Court Opinion

ID: 2963453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:09:58.339474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:45.398866
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          July 7, 1995      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          Nos. 94-1156, 94-1164, 94-1409, 94-1414, 94-1422, 94-1423,
               94-1426, 94-1427, 94-1430, 94-1438, 94-1439, 94-1440,
               94-1442

                     IN RE:  THIRTEEN APPEALS ARISING OUT OF THE

                     SAN JUAN DUPONT PLAZA HOTEL FIRE LITIGATION.

                              _________________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The opinion of this  Court issued May 31, 1995,  is ammended
          as follows:
            
               Delete cases #94-1430 and  #94-1442 from the Court's opinion
          and judgement  of May 31, 1995.

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          Nos. 94-1156, 94-1164, 94-1409, 94-1414, 94-1422, 94-1423,
               94-1426, 94-1427, 94-1438, 94-1439, 94-1440

                     IN RE:  THIRTEEN APPEALS ARISING OUT OF THE

                     SAN JUAN DUPONT PLAZA HOTEL FIRE LITIGATION.

                              _________________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________
                              _________________________

               Judith  Resnik,  with  whom  Dennis E.  Curtis,  Richard  A.
               ______________               _________________   ___________
          Bieder, and Koskoff, Koskoff  & Bieder, P.C., were on  brief, for
          ______      ________________________________
          appellants Bieder, et al.
               Jose E. Fernandez-Sein on brief for appellant Nachman.
               ______________________
               Steven C. Lausell, with whom Jimenez, Graffam & Lausell  was
               _________________            __________________________
          on brief, for appellee Jimenez, Graffam & Lausell.
               Will Kemp, with whom Stanley Chesley, Wendell Gauthier, John
               _________            _______________  ________________  ____
          Cummings, David Indiano and Harrison, Kemp & Jones, Chtd. were on
          ________  _____________     _____________________________
          brief, for remaining appellees.

                              _________________________

                                     May 31, 1995

                              _________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.    These appeals  require us  to
                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.
                            _____________

          revisit the war zone where two groups of plaintiffs' lawyers have

          struggled over the proposed  allocation of roughly $68,000,000 in

          attorneys'  fees.    One  camp, dissatisfied  with  the  district

          court's  latest formula  for distributing  the fees,  attacks the

          court's order on three  fronts.  The disgruntled lawyers  contend

          that the district  court (1) violated  their due process  rights,

          (2)  used an  improper method  to determine  the awards,  and (3)

          divided  the available  monies in  an arbitrary  and unreasonable

          manner.   We  find appellants'  first two  plaints to  be without

          merit, but  we agree with them that allocating 70% of the fees to

          the  appellees   constituted  an  abuse  of   the  trial  court's

          discretion.   And, because we  are reluctant to  prolong a matter

          that, like the proverbial cat, seems to have  nine lives, we take

          matters into our own hands and reconfigure the fee awards.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    The lay of the land is familiar.  We  explored much the

          same  terrain in an earlier encounter, see In re Nineteen Appeals
                                                 ___ ______________________

          Arising Out of San Juan Dupont  Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d
          _______________________________________________________

          603  (1st Cir. 1992), and  a plethora of  opinions describing the

          details of  the underlying litigation  pockmark the pages  of the

          Federal  Reports, see,  e.g., id.  at 605  n.1  (offering partial
                            ___   ____  ___

          listing).  Thus, a brief overview of the litigation will suffice.

                    In 1987, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

          consolidated  over  270  cases  arising  out  of  the  calamitous

          conflagration that had ravaged the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel on

                                          3

          the evening of  December 31, 1986.   See In  re Fire Disaster  at
                                               ___ ________________________

          Dupont  Plaza  Hotel,  660  F. Supp.  982  (J.P.M.L.  1987)  (per
          ____________________

          curiam).   The designated trial  judge, Hon.  Raymond L.  Acosta,

          handpicked  certain  attorneys, denominated  collectively  as the

          Plaintiffs' Steering Committee (PSC), to act as  lead and liaison

          counsel for the plaintiffs.   In Nineteen Appeals, we  summarized
                                           ________________

          the  roles  played  by  the  PSC and  the  individually  retained

          plaintiffs' attorneys (IRPAs), respectively:

                    The PSC members looked after the big picture:
                    mapping the overarching discovery, trial, and
                    settlement  strategies  and coordinating  the
                    implementation  of  those  strategies.    The
                    IRPAs handled individual client communication
                    and   other   case-specific  tasks   such  as
                    answering   interrogatories    addressed   to
                    particular    plaintiffs,    preparing    and
                    attending the depositions  of their  clients,
                    and taking depositions which bore on damages.
                    The IRPAs also worked with Judge Bechtle [the
                    "settlement judge"] on  a case-by-case  basis
                    in his  efforts to identify  and/or negotiate
                    appropriate settlement  values for individual
                    claims.   When  Judge Acosta  determined that
                    the    plaintiffs     should    try    twelve
                    representative   claims   as   a   means   of
                    facilitating   settlement,   a  collaborative
                    composed of three PSC members and  four IRPAs
                    bent their backs to the task.

          Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d at 605.
          ________________

                    The  combined  efforts  of  all concerned  generated  a

          settlement  fund approximating $220,000,000.   The district court

          computed  the  payments  due  under the  various  contingent  fee

          agreements, deducted  the total  (roughly  $68,000,000) from  the

          overall settlement proceeds, and placed that sum in an attorneys'

                                          4

          fee  fund (the Fund).1   In his  initial attempt to  disburse the

          Fund, Judge Acosta used an enhanced lodestar to compute the PSC's

          fees,  and  awarded some  $36,000,000 (52%  of  the Fund)  to PSC

          members  in their  capacity as  such, leaving  the balance  to be

          distributed among the IRPAs.  A group of lawyers (mostly, but not

          exclusively, "non-PSC" IRPAs)2  succeeded in vacating  this award

          on the ground that the proceedings were procedurally flawed.  See
                                                                        ___

          id. at 610-16.
          ___

                    The  victory proved  to be  illusory.   On remand,  the

          district  court  abandoned  the  lodestar approach,  adopted  the

          percentage of  the fund (POF)  method, and recalculated  the fees

          based on what it  termed "the relative significance of  the labor

          expended by the  IRPAs and PSC members in instituting, advancing,

          or  augmenting  the plaintiffs'  settlement  fund."   Using  this

                              
          ____________________

               1In  addition to  attorneys' fees,  the lawyers  are seeking
          reimbursement of certain costs  and expenses from the plaintiffs'
          share of the settlement proceeds.  The district court  has yet to
          make a final  determination relative  to costs, and  we have  not
          considered  that  aspect of  the matter.    Thus, our  opinion is
          without  prejudice  to  the  parties' claims  and  objections  in
          respect to costs.

               2Since each  PSC member is also an IRPA in the sense that he
          or  she has been individually retained by one or more plaintiffs,
          the  PSC  members  will  receive  payments  in  both  capacities.
          Nevertheless,  due to the wide disparity in the number of clients
          that each PSC member  represents, a generous PSC award  stands to
          benefit certain  PSC members  who have relatively  few individual
          clients and  to disadvantage those who  represent many claimants.
          See Nineteen Appeals, 982  F.2d at 607.  Similarly,  an oversized
          ___ ________________
          PSC  award is  even more  detrimental to  the interests  of those
          IRPAs who are not members of the PSC, as each dollar that is paid
          to the PSC shrinks the  pot that otherwise will be divided  among
          the IRPAs.   See id.   Due to  this phenomenon, some  PSC members
                       ___ ___
          were  among  the lawyers  who  fought  to  overturn the  original
          allocation.

                                          5

          methodology, the court awarded 70% of the Fund to PSC members  in

          their capacity  as such,  thereby increasing  their share  of the
                                            __________

          fees  by  some  $11,000,000,  while simultaneously  reducing  the
                                                              ________

          IRPAs' share  of the  Fund by  the  same amount.   These  appeals

          ensued.

          II.  ADEQUACY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
          II.  ADEQUACY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

                    In a virtual  echo of the  claims advanced in  Nineteen
                                                                   ________

          Appeals,  appellants (all  of  whom are  IRPAs) characterize  the
          _______

          proceedings by which the district court determined the allocation

          of  the Fund as unfair.  Specifically, appellants assert that the

          revamped  procedural  framework  violated  their  rights  to  due

          process, and that, in all events, the court abused its discretion

          in  erecting  the framework.    We consider  these  assertions in

          sequence.

