Court Opinion

ID: 2964852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:12.807395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.638556
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                For the First Circuit
                                ____________________
       No. 96-2326
                                  JAMES A. STEINKE,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
                          SUNGARD FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC.,
                                Defendant, Appellee.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                   [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                                Lynch, Circuit Judge,
                         and O'Toole,* U.S. District Judge.
                                ____________________
            Margaret S. Garvey
                             , with whom 
                                         Wm. David Byassee
                                                         , 
                                                           Freeborn & Peters
                                                                            ,
       David C. Casey, Thomas A. Bockhorst, and Peckham, Lobel, Casey, Prince
       & Tye, were on brief for appellant.
            Mark 
                 Blondman, with whom  Scott 
                                            F. 
                                                Cooper, Blank 
                                                              Rome 
                                                                    Comisky 
                                                                            &
       McCauley, and  Testa,  
                              Hurwitz  
                                      &  
                                         Thibeault,  
                                                     LLP, were on brief for
       appellee.
                                ____________________
                                   August 6, 1997
                                ____________________
       _____________________
       *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant James A.
            Steinke appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment
            in favor of defendant-appellee SunGard Financial Systems, Inc.
            ("SFS") on his breach of contract and promissory estoppel
            claims. We affirm.
                                     Background
                      We state the facts in the light most favorable to the
            party opposing summary judgment.   See  Hoeppner v.  Crotched
            Mountain Rehabilitation Ctr., 31 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1994).
                      Steinke is a former SFS employee. SFS, a wholly-
            owned subsidiary of SunGard Data Systems, Inc., develops and
            sells computer software used for investment and financial
            purposes. In 1992, SFS decided to create a brokerage division
            called "Phase3"  to develop software applications for the
            securities industry and specifically to compete with Security
            Industrial Software ("SIS"). SIS was a multi-service company
            whose primary business involved providing software and related
            services to self-clearing broker dealers. In 1992, Steinke was
            the President and Chief Executive Officer of SIS. In December
            1992, Citicorp/Quotron, SIS's parent corporation, decided to
            sell SIS to a company called ADP.
                                
            1.  In April 1993, Phase3 was renamed SunGard Brokerage
            Systems. For purposes of clarity, however, we substitute the
            name Phase3 for SunGard Brokerage Systems as the relevant
            entity throughout this opinion.
                                         -2-
                                          2

                      When Dr. David Wismer, President and Chief Executive
            Officer of SFS, learned of ADP's acquisition of SIS, he thought
            Steinke might become available to head Phase3 and immediately
            began to recruit Steinke to come to Waltham, Massachusetts to
            lead Phase3. SFS's first efforts to recruit Steinke began in
            April or May 1992, when Wismer told Steinke that he understood
            SIS was well run and that he could use that type of management
            at Phase3. Late in 1992, Steinke attended a presentation that
            Wismer and James Mann, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
            SunGard Data Systems, made to Quotron. During this
            presentation, Wismer and Mann discussed with Quotron the
            possibility of SunGard Data Systems acquiring SIS. Mann also
            told Steinke during the meeting that if Steinke was to work for
            SFS, he would have one year to get to know the operations of
            Phase3 and two years after that to "conquer the ADP market."
                      In early February 1993, Steinke met with Wismer at
            Stapleton International Airport in Denver to discuss possible
            employment at SFS. During this meeting, Wismer told Steinke
            that he wanted him to fill Phase3's need for professional
            management. Wismer informed Steinke that SFS expected him to
            take three years to acquire former SIS customers and to reach
            Phase3's $50 million annual revenue target.
                       Later that month, Steinke met with Fraser Chambers,
            Executive Vice President of SFS's Eastern Region. Steinke
            inquired as to how SFS funded its divisions; Chambers responded
                                         -3-
                                          3

            that funding would be available if Steinke returned profits
            over a three-year period.
                      Over the weekend of February 19-20, 1993, Steinke
            attended an SFS meeting in Naples, Florida. In Naples, Steinke
            met with a variety of SFS personnel, including Wismer,
            Chambers, and Mann, in order to finalize the terms of his
            employment with SFS. Wismer informed Steinke that he was in
            the process of putting together an offer letter for Steinke.
            The SFS executives also reiterated that SFS senior executives
            were rated by their performance over a three-year period.
            Wismer in particular indicated that Steinke would have three
            years to "show his mettle" at SFS by achieving the aggressive
            financial results SFS demanded of its Phase3 division. Wismer
            told Steinke that SFS might not make its numbers in 1992, but
            that the plan Wismer had developed was sound and Steinke had
            three years to "make his numbers." Wismer reassured Steinke
            that if he could make his numbers in that time frame, he would
            have a long and successful career at SFS. The following day,
            Mann confirmed that SFS operated on a three-year financial
            plan.
                      On February 22, 1993, Wismer sent Steinke a letter
            constituting a formal offer of employment. The letter offered
            Steinke the position of President of SFS's Phase3 division at
            an annual salary of $195,000 plus bonuses and certain expenses.
            The letter stated that "[t]his offer is contingent upon your
                                         -4-
                                          4

