Court Opinion

ID: 9558244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:05:09.563117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:30.440728
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur with the result reached by the majority. The trial court properly denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion to suppress evidence. First, the motion to dismiss was properly denied because "corrupt intent" is an element of *876the crime of bribery, RCW 9A.68.010. This element expunges any objection to the charge of bribery as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Second, suppression of the state-authorized interception of conversations is unwarranted, not for the reasons stated by the majority, but because the affidavits filed in support of issuance of the state warrants independently establish probable cause and there is no need to use federally obtained information.
I dissent to the majority's holding that probable cause for a state interception of conversations can be established by federal interceptions that violate state law. The majority's holding violates the privacy interests of Washington residents guaranteed by the Washington privacy act, undermines the protections of article 1, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, and encourages subterfuge and evasion with respect to state law.
In the subject case, the state and federal law enforcement authorities conducted a joint investigation into Pierce County sauna activities. During the course of their cooperative activities, 13 tape recordings were made by federal agents. These recordings did not satisfy the requirements of our Washington privacy act, RCW 9.73, and were, therefore, illegally obtained under Washington law. The federal recordings were utilized by the State, however, in submitting information on such tapes to superior court judges for determining probable cause to authorize secret recordings by state agents.
The federal wiretap statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, deals with wire interception and interception of oral communications. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. Its purpose is to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications and to delineate on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized. Halpin v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 885, 495 P.2d 1295, 101 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1972).
Title III prohibits most interceptions of either wire or oral communications when neither party consents to the *877interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (exceptions for national security and communication common carriers). On the other hand, Title III does not make it unlawful for persons acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication, or one of the parties to the communication has given consent to such interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2) (c). Neither the federal constitution nor any federal statute requires that official approval be secured before conversations are recorded by federal government agents with the consent of one of the conversants. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733, 99 S. Ct. 1465 (1979). Hence, law enforcement officers need not, under the federal statute, obtain a court order prior to wiring an informant who has consented to the interception.
The provisions of Title III which govern the receipt, disclosure, and use of wiretap-derived information by law enforcement officers provide as follows:
(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to another investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom may use such contents to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties.
(Italics mine.) 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1), (2). Under these provisions, a state officer may receive and use wiretap information only to the extent that such receipt and use is appropriate for the proper performance of his official duties. The scope of a state officer's official duties is defined by state law.
The legislative history of Title III indicates that Congress *878intended to permit state electronic surveillance laws to be more restrictive than the federal provision and, therefore, more protective of individual privacy. State enactments cannot, however, be less restrictive. Nor can they expand the use of electronic surveillance beyond the perimeters established by Title III. Thus, Congress did not intend to supersede state attempts to protect conversational privacy but merely to subject state eavesdropping legislation to minimum standards. See State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 539-40, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980); J. Carr, Electronic Surveillance § 2.04[a] (1977).
The State of Washington attempted to curtail wiretapping before the federal statute was adopted. In 1967, Washington enacted RCW 9.73.030-.080, making it unlawful for anyone not operating under a court order to intercept or divulge certain communications without the consent of all persons engaged in the communications or conversations. This law was characterized as an all party consent law. The law provides that a court ordered wiretap can be authorized when there are reasonable grounds to believe that national security or human life is endangered. RCW 9.73.040. As originally adopted, RCW 9.73 is one of the most restrictive electronic surveillance laws ever promulgated.
In 1970, the statute was amended to exclude certain police and fire department functions such as recording of incoming telephone calls. Laws of 1970, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 48, § 1 (codified at RCW 9.73.090(1)). In State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977), this court interpreted RCW 9.73.090(1) to except emergency telephone calls to police from the prohibition against the unconsented recording of private conversations only for the purpose of insuring the accuracy of their reception. This provision does not affect the application of RCW 9.73.050 under which nonconsensual recordings of private conversations are inadmissible as evidence.
