Court Opinion

ID: 9899545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 21:01:01.413963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:33.647650
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359   Doc: 57        Filed: 11/15/2023   Pg: 1 of 13

                                         PUBLISHED

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                          No. 23-6359

        ROBERT FRAZIER; ANIBAL HERNANDEZ; D.P., a minor, by and through his
        next friend and guardian, K.P.; CHRISTOPHER BUTLER; MIRAMBA
        WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons,

                         Plaintiffs-Appellants,

        and

        DONNELL DAVIS; LESLIE SHARP; ELMER LAGUAN-SALINAS; ADRIENNE
        WORTHINGTON, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
        persons,

                         Plaintiffs,

                                            v.

        PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND,

                          Defendant-Appellee,

        and

        CORENNE LABBÉ, in her official capacity as Director of the Prince George’s
        County Department of Corrections; JEFFREY LOGAN, in his official capacity as
        Division Chief of the Prince George’s County Population Management Division;
        KENNETH GRAY, in his official capacity as Section Chief of the Prince George’s
        County Community Supervision Section; TANYA LAW, in her official capacity as
        Unit Chief of the Prince George’s County Monitoring Services Unit; LAKEECIA
        ALLEN; BRYON BEREANO; JOHN BIELEC; SCOTT CARRINGTON; ADA
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359     Doc: 57         Filed: 11/15/2023    Pg: 2 of 13

        CLARK-EDWARDS; STACEY COBB SMITH; BRIAN DENTON; ROBERT
        HEFFRON, JR.; DONNAKA LEWIS; OFFICER GREGORY POWELL; CATHY
        SERRETTE, in their personal capacities and official capacities as District and
        Circuit Court Judges for the District and Circuit Courts of Maryland for Prince
        George’s County,

                            Defendants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
        Peter J. Messitte, Senior District Judge. (8:22-cv-01768-PJM)

        Argued: September 20, 2023                                 Decided: November 15, 2023

        Before RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in
        which Judge Heytens and Senior Judge Floyd joined.

        ARGUED: Ellora Thadaney Israni, CIVIL RIGHTS CORPS, Washington, D.C., for
        Appellants. Andrew Jensen Murray, PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW,
        Largo, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jeremy D. Cutting, Ryan C. Downer, CIVIL
        RIGHTS CORPS, Washington, D.C.; Seth Wayne, Elizabeth R. Cruikshank, Mary B.
        McCord, Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection, GEORGETOWN LAW
        CENTER, Washington, D.C.; Matthew Martens, Edward Williams, Donna Farag, Thomas
        Bredar, Ayana Williams, Sonika Data, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND
        DORR LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Rhonda L. Weaver, Shelley L. Johnson,
        PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Largo, Maryland, for Appellees.

                                                   2
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359      Doc: 57         Filed: 11/15/2023     Pg: 3 of 13

        RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

               Plaintiffs-Appellants, former pretrial detainees in Prince George’s County,

        Maryland, appeal from the district court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary

        injunction. The detainees sought an injunction that would require the County to release

        them, and others similarly situated, on the ground that the County’s pretrial-release

        program violates the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion without

        stating its factual findings and legal conclusions. But Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

        52(a)(2) requires a district court to say more than: “No.” So we vacate and remand for

        further proceedings.

        I.     Background

               The County’s Department of Corrections operates a pretrial-release program.

        Exactly how the program functions remains unclear. But here’s what we know.

               When a person is arrested in the county, the process starts like it does most

        everywhere. The arrestee first makes an initial appearance where a magistrate official

        determines his preliminary pretrial-release status. That is, the magistrate decides under

        state law whether the arrestee should be released on personal recognizance, released subject

        to conditions (including a bond), or committed (i.e., detained). See Md. Rule 4-216.1. We

        can call this phase one.

