Court Opinion

ID: 9683948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:41:10.189102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:51.188875
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR ' ' REHEARING
MORRISON, Judge.
The State now asserts, and we agree, that appellant failed to perfect his claim of denial of due process. They point out that this record does not reveal that the witness in question ever left town or that such witness was not in fact available *550at the time of trial. The appellant made no proof or offer of proof that the witness normally lived at the address on the subpoena, whether or not he had recently moved, what effort was made by the officer to locate him, or even the manner in which the information was acquired that this was the proper address, if it was. As a matter of fact, this record is devoid of any testimony that the witness was not in fact available and that his whereabouts were unknown to the appellant at the time of trial. There is no showing that he made any request of any person involved in the trial of this case about their knowledge of the whereabouts of the witness. No request was made of the prosecution to determine if they had information concerning the whereabouts of the witness.
Appellant issued a subpoena for the witness twelve days before the trial. It was returned unserved, “Subject not at this address.” The unavailability of the witness could not be logically inferred on this basis alone. Appellant failed to establish that, apart from issuing the subpoena, he exercised due diligence in securing the attendance of this missing witness. Cf. Spencer v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 503 S.W.2d 246.
One of the two other grounds not discussed in our original opinion is appellant’s contention that the court erred in not quashing the third paragraph of the indictment which alleged a 1955 burglary conviction from Bexar County. Appellant contends that at the time of such conviction he was indigent and was not represented by counsel. At the hearing on the motion, the State introduced a judgment in said cause which recites that the appellant “stated to the court that he desired to waiver jury and plead guilty before the court, and that he was without counsel, whereupon the court appointed a practicing attorney of this Bar to represent said defendant.” A jury waiver signed by Emmett J. Rohm as “Attorney for Defendant” was also introduced and proof was offered that Emmett J. Rohm was a practicing attorney in San Antonio in 1955.
Appellant’s testimony that he was not represented by an attorney, standing alone, is insufficient to disprove the recitations in the judgment. Reeves v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 648; Gutierrez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 456 S.W.2d 84.
The trial court did not err in overruling the motion to quash.
Appellant’s last ground of error is that the court erred in overruling his motion for instructed verdict. He claims that there is no showing that heroin is a narcotic drug within the terms of Article 725b, Sec. 1(14), Vernon’s Ann.P.C.1
The Article in effect at the time read:
“(14) ‘Narcotic drugs’ means coca leaves, opium, cannabis, amidone, isoni-pecaine and every substance neither chemically nor physically distinguishable from them; also opiates, which shall mean any drug having an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to opium or cocaine; . . . ”
Appellant’s contention that no offense is charged since heroin is not mentioned in said Article was answered adversely to him in Gonzales v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 432, 293 S.W.2d 786.
The State’s Motion for Rehearing is granted; the judgment of reversal is set aside, and the judgment is now affirmed.

. Sec. 1(14)-(16) as amended by Acts 1971, 62nd Leg., p. 3069, Oh. 1023, Sec. 1, effective • June 15, 1971.