Court Opinion

ID: 9913910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 22:09:00.766921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:30.447464
License: Public Domain

J-A11008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KAELEN TIMOTHY O'CONNOR                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 184 WDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 30, 2019
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
              Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0009040-2018

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                         FILED: December 28, 2023

       Appellant, Kaelen Timothy O’Connor, is a former City of Pittsburgh police

officer who seeks review of a judgment of sentence entered by the Court of

Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court).           Following a jury trial,

Appellant was found guilty of obstructing administration of law (18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5101) and hindering apprehension and prosecution (18 Pa.C.S.A. §

5105(a)(3)). He was sentenced to one year of probation as to each count, to

be served consecutively. Appellant now asserts that the evidence was legally

insufficient, and that, alternatively, he is entitled to a new trial because the

presiding judge visibly exhibited to the jury his disapproval of Appellant’s

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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testimony. For the following reasons, we remand the case for an evidentiary

hearing so that the judicial misconduct issue can be further developed.

      This case arises from a road-rage incident that took place in or around

a Pittsburgh school zone on May 3, 2017. Jesse Smith, a Michigan resident,

was driving his vehicle when he encountered a motorist in a black Mercedes,

Robert Kramer, who at that time was a City of Pittsburgh police officer. While

stopped alongside Smith’s vehicle, Kramer allegedly aimed a handgun in

Smith’s direction. Smith demanded that Kramer pull over and exit his car to

be confronted, but Kramer instead drove away.

      By keeping his own vehicle stopped, Smith was able to observe a partial

license plate number of the Mercedes. He then called 911 at about 3:36 p.m.

and reported what had happened. In response, Appellant and Officer Troy

Signorella arrived at the scene in separate patrol cars to speak with Smith.

During his interview with Appellant, Smith noticed Appellant searching

through his patrol car’s computer system in an attempt to locate the Mercedes

using the partial plate that Smith had provided.         Smith heard Appellant

announce to Officer Signorella that he was able to retrieve the full license plate

number of the Mercedes, as well as the name and address of the driver

associated with the vehicle.

      Officer Signorella asked Appellant to call him on his cellular phone.

Appellant stepped away from Smith to make the call from behind his vehicle.

Smith could not hear the conversation, but he could see the officers speaking

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to each other on their cell phones.      Once the officers had finished their

discussion, Appellant walked back to Smith and advised that nothing further

could be done at that time. See N.T. Trial, 5/14/2019, at 71.

      Although the two officers told Smith that detectives would be in touch,

Smith did not hear back from Appellant, Officer Signorella, or any other

officers for several weeks. It took almost one month from the day of the

incident for Smith himself to contact an officer (Detective Dawn Mercurio) who

was able to address his complaint and retrieve the investigative report of the

incident prepared by Appellant.

      The report indicated that the case had not yet been “cleared” because

further investigation was needed. The name, address, and phone number of

Jesse Smith was correctly recorded, as was Smith’s general account of the

incident. Notably, however, the report included a license plate number that

had a missing letter and an incorrect numeral. It also made no mention of

Appellant, much less the fact that he was a police officer.

      Detective Mercurio was able to locate the black Mercedes, and the

identity of Kramer as the owner, in a police database. But it was only possible

for her to do so because Smith provided her with the full and correct plate

number he had received from Appellant. See N.T. Trial, 5/14/2019, at 142.

      After her call with Smith, Detective Mercurio contacted Kramer directly

and confirmed with him that he had been involved in a traffic incident the prior

month. At that point, Detective Mercurio referred the case to the Office of

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Professional Standards, which was responsible for investigating complaints

against City of Pittsburgh police officers. See N.T. Trial, 5/15/2019, at 151.

      The case was assigned to Detective Edward Green, who reviewed all of

the recorded communications associated with the road-rage incident.

Detective Green discovered several irregularities in how events unfolded after

Smith’s initial call to 911. Of significance here, Detective Green noted that

Officer Signorella had received the correct plate number of Kramer’s vehicle,

and at 3:53 p.m. he dispatched several units to the home address of Kramer’s

parents.       Only 30 minutes after doing so, however, Officer Signorella

contacted the dispatched units to cancel his request and halt their

investigation without having contacted Kramer. See id., at 170-71.

