Court Opinion

ID: 9685016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:21:18.749421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.869190
License: Public Domain

Brodkey, J., Retired,
dissenting.
I must strongly dissent because I am convinced that the majority opinion is clearly wrong. Not only does it ignore the plain words of the amendment to the workmen’s compensation laws of this state, enacted by the Legislature in 1973 in L.B. 150, but it also incorrectly applies the applicable law with reference to that amendment, and relies upon cases decided before the adoption of that amendment.
At the outset, I wish to point out that there are no conflict of law questions (in the sense of whether the law of Nebraska, Kansas, or Colorado applies), nor any constitutional questions involved in this case; and none were raised in the court below, either in the one-judge hearing or in the rehearing before the three-judge panel, and none are raised by the parties on appeal to this court. The sole question involved in this appeal is whether the statutory law of Nebraska on the date of the hiring of Jensen or on the date of his accident or injury should be applied. Under the authorities hereinafter cited, there can be no question but that the latter is correct.
The following chronology of events is important in the decision of this case, and there is no dispute in *409the record about them. (1) Clifford Jensen was employed by the defendant, Floair, Inc., in 1971, the contract being concluded in Bellevue, Nebraska, over the telephone; (2) The Nebraska workmen’s compensation statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-115(2)(c) (Reissue 1978), was enacted and became law in 1973, that statute providing, among other things: “If an employee subject to this act suffers an injury on account of which he or, in the event of his death, his dependents would otherwise have been entitled to the benefits provided by this act, the employee or, in the event of his death, his dependents shall be entitled to the benefits provided under this act if the injury or injury resulting in death occurred within this state, or if at the time of such injury (a) the employment was principally localized within this state, (b) the employer was performing work within this state, or (c) the contract of hire was made within this state” (emphasis supplied); (3) The decedent suffered a fatal heart attack on November 10, 1977, at Denver’s Stapleton Airport; (4) The plaintiff filed this action under the Nebraska workmen’s compensation laws on November 9, 1979. It is to be noted that both Jensen’s injury and the filing of the lawsuit occurred after the amendment of the Nebraska workmen’s compensation laws. Only his hiring preceded the amendment referred to.
In the first hearing of the matter in the Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Court, Judge Novicoff, before whom the matter was heard, stated in his order of dismissal: “There are two issues to be determined in this case. The first issue is that of jurisdiction. In 1973, the Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Law was amended to provide additional bases of jurisdiction for the operation of the Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Law. One basis for jurisdiction was if the contract of hire was made within the State of Nebraska. The evidence is that the decedent entered in to a contract of hire with the de*410fendant when he was called from Kansas over the telephone by the defendant while the decedent was at his home in Nebraska. The contract of hire was entered into over the telephone. Since the acceptance of the offer of employment was in Nebraska, the Court finds that it is the place of acceptance which governs and therefore, the contract of hire was made within the State of Nebraska and this Court does have jurisdiction. The Court specifically finds, however, that by taking jurisdiction, the court does not imply that there may not be concurrent jurisdiction in a sister state.”
On rehearing, the case was heard before a three-judge panel, which in its dismissal on rehearing stated: “It is conceded that the hiring of Mr. Jensen occurred prior to the enactment of the addendum to Section 48-115(2) quoted above. It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the enactment was primarily procedural in nature and therefore operative as to all injuries and diseases occurring after its effective date, regardless of the date of hiring, or whether it is primarily substantive in nature and therefore operative only to cases in which the hirings occurred after its effective date. We conclude that the amendment was primarily substantive in nature in that it extended the extraterritorial operation of the compensation act.” The court based its decision on certain Nebraska cases decided long before the enactment of the amendment referred to. The court then continued: “Having reached the conclusion that part (c) of the previously quoted amendment to Section 48-115(2) has no retroactive effect, it becomes unnecessary to determine whether the contract of employment was made in Nebraska, as claimed by the plaintiff, or in Kansas, as claimed by the defendant. Similarly, it is unnecessary to decide whether Mr. Jensen’s death arose out of his employment.
“The Order of Dismissal hereinbefore entered on *411April 10, 1980, by Judge Ben Novicoff should be modified to conform to the findings herein made.”
