Court Opinion

ID: 9379589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 20:03:20.136797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.767735
License: Public Domain

***   FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER   ***

                                                                Electronically Filed
                                                                Supreme Court
                                                                SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                                15-MAR-2023
                                                                09:06 AM
                                                                Dkt. 21 OP

             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

                                   ---o0o---

                            STATE OF HAWAI‘I,
                     Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                      vs.

                            CYRINA L. HEWITT,
                     Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

                              SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

           CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
            (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CRIMINAL NO. 3DTA-15-00745)

                               MARCH 15, 2023

McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.; AND NAKAYAMA, J., DISSENTING,
              WITH WHOM RECKTENWALD, C.J., JOINS

                  OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.

                              I.   Introduction

       This appeal addresses Miranda rights arising out of police

questioning of a person confined to a hospital bed.             Cyrina

Hewitt (“Hewitt”) was charged in the District Court of the Third

Circuit, Kona Division (“district court”) with operating a
vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (“OVUII”) and

driving without a license (“DWOL”).     Hewitt moved to suppress

evidence based on a failure to provide Miranda warnings.     The

district court denied Hewitt’s motion, and Hewitt was convicted

of both offenses after a bench trial.

     On appeal to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”),

Hewitt argued in part that she had been subjected to custodial

interrogation without the requisite Miranda warnings.     In State

v. Hewitt, 149 Hawai‘i 71, 481 P.3d 713 (App. 2021), a published

opinion, the ICA held that Miranda warnings were not required

because Hewitt was not in custody at the time of questioning.

     The ICA ruled Hewitt was not entitled to Miranda warnings

because (1) her inability to leave the scene of questioning was

not the result of detention by law enforcement; (2) the officers

did not have probable cause to arrest until Hewitt stated she

had been driving a truck; and (3) the record did not reflect

sustained and coercive questioning of Hewitt by the officers.

Hewitt, 149 Hawaiʻi at 75, 481 P.3d at 717.    The ICA also held,

however, that the district court erred by (1) overruling

Hewitt’s Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 621-26 (1993) trial

objection by failing to conduct a voluntariness hearing; and (2)

denying Hewitt’s motion to suppress her blood test result

because a search warrant had not been obtained.     149 Hawaiʻi at

76, 79, 481 P.3d at 718, 721.   On these grounds, the ICA vacated

                                2
Hewitt’s convictions and remanded.

     Hewitt sought certiorari review of the district court’s

motion to suppress denial and the ICA’s Miranda analysis.

Hewitt posited that, under the ICA’s rationale, anyone

hospitalized but not under arrest need not be Mirandized because

law enforcement did not prevent their ability to leave.

     We agree with Hewitt that the district court and ICA erred.

First, we hold that Hewitt was in custody when probable cause

developed.   State v. Sagapolutele-Silva, 151 Hawaiʻi 283, 511

P.3d 782 (2022), overruled the bright-line rule articulated in

State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawaiʻi 107, 34 P.3d 1006 (2001), underlined

below, which clearly held:

          [A] person is “in custody” for purposes of article I,
          section 10 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution if an objective
          assessment of the totality of the circumstances reflects
          either (1) that the person has become impliedly accused of
          committing a crime because the questions of the police have
          become sustained and coercive, such that they are no longer
          reasonably designed briefly to confirm or dispel their
          reasonable suspicion or (2) that the point of arrest has
          arrived because either (a) probable cause to arrest has
          developed or (b) the police have subjected the person to an
          unlawful “de facto” arrest without probable cause to do so.

Ketchum, 97 Hawaiʻi at 126, 34 P.3d at 1025 (emphases added).

The Sagapolutele-Silva majority said it was clarifying that,

despite this holding, the existence of probable cause is not

conclusive and is only a factor to consider in determining

whether someone is in custody under a “totality of

circumstances” and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings.

Sagapolutele-Silva, 151 Hawaiʻi at 287, 511 P.3d at 786.

                                    3
     We now expressly overrule Sagapolutele-Silva’s abrogation

of Ketchum’s bright-line rule and hold that the Ketchum rule

remains in effect:     Miranda warnings are required by article I,

section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaiʻi when

probable cause to arrest has developed.    And in Hewitt’s case,

contrary to the ICA’s conclusion, probable cause had developed

before she was asked whether she had been driving.

     Second, we hold that, based on the totality of

circumstances, Hewitt was in custody and was therefore entitled

to Miranda warnings even before probable cause developed.     In

addition to Ketchum’s bright-line rule, we have stated,

“[W]hether the defendant was in custody or otherwise deprived of

[their] freedom of action for Miranda purposes is to be

determined from the totality of the circumstances, objectively

appraised.”   State v. Patterson, 59 Haw. 357, 361, 581 P.2d 752,

755 (1978).   “These would include the place and time of the

interrogation, the length of the interrogation, the nature of

the questions asked, the conduct of the police, and all other

relevant circumstances.”    Id.

     Police interrogation occurring in a medical treatment

setting presents a special circumstance under the “totality of

circumstances” test.    In United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386,

396 (1st Cir. 2012), the United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit addressed whether the Fifth Amendment requires

                                  4
Miranda warnings under these circumstances.     The court noted

that when a person is unable to leave the place of an

interrogation solely due to circumstances incident to medical

treatment, it must be determined whether they were at liberty to

terminate the interrogation and cause the officers to leave.

701 F.3d at 396.

    We generally adopt the First Circuit’s approach for

purposes of our constitution’s article I, section 10 right

against self-incrimination.    We hold that if a person is unable

to leave a place of interrogation due to circumstances incident

to medical treatment, determining whether the person is “in

custody” under a totality of circumstances requires an inquiry

into whether the person was at liberty to terminate the

interrogation and cause the officer to leave.

