Court Opinion

ID: 4282448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2018-06-07 22:46:30.401303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:53.011669
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                                                            06-17-00226-CR
                                                                                                  SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                                        TEXARKANA, TEXAS
                                                                                                           6/6/2018 1:33 PM
                                                                                                           DEBBIE AUTREY
                                                                                                                     CLERK

                                      NO.	
  06-­‐17-­‐00226-­‐CR	
  
	
  
                                  IN	
  THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
                     FILED IN
                                                                                     6th COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR	
  THE	
  SIXTH	
  APPELLATE	
  DISTRICT	
             TEXARKANA, TEXAS
                                           AT	
  TEXARKANA	
                         6/6/2018 1:33:58 PM
	
                                                                                       DEBBIE AUTREY
                                                                                             Clerk
	
  
                                   JUSTIN	
  GEROME	
  HORN	
  
                                                  	
  
                                               VS.	
  
                                                  	
  
                                    THE	
  STATE	
  OF	
  TEXAS	
  
                                                  	
  
                                     TH
       APPEALED	
  FROM	
  THE	
  124 	
  DISTRICT	
  COURT,	
  GREGG	
  COUNTY,	
  TEXAS	
  
                                TRIAL	
  CAUSE	
  NO.	
  46,873-­‐B	
  
	
  
	
  
                    BRIEF	
  FOR	
  JUSTIN	
  GEROME	
  HORN,	
  APPELLANT	
  
                                                  	
  
	
  
                                                     Hough-­‐Lewis	
  (“Lew”)	
  Dunn	
  
                                                     Attorney	
  at	
  Law	
  
                                                     201	
  E.	
  Methvin,	
  Suite	
  102	
  
                                                     P.O.	
  Box	
  2226	
  
                                                     Longview,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
                                                     Tel.	
  903-­‐757-­‐6711	
  
                                                     Fax	
  903-­‐757-­‐6712	
  
                                                     Email:	
  dunn@texramp.net	
  
                                                     	
  
	
  
Appellant	
  Respectfully	
  Requests	
  Oral	
  Argument	
  	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                    STATEMENT	
  REGARDING	
  PARTIES	
  TO	
  THIS	
  APPEAL	
  
                           [RULE	
  38.1(a)	
  TEX.R.APP.	
  PROC.]	
  
     	
  
Justin	
  Gerome	
  Horn,	
  Appellant	
  
	
  
Barrett	
  Hunt	
  
Attorney	
  at	
  Law	
  
409	
  North	
  Fredonia,	
  Suite	
  122	
  
Longview,	
  TX	
  75601	
  
Trial	
  Counsel	
  for	
  Appellant	
  
	
  
Chris	
  Parker	
  
V.	
  Christopher	
  Botto	
  
Assistant	
  Criminal	
  District	
  Attorneys	
  
101	
  E.	
  Methvin,	
  Suite	
  333	
  
Longview,	
  TX	
  75601	
  
Trial	
  and	
  Pre-­‐Trial	
  Counsel	
  for	
  the	
  State	
  
	
  
	
  Hough-­‐Lewis	
  (”Lew”)	
  Dunn	
  
	
  Attorney	
  at	
  Law	
  
     P.O.	
  Box	
  2226	
  
     Longview,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
     Counsel	
  for	
  Appellant	
  on	
  Appeal	
  
     Texas	
  State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  06244600	
  
     	
  
     John	
  Roberts	
  
     Assistant	
  Criminal	
  District	
  Attorney	
  
     101	
  E.	
  Methvin,	
  Suite	
  333	
  
     Longview,	
  TX	
  75601	
  
     Counsel	
  for	
  the	
  State	
  of	
  Texas	
  on	
  Appeal	
  
     	
  
     	
  
     	
  
     	
  
     	
  
     	
  
                                                               ii	
  
                                             	
  
                             TABLE	
  OF	
  CONTENTS	
  
	
  
                                                                            PAGE	
  
                                                                            	
  
STATEMENT	
  REGARDING	
  PARTIES	
  TO	
  THIS	
  APPEAL	
  ………………….	
     ii	
  
	
  
TABLE	
  OF	
  CONTENTS	
  ………………………………………………………………..	
                     iii	
  
	
  
TABLE	
  OF	
  AUTHORITIES	
  …………………………………………………….………	
                    vi	
  
	
  
STATEMENT	
  OF	
  THE	
  CASE	
  …………………………………………………………	
                  viii	
  
	
  
STATEMENT	
  REGARDING	
  ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  …………………………….	
                viii	
  
	
  
ISSUES	
  PRESENTED	
  ………………………………………………………………..….	
                       ix	
  
	
  
STATEMENT	
  OF	
  FACTS	
  ………………………………………………………………..	
                    2	
  
	
  
Waiver	
  of	
  Jury	
  Trial	
  …………………………………………………………………….	
              2	
  
	
  
Trial	
  and	
  Punishment	
  	
  ………………………………………………………………………	
             2	
  	
  
	
  
	
        State’s	
  Case	
  in	
  Chief	
  …………………………………………………………	
        4	
  
	
  
	
        Lt.	
  Antonio	
  Monsivais	
  ……………………………………………………	
  	
         4	
  
	
  
	
        Dolorosa	
  Welch	
  …………………………………………………………….	
   	
              8	
  
	
  
	
        Appellant’s	
  Case	
  in	
  Chief	
  ………………………………………………..	
      9	
  
	
  
	
        Mary	
  Davis	
  …………………………………………………………………….	
  	
                9	
  
	
  
	
        Justin	
  Gerome	
  Horn	
  ………………………………………………………	
  	
           10	
  
	
  
                                                     iii	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                                                             PAGE	
  
                                                                                             	
  
	
      Argument	
  ……………………………………………………………………..	
   	
                                      13	
   	
  
	
  
	
      Verdict	
  ……………………………………………………………………………	
                                           13	
  
	
  
	
      Punishment	
  	
  	
  …………………………………………………………………	
   	
                               14	
  
	
  
SUMMARY	
  OF	
  THE	
  ARGUMENT	
  ……………………………………………….	
  	
                                15	
      	
  
	
  
SOLE	
  ISSUE,	
  RESTATED	
  …………………………………………………………….	
  	
                                 15	
      	
  
	
  
THERE	
  IS	
  	
  LEGALLY	
  INSUFFICIENT	
  EVIDENCE	
  TO	
  PROVE	
  APPELLANT	
  	
  
IS	
  GULTY	
  OF	
  THE	
  OFFENSE	
  OF	
  CREDIT	
  CARD	
  ABUSE	
  
	
  
         THE	
  LAW	
  	
  ……………………………………………………………………….	
  	
                                15	
  
         	
  
         Legal	
  Sufficiency	
  ……………………………………………………………..	
                                 15	
      	
  
	
      	
  
	
      Credit	
  Card	
  Abuse	
  ……………………………………………………………	
                                 17	
  
	
  
	
      Trial	
  to	
  the	
  Court	
  ………………………………………………………………	
                            18	
  
	
  
	
      ANALYSIS	
  …………………………………………………………………………..	
                                         18	
  
	
  
	
      	
      First	
  Problem	
  with	
  the	
  Evidence:	
  the	
  Photos	
  ………..	
     23	
  
	
  
        	
      Second	
  Problem:	
  No	
  Labels	
  During	
  Interview	
  ………….	
         26	
  

        	
      Third	
  Problem:	
  Indistinct	
  Images	
  ……………………………	
                   27	
  

        	
      Fourth	
  Problem:	
  the	
  Watch	
  	
  …………………………………….	
                  27	
  

        	
  

                                                       iv	
  
                                                               PAGE	
  

PRAYER	
  FOR	
  RELIEF	
  …………………………………………………………………….	
       31	
  

CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  SERVICE	
  …………………………………………………………..	
     32	
  

CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  COMPLIANCE	
  …………………………………………………….	
     33	
  

	
  

	
  

       	
  

       	
  

       	
  

       	
  

       	
  

       	
  

       	
  

       	
  

       	
  

       	
  

       	
  

       	
     	
  

                                  v	
  
                                              INDEX	
  OF	
  AUTHORITIES	
  
                                                              	
  
CASES	
  	
         	
       	
          	
       	
          	
   	
        	
         	
   	
   	
                        PAGE	
  
	
  
Brooks	
  v.	
  State,	
  323	
   S.W.3d	
  893	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
   App.	
  2010)	
  …………………………	
                         16	
  
	
  
Carmouche	
  v.	
  State,	
  10	
  S.W.3d	
  323	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2000)	
  ……………………	
                           29,	
  30	
  
	
  
Clinton	
  v.	
  State,	
  354	
  S.W.3d	
  795	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2011)	
  …………………………	
                          18	
  	
  

Hooper	
  v.	
  State,	
  214	
  S.W.3d	
  9	
  (Tex.	
   Crim.	
  App.	
   2007)	
  ………………………..	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  16,	
  30,	
  31	
  
	
  
In	
  re	
  Winship,	
  397	
  U.S.	
  358	
  (1970)	
  ………………………………………………………….	
   15	
  
	
  
Jackson	
  v.	
  Virginia,	
  443	
  U.S.	
  307	
  (1979)	
  ………………………………………………….	
   15,	
  16	
  
	
  
Johnson	
  v.	
  State,	
  571	
  S.W.2d	
  170	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1978)	
  ………………………	
                         18	
  
	
  
Malik	
  v.	
  State,	
  953	
  S.W.2d	
  234	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  19970	
  …………………………	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   16	
  

Tate	
  v.	
  State,	
  500	
  S.W.3d	
  410	
  	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2016)	
  ………………………….	
                        16	
  
	
  
Webb	
  v.	
  State,	
  278	
  S.W.2d	
  158	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1955)	
  ………………………….	
                            16	
  
	
  
Wilson	
  v.	
  State,	
  536	
  S.W.2d	
  375	
   (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1976)	
  ………………………	
                           15	
  
	
  
Winfrey	
  v.	
  State,	
  393	
  S.W.3d	
  763	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2013)	
  ……………………	
                            16	
  
	
  
STATUTES	
  AND	
  RULES	
  
	
  
U.S.	
  CONST.	
  
	
  
	
       Fourteenth	
  Amendment	
  ……………………………………………………………….	
                                                             15,	
  16	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                                       vi	
  
	
  
	
  
STATUTES	
  AND	
  RULES	
  	
   	
                       	
   	
           	
   	
       	
   	
   	
       PAGE	
  
	
  
TEX.	
  CONST.	
  
	
  
         art.	
  1,	
  §	
  19,Art.	
  1,	
  §	
  19	
  …………………………………………………………………….	
                        15	
  
	
  
TEX.	
  CODE	
  CRIM.	
  PROC.	
  
	
  
	
       Art.	
  1.04	
  …………………………………………………………………………………………	
                                                15	
  
	
  
TEX.	
  PENAL	
  CODE	
  
	
  
	
       §32.31	
  	
  ……………………………………………………………………………………………	
                                                 17	
  
	
  
	
  
References	
  to	
  statutes	
  are	
  to	
  the	
  version	
  of	
  Vernon’s	
  Annotated	
  Statutes	
  
current	
  for	
  the	
  dates	
  of	
  the	
  offense	
  and	
  trial	
  herein.	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                                    vii	
  
                                                                	
  
                                             STATEMENT	
  OF	
  THE	
  CASE	
  
	
  
	
         On	
   July	
   27,	
   2017,	
   Justin	
   Gerome	
   Horn	
   was	
   indicted	
   for	
   credit	
   card	
  

abuse	
  (CR	
  4).	
  On	
  October	
  6,	
  2017,	
  Horn	
  waived	
  his	
  right	
  to	
  a	
  jury	
  trial	
  (2	
  RR	
  

4-­‐6).	
  On	
  December	
  4,	
  2017,	
  Appellant	
  pleaded	
  not	
  guilty,	
  and	
  evidence	
  was	
  

taken	
   by	
   the	
   Court	
   (3	
   RR	
   13).	
   	
   The	
   State	
   presented	
   evidence	
   by	
   live	
  

testimony	
  and	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  exhibits	
  and	
  rested	
  (3	
  RR	
  45).	
  Appellant	
  offered	
  

his	
  witnesses	
  (3	
  RR	
  46	
  and	
  50).	
  After	
  arguments	
  by	
  counsel,	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  

found	
  Appellant	
  guilty	
  (3	
  RR	
  69).	
  At	
  the	
  punishment	
  phase	
  no	
  evidence	
  was	
  

offered	
   other	
   than	
   the	
   PSI	
   (3	
   RR	
   71).	
   The	
   trial	
   court	
   	
   assessed	
   a	
   sentence	
   of	
  

14	
  months	
  in	
  the	
  State	
  Jail	
  division	
  of	
  TDCJ	
  (3	
  RR	
  74;	
  CR	
  38).	
  The	
  motion	
  for	
  

new	
  trial	
  was	
  overruled	
  as	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  law,	
  and	
  this	
  appeal	
  came	
  forward.	
  	
