Court Opinion

ID: 9897264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:25.527827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.696832
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Oct 10 2023, 8:46 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey C. Gerish                                          Philip A. Whistler
Plunkett Cooney                                            Jenny R. Buchheit
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan                                 Eric J. McKeown
                                                           Ice Miller LLP
Crystal G. Rowe                                            Indianapolis, Indiana
New Albany, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

London Witte Group, LLC,                                   October 10, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-MI-2060
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Grant Superior
                                                           Court
City of Marion,                                            The Honorable David A. Happe,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Special Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           27D03-1612-MI-168

                                Opinion by Judge Bradford
                            Judges Riley and Weissmann concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023                           Page 1 of 35
      Case Summary
[1]   London Witte Group, LLC (“LWG”) and the City of Marion (“the City”) have

      been engaged in litigation relating to the financing of a construction project in

      downtown Marion since September 29, 2017. The matter came before this

      court and the Indiana Supreme Court in 2020 and 2021, respectively. In the

      instant appeal, which follows a jury trial, LWG contends that the trial court

      abused its discretion in denying its motions for a directed verdict and its

      subsequent motion to correct error. LWG alternatively contends that the jury’s

      verdict is excessive. For its part, the City contends that the trial court acted

      within its discretion in denying LWG’s motions and that the jury’s verdict is

      supported by the evidence. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History                                1

[2]   As is stated above, this matter has previously come before both this Court and

      the Indiana Supreme Court. Our opinion issued in the prior appeal sets forth

      the facts relating to the parties’ underlying dispute as follows:

              A few years before 2008 or 2009, the YMCA in Marion moved
              into a new space, leaving the old YMCA building in downtown
              Marion vacant. In 2008 or 2009, the City began discussions with
              Michael An, a developer from California. An proposed a
              redevelopment of the old YMCA building into a combination of
              hotel, restaurant, retail, and commercial spaces [(“the YMCA

      1
       We held oral argument in this case on September 20, 2023, in our courtroom in the Indiana Statehouse.
      We commend counsel for the quality of their written submissions and oral presentations.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023                          Page 2 of 35
        project”)]. He estimated that the project would cost around $5.5
        million. The City was willing to provide bond financing in the
        amount of $2.5 million, meaning that An had to come up with $3
        million from other sources.

        The core of the City’s project team was Mayor Wayne Se[y]bold,
        Director of Development Darren Reese, Bruce Donaldson of
        Barnes and Thornburg, and Bob Swintz of LWG. Reese was the
        point person on the project. Donaldson, who served as bond
        counsel, reported to Reese. Swintz served as financial advisor.
        The bonds would be funded from a tax-increment financing
        (TIF) district, with Swintz’s role being to determine “how much
        room is in the TIF district to do this project.” Appellant’s App.
        Vol. II p. 197.[ ] Essentially, Swintz’s primary job was to ensure
        that the City could pay back the bonds.

        First Farmers Bank … emerged as the prospective bond buyer.
        The Bank and the City each expected that An would provide
        proof that he had attained the additional $3 million in financing.
        In December 2009, shortly before the bond issue, Swintz told the
        Bank that he had spoken with Reese and Mayor Seybold and that
        the City had “the comfort they need[ed] for the YMCA project.”
        Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 231. Reese and Donaldson were
        included on the email and Reese later said that he had no reason
        to dispute Swintz’s statement. A few days later, the Bank again
        questioned whether An had the full funding in hand in
        correspondence to Reese and Donaldson, reminding them that
        the Bank “need[ed] to insure that there [were] sufficient funds to
        complete the project at all times.” Id. at 234. Swintz responded
        to the Bank, explaining that “[a]s far as the City is concerned the
        developer had provided written documentation about the funding
        to complete the project.” Id. at 237. Swintz later testified that he
        “would not have come up with [his response] without talking to”
        Reese, Mayor Seybold, or Donaldson. Appellant’s App. Vol II.
        p. 239–40.

        Meanwhile, on December 4, 2009, An, through Chad Seybold,
        provided a memorandum of understanding [(“the Cho
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023       Page 3 of 35
        Memorandum”)] to Swintz. The [Cho Memorandum] was non-
        binding and signed by Se Kwon Cho; it stated that Cho would
        make $3 million available to An to complete the project. The
        [Cho Memorandum] also indicated that it was not a final, legally
        binding agreement, though both An and Cho signed it. Chad
        indicated to Swintz that the [Cho Memorandum] was the proof
        requested by the City and the Bank that An had the $3 million in
        financing on hand. Years later, at the time of the litigation at
        issue herein, neither Mayor Seybold nor Reese recalled knowing
        about the [Cho Memorandum]. The City claims that Swintz
        intentionally withheld the [Cho Memorandum] from the Bank
        and the City.

        Evidently, Swintz’s assurances satisfied the Bank, because the
        bonds were issued on December 16, 2009. At some point,
        construction began, but it was never completed. The City
        refinanced the bonds in 2011, after which An continued to work
        on the project and to look for investors.

        In December 2013, four years after the bond issue, the Marion
        Chronicle-Tribune published several critical articles about the
        project and submitted several information requests. In response,
        the City hired KPMG to perform a forensic audit of the project;
        KMPG found no improprieties, though Chad failed to comply
        with KPMG’s document requests. The State Board of Accounts
        … also reviewed the project and found, in the spring of 2014, that
        it was nearly completed.

        In December 2015, An died. The project remained unfinished.
        The City filed a complaint against An’s estate on December 8,
        2016. The City entered into a tolling agreement with LWG on
        February 13, 2017, which tolled the statute of limitations through
        September 30, 2017. On September 29, 2017, the City filed an
        amended complaint, adding Chad and LWG as defendants. The
        primary allegation from which the City’s claims against LWG
        stems is that LWG “not only failed to tell the City that An lacked
        the money to complete the project, it prevented the Bank from
        learning it—a fact which would have stopped, or at least
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023     Page 4 of 35
        substantially changed, the bond issue.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. The
        specific claims remaining against LWG are for negligence,
        breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive fraud/unjust
        enrichment.

        During the discovery process, the City allegedly first became
        aware of the [Cho Memorandum]. Additionally, discovery has
        revealed that bond proceeds were used to provide personal
        benefits to Mayor Seybold, including payment of the premium on
        a life insurance policy, cash payments to Mayor Seybold’s wife,
        and contributions to Mayor Seybold’s political campaigns.
        Moreover, An was allegedly told that the City would invest in his
        project only if he hired the Mayor’s brother, Chad.

