Court Opinion

ID: 9465130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:36:35.737658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:59.312378
License: Public Domain

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result.
I concur in the judgment of affirmance reached in Judge Merritt’s opinion for the court but I do not concur in the reasoning employed therein.
I would follow the fourth circuit and hold that surreptitious entry to install electronic listening devices must be expressly approved in the court order authorizing the interception itself. Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690, 696 & n. 13 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. den. 429 U.S. 1045, 97 S.Ct. 751, 50 L.Ed.2d 759 (1977) (approving order with express approval of surreptitious entry and noting that the issue becomes “much more difficult” without such express authorization). I would not go so far, however, as the District of Columbia circuit apparently has in requiring two search warrants. United States v. Ford, 180 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 553 F.2d 146 (1977). I would instead join the fourth and eighth circuits in allowing both the seizure of the conversation and the entry to install the listening devices to be approved in one court order. Since the order in this cause did not expressly authorize surreptitious entry, I concur in the result affirming the district court’s suppression order.
Although authorization for surreptitious entry is arguably implicit in a court order permitting installation of a listening device in a private office (see United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. den. 436 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 2231, 56 L.Ed.2d 401 (1978); United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 78, 58 L.Ed.2d 108), I believe that such intrusive governmental action should require express advance approval.1 Searches are generally considered per se unreasonable unless expressly authorized in advance by a search warrant. No less should be required where an entry is a discrete part of a prolonged invasion of the subject’s privacy.
I agree with Part III of Judge Merritt’s opinion concluding that federal judges derive their power to issue search warrants exclusively from statutes and that any power to order surreptitious entry must similarly be derived from a statute. I strongly disagree, however, with Part II of Judge Merritt’s opinion which concludes that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 does not contain sufficient statutory authorization for surrepti*851tious entry to install listening devices.2 This is a strained and hypertechnical reading of the statute. It is significant that none of the other circuits addressing this issue have so interpreted the statute. Neither appellant has made such an argument to this court.
While it is correct to say that Title III does not explicitly empower federal judges to authorize surreptitious entry to install listening devices, it is unreasonable to require such explicit language. Title III clearly authorizes the interception of wire and oral communications under specified circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) defines “intercept” to mean “the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device.” (Emphasis added.) “Any electronic, mechanical or other device” necessarily includes those devices which must be installed inside the premises wherein the intercepted conversation is to occur. Since it would be self-defeating to require the consent of the owner of the premises and, as Judge Merritt’s opinion concedes, “in some circumstances, the installation of an electronic bug may not be possible without a forcible breaking and entering of the suspect’s premises,” ante at 841, it follows that the statute contemplates that such devices can be installed surreptitiously.
Inferential support for authority to authorize surreptitious entry is also found in §§ 2518(l)(b)(ii), 2518(4)(b), and 2518(4) (last H). The first two provisions require the application and court order, respectively, to specify the “nature and location” of the place where the communication is to be intercepted. No limitations are placed on permissible locations. The third provision authorizes a court to compel assistance from a “communication common carrier, landlord, custodian or other person” in order to “accomplish the interception unobtrusively.” The language of this provision apparently authorizes furtive placement of listening devices by gaining access to telephone lines, by using an apartment master key, or by other similar ploys. It is anomalous to hold that the statute does not authorize the entry involved in this case (through an unlocked window) when it plainly authorizes such an entry when facilitated by a landlord or custodian. Judge Merritt’s opinion could make the result in a given case turn on the fortuity of whether one is an owner of his premises or a tenant or whether one employs custodians or not.
Moreover, I agree with the fourth circuit that the overall statutory scheme of Title III and its legislative history make clear that Title III authorizes district courts to approve surreptitious entry to plant listening devices. Application of United States, supra, 563 F.2d at 642-44. Judge Merritt’s opinion notes some legislative history suggesting that Congress intended Title III to authorize such entry. Ante, at 839. I further agree with the fourth circuit that “any other conclusion would run counter to the principle that we should attempt to effectuate the purpose of federal legislation. ... Cf. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).” 563 F.2d at 642.
Finally, Judge Merritt’s opinion is wholly inconsistent with United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 98 S.Ct. 364, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977). There the Supreme Court held that federal district courts have the power to order the installation of pen registers to record the numbers dialed on a telephone.3 While finding that pen registers were outside the ambit of Title III, the Court held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 empowered district courts to authorize the installation of pen registers *852and that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), empowered district courts to compel public utilities to cooperate in the installation of pen registers. The case is factually distinguishable from the instant case but it unmistakably stands for a broad reading of both Rule 41 and the All Writs Act in this generaT context. Therefore, given Title Ill’s clear authorization of interception of communications, I believe the federal district courts gain sufficient ancillary power from Rule 41 and the All Writs Act to order surreptitious entry to implement such interceptions wholly apart from the power to authorize such entry which exists in Title III itself.
I would hold that district courts have power to authorize surreptitious entry to install listening devices pursuant to Title III but that such an entry must be expressly approved in advance by court order. Since there was no such express advance approval here, I concur in the judgment of affirmance.

. I would further hold that surreptitious entry should be approved by the district court only upon a showing by the applicant that other less intrusive means of electronic eavesdropping have been or would be ineffective. This is consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c)’s requirement that the applicant state “whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” This requirement is also supported by § 2518(2): “The judge may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of the application.”

. I do not address the conclusion of Part IV of Judge Merritt’s opinion since I disagree with its underlying premise that Title III does not itself authorize surreptitious entry. I do note, however, that reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3109 is questionable. United States v. Agrusa, supra, 541 F.2d at 699-701.

. While the Supreme Court’s holding was contrary to my initial views on the topic, Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 390 (6th Cir. 1977) (Celebrezze, J. dissenting), my views did not prevail and I am now bound by the Supreme Court’s pronouncement.