Court Opinion

ID: 9533269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:30:02.689669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:59.530801
License: Public Domain

FLANDERS, J.,
dissenting.
Responding to a notice that the authorities had prepared and delivered to their home, the defendants, Sory Kaba (Kaba) and Kankoumady Traore (Traore),9 drove to the post office and accepted delivery of a sealed package from Thailand. Before they did so, however, customs officials alerted the police that the package contained a substantial quantity of heroin. For reasons that the record does not disclose, the authorities delivered notification slips concerning the package to the address where defendants lived, even though the name and the address written on the package differed from the defendants’ names and address. Moments after the defendants picked up the package at the post office, but before they could open it, the police swooped down on them and took them into custody.
The defendants are before us on appeal from their Superior Court convictions for possession of a controlled substance, conspiracy to possess a controlled substance, and conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute. They argue that we should vacate their convictions because the state lacked legally sufficient evidence upon which to convict them of these crimes. According to the state’s evidence, they suggest, they simply responded to a notice that the authorities had prepared and delivered to them at their residence, pursuant to which they proceeded to the post office and picked up a sealed package that, unbeknownst to them, contained heroin. Therefore, they posit, the trial justice erred when he refused to grant their motions for judgments of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.10 The state, on the other hand, contends that it presented legally sufficient evidence to support defendants’ convictions, and, therefore, that the trial justice did not err in his denial of their acquittal motions.
Because I am of the opinion that insufficient evidence existed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants knew that the sealed package they had picked up at the post office contained contraband, I conclude that the trial justice erred when he refused to grant defendants’ motions for judgments of acquittal. As a result, I would vacate the convictions and remand the papers in this case to the Superior *395Court for entry of judgments of acquittal for both defendants.
Facts and Travel
On March 17,1997, agents of the United States Customs Service intercepted a large sealed package that entered the country via Kennedy Airport in New York City. Although the agents were unable to discern the sender’s name or address from the writing on the package, they were able to read the sender’s country of origin as “Thailand.” The unknown sender addressed the package to one “Muaamed Traore, 124 Imest Ave., Pawtucket Rhode Island.” Suspicious of the contents, the customs agents opened the package and found five bowls inside, together with various kitchen utensils. They then proceeded to break open one of the bowls and discovered, hidden within a false bottom, 188 grams of a substance that later tested positive as heroin. The agents then resealed the contents and delivered it to their counterparts in Boston, Massachusetts.
Customs agents in Boston removed the remaining four bowls and sent them to the state toxicology laboratory for examination. After the laboratory confirmed the presence of large amounts of heroin in all the bowls, the police estimated the street value of the concealed contraband at $1.5 million to $3 million. The agents placed a smaller amount of the heroin back in the container. They also added several telephone books to compensate for the difference in weight, resealed the contents, and brought the package to the Pawtucket Police Department for it to arrange a controlled delivery of the package to the addressee.
Upon further investigation, however, the police were unable to locate an Imest Avenue in Pawtucket. And the record reveals no attempt to locate the addressee, one Muaamed Traore. Instead, the authorities decided — for reasons not revealed by the state’s evidence — to attempt a controlled delivery of the contraband-containing package to a different address and to a different addressee than the ones that appeared on the original package. To do so, the authorities prepared a notification slip concerning the package and arranged for the notice to be delivered to the residential premises located at 124 West Avenue,11 where defendant Kankoumady Traore lived on the third floor as a tenant with defendant Sory Kaba. On March 19, 1997, a postal inspector delivered a notification slip to 124 West Avenue, which indicated that the local post office was holding a package from Thailand addressed to a “Muhamed Traore.” On that portion of the notification slip showing the sender’s name, the authorities identified the sender as “Thailand.” Although the police actively surveilled 124 West Avenue that day, no one residing there attempted to retrieve the package from the post office. Accordingly, on the next day, March 20, 1997, the police delivered to the premises a second notification slip they had prepared with the same inserted information.