In light of Wanrow, the Legislature again amended RCW 9.73. The original Senate proposals would have conformed *879the statute with the federal law and allowed recordings when one party consents. Senate Bill 2925, 45th Legislature (1977); Engrossed Senate Bill 2419, 45th Legislature (1977). The House, however, refused to approve these Senate proposals because they were too broad an exception to the right of privacy. Hence, the statute was not conformed to federal law but rather a provision was adopted which retains the general restrictiveness underlying the statute yet gives law enforcement personnel some latitude by making it lawful to intercept oral communications when one party consents and the officer has obtained a court order. RCW 9.73.090(2). The court order must be based on probable cause to believe that the nonconsenting party has committed, is engaged in, or is about to commit a felony. RCW 9.73.090(2).
The statute provides that it is unlawful for any individual to violate its provisions. RCW 9.73.030. The statute excludes all evidence acquired in violation of the statute or court order, RCW 9.73.050, and provides both a civil and criminal penalty. RCW 9.73.060 and .080.
Thus, the Washington privacy act significantly expands the minimum standards of the federal statute and offers a greater degree of protection to Washington citizens. The state act requires both one party consent and probable cause, whereas the federal wiretap statute simply provides that it is not unlawful to intercept communications where one party consents to the interception.
In the present action, probable cause for the court ordered state interception was based in part on interception and recording of conversations in accordance with the federal wiretap statute, but in violation of the more restrictive state statute. The majority condones this activity on the basis that the federal information was not admitted in the state criminal trial proceeding and the federal statutes mandate for cooperation between federal and state law enforcement agencies. I cannot agree.
The Washington privacy act provides that one party consent recordings are unlawful without prior court *880approval based upon probable cause. Thus, the state officer's use of the federal wiretap information was the use of illegally seized evidence in a probable cause proceeding. This use is prohibited under RCW 9.73.030 and article 1, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.
The primary purpose of the Washington privacy act is to protect the privacy of individuals by prohibiting public dissemination, even in the course of a criminal proceeding, of illegally obtained information. State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 542-43, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980); State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 233, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). In Williams, we held that the prohibitions of the state act were applicable to federally authorized interceptions which did not comply with the state statute. Recordings made by federal agents, as well as testimony as to the content of the conversations, were inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. The basis of our holding in Williams was the illegality of the wiretap under state law, the statutory prohibition of admissibility of unlawfully obtained information, the statute's application to any individual, and the specific expectation of privacy an individual has under the Washington privacy act.
Similarly, in State v. Henderson, 16 Wn. App. 526, 557 P.2d 346 (1976), the Court of Appeals held that evidence obtained in violation of RCW 9.73 cannot be used for impeachment. The court stated:
Although Henderson did not directly seek the admission of " [a]ny information obtained in violation of RCW 9.73.030" (RCW 9.73.050), his use of the transcription clearly violated the statute's intended purpose of preventing "encroachment upon the privacy of the parties to a conversation." State v. Grant, 9 Wn. App. 260, 265, 511 P.2d 1013 (1973).
Henderson, at 530.
The same is true in the instant criminal proceeding. Although the State did not seek the admission of the information obtained in violation of the state privacy act, the use of the illegally obtained information in the probable cause determination clearly violated the act's intended pur*881pose of prohibiting public dissemination of illegally obtained information. Affidavits and information of probable cause are generally available for public dissemination. Cowles Pub'g Co. v. Murphy, 96 Wn.2d 584, 637 P.2d 966 (1981).
A well established principle of probable cause determinations is that illegally seized evidence cannot be used to establish probable cause. State v. Bean, 89 Wn.2d 467, 572 P.2d 1102 (1978); State v. Jones, 22 Wn. App. 447, 591 P.2d 796 (1979). This is equally true of the use of information from an illegal wiretap or interception in support of a subsequent intercept. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 529-34, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341, 94 S. Ct. 1820 (1974); see also C. Fishman, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping § 80 (1978). The United States Supreme Court also has indicated that evidence obtained in violation of intercept and recording statutes may not be used in any sense:
To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized but to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed "inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty." What was said in a different context in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392, [64 L. Ed. 319, 40 S. Ct. 182, 183, 24 A.L.R. 1426,] is pertinent here: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all." See Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 307 [65 L. Ed. 647, 41 S. Ct. 261, 264],
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41, 84 L. Ed. 307, 60 S. Ct. 266 (1939).
