Court Opinion

ID: 9554357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 18:11:30.983195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:39.115072
License: Public Domain

J-S25019-23

  NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JONATHAN BENNETT                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 198 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2021
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                 Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0005523-2019

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                               FILED AUGUST 8, 2023

       Jonathan Bennett (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court convicted him of attempted murder, aggravated

assault, simple assault, and persons not to possess firearms.1 We affirm.

       The trial court detailed the underlying facts:

              On or around March 5, 2019, Elijah Joseph (hereinafter “Mr.
       Joseph” [or “the victim”]) moved into the second-floor apartment
       [(the apartment)] located at 5918 N. Marvine Street in the [C]ity
       and [C]ounty of Philadelphia. Notes of Testimony (hereinafter
       “N.T.”), 2/16/21, at 15-16. Mr. Joseph rented a bedroom, which
       included a lock on the bedroom door, from the individual currently
       residing in the apartment. Id. Said individual was identified as
       Whitney Allen (hereinafter “Ms. Allen”). Id. On the morning of
       March 12, 2019, a verbal altercation occurred between Mr. Joseph
       and Ms. Allen. Id. at 17-19. Mr. Joseph responded by offering to
       vacate the apartment on the condition that the one hundred fifty
       (150) dollars he paid as rent be refunded. Id. Ms. Allen agreed
       to this condition and told Mr. Joseph that she would retrieve the
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a) and 2502(a), 2702(a), 2701(a), 6105(a)(1).
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       rent money from her mother. Id. Following this discussion, Mr.
       Joseph left the apartment. Id.

             After Mr. Joseph left the apartment, Ms. Allen reported a
       disturbance at the apartment to the police and Officer [Joseph]
       Sugan responded to the call. Id. at 72-76. Officer Sugan testified
       that upon his arrival at [the apartment], Ms. Allen informed him
       that she was having an issue with a tenant and needed to know
       how to evict said tenant. Id. More specifically, Ms. Allen
       requested that Officer Sugan kick the tenant’s bedroom door
       down. Id. Officer Sugan told Ms. Allen that he could not legally
       comply with her request and explained that she would have to
       evict the tenant through the court system. Id. Following this
       interaction with Ms. Allen, Officer Sugan generated a police report
       memorializing the encounter. Id.

             At or around 8:00 P.M. on March 12, 2019, Mr. Joseph
       encountered Ms. Allen’s mother, Angela Horn (hereinafter “Ms.
       Horn”), and Appellant while walking near the … apartment. Id. at
       20. Mr. Joseph briefly interacted with Ms. Horn, before continuing
       his walk. Id.

             At or around 10:00 P.M. on March 12, 2019, Mr. Joseph
       returned to the … apartment to retrieve his Play Station [video
       game console]. Id. at 20-32. Mr. Joseph began recording a video
       on his cellphone shortly before he arrived at the apartment [(the
       video)]. Id. [As we discuss below, the trial court permitted the
       prosecution to play the video during direct examination of Mr.
       Joseph, over the defense’s objection that the video is “protected
       under … the Pennsylvania Wiretap law.”2 Id. at 22.] When Mr.
       Joseph entered the apartment, Ms. Allen and her mother were
       already inside. Id. [at 29-30.] Despite their presence, Mr. Joseph
       walked from the entrance of the apartment to his locked bedroom
       door. Id. After reaching the door to his bedroom, Mr. Joseph
       observed Appellant enter the apartment holding a gun. Id. [at
       31.] About five seconds after Appellant entered the apartment,
       Appellant fired the gun, hitting Mr. Joseph in the right thigh and
       back. Id. at [32,] 33-36.
____________________________________________

2 “In general, the Wiretap Act prohibits the interception, disclosure or use of

any wire, electronic or oral communication.” Commonwealth v. Byrd, 235
A.3d 311, 319 (Pa. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted); 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 5701 et seq.

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           Mr. Joseph testified that after he heard the initial gun shot,
     he immediately turned away from Appellant to avoid getting shot
     in the face or chest. Id. [at 35-36.] After Mr. Joseph was shot in
     the right thigh and back, he fell to the ground and attempted to
     “play dead” because he realized Appellant was “trying to kill” him.
     Id. Mr. Joseph remained on the ground until he was alone inside
     the apartment, at which point Mr. Joseph called 911. Id. at 37.
     Mr. Joseph stated that he believed he was going to die after he
     was shot. The police arrived shortly thereafter and transported
     Mr. Joseph to Albert Einstein Medical Center. Id. at 38.

