Court Opinion

ID: 9758010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:07:20.269161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:46.376976
License: Public Domain

Shangraw, J.,
dissenting. I am unable to subscribe to a reversal in this case.
*311The majority view presupposes that the plaintiff induced Mr. Mosher to use his authority in favor of the plaintiff and against the interest of his principal, the defendant. To a great extent this centers around the letter of May 23, 1960, PI. Ex. 4, signed by Mr. Mosher on behalf of the defendant, modifying the original contract between the plaintiff and defendant to a cost-plus basis.
It becomes apparent from the record, and the majority opinion, that the jury could have reasonably found that this changeover was brought about either by reason of the verbal conversation between Mr. Westlund and Mr. O’Bryan, or by virtue of the letter of May 23, 1960 signed by Mosher. Either was sufficient to support the cost-plus arrangement. These issues were squarely presented to the jury by the court’s charge. In referring to the original contract, the court at one point instructed the jury as follows:
“. . . unless that agreement was rescinded, amended or modified subsequently by the parties either orally or in writing it must stand as the only agreement existing between these parties.”
On the issue of Mosher’s authority to bind the defendant, the court charged:
“If you find by the weight of the evidence that Mr. O’Bryan and Mr. Westlund had no talk in regard to rescinding the written contract and that Mosher was not directed or that he had no authority to act for the defendant and write plaintiff’s #4, then you may not consider plaintiff’s Exhibit #4 in arriving at your decision. The evidence must establish that Mosher had authority to act for the defendant and write the letter, otherwise it has no binding effect on the defendant.”
This is not a one-way street. Assuming that the jury based its verdict on the verbal changeover to a cost-plus basis, which had evidentiary support, then of course the defendant had no occasion to complain. If, on the contrary, the verdict was based entirely upon Mosher’s general authority to write the letter of May 23, 1960, this leads us to the course of dealings between the defendant and Mosher, and the latter’s general authority upon which Westlund had a right to rely.
As evidence to show that the plaintiff could rely on the letter in question, and Mosher’s authority for preparing and signing the same, *312Mr. Westlund testified that on a number of occasions O’Bryan stated to him that he backed Mosher “. . . up 100% at all times.” Plaintiff also produced two contracts signed by Mosher on behalf of the defendant corporation, which contracts were performed by all parties. One of these contracts was between J. Cole Steel Construction Co. and the defendant, dated July 1, 1960, and the other between the defendant and Theodore Logan & Son, dated September 16, 1960. No doubt the court had in mind the foregoing in its submission of the issue of Mosher’s authority to the jury.
In addition to the foregoing Westlund testified that Mosher was present at the time of the changeover to a cost-plus basis, verbally agreed to by the parties, and at the time O’Bryan instructed Mosher to confirm the new arrangement by letter. This was done by letter of May 23, 1960.
It becomes apparent that under the evidence, and the court’s charge, the jury was at liberty to: (1) completely disregard the Mosher letter and rely entirely upon the conversation between Westlund and O’Bryan, or; (2) in connection with the conversation find that Mosher had the authority of the defendant to confirm the hew agreement by the letter of May 23, 1960, or; (3) that Mosher, independent of any verbal arrangement or instructions from the defendant had the general authority to make the changeover to a cost-plus basis as evidenced by the above letter.
The majority opinion appears to imply that by reason of the transfer by Mr. Westlund to Mosher’s wife of the lot of land in Brattleboro some sort of collusion existed between Westlund and Mosher which prompted Mr. Mosher to write the letter of May 23, 1960, to the detriment of the defendant corporation.-
The lot of land was conveyed by Westlund to Mrs. Mosher on July 7, 1960. This was after the claimed changeover to a cost-plus basis took place. In referring to the lot in question, on cross-examination of Mr. Westlund, the following was developed by the defendant.
