Court Opinion

ID: 9463605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:10:39.2748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:10.966824
License: Public Domain

WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I
I think it worth mentioning that the Ninth Circuit, in Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974),1 has come to the opposite conclusion in a case very nearly indistinguishable on its facts from that present here.
The rule announced by the majority in this case follows United States Steel Corp., and is that attorneys’ fees should not be awarded to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case unless it may be said that the plaintiff “ . . . acted in bad faith in bringing the lawsuit.”
In Van Hoomissen, the EEOC had attempted to intervene and assert two contentions in the district court; one that Xerox had engaged in retaliation against an employee, and, second, that Xerox discriminated against employees. The district court allowed intervention but restricted its application to the retaliation claim, not permitting litigation of the discrimination claim. Upon appeal from the denial of intervention as to the discrimination claim, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that whether or not to allow the EEOC to intervene in the district court was a matter of discretion which had not been abused. There was no intimation of bad faith, harassment, or the like, on the part of the EEOC anywhere in the proceeding, which, concerning itself with technical matters only, was much like that present here. The court held that since Xerox prevailed in the appeal, it qualified as a “prevailing party” under the statute, thus making it eligible for an award of attorneys’ fees, and concluded that “ . . .we exercise our discretion and award Xerox an attorney’s fee of $3,000.” p. 1133.
The point I make is illustrated by Van Hoomissen. Bad faith on the part of a losing plaintiff in a Title VII case should not be the necessary prerequisite to awarding attorneys’ fees.
II
I have mentioned Van Hoomissen by way of illustration that there is a conflict in the circuits on this point, and that I think the rule illustrated by that case is preferable.
The principal point of my dissent, however, is that the opinion of the majority creates a double standard in the application of Title VII. Employers are forbidden by the Civil Rights Act to apply double standards to their employees, and I do not accept the proposition that the courts should administer one standard for the plaintiff and a very different standard for the defendant in the prosecution and defense of suits under the statute.
The statute involved here permits the district court “ . . . in its discretion [to] allow the prevailing party *953a reasonable attorney’s fee . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
It was a statute phrased in like words which the Supreme Court construed in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968), in which the Court held that a prevailing plaintiff under Title II of the same statute “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” p. 402, 88 S.Ct. p. 966. We followed that reasoning in construing the same statute involved in this case in Robinson v. Loriilard Corp., and Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., as has been noted by the majority.
All of these cases, however, were followed by Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), which put to rest the private attorney general theory of recovery of attorneys’ fees unless authorized by statute. Alyeska construed 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) and Newman that “ . . . the award should be made to the successful plaintiff absent exceptional circumstances.” p. 262, 95 S.Ct. p. 1624. But the opinion continued on the same page “Under this scheme of things, it is apparent that the circumstances under which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for the Congress to determine.”2
In our case, Congress has determined that an attorney’s fee “may” be allowed to “the prevailing party” by the court “in its discretion.” And the standard under this Title YII language has been construed under Title II as an award to a prevailing plaintiff absent exceptional circumstances.
The majority supports its denial of the same standard to prevailing defendants as to prevailing plaintiffs in this way: “However, these policy considerations which support the award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not present in the case of a prevailing defendant.’ 3 I suggest that policy considerations are not matters for the courts but are matters for Congress. Since Congress has provided that a prevailing defendant may recover an attorney’s fee for the successful defense of a suit, no reason exists to apply a radically different standard to a prevailing defendant than to a prevailing plaintiff.
Acknowledging that it is the policy of the United States to eliminate discrimination in employment, as well as in other aspects of our national life, how can it be said that it is not the policy of the United States to allow a defendant to recover an attorney’s fee for the successful defense of a claim against it which is without merit? A mere colorable claim, although without merit, is easy to come by. The dozens of records which cross our desks each day are proof certain of that fact. The remedies provided under the statute are radical and undoubtedly would not have been imposed had Congress not believed it necessary to achieve the national goal. But the remedies are no less than government by injunction. This is pointed out in the Legislative History, U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 1964, p. 2415. And while government by injunction is to be abhorred, it is no stranger to our system. Dozens of statutes attest to the contrary. I mention this not to criticize the statute, but to point out that, like Dombrowski, it is strong medicine. Union contracts entered into in good faith, for example, are casually set aside; and awards against defendants running into the hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars are not uncommon.
Yet the fact that the remedy is so radical, to me, is not inconsistent with an intent of Congress that an unsuccessful plaintiff be required to pay attorneys’ fees under a standard not substantially different from that of an unsuccessful defendant. Especially where the government is the plaintiff, with its limitless resources and sensi*954tivity to the political winds of the moment, it should not be allowed to escape attorneys’ fees by hiding behind a double standard.
The net result we end up with as result of the majority opinion, under a statute which says the court, may allow an attorney’s fee in its discretion to the prevailing party, is that a prevailing plaintiff is allowed an attorney’s fee absent exceptional circumstances, while a prevailing defendant under the same statute is not allowed an attorney’s fee unless the plaintiff has prosecuted his action in bad faith. I suggest this is not the level floor the courthouse demands.

. Reported on the merits of dismissing the appeal in 497 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1974) and in the district court in 368 F.Supp. 829 (1973).

. I am aware of S. 2278, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, and Senate Report 94-1011.

. While the majority properly gives significance to a policy not to discourage suits under Title VII, it fails to consider any countervailing policy short of bad faith.