The three-judge panel was clearly wrong in its ruling on rehearing that § 48-115(2) (c) operates only for those cases in which the contract of hire was entered into after the effective date of the amendment. The general rule is well established in a majority of jurisdictions that the law in force at the time of the injury or accident governs the right to, or liability for, compensation, in the absence of any provisions of the contrary effect. 99 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation § 21 (1958); 81 Am. Jur. 2d Workmen’s Compensation § 89 (1976). In other words, the law which must control the right to compensation is that law which is in effect at the time the right to compensation springs into existence. In Chadd v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 Neb. 483, 89 N.W.2d 586 (1958), this court determined that the time for which wages were to be recompensed under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-126 (Reissue 1978) of the compensation act was at the time of the accident under the contract of hiring in force. ‘‘It is apparent that all calculations were intended by the Legislature to have reference to wages, percentages, and results as of the time of the injury.” Id. at 491, 89 N.W.2d at 591. In this case, Jensen’s injury occurred years after the adoption and effective date of the amendment previously referred to. It was clearly the intention of the Nebraska Legislature in adopting L.B. 150, amending § 48-115, as set out above, to extend the extraterritorial operation of the Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Act to all contracts of hire made within the state, without any qualification that the employer be a resident of Nebraska, perform services in Nebraska, or be engaged in any trade or business in this state. L.B. 150, 83d Leg., 1st Sess. (1973), was introduced by Senator John Cavanaugh who, in his ‘‘Statement of Purpose” contained in the legislative history of that bill, stated: ‘‘The following consti*412tute my reasons for this bill and the purposes which are sought to be accomplished thereby: The intent of LB 150 is to provide for additional bases of jurisdiction for workmen’s compensation cases so that the state could take jurisdiction if the employment was principally localized in Nebraska, if the contract of hire was made in Nebraska, or the injury occurs in Nebraska, in addition to present jurisdictional bases.” Likewise, the report on L.B. 150 made by the Committee on Labor makes the same statement as that set out above.
The majority opinion also argues that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-106 (Reissue 1978) provides in part that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act shall apply ‘‘to every employer in this state, including nonresident employers performing work in the State of Nebraska” (emphasis supplied), and also that that language has remained unchanged since 1957. It is interesting to note, however, that in another section of the Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Act the term ‘‘performance of work” is defined as follows: ‘‘For purposes of this section, performance of work shall include but not be limited to situations in which (i) the injury or injury resulting in death occurred within this state, (ii) the employment was principally localized within this state, or (iii) the contract of hire was made within this state.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-175.01 (Reissue 1978). This is practically the identical language used in the previously referred to amendment.
Although as previously stated no issue was made either in the Workmen’s Compensation Court or in this court with reference to problems of conflict of laws, and the issue should therefore not be discussed in this case, nevertheless, the majority opinion does refer to and cite various matters relating to conflict of laws. Much has been written upon the subject of conflict of laws in workmen’s compensation cases, and it is clear that many and varied rules have been *413suggested and adopted in that regard. The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws has endeavored to unify the rule which frequently arises in various jurisdictions with reference to their workmen’s compensation laws. We note that in The Report of The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws, Part II, Evaluations & Recommendations at 48 (July 1972), the following appears: “We recommend that an employee or his survivor be given the choice of filing a workmen’s compensation claim in the State where the injury or death occurred, or where the employment was principally localized, or where the employee was hired.” Here, again, is the identical language used in the Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Finally, we point out that in construing the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it has long been the policy of this court to give a liberal construction to it so that its beneficent purposes may not be thwarted by technical refinements of interpretation. Spiker v. John Day Co., 201 Neb. 503, 270 N.W.2d 300 (1978); Marlow v. Maple Manor Apartments, 193 Neb. 654, 228 N.W.2d 303 (1975). In Dobesh v. Associated Asphalt Contractors, 138 Neb. 117, 119-20, 292 N.W. 59, 60 (1940), we stated: “In all questions under the workmen’s compensation law, it is our duty to avoid rules of technical construction as much as possible, and to determine the intention of the Legislature from the language of the act as a whole, rather than from the loose words or phrases of isolated paragraphs.” Likewise, in Union Packing Co. v. Klauschie, 210 Neb. 331, 336, 314 N.W.2d 25, 29 (1982), we stated: “ ‘ “The primary purpose of the workmen’s compensation act is to insure an employee against accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. To accomplish this purpose the act should be liberally construed, not to find that liability exists without the required quantum of proof, *414but to include within the protection of the act by liberal interpretation all injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment which the act does not clearly exclude. A strict interpretation should not be resorted to in order to accomplish such exclusion.” ’ ” See, also, White v. Western Commodities, Inc., 207 Neb. 75, 295 N.W.2d 704 (1980). If there ever was a case in which the foregoing rules should apply, it is the instant case.
I am firmly convinced that Judge Novicoff was correct in his finding that the Nebraska Workmen’s Compensation Court had jurisdiction of this case under the 1973 amendment to the Nebraska workmen’s compensation statutes, and that the court on rehearing erred in holding that § 48-115(2) (c) operated only as to cases in which the contract of hire was entered after the effective date of the amendment. However, since it is clear from the record that the court on rehearing made no findings or decision on the merits of the case, the question of liability should be remanded for a hearing in that court on that issue alone. I would do so.