Court Opinion

ID: 9587181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:18:56.451888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:19.378777
License: Public Domain

Haymond, Judge,
dissenting:
I do not concur in the decision of the majority in this proceeding. It summarily deprives the Court of Common Pleas of Kanawha County of its power to hear and determine the earlier action of Raymond Ellis v. Chemical Tank Lines, Inc., and Clay Spurlock, of which it had jurisdiction, and requires the judge of that court to transfer it to the Circuit Court of Mason County which before the transfer did not have jurisdiction of that action and does not have and can not acquire jurisdiction of the person of the defendant in the later action of Chemical Tank Lines, Inc., v. Raymond Ellis unless he should be found and served with process in Mason County or he should appear in the circuit court of that county to prosecute his case against Chemical Tank Lines, Inc. Under the holding of the majority Ellis, the plaintiff in the action first instituted, is virtually compelled to appear in the Circuit Court of Mason County to avoid abandonment or indefinite delay in the prosecution of his claim against Chemical Tank Lines, Inc., and Clay Spurlock, the defendants in the action originally instituted against them in the Court of Common Pleas of Kanawha County.
In my opinion the provisions of Rule XIII, relating to the consolidation of cross-actions based on negligence, that “If such actions are pending in different jurisdictions of the State, and if the parties are unable to agree on the court in which the combined actions shall be heard, *497the said combined actions shall be tried and determined in the circuit court of the county wherein the occurrence took place, provided either action was instituted therein; otherwise, in the circuit court of the county wherein the first action was instituted.” were never intended to deprive a court having jurisdiction of the action first instituted of its authority to try and determine it by requiring its transfer to a court in another county which does not have jurisdiction of the person of the defendant in the second action and can not obtain such jurisdiction by the service outside that county of any process issued by it against such defendant, or to require such defendant, under penalty of abandoning his claim as plaintiff in the first action against the defendants in that action, or permitting a judgment against him by default, to appear to the second action in a court which, while he remains outside its jurisdiction, as he has a substantive legal right to do, is powerless to require his attendance in and before it.
That the Circuit Court of Mason County is without jurisdiction of the defendant, in the second action instituted in that court, until he voluntarily appears to that action or is served in that county with process requiring his appearance, is clear beyond question. Section 2, Article 1, Chapter 56, Code, 1931, relating to venue to the extent here pertinent, provides that: “An action, suit or proceeding may be brought in any county wherein the cause of action, or any part thereof, arose, although none of the defendants reside therein, in the following instances : * * * (b) When the defendant, or if more than one defendant, one or more of the defendants, are served in such county with process or notice commencing such action, suit or proceeding.” Ellis, the sole defendant in the second action, not having been served with process in Mason County, the requirement of the foregoing statute to confer venue in that county has not been satisfied and the circuit court is without jurisdiction of the defendant. Wolfe v. Shaw, 113 W. Va. 735, 169 S. E. 325. In Danser v. Dorr, 72 W. Va. 430, 78 S. E. 367, *498point 2 of the syllabus is in this language: “If a cause of action arises in one county, and the sole defendant resides in another, plaintiff may sue in either. But if he sues where the cause of action arose defendant must be served with process in that county.” See also Jones v. Main Island Creek Coal Company, 84 W. Va. 245, 99 S. E. 462; Wolfe v. Shaw, 113 W. Va. 735, 169 S. E. 325; Gunnoe, Admx. v. West Virginia Poultry Co-Operative Association, 115 W. Va. 87, 174 S. E. 691, 93 A. L. R. 944; Iacuone v. Pietranton, 138 W. Va. 776, 77 S. E. 2d 884; Staples v. Left Fork Fuel Company, 138 W. Va. 819, 77 S. E. 2d 872.
In Wolfe v. Shaw, 113 W. Va. 735, 169 S. E. 325, involving venue in Marion County, where the cause of action against one defendant arose, of an action against that defendant and another defendant against whom no cause of action arose in that county, this Court held that service of process in that county upon the other defendant and service of process in another county upon the defendant against whom a cause of action had arisen in Marion County did not confer venue of the action in Marion County and that the circuit court of that county did not have jurisdiction of that defendant and prohibited the further prosecution of the action in that court because of its lack of such jurisdiction. In the recent case of Crawford v. Carson, 138 W. Va. 852, 78 S. E. 2d 268, 38 A. L. R. 2d 1191, this Court held that venue of an action exists by virtue of law and that when no cause of action arises and venue of an action does not lie in a county the circuit court of that county does not have jurisdiction of such action.
