Court Opinion

ID: 9670286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:18:15.587088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:03.630617
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I agree that persons are not to be excluded from a panel of prospective jurors because of status. However, Williams is not entitled to have its members on the jury as a matter of law. There is no indication that the jury finally seated was somehow less competent than it would have been had members of the cooperative been seated on the jury. Nor are we looking at a class that may be systematically excluded from jury service in which instance the rights of the class are also at issue. See City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D.1993) [gender discrimination violates not only defendant’s equal protection rights but also the excluded juror’s rights].
There is nothing in the record to indicate the verdict was given under the influence of passion and prejudice on the part of the jurors. Because there is no right of equal protection to be vindicated, thus requiring reversal as a remedy, because there is no other reversible error, and because there is no indication that systematic exclusion of an identifiable group from jury venue is common place or, for that matter, occurs even infrequently, I would prefer to affirm. However, I yield to the wisdom of my colleagues in their desire to make a statement as to the importance with which we regard our jury system.
The reason I write separately is that I am concerned the practicing bar recognize this *6decision has limited value as precedent. It is my understanding that Rule 61, NDRCivP, “Harmless Error,” as discussed by this Court in Sathren v. Behm Propane, Inc., 444 N.W.2d 696 (N.D.1989) is alive and well. Sa-thren stands for the proposition that even errors affecting the jury will not be grounds for reversal when there is “no demonstration of prejudice which would warrant a new trial.” Sathren, supra, at 698. C.f., State v. Breding, 526 N.W.2d 465 (N.D.1995) [trial court has broad discretion in ruling on motions for mistrial or a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct].
Few errors, even with regard to the jury, require a new trial on the basis that to deny a new trial would be inconsistent with substantial justice. I am willing to join my colleagues in their statement, but the result does not indicate my willingness to broaden the definition of error which affects a substantial right of the parties.