Court Opinion

ID: 9790954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:01:55.648473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:32.831517
License: Public Domain

Durham, C.J.
(dissenting)—In its attempt to circumvent the clear holding of Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490, 102 S. Ct. 1309 (1982), the majority uses an expansive interpretation of our state due process clause, Const. art. 1, § 3.
The majority concedes that this case is controlled by Fletcher insofar as the federal due process clause is concerned. Fletcher held that if Miranda warnings are not given, fundamental fairness is not violated when the defendant's post-arrest silence is used to impeach an exculpatory story given for the first time at trial. Thus, Fletcher made the admissibility of such impeachment hinge upon receipt of Miranda warnings. The Court followed Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976), in which it held that the giving of Miranda warnings renders an arrestee's silence "insolubly ambiguous" because he or she may simply be exercising his right to remain silent in response to the assurance that silence will not be penalized. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.
This rationale has been criticized. See Clark, The Emergence of a "New Federalism" Approach, 19 Am. Crim. L.J. 761 (1982). A defendant has the right to remain silent following arrest whether or not Miranda warnings are given. Arguably, it may be as unfair to permit the impeachment of an unadvised defendant, particularly in view of the *607widespread public awareness of the Miranda rights. See Comment, Fourteenth Amendment—Due Process: The Impeachment Use of Post-Arrest Silence Which Precedes the Receipt of Miranda Warnings, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1572, 1587 (1982). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court effectively rejected this view in Fletcher, and we are bound by that decision as a matter of federal due process.
In order to circumvent Fletcher, the majority interprets the due process clause of our state constitution, Const, art. 1, § 3, to mandate a different result. Unfortunately, it offers no substantive reason for doing so. Admittedly, we have the power, as a matter of federalism, to interpret our constitution as more protective of individual rights than the federal constitution. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 95 S. Ct. 1215 (1975); State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 177, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). As stated in Simpson, at 177:
Such independent interpretation of state constitutional provisions is particularly appropriate when the language of the state provision differs from the federal, and the legislative history of the state constitution reveals that this difference was intended by the framers. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972); State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978); see generally Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 297 (1977).
However, in affirming our authority to more liberally interpret the Washington Constitution, the majority states the obvious. Any particular reading of our constitution should be based upon an actual analysis of its language and historical origin, not upon a visceral reaction to ideological trends in the United States Supreme Court. The majority completely fails to identify any aspects of the language or historical purpose of article 1, section 3 that would warrant a departure from Fletcher.5
*608The authority that does exist with respect to the proper interpretation of our due process clause is, at best, inconclusive. As the majority concedes, the language of that clause is virtually identical to the federal due process clause. The only difference is that Const, art. 1, § 3 apparently does not have a state action requirement. Neither Davis nor the majority suggests that this difference is relevant here. Moreover, the rules of construction which have been applied to the interpretation of our constitution are somewhat conflicting in the due process context. The general rule has been that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court will be followed when the language of the relevant constitutional provisions is similar. See, e.g., Dutil v. State, 93 Wn.2d 84, 86, 606 P.2d 269 (1980); Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d 732, 739, 557 P.2d 321 (1976). In construing article 1, section 3, however, the courts have held that federal decisions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment are entitled to great weight but are not controlling. See, e.g., In re Young, 95 Wn.2d 216, 229, 622 P.2d 373 (1980); Young v. Konz, 91 Wn.2d 532, 538-39, 588 P.2d 1360 (1979).
If anything, our Supreme Court has embraced the rationale of Fletcher. Both State v. Evans, 96 Wn.2d 1, 633 P.2d 83 (1981) and State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979), relied upon by the majority, were based squarely upon the reasoning in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976). Neither decision even mentioned the Washington Constitution. Doyle, of course, held that the use of post-arrest silence to impeach an exculpatory story offered at trial denies fundamental fairness only when Miranda warnings are given. Fletcher is nothing more than an application of Doyle. Indeed, the *609Evans court expressly recognized that the linchpin of Doyle was the giving of Miranda warnings. See Evans, 96 Wn.2d at 3.
The majority's reliance on Fricks and Evans to support its departure from Fletcher is, therefore, surprising, to say the least.
Accordingly, I dissent.

The majority claims that I assert "that it is improper to construe our state constitution as more protective of individual rights than the federal constitution *608when the pertinent provisions are similarly or identically phrased." Majority opinion, at 605 n.4. To the contrary, my position here is simply that the majority offers no sound historical reasons for departing from otherwise controlling authority. After years of acknowledging the great weight and deference due federal decisions, the majority dismisses Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490, 102 S. Ct. 1309 (1982) summarily.