I disagree with the statement in the majority opinion that “Venue is procedural and statutes relating thereto are so treated.” It is not a correct statement of the law of this State relating to venue of actions, suits or proceedings and, as to this jurisdiction, it is not supported by 92 C. J. S., Venue, Section 75 and 56 Am. Jur., Venue, Section 2 et seq., cited in the majority opinion.
*499The pertinent provisions of the text in 92 C. J. S., Venue, Section 75, are in these words: “While there are holdings under certain venue statutes that their requirements are jurisdictional, by the weight of authority, and by express provision in some jurisdictions, statutes with respect to venue are merely procedural, and not jurisdictional in the strict sense.” (Emphasis supplied). 56 Am. Jur., Venue, Section 2, contains no discussion whatsoever of the question whether statutes relating to venue are procedural or jurisdictional in character.
The above quoted statement in the majority opinion is in direct conflict with the provisions of Section 2, Article 1, Chapter 56, Code, 1931, previously quoted in this dissenting opinion which, with respect to venue of an action, suit or proceeding in the county in which the cause of action or a part of it arose, expressly require the service, in that county, upon the defendant who does not reside in such county, or upon one such defendant if there be more than one, of the process or the notice commencing such action, suit or proceeding. The quoted statement is also entirely inconsistent with point 2 of the syllabus in Danser v. Dorr, 72 W. Va. 430, 78 S. E. 367, also previously quoted, that if the plaintiff sues in the county where the cause of action arose and the sole defendant is a resident of another county, such defendant must be served with process in the county in which the action is instituted to enable the court in that county to acquire jurisdiction of the person of such defendant. And finally the quoted statement in the majority opinion is expressly and completely contrary to the holding of this Court in point 2 of the syllabus, of the recent case of Crawford v. Carson, 138 W. Va. 852, 78 S. E. 2d 268, that “Venue of an action exists by virtue of law.”, which to me means clearly that venue is created by statute in this State and that the statute, which provides for venue of an action in the county in which the cause of action arose and requires a sole defendant to be served with process or notice in that county when he resides in another county to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction *500of the person of such defendant, is an enactment of substantive law and is not procedural in character.
Jurisdiction consists of two elements. One of these elements is jurisdiction of the subject matter and the other is jurisdiction of the person. Sidney C. Smith Corporation v. Dailey, Judge, 136 W. Va. 380, 67 S. E. 2d 523. Jurisdiction of the subject matter must exist as a matter of law. Sidney C. Smith Corporation v. Dailey, Judge, 136 W. Va. 380, 67 S. E. 2d 523; Hustead v. Boggess, 122 W. Va. 493, 12 S. E. 2d 514; Hartford V. Davis, 107 W. Va. 693, 150 S. E. 141; Yates v. Taylor County Court, 47 W. Va. 376, 35 S. E. 24. Jurisdiction of the person may be conferred by the consent of the parties or the lack of such jurisdiction may be waived. Sidney C. Smith Corporation v. Dailey, Judge, 136 W. Va. 380, 67 S. E. 2d 523; Hall, Admr. v. The Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation, Ltd., 122 W. Va. 188, 9 S. E. 2d 45; Anderson v. Anderson, 121 W. Va. 103, 1 S. E. 2d 884; Robinson v. Engle, 107 W. Va. 598, 149 S. E. 836; State ex rel. Brannon v. Hudson, Judge, 95 W. Va. 183, 120 S. E. 921; Yates v. Taylor County Court, 47 W. Va. 376, 35 S. E. 24.
There is a distinction between jurisdiction and venue and the two terms are not synonymous. Jurisdiction is the inherent power to decide a case. Venue designates the particular county in which a court having jurisdiction may, in the first instance, properly hear and determine a case. Sidney C. Smith Corporation v. Dailey, Judge, 136 W. Va. 380, 67 S. E. 2d 523. But notwithstanding this distinction a court in a county in which venue of an action does not lie does not acquire jurisdiction of the defendant in such action. Wolfe v. Shaw, 113 W. Va. 735, 169 S. E. 325; Crawford v. Carson, 138 W. Va. 852, 78 S. E. 2d 268.
