Court Opinion

ID: 9917239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 19:00:29.120972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:58.994565
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30720          Document: 00517029575               Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/11/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit
                                       ____________                                          FILED
                                                                                      January 11, 2024
                                        No. 21-30720
                                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                       ____________                                          Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                          Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                               versus

   Dwight Alexander,

                                                Defendant—Appellant.
                       ______________________________

                       Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 2:16-CR-197-1
                       ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Defendant-Appellant Dwight Alexander was convicted by a jury of
   conspiracy to possess heroin and cocaine hydrochloride, distribution of
   heroin, possessing a firearm as a felon, and structuring transactions to evade
   federal reporting requirements. He now appeals, raising two issues: (1)
   whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of
   Alexander’s prior testimony; and (2) whether there is sufficient evidence

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-30720      Document: 00517029575          Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/11/2024

                                    No. 21-30720

   against him for this court to uphold his drug conspiracy conviction. For the
   following reasons, we AFFIRM.
             I.    Factual and Procedural Background
          Alexander was originally charged in October 2016 by a one-count
   complaint with possessing a firearm as a felon following a warranted search
   of his house. During that search, the police found a firearm, large quantities
   of chemicals frequently used as cutting agents for narcotics, and cash. After
   the initial charge, Alexander met with investigators to discuss his options.
   According to a November 3, 2016, e-mail memorializing plea negotiations,
   the Government offered to not seek additional charges against Alexander if
   he agreed to (1) plead guilty to a two-count bill of information charging him
   with conspiring to distribute heroin and possessing a firearm as a convicted
   felon; (2) not contest the forfeiture of certain assets; and (3) cooperate with
   the Government. The e-mail also noted that if Alexander’s cooperation rose
   to the level of “substantial assistance,” the Government would move the
   district court for a downward departure from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
   at the time of his sentence. Consistent with that e-mail, Alexander then filed
   a document waiving his right to be charged by an indictment on November 8,
   2016. The Government filed a bill of information the following day, charging
   Alexander with two counts: conspiracy to distribute heroin and possessing a
   firearm as a felon. On November 10, Alexander was arraigned before a
   magistrate judge and entered a plea of not guilty to both counts. A couple of
   weeks later, the Government sent Alexander a formal plea agreement and
   factual basis consistent with their previous discussions. On December 14,
   Alexander filed a motion to substitute counsel and continue the case, which
   the court promptly granted.
          After retaining new counsel, Alexander continued to cooperate with
   investigators. As part of his cooperation, he assisted the Government with its

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   investigation and prosecution of one of his co-conspirators, Cornell
   Pendleton. During a proffer prior to Pendleton’s trial, while accompanied by
   his new attorney, Alexander told government agents that while visiting a
   barbershop frequented by drug dealers, he learned about a product called
   superior mannitol, a cutting agent for narcotics. After doing some research
   on the product, Alexander reportedly found that selling cutting agents to
   drug dealers could be a lucrative enterprise, and he began buying, packaging,
   and selling them in bulk. Specifically, he labeled his combination of cutting
   agents as “Bonita,” which he sold for $1,000 per kilogram. Alexander also
   informed investigators during that proffer that he could mix Bonita in two
   colors: white for cutting cocaine and brown for cutting heroin.
           On April 25, 2017, Alexander testified at Pendleton’s criminal trial as
   a government witness. Alexander made multiple self-incriminating
   statements during his testimony, including that he sold his Bonita to cocaine
   and heroin dealers with the knowledge that they were using the product to
   cut narcotics. He also admitted that he was guilty of conspiring to distribute
   heroin and feloniously possessing a firearm. During his testimony, Alexander
   acknowledged that he had yet to sign his plea agreement with the
   Government, but “was trying to get everything in order to facilitate and
   finalize everything.” He noted in his testimony that his plea agreement “goes
   out the door” if he were to lie on the stand—due to the cooperation
   requirement—and that he would be charged with perjury and serve “two
   years extra time.” Alexander also stated that although he intended to sign the
   plea agreement, he could still continue with his initial not guilty plea at that
   time.
           After the Pendleton trial, Alexander changed counsel again and began
   to have second thoughts about his plea agreement, which he formally rejected

