Court Opinion

ID: 9912804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 00:02:24.672771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:45.346800
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 In re J.J. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

In re J.J., a Person Coming                                  B328838
Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No.
                                                             20CCJP06178A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

A.J.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Commissioner.
Conditionally affirmed with directions.
      Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
           _________________________________________
      A.J. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating parental rights over his son, J.J., under Welfare and
                 1
Institutions Code section 366.26. Father contends it was error to
deny him the right to present evidence at the section 366.26
hearing. He further contends the court erroneously failed to
ensure compliance with the inquiry provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related
California statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).
      We conditionally affirm and remand the matter solely for
the court to ensure compliance with ICWA and related California
statutes.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.    Initial Proceedings and Reunification Period
      In October 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral
from a reporting party with safety concerns for J.J., a one-week-
old baby, due to mother’s mental health issues and excessive

1
      All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

                                2
                                                      2
discipline history with J.J.’s 13-year-old half-sibling. The half-
sibling had already been removed from mother in Ohio on
suspicion of excessive physical discipline and child trafficking.
There was also a history of domestic violence by father against
mother. There were two active protective orders protecting
mother from father until August 2022, and March 2030,
respectively.
       In November 2020, J.J. was detained pursuant to a
protective custody warrant and the Department filed a petition
under section 300 alleging risk of serious physical harm to J.J.
During the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in December
2020, the juvenile court sustained the allegations, declared J.J. a
dependent, removed him from parents’ custody, and ordered
family reunification services and monitored visitation for each
parent.
       By March 2021, J.J. was placed with his paternal
grandmother (PGM). At the six-month review hearing in June
2021, the court found father to be in substantial compliance with
the reunification order and ordered continued family
reunification services, allowing father unmonitored visits with
J.J.
       On November 14, 2021, during an unmonitored visit with
J.J., father called the police complaining mother was intoxicated
and banging on his door demanding to see J.J. Father was
arrested on suspicion of domestic violence and J.J. was returned
to PGM. Charges were later dismissed but father was
subsequently arrested on a probation violation instead. In May

2
      Mother is not a party to the current appeal.

                                 3
2022, father was sentenced to four years in prison with a
potential release within 8 to 18 months. At the combined 12 and
18-month review hearing in June 2022, the juvenile court
followed the Department’s recommendation by terminating
family reunification services and set the matter for a section
366.26 hearing.

2.    Permanency Planning
      According to the Department’s November 29, 2021 service
log, aware of the domestic violence incident two weeks prior,
     3
PGM stated she was “willing to provide permanency for [J.J.]
whether it is to adopt him or to be his legal guardian.” The
Department reported as such in its December 16, 2021 Status
Review Report for the 12-month review hearing. Thereafter,
during a December 22, 2021 home visit, when a social worker
discussed J.J.’s need for stability whether with father or PGM,
PGM stated she was willing to adopt J.J. to keep him safe from
mother and father.
      Then, during a home visit on April 12, 2022, PGM stated
although she was “open to adoption,” she preferred legal
guardianship because father did not want her to adopt. During a
home visit on May 16, 2022, however, PGM reiterated her
willingness to adopt J.J. “to ensure that he is [safe] and not
around his [parents’] drama.” She explained that her intentions
were not to keep J.J. from his parents, but to ensure J.J. was

3
      The service log indicates contact with “MGM” or the
maternal grandmother, then changes mid-paragraph to “PGM” or
the paternal grandmother. J.J. began living with PGM in March
2021, thus, “MGM” appears to be a typographical error.

                               4
raised in a safe and healthy environment. She further explained
that although she had no doubt J.J.’s parents loved him, they did
not make the best decisions regarding J.J. Accordingly, the
Department reported in its May 23, 2022 Status Review Report
that PGM “desires to provide permanency for [J.J.] through
adoption should the parents be unable to reunify with him” and
that “[s]he wants to raise [J.J.] in a safe and loving home
environment, where he is not exposed to abusive behaviors.”
       On June 10, 2022, the juvenile court set a section 366.26
hearing for October 5, 2022 “to address the best permanent plan
for the child with the court identifying adoption” and ordered the
Department to initiate an adoptive home study. In a July 14,
2022 Concurrent Planning Assessment, PGM acknowledged she
was aware of the full legal responsibility of adoption; that family
reunification takes precedence, but if reunification fails, adoption
is the preferred alternative plan; and that she was interested in
adopting J.J. if reunification with his parents was not possible.
       In its September 20, 2022 Addendum Report, the
Department requested a continuance of the October 5, 2022
section 366.26 hearing because there were pending reference
checks and PGM needed more time to provide documents related
to her previous marriages necessary to adopt J.J. The
Department also informed the court that PGM appeared to
understand the responsibilities inherent with being an adoptive
parent and that she was “committed to providing [J.J.] with a
stable and loving family environment through adoption.” This
status was unchanged in the Department’s Status Review Report
and the 366.26 WIC Report, both filed on September 26, 2022.
       During the section 366.26 hearing on October 5, 2022, J.J.’s
counsel stated PGM previously indicated to counsel an interest in

