Court Opinion

ID: 9751524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:33:57.096073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:18.498745
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CASTILLE,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the Commonwealth Court’s holding that deputy sheriffs of second class counties are not “policemen” for purposes of collective bargaining under Act 111 of 1968, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.10 (“Act 111”), but are instead employees covered by the Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act (the “PERA”).1
As the majority concedes, our review of this appeal arising out of a decision by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (the “PLRB”) is limited to determining whether there has been a violation of constitutional rights, an error of law, a procedural irregularity, or whether the findings of the PLRB are supported by substantial evidence. Majority Opinion at *138131, 41 A.3d at 843 (citing Borough of Ellwood City v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 606 Pa. 356, 998 A.2d 589, 594 (2010)). A reviewing court must uphold the PLRB’s decision if its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, and if the conclusions of law drawn from those facts are reasonable. Ellwood City, supra; Commonwealth v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 502 Pa. 7, 463 A.2d 409, 411 (1983) (“Capitol Police ”). The court must give controlling weight to the PLRB’s interpretation of a governing statute unless it is clearly erroneous. Ellwood City, 998 A.2d at 594.
The PLRB asserts that, like the courts, it uses a two-part test for determining what employees are considered “policemen” for purposes of collective bargaining under Act 111: whether 1) they are legislatively authorized to act as police; and 2) they “in fact effectively act as police.” Appellee’s Brief at 14. Although the sheriffs do perform some police-type duties, according to the PLRB, their work remains primarily court-related.2 Since the examiner’s findings were supported by the evidence presented, the PLRB contends that its decision that the deputy sheriffs are not Act 111 policemen was correct.3 My review reveals that the PLRB’s interpretation of the relevant statutes was not clearly erroneous, and its find*139ings were supported by the evidence. I would therefore reject the arguments of the Allegheny County Deputy Sheriffs’ Association (the “Association”) to the contrary.
The question of whether deputy sheriffs in counties of the second class are “police officers” for purposes of collective bargaining under Act 111, or are instead employees covered by the arbitration provisions of the PERA, is ultimately a question of legislative intent, and there is no statutory provision that plainly expresses this intention. The Majority gleans its conclusion instead from what amounts to vague, indirect or circumstantial evidence of legislative intent, based on definitions in the Crimes Code, and the Municipal Police Education and Training Law (“MPETL”).4 The Majority concludes that public employees who perform some police or police-like duties, and who are identified as “police officers” in unrelated statutes, have been granted the same collective bargaining rights as the “policemen” expressly referred to in Act 111 — ie., that the term “police officers” always carries a specialized meaning, with collateral collective bargaining trappings, regardless of the statutory or factual context.
Our prior determinations that Act 111 applied to certain employees derived from the language of the relevant statutory *140scheme governing those specific employees, which conferred policing powers, and not from external or circumstantial sources for the conclusion. See, e.g., Hartshorn v. County of Allegheny, 460 Pa. 560, 333 A.2d 914 (1975) (statutory language provides that “[county] detectives shall be general police officers”); Capitol Police, supra (statutory language provides that Capitol police may “exercise the same powers” within their jurisdiction as police in Harrisburg, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia). The Majority insists that these cases are analogous here, but I respectfully cannot agree.
We have held that the legislative grant of policing powers is of substantial concern in considering the status of employees for purposes of determining the applicability of Act 111. Capitol Police, 463 A.2d at 413. The statutes describing the powers of the Capitol Police, for example, made it clear that they have “full police powers and duties confined jurisdiction-ally to property of the Commonwealth, a geographical limitation not unlike special police forces in other governmental or principality jurisdictions.” Id. at 412 (citing 71 P.S. § 646, which authorizes Capitol police, inter alia, to “exercise the same powers as are now or may hereafter be exercised under authority of law or ordinance by the police of the cities of Harrisburg, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia ... ”).
Similarly, the Allegheny County detectives seeking Act 111 coverage in Hartshorn were deemed entitled to such coverage on the basis of express statutory language which specified that those “detectives shall be general police officers.” 16 P.S. § 4440(b). This Court held that the statute established that the county detectives “are policemen, [and] their right to collective bargaining is then clear under Act 111----” 333 A.2d at 915-16. See also Commonwealth v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 125 Pa.Cmwlth. 549, 558 A.2d 581 (1989) (“Park Rangers ”) (Legislature specifically vested state park officers ■with broad police powers within their jurisdiction, and Act 111 applies to them). As the Commonwealth Court correctly concluded in the instant case, absent similar specific legislative direction regarding deputy sheriffs, either throughout the Commonwealth or in second class counties specifically, we *141should not presume that the General Assembly has intended that they be deemed police officers for purposes of Act 111, merely because they receive police officer training and certification under the MPETL, or are defined as “police officers” in an unrelated criminal statute. Allegheny County Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 990 A.2d 86, 97 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010).