        On May 17, 2019, LWG filed a motion for summary judgment
        on each of the three claims against it. LWG’s motion focused on
        the statute of limitations for each claim, arguing that the
        complaint was filed outside the limitations period. During the
        oral argument on the summary judgment motion, counsel for the
        City conceded that “in the spring of 2014, the City ... certainly
        had some concerns about the misapplication of bond proceeds.”
        Tr. Vol. II p. 36.

        On July 8, 2019, the trial court entered an order granting LWG’s
        motion with respect to the claims for negligence and breach of
        fiduciary duty and denying it with respect to the claim for
        constructive fraud/unjust enrichment. In pertinent part, the trial
        court found as follows:

                 The negligence and breach of fiduciary duty Counts
                 are based on the two-year statute of limitations
                 contained in Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4(a). The two-year
                 period had expired long before February 16, 2017
                 when LWG signed a tolling agreement with the City.

                 LWG’s work for the City as it relates to this case was
                 divided into two parts:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 5 of 35
                 • The December 1, 2009 Series 2009 Bonds for a
                 principal amount of $2,500,000; and

                 • The February 15, 2011 Refinancing of the 2009
                 Bonds and consolidation of obligations from other
                 City projects.

                 LWG’s work on the 2009 Bonds and its work on the
                 2011 Refinancing are intertwined. At the latest the
                 City became aware that bond funds may have been
                 misappropriated in the Spring of 2014. As a result
                 the City’s Corporate Counsel employed a forensic
                 accounting firm to investigate and the City requested
                 an investigation by the State Board of Accounts. The
                 Court determines that at the latest the statute of
                 limitations ... began to run as of the Spring of 2014.

                 The Court finds that the City may not rely upon the
                 continuous representation nor the adverse
                 domination nor fraudulent concealment ... to extend
                 the begin date for the two-year statute of
                 limitations....

                 ***

                 The Court denies the relief requested in the
                 [summary judgment motion] as to the constructive
                 fraud/unjust enrichment claim. That claim is based
                 on the six-year statute of limitations contained in I.C.
                 § 34-11-2-7(4) and did not begin to run until LWG’s
                 work on the 2011 Refinancing was completed.

        Appealed Order p. 1–2. The trial court deemed the grant of
        summary judgment on the first two counts to be a final and
        appealable judgment; it later certified the denial of summary
        judgment on the third count for interlocutory appeal.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023        Page 6 of 35
      City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., LLC, 147 N.E.3d 362, 365–67 (Ind. Ct. App.

      2020) (cleaned up, bracketed information added) (“City of Marion I”), trans.

      granted.

[3]   On appeal, we concluded that the City’s negligence and breach of contract

      claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, stating as

      follows:

              the undisputed evidence in the record shows that the City had
              enough information long before February 2015 to have caused it
              to inquire further regarding possible wrongdoing. And, in fact, it
              did inquire further by instituting investigations from KPMG and
              the State Board of Accounts. Therefore, we find that the
              discovery rule bars these two claims against LWG.

      Id. at 370–71. We further concluded that neither the continuous-representation

      doctrine, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, nor the adverse-domination

      doctrine applied to toll the statute of limitations period. Id. at 371–73. We also

      concluded that the trial court had erred in applying a six-year statute of

      limitation to the City’s constructive fraud/unjust enrichment count, concluding

      that a two-year statute of limitations governed the claim. Id. at 374. As such,

      we affirmed the portion of trial court’s order relating to the negligence and

      breach-of-contract claims, reversed the portion relating to the constructive-

      fraud/unjust-enrichment count, and “remanded with instructions to enter

      summary judgment in LWG’s favor on the City’s claim for constructive

      fraud/unjust enrichment.” Id.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023         Page 7 of 35
[4]   The City sought transfer, which the Indiana Supreme Court granted, vacating

      our prior opinion. See City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., LLC, 169 N.E.3d 382

      (Ind. 2021) (“City of Marion II”). The Indiana Supreme Court adopted the

      doctrine of adverse domination as a potential avenue for tolling a statute of

      limitation in Indiana, finding that “the doctrine, which has been significantly

      developed over time in other jurisdictions, is a logical corollary of our discovery

      rule.” Id. at 390. The Supreme Court limited the doctrine’s application to

      situations where “intentional wrongdoing of some kind” is involved. Id. at 392.

      Applying the doctrine to the facts at hand, the Supreme Court held that

              the City sufficiently established facts to avoid the statute of
              limitations defense on summary judgment. Drawing all
              reasonable inferences in favor of the City, there are genuine
              issues of material fact as to whether knowledge of the injury was
              available to the City while Mayor Seybold was in office.
              Moreover, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether
              [LWG] was complicit in Mayor Seybold’s wrongdoing.
              Summary judgment “should not be granted when it is necessary
              to weigh the evidence.” Bochnowski v. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan
              Ass’n, 571 N.E.2d 282, 285 (Ind. 1991). After weighing the
              evidence, a factfinder ultimately may not conclude that the City
              proved Mayor Seybold’s adverse domination and [LWG]’s
              complicity, but that is a matter for trial, not summary judgment.

      Id. at 395. Finding that “[s]ummary judgment on all counts [was] inappropriate

      as the City established facts in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense at

      this stage,” the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the trial court for further

      proceedings. Id. at 397.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023        Page 8 of 35
[5]   On remand, the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the City’s case-in-

      chief, LWG moved for directed verdict on the issues of whether (1) the adverse-

      domination doctrine applied and (2) the City had presented sufficient evidence

      to support its negligence, fiduciary duty, and damages claims. The trial court

      denied LWG’s motions for directed verdict “but in the interest of the jury’s

      time, reserved the Court’s explanation of the ruling to be made by” a written

      order, which was issued on May 23, 2022. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 73. The

      trial continued, after which the jury returned a general verdict for the City, in

      which it found the City’s total damages were $3,285,920.00 and that LWG was

      95% responsible for the City’s damages. Based on its findings relating to

      damages and fault, the jury entered a verdict against LWG in the amount of

      $3,121,624.00. LWG filed a motion to correct error, which was denied by the

      trial court on August 1, 2022.

      Discussion and Decision
[6]   At the conclusion of the City’s case-in-chief, LWG filed two motions for a

      directed verdict. LWG challenges the trial court’s denial of both motions on

      appeal, which follows the denial of LWG’s motion to correct error.

      I.      Standard of Review
[7]   “The standard of review on a challenge to a directed verdict, also known as

      judgment on the evidence, is the same as the standard governing the trial court

      in making its decision.” Denman v. St. Vincent Med. Grp., Inc., 176 N.E.3d 480,

      492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Trial Rule 50(A) provides that “[w]here
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 9 of 35
      all or some of the issues in a case tried before a jury … are not supported by

      sufficient evidence … the court shall withdraw such issues from the jury and

      enter judgment thereon or shall enter judgment thereon notwithstanding a

      verdict.” A party may move for a directed verdict “after another party carrying

      the burden of proof or of going forward with the evidence upon any one or

      more issues has completed presentation of his evidence thereon[.]” T.R. 50(A).

