Court Opinion

ID: 9952552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 00:00:57.542755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:30.671813
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1201     Document: 010111018764         Date Filed: 03/19/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                             March 19, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  ERIC KING,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 23-1201
                                                      (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-00519-CNS)
  ANDREW CIOLLI, Warden, Florence                                (D. Colo.)
  FCC and ADX, United States Bureau of
  Prisons,

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

        Petitioner-Appellant Eric King appeals from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241

 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude that Mr. King’s release from prison

 during the pendency of this appeal has mooted his petition. Accordingly, we vacate the

 district court’s judgment, remand with instructions to dismiss the petition as moot, and

 dismiss this appeal.

        *
               After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
 appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); 10TH CIR. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
 be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate
 Procedure 32.1(a) and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 23-1201      Document: 010111018764        Date Filed: 03/19/2024       Page: 2

                                               I

                                               A

        Mr. King was convicted of using explosive materials to commit arson in the

 Western District of Missouri in 2016. He received a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment,

 with three years of supervised release to follow. Throughout his imprisonment, Mr. King

 was housed at a variety of facilities. In 2022, he was transferred to the Administrative

 Maximum Facility (“ADX”) in Florence, Colorado.

        On February 27, 2023, while in custody at the ADX, Mr. King filed a habeas

 petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and a motion for a temporary restraining order

 (“TRO”) and hearing in the District of Colorado. In the habeas petition, Mr. King

 asserted four grounds for relief, arguing that:

        (1) [his sentence was] unlawfully prolonged . . . based on arbitrary and
            capricious disciplinary proceedings lacking in Due Process and
            depriving him of good time credit[,]

        (2) [he was] serving this unlawfully prolonged sentence at the ADX based
            on a bias motivated and secretive ADX placement process devoid of Due
            Process[,]

        (3) [t]he Bureau of Prisons . . . unlawfully prolonged this cruel and unusual
            sentence based in part on over sixteen hundred (1600) days of
            designation in segregated housing without meaningful review or
            opportunity to be heard in violation of federal law, preventing
            Mr. King’s ability to earn good time credit, also causing Mr. King an
            unlawfully prolonged Sentence[, and]

        (4) [he was] serving an unnecessarily prolonged sentence at the ADX where
            he [wa]s unable to access prerelease programs pursuant to what appears
            to be an unreviewable Ultra Vires Special Administrative Measure
            (SAM) policy and process enacted in violation of the Administrative
            Procedure Act (“APA”) and contrary to the judicial review power of the
            courts.

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 Aplt.’s App., Vol. I, at 6–7 (Pet. for Writ Habeas Corpus, filed Feb. 27, 2023). In his

 TRO motion, Mr. King requested that the court enjoin the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and

 the ADX warden from:

        (1) [h]ousing Mr. King at the ADX on an unlawfully prolonged sentence,

        (2) [t]ransferring Mr. King out of [the] Court’s jurisdiction,

        (3) [e]ndangering Mr. King through manipulation of his housing placement,

        (4) [i]mposing arbitrary and unnecessary special conditions on Mr. King’s
            release, and

        (5) [i]nterfering with [the] exercise of Mr. King’s rights, to include his right
            to counsel and to seek relief in the courts.

 Aplt.’s App., Vol. II, at 335 (Pl.’s Emergency Mot. for a TRO & Req. for Hr’g, filed Feb.

 27, 2023). Mr. King also “move[d] th[e] . . . Court to convene an emergency hearing on

 th[e] injunction [request].” Id. at 355.

        On April 13, 2023, the district court denied Mr. King’s motion for a TRO on the

 basis that Mr. King had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. On May 5, 2023,

 Mr. King filed an unopposed motion, “request[ing] that the Court clarify whether or not

 the Court intended the Order . . . to be a final order with respect to the underlying petition

 seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus.” Aplt.’s App., Vol. III, at 768 (Pet’r’s Unopposed Mot.

 to Clarify April 13, 2023 Order, filed May 5, 2023). The district court issued a clarifying

 order on May 10, 2023, confirming that the April 13 order was intended to be a final

                                               3
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 order with respect to the underlying habeas petition, and formally denied Mr. King’s

 habeas petition for the same reason it denied the TRO motion. Mr. King timely appealed.

                                               B

        On January 12, 2024, Mr. King filed his custody status questionnaire with this

 Court and indicated that his custody status was “Conditional release; Subject of this

 appeal 2241 habeas regarding the execution of Mr. King’s sentence.” Custody Status

 Questionnaire, No. 23-1201, at 1 (10th Cir., filed Jan. 12, 2024). Further, both parties’

 briefing on the merits noted that Mr. King’s expected release date was February 23, 2024.

