Court Opinion

ID: 9844736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:07:46.707777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.159262
License: Public Domain

Judge GREENE
concurring in the result.
I agree, and for the reasons stated by the majority, that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Like the majority, I also believe that the trial court’s conspiracy instruction was erroneous. And, because evidence was presented from which the jury could have determined that defendant conspired with someone besides Branch to sell cocaine, the instructional error was prejudicial and therefore I agree that it entitles defendant to a new trial. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1988).
I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly admitted Branch’s grand jury testimony as “impeachment” evidence. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, I believe that defendant is also entitled to a new trial on the ground that the trial court improperly admitted Branch’s grand jury testimony.
I state the facts necessary to an understanding of the issues which I feel compelled to address. Defendant was indicted in Guilford County for conspiracy to commit trafficking in cocaine by the sale and delivery of more than 400 grams of cocaine. The sole co-conspirator alleged in the indictment was William Anthony Branch *51(Branch). The evidence presented by the State at defendant’s trial established that in 1988, Michael Richardson (Richardson), a resident of New York City, began a cocaine distribution network in High Point, North Carolina. Richardson testified that he arranged for Branch to move to High Point and distribute the cocaine transported in from New York. Richardson testified that defendant, who is Branch’s cousin, moved from New York to High Point in 1989, but that Richardson did not have any personal drug dealings with defendant. Richardson did testify, however, that on one occasion in the summer of 1989 he had an argument with defendant regarding $200.00 owed Branch by defendant for drugs sold by defendant.
Branch, who had earlier testified before the grand jury that he hired defendant to sell cocaine, testified at trial for the State. Prior to calling Branch, the prosecutor advised the court that “we probably ought to be heard outside the presence of the jurors before the next witness testifies.” Branch then testified on voir dire that, despite the fact that he testified against defendant before the grand jury, he was not going to testify against defendant at trial, and had told SBI agents the day before that he would not testify. Branch testified that the numerous statements that he made to the grand jury regarding defendant’s participation with him in the High Point drug operation were false. The court appointed counsel for Branch and subsequently issued a bench warrant charging Branch with perjury in his testimony before the grand jury, to which Branch pleaded guilty. Defendant made a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Branch gave perjured testimony to the grand jury, which was denied.
Branch then testified for the State before the jury. The trial court declared Branch hostile and allowed the State to cross-examine him. Branch testified that defendant was his cousin who had come to High Point from New York, but that Branch did not hire defendant to help him sell drugs. When asked by the prosecutor whether he had told the grand jury that he brought defendant to High Point to sell drugs for him, Branch denied ever making such a statement. Branch also denied telling SBI detectives that he had brought defendant to High Point to help sell drugs. Over repeated objections by defendant, the prosecutor continued to cross-examine Branch using the portions of Branch’s grand jury testimony in which he had stated that defendant worked for him in the High *52Point drug operation. Branch either denied making the statements or stated that his prior statements were “false testimony.”
In response, the trial court permitted the State to call the court reporter who had transcribed Branch’s grand jury testimony. Through this witness, the State attempted to introduce into evidence the full transcript of Branch’s grand jury testimony, arguing at length for its admission as substantive evidence. Defendant objected to the admission of the transcript for any purpose. The trial court agreed that it was inadmissible as substantive evidence; however, the court allowed it as impeachment evidence. The court also allowed the State to pass a copy of the transcript of Branch’s grand jury testimony to each member of the jury, and instructed the jury to consider it solely for the purpose of “deciding whether you’re going to believe or disbelieve [Branch’s] sworn testimony at this trial.”
At the outset, I note my concern with the majority’s reading of the amendment to N.C.G.S. § 15A-623(h), dealing generally with grand jury proceedings. The majority acknowledges that the amendment was not in effect at the time of defendant’s trial and therefore has no application to the instant case. However, the majority nevertheless concludes that the amendment suggests that grand jury testimony may now be introduced as substantive evidence, a conclusion which is at odds with our Rules of Evidence, for the following reasons.
“ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1992), and is not admissible except as provided by statute or by our Rules of Evidence. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 802 (1992). Thus, in North Carolina, the prior statement of a witness, when offered for its truth, is hearsay. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) provides that a prior inconsistent statement of a declarant who testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, which prior statement was given under oath, subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition, is not hearsay and therefore is admissible as substantive evidence. Included within the concept of “other proceeding” in the federal rule is grand jury testimony. Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6711, at 446 (1992). *53However, because it “departs markedly from the common law in North Carolina,” federal Rule 801(d)(1) was deleted from the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(d) commentary (1992); see also State v. Cope, 240 N.C. 244, 249, 81 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1954) (prior inconsistent statements admissible for impeachment purposes and not as substantive evidence). In other words, the prior inconsistent statement of a witness — regardless of the circumstances under which it was made — is not admissible as substantive evidence unless it properly falls within an exception to the hearsay rule or except as provided by statute. The latter exception does, however, raise the question of whether N.C.G.S. § 15A-623(h), as amended, authorizes the admission of grand jury testimony as substantive evidence at trial.
