Court Opinion

ID: 9719619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:57:15.728862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:08.459592
License: Public Domain

SHORT, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. It is undisputed Wschola’s complaint was served nine days after the expiration of the 300-day statutory limitation in effect at the time her cause of action commenced to accrue. See Minn.Stat. § 363.06, subd. 3 (1986). It is also undisputed Wschola has set forth no mitigating facts to toll that statute of limitations. See, e.g., State by Khalifa v. Russell Dieter Enter., 418 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Minn.App.1988). The 1988 amendment to the Minnesota Human Rights Act statute of limitations is silent as to whether it should be applied retroactively. No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly stated by the legislature. Minn.Stat. § 645.21 (1990).
Donaldson v. Chase Securities Corp., 216 Minn. 269, 13 N.W.2d 1 (1943), aff'd Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945), does not alter this legislative mandate. The legislature clearly and manifestly stated its retroactive intent in the statute at issue in Chase. Section 645.21 is therefore not discussed in Chase; the only issue in Chase is whether such retroactive application is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court in Chase did not say that the retroactive approach was the better one; it only held that retroactive application was permissible and did not violate the Constitution. 325 U.S. at 313-16, 65 S.Ct. at 1142-43. While the Supreme Court held in Chase that a state has the power to apply a statute retroactively, section 645.21 declares that, as a general rule, that power will not be exercised unless the legislature clearly and manifestly states its intent to do so.
Klimmek v. Independent School Dist. No. 487, 299 N.W.2d 501 (Minn.1980) does not alter this general rule. In 1988 the Minnesota Supreme Court had the opportunity to extend the Klimmek rule beyond workers’ compensation cases and declined to do so. See State v. Traczyk, 421 N.W.2d 299 (Minn.1988). Instead, the Supreme Court in Traczyk characterized the rule in Klimmek and Marose v. Maislin Transport, 413 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.1987), as “one notable exception in the area of worker’s compensation law” and a departure from the § 645.21 “general rule.” Traczyk, 421 N.W.2d at 301, n. 4. It gave three justifications for this departure. First, in Klimmek and Marose the employees had already “effectively commenced a proceeding” through their prior claims for statutory benefits for their injuries. The actions in question were claims for additional disability benefits. Traczyk, 421 N.W.2d at 301, n. 4. Second, the result in Klimmek and Marose is consistent with Donovan v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 150 Minn. 364, 185 N.W. 388 (1921), a workers’ compensation case decided before enactment of section 645.21. Traczyk, 421 N.W.2d at 301, n. 4. Third,
[bjecause wholly statutory workers compensation laws comprehensively govern the rights and duties of the parties in an employment relationship and have historically been generally modified with the view of expanding employee benefits arising out of that relationship, workers’ compensation cases are distinguishable from cases arising following statutory modifications in other areas of the law.
Id. None of these justifications applied in Traczyk, a criminal case. While arguably *229the third justification applies in Wschola s case, the first two do not. Extending the Klimmek exception beyond workers’ compensation law to this case risks limiting the effect of section 645.21 to criminal cases only. This is a task for the legislature, not the courts.
If the legislature had wanted to expand its 1988 amendment of section 363.06 to cover Wschola’s case, it could have drafted the statute of limitations to apply to all actions pending. See, e.g., 1988 Minn.Laws ch. 607 § 3 (“Sections 1 and 2 are effective the day following final enactment and apply to matters pending on or instituted on or after the effective date.”). I would affirm the trial court’s decision that Wscho-la’s claim is time barred.