Court Opinion

ID: 9721960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:13:20.08247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:29.573864
License: Public Domain

Lucos, C.J.
(dissenting). In his decision of June 26, 1992, a judge in the Housing Court noted that the defendant was a quadriplegic and that, because of this handicap, the defendant’s rent payments were subsidized by the Federal government. The judge then stated that the defendant was entitled to “reasonable accommodation,” citing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f) (1988) (Fair Housing Act), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
*612The Fair Housing Act provides that it is unlawful to discriminate, in the sale or rental of a dwelling and in other activities related thereto, against a person because of a handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988). “Discrimination” under that statute includes the “refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services” (emphasis supplied). 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3)(B). It appears that, although the judge cited both the Fair Housing Act and the Rehabilitation Act in finding that the defendant was entitled to “reasonable accommodations,” his actual authority for this finding was solely the above-quoted language from the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(3)(B).
The defendant’s paralysis constitutes a “handicap” within the definition of that word in the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h) (1988). See Pulcinella v. Ridley Township, 822 F. Supp. 204, 207-208 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (discussing definition of “handicap” under 42 U.S.C. § 3602 [h], which relates to 42 U.S.C. § 3604 [f]). The Fair Housing Act excludes from the definition of “handicap” the current, illegal use of drugs, but it does not exclude necessarily from its protection a current user of illegal drugs who has some other handicap. Thus, while the defendant could not argue that current drug use constituted a handicap under the Fair Housing Act,1 he still had a handicap because he was a quadriplegic.
The court recognizes that the drug dependency of a currently drug-free individual coupled with that individual’s participation in a rehabilitation program may constitute a handicap entitling the individual to protection under the Fair Housing Act. The court suggests, and I tend to agree, that distribution of illegal drugs is not a handicap entitling one to protection of the Fair Housing Act.
I do not dispute that certain provisions of the lease agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant and G. L. *613c. 139, § 19 (1992 ed.), both provided the plaintiff grounds on which to bring a summary process action against the defendant based on his drug possession. Nevertheless, the Fair Housing Act, a Federal statute which this court is bound to uphold and which preempts State law, see the supremacy clause of art. 6 of the United States Constitution, requires that the defendant receive reasonable accommodations because of his quadriplegia.2 The court seems to ignore the supremacy clause in its decision today. The defendant is entitled, under the Fair Housing Act, to a reasonable accommodation, if such exists.
The Housing Court judge credited the defendant’s testimony that he was drug-free at the time of trial and was enrolled in a rehabilitation program. In that light, the Housing Court judge afforded the defendant a reasonable accommodation because of his quadriplegia, but also took into account the defendant’s drug activity.3 The judge withheld ordering possession for the landlord but imposed several strict conditions on the defendant’s continued occupancy: (1) continuance in drug counselling, (2) periodic urinalysis screening for drug use, (3) permit the landlord to inspect the premises for illegal drugs, (4) permit the landlord to participate in hiring defendant’s personal care attendants, (5) admit only visitors with prior approval of the landlord or the Housing Court, and (6) report monthly as a probationer to the housing specialist of the Housing Court. If the defendant violates these conditions, the landlord will get possession.
*614I believe, as did the Housing Court judge, that the order withholding possession for the landlord, with strict conditions imposed on the defendant, was a reasonable accommodation. We should not reverse the findings of the Housing Court judge unless they are clearly erroneous. Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), 365 Mass. 816,(1974). Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 379 Mass. 703, 705 (1980). I do not believe that the court has demonstrated in its opinion that the findings of the judge were clearly erroneous. Instead, the court has expressed its view of the evidence presented below, a view which happens to differ from the view taken by the trial judge.
I believe that there was no showing in this case that the accommodations that the judge provided in his order were not reasonable, and so I would affirm that order. The view taken by the court today means that the defendant tenant is to be evicted and makes it likely that he will become a homeless person with no incentive to remain drug-free and in rehabilitation. Such a result is hardly consonant with the intention of Congress. Accordingly, I dissent.

I note that the trial judge found that at the time of trial the defendant was not involved with illegal drugs and had enrolled in a rehabilitation program.

There may be no “reasonable accommodation” that can be provided to a particular drug user. In this case, however, the Housing Court judge implicitly found that there was a possible reasonable accommodation that could be afforded to the defendant. This included the imposition of several strict conditions on the defendant, violation of which would result in the landlord’s regaining possession of the apartment. See infra at 613.

The judge wrote that “the accommodation to which this defendant is entitled is only ‘reasonable accommodation.’ It would not be reasonable for this landlord to suffer any further episodes of drug abuse or related misbehavior, nor would it be reasonable for the landlord to suffer the defendant’s continued occupancy without reasonable terms and conditions of probation.”