Court Opinion

ID: 9409855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 18:04:24.138124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:53.984162
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/19/23 P. v. Torres CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084625
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. VCF400693)
                    v.

 EUGENIO GALVAN TORRES,                                                                   OPINION
           Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Antonio A.
Reyes, Judge.
         Tim Ward, District Attorney, Dan Underwood, Chief Deputy District Attorney,
Dave Alavezos, Assistant District Attorney, and Victoria K. Frazier, Deputy District
Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                     INTRODUCTION
       This is an appeal from the trial court’s May 11, 2022, order granting diversion
under Penal Code section 1001.23.1 In granting diversion, the trial court concluded
defendant has a developmental disability as determined by a regional center, and
defendant does not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community.
The People argue the trial court abused its discretion in reaching these determinations,
including by improperly shifting the burden of proof to the People to disprove eligibility
for developmental disability diversion. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the
trial court’s order granting developmental disability diversion under section 1001.23.
                               FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.     Current Underlying Charges2
       Around noon on July 28, 2020, defendant, who was approximately 21 years old at
the time, encountered J.F., who was 15 years old, walking along a sidewalk. J.F. did not
know defendant, but defendant approached him and asked him where he was going. J.F.
said he was going home, and defendant told J.F. he was not going anywhere. J.F. asked
defendant to leave him alone, but defendant then started pushing J.F., and when J.F.
pushed back, defendant started hitting him. J.F. escaped by running to the nearest house,
and the attack was reported to the police. Paramedics were summoned, but J.F. never
went to the hospital. The attack left a gash on J.F.’s arm and 12 puncture marks on his
back. Based on J.F.’s description, police found defendant in a parking lot later that
afternoon. He admitted to getting into a fight and told police about the knife in his
pocket, which police recovered after defendant consented to a search. It was a
novelty-type knife with a fixed blade approximately one and one-half inches in length.

1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless indicated otherwise.
2      The facts underlying the current charges are drawn from the preliminary hearing
testimony.

                                               2.
       After a preliminary hearing on April 7, 2021, the People filed an information
charging defendant with child abuse in violation of section 273d, subdivision (a), and for
assault with a deadly weapon under section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The People
subsequently filed an amended information in September 2021 alleging an additional
count for attempted murder, but that attempted murder count was dismissed by the trial
court under section 995.
II.    Developmental Disability Diversion Granted
       In April 2021, pursuant to a request from defense counsel, the trial court referred
the matter to the probation department and to the People for diversion consideration
under section 1001.22, which included obtaining information from the Central Valley
Regional Center (CVRC), where defendant received services for a developmental
disability. At a hearing on August 31, 2021, the People indicated their opposition to
diversion, the trial court ordered them to submit their opposition in writing, and a hearing
on the diversion issue was set. The People’s opposition brief asserted the information
submitted by CVRC was insufficient to establish defendant had a qualifying
developmental disability diagnosis for diversion under section 1001.23, and it failed to
set forth a proposed diversion program in which defendant could receive treatment.
Moreover, the People argued, defendant’s current offenses disqualified him for diversion.
       At a hearing on October 19, 2021, the trial court ordered CVRC to submit a more
detailed diversion program plan and to address the date of onset for defendant’s
developmental disability that qualified defendant for CVRC services. In April 2022,
defendant filed documentation to support a grant of diversion. The attached records
included a March 2021 letter from CVRC addressed to the court indicating defendant
qualified for CVRC services based on his borderline intellectual disability diagnosis, and
the letter recommended a plan where defendant would continue to live with his mother
and receive personal attendant services funded by CVRC, which would provide support
and supervision of his medical appointments and community integration. The letter also

                                             3.
recommended that defendant participate in anger management classes, which would be
monitored by CVRC.
       Also attached to defendant’s supplemental filing was a November 2021 letter from
CVRC addressed to the court, which further explained defendant was found eligible for
CVRC services on September 1, 2006, and defendant has “cooccurring” diagnoses of
mood disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder,
all diagnosed by Turning Point of Central California. The letter recommended a
diversion plan, which, among other things, included anger management classes. The
letter noted other vocational programs and residential care facilities were available
through CVRC if defendant agreed.
       Finally, defendant attached a report from the probation department appended to
which was additional documentation from CVRC. The probation department’s records
from CVRC indicated that defendant had been assessed by CVRC in 2006—when
defendant was about seven years old—and he was diagnosed with an unspecified delay in
development resulting in “mild mental retardation.” A full psychological evaluation of
defendant was performed in April 2009, which reflected a cognitive disorder, not
otherwise specified, and mild “mental retardation.”
       CVRC records from July 2009 showed defendant was diagnosed with borderline
intellectual functioning in addition to his unspecified delay in development. These
CVRC records also contained an individual program plan that was first developed in
January 2020, before the events giving rise to this case occurred, and an independent
living services plan dated January 2022. The probation report recommended that
diversion under section 1001.23 be granted, and that defendant’s behavior and progress
be monitored through CVRC services. The recommendation was based on defendant’s
lack of prior convictions; compliance with arresting officers; and the comprehensive
nature of the diversion plan proposed by CVRC.