                                   A.  Due Process.
                                   A.  Due Process.
                                       ___________

                    In Nineteen  Appeals, 982 F.2d at  610-16, we discussed
                       _________________

          the  due  process considerations  implicated  in  the fee-setting

          aspect of this litigation.  We again use the triangular construct

          of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to determine whether
             _______    ________

          the  district court  afforded the  IRPAs "the  opportunity to  be

          heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'"  Id. at
                                                                     ___

          333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 553 (1965)).
                       _________    _____

                    The first  Mathews factor  involves a  specification of
                               _______

          "the  private interest  that  will be  affected  by the  official

          action . . . ."  Id. at 335.  Rehashing this point would serve no
                           ___

          useful  purpose.   We conclude,  for  precisely the  same reasons

                                          6

          articulated in our earlier opinion, that the IRPAs have a salient

          private interest in the fees due them for services rendered.  See
                                                                        ___

          Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d at 612.
          ________________

                    The second  Mathews factor  requires us to  examine the
                                _______

          risk  of error presented by the district court's procedures.  See
                                                                        ___

          Mathews, 424  U.S. at 335.   The last  time around  we determined
          _______

          that the hearing format invited error.  See Nineteen Appeals, 982
                                                  ___ ________________

          F.2d at 612-13.  Appellants urge  us to find that the proceedings

          on remand represented no real  improvement and again presented an

          intolerable  risk of error   this time because the district court

          refused  to  hold  an  evidentiary hearing,  to  allow  free-form

          discovery, or  to permit cross-examination  of PSC  members.   We

          conclude, for reasons  described more fully in Part II(B), infra,
                                                                     _____

          that  the format revisions cured  the infirmities that  led us to

          invalidate the district court's earlier effort.

                    The third Mathews factor  necessitates an assessment of
                              _______

          the  public  interest, including  "the fiscal  and administrative

          burdens"  that  improved  procedural requirements  would  entail.

          Mathews,  424 U.S.  at 335.   Here,  too, past  is prologue:   we
          _______

          studied this point in the course of the first appeal and remarked

          the  "substantial  governmental  interest  in  conserving  scarce

          judicial resources."  Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d at 614.  We also
                                ________________

          recognized the  reasonableness of  keeping tight controls  on the

          fee dispute in light of the large number of lawyers involved, the

          lengthy shelf life  of the  litigation, and  the Supreme  Court's

          admonition  that  "[a] request  for  attorney's  fees should  not

                                          7

          result  in a second major litigation."  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
                                                  _______    _________

          U.S. 424,  437 (1983).   This  important public  interest remains

          intact.

                    To  sum  up,  the  district court  reformed  its  ways,

          significantly  moderating the restrictions  originally imposed on

          the  IRPAs.  The court  levelled the playing  field by permitting

          the IRPAs to present their  case in precisely the same  manner as

          their  litigation adversaries.    Moreover, the  court gave  both

          camps adequate notice  and a meaningful opportunity  to be heard.

          From  a  procedural standpoint,  then,  the  adjudicative process

          employed  on remand met the test of fundamental fairness and gave

          appellants the process that was due.

                               B.  Abuse of Discretion.
                               B.  Abuse of Discretion.
                                   ___________________

                    Appellants  strive  to  convince us  that  Judge Acosta

          abused  his discretion  in  authoring  three procedural  rulings,

          namely,  (1) denying  appellants'  entreaty  that an  evidentiary

          hearing  be  held;  (2)  denying  the  bulk  of  their  discovery

          requests;  and   (3)  denying   them  the  privilege   of  cross-

          examination.  We are not persuaded.

                    1.  Lack of an Evidentiary Hearing.  We need  not tarry
                    1.  Lack of an Evidentiary Hearing.
                        ______________________________

          over the  supposed  error  in  refusing to  hold  an  evidentiary

          hearing.3   A  district  court  is  not  obliged  to  convene  an
                              
          ____________________

               3The lower court did not make this decision casually.  After
          reminding the protagonists of  his "detailed first hand knowledge
          of the  proceedings," Judge Acosta observed  that "any meticulous
          fact-finding  regarding the contemporaneous  time records  of the
          PSC  is   unnecessary  because  the  lodestar   method  has  been
          abandoned;  and both parties have been granted the opportunity to
          file extensive  pleadings describing  their contributions  to the

                                          8

          evidentiary hearing as a means of resolving every attorneys'  fee

          dispute.   See Nineteen Appeals,  982 F.2d at  614; Weinberger v.
                     ___ ________________                     __________

          Great  N. Nekoosa  Corp.,  925 F.2d  518,  528 (1st  Cir.  1991).
          ________________________

          Because evidentiary  hearings in fee disputes  are not mandatory,

          the decision not to convene one is  reviewed deferentially, using

          an  abuse-of-discretion standard.   See  Weinberger, 925  F.2d at
                                              ___  __________

          527.    In conducting  that  review,  appellate tribunals  cannot

          woodenly apply a preconceived matrix.  Rather, flexibility is the

          watchword.  Because a district court has available to it  a "wide

          range  of  procedures" through  which it  can  "bring a  sense of

          fundamental  fairness to the  fee-determination hearing  while at

          the  same  time  husbanding  the  court's  resources,"   Nineteen
                                                                   ________

          Appeals,   982  F.2d  at  614,  flexibility  implies  substantial
          _______

          discretion.    Therefore,  when   the  court  chooses  among  the

          available options, it can mix and match.

                    This  emphasis on  flexibility  is  heightened when  an

          evidentiary  hearing is requested.   Even in  situations far more

          inviting than  fee disputes, we  have been chary  about mandating

          such hearings.   See, e.g.,  Aoude v.  Mobil Oil Corp.,  862 F.2d
                           ___  ____   _____     _______________

          890,  894 (1st  Cir.  1988) (observing  that  matters often  "can

          adequately be `heard'  on the  papers").  We  favor a  "pragmatic

          approach"  to the question of  whether, in a  given situation, an

          evidentiary   hearing  is  required.    Id.  at  893.    The  key
                                                  ___

                              
          ____________________

          litigation process."  He  also stated that, "for the  most part,"
          the  fee  controversy  presented "no  material  factual  disputes
          regarding  the tasks undertaken by the PSC as contrasted to those
          undertaken by the IRPAs."

                                          9

          determinant is  whether, "given  the nature and  circumstances of

          the case  . . . the  parties [had] a fair  opportunity to present

          relevant facts and  arguments to  the court, and  to counter  the

          opponents'  submissions."  Id. at  894.  Taking  this approach in
                                     ___

          Aoude, we upheld the issuance of a preliminary injunction without
          _____

          an evidentiary  hearing, noting, inter  alia, that the  judge was
                                           _____  ____

          "obviously familiar" with the facts and  had afforded the parties

          several opportunities to make written submissions.  Id.
                                                              ___

                    The Aoude model can readily  be adapted to requests for
                        _____

          hearings  anent  attorneys'  fees.   Appellants'  protest  cannot

          survive the  resultant comparison.   Judge  Acosta knew  the case

          inside  and out.  He  gave the protagonists  ample opportunity to

          present both factual data  and legal arguments.   He set no  page

          restrictions  on  written  submissions, permitting  the  IRPAs to

          proffer thousands of pages of documents both in opposition to the

          PSC's requisitions and  in support  of their  own fee  requests.4

          These filings  allowed the  IRPAs to go  into painstaking  detail

          both as to their own contribution to the litigation and as to the

          reasons why the PSC members deserved a relatively modest slice of

                              
          ____________________

               4To  give the  reader a  taste of  what transpired,  we note
          that,  on remand, the  IRPAs' initial submission,  filed June 10,
          1993, included a  memorandum of law regarding attorneys' fees and
          expenses (110  pages, with a  40-page appendix), an  affidavit by
          the IRPAs'  accountant, William Torres, detailing  the results of
          his  analysis of  the PSC's claims  (approximately 650  pages), a
          memorandum giving  an overview  of the efforts  and contributions
          made  by the IRPAs (33 pages), and individual IRPA assessments of
          efforts   and   contributions   made   on   behalf   of   clients
          (approximately 2700 pages).  The IRPAs also filed a reply  to the
          PSC's  main submission,  again  unhampered by  page restrictions,
          that totalled approximately 430 pages.

                                          10

          the pie for their services in that capacity.

