Court Opinion

ID: 9479782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:28:58.542267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:16.719790
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in part A of the majority disposition, but dissent from parts B and C. I would affirm the judgment of conviction.
I
We review the district court’s determination of admissibility under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir.) (Satterfield), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840, 99 S.Ct. 128, 58 L.Ed.2d 138 (1978). The proponent of the statement, Slaughter, must establish three elements under Rule 804(b)(3): (1) that the declarant, Kenny, was unavailable; (2) that the statement so far tended to subject Kenny to criminal liability that a reasonable person would not make the statement unless it was true; and (3) that corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of Kenny’s statement. Id. at 691.
*701I agree with the majority that the first Satterfield prong has been met: Kenny was not available. It is less clear that the statement meets the second prong of the Satterfield test, which requires the court to ask whether Kenny’s statement was sufficiently against her penal interest to deem it trustworthy. The drafters of Rule 804(b)(3) realized the risks involved in creating an exception to the hearsay rule for statements against one’s interest, and they constructed carefully designed safeguards to address these risks. The second prong of the Satterfield test, based upon the language of Rule 804(b)(3), is one such safeguard — it is designed to prevent suspicious or fabricated statements from being admitted. See Fed.R.Evid. 804 advisory committee’s note.
The majority’s opinion focuses almost exclusively upon the language in Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) requiring that the statement must have “tended to subject” the declarant to civil or criminal liability. Although this language provides the threshold requirement for admitting a statement under the second prong of Satterfield, it does not eliminate the importance of the remainder of the rule: the requirement that “a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.” Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3). This language demands more than a showing that the declarant might have been criminally liable. It requires that the statement be made under conditions that suggest the sincerity and reliability of the declarant. Here, Kenny had sufficient time to fabricate her story. She may have implicated herself as a drug user in order to exculpate her friend Slaughter from the larger crime of distributing cocaine.
Be that as it may, it is clear that Kenny’s statement failed to meet the standard imposed by the third prong of the Satterfield test: a statement against interest may be admitted only when “corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” Id. The advisory committee note to Rule 804 explicitly states that “[t]he requirement of corroboration should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.” Our cases have interpreted this requirement to require that the party seeking admittance of the statement must show independent corroborating circumstances. In United States v. Benveniste, 564 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir.1977), for example, the statement in question was corroborated by an investigatory report and the admissions of two third party witnesses. In United States v. Layton, 720 F.2d 548, 560 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1069, 104 S.Ct. 1423, 79 L.Ed.2d 748 (1985), the offered statements were spontaneous, were corroborated by later events, and were made to a trusted advisor. We found these corroborating circumstances to be analogous to those in Benveniste. 720 F.2d at 560 n. 10.
Unlike the statements offered in Benveniste and Layton, the Kenny statements are not clearly corroborated by external evidence. The only corroboration is provided by Slaughter’s own testimony, which fails to rise to the level of clearly corroborating because it is self-serving. Rather, Kenny’s statements are more closely analogous to those made by the declarant in Satterfield. Despite finding three separate corroborating circumstances, we nevertheless concluded that discretion was not abused in denying admission; the statement was untrustworthy because other circumstances undercut the reliability of these corroborating circumstances. We emphasized that “the corroborating circumstances must do more than tend to indicate the trustworthiness of the statement; they must clearly indicate it.” Satterfield, 572 F.2d at 693; see also United States v. Ospina, 739 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir.) (statements made by declarants after arrest and without spontaneity lacked sufficient corroborating circumstances), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 887, 105 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed.2d 198 (1984); United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir.1978) (statements made by declar-ant after arrest, without spontaneity, and to a spouse who could invoke her privilege against testifying do not possess sufficient corroborating circumstances).
*702The circumstances surrounding Kenny’s statement present an even clearer case of unreliability than the statement at issue in Satterfield because here there exists no reliable corroborating evidence at all. In addition, Kenny’s statement was made in a situation highly suggestive of fabrication. Given the demanding requirements of Rule 804(b)(8), and the lack of any circumstances of reliability surrounding Kenny’s statement, it is difficult to see how the majority can find that the district judge’s refusal to admit the statement was an abuse of discretion. Because Kenny’s statement does not possess the high degree of reliability required by the Satterfield test, I would hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Kenny’s statement.
Slaughter also argues, as he must, that the exclusion was so prejudicial that it amounted to reversible error. Kenny’s statement would have assisted in impeaching Antal’s testimony, but it would not necessarily have changed the outcome of his case. Reversal for nonconstitutional error depends on whether it is more probable than not that the verdict would have been different. United States v. Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir.1984). The testimony of the cook at the Prime Rib Restaurant provided sufficient evidence to hold Slaughter guilty of selling Antal the drugs on April 30 and May 20. Therefore, even if the majority were correct in finding an abuse of discretion, I would hold that it was harmless error.
II
I also conclude that the district court’s jury instructions adequately covered Slaughter’s entrapment defense. We review the district court's formulation of jury instructions, taken in their entirety, for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Burgess, 791 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir.1986). Failure to give a requested instruction is reversible error only if the instructions given did not fairly and adequately cover a defense properly raised by the defendant. United States v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1046, 108 S.Ct. 782, 98 L.Ed.2d 868 (1988).
The entrapment defense depends primarily on showing that the defendant had no predisposition to commit the crime before the government agents became involved. United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir.1986). The court instructed the jury on Slaughter’s general entrapment defense. The court also told the jury to apply the instructions to each count separately. That is, as to their deliberations on each count, the entrapment jury instructions were to be separately and specifically applied. Slaughter contends, however, that the district court committed reversible error by refusing to give the continuing entrapment instructions formulated from United States v. North, 746 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir.1984) (North), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1773, 84 L.Ed.2d 832 (1985).
The issue before us is not whether entrapment instructions should have been given, but the necessity for additional entrapment instructions. The necessity, extent and character of supplemental instructions are within the broad discretion of the district court. United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1351-52 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086, 107 S.Ct. 1289, 94 L.Ed.2d 146 (1987); United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 431 (9th Cir.1983).
North is helpful on the issue of whether further instructions were required. In North, the district court gave a general entrapment instruction. Then, after a question from the jury, the court supplemented its instructions specifically on how entrapment applies to multiple counts of drug distribution. The court instructed that the jury could find three possible factual situations: (1) defendant was entrapped and all following criminal acts were the subject of that entrapment; (2) defendant was not entrapped and none of the acts were subject to the entrapment defense; or (3) defendant was entrapped as to some of the acts, but not to others. We held as a matter of law that “disposition can arise and entrapment can cease in the midst of a series of drug sales.” North, 746 F.2d at 629-30.
*703In the present case, the instructions given by the district court covered all three parts of the North supplemental instructions. Separate application of Slaughter’s entrapment defense to each count of the indictment implicitly dealt with any possible confusion of multiple counts. The instructions adequately clarified the jury’s duty to apply the entrapment defense to each transaction. Indeed, additional instructions may have “risked further confusion” for the jury. See United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624, 631 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923, 100 S.Ct. 1862, 64 L.Ed.2d 278 (1980). I would hold that Slaughter did not demonstrate that the district court abused its sound discretion in declining to give added instructions.