Court Opinion

ID: 9662880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:20:50.033887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:43.468103
License: Public Domain

Otis H. Turner, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The plain and unambiguous wording of the Statute of Limitations relating to actions for medical malpractice begins to run from the date of the wrongful act complained of and at no other time. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-203(b) (1987). It is unclear from a reading of the majority opinion that any recovery by the appellant would be limited to damages incurred as a result of acts of medical malpractice occurring within the two-year period of limitations, whether those acts be considered ones of commission or omission. This appears to be the holding of the majority in its recognition that “the plaintiff’s complaint did not allege negligence in the performance of the surgery,” an event that occurred outside the period of limitations. To that extent, I concur. I dissent from any part of the majority opinion which might be construed to permit any recovery for acts or omissions that occur more than two years prior to commencement of the action, whether such recovery is based upon a theory of “continuing treatment,” or “relation back,” or any other similar theory. Under the statute, no recovery is permitted for any malpractice or resulting damages that occur outside the statutory period. Dudley, J., joins.