Court Opinion

ID: 9943447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 16:10:15.528955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:01.211052
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re S.W., 2024-Ohio-681.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 IN RE: S.W., A.W.                                   :
                                                     :
                                                     :   C.A. No. 29874
                                                     :
                                                     :   Trial Court Case Nos. C-2023-002004-
                                                     :   01; C-2023-002003-01
                                                     :
                                                     :   (Appeal from Common Pleas Court-
                                                     :   Juvenile Division)
                                                     :

                                               ...........

                                               OPINION

                                       Rendered on February 23, 2024

                                               ...........

ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Attorney for Appellant, Father

NATHAN B. VANDERHORST, Attorney for Appellee, Montgomery County Children
Services

                                              .............

WELBAUM, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant Father appeals from an order awarding temporary custody of his

minor children, S.W. and A.W., to Appellee, Montgomery County Children Services

(“MCCS”).      Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting

temporary custody to MCCS. In addition, Father argues that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel in the proceedings below. For the reasons discussed below, we
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find that Father’s assignments of error lack merit. Accordingly, the judgments of the

juvenile court will be affirmed.

                           I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

       {¶ 2} On April 21, 2023, MCCS filed dependency complaints regarding S.W. and

A.W., contending they lacked adequate parental care due to their parents’ mental or

physical condition.1 According to the complaints, MCCS had been involved with the

children on August 20, 2020, based on concerns over domestic violence, physical abuse,

drug use, medical neglect, and children failing to attend school. Montgomery County

J.C. No. 2023-2003, Dependency Complaint (Apr. 23, 2023), p. 1. After filing complaints

in September 2021, MCCS had protective supervision over the children before

withdrawing the complaints without prejudice in January 2022. Id.

       {¶ 3} On November 4, 2022, MCCS again became involved due to concerns about

physical abuse and neglect and exposure to domestic violence in the home.             The

complaints stated that the police had been called to the home on numerous occasions for

domestic violence complaints, and that on November 4, 2022, an incident occurred in the

early morning hours in which Father “allegedly beat mother’s head into a kitchen counter

resulting in her stabbing him with a knife before he fled the house.” Id. at p. 1-2. Mother

reportedly was under the influence, and the children were present. Father was later

arrested as the primary aggressor. Id. at p. 2.

       {¶ 4} The children reported to MCCS that they knew where illegal drugs were

1 Because there are two complaints, we will refer to the docket in In re S.W., Montgomery

J.C. No. C-2023-002003-01.
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hidden in the house. In addition, Mother reported that she had experienced 16 years of

violence with Father, that he had been in prison for violence against her, and that she had

also refused to follow through with charges against him. Id.

       {¶ 5} Another referral was received in November 2022 about the children being left

alone with inappropriate drug use and that Mother was using cocaine; the children

confirmed Mother’s drug use. At that time, MCCS created a safety plan to place the

children temporarily with a non-relative. However, the agency then received reports that

this person was violating the plan by letting the parents reside in her home with the

children, unsupervised.     Id.   Another referral was received in December 2022

concerning the fact that A.W. had bruises under her eye because Father had thrown a

water bottle at her; Father denied this. Id. Mother then contacted police in January

2023 about Father’s violation of a protection order. She accused Father of slashing her

tires and stealing her phone. Later that January, Father was charged again with violating

the protection order.     However, Mother failed to appear and both charges were

dismissed. Id.

       {¶ 6} The complaints further alleged that Mother had lost custody of six of her other

children due to violence and substance abuse in the home, and that although MCCS had

regular contact with Father, he had refused to cooperate. Id. at p. 2-3. MCCS asked

the court to adjudicate the children as dependent and to award MCCS temporary custody.

       {¶ 7} On April 21, 2023, MCCS also filed a motion seeking interim temporary

custody at an ex parte hearing due to violence, substance abuse, and violations of the

safety plan. The same day, the court granted MCCS’s motion for interim temporary
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custody and set a hearing for April 24, 2023. The court also appointed a guardian ad

litem for the children. At the April hearing, the court found that placement with the

parents would place the children in imminent risk of harm, that the parents were unable

to provide the children with a safe and stable home at that time, and that MCCS had

concerns about domestic violence and substance abuse. The court, therefore, granted

the agency interim temporary custody of A.W. and S.W. An adjudication hearing was

set for July 10, 2023. Magistrate’s Interim and Final Order (Apr. 24, 2023), p. 2-4.

