Court Opinion

ID: 9546656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:33:37.518942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:44.205351
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with the result reached by the majority, for I agree that the warrantless search of the pocket of Miller’s overcoat at the police station violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and that the search cannot be upheld as incident to an arrest for receiving stolen property because there was not probable cause to believe he committed that offense. Moreover, the theory that it was incident to an arrest for that offense was not presented in the trial court and may not be urged for the first time on appeal.
I disagree, however, with dictum by the majority indicating that unless the People establish that the arresting officer at the time of the arrest held a subjective belief that a particular crime had been committed by the person
*228to be arrested the People cannot establish probable cause to arrest for that crime. This dictum is inconsistent with Penal Code section 836 and the views of authorities hereinafter cited. The effect of the dictum will be to require that law enforcement officers be legal scholars and to fail “to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection” (see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 [93 L.Ed. 1879, 1891, 69 S.Ct. 1302]).
Our Legislature has provided an objective standard for an officer’s authority to make an arrest. Penal Code section 836 provides: “A peace officer may . . . without a warrant, arrest a person: . . . Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether or not a felony has in fact been committed.”1 Under this standard the “question is not what the state of mind of the arresting officer was, but instead whether a reasonable man would have grounds to believe the arrested person guilty.” (See LaFave, Arrest: The Decision to Take A Suspect into Custody: The Report of the American Bar Foundation’s Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States (1965) pp. 254-255; in accord, People v. Pike, 239 Cal.App.2d 237, 240 [48 Cal.Rptr. 575]; People v. Reed, 202 Cal.App.2d 575, 578 [20 Cal.Rptr. 911]; People v. Knox, 178 Cal.App.2d 502, 513-514 [3 Cal.Rptr. 70].)2
In addition to the foregoing authorities it is implicit in various decisions that it is not essential that the arresting officer at the time of the arrest have a subjective belief that the arrestee is guilty of a particular crime in order to establish probable cause to arrest for that crime. (See, e.g., Klingler v. United States (8th Cir. 1969) 409 F.2d 299, 304; People v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.App.3d 146,152-153 [92 Cal.Rptr. 916]; People v. Walker, 273 Cal.App.2d 720, 722-725 [78 Cal.Rptr. 439].) For example, in Klingler, which involved a statute similar to Penal Code section 836, the officer arrested Klingler for vagrancy and made a contemporaneous search that revealed a pistol, which formed the basis for a Federal Firearms Act charge against him. The court concluded that there was not probable cause to believe *229him guilty of vagrancy. The court upheld the arrest, however, on the ground that there was probable cause to arrest him for robbery. Nowhere in the opinion is it stated that the officer held a subjective belief that Klingler was guilty of robbery, and the contrary is indicated by the officer’s testimony that he did not think he had “enough facts” upon which to arrest Klingler for robbery. With respect to that testimony the court stated “Because probable cause for an arrest is determined by objective facts, it is immaterial that [the officer] . . . testified that he did not think that he had ‘enough facts’ upon which to arrest Klingler for . . . robbery. His subjective opinion is not material. See Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,22 .... A .. . safeguard predicated on an objective standard requires an even-handed application. From the standpoint of the individual, the . . . zone protecting his privacy . . . may be encroached . . . only by facts and circumstances totaling probable cause for arrest. [Citations.] From the standpoint of the government, application of the principle of probable cause must allow room for some mistakes by the arresting officer.” (Italics added.)
I further note that section 120.1 of the American Law Institute, a Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, April 10, 1972), like Penal Code section 836, contains an objective standard for an officer’s authority to make an arrest, and under that section “the officer’s inability to determine the particular crime which may have been committed will not render illegal an arrest.” (Id. at p. 136.) The commentary to that section notes (at p. 136) that “there appears to be no ground in principle or authority that would justify requiring an arresting officer to be able to identify the precise crime for which he is arresting. . . . [I]t would be undesirable to require, as a condition of taking the person into custody, that the officer discover precisely what sort of serious criminality that person may have been involved in. And even if the raw facts of the situation are known to the officer, their precise legal characterization may involve legal subtleties with which an arresting officer should not be required to concern himself.” The majority in this case, however, contrary to the views of the American Law Institute, require that the arresting officer “be able to identify the precise crime for which he is arresting,” since, according to the majority, unless the arresting officer at the time of the arrest held a subjective belief that a particular crime had been committed by the arrestee the People cannot establish probable cause to arrest for that crime.
The majority cite Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 [13 L.Ed.2d 142, 148, 85 S.Ct. 223], People v. Talley, 65 Cal.2d 830, 835 [56 Cal.Rptr. 492, 423 P.2d 564], and People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 807, 821 [91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449], but none of the citations support the proposition *230that the subjective belief of the arresting officer as to the arrestee’s guilt is critical in determining the legality of an arrest, as the majority herein indicate.3
The majority claim that the exclusionary rule “requires that courts focus first on the officers’ beliefs [concerning the arrestee’s guilt of a particular crime] before measuring those beliefs against the objective standard of probable cause.” I disagree. The exclusionary rule seeks to deter unreasonable searches and seizures. A search and seizure incident to an arrest based upon probable cause to believe that the arrestee is guilty of a felony manifestly are not unreasonable merely because the officer may not have held a subjective belief that the defendant was guilty of that crime.
The only reason given by the majority for their claim that the exclusionary rule requires focusing on the officers’ beliefs concerning the arrestee’s guilt of a particular crime is that “police behavior cannot be labelled ‘reasonable’ if the officers themselves did not believe they were acting on legitimate suspicions of unlawful activity.” However, officers may well be of the opinion that they are acting on such suspicions where they believe there is reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a felony, yet they may not have pledged their personal opinion of the arrestee’s guilt4 or may be unaware of the particular crime for which a lawful arrest could be made (see American Law Institute, A Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, supra, at p. 136).
I would disapprove Agar v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.App.3d 24 [98 Cal.Rptr. 148], to the extent that it is inconsistent with the views I have expressed herein.
Another conclusion of the majority with which I disagree is their declaration that “the Fourth Amendment compelled the officers to honor Miller’s stated desire that they leave the property undisturbed [in his car].” *231In support of their conclusion the majority rely solely upon language in Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 699 [94 Cal.Rptr. 412, 484 P.2d 84]. That language, however, is merely dictum. Furthermore, Mozzetti was concerned with what action should be taken by the police regarding property in a car that is taken into police custody, and the dictum relied upon by the majority did not declare that under any and all circumstances the police must honor an owner’s stated desire regarding his property.
In my opinion under the circumstances hereinafter recited the officers acted reasonably in failing to honor Miller’s stated desire regarding his property and in taking it from his car to the police station.
The property consisted of an overcoat and electronic and musical equipment. The officer who took the property stated that he did so solely to safeguard it, and the committing magistrate and trial court evidently believed his testimony.
The property appeared to be of considerable value and was in plain sight on the rear seat of Miller’s car. The car was in an area known by the officers to have a high, incidence of burglary and could not be moved immediately since it was out of gas.
One of the doors of Miller’s car could not be locked. The officer who took the property testified that he did not try to get into Miller’s car trunk and that he neither had, nor asked Miller for, the car keys. Even if (1) Miller’s property could have fit into his car trunk and (2) a key thereto would have been furnished by him had the officers requested it, taking the property to the police station was a reasonable alternative method of protecting the property. Indeed the property would in all likelihood be safer at the police station than it would have been had it been placed in Miller’s car trunk in view of the high crime area in which the car was parked. The officers had reason to believe that the car would be left unattended for more than a de minimis period of time since they arrested Miller for a traffic violation.
Safeguarding the property manifestly was not solely for the owner’s benefit but also for the benefit of others. To leave the property in the unattended car following Miller’s arrest would have invited the commission of crime by minors and others and could have led to a needless consumption of police time in efforts to retrieve the property.
McComb, J., concurred.

