Court Opinion

ID: 9910607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-16 01:00:42.95782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:32.236961
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50536      Document: 00517004327         Page: 1    Date Filed: 12/15/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                   FILED
                                                                        December 15, 2023
                                   No. 22-50536                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                   Clerk

   Vote.Org,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Jacquelyn Callanen; Et al.,

                                                                     Defendants,

                                       versus

   Ken Paxton, In His Official Capacity as the Attorney General of Texas;
   Lupe C. Torres, In His Official Capacity as the Medina County Elections
   Administrator; Terrie Pendley, In Her Official Capacity as the Real
   County Tax Assessor-Collector,

                                   Intervenor Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 5:21-CV-649
                  ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:
          A non-profit organization whose stated mission is to simplify voting
   brought suit against four county election officials in Texas. It alleged that a
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                                    No. 22-50536

   Texas law requiring an original signature on a voter registration form violates
   the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments’ ban
   on imposing undue burdens on the right to vote. The Texas requirement
   frustrated use of the organization’s smartphone app that allows for digitized
   signatures only. The Attorney General of Texas intervened and has been the
   party actively defending the law. The district court granted summary
   judgment in favor of the organization. We REVERSE and RENDER.
           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          As is standard in the United States, an individual in Texas must
   register to vote before casting a ballot. To register, applicants “must submit
   an application to the registrar of the county in which the person resides.”
   TEX. ELEC. CODE § 13.002(a). That “application must be in writing and
   signed by the applicant.” § 13.002(b).
          The application form is available both online and at government
   offices designated as “voter registration agencies,” such as the Department
   of Public Safety and public libraries. §§ 20.001, 20.031. The Secretary of
   State and county registrars will also, upon request, mail applicants a postage-
   paid application form.
          Texans have several ways to submit their applications. They can
   submit the application by personal delivery or United States mail directly to
   the county registrar. § 13.002(a). Voter registration agencies are also
   required to accept registration applications and deliver them to the county
   registrar. §§ 20.001, 20.035. Moreover, counties may appoint “volunteer
   deputy registrars” to distribute and accept applications on the county
   registrar’s behalf. §§ 13.031, 13.038, 13.041. If an applicant submits an
   incomplete voter registration application, then the county registrar will notify
   the applicant and allow ten days to cure the deficiency. § 13.073.

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          Once an application form is received, the county registrar reviews it
   to ensure the necessary information, including a signature, is present. Upon
   confirming completeness of the form, registrars generally scan or enter the
   applicants’ information in their computer system and save images of the
   signatures. Some counties then destroy the original applications. The
   applicants’ information is electronically transmitted to the office of the Texas
   Secretary of State. The Secretary’s office processes these applications if the
   essential information — such as a person’s last name, date of birth, and social
   security number — is accurate.
          In 2013, the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 910, which allows
   individuals to transmit voter registration forms by facsimile, i.e., a fax, if they
   then, within four days, deliver or mail a hardcopy of the application.
   §§ 13.002(a), 13.143(d-2). When applicants use this method, the effective
   date of registration is the day of the fax transmissions. § 13.143(d)(2).
          The plaintiff, Vote.org, developed a smartphone application, or
   “app,” that it argues allows Texans to satisfy all enforceable voter
   registration requirements online. In an earlier decision that granted a stay of
   the district court’s injunction, this court described Vote.org as “a non-profit,
   non-membership organization that seeks to simplify and streamline political
   engagement by, for example, facilitating voter registration.” Vote.Org v.
   Callanen, 39 F.4th 297, 301 (5th Cir. 2022). The organization works to
   support low-propensity voters, including racial and ethnic minorities and
   younger voters. The app prompts applicants for information and auto-fills it
   onto the voter registration form. To sign the form, applicants sign a piece of
   paper, take a photo of it, and upload the photo to the app. The app then
   affixes the signature onto the registration form and transmits the form to two
   third-party vendors: one that sends the form to the county registrar via fax
   and another that mails a paper copy of the application to the county registrar.
   Id. at 301.

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           In 2018, Vote.org began its registration efforts in Bexar, Cameron,
   Dallas, and Travis counties. Id. at 301. After some technical problems were
   resolved, over 2,000 Texans registered to vote using the app. In October
   2018, the Texas Secretary of State issued a press release stating that “[a]ny
   web site that misleadingly claims to assist voters in registering to vote online
   by simply submitting a digital signature is not authorized to do so.” After
   this statement, Vote.org shut off its app.
           In mid-June 2021, the Texas Governor signed House Bill 3107, which
   clarified that applicants using the fax option must subsequently mail a paper
   application to the registrar that “contain[s] the voter’s original signature.”
   § 13.143(d-2). The parties refer to this as the “Wet Signature Rule,” and we
   also will at times even though “original signature” seems clear enough. The
   Secretary’s Rule 30(b)(6) designee explained in his deposition that the
   impetus behind the 2021 statute was “Vote.org’s misreading of [the
   signature requirement] in 2018.”
           In July 2021, Vote.org sued voter registrars in four counties under 42
   U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to enjoin Section 13.143(d-2)’s signature requirement.
   Vote.org alleged a violation of federal rights established in the Civil Rights
   Act of 1964, specifically that the right to vote shall not be denied due to
   immaterial errors or omissions on any record relating to registration or other
   voting requirements.          52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2). 1         Also alleged was that

           _____________________
           1
             The defendants’ briefing usually cites this key statute as “Section 1971,” a former
   section of Title 42; the plaintiff cites to 52 U.S.C. § 10101. The conflicting cites illustrate
   that the location of statutes in the U.S. Code can change. “The responsibility for creating
   and maintaining the Code has always been lodged in various locations within the House of
   Representatives.” Will Tress, Lost Laws: What We Can’t Find in the United States Code,
   40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 129, 143 (2010). The first official compilations were in 1873
   and 1878, enacted by Congress and called the Revised Statutes. Id. at 134–35.
   Controversies over those compilations may have delayed any new ones until the first
   United States Code was published in 1926; beginning in 1934, there has been a new official

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   requiring an original signature unduly burdens the right to vote in violation
   of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In September 2021, the district
   court granted motions to intervene as defendants filed by the Texas Attorney
   General and the voter registrars of two additional counties.
           After discovery, the defendants and Vote.org filed competing motions
   for summary judgment. The district court granted Vote.org’s motion.
   Vote.org v. Callanen, 609 F. Supp. 3d 515, 540 (W.D. Tex. 2022). The court
   concluded that requiring an original signature violates Section 10101 of Title
   52 because such a signature is not “material” to an individual’s qualifications
   to vote. Id. at 527–32. The court also determined that the requirement
   unduly burdens the right to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth
   Amendments. Id. at 532–39. The court permanently enjoined the defendants
   from enforcing the Wet Signature Rule. Id. at 540. The original defendants
   did not appeal. The only briefing from an appellant is by the Attorney
   General as intervenor. Consequently, we will refer to the appellants as Texas
   or the State.

           _____________________
   edition of the Code every six years. Id. at 135–37 & 137 n.42 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 202(c)). In
   the 1934, 1940, and 1946 Codes, the then-sole section of this key statute was in the Code
   title for “Aliens and Citizenship” or “Aliens and Nationality” as 8 U.S.C. § 31 (1934, 1940,
   1946). What is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was also in that title: 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1934, 1940, 1946).
   In the 1952 Code, the sections were recodified in the title for “Public Health and Welfare”
   as 42 U.S.C. § 1971 and § 1983 (1952). See 1952 Code at 713–14 (explaining omissions,
   repeals, and transfers of Title 8 sections to other titles).
            In 1974, the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives
   was created and became responsible for codification. Pub. L. No. 93-554, Title I, ch. III, §
   101, Dec. 27, 1974, 88 Stat. 1777, codified as 2 U.S.C. § 285–285g. “In 2014, provisions
   relating to voting and elections were transferred in the United States Code from titles 2 and
   42 into a new Title 52, Voting and Elections.” Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United
   States Code, Editorial Reclassification, Title 52, United States Code, found at
   https://uscode.house.gov/editorialreclassification/t52/index.html. Section 1971 became
   52 U.S.C. § 10101. Id. (link to chart of transferred provisions). Section 1983, a broadly-
   applicable civil rights statute, was not transferred. Of course, we cite the current Code.

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          A motions panel of this court granted a stay of the injunction pending
   resolution of the appeal. Vote.org, 39 F.4th at 309. That panel held that all
   the factors for a stay, including likelihood of success on the merits by the
   appellants, had been satisfied. Id. at 308–09. This motions panel decision
   does not bind us as a merits panel. Veasey v. Abbott, 870 F.3d 387, 392 (5th
   Cir. 2017). We have, though, examined that opinion closely and respectfully.
                                  DISCUSSION
          We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Nationwide Mut.
   Ins. Co. v. Baptist, 762 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is
   proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” FED. R.
   CIV. P. 56(a). In reviewing the record, “the court must draw all reasonable
   inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
   determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
   Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
          Texas argues the district court erred in its analysis of Article III
   standing, of the relevant section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and of the
   First and Fourteenth Amendments. We address these issues in that order.
          I.     Article III standing
          The parties briefed the issues of both Vote.org’s possible
   organizational standing and its third-party standing.          We start with a
   discussion of organizational standing.
          We examine standing de novo. United States v. $500,000.00 in U.S.
   Currency, 591 F.3d 402, 404 (5th Cir. 2009). Associational standing is
   derivative of an organization’s members. OCA-Greater Houston v. Texas, 867
   F.3d 604, 610 (5th Cir. 2017). Because Vote.org is a non-membership
   organization, it can assert only organizational standing. The requirements
   for organizational standing mirror those for individual plaintiffs. Association

