Court Opinion

ID: 9384037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 17:00:56.603298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.900860
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 31 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KRISTINE E. ARMFIELD,                           No.   22-35127

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05239-SKV

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Washington
                 Sarah Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 29, 2023**
                               Seattle, Washington

Before: NGUYEN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and GUTIERREZ,*** Chief
District Judge.

      An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Kristine Armfield’s application

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez, Chief United States District Judge
for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
for Social Security disability benefits. The district court affirmed the agency’s

decision. We have jurisdiction over Armfield’s appeal of that ruling under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and affirm.

       1.     Armfield argues that the ALJ improperly rejected various medical

opinions.     We review the IJ’s evaluation of medical opinions for substantial

evidence. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). The “most

important factors” are “supportability” and “consistency.”              20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920c(b)(2). If “the evidence can rationally be interpreted in more than one

way, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision.” Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111,

1115–16 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

       a. Dr. Ruddell’s 2018 opinion predated the claimed onset date and was not

materially different from the same psychologist’s 2019 opinion, so the ALJ properly

discussed them in a single analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(1). Substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the 2019 opinion was “inconsistent

with the treatment record,” which contains numerous subsequent “normal findings.”

       b.     Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s discounting of Nurse

Patterson’s opinion. Patterson’s own evaluation “indicates the claimant has no

mental health issues,” and other records show Armfield ambulating without

difficulty.

       c. The ALJ also reasonably concluded that Dr. Harmon, a psychologist, was

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not qualified to give an opinion about Armfield’s physical condition. Harmon

recognized that a proper physical assessment would “depend on the information in

[Armfield’s] medical records and the judgment of the physicians on the [ ] review

panel.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(4).

      d.   Citing Dr. Gollogly’s statement that she would have “occasional”

workplace interruptions, Armfield argues that her residual functional capacity

should have assumed interruptions of one-third of a workday. But the ALJ is “the

final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence,”

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008), and Dr. Gollogly’s report

can reasonably be read to give “occasional” a more limited meaning.

      e. The ALJ reasonably found Dr. Leinenbach’s opinion not persuasive

because it predated the alleged onset date and other medical opinions. See Carmickle

v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Medical

opinions that predate the alleged onset of disability are of limited relevance.”).

      2. The ALJ offered “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting

Armfield’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at

1039 (cleaned up). A favorable response to conservative treatment “undermines [a

claimant’s] reports regarding the disabling nature of [her] pain.” Id. at 1040. The

record supports the ALJ’s finding that Armfield’s “pain symptoms and medical

impairments” were “managed conservatively with medication, physical therapy, and

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therapeutic injections,” and that reports throughout the record “often document no

acute distress and normal ambulating without difficulty.” Moreover, the record

conflicts with Armfield’s testimony about her use of electronic devices, cleaning

work, and socialization. See Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996,

1006 (9th Cir. 2015). The record is also inconsistent with Armfield’s testimony

about her depression because it shows management of her mental-health symptoms

with medication and therapy.       The ALJ “did not wholly reject [Armfield’s]

allegations,” Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1163, but rather found contrary evidence clear

and convincing.

      AFFIRMED.1

1
       We decline to consider Armfield’s argument that portions of the Social
Security Administration’s 2017 rule revisions, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017),
violate the Administrative Procedure Act and Social Security Act, which was raised
for the first time in a reply brief. See Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062, 1066
n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e decline to consider new issues raised for the first time in
a reply brief.”).

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