Court Opinion

ID: 9885798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 14:06:21.996167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:24.824218
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 29, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                            Court of Appeals
                               NO. 2022-CA-1533-MR

WESLEY STOVER                                                            APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE AUDRA J. ECKERLE, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 17-CI-003004

LOUISVILLE METRO DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND
WELLNESS AND
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY
METRO GOVERNMENT                                                          APPELLEES

                                      OPINION
                                     AFFIRMING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND COMBS, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Wesley Stover (“Appellant”) appeals from an

opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment in

favor of Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness and

Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (“Appellees”). Appellant argues

that the circuit court erred in failing to find that he engaged in activities protected
by Kentucky’s Whistleblower Act,1 and that the termination of his employment for

falsifying his time records was a mere pretext for his wrongful termination. He

seeks an opinion reversing the order on appeal. After careful review, we find no

error and affirm the opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.

                        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                This matter was previously before a panel of this Court in Stover v.

Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness, No. 2018-CA-

000054-MR, 2019 WL 258123 (Ky. App. Jan. 18, 2019). The panel in that appeal

stated the facts as follows:

                      From January 2001 through November 18, 2016,
                Stover was employed as manager of the information
                technology section of the Department of Public Health
                and Wellness, a division of Metro Government. In June
                2017, he filed a verified complaint against the
                Department and Metro Government for wrongful
                termination and violation of Kentucky’s Whistleblower
                Act, KRS 61.101, et seq.

                        In his complaint, Stover alleged that he requested
                the facilities department to remove ceiling tiles in his
                workspace in January 2016. According to Stover, the
                tiles appeared to be tar-stained as a result of years of
                cigarette smoke. When tested, the tiles were discovered
                to contain asbestos. Stover alleged that he informed his
                supervisor and the interim director of his department of
                the asbestos-ridden tiles in March. Stover contacted the
                facilities department in April and again in July to inquire
                about a timeline for replacement of the tiles. In
                September, Stover and his supervisor were informed that

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 61.101 et seq.

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the ceiling tiles would not be replaced during the fiscal
year. Stover complained again in September and October
about the asbestos. In his civil action, Stover alleged that
he disclosed to his supervisor that he would file a federal
or state OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Act)
complaint if the tiles were not promptly removed.

      Stover was discharged in November after it was
discovered that his electronic badge entry history did not
match his timesheets. Pursuant to Metro Government’s
personnel policy, Stover appealed the termination
decision. He provided several explanations for the
discrepancies between his timesheets and the badge entry
reports. He also complained that other department
employees had similar discrepancies between their
timesheets and badge entry reports but that no action had
been taken against them. Stover’s appeal was denied.

      He then appealed to the Metro Government’s
human resources department. Following a hearing, the
hearing officer concluded that termination of Stover’s
employment was justified and denied the second appeal.
Stover alleged that the charge that he had falsified his
time sheets was a pretext for the discharge and that his
announcement that he intended to file an OSHA
complaint contributed to the Department’s decision to
terminate his employment. In Count I of his complaint,
Stover alleged that his discharge under these
circumstances violated provisions of Kentucky’s
Whistleblower Act.

       In Count II of his verified complaint, Stover
alleged that he was wrongfully discharged after he made
an open records request in November 2016. This request
pertained to an incident involving the Department of
Public Health and Wellness information technology staff
and the Metro Government’s technology department.
Stover alleged that his superiors were “furious” that he
had made the request. In his complaint, Stover claimed

                            -3-
               that this open records request was another contributing
               factor in the decision to terminate his employment.

                      On July 5, 2017, the Department of Public Health
               and Wellness and Metro Government filed a motion to
               dismiss Stover’s claim of wrongful discharge pursuant to
               the provisions of [Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
               (CR)] 12.02(f) (failure to state a claim upon which relief
               may be granted). The government entities contended that
               Stover’s common law action was barred by principles of
               sovereign immunity.

                     On July 14, 2017, the Department of Public Health
               and Wellness and Metro Government filed a motion to
               dismiss Count I of Stover’s complaint as well. The
               government entities argued that Stover’s claim under the
               provisions of Kentucky’s Whistleblower Act was
               preempted and that his remedy, if any, was recourse to
               the specific provisions of Kentucky’s Occupational
               Safety and Health Act providing for reinstatement and
               back pay.

                      Following oral argument, the circuit court ordered
               that both counts of the complaint be dismissed with
               prejudice since Stover had failed to state a claim upon
               which relief may be granted. Stover’s motion to alter,
               amend or vacate was denied by order entered on
               December 8, 2017.

