Court Opinion

ID: 9746296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:11:22.886345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:11.601255
License: Public Domain

JONES, P. J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I would reverse the finding that appellant committed a battery on a police officer (Pen. Code,1 § 243, subd. (b)) and violated section 148, subdivision (a)(1) (resisting arrest). In my view, there is insufficient evidence that Officer Robert Salas was acting lawfully at the time of the offense. Specifically, there were insufficient facts to justify detaining appellant. However, even if appellant’s detention was unlawful, he may be guilty of a simple battery, as the majority explains, where sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that Officer Salas did not use excessive force in effectuating the detention. I concur in this analysis. I also concur with my colleagues’ analysis, contained in the unpublished portion of the majority opinion, of appellant’s challenge to the gang-related conditions of his probation.
*991I.

Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity

a. Specific Penal and Education Code Violations
The majority finds the detention of appellant lawful by characterizing it as “analogous to an ‘administrative search’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 987, fn. 6) and therefore a permissible intrusion to foster the goal of deterring criminal conduct on school property. Additionally, the majority concludes appellant’s detention was justified under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 987, fn. 6.) I cannot subscribe to either conclusion.
The stated purpose of the statutes requiring outsiders to register during school hours (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 982-983) is to safeguard school personnel and property against criminal activity by outsiders (§ 627). Had the Legislature believed a longer registration period was appropriate to effectuate the statute’s purpose, it presumably would have defined “school hours” differently.
On this record there is no evidence to draw a reasonable inference that appellant was violating section 627.2 or section 627.7 when Salas saw him on the middle school campus. Salas testified that the middle school “gets out,” i.e., “the bell rings, and all the students start leaving the school and leaving the campus” at 1:40 p.m. However, Salas did not see appellant until sometime between 3:00 p.m. and 3:10 p.m., more than 20 minutes after the conclusion of statutory “school hours” at this middle school. Although Salas testified that “other activities” occur between 1:40 p.m. and shortly after 3:00 p.m., there was no evidence that “other activities” included a continuation of classes. Furthermore, Salas knew that classes at appellant’s high school end at 2:40 p.m., and appellant testified that he was on the middle school grounds at approximately 3:00 p.m., “on [his] way home ... out of school . . . [high] school was over.” The reasonable inference from appellant’s testimony is that he left his school when classes ended at 2:40 p.m., and there is no evidence to the contrary. Under these facts, there can be no reasonable inference that appellant was on the middle school grounds before 2:40 p.m., i.e., during middle school “school hours.”
Additionally, Salas and appellant both testified that appellant was in the parking lot at the school’s perimeter walking in a direction to leave the school grounds when Salas confronted him, which was within two minutes of appellant’s encounter with Fink. Thus, even though by statute appellant *992was not required to register to be on the school grounds at that hour, he was promptly complying with instructions to leave the school grounds. Taking this factual scenario as a whole, Salas lacked an objectively reasonable basis to detain appellant on suspicion of violating the pertinent statutes that forbid nonstudents from being on a school campus. during school hours without registering or refusing to leave the campus when requested to do so by the appropriate authority.
Nor was there evidence that appellant’s conduct violated section 626.7 or 626.8. Under section 626.7, a designated school officer, like Salas, may direct a person who is not a student or employee at the school to leave the campus if “it reasonably appears” to the designated officer that the person is committing any act likely to interfere with the peaceful conduct of the activities of the campus, or has entered the campus for the purpose of committing any such act. As construed in the identical statute governing public colleges and universities (§ 626.7), “reasonably appears” infuses into the statute “ ‘. . . the objective standard of a reasonable man having to have “reasonable cause to believe” that an act interfering with the peaceful conduct of the institution’s activities is being committed. [H] . . . The criterion is not what subjectively appears reasonable to the [officer] whose decision is in question, but what would appear to a reasonable man in the [officer’s] situation to be reasonable. . . . Therefore, [the statute protects] against ouster upon the personal whim or arbitrary judgment of [an officer] charged with maintenance of order on a campus . . . .’” (.People v. Agnello (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 785, 791-792 [66 Cal.Rptr. 571].)
Under section 626.8, a nonstudent who enters any school grounds without lawful business thereon, and “whose presence or acts interfere with the peaceful conduct of the activities of the school or disrupt the school or its pupils or school activities” is guilty of a misdemeanor if he remains on the grounds after being asked to leave by a designated school officer. For purposes of section 626.8, “lawful business” is defined as “a reason for being present upon school property which is not otherwise prohibited by” statute, ordinance, or by any regulation adopted pursuant to statute or ordinance. (§ 626.8, subd. (c)(2).)
Nothing on this record implies appellant was on the middle school campus to interfere with the peaceful conduct of campus activities. When first seen by Salas and John Fink, appellant and his friend Raymond G. were in an exterior area of the campus, and when Salas reached them several minutes later, they were in the parking lot walking away from the campus. There was no evidence that either appellant or Raymond was creating a disturbance or was known to have created previous disturbances on the campus, e.g., by *993disrupting a sporting event, harassing younger children, playing music at extreme volume, or by more troubling conduct such as vandalizing school property, possessing or distributing contraband, or brandishing a weapon.
