Court Opinion

ID: 9913233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 15:05:43.886444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:06.080492
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0964-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SAMUEL TOLBERT, a/k/a
SAM TOLBERT, and
SAMUEL J. TOLBERT,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Argued December 13, 2023 – Decided December 27, 2023

                   Before Judges Vernoia and Walcott-Henderson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Gloucester County, Indictment No. 16-03-
                   0235.

                   Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, Designated Counsel, argued the
                   cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
                   Defender, attorney; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, on the
                   briefs).

                   Boris Moczula, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
                   cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
            General, attorney; Boris Moczula, of counsel and on the
            brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Samuel Tolbert pleaded guilty to the first-degree armed

robbery of a Washington Township gas station and the court imposed a ten-year

sentence subject to the requirements of the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-7.2. On the direct appeal from his sentence, defendant argued in part the

court erred in its calculation of jail credits, but we rejected that argument and

others made on his behalf, and we affirmed his conviction and sentence. State

v. Tolbert, No. A-0405-18 (App. Div. Feb. 11, 2020).

      Defendant filed a timely post-conviction relief (PCR) petition generally

alleging he was denied the effective assistance of plea counsel. Defendant later

filed an amended verified petition asserting in part he was entitled to PCR for

the reasons set forth in PCR counsel's brief "as well as" defendant's "pro se

brief."1

1
   Defendant's appendix on appeal includes PCR counsel's brief to which
defendant refers in the amended verified petition. The appendix does not
include defendant's pro se brief to which he refers in the amended verified
petition. The absence of defendant's pro se brief in the record on appeal is in
accord with Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), and defendant does not make any arguments on
appeal requiring consideration of his pro se brief to the PCR court.
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      Relying on a detective's report, PCR counsel's brief to the trial court

summarized the facts supporting the charge against defendant—first-degree

armed robbery. More particularly, counsel explained a Washington Township

detective had reported that gas station attendant Pawam Jung Rayamajhi "was

held up at gun point by a white male and white female." According to the

detective's report, the male had worn "a black hoodie with CSI wording on the

front, a bandana across his face, and yellow work gloves."

      The detective's report further explained the male had entered the gas

station store holding a handgun, which he pointed at Rayamajhi while directing

Rayamajhi to open the cash drawer. The male removed approximately $600

from the drawer after it was opened.

      The female removed several packs of cigarettes and lottery tickets from

behind the counter. As explained in PCR counsel's brief, the detective reported

the female dropped a cigarette package as she exited the store and a fingerprint

recovered from that package was later determined to be a positive match for

Natashia Johnson. After exiting the store, the male and female ran to a "waiting

vehicle" in the store's parking lot. Johnson later provided a statement to the

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police inculpating defendant and another individual, Geana M. Carr, in the

commission of the robbery.2

      A surveillance recording captured the robbery and showed the male

"holding a small revolver and wearing a black sweatshirt with 'CSI' on the front."

An "Evidence Examination Request Worksheet" completed by the Washington

Township detective who investigated the robbery stated the sweatshirt

"was . . . found on the side of the road" and requested a DNA test of the

sweatshirt. An "Evidence Receipt" for the sweatshirt was later completed by

the New Jersey State Police Office of Forensic Sciences. The receipt generally

describes the gas station robbery, notes the suspect had held a small revolver

and had worn a "black sweatshirt with 'CSI' on the front," and states the

sweatshirt was "found outside the gas station and [is] believed to have been worn

by the suspect."   It is undisputed that subsequent testing of the sweatshirt

revealed defendant's DNA.

      Based on those facts, defendant argued plea counsel was ineffective by

failing to move to suppress the sweatshirt on grounds it was seized unlawfully

2
   Counsel's brief submitted to the PCR court, that defendant incorporated by
reference into his amended verified petition, explained that Carr pleaded guilty
to second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery and testified she agreed with
defendant and Johnson to commit the robbery, acting as the "getaway driver."
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without a warrant. Defendant also claimed the court imposed an illegal sentence

because it did not grant defendant jail credits to which he claimed he was

entitled. Defendant further asserted that plea counsel was ineffective by failing

to argue defendant's ten-year sentence was grossly disproportionate to the five-

year sentences imposed on Johnson and Carr.