Subsequently, the court set a disposition hearing for July 14, 2023.

       {¶ 8} A semiannual administrative review (“SAR”) was filed on June 21, 2023,

discussing the case’s progress, which included that Father had been combative and

uncooperative during most of the life of the case and had refused to provide a release of

information until that week. SAR at p. 3 and 8. On the same day, MCCS filed an

amended dependency complaint seeking a new disposition, which was preferred custody

to MCCS or, alternatively, to the children’s adult half-sibling.

       {¶ 9} MCCS then filed a family case plan (“FCP”) on July 5, 2023, outlining various

goals, including the following items: (1) Father “will be honest about his drug use/selling,

will submit to random screens and will complete an AOD assessment and follow

recommendations”; (2) Father “will complete Batterer’s Intervention/August Project and

will demonstrate newly learned skills in his interaction with [a then 16-year-old child who

was involved in the proceedings and is not the subject of the current appeal]. He will

recognize behaviors that are controlling and lead to violence”; (3) Father “will obtain and

maintain income that will meet the needs of his family and will provide pay check stubs to
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verify legal income”; (4) Father “will obtain and maintain housing that will meet the needs

of his family if he wishes to obtain custody of his children”; (5) Father “will sign releases

of information for service providers as needed’; (6) Father “will meet with the CW

[caseworker] at his home on a monthly basis and more often as needed to discuss case

plan progress”; and (7) Father “will attend weekly visitation with his children which will be

supervised until it is determined that visits do not need to be supervised. [Father] will

make sure that his children know they are to tell the truth about what goes on in their

home and that they are safe to report concerns.” FCP (July 5, 2023), p. 8. At that time,

A.W. and S.W. were in a foster home and MCCS intended to place them with a relative.

Id. at p. 1-3.

       {¶ 10} At the July 10, 2023 dependency hearing, both parents agreed to a

dependency finding. Transcript of Proceedings (Dependency Hearing) (July 10, 2023),

7, 13, 15, and 18-23. The court then held the disposition hearing on July 14, 2023.

During the hearing, the court heard testimony from Jeremiah Hunt, the MCCS

caseworker, and from Father.        At the hearing, Mother agreed to MCCS’s having

temporary custody, with visitation at the agency on Tuesdays from 5:00 to 7:00 p.m. until

August 15, 2023, when Mother would be able to take the children off grounds for the same

period of time. There would also be no contact with Father during visitation. Transcript

of Proceedings (Disposition Hearing) (July 14, 2023) (Disp. Tr.”), 11-12, 15, and 17-18.

If any contact with Father occurred or if any domestic violence occurred between the

parents, visitation would return to occurring at the agency. Id. at 13.

       {¶ 11} During the hearing, Father did not agree to MCCS having temporary
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custody. Id. at 11. MCCS proposed visitation for Father with the same conditions as

Mother, but on Thursdays, from 5:00 to 7:00 p.m. Id. at 13.

       {¶ 12} According to the caseworker, Jeremiah Hunt, the children were doing well

in foster care and in school and did not have significant special needs, other than S.W.’s

severe asthma. Id. at 21-25. Hunt then discussed Mother’s progress on the case plan.

Id. at 26-34. Among other things, Mother had told him that she had been hit by a car in

April 2023. At first, Mother claimed it was a hit-and-run as she was exiting her food truck.

(Both parents had operated a food truck together prior to May 2023.) Id. at 28 and 31.

However, Mother then reported to Hunt in May that Father had hit her and driven over her

with his truck, and she had filed for a temporary protection order (TPO), which was

granted. Id. The TPO was later dismissed. Id. at 31.

       {¶ 13} At a prior hearing in April 2023, Hunt saw a video of Mother and Father

running into each other with vehicles. Father had a pickup truck and Mother had a food

truck. Hunt discussed it with Mother, and she denied being involved in that incident.

Disp. Tr. at 32 and 54. Both parents denied being involved in any “back and forth with

vehicles.” Id. at 33. Father also denied to Hunt that he had run over Mother with a food

truck in April 2023. Id.