                    To be  sure, this  is a  high-stakes dispute,  but that

          fact,  in and of itself,  does not warrant  handcuffing the trial

          court.  Matters  of great consequence  are often decided  without

          live  testimony.   See,  e.g., id.  at  893-94 (holding  that  an
                             ___   ____  ___

          evidentiary  hearing   is  not   obligatory  in  respect   to  an

          application  for  preliminary   injunction);  United  States   v.
                                                        ______________

          DeCologero,  821 F.2d  39, 44  (1st  Cir. 1987)  (same, regarding
          __________

          criminal defendant's motion to reduce his sentence); Amanullah v.
                                                               _________

          Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1987) (same, regarding habeas
          ______

          review  of   asylum   applicant's  detention   during   exclusion

          proceedings).  In the last analysis, what counts is not the prize

          at  stake,   but   whether   particular   parties   received   "a

          fundamentally fair chance to present [their] side  of the story."

          Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d at 611.  
          ________________

                    The controlling legal principle,  then, is that parties

          to a  fee dispute do not have the right to an evidentiary hearing

          on demand.  When the written record affords an adequate basis for

          a reasoned determination  of the  fee dispute, the  court in  its

          discretion  may  forgo  an  evidentiary hearing.    Here,  it  is

          pellucid  that  the   litigants'  extensive  written  submissions

          comprised  an   effective  substitute   for  such  a   hearing   

          particularly since the judge had  lived with the litigation  from

          the  start and had an encyclopedic knowledge  of it.  Under these

          circumstances,  the court  did not  err in  refusing to  hold yet

          another  hearing.  See, e.g.,  Norman v. Housing  Auth., 836 F.2d
                             ___  ____   ______    ______________

                                          11

          1292,  1303 (11th  Cir.  1988) (upholding  propriety of  awarding

          attorneys' fees  without an evidentiary hearing  "based solely on

          affidavits in  the record"); Bailey  v. Heckler,  777 F.2d  1167,
                                       ______     _______

          1171  (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining  that an evidentiary hearing is

          not  required so  long  as the  record  is sufficient  to  permit

          meaningful review);  National  Ass'n  of  Concerned  Veterans  v.
                               ________________________________________

          Secretary  of  Defense,  675 F.2d  1319,  1330  (D.C. Cir.  1982)
          ______________________

          (holding that  district court  may in its  discretion decline  to

          convene   a   fee   hearing  where   information   generated   by

          "documentation  accompanying  the  fee  application  and  through

          appropriate discovery  . . .  provides an adequate  factual basis

          for  an award"); Konczak  v. Tyrrell, 603  F.2d 13, 19  (7th Cir.
                           _______     _______

          1979)  (indicating  that "depth  of  the briefing"  can  render a

          hearing on fees unnecessary), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980);
                                        _____ ______

          see also
          ___ ____

          DeJesus  v. Banco Popular de P.R., 951  F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1992)
          _______     _____________________

          (finding no  error in  lack of an  evidentiary hearing  regarding

          counsel fees absent  some "special  issue as to  which the  court

          needed the assistance of counsel or witnesses").

                    2.  Restrictions on Discovery.   Apart from the refusal
                    2.  Restrictions on Discovery.
                        _________________________

          to convene  a full-scale  hearing, appellants also  complain that

          the  court  demonstrated  too  great  an  aversion  to  discovery

          initiatives.    But  unlimited  adversarial discovery  is  not  a

          necessary   or even  a usual   concomitant  of fee disputes,  see
                                                                        ___

          National Ass'n of  Concerned Veterans, 675  F.2d at 1329  (noting
          _____________________________________

          that,  in general, fee contests  should not involve  "the type of

                                          12

          searching discovery that  is typical where  issues on the  merits

          are presented"), and, in the circumstances of this case, we think

          that the court acted  well within the province of  its discretion

          in refusing to allow more elaborate discovery. 

                    The Due  Process Clause does  not require  freewheeling

          adversarial discovery as standard equipment in fee contests.  See
                                                                        ___

          Nineteen Appeals, 982  F.2d at  614.  This  case exemplifies  the
          ________________

          wisdom of  the rule.   The district  court did not  shut off  all

          discovery,  and   the  procedures  that  the   court  employed   

          especially the compelled  exchange of  documentation    minimized

          the need for  additional discovery  by giving the  IRPAs the  raw

          material  that they needed to sift through the particulars of the

          PSC's  fee application.  In  other words, the  court ensured that

          the  IRPAs had  access to  all the  data reasonably  necessary to

          formulate  their  objections,5  including all  the  PSC  members'

          time-and-expense   submissions,   summaries   thereof,   detailed

          accounts of the procedures used by the PSC to gather, review, and

          audit time  records, and the working  papers, correspondence, and

          documentation  generated  by  the  PSC's  accountants  during the

          compilation  process.   With this  banquet of  information spread

          before them, appellants then partook of the court's liberality in

          allowing them to formulate extensive written submissions.

                    Furthermore,  the  court  below  also had  a  right  to
                              
          ____________________

               5The proof  of the  pudding is  in the  record.   The IRPAs'
          initial submission  to  the district  court highlighted  specific
          objections to  the PSC's fee  request, and,  following the  PSC's
          rejoinder, the IRPAs' reply  took precise aim at the  accuracy of
          the supporting materials.

                                          13

          consider the  extent to  which appellants' request  for discovery

          threatened to multiply  the proceedings and turn  the fee dispute

          into  a   litigation  of  mammoth  proportions.     Judge  Acosta

          characterized the  IRPAs'  discovery foray    which  encompassed,

          inter  alia, production of tax  returns for employees  of all PSC
          _____  ____

          members' firms  and  details  anent  fringe  benefits  (including

          vacations,  maternity  leaves,  and  the  provision  of  training

          programs)   as  "a discovery scheme of needless  and unreasonable

          proportions."    It  is  surpassingly  difficult  to  fault  this

          characterization.

                    The sweeping  nature  of appellants'  request,  coupled

          with  the fact that  the focus of  the hearings had  shifted away

          from the lodestar  and toward a  task-oriented assessment of  the

          lawyers' participation  in the litigation, give  substance to the

          district  court's fears  that  granting appellants'  supplication

          would have  started the  parties on  the road  to a  wasteful and

          time-consuming "satellite litigation."  On  this ramified record,

          appellants  can demonstrate  neither  a high  level  of need  for

          incremental discovery nor preponderant equities in favor of their

          request.  Hence, we  cannot say that the district  court's denial

          of  further  discovery  constituted   an  abuse  of  the  court's

          considerable discretion.  See,  e.g., National Ass'n of Concerned
                                    ___   ____  ___________________________

          Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1329 (holding that  district court "retains
          ________

          substantial  discretion based on its view of the submissions as a

          whole" to limit further discovery).

                    3.   Lack of Cross-Examination.   As a  subset of their
                    3.   Lack of Cross-Examination.
                         _________________________

                                          14

          claims regarding  the supposed necessity for  both an evidentiary

          hearing  and additional  discovery, appellants  contend that  the

          district court should have allowed them to cross-examine  the PSC

          members  concerning   the  hours  that  they   logged  and  their

          contribution to the creation of the Fund.  This is merely a back-

          door  attempt  to  rekindle  an extinguished  flame  and  satisfy

          appellants' thwarted desire for  either an evidentiary hearing or

          extensive depositions.

                    In  Chongris v.  Board  of Appeals,  811  F.2d 36  (1st
                        ________     _________________

          Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021  (1987), we held that, in  the
                 _____ ______

          context  of an administrative  hearing, lack of cross-examination

          did not work a violation of due  process.  See id. at 41-42.   So
                                                     ___ ___

          it is here.   Moreover, because the lower court  could reasonably

          conclude  that   its  liberal  policy  with   regard  to  written

          submissions,  in  conjunction  with  the  IRPAs'  access  to  PSC

          documentation, obviated  the need for further  probing via cross-

          examination, pretermitting cross-questioning  did not  constitute

          an abuse  of discretion.  Cf. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880,
                                    ___ ________    ________

          905 n.57 (D.C.  Cir. 1980) (en banc) (noting that  a live hearing

          is  not necessary if "the adversary papers filed by plaintiff and

          defendant . . . adequately illuminate the factual predicate for a

          reasonable fee").

