Court Opinion

ID: 9845622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:25:19.317269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:16.402926
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Smith, 103 Or App 113, 796 P2d 665 (1990), and because I do not believe that remanding the case for the findings that the majority considers to be decisive will cure the problem.
The trial court stated:
“I’m finding that he had a legal justification under Car-aher, now that he’s got this man under arrest, he’s got him in custody, to take his property pursuant to a search for a check for weapons, to make sure there aren’t any. You can go through wallets, make sure that he has nothing that would allow him to effect an escape * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.)
That overstates the scope of a permissible search incident to arrest. In State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741, 653 P2d 942 (1982), the court stated that, under the Oregon Constitution, “a valid custodial arrest does not alone give rise to a unique right to search. Such a warrantless search must be justified by the circumstances surrounding the arrest.” 293 Or at 757. As pointed out in State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 201, 729 P2d 524 (1986), Caraher rejected the federal rule that permits full searches of a person incident to any lawful custodial arrest. If evidence of the crime for which the arrestee has been arrested reasonably may be concealed on his person or in his personal effects, a thorough search may be justified. If, as here, no search for evidence of the crime that justified the arrest is involved, the officer is limited to a pat-down or limited search for weapons to protect the officer or to prevent escape. 302 Or at 200. If, during a pat-down, the officer reasonably believes that he has felt an object that may be a weapon, he may reach into the pocket for further examination. If, after doing that, he no longer has reason to believe that there is a weapon, he has no legitimate reason to remove the object from the pocket. State v. Baker, 100 Or App 31, 784 P2d 446 (1989); State v. Boyd, 101 Or App 649, 792 P2d 462 (1990). The majority effectively overrules both of those cases that were decided very recently.
Assuming that Barbour could not tell from the pat-*129down whether the object in defendant’s back pocket was a weapon, he had to have had a reasonable belief that it was a weapon in order to justify a more intensive search. He testified that he “had no idea” what the article was, but that the bulge “could have been a striking instrument; it could have been any number of things. It could have been a case holding a knife; it could have been a gun.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court made no express finding that Barbour reasonably believed that the wallet was a weapon and, on this record, I do not believe that the evidence would support such a finding.
Even if we were to assume that the circumstances justified Barbour’s reaching into defendant’s pocket, it was no longer reasonable to believe that it was a weapon once it became apparent that the object was a billfold, and he no longer had authority to remove anything. State v. Baker, supra; State v. Boyd, supra. He should have left the wallet in defendant’s pocket.
Because I would reverse and remand for a new trial, I respectfully dissent.
Joseph, C. J., and Warren and Newman, JJ., join in this dissent.