Court Opinion

ID: 9392583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 16:08:27.951367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:46.736227
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tredyffrin Outdoor, LLC,                   :
                  Appellant                :
                                           :
       v.                                  : No. 1305 C.D. 2021
                                           :
Zoning Hearing Board of                    :
Tredyffrin Township                        : Submitted: October 28, 2022

BEFORE:       HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
              HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
              HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE CEISLER                                                    FILED: May 5, 2023

       Appellant Tredyffrin Outdoor, LLC (Outdoor) appeals from the Court of
Common Pleas of Chester County’s (Common Pleas) October 19, 2021 order, which
denied Outdoor’s land use appeal. Through that order, Common Pleas affirmed
Appellee Zoning Hearing Board of Tredyffrin Township’s (Board) October 24, 2019
Decision, which denied Outdoor’s appeal of the Township zoning officer’s denial of
Outdoor’s application for an advertising sign permit, as well as its substantive
validity challenge to former Section 208-131 of Tredyffrin Township’s (Township)
Zoning Ordinance.1 After thorough review, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
                                      I. Background
              [Outdoor] is the lessee of property known as 1819 East
              Lancaster Avenue, [in] Paoli, Pennsylvania [(Property)].
              [Board’s Decision, Findings of Fact (F.F.) ¶¶3, 11-13.]
       1
         Tredyffrin Township Zoning Ordinance of 1939, Chester County, Pa., as amended
(1939). Subsequent to Outdoor’s appeal to the Board and its substantive validity challenge, the
Township’s Board of Supervisors substantially revised and replaced Section 208-131 when it
enacted Ordinance HR-437 on August 17, 2020.
The Property is located at the corner of Route 30 and
Route 252 in the C-1 and Advertising Sign Overlay
District in the Township. [On the Property is] an existing
advertising sign [(Sign)]. [Id., F.F. ¶4.] The Sign is a vinyl
wrap advertising sign and was erected approximately [70]
years ago. [Id., F.F. ¶¶10, 21.] It is [8] feet tall, [136]
square feet in size[,] and [is] single[-]faced. [Id., F.F. ¶¶16,
19-20.] In 1974, the Sign was recognized as non-
conforming [regarding the Zoning Ordinance’s then-
applicable regulations]. [Id., F.F. ¶22.]
In 2004, the Township[’s Board of Supervisors] adopted
Ordinance HR-329 [(HR-329)]. HR-329, with the
exception of Section III, was codified at [former Zoning]
Ordinance § 208-131 . . . [, which ]established the
Advertising Sign Overlay District [(Overlay District)] . . .
[and] permit[ed] advertising signs within the Overlay
District by conditional use. [Id., F.F. ¶¶23-26; former
Zoning Ordinance § 208-131.A.] Pursuant to the [former
Zoning] Ordinance, any such advertising signs shall not
exceed [15] feet in height or [136] square feet in area.
[Former Zoning Ordinance] § 208-131[.B]. The number of
advertising signs on any parcel is limited to one. []Id.[]§
208-131.C[].
Three . . . properties are located within the Overlay
District: the . . . Property and two other parcels[. Id. § 208-
131.A]. The other parcels also contain advertising signs.
The parcel located at 750 Bear Hill Road has a double-
faced billboard with each face being more than three . . .
times the area of the Sign and taller than the limitation in
[former Section] 208-131. [See Reproduced Record (R.R.)
at 244a-50a.] The parcel located at 21 Lancaster Avenue
in Devon has seven billboards of varying heights and
sizes, each taller and larger than the Sign. [See id. at 251a-
61a.] Notwithstanding the above, the advertising signs on
all of the various parcels were allowed to remain as[-]is
and “by right.” [Former Zoning Ordinance § 208-131.C.]
In [December] 2018, Outdoor sought [permission] to
modernize the method of changing [advertising] copy on
the Sign [by filing a zoning permit application
(Application) with the Township]. [See R.R. at 184a-
203a.] It proposed replacing the vinyl wrap with installed
changeable LED lights. [Board’s Decision, F.F. ¶¶35, 39-

                               2
               57.] The Sign’s area and height would remain the same.
               [Id., F.F. ¶¶ 35-39]. . . . A little over a month later, the
               Township’s Zoning Officer issued a denial letter[. R.R. at
               236a-37a].
Common Pleas Decision Sur Appeal at 1-3. Therein, the zoning officer explained
that, per the terms of the Zoning Ordinance, the Sign qualified as a freestanding
advertising sign,2 but not a changeable copy sign,3 and could not be approved
because, contrary to the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance, Outdoor’s
modernized Sign would be internally lit and would flash when it displayed images.
R.R. at 236a-37a.
       Outdoor appealed the zoning officer’s denial to the Board on several bases.
First, it lodged a substantive validity challenge4 against former Section 208-131, on
the basis that it regulated signage in the Township in a manner that was unconnected
to protecting the public welfare and, thus, exceeded the Township’s constitutionally

       2
          At the time of Outdoor’s Application, the Zoning Ordinance defined “freestanding sign”
as “[a] sign which is self-supporting upon the ground or which is supported by means of poles,
pylons or standards in the ground. A freestanding sign is not attached to a building, except by
secondary supports such as guy wires.” Former Zoning Ordinance § 208-6. In addition, it defined
“advertising sign” as “[a] sign which directs attention to a business, commodity, service or
entertainment conducted, sold or offered elsewhere than upon the property on which the sign is
located. An advertising sign shall include a commercial billboard.” Id. Section 208-6’s definitions
for various kinds of signs were substantially revised and replaced when the Township’s Board of
Supervisors enacted Ordinance HR-437 on August 17, 2020.