                                             4.
       A diversion hearing was held on May 11, 2022. The prosecutor argued no
evidence established defendant was qualified for developmental disability diversion. No
self-authenticating records had been submitted by CVRC regarding defendant’s
diagnosis, and the records from CVRC were all hearsay. The prosecutor also argued
there was no evidence of any relationship between the charged offense and defendant’s
disability.
       The court pointed out there was a detailed report from CVRC received in
November 2021 that set out a diversion plan, and a report from the probation department
recommending diversion be granted. The court noted that unless the People were
prepared to provide expert testimony, there was nothing before the court that would
change the findings of the probation report and the CVRC report showing that defendant
has a development disability that qualifies him for CVRC’s services. As for the risk of
danger defendant posed if treated in the community through diversion, the court noted
defendant had been out of custody for nearly two years and he was doing “fine” with the
program, and there was no evidence indicating a potential for defendant to commit
another serious offense. The trial court ordered that defendant’s program of diversion be
subject to dual-agency supervision of the probation department and CVRC, ordered
probation to submit another report regarding their role in monitoring the dual program,
and set another hearing to review the details of the dual-diversion program ordered.
                                     DISCUSSION
I.     Statutory Background: Developmental Disability Diversion
       A.     Eligibility For Developmental Disability Diversion
       The diversion statutes that apply to defendants with developmental disabilities are
markedly different from those relating to diversion for mental health disorders. The
diversion program available for those with developmental disabilities is governed by
part 2, title 6, chapter 2.8 of the Penal Code (chapter 2.8), which encompasses

                                            5.
sections 1001.22 through 1001.34.3 Subject to only a few enumerated exceptions for
specific violent and/or sexual offenses, chapter 2.8 applies broadly to defendants charged
with a felony or a misdemeanor who have been found by a regional center to be
developmentally disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman Developmental
Disabilities Services Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4500 et seq.; Lanterman Act) and,
therefore, eligible for regional center services. (§§ 1001.20, subds. (a) & (c), 1001.21,
subds. (a)–(b).)
       The Lanterman Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme to provide treatment,
services, and support for persons with developmental disabilities. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§§ 4500, 4500.5, 4502, 4511.) The State Department of Developmental Services (DDS),
a state agency, is charged with implementing the statutory scheme. (Ronald F. v. State
Dept. of Developmental Services (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 84, 94 (Ronald F.).) The DDS
contracts with private nonprofit corporations to establish and operate a network of
regional centers that are responsible for determining eligibility, assessing needs, and
providing services to the developmentally disabled. (Ibid.)
       To be eligible for services and treatment under the Lanterman Act, a person must
have a “‘Developmental disability,’” defined in Welfare and Institutions Code
section 4512 as “a disability that originates before an individual attains 18 years of age,
continues, or can be expected to continue, indefinitely, and constitutes a substantial
disability for that individual.” (Id., subd. (a).) There are five categories of disabling
conditions that are eligible for services including “disabling conditions found to be
closely related to intellectual disability or to require treatment similar to that required for
individuals with an intellectual disability, .…” (Ibid.) Under this category of disabling
conditions, a person may qualify for services by either (1) having a disabling condition

3      Chapter 2.8 was amended effective January 1, 2021. Diversion was granted in May
2022, and the trial court applied the amended version of chapter 2.8. Neither party disputes that
the amended statutes under chapter 2.8 govern.

                                                6.
found to be “closely related to” intellectual disability or mental retardation; or (2) by
having a disabling condition that requires “treatment similar to” that required by persons
with intellectual disability or mental retardation. (Ibid.; accord, Ronald F., supra, 8
Cal.App.5th at p. 95.) Determining whether an individual is developmentally disabled
under these statutory standards is a “difficult, complex determination” for which general
and specific guidelines are provided in the Lanterman Act and in regulations to assist
regional center professionals. (Mason v. Office of Admin. Hearings (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 1119, 1129.)
       As noted, for individuals found by a regional center to be developmentally
disabled under the Lanterman Act, the diversion statutes under chapter 2.8 “shall apply”
(§ 1001.21, subd. (a)) in the context of any felony or misdemeanor offense charged,
except for certain enumerated offenses (id., subd. (b)),4 or if diversion was previously
ordered under this chapter within two years prior to the present criminal proceedings
(§ 1001.21, subd. (c)).
       B.      Procedures For Granting or Denying Diversion Under Chapter 2.8
       Sections 1001.22 and 1001.23 describe the required procedures to determine the
appropriateness of diversion for a developmentally disabled defendant.
               1.      Development of the Record
       As an initial matter, the trial court “shall” consult with the prosecutor, the defense
counsel, the probation department, and the appropriate regional center to determine

4       Excluded offenses include (1) murder or voluntary manslaughter (§ 1001.21,
subd. (b)(1)); (2) an offense for which conviction would require registration under section 290,
except for a violation of section 314 (§ 1001.21, subd. (b)(2)); (3) rape (id., subd. (b)(3));
(4) lewd or lascivious acts on a child under 14 years of age (id., subd. (b)(4)); (5) assault with the
intent to commit rape, sodomy, or oral copulation, in violation of section 220 (§ 1001.21,
subd. (b)(5)); (6) commission of rape or sexual penetration in concert with another person in
violation of section 264.1 (§ 1001.21, subd. (b)(6)); (7) continuous sexual abuse of a child in
violation of section 288.5 (§ 1001.21, subd. (b)(7)); violation of section 11418, subdivisions (b)
or (c) (§ 1001.21, subd. (b)(8)).

