Court Opinion

ID: 9465874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:58:18.451659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:25.030299
License: Public Domain

ELY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
The facts of this case should lead to no other conclusion except that the advice of the petitioner’s counsel was “[not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases”. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970).1
*732It is first necessary to supplement, to some extent, the facts as set forth by the majority. There is some dispute in the record as to when Saunders, as he attempted to sell Fenton’s vehicle, was. first apprehended by the police. A newspaper article written at the time reported that Saunders was arrested on March 6, 1951 and questioned for a week thereafter by the Phoenix police. Even assuming that Saunders was not arrested until March 15, however, the evidence is undisputed that he adamantly declared the shooting of Fenton to be accidental. This initial version of the facts was not altered by Saunders until he had been held and continuously questioned by the Yuma sheriff’s office for a period of three days. Then, while Saunders yet remained without counsel, he “confessed” under interrogation by a prosecuting attorney. He further obliged the State by testifying at the coroner’s inquiry and waiving his right to a preliminary hearing. When Saunders’ father ultimately obtained counsel for his son, on March 27, only two days remained until the time scheduled for Saunders’ plea.
The record contains substantial evidence corroborating Saunders’ claim that his counsel appeared uninterested in investigating the facts surrounding the killing, directing his whole efforts toward a plea bargain leading to the obtaining of a life sentence. Moreover, the record indicates that the attorney had little experience in the handling of criminal cases. The attorney’s case file reveals absolutely no investigation of the facts other than an interview with Saunders’ father. The record is likewise devoid of any indication that the lawyer considered the defense of reduced capacity and lack of criminal intent due to Saunders’ age and youth, a defense available to Saunders under the then-existing Arizona law.2 See Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P.2d 18 (1934). Finally, there is no evidence indicating that Saunders’ counsel considered the consequences of the procedural defects attending Saunders’ case. Since Saunders’ remand from juvenile to adult court took place only moments after juvenile jurisdiction had attached, it appears undeniable that there was an inexcusable disregard of the statutory requisites of the Arizona Juvenile Code. See 1941 Arizona Sessions Laws, ch. 80, §§ 7(b), 10(a). I believe that the majority has confused the holding of Vigileos v. State, 84 Ariz. 404, 330 P.2d 116 (1958), that the juvenile court possessed discretion, after hearing, to remand a juvenile for trial as an adult, with the separate question of whether the statutory requirements for the remand hearing were satisfied. In Eyman v. Superior Court, 9 Ariz. App. 6 (ten years after Vigileos), 448 P.2d 878 (1968), the court stated:
The record of the habeas corpus proceedings below fully establishes that the statutory requisites were complied with, i. e., that an informal hearing was conducted in chambers, that inquiry into the facts was made, and that the juvenile court judge decided that Kelley should be treated as an adult. Id. at 13, 85, 448 P.2d at 885 (emphasis supplied).
Thus, the Arizona Court of Appeals, in Ey-man, has suggested that reversal is here required for the wholly rational and explicable reason that Saunders was not afforded the required hearing before it was summarily determined that he would be treated as an adult.3 Incidentally, I can *733hardly conceive a more critical stage of a criminal proceeding against a child than the time of the determination of whether he shall be treated as a juvenile or an adult.
The United States Supreme Court, in a discussion of the McMann v. Richardson test regarding competency of counsel in criminal cases, pointedly wrote:
“Counsel’s failure to evaluate properly facts giving rise to a constitutional claim, or his failure properly to inform himself of facts that would have shown the existence of a constitutional claim, might in particular fact situations meet this standard of proof.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973).
The present case is, of course, made more difficult because of the passage of time and the death of the attorney involved, and were I convinced that the record does not reflect the full extent of the effort of defense counsel, I would join the majority. But the flavor of the evidence now available leaves me with the abiding conviction that everyone assumed Saunders to be guilty, and that, accordingly, no reasonably effective legal assistance was given in his behalf.4 Thus, Saunders was deprived of a most critical constitutional right. This being true, I would reverse so that the District Court might afford to the Arizona courts the opportunity to allow Saunders to plead anew.

. The standard for judging a claim of denial of effective assistance of counsel has become confusing in our Court. Compare United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948, 94 S.Ct. 3073, 41 L.Ed.2d 668 (1974) with Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962). Although Saunders’ attorney was constitutionally incompetent under either standard, the Brubaker test of competency seems preferable, i. e., “Counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.” Id. at 37.

. Had Mansfield delayed the change of plea for one additional week, he would have received an answer to critical written inquiries that he had addressed to one Cavanaugh, the principal of the Anderson school. In a letter to Mansfield written March 30, Cavanaugh enclosed detailed adjustment reports regarding the petitioner and stated that he had known Saunders for approximately four years, from 1946 to 1950. He further noted that Saunders had displayed serious behavioral problems while at the Anderson school and that he had been seen by a psychiatrist. Mr. Cavanaugh concluded his letter by stating that Saunders:
“. . seemed typical of a constitutionally psychopathic type of personality. No doubt you have sought psychiatric advice in respect to this possibility." (Emphasis supplied.)

. Judge Wallace notes first that Saunders relied primarily on his own testimony to support his claim. In response to my original dissent wherein I pointed out the corroboration of Saunders’ testimony found in newspaper arti*733cles written at the time and verified for this appeal by their author, Judge Wallace correctly writes that the trial judge was not obliged to accept the statements made in the articles. The gravity of my concern, however, is the evidence, or rather the lack of it, upon which the district judge chose to rely. The testimony of Judge Nabours about the informality of the juvenile remand and the competency of Mansfield (cited by the majority), can only be viewed fairly when we realize that in 1951 Judge Nab-ours was the County Attorney responsible for the prosecution of Saunders.

. Judge Nabours’ testimony that the juvenile remand procedure was informal, with absolute discretion vested in the remanding judge, can hardly be held to override statutory and court declared procedures to the contrary.