Court Opinion

ID: 9741640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:59:59.068661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.223463
License: Public Domain

Peterson, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. I will briefly state my reasons. I accept the statement of facts as to the Des Moines situation as stated in the majority opinion.
In the final analysis there is only one question in the case. Did the Des Moines City Council act in an arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious manner in adopting amendatory Ordinance No. 5926?
I doubt the wisdom of spot zoning. However, since we have adopted the doctrine in Iowa in Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 66 N.W.2d 113, 51 A. L. R.2d 251, we should be consistent. The majority does not overrule the Keller case, but attempts to distinguish it. Without a strong and impelling reason it does not seem consistent to approve the theory in the Keller case, and disapprove it in the case at bar. I fail to find any such reason.
Adoption of zoning ordinances, and amendments thereto, is a legislative function, and should not be disturbed by the judiciary, unless such ordinances or amendments are arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. Furthermore, if fairly debatable, the legislative judgment should control. Keller v. City of Council *1291Bluffs, supra; Brackett v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 249, 67 N.W.2d 542; McMahon v. City of Dubuque, 8 Cir., 255 F.2d 154.
The basic theory of spot zoning, as announced in the Keller ease, is as follows (page 207 of 246 Iowa): “We are of the opinion the governing body of a municipality may amend its zoning ordinances any time it deems circumstances and conditions warrant such action, and such an amendment is valid if the procedural requirements of the statutes are followed and it is not unreasonable or capricious nor inconsistent with the spirit and design of the zoning statute.”
The majority say the distinction between the Keller case and the case at bar is that in the Keller case the rezoned property had been used for many years as a rooming house and convalescent home; in the Hermann case the house had been a large one family home. This is not a criterion establishing the action of the City Council as arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.
Also, the question is fairly debatable in the case at bar, under which circumstances there should be no judicial interference. Brackett v. City of Des Moines, supra.
The case above-cited has analyzed this situation carefully and cites several supporting cases, as follows at page 260 of 246 Iowa:
“The strong presumption in favor of a legislative act applies as well to zoning ordinances, and if the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A. L. R. 1016, 1025; City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1117, 184 N.W. 823, 188 N.W. 921, 23 A. L. R. 1322; Geneva Inv. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 8 Cir., Mo., 87 F.2d 83, 89 to 91; Kiges v. City of St. Paul, 240 Minn. 522, 531, 62 N.W.2d 363, 370; City of Corpus Christi v. Jones, Tex. Civ. App., 144 S.W.2d 388, 398 et seq.; Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, Second Ed., sections 33 and 37; 58 Am. Jur., Zoning, sections 16 and 21. Similar, in effect, are statements that provisions of a zoning ordinance will not be held invalid unless they clearly appear to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Board*1292man v. Davis, 231 Iowa 1227, 1231, 3 N.W.2d 608; Keller v. Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 207, 208, 66 N.W.2d 113, 116, 117 [51 A. L. R.2d 251].”
The same decision also states: “The city council, in determining and establishing this and other zones, acted within the scope of the police power and as authorized by statute. Hence, courts will not substitute their judgment as to the wisdom or propriety of such action for that of the city council. Various circumstances tend to support the propriety and wisdom of the legislative classification of these lots as residential. We are satisfied that question was, at least, fairly debatable.” (Italics supplied.)
There are several decisive elements in the instant ease which show the'basis of the council action to be logical and reasonable, and which negative the action of the city to be arbitrary, etc.: (1) The ordinance amendment creates no damage as to general conditions in the neighborhood. (2) There is no prejudice nor damage to property of plaintiffs, who are neighbors in the community. (3) The general welfare of this area in the community is enhanced.
1. On Thirty-fourth Street, in the block where the property is located, are three other sorority houses, and one fraternity house. Plaintiffs are the neighbors among these houses. The block is a reasonable and logical location for the establishment of another sorority house.
2. The properties of plaintiffs have not suffered one penny of damage. To trade a large family home, which perhaps housed the parents and several children of varying ages, for a house with 8 to 10 studious and, no doubt, high-type, sorority college girls, is an asset to the property on any street. This is far preferable to the detriment caused by the old dilapidated convalescent home involved in the Keller case.
3. Section 414.1, Iowa Code, 1958, provides: “For the purpose of promoting * * * the general welfare of the community, any city or town is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict * * * the location and use of buildings * * * and land for * * * residence or other purposes.”
Since we have approved spot zoning this has reference to the welfare of the area involved. In its legislative discretion, as *1293a matter of sound good judgment, tbe Des Moines City Council had the right to determine that the general welfare of this area in the community was enhanced.
The action of the City Council cannot be called arbitrary, unreasonable nor capricious. The Council had legislative discretion which it exercised in a sensible manner. The judiciary should not interfere.
I would affirm.