Court Opinion

ID: 9503335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 19:41:54.649609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:23.892872
License: Public Domain

GILLETTE, J.,
dissenting.
The majority today regrettably pushes ahead with a line of analysis that the court first articulated as its rationale in State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 115 P3d 908 (2005). That rationale utterly fails to appreciate or give constitutional validity to the defendant’s noncoerced consent in this case, just as the majority in Hall failed to understand the significance of the defendant’s consent there. See generally Hall, 339 Or at 37-52 (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (identifying fallacy in majority’s treatment of the defendant’s consent in that case). “Consent” used to be an event of significant constitutional moment, but the majority’s rationale here and in Hall robs it of that constitutional significance.
I respectfully dissent.
Durham, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.