Along these same lines, this Court determined that sheriffs, “while performing vital and necessary duties in the Commonwealth, are not ‘investigative or law enforcement officers’” under the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (“Wiretapping Act”), 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5701-82. Kopko v. Miller, 586 Pa. 170, 892 A.2d 766, 767 (2006). Our decision in Kopko was based on the language of the Wiretapping Act, which grants authority to an “investigative or law enforcement officer” who is “empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for” certain predicate offenses listed in the Act, and who is “a member of the Pennsylvania State Police or an individual employed as a police officer who holds a current certificate under 53 Pa.C.S. Ch. 21 Subch. D (relating to municipal police education and training).” Id. at 768, 780 (quoting from 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5702 & 5704(16)(iii)). We concluded that the sheriffs were not “investigative and law enforcement officers” under the Wiretapping Act, despite the fact that two of the sheriffs had in fact completed training under the MPETL. None of the sheriffs in Kopko were employed as “police officers” pursuant to the MPETL. Id. at 768 & n. 2. Although we acknowledged that the “role of sheriffs in the Commonwealth commands our utmost respect,” and it certainly does, we could not ignore the terms of the Wiretapping Act and determined that it “is incumbent on the legislature to specify that the Sheriffs are encompassed within the definition of ‘investigative or law enforcement officers,’ in order to reach a different conclusion.” Id. at 770.
I am well aware of the essential law enforcement role played by the dedicated employees of the sheriffs office in Allegheny County. But, I would not blithely set aside the General Assembly’s use of the specific term “policemen” to limit the application of Act 111. The Majority adopts the *142Association’s reasoning that deputy sheriffs should be accorded Act 111 coverage by extrapolating from their “police-type” duties and training, and from statutory language in the Crimes Code and the MPETL. In my view, neither basis supports such a result as a matter of the intended scope of Act 111.
I do note the limited value in this appeal of many of our existing cases concerning sheriffs, which did not present questions of labor law but instead arose out of challenges to sheriffs’ law enforcement authority. Sheriffs are long-standing officers in this Commonwealth, and, indeed, in Anglo-American history. Sheriffs have performed varied duties over the centuries, which have included law enforcement functions, and we have respected that history in construing challenges to their residual authority.5 The parties’ arguments reflect this dearth of precisely apposite case law by focusing primarily on the various duties that deputies presently execute, and how these duties do or do not functionally make them “police” under Act 111. But, more important in determining which of two labor law statutes — Act 111 or the PERA — governs the employment terms of these particular public employees, is the consideration of the unique role of sheriffs in relation to the functions of the court system.
The sheriff at early common law acted as a “judge” in the modern sense, and we have noted that, as the judiciary developed, “the sheriffs role evolved from that of judge to *143that of court officer.” Commonwealth v. Leet, 537 Pa. 89, 641 A.2d 299, 301-02 (1994). Provisions of general application to all sheriffs throughout the Commonwealth give this Court a role in providing rules of practice, procedure, and conduct for sheriffs and their deputies. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of the peace.... All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions.
Pa. Const, art. V, § 10(c) (emphasis supplied). According to the Commonwealth’s Judicial Code, “[t]he sheriff, either personally or by deputy, shall serve process and execute orders directed to him pursuant to law.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 2921. See also 42 Pa.C.S. § 102 (sheriffs are officers “enforcing orders” and are included as personnel of the unified judicial system existing under Article V, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution).6 Thus, the Commonwealth Court correctly concluded that:
[substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that Deputies’ primary duties remain court-related. Deputies provide courtroom security, transport prisoners, watch hospitalized prisoners, serve writs, and locate and apprehend fugitives. Deputies perform some police-type functions. However, Deputies[’] primary duties do not fall within the *144realm of Act 111 police work. Rather, Deputies[’] primary duties are directly related to the operation of the County courts.
990 A.2d at 98 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
In my view, the lower tribunals properly determined that, despite their voluntary execution of certain incidental “police-type” duties, the primary responsibility of deputies in Allegheny County remains to the courts.7 Simply because the Sheriffs Office assumes police-type activities does not confer upon the office or its personnel the legal determination of “police officer” for collective bargaining purposes. The Majority reaches far afield to so conclude. One does not become a “police officer” by osmosis. As the deputies are public employees “directly involved with and necessary to the functioning of the courts,” they are thus governed by the provisions of the PERA. 43 P.S. § 1101.805.1 cannot conclude that they are “policemen” for purposes of collective bargaining under Act 111.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. Act 195 of 1970, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301. Section 805 of the PERA provides that when "units of employes directly involved with and necessary to the functioning of the courts of this Commonwealth have reached an impasse in collective bargaining and mediation,” the impasse shall be submitted to arbitration. 43 P.S. § 1101.805.

