Court Opinion

ID: 9953596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 15:01:38.359926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:26.482388
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10768   Document: 38-1    Date Filed: 03/22/2024   Page: 1 of 20

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                               No. 23-10768
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        TK GLOBAL, LLC,
                                          Petitioner-Cross Respondent,
        versus
        NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

                                          Respondent-Cross Petitioner,

        PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS LOCAL 72,

                                                           Intervenor.

                          ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                23-10768

                    Petitions for Review of a Decision of the
                         National Labor Relations Board
                            Agency No. 10-CA-267762
                            ____________________

        Before BRANCH, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               In this labor law case, the National Labor Relations Board
        (“NLRB” or “the Board”) found that TK Global, LLC (“TK” or “the
        Company”), violated several provisions of the National Labor
        Relations Act (“NLRA”) by prematurely terminating a project
        labor agreement (“PLA”) and then firing and refusing to hire union
        workers. The core dispute is whether TK was bound by the PLA
        to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)
        requiring participating employers to hire exclusively union
        workers. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that TK was
        bound by the PLA, and the Board agreed. TK now petitions this
        Court for review of the Board’s decision, arguing that (1) it never
        expressly agreed or otherwise manifested an intent to be bound by
        the CBA, and (2) its decision to step away from union workers was
        neither motivated by animus nor inherently destructive of
        employee rights. The Board filed a cross-application for
        enforcement of its order. After review, we conclude that the
        Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly,
        we grant the Board’s application for enforcement and we deny
        T.K.’s petition for review.
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        23-10768               Opinion of the Court                        3

                                  I.       Background

                   A. Factual Background
                         i. The Parties and the CBA
              TK is a pipefitting fabrication and installation company
        owned by Tae Kyong Kim and managed by Phillip Ahn, both of
        whom emigrated to the United States from South Korea. One of
        Ahn’s principal duties is to translate and communicate for Kim,
        who does not speak English.
               The Union in this case is the United Association of
        Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting
        Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO. The Union
        has a type of CBA with the Mechanical Contractors Association of
        Georgia known as an “area agreement.” This CBA applies to all
        members of the Mechanical Contractors Association and any
        employers that separately enter into an agreement to be bound by
        the CBA. The Union and the NLRB contend that TK entered into
        such a separate agreement here.
               The two key provisions of the CBA, for purposes of this case,
        describe the referral and hiring process for covered employers.
        The first is a non-discrimination provision: it gives the employer
        “the right to determine the competency and qualifications of
        employees . . . referred by the Union,” as well as “the right to hire
        and discharge accordingly,” provided that “such rights shall be
        exercised on a non-discriminatory basis” and “shall not be based
        on, or be in any way affected by . . . union membership . . . or any
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                     23-10768

        other aspect or obligation of union membership[.]” The next is
        sometimes called an “exclusivity” provision: it states that the Union
        will furnish the employer with duly qualified workers in sufficient
        numbers to properly do the contracted work—and, if it does not,
        “the employer may secure” labor “from other sources.”
                          ii. The Negotiation and Signing of the PLA
              TK was hired to perform pipefitting work on the
        construction of a manufacturing facility in Commerce, Georgia.
              In March of 2020, a Union representative approached TK,
        asking if the company needed additional workers for the
        construction project. TK did not initially hire any Union workers
        because it already had several employees working on the project,
        most of whom were Korean.
               When the company later needed more workers, a Union
        organizer, David Cagle, met with Ahn. Cagle told Ahn that the
        company had to sign an agreement before the Union would
        provide workers. 1 Cagle did not have a copy of the CBA with him,
        so he described it in general terms, including the provisions
        covering the referral and hiring of employees. In particular, he
        explained that the company had the right to reject or terminate any

