Court Opinion

ID: 9958239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 16:09:09.036204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.733745
License: Public Domain

J-S37030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  PAVEL BELOUS                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 301 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 9, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003551-2021

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  PAVEL BELOUS                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 302 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 9, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0002652-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                               FILED APRIL 8, 2024

       Pavel Belous (“Belous”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following his convictions for, inter alia, robbery, kidnapping, and attempted

homicide.1 We affirm.

       The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 2901(a)(2), 901(a).
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            [I]n March [] 2022, [Belous] entered two separate guilty
     pleas. On docket number 2652-2021, [Belous] pled guilty to[,
     inter alia,] [r]obbery – [t]hreat of [i]mmediate [s]erious [b]odily
     [i]njury, . . . [ and k]idnapping to [f]acilitate a felony . . .. On
     docket number 3551-2021, [Belous] pled guilty to two counts of
     [a]ttempted [h]omicide. [Belous was thirty-six years old at the
     time he committed these offenses.] The following summary of
     facts was established and agreed to by [Belous] at the [plea]
     hearing:

               [Jarred Peglow (“Mr. Peglow”) left home around 7:30
        p.m. after completing schoolwork to go to a friend’s house;
        that friend asked him for] a favor. [The friend] was going
        to pay [Mr. Peglow] $15 to take him to Dina’s Café [to] buy
        some beer . . .. . . . While [the friend] was inside Dina’s
        Cafe, [Mr. Peglow saw] a maroon SUV and a person sitting
        in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with a mask over his face,
        staring at him. He thought it was off[,] but then didn’t think
        too much of it. . . .

              [That person was later identified as Belous.]

                                  ****

               [Mr. Peglow later] dropped off [his friend] at . . . home
        . . .. When [Mr. Peglow] did that [he], again, saw the
        maroon SUV pull into a driveway with its lights off. Again,
        Mr. Peglow thought it was off[,] but didn’t think too much of
        it[,] and he left the area. Around 10:14 p.m., [Mr. Peglow]
        arrived at [a] McDonald’s . . .. [After he got his meal, he
        parked by a dumpster and began to eat.] . . . [Belous]
        parked his SUV next to [Mr. Peglow’s] vehicle, about two
        spaces over.

               [Belous] entered the passenger’s side of Mr. Peglow’s
        vehicle[,] and immediately put a knife up against Mr.
        Peglow’s face[,] and demanded that Mr. Peglow give him
        money. Mr. Peglow [only had $18 on him, and Belous] was
        not satisfied with it, so Mr. Peglow offered an additional $2
        in coins . . ..

              [Belous then] threatened [Mr. Peglow] in various
        ways. He [told] Mr. Peglow that he [was] going to slit his
        throat and burn his car so there [would not] be any evidence

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       of what he did. He [told] Mr. Peglow that he [would] not
       hesitate to kill [him] and that [he has] killed before.

              Mr. Peglow [took] this seriously and [observed] what
       looked like to be dried blood on [Belous’s] hands . . ..
       [Belous] then ordered Mr. Peglow to drive from the
       McDonald’s to an ATM machine to get him more money . . ..
       They went to [a] Wawa . . .. [Belous told Mr. Peglow it was
       too busy and made him drive to] a different location[,] an
       isolated ATM where there were not so many people . . ..
       [The second] ATM [wa]s right across the street from
       [Wawa.]

             [Belous then] made Mr. Peglow, at knife point, go to
       the ATM. . . . [Belous] told Mr. Peglow [that because Mr.
       Peglow had seen him without a mask, Belous] had to kill
       [Mr. Peglow] so he could not identify [him]. [Belous]
       threatened that, based on the blood on his hand, the knife
       in [Mr. Peglow’s face and neck, [Belous] knew Mr. Peglow
       could identify him and said, “]I’m going to kill you.[”]

             [At the ATM], Mr. Peglow used his ATM card, and
       [Belous told] him to clear out his bank account. At the time,
       Mr. Peglow had $477 in his bank account that he [had]
       earned working full[-]time while he attended school. . . ..

             [Belous was] still not satisfied. He still wanted more.
       He [told] Mr. Peglow [to drive them to his home so Belous
       could take more of his belongings.]

              [However, prior to making Mr. Peglow drive home,
       Belous] initially told him to go back to McDonald’s. They
       drove back to the McDonald’s[, where they sat in the
       parking lot, and Belous went on] about how he intended to
       kill [Mr. Peglow], how he intended to take him back to his
       house and . . . rape [Mr. Peglow’s] mother. [Belous said he
       was] going to cut her face off, slit her throat, and kill her
       after he kills him, then he was going to set their family home
       on fire and destroy the evidence so he couldn’t be tracked
       . . ..

