Court Opinion

ID: 9589146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:41:40.487901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:52.765704
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, “we need only consider whether Comes, supra [ITT Continental Baking Co. v. Comes, 165 Ga. App. 598 (302 SE2d 137) (1983)], controls the decision here.” The ALJ based its findings upon this cited case, and this is the case relied upon by the superior court in its reversal of the full board, which had in turn reversed the ALJ. The Comes case is only a two-judge decision, and thus does not have precedential value. However, in the instant whole court case, this court has the opportunity to adopt the holding in Comes, which would in turn breathe life into it and give it precedential value. While the majority opinion cites Longman’s Dictionary of Psychology & Psychiatry (1984) and 15 Encyclopaedia Brittanica 176 to bolster its position that an independent post traumatic stress syndrome has now occurred, nevertheless, I believe the trial court was correct in categorizing the particular, limited depression and anxiety here as a residual part of the narrow, normal and natural responses to reliving the memory of a traumatic 225-foot fall from a tower at Three Mile Island. The adoption by the whole court of the Comes principle would require affirming the trial court.
The majority also cites and relies upon Sawyer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 298, 301 (233 SE2d 227) (1977). In that particular case, the claimant had a deep preoccupation in the area of religion and homosexuality (relating to his interpretation of his feelings toward the younger boys in his charge). He claimed to be a child sent by God to spread love to the world. He further contended that from working two years as a group leader to help 16-to-18-year-old young boys through treatment and psychological rehabilitation, he became addicted to the treatment and acutely psychotic. It is my considered opinion that we went too far in that case in holding that there was a viable claim based on the possible triggering of psychological injury notwithstanding the absence of a physical impact. The impact from the vehicle accident there was irrelevant to our decision. See Williams v. ARA Environmental Svcs., 175 Ga. App. 661, 662 (334 SE2d 192) (1985), and also Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 (160 SE2d 424) (1968). We should have followed the latter cited case, which held on page 314, that while mental illness “is as real as pneumonia, like pneumonia it is an illness. It is not an ‘injury’ by ‘accident.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Having authored Sawyer, supra, I now propose that we declare Sawyer too extravagant and painted with too broad a *72brush, and that we now reconsider and overrule it. “[W]e are faced with the alternative of eating crow or perpetuating the error. It is better to eat crow than to perpetuate an error. The crow is not rationed and the approval of conscience will more than compensate for the eating.” American Can Co. v. City of Tampa, 14 S2d 203, 211 (Fla. 1943).
Decided July 16, 1986
Rehearing denied July 31, 1986
Meg Tysinger Hartin, for appellant.
Richard G. Farnsworth, John Williams, for appellee.
In summary, the whole court should (a) adopt the rule in Comes, (b) overrule Sawyer and (c) affirm the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Sognier join in this dissent. Chief Judge Banke concurs in the judgment only of this dissent.