Court Opinion

ID: 9838162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 15:01:25.505191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:53.903514
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 22-1676
                         ___________________________

                              United States of America

                                        Plaintiff - Appellee

                                          v.

                                Darrius Decnan Redd

                                     Defendant - Appellant
                                   ____________

                      Appeal from United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Iowa
                                  ____________

                             Submitted: June 15, 2023
                             Filed: September 5, 2023
                                  ____________

Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

GRASZ, Circuit Judge.

       A jury convicted Darrius Redd of sex trafficking, facilitating prostitution, and
distributing a controlled substance to a person under twenty-one years old. On
appeal, Redd argues he is entitled to a new trial on two of the three counts because
the district court 1 made evidentiary errors and the government deprived him of a fair
trial. We affirm.

                                  I. Background

       A jury found Redd guilty of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, 18
U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1); facilitating prostitution, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A);
and distributing methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”) to a person under
twenty-one, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 859. Most relevant for this appeal, the
government relied on evidence related to the trafficking of A.E. who, at the time,
was a college student and under twenty-one. According to the indictment, Redd
trafficked A.E. between approximately February 2 and March 14, 2020.

      A.E. testified at trial and recounted the following. On or about February 2,
sometime after midnight, A.E. met Redd at a gas station in Iowa. A.E. gave Redd
her phone number and social media information, and Redd gave A.E. the drug
commonly known as “molly.” 2 A.E. believed Redd’s name was “Shawn Cory”
because of his social media profile.

      A month later, in the early morning on March 3, Redd visited A.E.’s sorority
house after insisting he “needed to meet up with” her and that “it wouldn’t take that
long.” Shortly after he arrived, Redd suggested A.E. use the molly he brought with
him. A.E. eventually agreed. The drug made her feel “very relaxed” and “talkative.”
Using a cell phone, Redd openly recorded A.E. while asking her personal questions,
including about her family and sexual history. The encounter turned sexual, and
Redd recorded A.E. and himself having sex.

      1
       The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Iowa.
      2
          A certain type of MDMA is commonly referred to as molly.
                                       -2-
       At some point on March 3, Redd proposed to A.E. that she could make money
as a prostitute, but first she had to pay back a “debt” she owed Redd for helping her
prostitute. Before A.E. began working with Redd, he warned her that she did not
“want to know the consequences” if she had sex with anyone “he didn’t approve of,”
meaning she could only have sex with people who were giving her money in
exchange. While Redd told A.E. he made money “off of other girls that were having
sex for him,” he also told her that he sold or abused the women who worked for him
if they did not “do what he wanted them to.”

       Later that same day, Redd scheduled appointments for A.E. to prostitute
herself. After driving A.E. to meet with two clients, Redd took the money she
received. By this point, Redd made A.E. share her location with him via a social
media application. A.E. was eager to “help” Redd by, for example, texting him
about her new “goals” to earn more money in part because she was afraid Redd could
retaliate against her by releasing the videos from the sorority house.

       Redd continued to drive her to and from prostitution encounters, and he
collected all of the money. On March 7, Redd forced her to have sex with him. And
on March 8, A.E. “kind of protest[ed]” Redd’s sexual advances, but he told her she
was going to have sex with him anyway. Later that evening, Redd had a contentious
encounter with one of A.E.’s clients, which led to police officers asking A.E. some
questions. When Redd found out that A.E. spoke with the police, he became “very
aggressive” and told her via text message that she was “going to regret this.” Redd
had A.E.’s wallet, as well as videos and pictures of her, so A.E. “tried to reassure
him” that she had not told the police anything. Redd agreed to eventually return her
wallet.

      When Redd visited A.E. at her sorority house on March 12, he did not bring
her wallet. While Redd told A.E. he wanted to talk, he instead drove A.E. to a hotel,
gave her drugs and alcohol that she consumed, and told her that she “was going to
make money.” While A.E. “was on a lot of molly,” she and Redd had a sexual
encounter. The encounter devolved into Redd holding A.E.’s arms down and
                                         -3-
urinating in her mouth. On March 13 and 14, A.E. engaged in prostitution with more
clients. And on March 14, Redd drove A.E. back to her sorority house so that her
mother could pick her up for spring break.

