Court Opinion

ID: 9666436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:14:54.692638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:28.802053
License: Public Domain

DRAUGHN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The affidavit in this case is a classic example of the old adage about “not seeing the forest for the trees.” The government agent in this case has listed in his affidavit, like trees, a voluminous number of internally detailed items under a general label. If these numerous items are evaluated without specifically relating them to appellant and the residence in question, one might be tempted to conclude that with such a large number of items, there must be something among them that constitutionally justified a search of this private residence where appellant lived. Indeed, the cumulative effect of the list is overwhelming. It contains a virtual laundry list of all possible records that might be kept by a reasonably prudent (or imprudent) drug dealer. It also contains a voluminous amount of hearsay information about suspected drug dealing in the past by other people in other locations.
I assert that there is no probative evidence anywhere in the sixty-eight paragraphs spread out over the twenty pages of this affidavit to justify the conclusion that appellant was engaged in an “ongoing and continuing involvement in the distribution of illegal controlled substances.” Yet, Agent Gallman, no less than five times in the affidavit, states that she was. Agent Gallman’s personal conclusion, no matter how many times repeated, does not make it so. There is simply no viable evidence to support such a conclusion. The only possible evidence directed at her consists of a statement in paragraph 15(a) that in May *368of 1986 Ruth Bernard was arrested for D.W.I. and that an inventory of the vehicle she was driving revealed a large amount of cash, a small amount, of marijuana, and suspected cocaine. Daniel Bernard testified at a forfeiture hearing that the cash was from the sale of designer drugs. Even by the most liberal of standards, this isolated instance involving appellant in 1986 cannot justify the conclusion that she was engaged in “an ongoing and continuing involvement in the distribution of illegal controlled substances.” And to suggest that this 1986 incident is justification for a search of her residence and purse in 1988 defies logic. It follows that such an unsupported conclusion cannot constitutionally justify or support an approved search of her residence.
Regarding appellant, the affidavit specifically alleges only the following statements of fact:
(1) In May 1986, she was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A small amount of marijuana was seized from the vehicle she was driving, along with what was suspected to be cocaine. Also seized was a total of $151,504.00, which Mr. Bernard asserted under oath was derived from the sale of designer drugs.
(2) On December 14, 1988, Houston Lighting & Power information revealed that Mr. Bernard and appellant “had utilities” at the apartment which was raided.
Agent Gallman also made the following conclusion in the affidavit: “Based on all the foregoing facts, the affiant believes that there exists probable cause to believe that [both appellant and her husband] are concealing quantities of illegal controlled substances” in addition to records “and other documents relating to the receipt and disposition of funds derived from or related to the ongoing and continuing illegal criminal activity, in the residence_” How;ever, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Agent Gallman testified: “We did not contend there were illegal narcotics in the apartment.”
Although appellant was prosecuted in state court, if the federal search was lawfully conducted, a state court need not exclude evidence properly seized under federal law. Of course, the search, conducted by IRS agents under a federal warrant, still must meet constitutional provisions against unreasonable search and seizure. King v. State, 746 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d). Appellant argues that whether the warrant authorized a search for illegal drugs or, as the State contends, merely financial information, the warrant was insufficient to show probable cause to justify a search of appellant’s apartment.
We must examine the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether an affidavit for a search warrant states probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Further, because of the strong preference for warrants, in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustained where, without it, one might fall. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07, 85 S.Ct. 741, 744-45, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 902 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927, 109 S.Ct. 3266, 106 L.Ed.2d 611 (1989).
In my opinion, the affidavit failed to establish an adequate connection between the residence that was searched and any criminal activity. The affidavit implies a connection between the residence and the alleged drug smuggling activities of Sam Stewart, who had been arrested twelve days earlier some one-hundred-fifty miles away. Also, the affidavit mentions no particular documents or other items to be seized. Absent a degree of specificity, there is a danger of a search turning into a “fishing expedition.” However, the warrant did allege specific illegal activity which the records allegedly would document. United States v. LeBron, 729 F.2d 533, 538 (8th Cir.1984). Finally, appellant contends that none of the activities described in the affidavit suggest there was probable cause that drugs or other items mentioned would be found in her apartment on December 19, 1988.