                    Appellants' attempt  to anchor  their claimed  right to

          cross-question PSC members on language excerpted from our earlier

          opinion, see, e.g.,  Nineteen Appeals,  982 F.2d  at 615,  leaves
                   ___  ____   ________________

          them  adrift.   We  flatly  reject  the  suggestion, noting  that

                                          15

          appellants, to their discredit, have pieced the argument together

          by  cutting  words  loose   from  their  logical  and  contextual

          moorings, and ignoring  limiting language that contradicts  their

          interpretation.

                    The  bottom line is that the district court did not err

          in  refusing  to convene  an  evidentiary  hearing, declining  to

          permit   more  wide-ranging   discovery,   and   barring   cross-

          examination.  Thus, whether the issue is cast in a constitutional

          mold   or  considered   under   an  abuse-of-discretion   rubric,

          appellants'  challenge  fails.    Either  way,  the  adjudicative

          process employed on remand passes muster.  

          III.  APPROPRIATENESS OF THE METHODOLOGY
          III.  APPROPRIATENESS OF THE METHODOLOGY

                    Appellants  claim that  the district  court erred  as a

          matter  of law  in  embracing the  POF  method, rather  than  the

          lodestar  method, during  the fee-setting  pavane.  The  issue of

          whether  a  district  court  may  use   a  given  methodology  in

          structuring an award of attorneys' fees is one of law, and, thus,

          is  subject to  de novo  review.   See Liberty  Mut. Ins.  Co. v.
                          __ ____            ___ _______________________

          Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir. 1992).
          _________________________

                             A.  Historical Perspective.
                             A.  Historical Perspective.
                                 ______________________

                    A  few  introductory  comments  may  lend  a  sense  of

          perspective.  Traditionally, under  what has come to be  known as

          the  "American Rule," litigants bear their own counsel fees.  See
                                                                        ___

          Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245
          __________________________    ________________

          (1975).    This rule  is  not without  exceptions.   Fee-shifting

          statutes  comprise one  category of  exceptions.   See,  e.g., 42
                                                             ___   ____

                                          16

          U.S.C.    1988, 2000e-5(k).  So, too, certain equitable doctrines

          furnish  a basis  for  departing from  the  American Rule.    See
                                                                        ___

          Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d at 606.
          ________________

                    When  statutory  exceptions pertain,  we  have directed

          district courts, for the most part,  to compute fees by using the

          time-and-rate-based lodestar method.  See, e.g., United States v.
                                                ___  ____  _____________

          Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1988); Segal
          _________________________                                   _____

          v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746  F.2d 78, 85-86 (1st Cir. 1984);
             ________________________

          see also  City of  Burlington  v. Dague,  112 S.  Ct. 2638,  2641
          ___ ____  ___________________     _____

          (1992) (acknowledging, in the statutory  fee-shifting context, "a

          strong  presumption that the  lodestar represents  the reasonable

          fee")  (citation and internal quotation marks  omitted).  A court

          arrives at  the  lodestar  by determining  the  number  of  hours

          productively spent on the  litigation and multiplying those hours

          by reasonable hourly rates.   See Blum v. Stenson,  465 U.S. 886,
                                        ___ ____    _______

          896-902  (1984); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Lipsett v. Blanco, 975
                           _______                   _______    ______

          F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1992).

                    Although  the  lodestar  method  is  entrenched in  the

          statutory fee-shifting  context, a growing number  of courts have

          looked  elsewhere  in  "common  fund" cases     a  category  that

          encompasses cases in which  "a litigant or lawyer who  recovers a

          common fund for the benefit of persons  other than himself or his

          client is entitled to  a reasonable attorney's fee from  the fund

          as  a whole."    Boeing Co.  v.  Van Gemert,  444  U.S. 472,  478
                           __________      __________

                                          17

          (1980).6    The  POF   method  represents  one  such  alternative

          approach to  fee-setting.  This  method functions exactly  as the

          name implies:  the court shapes  the counsel fee based on what it

          determines  is a reasonable percentage  of the fund recovered for

          those benefitted by the  litigation.  See, e.g., Camden  I Condo.
                                                ___  ____  ________________

          Ass'n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 1991).
          ___________    ______

                    Contrary to popular belief,  it is the lodestar method,

          not the POF  method, that breaks from precedent.   Traditionally,

          counsel fees in common  fund cases were computed as  a percentage

          of   the  fund,   subject,  of   course,  to   considerations  of

          reasonableness.  See, e.g., Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus,
                           ___  ____  __________________________    ______

          113 U.S. 116, 127-28 (1885).  It was not until the mid-1970s that

          judicial infatuation with the  lodestar method started to spread.

          See Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d  1261, 1266 (D.C. Cir.
          ___ ___________________    _______

          1993) (chronicling  history of the debate).  Many courts embraced

          the new approach,  and a wall  of cases soon  arose.  See,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          Copeland,  641 F.2d at 890-91;  Furtado v. Bishop,  635 F.2d 915,
          ________                        _______    ______

          919-20  (1st Cir. 1980); City  of Detroit v.  Grinnell Corp., 560
                                   ________________     ______________

          F.2d  1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977); Grunin v. International House of
                                           ______    ______________________

          Pancakes,  513 F.2d 114, 128  (8th Cir.), cert.  denied, 423 U.S.
          ________                                  _____  ______

          864 (1975);  Lindy Bros. Builders,  Inc. v.  American Radiator  &
                       ___________________________     ____________________

                              
          ____________________

               6The  common  fund  doctrine  is founded  on  the  equitable
          principle  that those  who have  profited from  litigation should
          share  its costs.  While  class actions furnish  the most fertile
          ground for the doctrine, its reach  is not limited to such cases.
          See  Sprague  v. Ticonic  Nat'l Bank,  307  U.S. 161,  167 (1939)
          ___  _______     ___________________
          (holding that "the  absence of an avowed class suit  . . . hardly
          touch[es] the power of equity in doing justice as between a party
          and the beneficiaries of his litigation").

                                          18

          Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
          _______________________

                    A crack in the  wall appeared in 1984 when  the Supreme

          Court  took pains to distinguish the  calculation of counsel fees

          under fee-shifting statutes from  the calculation of counsel fees

          under the common fund  doctrine.  The court described  the latter

          group as comprising cases in which "a reasonable fee  is based on

          a percentage of the fund bestowed on the class."   Blum, 465 U.S.
                                                             ____

          at 900 n.16.  Since Blum involved the application of the lodestar
                              ____

          under a fee-shifting statute, footnote 16 is dictum.  Yet, it can

          hardly be dismissed as a slip  of the pen, and considered  dictum

          emanating from  the High  Court carries great  persuasive force.7

          See  Dedham Water Co. v.  Cumberland Farms Dairy,  Inc., 972 F.2d
          ___  ________________     _____________________________

          453, 459 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating general rule that courts should

          give "considerable weight" to  dictum that appears "considered as

          opposed to casual"); McCoy  v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology,
                               _____     _________________________________

          950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (same), cert. denied,  112 S. Ct.
                                                  _____ ______

          1939 (1992).

                    Hard on  the heels of  footnote 16, the  Third Circuit,

          which  had been  in  the forefront  of  the movement  toward  the

          lodestar method, see, e.g., Lindy Bros., supra, sounded a note of
                           ___  ____  ___________  _____

          caution.   Its  blue-ribbon  task  force,  although  recommending

          continued use of the lodestar technique in statutory fee-shifting

                              
          ____________________

               7For this  reason, we find it unsurprising that other courts
          have  cited  footnote  16  as  evidence  that  the  Blum  Court's
                                                              ____
          "approval of the lodestar method in  the fee-shifting context was
          not intended to overrule prior common fund cases. . . ."  Swedish
                                                                    _______
          Hosp.,  1 F.3d at 1268; see also Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
          _____                   ___ ____ _____    ______________________
          838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988).
                                         _____ ______

                                          19

          cases,  concluded that all fee awards in common fund cases should

          be  structured as a  percentage of the  fund.  See  Report of the
                                                         ___

          Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D.
                                    ___________________________

          237, 255 (1985) (hereinafter "Third Circuit Report").

