Court Opinion

ID: 9770452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:05:35.430623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:17.458451
License: Public Domain

J. Seaborn Holt, J., dissenting. The trial court found that Hattie Mobley (deceased) at the time of the execution of the will here in question lacked mental capacity and ordered its probate set aside and the will declared void. The findings of the Chancellor contained these recitals: “In this case we have direct and positive testimony that leads me to the inevitable conclusion that whether it was occasioned by the weakness of the body or the weakness of the mind or the effects of opiates or drugs, whether or not it was caused by undue influence or what it might have been caused by, I am led to the inevitable conclusion that she did not know and understand the contents of that will. Here are the men who witnessed the execution of the will, being more familiar with the legal terms, but as he expressed it, he galloped through the will, but he determined the effect of it and asked if Peyton was to be turned out in the cold and her answer was, as I wrote it down as he stated it, ‘I told the children not to do that.’ And yet the will did just that. That statement could mean several different things. It could mean the instructions in the preparation of the will and told them not to give that or it might have meant the promise that that would not be done before the will could be executed. But that is not all. She goes farther and says, ‘But'Mr. Ahlf, he is to get the cattle and the other personal property around here.’ But that will specifically devises and bequeaths to him, $500 and $500 alone and divides alb the rest and residue of the property, real, personal and mixed so the evidence is clear and conclusive and convincing that she did not, at the time of the execution of the will, know and understand the contents of the will and that is the positive testimony of the attesting witnesses, both of them, slated in detail by one and confirmed as being as Mr. Ahlf has stated it by the other. The very statements she made, the very terms show that she did not know and understand the contents of the will.” While we try the case de novo, we must affirm unless we can say that such findings are against the preponderance of the testimony, and in this particular kind of a case we have frequently said that the findings of the Chancellor have persuasive authority and are entitled to weight and consideration. In West v. Whittle, 84 Ark. 490, 106 S. W. 955, we said: “ ‘And in a court of equity, where bad faith and unconscionable acts can have no allowance or favor, the strength of mental capacity of the parties, the circumstances surrounding them, their relationship, etc., make up the grounds upon which the court can find the real influences that produced the conveyance. And when it is discovered that the party in whose favor the conveyance was made possessed an undue advantage over the grantor, and in person, or by agent, exercised an improper influence over such one, and to the advantage of the grantee, it is an act against conscience and within the cognizance of a court of equity.’ “The chancellor found that the whole substance of this transaction shows a want of capacity or undue influence; and, as said in the case of Boggianna v. Anderson, 78 Ark. 420, 94 S. W. 51, this kind of case is one where the chancellor’s finding has persuasive authority, and is entitled to weight and consideration.” “Mental weakness, though not to the extent of incapacity to execute the instrument designated, ‘may render a person more susceptible of fraud, duress, or undue influence, and, when coupled with any of these, or even with unfairness, such as great inadequacy of consideration, may make a contract voidable, when neither such weakness nor any of these other things alone, or of themselves, would do so.’ 8 Sup. Elliott on Contracts, § 365; Hightower v. Nuber, 26 Ark. 604; see West v. Whittle, 84 Ark. 490, 106 S. W. 955, and cases there cited; also Jones v. Travers, 116 Ark. 95, 172 S. W. 828; Morton v. Davis, 105 Ark. 44, 150 S. W. 117; Boggianna v. Anderson, 78 Ark. 420, 94 S. W. 51.” Pledger v. Birkhead, 156 Ark. 443, 246 S. W. 510. I think the preponderance of the testimony, as the Chancellor found, brings this case clearly within the above rule. I would affirm. Justices Mill wee and Robinson join in this dissent.