Court Opinion

ID: 9573405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:54:34.986472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:52.756386
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I would reach the merits of Schleicher’s claims in the interests of justice. Taylor v. State, 691 N.W.2d 78, 79 (Minn.2005). Minnesota Statutes § 611.026 (2004) provides:
No person shall be tried, sentenced, or punished for any crime while mentally ill or mentally deficient so as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings or making a defense; but the person shall not be excused from criminal liability except upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged criminal act the person was laboring under such a defect of reason, from one of these causes, as not to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong.
*451We have said on a number of occasions that the test for right and wrong does not focus on whether the individual knew his actions were legally wrong, but encompasses the individual’s ability to know that the action was morally wrong. State v. Ulm, 326 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Minn.1982); State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 336, 246 N.W.2d 48, 52 (1976). The model jury instruction, titled “Defense of Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency,” states:
[E]ven if the defendant knew the nature of the act, the defendant did not understand that the act was wrong. * * * The word “wrong” is used in the moral sense and does not simply refer to a violation of a statute. Stated another way, even if the defendant realized that the act violated the law, the defendant is not criminally liable if, because of a defect of reason, the defendant did not. understand that the act was morally wrong.
10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice — Jury Instruction Quides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 6.02 (4th ed.1999).
Here, Schleicher has an extensive medical history of mental illness. He suffered from severe psychosis, as manifested by, among other things, his delusion that Jo-hannsen was working as an agent of the Chinese government. The trial court concluded that, but for his mental illness, Schleicher would not have killed Johann-sen. The trial court’s words are particularly telling:
The evidence appears overwhelming that the murder of Mr. Johannsen was a direct result of the active delusions that were a major part of Defendant’s mental illness. He would not have killed Mr. Johannsen if he had not been suffering from an active psychotic mental illness. In summary, Defendant’s delusions caused him to increasingly fear and dislike Mr. Johannsen and the delusions led him to kill Mr. Johannsen in a brutal murder.
(Emphasis added.)
Given that the test for knowing right from wrong under section 611.026 encompasses the individual’s ability to know that his actions were morally wrong and given the trial court’s finding that Schleicher’s murder of Johannsen “was a direct result of the active delusions that were a major part of [Schleicher’s] mental illness,” it is not clear to me how Schleicher failed to meet his burden of showing that he did not know that the act of killing Johannsen was wrong.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Page.