Court Opinion

ID: 9884285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:51:05.715537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.311676
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
concurring in result in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in result in part and dissent in part. I agree with Judge May that this case should be remanded in order to allow the trial court to either grant or deny the motion to expunge on a statutorily permitted basis. I also agree with Judge May that the statute of limitations for an offense is not the appropriate guideline to determine whether a petition for expungement may be granted. After all, if a person is falsely arrested for murder or any Class A felony, would that mean expungement of the arrest could never be allowed because there is no statute of limitations for those offenses? See Ind.Code § 35-41-4-2. That cannot be what the legislature intended.
I admit that there certainly could be situations in which a person is not immediately charged for an offense after being arrested, but expungement of the arrest still would be improper. In some cases, for example, prosecutors may decide that further investigation of a suspect is necessary before deciding whether to formally file charges. If that is the reason why no charges have been filed immediately after an arrest, the prosecutor should file a response to that effect under subsection (d) of the expungement statute. Subsection (d)(3)(B) then would permit a trial court to summarily deny an expungement petition if the trial court determines it would be premature to expunge an arrest because of an ongoing investigation. The mere fact that the statute of limitations has not passed for that offense, however, is not by itself sufficient to deny an expungement petition.
The prosecutor here did not file a response to Gerber's expungement petition within the time allotted by subsection (d). Although I understand the concern that raises, I agree with Judge May that this *393failure does not automatically entitle Gerber to expungement of his arrest. I part ways, however, from her conclusion that participation by the prosecutor "should not be permitted on remand." Op. p. 391. "Participation" can take‘many shapes and forms. For example, the prosecutor could inform the trial court of legal matters related to the petition, or notify the trial court that an alleged victim opposes ex-pungement, even if the prosecutor him or herself does not actively oppose it. I would permit this type of "participation" in this case on remand. I believe a blanket statement prohibiting the prosecutor's "participation" could unfairly and, perhaps unknowingly, inhibit conduct that would otherwise be both proper and helpful.