               Then, if the arrestee is not immediately released, we move on to phase two: a bail-

        review hearing before a county judge. At that hearing, the arrestee—now a detainee—is

        represented by counsel and can make arguments and present evidence. The judge may also

        consider a “pretrial fact intake sheet” prepared by the Department of Corrections’ Pretrial

                                                     3
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359       Doc: 57          Filed: 11/15/2023     Pg: 4 of 13

        Division. The sheet includes relevant facts about the detainee, such as his criminal history

        and employment. Based on the information presented at the hearing, the judge decides the

        detainee’s release status on an individualized basis. Md. Rule 4-216.1(b)(2).

               The judge’s determination, like the magistrate’s initial determination, is governed

        by state law. She must release the detainee unless she finds “that, if the defendant is

        released, there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant (i) will not appear when

        required, or (ii) will be a danger to an alleged victim, another person, or the community.”

        Md. Rule 4-216.1(b)(1)(B). Even if the judge finds such a likelihood, she must release the

        detainee unless she also finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that there are no financial

        or non-financial conditions that will ensure the detainee’s return to court and the safety of

        the community. Md. Rule 4-216.1(c). And the judge must “state the basis” for the finding

        “on the record.” Md. Rule 4-216.1(c)(1); see also J.A. 157 (noting that a judge detaining

        an individual recites that she has found by clear and convincing evidence that no condition

        or combination of conditions of release can reasonably assure the public’s safety or the

        individual’s appearance in court).

               So far, so good. But it is at this point that the detainees claim that the County’s

        process deviates from the norm. That is because when a county judge issues an order

        stating that someone is committed (with or without the option to be released with a bond),

        she can add that the commitment is “subject to” a particular “condition”: pretrial release

        by Pretrial Services. This “condition” varies in language. Some orders state it as “court

        ordered pre trial release.” E.g., J.A. 185. Others read “or PR to PTR.” E.g., J.A. 519. And

        still others describe the condition as a pretrial-release “option.” E.g., J.A. 191.

                                                      4
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359      Doc: 57          Filed: 11/15/2023     Pg: 5 of 13

               Whatever the language, the parties agree that this effectively creates a third phase

        where Pretrial Services determines whether a detainee qualifies for release under its own

        program. To make this determination, Pretrial Services uses a non-exhaustive set of

        considerations, which primarily relate to the detainee’s dangerousness and flight risk.

        Pretrial Services makes this decision without a county judge’s involvement. And the

        process can take months, during which the detainee may not be provided status updates.

        In the end, a detainee may never hear anything at all from Pretrial Services.

               The detainees think this process violates their due-process rights. So they sued the

        County, various county officials, and local circuit- and district-court judges under 42

        U.S.C. § 1983 and the Maryland constitution. On the same day, they moved to certify a

        class of similarly situated pretrial detainees. And, relevant to this appeal, they moved for

        a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the County’s 1 alleged federal due-process

        violations.

               The detainees’ argument in support of their motion rests on their understanding of

        what a county judge does at phase two. According to the detainees, when the county judge

        commits someone subject to the condition of pretrial release by Pretrial Services, the judge

        is implicitly finding that the detainee can be released under conditions sufficient to protect

        the community from danger and assure his return to court. Thus, the judge is authorizing

        the detainee’s release if Pretrial Services decides conditions may be imposed to permit

               1
                 The preliminary injunction also sought to enjoin certain county officials. But the
        district court granted those county officials’ motion to dismiss on sovereign-immunity
        grounds. Since that dismissal is not on appeal, the County is the only relevant defendant.
                                                      5
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359       Doc: 57         Filed: 11/15/2023      Pg: 6 of 13

        release. And the detainees argue that it violates due process to detain someone after a judge

        has made the determination that there are possible conditions under which that person can

        be released. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (finding certain

        procedures sufficient under the Due Process Clause).

               But the County has a different understanding of Pretrial Services’ pretrial-release

        program. It suggests that a county judge does not authorize a detainee’s release during

        phase two when she adds pretrial release by Pretrial Services as a “condition” on the

        detainee’s commitment order.        Rather, as state law requires, the judge is ordering

        commitment because she has found that the detainee is a flight or safety risk that requires

        commitment. By including the “condition” of pretrial release by Pretrial Services, the

        judge isn’t backtracking on that finding, but is simply stating Pretrial Services may release

        the detainee if it finds that the detainee meets its own criteria. So the County argues that

        once the judge orders the individual committed under state-law procedures and standards,

        it doesn’t violate due process to detain that person even if the County is permitted to release

        him under its own pretrial-release program.

