Court Opinion

ID: 9703165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:43:21.233297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:22.757703
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting:
Because in my view the majority and concurring opinions do serious harm to our strong policy of waiver, I dissent.
The concept of waiver—that issues must be raised in the lower court to be considered on appeal—is basic to Pennsylvania appellate review. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 302 declares: “[ijssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302. Moreover, in 1974 our Supreme Court held that even fundamental error may be waived in both criminal and civil cases. Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974).
Situations in criminal cases in which an issue is waived include the following: if the issue is not raised in a timely filed omnibus pretrial motion, Pa.R.Crim.P. 306; if there is no timely motion for a mistrial, Commonwealth v. Randolf, *239280 Pa.Super. 189, 421 A.2d 469 (1980); if there is no specific objection to the jury instruction, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1119; Commonwealth v. Corkan, 467 Pa. 33, 354 A.2d 537 (1976); if there is no objection to the admission of evidence at trial, Commonwealth v. Griffin, 271 Pa.Super. 228, 412 A.2d 897 (1979) allocatur denied (1980); if the defendant is not tried within the time provided in Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 and there is no timely motion for discharge, Commonwealth v. Byrd, 250 Pa.Super. 250, 378 A.2d 921 (1977); if the issue is not presented in written, specific postverdict motions, Pa.R. Crim.P. 1123; Commonwealth v. Gravely, 486 Pa. 194, 404 A.2d 1296 (1979); if there is no timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea, Pa.R.Crim.P. 321; Commonwealth v. Baylor, 279 Pa.Super. 304, 420 A.2d 1346 (1980); if the issue is not contained in a timely filed motion to modify sentence, Pa.R. Crim.P. 1410; Commonwealth v. Gottshalk, 276 Pa.Super. 102, 419 A.2d 115 (1980); if the petitioner in a Post Conviction Hearing Act proceeding had a previous opportunity to raise the issue and cannot prove extraordinary circumstances, 19 P.S. § 1180-4; if the issue is not briefed or argued during the postverdict proceedings even though it is contained in postverdict motions, Commonwealth v. Holtzer, 480 Pa. 93, 94, 389 A.2d 101, 104 (1978); Commonwealth v. Perry, 279 Pa.Super. 32, 420 A.2d 729 (1980); if the issue is not included in a statement of matters complained of on appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 1925; if on appeal the issue is not set out or suggested by the statement of questions involved and not adequately developed in the argument, Pa.R.A.P. 2116; Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621, 630 n.11, 417 A.2d 597, 601 n.11 (1980); if on appeal the jurisdiction of the appellate court is not raised, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 704; Pa.R.A.P. 741.
Situations in civil cases in which an issue is waived include the following: failure to specifically object to the jury instruction, Pa.R.A.P. 302; Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., supra; failure to object to the admission of evidence at trial, Rubenstein v. J. E. Kunkel Co., 244 Pa.Super. 474, 368 A.2d 819 (1976); failure to include the issue in *240exceptions, Pa.R.C.P. 1038, 1518; failure to include the issue in postverdict motions, Benson v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 463 Pa. 37, 342 A.2d 393 (1975); failure on appeal to raise the issue of the appellate court’s jurisdiction, 42 Pa.C. S.A. § 704; Pa.R.A.P. 741.
Even constitutional errors may be waived. Commonwealth v. Romberger, 474 Pa. 190, 378 A.2d 283 (1977).
Constitutional errors may be waived, for example, by not raising a specific objection on such ground at trial, Commonwealth v. Danko, 281 Pa.Super. 97, 421 A.2d 1165 (1980); by not raising the issue of sentencing in the lower court, Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307, 328 A.2d 845 (1975); by not notifying the Attorney General, Pa.R.C.P. 235; Matter of Adoption of Christopher P., 480 Pa. 79, 389 A.2d 94 (1978) ; but see Commonwealth ex rel. Stein v. Stein, 487 Pa. 1, 406 A.2d 1381 (1979); by not notifying the Attorney General on appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 521; Commonwealth v. Ashford, 268 Pa. Super. 225, 231 n.3, 407 A.2d 1328, 1330 n.3 (1979) .
Thus waiver is a policy firmly established in our jurisprudence. There are, however, situations in which failure to raise an issue in the lower court will not result in waiver on appeal. In Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A. 897 (1966), appellants asked that the rule of Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), be applied to them. Griffith had changed Pennsylvania’s choice of law rules. The trial in Kuchinie had been conducted under the existing choice of law rules and no objection had been raised by the appellants at trial. While Kuchinie was on appeal, Griffith was decided. The Supreme Court applied Griffith to Kuchinic even though the appellee argued that the issue had been waived. The court reasoned that the policy behind waiver—the opportunity of the lower court to correct its errors—would not be thwarted by holding that there was no waiver in Kuchinie. This is because in Kuchinie the case was tried according to the law in existence at that time and, if an objection had been made at trial, the lower court would have had to overrule it and thus would have been unable to *241correct its “error.” Kuchinic, supra, 422 Pa. at 626, 222 A.2d at 901. Thus in Kuchinic there was no waiver because an objection in the lower court would have been unavailing.
The instant case, however, differs materially from Kuchinic. Here, unlike Kuchinic, there was no appellate court decision that governed the issue which could have been raised below. Without such appellate court decision, the lower court, if given the opportunity, could have decided the issue in favor of appellant. Indeed, that is precisely what happened in Gonzales v. Procaccio Brothers Trucking Company, 268 Pa.Super. 245, 407 A.2d 1338 (1979). In Gonzales the lower court held Philadelphia Civil Rule 145 invalid and on appeal we affirmed. Therefore, if the appellant in the instant case would have made the same argument to the lower court, the lower court could have corrected its error. Since the reason for not finding waiver in Kuchinic is absent here, Kuchinic does not govern the instant case and waiver may be applied.