Q. Was this, Mr. Westlund, a gift from you to the Moshers?
A. No
Q. What did you get then in return for conveying to them this land which you had bought with Westlund’s money ?
A. I was told they were going to return the money when they got the loan to build the house.
*313Q. They were told ?
A. They told me they would give me the money as soon as they got the money from the house they lived in when it was sold.
Q. You were loaning Mr. and Mrs. Mosher money to the tune of $3,000.00 until such time as they sold the house they were living in down in Massachusetts or wherever it was ?
A. Yes. They had a piece of land they were interested in here. They couldn’t afford to buy it. They asked me to buy it. Later they were going to sell their house and build a house up here. They asked me to buy the land and build a house and when the loan came through they would give me the money.
Q. This loan at least hadn’t come through up until the 12th of July when this second deed . . .
A. No, it had not come through.
Following the above cross-examination of Westlund, his wife was inquired of on cross-examination by the defendant as to whether any note, letter, or other evidence of the obligation had been given by Mosher to her husband or the plaintiff corporation for the land in question. On objection, examination of this subject matter was excluded on the basis that this line of inquiry related to a collateral matter.
It is the generally accepted rule that, in the absence of an abuse of the exercise of discretion in limiting the scope and extent of cross-examination, the ruling of the trial court is not revisable here. State v. Aronson, 111 Vt. 129, 130, 11 A.2d 214; Parker v. Hoefer, 118 Vt. 1, 7, 100 A.2d 434, 38 A.L.R.2d. 1216.
In view of the extent and substance of the testimony of Mr. Westlund relating to the consideration for the lot in question, I am convinced that further cross-examination of Mrs. Westlund on this point would have failed to produce any facts unknown to the jury, and that such testimony would have been merely of a cumulative nature. The limitation of cross-examination of Mrs. Westlund on the point in question was not sufficiently consequential to have affected the verdict. If error exists it was harmless.
On May 16, 1960 the plaintiff signed a letter, PI. Ex. 3, authorizing Mosher to act for it in purchasing materials for the Case plant job, and for the construction of a house on the Mosher lot. Mr. O’Bryan *314acknowledged that he was informed of the contents of this letter shortly after it was written, and made no objection to this arrangement. This letter was witnessed by Harold E. O’Bryan, brother of Howard. Howard testified that his brother Harold was employed by him on the Case plant job and served as his “watch dog.” Mosher’s authority to act in this matter was at least impliedly ratified by the defendant and it is now bound by its silence. Keyes v. Union Pacific Tea Co., 81 Vt. 420, 427, 71 Atl. 201; 2 Am. Jur. Agency, §266, p. 214. It does not appear from the record that Mr. Mosher’s authority to purchase materials for Mr. Westlund for the Case plant job, or the house, were in conflict with his duties and loyalty to the defendant. The claim of the defendant that this arrangement was prejudicial to its interest is without evidentiary support.
By reason of the changeover to a cost plus basis as outlined in the Mosher letter to the plaintiff, the defendant was to “. . . supervise, hire, discharge and direct in your name and use your personnel as best fitted for whatever needs to be done at the Case Plant or whatever else necessary.” The defendant did hire and discharge personnel pertaining to plaintiff’s operations at the Case plant. To a large extent the defendant “took over” employment and management of the plaintiff’s personnel. It also included the purchase by Mr. Mosher of materials for the Case plant job, which of course might well have been beneficial to the defendant in the reduction of the overall plant construction costs. While the defendant denies any changeover to a cost-plus basis, it is interesting to note that in this litigation the defendant claims overpayment of $31,000 to the plaintiff and seeks to recover this amount. It seems illogical to assume that the defendant would have permitted such a situation to arise, that is, overpayment to this extent, had the plaintiff been performing under the original contract, and not on a cost-plus basis. This factor may well have been considered by the jury as bearing upon what contract or arrangement was in force.
I concur with the majority in saying that the failure to charge on the dual agency of Mosher, as requested by the defendant, presents no ground for reversal. These requests assumed the existence of facts not binding on the jury, and if given would have disregarded evidence favorable to the plaintiff and its theory of the case.