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   of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1999). An
   organization must demonstrate that (1) it suffered an injury in fact; (2) the
   injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3)
   it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
   by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–
   61 (1992) (citation omitted).
          We first review whether Vote.org satisfies each of those requirements
   for organizational standing in a general sense, i.e., without analyzing whether
   it has standing to bring this suit under Section 1983. That analysis will
   determine whether Vote.org has suffered an injury to itself that would be
   redressed if the suit were successful. We then analyze third-party standing
   to see if Vote.org can sue on behalf of prospective voters. Finally, we analyze
   whether Vote.org can bring its claims via Section 1983.
                 a.      Injury in fact
          Organizations can satisfy injury-in-fact for standing under two
   theories: associational standing and organizational standing. OCA-Greater
   Houston, 867 F.3d at 610. “An organization suffers an injury in fact if a
   defendant’s actions ‘perceptibly impair[]’ the organization’s activities and
   consequently drain the organization’s resources.” El Paso Cnty. v. Trump,
   982 F.3d 332, 343 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
   455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)). A “setback to [an] organization’s abstract social
   interests” is insufficient. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379. “[A]n organization may
   establish injury in fact by showing that it had diverted significant resources to
   counteract the defendant’s conduct.” N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Kyle, 626 F.3d
   233, 238 (5th Cir. 2010).
          Vote.org contends that, as a result of the Wet Signature Rule, it is no
   longer able to make use of its app and “has been diverting its limited
   resources to less effective (and less efficient) means of increasing turnout and

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   political engagement.” Vote.org’s CEO testified that the Wet Signature
   Rule caused it to shut down its app and impaired the organization’s “ability
   to reach voters” and “to get people . . . to participate in elections.”
   Moreover, because of the shutdown and concomitant drain on resources,
   Vote.org was “not [] able to do some of [the] innovative work” it pursues in
   other states, such as programs at historically black colleges and universities,
   other college programs, youth influencer programs, corporate organizing
   activities, and advocating for election day as a holiday. Indeed, Vote.org’s
   CEO testified that the Wet Signature Rule took up significant staff time and
   resources across its engineering, partnership, and operations teams that
   could have been spent on other efforts. Vote.org contends this is enough to
   prove it has suffered an injury in fact.
          Texas argues that organizational standing cannot be premised on
   “routine” responses to allegedly unlawful conduct. That concept originated
   in City of Kyle. There, we concluded that plaintiff home-builders associations
   had not shown how their response to certain ordinances “differ from [the
   home building associations’] routine lobbying activities.” Id. at 238. We did
   not hold that resources spent on routine activities were necessarily irrelevant
   to the existence of standing, and our ultimate holding did not rely on that
   consideration. We held that plaintiffs lacked standing after faulting them for
   merely “conjectur[ing] that the resources that the HBA had devoted to the
   revised ordinances could have been spent on other unspecified HBA
   activities.” Id. at 239.
          Texas also relies on a precedent in which a community organization
   sought standing to challenge federal expenditures on a border wall. El Paso
   Cnty., 982 F.3d at 336–37, 344. We found that record to be unclear as to
   whether    the    community      organization’s    responses   to   border-wall
   construction “fall within the general ambit of its normal operations.” Id. at
   344. The organization’s lack of standing was also based on its inability to

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   establish traceability and its reliance on a “single vague, conclusory assertion
   that the organization had to divert resources.” Id.
          The evidence here on diversion of resources is more detailed than in
   either City of Kyle or El Paso County. Vote.org has presented more than
   conjecture or a “conclusory assertion.” It has provided substantial evidence
   that, because of the requirement for original signatures, it had to expend
   additional time beyond the routine activities of multiple departments and
   divert resources away from “particular projects.” El Paso Cnty., 982 F.3d at
   344. That diversion “perceptibly impaired” Vote.org’s ability to pursue its
   mission. Havens, 455 U.S. at 379.
                  b.      Traceability
          “An organization cannot obtain standing to sue in its own right as a
   result of self-inflicted injuries, i.e., those that are not ‘fairly traceable to the
   actions of the defendant.’” Association of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v.
   Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 358 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
   154, 162 (1997)). If an organizational plaintiff is asserting an injury caused by
   a need to divert its resources and actions, it must show that the change
   “result[ed] from counteracting the effects of the defendant’s actions.”
   Louisiana ACORN Fair Hous. v. LeBlanc, 211 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2000).
   Any diversion must be a specific response to the challenged law or action. It
   is not fairly traceable to defendants if the diversion responded not only to the
   defendants’ conduct but also to other forces. Texas State LULAC v. Elfant,
   52 F.4th 248, 254 (5th Cir. 2022).
          Vote.org’s injury includes the continuing bar to the use of its app. The
   shutdown of the app was a “direct result of the challenged law.” Id. at 254.
   As the Secretary’s Rule 30(b)(6) designee explained, the “particular
   genesis” of the Wet Signature Rule was Vote.org’s app. Moreover, several
   county registrars testified they would accept applications using Vote.org’s

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   app if not for the Wet Signature Rule. It is the shutdown of the app, of course,
   that produced the diversion of resources described earlier.
          Vote.org has met the traceability requirement.          Texas does not
   challenge the redressability element of standing.             Regardless, that
   requirement is plainly met. Relief from the requirement of original signatures
   on voter registration forms would allow Vote.org to offer its application again.
          We thus conclude that Vote.org has organizational standing to seek
   redress for its own alleged injuries.
                 c.       Third-party standing
          Even though we hold that Vote.org has a traceable injury redressable
   in litigation, its complaint asserts that the Wet Signature Rule violates the
   federal statutory and constitutional rights of voters.
          Certainly, Vote.org itself is not a Texas voter. A party ordinarily may
   assert only “his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
   relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth v. Seldin, 422
   U.S. 490, 499 (1975). This is a prudential rule, though, not a constitutional
   one. In re Deepwater Horizon, 857 F.3d 246, 252 (5th Cir. 2017). We examine
   the possibility of third-party standing to assert claims of voters.
                          1.    Sufficiency of relationship between Vote.org and
                                voters
          Vote.org sued under Section 1983 because of alleged violations of
   voters’ rights under the Constitution and Section 10101. A necessary
   premise for the following analysis is that voters themselves have a right to
   bring such a suit. We will consider the validity of that premise later.
          Third-party standing often turns on “categorized relationships” —
   e.g., vendor-vendee, doctor-patient, employer-employee. 13A WRIGHT &
   MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.9.3 (3d ed. 2022).

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   Such standing “has become firmly established with respect to a number of
   easily categorized relationships. Vendors are routinely accorded standing to
   assert the constitutional rights of customers and prospective customers.” Id.
   This treatise reached that conclusion after discussing a Supreme Court
   opinion invalidating a state law prohibiting beer vendors from selling to
   females under the age of 18 or to males under the age of 21. Id. (discussing
   Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976)). The initially underage plaintiffs
   aged out before the Supreme Court considered the appeal, but the Court
   allowed the case to proceed because the plaintiff beer vendor could
   reasonably assert the claims of prospective beer purchasers, as well as its own
   claims. Craig, 429 U.S. at 195. “[V]endors and those in like positions have
   been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their operations by
   acting as advocates for the rights of third parties who seek access to their
   market or function.” WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 3531.9.3
   (quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted); see also Maryland Shall
   Issue, Inc. v. Hogan, 971 F.3d 199, 216 (4th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases).
          We end where we began.          Third-party standing is a prudential
   consideration. Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.
   947, 956 (1984).     Judicial self-restraint is warranted to avoid making
   “unnecessary pronouncement[s] on constitutional issues” and “premature
   interpretations of statues.” Id. at 955 (citation omitted). On the other hand,
   where a party can ensure that “issues . . . will be concrete and sharply
   presented,” prudential concerns are less salient.          Id.     On these facts,
   Vote.org’s position as a vendor and voting rights organization is sufficient to
   confer third-party standing.
          To complete our multi-part examination of standing, we analyze
   whether Vote.org, as a non-voter asserting violations of voting rights, has a
   claim under Section 1983.

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                        2.      Third-party claims via Section 1983
          Section 1983 specifies that those acting under color of state law who
   subject “any citizen of the United States or other person within the
   jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
   secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.”
   42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). The claim here is that voters have been
   deprived of their rights under the Constitution and Section 10101, and that
   Vote.org itself has been injured.
          Texas asserts that Section 1983’s reference to “party injured”
   encompasses only the party “depriv[ed]” of its rights, not someone seeking
   to vindicate another’s rights. Section 1983 plaintiffs, though, often have been
   allowed to vindicate the rights of others. We offer a few examples. A
   bookseller was allowed to vindicate the First Amendment rights of book
   buyers under Section 1983. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S.
   383, 392–93 (1988). In Craig, a vendor invoked Section 1983 to assert the
   Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights of its customers. 429 U.S.
   at 195; see Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 1975), rev’d
   sub nom. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (confirming Craig was a 1983 action).
   Finally, this court permitted a Section 1983 suit for a business that was
   asserting the First Amendment rights of its employees and customers. Hang
   On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1251–52 (5th Cir. 1995).
          Section 1983 is an appropriate vehicle for third-party claims.
          II.    Voting Rights Section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Section 1983
          The parties dispute whether Section 10101 creates a private right of
   action. They also dispute whether, even if a private right of action were cre-
   ated, it could be enforced using Section 1983. We discuss both disputes.

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                   a.       Private right enforceable under Section 1983
           The section on voting in the 1964 Civil Rights Act 2 established what
   is often called the Materiality Provision. That provision prohibits denying
   the right to vote because of minor errors or omissions:
           No person acting under color of law shall . . . deny the right of
           any individual to vote in any election because of an error or
           omission on any record or paper relating to any application,
           registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or
           omission is not material in determining whether such
           individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election.
   52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B).            Section 10101 does not explicitly grant
   individuals the right to bring suit. The only explicit right to sue is the one
   granted to the Attorney General. § 10101(c).
           A private cause of action may still be implied when a statute (1)
   contains rights-creating language and (2) displays “an intent to create a
   private remedy.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002); Alexander
   v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). If “a plaintiff demonstrates that a
   statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by
   § 1983.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284.
                            1.      Rights-creating language
           The first requirement is met when “the provision in question is
   phrased in terms of the persons benefitted” or has “an unmistakable focus
   on the benefited class.” Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599

           _____________________
           2
              The more detailed and significant contemporaneous legislation on voting was the
   1965 Voting Rights Act. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). It is not involved in this
   litigation except to the extent of our relying by analogy on caselaw under that Act.