*396Thereafter, at approximately 4:10 p.m. on that same date, the police observed two men — later identified as Kaba and Traore — exit the 124 West Avenue premises and drive away in a Hyundai automobile. The men then tended to various errands (visiting a temporary employment agency and a bank) before wending their way to the Pawtucket post office. There, numerous police officers and government agents were hiding in wait for them. Upon entering the post office, one of thé defendants12 handed the “Thailand” claim slip for the package to a postal employee, who in turn notified his supervisor that a man was attempting to claim the suspect package. The supervisor, Paul Izzo (Izzo), asked whether defendants were there to retrieve the package from Thailand, to which Kaba replied “Yeah. Thailand.” Izzo informed the men that he needed to see some identification, which they produced. Traore then signed for the package, telling Izzo that the package was for his brother in New York. Officer Pasciuc-co, a policeman assigned to the customs task force, watched as defendants exited the post office, saw them speaking with each other in what he categorized as a “jovial” manner, and observed that Kaba at one point lifted the package over his head, moving it up and then down as he headed out the door. The surveillance team observed defendants approach the parked Hyundai and watched them as Traore entered the front passenger side of the car, while Kaba placed the package in the trunk. Eight or ten agents and police officers then converged on the car, surrounded defendants, and placed them under arrest. After his arrest, but before the police gave him the Miranda warnings,13 Kaba allegedly asked Pawtucket Police Detective Briden whether he was in trouble. The detective told him that he could be in big trouble, to which Kaba allegedly responded that “he had nothing to do with what was in the package.”
The case proceeded to a jury trial in Providence County Superior Court. At the close of the state’s evidence, defense counsel for both men moved for judgments of acquittal on the ground that the state’s evidence, as recited above, was legally insufficient to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial justice denied that motion, stating:
“[a] case can be supported by circumstantial evidence, whether or not there’s reasonable inferences that can be drawn to infer guilty knowledge. Here we cannot underestimate * * * the amount at issue. If the testimony of the agent is believed, the package contained approximately 1.5 to 3 million dollars worth of heroin * * * the amount of heroin in the package and his estimate as to the street value, certainly is a significant factor in determining whether or not a person knew he is charged with possession. It would be unreasonable to infer that any person would send in the mail 1.5 to 3 million dollars worth of heroin without having recognized the receiver knew what was in the package. * * * We have the testimony of the post office employee, when he indicated that when the defendants retrieved the package Kaba said, Tes, from Thailand,’ obviously conveying some belief that he was expecting a package from Thailand. There’s no testimony offered as to what he believed that package to contain. The codefendant, Traore, testified according to Izzo that, ‘Yes, the package is for my brother in New York.’ Again, a *397recognition there was something in the package. They were expecting a package from Thailand. The manner in which the package was carried out, as suggested by the State’s witnesses, would certainly not suggest they were expecting to receive glassware. [The evidence] would allow a reasonable person to conclude if they found the evidence to be proven, that the person in possession knew what was in the box.”14
Immediately after the trial justice heard and denied their motions for judgment of acquittal, both defendants rested without presenting any evidence. Their convictions and these appeals soon followed.
Analysis
The standard to be applied in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is as follows:
“In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, a trial justice must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, without weighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of the witnesses, in fact giving full credibility to the state’s witnesses, and draw therefrom all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt. State v. Mercado, 635 A.2d 260, 263 (R.I.1993); State v. Laperche, 617 A.2d 1371, 1373 (R.I.1992). If the totality of the evidence so viewed and the inferences so drawn would justify a reasonable juror in finding a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion for a judgment of acquittal must be denied. Laperche, 617 A.2d at 1373; State v. Grundy, 582 A.2d 1166, 1170 (R.I.1990); State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 581-82 (R.I.1987). In reviewing a trial justice’s denial of such a motion, this Court applies the same standard as the tribunal below. Mercado, 635 A.2d at 263.” State v. Snow, 670 A.2d 239, 243 (R.I.1996).
