Court Opinion

ID: 9379671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 00:00:25.796733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:29.321296
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10357        Document: 00516677819             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/15/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                                                                            FILED
                                                                                      March 15, 2023
                                        No. 22-10357                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                            Clerk

   Jacqueline McCloud,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Denis McDonough, Secretary, U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs,

                                                                   Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 3:19-CV-03082

   Before Jones, Dennis, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Plaintiff Jacqueline McCloud alleges that she suffered discrimination
   and a hostile work environment while working at a Department of Veteran
   Affairs (VA) healthcare facility in Dallas, Texas. During her employment,
   McCloud filed multiple Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints
   against the VA. The VA investigated the hostile work environment claims,
   and an EEOC administrative law judge ruled for the VA. McCloud then filed

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10357         Document: 00516677819            Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/15/2023

                                         No. 22-10357

   this pro se suit against the Secretary of the VA, alleging the same hostile work
   environment claims she did in her administrative complaint. After reviewing
   the parties’ arguments and the record, we AFFIRM on the same grounds as
   explained by the magistrate judge and adopted by the district court.
                                              I
          McCloud is an African-American woman who was around 50 years old
   when she began working as a physical therapist at a VA facility in Dallas in
   2012. At some point while working at the facility, McCloud sustained a
   chronic shoulder injury which limited how much weight she could lift. In
   early 2016, McCloud transitioned to a therapist position in the facility’s
   clinical video telerehab (CVT) program.
          The VA subsequently hired Margaret Parker as the new supervisor
   for the CVT program. 1 McCloud’s relationship with Parker soured quickly
   after Parker assumed her post. McCloud alleges that Parker harassed her in
   several ways such as by decreasing her patient numbers and not crediting her
   for certain work. McCloud ultimately resigned after being placed on a
   Performance Improvement Plan for misconduct such as tardiness, leaving
   her post, and failure to follow orders.
          Before her resignation, McCloud filed an EEO complaint with the
   VA. After making several additions, McCloud alleged 31 instances of
   harassment based on race, sex, disability, and reprisal for filing a prior
   complaint. 2 The agency accepted all but McCloud’s whistleblower claim for
   investigation. After the investigation, an administrative law judge with the

          1
              McCloud’s second-level supervisor, Dr. Weibin Yang, remained the same.
          2
            McCloud claims she experienced racial discrimination as early as 2014 and, by
   2015, she had contacted an EEO counselor and filed two complaints. She later dropped
   these complaints.

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   Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued summary
   judgment for the VA, concluding that McCloud “offered no evidence to
   show that the Agency’s articulated reasons for its actions are a pretext for
   discrimination.” 3
           On December 31, 2019, McCloud filed a pro se lawsuit in federal
   district court against the Secretary of the VA under Title VII of the Civil
   Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
   of 1967 (ADEA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. She alleges the same 31
   instances of harassment asserted in her EEO complaint and requests
   “settlement/compensation of $4,995,000, removal of all unsubstantiated
   documents placed in Plaintiff[’s] personnel file” and for the VA to bear all
   litigation costs.
           The VA moved for summary judgment. McCloud filed what the lower
   court construed as a response to the VA’s motion and a separate motion for
   summary judgment. The district court referred the motions to a magistrate
   judge for initial findings of fact and conclusions of law. See McCloud v.
   McDonough, No. 3:19-cv-3082, 2022 WL 1230303 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2022).
           The magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the
   VA’s motion. The judge first concluded that McCloud had administratively
   exhausted only her hostile work environment claims and thus those were the
   only claims properly before the court. Id. at *3. Still, the magistrate judge
   determined that the hostile work environment claims failed because the Fifth
   Circuit does not recognize a reprisal claim. Id. The judge determined that
   McCloud otherwise failed to show any genuine issue of material fact that she

           3
            McCloud timely appealed the ALJ’s decision to the EEOC. The EEOC however
   took longer than 180 days to decide, so McCloud filed this suit. The EEOC finally affirmed
   the ALJ’s decision on January 9, 2020.