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   U.S. 166, 183 (2023) (quotation marks and citation omitted). There is strong
   “rights-creating” language in the first section of the statute:
          All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by
          law . . . , shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such
          elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous
          condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or
          regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under its
          authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.
   52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(1). That statutory language has existed since 1870; it
   was the entirety of the section until the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Act of May
   31, 1870, ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat. 140; see Historical and Statutory Notes,
   Codifications, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (2012), at 145 (now 52 U.S.C.§ 10101).
          Several courts held there was a private right under the original section,
   though they were not using the much later Gonzaga test. Indeed, “from the
   enactment of § 1983 in 1871 until 1957, plaintiffs could and did enforce the
   provisions of § 1971 [now, § 10101] under § 1983.” Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d
   1284, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). One example of a suit brought
   by private plaintiffs under the pre-1957 statute concerned the refusal of local
   officials to allow a black man to vote. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
   650–51 (1944). The plaintiff claimed that actions of local officials “violate
   Sections 31 and 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code,” id., which are now
   Section 10101 and Section 1983. Two other examples are from this court. In
   each, we held that a private party had a right to seek relief when the original
   1870 language was the entirety of the statute. See Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d
   930, 931, 934 (5th Cir. 1958) (alleged violations occurred in 1956, before the
   1957 amendment); Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1946) (private
   suit allowed).
          In 1964, Congress added the Materiality Provision to what is now
   Section 10101. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78 Stat.

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   241. That amendment added language that also is written in terms of rights:
   “No person acting under color of law shall . . . deny the right of any individual
   to vote in any election because of an error or omission,” etc. 52 U.S.C.
   § 10101(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).                The new provision, subsection
   (a)(2)(B), identifies a specific means of denying the rights described in
   subsection (a)(1). We do not see that the focus on rights of Section 10101(a)
   is distorted by the enactment of a specific prohibition.
           The phrasing of the Materiality Provision is similar to language the
   Court has held to confer a private right.3 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 & n.3.
   Moreover, the Materiality Provision neither has an “aggregate focus” nor
   does it “speak only in terms of institutional policy and practice.” Id. at 288.
   It is true that the subject of the Materiality Provision is the regulating official
   — “no person acting under color of law,” 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B) — not
   the person regulated by state law. The Supreme Court recently stated,
   though, that “it would be strange to hold that a statutory provision fails to
   secure rights simply because it considers, alongside the rights bearers, the
   actors that might threaten those rights (and we have never so held).”
   Talevski, 599 U.S. at 185. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that, although
   “[t]he subject of the sentence is the person acting under color of state
   law, . . . the focus of the text is nonetheless the protection of each individual’s
   right to vote.”       Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1296.             Further, the Materiality

           _____________________
           3
               For example, the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act provides that “nursing
   facilit[ies]” must “protect and promote” residents’ “right to be free from . . . any physical
   or chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience and not required
   to treat the resident’s medical symptoms.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii). It also requires
   “nursing facilit[ies]” to “not transfer or discharge [a] resident” unless certain enumerated
   preconditions are met. § 1396(c)(2)(A). The Supreme Court recently held that these
   provisions confer a private right. Talevski, 599 U.S. at 184–86.

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   Provision’s language is decidedly more rights-focused than language the
   Court has held not to confer a private right. 4
           We conclude that Sections 10101(a)(1) and 10101(a)(2)(B) both confer
   an individual right.
                            2.      Congressional intent to create a private remedy
           “Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual
   right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S.
   at 284. Nonetheless, even when “a statutory provision unambiguously
   secures rights, a defendant ‘may defeat t[he] presumption by demonstrating
   that Congress did not intend’ that § 1983 be available to enforce those
   rights.” Talevski, 599 U.S. at 186 (quoting Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,
   544 U.S. 113, 120 (2005) (alterations omitted)). Different phrasing appears
   in Gonzaga: rebutting the presumption requires “showing that Congress
   specifically foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284
   n.4 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
           In looking for rebuttal evidence, we explore a little more statutory
   history.    In 1957, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act, granting
   enforcement power to the Attorney General of the United States. Civil
   Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131, 71 Stat. 634, 637 (1957). The

           _____________________
           4
             The Supreme Court held there was no private right in the Family Educations
   Rights and Privacy Act, which provides: “No funds shall be made available under any
   applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice
   of permitting the release of education records . . . of students without the written consent
   of their parents to any individual, agency, or organization.” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 279
   (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)).
            The Supreme Court also held Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act contained no
   rights-creating language because the statute “focuses neither on the individuals protected
   nor even on the funding recipients being regulated, but on the agencies that will do the
   regulating.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289.

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   amendment’s text does not mention private actions. The argument is that
   by explicitly granting authority to the Attorney General to enforce the Act,
   private rights were implicitly withdrawn. We will examine the validity of that
   argument after explaining a few more details.
          The 1957 amendment also added what is now 52 U.S.C. § 10101(d),
   which provides that all actions brought “pursuant to this section” can be
   exercised “without regard to whether the party aggrieved shall have
   exhausted administrative or other remedies that may be provided by law.”
   Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131(d), 71 Stat. 637. Critically
   in our analysis of whether granting enforcement authority had the effect of
   cancelling the private remedy, the “party aggrieved” reference is unlikely to
   refer to the Attorney General. The House Report on the 1957 Act cites and
   discusses court opinions in which exhaustion of remedies had been required
   for private plaintiffs. H.R. Rep. No. 85-291 (1957), 10–11, reprinted in 11984
   U.S. CONG. SERIAL SET (1957). The Eleventh Circuit found it to be illogical
   for Congress to have eliminated exhaustion requirements for private
   plaintiffs unless there were a corresponding private right. Schwier, 340 F.3d
   at 1296. We interpret these 1957 amendments as augmenting the implied but
   established private right to sue with an explicit right in the Attorney General.
          We find no explicit foreclosure of a remedy under Section 1983. To
   avoid recognition of a private right, the “defendant must show that Congress
   issued the same command implicitly, by creating ‘a comprehensive
   enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under
   § 1983.’” Talevski, 599 U.S. at 186 (quoting Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at
   120)). Thus, we examine the enforcement scheme.
          Several subsections of the statute detail the Attorney General’s
   authority. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(c)–(e). These elaborate statutory explanations
   of how enforcement by the Attorney General is to proceed certainly seem to

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   us to qualify as a “comprehensive scheme.”                  Regardless of how
   comprehensive it is, though, use of Section 1983 is foreclosed only when the
   scheme is “incompatible” or “inconsistent” with Section 1983 enforcement.
   Talevski, 599 U.S. at 187. Of course, the first part of what is now Section
   10101 was routinely enforced through Section 1983. See Schwier, 340 F.3d at
   1295. That means there is a long history of compatibility between at least parts
   of Section 10101 and Section 1983 that predates the addition of the Attorney
   General enforcement in 1957.        The details of the Attorney General’s
   enforcement scheme create no conflicts with private suits under Section
   1983.
           Besides an incompatible enforcement regime, the Court has also
   explained that “the existence of a more restrictive private remedy for
   statutory violations” than what Section 1983 allows creates “the dividing line
   between those cases in which we have held that an action would lie under
   §1983 and those in which we have held that it would not.” Rancho Palos
   Verdes, 544 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added). Section 10101 lacks any specific
   “private judicial right of action” or “private federal administrative remedy”
   that requires plaintiffs to comply with particular procedures. Talevski, 599
   U.S. at 190. Thus, this exception to using Section 1983 is inapplicable.
           With our review of the Supreme Court’s relevant guidance behind us,
   we examine what other circuits have determined. Two circuits have held that
   the Materiality Provision creates a private right enforceable under Section
   1983. See Migliori v. Cohen, 36 F.4th 153, 159 (3d Cir. 2022), cert. granted,
   judgment vacated sub nom. Ritter v. Migliori, 143 S. Ct. 297 (2022); Schwier,
   340 F.3d at 1297. A third held that the Materiality Provision “is enforceable
   by the Attorney General, not private citizens.” McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d
   752, 756 (6th Cir. 2000). We find no other circuit court to have addressed
   the issue. We will discuss all three opinions.

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           We have discussed Schwier to some extent already. 5 The components
   of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis included reliance on the caselaw allowing
   private suits under the pre-1957 version of this statute. Schwier, 340 F.3d at
   1295. The court held that exhaustion of remedies would be irrelevant to
   Attorney General enforcement of the statute, yet the same amendment that
   added Attorney General enforcement to a statute that had for decades been
   used by private plaintiffs also made clear exhaustion was not required;
   exhaustion is irrelevant except as to private suits. Id. at 1296. That analysis
   is sound.
           Undermined by later caselaw is the Schnier’s reliance on Allen v. State
   Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Id. at 1294–95. Allen involved
   whether there was a private cause of action under Section 5 of the 1965 Voting
   Rights Act. Allen, 393 U.S. at 548. That section limited the right of States to
   change voting prerequisites. Id. The Court in Allen “reasoned that the goals
   of the statute were much more likely to be reached if private citizens were not
   ‘required to depend solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of the
   Attorney General.’” Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1294–95 (quoting Allen, 393 U.S.
   at 556).
           Almost five decades after Allen and one decade after Schwier, the
   Supreme Court declared that Allen and precedents like it too readily implied
   a cause of action in statutes and had largely lost their force because “the
   Court adopted a far more cautious course.” Ziglar v. Abassi, 582 U.S. 120,

           _____________________
           5
              In its first opinion, the Eleventh Circuit provided extensive analysis for its
   conclusion that there was a private right, then remanded to the district court for further
   proceedings because the district court had gone no further than holding there was no
   private right. Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1297. When the case returned to the circuit court, it said
   it would “affirm the district court’s judgment for the reasons stated in the district court’s
   memorandum opinion.” Schwier v. Cox, 439 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
   Schwier v. Cox, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (N.D. Ga. 2005)).

