Court Opinion

ID: 9899031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 19:04:19.377922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:18.042138
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/15/23 In re I.Q. CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Yolo)
                                                            ----

 In re I.Q., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court                                          C097050
 Law.

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                     (Super. Ct. Nos. JD2022041,
                                                                                   JD2021199, JD2022001)
                    Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 I.Q.,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         I.Q. challenges a juvenile court’s order denying his motion to suppress. His
motion concerned allegations in a wardship petition that he assaulted, robbed, and falsely
imprisoned another person. After the victim of this conduct identified I.Q. as one of her
attackers, an officer searched the phone of someone who associated with I.Q., A.A., and
found on A.A.’s social media information that tied I.Q. to the crime. The officer thought
he could search the phone because A.A. was on probation, dispatch said the probation
terms included a search and seizure clause, and A.A. said his probation officer “always”
looked through his phone. This information led the officer to believe that a condition of
A.A.’s probation allowed searches of electronic devices. But the officer later learned he
was mistaken.
       I.Q. afterward moved to suppress the information obtained from the search based
on California’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA; Pen. Code, § 1546 et
seq.). That law, as relevant here, generally bars a government entity from “[a]ccess[ing]
electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic
communication with [an] electronic device” (id., § 1546.1, subd. (a)(3))—with an
exception for searches based on a “clear and unambiguous condition of probation” (id.,
subd. (c)(10))—and allows any person in a proceeding to move to suppress information
obtained in violation of this requirement (id., § 1546.4, subd. (a)). Following a hearing,
the trial court denied I.Q.’s motion, finding that the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applied and disfavored suppression of the evidence.
       On appeal, I.Q. contends the trial court misapplied the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, reasoning that this exception should have been found inapplicable
because the officer’s mistake here was not reasonably made in good faith. He also asserts
that he has a right to object to the search of A.A.’s phone. He acknowledges that, under
traditional Fourth Amendment principles, he would not have a right to challenge the
search because Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be vicariously asserted.
(See Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014) 572 U.S. 765, 778.) But he contends the law is
otherwise under CalECPA. He reasons that under CalECPA’s express terms, any person
may move to suppress electronic information obtained in violation of the act.
       We affirm, finding no need to delve into the merits of I.Q.’s claims. I.Q.’s claims
concern an alleged state law error in failing to suppress evidence. Appellate courts
review these types of errors under “the California harmless error standard ([Cal. Const.],
art. VI, § 13) as explicated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.” (People v.
Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, 730 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.); see People v. Blair (1979) 25
Cal.3d 640, 650-655, 667 [reviewing under the Watson standard the trial court’s failure to
suppress evidence obtained in violation of California law].) “That standard requires us to
evaluate whether the defendant has demonstrated that it is ‘ “reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of
the error.” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195.) I.Q. has not made this
showing here.
       I.Q.’s argument on prejudice consists of three sentences and includes no citation to
the record. He claims that the information in the warrant affidavits was derived from
information unlawfully taken from A.A.’s cellphone, that this information led law
enforcement to search his own phones and social media accounts, and that without the
evidence from this latter search, the evidence would have been insufficient to support the
juvenile court’s findings that he committed the crimes of assault, robbery, and false
imprisonment. But having failed to provide any citation to the record to back up these
claims, I.Q. has failed to meet his burden to show prejudice. (See People v. Hoyt (2020)
8 Cal.5th 892, 939 [“by failing to support his appellate arguments with record citations,
defendant has forfeited any claim of error on appeal”].)
                                     DISPOSITION
       The order denying the motion to suppress is affirmed.

                                                     /s/
                                                 BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

    /s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

    /s/
MESIWALA, J.