Court Opinion

ID: 9777193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:01:57.391442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:49.952522
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
While there is a great deal in the opinion of the Court with which I cannot agree, I would be content simply to dissent but for the majority’s overruling the second ground of error on a theory that evidence revealing the extraneous robbery offense is “relevant as rehabilitation evidence for the testimony of Kevin Long.” If there is authority for that proposition, it ought to be cited.
When Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), speaks of “relevance to *40a material issue the State must prove” in a circumstantial evidence case, id., at 346, it and the cases cited make clear that “issue” means such matters as motive, intent and design, Etchieson v. State, 574 S.W.2d 753, 760 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) and Mulchahey v. State, 574 S.W.2d 112, 117 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), or identity, Jones v. State, 568 S.W.2d 847, 858 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).1
Just as clearly, in Caldwell v. State, 477 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), the Court rejected the theory advanced by the majority opinion in this cause, viz:
“To hold that the cross-examination of this [complainant] would permit the introduction of an extraneous offense would be tantamount to holding that such testimony would be admissible in any case where defendant’s counsel exercised the constitutional right of cross-examination. This is not and should not be the law.” [Emphasis added]
Accordingly, I dissent.
TEAGUE, J., joins.

. While some opinions have drawn a distinction between cases proved by direct evidence and those proved by circumstantial evidence, based on what seems to be simply loose language in Etchieson and Mulchahey, supra, as well of the formulation in Jones, supra, just recently in Morgan v. State, 692 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985), the Court pointed out, “There is no conceptual necessity to differentiate between circumstantial and direct evidence in determining the admissibility of extraneous acts of misconduct,” id., at 879-880, n. 2.