Court Opinion

ID: 9963199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 19:00:52.669804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:42.606476
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-4122

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        PERCY LEROY JACOBS, a/k/a Percy El Jacobs, a/k/a Percy Jacobs El, a/k/a
        Minister Percy El Jacobs,

                            Defendant - Appellant,

                                              No. 23-4123

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        SANDRA DENISE CURL, a/k/a Sandra Curl Jacobs, a/k/a Sandra Curl-Jacobs El,
        a/k/a Minister Sandra El,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
        George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:19-cr-00444-GJH-2; 8:19-cr-00444-GJH-1)
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        Submitted: December 15, 2023                                      Decided: April 23, 2024

        Before WILKINSON, KING, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Brent Evan Newton, Gaithersburg, Maryland; Marc G. Hall, Greenbelt,
        Maryland, for Appellants. David A. Hubbert, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, S.
        Robert Lyons, Chief, Criminal Appeals & Tax Enforcement Policy Section, Katie Bagley,
        Joseph B. Syverson, Hannah Cook, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.;
        Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               Percy Leroy Jacobs and Sandra Denise Curl 1 (collectively, “Appellants”), appeal

        their convictions following a jury trial for conspiracy to defraud the United States, in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; multiple counts of aiding and assisting the preparation of a

        false return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2); and aiding and abetting theft of

        government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 641. The district court sentenced

        them each to 30 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Appellants contend that the district

        court (1) erred by granting their requests to waive their right to counsel, and (2) violated

        the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. Finding no error, we affirm.

               Beginning with Appellants’ waiver of their right to counsel, “[t]he Sixth

        Amendment guarantees to a criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel before

        he can be convicted and punished by a term of imprisonment.” 2 United States v. Ductan,

        800 F.3d 642, 648 (4th Cir. 2015). But it also guarantees a defendant’s right to self-

        representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975). Thus, a defendant may

        relinquish the right to counsel upon a valid waiver. A waiver of the right to counsel is valid

        if it is “(1) clear and unequivocal, (2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and (3) timely.”

        United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

        omitted).

               1
                   Curl also used the name Sandra Kenan during the underlying proceedings.
               2
                 The parties dispute the standard of review applicable to these claims. We need not
        resolve this issue because Appellants’ arguments fail under their requested standard of de
        novo review.

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               “The Supreme Court has not prescribed any formula or script to be read to a

        defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel.” United States v. Roof,

        10 F.4th 314, 359 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). And a court need not

        conduct a “searching or formal inquiry” for a waiver of the right to counsel to be valid.

        Ductan, 800 F.3d at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “no particular

        form of interrogation is required” for a valid waiver. Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 229 (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               Accordingly, a district court must simply “assure itself that the defendant knows the

        charges against him, the possible punishment and the manner in which an attorney can be

        of assistance, as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,” Roof,

        10 F.4th at 359 (cleaned up), such that the defendant “knows what he is doing and his

        choice is made with his eyes open,” Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 229 (cleaned up). The district court

        does this “by examining the record as a whole and evaluating the complete profile of the

        defendant and the circumstances of his decision as known to the . . . court at the time.”

        Roof, 10 F.4th at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Here, the district court had the Government review the charges against Appellants

        and the maximum potential penalties, which Appellants confirmed they understood. The

        court warned Appellants of the risks of proceeding pro se and advised them that it would

        be in their best interests to continue being represented by counsel. And it confirmed

        Appellants were freely and voluntarily choosing to relieve counsel and proceed pro se. The

        colloquies satisfied the district court’s obligation to ensure Appellants’ waivers of their

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        right to counsel were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. On the facts of these cases, no

        more searching inquiry was required.

               “We review a district court’s decision to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act

        de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Pair, 84 F.4th 577, 582

        (4th Cir. 2023). “The Speedy Trial Act requires that a criminal defendant’s trial commence

        within seventy days from the filing date of the indictment, or from the date the defendant

        has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending,

        whichever date last occurs.” Id. (cleaned up). However, it also “specifies various periods

        of delay that are excluded from the speedy trial clock.” Id. As relevant here, such

        excludable delay includes any “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of

        the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such

        motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). The filing of a pretrial motion “stops the speedy trial

        clock from running automatically.” United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647, 653

        (2011).

               The parties agree that Appellants’ speedy trial clock commenced on November 25,

        2019. And Appellants concede that the district court properly tolled all time from March

        31, 2020, through the start of their trial. Accordingly, the relevant period for this appeal

        covers the 127 days from November 25, 2019, to March 30, 2020. Our review of the record

        reveals that all but 11 days of this period were tolled by Curl’s December 6, 2019, motion

        for a Faretta hearing. Contrary to Appellants’ contentions on appeal, this filing was a

        motion within the meaning of § 3161(h)(1)(D). The motion said Curl wished to waive her

        right to counsel and specifically requested a Faretta hearing, and the district court

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        ultimately granted that request and held a hearing. That hearing was necessary for the

        district court’s resolution of the motion, as the court could not permit Curl to waive her

        right to counsel without first holding the requested hearing. The filing of this motion thus

        automatically tolled the speedy trial clock from December 6 through the date of that

        hearing, which was held after the period Appellants challenge in this appeal. See United

        States v. Henderson, 476 U.S. 321, 326-30 (1986); see also United States v. Harris, 491

        F.3d 440, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir. 2005).

               We therefore affirm the criminal judgments. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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