Court Opinion

ID: 9844970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:12:52.26728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:48.520376
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
dissenting.
“You can’t tell a book by its cover,” so an old English proverb tells us. Today, the Court rewrites this proverb to allow a statement on a book’s cover to permit a law enforcement officer to seize the book without a warrant. I am unable to join in this opinion. In my view, the plain view doctrine is not applicable to the seizure of a book because of statements on its cover about its contents.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on this question, in a footnote in Lo-Ji Sales Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 2324 n. 5, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979) the Court noted that “materials normally may not be seized on the basis of alleged obscenity without a warrant.”
In United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 829, 107 S.Ct. 110, 93 L.Ed.2d 59 (1986), the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of the seizure of alleged child pornography under the plain view doctrine:
Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the “First Amendment imposes special constraints on searches for and seizures of presumptively protected material ... and requires that the Fourth Amendment be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude’ in such circumstances.” As we have held, “Because of the First Amendment, the seizure of all publications must meet higher procedural standards than normal.”
These “higher procedural standards” take two forms. First, the warrant must specifically describe the material to be seized. Blanket clauses that do not refer to specific items and to material directly related to specific items are not proper bases for constitutional searches and seizures. Second, the exceptions to the warrant requirement are narrowly construed. The plain view exception argued by the government, for example, cannot be used to search for or seize alleged obscenity or alleged child pornography that is unspecified in the warrant. Otherwise, police officers could seize any publication or film they deem to be unprotected by the First Amendment, thereby subverting the higher procedural standards that require a neutral magistrate to make the initial determination of probable cause as to specific items. The fact that child pornography is unprotected by the First Amendment is irrelevant. All expression is presumptively protected at the time of the warrantless seizure; child pornography is no different in this regard from obscenity.
Id. at 1469 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit has recently noted that to the extent Hale stands for the proposition that a stricter probable cause standard should apply when First Amendment values are implicated it has been overruled by New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875, 106 S.Ct. 1610, 1615, 89 L.Ed.2d 871 (1986). U.S. v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1343 n. 6 (9th Cir.1990). P.J. Video does not, however, hold that the plain view doctrine applies to the seizure of a publication thought to contain child pornography. In *588PJ. Video, the Court buttressed its conclusion that a different standard for determining probable cause is not necessary where First Amendment protection is at issue with a reference to “the requirement that the magistrate determine probable cause as a means of safeguarding First Amendment interests.” Allowing an officer to make a probable cause determination under the plain view doctrine based on the reading of a book’s cover is inconsistent with this view.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 108, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) does not undermine the force of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hale rejecting the application of the plain view doctrine to the seizure of alleged child pornography. In Osborne, the Court held that a state may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography. Osborne did not purport to deal with the Fourth Amendment question presented in this case. The opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court in Osborne reveals that the search and seizure of child pornography there was conducted pursuant to a warrant, not pursuant to the plain view doctrine. State v. Osborne, 37 Ohio St.3d 249, 525 N.E.2d 1363, 1372 (1988).
The fact that the cover of The Ugly Duckling referred to its being “Completely Photo-Illustrated” should not be considered as a substitute for a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on a determination of probable cause. To do so would weaken the presumption that all publications are protected under the First Amendment.
I do not gainsay the right of the state to seek a warrant for the search and seizure of The Ugly Duckling based on information provided by the officers who executed the warrant for the search of Claiborne’s residence. Nor do I contend that the state could not prosecute Claiborne if the book were seized pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate. What I do find erroneous is permitting the seizure of the book without a warrant issued after a determination of probable cause by a magistrate. The application of the plain view doctrine in this case puts law enforcement officers in the position of determining what is entitled to First Amendment protection.
BISTLINE, J., concurs.