Court Opinion

ID: 9403257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 19:04:06.149965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:05.402465
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/20/23 P. v. Drawn CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

    THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A166794
    v.
    ROBERT DRAWN,                                                       (Alameda County
                                                                        Case No. 173278)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Robert Drawn appeals an order denying his petition for resentencing
under former Penal Code section 1170.95,1 now section 1172.6.2 We affirm.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In October 2015, a jury convicted Drawn of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) for shooting Waleed Wheatfall, attempted murder (§§ 664/187,
subd. (d)) in connection with the shooting of K. Robinson, and other charges.
The jury also found true enhancements for personal use and discharge of a
firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subds. (c), (d)). Drawn was
sentenced to decades in prison, but the exact length of his sentence is not

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2     Section 1170.95 of the Penal Code was renumbered as section 1172.6
without change in the text, effective June 30, 2022 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).
For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the provision by its new numbering.

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clear from the record provided.3 Drawn appealed, and this court corrected
two sentencing errors but otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People v. Drawn
(May 30, 2017, A147250) [nonpub. opn.].)
      In February 2022, Drawn filed a form petition for resentencing. The
petition alleged he had been charged under a theory of felony murder,
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine; he was convicted of murder or attempted
murder following a trial; and he could not now be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189 effective
January 1, 2019. The trial court appointed counsel and directed the parties
to file briefs addressing whether Drawn made a prima facie showing of his
entitlement to relief under section 1172.6. The People opposed the
resentencing petition and submitted copies of the court’s instructions to the
jury and the jury’s verdict forms. Drawn filed a reply which included the
information setting forth the charges against him.
      Following a hearing, the trial court denied the resentencing petition.
The court explained: “I do find that based on a review of the jury
instructions . . . it appears to me that the types of instructions that had to be
given as a prerequisite to relief under 1172.6, that being some sort of

3     Drawn was initially sentenced to 84 years-to-life. (People v. Drawn
(May 30, 2017, A147250) [nonpub. opn.].) We made corrections to that
sentence, but those corrections applied only to the terms that ran concurrent
to the sentences for the murder and attempted murder convictions. (Ibid.)
The CR-292 abstract of judgment in the record, dated December 15, 2022 –
the only one in the record – refers only to the indeterminate sentence for his
murder conviction, and appellate counsel’s brief states that Drawn was
sentenced to 50-years-to life.

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vicarious liability or·imputed . . . malice instruction, specifically having in
mind aiding and abetting and felony murder instructions, something in that
range. No such instructions were given. For that reason, I find that no
prima facie case has been made.” Drawn appealed.
      Drawn’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under the authority of
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) which raised no
specific contentions on appeal but suggested we conduct an independent
review of the record at our own discretion in the interests of justice. Relying
on Delgadillo, we informed Drawn of his right to file a supplemental letter or
brief raising any issues he chose to call to our attention. We also informed
him that his appeal could be dismissed as abandoned if he did not file a
timely supplemental brief.
      Drawn filed a supplemental brief which attached and incorporated by
reference the reply brief he filed in the trial court.4 We address his
arguments below.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437) “ ‘amend[ed]
the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842
(Gentile), superseded in other part by statute, as stated in People v. Birdsall
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 866, fn. 19.) The Legislature accomplished this in

4    Drawn captioned his brief “Request for Leave to File Supplemental
Opening Brief” and requested we grant him leave to file it. As no request
was needed, the brief was filed and we have considered it.

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part by substantively amending sections 188 and 189. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
      Section 188, which defines malice, now provides in part: “Except as
stated in subdivision (e) of [s]ection 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a
principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
      Section 189, subdivision (e), now limits the circumstances under which
a person may be convicted of felony murder: “A participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a)
[defining first degree murder] in which a death occurs is liable for murder
only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.
[¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection
190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
      Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (SB 775) expanded
eligibility for resentencing relief. (People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
377, 388.) Those eligible for relief now include persons charged and/or
convicted of attempted murder under a theory of felony murder or the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Porter
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 644, 650, 651–652 [observing SB 775 amended section
1172.6 to “ ‘[c]larif[y] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder
or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and]

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probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those
persons convicted of murder under the same theories’ ”].)
      SB 1437 also created a procedure for offenders previously convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to seek retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted of
murder under the new law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 843; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708 (Strong).) “[T]he process begins with the filing of a petition
containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met
[citation], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to . . . [s]ection 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (Strong, at p. 708.) “When the trial court
receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and other required
information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition
and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible
for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (Ibid.)
      In assessing whether a prima facie showing was made, the court “ ‘can
and should make use of the record of conviction.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971.) That record includes jury instructions. (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 546–548; People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 204–
206.) It also includes verdict forms. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 59.) The prima facie inquiry is limited. The court takes the petition’s
factual allegations as true and preliminarily assesses whether, if proven, they
would entitle the petitioner to relief. But if the record of conviction, including
the court’s own documents, establishes facts conclusively refuting the