                                                  7.
whether a defendant may be diverted. (§ 1001.22.) Even absent a request for diversion,
“When the court suspects that a defendant may have a developmental disability [within
the meaning of the Lanterman Act], and the defendant consents to the diversion process
and to the case being evaluated for eligibility for regional center services, and waives
their right to a speedy trial, the court shall order the prosecutor, the probation department,
and the regional center to prepare reports on specified aspects of the defendant’s case.”
(Ibid., italics added.) “Each report shall be prepared concurrently.” (Ibid.)
                     a)      Mandatory Report From the Regional Center
       Section 1001.22 requires the regional center to submit its report to the probation
department within 25 days of the court’s order to prepare reports, and that report must
include (1) a determination as to whether the defendant has a developmental disability
and is eligible for regional center diversion-related treatment and habilitation services;
(2) a proposed diversion program, individually tailored to the defendant’s needs as
derived from the defendant’s individual program plan under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 4646, and shall include treatment addressed to the criminal offense charged;
and (3) whether the proposed program is available for the defendant through the
treatment and habilitation services of the regional centers provided under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 4648. (Pen. Code, § 1001.22, subd. (a).)
                     b)      Mandatory Report From the Probation Department
       Within 30 days from the court’s order to prepare reports, the probation department
is required to submit its own report on specified aspects of the defendant’s case to the
court, to each of the other agencies involved in the case, and to the defendant.
(§ 1001.22, subd. (c).) The report shall be based on an investigation by the probation
department and consideration of the defendant’s age, developmental disability,
employment record, educational background, ties to the community agencies and family,
treatment history, criminal record if any, and demonstrable motivation and other
mitigating factors in determining whether the defendant is a person who would benefit

                                              8.
from a diversion-related treatment and habilitation program. The regional center’s report
in full shall be appended to the probation department’s report to the court. (Ibid.)
                     c)      Mandatory Report From the Prosecutor
       Also within 30 days of the court’s order for reports, the prosecutor is to submit a
report that includes a statement of whether the defendant’s record indicates the defendant
has been diverted pursuant to this chapter within two years prior to the alleged
commission of the charged divertible offense. (§ 1001.22, subd. (b), (b)(1).) If the
prosecutor recommends that the chapter may be applicable to the defendant, the
prosecutor shall recommend either a dual- or single-agency diversion program and shall
advise the court, the probation department, the regional center, and the defendant, in
writing, of that determination within 20 days of the court’s order to prepare a report. (Id.,
subd. (b)(2).)
       On the other hand, if the prosecutor recommends against diversion, the
prosecutor’s report shall include “a declaration in writing to state for the record the
grounds upon which the recommendation was made, and the court shall determine” under
section 1001.23 whether the defendant shall be diverted. (§ 1001.22, subd. (b)(3).)
       If dual-agency diversion is recommended by the prosecutor, a copy of the
prosecutor’s report shall also be provided by the prosecutor to the probation department,
the regional center, and the defendant within 20 days of the court’s order to prepare the
report. (§ 1001.22, subd. (b)(4).) This notification must include “(A) A full description
of the proceedings for diversion and the prosecutor’s investigation procedures”; “(B) A
general explanation of the role and authority of the probation department, the prosecutor,
the regional center, and the court in the diversion process”; “(C) A clear statement that
the court may decide in a hearing not to divert the defendant and that the defendant may
have to stand trial for the alleged offense”; “(D) A clear statement that should the
defendant fail in meeting the terms of the diversion, or if, during the period of diversion,

                                              9.
the defendant is subsequently charged with a felony, the defendant may be required, after
a hearing, to stand trial for the original diverted offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(4)(A)–(D).)
              2.      Diversion Decision Under Section 1001.23
       Once the trial court has received the reports from the prosecutor, the probation
department, and the regional center, if the regional center has determined the defendant
does not have a developmental disability, the criminal proceedings for the current offense
shall proceed. (§ 1001.23, subd. (a).) If the defendant is found to have a developmental
disability and to be eligible for regional center services, the trial court must consider the
agency reports and examine various factors, including the defendant’s violence and
criminal history, the relationship of the developmental disability to the charged offense,
and the current charged offense, and any other relevant information. (Id., subds. (a), (b).)
If the court is “satisfied that the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community, the court shall
determine if the defendant shall be diverted under either dual or single agency
supervision, and referred for habilitation or rehabilitation diversion pursuant to this
chapter.” (Id., subd. (b).)
       The court may, without a hearing, order that the diversion plan proposed be
implemented so long as the proposed diversion program is acceptable to the court and all
of the agencies, and the defendant consents and waives the right to a speedy trial.
(§ 1001.23, subd. (a).) Otherwise, after a hearing and consideration of the agency reports
and the relevant factors, “If the court does not deem the defendant a person who would
benefit by diversion at the time of the hearing, the suspended criminal proceedings may
be reinstituted, or any other disposition as authorized by law may be made, and diversion
may be ordered at a later date.” (Id., subd. (b).)
II.    Establishing a Developmental Disability
       To reiterate, chapter 2.8 “shall apply whenever a case is before any court upon an
accusatory pleading at any stage of the criminal proceedings, for any person who has