      The PCR court heard argument on defendant's PCR petition. In a decision

from the bench, the court found defendant's claim plea counsel was ineffective

by failing to move to suppress the sweatshirt lacked merit because the sweatshirt

had been abandoned and, therefore, there was no basis to assert its warrantless

seizure was improper. The court was also unpersuaded by defendant's claim his

sentence was illegal. The court explained defendant's contention he had not

been awarded jail credits to which he was entitled had been rejected on his direct

appeal. The court further determined defendant otherwise failed to sustain his

burden of establishing his plea counsel was ineffective and entered an order

denying the PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.

      In his merits brief on appeal, defendant presents the following arguments:

            POINT I

            PLEA COUNSEL AND PCR COUNSEL WERE
            BOTH INEFFECTIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE
            APPROPRIATE    CHALLENGE    TO   THE

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           SWEATSHIRT RECOVERED AT OR NEAR THE
           GAS STATION.

           POINT II

           THE PCR COURT FAILED TO CALCULATE
           CUSTODY CREDIT.

           POINT III

           THE PCR COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
           ADDRESS PLEA COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
           ARGUE   FOR    A  MORE    PROPORTIONAL
           SENTENCE FOR [DEFENDANT].

     In his brief in reply to the State's opposition, defendant presents the

following arguments:

           POINT I

           THE SWEATSHIRT ISSUE NEEDS TO BE
           ADJUDICATED:    THE PCR COURT MUST
           DEVELOP THE FACTS ON THE RECORD AND,
           WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF NEW COUNSEL,
           [DEFENDANT] SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
           PRESENT AN APPLICABLE LEGAL ARGUMENT.

           POINT II

           THE SENTENCING CREDIT ISSUE MUST BE
           RESOLVED[] BECAUSE THE PCR COURT MADE
           NO FINDINGS ON THE DATES THAT WILL
           CONTROL    THE     CREDIT  TO   WHICH
           [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED.

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                                     6
            POINT III

            THE PROCEDURAL BARS DO NOT APPLY HERE.

      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed

questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. We may "conduct a de novo review" of

the court's "factual findings and legal conclusions" where the PCR court has not

conducted an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 421; see also State v. Lawrence, 463

N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020). We apply these standards here.

      In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the Court

established a two-part standard, later adopted under the New Jersey Constitution

by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), to determine

whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.

Under the standard's first prong, a petitioner must show counsel's performance

was deficient by demonstrating counsel's handling of the matter "fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness" and that "counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [to] the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

      Under the "second, and far more difficult prong of the" Strickland

standard, State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose,

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                                       7
129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense[,]" State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 687). To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome."    Gideon, 244 N.J. at 550-51 (alteration in original) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong

"is an exacting standard." Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352,

367 (2008)). A defendant seeking PCR "must affirmatively prove prejudice"

satisfying the second prong of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693).

      Where, as here, a defendant alleges counsel was ineffective during a

criminal proceeding in which the defendant pleaded guilty, satisfaction of

Strickland's second prong requires the presentation of evidence showing "'a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'"         State v.

O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 376 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). A defendant must further demonstrate that "had he

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                                        8
been properly advised, it would have been rational for him to decline the plea

offer and insist on going to trial and, in fact, that he probably would have done

so." State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011) (citing Padilla

v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)).

      A failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard requires the

denial of a PCR petition founded on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. "With respect to both prongs of the Strickland test,

a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR bears the burden

of proving his or her right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." State

v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citations omitted).

      Defendant has abandoned his claim plea counsel was ineffective by failing

to move to suppress the sweatshirt based on grounds it was seized during an

improper warrantless search. Defendant acknowledges plea counsel was not

ineffective by failing to make a meritless motion, see State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J.

601, 619 (2007) (explaining "[i]t is not ineffective assistance of counsel for

defense counsel not to file a meritless motion"), and he concedes there is no

basis in law or the pertinent facts supporting a claim that the seizure of the

sweatshirt violated the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches

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                                       9
and seizures, see generally State v. Vanderee, 476 N.J. Super. 214, 229-30 (App.

Div. 2023).

      Instead, for the first time on appeal, defendant argues plea counsel was

ineffective by failing to challenge the admissibility of the sweatshirt on grounds

that the State could not prove a proper chain of custody of the sweatshirt. And,

recognizing the newly minted argument was not presented to the PCR court,

defendant claims he is entitled to a remand for the court to consider and

determine whether PCR counsel was ineffective by failing to argue that plea

counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate or challenge the chain of

custody of the sweatshirt.