    As further discussed below, under the “totality of

circumstances” of this case, Hewitt was in custody well before

probable cause developed.     Hence, the district court and the ICA

erred by holding that Miranda warnings were not required until

Hewitt responded affirmatively to an officer’s question as to

whether she had been driving a truck found damaged on a

roadside.

    Hewitt’s convictions have already been set aside, however,

based on developments discussed in Section IV.A below.     The

nolle prosequi of both counts raises appellate jurisdiction and

                                  5
mootness questions.     Hence, before addressing the merits of the

issues on certiorari, we explain why appellate jurisdiction was

retained.   We also clarify that mootness is a prudential

consideration and not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction,

and that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine

applies.

     Remand is no longer appropriate, however, whether for the

grounds stated in the ICA opinion or in this opinion, and it is

unnecessary to determine precisely when Hewitt should have been

provided Miranda warnings.    Based on the procedural posture of

this case, we reverse the ICA’s March 18, 2021 Judgment on

Appeal and affirm the district court’s August 9, 2021 judgment

of nolle prosequi of both counts.

                            II.   Background

1.   Factual background

     In 2014, Hawaiʻi County Police Department (“HCPD”) Officers

Chandler Nacino (“Officer Nacino”) and Kaea Sugata (“Officer

Sugata”) were called to Kona Community Hospital to interview

Hewitt as a possible assault victim.     An unknown male had

dropped Hewitt off at the hospital’s emergency room, and

hospital staff contacted HCPD regarding Hewitt possibly being an

assault victim.     Hewitt had large contusions on her face, eyes

that were swollen shut, a laceration on her ear, and a broken

breast plate.     Although awake, Hewitt appeared disoriented and

                                   6
was “rambling incoherently.”        She did not know where she was or

why she was in the hospital.

     Officers Nacino and Sugata first encountered Hewitt at

around one o’clock in the morning.         They waited for the nurse

administering Hewitt’s treatment to leave before starting an

interview.     Hewitt gave the officers her name and birth date.

Officer Nacino then served Hewitt with a “legal document” for an

unrelated case and told her she needed to sign it.1            Both

officers stood at Hewitt’s bedside during the interview while

Officer Nacino did the majority of the talking.

     Officer Nacino asked Hewitt whether she had been assaulted

and why her eyes were swollen.        Hewitt first responded she had

pink-eye, but later said she had a stye.          To Officer Nacino,

Hewitt’s injuries did not appear consistent with either

explanation.

     At some point, Hawai‘i Fire Department (“HFD”) paramedics

walked by and asked what was going on.          Officer Nacino said they

were investigating a possible assault.          The paramedics said they

had seen a truck’s taillights sticking out from roadside bushes.

1     As the ICA noted, “[t]he record does not show what the document was, to
what case it pertained, or why Officer Nacino had possession of the document
at the time he was assigned to investigate an unidentified potential assault
victim.” Hewitt, 149 Hawai‘i at 73 n.4, 481 P.3d at 715 n.4.

                                      7
The police officers then left the room2 and contacted Sergeant

Mekia Rose (“Sergeant Rose”) to check on the truck.

     Sergeant Rose located an unoccupied truck in some bushes on

the shoulder of the road at the Queen Ka‘ahumanu Highway and

Kuakini Highway intersection.        The truck had front-end damage,

and both of its airbags had been deployed.          Sergeant Rose found

Hewitt’s identification card in the truck and sent a photo of it

via text message to Officer Nacino.         He also relayed the truck’s

license plate number, a check of which revealed that the vehicle

belonged to a “Cyrus Hewitt.”

     Officer Nacino returned to the room and asked Hewitt

whether she had been in a traffic accident.           Hewitt answered

yes, first stating that she was driving to a friend’s house and

parked her vehicle there but later stating that she was going to

a doctor’s appointment.       After this response, the officers

stopped asking further questions and placed Hewitt under arrest

for suspicion of OVUII.

     Before the arrest, the officers did not provide Hewitt any

Miranda warnings.     They also did not tell Hewitt whether she was

free to not respond to questions, leave, or terminate the

conversation.

     After this, at around four o’clock in the morning, Hewitt

2     The record does not reflect exactly when the officers left the room,
but trial testimony suggests that the officers did leave at some point and
“returned” or “recontacted” Hewitt after locating her vehicle.

                                      8
was subjected to a blood draw without a search warrant having

been requested or obtained.       Officer Nacino remained with Hewitt

until the blood draw was completed.         He also ran a check on

Hewitt’s driver’s license and learned that she had a suspended

license.

2.    District court proceedings

      On March 12, 2015, the State of Hawaiʻi (“the State”)

charged Hewitt with OVUII and DWOL.         Before trial, Hewitt filed

a motion to suppress statements alleging a violation of her

constitutional rights under the federal and state constitutions.

At the hearing just before the October 28, 2015 trial, the State

argued that because Hewitt was not in custody, there was no

constitutional violation.       The district court3 denied the motion

to suppress and ultimately convicted Hewitt of OVUII in

violation of HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) (2007)4 and DWOL in violation of

HRS § 286-102(b) (Supp. 2013).5

3     The Honorable Margaret K. Masunaga presided.

4     §291E-61 Operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant.
      (a) A person commits the offense of operating a vehicle under the
      influence of an intoxicant if the person operates or assumes
      actual physical control of a vehicle:
      (1) While under the influence of alcohol in an amount sufficient
      to impair the person’s normal mental faculties or ability to care
      for the person and guard against casualty[.]

HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) (2007).

5     §286-102 Licensing.
            . . . .
      (b) A person operating the following category or combination of
      categories of motor vehicles shall be examined as provided in
      section 286-108 and duly licensed by the examiner of drivers:

                                      9
3.    ICA proceedings

      Hewitt filed a notice of appeal on June 14, 2016.               On

appeal, Hewitt argued, inter alia, that the district court erred

in denying her motion to suppress because she had been subjected

to custodial interrogation without any Miranda warnings before

her statement.     In a published opinion, the ICA concluded, in

relevant part, that Hewitt was not in custody at the time of

questioning because (1) Hewitt’s inability to leave was not the

result of detention by law enforcement; (2) the officers did not

have probable cause to arrest Hewitt until she stated she had

been driving the truck; and (3) the record did not reflect any

sustained and coercive questioning of Hewitt by the officers.

Hewitt, 149 Hawaiʻi at 75, 481 P.3d at 717.

      The ICA also held, however, that the district court erred

by overruling Hewitt’s HRS § 621-26 (1993)6 trial objection and

      (1) Mopeds;
      (2) Motorcycles and motor scooters;
      (3) Passenger cars of any gross vehicle weight rating, buses
            designed to transport fifteen or fewer occupants, and
            trucks and vans having a gross vehicle weight rating of
            eighteen thousand pounds or less; and
      (4) All of the motor vehicles in category (3) and any vehicle
            that is not a commercial motor vehicle.
      A school bus or van operator shall be properly licensed to
      operate the category of vehicles that the operator operates as a
      school bus or van and shall comply with the standards of the
      department of transportation as provided by rules adopted
      pursuant to section 286-181.

HRS § 286-102(b) (Supp. 2013).

6     §621-26 Confessions when admissible. No confession shall be
      received in evidence unless it is first made to appear to the

                                     10
by failing to conduct a hearing on the voluntariness of her

statement;7 and (2) the district court erred by denying Hewitt’s

motion to suppress her blood test result.8          149 Hawaiʻi at 76,

      judge before whom the case is being tried that the confession was
      in fact voluntarily made.

HRS § 621-26 (1993).

7     The ICA held the district court erred by failing to conduct a hearing
on the voluntariness of Hewitt’s statement that she was driving the vehicle
and had parked it in the bushes. Hewitt, 149 Hawaiʻi at 76, 481 P.3d at 718.
The ICA ruled that, rather than overruling Hewitt’s HRS § 621-26 objection,
the district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Hewitt’s statement was voluntarily made, in light of the evidence
that Hewitt had sustained significant head trauma, did not know where she
was, and was incoherent. Id.

8     The ICA noted that although the State argued that Hewitt’s motion to
suppress evidence of the alcohol content of her blood was not timely filed
under Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure (“HRPP”) Rule 12(c) (2007), the
district court had the discretion to proceed to rule on the merits, citing
State v. Przeradski, 5 Haw.App. 29, 32, 677 P.2d 471, 474-75 (1984), and
therefore, the denial of the motion on its merits was properly before the
ICA. Hewitt, 149 Hawaiʻi at 76, 481 P.3d at 718. The ICA appropriately noted
that although the district court relied upon Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966) in denying Hewitt’s motion to suppress, Missouri v. McNeely,
569 U.S. 141 (2013), which was decided after State v. Entrekin, 98 Hawaiʻi
221, 47 P.3d 336 (2002) (discussing Schmerber), held “that in drunk-driving
investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does
not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a
blood test without a warrant.” 149 Hawaiʻi at 77, 481 P.3d at 719. The ICA
noted that it cited McNeely in State v. Niceloti-Velazquez, 139 Hawaiʻi 203,
386 P.3d 487 (App. 2016), in which it held the trial court erred by holding
exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless extraction of the
defendant’s blood sample, because the trial court only cited the risk of
blood alcohol dissipation to support its finding of exigency and the State
failed to adequately develop the record to demonstrate that the police
officers were justified to act without a warrant. 149 Hawaiʻi at 78, 481 P.3d
at 720.
      The ICA opined that the facts of this case illustrate why more than
just “the risk of blood dissipation” should be required to justify a
warrantless blood draw. Id. The ICA stated that Officer Nacino did not
testify that he detected an odor similar to that of an alcoholic beverage on
Hewitt’s breath or body; there was no evidence that empty or open containers
of liquor, or a bar or restaurant tab or other receipt evidencing the recent
consumption of alcohol, were found in Hewitt’s truck or with her
identification card; Hewitt’s apparent disorientation could have been
explained by a concussion, as evidenced by her significant head trauma;
although she knew who she was, she did not know where she was; there was no
evidence that Officer Nacino attempted to determine if Hewitt was oriented to
time (as one would to attempt to diagnose or rule out a concussion); and

                                     11
79, 481 P.3d at 718, 721.       The ICA remanded the case for a new

trial.

4.   Certiorari

     Hewitt’s certiorari application presents a single question:

whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the district court

did not err in denying Hewitt’s motion to suppress because

Hewitt was not in custody.           We accepted certiorari.

                        III.    Standard of Review

     “An appellate court reviews a ruling on a motion to

suppress de novo to determine whether the ruling was ‘right’ or

‘wrong.’”    State v. Weldon, 144 Hawaiʻi 522, 530, 445 P.3d 103,

111 (2019) (quoting State v. Tominiko, 126 Hawaiʻi 68, 75, 266

P.3d 1122, 1129 (2011)).

