Court Opinion

ID: 9679070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:39:49.730108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:09.977734
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gtillis, J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion bases its reversal on the failure of the trial coprt to comply with GrCR 1963, 517.1, an issue not *379raised on appeal and consequently not briefed by the parties.
Because equity cases are still reviewed de novo, Osius v. Dingell (1965), 375 Mich 605, 610, this Court is not powerless to render decision because of the trial court’s failure to comply with GCR 1963, 517.1. This is not a case with involved questions of law and fact which might make special findings of fact and conclusions of law absolutely necessary to appellate review. To the extent plaintiff felt prejudiced by the absence of special findings, she could have made a point of it in the trial court and here. To send this case back to the trial court for further proceedings and a probable second appeal to this Court, with the attendant legal expenses, on a point not suggested by the plaintiff unduly penalizes both parties. "While compliance with GCR 1963, 517.1, would have made our de novo review of this record easier, noncompliance with the rule should not justify our refusal to decide the issues squarely presented by this record and the rulings of the trial judge.
A recounting of the events which precipitated the dissolution of this 20-year marriage would add nothing to the jurisprudence of this State. It is sufficient to say that the testimony showed ample grounds for granting defendant a divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty as set forth in his counterclaim. Based on my examination of the record in this case and making a de novo review of the facts, I would conclude that the trial court properly granted a judgment of divorce to the defendant on his counterclaim. The division of the property is just and equitable considering the fact that the burden of raising the minor children of the parties rested on the defendant.*
*380• I feel constrained to comment on appellant’s-allegation that the trial court erred in speaking personally to the minor children of the parties in chambers without making a record of same and without offering plaintiff or her attorney the opportunity to be present. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were represented by able counsel vigorously attempting to protect the interests of their clients. No attorney was present to represent specifically the interest of the minor children. The court quite properly conducted a private informal interview with the children in an atmosphere calculated to embarrass them least and to remove them from the arena where they might be influenced by the presence of one or both of their parents or a parent’s advocate.; As stated in Bowler v. Bowler (1958), 351 Mich 398, at p 406:
“In disputed custody cases, we believe that sound practice dictates that the judge charged with decision see and talk informally with the child, preferably in chambers, when it is of discretionary age.”
Summarizing my de novo review of the record in this case, I would answer in the negative each of the four issues presented by appellant for our determination and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 Cf. Dean v. Dean (1955), 343 Mich 458.