Court Opinion

ID: 9775680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:06:57.939284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.225405
License: Public Domain

DENTON, Chief Justice.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority has held the “separation agreement” entered into by Jack D. Liston and Bonne Liston is null and void for the reason it does not meet the requirements of Art. 4624a, V.A.C.S. I am in agreement with the majority holding concerning the partition of community property by the husband and wife; however in my opinion the requirements of that statute are not applicable to this separation agreement entered into by the Listons. The separation agreement by the Listons was in contemplation of divorce and permanent separation and was not a partition of community property by the husband and wife while living together. This latter method of property division is controlled by Art. 4624a while in my opinion, the separation agreement here is not governed by the provisions of that article. The separation agreement under consideration here has been recognized as valid by the Texas courts since Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390, 13 S.W. 324 (1890). It is well settled that where husband and wife have separated and have determined upon a separation and are in the act of executing it, a deed of separation, including partition of community property, will be upheld, provided the agreement has been entered into without coercion or undue influence, and the provisions are just and *410equitable. Rains v. Wheeler, supra; Callicoatte v. Callicoatte (Tex.Civ.App.) 417 S.W.2d 618; Loston v. Loston (Tex.Civ.App.) 424 S.W.2d 316 (error dism’d); Simpson v. Simpson (Tex.Civ.App.) 387 S.W.2d 717; Rodriguez v. Rodriguez (Tex.Civ.App.) 233 S.W.2d 916; Corrigan v. Goss (Tex.Civ.App.) 160 S.W. 652 (writ ref’d); Couch v. Schwalbe, 51 Tex.Civ.App. 94, 111 S.W. 1046 (writ ref’d); Speckels v. Kneip (Tex.Civ.App.) 170 S.W. 2d 255 (writ ref’d).
The jury found: (23) the Listons were permanently separated on the date the agreement was executed; (24,25) that Jack Liston did not sign the separation agreement as a result of duress or undue influence; (26) that the Listons did not intend by their subsequent reconciliation to cancel the separation agreement; and (27) that the Listons continually ratified and intended to carry out the agreement from its inception to the present time. It is my opinion there was sufficient evidence to support these findings.
There was also sufficient evidence to support further findings of the jury that: (28, 29, 30, 31) both the Amarillo National Bank and Caprock Leasing, before making the loan and lease to Hallmark Academy and Liston, had knowledge of facts upon the basis which a prudent banker or lessor would make further inquiries as to the status of the separate and community property of Jack and Bonne Liston; and that inquiries would have led to the discovery of the existence and terms of the instrument designated “Agreement in Contemplation of Divorce and Permanent Separation”. I would therefore hold the separation agreement was effective as to these creditors.
The jury’s findings that the conveyances, releases and transfers from Bonne Liston to the Jack D. Liston Trust No. II in June 1967 were given to hinder and delay the appellants in the collection of their debts against Jack D. Liston and Hallmark Academy are not material or decisive under this record. It is well settled that a conveyance of exempt property may not be attacked on the grounds it was made in fraud of creditors. Chandler v. Welborn, 156 Tex. 312, 294 S.W.2d 801; Sorenson v. City National Bank, 121 Tex. 478, 49 S.W.2d 718. See also 20 Tex.Jur.2d 389, Sec. 86. The securities and notes conveyed and pledged by Bonne Liston, being her separate property, are exempt property and not subject to the attack made by appellants.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.