[8]           The purpose of a Trial Rule 50(A) motion for judgment on the
              evidence is to test the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the
              non-movant. Stewart v. Alunday, 53 N.E.3d 562, 568 (Ind. Ct.
              App. 2016) (citing Purcell v. Old Nat’l Bank, 972 N.E.2d 835, 839
              (Ind. 2012)). The grant or denial of a motion for judgment on the
              evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court and will
              be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. Hill v. Rhinehart,
              45 N.E.3d 427, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Levee v. Beeching,
              729 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)), trans. denied. Upon
              appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on such a motion, the
              reviewing court must consider only the evidence and reasonable
              inferences most favorable to the nonmoving party. Belork v.
              Latimer, 54 N.E.3d 388, 394-395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). A motion
              for judgment on the evidence should be granted “only when there
              is a complete failure of proof because there is no substantial
              evidence or reasonable inference supporting an essential element
              of the claim.” Stewart, 53 N.E.3d at 568 (quoting Raess v.
              Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 793 (Ind. 2008) (quotation omitted),
              reh’g denied). Likewise, judgment on the evidence is proper if the
              inference intended to be proven by the evidence cannot logically
              be drawn from the proffered evidence without undue speculation.
              Hill, 45 N.E.3d at 435 (citing Levee, 729 N.E.2d at 223[)].

      Overshiner v. Hendricks Reg’l Health, 119 N.E.3d 1124, 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019),

      trans. denied.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 10 of 35
[9]    LWG appeals the denial of its motions for a directed verdict following the

       denial of its motion to correct error. “[W]e review rulings on motions to correct

       error for an abuse of discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the

       trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and

       circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” In re

       G.R., 863 N.E.2d 323, 325–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

       II. Analysis
       A.      Denial of LWG’s Motions for a Directed Verdict
[10]   The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “determining whether evidence was

       sufficient ‘requires both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis.’” Purcell, 972

       N.E.2d at 840 (quoting Am. Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 457 N.E.2d 181, 184

       (Ind. 1983)). “Evidence fails quantitatively only if it is wholly absent; that is,

       only if there is no evidence to support the conclusion.” Id. “If some evidence

       exists, a court must then proceed to the qualitative analysis to determine

       whether the evidence is substantial enough to support a reasonable inference in

       favor of the non-moving party.” Id.

[11]           “Qualitatively, ... [evidence] fails when it cannot be said, with
               reason, that the intended inference may logically be drawn
               therefrom; and this may occur either because of an absence of
               credibility of a witness or because the intended inference may not
               be drawn therefrom without undue speculation.” American
               Optical, 457 N.E.2d at 184. The use of such words as
               “substantial” and “probative” are useful in determining whether
               evidence is sufficient under the qualitative analysis. Id.
               Ultimately, the sufficiency analysis comes down to one word:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 11 of 35
               “reasonable.” See, e.g., [Raess, 883 N.E.2d at 793] (“A motion for
               judgment on the evidence should be granted only when there is a
               complete failure of proof because there is no substantial evidence or
               reasonable inference supporting an essential element of the claim.”
               (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks
               omitted)); Ross v. Lowe, 619 N.E.2d 911, 914 (Ind. 1993) (“If
               there is any probative evidence or reasonable inference to be
               drawn from the evidence in favor of the plaintiff or if there is
               evidence allowing reasonable people to differ as to the result,
               judgment on the evidence is improper.”); Teitge v. Remy Const. Co.
               Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. App. Ct. 1988) (“[J]udgment
               on the evidence is proper only where there is a lack of evidence of
               probative value upon one or more of the factual issues necessary
               to support a verdict, and no reasonable inference in favor of the
               plaintiff can be drawn from this evidence.”).

       Id. (brackets, ellipsis, and emphasis in original).

[12]           By its express language, Rule 50 acknowledges that a party must
               do more than simply present some evidence; in addition, that
               evidence must also be sufficient evidence. Unlike a motion for
               summary judgment under Rule 56, the sufficiency test of Rule
               50(A) is not merely whether a conflict of evidence may exist, but
               rather whether there exists probative evidence, substantial
               enough to create a reasonable inference that the non-movant has
               met his burden.

       Id. at 841. “The crux of the qualitative failure analysis under Rule 50(A) is

       ‘whether the inference the burdened party’s allegations are true may be drawn

       without undue speculation.’” Id. (quoting Dettman v. Sumner, 474 N.E.2d 100,

       105 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)).

[13]   Furthermore, we have concluded that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023       Page 12 of 35
               if a defendant unsuccessfully moves for a judgment on the
               evidence at the close of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, presents his
               own additional evidence thereafter, but renews his motion at the
               conclusion of all evidence, the motion is preserved in the
               traditional sense and is reviewed in light of only the evidence
               introduced during the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. This explains why
               it is advantageous for the defendant to renew the motion. Where
               the defendant moves for judgment on the evidence at the close of
               the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, presents his own evidence thereafter,
               but fails to renew the motion at the conclusion of all evidence,
               the motion is not completely “waived,” because renewal is not a
               requirement under Rule 50. However, the motion must be
               reviewed in light of all evidence presented during the trial,
               because any evidence offered by the defendant may cure an
               otherwise erroneous denial of his motion for judgment on the
               evidence. Appellate review of the motion essentially becomes
               review for sufficiency of the evidence.

       Farmers Elevator Co. of Oakville v. Hamilton, 926 N.E.2d 68, 76 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2010), trans. denied; see also Romero v. State, 124 N.E.3d 1287, 1290–91 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2019).

[14]   The parties dispute whether LWG renewed its motions for a directed verdict at

       the close of evidence. While the City claims that LWG made only a general

       request for the trial court to enter judgment in its favor, LWG claims that it

       effectively renewed its motions for a directed verdict, mentioning the issues

       included in its motions for a directed verdict and specifically mentioning the

       words “directed verdict.” While LWG, perhaps, could have been more specific

       in its arguments to the trial court, counsel did attempt to renew LWG’s motions

       for a directed verdict, arguing the same grounds as were argued in the motions

       and referring to the motions themselves. As such, in reviewing whether the trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 13 of 35
       court abused its discretion in denying LWG’s motions for a directed verdict, we

       limit our review to only the evidence presented during the City’s case-in-chief.

