Court Opinion

ID: 9676278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:19:56.366056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:46.850781
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
Believing exempt properly, in the form of a homestead, should not be considered in indigency determinations, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Appellant was self-employed in the glass business. After being charged with aggravated sexual assault, he retained counsel. As a result of his incarceration, appellant’s financial circumstances deteriorated, and, during trial appellant and his wife filed a joint petition for bankruptcy. Appellant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment.
Appellant requested the appointment of appellate counsel and a free statement of facts. At the hearing on this request, appellant’s wife testified she had contacted an attorney who quoted a fee of $30,000 to represent appellant on appeal, plus any expenses. The court reporter estimated the cost of the statement of facts to be $5,000. Both appellant and his wife testified they were without funds to pay these expenses. Additionally, appellant provided a copy of his bankruptcy petition which listed the couple’s total assets and liabilities as $156,174.00 and $143,466.00, respectively.1 Based upon these figures, the trial judge determined appellant was not indigent under Tex.RA.pp. P. 53(j)(2) and Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(b), and denied appellant’s requests for a free statement of facts and appointment of counsel.
On appeal, appellant contended the trial judge erred in considering exempt property to hold appellant was not indigent.2 Indeed, when appellant’s homestead is not considered, appellant has a negative net worth of $10,015.00.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was equity in appellant’s residence, business and items of personal property which could be sold to pay for a statement of facts.4 Newman v. State, No. 04-93-00506-CR (TexApp. — San Antonio, delivered September 7,1994) (not published).
II.
An indigent defendant, facing the possibility of imprisonment, is entitled to the appointment of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). See, Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 1.051 and 26.04. Moreover, where an appeal is provided by statute, the United States and Texas Constitutions require that indigent defendants be appointed counsel on appeal. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 *6L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); and, Hogan v. State, 572 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). Obviously, there can be no effective appeal, and no effective appellate representation, without a transcript and statement of facts. Stephens v. State, 509 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
Tex.R.App. P. 53(j)(2) provides a procedure whereby indigent defendants can obtain a free statement of facts to perfect their appeal.5 Rosales v. State, 748 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex.CrApp.1987). See also, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (Upon a showing of indigency the trial judge must provide an indigent defendant with an adequate record for appeal.); Williams v. State, 530 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); and, Gray v. State, 928 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). The purpose of the rule is to provide equal appellate access to indigent defendants whose indigen-cy would otherwise prevent them from obtaining such access. Rosales, 748 S.W.2d at 454. And, unless the State produces evidence to the contrary, a defendant is entitled to a free statement of facts upon a prima facie showing of indigency. Snoke v. State, 780 S.W.2d 210, 213-214 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Castillo v. State, 595 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Indigency is determined on a case-by-case basis resting within the discretion of the trial judge. Rosales, 748 S.W.2d at 455; and, Abdnor v. State, 712 S.W.2d 136 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). Because appellate review of an indigency determination is conducted under an abuse of discretion standard, this Court has been reluctant to set rigid standards for such a determination. Rosales, 748 S.W.2d at 455. However, two principles are clear. First, the trial judge must look at the defendant’s financial status at the time of appeal, not at the time of trial. Barber v. State, 542 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Second, the trial judge shall consider only the defendant’s personal financial condition, not that of his parents, other relatives, friends or employers. Rosales, 748 S.W.2d at 455.6
Indigency is defined as “not financially able to afford counsel.” Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(b). The method for determining indigency is found at Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(b) which provides:
In determining whether a defendant is indigent, the court shall consider such factors as the defendant’s income, source of income, property owned, outstanding obligations, necessary expenses, the number and ages of dependents, spousal income, and whether the defendant has posted or is capable of posting bail.
This article should be considered when making an indigency determination under Rule 53(j)(2). Ex parte Bain, 568 S.W.2d 356, 361 (Tex.CrApp.1978); and, Redman v. State, 860 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993). However, neither rule 53(j)(2) nor art. 26.04 distinguishes between exempt and non-exempt property. Accordingly, we granted review to consider whether exempt property, in the form of a homestead, may be considered in indigency determinations.7
*7III.
The Legislature has provided that certain property is protected from forced sale by creditors. See, Tex. Prop.Code Ann. §§ 41.001-42.005. One’s homestead falls within this category of exempt property.8 Although this is a case of first impression, there are at least four reported cases dealing with homesteads in indigency determinations.
In Stephens v. State, 509 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), the defendant challenged the trial judge’s denial of a free statement of facts. The record indicated the defendant owned a non-working Ford station wagon, a homestead, and a horse. We reversed, holding, “it is clear that [the defendant] in this case established a prima facie case of his status as indigent at the date of his hearing.” Id., at 364-365. We did not consider the homestead in reaching this holding.
In Rosales, 748 S.W.2d 451, the defendant was convicted of capital murder and requested a free statement of facts. The trial judge denied the request. In reviewing that decision we considered the defendant’s assets. He owned a homestead, had recently sold his business for $35,000 (at an initial payment of $10,000 and $500 paid monthly for five years), owned the land the business was located on, owned an apartment complex worth $45,000 (mortgaged for $25,000-$30,000), owned a residential lot worth $3,000, a trailer house valued between $13,000 and $30,000 and four cars. The defendant testified he had no money to pay for the statement of facts, unless he was forced to sell all or part of his property. Id., 748 S.W.2d at 456-457. Although it is not clear from the opinion, the Court apparently excluded the homestead from its review of the indigency determination, noting the record was sufficient to uphold the trial judge’s determination that appellant had sufficient assets to obtain the $9,000-$10,000 needed to pay for the statement of facts. Id., at 457.
In Harper v. State, 850 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993), the trial judge held the defendant was not indigent because he held equity in his homestead. The Court of Appeals reversed, and expressly refused to consider the equity in the defendant’s homestead because of its exempt status.9 Id., at 739.
At least one federal court has chosen to not consider homesteads in indigency determinations. In U.S. v. Trevino, 679 F.Supp. 636 (S.D.Tex.1987), the defendant owned a spacious home in an exclusive community, a motor boat and four motor vehicles. The Court “doubt[ed] that the law would require these Defendants to actually sell their homestead to perfect an appeal.” Ibid. The Court then found the defendants were entitled to a free appellate transcript. Ibid.
Furthermore, in several bankruptcy cases the Fifth Circuit has dealt with the exempt status of Texas homesteads. In Matter of England, 975 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir.1992), the court explained the proceeds exemption statute recognized the right to sell one’s homestead and reinvest the proceeds in another homestead within a period of six months. Prior to the enactment of this statute, the proceeds could be seized by creditors immediately after sale, directly contravening the spirit of the homestead exemption;
Texas cases have consistently held that the fundamental purpose of the Texas homestead laws is to secure a place of residence against financial disaster. Cocke v. Conquest, 120 Tex. 43, 53, 35 S.W.2d 673, 678 (1931); Herman Iken and Co., 42 Tex. at 198 (“The leading and fundamental
*8idea connected with a homestead is unquestionably associated with that of a place of residence for the family, where the independence and security of a home may be enjoyed, without danger of its loss, or harassment and disturbance by reason of the improvidence or misfortune of the head or any other member of the family. It is a secure asylum of which the family cannot be deprived by creditors.”) The homestead laws not only have beneficent purposes, but they also are designed to support the public policy of preventing homelessness of Texas residents.
In Matter of Bradley, 960 F.2d 502, 507 (5th Cir.1992), the Fifth Circuit stated:
... Because homesteads are favorites of the law, we must give a liberal construction to the constitutional and statutory provisions that protect homestead exemptions ... Indeed, we must uphold and enforce the Texas homestead laws even though in so doing we might unwittingly “assist a dishonest debtor in wrongfully defeating his creditor.”
(Internal citations omitted.)
Though these latter two cases involve bankruptcy proceedings and the equitable disposition of properties to creditors, they are persuasive authority for holding homesteads should not be included in indigency determinations.
IV.
Because homesteads are exempt from forced sale, and because case precedent supports the principle that homesteads should be given special treatment in indigency determinations, I would hold that homesteads may not be considered in indigency determinations under either rule 53(j)(2) or art. 26.04(b). Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.10 Because the majority fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.