            Detective [Anthony] Glaviano and his partner, Detective
     Cahill, were assigned to investigate the incident. Id. at 76.
     Detective Glaviano initially proceeded to Albert Einstein Medical
     Center but was unable to interview Mr. Joseph because he was in
     critical condition. Id. Later that night, a search warrant was
     issued and executed inside [the apartment]. An iPhone belonging
     to Mr. Joseph, two .45 caliber [fired cartridge casings,] and
     various documents were recovered from the crime scene.

           On March 13, 2019, Ms. Allen and Ms. Horn traveled to the
     Northwest Detectives, where Ms. Allen provided a formal
     statement detailing the events of the shooting. Id. at 85-87.
     More specifically, Ms. Allen identified the shooter as [] Appellant
     … and stated that [Appellant] was the longtime boyfriend of her
     mother, Ms. Horn. Id. Furthermore, Ms. Allen explained that she
     originally intended to offer Mr. Joseph one hundred fifty (150)
     dollars to vacate the apartment on the night of March 12, 2019.
     Id. However, Ms. Horn and Mr. Joseph began to argue, at which
     point Appellant entered the apartment and shot Mr. Joseph twice
     in the back without provocation. Id. After Mr. Joseph was shot,
     Appellant ordered Ms. Allen and Ms. Horn to flee the premises.
     Id. Ms. Allen also informed detectives that Ms. Horn had come to
     Northwest Detectives with the intention of lying to detectives
     about her involvement in the shooting. Id. Ms. Horn briefly spoke
     with detectives but refused to give a formal statement and denied
     that any shooting occurred at [the apartment]. Id.

           The contents of said statements le[]d Detective Glaviano to
     develop Appellant as a suspect in the shooting of Mr. Joseph. Id.
     On March 14, 2019, Detective Glaviano and his partner returned
     to Albert Einstein Medical Center, where Mr. Joseph was shown a
     photo lineup that included a photo of Appellant. Id. at 88. Mr.

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     Joseph indicated that the third photo in the lineup was the
     individual that shot him, stating “I recognize his face. I just don’t
     remember seeing those tattoos.” Id. at 64-65. Mr. Joseph was
     asked if he was confident in his identification, to which he
     responded, “It looks like him. I’m pretty sure that’s the one that
     shot me.” Id. at [59, 98]. Detective Glaviano testified that Mr.
     Joseph immediately began to cry and shake when shown the
     photo of Appellant. Id. [at 87-88.] After Mr. Joseph identified
     Appellant as the individual [who] shot him, Detective Glaviano
     took Mr. Joseph’s formal statement. Id.

            Hospital records show that Mr. Joseph was treated at Albert
     Einstein Medical Center for multiple gunshot wounds, which
     resulted in a bullet wound to the right forearm, bullet wound to
     the chest cavity, T5 closed fracture, T6 vertebral body fracture,
     T7 vertebral body fracture, L3 spinal processes fracture, and L4
     spinal processes fracture. Id. at 106-[]08. Upon Mr. Joseph’s
     arrival at the hospital, his injuries were found to be operable, and
     he underwent multiple surgeries. Id. Mr. Joseph was discharged
     directly to Moss Rehab Center on or around March 22, 2019. Id.
     Mr. Joseph is now a paraplegic due to the bullet fragments that
     remain in his spinal cord. Id.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, at 2-5 (footnote added).

     Following a non-jury trial on February 16, 2021, the trial court convicted

Appellant of the aforementioned crimes. The trial court deferred sentencing

for the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). On May 18,

2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 25 – 50 years in

prison. That same day, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion (PSM)

claiming the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence, and the trial

court imposed a manifestly excessive sentence. Appellant’s PSM was denied

by operation of law on September 20, 2021. He did not appeal.

     On October 23, 2021, Appellant filed a counseled petition pursuant to

the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant

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sought reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, based on

defense counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to file a requested direct appeal.