        1 On this point, the ALJ credited Cagle’s testimony that he told Ahn the

        company needed to sign an “agreement” over Ahn’s testimony that the
        company would need to sign a “document.” Because that conclusion is not
        “inherently unreasonable” or “self contradictory,” we are bound by it. NLRB
        v. Allied Med. Transp., Inc., 805 F.3d 1000, 1005 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation
        omitted).
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        23-10768                  Opinion of the Court                              5

        workers referred by the Union, but that employers were asked to
        first notify the Union of any issues.
               The next day, Cagle e-mailed Ahn. “The subject line of the
        email read ‘CBA for PLA.’” A copy of the CBA was attached to the
        e-mail.
               Ahn texted Cagle acknowledging receipt of the e-mail and
        attachment. Ahn asked Cagle to confirm that, if TK decided to hire
        Union workers, those workers would still need to fill out a job
        application and could be terminated at-will. 2
             The day after that, Cagle e-mailed Ahn a copy of a one-page
        PLA. The PLA reads as follows:
               Project Labor Agreement for UA Local Union 72 &
               TK LLC at the SKI Battery Plant, Commerce Georgia
               and TK LLC Pipe Fabrication Shop located at 274
               Galilee Church Road, Jeﬀerson, Georgia 30549

               The agreement is a Collective Bargaining
               Agreement/Project Labor Agreement for the above
               listed jobsites/projects. The duration of this
               agreement will be in eﬀect until the end of the above
               listed jobsites/projects.

        2 The ALJ credited Cagle’s recollection that Ahn only ever asked about the

        ability to fire workers over Ahn’s testimony that he wanted to confirm that TK
        could hire whoever it wanted and terminate them for any reason. See Allied
        Med. Transp., 805 F.3d at 1005.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                    23-10768

              Ahn e-mailed Kim a copy of the CBA and the PLA and asked
        him to sign the PLA and return it. Ahn informed Kim that he had
        read over the “62 pages of documents as well,” referring to the
        CBA, but that he did “not have the profession [sic] on this field.”
        Ahn said that he believed the CBA was “what they [are] required
        to give us such as [a] CC&R,” apparently referring to the
        “covenants, conditions, and restrictions report” that a seller is
        required to provide to a buyer in a real estate transaction. Kim later
        signed and returned the PLA. Ahn and Cagle executed the PLA.
                        iii. TK requests worker referrals, hires and fires
                             workers, and pays wages and benefits
                             consistent with the CBA.
               The day after they executed the PLA, however, Ahn
        e-mailed Cagle and told him that TK no longer needed workers for
        the construction project because of scheduling issues. Ahn
        apologized and said he would contact Cagle if the company
        planned to hire in the future. Ahn also stated that they should void
        out the agreement and make a new one when the company was
        ready to hire. Cagle did not respond or agree to void the contract.
              A few weeks later, Ahn contacted Cagle again and asked for
        five workers. There was no discussion about a new agreement.
        The Union supplied the workers, and they worked for TK for about
        six weeks.
               During that time, TK paid the union workers wages and
        fringe benefits consistent with the terms of the CBA. Indeed, when
        TK’s payroll department was confused about how and where to
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        23-10768              Opinion of the Court                       7

        make fringe benefit contributions, Ahn asked Union fund
        administrators for assistance. Along the same lines, when one of
        the workers had worked a Saturday but had not been paid for
        overtime hours, Cagle and Ahn discussed over e-mail how
        overtime and “make-up time” (a shorthand for off schedule work
        done to replace hours missed because of unforeseen
        circumstances) played out under the CBA. Ahn specifically quoted
        the relevant provision of the CBA and explained that he wanted to
        make sure he understood how to interpret this language because
        he wanted to avoid further misunderstandings.
                TK terminated the five workers sometime later, because,
        according to Ahn, they could not communicate effectively with
        Korean workers already on the job site and the supervisor was not
        satisfied with their work. Ahn notified Cagle by e-mailing him that
        the company had exercised its right to terminate workers at-will
        and that he hoped they could work together again in the future.
        The Union was unhappy with TK firing the five employees because
        TK “had [non-union] people working on” projects covered by the
        CBA, but the Union “let it go because of the bigger picture . . .
        instead of blowing it all up[.]” In particular, Ahn and Cagle had
        discussed replacing those existing employees with Union
        employees over time.
              Over the next few weeks, Ahn requested and hired several
        more workers. TK paid wages and deducted Union dues for all of
        them consistent with the CBA.
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10768

