Court Opinion

ID: 9839239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 17:05:24.667001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:49.507197
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/12/23 P. v. Williamson CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                     A167671
 v.
 CHARLES LEE WILLIAMSON,                                             (Lake County Super. Ct.
                                                                      No. CR962521)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Based on his sexual abuse of his daughter, defendant Charles Lee
Williamson pleaded no contest to a felony count of forcible lewd or lascivious
acts upon a child under 14 years old. He also admitted a prior strike but
reserved the right to seek its dismissal under People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). The trial court denied Williamson’s
Romero motion and sentenced him to 16 years in prison.
         Williamson’s only claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by
denying his Romero motion. We reject this claim and affirm.
                                                    I.
                                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                                               BACKGROUND
         In April 2022, after Williamson waived his right to a preliminary
hearing, the Lake County District Attorney filed an information charging him
with seven felony counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child

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10 years of age or younger and one felony count of forcible lewd or lascivious
acts upon a child under 14 years old.1 The charges were based on acts
against Williamson’s teenage daughter, U.W., starting when she was around
four years old. The information also alleged that Williamson had a 1998
conviction for first degree burglary, a serious felony.2 (See § 1192.7,
subd. (c)(18).)
      Under a plea agreement, Williamson pleaded no contest to the count of
forcible lewd or lascivious acts for a stipulated midterm sentence of eight
years and admitted the prior strike, and the remaining charges were
dismissed. He stipulated to the following factual basis for the plea: “[O]n or
about June 17th, year 2019, through January 3rd, 2020, within the County of
Lake, [he] did touch victim U.W. who was 13 years old at the time . . . on her
genitalia for his sexual desires. He used force by holding her down, covering
her mouth to keep her from yelling.”
      As part of the plea agreement, Williamson was allowed to bring a
Romero motion. In the motion, Williamson gave several reasons that the
prior strike should be dismissed. The conviction was almost 25 years old, and
it was “for a different crime of a different class” than the instant one.
Although he admitted that he “ha[d] not led a crime[-] or incarceration[-]free
life in those intervening years,” he emphasized his low risk of reoffending, as

      1 The first seven counts were brought under Penal Code section 288.7,

subdivision (b), and the last count was brought under Penal Code section 288,
subdivision (b)(1). All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
      2 The strike was alleged under sections 667, subdivision (d), and

1170.12, subdivision (b), based on a prior conviction under sections 459 and
460, subdivision (a).

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noted in the probation report.3 He also argued that the trial court should
consider his “prospects after incarceration,” since there was a “foundation for
dramatic improvement.” As set forth in an accompanying declaration by
Williamson’s trial counsel, Williamson had “committed himself to sobriety,
. . . found the support and love of a committed wife and a religious
community,” and was “intent upon improving his condition and becoming a
positive contributor to society.”
      At the January 2023 sentencing hearing, Williamson’s trial counsel
added the point that the victim impact statements from U.W. and her mother
were “not totally in contravention” of a more lenient sentence. Both
statements acknowledged that Williamson had a serious drug abuse problem,
which played a part in the sexual abuse, and expressed continuing love for
him. The prosecutor responded that Williamson was “the poster child of why
this Three Strikes [l]aw exists,” since he had numerous criminal convictions
between the 1998 strike and the instant one. As set forth in the probation
report, these included several convictions for misdemeanor and felony drug
offenses between 2005 and 2013 and convictions for sexual assault in 2015,
with the latter resulting in a four-year prison term.
      The trial court denied the Romero motion and sentenced Williamson to
16 years in prison, consisting of the midterm of eight years for the instant
conviction, doubled because of the prior strike. The court recognized as
mitigating factors that the strike was 25 years old, Williamson had a
substance abuse problem for decades, and there was a recent “turnabout in
his life” for the better. On the other hand, he had “a long and continuous

      3 Williamson scored a -2 on the Static-99R, “an actuarial measure of

risk for sexual offense recidivism.” The probation report explained this score
meant “his relative risk level is very low risk.”

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criminal history, the commission of crimes interrupted indeed only by prison
terms.” Williamson had also repeatedly violated probation and his offenses
became increasingly serious over time, with the instant offense being
“extremely serious.” The court did not “find[] any evidence in the record of
significant support for a causal connection between the sex offenses on his
record and drug or alcohol use and abuse,” and he did not pursue any
rehabilitation programs to address his substance-abuse problem. Finally,
though Williamson’s recent improvement was laudable, the court could not
give it “great weight” since he missed many prior “opportunities for the light
to have been seen.”
                                         II.
                                   DISCUSSION
      Williamson claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
Romero motion. We are not persuaded.
      Under section 1385, subdivision (a), a sentencing court may, “ ‘in
furtherance of justice,’ ” dismiss a finding that a defendant has a prior strike.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373 (Carmony); Romero, supra,
13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.) In evaluating a defendant’s request to strike a
prior strike, a court “ ‘must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of [the defendant’s]
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part.’ ” (Carmony, at p. 377.)
      We review the denial of a Romero motion for an abuse of discretion.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.) The Three Strikes law, which is
“ ‘intended to restrict courts’ discretion in sentencing repeat offenders’ . . . [¶]
. . . [¶] . . . creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to
[its] sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (Id. at pp. 377–378.)

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Thus, “a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior
felony conviction . . . in limited circumstances,” such as where it “considered
impermissible factors in declining to dismiss” the conviction or where “ ‘the
sentencing norms [of the Three Strikes law] . . . produce[] an “arbitrary,
capricious[,] or patently absurd” result’ under the specific facts of a particular
case.” (Id. at p. 378.)
      Williamson claims the trial court abused its discretion by focusing on
the fact he “committed a serious crime” (his sexual abuse of his daughter)
while “refus[ing] to find that the drug use . . . caused the charged criminal
behavior and explained the intervening crimes.” Although there was some
indication that Williamson’s crimes were related to his substance-abuse
problem, the record hardly compelled the conclusion that they were “largely
attributable” to drug use. In addition, the court relied on several factors
other than the seriousness of the instant offense to deny the Romero motion,
including Williamson’s long and increasingly serious criminal history since
the prior strike and his failure to take advantage of earlier opportunities to
rehabilitate himself. These factors distinguish this case from the two
decisions on which Williamson primarily relies. (See People v. Avila (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140, 1143 [Romero motion improperly denied where
defendant committed no serious crimes since remote strikes]; People v.
Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1245 [pre-Carmony, affirming dismissal of
strikes where current offense was minor].) In short, no abuse of discretion
appears.
                                       III.
                                   DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

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                                         _________________________
                                         Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Bowen, J.*

      *Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Contra Costa, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

People v. Williamson A167671

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