            written acceptance of our [attached] Employee Agreement." The
            attached employment agreement contained a provision entitled
            "Termination," which provided:
                      I understand that this agreement does not
                      contain a guarantee of employment and
                      that, at any time and for any reason, I
                      may resign or SFS may terminate my
                      employment. If I decide to resign, I will
                      give at least two weeks' prior notice, and
                      I will remain for the full notice period
                      unless SunGard instructs me to leave
                      earlier and pays the remaining salary I
                      would have earned during the notice
                      period. In return, if SunGard terminates
                      my employment after six months without
                      cause, I will receive at least two weeks'
                      salary as severance pay.
          SFS previously had not informed Steinke that it required its
          employees to sign a form agreement before beginning employment.
                      Prior to executing the relevant documents, Steinke
          telephoned Wismer and told him that he was concerned about several
          issues in the form agreement, including the termination provision.
          Specifically, Steinke expressed concern about the fact that
          temporary housing would only last until July 15, 1993 and indicated
          that he found SFS's offer of five expense-paid trips per year
          between his home in Colorado and SFS's offices in Massachusetts to
          be unacceptable. Wismer verbally agreed to modify the term of the
          temporary housing and to work with Steinke so that he could take
          some additional trips to Colorado. When Steinke asked Wismer
          whether or not he had to sign the form agreement, Wismer informed
          him it was required of all SFS employees. In his deposition,
          Steinke recounted that Wismer responded: "You'll be judged on your
                                         -5-
                                          5

          numbers and you've got three years to make them. [E]verybody signs
          it. It's not an issue."
                      Steinke signed the Employee Agreement on February 26,
          1993. Although the offer letter indicated "a most desirable start
          date" of March 15, 1993, after executing the Employee Agreement,
          Steinke informed Wismer that he could not start work before April
          19, 1993 due to a non-compete agreement he had negotiated with SIS.
          Wismer responded that he wanted Steinke to start work on March 15,
          1993. Steinke replied that he would be willing to work in some
          unofficial capacity and suggested that he be paid as a consultant.
          Wismer objected to this method of payment due to the accounting
          difficulties it apparently would occasion and remarked that "in the
          scheme of working together for the next five to ten years," Steinke
          should consider beginning work on March 15 with compensation for
          expenses only until he could officially start with SFS on April 19.
          Steinke agreed to this solution. When negotiations resulted in an
          acceptable arrangement, Steinke ceased considering alternative
          employment opportunities.
                      On one occasion after Steinke began his employment with
          Phase3, Mann told him that he had three years to make his numbers
          under SFS's three-year plan. Also after starting his employment,
          Steinke learned that Phase3's expenses were running far beyond what
          they should be if he was to make a bottom line profit of $6.7
                                
            2.  Steinke claims that he was reviewing at least two other
            employment offers when he accepted SFS's offer.
                                          6

          million for 1993. On July 14, 1993, Wismer and Steinke discussed
          SFS's financial situation and Wismer informed Steinke that the 1994
          numbers would be even more critical. Wismer indicated that it was
          Steinke's job to put the Phase3 business plan together to achieve
          the goals, reinforcing the perception that Steinke had three years
          to make his numbers.
                      On August 12, 1993, Wismer informed Steinke that his
          performance was "excellent." On October 15, 1993, however, SFS
          terminated Steinke's employment. 
                      Steinke filed suit against SFS in Massachusetts
          Superior Court, alleging breach of contract, breach of implied
          contract, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and
          promissory estoppel. The gist of Steinke's claims was that SFS was
          obligated to compensate him for three years' worth of service based
          on its alleged oral representations to him and his subsequent
          reliance on these representations. SFS removed the case to federal
          district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship.  See 28
          U.S.C. S 1332(a)(1). On October 18, 1995, SFS filed a motion for
          summary judgment. The district court granted SFS's motion as to
          the breach of contract and breach of implied contract claims, but
          not as to the fraud in the inducement and negligent
          misrepresentation claims. The district court dismissed the
          promissory estoppel claim, and Steinke, after voluntarily
          dismissing the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims
                                          7

          pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), now appeals the district
          court's rulings.
                                 Standard of Review
                      We review the district court's grant of summary
          judgment de novo. See 
                                Werme v. 
                                        Merrill, 84 F.3d 479, 482 (1st Cir.
          1996). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals no
          genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
          judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact
          becomes material when it has the potential to affect the outcome of
          the suit. See 
                        J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan
                                                            v. 
                                                               Smith Barney
          Shearson, Inc.
                       , 76 F.3d 1245, 1250-51 (1st Cir.), 
                                                          cert. 
                                                                denied, 117
          S. Ct. 81 (1996). We are not "wedded to the district court's
          reasoning. Rather, '[w]e are free, on appeal, to affirm [or
          reverse] a judgment on any independently sufficient ground.'"
          Garside v.  Osco  
                           Drug,  
                                  Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 1990)
          (quoting 
                  Polyplastics, Inc.
                                     v. 
                                        Transconex, Inc.
                                                       , 827 F.2d 859, 860-
          61 (1st Cir. 1987)).
                                     Discussion
                      On appeal, Steinke advances three arguments. First, he
          asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
          on his claim of breach of an express and implied contract because
          issues of fact existed concerning the terms of his employment
          agreement with SFS, precluding the finding that this agreement
          constituted an unambiguous integrated contract. Second, Steinke
          maintains that the district court improperly granted summary
                                          8

          judgment on his contract claims because "disputed issues of fact
          existed regarding whether the written contract was modified to
          require employment for a reasonable term." Third, Steinke insists
          that the district court improperly dismissed his promissory
          estoppel claim. We address these arguments in turn.
                      Before turning to the merits of Steinke's appeal, we
          note that the parties agree that, pursuant to a choice of law
          provision in the Employee Agreement, Pennsylvania law governs
          contract-based claims arising out of the Agreement. Because we see
          no compelling reason to do otherwise, we will honor the parties'
          choice of law on all counts upon which they agree.  See James 
                                                                         L.
          Miniter Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Ohio Indem. Co., 112 F.3d 1240, 1245
          (1st Cir. 1997); 
                          Borden v. 
                                    Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.
                                                            , 935 F.2d 370,
          375 (1st Cir. 1991).
          A.  Integrated Contract
                      The district court found that "the Employment Agreement
          and the offer letter constitute[d] a complete expression of the
          parties' agreement regarding the terms of Steinke's employment."
          Steinke asserts that the district court erred because he and SFS
          never executed an integrated employment contract. Specifically,
          Steinke contends: 
                      The contract consisted of the oral
                      representations made to [him] . . . when
                      he was solicited by SFS to head up its new
                      brokerage division prior to receipt of the
                      offer letter; the negotiations with
                      respect to the term of the contract, the
                      starting date, the duration of his
                      temporary housing allowance and the number
                                          9

