Court Opinion

ID: 9730570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:15:59.95201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:07.498333
License: Public Domain

BABLITCH, J.
(dissenting). Common experience tells us that removing a child from an environment which he or she knows and trusts is generally disruptive, frequently devastatingly so. Equally true is that the new environment which the child enters may be harmful to the *547health, education, and welfare of the child. We also understand that changes in the broader environment— changes of school, of friends, of neighborhood, of access to grandparents, aunts, uncles and other important adults — often aggravate the sense of insecurity which children of divorcing parents experience when the parents separate. Nonetheless, the majority today holds that the only factor a court may consider as "against the childs1 best interests" in preventing a custodial parent from removing a child to an out of state environment is the impact which removal has on visitation between the noncustodial parent and the child.
The majority's conclusion is a serious step backward in this very critical area of family law. It cannot be justified by its strained interpretation of sec. 767.245(6), Stats. It cannot be justified in light of research regarding the needs of children and families after divorce. Further, its conclusion will, in numerous cases, cause harmful and absurd results. Because I conclude that a court, in determining whether a custodial parent should be allowed to remove a child from this state, must consider all evidence relating to the effect such a move would have on the child's total living environment, I respectfully dissent.
This case involves interpretation of sec. 767.245(6), Stats., which states, in part, that a court may deny a custodial parent permission to remove a child from this state upon". . .a finding by the court that it is against the best interests of the child for the custodian to so remove the child from this state. . . ." The majority interprets "against the best interests of the child" to mean that a court should consider removal to be against the child's "best interests" only where, under the circumstances, alternative visitation arrangements would significantly harm the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent. Majority opinion pp. 534-535. In short, the majority holds that in removal cases the only relevant issue *548is visitation; evidence of disruption and harm to the children, other than as the removal affects visitation, is not relevant and, therefore, not to be considered.
The majority's interpretation is grounded on a basic hypothesis: "The purpose of the removal statute is to sustain a relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent by protecting reasonable visitation rights."1 Majority opinion p. 532. Although the majority's hypothesis may appear reasonable on its face, to accept it as correct is to be drawn inexorably to the majority's conclusion. I agree that if the sole purpose of this section is to safeguard the right of the noncustodial parent to sustain a relationship with his or her child after divorce through reasonable visitation arrangements, then the only admissible evidence at a hearing to challenge removal of the child must relate to the adequacy of the proposed visitation arrangement. But I don't agree that this is the sole purpose of this section. I challenge the majority's hypothesis and submit that it does not capture the primary purpose of the section. From the context of the entire family code, it is apparent that the primary purpose of the section is to protect the "best interests of the child." When viewed from that perspective, rather than from the perspective of the interests of parents, as the majority opinion does, the majority's conclusion must fall.
Critical to the interpretation of sec. 767.245(6), Stats., is to look at the family code in its entirety. To do so makes clear that in ch. 767 the legislature has, in regard to all questions involving children of divorcing parents, insisted that the analytical framework be a form of "best interests *549of the child" test, whether the words the legislature used are "against" or "in" the best interest.2
In reforming ch. 767, Stats., the legislature introduced into the family code of this state important protection for the interests of the child in continuation of familial and community relationships after divorce. It mandated that courts consider the "best interests of the child" in making both temporary and permanent custody awards, in altering custody, in granting and modifying visitation rights and in property division. See secs. 767.23(1n), 767.24, 767.045, 767.32 and 767.255.
Accordingly, sec. 767.245, Stats., did not limit the test for permission to remove a child from the state to the issue of whether an alternative visitation schedule would permit sufficient contact to preserve the existing relationship between the noncustodial parent and the child. Instead, it required the court to determine whether the removal was "against the best interests of the child." In doing so, the legislature recognized, as this court has previously recognized, that visitation privileges, like custodial rights, and many other divorce related decisions, are to promote the best interests of the child. Marotz v. Marotz, 80 Wis. 2d 477, 486, 259 N.W.2d 524 (1977).
The majority opinion errs by framing the issue in this case in terms of visitation arrangements only, as though the legislature intended that somehow each decision re*550garding children after divorce be compartmentalized and assessed with near mathematical precision. By analyzing the removal issue in terms of visitation arrangements only, the majority looks at the issue through the wrong end of the telescope, and thereby misses the point. Focusing on the rights of the custodial and the noncustodial parents causes the majority to overlook very important interests of the child.
