Court Opinion

ID: 9809658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:19:50.893973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:44.002118
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
dissenting. Want of time prevents me, at this late day, from thoroughly discussing the opinion of the Court, and so I will merely indicate one or two of the salient points of error. The opinion apparently attempts to reconcile the testimony by excluding that of the plaintiff, and then proceeds to find as a fact that there was a break in Monk’s possession. In the opinion appear the following significant *328paragraphs: “It is true that Mont says, ‘After the Dodge lease was out I leased the property to Mr. Southerland for five years, and after Mr. Southerland’s lease was out I leased it to Isaac Rhodes.’ Two of his witnesses say that the locus in quo was not leased to Rhodes. It is difficult to reconcile the testimony of the plaintiff’s witnesses ivith this statement.” This Court is not called upon to reconcile the testimony of Monk with that of other witnesses, nor has it the right to say his testimony is any less worthy of credit than that of others. Monk testifies that he was in actual possession, and the jury alone can pass upon the credibility of his testimony and its relative weight as compared with that of other witnesses.
Again, the opinion of the Court places upon the evidence of Rhodes the construction most unfavorable to the plaintiff, while deciding against the plaintiff. It is true Rhodes said “I do not say I rented this seven acres,” but he evidently meant to say that he did not know whether he had a valid lease. This is shown by his further testimony that when Wright wished to rent the land to Rhodes he expressly declined to rent because he had already rented the same land from Monk. Ilis exact words as stated in the record are as follows: “I told him I thought I already had it rented; that I had rented it from Monk.” This is clearly consistent with Monk’s testimony, if the question of consistency can be considered by this Court.
This Court held, in Ruffin v. Overby, 88 N. C., 369, that “Every possession of land by one other than the claimant is deemed to be adverse until proof to the contrary is made”; that is, that the possessor is deemed to be holding under his own right. But suppose that this decision is in conflict with section 146 of The Code, that section does not profess to be conclusive. The presumption does not arise until the claimant “establishes a legal right to the premises,” and not then *329even if “it appears that such premises have been held and possessed adversely to such legal title.” Monk’s own testimony to facts tending to show that he was holding adversely would be sufficient to carry the case to the jury, even if he were not corroborated by others. Iiis enclosing the locus in quo with other land, admittedly his own, by a common fence, his using it for pasture, his renting it to others and paying no rent to himself, are all circumstances tending to prove that he was holding adversely.
This case was one peculiarly for the jury, and I do not think that their verdict should be disturbed, except for some material error of law in the trial, certainly not on account of any view we might have as to the weight of conflicting evidence.