Court Opinion

ID: 9828208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:12:48.163188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:45.894756
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Dismissing the applicability of R. S. art. 5517, by simply saying it “gives a court of equity no power to grant a temporary injunction for the forcible removal of a person in possession of property which might oome under its terms,” appellants, through their able counsel, as the major contention in their motion for rehearing, hark back to their original insistence, notwithstanding such enactment that it was legal lese majeste for them to be deprived of their claimed “continuous, peaceable, and adverse possession ,of the property in controversy for more than thirty-five years” in advance of a final trial, marshaling in support of the position an array of authorities laying down the well-settled general rule, in ordinary cases, that is thus stated by this court in San Jacinto Construction Company v. Scanlan, 300 S. W. 220, 222: “In such circumstances, the possession not having been obtained by one of the litigants from the other by force or fraud, it is never the office of a temporary injunction — pending a trial of the title to the property between rival claimants — to oust the actual possession of one and transfer it to the other, but rather to merely preserve the ■original status with reference to the possession between them until the issue of ownership has been settled. Simms v. Reisner (Tex. Civ. App.) 134 S. W. 278; Simms v. Pipe Line Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 195 S. W. par. 3, at page 288.”
As counsel urges, the quoted holding is typical of all that class of cases to which he so strongly appeals, but, to the contrary of his further view, it et id genus omne are far from resting upon the legal equivalent of the same state of facts as obtains here. In the first place, being delivered as ruling conditions occurring long before the passage of article 5517, and the city there having declared upon neither a conveyance nor a dedication of the property, it did not come within the purview of that act at all; in the second place, it w{is expressly grounded on a finding on the facts that there had been “thus disclosed a bona fide and undisposed-of dispute over the title to the strip of land involved” — in other words, that the Seanlans had shown out of their actual occupancy for many years before the passage'of this statute at least a probable, colorable, or debatable title to ithe property, together with the consequent right of possession — whereas Mrs. Coombs in this instance, having begun her obstructive use of this land both years after" it was shown to have been dedicated for street purposes and the cited statute had been in operation, by virtue of its directly inhibitory terms, had nothing that could be deemed “adverse possession,” however long she may have continued it. She was therefore not on a parity With one who has an actual appropriation of land commenced and continued for the length of the limitation period under a claim of right, inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another; rather she stood as one boldly challenging the public authority inhering in the city— her answer even admitting' that she proposed.. , to maintain her tenure 'by force, if necessary —without the possibility of ever acquiring such a bona fide claim of right, title, or possession, as this court was pronouncing upon in the Scanlan Case, since she indisputably had nothing but occupancy of what had been so dedicated as a street, and had never bought or otherwise acquired any right to any land outside of the block lines of the addition.
The rationale of the two Simms Oases, cited and relied upon for support of the Scan-lan'opinion, is the same; neither came within the purview of article 5517; but in both of them there was a like showing'on the facts that the litigant in possession had what might at least be shown upon'a ffill hearing of all the facts underlying the rival claims to amount to a right to maintain It. ■'' '•
These considerations, we hold, fundamentally distinguish all that line of cases from the one at bar. ■ ’’ ■■' ■■■ ■
Like this cause in the principle applied, however, though not involving a' public street nor otherwise arising under the statute referred to, is Hudspeth v. Gugenheim (Tex. Civ. App.) 278 S. W. 952, 953, where essentially the same state of fact in purport as here came out in a different way on preliminary hearing; that is, the legal ef- . feet of the evidence was. to negative any right of possession in Hudspeth, the actual *1070occupant of the property. The San- Antonio Court of Civil Appeals, with the approval of the Supreme Court through its refusal of a writ of error, in affirming the granting at that stage of the proceeding of both temporary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions, said:
“The general rule in ⅛⅛ state is that a mandatory injunction is not available for the purpose of dispossessing one who is in peaceable possession of land, pending an adjudication of the relative equities of those claiming the right of possession. But the rule is not so inflexible as to exclude all exceptions, for it has been relaxed so as to permit such injunctions in extreme cases of pressing necessity, and where the complaining party shows himself entitled to the interference-of a court of equity and is without ■adequate and practical remedy at law. Sumner v. Crawford, 91 Tex. 131, 41 S. W. 994.
