Court Opinion

ID: 9376662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 15:05:40.097648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.106877
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
03/03/2023 09:05 AM CST

                                                          - 699 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        313 Nebraska Reports
                                                   STATE V. BLOCHER
                                                   Cite as 313 Neb. 699

                                         State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
                                        Samantha R. Blocher, appellant.
                                                      ___ N.W.2d ___

                                            Filed March 3, 2023.    No. S-22-311.

                 1. Motions for New Trial: Appeal and Error. The standard of review
                    for a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial after an evidentiary
                    hearing is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
                    the motion.
                 2. Stipulations: New Trial. Parties have no right to stipulate to whether
                    the facts satisfied the standard for a new trial under Neb. Rev. Stat.
                    § 29-2101(5) (Reissue 2016), which determination is a question of law.
                 3. Stipulations: Public Policy. In general, parties in a legal action are free
                    to make stipulations of fact that govern their rights during the trial or
                    progress of the action. Such stipulations will be respected and enforced
                    by the courts so long as the agreement is not contrary to good morals or
                    sound public policy.
                 4. Stipulations. Parties have no right to stipulate as to questions of law,
                    and such a stipulation, if made, will be disregarded.
                 5. Stipulations: Judgments. Decisions of law must rest upon the judg-
                    ment of the court, uninfluenced by the stipulations of the parties or
                    counsel as to the legal conclusion from a given state of facts.
                 6. Constitutional Law. Neb. Const. art. II, § 1, prohibits one branch of
                    government from encroaching on the duties and prerogatives of the
                    others except as the Nebraska Constitution itself otherwise directs
                    or permits.
                 7. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Standing. A criminal defendant
                    lacks standing to assert the State’s executive powers on its behalf.
                 8. Constitutional Law: Courts: Legislature. It is unquestionably within
                    the judicial branch’s power set forth by Neb. Const. art. V, § 1, to inter-
                    pret and apply the laws validly enacted by the Legislature.
                 9. Due Process: Notice. Procedural due process generally requires that
                    parties whose rights will be affected by a proceeding be provided
                                      - 700 -
             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      313 Nebraska Reports
                               STATE V. BLOCHER
                               Cite as 313 Neb. 699

       adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, which are appropriate
       to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights that might
       be affected.
10.    Due Process: Proof. Procedural due process protections are only
       required if the party asserting the inadequacy of procedural due process
       first establishes that the government deprived him or her of interests
       which constitute “liberty” or “property” within the meaning of the Due
       Process Clause.
11.    Due Process: Stipulations: New Trial. Due process is not implicated
       by a court’s decision to disregard the conclusory stipulation of law that
       a new trial should be granted.
12.    Stipulations: Evidence: Proof: New Trial. A court must determine
       whether the evidence presented, including valid stipulations of fact,
       satisfies the defendant’s burden under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2101(5)
       (Reissue 2016).
13.    Criminal Law: Motions for New Trial: Evidence: Proof. A crimi-
       nal defendant who seeks a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
       evidence is required to show that if the evidence had been admitted at
       the former trial, it would probably have produced a substantially differ-
       ent result.

  Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Lori
A. Maret, Judge. Affirmed.
      Matt Catlett, of Law Office of Matt Catlett, for appellant.
   Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Austin N. Relph
for appellee.
  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
      Freudenberg, J.
                      INTRODUCTION
  A jury convicted the defendant of possession of a controlled
substance. The defendant appealed, but voluntarily dismissed
her appeal after being informed of the criminal indictment of
an evidence technician who may have been responsible for
drug-related evidence in her case. The State agreed to join the
defendant’s motion for a new trial and stipulated that there
                                  - 701 -
            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     313 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. BLOCHER
                            Cite as 313 Neb. 699

were sufficient grounds to sustain it. The district court over-
ruled the motion. On appeal, the defendant argues that by
disregarding the parties’ stipulation, the court abused its dis-
cretion, infringed on the powers of the executive branch, and
violated her due process rights. We affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
   Samantha R. Blocher was charged and tried for possession
of a controlled substance. 1 The State offered at trial a report
from the Nebraska State Patrol Crime Laboratory confirming
that the substance found in Blocher’s possession was metham-
phetamine. A jury found Blocher guilty, and the district court
sentenced her to probation.
   Blocher appealed her conviction. While the appeal was
pending, Blocher’s counsel received a letter from the Lancaster
County Attorney’s office disclosing the criminal indictment
of a former Nebraska State Patrol evidence technician, Anna
Idigima. The letter stated it was “possible that during the time
any drug-related evidence in this case was in the custody of
[the Nebraska State Patrol], it may have been directly or indi-
rectly maintained by or otherwise subject to the oversight of
[Idigima].” Blocher’s counsel later received another letter from
the Lancaster County Attorney’s office stating that “the actions
of a former Nebraska State Patrol evidence technician who is
in the chain of custody on the drug evidence supporting the
Possession of a Controlled Substance conviction gives rise to
a Motion for New Trial” under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2101(5)
(Reissue 2016). The letter also stated that if Blocher withdrew
her direct appeal, the State would join in her motion for new
trial and then move the court to dismiss the case with prejudice
if the new trial was granted.
   Blocher dismissed her appeal and filed a joint motion and
stipulation for new trial. The motion stated that there existed
newly discovered material evidence that could not have been
discovered with reasonable diligence to produce at trial.
1
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
                       STATE V. BLOCHER
                       Cite as 313 Neb. 699

