Court Opinion

ID: 9533780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:34:31.473705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:10.291177
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CAPPY,
concurring.
Although I agree with the result reached by the Majority, because I arrive at that conclusion for different reasons, I am compelled to write separately. More specifically, the Majority holds that a transfer of property into a custodial account established pursuant to the Pennsylvania Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (“PUTMA”), 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 5301-23, is the irrevocable property of the minor beneficiary of the account, regardless of the transferor’s intent at the time of the transfer. In my view, however, the words of PUTMA clearly and unambiguously make the transferor’s intent relevant. I believe that this is so because PUTMA provides that “[a] person may make a transfer by irrevocable gift ...,” 20 Pa.C.S. § 5304, and in order to make a gift, there must be donative intent. Here, since Father transferred funds into his daughter’s PUTMA account, intending the transfers as gifts to her, the transferred funds were irrevocable gifts under PUTMA. Accordingly, albeit for different reasons than the Majority, I would affirm the order of the Superior Court.
PUTMA allows for transfers by several means: by gift or exercise of power of appointment, by will or trust, by fiduciary, or by obligor. 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 5304-07. This case involves a transfer by gift; therefore, Section 5304 of PUTMA is the specific provision that controls this matter. Section 5304, entitled “Transfer by gift or exercise of power of appointment,” provides that
*165[a] person may make a transfer by irrevocable gift to, or the irrevocable exercise of a power of appointment in favor of, a custodian for the benefit of a minor pursuant to section 5309 (relating to manner of creating custodial property and effecting transfer).
20 Pa.C.S. § 5304 (emphasis added). The emphasized language above clearly and unambiguously requires that a transfer under this section must be by gift, and if in fact the transfer is a gift, then the gift would be irrevocable.
The Legislature did not define “gift” in PUTMA. In such circumstances, the Legislature mandates that a word be construed according to its common and approved usage, unless the word is technical. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). If a word is technical and has acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning, then the word must be construed according to that peculiar and appropriate meaning. Id. As described below, “gift” is a technical word that has acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning.
Specifically, in this Commonwealth, “[e]ssential to the making of a valid gift are donative intent on the part of the donor and delivery of the subject matter to the donee.” Wagner v. Wagner, 466 Pa. 532, 353 A.2d 819, 821 (1976) (citations omitted); see also Fuisz v. Fuisz, 527 Pa. 348, 591 A.2d 1047, 1050 (1991) (stating that “a transfer of ownership by gift requires that there be a present donative intent ... ”) (emphasis added).1 Under our precedent, it is this legal understanding of the word “gift” that we must apply to Section 5304. See Semasek v. Semasek, 509 Pa. 282, 502 A.2d 109, 111 (1985) (finding that a statute’s use of the term “gift” was unambiguous, that “gift” has a definite meaning, and that “[o]ur law requires only donative intent, delivery and acceptance”).
*166Under the common law, when the validity of a gift is challenged, the alleged donee of an inter vivos gift has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that delivery to the donee occurred and that the alleged donor had donative intent. In re Pappas’ Estate, 428 Pa. 540, 239 A.2d 298 (1968). “Once prima facie evidence of a gift is established, a presumption arises that the gift is valid, and the burden is then on the contestant to rebut the presumption by clear, precise and convincing evidence.” Banko v. Malanecki, 499 Pa. 92, 451 A.2d 1008, 1010 (1982) (citation omitted).
PUTMA, however, clearly indicates that PUTMA accounts are depositories for custodial property. See, e.g., 20 Pa.C.S. § 5309(a)(2) (providing that “[cjustodial property is created and a transfer is made whenever ... [m]oney is paid or delivered to a broker or financial institution for credit to an account in the name of the transferor, an adult other than the transferor or a trust company, followed in substance by the words: ‘as custodian for (name of minor) under [PUTMA]’ ”). Therefore, under PUTMA, when property is transferred in compliance with Section 5309, such compliance demonstrates completed delivery of the property and prima facie evidence of donative intent on the part of the transferor. Once this prima facie evidence of a gift is established, a rebuttable presumption arises that the gift is valid, and the burden is on the party challenging the validity of the gift to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Because the clear and unambiguous words of Section 5304 require that a transfer be by gift and because, in order for a gift to be valid, an alleged donor must have had donative intent, this burden-shifting analysis applies when a party challenges a transfer of property by gift into a PUTMA account.
Turning to the Majority Opinion, the interpretation of PUT-MA adopted by the Majority runs afoul of this construct and, more specifically, of two fundamental presumptions of statutory construction. First, by employing a literal interpretation of Sections 5309 and 5311(b) in holding that a transfer of property into a PUTMA account is the irrevocable property of the minor beneficiary of the account regardless of the transferor’s *167intent, the Majority has given no force to Section 5304, specifically to that section’s use of the phrase “by irrevocable gift.” Such an interpretation is counter to the presumption “[t]hat the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2).
Second, if the Legislature did not intend to require donative intent in order for a gift to be valid under PUTMA, then the application of PUTMA would lead to absurd and unreasonable results. It is not difficult to imagine how a person could transfer funds into a PUTMA account without donative intent. For instance, while banking on-line, one could intend to transfer funds into his or her personal account, but due to a mistaken click of the mouse, the person accidentally deposits the funds into his or her child’s PUTMA account. Similarly, an intended transfer by gift of funds into one child’s PUTMA account could be transferred erroneously into the PUTMA account of another child. Under the Majority’s interpretation, the money transferred under these circumstances would be the irrevocable property of the minor beneficiary of the PUT-MA account into which the transfer was made, regardless of the transferor’s lack of donative intent. Majority Opinion at 159-60, 876 A.2d at 910 (“The plain and common meaning is that money transferred into a custodian account pursuant to PUTMA is irrevocably the property of the minor.”) (citations omitted). Such results are patently unreasonable and absurd and ran contrary to the presumption that the General Assembly does not intend results that are absurd or unreasonable. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).