. This included a real property valued at $97,-000.00 and personal property valued at $59,-174.00. Subtracting total liabilities from total assets results in a $12,708.00 equity which, on its face, seems to indicate appellant had sufficient funds to pay for the statement of facts.

. In refusing to find appellant indigent, the trial judge stated: "[Wjhat I have in front of me is the bankruptcy records which indicate there is sufficient exempt properly, and that [appellant] is not indigent....”

. Schedule A of the bankruptcy petition establishes that appellant's homestead has a current market value of $35,000.00, subject to a mortgage balance of $12,277.00.

. At the time of his direct appeal, appellate counsel had been retained. Therefore, appellant’s sole point of error concerned the denial of a free statement of facts.

. Rule 53(j)(2) provides in pertinent part:
Within the time prescribed for perfecting the appeal an appellant unable to pay for the statement of facts may, by motion and affidavit, move the trial court to have the statement of facts furnished without charge. After hearing the motion, if the trial court finds the appellant is unable to pay or give security for the statement of facts, the court shall order the reporter to furnish the statement of facts....

. There are two exceptions to this latter principle. First, the financial position of spouses may be considered, especially in cases where the spouse is willing and able to help the defendant reach and convert assets. Rosales, 748 S.W.2d at 457. Second, outside sources such as relatives and employers may be considered if they are legally bound to pay for the defendant's appellate expenses. Abdnor, 712 S.W.2d at 142 (quoting Staten v. State, 662 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no pet.)).

.We granted review on two grounds:
1. The Fourth Court of Appeals erred in holding that an appellant must sell or mortgage properly exempted under Texas Homestead laws to pay for an attorney and record when a determination is made that he is not indigent.
2. The Fourth Court of Appeals erred by holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that appellant was not indigent and denied appellant a free record on appeal.

. Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 41.001 provides in part:
(a) A homestead and one or more lots used for a place of burial of the dead are exempt from seizure for the claims of creditors except for encumbrances properly fixed on homestead property.
(b) Encumbrances may be properly fixed on homestead property for:
(1) purchase money;
(2) taxes on the property;
(3) work and material used in constructing improvements on the property ...;
(4) an owelty of partition ... or
(5) the refinance of a lien against a homestead, including a federal tax lien ...
(c)The homestead claimant’s proceeds of a sale of a homestead are not subject to seizure for a creditor’s claim for six months after the date of the sale.

. See, Tex. Prop Code Ann. § 41.001, note 5, supra.

. As the Court of Appeals noted, schedule C of appellant's bankruptcy petition lists several items of exempt personal property. I believe exempt personal property may be considered in indigen-cy determinations under rule 53(j)(2) and art. 26.04(b). However, as mentioned in footnote 4, supra, appellant has retained appellate counsel. I can only assume the exempt personal property was used to secure the services of appellate counsel.
Finally, on remand I would ask the trial judge to consider whether non-exempt property under the jurisdiction of a federal bankruptcy court may be considered in indigency determinations. Appellant and his wife petitioned for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The record indicates a Chapter 7 bankruptcy results in a complete liquidation of the non-exempt property.