Court Opinion

ID: 9565257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:17:36.174805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:30.137579
License: Public Domain

Given, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the ultimate conclusion of the Court as announced in the opinion of Judge Riley, but reach that conclusion by a different process of reasoning. I do not believe that a claimant or any other person “has a right to a judicial review independent of the provisions of Section 22,” but believe that the “appeal” mentioned in Section 17 has reference only to the “judicial review” mentioned in Section 22. Section 17 contains no specific language creating any right of review, no method for perfecting any such procedure, and no provision relating to the powers or duties of any appellate tribunal. It reads: “The decision of the board shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith, unless a claimant, last employer, or other interested party appeals to a court within thirty days after mailing of notification of the board’s decision.”
To hold that Section 17 accords the claimant or any other person the “right to a judicial review independent of the provisions of Section 22,” necessarily means that the Legislature, in the same act, provided two separate judicial reviews to any action of the board, each such review to be heard by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. Presumably, if that be true, some of the parties to a proceeding before the board could obtain one of such reviews while other parties could obtain the other. Why attribute to the Legislature the intent to create such endless confusion? Why two distinct reviews by the same *75court? Only clear language should impel us to such conclusions. All agree that the several sections dealing with judicial review should be read in pari materia. Why so read them if they necessarily deal with separate and distinct judicial reviews?
In my opinion Section 17 deals primarily with payment of benefits in the event of an appeal from the order of the board. It also makes such an order final after thirty days, and also necessarily implies that a claimant or other interested person may “appeal to a court within thirty days” after mailing of the notices. Note that the appeal may be had “within” the thirty days before the order becomes final. Section 22 merely extends the period in which the review may be had twenty days after the order of the board has become final. That creates no inconsistency. The petition in the instant case, having been filed within the thirty day period after the mailing of the notification of the board’s decision, was filed within the time allowed by Section 17. I think such a petition would be filed in time if filed within fifty days after the mailing of the notification of the board’s decision.