Court Opinion

ID: 9380506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 10:07:00.766808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:25.550558
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued March 16, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                           First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                              NO. 01-20-00109-CR
                            ———————————
                       JORGE MONTALVO, Appellant
                                        V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 174th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 1526956

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      After   appellant,   Jorge   Montalvo,   without   an   agreed   punishment

recommendation from the State, pleaded guilty to the first-degree felony offense of
murder,1 the trial court assessed his punishment at confinement for forty years.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.

      Appellant’s appointed counsel on appeal has filed a motion to withdraw, along

with a brief stating that the record presents no reversible error and the appeal is

without merit and is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

      We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm the judgment as modified.

                                     Background

      On September 24, 2019, appellant pleaded guilty to the first-degree felony

offense of murder. In connection with his guilty plea, appellant executed a “Waiver

of Constitutional Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and Judicial Confession.” In this

waiver, appellant confessed to the allegations against him in the indictment and

stipulated that he was “satisfied with the attorney representing [him],” his attorney

“properly represented [him] and [he] has fully discussed the case with [his

attorney],” and the “State agree[d] to waive its right to a jury trial in exchange for .

. . [appellant’s] agree[ment] to waive his right of appeal.”

      Also on September 24, 2019, appellant executed written “Admonishments.”

In this document, appellant acknowledged that he understood the range of

punishment for a first-degree felony offense is a term of life incarceration, or any

term not more than 99 years or less than fifteen years. Appellant also acknowledged

1
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02.

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that he understood “the admonishments of the trial court set out” in the document,

he “waive[d] the right to have the trial court orally admonish” him, his “plea [was]

freely, knowingly and voluntarily made,” he was “totally satisfied with the

representation provided by [his] counsel and [he] received effective and competent

representation,” and he “fully [understood] the consequences of [his] plea.” Further,

“after having fully consulted with [his] attorney . . . [appellant] . . . request[ed] that

the trial court accept [his] plea.”

      Finally, and also on September 24, 2019, the trial court entered its first

certification of appellant’s right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2. Based on the

above-discussed waivers and admonishments, the trial court checked the box

indicating that appellant had “waived the right of appeal.” This certification was

signed by the trial court, appellant, and appellant’s court-appointed trial counsel.

      At the punishment hearing, appellant’s counsel notified the trial court that

appellant indicated that it was his desire to “withdraw his plea of guilty and instead

go to trial on this case.” The trial court noted that, during the plea hearing, appellant

“never indicated in any kind of way that he felt pressured or coerced into this plea,”

and stated that it would “not let [appellant] now withdraw a plea that the [trial court]

believe[d] he freely, knowingly, and voluntarily entered into,” where “there [was]

no suggestion or any kind of statement from [appellant] to indicate or suggest that

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there[] [was] some new evidence that’s just been revealed that would show

[appellant] is not guilty after he’s entered this plea of guilty.”

      However, the trial court also advised appellant that, “[i]f [appellant] would

like to appeal after this, [he] can do everything [he] need[s] to do to effect an appeal.”

Because the trial court’s statement was inconsistent with the trial court’s first

certification of appellant’s right to appeal, signed on September 24, 2019, which

stated that appellant had waived his right of appeal, appellant filed a motion to abate

the appeal so that the inconsistency could be resolved. See Burt v. State, 445 S.W.3d

752, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Accordingly, on July 14, 2020, the Court abated

this appeal and directed the trial court to make a finding clarifying its intention, or

not, to grant appellant permission to appeal, and, if necessary, to execute an amended

certification of appellant’s right to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(f).

      On August 9, 2021, a supplemental clerk’s record was filed with this Court.

The supplemental clerk’s record included an amended certification of appellant’s

right of appeal. See id. The amended certification indicated that this “is a plea-

bargain case, but the trial court has given permission to appeal, and the [appellant]

has the limited right of appeal to matters raised during the sentencing hearing and

ruled on” by the trial court. Based on the amended certification, granting appellant

a limited right of appeal, the Court reinstated the appeal. Appellant’s appointed

appellate counsel subsequently filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief.

