Court Opinion

ID: 9754002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:37:49.101797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:13.846535
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the incriminating statements made by appellant during his third interview on November 10 should have been suppressed.
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the U. S. Supreme Court held,
... [W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by *317showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused .. ., having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. (Footnote deleted)
Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884, 1885.
In the present case, the City of Pittsburgh Police and the F.B.I. conducted what was termed an “interview” of appellant, after he had invoked his right to counsel. (See N.T. Suppression, p. 465.)
The majority seeks to avoid the mandate of Edwards, supra, by relying on the earlier Pennsylvania cases, Commonwealth v. Rose, 265 Pa.Super. 159, 401 A.2d 1148 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Grandison, 449 Pa. 231, 296 A.2d 730 (1972). Both cases are distinguishable from the instant one.
The court in Grandison stated that it believed that questioning of the defendant was justified despite his having elected to remain silent, because of a “substantial change in circumstances.” Those circumstances included finding out the identity of the defendant and learning that he had been charged with other crimes. He was confronted with those matters. Not only do such circumstances not exist in this case, it is important to note Grandison predates the Supreme Court’s Edwards decision by nine years. The Edwards mandate is clear.
In Rose, the court addressed the issue of whether an admission obtained when a defendant was shown a ballistic report was admissible. In that case, the police had confronted the defendant with evidence, but the majority was careful to note that “after appellant decided to remain silent no interrogation took place.” Id., 265 Pa.Superior Ct. at 168, 401 A.2d at 1153.
*318In the present case, on the other hand, questions were asked of appellant. (See n.8, suppression generally 465-470, 576-580, esp. 467.)
The interview should not have been commenced given appellant’s earlier invocation of his rights. Furthermore, the majority notes that during this interview appellant indicated that he wished to say no more; “he was then informed that he could discontinue the conversation whenever he so wished.” The testimony of the1 officers present at the interview was in pertinent part:
And he was told that he had the right to stop at any time and leave. We then told him that it would be to his benefit to—well, it would be to our benefit to get the other individual identified, and that we were asking his cooperation due to the fact that we had certain evidence which implicated him, to continue on with the statement. And so, he would then come over, sit down and begin his statement again.
N.T. Suppression, 467.
Mr. Harris indicated then that’s all he wanted to say, and he began to indicate he wanted to walk out, and he proceeded to the door. And we indicated to him that we would like him to reconsider and tell us who else was involved in the robbery.
N.T. Suppression, 470.
In Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court wrote:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627.
*319Incriminating statements made after appellant attempted to end the interview should have been suppressed not only because the interview session should not have been commenced, but also because of the violations of Miranda that occurred during the interview.