Court Opinion

ID: 9788589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:09:35.45125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:41.784847
License: Public Domain

LASKER, District Judge
(concurring and dissenting).
I concur with my brothers that there is no merit to the plaintiff’s statutory claim.
I dissent on the constitutional issue as to whether the Supreme Court’s holding last term in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, requiring a due process hearing before the termination of welfare benefits, compels a similar proceeding before the termination of unemployment compensation. The majority holds that it does not, relying exclusively on the distinction between the need of the welfare recipient compared to that of an unemployment compensation recipient. I recognize that in Goldberg both the three-judge court and the Supreme Court stressed, as a key factor, the “brutal need” of the welfare recipient. I differ with my brothers in that I cannot conclude as easily as they that a benefi*439eiary of unemployment compensation whose payments are terminated does not often fall within the category of “brutal need.” Indeed, such evidence as exists in the record of this case establishes that for the year 1967, 42 percent of the claimants for unemployment benefits had an annual income of less than $3,000 and 75 percent an annual income of less than $5,000.1 Since the record also demonstrates that the average disputed compensation case takes 45 days 2 for determination, during which period no benefits are paid, it is clear that there are often cases in which, because of delay in the administrative process and personal lack of resources, those deprived of unemployment compensation are in dire straits. Indeed, as to the question of delay, the majority opinion itself points out that one of the primary advantages of a post-termination hearing (as presently occurs) is that it allows the government to make its determination as to whether a claimant is entitled to benefits “without undue pressure for unnecessary speed in making that determination.” Nor is it an adequate answer that welfare benefits are then available. One does not automatically become entitled to welfare benefits on the termination of unemployment compensation. Indeed, the reports of the public press 3 indicate that the experience of New York City taxi drivers in the recent taxi strike was to the contrary. As strikers they were not eligible for unemployment compensation, and those without savings had no fail-back but welfare. However, arrangements to secure welfare assistance were so complicated and time-consuming that some were evicted or on the abyss of eviction from their homes before relief could be secured. Surely this is a syndrome of “brutal need.”
I recognize that the unemployment compensation statute does not make need a criterion for the granting of benefits as does the welfare statute; but the “brutal need” standard referred to in Goldberg relates to actual financial want and not eligibility requirements. I regret that the record before us is so sparse and superficial as to the true degree of need of beneficiaries of unemployment compensation. Since my brothers find the record adequate to establish a lack of need, no purpose would be served in the present case by calling for the presentation of further data. However, since the issue is so crucial to the determination of the matter before us, I would be deeply concerned as to this deficiency were it not for the knowledge that the Supreme Court of the United States has noted probable jurisdiction of Java v. California Department of Human Resources Development, 317 F.Supp. 875 (N.D.Cal.1970), in which a three-judge court in California determined that Goldberg was controlling as to the termination of unemployment compensation benefits. Whether that decision is correct or not, the matter will presumably be definitively determined by the Supreme Court this term.
Under these circumstances and without the submission of further evidence on this issue, I cannot state with any degree of certainty that an individual cut off without prior hearing from the benefits of unemployment insurance will not be “condemned to suffer grievous loss,” *440Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (cited with approval in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at 263, 90 S.Ct. 1011), or, indeed, will not be deprived “of the very means by which to live while he waits.” Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at 264, 90 S.Ct. at 1018.
Finally, it is to be observed that in Goldberg the Supreme Court stated (at 262, 90 S.Ct. at 1017, footnote 8):
“It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’ Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights which do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property.”
The Court continued:
“It has been aptly noted that ‘[s]ociety today is built around entitlement. * * * Many of the most important of these entitlements now flow from government: * * * Such sources of security, whether private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It is only the poor whose entitlements, although recognized by public policy, have not been effectively enforced.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
The flavor of this passage suggests that, although the Court was dealing with welfare benefits only, it contemplated the possibility that other forms of “entitlement” might merit the same protection as welfare benefits. If this is so, surely no entitlement is closer in nature to welfare benefits than the payment of unemployment compensation. If the Goldberg rationale is to be extended to any entitlement beyond welfare benefits, the natural extension would be to unemployment compensation.

. Testimony of James O’Brien, Assistant Director AFL-CIO, Department of Social Security, Washington, D. C.

. The testimony (of James O’Brien, supra) describing a 45-day period of delay does not appear to distinguish between (1) disputes as to whether a claimant who has not yet received benefits is entitled to receive them, and (2) disputes, as here, as to the propriety of termination of benefits. There is no reason to believe, however, that decisions as to the propriety of termination are rendered any more speedily than decisions in cases of other disputed claims.

. The New York Times, December 17, 1970, p. 57.