PCRA Petition, 10/23/21, ¶¶ 6-10.        The court granted Appellant’s PCRA

petition on January 4, 2022, and reinstated his direct appeal rights nunc pro

tunc. This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court have complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents four issues for review:

      1. Did the trial court err in overruling defense counsel’s objection
         to the admission of a recording that was inadmissible under 18
         Pa.C.S. § 5703 and did not fall under any of the exceptions of
         18 Pa.C.S. § 5704?

      2. Did the trial court err in overruling defense counsel’s objection
         to statements made in a recording as they constituted
         inadmissible hearsay?

      3. Did the trial court err by denying [Appellant’s] request for a
         new trial as the weight of the evidence should have resulted in
         an acquittal of all charges?

      4. Was the sentence manifestly excessive and unreasonable?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

      Appellant first claims the trial court committed reversible error when it

overruled Appellant’s objection to admission of the video. Appellant contends

the video “was inadmissible pursuant to the Wiretap Act” and not subject to

any exception. Id. at 13.

      Our “standard of review for a trial court’s evidentiary rulings is narrow.”

Commonwealth v. Mendez, 74 A.3d 256, 260 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation

omitted).

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      When we review a trial court’s ruling on admission of evidence,
      we must acknowledge that decisions on admissibility are within
      the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned
      absent an abuse of discretion or misapplication of law. In addition,
      for a ruling on evidence to constitute reversible error, it must have
      been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party. An abuse of
      discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a
      conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment
      exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
      prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record,
      discretion is abused.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 283 A.3d 814, 817 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted).

      As noted above, the Wiretap Act prohibits the interception, disclosure or

use of any wire, electronic or oral communication, unless an exception applies.

Byrd, supra; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703(1)–(3); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5721.1(a)

(providing generally, “no person shall disclose the contents of any wire,

electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, in any

proceeding in any court….”). The Wiretap Act defines “oral communication”

as “oral communication uttered by a person possessing an expectation that

such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances

justifying such expectation.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5702. Finally, a claimant alleging

a Wiretap Act violation bears the burden of establishing, inter alia, that the

claimant possessed a justifiable expectation that the communication would

not be intercepted. Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519, 522 (Pa. 1998).

      The Wiretap Act provides numerous exceptions to the general

prohibition announced in Byrd, supra, including an exception for

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      [a]ny victim … to intercept the contents of any wire, electronic or
      oral communication, if that person is under a reasonable suspicion
      that the intercepted party is committing, about to commit or has
      committed a crime of violence and there is reason to believe that
      evidence of the crime of violence may be obtained from the
      interception.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(17).     The Wiretap Act defines “crime of violence” by

listing numerous offenses under the Crimes Code. Id. § 5702 (including, inter

alia, aggravated assault).

    Instantly, Appellant’s counsel argued at trial that the exception at Section

5704(17) was inapplicable:

    One of the exceptions is crimes of violence, which if the individual
    believes that they’ll be recording a crime of violence, obviously, you
    should allow that [evidence]. But in a situation where the [victim]
    testified that he thought [a person] was going to be lying[,] that
    will not [fall] under the exception.

N.T., 2/16/21, at 23. Appellant’s counsel referenced Mr. Joseph’s testimony

on direct examination:

      Just before I got to the [apartment,] I started recording, because
      I felt [Ms. Allen] was going to … call the cops or say I threatened
      her or something. So I just started recording.

Id. at 20.   The trial court overruled Appellant’s objection, id. at 24, and

permitted the prosecution to play the video depicting the shooting. See id.

at 24-38.

      Appellant argues the exception at Section 5704(17) is inapplicable

because Mr. Joseph’s trial testimony purportedly “revealed that the [video]

recording was made not to capture evidence of a violent crime, but rather to

dispute accusations that [Ms.] Allen could make when [Appellant] entered the

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[apartment].” Appellant’s Brief at 14 (citing Mr. Joseph’s testimony regarding

his motive when he began recording the video); see also N.T., 2/16/21, at

20.