                                 5
legal guardianship, yet the Department’s report stated PGM is
interested in adoption. J.J.’s counsel requested the Department
address this seeming conflict in their next report. No contested
hearing was requested by mother or father, but the court
suggested and ordered the Department to notice PGM to appear
at the continued section 366.26 hearing on January 3, 2023 “so
that she can express what her desire is.”
       Thereafter, in a December 14, 2022 medical evaluation
      4
report for J.J., the clinician reported PGM “does plan to adopt
[J.J.]; however, there have been no updates regarding court
dates.” On January 3, 2023, the Department filed a Last Minute
Information (LMI) requesting a continuance to determine if PGM
is able to provide the aforementioned documents and to
“determine if she is fully invested in pursuing the permanent
plan of adoption for [J.J.].” The hearing was continued to April
26, 2023.
        On April 12, 2023, the Department filed an LMI apprising
the court that it received the references they were waiting for and
that PGM submitted the documents necessary for adoption. The
Department confirmed PGM was still interested in adopting J.J.
The Status Review Report for the April 26, 2023 hearing reflected
the same.

3.   Section 366.26 Hearing
     The section 366.26 hearing was held on April 26, 2023.
Father’s counsel stated during the hearing:

4
     The medical report was attached to the Status Review
Report for the April 26, 2023 section 366.26 hearing.

                                6
      “I did discuss the recommendation with the father
      this morning via telephone. I discussed with him
      previously. However, it was supposed to be a legal
      guardianship rec. The caretaker had been going back
      and forth for sometime. And if you look at prior notes
      from, I believe, January, my notes it does state you
      ordered the caretaker to come back previously
      because they weren’t sure whether it was going to be
      legal guardianship or adoption. The father -- I spoke
      to him this morning, he believes that the wishes of
      the paternal grandmother/caretaker, that he’s very
      close to, is legal guardianship and she’s being
      pressured by the social worker. And he speaks to
      [J.J.], his son, on a weekly basis. He used to have
      unmonitored visits before the arrest. He is asking to
      set it for contest. And LMI on his weekly phone
      contact with his son and also the wishes of paternal
      grandmother/caretaker.”

       The court turned to J.J.’s counsel for a response as it was
J.J.’s counsel who, on October 5, 2022, originally requested
clarification on whether PGM was interested in legal
guardianship or adoption. J.J.’s counsel replied:

      “I spoke with the caretaker yesterday. She was still
      on board with the plan of adoption. In fact, she
      thought the adoption was happening today based on
      her conversation with the social worker. I haven’t
      spoken to her about legal guardianship as an
      alternative, at this point, because the plan was

                                 7
      always adoption. I don’t have an objection to – I do
      understand that [J.J.] has a relationship with his
      father. They talk every single week. So I don’t have
      an objection to discussing the idea of legal
      guardianship. That was not the plan she was on
      board with as of today.”

      The court responded, “well, it’s not a matter of on board.
She’s ready, willing and able to adopt. There’s no real legal basis
to continue this matter over, as she indicates, she’s ready to
adopt.” Father’s counsel then changed her approach and
attempted to argue the parental benefit exception based on the
                        5
father’s regular contact. The court stated based on the facts of
this case, the parental benefit exception would not apply either.
Thereafter, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that
J.J. was adoptable and terminated parental rights.

4.    Facts Related to ICWA
      The Department’s Detention Report indicated mother and
father denied having any Indian ancestry. Mother and father also
denied any Indian ancestry on their Parental Notification of
Indican Status form (ICWA-020). During the detention hearing
on November 24, 2020, based on the ICWA-020 forms, the court
found ICWA inapplicable.
      A December 17, 2020 jurisdiction/disposition report stated
mother and father again denied having any Indian ancestry. The

5
      On appeal, appellant raised an issue only as to the relative
adoption exception under section 366.26(c)(1)(A), and not as to
the parental benefit exception under section 366.26(c)(1)(B).