      Defendant's argument is founded on the singular contention there were

grounds to challenge the chain of custody because the Washington Township

detective's "Evidence Examination Request" stated the sweatshirt was found "on

the side of the road" and the State Police receipt for the sweatshirt stated the

sweatshirt was found "outside the gas station." Based on what he claims are

those inconsistent reports as to where the sweatshirt was found, defendant argues

PCR counsel should have argued that plea counsel was ineffective by failing to

move to suppress the sweatshirt on chain-of-custody grounds.

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                                       10
      Defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel includes the right

to the effective assistance of PCR counsel. State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 18-19

(2002).   PCR counsel was obligated to investigate claims that support

defendant's PCR petition and advance them on defendant's behalf. State v.

Webster, 187 N.J. 254, 257 (2006). The remedy for an alleged failure of PCR

counsel to provide effective assistance "is a new PCR proceeding," State v.

Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 626-27 (App. Div. 2023), because "resolution of

claims against PCR counsel generally involves matters outside the record," id.

at 627; see also State v. Armour, 446 N.J. Super. 295, 317 (App. Div. 2016).

      The record presented on appeal does not permit a determination as to

whether plea counsel erred by failing to challenge the chain of custody of the

sweatshirt such that we may assess whether PCR counsel was ineffective by

failing to argue plea counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard. "To

satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the

proponent of the evidence must present evidence sufficient to support a finding

that the item is what its proponent claims." N.J.R.E. 901. The State bore that

burden of proof as to the sweatshirt.

      To satisfy its burden of establishing the proper foundation for admission

of the sweatshirt, the State was required to "show[] . . . an uninterrupted chain

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                                        11
of possession." State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 393 (1993). Stated differently,

"where the incriminating object has passed out of the possession of the original

receiver and into the possession of others, the 'chain of possession' must be

established to avoid any inference that there has been substitution or tampering."

State v. Brown, 99 N.J. Super. 22, 27 (App. Div. 1968).

      Defendant does not point to sufficient evidence in the record on appeal

supporting a determination that PCR counsel was ineffective by not asserting

that plea counsel erred by failing to challenge the chain of custody of the

sweatshirt. The claimed contradiction between the detective's statement—in the

"Evidence Examination Request"—that the sweatshirt was found on the street

and the State Police laboratory's reference—in its receipt for the sweatshirt—

that the sweatshirt was found outside the gas station does alone establish a break

in the chain of custody such that we may conclude defendant had a meritorious

argument supporting a chain-of-custody challenge. Indeed, it is unclear if the

two statements are, in fact, contradictory. In our view, they are not necessarily

inconsistent or contradictory; they both could be true and accurate and there may

be additional evidence not included in the record pertinent to a proper chain of

custody determination.

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                                       12
      In any event, we do not offer an opinion on the merits of defendant's newly

minted claim PCR counsel was ineffective by failing to argue plea counsel erred

by not challenging the chain of custody of the sweatshirt. We determine only

that the record on appeal does not permit a proper disposition of defendant's

claim PCR counsel was ineffective, and resolution of the claim "involves matters

outside the record," that "are better suited for a PCR petition." Vanness, 474

N.J. Super. at 627. Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim against

PCR counsel may therefore be pursued under the Strickland standard in a

separate PCR petition filed in accordance with the requirements of Rule

3:22-12(a)(2). Ibid.; see also Armour, 446 N.J. Super. at 317.

      We are also unpersuaded by defendant's claim the court erred by rejecting

his claim his sentence is illegal because he was not awarded jail credits to which

he claims he is entitled.    The claim is without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), other than to note it is barred under Rule 3:22-5

because the identical argument was raised and rejected on defendant's direct

appeal,3 see State v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 351 (2002) (explaining Rule 3:22-5

3
   During oral argument on defendant's direct appeal, his counsel expressly
raised defendant's claim the sentencing court erred by failing to award jail
credits "from the time of [defendant's] arrest until the date of his sentence" based
on the court's finding he also served a sentence for a parole violation during a

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                                        13
precludes "consideration of an argument presented in a [PCR] proceeding . . . if

the issue is identical or substantially equivalent to that adjudicated previously

on appeal" (citations omitted)).