Id. at *1-2.

               Appellant then filed his first appeal, arguing that the circuit court

erred in dismissing both counts of his complaint. On January 18, 2019, the panel

hearing that appeal vacated and remanded as to Count I of the complaint, upon

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finding that his Whistleblower claim was not preempted by KRS 338.121(3)(b).2

The panel affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal as to Count II, alleging common

law wrongful discharge, because the claim was barred by sovereign immunity.

              On remand, the Jefferson Circuit Court considered Appellant’s claim

under Count I that he was wrongfully terminated under the Whistleblower Act.

After discovery was conducted, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment.

The motion was denied. Appellees then moved to reconsider, resulting in a

November 30, 2022 opinion and order granting the motion for summary judgment.

In support of the opinion and order, the Jefferson Circuit Court found that

Appellees had provided ample evidence that they were aware of the asbestos

problem in the building and were actively taking steps to abate the problem. Based

on this finding, the court determined that Appellant,

              simply cannot qualify as a whistleblower for pointing out
              an obvious problem of which his employer was aware
              and was addressing merely because he did not approve of
              the speed of the project. He also failed to provide an
              expert opinion to support his theory. And he did not
              rebut Metro’s uncontroverted evidence of knowledge and
              work to remediate. Accordingly, he is unable to make a
              prima facie case and the Court must grant summary
              judgment for Metro.

This appeal followed.

2
 KRS 338.121 established a cause of action for an employee who suffers discrimination or
discharge from employment for requesting an occupational safety and health inspection or filing
an action alleging an occupational safety and health violation.

                                              -5-
                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” CR 56.03. “The record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his

favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.

1991). Summary judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the

nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in

his favor. Id. “Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the

motion may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there

is any issue of material fact.” Id. Finally, “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a

summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no

genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.

1996).

                         ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

             Appellant argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court erred in granting

Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. He maintains that he engaged in

                                          -6-
activities protected by the Kentucky Whistleblower Act, and that his termination

from employment for falsifying his time records was a mere pretext for his

wrongful termination. Appellant directs our attention to KRS 61.102(1), which

states:

             No employer shall subject to reprisal, or directly or
             indirectly use, or threaten to use, any official authority or
             influence, in any manner whatsoever, which tends to
             discourage, restrain, depress, dissuade, deter, prevent,
             interfere with, coerce, or discriminate against any
             employee who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges,
             or otherwise brings to the attention of the Kentucky
             Legislative Ethics Commission, the Attorney General,
             the Auditor of Public Accounts, the Executive Branch
             Ethics Commission, the General Assembly of the
             Commonwealth of Kentucky or any of its members or
             employees, the Legislative Research Commission or any
             of its committees, members or employees, the judiciary
             or any member or employee of the judiciary, any law
             enforcement agency or its employees, or any other
             appropriate body or authority, any facts or information
             relative to an actual or suspected violation of any law,
             statute, executive order, administrative regulation,
             mandate, rule, or ordinance of the United States, the
             Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any of its political
             subdivisions, or any facts or information relative to actual
             or suspected mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of
             authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
             health or safety. No employer shall require any
             employee to give notice prior to making such a report,
             disclosure, or divulgence.

             Appellant argues that he filed a complaint asserting violations of KRS

61.102; that he satisfied the elements of the statute and the supportive case law;

and that, at a minimum, genuine issues of material fact exist sufficient to overcome

                                         -7-
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. He also points to Consolidated

Infrastructure Management Authority, Inc. v. Allen, 269 S.W.3d 852 (Ky. 2008),

wherein the plaintiff successfully brought an action under the Whistleblower Act

when his employment was terminated after he threatened to contact OSHA

regarding his workplace environment. Appellant asserts that the facts of Allen

mirror those of his claim and bolster his contention that summary judgment was

not warranted. Lastly, Appellant argues that the purported reason for his

termination, i.e., falsifying his work time records, was a mere pretext because

dozens of other employees engaged in the same sign in/sign out procedure with no

discipline having been taken.

             The elements for a wrongful discharge claim under the Whistleblower

Act are set out in Davidson v. Commonwealth, Department of Military Affairs, 152

S.W.3d 247, 251 (Ky. App. 2004). A panel if this Court stated:

                    In order to demonstrate a violation of KRS 61.102,
             an employee must establish the following four elements:
             (1) the employer is an officer of the state; (2) the
             employee is employed by the state; (3) the employee
             made or attempted to make a good faith report or
             disclosure of a suspected violation of state or local law to
             an appropriate body or authority; and (4) the employer
             took action or threatened to take action to discourage the
             employee from making such a disclosure or to punish the
             employee for making such a disclosure. The employee
             must show by a preponderance of evidence that the
             disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel
             action. The burden of proof is then on the state employer
             to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

                                         -8-
             disclosure was not a material fact in the personnel action.