Because the state charged defendants with possession of a controlled substance, the law required it to prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
“In Rhode Island possession within the context of a criminal statute means an intentional control of an object with knowledge of its nature. State v. Jenison, 442 A.2d 866, 875 (R.I.1982); State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. 207, 215, 291 A.2d 425, 430 (1972). Knowledge of the nature of the object must necessarily precede the exercise of such control. State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. at 215, 291 A.2d at 430. Proof of the knowledge of the object, which is essential to conviction, may be shown by evidence of acts, declara*398tions, or conduct of the accused from which an inference may be drawn that he or she knew of the existence of narcotics at the place where they were found.” State v. Colbert, 549 A.2d 1021, 1028-24 (R.I.1988).
The defendants do not dispute that they exercised intentional control over the package; rather, they dispute the sufficiency of the state’s evidence to show that they knew that the package contained contraband before or, for that matter, at any time after they exercised control over it. If the state faded to prove this latter element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, then defendants were entitled to an acquittal. State v. Mora, 618 A.2d 1275, 1280 (R.I.1993) (holding that “[w]hen the state prosecutes a defendant, it carries the burden of proving every element necessary to the charge beyond a reasonable doubt * * * ”). Moreover, if the .state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants knowingly possessed the controlled substance, then necessarily the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the conspiracy and possession-with-intent-to-distribute charges.
Because direct evidence rarely exists to prove a defendant’s knowledge of the nature of an object he or she constructively possesses, the state may prove such knowledge through the use of circumstantial evidence. Mora, 618 A.2d at 1280. Thus, it is well established that “[tjhrough a process of logical deduction, the state may prove guilt from an established circumstantial fact through a series of inferences.” State v. Dame, 560 A.2d 330, 334 (R.I.1989) (citing State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 581-82 (R.I.1987)). Nevertheless,
“[i]f this pyramiding of inferences becomes speculative * * * proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will not be found. * * * State v. Alexander, 471 A.2d 216, 218 (R.I.1984); In re Derek, 448 A.2d 765, 768 (R.I.1982). We have recognized that pyramiding of inferences becomes speculative when the initial inference rests upon an ambiguous fact that may support other inferences which are clearly inconsistent with guilt. [Caruolo], 524 A.2d at 582.” Dame, 560 A.2d at 334.
Here, our task was to determine whether the circumstantial evidence in question amounted to a pyramid of inferences too speculative to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants knew what was inside the package before they picked it up at the post office.
Both defendants and the state have brought to our attention numerous cases from other jurisdictions dealing with controlled deliveries of narcotics, such as the one at issue in this case. Uniformly, those jurisdictions have held that the “knowing or intentional possession [of contraband] cannot be inferred merely from the fact of delivery to defendant by mail or common carrier of a sealed package containing the illegal goods, and that acceptance of the package by itself cannot yield an inference of knowledge by the recipient of its contents.” State v. Richards, 155 N.J.Super. 106, 382 A.2d 407, 411 (1978). See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 769 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3323 n. 3, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003, 1009 n. 3 (1983) (“the mere fact that the consignee takes possession of the container would not alone establish guilt of illegal possession or importation of contraband”); United States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir.1984) (holding that the state cannot establish criminal liability for possession by “merely [showing] that a package containing] drugs was mailed from outside this country and was received and opened by the addressee of the package who resided in this country”); State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 889 P.2d 729, 736 *399(1994) (concurring with the view that a defendant’s mere receipt of a sealed package containing contraband is insufficient to support his or her conviction for knowing or intentional possession of that contraband); Commonwealth v. Aguiar, 370 Mass. 490, 350 N.E.2d 436, 442 (1976) (holding that, without more, possession of an unopened package containing drugs, which the defendant received through the mail moments before his arrest, cannot support an inference of knowing possession beyond a reasonable doubt). The trial justice, however, ignored this general rule and instead created his own exception for cases like this one in which the accused takes possession through the mail of a sealed package containing a large amount of contraband with a high “street value.” In linking the large quantity and high “street value” of the concealed drugs to the recipients’ presumed knowledge of same, the trial justice, I believe, erred as a matter of law, especially when he concluded that “[i]t would be unreasonable to infer that any person would send in the mail 1.5 to 3 million dollars worth of heroin without having recognized the receiver knew what was in the package.” But this reasoning overlooks the possibility that defendants were not the intended recipients of the package. The trial justice’s analysis assumes — erroneously, in my opinion — that the actual receiver will always be the same person as the intended receiver, when in fact they may not be the same because of a mistake or, as here, because of an intentional diversion of the package to someone other than the addressee. And what about individuals, such as Kaba, who merely accompany the actual recipient to the place of delivery and assist in taking control of the package? Here, presumably the intended recipient was the addressee, one “Muaamed Traore.” The actual recipient, however, was Kankoumady Traore. For all we can know and infer from the record, these were two different people. And no evidence suggested that Kaba knew about the contents of the package merely because he accompanied his roommate to the post office and helped him to carry it to their car.