*369Speaking to the question of “stale” facts presented in an affidavit in support of a search warrant, the United States Supreme Court has stated that such facts must be “so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.... ” Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210, 53 S.Ct. 138, 140, 77 L.Ed. 260 (1932). However, where the affidavit recites facts indicating illegal activity of an ongoing and continuing nature or a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant. Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860, 864 (5th Cir.1973); United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir.1972). Here, the affidavit alleged suspected illegal activity spanning several years, involving Sam Stewart and Daniel Bernard. From this hearsay on hearsay suspicion, Agent Gall-man reasons in circular fashion that since he knows that individuals engaged in such suspected drug trafficking keep and maintain their records “over long and extended periods of time,” there must be such records in appellant’s residence.
The majority seeks to refute the “staleness” attack on the information contained in this affidavit by seizing on to the conclusion that only twelve days before the search various drug records and cash were seized from Sam Stewart’s residence in Austin revealing drug dealing. The affidavit also reflects that some “unspecified” documents seized at Stewart’s Austin residence bore the name of Daniel Glass Bernard, and that Agent Gallman, based on his experience and training, concluded “these records reflected sales of ecstasy and eve.” He never specifically identified the alleged documents with Bernard’s name on them nor did he say how they specifically tied Bernard to illegal activity. I fully agree that the affidavit builds a strong probable cause case against Sam Stewart in Austin, but its staleness and lack of specificity as to appellant and her husband is glaring. The connection to the searched residence is simply non-existent.
Appellant’s assessment of the “staleness” of the facts appearing in the affidavit is greatly bolstered by the omission of the crucial fact that on the day of the search, December 19, 1988, Mr. Bernard was in jail and had been for approximately two months. Such information is necessarily a critical factor for the magistrate who must evaluate the allegations of ongoing, continuing criminal activity and their connection, if any, to the apartment where Mr. Bernard had not lived for almost two months. That information is also important to the magistrate in determining the extent of the search and the degree of specificity necessary to identify property to be seized. There are no allegations in the affidavit that appellant, alone or with her incarcerated husband, continued to carry on any drug-related activities from the apartment. Indeed, there is nothing to tie appellant to any alleged ongoing, continuing illegal activity other than that she was arrested in 1986 and was married to Mr. Bernard. Probable cause allegations should be made of “sterner stuff.”
The duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed and that sufficient information was presented to allow him to make a fair determination. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332-33. When, as here, a defendant claims that the affidavit contains a material omission, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the omission was in fact made, and (2) it was made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit. If the defendant carries this burden, the reviewing court then determines whether the affidavit would establish probable cause for the search if the omitted material were included in the affidavit. If it does not, it becomes the appellate court’s duty to void the warrant and suppress the evidence seized pursuant to it. Melton v. State, 750 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (citing United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir.1980)).
Agent Gallman testified at the suppression hearing that he knew at the time he sought the warrant that Mr. Bernard was in custody, and that he did not include the information in his affidavit. I cannot con*370ceive of, nor did the agent offer, any credible reason for omitting this important fact. Further, in my view, a common-sense reading of the twenty-page affidavit necessarily imposes the false impression that appellant and her husband were engaged in a present, ongoing, continuing criminal activity in the apartment to be searched, and that Mr. Bernard had resided there at that time. Therefore, a key justification presented to the magistrate for searching the apartment was that there was ongoing, continuing illegal activity at the apartment along with supporting records because it was Mr. Bernard’s residence. The State relies on Agent Gallman’s testimony that he may or may not have informed the magistrate that telephone calls had been made between the Houston apartment and Stewart’s residence in Austin after Mr. Bernard was taken into custody. The inference from that possibility being that such information might have indicated to the magistrate that appellant was continuing the alleged narcotics enterprise in her husband’s absence. However, this unsupported information was not included in the affidavit, and we cannot consider it in evaluating whether there was probable cause justifying the search. In evaluating probable cause, we are restricted to the four corners of the affidavit. For our purposes, what additional information the agent might have given the magistrate is no information at all and cannot be the basis for creating probable cause if it is otherwise lacking.