       1.      Adverse Domination

[15]   “‘Adverse domination is an equitable doctrine that tolls statutes of limitations

       for claims by corporations against its officers, directors, lawyers and

       accountants for so long as the corporation is controlled by those acting against

       its interests.’” City of Marion II, 169 N.E.3d at 390–91 (quoting Clark v. Milam,

       192 W.Va. 398, 452 S.E.2d 714, 718 (1994)). “It ‘applies to causes of action

       against the wrongdoing directors ... [and] against co-conspirators of the

       wrongdoers.’” Id. at 391 (quoting Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp.,

       665 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2012)) (brackets and ellipsis in original). The

       doctrine of adverse domination was “founded on the presumption that those

       who engage in fraudulent activity likely will make it difficult for others to

       discover their misconduct.” Id. at 392.

[16]           “Generally, a corporation ‘knows,’ or ‘discovers,’ what its
               officers and directors know.” Clark, 452 S.E.2d at 718. “But
               when officers and directors act against the interests of the
               corporation, their knowledge, like that of any agent acting
               adversely to his principal, is not imputed to the corporation.” Id.;
               see also Am. Heritage Banco, Inc. v. McNaughton, 879 N.E.2d 1110,
               1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (exception to the general rule of
               imputed knowledge when an agent acts adversely to the
               principal). A corporate plaintiff cannot “have ‘knowledge’ of an
               injury to itself until those individuals who control it know of the
               injury and are willing to act on that knowledge.” [Resol. Tr. Corp. v.
               Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1994)] (emphasis
               added). In other words, where an “entity is dominated by those

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023       Page 14 of 35
               whose own malfeasance might be revealed in the course of
               litigating a complaint, it follows the entity has not ‘discovered’
               the injury to its interests in any meaningful way.” [Resol. Tr.
               Corp. v. O’Bear, Overholser, Smith & Huffer, 840 F. Supp. 1270,
               1284 (N.D. Ind. 1993)]. The doctrine is based “on the theory
               that it is impossible for the corporation to bring the action while
               it is controlled, or ‘dominated,’ by culpable officers and
               directors.” [F.D.I.C. v. Smith, 980 P.2d 141, 144 (Or. 1999)].
               Wrongdoing officers and directors “cannot be expected to sue
               themselves or to initiate any action contrary to their own
               interests.” Id. Thus, the statute of limitations is tolled as long as
               a corporate plaintiff is controlled by the alleged wrongdoers. Id.

       Id. at 391.

[17]   The Indiana Supreme Court has limited the application of the adverse-

       domination doctrine to cases “in which intentional wrongdoing is involved” so

       as not to “‘overthrow the statute of limitations completely in the corporate

       context.” Id. at 392 (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir.

       1993)). The doctrine applies to both private and municipal corporations. Id. In

       addition, “[i]t is well established that the doctrine also applies to causes of

       action against co-conspirators of the wrongdoers who adversely dominate the

       entity.” Id.

[18]   In denying LWG’s motion for a directed verdict on adverse domination

       grounds, the trial court found as follows:

               To avoid a directed verdict on its adverse domination defense,
               the City must have introduced evidence supporting a conclusion
               that Mayor Seybold engaged in intentional wrongdoing, that
               LWG was complicit in the wrongdoing, and that no one else had
               the knowledge, capability and motivation to bring suit.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023        Page 15 of 35
        The City’s evidence provides a basis for reasonable inferences
        that: The Mayor formed a personal relationship with Michael
        An, and thereafter directed $2.5 million of public money toward
        An’s YMCA project without objectively establishing An’s
        credentials as a developer. Members of the Mayor’s
        administration who served at the pleasure of the Mayor
        facilitated the financing of the $2.5 million. Disbursements of the
        $2.5 million were made without An having to meet the
        conditions precedent set out within the bond indenture. LWG
        was complicit in this wrongdoing, in that Mr. Swintz sent an
        email urging the First Farmers trustee to disburse funds to An,
        although Mr. Swintz knew that An had not provided acceptable
        proof of the additional $3 million he was required to commit
        before being entitled to disbursement. An made payments to
        Mayor Seybold for a campaign contribution, to pay the Mayor’s
        life insurance premium, and to the Mayor’s wife. An also hired
        the Mayor’s brother Chad to work on the YMCA project. When
        KPMG was hired to investigate or audit the YMCA project,
        Chad refused to turn over receipts of project expenditures, citing
        a non-disclosure agreement with Mr. An. Mayor Seybold’s
        administration did not insist on seeing the agreement to
        determine if this claim was legitimate, did not seek relief from the
        NDA from Mr. An, and did not ask the City Council to invoke
        its subpoena power to obtain these records, pursuant to I.C. 36-4-
        6-21.

        The YMCA project was a significant commitment of public
        money, and became a source of local controversy when the
        public money was spent and the project not completed. If the
        Mayor’s administration was serious about investigating the
        project, there were easily available steps that were not taken. The
        city administration took “no” as an answer from the Mayor’s
        brother, and did little else to get to the bottom of the issue. This
        evidence could be interpreted by a reasonable jury as proof that
        the Mayor engaged in intentional wrongdoing, and this in turn
        made it difficult or impossible for others at the City to discover
        and act on evidence of this wrongdoing.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 16 of 35
        LWG can defeat an otherwise proven claim of adverse
        domination if it establishes another person or entity had the
        ability, knowledge, and motivation to bring suit despite the
        Mayor’s adverse domination, and failed to do so. [LWG]
        identifies the Redevelopment Commission as that entity, citing
        I.C. 36-7-14-12.2(11). That section does provide that the
        Redevelopment Commission has the ability to bring suit in the
        name of the City. This establishes that the Commission had the
        ability to bring suit, but not that it also had the knowledge and
        motivation to do so. Mr. Hunt’s testimony described that
        economic development project presentations made to the City’s
        deliberative bodies were typically brief oral presentations made
        either by persons subject to the Mayor’s appointment/retention
        authority, or by persons hired by these [persons]. A jury could
        reasonably infer that if the Mayor did not want the deliberative
        bodies to be aware of facts implicating the Mayor in wrongdoing,
        that he would discourage members of his administration from
        making these facts known to these bodies, including the
        Redevelopment Commission. Without a showing of the bodies’
        knowledge and motivation to bring suit, the mere statutory
        capability is insufficient.