                               IV.    Discussion

A.   Preliminary issues

     Before addressing the issue on certiorari, we address

unusual developments after our acceptance of certiorari, which,

Hewitt’s disorientation could also have been the result of prescription
medication administered to her in the hospital emergency room. 149 Hawaiʻi at
79, 481 P.3d at 721. The ICA concluded that under the totality of these
circumstances, it would not have been unreasonable for a judge to require
more information before issuing a warrant for a blood draw; there was no
evidence that Officer Nacino, Officer Sugata, Sergeant Rose, or any other
police officer attempted to contact a judge to obtain a warrant before
requesting the blood draw. Id. Thus, the ICA held the State failed to
adequately develop the record to demonstrate the existence of exigent
circumstances that would have justified Officer Nacino requesting a
warrantless blood draw, and therefore, the district court erred in denying
Hewitt’s motion to suppress the blood test results. Id.

                                        12
at first blush, might appear to raise questions of appellate

jurisdiction and mootness.

      1.    Background after acceptance of certiorari

      As noted, the ICA’s published opinion ruled in the State’s

favor regarding the motion to suppress denial, and this was the

only question raised by Hewitt on certiorari.           Immediately after

we entered our order accepting certiorari, however, the State

contacted Hewitt’s counsel and offered to dismiss Hewitt’s case

with prejudice if Hewitt dismissed the instant certiorari

proceeding.    Hewitt therefore filed a motion requesting a

temporary remand of this appeal to the district court.9             Our

order regarding this motion provided:

                  IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted as
            follows. This case shall be temporarily remanded to the
            District Court of the Third Circuit for no more than 30
            days. No later than 30 days after this order, the clerk of
            the district court shall supplement the record on appeal
            with all documents entered on temporary remand, and the
            case shall then resume in the Supreme Court for such
            further proceedings as may be appropriate.

      On remand, the State filed a motion for nolle prosequi10

with prejudice as to the complaint against Hewitt.            The State

indicated it filed the motion “due to the ICA opinion on appeal

following bench trial and in the interest of justice.”             The

9     Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure (“HRAP”) Rule 42 requires appellate
court approval of any dismissal.

10    The expression nolle prosequi, or more fully, dicit nolle prosequi,
means that the government will not prosecute. The King v. Robertson, 6 Haw.
718, 1889 WL 1054 (Haw. Kingdom 1889).

                                      13
district court11 granted the motion and filed a judgment

indicating a disposition of “nolle prosequi” for both counts.

The district court’s supplemental record was filed pursuant to

our order of temporary remand, and we scheduled oral argument.

     Hewitt then filed a motion to set aside the oral argument

setting or to clarify the status of the case due to the nolle

prosequi on remand.12     We entered an order denying the motion to

set aside the oral argument, and we now explain why.

     2.    This court retained appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
           the order of temporary remand

     Based on our order of temporary remand, the district

court’s judgment of nolle prosequi did not terminate this

certiorari proceeding.      Pursuant to HRS § 602-5(a)(6) (Supp.

2004), this court has jurisdiction:

           [t]o make . . . such . . . orders   . . . and do such other
           acts and take such other steps as   may be necessary to carry
           into full effect the powers which   are or shall be given to
           it by law or for the promotion of   justice in matters
           pending before it.

     Our order specifically provided that, after remand, the

case would resume in this court “for such further proceedings as

may be appropriate.”      Thus, this court retained appellate

jurisdiction despite the nolle prosequi.

11   The Honorable Robert J. Crudele presided.

12    The State’s motion requested a dismissal of both counts “with
prejudice.” The judgment did not include language indicating the dismissal
was with prejudice. This lack of clarity is immaterial to the issues we
discuss.

                                     14
      3.    The “public interest” exception to the mootness
            doctrine is applicable

      Although we retained appellate jurisdiction, the charges

against Hewitt were mooted based on the nolle prosequi of both

counts.    We therefore address mootness.

      We first clarify that mootness is a prudential

consideration and not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction,

as we have stated, even recently.13        Tax Foundation v. State, 144

Hawaiʻi 175, 439 P.3d 127 (2019), addressed standing, a

“prudential concern of judicial governance” like “mootness”:

            As explained by Justice Nakamura in Trustees of the Office
            of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 737 P.2d 446
            (1987):

                  Unlike the federal judiciary, the courts of Hawaiʻi
                  are not subject to a cases or controversies
                  limitation like that imposed by Article III, § 2 of
                  the United States Constitution. But like the federal
                  government, ours is one in which the sovereign power
                  is divided and allocated among three co-equal
                  branches. Thus, we have taken the teachings of the
                  Supreme Court to heart and adhered to the doctrine
                  that the use of judicial power to resolve public
                  disputes in a system of government where there is a
                  separation of powers should be limited to those
                  questions capable of judicial resolution and
                  presented in an adversary context. And, we have
                  admonished our judges that even in the absence of
                  constitutional restrictions, they must still
                  carefully weigh the wisdom, efficacy, and timeliness
                  of an exercise of their power before acting,
                  especially where there may be an intrusion into areas
                  committed to other branches of government.

13    See, e.g., Skahan v. Stutts Constr. Co., Inc., 148 Hawaiʻi 460, 468 n.7,
478 P.3d 285, 293 n.7 (2021); Hawaiʻi Tech. Acad. v. L.E., 141 Hawaiʻi 147,
156, 407 P.3d 103, 112 (2017); In Re Marn Fam., 141 Haw. 1, 7, 403 P.3d 621,
627 (2016).