The majority alleges that the omission of information about Bernard’s incarceration has not been properly shown by appellant to be material. It further suggests that our decision in Melton v. State, 750 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.), is at variance with the court of criminal appeals opinion in Brooks v. State, 642 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), and reliance on United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.1976), is inapplicable to the facts of this case. The gist of the majority's conclusion is that a material omission from a search warrant affidavit to vitiate the affidavit must have been made with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit; that negligent omission alone will not undermine the affidavit. United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 329 (5th Cir.1980). As applied to our case, the majority reasons that appellant did not meet her burden of proof in that regard because she presented “absolutely no evidence as to the state of mind of Agent Gallman.” I disagree with the majority’s rigid limitation of the reasoning in these cases. If the majority is correct, the defendant’s burden as to material omissions would be impossible to shoulder. It is unlikely that a narcotics agent is ever going to reveal that his state of mind in omitting a critical fact from a search warrant affidavit was one of “reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit.” To prove another’s state of mind directly is, at best, difficult. Such proof necessarily consists of examining what occurred (or what was omitted) in the context of the circumstances. In the absence of an outright admission by the affi-ant, his or her state of mind or intent can only be inferred by reference to the omission and its impact if it had been included in the affidavit.
My reading of the affidavit in this ease in which Agent Gallman repeatedly refers to appellant and her husband jointly being engaged in “ongoing and continuing involvement in the distribution of illegal controlled substances ...” leads me to conclude that it could have no other purpose tlian to suggest to the examining magistrate that there was presently illegal activity being conducted by the Bernards at the residence in question. Otherwise, why include their names and such allegations at all? The majority tells us the inclusion of their names is unnecessary because this is a federal search of a residence. If the majority is correct in this conclusion, it only makes the affidavit more suspect.
It is reasonable to ask why, if unnecessary, would a narcotics agent include the name of a suspected drug dealer already in jail for two months and another named person, who had no record of drug dealing, in a probable cause affidavit? Why would the agent repeatedly assert that these named individuals were engaged in ongo*371ing, illegal drug activities at the residence for which a search warrant is sought if it were unnecessary? And having included their names, why would he omit the fact that the suspected drug dealer had been in jail for two months at the time the search warrant for the residence was sought?
Under these circumstances, I conclude that the reason for the inclusion of these named parties with the ongoing drug involvement allegations was designed to shore up an inherently weak probable cause affidavit. I can discern no other reason for such inclusion. My conclusion is buttressed by the agent’s failure to include the critical fact that his strongest suspect named had been in jail for two months and could not have been operating out of the residence sought to be searched. I say “critical fact,” because Daniel Bernard was obviously the agent’s best shot at obtaining a search warrant. Clearly, the puny evidence contained in the affidavit pertaining to Irene Bernard’s ongoing drug activities amounts to virtually no evidence. The only possible basis the agent had for obtaining a search warrant then was the suspected drug activities of Daniel Bernard over a period of several years, in other places. Since there is no evidence connecting these suspected activities to the residence in question and since he had not even been in the residence for the preceding two months, the omission of this latter fact is, in my opinion, critical to the viability of the probable cause affidavit.
