Court Opinion

ID: 9945924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 20:01:27.702468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:19.694706
License: Public Domain

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                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10551
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        MICHAEL SHAQUILLE LEE,
        a.k.a. Smooth,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cr-00048-TJC-PDB-11
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                     23-10551

                                ____________________

        Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                The district court sentenced Michael Lee to 40 months of
        imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with in-
        tent to distribute molly and flakka over an approximated six-month
        span. This term of imprisonment was a 47-month downward vari-
        ance from the low-end of the advisory guideline range. Nonethe-
        less, Mr. Lee asserts on appeal that he was entitled to safety-valve
        relief, that he was entitled to a minor role reduction for his part in
        the conspiracy, that his sentence is both procedurally and substan-
        tively unreasonable, and that it violated his constitutional right to
        be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
        Amendment.
               As explained below, we affirm. 1
                                               I
               Mr. Lee was charged with conspiring to possess and distrib-
        ute MDMA and alpha-PVP, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)
        and § 846. These drugs are colloquially known as “molly” and
        “ﬂakka,” respectively. After Mr. Lee pled guilty without a written
        plea agreement, a probation oﬃcer prepared a presentence investi-
        gation report (“PSR”) outlining the following oﬀense conduct.

        1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history and

        set out only what is necessary to explain our decision.
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        23-10551               Opinion of the Court                         3

                                          A
               Between July of 2018 and April of 2021, Kimberly and Neal
        Walker led a drug-traﬃcking organization that distributed molly
        and ﬂakka from three residences. The Walkers did not personally
        distribute the drugs but hired others, like Mr. Lee, to do so on the
        organization’s behalf. The organization comprised of at least
        twelve members with varying roles; those members worked in reg-
        ular shifts, selling drugs from the three residences twenty-four
        hours a day. The Walkers coordinated shifts at the residences, main-
        tained the drug inventory, supplied the drugs, and paid their distrib-
        utors.
               According to the initial PSR, Mr. Lee worked approximately
        four shifts per week at one of the drug residences from September
        of 2020 through April of 2021, and approximately 4.9 kilograms of
        ﬂakka and 358 grams of molly were attributed to him. The proba-
        tion oﬃcer calculated a base oﬀense level of 30 under U.S.S.G. §
        2D1.1(a)(5) & (c)(5) based on a converted drug weight of 2,041 kil-
        ograms. The PSR recommended no enhancements and applied a
        three-level total reduction under § 3E1.1(a)–(b) for acceptance of
        responsibility and for timely notifying authorities of his intention
        to plead guilty. As a result, the PSR calculated a total oﬀense level
        of 27.
               The PSR also described Mr. Lee’s criminal history, which in-
        volved various juvenile oﬀenses and adult convictions for posses-
        sion of 20 grams or less of cannabis and separately for possession
        of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. For these
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10551

        oﬀenses, the PSR calculated a criminal history subtotal of eight;
        however, because the instant oﬀense was committed while Mr. Lee
        was on probation, an additional two points were added, for a total
        criminal history score of ten and a criminal history category of V.
        Mr. Lee’s criminal history category of V and an oﬀense level of 27
        yielded a Sentencing Guidelines range of 120 to 150 months of im-
        prisonment.
                                          B
               Mr. Lee raised several objections to the PSR, including ob-
        jections to the scoring of his criminal history points for his juvenile
        oﬀenses, the calculated drug weight attributed to him (which in-
        cluded a time period during which he was incarcerated), the denial
        of a minor role adjustment under § 3B1.2, the recommendation
        that a downward departure was unwarranted, and ﬁnally, to the
        “implicit conclusion” that the safety-valve criteria under § 3553(f )
        was inapplicable to his case.
               After addressing those objections, the probation oﬃcer re-
        vised the PSR, adopting Mr. Lee’s objections to calculations of the
        drug quantity and criminal history category but rejecting the ob-
        jections regarding a minor role adjustment, downward departure,
        and the application of the safety-valve. The revised PSR attributed
        4.084 kilograms of ﬂakka and 294.4 grams of molly to Mr. Lee,
        lowering the converted drug weight to 1,685.44 kilograms. Be-
        cause this weight still fell within the more-than-1,000-but-less-than-
        3,000-kilograms range, this revision did not aﬀect Mr. Lee’s base
        oﬀense level of 27. The probation oﬃcer did, however, reduce the
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        23-10551              Opinion of the Court                        5

