Court Opinion

ID: 9661205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:32:15.601356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:26.265276
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.
On the basis of his religion, the state struck a prospective juror. This action, which the trial court approved, violated the right of the venireperson to participate in the judicial process. This violation of the venireperson’s right to be free of religious discrimination, which Strong may raise, is so fundamental to a trial’s legitimacy that a trial marred by such error must be deemed inherently prejudiced. This error, which is structural, affects the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than being simply an error in the trial process itself.
In its analysis of Strong’s argument that venireperson Luke Bobo was unconstitutionally struck from the jury pool because of his religious beliefs, the majority correctly concludes that the issue is to be considered a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rule 29.15(d).
*655The Strickland standard is used to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance, as the majority notes. Strickland establishes a two-part test necessary to sustain such a claim: a Rule 29.15 movant must establish “(1) that his attorney failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances, and (2) that he was thereby prejudiced.” Sanders v. State, 738 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Mo. banc 1987) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). The “prejudice” prong requires an appellant to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Citing Strickland’s caution that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed,” the majority does not engage in a substantive analysis of the first Strickland prong — trial counsel’s failure to exercise customary diligence — and instead focuses on the prejudice analysis. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The majority ultimately concludes that Strong has “failed to establish that trial counsel’s alleged defects prejudiced him” and affirms the motion court’s denial of Strong’s claim of error.
Because this claim raises a question of structural error that goes to the legitimacy of the trial process, I do not agree with the majority that Strong’s claim of ineffectiveness may be disposed of on grounds of insufficient prejudice. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the first Strickland prong, that is, the claim of counsel’s failure to exercise customary skill and diligence.
A brief factual review of the state’s questioning during voir dire and defense counsel’s conduct during the Batson1 conference in question will be of use in determining “whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. During voir dire, the prosecutor had this discussion with venireperson Bobo:
Mr. McCulloch: ... do you feel there are situations, an evidentiary set of circumstances, in which death would be an appropriate punishment in a murder first degree case?
Venireman Bobo: Sure.
Mr. McCulloch: And if the Judge were to give you that instruction, that question, assess and declare the punishment at death or life without parole, would you be able to consider both of those?
Venireman Bobo: Yes.
Mr. McCulloch: Would you be able to impose the one you felt was appropriate punishment for this case?
Venireman Bobo: Based on the evidence, yes.
At the conclusion of voir dire, the state used a preemptive strike against venire-person Bobo, who was the assistant dean of Covenant Seminary. Defense counsel raised a Batson challenge to the strike on race grounds. In keeping with the dictates of Batson, the trial court asked the state to supply a race-neutral reason for striking Bobo. The prosecutor indicated that Bobo
*656... was the assistant dean of Covenant Seminary, and as much respect as I have for religious people, I don’t want religious people, very religious, and I would have to assume because he’s the dean of a seminary that he is a very religious person. I don’t think he would make a particularly good death penalty juror in this case, but — -or in any case for that matter. Although he indicated during the voir dire that he would impose the death sentence in an appropriate situation, he was not, certainly not as strong as I would like him to have been on that, combined primarily with his position as the assistant dean of Covenant Seminary. And he does have, as you mentioned up at the bench, a cousin in prison, I believe out in the Kansas City area. As I recall that was, I could be mistaken on this, but I think it was a murder and his cousin was in prison for murder.
The trial court overruled defense counsel’s Batson challenge, finding that the prosecutor had race-neutral reasons for striking Bobo: “Most importantly, the race-neutral reason the Court believes for striking Bobo beyond the other reasons that Mr. McCulloch has mentioned is clearly that being the assistant dean, director of Covenant Seminary, which the Court is aware of, is a race-neutral reason.” When defense counsel pointed out that a similarly situated juror was a retired parochial school teacher, the trial court found that the state’s reasons were not pretextual, saying:
... the logical relevance between striking Bobo, who’s assistant dean, director of a Covenant Seminary, and the relevance between that and the fact that the State of Missouri has elected to proceed with the death penalty, it’s clear to the Court that individuals in often religious avocations are more apt to — it’s a very relevant issue between those two and the effect that it would have upon an individual sitting in a case involving the death penalty.