Furthermore, there was no evidence appellant lacked lawful business on the middle school campus, i.e., that his mere presence thereon violated a law. Education Code section 32211, the parallel statute to section 627.7 making a nonstudent’s failure to register during school hours a misdemeanor, provides that nothing therein “shall be construed as preempting any ordinance of any city, county, or city or county.” (Ed. Code, § 32211, subd. (g).) However, there was no evidence that the City of Fairfield or Solano County enacted an ordinance that extended section 627.1, subdivision (c)’s definition of school hours to a time later than one hour after classes end or any other ordinance restricting the presence of nonstudents on middle school campuses generally or the particular areas of this campus where Fink and Salas saw appellant.2
b. Reasonable Mistake of Law
Appellant’s detention cannot be justified by the fact that Salas mistakenly believed a nonstudent was required to register even when “school hours” were concluded. “Courts on strong policy grounds have generally refused to excuse a police officer’s mistake of law. [Citation.]” {People v. Teresinski (1982) 30 Cal.3d 822, 831 [180 Cal.Rptr. 617, 640 P.2d 753].) Teresinski stated that finding the officer’s mistake of law reasonable under the circumstances “would provide a strong incentive to police officers to remain ignorant of the language of the laws that they enforce . . . .” (Id. at p. 832.)
Detentions based on a mistake of law have been upheld, but only when the detaining officer’s misunderstanding of the law was objectively reasonable. {People v. Glick (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 796, 802 [250 Cal.Rptr. 315] {Glick) [mistaken interpretation of New Jersey vehicle registration laws reasonable]; People v. Lopez (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 93, 101 [242 Cal.Rptr. 668] [mistaken interpretation of California open container laws unreasonable]; In re Arthur J. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 781, 787 [238 Cal.Rptr. 523] [mistaken understanding of local curfew ordinance unreasonable].)
In Glick, a six-year veteran officer detained a car on the grounds its New Jersey license plates did not display registration tags because he believed *994New Jersey, like California, required registration stickers. The officer had previously stopped at least 75 out-of-state cars from nine states for faulty registration, every one of which required registration stickers on license plates. (Glick, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 799, 803.) New Jersey did not require such stickers. We concluded the officer’s mistake of law was reasonable: an officer cannot realistically be expected to know the registration laws of all 50 states; proportionally few New Jersey vehicles visit California; this officer had never before encountered a New Jersey vehicle; and in his experience the statutes of other states comport with California’s. We noted, however, that a different outcome might be required were the vehicle from a contiguous state or if that state’s motorists routinely drove on California roads, e.g., a highway patrol officer posted in the Lake Tahoe area would reasonably be expected to be familiar with Nevada registration laws. (Id. at pp. 803-804.)
Salas’s position is akin to Glick’s hypothetical Tahoe highway patrol officer. As the liaison officer between the police department and the district, he would be expected to have particular familiarity with the statutes governing activities on school premises. Under the circumstances, his mistake of law was not reasonable.
c. Nonspecific Criminal Activity
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119 [120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570] (Wardlow) does not support the People’s argument that appellant’s flight, confrontational behavior, and lack of cooperation provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In Wardlow, a four-police-car caravan converged in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. An officer in the fourth car observed the defendant standing next to a building holding an opaque bag. The defendant looked in the officer’s direction, then ran through a gangway and alley. The officer, in his car, eventually cornered the defendant on the street, exited his car, detained the defendant, and found a handgun and ammunition during a patdown. (Id. at pp. 122-123 [120 S.Ct. at pp. 675-676] .) Wardlow concluded that, although “flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity,” the officer was justified in suspecting defendant’s involvement in criminal activity based on the entire context of his “unprovoked” “headlong” flight. (Id. at pp. 125, 126. [120 S.Ct. at pp. 676, 677] .)
The instant facts are significantly distinguishable. Appellant was not in a high crime area, there was no evidence he was holding an object that could have contained contraband, and he did not immediately bolt down an alley *995away from Salas when Salas first called to him. He simply continued walking in the direction he was already proceeding. If these facts were sufficient to constitute a “flight” that reasonably justified a stop, the “temporary detention of anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer” would be justified, which is not Wardlow's holding. (Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 126 [120 S.Ct. at p. 677] (cone. opn. of Stevens, J.).) As Wardlow observed, when an officer, without reasonable suspicion, approaches an individual, the individual has the right to ignore the police and go about his business. “[A]ny ‘refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 125 [120 S.Ct. at p. 676].) Moreover, there was no evidence that assistant principal Fink communicated to Salas any suspicion of unlawful conduct by appellant other than a possible trespass. As discussed, there was no evidence on this record of a trespass because there was no evidence of a local ordinance or rule forbidding nonstudents on the school’s premises after school hours.
Without evidence that Salas had an objective basis to detain appellant, there was insufficient evidence he was acting lawfully in the performance of his duties. Therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that appellant violated section 243, subdivision (b) or section 148, subdivision (a)(1). The only possible valid finding is that appellant committed simple battery (§ 243, subd. (a); People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 355-356 [74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33]; Evans v. City of Bakersfield (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 321, 331 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 406]; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166 [161 Cal.Rptr. 541]).
II.