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   during a Frye1 hearing on October 24, 2017. During the Frye hearing, the
   district court discussed the terms of the proposed plea agreement. Alexander
   confirmed that he understood that the Government was no longer bound by
   it should he choose to go to trial and that the Government was likely to add
   additional charges. Nevertheless, he rejected the plea agreement. On
   December 8, 2017, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment,
   charging Alexander with five total counts: the two counts contained in the
   bill of information, as well as two counts of distributing heroin, and one count
   of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. That
   same day, apparently proceeding pro se, Alexander filed a document
   criticizing his current and former attorneys and accusing them of tricking him
   into waiving the indictment. He also claimed for the first time that prior to
   testifying in the Pendleton trial, a government attorney met with him,
   rehearsed his testimony, and informed him he had immunity as a result of his
   testimony.
           On January 26, 2018, a grand jury returned another superseding
   indictment, containing the five counts in the previous indictment and a sixth
   count of structuring to avoid bank reporting requirements under 31 U.S.C. §
   5234(a)(3), (d)(2). After again obtaining new counsel, Alexander filed a
   motion in limine to exclude his Pendleton trial testimony. He argued that on
   the day of the Pendleton trial, the U.S. Marshals brought him to the
   courthouse, where he met with Assistant United States Attorney William
   McSherry (AUSA) prior to testifying. The motion alleged that “McSherry
   expressly promised Mr. Alexander that he need not be nervous about

           _____________________
           1
             Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 142 (2012) (explaining that the hearing provides an
   opportunity to establish on the record “the defendant’s understanding of the plea and its
   consequences” and “affords . . . substantial protection against later claims that the plea was
   the result of inadequate advice”).

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   testifying because he would be granted immunity against further
   prosecution.”
          In response, the Government argued that no such promises were
   made, submitting affidavits from both the AUSA and a U.S. Drug
   Enforcement Administration case agent (who was also present during
   meetings with Alexander) stating that they never promised immunity and
   that Alexander was eager to testify in the hopes that the Government would
   move for a downward departure during his sentencing.
         The district court denied the motion in limine. It found that there was
   not “an inkling of evidence showing that there was a meeting of the minds
   regarding a grant of immunity.” Further, “[Alexander]’s testimony from the
   Pendleton trial makes clear that [he] knew the government was offering a
   favorable plea agreement in exchange for his testimony rather than any sort
   of immunity.” Alexander’s case proceeded to trial.
         At trial, Alexander proceeded under the theory that he was a
   legitimate businessman selling a lawful substance and was not involved in a
   drug conspiracy. In addition to the Pendleton trial testimony transcript, the
   evidence against him included testimony of several drug dealers who bought
   Bonita directly from Alexander, large quantities of Bonita and cash seized
   from Alexander’s residence pursuant to a search warrant, and Alexander’s
   own testimony that he knew drug dealers were buying Bonita. Alexander’s
   counsel objected to the introduction of the Pendleton testimony again during
   trial, which the district court overruled. Alexander also moved for acquittal
   at the close of the Government’s case, which the court denied.
         The jury found Alexander guilty of conspiracy to distribute heroin and
   cocaine hydrochloride, two counts of distributing heroin, possession of a
   firearm as a felon, and structuring transactions to evade federal reporting
   requirements. It found him not guilty of possessing a firearm in furtherance

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                                    No. 21-30720

   of a drug trafficking crime. After the verdict, Alexander again moved for
   acquittal, which the court again denied. The district court sentenced him to
   136 months in prison for the drug conspiracy and concurrent 120-month
   terms for the remaining counts. Alexander timely filed a notice of appeal.
                        II.    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
          Alexander preserved our review of the district court’s evidentiary
   ruling by raising the issue in his motion in limine and renewing his objection
   when the evidence was introduced at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1).
   Accordingly, we review the district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of
   discretion. United States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 318 (5th Cir. 2011). “[F]or
   any of the evidentiary rulings to be reversible error, the admission of the
   evidence in question must have substantially prejudiced [the defendant’s]
   rights.” Id. (quoting United States v. Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.
   2003)). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United
   States v. Jimenez, 256 F.3d 330, 345 (5th Cir. 2001). “A factual finding is not
   clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” United
   States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
          Because Alexander moved for acquittal at the close of the
   Government’s case and after the verdict, we review his challenge to the
   sufficiency of the evidence de novo. See United States v. Oti, 872 F.3d 678,
   686 (5th Cir. 2017). On de novo review, we determine whether, “after
   viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
   to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
   elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Vargas-
   Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (emphasis in original)
   (citation omitted). Appellate review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is
   highly deferential to the jury’s verdict. United States v. Chon, 713 F.3d 812,
   818 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

