Court Opinion

ID: 9762367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:21:11.179303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:33.809896
License: Public Domain

PRYOR, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
This case requires us to consider again, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the balance between the right against self-incrimination and society’s interest in law enforcement. The specific question in this instance is whether appellant’s statement, after initially electing to remain silent, was the consequence of interrogation or the equivalent thereof.
I
Appellant, a member of the armed forces stationed at Fort Myer, Virginia, was the subject of an arrest warrant issued in this jurisdiction. He was arrested by a military policeman, warned of his right to remain silent and to consult counsel, and transferred to the custody of Arlington County police authorities. The latter also advised him of his right not to answer questions. The next day, two detectives from the Metropolitan Police Department arrived at the Arlington County Jail; they apprised appellant of the nature of the charges against him and repeated the Miranda warnings. Appellant indicated that he would make no statement but “was curious as to how [the police] got his name for the arrest.” This inquiry was answered generally. In the course of the next few hours, appellant was transported to the District’s Homicide Office, again advised of his rights, photographed and prepared for court. En route to the Superior Court, appellant “asked us again about the evidence that implicated him in the murder. . . . ” Whereas previous reference had been to an unnamed witness, the officers then disclosed the name of a particular witness, having in mind, that the information might cause the subject to change his mind and give a statement.
Upon hearing the name of the person who implicated him, appellant indicated that he wished to state his version of the incident. After returning to police headquarters, and being apprised that any statement could be used against him, appellant gave a written statement which was used against him at trial.
II
We start with the premise that when a suspect to a crime asserts the right to remain silent, that decision must be scrupu*31lously honored and such a person, without more, may not be interrogated against his will. A brief summary of the Supreme Court’s decisions in this regard is helpful.
In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), Mosley, a robbery suspect, was arrested and warned of his right to remain silent; he chose not to answer questions. Some hours later, a homicide detective learned that he was in custody and sought to question him about an unrelated murder. After being advised of his rights by the second detective, Mosley acknowledged that he understood but nonetheless gave a statement.
In upholding the prosecution’s use of the statement at trial, the Court observed that a suspect’s initial decision not to answer questions does not create a per se proscription against all further questioning. The decision not to answer questions must be scrupulously honored but that circumstance may change:
* * * * * *
Although a recently arrested individual may have indicated a desire not to answer questions, he would nonetheless want to know immediately — if it were true — that his ability to explain a particular incriminating fact or to supply an alibi for a particular time period would result in his immediate release. Similarly, he might wish to know — if it were true — that (1) the case against him was unusually strong and that (2) his immediate cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension and conviction of others or in the recovery of property would redound to his benefit in the form of a reduced charge. Certainly the individual’s lawyer, if he had one, would be interested in such information, even if communication of such information followed closely on an assertion of the “right to silence.” Where the individual has not requested counsel and has chosen instead to make his own decisions regarding his conversations with the authorities, he should not be deprived even temporarily of the information relevant to the decision. [Id at 109 n.l, 96 S.Ct. at 329 n.l; (White, J., concurring).]
In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), Williams, a suspect in the death of a young girl, was taken into custody in Davenport, Iowa. After receiving the Miranda warnings, he appeared in court and was advised by counsel to remain silent. By arrangement with the police, it was agreed that Williams would be transported by automobile to Des Moines but would not be interrogated by the escorting officers. During the two and one-half hour ride, one of the officers, a Detective Learning, spoke to Williams in a manner that has been described as the “Christian burial speech.” 1 At a later point, Williams directed the officers to the body of the girl.
In deciding the case, the Court was explicit in ruling that it was reversing the conviction because of the violation of the right to counsel rather than on Miranda grounds.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), Innis was arrested at an early hour in the morning on the streets of Providence in connection with the shotgun death of a taxicab driver. After being warned of his rights by three different officers of ascending rank, he was placed in a transport vehicle. As the vehi*32cle was driven to the police station, there was conversation among the three officers — within hearing of the suspect — to the effect that an abandoned shotgun would pose a considerable threat to school children.2 Innis interrupted, and directed the officers to the weapon.
Applying the previously declared standards, the Court held that the suspect had not been interrogated and that the statements were admissible evidence against him.
Finally, in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), Edwards was arrested for a robbery culminating in a death. After being warned of his rights, he discussed the possibility of a “deal” but ultimately decided that he wanted a lawyer to accomplish this for him. The conversation ended; but the next morning Edwards was told that he was required to see two other officers who had come to the jail especially to see him. After a new Miranda warning, a taped statement of an accomplice implicating Edwards was played. Upon hearing it, Edwards made a statement but declined to have it recorded. The statement was used at trial.
In reversing the conviction, it was held that, under the circumstances presented, the accused had not waived his right to counsel and therefore should not have been questioned a second time by the police.
Returning to this case, the critical inquiry, I think, is whether appellant’s statement was the consequence of direct questioning or of an impermissible equivalent of interrogation. In light of the decisions just reviewed, the argument advanced by appellant causes me to pause. Essentially, appellant contends that because the police answered appellant’s questions in a piecemeal, increasingly specific manner, with the hope that this approach would induce a statement from him, that such conduct was the “functional equivalent of interrogation.”
Certainly an emotional and lengthy statement directed to a suspect in custody, as in Brewer v. Williams, supra, can rightly be reviewed as “interrogation” which is viola-tive of the expressed right of the accused to remain silent. Similarly, the initiation and insistent questioning of an arrestee who has declined to answer questions, is improper. See Edwards, supra. Significantly, the cross-talk among officers respecting the missing weapon in Innis clearly bore the police hope that the suspect would reconsider his decision to be silent and respond in some way. Notwithstanding this factor, the Court did not hold the police statements to be the functional equivalent of interrogation.
Appellant’s argument in this case must mean that, after having had numerous warnings about the right to remain silent, the failure of the police to answer appellant’s questions in an immediate and exhaustive fashion, was, in itself, an impermissible form of interrogation.3
In my view, appellant has not shown that he was “interrogated” in this instance or *33coerced into giving a statement.4 The holding which he seeks would, I think, be tantamount to a per se rule which both the
Supreme Court and this court have previously rejected.
Accordingly, I dissent.

. I want to give you something to think about while we’re traveling down the road. ... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it’s raining, it’s sleeting, it’s freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it’s going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl’s body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all. [Id. at 392-93, 97 S.Ct. at 1236-37].

. One of the officers testified:
At this point, I was talking back and forth with Patrolman McKenna stating that I frequent this area while on patrol and [that because a school for handicapped children is located nearby,] there’s a lot of handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves. [Id. at 294-95, 100 S.Ct. at 1686-87],

. Appellant understandably places some reliance on our decision in United States v. Alexander, D.C.App., 428 A.2d 42 (1981). There a suspect in a homicide investigation who was advised of her rights, indicated that she did not wish to answer questions without first having the advice of a lawyer. A few minutes later, the same detective, who had earlier given the Miranda warnings, stated, “we know what happened” or “we know you are responsible for the stabbing.” Still later, the officer advised the arrestee that he would need certain routine information from her in order to transfer her to the jail. She, thereupon, without further warnings, began to relate her version of the events which had occurred.
Concluding that the proffered statement was inadmissible, we emphasized that appellant had asserted the right to consult with counsel, but that the officer had nonetheless initiated a further discussion of the case and, without any new warnings, obtained an incriminating statement. That analysis, in my view, is not persuasive, under the circumstances of this case.

. The trial judge specifically found that appellant “was able to and did in fact freely and voluntarily waive his rights in ... giving a statement.”