 See Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 16; Aplee.’s Resp. Br. at 5.

        On February 26, 2024, this Court ordered supplemental briefing on whether

 Mr. King’s appeal was moot in light of his release from custody on February 23, 2024.

 See Order, No. 23-1201, at 1 (10th Cir., filed Feb. 26, 2024). Both parties submitted their

 supplemental briefing on March 4, 2024. See Aplt.’s Suppl. Br. at 10; Aplee.’s Suppl.

 Br. at 3. The government asserts that Mr. King’s release from prison has mooted his

 appeal. See Aplee.’s Suppl. Br. at 1. However, Mr. King asserts “that this matter is not

 moot.” Aplt.’s Suppl. Br. at 1.

                                               II

        The federal writ of habeas corpus “shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is

 in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

 § 2241(c)(3). Although Mr. King is no longer in prison, the “in custody” requirement of

 § 2241 is satisfied because he filed his habeas application while he was incarcerated. See

 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir.

                                               4
Appellate Case: 23-1201      Document: 010111018764          Date Filed: 03/19/2024       Page: 5

 2002). “The more substantial question, however, is whether [Mr. King’s] subsequent

 release cause[s] the petition to be moot because it no longer present[s] a case or

 controversy under Article III, § 2, of the Constitution.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7.

        This Court has held that “[m]ootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a

 live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” Rio

 Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1109 (10th Cir. 2010)

 (quoting Disability Law Ctr. v. Millcreek Health Ctr., 428 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir.

 2005)). “This requirement exists at all stages of federal judicial proceedings, and it is

 therefore not enough that the dispute was alive when the suit was filed; the parties must

 continue to have a personal stake in the outcome.” McClendon v. City of Albuquerque,

 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir. 1996). Because “a federal court has no authority ‘to give

 opinions upon moot questions,’ . . . if an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal

 that makes it impossible for the court to grant ‘any effectual relief,’ . . . the appeal must

 be dismissed.” Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting

 Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). Stated otherwise, “[a]n issue becomes moot

 when it becomes impossible for the court to grant ‘any effectual relief whatsoever’ on

 that issue to a prevailing party.” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1323 (10th Cir.

 2004) (en banc) (quoting Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1179 (10th Cir. 2001)).

        When a prisoner has been released from custody while his or her habeas petition is

 pending, a court’s jurisdiction depends upon the existence of “collateral consequences [of

 the conviction] adequate to meet Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.” Spencer, 523

 U.S. at 14. In other words, the petitioner must demonstrate “some concrete and

                                                5
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 continuing injury.” Id. at 7; see, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1968)

 (holding that the defendant’s inability to engage in certain businesses, serve as an official

 of a labor union, vote in an election, and serve as a juror due to his conviction defeated

 the mootness challenge to his appeal). This is because “[w]e will not dismiss a petition

 as moot if ‘(1) secondary or “collateral” injuries survive after resolution of the primary

 injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; (3) the

 defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume it at any

 time; or (4) it is a properly certified class action suit.’” Riley, 310 F.3d at 1257

 (quoting Chong v. Dist. Dir., INS, 264 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2001)). Ultimately, we ask

 “whether granting a present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in

 the real world.” Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 601 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Wyoming v. U.S.

 Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005)); see Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d

 1012, 1029 (10th Cir. 2011).

                                               III

        Mr. King argues in his supplemental brief that this appeal is not moot because the

 facts of his case are capable of repetition yet evade review, and because the facts

 attendant to his case represent a concrete injury. See Aplt.’s Suppl. Br. at 7–10. For the

 following reasons, we disagree and find that Mr. King’s release has mooted this appeal.

                                               A

        Mr. King contends that the facts of this case are capable of repetition yet evade

 review because, “[e]ven though Mr. King sought release and has been released, the

 injurious administrative maximum prison placement, procedures, and unconstitutional

                                                6
Appellate Case: 23-1201       Document: 010111018764           Date Filed: 03/19/2024       Page: 7

 assumption of administrative authority contrary to BOP duties as assigned by Congress

 persist, as does King’s possible return to the Bureau’s custody during the thirty-six-

 month period of Supervised Release.” Id. at 8. But this argument concerning the BOP’s

 allegedly injurious classification policy fails because, even if Mr. King’s assertions were

 correct, he has not demonstrated that those factual circumstances—viz., the BOP’s

 allegedly unlawful conduct in classifying him for placement in the ADX—are capable of

 being repeated as it relates to him.