                      of trips between Massachusetts and
                      Colorado prior to his relocation which
                      were settled after the written documents
                      were received; and the offer letter and
                      form agreement.
          Because "[t]here was no single document or combination of documents
          which fully and completely expressed the parties' agreement with
          respect to the employment relationship," Steinke argues that he was
          entitled to introduce parol evidence to prove the intent of the
          parties. 
                      It is well settled that Pennsylvania law presumes all
          employment to be at-will.   See Darlington v. General 
                                                                Elec., 504
          A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (tracing recognition of
          employment at-will doctrine in Pennsylvania to 
                                                        Henry v. 
                                                                 Pittsburgh
          & 
            Lake 
                 Erie 
                      R.R. 
                           Co., 21 A. 157 (Pa. 1891));   see also Scott v.
          Extracorporeal, Inc.
                             , 545 A.2d 334, 336 (Pa. 1988). Specifically,
          Pennsylvania law dictates that absent a statutory or contractual
          provision to the contrary, it is presumed that either party may end
          an employment relationship at any time, for any or no cause.  See
          Murray v. Commercial 
                               Union 
                                     Ins. 
                                          Co., 782 F.2d 432, 435 (3d Cir.
          1986). An employee attempting to overcome the presumption of at-
          will employment in Pennsylvania must demonstrate "facts and
          circumstances establishing some tenure of employment." 
                                                                Cummings v.
          Kelling 
                  Nut 
                      Co., 84 A.2d 323, 325 (Pa. 1951). Overcoming the
          presumption constitutes "an up-hill battle" in Pennsylvania.
          Schoch v. 
                   First Fidelity Bancorporation
                                                , 912 F.2d 654, 661 (3d Cir.
          1990).
                                         10

                      In this case, no statutory or contractual provision
          conflicts with Pennsylvania's presumption of at-will employment.
          SFS's offer letter stated that "[t]his offer is contingent on your
          written acceptance of our Employee Agreement." The Employee
          Agreement provided no fixed term of employment. Instead, the
          Employee Agreement stated: "I understand that this agreement does
          not contain a guarantee of employment and that, 
                                                        at any time and for
          any reason, I may resign or SunGard may terminate my employment."
          (emphasis added). The Employee Agreement indicated only that if
          Steinke completed six months of employment with SFS, then SFS would
          pay him "at least two weeks' salary as severance pay" if it
          terminated his employment without cause. "[W]here a contract
          purports to be a complete legal obligation without any doubt as to
          its object or extent, it is presumed to reflect the whole legal
          right of the parties." Lenzi v.  Hahnemann 
                                                     Univ., 664 A.2d 1375,
          1379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); 
                                     see 
                                        Fountain Hill Millwork Bldg. Supply
          Co. v. Belzel, 587 A.2d 757, 760 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);  Levy v.
          Leaseway Sys. Inc., 154 A.2d 314, 316 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959). 
                      Despite the clear language of both the Employee
          Agreement and Pennsylvania law, Steinke argues that the Agreement's
          object and extent remain in doubt, and points to parol evidence
          concerning representations of a fixed three-year term of employment
          that various SFS officials made to him prior to the execution of
          the Employment Agreement. Steinke places particular emphasis on
          the fact that SFS, in response in part to his concerns about the
                                         11

          termination provision in the Employment Agreement, indicated that
          "everybody signs it. It's not an issue."
                      "Whether a writing is an integrated agreement, and if
          so, whether the agreement is completely or partially integrated are
          questions to be decided by the court prior to application of the
          parol evidence rule." Greenberg v. 
                                            Tomlin, 816 F. Supp. 1039, 1053
          (E.D. Pa. 1993); 
                          see 
                              Hershey Foods Corp.
                                                 v. 
                                                    Ralph Chapek, Inc.
                                                                      , 828
          F.2d 989, 995 (3d Cir. 1987). In determining whether an agreement
          is integrated, a court must compare both the alleged oral and
          written agreements and must determine whether "'the parties,
          situated as were the ones to the contract, would naturally and
          normally include the one in the other if it were made.'"   Mellon
          Bank Corp.
                    v. 
                       First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage Invs.
                                                                      , 951
          F.2d 1399, 1405 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 
                                                 Gianni v. 
                                                           R. Russel & Co.
                                                                          ,
          16 A. 791, 792 (Pa. 1924)); see Crompton-Richmond Co.--Factors v.
          Smith, 253 F. Supp. 980, 983 (E.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 577
          (3d Cir. 1967) (per curiam). If the alleged oral and written
          agreements "'relate to the same subject matter and are so
          interrelated that both would be executed at the same time and in
          the same contract, the scope of the subsidiary agreement must be
          taken to be covered by the writing.'"  Ralph 
                                                       Chapek, 828 F.2d at
          995 (quoting  Gianni, 126 A. at 792). In such case, "'parol
          evidence to vary, modify or supersede the written contract is
          inadmissible in evidence.'" HCB Contractors
                                                     v. 
                                                        Liberty Place Hotel
                                         12

