Court Opinion

ID: 9912483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 17:00:53.50825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:32.905128
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2008     Document: 010110973223        Date Filed: 12/22/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          December 22, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                            Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 23-2008
                                                     (D.C. No. 2:16-CR-03254-MIS-1)
  RAYBERT DARIN AHIDLEY,                                         (D. N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, EBEL, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        Defendant Raybert Darin Ahidley appeals his sentence of 24 months of

 imprisonment followed by 24 months of supervised release imposed for his violation of

 the terms of his supervised release. He challenges the sentence as substantively

 unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm his sentence.

        In 2016 Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a minor in Indian country, see

 18 U.S.C. §§ 2243(a), 1153, for having sex, while at the age of 29, with a 15-year-old girl

        *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2008      Document: 010110973223          Date Filed: 12/22/2023        Page: 2

 on the Mescalero Apache reservation. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and

 five years of supervised release. His term of supervision began on November 3, 2017.

 Over the next five years his supervision was revoked five times and he spent roughly half

 that time in custody. Then, on October 4, 2022, in the second month of his sixth term of

 supervision, Defendant was pulled over by an officer who observed him swerving in his

 car. He failed six out of six field sobriety tests and his breath alcohol concentration

 (BrAC) measured .25. Also, the arresting officer found Defendant’s one-year-old child

 sitting in his lap and his newborn in the lap of his girlfriend in the passenger seat. He was

 charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and child abuse.

        At his revocation hearing Defendant admitted to violating the terms of his release

 by committing a federal, state, or local crime and by possessing alcohol. The district

 court sentenced Defendant to two years’ imprisonment—the statutory maximum, see 18

 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (setting maximum terms of imprisonment upon revocation of

 supervision); 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (classifying offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (maximum

 sentence for Defendant’s crime of conviction)—and two years’ supervised release.

 Because Defendant’s supervised-release offense was a Grade B violation, see USSG §

 7B1.1(a), and he was in criminal-history category II, the recommended sentence under

 the Sentencing Commission policy statements was six to twelve months’ imprisonment,

 see USSG § 7B1.4(a).

        On appeal Defendant argues only that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

 Substantive reasonableness “concerns whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in

 light of the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Adams, 751

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Appellate Case: 23-2008      Document: 010110973223         Date Filed: 12/22/2023      Page: 3

 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2014). This proposition applies to revocation of supervised

 release as well as initial sentencing on a conviction. See United States v. McBride, 633

 F.3d 1229, 1231–33 (10th Cir. 2011). In assessing a district court’s application of these

 factors, we apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See id. at 1232. “To prove

 the court abused its discretion, the defendant must show the sentence exceeded the

 bounds of permissible choice, such that the sentence is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical,

 or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Gross, 44 F.4th 1298, 1302 (10th Cir.

 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). While a sentence within the range suggested by

 Sentencing Commission policy statements is presumptively reasonable, a sentence

 outside that range is not presumptively unreasonable; instead, the reviewing court must

 “give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,

 justify the extent” of any variance from Sentencing Commission policy guidance. Gall v.

 United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

        Here, the district court gave explicit and reasoned consideration to the § 3553(a)

 factors in explaining Defendant’s sentence. See United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910,

 917 (10th Cir. 2018) (“A sentence is more likely to be within the bounds of reasonable

 choice when the court has provided a cogent and reasonable explanation for it.”).

        First, the district court considered the “nature and circumstances of the offense,

 and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” R., Vol. 3 at 41; see § 3553(a)(1). It

 noted that Defendant’s underlying offense was a sex crime, that the violation in this case

 “was driving while very intoxicated with two young children in the car,” and that

 Defendant’s history while on supervised release included “numerous” previous

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 violations: “Failure to attend treatment, new charges, drug use, discharge from facilities,

 failure to attend therapy multiple times, alcohol use.” R., Vol. 3 at 41–42.

        Second, the district court addressed the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(2).

 Considering the “need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal

 conduct,” the court, observing that Defendant had received multiple guideline sentences

 in the past, found that another guideline sentence would not be adequate to deter him

 from crime. R., Vol. 3 at 42; see § 3553(a)(2)(B). Considering the need “to protect the

 public from further crimes of the defendant,” the court was “concerned about

 [Defendant’s] alcohol consumption and protecting the public from crimes of [Defendant]

 like the one that he committed during the violation in this case of very high driving-

 under-the-influence with children in the car.” R., Vol. 3 at 42; see § 3553(a)(2)(C).

 Considering “the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training,

 medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner,” the court

 explained that it “ha[d] attempted to provide the defendant with those things while on

 supervised release, but it has not worked because [Defendant] continually violates his

 supervised release, and . . . some of those things are available in the Bureau of Prisons.”

 R., Vol. 3 at 42; see § 3553(a)(2)(D).

        Third, in reference to §§ 3553(a)(3)–(5), the district court explained that it was

 considering the guideline range and the policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.

 R., Vol. 3 at 43.

