Court Opinion

ID: 9373881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:09:41.382528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.712996
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-12095   Document: 54-1    Date Filed: 02/22/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 21-12095
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       STEPHANIE NORMAN,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       H. LEE MOFFITT CANCER CENTER AND
       RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC.,
       d.b.a. Moffitt Cancer Center,

                                                 Defendant-Appellee.
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12095

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-02430-WFJ-CPT
                           ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Appellant Stephanie Norman, proceeding pro se, appeals the
       grant of summary judgment to the Moffitt Cancer Center, her for-
       mer employer, on her claims of interference, disability discrimina-
       tion, and retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act
       (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617(a); the Americans with
       Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12203(a); and the
       Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”), Fla. Stat. §§ 760.10(1),
       (7). Norman argues that the district court erred in dismissing her
       suit without considering her evidence on the matter. After review-
       ing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district
       court’s order granting summary judgment to the Moffitt Cancer
       Center.
                                         I.
              When appropriate, we review a district court’s order grant-
       ing summary judgment de novo, “viewing all the evidence, and
       drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving
       party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th
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       21-12095                 Opinion of the Court                           3

       Cir. 2005). We can affirm the district court's judgment on any basis
       supported by the record, “regardless of whether the district court
       decided the case on that basis.” Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Mi-
       ami Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2019).
               We construe pro se pleadings liberally, Tannenbaum v.
       United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998); however, pro
       se litigants are required to comply with applicable procedural rules.
       Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation
       omitted). We consider forfeited an issue that was not raised in the
       district court and is raised for the first time on appeal in a civil case,
       and we will not address its merits absent extraordinary circum-
       stances. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324,
       1331-32 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860,
       873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), petition for cert. denied, 143 S. Ct.
       95 (2022). Further, an appellant abandons an issue if she fails to
       raise it prominently in an opening appellate brief. Sapuppo v. All-
       state Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680-82 (11th Cir. 2014).
              Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and evi-
       dence of record show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
       material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
       law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial bur-
       den of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
       identifying those portions of [the evidentiary record] which it be-
       lieves demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
       Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553
       (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). If the moving party meets its
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12095

       initial burden, the nonmovant must then show that a genuine dis-
       pute exists regarding any issue for which she will bear the burden
       of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553.
       The nonmovant can withstand a summary judgment motion by
       establishing that “based on the evidence in the record, there can be
       more than one reasonable conclusion as to the proper verdict.”
       Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999).
                                        II.
              The FMLA creates two types of claims -- interference claims
       and retaliation claims. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)–(2); O'Connor v. PCA
       Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2000). To
       establish a prima facie FMLA interference claim, an employee must
       show, inter alia, that she was entitled to a benefit under the FMLA
       that was denied. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); Drago v. Jenne, 453
       F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff is not denied a benefit
       under the FMLA when she receives all the leave she requests, how-
       ever. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1275
       (11th Cir. 1999). Moreover, where an employer did not deny leave
       time, the plaintiff cannot establish an FMLA interference claim,
       even when the employer terminated her and prevented her from
       the continued use of such leave. Munoz v. Selig Enters., Inc.,
       981 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2020).
              To establish an FMLA retaliation claim, an employee must
       show her employer intentionally discriminated against her for ex-
       ercising a right guaranteed under the FMLA. Strickland v. Water
       Works and Sewer Bd. of City of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1207
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       21-12095                Opinion of the Court                          5

       (11th Cir. 2001). Unlike an interference claim, an employee bring-
       ing a retaliation claim faces the increased burden of showing her
       employer’s actions “were motivated by an impermissible retalia-
       tory or discriminatory animus.” Id. (citation omitted).
              The ADA provides that no employer shall discriminate
       against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in discharging
       its employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination under the ADA
       includes the failure to make a reasonable accommodation to the
       known physical or mental limitations of the individual. Id.
       § 12112(b)(5)(A). To support a claim of discrimination under the
       ADA, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that she is a disa-
       bled person. Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1255-56 (11th
       Cir. 2007).
              An employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate a disa-
       bled individual is itself discrimination. Id. at 1262. However, to
       “trigger an employer’s duty to provide a reasonable accommoda-
       tion, the employee must (1) make a specific demand for an accom-
       modation and (2) demonstrate that such accommodation is reason-
       able.” Owens v. Governor's Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th
       1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2022) (applying ADA principles in Rehabilita-
       tion Act case).
              The ADA also provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate
       against any individual because such individual has opposed any act
       or practice made unlawful by this chapter . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
       § 12203(a). Because this provision creates a prohibition on retalia-
       tion under the ADA that is similar to the prohibition on retaliation
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                 21-12095

       found in Title VII, courts should evaluate ADA retaliation claims
       under the same framework used for Title VII retaliation claims.
       See Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d
       1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997). To support a claim for retaliation un-
       der the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in statuto-
       rily protected conduct, (2) she suffered an adverse action, and (3)
       there was a causal link between the adverse action and her pro-
       tected conduct. Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1260–
       61 (11th Cir. 2001) (summary judgment case).
              The FCRA forbids employers from “discriminat[ing] against
       any individual ... because of such individual's . . . handicap . . . .”
       Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). The FCRA also prohibits employers from
       discriminating against any person because that person has opposed
       any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under the
       law. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7).
                                        III.
              The record in this case demonstrates that the district court
       did not err in granting the Moffitt Cancer Center’s properly sup-
       ported motion for summary judgment. After the Moffitt Cancer
       Center moved for summary judgment, Norman had an oppor-
       tunity to provide evidence supporting her claims or to argue why
       the evidence in the record supported her claims. She failed to do
       so; rather, she filed a short pro se response, accompanied by copies
       of two letters she had written, neither of which provided evidence
       to defeat the motion for summary judgment. One letter requested
       notification of her deposition transcript, and one letter requested
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       21-12095               Opinion of the Court                        7

       information from her former counsel regarding her inquiries with
       social security and the Internal Revenue Service. The district court
       warned her that if she did not properly respond to the motion it
       could deem the motion unopposed. Because Norman failed to re-
       spond to the motion, she has failed to preserve for appeal any ar-
       guments in opposition to the grant of summary judgment.
               Additionally, we conclude that, even if she had preserved ar-
       guments for appeal, she fails to challenge on appeal several of the
       district court’s findings supporting summary judgment. Thus, she
       has abandoned those points. Accordingly, based on the aforemen-
       tioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s order granting sum-
       mary judgment to the Moffitt Cancer Center on Norman’s claims.
             AFFIRMED.