Court Opinion

ID: 9846649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:44:45.948086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:41.126046
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
I disagree with the majority that this newsman must be compelled to reveal the identity of the undisclosed “police expert” quoted in his news story. I agree with Justice Donaldson that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution affords a newsman a limited privilege against disclosure of his news sources in some cases. *306However, assuming that the article was false and defamatory, I disagree with Justice Donaldson that the claim of constitutional privilege in this case would have outweighed the importance of discovery of the police expert because in my opinion this information would have been critical to the issue of malice. But since I do not believe that this article was false and defamatory of Caldero, I conclude that the First Amendment interests in a free press outweigh the discovery of this information.
I
First, I cannot agree with the majority that the First Amendment guarantee of a free press does not afford a limited privilege to newsmen protecting them from discovery of their sources. An examination of the United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Branzburg and the many intermediate court cases in this area reveals that even where discovery is ultimately ordered, it is only after application of a balancing of First Amendment interests in a free press against the right of litigants to discovery of material information, and then narrowly prescribing the questions which must be answered. This approach of the courts is thoroughly analyzed by Justice Donaldson in his dissent.
I believe the most telling indication that a limited privilege does exist in these news source discovery cases is disclosed by a comparison of the approach taken by the courts in these cases with the general rule of discovery laid out in I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1), which is identical to the comparable federal rule:
“RULE 26(b)(1). Scope of discovery in general. — Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: (1) Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to, lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Emphasis added).
This rule has consistently been interpreted to allow the broadest possible discovery; in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the scope of discovery under this rule, that Court observed:
“No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.” 329 U.S. at 507, 67 S.Ct. at 392.
The only limitation on discovery of unprivileged material is that it be relevant to the subject matter of the litigation, which is such a broad standard that at the discovery stage a party may in fact engage in a fishing expedition. 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Prac. & Proc., § 2008.
If there is no limited newsman’s privilege, how can the following passage from Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), be reconciled with the broad discovery rules outlined above?
“It is to be noted that we are not dealing here with the use of the judicial process to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper’s confidential sources of news, nor with a case where the identity of the news source is of doubtful relevance or materiality. [Citations omitted]. The question asked of the appellant went to the heart of the plaintiff’s claim. We hold that the Constitution conferred no right to refuse an answer.” 259 F.2d at 549-550.
The “heart of the claim” test was also adopted in Carey v. Hume, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 492 F.2d 631 (1974), wherein that Court observed:
“. . . Branzburg, in language if not in holding, left intact, insofar as civil litigation is concerned, the approach tak*307en in Garland. That approach essentially is that the court will look to the facts on a case-by-case basis in the course of weighing the need for the testimony in question against the claims of the newsman that the public’s right to know is impaired.” 492 F.2d at 636.
Clearly, that court recognized that a limited privilege existed. Its holding that the newsman could be compelled to reveal his sources was arrived at by the balancing process it describes, which is a far contrast from the broad discovery provisions of Rule 26(b)(1).
In Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit upheld the trial court’s refusal to compel disclosure of a newsman’s sources because it found no “concern [in this case] so compelling as to override the precious rights of freedom of speech and the press.” 470 F.2d at 785. Again, the court was recognizing a limited privilege and so refused to allow broad discovery as provided by Rule 26(b)(1).
In this case, even while the trial court and the majority of this Court have held that the reporter here was not privileged to refuse to disclose his sources, the scope of the discovery ordered is limited to three questions, ante at 792, and the trial court rejected the plaintiff’s request for discovery of answers to several collateral questions. But if “no newsman’s privilege against disclosure of confidential sources founded on the First Amendment exists in an absolute or qualified version,” as the majority states, ante at 797, there should be no reason why the plaintiff in this case is not afforded the right to broad discovery given all parties in civil litigation under Rule 26(b)(1)— in short, a fishing expedition. This very inconsistency in the trial court’s limiting order and the majority’s holding reveals that they have also done some balancing between the First Amendment right of free press and the right of litigants to information.
I agree with Justice Donaldson that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution affords a limited privilege against disclosure of sources in cases where such disclosure is not critical to an issue in the case. This limited privilege protects a newsman from broad discovery of his sources under Rule 26(b)(1). But he may be compelled to disclose certain information if a court concludes that a party’s interest in obtaining that information outweighs the newsman’s limited First Amendment privilege.
I disagree with Justice Donaldson, however, in his conclusion that discovery of the police expert would not have been critical in this case if this were a true case of defamation. However, because I do not believe that the article in question is defamatory of Caldero, I conclude that it would serve no purpose to allow discovery of the police expert and that in this case the interest in discovery is outweighed by the newsman’s First Amendment privilege.