       {¶ 14} Concerning Father, Hunt testified that Father had not been very cooperative

and had refused to sign a release of information until May 25, 2023. Id. at 35. At the

time of the hearing, Father did not appear to have his own stable housing. Hunt had

completed visits with Father in several different residences, including his sister’s home,

his mother’s home, and a residence Father had claimed to be renting on Emerson
                                                                                      -7-

Avenue, but for which he had no lease. Id. Father had also said he had been working

on another address to rent separate from the Emerson residence. As a result, the

housing objective was ongoing. Id. at 36.

      {¶ 15} Father also had not provided verifiable information about his source of

income or deposits other than showing Hunt screenshots of two business bank accounts

and a savings account. In June 2023, Father had a savings balance of $10,000, a slight

negative business balance in one account, and some money in the other account. Id. at

37-38. Father did not show Hunt any bank statements. Rather, he just provided images

on his phone that showed a bank balance. Id. at 55. Father had also not established

who owned the food truck, which was reported to be his income source. Id. at 36-37.

In addition, Father had never been clear on his monthly income. Id. at 38.

      {¶ 16} According to Hunt, Father had not engaged with the August Project for

domestic violence. Disp. Tr. at 38-39. At the end of June 2023, Father brought Hunt

some documentation from Samaritan Behavioral Health (“SBH”), but Hunt had not yet

been able to verify with a therapist what type of domestic violence material was being

addressed. Id. at 39-40. Father apparently had mental health and substance abuse

diagnoses in November 2022, and the most recent documentation Hunt had only went

through May 2023. Id. at 41-42. Again, Hunt had not yet been able to verify the specific

treatment, and Father needed to continue to sign releases so that Hunt could verify his

progress on case plan objectives. Id. at 42.

      {¶ 17} Hunt did indicate that Father’s visitation was very consistent and had been

positive. Id. at 42. However, Mother was present during Father’s July 6, 2023 visit,
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which was against the rules. Id. at 34 and 43. Hunt was concerned about the possibility

of the parents hurting each other. In addition, he was concerned about the ongoing

interpersonal conflict and filing of TPOs and then not following through. Id. at 43. Anger

management for Father was a huge component. Id. at 44.

      {¶ 18} During the case, MCCS had contacted quite a few people in an attempt to

get the children out of foster care. MCCS had planned to place the children with the

most recent person (the eighth) on July 6, 2023. However, that person backed out, and

MCCS was researching a ninth person. Id. at 44-45. The eighth person, who was

Father’s daughter, had expressed willingness to take the children at a later time, in mid-

September 2023, when she relocated and changed addresses. MCCS kept having the

same issue with Father on this subject. After Hunt met with the daughter on May 9, 2023,

Father had shown up unannounced at the daughter’s home three times and had parked

a car in the front yard. The daughter said she was not willing to take the children until

she moved because she did not want Father to have her address. Id. at 46-47.

      {¶ 19} At the hearing, Father testified that his SBH therapist had previously worked

for children services. According to Father, the therapist said that if he were subpoenaed,

he would say that Father had “completed a case plan at least three times over.” Disp.

Tr. at 61. Father also stated that his domestic violence and anger management issues

were being addressed at SBH. Id. at 63. As to why he did not sign a release until late

May 2023, Father claimed SBH did not recognize MCCS’s information and he had to sign

SBH’s release. He stated that he was going by what SBH and his therapist told him. Id.

at 70 and 75.
                                                                                          -9-

       {¶ 20} Concerning his housing, Father testified that he had sold the house he

previously claimed to be renting (the Emerson Avenue home) and had been living for the

past month and a half with his cousin in a five-bedroom home in Dayton. Id. at 63-64

and 69-70. According to Father, his cousin was planning to move to Tennessee and was

going to let Father take over the house. Id. at 64. No documentation of any of this was

provided.

       {¶ 21} On July 14, 2023, the court filed orders granting temporary custody of A.W.

and S.W. to MCCS. Among other things, the court found that: the children had been

removed from Mother’s care on December 8, 2022; “placement with either parent would

place the children in imminent risk of harm”; Father and Mother were not adequately able

to care for the children; Father “testified that he has made significant progress on his case

plan but has not verified with the agency”: and it was in the children’s best interest for

temporary custody to be granted to MCCS. Judge’s Final Appealable Order (July 14,

2023), p. 2-3. The court also established visitation times for each parent and ordered

that they not have contact during each other’s parenting time or interfere with parenting

time. Id. at p. 3.