 Reasonable cause exists “when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officers at the moment of the arrest are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the defendant has committed an offense. [Citations.]” (People v. Talley, 65 Cal.2d 830, 835 [56 Cal.Rptr. 492, 423 P.2d 564].)

LaFave, supra, notes (at p. 255, fn. 49) that 1 Restatement of Torts (1934) section 119, comment j, concludes that if the actor’s belief that the other was guilty of the felony were required only one suspect could be arrested. Some of the majority’s language in this case indicates that a belief by the officer of the other’s guilt of a particular crime is required, although other of the majority’s language indicates that it is sufficient if the officer suspects the other’s guilt of a particular crime. Only the former language, of course, presents the problem mentioned by the Restatement of Torts, supra.

The majority also state that “Although the officer must suspect that an individual has committed the elements of a crime in order eventually to establish probable cause to arrest for commission of that crime, the officer need not articulate all his suspicions at the time of arrest, so long as he informs the arrestee of at least one ‘cause of the arrest.’ (Pen. Code, § 841; People v. Maddox ... 46 Cal.2d 301, 305 [294 P.2d 6]; People v. Superior Court ... 15 Cal.App.3d 146, 151-152 [92 Cal.Rptr. 916]; People v. Graves ... 263 Cal.App.2d 719, 737-738 [70 Cal.Rptr. 509] ....)” None of the citations support the first clause of the quoted statement.

A hypothetical example of the above appears in LaFave, supra, at page 254. “An officer investigating a murder found that the assembled evidence made it highly probable that a particular person had committed the offense. The suspect was a longtime personal friend of the officer, and consequently the officer could not bring himself to believe the suspect would commit such a crime. He nonetheless placed his friend under arrest.”