Court Opinion

ID: 9352068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 20:01:47.064976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:51.178953
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/4/23 In re D.H. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

In re D.H., a Person Coming Under                               B319200
the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________                                  (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              Super. Ct. No. 20LJJP00049A)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
         v.

T.H.,
         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from findings and order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Davis, Referee. Affirmed.

      Lori N. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane E. Kwon, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                    _________________________
                         INTRODUCTION
       T.H. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s March 18,
2022 findings and order terminating her parental rights to her
12-year-old son, D.H. On appeal, she does not contest the merits
of the court’s order; instead, her sole contention is that reversal is
warranted because the juvenile court and Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to satisfy the initial
inquiry requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law
(Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 224 et seq.).
       While we agree with Mother that DCFS did not properly
discharge its statutory duty, resulting in “ICWA error,” we
conclude any such error was harmless and affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Events Leadings to Filing of Petition
      In December 2019, DCFS received two immediate response
referrals with allegations of “general neglect and caretaker
absence/incapacity” by Mother towards D.H. It was reported
Mother was not in compliance with her psychotropic medications
and was hospitalized due to her anxiety and pain. Mother’s and
D.H.’s home was “observed to be a mess and a ‘hoarder’s home.’ ”
D.H. stated he “takes care of himself and [his] mother” and he
was concerned they may be evicted “because of their living
conditions.” D.H. expressed concern about his Mother’s repeated
911 calls due to her anxiety attacks. D.H. reported that when
Mother goes through her “anxiety stuff,” he “takes care of himself

1    Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                  2
and the mother”; he said this happens at least once a month and
could last up to a week. D.H. reported his school “asked him not
to come back . . . due to the excessive amount of absences he had.”
It appeared the “minor was really raising himself.”
       On December 24, 2019, a children’s social worker (CSW)
observed the apartment and found it “in disarray” with a strong
odor of trash permeating the home. There were “multiple pots,
pans and dirty dishes overflowing from the sink and piled up” in
the kitchen, “boxes and miscellaneous items cluttering the
pathway” to Mother’s bedroom; “the room is so cluttered that it
does not appear that it is used for sleeping.” D.H.’s room had
“trash all over the side of the room.”
       Mother suffers from Alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency which
causes her breathing difficulties. She currently takes the
following medication: albuterol inhaler, symbicort inhaler,
trelegy, daliresp, fluticasone, azelastine, water pills, sudogest,
hydroxyzine, Cymbalta, escitalopram, and clonazepam. Mother
has a “history of coming into the hospital due to her anxiety and
mental health.”
       The identity of D.H.’s father is unknown. According to the
maternal aunt April (MA April), Mother lost custody of D.H. in
2014 in the state of Oregon where they resided at the time.
Mother stated her son was taken from her because “they said I
was mentally unstable.” Mother said she signed papers “under
duress” that allowed D.H. “to be taken away.” Maternal cousin
Michael (MC Michael) had custody of D.H. from 2014 to 2015.
When Mother moved to California, D.H. “was given to” maternal
aunt Lori (MA Lori) to live “closer to his mother” and, at some
later point, was returned to Mother’s care and home. MA April

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stated “things took a negative turn” for Mother about one year
ago when she lost both her parents (maternal grandparents).
       On January 21, 2020, the CSW learned D.H. last attended
middle school from August 2019 to September 2019, and “has not
been enrolled in a school for over four months now.” DCFS found
prior child welfare history pertaining to D.H. A referral of
general neglect of D.H. was made in November 2018 because of
Mother’s hospitalization, positive test for methamphetamine, and
placement on a 72-hour psychiatric hold; the referral was closed
as unfounded. DCFS also discovered Mother has past arrests
related to drug charges and past convictions for traffic violations.
II.   Petition and Detention
       On January 27, 2020, DCFS filed a petition on behalf of
minor D.H., born June 2007, pursuant to section 300, subdivision
(b)(1). The petition alleged Mother has “mental and emotional
problems, including anxiety, depression, paranoia, and panic
attacks” which render her unable to provide D.H. with regular
care and supervision. On prior occasions, Mother was
hospitalized for evaluation and treatment of her psychiatric
condition. Mother failed to take her psychotropic medication as
prescribed and failed to regularly participate in services to
address her mental and emotional problems. It was alleged
Mother’s problems endangered D.H.’s physical health and safety,
created a detrimental home environment, and placed him at risk
of serious harm and danger.
       The petition included an “Indian Child Inquiry
Attachment” (Judicial Council form ICWA-010(A)) which
provided that an Indian child inquiry was “made” and that D.H.
“has no known Indian ancestry.” The attachment also indicated
Mother “denied” any known Native American ancestry.

