Court Opinion

ID: 9495091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:54:05.947658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:19.511507
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the court’s ■determination that Insook Kim was “in custody” for Fifth Amendment purposes when police officers questioned ' her. While paying lip service to the factors that properly guide our determination, the majority fails, in my view, to apply them faithfully to the facts before us.
I
As the majority correctly states, an officer’s obligation to give the traditional Miranda warning to a suspect applies only to custodial interrogation. “In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury v. Cal., 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The inquiry should focus on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not the subjective views of the officers or the individual being questioned. Id. at 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526. “An objective standard avoids imposing upon police officers the often impossible burden of predicting whether the person they question, because of characteristics peculiar to him, believes himself to be restrained.” United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.), modified, 830 F.2d 127 (9th Cir.1987).
We ask whether, based upon a review of all the pertinent facts, “a reasonable innocent person in such circumstances would conclude that after brief questioning [she] would not be free to leave.” United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.1981); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (plurality). Factors that we should consider in determining whether a person was in custody include: (1) the language used to summon the individual, (2) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt, 8151(3) the physical surroundings of the interrogation, (4) the duration of the detention, and (5) the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual. United States v. Hayden, 260 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.2001), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1117, 151 L.Ed.2d 1011 (2002).
A
As to the first factor, the police did not summon Kim; rather, she came to her *979store voluntarily. Indeed, the officers allowed her inside only after she knocked and shook the door. The Supreme Court has consistently found that a suspect is not in custody if she voluntarily approaches or accompanies law enforcement. See Cal. v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) (holding defendant was not in custody when he voluntarily accompanied police to the station for questioning and was allowed to leave after the interview); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (holding defendant was not “clearly” in custody when he came to the station voluntarily and left “without hindrance” after a 30-minute interview); see also Hayden, 260 F.3d at 1066-67 (holding defendant was not in custody when she voluntarily appeared at FBI building for questioning and was told that she was free to leave); People v. Palomo, 35 F.3d 368, 375 (9th Cir.1994) (holding defendant was not in custody despite “the duration of the interview and the nature of the interrogation room” when he went to the police station voluntarily and “left of his own accord”); United States v. Hudgens, 798 F.2d 1234, 1236-37 (9th Cir.1986) (holding defendant was not in custody when he initiated contact with police, was- not physically restrained, and was questioned for 45 minutes).1
The majority distinguishes between a person voluntarily approaching the police with the expectation that she will be asked questions and Kim’s voluntarily entering her store. Supra at 976-77. To the ma: jority, the fact that she voluntarily entered her store for the purpose of checking on her son does not suggest that she voluntarily subjected herself to the possibility of a police interview. Yet, we rejected a similar distinction in Palomo, where the defendant went to the police station because his relatives had been taken there— not to speak to the police. We held that the defendant’s “assertion that he went to the station only because his relatives had been taken there does not, without more, indicate that he did not initiate contact *980with the police.” Palomo, 35 F.3d at 375. The same must, be said regarding Kim.2
Furthermore, it seems somewhat disingenuous to say that when Kim approached her store with police cars parked in front, found the front door locked, and then had to knock and gain entrance from an officer, that she had no expectation that maybe, just maybe, she might be called upon to answer questions.3 While her purpose for coming to her store was to check on her son, once she saw the police presence and sought access to a premise that was being searched by law enforcement, it would be utterly naive to suggest that she did not consent to an encounter with the police.
B
The second factor — the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt — is not implicated here. The record does not indicate that the officers confronted Kim with evidence of her guilt.
C
The third factor looks to the physical surroundings of the interrogation. Here, Kim was in familiar surroundings — her own store — during the interview, which stands in direct contrast to the more coercive environment of a police station. However, the Supreme Court has found that even when questioning occurs at a police station there is not custody per se. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517 (“[W]e have explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’ ” (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711)). Here, of course, the familiar surroundings of Kim’s store would be much less coercive than an interrogation room at the police station. Cf. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (finding detention of an individual at his home during the execution of a search warrant is permissible because it is “substantially less intrusive” than an arrest and involves “neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police station”); United States v. Eide, 875 F.2d 1429, 1437 (9th Cir.1989) (holding defendant was not in custody “[particularly because the FBI agents- interviewed [him] at his home.”).
*981D
The fourth factor we consider is the duration of the detention. The district court found that she was questioned for approximately 45-50 minutes, but had been detained for “some time” before the interview began. The government states that the entire detention lasted about 90 minutes, which admittedly seems on the high end of our precedent.
E
Finally, we must consider the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual. Here, Kim was neither handcuffed nor 8155 told that she was under arrest. It also appears that, at least until the interpreter arrived, Kim had a clear path of egress during the interview. While the front door was locked, it is a reasonable police procedure to control access to a scene during the execution of a search warrant. See Booth, 669 F.2d at 1236 (“Strong but reasonable measures to insure the safety of the officers or the public can be taken without necessarily compelling a finding that the suspect was in custody.”);4 see also Summers, 452 U.S at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (“The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”).
Furthermore, the presence of many officers conducting a search cannot aloné establish a custodial situation:
Such a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a “coercive environment.” Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711 (emphasis added). Other than the mere presence of officers, there was no pressure applied to detain Kim, even taking as true the district court’s determination that no officer told her that she was free to leave.
Finally, it is significant that when the officers finished searching the store, they left without arresting Kim or her son. See Palomo, 35 F.3d at 375 (weighing as an important factor that the defendant “left of his own accord”).
II
I recognize that Kim was justifiably concerned about her son and worried about the presence of officers in her store. However, under the five Hayden factors that guide our analysis, I cannot agree that there was a “restraint on [Kim’s] freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526. While the interview lasted about 90 minutes, the police did not summon Kim, she was not confronted with evidence of her guilt, she was in familiar surroundings, and the degree of pressure applied to detain her was minimal. See Palomo, 35 F.3d at 375 (“Although the duration of the interview and the nature of the interrogation room support Palomo’s position, the remaining factors strongly support the government’s contention that Palomo was not in- custody.”). Because I would conclude that Kim *982was not in custody during her presence at her store, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority's characterization of United States v. Crawford, 52 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir.1995), as having “significant factual differences” from this case is, with respect, inaccurate. See supra at 977. In Crawford, the Fifth Circuit held that defendants were not in custody when they made incriminating statements during the execution of a search warrant at their electronics store. Id. at 1309. There, officers did not tell defendants that they were or were not free to leave, the defendants (who are husband and wife) could not move around the store without being accompanied by an agent and could not be in each other’s presence, and one defendant came to the shop voluntarily after the search was underway, but was then "sandwiched between two men at all times.” Id. at 1307-09. Like Kim, who was probably more worried.about her son and having her store disrupted than about being questioned, the Crawford defendants were "more worried about their electronic equipment [and] not having their store disrupted than about being held in custody." Id. at 1308. Furthermore, the defendants knew that, the officers had found a small quantity of marijuana- — evidence of their guilt — during the search, id. at 1308. Thus, Crawford’s “factual differences” from this case actually make the situation there more coercive. Despite Crawford's coercive aspects, however, the Fifth Circuit held that they did not constitute a custodial situation for Miranda'purposes.
The majority attempts to distinguish Crawford primarily by relying on the standard of review exercised by the Fifth Circuit. First, it is not entirely clear what standard of review Crawford employed, as the court simply stated "[w]e review the district court’s finding that the Appellants were not in custody at the time of the statements.” Id. at 1307. Second, assuming Crawford did review for clear error, the more deferential standard of review did not appear to be the decisive factor in the court's decision, i.e., the court was not torn between two equally meritorious arguments as the majority makes it seem. Id. at 1308-09.