                                      15
                      Our guideposts for the application of the rules
                of judicial self-governance founded in concern about
                the proper — and properly limited — role of courts in
                a democratic society reflect the precepts enunciated
                by the Supreme Court. When confronted with an
                abstract or hypothetical question, we have addressed
                the problem in terms of a prohibition against
                rendering advisory opinions; when asked to decide
                whether a litigant is asserting legally recognized
                interests, personal and peculiar to him, we have
                spoken of standing; when a later decision appeared
                more appropriate, we have resolved the justiciability
                question in terms of ripeness; and when the continued
                vitality of the suit was questionable, we have
                invoked the mootness bar.

           Thus, Yamasaki recognizes that standing is a prudential
           concern in Hawaiʻi state courts, which are not subject to
           the case and controversy subject matter jurisdiction
           limitation of federal courts. Yamasaki also noted that
           standing is a prudential concern “founded in concern about
           the proper – and properly limited – role of courts in a
           democratic society.”

Tax Foundation, 144 Hawaiʻi at 190–91, 439 P.3d at 142–43

(quoting Yamasaki, 69 Haw. at 170-72, 737 P.2d at 455-56)

(cleaned up).

       As noted in Yamasaki, “mootness,” like “standing,” is a

prudential concern not subject to the “case and controversy”

subject matter jurisdiction limitation of federal courts.               69

Haw. at 170-72, 737 P.2d at 455-56.        In Tax Foundation, we noted

that courts of other states recognize that standing is a

prudential concern regarding justiciability and is not an issue

of subject matter jurisdiction.       144 Hawaiʻi at 191, 439 P.3d at

143.   Most other state courts also recognize that mootness is a

prudential concern regarding justiciability, not an issue of

subject matter jurisdiction.       See, e.g., Matter of Big Foot

Dumpsters & Containers, LLC, 507 P.3d 169, 173 (Mont. 2022)

                                    16
(noting mootness is a concept of justiciability); Nesbitt v.

Frakes, 911 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Neb. 2018) (holding mootness is a

justiciability doctrine that does not prevent appellate

jurisdiction); Couey v. Atkins, 355 P.3d 866, 901 (Or. 2015)

(holding that the Oregon state constitution does not require

dismissal of a case based on the justiciability doctrine of

mootness); DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 102 A.3d 616, 622

(R.I. 2014) (holding mootness is a distinct concept, separate

and apart from subject-matter jurisdiction); Wylie v. State of

Idaho Transp. Bd., 253 P.3d 700, 705 (Idaho 2011) (noting

mootness is a subcategory of justiciability);   McIntyre v.

Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (noting

mootness is a doctrine of justiciability).   Thus, mootness is an

issue of justiciability, not an issue of subject matter

jurisdiction.

    Under Hawaiʻi law, a well-recognized exception to the

mootness doctrine is for matters “affecting the public

interest.”   See State v. Kiese, 126 Hawaiʻi 494, 509, 273 P.3d

1180, 1195 (2012).   This exception applies here.

    Only after we accepted Hewitt’s certiorari application on

an issue for which the ICA had ruled in the State’s favor in a

published opinion did the State offer to dismiss Hewitt’s case

with prejudice; the State made the offer conditioned upon

Hewitt’s dismissal of this appeal.   On temporary remand, the

                                17
State indicated it filed the motion to nolle prosequi the case

with prejudice for two reasons: “the ICA opinion on appeal

following bench trial”; and “in the interest of justice.”     The

State may have realized that the district court had erred with

respect to voluntariness, especially due to the testimony

regarding Hewitt’s condition during questioning.     The State may

also have realized that, as ruled by the ICA, a search warrant

should have been obtained before the blood draw.     But this court

had just accepted certiorari on the custody issue, an issue on

which the State had obtained a favorable opinion from the ICA.

If this certiorari was dismissed pursuant to the State’s offer,

the ICA’s published opinion would remain as precedent despite

the errors of law discussed in Section IV.B below.

     Under these circumstances, the “public interest” exception

to the mootness doctrine applies.   Although factually and

procedurally distinguishable, concerns expressed in Ocean Resort

Villas Vacation Owners Ass’n v. County of Maui, 147 Hawai‘i 544,

465 P.3d 991 (2020), which addressed “stipulated reversals” of

trial court judgments are instructive.   In that case, we cited

to a law review article highlighting the “‘tangible but

frequently undetectable social costs’ of allowing [appellate]

courts to consider vacaturs based solely on the parties’

settlement during the pendency of an appeal”:

                               18
           The costs . . . include the . . . loss of precedential
           value for judicial decisions, and a diminished respect for
           the judicial process. . . . A procedure which allows
           parties to obtain vacatur as a matter of right . . . will
           encourage parties to delay settlement until after trial
           because the effects of an adverse judgment can be avoided
           at little or no cost by postjudgment settlement. The
           procedure . . . will place the defense of the integrity of
           judicial decisions in the hands of litigants who are not in
           a position to safeguard the public values inherent therein.

147 Hawaiʻi at 560, 465 P.3d at 1007 (quoting Jill E. Fisch,

Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional

Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 589, 641-

42 (1991)) (cleaned up).

     Allowing the State to nolle prosequi charges after a

favorable ICA opinion in exchange for dismissal of an appeal

would likewise (1) result in the loss of precedential value of

judicial decisions from this court; (2) cause a diminished

respect for the judicial process; (3) allow parties to obtain

dismissal as a matter of right, which could encourage the State

to delay offering dismissal until after certiorari is accepted

to see if a possible adverse opinion can be avoided; and (4)

place the defense of the integrity of judicial decisions in the

hands of litigants who are not in a position to safeguard the

public values inherent therein.14         However well-intentioned the

14    With respect to (4), an individual defendant has no real incentive to
continue with a certiorari proceeding after receiving an offer to nolle
prosequi with prejudice. The nolle prosequi would be a sure thing, and a
defendant does not know how this court will rule on certiorari. We have no
concern with the actions taken by Hewitt’s counsel after receipt of the
State’s offer to nolle prosequi with prejudice in exchange for a dismissal of
the appeal. Counsel’s obligation was to represent Hewitt’s interests, and
counsel took appropriate actions to do so.