Thus, far from constituting “a significant factor in determining whether or not a person [who receives such a package] knew he is charged with possession,” the “street value” of the contraband in the package should have been irrelevant in deciding whether the recipients knew about what was inside the package before they accepted the delivery. Otherwise, a person’s knowing or intentional possession of contraband could be inferred merely from the fact of delivery to the person of a sealed package containing such contraband. And anyone who accompanied the recipient and assisted him or her in taking delivery also would be subject to such an unjustified inference. I believe that the trial justice committed a fundamental error in equating the large amount and high street value of the hidden contraband with the recipients’ purported knowledge of its presence inside the package, and that this error infected all the trial justice’s reasoning about what defendants must have known about the existence of contraband in the package.
Although this Court has not specifically ruled on this precise issue in its previous cases, I agree with the above-cited authorities from other jurisdictions, which hold that merely taking possession of a sealed package containing contraband — delivered to a person through the mail or by other legitimate means — cannot, without more, subject that person to criminal liability, even though the amount and value of the contraband inside the package proves to be substantial. The inherent risk in holding otherwise would place innocent people in criminal jeopardy for the unilateral and *400unsolicited acts of third parties, including not only their deliberate acts, but also their mistakes and those of others in the delivery chain who cause packages to be delivered to persons who are not the ultimate intended recipients. Because defendants’ mere possession of the sealed package could not subject them to criminal liability, the law required the state to demonstrate — at least inferentially — that defendants knew that the package contained contraband before they took possession and control of it at the post office. Therefore, the issue squarely presented for this Court’s consideration was whether the circumstances surrounding the delivery of the package in this case, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, could support a finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendants knew that the package contained a controlled substance before they took delivery of it at the post office, or whether it “is of such a nature that it merely raises a suspicion or conjecture of guilt.” State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 581 (R.I.1987).
The state argued that this case is factually similar to Colbert. There, the Court upheld the defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. Colbert, 549 A.2d at 1025. The defendant arrived at the T.F. Green Airport in Warwick to claim a barrel of personal goods that, he asserted, his mother-in-law had shipped to him via a bonded carrier. After executing the necessary claim forms with a customs agent, defendant identified the package as his, and began, at the customs agent’s instruction, to remove the items from the barrel. The barrel contained nearly twenty pounds of marijuana. Id. at 1023. The Court found that the circumstances of the case — including the fact that defendant asserted that the sender was a relative and that the defendant had paid for the shipping charges — were sufficient to satisfy the knowledge element of the possession charge. Specifically, the Court stated that the defendant
“admittedly spent over $60 to transport household goods from Jamaica to Providence that he admits had a value of less than $100. Again, upon its arrival at Green Airport, the barrel was only one-third full of household items and two-thirds full of marijuana. Surely if only the personal items were intended to be the cargo, a more cost-efficient container would have been used. * * * Evidence introduced at trial established that it was very uncommon for noncommercial shipments to be bonded because of the increased transportation costs * * * [and] Colbert was a bachelor.” Id. at 1024.
