Court Opinion

ID: 9730643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:19:13.079217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:57.488634
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Bobbitt, J.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion for the following reasons:
*409Warner v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 426, 143 N. E. 288, upon which the majority opinion is based, has no application to the facts in this case. In the Warner case defendant-Warner was arraigned and entered a plea of guilty on April 23, 1921. On May 11, 1921 he was released on his own recognizance pending further order of the court. On October 2, 1922, defendant was produced in court by the sheriff under order of the court, at which time judgment was entered that he be fined and committed to the Indiana State Prison.
It was there asserted that the court had lost jurisdiction to pronounce judgment and sentence Warner after his having been released on his own recognizance for approximately 18 months after his plea of guilty and before judgment was entered on his plea.
The decision in that case was based upon a statute.1 At page 430 of 194 Ind., this court said:
“Under the common law and early practise generally in the jurisdictions of the states the trial court was not confined closely as to time when judgment was to be pronounced, either upon a plea of guilty or upon finding of verdict of guilty, but might withhold rendering judgment. Even under statute, this court has held that the trial court may withhold sentence until a time certain for a definite and valid reason. But in the face of the statute which requires that the accused shall be sentenced upon his plea of guilty, or be placed in the custody of the sheriff until sentenced, the sentence and rendition of judgment may not be prolonged for an indefinite and uncertain period of time. That part of §2073, Burns’ 1914, Acts 1905, p. 584, §202, applicable to this case, is: ‘If the accused plead guilty, said plea shall be entered on the minutes, and he shall be sentenced, or he *410may be placed in the custody of the sheriff until sentenced;’ . . .”
The rule which the majority opinion would apply in the case now before us is stated at page 431 of 194 Ind. as follows:
“Under the statutes of our own state, and as pronounced by the decisions of the appellate courts generally, the rule is well settled that it is the duty of the court upon a plea of guilty or upon a finding or verdict of guilty, to impose sentence at that time unless there is reasonable excuse for delay, which delay must be for a time certain for a definite recognized legal purpose, and that an indefinite postponement of rendering judgment or pronouncing sentence will deprive the court of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, from which it follows that a subsequent sentence is void.” (My italics.)
It will be noted that the rule as above stated prescribes the duty of the court upon a plea of guilty or upon a finding or a verdict of guilty. It does not attempt to say when the court shall render a finding of guilty or not guilty when a trial is had by the court upon a plea of not guilty as is the situation in the case at bar. Here there has been no plea of guilty. Appellant was tried by the court on his plea of not guilty and on May 3, 1952, the hearing of evidence was concluded and the cause taken under advisement. On July 12, 1952 the matter was continued under advisement as to finding and judgment “so long as defendant remains in the Indiana Epileptic Village, New Castle, Indiana, and complies with their rules and regulations.”
A finding of guilty was not entered until April 18, 1953, when appellant-defendant was brought before the court on an information filed by the prosecuting attorney that he had escaped from the Epileptic Village at New Castle, and sentence was pronounced im*411mediately upon the finding of guilty in full compliance with the rule as stated in the Warner case.
It cannot be said that appellant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial without delay has been violated. He had a trial without undue delay, and since he acquiesced in the action of the court wherein the cause was held under advisement for approximately one year, he cannot now complain that he was denied his rights under Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution.
The trial court here had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, of the person, and of the particular class of cases, and this jurisdiction continued and the court’s duty was not completed until sentence was pronounced on April 18, 1953. The case remained pending and continued with the unfinished business of the court from term to term until the court’s duty was completed by the final disposition of all the matters submitted to it. Miller & Babbs v. Hall (1933), Tex. Civ. App., 62 S. W. 2d 165, 166; Moroney v. Tannehill (1923), 90 Okla. 224, 215 Pac. 938, 942; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Muse (1919), 109 Tex. 352, 207 S. W. 897, 4 A. L. R. 613, 616; Commonwealth v. Vaughn (1948), 64 Pa. D. & C. 320, 323.
In the absence of a rule of court on this subject the matter of the time when a judge may decide a case submitted to him for decision is as much a matter of judicial discretion and judgment as the matter of how he may decide it. Wyatt v. Arnot (1907), 7 Cal. App. 221, 94 Pac. 86, 89; Barnes v. Benham (1904), 13 Okla. 582, 75 Pac. 1130.
The legislature of Indiana attempted by statute2 to limit the time within which a trial court might hold a case under advisement. However, this provision was declared unconstitutional as being a legislative inter*412ference with the judiciary. State ex rel. Kostas v. Johnson (1946), 224 Ind. 540, 550, 69 N. E. 2d 592, 168 A. L. R. 1118.
This court recognized the principle that a trial court does not lose jurisdiction by taking a case under advisement beyond the end of a term, and provided a remedy for litigants whose cases were being held under advisement indefinitely by trial judges and a method of preventing an abuse of the court’s discretion as to the time of deciding issues by the adoption of Rule 1-13.3
This rule was in effect at the time appellant’s case was taken under advisement. If appellant, at any time, felt that the trial court was abusing its discretion in holding his case under advisement in the manner shown by the record, his remedy was to invoke the provisions of said Rule 1-13. I know of no other rule of court or of any statute in this state which requires a trial judge to decide a case, either civil or criminal, within any specified time after it has been submitted to him.
It has been held in numerous jurisdictions where a decision of a cause is carried over by a proper entry *413such as curia advisari vult the judgment may be rendered at a subsequent term. People v. Noonan (1917), 276 Ill. 430, 437, 114 N. E. 928, 931; Moroney v. Tannehill (1923), 90 Okla. 224, 215 Pac. 938, 942, supra; Bookhart v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1939), 226 Iowa 1186, 286 N. W. 417; Tarpenning v. Cannon (1882), 28 Kan. 665, 667; Hoffman v. Hoffman (1943), 156 Kan. 647, 135 P. 2d 887, 892; Ditch, Ex’r, etc. v. Trustees of Shurtleff College (1881), 8 Ill. App. 294.
Applying the rule of expressio unius exclusio alterius to Eule 1-10, Eules Ind. Sup. Ct., 1954 Ed., Eule 1-13, supra, is applicable in criminal cases as well as civil cases.
I would sustain the judgment of the trial court.

. Acts 1941, ch. 148, §11, p. 447, being §9-1203, Burns’ 1942 Replacement.
See also: Smith v. State (1919), 188 Ind. 64, 121 N. E. 829, 3 A. L. R. 999; Varish v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 358, 163 N. E. 513.

. Section 2-2102, Burns’ 1946 Replacement.

. Rule 1-13. Time for Holding Issue Under Advisement. Whenever any issue of law or fact shall hereafter be submitted to the court for trial, ruling, or decision, and the judge shall take the same under advisement, the court shall not hold the same under advisement for more than ninety (90) days; but_if the court wherein said issues áre pending be then in vacation, he shall make his determination therein on the first day of the next succeeding term. Provided, that if the judge shall fail to determine any issue of law or fact within the time above reserved, then upon written application of any of the parties to the action or their attorneys of record duly filed in the office of the Clerk of said court and called to the attention of said judge before the announcement of the decision of the issue in question, the submission of said issue shall thereupon be withdrawn and the judge before whom said cause is pending shall be disqualified to hear or determine any of the issues in said cause, and a special judge shall be appointed to take jurisdiction thereof under the same rules and regulations prescribed by law in cases where the judge is disqualified for hearing a given cause.
With respect to any such issues under advisement on the date of the adoption of this rule, the ninety (90) day limitation shall begin to run from the date of its adoption. (Adopted April 30, 1952.) (My italics.)