II
The newspaper article that is the subject of this litigation covered a full page of the November 23, 1973, edition of the Lewiston Morning Tribune. The headline read, “ ‘You shot me . . . you really shot me!’ Young father gunned down by state narc in Coeur d’Alene park when he panics after friend accosted by ‘hippies.’ ” The article describes the facts leading up to the narcotics transaction and the shooting of the victim Johnson, mostly from Johnson’s perspective. The article quotes Johnson extensively, and also quotes the prosecuting attorney of Kootenai County, the then Attorney General, a witness of the incident, Johnson’s attorney, and the unidentified police expert. The tone of the article is sympathetic toward the victim Johnson, who subsequently pleaded guilty to a charge of possession with intent to sell, and is generally critical of the manner in which the incident was handled by Caldero. The passage quoting the police expert supported this generally critical tone.
In his complaint filed against the Tribune Company, Caldero alleged that the article “was an unfair, false and malicious account of the shooting incident which involved the plaintiff on August 27, 1972, and as such *308the publication was not privileged by the defendant but was a libelous and defamatory publication on the part of the defendant.” His affidavit filed in support of plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery merely alleged that “such questions are material and relevant to the issues herein, and answers thereto should be required.” In his deposition, Caldero was asked by the defendant to identify those passages of the article which he contended were false and libelous. Caldero went through the article, paragraph by paragraph, contending that certain statements were factually inaccurate, or that he disagreed with Johnson’s version of the facts, or that the Attorney General and the prosecuting attorney had not made certain statements that were attributed to them in the article. None of these accusations of themselves could be considered defamatory. Concerning the passage at issue in this case, Caldero contended that the expert’s opinion was speculative, and that he did not believe that such a police expert existed. He contended that this opinion made it appear that he, Caldero, had lied in his version of the facts, but he did not disagree with any of the factual assertions underlying the opinion of the police expert.
Caldero’s deposition concludes with the following colloquy between Caldero and his counsel:
“Q. Mr. Caldero, in response to counsel’s question as to the specific untrue parts of the article, can you state that any of those things taken by themselves are libelous to you, in and of themselves as picked apart by counsel?
“A. Very few of them sir, would in themselves mean much.
“Q. All right.
“A. But all lumped together they would mean a great deal.
“Q. You have alleged in your complaint that the article was an unfair, false and malicious account of the incident. Is that the article taken as a whole?
“A. Yes sir.” Clk.Tr., p. 105.
The trial court had ruled that Caldero was a public official and therefore in order to prevail in this defamation action he is bound by the rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), that “prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 376 U.S. at 279-280, 84 S.Ct. at 726. While the New York Times case became a landmark for its articulation of the actual malice standard in defamation cases, the actual holding in that case went further and the Supreme Court ruled that the publication in that case could not constitutionally be said to be defamatory of the plaintiff because the publication could not reasonably be interpreted as referring to the plaintiff. Such is not the concern in this case since Caldero is clearly identified in the article; however, I believe that based on the position taken by Caldero in his deposition and pleadings, and after a careful reading of the article itself, it cannot be said that the article has defamed Caldero, and therefore the search for actual malice in the publication becomes irrelevant.
I believe that a case directly in point is this Court’s recent decision in Hemingway v. Fritz, 96 Idaho 364, 529 P.2d 264 (1974). In that case a public official sued a newspaper publisher alleging that a news article and editorial that it had printed about him were libelous. The publication in that case was critical of the official and of certain actions he had taken in office. This Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, and we observed:
“Critical statements aimed at public officials and their conduct in relation to their public trust should not be microscopically examined. Rather, ‘the article must be read and construed as a whole.’ [Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 508, 275 P.2d 663 (1954) ]. Reading the article and editorial as a whole, we do not feel that Hemingway has been untruthfully accused of a misuse of his püblic office. *309Whatever impropriety he may feel he has been accused of by the use of ‘privileged information’ in bidding, Hemingway in his deposition in essence admitted the essential facts in the publications . . 96 Idaho at 365-366, 529 P.2d at 265-266.
It is important to note that the plaintiff in Hemingway also sought discovery of an alleged informant, but this Court stated that since the articles in question were not defamatory, discovery of the informant was irrelevant. 96 Idaho at 366, 529 P.2d 264.
The basic facts surrounding the incident in the Couer d’Alene park, as described in the Tribune article, are not disputed by Caldero. His contention is that he has been harmed by the overall tone of the article which was critical of his handling of the situation. However, as a public official, Caldero cannot attempt to stifle public criticism of his actions by means of a defamation suit. As this Court stated in Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 516 P.2d 193 (1973):
“The appellants as public officials in the exercise of their officials duties are not immune from the criticism and censure of public debate. The appellants voluntarily entered the arena of public debate and should not complain over ribald or robust criticism of their public action. Political epithets and hyperbole leveled against the actions of public officials are within the freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment afforded to citizens criticizing the function of their government.” 95 Idaho at 639, 516 P.2d at 198.
The “fair comment” doctrine is of common law origin, antedating the New York Times rule. Comment or opinion upon the conduct of public officials in their office, critical or otherwise, has long been exempt from liability in defamation actions. Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed., §' 118, p. 819.
In light of the fact that I believe that the article in question is not defamatory of Caldero, it would serve no purpose to allow discovery of the unidentified police expert, and therefore under the circumstances here, I would reverse the order of the district court holding appellant Shelledy in contempt.