Court Opinion

ID: 9368159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 21:02:59.021704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.942559
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/2/23 P. v. Shabazz CA2/1
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                        B319901

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                    Super. Ct. No. BA047906)
           v.

 JOSHUA SHABAZZ,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
     John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                           ________________________________
       Joshua Shabazz appeals from an order denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6
(former section 1170.95).2 His appointed appellate counsel filed
a brief identifying no issues on appeal and requesting that we
independently review the record to determine whether there are
any arguable issues pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436. Although Shabazz is not entitled to Wende review of the
challenged order (see People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216,
226 (Delgadillo)), we nevertheless conduct that review because
this court did not inform Shabazz that we may deem his appeal
abandoned if he did not file a supplemental brief. Based on that
review, we find no arguable issues and affirm the court’s order.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       In October 1991, Shabazz shot Carl Sturdivant in the chest
with a shotgun from a distance of about eight feet. Sturdivant died
as a result.
       The District Attorney charged Shabazz with murder and
alleged that he personally used a firearm in committing the crime.
       Shabazz testified in his defense at trial and asserted that he
shot Sturdivant in self-defense.
       The jury convicted Shabazz of murder in the second degree
and found true the firearm allegation. The court sentenced him
to prison for 24 years to life. We affirmed the judgment in an
unpublished opinion. (People v. Shabazz (Apr. 29, 1997, B101604).)

      1Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
      2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in its text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).
For the sake of consistency, we will refer to the current statutory
designation.

                                   2
       On March 30, 2022, Shabazz filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, in which he requested the appointment of
counsel. Shabazz used a preprinted form that provided checkboxes
corresponding to the statutory requirements for a facially sufficient
petition under section 1172.6. (See § 1172.6, subds. (a), (b)(1).)
Shabazz did not check the box next to the statement that he was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter.3
       In a statement attached to the petition, Shabazz asserts that
he could not now be convicted of murder because he was convicted
of second degree murder and “the prosecution did not prove any
kind of deliberate premed[ita]tion or malice in [his] murder trial.”
He states further that he “was the only witness to the shooting,”
and asks rhetorically, “how could the prosecution prove murder
when the court records [show] there was no prosecution witnesses
to the shooting . . . ?”
       On March 30, 2022, the superior court summarily denied
the petition “because it is facially insufficient to establish that
[Shabazz] is legally eligible for resentencing.”
       Shabazz filed a timely notice of appeal.
       As noted at the outset, Shabazz’s counsel filed a brief
identifying no issues on appeal and requesting that we
independently review the record to determine whether there are
any arguable issues pursuant to Wende.
       According to counsel’s declaration, counsel informed Shabazz
of his intention to file the Wende brief and of Shabazz’s right to file

      3 The form Shabazz used states that it has two pages, but
only the first page is included in our record. Shabazz’s counsel
sought to augment the record pursuant to California Rules of Court,
rule 8.320 with additional pages of the petition “if they exist.” The
superior court clerk, however, indicated that no additional pages
are in the court’s file.

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a supplemental brief. On December 5, 2022, counsel filed his brief
and sent a copy of the brief to Shabazz.
       On December 5, 2022, this court’s clerk sent a letter to
Shabazz informing him that his counsel had filed a brief pursuant
to Wende, and stating that Shabazz may submit a supplemental
brief or letter stating any ground for appeal or contentions or
argument he wishes us to consider.
       Neither Shabazz’s counsel nor this court informed Shabazz
that the failure to file a supplemental brief might be deemed an
abandonment of his appeal and result in its dismissal.
       Shabazz did not file a supplemental brief.

                          DISCUSSION
       In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437), which abolished the natural
and probable consequences doctrine in cases of murder, and limited
the application of the felony-murder doctrine. (See People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.) Senate Bill No. 1437 also enacted
section 1172.6, which provides a procedure whereby a defendant
“convicted of felony murder” may file a petition to have the murder
conviction vacated and “be resentenced on any remaining counts.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) A defendant makes a prima facie case
for relief under this section if, among other requirements, the
defendant “could not presently be convicted of murder” under
the amendments to sections 188 or 189 that became effective
on January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) If the petitioner
sets forth a “facially sufficient” petition, he or she is entitled to
the appointment of counsel, if requested. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 970.) An error in failing to appoint counsel and
summarily denying a petition is harmless if the record of conviction
establishes as a matter of law that defendant was convicted under
a theory of murder that remains valid after the effective date of