The prohibition against excluding potential jurors from service on the basis of their religious beliefs is explicitly articulated in the Missouri Constitution. Article I, Section 5 of the Missouri Constitution provides in part that “no person shall, on account of his religious belief ... be disqualified from ... serving as juror.” In addition to this Constitutional provision, there is a wealth of case law, both federal and Missouri, holding that religion may not be used as a basis for striking a potential juror. See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. banc 1997); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). While most such rulings involve challenges for cause, the same principle applies in this case because it was the action of the state in exercising a peremptory challenge. J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B, 511 U.S. 127, 128, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs the exercise of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor in a criminal trial). Moreover, the trial court, also of course an arm of the state, endorsed the religious basis for excluding Bobo.
In a challenge for cause, this Court in State v. Roberts observed that “[vjenire-persons may not be excluded simply because of general objections to the death penalty or conscientious or religious scruples against it. Venirepersons may be excluded only where it appears that their views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with the instructions and their oath.” 948 S.W.2d at 597 (em*657phasis added). Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that a capital defendant’s right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution prohibits the exclusion of venire members “simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 657, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968)); see also State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 155 (Mo. banc 1998) (“Under the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, a trial court cannot strike venirepersons simply because they voice general objections to the death penalty.”); State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo. banc 1996).
As Gray and Witherspoon make clear, barring a religious juror from service, even a juror who has expressed ambivalence regarding the death penalty, is constitutionally impermissible. Indeed, in this case, far from approaching the Gray and Witherspoon levels of ambivalence regarding the death penalty, Bobo’s statements during voir dire were unambiguous; he expressed no reservations about his ability to be objective, to follow the law and to impose the death sentence if appropriate “based on the evidence.”
At the point in Batson conference at which the state said it “[did not ] want religious people” serving on the jury, the state violated the Missouri Constitution, a violation that defense counsel did not object to or comment upon. When the trial court made its observation that a juror’s religiousness was a valid race-neutral basis for exclusion, reasonably competent trial counsel should have interposed and drawn the trial court’s attention to Missouri’s explicit constitutional bar to just such exclusions, as well as the federal constitutional principles.
Strong’s defense trial counsel, in a deposition for the Rule 29.15 motion hearing, testified that he was not aware of any case law holding that religion was not a valid reason for striking a venireperson. In that deposition, defense trial counsel also made no mention of the provision of the Missouri Constitution barring such strikes. “[Wjhen defense counsel fails to raise a possible defense, to make a suppression motion, or to take some other possibly beneficial action, and such failure is due to his ignorance or mistaken understanding of the law, which reasonable preparation would have corrected, the defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel.” 5 Am.JuR.2d Acts or omissions of counsel constituting ineffective assistance — Ignorance of rule of law sec. 7 (2008).
Strong’s trial counsel stood silent as both the state and the trial court ignored a basic precept of the Missouri constitution. That silence is precisely the sort of failure “to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances” against which Strickland guards. By failing to draw the trial court’s attention to any one of the numerous legal problems with using religion as a “race-neutral” reason for a preemptory strike, Strong’s trial counsel fell below the necessary level of effectiveness.
Establishing the second Strickland prong — prejudice—is not quite as clear-cut a task. The typical Strickland prejudice formulation requires that a movant show that but for his counsel’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Here, that task is impossible. Strong cannot conceivably show that had Bobo been placed on his jury, the outcome of his jury trial would have been different. Any arguments in that vein would be pure *658conjecture and would carry no legal weight.
With the prejudice analysis foreclosed to him, Strong invokes the Arizona v. Fulmi-nante structural error standard. Structural errors are those violations of constitutional protections so fundamental to a trial’s fair outcome that any trial marred by such error must be deemed inherently prejudiced. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Structural errors are those errors “affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself. Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.’ ” Id. (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)). Where structural error has been committed, the defendant does not have to demonstrate that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the error. Prejudice is presumed. Everage v. State, 229 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Mo.App.2007).
In its discussion of structural error, the majority frames the issue as a Sixth Amendment question, relying on the well-accepted view that the deprivation of the right to a fair and impartial jury constitutes structural error. See Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Mo. banc 2002). The majority then goes about the not-difficult task of dismissing Strong’s structural error argument as distinguishable from Missouri precedents holding that “in order to avail himself of this presumption [of prejudice resulting from deprivation of the right to a fair and impartial jury], [the defendant] must establish that the errors complained of resulted in his trial by a jury that was not fair and impartial.” Everage, 229 S.W.3d at 102.
