Court Opinion

ID: 9700553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:35:11.552507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:11.156261
License: Public Domain

Broderick, C.J.,
concurring specially. I concur with the majority that RSA 170-C:5, III (2002) requires that, before the probate court may grant a petition to terminate parental rights based upon a finding of child neglect or abuse under RSA chapter 169-C, the parents must have failed to correct the conditions leading to such a finding within twelve months of the finding, despite reasonable efforts under the direction of the district court to rectify the conditions. I also concur with the majority’s statement that “[b]ecause the statute requires that the conditions be corrected within twelve months, it cannot be determined whether the conditions have been corrected until twelve months have elapsed.” I write separately, first, because I remain uncertain as to which dates the probate court considered when it terminated the father’s parental rights.
As noted by the majority, we requested clarification from the probate court as to which dates it considered in making its determination. It is clear to me that the probate court began with the date of September 23, 2004, the date on which the Rochester District Court held an adjudicatory hearing and the father stipulated to a finding of neglect. What remains unclear to me, however, is the date on which the probate court ended its review of the father’s efforts to correct the conditions leading to the finding of neglect. Based upon the probate court’s clarification of an inconsistency in the wording of its order, the majority states that “the probate court admits that it considered” only the period between September 23, 2004, and August 18, 2005, the date of the permanency hearing. I am not so certain of that.
The probate court’s response to our request for clarification also noted that the district court order subsequent to the permanency hearing was issued on August 29, 2005, and was supplemented with a second order issued on September 2, 2005. In addition, this court’s request for clarification noted that the probate court’s order granting the petition for *191termination was issued November 7,2006, “approximately 26 months after the father signed a consent agreement.” Absent a definitive statement from the probate court regarding the end date of its review, I am uncertain if the probate court review ended on August 18, August 29, or September 2, 2005, all of which were before the statutorily required twelve-month period, or on November 7, 2006, or some other date subsequent to September 23, 2005, which was after the statutory requirement. Consequently, I concur with the majority’s decision to remand this case to the probate court to decide whether the father failed over a period of at least twelve months to correct the conditions leading to the finding of neglect. Because I am not certain that the probate court has not already done that, however, I am not prepared at this point to say that the probate court erred.
In addition, I write separately because I disagree with the majority that In re Melissa M., 127 N.H. 710 (1986), has no bearing on a decision in this case. The majority states that “DCYF also contends, citing [Melissa M.\ that it was not necessary for the probate court to review the [father’s] behavior over the full twelve months.” I do not believe that is an accurate portrayal of DCYF’s argument. DCYF’s memorandum of law states:
The Probate Court reasoned that even if the District Court were deemed not to have provided a full 12 months for [the father] to correct the conditions of neglect, under [Melissa M.], it is not required to do so in every case, and therefore termination may be ordered in any event. While Melissa M. was not decided in the context of a termination proceeding under RSA 170-C, the Probate Court’s interpretation is nevertheless sound.
Contrary to the majority, I believe that DCYF has argued that if the twelve-month period for probate court review (required by RSA 170-C:5, III) is met, it is not dispositive if the district court efforts did not continue for a co-terminus twelve-month period.
In Melissa M., subsequent to the division of welfare’s investigation revealing that the father had sexually abused his daughter, the district court, pursuant to RSA chapter 169-C, entered a finding that Melissa had been abused. On de novo appeal, the superior court found that Melissa was an “abused child” within the meaning of RSA 169-C:3, II, awarded permanent custody of Melissa to the division, and directed the division to file a petition for termination of parental rights in the probate court. Melissa M., 127 N.H. at 711. On appeal to this court, the father contended that the trial court had erred in failing to establish a plan of conditions for him to meet in order to regain custody of the child, as required by RSA 169-C:21, II. Id. at 712. Notwithstanding the language of RSA 169-C:21, II, *192we disagreed, and held that the statute “does not require a court to attempt to specify conditions under which a parent and child may be reunited when no conditions exist under which reunification could safely occur.” Id. at 714.
In the instant case, the probate court recognized that Melissa M. related to a neglect case under RSA chapter 169-C, and not a termination of parental rights case under RSA chapter 170-C. The probate court continued:
[T]he court cannot conceive of any logical reason why the [Melissa M.] ruling would not have equal application to a failure to correct case brought under RSA 170-C:5, III, as here, since there can be no failure to correct grounds proved unless there is a predicate neglect case. To conclude otherwise would lead to the anomalous result that where the district court properly ruled no effort toward reunification was necessary under any conditions no termination could be ordered in furtherance of the child’s permanency interests via adoption.
I find the reasoning of the probate court to be persuasive. While I agree with the majority that Melissa M. is “distinguishable” as the “statute at issue in Melissa M. concerned the reunification requirements of a final order of the district court,” that statute is referenced in RSA 170-C:5, III, and a finding by the district court under the statute serves as the prerequisite for every petition for termination under RSA 170-C:5, III. Further, Melissa M. forms much of the foundation for both the probate court’s order and DCYF’s argument. Given our remand of this case, the specific applicability of Melissa M. need not be decided here, yet the issue may well arise in the probate court. Unlike the majority, I am not prepared at this point to decide that Melissa M. has no bearing here.