Court Opinion

ID: 9642345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:55:31.039328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:46.365396
License: Public Domain

ON appellant’s second motion for rehearing.
WOODLEY, Judge.
The indictment returned January 8, 1952, charged the offense of murder without malice, alleged to have been committed on or about December 8, 1951.
For the purpose of enhancing the punishment the indictment further alleged that appellant was convicted on September 26, 1946, of robbery by assault, in the 99th District Court of Lubbock County in Cause 2985, and on November 14, 1942, in Cause No. 818, in the 106th District Court of Lynn County of felony theft. The latter conviction was alleged to have become final prior to the commission of the offense of which he was convicted in Cause 2985 in the Lubbock Coúnty District Court. Both convictions were alleged to have occurred prior to the commission of the primary offense of murder without malice.
Such allegations are sufficient to show a repetition of offenses after a prior conviction, as required under the holdings of this court construing Arts. 61 and 63 of our Penal Code to be reform statutes.
Appellant now, for the first time, contends that the evidence does not support the allegations as to the prior convictions.
The record shows that the primary offense of which appellant was convicted was committed on December 8, 1951. There is testimony in the record that the offense of which appellant was convicted in Lubbock County was committed in the spring of the year 1946, and the Lynn County offense in 1942. Appellant was identified as the person who was so convicted in the two previous cases, and certified copies of the judgments and sentences were introduced.
In urging that the proof does not show that the offense for which appellant was convicted in Lubbock County was committed after the conviction in Lynn County on November 14, 1942, became final appellant has apparently overlooked the testimony of the witness F. R. Land, who identified appellant *248as the defendant in said cause and fixed the time of the commission of the offense as in the spring of the year 1946.
Appellant’s second motion for rehearing is overruled.