Employing the same logic to the case at bench, it follows that information obtained in violation of RCW 9.73.030 not only may not be used at trial, but also may not be used to establish probable cause for issuance of court authorized intercepts pursuant to RCW 9.73.090(2). To conclude otherwise is to encourage state officers to break faith with the State and its citizens and violate clearly expressed state policy. Though Congress did contemplate close cooperation *882between federal officers and the officers of states welcoming such cooperation, it did not intend to permit usurpation of state law in the manner contemplated by the majority opinion.
Individuals residing in Washington have a legitimate interest in restricting the admissibility of evidence derived from the federal intercept in state court proceedings. The privacy interests of individuals concerning illegally obtained evidence are protected by the requirement that such evidence not be used against such individuals. Violation of the state privacy act by the joint federal/state investigation represents the kind of intrusion that the exclusionary rule is designed to prevent. Refusal to employ the strict state standards to the wiretap evidence gathered by federal agents in contravention of state law has the effect of impairing legitimate state privacy interests.
Article 1, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." This constitutional guaranty confers upon the citizenry of this state a right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136 (1984). The exclusionary rule is applicable whenever the right of an individual to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions under article 1, section 7 is unreasonably violated. State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 110, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
This court has recognized that the exclusionary rule should be applied to achieve three objectives:
first, and most important, to protect privacy interests of individuals against unreasonable governmental intrusions; second, to deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; and third, to preserve the dignity of the judiciary by refusing to consider evidence which has been obtained through illegal means.
State v. Bonds, 98 Wn.2d 1, 12, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982).
The statutorily imposed requirement of establishing probable cause for issuance of warrants for state intercepts *883embodies the constitutional standards for accommodating the often opposing interests in safeguarding citizens from unreasonable interferences with privacy and in seeking to give fair leeway for effective law enforcement. See State v. Broadnax, 98 Wn.2d 289, 303, 654 P.2d 96 (1982).
Policy arguments rooted in deterrence and maintaining judicial integrity, the other objectives which are said to be served by the exclusionary rule, have great validity here. A blanket suppression rule governing the use of unlawfully obtained wiretap evidence for purposes of determining probable cause would deter state and federal officers from violating state law.
I perceive no basis for distinguishing between the exclusionary rule of RCW 9.73.050 and the use prohibition of RCW 9.73.030; each of those provisions is a device for eliminating an invasion of privacy whether in its inception or derivative thereof. If evidence obtained in conformity with federal standards but in violation of state law is excluded in state court proceedings under RCW 9.73.050, State v. Williams, 94 Wn.2d 531, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980), its use by state officers in a probable cause proceeding continues to be precluded by RCW 9.73.030.
It is contrary to reason and common sense for the majority to contend that the federal wiretap information in Williams was not illegal. It is the fact that such evidence is illegal under Washington law that requires it to be held inadmissible in a state court proceeding pursuant to RCW 9.73.050. See Williams, at 536. In the present case, it is not the exclusionary rule of RCW 9.73.050 which prohibits the use of this illegally seized information, but the application of the firmly established principles of article 1, section 7 that illegally seized information shall not be used in a court proceeding to establish probable cause for a subsequent seizure which requires exclusion of the federal wiretap.
The majority has, in effect, created a new version of the "silver platter doctrine". According to the original silver platter doctrine, evidence obtained by state officials and turned over to federal officials would not be suppressed *884even though it was obtained by means of an illegal search. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 93 L. Ed. 1819, 69 S. Ct. 1372 (1949). The original doctrine was overruled by the Supreme Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960) on the basis that it undermined the policies of deterrence and judicial integrity inherent in the purpose of the exclusionary rule.
Free and open cooperation between state and federal law enforcement officers is to be commended and encouraged. Yet that kind of cooperation is hardly promoted by a rule that implicitly invites federal officers to withdraw from such association and at least tacitly to encourage state officers in the disregard of constitutionally protected freedom. If, on the other hand, it is understood that the fruit of an unlawful search by state agents will be inadmissible in a federal trial, there can be no inducement to subterfuge and evasion with respect to federal-state cooperation in criminal investigation. Instead, forthright cooperation under constitutional standards will be promoted and fostered.