                                     19
State’s offer might have been, dismissal would have precluded

this court from reviewing an issue on which the State had

obtained a favorable published opinion from the ICA.            For the

reasons discussed in Section III.B below, the public interest

exception to the mootness doctrine applies here despite the

dismissal of the charges against Hewitt.

B.   Custody

     We therefore address the merits of the issue raised on

certiorari:      whether the ICA erred in determining that Hewitt

was not in custody at the time she made her statements and that

Miranda warnings were therefore not required.

     1.     General Miranda principles

     The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in

relevant part, that no person “shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]”            U.S. Const.

amend. V.      Article I, section 10 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution

similarly guarantees a privilege against self-incrimination to

our state’s citizens.      See State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawaiʻi 207, 210,

10 P.3d 728, 731 (2000).       Miranda warnings help safeguard this

right:

                  The Miranda rule is, at core, a constitutionally
            prescribed rule of evidence that requires the prosecution
            to lay a sufficient foundation—i.e., that the requisite
            warnings were administered and validly waived before the
            accused gave the statement sought to be adduced at trial—
            before it may adduce evidence of a defendant’s custodial
            statements that stem from interrogation during [their]
            criminal trial.

                                     20
                The prosecution’s burden of establishing that the
          requisite warnings were given, however, is not triggered
          unless the totality of the circumstances reflect that the
          statement it seeks to adduce at trial was obtained as a
          result of “custodial interrogation,” which, as the United
          States Supreme Court defined it in Miranda, consists of
          “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
          person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
          [their] freedom of action in any significant way.” In
          other words, the defendant, objecting to the admissibility
          of [their] statement and, thus, seeking to suppress it,
          must establish that [their] statement was the result of (1)
          “interrogation” that occurred while [they were] (2) “in
          custody.”

State v. Wallace, 105 Hawaiʻi 131, 137, 94 P.3d 1275, 1281 (2004)

(cleaned up).   Thus, a statement made by a defendant under

custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning must be

suppressed as unconstitutionally elicited.

     2.   Hewitt was in custody when probable cause developed
          and Sagapolutele-Silva is overruled to the extent it
          said the existence of probable cause is not
          dispositive on the issue of whether a person is in
          custody for purposes of Miranda warnings required by
          the Hawaiʻi constitution

     In Ketchum, we articulated that a person is in custody for

purposes of Miranda warnings as required by the Hawaiʻi

Constitution:

          [I]f an objective assessment of the totality of the
          circumstances reflects either (1) that the person has
          become impliedly accused of committing a crime because the
          questions of the police have become sustained and coercive,
          such that they are no longer reasonably designed briefly to
          confirm or dispel their reasonable suspicion or (2) that
          the point of arrest has arrived because either (a) probable
          cause to arrest has developed or (b) the police have
          subjected the person to an unlawful “de facto” arrest
          without probable cause to do so.

Ketchum, 97 Hawai‘i at 126, 34 P.3d at 1025.

                                   21
     The majority in Sagapolutele-Silva said it was clarifying

that despite this holding, the existence of probable cause is

but one factor in the totality of circumstances test.    151

Hawaiʻi at 291, 511 P.3d at 390.

     Ketchum stated a clear, easily applied, bright-line rule:

when probable cause to arrest exists upon an initial stop or

detention, the Hawaiʻi constitution requires that Miranda rights

be given before “interrogation” occurs.    Ketchum, 97 Hawaiʻi at

126, 34 P.3d 1006 at 1025.    Even before Ketchum, we had held

that “if the detained person’s responses to a police officer’s

questions provide the officer with probable cause to arrest . .

. the officer is—-at that time—-required to inform the detained

person of his or her constitutional rights against self-

incrimination and to counsel, as mandated by Miranda and its

progeny.”   State v. Loo, 94 Hawaiʻi 207, 212, 10 P.3d 728, 733

(2000) (citing State v. Melemai, 64 Haw. 479, 481-82, 643 P.2d

541, 543-44 (1982)).   Ketchum followed within a year, setting

out the rule quoted above pursuant to article I, section 10 of

the Hawaiʻi constitution.    97 Hawaiʻi at 126, 34 P.3d 1006 at

1025.

     Bright-line rules foster uniformity and predictability.

See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.

Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179 (1989).    The most significant role of

judges may be to protect the individual criminal defendant

                                  22
against the occasional excesses of popular will, and to preserve

the checks and balances within our constitutional system that

are designed to inhibit that popular will.         Id., 56 U. Chi. L.

