Court Opinion

ID: 9459844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:33:02.189632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:21.454724
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge:
This suit by the widow and beneficiary of Harrison Trawick for death benefits from two insurance policies on his life is on its second journey to this court. Our opinion on the first appeal is Trawick v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 1293 (C.A.5,1971).
In his applications for insurance Tra-wick had misrepresented his physical condition. The central issue in this litigation became whether the insurer, Manhattan, issued the policies despite its knowledge of the applicant’s prior history of heart disease. At the first trial there was a jury verdict for plaintiff, but judgment n. o. v. was granted for Manhattan on the basis that the undisputed evidence showed that it had no actual knowledge of Trawick’s heart condition. We reversed and remanded for a new trial. On remand, at the second trial, a jury again returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Manhattan again appeals. We affirm.
1.
A major contention of appellant is that the prior decision of this court was wrong and should be overruled. No val*537id reason is shown why we should depart from the law of the case, and, in fact, we agree with the earlier decision.
The trial court considered and denied Manhattan’s motions for judgment n. 0. v. and for a new trial based on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence. We agree with the District Judge’s ruling.
2.
The only point which justifies discussion is defendant’s claim that the court reversibly erred in denying it the right to reargue to the jury when the court, after oral argument, gave and then withdrew an erroneous instruction which had been requested by defendant. The starting point for disposition of this issue is an analysis of our prior decision. We then held that there was sufficient evidence of information in the possession of Manhattan prior to issuance of the policies to justify a jury finding that Manhattan knew of the insured’s heart condition. Alternatively we concluded that if arguendo the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of actual knowledge in the sense of awareness by the insurer of the content of the information in its files which it had obtained pursuant to an independent investigation of the insured’s condition, it was charged with knowledge of such information.
There were several critical pieces of evidence which the jury could have found were the source of knowledge by the company, actual or imputed, prior to the time it issued the policies. It was undisputed that prior to issuance Manhattan had in its files various information which Judge Goldberg described in the prior opinion. There was, however, a conflict in the evidence concerning whether, prior to issuance, the company had in its possession the applicant’s hospital records from St. Dominic’s Hospital. In his order denying the post-trial motions of defendant after the second trial, the District Judge described the contents of these records:
The hospital records of St. Dominic’s unmistakably involved all the facts and circumstances in one small jacket file to the effect that Harrison Tra-wick had been hospitalized there for treatment for a very serious heart condition prior to his application for these policies of insurance on his life.
In our prior opinion we held:
[T]he record reveals that reasonable and fair-minded men could have concluded from sharply conflicting evidence that the defendant prior to the issuance of the policies possessed hospital records of the insured which contained (1) a diagnosis of “arterio-sclerotic heart disease with angina pectoris,” (2) electrocardiogram readings showing abnormality of the heart muscle, and (3) a family history revealing that the father and two brothers of the insured died of heart trouble.
447 F.2d at 1296. The “sharply conflicting” evidence to which the opinion referred came about in this manner. By interrogatory plaintiff requested the insurance company to give the names of doctors and hospitals that had furnished to it past medical data on the applicant and the dates the data was received. Manhattan’s answer in narrative form said, inter alia, “The defendant secured information relative to Mr. Trawick’s past medical history from Dr. Gayden Ward, Dr. Temple Ainsworth, St. Dominic’s Hospital, Retail Credit Company, and the Medical Information Bureau before the policies were issued.” (emphasis added). In mid-trial, after it became apparent that the contents of the hospital records were damaging to its position, the company asked leave to amend the answer by deleting the name of St. Dominic’s from the above-quoted sentence, on the ground that through error it had answered erroneously and that in truth it had not received any records from St. Dominic’s. The court refused to permit the amendment. It had, however, allowed Manhattan to introduce oral testimony to the effect that it had *538received no records from St. Dominic’s and that the name of the hospital as a source of information had been included in the answer through error.
