Court Opinion

ID: 9913048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 19:05:16.912372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:54.825252
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                       Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                              STATE OF MINNESOTA
                              IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                    A23-0070

                                  State of Minnesota,
                                      Respondent,

                                           vs.

                                       Jebah Doe,
                                       Appellant.

                               Filed December 26, 2023
                                       Affirmed
                                     Frisch, Judge

                            Hennepin County District Court
                              File No. 27-CR-20-25721

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Special
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

       Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Kirk,

Judge. ∗

∗
 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

FRISCH, Judge

       Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence discovered in his vehicle during a traffic stop because law enforcement

unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop. Because each incremental intrusion by law

enforcement was reasonable, we affirm.

                                          FACTS

       This case arises from appellant Jebah Doe’s challenge to the district court’s pretrial

order denying his motion to suppress evidence of a firearm discovered in a vehicle that he

was driving. At the suppression hearing, the district court received testimony from the

sergeant who conducted the traffic stop and also received the sergeant’s squad-car video

from the stop. A summary of the evidence at the suppression hearing follows.

       On November 26, 2020, the sergeant heard dispatch relay that a vehicle with no

license plates and front-end damage had struck a concrete median. The sergeant located a

vehicle matching the description provided by dispatch and began to follow the vehicle.

The sergeant’s squad-car video depicts the vehicle weaving within the traffic lane and

crossing the fog line. The sergeant initiated a traffic stop on the highway immediately

before an offramp exit. The driver stopped the vehicle partially on the shoulder of the

highway and partially within the traffic lane. After the driver initially stopped the vehicle,

the driver began reversing the vehicle on the highway shoulder, prompting the sergeant to

yell, “Stop!”

                                              2
       The sergeant approached the front passenger-side door and immediately tried to

open that door. When the door did not open, the sergeant knocked on the window, and the

sergeant was then able to open the car door. After opening the door, the sergeant leaned

into the vehicle and asked the driver if everything was okay. The driver responded that

everything was okay. The sergeant asked if the driver had been involved in an accident.

The driver replied that he had not been involved in an accident. The sergeant stated to the

driver that he stopped the vehicle after receiving driving complaints and then asked the

driver for his license. The driver responded that he did not have a license with him but

identified himself as Doe, providing his full name and date of birth. The sergeant closed

the door, returned to his squad car, ran Doe’s name through law-enforcement databases,

and learned Doe did not have a valid driver’s license.

       Because Doe did not have a valid driver’s license and because the vehicle was

parked on the highway in a manner posing a traffic hazard, the sergeant ordered that Doe’s

vehicle be towed. The sergeant returned to Doe’s vehicle, this time approaching the front

driver-side door, tapped on the window, and opened the door. Immediately upon opening

the door, the sergeant saw a firearm between Doe’s legs on the floor of the vehicle and

instructed Doe not to move. The sergeant leaned into the vehicle to secure Doe’s arms and

another officer on the scene removed the gun from inside the vehicle. Doe was arrested

and the vehicle was impounded. Police conducted an inventory search of the vehicle.

       Respondent State of Minnesota charged Doe with possession of a firearm by an

ineligible person pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020), and receiving stolen

property pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2020). Doe moved to suppress the

                                             3
firearm evidence seized from his vehicle, arguing that the segreant had illegally entered

and searched that vehicle. The district court denied his motion. Doe then moved for

reconsideration of his motion to suppress, arguing generally that the sergeant violated

Doe’s Fourth Amendment rights when he opened the vehicle doors. The district court

denied the motion to reconsider. Doe waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded with a

stipulated-evidence trial under the procedures described in Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,

subd. 4. The district court found Doe guilty of possession of a firearm by an ineligible

person and of receiving stolen property, entered judgment of conviction for both counts,

and sentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm by an ineligible

person.

      Doe appeals.

                                      DECISION

      Doe argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because

the sergeant unlawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop by opening the passenger-

side and driver-side doors to the vehicle. Because the sergeant’s actions were reasonable

incremental intrusions following a lawful traffic stop, and the evidence would otherwise

have been inevitably discovered, we disagree.

