Court Opinion

ID: 9941615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 17:01:12.458049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:48.512485
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14109    Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 02/16/2024   Page: 1 of 11

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-14109
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        DAMIEN DESHAUN DENNIS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00011-TJC-JBT-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-14109     Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 02/16/2024    Page: 2 of 11

        2                     Opinion of the Court                22-14109

        Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
              This case is before us on the government’s motion to dismiss
        Damien Dennis’s direct appeal based on the sentence appeal waiver
        within his plea agreement. Upon review of the record, we grant
        the government’s motion.
            I.    FACTUAL       BACKGROUND           &    PROCEDURAL
                  HISTORY
               In February 2022, a federal grand jury indicted Dennis on
        two counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Counts
        1 and 2), two counts of falsely representing a social security num-
        ber, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (Counts 3 and 4), and
        two counts of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 1028A(a)(1) (Counts 5 and 6). Shortly thereafter, he entered into
        a written plea agreement with the government in which he agreed
        to plead guilty to Counts 1 and 5 in exchange for the government
        dismissing the remaining counts. In the agreement, the govern-
        ment stated that it intended to move for an upward variance at sen-
        tencing. Dennis agreed that, should the court accept the recom-
        mendation, he could not withdraw his plea.
               The agreement included a section entitled “Defendant’s
        Waiver of Right to Appeal Sentence,” which explained that, upon
        entering the plea agreement, Dennis waived his right to appeal his
        sentence “on any ground, including the ground that the Court
        erred in determining the applicable guidelines range pursuant to
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        22-14109               Opinion of the Court                        3

        the United States Sentencing Guidelines.” Dennis reserved the
        right to appeal on “(a) the ground that the sentence exceeds [his]
        applicable guidelines range as determined by the Court pursuant
        to the United States Sentencing Guidelines; (b) the ground that the
        sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty; or (c) the
        ground that the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.” (em-
        phasis in original). Additionally, the agreement provided an excep-
        tion if “the government exercise[d] its right to appeal the sentence
        imposed.” Dennis initialed each page and signed the ﬁnal page.
              As part of the plea agreement, Dennis signed a statement
        which detailed the facts supporting the agreement. He also signed
        a form consenting to the magistrate judge conducting his plea hear-
        ing.
               At his change-of-plea hearing, the magistrate judge placed
        Dennis under oath and advised him that the government could use
        any false statement by him in a perjury prosecution. The magis-
        trate judge advised Dennis of his right to have the district court
        take his plea, and Dennis again consented to having the magistrate
        judge take his plea. Dennis testiﬁed that his highest level of educa-
        tion was the eleventh grade, and that he spoke, read, and under-
        stood English. He stated that he had not taken any medication or
        intoxicants that would aﬀect his ability to understand the proceed-
        ings and, while he had been treated for paranoid schizophrenia
        from 2015 through 2017, he was not currently suﬀering from any
        mental or emotional disease. Dennis’s attorney indicated that he
        had no concerns regarding Dennis’s competency to enter a plea.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14109

                The magistrate judge advised Dennis of the trial rights he
        would be waving by pleading guilty, including the ability to poten-
        tially challenge on appeal any rulings the court made in his case.
        The magistrate judge also advised that Dennis could lose certain
        civil rights by pleading guilty, such as his right to vote, hold public
        oﬃce, serve on juries, and own and possess ﬁrearms and ammuni-
        tion. Dennis conﬁrmed that he understood the waivers he was
        making and the potential consequences of entering the plea.
               Regarding sentencing, the magistrate judge advised Dennis
        that the district court would calculate the applicable sentencing
        guideline range and consider several sentencing factors to deter-
        mine a reasonable sentence. The magistrate judge noted that,
        while the guideline range and any recommended sentence by the
        government would not bind the district court, the statutory mini-
        mums and maximums would. Dennis conﬁrmed that he under-
        stood the terms of the plea agreement and had discussed them
        with his attorney, and that he understood he would be bound by
        his plea, even if the sentence was higher than he expected.
               Dennis conﬁrmed that he had received, read, and reviewed
        the indictment with his attorney. The magistrate judge outlined
        the charges Dennis was pleading guilty to and the elements the
        government would have to prove as to both counts. Dennis con-
        ﬁrmed that he understood the charges and their elements and did
        not have any questions.
              The magistrate judge also advised Dennis that he faced sev-
        eral penalties by pleading guilty, including a maximum prison
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        22-14109               Opinion of the Court                         5

