Court Opinion

ID: 9669461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:56:46.605022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:56.893518
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent only from that part of the opinion that holds that the misconduct of the jury in this case was prejudicial as a matter of law and, for that reason, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
In his statement to the police, the defendant, Trammell, said that he had observed the burglary from the top of a hill north of Cornhusker Highway, at a point “[bjetween Cornhusker and Superior.”
Officer Nelson, on cross-examination, testified that he did not believe parts of the statement which the defendant had made to him. Specifically, Nelson said he did not believe
[t]he part where [Trammell] described a hill near some houses. That hill would have been close enough for him to run there, to move quickly from the hill to where the crime was . . . taking place, but that it was closer to Superior or because he knew Superior. 20th and Cornhusker is not really a hilly part of Lincoln.
(Emphasis supplied.)
At the hearing on the motion for new trial one of the jurors, Doris Ward, testified that she lives 3 miles north and a half mile west of 14th and Superior Streets. She uses Cornhusker Highway quite often to go home. On her way home she drove by the site of the burglary. On the next morning, during the deliberations of the jury, she reported her observations to the other members of the jury. This is the misconduct of the jury that, according to the majority, requires the judgment to be reversed.
At the outset, it is far from clear that the defendant and Officer Nelson were talking about the same location. The defendant described a hill somewhere “[b]etween Cornhusker and Superior.” Officer Nelson was describing the area at “20th *739and Cornhusker,” the location where the burglary itself occurred.
In this case, the question as to whether there was a hill near the crime scene was a collateral matter which was not an issue in the case. Although Officer Nelson’s testimony indicates that he was not aware of the presence of a hill near the site of the burglary, the defendant’s description of such a hill was an insignificant collateral detail in the statement which the defendant gave to police. That statement described the defendant’s involvement in the burglary and provided ample evidence to support the conviction irrespective of the existence or nonexistence of the hill in question.
While the majority holds that the juror’s observation of a hill “tended ... to corroborate his whole confession,” the observation is trivial in comparison to the other corroboratory evidence which was presented to the jury. In a portion of Trammell’s confession which was read to the jury, Trammell recounts concealing “at least three cases or more” of stolen beer and “more than 30” bottles of stolen whiskey at his residence. This confessional evidence is corroborated by the undisputed testimony of the two police officers, who recovered the stolen beer and liquor from the very place within the Trammell residence where the defendant confessed that he had stored it. Certainly that evidence was far superior in corroborating the truthfulness of the defendant’s confession when compared to a juror’s observation of a hill near the crime scene. Consequently, when viewed in the context of the entire record before us, the juror’s actions were inconsequential, and the juror’s conduct could not be said to have prejudiced the rights of the defendant as a matter of law.
For a juror’s unauthorized inspection of an alleged crime scene to be sufficient to vitiate a conviction, it must be shown to have related to a matter in dispute and to have influenced the jury in arriving at a verdict. Phillips v. State, 157 Neb. 419, 59 N.W.2d 598 (1953). See, also, State v. Woodward, 210 Neb. 740, 316 N.W.2d 759 (1982). Where the trial court has determined that an unauthorized inspection of the crime scene was not prejudicial to the rights of the defendant, ordinarily its finding will not be disturbed by the appellate court in the *740absence of an abuse of discretion. Id.
An error is harmless if, on review of the entire record, it did not influence the jury in a verdict adverse to a substantial right of the defendant. State v. Christian, 237 Neb. 294, 465 N.W.2d 756 (1991).
The evidence of guilt in this case is overwhelming. The defendant was charged with aiding the consummation of a felony by intentionally aiding another to secrete, disguise, or convert the proceeds of the burglary at the Star City Eagles Club, 2050 Cornhusker Highway, Lincoln, Nebraska, on November 5, 1986. There is no serious dispute in the evidence concerning any of the elements of this crime. The evidence of the State was uncontradicted. Under these circumstances, I believe it is impossible to conclude that the misconduct of the jury was prejudicial as a matter of law.
I would affirm.
Hastings, C. J., joins in this dissent.