  

                             STATEMENT	
  REGARDING	
  ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  

           Because	
  of	
  the	
  legal	
  complexities	
  of	
  this	
  case,	
  oral	
  argument	
  should	
  

be	
  granted	
  to	
  enable	
  the	
  parties	
  to	
  present	
  their	
  positions	
  to	
  the	
  Court	
  to	
  

clarify	
  the	
  	
  sole	
  issue.	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

                                                                   viii	
  
                                    	
  ISSUES	
  PRESENTED	
  

SOLE	
   ISSUE:	
   	
   THERE	
   IS	
   LEGALLY	
   INSUFFICIENT	
   EVIDENCE	
   TO	
   PROVE	
  
APPELLANT	
  IS	
  GUILTY	
  OF	
  THE	
  OFFENSE	
  OF	
  CREDIT	
  CARD	
  ABUSE	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                        ix	
  
	
  

                                                      	
  
                                                      	
  
                                                      	
  
                                                         NO.	
  06-­‐17-­‐00226-­‐CR	
  
	
  
                                                  IN	
  THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
  
                                            FOR	
  THE	
  SIXTH	
  APPELLATE	
  DISTRICT	
  
                                                           AT	
  TEXARKANA	
  
	
  
	
  
                                            JUSTIN	
  GEROME	
  HORN	
  
                                                           	
  
                                                        VS.	
  
                                                           	
  
                                             THE	
  STATE	
  OF	
  TEXAS	
  
                                                           	
  
                                              TH
                APPEALED	
  FROM	
  THE	
  124 	
  DISTRICT	
  COURT,	
  GREGG	
  COUNTY,	
  TEXAS	
  
                                         TRIAL	
  CAUSE	
  NO.	
  46,873-­‐B	
  
	
  
	
  
                                   BRIEF	
  FOR	
  JUSTIN	
  GEROME	
  HORN,	
  APPELLANT	
  
                                                                 	
  
	
  
TO	
  THE	
  HONORABLE	
  JUSTICES	
  OF	
  THE	
  SIXTH	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS:	
  
	
  
         COMES	
   NOW	
   JUSTIN	
   GEROME	
   HORN,	
   Appellant,	
   on	
   appeal	
   in	
   Cause	
   No.	
  

       46,873-­‐B	
   from	
   the	
   Judgment	
   of	
   Conviction	
   entered	
   by	
   the	
   District	
   Court	
   for	
   the	
  	
  

       124TH	
   Judicial	
   District	
   of	
   Gregg	
   County,	
   Texas,	
   wherein,	
   on	
   his	
   plea	
   of	
   not	
   guilty	
  

       (having	
   waived	
   his	
   right	
   to	
   jury	
   trial),	
   the	
   case	
   was	
   tried	
   to	
   the	
   court,	
   and	
  

       Appellant	
  was	
  found	
  guilty	
  of	
  the	
  offense	
  of	
  credit	
  card	
  abuse	
  and	
  sentenced	
  to	
  a	
  

       term	
  of	
  fourteen	
  (14)	
  months	
  imprisonment	
  in	
  the	
  Texas	
  Department	
  of	
  Criminal	
  

       Justice,	
   State	
   Jail	
   Division,	
   the	
   Honorable	
   Alfonso	
   Charles	
   presiding	
   at	
   trial	
   and	
  

       sentencing,	
  in	
  which	
  Appellant	
  was	
  Defendant,	
  and	
  in	
  which	
  The	
  State	
  of	
  Texas	
  was	
  

	
                                                                                                                                            1	
  
       plaintiff	
  and	
  is	
  now	
  Appellee.	
  

                                              STATEMENT	
  OF	
  FACTS	
  

Waiver	
  of	
  Jury	
  Trial	
  

	
             On	
  October	
  6,	
  2017,	
  Appellant	
  appeared	
  in	
  open	
  court	
  with	
  counsel	
  (2	
  RR	
  4).	
  

The	
   trial	
   court	
   admonished	
   him	
   about	
   his	
   rights	
   to	
   a	
   jury	
   trial	
   and	
   the	
  

consequences	
   of	
   the	
   waiver	
   (2	
   RR	
   5-­‐6;	
   signed	
   waiver	
   at	
   CR	
   10).	
   Appellant	
   was	
   firm	
  

in	
  his	
  decision	
  to	
  waive	
  his	
  right	
  to	
  a	
  jury	
  trial.	
  (Id.)	
  

Trial	
  and	
  Punishment	
  

	
             On	
  December	
  4,	
  2017,	
  trial	
  convened	
  to	
  the	
  court	
  sitting	
  without	
  a	
  jury	
  (3	
  

RR	
  7).	
  Since	
  Appellant	
  was	
  dissatisfied	
  with	
  his	
  trial	
  counsel,	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  heard	
  

from	
  Appellant	
  about	
  why	
  he	
  wanted	
  another	
  attorney.	
  Appellant	
  stated	
  that	
  he	
  

felt	
  like	
  trial	
  counsel	
  had	
  not	
  “done	
  enough	
  to	
  prepare	
  with	
  you	
  for	
  this	
  case”;	
  and	
  	
  

that,	
  according	
  to	
  Appellant,	
  “we	
  haven’t	
  had	
  a	
  chance	
  to	
  talk	
  about	
  this	
  case	
  clear	
  

enough	
  for	
  me	
  –	
  to	
  me,	
  to	
  understand	
  what’s	
  going	
  on.	
  Because	
  I	
  still	
  don’t	
  know	
  

what’s	
   going	
   on.	
   It’s	
   been	
   messed	
   up	
   from	
   the	
   start”	
   (3	
   RR	
   8).	
   Trial	
   counsel	
  

confirmed	
   with	
   Appellant	
   that	
   the	
   two	
   had	
   spoken	
   the	
   day	
   before	
   on	
   the	
  

telephone	
  and	
  went	
  over	
  what	
  was	
  going	
  to	
  occur	
  at	
  trial;	
  that	
  they	
  talked	
  about	
  

	
                                                                                                                                          2	
  
the	
  questions	
  and	
  what	
  would	
  happen	
  throughout	
  the	
  entire	
  trial	
  (3	
  RR	
  8-­‐9).	
  The	
  

trial	
  court	
  denied	
  the	
  request	
  for	
  another	
  counsel	
  (3	
  RR	
  9).	
  

	
          Next,	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  inquired	
  about	
  discovery	
  between	
  the	
  parties	
  (3	
  RR	
  10).	
  

There	
  was	
  one	
  exception	
  to	
  the	
  statement	
  by	
  the	
  State	
  that	
  all	
  photographs	
  had	
  

been	
  furnished.	
  According	
  to	
  Appellant,	
  there	
  was	
  another	
  photo	
  that	
  was	
  shown	
  

to	
   him	
   by	
   the	
   detective	
   that	
   was	
   not	
   provided	
   (3	
   RR	
   11).	
   The	
   trial	
   court	
   found	
   that	
  

the	
  State	
  had	
  complied	
  with	
  discovery	
  based	
  upon	
  the	
  representations	
  of	
  State’s	
  

counsel	
  and	
  the	
  statements	
  of	
  the	
  officer	
  (3	
  RR	
  12).	
  Counsel	
  for	
  Appellant	
  stated	
  

that	
  he	
  would	
  inquire	
  into	
  this	
  on	
  cross-­‐examination.	
  (Id.)	
  	
  	
  

	
          The	
   indictment	
   (CR	
   4)	
   was	
   then	
   read;	
   Appellant	
   entered	
   his	
   plea	
   of	
   “not	
  

guilty”	
  (3	
  RR	
  12-­‐13).	
  The	
  trial	
  court	
  then	
  told	
  Appellant	
  that	
  “we’re	
  getting	
  ready	
  

to	
   go	
   to	
   trial,”	
   to	
   which	
   he	
   then	
   asked,	
   “So	
   is	
   it	
   by	
   jury?”	
   At	
   that	
   point	
   the	
   trial	
  

court	
   reminded	
   Appellant	
   that	
   he	
   had	
   waived	
   his	
   right	
   to	
   a	
   jury	
   trial	
   back	
   in	
  

October	
   (3	
   RR	
   13).	
   The	
   trial	
   court	
   went	
   over	
   the	
   fact	
   of	
   the	
   waiver	
   of	
   jury	
   trial	
   and	
  

asked	
   Appellant	
   if	
   he	
   understood;	
   he	
   acknowledged	
   that	
   he	
   did,	
   and	
   that	
   “I	
   just	
  

want	
   to	
   be	
   treated	
   fairly”	
   (3	
   RR	
   14).	
   The	
   trial	
   court	
   replied	
   that	
   he	
   intended	
   to	
  

treat	
  him	
  fairly	
  (id.).	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                          3	
  
	
         After	
   a	
   brief	
   recess,	
   the	
   witnesses	
   were	
   duly	
   sworn,	
   and	
   counsel	
   for	
  

Appellant	
  offered	
  his	
  opening	
  statement,	
  saying	
  that	
  the	
  case	
  was	
  one	
  of	
  mistaken	
  

identity	
  (3	
  RR	
  15-­‐16).	
  	
  

	
         State’s	
  Case-­‐in-­‐Chief	
  

	
         Lt.	
  Antonio	
  Monsivais	
  

	
         The	
  State’s	
  first	
  witness	
  was	
  Lt.	
  Antonio	
  Monsivais	
  (3	
  RR	
  16).	
  He	
  investigated	
  

a	
   credit	
   card	
   abuse	
   case	
   that	
   was	
   reported	
   by	
   Dolorosa	
   Welch;	
   she	
   filed	
   a	
  

complaint	
  that	
  someone	
  had	
  used	
  her	
  credit	
  card	
  without	
  her	
  authorization	
  (3	
  RR	
  

17).	
  According	
  to	
  Lt.	
  Monsivais,	
  Ms.	
  Welch	
  reported	
  that	
  her	
  credit	
  card	
  had	
  been	
  

used	
  at	
  two	
  stores	
  in	
  Longview:	
  Walgreens	
  on	
  the	
  Loop	
  and	
  Kroger’s	
  on	
  the	
  Spur.	
  

He	
   went	
   to	
   the	
   stores	
   to	
   see	
   if	
   he	
   could	
   obtain	
   video	
   and	
   receipts	
   of	
   the	
  

transactions	
  (id.).	
  

	
         The	
  date	
  of	
  the	
  Walgreens	
  transaction	
  was	
  July	
  19,	
  2016;	
  the	
  card’s	
  last	
  four	
  

numbers	
   were	
   “6379,”	
   a	
   credit	
   card	
   (3	
   RR	
   18).	
   At	
   Walgreens	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais	
  

obtained	
  video	
  and	
  a	
  receipt	
  (id.)	
  

	
         The	
   State	
   then	
   offered	
   its	
   Exhibits	
   1	
   through	
   6;	
   they	
   were	
   admitted	
   into	
  

evidence	
   without	
   objection	
   (3	
   RR	
   18-­‐19).	
   State’s	
   Exhibit	
   #7	
   was	
   also	
   offered	
   and	
  

received	
  without	
  objection:	
  a	
  copy	
  of	
  the	
  video	
  from	
  Walmart	
  (3	
  RR	
  19-­‐20).	
  

	
                                                                                                                                    4	
  
	
         From	
  the	
  videos	
  Lt.	
  Monsivais	
  made	
  some	
  still	
  photographs;	
  State’s	
  Exhibit	
  

#8	
  was	
  one	
  of	
  those	
  pictures;	
  it	
  was	
  offered	
  and	
  admitted	
  into	
  evidence	
  without	
  

objection	
   (3	
   RR	
   20-­‐21).	
   Then	
   State’s	
   #9	
   was	
   offered	
   and	
   	
   admitted	
   into	
   evidence	
  

without	
  objection,	
  the	
  receipt	
  from	
  Walgreens	
  (3	
  RR	
  21).	
  

	
         Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   then	
   related	
   how	
   he	
   and	
   the	
   manager	
   of	
   Walgreens	
   got	
  

together	
   and	
   reviewed	
   the	
   date	
   and	
   times	
   that	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   had	
   gotten	
   from	
   Ms.	
  

Welch,	
   and	
   the	
   manager	
   pulled	
   up	
   the	
   time	
   when	
   the	
   person	
   checked	
   out;	
   Lt.	
  

Monsivais	
   had	
   the	
   receipt	
   from	
   Ms.	
   Welch	
   which	
   had	
   a	
   time	
   on	
   it;	
   and	
   he	
   went	
  

back	
   to	
   the	
   security	
   camera	
   to	
   find	
   out	
   who	
   was	
   using	
   the	
   card	
   at	
   that	
   transaction	
  

time	
  (3	
  RR	
  22).	
  