Given these circumstances, the Court ruled that a reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty of possession of marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt.
Here, however, we are not presented with circumstances as in Colbert, in which the defendant asserted that he had arranged with a relative to send him a package whose delivery costs he paid for but whose legitimate contents were worth little more than the mailing or delivery costs. Indeed, in contrast to Colbert, no evidence suggested that these defendants had anything to do with arranging or paying for the delivery of the package. Nor is there any suggestion here that, as in Colbert, the defendants claimed that the sender of the contraband-containing package was a relative of one of them. If true, such a person could be expected to have arranged in advance with the recipient for the sending of the package and would quite naturally have been in regular communication with him (or his kin) concerning what she was sending. Moreover, it would make little economic sense for a person to arrange for the delivery of mere common household goods from out of the country when the *401cost for doing so approximated the cost of the goods themselves.
I believe that this case is more akin to that of Samad. There, defendant Samad resided in an apartment 'with defendant Hanan. As in this case, both defendants were immigrants, and Samad at least experienced some difficulty with the English language, requiring a translator at his trial. Samad, 754 F.2d at 1094. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) intercepted a package containing narcotics that was addressed to “M. Amin,” with a delivery address at Hanan’s and Samad’s apartment. The DEA set up a controlled delivery of the package. Samad answered the door of the apartment and spoke to the letter carrier. The letter carrier asked for “M. Amin,” to which Samad responded ‘Tes.” Samad took the package and gave it to Hanan because the package listed Pakistan, Hanan’s home country, as its country of origin. When Hanan opened the package, the narcotics fell out of it. Samad then left the room, having no further contact with the package. Before delivering the package, DEA agents had fitted it with a beeper to inform them when it was opened. Hanan’s opening of the package triggered the beeper, and the agents then entered the apartment. Thereafter, a district court convicted Samad and Hanan of narcotics possession.
On appeal, the government asserted that Samad’s “eager identification” of himself as the false addressee, inter aha, constituted sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Fourth Circuit disagreed. It found that Samad’s actions were entirely reasonable in fight of the circumstances, especially given Samad’s limited command of the English language. Moreover, all his actions, even when construed in the light most favorable to the government, were “simply too attenuated” to establish his guilt. Samad, 754 F.2d at 1098. I am convinced that this case presented similar circumstances to those in Samad, and that the inferences that the trial justice drew from these circumstances concerning defendants’ knowledge of the package’s illegal contents were much too attenuated to prove defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Here, the government’s case against defendants rested on the slenderest of factual reeds. An unknown person in Thailand sent a package addressed to one “Muaamed Traore 124 Imest Ave. Pawtucket, Rhode Island.” After the authorities concluded that no such address existed, they changed the address on the notification slip for the package to “124 West Ave.” and caused it to be delivered there. Although defendant Kankoumady Traore shared the same surname as the addressee, no one by the addressee’s name of “Muaamed Traore” lived at 124 West Avenue. Nevertheless, the police delivered not one, but two notification slips (fisting the sender as “Thailand”) to the 124 West Avenue address where defendants resided together with other tenants. Following the delivery of the second notification slip, defendants drove to the post office after running various other errands. Once there, they presented a postal employee with the notification slip. He then asked them if they were there to pick up the package from Thailand, and Kaba said ‘Teah. Thailand.” Traore informed the postal official that the package was for his brother in New York. The police then observed defendants exit the post office, while speaking “jovially” with each other. At one point, as defendants left the post office, they saw Kaba lift the package over his head. Moments later the police arrested both defendants, whereupon Kaba, quite understandably, asked whether he was in *402trouble and disclaimed having anything to do with what was in the package. ■
In my opinion, none of these actions and statements — whether considered individually or collectively — were in any way incriminating because they were just as consistent with defendants’ innocence as with their guilt. Thus, I believe that these facts, taken individually and as a whole, were legally insufficient to prove either defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because they did not suggest that, before they took delivery of the package, they must have known about the; illegal nature of the contents.
