Court Opinion

ID: 9732219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:12:16.374865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:13.151588
License: Public Domain

Steinle, J.
(dissenting). By the judgment the trial court denied the petition to distribute the estate in accordance with the agreement entered into between Paulina Hertzfeld, her brother Rynard Draheim, her sister Augusta Hertzfeld, and nieces and nephews who are the children of a deceased sister, Amelia Draheim Pagel. In its findings of fact, the court determined that at the time of the execution of the agreement Paulina was competent, although she was an elderly lady of little business experience; that the petitioners for distribution had stipulated that the agreement was not one of compromise under sec. 318.31, Stats.; that the only consideration for the agreement was the compromise of the pending will contest, and that the same did not constitute a valuable consideration for the. purported assignment of Paulina’s interest in the estate.
In its conclusions of law the court determined that the agreement was not a valid assignment under sec. 318.06 (10), Stats. The basis for such conclusion is that the agreement was not supported by a valuable consideration. It appears from the record that the agreement was signed after the will had been offered for probate, and after objection thereto had been interposed, but before it was admitted to probate.
Under the terms of the will Paulina would have received 100 per cent of the proceeds of the estate, less $500 bequeathed to the church. Under the agreement she would have been entitled to certain real estate and 50 per cent of the net proceeds of the estate. Had probate of the will been *194denied, she would have been entitled to 25 per cent of the estate. Since under the terms of the agreement Paulina would have received at least twice the amount that she would have been entitled to were the will not admitted to probate, I am of the opinion that such benefit to her was a valuable and sufficient consideration to sustain the contract. Sufficient consideration may consist in either some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, p. 570, sec. 79.
The trial court did not find that it had been imposed upon by virtue of the failure of the petitioners to have filed the agreement with the court at an earlier time. I am unable to reach the conclusion that the failure to have presented the agreement before the will was admitted to probate, standing alone, is as a matter of law such deception as to constitute fraud upon the court. While it appears that the circumstances under which the agreement was signed by Paulina are open to question, nevertheless I am not convinced that upon the evidence presented at the hearing, imposition upon Paulina or upon the court was conclusively established. In the interests of justice, a thorough investigation ought to be made, and under proper pleadings, a full hearing should be afforded by the trial court wherein determination can be made as to whether Paulina’s signature to the agreement was obtained by fraud or undue influence. Were it to be found that there had been imposition of such type upon Paulina, then it is conceivable that the failure to present the agreement in court prior to the time that the will was admitted, could be construed as an attempt to deceive the court.
In my opinion the judgment ought to be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings as herein suggested. For reasons as stated, I am compelled to respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination.