Court Opinion

ID: 9522366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:24:00.080352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:40.240782
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion in this case for two reasons. First, I do not agree that the appellant was adequately advised of his right to a public and *273speedy trial. We have repeatedly held that there must be strict compliance with Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3 (Burns 1979 Repl). Garringer v. State, (1983) Ind., 455 N.E.2d 335; German v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234. And we have also held that "[iln order for rights to be voluntarily waived, they must be known and understood at the time of the waiver." Early v. State, (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (emphasis in original). The majority here, however, relies on a discussion that occurred three weeks earlier when the appellant was still pleading not guilty. The majority finds that the trial judge by reminding the appellant of this conversation "conveyed the idea" that the trial would be public, and states that it would have been illogical for the court to have addressed the function and composition of the jury. I find nothing illogical about requiring the trial judge to comply with the mandates of the statute and with the cases that have construed it. Furthermore, the majority only dealt with half of the problem when it: held that the appellant "was adequately informed of his right to a public trial ...." The statute requires that the appellant be advised of his right to a public and speedy trial. Therefore, I believe the appellant's plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given.
My second reason for this dissent is that I believe that the appellant was entitled to a fact-finding hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. While I express no opinion as to the other issues of material fact claimed by appellant, I do not see how the majority can hold that the petition conclusively demonstrated that the appellant was not entitled to relief on the issue of a proper advisement. Nothing here is conclusive; the fact that the majority reaches a result different from the Court of Appeals demonstrates that this is not a case capable of only one outcome. The majority is, in effect, saying that after a Court of Appeals' decision, a decision on rehearing, and our opinion vacating the Court of Appeals' result, the petition demonstrated conclusively that the appellant was not entitled to relief. I do not agree with this logic. The appellant should have had the benefit of a fact-finding hearing.
I therefore dissent to the majority opinion.
PRENTICE, J., concurs.