Court Opinion

ID: 9792548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:30:36.822866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:43.533783
License: Public Domain

Steffen, J.,
with whom Mowbray, J., joins,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but specifically dissent from Part III of the opinion entitled “Sanctions for attorney misconduct.”
My decision to separate myself from my respected colleagues on the question of sanctions was reached advisedly and with a degree of regret. The lack of enthusiasm with which I write is not derived from the position I take; rather, it stems from an awareness that whenever this court seeks to instruct the bar through its opinions, greater effect is achieved when the members of the court are united in their views. My reluctance notwithstanding, I am compelled to dissent because I am convinced that my brethren in the majority have allowed an excess of zeal or preoccupation to possibly — and in my opinion, unnecessarily — jeopardize the *724future of a highly talented prosecutor whose efforts have been of lasting benefit to the state and community which he serves.
I would observe at the outset that I do agree, albeit to a lesser degree than the majority, that improper argument occurred in this case. Under our prior rulings, the prosecutor did inch his way beyond what this court has approved in those areas identified by the majority. Nevertheless, I also agree that the prosecutor’s inappropriate argument failed to reach a level that deprived Howard of fundamental fairness in the overall trial. Indeed, neither defense counsel nor the trial judge perceived the need to interfere with Mr. Seaton’s argument, a point that I shall presently address.
I am firmly of the opinion that a trial judge has the responsibility to control courtroom proceedings, including the conduct of trial counsel. Moreover, counsel has an obligation to object to comments or actions by opposing counsel whenever their effect may be considered to be prejudicial or otherwise deserving of an objection and perhaps a request for an admonition by the judge. Trial counsel will often withhold objections for tactical reasons, concluding that an objection may appear offensive to the jury or at least an unnecessary annoyance. In any event, for whatever reason, defense counsel was uninspired to object to the comments which this court seizes upon as a final straw.1 More importantly, however, the veteran trial judge who presided over the trial was unmoved by the prosecutor’s remarks. I find it somewhat unseemly for this court to refer the prosecutor to the embarrassing stigma and ordeal of a bar discipline proceeding when neither *725the trial judge nor defense counsel was motivated to find fault with the prosecutor’s conduct. It is the trial judge who should refer trial counsel who are clearly deserving of such sanctions to a bar discipline board, just as we should refer appellate counsel who are similarly deserving. I find it highly anomalous that this court, which apparently has found no basis for criticizing the control of the trial arena by the presiding trial judge, nevertheless perceives the prosecutor’s conduct as being sufficiently egregious to warrant the supervening sanctions imposed by the majority.
. I am also concerned that the majority’s preoccupation has reached a crescendo prematurely. I am quite willing to acknowledge Mr. Seaton’s obvious dislike for certain of this court’s rulings and his obstinate disregard of our previous admonitions. Moreover, I am not entirely without sympathy for the majority’s *726unwillingness to continue dancing to the same tune. On the other hand, I am not entirely convinced that Mr. Seaton’s seeming recalcitrance is more reflective of disdain for this court’s rulings than it is the product of a prosecutorial zeal that is characteristic of his efforts. It in fact may involve an element of both. As Mr. Seaton himself has explained to this court, there are times when the heat of battle will produce some outpourings that, under more quiescent settings, would never reach human ears. And yet, I have sufficient regard for Mr. Seaton’s intelligence and control mechanisms to believe that if he truly concentrated on the inner periphery of acceptable argument as opposed to its outer limits beyond which the temptation to travel is obviously great, he could readily and effectively eliminate future sources of conflict with this court.
In short, I would have voted to meet with Mr. Seaton personally in an atmosphere of reason and respect to discuss our mutual concerns and differences. My respect and appreciation for his efforts of the past and the talent and commitment he brings to the prosecutor’s office would cause me to accord him nothing less. The people of Nevada are indeed fortunate to have men and women of Mr. Seaton’s caliber serving as prosecutors and defenders in our criminal justice system. In many instances, they could vastly improve their situations financially by entering the private practice of law. Although this court must be vigilant in exacting high ethical standards of practice from our attorneys both in the public and private sectors of the law, we must also be careful not to overreact to the point of discouraging public service where it is not truly warranted. My own experience on the bench causes me to believe that judges in particular ought to be wary and introspective before casting stones capable of inflicting injury or impairing careers when questions of judgment rather than honesty are at stake.
For the reasons set forth above, I do not agree with the majority’s sense of justice concerning Mr. Seaton and therefore dissent from the aspect of the majority’s opinion. I do, however, concur in the result of the opinion insofar as it affirms the judgment of the district court.

 It is clear from the majority opinion that the harsh sanction imposed against Mr. Seaton is calculated to exact payment for sins both past and present. In that regard, it would appear that the beleaguered prosecutor is actually being subjected to double punishment for historical conduct that has been previously criticized and otherwise addressed by this court.
Another reason why I believe the metaphorical “camel’s back” should have endured the latest burden from Mr. Seaton is that I have seen conduct far more egregious passing muster in other courts. As an example, one need not look beyond the case of Darden v. State, 329 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1976). Some of the comments from the prosecutor included the following:
“The second part of the trial I will request that you impose the death penalty. I will ask you to advise the Court to give him death. That’s the only way that I know that he is not going to get out on the public. It’s the only way I know. It’s the only way I can be sure of it . . . .”
“I don’t know, he said on final argument I wouldn’t lie, as God is my witness, I wouldn’t lie. Well, let me tell you something: If I am ever over in that chair over there, facing life or death, I guarantee you I will lie until my teeth fall out. ”
“/ wish he [the victim] had had a shotgun in his hand when he walked in the back door and blown his [the defendant’s] face off. I wish that I *725could see him sitting here with no face, blown away by a shotgun, but he didn’t.”
I wish someone had walked in the back door and blown his [the defendant’s] head off at that point. ”
Id. at 289-290 (emphasis in original).
Justice Sundberg, in his dissent, included some of the following comments from the prosecutor:
“He [the defendant who was out of prison on a brief furlough when he committed the crimes] shouldn’t be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him and a prison guard at the other end of that leash.”
“[A]nd he [the defendant] fired in the boy’s back, number five, saving one [bullet]. Didn’t get a chance to use it. I wish he had used it on himself. ...”
“. . . And Mr. Darden saved one. Again, I wish he had used it on himself. ...”
In asserting that the appellant had attempted to change his appearance subsequent to the date of the crimes the prosecutor concluded with the remark, “The only thing he hasn’t done that I know of is cut his throat.”
Id. at 291, 292-293 (dissenting opinion).
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the quoted remarks were fair comments by the prosecutor. Id. at 290. In Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1985), the United States Supreme Court characterized the prosecutor’s remarks as “improper,” but concluded that they did not deprive Darden of a fair trial and that the “argument did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implicate other specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent.” Id. at 180-82.
I burden the reader with the Darden history only because it is illustrative of a more tempered approach to a trial record reflecting improper prosecu-torial argument. I am of the opinion that justice would have been served if this court had simply analyzed the prosecutor’s remarks in the instant case, determined their propriety and whether they deprived Howard of a fair trial.