The only way for these facts to amount to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would be to engage in an impermissible pyramiding of speculation and adverse inferences upon a factual base incapable of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants knew in advance that the package contained contraband — a process that this Court specifically condemned in Dame, 560 A.2d at 384. The name and address on the package and the large quantity of contraband secreted therein formed the base of this impermissible pyramid. The trial justice, however, overlooked the fact that the police had altered the original address shown on the package when they caused the notification slips to be prepared before delivering them to 124 West Avenue. He also overlooked the fact that neither defendant’s name matched the addressee’s name on the package. As a result, he further overlooked the distinct possibility that neither defendant was the intended recipient of this illicit package, while impermissibly inferring otherwise because of the large quantity and high “street value” of the narcotics secreted within.
I believe- that the trial justice’s reliance on the multimillion-dollar estimated street value of the narcotics involved was misplaced for two reasons. In denying defendants’ motion for judgments of acquittal, the trial justice stated that anyone who would send such high-value illegal substances through the mail surely would have informed the intended recipient of at least the nature of the package’s contents. But even were we to assume that this hypothesis. was correct, the unknown sender in this case failed to address the package to the location where these defendants resided and failed to name either defendant correctly as the recipient of the package, thereby suggesting that neither defendant was the intended recipient. Indeed, but for the authorities’ preparing and delivering notification slips to a different address and to a different addressee than the one specified on the package, in all likelihood these defendants never would have received any notice to pick up the package. The existence of this possibility — one that was at least as likely as the inferences drawn by the trial justice— demonstrates that thb trial justice erred in placing such an emphasis on the quantity and street value of the narcotics hidden within the package. Athough the quantity and value of narcotics seized in a controlled-delivery case may be quite significant in determining whether the recipient should be charged with possession with intent to distribute, the quantity or value of the contraband should never have been accorded such controlling significance in deciding whether the recipients were aware of the package’s illicit contents before they took possession of it and before they could' open it. Otherwise, simply by sending a significant quantity of valuable contraband to an innocent party — either by mistake or with the intent to incriminate the recipient — the sender, the intended recipient, or, as in this case, the authorities, thereby could unilaterally manufacture sufficient facts to convict an innocent recipient for illegal possession of a controlled substance.
*403In addition, the trial justice cited the alleged significance of defendant Kaba’s affirmative response to the postal clerk’s question of whether defendants were there at the post office to pick up the package from Thailand. But I can discern no incul-patory significance in that innocuous rejoinder. First, the postal inspector had mentioned when defendants first presented the claim slip to him that the package was from Thailand. Second, and most significantly, the notification slips that the authorities had prepared and delivered to 124 West Avenue proclaimed “Thailand” as the sender of the package. It was completely appropriate, therefore — and not at all suspicious or incriminating — for Kaba to respond “Yeah. Thailand” to Izzo’s question whether he was there to pick up the package from Thailand. Either the postal authorities themselves, or information that the police had conveyed to defendants via the postal notification slips, were the likely source of this affirmative response from Kaba. And like the defendants in Samad, Kaba was also experiencing difficulty in speaking and understanding the English language. Traore’s statement that the package was for his brother in New York, while perhaps raising some suspicion that he knew the person who was the intended recipient of the package, still did not create a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt inference concerning his knowledge of the package’s illicit contents. Knowing and even expecting that a package is coming for a relative does not equate, in my judgment, with knowledge of the contents. For example, Traore’s brother may have asked him to accept delivery of the package for him without telling him what was inside it or by misrepresenting that it contained fabrics, bamboo poles, or some other legitimate merchandise. Finally, the “jovial” interaction between Kaba and Traore after they received the package and the over-the-head manner in which Kaba lifted it as he left the post office similarly raised no such inference of knowledge that the package contained contraband. There are simply too many other possible innocent explanations for this behavior for it to be capable of proving beyond a reasonable doubt defendants’ consciousness of the contraband inside the package. Although, as the trial justice noted, “[t]he manner in which the package was carried out as suggested by the state’s witnesses, would certainly not suggest they were expecting to receive glassware,” the glassware versus contraband dichotomy hardly exhausted the possible contents of the package. Thus, even though we are bound to draw all inferences in favor of the state when passing on a motion for judgment of acquittal, I cannot say that the state presented sufficient evidence concerning whether defendants knew about the contraband in the package to support verdicts of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the possession charges.