          Ass'n, 652 A.2d 1278, 1279 (Pa. 1995) (quoting 
                                                       Nicolella v. 
                                                                    Palmer,
          248 A.2d 20, 22 (Pa. 1968)).
                      Having compared the alleged oral agreement and the
          written agreement in this case, we believe that Steinke and SFS
          would "naturally and normally" have included the alleged oral
          agreement in the written agreement had they actually made an
          agreement establishing three years as Steinke's term of employment.
          A provision dictating such a lengthy term of employment would be
          integral to an agreement providing an offer of employment and
          dictating the terms of such employment, including a specific
          termination provision. Moreover, Steinke specifically inquired
          about the termination provision and, after SFS informed him that
          all employees were required to sign the Employee Agreement as a
          condition of employment with SFS, he signed the Agreement without
          protest. Furthermore, the alleged oral agreement and the written
                                
            3.  We believe the fact that Steinke signed the agreement after
            inquiring about its terms is particularly telling in this
            situation. Over a period of approximately twenty years,
            Steinke had worked for many large corporations involved in
            finance and high technology, including Merrill Lynch, Shearson
            Lehman Brothers, Kemper Securities, and Colgate Palmolive.
            Steinke negotiated and signed employment agreements with at
            least three of these corporations. Steinke's considerable
            experience in the field casts doubt upon his assertion that he
            did not expect to be bound by the termination provision. See,
            e.g., 
                 M/S Bremen
                            v. 
                               Zapata Off-Shore Co.
                                                  , 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972)
            (upholding written contractual provision in part because it was
            "made in an arm's-length negotiation by experienced and
            sophisticated businessmen");   Beckman v.   Vassall-Dillworth
            Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.
                                , 468 A.2d 784, 788 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
            (rejecting argument that appellant did not intend "no-agency"
            clause to be included in his contract, reasoning in part that
            appellant "was an experienced businessman, equipped to
            understand the meaning of the terms of the agreement he
                                         13

          agreement (particularly the termination provision in the Employee
          Agreement) both addressed the duration of Steinke's employment with
          SFS. We therefore find that the Employee Agreement covered the
          scope of, and thus superseded, the alleged oral agreement.    See
          Mellon Bank
                    , 951 F.2d at 1406-08; 
                                          Ralph Chapek
                                                      , 828 F.2d at 996-98;
          United Ref. Co. v. Jenkins, 189 A.2d 574, 579 (Pa. 1963); Gianni,
          176 A. at 792; 
                        Beckman v. 
                                   Vassall-Dillworth Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.
                                                                          ,
          468 A.2d 784, 788 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
                      "These cases show that under Pennsylvania law, a
          written contract which gives one party an unconditional right
          precludes the other party from using parol evidence to establish a
          condition on the exercise of the unlimited right the written text
          contains."  Mellon 
                             Bank, 961 F.2d at 1407. We thus affirm the
          trial court's finding that the offer letter and the Employment
                                
            signed"). 
            4.  Relying only on  Moyer v. Heilveil, 49 A.2d 514, 515 (Pa.
            Super. Ct. 1946), Steinke quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
            as ruling that "[a] contract may be partly oral and partly in
            writing and the written agreement does not supersede the oral
            contract unless it is complete in itself, embodying all the
            terms orally agreed upon."  Id. The  Moyer court reached this
            conclusion only after it determined that the writing in
            question was silent concerning the terms of employment; it
            reasoned "[i]t therefore was proper for plaintiff to prove a
            prior separate oral agreement not inconsistent with the writing
            and unaffected by it, establishing the actual intention of the
            parties."  Id. (emphasis added). In the context of Steinke's
            appeal, Moyer thus dictates that Steinke may not have the
            opportunity to prove a separate oral agreement because the
            Employee Agreement contained a termination provision which
            specifically detailed the "terms of employment." 
                                         14

          Agreement constituted an integrated agreement. Consequently, we
          hold that the district court did not err in applying the parol
          evidence rule to bar evidence of alleged oral terms.     See  HCB
          Contractors, 652 A.2d at 1280;    International  
                                                           Milling  
                                                                    Co. v.
          Hachmeister, Inc., 110 A.2d 186, 191 (Pa. 1955).
                                
            5.  The fact that the offer letter and the Employment Agreement
            did not constitute one single document does not affect this
            ruling. An integrated agreement may take the form of two
            documents, 
                      see 
                          Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc.
                                                            v. 
                                                               Pitterich,
            805 F.2d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 1986) ("It is a general rule of
            contract law that where two writings are executed at the same
            time and are intertwined by the same subject matter, they
            should be construed together and interpreted as a whole, each
            one contributing to the ascertainment of the true intent of the
            parties."); 
                       see 
                           also 
                                Zaidan v. 
                                         Borg-Warner Corp.
                                                          , 341 F.2d 391,
            392 (3d Cir. 1965); 
                               United States
                                             v. 
                                               Goldberg, 136 F. Supp. 34,
            37 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1955), provided it "appears to be a contract
            complete within itself, couched in such terms as import a
            complete legal obligation without any uncertainty as to the
            object or extent of the engagement," 
                                               Fountain Hill
                                                            , 587 A.2d at
            760. Moreover, "[w]hile the effect of an integration clause is
            to make the parol evidence rule clearly applicable, it is not
            required."   Mellon  
                                 Bank, 951 F.2d at 1406 n.6 (internal
            citations omitted); see Ralph Chapek, 828 F.2d at 998. Thus,
            Steinke's argument that neither the offer letter nor the
            Employment Agreement contained an integration clause, and,
            thus, that there is no integrated contract, is unavailing.
            6.  Steinke's reliance on 
                                     McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc.
                                                                v. 
                                                                   Norton
            Co., 563 N.E.2d 188, 191-95 (Mass. 1990), is unpersuasive. As
            noted previously, the law of Pennsylvania controls these
            issues. McEvoy Travel
                                 , furthermore, is distinguishable on its
            facts. In   McEvoy  
                               Travel, the appellant signed a contract
            containing a sixty-day termination clause. When the appellant
            questioned the clause, the appellee informed him that the
            clause was "inoperative" and "meaningless."  Id. at 191. The
            court held that the written contract was not an integrated
            agreement, reasoning as follows: 
                      When parties . . . sign a document and
                      include in it a provision as to
                      termination by notice, at the same time
                      expressly stating that the provision is a
                      mere "face saving device" never to be
                      effective, they have not adopted that
                                         15