	
         Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   then	
   identified	
   State’s	
   Exhibits	
   1,	
   2,	
   and	
   3	
   as	
   actual	
   still	
  

photographs	
   from	
   the	
   Walgreens	
   video	
   (3	
   RR	
   23).	
   Next,	
   Counsel	
   for	
   the	
   State	
  

played	
   the	
   video	
   from	
   Walgreens	
   (State’s	
   #	
   7)	
   (3	
   RR	
   23-­‐24.)	
   Then	
   the	
   witness	
  

testified	
  as	
  to	
  where	
  the	
  person	
  on	
  the	
  video	
  was	
  at	
  various	
  times	
  on	
  the	
  video,	
  

eventually	
  coming	
  up	
  to	
  register	
  number	
  two	
  at	
  18:19	
  and	
  18:20	
  checking	
  out	
  (3	
  

RR	
   24-­‐25).	
   He	
   described	
   the	
   items	
   purchased	
   as	
   a	
   “Vanilla	
   Visa”	
   with	
   a	
   value	
   of	
  

$200	
  –	
  a	
  prepaid	
  card	
  	
  -­‐-­‐	
  and	
  a	
  few	
  other	
  items	
  (3	
  RR	
  25)	
  

	
                                                                                                                                            5	
  
	
                           Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   stated	
   that	
   Kroger’s	
   was	
   not	
   very	
   cooperative	
   in	
   the	
  

investigation	
  (3	
  RR	
  26).	
  He	
  then	
  stated	
  that	
  Ms.	
  Welch	
  told	
  him	
  that	
  she	
  did	
  not	
  

know	
  who	
  took	
  the	
  card	
  or	
  who	
  had	
  it	
  (id.).	
  

	
                           To	
  try	
  to	
  determine	
  who	
  the	
  person	
  was,	
  he	
  posted	
  either	
  the	
  video	
  or	
  some	
  

of	
  the	
  photographs	
  on	
  the	
  Gregg	
  County	
  web	
  page	
  (he	
  did	
  not	
  recall	
  which)	
  (id.).	
  

Lt.	
  Monsivais	
  was	
  told	
  by	
  a	
  Longview	
  police	
  officer	
  that	
  the	
  individual	
  in	
  the	
  video	
  

or	
   photographs	
   looked	
   like	
   Appellant	
   (3	
   RR	
   26-­‐27).	
   	
   Since	
   Appellant	
   was	
   then	
   in	
  

jail,	
  Lt.	
  Monsivais	
  interviewed	
  him	
  there	
  (3	
  RR	
  27).	
  	
  

	
                           The	
  State	
  then	
  referred	
  the	
  witness	
  to	
  State’s	
  #	
  10	
  and	
  #	
  11;	
  a	
  picture	
  of	
  a	
  

watch	
  and	
  the	
  interview	
  with	
  Appellant,	
  respectively	
  (3	
  RR	
  27).	
  The	
  picture	
  of	
  the	
  

watch,	
   according	
   to	
   the	
   witness,	
   resembled	
   a	
   “large	
   face	
   watch”	
   seen	
   in	
   the	
  

photographs	
   from	
   Kroger	
   and	
   Walgreens	
   (3	
   RR	
   27-­‐28).	
   Appellant	
   had	
   a	
   similar	
  

watch	
  in	
  his	
  property	
  at	
  the	
  jail	
  (3	
  RR	
  28).	
  

	
                           The	
   State	
   then,	
   without	
   objection,	
   offered	
   State’s	
   #10,	
   #11,	
   and	
   #121	
  into	
  

evidence,	
   and	
   they	
   were	
   admitted	
   (3	
   RR	
   28-­‐29).	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   then	
   testified	
   that	
  

he	
   showed	
   some	
   of	
   the	
   pictures	
   to	
   Appellant	
   during	
   the	
   interview,	
   and	
   that	
  

initially	
  -­‐-­‐	
  when	
  he	
  showed	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  pictures	
  to	
  Appellant	
  -­‐-­‐	
  Appellant	
  said	
  that	
  

one	
  of	
  the	
  pictures	
  was	
  of	
  himself	
  (State’s	
  #1)	
  or	
  that	
  “that	
  looks	
  like	
  me”	
  (State’s	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  Copy	
  of	
  Miranda	
  warnings	
  administered	
  to	
  Appellant.	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 6	
  
#2);	
   but	
   later	
   in	
   the	
   interview	
   (said	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais)	
   	
   Appellant	
   changed	
   his	
   mind	
  

about	
  the	
  pictures,	
  stating	
  that	
  were	
  not	
  of	
  him	
  (3	
  RR	
  32-­‐33).	
  

	
         On	
   cross-­‐examination	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   stated	
   that	
   those	
   were	
   all	
   of	
   the	
  

photographs	
   he	
   had	
   shown	
   to	
   Appellant;	
   that	
   there	
   were	
   no	
   pictures	
   with	
  

Appellant	
  wearing	
  white	
  shorts	
  	
  (3	
  RR	
  33).	
  	
  Lt.	
  Monsivais	
  said	
  that	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  pay	
  

any	
   attention	
   to	
   whether	
   the	
   person	
   walking	
   into	
   Walgreens	
   was	
   bowlegged;	
   he	
  

could	
   not	
   tell	
   how	
   tall	
   the	
   individual	
   was;	
   that	
   State’s	
   #1	
   was	
   “a	
   pretty	
   blurry	
  

photo”;	
  that	
  State’s	
  #	
  2	
  was	
  “grainy”	
  as	
  was	
  State’s	
  #3	
  (3	
  RR	
  35).	
  According	
  to	
  the	
  

witness,	
  when	
  shown	
  State’s	
  #1,	
  Appellant	
  said,	
  “That’s	
  me”	
  (id.).	
  As	
  to	
  the	
  watch,	
  

Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   admitted	
   that	
   wearing	
   a	
   watch	
   is	
   a	
   common	
   occurrence	
   (3	
   RR	
   36).	
  

According	
   to	
   the	
   witness,	
   the	
   individual	
   seen	
   in	
   the	
   photos	
   was	
   wearing	
   sandals	
  

that	
  day,	
  but	
  Appellant	
  was	
  pretty	
  adamant	
  that	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  wear	
  sandals,	
  and	
  that	
  

was	
  one	
  way	
  he	
  was	
  able	
  to	
  clarify	
  that	
  the	
  individual	
  in	
  the	
  photos	
  was	
  not	
  him	
  

(id.).	
  Furthermore,	
  (stated	
  Lt.	
  Monsivais)	
  the	
  individual	
  in	
  the	
  photos	
  wore	
  green-­‐

tinted	
  shorts,	
  but	
  Appellant	
  was	
  adamant	
  upon	
  looking	
  at	
  the	
  pictures,	
  that	
  he	
  did	
  

not	
   own	
   any	
   green	
   shorts	
   (3	
   RR	
   37).	
   Even	
   after	
   looking	
   at	
   the	
   video	
   in	
   open	
   court,	
  

Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   –	
   asked	
   if	
   the	
   individual	
   walking	
   in	
   would	
   be	
   “fairly	
   bowlegged”	
   –	
  

stated:	
  “Doesn’t	
  appear	
  [so]	
  to	
  me”	
  (id.).	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                7	
  
	
        On	
   further	
   questioning,	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   stated	
   that	
   the	
   only	
   time	
   Appellant	
  

told	
   him	
   that	
   he	
   used	
   a	
   credit	
   card	
   was	
   when	
   he	
   was	
   together	
   with	
   someone	
  

called	
  Ms.	
  Strickland	
  (id.).	
  

	
        On	
  re-­‐direct	
  examination	
  Lt.	
  Monsivais	
  further	
  testified	
  that	
  he	
  had	
  turned	
  

over	
   all	
   of	
   the	
   materials	
   from	
   his	
   investigation	
   to	
   the	
   District	
   Attorney’s	
   office,	
  

including	
  hand-­‐written	
  notes	
  	
  (3	
  RR	
  38).	
  	
  

	
        Dolorosa	
  Welch	
  

	
        Dolorosa	
  testified	
  that	
  she	
  had	
  a	
  credit	
  card	
  from	
  Chase	
  bank,	
  the	
  last	
  four	
  

digits	
  being	
  6379.	
  State’s	
  counsel	
  marked	
  as	
  State’s	
  #13	
  	
  some	
  materials	
  she	
  had	
  

received	
   from	
   Chase	
   relating	
   to	
   the	
   use	
   of	
   the	
   credit	
   card,	
   and	
   placed	
   it	
   into	
  

evidence	
  without	
  objection	
  (3	
  RR	
  41-­‐42).	
  Ms.	
  Welch	
  testified	
  that,	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  

the	
  offense,	
  her	
  credit	
  card	
  was	
  expiring	
  and	
  she	
  was	
  supposed	
  to	
  receive	
  a	
  new	
  

one;	
   however,	
   she	
   never	
   received	
   it	
   (3	
   RR	
   42).	
   	
   She	
   believed	
   that	
   someone	
  

intercepted	
  the	
  card	
  (id.).	
  She	
  received	
  a	
  fraud	
  alert	
  from	
  Chase	
  on	
  July	
  23,	
  2016;	
  

she	
   contacted	
   Chase	
   and	
   was	
   informed	
   of	
   the	
   transaction	
   at	
   Walgreen	
   for	
  

$220.80;	
   she	
   passed	
   this	
   on	
   to	
   the	
   investigator	
   (3	
   RR	
   43).	
   Ms.	
   Welch	
   never	
   gave	
  

permission	
  to	
  Appellant	
  to	
  use	
  the	
  credit	
  card;	
  she	
  did	
  not	
  know	
  Appellant.	
  	
  As	
  to	
  

the	
  person	
  who	
  was	
  identified	
  to	
  her	
  in	
  open	
  court	
  as	
  Appellant:	
  she	
  stated	
  that	
  

she	
  did	
  not	
  know	
  him	
  and	
  that	
  she	
  never	
  consented	
  for	
  him	
  to	
  use	
  the	
  credit	
  card;	
  

	
                                                                                                                                      8	
  
nor	
  did	
  she	
  ever	
  consent	
  to	
  anyone	
  else	
  to	
  use	
  it	
  (3	
  RR	
  44).	
  Then	
  she	
  was	
  asked:	
  

“You	
  were	
  the	
  only	
  person	
  to	
  use	
  your	
  credit	
  card?”	
  and	
  she	
  answered,	
  “I’m	
  the	
  

only	
  one”	
  (id.).	
  	
  	
  

	
           That	
   concluded	
   the	
   State’s	
   evidence.	
   Counsel	
   for	
   Appellant	
   requested	
   a	
  

directed	
   verdict,	
   stating,”	
   …I’d	
   ask	
   for	
   a	
   directed	
   verdict;	
   that	
   the	
   State	
   did	
   not	
  

meet	
  all	
  their	
  evidence	
  –	
  did	
  not	
  meet	
  all	
  their	
  elements.	
  Mainly,	
  I	
  do	
  not	
  believe	
  

the	
  State	
  identified	
  the	
  defendant.”	
  The	
  motion	
  was	
  overruled,	
  with	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  

stating,	
  “I	
  believe	
  the	
  defendant	
  has	
  been	
  identified.”	
  (3	
  RR	
  45).	
  

	
           Appellant’s	
  Case-­‐in-­‐Chief	
  

	
           Mary	
  Davis	
  

	
           Mary	
   Davis	
   is	
   the	
   mother	
   of	
   Appellant	
   (3	
   RR	
   46).	
   Ms.	
   Davis	
   testified	
   that	
   her	
  

son	
  does	
  not	
  wear	
  sandals,	
  that	
  he	
  had	
  never	
  worn	
  sandals,	
  	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  one	
  

thing	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  wear.	
  He	
  wore	
  sneakers	
  or	
  Sperry	
  loafer-­‐like	
  shoes,	
  but	
  she	
  had	
  

never	
   seen	
   him	
   wear	
   sandals;	
   that	
   he	
   had	
   lived	
   with	
   her	
   for	
   some	
   time	
   and	
   she	
  

never	
  saw	
  him	
  wear	
  sandals	
  (3	
  RR	
  47).	
  She	
  also	
  stated	
  that	
  she	
  or	
  his	
  sister	
  drove	
  

Appellant	
   where	
   he	
   needed	
   to	
   go	
   or	
   that	
   his	
   girlfriend	
   Erma	
   would	
   drive	
   him;	
   that	
  

she	
   (Ms.	
   Davis)	
   drove	
   a	
   black	
   Kia	
   Forte;	
   that	
   his	
   sister	
   drove	
   a	
   green	
   Toyota	
   Camry	
  

(3	
  RR	
  47-­‐48).	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                9	
  
	
         Ms.	
  Davis	
  further	
  stated	
  that	
  Appellant	
  mostly	
  paid	
  for	
  things	
  by	
  cash,	
  that	
  

he	
  was	
  not	
  established	
  enough	
  to	
  get	
  a	
  credit	
  card	
  (3	
  RR	
  48).	
  On	
  cross-­‐examination	
  

Ms.	
  Davis	
  stated	
  that	
  Appellant	
  would	
  use	
  his	
  girlfriend’s	
  (Erma	
  Strickland’s)	
  credit	
  

card	
  sometimes	
  (3	
  RR	
  49).	
  

	
         Justin	
  Gerome	
  Horn	
  

	
         Appellant	
  took	
  the	
  witness	
  stand	
  in	
  his	
  own	
  defense	
  (3	
  RR	
  50).	
  	
  He	
  testified	
  

that	
   he	
   did	
   not	
   have	
   a	
   driver’s	
   license,	
   that	
   it	
   was	
   suspended,	
   and	
   that	
   his	
   mother	
  

or	
   Ms.	
   Strickland	
   would	
   drive	
   him;	
   his	
   mother	
   drove	
   a	
   Black	
   Kia	
   Forte,	
   and	
   Ms.	
  

Strickland	
   drove	
   a	
   black	
   Pontiac	
   G6	
   (3	
   RR	
   51).	
   He	
   drove	
   with	
   his	
   mother	
   on	
   her	
  

insurance	
  route	
  and	
  also	
  drove	
  with	
  her	
  when	
  he	
  was	
  looking	
  for	
  work	
  (3	
  RR	
  52).	
  

When	
  he	
  drove	
  with	
  Ms.	
  Strickland,	
  it	
  was	
  perhaps	
  to	
  get	
  something	
  to	
  eat	
  or	
  go	
  

to	
   a	
   park	
   or	
   convenience	
   store	
   to	
   get	
   something	
   to	
   drink	
   (id.).	
   When	
   he	
   drove	
  

around	
   with	
   Ms.	
   Strickland,	
   he	
   would	
   pay	
   for	
   things	
   by	
   using	
   her	
   credit	
   card:	
   a	
  

Telco	
  card	
  and	
  a	
  Bank	
  of	
  America	
  card;	
  he	
  would	
  return	
  the	
  card	
  to	
  her	
  when	
  he	
  

finished	
  using	
  it;	
  other	
  times	
  she	
  would	
  have	
  cash	
  (id.).	
  	
  

	
         Appellant	
   denied	
   that	
   he	
   had	
   ever	
   gone	
   to	
   Krogers	
   or	
   Walgreens	
   with	
   Ms.	
  

Strickland	
  (3	
  RR	
  53).	
  He	
  did	
  not	
  know	
  anyone	
  with	
  a	
  silver	
  car	
  (id.).	
  On	
  the	
  date	
  in	
  

question	
  –	
  July	
  19,	
  2016	
  –	
  he	
  stated	
  that	
  he	
  was	
  not	
  working;	
  during	
  the	
  day	
  he	
  

would	
  typically	
  be	
  with	
  his	
  mother	
  or	
  Ms.	
  Strickland	
  (id.).	
  

	
                                                                                                                                           10	
  
	
         On	
  July	
  19,	
  2016,	
  he	
  was	
  confined	
  to	
  the	
  Marvin	
  A.	
  Smith	
  unit	
  of	
  the	
  Gregg	
  

County	
   jail,	
   and	
   two	
   detectives	
   came	
   in	
   to	
   talk	
   with	
   him	
   (id.).	
   He	
   stated	
   that	
   when	
  

he	
   was	
   told	
   that	
   they	
   wanted	
   to	
   speak	
   to	
   him	
   about	
   credit	
   card	
   abuse,	
   he	
   decided	
  

to	
   talk	
   to	
   them	
   because	
   his	
   Facebook	
   page	
   had	
   been	
   hacked,	
   and	
   he	
   wanted	
   to	
  

hear	
  what	
  they	
  had	
  to	
  say	
  (3	
  RR	
  54).	
  

	
         The	
   detectives	
   asked	
   him	
   about	
   credit	
   cards	
   and	
   showed	
   him	
   a	
   stack	
   of	
  

photos,	
   maybe	
   10	
   or	
   12	
   of	
   them.	
   The	
   detective	
   showed	
   him	
   “one	
   particular	
  

picture,	
  and	
  it	
  caught	
  my	
  eye	
  because	
  the	
  guy	
  had	
  on	
  khaki	
  shorts	
  and	
  a	
  white	
  T-­‐

shirt.	
  And	
  I	
  have	
  a	
  pair	
  of	
  khaki	
  shorts	
  that	
  was,	
  like,	
  similar	
  to	
  those	
  in	
  the	
  picture.	
  

And	
   that’s	
   what	
   caught	
   my	
   eye.	
   And	
   I	
   told	
   him	
   that	
   might	
   be	
   me	
   right	
   there.	
  

Because	
  I	
  wanted	
  to	
  be	
  honest	
  with	
  him,	
  you	
  now,	
  to	
  help	
  him	
  with	
  this	
  case,	
  get	
  it	
  

narrowed	
  down,	
  so	
  he	
  can	
  find	
  the	
  right	
  victim	
  (sic).	
  “	
  (3	
  RR	
  54-­‐55).	
  Then	
  (a	
  few	
  

lines	
  later	
  in	
  the	
  record)	
  Appellant	
  testified:	
  

	
         “He	
   showed	
   me	
   some	
   pictures	
   of	
   a	
   gentleman	
   with	
   some	
   green	
   shorts	
   on	
  

and	
  a	
  plaid	
  shirt	
  and	
  some	
  sandals.	
  And	
  that’s	
  when	
  I	
  told	
  him,	
  ‘Look,	
  I	
  don’t	
  -­‐-­‐	
  I	
  

don’t	
  wear	
  any	
  sandals,’	
  you	
  know.”	
  (3	
  RR	
  55).	
  	
  

	
         Trial	
  counsel	
  came	
  back	
  to	
  the	
  picture	
  of	
  someone	
  wearing	
  a	
  white	
  shirt	
  and	
  

khaki	
   shorts,	
   and	
   Appellant	
   stated,	
   “	
   I	
   have,	
   like,	
   three	
   pictures	
   on	
   my	
   Facebook	
  

	
                                                                                                                                           11	
  
right	
   now	
   on	
   my	
   page	
   with	
   those	
   –	
   I	
   have	
   –	
   I	
   have	
   on	
   the	
   khaki	
   shorts	
   and	
   the	
  

white	
  short	
  –	
  white	
  T-­‐shirt….and	
  I	
  don’t	
  see	
  it	
  today.”	
  (id.).	
  

	
          Trial	
   counsel	
   then	
   showed	
   State’s	
   Exhibits	
   1	
   through	
   6	
   to	
   Appellant	
   and	
  

asked	
  him	
  to	
  take	
  a	
  look	
  at	
  them,	
  asking	
  him	
  were	
  there	
  additional	
  pictures	
  that	
  

the	
   detective	
   showed	
   him	
   that	
   day,	
   and	
   Appellant	
   stated	
   that	
   there	
   were	
   more	
  

than	
   this	
   (3	
   RR	
   55-­‐56).	
   On	
   questioning	
   from	
   his	
   counsel,	
   Appellant	
   insisted	
   that	
  

one	
  of	
  the	
  missing	
  pictures	
  was	
  “potentially”	
  of	
  himself,	
  described	
  as	
  follows:	
  “He	
  

had	
   on	
   khaki	
   shorts,	
   and	
   it	
   was	
   a	
   side	
   view	
   of	
   the	
   shorts,	
   he	
   was	
   standing	
  

sideways.”	
   (3	
   RR	
   56).	
   Appellant	
   repeated	
   the	
   fact	
   that	
   on	
   his	
   Facebook	
   page	
   he	
  

had	
   pictures	
   of	
   himself	
   wearing	
   khaki	
   shorts,	
   and	
   that	
   those	
   were	
   similar	
   to	
   the	
  

one	
   shown	
   to	
   him	
   by	
   the	
   detectives	
   that	
   day;	
   Appellant	
   also	
   repeated	
   that	
   the	
  

individual	
  -­‐-­‐	
  in	
  the	
  pictures	
  offered	
  by	
  the	
  State	
  -­‐-­‐	
  is	
  wearing	
  sandals,	
  and	
  that	
  he	
  	
  

did	
  not	
  wear	
  sandals,	
  that	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  like	
  them	
  on	
  his	
  feet	
  (id.).	
  He	
  stressed	
  that	
  he	
  

had	
  not	
  worn	
  sandals	
  since	
  he	
  “was	
  a	
  kid”	
  (3	
  RR	
  57).	
  Appellant	
  stated	
  that	
  he	
  had	
  

tattoos	
  on	
  his	
  arms	
  and	
  on	
  his	
  lower	
  right	
  wrist,	
  and	
  had	
  had	
  them	
  for	
  six	
  to	
  ten	
  

years	
  (id.).	
  	
  

	
          Later	
  Appellant	
  stated	
  that	
  the	
  photo	
  that	
  he	
  had	
  identified	
  as	
  himself	
  was	
  

not	
  in	
  court	
  at	
  trial	
  (3	
  RR	
  63).	
  

	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                 12	
  
	
        Argument	
  

	
        The	
  State	
  argued	
  that	
  the	
  photographic	
  evidence	
  was	
  sufficient	
  to	
  prove	
  the	
  

case	
  beyond	
  a	
  reasonable	
  doubt.	
  He	
  also	
  pointed	
  to	
  the	
  presence	
  of	
  the	
  watch	
  as	
  

“unique”;	
   he	
   argued	
   that	
   Appellant’s	
   memory	
   had	
   gotten	
   worse,	
   and	
   the	
   State	
  

argued	
   that	
   the	
   interview	
   was	
   a	
   significant	
   piece	
   of	
   evidence”	
   	
   and	
   argued	
   for	
   a	
  

conviction	
  (3	
  RR	
  65-­‐66).	
  

	
        Trial	
  Counsel	
  argued	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  a	
  case	
  of	
  mistaken	
  identity.	
  He	
  stated	
  that	
  

Appellant	
  was	
  initially	
  cooperative	
  because	
  he	
  believed	
  he	
  was	
  a	
  victim	
  of	
  stolen	
  

identity;	
   that	
   the	
   photo	
   that	
   Appellant	
   believed	
   was	
   of	
   himself	
   has	
   not	
   been	
  

produced,	
   and	
   that	
   the	
   photos	
   were	
   not	
   of	
   the	
   clearest	
   resolution;	
   but	
   as	
  

Appellant	
  looked	
  closer	
  at	
  the	
  photos,	
  he	
  noticed	
  details	
  –	
  like	
  the	
  sandals	
  –	
  that	
  

indicated	
   that	
   the	
   person	
   in	
   the	
   photos	
   was	
   not	
   him;	
   that	
   the	
   watch	
   was	
   not	
  

unique	
  but,	
  contrarily,	
  very	
  common;	
  that	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  other	
  evidence	
  linking	
  him	
  

to	
  using	
  the	
  credit	
  card;	
  that	
  Appellant	
  did	
  not	
  use	
  credit	
  cards	
  unless	
  those	
  of	
  Ms.	
  

Strickland;	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  a	
  case	
  of	
  mistaken	
  identity	
  (3	
  RR	
  66-­‐68).	
  

	
        Verdict	
  

	
        After	
   a	
   recess	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   announced	
   his	
   verdict.	
   He	
   stated	
   that	
   certain	
  

elements	
   of	
   the	
   offense	
   were	
   not	
   contested,	
   and	
   that	
   the	
   issue	
   was	
   one	
   of	
  

identity;	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  stated	
  (from	
  listening	
  to	
  the	
  audio	
  interview)	
  that	
  although	
  

	
                                                                                                                                     13	
  
initially	
   Appellant	
   identified	
   himself	
   in	
   the	
   first	
   picture	
   shown	
   to	
   him,	
   that	
   “it	
  

sounds	
  like	
  when	
  he	
  realizes	
  he	
  could	
  be	
  in	
  trouble,	
  all	
  of	
  sudden	
  he	
  changes	
  that	
  

it’s	
   not	
   him	
   anymore”;	
   	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   stated	
   that	
   Appellant	
   “put	
   at	
   issue	
  

credibility,”	
   because	
   Appellant	
   stated	
   that	
   a	
   picture	
   was	
   missing	
   which	
   he	
   had	
  

identified	
   as	
   himself,	
   but	
   that	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   had	
   testified	
   that	
   all	
   of	
   the	
   pictures	
  

were	
   in	
   evidence;	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   stated	
   that	
   evidence	
   of	
   the	
   watch	
   –	
   while	
  

“probably	
  several	
  –	
  maybe	
  several	
  thousand	
  here	
  in	
  Gregg	
  County”	
  –	
  that	
  “when	
  

you	
   have	
   the	
   defendant	
   in	
   a	
   photograph	
   identifying	
   himself,	
   and	
   then	
   also	
   that	
  

watch	
   or	
   a	
   watch	
   very	
   similar	
   plainly	
   visible	
   in	
   the	
   transactions	
   or	
   the	
   offense	
  

being	
  committed,”	
  all	
  of	
  this	
  led	
  him	
  to	
  find	
  Appellant	
  guilty	
  beyond	
  a	
  reasonable	
  

doubt”	
  (3	
  RR	
  	
  69-­‐70).	
  

	
         Punishment	
  

	
         The	
   State	
   asked	
   the	
   Court	
   to	
   take	
   judicial	
   notice	
   of	
   the	
   Presentence	
  

Investigation	
  and	
  rested.	
  No	
  evidence	
  was	
  offered	
  by	
  Appellant	
  (3	
  RR	
  71).	
  	
