Court Opinion

ID: 9541677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:27:41.112192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:21.865206
License: Public Domain

*78OPALA, Justice,
concurring in result:
At the center of the controversy sought to be placed before us in this original proceeding for a prerogative writ is the so-called mansion account — a legislatively-fixed stipend authorized by the now-repealed statute 1 for the upkeep and occupancy of the chief executive’s official residence. Petitioners seek from this court— by writ of mandamus — a judicial command compelling (a) the disclosure of all expenses paid from the allowance received under this statute and (b) the production of all underlying documents by which each transaction is reflected.
I concur insofar as the court holds that the mansion account statute petitioners invoke as a basis for the relief sought does not facially require records to be kept nor does it create any duty to account to the government for any expenses made. Petitioners' argument that by this action they may compel the production of purely public records by a government official must hence fail. Simply stated, the writ sought will not lie for discovery of private papers.
What, then, remains of petitioners’ case may be a suit for an accounting and the return of excessive mansion allowance payments to the state treasury. This claim, if indeed actionable, is plainly inappropriate for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. The theory advanced by the petitioners — that the mansion allowance received may be subject to a judicially-compellable accounting and the return of unexpended or misapplied funds enforced— is founded on the contention that the statute under consideration, 74 O.S.1981 § 7, is a disguised salary increase in violation of Art. 23 § 10, Okl. Const. Aside from posing accounting problems, this approach, if correct, would require some exploration of, and inquiry into, the factual foundation that underlies the statutorily-fixed amount determined by the legislature to be necessary for the upkeep and occupancy of the mansion. While petitioners’ allegations in the paperwork before us doubtless are sufficient to show their standing to press for the production of public records sought by them for inspection, it is far from certain that these petitioners also would have standing to challenge the constitutional validity of the mansion account statute here under consideration and to bring a claim for an accounting ancillary to the recovery of unexpended or misapplied funds. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).2
I would hence declare this controversy unsuitable for resolution in the exercise of this court’s original cognizance.

. 74 O.S.1981 § 7.

. In a suit for accounting petitioners would occupy the status of so-called "non-Hohfeldian” plaintiffs, i.e. persons whose interest tendered for judicial vindication is neither personal nor proprietary. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1962, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).