Court Opinion

ID: 9451328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:13:59.482482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:40.100797
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
This prosecution began on January 9, 1956, when a warrant issued for Busby’s arrest on the charge of rape. He was arrested about the middle of January and jailed in Detroit, Michigan. The Walker County, Alabama, jury returned an indictment against him on January 28. About March 13, two Walker County deputy sheriffs took Busby into their custody in Detroit and started the train ride on a day coach to Jasper, Alabama. Busby was kept handcuffed. He could not read and write, except that he could sign his name. He was not informed of *81his right to remain silent or that anything he said might be used against him. In conversation with the deputies, he admitted that he had had sexual relations with the prosecutrix, but claimed that was with her consent. That information was reported to the prosecuting attorney. Shortly after Busby was jailed in Jasper, he was interrogated by the prosecuting attorney, Sheriff Bennett, and Deputy Daly. He was not then informed of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult an attorney. When the prosecuting attorney and Deputy Daly left for lunch, the Sheriff had lunch with Busby at the jail. The Sheriff testified:
“He and I were sitting at the table there after we had finished eating, and as I recall, we were sitting there drinking a cup of coffee, maybe smoking a cigarette; Busby asked me to contact the D.A., he was ready to give him a statement.” (R. 321.)
The prosecuting attorney and the deputy returned. There is no testimony that anyone advised Busby of his right to counsel. However, the prosecutor Wilson did tell him that he did not have to make a statement. Mr. Wilson testified:
“I told David this; . I said, ‘Now, David, you don’t have to tell me anything if you don’t want to.’ When he told me he wanted to tell me the whole story, I said, ‘You don’t have to tell me anything, but if you tell me anything, tell me the truth, and I am going to write it down. Now, if you are not going to tell me the truth, don’t tell me anything, because I am going to write down everything you say’; that is what I told him.” (R. 349.)
Busby’s plea of guilty was induced not only by his confession, but more certainly and directly by the promise of the prosecuting attorney that he would not insist on the death penalty. Prosecutor Wilson testified that he discussed settlement with Busby and his appointed counsel, and further:
“Q. Did any of the three of you, either that morning or after lunch, say anything to him about the electric chair?
“A. Yeah, the electric chair was mentioned; yes.
“Q. When was it mentioned?
“A. I can’t remember; all I remember about the electric chair was that after he learned that I was not going to press for the electric chair, he was most cooperative, most friendly; all our relationship was strictly friendly and cooperative, and everything was in agreement and- — ■” (R. 348.)
Mr. Wilson further testified:
“Q. What were their statements to you with reference to settlement?
“A. When he became convinced that I was not going to ask for the electric chair, he just fell all over himself to plead guilty; now, that is the best way I can describe it.”
There is no official record of the judge’s interview with Busby before accepting his plea of guilty. I doubt whether it is possible for any such interview to truly show that the dominant motivating cause of the plea was to confess actual guilt rather than to reap the reward of escaping death in the electric chair.
A week or so before the formal trial, Busby, his attorney, and the prosecuting attorney came before the Judge. The Judge testified:
“Q. Did they state to you that he was entering a guilty plea, or going to, in the case ?
“A. That was the — yes, sir. Now, you say, ‘They’; I don’t know whether he did or his attorney, but the conference—
“Q. He or his attorney ?
“A. • — was for that purpose; yes, sir.
“Q. And Mr. Busby was present when that conversation took place?
“A. Yes, sir; he was present at the time, I think in my office, I am not positive, it could have been in *82the court room; I think it was my office.
“Q. And did the two attorneys, that is, Mr. Carmichael and the Solicitor, Mr. Wilson, indicate that they had reached an agreement in the case?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Do you recall the nature of that agreement, Judge?
“A. The nature of agreement was that he would enter a plea of guilt to the charge of rape, and that he would agree to take a life sentence, and I specifically asked him if he entered into that agreement, and he said, ‘Yes.’
“Q. You asked him independently and of his own free will ?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did he appear to you to understand exactly what you were saying when you discussed that with him?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And he was there with his attorney and the Solicitor?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And despite the two attorneys’ statements, you asked him of his own—
“A. That’s right.
“Q. —-knowledge?
“A. I asked him • specifically; as a matter of fact, I make a practice of that.” (R. 276-277.)
When the case came on for trial on August 20, 1956, the proceedings in court (R. pp. 135, et seq.) show no further effort to ascertain that the plea of guilty was truly voluntary. So far as I have found in the record, the Judge did no more than ascertain in the quoted conference that Busby had agreed to plead guilty to get a life sentence instead of death.
For reasons stated in my dissent in Grant Cooper v. Holman, 5 Cir., 356 F.2d 82, it seems to me that a judgment of conviction and sentence of life imprisonment based on such a plea cannot be sustained. I therefore respectfully dissent.