Blocher did not support the motion with any evidence, and
the district court overruled the motion on the same day for not
complying with the requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2102
(Reissue 2016).
   Blocher then filed a second motion for new trial supported
by the affidavit of Blocher’s counsel. The affidavit explained
that Blocher dismissed her direct appeal in reliance on the
two letters her counsel received from the Lancaster County
Attorney’s office. The affidavit did not provide any additional
information beyond what was disclosed in the letters regard-
ing the nature of Idigima’s crimes or her involvement in
Blocher’s case.
   The district court held a hearing on the joint motion. The
only evidence presented at the hearing was the affidavit and the
two letters, offered and received without objection. Counsel for
the State stipulated generally that there were grounds to grant
the motion for new trial but did not explain what those grounds
were or offer any specific stipulations of fact.
   The district court overruled the joint motion for new trial.
The district court rejected Blocher’s argument that it was
required to grant a new trial because of the parties’ stipula-
tion. It held that the parties’ stipulation must be disregarded
because whether there were sufficient grounds to grant a new
trial under § 29-1201(5) was a question of law, and the parties
could not stipulate to legal conclusions.
   The court then evaluated the evidence presented and held
that Blocher was not entitled to a new trial. It noted that the
affidavit and letters only showed that Idigima was charged with
unknown crimes and “‘may’” have been responsible “‘directly
or indirectly’” for drug evidence in Blocher’s case. It further
reasoned that even if Idigima’s criminal conduct required the
exclusion of the crime laboratory results, the result at trial
would probably not have been different because other evidence
was enough to support a conviction.
   Blocher appeals.
                                 - 703 -
            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     313 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. BLOCHER
                           Cite as 313 Neb. 699

                 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Blocher assigns that by disregarding the parties’ stipula-
tion that there were grounds to grant a new trial, the district
court (1) abused its discretion, (2) infringed on the powers
of the executive branch, and (3) violated Blocher’s due proc­
ess rights.
                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] The standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a
motion for new trial after an evidentiary hearing is whether the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. 2
                           ANALYSIS
   Blocher argues that the district court abused its discretion
by denying the joint motion for new trial under § 29-2101(5).
She argues that the court was bound by the parties’ stipula-
tion that a new trial should be granted and that the district
court infringed on the exclusive prosecutorial powers of the
executive branch and violated Blocher’s due process rights by
disregarding it. We hold that the district court was not bound
by the parties’ stipulation as to a legal conclusion and that dis-
regarding it did not violate separation of powers or Blocher’s
due process rights. We also hold that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that the facts presented
failed to meet Blocher’s burden to show a new trial should
be granted.
                      Court Not Bound by
                       Stipulation of Law
   [2-4] The parties had no right to stipulate to whether the
facts satisfied the standard for a new trial under § 29-2101(5),
which determination is a question of law. 3 In general, parties
2
    State v. Bartel, 308 Neb. 169, 953 N.W.2d 224 (2021).
3
    See, SID No. 196 of Douglas Cty. v. City of Valley, 290 Neb. 1, 858
    N.W.2d 553 (2015); Jackson v. Brotherhood’s Relief & Comp. Fund, 279
    Neb. 593, 779 N.W.2d 589 (2010); North Platte Lodge, B. P. O. E., v.
    Board of Equalization, 125 Neb. 841, 252 N.W. 313 (1934).
                                     - 704 -
             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      313 Nebraska Reports
                              STATE V. BLOCHER
                              Cite as 313 Neb. 699