Regarding the criteria which apply to the determination of custody, which is supplemented by the assignment of visitation rights to the noncustodial parent in most cases, the legislature required courts to consider "... all facts in the best interest of the child. . .," including these factors:
" (a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
" (am) The wishes of the child as to his or her custody;
" (b) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
" (c) The child's adjustment to the home, school, religion and community;
" (d) The mental and physical health of the parties, the minor children and other persons living in a proposed custodial household;
" (e) The availability of public or private child care services; and
" (f) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant." Section 767.24(2), Stats.
Clearly the broad inquiry into the "best interest of the child" at the divorce of the parents mandated by sec. 767.24(2), Stats., requires the court to do much more than assess each parent's relationship with the child. It re*551quires examination of the matrix of social connections which make up the child's world at the divorce of the parents.
Thus, whether the parties stipulate to or litigate custody issues, the final judgment in a divorce in which the parties have minor children embodies an overall plan to promote the welfare of the children after the divorce. The final judgment is the result of the court's review of numerous factors, including relationships of the child with significant people in the child's life; the psychological adjustment of the child to home, school, religion, and community; the mental and physical health of all the parties in the proposed household, and more. In essence, the judgment establishes an overall post-divorce living plan for the child which is based on important needs of the child. Because the plan is an integrated plan, substantial revisions of one element of the plan reverberate through and affect the entire plan. It is self-evident that removal from the original court-approved environment will, in many cases, be a substantial revision of that plan, requiring a review of the full range of the interests of the child which originally shaped it.
I submit that preventing the court from considering the full range of the interests of the child in the context of a removal from the state defeats the legislative purpose in enacting the family code. Reducing the "best interests of the child" standard to consideration only of facts relevant to the visitation between the noncustodial parent and the child eliminates consideration of nearly all of the factors which justified the court's original order.
By making the quality of the relationship with the visiting parent and the potential for alternative visitation arrangements the only criteria for denial of permission to remove the child, the majority prevents a court from considering factors that may very well justify denial of permission to remove the child, even though they may not *552justify a change in custody. Thus, a court, whose original order was intended to protect the child's interest in contact with the family and other psychologically significant persons, may not consider at a removal hearing the effect of a removal on sibling, step-sibling, grandparent or other relationships, so loiig as the custodial parent offers an alternative visitation schedule that preserves the relationship between the child and the visiting parent. Similarly, although a court previously determined that custody in one parent represented the child's "best interests" at least in part because of proposed arrangements for child care, schooling, religious training and the like, a court may not consider disruptions or discontinuations of those arrangements, or problems of the proposed new arrangements, at a removal hearing. Such an interpretation of the section permits the custodial parent to disregard legitimate objections of the noncustodial parent to changes in the child's environment merely because the changes are unrelated to the visitation schedule and are not sufficiently harmful to justify a change of custody. In short, the majority's interpretation disregards situations in which a proposed arrangement preserves the visitation pattern but jeopardizes other interests of the child which the parties, as well as the court, ought to protect in fulfillment of their responsibilities to the child.
Under the best of conditions under the principle of shared parenting, divorced parents should make important decisions which affect their children after divorce by taking into account the best interests of the children, as well as their own individual interests. Children's needs change, parents' needs change. However, when parents are unable to cooperate in such decisions, including whether a child should be removed to another state at a particular time, it becomes the responsibility of the court to make the decision in the interests of the child. Accordingly, when it undertakes this responsibility, the court *553must have access to all the relevant information regarding the probable impact of the removal on the interest of the child.
Why the legislature chose to allow a court at a removal hearing to focus on the best interests of the child and to consider this wide range of*factors is also clear from the historical development of child custody law. Historically, the majority's emphasis would have been appropriate. Until well into the nineteenth century, the law emphasized the rights of the parents, treating children as property of the parents. In early times, the law considered children as the property of the father, who therefore was presumptively the custodial parent. However, as time changed, concepts of the family changed, and child-rearing became associated with the mother; then the law began to recognize a presumptive custody with the mother. See: Foster & Freed, Life With Father: 1978, 11 Fam. L.Q. 321 (1978); Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. Fam. L. 423 (1976); Podell, Custody-To Which Parent? 56 Marq. L. Rev. 51 (1972); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 453 (Lewis ed. 1897); and 70 A.L.R. 3d 262 (1976). See also In re Marriage of Groh v. Groh, 110 Wis 2d. 117, 122-23, 327 N.W.2d 655 (1983).