Moreover, I cannot ignore, as the trial justice did, the conduct of the authorities in causing defendants to retrieve this package and in intentionally readdressing the notification slips for the package to a location and to an addressee that were different from the location and the addressee shown on the package. These circumstances leave me with reasonable doubts about whether defendants knew about the illegal contents of the package merely because they eventually picked it up at the post office in response to receiving the notices with the altered address that the authorities had prepared and delivered to them. To pyramid inferences of guilty knowledge concerning the illicit nature of the package based on such an extremely thin and flimsy factual base is in itself impermissible. Caruolo, 524 A.2d at 582 (“when the initial inference in the pyramid rests upon an ambiguous fact that is equal*404ly capable of supporting other reasonable inferences clearly inconsistent with guilt,” the evidence is insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Most tellingly, however, all the inferences drawn concerning the intended addressee were tainted by the authorities’ conduct in using a different address than the one on the package in connection with preparing and delivering the notices to an address and an addressee that were not shown on the package, and in communicating the package’s country of origin to the recipients before they retrieved it. Moreover, even if the police had simply delivered the original package to defendants, the adverse inferences relied upon by the trial justice in denying defendants’ motion — although certainly raising suspicions and possible inferences concerning defendants’ potential guilt when viewed in the light most favorable to the state — cannot and do not rise to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt level required to convict defendants for these crimes. Dame, 560 A.2d at 334 (holding that “circumstantial evidence, however, must be sufficient proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and will be found insufficient if it merely raises a suspicion or inference of guilt,” citing Caruolo, 524 A.2d at 581). (Emphases added.)
Although somewhat similar factually to the case at bar, the cases cited to us by the state all bear distinguishing factual features that are absent here. For example, in State v. Arthun, 274 Mont. 82, 906 P.2d 216 (1995), the defendant behaved in a most suspicious manner, hiding an unopened package containing narcotics in a farming shed some distance from his home. In this case, the police never gave defendants the opportunity to hide the unopened package or even to open it and thereby inform themselves of the nature of its contents. Moreover, defendants urge that the- better course of action for the state to take in a controlled-delivery situation would be to await the defendants’ opening of the package before the authorities move in to arrest the recipients. This suggestion, however, may not go far enough. A defendant in a controlled delivery case usually should have the opportunity not only to open the sealed package and appreciate the nature of the package’s contents, but also he or she should be given the chance to exercise dominion and control over the illicit contents by taking some incriminating action with respect thereto before the authorities swoop in for the arrest.15 See United States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir.1984) (holding that defendant Hanan, who attempted to hide drugs under a carpet that fell out from a package that he opened was guilty of possession, but not so with respect to codefendant Samad, whose actions did not suggest guilty knowledge of the contents under the circumstances); United States v. Thao, 712 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.1983) (controlled delivery case where the Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant’s conviction because, when officers entered the house, the defendant had opened the package and hidden opium in various places).
