Court Opinion

ID: 9373421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:55.239445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.025047
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                         MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BRENDA HARPER,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          CH-315H-21-0395-I-1

                   v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: September 14, 2022
                 Agency.

                    THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

             Brenda Harper, Clarksville, Tennessee, pro se.

             Katherine E. Griffis, Esquire, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                                Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                 Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                  Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1           The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her appeal of an agency action separating her from Federal service as
     moot.     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the petition for review,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Central Regional
     Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        On May 26, 2020, the appellant was appointed to the position of Medical
     Support Assistant with the agency. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 14. As a
     preference eligible in the excepted service, see id., she was required to complete
     1 year of service to meet the statutory definition of an “employee,” see 5 U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1)(B)(i). On July 16, 2021, the agency issued the appellant a “Notice
     of Termination during Probationary Period,” asserting that it was terminating her
     during her probationary period for unsatisfactory performance or conduct. IAF,
     Tab 5 at 30-35.    The agency also issued the appellant a Standard Form 50
     (SF-50), reflecting that, effective July 16, 2021, the appellant was terminated
     during her probationary period. IAF, Tab 1 at 36.
¶3        Thereafter, the appellant appealed the action to the Board.       IAF, Tab 1.
     During her appeal, she claimed that the agency’s July 16, 2021 action was due to
     discrimination on the basis of disability and age. IAF, Tab 25. Also, while the
     appeal was pending before the administrative judge, the agency rescinded the
     termination action, took steps to return the appellant to a position at the same
     grade and level of pay as the position she held prior to the separat ion action,
     restored her leave and other benefits, and provided her with all applicable back
     pay. IAF, Tab 10, Tab 23 at 16, Tab 36 at 4-5. Thereafter, the administrative
     judge issued a notice of intent to dismiss the appeal as moot, providing the
     appellant with an opportunity to object or to express opposition to a dismissal.
     IAF, Tab 37. The appellant did not respond to the notice.
¶4        On December 1, 2021, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     dismissing the appeal as moot.       IAF, Tab 38, Initial Decision (ID) at 1.
     Specifically, she reiterated the steps taken by the agency to restore the a ppellant
     to the status quo ante prior to the July 16, 2021 separation, ID at 2-3, reasoning
     that, because the agency completely rescinded the action after the appeal was
                                                                                          3

     filed, the appeal was rendered moot, thereby divesting the Board of jurisdiction,
     ID at 2.     Because she determined that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the
     appeal, she concluded that the appellant’s discrimination claims would be
     “returned to the agency for processing as a nonmixed discrimination complaint.”
     ID at 4 n.1.
¶5            The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision,
     requesting that the Board hear her discrimination claims.        Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-10.       The agency has not responded to the appellant’s
     petition for review. 2

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The agency’s separation action against the appellant is a removal under 5 U.S.C.
     § 7701, and not a probationary termination.
¶6            As explained above, the agency issued the appellant a Notice of
     Termination during Probationary Period and an SF-50 reflecting a termination
     during a probationary or trial period. IAF, Tab 1 at 34, Tab 5 at 30-35. However,
     the appellant’s appointment began on May 26, 2020, and under 5 U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1)(B)(i), she met the statutory definition of an employee after 1 year of
     service.     IAF, Tab 5 at 14.    Thus, the agency’s separation action, effective
     July 16, 2021, was taken after the appellant became an employee. IAF, Tab 1
     at 34.     Because, at the time of the separation action, the appellant was a
     preference eligible in an excepted-service position who had completed 1 year of
     current continuous service in the same or similar position in an Executive a gency,
     she was an “employee” and thus had Board appeal rights. 3 See IAF, Tab 1 at 34,

     2
       The appellant has also filed a motion for leave to submit additional information or
     documentation. PFR File, Tab 3. Because the parties will have an opportunity to
     further develop the record on remand, we find it unnecessary to rule on the appellant’s
     motion for leave.
     3
        The agency’s characterization of the appellant’s separation as a probationary
     termination does not control the appellant’s legal status. See Grigsby v. Department of
     Commerce, 729 F.2d 772, 774-76 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that an SF-50 does not
                                                                                         4

     Tab 5 at 14; 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B)(i).       Thus, we find that the Board has
     jurisdiction over her removal. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512(1), 7513(d).

     The agency’s rescission of the appellant’s removal does not render the appeal
     moot.
¶7         As noted above, the administrative judge concluded that, because the
     agency rescinded the removal action, the appeal was rendered moot. ID at 2-3.
     However, an appeal of an action over which the Board has jurisdiction , such as
     the removal action at issue here, is not moot even when the agency effects a
     complete rescission of the action as long as there is s ome possible, effectual relief
     that could be granted to the appellant. See, e.g., Lamberson v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 80 M.S.P.R. 648, ¶¶ 12-14, 36 (1999) (finding that, because the
     Board initially had jurisdiction over the appeal of the removal action, the
     agency’s post-appeal rescission of that action did not render the appeal moot and
     the Board retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the appellant’s claims of
     discrimination and retaliation).    Specifically, in Hess v. U.S. Postal Service,
     124 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶ 8 (2016), the Board recognized that an appellant’s claims of
     discrimination may result in compensatory damages, and an appeal in which such
     claims are raised is not rendered moot by an agency’s rescission or cancellation
     of an adverse action. Thus, although the agency rescinded the removal action, the
     appellant nonetheless had outstanding discrimination claims at issue in her
     appeal.   Accordingly, we find that the appeal is not moot and that the
     administrative judge must address the appellant’s discrimination claims on
     remand. See Hess, 124 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶ 8; Lamberson, 80 M.S.P.R. 648, ¶¶ 12-14,
     36.

     control an employee’s legal status). Rather, the statutory language of 5 U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1)(B)(i) controls her legal status.
                                                                                    5

                                        ORDER
¶8           For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Central
     Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
     On remand, the administrative judge shall hold the appellant’s requested hearing
     but may limit the subject matter to issues deemed relevant on remand. IAF, Tab 1
     at 2.

     FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                             Jennifer Everling
                                             Acting Clerk of the Board
     Washington, D.C.