Court Opinion

ID: 9883597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:53:39.774629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:25.973872
License: Public Domain

MINZNER, Justice (specially concurring). I concur in the majority’s opinion, but write separately to address additional issues under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities code (“the MHDDC”), NMSA 1978, §§ 48-1-1 to -25 (Repl.Pamp.1993), and the New Mexico Mental Illness and Competency code (“the NMMIC”), NMSA 1978, §§ 31-9-1 to -4 (Repl.Pamp.1994 & Cum.Supp.1995), raised by Appellant Richard Lopez or suggested by his circumstances. Lopez’s issues and particularly his circumstances seem to me to present issues in addition to those raised and argued by the other appellants or presented by their circumstances. Because I conclude that the State may continue to confine Lopez, I agree that we should affirm the trial court’s order denying release. I also would affirm his 1994 order on periodic review. The record indicates that a subsequent, two-year periodic review is pending before the trial court.1  Additional Facts Regarding Lopez’s Circumstances and Issues Raised by Lopez. In May 1990, Lopez’s treating physicians filed with the trial court a treatment plan which contained five objectives of diagnosing and treating Lopez with the goal of rendering him competent to stand trial. In October 1990, the court, following a hearing, found that there was no substantial probability that Lopez would become competent to stand trial by October 12, 1991, a year from the date of the hearing. In November 1990, the court conducted a Section 31-9-1.5 hearing. Between 1990 and 1993, Lopez’s physicians at the Las Vegas Medical Center-Forensic Treatment Unit (“the LVMC-FTU”) filed treatment and update reports with the court, stating that Lopez had shown minimal compliance with treatment. In April 1994, Dr. John Gatling, Lopez’s treating physician, testified during a hearing before the court that he didn’t think he would be able to treat Lopez to competency. Despite this testimony, the trial court concluded: Although [Lopez] has made only minimal progress towards competency, in the period 1990 through March of 1993, he has— those are pursuant to those three annual reports that I have seen, plus the testimony at the April 1994 hearing — since then he has made substantial progress. Not nearly as much as I would like to see, but substantial progress towards attaining competency as a result of the’ May 11,1990 treatment plan and his care and supervision at Las Vegas Medical Center. Lopez challenges the trial court’s finding that he stands a substantial likelihood of attaining competency in the foreseeable future as not supported by the evidence. He also argues that the findings are not sufficient to support his continued confinement and that the trial court made its findings pursuant to the wrong standard. The record contains two orders entered by the trial court in this case. The first is an order entered on Lopez’s motion to dismiss and petition for writ of habeas corpus. The second is the court’s order entered on periodic review. Neither order references the burden of proof the trial court believed to be applicable. Lopez relies on an oral comment by the trial court to the effect that the court found it possible that he would obtain competency within a reasonable time, but only by a preponderance of the evidence. We will not rely on the trial court’s oral comment to reverse. “Oral statements of a judge in articulating [a] ruling at the close of trial do not constitute a ‘decision’ within the meaning of [SCRA 1986, 1-052(B)(1)(a) (Repl.Pamp.1992) ], and error may not be predicated thereon.” Balboa Constr. Co. v. Golden, 97 N.M. 299, 304, 639 P.2d 586, 591 (Ct.App.1981). The order entered on Lopez’s motion to dismiss contains no finding regarding the likelihood of his attaining competency. The order entered on periodic review contains a finding regarding the likelihood of Lopez’s attaining competency. There is no statutory requirement that the trial court make a finding regarding the likelihood of Lopez’s attaining competency on periodic review following a Section 31-9-1.5 hearing. The order entered contains findings that track the statutory requirements for the proceedings conducted by the trial court. The appropriate standard of review is whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings. In re Pernell, 92 N.M. 490, 495, 590 P.2d 638, 643 (Ct.App.1979). On appeal an appellant is required to include in the brief-in-chief a specific challenge to a finding of fact or that finding will be “deemed conclusive.” SCRA 1986, 12-213(A)(3) (Cum.Supp.1995). Further, the appellant must include in the summary of proceedings “the substance of the evidence bearing upon the proposition, and the argument [must have] identified with particularity the fact or facts which are not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. In this case, Lopez has not summarized the evidence regarding his progress from March 1993 to April 1994. In addition, there has been no specific attack on the additional finding that “further treatment ... likely will result in further progress and improvement ... toward attaining competency.” I conclude that the issue of the sufficiency of the finding regarding competency is not properly before us. The arguments on appeal have been constitutional challenges to the validity of the statutory scheme as a whole. The attack on the findings in this case seems intended to provide additional support for Lopez’s characterization of the statute as authorizing unlawful confinement. No independent basis for reversal has been identified. Lopez’s Right to Substantive Due Process. As the majority opinion notes, the NMMIC initially requires an expedited schedule of hearings regarding competency. See op. at 1138-39; see also 1141. I think that the statutory schedule satisfies Lopez’s constitutional rights to equal protection and due process, and particularly the holding in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), during the period in which the statute requires an expedited schedule. However, during