                                 4
      On January 22, 2020, Mother denied any known Native
American ancestry. Mother stated the identity of the father is
unknown. DCFS has “no means to assess if there may be any
paternal Indian heritage.”
      On January 28, 2020, Mother filed her Parental
Notification of Indian Status (Judicial Council form ICWA-020)
and marked the box indicating “no Indian ancestry as far as I
know.”2
      At the initial hearing on January 28, 2020, the juvenile
court reviewed the ICWA-020 form filed by Mother. The court
stated, “Mom’s filed an Indian Child Welfare statement
indicating she has no American Indian heritage.” The court
provided it “does not have a reason to know that [D.H.] is an
Indian Child . . . and does not order notice to any tribe or the
BIA.” Mother was ordered to keep DCFS and the court aware of
“any new information relating to possible ICWA status.” As to
D.H.’s father, the juvenile court stated the identity is unknown
and it “can make an ultimate finding today that the Indian Child
Welfare Act does not apply.” The court ordered D.H. released to

2     The form includes four other checkboxes that provide:

        a) “I am or may be a member of, or eligible for membership
in, a federally recognized Indian tribe.”
        b) “I may have Indian ancestry.”
        c) “The child is or may be a member of, or eligible for
membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe.”
        d) “One or more of my parents, grandparents, or other
lineal ancestors is or was a member of a federally recognized
tribe.”

      Mother left these checkboxes blank.

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Mother’s home and ordered DCFS to make unannounced home
visits and to assist Mother in enrolling D.H. in school.
       The detention report filed February 28, 2020, states that
during an unannounced home visit on February 19, 2020, the
CSW observed Mother and son at their apartment, which was “in
disarray with trash, clothes, boxes, a Christmas tree, dishes and
numerous other things all over the place.” The CSW noted there
“was a small walkway to wade through the debris.” Mother had
“numerous feet of oxygen tubing lying all over the home that
connected her to oxygen tanks,” which she needs to ease her
breathing difficulties. When asked if she had registered her son
at school as ordered by the court, Mother gave excuses, was very
disorganized in her thought process, and could not finish a
sentence or express her thoughts. The CSW next spoke with
D.H., who stated Mother “was not doing good” and was “not
taking her medication.” He reported Mother “kept waking him
up saying she heard noises and she thinks the apartment
building is going to collapse.” He also reported Mother calls the
paramedics “4–5 times a day because she is anxious.”
       On February 28, 2020, DCFS filed a section 385 ex parte
application requesting the court to detain D.H. and place him in
shelter care. Mother failed to enroll D.H. in school, failed to take
prescribed medication, and was now hospitalized and
incapacitated. D.H. was taken into protective custody; there was
no suitable plan for D.H.’s care “as the potential relative
caregivers [that Mother proposed] are unable to provide care.”
       On March 2, 2020, the juvenile court granted the
application, ordered D.H. removed from Mother’s home, and gave
DCFS discretion to place him with an appropriate relative.
Mother was granted unmonitored visits in a public setting for a

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maximum of two hours per visit, three times a week. DCFS was
ordered to enroll D.H. in school forthwith.
      On March 10, 2020, D.H. expressed to DCFS that he does
not wish to have visitation or telephone contact with Mother.
      On March 17, 2020, the CSW asked MA April if she or MA
Lori could care for D.H. MA April stated both she and MA Lori
work full-time and could not care for D.H. MA April proposed
family friends (Mr. and Mrs. R)3 for D.H.’s placement.
III.   Jurisdiction and Disposition
      In an addendum report filed August 11, 2020, DCFS
informed the court Mother enrolled in a 16-week virtual parent
education class and has attended three sessions to date. Mother
indicated she started counseling three weeks ago, and she meets
with her psychiatrist once every three months. Meanwhile, D.H.
continued staying at Mr. and Mrs. R’s home, where he stated he
was “very happy.”
      Adjudication took place on August 12, 2020. The juvenile
court repeated its earlier finding that ICWA did not apply. It
sustained the section 300 petition as alleged and declared D.H. a
dependent of the court. The court ordered “suitable placement” of
D.H. and reunification services. Mother’s case plan included
individual counseling, parenting classes, on-demand drug testing,
mental health counseling, a psychological assessment, and a
psychiatric evaluation. Mother was ordered to take all prescribed
psychotropic medication. She was afforded monitored visitation
for three hours a visit, three times a week.

