Court Opinion

ID: 9849736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:45:15.699518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:25.510124
License: Public Domain

FINNEY, Chief Justice
(Dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm appellant’s convictions, but I would reverse and remand for a new sentencing proceeding.
Based upon the non-definitive nature of Juror Young’s response to the court that her ability to be fair and impartial “should not” be affected by the fact that she knew Fletch, and the cursoriness of the trial judge’s examination, I would hold that the trial judge erred in failing to allow further examination of Juror Young. (Emphasis added.) During the following portion of his guilt phase cross-examination Vincent Neumon, appellant’s accomplice, admitted that he (Neumon) had borrowed the murder weapon from an individual named Fletch.
Q. All right. Now, this gun that you’re talking about that you borrowed, this gun, you knew where to go borrow that gun, didn’t you?
A. Yeah.
*125Q. And you went and you got that from Fletch, did you, over at Belvedere?
A. Yeah.
Q. And Thomas Ivey, you took him with you, because he didn’t know how to get to Belvedere, did he?
A. That’s true.
Q. All right. So y’all went over there and you talked to Fletch, and you know Fletch, isn’t that right? (Transcript of Record does not show a response before the next question.)
Q. That’s right. (Transcript of Record does not show a response before the next question.)
Q. All right. And Thomas doesn’t know Fletch, does he?
A. No.
Q. Not good enough for Fletch to loan him a gun, but he loaned you the gun, is that right?
A. That’s true.
Q. Okay. Now, the way I understand it, you told Fletch, “I’m going to bring you the gun back with some drugs.” So you kind of rented it?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And you told Fletch — does he live in Belvedere or y’all just met him over there, do you know? You don’t know if he lives there now?
A. No, I don’t know if he lives there now.
Q. He might have moved. You told Fletch y’all were going to rob some drug dealers, and isn’t it true that since you’re from Columbia, you know where the drug dealers live, you know those areas?
A. True.
Subsequently, the jury was sent out and another issue was discussed out of the jury’s presence. Prior to bringing the jury back into the courtroom, the trial judge advised counsel that he had received from one of the jurors a note which stated: “I know the person, Fletch, that Mr. Neumon was talking about.” With counsel’s assent, the Judge ruled that the juror would be questioned at the conclusion of Mr. Neu*126mon’s examination, and testimony resumed in the presence of the jury. At the end of the state’s case, except for the author of the note, the jurors were excused for the evening recess. Juror Young was then examined by the Court as follows:
Q. Okay, Ms. Young, you sent out a note that says, “I know the person, Fletch, that Mr. Neumon was talking about.”
A. Uh huh.
Q. Do you feel like you know that same person?
A. Yes.
Q. If it is the same person, would that have any effect on your ability to be fair and impartial in this case, just because you know Fletch?
A. No, it shouldn’t.
Q. Ma’am.
A. It shouldn’t affect me.
Q. Okay. It shouldn’t have any effect on you at all, you just wanted us to know that?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. All right, we appreciate it.
The State did not object to allowing Juror Young to continue on the case. Defense counsel objected as follows:
MR. CULLER: Your Honor, we would argue that, you know, certainly if she has said that she knows the same Fletch, this guy is someone from whom the gun was rented, the drugs would be provided later, it was a Three fifty-seven Magnum, that causes us some problems and we would ask that she be removed.
The Court denied the defense motion to remove Ms. Young from the jury. When the trial resumed the next morning Mr. Early, one of the defense attorneys, made the following request to question Juror Young:
MR. EARLY: You recall, Ms. Young was a juror that we had moved to strike for cause in Winnsboro. She initially started out as a, a always death juror, and then she equivocated and came around, according the — Your Hon- or ruled that she came around to a Number Three juror. We just feel like that Fletch, who was the guy that *127provided the gun to Neumon, being involved in the drug world, the gun world, and all the other situations, he’s such an important character in this event, that I’d like to know more about her knowledge of Fletch and question her on her ability to be unbiased and fair in this case.
