Court Opinion

ID: 9638226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:38:08.947555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:04.948202
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
James Calvin Lewis, appellant, was convicted of “knowingly and intentionally en-gag[ing] in sexual contact with L.S., hereinafter styled [the] complainant, a female child then younger than seventeen (17) years [of age] and not then the spouse of the Defendant, by touching the genitals of the complainant with the intent to arouse and gratify the sexual desire of the Defendant.” [Emphasis added]. The record reflects that the female complaining witness was twelve years of age when the offense was allegedly committed.
Because of the reasons the majority gives in its opinion, also see Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), I agree that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence testimony which related to appellant telling another person about his past efforts and future plans to photograph children in the nude for publication and sale. I also agree with the majority’s holding that the trial court further erred when it admitted into evidence a magazine which contained nude photographs of what appears to be a female approximately 12 years of age, who was other than the complainant.
Notwithstanding my agreement with the majority on the above, I am unable to agree with its conclusion that there is not a reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed either to the jury’s finding appellant guilty or the trial court’s assessment of punishment.
*144Of course, the actual effect on the jury of the prosecutor’s demonstrating to it of such opprobious conduct on the part of the appellant will never be known. However, the question is not what actual effect the inadmissible evidence had on the jury, but, instead, is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the jury finding appellant guilty. Given the nature of the offense, in conjunction with the inadmissible evidence, I am unable to state that there is not a reasonable possibility that the inadmissible evidence did not contribute to the jury’s verdict of guilty.
I also find that the errors carried over to the assessment of punishment by the trial judge. In this regard, I do not believe it is humanly possible to state that there is not a reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence did not contribute to the trial judge assessing appellant’s punishment at seventeen (10) years’ confinement in the penitentiary; especially is this so when one examines the record and finds that appellant was not shown to have ever had any type of criminal record.
The errors were not harmless. The judgment of conviction should be reversed and not affirmed.
I dissent.