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   132 (2017). Instead, the key was whether there was congressional intent to
   create a private right. Id. at 133 (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286).
          Regardless of the reliance on Allen, the Schwier court properly applied
   Sandoval and Gonzaga and identified the rights-creating language in what are
   now Sections 10101(a)(1) and (a)(2)(B). Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1296. The
   rights created “are specific and not amorphous,” i.e., they protect the right
   to vote when some immaterial information is not provided. Id. at 1296–97.
   The language of the Materiality Provision is also mandatory: “No person
   acting under color of law shall . . . deny the right of any individual to vote.”
   Id. (quoting what is now Section 10101(a)(2)(B)). Those points, plus the
   reference to not needing to exhaust administrative remedies in the same
   amendment that added Attorney General enforcement powers, make a
   strong case for finding congressional intent to allow a private remedy.
          The Third Circuit also held that the Materiality Provision created a
   private right presumably enforceable under Section 1983. See Migliori, 36
   F.4th at 159. 6 “To rebut the presumption, a defendant must point to either
   specific evidence from the statute itself or a comprehensive enforcement
   scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.” Id.
   at 160 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The court found no evidence
   in the text of the statute to rebut the presumption nor a “comprehensive
   enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under
   § 1983.” Id. We agree with those conclusions.
          The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit court to analyze whether there
   was a private right under the Materiality Provision, and it held there was not.
   See McKay, 226 F.3d at 756. This is the entirety of that court’s analysis:

          _____________________
          6
             The Supreme Court vacated Migliori and remanded to the Third Circuit with
   instructions to dismiss the case as moot. Migliori, 143 S. Ct. at 297–98.

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          The district court correctly dismissed this claim for lack of
          standing. Section 1971 is enforceable by the Attorney General,
          not by private citizens. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c); Willing v. Lake
          Orion Community Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 924 F. Supp. 815, 820
          (E.D. Mich. 1996).
   Id.
          Obviously, the Sixth Circuit considered the silence in the statutory
   language and the analysis of the cited district court to be sufficient. The cited
   district court opinion said little more than the Sixth Circuit did: “Section
   1971 is intended to prevent racial discrimination at the polls and is
   enforceable by the Attorney General, not by private citizens.” Willing, 924
   F. Supp. at 820. In addition to the statutory language, the Willing court cited
   Good v. Roy, 459 F. Supp. 403, 405 (D. Kan. 1978). Id. That case was not
   even about the Materiality Provision, but it did refer to the statutory language
   that Section 1971 was to be enforced by the Attorney General. Good, 459 F.
   Supp. at 405. Neither the Sixth Circuit nor these two district courts wrestled
   with the considerations for implying a private right. Moreover, McKay
   predates the 2001 Sandoval opinion and the 2002 Gonzaga opinion.
          We conclude that private enforcement via Section 1983 does not
   thwart Congress’s enforcement scheme. Vote.org can seek a remedy for
   Section 10101 violations by way of Section 1983.
          Finally — does Vote.org’s claim have merit?
          III.   Merits of the Materiality Provision claim
          Though we earlier quoted the Materiality Provision, we quote again
   for ready reference:
          No person acting under color of law shall . . .
                 deny the right of any individual to vote in any election
                 because of an error or omission on any record or paper

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                 relating to any application, registration, or other act
                 requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not
                 material in determining whether such individual is
                 qualified under State law to vote in such election.
   52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B).
          We need to interpret that provision. Statutory definitions often get us
   started. We have no such assistance, though, as the core term of “material”
   is not defined. The most-used legal dictionary gives this definition: “Of such
   a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person’s decision-making:
   significant; essential.” Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
   A more comprehensive dictionary has this definition: “Of serious or
   substantial import; significant, important, of consequence.”           Material,
   OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, III.6.a. (July 2023). We reject “essential”
   as a reasonable meaning, but the rest of the variations seem about right.
          There is not much caselaw applying this provision. To some degree,
   then, we must set our own course. Should a district court, with some level of
   deferential review on appeal, decide as a de novo factual, legal, or mixed legal-
   factual question, whether a particular statutory provision is material in
   determining if a person is qualified to vote? Or, is some weight given to
   legislative judgment, which is not controlling perhaps but at least meaningful
   to some degree?
          There is a constitutional challenge as well, for which considerable
   Supreme Court guidance exists. We will get to that.
          The Section 10101(a)(2)(B) claim in this suit challenges a legislative
   judgment on the appropriate procedures for registering voters. A vendor
   wishing to facilitate voter registration contests a statutory requirement for an
   applicant’s signature that the vendor’s smartphone application cannot
   satisfy. Usually, a legislature would not need to revise statutes to allow a

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   private party to operate its business. Build a better app, the State might insist.
   Still, the Materiality Provision mandates that an error or omission in a
   requisite for voting be material before the requirement can be enforced.
   Here, if an application received by a registrar is to be rejected, even when the
   reasons for the error or omission are limitations in Vote.org’s app, we accept
   (in the absence of any contrary argument) that materiality must be shown.
          We will proceed in the following order. First, we consider the limited
   caselaw from other circuit courts. Second, we analyze whether some weight
   should be given to Texas’s legislative judgment as to the utility of the
   contested provision. Third, we explore in some depth a factor that the
   Supreme Court has identified as relevant in voting rights claims. Finally, we
   pull those strands together as we determine the merits of the claim here.
                  a.       Other circuits’ interpretations
          We again review the few circuit court opinions that analyze the
   Materiality Provision. We already discussed those opinions insofar as they
   addressed whether the statutory language created a private right enforceable
   through Section 1983. We return to the two opinions that found a private
   right and review their analysis of materiality.
           The Eleventh Circuit’s 2006 opinion considered whether it was
   permissible for Georgia to require registrants to provide a Social Security
   number. Schwier, 439 F.3d at 1286. The circuit court affirmed for the reasons
   the district court had stated in its opinion. Id. We therefore review the
   district court’s analysis.
          One issue, not present in our dispute, was the effect of the Privacy
   Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, on requiring Social Security numbers. Schwier v. Cox,
   412 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1276 (N.D. Ga. 2005), aff’d, 439 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.
   2006). The district court found that requiring this unique number could help
   “prevent voter fraud,” but concluded that the Privacy Act nevertheless

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   proscribed its necessity. Id. As to our issue of materiality, the court held that
   having a Social Security number was not one of the qualifications for a voter
   under Georgia law, and that meant requiring its disclosures to vote could not
   be material when determining whether an applicant was qualified. Id.
           We do not find Schwier directly applicable. Georgia was insisting on a
   manner of voter identification that added to the statutory qualifications for
   voting, namely, that a voter have a Social Security number.
           Much more recently, the Third Circuit in 2022 evaluated whether a
   Pennsylvania law requiring a voter to write a “date on the outside of a mail-
   in ballot . . . is material to the voter’s qualifications and eligibility to vote.”
   Migliori, 36 F.4th at 156. 7 As with any out-of-circuit precedent, we consider
   the opinion’s persuasiveness. We do that here even though the Supreme
   Court vacated the opinion. Migliori, 143 S. Ct. at 298. For mail-in voting in
   Pennsylvania, a prospective voter was sent a ballot and a return envelope; a
   declaration was printed on the envelope that was to be signed and dated. Id.
   at 157. The envelopes containing the contested ballots were not dated. Id.
   The court began its analysis by looking to Pennsylvania’s substantive voting
   requirements, including age and residency. Id. at 162–63. The State argued,
   in part, that dating the envelope helped to deter fraud. Id. at 163. The court

           _____________________
           7
              We earlier explained that a majority of the Supreme Court vacated Migliori
   because it held that the case was moot. See supra note 6. One explanation for mootness is
   that after the Third Circuit ordered that the disputed ballots be counted, “the election was
   certified. Then, essentially because plaintiffs had won, the Supreme Court vacated the
   Third Circuit’s decision.” David Herman, Reviving the Prophylactic VRA: Section 3,
   Purcell, and the New Vote Denial, 132 YALE L.J. 1462, 1478 n.91 (2023).
           Justice Alito, writing for three dissenting justices, concluded the Third Circuit’s
   application of the Materiality Provision was “very likely wrong.” Ritter v. Migliori, 142 S.
   Ct. 1824, 1824 (2022) (Alito, J., dissenting). We find Justice Alito’s analysis largely
   dependent on difficulties of applying the Materiality Provision to vote counting. That
   possibly overbroad application of the Materiality Provision is not involved here.

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   explained that “[f]raud deterrence and prevention are at best tangentially
   related to determining whether someone is qualified to vote.” Id. Moreover,
   “whatever sort of fraud deterrence or prevention this requirement may
   serve, it in no way helps the [State] determine whether a voter’s age,
   residence, citizenship, or felony status qualifies them to vote.” Id. The court
   ultimately concluded that the date requirement violated the Materiality
   Provision. Id. at 164.
          Of course, the only issue was whether a date on an envelope in which
   a ballot was returned to the proper officials was material to the qualifications
   to vote. None of the votes in dispute arrived after the election, id. at 157, so
   the date was not needed as evidence that the votes were timely cast.
          A signature was also required on the envelope, and that requirement
   was uncontested. The signature was to be next to a declaration on the
   envelope, which included “a statement of the elector’s qualifications,
   together with a statement that the elector has not already voted in the primary
   or election.” 25 Pa. Stat. § 3150.14(b). An original versus an alternative form
   of signature was also not in question.
          The immateriality of the omissions in those two decisions was fairly
   obvious. Overall, nothing in Schwier and Migliori causes us to question a
   State’s requiring a signature in some form on documents relating to voting.
   Indeed, the Texas requirement of a signature is not challenged in this case.
   Only its form is contested — original versus an alternative that would allow
   Vote.org to provide its services.
                 b.       Weight of legislative judgments in general
          For a successful claim of immateriality, the statutory text requires that
   the “error or omission” — here, the absence of an original signature on a
   voter application — not be material in determining qualifications to vote.
   Some requirements for a voter application could easily be dismissed as

