Court Opinion

ID: 9881382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-02 11:08:18.940098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:37.953797
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00163-CR
     ___________________________

 DONNIE EARL PHILLIPS, JR., Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 371st District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 1735446

  Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
    Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Donnie Earl Phillips, Jr., proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal his

felony conviction for driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.04(a),

.09(b)(2). Pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant pled guilty to that offense in exchange

for the State’s offering eight years’ confinement and waiving a deadly-weapon finding

and a habitual-offender allegation.1 The trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance

with that agreement. Under the written plea admonishments that were signed by

Appellant, he waived his right to appeal. Specifically, through those written plea

admonishments, Appellant stated, “I give up and waive any and all rights of appeal in

this case.” He also stated, “I give up and waive all pretrial motions that may have been

filed in my case.” Consistent with Appellant’s plea-bargain agreement, the trial court’s

certification of Appellant’s right of appeal reflects that this “is a plea-bargain case, and

the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).

       After receiving a copy of Appellant’s notice of appeal, we notified Appellant

that we had received the trial court’s certification stating that this is a plea-bargain case

and that he had waived the right of appeal. We warned him that this appeal could be

       1
        The State proceeded on a repeat-offender allegation instead of the habitual-
offender allegation, so Appellant faced a punishment range of two to twenty years’
confinement instead of twenty-five to ninety-nine years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. §§ 12.33(a), .42(a), (d); Johns v State, No. 02-14-00233-CR, 2015 WL
1868822, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 23, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). This agreed reduction in the range of punishment
qualified as a plea bargain. See Johns, 2015 WL 1868822, at *1 n.3 (citing Carender v.
State, 155 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)).

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dismissed unless he or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a response

showing grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3. We have

received no response.2

      In accordance with the trial court’s certification, we dismiss the appeal. See Tex.

R. App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f); Hubatch v. State, No. 02-22-00153-CR, 2022 WL 4105417,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Johns, 2015 WL 1868822, at *1.

                                                      Per Curiam

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: September 28, 2023

      2
        On August 16, 2023, we received a document from Appellant titled, “Notice
of Interlocutory Appeal,” which purports to challenge certain pretrial rulings and
reiterates Appellant’s appeal of his conviction. It appears to be a copy of a document
that Appellant had previously filed on July 11, 2023. To the extent that Appellant
intended this to be a response to our notice, it does not show grounds for continuing
the appeal.

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