Court Opinion

ID: 9450803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:58:06.277779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:27.568817
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge, with whom J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
concurs (dissenting).
Appellant was convicted for sexual assault and robbery. He had been adjudged of unsound mind and civilly committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital in 1956 when he was 13 years old, following “an act of homicide on an 80 year old woman who, he said had attempted to incite him sexually.” At that time the Mental Health Commission found him “of unsound mind suffering from a Psychosis with Mental Deficiency.” In February 1962, he was placed on convalescent leave and required to report to the Hospital from time to time. The alleged crimes occurred seven months later while he was still on convalescent leave.
After indictment herein, the Government obtained an order committing Whalem to St. Elizabeths for mental examination pursuant to D.C.Code § 24-301. By letter dated March 5, 1963, the Superintendent of the Hospital informed the court, without elaboration of its inquiry or diagnosis, that Whalem had been examined and found to be
“mentally competent to understand the nature of the charges pending against him and to assist properly in the preparation of his defense. * * [T]hat he is * * * now, and was suffering from mental disease, Schizophrenic Reaction, Catatonic Type (In Remission), on or about September 28, 1962, but that the alleged offenses * * * were not products of this mental illness.1
On the day of this report, Whalem was discharged from the Hospital’s roll of civil patients with the notation “condition improved” and transferred to jail, in the custody of the United States Marshal.
The court ordered a further mental examination at D. C. General Hospital on *820defense counsel’s urging that, because the alleged crimes occurred while Whalem was on convalescent leave, “St. Elizabeths Hospital is in no position to render an impartial opinion [on the insanity issue].” D. C. General reported, also without elaboration, that Whalem was “mentally competent as to be able to understand the proceedings against him and to be able to properly assist in the preparation of his defense.” 2
Whalem was thereupon brought to trial. Defense counsel did not raise the issue of his competency and the record discloses no judicial consideration, inquiry or determination of the issue.
II
The majority opinion construes D.C. Code § 24-301 to establish a uniform procedure for judicial determination of competency. Upon receiving the psychiatric report, the trial judge may adjudicate an accused incompetent or competent, as the report recommends. Or he may order a hearing, or require the hospital to elaborate its report. Upon objection to the report, the court must grant a request for a hearing or elaboration. And, in certain circumstances, it would be an abuse of discretion for the judge not to take one or the other of these courses sua aponte.3
I concur in this reading of the statute. The court properly rejects the view, apparently held by some lawyers and judges,4 that hospital reports respecting competency are binding upon the trial court. Its error, in my opinion, lies in its determination that discretion was not here abused.
I think the trial judge must exercise his discretion to require elaboration of hospital reports where, as here, the record is uninformative because a cursory report has been filed.5 As the majority recognize, determination of competency “ * * * requires not only a clinical psychiatric judgment but also a judgment based upon a knowledge of criminal trial proceedings that is peculiarly within the competence of the trial judge.”6 Necessarily, then, it is the judge who must have the information relevant to decision. A naked conclusion that an accused can “properly assist in the preparation of his defense and understand the nature of the charge pending *821against him” provides no basis for independent judicial judgment.7 The judge needs to know how the accused was tested, and for what, and what mental characteristics the examining psychiatrists believed relevant to the inquiry.8 He needs to know whether there are opposing diagnostic factors or minority views, how any conflicts were resolved, and how each examiner reasoned from the raw psychiatric data to his “legal” conclusions.9
Although the majority suggests that “circumstances” may on occasion require elaboration of a report before trial, it approves a conclusory form of report which assures that such circumstances will never come to light.10 I would not thus attribute to Congress a purpose to permit the trial court to accept hospital conclusions on faith alone. Committee reports of the 1955 amendments to D.C. Code § 24-301 reveal an assumption that trial judges would receive meaningful information through the hospital reports. Congress’ concern was with the possible burden on medical resorces if a hearing was required in every case by our decision in Gunther v. United States.11 It reasoned that this burden was unnecessary because it assumed that the views of medical authorities would Bbe “adequately covered by their written report.” 12
The importance of the congressional assumption that essential information would be “adequately covered” in the hospital report is highlighted by the parallel construction of the statute. It would be intolerable if an accused could be committed as incompetent on the mere basis of an unelaborated statement of conclusion, simply because no one objected. Such commitments are for an indefinite period, without the protections of either trial or civil commitment procedures. Serious questions of due process would arise if they were rested on so narrow a ledge of inquiry and information.13
Moreover, a report justifying the congressional assumption could provide an intelligent basis for judicial decision, without burdening hospital authorities with attendance in court. Such reports have been required in other federal districts,14 and were recently recommended in strongest terms by a Judicial Conference Committee in this circuit.15 The *822only opinion the Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital or any other psychiatrist is competent to render is a medical one.16 If the statute can be read to keep legal and psychiatric experts within their respective areas of competence, it is poor statutory construction to read it otherwise.
Whatever doubts may exist as to the sufficiency of conclusory reports as a basis for determining competency in other cases, such reports were clearly insufficient in the circumstances of this case. At the time of these criminal proceedings, there was an outstanding judicial adjudication of insanity, which could not be altered without subsequent judicial action. There was no such action. Insanity is presumed to continue until the contrary is shown,17 and this presumption is relevant to an accused’s competency to stand trial.18 The Supreme Court has strongly implied that this presumption raises sufficient question of competency to require a full hearing.19
The majority notes that there are two hospital reports in this case — one from St. Elizabeths and one from D. C. General Hospital. The point seems to be that two reports are sufficient to overcome any inferences from the prior confinement, even if one report is not. But both reports state empty conclusions. Hence judicial discretion is not significantly more informed by two than one. In my opinion the warning sounded by appellant’s previous adjudication of insanity makes the information before the court plainly insufficient for the required determination of fitness to stand trial.
Since I conclude that the record on competency was fatally deficient, it is unnecessary to consider whether the trial judge acted upon it.20 However, the majority’s inference that a judicial decision on competency was in fact made is without record support. Both statutory provisions discussed by the majority require judicial action by order. No reason is given why the same requirement does not apply here. Unless the record makes clear that the matter has been considered,21 I think proper judicial action should not be inferred in the absence of an order. A silent record is equally consistent with either a failure to decide the issue, or a mistaken belief that psychiatric views are binding.22 In view of these possibilities, the record’s failure to reveal judicial awareness of the competency issue cannot be deemed harmless.
*823I think there must be a new trial.23
Ill
A word about the role of counsel seems appropriate. Counsel is no more bound than the judge by the psychiatric report. He has a duty to be informed of the details of the examination in order to determine whether it was adequate according to professional medical standards.24 He should make known his own observations to the hospital and to the court.25 In all cases where “boiler-plate” reports are filed, he should request an order requiring their elaboration. In any event, he should spread on the record before the court all available information necessary for an informed decision.26 And if he is not satisfied that the court has such information, he should seek a plenary hearing on the issue.
These are not responsibilities easily discharged, especially for appointed counsel. “[T]here are a great number of indigent defendants and relatively few lawyers familiar with criminal trial practice. Hence, it is very often necessary to appoint lawyers who understandably know little about such practice, and even less about the special difficulties of presenting the insanity defense,”27 or questions of incompetency. It may sometimes be impossible for counsel to render effective assistance without an opportunity to consult psychiatric experts in order to understand the requisites of examination and to assess the meaning and reliability of diagnosis.28 If so, he should inform the court and request such services. Whether or not he needs such services, the issue of competency is so important to the accused and to the court that it should not be decided by default.
BAZELON, Chief Judge, may file a further expression of his views.