       {¶ 22} The court filed amended orders on August 4, 2023. The relevant findings

were not changed, but the court added language restricting the location of off-site

parenting time and ordering parenting time to revert back to the agency if the parents

violated any parenting orders. Amended Judge’s Final Appealable Order (Aug. 4, 2023),

p. 3. Father timely appealed from the court’s August 4, 2023 orders. Mother did not

appeal.
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                                 II. Temporary Custody Award

       {¶ 23} Father’s first assignment of error states that:

              The Juvenile Court Judge Abused Her Discretion by Awarding

       Temporary Custody of the Children to MCCS.

       {¶ 24} Under this assignment of error, Father contends that the juvenile court

abused its discretion in granting temporary custody to MCCS. According to Father, the

record indicates that he completed all of his case plan objectives, including housing,

visitation, sufficient income, mental health treatment, and domestic violence and anger

management.

       {¶ 25} Under R.C. 2151.353(A), a juvenile court may make any one of several

dispositional orders if a child is adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent. These

orders include, among other things, committing the child to the temporary custody of a

public children services agency or awarding legal custody to either parent or another

person. R.C. 2151.353(A)(2)(a) and (c). “ ‘In choosing among the alternatives, the best

interest of the child is the court's primary consideration. Furthermore, in making its

dispositional order, the court must consider which situation will best promote the “care,

protection, and mental and physical development” of the child with the understanding that

the court should separate a child from his family environment “only when necessary for

the child's welfare or in the interests of public safety.” ’ ” In re L.C., 2d Dist. Clark No.

2010-CA-90, 2011-Ohio-2066, ¶ 13, quoting In re C.W., 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-09-26,

2010-Ohio-2157, ¶ 11.
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       {¶ 26} “When considering the best interest of the child, courts typically look to the

factors found in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).” In re M.S., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29441, 2022-

Ohio-3348, ¶ 38, citing In re M.W., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29413, 2022-Ohio-2054,

¶ 13. “Some of the listed factors ‘include such things as the parents’ wishes; the child's

wishes, if the court has interviewed the child; the child’s interaction with parents, siblings,

and others who may significantly affect the child's best interests; adjustment of the child

to home, school, and community; and the mental and physical health of all involved

persons.’ ” Id., quoting In re D.S., 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013-CA-51, 2014-Ohio-2444, ¶ 9.

       {¶ 27} “A temporary-custody decision ‘must be supported by a preponderance of

the evidence.’ ” In re A.A.R., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2021-CA-23, 2022-Ohio-93, ¶ 17,

quoting In re S.M., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24539, 2011-Ohio-6710, ¶ 4.

“Preponderance of the evidence simply means ‘evidence which is of a greater weight or

more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.’ ” In re Starks, 2d

Dist. Darke No. 1646, 2005-Ohio-1912, ¶ 15, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1182 (6th

Ed.1998).

       {¶ 28} Nonetheless, “[a] trial court has substantial discretion in weighing the

considerations involved in making the determination regarding a child's best interest, and

the court's determination will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” In re

S.M. at ¶ 4, citing In re K.H., 2d Dist. Clark No. 2009-CA-80, 2010-Ohio-1609, ¶ 66.

“ ‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable.” (Citation omitted.) AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban

Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). Most often, this
                                                                                        -12-

means a court’s decision was based on unsound reasoning rather than being arbitrary or

unconscionable. Id.

       {¶ 29} We have also stressed that “our review is limited to determining whether the

record contains competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court's decision.” In re

A.A.R. at ¶ 17, citing In re J.T., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26839, 2016-Ohio-602, ¶ 33.

On review, we are also guided by a presumption that the trial court’s factual findings were

correct, because “[t]he knowledge a trial court gains through observing the witnesses and

the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed

record.” Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523 N.E.2d 846 (1988). Accord In re

M.S., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29441, 2022-Ohio-3348, ¶ 36.

       {¶ 30} Notably, in a very recent decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio accepted a

certified conflict regarding the proper standard to be applied to review of permanent

custody decisions. In re Z.C., Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4703, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 1.