       Redd continued to contact A.E. through text messages. He texted A.E. that
he had “voicemails of [her] admitting to prostituting” and that she had “told [him]
everything about everything.” Redd also texted her, “[w]hen you least expect so
always expect,” and “[y]ou can get touched right now this moment hoe.” Redd’s
texts became more explicit, claiming A.E. owed him $30,000 and that he “recorded
everything,” including her sexual interactions with him and others. He wrote, “Cash
app. Clear your debt. Or . . . .” (ellipsis in original).

       Redd testified at trial in his defense. Redd acknowledged he had sex with
A.E. on multiple occasions, agreed to set up an online escort account for A.E., and
drove A.E. around to meet with clients. But he insisted A.E. voluntarily participated
in all of this. Redd also testified he did not keep all of the money A.E. earned and
never gave her a controlled substance. Redd told the jury that, between March 3 and
14, he never suggested to A.E. that he would use the videos of their sexual
interactions to embarrass or extort her.

       Despite Redd’s testimony, the jury found him guilty of sex trafficking by
force, fraud, or coercion; facilitating prostitution; and distributing MDMA to a
person under twenty-one years old. The district court sentenced Redd to forty-five
years in prison.

                                   II. Analysis

       Redd asks us to reverse and remand for a new trial on two of the three counts:
sex trafficking and distributing MDMA. In support, Redd argues the district court
erred by excluding videos of his initial sexual encounter with A.E. and by admitting
expert testimony. He also argues the government deprived him of a fair trial when
it cross-examined him and during its closing argument.
                                         -4-
                             A. Exclusion of Evidence

       Before trial, Redd sought to admit videos of his and A.E.’s initial sexual
encounter at the sorority house to undermine the government’s theory that he used
force, fraud, or coercion to cause A.E. to engage in a commercial sex act. The district
court excluded the videos in their entirety under Rules 401, 402, 403, and 412 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. On appeal, Redd challenges the district court’s ruling
under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Constitution. We review evidentiary
rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Schave, 55 F.4th 671, 677 (8th Cir.
2022). Our review, however, is de novo when an evidentiary ruling implicates a
constitutional right. United States v. Walker, 917 F.3d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir. 2019).

       We begin with Redd’s arguments grounded in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Broadly, he argues the district court erred because the videos—in their entirety—
were necessary to show A.E. and Redd had a consensual sexual relationship, A.E.’s
sexual preferences, and A.E.’s consent to prostitute herself. First, Redd challenges
the application of Rule 412 to exclude the videos, claiming the videos fall under the
limited exception for evidence of a victim’s sexual behavior. He also characterizes
the videos as “intrinsic,” arguing admission of the evidence would have allowed the
jury to reject A.E.’s “testimony that she did not consent to Redd’s allegedly forceful
conduct in later sexual encounters.”

       Under Rule 412, “[t]he following evidence is not admissible in a civil or
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct: (1) evidence offered to
prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove
a victim’s sexual predisposition.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(a). In a criminal case, however,
a “court may admit . . . evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior
with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the
defendant to prove consent[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(B). Here, Redd was charged
with using force, fraud, or coercion to cause A.E. to engage in a commercial sex act.
In this way, a video that displays a victim’s initial sexual encounter with a defendant
does not prove the victim’s consent to later exchange money for sex with someone
                                         -5-
else. 3 Cf. United States v. Roy, 781 F.3d 416, 420 (8th Cir. 2015) (“At issue here is
not recruiting an individual to engage in commercial sex for the first time, but doing
an act with the use of force, threats, fraud, or coercion to cause the victim to engage
in commercial sex.”).