                      Apparently determined to circumvent the parol evidence
          rule, Steinke argues that the termination provision contained in
          the Employee Agreement is ambiguous. Specifically, Steinke
          maintains:
                      If the contract was for "at will"
                      employment, it would be inconsistent with
                      the provision of the offer letter that
                      provides Steinke temporary housing "until
                      the earlier of July 15, 1993 or your move
                      into your permanent residence." It would
                      negate the provision that SFS would
                      provide storage of Steinke's household
                      goods "until the earlier of September 15,
                      1993 or your move into your permanent
                      residence." . . . It is also at odds with
                      the fact that Steinke was agreeing to a
                      covenant not to compete for twelve months
                      after his termination for any reason.
          A finding of ambiguity in the termination provision, according to
          Steinke, necessarily would entitle him to submit to a jury evidence
          concerning his alleged three-year contract with SFS.
                                
                      document as a "complete and accurate
                      integration" of their agreement. Instead
                      they have [in Williston's words] issued it
                      "in usual form but limited its terms by
                      parole agreement." 
            Id. at 194 n.7 (quoting 3  Corbin 
                                              on 
                                                 Contracts S 582, at 463
            (1960)). In the instant case, SFS never told Steinke that
            either the Employee Agreement or the termination provision
            contained therein were "inoperative" or "meaningless."
            Wismer's remark that signing the Employee Agreement was not "an
            issue" does not equate with   McEvoy  
                                                  Travel's "never to be
            effective" language. Wismer, in fact, informed Steinke both
            that SFS required all of its employees to sign the Employee
            Agreement and that all SFS employees did so. The offer letter
            made this requirement clear with respect to Steinke, stating
            that "[t]his offer is contingent on your written acceptance of
            our Employee Agreement."
                                         16

                      In Pennsylvania, "[o]nly if the terms used [in an
          agreement] are ambigious [sic] or if the contract is not fully
          integrated, should the trial judge allow the finder of fact to
          consider evidence that might vary or add to the contract's express
          terms."  Griesmann v. Chemical 
                                         Leaman 
                                                Tank 
                                                     Lines, 
                                                            Inc., 776 F.2d
          66, 72 (3d Cir. 1985); 
                                see 
                                    Compass Tech., Inc.
                                                       v. 
                                                          Tseng Lab., Inc.
                                                                          ,
          71 F.3d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[I]f the[] [parties'] intent
          can be cleanly extracted from the clear and unambiguous words that
          the parties have used, it is . . . conventional wisdom that they
          are held to those words contained in the contract."); Steuart v.
          McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1982) (holding that when words in
          written contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent is to be
          discovered only from the express language of the agreement). "In
          making the ambiguity determination, a court must consider the words
          of the agreement, alternative meanings suggested by counsel, and
          extrinsic evidence offered in support of those meanings." Kroblin
          Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir.
          1986). Having considered the integrated agreement's language, the
          meanings that Steinke suggests, and the extrinsic evidence he
          offered as evidence of these meanings, we believe that the terms of
          the integrated agreement in this case were unambiguous.
                      As mentioned earlier, the Employee Agreement provided
          "this agreement does not contain a guarantee of employment and . .
          . at any time and for any reason I may resign or SunGard may
          terminate my employment. . . . [I]f SunGard terminates my
                                         17

          employment after six months without cause, I will receive at least
          two weeks' salary as severance pay." The existence of the words
          "at least" in the Employee Agreement in no way clouds or muddles
          the terms of the Agreement. It simply indicates that if SFS
          terminates an employee without cause after the employee has worked
          for six months, then SFS must pay the employee a minimum of two
          weeks' salary. At its discretion, SFS may agree to pay the
          employee more than two weeks' salary. In this case, Steinke failed
          to provide sufficient evidence of an oral agreement committing SFS
          to pay him more than two weeks' salary.  See Schoch, 912 F.2d at
          661 (finding that evidence appellant submitted to demonstrate oral
          contract of employment "lack[ed] the clarity and specificity that
          Pennsylvania courts require to overcome the presumption of at-will
          employment"); 
                       Kelling Nut
                                  , 84 A.2d at 324 (holding that statements
          made by employer regarding future possibilities were nothing more
          than "puffing"); Cashdollar v.  Mercy 
                                                Hospital 
                                                         of 
                                                            Pittsburg, 595
          A.2d 70, 76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (explaining that "an expectation
          of the prospective employee, however reasonable from his point of
          view, does not supply a meeting of the minds"). SFS simply
          exercised the discretion that the terms of the Employee Agreement
          afforded it in refusing to pay Steinke more than two-weeks salary
          as severance pay.
                      We recognize that in Pennsylvania "[o]ne part of a
          contract cannot be interpreted so as to annul another part, and a
          contract must be construed, if possible, to give effect to all of
                                         18