        “A dispute qualifies for [the capable of repetition, yet evading review] exception

 only ‘if (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its

 cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same

 complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.’” United States v. Sanchez-

 Gomez, 584 U.S. 381, 391 (2018) (emphases added) (quoting Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S.

 431, 439–40 (2011)). Here, even if “the injurious administrative maximum prison

 placement, procedures, and unconstitutional assumption of administrative authority

 contrary to BOP duties as assigned by Congress persist,” Aplt.’s Suppl. Br. at 8, Mr.

 King has not shown that the alleged illegality persists as to him or that there is a

 reasonable expectation that he will be subjected again to the same allegedly unlawful

 conduct by ADX.

        Moreover, in making his unlawful classification argument, Mr. King hints at his

 “possible return to the Bureau’s custody during the thirty-six-month period of Supervised

 Release,” id.; however, his own explication of the relevant legal principles reveals that

 such a hint is based on no more than speculation and is a legal non-starter, see id. at 7

                                                 7
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 (“Generally, possible future potential violations of parole or supervised release are too

 speculative for a court to retain jurisdiction and that such speculation would undermine

 the presumption of innocence in our criminal justice system, and the rehabilitative focus

 of the parole system.” (citing McAlpine v. Thompson, 187 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 1999))).

        As we have stated, we “assum[e] that citizens ‘will conduct their activities within

 the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction.’” McAlpine, 187 F.3d at 1218 (quoting

 O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974)). Therefore, “we are not inclined to

 speculate that [petitioners] will break the law or otherwise violate the conditions of their

 release agreement.” Id. (citation omitted). “Such speculation would undermine the

 presumption of innocence in our criminal justice system, and the rehabilitative focus of

 the parole system.” Id.; see also Ind v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 801 F.3d 1209, 1215 (10th

 Cir. 2015) (“Given these circumstances and our precedent, we will not assume Mr. Ind

 will commit future violations that will land him in administrative segregation once

 again.”).1

        1
                  To the extent that Mr. King is also arguing against mootness by asserting
 that the BOP voluntarily stopped its allegedly illegal treatment by “strategic[ally]
 releas[ing]” him, Aplt.’s Suppl. Br. at 8, he would be, in effect, making a voluntary
 cessation argument, see Riley, 310 F.3d at 1257 (“We will not dismiss a petition as moot
 if . . . ‘the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal practice but is free to resume
 it at any time . . . .’” (quoting Chong, 264 F.3d at 384)). But such an argument would not
 be persuasive because it is belied by the record. In his initial habeas petition filed in
 February 2023, Mr. King indicated that his then-projected release date was February 23,
 2024. See Aplt.’s App., Vol. I, at 8. And he was indeed released on February 23, 2024.
 See Aplt.’s Suppl. Br. at 1; Aplee.’s Suppl. Br. at 2. Therefore, Mr. King has not offered
 any evidence that this judicial proceeding had any impact on the timing of his release to
 supervised release.
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        Therefore, Mr. King’s appeal does not fall under the “capable of repetition, yet

 evading review” exception to our mootness doctrine.

                                              B

        Mr. King also contends that the facts of this case reveal a concrete injury in the

 form of collateral consequences. See Aplt.’s Suppl. Br. at 8. In this regard, Mr. King

 states that this “matter is not moot because he faces potential continuing collateral

 consequences as he remains under the custody and control of the BOP by way of

 supervised release and therefore subject to a harmful classification by BOP.” Id.

 (emphasis added).

        This is incorrect because while on supervised release, Mr. King is under the

 control of the court, not the BOP. See United States v. Mike, 596 F. App’x 692, 695

 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court has counseled us that an individual on supervised

 release is not in the BOP’s custody.” (citing United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 57

 (2000)));2 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (“The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of

 imprisonment for a felony or a misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence a

 requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after

 imprisonment . . . .”); cf. United States v. Foster, 754 F.3d 1186, 1191 n.3 (10th Cir.

 2014) (“The question is not whether Foster was in the BOP’s custody but rather whether

 he was in custody by virtue of the district court’s order. Nor is the question whether all

        2
               We cite to unpublished cases only for their persuasive value and do not
 treat them as binding authority. See United States v. Ellis, 23 F.4th 1228, 1238 n.6 (10th
 Cir. 2022).
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  defendants on supervised release are in custody regardless of the terms of their release,

  but rather whether Foster was in custody because of the residence requirement in the

  district court’s order.”). Therefore, any relief directed at the BOP—more specifically, at

  the ADX warden—would have no “effect in the real world” as it relates to Mr. King, who

  is no longer behind prison walls but, rather, on supervised release. Rio Grande Silvery

  Minnow, 601 F.3d at 1111–12.