If Rule XIII is properly applied I agree with the conclusion expressed in the majority opinion that the rule is a valid exercise of the power of this Court to prescribe, promulgate and enforce rules and regulations governing *501pleading, practice and procedure in this Court and other courts of record in this State. But it must ever be kept in mind that this rule making power, whether inherent or conferred by Section 4, Article 1, Chapter 51, Code, 1981, as amended by Section 4, Chapter 87, Acts of the Legislature, Regular Session, 1935, a matter which need not now be considered or discussed, in its exercise must be limited to matters of procedure, must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or obstructive of common right, and must not be inconsistent with organic or statutory law, or impair or destroy substantial rights created or conferred by positive law. Teter v. George, 86 W. Va. 454, 103 S. E. 275; Star Piano Company v. Burgner, 89 W. Va. 475, 109 S. E. 491; Citizens National Bank v. Dixon, 94 W. Va. 21, 117 S. E. 685; Wagner v. Edgington Coal Company, 100 W. Va. 117, 130 S. E. 94. When a rule of court deprives a litigant of a substantial right the rule will not be enforced. Kemble v. Wiltison, 92 W. Va. 32, 114 S. E. 369. A rule of court which contravenes organic or statutory law is void. Teter v. George, 86 W. Va. 454, 103 S. E. 275; Ex Parte Doyle, 62 W. Va. 280, 57 S. E. 824; Suckley’s Adm’r v. Rotchford, 12 Gratt. 60, 65 Am. Dec. 240; State ex rel. Plummer v. Gideon, 119 Mo. 94, 24 S. W. 748, 41 Am. St. Rep. 634.
I can not sanction or approve the application, by the majority, of the pertinent provisions of Rule XIII to the undisputed facts of this case. A proper application of the rule would require the denial of the writ in this proceeding. By its misapplication of the rule the majority causes it to contravene statutory law, makes it operate unreasonably, and gives it the effect of impairing substantial legal rights of Ellis in his status of plaintiff in the first action and of defendant in the second action. As stated in Crawford v. Carson, 138 W. Va. 852, 78 S. E. 2d 268, venue of an action exists by virtue of law. Under Section 1, Article 1, Chapter 56, Code, 1931, a statute relating to and providing for venue of actions, suits and proceedings, Ellis, as the plaintiff in the first action, has a substantial legal right to institute *502and prosecute that action in Kanawha County where, by virtue of paragraph (b) of Section 1 of the statute, venue of the action lies and the court of common pleas of that county has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and jurisdiction of the person of the parties to the action. By virtue of paragraph (b), Section 2, Article 1, Chapter 56, Code, 1931, which places venue of an action, suit or proceeding in the county in which the cause of action, or any part of it, arose, although none of the defendants resides in such county, when the defendant or one or more of the defendants, if there be more than one defendant, is served in such county with process or notice commencing such action, suit or proceeding, Ellis, as the defendant in the second action, has a substantial legal right to remain outside Mason County, in which the second action has been instituted, for the purpose of avoiding service of process, in that action, upon him in that county.
By its summary and unwarranted misapplication of the rule, which renders it invalid because both unreasonable and in contravention of the foregoing provisions of Sections 1 and 2, Article 1, Chapter 56, Code, 1931, the majority has impaired and in effect has destroyed the right of Ellis, as the plaintiff in the first action, to prosecute it in the Court of Common Pleas of Kanawha County and his right, as the defendant in the second action, to stay out of Mason County for the purpose of avoiding service of process upon him in that county. Both of these rights are substantial. Each of them is conferred upon him by statutory law and he should not be deprived, by the misapplication of a rule of court, of his exercise or enjoyment of either of such rights. I know of no other decision of this Court which accomplishes that result; and the holding of the majority in this proceeding to that effect is not supported by any cited text book or case authority and is not justified by any sound principle of law or logic.
The validity of the rule, as applied by the majority in this proceeding, is not sustained by Teter v. George, 86 *503W. Va. 454, 103 S. E. 275; Star Piano Company v. Burgner, 89 W. Va. 475, 109 S. E. 491; and Kemble v. Wiltison, 92 W. Va. 32, 114 S. E. 369, cited in the majority-opinion to support the authority of this Court to adopt and promulgate the rule. The quotation of point 2 of the syllabus in the Teter case incorporated in the majority opinion that “Courts have inherent power and authority to prescribe and enforce rules and regulations for the conduct of their business in accordance with established procedure, not inconsistent with organic or statutory law, nor unreasonable, oppressive or obstructive of common right.”, and the holding in the Star Piano Company and Kemble cases show clearly that a rule of court regulating procedure, which is reasonable and not oppressive, obstructive of common right, or inconsistent with organic or statutory law, is valid and enforceable but that a rule of court governing procedure, which is unreasonable, oppressive, obstructive of common right, or inconsistent with organic or statutory law, is void and unenforceable. See Kemble v. Wiltison, 92 W. Va. 32, 114 S. E. 369; Ex Parte Doyle, 62 W. Va. 280, 57 S. E. 824; Suckly’s Adm’r. v. Rotchford, 12 Gratt. 60, 65 Am. Dec. 240; State ex rel. Plummer v. Gideon, 119 Mo. 94, 24 S. W. 748, 41 Am. St. Rep. 634. As the misapplication of the rule by the majority of this Court renders it unreasonable, obstructive of the common right of Ellis as a party to each action, and inconsistent with the statutory law relating to venue, it should not be given the force and effect attached to it by the decision of the majority of this Court.