                        iv. TK seeks out a subcontractor to complete the
                            project and terminates the PLA after the Union
                            insists on exclusive hiring.
               Eventually, however, TK realized it might not complete the
        project on schedule. Ahn reached out to the Union, asking if the
        Union might be able to take over work on the project as a
        subcontractor. The Union said it could not, the most it could do
        was provide laborers. So TK hired a subcontractor, Genesys
        Systems Integration, to provide labor and management to finish
        the project.
               When the Union found out that TK had hired a
        subcontractor to complete the project, it went to Ahn with the
        Union lawyer and explained that the CBA required TK to hire
        exclusively through the Union for the project. Ahn said he had
        never agreed to an exclusivity provision and TK would never have
        agreed had it known that the agreement required exclusivity. Still,
        TK was happy with the union workers it had at that point, and the
        company arranged to hire 13 more.
               At some point after this meeting, Ahn spoke with Tim
        Fackler, the Sales Manager of the subcontractor, Genesys Systems
        Integration. Fackler advised Ahn to withdraw from or terminate
        the agreement, and he helped Ahn draft a letter to that end. The
        letter stated that TK did not believe that the agreement was
        “representative of [the parties’] collaborative discussions prior to
        issuing or execution of the agreement,” and therefore “request[ed]
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        23-10768                    Opinion of the Court                               9

        immediate withdraw[al] and termination without penalty of any
        and all obligations contained” in the PLA and CBA.
                             v. TK terminates the agreement and separates
                                from union employees because it no longer had
                                a contract with the union.
              After that, Ahn and Kim arranged to meet with the Union
        workers still on site. They told the foreman that they had to
        discharge him and his crew because they no longer had any
        agreement with the Union. TK also declined to hire any of the 13
        Union members that it had solicited at the last meeting with the
        Union.
                    B. Procedural Background
               After an investigation, the General Counsel of the NLRB
        charged TK with violating the NLRA by terminating the
        agreement, and refusing to hire union workers. See 29 U.S.C. §
        158(a)(1), (3), (5). 3 The ALJ found for the NLRB, as follows.

        3 Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) fully provide as follows:

                (a) Unfair labor practices by employer
                It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer--
                        (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the ex-
                            ercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
                             ...
                        (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
                            ment or any term or condition of employment to
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                        23-10768

                        encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
                        zation: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in
                        any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an
                        employer from making an agreement with a labor organi-
                        zation (not established, maintained, or assisted by any ac-
                        tion defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice)
                        to require as a condition of employment membership
                        therein on or after the thirtieth day following the begin-
                        ning of such employment or the effective date of such
                        agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organi-
                        zation is the representative of the employees as provided
                        in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-
                        bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made,
                        and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in sec-
                        tion 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effec-
                        tive date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified
                        that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in
                        such election have voted to rescind the authority of such
                        labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided
                        further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination
                        against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organ-
                        ization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
                        such membership was not available to the employee on
                        the same terms and conditions generally applicable to
                        other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for be-
                        lieving that membership was denied or terminated for rea-
                        sons other than the failure of the employee to tender the
                        periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as
                        a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
                        ...
                   (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
                       of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a)
                       of this title.
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        23-10768                     Opinion of the Court                   11

               First, the ALJ concluded that TK violated Sections 8(a)(5)
        and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA when it withdrew from the PLA. To
        begin, the ALJ found that TK’s “execution of the PLA bound it to
        the CBA” because the PLA’s reference to “‘a Collective Bargaining
        Agreement/Project Labor Agreement’” was sufficient to show that
        the CBA and PLA were “a single, combined agreement objectively
        reflect[ing] the parties’ intent to incorporate the CBA into the
        PLA.” “This conclusion [was] further bolstered,” the ALJ said, “by
        the circumstances surrounding the parties’ execution of the PLA.”
               But even if signing the PLA did not expressly bind TK to the
        CBA, the ALJ concluded that TK was also bound to the CBA by
        conduct. The ALJ found that, from the time that the parties
        executed the PLA to TK’s announcement that it was withdrawing
        from the agreement, TK hired all its employees for the
        construction project through the Union’s referral service; paid
        wages and fringe benefits in accordance with the CBA; made
        benefit fund contribution payments deducted and remitted Union
        dues; referenced the CBA in an overtime dispute; and asked Cagle
        for clarification as to the correct interpretation of the language in
        the CBA.
               Second, the ALJ concluded that firing and refusing to hire
        Union employees after terminating the agreement violated §
        8(a)(5) and (a)(1) of the NLRA because TK “failed to honor the non-

