Court Opinion

ID: 9770851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:23:20.107723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:21.301628
License: Public Domain

on appellant’s motion for rehearing.
DAVIDSON, Judge.
Notice of appeal was given in this case on April 17, 1950. The statement of facts shows to have been approved by the trial judge on May 15, 1950. Notwithstanding such fact, the statement of facts was not filed in the trial court until August 21, 1950, and long after the expiration of the 90 days allowed by statute (Art. 760, C. C. P.) for the filing of statement of facts in the trial court.
It is by reason of the penalty here inflicted that we considered the statement of facts, regardless of the delayed filing. We did not, however, consider the so-called bills of exception, which are presented by counsel now representing appellant and employed in the case since the appeal of the case.
By motion for rehearing, appellant insists that the absence of bills of exception presenting the errors claimed to have occurred upon the trial of the case is attributed solely and alone, to the failure of his court-appointed counsel to properly represent him upon and in furtherance of the appeal of this case.
As we understand appellant’s postion, it is that inasmuch as the trial court recognized the necessity of appointing counsel to represent him upon the trial of the case, it became the duty of such counsel not only to represent him upon the trial but *579also to prepare and submit for approval, within the time and in the manner prescribed by law, bills of exception as to errors claimed to have been committed upon the trial.
■ In Spalding v. State, 137 Tex. Cr. R. 329, 127 S. W. 2d 457, we held that an attorney appointed to represent an accused in the trial of a capital case, as required by Art. 494, C. C. P., is not required to prosecute an appeal.
It is also insisted that the failure of counsel to prosecute the appeal in the case constituted a denial of due process under our State and Federal Constitutions.
We are not unmindful of the expressions of the Supreme Court of the United States holding that, under certain circumstances, trial without counsel constitutes a denial of due process. A list of the cases upon the subject are set forth in a footnote to the case of Quicksell v. Michigan, 94 L. Ed. 1188, 339 U. S. 660, 70 S. Ct. 910.
We are unable to agree with appellant’s contention.
The right of appeal in a criminal case is not a right conferred by the Constitution, but is a creature of statute. 4 Tex. Jur., Appeal and Error — Criminal Cases, Sec. 3, p. 17. The right of appeal being the subject only of statute, the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury ends with the decision of the trial court.
Appellant, having been represented by counsel upon the trial of the case, was accorded his right of trial by jury, as guaranteed by the Constitution.
There being no facts evidencing racial discrimination in the organization of the grand jury which returned the indictment against appellant, that question is not before us.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion approved by the court.