      The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect an individual’s right against

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.

Warrantless seizures are unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional, unless a recognized

exception to the warrant requirement applies. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,

474-75 (1971) (“The most basic constitutional rule in this area is that searches conducted

                                            4
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established

and well delineated exceptions.” (quotation omitted)); State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145,

149 (Minn. 2009).       One exception to the warrant requirement permits reasonable

investigatory seizures, including traffic stops. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363

(Minn. 2004). But an officer’s actions during the traffic stop must be “reasonably related

to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place” and “may

become invalid if [the stop] becomes ‘intolerable’ in its ‘intensity or scope.’” Id. at 364

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968)). Thus, “each incremental intrusion

during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original

legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as

defined in Terry.” Id. at 365. In assessing reasonableness, “the court should ask whether

with the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search, would a person

of reasonable caution believe that the action taken was appropriate.” State v. Othoudt, 482

N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 1992). “The test for appropriateness, in turn, is based on a

balancing of the government’s need to search or seize ‘and the individual’s right to personal

security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365

(quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). When evaluating a

district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual

findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d

496, 502 (Minn. 2008).

                                              5
       Against this backdrop, we address the two incremental intrusions by the sergeant

following the lawful traffic stop.

       Passenger-Side Door

       Doe first argues that the district court erred in determining that the sergeant acted

reasonably in opening the passenger-side door because the sergeant’s investigation could

have been accomplished without such an intrusion and that the sergeant’s actions in

opening the passenger-side door were without reasonable, articulable suspicion. These

arguments are unavailing.

       The record supports the district court’s conclusion that the sergeant’s act of opening

the passenger-side door at the beginning of the encounter with Doe was “tied to and

justified by reasonableness.” Our review of the record confirms that each of the sergeant’s

actions during this encounter was for the legitimate purpose of identifying Doe and

ensuring his welfare. The sergeant testified that he wanted to identify the driver and “make

sure that the driver was okay” based on information he received from dispatch reporting

that the driver hit a center median. Based on this and other evidence in the record, the

district court specifically determined that, following a lawful traffic stop, the sergeant

reasonably approached the vehicle “given the unknown state of the driver, reports that were

provided to the Sergeant prior to initiating the traffic stop, and the conduct the Sergeant

observed.” This is consistent with the district court’s finding that the sergeant stopped the

vehicle to “determine whether [Doe] was okay as he did not know whether the driver was

impaired or required additional aid.”

                                             6
       Any incremental intrusion associated with the opening of the passenger-side door

was therefore reasonably tied to the original purpose of the lawful traffic stop and

appropriate under the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 891

(Minn. 1978) (holding an officer opening a vehicle door was reasonable where the vehicle

was covered in snow and the officer could not see the passenger); State v. Lopez, 698

N.W.2d 18, 24 (Minn. App. 2005) (holding an officer opening a vehicle door was

reasonable when responding to a call that someone was asleep or unconscious in a parking

lot); see also State v. Perry, No. A08-0083, 2009 WL 233937, at *1, *3-4 (Minn. App. Feb.

3, 2009) (holding an officer opening a vehicle door was reasonable when the officer

responded to a call that a car was weaving, observed the parked car for ten minutes, and

then found the driver asleep). 1

       Doe nonetheless argues that the sergeant’s actions were an unreasonable expansion

of the traffic stop, citing our nonprecedential opinion State v. Stevenson, No. A21-1142,

2022 WL 3152587, at *1, *5-6 (Minn. App. Aug. 8, 2022) (holding law enforcement

opening a vehicle door was unreasonable where law enforcement stopped a vehicle for

having no front license plate and expired tabs in a parking lot and the reason for opening

the door was general officer safety). But the facts available to the sergeant when he stopped

Doe differ from those in Stevenson in two notable ways. First, the sergeant conducted the

traffic stop and opened the vehicle door because of concern for Doe’s wellbeing and not

an equipment violation, which was the reason for the stop in Stevenson. 2022 WL 3152587,

1
  We cite nonprecedential opinions for their persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                             7
at *6. Second, the sergeant’s expansion of the stop was reasonably connected to the reason

for the traffic stop. In Stevenson, the reasons for the traffic stop were not connected to the

reason for the expansion—officer safety. Id. at *5-6.