The Court denied appellant’s motion to question Juror Young, holding that Fletch was neither a witness nor a party and that he was not a major player in the case. Appellant contends it was reversible error for the court to deny his motion to allow further questioning of Juror Young and, consequently, his death sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing. I agree.
The question of the impartiality of the juror is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Johnson, 248 S.C. 158, 149 S.E.2d 348 (1966). Johnson involved the qualification of members of the jury venire before being seated as jurors and dealt with the trial judge’s discretion in qualifying a jury based upon general information available at the beginning of that trial. Likewise, S.C.Code §§ 16-3-20(D) and 14-7-1020 (1976) (Supp.1997) address voir dire examination of venirepersons. Conversely, the question before this court relates to a particular juror’s knowledge of an individual who was not the subject of voir dire examination, but who was introduced through testimony elicited during the trial.
In denying appellant’s request for further questioning of Juror Young, the trial judge stated that Fletch “... is, if anything, a very peripheral character, but certainly, not even a witness.” On the contrary, mention of the name Fletch occurs several times in the record in conjunction with crucial evidence. Cross examination connected Fletch with illegal activities which had the potential to be known by people who knew Fletch, including Juror Young. Testimony suggested that Fletch was involved in drug dealing. Fletch was reportedly the person who provided the gun used in the commission of the crime for which the appellant was charged. Upon hearing the testimony concerning Fletch, Juror Young obviously felt compelled to apprise the trial court of the fact that she knew Fletch.
Essentially, the trial judge’s examination consisted of restating the text of Ms. Young’s note, and no further information *128about the juror’s knowledge of or relationship with Fletch was elicited by the court. I hold the view that after Juror Young’s repeated response that knowing Fletch “should not” affect her ability to be fair and impartial, further examination was required to ascertain the context in which the juror was acquainted with Fletch.- Recognizing that qualification of jurors on voir dire is within the discretion of the judge, a review of the voir dire examination of Juror Young tends to support Appellant’s concern over Juror Young’s ability to accord fair and impartial consideration to this capital case. In ■ her reply to a series of voir dire questions on her view of imposing capital punishment, the record reflects that Juror Young equivocated on whether she could vote for a penalty of less than death for a defendant found guilty of killing someone. The defense had sought unsuccessfully to strike Juror Young for cause on the basis of her responses on voir dire examination.
The majority cites State v. Nance, 25 S.C. 168 (1886), to support its holding that the appellant waived his right to further examination of the juror by failing to make a timely objection. I note that, according to the record, the issue of Juror Young’s disclosure that she knew Fletch was the last business taken up by the court at the end of the court day and among the first items considered when the trial resumed the following morning.
As set forth in the majority opinion, whether and in what form to conduct an inquiry may depend upon the circumstances. 50A C.J.S. Juries § 503 (1997). The trial of a capital case and the imposition of the resulting punishment are inherently different from any other criminal prosecution. At the very least, justice demands and conscience dictates that the irretrievable extinguishment of human life by the state be preceded by a conscionable effort to be thorough, fair and reasonably certain that adequate measures are ... observed to minimize the likelihood of an illegal execution. State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) (Finney, A.J., dissenting). Clearly, the circumstances attending Juror Young’s revelation warranted a more thorough inquiry than was conducted.
*129I would hold that the record before this court supports appellant’s entitlement to a new sentencing proceeding due to the failure of the trial court to ascertain, through appropriate examination, the extent of Juror Young’s knowledge of Fletch and whether or not there existed such knowledge of or connection with Fletch as would,affect her ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.
The cumulative effective of Juror Young’s inclination to impose the penalty of death, and the absence from this record of responses by the Juror which would enable the court to ascertain the extent of her knowledge of Fletch, an individual whose name was raised in connection with parties whose roles were significant in this case raises, in my mind, serious questions as to Juror Young’s ability to accord the appellant a fair and impartial trial. I would reverse appellant’s death sentence and remand for a new sentencing proceeding.