The state also relies upon Lockhart v. State, 715 So.2d 895 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). There, the defendant became agitated when the post office could not deliver a package — one that she acknowledged she was “eagerly anticipating” — so she went to pick up the package herself. Id. at 897-*40598. In this case, however, a postal inspector delivered not one, but two notification slips to defendants concerning a package from Thailand that the authorities had taken upon themselves to readdress. Even then, it was not until after 4 p.m. on the day the postal authorities delivered the second notification slip that defendants actually headed to the post office to pick up the package. Moreover, they did not go straight to the post office, but took the time to stop at a temporary employment agency and a bank before finally arriving there. None of these circumstances suggest that defendants eagerly were anticipating the arrival of a shipment of $1.5 to $3 million worth of heroin. On the contrary, even viewed in the light most favorable to the state, these circumstances, and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, do not rise to proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants were aware of the contraband in the package. Consequently, the Lockhart case is not helpful on this point. The state, I conclude, failed to carry the heavy evidentiary burden that the law places on its shoulders in criminal prosecutions of this kind.
Conclusion
As the sixteenth president of the United States once remarked, “[i]t is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice against itself in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals.”16 For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that the trial justice erred in this case when he refused to render prompt justice against the government by granting the defendants’ motions for judgments of acquittal. I would therefore vacate the defendants’ convictions and remand the papers in this case to Superior Court for entry of judgments of acquittal. Because the state presented legally insufficient evidence to convict the defendants of possessing a controlled substance, I would also vacate their convictions for conspiracy and for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.

. Both defendants immigrated to this country from the West African nation of Guinea. Because their native language was Mandingo, interpreters assisted both defendants at trial.

. Kaba also asserts that the trial justice erred by restricting his voir dire of potential jurors, refusing to suppress certain statements he made to the police, and failing to grant his motion for a new trial. Because I would hold that the state failed to present legally sufficient evidence to convict defendants of these crimes, I would not reach these other alleged errors.

. The record does not reveal exactly why the police chose to deliver the notices about the package to 124 West Avenue. In particular, the state offered no evidence indicating that the authorities believed that the handwritten address on the package spelling out "Imest” could have been intended to be written as "West.” Apparently, the police had conducted some previous surveillance at 124 West Avenue before the March 20, 1997 delivery date, but the record does not disclose why the police were surveilling that address, or why they decided to deliver notices about the suspect package to that location, except that one of the investigating officers testified that "there is no Imest Avenue in the City of Pawtucket and West Avenue comes to my mind immediately, and that’s where the investigation started.”

. It is unclear from the record which one of the defendants presented the notification slip to the postal employee.

. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. The trial justice also relied on this Court’s decision in State v. Sundel, 121 R.I. 638, 402 A.2d 585 (1979). But that case dealt with a different situation than this one, and did not touch at all upon controlled deliveries. The defendant in Sundel admitted possessing a small amount of narcotics that the police found in his home, but he denied possessing a much larger quantity also found there. Citing State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. 207, 291 A.2d 425 (1972), this Court stated that "possession of a proscribed substance can give rise to the inference that the possessor knows what he possesses, especially if it is in his hands, on his person, in his vehicle, or on his premises.” Sundel, 121 R.I. at 645, 402 A.2d at 589. In my opinion, however, the Sundel holding is limited to situations in which, for example, a defendant acknowledges possessing several pills, or a green vegetable matter, on his person, in his home, or in his vehicle, but then denies knowing the nature of these substances (that is, illegal drugs) or about further quantities of the same substances found elsewhere but in the same general area. In such a case, a permissible inference arises that the defendant has knowledge of the nature of the substance in question. The Sundel case, therefore, does not aid our analysis of a controlled-delivery situation, such as the one in this case, where no evidence directly established defendants’ knowledge of the nature of what they picked up at the post office.

. In some limited circumstances, such as those presented in State v. Arthun, 274 Mont. 82, 906 P.2d 216 (1995), in which the defendant drove the package, unopened, to a shed on his property and hid it there, the actual opening of the package may not be a prerequisite to an inference that the defendant possessed guilty knowledge of the unlawful nature of the contents.

. Abraham Lincoln, First Annual Message to Congress, delivered December 3, 1861. See 5 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 1861-1862, at 44 (Roy P. Basler ed.1953).