          its terms." Meeting House Lane
                                         v. 
                                           Melso, 628 A.2d 854, 857-58 (Pa.
          Super. Ct. 1993); see Heidt v. Augenbaugh Coal Co., 176 A.2d 400,
          401-02 (Pa. 1962);   Giuliani  
                                         Constr.  
                                                 Co. v.   School  
                                                                  Dist.  
                                                                         of
          Philadelphia, 217 A.2d 793, 795 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966). In this
          case, the fact that SFS could terminate Steinke's employment "at
          any time and for any reason" and pay him only two weeks', rather
          than three years' salary neither annuls nor renders inexplicable
          the provisions in the agreement that Steinke highlights. If SFS
          dismissed Steinke without cause, then pursuant to the agreement it
          still would be responsible for providing him temporary housing
          "until the earlier of July 15, 1993 or [his] . . . move into [his]
          . . . permanent residence;" it would continue to be obligated to
          store his household goods "until the earlier of September 15, 1993
          or [his] . . . move into [his] . . . permanent residence;" and,
          Steinke would be precluded from competing with SFS for a period of
          twelve months after his termination. This construction of the
          agreement gives effect to all of the terms of the contract.
          Moreover, Pennsylvania law provides that contractual obligations
          contained in an employment contract may persist after the
          employment provided for in the contract is terminated.        Cf.
          Insulation Corp. of Am.
                                 v. 
                                    Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 733 (Pa. Super.
          Ct. 1995); Wainwright's 
                                  Travel 
                                         Serv., 
                                                 Inc. v. Schmolk, 500 A.2d
          476, 479 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
                      Given the terms of the integrated agreement between
          Steinke and SFS, considered in the context both of the arguments
                                         19

          and evidence Steinke advances and of Pennsylvania law governing the
          construction of contracts, we do not believe either that the
          agreement was ambiguous or that the district court's interpretation
          of the agreement improperly created an ambiguity in the agreement.
          See Amoco  
                     Oil  
                         Co. v.   Snyder, 478 A.2d 795, 799 (Pa. 1984);
          McChesney, 444 A.2d at 663. The district court, therefore, did not
          err in refusing to admit parol evidence to determine the parties'
          intent.
          B.  Modification
                      Steinke next contends that even if the offer letter and
          Employee Agreement constituted an unambiguous integrated contract,
          a subsequent oral agreement with SFS modified the written
          agreement. Steinke maintains that on several occasions after he
          executed the Employee Agreement, SFS executives communicated to him
          that SFS would employ him for a fixed term of years. Steinke
          further contends that he supported this oral modification with
          separate consideration by working without any salary for one month.
                      The district court found that the evidence Steinke
          offered to support his modification argument was "pretty thin."
          Consequently, the district court, after "[i]ndulging every nuance
          in Steinke's favor, [concluded that] no reasonable finder of fact
          could wring from these ruminations on SFS's corporate culture an
          affirmative offer to junk Steinke's existing at-will agreement in
          favor of a term contract." We agree.
                                         20

                      In Pennsylvania, a party arguing that an oral agreement
          modified a prior written contract must prove the existence of the
          oral agreement "by evidence which is clear, precise[,] and
          convincing."  Pellegrene v. Luther, 169 A.2d 298, 299 (Pa. 1961);
          see Gorwara v. AEL 
                             Indus., 784 F. Supp. 239, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
          (indicating that at-will presumption in Pennsylvania "can only be
          overcome by clear and specific evidence showing the parties' [sic]
          intended their contract to extend a certain period"). Generally,
          vague, broad, or aspirational statements are insufficient under
          Pennsylvania law to establish an oral contract modifying an at-will
          employment contract.  See Green v. Oliver 
                                                    Realty, 
                                                            Inc., 526 A.2d
          1192, 1202 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 571,
          579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986);      Darlington, 504 A.2d at 312.
          Specifically, promises of employment for "broad, unspecified
          durations do not overcome the [at will] presumption."  Forman v.
          BRI Corp., 532 F. Supp. 49, 51 (E.D. Pa. 1982). In this case, we
          find the evidence that Steinke brings forth to support his claim of
          an oral modification of the written integrated agreement
          insufficiently clear and specific to reverse the district court's
          award of summary judgment to SFS on this issue. 
                      Steinke asserts that when he informed Wismer that he
          could not begin work for SFS until April 19, rather than the
          preferred March 15 date specified in the offer letter, Wismer
          suggested that he work between these dates for expenses only given
          "the scheme of working together for the next five to ten years."
                                         21

          In March, during a discussion "over some drinks" in Steamboat
          Springs, Colorado, which focused primarily on the success of
          another SFS executive, Mann "made comments to the effect that, you
          know, you've got three years to make your numbers. You've got to
          beat out Simpson." During a dinner conversation on July 14,
          according to Steinke, Wismer worried aloud about his own prospects
          with SFS, "reinforcing that belief that you have three years to
          make your numbers. You can have a bad year, you can even have two
          bad years. But since it's a numbers company, three years and your
          employment would be at risk." Based on this evidence, in
          conjunction with the fact that he consented to work for SFS between
          March 15 and April 19 "for expenses only," Steinke concludes that
          he was "entitled to have a jury determine whether the post-contract
          representations, supported by the consideration of working without
          any salary for one month, modified the contract to incorporate the
          three year term."
                      In Marsh v. Boyle, 530 A.2d 491, 494 (Pa. Super. Ct.
          1987), the court found that an oral assurance of employment "for at
          least two years" lacked the requisite specificity to rebut the at-
          will presumption in Pennsylvania. In      Darlington, the court
          rejected the appellant's argument that the parties had modified an
          at-will employment relationship given that the appellant was hired
          for a "long range project."  See 504 A.2d at 32. The   Darlington
          court reasoned that the "term long range project is, in and of
                                         22

