Court Opinion

ID: 9945193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 15:16:21.573122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.525942
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present:    Judges Athey, Friedman and Raphael

              COREY FLEMING, A/K/A
               COREY CONWAY FLEMING
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION*
               v.        Record No. 1575-22-2                                   PER CURIAM
                                                                              FEBRUARY 27, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
                                                John Marshall, Judge

                              (Stephen A. Mutnick; Winslow, McCurry & MacCormac, PLLC, on brief),
                              for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Matthew J. Beyrau, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Corey Conway Fleming appeals his conviction for felony eluding in violation of Code

              § 46.2-817. He argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he drove the vehicle that

              eluded police. He also argues that the trial judge imposed an unduly harsh sentence by

              disregarding mitigating factors. After examining the briefs and the record, the panel unanimously

              holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code

              § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). We affirm Fleming’s conviction.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     On June 24, 2020, Detective J.C. Ritchie and Officer Frank Podolak were conducting

              undercover surveillance of Fleming and his girlfriend at an apartment that they frequented.

              Ritchie and Podolak had met the couple before. Officer Podolak had interacted with Fleming

              during “multiple calls” to that apartment. And about nine months earlier, Detective Ritchie had

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
served a warrant on the girlfriend at that apartment, where he also spoke with Fleming. That

warrant had charged the girlfriend with a hit-and-run violation while driving a white Hyundai.

          During the June 24, 2020 surveillance, Detective Ritchie observed Fleming and his

girlfriend get into a white Hyundai. Ritchie ran the Hyundai’s license-plate number and

confirmed that it was the same white Hyundai involved in the earlier hit-and-run incident.

Fleming got into the driver’s seat, and his girlfriend sat in the passenger seat. Ritchie followed

the Hyundai as Officer Podolak initiated a traffic stop. When Podolak turned on his police

lights, the white Hyundai stopped. Podolak exited his vehicle and approached. Podolak saw

Fleming in the driver’s seat “looking back through the side view [mirror]”; the window was

“cracked about five or six inches.”

          But as Officer Podolak got within about ten feet, the Hyundai sped off and “accelerated

through a red light at the intersection.” Podolak got back into his cruiser and gave chase. The

Hyundai veered from the left lane to the rightmost lane, “cut off a bunch of vehicles,” and ran

another red light. Podolak’s sergeant ordered him to stop the chase.

          Throughout the pursuit, Detective Ritchie was driving behind Officer’s Podolak’s cruiser.

Ritchie testified that he saw Fleming’s vehicle take off “very quickly.” He said there were other

cars on the road at the time. Ritchie never saw Fleming switch places with the girlfriend after

getting into the driver’s seat.

          Fleming was ultimately apprehended and charged with felony eluding. At his bench trial,

the court denied Fleming’s motions to strike and found him guilty. At sentencing, the trial court

noted Fleming’s two prior convictions for eluding (among other convictions) and sentenced him

to five years’ incarceration with two years and eight months suspended. Fleming noted a timely

appeal.

                                                -2-
                                            ANALYSIS

                                  A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “The relevant issue on appeal is,

‘upon review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Lambert v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 510, 515 (2020) (quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va.

502, 512 (2017)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not

permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions

reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

       Fleming argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was driving the Hyundai.

Although both Officer Podolak and Detective Richie positively identified him at trial, Fleming

claims that their testimony was unreliable. He says that Officer Podolak could not have reliably

seen him through the side-view mirror. And he argues that Detective Ritchie’s identification was

based on a “chance, short meeting” with Fleming “nine months” earlier.

       In cases challenging the sufficiency of the defendant’s in-court identification, our

appellate courts apply the analysis set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). See, e.g.,

Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 248-49 (1992); Cuffee v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App.

353, 364 (2013); Brown v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 507, 522 (2002). Biggers involved a

due-process challenge to a pretrial identification “involving improperly suggestive, out of court

police procedures.” Walker v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ (June 1, 2023), petition for

                                                -3-
cert. docketed (U.S. Aug. 31, 2023) (No. 23-5505). Biggers directed courts in such cases to

examine

               whether under the “totality of the circumstances” the identification
               was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was
               suggestive. . . . [T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the
               likelihood of misidentification include [1] the opportunity of the
               witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, [2] the
               witness’ degree of attention, [3] the accuracy of the witness’ prior
               description of the criminal, [4] the level of certainty demonstrated
               by the witness at the confrontation, and [5] the length of time
               between the crime and the confrontation.