               After an eight-month delay, the district court took up the preliminary-injunction

        motion in a telephonic hearing. It explained that the delay was due to the lack of a factual

        record. And it maintained that there still wasn’t enough of a record for it to rule on the

        motion. In its words, critical facts were disputed, so “[h]ow [would it] know whether the

        plaintiff is more likely to prevail on the merits or not?” J.A. 785. To have sufficient facts,

        the district court explained, there would need to be discovery. But it said it would not order

                                                      6
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359       Doc: 57         Filed: 11/15/2023      Pg: 7 of 13

        discovery because that would be “duplicative” of the discovery required for the merits.

        J.A. 786.

               The detainees responded that they and the County concurred on the critical facts

        needed to rule on the motion. The district court disagreed. But it gave the parties ten days

        to stipulate to enough facts to allow a preliminary-injunction ruling. In doing so, however,

        the district court noted that it would “almost certainly . . . say” the preliminary injunction

        would be “denied without prejudice.” J.A. 795.

               The parties could not agree on the requisite facts within the district court’s ten-day

        window. So about two weeks later, the district court issued an order denying the motion

        for a preliminary injunction without prejudice. The order stated that the motion was denied

        “for the reasons stated on the record during the [] telephone conference.” J.A. 831. This

        interlocutory appeal followed.

        II.    The district court violated Rule 52(a)(2)’s command to state the findings and
               conclusions that supported its denial of the preliminary-injunction motion.

               We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction for abuse

        of discretion. 2 Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2017). In determining

               2
                  The County unsuccessfully argues that the detainees don’t have standing. Article
        III standing requires that a plaintiff have an injury in fact, caused by the defendant, and
        redressable by the relief requested. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
        The detainees allege that they were subjected to unconstitutional pretrial detention (injury
        in fact), as a result of the County detaining them despite a judge authorizing their release
        (causation), and that those similarly situated will be released if they are awarded an
        injunction (redressability). Moreover, their claim isn’t moot even though they’ve been
        released or tried since they filed their complaint. A pretrial detainee who is a putative class
        representative retains the standing he enjoyed when he sought class certification even if he
        (Continued)
                                                      7
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359       Doc: 57         Filed: 11/15/2023       Pg: 8 of 13

        whether the district court abused its discretion, we review the district court’s factual

        findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery

        Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013). To obtain the “extraordinary relief” of a

        preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish the four so-called Winter factors: (1) that

        he’s likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that he’s likely to suffer irreparable harm if

        preliminary relief isn’t granted; (3) that the balance of equities favors him; and (4) that an

        injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

        (2008).

               But a district court cannot decide whether a plaintiff has satisfied Winter behind the

        curtain. Instead, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(2) requires that, when “granting or

        refusing” a preliminary injunction, a district court “state the findings [of fact] and

        conclusions [of law] that support its action.” 3 In other words, it must explain its decision.

               There are two reasons for this rule: it ensures that parties are informed of the district

        court’s reasoning, and it allows for meaningful appellate review. Hoechst Diafoil Co. v.

        Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 423 (4th Cir. 1999).              Without findings and

        conclusions, neither the parties nor this Court know why the district court denied the

        injunction. So challenging that decision and reviewing it are made tougher. Indeed, it

        is released or tried before the class is certified. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110–
        11 n.11 (1975).
               3
                 Rule 52(a)(2) states: “In granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction, the court
        must similarly state the findings and conclusions that support its action.” The “similarly”
        here refers to the preceding subsection (a)(1), which addresses actions tried without a jury
        and requires the court to “find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law
        separately.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).
                                                       8
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359      Doc: 57          Filed: 11/15/2023      Pg: 9 of 13

        becomes somewhat of a guessing game: Did the district court abuse its discretion in

        balancing the equities, evaluating irreparable harm, or considering the public interest? Or

        was the denial based on a factual finding or legal conclusion that rendered success on the

        merits unlikely?