  

           Trial	
  counsel	
  for	
  Appellant	
  requested	
  probation	
  (3	
  RR	
  72).	
  

           The	
  State	
  requested	
  a	
  sentence	
  of	
  18	
  months	
  state	
  jail	
  (3	
  RR	
  73).	
  

           After	
   a	
   recess	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   pronounced	
   sentence	
   at	
   14	
   months	
   in	
   state	
   jail	
  

(3	
  RR	
  75).	
  Counsel	
  for	
  appeal	
  was	
  then	
  appointed	
  (3	
  RR	
  77).	
  

	
                                                                                                                                         14	
  
               On	
   January	
   4,	
   2018,	
   a	
   hearing	
   was	
   held	
   to	
   set	
   an	
   appeal	
   bond	
   (4	
   RR	
   4	
   ff).	
  

After	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  heard	
  testimony,	
  the	
  appeal	
  bond	
  was	
  set	
  at	
  $7,500	
  (4	
  RR	
  17).	
  

However,	
  at	
  this	
  writing,	
  Appellant	
  has	
  been	
  unable	
  to	
  post	
  that	
  bond.	
  	
  This	
  appeal	
  

came	
  forward.	
  

                                                  SUMMARY	
  OF	
  THE	
  ARGUMENT	
  

THE	
   EVIDENCE	
   IS	
   INSUFFICIENT	
   TO	
   PROVE	
   THE	
   ELEMENT	
   OF	
   IDENTITY,	
   SINCE	
  
THERE	
  ARE	
  INCONSISTENCIES	
  IN	
  THE	
  STATE’S	
  CIRCUMSTANTIAL	
  EVIDENCE	
  WHICH	
  
DEMONSTRATE	
  THAT	
  SOMEONE	
  OTHER	
  THAN	
  APPELLANT	
  WAS	
  THE	
  OFFENDER.	
  	
  
	
  
                                 ARGUMENT	
  AND	
  AUTHORITIES	
  

                                                          SOLE	
  ISSUE,	
  RESTATED	
  

THERE	
   IS	
   LEGALLY	
   INSUFFICIENT	
   EVIDENCE	
   TO	
   PROVE	
   APPELLANT	
   IS	
   GUILTY	
   OF	
  
THE	
  OFFENSE	
  OF	
  CREDIT	
  CARD	
  ABUSE	
  
	
  
	
  
	
      THE	
  LAW	
  

	
             Legal	
  Sufficiency	
  

               The	
   State's	
   burden	
   is	
   to	
   prove	
   each	
   and	
   every	
   element	
   alleged	
   beyond	
   a	
  

       reasonable	
  doubt.	
  See,	
   Due	
  Course	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  provision,	
  TEX.	
  CONST.,	
  art.	
  1,	
  §	
  19,	
  

       and	
  TEX.	
  CODE	
  CRIM.	
  P.,	
  Art.	
  1.04;	
  Wilson	
  v.	
  State,	
  536	
  S.W.2d	
  375,	
  at	
  377	
   (Tex.	
  

       Crim.	
   App.	
   1976)	
   (state	
   law).	
   Federal	
   argument	
   rests	
   in	
   due	
   process	
   rights	
   as	
  

       guaranteed	
   under	
   U.S.CONST.	
   amend.	
   XIV;	
  see	
   Jackson	
  v.	
  Virginia,	
   443	
   U.S.	
   307,	
  

       319	
  (1979);	
   In	
  re	
  Winship,	
  397	
  U.S.	
  358	
  (1970).	
  	
  The	
  Texas	
  Constitution	
  provision	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                    15	
  
       has	
   been	
   held	
   analogous	
   to	
   Fourteenth	
   Amendment	
   Due	
   Process.	
   See,	
   Webb	
   v.	
  

       State,	
  278	
  S.W.2d	
  158,	
  160	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1955).	
  	
  Under	
  legal	
  sufficiency,	
  all	
  the	
  

       evidence	
  is	
  reviewed	
  in	
  the	
  light	
  most	
  favorable	
  to	
  the	
  jury’s	
  verdict	
  to	
  determine	
  

       whether	
  or	
  not	
  any	
  rational	
  jury	
  could	
  have	
  found	
   the	
   essential	
  elements	
  of	
  the	
  

       crime	
   beyond	
   a	
   reasonable	
   doubt.	
   Brooks	
   v.	
   State,	
   323	
   S.W.3d	
   893,	
   912	
   (Tex.	
  

       Crim.	
  App.	
  2010).	
   Review	
  focuses	
  on	
  quality	
  of	
  evidence	
   p r e s e n t e d .	
  Brooks,	
  

       323	
   S.W.3d	
   at	
   917-­‐918	
   (Cochran,	
   J.,	
   concurring).	
   As	
   to	
   legal	
   sufficiency	
   under	
  

       Brooks,	
  deference	
  is	
  made	
  to	
  the	
  responsibility	
  of	
  the	
  jury	
  to	
  “fairly	
   resolve	
   conflicts	
  

       in	
   testimony,	
   to	
   weigh	
   the	
   evidence,	
   and	
   to	
   draw	
   reasonable	
   inferences	
  from	
  

       basic	
  facts	
  to	
  ultimate	
  facts.”	
  Hooper	
  v.	
  State,	
  214	
  S.W.3d	
  9,	
  13	
  (Tex.	
   Crim.	
   App.	
  

       2007)(citing	
   Jackson,	
   443	
   U.S.	
   at	
   318-­‐19).	
   Legal	
   sufficiency	
   of	
   the	
   evidence	
   is	
  

       measured	
   by	
   the	
   elements	
   of	
   the	
   offense,	
   defined	
   by	
   hypothetically	
   correct	
  

       jury	
  charge.	
  Malik	
  v.	
  State,	
  953	
  S.W.2d	
  234,	
  240	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1997).	
  

               It	
   has	
   been	
   held	
   that	
   in	
   a	
   sufficiency	
   inquiry,	
   direct	
   and	
   circumstantial	
  

       evidence	
   are	
   equally	
   probative.	
   Tate	
   v.	
   State,	
   500	
   S.W.3d	
   410,	
   413	
   (Tex.	
   Crim.	
  

       App.	
   2016)	
   (citing	
   to	
   Winfrey	
   v.	
   State,	
   393	
   S.W.3d	
   763,	
   771	
   (Tex.	
   Crim.	
   App.	
  

       2013).	
   In	
   Hooper	
   v.	
   State,	
   at	
   16,	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Criminal	
   Appeals	
   made	
   the	
  

       following	
   observation	
   about	
   different	
   types	
   of	
   conclusions	
   drawn	
   from	
  

       evidence:	
  

	
                                                                                                                                    16	
  
               To	
  correctly	
  apply	
  the	
  Jackson	
  standard,	
  it	
  is	
  vital	
  that	
  courts	
  of	
  appeal	
  
               understand	
   the	
   difference	
   between	
   a	
   reasonable	
   inference	
   supported	
  
               by	
   the	
   evidence	
   at	
   trial,	
   speculation,	
   and	
   a	
   presumption.	
   A	
  
               presumption	
   is	
   a	
   legal	
   inference	
   that	
   a	
   fact	
   exists	
   if	
   the	
   facts	
   giving	
  
               rise	
   to	
   the	
   presumption	
   are	
   proven	
   beyond	
   a	
   reasonable	
   doubt.	
   See	
  
               TEX.	
   PENAL	
   CODE	
   §	
   2.05.	
   For	
   example,	
   the	
   Penal	
   Code	
   states	
   that	
   a	
  
               person	
   who	
   purchases	
   or	
   receives	
   a	
   used	
   or	
   secondhand	
   motor	
  
               vehicle	
   is	
   presumed	
   to	
   know	
   on	
   receipt	
   that	
   the	
   vehicle	
   has	
   been	
  
               previously	
   stolen,	
   if	
   certain	
   basic	
   facts	
   are	
   established	
   regarding	
   his	
  
               conduct	
  after	
  receiving	
  the	
  vehicle.	
  TEX.	
  PENAL	
  CODE	
  §	
  31.03(c)(7).	
  A	
  
               jury	
  may	
  find	
  that	
  the	
  element	
  of	
  the	
  offense	
  sought	
  to	
  be	
  presumed	
  
               exists,	
   but	
   it	
   is	
   not	
   bound	
   to	
   find	
   so.	
   TEX.	
   PENAL	
   CODE	
   §	
   2.05.	
   In	
  
               contrast,	
   an	
   inference	
   is	
   a	
   conclusion	
   reached	
   by	
   considering	
   other	
  
               facts	
   and	
   deducing	
   a	
   logical	
   consequence	
   from	
   them.	
   Speculation	
   is	
  
               mere	
  theorizing	
  or	
  guessing	
  about	
  the	
  possible	
  meaning	
  of	
  facts	
  and	
  
               evidence	
  presented.	
  A	
  conclusion	
  reached	
  by	
  speculation	
  may	
  not	
  be	
  
               completely	
   unreasonable,	
   but	
   it	
   is	
   not	
   sufficiently	
   based	
   on	
   facts	
   or	
  
               evidence	
  to	
  support	
  a	
  finding	
  beyond	
  a	
  reasonable	
  doubt.	
  
               	
  	
  
               Credit	
  Card	
  Abuse	
  

               The	
   statute	
   under	
   which	
   Appellant	
   was	
   charged	
   was	
   this:	
   §32.31,	
   TEX.	
  

       PENAL	
  CODE.	
  The	
  elements	
  of	
  the	
  offense	
  are	
  these:	
  	
  

               a	
  person,	
  	
  

               with	
  intent	
  to	
  obtain	
  a	
  benefit	
  fraudulently,	
  

               presents	
  or	
  uses	
  a	
  credit	
  card	
  or	
  debit	
  card,	
  

               with	
  knowledge	
  

               that	
  the	
  card	
  has	
  not	
  been	
  issued	
  to	
  him,	
  and	
  

               is	
  not	
  used	
  with	
  the	
  consent	
  of	
  the	
  cardholder.	
  

	
                                                                                                                                              17	
  
                See,	
  Clinton	
  v.	
  State,	
  354	
  S.W.3d	
  795,	
  800	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2011).	
  

                Trial	
  to	
  the	
  Court	
  

                It	
  has	
  been	
  written	
  that	
  “the	
  trial	
  judge	
  in	
  a	
  trial	
  before	
  the	
  court,	
  is	
  the	
  sole	
  

       judge	
   of	
   	
   the	
   credibility	
   of	
   the	
   witnesses	
   and	
   may	
   accept	
   or	
   reject	
   any	
  part	
   of	
   the	
  

       testimony	
  of	
  the	
  State	
  or	
  defense	
  witnesses.”	
  Johnson	
  v.	
  State,	
  571	
  S.W.2d	
  170,	
  

       173	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1978).	
  

                ANALYSIS	
  

                The	
  case	
  at	
  bar	
  has	
  evidence	
  that	
  someone	
  used	
  the	
  credit	
  card	
  belonging	
  

       to	
  the	
  victim	
  to	
  purchase	
  items	
  at	
  a	
  Walgreens	
  store	
  and	
  at	
  a	
  Kroger	
  store	
  (see	
  

       State’s	
  Ex.	
  #9,	
  the	
  Walgreens	
  receipt,	
  3	
  RR	
  21).	
  The	
  victim	
  testified	
  that	
  the	
  credit	
  

       card	
   used	
   was	
   her	
   credit	
   card	
   (3	
   RR	
   	
   41-­‐42).	
   	
   She	
   did	
   not	
   consent	
   to	
   anyone	
  

       making	
   those	
   purchases	
   (3	
   RR	
   44).	
   	
   What	
   she	
   did	
   state	
   was	
   that	
   she	
   never	
  

       received	
   a	
   new	
   credit	
   card	
   that	
   had	
   been	
   sent	
   to	
   her,	
   and	
   she	
   believed	
   that	
  

       someone	
   had	
   intercepted	
   the	
   card	
   (3	
   RR	
   42).	
   The	
   victim	
   told	
   the	
   investigating	
  

       detective	
  that	
  she	
  did	
  not	
  know	
  who	
  had	
  taken	
  her	
  credit	
  card	
  (3	
  RR	
  26).	
  

                	
  

                	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                     18	
  
          There	
  was	
  no	
  evidence	
  to	
  show	
  that	
  Appellant	
  was	
  the	
  one	
  who	
  intercepted	
  

the	
  credit	
  card	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  gain	
  its	
  possession.	
  Appellant	
  did	
  not	
  admit	
  to	
  the	
  use	
  of	
  

the	
   victim’s	
   credit	
   card.	
   There	
   was,	
   therefore,	
   no	
   evidence	
   to	
   link	
   Appellant	
   to	
   the	
  

credit	
   card	
   and	
   its	
   use	
   other	
   than	
   whatever	
   circumstantial	
   evidence	
   the	
   State	
  

might	
   want	
   to	
   place	
   into	
   evidence.	
   At	
   the	
   close	
   of	
   the	
   State’s	
   evidence,	
   trial	
  

counsel	
   for	
   Appellant	
   moved	
   for	
   a	
   directed	
   verdict,	
   arguing	
   that	
   the	
   element	
   of	
  

identity	
  was	
  not	
  proven	
  (3	
  RR	
  45).	
  That	
  same	
  argument	
  was	
  made	
  in	
  Appellant’s	
  

opening	
  statement	
  (3	
  RR	
  15-­‐16)	
  and	
  in	
  closing	
  argument	
  (3	
  RR	
  66-­‐68).	
  	