         To be sure, Mr. King states that the ADX classification has collateral, harmful

  effects on him by adversely impacting the conditions of his supervised release. See

  Aplt.’s Suppl. Br. at 9 (“Mr. King’s current supervision and the conditions upon him are

  a direct result of the wrongful security classifications and Special Administrative

  Measures imposed by the Bureau of Prisons.”); id. at 2 (“Mr. King alleges that these

  conditions are a direct and proximate result of the wrongful security classification and

  misapplication of Special Administrative Measures underlying the original habeas

  petition.”). But the portions of the record that Mr. King cites—involving correspondence

  from the District of Colorado’s Probation Office—do not support his contention that his

  current supervised release conditions are the result of the security classification that the

  BOP imposed on him. See Aplt.’s Suppl. Br. at 2 (citing Aplt.’s App., Vol. II, at 358–59

  (Prerelease Investigation Denial, filed Feb. 27, 2023)). Moreover, Mr. King does nothing

  further to develop this argument, and it is his burden to do so. See Raley v. Hyundai

  Motor Co., 642 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Where an appellant fails to lead, we

  have no duty to follow. It is the appellant’s burden, not ours, to conjure up possible

  theories to invoke our legal authority to hear her appeal.”).

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         Furthermore, on its face, this argument seems dubious in light of the fact that

  supervised release is the domain of the court, not the BOP. Therefore, in a suit against

  the warden of the ADX, it is hard to see what relief that Mr. King could get that would

  impact his conditions of supervised release. Indeed, in his supplemental briefing,

  Mr. King seems to recognize as much. See Aplt.’s Suppl. Br. at 4 (“[T]he Tenth Circuit

  has previously recognized that any modification of supervised release term was ‘wholly

  within the discretion of the sentencing court’ and therefore lacking injury for the purpose

  of the mootness analysis.” (quoting United States v. Fields, 823 F. App’x 587, 590

  (2020))). As such, “there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.”

  Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18.

         Therefore, Mr. King has not shown that he is subject to a “concrete and continuing

  injury” as a “collateral consequence” of his ADX classification adequate to meet Article

  III’s injury-in-fact requirement. Id. at 7.3

         3
                 Indeed, Mr. King’s appeal may have been moot when he was transferred
  from the ADX to a halfway house in Phoenix, Arizona, on December 11, 2023, prior to
  his release to supervised release. That is, Mr. King’s habeas action was directed solely
  toward the warden of the ADX. See Aplt.’s App., Vol. I, at 9 (“Warden Andrew Ciolli is
  the Warden of the Florence Correctional Complex. In this role Warden Ciolli oversees
  the entire Florence Correctional Complex, including the Florence prison camp, FCI
  Florence, USP Florence, and Florence ADX.”). We have held that, when a petitioner
  challenges, through claims seeking prospective relief, their confinement in the ADX, any
  transfer out of the ADX—and not just the expiration of their ultimate sentence—moots
  the challenge. See Boyce v. Ashcroft, 268 F.3d 953, 954 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
  (“Boyce states that the Bureau of Prisons transferred him from ADX Florence, Colorado
  to FCI Sheridan, Oregon on May 31, 2001. He points out that the transfer is precisely the
  relief which his petition requested, and he contends that the published opinion is therefore
  moot. . . . The court agrees that the case became moot when the BOP transferred
  petitioner to FCI Sheridan.”). Therefore, any relief at this point that is directed to the
  ADX warden could not possibly have any effect in the real world. See Jordan, 654 F.3d
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                                             ***

         Thus, Mr. King’s appeal has been rendered moot by his release from prison on

  February 23, 2024.

                                              IV

         For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s judgment, REMAND

  with instructions to dismiss without prejudice the underlying case as moot, and

  DISMISS this appeal.

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                Jerome A. Holmes
                                                Chief Judge

  at 1029–30 (“[T]here is a critical flaw in Mr. Jordan’s argument: he has never sought
  relief on a system-wide basis against the BOP in this case. Instead of suing the BOP or
  its director, he has pursued injunctive and declaratory relief only with respect to
  individual BOP officials at specific penal institutions—most notably, the Inmate Systems
  Manager and the Warden at the ADX in Florence, Colorado, where Mr. Jordan was
  incarcerated at the time that he commenced his lawsuit. . . . Therefore, Mr. Jordan has
  not sued defendants who are actually situated to effectuate any prospective relief that this
  court might afford him.”).
                                               12