Court Opinion

ID: 9403952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 21:00:42.673593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:10.073618
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4404

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        TERRANCE ANTHONY MOORE,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00164-BO-1)

        Submitted: May 1, 2023                                            Decided: June 20, 2023

        Before DIAZ and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMAS, STYERS & MAY, PLLC,
        Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney,
        David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant
        United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               A jury convicted Terrance Anthony Moore of being a felon in possession of a

        firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Moore argues that the district

        court failed to adequately ensure that he was competent to waive his right to counsel and

        in allowing him to represent himself at trial. We affirm.

               The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the right to be represented by counsel

        but also the right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).

        The record must demonstrate that the defendant’s decision to represent himself was clear,

        knowing, and intelligent. United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2021). “To

        waive counsel, a defendant must also be mentally competent.” Id. “[A] defendant is

        competent to waive his right to counsel when he (1) has sufficient present ability to consult

        with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and (2) he has a rational

        as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Id. at 227 (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               “The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to

        counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding

        that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. (internal

        quotation marks omitted). The district court must make the defendant “‘aware of the

        dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he

        knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” United States v. Bush,

        404 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835). We do not, however,

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        require “[a] precise procedure or litany for this evaluation.” United States v. Singleton,

        107 F.3d 1091, 1097 (4th Cir. 1997). *

               Beginning with Moore’s argument that the district court failed to adequately ensure

        that he was competent to represent himself at trial, “[w]e review the district court’s

        competency determination for clear error.” United States v. Roof, 10 F.4th 314, 341 n.8

        (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 303 (2022). We

        reverse for clear error only “if our review of the entire record leaves us with the definite

        and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Nunez-Garcia,

        31 F.4th 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Here, Moore expressed his desire to waive counsel and proceed pro se at trial, and

        the district court granted his request. The court had previously ordered Moore to undergo

        a competency evaluation, which concluded that Moore was not suffering from a mental

        disease that would impact his capacity to work with his attorney or understand the nature

        and consequences of the criminal proceedings and that Moore was competent to stand trial.

        At a later arraignment, Moore stipulated that he was competent.

               Moore acknowledges in this appeal that the evaluation found him competent to

        stand trial, but he contends that it offered no opinion as to whether he was competent to

               *
                 The parties disagree about the standard of review applicable to Moore’s waiver of
        his right to counsel. However, because Moore’s arguments fail under both plain error and
        de novo review, we decline to reach the issue here. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 739
        F.3d 633, 645 (11th Cir. 2014) (declining to determine standard of review when
        defendant’s challenge to the validity of his waiver of right to counsel fails under both plain
        error and de novo review).

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        represent himself at trial. Moore argues that Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008),

        supports his assertion that the district court should have ordered an additional psychiatric

        or psychological examination to determine whether he was competent to conduct trial

        proceedings. To be sure, the Supreme Court in Edwards recognized that a different or

        higher standard might be appropriate when considering a defendant’s competency to

        conduct trial proceedings versus his competency to merely stand trial. 554 U.S. at 172-77.

        However, we have expressly rejected a conclusion that Edwards created any rule

        compelling trial courts to deny self-representation in certain situations. United States v.

        Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that rule from Edwards is “permissive”

        and does not create any “pronouncement of a requirement”); see Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178

        (“[T]he Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those

        competent enough to stand trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the

        point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” (emphasis

        added)). Instead, under Edwards, a district court’s finding that a defendant was competent

        to stand trial neither compels nor bars the court from finding him competent to represent

        himself at trial. Bernard, 708 F.3d at 590 (“[A] court may constitutionally permit a

        defendant to represent himself so long as he is competent to stand trial.”).

               When determining whether to permit Moore to waive counsel and represent himself

        at trial, the district court noted that the competency evaluation had concluded that Moore

        was competent to stand trial, and the court then confirmed those findings with Moore. This

        was sufficient for the district court to find Moore competent to waive his right to counsel

        and represent himself at trial. See United States v. Turner, 644 F.3d 713, 724 (8th Cir.

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        2011) (noting that Edwards “does not mandate two separate competency findings for every

        defendant who seeks to proceed pro se”). In any event, the record also confirms that Moore

        appropriately responded to the district court’s concerns about his self-representation and

        that he understood the nature of the proceedings, further supporting the court’s finding that

        Moore was competent to proceed pro se. See Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1098 (observing that

        defendant’s colloquy with district court about proceeding pro se at trial demonstrated

        defendant knowingly and competently waived his right to counsel). Therefore, the district

        court did not err in finding Moore competent to waive his right to counsel.

               Furthermore, our examination of the record confirms that Moore’s decision to waive

        his right to counsel and proceed pro se was clear, knowing, and intelligent. The district

        court advised Moore of the limitations he might face if he proceeded pro se, including that

        he would not be allowed to leave the defense table in the courtroom or interrupt witnesses

        and that it may be difficult for him to testify without the assistance of counsel. Nonetheless,

        Moore repeatedly stressed his desire to proceed pro se, rejecting the various opportunities

        provided by the district court for him to reconsider his decision.

               Finally, Moore contends that his ineffectual self-representation at trial was evidence

        of the fact that he was not competent to represent himself. However, “the competence that

        is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive

        the right, not the competence to represent himself.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399

        (1993); see Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 227 (“All that is required is the competence to waive the

        right to counsel—not the competence to effectively represent oneself.”). Indeed, “while it

        is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with

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        counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts, a criminal defendant’s ability to

        represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation.”

        Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400 (cleaned up).

               Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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