      In between Smith’s initial 911 call at 3:36 p.m. and Officer Signorella’s

directive for the dispatched units to disperse at 3:53 p.m., there were

extensive communications made by and between Appellant, Officer Signorella,

one of the dispatched units (Officer Ray Toomey), and Kramer:

           •   (3:36 p.m.) Smith called 911;

           •   (3:49 p.m.) Officer Toomey sent a police radio transmission
               to Officer Signorella asking him to call his cell phone;

           •   (3:50 p.m.) Officer Signorella initiated a cell phone call with
               Officer Toomey lasting over two minutes;

           •   (3:52 p.m.) Officer Tommey initiated a cell phone call with
               Kramer that was not answered;

           •   (3:53 p.m.) Dispatched units sent a police radio
               transmission to report that they had arrived at the home of
               Kramer’s parents and no one was present;

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           •    (3:53 p.m.) Appellant initiated a cell phone call with Officer
                Signorella lasting over a minute;

           •    (3:53 p.m.) Dispatched units sent a police radio
                transmission to report that they were no longer needed at
                Kramer’s address;

           •    (3:54 p.m.) Kramer returned a cell phone call to Officer
                Toomey and spoke with him for almost a minute;

           •    (3:58 p.m.) Officer Signorella initiated a cell phone call to
                Appellant lasting about half a minute;

           •    (4:05 p.m.) Appellant initiated a call to Kramer lasting three
                minutes, by which time the dispatched units had already
                dispersed from the location of Kramer’s parents’ home.

See id., at 156-73.

       When Appellant submitted his investigative report a day later on May 4,

2017, it included no timestamps, and all of the above communications were

omitted.       As was the fact that Appellant had used another officer’s login

information to search the plate number of Kramer’s vehicle. See id., at 180-

81, 191. Perhaps most significantly, it also came to light during Detective

Green’s investigation that in 2013, Appellant was in the same police academy

class as both Kramer and Officer Toomey. See id., at 175.1

____________________________________________

1 Kramer testified at Appellant’s trial concerning the content of his cell phone
calls with Officer Toomey and Appellant, both of whom Appellant admitted to
knowing personally from their time at the police academy. Kramer recalled
telling them that no road-rage incident had occurred. Similarly, a month later,
when he received a call from Detective Mercurio, he recalled telling her that
the alleged handgun pointed at Smith was really a cell phone that Kramer had
been holding as Smith drove past him. See id., N.T. Trial, 5/15/2019, at 223-
24, 230-32.

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      At Appellant’s subsequent trial, he testified that he had not attempted

to conceal Kramer’s role in an alleged road-rage incident with Smith. He found

Smith to be an unreliable witness, and his conversation with Kramer convinced

Appellant that he was telling the truth in stating that he not been involved in

a gun-related dispute on the day in question. Kramer’s name was omitted

from the investigative report because Appellant believed including it in a public

record would pose a safety risk to Kramer. See id., at 278.

      Appellant claimed that he had been using his former partner’s login

information when accessing the police database on May 3, 2017 because two

weeks earlier, technical support had incorrectly reset his username and he

could not otherwise use the system. It was also suggested by Appellant that,

by marking the investigation as not yet cleared in his report, he proved that

there was no intent to impede the investigation since clearing the case would

have halted any further inquiry by detectives.

      Appellant was found guilty and sentenced as outlined above. He did not

file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. A petition for post-conviction

relief was filed on October 9, 2020. An amended petition was filed on February

23, 2021, and a supplemental petition was filed on March 23, 2021.

