Court Opinion

ID: 9720153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:18:18.106869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:13.683189
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: Defendant raised three issues on appeal. I agree with the majority opinion regarding the trial court’s ruling on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and, conditionally, with its denial of the defendant’s motion to reduce the jury’s verdict. However, I respectfully disagree with the decision as it relates to the relevance and admissibility of evidence of the existence of a sign and lighting strip near the steps prior to Janet Worsley’s fall. First, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment on the basis that the defendant did not owe Janet a duty to warn her of the step. As indicated in the majority opinion, there were material questions of fact with regard to whether the step was open and obvious. On that basis, the denial of the motion was appropriate. Second, defendant argued that there was no evidence to support the amount of the verdict entered by the jury. Here again, as indicated by the majority, a jury’s verdict will only be reversed or reduced where it is against the manifest weight of the evidence or bears no reasonable relationship to the plaintiffs loss. Burnham v. Lewis, 217 Ill. App. 3d 752, 756, 577 N.E.2d 922, 924 (1991). In this case, the jury’s verdict does not appear to be clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence which was allowed, rightly or wrongly, to be presented at trial. Given that evidence, the trial court appropriately denied defendant’s motion. Finally, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion in limine and motion for a new trial, both of which challenged plaintiffs’ evidence of a warning sign and lighting strip that had previously been placed near the step. I believe the defendant was correct in this argument. The basis of the challenge was defendant’s contention that the specific safety measures taken by the defendant prior to the injury were irrelevant to the condition of the step at the time of the injury. In support of this position, defendant cites Schultz v. Richie, 148 Ill. App. 3d 903, 499 N.E.2d 1069 (1986). In the Schultz case, the plaintiff slipped on ice that had accumulated on the step of a porch due to the absence of gutters. The court held that the fact that gutters had once been on the house was not admissible at the trial because it was not relevant to the jury’s determination in that particular case. Schultz, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 906, 499 N.E.2d at 1071. The majority acknowledges that a defendant’s postaccident remedial measures are not admissible (Schaffner v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 129 Ill. 2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 643 (1989)) and that there are several policy reasons for the rule, including the possibility that a jury may view remedial measures as an admission of negligence. However, the majority then goes on to state that, in this case, the evidence of the sign and lighting strip was relevant, and therefore admissible to show the defendant’s knowledge of a potentially dangerous condition, regardless of the prejudicial effect of admitting such evidence. Evidence that a possible safety measure had been removed from an area where an alleged injury later occurred is clearly prejudicial. Defendant’s prior placement of a sign and a lighting strip, without any showing that either was necessary or helpful, was admitted as evidence that their absence at the time of the accident was negligence. However, representatives for the defendant testified that the sign and lighting strip had been removed because they were serving no purpose and were difficult to keep in place. There was no evidence that Janet had relied on the sign or lighting strip prior to the fall. In fact, she testified that she had never been to the defendant’s restaurant prior to the date of her fall. Therefore, the sign and lighting strip were not relevant to the condition of the step as it was known to Janet. The only issue to be decided by the jury was whether the step, as it existed at the time of Janet’s injury, was unreasonably dangerous and whether defendant was negligent in maintaining it in that condition. What defendant may have done previously was, absent some prior reliance by Janet, totally irrelevant to that inquiry. Since the jury entered its verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and there is no way to determine the amount of weight given to the evidence regarding the sign and lighting strip, the admission of the evidence was reversible error. On that basis, I would remand the case to the trial court for a new trial without the improper evidence.