The court remarked that confusion may have arisen due to its prior decisions, which had

applied the abuse of discretion standard in custody cases. Id. at ¶ 12. However, the

court distinguished these cases because they “involved change-of-custody proceedings

under R.C. 3109.04 for the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities, not a

permanent-custody determination terminating parental rights under R.C. 2151.414, for

which the General Assembly has expressly prescribed a clear-and-convincing-evidence

burden of proof.” Id., discussing Masters v. Masters, 69 Ohio St.3d 83, 85, 630 N.E.2d

665 (1994), and Miller at 74.

       {¶ 31} The court, therefore, held that:
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                 Given that R.C. 2151.414 requires that a juvenile court find by clear

       and convincing evidence that the statutory requirements are met, we agree

       with those appellate courts that have determined that the sufficiency-of-the-

       evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards of review are

       the proper appellate standards of review of a juvenile court's permanent-

       custody determination, as appropriate depending on the nature of the

       arguments that are presented by the parties.

Id. at ¶ 11.

       {¶ 32} Most cases subsequently citing In re Z.C. have involved permanent

custody.       E.g., In re E.C., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-23-1217, 2024-Ohio-281, ¶ 71.

However, in the one case that did not, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals noted In re

Z.C. in a footnote, but applied an abuse of discretion standard for purposes of reviewing

a grant of legal custody. See In re I.G.C., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2023-P-0026, 2024-

Ohio-145, ¶ 15 and fn. 2. In light of the lower burden of proof in such cases, i.e., a

preponderance of the evidence, this was appropriate. Accordingly, in situations like the

present, where only temporary custody is at issue, we will continue to apply the standards

we recited above, which involve abuse of discretion.

       {¶ 33} In contending that the juvenile court abused its discretion, Father focuses

primarily on his own testimony that he completed his case plan. Appellant’s Brief, p. 4-

5. However, the juvenile court was not required to credit Father’s testimony, and the

evidence in the record supported the court’s decision.         A significant reason for the

children’s removal was domestic violence. Despite Father’s contention that he had been
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treated, the parents’ violent interactions with each other only a few months before the

temporary custody hearing belied this assertion. Anger and violence continued and were

a legitimate concern for the court.    In addition, the parties’ willingness to disregard

visitation restrictions designed to protect the children was evident. Specifically, in the

weeks before the custody hearing, Mother was present during Father’s visitation with the

children at the agency.

       {¶ 34} Furthermore, Father did not maintain stable housing. During the time this

action was pending, Father lived in several different places and never provided any

verification of independent housing. Moreover, counsel was appointed for Father in May

2023 because he was indigent, and he did not thereafter provide MCCS with any income

statements verifying the source of his income. It is true that Father’s savings account

showed a $10,000 balance in June 2023 (which contradicts his claim of indigence).

Again, however, Father failed to provide documentation of how he earned his income,

and there was no indication that it would continue, because his only source of income

was a food truck. Finally, Father did not convincingly explain why he had waited so long

to provide MCCS with information about his treatment.

       {¶ 35} In light of these points, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in

awarding temporary custody of the children to MCCS. Accordingly, the first assignment

of error is overruled.

                          III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       {¶ 36} Father’s second assignment of error states that:
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                  Father Was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel in the Trial

         Court.

         {¶ 37} Under this assignment of error, Father contends that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel in the juvenile court. His primary point is that his trial counsel erred

in failing to call Father’s SBH therapist, “Max,” who would have testified that Father had

“ ‘completed a case plan three times over.’ ” Appellant’s Brief at p. 5, quoting Disp. Tr.

at 61.

         {¶ 38} Our district has recognized the right to effective assistance of counsel in

“actions seeking the permanent, involuntary termination of parental custody.” In re J.D.,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26588, 2015-Ohio-4114, ¶ 79.                This is because “ ‘the

permanent termination of parental rights has been described as “the family law equivalent

of the death penalty.” ’ ” In re A.T., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28332, 2019-Ohio-3527,

¶ 68, quoting In re S.A., 2d Dist. Clark No. 2007-CA-110, 2008-Ohio-2225, ¶ 7. (Other

citation omitted.)