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                                    No. 22-50536

   immaterial, while others could as easily be upheld as material.            The
   requirement of an original signature is not in either category.
          Among the questions for us to answer is the weight that should be
   given to the State’s legislative judgment. This is not a constitutional claim
   necessitating the application of a balancing test that we will analyze later in
   addressing a First Amendment claim. We do draw from that caselaw,
   though, that States have considerable discretion in establishing rules for their
   own elections.     The Supreme Court recognizes a “general rule that
   evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the
   electoral process itself are not invidious” and may be upheld at least against
   a constitutional attack. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,
   189–90 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Crawford was a facial
   challenge to an Indiana statute requiring a prospective voter to present at the
   polls one of a wide range of photo identifications. Id. at 185. The plaintiffs
   alleged the measure was a “violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; that it
   is neither a necessary nor appropriate method of avoiding election fraud.”
   Id. at 187. The Court conceded that the requirement had sharply divided the
   Indiana legislature on a partisan basis, and whether this was “the most
   effective method of preventing election fraud may well be debatable.” Id. at
   196. What was not debatable was “the legitimacy or importance of the
   State’s interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters.” Id. The Court
   upheld the state measure without deciding what the most effective means to
   prevent fraud would be.
          Crawford is only the latest example in which the Court acknowledged
   the significance of a State’s authority to set its electoral rules and the
   considerable deference to be given to election procedures so long as they do
   not constitute invidious discrimination.        The Court has explained that
   “substantial regulation of elections” is necessary incident to a “fair and
   honest . . . democratic process[].” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788

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   (1983) (citation omitted). Consequently, “the state’s important regulatory
   interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
   restrictions.” Id. The Court has emphasized that when election regulations
   “impose[] only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,” “the State’s
   important regulatory interests” will usually “justify [those] restrictions.”
   Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quotation marks and citation
   omitted).     Indeed, a “State indisputably has a compelling interest in
   preserving the integrity of its election process.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S.
   1, 4 (2006) (citation omitted).
          We have had our own cases that, like Crawford, analyze a photo
   identification requirement for voters. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216
   (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Veasey involved claims brought both under the
   Constitution and under the following Voting Rights Act provision that
   invalidate rules denying or abridging the right to vote based on race:
          No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
          practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
          or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
          abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
          vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
          guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as
          provided in subsection (b).
   52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). The Veasey court found little guidance on how to
   analyze a claim that “the right to vote has been denied or abridged on account
   of race.” 830 F.3d at 244 (emphasis in original). We examined the Supreme
   Court’s factors that were first “enunciated by Congress to determine
   whether [a discriminatory] impact is a product of current or historical
   conditions of discrimination such that it violates Section 2.” Id. (citing
   Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44–45 (1986)). The Supreme Court quite
   recently reaffirmed the central role of the Gingles factors in disputes under

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   Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 17–19
   (2023).
             In considering this appeal, we also, like our court in Veasey, have found
   little guidance on analyzing the materiality of a requirement for registering to
   vote. Failing to register will deny a right to vote. The 1964 Materiality
   Provision for registration to vote only slightly predates the 1965 Voting
   Rights Act and can be considered a precursor in many respects. That makes
   the Supreme Court’s guidance on applying the Voting Rights Act of
   relevance to the earlier, quite narrow provision on voting.
             As we structure our own approach, we explain why the Materiality
   Provision — even though it was in the first section of the 1964 Civil Rights
   Act 8 — is not limited to claims that immaterial requirements for voter
   registration discriminate on the basis of race. The House Report on the Act
   stated that the provision was a response to practices in many states that
   treated blacks seeking to register to vote differently than whites. Civil Rights
   Act of 1963, H.R. Rep. No. 88-914 (Nov. 20, 1963), Part 2, at 5, reprinted in
   12544 U.S. CONG. SERIAL SET (1963). All three provisions that are now
   Sections 10101(a)(2)(A)–(C) were adopted to attack the problem.
   Subsection (A) requires any practice applied to one individual to be applied
   to all.       Subsection (C) prohibits literacy tests, which were applied to
   discriminate against Blacks. Together with the Materiality Provision of
   subsection (B), these three provisions were a formidable barrier to a
   continuation of discriminatory practices. Surely, Congress anticipated in
   1964 that usually the claim would be of racial discrimination. Thus, in
   deciding the proper considerations for a claim under the Materiality
             _____________________
             8
              The Materiality Provision was one of three subsections, all dealing with voting,
   comprising the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101, 78
   Stat. 241.

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   Provision, the existence of racial discrimination generally will be relevant
   though, in light of the text of the provision, not essential. The provision was
   written in a somewhat over-inclusive form to capture well-disguised
   discrimination. We later discuss Texas’s argument that, by not requiring
   proof of racial discrimination, the provision is unconstitutional.
          Now, back to Veasey. The two factors we selected there from Gingles
   were the ones uniquely relevant to examining claims of vote denial. Veasey,
   830 F.3d at 244. We distinguished vote denial claims from those of vote
   dilution, the latter often seen in legislative redistricting cases where the
   Gingles factors are applied in full. Id. If the claim is that the right to vote has
   been denied or abridged on account of race, these factors are relevant:
          [1] [T]he challenged standard, practice, or procedure must
          impose a discriminatory burden on members of a protected
          class, meaning that members of the protected class have less
          opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate
          in the political process and to elect representatives of their
          choice, [and]
          [2] [T]hat burden must in part be caused by or linked to social
          and historical conditions that have or currently produce
          discrimination against members of the protected class.
   Id. (alterations in original) (quoting League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North
   Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th Cir. 2014)).
          Those two factors, though not focused on the significance of a voting
   requirement, could also be relevant to a Materiality Provision claim when
   racial discriminatory effects are alleged. Vote.org’s brief argued that the
   challenge of providing an original signature is “particularly acute for young
   adults, low-income voters, and minorities.” We find insufficient evidence or
   argument, though, to conclude that Vote.org has claimed racial
   discrimination. Indeed, the State argues that Vote.org’s claims fail because

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   they are not about racial discrimination. We explain later that the Materiality
   Provision does not require proof of racial discrimination. We similarly reject
   that Vote.org’s claims are for racial discrimination. Perhaps, though, Gingles
   has useful guidance for a claim that a particular “application, registration, or
   other act requisite to voting” is material. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B).
          Of the other seven Gingles factors, we find one that is directly
   applicable in analyzing a State’s justifications for the materiality of a practice:
   “whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such
   voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure
   is tenuous.” Veasey, 830 F.3d at 246 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37).
   “Tenuous” suggests an absence of a strong connection between the policy
   and the requirement. See id. at 262. Thus, if the policy or justification for
   the requirement is merely tenuous, that is a factor in favor of invalidating the
   requirement. On the other hand, how does a connection that is more than
   tenuous affect our analysis? We explore tenuousness next.
                  c.       Tenuousness
          To understand the factor of tenuous connections, we examine one of
   our opinions from two decades before Veasey. The discussion was in a case
   about Texas’s long-time practice of electing judges county-wide. See League
   of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993). All
   voters in a populous county would elect numerous judges to serve on the
   same local court with county-wide jurisdiction, but the plaintiffs sought to
   have elections from smaller, single-judge districts. Id. at 837–38. The
   Supreme Court had reversed and remanded our earlier decision that the
   Voting Rights Act did not even apply to judicial elections. See Houston
   Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Att’y Gen., 501 U.S. 419, 423–24, 428 (1991). Though the
   Act applied, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Texas had a legitimate
   interest in linking a judge’s jurisdiction to the same geographical area as the

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   one in which the judge’s voters resided. Id. at 426. Moreover, the “State’s
   justification for its electoral system is a proper factor for the courts to assess
   in a racial vote dilution inquiry, and the Fifth Circuit has expressly approved
   the use of this particular factor in the balance of considerations.” Id. at 426–
   27 (citing Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (1973), aff’d sub nom.
   East Carroll Par. Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976)).
           This cite to Zimmer is significant, for that is a source for the Gingles
   Court’s adoption of factors to consider in vote-dilution cases. Gingles, 478
   U.S. at 36 n.4. The “particular factor” cited with approval by the Houston
   Lawyers’ Court was whether the State’s policy behind a requirement was
   tenuous. Houston Lawyers’, 501 U.S. at 426–27. The Court remanded to us
   for further proceedings, making clear that the State’s justifications for
   maintaining a particular electoral scheme was only one factor to consider. Id.
           On remand, we discussed the consideration of the tenuousness of a
   State’s justifications in some detail. We concluded that, “while the Supreme
   Court rejected the contention that the linkage interest in all cases defeated
   liability under § 2,[9] the Court endorsed the position that the linkage interest
   is relevant to a determination of liability.” League of United Latin Am.
   Citizens, 999 F.2d at 870. By “linkage interest,” we were referring to the
   State’s interest in linking a judge’s jurisdiction to the same area as the judge’s
   electoral base. Id. at 869. We identified the issue for determination as
   deciding “when the linkage interest will outweigh other factors and defeat
   liability under § 2.” Id. at 870. Some of our analysis was specifically about
   the State’s interest in that linkage, which our court saw as far more than

           _____________________
           9
            Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is codified as 52 U.S.C. § 10301. It prohibits
   imposition of a “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting” that “results in a denial or
   abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color.” § 10301(a). “A violation
   of subsection (a) is established” under a “totality of the circumstances” test. § 10301(b).

