Court Opinion

ID: 9389075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 16:07:38.859619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:24.677975
License: Public Domain

J-A01023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
             v.                             :
                                            :
                                            :
DANAE JONES                                 :
                                            :
                   Appellant                :   No. 1576 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 3, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0006264-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED APRIL 24, 2023

      Appellant Danae Jones appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following her convictions for recklessly endangering another person

(REAP) and related offenses. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting her convictions. Following our review, we affirm.

      The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this matter as

follows:

      [Appellant was charged with multiple offenses] for her role in a
      two-day dispute between two families living on the 5500 block of
      Hadfield Street in Philadelphia. [Appellant] was charged with
      crimes against Alex Wise and his mother, Larenda Wise [(Mrs.
      Wise)] . . . .

                                 *      *       *

      The evidence at trial showed an incident on January 25, 2021 . .
      . between [Mrs.] Wise and [Appellant’s] father, Charles Clark.
      The Commonwealth adduced no evidence of misconduct by
      [Appellant] against [Mrs.] Wise.
J-A01023-23

        Mrs. Wise’s adult son, Alex Wise, lives with her. On January 26,
        2021 [], Alex Wise left [his] home to go to a local convenience
        store. Wise testified credibly at trial that he encountered Clark
        and Clark’s mother as he approached the corner of their block.
        Clark brandished a knife, and Clark’s mother drew a Taser.
        Clark then called someone on his phone and directed that person
        to “get that s---.” Wise turned around and walked back towards
        his home. Clark walked toward his own home, in the same
        direction. The two men argued as they walked toward their
        respective homes.

        Wise noticed at that point that [Appellant] had come out of her
        house with a handgun held at her side. Wise split his attention
        between [Appellant] and Clark as he followed Clark to the base
        of the steps that [led] to Clark’s house. [Appellant] then went
        into her home (she lived across the street from her father),
        appeared at her upstairs window, and pointed her handgun at
        Wise, finger on the trigger. [Appellant] testified that she did not
        intend to threaten or hurt anyone but was silent on the question
        whether her gun was loaded. Wise and Clark stopped arguing a
        few minutes later.

Trial Ct. Op., 9/6/22, at 3 (citations to the record omitted).

        On March 28, 2021, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two

counts each of REAP, possession of an instrument of crime (PIC), simple

assault, and conspiracy.1,2       On March 17, 2022, the Commonwealth added

another PIC charge relating to the incident involving Mrs. Wise. Following a

bench trial on March 22 and June 3, 2022,3 the trial court found Appellant

guilty of the charges as to Alex Wise, but not guilty of the charges as to Mrs.
____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a), 2705, 907(a), and 903(a), respectively.

2The Commonwealth also charged Appellant with two counts of aggravated
assault; however, the trial court quashed those two charges prior to trial.

3 The trial in this matter was bifurcated so one of the Commonwealth’s
witnesses could appear to testify. N.T. Trial, 3/22/22, at 4-5, 53.

                                           -2-
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Wise.    That same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to one year of

probation for each conviction, to be served concurrently.

        Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

        On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

        1. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to support
           [Appellant’s] conviction for simple assault in violation of 18
           Pa.C.S. § 2701(a), where the Commonwealth failed to prove
           beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] attempted to
           cause, or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily
           injury to anyone, or attempted by physical menace to put
           another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury?

        2. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to support
           [Appellant’s] conviction for [PIC] in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §
           907(a), where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
           reasonable doubt that [Appellant] ever possessed a long
           metal pipe or a knife, or otherwise possessed any instrument
           of crime, including a firearm with the intent to employ it
           criminally?

        3. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to support
           [Appellant’s] conviction for conspiracy – possession of an
           instrument of crime – in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 903, where
           the bills of information never charged [Appellant] with
           conspiracy relating to the possession of an instrument of
           crime and where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
           reasonable doubt that [Appellant] conspired with another
           person to commit the objective crime charged, including
           assault?