                                             10.
been evaluated by a regional center and who is determined to be a person with a
developmental disability by the regional center, and who therefore is eligible for its
services.” (§ 1001.21, subd. (a).) Section 1001.20 expressly incorporates the definition
of developmental disability as it is defined under the Lanterman Act in Welfare and
Institutions Code section 4512, subdivision (a), and defines “‘Regional center’” as a
regional center for the developmentally disabled established under the Lanterman Act.
(§ 1001.20, subds. (a), (c).)
       A.     Additional Background
       When the diversion issue was discussed at the October 2021 hearing, the People
argued (1) the documentation from CVRC was too vague to establish defendant has a
developmental disability because it failed to identify an onset date or provide sufficient
details to understand the basis for the diagnosis; (2) the treatment plan outlined by CVRC
was not detailed; and (3) defendant was precluded from diversion because the current
charge for assault with a deadly weapon was a serious felony under section 1192.7.
       The trial court pointed out that CVRC’s finding of a developmental disability
under the Lanterman Act is a careful one, and CVRC would not have found defendant
eligible for their services had they not previously found that the onset of defendant’s
condition met the requirements under the Lanterman Act. However, the trial court
concluded CVRC’s determination as to defendant’s disability needed to be “affirmatively
established,” which the court felt was probably “something that could be easily resolved.”
The court ordered the matter re-referred to CVRC to address “the issue of the onset [of]
developmental delays that would qualify the defendant for their services. Again, I think
that that was an assumption that CVRC made, but having that expressly in the record
would be helpful.” The court also required CVRC to provide a more detailed case plan.
       Following the hearing, CVRC provided additional documentation stating that
defendant qualifies for CVRC services due to an intellectual disability within the
meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 4512, subdivision (a); defendant was

                                            11.
found eligible for regional center services in September 2006, when defendant was
approximately seven years old; and defendant has co-occurring diagnoses of mood
disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, given
by Turning Point of Central California. CVRC records appended to a subsequent
probation report also provided an annual individual program plan dated January 2020, a
diagnostic sheet showing defendant’s diagnoses as assessed by CVRC since 2006, an
April 2009 psychological evaluation performed by a clinical psychologist for CVRC, and
an independent living services plan with progress notes through November 2021.
       After additional continuances, the People requested a hearing on the diversion
issue, and a hearing was held on May 11, 2022. The People argued the records from
CVRC were not properly authenticated and were inadmissible hearsay. The People also
argued the diagnosis was not conclusive, and there was no expert to give any testimony
about the relationship between the charged offense and the disability. The trial court
pointed out that defendant has been a patient at CVRC since at least 2006, and if the
People wished to dispute CVRC’s diagnosis of a developmental disability under the
Lanterman Act, they would have to present their own expert evidence. The trial court
reasoned that the People were merely objecting to the diagnosis of the CVRC
professionals, but argument alone was not sufficient to undercut CVRC’s determination.
As for the risk of danger that defendant posed to the community, defendant had been out
of custody for almost two years at the time of the hearing, and he has done “fine” with his
program. The court concluded there was nothing indicating an unreasonable risk
defendant would commit another serious offense. The court granted diversion and
required that it be a dual-agency diversion program that CVRC and probation would
supervise.

                                            12.
          B.    Defendant Does Not Bear a Burden of Proof Under Chapter 2.8 to
                Prove Eligibility or Suitability For Diversion
          On appeal, the People maintain that under Evidence Code section 500, it is
defendant’s burden to establish he has a developmental disability that qualifies him for
diversion. Due to deficiencies in the CVRC documentation, the People argue the record
lacks substantial evidence that defendant has a developmental disability within the
meaning of the Lanterman Act. By indicating the People were required to produce an
expert to contest the CVRC documentation, the People contend the trial court
impermissibly shifted defendant’s burden of proof to the People. Defendant argues the
statutory scheme under chapter 2.8 places no burden on defendants to establish eligibility
for developmental disability diversion; rather, defendant argues, the statute imposes a sua
sponte duty on the trial court to consider this type of diversion for defendants who may
be eligible.
          Whether the trial court has a sua sponte duty to consider developmental disability
diversion or, instead, whether defendant carries the burden of proof to establish eligibility
for diversion, depends on what the Legislature intended under chapter 2.8. The
interpretation of these statutes is a question of law subject to independent review.
(Flethez v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Assn. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 630,
639.) Our “‘fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate
the law’s purpose.’” (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 974.) As statutory language
is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, we begin with the language
employed by the statutes in chapter 2.8. (Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 51.)
The statutes’ words themselves are to be given their usual and ordinary meanings, and we
construe them in context. (Ibid.) “‘If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we
presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs.’”
(Ibid.)

                                              13.
       As noted, section 1001.21 states “This chapter shall apply whenever a case is
before any court upon an accusatory pleading at any state of the criminal proceedings, for
any person who has been evaluated by a regional center and who is determined to be a
person with a developmental disability by the regional center, and who therefore is
eligible for its services.” (Id., subd. (a), italics added.)
       Similarly, section 1001.22 states the trial court “shall consult with the prosecutor,
the defense counsel, the probation department, and the appropriate regional center in
order to determine whether a defendant may be diverted pursuant to this chapter.” This
language obligates the trial court to undertake an initial inquiry regarding diversion
without any reference to a motion or a request. Indeed, the statute goes on to state that
“When the court suspects that a defendant may have a developmental disability,” the
court (subject to the defendant’s consent and waiver of the speedy trial right) “shall order
the prosecutor, the probation department, and the regional center to prepare reports on
specified aspects of the defendant’s case.” (Ibid., italics added.) Under section 1001.23,
no decision regarding diversion is anticipated in the absence of these mandatory reports.
(Id., subd. (a) [“Upon the court’s receipt of the reports …, the court may order … that the
diversion program be implemented”]; id., subd. (b) [“After consideration of” the reports
from probation, the regional center, and the prosecutor, court is to consider various
factors to determine whether the defendant is a person who would benefit by diversion].)
       Through repeated use of the word “shall,” these statutes impose an affirmative and
mandatory duty on the trial court to first consult with counsel and the agencies as to
whether a defendant may be diverted under this chapter; upon suspicion the defendant
has a developmental disability, the court is obligated to obtain the necessary information
from the relevant agencies through reports; and, finally, the court is to make a decision
based on consideration of these reports. (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23
Cal.4th 183, 194 [the word “‘“shall”’” is ordinarily construed as mandatory, unless such a
construction would imply an unreasonable legislative purpose].) Nothing in these

