Court Opinion

ID: 9614203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:23:28.222111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:48.585941
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I can concur in the Court’s opinion, including Section 11(B), addressing the prosecutor’s closing arguments. I agree with the conclusion the prosecutor’s arguments “individually or combined did not so infect the trial with unfairness so as to deny Clayton due process.” Ante at 792. I do write separately, however, to point out the impropriety of the prosecutor’s argument about the law not requiring the punishment to fit the criminal in a capital case.
The Court’s opinion sets forth a portion of the prosecutor’s improper argument, which bears repeating:
I think counsel said one thing here that is interesting, in that I think it shows the fallacy of what he has suggested to you. And that is he said the punishment should fit the criminal. You will find that nowhere in our law, nowhere in our tradition. Punishment should fit the crime. That’s what you’ll find in our law and in our tradition. The focus should not be on the criminal, but should be on the crime, and I think that is instructive.
The prosecutor further expounded on this point by adding:
Punishment here must fit the crime, and if it doesn’t then it diminishes us all. We are not here to judge Cecil Clayton as a person, we are here to punish him for the crime he’s committed. There is a difference. The crime calls for the ultimate penalty, and that’s what I ask you for.
These comments are directly contrary to well-established Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the importance of an individualized decision-making process in capital cases. Capital cases not only permit, but mandate, that the punishment fit the criminal. Thus, the prosecutor’s comments were improper and inconsistent with Clayton’s constitutional right to have the jury’s sentencing decision rest upon an individualized inquiry. The prosecutor should have known better than to tell the jury this concept is not part of our law, not part of our tradition. Indeed, we have previously recognized such comments as justifying the grant of habeas relief. See Weaver v. Bowersox, 438 F.3d 832, 841 (8th Cir.2006) (citing Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999); Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 274-75, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 7, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 *794U.S. 279, 303, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)).
In Weaver, however, the very focus of the prosecutor’s closing argument was to persuade the jury to disregard the individualized decision-making process required by the Constitution. My concurring opinion therein noted “[n]ot once, not twice, not thrice, but seven times the prosecutor urged the jury to ignore the individual offender, William Weaver.” Id. at 843 (Bye, J., concurring). Such thankfully is not the case here.
The above comments are the only instances identified by Clayton where the prosecutor improperly told the jury the law did not require the punishment to fit the criminal. As the district court noted, immediately after making the above comments, the prosecutor nevertheless focused the jury upon Cecil Clayton, the individual, by discussing Clayton’s functioning abilities. In addition, the jury was properly instructed to consider the mitigating factors unique to Clayton in determining whether to impose the death penalty.
As a consequence, although this limited portion of the prosecutor’s argument was improper, I cannot conclude the Missouri Supreme Court was unreasonably wrong when it determined the argument did not violate Clayton’s due process rights.
I therefore concur in the Court’s opinion.