Court Opinion

ID: 9913023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 18:00:26.368782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:50.165860
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                  FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                       ___________

                           No. 23-2330
                           ___________

                         RYAN P. GIVEY,
                                            Appellant

                                 v.

         UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
              JENNIFER ARBITTIER WILLIAMS
           ____________________________________

           On Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                       (D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00298)
        District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro
             ____________________________________

         Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                      on December 21, 2023

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

                 (Opinion filed: December 26, 2023)
            ____________________________________
                                        ___________

                                         OPINION *
                                        ___________

PER CURIAM

       In January 2022, pro se appellant Ryan Givey filed a petition for a writ of manda-

mus in the District Court. 1 The respondents are the U.S. Department of Justice and Jen-

nifer Arbittier Williams, who at the time was the United States Attorney for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania. In his petition, Givey states that he is the target of a wide-rang-

ing conspiracy that has caused him misfortune in various aspects of his life. He alleges

that a network of hostile figures has conspired to, among other things, have him wrong-

fully declared mentally ill, harm him professionally, isolate him from his family, surveil

him 24 hours a day, and undermine his legal interests. He believes that the network in-

cludes secret societies (particularly the Freemasons), the mob, government officials, and

his own attorneys.

       Givey’s mandamus petition asks the District Court to order the DOJ and Williams

to investigate and prosecute the network’s crimes against him. It also asks that Givey, his

children, and his supporters be admitted to the federal witness protection program. The

District Court dismissed the petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The

District Court held that Givey’s petition was so insubstantial and implausible that it

*
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
  Givey’s petition also included a “Motion for Temporary Emergency Injunction,” which
the District Court denied.

                                              2
presented no actual federal case or controversy, thus depriving the court of subject-matter

jurisdiction to hear the claims. Givey appeals. 2

       We agree with the District Court. Some claims are “so insubstantial, implausi-

ble, . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.”

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974). Federal courts

lack power to entertain such claims. A claim meets the standard for dismissal if it is “ob-

viously without merit” or its unsoundness so clearly results from previous Supreme Court

decisions “as to foreclose the subject.” Cal. Water Serv. Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S.

252, 255 (1938) (per curiam); see also Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 350 (3d Cir.

2016); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 1963). As a pro se

appellant, Givey is afforded liberal construction of his pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (per curiam). And the standard for dismissing a federal

claim as wholly insubstantial is “especially high.” Hill ex rel. Republic First Bancorp Inc.

v. Cohen, 40 F.4th 101, 111 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,

716 F.3d 660, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). But even when viewing the well-pleaded facts in the

light most favorable to Givey, his claims are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be ab-

solutely devoid of merit,” “wholly insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” “plainly unsub-

stantial,” or “no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37

(1974) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(1), we review only whether the well-pleaded allegations on the face of the com-
plaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
District Court. Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).
                                               3
        Givey has undoubtedly had many struggles over the last nine years involving,

among other things, his doctoral program, his family, his job, his application for disabil-

ity benefits, his attorneys, and his rental properties. But given his efforts to weave these

allegations into a vast conspiracy against him, as well as the outlandish nature of some of

his claims (such as a secret society spending eight years hiring Givey’s friends and family

in order to turn those people against him), we agree that his petition was so insubstantial

as not to present a federal case or controversy. Thus, the District Court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction and therefore lacked the power to adjudicate Givey’s mandamus peti-

tion.

        For these reasons, the District Court’s order is affirmed.

                                              4