                    Together, footnote 16 and  the Third Circuit Report led

          to a  thoroughgoing reexamination of the suitability of using the

          lodestar method in  common fund  cases.   This reexamination,  in

          turn, led to more frequent application  of the POF method in such

          cases.  See Federal Judicial Center, Awarding Attorneys' Fees and
                  ___                          ____________________________

          Managing Fee Litigation  63-64 (1994) (hereinafter "FJC  Report")
          _______________________

          (canvassing  case law).  Today, the D.C. Circuit and the Eleventh

          Circuit require the  use of the POF method  in common fund cases,

          see Swedish Hosp., 1 F.3d at 1271; Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774, and
          ___ _____________                  ________

          four other circuits confer discretion upon the  district court to

          choose between the lodestar and POF methods in common fund cases,

          see In re Washington Pub. Power  Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d
          ___ ____________________________________________________

          1291, 1295 (9th Cir.  1994); Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Props.,
                                       ________    ________________________

          Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993); Harman v. Lymphomed, Inc.,
          ____                                   ______    _______________

          945  F.2d 969, 975 (7th  Cir. 1991); Brown  v. Phillips Petroleum
                                               _____     __________________

          Co., 838 F.2d  451, 454 (10th  Cir.), cert. denied, 488  U.S. 822
          ___                                   _____ ______

          (1988).   We  have yet  to pass  upon the  legitimacy of  the POF

          method in common fund cases.8
                              
          ____________________

               8Of course, we alluded to the trend in Weinberger, stating:
                                                      __________

                    We  are aware  of the  tendency  exhibited by
                    some  courts,  particularly  in  common  fund
                    cases, to jettison the lodestar in favor of a
                    `reasonable  percent  of the  fund' approach.
                    Because the  absence of any true  common fund

                                          20

                       B.  Computing Fees in Common Fund Cases.
                       B.  Computing Fees in Common Fund Cases.
                           ___________________________________

                    We  have previously  classified this  as a  common fund

          case.9   Appellants do not  dispute this  taxonomy, but,  rather,

          they  insist  that Judge  Acosta erred  in  using the  POF method

          because the lodestar technique should hold sway in all attorneys'
                                                             ___

          fee  determinations.10    Though  appellants  concede  that  this
                              
          ____________________

                    renders  the  percentage approach  inapposite
                    here,  we cannot  fault the  district court's
                    implied  premise that  the  lodestar  is  the
                    soundest available alternative.

          Weinberger,  925  F.2d at  526  n.10 (citations  omitted).   This
          __________
          statement  has  been  interpreted as  conferring  discretion upon
          district courts to use the POF method  in common fund cases, see,
                                                                       ___
          e.g., Wells v.  Dartmouth Bancorp,  Inc., 813 F.  Supp. 126,  129
          ____  _____     ________________________
          (D.N.H. 1993), and, in some quarters, as indicating  a preference
          for the use of that method, see, e.g., FJC Report, supra, at 64 &
                                      ___  ____              _____
          n.305.

               9We reached  this conclusion because the  Fund emanates from
          "the disproportionate strivings of a few (the PSC members) to the
          benefit   of  a   much   larger  number   (the  plaintiffs   and,
          derivatively, the IRPAs)," Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d at 610, and
                                     ________________
          possesses   each  of  the  three  distinguishing  characteristics
          identified by the Boeing Court:
                            ______

                    First,  the   .  .  .  beneficiaries  can  be
                    determined with complete assurance.   Second,
                    while the  extent  to which  each  individual
                    plaintiff and each  IRPA benefitted from  the
                    PSC's  efforts  cannot  be   quantified  with
                    mathematical  precision,  it  is possible  to
                    study the PSC's  contribution to the  overall
                    success of the litigation and approximate the
                    incremental  benefits   with  some  accuracy.
                    Finally,  the  district  court controls  [the
                    Fund],  and,  therefore, possesses  the ready
                    ability to prorate the  cost of achieving the
                    incremental benefits in an equitable manner.

          Id. (citing Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478-79).
          ___         ______

               10In  a sermon  that  is difficult  to  reconcile with  this
          display  of newfound  religion, appellants  preach intermittently
          that  Judge Acosta's  initial suggestion    that  the  PSC's fees

                                          21

          court  has not  yet  decided  what  method(s) of  fee  allocation

          appropriately may  be invoked in  common fund cases,  they assert

          that  the lodestar is  a far better alternative  and that its use

          should be mandated in this circuit.

                    We think  that a more malleable  approach is indicated.

          Thus, we hold  that in a common fund case  the district court, in

          the exercise  of its  informed discretion, may  calculate counsel

          fees either  on a percentage of the fund basis or by fashioning a

          lodestar.   Our decision is  driven both by  our recognition that

          use  of the  POF method  in common  fund cases is  the prevailing

          praxis and by  the distinct  advantages that the  POF method  can

          bring to bear in such cases.

                    In  complex litigation   and  common fund cases, by and

          large, tend  to  be complex     the POF  approach is  often  less

          burdensome to administer than  the lodestar method.  See  Swedish
                                                               ___  _______

          Hosp.,  1 F.3d at 1269  (finding POF approach  "less demanding of
          _____

          scarce  judicial resources").   Rather than forcing  the judge to

          review the time records of  a multitude of attorneys in  order to

          determine  the   necessity  and  reasonableness   of  every  hour

          expended, the POF method permits the judge to focus on "a showing

          that  the fund conferring a  benefit on the  class resulted from"

          the lawyers' efforts.  Camden I, 946 F.2d at 774.  While the time
                                 ________

                              
          ____________________

          would  probably be  computed  using  the  POF  method  and  would
          probably  aggregate "less  than 10%"    should  be enshrined  and
          enforced by us.  We have already ruled  that this suggestion "did
          not  bind  the district  court to  a  ten percent  cap," Nineteen
                                                                   ________
          Appeals, 982 F.2d  at 612, and appellants have  proffered nothing
          _______
          that prompts us to revisit this ruling.

                                          22

          logged is still relevant to the court's inquiry   even under  the

          POF method, time  records tend to illuminate  the attorneys' role

          in  the creation  of  the fund,  and,  thus, inform  the  court's

          inquiry into  the reasonableness  of a particular  percentage11  

          the shift in focus lessens the possibility of collateral disputes

          that  might transform  the  fee proceeding  into  a second  major

          litigation.

                    For another  thing, using  the POF method  in a  common

          fund  case enhances efficiency, or, put in the reverse, using the

          lodestar method in  such a case  encourages inefficiency.   Under

          the latter approach, attorneys not only have a monetary incentive

          to spend as  many hours as possible (and bill  for them) but also

          face a  strong  disincentive  to early  settlement.    See  Third
                                                                 ___

          Circuit  Report, 108 F.R.D.  at 247-48  (finding that,  in common

          fund cases,  the lodestar method "encourag[es]  lawyers to expend

          excessive  hours"  and  "creates  a disincentive  for  the  early

          settlement of  cases"); see also  FJC Report, supra, at  310.  If
                                  ___ ____              _____

          the  POF  method  is  utilized, a  lawyer  is  still  free to  be

          inefficient  or to drag her feet in pursuing settlement options  

          but, rather  than being rewarded for  this unproductive behavior,

          she will likely reduce her own return on hours expended.

                    Another  point  is  worth  making:    because  the  POF

          technique is  result-oriented  rather than  process-oriented,  it

                              
          ____________________

               11For this reason,  and because  the district  court in  any
          given case may  eschew the POF  method in favor  of the  lodestar
          method, we urge attorneys  to keep detailed, contemporaneous time
          records in common fund cases.

                                          23

          better approximates the  workings of the  marketplace.  We  think

          that  Judge Posner  captured the  essence of  this point  when he

          wrote that "the market in fact pays not  for the individual hours

          but for  the ensemble  of services  rendered  in a  case of  this

          character."   In re Continental  Ill. Sec. Litig.,  962 F.2d 566,
                        ___________________________________

          572 (7th  Cir. 1992).   In fine, the  market pays for  the result

          achieved.

                    Let us be perfectly clear.   We do not pretend that the

          POF  approach   is  foolproof,  or   that  it  suffers   from  no

          disadvantages.      For   example,   it   may   result   in   the

          overcompensation  of  lawyers  in  situations  where actions  are

          resolved  before   counsel  has  invested   significant  time  or

          resources.  See  Six Mexican Workers  v. Arizona Citrus  Growers,
                      ___  ___________________     _______________________

          904  F.2d  1301, 1311  (9th Cir.  1990)  (counselling use  of the

          lodestar method rather than  the POF method when "the  percentage

          recovery  would be either too small or  too large in light of the

          hours devoted to the  case or other relevant factors");  see also
                                                                   ___ ____

          Third Circuit Report,  108 F.R.D. at 242  (noting "criticism from

          within the  profession" that fees under the  POF method sometimes

          are   "disproportionate  to   actual  efforts  expended   by  the

          attorneys").  The  converse is also true;  law firms may  be less

          willing to  commit needed  resources to  common fund cases,  even

          those  for  the  public  benefit,  if  the   likely  recovery  is

          relatively  small.   It can  also be  argued that  the percentage

          method  may lend itself to  arbitrary fee awards  by some courts.