        criminal history points attributed to Mr. Lee’s three juvenile of-
        fenses to zero points, reducing his total number of criminal history
        points to four and his criminal history category to III.
               The revised criminal history category of III and an oﬀense
        level of 27 lowered Mr. Lee’s Sentencing Guidelines range to 87 to
        108 months of imprisonment.
                                         C
               At sentencing, the district court heard argument from Mr.
        Lee’s counsel regarding the outstanding objections. Speciﬁcally, Mr.
        Lee still maintained that he was entitled to (1) a minor role reduc-
        tion, (2) safety-valve relief, and (3) a downward departure or vari-
        ance based on his personal history and characteristics. The district
        court ultimately denied Mr. Lee’s requests for a minor role reduc-
        tion and/or safety-valve relief, but granted a downward variance
        based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the mitigating evidence
        presented by Mr. Lee’s counsel.
                The district court sentenced Mr. Lee to 40 months’ impris-
        onment and three years of supervised release. The court speciﬁ-
        cally rejected Mr. Lee’s arguments regarding the propriety of a mi-
        nor role reduction and the application of the safety-valve relief,
        noting that Mr. Lee’s conduct was commensurate with that of an
        average participant in the drug scheme and that the statutory safety
        valve did not apply. To the extent Mr. Lee asserted that he was
        entitled to safety-valve relief under the relevant Sentencing Guide-
        lines, the district court also noted that—at the time of Mr. Lee’s
        sentence—the Sentencing Guidelines had not yet been amended to
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10551

        reﬂect the new criteria in § 3553(f ), and therefore, this circuit’s de-
        cision in United States v. Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir. 2022) (en
        banc), was not at issue.
                                          D
               On appeal, Mr. Lee asserts that the district court erred by
        declining to apply safety-valve relief and by declining to apply a mi-
        nor role reduction. He also asserts that the district court’s sentence
        is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and violative
        of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
        punishment. We address each argument below.
                                           II
                We start with Mr. Lee’s argument regarding safety-valve re-
        lief. There are two “safety valve” provisions potentially at issue: a
        statutory safety valve provision under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f ) and a
        guidelines safety valve provision under U.S.S.G. §§ 5C1.2(a) and
        2D1.1(b)(18). It is not clear under which provision Mr. Lee seeks
        relief, but both on appeal and before the district court, Mr. Lee cites
        only to the statutory safety valve under § 3553(f ) and our en banc
        decision in Garcon, 54 F.4th at 1277 (analyzing § 3553(f )). Notably,
        as the district court correctly observed at sentencing, the criteria
        for relief under the guidelines safety valve provision, U.S.S.G. §
        5C1.2(a), had not been amended at the time of sentencing to reﬂect
        the more expansive criteria contained in § 3553(f ). See First Step Act
        of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402(a)(1)(A)(ii), 132 Stat. 5194,
        5221 (amending § 3553(f )(1)). See also United States v. Jerchower, 631
        F.3d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 2011) (a court applies the version of the
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        23-10551                   Opinion of the Court                                  7

        Sentencing Guidelines in eﬀect on the date of the sentencing hear-
        ing). 2
               Accordingly, we limit our discussion to the statutory safety
        valve as amended by the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f ).
              When reviewing a district court’s safety-valve decision, we
        review factual determinations for clear error and legal conclusions
        de novo. United States v. Milkintas, 470 F. 3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir.

        2 As set forth above, at the time of Mr. Lee’s sentencing, there was an incon-

        gruity between the safety-valve criteria under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G.
        § 5C1.2(a). The Guidelines similarly list five criteria in § 5C1.2(a) and provide
        for a two-level reduction in the offense level for a drug offender if he or she
        satisfies that criteria. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(18), 5C1.2(a). Under the then-
        applicable § 5C1.2, which had not yet been amended, a defendant was eligible
        for safety-valve relief if, among other things, the defendant “d[id] not have
        more than 1 criminal history point.” § 5C1.2(a). Mr. Lee was not eligible under
        that version of the Guidelines because he had more than one criminal history
        point. The United States Sentencing Commission has since enacted an amend-
        ment to make U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 consistent with § 3553(f), which went into ef-
        fect on November 1, 2023. See U.S.S.G. Proposed Amend. No. 4 (eff. Nov. 1,
        2023).
        As in this case, confusion was inevitable given the Sentencing Guidelines’
        cross-reference to § 3553(f)’s criteria—even where that criteria was not identi-
        cal. Nonetheless, the only way Mr. Lee (had he properly raised the issue) could
        qualify for the two-level Guidelines reduction is if § 5C1.2’s incorrect reference
        to “the criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)–(5) set forth below” is read to incorpo-
        rate the amended criteria in § 3553(f), including the broadened criteria for
        criminal history in § 3553(f)(1)—and to supplant the incongruent criteria in §
        5C1.2. But that reading is not plain from the language of § 5C1.2, which set
        out the former criteria explicitly. Nor has Mr. Lee pointed us to any authority
        to the contrary.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10551