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                                     No. 22-10357

   suffered pervasive harassment because of a protected characteristic or any
   harassment affected a term or condition of her employment. Id. at *4–5.
          After considering McCloud’s objections, which largely restated her
   factual allegations, the district court fully adopted the magistrate judge’s
   findings and recommendations and entered judgment for the VA. See
   McCloud v. McDonough, No. 3:19-cv-3082, 2022 WL 682747, at *2 (N.D.
   Tex. Mar. 8, 2022). McCloud filed this appeal.
                                          II
          We review summary judgment de novo, reviewing all facts “in a light
   most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in
   its favor.” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 2002). To defeat
   summary judgment, the non-moving party must point the court to specific
   facts “showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air
   Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). A party cannot defeat summary
   judgment with “conclusory allegations,” “unsubstantiated assertions,” or
   “only a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
   omitted). “If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of
   fact to find for the non-moving party, then there is no genuine issue for trial.”
   Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2005)
   (citation omitted).
                                         III
          McCloud assigns eight points of error to the district court’s decision,
   but they can be consolidated into three main issues: (1) whether the district
   court erred in holding that McCloud only exhausted her hostile work
   environment claims; (2) whether the district court erred in holding that the
   Fifth Circuit did not recognize a reprisal claim; and (3) whether the district

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   court erred in granting summary judgment for the VA on her hostile work
   environment claims. 4 We address each of McCloud’s arguments in turn.
                                               A
           McCloud argues that the district court erred in holding that she failed
   to exhaust her discrimination claims. “Before seeking relief in federal court,
   Title VII plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative remedies.” Story v.
   Gibson on behalf of Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 896 F.3d 693, 698 (5th Cir. 2018).
   A claim is exhausted if: “(1) the employee receives notice of final agency
   action or by the EEOC upon appeal from an agency decision, or (2) 180 days
   have passed from the filing of the administrative complaint or appeal thereof
   without final agency action.” Ruiz v. Brennan, 851 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir.
   2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)). McCloud only pursued hostile work
   environment claims in her administrative complaint. Indeed, the EEO
   investigation can be construed only as investigating hostile work environment
   claims. Thus the district court correctly held that only McCloud’s hostile
   work environment claims were exhausted.
                                               B
           Turning to her exhausted hostile work environment claims, the
   district court correctly granted the VA summary judgment on the reprisal
   claim, as “[w]e have not recognized a retaliatory hostile work environment
   cause of action.” Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech.
   Coll., 850 F.3d 731, 741 n.5 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Montgomery-Smith v.

           4
             McCloud also contends that the district court erred in striking parts of her
   summary judgment filings for revealing confidential settlement information. McCloud
   does not expand on this argument and thus it is forfeited. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8
   F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (a party forfeits an argument “by failing to adequately brief
   the argument on appeal”); see also Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993)
   (same for pro se plaintiffs).

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   George, 810 F. App’x 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2020) (“This circuit has not
   recognized a retaliatory hostile work environment cause of action[.]”). We
   need not decide whether one exists now because McCloud generally cannot
   establish the elements of a hostile work environment claim as discussed
   below.
            To succeed on the other bases, McCloud must show that (1) she
   “belongs to a protected group”; (2) she suffered “unwelcome harassment”;
   “(3) the harassment complained of was based on [the protected
   characteristic]”; (4) the harassment “affected a term, condition, or privilege
   of employment”; and (5) her “employer knew or should have known of the
   harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action.” 5 Ramsey,
   286 F.3d at 268. For harassment to affect “a term, condition, or privilege of
   employment,” it must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
   conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
   environment.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
   (1993)); see also Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir.
   2012).
            McCloud fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on at least two
   of these prongs: As the ALJ, EEOC, magistrate judge, and district court all
   concluded, McCloud has not shown a genuine factual dispuate that any of the

