Court Opinion

ID: 9408882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 23:00:50.430629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:47.508312
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JONTE ROBINSON et al.,

               Plaintiffs,

       v.                                             Civil Action No. 22-1098 (TJK)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,

               Defendant.

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

       For many years, the Bureau of Prisons, or BOP, assessed kidney function differently for

black inmates than for non-black inmates. Plaintiffs—one former and one current black inmate

whose kidneys were assessed under that method—sue BOP because they say that policy caused

them medical injuries and resulted in denial of their compassionate-release requests. They claim

that BOP’s race-based kidney-assessment method violated the Administrative Procedure Act, as

well as their rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. BOP, emphasizing that it has now

changed the policy at issue to a race-neutral one, moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter ju-

risdiction and failure to state a claim. The Court finds that BOP has not waived its sovereign

immunity, so Plaintiffs may not pursue claims for monetary damages against it. And Plaintiffs

lack standing to pursue their other claims seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. Thus, the Court

will grant BOP’s motion to dismiss but will allow Plaintiffs time to seek leave to file an amended

complaint if they so choose.

I.     Background

       According to the operative complaint, BOP relies on the estimated Glomerular Filtration

Rate (“eGFR”) to measure the level of kidney disease in an inmate. ECF No. 14 (“Compl.”) ¶ 2.
When properly functioning, kidneys remove serum creatinine—a waste “byproduct of muscle ac-

tivity”—from the bloodstream. Id. ¶ 28 n.12. To assess kidney function, the eGFR therefore

measures blood concentration of serum creatinine, with lower eGFR scores generally reflecting

poorer kidney function. Id. ¶¶ 3, 28 n.12, 29. In the BOP context, eGFR scores below 60 for three

straight months support a formal stage-three chronic-kidney-disease diagnosis. Id. ¶¶ 30 & n.14,

34, 54; see also id. ¶ 43 n.28 (“Chronic kidney disease is defined as damaged kidneys or a glomer-

ular filtration rate (i.e., a measure of kidney function) <60 mL/min/1.73 m2 for more than 3

months.” (quotation omitted)).

       Until recently, BOP used a race-based multiplier to calculate eGFR scores for black in-

mates but not others.1 See Compl. ¶¶ 1–7, 88. To do so, BOP would multiply black inmates’ raw

eGFR scores by 1.2. Id. ¶¶ 5, 30; see also id. ¶ 3 (BOP elevated black inmates’ raw eGFR scores

by “approximately 21%.”). According to the complaint, the multiplier emerged in the 1990s based

on “a faulty assumption that Black persons have, on average, greater muscle mass than White

persons hence different blood creatinine levels.” Id. ¶ 4; see also id. ¶ 37. This view then sup-

ported “the use of race as a proxy for an artificial multiplier applied exclusively to a Black person’s

eGFR results.” Id. ¶ 4. The result: black individuals’ kidneys “appear healthier,” causing their

kidney disease to go “undetected” and leading to “negative clinical consequences.” Id. ¶ 38. Ac-

cording to Plaintiffs, the assumption underlying the multiplier has been “overwhelmingly de-

bunked and rejected by the scientific community.” Id. ¶ 4; see also id. ¶¶ 36–37.

       1
        BOP refers to this as the “African-American eGFR Multiplier,” but it is more technically
known as the “Modification of Diet in Renal Disease” and “CKD-EPI formula.” Compl. ¶ 3 &
n.2. The Court will refer simply to “the multiplier.”

                                                  2
       Plaintiffs are two black inmates for whom BOP applied the multiplier to calculate their

eGFR scores and whose compassionate-release requests were allegedly denied or delayed as a

result. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7, 67–68.

       In 2000, Plaintiff Jonte Robinson pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting two murders and

was sentenced to 25 years’ incarceration. Compl. ¶ 16. He alleges he has an “array of illnesses

that include kidney disease and hypertension.” Id. ¶ 21. So, in September 2020, during the

COVID-19 pandemic, Robinson requested compassionate release from BOP. Id. ¶ 23. He cited

“progressive illness or a debilitating injury.” Id. BOP denied his request. Id.

       Robinson next turned to the federal courts for compassionate release. Compl. ¶ 24. Rob-

inson’s raw eGFR scores preceding his compassionate-release hearing were 56, 57, and 58. Id.