                                 8
October 5, 2022 366.26 WIC Report, however, indicated PGM told
the dependency investigator that there was Native American
ancestry in her family but she did not know which tribe. The
investigator did not ask PGM for contact information of other
relatives who might have more information. The same report
indicated mother also stated that she is Native American, but
declined to name a tribe or provide relative information. The
investigator noted in the report that she left a voicemail for
paternal aunt and sent ICWA notices to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) and Secretary of Interior. These notices are absent
in the record, however. In December 2022, mother again
indicated she had Indian ancestry in her section 388 petition.
      There is no evidence in the record that Department
employees made any attempt to contact available maternal or
paternal relatives, other than PGM, to ask whether J.J. had any
Indian ancestry.

                           DISCUSSION
       Father asserts the juvenile court violated his due process
rights when it refused to set a contested hearing to prove the
application of the relative caregiver exception. Father also
asserts, and the Department concedes, the ICWA procedure was
not followed.
1.     Father’s Due Process Claim
       Father contends his due process rights were violated when
the court terminated his parental rights without permitting a
contested evidentiary hearing on the applicability of the relative
caregiver exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A).
We disagree.

                                 9
      A.      Standard of Review
      We review the denial of a contested hearing by the trial
court for abuse of discretion. (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
973, 1003 (A.G.); In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 611
(Grace P.) Under that standard, the decision of the trial court is
given a high degree of deference unless it was arbitrary,
capricious, patently absurd, or exceeds the bounds of reason. (In
re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Earl L.
(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1053.) “[W]hen two or more
inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, we may not
substitute our decision for the juvenile court’s decision.” (In re
Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, 419.)
      B.      Relative Caregiver Exception
      At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court selects and
implements a permanent plan for the dependent child, i.e.,
adoption, legal guardianship, or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26,
subd. (b); In re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1299.) The
preferred plan is adoption. (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
636, 645.) “Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the
court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s
needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the
parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for
adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
1339, 1350.) Once the juvenile court determines by clear and
convincing evidence “that it is likely the child will be adopted, the
court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed
for adoption,” unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) Father does not dispute the juvenile court’s findings
of adoptability or inapplicability of exceptions to termination of
parental rights. Father claims the juvenile court denied his due

                                 10
process rights by refusing to permit a contested hearing on
whether the relative caregiver exception applies.
      It is the parent’s burden to prove a statutory exception
applies. (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1119-1120.)
To meet the burden of proving the relative caregiver exception,
the parent must show (1) “a circumstance exists which makes the
relative unable or unwilling to adopt,” (2) “the relative’s inability
or unwillingness is not due to a refusal to accept legal or financial
responsibility,” (3) “the relative is willing and capable of
providing the child with a stable and permanent environment
through legal guardianship, and” (4) “removing the child from the
relative’s custody would be detrimental to the child’s emotional
well-being.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re K.H. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 406, 416.)

       C.     Due Process and Offer of Proof
       A parent has a due process right to present evidence at a
section 366.26 hearing. This due process right “includes a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, present evidence, and
confront witnesses. However, these procedural rights are subject
to evidentiary principles. Due process is ‘a flexible concept
dependent on the circumstance.’ (In re Tamika T. (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122.) Since due process does not authorize a
parent ‘to introduce irrelevant evidence, due process does not
require a court to hold a contested hearing if it is not convinced
the parent will present relevant evidence on the issue he or she
seeks to contest.’ (Ibid.) ‘The trial court can therefore exercise its
power to request an offer of proof to clearly identify the contested
issue(s) so it can determine whether a parent’s representation is
sufficient to warrant a hearing involving presentation of evidence

                                 11
and confrontation of witnesses.’ (Ibid.) The parent’s offer of proof
must be specific, setting forth the actual evidence to be produced,
not merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued.’ (Id. at
p. 1124.)” (In re Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 612; see also
In re Jeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 816-817.) The parent
must have “relevant evidence of significant value to the issue
before the court.” (In re Tamika T., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1122.)
       Unlike a criminal defendant, a parent in a dependency
proceeding does not have a right ‘to full confrontation and cross-
examination’ under the Sixth Amendment of the federal
Constitution or article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.
[Citations.]” (In re Daniela G. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1092;
Maricela C. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1146-
1147 (in dependency proceedings, a parent’s due process rights do
not necessarily include the opportunity for full confrontation and
cross-examination].) “[T]he state’s strong interest in prompt and
efficient trials permits the nonarbitrary exclusion of evidence
[citation], such as when the presentation of the evidence will
‘necessitate undue consumption of time.’ (Evid. Code, § 352.)”
(Ibid.)