        Even if the videos were admissible under Rule 412, we see no reason to
disturb the district court’s exclusion under Rule 403. See United States v. Pumpkin
Seed, 572 F.3d 552, 558–59 (8th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 403, a “court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of
. . . unfair prejudice[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Unfair prejudice means an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, including evidence which is so
inflammatory on its face as to divert the jury’s attention from the material issues in
the trial.” Schave, 55 F.4th at 678 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 40 F.4th
858, 867 (8th Cir. 2022)). We afford great deference to a district court’s balancing
under Rule 403 “of the probative value and prejudicial impact of the evidence.”
Pumpkin Seed, 572 F.3d at 558 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 412 F.3d 871, 881
(8th Cir. 2005)).

       In a pretrial order, the district court acknowledged that A.E.’s statements in
the videos “about sexual activity with Redd may be admissible.” The district court
ultimately concluded it could not “rule on the statements in the abstract without
understanding the testimony and proposed use of the statements” and thus invited
further argument and reserved “ruling on the statements” in those videos “until the
matter presents itself at trial.” At trial, A.E. and Redd testified about much of what
was depicted in the videos. This lends support to the district court’s decision that

      3
        At oral argument, the government stated the indictment included the date
March 3 because the encounter at the sorority house was the beginning of Redd and
A.E.’s relationship. The government then stated the March 3 encounter at the
sorority house involved fraud and coercion. We understand the government’s theory
to be that Redd generally began his scheme in the early morning on March 3—not
that Redd used force, fraud, or coercion to cause A.E. to engage in prostitution at
that time.
                                        -6-
any probative value of showing the jury the videos would be substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice as inflammatory enough to divert the
jury’s attention from the material issue at trial—whether Redd later used force,
fraud, or coercion to cause A.E. to exchange sex with others for money. See Fed. R.
Evid. 403. In this way, Redd’s argument is similar to the one we rejected in Roy,
where we held the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a video
depicting a sexual act because the trial testimony described the contents of the video,
making “the explicit video . . . substantially more prejudicial than probative.” 781
F.3d at 419.

       Redd also argues the district court’s evidentiary rulings violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Sixth’s Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause. “In our adversarial system, criminal defendants have long had a right ‘to
introduce evidence in their defense.’” United States v. Zephier, 989 F.3d 629, 636
(8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pumpkin Seed, 572 F.3d at 559–60); see also U.S. Const.
amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”); U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”). The
right to introduce evidence in one’s defense is limited by “legitimate interests in the
criminal trial process” so long as those restrictions are not “arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Zephier, 989 F.3d at
636 (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1998)); see also
United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2009) (“If evidence has only
minimal probative value and would have a highly prejudicial effect, a court can
exclude the evidence without infringing upon the Confrontation Clause or other
constitutional rights of a defendant.”). We will affirm a conviction despite a district
court’s limits on cross-examination “unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion
and a showing of prejudice to the defendant.” United States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d
1133, 1143–44 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Petters, 663 F.3d 375, 382
(8th Cir. 2011)).

                                         -7-
      At trial, the government’s theory was that Redd used fraud and coercion, as
well as force, to cause A.E. to engage in commercial sex acts. On appeal, Redd
attacks the district court’s pretrial ruling that he could not cross-examine A.E. on
statements in the videos about her preference for “rough sex,” arguing this prevented
him from rebutting A.E.’s testimony that he forced her to have sex.

       “A critical factor in determining whether a defendant’s right of confrontation
has been violated is whether the defendant had other ways to obtain the effect that
the excluded examination would have allegedly established.” United States v.
Brown, 110 F.3d 605, 611 (8th Cir. 1997). Here, Redd never tried to cross-examine
A.E. on, for example, what distinguished the initial sexual encounter with
subsequent encounters that A.E. testified involved force. Perhaps this was a strategic
decision on Redd’s part to insulate the jury from details surrounding his alleged use
of force. Regardless of Redd’s motivation, he never cross-examined A.E. in a
manner that warranted a departure from the district court’s pretrial ruling. Again,
the district court’s pretrial order “reserve[d] ruling on the statements contained in
the video until the matter present[ed] itself at trial.” Under these circumstances, we
cannot conclude the district court clearly abused its discretion.