         {¶ 39} “An award of legal custody is not the equivalent of, nor as drastic as, a

permanent custody award, because legal custody ‘does not divest a parent of residual

parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.’ ” In re P.S., 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

28812, 2020-Ohio-4929, ¶ 7, quoting In re C.R., 108 Ohio St.3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191,

843 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 17. This is likely the reason the Fifth District Court of Appeals has

declined to extend “the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel beyond criminal

cases and those involving permanent custody.” In re L.J.W., 5th Dist. Ashland No. 16

COA 013, 2016-Ohio-7054, ¶ 12. Accord In re B.H., 5th Dist. Richland No. 18CA95,
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2019-Ohio-1508, ¶ 45. Other districts, however, have applied the doctrine in temporary

custody cases. See In re Q.S., 2023-Ohio-712, 210 N.E.3d 610, ¶ 130-131 (8th Dist.);

In re Graves, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 99-G-2219, 2000 WL 816320, *7 (June 23, 2001); In

re H.D.D., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-134, 2012-Ohio-6160, ¶ 55 (same).

       {¶ 40} In a case involving a temporary custody situation, our district also has said

that while “ineffective assistance claims are typically raised in cases involving termination

of parental rights, they have also been considered in less serious juvenile matters, due to

the requirement in R.C. 2151.352 that counsel be furnished at all stages of juvenile

proceedings.” Matter of Lannom, 2d Dist. Clark No. 1996-CA-64, 1997 WL 761323, *10

(Dec. 12, 1997), citing Matter of Mull, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-96-38, 1997 WL 155412

(Mar. 24, 1997). In Mull, the court remarked that “[u]nder R.C. 2151.352, the right to

counsel implies effective assistance of counsel.” This statute, indeed, does provide for

a right to counsel. Consequently, we will consider Father’s assignment of error.

       {¶ 41} To succeed on ineffective assistance claims, a party must establish: (1) trial

counsel’s deficient performance; and (2) that the deficient performance caused prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);

State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraph two of the

syllabus. In order to prove deficient performance, a defendant must show that “counsel's

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation.” Strickland

at 688. To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
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confidence in the outcome.”     Id. at 694.   “In making the determination whether the

specified errors resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent

challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury

acted according to law.” Id.

       {¶ 42} After reviewing the record, we find no evidence of deficient performance or

prejudice. “The defendant or petitioner has the burden of proof on the issue of ineffective

assistance of counsel, as licensed attorneys in Ohio are presumed to be competent.”

State v. Southern, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27932, 2018-Ohio-4886, ¶ 47, citing State v.

Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). “Trial counsel is entitled to a

strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” In re J.J., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-495, 2006-Ohio-6151, ¶ 29, citing

State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675, 693 N.E.2d 267 (1998).

       {¶ 43} Furthermore, “[a]n appellant is not deprived of effective assistance of

counsel when counsel chooses, for strategic reasons, not to pursue every possible trial

tactic.” State v. Conley, 2015-Ohio-2553, 43 N.E.3d 775, ¶ 56 (2d Dist.), citing State v.

Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 319, 528 N.E.2d 523 (1988).           For example, “[f]ailing to

question witnesses on cross examination and choosing not to present witnesses fall

within the realm of trial strategy.” In re Riley, 4th Dist. Washington No. 03CA19, 2003-

Ohio-4109, ¶ 21. In addition, the law is “well settled that debatable trial tactics do not

give rise to a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.” In re Simon, 9th Dist. Wayne

No. 00CA0072, 2001 WL 651519, *2 (June 13, 2001), citing State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio

St.2d 45, 49, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980).
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       {¶ 44} In the case before us, trial counsel could have had various reasons for

failing to call Father’s therapist to testify.   Notwithstanding Father’s unsubstantiated

statements about what his therapist would say, it is quite possible that cross-examination

may have disclosed matters unfavorable to Father’s case.         Appellate courts do not

second-guess counsel’s decisions on trial strategy. In re B.B., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2015-

CA-1, 2015-Ohio-3790, ¶ 29.

       {¶ 45} The trial testimony that Father cites indicates that: (1) Father’s therapist

would have said that Father had “completed his case plan three times over”; and (2)

Father’s therapist or a doctor would have been willing to testify if subpoenaed.

Appellant’s Brief at p. 5, citing Tr. at 61 and 75. However, we have already rejected

Father’s statement about completing his case plan, because he did not complete most of

it. Therefore, whatever Father’s therapist may have said on that point is irrelevant. In

addition, a general statement that someone may have testified if subpoenaed is

meaningless and does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Accordingly, Father’s second assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.

                                      IV. Conclusion

       {¶ 46} Both of Father’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgments

of the juvenile court are affirmed.

                                      .............

TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.
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