Court Opinion

ID: 9573906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:00:20.648534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:38.561480
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Chief Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result but write separately because I would hold that F.T.’s statements identifying Robinson as the person who caused her injury were admissible under the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule, Minn. R. Evid. 803(4). Because I believe these statements were admissible under Rule 803(4), I would not reach the issue of their admissibility under Minn. R. Evid. 803(24) or Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C).
As a preliminary matter, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that de novo review is appropriate. Typically, we review district court rulings admitting hearsay statements for abuse of discretion. See State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn.2001). In this case, however, the majority asserts that our review should be de novo because the district court “adopted a categorical rule of admissibility under the medical diagnosis exception” instead of applying the elements of Rule 803(4).
*411I do not agree with the majority’s characterization of the district court’s ruling. Rather than adopting a categorical rule of admissibility, the district court stated that its ruling admitting F.T.’s statements was intended to be “very narrow.” Prior to ruling, the district court heard extensive argument on the admissibility of the statements, during which the court focused on the critical issue under Rule 803(4)— whether the identity of F.T.’s abuser was pertinent to her medical diagnosis or treatment. That the district court specifically asked the parties to pinpoint the aspects of F.T.’s treatment affected by the nurses’ knowledge of the identity of her abuser reveals that the court focused on the proper criteria under Rule 803(4) and the rule’s application to the case at bar. Because the district court exercised its discretion in deciding that identity was reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment in this case, the court’s ruling should “not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Minn.2005). Applying this standard of review, I conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting F.T.’s statements under Rule 803(4).
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 803(4) admits as an exception to the hearsay rule:
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
F.T. made the disputed statements to a nurse for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment, and the statements described the inception of her injury. Thus, the key question under the rule is whether F.T.’s statements were “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”
We have held that in a child sexual abuse case a victim’s statements identifying her abuser are admissible under Rule 803(4) because identity is pertinent to medical treatment in such cases. State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn.1990), vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 801, 111 S.Ct. 29, 112 L.Ed.2d 7 (1990). In Larson, we adopted the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that the nature and extent of the psychological effects of child sexual abuse and their proper treatment often depend on the identity of the abuser.1 Id. (citing United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir.1987)); see also United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir.1985) (“Statements by a child abuse victim to a physician during an examination that the abuser is a member of the victim’s immediate household are reasonably pertinent to treatment.”). Similarly, in State v. Richards, we considered the admissibility of a victim’s statements to a counselor that the victim’s half brother beat her and that she was afraid of him. 552 N.W.2d 197, 201, 209 (Minn.1996). We upheld the district court’s ruling that the statements were admissible under Rule 803(4). Richards, 552 N.W.2d at 209.
Courts in other jurisdictions have ruled along the lines of Larson and Richards, recognizing that statements identifying an abuser as a family or household member are reasonably pertinent to medical diag*412nosis and treatment. In a rape ease, the Tenth Circuit held that the adult victim’s statements to a physician identifying her husband as the perpetrator were admissible under the medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception. United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1993). The court explained:
[T]he identity of the abuser is reasonably pertinent to treatment in virtually every domestic sexual assault case, even those not involving children. All victims of domestic sexual abuse suffer emotional and psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which depend on the identity of the abuser. The physician generally must know who the abuser was in order to render proper treatment because the physician’s treatment will necessarily differ when the abuser is a member of the victim’s family or household.
Id. at 1494-95 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that a “domestic sexual abuser’s identity is admissible under Rule 803(4) where the abuser has such an intimate relationship with the victim that the abuser’s identity becomes ‘reasonably pertinent’ to the victim’s proper treatment.” Id. at 1495.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has extended the reasoning of Joe to cases involving domestic physical abuse with no sexual component. Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 962 (Wyo.2000). The court in Oldman observed that “[tjhere is no logical reason for not applying [the] rationale [of Joe ] to non-sexual, traumatic abuse within a family or household, since sexual abuse is simply a particular kind of physical abuse.”2 Id. The court thus concluded that the victim’s statements to a physician were “consistent with the purpose of promoting diagnosis and treatment” and that the assailant’s identity was relevant to treatment of the victim. Id. The Washington Court of Appeals, too, has held that statements identifying a family or household member as the perpetrator of a nonsexual physical assault are reasonably pertinent to treatment. State v. Price, 126 Wash.App. 617, 109 P.3d 27, 39 (2005) (“A physician’s treatment will necessarily differ when the abuser is a member of,the victim’s family or household * * *.”).
I agree with the reasoning of Oldman and Price and see no principled way to distinguish the domestic physical abuse in this case from the sexual abuse in Larson and the physical abuse in Richards. As with child sexual abuse, domestic physical abuse entails more than physical injury; it frequently precipitates psychological and emotional problems requiring specific treatment. See Am. Med. Ass’n, Diagnostic and Treatment Guidelines on Domestic Violence 10 (March 1992), http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/386/domes-ticviolence.pdf [hereinafter AMA Guidelines].3 In addition, given the often recur*413rent nature of domestic abuse, proper treatment may include efforts to prevent future abuse, which requires knowledge of the identity of the abuser. See AMA Guidelines at 7, 12; see also Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (noting that part of a nurse’s job in assessing and treating patients is to recommend domestic violence resources when appropriate); Oldman, 998 P.2d at 962 (noting that knowledge of the abuser’s identity was important to preventing further abuse). Thus, the fact that an abuser is a member of the victim’s family or household is reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment of the underlying domestic abuse and its attendant psychological and emotional injuries.
In this case, the assessment and treatment form used by J.W. to evaluate F.T. provides further evidence of the relevance of the identity of F.T.’s abuser to her diagnosis and treatment. Included on the form is a section entitled “abuse assessment,” which inquires whether the patient has been “hurt or mistreated by someone important to [her].” The section also provides a space for nurses to indicate whether “referral information” was given to the patient. Inclusion of this section reveals that Abbott Northwestern Hospital considers the identity of a patient’s abuser to be relevant to assessment and treatment in the context of domestic abuse. Because F.T.’s statements were reasonably pertinent to her diagnosis and treatment, I would hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the statements under Rule 803(4).

. The majority claims that we are not sufficiently familiar with the medical issues surrounding treatment of victims of domestic abuse to decide whether the abuser's identity is reasonably pertinent to treatment. However, we do not appear to be any less informed than we were in Larson, where we concluded that an abuser's identity is relevant to treatment of a child sexual abuse victim without reference to medical publications or expert medical testimony on that point. See Larson, 453 N.W.2d at 47.

. This statement raises an interesting point. As the statement suggests, both sexual abuse and nonsexual physical abuse are prevalent in abusive relationships. Am. Med. Ass’n, Diagnostic and Treatment Guidelines on Domestic Violence 7, 9-10 (March 1992), http:// www.ama-assn.org/ama 1/pub/upload/mm/ 386/domesticviolence.pdf. It defies logic to permit admission of a victim's statement to a treating physician that "my husband raped me,” but not her subsequent statement "and then my husband hit me.”

. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that we cannot rely on the AMA Guidelines in this case because it was not included in the record below. We are free to refer to publicly available documents generally relevant to resolution of an issue before us, even if those documents are not included in the record. See State v. Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn.2000); In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn.1986). My use of the AMA Guidelines is not evidentiary in nature. Instead, I employ generic information found in the guidelines to support general proposi*413tions about the symptoms and treatment of domestic abuse. Such usage is distinguishable from the statistical information stricken in Hinneberg v. Big Stone County Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 706 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Minn.2005), which was specific to the parties and issues involved in that case.