409 U.S. at 199-200.

       This case involves a sufficiency challenge to an in-court identification, not a due-process

challenge to an unduly suggestive out-of-court identification. Still, our appellate courts have

consistently applied the Biggers factors to determine whether the totality of circumstances

supported the sufficiency of the in-court identification. E.g., Cuffee, 61 Va. App. at 364 (“The

factors set forth in [Biggers] are used to determine ‘whether the identification evidence is

sufficient, standing alone or in combination with other evidence, to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt’ the identity of the perpetrator.” (quoting Brown, 37 Va. App. at 522)); Smallwood v.

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 527, 530 (1992) (“In determining whether eyewitness identification

is reliable, our Supreme Court has adopted the factors set out in [Biggers] . . . .”).

       Here, both officers were surveilling Fleming and his girlfriend. Their degree of attention

was high—so much so that Detective Ritchie checked the Hyundai’s license plate to confirm that

it was the same car involved in the girlfriend’s hit-and-run incident. Cf. McCary v.

Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 233 (1984) (“The degree of the [witness’s] attention is shown by

their curiosity concerning [the defendant’s] actions before the crimes.”). Both officers also saw

Fleming get into the driver’s seat of the Hyundai. And Podolak testified that, after stopping the

Hyundai, he recognized Fleming’s “brown eyes through the mirror.”

                                                 -4-
       Both officers were also familiar with Fleming’s appearance from their prior interactions.

See Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 240 (2022) (finding witness’s testimony not

inherently incredible in part because of his familiarity with the defendant). Both officers had

encountered Fleming at the apartment complex before. And both identified Fleming in court as

the driver of the white Hyundai. While the time between the incident and the trial was a little

over two years, “the lapse of time alone is not sufficient to render an identification unreliable as a

matter of law.” Satcher, 244 Va. at 250; see also McCary, 228 Va. at 234 (“Although 15 months

elapsed between the crimes and the identification testimony[,] . . . the mere passage of time is

insufficient to invalidate the identification.”). The lapse of time here is not great enough to offset

the other circumstances supporting the reliability of Fleming’s identification, particularly given

that both officers knew Fleming from earlier encounters, knew that he was the person they were

surveilling, and witnessed him get into the driver’s seat of the Hyundai that eluded them.

       In short, the evidence sufficed for a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that Fleming was the driver who eluded police.1

                                           B. Sentencing

       Fleming argues that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion because it “should

have given significant weight to the mitigating factors”—particularly his consistent use of

controlled substances and lack of treatment.

       1
          Fleming also argues that we should reverse his conviction because no one was
endangered as he eluded police, but Fleming has defaulted that argument by not raising it below.
See Rule 5A:18. Fleming’s motion to strike at trial focused on defendant identification; he never
argued the absence of endangerment. While Fleming asks that we excuse his default under Rule
5A:18’s ends-of-justice exception, that narrow exception “requires proof of an error that was
‘clear, substantial and material.’” Clark v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 726, 768 (2023)
(quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 132 (1989)). The record “must affirmatively
show that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.” Id.
(citing Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221 (1997)). Fleming cannot meet that high
bar because there was ample evidence here of endangerment. Fleming sped through two red
lights after evading Officer Podolak, veering across traffic lanes and cutting off other vehicles.
                                               -5-
       We review a sentencing decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Cellucci v.

Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 36, 45 (2023) (en banc). “A trial court abuses its discretion by

failing to consider a significant relevant factor, giving significant weight to an irrelevant or

improper factor, committing a clear error of judgment, or making a mistake of law.” Id. at 46

(citing Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564-65 (2016)). “Barring clear evidence

to the contrary,” however, we “will not presume that a trial court purposefully ignored mitigating

factors in blind pursuit of a harsh sentence.” Guest v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 187, 197

(2023) (quoting Bassett v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 580, 584 (1992)); see also Cellucci, 77

Va. App. at 52 (“[T]he trial court was not obligated to find that the evidence highlighted by the

appellant actually mitigated his crime.”). And when a sentence “is within the statutory limits

fixed by the legislature, the assumption is that the sentence will not be disturbed on appeal.”

Cellucci, 77 Va. App. at 48 (citing Bassett, 13 Va. App. at 582).

       We find no abuse of sentencing discretion here. The trial judge received and reviewed

the presentence investigation. The sentence fell within the statutory range for felony eluding.

The trial court properly considered Fleming’s two prior eluding convictions, not to mention his

other driving offenses and felony convictions. And we see no basis in the record to suggest that

the trial judge disregarded any mitigating circumstances.

                                           CONCLUSION

       In short, we find no basis to disturb Fleming’s conviction.

                                                                                             Affirmed.

                                                 -6-