Court Opinion

ID: 9452818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:52:52.99394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:22.293486
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting in part):
I am in general agreement with the discussion in Part I of the court’s opinion. My disagreement relates only to the court’s refusal, in Part II, to grant any relief. I would remand this case to the District Court for reconsideration of appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to apply the principles which govern prior to the imposition of sentence.
Immediately before the sentencing proceedings, Bruce informed his attorney that he desired to withdraw his guilty plea. Counsel advised him that he could appeal after sentence was imposed1 *123without mentioning that it is more difficult to withdraw a guilty plea after sentence than beforehand.2 Bruce stood mute at the sentencing hearing.
My colleagues agree that counsel’s advice was “clearly erroneous,” and that “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel might be made out if the wishes of the appellant were in fact diverted by clearly erroneous legal advice and he was substantially prejudiced thereby.” They deny relief, however, because the issue presented to the trial judge at the hearing below was not based upon counsel’s erroneous advice on this point, but rather upon appellant’s claim that counsel failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing, even though he requested him to do so. Consequently, they conclude, there is absent the additional evidence in the record that might indicate “more precisely exactly what defense counsel said and what he took into account, and not least important what the impact was on appellant and what prejur dice if any resulted therefrom.”
I find the present record sufficiently clear. The trial judge had no opportunity to consider whether, under the more lenient standard for withdrawing guilty pleas prior to sentence, Bruce should have been given a trial on the merits.
By denying relief altogether, my colleagues send this indigent prisoner down the hill only to start up all over again on a new pro se petition, even though he only seeks a trial, not a retrial.
It appears that appellant may soon be paroled, and thus that he may no longer desire further proceedings. But that should be his choice.

. At the hearing below, counsel testified: He asked me, Could he appeal, and I had to answer, You can appeal practi*123cally anything now, but that was as far as we discussed appeal * * *. How could I say that he could not appeal? Of course, he can appeal. His remedies are available as you can see now.

. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 47 S.Ct. 582 (1927); Nagelberg v. United States, 377 U.S. 266, 84 S.Ct. 1252 (1964); Everett v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 60, 336 F.2d 979 (1964); Gearhart v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 272 F.2d 499 (1959).