        2006). The defendant bears the burden of proving eligibility for
        safety-valve relief. See id. at 1345.
               As amended in 2018 by the First Step Act, § 3553(f ) provides
        that a sentencing court shall disregard the statutory minimum
        mandatory sentence if the defendant does “not have (A) more than
        4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points re-
        sulting from a 1-point oﬀense . . .; (B) a prior 3‑point oﬀense . . . ;
        and (C) a prior 2-point violent oﬀense” and no later than the time
        of sentencing, have “truthfully provided to the Government all in-
        formation and evidence the defendant has concerning the oﬀense
        or oﬀenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a
        common scheme or plan.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f ); First Step Act of
        2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402(a)(1)(A)(ii), 132 Stat. 5194,
        5221 (amending § 3553(f )(1)). In Garcon, we held that the “and” in
        § 3553(f )(1) is conjunctive and that a defendant remains eligible for
        safety-valve relief unless he has more than four criminal history
        points (excluding any criminal history points resulting from a one-
        point oﬀense), a prior three-point oﬀense, and a prior two-point vi-
        olent oﬀense. Garcon, 54 F.4th at 1277–80.
               Although § 3553(f ) permits a district court to disregard a
        statutory mandatory minimum sentence and instead impose a sen-
        tence within the advisory guidelines range, there is no mandatory
        minimum sentence at issue here. Thus, it is unclear why §
        3553(f )—or our holding in Garcon, which is premised on that stat-
        ute—is relevant here. Mr. Lee having failed to indicate its relevance
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        23-10551               Opinion of the Court                        9

        to the contrary, we agree with the district court that statutory
        safety-valve relief is not applicable.
                                         III
               Mr. Lee next asserts that he was entitled to a minor role re-
        duction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Under this provision, a de-
        fendant who is a “minor participant” in a criminal scheme can re-
        ceive a two-level reduction in his or her oﬀense level. A “minor par-
        ticipant” is someone “who is less culpable than most other partici-
        pants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described
        as minimal.” Id., cmt. (n.5).
                Whether a defendant is a minor participant is a ﬁnding of
        fact that we review for clear error; thus, we will reverse only if we
        have “a deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that a mistake has been com-
        mitted.” United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir.
        2016). The district court has “considerable discretion in making
        this fact-intensive determination,” and the defendant bears the bur-
        den of establishing his qualiﬁcation for a reduction by a preponder-
        ance of the evidence. United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274, 1277–78
        (11th Cir. 2002).
               In determining whether a defendant qualiﬁes for the reduc-
        tion, the district court should consider the following non-exhaus-
        tive factors: (1) the defendant’s degree of understanding of the
        structure and scope of the criminal activity; (2) the defendant’s de-
        gree of participation in the organization and planning of the crim-
        inal activity; (3) the defendant’s degree of decision-making author-
        ity or inﬂuence over the decision-making authority; (4) the
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10551

        defendant’s nature and extent of participation in the criminal activ-
        ity, including his actions and his responsibility and discretion in per-
        forming those actions; and (5) how much the defendant “stood to
        beneﬁt” from the activity. See United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d
        1228, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2018); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. (n.3(C)). And
        a district court’s analysis should be informed by (1) the defendant’s
        role in the relevant conduct for which he has been held accountable
        for at sentencing, and (2) his role as compared to that of the other
        participants in the relevant conduct. See United States v. De Varon,
        175 F.3d 930, 939 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
               As to the ﬁrst prong, “only if the defendant can establish that
        he played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which he has
        already been held accountable—not a minor role in any larger
        criminal conspiracy—should the district court grant a downward
        adjustment for minor role in the oﬀense.” Id. at 944. And as to the
        second prong, “the district court should look at other participants
        only to the extent that they (1) are identiﬁable or discernable from
        the evidence, and (2) were involved in the relevant conduct at-
        tributed to the defendant.” United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 980
        (11th Cir. 2015) (citing De Varon, 175 F.3d at 944). “The conduct of
        the participants in any larger criminal conspiracy is irrelevant.” De
        Varon, 175 F.3d at 944. Indeed, “[e]ven if a defendant played a lesser
        role than the other participants, that fact does not entitle [him] to
        a role reduction since it is possible that none [of the participants]
        are minor or minimal participants.” United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d
        581, 591 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
        “in order to satisfy the second prong, the defendant must show that
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        23-10551               Opinion of the Court                         11