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   tenuous. The policy has “additional and distinct relevance because it
   advances objectively substantive goals.” Id. Useful, more general analysis
   was also given.
          Our resolution of the issue included quoting the Supreme Court “that
   the linkage interest does not ‘automatically, and in every case, outweigh
   proof of racial vote dilution.’” Id. (quoting Houston Lawyers’, 501 U.S. at
   427). “We also reject[ed] the position of plaintiffs that the linkage interest
   can never defeat liability under the totality of circumstances if ‘illegal’
   dilution is otherwise established.” Id. More generally, “[t]he weight, as well
   as tenuousness, of the state’s interest is a legitimate factor in analyzing the
   totality of circumstances.” Id. at 871. Our reference to “totality” borrowed
   from Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Supreme Court’s holding
   that the State’s interest in a voting measure “is a legitimate factor to be
   considered by courts among the ‘totality of circumstances’ in determining
   whether a § 2 violation has occurred.” Houston Lawyers’, 501 U.S. at 426;
   52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). We also stated that “[t]he substantiality of the state’s
   interest has long been the centerpiece of the inquiry into the interpretation of
   the Civil War Amendments and their interplay with the civil rights statutes.”
   League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 871. As to the policy in that
   case, we held that the State’s interest in linking judges’ electoral districts to
   the geographical areas over which they had jurisdiction was substantial and
   overrode the evidence of some vote dilution. Id. at 876.
          The principles stated by our court that are relevant here were these:
          (1) “[T]he principal probative weight of a tenuous state policy is its
   propensity to show pretext.” Id. at 870 (quoting Terrazas v. Clements, 581 F.
   Supp. 1319, 1345 n. 24 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (three-judge court)).
          (2) “Proof of a merely non-tenuous state interest discounts one
   Zimmer factor, but cannot defeat liability.” Id. at 871.

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          (3) “[P]roof of a substantial state interest” may defeat liability even if
   some vote dilution results. Id.
          (4) “The issue of substantiality” of the State’s interest “is a legal
   determination.” Id.
          These opinions regarding election of judges were applying Section 2
   of the Voting Rights Act. That provision prohibits “denial or abridgement
   of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
   The Materiality Provision similarly prohibits denial of the right to vote due
   to an immaterial error or omission in some “act requisite to voting.”
   § 10101(a)(2)(B). Because the State’s justification for its practice is relevant
   even in a claim that a voting requirement has racially discriminatory effects
   and some weight is given to the State’s judgment so long as that policy is
   more than tenuous, we hold that similar considerations apply to the
   Materiality Provision.
          We thus need to examine the State’s policy and its connection to
   original signatures. We draw from our earlier discussion of Crawford. There
   we quoted the Supreme Court’s giving weight to the legislature’s judgment
   in creating “evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability
   of the electoral process.” Crawford, 553 U.S. 189–90 (quotation marks and
   citation omitted). “Evenhanded” is a synonym for nondiscriminatory. The
   Crawford Court upheld the State’s remedy to protect against voter fraud —
   photo identification — even though evidence of voter fraud was scant and
   the most effective means of combatting any fraud that existed was
   “debatable.” Id. at 195–96. Obviously, then, a State has considerable
   discretion in deciding what is an adequate level of effectiveness to serve its
   important interests in voter integrity. When we evaluate the materiality of a
   measure, we must give weight to the State’s justification for it.

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            Application of the tenuousness factor can be seen as involving two
   steps.    The first is determining if the connection between policy and
   requirement is only tenuous. If it is, then the factor supports invalidating the
   requirement. To avoid a finding of tenuousness, “there cannot be a total
   disconnect between the State’s announced interests and the statute
   enacted.” Veasey, 830 F.3d at 262. There must be some measure of “fit
   between the expressed policy and the provisions of the law.”                 Id.
   Tenuousness might be found, for example, where a law “fail[s] to correspond
   in any meaningful way to the legitimate interests the State claims to have been
   advancing.” Id. at 263. Indeed, there must be more than a “dubious
   connection between the State’s interests” and the challenged law. Id.
            The second step is taken if the connection between a measure relating
   to voting and its justification is more than tenuous. That does not mean the
   measure is upheld. Instead, under the totality of circumstances, we consider
   whether a provision meaningfully corresponds to “legitimate interests the
   State claims to have been advancing.”             Id.   By “meaningful” and
   “legitimate” we mean that the measure advances that interest without
   imposing pointless burdens. Specifically, we ask: (1) how substantial is the
   State’s interest in the “requisite to voting” in which some “error or
   omission” exists; (2) does that interest relate to “determining whether such
   individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election”; and (3) under
   the totality of the circumstances, what is the strength of the connection
   between the State’s interest and the measure, i.e., how well does the measure
   advance the interest? See 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). “The issue of
   substantiality” of the State’s interest “is a legal determination.” League of
   United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 871.

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                    d.       Materiality of an original signature
           With this caselaw in hand, we now analyze Texas’s arguments to
   overturn the district court’s holding that the absence of an original signature
   on a voter registration form was an immaterial omission.
           Texas’s first argument is that the Materiality Provision requires a
   showing of racial discrimination. To hold otherwise, Texas says, presents
   constitutional problems. We discussed earlier why the Materiality Provision
   was not written in terms of racial discrimination. 10 The key words and
   phrases are “error or omission,” “right of any individual to vote,” “on any
   record or paper,” “application, registration,” and “not material in
   determining whether such individual is qualified” to vote.                        52 U.S.C.
   § 10101(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). No suggestion of a requirement of racial
   discrimination exists in any of that language.
           Though it is clear that the target of the Materiality Provision was racial
   discrimination, the manner chosen to capture the hard-to-predict variations
   in “trivial reasons” was by broadly “prohibiting the disqualification of an
   individual because of immaterial errors or omissions.” Civil Rights Act of
   1963, H.R. Rep. No. 88-914 (1963), Part 1, at 19, reprinted in 12544 U.S.
   CONG. SERIAL SET (1963). Thus, the Materiality Provision is not textually
   limited to protecting only one race of voters in order to more effectively reach
   subtle forms of racial discrimination, i.e., requirements that are pretexts for
   racial discrimination.

           _____________________
           10
              Elsewhere in Section 10101, Congress did plainly express this need. Section
   10101(a)(1) provides that “[a]ll citizens . . . who are otherwise qualified by law to vote . . .
   shall be entitled and allowed to vote . . . without distinction of race.” 52 U.S.C.
   § 10101(a)(1). When Congress “includes particular language in one section of a statute but
   omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally.” Keene
   Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

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           This understanding of the broader language is expressed in one of the
   few scholarly articles on the Materiality Provision. Justin Levitt, Resolving
   Election Error: The Dynamic Assessment of Materiality, 54 WM. & MARY L.
   REV. 83 (2012). “Though the primary motivation for the sponsors of the
   materiality provision was clearly the confrontation of racial discrimination,
   Congress drafted the provision to embrace errors or omissions beyond those
   used to discriminate based on race.” Id. at 148. While “the text of most
   other sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ties the relevant right in
   question to racial discrimination,” id. at 149 & n.216, Congress did not place
   that limitation in the Materiality Provision.
           Though we find it reasonable that omitting any reference to racial
   discrimination in this provision made it more effective in combatting that
   scourge, there remains the issue of whether Congress had authority to
   legislate so broadly. Understanding the scope of the problem Congress
   sought to rectify, we must decide whether the Materiality Provision was a
   “congruen[t] and proportional[]” exercise of power under the Fourteenth
   and Fifteenth Amendments. 11 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
   (1997).
           “Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that
   proscribes facially constitutional conduct in order to prevent and deter
   unconstitutional conduct.” Nevada Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
   721–22 (2003). The Boerne Court quoted Justice Harlan’s 1970 conclusion
   that Congress may prohibit all literacy tests under the Fifteenth Amendment

           _____________________
           11
               The Supreme Court has not decided whether legislation enacted under the
   Fifteenth Amendment on voting rights must be “congruen[t] and proportional[]” or
   simply a “rational means” of executing a constitutional prohibition. Northwest Austin Mun.
   Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009). The Materiality Provision satisfies
   either test.

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   because they “unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application.”
   Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 216 (1970)
   (Harlan, J., concurring in part)). We apply that reasoning here to prohibit
   those acting under color of law from using immaterial omissions, which were
   historically used to prevent racial minorities from voting, from blocking any
   individual’s ability to vote — irrespective of racial animus. That prohibition
   is a congruent and proportional exercise of congressional power.
          Next, Texas argues that requiring an original signature does not “deny
   the right of any individual to vote,” quoting Section 10101(a)(2), because (1)
   the requirement is part of an expansion of registration methods; (2) rejected
   applicants are offered a chance to cure the deficiency; and (3) there are other
   registration methods apart from fax.
          We cannot agree that if the relevant restriction on voting is packaged
   with expansions, the restriction must be valid. Less clear is the effect of a
   simple means to cure. This court’s motions panel decided that because the
   absence of an original signature on the initial application still allows
   registration through alternative means, the requirement was not a denial of
   the right to vote. Vote.org, 39 F.4th at 306. We set aside that holding. It is
   true that the immaterial requirements some of the State’s voting registrars
   were using when this provision was adopted left no alternatives, from simple
   misspellings to requiring Black applicants to analyze long sections of the
   Constitution. See H.R. Rep. 88-914 (1963), Part 2, at 5. Our doubt about the
   efficacy of an ability to cure is that the need to cure an immaterial requirement
   creates a hurdle for — even if it is not itself a final denial of — the right to
   vote. That issue is left open for a later case. We do not rely today on the fact
   alternatives exist if the initial registration fails.
          The State also seemingly argues that any requirement in State law that
   is a prerequisite to voting is “material” because it is, by definition, a

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   component of someone’s qualifications to vote. The argument is that “in
   Texas, an individual is qualified to vote only if she is registered and to register
   via fax she must comply with the [W]et [S]ignature [R]ule.” Thus, Texas
   concludes, the Wet Signature requirement is “material” because without a
   wet signature, a “person is not qualified to vote under state law.”
          We reject that States may circumvent the Materiality Provision by
   defining all manner of requirements, no matter how trivial, as being a
   qualification to vote and therefore “material.” The Materiality Provision is
   a standard that a State’s voter registration requirements must satisfy. The
   central question here is whether an original signature is material to
   “determining whether such individual is qualified” to vote, giving weight to
   the State’s policy for the provision unless it is too tenuous.
          Now that we have rejected the arguments that would avoid actually
   analyzing the materiality of an original signature, we examine what Texas
   argues makes an original signature material.
          To restate, Section 10101(a)(2)(B) refers to matters that are material
   in deciding whether an “individual is qualified under State law to vote.”
   What makes an individual qualified to vote under Texas law? By statute,
   there are age, citizenship, residency, capacity, and criminal history
   qualifications. TEX. ELECT. CODE § 11.002. There are similar qualifications
   for eligibility to register. § 13.001. Undeniable, though, is a premise for all
   the statutory qualifications: Are the individuals who are trying to register
   actually who they say they are? Texas argues that requiring an original
   signature assists in meeting this voting qualification.
          Voter identification was the subject of the Supreme Court’s opinion
   we discussed earlier that approved Indiana’s photo identification law. See
   Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204. Even in our en banc Veasey opinion that invalidated
   a statutory requirement for voter identification, we found “[t]he State’s

