Court Opinion

ID: 9587309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:20:54.377892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:12.770464
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the decision to affirm the convictions against Savina Delacruz. I also concur in the decision to affirm the convictions against Julio Delacruz on the two counts of cruelty to children that were based on his regular abuse of Alejandra, by beating her with a belt and otherwise. Regrettably, due to a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence, I am compelled to dissent to that part of the majority opinion affirming Julio’s convictions for felony murder and cruelty to children relating to the incident that caused Alejan-drad ultimate death.
The only evidence introduced at trial indicated that at the time Alejandrad fatal injuries were inflicted, Julio was not at the scene. The evidence showed that Julio came home later that evening and found the child in acute distress, but waited until the next morning to seek medical attention.
Although the majority correctly states that cruelty to children may be committed by intentionally failing to seek necessary medical attention and thereby causing a child to experience cruel or excessive *399pain,3 the problem with that theory in this instance is that the relevant count of the indictment charged Julio with causing the child’s death through blunt force head trauma or shaking. Because the description of the manner in which the crime is committed is a material allegation in the indictment, relying on Julio’s failure to seek medical care to sustain this conviction creates a variance problem between the indictment and the evidence. “[I]f an indictment avers that an offense is committed in one particular way, the proof must so show it, or there will exist a fatal variance.”4
Although it is true that we do not rely on an overly technical application of the fatal variance rule, the majority fails to explain how Julio was put on notice that he could be convicted for failing to render medical care when the indictment charged him with causing the child’s injuries. Because the indictment failed to put Julio on notice that he could be convicted for failing to seek medical care, as opposed to causing the injuries in the first place, the evidence of his failure to obtain care, standing alone, cannot support his conviction.5 By way of contrast, in the Glenn case cited by the majority, the indictment specifically charged Glenn with causing excessive pain by failing to seek medical care.6
Because Julio cannot be convicted solely for failing to render medical care, the question remaining is whether sufficient evidence was presented to show that Julio aided, abetted, encouraged, or otherwise assisted in the malicious acts that caused Alejandra’s injuries. The only evidence cited by the majority to purportedly support that conclusion is Julio’s participation in the pattern of abuse inflicted upon the child. I am unwilling, however, to expand the “party to a crime” concept to such an extent that a defendant’s past participation in a pattern of conduct qualifies as aiding, abetting, encouraging, or otherwise assisting in a future crime in which he does not participate.
Had the State properly charged Julio with failing to seek medical care for the child, who was in obvious distress, Julio could have been *400convicted for felony murder based on his role in Alejandra’s death. Unfortunately, Julio was not properly charged, and the cruelty to children and felony murder counts based on the conduct that caused Alejandra’s death are not supported by any evidence. Accordingly, I regretfully concur in part and dissent in part to today’s majority opinion.
Decided March 13, 2006
Reconsideration denied April 13, 2006.
Justin J, Wyatt, for appellant (case no. S05A2071).
Ruth R Marks, for appellant (case no. S05A2073).
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Amy H. McChesney, Eleanor A. Dixon, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Robin J. Leigh, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justice Benham join in this dissent.

 See Glenn v. State, 278 Ga. 291, 293 (602 SE2d 577) (2004).

 Gentry v. State, 212 Ga.App. 79, 83 (441 SE2d 249) (1994); see also Petty v. Smith, 279 Ga. 273, 274 (612 SE2d 276) (2005) (“[t]helawis clear that where an indictment charges a defendant with committing an offense by one specific method, the defendant cannot be convicted of that offense based on a totally different, unspecified method.”); Henderson v. State, 113 Ga. 1148 (39 SE 446) (1901) (“[N]o averment in an indictment can be rejected as surplusage which is descriptive either of the offense or of the manner in which it was committed. All such averments must be proved as laid, or the failure to prove the same as laid will amount to a variance.”).

 Dobbs v. State, 235 Ga. 800, 802 (221 SE2d 576) (1976) (the indictment must be sufficiently detailed to allow the accused to be “definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial”).

 278 Ga. at 293 (1) (a).