        [The City’s] evidence would permit a reasonable jury to conclude
        Mayor Seybold did adversely dominate the City during his term
        in office. Through cross-examination and impeachment, LWG
        has challenged many of the inferences in favor of [the City] listed
        above, and the jury may ultimately not accept the City’s position
        after all evidence for both sides has been brought forth. For
        example, Chad Seybold testified that he was hired by Mr. An
        solely through Chad’s own merit, over the strenuous objections
        of his brother the Mayor. And Mr. Kleinrichert testified that Mr.
        An had roughly $38,000 of his own, non-bond related funds in
        his account from which he could have made the payments to the
        Mayor and his Wife. The jury has the prerogative to reject Chad
        Seybold’s self-serving statements that the Mayor was uninvolved
        in his selection by Mr. An. Likewise, the jury could conclude
        that Mr. An’s payments to the Seybolds from the account

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023     Page 17 of 35
               receiving YMCA bond money were at least in some proportion
               made from bond proceeds, as Mr. An was commingling his
               personal funds with corporate assets in a non-businesslike
               manner.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 79–81. LWG challenges the trial court’s

       determination that the City presented sufficient evidence of both intentional

       wrongdoing and domination by Mayor Seybold to survive its directed verdict

       motions. Specifically, LWG asserts that “[a]t bottom, the trial court’s

       conclusions with respect to intentional wrongdoing by the Mayor amount to

       nothing more than unsupported innuendo” and “[s]imply put, the City failed to

       adduce any evidence that Mayor Seybold did anything that could qualify as

       intentional wrongdoing.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 34, 36.

       a.      Intentional Wrongdoing

[19]   With regard to the trial court’s determination that the City’s evidence supported

       a reasonable inference of intentional wrongdoing by Mayor Seybold, LWG

       argues that “[e]ven assuming such inferences were properly drawn from the

       sparse evidence adduced from the City’s five witnesses, they come nowhere

       close to establishing intentional wrongdoing by Mayor Seybold.” Appellant’s Br.

       p. 30 (emphasis in original). In support, LWG cites to the United States Court

       of Appeals for the 5th Circuit’s decision in Dawson in which the Federal Deposit

       Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) sued certain individuals connected to a failed

       bank, Texas Investment Bank, N.A. (“TIB”). 4 F.3d at 1305. The FDIC

       alleged that Dawson, TIB’s former president, and other board members had

       made a series of eighty-two unsafe and unsound loans between February of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 18 of 35
       1982 and October of 1984, which constituted unsafe and unsound banking

       policies “that should have been detected and prevented by Dawson and the

       other members of TIB’s board of directors.” Id. Some of the defendants moved

       to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming that it was barred by the applicable statute of

       limitations. Id. at 1306. For its part, the FDIC argued that the statute of

       limitations did not apply because of the doctrine of adverse domination. Upon

       review, the 5th Circuit concluded that

               [t]he FDIC’s own evidence tended to show that most of TIB’s
               directors may have been negligent in failing to supervise the
               lending functions. Yet, at the same time, the board never
               concealed its “serious deficiencies” from examination by the
               OCC or anyone else. Even after the OCC notified TIB’s board of
               its shortcomings in supervising TIB’s lending function, there is
               no evidence to suggest that an organized majority coalesced to
               prevent any other parties from discovering the problems.

       4 F.3d at 1312. Thus, the 5th Circuit determined that the adverse-domination

       theory was inappropriate as the evidence established mere negligence rather

       than intentional wrongdoing. Id.

[20]   LWG also cites to the 5th Circuit’s decision in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Acton, 49

       F.3d 1086 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Acton I”). In Acton I, the defendants, who were

       former directors of HeritageBanc Savings Association (“HeritageBanc”), were

       alleged to have breached their fiduciary duties and committed gross negligence

       with respect to their oversight duties for HeritageBanc. 49 F.3d at 1088–89.

       Charles Acton, the chairman of the board and president of HeritageBanc

       appointed his wife, two daughters, and father-in-law as officers of HeritageBanc

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023     Page 19 of 35
       and/or one of its subsidiaries. Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Acton, 844 F. Supp. 307, 310–

       11 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (“Acton II”). Acton’s two sons-in-law were also active in

       bank operations. Id. at 311. In alleging adverse domination, the plaintiff

       alleged that HeritageBanc had circumvented regulation by making “a number

       of imprudent transactions.” Id. These allegedly imprudent transactions

       included (1) the sale of land owned by HeritageBanc to a member of Acton’s

       family for $0.64 per square foot only for the bank to repurchase the land four

       months later at a rate of $6.50 per square foot, (2) 100% financing for the

       purchase of land by a client from HeritageBanc and one of Acton’s family

       members, and (3) make a series of loans to allegedly insolvent entities. Id.

       Based on these transactions, Acton and the other board members were alleged

       to be grossly negligent. On appeal, the 5th Circuit concluded that negligence,

       even if gross in nature, “is not enough to toll limitations” under the doctrine of

       adverse domination. Acton I, 49 F.3d at 1092.

[21]   Finally, LWG cites to the United States District Court for the Northern District

       of Texas’s decision in U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,

       2012 WL 3100778 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2012), in which an independent board

       that had allegedly been chosen by Verizon was alleged to have engaged in

       adverse domination by engaging in allegedly tainted business dealings with

       Verizon. The court concluded that the board members had not engaged in

       intentional wrongdoing and, as such, the adverse-domination doctrine did not

       apply to toll the statute of limitations. Verizon, 2012 WL 3100778 at *15.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023     Page 20 of 35
[22]   LWG asserts that the acts involved in each of the three cited cases are arguably

       worse than the alleged acts committed by Mayor Seybold, suggesting that

       Mayor Seybold’s acts could not reasonably have been classified as intentional

       wrongdoing. Specifically, LWG asserts that “[n]one of the evidence proffered

       in the City’s case-in-chief demonstrated any conduct by Mayor Seybold as

       egregious as the conduct shown in these decisions, all of which was held not to

       meet the standard of intentional wrongdoing.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 32–33.

[23]   Despite LWG’s assertion, with respect to the alleged intentional wrongdoing by

       Mayor Seybold, the City’s case-in-chief contained evidence indicating that

       Mayor Seybold had received improper financial benefits from An in the form of

       cash payments to his wife and political campaign and premium payments on a

       life insurance policy with these benefits being financed solely or at least in part

       from bond proceeds. Specifically, the City presented evidence that showed that

       An had made cash payments to Mayor Seybold’s wife and his political

       campaign as well as had made premium payments on a life insurance policy

       taken out for Mayor Seybold’s benefit. An issued a $1000.00 check made

       payable to Mayor Seybold’s wife, Jennifer, from funds which, based on the

       account the check came from, Kleinrichert testified “with 100 percent

       certainty” came “from the bonds.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 138. Other payments came

       from accounts in which An is alleged to have co-mingled personal and bond

       funds, with “[b]etween 98 and 99 percent of the money” in those accounts

       coming from bond proceeds. Tr. Vol. IV p. 110. An was listed as the

       “premium payor” of the $792.48 annual premium on the life insurance policy

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 21 of 35
       taken out for Mayor Seybold’s benefit. Appellee’s Addendum p. 37.

