Court Opinion

ID: 9472407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:59:33.637997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:55.378103
License: Public Domain

SEITZ, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I am in agreement with all the basic conclusions reached in Judge Rosenn’s dissent.1 I write separately because Judge Rosenn would order a new trial while I would vacate and remand to afford the government an opportunity to discharge its burden of showing that Quintiliano was unavailable at the time of the trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106.
The only issue dividing the court concerns a possible violation of the Confrontation Clause. I agree with Judge Rosenn that there was a violation of the Confrontation Clause if Quintiliano was available at the time of the trial. On the other hand, if the government can present clear and convincing evidence at a hearing that it made a “good faith effort” to obtain Quintiliano’s presence at trial, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2543, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), or that such an effort would have been clearly unavailing, then I believe the government will have satisfied the unavailability requirement of the Confrontation Clause.2 This would correct the erroneous ruling of the district judge at the trial. I can think of no legitimate societal purpose to be served by ordering a new trial, unless such a hearing would debase the values inherent in the Confrontation Clause.
*858I assume that the objection to a later hearing on the unavailability issue would be based on the problems inherent in reconstructing the situation that existed at the time of the trial. It seems to me that the heavy burden on the government at such a hearing, together with the requirement that the district court make a reasoned determination, subject to appellate review, provides meaningful assurance that a defendant will not be impermissibly deprived of his Confrontation rights.
I recognize the concern expressed by the then Chief Judge Bazelon in his dissent in Henderson v. United States, 349 F.2d 712 (D.C.Cir.1965), that a remand places what amounts to a psychological burden on the defendant because of the court’s awareness of the conviction. However, I believe the safeguards afforded, including appellate review, sufficiently protect a defendant’s Confrontation rights. Indeed, the nunc pro tunc hearing approach to the suppression of evidence which was approved in Waller v. Georgia, 52 U.S.L.W. 4618, 4620-21 (May 22, 1984) and Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 394, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1790, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), certainly implicated defense interests every bit as important as that here implicated. Compare Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3rd Cir.1980).
Thus, while I join the basic conclusions in Judge Rosenn’s dissent, I would vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the unavailability issue and, if pertinent, the trustworthiness issue.
I therefore dissent.

. I do not find it necessary to join Judge Rosenn’s plain error discussion.

. It would be for the district court to consider the "trustworthiness’’ issue if it determined that Quintiliano was unavailable.