. The report did not mention mental deficiency, a condition which was a factor in the 1956 civil commitment.

. The report also noted that Whalem “does exhibit manifestations of a passive-aggressive character disorder with a low normal or borderline intellectual endowment. He achieved a maximum I.Q. (intellectual quotient) of eighty-four * * *. In my opinion this character disorder does not constitute a mental disease or defect."

. Whatever a defendant’s right to waive the insanity defense, he cannot waive the question of competency, Seidner v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 214, 260 F.2d 732 (1958); it may be raised by the court, the Government, or defense counsel, D.C.Code § 24-301; 18 U.S.C. § 4244.

. E. g., United States v. Heath, D.D.C. Crim.No. 126-63, hearing of January 17, 1964 (“The hospital says he is competent * * * he is competent”); United States v. Wider, D.D.C.Crim.No.84902 (“ * * * I am not a psychiatrist and these psychiatrists * * * say that he is mentally competent * * * ”).

. Since the District Court employs a form of order for examination that is phrased in terms of the legal issue of competency (i. e., whether the defendant is “unable to understand the proceedings against him or to properly assist in the preparation of his defense”), hospital authorities may mistakenly believe that they are allowed or required to decide the issue. Report of the Committee of the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia on Problems Connected with Mental Examination of the Accused in Criminal Cases, Before Trial 36-42 (1965), hereinafter cited as Report.