On remand and prior to the second trial, the court allowed the defendant to amend its answer to the interrogatory so as to delete St. Dominic’s Hospital as a source of information. The effect of this was to deny that any records had ever been received from the hospital. At trial both the original and the amended answers were read into evidence. The officer of Manhattan who had sworn to the original answer to interrogatories testified orally that there was nothing in the company’s files from St. Dominic’s prior to issuance of the policies.
The hospital’s director of medical records testified that Trawick’s only admission to the hospital had been in 1963 (five years before the issuance of the policies), and that all his medical records were kept in a single folder which would be the only record available to an insurance company seeking medical information on him.1
The defendant in writing requested the following charge:
You are instructed that there is no evidence in this case from which you can find that Manhattan Life Insurance Company secured information from St. Dominic Hospital before the death of Harrison Trawick.
The record does not show when the request was made, but the fair inference is that it was timely. The trial judge wrote “Given” on the instruction. What the judge may have said orally to defense counsel is not in the record, but the judge acknowledges that the defendant had a fair expectation that the charge would be given. In his oral charge, after closing arguments, the court gave the instruction, as he had said he would. Upon objection by plaintiff the court recognized its error and, over the objection of defendant, instructed the jury that he withdrew the charge and that the jury should decide under all the evidence whether the company had the information from St. Dominic’s prior to the death of the insured. Defendant then asked the opportunity to reargue the particular point and the court, while stating that it believed defendant had relied on the expectation the charge would be given, denied the request. This denial is asserted as error on appeal.
Under some circumstances, when the court has announced prior to argument that it will give a charge and subsequently declines to give, or gives and withdraws the charge, the court should allow the party misled, if he requests it, to reargue that point to the jury. Loveless v. United States, 104 U. S.App.D.C. 157, 260 F.2d 487 (1958); Terminal R. Ass’n v. Staengel, 122 F.2d 271 (C.A.8, 1941); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760 (C.A.10, 1951). This is an implementation of the requirement of Rule 51, Fed.R.Civ.P. and Rule 30, Fed. R.Crim.P., that prior to argument the court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon timely written requests for jury instructions. Id. It is but a particularized instance of the general discretionary power of the court over oral arguments. The district court has wide latitude and discretion in supervising the time limits, the scope, and the extent of argument and summation to the jury. United States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 1266 (C.A.5, 1970); Rochester Civic Theatre, Inc. v. Ramsay, 368 F.2d 748 (C.A.8, 1966); Wagner v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 282 F.2d 392 (C.A.3, 1960); Hockaday v. Red Line, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 174 F.2d 154 (C.A.D.C.1949); Palmer v. Miller, 145 F.2d 926 (C.A.8, 1944); Biggs v. Mays, 125 F.2d 693 (C.A.8, 1942); Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Richardson, 116 F.2d 860 (C.A.6, 1941); Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Vallone, 74 F.2d 137 (C.A.5, 1934). Whether there should be reargument is a matter *539for the discretion of the trial court, subject to review for abuse of discretion. Counsel should be permitted to reargue “if justice requires” it. Downie v. Powers, supra, 193 F.2d at 767. In United States v. Shirley, 435 F.2d 1076 (C.A.7, 1970), the trial court, after argument modified its charge in a manner correct as a matter of law. To defendant’s argument that he was prejudiced because he would have argued differently had he known of the charge, and that the charge made his oral argument ineffective, the court held:
Although we recognize the necessity of assuring compliance with the rule [Rule 30 Fed.R.Crim.P.] so that counsel may effectively plan their arguments to the jury, United States v. Bass, 425 F.2d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1970), the rule is not so inflexible as to restrict the trial judge in giving a supplemental or modified instruction designed to prevent the jury from becoming confused and deciding the case on a false basis.