       Kleinrichert further testified that he had seen no indication that either the life

       insurance premiums or the $1000.00 payment to Jennifer Seybold had ever

       been reimbursed by Mayor Seybold and that he had been able to “follow 100

       percent of the bond money” to see where it had gone and how it had been

       spent. Tr. Vol. IV p. 111. This evidence supports a finding, at the very least,

       that the $1000.00 payment to Jennifer came from bond proceeds and, the jury

       could reasonably infer that it was very probable that the other payments also

       came from bond proceeds.

[24]   The City also introduced evidence that An and Chad had failed to cooperate

       with the initial investigation into use of bond funds that was conducted during

       Mayor Seybold’s time in office, with Chad citing a non-disclosure agreement

       with An. While the City does not cite to any evidence specifically indicating

       that Mayor Seybold instructed An and Chad to refuse to cooperate with the

       investigation, there is no evidence indicating that Mayor Seybold took any

       action to ensure cooperation with the investigation by either his brother or An.

       While this evidence itself falls short of establishing intentional wrongdoing by

       Mayor Seybold, this evidence was not considered in isolation but together with

       the other evidence relating to the alleged intentional wrongdoing by Mayor

       Seybold.

[25]   In denying LWG’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial court also cited

       evidence indicating that disbursements of the $2.5 million bond proceeds were

       made without An having to meet the conditions set out in the bond indenture.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 22 of 35
       While An was initially required to submit proof of funding before bond

       proceeds would be released by First Farmers, i.e., the bank through which bond

       proceeds were released, the City introduced evidence that “Mayor Seybold, for

       and on behalf of the City of Marion, waived the documentation requirements of

       Section 4.3 of the Trust Indenture, and further instructed First Farmers to

       cooperate and work through Chad Seybold.” Ex. Vol. 11 p. 36. The City

       further provided evidence establishing that while a document referred to as the

       Cho Memorandum claimed to provide proof that An had secured funding to

       complete the YMCA project, “[a] competent financial advisor reading the [Cho

       Memorandum] would recognize readily that it did not do so.” Tr. Vol. III p.

       228. As it was, the Cho Memorandum was not disseminated to all relevant

       City officials or to First Farmers.

[26]   The trial court also cited evidence that Mayor Seybold did not objectively

       establish An’s credentials as a developer before directing $2.5 million of public

       money toward the YMCA project, with the City presenting the expert

       testimony of Robert Doty, a financial advisor in the municipal bond market

       who was hired to review the circumstances relating to the YMCA project.

       Doty testified that (1) he had not “seen evidence that [An] had experience in

       developing this type of project” and (2) An “didn’t approach the transaction in

       the way that many developers would approach a bond finance transaction. He

       didn’t have a lawyer who understood bond finance for development projects.

       He didn’t have an accountant or didn’t have a bank advising him.” Tr. Vol. III

       p. 240. In addition, An hired Mayor Seybold’s brother, Chad, to work as

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023    Page 23 of 35
       project manager on the YMCA project despite the fact that Chad had not had

       any experience building a boutique hotel “or anything like that.” Tr. Vol. III p.

       15.

[27]   The trial court considered all of the above-discussed evidence, which again was

       presented during the City’s case-in-chief, and determined that a directed verdict

       was improper because there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable

       inference of wrongdoing, or at least that would allow reasonable persons to

       differ as to the result. See Purcell, 972 N.E.2d at 840. Upon review, we reach

       the same conclusion as the trial court.

       b.      Domination

[28]   In addition to proving intentional wrongdoing, the City was also required to

       prove that Mayor Seybold had dominated the City. City of Marion II, 169

       N.E.3d at 396. “An affirmative showing of domination would require a city to

       show that its mayor was exercising its ability to supervise and control the City

       Attorney, and others who could investigate the mayor’s own wrongdoing.” Id.

       at 397.

[29]   LWG asserts that the City failed to present sufficient evidence to defeat its

       motion for a directed verdict on the question of whether Mayor Seybold had

       dominated the City. LWG claims that “the City presented no evidence during

       its case-in-chief that Mayor Seybold did anything to exercise domination over

       the city attorney” or the City’s Redevelopment Commission, both of whom had

       the authority to file suit on behalf of the City. Appellant’s Br. p. 39.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023       Page 24 of 35
[30]   While the Redevelopment Commission may have had the statutory power to

       file suit on behalf of the City, three of its five members were appointed by

       Mayor Seybold and any or all of those three members could have been removed

       by him without cause. See Ind. Code §§ 36-7-14-6.1(a) (“The five (5)

       commissioners for a municipal redevelopment commission shall be appointed

       as follows: (1) three (3) shall be appointed by the municipal executive.), 36-7-

       14-9(a) (“The municipal executive … that appointed a municipal

       redevelopment commissioner may summarily remove that commissioner from

       office at any time.”). In addition, while LWG is correct that the

       Redevelopment Commission has the power to “[i]nstitute or defend in the

       name of the unit any civil action,” Indiana Code section 36-7-14-12.2(a)(11),

       the statute does not explicitly grant the Redevelopment Commission the

       statutory power to investigate alleged wrongdoing by the City’s executive. See

       Ind. Code § 36-7-14-12.2.2 Further, given that the Redevelopment Commission

       had not received either the Cho Memorandum or any information relating to

       how the Bond proceeds had been spent, the a fact-finder could reasonably infer

       that the Redevelopment Commission had not, during the relevant time period,

       had any reason to believe that it was necessary to bring a lawsuit on the City’s

       behalf.

       2
         Indiana Code section 36-7-14-12.2 was amended effective January 1, 2023. The current version of the
       statute still does not appear to give the Redevelopment Commission the statutory power to investigate alleged
       wrongdoing by the City’s executive.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023                           Page 25 of 35
[31]   In addition, Tom Hunt, who became corporate counsel for the City on

       September 1, 2014, testified that neither he nor his predecessor could have filed

       a lawsuit relating to the YMCA project without Mayor Seybold’s approval.

       Specifically, Hunt testified that both he and his predecessor “served at the

       pleasure of the mayor, took directions from the mayor, and did projects as the

       mayor directed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 91. Hunt further testified that he was never

       directed by Mayor Seybold “to look into whether the [C]ity had any legal rights

       that it could enforce to require” An to complete the project. Tr. Vol. II p. 90.

