Court Opinion

ID: 9734287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:30:58.293844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:47.626857
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
I believe we should vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
In his charge to the jury, the trial judge stated:
*526In deciding which conflicting testimony to believe, you should not necessarily be swayed by the number of witnesses on each side. You may find that the testimony of a few witnesses-just one witness-is more believable than the opposing testimony of a greater number of witnesses.
On the other hand, you should also consider the extent to which conflicting testimony is supported by other evidence. You should evaluate the testimony of Ida Williams with special care, in view of Ida Williams’ emotional involvement and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to the crime charged, which is one that is usually carried out in private.
You can determine for yourselves what her appearance was. I cannot influence you. I can say that I thought she was a very direct witness who stood up extremely well under circumstances that must have been extremely distressing and painful to her.
Now, before you find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in this case, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act charged did, in fact, occur and it occurred without Ida Williams consent.
One of the factors to be considered in a case of this kind is as to whether a complaint was promptly made to the police. I would say, from the facts as I have heard them, Ida Williams proceeded with all commendable and due haste to immediately go to her daughter for assistance and immediately report what had occurred to her, immediately to the police....
Ida Williams testified that she did not see any particular mark or scars on the defendant. One of the witnesses for the defense stated that at the time of the line-up there was blood coming out of the corner of the mouth of the defendant at the time and that somehow the inference would be that because blood was coming out of his mouth that an inference that you may draw-that is entirely up to you-that that somehow identified him as the person and it was upon that that Ida Williams made her identification.
*527Now, in my opinion, that is just not consistent. She said she did not see any scars or any identification on him at all at the line-up or any other time. But that’s for you to determine. . . .
After you have considered everything, what it all comes down to is to use your common sense as to what did happen in this housing project and did this person who, in my opinion, Ida Williams has testified fairly and truthfully -was this person really-did she make a proper identification of this defendant, who has been charged and is on trial before you. And you have to do that by considering the way all the witnesses in this case impressed you.
Now, don't be misled by the-where obviously two sets of friends and former friends of this defendant that are-whose opinion may or may not be reliable as to where he was. Do not be impressed by the fact that all of the witnesses testified —the alibi witnesses testified that between the hours of-I think four or five witnesses said that on June 14th of this year, that Momma’s birthday party, between the hours of noon time and 9:00 p. m. all the people stayed in the house and nobody ever left the house.
The only impression-you can decide whether that impresses jou-but that kind of consistency, in my opinion, is quite suspect. I don’t-/ think it's impossible that four people would stay in a house on a summer day, apparently, and nobody left the house. I mean, it’s that sort of determined consistency that would, in my opinion, raise some question as to all of the testimony of the people-that those witnesses have given. But that is for you to determine. You may be impressed by it. It’s for you to determine.
(N.T. 796-803, emphasis added).
Section 4.7 of the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury (Approved Draft, 1968), provides:
(a) The court, at the time it instructs the jury, may summarize and comment on the evidence, provided the jury is clearly and unequivocally instructed that it is the *528exclusive judge of the facts, that it is to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses and that it is not bound by the comments of the court.
(b) The summary and comment permitted in subsection (a) is governed by the following principles:
(iv) The court may state the law and comment on matters in evidence bearing on the credibility of any witness, but may not directly express an opinion that certain testimony is worthy or unworthy of belief.
(Emphasis added.)
The Commentary to Section 4.7(b)(iv) states:
The standard permits the judge to put to the jury appropriate legal principles on credibility and to point out relevant matters in evidence, such as conflicts in testimony of a witness. But, the judge may not ‘intimate that certain testimony is worthy or unworthy of belief.’ United States v. Bookie, 229 F.2d 130 (7th Cir.1956).
In Commonwealth v. Archambault, 448 Pa. 90, 290 A.2d 72 (1972), our Supreme Court stated that a trial judge may not express his personal view of a defendant’s guilt, for to do so would invade the province of the jury and violate the defendant’s right to a trial by jury. In Commonwealth v. Butler, 448 Pa. 128, 134-35, 291 A.2d 89, 92 (1972), the Court stated:
Just as a trial judge is not permitted to indicate to the jury his views on the verdict that they should reach in a criminal case . . . [citations omitted] similarly, he is not permitted to indicate to a jury his views on whether particular witnesses are telling the truth.
Here, the trial judge’s comments went far beyond “comment on matters . . . bearing on the credibility of any witness.” ABA Standards, supra. Instead, the judge’s comments made plain to the jury the judge’s personal opinion that Ida Williams was a credible witness; that the alibi witnesses were not credible; and that appellant was therefore guilty. The trial judge’s statement to the jury that it was “for you to determine” whether the alibi witnesses were credible did not excuse, or cure the effect of, the judge’s *529expression of his personal opinion of appellant’s guilt. The statement was preceded by the most unequivocal admonitions: “Now, don’t be misled by ... . Do not be impressed by .... it’s impossible that . . ..” As the Supreme Court recognized, in Commonwealth v. Archambault, supra:
An expression by the judge that in his opinion the accused is guilty leaves an indelible imprint on the minds of the jury. The jury is undoubtedly going to attribute to the judge, because of his experience in criminal cases, special expertise in determining guilt or innocence. As Mr. Justice (late Chief Justice) Kephart stated for this Court: “The judge occupies an exalted and dignified position; he is the one person to whom the jury, with rare exceptions, looks for guidance, and from whom the litigants expect absolute impartiality. ...”
In light of the decisive effect that a jury is likely to give to a judge’s statement that in his opinion the accused is guilty, it is clear that cautionary instructions to the effect that the jury is the final arbiter of the verdict are insufficient to vitiate the impact of the judge’s statement. 448 Pa. at 95-96, 290 A.2d at 75.
Finally, it cannot be maintained that the trial judge’s error was harmless. The respective credibility of Ida Williams and of the alibi witnesses was critical to deciding the case. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wortham, 471 Pa. 243, 369 A.2d 1287 (1977). Moreover, despite being told by the judge not to be impressed by the testimony of the alibi witnesses, at least some of the jurors evidently were impressed, for the foreman twice informed the judge that the jury could not reach a verdict. (N.T. 810-811, 814-815) The fact that eventually the jury did reach a verdict makes it especially likely that judge’s expression of his personal opinion of appellant’s guilt proved decisive.
The judgment of sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for new trial.
HOFFMAN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.