Court Opinion

ID: 9618611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:14:23.31858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:31:42.450673
License: Public Domain

*705LEWIS, Judge.
Plaintiff was permanently injured while working on a silage harvesting machine at Caldonia Farm in Tillery, North Carolina, operated by the North Carolina Department of Correction. On 23 September 1991, plaintiff filed a claim with the North Carolina Industrial Commission under the Tort Claims Act, N.C.G.S. §§ 143-291 to -300.1. In its amended answer, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs claim on the grounds that workers’ compensation was plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. By order filed 6 January 1993, Deputy Commissioner Jan N. Pittman granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission, which, after a de novo hearing, by order filed 31 March 1994 affirmed the decision of Deputy Commissioner Pittman two to one. Plaintiff then appealed the Full Commission’s order.
The issue on appeal is whether the Full Commission erred in concluding that N.C.G.S. § 97-13(c) (1991) bars plaintiff’s claims under the Tort Claims Act. We affirm.
Section 97-13(c) permits prisoners to apply for workers’ compensation if they suffer accidental injury arising out of and in the course of assigned employment and if the accident results in disabling injuries that continue after discharge from prison. Dependents and kin of prisoners who suffer accidental death may also apply for workers’ compensation under this section. Section 97-13(c) further provides that N.C.G.S. §§ 97-10.1 and 97-10.2 apply to prisoners and discharged prisoners entitled to compensation under section 97-13(c) and to the State “in the same manner” as these sections apply to ordinary employees and employers. Section 97-10.1 sets forth the general rule that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for injured workers. By treating prisoners “in the same manner” as other employees under section 97-10.1, section 97-13(c) effectively provides that workers’ compensation is a prisoner’s exclusive remedy to the same extent as it is for other employees.
Ivey v. North Carolina Prison Department, 252 N.C. 615, 114 S.E.2d 812 (1960), relied upon by plaintiff, is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Ivey, our Supreme Court refused to read section 97-13(c) as barring recovery by a prisoner’s estate under the Tort Claims Act. Id. at 620, 114 S.E.2d at 815-16. At the time Ivey was decided, section 97-13(c) only provided burial expenses when a prisoner suffered accidental death. See id. at 618, 114 S.E.2d at 814. Ivey held that “burial expenses” were not “compensation” as meant by the clause “entitled to compensation” in section 97-13(c). Id. at 619-20, *706114 S.E.2d at 815. Since only those prisoners who were “entitled to compensation” could be barred by the section 97~13(c) reference to former section 97-10 (now rewritten as section 97-10.1), section 97-13(c) did not bar tort claims arising from the death of a prisoner. See id. Section 97-13(c) was amended in 1971 to grant compensation for death as well as for injury. 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1176, § 1. At the time of Ivey, regular employees and prisoners had the same benefits potential for injuries but not for death. Since the 1957 and 1971 amendments of section 97-13(c), prisoners with assigned employment are entitled to pursue their rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act “in the same manner” as other employees. Id.-, 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 809, § 2. Since Ivey was a pre-1971 amendment death case in which the dead prisoner was not entitled to workers’ compensation, its holding does not apply to plaintiff who is an injured employee who may elect to pursue compensation under the present version of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
The other cases relied on by plaintiff are also inapposite. Gould v. North Carolina State Highway & Public Works Commission, 245 N.C. 350, 95 S.E.2d 910 (1957), is distinguishable from the case at bar because it dealt with the death of a non-working prisoner. See id. at 352, 95 S.E.2d at 911. Lawson v. North Carolina State Highway & Public Works Commission, 248 N.C. 276, 103 S.E.2d 366 (1958), is also not applicable here since it dealt with the law prior to the 1957 amendment of section 97~13(c), which applied the exclusivity provisions of former section 97-10 to prisoners. Id. at 280, 103 S.E.2d at 370. In addition, Brewington v. North Carolina Department of Correction, 111 N.C. App. 833, 433 S.E.2d 798, disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 552, 439 S.E.2d 142 (1993), is not controlling here because the issue of whether workers’ compensation is a prisoner’s exclusive remedy was not an issue on appeal in that case.
The benefits given prisoners under workers’ compensation are not insubstantial. The defendant noted in its oral argument, and plaintiff did not contest, that prisoners, in addition to their weekly compensation payments may be entitled to vocational rehabilitation and lifetime medical benefits under workers’ compensation to the same extent as are employees who are covered. If we were to adopt the plaintiff’s position, prisoners would have the workers’ compensation remedy and the right to sue under the Tort Claims Act, as well as any other actions, such as actions against state employees as individuals or product liability actions, which might lie in superior court.
*707Our courts have refused to construe statutes so as to result in “palpable injustice” when the statutory language is “susceptible to another reasonable construction which is just and is consonant with the purpose and intent” of the act. Wagoner v. Butcher, 6 N.C. App. 221, 229, 170 S.E.2d 151, 156 (1969). We do not believe, as suggested by the dissent, that the legislature, through use of the word “may” in section 97-13(c), intended to vest prisoners with a greater election of remedies than available to those employees not serving prison sentences. We do believe that the legislature intended, by enacting section 97-13(c), to make recovery of disability “cash” benefits available to prisoners, as their exclusive remedy, after being released from custody. Otherwise, a prisoner, who is already provided with the custodial benefits of food, lodging, and medical care, could potentially receive a “double recovery” not available to employees generally. Section 97-13(c) clearly sets forth the legislative policy that prisoners be treated “in the same manner” as employees in regard to the limitation in section 97-10.1. Accordingly, a prisoner’s exclusive remedy for “accidental injury . . . arising out of and in the course of the employment to which he had been assigned,” whether he is incarcerated or released, as with other employees, arises under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. See N.C.G.S. 97-13(c). Workers’ compensation is the plaintiff’s sole remedy.
We further dismiss plaintiff-appellant’s equal protection argument as being without merit.
For the reasons stated, the order of the Full Commission is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judge MARTIN, Mark D. concurs.
Judge GREENE dissents.