        4. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to support
           [Appellant’s] conviction for [REAP] in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §
           2705, where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
           reasonable doubt that [Appellant] recklessly engaged in
           conduct that placed or may have placed another person in
           actual danger of death or serious bodily injury or otherwise
           consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk

                                       -3-
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         that death or serious bodily injury would result from her
         conduct?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5 (some formatting altered).

      All of Appellant’s claims challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting her convictions. Our standard of review when presented with a

sufficiency challenge is well settled:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
      evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
      the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
      evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
      crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
      we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
      the fact-finder.     In addition, we note that the facts and
      circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
      preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
      defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
      evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
      probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
      circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
      proof of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
      doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
      applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
      all the evidence actually received must be considered. Finally,
      the trier of fact while passing on the credibility of witnesses and
      the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
      part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Bragg, 133 A.3d 328, 330-31 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted). Because a sufficiency of the evidence challenge raises a

question of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review

is plenary.   Commonwealth v. Mikitiuk, 213 A.3d 290, 300 (Pa. Super.

2019).

                                         -4-
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                               Simple Assault

      In her first claim, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient

to sustain her conviction for simple assault.        Appellant’s Brief at 15.

Specifically, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to establish

that she acted with specific intent to cause injury. Id. at 16. In support,

Appellant asserts that “there were no words or threats ever uttered by

[Appellant] or other circumstances evidencing her criminal intent to menace,

as opposed to dissuade or protect.” Id. at 17. Appellant also argues that

she raised the issue of self-defense during her testimony at trial and that

“the trial court found that [Appellant] likely had concerns for her safety” in

light of the exchange between Alex Wise and Appellant’s father the day

before. Id. at 19. Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court expressly

credited Appellant’s testimony that she “displayed the gun while standing

inside her front door so Alex [Wise] would not think about coming near her

or her home while or after fighting with her father directly across the street,”

and she concludes that the “Commonwealth offered nothing to disprove this

fear or the possibility that [she] was just trying to dissuade and protect.”

Id. at 20.

      The Crimes Code defines simple assault, in relevant part, as an

“attempt[] by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious

bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3).

      This Court has explained:

                                     -5-
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     “The act of pointing a gun at another person can constitute
     simple assault as an attempt by physical menace to put another
     in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” In re Maloney, 636
     A.2d 671, 674 (Pa. Super. 1994) (concluding simple assault
     under Section 2701(a)(3) established where driver pointed gun
     at another driver and said, “Get the f--- out of here”).

     In Commonwealth v. Little, 614 A.2d 1146 (Pa. Super. 1992),
     this Court formally adopted the trial court’s analysis regarding
     sufficiency of the evidence to prove simple assault by physical
     menace. The elements which must be proven are intentionally
     placing another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury through
     the use of menacing or frightening activity. Id. at 1151-55.
     Intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence and may be
     inferred from the defendant’s conduct under the attendant
     circumstances. Id. at 1154.

Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. 2003) (some

citations omitted and formatting altered).   Further, when a defendant is

charged with simple assault by physical menace for brandishing a firearm,

the Commonwealth is not required to prove that the firearm was loaded.

See Commonwealth v. Gouse, 429 A.2d 1129, 1133 (Pa. Super. 1981)

(explaining that “to obtain convictions for the pointing of an unloaded

firearm in situations where there was no actual danger of harm to the

person allegedly endangered, the indictment or information should, at the

outset, specifically charge the accused with simple assault pursuant to

[Section] 2703(a)(3)”).

     With respect to self-defense, this Court has explained:

     [T]he elements of a claim of self-defense are that the individual
     (1) reasonably believed that force was necessary to protect
     [herself] against death or serious bodily injury; (2) was free
     from fault in provoking the use of force against him; and (3) did
     not violate any duty to retreat.

                                   -6-
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      A defendant does not have a burden to prove a claim of self-
      defense. Once a defendant introduces some evidence to justify
      a finding of self-defense, then the issue is properly before the
      fact-finder and the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove
      the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations

omitted, formatting altered).     In order for the Commonwealth to meet its

burden of disproving a defendant’s claim of self-defense, it need only

disprove     one   of   the   above   elements   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt.

