Court Opinion

ID: 9779476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:51:58.777497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:26.826829
License: Public Domain

LÓPEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion in this case.
Although the majority opinion sets out the summary of facts, for purposes of clarification of my dissent, I will reiterate certain facts.
Appellant sued appellee for divorce. The case was initially tried on October 21, 1994, and a letter ruling was issued on October 25, 1994 setting forth the trial court’s proposed decree. On November 18, 1994, a second hearing was held in response to the appellant’s Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Clarify or Amend Court’s Ruling.
The trial court named the parties as joint managing conservators of their two children, and granted each party primary physical custody of one child. The joint managing con-servatorship referred to specific decision making powers enumerated in the decree and not to physical custody. Each party was awarded specific visitation with the non-custodial child. As such, each parent does not have an equal amount of time with the noncustodial child even though each is named as a joint managing conservator. The trial court also ordered appellee to pay appellant $20,000, representing one-half the equity value in the homestead awarded to the appellee through a promissory note paid over seven years. The trial court ordered that appellee pay all community debts, but allowed a dollar for dollar reduction on the promissory note for appellant’s one-half share of the community debts.
The trial court found that appellant’s net resources were $775.00 a month and appel-lee’s net resources were $2,800.00 a month. The court further found that in accordance with Section 14.055 of the Texas Family Code, appellant’s child support obligation for B.C.S. would be $155.00 a month and appel-lee’s child support obligation for AD.S. would be $560.00 a month. However, the court ordered that neither party pay child support. In its written order, the trial court gave three specific reasons for its action. First, each party was granted primary physical custody of one child and would be primarily responsible for the full support of the child. Second, the appellee would have less monthly resources due to his assumption of a greater proportion of the community debt service and the monthly note payments to the appellant. Finally, the appellee would be receiving additional monthly income from the note payments.
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL ADDRESSED BY DISSENT
In appellant’s first three points of error, she complains that the trial court considered erroneous factors in ordering that neither party pay child support. Because I agree with these contentions, I dissent to the majority opinion.
The majority opinion correctly states the standard of review. However, it is my opinion that the trial court incorrectly applied the factors to be considered under the standard of review.
*104In her first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court improperly included appellee’s monthly note payments in the calculation of appellant’s net resources. Section 14.053(b) of the Texas Family Code provides that note payments are not additional income, but rather a return of principal or capital and not part of net resources. Tex. Fam.Code § 14.053(b) (Vernon Supp.1995) (currently § 154.062(c)(1) Vernon Supp.1996). Therefore, the court erred in considering the note payments as additional net resources. I would sustain appellant’s first point of error.
In her second and third points of error, appellant maintains that neither the split custody of the children nor the appellee’s assumption of additional community debt service were appropriate factors for the court to consider.
Section 14.054 of the Family Code provides additional factors that the court may consider in determining child support, including debts or debt service assumed by either party, as well as the number of children each party has physical custody of. Tex.Fam. Code § 14.054 (Vernon Supp.1995) (currently § 154.123(b)(16) Vernon Supp.1996). However, the best interest of the child shall still be the trial court’s primary consideration in determining questions of child support. Tex. Fam.Code § 14.07(a) (Vernon Supp.1995) (currently § 153.002 Vernon Supp.1996); Clark v. Jamison, 874 S.W.2d 312, (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). Furthermore, the Family Code includes a rebuttable presumption that the statutory guidelines set to determine child support are reasonable and in the best interest of the child. Tex.Fam.Code § 14.055(a) (Vernon Supp.1995) (currently § 154.122(a) Vernon Supp.1996).
Although the trial court cited appellee’s debts or debt service as a basis for not requiring him to pay child support, the court apparently did not consider that appellant was also paying her share of the indebtedness by the reduction in the homestead promissory note payments. Debt alone does not excuse a parent’s obligation to pay child support. Cole v. Cole, 882 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex.App. — Houston 14th District, 1994, writ denied). Parents are ordered to pay child support based on their income, or even on their earning potential, not reduced by the debt they have chosen to incur. See Id.
Divorces are difficult for all concerned, but especially for the children under the best of circumstances. These siblings, for whatever reason the court decided or the parties agreed to, will be raised in different households. The separation of the siblings is quite sufficient to cause problems and hardships. To add to this, one child is being supported by the father whose available net resources is approximately four times that of the mother who supports the other child. This situation will very likely cause adversity between the children and could be disastrous to their relationship. This decision cannot be labeled “in the best interest of the children,” who are the only innocent parties in the divorce.
The trial court failed to take the best interests of these children into account. Therefore, the court did not act with reference to guiding rules and principles, and abused its discretion when it ordered that neither party pay child support. See Cole, 882 S.W.2d at 94. I would sustain appellant’s second and third points of error.
I would reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to this dissent.