Court Opinion

ID: 9605869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:42:53.381788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:30.723507
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority opinion ignores fundamental principles of constitutional law and firmly established rules of evidence in reaching its conclusion to affirm Gonzales’ conviction.
I.
Probable Cause
The United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution are couched in terms that protect an accused from an arrest when probable cause does not exist to establish that a crime has been committed by the defendant. Colo. Const., Art. II, § 7; U. S. Const. amends. IV and XIV. Marquez v. People, 168 Colo. 219, 450 P.2d 349 (1969); Johnson v. Enlow, 132 Colo. 101, 286 P.2d 630 (1955). See C.R.S. 1963, 39-2-20. An arrest which is not supported by probable cause cannot stand in the light of constitutional standards. People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1971); *56Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971). See also Colo. Sess. Laws 1972, ch. 44, 39-3-102 at 198.
At the time the defendant was arrested in this case, the only information that the police had was (1) that an accounting at the So-Lo Discount Food Store reflected that there was an abnormally low amount of cash on hand, and (2) that some unnamed person informed the police that the defendant took the money from the store and bought a car With the money. If probable cause to arrest exists, it stems entirely from the confidential informant’s tip. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971).
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly set forth the constitutional requirements which must be met before a confidential informant’s tip may provide the basis for a finding of probable cause. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). The Aguilar-Spinelli two-prong test stems from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and is binding upon this court. People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971).
“A rule stated in a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States and based upon the Federal Constitution is under the supremacy clause binding upon State Courts, as well as upon Federal Courts.” Henry v. Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 84 S.Ct. 1042, 12 L.Ed.2d 79 (1964).
Although a state is free to develop its own law of search and seizure to meet the needs of local law enforcement, and in the process may call the standards employed by any name it chooses, the states may not authorize police conduct which violates the minimum constitutional standards which the Supreme Court has announced. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). Under the Supremacy Clause, the state’s power to alter Fourth Amendment rights is limited to imposing higher standards on police *57conduct than the minimum standards required by the Federal Constitution. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).
The Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test limits the use of a confidential informant’s tip to establish probable cause to only those instances (1) where the tip sets forth sufficient “underlying circumstances” which would be necessary to enable a judge to independently determine the validity of the informant’s conclusion, and (2) where the prosecution establishes the credibility of the informant or the reliability of his information. Neither prong of the test is met under the facts of this case.
According to Officer Koncilja, the informant told him:
“[T] hat the defendant, Gonzales, was the individual who had removed an amount of money from So-Lo Discount . .. [and] that he had used this money to buy a late model white GTO in Denver.”
The only alleged circumstance contained in the tip which is directed to the first prong of the test is the informant’s unsupported assertion “that the defendant, Gonzales, was the individual who had removed an amount of money from the So-Lo Discount Store .. ..” The informant’s assertion alone is nothing more than a conclusion that Gonzales was responsible for the disappearance of the missing funds. Mere conclusions of a confidential informant do not satisfy the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test which requires a recital of the underlying circumstances from which the informant drew his conclusion.
“The Commissioner must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on ... to show probable cause. He should not accept without question the . . . [informant’s] . . . mere conclusion.” Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958).
“In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused’s criminal activity in sufficient detail so that the magistrate may know that he is relying on *58something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual’s reputation.” Spinelli v. United States, supra.
No facts were provided by the informant which would allow a judge to independently assess the persuasiveness of the facts which led Koncilja’s informant to accuse Gonzales.1 As a result, the prosecution failed to satisfy the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
In my view, the prosecution also failed to satisfy the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Even at the time of the defendant’s trial, the only facts which could tend to establish either the credibility of the confidential informant or the reliability of his information was Officer Koncilja’s bald statement that the informant had provided reliable information in the past. We have held in the past that a police officer’s unsupported testimony that a confidential informant has been reliable in the past does not satisfy the second prong of the test. People v. Brethauer, supra. Officer Koncilja’s statement in this case contains no supportive facts which would indicate that the informant was in a position to know whether Gonzales took the money, whether the informant’s prior reliability dealt with the same type of crime, or whether the informant relayed facts of his own personal knowledge. See Spinelli v. United States, supra; Aguilar v. Texas, supra.