  

          Crucial	
   to	
   the	
   State’s	
   case	
   –	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   specifically	
   referred	
   to	
   it	
   (3	
   RR	
  	
  

69-­‐70)	
  when	
  he	
  made	
  his	
  ruling	
  on	
  guilt/innocence	
  –	
  was	
  the	
  audio	
  recording	
  of	
  

the	
   interview	
  of	
  Appellant,	
  State’s	
  Exhibit	
  #	
  11.	
  Absent	
  that	
  piece	
  of	
  evidence,	
  the	
  

State’s	
  proof	
  of	
  identity	
  would	
  be	
  seriously	
  undermined.	
  

          So	
   what	
   are	
   the	
   sufficiency	
   problems	
   with	
   State’s	
   Exhibit	
   #	
   11	
   and	
   the	
  	
  

photographic	
  exhibits	
  (State’s	
  1-­‐4)	
  that	
  derive	
  from	
  it?	
  	
  

          First	
  of	
  all,	
  it	
  is	
  an	
  audio	
  tape,	
  not	
  a	
  video.	
  The	
  Code	
  of	
  Criminal	
  Procedure	
  

evidently	
   permits	
   an	
   electronic	
   recording	
   of	
   a	
   statement	
   of	
   someone	
   in	
   custody,	
  

yet	
   in	
   its	
   enumeration	
   of	
   those	
   sorts	
   of	
   recordings	
   does	
   not	
   expressly	
   permit	
   an	
  

audio	
  recording;	
  the	
  statute	
  does	
  list	
  “motion	
  picture,	
  video	
  tape,	
  or	
  other	
  visual	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                19	
  
recording.	
   Art.	
   38.22,	
   Sec.	
   3(a)(1),	
   TEX.	
   CODE	
   CRIM.	
   PROC.	
  2	
  	
   	
   	
   Secondly,	
   even	
  

without	
   an	
   objection	
   to	
   the	
   evidence,	
   there	
   still	
   exist	
   some	
   stark	
   problems	
   with	
  

the	
   methodology	
   and	
   impact	
   of	
   this	
   audio	
   tape	
   as	
   opposed	
   to	
   a	
   video	
   tape.	
   Those	
  

problems	
   center	
   around	
   such	
   issues	
   as	
   demeanor	
   of	
   Appellant	
   during	
   the	
  

questioning,	
  the	
  position	
  and	
  gestures	
  of	
  the	
  interrogator	
  vis	
  a	
  vis	
  Appellant,	
  and	
  

perhaps	
   most	
   importantly,	
   the	
   photographs:	
   there	
   is	
   no	
   visual	
   record	
   of	
   what	
  

images	
  were	
  shown	
  to	
  Appellant.	
  	
  

                At	
   first	
   one	
   hears	
   a	
   cooperative	
   voice	
   from	
   Appellant	
   when	
   the	
   officers	
  

speak	
  to	
  him	
  –	
  he	
  had	
  been	
  the	
  victim	
  of	
  someone	
  hacking	
  into	
  his	
  Facebook	
  page,	
  

and	
  was	
  hoping	
  that	
  this	
  was	
  something	
  to	
  do	
  with	
  that	
  (3	
  RR	
  54).	
  Even	
  though	
  the	
  

conversation	
   –	
   from	
   the	
   point	
   of	
   view	
   of	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   –	
   from	
   the	
   very	
   first	
   was	
  

designed	
  to	
  see	
  if	
  Appellant	
  would	
  incriminate	
  himself	
  in	
  the	
  misuse	
  of	
  the	
  credit	
  

card	
  [one	
  might	
  listen,	
  for	
  instance,	
  to	
  the	
  questions	
  posed	
  at	
  (minute	
  and	
  second)	
  

2:15,	
  3:00,	
  4:49,	
  5:00,	
  5:24,	
  5:48,	
  5:54]	
  -­‐-­‐	
  all	
  questions	
  directed	
  at	
  Appellant	
  to	
  see	
  

if	
  he	
  used	
  a	
  credit	
  card	
  on	
  the	
  date	
  in	
  question	
  and	
  where	
  he	
  was	
  when	
  he	
  used	
  

it],	
   Appellant’s	
   responses	
   were	
   factual	
   as	
   best	
   he	
   could	
   recall,	
   saying	
   that	
   he	
  

sometimes	
  used	
  the	
  credit	
  cards	
  of	
  his	
  girlfriend,	
  Erma	
  –	
  a	
  Bank	
  of	
  America	
  card	
  

and	
  a	
  Telco	
  card,	
  but	
  only	
  with	
  her	
  permission.	
  Then	
  at	
  minute	
  number	
  six	
  (6)	
  the	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2	
  Regrettably,	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  motion	
  filed	
  to	
  suppress	
  the	
  recording;	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  objection	
  to	
  

its	
  introduction	
  at	
  trial.	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      20	
  
detective	
   tells	
   Appellant	
   that,	
   when	
   the	
   video	
   and	
   photos	
   were	
   seen	
   by	
   other	
  

people,	
   Appellant’s	
   name	
   came	
   up.	
   Appellant	
   then	
   tries	
   the	
   recall	
  the	
   last	
   time	
   he	
  

used	
  Erma’s	
  card,	
  but	
  cannot	
  (6:24-­‐25).	
  Appellant	
  tries	
  to	
  recall	
  what	
  he	
  was	
  doing	
  

on	
   the	
   date	
   in	
   question,	
   and	
   says,	
   “Let	
   me	
   think”	
   (6:58),	
   after	
   which	
   there	
   is	
   a	
  

pause	
  until	
  the	
  detective	
  (at	
  7:22)	
  asks	
  why	
  Appellant	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  jail.	
  Appellant	
  tells	
  

him	
  “fines,	
  court	
  fines”	
  (7:26).	
  	
  

           Then	
   the	
   conversation	
   develops	
   some	
   more,	
   as	
   the	
   detective	
   tells	
   Appellant	
  

that	
   there	
   are	
   	
   (paraphrasing)	
   ….	
   things	
   I	
   have,	
   things	
   I	
   know	
   that	
   I	
   need	
   you	
   to	
  

clarify	
  for	
  me	
  (8:00-­‐03);	
  he	
  encourages	
  Appellant	
  to	
  “be	
  straight	
  with	
  me”	
  (8:08).	
  

Appellant	
   replies	
   that	
   he	
   understood,	
   but	
   that	
   he	
   could	
   not	
   recall	
   what	
   they	
  

bought	
  or	
  where	
  they	
  were,	
  that	
  he	
  recalled	
  that	
  they	
  made	
  a	
  lot	
  of	
  random	
  stops	
  

(8:18-­‐30).	
  Appellant	
  said	
  that	
  Erma	
  drove	
  a	
  black	
  Pontiac	
  (8:37)	
  and	
  that	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  

have	
   a	
   car.	
   When	
   asked	
   why	
   people	
   would	
   give	
   the	
   detective	
   Appellant’s	
   name,	
  

Appellant	
  said,	
  “I	
  could	
  pop	
  up…I	
  don’t	
  know…I	
  don’t	
  own	
  a	
  gray	
  car”	
  (9:50-­‐52).	
  

           Finally,	
  Lt.	
  Monsivais	
  tells	
  Appellant	
  that	
  he	
  was	
  seen	
  on	
  surveillance	
  video	
  

using	
   a	
   stolen	
   credit	
   card	
   (10:00	
   ff.).	
   Sounding	
   surprised,	
   Appellant	
   wonders	
  

“you’ve	
   got	
   me	
   on	
   tape	
   using	
   stolen	
   credit	
   cards?”	
   (10:17-­‐19).	
   When	
   asked	
   if	
   he	
  

would	
  like	
  to	
  see	
  pictures,	
  Appellant	
  states	
  that	
  he	
  would,	
  “because	
  I	
  didn’t	
  use	
  no	
  

stolen	
   credit	
   card”	
   (10:21-­‐25).	
   Still	
   thinking	
   that	
   this	
   concerns	
   the	
   use	
   of	
   Erma’s	
  

	
                                                                                                                                             21	
  
credit	
  cards,	
  Appellant	
  tells	
  the	
  detective	
  to	
  check	
  with	
  her	
  and	
  gives	
  him	
  her	
  work	
  

hours	
   	
   (10:48-­‐59).	
   Then	
   the	
   detective	
   tells	
   Appellant,	
   “We	
   don’t	
   have	
   Erma	
   on	
  

video;	
  we	
  have	
  you”	
  (11:00).	
  Then	
  the	
  investigator	
  shows	
  Appellant	
  a	
  picture	
  (not	
  

identified	
  in	
  the	
  audio	
  tape	
  as	
  any	
  particular	
  photo)	
  and	
  asks	
  him,	
  “Who’s	
  this?”	
  

and	
   Appellant	
   replies,	
   “That’s	
   me”	
   (11:14-­‐19).	
   The	
   investigator	
   refers	
   to	
   the	
   “big	
  

ol’	
   watch”	
   seen	
   in	
   the	
   picture	
   (11:22	
   ff).	
   	
   Then	
   the	
   investigator	
   tells	
   Appellant	
   that	
  

“Erma	
  may	
  be	
  playing	
  you,”	
  to	
  which	
  Appellant	
  replies	
  that	
  “she	
  wouldn’t	
  do	
  me	
  

like	
  that”	
  (12:00	
  ff).	
  Then	
  the	
  investigator	
  –	
  evidently	
  pointing	
  to	
  some	
  picture	
  –	
  

says,	
   “But	
   that’s	
   you”	
   and	
   Appellant	
   says,	
   “Yeah,	
   right”	
   (12:08-­‐10).	
  The	
  audio	
  tape	
  

is	
   silent	
   as	
   to	
   which	
   picture	
   was	
   shown.	
   Once	
   again	
   the	
   detective	
   asks	
   Appellant	
  

whether	
   he	
   remembered	
   anything,	
   and	
   Appellant	
   says	
   “Nope”	
   (12:24-­‐26).	
   Then	
  

again	
  (with	
  no	
  description	
  of	
  what	
  photo	
  is	
  being	
  shown)	
  the	
  detective	
  says,	
  “But	
  

it	
  is	
  you,	
  right?”	
  and	
  Appellant	
  says	
  “Yes,	
  sir”	
  (12:29-­‐31).	
  	
  

           Asked	
   once	
   more	
   if	
   that	
   was	
   he	
   using	
   the	
   credit	
   card,	
   Appellant	
   does	
   not	
  

reply	
  (12:33-­‐35).	
  At	
  that	
  point	
  Appellant	
  begins	
  making	
  some	
  observations	
  about	
  

how	
  the	
  person	
  in	
  the	
  pictures	
  is	
  not	
  him:	
  he	
  owns	
  no	
  green	
  shorts	
  (13:05,	
  13:11,	
  

14:47),	
   just	
   a	
   pair	
   of	
   brown	
   khaki	
   shorts	
   (13:21),	
   that	
   he	
   had	
   a	
   black	
   and	
   gold	
  

watch	
  (13:24,	
  13:33),	
  and	
  denying	
  that	
  the	
  photos	
  showed	
  him	
  (13:46,	
  13:56-­‐57),	
  

that	
   he	
   does	
   not	
   own	
   sandals	
   (14:00	
   ff.)	
   and	
   does	
   not	
   own	
   open-­‐toed	
   sandals	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                                          22	
  
(14:30	
   ff,	
   14:38).	
   Then	
   at	
   the	
   fifteenth	
   minute	
   Appellant	
   requests	
   an	
   attorney	
  

(15:00-­‐05),	
  at	
  which	
  point	
  the	
  interview	
  ends.	
  

          Several	
  things	
  undermine	
  the	
  sufficiency	
  of	
  the	
  evidence,	
  as	
  one	
  considers	
  

what	
   was	
   heard	
   during	
   that	
   interview,	
   what	
   was	
   later	
   told	
   in	
   court,	
   and	
   the	
  

photographs	
  introduced	
  into	
  evidence.	
  

