Court Opinion

ID: 9472342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:57:00.65391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:52.472613
License: Public Domain

LYNNE, District Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
While I concur in Parts I and III of the opinion, I cannot join in Part II. I, of course, agree with the general rule that federal courts reviewing habeas corpus petitions are not empowered to correct erroneous evidence rulings of state trial courts and that there is a well recognized exception thereto; that fundamental fairness is violated and due process denied when the evidence excluded is material in the sense of a crucial, critical, highly significant factor. In its treatment of the facts revealed by the record, the court allows the exception to swallow the rule.
Since Boykins was caught red-handed in the perpetration of an armed robbery, it is not surprising that his only asserted defense was insanity. A fair reading of the record compels the court’s conclusion that the state trial court committed error in excluding testimony of Dr. Rodriguez of mental problems experienced by Boykins while undergoing his treatment at Chattahoochee over a three year period. If that were the end of the matter my dissent would not be provoked.
But there is much more which leads me ineluctably to the conclusion that such error, while perhaps not harmless, was assuredly not of constitutional magnitude. In the presence of the jury, Dr. Rodriguez testified without objection:
1. That he is a psychiatrist from Florida State Hospital (R. 162);
2. That Boykins was his patient for three years (R. 163);
3. That in a report to general staff of Chattahoochee, on September 5, 1972, he recommended that [Boykins] be adjudicated competent and released from Chattahoochee (R. 184);
4. That [Boykins] was adjudicated competent and released from Chattahoochee in January 1973, the last time he talked to him (R. 184);
5. That it is possible that a psychotic patient who is later adjudged competent will again become psychotic, and it is possible he will stay in remission for the rest of his life; that he could not say for sure, and that a schizophrenic is always a schizophrenic (R. 189).
6. That on the basis of the hypothetical question put to him by defense counsel, which graphically described Boy-kins’ behavior during the commission of the offense and immediately thereafter, it was his opinion that at that time he was psychotic and did not know right from wrong (R. 183), and
*15477. That his opinion was based upon the hypothetical posed to him by defense counsel and his previous experience with him (R. 187).
The colloquy between court and counsel out of the presence of the jury is revealing (R. 164-181). Apparently the judge was confused as to the purpose for which the testimony of Dr. Rodriguez was sought to be offered. Seemingly, he jumped to the erroneous conclusion that Mr. Cosgrove was attempting to lay a predicate, based upon his treatment of Boykins over a period of three years at Chattahoochee, to qualify him as an expert with respect to the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense.
With an eye too single upon this misconception and prodded by the artless objection of the prosecutor, he failed to come to grips with the relevancy of the evidence for the true purpose for which it was being offered, as revealed in the following dialogue:
THE COURT: In January, 1973, the doctor found him to be competent.
MR. COSGROVE: Yes, I understand that, my purpose in bringing Dr. Rodriguez here is not at all to seek testimony as to his opinion regarding incompetency of this offense, I don’t think that would be possible. My purpose is, too, which I think is relevant, as to pointing out to the jury that this man has had very severe mental problems in the very recent past. As he will testify, the disorder that Mr. Boykins had is a reoccurring [sic] disorder. Even after he’s adjudged competent, which is a very tentative thing, could reoccur [sic] at any time. It’s entirely unpredictable and I think that’s highly relevant.
Finally, the jury heard the testimony of four psychiatrists; two in behalf of Boy-kins; two called by the state. They were informed that Dr. Rodriguez, who expressed the opinion that Boykins was insane at the time the offense was committed, had treated him as a mental patient for three years, and that Dr. Miller, who expressed the same opinion after a brief interview, had been appointed by the court to determine his competency to participate in his own defense. For the state, both Dr. Barnard and Dr. Carrera, each of whom testified that he had examined Boykins for approximately one hour, expressed the opinion that he was competent at the time of the offense.
I share the sensitivity of my colleagues to the constitutional imperative that every defendant in a criminal case be accorded a fair trial. I part company with them because my reading of the cold record convinces me beyond peradventure that Boy-kins’ trial was not lacking in fundamental fairness. I would not require another after the lapse of eleven years. I respectfully dissent.