3   Mr. and Mrs. R are parents of a friend of D.H. D.H. has
known them since the fourth grade.

                                7
IV.   Section 366.21 Status Review Hearings
        In the status review report filed January 21, 2021, DCFS
informed the court that D.H. adjusted “very well” at Mr. and Mrs.
R’s home and was doing well in school. DCFS reported Mother
was not cooperative and refused to meet with the CSW or provide
documentation of progress with her case plan.
        At the section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing held
February 11, 2021, the juvenile court found Mother had not made
substantial progress in her case plan and that returning D.H. to
Mother’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment to his
well-being.
        On March 2, 2021, Mother’s psychiatrist noted Mother was
“not medication compliant.” Mother’s therapist disclosed Mother
had not had a session since September 2020. The CSW reported
Mother’s mental health concerns “get in the way of every aspect
of her life including remaining on task.” There was a five-month
gap between her individual counseling sessions from September
17, 2020, to February 1, 2021. The CSW interviewed D.H., who
expressed his wish to be adopted by his caregivers and to
continue visits with Mother.
        At the section 366.21, subdivision (f) review hearing held
October 21, 2021, the juvenile court found Mother “has not
adequately addressed the issues that brought this family before
the court.” It found Mother was noncompliant with her case plan
and inconsistent with her individual counseling or therapy
appointments. Mother “has not made significant progress in
resolving the problems that lead to the removal of the minor and
. . . has not demonstrated the capacity and ability to complete the
objectives of the treatment case plan.” Minor’s counsel informed
the court of 14-year-old D.H.’s wishes that reunification services

                                 8
be terminated, so that D.H.’s “case can move forward” to
permanent planning.
      The court did not find enough evidence to support
reunification services for Mother and found it was not in D.H.’s
best interests to continue with reunification efforts. The court
terminated reunification services. The court found returning
D.H. to Mother’s physical custody would create a substantial risk
of detriment to D.H.’s well-being and safety and ordered the
current placement to continue.4 DCFS was ordered to provide
information about adoption and guardianship to D.H. and his
caregivers and to set-up an adoptive home study. The matter
was set for a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a
permanent plan of adoption or guardianship for D.H.
V.    D.H.’s Section 388 Petition to Modify Visitation
       On January 28, 2022, D.H. filed a section 388 petition
asking the court to “minimize in-person visits because to date,
[Mother] does not engage with him during the visits” and it is
“awkward and full of silence.” D.H. asked that visitation be
“primarily virtual” and “shorter in length.”
       A report DCFS submitted February 10, 2022, informed the
court that Mr. and Mrs. R’s home study was approved and all
adoption readiness documents had been obtained. There were
“no impediments to moving forward with [D.H.’s] adoption.”
       At the February 18, 2022, hearing on D.H.’s section 388
petition, the court found “no evidence” that the last two years of
court-ordered visitation “benefited either the minor or the mother
in creating a bond between the two.” The court granted D.H.’s