[32]   Furthermore, despite LWG’s claim to the contrary, the City’s case-in-chief

       included evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could infer that Mayor

       Seybold had impeded the KPMG investigation. Again, the City’s evidence

       established that neither Chad nor An had cooperated with the KPMG

       investigation, with Chad claiming that he “was not able to because [he] was

       under a non-disclosure agreement with [An].” Tr. Vol. III p. 106. The Indiana

       Supreme Court discussed Chad’s actions and Mayor Seybold’s alleged control

       over the KPMG investigation in City of Marion II, stating

               Here, the KPMG investigation was initiated by Mayor Seybold’s
               office. But it never came close to revealing any wrongdoing
               because Mayor Seybold’s own brother refused to give KPMG the
               receipts necessary to perform an investigation. And Mayor
               Seybold never asked Chad to turn over the receipts, further
               establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to Mayor
               Seybold’s willingness to redress the City’s injures. The reasonable
               inference to draw here is that Mayor Seybold would not allow an
               investigation into the project, and his alleged wrongdoing, to succeed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023         Page 26 of 35
       169 N.E.3d at 394–95 (emphasis added). We agree with the Indiana Supreme

       Court that Chad’s refusal to cooperate with the investigation together with

       Mayor Seybold’s failure to request that Chad and An cooperate with the

       investigation supports the reasonable inference that Mayor Seybold exerted

       control over the investigation such that any wrongdoing on his behalf would

       not be discovered.

[33]   Further, although Hunt provided another city employee, who also served at the

       pleasure of the mayor, a name of someone at KPMG, he did not hear anything

       about what happened to the KPMG investigation until after Mayor Seybold

       had left office. It seems unlikely that the City attorney, i.e., Hunt, would not

       have had at least some knowledge of or been involved at some level in an

       investigation into issues relating to city spending/funding. The trial court

       found that “[a] jury could reasonably infer that if the Mayor did not want the

       deliberative bodies to be aware of facts implicating [him] in wrongdoing, that he

       would discourage members of his administration from making these facts

       known to these bodies, including the Redevelopment Commission.”

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 81.3

[34]   Upon review, like the trial court, we conclude that the evidence presented in the

       City’s case-in-chief was such that reasonable persons could differ as to the

       3
         The City also argues that the tolling of the statute of limitations was warranted due to the doctrine of
       fraudulent concealment. The trial court, however, did not base its ruling on this doctrine and we accordingly
       limit our focus to the parties’ arguments relating to adverse domination.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023                            Page 27 of 35
       result. As such, we agree with the trial court’s determination that it would have

       been improper for the trial court to have entered a directed verdict in favor of

       LWG on the question of whether Mayor Seybold dominated the City during

       the relevant time period. See Purcell, 972 N.E.2d at 840.

       c.      LWG’s Complicity

[35]   The City also presented evidence of LWG’s complicity, mainly through the

       actions of LWG employee Bob Swintz, who had acted as a financial advisor for

       Mayor Seybold’s administration. Swintz was one of the few individuals who

       had received the Cho Memorandum. Doty opined that Swintz should have

       “delivered that document to the key decision makers, the financial decision

       makers of the city, the Common Counsel, the city commissions, the Economic

       Development Director, and the mayor” and “warned the city that the [Cho

       Memorandum] was a red flag that funding was not available to complete the

       project and that the city needed to take action to protect itself.” Tr. Vol. III p.

       228. Hunt testified that the Economic Development Commission would not

       have been able to find that the YMCA project would create a public benefit had

       it known An did not have requisite funding. Specifically, Hunt testified that

               if the Commission knew about it, it would have been difficult for
               them to make the … finding that … a public benefit to the area to
               be developed would result, because if … [An] didn’t have the
               money to complete the project, then the project never got off the
               ground and there would be no benefit. So if the Commission …
               had been informed that the … developer was underfunded, then
               they could not have made that … finding.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023       Page 28 of 35
       Tr. Vol. II p. 81. It appears that, at the very least, Swintz was complicit in

       keeping the Cho Memorandum from relevant city officials.

[36]   In addition, Doty opined that Swintz had “acted against the city’s best interest”

       in giving certain advice to Chad, which had enabled Chad “to circumvent, key

       protections, important protections in the trust indenture for the city requiring

       that reimbursement be made only for costs that had already been spent on the

       project.” Tr. Vol. III p. 228. Doty further opined that in 2011, Swintz had

       “voluntarily made an affirmative recommendation to the Common Counsel

       that the 2009 bonds be refinanced” without forming a reasonable basis for that

       recommendation or informing the Counsel that “the transaction created new

       risks for the city.” Tr. Vol. III p. 229. The City also introduced various emails

       which, at the very least, supported a reasonable inference that Swintz had been

       aware of and had acted in a manner complicit with Mayor Seybold’s actions.

       Swintz’s testimony indicated that he had made false, or at the very least

       misleading, statements to First Farmers and KPMG during communications

       regarding the bonds and the subsequent investigation into the use of the bond

       funds. The above-stated evidence is sufficient to have rendered entry of a

       directed verdict on the question of complicity improper. See Purcell, 972 N.E.2d

       at 840. In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

       denying LWG’s motion for a directed verdict on the City’s claim of adverse

       domination.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 29 of 35
       2.      LWG’s Liability

[37]   LWG additionally contends that “[i]n addition to being time-barred, the City’s

       claims against [LWG] are without merit.” Appellant’s Br. p. 42. Thus, LWG

       asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict “on

       both the negligence and fiduciary duty claims.” Appellant’s Br. p. 43 (emphasis

       omitted). For its part, the City contends that the trial court did not abuse its

       discretion as its case-in-chief contained sufficient evidence to survive LWG’s

       motions for a directed verdict.

       i.      The City’s Negligence Claim

[38]   With respect to the City’s negligence claim, LWG asserts that “the City

       submitted no evidence as to what constitutes the applicable standard of care for

       negligence as against [LWG].” Appellant’s Br. p. 43. LWG further asserts

       because such evidence was necessary to prove the City’s negligence claim, the

       trial court abused its discretion in denying LWG’s motion for a directed verdict.

[39]   LWG points to Doty’s testimony, wherein he indicated that the negligence

       standard of care and the fiduciary standard of care are different, with the

       fiduciary standard of care being higher. LWG also points to Doty’s admission

       on cross-examination that “[i]f you looked at [LWG’s] conduct from just the

       standard of care applicable to negligence,” it is possible that there may not have

       been a breach of the negligence standard. Tr. Vol. IV p. 21. Doty also testified,

       however, regarding the ways he believed LWG, through Swintz, had breached

       the relevant standards of care, outlining actions which he believed Swintz

       should have taken in order to have acted as a competent financial advisor. The
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023      Page 30 of 35
       evidence was sufficient to create a question for the jury as it could support a

       reasonable inference in favor of the City. See Purcell, 972 N.E.2d at 840. The

       trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying LWG’s motion for

       a directed verdict.

       ii.     The City’s Fiduciary-Duty Claim

[40]   Statements relating to the standard of care given by competent fiduciaries were

       spaced throughout Doty’s expert testimony. LWG acknowledged that Doty

       had addressed the standard of care but claims that the trial court abused its

       discretion in denying its motions for a directed verdict because Doty had

       “merely assumed that [LWG] owed the City a fiduciary duty at the time the

       2009 bond was issued.” Appellant’s Br. p. 45. LWG argues that its fiduciary

       duty was not established until after the 2009 bonds were issued. Swintz’s

       testimony at trial, however, seems to indicate otherwise.