                                               14.
statutes premises the trial court’s duties on a request or a showing made by the defendant.
The statutes do not obligate the defendant to furnish any reports or documentation; there
is nothing in the statutory language that contemplates a defendant will submit any
information or documentation to aid with the mandatory development of the record or the
ultimate determination.
       This is a notable divergence from statutes that do not impose any sua sponte duty
on the trial court. For example, a former version of section 1001.36 pertaining to mental
health diversion was interpreted to impose no sua sponte duty on the court to consider
mental health diversion. (See People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 234.) In
Banner, the court pointed out that section 1001.36, former subdivision (b)(3), stated a
court had discretion to require the defendant to make a prima facie showing of the
minimum requirements for diversion eligibility, and that absent a prima facie case, the
court had discretion to “‘summarily deny the request for diversion.’” (Banner, supra, at
p. 234, quoting § 1001.36, former subd. (b)(3).) Banner concluded this statutory
language “undoubtedly contemplate[d] a ‘request for diversion’ originating in the
defendant.” (Banner, supra, at p. 234.) Additionally, the court noted, the statute stated
that “‘[e]vidence of the defendant’s mental disorder shall be provided by the defense,’”
which was language that could not be squared with an interpretation imposing a sua
sponte duty on the trial court. (Ibid., quoting § 1001.36, former subd. (b)(1)(A).)
       Statutory language signaling that an initial request by a defendant is required
before the trial court will reach an issue has been similarly interpreted in the context of
section 954. This statute governs the joinder and severance of different criminal charges
against the same defendant and provides that the court may, “in the interests of justice
and for good cause shown,” order that different offenses or counts in the accusatory
pleading be tried separately or divided into distinct groups. (Ibid.) As the statute
anticipates a severance decision stemming from a good cause showing by the defendant,
section 954 has been held not to impose a sua sponte duty on the trial court to consider

                                             15.
severance. (See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 392 [no sua sponte duty of
severance on trial courts because statute requires the defendant to make a good cause
showing in order to obtain severance].)
       By contrast, section 1001.22 places a mandatory duty on the trial court to consult
with counsel, the probation department, and the regional center about diversion, and
imposes a mandatory and affirmative duty on the trial court to develop the record to
determine whether the defendant may be diverted under this chapter, subject to the
defendant’s consent. (Cf. People v. Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 [no sua sponte
duty to consider striking prior conviction under § 1385; nothing in the statute imposes a
duty on the court to investigate facts potentially supporting a defendant’s request to do
so].) Moreover, no decision about diversion under section 1001.23 is even contemplated
without the trial court first ordering and obtaining the mandatory reports from the
prosecution, the probation department, and the regional center. (Id., subds. (a), (b).)
       The People point out section 1001.22 requires the court to appoint the defendant
counsel if he or she does not already have counsel, and they argue there would be “no
purpose” in appointing counsel if a defendant bore no burden of proof in the diversion
determination. As we have already noted, nothing in chapter 2.8 indicates a defendant is
required to request, submit or prove anything with respect to diversion, and the provision
for the appointment of counsel does not change this. Notably, though, the defendant is
required to consent to the diversion process and waive their right to a speedy trial before
reports are to be ordered from the agencies. (§ 1001.22.) Far from serving no purpose,
the appointment of counsel helps to ensure that any waiver of the constitutional right to a
speedy trial is voluntary, intelligent and knowing, and that the defendant’s consent to the
diversion process is informed, especially since the entire process is predicated on a
suspicion that the defendant is developmentally disabled.
       Here, although the trial court’s consideration of chapter 2.8 was apparently
initiated by a request from defendant, this did not impose a burden of proof on defendant.

                                            16.
Instead, defendant’s request for diversion consideration gave rise to the trial court’s sua
sponte duty imposed by section 1001.22 and section 1001.23 to obtain the required
reports, and to consider whether defendant may be diverted under this chapter. Although
in civil actions Evidence Code section 500 generally places the burden of proof on the
party asserting a claim or defense, this does not control a defendant’s obligations under
chapter 2.8. Based on defendant’s indication he had been deemed a person with a
developmental disability by a regional center and had been eligible for (and was
receiving) regional center services under the Lanterman Act, the trial court was
statutorily obligated to develop the record with agency reports and make a determination
regarding developmental disability diversion. By its plain language, the statute placed no
burden of proof on defendant under chapter 2.8; rather, it imposed a sua sponte duty on
the court to consult with counsel and the agencies and to develop the record upon
suspicion defendant has a developmental disability. (§ 1001.22.)