¶¶ 29, 32. But BOP told the compassionate-release court that because Robinson is black, it had

applied the multiplier and, based on his adjusted eGFR score above 60, it would not diagnose

Robinson with chronic kidney disease. Id. ¶¶ 29–30, 33–34. Robinson alleges, however, that he

“should have been diagnosed with [chronic kidney disease].” Id. ¶ 29. If BOP had so diagnosed

him, and had the court instead considered his raw eGFR scores, Robinson alleges “he would have

most likely been granted compassionate release.” Id. ¶¶ 32; see id. ¶ 39 (The multiplier “jeopard-

ized his compassionate release application.”). In the end, the court denied Robinson’s compas-

sionate-release request. Id. ¶ 26; see also United States v. Robinson, No. 04-cr-128 (RDM),

2021 WL 1318027, at *9 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2021). Robinson appealed, again challenging BOP’s

use of the multiplier, but the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Compl. ¶ 27; see also United States v. Robin-

son, 853 F. App’x 681 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

       Beyond the denial of his compassionate-release application, Robinson alleges that he con-

tinues to receive “substandard medical care” as a result of the multiplier because he is not receiving

                                                  3
treatment to prevent further damage to his kidneys. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 39, 40. As just one example,

he claims, BOP has “repeatedly” prescribed him with high doses of ibuprofen, a drug toxic to

kidneys, and which “may have contributed to his declining kidney function over time.” Id. ¶ 41

(citation omitted). The medical expert that reviewed Robinson’s medical records for his compas-

sionate-release hearing also determined that he faced a tenfold risk of dying from COVID-19 com-

pared to the average healthy American. Id. ¶ 21.

       Plaintiff Reginald Hicks was convicted for crimes “which involved murder” and began

serving a life sentence for those crimes in 1995. Compl. ¶ 47. Like Robinson, Hicks moved for

compassionate release. Id. ¶ 51. Among other things, Hicks argued to the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia that he should be released because he had chronic kidney disease, which

“placed him at a high risk of severe illness and death from COVID-19.” Id. ¶¶ 50–51. The court

denied his motion in June 2021 because Hicks had not received the COVID-19 vaccine. Id. ¶ 51.

Hicks later received his vaccine, so on appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded

the case back to the Superior Court for it to consider his eligibility for compassionate release based

on his new vaccination status. Id. ¶ 55.

       On remand, the government argued that the Superior Court still should not grant compas-

sionate release to Hicks based on a chronic-kidney-disease diagnosis because BOP had never so

diagnosed him. Compl. ¶ 56. The government argued that Hicks’s then-recent eGFR score, 58,

would not support a chronic-kidney-disease diagnosis because the multiplier brought his adjusted

score above 60. Id. A doctor that conducted an independent review of Hicks’s records, however,

concluded that he should have been diagnosed with stage-three chronic kidney disease and that his

condition had “deteriorated” because of the inadequate diagnosis and healthcare management dur-

ing his incarceration. Id. ¶¶ 57–58. Ultimately, in August 2022, Hicks alleges that the Superior

                                                  4
Court granted his compassionate-release motion. Id. ¶ 65.2 Although he is now no longer incar-

cerated, Hicks alleges that the “mismanagement of his medical care” while incarcerated by BOP

“pose[s] severe consequences and health problems in restarting a healthy life” and that his “kid-

neys have been irreversibly damaged.” Id. ¶ 66.

       In April 2022, Robinson (at first without Hicks) sued BOP over its use of the multiplier.

ECF No. 1. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and (2), Robinson also sued on behalf

of a putative class action of other black inmates incarcerated by BOP and affected by the multiplier.

ECF No. 1 ¶ 50; see also Compl. ¶ 73.

       Then, in July 2022, BOP replaced the multiplier with a race-neutral method for assessing

kidney function. ECF No. 15-1 at 1–2. In a memorandum to “All BOP Regional Medical Direc-

tors & Clinical Directors,” BOP announced “that Effective July 12, 2022, our laboratories are

changing the calculation of estimated glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) from creatinine to the new

CKD-EPI 2021 equation that does not include a race coefficient.” Id. at 1. Unlike the multiplier,

which differentiated between “raw” and “adjusted” or “inflated” eGFR scores for black inmates,

Compl. ¶¶ 3, 30, 94, the new, race-neutral method reports only one value, ECF No. 15-1 at 1.