. The PLRB found that the "primary duty of approximately 70-75 deputy sheriffs is to provide courtroom security for the County’s common pleas judges and district magistrates. The primary responsibility of approximately 24-26 deputy sheriffs is to transport prisoners to court proceedings. Seven deputy sheriffs are assigned to hospital duty and watch prisoners taken to the hospital from the County jail pursuant to an order of the common pleas court. Approximately 12 deputy sheriffs serve writs or other process issued by the common pleas court during daylight hours, and two deputy sheriffs serve housing warrants on the evening shift at the court’s request. Approximately 16 deputy sheriffs work in the investigation unit of the Sheriff's office and are assigned arrest warrants for fugitives who are subject to the jurisdiction of the court.” Appellees’ Brief at 9 (citations omitted). See also Majority Opinion at 129-30 n. 4, 41 A.3d at 841-42 n. 4.

. The PLRB notes that this is the "third time that the Allegheny County deputy sheriffs have sought a determination that they are police officers under Act 111,” and that there has been no change in circumstances to justify a different result this time. Appellee’s Brief at 4-6 (citing Venneri v. County of Allegheny, 12 Pa.Cmwlth. 517, 316 A.2d 120 (1974) and Allegheny County Deputy Sheriff's Ass’n v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 95 Pa.Cmwlth. 132, 504 A.2d 437 (1986)). The primary duties of the *139deputy sheriffs are still "directly related to the operation of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas,” and the primary duty of most deputy sheriffs is to provide courtroom security for judges and magistrates, transport prisoners to court, and serve writs or other process. Id. at 8-9. "Nearly all of the investigative work performed by the deputy sheriffs is directed at apprehending fugitives who are already subject to the jurisdiction of the courts." Id. at 9-10. According to the PLRB, there are no communities in Allegheny County where the deputy sheriffs provide primary police protection; instead, at most, they "back up” or substitute for municipal police officers. Id. at 11.

. Section 103 of the Crimes Code defines "police officer” as including "deputy sheriffs of a county of the second class who have successfully completed the requirements under [the MPETL].” 18 Pa.C.S. § 103. The MPETL, in relevant part, defines "police department” as: "(1) A public agency of a political subdivision having general police powers and charged with making arrests in connection with the enforcement of the criminal or traffic laws. This paragraph includes the sheriff’s office in a county of the second class.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 2162. Section 2162 also defines "police officer,” in relevant part, as a “deputy sheriff of a county of the second class.” Id.

. For example, the PLRB discusses Commonwealth v. Leet, 537 Pa. 89, 641 A.2d 299 (1994), where we considered deputy sheriffs' common law power to make warrantless arrests for breaches of the peace committed in their presence, and determined that they now may exercise that power in the context of Motor Vehicle Code violations. See also Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp. v. Kline, 559 Pa. 646, 741 A.2d 1281 (1999) (deputy sheriff who received same training as municipal police officer was authorized to enforce Vehicle Code). But, in my view, the use of the term "police officer” when referring to deputy sheriffs in the context of their duties is not dispositive of the question of what statute governs the employment status of these public employees. See also Commonwealth v. Dobbins, 594 Pa. 71, 934 A.2d 1170, 1180 (2007) ("no legal authority whatsoever” supports treating sheriffs as comparable to police officers with regard to conducting independent criminal investigations; sheriffs have only such independent investigatory authority as is expressly authorized by statute).

. Sheriffs' duties within the unified judicial system include holding judicial sales, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991 (sale conducted by officer or person authorized for purpose by some competent tribunal), and collecting proceeds from recognizances taken in open court for distribution by a judge, such as costs of prosecution and apprehension and victim compensation, 53 P.S. § 17088. See also 20 Pa.C.S. § 8301 (court of common pleas may authorize sale of personal or real property under Orphans’ Court jurisdiction); 21 P.S. §§ 274, 274a, 274b (sheriff's sales in mortgage foreclosure); 42 Pa.C.S. § 4134 (power to take into custody persons fined for contempt until fine paid or discharged); 50 P.S. §§ 4419, 4425 (power to apprehend and return committed persons escaped from mental hospital); 53 P.S. §§ 7282-83, 16040 (sheriff’s sale for failure to pay local taxes; delivery of deed).

. The PLRB’s summary, in footnote 2 supra, amply demonstrates the record evidence supporting the conclusion that the primary function of deputy sheriffs remains court-related. In addition, Intervenor Allegheny County filed a brief in opposition to the Association's position, and argues that the General Assembly placed deputies within the jurisdiction of the PERA, rather than Act 111, because of the deputies’ role in the operation of the courts of the Commonwealth. The County asserts that even the majority of the work done by the deputy sheriffs’ investigations unit relates to people who are already subject to warrants, or is otherwise related to the work of the courts. According to the County, classifying the deputies as Act 111 employees "would undermine the independence of the judicial branch” by reducing the court's authority over hiring, firing and supervising these employees. Intervenor’s Brief at 10. Moreover, says the County, treating deputy sheriffs of Allegheny County differently from those in other counties would violate equal protection principles established in DeFazio v. Civil Service Comm’n, 562 Pa. 431, 756 A.2d 1103, 1106 (2000) ("One particular county officer may not be treated differently from the other similar officers throughout the commonwealth merely because that officer is within a certain class of county.”).