             [Mr. Peglow tried] to bargain with [Belous] and
       [offered to give him his coin collection he had at home].
       [Belous agreed,] so they went from McDonald’s to the

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       Peglow residence. Prior to arrival, [Mr. Peglow attempted
       to dial 911] but it was a drop call. [However,] it alerted law
       enforcement [that something was amiss] . . . [Mr. Peglow]
       then told [Belous that he had to call his mother to let her
       know he was bringing someone home, and Belous let Mr.
       Peglow call her, but said, “P]ut it on speaker phone and
       don’t tip her off about anything.[”]

             [Mr. Peglow made the call as he entered] the
       neighborhood. [His mother, Felicia Peglow (“Ms. Peglow”),
       thought] there was something [wrong because] it was night,
       [and Mr. Peglow] was in school, and did not [normally] bring
       people home like that. She thought it was odd. So, Ms.
       Peglow went out onto the front porch of her house . . ., and
       [had] a cigarette while waiting for her son to arrive.

              Mr. Peglow pulled up to the residence[,] but did not
       pull up to where he normally parks, but pulled up across the
       street.. .. [Belous got out of the car and wanted Mr. Peglow]
       to leave the car on. [Mr. Peglow told Belous] that his car
       [wa]s [on its last leg] and would die . . .. He asked
       permission to turn the car off and get the keys. As [Mr.
       Peglow went] back to the car, [he] grabbed his boy scout
       knife . . . from the center console of his vehicle.

               As [Belous] ran towards [Ms. Peglow], who was on the
       porch, [Mr. Peglow] stabbed [Belous] in the back. [Belous]
       [fell] down and [Mr. Peglow] ran to his mother, grabbed her,
       and forced her in the house. She didn’t know what was
       going on . . .. [Mr. Peglow] immediately locked the door
       and called 911.

             [Mr. Peglow told] 911 exactly what happened[:] that
       he was robbed and he was forced to go to his home. The
       person was going to kill him, that he stabbed [the person,]
       and that person was in the driveway . . ..

             [Meanwhile, Belous dragged] himself back to [Mr.
       Peglow’s] car because he believed that they keys were still
       in there and put himself in the driver’s side of the vehicle.

            Police [arrived] within a few minutes [and found
       Belous in Mr. Peglow’s vehicle]. He was honking the horn
       [and was] obnoxious to the police on site .. . he [also] told

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         the police on scene and then at the hospital that he was the
         victim. He said he was kidnapped, he said that he was
         robbed, he said that Mr. Peglow intended to kill him . . ..
         [Belous maintained the] ruse from the time he was stabbed
         up until [just before the guilty plea].

         N.T. 3/25/[]22, [at] 24-45.

            Sentencing was deferred for approximately 90 days to
      obtain a presentence investigation report [(“PSI”)]. On November
      9, 2022, th[e c]ourt sentenced [Belous] to four consecutive terms
      of incarceration of no less than ten (10) years to no more than
      twenty (20) years in a [s]tate [c]orrectional [i]nstitution, [each,
      for robbery and kidnapping at number 2652-2021, and two counts
      of attempted criminal homicide at number 3551-2021,] totaling
      forty (40) years to eighty (80) years of incarceration. [I]n
      November [] 2022, [Belous] filed a [m]otion for [r]econsideration
      of [s]entence, which th[e c]ourt denied . . ..

            On January [6], 2023, [Belous] filed a [petition for post-
      conviction relief seeking] leave to file a [n]otice of [a]ppeal [nunc
      pro tunc]. . . . [U]pon agreement of the parties, th[e c]ourt
      granted [Belous’s p]etition and reinstated [his] right to file [a
      n]otice of [a]ppeal nunc pro tunc . . ..

            . . . [Belous] filed a [timely n]otice of [a]ppeal . . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/23, at 1-5 (some brackets and ellipses in original).

Both Belous and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Belous raises the following issue for our review:

      Did the lower court impose a functional life sentence that is
      inconsistent with the Sentencing Code?

Belous’s Brief at 2.

      In his sole appellate issue, Belous challenges the discretionary aspects

of his sentence. Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not

entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. See Commonwealth v. Perzel,

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291 A.3d 38, 46 (Pa. Super. 2023), appeal denied, 301 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2023).

Rather, before reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue:

      [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
      appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal[;] (2) whether the
      issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
      reconsider and modify sentence[;] (3) whether appellant’s brief
      has a fatal defect[;] and (4) whether there is a substantial
      question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
      the Sentencing Code[.]