          See  generally  Washington  Pub.  Power,  19  F.3d  at  1294  n.2
          ___  _________  _______________________

                                          24

          (counselling that, to avoid arbitrary fee awards, neither the POF

          nor  the lodestar  method "should  be applied  in a  formulaic or

          mechanical fashion"); cf. Laffey  v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 746
                                ___ ______     _______________________

          F.2d 4,  12-13 (D.C. Cir. 1984)  (attributing widespread adoption

          of   lodestar  method   to   desire  to   reduce   "arbitrariness

          characteristic  of court  awards of  attorneys fees"  under other

          methods),  cert.  denied,  472  U.S.  1021  (1985).    Given  the
                     _____  ______

          peculiarities of common fund cases and the fact that each method,

          in  its own  way, offers  particular advantages,  we believe  the

          approach  of choice is to accord the district court discretion to

          use whichever method,  POF or lodestar, best  fits the individual

          case.   We  so  hold, recognizing  that  the discretion  we  have

          described  may, at  times, involve  using a  combination  of both

          methods  when appropriate.   Cf.  Metropolitan Dist.  Comm'n, 847
                                       ___  __________________________

          F.2d  at  15 (advocating  flexible  approach  to determining  fee

          awards because an overly  mechanical rule "sacrifice[s] substance

          on the altar of form").

                      In  arriving at this  decision, we reject appellants'

          suggestion that Dague,  a case in which the Court  barred the use
                          _____

          of  contingency enhancements in respect to fee-shifting statutes,

          compels a different conclusion.  Although the Dague  Court stated
                                                        _____

          that  "[t]he `lodestar' figure has,  as its name suggests, become

          the guiding light of our fee-shifting jurisprudence,"  112 S. Ct.

          at  2641,  and  remarked that  it  had  "generally"  abjured "the

          contingent-fee  model     which  would  make   the  fee  award  a

          percentage  of the  value of  the relief  awarded in  the primary

                                          25

          action     [in  favor  of]  the  lodestar  model,"  id.  at  2643
                                                              ___

          (citations,  footnotes, and  internal quotations  omitted), these

          statements were made in  the course of a discussion  of statutory

          fee-shifting  cases.    The  Court's  reasoning   reflected  this

          environment;  the  opinion  stressed  the  limiting  effects   of

          statutory language in fee-shifting cases, see id., and set out "a
                                                    ___ ___

          number of reasons for  concluding that no contingency enhancement

          is compatible with the fee shifting statutes at issue," id.  This
                                                                  ___

          case,  unlike  Dague,  involves  a  common  fund  rather  than  a
                         _____

          statutory fee-shifting  scheme.   Since Dague, fairly  read, does
                                                  _____

          not  require abandonment  of  the POF  method  typically used  in

          common  fund cases, it is  not controlling here.   Accord Swedish
                                                             ______ _______

          Hosp., 1 F.3d at  1267-70 (concluding that Dague does not bar use
          _____                                      _____

          of the POF method in common fund cases).

                                C.  Applying the Rule.
                                C.  Applying the Rule.
                                    _________________

                    Having placed our imprimatur on a decisional model that

          maximizes flexibility, we  move from the general to  the specific

          and turn next to the order  under review.  In this connection, we

          rule that  the court below did  not err in purposing  to allocate

          fees  based  on  the   POF  method,  emphasizing  the  attorneys'

          "relative  contribution" to  the creation  of the  Fund.   In the

          first  place, Judge  Acosta had  originally stated  an  intent to

          compensate the  PSC  members under  a percentage  approach.   See
                                                                        ___

          supra  note 10.  In "justifiable reliance" on this statement, see
          _____                                                         ___

          Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d at 614 n.19, the majority of the IRPAs
          ________________

          did  not maintain  time records.    The difficulties  inherent in

                                          26

          implementing the  lodestar under these circumstances  militate in

          favor  of sticking to the POF method.  In the second place, as we

          have  explained  above,  the  POF   approach  offers  significant

          structural  advantages in  common fund  cases, including  ease of

          administration,  efficiency, and  a  close approximation  of  the

          marketplace.   Finally,  a further case-specific  factor counsels

          against using the lodestar here.   Unlike the prototypical common

          fund case, this case involves a subdivision of a fee fund amassed
                                          ___________

          by the operation of  sundry contractually determined percentages.

          Thus, using the POF  method to effectuate the subdivision  of the

          Fund  brings a  sort of  elemental symmetry  to   the fee-setting

          process.  Relatedly, because this case calls for a subdivision of

          a fee fund,  rather than a  unitary award of  fees, "a trier  who

          attempted punctiliously to follow  the classic lodestar  formula,

          to  the exclusion  of  all  else,  could  theoretically  wind  up

          awarding the entire fee pool to  the PSC, leaving nothing for the

          IRPAs."  Id.  at 614  n.20.  Use  of the POF  method negates  any
                   ___

          possibility of this totally indefensible result.

          IV.  APPROPRIATENESS OF THE ALLOCATION
          IV.  APPROPRIATENESS OF THE ALLOCATION

                    In allocating counsel fees, the district court assigned

          70%  of the Fund  to the PSC,  leaving 30% to be  split among the

          IRPAs.12    Appellants object.    We review  this  allocation for

          abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Foley v. City of Lowell, 948 F.2d
                               ___  ____  _____    ______________

          10,  18 (1st Cir. 1991), mindful that,  in respect to fee awards,

                              
          ____________________

               12The  PSC members  will, of  course,  share ratably  in the
          latter portion of the award as well.  See supra note 2.
                                                ___ _____

                                          27

          the  trial court's  latitude is  "extremely broad,"  Lipsett, 975
                                                               _______

          F.2d at  937.   After scrutinizing  the Brobdingnagian  record in

          this  case,  we  are convinced  that  the  court  below erred  in

          weighing  and synthesizing the factors  relevant to a division of

          the fees, and in settling upon so lopsided a split.

                                 A.  Cutting the Pie.
                                 A.  Cutting the Pie.
                                     _______________

                    In  the proceedings  on remand,  Judge  Acosta lavished

          praise  on all the plaintiffs' lawyers, lauding the "high caliber

          legal representation" provided by both the PSC and the IRPAs.  He

          then summarized the tasks undertaken by the two sets of attorneys

          in the  course of the litigation.  In the judge's view, the PSC's

          most  significant  accomplishments   included  (1)  performing  a

          comprehensive  on-site investigation  of the accident  scene, (2)

          "identif[ying] the  manufacturers  and suppliers  of many  . .  .

          products  and  services  .  .  .  and  develop[ing]  theories  of

          liability   against  each   opponent,"  (3)   drafting  plethoric

          pleadings, including the  master complaint,  weekly agendas,  and

          several pretrial  memoranda,  (4) filing  "literally hundreds  of

          motions  . .  .  on numerous  topics,  including many  novel  and

          creative issues," (5) orchestrating extensive pretrial discovery,

          (6) conducting the nine-week Phase I trial and  the fifteen-month

          Phase  II  trial (in  the  course  of which  the  PSC  called 313

          witnesses  and offered  1,455  exhibits),  and (7)  "aggressively

          pursu[ing] settlement negotiations."   The  court visualized  the

          IRPAs' main accomplishments as comprising (1)  maintaining direct

          client  communication,  counselling  clients,  and  keeping  them

                                          28

          abreast of  developments in the litigation, (2)  carrying out the

          factual investigation incident to individual cases, with especial

          emphasis on issues pertaining  to damages, (3) retaining experts,

          including  physicians, economists, and  actuaries, and,  once the

          experts had  been located,  collaborating with them  to establish

          damages,  (4)  researching  client-specific legal  issues  (e.g.,
                                                                      ____

          standing,   assumption  of  risk),  (5)  representing  individual

          plaintiffs  in  connection  with  ancillary   matters,  including

          probate, inheritance, insurance,  and domestic relations matters,

          (6)  meeting with Judge Bechtle "as part of the settlement scheme

          to negotiate  settlement values for [individual]  cases," and (7)

          assisting  clients  in  reaching  informed  decisions  (including

          decisions   about   whether  to   accept   or  reject   proffered

          settlements).  Moreover, certain selected plaintiffs were used as

          exemplars for purposes of  the Phase II trial, and  the IRPAs who

          represented  those plaintiffs  actually  presented  the  evidence

          pertaining to their clients' damages.

