Court Opinion

ID: 9699000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:06:24.015572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:45.381293
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
This defendant was indicted on October 23, 1985. The first count charged that he had “purposely or knowingly by his own conduct, cause[d] the death” of the victim, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3a(l) or (2); further counts charged him with aggravated sexual assault and theft. On September 19, 1986, he pled guilty to the counts charging murder and theft. A jury trial to determine the penalty was held four months later. The jury unanimously found that aggravating factors existed beyond a reasonable doubt and outweighed beyond a reasonable doubt any existing mitigating factors. Defendant was sentenced to death.
Defendant took this appeal in April, 1988. In July, 1989, he filed a motion seeking reversal of his conviction and sentence on the ground that the plea did not establish guilt to capital murder. In the interim this Court decided the case of State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988). This decision was, obviously, not available to the defendant, the prosecutor or the trial court at the time defendant offered his guilty plea, nor did they foresee the Gerald holding. As a consequence, the plea was not structured to conform to Gerald’s requirements, and, as the Court now finds, the plea lacks the requisite factual basis for death eligibility under Gerald — an intentional killing. The Court observes that “[a]ll that the trial court had were the ambiguous statements made by the defendant at the plea hearing, none of which was sufficient to establish the state of mind necessary for capital murder under State v. Gerald.” Ante at 490, 572 A.2d at 610.
I substantially agree with the Court’s reasoning and conclusion with respect to the narrow but important point it addresses. The factual basis for the plea in this as in most plea cases emerges in the form of defendant’s testimony. We have insist*494ed that the underlying facts disclosed to support the plea to capital murder establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the requisite mental state — the intent to kill — prompted the murder. Ante at 490, 572 A.2d at 610; State v. Davis, supra, 116 N.J. at 366-75, 561 A.2d 1082. This plea transcript fails to demonstrate this requisite mental state and, also, exhibits an interrelated deficiency. We have taken pains to explain that a defendant must be fully informed of the requirements that establish capital murder and expose the defendant to the death penalty, and of the penal consequences of that plea once accepted. State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 367-68, 561 A.2d 1082 (1989); State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 285-287, 571 A.2d 914 (1990) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This defendant was not correctly informed of the mental state necessary to make murder capital. These standards for accepting a guilty plea to capital murder must be exacting and scrupulously applied. See e.g., State v. DiFrisco, supra, 116 N.J. at 285, 571 A.2d 914 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In light of the failure of the trial court to explain the necessity of the intent requirement for capital murder, defendant’s responses are not only factually deficient but uninformed and unenlightened.
I agree, also, with the Court’s rejection of defendant’s confession as an added source of the factual basis for his guilty plea. The Court has acknowledged that the use of a defendant’s confession in conjunction with a guilty plea must be carefully scrutinized. See State v. DiFrisco, supra. Here, the confession was not proffered when the plea was entered, and is substantively inadequate to establish the requisite mental state. Ante at 491, 572 A.2d at 611.
With these added observations, I am satisfied to concur in the opinion of the Court. The narrow issue posed by the motion for leave to appeal does not raise more fundamental grounds for determining the validity of defendant’s conviction and sentence and, consequently, need not be addressed. See State v. DiFris-*495co, supra, 116 N.J. 253, 284, 571 A.2d 914 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Concurring in result — Justice HANDLER — 1.
For vacation and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 6.