Commonwealth v. Green, 273 A.3d 1080, 1085 (Pa. Super. 2022).

      Here, at trial, Appellant testified that she stood inside her home

brandishing a firearm because she “didn’t want [Alex Wise] to even come

near [her] or think about doing anything.”        N.T. Trial, 6/3/22, at 53-54.

Appellant also confirmed that she walked out to the street while holding a

firearm, and that Alex Wise did not point a firearm in her direction at any

point. Id. at 55-56.

      Before it announced its verdict, the trial court made the following

finding regarding Appellant’s testimony:

      [I]t’s possible that if [Appellant] thought [her] father was being
      threatened that [she] would get a gun to protect [her] father.
      And so, you know, it’s possible that that – I don’t need to make
      this finding. Here she is in her house with her hand on the
      trigger. But before there’s any threat to her father whatsoever,
      when her father – just in response to a phone call, get that s---,
      she comes out into the street with a handgun.

Id. at 77.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court further explained:

                                        -7-
J-A01023-23

      Exhibit C-2 is a photograph that shows [Appellant] standing in
      the middle of her street, gun drawn. Exhibit C-1 is a photograph
      that shows [Appellant] at her second-floor window, pointing the
      gun at [Alex] Wise, finger on the trigger. [Appellant] testified at
      trial. She acknowledged she had appeared in the middle of her
      street . . . with a gun drawn.

Trial Ct. Op. at 6 (citations omitted).

      Following our review of the record, and in viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we conclude

that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction for simple

assault by physical menace. See Bragg, 133 A.3d at 330-31. Although the

trial court sitting as the finder of fact credited some of Appellant’s testimony,

the trial court also noted that Appellant brought her gun out to the street

before there was any threat to Appellant or her father.         See N.T. Trial,

6/3/22, at 77.      Therefore, the record reflects that the Commonwealth

established that Appellant was not free from fault in provoking the incident

at issue. See Green, 273 A.3d at 1085; Miller, 172 A.3d at 640.

      Additionally, as noted previously, the Commonwealth presented

evidence that Appellant pointed a firearm at Alex Wise with her finger on the

trigger, thereby placing Alex Wise in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

Therefore, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence supporting

Appellant’s simple assault conviction.      See Reynolds, 835 A.2d at 726

(reiterating that the act of pointing a firearm at another person is sufficient

to prove simple assault under Section 2701(a)(3)). Accordingly, Appellant is

not entitled to relief.

                                      -8-
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                  Possession of an Instrument of Crime

      Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

her conviction for PIC. Appellant’s Brief at 23. Specifically, Appellant argues

that “there was insufficient evidence to support the finding beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant employed the firearm criminally,

especially if she did not commit an assault or recklessly endanger anyone.”

Appellant’s Brief at 23 (citations omitted).

      PIC is defined as possession of “any instrument of crime with intent to

employ it criminally.”    18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a).     The Crimes Code defines

“instrument of crime” as “[a]nything used for criminal purposes and

possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for

lawful uses it may have.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(d).

      Here, as noted by the trial court, the Commonwealth introduced a

photograph into evidence of Appellant pointing a firearm at Alex Wise. See

Trial Ct. Op. at 6-7. Further, as discussed previously, the act of pointing a

firearm at another person is sufficient to prove the elements of simple

assault. See Reynolds, 835 A.2d at 726. On this record, and viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that

there was sufficient evidence establishing that Appellant used a firearm with

the intent of using it for a criminal purpose.    See 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a);

Bragg, 133 A.3d at 330-31. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on

this claim.

                                      -9-
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                                Criminal Conspiracy

       Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

her conviction for criminal conspiracy to commit simple assault.4 Appellant’s

Brief at 24. Appellant argues that the trial court engaged in “guesswork and

speculation” to convict Appellant of conspiracy because Appellant “did

nothing with the handgun as she stood outside her home other than to hold

it down to her side and then scurry into her house when the fight between

Alex [Wise] and [Clark] drew closer to her home.” Id. at 25.