. The majority again attempts to distinguish a case that undermines its analysis — this time, Palomo — based on the fact that in Palomo we reviewed the district court's "in custody” determination for clear error. Supra at 976 n. 3. Again, to respond: the more deferential standard of review did not appear to be the decisive factor in our decision. Palomo, 35 F.3d at 375. Reliance on the standard of review in this situation is nothing more than a makeweight.
• Furthermore, nothing in the majority's characterization of Palomo undermines our clear rejection of the distinction between voluntarily subjecting oneself to be interviewed and voluntarily subjecting oneself for some other reason. The "without more” language in Palomo, 35 F.3d at 375, does not refer to other coercive elements that make a situation custodial, as the majority seems to suggest. Rather, Palomo simply rejected the defendant's argument that because he went to the police station to visit relatives — not to subject himself to an interview — he did not initiate contact with the police. Or, in other words, it takes more than approaching the police for a purpose other than speaking to them to make one's encounter with the police involuntary.

. This is all the more demonstrated by the fact that months prior to the search she had received an explicit warning from DEA officers, in Korean, about the connection between sales of large quantities of pseu-doephedrine and methamphetamine production. Thus, she should have had some idea as to why the police were there and that they might be interested in talking to her. Kim’s status as a suspect, of course, is irrelevant to whether she' was in custody. Palomo, 35 F.3d at 375.

. I note that the Booth court found this factor important in determining whether defendant was in custody for Fifth Amendment1 purposes. Thus, the majority cannot simply relegate reasonable police measures designed to insure safety to the Fourth Amendment context. Supra at 978.