Court Opinion

ID: 9482578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:54:41.891598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:05.028342
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Instead of focusing on a technical reading of the Wyoming abandoned vehicles statute, see Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 31-5-508 (Michie 1987) and the alternatives available to the officers, the court should focus on the reasonableness of the decision to impound the vehicle; the Fourth Amendment requires no more. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (“The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.”).
I cannot agree that it was unreasonable for the officers to impound Defendant’s vehicle. Neither occupant possessed a valid driver’s license, both were from a distant state, the ownership of the vehicle was questionable at best, and, perhaps most importantly, the vehicle was parked on a dangerous curve adjacent a two-lane highway. See IV R. 23, 107 (officer testified that the curve was “tight” and that numerous accidents had occurred there in the previous year). Given the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the officers to call a wrecker and thus insure the vehicle’s removal rather than rely on Defendant to do the same, nor was it unreasonable for the officers to wait forty-five minutes without requesting Defendant to move the vehicle, for it is by definition unreasonable to *1412expect officers diligently to pursue all alternatives, particularly when a potential safety hazard exists.1 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374, 107 S.Ct. 738, 742, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (“ ‘The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity [impoundment] does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.’ ”) (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983)). See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) (“The fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ means does not, by itself, render the search ‘unreasonable.’ ”). Moreover, Defendant could not legally have moved the vehicle anyway because he did not have a valid driver’s license.
Notwithstanding, I concur because the district court’s fact findings concerning the officers’ motivation are not clearly erroneous. The inventory search exception does not apply if the inventory procedure is a mere “pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.” Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376, 96 S.Ct. at 3100. See also Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376, 107 S.Ct. at 743. The district court’s conclusion that the officers’ decision to impound the vehicle was tainted by an investigatory motive is supported by the record. See IV R. at 90, 105 (officer’s testimony that he suspected drugs and that he assumed he was operating under continuing consent). Thus, I concur based on this narrower ground.

. On this point, the court cites United States v. Pappas, 735 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir.1984). Op. at p. 1409, n. 4. Pappas, however, did not involve public safety; the vehicle in that case was legally parked in a private lot. 735 F.2d at 1234.