Court Opinion

ID: 9635004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:32:08.130104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:14.449328
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice COOPER.
I have no quarrel with the “bare bones” approach to instructing juries in Kentucky — so long as the jury is given all the bones. Because the jury was given less than a whole skeleton in this case, I respectfully dissent.
The law is clear that a hostile work environment claim cannot be premised upon one incident involving the “mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2283, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (quoting Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.1971)). “A recurring point in these opinions is that ... isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’ ” Id. at 788, 118 S.Ct. at 2283. We adopted this principle verbatim in Ammerman v. Bd. of Educ., 30 S.W.3d 793 (Ky.2000), and noted that “[w]e are unable to find any authority holding that a single incident can support a claim for ‘hostile environment’ — ” Id. at 799.
The City admitted that on August 11, 1997, Appellants’ supervisor accused Appellants of vandalizing his bicycle and referred to them on one occasion as “niggers,” and that such constituted an act of racial discrimination/harassment. As a matter of law, however, that incident, standing alone, does not support a claim of hostile work environment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787, 118 S.Ct. at 2283; Ammerman, 30 S.W.3d at 799. Unfortunately, the instructions did not inform the jury of that fact, thus did not “properly and intelligibly state the law.” Howard v. Com*608monwealth, 618 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Ky.1981). While Appellants introduced evidence from which a jury could believe that other incidents of racial discrimination occurred, the City offered evidence that could lead a jury to the contrary conclusion. Thus, the jury may well have decided this case solely on the basis of the August 11, 1997, incident. I do not believe use of the undefined term “pervasive” sufficed to inform the jury that it could not find for Appellants solely on the basis of that one incident.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the Court of Appeals and remand this case for a new trial before a properly instructed jury.
GRAVES, J., joins this dissenting opinion.