       Relatedly, Redd argues his constitutional rights were violated when the
district court held he could not cross-examine A.E. regarding statements in the
videos suggesting she previously engaged in prostitution. In support, Redd relies on
Zephier. In Zephier, we concluded the district court erroneously prevented the
defendant, who was charged with aggravated sexual abuse, from presenting “an
alternative explanation” for the alleged victim’s “drug use and other difficulties.”
989 F.3d at 636. Specifically, the defendant was unable to argue “the difficulties
[the alleged victim] experienced were the result of a prior crime, not the one he
allegedly committed,” after the expert testified regarding how rape victims often
respond. Id. Roy, a case involving sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), is
more on point. 781 F.3d at 418. In Roy, we rejected the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment argument that the district court erred by excluding evidence of a
victim’s sexual history, reasoning “evidence of past prostitution ha[d] little
                                         -8-
impeachment value because it [did] not contradict [the victim’s] testimony about
[the defendant].” Id. at 421. So too here. Because the “evidence has only minimal
probative value and would have a highly prejudicial effect,” the exclusion of the
videos did not violate Redd’s constitutional rights. See id. (quoting Elbert, 561 F.3d
at 777).

                               B. Expert Testimony

      Redd next challenges the district court’s admission of Carrie Landau’s expert
testimony on sex-trafficking-related topics. Redd first argues the district court
abused its discretion because, under Rule 702, the expert testimony was broad and
merely mirrored the facts of the case. Redd also insists Landau’s expert testimony
was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 because Landau, in effect, presented A.E.’s
“innocuous characteristics as consistent with a sex trafficking victim[.]”

       “The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Merrell, 842 F.3d 577, 582 (8th Cir. 2016).
“Improperly admitted testimony warrants reversal of a conviction if the testimony
‘substantially influenced the jury’s verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Iron
Hawk, 612 F.3d 1031, 1039 (8th Cir. 2010)) (alteration omitted). Under Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a district court can admit expert testimony if,
among other things, “the expert’s . . . specialized knowledge will help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue[.]” Fed. R. Evid.
702(a). A district court may exclude evidence under Rule 403 even when Rule 702
is met. United States v. Strong, 826 F.3d 1109, 1115 (8th Cir. 2016). Under Rule
403, a “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Landau’s
testimony. At the time of trial, Landau had been employed as an FBI agent for
almost twenty years. As an agent and member of a sex trafficking task force, Landau
has participated in over 130 sex trafficking investigations, which often included
                                         -9-
interviews with victims and suspects. At trial, Landau testified about her specialized
knowledge regarding sex trafficking, including terminology, characteristics of
victims, and methods used by traffickers to recruit and retain women. Given the
unique terminology and circumstances surrounding sex trafficking, Landau’s
specialized knowledge could help the jury understand the evidence. For example,
we have concluded a district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert
testimony from a special agent on a human trafficking task force who “testified from
her training and experience on the operation of sex trafficking rings and the terms
used therein.” United States v. Geddes, 844 F.3d 983, 991 (8th Cir. 2017). Indeed,
expert testimony about how individuals generally react to being trafficked can help
a trier of fact evaluate an alleged victim’s behavior. See Johnson, 860 F.3d at 1140
(applying similar reasoning to a case involving aggravated sexual abuse). Although
Redd takes issue with Landau’s testimony as “mirroring” A.E.’s testimony, we see
her testimony as consistent with the purpose and scope of expert testimony: helping
the trier of fact. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). And it does not mean Landau’s testimony
was unduly prejudicial. See United States v. Washington, 810 F. App’x 478, 480–
81 (8th Cir. 2020) (unpublished per curiam).

                               C. Cross-Examination

       Redd argues the government engaged in “prosecutorial misconduct” during
its cross-examination of him that deprived him of a fair trial. In particular, he insists
the government effectively asked him to accuse other witnesses of lying by
repeatedly asking if he had “heard” contradictory witness testimony.