in a legal action are free to make stipulations of fact that gov-
ern their rights during the trial or progress of the action. 4 Such
stipulations will be respected and enforced by the courts so
long as the agreement is not contrary to good morals or sound
public policy. 5 However, the question of whether undisputed
facts fulfill a particular legal standard presents a question of
law. 6 It is well established that “parties have no right to stipu-
late as to questions of law; such a stipulation, if made, will be
disregarded.” 7 Whether to grant a motion for a new trial is dis-
cretionary, and it is fundamental that the parties cannot remove
such discretion from the court through a stipulation.
   [5] For instance, in North Platte Lodge, B. P. O. E., v. Board
of Equalization, 8 we held that the parties in a legal action
could not stipulate that a relevant legal standard was satisfied
where such stipulation was contradicted by the undisputed
facts. The issue at trial was whether various properties could
be exempted from taxation under a state constitutional provi-
sion that allowed the Legislature to exempt properties “‘owned
and used exclusively for educational, religious, [or] chari-
table . . . purposes.’” 9 The parties stipulated that the plaintiffs
owned the properties and were charitable organizations as
defined by our earlier decisions. 10 The stipulation was contra-
dicted, however, by the undisputed fact that some parcels were
not exclusively owned and used by the plaintiff’s organizations
because they were subject to a mortgage or a term-of-years
 4
     See In re Estate of Lofgreen, 312 Neb. 937, 981 N.W.2d 585 (2022).
 5
     See id.
 6
     See City of Valley, supra note 3.
 7
     Jackson, supra note 3, 279 Neb. at 602, 779 N.W.2d at 595. See, Vitalix,
     Inc. v. Box Butte Cty. Bd. of Equal., 280 Neb. 186, 786 N.W.2d 326
     (2010); North Platte Lodge, B. P. O. E., supra note 3; State v. Murphy, 15
     Neb. App. 398, 727 N.W.2d 730 (2007).
 8
     North Platte Lodge, B. P. O. E., supra note 3.
 9
     Id. at 845, 252 N.W. at 315 (emphasis omitted).
10
     North Platte Lodge, B. P. O. E., supra note 3.
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      313 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. BLOCHER
                             Cite as 313 Neb. 699

lease. 11 We disregarded the parties’ stipulation, explaining
that “‘[d]ecisions . . . of law must rest upon the judgement of
the court, uninfluenced by [the] stipulations of the parties or
counsel . . . as to the . . . legal conclusion from a given state
of facts . . . .’” 12
   [6-8] We decline Blocher’s invitation to hold that by mak-
ing its own determination that the facts did not warrant a new
trial, the district court infringed upon the prosecutorial preroga-
tive of the executive branch. Neb. Const. art. II, § 1, prohibits
one branch of government from encroaching on the duties and
prerogatives of the others except as the Nebraska Constitution
itself otherwise directs or permits. 13 A criminal defendant, such
as Blocher, lacks standing to assert the State’s executive powers
on its behalf, 14 and the State does not argue in this appeal that
the district court invaded its executive powers. Furthermore, it
is unquestionably within the judicial branch’s power set forth
by Neb. Const. art. V, § 1, to interpret and apply the laws val-
idly enacted by the Legislature. 15 Section 29-2101 allows the
court to grant a new trial for any of the enumerated grounds,
and Blocher does not challenge its validity.
   [9,10] We also disagree with Blocher’s contention that by
disregarding the conclusory stipulation of law, the district
court infringed upon Blocher’s procedural due process rights.
Procedural due process generally requires that parties whose
rights will be affected by a proceeding be provided adequate
notice and an opportunity to be heard, which are appropriate
to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights
that might be affected. 16 Such protections are only required
11
     See id.
12
     North Platte Lodge, B. P. O. E., supra note 3, 125 Neb. at 844, 252 N.W.
     at 314.
13
     See State v. Philipps, 246 Neb. 610, 521 N.W.2d 913 (1994).
14
     See Hradecky v. State, 264 Neb. 771, 652 N.W.2d 277 (2002).
15
     See State v. McColery, 301 Neb. 516, 919 N.W.2d 153 (2018).
16
     See, Dycus v. Dycus, 307 Neb. 426, 949 N.W.2d 357 (2020); D.W. v. A.G.,
     303 Neb. 42, 926 N.W.2d 651 (2019).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      313 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. BLOCHER
                             Cite as 313 Neb. 699

if the party asserting the inadequacy of procedural due process
first establishes that the government deprived him or her of
interests which constitute “liberty” or “property” within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause. 17
   [11] Blocher points to no source of a general liberty or
property interest in the enforcement of legal conclusions con-
tained in stipulations with the State. Blocher was given ade-
quate notice that the stipulation on a legal conclusion would
not satisfy § 29-2101(5), and she received an opportunity to
be heard on the issue. After summarily denying Blocher’s
initial motion for new trial due to her failure to comply with
the statutory filing requirements, the district court allowed
Blocher to refile her motion and held a hearing to allow her
the opportunity to support her motion with evidence. Due
proc­ess was not implicated by the court’s decision to disregard
the conclusory stipulation of law that a new trial should be
granted for Blocher.