4     D.H. had resided with Mr. and Mrs. R since August 10,
2020, almost one year.

                                9
petition and modified visitation to “predominantly virtual,”
reducing it to 30 minutes per visit, three times a week. The court
encouraged Mother to use visitation time to initiate “exchanges of
ideas and conversation with [D.H.] about him and his life in order
to form a bond.”
VI.   Section 366.26 Selection of Permanent Plan Hearing
      At the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing held
March 18, 2022, the court found D.H. adoptable. Mother “has not
maintained regular visitation” and “has not established a bond
with” D.H. The court found no exception to adoption and ordered
adoption as the “permanent plan.” The court found it would be
“detrimental” to D.H. to return to Mother. The court repeated it
“previously made Indian Child Welfare Act findings and those do
remain in full force and effect.” The court then proceeded to
terminate Mother’s and the unknown father’s parental rights to
D.H. Custody of D.H. was ordered temporarily transferred to
DCFS to effectuate adoptive planning and placement. The court
designated Mr. and Mrs. R as D.H.’s prospective adoptive
parents.
      Mother timely filed a notice of appeal.
                         DISCUSSION
      The sole issue raised by Mother on appeal is whether DCFS
and the juvenile court complied with ICWA as “no inquiry was
made of extended relatives as to whether [D.H.] has possible
Indian ancestry in violation of ICWA mandates.” Mother argues
DCFS was in contact with several maternal relatives and easily
could (and should have) asked whether there was Indian ancestry
or reason to believe [D.H.] is an Indian child. She contends

                               10
substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that
ICWA did not apply.
      While we agree with Mother that DCFS did not properly
discharge its statutory duty, resulting in “ICWA error,” we
conclude any such error was harmless and we affirm.
I.    Standard of Review
       “[W]here the facts are undisputed, we independently
determine whether ICWA’s requirements have been satisfied.”
(In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1051 (D.S.); accord, In re
A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314 (A.M.).) However, “we
review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the substantial
evidence test, which requires us to determine if reasonable,
credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s order.
[Citations.] We must uphold the court’s orders and findings if
any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them, and we resolve all conflicts in favor of
affirmance.” (A.M., at p. 314; accord, In re Austin J. (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885 (Austin J.).) The appellant—in this case,
Mother—has the burden to show the evidence was not sufficient
to support the ICWA finding. (Austin J., at p. 885.)
II.   Applicable Law
      ICWA5 reflects “a congressional determination to protect
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal
standards that a state court . . . must follow before removing an

5     Our state Legislature incorporated ICWA’s requirements
into California statutory law in 2006. (In re Abbigail A. (2016)
1 Cal.5th 83, 91.)

                                11
Indian child from his or her family.” (Austin J., supra,
47 Cal.App.5th at p. 881.) Both ICWA and the Welfare and
Institutions Code define an “Indian child” as “any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of
an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”
(25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); § 224.1, subds. (a) & (b) [incorporating
federal definitions].)
       The juvenile court and DCFS have “an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition
under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016)
1 Cal.5th 1, 9, 11–12.) This continuing duty can be divided into
three phases: the duty of initial inquiry, the duty of further
inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice. (In re D.F.
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) It is the first phase, the duty of
initial inquiry, that is at issue here.
       The duty to inquire whether a child is an Indian child
begins with “the initial contact,” i.e., when the referring party
reports child abuse or neglect that jumpstarts DCFS
investigation. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) DCFS’s initial duty to inquire
includes asking the child, parents, legal guardian, extended
family members, and others who have an interest in the child
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child. (Id., subd. (b).)
Similarly, the juvenile court must inquire at each participant’s
first appearance before the court whether he or she “knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (c).)
The juvenile court must also require each parent to complete
Judicial Council Form ICWA-020, Parental Notification of Indian
Status. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2)(C).) The parties are

                                12
instructed to inform the court “if they subsequently receive
information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian
child.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a); § 224.2, subd. (c).)
III.   Analysis
      Here, Mother argues the juvenile court and DCFS failed to
conduct their duty of initial inquiry to gather information that
could have triggered additional duties and heightened
requirements. (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
735, 742.) Mother essentially argues DCFS and the juvenile
court should not have accepted at face value Mother’s multiple
statements that she had no Indian heritage; instead, DCFS
should have asked maternal aunts April and Lori and maternal
cousin Michael—Mother’s “available extended family members”—
what they knew about possible Indian heritage.
      As the facts before us are not disputed, we independently
determine whether ICWA’s requirements were met. (D.S., supra,
46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.)
      In the case before us, the juvenile court conducted its initial
inquiry as to whether D.H. is an Indian child during Mother’s first
appearance at the January 28, 2020, initial hearing. (§ 224.2,
subd. (c) [“At the first appearance in court of each party, the court
shall ask each participant present in the hearing . . . .”].) The court
reviewed the ICWA-020 form submitted by Mother and noted,
“Mom’s filed an Indian Child Welfare statement indicating she has
no American Indian heritage.” The court ordered Mother to keep
DCFS and the court aware of “any new information relating to
possible ICWA status.” As to D.H.’s father, the juvenile court
found his identity unknown and that it “can make an ultimate
finding today that the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply.”