Section 15A-623(h), prior to the July, 1991, amendment, provided that “[t]he record of the examination of a [grand jury] witness may be used in a trial to corroborate or impeach that witness to the extent that it is relevant and otherwise admissible.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-623(h) (1988) (emphasis added). As a result of the amendment, the statute now provides that “[t]he record of the examination of a [grand jury] witness may be used in a trial to the extent that it is relevant and otherwise admissible.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-623(h) (Supp. 1992). One possible explanation for the deletion of the phrase “to corroborate or impeach that witness” is simply that it was surplusage, because the statute already stated, as it does now, that the record may be used only to the extent that it is relevant and otherwise admissible. In other words, the admissibility of the record of the examination of a grand jury witness, like all evidence, is governed by our Rules of Evidence, and, as previously discussed, our Rules of Evidence preclude the admission of prior inconsistent statements of a witness — whether sworn or unsworn — as substantive evidence.
On the other hand, by deleting in Section 15A-623(h) the phrase “to corroborate or impeach that witness,” the Legislature could have intended to authorize the admission of grand jury testimony as substantive evidence as well as for corroboration or impeachment. However, because this appeal does not require that we construe Section 15A-623(h), as amended, it is unnecessary to resolve the issue raised. Under the law applicable to the instant case, there is no question that grand jury testimony is not admissible as substantive evidence.
*54There remains, however, the question of whether the trial court properly admitted Branch’s prior grand jury testimony as impeachment evidence. As a preliminary matter, I note that, assuming without deciding that Branch’s plea of guilty to perjury before the grand jury somehow renders his grand jury testimony incompetent, evidence which is used for impeachment purposes is admissible as such notwithstanding the fact that it would otherwise be incompetent. Cf. State v. Riddle, 316 N.C. 152, 159, 340 S.E.2d 75, 79 (1986) (corroborative evidence admissible as such even if otherwise incompetent). Therefore, the perjury adjudication has no effect on whether the trial court properly admitted Branch’s former testimony for impeachment purposes.
Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the court committed reversible error (I) in allowing the State to use portions of Branch’s grand jury testimony when cross-examining Branch, and (II) in admitting the entire transcript of Branch’s grand jury testimony for “impeachment” purposes.
The rule allowing the use of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes is not without its exceptions. Two exceptions are raised by the facts of the instant case.
I
Defendant argues that the court erred in allowing the State to call the court reporter and to introduce through this witness the entire transcript of Branch’s grand jury testimony.
Under the rules applicable to cross-examination of a witness, whether the witness is called by the opposing party or is a party’s own witness who has been declared hostile, “extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements may not be used to impeach a witness where the questions concern matters collateral to the issues.” State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. 343, 348, 378 S.E.2d 754, 757 (1989). In other words, “if the inquiry on cross-examination is as to inconsistent statements about ‘collateral’ matters, the cross-examiner must ‘take the answer’ [of the witness] — he cannot bring on other witnesses to prove the making of the alleged statement.” Edward W. Cleary et al., McCormick on Evidence § 36, at 77 (3d ed. 1984); accord 1 Henry Brandis, Jr., Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 48, at 227-28 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Brandis]; State v. Green, 296 N.C. 183, 192-93, 250 S.E.2d 197, 203 (1978). As a general rule, “collateral matters” are those which are not relevant to the issues *55in the case, including immaterial matters and irrelevant facts inquired about to test observation or memory. Brandis at 228. Our Courts, however, have interpreted this rule of evidence as also barring (1) testimony which contradicts a witness’s denial that the witness stated on a prior occasion that the defendant made an inculpatory statement to him, State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 213-14, 166 S.E.2d 652, 662-63 (1969); State v. Williams, 322 N.C. 452, 454-56, 368 S.E.2d 624, 626-27 (1988); and (2) testimony which contradicts a witness’s denial that the witness on a prior occasion made a statement inconsistent with his testimony at trial. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 348, 378 S.E.2d at 757; State v. Jerrells, 98 N.C. App. 318, 321, 390 S.E.2d 722, 724, disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 802, 393 S.E.2d 901 (1990); State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 349, 180 S.E.2d 745, 754 (1971); hut see Green, 296 N.C. at 193, 250 S.E.2d at 204 (alibi witness, who denied at trial that he told a detective prior to trial that he was asleep when defendant came home on the night of the murder, was properly impeached by the detective, who testified regarding the substance of the alibi witness’s prior statement, on the ground that the prior statement concerned the subject matter of the alibi witness’s trial testimony and the subject matter of the trial testimony was material to an issue in the case).
