Court Opinion

ID: 9585612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:02:14.101735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:42.452957
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe the majority has misread and misapplied this *510court’s decision in Southern Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 131 Ga. App. 761 (206 SE2d 672), and has infringed upon the function of the trial judge as finder of fact in a bench trial, I must respectfully dissent from the reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
The majority opinion accurately has set forth the undisputed facts giving rise to this lawsuit and the general legal principles governing interpretation of provisions in insurance policies. However, the majority then concludes that the holding in Duncan, supra, mandates reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
A close review of Duncan will demonstrate what I perceive to be the basic error in the majority’s analysis in this case. In Duncan, the trial court found that the activity involved therein was not a “business pursuit” within the terms of the homeowner’s policy involved in that case. This finding was amply supported by the evidence, and could not have been overturned on appeal. “Whether an activity is a business pursuit is almost always a factual question presented for the determination by a court.” (Emphasis supplied.) Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice (Berdal ed.), § 4501.10, p. 273. “Findings of fact made by a trial court in non-jury cases are given the same weight as a verdict in jury cases, and will not be set aside on appeal unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous or wholly unsupported by the evidence.” Hanna Creative Enterprises v. Alterman Foods, 156 Ga. App. 376-377 (274 SE2d 761); OCGA § 9-11-52.
Unlike Duncan, the present case involves an appeal from the trial court’s finding that the activity involved herein did fall within the “business pursuits” exclusion contained in the subject homeowner’s policy. As in Duncan, the finding by the trial court in this case is amply supported by the evidence. The record shows without question that the appellant was a professional, licensed realtor, and has for many years earned his living dealing in real estate. He not only acted as a broker handling property owned by others, but he also has a history of buying, selling, and developing land in his own right. The record reveals at least four instances in which appellant has bought, developed, and sold land of his own. Furthermore, appellant admitted to purchasing the subject property with his father-in-law as a commercial or investment venture. Perhaps most importantly, appellant was engaged in improving the property when the subject accident occurred. In view of these facts, the judgment of the trial court is amply supported by the evidence and should be affirmed.
The majority appears to limit, as a matter of law, the application of the “business pursuits” exclusion in homeowners’ policies to those activities involving the policyholder’s principal business. I do not believe that this conclusion can be supported. “The business need not be the sole occupation and part-time business activities are excluded under comprehensive personal liability policies [homeowners].” Ap*511pieman, supra, pp. 271-272. As the majority opinion notes, Webster’s New International Dictionary (3d ed.) defines “business” in part as “[2]: A commercial or industrial enterprise. . . .[4]: Transactions, dealings or intercourse of any nature . . . but now especially economic. . . Under any “usual” or “normal” understanding of the term “business pursuit,” that term clearly encompasses all commercial activities engaged in by the insured, whether or not those activities relate to the insured’s principal business or occupation.
Duncan does not compel a different result. There was ample evidence for the trial court in that case to conclude that the activity involved therein, while potentially income-producing, was nothing more than a “hobby” to the insured. While the evidence in the present case might support a finding by the trial court that the insured was engaged in a non-business pursuit, it clearly does not mandate such a result. Nevertheless, by reversing the trial court’s judgment, the majority necessarily has limited the application of the “business pursuit” exclusion to the policyholder’s principal occupation. This is an unsupportable limitation upon that exclusion.
Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from the judgment. I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Quillian, Judge Sognier, and Judge Pope concur in this dissent.