I also am compelled to express my disagreement with the Majority’s treatment of Section 1927 of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1927. PUTMA is undeniably a uniform law, the interpretation of which implicates Section 1927. The Majority recognizes this, but rather than examining the decisions of our sister states, the Majority relegates its discussion of Section 1927 to a footnote and asserts that when an issue raised in the context of a uniform law can be addressed by Section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction *168Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b), it is inappropriate to analyze the uniform law under Section 1927.
To the contrary, Section 1927 states that “[statutes uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted and construed to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact them.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1927 (emphasis added); see Commonwealth v. National Bank & Trust Co. of Central Pennsylvania, 469 Pa. 188, 364 A.2d 1331, 1335 (1976) (finding in the context of construing a uniform law that “[w]hile it is a truism that decisions of sister states are not binding precedent on this Court, they may be persuasive authority and are entitled to even greater deference where consistency and uniformity of application are essential elements of a comprehensive statutory scheme ...”); see also Commonwealth v. Gilmour Manufacturing Co., 573 Pa. 143, 822 A.2d 676, 682 (2003) (stating that “uniform interpretation of legislation affecting multi-state matters is preferable____”) (citing to 1 Pa.C.S. § 1927). While we are not bound by the decisions of our sister states, in my view, consistent with the legislative mandate set forth in Section 1927, we must consider these decisions and afford them deference when those states have adopted the uniform law under scrutiny and have considered the issue presented to this Court. I, therefore, will consider the decisions of our sister states.
Our sister courts generally hold that the establishment of a custodial bank account in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (“UTMA”) or UTMA’s predecessor, the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, creates a rebuttable presumption of donative intent. See, e.g., In re Marriage Hendricks, 681 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (adopting other jurisdictions’ conclusions that “although establishing a bank account in a minor’s name in compliance with the provisions of the UGMA, now UTMA, is highly probative on the issue of donative intent, it does not create an irrebuttable presumption of intent”) (citing to In re Marriage of Stephenson, 162 Cal.App.3d 1057, 209 Cal.Rptr. 383 (1984); In re Marriage of Jacobs, 128 Cal.App.3d 273, 180 Cal.Rptr. 234 (1982); Golden v. Golden, 434 So.2d 978 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. *1691983); In re Marriage of Agostinelli, 250 Ill.App.3d 492, 189 Ill.Dec. 898, 620 N.E.2d 1215 (1993); Heath v. Heath, 143 Ill.App.3d 390, 97 Ill.Dec. 615, 493 N.E.2d 97 (1986); Gordon v. Gordon, 70 A.D.2d 86, 419 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1979); and State v. Keith, 81 Ohio App.3d 192, 610 N.E.2d 1017 (Ohio Ct.App. 1991)). Thus, the analytical construct that I would employ regarding a transfer by gift here is in accord with the decisions of our sister states. I, therefore, believe that the analysis that I would adopt is consistent with Section 1927 of the Statutory Construction Act.
Turning to the disposition of this matter, Father contends that he rebutted the presumption that he intended the transfers he made into his daughter’s PUTMA account between October 1997 and December 1998 as gifts to his daughter. He bases this contention on his testimony that he did not intend to donate to his daughter the stocks purchased with the transferred funds but, rather, that he merely transferred the funds into the PUTMA account because he was “under the impression that you had better tax advantages to put [the funds] into a custodial account then [sic] into your own account.” N.T., 8/20/01, at 47.
Father confuses “intent” with “motive.” While Father may have been motivated to transfer his funds to his daughter in order to lessen his tax burden, he only received such a benefit because he gifted the funds to her. As we have stated before, “[a] transfer motivated by an attempt to avoid [ ] taxes is ‘not inconsistent with a donative intent, but rather positively suggests such an intent.’ ” Sutliff v. Sutliff 518 Pa. 378, 543 A.2d 534, 539 (1988) (citation omitted). Father did not “erroneously” transfer funds into his daughter’s PUTMA account and “accidentally” receive tax benefits. In fact, Father filed a 1999 tax return in his daughter’s name wherein he attributed the income from the sale of the stocks purchased with the transferred funds to his daughter. He, therefore, considered the transferred funds gifts to his daughter for tax purposes. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Father’s testimony fails to rebut the presumption that he intended the transfers as gifts.
*170Because Father failed to rebut the presumption of donative intent relative to the transfers he made into his daughter’s PUTMA account between October of 1997 and December of 1998, those funds were irrevocable gifts to his daughter. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, I would affirm the order of the Superior Court, albeit on different grounds than the Majority.
Mr. Justice SAYLOR joins this concurring opinion.

. This Court sometimes requires “acceptance” as a third element of a gift. In re Sipes Estate, 492 Pa. 125, 422 A.2d 826, 828 (1980); Wagner, 353 A.2d at 822 n. 5. We, however, have recognized that “[o]ften there is no express acceptance by the donee, but if the gift is beneficial to the donee[, then] acceptance is presumed in the absence of evidence of rejection.” Id. (citation omitted).