                                 13
       Section 224.2, subdivision (b) imposes on DCFS a duty of
initial inquiry, i.e., to ask “extended family members”6 whether
the child may be an Indian child. Mother contends DCFS failed
in its duty to inquire because DCFS did not ask D.H.’s extended
family relatives—MA April, MA Lori, MC Michael—about
possible Indian ancestry.
       We agree with Mother. DCFS’s failure to ask MA April,
MA Lori, and MC Michael—all of whom DCFS was in contact
with throughout the proceedings—about any possible Indian
ancestry violated the express mandate of section 224.2,
subdivision (b). (See In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421,
431–432; In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742.)
The court erred in finding that ICWA did not apply.
       The next question is whether the error was harmless.
A violation of section 224.2 is a violation of state law which
requires reversal only if it has caused a “miscarriage of justice
under California Constitution, article VI, section 13.” (In re Y.M.
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 901, 910.) Our colleagues in Division Two
issued an opinion earlier this year where it proposed and adopted
a new rule for harmlessness. (In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
769, 777–778, review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.) “[A]n
agency’s failure to conduct a proper initial inquiry into a
dependent child’s American Indian heritage is harmless unless
the record contains information suggesting a reason to believe that
the child may be an ‘Indian child’ within the meaning of [the]
ICWA, such that the absence of further inquiry was prejudicial to

6      “Extended family members” include the child’s
“grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or
sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) and § 224.1, subd. (c).)

                                14
the juvenile court’s ICWA finding. For this purpose, the ‘record’
includes both the record of proceedings in the juvenile court and
any proffer the appealing parent makes on appeal.” (Id. at
p. 779, italics added.) We agree with our colleagues in In re
Dezi C. that by limiting a remand for further inquiry to those
cases in which the record gives the reviewing court a reason to
believe that the remand may undermine the juvenile court’s
ICWA finding, the “reason to believe” rule effectuates the rights
of the tribes in those instances in which those rights are most
likely at risk, which are precisely the cases in which the tribe’s
potential rights do justify placing the children in a further period
of limbo. (Id. at pp. 781–782; In re G.A. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
355, 363–364 [endorsing approach taken in In re Dezi C.].)
       There is nothing in the record to suggest further contact
with Mother’s relatives might contradict the unqualified
statements by Mother that the family did not have Indian
heritage. DCFS spoke with Mother prior to filing the section 300
petition, which included the “Indian Child Inquiry Attachment”
indicating an inquiry was made and Mother denied Native
American ancestry. Mother filed her “Parental Notification of
Indian Status” stating she has “no Indian ancestry.” Mother also
denied Native American ancestry to the CSW on January 22,
2020. At no time during the two years of proceedings did Mother
claim Indian ancestry. Despite multiple opportunities to do so
over the course of the dependency case, Mother never suggested
that a family member might know more about their ancestry.
There was no evidence whatsoever of any Indian tribal link.
“Simply put, no information was ever supplied ‘suggesting that
either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be

                                 15
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.’ ” (See In re G.A.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 363.)
       Error committed by DCFS or the juvenile court in not
asking the three identified extended relatives (MAs and MC)
prior to the termination hearing was harmless. We find it
appropriate to remand only where the record shows “ ‘a reason to
believe that the child may be an “Indian child” within the
meaning of [the] ICWA.’ ” (See In re G.A., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at p. 363; see In re Kenneth D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1035.)
Mother cannot establish prejudicial error under this test.
       We affirm.
                         DISPOSITION
      The findings and order terminating parental rights are
affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                      STRATTON, P. J.

I concur:

            HARUTUNIAN, J.*

*     Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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WILEY, J., Dissenting.
      The Department with little effort could have asked the
maternal relatives the required question about ancestry but did
not and thereby added needless delay and uncertainty to a
situation that would benefit from swift and definite resolution.
Perhaps someday this issue will vanish when the Department
becomes convinced it should follow the law.
      This is my 15th dissent on this issue.

                                    WILEY, J.

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