the period after a Section 31-9-1.5 hearing, the schedule of hearings is no longer expedited; this portion of the statute contains no reference to treatment, extends the time between court hearings to two years, and permits confinement up to the length of the permissible criminal sentence. The statute appears to establish confinement for dangerousness and incompetency not likely to be remedied within a reasonable time; a different kind of confinement than the period prior to the so-called “merits” hearing in which the Legislature has required that the district court inquire into the likelihood of a defendant attaining competency within a reasonable period. While Section 31-9-1.5 clearly mandates treatment to competency, it is unclear whether defendants are also to be afforded treatment addressed to their dangerous and disabling conditions. At present, the statute only requires the State to review a defendant’s condition every two years after an initial determination that the defendant committed the crime and is still dangerous. If the defendant is found to be competent, then the criminal case will proceed; otherwise, the State may detain defendants in a secure, locked facility for up to the maximum duration of their sentence. Existing United States Supreme Court precedents suggest a direction, but they do not compel a particular answer. No state statute seems comparable to New Mexico’s, and thus precedent from other jurisdictions is of limited help in resolving this case. In the absence of controlling federal precedent or helpful state law opinions, I believe that we must identify the Legislature’s particular purpose in providing for the period of confinement following a Section 31-9-1.5 hearing. Then, to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the New Mexico Constitution, see N.M. Const, art. II, § 18, we must be satisfied that the period of confinement after the Section 31-9-1.5 hearing is narrowly tailored to serve that purpose. See generally Marrujo v. New Mexico State Highway Transp. Dep’t, 118 N.M. 753, 757, 887 P.2d 747, 751 (1994) (comparing substantive due process and equal protection analysis); see also State v. Post, 197 Wis.2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to an involuntary commitment statute). Lopez specifically challenges the limited kinds of treatment available to him at the LVMC-FTU. Dr. Gatling testified that he is limited in his ability to treat Lopez properly due to his commitment at the LVMC-FTU as opposed to the civil wing of the hospital, where a wider range of treatments is available. Lopez alleges that the nature of his confinement violates his right to substantive due process because the LVMC-FTU cannot and does not provide the type of treatment necessary to address his conditions. Counsel for Lopez argues that ultimately because of his status, i.e., commitment to an FTU, Lopez’s condition may deteriorate, since there have been inadequate efforts to restore him to a minimal level of functioning. Moreover, Amici assert that Section 31-9-1.5 restricts and curtails opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation for individuals such as Lopez because it effectively allows the State to subject defendants to an indefinite “treat to competency” status. Lopez seeks transfer to the civil side of the Las Vegas Medical Center for the purpose of obtaining proper treatment. The majority opinion indicates that treatment available in civil commitments shall not be denied to those held for treatment to regain competency. Op. at 1141-43. Further, the majority opinion indicates that this broader range of treatment is also available to those committed to a “secure, locked facility” pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5(D)(l). Op. 1143. I agree with the majority that the State has a legitimate interest in confining incompetent, dangerous defendants to a secure, locked facility; I also agree with the explicit holding of the majority, that the broader range of treatment is available to those confined to a secure, locked facility, as a matter of equal protection. That is, it makes little or no sense to preclude those committed to a secure, locked facility following a Section 31-9-1.5 hearing from the broader range of treatment available to those who have not yet had the hearing. After all, those who have not had that hearing presumably are viewed as likely to attain competency within a reasonable period of time. For them, treatment to competency may be all that is appropriate or necessary. For the following reasons, however, I would also hold that following the Section 31-9-1.5 hearing, incompetent, dangerous defendants have a right to treatment for both of the conditions that serve as the basis for their confinement throughout their confinement as a matter of substantive due process under the New Mexico Constitution. Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F.Supp. 908 (W.D.Mo.1979), recognized that persons who are mentally ill or who are mentally retarded and are dangerous to either themselves or others have a right to treatment whether they are hospitalized through a criminal or civil process. As a matter of federal due process, the district court in Eckerhart required treatment that afforded the affected individuals a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve their mental condition, and that the required treatment be directed to that aspect of behavior which caused the confinement. Id., 475 F.Supp. at 914. Although that right is not sufficiently well-established that I can say federal due process requires us to reach that result in this case, I would require that result under the New Mexico Constitution. The confinement in this case is in effect pretrial detention in a mental institution. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1873, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), a challenge to the conditions of confinement in a custodial facility, the United States Supreme Court held that pretrial detainees, not yet convicted of the crimes charged, could not be punished. Therefore, in reviewing challenges to the conditions of pretrial confinement, the inquiry should be whether the government’s interests served by any given restriction outweigh the individual deprivations suffered. Id. at 564, 99 S.Ct. at 1887 (Marshall, Justice, dissenting). The more specific test for determining whether conditions of pretrial detention violate due process is whether conditions amount to punishment. Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir.1984). I would construe confinement pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5 as pretrial detention primarily for remedial purposes rather than punishment, on the basis that the Legislature intended to create an alternative to civil commitment under the MHDDC to serve compelling state interests in protecting the community and in providing for the appropriate disposition of a criminal charge. Cf. Post, 541 N.W.2d at 122 (sustaining Wisconsin’s statute permitting civil commitment of persons convicted of certain sexual offenses and found to be in need of specialized treatment following service of their prison sentences). Because it would be unconstitutional to try an incompetent defendant, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), a court must have the power to order a competency hearing and to commit the defendant to an appropriate facility for treatment. The treatment should aid the defendant in becoming competent, and the release standards should be interpreted in light of the pending trial. See generally Pernell, 92 N.M. at 499, 590 P.2d at 647. Because Lopez has been additionally found to be dangerous to himself and others, the State has a particular, compelling interest in his detention in a secure, locked facility. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2105, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3048, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983). When it becomes clear that a defendant may not attain competency within a reasonable period, the district court conducts a hearing under Section 31-9-1.5 to determine whether further confinement is appropriate. WTiile Lopez may be legitimately confined and subjected to the conditions and restrictions inherent in such confinement, these restrictions must not amount to punishment, Bell, 441 U.S. at 537, 99 S.Ct. at 1873 but must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the LVMC-FTU. Without opportunities for proper treatment and rehabilitation to curtail dangerousness, it is highly unlikely that individuals such as Lopez will improve to the point where release from the LVMC-FTU will be possible. Not to provide treatment when it could significantly reduce a defendant’s need for restraints or the likelihood of violence “may well be unreasonable.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2462-63, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). Defendants held pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5 face a potential commitment for a period of time equalling their sentence had they been convicted of the crime as charged. Since Lopez may be subject to a life sentence for the crime charged, he may potentially be held for life unless he attains competency. Such incarceration is exactly the type of permanent incarceration before adjudication of guilt that was vehemently denounced by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson, as an individual may not be deprived of his liberty and stigmatized by confinement unless all elements of the case against him have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). I conclude that the question of whether the conditions of confinement after a Section 31-9-1.5 hearing amount to punishment depends on the treatment that is available under the statute, either as written or as we may construe it to accomplish the Legislature’s purposes. See Post, 541 N.W.2d at 124. I also think that unless treatment is a goal, then the state’s interest cannot be said to outweigh that of the defendant’s. I would construe the statute to provide adequate treatment during the post-Section 31-9-1.5 hearing period. During such a commitment, as a matter of substantive due process, those involuntarily committed under Section 31-9-I.5 have a right to be treated not only for competency, but to alleviate their dangerousness and accompanying mental illness or disability. Cf. In re Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 343, 540 P.2d 818, 823 (1975) (mental illness is not a crime and mentally ill patients, involuntarily committed, must be afforded effective treatment since their liberty is abridged). Various acceptable forms of treatment may rise above the constitutional threshold, but minimal constitutional standards require treatment to counter dangerousness in order to facilitate defendants’ release from a criminal involuntary commitment and into the potential advantages of a civil commitment. See Eckerhart, 475 F.Supp. at 914; In re J.S., 124 Wash.2d 689, 880 P.2d 976 (1994). The state has constitutional obligations to adequately care for and treat involuntarily-committed individuals. I agree with Amici that Section 31-9-1.5 appears to permit indefinite commitment without treatment whenever defendants will not likely attain competency to stand trial. As applied to Lopez, it would commit him to a life sentence in a “secure, locked facility,” without proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in the course of a trial in which he was compelled to participate. Therefore, in accord with the purposes behind Section 31-9-1.5 of facilitating the proper disposition of a criminal trial, I would construe Section 31-9-1.5 as requiring treating incompetent defendants to become competent to stand trial, including treatment for dangerousness, in order to afford them an opportunity to utilize the statute’s release provisions. To hold otherwise would certainly “transform the hospital into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense.” Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C.Cir.1960) (Fahy, Circuit Judge, concurring). RANSOM, J., concurs.  . The transcript of that hearing contains testimony that Lopez’s condition has changed and that the court is considering the legal consequence of those changes.