Accordingly, neither prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test has been satisfied in this case, and as a result, probable cause did not exist to arrest Gonzales.
Moreover, assuming that probable cause did exist, the arresting officers made no attempt to obtain an arrest warrant even though three days elapsed between the time Officer Bravo completed his investigation of Gonzales’ *59automobile purchase and the arrest. Both the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution make an arrest warrant mandatory prior to an arrest except in very limited circumstances.2 U. S. Const., Amend. IV; Colo. Const. Art. II, § 7; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, supra. No explanation was offered to justify the police officers’ failure to obtain a warrant, and I can only conclude that the officers were aware that an arrest warrant could not have been secured on the gossamer information which was received from the informant.
The lack of probable cause to arrest and the failure to obtain an arrest warrant made the defendant’s arrest illegal and tainted the confession which followed the arrest. The prosecution failed to introduce evidence which would satisfy the heavy burden cast upon the prosecution to overcome the taint which attached to the defendant’s confession by reason of an unlawful arrest. As a consequence, the confession should not have been admitted into evidence. People v. Moreno, supra; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
II.
Corpus Delicti
Apart from the confession, no evidence appears in the record which would establish that a crime was committed, let alone that the defendant was guilty of the charges. The necessity of showing a corpus delicti for any crime requires the prosecution to show (1) that a loss or injury occurred, and (2) that criminality was the cause. Downey v. People, 121 Colo. 307, 215 P.2d 892 (1950); Bruner v. People, 113 *60Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111 (1945); Lowe v. People, 76 Colo. 603, 234 P. 169 (1925).
The evidence in this case established that there was a loss of approximately $3200, but there is nothing, other than the defendant’s involuntary and inadmissible confession, to show that the loss resulted from a criminal act. Therefore, the admissible evidence was insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of either the crime of burglary or theft. Martin v. People, 179 Colo. 237, 499 P.2d 606 (1973); Owen v. People, 155 Colo. 19, 392 P.2d 163 (1964); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 380 P.2d 227 (1963). Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde The Defendant’s Confession, 103 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 638 (1955). Accordingly, the defendant’s Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted. People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973).
However, even if for some reason the trial court was correct in allowing the confession to be presented to the jury, Gonzales’ conviction should be reversed.
The majority opinion correctly states that the corpus delicti must be corroborated independently of the.confession, then summarily ignores that evidentiary rule. Both elements of the corpus delicti must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the facts stated in the majority opinion, it cannot be denied that there is corroborative proof that a loss occurred. It is equally undeniable that, apart from the defendant’s confession and the informant’s tip which was not before the jury, there is not one scintilla of evidence which corroborates the criminal cause element of the corpus delicti. As a result, the corpus delicti is not corroborated as the majority asserts and the conviction should be reversed. See Neighbors v. People, 168 Colo. 319, 451 P.2d 264 (1969); Owen v. People, 155 Colo. 19, 392 P.2d 163 (1964); Meredith v. People, 152 Colo. 69, 380 P.2d 227 (1963); Martinez v. People, 129 Colo. 94, 267 P.2d 654 (1954); and Downey v. People, 121 Colo. 307, 215 P.2d 892 (1950).
MR. JUSTICE GROVES joins in Point II of this dissent.
*61III.
Jackson-Denno Hearing
I also dissent because the trial judge did not comply with the requirements of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), in determining the voluntariness of the confession. The trial judge made no finding of facts, as required by Jackson v. Denno, supra, from which it may be determined whether Gonzales’ confession was in fact voluntary.
In my view, Gonzales is entitled to have the confession issue remanded for a Jackson-Denno hearing which meets constitutional muster and results in the generation of specific findings of fact. In my view, this court may not summarily uphold a trial court’s ruling that a challenged confession is voluntary when the conclusion is not buttressed by findings of fact.
MR. JUSTICE DAY joins me in Point III of this dissent.

 See People v. Masson, 185 Colo. 65, 521 P.2d 1246 (1974) (dissenting opinion). The only other fact contained in the tip alleges that Gonzales purchased a car with the money which was allegedly missing from the So.-Lo Discount Store. Gonzales’ purchase of a car, in and of itself, is a completely innocent act and does not constitute an “underlying circumstance” for the purpose of establishing probable cause to believe Gonzales took the money from the So-Lo Discount Store.

 The Colorado statute which the majority opinion asserts as a basis for allowing an arrest without a warrant is, at best, of questionable constitutionality. See C.R.S. 1963, 39-2-20. Moreover, under the facts of this case, C.R.S. 1963, 39-2-20 is inapplicable. The statute applies only when “a criminal offense has, in fact, been committed.” At the time Gonzales was arrested, there was no evidence available which would have shown that the loss of the funds from the So-Lo Discount Store was, in fact, the result of a criminal act.