we do not believe the car was 'temporarily used as the substitute' for the Studebaker within the meaning of the policy. No one would seriously contend if Speck (insured) had sold the Studebaker on March 30, that a car driven by him thirty days later would be driven as a 'substitute' for the Studebaker as that term is used in the policy. We do not believe the present facts any more nearly reach the situation intended to be covered by this policy provision than the actual sale of the car. The word 'temporarily' read in connection with the whole of the policy provision indicates that it is intended the described car is to again be placed in use by the insured.
"This provision, we are convinced, was not intended to cover a car used by the insured after the described *43car was sold or abandoned with the intention of never using it again as disclosed by the facts presently before us.
"The facts in this case, as above stated, disclose without question that while Speck's car had been withdrawn from use so far as he was concerned, he had, at the time in question, abandoned it. If his car had been capable of use at the time of the accident (which it might have been in so far as this record reveals) it would not 'have been in use at the time and in the circumstances involved', because he had abandoned it, he was 'through with it'. The car being driven at the time, in other words, was not being driven as a 'substitute'."
The majority reads meaning into the opinion in the Munson case that is not there. The word "temporarily" unquestionably relates to and qualifies the use of a substitute automobile and there is no suggestion in the opinion therein to the contrary. It does not add a requirement not found in the insuring agreement. The word "temporarily" is the antonym of "permanently". The substitution may be made only where the insured vehicle becomes unavailable for use because of any one of the specified reasons, and the coverage does not continue after the insured vehicle again becomes available for use. The word in question was considered important in construction of the terms of the contract and for the purpose of determining the intent of the parties.
Turning now to the authorities cited, I find no expression of disagreement with the Munson decision. It has been distinguished on a factual basis as illustrated in the case of Harte v. Peerless Insurance Company, 123 Vt. 120, 183 A.2d 223, holding:
"Clearly, the object of the substitution clause is to afford a temporary insurance expedient to protect the insured's operation of a borrowed vehicle during the period of repair until the automobile named in the policy is restored to normal use. The provision is not to be unreason*44ably extended to materially increase the risk contemplated by the insurer. Neither is it to be narrowly applied against the insured for the clause was designed for his protection. * * *
"The findings report that the vehicle named in the contract was 'out of commission' and had remained parked at the owner's home for some two months before the accident occurred. * * * It is argued that the temporary aspect of the whole event had expired, citing Munson v. Speck, 76 S.D. 599, 83 N.W.2d 479.
"* * * In. the last analysis the intention of the insured in this regard was a factual issue for the chancellor to determine." (Emphasis supplied).
We have in the present case a determination of the intention of the insured. He abandoned the insured Chevrolet and did not intend to return it again to normal use.
The automobile covered by the policy herein was damaged and not withdrawn because of "loss or destruction". That is the unchallenged finding of the trial court. The factual issue then was whether the Chevrolet was withdrawn from its normal use by reason of "breakdown" or for "repairs" or "servicing". I disagree with the conclusion of the majority that in case of "breakdown" insured may elect not to repair; that the substitution clause is designed in such instance to extend coverage to insured during the remainder of the policy period. The policy makes it clear that its purpose is to extend coverage "temporarily", without payment of additional premium, to protect the insured using another automobile in the place of the insured automobile withdrawn from normal use for a reason stated in the policy. A destroyed automobile or one which will not run withdraws itself. The automobile here was still usable. If the policy was designed as construed by the majority to extend coverage during the remainder of the policy period, even though insured did not intend to repair and return it again to normal use, he could on occasion have used the Chevrolet in its damaged condition or a substitute car. This is a strained construction *45of the policy and is "tantamount", as stated by the Colorado court in Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. Addy, supra, "to holding that for one premium the insured could have the benefit of coverage on two automobiles and the insurers risk thereby doubled."
The policy is intended as stated to protect the insured in the operation of a substituted automobile during the period of repair until the automobile named in the policy is restored to normal use. Munson v. Speck, supra; Harte v. Peerless Insurance Company, supra. Under the present construction of the substitution provisions, an insured may use a borrowed automobile when he believes the automobile named in the policy is not in good running order. Plaintiff testified that he drove the Chevrolet on occasion. Coverage under such circumstances is clearly a mistaken construction of the substitution provisions as stated by the court in Erickson v. Genisot, supra, where insured borrowed an automobile to make a trip of some 50 miles because he considered the insured vehicle not in condition to travel that far. See also Atlantic Insurance Company v. Gonzalez, supra.
In its facts as found by the trial court and the applicable law, the present case does not differ from Munson v. Speck, supra. I would adhere to the sound and logical reasoning therein and affirm.