          itself, too vague and unspecified to overcome the [at-will]
          presumption."  Id. 
                      Similarly, in McMahon v. Impact 
                                                      Sys., 
                                                            Inc., 126 Lab.
          Cas. q 57,486, 1992 WL 201004, at 5 (E.D. Pa. 1992), the court did
          not find persuasive the plaintiff's argument that a conversation he
          had with his employer modified his written at-will employment
          contract. During the conversation in question, the employer asked
          the plaintiff how long he intended to be employed by the employer.
          The discussion then proceeded as follows: "I [the plaintiff] said
          I'd like to be employed for three years, then we can renegotiate
          where I can at least be suitable with the company, right? She [the
          employer] said that would be no problem. That was the agreement."
          Id. The court held that "this conversation, without more, [wa]s
          not sufficiently clear and definite to overcome the at-will
          presumption."  Id.; see Extracorporeal, 545 A.2d at 337 (finding
          neither oral nor written assurances of permanent employment
          sufficiently definite or specific to rebut at-will presumption);
          Betts v. 
                  Stroehmann Bros.
                                  , 512 A.2d 1280, 1281 (Pa Super. Ct. 1986)
          (finding oral understanding that employment "was to be long term"
          did not alter at-will presumption).
                      In the instant case, the three conversations Steinke
          had with various SFS executives do not provide specific, definite
          evidence of both Steinke and SFS's intention to substitute an oral
          three-year term contract for Steinke's written at-will agreement.
          During these conversations, Wismer and Mann adverted to three,
                                         23

          five, and potentially even ten years in reference to Steinke's
          future employment with SFS. We believe these references amounted
          to nothing more than vague, aspirational statements. Accordingly,
          we find that they were insufficient to establish an oral contract
          modifying Steinke's written employment agreement.
                      We note that Steinke argues that by working for SFS
          between March 15, 1993 and April 19, 1993 without salary, he
          supplied sufficient additional consideration to demonstrate the
          existence of an oral modification to his written at-will employment
          agreement. In Pennsylvania, separate or additional consideration
          may evince contract modification.   See Green, 526 A.2d at 1200;
          Darlington, 504 A.2d at 314; 
                                      Nicolella, 248 A.2d at 23. "[A] court
          will find 'additional consideration' when an employee affords his
          employer a substantial benefit other than the services which the
          employee is hired to perform, or when the employee undergoes a
          substantial hardship other than the services which he is hired to
          perform."  Darlington, 504 A.2d at 315. 
                      It does not appear to us that Steinke afforded SFS a
          substantial benefit other than the work he contracted to perform
          because the offer letter that Steinke accepted specifically
          delineated March 15 as his "most desirable start date." It was not
          until after he executed the Employee Agreement that Steinke
          informed SFS that he could not commence his employment until April
          19 due to the restrictions of the non-compete agreement he had
          executed with SIS. 
                                         24

                      In addition, it seems unlikely that Steinke suffered
          any hardship by working from March 15 until April 19 without salary
          because it was his contractual duty to SIS that precluded him from
          commencing work as a salaried employee with SFS on March 15. The
          record does not reveal any other hardship that Steinke suffered
          during this period; for instance, he did not move his family to
          Massachusetts until after April 19.    See  id. (indicating that
          additional consideration may be sufficient when individual must
          move his family to commence a new employment position). We thus do
          not find that Steinke furnished SFS with the necessary separate or
          additional consideration to demonstrate an intent to modify his
          written at-will employment agreement.  See id. at 315; Veno, 515
          A.2d at 580; Betts, 512 A.2d at 1281. 
                      Even if we were to find sufficient separate or
          additional consideration, this finding would not affect our
          analysis. In Pennsylvania, "if the parties specifically agreed
          that the employment would be at-will, even though additional
          consideration were present, . . . court[s are expected] to construe
          the contract according to the parties' stated intention and hold it
          to be at-will."  Extracorporeal, 545 A.2d at 339. In this case,
          the parties agreed that Steinke's employment would be at will; we
          reiterate that the Employee Agreement stated: "I understand that
          this agreement does not contain a guarantee of employment and that,
                                         25

          at any time and for any reason, I may resign or SunGard may
          terminate my employment." 
          C.  Promissory Estoppel
                      Steinke finally argues that even if his at-will
          employment agreement was not modified, "under principles of
          promissory estoppel, a jury is entitled to determine that SFS is
          precluded from claiming that Steinke could be terminated at any
          time, without any recourse." Specifically, Steinke insists that he
                      discontinued negotiations with other
                      employers in reliance on the
                      representations that his employment would
                      be for three years; he sold his house and
                      his wife quit her job to be able to move
                      to Massachusetts. Steinke agreed to work
                                
            7.  Steinke insists that "at a minimum," because he provided
            the consideration of working without salary from March 15 until
            April 19, he was "entitled to be paid for the period he
            performed services for SFS prior to his official start date of
            April 19, 1993 on the theory of implied contract." "A contract
            implied in fact is an actual contract which arises where the
            parties agree upon the obligations to be incurred, but their
            intention, instead of being expressed in words, is inferred
            from acts in light of the surrounding circumstances." 
                                                                 Elias v.
            Elias, 237 A.2d 215, 217 (Pa. 1968). In Pennsylvania, "[t]he
            law will not imply a different contract than that which the
            parties have expressly adopted."   Hutchison v. Sunbeam 
                                                                     Coal
            Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 388 (Pa. 1986). Having determined that
            Steinke did not provide additional consideration to evidence a
            modified oral contract, we find no merit in Steinke's
            contention that he is entitled to be paid for the approximately
            four weeks during which he worked for expenses only. Steinke
            and SFS specifically agreed that in light of Steinke's non-
            compete agreement with SIS, he would not receive salary during
            this period.
            8.  Although the parties and the district court labeled
            Steinke's final claim "detrimental reliance," Steinke explains
            that it actually constitutes a "cause of action for promissory
            estoppel." We agree and thus use this designation in the
            discussion that follows.
                                         26