       Our review is for plain error if a defendant fails to object to a line of
questioning during trial. See United States v. Two Elk, 536 F.3d 890, 908 (8th Cir.
2008). As the government correctly observes, Redd did not object to prosecutorial
misconduct during cross-examination. Thus, plain-error review applies. “A plain
error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought
to the court’s attention.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). “At a minimum, court of appeals

                                          -10-
cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current
law.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).

        “To obtain a reversal” for prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant “must show
that the prosecutor made improper remarks that prejudiced his rights in obtaining a
fair trial.” United States v. Marin, 31 F.4th 1049, 1054–55 (8th Cir. 2022). Redd
cites a number of out-of-circuit cases for the proposition that the government cannot
ask a testifying criminal defendant whether another witness who testified lied. Here,
the government never cross-examined Redd about whether another witness lied.
Instead, the government asked, for example, whether Redd gave A.E. molly. When
Redd testified that he did not, the government asked whether he “heard” A.E. testify
that he did give her molly. The same pattern continued: the government would ask
a question, Redd would provide a response, and the government would ask whether
he “heard” testimony to the contrary. On appeal, Redd points to no controlling
precedent requiring a district court to sua sponte intervene under these
circumstances. Cf. United States v. Thompson, 11 F.4th 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2021)
(holding the district court did not plainly err in similar circumstances). Thus, we
cannot conclude the district court plainly erred by failing to sua sponte intervene
during Redd’s cross-examination. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.

                              D. Closing Argument

       Finally, Redd argues the government’s closing argument improperly urged the
jury to convict to protect the community and deter future lawbreaking. As Redd
concedes, we review this argument for plain error because he did not object during
closing argument. Accordingly, “[w]e will only reverse under exceptional
circumstances.” United States v. Obi, 25 F.4th 574, 579 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting
United States v. Eldridge, 984 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1993)). A prosecutor’s
remarks during closing argument warrant a new trial if the remarks were improper
and the “remarks prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights by
depriving him of a fair trial.” United States v. Spencer, 998 F.3d 813, 819–20 (8th
Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Alaboudi, 786 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 2015)).
                                        -11-
     Redd takes issue with the following portion of the government’s closing
argument:

      And now it’s falling to you, the jurors, for somebody to tell the
      defendant “no” in a way that actually has some meaningful effect,
      someone to tell him enough is enough. There will be no more E.N.
      hiding in the back of a Burger King. There will be no more T.R.
      shielding her children behind her as he threatens to kill them. There
      will be no more M.S. running to her house and hiding inside while the
      defendant sits nearby. And there will be no more A.E., no more women
      who are drugged, abused, and raped until they comply with the
      defendant’s commands and perform commercial acts for money so that
      the defendant can profit. No more force, fraud, and coercion. Enough
      is enough. The evidence here should leave you firmly convinced that
      the defendant is guilty of three crimes, and at this point, you should find
      him guilty of those three crimes. Thank you.

These statements concluded the closing arguments.

       There was no plain error. While Redd relies on United States v. Johnson, 968
F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1992), for the proposition that a prosecutor may not urge the jury
to convict so as to protect community values or deter other criminal conduct, this is
not what occurred here. Rather, the government referenced Redd’s victims, tracking
the evidence presented at trial. And although the government stated someone should
end Redd’s behavior by telling him “no” and “enough is enough,” the context was
recounting the evidence presented at trial. See Obi, 25 F.4th at 580. Indeed, the
government concluded by urging the jury to rely on the evidence. The district court
did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte correct the government’s closing
argument.

                                  III. Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                         -12-
KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

       I concur in the result of the court’s opinion. However, I write separately
because I disagree with the court’s understanding of two things: the government’s
theory of the case against Redd for sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1), and how the excluded videos of the events at A.E.’s
sorority house are relevant to that theory.