Davidson, 152 S.W.3d at 251 (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations

omitted).

             In granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the Jefferson

Circuit Court determined that Appellant was not properly characterized as a

whistleblower because he merely pointed out an obvious problem of which his

employer was aware and was addressing; because he failed to provide an expert

opinion to support his theory; and, because he did not rebut Appellees’

uncontroverted evidence of knowledge and work to remediate the asbestos

problem.

             Having closely examined the record and the law, including the well-

written arguments of counsel, we agree with the Jefferson Circuit Court that

Appellant cannot be properly characterized as a whistleblower per KRS 61.102 and

Davidson. According to the record, on January 11, 2016, Appellant requested that

the facilities department of Metro Government remove the ceiling tiles at

Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness because they appeared

to be tar-stained from many years of smoking in the building. On March 16, 2016,

a private corporation called Environmental Health Management produced its

results from air samples tested in the affected area. It determined that though the

tiles contained asbestos, the workspace was safe for occupancy per the relevant

                                         -9-
United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) guidelines. This

conclusion was later bolstered by Appellees’ asbestos expert, Douglas W. Peters.

Evidence was adduced that on the same day the air testing was completed,

Appellant was informed via email that the results were within the acceptable

asbestos levels per the EPA guidelines.

             Thereafter, Louisville Metro government undertook a plan to replace

the ceiling tiles and remediate the asbestos even though the air samples were

within safe levels. Because of budgetary constraints, the remediation project could

not be completed by the end of calendar year 2016. As 2016 progressed, Appellant

continued to press for quicker remediation and threatened to file an OSHA

complaint. On November 15, 2016, Appellant filed an open records request

relating to the remediation program. Three days later, his employment was

terminated on the claim that he was falsifying his timesheets.

             Appellant satisfied elements 1 and 2 of Davidson, supra, i.e., he

demonstrated that he and his employer fell within the scope of the Whistleblower

Act. Appellees do not contest this assertion. Appellant cannot, however, satisfy

the third element requiring proof that he “made or attempted to make a good faith

report or disclosure of a suspected violation of state or local law to an appropriate

body or authority[.]” Davidson, 152 S.W.3d at 251. After Appellant complained

to his superior of what he characterized as tar-stained ceiling tiles, the air quality

                                          -10-
was tested by an independent third party and Appellant was informed that the air

quality fell within EPA guidelines for occupancy. Thus, Appellant knew early on

that there was no violation of state or local law relating to either asbestos or air

quality. As there was no underlying violation of state or local law, Appellant

cannot satisfy the third element of Davidson.

             Adverse employment action against an employee is actionable under

the Whistleblower Act and Davidson only if it results from the employee’s good

faith report or disclosure of a suspected violation of state or local law. Id. Within

weeks of his initial complaint to his superior, on March 16, 2016, Appellant was

informed that the air quality had been independently tested and complied with EPA

guidelines. Because he was aware of this fact, his complaining and threats of

OSHA action after March 16, 2016, cannot be characterized as having been made

in good faith per Davidson. Further, and as properly noted by the circuit court in

its order granting summary judgment, Appellant produced no expert testimony to

rebut the March 16, 2016 air quality test result. Thus, Appellant knew or should

have known from March 16, 2016, until his termination from employment on

November 18, 2016, that there was no underlying violation of state or local law.

Since there was no violation of state or local law to expose, Appellant cannot be

characterized as a whistleblower. The Jefferson Circuit Court properly so found.

                                          -11-
Having determined that Appellant is not a whistleblower per KRS 61.102, his

claim that his termination resulted from a mere ruse or pretext is moot.

                                  CONCLUSION

             When the record is viewed in a light most favorable to Appellant and

all doubts are resolved in his favor, Steelvest, supra, the Jefferson Circuit Court

correctly concluded that Appellant is not a whistleblower per KRS 61.102. The

circuit court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material

fact, and that Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres, supra.

For these reasons, we affirm the opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court

granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

 Oliver H. Barber, Jr.                     John F. Carroll
 Louisville, Kentucky                      Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
                                           Louisville, Kentucky

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