          First	
  Problem	
  with	
  the	
  Evidence:	
  the	
  Photos	
  

          First:	
  Appellant	
  was	
  certain	
  in	
  court	
  that	
  he	
  was	
  shown	
  a	
  picture	
  of	
  a	
  man	
  

wearing	
  khaki	
  shorts	
  and	
  a	
  tee	
  shirt	
  	
  (3	
  RR	
  54-­‐55).	
  During	
  the	
  interview	
  Appellant	
  

tells	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais,	
   “I	
   have	
   a	
   pair	
   of	
   brown	
   khaki	
   shorts.”	
   That	
   assertion	
   is	
   quite	
  

important,	
  because	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  made	
  after	
  the	
  fact	
  but	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  the	
  interview.	
   It	
  

substantiates	
   Appellant’s	
   later	
   assertion	
   in	
   court	
   that,	
   indeed,	
   he	
   was	
   shown	
   a	
  

photograph	
   of	
   himself	
   in	
   brown	
   khaki	
   shorts,	
   and	
   that	
   picture	
   is	
   not	
   among	
   the	
  

State’s	
  exhibits.	
  It	
  fits	
  Appellant’s	
  narrative	
  of	
  events,	
  because	
  he	
  very	
  well	
  could	
  

have	
  said,	
  “That’s	
  me,”	
  if	
  he	
  was	
  being	
  shown	
  a	
  photo	
  of	
  a	
  man	
  in	
  a	
  white	
  tee	
  shirt	
  

and	
  khaki	
  shorts.	
  That	
  photograph	
  is	
  one	
  that	
  does	
  NOT	
  fit	
  the	
  State’s	
  narrative,	
  

and	
  that	
  raises	
  the	
  very	
  real	
  possibility	
  that	
  the	
  State’s	
  witness	
  somehow	
  wound	
  

up	
  in	
  court	
  without	
  that	
  photograph.	
  	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                                        23	
  
            A	
   close	
   look	
   at	
   the	
   evidence	
   supports	
   that	
   position.	
   Under	
   cross-­‐

examination,	
   there	
   was	
   this	
   exchange	
   between	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   and	
   Appellant’s	
  

counsel	
  on	
  cross-­‐examination:	
  

Q	
         Lieutenant	
   Monsivais,	
   in	
   investigating	
   this	
   case,	
   the	
   photos	
   you’ve	
   –	
   the	
  

photos	
   that	
   you	
   showed	
   Mr.	
   Horn,	
   is	
   that	
   all	
   of	
   the	
   photos	
   that	
   you	
   have	
   –	
   that	
  

you	
  have?	
  

A	
         Yes,	
  I	
  -­‐-­‐	
  yes.	
  And	
  I	
  marked	
  them.	
  

Q	
         So	
  there	
  –	
  would	
  there	
  –	
  could	
  there	
  have	
  been	
  any	
  other	
  photos?	
  

A	
         No,	
  sir.	
  

Q	
         So	
  there	
  were	
  no	
  pictures	
  with	
  him	
  wearing	
  white	
  shorts	
  or	
  anything?	
  

A	
         No.	
  

(3	
  RR	
  33)	
  

A	
  couple	
  of	
  things	
  are	
  important	
  in	
  the	
  exchange.	
  First,	
  the	
  question	
  should	
  be	
  not	
  

whether	
  there	
  was	
  a	
  picture	
  of	
  Appellant	
  wearing	
  white	
  shorts,	
  but	
  khaki	
  shorts.	
  

So	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  dishonesty	
  in	
  answering	
  the	
  question	
  as	
  it	
  was	
  asked.	
  Second,	
  the	
  

initial	
   question	
   is	
   phrased	
   in	
   the	
   present	
   tense,	
   not	
   the	
   past	
   tense.	
   Again,	
   Lt.	
  

Monsivais	
  could	
  truthfully	
  reply	
  that	
  that	
  was	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  pictures	
  he	
  has	
  –	
  that	
  is,	
  

today,	
  in	
  open	
  court,	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  the	
  trial.	
  

	
                                                                                                                                           24	
  
            The	
   other	
   question	
   and	
   answer	
   seem	
   a	
   little	
   more	
   complex,	
   when	
   the	
  

witness	
   was	
   asked,	
   ”So	
   there	
   –	
   would	
   there	
   –	
   could	
   there	
   have	
   been	
   any	
   other	
  

photos?”	
   	
   It	
   would	
   be	
   truthful	
   to	
   reply,	
   “No,	
   sir”	
   if	
   the	
   witness	
   means	
   by	
   that,	
   that	
  

no	
  other	
  still	
  photographs	
  were	
  made	
  off	
  the	
  Walgreens	
  or	
  Kroger	
  videos,	
  since	
  all	
  

of	
   the	
   ones	
   offered	
   in	
   open	
   court	
   appear	
   to	
   have	
   come	
   from	
   either	
   of	
   the	
   two	
  

stores.	
  	
  

            Yet,	
  to	
  explain	
  the	
  conundrum	
  of	
  reconciling	
  both	
  Lt.	
  Monsivais’	
  version	
  and	
  

Appellant’s,	
  	
  what	
  if	
  the	
  Lieutenant	
  had	
  some	
  other	
  photograph	
  of	
  Appellant,	
  one	
  

taken	
  from	
  his	
  Facebook	
  page?	
  What	
  if,	
  in	
  fact,	
  it	
  was	
  shown	
  to	
  Appellant	
  as	
  the	
  

picture	
   to	
   which	
   he	
   says,	
   “That’s	
   me”	
   ?	
   	
   Appellant	
   speaks	
   twice	
   of	
   having	
   such	
  

pictures	
   of	
   himself	
   on	
   his	
   FaceBook	
   page	
   (3	
   RR	
   55,	
   56),	
   two	
   or	
   three	
   pictures	
  

showing	
  him	
  wearing	
  a	
  white	
  tee	
  shirt	
  and	
  khaki	
  shorts.	
  The	
  record	
  supports	
  such	
  

a	
  scenario,	
  and	
  the	
  witness	
  need	
  not	
  have	
  necessarily	
  been	
  telling	
  a	
  falsehood	
  in	
  

his	
  answers	
  to	
  the	
  questions.	
  It’s	
  just	
  that	
  the	
  witness	
  was	
  never	
  asked	
  the	
  direct	
  

question:	
  “Did	
  you,	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  of	
  the	
  interview,	
  show	
  a	
  picture	
  to	
  Appellant	
  that	
  

showed	
   him	
   wearing	
   a	
   white	
   tee	
   short	
   and	
   khaki	
   shorts?”	
   That	
   question	
   was	
  

never	
   asked.	
   In	
   hindsight	
   it	
   should	
   have	
   been,	
   but	
   it	
   was	
   not.	
   With	
   no	
   video	
   of	
   the	
  

interview	
   and	
   no	
   ability	
   externally	
   to	
   verify	
   what	
   precise	
   photo	
   was	
   shown	
   to	
  

Appellant,	
  the	
  audio	
  tape	
  record	
  in	
  fact	
  could	
  support	
  either	
  narrative.	
  On	
  behalf	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                 25	
  
of	
  Appellant,	
  his	
  narrative	
  makes	
  more	
  sense.	
  It	
  makes	
  no	
  sense	
  to	
  see	
  a	
  picture	
  of	
  

someone	
   in	
   a	
   plaid	
   shirt,	
   green	
   shorts,	
   and	
   sandals,	
   and	
   say,	
   	
   “That’s	
   me”;	
  

Appellant	
   disavowed	
   owning	
   green	
   shorts	
   and	
   said	
   he	
   never	
   wore	
   sandals.	
  

However,	
   It	
   does	
   make	
   sense	
   to	
   see	
   oneself	
   wearing	
   a	
   white	
   tee	
   shirt	
   and	
   khaki	
  

shorts	
  and	
  say,	
  “That’s	
  me,”	
  if	
  in	
  fact	
  you	
  do	
  wear	
  such	
  clothes	
  and	
  	
  have	
  several	
  

pictures	
   on	
   FaceBook	
   of	
   that,	
   	
   and	
   if,	
   during	
   the	
   questioning	
   from	
   the	
   detective	
  

you	
  tell	
  him,	
  “I	
  have	
  a	
  pair	
  of	
  brown	
  khaki	
  shorts.”	
  

           Second	
  Problem:	
  No	
  Labels	
  During	
  Interview	
  

           Second:	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  record	
  during	
  the	
  audio	
  tape	
  of	
  what	
  picture	
  was	
  shown	
  

to	
   Appellant,	
   other	
   than	
   what	
   Appellant	
   states	
   or	
   that	
   one	
   can	
   infer	
   from	
   what	
   he	
  

states:	
   first,	
   that	
   he	
   had	
   brown	
   khaki	
   shorts	
   –	
   like	
   the	
   man	
   in	
   the	
   (now	
   missing)	
  

picture;	
  second,	
  that	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  own	
  green	
  shorts,	
  and	
  third,	
  that	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  own	
  

sandals.	
  As	
  the	
  audio	
  tape	
  unwinds,	
  there	
  is	
  never	
  any	
  reference	
  by	
  Lt.	
  Monsivais	
  

(as	
  he	
  hands	
  a	
  photo	
  to	
  Appellant)	
  to	
  a	
  picture	
  as	
  “TM-­‐1,”	
  “TM-­‐2,”	
  “TM-­‐3,”	
  etc.,	
  

although	
   by	
   the	
   time	
   of	
   trial	
   those	
   markings	
   appear	
   on	
   the	
   photos.	
   But	
   none	
   of	
  

those	
   are	
   of	
   	
   Appellant	
   in	
   a	
   white	
   tee	
   shirt	
   and	
   khaki	
   shorts.	
   Maybe	
   the	
   photo	
   just	
  

got	
   left	
   out	
   of	
   the	
   eventual	
   assemblage,	
   inadvertently	
   and	
   not	
   intentionally,	
   and	
  

only	
   later	
   the	
   photos	
   were	
  given	
   their	
   respective	
   initials	
   and	
   numbers,	
   especially	
  

since	
  from	
  the	
  outset	
  they	
  are	
  not	
  identified.	
  This	
  Court	
  is	
  invited	
  to	
  listen	
  carefully	
  

	
                                                                                                                                               26	
  
to	
   the	
   audio	
   tape	
   and	
   note	
   that	
   there	
   are	
   no	
   words	
   like,	
   “OK,	
   I	
   am	
   marking	
   this	
  

photo	
   TM-­‐1	
   and	
   handing	
   it	
   to	
   Mr.	
   Horn.”	
   There	
   is	
   nothing	
   like	
   that.	
   There	
   is	
  

nothing	
   at	
   the	
   outset	
   of	
   the	
   interview	
   where	
   Lt.	
   Monsivais	
   says,	
   something	
   like,	
  

“For	
   the	
   purpose	
   of	
   this	
   interview,	
   I	
   am	
   marking	
   an	
   array	
   of	
   photographs	
   taken	
  

from	
  the	
  videos;	
  I	
  am	
  marking	
  them	
  TM-­‐1,	
  TM-­‐2	
  etc.”	
  Similarly,	
  there	
  is	
  nothing	
  at	
  

the	
  conclusion	
  of	
  the	
  interview	
  to	
  indicate	
  that	
  any	
  sort	
  of	
  labeling	
  of	
  the	
  photos	
  

was	
  made.	
  	
  

           Third	
  Problem:	
  Indistinct	
  Images	
  

           Third,	
   the	
   still	
   photos	
   taken	
   from	
   the	
   video	
   are	
   indistinct,	
   lacking	
   the	
  

definition	
   that	
   would	
   make	
   distinctive	
   facial	
   features	
   readily	
   apparent.	
   Lt.	
  

Monsivais	
   concedes	
   this	
   during	
   cross-­‐examination,	
   using	
   words	
   like	
   “blurry”	
   and	
  

“grainy”	
   	
   (3	
   RR	
   34,	
   line	
   23	
   through	
   p.	
   35,	
   line	
   12).	
   Surely,	
   that	
   is	
   not	
   proof	
   of	
  

identity	
  beyond	
  a	
  reasonable	
  doubt.	
  	
  	
  

           Fourth	
  Problem:	
  the	
  Watch	
  	
  

           Fourth,	
   and	
   as	
   important	
   as	
   any	
   of	
   the	
   foregoing	
  –	
   maybe	
   more	
   so	
   -­‐-­‐	
   ,	
   is	
   the	
  

watch.	
   The	
   State	
   went	
   to	
   some	
   lengths	
   to	
   try	
   to	
   make	
   its	
   identification	
   of	
  

Appellant	
  by	
  means	
  of	
  the	
  watch	
  that	
  was	
  in	
  his	
  property	
  at	
  the	
  jail.	
  See,	
  State’s	
  

Exhibits	
   #10,	
   two	
   pictures	
   of	
   Appellant’s	
   watch:	
   a	
   large	
   silver	
   and	
   gold	
   face	
   dial,	
  

with	
   black	
   straps,	
   accented	
   by	
   some	
   small	
   silver	
   pieces.	
   It	
   would	
   be	
   quite	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                      27	
  
problematic	
   at	
   best	
   to	
   say	
   that	
  the	
  still	
  photographs	
  from	
   the	
   video	
   at	
   Walgreens	
  

showed	
  Appellant’s	
  watch.	
  The	
  images	
  are	
  simply	
  too	
  vague	
  in	
  their	
  detail.	
  What	
  is	
  

not	
  vague	
  or	
  indistinct	
  is	
  what	
  is	
  seen	
  in	
  the	
  Walgreens	
  video	
  of	
  the	
  man	
  walking	
  

into	
   the	
   store,	
   approaching	
   the	
   checkout	
   counter,	
   paying	
   for	
   the	
   items,	
   and	
  

leaving.	
   State’s	
   Ex.	
   #	
   7	
   shows	
   the	
   man	
   enter	
   the	
   store	
   at	
   (hour,	
   minute,	
   second)	
  	
  

18:14:54,	
  only	
  to	
  disappear	
  from	
  sight.	
  	
