Court Opinion

ID: 9398280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 19:01:17.371801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:32.161796
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12286    Document: 23-1     Date Filed: 05/30/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12286
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JOHNATHAN COLE WARD,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00107-JB-MU-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12286

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Johnathan Cole Ward appeals his 180-month sentence for
       possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. For the first time on
       appeal, he argues that the district court erred in sentencing him as
       an armed career criminal because the government failed to estab-
       lish that his three prior Alabama robbery offenses were committed
       on separate occasions. In support of his position, he has moved this
       Court to supplement the record on appeal to include state-court
       documents concerning his robbery convictions.
              We grant the motion to supplement the record. But because
       Ward failed to show that the district court committed plain error
       in applying the statutory sentence enhancement, we affirm.
                                        I.
               Ward pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted
       felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The probation officer
       prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR), which stated
       that Ward was subject to an enhanced sentence under the Armed
       Career Criminal Act because he had three prior convictions for a
       violent felony or serious drug offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Spe-
       cifically, the PSR reported that Ward pleaded guilty in April 2009
       to three counts of Alabama third-degree robbery charged in three
       separate (but sequentially numbered) cases. In language parroting
       the state charging documents, the PSR described the three rob-
       beries as follows: (1) the use of force against Rachel Woods to steal
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       22-12286               Opinion of the Court                        3

       cash from a Circle K; (2) the use of force against Gwendolyn Craig
       to steal cash from a Shell station; and (3) the use of force against
       Kathy Huffmaster to steal cash from a BP service station.
               Ward filed objections to the PSR’s application of the armed-
       career-criminal sentence enhancement on the ground that Ala-
       bama third-degree robbery is not a violent felony under § 924(e)—
       an argument that is foreclosed by our precedent. See United States
       v. Hunt, 941 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2019). Ward also filed police
       reports from the three robberies, arguing that the sentence en-
       hancement should not apply because the reports showed that he
       had not actually used violence during the offenses—an argument
       that is also foreclosed by binding precedent. See Descamps v. United
       States, 570 U.S. 254, 267–68 (2013); United States v. Braun, 801 F.3d
       1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2015). Among other things, the police reports
       indicated that the robberies took place on three different dates, and
       that the three gas stations were located on different streets in Mo-
       bile and Theodore, Alabama. The district court overruled Ward’s
       objections and sentenced him to 180 months in prison, the manda-
       tory minimum sentence under § 924(e).
               This appeal followed. In this Court, Ward argues for the
       first time that the district court plainly erred by sentencing him as
       an armed career criminal because his three robbery offenses were
       not committed on different occasions, as required by § 924(e). He
       has filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal with copies
       of the state charging documents (which contain essentially the
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12286

       same information as the PSR) and court documents reflecting his
       guilty pleas and sentence in the three consolidated cases.
                                        II.
              Ordinarily, we review a district court’s determination that a
       defendant’s prior felony offenses were committed on different oc-
       casions (as required by § 924(e)(1)) de novo. United States v. Dudley,
       5 F.4th 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2021). But where, as here, a defendant
       raises an issue for the first time on appeal, our review is for plain
       error only. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Dudley, 5 F.4th at 1255. “To
       establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error; (2) that
       was obvious; (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and
       (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputa-
       tion of judicial proceedings.” Dudley, 5 F.4th at 1255.
                                        III.
              The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandates a mini-
       mum 15-year sentence for possession of a firearm in violation of 18
       U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) if the defendant has three prior convictions for
       violent felonies “committed on occasions different from one an-
       other.” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). District courts may determine the na-
       ture of a defendant’s prior convictions at sentencing, including
       whether the offenses were committed on different occasions, “so
       long as they limit themselves to Shepard-approved documents.”
       United States v. Longoria, 874 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2017).
             So-called “Shepard documents” include “the charging docu-
       ment, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy be-
       tween judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea
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       22-12286               Opinion of the Court                         5

       was confirmed by the defendant,” or “some comparable judicial
       record of this information.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26
       (2005). District courts may also rely on undisputed statements of
       fact in the PSR. United States v. McCloud, 818 F.3d 591, 595 (11th
       Cir. 2016). Courts generally may not rely on police reports in de-
       termining whether predicate offenses were committed on different
       occasions. United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir.
       2010).
              Whether crimes were committed “on occasions different
       from one another” for purposes of an ACCA sentence enhance-
       ment is a “multi-factored” inquiry focusing on the ordinary usage
       of the term “occasion” as referring to “an event or episode.”
       Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1070 (2022). Relevant fac-
       tors include the timing, proximity of location, and character and
       relationship of the offenses. Id. at 1071. “In many cases, a single
       factor—especially of time or place—can decisively differentiate oc-
       casions.” Id.
              Applying this standard, we conclude that the district court
       did not plainly err in enhancing Ward’s sentence under ACCA.
       Even if the district court was required to disregard the dates and
       addresses in the police reports that Ward himself submitted and
       relied upon (a question we do not reach here), the undisputed facts
       in the PSR indicated that the robberies took place at three different
       locations and involved three different victims. Whether that infor-
       mation would be sufficient to meet the government’s burden of
       proving the different-occasions requirement when the defendant
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12286

       raises the issue in the district court is a close question. But on plain-
       error review, “the defendant has the burden of establishing each of
       the four requirements for” relief. Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct.
       2090, 2097 (2021). And the requirement that an error be “plain” is
       met only if the error “is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’—that is, if ‘the explicit
       language of a statute or rule’ or ‘precedent from the Supreme
       Court or this Court directly resolv[es]’ the issue.” United States v.
       Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2020) (alteration in the orig-
       inal) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993), and
       United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015)). A close
       call or even a questionable decision does not amount to plain error.
       See Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 278 (2013) (Rule 52(b)’s
       “requirement that an error be ‘plain’ means that lower court deci-
       sions that are questionable but not plainly wrong (at time of trial
       or at time of appeal) fall outside the Rule’s scope”). The district
       court’s decision here was not plainly wrong, so we must affirm.
                                         IV.
             The district court did not plainly err in sentencing Ward as
       an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We therefore
       AFFIRM Ward’s conviction and sentence. We GRANT his motion
       to supplement the record on appeal.
              AFFIRMED.