                    Having  made these ledger  entries, the  district court

          then  tabulated  the  columns.   It  concluded  that  "reasonable

          compensation for the work  undertaken requires recognition of the

          massive undertaking of the PSC in terms of the organizational and

          financial   requirements,   the  overwhelming   amount   of  work

          performed,  the significant  time constraints,  and the  numerous

          complex and novel issues  addressed during the proceedings .  . .

          ."   Contrasting this workload "with the IRPAs' efforts in client

          communication and counseling, client preparation  for settlement,

                                          29

          and  handling of the damages  issues," the court  awarded the PSC

          70% of the  fee due under each  individual contingency agreement,

          thus permitting each IRPA to retain only 30%  of the fee promised

          by the client.

                        B.  Evaluating the Court's Handiwork.
                        B.  Evaluating the Court's Handiwork.
                            ________________________________

                    We are uneasy with the way in which the lower court cut

          the fee pie, and with the size and shape of the resultant wedges,

          for several reasons.

                    First, we are troubled by  the implications of a scheme

          in which the trial judge selects  a chosen few from many  lawyers

          who  volunteer,  assigns  legal   tasks  to  those  few  (thereby

          dictating, albeit indirectly, the scope of the work  remaining to

          be  done  by  the many),  and  then,  in  awarding fees,  heavily

          penalizes  the very lawyers to whom he has relegated the "lesser"

          duties.  Courts must recognize that while such an arrangement may

          be a necessary  concomitant to skillful  case management of  mass

          tort  suits,  it nevertheless  significantly  interferes  with an

          attorney's expectations regarding the fees that his or her client

          has  agreed to  pay.    Conversely,  lead counsel  are  typically

          volunteers, as  in this case, and, as such, they have no right to

          harbor any expectation beyond a fair  day's pay for a fair  day's

          work if a  fee fund  develops.  Cf.  Matthew 20:1-16  (recounting
                                          ___  _______

          parable of the laborers in the vineyard).  We believe that  trial

          courts should  take these differing expectations  into account in

          allocating fees.   Here, the  judge's rescript  does not  suggest

          that he factored these expectations into the decisional calculus.

                                          30

                    Courts must  also be  sensitive  to a  second facet  of

          economic  reality:  the power  to appoint lead  counsel gives the

          trial judge an unusual  degree of control over the  livelihood of

          the  lawyers  who   practice  before  the  court.    Though  such

          appointments  are often  an  administrative necessity  in complex

          litigation, and disproportionate fees are at times an unavoidable

          consequence of the classic common fund  "free rider" problem, see
                                                                        ___

          generally  Mancur  Olson, Jr.,  The  Logic  of Collective  Action
          _________                       _________________________________

          (1971),  the  judge  must  attempt to  avoid  any  perception  of

          favoritism.    This  need  is  especially  acute  in  mass   tort

          litigation where,  as this case illustrates,  free rider concerns

          are minimized by  the important nature of the work  to be done by

          claimants'  individually  retained  attorneys.    In  this  case,

          moreover,  free rider concerns are also lessened by the fact that

          most  of  the  IRPAs applied  for  appointment  to  the PSC,  see
                                                                        ___

          Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d at 605 (noting that over 40  of the 56
          ________________

          IRPAs volunteered  to serve  on the PSC),  thus signifying  their

          willingness to  pay full fare.   The record does  not contain any

          clue  intimating that  Judge Acosta  considered these  factors in

          ordering that 70% of the fees be paid to the PSC.

                    Third, and relatedly, this  case required the IRPAs not

          merely to go along for a free ride but to earn their keep.   They

          exhibited  great  versatility,  counseling  clients,  researching

          medical   histories,  arranging   for  specialists   to  evaluate

          injuries, preparing  the damages  aspect of each  case (including

          extensive   work   with  physicians,   psychologists,  actuaries,

                                          31

          vocational  specialists, and other witnesses), obtaining evidence

          needed  to  prove  losses   of  earnings  and  earning  capacity,

          responding  to  client-specific   discovery,  preparing  for  and

          attending  clients'  depositions,  negotiating settlement  values

          before Judge Bechtle, assisting clients with probate,  insurance,

          and   tax  matters,   and   handling  a   bewildering  array   of

          idiosyncratic problems as they developed.  This is a far cry from

          the paradigmatic  common  fund case     say, a  securities  class

          action   in  which class counsel  do virtually all the  work, and

          other counsel piggyback  on their efforts.  See, e.g., In re Ivan
                                                      ___  ____  __________

          F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 1358, 1364-65 (2d Cir. 1991); see
          _____________________                                         ___

          also  Randall S.  Thomas  & Robert  G.  Hansen, Auctioning  Class
          ____                                            _________________

          Action and Derivative Lawsuits:   A Critical Analysis, 87  Nw. U.
          _____________________________________________________

          L.  Rev.  423,  429  (1993) (explaining  that,  in  general, lead

          counsel in  class actions have "substantial  authority to conduct

          the  litigation,  even  to  the  exclusion  of  other  counsel");

          Jonathan  R.   Macey  &  Geoffrey  P.   Miller,  The  Plaintiffs'
                                                           ________________

          Attorney's  Role  in  Class  Action  and  Derivative  Litigation:
          _________________________________________________________________

          Economic Analysis  and Recommendations for Reform, 58  U. Chi. L.
          _________________________________________________

          Rev.  1,  3  (1991)  (observing  that  plaintiffs'  class  action

          attorneys  have   "nearly  plenary  control  over  all  important

          decisions in the lawsuit" because of the absence of monitoring by

          clients).     We  see  no  sign  that  the  district  court  gave

          significant weight to this reality.

                    This  leads  directly  to  a  fourth point.    We  have

          carefully considered  the IRPAs' compendious  submissions and are

                                          32

          of the view that Judge Acosta undervalued the worth of the client

          contact/counseling aspect of this  litigation.  Such services are

          labor-intensive and  frequently low in  visibility   at  least in

          visibility from the bench.   Thus, they are susceptible  to being

          overlooked, leading to an overemphasis  on the relative value  of

          the  court-related  work.    Despite their  lack  of  visibility,

          however, the mundane chores incident to client representation are

          particularly  critical in  a  mass tort  common  fund case.    We

          explain briefly.

                    In a securities class action many of the victims do not

          participate in the lawsuit, and are aware of their loss dimly, if

          at all.   See, e.g.,  Macey & Miller,  supra, at 30  (noting that
                    ___  ____                    _____

          "[i]n the  large-scale, small-claim  class action  context . .  .

          [plaintiffs]  are typically unaware  that they even  have a claim

          against  the  defendant").   The  mass  tort  context  supplies a

          stunning  contrast.  In a  mass tort action,  the victims' losses

          (whether of life, limb,  or loved ones) are almost  always keenly

          felt, and are  usually not  amenable to computation  by a  simple

          arithmetic  formula.   As  a  result,  the individual  plaintiffs

          typically require a  multitude of services, many  of which cannot

          be satisfied  by  an  impersonal  steering committee.    In  such

          circumstances,  the  attention   of  the  individually   retained

          attorneys  becomes   crucial  to  the  success   of  the  overall

          enterprise.13   That  important contribution  demands appropriate
                              
          ____________________

               13One IRPA, now deceased, made this point in a submission to
          the district court:

                                          33

          recognition.

                    Fifth, although we do  not dispute the district court's

          assessment  of the quality of the PSC's work, this factor cancels

          itself  out  to  some extent.    After  all,  the district  court

          repeatedly commented  upon "the excellence of  the work performed

          by all attorneys" (emphasis supplied), and left no doubt but that
             ___

          both sets of plaintiffs'  lawyers had rendered exemplary service.

          Given these  widespread plaudits,  it seems manifestly  unfair to

          reward excellence on the part of one group and not the other.

                    Sixth,  the  district  court  failed   to  advance  any

          reasoned explanation as to why it boosted  the PSC's share of the

          Fund  from  52%  in the  initial  go-round  to  70% on  remand.14
                              
          ____________________

                    In the course  of representing these clients,
                    the attorneys and staff did hundreds of hours
                    of  work that was  not separately  billed but
                    that is a part  of the work of competent  and
                    dedicated [IRPAs].  For example we helped  to
                    arrange  the shipping  of bodies  from Puerto
                    Rico to their homes, counseled families . . .
                    to help them function as  witnesses, obtained
                    [hard   to   locate]  records,   investigated
                    possible  criminal   activity,  searched  for
                    heirs,  negotiated  with creditors,  and with
                    law  enforcement   agencies,  and  researched
                    legal  issues such  as the  rights to  awards
                    from the State insurance fund.

