Court Opinion

ID: 9753810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:30:39.217444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:42.786247
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
Over the years I have spent on the appellate bench, I have come to see the great emphasis which, of necessity, is placed on the administrative aspect of the administration of justice. Still, it remains troubling that courts shape the review process based on presumptions and pronouncements that are not empirically verified, while sometimes demonstrating limited sensitivity toward other vital interests at stake in criminal justice.
Here, ultimately, I agree with the majority that the balancing of the public and private interests involved justifies restrictions on hybrid and self-representation on appeal. Nevertheless, I remain circumspect about the reasoning supplied on a number of points. For example, I believe courts should continue to reflect on the weight being accorded to the presumption of effectiveness, particularly in light of the demonstrated need for material improvement in the provision of legal services to indigent defendants. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walter, 600 Pa. 392, 397-404, 966 A.2d 560, 563-67 (affirming a capital judgment of sentence, while describing various of the appellant’s claims as “unintelligible,” underdeveloped, “vague and confusing,” waived, “incomprehensible,” *192and “incapable of review”), cert denied — U.S. -, 180 S.Ct. 743, 175 L.Ed.2d 522 (2009). See generally Report of the National Right to Counsel Committee, Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel (Apr.2009) (embodying the analysis of a bipartisan committee of independent experts representing all segments of the Nation’s justice system, identifying systemic deficiencies, and recommending reform measures).
I also have substantial difficulty with the notion that “appellate counsel is entitled, as a matter of strategy, to forego even meritorious issues in favor of issues he believes pose a greater likelihood of success.” Majority Opinion, Op. at 183-84, 23 A.3d at 1043. While this may be true in the abstract— assuming that foregone issues are, in fact, materially weaker than those actually litigated in an appeal — doubt is cast on such assumption in instances in which the claims actually advanced by counsel are adjudged to be meritless. To the degree there is difficulty in predicting which issues have the best chance of succeeding before an appellate court, the allocation to lawyers of the ability to forfeit meritorious claims seems highly questionable, at least in the absence of effective client consultation. The fairness of such allocation is particularly debatable in view of the barriers to judicial review of appellate-counsel stewardship, including the strong presumption of effectiveness and statutory and court-imposed limitations placed on the review.
In light of the above, I am sympathetic to the Superior Court’s efforts to implement a procedure by which, at least upon a non-frivolous complaint by a criminal defendant, judicial review of claim selection decisions by his appellate counsel is not evaded. Again, however, on balance, I ultimately agree with the majority that the Battle procedure simply is too burdensome.