       After BOP made this change, Robinson amended the complaint to add Hicks as a plaintiff

and to address BOP’s new race-neutral method for assessing kidney function. Compl. ¶¶ 47–66,

88; see also ECF No. 14-1 (redlined complaint). That operative complaint brings three claims.

First, it alleges BOP’s use of the multiplier violates the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),

       2
          In fact, the Superior Court’s order, attached to BOP’s motion to dismiss, reflects that it
granted Hicks’s separate motion to reduce his sentence under the Incarceration Reduction Amend-
ment Act for reasons unrelated to his kidney disease and that it denied as moot his motion for
compassionate release based on COVID-19. See ECF No. 15-4 at 16–17. The Court may take
judicial notice of such “related proceedings in other courts.” Dupree v. Jefferson, 666 F.2d 606,
608 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In any event, Hicks was released and is no longer incarcerated. Compl.
¶¶ 65–66.

                                                 5
5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., as it is “contrary to constitutional right,” “not in accordance with law,” and

“arbitrary and capricious.” See Compl. ¶¶ 82–90. Second, Plaintiffs claim BOP’s use of the mul-

tiplier violated Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights by treating similarly situated persons (i.e., black

and non-black inmates) disparately without a rational basis for doing so. Id. ¶¶ 91–96. And third,

Plaintiffs allege BOP’s use of the multiplier violated Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment, which includes a right not to be subjected to a substantial

risk of serious harm to their health and safety. Id. ¶¶ 97–104. Plaintiffs bring these claims on

behalf of a similar putative class of black inmates as in the original complaint. See Compl.

¶¶ 73–81; ECF No. 14-1 ¶¶ 73–81.

       Plaintiffs seek several forms of relief. They ask the Court to certify the putative class and

appoint Plaintiffs as lead plaintiffs and counsel as class counsel. Compl. at 28. They seek decla-

rations that BOP’s use of the multiplier violates the APA. Id. They also seek a host of injunctive

relief. They ask for an injunction preventing BOP’s future use of the multiplier. Id. Further, they

request an order imposing various affirmative obligations on BOP to remedy the multiplier’s al-

leged effects, including, for example, an order that BOP “reevaluate all BOP decisions that resulted

in denials of compassionate release applications from Black incarcerated individuals” based on the

multiplier. See id. at 28–29. Lastly, they seek compensatory damages for Plaintiffs’ irreversible

physical harm and emotional distress along with costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 29–30.

       BOP moves to dismiss on both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) grounds. ECF No. 15. As for

the Rule 12(b)(1) grounds, BOP advances four arguments. First, Plaintiffs’ APA claims are moot

because BOP has replaced the multiplier with a race-neutral method for assessing kidney function.

Id. at 17–22. Second, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Robinson’s claims that

sound in habeas. Id. at 22–24. Third, both Plaintiffs lack standing on injury and redressability

                                                  6
grounds. Id. at 24–36. And fourth, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

money-damages claims because BOP has not waived sovereign immunity. Id. at 47–48. BOP

also argues that dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) for two reasons. First, Robinson’s

claims are barred by res judicata. Id. at 36–41.3 Second, Plaintiffs fail to state any plausible Eighth

Amendment claim. Id. at 41–47. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. ECF No. 17.

II.     Legal Standards

        To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the plain-

tiff bears the burden of proving that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.” United States ex

rel. Bid Solve, Inc. v. CWS Mktg. Grp., Inc., 567 F. Supp. 3d 59, 66 (D.D.C. 2021).4 Sovereign-

immunity claims are jurisdictional. Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Thus, where, as here, a defendant raises the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a bar to claims, the

plaintiff must overcome that defense to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Jackson v.

Bush, 448 F. Supp. 2d 198, 200 (D.D.C. 2006).