Regulatory Scheme Based on Public Safety

The majority’s reliance on the cited provisions in our state Constitution, Education Code and Penal Code do not, in my view, trump Fourth Amendment protections by creating a broad “special needs” administrative search and seizure exception at public schools to justify an otherwise unlawful unconsented-to investigative stop of this one visitor. Administrative “special needs” stops or searches have been upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge without individualized suspicion where the primary purpose of the procedure is to promote public safety by deterring conduct potentially injurious to persons and property. (See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 *996Cal.3d 1321, 1327-1328, 1331 [241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299] (Ingersoll); but see City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) 531 U.S. 32 [121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333] [suspicionless vehicle stops do not pass Fourth Amendment muster when they are conducted as part of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is not to reduce the immediate hazard posed by dangerous drivers, but to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing].) Such stops are based on a regulatory plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers, which is necessitated because a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable to prevent or deter the dangerous conduct. (People v. Banks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 926, 936 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 524, 863 P.2d 769], citing Ingersoll, supra, at p. 1329; Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 51 [99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640-2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357].) The reasonableness of the special needs administrative stop, for purposes of Fourth Amendment compliance, is assessed by applying a balancing test that weighs the gravity of the governmental interest or public concern served and the degree to which the regulatory plan advances that concern against the intrusiveness of the interference with individual liberty. (Ingersoll, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1338.) Hence, sobriety checkpoints to prevent drunk driving, where motorists are randomly stopped according to a neutral formula, such as every fifth driver, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. (See People v. Banks, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 936.) Nor, in order to protect school personnel, does subjecting all students who are late for class to a weapons search with a hand-held metal detector (see In re Latasha W. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1527 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 886]) or, in order to prevent hijacking, does requiring all airplane passengers to pass through a magnetometer (see People v. Hyde (1974) 12 Cal.3d 158, 166 [115 Cal.Rptr. 358, 524 P.2d 830]). In this case, there is no evidence of the adoption of a school district or campus-wide stop and/or search scheme based on predetermined specified neutral criteria beyond those in effect under the aforementioned provisions of the Penal and Education Codes. No witness articulated a concern for, or problem with, after-class-hours security or safety on the school premises so great as to justify this detention in the absence of an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
Implicit in the majority’s weighing of the “risk [of] appellant escaping [Salas’s query]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 985) is a presumption that Salas had a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. He did not, because the fact giving rise to Salas’s stop—“[knowing] Fink’s encounter with appellant was not satisfactory to Fink”—was insufficient to initiate an investigative stop under In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 [148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957]. As offensive as appellant’s subsequent disrespectful outburst of profanity may have been, it does not elevate the existing circumstances into a *997reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Accordingly, I would reverse the findings on the section 243, subdivision (b) and section 148, subdivision (a)(1) charges.
On January 12, 2001, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 11, 2001. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Unless otherwise indicated, all further section references are to the Penal Code.

 New Jersey v. T. L. O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325 [105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720] (maj. opn., ante, at p. 985, fn. 5) is factually inapposite. T. L. O. concerned the search of the purse of a student discovered smoking in the school lavatory in violation of a school rule.