       “A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person . . . to commit a

crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission [s]he

agrees with such other person . . . that they or one or more of them will

engage in conduct which constitutes such crime[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1).

       Further, as this Court has noted:

       The essence of a criminal conspiracy is a common
       understanding, no matter how it came into being, that a
       particular criminal objective be accomplished.    Therefore, a
       conviction for conspiracy requires proof of the existence of a
____________________________________________

4 In her brief, Appellant has included argument and analysis challenging her
conviction for conspiracy to commit simple assault. However, Appellant
notes that the trial court’s written sentencing order reflects that Appellant
was convicted of conspiracy to commit PIC. See Appellant’s Brief at 24.
After reviewing the record in its entirety, we conclude that the charge
reflected on the written sentencing order was an error, and that Appellant
was actually charged with and convicted for conspiracy to commit simple
assault. See Criminal Information, 7/15/21, at 1; see also N.T. Trial,
6/3/22, at 77-78 (reflecting the trial court’s guilty verdict for conspiracy to
commit simple assault). As such, we will review Appellant’s sufficiency claim
as it pertains to her conviction for conspiracy to commit simple assault.

                                          - 10 -
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      shared criminal intent.      An explicit or formal agreement to
      commit crimes can seldom, if ever, be proved and it need not
      be, for proof of a criminal partnership is almost invariably
      extracted from the circumstances that attend its activities.
      Thus, a conspiracy may be inferred where it is demonstrated
      that the relation, conduct, or circumstances of the parties, and
      the overt acts of the co-conspirators sufficiently prove the
      formation of a criminal confederation. The conduct of the parties
      and the circumstances surrounding their conduct may create a
      web of evidence linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy
      beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if the conspirator did not act
      as a principal in committing the underlying crime, [s]he is still
      criminally liable for the actions of [her] co-conspirators taken in
      furtherance of the conspiracy.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 479 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

      In the instant case, the trial court addressed Appellant’s conspiracy

conviction as follows:

      The evidence showed [Appellant] conspired with her father to
      assault Alex Wise. [Alex] Wise testified credibly that Clark called
      someone on the phone when [Alex] Wise and Clark argued on
      the street corner on [January 26, 2021]. [Alex] Wise heard
      Clark tell the other person on the line to “get that s---.”
      [Appellant] appeared in the street a few minutes later with a
      handgun, and later pointed it at [Alex] Wise with her finger on
      the trigger. The [trial court] inferred from this sequence of
      events that (1) Clark was speaking with [Appellant] when he told
      someone to “get that s---,” (2) [Appellant] understood Clark to
      mean she should get her handgun, and (3) [Appellant] agreed
      with Clark to use the handgun to intimidate [Alex] Wise. This
      evidence supports a conviction of conspiracy to commit simple
      assault in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a).

Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (formatting altered).

      Based on our review of the record, and in viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that there was

                                     - 11 -
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sufficient evidence establishing Appellant’s guilt for conspiracy to commit

simple assault.      See Bragg, 133 A.3d at 330-31.       As noted by the trial

court, the Commonwealth presented circumstantial evidence that Appellant

and Clark agreed to intimidate Alex Wise through the use of a firearm. See

18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a); Johnson, 180 A.3d at 479. Accordingly, Appellant is

not entitled to relief on this claim.

                   Recklessly Endangering Another Person

      In her final claim, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting her conviction for REAP.          Appellant’s Brief at 21.   Initially,

Appellant notes that the mere act of pointing an unloaded gun at a person is

insufficient to prove the elements of REAP. Id. (citing Gouse, 429 A.2d at

1131). In the instant case, Appellant asserts that the trial court found her

guilty of REAP because she brought “a loaded handgun out on the street”

and later pointed that gun out of her second-floor window, which was

reckless conduct that “created an actual danger of death or serious bodily

injury[.]”     Appellant’s Brief at 22.    However, Appellant argues that the

Commonwealth failed to present any evidence establishing that the gun was

loaded.      Further, Appellant argues that although the trial court found that

“the handgun must have been loaded[,] there was no evidence to support

this conclusion.” Id.

