Court Opinion

ID: 9376489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-02 20:00:36.766322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.202833
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-2129     Document: 010110820504       Date Filed: 03/02/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 2, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-2129
                                                    (D.C. No. 2:22-CR-00242-KG-1)
  DIMAS RODRIGUEZ-RUIZ,                                        (D. N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Dimas Rodriguez-Ruiz appeals from his sentence despite the appeal waiver in

 his plea agreement. The government now moves to enforce that waiver under United

 States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Through counsel,

 Rodriguez-Ruiz responds that the appeal waiver is unenforceable for lack of

 consideration. For the reasons explained below, we grant the government’s motion.

 I.    BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       In February 2022, a grand jury in the District of New Mexico indicted

 Rodriguez-Ruiz for the crime of illegal reentry into the United States. He chose to

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-2129      Document: 010110820504       Date Filed: 03/02/2023   Page: 2

 accept a plea deal offered by the government. Specifically, he agreed to plead guilty

 to the illegal-reentry charge (the only charge alleged in the indictment), and to waive

 his right to appeal the conviction or sentence. He also agreed not to seek a

 downward departure or variance, or otherwise seek a sentence below the guidelines

 range.

          The government, for its part, stipulated that Rodriguez-Ruiz met the

 requirements for a two-level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G.

 § 3E1.1(a). The government also agreed to move for an additional one-level

 reduction under § 3E1.1(b), if applicable. Finally, the government agreed not to

 bring other criminal charges against Rodriguez-Ruiz arising out of the facts

 underlying the indictment.

          Following a hearing, the district court accepted Rodriguez-Ruiz’s plea. The

 parties then prepared for sentencing, and the presentence report included a two-level

 reduction under § 3E1.1(a) and a one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b). Combined

 with his criminal history, his guidelines range came out to 37–46 months. The

 district court ultimately accepted the presentence report without change and

 sentenced Rodriguez-Ruiz to 37 months’ imprisonment.

          Rodriguez-Ruiz timely filed a notice of appeal, leading to the current

 proceeding.

 II.      ANALYSIS

          The government’s motion to enforce would normally require us to ask three

 questions: “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of

                                              2
Appellate Case: 22-2129   Document: 010110820504        Date Filed: 03/02/2023     Page: 3

 appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his

 appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage

 of justice.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. But we need not address a Hahn factor that the

 defendant does not dispute, see United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1143

 (10th Cir. 2005), and Rodriguez-Ruiz does not raise any challenge under these

 factors. He instead argues that his appeal waiver is unenforceable due to lack of

 consideration. Cf. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1324–25 (“[C]ontract principles govern plea

 agreements.”). He claims he could have received the § 3E1.1(a) and (b) reductions

 without a plea agreement, and there is no evidence of other charges the government

 could have brought. Therefore, in Rodriguez-Ruiz’s view, he could have pleaded

 blindly and ended up in the same place without waiving his right to appeal, and the

 government gave nothing in exchange for that waiver—so the waiver fails and must

 be severed.

       “Whether a defendant’s appeal waiver set forth in a plea agreement

 is enforceable is a question of law we review de novo.” United States v.

 Ibarra-Coronel, 517 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008). When a defendant argues

 lack of consideration for an appeal waiver, we look at the whole plea agreement

 because the “appeal waiver [may be] supported by the overall consideration given for

 the plea.” United States v. Miles, 902 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal

 quotation marks omitted).

       The government tells us, however, that we should look at this question solely

 from a plain-error perspective, given that Rodriguez-Ruiz did not raise any

                                           3
Appellate Case: 22-2129    Document: 010110820504         Date Filed: 03/02/2023     Page: 4

 consideration challenge in the district court. The government relies on United States

 v. Rollings, 751 F.3d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2014), where we held, “If defense counsel

 did not object to the validity of the plea, we review solely for plain error.” In

 Rollings, we were specifically addressing an argument that the entire plea was not

 knowing or voluntary, and therefore the appeal waiver within the plea agreement was

 likewise involuntary. See id. at 1187–91. Here, Rodriguez-Ruiz attacks the appeal

 waiver, not his plea agreement overall, nor the resulting guilty plea. We will

 therefore apply our typical standard of review. 1

       We have previously held that overall consideration such as that given here was

 enough to support an appeal waiver. See United States v. Hernandez, 134 F.3d 1435,

