Court Opinion

ID: 9845688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:26:19.591626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:18.530448
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WHITING,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority decision in this case. I do not think that the evidence in this case is sufficient to establish a claim for punitive damages.
Our first case dealing with a punitive damage claim against an allegedly intoxicated driver was Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 908, 114 S.E.2d 617, 620 (1960). In Baker, a negligent defendant, whose intoxication was considered “borderline” by the police, ran into the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle. Although we recognized that the defendant’s failure to keep a proper lookout for the vehicle ahead of her “may have been partly due to the intoxicants which she had imbibed,” we reversed an award of punitive damages because there was “nothing to show that [the defendant] acted in a spirit of mischief, criminal indifference, or conscious disregard of the rights of others.” Id. at 910, 114 S.E.2d at 621.
Next, we decided Booth v. Robertson, 236 Va. 269, 374 S.E.2d 1 (1988), in which the defendant, George Barnitz Robertson, drove his jeep the wrong way down an exit ramp onto an interstate highway into the path of an approaching tractor-trailer truck. In *317response, the driver of that vehicle blinked his lights, blew “a constant blast’ ’ on his air horns, and swerved his tractor-trailer twice to avoid a collision with Robertson’s jeep. Id. at 270, 374 S.E.2d at 1. Robertson passed by the left side of the tractor-trailer and kept going “at a pretty high rate of speed.” Id. Robertson continued for approximately four-tenths of a mile farther down the interstate highway until he collided head-on with the plaintiff. Id. After the collision, a blood test showed that Robertson had a blood alcohol content of 0.22%. We held that this “egregious set of facts” supplied the necessary “conscious disregard of the rights of others” to permit an award of punitive damages. Id. at 273, 374 S.E.2d at 3.
In the next case, Hack v. Nester, 241 Va. 499, 404 S.E.2d 42 (1991), the defendant Hack’s car intruded more than four feet into the opposing traffic lane on a curve at night and struck an approaching car head-on, killing its driver. Hack had two drunk driving convictions prior to this collision, and his blood alcohol content was an indeterminate amount between 0.09% and 0.114% after the collision. He was also suffering from “night blindness” and was operating his car without a left headlight.
After comparing not only the difference in Robertson’s and Hack’s blood alcohol content, but also the particular conduct of each defendant that led to the collision, we concluded that the facts were not sufficiently egregious to justify an award of punitive damages. Id. at 507, 404 S.E.2d at 45.
Huffman contends that Booth, not Hack, controls this case because Love’s blood alcohol content was 0.32% and the Booth defendant’s blood alcohol content was 0.22%. However, this difference is only one of the factors that must be considered. As we have said: “Evidence of intoxication may be offered to show the negligence of a driver; but in the absence of proof of one or more of the elements necessary to justify an award of punitive damages, it may not be used to enlarge an award [of compensatory damages].” Baker, 201 Va. at 910, 114 S.E.2d at 621 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, I turn to the other evidence relied upon by Huffman to establish her case for punitive damages. This includes evidence that might show Love’s knowledge or state of mind, as well as evidence of Love’s negligent acts that were direct causes of the collision. And, because the court effectively struck Huffman’s claim for punitive damages in sustaining Love’s motion in limine, I view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most *318favorable to Huffman’s claim. Puent v. Dickens, 245 Va. 217, 219, 427 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1993) (this day decided).
Love’s two previous drunk driving convictions and his participation in Alcohol Safety Action Programs constitute evidence that might indicate his awareness of the general dangers of drunken driving. And Love’s knowledge of his incapacity to drive on the night of the accident could also be inferred from the facts that he had two accidents that night and failed to stop following either.
However, the issue is not merely how drunk Love was and how much he was aware of his condition, but also whether his drunkenness, combined with his actions directly contributing to the collision, “evince[d] a conscious disregard for the rights of others.” Simply being drunk is not enough; a sober driver could evidence such disregard, while a drunken driver may merely be negligent. See Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 283, 322 S.E.2d 216, 221 (1984).
Hence, to decide whether there is sufficient evidence of the necessary wantonness, I think that we must also consider those acts that could have been direct causes of the collision. They are the drunken Love’s alleged negligence in: (1) ‘‘approaching a dangerous curve” while driving approximately 10 miles per hour in excess of the posted speed limit of 15 miles per hour; (2) failing to keep a proper lookout; and (3) failing to keep his vehicle under proper control, thereby causing it to enter the opposing traffic lane as the Huffman car was approaching.
In my opinion, these negligent acts pale in comparison with the wanton negligence of the defendant Robertson in Booth. Although both intoxicated drivers had an accident (or near-accident) with another vehicle before proceeding on to strike the plaintiff’s car, Robertson’s near-accident gave him notice that he was engaged in the highly dangerous act of driving the wrong way down an interstate highway. And it was his persistence in that very act which caused the collision in Booth.
Although Love’s alleged prior rear-end collision should have indicated to him that he was intoxicated, his momentary entry into the wrong lane of travel on a curve while going 10 miles an hour over the 15 mile per hour speed limit, in my opinion, is simply not equatable with the egregious act of continuing to drive the wrong way down an interstate highway after a near-collision with a tractor-trailer. Thus, except for going approximately 25 miles per hour in a 15 mile per hour speed zone, I think Love’s negligent driving more *319closely resembles that of the defendant in Hack rather than that of Robertson. And even though Love had a blood alcohol content substantially higher than the defendant in the Hack case, I do not think that this difference alone can elevate this run-of-the-mill personal injury case into one permitting punitive damages.
Accordingly, I conclude that the trial court correctly sustained Love’s motion in limine. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.