Court Opinion

ID: 9756318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:22:58.206338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:19.475508
License: Public Domain

FICKLING, Associate Judge
(dissenting) :
It is clear from this record that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the husband a divorce on the ground of voluntary separation and awarded him custody of the child, therefore, I dissent from Parts II and IV of the majority opinion.
The husband entered the United States from Poland in January 1967 under a cultural-scientific exchange program for two years. Within a few months he began an adulterous relationship with a married woman with whom he lived up to the date of trial of this case when the trial court ordered them to separate. The wife, living in Poland, had no knowledge of this relationship and expected that her husband would be required to return to Poland at the expiration of the two-year period, even though the husband informed her shortly after his arrival that he intended to remain in the United States and seek a divorce. The principle stated by the majority — that where there has been a desertion by one party, the other party, in order to defeat the claim of voluntariness, should manifest a real desire to continue the marital status —is not applicable under the facts of this case.1 First, the wife had every reason to believe that her husband would be required to return to Poland and that the marital relation would resume. Secondly, I do not think the law envisioned that a deserted wife was expected to manifest a real desire to continue their marital status while the deserting husband was committing adultery and living with his paramour. This is a clear case of desertion which had not ripened into a voluntary separation.
I also think there was clear abuse of discretion when the trial court awarded custo*442dy of the child to the husband.2 It is conceded that the child, Piotr, as well as his younger sister, was being well cared for by his mother in Poland. Similarly, the husband admits that he obtained the child through planned trickery and deceit, which included forgery of documents and overt lies to his wife. It is also unchallenged that the wife is a fit person to have custody,3 and it is clear from the record that the husband is unfit to have custody. The record reveals many reasons for a finding of unfitness; these are a few of the more serious ones. The husband: (1) removed the child from his mother by trick and subterfuge and then informed the wife that he was going to keep the child and seek a divorce; (2) committed perjury in official documents; (3) commenced an adulterous relationship with a married woman; (4) took his child to live in the house where the adulterous relationship was ongoing; (5) continued to live with his paramour until an order of the trial court forbade him to live there; (6) did not inform his wife of his home address or the address of the child’s school until he had filed for divorce; (7) has either by accident or by design created hostility in the child towards his mother;4 (8) referred under oath to his wife as the child’s “biological” mother;5 and (9) had his son refer to his paramour as “Mommy.” 6
The record also reveals the husband has deportation proceedings pending against him because he now has no status in the United States.7
The legal presumptions which are to guide trial courts in custody cases are well established in this jurisdiction and, while none of these presumptions are conclusive, they must be considered by the trial judge. There is the strong presumption that children of tender years should be awarded to the mother; 8 this presumption takes on even greater weight when the mother is a fit parent.9 There is also the presumption that children of tender years should be together.10 Finally, there is the strong presumption that an. adulterous parent should not be awarded custody,11 especially when it is conceded that the other parent is a fit guardian.12 It is essential to note that in its extensive Opinion the trial court failed *443to even mention any of these presumptions; thus it is impossible to determine to what extent, if any, the court considered them as it must.
I have no doubt on this record that if the wife had been a citizen of the United States and a resident of any one of the states, she would have been awarded custody.
I would reverse the judgment with instructions to vacate the divorce decree and hold a new hearing to determine the custody of the child, Piotr, in light of my opinion. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. The majority opinion merely recites the holding of Seabrook v. Seabrook, D.C.App., 264 A.2d 311 (1970), apparently disregarding the factual context of that case as well as this one. I, for one, do not believe the holding of that case can be viewed in the abstract and, examined in its factual setting, I do not find it controlling.

. Recognizing that the determination of the custody of a child is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge, Coles v. Coles, D.C.App., 204 A.2d 330 (1964), it is noted that where there is a showing of manifest abuse of discretion this court must reverse such a determination. Dorsett v. Dorsett, D.C.App., 281 A.2d 290 (1971) ; Wells v. Wells, 11 App.D.C. 392 (1897).

. See trial court’s Opinion at 8.

. In Coles v. Coles, supra note 2, Chief Judge Hood indicated that he placed great weight on the trial court’s finding that:
‘The atmosphere must be as free of tensions, bitterness and hostility towards the other party as is possible under the circumstances. The child should be taught to love and respect each parent and the opportunities for its mind to be poisoned against either parent should be minimized.’ ” [Id. 204 A.2d at 331.]
It is obvious in the instant case that the husband’s actions were calculated to deprive the mother not only of the possession of her son but also of his affection.

. Id.

. Id.

. These proceedings have been at least temporarily suspended.

. Boone v. Boone, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 152, 150 F.2d 153 (1945) ; Dorsett v. Dorsett, supra note 2.

. Custody is awarded to the mother occasionally even where it is shown that she committed adultery. Jay v. Jay, D.C.App., 212 A.2d 331 (1965). Again, it is noted that the husband in this case admits that his wife is a fit parent. Supra note 3.

. See Annot., 98 A.D.R.2d 926 (1964).

. Dixon v. Dixon, D.C.App., 190 A.2d 652 (1963).

. See Schwier v. Schwier, D.C.App., 207 A.2d 115 (1965) ; Dixon v. Dixon, supra note 11; Opinion of trial court, supra note 3.