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   stated purpose in passing [a voter-identification statute] centered on
   protection of the sanctity of voting, avoiding voter fraud, and promoting
   public confidence in the voting process. No one questions the legitimacy of
   these concerns as motives.” Veasey, 830 F.3d at 231. After remand and a
   revision in the law, we upheld the requirements. Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d
   792, 796, 802–03 (5th Cir. 2018).
          Voter integrity is the principal justification that Texas argues to
   support the requirement of an original signature. As a matter of law, we
   conclude that is a substantial interest. Is that substantial interest, though,
   more than tenuously connected to the requirement of an original signature?
          Texas says it is. It argues that an original signature helps assure that
   an applicant meets the substantive requirements to vote that are listed above
   where the signature is to be placed. The following statements appear directly
   above the signature block in the registration forms in this record:
          I understand that giving false information to procure a voter
          registration is perjury, and a crime under state and federal law.
          Conviction of this crime may result in imprisonment up to one
          year in jail, a fine up to $4,000, or both. Please read all three
          statements to affirm before signing.
          I am a resident of this county and a U.S. citizen;
          I have not been finally convicted of a felony, or if a felon, I have
          completed all of my punishment including any term of
          incarceration, parole, supervision, period of probation, or I
          have been pardoned; and
          I have not been determined by a final judgment of a court
          exercising probate jurisdiction to be totally mentally
          incapacitated or partially mentally incapacitated without the
          right to vote.
          Screenshots taken using Vote.org’s app reveal that users did not see
   those notices when they completed their applications. The first paragraph of

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   warnings concerning perjury, imprisonment, and fines is required by statute
   to appear on the application form. See TEX. ELECT. CODE § 13.122(a)(1),
   (13). The form also may contain any information “considered appropriate
   and required by the secretary of state.” § 13.122(a)(14). These statements
   affirm the substantive qualifications needed to vote under Texas law. See
   § 11.002.
          It is true that no statute requires those warnings to appear next to
   where a voter is to sign; distance between the two would potentially dilute
   the wet signature’s effectiveness.         One statute, though, requires the
   Secretary of State to “have the official application forms for registration by
   mail printed” and mandated that the Secretary would “furnish the forms
   without charge to each registrar.” § 13.121(c). A copy of that form was
   attached to Texas’s motion for summary judgment.             The space for a
   signature is in the same numbered block of the form as the warnings and
   directly below them. Even though the requirements that the form contain
   the warnings and that it be completed with an original signature are in
   different statutory sections, it is reasonable to assume the legislature knew
   the structure of the form when it decided in 2021 to require an original
   signature.
          We accept what Texas is arguing now, that a reasonable
   understanding of the legislative judgment is that physically signing the form
   with the warnings in front of the applicant, threatening penalties for perjury
   and stating the needed qualifications, has some prospect of getting the
   attention of many applicants and dissuading false statements that an
   electronic signature, without these warnings, does not. Even beyond the
   appearance of the printed warnings, Texas insists — echoing the motions
   panel — that applying an original signature to a voter registration form carries
   “solemn weight” that an imaged signature does not. Vote.org, 39 F.4th at

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   308. Texas is allowed to have doubts about technological substitutes, at least
   when those doubts fit within the strictures of the Materiality Provision.
          Signing an application is related to voting qualifications. The district
   court agreed: “Texas provides abundant evidentiary and legal support for the
   conclusion that a signature is important and vital to determine a voter’s
   qualification to vote.” Vote.org, 609 F. Supp. 3d at 529. The district court
   faulted Texas for “fail[ing] to show or explain why a wet signature is required
   in this instance to determine the registrant’s qualification to vote.” Id.
   (emphasis in original). Thus, the district court accepted the validity of
   requiring a signature, just not an original one when a registrant wanted to use
   Vote.org’s services.
          Vote.org makes several criticisms of the effectiveness of an original
   signature to deter fraud and of the consistency by which Texas imposes that
   requirement. For example, Vote.org insists that original signatures are, in
   practice, not used to verify anyone’s identity or to check for fraud. Vote.org
   also refers to evidence that some of the county defendants conceded that
   there is no practical difference between an original signature and an
   electronic one. Moreover, Vote.org highlights that Texas accepts digital
   signatures in other contexts, such as when individuals register to vote at the
   Department of Public Safety.
          Our resolution comes down to whether requiring an original signature
   meaningfully, even if quite imperfectly, corresponds to the substantial State
   interest in assuring that those applying to vote are who they say they are. Is
   there a strong enough connection to overcome the possible denial of
   registration to some applicants? We must give weight to a state legislature’s
   judgment when it has created “evenhanded restrictions that protect the
   integrity and reliability of the electoral process.” Crawford, 553 U.S. 189–90.
   Does giving weight to that judgment allow us to conclude that an original

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   signature is material to deciding the applicant’s identity — the most basic
   qualification to vote? Does it have “serious or substantial import”? Material,
   OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, III.6.a. Does requiring an applicant to
   provide an original signature on the form with the attendant warnings and
   explanations “affect a person’s decision-making”? Material, BLACK’S LAW
   DICTIONARY.
          We answer, first, that Texas’s interest in voter integrity is substantial.
   Second, that interest relates to the qualifications to vote — are the registrants
   who they claim to be? Finally, most voter registration forms likely are
   completed far from any government office or employee. That limits the
   methods of assuring the identity of the registrant. Though the effect on an
   applicant of seeing these explanations and warnings above the signature block
   may not be dramatic, Texas’s justification that an original signature advances
   voter integrity is legitimate, is far more than tenuous, and, under the totality
   of the circumstances, makes such a signature a material requirement.
          IV.    First Amendment claim
          Vote.org also brought a First Amendment claim. “Where a state
   election rule directly restricts or otherwise burdens an individual’s First
   Amendment rights, courts apply a balancing test derived from two Supreme
   Court decisions, Anderson [v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)], and Burdick
   v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).” Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382,
   387 (5th Cir. 2013). The Anderson-Burdick rule requires courts to weigh the
   “character and magnitude of the asserted injury” against the “precise
   interests put forward by the State,” “taking into consideration the extent to
   which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Id.
   (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434). If a “severe burden on First Amendment
   rights” is created, the state rule “must be narrowly drawn to advance a state
   interest of compelling importance. Lesser burdens, however, trigger less

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   exacting review, and a State’s important regulatory interests will usually be
   enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” Id. (quotation
   marks and citations omitted).
          The district court, focusing on the original signature requirement in
   isolation, found that it imposed a burden that is “more than slight.” Texas
   argues that looking at the Rule in a vacuum was error; instead, the court
   should have considered the panoply of registration options available to Texas
   voters. In one of our opinions, we evaluated Supreme Court precedents and
   explained that “the severity analysis is not limited to the impact that a law
   has on a small number of voters.” Richardson v. Tex. Sec’y of State, 978 F.3d
   220, 236 (5th Cir. 2020) (examining Crawford, 553 U.S. 181). Vote.org cites
   a Sixth Circuit case for the proposition that restrictions should be looked at
   only “from the perspective of [the] affected electors.” Mays v. LaRose, 951
   F.3d 775, 785 (6th Cir. 2020). Mays’s statement, however, was confined to
   laws that effect “disparate treatment” because they are facially
   discriminatory. Id. at 785. By contrast, the Wet Signature Rule here is
   generally applicable. Cf. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 207 (Scalia, J., concurring in
   the judgment) (“[A] generally applicable law with disparate impact is not
   unconstitutional.”).
          The original signature requirement, then, must be viewed in light of
   other available registration options, including submissions via Department of
   Public Safety, direct mail, personal delivery, and volunteer deputy registrars.
   TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 13.002(a), 13.031, 13.038, 13.041. Accounting for these
   other options, the burden imposed by the requirement is only “slight.”
   Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191.
          Texas argues that the requirement advances the State’s interest in
   multiple respects.     It guarantees that registrants attest to meeting the
   qualifications to vote and impresses upon registrants “the seriousness” of

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   registering. It also ensures security and reliability that a third-party app,
   Texas says, cannot provide.
          Texas’s interests in reliability and fraud deterrence are “legitimate.”
   Id. at 191, 196.   As described above, original signatures may dissuade
   improper individuals from registering.      Further, Texas may prefer the
   uniformity that original signatures provide, especially if that uniformity
   produces signatures that are “superior” and less prone to technical defects
   than those gathered by third-party apps. That Texas allows electronic
   submissions via the Department of Public Safety does not necessarily alter
   the calculus. Texas exerts more control over and may legitimately have more
   confidence in that department’s systems.
          Where the challenged law “imposes only a limited burden,” the
   constitutional inquiry grants state governments considerable leeway. See id.
   at 203. Texas’s interests in ensuring reliability and reducing fraud are
   “sufficiently weighty” to protect the Wet Signature Rule from constitutional
   attack. See id. at 190–91.
          We REVERSE and RENDER judgment for the defendants.