            5
             We have similarly recognized a hostile work environment cause of action under
   the ADEA. To succeed on a such a claim, plaintiffs must prove that: (1) they over the age
   of 40; (2) they were “subjected to harassment, either through words or actions, based on
   age; (3) the nature of the harassment was such that it created an objectively intimidating,
   hostile, or offensive work environment; and (4) there exists some basis for liability on the
   part of the employer.” Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 2011). The
   same is true for claims under the Rehabilitation Act. See Travis v. Potter, 221 F. App’x 345,
   348 (5th Cir. 2007) (harassment must be linked to the plaintiff’s disability). Because
   McCloud’s claims fail on the overlapping prongs, we do not separately analyze her claims
   under each statute.

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   31 instances of harassment were based on any of her protected characteristics
   or constituted “severe or pervasive harassment.”
          McCloud’s claims largely involve workplace disputes over work
   opportunities and discipline untethered from any evidence that such disputes
   stemmed from one of McCloud’s protected characteristics. For example,
   McCloud asserts she was accused of workplace misconduct and having low
   clinic numbers. But she points to no facts showing that these accusations
   were lobbed against her because of her race, sex, age, or disability other than
   her adamant belief. This cannot defeat summary judgment. See Badgerow v.
   REJ Props., Inc., 974 F.3d 610, 618 (5th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff’s subjective
   belief that the alleged harassment was based on her gender was insufficient
   to defeat summary judgment); Eberle v. Gonzales, 240 F. App’x. 622, 629 (5th
   Cir. 2007) (same).
          The claims that McCloud connects to a protected characteristic are
   still not severe or pervasive such as to “affect a term, condition, or privilege
   of [McCloud’s] employment.” See Ramsey, 286 F.3d at 268. “In determining
   whether harassment is sufficiently pervasive or severe, we consider ‘the
   frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
   threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
   unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Thompson
   v. Microsoft Corp., 2 F.4th 460, 471 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Patton v. Jacobs
   Eng’g Grp., Inc., 874 F.3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2017)).
          For example, McCloud alleges that Parker asked one of McCloud’s
   co-workers if McCloud would shoot Parker if Parker disciplined her. We have
   held that these types of statements “do not rise to the level of severity
   necessary to maintain a hostile work environment claim.” See, e.g., Baker v.
   FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 278 F. App’x 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2008)
   (“The phrases ‘fired girl walking’ and ‘stupid’ are not ‘based on race’ and,

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   thereby, do not sustain a race-based hostile work environment claim.”). And
   the isolated nature of this incident makes it less pervasive and severe. See,
   e.g., Frazier v. Sabine River Auth., 509 F. App’x 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2013) (use
   of racially derogatory language was “isolated and not severe or pervasive
   enough” to create a hostile work environment).
          McCloud also points to times when she disagreed with the VA’s
   accommodation of her shoulder injury, which she characterizes as disability
   harassment. Construing this as a harassment claim and not a failure to
   accommodate claim, we have held that similar conduct falls short of
   pervasive or severe. See Clark v. Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 585
   (5th Cir. 2020) (“[A] disagreement with an employer over . . . an
   accommodation [does] not amount to harassment.”).
          Moreover, even if McCloud’s other assertions of harassment based on
   workplace disagreements with, and accusations from, her superiors were
   connected to a protected characteristic, they do not qualify as severe or
   pervasive. McCloud does assert that she faced a physical threat, alleging that
   Parker shoved a piece of paper in her face. But we have held that this behavior
   does not constitute severe or pervasive harassment where it is isolated. See
   McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 554, 558 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
   curiam) (affirming summary judgment for employer even though a coworker
   “twice thr[ew] wadded-up paper in [the plaintiff’s] face”).
          Viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to McCloud, we
   agree with the district court that she has not shown any genuine issue of
   material fact that she suffered a hostile work environment under any of the
   statutory protections she cites. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

                                         8