Court Opinion

ID: 9743647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:39:28.586652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:51.636801
License: Public Domain

*488Arterburn, J.
Appellant was charged by affidavits with two counts of robbery. There was no trial on either charge of robbery. The only issue considered by the trial court was the mental capacity of the appellant to stand trial. A hearing on the issue resulted in the following order by the trial court:
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the defendant Theon Jackson be and hereby is committed to the Indiana Division of Mental Health to be confined until such time that the Division of Mental Health shall certify to this Court that the defendant is sane.”
The evidence at the hearing, which was conducted to determine appellant’s capacity to stand trial, consisted mostly of the testimony of two psychiatrists the trial court had appointed to examine the appellant. Their examination revealed that appellant was a deaf mute with a moderately severe intellectual defect. Both psychiatrists were of the opinion that appellant could neither understand the nature of the charges against him nor adequately participate in preparing his own defense. Appellant was found to be illiterate, which, when combined with his deaf mute condition, presented a major communication gap. Appellant’s mental retardation, or feeble-mindedness as one of the experts termed it, was such that his ability to learn sign language, or to learn to read or write, or both, was doubtful. Further testimony revealed that if appellant were to gain sufficient comprehension to stand trial it would be only as a result of developing a means of communication. But even then there was some doubt expressed as to whether appellant would be able to comprehend the charges.
The trial court, in ordering appellant’s examination and confinement, acted pursuant to Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-1706a (1969 Cum. Supp.) which reads as follows:
“Commitment before trial — Subsequent actions. — When at any time before the trial of any criminal cause or during the progress thereof and before the final submission of the cause to the court or jury trying the same, the court, either *489from his own knowledge or upon the suggestion of any person, has reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be insane, he shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine the question of the defendant’s sanity and shall appoint two (2) .competent disinterested physicians who shall examine the defendant upon the question of his sanity and testify concerning the same at the hearing. At the hearing, other evidence may be introduced to prove the defendant’s sanity or insanity. If the court shall find that the defendant has comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the criminal action against him and the proceedings thereon and to make his defense, the trial shall not be delayed or continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of the defendant. If the court shall find that the defendant has not comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense, the trial shall be delayed or continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of the defendant. If the court shall find that the defendant has not comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense, the court shall order the defendant committed to the department of mental health, to be confined by the department in an appropriate psychiatric institution. Whenever the defendant shall become sane the superintendent of the state psychiatric hospital shall certify the fact to the proper court, who shall enter an order on his record directing the sheriff to return the defendant, or the court may enter such order in the first instance whenever he shall be sufficiently advised of the defendant’s restoration to sanity. Upon the return to court of any defendant so committed he or she shall then be placed upon trial for the criminal offense the same as if no delay or postponement had occurred by reason of defendant’s insanity. [Acts 1951, ch. 238, §2, p. 682, ch. 151, §2, p. 329; 1963, ch. 91, § 1, p. 58; 1967 ch. 291, § 2, p. 946.] (Emphasis Added)
It is appellant’s contention that the above quoted statute is inapplicable; that he was denied due process of law; that in view of the unlikelihood of his improvement, he was in effect given a “life sentence”. Appellant further urges that his commitment should properly be to an institute for the feeble-minded and not to an institute for the insane. In this regard appellant would have the appellee first dismiss all charges against the appellant and then make application for appellant’s commitment to an institution for the feebleminded. *490Appellant makes specific reference to Muscatatuck State Hospital and Training Center which was established to provide care for the feebleminded. Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 22-1801, et seq. It appears to us that appellant has failed to understand the statutory mechanisms set up by the legislature as they refer to the Department of Mental Health.
Burns’ § 9-1706a, which we quoted above, requires the appellant be committed to “the department of mental health, to be confined by the department in an appropriate psyehiatric institution.” It is clear that it is the department’s function to determine the appropriate facility for the appellant. The choice does not lie with the appellant. Thus, the appellant is to be confined in “an appropriate psychiatric institution.” Appellant apparently equates the term “psychiatric institution” with the term “insane” and argues that appellant should not be committed to an institution for the insane. The statute is broader in scope than appellant would have us believe. First, an amendment made to § 9-1706a in 1967 is noteworthy. That amendment replaced the phrase “insane hospital” with the present “psychiatric hospital.” That amendment also gave the department more flexibility in dealing with various mental problems by substituting the phrase “the court shall order the defendant committed to the department of mental health, to be confined by the department in an appropriate psychiatric institution” for the phrase “the court shall commit the defendant, whether male or female, to the division for maximum security of the Dr. Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital.” These changes clearly indicate a broadening of the scope of § 9-1706a to meet such problems as the one herein presented by the appellant’s condition. Further, a careful scrutinization of the statutes creating the Department of Mental Health and setting up the mechanism for its functioning clearly dispell appellant’s narrow interpretation.
Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 22-5009 designates the institutions over which the commissioner of the Department of Mental *491Health is to have control. That statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
“The commissioner of mental health shall have administrative control of and responsibility for all the state-owned and operated mental health institutions, including, but not necessarily limited to, the following designated institutions:
(1) Central State Hospital;
(2) Fort Wayne State Hospital and Training Center;
(3) Evansville State Hospital;
(4) New Castle State Hospital;
(5) Richmond State Hospital;
(6) Larue D. Carter Memorial Hospital;
(7) Logansport State Hospital;
(8) Muscatatuck State Hospital and Training Center;
(9) Madison State Hospital;
(10) Dr. Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital;' and
(11) Northern Indiana Children’s Hospital. (Emphasis Added)
It is clear from the above statute that Muscatatuck State Hospital and Training Center is a “mental health institution” and is within the control of the department of mental health. Burns’ § 22-5003 (9) defines a “mental health institution” as any state owned and operated “psychiatric institution” under the control of the department of mental health, Thus, Muscatatuck State Hospital and Training Center is “an appropriate psychiatric institution” within the meaning of the statute (§ 9-1706a) pursuant to which appellant was committed.
From the foregoing it can be seen that the Department of Mental Health, pursuant to § 9-1706a, is to commit appellant to an appropriate institution; that the available scope of institutions, as set out in Burns’ § 22-5009, includes the Muscatatuck State Hospital, the very institute to which appellant aspires; and that the decision concerning the appropriate institution for the appellant is properly to be made by the department. There is nothing to prevent the Department of Mental Health from eventually committing appellant to the institution he now desires. The choice lies within the profes*492sional and expert opinion of the department. It is not for appellant to dictate.
Appellants argument, that the statute in question is unconstitutional because it imprisons appellant possibly for life, must fail. The legislature under its police power may provide for the safety, health, and general welfare. This necessarily includes the confinement, care and treatment of the mentally defective, retarded or insane.
Morgan v. State (1913), 179 Ind. 300, 101 N. E. 6; Marx v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 455, 141 N. E. 2d 126; State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall (1947), 225 Ind. 360, 74 N. E. 2d 914, cert. denied, 333 U. S. 834, 68 S. Ct. 609, 92 L. Ed. 1118, rehearing denied, 333 U. S. 858, 68 S. Ct. 732, 92 L. Ed. 1138.
Judgment Affirmed.
Hunter, C.J., Givan, J., concur; Jackson, J., concurs in result; DeBruler, J., dissents with opinion.