Elkins, at 221-22.
The majority's holding invites state law enforcement personnel to withdraw from initial association with federal officers and tacitly encourages the federal officers to disregard our statutory prohibitions. The silver platter doctrine would then permit state use of this illegally obtained information to obtain state court authorization for its own interception.
To allow the illegally obtained evidence to be used to establish probable cause would simply encourage law enforcement to do indirectly that which they cannot legally do directly. This court should not condone such an incentive to circumvent the purpose and intent of the state privacy act by subterfuge and evasion of state-guaranteed privacy interests.
I would hold that the information obtained by the federal officers was illegal under Washington law and should have been excluded from the probable cause determination. Such a rule is consistent with the Williams opinion, rein*885forces the policies underlying the privacy act, and prevents erosion of the exclusionary rule and its deterrent effect.
Furthermore, such a holding does not require a finding that the state orders in the instant action were improperly issued. The affidavits establish probable cause for issuance of the warrants independent of the information contained in Federal Bureau of Investigation tapes. This court recently reaffirmed the Aguilar-Spinelli 2-pronged test for evaluating the existence of probable cause in relation to informants' tips. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984). For an informant's tip (as detailed in an affidavit) to create probable cause for a search warrant to issue, (1) the officer's affidavit must set forth some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant drew his conclusions so that a magistrate can independently evaluate the reliability of the manner in which the informant acquired his information; and (2) the affidavit must set forth some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible or his information reliable. Jackson, at 435. The affidavit submitted by Sergeant Gibbs meets this 2-pronged test. Exhibit B.
The first, or "basis of knowledge", prong requires a revealing of some underlying factual justification for the informant's conclusion so that an assessment of the probable accuracy of the informant's conclusion can be made. State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980). Generally the surest way to satisfy the "basis of knowledge" prong is by showing that the informant is passing on what is to him firsthand information. 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3 (1978). In the affidavit submitted by Sergeant Gibbs in the instant case, paragraph (2)(g) clearly establishes the informant's firsthand knowledge:
Between 4/25/83 and 6/08/83 Confidential Informant #421 and [defendant] Chong Sim O'Neill had several conversations regarding the sauna operations . . .
Hence, the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test is met.
Under the second or "veracity" prong, sufficient facts *886must be presented so the magistrate may determine either the inherent credibility or the reliability of the informant on the particular occasion. State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 965, 639 P.2d 743, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982). This prong is met if the information has led to arrests or if the past information has proven to be '"true and correct'". Fisher, at 965. Sergeant Gibbs' affidavit states that the information received from informant Velez was proven to be "correct and true" and led to one arrest. Exhibit B, paragraph (2)(a), (c). Hence, the affidavit meets the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
Accordingly, there existed lawful grounds, independent of the illegal federal tapes, in support of the state court warrants for intercept of conversation.
Conclusion
Washington State has chosen to grant its citizenry a greater privacy interest in communications than mandated by federal law. Where the State chooses to enforce this privacy interest by prohibiting certain conduct by its law enforcement officers, that prohibition stands as a limitation of the state officer's authority to otherwise use information obtained in violation of the privacy interests of its citizenry.
I submit that the construction of the Washington privacy act by which the majority sustains the use of illegally obtained wiretap information, a construction which labels a direct violation of the state's privacy act appropriate to the proper performance of the state officer's official duties, is no inconsequential intrusion on the privacy interests of our citizenry. Reading into the state privacy act the legislative intent to permit illicit investigative cooperation decried by state law, not only is an undeserved blight on our Legislature but a compromise of the integrity of the Washington judiciary as well. In my view, due respect to our Legislature and the integrity of our judiciary forbids our ignoring, if not rewarding, a state officer's violation of the commands of the sovereignty which employs him.
*887In all other aspects, I concur with the majority.
Pearson, J., concurs with Dore, J.