Rev. at 1180.    In terms of constitutional rules of criminal

procedure, in order to preserve checks and balances, bright-line

rules are therefore preferable.15

15   As Justice Scalia stated:

                 I had always thought that the common-law [“totality
           of circumstances”] approach had at least one thing to be
           said for it: it was the course of judicial restraint,
           “making” as little law as possible in order to decide the
           case at hand. I have come to doubt whether that is true.
           For when, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt
           a general rule, and say, “This is the basis of our
           decision,” I not only constrain lower courts, I constrain
           myself as well. If the next case should have such
           different facts that my political or policy preferences
           regarding the outcome are quite the opposite, I will be
           unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed
           myself to the governing principle. In the real world of
           appellate judging, it displays more judicial restraint to
           adopt such a course than to announce that, “on balance,” we
           think the law was violated here—leaving ourselves free to
           say in the next case that, “on balance,” it was not. It is
           a commonplace that the one effective check upon arbitrary
           judges is criticism by the bar and the academy. But it is
           no more possible to demonstrate the inconsistency of two
           opinions based upon a “totality of the circumstances” test
           than it is to demonstrate the inconsistency of two jury
           verdicts. Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves
           in.
                 While announcing a firm rule of decision can thus
           inhibit courts, strangely enough it can embolden them as
           well. Judges are sometimes called upon to be courageous,
           because they must sometimes stand up to what is generally
           supreme in a democracy: the popular will. Their most
           significant roles, in our system, are to protect the
           individual criminal defendant against the occasional
           excesses of that popular will, and to preserve the checks
           and balances within our constitutional system that are
           precisely designed to inhibit swift and complete
           accomplishment of that popular will. Those are tasks
           which, properly performed, may earn widespread respect and
           admiration in the long run, but—almost by definition—never
           in the particular case. The chances that frail men and
           women will stand up to their unpleasant duty are greatly

                                    23
       Determining whether a defendant is in custody under a

totality of circumstances requires consideration of many factors

other than the existence of probable cause.          In Sagapolutele-

Silva, however, the majority eliminated the bright-line

“probable cause” test for custody and required analyzing

“custody” based on multiple factors.        151 Hawaiʻi at 292, 511

P.3d at 791.

       Also, until Sagapolutele-Silva, this court had

“consistently provided criminal defendants with greater

protection under Hawaiʻi’s version of the privilege against self-

incrimination (article I, section 10 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution)

than is otherwise ensured by the federal courts under Miranda

and its progeny.”     State v. Valera, 74 Haw. 424, 434, 848 P.2d

376, 380 (1993).     The majority in Sagapolutele-Silva actually

attempted to retrench on Hawaiʻi constitutional rights.           The

Ketchum bright-line rule enhances protection of our citizens’

constitutional rights and equal treatment of people under the

law.

           increased if they can stand behind the solid shield of a
           firm, clear principle enunciated in earlier cases. It is
           very difficult to say that a particular convicted felon who
           is the object of widespread hatred must go free because, on
           balance, we think that excluding the defense attorney from
           the line-up process in this case may have prevented a fair
           trial. It is easier to say that our cases plainly hold
           that, absent exigent circumstances, such exclusion is a per
           se denial of due process.

56 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1179-80.

                                    24
     We therefore expressly overrule Sagapolutele-Silva’s

abrogation of Ketchum’s bright-line rule and, based on the

above, hold that the Ketchum rule remains in effect:    Miranda

warnings are required by article I, section 10 of the

Constitution of the State of Hawaiʻi when probable cause to

arrest has developed.   Ketchum, 97 Hawaiʻi at 126, 34 P.3d at

1025.

     Hence, at the point probable cause to arrest Hewitt had

developed, which was at least by the time officers learned the

truck owned by “Cyrus Hewitt” crashed on the roadside contained

Hewitt’s identification card, she was entitled to Miranda

warnings before questioning recommenced.   For the reasons

discussed below, however, Hewitt was in custody under a totality

of circumstances and entitled to Miranda warnings even before

that point in time.

     3.   Based on the totality of circumstances, Hewitt was
          already in custody even before probable cause
          developed

     The ICA ruled that Hewitt was not in custody at the time

she made her statement about having driven the truck because (1)

her inability to leave was not the result of detention by law

enforcement; (2) the officers did not have probable cause to

arrest Hewitt until she stated she had been driving the truck;

and (3) the record does not reflect any sustained and coercive

                                25
questioning of Hewitt by the officers.   Hewitt, 149 Hawaiʻi at

75, 481 P.3d at 717.

    When a bright-line rule regarding “custody” (such as the

existence of probable cause) has yet to be triggered, “[w]hether

the defendant was in custody or otherwise deprived of [their]

freedom of action for Miranda purposes is to be determined from

the totality of the circumstances, objectively appraised.”

Patterson, 59 Haw. at 361, 581 P.2d at 755.    “These

[circumstances] would include the place and time of the

interrogation, the length of the interrogation, the nature of

the questions asked, the conduct of the police, and all other

relevant circumstances.”   Id.

    Thus, the circumstance of a person being questioned while

in a hospital bed or receiving medical treatment is relevant to

the “totality of circumstances” analysis.     Other courts have

specifically addressed questioning by law enforcement of a

person in a hospital bed or receiving medical treatment.     The

First Circuit has stated that “[w]hen an individual is unable to

‘leave’ the place of the interrogation solely due to

circumstances incident to medical treatment, the question is

said to be slightly different:   whether [they were] at liberty

to terminate the interrogation and ‘cause the [officers] to

                                 26
leave.’”   Infante, 701 F.3d at 396, modified on other grounds by

Hill v. Walsh, 884 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2018).16

16    Other courts have articulated different tests regarding whether custody
is established when a person is unable to leave the hospital due to their
medical condition. See State v. Pontbriand, 878 A.2d 227, 231-32 (Vt. 2005).
      The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted a
“reasonably free to terminate questioning and leave” test:

                 The question of custody typically turns on whether “a
           reasonable person [would] have felt [they were] not at
           liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”
           Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133
           L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). In some circumstances, however, the
           defendant may be prevented from pretermitting the
           interrogation because of factors independent of police
           restraint. For example, in Florida v. Bostick, the
           defendant's “freedom of movement was restricted by a factor
           independent of police conduct—i.e., by his being a
           passenger on a bus”—which rendered the standard “free to
           leave” analysis inapplicable. 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct.
           2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (emphasis omitted). In such
           circumstances, “the appropriate inquiry is whether a
           reasonable person would feel free to decline officers’
           requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Id. at
           436, 111 S.Ct. 2382.
                 This court came to a similar conclusion in United
           States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1985), a case
           decided before Bostick. . . .
                 . . . .
                 Analysis of whether Jamison was in custody when he
           made the statements describing the shooting depends on
           “whether a reasonable person would [have] fe[lt] free to
           decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
           encounter,” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382. In
           dissecting the perceptions of such a reasonable person,
           however, we must be careful to separate the restrictions on
           his freedom arising from police interrogation and those
           incident to his background circumstances. That is, to the
           extent Jamison felt constrained by his injuries, the
           medical exigencies they created (e.g., the donning of a
           hospital gown and the insertion of an I.V. line), or the
           routine police investigation they initiated, such
           limitations on his freedom should not factor into our
           reasonable-person analysis. It is this careful
           differentiation between police-imposed restraint and
           circumstantial restraint that leads us to conclude that
           Jamison was not in custody when he described the shooting
           during his hospital interview. The district court properly
           invoked the same lodestar, but proceeded to classify the
           significant limitations on Jamison’s freedom as police-
           imposed when they were actually routine treatment for a
           person in Jamison’s position.

                                     27
     We generally adopt the First Circuit’s approach for

purposes of the article I, section 10 right against self-

incrimination.     We hold that, under the Hawaiʻi Constitution, if

a person is unable to leave a place of interrogation due to

circumstances incident to medical treatment, determining whether

the person is “in custody” under a totality of circumstances

requires an inquiry into whether the person was at liberty to

terminate the interrogation and cause the officer(s) to leave.

     Applying that inquiry here, at the time of the questioning,

Hewitt lay in a hospital bed with contusions on her face, eyes

swollen shut, a laceration on her ear, and a broken breast

plate.   Early in the officers’ encounter with Hewitt, Officer

Nacino served her with a “legal document” and told her that she

needed to sign the document.       The officers proceeded to question

Hewitt about her injuries.       She did not know where she was or

why she was there.

     Both officers stood at her bedside throughout the

interview, which started around one o’clock in the morning and

continued intermittently until about three hours later.

United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir. 2007) (alterations in
original).

      We disagree with the Fourth Circuit that limitations on a person’s
freedom due to background medical treatment circumstances should not factor
into the custody analysis. Such circumstances are relevant to the
determination of whether a person is at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and cause the officers to leave.

                                     28
Hewitt’s responses were largely incoherent.    The officers had to

continually wake her up throughout the interview because she had

been heavily sedated.    When Hewitt finally left the hospital,

she could not do so on her own, and her friend had to assist her

movements.   Hewitt was not at liberty to terminate the

interrogation and cause the officers to leave.

    Applying other factors relevant to the “totality of

circumstances” analysis, Hewitt had also become the focus of an

OVUII investigation before Officer Nacino asked whether she had

been driving.   See Patterson, 59 Haw. at 361, 581 P.2d at 755

(holding that the focus of the investigation upon the defendant

is an important factor in the determination of whether the

defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation).    In this

regard, at the start of the officers’ shift and before they even

went to the hospital, HCPD received a report that somebody heard

a traffic collision.    The officers suspected Hewitt was under

the influence of alcohol or another intoxicant.    While Officer

Nacino questioned Hewitt, HFD paramedics informed the officers

of a truck apparently involved in a traffic collision and

suggested that Hewitt was somehow connected.    When the officers

called Sergeant Rose to confirm the truck’s whereabouts, they

already doubted that Hewitt’s injuries were from an assault as

they told Sergeant Rose that “a person was at the hospital for

injuries, which they didn’t know if it was from an assault or

                                 29
from a traffic accident” and “received information that there

was a possible crash.”17

     Hence, under the totality of circumstances, Hewitt was in

custody and entitled to Miranda warnings well before the

officers asked her whether she had been driving the truck.             The

district court and ICA erred in holding that Miranda warnings

were not required until after she responded to the question.

                              V.   Conclusion

     Hewitt’s conviction has already been set aside and the

charges against her have been dismissed.         It is therefore

unnecessary to determine when custodial interrogation of Hewitt

actually commenced.     A remand is no longer appropriate, whether

on the bases previously ordered by the ICA or to address the

issues discussed in this opinion.

17    Sergeant Rose confirmed the truck’s location in some brush and its
damaged state, which provided an explanation for Hewitt’s injuries and why
she had dirt and leaves on her person—details Officer Sugata testified to
noticing about Hewitt’s appearance. Sergeant Rose also found Hewitt’s
identification card in the truck, and texted a photo of the card to Officer
Nacino. Except for her injuries, Hewitt matched the image of the person on
the card. A search of the truck’s license plate number revealed that it was
registered to a “Cyrus Hewitt,” whom the officers assumed was Hewitt’s
father.

                                     30
    Due to the procedural posture of this case, we therefore

instead reverse the ICA’s March 20, 2021 Judgment on Appeal that

ordered a remand and affirm the district court’s August 9, 2021

judgment of nolle prosequi of both counts.

Taryn R. Tomasa                     /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for petitioner
                                    /s/ Michael D. Wilson

Christopher K. Rothfus              /s/ Todd W. Eddins
for respondent

                               31