        sentence of 30 years as to Count 1, followed by no more than 5
        years’ supervised release. The magistrate judge further noted that
        Count 5 carried a mandatory minimum two-year sentence, to run
        consecutively with any other term of imprisonment, followed by a
        maximum of one year of supervised release. The magistrate judge
        stated that the cumulative maximum penalties for both counts
        were 32 years’ imprisonment, a $1,250,000 ﬁne, a 5-year term of
        supervised release, and a $200 special assessment. The parties
        agreed that the magistrate judge accurately stated the maximum
        and minimum penalties, and Dennis stated that he understood, had
        discussed these penalties with his attorney, and did not have any
        questions.
               Regarding the plea agreement, Dennis conﬁrmed that he
        had read it, discussed it with his attorney, signed it, and understood
        it. The magistrate judge advised Dennis that the government
        agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in the indictment, but that
        the district court could consider relevant evidence giving rise to
        those charges in computing his guideline range. The magistrate
        judge further advised Dennis that the agreement indicated that the
        government would seek an upward variance, but that the district
        court would not be bound by that request. The magistrate judge
        also advised Dennis that the plea agreement contained a sentence
        appeal waiver, which would waive his right to appeal his sentence
        except in four speciﬁc circumstances: (1) the sentence exceeded his
        guideline range as calculated by the court; (2) the sentence ex-
        ceeded the statutory maximum; (3) the sentence violated the
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14109

        Eighth Amendment; or (4) the government appealed the sentence.
        Dennis stated that he understood.
                Dennis pled guilty to Counts 1 and 5, stated that he under-
        stood the factual proﬀer, and admitted that the facts were true.
        Thus, the magistrate judge found that suﬃcient facts supported the
        guilty plea. Dennis stated that he had not received any promises or
        assurances not reﬂected in the plea agreement, he was satisﬁed
        with his attorney’s representation, and he was not forced, threat-
        ened, coerced, or intimidated into pleading guilty. The magistrate
        judge found that Dennis’s decision to plead guilty was made know-
        ingly, freely, intelligently, and voluntarily, and stated that it would
        recommend that the district court accept his plea. The magistrate
        judge later issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) recom-
        mending the district court accept Dennis’s guilty plea, and Dennis
        was advised that he had fourteen days to object to the R&R. The
        district court ultimately accepted the guilty plea.
                Dennis’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”) calculated
        his base oﬀense level as 7 under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1), and added 4
        levels under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C) because the loss was $20,000,
        added 2 levels under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B) because the oﬀense involved
        a counterfeit driver’s license, and then subtracted 2 levels for ac-
        ceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a), resulting in a total of-
        fense level of 11. The PSI calculated his criminal history category
        at V, which, combined with a total oﬀense level of 11, resulted in a
        guideline sentencing range of 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment for
        Count 1 and a consecutive term of imprisonment of 24 months for
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        22-14109                Opinion of the Court                          7

        Count 5. The PSI stated that the statutory maximum term of im-
        prisonment for Count 1 was 30 years and a consecutive term of 2
        years’ imprisonment for Count 5.
               At sentencing, the district court asked Dennis if he had ob-
        jections to the PSI, and Dennis noted that his prior objections had
        been resolved. The district court then adopted the PSI guideline
        calculations. Next, the government addressed the court, arguing
        for an upward variance due to Dennis’s extensive criminal history,
        high potential of recidivism, the seriousness of his oﬀense, and the
        need for deterrence. The government requested the district court
        impose a 12-year total sentence. Dennis opposed the government’s
        arguments and requested a within guideline sentence.
                The district court granted the government’s motion for an
        upward variance based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and sen-
        tenced him to: (1) a 120-month term for Count 1 to run consecu-
        tively with a 24-month term for Count 5; (2) a 5-year term of su-
        pervised release for Count 1 to run concurrently with a 1-year term
        for Count 5; (3) $20,000 in restitution; and (4) $200 in special assess-
        ments. The court stated that, “[i]n addition to the standard condi-
        tions,” it was imposing the following conditions of supervised re-
        lease: (1) participation in a substance abuse program; (2) participa-
        tion in a mental health treatment program; (3) that he would “be
        subject to a search condition”; (4) prohibition from incurring new
        credit or obligating himself to major purchases without approval;
        and (5) that he would have to provide ﬁnancial information to the
        probation oﬃcer upon request. The court further required Dennis
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        8                           Opinion of the Court                  22-14109