        he was less culpable than most other participants in his relevant
        conduct.” Moran, 778 F.3d at 980.
                Mr. Lee asserts that he was nothing more than “a run of the
        mill street level drug salesman.” Appellant’s Br. at 24 (citing Cruick-
        shank, 837 F.3d at 1192). To support that assertion, Mr. Lee posits
        that he was “not in charge of anyone in the conspiracy, had no man-
        agerial [or] leadership role, [and] merely assisted the conspiracy in
        a limited manner at the direction of others.” Id. He further main-
        tains that—unlike some of his codefendants—he was not caught
        with a ﬁrearm and did not live in or maintain the residences where
        the drugs were found. Id.
                The district court did not clearly err in ﬁnding that Mr. Lee
        did not warrant a minor role reduction. As the district court made
        clear at sentencing, Mr. Lee was held accountable only for his con-
        duct by calculating the drugs actually attributed to his sales during
        his shifts at the drug house. The district court also properly com-
        pared Mr. Lee’s conduct to that of his co-conspirators, including
        other similarly situated members of the conspiracy, and agreed
        with the probation oﬃcer’s assessment that Mr. Lee’s role—specif-
        ically in terms of the weight of drugs attributed to him and the
        length of time of his involvement—was commensurate with that
        of an average participant in the scheme. See De Varon, 175 F.3d at
        940–41. Mr. Lee’s lack of decision-making authority within the
        conspiracy did not require the district court to grant him a minor
        role reduction, and a criminal conspiracy may exist without any
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10551

        minor or minimal participants, as the district court found here. See
        Cruickshank, 837 F.3d at 1195; Martin, 803 F.3d at 591.
                                          IV
              Mr. Lee also asserts that his sentence was both procedurally
        and substantively unreasonable. We do not agree.
                We use a two-step process to review the reasonableness of a
        sentence imposed by a district court. See United States v. Cubero, 754
        F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014). First, we determine whether the
        sentence is procedurally sound. See id. Assuming it is, we then
        examine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable given
        the totality of the circumstances and the sentencing factors set out
        in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See id. At both steps of the process, the party
        challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing it is unrea-
        sonable under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. See
        United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
        Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)).
                                           A
               A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court
        commits a “significant procedural error” such as failing to calculate
        or incorrectly calculating the guidelines range, treating the guide-
        lines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, failing
        to adequately explain the chosen sentence, or selecting a sentence
        based on clearly erroneous facts. See United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d
        1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 936
        (11th Cir. 2016).
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        23-10551                   Opinion of the Court                               13

               Mr. Lee contends that the district court failed to follow the
        requirements of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005). Mr.
        Lee appears to rely on his arguments regarding the application of
        the safety valve and minor role reductions in support of his proce-
        dural unreasonableness assertion. To the extent he does, we reject
        those arguments once more.
               To the extent Mr. Lee argues that the district court violated
        any of Booker’s other mandates, such as by failing to adequately ex-
        plain the chosen sentence or treating the guidelines range as man-
        datory, we likewise reject those contentions. There is no indication
        in the record that the district court treated the guidelines as man-
        datory. Indeed, the record reﬂects just the opposite: the district
        court expressly agreed with Mr. Lee’s counsel that the guideline
        range may have been too high and granted a signiﬁcant downward
        variance based on Mr. Lee’s individual circumstances.
              In short, the district court’s sentence was procedurally
        sound.
                                               B
              Mr. Lee also asserts that his sentence was substantively un-
        reasonable because the district court gave undue weight to his of-
        fense conduct and to his past criminal history.3 As the party