               14This  discrepancy cannot  be brushed  aside with  the glib
          reminder  that,  on  remand,  the district  court  abandoned  the
          lodestar in  favor of the POF  method.  The  court had originally
          arrived  at the 52% figure through an enhancement of the lodestar
          to account for  "the extraordinary results" achieved  by the PSC.
          In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 768  F. Supp. 912,
          _____ _______________________________________
          932  (D.P.R. 1991).  Thus, the court premised the original award,
          in  large measure,  on its  assessment of the  role that  the PSC
          played in creating the Fund.

                                          34

          Though we have great  confidence in Judge Acosta, his  silence on

          this  subject  leaves  the  award   open  to  a  perception  that

          appellants have been penalized for successfully prosecuting their

          previous appeals.   Cf. North  Carolina v. Pearce,  395 U.S.  711
                              ___ _______________    ______

          (1969)  (discussing importance  of  dispelling any  appearance of

          vindictiveness when a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a

          criminal defendant after the defendant wins a new trial).

                    Seventh,  the  district  court   erred  in  failing  to

          compensate the  representative trial  counsel   those  IRPAs who,

          though  not members  of the  PSC, prepared  and/or tried  the so-

          called "representative" cases   for  their work in that capacity.

          Just as the PSC members deserved compensation for their endeavors

          on behalf of the  whole, the IRPAs who labored  as representative

          counsel  conferred  a common  benefit,  and  must be  compensated

          accordingly.

                    Last   but far from least   we are persuaded, on whole-

          record review, that it is simply unreasonable to award 70% of the

          aggregate  fees  to the  attorneys  who  managed the  litigation,

          leaving only 30% of the Fund to those who brought  in the clients

          and worked hand-in-hand with them throughout the pendency of this

          long  safari of  a case.   Because  mass tort  cases are  a breed

          apart, it is difficult  to envision situations in which,  if fees

          are  divided  between  lead  counsel  and  individually  retained

          counsel  under a POF formula, the latter  will not be entitled to

                                          35

          at  least  half   the  fees.15    We  do   not  think  that  this

          litigation, though unique,  so far overshoots all  other cases as

          to  warrant  a substantially  larger  differential.   See,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          Vincent  v. Hughes  Air W.,  Inc., 557 F.2d  759 (9th  Cir. 1977)
          _______     _____________________

          (upholding district  court's allocation of 5%  of gross recovery,

          or approximately  20% of the  fee fund, to  lead counsel  in mass

          tort action).

                    Concluding, as we do,  that the fee allocation reflects

          a  serious  error   of  judgment,  and  therefore   an  abuse  of

          discretion, we vacate the award.

          V.  REMEDY
          V.  REMEDY

                    Ordinarily, "an improper calculation of attorneys' fees

          necessitates remand for reconfiguration  of the award."  Lipsett,
                                                                   _______

          975 F.2d at 943.   But this rule admits of exceptions, so long as

          "the record is sufficiently  developed that we can apply  the law

          to the  facts before us and  calculate a fair and  reasonable fee

          without resorting to remand."   Id.  Here, that  qualification is
                                          ___

          satisfied; the record  is voluminous and this  court is painfully

          familiar   with   the   particulars   of   this   fee  imbroglio.

          Nonetheless, an appellate  court must think long  and hard before

          usurping the district court's usual prerogatives, and, therefore,

          we doubt that this case would fall  within the narrow confines of

          the   exception   under   ordinary  circumstances.      But   the

          circumstances here are  extraordinary, and common sense  commands
                              
          ____________________

               15We have been unable to find any common fund case  in which
                                             ___
          a court, using the POF  method, has allocated more than 50%  of a
          fee fund to lead counsel.

                                          36

          that we not turn a blind eye to the reality of events.

                    This  litigation has  passed the  point of  diminishing

          returns.   The  holocaust that  underlies the  plaintiffs' claims

          occurred almost  a decade ago.   The meat-and-potatoes litigation

          is over;  with one small exception, see supra note 1, only a side
                                              ___ _____

          dish    attorneys' fees    remains on the  table.  The  amount of

          time, energy and  money already devoted  to this peripheral  item

          has careened virtually out of control.  Remanding would invite an

          even greater  investment in the side dish    and we are reluctant

          to  sanction the  squandering  of additional  resources for  this

          purpose.  We have, at  times, with considerably less provocation,

          simply  grasped  the  bull  by  the  horns  and  fixed  the  fees

          ourselves.  See, e.g.,  Jacobs v. Mancuso, 825 F.2d 559, 562 (1st
                      ___  ____   ______    _______

          Cir. 1987); Grendel's Den v. Larkin, 749 F.2d  945, 951 (1st Cir.
                      _____________    ______

          1984).

                    We  realize  that dividing  the  Fund  among groups  of

          attorneys   in  accordance   with  the   POF  method   cannot  be

          accomplished  with surgical precision.  We   or a district court,

          for  that matter   must necessarily traffic in estimates.  Taking

          into account all the facts and circumstances, we conclude that we

          should  subdivide  the Fund  ourselves,  rather  than remand  yet

          again.  We also  conclude that, on balance, assigning 50%  of the

          Fund to  the  PSC and  50%  to the  IRPAs  comprises a  fair  and

          reasonable allocation.

                    This   division   reflects    the   district    court's

          determination that the PSC contributed handsomely to the creation

                                          37

          of the Fund   it  is, after all, at the high end of  what a court

          should  usually award16   while  at the same  time correcting for

          the district court's undervaluation of  the IRPAs' contributions.

          This division also strikes a sensible balance between the equity-

          based  common  fund doctrine,  which  guards  against the  unjust

          enrichment of free riders, and the need to avoid adding insult to

          injury in a  situation in  which the court  selects lead  counsel

          from  amidst a group of willing volunteers and thereafter invades

          the contingency agreements of  the rejected lawyers to compensate

          the select few.   Moreover, this  division is not  incommensurate

          with the  time records of  the PSC.   Even if,  as an  uncritical

          reading of the record suggests, the PSC spent as many as  166,000

          hours  on   the   litigation,17   a   50%   allocation   (roughly

          $34,000,000)  pays  the  members  well.    Although  we  have  no

          tabulation  of IRPA hours to  compare with this  total, the PSC's

          time records are still a valid  measure of the vast resources its

          members expended in the course of the litigation.

                    One  loose  end  remains.    It   involves  appropriate

          compensation for the IRPAs  who tried the "representative" cases.

          As  we stated earlier, see supra p.33, their participation in the
                                 ___ _____

                              
          ____________________

               16Although  we do  not impose  an absolute  ceiling  on lead
          counsel fees  in common fund  mass tort cases, cf.  Camden I, 946
                                                         ___  ________
          F.2d at 774-75 (holding that, as a general rule, 50% is the upper
          limit in common  fund cases  in the Eleventh  Circuit), cases  in
          which  a court  should exceed  50% are  likely to  be hen's-teeth
          rare.

               17This  figure includes  time  logged not  only  by the  PSC
          members themselves but also  by their associates, paralegals, and
          law clerks.

                                          38

          Phase II trial inured to the benefit of all plaintiffs.  Thus, in

          presenting the representative claims,  the lawyers were acting as

          de facto PSC members.  It is only  logical, therefore, that their
          __ _____

          compensation  for those services be drawn from the PSC's share of

          the  fee Fund.   Since the record  is inadequate to  permit us to

          place  a dollar  value  on these  services,  we leave  it to  the

          district court to determine the amount of compensation due to the

          non-PSC members who served as representative trial counsel during

          the Phase II trial for their services in that capacity,  and then

          to order that sum paid out of the PSC's share of the Fund.

          VI.  CONCLUSION
          VI.  CONCLUSION

                    We  need  go  no further.    For  the  reasons we  have

          expressed, we vacate the order allocating attorneys' fees; direct

          that the  fee Fund be divided  equally among the PSC,  on the one

          hand, and the IRPAS, on the  other hand; and remand for the entry

          of a suitable decree and for  further proceedings consistent with

          this opinion.  Costs shall be taxed in favor of the appellants.

                    It is so ordered.
                    It is so ordered.
                    ________________

                                          39