               In most contexts, a district court’s lack of explanation doesn’t amount to error, even

        if it makes our job harder. In fact, we often must review district-court decisions with little

        or no explicit reasoning in front of us. See, e.g., United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252,

        1256 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that we can review a district court’s Federal Rule of Evidence

        403 decision for abuse of discretion without a record of its reasoning). So in those contexts,

        we must sift through the record and try to piece together the district court’s rationale. Id.

               But that’s when there isn’t a federal rule requiring the district court to make its

        reasoning known. In contrast, Rule 52(a)(2) is meant to save us and litigants from having

        to play detective when it comes to orders granting or denying preliminary injunctions.

        Thus, when issuing those orders, a district court must comply with the Rule by stating its

        factual findings and legal conclusions. And it errs when it fails to do so. See Mayo v.

        Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 317 (1940).

               Rule 52(a)(2)’s burden is not Herculean.          It does not require a tome that

        memorializes all factual minutiae or responds to every legal assertion. Cf. Kelley v.

        Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 419–22 (1943). Instead, the findings and

        conclusions required are those that are necessary, in context, to the action taken. Id.

        Granting a preliminary injunction requires analysis of each Winter factor because a

        preliminary injunction can be granted only if every factor is met. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20;

                                                      9
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359       Doc: 57          Filed: 11/15/2023       Pg: 10 of 13

        see also Hoechst Diafoil Co., 174 F.3d at 423. Yet denying a preliminary injunction only

        takes the rejection of a single factor. So a district court denying a preliminary injunction

        may satisfy Rule 52(a)(2) by stating the facts and legal conclusions about a single factor.

               Similarly, the extent of factual findings and legal conclusions required for any given

        Winter factor will vary depending on the issues presented. Cf. Darter v. Greenville Cmty.

        Hotel Corp., 301 F.2d 70, 75 (4th Cir. 1962). In other words, the more factual uncertainties

        and complex legal issues, the more explanation the district court must give. See Kelley,

        319 U.S. at 419–22.

               Here, the district court’s order falls short of Rule 52(a)(2)’s command. The written

        order denied the preliminary injunction “for the reasons stated” during an earlier telephonic

        hearing. While the Rule permits findings and conclusions to be given orally, those oral

        reasons must themselves satisfy the Rule. United States v. Virginia, 569 F.2d 1300, 1302

        (4th Cir. 1978). They didn’t do so. All the court noted was that it did not know enough

        facts to decide the merits of the issue either way.

               True, the district court mentioned one Winter factor: the detainees’ likelihood of

        prevailing on the merits. J.A. 785–86. And factual uncertainty can support a conclusion

        that the first Winter factor isn’t met; if a plaintiff hasn’t established a material fact, then he

        may have only shown that his success on the merits is possible, not likely. See Di Biase,

        872 F.3d at 234–35. But here, the district court did not make any findings that the plaintiff

        failed to establish material facts crucial to success on the merits. Instead, it spoke in broad

        strokes without identifying material facts that were unclear or ambiguous. Conclusory

        statements about the lack of a record and the existence of factual uncertainty cannot suffice

                                                       10
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359      Doc: 57          Filed: 11/15/2023      Pg: 11 of 13

        under Rule 52(a)(2). See Virginia, 569 F.2d at 1303; EEOC v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard

        Nat’l, 555 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1977); cf. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118,

        129–31 (1943).

               In short, the detainees’ motion for a preliminary injunction presented the district

        court with a disputed factual record and a difficult, fact-bound constitutional question.

        Thus, the district court had to explain the factual findings and legal conclusions that

        supported its determination that the preliminary injunction should be denied. Yet it only

        made generalized comments about the difficulty of deciding. So it violated Rule 52(a)(2).