I conclude that the agent’s failure to specifically inform the magistrate in the affidavit about Daniel Bernard’s incarceration was misleading. This omission, when considered in the context of this inherently weak affidavit, as to any specific connection between the suspected drug activities, the residence, and appellant warrants a reasonable inference that such omission was made at least with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit. No further proof should be required of appellant as to the impossible task of determining the agent’s subjective state of mind other than to show, as appellant did here, that the omission occurred in the context of these critical facts. The burden should then be placed squarely on the affiant to show why he omitted such a known critical fact from the affidavit and, thus, from the consideration of the neutral magistrate who must determine whether the personal residence can be searched.
The majority suggests that since only a residence is sought to be searched, it is hypertechnical to complain about the affidavit’s failure to tie any drug activities or drug records to appellant. They ground this reasoning on the fact that under federal law it is not even necessary that the person in charge of the premises be named in the warrant. See Wangrow v. United States, 399 F.2d 106 (8th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933, 89 S.Ct. 292, 21 L.Ed.2d 270 (1969). Rather, they suggest that we should look at the affidavit in a common-sense manner as mandated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).
I view this matter from a different perspective. The Fourth Amendment provides that a person is protected in his home from unreasonable searches and seizures. Residences do not commit crimes, people do. To suggest that the government has the right to search a residence as if it existed in a vacuum without regard to the person who lives there is, to me, taking a hyper-technical approach to a fundamental personal protection provided by the Constitution. Unless there is some nexus between the residence and the persons committing the alleged crime, there can be no search. This conclusion is not inconsistent with Wangrow and other eases cited by the majority. In Wangrow, the police had the individuals under surveillance that were driving the automobiles that were ultimately impounded and searched under a warrant. The Court stated:
A careful reading of the affidavit as a whole convinces us that the magistrate could reach no other conclusion than that the four men mentioned in the affidavit were Karzas and the appellants, and that the cars impounded by the police were *372those which had been under surveillance and which probably contained the burglary tools.
Wangrow v. United States, 399 F.2d at 115.
Wangrow clearly had human occupants reasonably identifiable in the affidavit and who had been under surveillance; in other words, human beings connected to probable crime based on observation. Under those and other similar circumstances, it may not be necessary to name the person in charge of the premises in the warrant. But in the present case, there was no surveillance of appellant or the residence. Here, the officer not only named appellant in the affidavit but alleged, without viable evidence, that she was part of the alleged ongoing criminal activity which justified the search of her residence. I can see no purpose in such allegations other than to persuade the magistrate to approve the search. Having included her name in the affidavit with an insufficient allegation of criminal activity designed to support the search, then the State cannot now say it is irrelevant because technically she need not be named in the search warrant.
In summary, my review of the totality of the circumstances involved leads me to the conclusion that there is no probative evidence linking appellant to any ongoing illegal activity at the residence, and that information contained in the affidavit regarding Mr. Bernard omits the material fact that he was incarcerated approximately two months before the warrant was issued. While such an omission might not have been critical under all circumstances, under the facts of this case, it is. The affidavit refers to Mr. Bernard’s past dealings, none of which are linked specifically to the residence in question or to appellant, while the whole tenor of the affidavit is that there is ongoing illegal activity at the residence which Mr. Bernard no longer occupies. The facts in the affidavit are constitutionally too stale to justify a search of the residence. They are insufficient to presently link appellant to any ongoing illegal activity or to records reflecting such activity. Under these circumstances, the omission of Mr. Bernard’s incarceration was not only misleading, but critical to the viability of the warrant.
Given the deficiency in the affidavit, it necessarily follows that the warrant based thereon must also fall short of constitutional muster. Therefore, in my view, the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from a purse in her kitchen cabinet pursuant to the warrant.
The State also contends that the evidence should be admissible under a “good faith” exception because the agents made the search under the authority of a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). A warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish the officers’ good faith. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 n. 32, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172 n. 32, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). Here, however, I would not uphold the search under a “good faith” exception when it was an agent relying on the warrant who failed to properly inform the magistrate of a critical fact for determining the existence of probable cause.
Because I find the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress, I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court.