Court Opinion

ID: 9949407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 16:11:40.451941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:48.841400
License: Public Domain

J-A29030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 BRENDAN ANDRE MCKENZIE                   :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 442 WDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 13, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0004430-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                    FILED: March 11, 2024

      Brendan Andre McKenzie appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following revocation of his probation for the third time. He challenges

the discretionary aspects of his new sentence claiming that it was manifestly

excessive, because the trial court placed him in a religious-based community

residential rehabilitation (“CRR”) facility where he could not comply with its

strict rules. Upon review, we vacate McKenzie’s sentence on other grounds

and remand for further proceedings.

      The relevant factual and procedural history follows. On November 8,

2016, McKenzie entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of aggravated

indecent assault of a child (complainant less than 16) and one count of
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corruption of minors (collectively “the minors’ offenses”).1 In accordance with

the agreement, the trial court sentenced McKenzie to 12 to 24 months’

incarceration, followed by three years’ probation (March 15, 2018 to March

15, 2021) for the aggravated indecent assault conviction and two years’

probation for the corruption of minors conviction, to run concurrent with the

other sentence of probation.

       On September 29, 2017, after multiple petitions, McKenzie was paroled.

Because he did not have an appropriate housing plan, he was sent to Remnant

House on October 27, 2017, a Christian-based CRR facility. However, not long

thereafter, he was removed for failure to comply with the rules. On December

24, 2017, McKenzie went to live with his uncle but remained on parole.

       On March 15, 2018, McKenzie started his sentence of probation.

       On May 9, 2018, probation was notified that McKenzie’s uncle made him

leave the house in April 2018 due to McKenzie not working and his alleged

drug use. Probation contacted McKenzie that day and instructed him to report

to the probation office, but he did not. McKenzie remained an absconder for

several months until he was arrested on new criminal charges.

        In March 2019, McKenzie was convicted for failure to register as a sex

offender. This conviction triggered a VOP hearing on the minors’ offenses. On

August 12, 2019, the VOP court found that McKenzie violated his probation

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125(a)(8) and 6301(a)(1). Notably, as part of the
agreement, the corruption of minors charge was graded as a misdemeanor of
the first degree.

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for the minors’ offenses based, inter alia, on these new convictions. The court

revoked the sentences of probation and resentenced him to concurrent 5-year

terms of probation (August 12, 2019 to August 12, 2024). McKenzie was sent

to another CRR.    Again, he was unable to comply with the rules and was

removed, but he remained on probation.

      In October 2019, McKenzie was arrested for failing to register again and

subsequently was convicted of this offense. This conviction triggered another

VOP hearing on November 2, 2020, and the VOP court found that McKenzie

violated his probation for the minors’ offenses a second time.      The court

revoked the probation and resentenced McKenzie to 10 to 20 months’

incarceration, with 395 days credit for time served, followed by 5 years’

probation for the aggravated indecent assault conviction and a concurrent

sentence of 5 years’ probation (November 2, 2020 to November 2, 2025) for

the corruption of minors conviction. McKenzie was paroled immediately and

sent to Remnant House.

      In May 2021, McKenzie was removed from Remnant House for failure to

comply with the rules. A warrant was issued, and McKenzie turned himself in

on May 27, 2021, and was sent to jail. Shortly thereafter, on June 5, 2021,

McKenzie’s 20-month sentence of incarceration expired. On July 19, 2021,

the VOP court ordered, inter alia, that McKenzie remain detained and provide

a new home plan. On February 7, 2022, following a hearing, the VOP court

lifted the detainer, with no further action. McKenzie was released on March

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22, 2022, and sent to another CRR.         McKenzie remained subject to the

remainder of his probationary sentence for the minors’ offenses.

      At the end of June 2022, McKenzie was discharged from the CRR for

failure to follow the rules, and he absconded. A probation violation warrant

was issued on June 30, 2022. McKenzie was arrested on July 4, 2022, and

sent to jail. While there, McKenzie experienced severe mental health issues.

He was sent to Torrance State Hospital.