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Senate Bill No. 1437. (People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666,
677−678, review granted Feb. 24, 2021, S266336, review dism.
Dec. 1, 2021.)
       In Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, our Supreme Court
considered the procedures “Courts of Appeal must follow when
counsel determines that an appeal from an order denying
postconviction relief under [section 1172.6] lacks arguable
merit and . . . whether defendants are entitled to notice of these
procedures.” (Delgadillo, supra, at p. 221.) The appellant in that
case had appealed from the denial of a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. (Delgadillo, supra, at p. 223.) Appellant’s
appointed counsel filed a brief specifying no issues on appeal and
requesting the court conduct an independent review of the record
in accordance with Wende. The Court of Appeal informed the
appellant by letter that his counsel had filed a Wende brief and
that the appellant may file a supplemental brief with the court.
(Delgadillo, supra, at pp. 223−224.) The court did not inform the
appellant that the court would dismiss the appeal as abandoned if
no supplemental brief was filed. (Id. at p. 233.) The appellant did
not file a supplemental brief. (Id. at p. 224.)
       The Delgadillo court held that the procedures established in
Wende do not apply to an appeal from the denial of postconviction
relief under section 1172.6. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 226, 231.) Instead, “[w]hen appointed counsel finds no arguable
issues to be pursued on appeal[,] . . . the court should send, with
a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and that
if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the
matter.” (Id. at pp. 231−232.)
       Applying this principle to the facts in the case, the Supreme
Court explained that the Court of Appeal’s letter to the appellant,
which cited Wende, provided notice to the appellant that “directly

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implicates the core holding of Wende,” that is, that the court is
required “ ‘to conduct a review of the entire record whenever
appointed counsel submits a brief which raises no specific issues
or describes the appeal as frivolous. This obligation is triggered
by the receipt of such a brief from counsel and does not depend on
the subsequent receipt of a brief from the defendant personally.’ ”
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.) The court stated that the
appellant “reasonably could have concluded from this notice that
the Wende procedures would apply and that the Court of Appeal
would conduct an independent review of the record, even absent
a supplemental brief— even though the Court of Appeal later
determined, without providing an opportunity to be heard on the
matter, that Wende was inapplicable. The notice further did not
inform [the appellant] that the appeal would be dismissed as
abandoned if no supplemental brief or letter were filed.”
(Delgadillo, supra, at p. 233.) In Delgadillo, the Attorney General
conceded that the Court of Appeal “should ordinarily ‘give the
appellant clear notice that the court will dismiss the appeal as
abandoned if no supplemental brief is received.’ ” (Ibid.)
       The Supreme Court held, however, that despite the Court
of Appeal’s “suboptimal” notice to the appellant, the court could
“determine, based on [its] independent review of the record, that
[the appellant] is not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6.
Indeed, the record [in Delgadillo] makes clear that [the appellant]
was the actual killer and the only participant in the killing.”
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.) Thus, although the
Court of Appeal did not comply with the procedure announced in
Delgadillo that the court inform appellants that it may dismiss
their appeal as abandoned in the absence of a supplemental brief,
a reviewing court may nevertheless affirm the challenged order by,
in effect, conducting the “independent review of the record” (ibid.)
required under Wende.

                                  6
       Here, as in Delgadillo, this court informed Shabazz that
his counsel had “filed an appellant’s opening brief that raises no
issues,” citing Wende. The notice, like the notice in Delgadillo,
informed appellant that he may submit a supplemental brief, but
failed to inform him that the court may deem his appeal abandoned
and dismiss it on that basis if he does not file a supplemental brief.
       As in Delgadillo, we may nevertheless affirm the court’s
order if we “determine, based on our independent review of the
record, that [the appellant] is not entitled to any relief under
section 1172.6.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.)
       Here, the court summarily denied Shabazz’s section 1172.6
petition “because it is facially insufficient to establish that
[Shabazz] is legally eligible for resentencing.” The only apparent
basis for reaching this conclusion is Shabazz’s failure to check the
box on his printed petition to indicate that he was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter. The unchecked box,
however, does not necessarily warrant the denial of counsel or the
summary denial of the petition. Section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3)
provides that “[u]pon receiving . . . a petition where any missing
information can readily be ascertained by the court, if the petitioner
has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent
the petitioner.” Here, the court could have readily ascertained the
omitted fact that Shabazz had been convicted of murder. The jury’s
verdict, the sentencing record, the abstract of judgment, and our
prior opinion each establish that Shabazz was convicted of murder.
Indeed, Shabazz’s statement accompanying his petition states that
he was “convicted of second degree murder.” It was thus error to
deny Shabazz appointed counsel based on the insufficiency of the
petition.
       The court’s failure to appoint counsel and its summary denial
of a section 1172.6 petition when the petition is facially sufficient
(or its sufficiency can be readily ascertained from the record) is

                                  7
harmless if the record of conviction establishes as a matter of law
that defendant was convicted under a theory of murder that
remains valid after Senate Bill No. 1437. (People v. Daniel, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 677−678.)
       Here, the record of conviction establishes that Shabazz, like
the appellant in Delgadillo, “was the actual killer and the only
participant in the killing.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.)
Shabazz did not deny these facts; his defense at trial was that
he killed Sturdivant in self-defense. This case did not involve,
and Shabazz did not assert in his resentencing petition that it
did involve, either the felony-murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrines that were narrowed or eliminated as
theories of murder by Senate Bill No. 1437. Thus, as in Delgadillo,
we can “determine, based on our independent review of the
record that [the appellant] is not entitled to any relief under
section 1172.6.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.)
We therefore affirm the order denying Shabazz’s petition for
resentencing.

                                   8
                         DISPOSITION
       The court’s March 30, 2022 order denying Shabazz’s petition
for resentencing is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                         ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                 CHANEY, J.

                 WEINGART, J.

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