      In his petitions, Appellant contended that his trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to file post-sentence motions, failing to request jury

instructions concerning character evidence, and failing to ask Kramer

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exculpatory questions about the outcome of Kramer’s own criminal trial.2

       Appellant’s final postconviction claim concerned the conduct of the

presiding judge at his trial, the Honorable Mark V. Tranquilli.      Appellant

asserted that after the trial had concluded, he learned from two witnesses

(Kramer’s sister and brother-in-law) that Judge Tranquilli “was making

disparaging faces, rolling his eyes, and scoffing during [Appellant’s]

testimony[.]” Amended Petition, 2/23/2021, at 11.       Attached certifications

from both witnesses included identical language to that effect. Appellant and

the two witnesses also attested to the fact that the judge’s alleged conduct

was not immediately apparent to Appellant and his counsel because they were

focused only on each other as questions were asked and answered during his

examination.

       Appellant presented this issue as a claim of after-discovered evidence.3

Appellant’s claim was supplemented by undisputed evidence that Judge

Tranquilli had engaged in egregious misconduct in many other cases, resulting

in his suspension and resignation from the bench, as well as his substitution

in the present matter by the Honorable Bruce R. Beemer.

____________________________________________

2 In 2017, a jury found Kramer not guilty as to criminal charges stemming
from the incident with Jesse Smith.

3 Under subsection 9543(a)(2)(vi) of the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, relief is afforded where exculpatory evidence that
was unavailable at the time of trial “has subsequently become available and
would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced.”

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       An Answer to Appellant’s postconviction petitions was filed by the

Commonwealth on April 6, 2021. The Commonwealth argued that Appellant’s

ineffectiveness claims had no merit and that his judicial misconduct claim was

both undeveloped and not cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth’s

Answer, 4/6/2021, at 11-14. As to the requested reinstatement of Appellant’s

post-sentence and direct appeal rights, the Commonwealth made no

objection. See id., at 5. Appellant’s post-sentence and direct appeal rights

were reinstated on September 14, 2021, and all other relief was denied.

       Pursuant to the reinstatement of his rights, Appellant timely filed post-

sentence motions nunc pro tunc on September 24, 2021. He again asserted

that the evidence was insufficient, that the verdict was contrary to the weight

of the evidence, and that a new trial was needed to remedy the misconduct

of Judge Tranquilli.4      The post-sentence motion was summarily denied on

January 7, 2022.

       Appellant timely appealed and filed a 1925(b) statement of errors which

included three issues:

       1. Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of
       Obstructing the Administration of Law as the Commonwealth
       failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
       intentionally obstructed, impaired, or perverted the administration
       of law by breach of official duty[.]

       2. Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of
       Hindering Apprehension or Prosecution as the Commonwealth
____________________________________________

4 The misconduct issue was presented in the post-sentence motion as a claim

of after-discovered evidence pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(C).

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      failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intended
      to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment
      of Robert Kramer by tampering with a document or other source
      of information[.]

      3. Whether Appellant is entitled to a new trial after newly
      discovered evidence has come to light that people in the gallery
      witnessed former Judge Mark Tranquilli making disgusted facial
      expressions, scoffing, and rolling his eyes to the jury while
      Appellant was testifying[.]

Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement of Errors, 3/8/2022, at 1.

      The trial court (Judge Beemer) filed a 1925(a) opinion, finding that

Appellant’s sufficiency claims were waived for purposes of appellate review

because Appellant did not specify the elements of his two convictions which

he believed were not proven. See Trial Court’s 1925(a) Opinion, 6/7/2022,

at 14-15. With respect to the judicial misconduct claim, the trial court found

that the issue was timely raised in Appellant’s post-sentence motion. See id.,

at 15-16. The trial court found, however, that the characterization of the trial

judge’s behavior by two witnesses was subjective, and the claim was

“completely undeveloped” due to the lack of evidence as to whether, and to

what extent, the jury was affected by any misconduct it may have observed.

Id., at 16.

      The trial court determined that it had to be presumed that the jury had

followed instructions on how to properly consider the evidence and render a

verdict. Moreover, Judge Tranquilli had specifically instructed the jury at the

conclusion of the trial not to consider or lend any weight to its perceived notion

of how he viewed the case:

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      Now, I have not attempted to indicate my opinion concerning the
      weight you should give to the evidence or to any part of it, and I
      do not want you to think that I have. If during the trial I exhibited
      what you felt to be annoyance or displeasure towards any witness
      or lawyer, or if I made any comment or displayed any facial
      expression, you are not to assume that I am attempting to lead
      you to render a particular verdict because I am not.

