Court Opinion

ID: 9830134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:54:30.680808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:13.680867
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[13] Counsel for appellants has filed an able and vigorous motion for rehearing, and in it insistently urges that in our original opinion, as well as in the opinions of all the other courts passing upon the “jitney” ordinances, the courts have overlooked, or at least failed to discuss, a feature which he thinks renders said ordinances discriminatory. It is urged that in the requirement of a surety bond of the “jitneys” the city can only justify such a provision upon the ground that it will tend to make the “jitney” operators more careful, exercise greater diligence to avoid injury to the public, but that this duty — i. e., not to negligently or willfully injure any person upon the streets of the city — is a duty which is no more chargeable upon the “jitney” operator than upon the driver of a rent car or taxicab, or upon an individual who is not operating his car for hire; that the conditions, in this-respect, under which the several classes of motor-propelled vehicles operate upon the streets are the same; that the same driver may during a part of the day operate the “jitney,” and during another part of the day drive a private car or a rent car; that the public is no more subject to injury from the same driver’s operation of a “jitney” in the forenoon than from his operation of a car other than the “jitney” in the afternoon; that his duty in this respect is no greater in the forenoon than in the afternoon; that the rule is that the same obligations or restrictions must be imposed upon all persons similarly conditioned in reference to the duty regulated. He cites in support of his contention the case of G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255, 41 L. Ed. 667, a suit involving the validity of a Texas statute, passed April 5, 1889, providing, that a plaintiff whose claim, under $50 for stock killed by a railway company, which had not been paid within 30 days, should be entitled, in a suit, and upon establishing his claim, to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, not to exceed $10. The Texas Supreme Court had held this act valid, but the United States Supreme Court, in reversing our state court upon this feature, said in part as follows:
“Considered as such [as a whole], it is simply a statute imposing a penalty upon railroad corporations for a failure to pay certain debts. No individuals are thus punished, and no other corporations. The act singles out a certain class of debtors, and punishes them when for like delinquencies it punishes no others. They are not treated as other debtors, or equally with other debtors. * * * It is, of course, proper that every debtor should pay his debts, and there might be no impropriety in giving to every successful suitor attorney’s fees. Such a provision would bear a reasonable relation to the delinquency of the debtor, and would certainly create no inequality of right or protection. But before a distinction can be made between debtors, and one be punished for a failure to pay his debts, while another is permitted to become in like manner delinquent without any punishment, there must be some difference in the obligation to pay, some reason why the duty of payment is more imperative in the one instance than in the other. * * * That such corporations may. be classified for some purposes is unquestioned. The business in which they are engaged is of a peculiarly dangerous nature, and the Legislature, in the exercise of its police powers, may justly require many things to be done by them in order to secure life and property. Fencing of railroad tracks, use of safety couplers, and a multitude of other things easily suggest themselves. And any classification for the imposition of such special duties — duties arising out of the peculiar business in which they are engaged —is a just classification, and not one within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
We do not believe our bolding in tbe instant case and tbe bolding of tbe other courts cited in “jitney” eases fails to measure up to tbe principle laid down in tbe Ellis Case. If we are correct in concluding from the facts submitted that the operation of tbe “jitney” on tbe crowded streets of a city is a business peculiarly dangerous to tbe public using the streets, then tbe fulfillment of tbe duty of care on tbe part of tbe operators is more important than tbe performance of such duty in tbe case of one only occasionally or infrequently driving a car over said streets. Tbe danger is more imminent and frequent, and might be said to be continuous. Therefore, in tbe exercise of its police powers, a city may require of tbe “jitney” operators a further guaranty than it does of others that be will avoid acts of negligence, and that, in case of an accident, certainly more likely to occur than in the case of operators of other motor vehicles mentioned, be will be in a position to respond for tbe damage inflicted.
In St. John v. New York, 201 U. S. 633, 26 Sup. Ct. 554, 50 L. Ed. 896, 5 Ann. Cas. 909, a case in which tbe court was dealing with the question of alleged discrimination between producing and nonprodueing vendors of such article, it being contended that such law was discriminatory, for the reason that . nonproducing vendors might not exempt themselves from actions or penalties for violations of certain subdivisions of said act by showing that tbe milk sold or offered for salé by them was in tbe same condition as when it left the herd of tbe producer, a *694privilege accorded to producing vendors, tlie United States Supreme Gourt, after stating that the purpose of the law was to secure to the population milk containing a certain standard of purity and strength, and to disclose other milk unclean, impure, unwholesome, etc., continued:
“It is not contended that such purpose is not within the power of the state, but it is contended that the power is not exercised on all alike who stand in the same relation to the purpose, and quite dramatic illustrations are used to show discrimination. A picture is exhibited of producing and nonproducing vendors' selling milk side by side; the latter, it may be, a purchaser from the former; the act of one permitted; the act of the other prohibited or penalized. If we could look no farther than the mere act of selling, the injustice of the law might be demonstrated, but something more must be considered. Not only the final purpose of the law must be considered, but the means of its administration— the ways it may be defeated. Legislation, to be practical and efficient, must regard this special purpose, as' well as the ultimate purpose.”
We feel that the language of the Supreme Court, as above quoted, is sufficient answer to appellants’ contention.
It might be well to state that, though the “jitney” legislation is of recent origin, yet the question of the validity of ordinances similar to the one under consideration has reached the courts of- last resort, both of civil and of criminal jurisdiction, in many of the states, and, in no case, so far as we have found from our examination, has the court sustained the contention of invalidity.
In addition to the cases cited in our original opinion we might cite City of Memphis v. State (Tenn.) 179 S. W. 631; Ex parte Bogle, 179 S. W. 1193, by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, decided November 3, 19151, not yet officially published; City of New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 70 South. 212, decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court November 29, 1915. In these cases ordinances with similar or more onerous provisions have been upheld.
Believing that in our original opinion we correctly disposed of all the issues involved, the motion for rehearing is overruled.