In the instant case, Branch denied telling the grand jury that Branch brought defendant to High Point to sell drugs for him. In response, the State with the permission of the court called as an impeaching witness the court reporter who had transcribed the grand jury testimony, and, through this witness, introduced the entire transcript of Branch’s testimony, giving a copy to each member of the jury. Under the principles previously discussed, in particular those set forth in Hunt, Cutshall, and Jerrells, the trial court erred in admitting this evidence. The majority’s effort to distinguish this line of cases from the instant case on the ground that the former involved unsworn prior inconsistent statements and the latter, sworn prior inconsistent statements, is unpersuasive. This is so because, as previously discussed, our Rules of Evidence in addressing the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements make no distinction between those that are sworn and those that are unsworn — any prior inconsistent statement is admissible, but only for impeachment purposes — nor have I been able to determine that our Courts have ever made such a distinction. Not in Hunt nor in any of the cases preceding it which I have discussed did the Court ever suggest that its holding, prohibiting the admission *56of extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness who, at trial, denies making a prior inconsistent statement, was based on the fact that the prior inconsistent statement to which the impeaching witness testifies was not given under oath.
II
Defendant argues that the court also erred in allowing the State to use portions of Branch’s grand jury testimony during its cross-examination of Branch because the record reveals that the State attempted to “impeach” Branch solely for the improper purpose of putting the substance of Branch’s prior testimony before the jury.
Impeachment of a witness by use of a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness is not permitted where such impeachment is “ ‘employed as a mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible.’ ” Hunt, 324 N.C. at 349, 378 S.E.2d at 757 (citations omitted).
[I]t would be an abuse of [Rule 607], in a criminal case, for the prosecution to call a witness that it knew would not give it useful evidence, just so it could introduce hearsay evidence against the defendant in the hope that the jury would miss the subtle distinction between impeachment and substantive evidence — or, if it didn’t miss it, would ignore it.
Id. at 349-50, 378 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984)). Only in rare cases have courts addressing the question found good faith and the absence of subterfuge on the part of the State in introducing hearsay statements to impeach its own witness. Id. at 350, 378 S.E.2d at 758.
A review of the record in light of Hunt leads me to the inescapable conclusion that the hearsay statements of Branch, who testified for the State as a hostile witness, were used by the State primarily for the purpose of putting before the jury the substance of those statements. A thorough reading of the transcript in this case reveals that the prosecutor knew prior to trial that Branch would not testify against defendant, yet Branch nonetheless was called as a witness. Moreover, the jury’s consideration of the portions of Branch’s grand jury testimony used by the State during cross-examination of Branch was not limited to purposes of impeachment. The State’s lack of good faith is further evidenced by its strenuous argument at trial for the admission of the transcript *57of Branch’s grand jury testimony as substantive evidence. As the following exchange reveals, only after failing to persuade the court that the testimony was admissible as substantive evidence did the State, after suggestion by the trial court, offer the evidence for “impeachment” purposes:
The COURT: All right. Mr. [Prosecutor], I’ll hear you further on this. You tender [Branch’s grand jury testimony] as impeachment evidence?
[The PROSECUTOR]: I tender it, Your Honor, as substantive evidence. And I understand Your Honor’s ruling on that.
The COURT: I can’t — I’ve read everything I know to read. And I know of no authority to admit it as substantive evidence.
[The PROSECUTOR]: Well, Your Honor, then I tender it also as impeachment evidence.
The COURT: I’m going to overrule the objection and let it in as impeachment.
[Emphases added.] I can conceive of no purpose on the part of the State for introducing the entire transcript of Branch’s prior testimony, and ensuring that each member of the jury was given his own copy to read, other than the improper purpose of hoping that the jury would consider the testimony as substantive evidence.
The foregoing circumstances indicate on the part of the State a lack of good faith in using Branch’s grand jury testimony, see Hunt, 324 N.C. at 350-51, 378 S.E.2d at 758-59, especially in light of the damaging nature of the evidence, and therefore the trial court erred in allowing its use.