      The Commonwealth responds that “the evidence was sufficient to allow

the reasonable inference that [Appellant] placed others in danger of death or

serious bodily injury.”       Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.       In support, the

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Commonwealth relies on Mrs. Wise’s trial testimony that “‘a loaded firearm’

prevented [Alex Wise] from returning to his home.”            Id. at 9.     The

Commonwealth also refers to Alex Wise’s testimony from the preliminary

hearing where he stated that Appellant’s father “‘was continually egging her

on to use the firearm,’ which suggests he had reason to believe that the gun

was usable and the weapon was loaded.” Id. (citing N.T. Trial, 3/22/22, at

44; N.T. Preliminary Hr’g, 7/12/21, at 14) (emphasis added).5 Finally, the

Commonwealth notes that this Court has affirmed REAP convictions in cases

where there was no “definitive confirmation that a wielded gun was loaded.”

Id. at 9-10 (citing Commonwealth v. Rivera, 503 A.2d 11 (Pa. Super.

1985) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Holguin, 385 A.2d 1346 (Pa. Super.

1978) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.

2009)).

       The Crimes Code defines REAP as follows: “a person commits a

misdemeanor of the second degree if [s]he recklessly engages in conduct

which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious

bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.

       This Court has explained:

____________________________________________

5 The record reflects that the trial court admitted a copy    of the transcript
from the preliminary hearing. See N.T. Trial, 6/3/22, at      56-58. Because
our standard of review requires that we review all evidence   admitted at trial,
we may review the contents of the preliminary hearing         transcript. See
Bragg, 133 A.3d at 330.

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      To sustain a conviction for recklessly endangering another
      person, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant had
      an actual present ability to inflict harm and not merely the
      apparent ability to do so. Danger, not merely the apprehension
      of danger, must be created.        The mens rea for recklessly
      endangering another person is a conscious disregard of a known
      risk of death or great bodily harm to another person.
      Brandishing a loaded firearm during the commission of a crime
      provides a sufficient basis on which a fact-finder may conclude
      that a defendant proceeded with conscious disregard for the
      safety of other[s], and that [s]he had the present ability to inflict
      great bodily harm or death.

Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 949 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citations omitted, formatting altered, and emphasis added).        Additionally,

the “mere apparent ability to inflict harm is not sufficient for a conviction

under section 2705, and the pointing of an unloaded weapon, without more,

does not constitute recklessly endangering.”       Gouse, 429 A.3d at 1131

(citations omitted).

      However, this Court has acknowledged that we may sustain a REAP

charge involving an unloaded gun where “the circumstances surrounding the

pointing of the gun were so inherently dangerous that the required common

law element of actual danger of harm was proven despite the fact that the

gun was unloaded.” Id.; see e.g., Rivera, 503 A.2d at 12-13 (concluding

that it was unnecessary for the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant’s

gun was loaded in a REAP case where the evidence demonstrated that the

victims in a home invasion “were in ‘actual’ danger, not merely ‘apparent’

danger, from the pointed gun and [] the robbers were in a position whereby

they could, in fact, shoot the victims of the robbery”); Holguin, 385 A.2d at

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1353 (finding sufficient evidence for REAP where the defendant pointed a

gun into a crowded bar because, although there was no evidence that the

defendant’s gun was loaded, the defendant created a significant risk of

retaliation with gunfire by either employees or patrons of the bar); Hartzell,

988 A.2d at 144 (finding sufficient evidence for REAP where the defendant

fired a gun, and stating that “it is not difficult to conclude that the actual

discharging of a weapon numerous times in the vicinity of others constitutes

a sufficient danger to satisfy the REAP statute”).

      We find that the facts of the instant case are analogous to Holguin,

Rivera, and Hartzell. The Commonwealth presented evidence of escalating

hostilities between Clark and the Wises.       Indeed, the trial court heard

testimony that Clark struck Mrs. Wise in the face with a metal pipe the day

before the incident at issue in the instant case. N.T. Trial, 3/22/22, at 13.

