Court Opinion

ID: 9557964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:01:06.73857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:59.170718
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(dissenting)—In my opinion the action, of the department was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The majority opinion concedes that, if there is no difference in the burden of proof in the criminal action in which the appellant was acquitted and this attempt to assess a fraudulent overpayment penalty against her, the ■doctrine would operate to bar the assessment. The majority, however, concludes that there is indeed a difference between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof by' evidence which is clear, cogent, and convincing, the latter being the standard for proof of fraud. Its apparent conclusion is that the criminal burden is more onerous. The conclusion is unsupported by any rationale, however, just as was. the statement cited as authority.
That statement, which was dictum, occurs in Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wn.2d 150, 385 P.2d 727 (1963), and reads, at page 154: “We do not deem the term connotes proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” It is in direct conflict with a quotation from 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 94, at 398 (1943), which was approved in Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wn.2d 190, *191202, 170 P.2d 642 (1946), a case which went unnoticed by the court in Bland v. Mentor, supra, and by the majority in this case. That statement is as follows:
■ “The rules which impose the burden of proof on one alleging fraud and which deny a presumption of fraud rest on the fact that fraud is regarded as criminal in. its essence, and involves moral turpitude at least, while, on the other hand, the presumption is that all men are honest, that individuals deal fairly and honestly, that private transactions are fair and regular, and that participants act in honesty and good faith. The presumption is against the existence of fraud and in favor of innocence, the presumption against fraud approximating in strength the presumption of innocence of crime.”
While there were in the intervening years statements made about the clear, cogent, and convincing test which would render it less exacting than the reasonable doubt test, although more stringent than the preponderance of the evidence test, this vague and amorphous middle ground, of proof was eliminated in In re Levias, 83 Wn.2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973). The holding of that case—that proof.by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is the civil equivalent of proof beyond a reasonable doubt—was approved and followed in Alter v. Morris, 85 Wn.2d 414, 536 P.2d 630 (1975).
The opinion in In re Levias, supra at 256 n.1, indicates that the holding regarding the nature of clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, is not in conflict with that of Bland v. Mentor, supra, because that case “was concerned only with a conveyance of real property and ... a constructive trust” and involved no social stigma and loss of reputation.4 I can only construe this to mean that, where the complaint contains no allegation reflecting upon the character of the *192defendant, proof by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is not required.
Here the appellant is accused of fraudulent conduct, decidedly a reflection upon her character. The burden of proof should be that which was approved by the court in In re Levias, supra, and Alter v. Morris, supra.
To tell the trier of fact that the burden of proof by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is something more than “more probable than not” but less than “without any reasonable doubt” is to invite it into the land of speculation upon an abstract concept. Such advice violates the fundamental principle that words are to be given their usual and ordinary meaning except in extraordinary cases—as where the legislature has assigned them a different meaning.
The majority here ventures even further into vagary. It says that the law’s definition of “clear, cogent, and convincing” is a nebulous thing, changing from case to case, depending upon the penalty or liability which the defendant may face.
The ordinary meaning of these words, however, is not nebulous. As words go, they are exceptionally rigid and precise.
“Clear”—as it relates to perceivable facts—means “easy to perceive or determine with certainty.” “Cogent” means “appealing forcibly to the mind or reason: convincing.” “Convincing” means “satisfying or assuring by argument or proof.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1968).
Black’s Law Dictionary 317 (4th ed. rev. 1968), says of “clear and convincing proof”:
Generally, this phrase and its numerous variations mean proof beyond a reasonable, i.e., a well-founded doubt. . . . Some cases give a less rigorous, but somewhat uncertain, meaning, viz., more than a preponderance but less than is required in a criminal case.
The word “cogent” is not defined in the law dictionary, but “convincing proof” is defined as
*193[s]uch as is sufficient to establish the proposition in question, beyond hesitation, ambiguity, or reasonable doubt, in an unprejudiced mind.
Black’s Law Dictionary 404 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
I am inclined to agree with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin which said, in the case of Evans v. Rugee, 57 Wis. 623, 626, 16 N.W. 49 (1883):
To convince is primarily “to overcome or subdue,” and, in logic, “to satisfy the mind by proof.” When one is convinced he cannot be more convinced. If evidence is convincing, it is sufficient in any case, and to say it ought to be more convincing in one case than another, is giving to the word degrees of comparison when the word itself is superlative.
The difference between the burden of proof in the ordinary civil case, in the criminal case, and in the fraud case or other case in which a statute or the common law imposes the larger burden is that in the one the plaintiff’s evidence must be sufficient to persuade the jury that it is more probable than not that the plaintiff’s facts are true, while in the other it must be sufficient to convince the jury that they are true. To ask the trier of the facts to apply a standard somewhere between these two asks the philosophically untrained layman to conceptualize a proposition which is both qualitatively and quantitatively beyond the range of ordinary human understanding.
In my opinion the State’s burden of proof before the jury which exonerated the appellant was no greater than the standard which the respondent (an agency of the State) is obliged to follow in evaluating the evidence against the appellant for the purpose of imposing the civil penalty provided in RCW 74.04.300. Since there is an identity of parties, subject matter, issues, and burden of proof, the doctrine of collateral estoppel should apply to grant the appellant the relief which she seeks. See Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn.2d 392, 429 P.2d 207 (1967).
But even assuming that the burden of proof in this case is different from that in the criminal action brought against the appellant, it is now established that the principle of res *194judicata' bars a punitive forfeiture of property following an acquittal of charges arising from the same conduct. Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 29 L. Ed. 684, 6 S. Ct. 437 (1886); United States v. One 1967 Cadillac El Dorado, 453 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1971).
In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 29 L. Ed. 746, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886), the United States Supreme Court held that civil proceedings which penalize a person by reason of offenses committed by him, are criminal in nature. Here the appellant was required to forfeit payments received by her and to pay an additional penalty to the State. The amount of the penalty may not appear great to this court, but to an indigent it may indeed be a “grievous loss”—see Standlee v. Rhay, 403 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D. Wash. 1975). There is no showing that the 25 percent penalty merely covered the cost of recoupment. I would hold that this penalty provision, attached to the same conduct for which the appellant was tried and found innocent, renders the proceeding criminal in nature.
The appellant should not be twice put in jeopardy by the State for this alleged offense.
I would reverse the Superior Court’s order.
Utter and Horowitz, JJ., concur with Rosellini, J.
Petition for rehearing denied August 2, 1976.

 The majority now says that the distinction noted in Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wn.2d 150, 385 P.2d 727 (1963), is not the significant one at all. Reflections upon character do not require convincing proof, nor is it required where monetary penalties are threatened. It is only necessary where' loss of liberty is involved. This makes the commitment of persons in need of hospitalization for mental or emotional treatment very difficult and the imposition of treble damages relatively easy.