       The government argued to the jury that the sex trafficking offense began when
Redd recruited A.E. at the gas station. As A.E. recounted at trial, in the early
morning hours of February 2, 2020, she met Redd at a gas station near campus. She
gave Redd her contact information, and Redd gave A.E. the drug molly—she did not
have to pay him for it. At trial, the government told the jury that it was Redd who
“recruited [A.E.] to work for him. [She] did not go looking for the defendant. He
found her at a gas station, and he’s read books that say ‘choose the right victim.’”
And, the government argued, A.E. was “the right victim,” someone who “t[ook]
drugs from a man she doesn’t know in the middle of the night at a gas station.”
According to the government’s theory, the sex trafficking started that night, when
he started his efforts to “recruit” A.E. as a prostitute. And, the government said, “he
continually contacted her and told her he was a pimp. And when she asked clarifying
questions, he was confusing, didn’t come right out with it, but just said they needed
to meet up.” A.E. testified that she would not always respond to his “constant[]”
messages, but “it didn’t seem like he would leave [her] alone until [she] did meet up
with him.”

       A.E. did not know Redd’s true identity. She thought he was “Shawn Cory”
because that was his Snapchat name. And the government called out Redd’s
deception about who he really was—a deception that began before the events in the
sorority house and extended long after—as part of his fraud.

       About a month after their gas station meeting, A.E. and Redd met up again,
this time at her sorority house. Redd brought alcohol, molly, and ecstasy with him,
                                         -13-
and they both took the molly. A.E. testified that after she took it, she felt relaxed,
open, talkative, happy and in a good mood. At that point, Redd started asking her
personal questions—about her family, her sex life, her birthday. He told her to take
off her clothes, and they also had sex. Using a cell phone—initially his own, but
later A.E.’s—Redd openly recorded the encounter. The videos are explicit, and they
show Redd and A.E. having oral, anal, and vaginal sex. They also capture some of
their conversations, which included discussions about A.E. working as a prostitute
and how Redd would be her pimp. While Redd admitted to A.E. that his name was
not Shawn Cory, he refused to tell her his real name. During closing arguments, the
government asserted that Redd filmed these “really embarrassing” videos so he
could use them “as a coercive tactic,” and “to control her.” And the government
presented evidence that Redd, in fact, used them that way. After A.E. stopped having
sex for money, she never saw Redd again but he “continuously texted her.” He told
her she owed him money, reminded her that she had “told [him] everything about
everything,” and told her that he “recorded everything.” It made A.E. scared that
Redd would release videos of her, and that it would ruin her life.

        Thus, the theory of the case that the government argued to the jury was that
the sex trafficking offense began with Redd’s recruitment of A.E. at the gas station—
not at the sorority house a month later. This is also reflected in the Indictment, which
charged that Redd committed the trafficking offense “[f]rom in or about February 2,
2020, . . . through in or about March 14, 2020.” In this context, the sorority house
cell phone videos were relevant because they supported the government’s contention
that Redd was a pimp who continued to use “fraud” and “coercion” to induce A.E.
to prostitute for him. Even if A.E. consented to the sex she had with Redd in the
sorority house, the government used the fact that Redd made the videos—which
included their sexual activity—to show that the pimp-prostitute relationship was
non-consensual.

      Had Redd sought to introduce the videos only to support an argument that
A.E.’s consent to the sex in the sorority house meant that she also consented to have
sex with someone else for money, or to show that she consented to have sex with
                                         -14-
Redd at some later time, I agree that the videos were properly excluded. See United
States v. Roy, 781 F.3d 416, 419–20 (8th Cir. 2015). But Redd argues that the videos
are evidence that A.E. voluntarily agreed to prostitute for him. That is a different
question than what the videos show about whether A.E. voluntarily agreed to have
sex with Redd at the sorority house. In one of the videos, for example, A.E. said,
while having sex with Redd, that “a pimp is the perfect situation for me.” She then
went on to briefly explain why she was well-suited to having a pimp. Excluding the
videos in their entirety kept the jury from hearing conversations between A.E. and
Redd that were relevant to Redd’s defense that he did not coerce A.E. to engage in
prostitution.

