Court Opinion

ID: 9918847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 18:08:12.974348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:26.832676
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Pringle, 2024-Ohio-137.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                   TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 STATE OF OHIO                                  JUDGES:
                                                Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                     Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
 -vs-
                                                Case No. 2023 AP 05 0033
 JEFFREY PRINGLE

          Defendant-Appellant                   OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Tuscarawas County Court
                                                of Common Pleas, Case No. 2022-CR-07-
                                                0262

 JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        January 12, 2024

 APPEARANCES:

 For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

 RYAN STYER                                     DAN GUINN
 Tuscarawas County Prosecutor                   232 West 3rd Street, Suite #312
                                                Dover, Ohio 44622
 KRISTINE W. BEARD
 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
 Tuscarawas County Prosecutors Office
 125 E. High Avenue
 New Philadelphia, Ohio 44663
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 05 0033                                                 2

Hoffman, P.J.
       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Jeffrey Pringle appeals the judgment entered by the

Tuscarawas County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his pleas of guilty to

three counts of rape of a victim under the age of thirteen (R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b)), three

counts of gross sexual imposition of a victim under the age of thirteen (R.C.

2907.05(A)(4)) and one count of gross sexual imposition by force or threat of force (R.C.

2907.05(A)(1)), all with sexually violent predator specifications (R.C. 2941.148), and

sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of twenty years to life. Plaintiff-appellee is

the state of Ohio.

                           STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

       {¶2}   Appellant engaged in sexual conduct and sexual contact with two minor

victims over a period of years. The minor victims eventually reported the abuse to their

mother. During the police investigation which followed, Appellant admitted to the sexual

abuse of the victims.

       {¶3}   Appellant was indicted by the Tuscarawas County Grand Jury with three

counts of rape of a victim under the age of thirteen, three counts of gross sexual

imposition of a victim under the age of thirteen, and one count of gross sexual imposition

by force or threat of force, all with sexually violent predator specifications. He pled guilty

to all charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of incarceration of ten years

to life imprisonment for each charge of rape, 36 months to life imprisonment for each

count of gross sexual imposition of a victim under the age of thirteen, and 18 months

incarceration for gross sexual imposition by force or threat of force. The sentences on

the first two counts of rape were to run consecutively to each other, and the sentences

on the remaining count of rape and all counts of gross sexual imposition were to run
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 05 0033                                                3

concurrently with the sentences on the first two counts of rape, for an aggregate term of

incarceration of 20 years to life.

       {¶4}   It is from the February 10, 2023 judgment of the trial court Appellant

prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:

              THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPOSED CONSECUTIVE

       SENTENCES FOR COUNTS I AND II AS OPPOSED TO A CONCURRENT

       SENTENCE UPON THE APPELLANT.

       {¶5}   We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.

2953.08. State v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 0030, 2020-Ohio-6722, ¶13,

citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231. R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence

and remand for sentencing where we clearly and convincingly find either the record does

not support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D),

2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(l), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Id.,

citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659.

       {¶6}   R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides:

              (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions

       of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison

       terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is

       necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 05 0033                                                4

       and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness

       of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,

       and if the court also finds any of the following:

              (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses

       while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction

       imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised

       Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

              (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of

       one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of

       the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single

       prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses

       of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

              (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that

       consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime

       by the offender.

       {¶7}   The trial court must make the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings at the sentencing

hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but it has no obligation to

state reasons to support its findings, nor must it recite certain talismanic words or phrases

in order to be considered to have complied. State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-

Ohio-3177, syllabus.

       {¶8}   In deciding whether to impose consecutive sentencing, the trial court is to

consider the aggregate term of incarceration which will result from consecutive
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 05 0033                                                 5

sentencing.   State v. Gwynne, 2022-Ohio-4607, 2022 WL 17870605, ¶¶14-15.                   In

Gwynne, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified the standard of review this Court is to use on

review of consecutive sentences:

              It is important to understand that the standards referenced above

      have very specific meanings and fall into one of two categories—either a

      standard of review or an evidentiary standard of proof. “Abuse of discretion,”

      “clearly erroneous,” and “substantial evidence” are traditional forms of

      appellate-court deference that are applied to a trial court's decisions. They

      are standards of review that are applied by a reviewing court to certain

      decisions that are made by a fact-finder. They are, in essence, screens

      through which reviewing courts must view the original fact-finder's decision.

      In contrast, “preponderance,” “clear and convincing,” and “beyond a

      reasonable doubt” are evidentiary standards of proof. These standards

      apply to a fact-finder's consideration of the evidence. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)’s

      requirement that appellate courts apply the clear-and-convincing standard

      on review indicates that the legislature did not intend for appellate courts to

      defer to a trial court's findings but to act as a second fact-finder in reviewing

      the trial court's order of consecutive sentences.

              In this role as a finder of fact, the appellate court essentially functions

      in the same way as the trial court when imposing consecutive sentences in

      the first instance. There are three key differences, however. The first

      difference, which is discerned from the language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), is
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 05 0033                                             6

     that the appellate court is constrained to considering only the findings in

     R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) that the trial court has actually made. In other words, a

     reviewing court cannot determine for itself which of the three permissible

     findings within R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) might apply to satisfy the third

     required finding for imposing consecutive sentences, as the trial court is

     permitted to do. The second difference involves the standard of proof.

     Whereas the trial court's standard of proof under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) is a

     preponderance of the evidence—i.e., that when considered as a whole, the

     evidence demonstrates that the proposition of fact represented by the

     finding is more likely true, or more probable, than not—an appellate court

     applies a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. And the third

     difference is the inversion of the ultimate question before the court.

     Whereas the trial court is tasked with determining whether the proposition

     of fact represented by each finding is more likely—or more probably—true

     than not, an appellate court's task is to determine whether it has a firm belief

     or conviction that the proposition of fact represented by each finding is not

     true on consideration of the evidence in the record.

            Thus, when viewed in its proper context, the deference that a trial

     court's consecutive-sentence findings receive comes from the language of

     R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which imposes a higher evidentiary standard to reverse

     or modify consecutive sentences. It does not stem from any statutory

     requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial court's findings when
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 05 0033                                                 7

        considering whether reversal or modification is appropriate under R.C.

        2953.08(G)(2).

        {¶9}   Id. at ¶¶20-22.

        {¶10} In the instant case, the trial court found consecutive sentences are

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish Appellant, consecutive

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of Appellant’s conduct and to the

danger he poses to the public, and at least two of the multiple offenses were committed

as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the

multiple offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses

committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness

of Appellant’s conduct.

        {¶11} Appellant argues the trial court’s findings are not supported by the record.

He argues he expressed remorse and admitted his actions were wrong, he is elderly and

has numerous health issues, his risk assessment score was low, and he had no prior

criminal record other than traffic offenses.

        {¶12} In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court noted the conduct went

on for years, and was done in a manipulative manner. The conduct involved various

different forms of sexual conduct, and Appellant was in a position of trust to the victims.

Upon review of the record, we are not “left with a firm belief or conviction that the findings

are not supported by the evidence.” See Gwynne, supra at ¶27. We find the trial court

did not err in imposing consecutive sentences on counts one and two of rape in the instant

case.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 05 0033                                   8

      {¶13} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Tuscarawas

County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, P.J.
Wise, J. and
King, J. concur