Court Opinion

ID: 9836970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:46.467311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.621403
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Judge
(concurring in the result):
In addition to finding that there was a lawful stop, a plain view search and seizure, and a valid search of the truck under the automobile exception, I would also hold that there was probable cause for an arrest and a search incident to that arrest.
Additionally, I would hold that there was a valid consent to search based on appellant’s signing a written consent to search after being advised of his rights. I would excise from consideration of the consent to search the house, the call by appellant’s friend who said that the police had a search warrant, since this information was not mentioned by the law enforcement officials at the time they obtained written consent. Furthermore, we should not leave the bench and bar with the impression that absent the nine factors considered by the majority, there would not be voluntary consent. Such an implication is contrary to precedent of this Court, cf. United States v. Bubonics, 45 MJ 93, 95 (1996), and the Supreme Court, cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).
Two law enforcement agents, SA Langman and SA Ray, had received information from two non-commissioned officers (NCOs) that one had seen appellant stealing government property and putting it in a truck and the other had received a government medical cabinet from appellant. This was confirmed when the agents seized the cabinet. The second NCO agreed to call appellant and tell him that the police had seized the medical cabinet from her and that “they might be coming to your house next, they have a search warrant.”
Probable cause to search exists when there are reasonable grounds to believe that items connected with criminal activity are located in the place to be searched. United States v. Hester, 47 MJ 461, 463 (1998). Probable cause to arrest requires reasonable grounds to believe that (1) an offense has been committed and (2) the person to be arrested committed it. RCM 302(c), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.). Both of these were met here. The information obtained from the NCOs was based on their personal observation. See United States v. Wood, 25 MJ 46 (CMA 1987); United States v. Ochoa, 12 MJ 281 (CMA 1982). Additionally, the police corroborated this in*225formation by seizing the cabinet from the second NCO. Hester, supra at 464. Since both of these NCOs could have been charged with providing false information to the police, there was additional reason to believe them.
Agents placed appellant’s house under observation. After the telephone call, appellant was seen loading items into the bed of his truck. When appellant drove away, he was stopped by the agents. During the stop, they noticed government property in the bed of the pickup truck. The issues in this case concern the search of the truck and the subsequent search of appellant’s home.
Although the police obtained consent to search the truck, it was not needed because a search incident to arrest would allow a search of the truck bed. In United States v. Chapman, 954 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir.1992), a gray Ford Ranger pickup truck was the description of a getaway vehicle used in a bank robbery. Two officers observed the truck and stopped it. They found the two defendants in the back of the truck wearing clothing matching the description of the robbers. As the defendants were escorted out of the truck, the officers observed in plain view the top of a money bag, a holster, and a dark ski mask. Once the defendants were handcuffed, the officers found handguns underneath the carpeting in the front of the truck bed and money in the money bag. The court found that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendants based on a number of factors: their knowledge that a robbery had just occurred in the area; the description of the getaway vehicle; the initial evasion of the police; and the observation of the two men hiding in the rear of the truck, the money bag, holster, and ski mask. The court also concluded that, once the defendants were arrested, the officers were justified in conducting a warrantless search of the truck bed.
However, the court noted specifically the peculiarity of these facts:
Although the compartment in which Mr. Chapman was hiding might not be a conventional passenger compartment, he can take no solace from the fact that the Belton Court noted that its holding did not extend to the trunk of an automobile. [New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).] Under the circumstances of this case, it is abundantly clear that the rear of the truck functioned as a passenger compartment at the time of the arrest.
954 F.2d at 1358 n. 6.
Since Belton, there have been several cases exploring what constitutes a trunk. In United States v. Henning, 906 F.2d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069, 111 S.Ct. 789, 112 L.Ed.2d 852 (1991), the court determined that the back portion of a sport utility vehicle is considered part of the passenger compartment, noting, “Where, as here, the vehicle contains no trunk, the entire inside of the vehicle constitutes the passenger compartment and may be lawfully searched.” The Tenth Circuit later noted that the determination that the cargo area of a sport utility vehicle, whether covered or uncovered, is part of the passenger compartment is primarily based on “reachability.” United States v. Olguin-Rivera, 168 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir.1999).
Based on these cases, I would hold that the items obtained from the bed of the truck were obtained based on a search incident to arrest.
After being taken to the OSI Office, appellant was warned of his rights, waived them, and consented to a search of his house.
When the police have probable cause to obtain a search warrant and tell an individual that they could seek a search warrant, this does not undermine the consent. See, e.g., United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495 (2nd Cir.1974)(not coercive where belief was “well founded” that warrant would be issued). In this case, it was the NCO who mentioned the search warrant, not the police. Cf. United States v. Rios, 48 MJ 261 (1998); United States v. White, 48 MJ 251 (1998). Thus, there is no direct compulsion by law enforcement officials. Trickery by the police does not equal compulsion where there is independent probable cause to arrest an individual and search his house. Police trickery is not necessarily wrong. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and *226Trickery: Investigative Lies By the Police, 76 Or. L.Rev. 775 (1997).
Based on appellant’s lawful arrest, the search of appellant’s truck incident to that arrest, and the signed written consent to search the house when the police had sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant, I concur in the result.