        Standing also implicates the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.          Haase v. Sessions,

835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Thus, plaintiffs have the burden of establishing standing as

        3
          “Although the defense of res judicata is jurisdictional in character, it is an affirmative
defense, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1), and therefore is not a per se jurisdictional bar to court review
as contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),” Youngin’s Auto Body v. District of
Columbia, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 189
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he defense of res judicata, or claim preclusion, while having a ‘somewhat
jurisdictional character,’ does not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court.” (cita-
tions omitted)).
        4
          “When confronted with . . . a motion to dismiss under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule
12(b)(6), the Court must first consider whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Hamilton v.
United States, 502 F. Supp. 3d 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998)). As the Court is satisfied that it does not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over the complaint for the reasons explained, it need not reach BOP’s remaining argu-
ments for dismissal, including those implicating Rule 12(b)(6). See Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police
Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2011).

                                                   7
well. Little v. Fenty, 689 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 (D.D.C. 2010). Standing under Article III requires

plaintiffs to “state a plausible claim that they have suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to the

actions of the defendant that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.” Food

& Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

       To determine standing, the Court may consider the allegations in the complaint, undisputed

facts in the record, and, if necessary, its resolution of disputed facts. Coal. for Underground Ex-

pansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The Court must “assume the truth of all

material factual allegations in the complaint” and grant Plaintiffs “the benefit of all inferences that

can be derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir.

2011) (quotation omitted). Still, factual allegations demand “closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule

12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Tex. Low Income Hous. Info.

Serv. v. Carson, 427 F. Supp. 3d 43, 52 (D.D.C. 2019) (quotation omitted). Thus, “threadbare

recitals of the elements of standing, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”

because courts cannot “accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the com-

plaint.” See Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alterations adopted) (citations

omitted).

III.   Analysis

       The Court will dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs can-

not sustain their claims for money damages because the government has not waived its sovereign

immunity. And neither Robinson nor Hicks has adequately alleged ongoing or future injury that

would be redressed by the remaining declaratory and injunctive relief they seek.

                                                   8
       A.      The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Claims for
               Monetary Damages

       Among other forms of relief, Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages for the “irreversible

physical harm and emotional distress” caused by BOP’s “inadequate medical care.” Compl. at 29.

But “the United States may not be sued without its consent and . . . the existence of consent is a

prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). And the United

States has not waived sovereign immunity for damages claims under either the APA or the Con-

stitution. See ECF No. 15 at 47; Fletcher v. DOJ, 17 F. Supp. 3d 89, 93 (D.D.C. 2014); 5 U.S.C.

§ 702 (permitting APA actions against the “United States seeking relief other than money dam-

ages” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs do not contest that they cannot seek compensatory damages

under the APA, and they concede they are not seeking damages under the APA (or under the

United States’ sovereign-immunity waiver under the Federal Tort Claims Act). ECF No. 17 at

18–19. Thus, as far as Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages under the APA go, there is no

dispute that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over them, and they must be dismissed.

       As far as their constitutional claims go, Plaintiffs also concede that BOP has not waived

sovereign immunity so that they can recover monetary damages for those claims. But they raise

the prospect of seeking monetary damages against BOP officials in charge of their medical care

under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

See ECF No. 17 at 19. They ask the Court to “assum[e] that Plaintiffs would supply an amendment

of pleadings naming specific federal prison officials who engaged in the violative conduct alleged

in the complaint” to support their constitutional claims. Id.; see also id. (seeking “leave of court

to cure this defect through an amendment of pleadings”). But, as it stands, the complaint neither

alleges any such Bivens claims nor identifies as defendants any named or unnamed prison officials.

Indeed, the lone defendant identified in the complaint is BOP. Compl. ¶ 69. For now, the Court

                                                 9
must ask whether it has jurisdiction over the current complaint as pleaded—not over some hypo-

thetical amended complaint. See Wilcox v. Georgetown Univ., 987 F.3d 143, 150 (D.C. Cir. 2021)

(“The district court’s skepticism about aspects of [plaintiffs’] case was confined to the factual

allegations in the complaint before it.”). Plaintiffs concede their pleading “defect” here. See ECF

No. 17 at 19. Thus, the Court will dismiss all Plaintiffs’ claims for money damages for any past

harm suffered because it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims.