       With the facts available to the sergeant at the time he opened the passenger-side

door, a person of reasonable caution would believe that the action taken was appropriate.

See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365. Therefore, the sergeant acted lawfully in opening the

passenger-side door.

       Driver-Side Door

       Doe also argues that the district court erred in concluding that the sergeant’s actions

in opening the driver-side vehicle door were reasonable because the sergeant had “no need

to search or seize Doe’s vehicle.” We disagree.

       The record supports the district court’s determination that the sergeant acted

reasonably in opening the driver-side door. Because Doe was an unlicensed driver and not

lawfully permitted to operate a vehicle, the sergeant planned to have Doe exit the vehicle

so the sergeant could drive Doe up the road. “[A] police officer may order a driver out of

a lawfully stopped vehicle without an articulated reason.” Id. at 367 (citing Pennsylvania

v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)); see also Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d at 890 (recognizing

that a law-enforcement officer opening a door to order an occupant out of a vehicle is not

distinguishable from requesting that occupant exit the vehicle and the occupant opening

the door themselves). The sergeant had reasonable justification for this incremental

intrusion because he had probable cause to believe that Doe was driving without a license.

See Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365 (holding that independent probable cause justifies an

                                              8
incremental intrusion during a traffic stop). The fact that the sergeant could have chosen

to allow Doe to exit the vehicle in an alternate manner does not negate the reasonableness

of the manner chosen by the sergeant under these circumstances. We therefore discern no

error by the district court in its suppression order.

       Inevitable Discovery

       Even if the district court erred in its determination that the incremental intrusions

into the vehicle were reasonable, we agree with the district court’s denial of the suppression

motion because law enforcement would have inevitably discovered the firearm through an

inventory search of the vehicle after its impoundment. Doe argues that the evidence would

not have been inevitably discovered because the choice to impound the vehicle was not

reasonable.

       The exclusionary rule bars evidence “obtained either during or as a direct result of

an unlawful invasion.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). But the

inevitable-discovery doctrine is an exception to this rule and applies if the state can show

that the fruits of a challenged search inevitably would have been discovered through lawful

means. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 104-05 (Minn. 1999).

       Inventory searches are an exception to the warrant requirement and are reasonable

“because of their administrative and caretaking functions” which “serve to protect an

owner[’]s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost,

stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.” Gauster, 752 N.W.2d

at 502 (quotation omitted).      Because impoundment “gives rise to the need for and

justification of the inventory search, the threshold inquiry when determining the

                                               9
reasonableness of an inventory search is whether the impoundment of the vehicle was

proper.” Id. (quotation omitted). For impoundment to be proper, it must be “conducted

pursuant to standardized criteria” and “the State must have an interest in impoundment that

outweighs the individual’s Fourth Amendment right[s].” Id. at 502-03; State v. Rohde, 852

N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

       The sergeant properly impounded the vehicle driven by Doe. The state’s interest in

impounding a vehicle may outweigh individual rights if the vehicle is “impeding traffic or

threatening public safety and convenience.”      Rohde, 852 N.W.2d at 265 (quotation

omitted). The record shows that Doe stopped the vehicle partially in a lane of traffic on a

busy highway and that Doe was unable to lawfully move the vehicle himself because he

did not have a license. The sergeant reasonably concluded that the vehicle posed a traffic

hazard and needed to be removed. Although Doe asserts that the vehicle could have been

removed from the highway without impoundment, the fact that law enforcement could have

used alternate means to remove the vehicle does not negate the conclusion that the state’s

interest in impoundment outweighed Doe’s Fourth Amendment rights or otherwise

undermine the propriety of the sergeant’s choice given the circumstances. The record

supports the district court’s determination that impoundment of the vehicle was proper, and

law enforcement would have inevitably discovered the firearm in the resulting inventory

search of Doe’s vehicle.

       Affirmed.

                                            10