The majority is correct that in Missouri case law a structural error committed in impaneling the jury has been discussed only in the context of defense counsel’s failure to strike a biased juror. See, e.g., Knese, supra; Everage, supra, Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28 (Mo. banc 2006). The majority also surmises that because Strong objects not to his trial counsel’s failure to strike a biased venireperson, but rather, to counsel’s failure to object to the prosecution’s striking of a venireperson, he cannot prove that those venirepersons who were placed on the jury were not fair and impartial. Having summarily dispatched Strong’s argument by distinguishing it from existing precedent, the majority concludes that “counsel’s failure to raise a Batson objection, absent any attempt by Strong to demonstrate that unqualified persons served on the jury, does not amount to a structural defect that entitles him to a presumption of prejudice.”
So what then is the state of affairs as the majority’s analysis leaves them? Bobo was barred from sitting on a jury in violation of protections given him by the Missouri constitution, and Strong was tried by a jury seated in a constitutionally prohibited manner. Strong cannot prove that his trial might have had a different result but for the violation, nor can he prove that the jury that heard his case was biased.
The constitutional violation is grave, and yet neither wronged party — Bobo as well as Strong — can be given redress by the outcome-dependent formulations of the majority. But it is this very sort of harm that the doctrine of structural error exists to remedy. The fallacy in the majority’s reasoning lies with its too-narrow conception of structural error, and it is the deficiencies of this conception that produce such an incorrect and unjust result.
First, the majority works on the premise that the only right in question is Strong’s *659right to a fair and impartial jury. The majority ignores the implications of its decision on the rights of Bobo. In Powers v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that “a defendant in a criminal case can raise the third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the prosecution because of their race.” 499 U.S. 400, 415, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). Because the majority conceptualizes this issue as a deprivation of Strong’s right to a fair and impartial jury, the absence of demonstrable prejudice proves an absolute bar to redress, disregarding Bobo’s right to serve free of religious discrimination.
The majority might well rejoin that no Supreme Court case has extended equal protection to religion under Batson. While that is true, the constitutional violation at issue here is that of the protection guaranteed under the Missouri Constitution. As Judge Price observed in his concurrence in State v. Parker:
[t]he elevated protection ... of the rights of individuals to serve as jurors may extend beyond racial discrimination to religious, gender-based, or ethnic discrimination as well, either under the United States or the Missouri Constitutions. Interestingly, the Missouri Constitution may require greater protection of the right of an individual to serve on a petit jury than does the United States Constitution. While our Missouri Constitution includes similar equal protection language to that in the United States Constitution, stating: “that all persons are created equal and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the law”; article I, section 2, it provides further and more specific rights to individuals regarding jury service. Article I, section 5, provides “that no person shall on account of his religious persuasion or belief ... be disqualified from testifying or serving as a juror”.... Thus, whether Batson, Powers, Edmonson and McCollum directly prohibit the use of peremptory strikes based upon religion or sex, they certainly suggest such a result when coupled with Missouri’s Constitution.
836 S.W.2d 930, 941-943 (Mo. banc 1992) (Price, J. concurring). In the present case, the Court has the opportunity to answer the question raised by Judge Price in Parker. The language of Missouri’s constitution is plain: No citizen shall be disqualified from jury service on the basis of religious belief. Bobo is just such a citizen, and it is the deprivation of his rights that the majority’s analysis ignores.
The second problem with the majority’s understanding of structural error is its view of the doctrine as a finite and exclusive list of enumerated violations that amount to structural error. Because Strong cannot demonstrate that the constitutional violation produced a biased jury, the majority holds that the error is not structural. The theory of structural error is that when a constitutional violation is sufficiently egregious, the integrity of the judicial process is so gravely compromised that no outcome of such a tainted proceeding could conceivably be just. Courts have long recognized the hazards created by discrimination in the jury selection process. In J.E.B., the Supreme Court described the effect of discriminatory jury selection practices:
“Discrimination in jury selection ... causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process. The litigants are harmed by the risk that the prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will infect the entire proceedings.... The community is harmed by the State’s participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders.”
*660511 U.S. at 140, 114 S.Ct. 1419. This description of the impact of discriminatory jury selection mirrors the very description of structural error cited by the majority: Structural errors are those “affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246.
Structural error cannot be limited, as the majority in this case holds, to an exclusive list of named rights held only by the named defendant. By correctly applying the structural error doctrine, however, this Court can remedy harm that the state’s religious discrimination caused the litigants, the community and venireperson Bobo, who was, as the Supreme Court stated in “wrongfully excluded from the judicial process.” 511 U.S. at 140, 114 S.Ct. 1419.
The majority declines to apply the law of structural error to remedy the constitutional violation in this case. The remedy is a new trial free of the constitutional violation that tainted this trial. I respectfully dissent.

. All references to Batson are drawn from the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, in which the Supreme Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.” 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).