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   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
           I agree in large part with the majority opinion’s analysis. I agree with
   the panel majority that Vote.org has Article III standing; that it can privately
   enforce section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “Materiality
   Provision”), 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B); that a Materiality Provision claim
   does not require evidence of racial discrimination; that a chance to cure
   rejected applications does not render an immaterial provision material; and
   that a state may not circumvent the Materiality Provision by defining any
   trivial requirement as a “material” qualification to vote. But I cannot agree
   that Texas’s “wet signature” requirement 1—which Texas officials
   conceded serves “no practical purpose”—is “material in determining
   whether [a Texan] is qualified under [Texas] law to vote.” 52 U.S.C.
   § 10101(a)(2)(B). Because Texas’s wet-signature requirement violates the
   Materiality Provision, I must therefore respectfully dissent.
           The district court aptly described Vote.org’s mission and outreach
   activities as including: “(1) us[ing] technology to simplify political
   engagement, increase voter turnout, and strengthen American democracy;
   (2) work[ing] to support low-propensity voters, including racial and ethnic
   minorities and younger voters who tend to have lower voter-turnout rates;
   and (3) help[ing] Texans register to vote and verify registration status.”
   Vote.org’s app “is critical to ensure that voters with limited access to
           _____________________
           1
            Like the parties and the majority, I will refer to § 13.143(d-2) of the Texas Election
   Code as the “wet signature” requirement. Section 13.143(d-2) provides:
           For a registration application submitted by telephonic facsimile machine
           to be effective, a copy of the original registration application containing the
           voter’s original signature must be submitted by personal delivery or mail
           and be received by the registrar not later than the fourth business day after
           the transmission by telephonic facsimile machine is received.
   Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 13.143(d-2) (West 2023).

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   printers or mailing facilities, or who otherwise need assistance to register to
   vote, have meaningful opportunities to do so.” Complaint at 4, Vote.org v.
   Callanen, 609 F. Supp. 3d 515 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (No. 5:21-CV-649), ECF
   No. 1. Vote.org seeks to maximize registration of Americans eligible to vote,
   yet its effort to engage Americans in self-government faces legal hurdles
   around the country. See, e.g., Vote.org v. Ga. State Election Bd., No. 1:22-CV-
   01734-JPB, 2023 WL 2432011 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2023); Vote.org v. Byrd, No.
   4:23-cv-111-AW-MAF (N.D. Fla. June 13, 2023).
                                          I.
          The majority invokes a line of constitutional vote-denial cases,
   including Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), for
   the proposition that “[s]tates have considerable discretion in establishing
   rules for their own elections.” Op. 26-27 (citing Crawford, 553 U.S. 181;
   Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S.
   428 (1992)).    But we have previously recognized that Crawford “only
   considered a First and Fourteenth Amendment challenge, which involves a
   different analytical framework than what we use for [statutory] claims.”
   Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 249 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). And the
   Materiality Provision expressly limits states’ purported “considerable
   discretion”: States cannot “deny the right of any individual to vote in any
   election because of an [immaterial] error or omission on any record or paper
   relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting.” 52
   U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). The “considerable deference to be given to [state]
   election procedures” thus has no place in a materiality analysis. Op. 26.
          The majority likewise borrows the “tenuousness” factor from the
   multifactorial test in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)—which applies
   to section 2 claims under the Voting Rights Act—in its materiality analysis.
   The Gingles factors are “used to help determine whether there is a sufficient

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   causal link between the disparate burden imposed and social and historical
   conditions produced by discrimination.” Veasey, 830 F.3d at 245. Unlike a
   section 2 claim, though—as the majority recognizes—a Materiality Provision
   claim need not allege any evidence of discrimination. Op. 35-37. More
   importantly, nothing in the Materiality Provision’s text or existing case law
   requires plaintiffs to show a “disparate burden” on the right to vote; instead,
   plaintiffs need only demonstrate that the state’s procedural requirement “is
   not material in determining whether” they are “qualified” to vote. 52 U.S.C.
   § 10101(a)(2)(B). Accordingly, reliance on the Gingles factors is inapposite
   in the materiality context. Cf. Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1294 (11th Cir.
   2003) (explaining that the Materiality Provision “was intended to address
   the practice of requiring unnecessary information for voter registration with
   the intent that such requirements would increase the number of errors or
   omissions on the application forms, thus providing an excuse to disqualify
   potential voters”); Migliori v. Cohen, 36 F.4th 153, 163 (3d Cir.) (“Fraud
   deterrence and prevention are at best tangentially related to determining
   whether someone is qualified to vote. But whatever sort of fraud deterrence
   or prevention this requirement may serve, it in no way helps the [state]
   determine whether a voter’s age, residence, citizenship, or felony status
   qualifies them to vote.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ritter v.
   Migliori, 143 S. Ct. 297 (2022).
                                          II.
          The crux of the majority’s materiality analysis reduces to one
   sentence: “Texas says it is.” Op. 39. But even if we accept the majority’s
   importation of Crawford and Gingles into the materiality context, deference
   to Texas’s election procedures cannot save the wet-signature requirement.
   The majority characterizes the second step of the tenuousness analysis as
   requiring “that the measure advances [the state’s] interest without imposing

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   pointless burdens.” Op. 34. But as the district court carefully found,
   factually, the wet-signature requirement is undisputedly pointless.
          The district court found the following undisputed facts: County
   registrars admitted that “they do not use a wet signature at any time or with
   any form of voter registration submission to determine a voter’s qualification
   to vote.”     They “do not compare the telephonic-facsimile submitted
   signature against the wet signature, nor do they use either signature for
   identity verification purposes.” In fact, they typically destroy the original
   application once they have entered the applicant’s information into their
   computer system and saved an image of the signature.
          The district court found that when county officials “investigate
   reported or suspected voter fraud,” they use only “a scanned image of the
   registration signature[], not the original, wet signature.” Indeed, “[a]ny
   fraud investigation is conducted completely electronically” and “[a]t no time
   is an original, wet signature used.”
          Tellingly, officials conceded that there is no “difference in purpose or
   function between a ‘wet ink’ signature and an electronic or imaged
   signature.”    Texas has no problem accepting registration applicants’
   signatures in electronic form when completed at Texas Department of Public
   Safety offices. Nor does Texas object to the use of electronic signatures in
   contracts, advance health directives, divorce decrees, and real-property
   closings. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 322.007(d) (West 2023);
   Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 166.011 (West 2023); Bartee v.
   Bartee, No. 11-18-0017-CV, 2020 WL 524909, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 31,
   2020); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 12.0013 (West 2023). The record
   contains a simple explanation for Texas’s singular interest in a wet signature
   in the context of registration applications submitted by fax machine: Texas
   officials explicitly drafted § 13.143(d-2) to prevent the use of Vote.org’s e-

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   sign tool. Just like the states’ procedural requirements in Schwier and
   Migliori, the immateriality of Texas’s wet-signature requirement is “fairly
   obvious.” Op. 25.
          And there’s the rub: Although I suppose it might hypothetically be
   possible that a wet-signature requirement could materially determine whether
   a voter is qualified under Texas law, Texas—and the majority—cannot point
   to any evidence of the requirement’s materiality in the substantial record
   before us, on which we must decide this case. Instead, Texas officials’
   admissions that they do not use the wet signature in any capacity to
   determine a voter’s qualifications “slams the door shut on any argument that
   [a wet signature] is material.” Migliori, 36 F.4th at 164.
                                         III.
          Even if we accept the majority’s application of Crawford and Gingles
   to Materiality Provision claims, and even if we put to one side the factual
   immateriality of the wet-signature requirement, the majority’s analysis still
   fails on its own terms. Texas might have had an argument that Vote.org’s
   app implicates § 13.122(a) of the Texas Election Code if the app’s electronic
   registration application form omits the prescribed warning statements, but
   Texas did not make that argument and, regardless, that has nothing to do with
   the wet-signature requirement.          See Tex. Elec. Code Ann.
   § 13.122(a)(1), (13) (West 2023) (requiring, among other statements “on an
   officially prescribed registration application form,” the following two
   statements: (1) “I understand that giving false information to procure a voter
   registration is perjury and a crime under state and federal law” and (2) “a
   statement warning that a conviction for making a false statement may result
   in imprisonment for up to the maximum amount of time provided by law, a
   fine of up to the maximum amount provided by law, or both the
   imprisonment and the fine”). By placing the weight of its materiality analysis

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   on § 13.122(a)’s required statements, the majority effectively acknowledges
   that the wet-signature requirement is itself immaterial. See Op. 39-41.
          That is because the “solemnity” argument put forth by Texas (and
   accepted by the majority) is distinct from the wet-signature requirement.
   Nothing ties the wet signature itself to the statements above the signature
   block. In fact, Texas law does not even dictate where the prescribed
   statements are to be included in the registration application form. See Tex.
   Elec. Code Ann. § 13.122(a) (West 2023). That does not change based
   on whether a person signs with a pen or an electronic signature. And there is
   no evidence in the record that the wet signature itself—as opposed to a
   digitally imaged signature—adds any sort of “solemnity.” Indeed, the
   majority’s assertion that the wet-signature requirement is material hinges on
   “the effect on an applicant of seeing these explanations and warnings above
   the signature block.”      Op. 42; see also Op. 40 (describing Texas’s
   “solemnity” argument as “signing the form with the warnings in front of the
   applicant, threatening penalties for perjury and stating the needed
   qualifications, has some prospect of getting the attention of many applicants
   and dissuading false statements that an electronic signature, without these
   warnings, does not” (emphasis added)).
          The majority thus loses sight of the Texas law at issue in this case:
   Vote.org did not challenge the materiality of § 13.122(a); it challenged the
   materiality of § 13.143(d-2). Even if Vote.org’s app might have implicated
   § 13.122(a), the wet-signature requirement—codified in a separate provision
   of the Texas Election Code—has nothing to do with those warnings. Again,
   it requires only that “a copy of the original registration application containing
   the voter’s original signature” be submitted to the registrar within four
   business days of “the transmission by telephonic facsimile machine.” Tex.
   Elec. Code Ann. § 13.143(d-2) (West 2023).

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          Because the wet-signature requirement is unrelated to the warning
   statements in § 13.122(a) on which the majority rests its materiality holding,
   I agree with the district court and see nothing to sustain the wet-signature
   requirement: No evidence in the record supports—or even peripherally
   suggests—that the wet signature itself is material in determining whether a
   Texan is qualified to vote. Quite the contrary. Texas officials explicitly
   drafted § 13.143(d-2) to prevent the use of Vote.org’s e-sign tool.
   Consequently, the wet-signature requirement violates the Materiality
   Provision and the district court correctly enjoined its enforcement.
                                        IV.
          I would AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
   Vote.org on its statutory claim, and, therefore, I would not reach the
   constitutional claims.

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