Court Opinion

ID: 9473260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:24:37.226921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:25.237544
License: Public Domain

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
There is no case or controversy before the court and I dissent from the decision of a now hypothetical question. It is tempting to decide the merits of this case, simple as they are, and lay the matter to rest. But we cannot pretermit the question of mootness, because mootness is a matter of Article III power.
Appellants have complied with the subpoenas they would have us hold were improperly issued. If they had prevailed on the merits of their challenge, we could have given them no relief. We have many times concluded that compliance with an IRS subpoena seeking production of testimony and records renders an appeal from an enforcement action moot. United States v. Sweet, 655 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. First American Bank, 649 F.2d 288 (5th Cir.1981); Baldridge v. United States, 406 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.1969); Lawhon v. United *718States, 390 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968). This ease is no different.
Appellants suggest that the case falls within a narrow band of controversies which are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Ordinarily, this doctrine applies when challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated and there is a reasonable expectation that the same party will be subjected to the same action again. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1972). There is no pattern of regulatory activity undertaken by HUD which will necessarily implicate the concerns of the appellants. Appellants claim to be the owners of a great number of apartment houses, but action by HUD results only on complaint of third parties. To find this possibility as “capable” of repetition reads “capable” in a too speculative manner. There is a point at which there is no longer a controversy. I draw the line short of appellants’ present contention.
Finally, a future enforcement action will “escape” review only if appellants again choose to obey the subpoenas. That is, to conclude that this case would yet escape review effectively overturns our settled rule that such subpoenas cannot be attacked by persons obeying them. There is no exigency here to drive our reading of Article III beyond that created by the appellants. Thus this case differs from cases presenting a temporary status such as pregnancy, a residency requirement, or student enrollment, where the change in status is not a procedural choice of the litigant but rather is inherently vulnerable to the time required for judicial decisionmaking.