        29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (5).
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                 23-10768

        discrimination provision” of the CBA “without bargaining with the
        Union[.]”
               And third, the ALJ concluded that firing and refusing to hire
        those same Union employees after terminating the agreement
        violated § 8(a)(5) and (a)(3) because it was “inherently destructive
        of important employee rights” and “strong evidence of [anti-]union
        animus.” (quotation omitted).
                The NLRB (through a delegated panel) summarily affirmed
        by adopting the ALJ’s order. 4 TK filed a petition for judicial review
        in this Court, and the NLRB cross-petitioned for enforcement of its
        order. The Union intervened and filed a brief supporting the
        NLRB.
                                 II.     Standard of Review
                 We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its
        findings of fact for substantial evidence. Mercedes-Benz U.S. Int’l,
        Inc. v. Int’l Union, UAW, 838 F.3d 1128, 1134 (11th Cir. 2016). “We
        will enforce an order of the Board if its factual findings are
        supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a
        whole.” Allied Med. Transp., 805 F.3d at 1005 (quotation omitted).
              Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
        reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
        conclusion.” Northport Health Servs. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 1547, 1550
        (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.

        4 The panel amended the remedial order and corrected certain omissions in

        that section; those changes are not at issue here.
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        23-10768                Opinion of the Court                       13

        474, 477 (1951)). We are bound by an ALJ’s credibility
        determinations unless “they are inherently unreasonable, self-
        contradictory, or based on an inadequate reason.” Allied Med.
        Transp., 805 F.3d at 1005 (quotation omitted); see also NLRB v.
        Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 176 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999) (the
        Board’s findings of fact are “conclusive ‘if supported by substantial
        evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” (quoting 29 U.S.C.
        § 160(e), (f))).
                                   III.   Discussion
               TK argues that the Board erred in finding it violated the
        NLRA by withdrawing from the PLA and firing or refusing to hire
        union workers after doing so and that the Board’s findings are not
        supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons discussed
        below, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s
        findings.
                   A. Substantial evidence supports the finding that TK
                      violated the NLRA by prematurely terminating the
                      PLA.
               TK first argues that the Board erroneously found violations
        of § 8(a)(5) and (a)(1) because there is not substantial evidence to
        show that it agreed to be bound by the PLA or the CBA.
               Section 8(a)(5) declares that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor
        practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with
        the representatives of his employees[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5); see
        NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) (elaborating on the duty to
        bargain collectively). An employer violates the obligation to
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10768

        collectively bargain with his employees’ representative if he
        “terminate[s]” the CBA without observing the statutory process
        (TK does not argue that it observed the statutory process). 29
        U.S.C. § 158(d). The NLRB argues, and TK does not dispute, that
        if a violation of Section 8(a)(5) is established, there is also a
        “derivative” violation of Section 8(a)(1)—which prohibits
        “interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the
        exercise” of rights under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
               TK is not a member of the Mechanical Contractors
        Association with whom the Union signed the CBA, so whether it
        is bound by the terms of the CBA depends on whether it entered
        into (what is known as) a “me too” agreement. See Bd. of Trs., Sheet
        Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Four-C-Aire, Inc., 929 F.3d 135,
        142 n.4 (4th Cir. 2019).
               [A] “me-too agreement” . . . is a contract where an
               employer agrees to be bound by the terms of a CBA
               negotiated by a multiemployer association and [a] lo-
               cal union. Such agreements permit employers to ben-
               eﬁt from the terms of an association’s CBA without
               having to participate in the collective bargaining pro-
               cess.

