Court Opinion

ID: 9574583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:06:12.964797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:12.288290
License: Public Domain

BERNSTEIN, Justice
(dissenting).
The Arizona law of libel involving public officials has been so limited by .the United States Supreme Court in a series of decisions beginning with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and continuing through St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968), that we must look to these cases as a basis for our decisions.1
In New York Times, supra, the United States Supreme Court said:
“We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.”
The court further clarified its position in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 84, 86 S. Ct. at 675, when it said:
“If existing state-law standards reflect the purposes of New York Times, this is at best accidental. Our decision in New York Times, moreover, draws its force from the constitutional protections afforded free expression. The standards that set the scope of its principles cannot therefore be such that ‘the constitutional limits of free expression in the Nation would vary with state lines.’ Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335, [66 S.Ct. 1029, 1031, 90 L.Ed. 1295].”
The clear intent of the United States Supreme Court is to avoid the potentially inhibiting effects that libel actions have on free and open discussion.
The New York Times decision, 376 U.S., at 268, 84 S.Ct., at 719, contains the following language:
“The question before us is whether the rule of liability, as applied to an action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct, abridges the *603freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”
and at 269-270, 84 S.Ct. at 720:
“The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’ Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 [77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498]. ‘The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful ■means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.’ Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 [51 S.Ct. 532, 536, 75 L.Ed. 1117]. ‘[I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions, Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 270 [62 S.Ct. 190, 197, 86 L.Ed. 192], and this opportunity is to be afforded for ‘vigorous advocacy’ no less than abstract discussion.’ N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 [83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405].”
“The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, ‘presupposes that right •conclusions are more likely to be gathered •out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.’ United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372.”
The men who founded our country were well versed in history, and they knew that tyranny allowed no opposition; free and •open discussion has always been the great bulwark of liberty and democratic government. There is always danger in vociferous and often venomous debate; it is also a safety valve which allows pent up emotions to escape, reducing the threat of violence and insurrection which repression breeds. Thus, great men who fathered this nation also sought to protect its existence through the establishment of constitutional guarantees, and among others, the freedom of speech and press.
In the case before this court, Wade Church, who was Attorney General of Arizona, gave a speech before delegates to an AFL-CIO convention; the subject of his speech was vigorously attacked in a front page editorial, supra, printed by the Arizona Republic a prominent and influential Arizona daily newspaper. Mr. Church immediately filed suit for libel. I do not believe that libel of a public official can any longer be classified as libel per se in view of the United States Supreme Court decisions that:
“Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free than does factual error”. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272, 84 S.Ct. at 722,
and
“* * * to insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones”. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1326.
Since World War II, the charge that someone is a communist has become so common place that rare is the man active in public life who escapes it. Presidents of the United States, cabinet members and many of the most distinguished men in federal and state governments have fared no better. However, the consequences of imposing fear of punishment, whether by money judgments or incarceration, on free and open discussion would become the death knell of our system of government as we now know it; when hope, imagination and the right of dissent are stifled the freedom of men ends. The price is too high to pay for the protection of public officials against “* * * vehement, caus*604tic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721.
The New York Times decision, supra, at 273, 84 S.Ct. at 722, also quoted the following:
“The climate in which public officials operate, especially during a political campaign, has been described by one commentator in the following terms: ‘Charges of gross incompetence, disregard of the public interest, communist sympathies and the like usually have filled the air; and hints of bribery, embezzlement, and other criminal conduct are not infrequent.’ Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Col.L.Rev. 875 (1949).”
As Attorney General, Mr. Church knew that his words were newsworthy and carried great weight. His speech calling for creation of “people’s councils” and attacking everyone in sight, the newspapers, the legislature, the mining companies, public utilities, railroads, etc., was certainly not placid and virtually invited attack.
The speech surely was a matter of public concern and as the New York Times case - said:
“ * * * ‘public men, are, as it were, public property,’ and ‘discussion cannot be denied and the right, as well as the duty, of criticism must not be stifled.’ ” 376 U.S. at 268, 84 S.Ct. at 720.
In St. Amant v. Thompson, supra, the court said that in order for a public official to sustain a judgment in a defamation action the rule of New York Times must be correctly interpreted and applied, namely,
“*■ * * tha(; the plaintiff in such an action must prove that the defamatory publication ‘was made with actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Church had the burden of proving that the appellants did so act and he failed to carry that burden. The record shows-that the appellants did not believe that Church was a communist or a communist sympathizer. Some testimony was presented that after admitted baiting by an agent of Church’s, one of the appellants-said “We’ll still finish your buddy Church.” This statement is not such proof as is required of actual malice. It was an intemperate response, after deliberately arousing a man’s anger, as to the political intent to vote Church out of office. It’s the privilege of any American to support for election his friends and vote out people he dislikes for any reason.
The present standards for proving libel were clearly defined in the St. Amant decision, supra, wherein the court said:
“Our cases, however, have furnished meaningful guidance for the further definition of a reckless publication. In New York Times, supra, the plaintiff did not satisfy his burden because the record failed to show that the publisher was aware of the likelihood that he was-circulating false information. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, [85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125] (1964), also decided before the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in this case, the opinion emphasized the necessity for a showing that a false publication was made with a ‘high degree of awareness of * * * probable falsity.’ 379 U.S., at 74, 85 S.Ct. 216. Mr. Justice Harlan’s opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153, [87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094] (1967), stated that evidence of either deliberate falsification or reckless publication ‘despite the publisher’s azvareness of probable falsity’ was essential to recovery by public officials in defamation actions. These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his *605publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.” (Emphasis added.)
I do not find from the evidence that Mr. Church proved actual malice, that the editorial was either a deliberate falsification or a reckless publication or that the publishing was done with such doubts as to its truth, as to show reckless disregard for truth or falsity from which actual malice could be demonstrated. The editorial vigorously attacked the theme of Church’s speech, the need to establish “people’s councils”.
The arena of politics is not for the thin skinned. As one of our former great Presidents, Harry S. Truman, said on politics “If you can’t stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen.”
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the national welfare demands open and robust debate, which includes the freedom of the press to question and attack the words and deeds of those who hold and those who aspire to high office.
Conflicting ideas, often diametrically opposed, are the seeds of a progressive democracy, and this must be a fundamental principle of our government. The dialogue of freedom, is more often than not, sharply divided. The art of persuasion frequently invokes exaggeration, caustic commentary and vilification of prominent men. The false statement is not unknown. However, from this seeming turmoil our people have forged the greatest democracy history has ever known.
It is not libelous for a newspaper, in attacking a political speech made by a public official, to point out that said official has proposed a political contrivance (People’s Councils) which historically had been utilized by the communists to seize power, and to editorially state that the speaker should clarify to the public his position on communism in advocating such a proposal. This constitutes fair comment under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and does not impute that the public official is a communist or communist sympathizer. It is the right a newspaper has in free society, and does not libel Mr. Church.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court and dismiss the complaint.

. N. Y. Times v. Sullivan, supra; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L. Ed.2d 456 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 88 S.Ct. 197, 19 L.Ed.2d 248; St. Amant v. Thompson, supra.