Id., at 17 (quoting N.T. Trial, 5/16/2019, at 348-49).

      In Appellant’s brief, he has reiterated the three issues raised in his

1925(b) statement. He asserts that his sufficiency claims were not waived

because he had identified the specific element of each offense that he was

challenging. As to the obstruction conviction, Appellant refers to language in

his 1925(b) statement identifying the element of “breach of official duty.” As

to the hindering prosecution conviction, Appellant refers to language in the

1925(b) statement identifying the element of “tampering with a document or

other source of information.” Appellant’s Brief, at 16, 24.

      Regarding the judicial misconduct claim, Appellant maintained that it

was sufficiently developed at the present stage because he had only learned

of Judge Tranquilli’s behavior after the trial had already concluded. Appellant

argues that the post-trial production of his two witnesses and their proffered

testimony should have resulted in an evidentiary hearing at which further

evidence could be adduced. See Appellant’s Brief, at 29.

      We first consider Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claims. When

addressing whether evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction, our standard

of review is as follows:

      [W]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence

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      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not
      weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
      finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
      established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
      possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
      may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
      and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
      be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2003).

         “[W]hen challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, a court-

ordered 1925(b) statement ‘must specify the element or elements upon which

the   evidence    was   insufficient’   in   order   to   preserve   the   issue   for

appeal.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Failing to do so will result in a waiver of the claim. See id.

      In the present case, we find that Appellant adequately preserved his

sufficiency claims for appellate review. While he could have provided more

detail about the elements of the subject offenses he was challenging, he

indicated in his 1925(b) statement that he was disputing the sufficiency of the

evidence as to the “breach” element of obstruction and the “tampering”

element of hindering prosecution. Regardless, Appellant’s preservation of his

sufficiency claims is ultimately of no avail because the claims lack substantive

merit.

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      The evidence was legally sufficient for the jury to convict Appellant of

obstruction.    This offense occurs when a person “intentionally obstructs,

impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function

by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or

any other unlawful act[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101. “[T]he crime consists of two

elements: 1) an intent to obstruct the administration of law; and 2) an act of

‘affirmative interference with governmental functions.’” Commonwealth v.

Harper, 403 A.2d 536, 538 (Pa. 1979).

      Although “breach of an official duty” is undefined in section 5101, we

have construed the term as being synonymous with the affirmative

interference element. See Commonwealth v. Gentile, 640 A.2d 1309, 1312

(Pa. Super. 1994) (holding that “breaches of official duty are included within

the   types    of   conduct   described   as   ‘affirmative   interference[s]   with

governmental functions.’”) (Citation omitted).

      The Commonwealth’s evidence satisfied all elements of the offense,

including the disputed element of breach of an official duty. Specifically, the

evidence showed that Appellant thwarted an investigation into potential

crimes committed by Kramer by omitting from a report Kramer’s personal

information and the correct license plate number of the vehicle Kramer had

been driving.

      Appellant’s affirmative interference was also shown by his failure to

complete a daily activity report for the date of the road-rage incident; his use

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of another officer’s login credentials to look up Kramer’s information; and his

undisclosed familiarity with Kramer as a graduate of the same police academy

class.    The numerous unreported communications calls between Appellant,

Kramer, and other officers during what was supposed to be an objective

inquiry into Smith’s allegations further bolstered the Commonwealth’s

evidence that Appellant breached his official duty as a police officer by actively

impeding an investigation.

         The evidence also was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the

count of hindering apprehension or prosecution. This crime occurs when a

person, “with intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or

punishment of another for crime . . . conceals or destroys evidence of the

crime, or tampers with a . . . document or other source of information,

regardless of its admissibility in evidence[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101(a)(3).