         Id. (internal citation omitted)). In evaluating whether TK entered
        into such an agreement, we are “guided by the general common
        law of contracts.” E. Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 861 F.2d
        1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1988). A binding labor agreement, like any
        contract, typically involves an offer, acceptance, and consideration,
        but “all that is required to find the existence of a [CBA] is conduct
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        23-10768                  Opinion of the Court                               15

        by the parties manifesting an intent to be bound.” United
        Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Int’l Paper Co., 920 F.2d 852, 855, 855–59
        (11th Cir. 1991).
               The only dispute in this appeal is whether the parties
        reached a “meeting of the minds” on binding one another to the
        terms of the CBA. NLRB v. Downs-Clark, Inc., 479 F.2d 546, 548 (5th
        Cir. 1973). 5 This question deals not with the parties’ subjective
        intentions—but rather their intent as objectively manifested in
        what they said and did. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d
        840, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (agreeing with the board that “in federal
        labor law, as in common law, an agreement is judged by conduct
        evidencing an agreement rather than a party’s subjective belief”),
        reversed and remanded on other grounds, 560 U.S. 674 (2010). TK
        contends that the PLA furnishes no rights or obligations on its own
        terms, and that it does not otherwise incorporate the CBA by
        reference.
               Reviewing the record, we conclude that there is substantial
        evidence for the ALJ’s conclusion that, by executing the PLA, the
        parties intended to enter into a labor agreement under the terms of
        the CBA. The ALJ found the following facts—none of which TK
        disputes—demonstrated that TK intended to be bound to the
        terms of the CBA. Ahn sought Cagle’s help on hiring qualified

        5 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)

        (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
        “handed down . . . prior to the close of business” on September 30, 1981).
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10768

        employees. Cagle told Ahn that the Union could only supply
        employees if TK signed an agreement with the Union. Cagle then
        explained the general terms of the CBA to Ahn, and, when he sent
        the CBA to Ahn, the subject line of the e-mail forwarding the CBA
        to Ahn read “CBA for PLA” (emphasis added). Ahn proceeded to
        read the CBA, which (by its terms) applies to all employers
        executing a document agreeing to be bound. Ahn later forwarded
        both the CBA and the PLA to Kim for his signature. After
        executing the PLA, Ahn’s e-mail to Cagle suggested that the parties
        “void[ ] out the contract.” Notably, Cagle did not agree to void out
        the PLA, and the parties never replaced it with a new agreement
        before the Union started referring workers, despite Cagle telling
        Ahn there had to be a signed agreement before the Union would
        refer workers. When union workers came onboard, TK paid wages
        and fringe benefits, and deducted union dues, in accordance with
        the CBA, even quoting the CBA in an e-mail seeking clarification
        on wage questions. We agree with the ALJ that these facts
        demonstrate, by substantial evidence, that TK intended to enter a
        contract with the Union in accordance with the terms of the CBA.
        See E. Air Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d at1550 (“[T]he fact that Eastern
        currently claims wide areas of difference in the interpretation of [ ]
        important terms is not, of itself, sufficient to support a finding of
        no contract” because “the outward indicia of agreement point
        indisputably to a contractual arrangement.”).
                TK argues that the facts show that it “never intended to
        enter into any agreement of any kind containing an exclusive hiring
        . . . requirement[.]” Instead, TK says, the evidence shows that it
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        23-10768               Opinion of the Court                        17

        expressed a desire for “complete control over employees.” TK
        argues that even if Cagle misunderstood its intentions, and thought
        that TK Ahn merely wanted to be able to terminate employees at
        will, “[t]hese inconsistent understandings . . . show that the parties
        . . . never reached a meeting of the minds[,]” “especially in light of
        the obvious and undeniable language-comprehension obstacles[.]”
        TK’s view of the evidence is plausible—but it is not the only way
        to view the evidence, and the Board’s view is adequately
        supported. See Int’l Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 127 F.3d
        1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1997) (“If the Board has made a plausible
        inference from the evidence, we may not overturn its findings,
        even if we would have made contrary findings upon a de novo
        review of the evidence.”).
                TK makes a few other arguments in response, but they all
        fail. TK insists, for example, that “Kim is the only TK person
        authorized to bind TK to a contract, and [ ] Kim did not see the
        CBA before he signed the one-page [PLA].” But there is credible
        evidence to the contrary. The CBA was attached to Ahn’s e-mail
        soliciting Kim’s signature on the PLA, and it was Kim’s practice to
        rely on Ahn’s translations to conduct business. So it does not
        necessarily follow that Kim never gave the requisite assent to the
        terms of the CBA. The ALJ's conclusion that Kim eﬀectively
        assented is reasonable. See id. (explaining that we may not overturn
        a reasonable inference from the facts).
               TK next points to Ahn’s statement, after the subcontractor
        issue arose, that TK would never agree to an exclusive hiring
        arrangement. This statement might show that Ahn and Kim
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                        23-10768