        3 Mr. Lee consistently asserts that the district court inappropriately designated

        him as a recidivist offender or career offender. See Appellant’s Br. at 31–32.
        That is not reflected in the sentencing hearing transcript or elsewhere in the
        record. Rather, the district court properly reviewed Mr. Lee’s criminal history
        as determined under the Sentencing Guidelines.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10551

        challenging his sentence, Mr. Lee has “the burden of showing that
        the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the §
        3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference aﬀorded [to] sentenc-
        ing courts.” United States v. Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir.
        2015). We have “underscored” that we must give “due deference”
        to the district court to consider and weigh the proper sentencing
        factors. See United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir.
        2018) (quotation marks omitted).
                A district court must impose a sentence that is “suﬃcient,
        but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes listed
        in § 3553(a)(2). When fashioning a reasonable sentence, a district
        court must consider the factors set for in § 3553(a), which include,
        in relevant part, the “nature and circumstances of the oﬀense and
        the history and characteristics of the defendant.” United States v.
        Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1198 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). A district court
        abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to aﬀord consideration to rel-
        evant factors that were due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant
        weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear
        error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Id. at 1189
        (quotation marks omitted).
               One indicator of a reasonable sentence is that it is well below
        the statutory maximum for the crime. See United States v. Dougherty,
        754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). A district court has wide dis-
        cretion to decide whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance
        and the degree of the variance. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196. Though ap-
        pellate courts may presume a sentence within the guideline range
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        23-10551               Opinion of the Court                        15

        is reasonable, a sentencing judge must still properly analyze the §
        3553(a) factors and set forth enough to demonstrate that he or she
        has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
        exercising his or her decision-making authority. See Rita v. United
        States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–50, 356–57 (2007).
               Mr. Lee’s 40-month sentence is substantively reasonable.
        The district court appropriately weighed and considered the
        § 3553(a) factors, including his personal history and characteristics,
        his diﬃcult upbringing, and his relative culpability as compared to
        other co-conspirators. The district court appropriately weighed
        those factors against the serious nature of the crime and Mr. Lee’s
        “low-level but persistent misconduct” as reﬂected in his criminal
        history. On balance, the district court varied signiﬁcantly down-
        ward and imposed a sentence well below the guideline range. We
        ﬁnd no abuse of discretion in doing so.
                                          V
               Finally, Mr. Lee—for the ﬁrst time on appeal—contends that
        his 40-month term of imprisonment, a sentence well below the
        Guidelines range, constitutes a violation of Mr. Lee’s Eighth
        Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. Speciﬁ-
        cally, Mr. Lee contends that his sentence was disproportionate to
        his crime.
                We generally review de novo the legality of a sentence under
        the Eighth Amendment; but, when a defendant fails to object in the
        district court that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, we
        review the claim for plain error. See United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                    23-10551

        1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005). Plain error requires a defendant to
        show: (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that aﬀects substantial rights;
        and (4) that seriously aﬀects the fairness, integrity, or public repu-
        tation of the judicial proceedings. Id. Generally, “[a]n error is not
        plain unless it is contrary to explicit statutory provisions or to on-
        point precedent in this Court or the Supreme Court.” United States
        v. Hoﬀman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citation and
        quotation marks omitted).
               The Eighth Amendment contains a narrow proportionality
        principle that applies to noncapital sentences. See United States v.
        Johnson, 451 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2006). “Outside the context
        of capital punishment, there are few successful challenges to the
        proportionality of sentences.” Id. This is so because we accord
        substantial deference to Congress’s broad authority to determine
        the types and limits of punishments for crimes. Id. at 1242–43.
        Consequently, a court “must make a threshold determination that
        the sentence imposed is grossly disproportionate to the oﬀense
        committed.” Id. at 1243 (quotation marks omitted). “In general, a
        sentence within the limits imposed by statute is neither excessive
        nor cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quota-
        tion marks omitted).
               Here, Mr. Lee has failed to establish any error, much less
        plain error. Nor has he established how his sentence—more than
        47 months below the low end of his guideline range—is grossly
        disproportionate to his crime under the Eighth Amendment. See
        United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1343 (11th Cir. 2014). Mr. Lee
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        23-10551              Opinion of the Court                     17

        has not pointed to a single Eleventh Circuit or Supreme Court case
        to the contrary.
                                       VI
              We aﬃrm Mr. Lee’s sentence.
              AFFIRMED.