The instant case also materially differs from Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 239 A.2d 793 (1968).
In Cheeks the appellant raised the issue that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation had been violated. He had not raised the issue at trial but rather did so through the Post Conviction Hearing Act proceeding. The Supreme Court held there was no waiver for failure to raise the issue at trial since “[i]t would be manifestly unfair to hold appellant to a waiver when this waiver is alleged to have occurred at a time when neither the defendant nor his attorney had any way of knowing that there existed a right to be waived.” Id., 429 Pa. at 95, 239 A.2d at 796. At the time of Cheek’s trial the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation had not been made applicable to the states. Id.; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). Since Pointer announced a new principle, there was no waiver by failing to raise the issue at trial. The instant *242case does not involve the announcement of a new principle.1 There is no change in the law here. In Gonzales, supra, we merely decided that Philadelphia Civil Rule 145 was in conflict with Pa.R.C.P. 4019 and therefore invalid. Gonzales, supra, 268 Pa. Super, at 253, 407 A.2d 1342. Gonzales was based on the well-established principle that local rules cannot be inconsistent with or in conflict with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. This principle derives from a statute which existed at least as early as 1937. Act of June 21, 1937, P.L. 1982, § 2 as amended, 17 P.S. § 62 (repealed effective June 27, 1978). The last case before Gonzales which reaffirmed this principle was decided in 1975. Gilmer v. Philadelphia Transportation Company, 237 Pa.Super. 57, 346 A.2d 346 (1975). Gilmer predates the entry of the default judgment in the instant case. Since Gonzales did not announce a new principle, but instead applied a long-established principle to a particular local rule, the instant case is unlike Cheeks in which a new principle was involved. Therefore, Cheeks does not support the view that there is no waiver.
When this case was previously before us in Tice v. Nationwide Life Insurance Company, 253 Pa.Super. 118, 384 A.2d 1257 (1978) allocatur denied (Tice I), appellant asked us to give it the benefit of a decision which was filed while the appeal was pending. Appellant argued that the decision, which construed the same local rule involved here, represented a change in law and therefore failure to raise the issue below did not result in waiver. We held that although there was no prior appellate decision construing the local rule, the local rule was in effect at all times and therefore waiver applied. Id. 253 Pa.Super. at 126, 384 A.2d at 1261. Likewise, here 17 P.S. § 62 has been in effect at all times and therefore waiver should apply.
The teaching of Kuchinic and Cheeks is that there is no waiver when, pending appeal, an appellate decision overrules *243a prior appellate decision or an appellate decision announces a new principle. They represent limited exceptions to our policy of waiver. Indeed in Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 381 A.2d 1245 (1977), Justice Roberts, quoting from Commonwealth v. Simon, 446 Pa. 215, 285 A.2d 861 (1971) said:
failure to raise an issue in a prior proceeding is not a waiver when the legal principles upon which the issue is premised are newly announced in an appellate decision rendered subsequent to the date of the prior proceeding.
Commonwealth v. Ernst, supra 476 Pa. at 117, 381 A.2d at 1252. (Opinion in support of reversal). Since Gonzales did not overrule a prior decision or establish a new principle, our ordinary rules of waiver should apply.
The majority and concurring opinions, however, do not apply our waiver policy, but instead unnecessarily and unwisely depart from it.
In the majority’s view since the only issue is one of law and since that issue has been decided, there is no waiver. Majority Opinion, ante at 786, n.8. According to the concurring opinion, since there is no need for a fuller record and the issue has already been decided, there is no waiver. Concurring Opinion, ante at 790-791. Although these views consider some of the policies underlying waiver, they fail to adequately consider other policy of waiver, i. e., providing the lower court with an opportunity to correct its errors so that an appeal may be obviated and so that the litigants’ and court’s (therefore the public’s) time and expense may be saved. If we only needed a full record and the issue to have already been decided, we would not have applied waiver, for example, when appellant was before us in Tice I. There the record was full and we had already decided the issue in Strickler v. United Elevator Company, 248 Pa.Super. 258, 375 A.2d 86 (1977); nevertheless we held that waiver applied.
Applying waiver in the instant case will not be unjust. Appellant delayed answering the interrogatories for nearly six months. Tice I, supra, 253 Pa.Super. at 122, 384 A.2d at *2441259. We affirmed the lower court’s holding that appellant did not reasonably explain that delay. Any delay in answering interrogatories may not only delay the ultimate disposition of the case, but may also tax our limited judicial resources in enforcing compliance with the rules of discovery. Appellant has had numerous opportunities to raise the issue it seeks to raise here. It failed to do so in its petition to open, in its first appeal to this court, in its petition for allowance of appeal, and in its motion to strike. It raises the issue here for the first time, twenty-eight months after the judgment was entered. Since appellant has not reasonably explained the delay in its answering the interrogatories and since it has had numerous opportunities to raise the issue involved here, I conclude that the application of waiver would not be unjust.
Finally, I point out that nothing the court says today precludes the lower court on remand from properly imposing sanctions pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4019. See Majority Opinion, ante, n.6.
I dissent; I would affirm the order below.2

. I note that the motion to strike was filed over ten months after a Philadelphia Common Pleas Court decision had held Philadelphia Civil Rule 145 invalid.

. The other issues which appellant raises are either waived for failure to raise them below or without merit.