Court Opinion

ID: 9453380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:11:27.19154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:37.939472
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(concurring):
I join in the court’s opinion, and would only add this comment.
The District Court imposed a prison sentence, a disposition not designed to provide Fuller treatment which would improve his condition. Therefore, he is likely to renew his dangerous behavior after his release from imprisonment, with another conviction and further imprisonment to follow. Neither the public nor Fuller would be benefited. A program of care and treatment, on the other hand, would constitute a necessary first step in any bona fide effort to give him and society some hope of controlling his behavior.
In the present case such a program must confront the reality that Fuller’s behavioral abnormalities are probably due to organic brain damage which may be irreversible. If it were, commitment to a mental institution would be equivalent to a life sentence. This course should be followed, if at all, only after all alternatives have been thoroughly explored and exhausted. The psychiatrist *471reported that Fuller’s sexual misconduct stems from exposure to the combination of alcohol and children. If so, his age and blindness suggest that some form of supervision or less-than-total deprivation of liberty might provide reasonable protection to the community.
It is true that the sexual psychopath law provides that “if the patient is determined to be a sexual psychopath, the court shall commit him to Saint Eliza-beths Hospital * * 1 But since other alternatives must be explored in civil commitment proceeding under the Hospitalization of the Mentally 111 Act,2 we may not assume that Congress intended to withhold such consideration from persons committed as “sexual psychopaths.” 3 Otherwise, serious questions of equal protection would arise.4 On remand, therefore, I think the District Court may resort to absolute confinement in Saint Elizabeths Hospital, whether under the sexual psychopath law or the Hospitalization of the Mentally 111 Act,5 only after it has determined that no satisfactory alternative exists.6

. D.C. Code § 22-3508 (1967).

. D.C. Code § 21-545 (b) (1967); Lake v. Cameron, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 364 F.2d 657 (1966).

. Proceedings under the sexual psychopath law are essentially equivalent to civil commitment proceedings. Millard v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 373 F.2d 468 (1966); Miller v. Overholser, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 110, 206 F.2d 415 (1953). A finding of dangerousness is a prerequisite to commitment under both Acts (though under the Hospitalization of the Mentally 111 Act the person need not necessarily be dangerous to others). Compare D.C. Code § 22-3503(1) with D.C. Code § 21-545(b). Commitment as a sexual psychopath does not necessarily occur in the course of a criminal proceeding. D.C. Code § 22-3504(a).

. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Huebner v. State, 33 Wis.2d 505, 147 N.W. 2d 646 (1967); People ex rel. Smith v. Jackson, 37 Ill.2d 379, 227 N.E.2d 366, 369-371 (1967) (Schaefer, J., dissenting); see Rouse v. Cameron, 125 U.S. App.D.C. 366, 367-371, 373 F.2d 451, 452-456 (1967); Cameron v. Mullen, 127 U.S.App.D.C. ___, 387 F.2d 193 (March 2, 1967).

. According to the presentence report, the psychiatrist found that Fuller has an I.Q. of 86 (dull normal); that he has a long-standing personality disorder (passive-aggressive personality) with “marked sexual problems among others;” that there is “definite evidence” of organic brain damage resulting from arteriosclerosis and/or alcoholism; and that he would be dangerous if exposed to alcohol and children. Without some indication of his reasoning, and some explanation of the diagnostic labels, I find incomprehensible the psychiatrist’s conclusion that Fuller is not “commitable to a mental hospital against his will.” The Hospitalization of the Mentally 111 Act provides for involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons who are likely to be dangerous to themselves or others. D.C. Code §§ 21-501, 21-545(b).

. In fashioning an individual program the court may need information and assistance from the various agencies of the District of Columbia Government. See Lake v. Cameron, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 268-69, 364 F.2d 657, 661-662 (1966). If requested, appropriate District Government officials could, no doubt, coordinate the efforts of its departments in making available the necessary services and providing the court with relevant information.