Court Opinion

ID: 9657661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:33:38.000977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:47.335141
License: Public Domain

Corrigan, P.J.,
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I join Part iii of the majority opinion. I agree that defendant’s challenge to his sentence for resisting and obstructing an officer, MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747, is moot because defendant has served that sentence.
I dissent from the holding that defendant’s retrial on charges of breaking and entering, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305, and conspiracy to break and enter, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1) and MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305, offended the protection against double jeopardy, US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. First, I am not persuaded that the judge sua sponte declared a mistrial. Ante at 201, n 1. Defendant sought a mistrial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct in the rebuttal argument. The court declared a mistrial on grounds *205different from the ground identified by defendant. It found juror misconduct for violation of previous instructions. However, the court ruled after the defendant had first moved for a mistrial. A defendant who moves for or consents to a mistrial waives double jeopardy claims, whether or not a manifest necessity for mistrial exists. People v Benton, 402 Mich 42; 260 NW2d 77 (1977) (opinion by Levin, J.).
The transcript reflects:
Mr. Evans: Yes your Honor, I am making a motion for mistrial on the basis of the prosecutor’s —at least two questions to Deputy Brooks on — in rebuttal, in the rebuttal portion of the prosecutor’s trial case. . . . That’s improperly using the defendant’s silence against him and the jury should not have heard that and it is — and on that basis I am moving for a mistrial.
Mr. Rettig: Ah, your Honor, in the first place, in perspective, that was on rebuttal, as I believe you will recall, after Mr. Rutherford stated that he. had never seen Mr. Brooks until yesterday at trial. Rebuttal testimony—
The Court: I am going to stop you. We have a serious problem. This jury is in here deliberating. They asked a question earlier, could we hear Mrs. Slocum’s testimony because she was very inaudible yesterday, and I think she was. The court officer was instructed to tell them not to discuss the case, that we would deal with their questions later.
The trial court later questioned whether the defendant objected to the mistrial and accepted responsibility for the decision to mistry the case, stating it was the court’s decision sua sponte. Defendant did not stipulate to mistrial in response to the court’s inquiry whether he objected. Despite the court’s characterization, I am unwilling to overlook the procedural posture, i.e., that defen*206dant moved for a mistrial. The rationale for the granting of the mistrial was the court’s; the motion originated with defendant. Because defendant moved for a mistrial, he waived the double jeopardy protection. Defendant’s initial willingness to abort the trial distinguishes this case from People v White, 144 Mich App 698, 700-701; 376 NW2d 184 (1985).
For this reason, I would affirm all defendant’s convictions.