Court Opinion

ID: 9905439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 16:02:46.659225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:28.804503
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13286    Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13286
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        KATHY HALL GORDON,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        BIBB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

                                                    Defendant- Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00143-TES
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13286      Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023     Page: 2 of 12

        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13286

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Kathy Hall-Gordon appeals the district court’s grant of sum-
        mary judgment for her employer, Bibb County School District, on
        her claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Americans
        with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act.
                First, she argues that the court abused its discretion when it
        deemed most of the school district’s statement of material facts un-
        disputed because, according to her, her response to the school dis-
        trict’s motion for summary judgment complied with the local
        rules. Second, she argues that the district court erred in granting
        summary judgment on her failure to accommodate claim because
        the documentary evidence suggests that the school district refused
        her accommodations. Third, she argues that the district court
        erred in granting summary judgment on her retaliation claim be-
        cause her protected conduct was the reason for her demotion.

                                          I.
                We review a district court’s interpretation and application
        of its local rules for abuse of discretion. Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d
        1253, 1267 n.22 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court abuses its discre-
        tion when it applies the wrong legal standard, follows the wrong
        procedures, or makes a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Ass’n of
USCA11 Case: 22-13286       Document: 28-1       Date Filed: 11/29/2023     Page: 3 of 12

        22-13286                Opinion of the Court                           3

        Disabled Americans v. Neptune Designs, Inc., 469 F.3d 1357, 1359 (11th
        Cir. 2006).
               The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a party as-
        serting that a fact is genuinely disputed support that assertion by
        citing particular parts of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A
        failure to do so may result in the court deeming the fact undisputed
        for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. Id. 56(e)(2).
        Facts may be supported by an affidavit or declaration. Id. 56(c)(4).
               Middle District of Georgia Local Rule 56 provides that a mo-
        vant for summary judgment must attach a separate statement of
        material facts. M.D. Ga. R. 56. Likewise, the non-moving party
        must attach a “separate and concise statement” responding to each
        of the movant’s numbered facts. Id. “All material facts contained
        in the movant’s statement which are not specifically controverted
        by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the record shall
        be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropri-
        ate.” Id.
               In upholding a similar local rule from the Northern District
        of Georgia, this Court stated that we hold such rules in “high es-
        teem.” Reese, 527 F.3d at 1268. The rule “protects judicial re-
        sources by making the parties organize the evidence rather than
        leaving the burden upon the district judge” and “streamlines the
        resolution of summary judgment motions by focusing the district
        court’s attention on what is, and what is not, genuinely contro-
        verted.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Where a local rule pro-
        vides “the only permissible way for [the non-moving party] to
USCA11 Case: 22-13286      Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023      Page: 4 of 12

        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13286

        establish a genuine issue of material fact,” and the non-moving
        party fails to comply with that rule, then the district court may “dis-
        regard or ignore evidence” not cited in the response to the mo-
        vant’s statement of facts. Id. at 1268.
                Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
        deemed most of the school district’s statement of material facts un-
        disputed because Hall-Gordon’s response to the statement was de-
        ficient under Local Rule 56. Reese, 527 F.3d at 1267; M.D. Ga. R.
        56. In most of the responses where Hall-Gordon purported to dis-
        pute the school district’s fact, she merely raised peripheral facts or
        legal arguments rather than citing specific evidence to refute the
        fact. For example, several of the school district’s facts concerned
        Hall-Gordon’s lack of technical skills. Rather than showing these
        facts were in dispute by citing testimony or other evidence that
        Hall-Gordon possessed the technical skills in question, Hall-Gor-
        don instead argued that the court should assume that the school
        district’s assertion was false because if it were true, it would have
        been included in her 2018 performance evaluation.
                In several of her responses, Hall-Gordon argued that the dis-
        trict court should deem the school district’s fact in dispute merely
        because the school district relied on the declarations of Hall-Gor-
        don’s supervisors who, Hall-Gordon argued (without citing spe-
        cific evidence), were not credible. But the federal rules expressly
        permit the use of declarations in motions for summary judgment.
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Furthermore, her responses repeatedly ref-
        erenced information not in the record; asked the court to presume
USCA11 Case: 22-13286      Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023     Page: 5 of 12

        22-13286               Opinion of the Court                         5

        facts; or contained no citations at all. Some of Hall-Gordon’s re-
        sponses relied on bare legal conclusions.
               The text of Local Rule 56 clearly states that legal conclusions
        and facts not supported by specific citations will not be considered
        by the court when deciding a motion for summary judgment.
        M.D. Ga. R. 56. Both the federal rules and this Court’s precedent
        recognize that when a respondent fails to properly address a mo-
        vant’s assertion of fact, a district court may deem that fact undis-
        puted for summary judgment purposes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2);
        Reese, 527 F.3d at 1268. Therefore, the district court was within its
        discretion when it deemed most of the school district’s facts undis-
        puted. Reese, 527 F.3d at 1268.
                                         II.
               We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
        the same legal standards that were applicable in the trial court.
        Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000). Summary judg-
        ment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
        moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 1305.
        This Court must resolve any factual questions with all reasonable
        inferences being drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. This
        Court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any adequate
        ground, even if it is other than the one on which the district court
        relied. Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d
        1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997).
              Under the ADA and, for an entity that receives federal funds,
        under the Rehabilitation Act, employers may not discriminate
USCA11 Case: 22-13286       Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023      Page: 6 of 12

        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13286

        against an employee because of her disability. 29 U.S.C. § 791(f);
        42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “Cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act
        are precedent for cases under the ADA, and vice versa.” Cash, 231
        F.3d at 1305 n.2.
               “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
        ADA, a plaintiff must show: (1) [s]he is disabled; (2) [s]he is a quali-
        fied individual; and (3) [s]he was subjected to unlawful discrimina-
        tion because of h[er] disability.” Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492
        F.3d 1247, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2007). An employer unlawfully dis-
        criminates against a disabled employee when it fails to provide rea-
        sonable accommodations for known physical or mental limitations
        unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
        the employer’s business.          Id. at 1262 (citing 42 U.S.C.
        § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
               A qualified individual is one who, “with or without reason-
        able accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
        employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Holly,
        492 F.3d at 1256. A reasonable accommodation is a modification
        or adjustment that enables a qualified individual to perform the es-
        sential functions of a position. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S.
        391, 399 (2002). An accommodation must be reasonable in the or-
        dinary sense of the word, considering its feasibility and fairness to
        other employees, not merely its effectiveness. See id. at 399-402.
            To trigger an employer’s duty to provide a reasonable ac-
        commodation, a plaintiff must make a specific demand for such an
USCA11 Case: 22-13286     Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023    Page: 7 of 12

        22-13286              Opinion of the Court                        7

        accommodation. Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167
        F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 1999).
                Even if there is a genuine issue as to whether Hall-Gordon
        was a qualified individual, the district court did not err when it
        found that the school district granted the reasonable accommoda-
        tions that she requested. Cash, 231 F.3d at 1304. Hall-Gordon re-
        quested a standing desk, that she not be required to climb ladders
        or lift more than 10 pounds, and that she be allowed to wear a knee
        brace. The school district approved her climbing, lifting, and knee
        brace requests, and additionally granted her an hourly, five minute
        break for any job related activity that required prolonged standing.
                Hall-Gordon cites nothing that refutes the school district’s
        assertion that it accommodated her climbing, lifting, or knee brace
        request. She points to the fact she was required to attend training
        on ladders but never states she was required to climb a ladder.
        Likewise, she asserts that she was in conversations about her ac-
        commodation requests with the school district throughout 2019,
        but never claims that she was asked to climb a ladder or lift more
        than 10 pounds, nor told she could not wear a knee brace. She
        alleges that Powell told her that the school district could not ac-
        commodate her disabilities in a June 2019 meeting. But these state-
        ments do not show a failure to accommodate because they were in
        response to a new doctor’s note that included more severe re-
        strictions than what Hall-Gordon actually requested. Gaston, 167
        F.3d at 1363. Finally, she argues that the reference to precautions
        in her June 2019 performance review were “presumably” in
USCA11 Case: 22-13286     Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023    Page: 8 of 12

        8                     Opinion of the Court                22-13286

        reference to her doctor’s medical advice. Even accepting this pre-
        sumption, the June 2019 evaluation does not show that the school
        district denied her actually requested lifting, climbing, or knee
        brace accomodations. Gaston, 167 F.3d at 1363.
               Furthermore, Hall-Gordon’s deposition refutes her argu-
        ment. She testified that when she first presented a doctor’s note to
        HR in November 2018, “they came back and said okay.” She stated
        she was never refused a knee brace, was never required to lift more
        than ten pounds, and could not recall being required to climb a lad-
        der.
                The school district did not grant her request for a standing
        desk because (1) employees in Hall-Gordon’s position only spent
        10 to 20 minutes a day at a personal desk; (2) employees in her po-
        sition spent time traveling between different schools and did not
        have a traditional workspace; and (3) to the extent Hall-Gordon did
        have a workspace at each of her assigned schools, it was often a
        shared space and physical constraints prevented the installation of
        a standing desk. Hall-Gordon conceded that her job involved per-
        forming technical support at multiple schools and she did not spe-
        cifically dispute the amount of time she spent at a personal work-
        space. On these facts, Hall-Gordon’s request for a standing desk
        was not reasonable. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400 02.
               Because the school district granted all of Hall-Gordon’s rea-
        sonable accommodation requests, she cannot show she was dis-
        criminated against under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Holly,
        492 F.3d at 155 56.
USCA11 Case: 22-13286      Document: 28-1       Date Filed: 11/29/2023     Page: 9 of 12