       That said, I agree that excluding the videos’ visual component was not an
abuse of discretion. The videos are exceptionally graphic, and they may very well
have “divert[ed] the jury’s attention from the material issues.” United States v.
Schave, 55 F.4th 671, 678 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 40
F.4th 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2022)). However, the audio 4 of the encounter between Redd
and A.E. is different. I recognize that neither party proposed introducing an audio-
only version, so the district court was not presented with this decidedly less
inflammatory option. But an audio-only version would have allowed the jury to hear
evidence directly relevant to a key issue in the case: Did Redd traffic A.E. into
prostitution by force, fraud, or coercion? Or did A.E. voluntarily agree to have sex
for money, with Redd as her pimp, without the need for force, fraud, or coercion?

      4
        I see no abuse of discretion in excluding A.E.’s “rough sex” comment—made
soon after her comment that a pimp would have been a perfect situation for her—or
her statements about past prostitution. These statements go directly to A.E.’s sexual
propensity. See Fed. R. Evid. 412(a). Regardless of whether A.E. enjoyed “rough
sex,” she testified that Redd forced her have sex with him when she did not want to,
not just that they had sex that was too rough.

                                        -15-
       Nevertheless, I concur with the court on the outcome of this case. 5 Regardless
of the evidentiary ruling on the videos, there was adequate evidence that Redd
coerced A.E. to engage in commercial sex acts to support his conviction. See United
States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 1133, 1139 (8th Cir. 2017) (“We will reverse ‘only when
an improper evidentiary ruling affected the defendant’s substantial rights or had
more than a slight influence on the verdict.’ We will not reverse a harmless error.”
(cleaned up) (first quoting United States v. Picardi, 739 F.3d 1118, 1124 (8th Cir.
2014); then citing United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 2008))).

       The conversations between A.E. and Redd as captured on the videos might
have helped Redd convince the jury that A.E. initially consented to work as a
prostitute for him. But the jury was properly instructed that “[t]he fact that the
person may have initially consented or acquiesced does not preclude the finding that

      5
        I also concur as to the cross-examination issue because Redd has not
established that allowing the prosecution’s dozens of questions to Redd about
whether he heard what government witnesses said was plain error. See United States
v. Two Elk, 536 F.3d 890, 908 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d
1247, 1268, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding defendant had convinced the court
that allowing were-they-lying questions was error, but not plain error, and
defendant’s post-trial challenge on this basis thus failed). But these questions were
nevertheless improper. On their face, the questions are irrelevant. What Redd heard
in the courtroom does not matter to the case. See Fed. R. Evid. 401(b). If we
consider the underlying “were-they-lying” inference at the heart of these questions,
they are also impermissible. Counsel did not directly ask Redd if he believed the
government’s witnesses were lying. But the thrust of the questions was plainly to
force Redd to comment on the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony. These
questions improperly placed Redd in a “no-win” situation where he had to “either
accuse another witness of lying or undermine his . . . own version of events.” See
Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1269 (citing United States v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir.
2006)) (“[W]ere-they-lying questions ignore other possible explanations for
inconsistent testimony. Testimony can conflict for many reasons that do not involve
a deliberate intent to deceive.”). And they invaded the jury’s province. See United
States v. Trotter, 837 F.3d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Assessing the credibility of
witnesses is a task for the jury.” (citing United States v. Malloy, 614 F.3d 852, 861
(8th Cir. 2010))); Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1269.
                                           -16-
the person was thereafter compelled to engage in a commercial sex act. The question
is then whether the person at some time later wanted to withdraw but was compelled
by force, fraud, or coercion to continue to perform commercial sexual activity.” The
jury heard ample evidence that, even if A.E. initially consented to the prostitution,
she later changed her mind and wanted to withdraw from the business. Yet Redd
forced her to continue to engage in commercial sex acts. That is sufficient to support
the conviction. 6
                        ______________________________

      6
         It is also not evident that admitting the videos in their entirety would have
influenced the verdict. The government argued that Redd used coercive tactics to
convince and pressure A.E. to engage in commercial sex acts for him. Redd argued
that A.E. voluntarily consented to working as a prostitute for him. Evidence of both
of these theories is on the videos, and it would be up to the jury to decide how, if at
all, to factor this evidence into its deliberations.

                                         -17-