Id. (internal citation omitted). This Court has explained:

      . . . [A]n appellant must set forth in his brief a concise statement
      of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to
      the discretionary aspects of a sentence.          [Additionally], the
      appellant must show that there is a substantial question that the
      sentence imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
      That is, the sentence violates either a specific provision of the
      sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular
      fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.               We
      examine an appellant’s [Pa.R.A.P.] 2119(f) statement to
      determine whether a substantial question exists. Our inquiry
      must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in
      contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary
      only to decide the appeal on the merits.

Commonwealth v. Christman, 225 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(internal citation omitted; emphases in original).

      Regarding the Rule 2119(f) statement, this Court has provided:

      [T]he Rule 2119(f) statement must specify where the sentence
      falls in relation to the sentencing guidelines and what particular
      provision of the Code is violated (e.g., the sentence is outside the
      guidelines and the court did not offer any reasons either on the
      record or in writing, or double-counted factors already
      considered). Similarly, the Rule 2119(f) statement must specify
      what fundamental norm the sentence violates and the manner in
      which it violates that norm (e.g., the sentence is unreasonable or

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      the result of prejudice because it is 500 percent greater than the
      extreme end of the aggravated range).

Commonwealth v. Clary, 226 A.3d 571, 580 (Pa. Super. 2020) (internal

citation omitted). “We cannot look beyond the statement of questions

presented and the prefatory Rule 2119(f) statement to determine

whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Crawford,

257 A.3d 75, 78–79 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal citation and quotations

omitted; emphasis added).     Further, we will not accept bald assertions of

sentencing errors. See Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810, 835 (Pa.

Super. 2023). A combined failure to refer to the guidelines, the particular

provision of the Sentencing Code allegedly violated, or the fundamental norm

the sentence violates results in a failure to present a substantial question.

See Clary, 226 A.3d at 580; accord Faison, 297 A.3d at 836 (concluding the

appellant failed to raise a substantial question to invoke our review where he

did not “specify what factors in particular the [sentencing] court ignored, or

why his circumstances justified the imposition of a concurrent sentence”).

      With these principles in mind, we examine Belous’s Rule 2119(f)

statement. Our review discloses that Belous has failed to raise a substantial

question. Belous asserts “the trial court’s sentence was excessive because it

failed to consider the required statutory factors under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.]

§ 9721(b).”   Belous’s Brief at 9.   Belous maintains that because of this

asserted failure, the trial court imposed a sentence that will keep him

imprisoned for longer than his projected life expectancy.     See id.   Belous

presents a bald assertion that the trial court failed to consider the requisite

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sentencing factors, and thereby imposed an excessive sentence; however, this

Court will not accept a bald assertion of sentencing errors. See Faison, 297

A.3d at 835. We further note that Belous fails to refer to the guidelines, any

particular provision of the Sentencing Code the trial court allegedly violated,

or the fundamental norm his sentence violates. See Clary, 226 A.3d at 580.

Thus, Belous has failed to raise a substantial question and we decline to review

his challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence, and we affirm the

judgment of sentence.2

____________________________________________

2 We note that even had Belous raised a substantial question, he would be

due no relief. The trial court imposed consecutive standard-range sentences.
See N.T., 11/9/22, at 5-6, 48-49. Further, the trial court noted at sentencing
that it had “received a [PSI] that is comprehensive, thorough, and very
balanced in terms of giving [the trial court] all [it] need[s] in a case such as
this.” N.T., 11/9/22, at 38. The trial court is thus presumed to have
considered Belous’s mitigating information. See Commonwealth v. Hill,
210 A.3d 1104, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“Where the sentencing court had the
benefit of a [PSI], we can assume [the court] was aware of relevant
information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed [it] along with
mitigating statutory factors. [If] a sentence is within the standard range . . .,
Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate . . ..”) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). More specifically, the trial court considered the
“horrifying” circumstances of the crimes; Belous’s family support and recent
familial losses; his juvenile adjudications and adult convictions; his prior
enrollment in rehabilitative programs including violence prevention and drug
and alcohol counseling; his high risk of reoffending; and the guidelines. See
N.T., 11/9/22, at 38-41. The court also considered the victim impact evidence
of Mr. Peglow and his mother, as well as the community’s need for protection.
See id. at 42, 44. In light of the trial court’s thoughtful consideration of the
sentencing factors, we reject Belous’s assertion that the court “focused solely
on retribution and the ‘gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the
life of the victim.’” Belous’s Brief at 14 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)). See
also Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/23, at 8-10 (synopsis of the trial court’s reasons
for the sentence); Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Judgement of sentence affirmed.

Date: 4/8/2024

____________________________________________

2009) (holding that an appellant is due no relief where “[t]he sentencing court
[did] not . . . give the mitigating factors as much weight as [the a]ppellant
would have liked and decided . . . the facts did not warrant . . . a sentence
lower than the standard range,” because “[w]e cannot re-weigh the
sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing
court”).

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