[41]   LWG alternatively argues that even if it had a fiduciary duty to the City prior to

       the issuance of the bonds, Doty’s opinions do not support an inference that

       LWG had breached said duty. Doty opined otherwise, testifying that he

       believed that LWG had breached its duty in three ways. First,

               Swintz received a very important document from Chad Seybold
               intended for the city. I’ll refer to it as the [Cho Memorandum].
               The [Cho] Memorandum claimed to provide proof that funding
               was available to complete the YMCA project in the city. A
               competent financial advisor reading the [Cho Memorandum]
               would recognize readily that it did not do so. Mr. Swintz should
               have delivered that document to the key decision makers, the
               financial decision makers of the city, the Common Counsel, the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023     Page 31 of 35
        city commissions, the Economic Development Director, and the
        mayor. In addition, he should have warned the city that the
        [Cho Memorandum] was a red flag that funding was not
        available to complete the project and that the city needed to take
        action to protect itself.

Tr. Vol. III p. 227–28. Second,

        Swintz voluntarily undertook to provide advice to Mr. Chad
        Seybold, the local representative of the developer, an adverse
        party to the city. In doing so, Mr. Swintz acted against the city’s
        best interest. He advised Mr. Seybold that there was no problem
        with submitting a reimbursement request the next day at the
        bond closing of -- for monies that had not been expended on the
        YMCA project. In doing so, Mr. Swintz’[s] advice to Mr.
        Seybold allowed Mr. Seybold to circumvent, key protections,
        important protections in the trust indenture for the city requiring
        that reimbursement be made only for costs that had already been
        spent on the project.

Tr. Vol. III p. 228. Third,

        Swintz voluntarily made an affirmative recommendation to the
        Common Counsel that the 2009 bonds be refinanced. In doing
        so, Mr. Swintz failed to do his homework to form a reasonable
        basis for that recommendation. In addition, Mr. Swintz failed to
        make a presentation to the Common Counsel that was balanced
        stating the pros and cons. He omitted to mention that the
        transaction, even though he presented positive information, he
        omitted to mention that the transaction created new risks for the
        city.… Those specific new risks were that a mortgage on the
        project and a personal guarantee by Mr. An, the developer,
        would be eliminated.

Tr. Vol. III p. 229.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023     Page 32 of 35
[42]   Doty gave specific examples of why he believed that LWG, through Swintz,

       had violated its fiduciary duty. Again, the evidence was sufficient to create a

       question for the jury as it could support a reasonable inference in favor of the

       City. See Purcell, 972 N.E.2d at 840. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its

       discretion in denying LWG’s motion for a directed verdict.4

       B. Whether the Damages Awarded by the Jury Are
       Excessive
[43]   Alternatively, LWG contends that “[a]t an absolute minimum, the jury’s award

       of over $3 million based on [LWG’s] supposed deficiencies cannot possibly be

       sustained.” Appellant’s Br. p. 50.

                “Damages are particularly a jury determination.” Prange v.
                Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.
                “No particular degree of mathematical certainty is required in
                awarding damages.” Greives v. Greenwood, 550 N.E.2d 334, 339
                (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). “We will not deem a verdict to be the
                result of improper considerations, unless it cannot be explained
                on any other reasonable ground.” Prange, 629 N.E.2d at 922.
                “Our inability to look into the minds of jurors and determine
                how they computed an award is, to a large extent, the reason
                behind the rule that a verdict will be upheld if the award falls
                within the bounds of the evidence.” Weinberger v. Boyer, 956
                N.E.2d 1095, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied (2012).
                “[I]f there is any evidence in the record which supports the

       4
         As the City points out in its brief, LWG did not include any argument relating to the City’s constructive-
       fraud claim in its initial brief. Although LWG argues in its reply brief that the trial court abused its discretion
       by denying its motions for a directed verdict as they related to the constructive-fraud claim, this argument is
       waived as LWG had not challenged the trial court’s order in this regard in its initial brief. See Moriarty v.
       Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 631 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (providing that an appellant may not raise new
       arguments in its reply brief), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023                                 Page 33 of 35
               amount of the award, even if it is variable or conflicting, the
               award will not be disturbed.” Prange, 629 N.E.2d at 922.

       Husainy v. Granite Mgmt., LLC, 132 N.E.3d 486, 493–94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

       Stated differently,

               [t]he verdict will be reversed only when it is apparent from a
               review of the evidence that the amount of damages awarded by
               the jury is so small or so great as to clearly indicate that the jury
               was motivated by prejudice, passion, partiality, corruption or that
               it considered an improper element.

       Dee v. Becker, 636 N.E.2d 176, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).

[44]   The jury found that LWG was 95% at fault and awarded $3,121,624.00 in

       damages against LWG. LWG claims that

               [i]t is utterly implausible to put 95% of the blame for the entirety
               of those damages on the accounting firm whose role was very
               limited, given the wrongdoing of others, including the developer
               and originator of the project, An, Chad, and many others. The
               over $3 million award simply cannot be sustained as having been
               caused exclusively by [LWG’s] actions.

       Appellant’s Br. p. 51. LWG asserts that its allegedly limited role does not

       support the “outrageous damages award made against it” and “[a]t a minimum,

       the award should be vacated.” Appellant’s Br. p. 52.

[45]   Although LWG claims that its involvement with the YMCA project and the

       bond financing was limited, the jury found otherwise, concluding that LWG

       had played an active role, or at least had been complicit, in the wrongdoing of

       others. In addition to the evidence discussed above, which again was limited to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023       Page 34 of 35
       evidence that was presented during the City’s case-in-chief, additional evidence

       was presented during trial that implicated LWG, or its representatives, as

       having played an active role in the actions relating to the funding of the YMCA

       project. LWG had owed a duty to the City, not Mayor Seybold. The jury

       determined that LWG had breached that duty and, as a result, the City had

       suffered damages. The jury’s award of damages was consistent with the

       damages that it found the City had incurred in connection to the YMCA

       project. As such, the jury’s award of damages was not excessive.

[46]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

       Riley, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2060 | October 10, 2023   Page 35 of 35