Court Opinion

ID: 8032491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 03:17:03.40318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:37:01.040186
License: Public Domain

Dean, J.,
dissenting.
While the authorities conflict, in respect of the sole question which is presented by the record,- it does not appear that the great weight of authority supports the rule adopted by the majority. I respectfully submit that a drastic rule, which is admittedly based on a legal fiction, has been adopted, and a reasonable and well-recognized rule of law, which is applicable to the facts, has been ignored.
When the rule, adopted by the majority, is applied in the present case to the facts before us, its injustice is apparent. The contract, as made by the parties, is so simple in form and so clear in expression that it affords no room for strained and technical interpretation. It should be enforced only as made. An element should not be interpolated that was not in the minds of the parties when the contract was made. When the buildings were destroyed, the time fixed by the parties for the delivery of the deed and property to the vendee had not yet arrived.' True, as the opinion suggests, the parties might have agreed, in their contract, as to which of them should suffer the loss of the building in case of fire or other casualty. A sufficient answer is that they made no such agreement. In the language of the opinion, “the contract is silent upon that subject.” Is not the law fulfilled when the contract is enforced to Avhich the parties themselves gave voice? The main opinion, after observing that the contract contains “no express provision as to who should bear the loss,” straightway proceeds to impose the loss, for which the parties made no provision, upon the vendee. This was done by the grace of a legal *315fiction which is said to have originated in England, and which has been adopted in some of the states. The rule is not properly applicable to the facts before us, nor is it supported by the cited English case.
It is elementary that, in the absence of fraud or of mistake or of ambiguity in the terms of a contract, the duty of the court is fully accomplished when it enforces contractual obligations according to the plainly expressed provisions of the contract. The court should not supply material stipulations nor in any case make a contract for the parties. Clearly, the vendor, who was in possession, should be compelled to account to the vendee for the reasonable value of that which he- contracted to deliver but did not deliver. From the viewpoint of natural justice, as some law-writers express it, and from a practical viewpoint and for reasons that are obvious, the party in possession should be holden for the loss. I respectfully submit that the rule to which the majority opinion commits the court has been adopted, not because it appeals to the reason or to the conscience, nor because it is right, but merely because the weight of authority is said to be on that side. The weight of evidence is not determined by counting the witnesses, and by the same token the better rule is not always determined by counting the authorities.
When the authorities conflict as between two opposing rules of law, the court should choose the rule that more nearly accords with reason and with settled principles of equity. The question before us is new in this state, but it has been' discussed at some length in other states. In Wicks v. Bowman, 5 Daly (N. Y.) 225, it was held that, while it may be equitable and just that the vendee should bear the loss where the building is burned down after he enters upon the possession, “it is not just nor equitable to impose it upon him Avhilst the vendor is in possession of the premises.”
Sewell v. Underhill, 197 N. Y. 168, cites and approves the rule of law announced in the Wicks case. But the decision in the Sewell case turned on another point, as *316the discussion of the facts in the body of the opinion discloses. It is there said: “The title was accepted and the contract was consummated, prior to the fire, and what was deferred was the matter of placing the deed and the mortgage upon the records; a formality which it was agreed should operate as a delivery, on either side. There is the further feature of this case that the plaintiff, as vendee, went into the possession of the premises upon the execution of the contract, not as a tenant paying rent, but as their equitable owner and entitled to their beneficial enjoyment.” The Sewell case is cited in the majority opinion, but, in view of the facts in that case, it plainly appears that it does not support the views adopted by the majority in the present case.
Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 134, involved a parol agreement for the purchase of land with its appurtenances. Before a deed was given or tendered the house was destroyed by fire, and it was expressly held, as disclosed in the syllabus, that the vendee “was entitled to recover back the money, on the ground of a failure of the consideration.” In the bocLy of the opinion it was observed that the contract could not be enforced by the vendor, even though it had been commenced in a court of equity, because, the house having been destroyed, the vendor was no longer able to perform his part of the contract. The court then made the terse observation that no reason has been given, nor can be given, why the same principle that applies to the sale and purchase of personal property, that has been destroyed before delivery, should not be applied to real estate. It was declared that there can be no distinction between the two classes of property in this respect. '
Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass. 514, involved facts similar to those before-us. Judge Gray, who wrote the opinion for the court, held that the vendee’s agreement to pay the purchase price contemplated the tender of a deed of the whole estate, including both the land and the buildings, and, the latter having been wholly destroyed by fire be*317fore the day agreed upon for the conveyance, the vendor did not and could not tender such a conveyance as he had agreed to make or as the defendant vendee was bound to accept, and could not therefore maintain any action against the vendee upon the agreement.
In Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 50 L. R. A. 680, it was held that to require a vendor to pay damages to his vendee, for a failure to convey property which subsequent to the execution of the contract of sale was destroyed by fire, is no greater hardship than to require a vendor to pay damages on account of his having ignorantly, though honestly, sold something which he did not own, but which he believed was his own. In Conlin v. Osborn, 161. Cal. 659, it was held that where improvements are destroyed by fire, while in the vendor’s possession, he is excused from further performance of the contract, but in such case he can neither retain purchase money paid nor can he enforce the collection of money remaining unpaid, and the vendee may rescind the contract and recover back money that has been paid or deposited under the contract. The court further observed that, whatever may be the rule in other states, the rule is settled in California. Besides the foregoing authorities the following cases seem to support the, so-called, minority rule: LaChance v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 500; Wilson v. Clark, 60 N. H. 352; Powell v. Dayton, S. & G. R. R. Co., 12 Or. 488; Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. Car. 229; Huguenin v. Courtenay, 21 S. Car. 403, 53 Am. Rep. 688; Smith v. Cansler, 83 Ky. 367; Gould v. Murch, 70 Me. 288, 35 Am. Rep. 325.
Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. Jr. (Eng.) *349, the leading English case, as announced in the majority opinion, is discussed by Chief Justice Daly in the Wicks case, and it is there pointed out by the distinguished chief justice that the English rule, announced by Lord Eldon in the Paine case, was “where the purchaser had expressed himself satisfied with the title, but before the conveyance was prepared the houses were destroyed by fire.” Lord Eldon, with respect to the premises, and the purchaser’s *318relation thereto, expressly declared: “They are vendible as his, chargeable as his, capable of being incumbered as. his; they may be devised as his; they may be assets; and they would descend to his heir.” And that: “The houses being burnt before a conveyance, the purchaser is bound, if he accepted the title.” It appears that in England the vendee prepares the deed, instead of the vendor, as with us, and presents it to the vendor for execution. So that, if the vendee was “satisfied with the title,” it was ■ incumbent on him at once to prepare and present the title deed to the vendor for execution. If he did not do so but delayed, and, in the meantime, loss occurred, such loss was rightfully his. In that view of the facts, and in view of the following English citation, it appears that the Paine case is not an authority that may properly 'be invoked in support of the main opinion. Taking the language of the Paine case, in its usually accepted sense, it plainly appears that the vendee was the owner of the real estate for every purpose known to the law.
Stent v. Bailis 2 P. Wms. (Eng.) 217, 220, is the English case above referred to. It bears date as of 1724. The head note, and the opinion throughout, both bear the imprint of blunt and rugged honesty. The head note reads: “Against natural justice that any one should pay for a bargain which he cannot have.” In the body of the. opinion is this observation': “If I should buy an house, and, before such time as by the articles I am to pay for the same, the house be burned down by casualty of fire, I shall not in equity be bound to pay for the house, and yet the house may be built up again.”
I fear the opinion of the majority contains possibilities of substantial embarrassment to those who may hereafter buy real estate in any form, whether it be a home, a business property, or lands, that have not heretofore obtained in this state. If the vendee must suffer loss by fire, after execution of the contract and while the property is in possession and under control of the vendor, unless he protects himself in advance by his contract, it may be that *319the ingenuity of those who delight in legal fictions will bring about a condition which will compel the vendee, not only to protect himself, in advance, against such loss by fire, but as well from loss arising from judgment liens .that may be obtained after the execution of the contract and before delivery of the deed and of the land, and perhaps, too, from claims of a spouse or of heirs, where a vendor dies in the interval between the date of the contract and the date of such delivery.
Some legal writers refer to the so-called English rule as a legal fiction. It is well named. Legal fictions are .the bane of the law. They should not be permitted to propagate further in this state. Why should we lift the lid from a Pandora box of legal plagues?- There is a better way pointed out in the wholesome rule that prevails in Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, California, Oregon, South Carolina, Georgia, and Kentucky; I submit the “great weight of authority” in this country can scarcely be claimed for a rule of law which does not find support in the jurisdictions just cited. Nor should Stent v. Bailis, 2 P. Wms. (Eng.) 217, be lost sight of. We should adhere to the reasonable rule of law there announced. Where a vendor contracts to deliver an entire estate, it is clear that his obligation is unfulfilled if he delivers only a part of it. Lord Bacon said: “Chancery is ordained to supply the law, not to subvert the law.” 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (14th ed.) title page.
An argument that is advanced in support of the conclusion of the majority opinion is that, if a man buys real estate for an agreed price and pays a part of the earnest money and agrees to pay the remainder on a given date, he is entitled to his bargain, even though in the meantime the value of the land should have appreciated. Even so. The thing is in existence. The land contracted' for is there for delivery, and under the contract the buyer is, of course, entitled to that which he bought. If the land depreciated in value he would, of course, be compelled to *320pay for it, no matter what the depreciation, because the commodity that he bought, all of it, is there for delivery. The argument is not formidable. It is not even plausible, and much less is it conclusive. To illustrate: A. sells to B. for sufficient consideration land bordering on the Missouri river. The contract provides that B. shall pay the purchase price, or the unpaid part thereof, as the case may be, on a future named date, and on that date delivery of the deed and the land is to be made to B. On the day fixed for delivery A. sets out with B. to the farm to deliver to him his purchase. Upon arrival they find that on the preceding day the river changed its course, as is its wont at times, and where the land was, there is now pothing but a gurgling swirl of yellow water. Upon whom shall fall the loss by this act of God? Shall it be the loss of A. who was in possession and who contracted to deliver and now has nothing to deliver and therefore cannot fulfil his contract? Clearly the loss will fall on A., the vendor, because every vestige of that which he agreed to deliver, the res, has been destroyed. But if only that part of the land upon which the buildings were situate was destroyed, and if the vendee did not provide against loss from so calamitous an event in the contract, under the rule announced by the majority, the loss of the engulfed buildings would be his. Reduced to its last analysis there is something about the rule, as applied to -the facts in the present case, that makes it appear almost ridiculous. Clearly a doctrinaire’s rule of law, a legal fiction its progenitor, has been ingrafted upon the jurisprudence of Nebraska.
A contract to deliver an entire estate can no more be fulfilled by delivery of a part of the estate than it can be fulfilled by failing to deliver any part of the estate. It is nowhere asserted that the contract is ambiguous. But, even if it Avere, the construction that the parties themselves placed upon it would prevail. It appears, in the majority opinion, that the vendor collected the insurance, a trifling sum, thereby asserting' an act of ownership. *321But, by tbe grace of judicial compulsion, he paid the insurance money to the vendee, who was not a party to the insurance policy. In view of the fact, however, that, as announced in the main opinion, the sole question is, as to which of the parties shall suffer the loss, the question of insurance is a mere passing incident.
For the reasons herein expressed, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the majority of the court.