Court Opinion

ID: 9874651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 22:12:46.327493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:51.246864
License: Public Domain

Crothers, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
[¶ 35] I agree with the Majority opinion except Part V on attorneys fees. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the decision.
[¶ 36] The district court awarded $7,000 of Chad Lizakowski’s claimed $28,000 in attorneys fees. The ruling was a blend of payment under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23 based on need and ability to pay, and as a sanction for Laura Lizakowski’s discovery misconduct. In a similar case, I noted as follows:
“Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23, the primary standard governing an award of attorney fees in a divorce action is one spouse’s needs and the other spouse’s ability to pay. Under that statute, we have recognized that where a party’s actions have unreasonably increased the time spent on a case, attorney fees may be appropriate.
“A district court also has inherent authority to sanction a litigant for misconduct. ‘Sanctions must be reasonably proportionate to the misconduct.’ When sanctioning a party for misconduct, a district court should consider and make findings on the culpability or state of mind of the party against whom sanctions are being imposed, the prejudice to the moving party, the impact of the pi’ej-udice on the moving party’s ability to present or defend the party’s case, and the availability of less severe sanctions. “A district court has discretion in awarding attorney fees as a sanction in divorce actions. An award of attorney fees as a sanction will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court abuses its discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, when it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination.”
Walstad v. Walstad, 2013 ND 176, ¶ 61, 837 N.W.2d 911, (Crothers, J., dissenting) (quotation and citations omitted).
[¶ 37] While I agree the district court should not have considered Chad Lizakow-ski’s self-limiting employment, the Majority does not reverse to fix that error. Instead, the Majority’s sweeping mandate is to award Chad Lizakowski more money. I disagree with that broad directive because overall the district court considered the appropriate and competing factors in this case.
[¶ 38] Instead of relying on the district court’s exercise of discretion when balancing the appropriate and relevant factors and considerations, the Majority focuses only on the financial impact on Chad Liza-kowski under the fee award:
“The remaining fees in this case, if the figure should remain at the amount the *521district court found, would almost completely deplete Chad Lizakowski’s award of temporary spousal support. While Chad Lizakowski will have liquid assets after the cash equalization payment is paid, he ‘need not dissipate [his] property award for living expenses.’ Jorgenson v. Ratajczak, 1999 ND 65, ¶ 19, 592 N.W.2d 527. Chad Lizakowski would be required to dispense with roughly one-fourth of his cash equalization payment in order to pay his attorney fees.”
Majority opinion, at ¶ 29.
[¶ 39] The Majority’s math is wrong in saying that full payment of his attorney fees “would be required to dispense with roughly one-fourth of his cash equalization payment in order to pay attorney fees.” Id. at ¶29. He was not required to pay all of his attorney fees; Laura Lizakowski has been ordered to pay $7,000 of them. Also, absent from the Majority’s discussion is the impact on Laura Lizakowski, who was required to promptly pay Chad Lizakowski $100,000, refinance the home mortgage and pay nearly all of the parties’ debts. In the district court’s words:
“The basis of this amount considers, in part, that Laura has greater earnings; she likely will need to finance this cash property distribution; she has been allocated a large percentage of the marital debt whereas Chad takes the property debt free with only limited debt largely attributed to his attorney’s fees. He also will have supplemental income as a result of this decree, both in terms of spousal support for twenty-four months and child support.”
[¶ 40] When both sides of the financial ledger are considered, and recognizing our abuse of discretion standard of review, I submit the district court reached a result that should be affirmed.
[¶ 41] Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers