Court Opinion

ID: 9536954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:10:08.41575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:37.364244
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring) — I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. The errors alleged by the appellants herein could have been raised on appeal. Because of the nature of the alleged errors, and appellants’ knowing and intelligent waiver of their right of appeal, they are precluded from raising the same issues through petitions for habeas corpus.
However, I believe it should be clearly stated that there can be exceptional circumstances under which the failure to raise an issue on appeal will not preclude its consideration in a petition for habeas corpus. See Walker v. Chitty, 112 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1940); Voigt v. Webb, 47 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Wash. 1942). Where a petitioner makes a well-substantiated claim of error which has happened at any stage *342of the criminal process (arrest, arraignment, trial, sentencing) , and which is of such magnitude and has had such a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the trial as to cause the petitioner to be deprived of his liberty without due process of law, the courts should not summarily refuse to grant a petition for habeas corpus, even though the particular issues involved might have been raised on appeal. In such a case, the courts have a duty to consider the merits of the petition. A conviction which is violative of due process is void, Voigt v. Webb, supra, and being void, the judgment is subject to post-conviction attack. See In re Domanski, 24 Wn.2d 137, 163 P.2d 593 (1945).
In deciding whether or not to grant a petition for habeas corpus in such a case, the court should weigh (1) the truth and substance of petitioner’s claims, (2) the prejudicial effect of the alleged errors, (3) the reasons for failure to raise the issues on appeal, and (4) the extent to which petitioner was denied due process of law as a result of the error.
It would be impossible to define more precisely the applicability of the juristic principle involved. Application of the principle can be, and has been, developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. By way of example, however, it can be said that at one extreme, well-founded allegations of a violence-induced confession relied upon by the jury in a conviction should receive the attention of this court when raised by habeas corpus petition (see Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 935, 100 L. Ed. 816, 76 S. Ct. 307 (1956)), even if petitioner has failed to prosecute an appeal. Contrariwise, at the other extreme, a petition which alleged only violation of evidentiary rules at trial would not be deserving of consideration; an appeal is the only legitimate method of raising such issues. Under such circumstances, the desirable and legitimate juristic objective of finality in appellate proceedings should take precedence over the theoretical ideal of absolutely error-free justice.
Despite the impossibility of defining precisely the appli*343cable circumstances, I believe the courts have an inherent power to reach the merits of certain habeas corpus petitions notwithstanding petitioner’s knowing failure to exhaust available remedies on appeal. The courts do not exist to sort human complaints into semantical or procedural pigeonholes at the expense of justice and common sense. Rather, one of their most significant functions is to utilize the great common law writ of habeas corpus to correct undeniably prejudicial and fundamental trial error whenever it is found to have occurred in a criminal proceeding.
Hamilton, C.J., and Rosellini, J., concur with Finley, J.