Court Opinion

ID: 9640903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:17:51.520795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:33.576103
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case for trial on the issue of punishment. The question of death versus life imprisonment has not been adversarially tried. Such a trial should be required in any case in which the state seeks to execute a person who was a juvenile at the time the offense was committed. I would allow the guilty plea to stand, but would leave the way open for reconsideration of the waiver of trial by jury. Cf State v. Bibb, 702 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. banc 1985).
It is within our authority under Rule 24.035(a) to make such a holding. That rule reads in pertinent part as follows:
(a) A person convicted of a felony on a plea of guilty and delivered to the custody of the department of corrections who claims that the judgment of conviction or sentence imposed violate the constitution or laws of this state or the constitution of the United States, that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so, or that the sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law may seek relief in the sentencing court pursuant to the provisions of this Rule 24.035. This Rule 24.035 provides the exclusive procedure by which such person may seek relief in the sentencing court for the claims enumerated. The procedure before the trial court is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as applicable.
Our authority is not foreclosed by any prior proceedings in this case. The defendant filed no notice of appeal, because he received the sentence that he then desired. The case came to us only because of our statutory responsibility to review all death sentences. We initially invited the public defender to file a brief amicus curiae, but then reconsidered and appointed the public defender as counsel. The public defender did not argue in support of the proposition I now advance. See State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Mo. banc 1987).
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in Wilkins v. Missouri, 487 U.S. 1233, 108 S.Ct. 2896, 101 L.Ed.2d 930 (1988), to consider a single point, as follows:
Whether the infliction of the death penalty on a child who was sixteen at the time of the crime constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States?
Its opinion dealt with only that point. It did not foreclose our consideration of any other points.
It cannot be successfully argued that the defendant “waived” the point by failure to appeal. The record shows clearly that he tried to waive any right to adversarial determination by discharging his counsel and urging the trial court to sentence him to death. Since I would not allow him to waive an adversarial hearing at the trial stage, I would not allow him to effect a waiver by failing to appeal. Since the absence of an adversarial determination is a flaw tainting the entire proceeding, it is appropriately considered in a Rule 24.035 motion.
I do not challenge the statement in the principal opinion as to the trial judge’s painstaking efforts to make sure that the defendant understood the consequences of his actions. It is manifest that the defendant, as of that time, wanted to be sentenced to death. He repeated his desire, unequivocally and articulately, before this Court. But it was not his choice as to whether or not he would be sentenced to death. Wilkins, p. 422, fn. 14, Donnelly, J. dissenting. Sentencing is the responsibility of the jury or, if there is a valid waiver, of the trial judge.
Although the trial judge expressed a strong predilection toward a death sentence before he heard evidence of the punishment phase, I am confident that he exercised his customary thoroughness in evaluating the evidence and weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Nobody undertook to marshal the evidence which might support a life sentence, or to argue the reasons for leniency. As the *506trial judge said in his findings, both the prosecutor and the defendant urged the death sentence. The court did not have the assistance of counsel in adducing the facts and arguments bearing on the death sentence.
I am not sure that a defendant’s right to represent himself is absolute, and would question the ability of a person sixteen years old to understand the consequences of a decision not only to forego counsel, but to urge the death sentence affirmatively. But I will not argue that the waiver of counsel was invalid. I would hold that the court, when a juvenile affirmatively seeks the death penalty, should make use of the established procedure of appointing a guardian ad litem or amicus curiae to present evidence and argument against the death penalty. Only in this way can the court have the proper foundation for an informed decision.
Such a requirement would be consistent with decisions in other areas as well as with statutory policy. In Strahler v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. banc 1986), we held that the legislature could not cause the statute of limitations to run against a minor. The opinion observed as follows:
We think defendant’s contention that plaintiff should not now be heard to complain because she was free to “initiate her own suit” plainly ignores the disabilities and limitations that childhood, familial relationships, and our legal system place upon a minor of tender years — who has little if any understanding of the complexities of our legal system ... Our society takes great pride in the fact that the law remains forever at the ready to “jealously guard” the rights of minors ....
Id. at 10, 12.
I cannot understand how a person who could not settle a damage suit could be allowed to present an unchallenged argument in favor of his own execution.
Our legislature has decreed that a minor cannot make her own decision to have an abortion. Section 188.028, RSMo 1986. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989). Yet the principal opinion would allow the defendant to connive of destroying his own life.
In Cruzan by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. banc 1988), this Court said:
This State has expressed a strong policy favoring life. We believe that policy dictates that we err on the side of preserving life.
In writing as I do, I realize that the trial court found the defendant competent to stand trial. But it would be a mistake to assume that the issue is free from doubt. The defendant has a troubled psychological history, beginning when he was ten years old, Wilkins, p. 422, Donnelly, J., dissenting. Dr. Parwatikar, who examined the defendant at the request of this Court, said that he was “incompetent to waive his constitutional rights and represent himself in front of this Court.” As a result, we appointed appellate counsel for him instead of relying on an amicus curiae. How could he then be competent to waive trial counsel? Dr. Logan, who testified in the trial court, expressed strong reservations about his ability to act in his own interest, and, at the postconviction hearing, said that the defendant was incapable of proceeding without counsel. Dr. Mandracchia, who testified in favor of competency, testified at the post-conviction hearing that the defendant was not competent to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Thus the state’s own witnesses, when confronted with the realities of the defendant’s choice, retreated from their prior positions. Their changed testimony should not simply be brushed aside as the basis that they were unpersuasive. We really should not hold the defendant to a choice made when he was probably incompetent, when the question is one of consenting to execution.
The defendant may be executed for the crime to which he has pleaded guilty. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989). But let the adversary process work. Let there be evidence and argument in favor of life imprisonment. There is no compelling reason *507to hold the defendant to a decision to argue for his own death. The case is unique, and surely will not recur. What harm can there be in allowing a trial?
I would reverse for trial of the punishment phase.