Court Opinion

ID: 9533761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:34:21.114839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:09.782947
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe that the majority opinion errs in two important respects. The record indicates that Christensen pled a violation of I.C. § 49-2414(7)(f) and presented evidence in support of that contention. This being the case, the majority should have proceeded to address, whether the statute provides Christensen with a cause of action.
It is axiomatic that existing law is written into and made a part of every written contract. Christensen Motors Sales, Inc., contends that although the contract, standing alone, would permit American Motors Sales Corporation to terminate the franchise, the contract does not stand alone. Rather, it must be read in concert with I.C. § 49-2414(7)(f) and when so read, does not permit American Motor Sales to terminate the franchise.
I.C. § 49-2414(7)(f) provides, in part:
... In determining whether good cause has been established for modifying, re*106placing, terminating or refusing to continue a franchise, it shall be taken into consideration the existing circumstances, including, but not limited to:
1. Amount of business transacted by the franchise, as compared to the business available to the franchisee.
2. Investment necessarily made and obligations incurred by the franchisee to perform its part of the franchise.
3. Permanency of the investment.
4. Whether it is injurious or beneficial to the public welfare for the franchise to be modified or replaced or the business of the franchisee disrupted.
5. Whether the franchisee has adequate motor vehicle sales and services facilities, equipment, vehicle parts, and qualified service personnel to reasonably provide for the needs of the consumers for the motor vehicles handled by the franchisee and has been and is rendering adequate services to the public.
6. Whether the franchisee fails to fulfill the warranty obligations of the franchiser to be performed by the franchisee.
7. Extent of franchisee’s failure to comply with the terms of the franchise.
The majority states “that Christensen has failed to plead or present any evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment which tends to prove or, by fair inference, indicate the presence of elements necessary for a finding of the violation of the statute.” I disagree. Christensen clearly pled a violation of the statute, and in support of its own motion for summary judgment attached a copy of the dealer franchise agreement and a copy of the letter from American Motor Sales terminating the agreement. The sole reason for terminating the agreement as set forth in the letter of termination is the fact of Dell Christensen’s death. At no point are any of the factors set out in I.C. § 49-2414(7)(f) addressed. A “fair inference” would be that they had not been considered and, hence, that American Motor Sales Corporation lacked just provocation or cause for terminating the agreement.
Since the majority here erroneously concluded that Christensen failed to present evidence indicating a statutory violation, it does not address the issue of whether I.C. § 49-2414(7)(f) confers a cause of action upon a dealer for damages incurred upon the wrongful termination of a franchise. I think it clear that where, as here, the violation of a statute permits the state to seek penal sanctions, a private individual or entity harmed by the alleged violation should not be precluded from seeking judicial redress of his or her injuries simply because the statute does not specifically provide for a civil cause of action. Diehl and Sons, Inc., v. International Harvester Co., 445 F.Supp. 282 (1978) and Willys Motors, Inc., v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, Inc., 142 F.Supp. 469 (1956). For years this jurisdiction has never questioned the general rule that violation of a motor vehicle code provision not only was an actionable criminal offense, but also amounted to prima facie negligence in a civil action.
In the instant ease, Christensen Motor Sales, Inc., was a franchisee and clearly an entity for whose protection I.C. § 49-2414(7)(f) was enacted. It defies reason to conclude that one who violates such a statute cannot be required to answer at law to the party harmed by the violator’s wrongful conduct. For the above stated reasons I dissent from the majority opinion, and would reverse and remand for trial.
BISTLINE, J., concurs, adding that the majority decision in this case provides additional fuel for the fire that eventually will require the repeal of the Court’s rules which seem to encourage the many, many summary judgments which are a major stream of appeals from the district courts.