Court Opinion

ID: 9731643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:53:18.951322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.190144
License: Public Domain

*604PALLADINO, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Fiore was convicted of speeding in violation of Section 3362(a) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362(a). DOT then suspended his license for 15 days. Fiore appealed, and the trial court, after a de novo hearing, reduced the period of the suspension from 15 days to 10 days. The issue addressed by the majority to resolve the appeal concerned the trial court’s authority to modify a penalty imposed by DOT after the trial court hears the matter de novo. The majority concluded that the trial court has such authority. We respectfully disagree.
This court has consistently held that:
Upon appeal to the trial court, where the proceeding is de novo, the trial court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the motorist has, in fact, been convicted of a traffic violation and whether the Bureau of Traffic Safety has faithfully observed the provisions of the Vehicle Code in suspending the motorist’s operating privileges.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Edwards, 103 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 43, 45, 519 A.2d 1083, 1084 (1987).
The court has been equally consistent in holding that:
A trial court is empowered to modify a penalty if it makes findings of fact and conclusions of law which are different from those of an administrative agency.
However, when that court finds that the party charged has committed the violation for which the penalty was imposed, it is a manifest abuse of discretion for it to modify the penalty because it disagrees with it.
It ‘may not, because of the possible unfairness or inequity of the result, reverse the [Department] or modify the penalties imposed.’
*605Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Miller, 107 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 458, 460, 528 A.2d 1030, 1031-32 (1987) (citations omitted).
Although the trial court’s result obviously contradicts well-settled law, the majority would affirm. The majority focuses on the fact that DOT generally applies the maximum penalty available under the statute, and faults the reason that DOT gave for this practice, which is that it is almost impossible for DOT to process a suspension in less than 15 days. The majority considers DOT’s practice to be arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the majority attempts to remedy the situation by amending the law to allow trial courts to modify penalties after de novo hearings.
The majority reasons as follows:
Hearings de novo overcome the inherent bias which arises when an administrative agency serves the twin functions of prosecutor and judge by providing an opportunity to have the facts of one’s case heard again in an independent forum by a neutral fact finder.
By granting the right to a hearing de novo in appeals from suspensions of operating privileges, the legislature intended to afford the trial court broad discretionary powers in the interest of the administration of justice.
Maj. op. at' 602 (citations omitted).
In attempting to curb possible abuses of discretion by DOT, the majority completely ignores the reasoning behind the existing law. This court addressed the issue of whether a trial court may modify a penalty imposed by DOT after a de novo hearing in a license suspension appeal in Commonwealth v. McCartney, 2 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 540, 279 A.2d 77 (1971). The court stated the following:
It is an erroneous concept that under the guise of a de novo hearing, a Common Pleas court can not only examine the facts of a case to determine whether the appellant actually deserves his suspension, but can additionally *606modify the suspension period promulgated by the Secretary. Knowing this full well, some lower courts ... simply reverse the suspension altogether. To do so, or to modify the suspension, infringes upon the discretion vested in the Secretary and amounts to a manifest abuse of discretion ... Thus, the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Moogerman, 385 Pa. 256, 259, 122 A.2d 804, 806 (1956) has said, ‘The decision of the County Court in the case at bar, if unreversed, would tend to give ballast to the unsubstantiated notion that the Courts may be called upon to function as ex officio pardon boards to mitigate the penalties which the Legislature empowered the Secretary of [Transportation] to impose under given conditions.’
Id., 2 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 546, 279 A.2d at 80.
The majority opinion sets forth a position which would have the effect of transforming trial courts into ‘pardon boards’, and will “promote favoritism and undermine uniform enforcement of the law.” Miller, 107 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 461, 528 A.2d at 1032.
The supreme court recently considered in a different procedural posture the question of court modification of an agency’s penalty and provided helpful guidance for resolution of the problem at hand.1 The supreme court, in holding that Commonwealth Court had exceeded its authority in modifying an order of The State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, used language supportive of the rationale employed in Edwards and Miller:
Commonwealth Court’s approach, left unchecked, would swallow up the whole system of administrative adjudications, in which administrative bodies having expertise in specific areas of law are entrusted to fashion administrative remedies that are fair and appropriate. Absent abuses of the sort specified in the Administrative Agency Law, or Blumenschein [v. Pittsburgh Housing Authority, 379 Pa. 566, 109 A.2d 331 (1954)], appellate courts *607should exercise judicial restraint in reviewing administrative orders.
Id. 526 Pa. at 316, 586 A.2d at 366.
Although we note that there is a basic procedural distinction between the case at bar and Slawek, here we are considering de novo proceedings before a trial court, whereas Slawek concerns an agency adjudication statutorily before this court for review, the language from Slawek cannot be ignored.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be reversed and the 15 day suspension imposed by DOT reinstated.
SMITH, J., joins this dissent.

. Slawek v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, 526 Pa. 316, 586 A.2d 362 (1991).