Court Opinion

ID: 9617272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:53:55.685011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:07.611700
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I concur in the judgment of affirmance and in the reasoning in the majority opinion with the exception of the inference which might be drawn therefrom that a *832riparian right may be pleaded by simply alleging the ownership of land situated on a natural stream or watercourse and the ownership of a water right from said stream as being appurtenant to said land. It is my opinion that such a pleading would not be sufficient to raise an issue of riparian ownership or the existence of a riparian right. (See Riverside Water Co. v. Gage, 89 Cal. 410, 420 [26 P. 889] ; Wutchumna Water Co. v. Pogue, 151 Cal. 105, 112 [90 P. 362]; San Luis Water Co. v. Estrada, 117 Cal. 168, 182 [48 P. 1075] ; Creighton v. Evans, 53 Cal. 55; Montecito etc. Co. v. Santa Barbara, 151 Cal. 377 [90 P. 935] ; Title Ins. etc. Co. v. Miller & Lux, Inc., 183 Cal. 71 [190 P. 433]; Strong v. Baldwin, 154 Cal. 150 [97 P. 178, 129 Am.St.Rep. 149] ; Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal.2d 501, 528-529 [81 P.2d 533].) It appears to be the settled law of this state that the riparian right, or the right of a riparian owner to have his portion of the water flowing in the stream past his riparian land, is not an easement or an appurtenance, but a part and parcel of the land itself. (26 Cal.Jur., pp. 209-210, §§ 414, 415; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 [4 P. 919,10 P. 674]; Ferrea v. Knipe, 28 Cal. 340 [87 Am.Dec. 128] ; Stanford v. Felt, 71 Cal. 249 [16 P. 900] ; Miller & Lux v. Enterprise Canal & Land Co., 169 Cal. 415 [147 P. 567]; Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327 [88 P. 978, 11 L.R.A.N.S. 1062] ; Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal etc. Co., 155 Cal. 59 [99 P. 502, 22 L.R.A.N.S. 391] ; Herminghaus v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81 [252 P. 607]; Fall River Valley Irr. Dist. v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 202 Cal. 56 [259 P. 444, 56 A.L.R. 264].) The rule as above stated has been restated in innumerable decisions of this court and the appellate courts of this state and the only ease in which the riparian right has been referred to as being appurtenant to the land on which it is used is the recent case of City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 908 [207 P.2d 17]. This ease, however, did not involve the riparian right doctrine and no issue involving riparian rights was considered or decided in that case. It may be said, therefore, that the statement in the majority opinion in that case that “Generally speaking, an overlying right, analogous to that of a riparian owner in a surface stream, is the right of the owner of the land to take water from the ground underneath for use on his land within the basin or watershed; the right is based on ownership of the land and is appurtenant thereto,” is mere dictum. It is not supported by any of the cases cited in the *833opinion in that case and I have found no other case decided by either this court or any of the appellate courts of this state in which the riparian right has been referred to as being appurtenant to the land on which it is used. On the other hand the authorities are uniform in holding that a water right acquired by prescription, appropriation, adverse user or parol license may properly be pleaded by alleging that such a right is appurtenant to the land on which it is used. (26 Cal.Jur., pp. 209-210, §§ 414, 415; Estate of Thomas, 147 Cal. 236 [81 P. 539]; Miller & Lux, Inc. v. J. G. James Co., 179 Cal. 689 [178 P. 716] ; Verdugo Canon Water Co. v. Verdugo, 152 Cal. 655 [93 P. 1021]; McDonald v. Bear River & Auburn W. & Min. Co., 13 Cal. 220; Rianda v. Watsonville Water etc. Co., 152 Cal. 523 [93 P. 79]; American Co. v. Bradford, 27 Cal. 360; Irrigated Valleys L. Co. v. Altman, 57 Cal.App. 413 [207 P. 401].)
In my opinion a litigant in a case involving water rights is entitled to know whether his opponent is claiming the right to use water on his land as a riparian owner or is claiming that his right to the use of water is predicated upon prescription, appropriation, adverse user, parol license or other sources of title. This knowledge can be gained only by an allegation in a pleading that the claimant is relying upon his right as a riparian owner. The elements of this right are properly set forth in the majority opinion, and I agree with the majority in its statement that a riparian right may be pleaded by either alleging all of the factors necessary to establish that right or by pleading the riparian character of his land in general terms; that is, by pleading ownership of specifically described land adjacent to a natural stream or watercourse and specific allegations that said land is riparian to said stream or watercourse and that the owner has the right to devote a specific quantity of water from said stream to a beneficial use on said land as a riparian owner. The elements which are necessary to support the allegation of riparian ownership may be established by proof as correctly set forth in the majority opinion.