Alex Wise further testified that before Appellant pointed a gun at him, he

encountered Clark and Clark’s mother, both of whom were armed with a

knife and Taser, respectively, on the street. N.T. Trial, 6/3/22, at 17-18. At

the time of this encounter, Wise testified that Clark made a phone call

directing the recipient of the call to “get that s---.”   Id. at 18.   Based on

these facts, we find that Appellant’s pointing a gun at Wise increased the

likelihood of potential retaliation from other residents in the neighborhood.

See Holguin, 385 A.2d at 1353.

      Additionally, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Clark was

encouraging Appellant to shoot Wise. Specifically, Wise testified as follows:

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      Actually [Clark] was continually egging [Appellant] on to use the
      firearm. He was saying, you know, [“]Shoot that f-----.[”] Like
      talking about me and stuff about killing him. I was trying to stay
      home that day because there was an incident the day before
      that kind of ties into this.

N.T. Preliminary Hr’g, 7/12/21 at 14. Further, Wise testified that Appellant

was screaming inaudibly during this incident.     Id. at 16.    We find that a

factfinder may reasonably infer from this evidence that Appellant possessed

the ability to shoot Wise.   See Rivera, 503 A.2d at 12-13.         Finally, the

evidence introduced at trial reflects that this incident took place in an urban

neighborhood in the City of Philadelphia consisting of a narrow street with

rowhomes on each side. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 and 2. A factfinder

could reasonably infer if Appellant fired her gun, the bullets could potentially

hit bystanders. See Hartzell, 988 A.2d at 145.

      While our review of Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge is

de novo, we cannot overlook the troubling misinterpretation of fundamental

legal principles inferred by the trial court in its 1925(a) opinion.       When

addressing Appellant’s REAP conviction, the trial court observed:

      [At trial, Appellant] was silent on the question of whether the
      gun was loaded.

      Appellant knew her ability to harm [Alex] Wise was at issue at
      trial. She testified on direct examination that she did not intend
      to hurt or threaten him. She had every incentive to testify
      that the gun was unloaded if that had been the case. But
      she did not. The [trial court], sitting as the factfinder,
      reasonably inferred from her failure to address this issue
      that [Appellant] had pointed a loaded gun.

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Trial Ct. Op. at 7 (citations omitted and emphasis added).            We are

concerned that this analysis improperly articulates a shifting of the burden to

prove guilt from the Commonwealth to Appellant. See generally U.S.

Const. amend. V; Pa. Const., art. I, § 9. Clearly, Appellant testified at trial

and chose not to exercise her constitutional right to remain silent, but by

doing so she did not assume the burden to prove herself not guilty. The trial

court as factfinder in a bench trial certainly was entitled to assess her

credibility like any other witness but could not require Appellant to disprove

the charges against her.

      We note that it is axiomatic that in a criminal proceeding, the

Commonwealth bears the burden of proving a defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.   “Of course, the burden of proving [a] defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt never shifts . . . .” Commonwealth v. Bryson,

120 A. 552, 555 (Pa. 1923) (citation omitted); see also Patterson v. New

York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (stating that “[t]he requirement of proof

beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is ‘bottomed on a fundamental

value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent

man than to let a guilty man go free’” (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S.

358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).        Although the trial court’s

comments were troubling, the totality of the evidence presented in the

record supports its inference that the gun was loaded, including a photo of

Appellant at her front door, pointing a gun at Wise with her finger on the

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trigger. N.T. Trial, 6/3/22, at 25-26, 83-84; Commonwealth Exhibit 1; Trial

Court Op. at 3.

     For these reasons, following our review of the record, and in viewing

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that the

Commonwealth      presented   sufficient   evidence   to   sustain   Appellant’s

conviction for REAP as well as the other related offenses discussed herein.

See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208; Bryson, 120 A. at 555; Bragg, 133 A.3d

at 330-31.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/24/2023

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