                      for approximately four weeks without
                      compensation based upon the further
                      promises of SFS that in the overall
                      relationship between the parties, the four
                      weeks would be insignificant.
          The district court dismissed the promissory estoppel claim,
          reasoning that it was "simply a restatement of an element of the
          fraud claim and not a separate cause of action." 
                      As a preliminary note, we believe that Pennsylvania
          rather than Massachusetts law governs the promissory estoppel claim
          in this case because promissory estoppel is a "contractually based
          cause of action" and thus should "fall[] within the purview of the
          choice of law clause."  Shelley v. Trafalgar House Pub. Ltd. Co.,
          918 F. Supp. 515, 522 (D.P.R. 1996). We need not resolve this
          issue, however, because "the outcome is the same under the
          substantive law of either jurisdiction."   Lambert v. Kysar, 983
          F.2d 1110, 1114 (1st Cir. 1993); 
                                          see 
                                              Lucker Mfg.
                                                          v. 
                                                             Home Ins. Co.
                                                                          ,
          23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir. 1994). 
                      "[A]s a general rule, [in Pennsylvania] there is no
          common law cause of action against an employer for termination of
          an at-will employment relationship."  Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 569
          A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1990);      see  Clay v.   Advanced  
                                                                   Computer
          Applications, 
                        Inc., 559 A.2d 917, 918 (Pa. 1989). Specifically,
          "the 
               doctrine 
                        of 
                           equitable 
                                      estoppel 
                                               is 
                                                  not 
                                                       an 
                                                          exception 
                                                                    to 
                                                                        the
          employment 
                     at-will 
                             doctrine."   Paul, 569 A.2d at 349 (emphasis
          added); see 
                     Dugan v. 
                              Bell Tel. of Pa.
                                              , 876 F. Supp. 713, 727 (W.D.
          Pa. 1994) (holding that employee could not assert claim of
                                         27

          promissory estoppel based on reliance on employer's alleged promise
          to find him permanent employment); Anderson v. Haverford College,
          851 F. Supp. 179, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (instructing that 
                                                                 Niehaus v.
          Delaware 
                   Valley 
                          Med. 
                               Ctr., 631 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993),
          rev'd, 649 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1994), was expressly limited to the facts
          of that case and did not revise the long-standing at-will
          presumption). Under Pennsylvania law, therefore, Steinke's
          promissory estoppel claim necessarily fails because Steinke was an
          at-will employee according to the written employment agreement
          executed on February 26, 1993.
                      Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel in
          Massachusetts, "'[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably
          expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee
          or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance
          is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
          promise.'"  Veranda 
                              Beach 
                                    Club 
                                          Ltd. 
                                               Partnership v. Western 
                                                                       Sur.
          Co., 936 F.2d 1364, 1380 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting    McAndrew v.
          School Comm., 480 N.E.2d 327, 332 (Mass. 1985)); see Chedd-Angier
          Prod. Co.
                   v. 
                      Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd.
                                                  , 756 F.2d 930, (1st Cir.
          1985) (explaining that Massachusetts has adopted Restatement
          (Second) of Contracts S 90);   see  also Carlson v.   Arnot-Ogden
          Memorial Hosp., 918 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir. 1990) (indicating that
          in Pennsylvania, "[p]romissory estoppel allows the court to enforce
          a party's promise that is unsupported by consideration where (1)
          the promisor makes a promise that he reasonably expects to induce
                                         28

          action or forbearance by the promisee, (2) the promise does induce
          action or forbearance by the promisee, and (3) injustice can only
          be avoided by enforcing the promise"); Murphy v. Burke, 311 A.2d
          904, 908 (Pa. 1973) (indicating that Pennsylvania's promissory
          estoppel doctrine follows Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 90).
          In Massachusetts, "'[a]n element of promissory estoppel is that the
          party invoking it must have   reasonably relied on the alleged
          promise to his detriment.'"  Coll v. PB Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 50
          F.3d 1115, 1124 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting   Hall v. Horizon 
                                                                      House
          Microwave,  
                     Inc., 506 N.E.2d 178, 184 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)
          (emphasis added in Hall));  see Loranger 
                                                   Constr. 
                                                            Corp. v. E. 
                                                                         F.
          Hauserman Co.
                      , 374 N.E.2d 306, 311 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (dictating
          that in the context of a promissory estoppel claim, "attention is
          to be focused upon the reasonableness of th[e] reliance"), aff'd,
          384 N.E.2d 176 (Mass. 1978); see also Josephs v. Pizza Hut of Am.
          Inc., 733 F.Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 1217
          (3d Cir. 1990). Courts typically invoke the doctrine of promissory
          estoppel when the formal requirements of contract formation are
          absent and when enforcing the promise would serve the interests of
          justice.  See Veranda 
                                Beach, 936 F.2d at 1380; see also  Carlson,
          918 F.2d at 416.
                      Steinke thus bears the burden of proving that he
          reasonably relied to his detriment on a promise that SFS made of a
          three-year term of employment. In this case, Steinke indicates
          that Wismer alluded to working together over "the next five to ten
                                         29

          years." Wismer's remark, even considered in the context of a few
          other statements indicating that SFS executives had three years to
          "make their numbers," did not constitute a promise upon which
          Steinke reasonably could have relied. 
                                               See 
                                                   Coll, 50 F.3d at 1124-25
          (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that employer's failure to "firm up" oral
          promise of long-term compensation rendered any reliance on an oral
          promise unreasonable); 
                                Trifirio v. 
                                            New York Life Ins. Co.
                                                                 , 845 F.2d
          30, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining, in a situation similar to
          the instant case, "a reasonable person investigates matters
          further; he receives assurances or clarification before relying");
          Hall, 506 N.E.2d at 184 (declaring that "[i]nchoate negotiations
          are no better basis for reliance than for an action on the
          purported contract as such"); see also Burke, 311 A.2d at 400-01
          (ruling that the evidence in the case did not support a finding
          that there was a promise upon which appellants relied to their
          detriment). We thus rule that the district court did not err in
          dismissing Steinke's promissory estoppel claim.
                                     Conclusion
                      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
          court's award of summary judgment to SFS both on Steinke's
          contractual claims and on his promissory estoppel claim.
                      Affirmed.  Costs to appellee.
                                         30