Court Opinion

ID: 9745551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:09:23.840962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:02.484753
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority writes that “[o]ne thing is clear . . . there is no statutory duty to pay plaintiff a full salary for a job she would not perform.” I think there is: Government Code section 21153, which provides that “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an employer may not separate because of disability a member otherwise eligible to retire for disability but shall apply for disability retirement of any member believed to be disabled . . . .”
The majority is able to avoid Government Code section 21153 (section 21153) and focus on Education Code section 45192 by finding a distinction between “disability” under the Government Code and being “medically able to assume the duties of the . . . position,” under the Education Code, thus creating a hierarchy of medical problems, so that Jones was not disabled under the Government Code, but was merely “medically unable” under the Education Code.
*993I do not see that the law makes that distinction. When Los Angeles County Office of Education applied for disability retirement for Jones, and when it separated her from employment and placed her on the 39-month reemployment list, it did so because it believed that her health was such that she could not do the job. Under those circumstances, Government Code section 21153 provides that the employee cannot be fired “[notwithstanding any other provision of law.” (Italics added.) Any other provision of course includes Education Code section 45192.
Section 21153 provides that an employer may not separate an employee for a disability, but must apply for disability retirement for that employee. It does not specifically address the issue before us here: suppose the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) says no? Given that problem with interpreting the statute, and bearing in mind that “Disability pension laws are intended to alleviate the harshness that would accompany the termination of an employee who has become medically unable to perform his duties” (Haywood v. American River Fire Protection Dist. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1304 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 749]), we look to the legislative history (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299]) and find an answer: that section 21153 was enacted precisely to protect employees in Jones’s situation.
The statute was added to the Government Code in 1970, as section 21023.5, through Assembly Bill No. 1153 of the 1969-1970 legislative session. (The statute was renumbered in 1995 as part of a general reorganization of portions of the Government Code.) According to its author, Wadie Deddeh, the bill was the “direct outgrowth” of a study by the Assembly Committee on Public Employment and Retirement. That committee’s January 1970, report to the Assembly recommends that “[i]f the Public Employee’s Retirement System denies an application for disability retirement by an employee who has been terminated by his agency for that reason, the agency shall forthwith reemploy the individual in his prior capacity.”
In his letter to the Governor presenting the bill for signature, Assemblyman Deddeh cited the Assembly Committee study and wrote that “Under present procedures, it is possible—though infrequent—for a state or local employee to be discharged by the employer for reasons of disability, but for the P.E.R.S. retirement board to refuse his application for disability retirement on opposing medical grounds. In a few cases, this has resulted in an individual being left without any income—neither salary nor retirement income. [][]... [f] *994The bill requires that if the P.E.R.S. retirement board denies an application for disability retirement, that the employee shall be retained in employment.”1 (Italics added.)
The State Personnel Board’s analysis of the bill and two enrolled bill reports recommending that the Governor sign the bill are in accord. The State Personnel Board wrote “ ‘[w]hen an application for disability retirement is denied by PERS the employee is then considered capable of performing the full duties of the job and is returned to work.’ ” (57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 86, 88, fn. 2 (1974).) The report from the Department of Finance states that the law would provide that “individuals denied a timely request for disability be restored to positions of their former class,” and the report by the Agricultural and Services Agency states that “Under AB 1153, when an application for disability retirement is denied by PERS, the employee will then be considered capable of performing the full duties of his job and be returned to work.”
In 1974, the Attorney General opined that under section 21153, “upon a determination by the Public Employees’ Retirement System that a member can perform the duties of his position, an employer of said member cannot thereafter terminate said employee on the grounds that he cannot perform such duties.” (57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 86.)
The Attorney General was asked whether Government Code section 19253.5, subdivision (d)2 allowed an employee to be dismissed for medical reasons, after PERS denied disability retirement. The Attorney General answered in the negative, pointing out that section 19253.5, subdivision (d) applies only when the employee is not eligible for disability retirement due to number of years of employment, and that in that case, there could be no PERS decision. If the employee is eligible to apply for disability retirement, section 21153 applies.
The Attorney General then wrote that under section 21153, “The decision of [PERS] is determinative in the employer’s subsequent efforts to terminate *995the employee for medical reasons. A contrary decision would create a severe financial consequence to an employee resulting from inconsistent decisions between an employer and [PERS] ....[][]... The employer is thus bound by the PERS decision. To conclude otherwise would render the procedures outlined by Government Code section [21153] meaningless. It is not reasonable for the employee to go through the PERS hearing if the employer is not bound by said decision.” (57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 86, 87.)
Jones also cites administrative decisions from the State Personnel Board construing section 21153 in the same way. (In re Dana Jackson (1993) State Personnel Bd. Precedential Dec. No. 93-01, p. 10; In re Ruth Keck (2000) State Personnel Bd. Precedential Dec. No. 00-05.) These opinions are entitled to respect, if not deference (California Dept. of Corrections v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1601, 1611 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 390]) and for this reason, too, I believe that section 21153 prohibits an employer from terminating an employee, after PERS has denied a request for disability retirement.
Finally, “[i]f provisions of the Public Employees’ Retirement Law are ambiguous or uncertain, they are to be liberally construed in favor of the pensioner.” (City of Fremont v. Board of Administration (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [263 Cal.Rptr. 164].)
I recognize the dilemma the law poses, that Jones must be reinstated to a job she says she cannot do. However, the dilemma is not unique to Jones, or to her employer. The dilemma exists elsewhere.
Under Government Code section 31725, which applies to members of the County Employees Retirement Act, if the relevant board rejects an application for disability retirement, and the employer fails to petition for judicial review of that decision, or the petition is denied, the “employer shall reinstate the member to his employment effective as of the day following the effective date of the dismissal.” Notably, the relevant portions of section 31725 were enacted as a result of the same Assembly Committee on Public Employment and Retirement hearings which led to Government Code section 21153. (McGriff v. County of Los Angeles (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 394, 398-399 [109 Cal.Rptr. 186].) Further, where Government Code section 19253.5 applies, if the employer’s disability application “is denied, the appointing power shall reinstate the employee to his or her position with back salary and benefits.” (Gov. Code, § 19253.5, subd. (i)(3).)
*996I echo judicial discussions of Government Code section 31725: “[t]he Legislature’s intent is plain. [The employee] cannot be denied both work and disability retirement. If there is a hole in the statutory scheme, the county has to go to the Legislature for a patch.” (Raygoza v. County of Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1247 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 896].)
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 1, 2006, S140538.

 While we do not normally glean legislative intent from the motives or understandings of individual legislators, even the bill’s author, we do consider the statements of a bill’s author, where, as here, it is evidence of more than the author’s personal understanding. (In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 590-591 [128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371].)

 Government Code section 19253.5, subdivision (d) reads “When the appointing power after considering the conclusions of the medical examination provided for by this section or medical reports from the employee’s physician, and other pertinent information, concludes that the employee is unable to perform the work of his or her present position, or any other position in the agency, and the employee is not eligible or waives the right to retire for disability and elects to withdraw his or her retirement contributions or to permit his or her contributions to remain in the retirement fund with rights to service retirement, the appointing power may terminate the appointment of the employee.”