       B.      The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Remaining
               Claims for Relief

       Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are for various forms of injunctive and declaratory relief.5

BOP argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue these claims because neither can show injury or

redressability. ECF No. 15 at 24–36. The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing con-

tains three elements”—injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). As explained above, monetary damages are unavailable for Plaintiffs’

alleged past injuries, meaning they cannot be redressed in that way. And Plaintiffs seek no other

relief that would redress their past injuries. The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ allegations that they

were injured when BOP applied the multiplier to them and denied or delayed their compassionate

release are allegations of past injury. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 7, 24–32, 39, 52, 59, 89, 96. These are not

ongoing or future injuries that would be redressed by prospective injunctive or declaratory relief

because BOP has replaced the multiplier with a race-neutral method for measuring kidney func-

tion. And while, as explained in more detail below, Plaintiffs gesture at future injuries to support

       5
         See Compl. at 28–29 (requesting an injunction preventing BOP from using the multiplier
in its medical and compassionate-release decisions, and ordering BOP to reevaluate compassion-
ate-release decisions and medical records, establish and develop new processes and guidance, and
create a plan to prevent further violative conduct; requesting a declaration that the multiplier is
unlawful).

                                                 10
these forward-looking forms of relief, none qualifies as an injury-in-fact. Compl. at 28–29; ECF

No. 17 at 12–15. Thus, the entire complaint must be dismissed for lack of standing.6

       Before proceeding further, one point of clarification: BOP argues that its adoption of the

race-neutral method for measuring kidney function moots Plaintiffs’ APA claims. ECF No. 15 at

17–22. But in the Court’s view, this is a question of standing, because BOP changed its policy

before Plaintiffs amended their complaint.7 Judges in this District have observed that “[n]either

the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has directly resolved the question [of]

. . . whether the date of the commencement of an action or the date of the operative complaint is

the relevant date for determining standing.” G&E Real Est., Inc. v. Avison Young-Washington,

D.C., LLC, 168 F. Supp. 3d 147, 159 (D.D.C. 2016). But many judges have been “persuaded that

the better reading of the applicable law is that the Court must measure standing by the state of the

world as of the date of the Amended Complaint.” Id. at 160; see also Rockwell Int’l Corp. v.

       6
         Although Plaintiffs seek class certification in the operative complaint, “[t]hat . . . adds
nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege
and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, uni-
dentified members of the class to which they belong.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338
n.6 (2016) (cleaned up); see, e.g., Cason v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 538 F. Supp. 3d
100, 110–12 (D.D.C. 2021).
       7
          In any event, even under a mootness analysis, Plaintiffs still come up short. When an
agency has “already eliminated the [challenged] [p]olicy and plaintiffs never allege that the
[agency] will reinstitute it, any injunction or order declaring it illegal would accomplish nothing—
amounting to exactly the type of advisory opinion Article III prohibits.” Akiachak Native Cmty.
v. DOI, 827 F.3d 100, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir.
2008)). Plaintiffs do not allege that BOP will resurrect the multiplier. And of course “‘the mere
power to reenact a challenged [rule] is not a sufficient basis on which a court can conclude that a
reasonable expectation of recurrence exists’ absent ‘evidence indicating that the challenged [rule]
likely will be reenacted.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of
Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, and as explained more fully below
in the standing discussion, Plaintiffs have provided no reason to believe that BOP is about to revive
the multiplier or will fail to apply the race-neutral method of assessing kidney function to Plain-
tiffs.

                                                 11
United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473–74 (2007) (“[W]hen a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court

and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine

jurisdiction.”). Thus, “standing may be assessed by the timing of the filing of the operative com-

plaint in an action—whether the original complaint or a supplemental or amended complaint.”

G&E Real Est., 168 F. Supp. 3d at 160.8 The Court does so here.

       An injury-in-fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized” and “(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at

560 (internal quotation marks omitted). To “shift injury from ‘conjectural’ to ‘imminent,’ the

petitioners must show that there is a ‘substantial probability’ of injury.” Chamber of Com. of U.S.

v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). “When, as here, a plaintiff seeks pro-

spective declaratory and injunctive relief, he must establish an ongoing or future injury that is

‘certainly impending’; he may not rest on past injury.” Fuentes v. Biden, No. 21-cv-3106 (APM),

2023 WL 1070545, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2023) (cleaned up). Allegations “of possible future

injury are not sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (cleaned up).