      D. Denial of a Contested Hearing Was Not an Abuse of
         Discretion
      Father contends his offer of proof was sufficient to trigger a
contested hearing to establish the relative caretaker exception.
He argues Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th 605, and A.G., supra,
58 Cal.App.5th 973, are directly on point and it was abuse of
discretion for the juvenile court to deny him the opportunity to
question PGM on the record regarding her true feelings about

                                 12
adoption and whether the Department pressured her into
accepting adoption over legal guardianship. Father also argues
on appeal that he implicitly requested cross-examination of the
preparer of the reports to ascertain how, when, and why PGM
changed her position on legal guardianship.
       In Grace P., father offered to testify about detailed and
specific evidence related to the quality of his visitation and
parenting of his children during his visits. (In re Grace P., supra,
8 Cal.App.5th at p. 614.) He also offered testimony by one of his
children on how she enjoyed visits by her father and how she
would feel if the visits were terminated. (Ibid.) This evidence was
offered to prove the child’s “benefit from continuing the
relationship” and the detrimental impact on the child should the
visits terminate, the second prong of the parental benefits
exception under section 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i). (Ibid.) In
reversing the trial court’s rejection of this offer of proof, the Grace
P. court reasoned that father’s offer of proof “was consequential to
and probative of the issue of his relationship with the children
and the detriment they would suffer by its severance.” (Ibid.)
       In A.G., mother identified nine potential witnesses to
testify about regular contact with her children and the nature
and quality of the parental relationship. (In re A.G., supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at pp. 990, 1007.) In rejecting the trial court’s finding
that the offer of proof lacked specificity, the A.G. court reasoned
that although the offered testimonies arguably lacked specificity,
there were other materials that demonstrated sufficient
specificity. (Ibid.) Moreover, “the offer of proof was “plainly
relevant to the two components of the parental relationship
exception.” (Ibid.) The A.G. court then cautioned, in the parental
benefit exception context where a parent addressed regular

                                  13
visitation and the existence of a beneficial parent-child
relationship, trial courts should be more lenient on reviewing
legal sufficiency of the parent’s offer of proof. (Id. at p. 1009.)
       In contrast, here, father’s offer of proof in the relative
caregiver exception context is devoid of the level of specificity and
relevance shown in Grace P. and A.G. Critically, father fails to
identify the witnesses he would call to testify and the content of
their testimonies. Father’s counsel stated during the section
366.26 hearing, “The father – I spoke to him this morning, he
believes that the wishes of the paternal grandmother/caretaker,
that he’s very close to, is legal guardianship and she’s being
pressured by the social worker.” While father argues on appeal
that he proposed to call PGM and implicitly the preparer of the
report during the hearing, he made no such request on the
juvenile court. In fact, father did not mention any specific witness
or the substance of any testimony during his proffer. The court
could reasonably infer that father was offering himself as a
witness to testify to his own belief that PGM was being pressured
by the Department to adopt when she preferred legal
guardianship. In his opening brief, father states multiple times
his offer of proof was based on direct conversations with PGM.
Notably, this is not supported by the record either. The
foundation offered at the hearing for father’s beliefs were based
purely on his perception that he had a close relationship with
PGM. Such an offer of proof is speculative at best and does not
identify relevant, admissible evidence.
       Moreover, father’s counsel made unsupported statements to
the juvenile court as a basis for requesting a contested hearing.
Counsel stated, “[t]he caretaker had been going back and forth
for sometime. And if you look at prior notes from, I believe,

                                 14
January, my notes it does state you ordered the caretaker to
come back previously because they weren’t sure whether it was
going to be legal guardianship or adoption.” On the contrary, the
record reveals once PGM decided she was willing to adopt, she
maintained that position throughout. The only hesitation was
when PGM expressed preference for legal guardianship because
father did not want her to adopt. She never expressed an
unwillingness to adopt, however. Based on the record, it appears
counsel’s perception that PGM was indecisive was due to J.J.’s
counsel making a request on October 5, 2022 for a follow-up by
the Department to clarify whether PGM wanted legal
guardianship or adoption. This is why the juvenile court turned
to J.J.’s counsel for a response during the section 366.26 hearing,
at which time, J.J.’s counsel confirmed that she “spoke with the
caretaker yesterday. She was still on board with the plan of
adoption. In fact, she thought the adoption was happening today
based on her conversation with the social worker. I haven’t
spoken to her about legal guardianship as an alternative, at this
point, because the plan was always adoption.” The uncertainty
expressed by J.J.’s counsel was the basis for father’s offer of
proof. That uncertainty proved to be inaccurate, leaving the offer
of proof hollow.
       Even if the offer of proof was that PGM told father her wish
or preference was legal guardianship and she would testify
accordingly, it was not arbitrary or capricious for the juvenile
court to have concluded that such testimony was inadequate.
The court could reasonably conclude that such testimony would
only be peripheral to the issue of whether PGM was unwilling to
adopt despite her preference, and thus, would not rebut J.J.’s
adoptability. (See In re Tamika T., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp.