      We are also unpersuaded by defendant's contention the court erred by

rejecting his claim that plea counsel was ineffective by failing to argue

defendant received a sentence disproportionate to Johnson's.4 As noted, the

court imposed a ten-year sentence on defendant's conviction for the first-degree

robbery to which he pleaded. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(1) (providing an ordinary

sentencing range of ten to twenty years for a conviction of a first-degree

offense). The sentence was in accordance with defendant's plea agreement and

is the minimum sentence within the statutory range for first-degree offenses.5

See ibid. Johnson also pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery pursuant to a plea

portion of the time. Defendant made the identical argument in support of his
PCR petition, and makes it again on this appeal, but we rejected the argument
and affirmed defendant's sentence on his direct appeal. Tolbert, slip op. at 1.
4
  Defendant does not argue on appeal his sentence was disproportionate to the
sentence imposed on Carr. We therefore do not address Carr's sentence.
5
  Defendant does not argue there is evidence supporting a determination he was
entitled to sentencing within the second-degree range as permitted under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2).
                                                                           A-0964-22
                                      14
agreement permitting the court to impose a five-year sentence within the range

for a second-degree offense as authorized under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2).

      We recognize that "[d]isparity [in sentencing] may invalidate an otherwise

sound and lawful sentence."      State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 232 (1996).

However, a sentence "is not erroneous merely because a co-defendant's sentence

is lighter." Ibid. (quoting State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390, 391 (1969)). The primary

issue presented by a sentencing disparity claim is "whether the disparity is

justifiable or unjustifiable." Id. at 233. A court must determine "whether the

co-defendant is identical or substantially similar to the defendant regarding all

relevant sentencing criteria," ibid., and if "'there is an obvious sense of

unfairness in having disparate punishments for equally culpable perpetrators ,'"

id. at 232 (quoting State v. Hubbard, 176 N.J. Super. 174, 177 (App. Div. 1980)).

      Defendant correctly notes the PCR court did not make express findings

supporting its rejection of his claim plea counsel was ineffective by failing to

argue the court incorrectly imposed a sentence on defendant that he claims is

disproportionate from Johnson's sentence. Even in the absence of such findings,

our de novo review of the issue in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, Harris,

181 N.J. at 421, permits our consideration and rejection of defendant's claim.

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                                      15
      Most simply stated, although defendant and Johnson both pleaded guilty

to first-degree robbery, defendant's sentence is not impermissibly disparate from

Johnson's because defendant and Johnson are not substantially similar under the

relevant sentencing guidelines. Roach, 146 N.J. at 233. Johnson cooperated

with law enforcement from the outset, implicating herself and defendant in the

commission of the robbery and agreeing to continue her cooperation as a

condition of her plea agreement. Defendant offered no similar cooperation, and

it can be reasonably inferred that Johnson's cooperation with law enforcement

assisted the State in obtaining Johnson's plea to the first-degree robbery charge.

      Johnson's criminal history included only convictions for disorderly

persons offenses. In contrast, defendant had numerous juvenile adjudications,

three prior criminal convictions, including a conviction for aggravated

manslaughter, and defendant was on parole when he committed the gas station

robbery.   Moreover, defendant wielded the gun during the robbery and

threatened the gas station attendant with it. Johnson did not.

      Additionally, defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery and the

court imposed the minimum permissible sentence for that offense, see N.J.S.A.

2C:43-6(c), in accordance with his plea agreement. The court could only have

imposed a five-year sentence on defendant if he presented evidence he was

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                                       16
entitled to be sentenced within the second-degree range as permitted under

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). Defendant does not argue such evidence existed and the

record, including defendant's significant prior criminal record, does not disclose

any basis for a meritorious argument he was entitled to be sentenced to the five-

year term within the second-degree range to which Johnson was sentenced in

accordance with her plea agreement under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). In other

words, the court lacked any basis in the record to sentence defendant under

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) to the same five-year sentence imposed on Johnson.

      Plea counsel was not ineffective by failing to make a meritless disparate

sentencing argument.     O'Neal, 190 N.J. at 619.     The PCR court therefore

correctly rejected that claim and denied defendant's petition.

      To the extent we have not expressly addressed any of defendant's

remaining arguments, they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion.

R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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