       C.     Substantial Evidence Supports Existence of Defendant’s
              Developmental Disability as Determined by CVRC
       The People contend there is a lack of any substantial evidence establishing
defendant’s developmental disability because CVRC’s documentation is unauthenticated
hearsay, and it fails to establish the extent and nature of any disability from which
defendant may suffer.
              1.     Standard of Review
       Similar to other statutory diversion programs, the diversion determination under
section 1001.23 is ultimately a discretionary one. (Id., subds. (a), (b).) A trial court is
not obligated to divert a developmentally disabled defendant who is eligible for regional
center services—rather, that decision is to be based on the court’s consideration of
various factors, including the recommendations of the prosecutor and the probation
department, the plan outlined by the regional center, the defendant’s violence and
criminal history, the relationship of the developmental disability to the charged offense,

                                             17.
and the current charged offense itself. (Id., subds. (a), (b).) The court is also to
determine whether the defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to the public
safety as defined in section 1170.18 if treated in the community. (§ 1001.23, subd. (b).)
Even to the extent a defendant is found to be developmentally disabled by a regional
center and eligible for their services, and is found not to pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if treated in the community, section 1001.23 still permits a trial
court to deny diversion if it determines the defendant is a person who would not benefit
from it. (Id., subd. (b).)
       “Generally, where a trial court has discretionary power to decide an issue, an
appellate court is not authorized to substitute its judgment of the proper decision for that
of the trial judge. The trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal
in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, resulting in injury sufficiently grave as to
amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (In re Marriage of Rosevear (1998) 65
Cal.App.4th 673, 681–682 [applying abuse of discretion to trial court’s determination not
to set aside a judgment under Fam. Code, § 2120 et. seq.]; County of Kern v. T.C.E.F.,
Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 301, 316 (County of Kern) [granting or denying a
preliminary injunction involves weighing factors and is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion]; see People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147 [abuse of discretion
standard applies to mental health diversion decision under § 1001.36 where court
evaluates various factors]; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377 [refusal to
dismiss strike allegation based on consideration of several factors is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion].)
       However, abuse of discretion is not a unified standard, “and a more specific rule
might apply once the appellate court has identified the particular aspect of the trial court’s
determination being challenged.” (County of Kern, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 316,
citing Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711 (Haraguchi).) For
example, a trial court’s resolution of a question of law is reviewed de novo on appeal.

                                             18.
(Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 387.) If it is determined that a
question of law was incorrectly decided, the trial court’s application of that incorrect rule
will be an abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43
Cal.4th 737, 742 [a trial court abuses its discretion if its decision “rests on an error of
law”].)
       Similarly, trial courts may not make express or implied findings in the absence of
sufficient evidence. The sufficiency of the evidence for such findings is reviewed under
the deferential substantial evidence standard. If the trial court has based its discretionary
determination on factual findings that have no sufficient support under the substantial
evidence standard, then an abuse of discretion results. (County of Kern, supra, 246
Cal.App.4th at p. 316, citing Haraguchi, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 711 & Smith v. Adventist
Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 739; see People v. Gerson (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080 [a court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on
express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence].)
              2.      Analysis
       The People challenge whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s finding defendant has a developmental disability within the meaning of the
Lanterman Act. They argue first that the CVRC documents the trial court relied upon
were not properly authenticated and are hearsay, so they cannot constitute substantial
evidence defendant has a developmental disability.
       Among other things, the mandatory regional center report must include a
determination of whether the defendant has a developmental disability and is eligible for
regional center diversion-related treatment and services. (§ 1001.22, subd. (a).) Yet,
despite the hearsay nature of the report itself and the double hearsay such a report will
likely contain, nothing in the statute requires that the report be formally admissible under
the rules of evidence before the court is to consider its contents. (See ibid.)

                                              19.
       Instead, under section 1001.23, the trial court is required to consider the regional
center report in determining whether to grant diversion. (Id., subd. (a).) When the
reporting entities are all in agreement, the trial court is permitted to grant diversion
without a hearing based solely on those reports. (Ibid.) Even when a hearing is held,
section 1001.23 requires the trial court to consider these reports in making its diversion
determination. (Id., subd. (b) [“After consideration of the probation department’s report,
the report of the regional center, the report of the prosecutor …, and the court is satisfied
that the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, …, the
court shall determine if the defendant shall be diverted”].) There is no certification
requirement for any of the required reports, except that the prosecutor is required to
submit a declaration when recommending against diversion that states the grounds upon
which the recommendation is made. (§ 1001.22, subd. (b)(3).) While the reports are
hearsay, the trial court is expressly required to consider them in making the diversion
determination without further certification or authentication. (§ 1001.23, subds. (a), (b).)
The trial court properly considered CVRC’s documentation regarding defendant’s
developmental disability that was attached to the probation report (and submitted in a
supplemental filing by defendant), even to the extent those records were not properly
authenticated and their contents constituted hearsay.
       The People also argue the CVRC documentation is not substantial evidence
because it is too vague regarding the nature and extent of defendant’s disability. The
statutory framework indicates otherwise. Chapter 2.8 does not contemplate the trial court
will make an independent assessment of whether the defendant has a developmental
disability as defined under the Lanterman Act. Section 1001.21 makes clear that
chapter 2.8 “shall apply … for any person who has been evaluated by a regional center
and who is determined to be a person with a developmental disability by the regional
center, and who therefore is eligible for its services.” (§ 1001.21, subd. (a), italics
added.) This eligibility requirement is not framed around whether the court finds the