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                             III.      DISCUSSION
                  A. Alexander’s Pendleton Trial Testimony
          On appeal, Alexander argues that, based upon the plea agreement and
   the AUSA’s alleged promise of immunity on the day of the Pendleton trial,
   he could have reasonably believed that he had either equitable or informal
   immunity from the use of his Pendleton trial testimony or from further
   prosecution beyond the plea agreement. Thus, he contends, the district court
   erred when it denied his motion in limine to exclude the Pendleton trial
   testimony. We disagree for three reasons: (1) Alexander failed to establish
   that the Government promised him immunity; (2) the Government’s offer
   of a plea agreement did not confer any immunity; and (3) even if the
   Government’s plea agreement offered some immunity, Alexander failed to
   abide by the terms of the agreement.
          As both parties acknowledge, the threshold question to determine
   whether Alexander is entitled to any form of immunity—equitable, informal,
   or otherwise—is whether the Government made him a promise of immunity.
   To interpret the existence and scope of an immunity agreement, we apply
   general principles of contract law. United States v. Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 302
   (5th Cir. 1999). “Applying contract law, the defendant bears the burden of
   proving that there was a mutual manifestation of assent—either verbally, or
   through conduct—to the agreement’s essential terms.” Jimenez, 256 F.3d at
   347 (citation omitted). This analysis must include “both subjective and
   objective factors in determining whether the defendant has carried his
   burden.” Id. (citation omitted).
          First, Alexander’s argument that this “mutual manifestation of
   assent” is evidenced by his reasonable expectation of immunity from the
   AUSA’s alleged promise just prior to the Pendleton trial is unavailing.
   Alexander never challenged the district court’s finding that there was no

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   evidence in the record “showing there was a meeting of the minds regarding
   a grant of immunity for defendant in exchange for his testimony in the
   Pendleton trial.” And he admits that he did not present “evidence to
   contradict the position of the government or the trial court’s finding.”
   Because he failed to identify any error in the district court’s finding, he
   waived any argument demonstrating that there was a “mutual manifestation
   of assent” on appeal. See Ramey v. Davis, 942 F.3d 241, 248 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (finding that “[a] failure to identify error in the district court’s reasoning
   constitutes waiver”) (citation omitted); United States v. McBride, 402 F.
   App’x 909, 911 (5th Cir. 2010) (when reviewing for an abuse of discretion,
   “where an appellant fails to identify error in the district court’s analysis, it is
   the same as if he had not appealed that issue”) (citation omitted).
          Second, Alexander’s argument that the unsigned plea agreement was
   “sufficient to serve as an informal immunity agreement upon which [he]
   could rely in continuing to debrief and in testifying” is belied by the record.
   Alexander offers no support for his argument that an unsigned agreement
   could serve as the basis of informal or equitable immunity. Due to inadequate
   briefing, that argument is forfeited. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393,
   397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an argument . . . by failing to adequately
   brief the argument on appeal.”) (citation omitted).
          Third, even if we were to accept the, thus far, unrecognized possibility
   that an unsigned plea agreement could provide immunity, Alexander still
   would not be entitled to that immunity. In other cases where courts have
   found equitable immunity, the defendants have been able to show “that
   [they] complied in good faith with the terms of the agreement.” See, e.g.,
   Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524, 528 (11th Cir. 1982). But Alexander violated
   the terms of the proposed plea agreement by failing to plead guilty, which he
   even acknowledged during the Frye hearing. He cannot claim the benefits of
   a bargain that he failed to uphold.

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          All told, Alexander failed to satisfy his burden of showing a mutual
   manifestation of assent to either the alleged agreement just before the
   Pendleton trial or the unsigned plea agreement. See Jimenez, 256 F.3d at 347.
   Alexander also failed to show that he complied in good faith with the terms
   of the rejected plea agreement. Thus, we find that the district court did not
   abuse its discretion when it denied Alexander’s motion in limine to exclude
   his testimony during the Pendleton trial.
                         B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
          Alexander also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
   the drug conspiracy alleged in count one. He argues that without the
   testimony from the Pendleton trial, a rational jury could not have found that
   he knowingly participated in a drug conspiracy. Because we find that
   Alexander’s testimony from the Pendleton trial was properly admitted,
   Alexander’s sufficiency of the evidence argument fails.
                             IV.    CONCLUSION
          For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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