      Contrary to Appellant, the Commonwealth argues:

      [T]he evidence at issue does not meet the definition of “oral
      communication” protected by the [Wiretap Act.] Here, [Appellant]
      had no justifiable expectation that his communications would not
      be subject to interception. He was not in his own home during
      the recorded incident. He was in [Mr. Joseph’s] home.

Commonwealth Brief at 9; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5702, supra (defining

“oral communication”).     In the alternative, the Commonwealth states:

“[A]ssuming arguendo that this was an interception of protected oral

communications—it would fall under the violent crime exception” at 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(17). Commonwealth Brief at 10. We agree.

      The trial court opined that it did not err in overruling Appellant’s

objection to the video’s admission. The court explains that the exception at

Section 5704(17) applies, because

      the Commonwealth established that Mr. Joseph, the victim, was
      under a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Allen, Ms. Horn, and
      Appellant were about to commit a crime of violence against him
      and had reason to believe that evidence of the crime might be
      obtained from recording his interaction with said individuals.
      Preliminarily, the term “crime of violence” includes attempt to
      commit murder and aggravated assault. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5702.
      Further, Mr. Joseph was acting as a private citizen, and was not
      acting as an agent of the Commonwealth or at the discretion of
      law enforcement. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5704. Mr. Joseph began making
      the [video] recording after [previously] having an unrecorded
      altercation with Ms. Allen, as well as an unrecorded encounter with
      Ms. Horn and Appellant. N.T., 2/16/21, at 17-20. It was after
      these interactions that Mr. Joseph began to record his return to

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      [the apartment] in order to document and gather evidence of a
      potential violent crime. Id. at 20-36. After Mr. Joseph was shot,
      he informed law enforcement from his hospital bed that he had
      captured a video and audio recording of the shooting on his
      cellphone. N.T., 2/16/21, at 77-92. The iPhone [police] found at
      the crime scene was then returned to Mr. Joseph and the video of
      the incident was recovered. Id. Based on these facts, Mr.
      Joseph’s recording falls squarely within the exception to the
      Wiretap Act under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5704(17).             Accordingly,
      Appellant’s claim lacks merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, at 8-9 (some capitalization modified).         Our

review discloses that the record supports the trial court’s reasoning. Contrary

to Appellant’s claim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling

Appellant’s objection to admission of the video. Thus, Appellant’s first issue

lacks merit.

      In his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling

his objection to statements made by people in the video. See Appellant’s

Brief at 14-16. According to Appellant, the out-of-court statements constitute

inadmissible hearsay, as “they were being offered for the truth of the matter

asserted … to show, consistent with [Mr.] Joseph’s testimony, that an

argument actually occurred” at the apartment. Id. at 15. Appellant further

claims the statements “do not fall under any established exceptions” to the

rule against hearsay. Id. at 16.

      The Commonwealth counters that the video

      recording is [] not hearsay because it is not being used to prove
      the truth of the matter asserted. The [video] recording
      contains an argument between the victim, [his] roommate
      Whitney Allen, her mother Angela Horn, and [Appellant]. It was
      not introduced at trial to establish the truth of the specific

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          statements made, but to establish that a heated argument
          occurred (proving motive) and [Appellant] was the shooter
          (proving identity).

Commonwealth Brief at 12 (emphasis added).

          “Hearsay generally is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the

exceptions to the hearsay rule delineated in the Pennsylvania Rules of

Evidence.”      Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 492 (Pa. 2020);

Pa.R.E. 802 (general hearsay rule). Our Rules of Evidence define hearsay as

“a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the

trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.” Pa.R.E. 801(c) (emphasis added). However, “[w]hen a hearsay

statement is offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of its contents,

it   is   not   hearsay   and   is   not   excludable   under   the   hearsay   rule.”

Commonwealth v. Hood, 872 A.2d 175, 181 (Pa. Super. 2005); see also

Commonwealth v. Puksar, 740 A.2d 219, 225 (Pa. 1999) (“statements are

admissible to establish ill-will or motive where they are not being offered for

the truth of the matter contained therein.”).