                                15
1118-1119 (affirming juvenile court’s denial of contested hearing
because mother made no showing rebutting minor’s
adoptability).) Given the statutory preference for adoption and
the record supporting PGM’s consistent willingness to adopt,
whether PGM wished or preferred legal guardianship would not
have been “plainly relevant” or “probative of the issue” of her
willingness to adopt. Indeed, when J.J.’s counsel offered to
discuss legal guardianship even though PGM was “on board” with
adoption, the court stated, “It’s not a matter of on board. She’s
ready, willing and able to adopt. There’s no legal basis to
continue this matter over, as she indicates, she’s ready to adopt.”
      The inadequate offer of proof, coupled with extensive
evidence in the record showing PGM’s consistent willingness to
adopt, demonstrates that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
juvenile court to deny father’s request for a contested hearing on
the application of the relative caretaker exception.

2.     ICWA
       “Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising
concern in the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian
children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child
welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers
of Indian children from their families and tribes through
adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.’”
(In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7.) Both ICWA and California
law define an “‘Indian child’” as a child who is either a member of
an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.
(25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subds. (a) & (b); see In re
Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 783.)

                                16
       California statutory law incorporates the requirements of
ICWA and imposes some additional requirements. (In re Abbigail
A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 91; In re Benjamin M. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 741–742.) State and federal law require the
court to ask parties and participants at the outset of an
involuntary child custody proceeding whether they have reason to
know a minor is an Indian child, and to “instruct the parties to
inform the court if they subsequently receive information that
provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (25 C.F.R.
§ 23.107(a); § 224.2, subd. (c); see Benjamin M., at p. 741.) Initial
inquiry also includes requiring each party to complete the
parental notification of Indian status (ICWA-020) form. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2)(C).)
       State law imposes on the Department a first-step inquiry
duty to “interview, among others, extended family members and
others who had an interest in the child.” (In re H.V. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438; see § 224.2, subd. (b).) Federal
regulations explain that the term “extended family member is
defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s Tribe or, in the
absence of such law or custom, is a person who has reached
age 18 and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle,
brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew,
first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2017).)
When there is “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved
in a proceeding,” further inquiry is also required. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e); In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 290, fn. 14.) “We
review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s Indian ancestry
for substantial evidence.” (In re H.V., at p. 438.)
       The Department concedes on appeal that the further
inquiry requirements of ICWA and related state law were not

                                 17
met in this case and asks us to either conditionally affirm or
reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights,
with instructions limiting remand of the matter to ordering the
juvenile court to ensure compliance with ICWA’s requirements.
      We agree that the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA
inapplicable. The record shows mother and PGM claimed Indian
ancestry after the court’s November 24, 2020 finding, yet the
court proceeded in the absence of any evidence that the
Department asked available extended family members about the
possibility that minor has Indian ancestry. (See, e.g., In re H.V.,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 438 [prejudicial error when
Department fails to discharge its first step duty of inquiry]; In re
Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 741 [court must ask
each participant in child custody proceeding].)

                           DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s April 26, 2023 order terminating
parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26 is conditionally affirmed with directions. The juvenile
court is directed to ensure that additional inquiry under section
224.2, subdivision (e) is made with available paternal and
maternal relatives, as the court in the first instance deems
appropriate, and that any necessary notice be made. Thereafter,
if the court determines that no further inquiry under section
224.2, subdivision (e), or notice to tribes under section 224.3 is
necessary, then the jurisdiction and disposition orders shall
remain in place. If the court determines the Department’s
investigation was adequate and there is a reason to know the
child is an Indian child as that term is defined under ICWA, then
the jurisdiction and disposition orders are reversed and the

                                 18
Department shall provide adequate ICWA notice to the tribe or
tribes, mother, father, and the regional Bureau of Indian Affairs
and shall proceed thereafter in compliance with ICWA and
related California statutes.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                          LEE, J.

WE CONCUR:

            MOOR, Acting P. J.                  KIM, J.

     Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                                 19