More recently, the concept of shared responsibility of the parenting role has been increasingly recognized. Most states have recognized the need to consider child-related decisions at divorce as part of a process of establishing an overall living plan for the children, rather than as a series of separate decisions about custody, visitation and support. Almost two-thirds of the states now embody the concept of a joint custody in their statutes. See 11 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3019 (May 7, 1985) and Folberg, (ed.), Joint Custody and Shared Parenting 159-67 (1984). This new focus on the promotion of the well-being of the child encompasses concern for the totality of the child's post-*554divorce environment, including physical and emotional well-being, relationships, education, and necessary support. The adoption by the legislature of the new family code, which includes sec. 767.245(6), Stats., reflects this approach.
The legislature, by focusing concern on the well-being of the child and the totality of the child's post-divorce environment, has taken an important step toward integrating insights developed by recent research on the interests of children at divorce into the law. This research demonstrates that the consideration of a broad range of environmental factors, as mandated throughout ch. 767, Stats., safeguards critical needs of the child at this time.
Visitation is, of course, important. Psychological research on the adjustment of children to the divorce of their parents demonstrates that a continuing relationship with both parents is highly desirable; post-divorce arrangements that enable both parents to be responsible for the children and to express their concern for the children on a regular basis spare the children much of the pain and disorientation of a break in what remains an important emotional relationship with each parent. Wallerstein & Kelly, Surviving the Breakup 307, 310-11 (1980). In fact, researchers find that"... the key variable affecting satisfactory adjustment of children following divorce is the extent of continuing involvement by both parents in child rearing." Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. Rev. 523, 535 (1979). (Of course, common sense suggests that, in some situations, depending on the age of the child at divorce as well as the previous involvement of each parent with the child, the child's adjustment will be more affected by factors other than "continuing involvement.")
However, more than visitation is important. Research also indicates that the adjustment of children and parents to divorce is best understood as an adjustment *555over a prolonged period. During that period the extent of environmental change which parents and children experience is a key factor in the adjustment of the children; in fact, some researchers have concluded that children's divorce related difficulties, including depression, social withdrawal, and aggression, may stem from the children's perception that they have minimal control over such environmental changes as a new residence. See Wexler Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 Yale L.J. 757, 785, 797 (1985). Of course, the age of the child at divorce, as well as the previous involvement of each parent with the child, will also affect the adjustment of a child in a particular case.
I conclude from this and related research that the legislature had a very solid foundation for emphasizing the interests of the child in a stable, supportive familial and community environment when it reformed the family code in 1977. In order to effectuate the legislative intent to protect this important interest of children, sec. 767.245(6), Stats., must be interpreted so as to preserve the range of factors considered in the award of custody, so that custodial parents and the courts take this range of environmental factors into account when deciding whether a child should be removed from the state.3 The *556majority, unfortunately, ignores all the factors but visitation.
Lastly, the majority's conclusion can lead to very harmful and absurd results. Consider the situation in which there has been protracted battle over custody. Both parents want custody, and the court must decide between the two. Both parents submit plans to the court embodying, we must assume, plans for the children should they get custody, including available educational, health, and welfare opportunities in the environment in which they would place the children. The court, because one or both of the parties decline joint custody, must choose. See sec. 767.24(l)(b), Stats. One week, one month or one year after the decision, whatever, the custodial parent decides to leave the state with the children. The majority says that same court, which may well have made its final decision based primarily on the environment in which one of the battling parents told the court he or she would place the child, can only consider visitation with respect to allowing that move. That simply does not make sense.
Or consider the case where one party, for his or her own good reasons, chooses not to be the custodial parent. *557The majority would force that noncustodial parent into a custody fight he or she does not want, in order to prevent a removal that he or she perceives to be harmful to the health, education or welfare of the children. That is because the majority concludes that if factors other than visitation are implicated in the removal, then the noncustodial parent must seek a change of custody rather than a prohibition against removal. Majority opinion page 535.
Or consider the case where neither parent wants a custody change, but the noncustodial parent does not want the children removed and the custodial parent will not move if it means giving up custody. The majority, notwithstanding, would force this couple into a custody fight.