          Here, the trial court explained that it properly overruled Appellant’s

objection because the statements were not hearsay:

                 The statements contained in the video and audio recording
          did not constitute inadmissible hearsay because said statements
          were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein.
          N.T., 2/16/21, at 27-30. Instead, the statements involving the
          dispute over the apartment and rent were offered to establish
          Appellant’s motive for shooting Mr. Joseph by showing that
          ill-will existed between Ms. Horn, Ms. Allen, and Mr. Joseph. Id.
          Accordingly, the statements made in the audio and video

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     recording were admissible, as they were not offered to prove the
     truth of the matter asserted, but rather to establish a motive for
     the shooting. [See Puskar, supra (hearsay “statements are
     admissible to establish … motive where they are not being offered
     for the truth”).]

           Should it be determined that the statements made in the
     video and audio recording constitute hearsay, nevertheless, the
     issue lacks merit because said statements are admissible under
     the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. The
     Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provide certain exceptions to the
     rule against hearsay evidence. See Pa.R.E. 803. One such
     exception is an excited utterance. Id. An excited utterance is “a
     statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while
     the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”
     Pa.R.E. 803(2). An excited utterance need not describe or explain
     the event, but only relate to it, and it need not be made
     contemporaneously with the event. Id.

           Under the excited utterance exception, the timing of the
     statement is crucial and must show that “the nervous excitement
     continues to dominate while the reflective processes remain in
     abeyance.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gore, 396 A.2d
     1302, 1305 (Pa. Super. 1978)). The determination of what
     constitutes an excited utterance is a fact[-]specific inquiry, which
     is made on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Wholaver,
     989 A.2d 883, 907 (Pa. 2010). In determining that the statement
     was an excited utterance, this court considered the following
     factors: whether the statement was a narrative; the time that
     elapsed between the occurrence and the utterance; and whether
     the declarant had the opportunity to, or did, speak to others. See
     Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 147 (Pa. Super.
     2002) (citing Commonwealth v. Sanford, 580 A.2d 784, 788
     (Pa. 1990), appeal denied, 588 A.2d 508 (Pa. 1991)).

           In Appellant’s case, the [trial] court did not allow
     inadmissible hearsay when the court permitted the statements
     made in the video and audio recording to be admitted into
     evidence. The statements were admissible pursuant to the
     excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. Pa.R.E.
     803(2). The statements of Ms. Horn and Ms. Allen related to the
     ongoing dispute regarding the apartment and rent. N.T., 2/16/21,
     at 25-30. Further, Ms. Horn and Ms. Allen were screaming said
     statements during the heated argument that ensued upon Mr.

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      Joseph’s return to [the apartment]. Id. Thus, the statements
      contained in the audio and video recording were made during the
      occurrence, both in time and place, as to exclude the likelihood
      that the statement emanated in whole or in part from Ms. Horn
      and Ms. Allen’s reflective faculties. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim
      lacks merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, at 9-11 (emphasis added; some capitalization

modified). Again, our review discloses that the trial court’s rationale and

conclusion is supported by the record and law.          We thus conclude that

Appellant’s second issue lacks merit. See id.

      In his third issue, Appellant claims the trial court “erred by denying

[Appellant’s] request for a new trial as the weight of the evidence should have

resulted in an acquittal of all charges.” Appellant’s Brief at 17 (bold omitted).

Appellant emphasizes, “there was no physical evidence recovered to link

[Appellant] to the shooting.” Id. According to Appellant, “there was no[]

concrete identification made of [Appellant] as the shooter until trial.”     Id.

Appellant asserts that when police interviewed Mr. Joseph at the hospital on

March 14, 2019, and presented him with a photo lineup containing Appellant’s

picture, Mr. Joseph was unable to identify Appellant,

      beyond a reasonable doubt[,] because [Mr.] Joseph’s exact
      statement [in response to viewing Appellant’s] photo was “it looks
      like him, I’m pretty sure he’s the one who shot me.”

Id. (quoting N.T. (trial), 2/16/21, at 59). Finally, Appellant avers Mr. Joseph’s

“testimony is inconsistent and not credible.” Id. at 18.

      The Commonwealth responds that the verdicts are “not against the

weight of the evidence because physical evidence is not a requirement for a

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conviction and the victim’s identification of [Appellant] was credible.”

Commonwealth Brief at 13 (bold omitted). The Commonwealth emphasizes

this Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474 (Pa.

