Court Opinion

ID: 9487654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:23:20.979455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:25.177269
License: Public Domain

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Because of the constraints imposed upon the federal courts in their exercise of jurisdiction under 22 U.S.C. § 2254, I concur. I do so with great reluctance, however, because I believe that Sheldon Levine’s due process rights were violated during his sentencing.
Recognizing that sentencing must satisfy the requirements of due process, see Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d 974, 977 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809, 110 S.Ct. 50, 107 L.Ed.2d 19 (1989), and People v. Outley, 80 N.Y.2d 702, 712, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683, 610 N.E.2d 356 (1993), the New York courts emphasize the importance of explaining to defendants the sentencing exposure that will follow their guilty pleas. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 187 A.D.2d 532, 589 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1992) (mem.); People v. Molesse, 162 A.D.2d 629, 557 N.Y.S.2d 387 (mem.), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 988, 563 N.Y.S.2d 777, 565 N.E.2d 526; People v. Gibbs, 161 A.D.2d 661, 662-63, 555 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1990) (mem.). If the trial judge in the instant ease intended that, upon Levine’s breach of the stated conditions the court could impose whatever sentence it *128wished, it should have said so. See, e.g., Outley, supra, 80 N.Y.2d at 715, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683, 610 N.E.2d 356, where the trial court said:
If you violate any of the above conditions, the Court will not be bound by the promise to you and [may] sentence you to whatever sentence [it feels] is justified. Do you understand that?
In People v. Black, 187 A.D.2d 517, 589 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1992) (mem.), the court said:
The defendant argues, and the People concede, that the court erred in unilaterally imposing an enhanced sentence without having previously warned the defendant during the plea allocution that such a consequence could result upon his failure to abide by the plea conditions.
Id. at 518, 589 N.Y.S.2d 911 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the only discussion in the plea allocution about possible alternative sentences refers to sentencing following a trial. In the Assistant Attorney General’s letter of January 14, 1991 to Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals, counsel quoted the following statement of Levine’s then attorney Thomas Puccio in support of her contention that Levine understood the sentencing alternative:
Mr. Puccio: He’s been advised of the máximums, both the state and federal proceedings. And they could be consecutive not concurrent. And there are no promises if this plea is rejected.
Counsel refers to the same quotation at page 17 of the Commissioner’s brief on this appeal. As is demonstrable from a more complete transcript of the allocution, the quoted statement of attorney Puccio was taken out of context and therefore is misleading. The sentencing court’s statement that immediately preceded Mr. Puccio’s reads as follows:
The COURT: — Mr. Puccio, have you advised your client — and I’m really addressing each attorney, because I’ll ask each of you respectively; I want an expression from your clients — in the event this matter proceeds to trial, that the promise made by the Court at that conference will be withdrawn and the Court will not be bound, in event of a conviction, will not be bound by any of the promises made. And that I specifically ask each attorney, have you advised your clients as to the possible exposure in the event of a conviction with regard to whether or not they would be concurrent with any possible federal imprisonment and also whether or not you have advised each client, because there are concurrent matters, of their exposure in the event of a trial and a subsequent conviction. (emphasis supplied)
There is a substantial difference between a sentence conditioned upon a jury’s finding of guilt and a sentence imposed by an apparently irate judge following a defendant’s failure to abide by a plea agreement. The sentencing judge should have made clear his intentions and then given the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea. See Stewart v. Scully, 925 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir.1991). The court’s failure to do either was exacerbated by his completing the sentencing of the defendant after he had ordered the defendant removed from the courtroom.
I regret, therefore, that the deference we owe the New York courts prevent us from granting the writ requested herein.