         At trial, the evidence established that Appellant’s omissions from his

investigative report constituted an intentional concealment of Kramer’s

identity, which was carried out to help Kramer evade “apprehension,

prosecution, conviction or punishment” for crimes committed in a road-rage

incident. The inclusion of an incorrect license plate number, and the omission

of Kramer’s identity as the driver of the Mercedes, clearly constituted

tampering with an investigative report, so there was sufficient evidence to

prove that disputed element beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was free

to disbelieve or disregard Appellant’s justifications for omitting that critical

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information. See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 517 A.2d 1256, 1257 (Pa.

1986) (“[T]he trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of witnesses . . .

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.”).

       Finally, we turn to Appellant’s claim that he was prejudiced by Judge

Tranquilli’s misconduct during Appellant’s trial testimony.       Appellant first

raised this issue in a PCRA petition as a claim of after-discovered evidence.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(2)(vi). He also had asserted claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel which are not now before us.

       The result of the postconviction proceedings was the reinstatement of

Appellant’s post-sentence and direct appeal rights. Once these rights were

reinstated, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, nunc pro tunc, alleging

that, despite the exercise of due diligence, he learned after the trial had

concluded that Judge Tranquilli behaved inappropriately during Appellant’s

testimony. Appellant argued that this misconduct prejudiced him because he

was found guilty due to Judge Tranquilli’s influence instead of the evidence

presented at trial. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(C).5

____________________________________________

5 Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(C), a defendant may seek a new trial in a post-
sentence motion based on evidence discovered after the conclusion of the
trial. Relief is warranted if the after-discovered evidence meets a four-part
test:

       (1) the evidence could not have been obtained before the
       conclusion of the trial by reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is
       not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence will not
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Both the trial court and the Commonwealth stress that Appellant’s claim

is undeveloped, as the current record does not substantiate the alleged

observations by Appellant’s two witnesses regarding Judge Tranquilli’s

misconduct.      Nor does the record firmly reflect whether the jury ever

witnessed, or was influenced by, that behavior.        The Commonwealth also

points to Judge Tranquilli’s instruction to the jury to disregard any perceived

opinion he might have exhibited during the trial, and “[t]he presumption in

our law is that the jury has followed instructions.” Commonwealth v. Baker,

614 A.2d 663, 672 (Pa. 1992); see also Commonwealth v. O’Hannon, 732

A.2d 1193, 1196 (Pa. 1999) (“[A]bsent evidence to the contrary, the jury is

presumed to have followed the trial court’s instructions.”).

       Although the record is indeed undeveloped, we agree with Appellant that

the trial court erred in summarily denying the post-sentence motion. By its

very nature, Appellant’s claim of after-discovered evidence was unavoidably

lacking in development because Appellant did not learn of the new evidence

until after the trial had already concluded. The record contains no images of

Judge Tranquilli at the time of Appellant’s cross-examination, so anything

short of an evidentiary hearing would make it impossible for a court to assess

the merit of the claim.

____________________________________________

       be used solely for purposes of impeachment; and (4) the evidence
       is of such a nature and character that a different outcome is likely.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939 A,2d 355, 359 (Pa. Super. 2007).

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      Additionally, Judge Tranquilli’s well-documented history of highly

inappropriate behavior arguably corroborates the certified statements of

Appellant’s two witnesses.     The peculiar instruction Judge Tranquilli gave

about disregarding his apparent “annoyance,” “displeasure,” and “facial

expressions” certainly verifies that something improper may have been visible

to the jury in the present matter. Taken together, the giving of this instruction

makes it more likely, not less likely, that Judge Tranquilli may have

compromised the jury’s ability to consider the evidence objectively.

      Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the judicial conduct claim in

Appellant’s post-sentence motion. In order for the trial court to consider the

merit of Appellant’s post-sentence motion, nunc pro tunc, and to perfect the

record on appeal, further proceedings are required. We therefore vacate the

order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion and remand the case for an

evidentiary hearing at which Appellant will have the opportunity to

demonstrate the extent to which any improper conduct by Judge Tranquilli

influenced the jury in this case. Further relief may then be granted if needed.

      Order of January 7, 2023 denying post-sentence motion vacated. Case

remanded for evidentiary hearing. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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 12/28/2023

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