        to submit to DNA collection and periodic drug testing. The district
        court asked if either party objected to the sentence, and neither
        party objected. The court noted that Dennis had fourteen days to
        appeal and that he was entitled to counsel.
               The district court entered judgment reﬂecting its sentence,
        including the ﬁve additional conditions of supervised release that
        the court pronounced at sentencing. The judgment also listed thir-
        teen “standard” conditions of supervised release.
               After Dennis ﬁled his notice of appeal, his counsel ﬁled a
        motion to withdraw, and Dennis was appointed new counsel on
        appeal. Appointed counsel ﬁled an Anders 1 motion and brief, as-
        serting that there were no non-frivolous issues for appeal. A panel
        of this Court denied the Anders motion and ordered merits brieﬁng
        as to whether the district court erroneously failed to pronounce the
        standard conditions of supervised release at Dennis’s sentencing
        hearing. Now, the government moves to dismiss Dennis’s appeal
        due to the appeal waiver in his plea agreement.
            II.     ANALYSIS
                We do not review issues a party fails to raise in their initial
        brief. United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1125 (11th Cir. 2015).
        We review de novo a sentence appeal waiver’s validity. United States
        v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence appeal
        waiver is enforceable if it was made knowingly and voluntarily. Id.
        To establish that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily,

        1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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        22-14109               Opinion of the Court                        9

        the government must show either that: “(1) the district court spe-
        ciﬁcally questioned the defendant about the waiver; or (2) the rec-
        ord makes clear that the defendant otherwise understood the full
        signiﬁcance of the waiver.” Id. (citing United States v. Bushert, 997
        F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993)).
               “[T]he touchstone for assessing” whether a defendant en-
        tered a waiver knowingly and voluntarily is whether the district
        court “clearly conveyed to the defendant that he was giving up his
        right to appeal under most circumstances.” United States v. Boyd,
        975 F.3d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020) (brackets and emphasis omit-
        ted) (quoting Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1352-53). An appeal waiver may
        waive “the right to appeal diﬃcult or debatable legal issues or even
        blatant error.” Id. at 1191 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
        Further, even “a vigorous dispute about an issue during the sen-
        tencing proceedings does not preserve that issue for appeal when
        the terms of the appeal waiver do not except it from the waiver.”
        United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 2006).
               However, a sentence appeal waiver does not completely bar
        appellate review because review may be available despite a valid
        appeal waiver when the defendant was “sentenced entirely at the
        whim of the district court,” above the statutory maximum, or
        based on a constitutionally impermissible factor. Johnson, 541 F.3d
        at 1068 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have also noted
        that extreme circumstances, “for instance, if the district court had
        sentenced [the defendant] to a public ﬂogging,” may implicate due
        process and require that the defendant be allowed to appeal despite
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-14109

        a valid appeal waiver. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Nev-
        ertheless, a defendant is “free to bargain away his right to raise con-
        stitutional issues” on appeal. Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1297.
               Dennis argues that the district court violated his Fifth
        Amendment right to due process by failing to inform him at his
        sentencing hearing that he would also be subjected to thirteen
        “standard” conditions of supervised release, and by failing to make
        an individualized assessment as to whether those conditions were
        necessary. Notably, he does not argue that his sentence exceeded
        the guideline range as calculated by the court, exceeded the statu-
        tory maximum, or violated the Eighth Amendment. In response,
        the government contends that, in his plea agreement, Dennis
        waived the right to raise this argument on appeal.
               We grant the government’s motion to dismiss. The record
        shows that Dennis knowingly and voluntarily entered into the ap-
        peal waiver contained within his plea agreement, and none of his
        arguments fall within the narrow exceptions that would allow him
        to appeal. The magistrate judge, with Dennis’s consent, accepted
        the guilty plea and thoroughly explained to Dennis the conse-
        quences of entering the plea, including the appeal waiver. Dennis’s
        responses clearly indicated that he understood the appeal wavier
        and intended to enter into the plea agreement. Johnson, 541 F.3d at
        1066; Boyd, 975 F.3d at 1192. Although Dennis arguably preserved
        the right to appeal his sentence as being above the guideline rage
        calculated in the PSI, he does not raise that issue in his appeal, and
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        22-14109              Opinion of the Court                      11

        we will not consider it sua sponte. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1125. As
        such, Dennis’s appeal waiver is valid and enforceable.
           III.    CONCLUSION
              For the reasons set forth above, we GRANT the govern-
        ment’s motion to dismiss Dennis’s appeal.