“Under that exception, the question in cases of this character becomes one of whether or not under the peculiar facts the case is one of a clear right and a pressing necessity, in which the ousting party is entitled to relief, but is without a practical and adequate remedy at law.”
,So the rule appellants invoke, notwithstanding the seemingly unconditional form of its statement in many authorities they rely on, was clearly not promulgated as a •Procrustean bed that all instances of actual occupancy .of land by claimants must be made» to fit, irrespective of whether or not they are shown to have even a color of right to the possession thereof, hut only to cases where, under the evidence then heard, it at least prima facie appears that there is enough substance in the claim, or of probability to the asserted right, as justifies a further trial of that matter on the facts, gee, also, City of Llano v. Llano County, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 132, 23 S. W. 1008; Dozier v. Austin (Tex. Civ. App.) 253 S. W. 554, 555; Franklin County v. Huff, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 355, 95 S. W. 41; Joyce on Injunctions, vol. 2, § 1285; Miller v. Lynch, 149 Pa. 460, 24 A. 80; Galveston, H. & S. A. Railway Company v. City of Eagle-Pass (Tex. Civ. App.) 249 S. W. 268; City of Corsicana v. Zorn, 97 Tex. 317, 78 S. W. 924.
 But further insistence is made that the city had a full, complete, and adequate remedy at law in an action of trespass to try title to this claimed strip of street, wherefore the remedy by temporary injunction should have been denied.
This contention, we think, fails initially to take into account the materially different status toward each other of these litigants from that which ordinarily obtains between private individuals only concerning land unaffected with a public interest; the city here, as" the embodiment of the public authority, with all the consequent power over and responsibility for the dedicated streets within its limits, not only had the right, but the nondelegable and inescapable duty to the public, as well, to at all times open, protect against purprestures, and maintain them in usable condition as such ways. In the exercise of those high powers and duties, under the authorities last above cited, irrespective of what might be the slower and less effective remedies, if any, available at law, it undoubtedly had the affirmative right to summarily remove any such obstructions therefrom, either through the outside exercise of its police powers, or by securing a mandatory injunction from a court of equity, not being remitted to a mere action in trespass to try title, if that would have lain in these circumstances.
In Dozier v. City of Austin, supra, the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals put the matter in thi/3 way: “A city cannot recover damages arising from the obstruction of streets. It has the right to have them removed. Ap-pellee is a corporation organized by its citizens to administer their affairs, have their laws executed, protect their streets, alleys, and public grounds from trespassers and invaders of their rights, and, in seeking the aid of the courts of Texas to remove obstructions from streets and alleys placed there by trespassers and those acting in defiance of law, it does not devolve upon such corporation to allege or prove damages or that it has an adequate remedy at law for such relief. It has no such remedy at law. The only matter to be alleged or proven was the invasion of a public right. Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 1130; State v. Goodnight, 70 Tex. 682, 11 S. W. 119; Oxford v. Willoughby, 181 N. Y. 155, 73 N. E. 677; Woodbridge v. Middlesex Water Co. (N. J. Ch.) 68 A. 464. This action was brought by the guardian of the public to conserve the rights which the public have in the alley as a highway. The duty rested on the city to have the obstruction removed. Joyce on Injunctions, § 1285, and authorities cited in footnote.”
The Supreme Court dismissed that cause for want of jurisdiction, but the quoted declaration of the law is well supported by the authorities therein referred to, as well as those cited herei supra.
In this instance there were present, under the uncontroverted evidence heard, both the “pressing necessity” emphasized by the court in the Hudspeth Case, supra, in that the city had in process of construction on the portion of Tale street affected costly paving improvements, with attendant contractual obligations of magnitude, the appellants were, without a right in them of any sort, delaying and interfering with by 'maintaining their obstructions through threats and force, and the “invasion of a public right” deemed in *1071the Dozier Case, supra, to be the sole material consideration,, in that a dedicated street ■of the city of Houston was being encroached upon to the extent of obliteration.
’ After the most painstaking reconsideration of the cause, we must revert to our original conclusion that the determining issue was whether or not a dedication of the street had •been effected prior to the inception of appellants’ claim. That having been determined adversely to them, it cannot be held that the learned trial court abused a sound discretion in issuing the writ they inveigh against.
The motion for rehearing has accordingly been overruled.
Overruled.