               That error alone doesn’t require this Court to return the case to the district court. 4

        Compliance with Rule 52(a)(2) isn’t a prerequisite for our jurisdiction. Westley v. Southern

        Ry. Co., 250 F.2d 188, 189 (4th Cir. 1957). So we can choose to exercise our discretion

        and overlook a Rule 52(a)(2) error to review the merits of the district court’s preliminary-

        injunction ruling even if it contained no explanation at all. See id. The detainees request

        that we do so here and order the district court to enter a preliminary injunction.

               But we will disregard a Rule 52(a)(2) error and reach the merits of the district court’s

        preliminary-injunction order only if there is a record sufficient “to enable us to pass upon

        the questions involved.” Id. at n.1. There isn’t one here. To determine whether the

        detainees’ requested preliminary injunction should issue, we would have to decide whether

               4
                 A Rule 52(a)(2) error also wouldn’t require reversal and remand if that error was
        harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 78 (1939). A Rule 52(a)(2)
        error might be harmless if, for example, a district court summarily denied a preliminary
        injunction motion that was frivolous or had apparent flaws. But here, we can’t say the
        error was harmless given the nature of the challenges and the disputed factual record.
                                                      11
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359        Doc: 57            Filed: 11/15/2023   Pg: 12 of 13

        they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the pretrial-release program

        violates their due-process rights. Among other things, that requires us to know how the

        program operates. But we are hesitant to make such a finding on appeal.

               Consider the bedrock issue of what the “condition” of pretrial release by Pretrial

        Services on a commitment order means. Perhaps, as the detainees suggest, the commitment

        order with the pretrial release by Pretrial Services option authorizes the detainee’s release

        and thus serves as an implicit finding that there’s no risk to the community or of a failure

        to appear. But the detainees also acknowledge that the orders contain an “inherent

        contradiction” that makes their meaning unclear. J.A. 132 n.25. Recall that, under state

        law, a county judge can issue a commitment order only if no conditions of release will

        protect the community and ensure the person’s return to court. Md. Rule 4-216.1(b)(1)(B);

        see also Md. Rule 4-216.1(c)(1). So, when issuing an order committing the defendant with

        an option for pretrial release by Pretrial Services, the judge could be interpreted as doing

        two things: (1) finding that the detainee is an unconditional flight risk or danger to the

        community; and (2) permitting the person to still be released despite that prior finding,

        subject to Pretrial Service’s conditions. How one interprets the pretrial-detention scheme

        thus informs whether it’s likely that the County is violating the detainees’ due-process

        rights after the orders are issued. 5

               5
                 The detainees separately suggested below that county judges were at fault. See,
        e.g., J.A. 132 n.25. But, perhaps for good reason, the proposed preliminary injunction
        sought to enjoin only the County, not the judges.
                                                        12
USCA4 Appeal: 23-6359      Doc: 57         Filed: 11/15/2023      Pg: 13 of 13

               The record isn’t so obvious to permit us to answer to this critical factual question.

        And the district court didn’t make any findings on the issue. We, as a court of review,

        rightfully avoid becoming the factfinder in the first instance. So we decline to overlook

        the district court’s Rule 52(a)(2) error and decide whether the detainees’ motion should be

        granted. Cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (“The reviewing court

        oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of

        the lower court.”). 6 We instead vacate and remand for further proceedings.

                                              *      *       *

               The Supreme Court has told us that “[i]t is of the highest importance to a proper

        review of the action of a court in granting or refusing a preliminary injunction that there

        should be fair compliance with Rule 52(a).” Mayo, 309 U.S. at 316. Here, the district

        court had to do more than just deny the preliminary injunction. It needed to “state the

        findings and conclusions of law that support its action.” The district court’s order denying

        the motion for a preliminary injunction is thus

                                                                    VACATED AND REMANDED.

               6
                  To the extent the detainees forfeited any review of the Rule 52(a)(2) error on
        appeal by failing to raise it below, the lack of a record on which to address the merits of
        the district court’s denial also leads us to exercise our discretion to excuse any forfeiture
        of the Rule 52(a)(2) issue. Cf. Gibbs, 307 U.S. at 78; Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793
        F.2d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 1986).
                                                     13