                                              20.
defendant is a person with a developmental disability as defined under the Lanterman
Act, but whether a regional center has made that determination. (Ibid.)
       The required report from the regional center under section 1001.22,
subdivision (a), and the trial court’s consideration of it under section 1001.23 underscore
this distinction. Despite a detailed description of what the regional center is obligated to
include in its report, section 1001.22 does not require that the report contain medical or
diagnostic testing records establishing how the regional center reached its disability
determination, nor is there any requirement that the regional center support its disability
conclusion with any other type of documentation. (Id., subd. (a).) This indicates the trial
court is not meant to weigh the regional center’s diagnosis or conclusion regarding a
defendant’s disability. Further, the reports of the prosecutor and the probation
department are to be prepared concurrently with the regional center’s report, neither of
these reports are required to comment on whether a defendant has a qualifying
developmental disability, and no report or filing from defendant is required or
anticipated. As such, neither section 1001.22 nor section 1001.23 contemplate any
documentation regarding a defendant’s disability other than the regional center’s
determination about its existence or nonexistence. Finally, if the regional center report
indicates the defendant does not have a developmental disability, that is the end of the
diversion inquiry: “the criminal proceedings for the offense charged shall proceed.”
(§ 1001.23, subd. (a).) This too signals the regional center’s conclusion about the
existence of a developmental disability as defined under the Lanterman Act is meant to
be dispositive without any further evidence.
       There is good reason this is so: the regional center’s disability determination
under the Lanterman Act is a highly regulated and complex assessment within the
province of regional center professionals. (Ronald F., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 94–
95.) Once eligibility for state-funded regional center services due to a developmental
disability has been statutorily established under the Lanterman Act, nothing in chapter 2.8

                                             21.
indicates the trial court should endeavor to weigh diagnostic evidence and take up this
complex determination for itself.5 Indeed, a criminal court’s disability determination
under the Lanterman Act that contradicts a regional center’s disability determination
under the Lanterman Act defeats the purpose of shaping eligibility for diversion around
the regional center’s disability determination, and it creates the potential for
irreconcilable statutory conclusions as to eligibility for state-funded regional center
services.
       The People’s apprehension that “an individual simply need[s] to state they have a
cognitive disability and are a patient of CVRC, and suddenly they qualify for diversion”
is without merit. The regional center’s disability determination is not an unregulated
process with no oversight, nor do individuals simply elect, on their own, to become
patients of regional centers by stating they have a developmental disability. Moreover,
there is no entitlement to diversion under section 1001.23 just because a person is eligible
for diversion by virtue of a regional center’s disability determination.
       Thus, while the People argue CVRC did not provide sufficient evidence to
establish the existence of a developmental disorder within the Lanterman Act, the
regional center’s disability determination in its report necessarily means this complex and
statutorily regulated assessment has already been made under the Welfare and Institutions
Code. The trial court is obligated to rely on the regional center’s determination, both for
the purposes of disqualifying an individual from diversion (§ 1001.23, subd. (a)) and to
find an individual eligible for diversion (§ 1001.21, subd. (a) [ch. 2.8 “shall apply” when
regional center determines the defendant is a person with a developmental disability]).

5       There is an entire administrative and judicial review process devoted to overseeing
regional center determinations as to whether an individual is developmentally disabled under the
Lanterman Act and eligible for regional center services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 4706, 4710; see
Michelle K. v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 409, 442 [Lanterman Act’s administrative
fair hearing procedures final outcome may be judicially reviewed through a writ of
administrative mandamus].)

                                              22.
Nothing in chapter 2.8 indicates the criminal trial court should weigh medical evidence or
redetermine the developmental disability assessment made by the regional center—it is
the court’s obligation to ascertain what determination the regional center made with
respect to disability.
       It appears the original documentation from CVRC considered at the time of the
October 2021 hearing did not contain sufficient details to definitively establish the
regional center’s developmental disability determination, particularly with regard to the
date of onset. However, subsequent CVRC documentation indicates defendant was
diagnosed with a developmental disability in 2006 when defendant was approximately
seven years old; and he was eligible for, and has been receiving since 2006, regional
center services for that disability. The developmental disability was described by CVRC
as borderline intellectual disability, which CVRC explained is a developmental disability
within the meaning of Welfare and Institutes Code section 4512, subdivision (a). Under
these circumstances, the trial court was not only entitled to rely on CVRC’s supplemental
documentation indicating defendant had a developmental disability as defined under the
Lanterman Act, it was obligated to do so. (§§ 1001.21, subd. (a), 1001.23, subds. (a),
(b).) The documentation from CVRC is substantial (and dispositive) evidence that
defendant is determined to be a person with a developmental disability by a regional
center, and the trial court was entitled to rely on CVRC’s determination in granting
diversion.
III.   Dangerousness Determination
       The People argue defendant’s current charge for assault with a deadly weapon is
designated a serious felony under section 1192.7, and this designation disqualifies
defendant from diversion as one who will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety if treated in the community.
       Section 1001.23, subdivision (b), predicates a grant of developmental disability
diversion on a finding by the court that it “is satisfied that the defendant will not pose an