      On March 13, 2023, the VOP court found that McKenzie violated his

probation a third time. The court revoked the probation, and resentenced

McKenzie as follows: 3½ to 7 years’ incarceration for the corruption of minors

conviction followed by 4 years’ probation for the aggravated indecent assault

conviction. McKenzie filed a post-sentence motion which the court denied.

      McKenzie filed this timely appeal.     He and the court complied with

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

      On appeal, McKenzie raises the following issue:

      I. Did the [VOP] court abuse its sentencing discretion in imposing
      a manifestly excessive sentence which failed to consider that []
      McKenzie’s drug, alcohol, mental health, and sex offender
      treatments must be addressed in a non-religious setting?

McKenzie’s Brief at 7.

      McKenzie challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.        A

challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, following probation

revocation, does not entitle an appellant to review as of right; rather, the

appellant must petition    this Court for     permission to appeal.        See

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Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 289 (Pa. Super. 2008). Before

reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we must conduct a

four-part analysis to determine:

       (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
       Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
       preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
       sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the] appellant's
       brief has a fatal defect, [by failing to include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)
       statement]; and (4) whether there is a substantial question that
       the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
       Sentencing Code, [see] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal

citation and brackets omitted).

       Here, McKenzie satisfied the first requirement under Moury. However,

he did not preserve his issue for appellate review to satisfy the second

requirement.2

       Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 708 governs the rules

applicable to challenging a sentence imposed following a violation of probation

determination.     To preserve a discretionary aspects of sentence claim, the

appellant must raise the issue either at sentencing or in a post-sentence

motion.    Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa. Super.

2013) (en banc).        Furthermore, the appellant must set forth therein the

particular legal theory asserted on appeal so that the sentencing court was
____________________________________________

2 We also observe that McKenzie did not include the specific issue set forth in

his statement of questions involved on appeal, pertaining to the religious
nature of his community housing, in his Rule 2119(f) statement. As such, we
would decline to review it for that reason as well.

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given the opportunity to reconsider the imposition of the sentence.         See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d

592, 598 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“New legal theories cannot be raised on

appeal.”).   Thus, an appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of

sentence in a post-sentence motion may only argue on appeal the specific

arguments     he   included   in   his    post-sentence   motion.   See,   e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 499 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding

appellant waived discretionary aspects of sentence claim because, while he

filed a post-sentence motion raising a discretionary claim, that claim differed

from the claim he presented on appeal).        Failure to properly preserve an

argument results in waiver. Catrette, 83 Aa.3d at 1042.

      Here, McKenzie filed a post-sentence motion asking to modify his

sentence and raising a discretionary aspects of sentence claim. However, the

claim raised in his post-sentence motion differed from the one he presents on

appeal.   McKenzie did not argue to the VOP court that his sentence was

excessive because of his inability to comply with the strict rules at a religious

based residential facility.   McKenzie’s Brief at 7, 29.     Instead, McKenzie

claimed that the trial court failed to consider the relevant sentencing criteria,

particularly his rehabilitative needs given his mental health; he did not

reference any religious concerns. Thus, his post-sentence motion lacked the

requisite specificity necessary to properly preserve this issue for our review.

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        McKenzie also did not raise this issue at the time of his sentencing.

Instead, during the hearing, he acknowledged that he was unable to follow

the program requirements in a structured setting, but never mentioned the

religious nature of the facility, which he now claims prevented him from

successfully completing the mental health and sex offender components of his

treatment. N.T., 3/13/23, at 10-12. As such, McKenzie did not preserve his

appellate issue by raising it at sentencing.

        For these reasons, we conclude that McKenzie’s issue is waived, and we

will not address the merits of this issue.

        Even if McKenzie preserved his sentencing claim, we would conclude

that the VOP court did not abuse its discretion when it resentenced McKenzie.

Initially, we observe that the VOP court had a pre-sentence investigation

report (“PSI”). Id. at 4. “[W]here the [] court is informed by a pre-sentence

report, it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing

factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so informed,

its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975

A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).        Additionally, the VOP

court    was   well   familiar   with   McKenzie   given   his   “long   history   of

noncompliance.” N.T., 3/13/23, at 4.