The defendant filed motions to set aside the verdict, and in addition to matters disposed of in the majority opinion urges that the verdict *315of $40,000 was a compromise verdict without supporting evidence. This phase of the case is not discussed in the majority opinion, it being unnecessary by reason of the final entry.
The jury, as evidenced by its verdict, adopted the cost-plus theory as advanced by Westlund. On this basis, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we must do, the cost of labor was $123,470.83, less payments to secretaries of $5,910, which were disallowed, resulting in a final labor cost figure of $117,560.83. To this last figure is added costs of materials of $8,975.93, resulting in an actual cost of $126,536.73. Adding 10 percent of this latter figure as profit results in a total of $139,190.43. Payments of $103,299.39 were made by the defendant to the plaintiff, leaving a balance due the plaintiff for construction at the Case plant on a cost-plus-10 percent basis, of $35,801.04. The defendant conceded that it owed the plaintiff for construction at the Keene Clinic the sum of $4,500. When this latter sum is added to $35,801.04 the result is $40,301.04. With the foregoing in mind the verdict was supported by the evidence. On the basis that the verdict resulted by reason of a compromise, the motion was properly denied. No error appears on this point.
In referring to the use of a blackboard by the plaintiff in connection with the testimony of Mrs. Westlund, I agree that the appellant has not pointed out in what manner its use was misleading, or in what respect the figures placed thereon were not supported by the evidence.
The final ground of defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict is that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. From what appears in the record this ground is lacking in support and must be rejected.
It seems apparent that the primary basis on which the majority would reverse is predicated on the supposition that Mr. Mosher acted in behalf of the plaintiff in matters conflicting with the interest of the defendant. More particularly, and to this end, the opinion hinges on the restriction of cross-examination of Mrs. Westlund relating to the consideration, if any, paid for the lot deeded by her husband to Mrs. Mosher. By this attempted cross-examination, the defendant was endeavoring to show that the lot so deeded was a gift and not a sale. This subject was explained in detail by Mr. Westlund on cross-examination. As previously stated it is my opinion that further examination of Mrs. Westlund on this point would have only developed *316evidence in support of her husband’s testimony, merely cumulative in nature, and of no controlling effect.
The defendant urges that the lot transaction prompted Mosher to write the letter of May 23, 1960 without authority, and that by so doing he acted favorably to the plaintiff and against the interest of the defendant. Its claim of Mosher’s disloyalty on this point appears to be pretty well diluted by the fact that the deed in question was dated July 7th, 1960, a number of weeks after the cost-plus agreement was entered into as claimed by the plaintiff and supported by competent evidence. Furthermore, defendant’s position entirely disregards plaintiff’s evidence to the effect that the changeover was agreed to verbally between plaintiff and the defendant, and that Mosher’s letter was authorized by the defendant as a confirmation of the new arrangement.
The jury was left three routes to follow in reaching its decision. Firstly, plaintiff’s claim that the cost-plus arrangement was mutually entered into by virtue of the verbal conversation between Westlund and O’Bryan, and supported by the letter of confirmation from Mosher; secondly, the general authority of Mosher to make the changeover as evidenced by the letter; and thirdly, accept the defendant’s claim in its denial of each of the foregoing. The jury selected one and, traveling by it, reached its conclusion. It should not be said that the verdict is clearly wrong. We affirm a judgment whenever this can be legally done. Higgins, Admr. v. Metzger, 101 Vt. 285, 297, 143 Atl. 394. The burden is upon the defendant to show that the claimed error was to its prejudice. Towle v. St. Albans Publishing Co., 122 Vt. 134, 139, 165 A.2d 363, citing Parker v. Roberts, 99 Vt. 219, 225, 131 Atl. 21, 49 A.L.R. 1382. It is my judgment that the record fails to demonstrate any prejudicial error.
I would affirm. Associate Justice Smith joins me in this dissent.