                                             23.
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in
the community .…” Section 1170.18, subdivision (c), defines “‘unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety’” to mean “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a
new violent felony within the meaning of [section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)].” In
turn, section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), enumerates a class of violent felonies known
as super strikes. These felonies include: (1) a sexually violent offense as defined in
Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b); (2) certain enumerated
sexual offenses against children (Pen. Code, §§ 288a, 286, 289); (3) a lewd or lascivious
act against a child under section 288; (4) any homicide offense as defined in sections 187
through 191.5, inclusive; (5) solicitation to commit murder (§ 653f); (6) assault with a
machinegun on a peace officer or firefighter (§ 245, subd. (d)(3)); (7) possession of a
weapon of mass destruction (§ 11418, subd. (a)(1)); and (8) any serious or violent felony
punishable by life in prison or death. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I)–(VIII).)
       The obligation of a court under section 1001.23, subdivision (b), to make an
assessment regarding whether defendant poses an “‘unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety’” as defined in section 1170.18 is the same risk assessment courts are required to
undertake for purposes of mental health diversion under section 1001.36. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) As explained in People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990 (Williams),
“‘[b]y requiring an assessment of whether the defendant “will commit a new violent
felony” within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), a trial court
necessarily must find the defendant is “likely to commit a super-strike offense.”
[Citation.] Thus, the risk of danger is narrowly confined to the likelihood the defendant
will commit a limited subset of violent felonies.’” (Williams, supra, at p. 1001, quoting
People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449–450.)
       The People rely on Williams for the proposition that this risk determination under
section 1170.18 eliminates diversion eligibility for those with a current charge that is a
serious felony within section 1192.7, subdivision (c). This contention seems to rest on

                                             24.
section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C), which provides the sentencing scheme under the
“Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) for those defendants
with two or more prior serious or violent felonies that have been pled and proven, but the
current offense is not a serious or violent felony as defined under section 667,
subdivision (d). In such a case, a defendant is to be sentenced as a second-strike offender
under section 667, subdivision (e)(1). (Id., subd. (e)(2)(C).) However, even if the current
offense is not a serious or violent felony, the defendant may still be subject to a third-
strike sentence if one of the defendant’s prior felonies was a super-strike under
section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A) & (C).)
       The People’s interpretation of Williams and section 1170.18 is flawed. First,
section 1170.18 defines an unreasonable risk to the public safety as the likelihood the
defendant will commit a new super-strike offense as articulated in section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv); it does not incorporate any other portion of the Three Strikes
sentencing scheme into that definition. Second, Williams clearly holds the risk
assessment under section 1170.18 is the likelihood the defendant will commit a super-
strike offense if treated in the community. (Williams, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.)
Williams does not frame this inquiry around a current offense’s designation as a serious
felony under section 1192.7. Section 1001.21, subdivision (b), enumerates the current
offenses for which a defendant may not be placed into a developmental disability
diversion program, and the fact that a current charge constitutes a serious felony under
section 1192.7 is not among them. Given defendant’s current charge for assault with a
deadly weapon, a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23), the question is
whether, in light of all the facts, there is an unreasonable risk defendant will commit a
new super-strike offense as defined under section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).
(§ 1001.23, subd. (b) [court must be “satisfied that the defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in
the community”].)

                                             25.
       The trial court correctly indicated the dangerousness inquiry under
section 1001.23, subdivision (b), involved an assessment of the likelihood defendant
would commit a super strike in the future based on his past conduct. The trial court
acknowledged the current charges were serious, but observed defendant had been out of
custody for nearly two years, and he was doing “fine” under his program; in the court’s
estimation, there was nothing to indicate defendant had the potential to commit another
serious offense, let alone a super-strike offense.
       The trial court’s determination evidences no abuse of discretion. Defendant’s
compliance with his program for two years without further incident supports the trial
court’s decision there was not an unreasonable risk defendant would commit a super
strike if treated in the community; defendant did not have any criminal history prior to
the current charges; the probation department also recommended diversion; and his
program would be supervised by both CVRC and probation, which would further
mitigate any risk.
       The People note that no medical professionals have provided an opinion as to
whether defendant poses an unreasonable risk to public safety, but nothing in the statute,
or chapter 2.8 more broadly, requires the trial court to obtain medical evidence to make
this assessment. The People point out defendant failed to appear at two early
proceedings, which the People argue suggests an inclination to disregard court orders.
However, the minute orders noting this are not clear as to the reason for two failures to
appear in August 2020, and the trial court determined there was good cause not to forfeit
bond; additionally, there were no subsequent failures to appear.
       The People also assert there is no evidence defendant has shown any demonstrable
motivation to follow up on the prescribed programs suggested by probation or CVRC.
Notably, defendant’s CVRC caseworker, contracted through Rosehaven, spoke at the
May 2022 hearing, and indicated Rosehaven had performed an intake in December 2020,
after the events giving rise to the charges here, and studied those events and defendant’s

                                             26.
disabilities. In the nearly 18 months subsequent, defendant was succeeding at everything
he was doing in the program. Defendant was medication compliant during that time and
had been completing job and living skills training. While there was not yet any progress
reports on the anger management courses CVRC had recommended, there was ample
evidence defendant was motivated to perform under his diversion program and was doing
so. Additionally, while the People assert defendant has shown no remorse for his actions,
the Rosehaven caseworker stated that defendant wanted the court to know that he felt
“very bad about what has happened.”
       In any event, none of these arguments establish the trial court abused its discretion
in determining defendant did not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. Even to the
extent reasonable minds could differ on this issue, this does not amount to an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 655 [facts that merely afford an
opportunity for a difference of opinion does not establish an abuse of discretion].)
       In sum, the trial court correctly interpreted the dangerousness assessment required
under section 1001.23, subdivision (b), and based its dangerousness determination on
findings supported by the record. The People have not established the trial court abused
its discretion.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order granting dual-agency diversion is affirmed.

                                                                              MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

LEVY, J.

                                            27.