Court Opinion

ID: 9697547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:20:39.395108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:33.570497
License: Public Domain

*574Dissenting Opinion by
Van der Voort, J.:
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the Majority. The appellant pleaded guilty on April 11, 1978 to charges of forgery and fraudulent pretenses and was sentenced to five years probation. Just 13 days after his release he was arrested for assault and battery on a Philadelphia policeman, resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. By way of a plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to assault and battery in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on October 25, 1973 and was sentenced to 6 months supervised probation. Appellant then failed to report to the State Probation and Parole Office which was unable to locate him until March 7, 1974, when it was discovered that he was in the Federal Probation Office in Philadelphia.1 Defendant was returned to Montgomery County (where he had entered his plea on April 11, 1973), on August 4, 1974 where he was given a hearing for violation of his probation. After the hearing his probation was revoked and he was then sentenced to not less than 2nor more than 5 years in the State Correctional System.
Appellant now claims that he must be given another revocation hearing because he was not given written notice of what his violation of parole was. The Majority hold that on the strength of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed.2d 656 (1973), he must have such rehearing. I do not believe that either of these cases requires a rehearing in circumstances such as there are in the instant case. First of all, in both of these leading Supreme Court cases the appellants had no hearing at all, and in neither case was there any conviction. Each case established minimum procedures in cases of charges of violation of probation or parole.
*575Gagnon v. Scarpelli (supra) established the requirement for two hearings in the event of a violation of probation or parole: a Gagnon I hearing, as we have called it, for the purpose of determining probable cause to detain the accused on a violation, and if probable cause exists, a Gagnon II hearing, as we have called it, to determine whether or not there has been a violation, and if so, what action should be taken because of it. In this case the detention of the appellant took place after he had been convicted of a new crime while on probation. This conviction eliminated the necessity and reason for any Gagnon I hearing.
As to notice to the appellant of what his violation was, he had pleaded guilty in open court in the Court of Common Pleas to a new criminal offense. What clearer, or more impressive, notice could be given him? Certainly there was a written Bill of Indictment to which he pled guilty. I can’t conceive of the Supreme Court wanting to require any notice of violation of his parole in addition to the proceedings in open court, wherein appellant acknowledged his guilt of a new crime.
The commission of a new crime is a reasonable ground for revoking parole under Pennsylvania standards. Hence, my dissent.

. Appellant had pled guilty on March 3, 1973, to interstate transportation of forged securities and as a result was placed under supervised probation for a period of five years.