        fundamentally did not understand the contract—but it is not the
        only conclusion one could draw from the evidence. The evidence
        overall is equally consistent with the conclusion (discussed above)
        that TK’s conduct surrounding the execution of the PLA signaled
        an intent to be bound to the CBA. See id. (we may not overturn a
        reasonable inference from the facts).
               Finally, TK points to “the important language-
        comprehension and cultural diﬀerences” between the parties. But
        once again, the evidence does not demand the conclusion that Ahn
        and Kim did not understand the nature and relationship of the
        documents here. See id. (we may not overturn a reasonable
        inference from the facts).
               Thus, because the ALJ’s findings of fact are “supported by
        substantial evidence,” they are “conclusive,” and we agree that TK
        agreed to be bound to the terms of the CBA. Dynatron, 176 F.3d
        at 1313.
                    B. Substantial evidence supports the finding that TK
                       violated the NLRA by firing and failing to hire union
                       workers after purporting to withdraw from the PLA.
               TK also challenges the Board’s finding that it violated
        § 8(a)(3) by firing and refusing to hire union workers, because of
        their membership, after purporting to withdraw from the PLA. 6

        6 The ALJ also found that this conduct violated § 8(a)(1) and (a)(5).    TK chal-
        lenges those findings, as well, but it focuses on the § 8(a)(3) violation, and ar-
        gues that it did not violate § 8(a)(1) or (a)(5) for the same reasons that it con-
        tends it did not violate § 8(a)(3). Because TK makes just the one argument,
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        23-10768                  Opinion of the Court                               19

               Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA provides that “[i]t shall be an
        unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in
        regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
        of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
        labor organization[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). A violation of
        § 8(a)(3)’s nondiscrimination rule can be shown in two ways. First,
        an employer violates § 8(a)(3) if activity protected by the Act was a
        motivating factor in the discharge. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt.
        Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401 (1983). Second, even if no unlawful motive
        is shown, an employer can violate § 8(a)(3) if the employer’s action
        is “inherently destructive” of employee rights. NLRB v. Great Dane
        Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1967).
               “Some conduct . . . is so inherently destructive of employee
        interests that it may be deemed proscribed without need for proof
        of an underlying improver motive.” Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S.
        at 33 (quotation omitted). “If the conduct in question falls within
        this inherently destructive category, the employer has the burden
        of explaining away, justifying or characterizing his actions as
        something different . . . if he fails, an unfair labor charge is made
        out.” Id. (quotation omitted). Conduct that “discriminates solely
        on the basis of union status” is inherently destructive. Metro.
        Edison, 460 U.S. at 702.

        and we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, we
        need not decide whether TK is right to treat the § 8(a)(1) and (a)(5) violations
        as derivative.
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10768

               The ALJ concluded that firing and refusing to hire Union
        employees after terminating the PLA was “inherently destructive
        of important employee rights” and “strong evidence of [anti-]union
        animus” because, “[u]nder the circumstances, these adverse
        actions . . . were a direct result of [TK’s] premature
        termination/repudiation of the parties’ agreement[.]” (quotation
        omitted). “Furthermore, [TK] . . . failed to present a legitimate and
        substantial business justification for taking these actions and failed
        to prove that it would have taken the same actions in the absence
        of the Union threatening to enforce the exclusivity provision.”
               TK oﬀers reasons why ﬁring and refusing to hire the Union
        workers was not “inherently destructive” of employee rights, but,
        as TK agrees in its reply brief, they all depend on the assertion that
        TK was not bound to the CBA. And as we have already discussed,
        substantial evidence supports the conclusion that it was bound to
        the terms of the CBA.
               Thus, because TK has not challenged the substantial
        evidence found by the ALJ on inherent destructiveness related to
        the binding PLA, there is no need to go further.
                                  IV.    Conclusion
              In sum, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
        NLRB’s findings that TK violated the NLRA. We therefore deny
        the petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-petition to
        enforce its order.
            Petition DENIED and cross-petition for enforcement
        GRANTED.