I would be disposed to hold, however, that although a riparian right was not properly pleaded, if the proof offered was sufficient to establish the elements of a riparian right and the case were tried on the theory that a riparian right was involved, a judgment based upon the riparian right theory should be sustained. Such, however, is not the *834situation in this case. Here, there is no allegation in any of the pleadings and no statement in the findings or judgment which would support the riparian right doctrine. Neither is there any evidence which in the slightest degree supports the elements necessary to establish riparian ownership in either of the parties hereto or the right of either of said parties to make a riparian use of water. In fact, the only mention of the riparian right doctrine was in a colloquy between court and counsel and it is clear that neither party to this action had any thought of basing his claim to a water right upon the doctrine of riparian rights. It is clear, therefore, that there is no issue pertaining to riparian rights in this action.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer in this case is based upon the assumption that the riparian right issue is involved in this case and that the controversy between the parties involves the right to store and impound water. Both of these assumptions are erroneous. From what I have heretofore stated it is obvious that the riparian right issue is not involved in this case. With respect to the question of the right to store or impound water, plaintiff alleged in his second amended complaint: “V. That on or about October, 1949, the defendants West herein constructed, across the said ravine, a dam of earth in excess of about fifteen feet in height, and that said dam constructed on the lands of defendants has stopped the flow of water as it was wont to flow from and across the lands of defendants through the intervening lands onto the lands of plaintiffs; that the defendants West herein have taken, used and diverted all of the water flowing in said water course and that the plaintiffs herein have not been able to use any water from said ravine or watercourse by reason of the fact that the defendants West did construct said dam and did take, use and divert said water.
“VI. That said dam constructed by the defendants is in direct contravention of the Water Code of the State of California and particularly Section 6003 thereof; that said dam, as now constructed, constitutes a hazard, in that in the event said dam would burst or become destroyed by flood or otherwise, the lands and the improvements thereon belonging to plaintiffs would be irreparably injured and damaged by flooding.” At the trial the undisputed evidence disclosed that in 1950 defendant constructed a dam on his property across Grub Gulch or Red Ranch Ravine. The dam was 15 feet high, about 55 feet long on top and 30 feet on the bottom. The maximum depth of the water in the dam was about 8 *835feet and it backed the water up about 60 feet. The maximum capacity of the reservoir created by the dam was about 2 acre feet of water. The purpose of constructing the dam was to impound the very small flow of water in the ravine which defendant had previously diverted by means of a ditch, flume and pipe line to his land for the purpose of irrigating his orchard. This flow was determined by the only measurement made to be 1½ miner’s inches of water. After defendant constructed his dam, he pumped water out of the reservoir for the irrigation of his orchard instead of diverting it as he did previously by means of a ditch, flume and pipe line.
Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has alleged or made any claim that the dam constructed by defendant was for the purpose of impounding water during the rainy season for use during the irrigation season and it is obvious that the reservoir behind the dam is not of sufficient capacity to store a sufficient quantity of water to irrigate any considerable area of land. We may take judicial notice that 2 acre feet of water would not be sufficient to irrigate even 2 acres of land during the irrigation season in the locality where defendant’s land is situated. The record discloses that defendant owns approximately 25 acres of land which is devoted to an orchard and that he found it more practical to impound the small flow of water flowing in the ravine above his reservoir so that he could more efficiently use it to irrigate his orchard.
As stated in the majority opinion defendant makes no claim to the use of any water from the ravine during the non-irrigation season and the evidence shows that the water in the ravine would flow through the spillway of the dam during the nonirrigation season and on down the ravine. In fact, the plaintiff complained that the dam constituted a hazard to his property because it might fail and the increased flow of water from the reservoir would damage his property. The trial court found against this contention.
The undisputed evidence showed that the irrigation season extended from May to October and that during the rest of the year there was so much water flowing down the ravine that it was a menace to plaintiff’s property and one of the issues raised by his complaint was that the dam constructed by defendant in the ravine accentuated that menace and for this reason he wanted the dam abated.
The trial court wrote a memorandum opinion in which he stated that plaintiff had not made out a case because he had not proven that he had used any given quantity of water *836from the ravine, that prior to the installation of the steel syphon in the ditch of the El Dorado Irrigation District plaintiff had undoubtedly received sufficient water for his needs from the leaky wooden syphon and the spring on the Clark property which was located between the property owned by plaintiff and defendant.
The court made findings of fact to the effect that defendant had used all of the water which flowed from the Jones property continuously for more than five years and that no water flowed from defendant’s property to plaintiff’s property; that the dam was not a menace or hazard to plaintiff’s property and that defendant had not violated plaintiff’s right by building the dam and impounding the water behind it. The court quieted defendant’s title to his land and all of the water flowing in the ravine above his dam and denied plaintiff any relief.
I agree with the majority that the judgment should be modified by limiting defendant’s use of all of the water flowing in the ravine to the irrigation season, as it is conceded that neither he nor plaintiff has any use for water for irrigation during the nonirrigation season.