. Gunther v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 243, 246, 215 F.2d 493, 497 (1954). “[Competency] denotes the intellectual and emotional capacity of the accused to perform the functions which are essential to the fairness and accuracy of a criminal proceeding. * * * The question in any case is whether mental illness has disabled the specific functions of personality which sound policy in the administration of criminal justice require before the accused may be subjected to adversary proceedings on the charge against him.” Government’s memorandum p. 9, Pouncey v. United States, No. 18565.

. See Hess & Thomas, Ineompeteney to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results, and Problems, 119 Am.T. of Psychiatry 713, 715-16 (1963), a study of incompetency to stand trial in Michigan: “[T]he courts fail to use the physician in his appropriate role. The majority of the psychiatrists’ reports were empty and meaningless, and yet were accepted and acted upon by the courts as if they contained information which could be construed as evidence and, as such, decided upon.”

. It may well be that the examining psychiatrists require legal assistance in determining the requirements of competency, Report at 99-100.

. Oompare Report at 36-38 with id. at 118-24.

. In concluding, at note 6, that the statute contemplates a short-form report, the majority seem to put ail their reliance on the statutory use of the word “opinion.” I do not believe that this word, commonly used in legal contexts to denote a statement of reasons for a conclusion as well as the conclusion itself, will bear the weight thus placed upon it — especially in view of the legislative history and the gloss placed on 18 U.S.C. § 4244, a similar, nationally applicable statute, by the United States District Courts in the Western District of Missouri, note 14 infra.

. Note 6 supra; Holloway v. United States, No. 18017, decided Nov. 5, 1964.

. H.R.Rep.No.892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1955); S.Rep.No.1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1955).

. See Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U.Pa.L.Rev. 832 (1960).

. The Western District of Missouri, Report at 127. It is notable that the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, perhaps the only federal facility with psychiatric resources comparable to St. Elizabeths, is within this District.

. Report, passim.

. See Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954); Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 252 F.2d 608 (1957).

. Hurt v. United States, 327 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1964); Kitchens v. United States, 272 F.2d 757, 760 (10th Cir. 1959); Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Herrmann, 35 A.2d 828 (Mun.Ct.App.D.C. 1944). Cf. Orencia v. Overholser, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 285, 287, 163 F.2d 763, 765 (1947); Barry v. White, 62 App.D.C. 69, 64 F.2d 707 (1933).

. Simmons v. United States, 253 F.2d 909, 911 (8th Cir. 1958); Ashley v. Pescor, 147 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1945).

. In Frame v. Hudspeth, 309 U.S. 632, 60 S.Ct. 712, 84 L.Ed. 989 (1940), reversing, 109 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1939), the defendant had been adjudicated insane and committed to a hospital in December 1935. He escaped in January 1936 and committed the crimes charged. He pleaded guilty while still under the adjudication of insanity. In an ensuing habeas corpus action, the court of appeals noted that “Hit was the court’s duty, after having called to his attention the fact that the prisoner at the bar had been adjudged insane and had been an inmate of an insane asylum, to make a finding as to the mental condition of the accused.” But that court held that since the trial judge had questioned petitioner at length, there was an implied finding of competence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

. For the same reason, I do not consider the majority’s suggestion that in some cases, trial judges must refuse to allow waiver of an insanity defense. Cf. Report at 85-92.

. Cooper & Kennedy v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 142, 337 F.2d 538 (1964).

. Note 4 supra.

. Reversal, rather than remand for nune pro tune proceedings, seems to be the proper remedy in view of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the remand remedy in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). The Court held that because of the
“difficulties of retrospectively determining the petitioner’s competency as of more than a year ago, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the District Court for a new hearing to ascertain petitioner’s present competency to stand trial, and for a new trial if petitioner is found competent.”

. Report at 28-35, 97-99.

. Compare Cooper & Kennedy v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 142, 337 F.2d 538, 539 n. 4 (1964) (concurring opinion).

. See text at notes 7-9 supra.

. Jackson v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 341, 336 F.2d 579, 585 (1964) (separate opinion).

. Nickerson, The Expert Technical Witness on Trial, 50 A.B.A.J. 731, 733 (1964). For discussion of the availability of these services on a cost-free basis to indigents, see Brennan, Law and Psychiatry Must Join in Defending Mentally Ill Criminals, 49 A.B.A.J. 239, 242-43 (1963); Bazelon, The Responsibility of the Accused — and the Psychiatrist, 4 Bull.N.Y.Beanch, Am. Psych.Ass’n 1 (Feb. 1962); compare the recently enacted Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e). See note 8 supra.