In sum, I conclude that sec. 767.245(6), Stats., when correctly interpreted, allows the court to consider all evidence relating to the effect a removal from the state will have on the total living environment of the child. If, after consideration of all relevant evidence, the court determines that a move is "against the best interests of the child," it may deny permission to remove the child at that time. Only this interpretation gives effect to the unambiguous intent of the legislature to protect the interests of children at divorce by requiring courts to consider a broad range of factors which affect the adjustment of the child. Recent research which indicates that children and families after divorce need continuity as they go through the long process of adjustment to divorce supports this interpretation. Further, this interpretation protects post-divorce families from the needless disruption of the litigation of custody changes in situations in which the impacts of removal on the child are the real issue.
In addition, I agree with Justice Steinmetz that the majority errs in determining, as a matter of law, that the facts in this case permit removal even under the test it enunciates. The testimony presented to the circuit court *558did not directly assess the issue whether alternative visitation arrangements would significantly harm the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent. Majority opinion pages 534-535. Testifying for the custodial parent, a psychologist compared the harm to the children of a post-divorce change in custody to the harm of a readjustment in scheduling of visitations with the noncustodial parent, concluding that the loss of a primary custodian was the more harmful alternative. A social worker called by the noncustodial parent testified that replacing weekly visits with less frequent but extended visits would cause a more difficult adjustment for the parent than for the children. In short, the record indicates probable harm to the quality of the noncustodial parent's relationship with the children and is silent on the implications of that harm for the interests of the children.4 On this record, the majority's finding of fact is without support and application of its test (notwithstanding my disagreement with its test) requires remand.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE DONALD W. STEINMETZ and JUSTICE LOUIS J. CECI join in this dissent.

 The only authority cited for this claimed purpose is in footnote 7 of the majority's opinion, which states, in its entirety: "Sec. 767.245(6) is part of sec. 767.245 governing visitation rights." Majority opinion n.7. This conclusory statement is hardly a solid foundation upon which to rest a wide sweeping assertion about legislative purpose.

 The majority seems to argue that because the legislature used the words "against the best interests" in the removal statute rather than the words "in the best interests," the legislature was evincing its intent to limit judicial intervention in the custodial parent's decision to remove the children much more severely than in other post-divorce decisions involving children. There is no support for such an argument in the legislative history of the bill, nor in the words of the statute. I agree with the conclusion of my colleague, Justice Steinmetz, that "against the best interests" is, for the most part, indistinguishable from "in the best interests," in that one is merely the opposite side of the coin from the other.

 The majority argues that the ", . . legislature has recognized the custodial parent's caretaking and family decision-making responsibilities . . ." and has therefore chosen to make removal easier. Majority opinion pp. 531, 532. The majority does not cite legislative history to establish this interpretation of the legislative intent behind the removal statute. Instead, it refers to social science research, implying that this research supports making removal by the custodial parent easier. The majority quotes Wexler, cited above, in part: "Limiting judicial intervention in post-divorce family decision making is supported by a growing body of social science findings." Majority opinion n. 5. The Wexler article, however, does not support the majority's argument that restraints on removal are undesirable. To the extent that Wexler discusses the need *556of children for stability in post-divorce arrangements, his article supports my interpretation of sec. 767.245(6), Stats, as a necesary protection for such stability.
"... a growing body of social science findings . . . dispute important assumptions routinely made by the courts. These findings strongly suggest that divorce is a process, not a fixed event, and that the custodial parent and child require a period of time to adapt to the new post-divorce situation. Research indicates that courts generally do not appropriately evaluate the various factors that affect the child's adjustment during this process." Wexler at 760.
Further, I submit that for the majority to characterize the unilateral decision of one parent to remove the child from the state as "family decision-making" is inappropriate. "Family decisions" result from thoughtful consideration of the impact of proposed changes on the whole family, whether or not á divorce has occurred.

 Research indicates that both parents and children experience an abrupt discontinuity in their relationship when they originally adapt to the confines of the "visitation" relationship. Wallerstein & Kelly at 123. The noncustodial parent finds that the new relationship is very fragile and that legal restrictions on the visits exacerbate the difficulties of adjustment; children are dissatisfied with the limits of a visiting relationship, feeling that they see too little of the noncustodial parent. Id. at 315, 142. Because expert testimony in this case suggested that a negative impact on the noncustodial parent's adjustment to a restricted visitation schedule was likely, I cannot conclude, as does the majority, that no evidence supports a finding that a change in the visitation arrangement "... would significantly harm or impede the relationship between the children and their father _” P. 536. Instead, the evidence suggests that the new schedule would create a new disequilibrium in that relationship to which both the parent and the children must adjust.