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                                Anders Procedures

      When appointed counsel believes a criminal defendant’s appeal is frivolous,

counsel may file both a motion to withdraw and a brief stating that the record

presents no reversible error and the appeal is without merit and is frivolous. See

Anders, 386 U.S. at 741–42; In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008). Counsel’s brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional

evaluation of the record and supplying the Court with references to the record and

legal authority. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also High v. State, 573 S.W.2d

807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel indicates that he has thoroughly reviewed

the record and is unable to advance any grounds of error that warrant reversal. See

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Mitchell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

      Counsel has informed the Court that he provided appellant with a copy of the

brief and the motion to withdraw as well as a complete copy of the appellate record.

See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman,

252 S.W.3d at 408. Counsel also provided appellant with form motion to access the

appellate record, and counsel advised appellant of his right to file a pro se response

                                          5
to the Anders brief.2 See Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; In re Shulman, 252 S.W.3d

at 408. On February 21, 2023, appellant filed a pro se response to counsel’s brief.

      We have independently reviewed the entire record in this appeal, and we

conclude that no reversible error exists in the record, there are no arguable grounds

for review, and the appeal is frivolous. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (emphasizing

that reviewing court—and not counsel—determines, after full examination of

proceedings, whether appeal is wholly frivolous); Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763,

767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (reviewing court must determine whether arguable

grounds for review exist); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005) (same); Mitchell, 193 S.W.3d at 155 (reviewing court determines

whether arguable grounds exist by reviewing entire record). We note that an

appellant may challenge a holding that there are no arguable grounds for appeal by

filing a petition for discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827 & n.6.

2
      This Court also notified appellant that counsel had filed an Anders brief and a
      motion to withdraw and informed appellant that he had a right to examine the
      appellate record and file a response to his counsel’s Anders brief. And this Court
      provided appellant with a form motion to access the appellate record. See Kelly v.
      State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman, 252
      S.W.3d 403, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

                                           6
                              Modification of Judgment

      In appointed counsel’s Anders brief, counsel requests that the Court modify

the trial court’s judgment “to delete the special finding [of] ‘APPEAL WAIVED,

NO PERMISSION TO APPEAL GRANTED’.” As discussed above, while the trial

court’s judgment accurately reflected the state of the case as of the time appellant

entered his guilty plea, after the trial court entered its amended certification, granting

appellant a limited right of appeal, the judgment is no longer accurate.

      While we have concluded that appellant’s appeal is frivolous, an appellate

court has the power to correct and reform a trial court’s judgment to make the record

speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so. See Nolan

v. State, 39 S.W.3d 697, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); see

also TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). This is true no matter who, or if anyone, has called the

matter to the attention of the trial court. See Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet ref’d) (“The authority of an appellate court to reform

incorrect judgments is not dependent upon the request of any party, nor does it turn

on the question of whether a party has or has not objected in the trial court.”).

      Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment to delete, under the section,

“[f]urthermore, the following special findings or orders apply,” the words:

“APPEAL WAIVED. NO PERMISSION TO APPEAL GRANTED.” See TEX. R.

APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see

                                            7
also Lopez v. State, No. 01-14-00637-CR, 2016 WL 1600269, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 21, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(modifying judgment to remove “special finding that state[d] ‘APPEAL WAIVED.

NO PERMISSION TO APPEAL GRANTED” in Anders case).

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment, as modified, and grant appellant’s

appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw.3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f); see Morris v.

State, 496 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (“An

appellate court has the power to correct a trial court judgment to make the record

speak the truth when it has the necessary date and information to do so.”). Attorney

Nicholas Mensch must immediately send appellant the required notice and file a

copy of the notice with the Clerk of this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5(c). We

dismiss any pending motions as moot.

                                   PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

3
      Appellant’s appointed counsel still has a duty to inform appellant of the result of
      this appeal and that he may, on his own, pursue discretionary review in the Texas
      Court of Criminal Appeals. See Ex Parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. Crim.
      App. 1997).

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