435 F.2d at 1078.
Moreover, in the circumstances of this case we must give appropriate effect to the principle of “invited error,” that range of conduct which may create error at trial but which compels appellate courts to affirm when the party inducing the error raises it on appeal. United States v. Wurtsbaugh, 140 F.2d 534 (C.A.5, 1944); Cranston Print Works v. Public Service Co., 291 F.2d 638 (C.A.4, 1961); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 840 (C.A.2, 1962). See also Canon 7, EC 7-20, & DR 7-106(B), ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. The requested, and promised, instruction was not even arguably correct factually and was misleading as well. There was no rational basis on which defense counsel could have thought that it was correct. The question of possession of the St. Dominic’s records prior to issuance of the policies, and the company’s change of position regarding them, had been fought out at the first trial and fought out again on appeal. It was at the heart of the prior decision.2 Our prior opinion pointed out that whether the company possessed the records had been the subject of “sharply conflicting evidence.” The conflict was not removed at the second trial but continued in a more accentuated form — an answer which said “we received the records prior to issuing the policies”; an amended answer the effect of which was, “we did not receive the records at all”; and oral testimony which said, “we did not receive the records before issuance of the policies.” The instruction was not only predicated on an erroneous statement of the evidence but was misleading as well. The critical issue was not whether the company possessed the records before Trawick’s death but before the policies were issued.
Defendant had full opportunity before it made its argument to correct the error into which it had led the court. Prior to the oral arguments, in denying Manhattan’s motions for directed verdict, the trial judge had said this:
I think that’s a wide open question as to whether or not this insurance company undertook and made some independent investigation of this insurance risk before writing it and as to whether or not they had in their possession any information which charged them in law with knowledge of the fact that Mr. Trawick had a very serious heart condition which I think he certainly had contrary to his statement prior to their writing this insurance policy,- these insurance policies on his life. Gentlemen, I think that’s a jury question and I will overrule that motion.
The question of the dispute over pre-is-suance notice to Manhattan surfaced *540again in plaintiff’s first closing argument. Counsel pointed out the conflict between the first answer and the amended answer. Defense counsel responded in his argument by telling the jury:
and if you will listen to the Judge he will tell you that there is nothing from which you can find that this company had any information whatsoever from St. Dominies Hospital before these policies were issued.
This was not an accurate statement of the contents of the charge which counsel had requested and had a “fair expectation” would be given. In plaintiff’s closing argument, counsel reiterated the conflict in the answer and the amended answer and stated he expected the court to leave it to the jury to determine who was telling the truth. At none of these stages did the defense object or make any other move to correct the error into which it had led the court.
When plaintiff’s counsel objected to the requested and given instruction he pointed out to the court the conflict in the evidence concerning possession of the hospital records prior to issuance of the policies. The court, after sustaining the objection, recalled the jury and instructed it that the court was withdrawing the instruction and that the jury should decide under all the evidence whether Manhattan had received the St. Dominie’s records before the death of Trawiek. Defendant was given the opportunity to object again and then asked (without referring to the confusion it had brought about between date of issuance and time of death) for the right to reargue.
As part of the oral charge the court had instructed the jury that Trawick’s answers in his application were materially false, and then said, inter alia,:
Now under these circumstances and conditions the sole and only question for you to decide in making your verdict in this case is as to whether or not Manhattan knew or had the facts in its possession from which it should have known that the insured Mr. Harrison Trawiek had suffered heart attacks and was under treatment for heart attacks before it wrote the policies of insurance in suit.
The burden is upon the plaintiff Trawiek to show you by a greater weight of the more convincing evidence in this case that Manhattan thus knew the facts of the history of Mr. Trawiek with respect to heart trouble before it wrote these policies and that it therefore had no right in law to rely upon the false statements of this insured in this application to the contrary. This is the very heart of this entire controversy between these parties. This is the only disputed issue of fact that you are called upon in this case to decide, that is to say as to whether or not under all the facts and circumstances this insurance company did or did not rely or have any right to rely upon these false answers of Mr. Trawiek in this application.