 1437–38 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the government agreed to a “three level

 reduction in [the defendant’s] base offense level” and “agreed not to prosecute [the

 defendant] for additional charges arising out of conduct then known to the United

 States”); cf. United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008)

 (rejecting an argument that defense counsel had been ineffective because counsel had

 allegedly negotiated a plea agreement with no benefit to the defendant; among other

       1
          His argument seemingly implies the invalidity of the entire plea agreement—
 and, by extension, the resulting plea—because he is attacking the consideration for
 the plea agreement generally. But the government does not argue that he cannot have
 it both ways, i.e., he cannot invalidate the appeal waiver without invalidating the rest
 of the plea agreement. We will therefore take his argument at face value. See
 Rollings, 751 F.3d at 1190 n.5 (“Where only the appellate waiver provision is
 challenged, as in most cases, we are not obligated to consider whether the plea in the
 plea agreement is valid.”).

                                             4
Appellate Case: 22-2129      Document: 010110820504     Date Filed: 03/02/2023     Page: 5

 things, the government had “agreed to recommend a reduction for acceptance of

 responsibility”).

       Rodriguez-Ruiz counters with a Second Circuit case holding that the

 government’s agreement regarding the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustments

 could not be consideration for an appeal waiver because that three-level adjustment

 “was available to [the defendant] even in the absence of an agreement to waive his

 right to appeal.” United States v. Lutchman, 910 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2018). In

 support, the Second Circuit relied on guidelines commentary stating, “The

 government should not withhold [a § 3E1.1(b) motion] based on . . . whether the

 defendant agrees to waive his or her right to appeal.” Id. at 37–38 (quoting U.S.S.G.

 § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6) (internal quotation marks omitted; alterations in original). The

 Second Circuit appears to be saying that

       •      the district court could grant a two-level adjustment (§ 3E1.1(a))

              without government support (which is correct); and,

       •      although the additional one-level adjustment (§ 3E1.1(b)) requires a

              government motion, the guidelines commentary forbids the government

              from conditioning that motion on an appeal waiver.

 Accordingly, government agreements regarding acceptance of responsibility cannot

 support an appeal waiver.

       We need not address whether the Second Circuit correctly discerned the effect

 of the guidelines commentary. We point out, first, that the Second Circuit seems to

 have been searching for consideration specific to the appeal waiver, which is contrary
                                            5
Appellate Case: 22-2129    Document: 010110820504        Date Filed: 03/02/2023    Page: 6

 to this circuit’s focus on consideration for the plea agreement generally, see Miles,

 902 F.3d at 1161. We also note that the Second Circuit did not discuss the value of

 the government’s agreement to support a two-level adjustment under § 3E1.1(a). It is

 the defendant’s burden to prove entitlement to that adjustment. See United States v.

 Melot, 732 F.3d 1234, 1244 (10th Cir. 2013). Rodriguez-Ruiz gives us no reason

 why we should conclude that the government offers nothing of value when it agrees

 to support the defendant in carrying that burden.

       Rodriguez-Ruiz points to the same Second Circuit decision for the notion that

 an agreement not to bring other charges is insufficient where “[the defendant]

 pleaded guilty to the only count charged in the information, and the government has

 not articulated or identified any additional counts that could have been proven at

 trial.” Lutchman, 910 F.3d at 38. We agree with the government, however, that “the

 record does not indicate whether the government could have done so [in this case]

 because Rodriguez-Ruiz did not raise this argument in the district court. The

 government therefore never had the chance to address whether it could have brought

 additional charges arising from the same facts.” Reply at 5. Moreover, “parties

 cannot build a new record on appeal.” N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish v. United States

 Dep’t of the Interior, 854 F.3d 1236, 1240 n.1 (10th Cir. 2017). Thus, it would be

 inconsistent with due process for this court to fault the government for failing to

 present evidence on an issue it never knew would be contested. Cf. Orner v. Shalala,

 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that due process required relief from

                                            6
Appellate Case: 22-2129   Document: 010110820504        Date Filed: 03/02/2023    Page: 7

 judgment when the burdened party “was not given any notice” of the relevant

 proceeding and “had no reason whatsoever to anticipate [it]”).

 III.   CONCLUSION

        For all these reasons, we reject Rodriguez-Ruiz’s lack-of-consideration

 argument, grant the government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver, and dismiss

 this appeal.

                                            Entered for the Court
                                            Per Curiam

                                           7