        22-13286               Opinion of the Court                          9

                                         III.
              The ADA prohibits retaliation against an individual for op-
        posing an unlawful practice or making a charge under the ADA. 42
        U.S.C. § 12203(a). This Court assesses ADA retaliation claims un-
        der the same framework it employs for retaliation claims arising
        under Title VII. Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287.
               To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that:
        (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected expression, (2) she suf-
        fered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal link
        between the two. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th
        Cir. 2016). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
        has the “burden to provide evidence from which one could reason-
        ably conclude that but for her alleged protected act, her employer
        would not have fired her.” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Georgia, Inc.,
        967 F.3d 1121, 1136 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying Title VII).
               Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the
        employer to come forward with legitimate, non-discriminatory
        reasons for its actions that negate the inference of retaliation. Stew-
        art, 117 F.3d at 1287.
               The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate
        that she will be able to establish at trial that the employer’s prof-
        fered non-discriminatory reasons are a pretext to mask retaliation.
        Id. “[T]o establish pretext at the summary judgment stage, a plain-
        tiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsist-
        encies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered
        legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could
USCA11 Case: 22-13286      Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023     Page: 10 of 12

        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13286

        find them unworthy of credence.” Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1136. She
        must show both that the proffered reasons were false and that re-
        taliation was the real reason. Id.
                Here, the district court did not err in granting summary
        judgment for the school district because Hall-Gordon failed to
        make a prima facie case of retaliation and, even if she could, she
        failed to show pretext. Cash, 231 F.3d at 1304; Stewart, 117 F.3d at
        1287. Before the district court, Hall-Gordon argued she engaged in
        protected activity when she internally complained about her super-
        visors’ failure to accommodate her disability and when she filed a
        charge of discrimination with the EEOC. These both qualify as
        protected activity, satisfying the first element of a prima facie case.
        42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276; Frazier-White, 818
        F.3d at 1258. Hall-Gordon can also satisfy the second element be-
        cause she was demoted to a lower paying position. Garrett, 507
        F.3d at 1316.
               However, Hall-Gordon failed to show causation. Gogel, 967
        F.3d at 1136. On appeal, Hall-Gordon argues that, in addition to
        temporal proximity, other facts supported causation. However,
        before the district court, rather than laying out facts to show cau-
        sation, her brief merely stated that the causal connection should be
        “apparent,” and cited her statement of facts. The paragraph cited
        referenced the comments about her physical limitations in her June
        2019 evaluation and the June 2019 meeting notes that stated
        “[d]on’t want to look like we are retaliating against her.” But, as
        discussed in Issue 1, the statement of facts was not the place to
USCA11 Case: 22-13286     Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023     Page: 11 of 12

        22-13286               Opinion of the Court                        11

        make legal arguments, and thus, the district court did not err in
        finding that Hall-Gordon did “not clearly point to any causal con-
        nection between the protected activity and her later demotion.”
                Even if the district court should have considered the argu-
        ments in the statement of facts, those arguments related to physical
        limitations but the school district’s concerns about Hall-Gordon re-
        lated to her lack of technical abilities to do the job—not because of
        any physical limitations. And those concerns predated Hall-Gor-
        don’s request for accommodation for physical limitations. Even
        assuming arguendo that Hall-Gordon had made more progress to-
        ward satisfying the causal element (i.e. more than the district court
        acknowledged), the district court still properly granted summary
        judgment because the school district provided legitimate, non-dis-
        criminatory reasons for Hall-Gordon’s demotion (i.e. for lack of
        necessary technical skills) and Hall-Gordon failed to argue that the
        school district’s stated reasons for her demotion were pretext for
        retaliation. Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1136. Her brief in opposition to sum-
        mary judgment makes no mention of pretext in the retaliation con-
        text and on appeal, she delegates any discussion of pretext to a foot-
        note that relies only on her mostly non-compliant response to the
        school district’s statement of facts. In both documents, she fails to
        point to any “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, inco-
        herencies, or contradictions” in the school district’s stated reasons
        for her demotion, and she falls short of showing both that their rea-
        sons were false and that retaliation was the true reason. Gogel, 967
        F.3d at 1136. Hall-Gordon does not dispute that the school district
        made changes in her job duties in an effort to find a role to match
USCA11 Case: 22-13286     Document: 28-1     Date Filed: 11/29/2023    Page: 12 of 12

        12                    Opinion of the Court                22-13286

        her technical skills, and indeed she points to no specific evidence
        that tends to undermine the legitimacy of the school district’s con-
        cern about her lack of technical skills; she points to no evidence
        that she did in fact possess the necessary technical skills.
               Because the school district had legitimate, non-discrimina-
        tory reasons for demoting Hall-Gordon and she failed to show that
        the proffered reasons were pretext for discrimination, the district
        court did not err in granting summary judgment to the school dis-
        trict on Hall-Gordon’s retaliation claim.
              For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
        is
              AFFIRMED.