                 No Abuse of Discretion in
                   Finding Facts Did Not
                      Support New Trial
   [12] Finally, we turn to the question whether the district
court abused its discretion in finding the evidence presented
at the hearing on the defendant’s motion for new trial did not
warrant a new trial. A court must determine whether the evi-
dence presented, including valid stipulations of fact, satisfies
the defendant’s burden under § 29-2101(5). 18 Under § 29-2101,
a court may grant a new trial “on the application of the defend­
ant,” when “(5) newly discovered evidence material for the
defendant which he or she could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at the trial” “materially” affects
his or her “substantial rights.”
17
     Schaeffer v. Frakes, 306 Neb. 904, 947 N.W.2d 714 (2020).
18
     See State v. Lester, 295 Neb. 878, 898 N.W.2d 299 (2017).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      313 Nebraska Reports
                              STATE V. BLOCHER
                              Cite as 313 Neb. 699

   [13] We have interpreted this language of § 29-2101(5)
to require a criminal defendant who seeks a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence to show that if the evi-
dence had been admitted at the former trial, it would probably
have produced a substantially different result. 19 We review a
trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial after an eviden-
tiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. 20
   We have held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying a new trial under § 29-2101(5) where the evi-
dence was too ambiguous to support the defendant’s proposed
grounds for new trial. 21 In State v. Lester, 22 a jury convicted a
defendant of first degree murder. Two days after the verdict,
the defendant’s friend made a post on social media, which
read in part: “‘If they identified me as the shooter then why
tf ain’t ma brother sittin here next to me?’” 23 The defendant
moved for a new trial on the basis that the social media post
was exculpatory for the defendant because it showed the
friend’s “‘potential involvement’” in the shooting. 24 The trial
court denied the motion because the social media post was
“‘ambiguous at best.’” 25 We held on appeal that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because the
social media post gave no information about the defendant’s
guilt or innocence and, therefore, could not be exculpatory as
the defendant argued. 26
   Similar to the ambiguous evidence in Lester, Blocher pro-
vided no facts to support her argument of materiality of
19
     Id.
20
     See Bartel, supra note 2.
21
     See Lester, supra note 18.
22
     Id.
23
     Lester, supra note 18, 295 Neb. at 900, 898 N.W.2d at 316.
24
     Id.
25
     Id.
26
     See Lester, supra note 18.
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
                       STATE V. BLOCHER
                       Cite as 313 Neb. 699

the “new evidence.” Blocher’s attorney’s affidavit offered by
Blocher in support of her motion for new trial simply stated
that her counsel received information from the Lancaster
County Attorney’s office and relied upon it when moving to
dismiss Blocher’s direct appeal. The affidavit provided no facts
about Idigima’s involvement in Blocher’s case beyond the gen-
eralized statements made in the Lancaster County Attorney’s
office’s two letters that were presented to the court as attach-
ments to Blocher’s attorney’s affidavit.
   The letters contained only vague speculation as to Idigima’s
misconduct and involvement in Blocher’s case. The first let-
ter stated “it is possible” that drug-related evidence “may”
have been “directly or indirectly maintained” or “otherwise
subject to the oversight” of Idigima. The second letter stated
generally that “the actions of a former Nebraska State Patrol
evidence technician who is in the chain of custody on the drug
evidence supporting the Possession of a Controlled Substance
conviction gives rise to a Motion for New Trial.” This state-
ment could be read to imply that Idigima was in the “chain
of custody,” but in context is simply a generalized statement
in the abstract about the effect of misconduct by an evidence
technician in the chain of custody.
   Neither the letters nor the affidavit gave any facts about
Idigima’s supposed misconduct or whether she actually han-
dled drug-related evidence in Blocher’s case. Without such
facts, the district court could not have determined whether
Idigima’s actions would necessitate the exclusion of the labo-
ratory report. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Blocher failed to meet her burden
to show that there were grounds for a new trial.
   Due to this fact, we need not discuss whether the evi-
dence presented could have been discovered with reasonable
diligence or address whether the hypothetical exclusion of the
laboratory report would have resulted in a different outcome
at trial.
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
                       STATE V. BLOCHER
                       Cite as 313 Neb. 699

                        CONCLUSION
   The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dis-
regarded the parties’ stipulated motion for new trial and, ulti-
mately, denied the motion for new trial based upon Blocher’s
failure to meet her burden under § 29-2101(5).
                                                   Affirmed.