Court Opinion

ID: 9396642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 14:06:36.162175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.601511
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-152

                                   JOHN TYLER

                                       vs.

                                MELISSA TYLER.1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       In relation to a divorce action between John Tyler (Tyler)

 and Melissa Tyler, now known as Lady Melissa Taylor Morganite

 (Morganite), 154 Maverick LLC (the LLC) sought to intervene as a

 matter of right under Mass. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2), 365 Mass. 769

 (1974).    A judge of the Probate and Family Court denied the

 motion to intervene, and the LLC now appeals.             The LLC also

 makes other arguments relating to other judgments made by the

 Probate and Family Court.        For the reasons below, we affirm the

 denial of the LLC's motion to intervene and decline to address

 the LLC's other arguments.

       Background.     We summarize the relevant background as

 follows.    Tyler and Morganite were married in 2004.            In May of

 1 As is our practice, we use the parties' names as they appeared
 in the complaint.
2011, Tyler and Morganite formed and became the sole members of

the LLC, a company tasked with owning and operating the

commercial property of 154 Maverick Street.

    Tyler and Morganite were parties to the divorce action, in

which the ownership of the LLC was contested.   As part of that

action, the judge, with the agreement of the parties, appointed

a special master, to first determine the validity of a

prenuptial agreement and the relevant law governing the

agreement before making recommendations on the divorce and

counterclaim.   The special master made recommendations to the

Probate and Family Court judge concerning the validity of the

prenuptial agreement and the applicable law, and then

recommended that certain assets, including the LLC, be equally

distributed between the parties in accordance with the parties'

prenuptial agreement.   In response to the special master's

recommendations, the LLC filed the motion to intervene, arguing

that "[i]ntervention is necessary to protect the LLC's interests

in corporate property, control and governance, and to preserve

its limited liability status and its viability."   The Probate

and Family Court judge denied the LLC's motion to intervene,

adopted the findings of the special master, and ordered the

special master to "proceed forthwith with the division of

marital assets."

                                 2
    Discussion.    1.   Motion to intervene.   We first address the

LLC's arguments concerning the motion to intervene, because if

we affirm its denial, the LLC is not a party to this action and

thus cannot appeal judgments made in this case.    Randolph v.

Commonwealth, 488 Mass. 1, 6 (2021) (outside of limited

exceptions, only parties to lawsuit, or those who properly

become parties, may appeal adverse judgment).    To be able to

intervene as a matter of right, the LLC must have (a) made a

timely application, (b) claimed an interest relating to the

property or transaction which is the subject of the action, and

(c) been so situated that the disposition of the action may

impair or impede their ability to protect that interest, unless

the applicant's interest was adequately represented by existing

parties.   See rule 24 (a) (2).   "Whether the prospective

intervener has met 'the requirements for intervention is a

question of law,' and therefore we review the ruling de novo."

Beacon Residential Mgt., LP v. R.P., 477 Mass. 749, 753 (2017),

quoting Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 217

(2011).    The LLC made a timely application and claimed an

interest relating to the property, which was the subject of the

action, making the only issue before us the third requirement,

whether the disposition of the action may impede their interest

unless their interest was adequately represented by the existing

parties.

                                  3
    On appeal, the interests that the LLC claims may be

impacted by the disposition of this divorce action are its

corporate independence and status, and its assets.   The LLC has

failed to establish that the disposition of the action may

impair or impede their ability to protect those interests.     The

LLC has essentially only one asset, the commercial property of

154 Maverick Street, although the parties do dispute whether

this is truly the sole asset of the LLC.   Regardless, the LLC's

concern is that the equal division of the LLC amongst Tyler and

Morganite, as ordered by the judge of the Probate and Family

Court, will inevitably result in the selling of that sole asset,

causing, as they argue, the LLC to be "effectively 'dissolved.'"

The LLC also argues that the Probate and Family Court lacks the

power to dissolve the LLC because the Superior Court has

exclusive jurisdiction over that, under G. L. c. 156C, § 44.

    An order of a Probate and Family Court judge that divides

an LLC does not, as the LLC argues, automatically require that

the assets of the LLC be sold or that the LLC be dissolved.

Equitable division can be, and likely will be, accomplished by

simply redistributing the ownership of the LLC between Morganite

and Tyler.   Simply put, the LLC's argument depends on something

that has not occurred:   it is premised on a judge of the Probate

and Family Court dissolving the LLC, which it has not done yet

and does not have the authority to do under G. L. c. 156C, § 44.

                                 4
For purposes of intervention, it is insufficient for the LLC to

posit what may or could occur once the ownership of the LLC is

divided equally between the parties.      For those reasons, we

affirm the denial of the motion to intervene.

       2.   Other arguments.   Because we affirm the denial of the

LLC's motion to intervene, they are not a party to this action

and are unable to appeal any other decisions made by the Probate

and Family Court in this case.     Additionally, the LLC did not

identify the Probate and Family Court's order adopting the

recommendations of the special master in its notice of appeal.

Mass. R. A. P. 3 (c) (1) (A) (ii), as appearing in 481 Mass.

1603 (2019).    For those reasons, we do not address the LLC's

other arguments.

       Conclusion.   For the above reasons, we affirm the denial of

the LLC's motion to intervene and decline to address their other

arguments.

                                       Order denying intervention
                                         affirmed.

                                       By the Court (Meade,
                                         Englander & Walsh, JJ.2),

                                       Clerk

Entered:    May 23, 2023.

2   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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