Though this Court has held in Lambert v. Ensign Manufacturing Company, 42 W. Va. 813, 26 S. E. 431; United States Blowpipe Company v. Spencer, 46 W. Va. 590, 33 S. E. 342; The Geiser Manufacturing Company v. Chewning, 52 W. Va. 523, 44 S. E. 193; and Oil and Gas Well Supply Company v. Gartlan, 58 W. Va. 267, 52 S. E. 524, cited in the majority opinion, and in numerous cases, that the date of the issuance of the original summons fixes the date of the commencement of a suit or an action *504and that when instituted by the issuance of process the suit or the action is pending, and though paragraph (c) of the rule contains the words “actions are pending” and other portions of the rule contain the expressions “action is pending”, “pending action” and “action pending”, in my opinion those words in various paragraphs of Rule XIII were not intended to mean that the mere commencement or institution of a cross-action based on negligence in a court which does not have and can not acquire jurisdiction of the person of a sole defendant by service of process or notice upon such defendant in a county of which he is not a resident, but in which the cause of action arose, is a pending action, or that the use of those words in the rule renders it applicable and authorizes the transfer of another previously instituted action between the same parties and involving the same tort from a court of another county, having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, to the court of the county in which the cause of action arose and the consolidation for trial of both actions in that court. To give the above quoted words such construction or application would render the rule invalid and unenforceable and it should not be construed or applied to produce that result. The provisions of paragraph (c) of the rule that the combined actions should be tried and determined in the circuit court of the county in which the occurrence took place were intended to apply only if and when the circuit court of the county in which the cause of action arose has jurisdiction of the defendant in the cross-action instituted in that court. In the Lambert and United States Blowpipe Company cases the question involved was whether the action or the suit had been commenced before the particular statute of limitations had become operative; in The Geiser Manufacturing Company case the question of the relative priority of liens of creditors depended upon the time at which each of them instituted suit was considered; and in the Oil and Gas Well Supply Company case the question involved was whether an attachment against defendants obtained after the issuance of the original summons in an action *505of assumpsit was valid. In each of those cases this Court held that the issuance of the original summons is the commencement of the particular action or suit. In none of them was the question of interpreting the words “pending action” or their equivalent in any written instrument presented or considered; and for this reason those cases are not controlling upon the question of the meaning or the effect of the above quoted words or their equivalent as used in the various provisions of Rule XIII.
In short if properly applied the rule is valid. It applies when each of the actions has been properly instituted in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties in a county where venue of the action exists but not, as here, when the second action has been instituted in a court of a county in which venue of that action does not exist and the court does not have, and can not by service of its process in the usual way acquire, jurisdiction of the sole defendant.
The majority appears to have reached its conclusion to award the writ in this proceeding on the theory that “A denial of the application of the precedural rule relating to cross-actions in tort would seem to emasculate the rule which we are not disposed to do.” As heretofore indicated, the rule, if properly applied, is valid and its proper application would preserve its validity. If, however, misapplication of the rule is necessary to save it from emasculation, and that is the only alternative, I prefer its emasculation instead of giving it the effect of contravening and superseding express provisions of valid statutory law.
This Court has held in many cases that before the petitioner is entitled to the writ in mandamus he must show a clear legal right to the relief which he seeks. Gibson v. Bower, 137 W. Va. 462, 73 S. E. 2d 817; State ex rel. Daily Gazette Company v. The County Court of Kanawha County, 137 W. Va. 127, 70 S. E. 2d 260; State ex rel. Payne v. Board of Education of Jefferson Coun*506ty, 135 W. Va. 349, 63 S. E. 2d 579; State ex rel. Conley v. Pennybacker, 131 W. Va. 442, 48 S. E. 2d 9; State ex rel. Koontz v. The Board of Park Commissioners of the City of Huntington, 131 W. Va. 417, 47 S. E. 2d 689; Goloversic v. Arnold, 128 W. Va. 272, 36 S. E. 2d 209; Childers v. State Road Commissioner, 124 W. Va. 233, 19 S. E. 2d 611; Ebbert v. Bouchelle, 123 W. Va. 265, 14 S. E. 2d 614; Brumfield v. Board of Education, 121 W. Va. 725, 6 S. E. 2d 238; Rusinko v. Shipman, 111 W. Va. 402, 162 S. E. 316. As the petitioner has failed to show a clear legal right to a writ in this proceeding, but instead shows that it has no right whatsoever to such writ, it should not be given that relief.
For the reasons stated and under the authorities cited in this dissent I would deny the writ in this proceeding.
I am authorized to state that Judge Browning concurs in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.