The requirement that plaintiffs show an “imminent future injury” to seek injunctive relief “creates

a significantly more rigorous burden to establish standing than that on parties seeking redress for

past injuries.” Swanson Grp. Mfg. LLC v. Jewell, 195 F. Supp. 3d 66, 77 (D.D.C. 2016) (citations

omitted). Further, the Court’s standing inquiry must be “especially rigorous when,” as here,

“reaching the merits of the dispute would force [it] to decide whether an action taken by one of the

       8
          See, e.g., Maniar v. Mayorkas, No. 19-cv-3826 (EGS), 2023 WL 2709040, at *13 (D.D.C.
Mar. 30, 2023) (The “relevant question is whether” plaintiffs could establish “standing as of ‘the
state of the world’ when they filed their operative amended complaint.” (quotation omitted)); Kins-
ley v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-962 (JEB), 2021 WL 4551907, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2021) (similar);
Gatore v. DHS, 327 F. Supp. 3d 76, 91 (D.D.C. 2018) (similar), aff’d, No. 21-5148, 2023 WL
2576176 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 21, 2023).

                                                12
other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408

(citation omitted).

        Both Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief because at the time

of the operative complaint, BOP had adopted a race-neutral method for measuring kidney function.

Thus, they have not adequately pleaded an ongoing or future injury that this relief would redress.

        Plaintiffs allege generally that they “continue to suffer harm” from the multiplier, which

“has far-reaching impacts on the availability of life-saving medical resources, treatment outcomes,

debilitating health of kidneys, and timely opportunities to seek compassionate release.” Compl.

¶ 96; see also id. ¶ 88 (The multiplier is “still impacting Plaintiffs and will continue to cause dis-

crimination based on race.”). For instance, Robinson alleges that BOP “continues to subject him

to substandard medical care” and that he “continues to suffer physical and emotional harm as a

result” of “continuing problems in BOP policies and practices that are not rectified.”

Compl. ¶¶ 39, 46. But these allegations come up short for standing purposes for the simple reason

that the source of the injury is no more. Indeed, BOP has not used the multiplier since before the

filing of the operative complaint. Thus, there is nothing for the requested injunctive or declaratory

relief to redress.

        To be sure, Plaintiffs are right that they could demonstrate standing if BOP’s use of the

multiplier continued to affect them in some way. Cf. Zukerman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 961 F.3d 431,

443 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“It is clear from [the plaintiff’s] allegations, which we accept as true and

construe in his favor, that the effects of the alleged violation persist,” and thus it would be possible

for the court to provide effectual relief.); Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2016). For

example, Plaintiffs could meet the standing requirement by showing that BOP did not actually

change its policy, or that it was likely (for some reason) that BOP would refuse to apply the new

                                                  13
race-neutral policy to them. See Fuentes, 2023 WL 1070545, at *1; see also, e.g., City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (“[The plaintiff’s] standing to seek the injunction re-

quested depended on whether he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of the [defendant’s

challenged practice].”).

       But Plaintiffs have pleaded no facts to suggest any such thing. They allege in conclusory

fashion that the race-neutral policy is a “façade to a new formula.” Compl. ¶ 88. And in their

opposition, they similarly brand BOP’s policy change as “superficial.” ECF No. 17 at 9. But the

Court need not accept such “conclusory statements” that “are unsupported by the facts set out in

the complaint.” Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19. Similarly, Plaintiffs attack the new policy for not being

an “absolute and complete change in policy.” ECF No. 17 at 9. They even go as far as to predict

“it is likely that broad inconsistency and deviation from the proposed policy will likely occur,

enabling more discriminatory eGFR assessments to continue taking place under BOP supervision.”

Id. at 9–10. But again, this is speculation with no supporting factual basis.