Super. 2018):

     [T]he uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to
     sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as that
     testimony can address and, in fact, addresses, every element of
     the charged crime.

Id. at 481; see also Commonwealth Brief at 15.

     In reviewing Appellant’s weight claim, we recognize:

             The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the
     finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the
     evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new
     trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony
     and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the
     credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
     determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so
     clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
     weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

           On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined
     to whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the
     jury verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review
     of a weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise
     of discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether
     the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). “One of the least assailable reasons

for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the

verdict was or was not against the weight of evidence….” Commonwealth

v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).

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      The trial court addressed its exercise of discretion in rejecting

Appellant’s weight challenge, stating:

            The verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock
      one’s sense of justice.     This court[, sitting as fact-finder,]
      considered the evidence, including the video that recorded the
      incident and the testimony of the victim, Mr. Joseph, which
      detailed the events of the shooting. The court found the
      victim’s testimony to be credible, and that the weight of the
      evidence supported the verdict.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, at 14-15 (emphasis added; some capitalization

modified).

      As fact-finder, the trial court was free to believe all, part or none of the

evidence, Gonzalez, supra, and we decline Appellant’s suggestion that we

reweigh the evidence. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 27 (Pa.

2011) (“On appeal, [an appellate] Court cannot substitute its judgment for

that of the [fact-finder] on issues of credibility, or that of the trial judge

respecting weight.”). Mr. Joseph’s testimony, which the trial court expressly

credited, was sufficient to sustain the verdict.    See Johnson, supra; see

also Commonwealth v. King, 959 A.2d 405, 410-11 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court’s rejection of

Appellant’s weight claim. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 561

(Pa. Super. 2011) (concluding weight challenge did not shock one’s conscience

where fact-finder found eyewitness identification of defendant as perpetrator

to be credible). Appellant’s third issue does not merit relief.

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        In his final issue, Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in

imposing a manifestly excessive and unreasonable aggregate sentence. See

Appellant’s Brief at 11, 18-19. According to Appellant, “the trial court did not

give careful consideration to [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs, traumatic

childhood, and unresolved mental health issues.” Id. at 11. Appellant further

contends the sentencing court improperly failed to (1) “indicate that it had

considered [Appellant’s PSI] and mental health report” id.; or (2) “state its

reasons on the record justifying the imposition of sentence.” Id.

        Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, from

which there is no absolute right to appeal. Commonwealth v. Summers,

245 A.3d 686, 691 (Pa. Super. 2021). Here, where Appellant has preserved

his sentencing challenge in a timely PSM, he must (1) include in his appellate

brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) concise statement of reasons relied upon for

allowance of appeal; and (2) demonstrate there is a substantial question that

the sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. Id.

        Appellant has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. Appellant’s

Brief   at   11.     Further,   he   presents    a   substantial   question.    See

Commonwealth v. Knox, 165 A.3d 925, 929-30 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“A claim

that the trial court focused exclusively on the seriousness of the crime while

ignoring other, mitigating circumstances, such as [the defendant’s] mental

health history and difficult childhood, raises a substantial question.”);

Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“The

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failure to set forth adequate reasons for the sentence imposed has been held

to raise a substantial question. Likewise, an averment that the court … failed

to consider all relevant factors raises a substantial question.” (citations

omitted)).

     We are mindful that sentencing “is a matter vested in the sound

discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Barnes,

167 A.3d 110, 122 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc) (citation omitted).

     In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an
     error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by
     reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or
     misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of
     partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly
     unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation

omitted).

     The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

     The reason for this broad discretion and deferential standard of
     appellate review is that the sentencing court is in the best position
     to measure various factors and determine the proper penalty for
     a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual
     circumstances before it. Simply stated, the sentencing court
     sentences flesh-and-blood defendants and the nuances of
     sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript
     used upon appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court
     enjoys an institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to
     its decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that should
     not be lightly disturbed.

Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 27 (Pa. 2014) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

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      The Sentencing Code provides that “the sentence imposed should call

for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity

of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”         42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9721(b). “A sentencing court has broad discretion in choosing the range of

permissible confinements that best suits a particular defendant and the

circumstances surrounding his crime.”      Commonwealth v. Celestin, 825

A.2d 670, 676 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).        The court “need not

undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or

specifically reference the statute in question, but the record as a whole must

reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime and

character of the offender.” Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 99

(Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

      The trial court must also consider the sentencing guidelines.         See

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here,

the trial court imposed sentences for each conviction within the standard

range of the sentencing guidelines. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, at 12

(explaining respective guidelines, Appellant’s prior record score, and the

structure of Appellant’s sentence); see also N.T., 5/18/21, at 4-5. Therefore,

we may only vacate Appellant’s sentence if “the case involves circumstances

where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable.” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244,

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1254 (Pa. Super. 2014). We are mindful that “rejection of a sentencing court’s

imposition   of   sentence    on    unreasonableness        grounds   [should]     occur

infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline

ranges.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 964 (Pa. 2007).

       Finally, where a sentencing court is informed by a PSI, “it is presumed

that   the   court   is   aware    of   all   appropriate   sentencing   factors    and

considerations, and where the court has been so informed, its discretion

should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135

(Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa.

1988)). We explained:

       In imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider the
       particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
       defendant. The trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior
       criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for
       rehabilitation. However, where the sentencing judge had the
       benefit of a [PSI], it will be presumed that he or she was aware of
       the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and
       weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory
       factors. Additionally, the sentencing court must state its reasons
       for the sentence on the record. The sentencing judge can
       satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing sentence
       be placed on the record by indicating that he or she has
       been informed by the [PSI]; thus properly considering and
       weighing all relevant factors.

Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1135 (emphasis added; citation omitted).

       Instantly, the trial court explained it

       … was aware of the sentencing guidelines and considered the
       sentencing recommendations of both parties. The court offered
       sufficient valid reasons for imposing the sentence it did. First, the
       trial court had the benefit of and thoroughly reviewed the PSI and
       mental health reports, which was indicated on the record. N.T.,

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      5/18/21, at 3-4. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957
      n.7 (Pa. 2007) (stating that when a PSI exists, it is “presume[ed]
      that the sentencing judge was aware of the relevant information
      regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those
      considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”). Second,
      the trial court considered the victim’s testimony and the severity
      of his injuries. N.T., 5/18/21, at 21-23. The trial court specifically
      stated: “… I’ve listened carefully to the testimony and evidence
      presented in this case and most importantly the testimony of the
      victim in this matter and that is a grave concern to me.” Id. at
      22. Finally, the trial court properly considered the deadly weapon
      enhancement for the attempted murder charge, as Appellant
      committed the crime of attempted murder using a deadly weapon.
      See 204 Pa. Code § 303.17(b).

            The trial court clearly outlined its reasons for imposing
      Appellant’s sentence, which expressed appropriate consideration
      for the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the
      impact on the life of the victim, as well as Appellant’s rehabilitative
      needs and mitigating factors. N.T., 5/18/21, at 21-23. See 42
      Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). For all the aforementioned reasons, the trial
      court appropriately sentenced Appellant.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, at 13-14 (some capitalization modified).

      The record supports the trial court’s explanation. At sentencing, the

court expressly stated it had “considered” and “reviewed” Appellant’s PSI and

his mental health report.     N.T., 5/18/21, at 3-4.     Thus, the record belies

Appellant’s claim that “the trial court did not indicate that it had considered

[Appellant’s PSI] and mental health report.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Further,

the trial court advised Appellant:

      Mr. Joseph is lucky to be alive. You do have a prior conviction for
      aggravated assault also involving a firearm. I believe your
      behavior demonstrates that you are on a path that is getting
      worse. I’m going to sentence you within the guidelines.

N.T., 5/18/21, at 23.

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     In sum, we discern no abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion.

Contrary to Appellant’s claim, his standard-guideline-range sentence is not

unreasonable or excessive. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104,

1117 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating “where a sentence is within the standard

range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate

under the Sentencing Code.”) (citing Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d

162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding combination of PSI and standard-range

sentence, absent more, cannot be considered excessive or unreasonable));

see also Walls, supra (stating rejection of a sentence on unreasonableness

grounds should occur infrequently).

     As there is no merit to Appellant’s claims of error, we affirm his

judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/8/2023

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