Court Opinion

ID: 9696392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:46:37.396051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:21.822155
License: Public Domain

*259HAMLIN, Justice
(dissenting).
I am compelled to dissent from the majority opinion herein.
LSA-R.S. 14:129 is found under the heading, “Jury Tampering.” Its purpose is to prevent jury tampering. It has been on the statute books since 1942. The statute provides in effect that jury tampering is any influencing of or attempt to influence any petit juror in respect to his verdict in any cause pending or about to be brought before him other than that influence which occurs in the regular course of a trial.
With regard to the word “influence” as applicable to jurors, it leaps to the mind that a juror may be influenced to do one of the following:
(a) Return a qualified verdict or verdict for a lesser offense than charged;
(b) Return a verdict of guilty as charged;
(c) Return a verdict of not guilty.
I am not aware of any other “influence” that could be exerted on a juror.
I am of the opinion that the word “influence” with regard to jurors (and that is what is under consideration in this case) has a common accepted meaning.1 As stated in State v. Evans et al., 214 La. 472, 38 So.2d 140, it would be folly for the Legislature to define in a statute words that have a common and accepted meaning (when applicable to jurors). See, also, State v. Roth, 226 La. 1, 74 So.2d 392.
In the case of State v. Rose, 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643, Chief Justice O’Niell set out a rule or yardstick, call it what one will, to the effect that if all qualifying terms are contained in a statute, they would amount to nothing but tautology, which is no more desirable in a statute than in a newspaper write-up or elsewhere.
“The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision." LSA-R.S. 14:3. (Emphasis mine.)
It is clear to me that the Article under consideration was also enacted to ensure the impartial administration of justice, which is the foundation of liberty.
The trial judge is vested with the discretion to determine, after hearing the evidence in a case of this nature, and weighing the facts adduced by the evidence, whether or not what was said or done by the accused to the juror or jurors was in fact jury tampering and done with the intent to influence his or their verdict and thus defeat the impartial administration of criminal justice.
*261If appellate courts are going to strike down laws enacted for the purpose of preventing what this law is intended to prevent on the ground that words that have a common accepted meaning are vague, then, in my opinion, many important laws providing for the welfare, protection and safety of the public are going to be written out of the statute books by judicial decree, thus leaving a void in the substantive criminal law which will allow the criminal minded to be subject to no discipline whatever.
Being of the opinion that LSA-R.S. 14:129 is clear and constitutional, I respectfully dissent.

. It is synonymous with the vernacularism, "Put the fix on.”