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petition’s allegations, the court need not treat them as true. (Lewis, supra, at
p. 971.)
      Under Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, if a no-issues brief is filed in a
section 1172.6 appeal and the defendant then “files a supplemental brief or
letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments
presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Id. at p. 232.) We
are not required to conduct “an independent review of the entire record to
identify unraised issues” but may do so at our discretion. (Ibid. [“While it is
wholly within the court’s discretion, the Court of Appeal is not barred from
conducting its own independent review of the record in any individual section
1172.6 appeal.”])
      In his supplemental brief, Drawn asserts “that because there is no
special verdict reflecting which theory the jury based its finding of guilt upon,
and the jury was not instructed that it must unanimously agree regarding
the theory of liability for murder, there is no way to ascertain whether the
jury relied on the invalid theory of first degree murder.” He adds that “the
standard for evaluating ‘alternative theory error’ of this sort is that the error
must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” citing Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.
      As an initial matter, Drawn cites no authority to support his argument
that the absence of a special verdict and unanimity instruction prevents us
from ascertaining whether the jury relied on an invalid theory of first degree
murder. “ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of
authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the
court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.’ ” (People v.
Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Accordingly, we deem the assertion
raised in his supplemental brief forfeited.

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      Even if we were to consider Drawn’s contentions, his claims are belied
by the record of conviction, which establishes Drawn was not convicted under
a now-invalid theory of murder or attempted murder. In relevant part, the
resentencing statute requires that the defendant was “convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) At trial, the court
instructed the jury with CALJIC 8.10, the instruction on first degree murder
under section 187, which required the prosecutor to prove Drawn killed
Wheatfall with malice aforethought. The court also instructed the jury with
CALJIC 8.20, which provides that “[a]ll murder which is perpetrated by any
kind of willful, deliberate and premediated killing with express malice
aforethought is murder of the first degree.” In addition, the court instructed
the jury with CALJIC 8.66, the instruction on attempted murder, which
states that there must be proof that “[t]he person committing the act
harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill
unlawfully another human being.” The court did not instruct the jury on
aider and abettor liability, the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
or the felony murder rule. The jury found Drawn guilty of first degree
murder and attempted murder.
      This record of conviction readily allows us to ascertain whether the jury
relied on a now-invalid theory of first degree murder and attempted murder
to convict Drawn. It makes clear the jury did not. Without any instruction
on felony murder or aiding and abetting, none of the instructions given
enabled the jury to find Drawn guilty on any imputed malice theories. No
instruction was given under any doctrine by which the jury could have found
that someone other than Drawn shot or shot at his victims and imputed that

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person’s malice to Drawn. Instead, the jury was instructed on murder and
attempted murder based on malice aforethought, and on that basis, found
Drawn guilty of first degree willful, deliberate, premeditated murder and
attempted murder. Drawn therefore would still be convicted under the
statutes for murder and attempted murder as amended by SB 1437 and SB
775, and thus the trial court properly found he was not entitled to
resentencing under section 1172.6.
      Further, in incorporating his reply brief from the trial court into his
supplemental brief, Drawn argues that he made a prima facie showing
because the information filed in the case did not set forth any theory of
liability and thus allowed the prosecution to proceed under any of the now-
invalid theories of murder and attempted murder. While the information is
part of the record of conviction the trial court may rely upon to determine
whether a section 1172.6 prima facie showing is made, it is only one
component. The full record of conviction, which includes the jury instructions
and jury verdict forms and is to be used by the trial court in assessing
whether a prima facie showing has been made (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p.
972), shows that Drawn was ultimately not convicted under any of the now-
invalid theories of murder and attempted murder and was thus ineligible for
resentencing relief under section 1172.6.
      In addition, because the duration of Drawn’s sentence was unclear, we
requested supplemental briefing from Drawn and the People clarifying the
length and terms of Drawn’s current prison sentence, and asking the parties
whether there were errors in Drawn’s abstract of judgment requiring
correction. We received Drawn’s CR-292 second amended indeterminate
term abstract of judgment, dated April 20, 2023, which set forth his sentence
on his murder conviction, as well as his CR-290 amended indeterminate term

                                       8
abstract of judgment, dated December 14, 2017, which set forth his sentence
on his other convictions, including attempted murder.5 The parties agree
that Drawn’s effective sentence is 84-year-to-life, and that the April 20, 2023
CR-292 and December 14, 2017 CR-290 abstracts correctly reflect this
sentence.
      With respect to the restitution fines in the December 14, 2017 CR-290
abstract, however, the People seek a correction. Noting that the trial court
reduced Drawn’s restitution and parole revocation fines from $8,000 to
$6,500 at the hearing on his resentencing petition, the People observe these
new amounts are not reflected in the December 14, 2017 amended
determinate term abstract. We agree and direct the trial court to correct the
determinate term abstract of judgment to reflect these reductions and to
make consistent with the indeterminate term abstract of judgment which
properly lists these fines as $6,500.
                                 DISPOSITION
      Both the order denying Drawn’s section 1172.6 resentencing petition
and the judgement are affirmed. The trial court is directed to correct the
determinate term abstract of judgment (CR-290) to include the reduced
$6,500 restitution and parole revocation fines consistent with the trial court’s
oral pronouncement and the second amended indeterminate term abstract of
judgment. The court shall forward the corrected determinate term abstract
of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

5     We augment the record to include both abstracts. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.155.)

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                                 _________________________
                                 Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

A166794/People v. Drawn

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