        Finally, considering “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among

 defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” the

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 district court found that “there is not an unwarranted sentencing disparity[;] given the

 number of violations of supervised release[,] it would not be unusual for a defendant to

 receive an upward variance”; and it added that “[i]f there is any sentencing disparity, it is

 not unwarranted in this case, given the number of supervised release violations, the

 frequency with which they happen, and the seriousness of this violation.” R., Vol. 3 at 43;

 see § 3553(a)(6). The court also said there was no need to provide restitution. See

 § 3553(a)(7).

        We cannot say that the district court’s sentencing decision, reached after cogent

 and reasonable consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, was “arbitrary, capricious,

 whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Gross, 44 F.4th at 1302. Defendant’s arguments

 to the contrary are unpersuasive. Defendant argues that his substance abuse is at the root

 of his problems, that the public could best be protected if he receives substance-abuse

 treatment, and therefore that the district court abused its discretion by not giving

 sufficient weight to the opportunity provided by the Mescalero Tribal Court to provide

 him with substance-abuse treatment “targeted toward Mescalero people.” Aplt. Br. at 16.

 But the court considered and rejected this argument, remarking, “[T]o say there’s another

 place for him to get treatment when he has failed to get treatment so many times in this

 court—I mean, what’s different about Mescalero’s treatment versus all the treatment he’s

 walked away from in this case?” R., Vol. 3 at 19–20. It was no abuse of discretion to

 reject an argument that the availability of substance-abuse treatment justified a more

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 lenient sentence when Defendant had already violated his previous terms of supervision

 multiple times, including by failing to attend court-ordered treatment.

        Defendant also points to the difficult circumstances of his upbringing and his

 substance-use disorder as mitigating factors. But while “evidence of a poor upbringing or

 mental health problems can play a crucial mitigating role,” United States v. Lente, 759

 F.3d 1149, 1173 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), we cannot say that

 the district court abused its discretion by affording Defendant’s mitigating evidence

 limited weight. “Evidence of childhood trauma, psychological issues, or youthful

 indiscretion is most powerful when accompanied by signs of recovery,” id.; but such

 signs were absent here. As the district court noted, Defendant had already violated the

 terms of his supervision five times before violating it a sixth time by driving “while very

 intoxicated with two young children in the car.” R., Vol. 3 at 41. Indeed, “otherwise

 mitigating evidence may be ‘double-edged’ because it can also indicate a likelihood of

 recidivism.” Lente, 759 F.3d at 1173. Defendant’s inability to stop consuming alcohol

 even when his alcohol use had resulted in six violations of his terms of supervised release

 and his serving years in prison provided more than sufficient justification for the district

 court’s “concern[] about [Defendant’s] alcohol consumption and protecting the public

 from crimes of the defendant like the one that he committed during the violation in this

 case.” R., Vol. 3 at 42. Though Defendant claims that “the best way of addressing [the

 court’s] concern” for public safety and deterrence is to get him into substance-abuse

 treatment, Aplt. Br. at 17–18, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to decide

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 instead that a term of incarceration longer than the recommended policy guidelines would

 better serve those ends.

        Defendant also argues that while the nature and circumstances of his offense were

 “serious,” they were not “egregious,” as this was the first time he had violated his

 supervision by committing a new offense and because his act was not violent nor did he

 flee from the police. Id. at 14. But the district court was well within the bounds of its

 discretion to find his conduct to be a serious offense and to accord it heavy weight in

 imposing Defendant’s sentence. See Barnes, 890 F.3d at 915 (“We give substantial

 deference to the district court’s weighing of [the § 3553(a)] factors.”).

        Perhaps Defendant’s weakest argument is that the district court should have

 afforded more mitigating weight to his acceptance of responsibility at the revocation

 hearing. As the government points out, the sincerity of his acceptance of responsibility

 was highly questionable. Though he admitted he “screwed up bad this time,” R., Vol. 3 at

 25, he also claimed that he was swerving to avoid potholes, not because he was drunk;

 that he wasn’t very drunk at the time; that the officer who arrested him was “petty,” id. at

 28; and that he didn’t know why the breathalyzer gave such a high BrAC.

        Finally, Defendant argues that the district court should not have ordered more time

 on supervised release. Sentencing courts imposing supervised release are instructed to

 consider the § 3553(a) factors just as when imposing a sentence of incarceration. See

 United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59–60 (2000). For the same reasons that there was

 no abuse of discretion in the district court’s imposition of Defendant’s sentence of

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Appellate Case: 23-2008     Document: 010110973223         Date Filed: 12/22/2023      Page: 8

 incarceration, there was no abuse of discretion in imposing an additional two years of

 supervision upon his release from prison.

        In sum, “giv[ing] due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)

 factors, on a whole, justify” Defendant’s sentence, Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, we reject the

 Defendant’s argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.

        The Defendant’s sentence is AFFIRMED.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Harris L Hartz, Circuit Judge

                                              8