        We further note that the VOP court gave McKenzie multiple opportunities

for rehabilitation and treatment in a community setting, with only limited

periods of incarceration. However, McKenzie repeatedly failed to comply with

the conditions of his probation and the facility requirements. That he now

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blames the religious nature of the program facilities as the reason for his

inability to comply is absurd.   After the VOP court found he violated his

probation the second time, the court emphasized it would not accept the

religious nature of the CRR as the reason why McKenzie could not comply with

the rules. The court stated:

     If I agree to let you go to Remnant, there is no wiggle room. None
     whatsoever. You will follow the rules. You will abide by the
     conditions of the ankle bracelet. You will take your medication as
     it is prescribed for you by your physician.

                                    ***

     And if we do that and you can’t follow the rules at Remnant, there
     is no other alternative. The last time I did allow you to go to I
     think it was an uncle’s house. That was a disaster. We are not
     playing any games now. This is not, “Well, I don’t like Remnant
     because I’m not into the religious stuff. I want to go somewhere
     else.”

N.T., 11/2/20, at 8-9. McKenzie emphatically agreed. Id. at 9. Despite this

agreement and the court’s warning, McKenzie makes the same religious

excuse on appeal.

     We further observe that the VOP court was well aware of McKenzie’s

drug, alcohol, and mental health issues and considered these issues each time

it sentenced him.   The court repeatedly and painstakingly endeavored to

provide McKenzie with rehabilitation for these issues in a community setting

rather than incarceration. However, given all the circumstances, the court

was out of options for McKenzie. N.T., 3/13/23, at 10-11. Consequently, the

VOP court imposed a sentence of incarceration, the length of which would

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provide him with the treatment he needed and protect the community. Id. at

11, 14-15.    Additionally, the court recognized that, once McKenzie was

released into the community, he would still need supervision to ensure he had

stable housing to avoid sex offender registration violations and have help

available for his issues. Id. at 15-17. Thus, considering the VOP court’s

rationale, we would conclude that it did not abuse its discretion and McKenzie

would not be entitled to relief.

      Notwithstanding our decision regarding the discretionary aspects of

McKenzie’s    sentence,    the     Commonwealth        observes     that   McKenzie’s

resentence, which is the subject of this appeal, is an illegal sentence.

Commonwealth Brief at 32, 36. The Commonwealth maintains that McKenzie

negotiated his plea on the corruption of minors charge to be graded as a

misdemeanor one rather than a felony three. As such, the statutory maximum

sentence was 5 years. However, at McKenzie’s most recent VOP hearing on

March 13, 2023, the court resentenced him to 3½ to 7 years’ incarceration for

that conviction. According to the Commonwealth, this exceeded the statutory

maximum and is therefore            an illegal sentence.           Consequently, the

Commonwealth recommends that this Court vacate McKenzie’s sentence and

remand the case so that the VOP court can correctly resentence McKenzie.

Id. at 36.

      Although McKenzie does not argue that his new sentence exceeded the

statutory maximum for his corruption conviction, we may examine it sua

sponte   because    it   implicates   the   legality    of   his    sentence.    See

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Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 903 (Pa. Super. 2010).

When a trial court imposes a sentence outside of the legal parameters

prescribed by the applicable statute, the sentence is illegal.               See

Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 744 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Pa. 2000). An illegal

sentence should be vacated and remanded for correction. Vasquez, 744 A.2d

at 1284.

       As the Commonwealth noted, McKenzie’s plea agreement graded the

corruption of minors charge as a misdemeanor of the first degree.           N.T.,

11/8/16, 10-11. The statutory maximum sentence for a misdemeanor of the

first degree is 5 years. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1104(1). Consequently, the 7 ½ year

term of incarceration imposed on this count exceeded the statutory

maximum.3 We recognize that this may have been due to a clerical error, but

it is nonetheless an illegal sentence and must be corrected. Therefore, we

vacate McKenzie’s sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this memorandum.

       Judgment      of   sentence     vacated.    Case   remanded.   Jurisdiction

relinquished.

____________________________________________

3 We note however that this sentence would not exceed the statutory
maximum penalty of 10 years for the aggravated indecent assault conviction,
a second-degree felony. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(2).

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DATE: 03/11/2024

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