Court Opinion

ID: 9883980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:29:34.763972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:19.965226
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
¶ 28. {dissenting). Although the majority correctly states the test to apply in this case, see majority op. at ¶ 19,1 conclude that the majority errs in its conclusion that Nollie failed to present sufficient evidence in this case to sustain a claim of self-defense. For this reason, I would reverse Nollie's judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial, permitting the defendant to assert a privilege of self-defense.
¶ 29. Evidence is sufficient to support a theory of defense if "a reasonable construction of the evidence will support the defendant's theory 'viewed in the most favorable light it will "reasonably admit from the standpoint of the accused."'" State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d *552122, 153, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977) (citation omitted). A reasonable construction of the evidence in this case leads to the conclusion that Nollie had an actual and reasonable belief that there was an imminent unlawful interference with his person. Nollie argued that he was forced to pull his car over while driving home at 1:30 a.m. on a Thursday morning because of a flat tire. When he got out of his car, several men were being loud and profane approximately thirty feet from his car. Having been the victim of several crimes in the same area, including a physical assault and armed robbery, Nollie removed and loaded a firearm from his trunk and placed it in the waistband of his pants.
¶ 30. Indeed, the test is not whether the evidence showed that there was an actual or imminent unlawful interference with the defendant's person. Instead, it is based on whether the defendant had an actual and reasonable belief that there was an actual or imminent unlawful interference. In this case, in light of the defendant's past history with being a victim of a crime, of evidence showing his proximity to several individuals in a high crime area late at night, and of evidence of his vulnerability to becoming a victim of another crime, I would conclude that the defendant's belief that he may be victimized again was reasonable. Therefore, his claim of self-defense should have been permitted in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.