  

           Following	
  is	
  what	
  happened	
  when	
  he	
  next	
  appeared:	
  

TIME	
   	
          	
         EVENT	
  

	
         	
        	
         (View	
  of	
  Register)	
  

18:16:45	
           	
         Man	
  emerges	
  from	
  aisle	
  on	
  right,	
  gets	
  another	
  item	
  

18:16:58	
           	
         Man	
  gets	
  in	
  line	
  behind	
  several	
  others	
  to	
  check	
  out	
  

18:17:17	
                      Man	
  is	
  visible	
  in	
  line,	
  with	
  a	
  watch	
  with	
  a	
  silver	
  or	
  white	
  band	
  
                                visible	
  on	
  left	
  wrist	
  
	
  
18:19:10	
                      Man	
  steps	
  to	
  register,	
  with	
  same	
  watch	
  visible	
  

18:19:50	
                      Man	
  checks	
  out,	
  with	
  same	
  watch	
  visible	
  

18:20:30	
                      Man	
  exits	
  from	
  view	
  of	
  register	
  	
  

	
                              (View	
  of	
  Front	
  Door)	
            	
  

18:20:29	
           	
         Man	
  walks	
  to	
  door,	
  same	
  watch	
  prominently	
  displayed	
  

18:20:30	
           	
         Man	
  walks	
  to	
  door,	
  same	
  watch	
  prominently	
  displayed	
  

	
                                                                                                                                        28	
  
18:20:31	
          	
         Man	
  walks	
  out	
  door,	
  same	
  watch	
  prominently	
  displayed	
  

18:20:33-­‐34	
                Man	
   seen	
   walking	
   outside	
   the	
   store,	
   same	
   watch	
   prominently	
  
                               displayed	
  
	
  
In	
  short,	
  that	
  video	
  is	
  conclusive	
  that	
  the	
  watch	
  worn	
  by	
  the	
  man	
  in	
  the	
  

video	
  is	
  NOT	
  Appellant’s	
  watch,	
  with	
  its	
  black	
  band.	
  There	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  doubt	
  

that	
  the	
  watches	
  are	
  different.	
  	
  

          Interestingly	
   –	
   and	
   weighing	
   against	
   the	
   State	
  -­‐-­‐	
   	
   in	
   his	
   summation,	
   State’s	
  

counsel	
   conceded	
   that	
   the	
   photographic	
   evidence	
   “appears	
   to	
   be	
   of	
   the	
  

defendant”	
   (evidence	
   supplied),	
   placing	
   its	
   probative	
   effect	
   on	
   a	
   level	
   that	
   falls	
  

below	
   that	
   of	
   evidence	
   beyond	
   a	
   reasonable	
   doubt;	
   State’s	
   Counsel	
   placed	
  

emphasis	
  on	
  the	
  watch	
  as	
  identifying	
  Appellant,	
  saying	
  it	
  was	
  “unique”	
  (3	
  RR	
  65).	
  

Yet	
  the	
  video	
  shows	
  something	
  very	
  different	
  and	
  to	
  the	
  contrary.	
  The	
  trial	
  court	
  

seemed	
   to	
   rely	
   upon	
   the	
   evidence	
   of	
   the	
   watch	
   in	
   concluding	
   that	
   the	
   State	
   had	
  

made	
   its	
   case	
   on	
   identity,	
   saying	
   “…that	
   watch	
   or	
   a	
   watch	
   very	
   similar	
   plainly	
  

visible	
  in	
  the	
  transactions	
  or	
  the	
  offense	
  being	
  committed…”	
  (3	
  RR	
  70).	
  By	
  making	
  

that	
  reliance,	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  erred.	
  The	
  video	
  evidence	
  is	
  to	
  the	
  contrary.	
  	
  

          There	
   is	
   precedent	
   that	
   on	
   appeal,	
   when	
   video	
   evidence	
   contradicts	
   the	
  

finding	
  in	
  the	
  lower	
  court,	
  	
  the	
  reviewing	
  court	
  may	
  conclude	
  that	
  the	
  court	
  erred	
  

in	
  its	
  finding.	
  See,	
  Carmouche	
  v.	
  State,	
  10	
  S.W.3d	
  323,	
  332	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2000).	
  

	
                                                                                                                                      29	
  
In	
   Carmouche	
   “indisputable	
   video	
   evidence”	
   contradicted	
   parts	
   of	
   a	
   witness’	
  

testimony	
   and	
   therefore	
   could	
   not	
   have	
   upheld	
   the	
   conclusion	
   reached	
   by	
   the	
  

lower	
  court.	
  	
  

               The	
   case	
   at	
   bar	
   fits	
   the	
   Carmouche	
   profile.	
   There	
   is	
   indisputable	
   video	
  

evidence	
   that	
   the	
   man	
   in	
   the	
   video	
   –	
   hence,	
   in	
   the	
   photographs	
   –	
   was	
   NOT	
  

wearing	
   a	
   watch	
   like	
   the	
   one	
   owned	
   by	
   Appellant.	
   The	
   trial	
   court	
   erred	
   in	
  

concluding	
  from	
  that,	
  that	
  the	
  individual	
  was	
  Appellant.	
  It	
  most	
  certainly	
  was	
  not	
  

him.	
   That	
   big	
   difference	
   sets	
   off	
   a	
   cascading	
   effect,	
   like	
   a	
   row	
   of	
   dominos,	
   to	
  

support	
  Appellant’s	
  assertion	
  that	
  he	
  was	
  not	
  the	
  man	
  in	
  the	
  photos	
  that	
  the	
  State	
  

offered	
  into	
  evidence,	
  and	
  it	
  further	
  supports	
  Appellant’s	
  version	
  of	
  the	
  facts	
  that	
  

he	
  was	
  shown	
  some	
  other	
  picture	
  of	
  himself	
  wearing	
  a	
  tee	
  shirt	
  and	
  khaki	
  shorts.	
  

In	
  other	
  words,	
  when	
  the	
  State’s	
  evidence	
  fails	
  in	
  the	
  crucial	
  aspect	
  of	
  the	
  watch,	
  

its	
  probative	
  value	
  in	
  the	
  other	
  respects	
  is	
  also	
  subject	
  to	
  attack,	
  and	
  reasonable	
  

doubt	
  is	
  shown.	
  	
  

       	
      Finally,	
  the	
  evidence	
  is	
  no	
  longer	
  based	
  upon	
  a	
  “reasonable	
  inference”	
  

       but,	
   rather,	
   has	
   fallen	
   into	
   the	
   category	
   of	
   evidence	
   founded	
   upon	
  

       speculation.	
   As	
   stated	
   earlier	
   in	
   this	
   Brief	
   (quoting	
   from	
   the	
   Hooper	
  

       decision,	
  supra,	
  p.	
  17):	
  

	
                                                                                                                                    30	
  
       	
       	
  “Speculation	
   is	
   mere	
   theorizing	
   or	
   guessing	
   about	
   the	
   possible	
  

       meaning	
   of	
   facts	
   and	
   evidence	
   presented.	
   A	
   conclusion	
   reached	
   by	
  

       speculation	
   may	
   not	
   be	
   completely	
   unreasonable,	
   but	
   it	
   is	
   not	
   sufficiently	
  

       based	
   on	
   facts	
   or	
   evidence	
   to	
   support	
   a	
   finding	
   beyond	
   a	
   reasonable	
  

       doubt.”	
   Hooper	
   v.	
   State,	
   214	
   S.W.3d	
   at	
   16	
   (emphasis	
   supplied).	
   Why	
  

       speculation?	
   The	
   pictures	
   are	
   grainy	
   and	
   blurry;	
   no	
   contemporaneous	
  

       numbering	
  of	
  the	
  photographs	
  is	
  heard	
  in	
  the	
  audio	
   tape	
  record;	
  the	
  watch	
  

       is	
   not	
   Appellant’s	
   watch:	
   the	
   video	
   tape	
   contradicts	
   the	
   conclusion	
   drawn	
  

       by	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  and	
  State’s	
  counsel	
  concerning	
  the	
  watch;	
  	
  the	
  clothing	
  is	
  

       wrong;	
   there	
   is	
   a	
   mysteriously	
   missing	
   picture	
   whose	
   presence	
   would	
  

       explain	
   a	
   lot	
   of	
   things.	
   To	
   base	
   a	
   conviction	
   on	
   such	
   facts	
   veers	
   off	
   into	
  

       speculation.	
  

                The	
   evidence	
   is	
   legally	
   insufficient.	
   The	
   judgment	
   of	
   conviction	
   should	
   be	
  

reversed	
  and	
  remanded	
  with	
  an	
  acquittal.	
  

                                                            PRAYER	
  FOR	
  RELIEF	
  

                WHEREFORE,	
   PREMISES	
   CONSIDERED,	
   JUSTIN	
   GEROME	
   HORN,	
   Appellant,	
  

prays	
  that	
  this	
  Honorable	
  Court,	
  upon	
  consideration	
  of	
  the	
  record,	
  the	
  authorities,	
  

and	
   arguments	
   made	
   herein,	
   will	
   find	
   reversible	
   error	
   and	
   will	
   reverse	
   the	
  

Judgment	
  of	
  conviction,	
  and	
  remand	
  this	
  cause	
  with	
  an	
  acquittal,	
  or	
  alternatively,	
  

	
                                                                                                                                              31	
  
 for	
   a	
   new	
   trial,	
   and	
   for	
   such	
   other	
   and	
   further	
   relief	
   to	
   which	
   Appellant	
   may	
   be	
  

 entitled	
  at	
  law	
  and	
  equity.	
  	
  

                                                                  Respectfully	
  submitted,	
  
            	
  
                                                                  __/S/	
  Hough-­‐Lewis	
  Dunn	
  
                                                                  Hough-­‐Lewis	
  (“Lew”)	
  Dunn	
  
                                                                  Attorney	
  at	
  Law	
  
                                                                  P.O.	
  Box	
  2226	
  
                                                                  Longview,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
                                                                  E-­‐mail:	
  dunn@texramp.net	
  
                                                                  Vox:	
  903-­‐757-­‐6711	
  
                                                                  Fax:	
  	
  903-­‐757-­‐6712	
  
                                                                  Counsel	
  for	
  Appellant	
  
 	
         	
        	
         	
         	
         	
  

                                                    CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  SERVICE	
  
                                                                           	
  
	
  	
        I	
   hereby	
   certify	
   that	
   a	
   true	
   and	
   correct	
   copy	
   of	
   the	
   foregoing	
   “Brief	
   for	
  
Appellant”	
   has	
   been	
   sent	
   by	
   electronic	
   transmission	
   to	
   the	
   following	
   on	
   this	
  6th	
   day	
  
of	
  June,	
  2018:	
  
	
  
	
  	
        Hon.	
  John	
  Roberts,	
  Assistant	
  Criminal	
  District	
  Attorney,	
  Gregg	
  County,	
  Texas,	
  
at	
  his	
  e-­‐mail	
  address:	
  john.roberts@co.gregg.tx.us.	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                                    __/S/	
  Hough-­‐Lewis	
  Dunn	
  
                                                                    Hough-­‐Lewis	
  (“Lew”)	
  Dunn	
  
                                                                    	
  
                                                                    	
  
                                                                    	
  
                                                                    	
  
                                                                    	
  
                                                                    	
  
                                                                    	
  
     	
  

 	
                                                                                                                                        32	
  
                                                                                                                 	
  
                                                                                                       CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  COMPLIANCE	
  
	
  
	
  
                               I	
   certify	
   that	
   the	
   foregoing	
   document	
   complies	
   with	
   Rule	
   9,	
   TEX.	
   R.	
   APP.	
  

       PROC.,	
   regarding	
   length	
   of	
   documents,	
   in	
   that	
   exclusive	
   of	
   caption,	
   identity	
   of	
  

       parties	
  and	
  counsel,	
  statement	
  regarding	
  oral	
  argument,	
  table	
  of	
  contents,	
  index	
  of	
  

       authorities,	
   statement	
   of	
   the	
   case,	
   issues	
   presented,	
   statement	
   of	
  

       jurisdiction,	
   statement	
   of	
   procedural	
   history,	
   signature,	
   proof	
   of	
   service,	
  

       certification,	
  certificate	
  of	
  compliance,	
  and	
  appendix,	
  it	
  consists	
  of	
  	
  6,922	
  words.	
  

                                                                                                                                                                                               /s/	
  Hough-­‐Lewis	
  (“Lew”)	
  Dunn	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Hough-­‐Lewis	
  (“Lew”)	
  Dunn	
  

	
  

	
  

                        	
  	
  

                        	
  

	
  

                        	
  

	
  

	
  

	
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