* * * * * *
. if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that this insurance company legally knew these false answers in this application to be untrue but they nevertheless agreed to and did write these policies of insurance on Mr. Trawick’s life then it would be your duty to return a verdict in this case for the plaintiff, Mrs. Trawiek. This is basically and essentially the only matter presented to you for your decision under the evidence and law in this case.
The court submitted the case on a general verdict and special interrogatories under Rule 49, Fed.R.Civ.P. We set out in the margin the special interrogatories, each of which correctly framed the issue in terms of notice prior to issuance of the policies and each of which the jury answered “yes.” 3
*541We do not suggest that in every instance reargument should be denied to the party which has requested an erroneous instruction that has been promised but not given (or given and withdrawn). Rather we recognize an appropriate range of discretion for the trial judge to do what justice requires in the circumstances. Under the circumstances of this case we will not reverse a second jury verdict for the plaintiff on the basis of a claim that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying reargument. A ruling to the contrary would have been much closer to an abuse of discretion. In circumvention of the central point of our previous decision, Manhattan had sought and secured a patently incorrect advantage embraced in a misleading instruction. When the matter surfaced the insurance company hung on to its advantage with no effort to correct the error it had induced. It lost its advantage only when the error came to the ultimate — and intended — fruition in the court’s oral charge and plaintiff objected to it, and even then defendant opposed correction.4
An additional reason for affirmance is the action of the trial judge in denying the motion for new trial, one ground of which was the denial of reargument. The trial judge made clear in the record his opinions that defendant should not be liable, that under no circumstances should plaintiff recover, and that the prior opinion of this court was erroneous. In his order denying the motion for new trial he said so repeatedly and to the extent of several pages. He stated that he allowed the verdict to stand only because our prior opinion concerning actual or constructive notice of the hospital records was the law of the case, though to him erroneous. Under these circumstances there is unusually strong force to the trial judge’s rejection of the reargument point, in which he concluded that defendant’s reargument contention had no merit and that further argument from defendant “could not possibly do aught but worsen its position.”
Affirmed.

. The director’s description of the contents of the folder was consistent with that in the opinion by Judge Goldberg.

. The trial judge noted in his order denying defendant’s motion for new trial after the second trial: “That instruction [the instruction given and withdrawn] embodied the controlling principles in the case as announced by this circuit, and its approval would have been tantamount to a peremptory instruction.”

. No. 1: Before the policies were issued, did the insurance company have information in its possession from which it knew, or from which it should have *541known, that Harrison Trawick had falsely answered question 7(e) in the application when he denied having had, and having been treated for, chest pain and shortness of breath?
No. 2: Before the policies were issued, did the insurance company have information in its possession from which it knew, or from which it should have known, that Harrison Trawick had falsely answered question 7(g) in the application when he denied that he liad, and that he had been treated for coronary artery disease or any other heart condition?
No. 3: Before the policies were issued, did the insurance company have information in its possession from which it knew, or from which it should have known that Harrison Trawick had sustained a heart attack?
No. 4: Before the policies were issued, did the insurance company have information in its possession from which it knew, or from which it should have known that Harrison Trawick’s two brothers died of heart attacks?

. Compare Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Johnson, 140 F.2d 968 (CA5, 1944). Defendant requested an instruction which was erroneous. The court refused it but included its language in the general charge. On objection by defendant to that portion of the general charge, the court declined to correct it on the ground that defendant had initiated the idea. This court reversed, pointing out that it was wholly untenable for the court to adhere irrevocably to an erroneous instruction so that it could not “on second and better thought correct it.” In dictum, the court stated that even if the written request had been marked “Given” defendant could have timely brought the matter to the attention of the court, confessed error, and obtained a curative instruction. 140 F.2d 972. The present defendant did not bring the matter to the court’s attention, did not confess error, and opposed any correction but, nevertheless, insists that the court was required to allow it to argue further.