       For its part, BOP persuasively argues that “it can hardly be said that [BOP] implemented

its policy change . . . with the intent to nevertheless continue utilizing a purported race-based for-

mula,” especially given that BOP began considering a “newer, race-blind” method before this case

was filed. ECF No. 19 at 8 (citation omitted). In fact, BOP’s policy change has all the trappings

of a formal policy change implemented across the board, including for Plaintiffs. BOP sent a

memorandum, titled “Implementation of the CKD-EPI 2021 Race-Free Calculation for Estimated

Glomerular Filtration Rate (eGFR),” to “All BOP Regional Medical Directors & Clinical Direc-

tors.” ECF No. 15-1 at 1. In it, BOP said without qualification:

       Effective July 12, 2022, our laboratories are changing the calculation of estimated
       glomerular filtration rate (eGFR) from creatinine to the new CKD-EPI 2021 equa-
       tion that does not include a race coefficient. The National Kidney Foundation and

                                                 14
       the American Society of Nephrology’s Task Force on Reassessing the Inclusion of
       Race in Diagnosing Kidney Disease recommended the new equation.

Id. The memorandum also attached the medical evidence on which the race-neutral method is

based. Id. at 3–52. On this record, Plaintiffs have not shown that the multiplier’s effects persist

in a way that gives them standing.9

       In addition, Hicks would have to overcome another hurdle to show that BOP’s use of the

multiplier continued to affect him—because he was released from BOP custody before he was

even added as a plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 65. Thus, Hicks cannot show that he is likely to be affected

by anything BOP does (or does not do) going forward.10 In response, he argues that he is likely to

be injured in the future because he is serving five years of supervised release, which does not

“foreclose the very undesirable possibility that he may be exposed to BOP’s discriminatory prac-

tices again.” ECF No. 17 at 14–15 (citing Brannon v. City of Gadsden, No. 4:13-cv-1229 (VEH),

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28761, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 10, 2015)). But of course, Hicks will always

face the possibility of reincarceration. Mere speculation about future contingent events will not

do for standing purposes, even putting aside that this alleged injury is nowhere mentioned in the

complaint. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409; see also Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 21

(“When considering any chain of allegations for standing purposes, we may reject as overly

       9
          Although the Court will dismiss the complaint, out of an abundance of caution it will
allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to seek to file an amended complaint to address the deficiencies
identified in this Memorandum Opinion if they so choose.
       10
          Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has held, “a prisoner’s transfer or release from a prison [after
a complaint is filed] moots any claim he might have for equitable relief arising out of the conditions
of his confinement in that prison.” Scott v. District of Columbia, 139 F.3d 940, 941 (D.C. Cir.
1998); Aref v. Barr, No. 10-cv-539 (BJR), 2019 WL 11593252, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2019) (de-
scribing exceptions that do not apply here).

                                                 15
speculative those links which are predictions of future events (especially future actions to be taken

by third parties).”).

        Finally, the Court notes that Robinson has pleaded no facts to suggest that his past denial

of compassionate release—allegedly brought about by BOP’s use of the multiplier—continues to

affect him in some way that would support an ongoing or future injury. In other words, just as the

operative complaint identifies nothing that stood in the way of Robinson receiving a kidney eval-

uation under BOP’s race-neutral method on the day it was filed, it also identifies nothing that

prevented him from seeking compassionate release again from BOP or his compassionate-release

court after he receives such a new evaluation. See, e.g., United States v. Baylor, No. 16-cr-180

(ESH), 2020 WL 5970679, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2020) (granting a third compassionate-release

motion). In fact, that court expressly left the door open to changing its mind “if Robinson’s med-

ical condition worsens, or if further testing shows that his condition is, in fact, more severe than

the Court understands.” Robinson, 2021 WL 1318027, at *11 (emphasis added). For his part,

Hicks has also not pleaded anything suggesting that the results of his previous compassionate-

release proceedings continue to injure him in some way. But in his case, of course, that is because

he is no longer in BOP’s custody.

                                          *      *       *

        Plaintiffs have the “rigorous burden to establish standing,” and neither has done so here.

See Swanson, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 77. Thus, the Court must dismiss the complaint for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction.

                                                 16
IV.    Conclusion and Order

       For these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that BOP’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 15, is

GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ operative complaint, ECF No. 14, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJ-

UDICE. Plaintiffs may seek leave to file a new complaint to correct the deficiencies identified by

August 14, 2023. If they do not seek leave by that date, the Court will dismiss the case as well.

       SO ORDERED.

                                                             /s/ Timothy J. Kelly
                                                             TIMOTHY J. KELLY
                                                             United States District Judge
Date: July 13, 2023

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