       3
          Likewise, at the time of Outdoor’s Application, the Zoning Ordinance defined
“changeable copy sign” as “[a] sign on which message copy can be changed through use of
attachable letters, numerals or graphics or by switching of lamps. A changeable copy sign shall
not be considered to be an animated sign.” Former Zoning Ordinance § 208-6.

       4
          Section 916.1 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) authorizes
landowners to “challenge the [substantive] validity of an ordinance or map or any provision thereof
which prohibits or restricts the use or development of land in which he has an interest[.]” Act of
July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S.
§ 10916.1.

                                                3
granted police power.5 See R.R. at 173a-174a. Second, Outdoor maintained that the
zoning officer had erroneously determined that the Sign did not qualify as a
changeable copy sign. Id. at 176a. Third, it asserted that, even if the sign was not a
changeable copy sign, the zoning officer had incorrectly interpreted the Zoning
Ordinance as prohibiting internal sign illumination. Id. at 176a-177a. Finally,
Outdoor claimed that the zoning officer had wrongly concluded that the Sign would
flash when it displayed images and was consequently barred by the Zoning
Ordinance. Id. at 177a.6
       The Board held hearings regarding Outdoor’s substantive validity challenge
and its appeal on May 29, 2019, July 9, 2019, and July 25, 2019. Thereafter, on
October 24, 2019, the Board issued its Decision, through which it unanimously
denied the substantive validity challenge and affirmed the zoning officer’s denial of
Outdoor’s Application. In doing so, the Board noted that the zoning officer had
reversed his initial conclusion that the Sign did not constitute a changeable copy
sign, but agreed with him that the Sign was nevertheless barred because it would
flash by “chang[ing] instantaneously, every six . . . seconds, to different lit images,”
and would be internally illuminated. Decision, F.F. ¶¶62-69; id. Conclusions of Law
(C.L.) ¶¶16-24; id., Discussion at 14-18. Additionally, the Board rejected Outdoor’s
substantive validity challenge, reasoning that former Section 208-131 had merely
legalized preexisting, non-conforming signs in a uniform manner across the three
properties in the Overlay District and did not treat those properties in an arbitrary or

       5
         “Police power controls the use of property by the owner, for the public good, its use
otherwise being harmful[.]” Appeal of White, 134 A. 409, 411 (Pa. 1926).

       6
         Outdoor also challenged the Township’s $10,000 fee for applicants who wished to make
substantive validity challenges to its ordinances. R.R. at 174a.

                                              4
discriminatory way. See id., F.F. ¶¶71-78; id., C.L. ¶¶25-34; id., Discussion at 19-
22.7
       Outdoor then appealed to Common Pleas, which took no additional evidence
and, on October 19, 2021, affirmed the Board’s Decision in full. This appeal to our
Court followed shortly thereafter.
                                         II. Discussion
       Outdoor presents several arguments in support of its position that reversal of
Common Pleas’ order is warranted, which we summarize and reorder as follows.8
First, the Board improperly denied Outdoor’s substantive validity challenge.
Outdoor claims that former Section 208-131 accorded signage rights in the Overlay
District based not upon some uniform standard that came within the Township’s
authority to protect the public health, safety, and welfare; instead, in Outdoor’s view,
the Township arbitrarily awarded such rights based only on what signs were already
in the Overlay District prior to its creation, which renders former Section 208-131

       7
          The Board did grant Outdoor’s substantive validity challenge to the aforementioned
$10,000 filing fee, and issued a recommendation that “the Township review and revise as
appropriate the filing fee as part of its adoption of the 2020 fee schedule resolution.” Decision,
Order ¶4; see also id. F.F. ¶¶79-86; id., C.L. ¶¶35-37; id., Discussion at 22-23. The Board’s ruling
on this point was not appealed by either Outdoor or the Township and had no bearing on Common
Pleas’ handling of Outdoor’s appeal, or on our disposition of this matter.

       8
         As Common Pleas took no additional evidence, our standard of review is limited to
determining whether the Board violated Outdoor’s constitutional rights, committed an error of law,
or abused its discretion. SSEN, Inc. v. Borough Council of Borough of Eddystone, 810 A.2d 200,
208 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). “An abuse of discretion occurs when [a local agency’s factual]
findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Coal Gas Recovery, L.P. v.
Franklin Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 944 A.2d 832, 838 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “By ‘substantial
evidence’ we mean such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Valley View Civic Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 640
(Pa. 1983) (citations omitted).

                                                 5
unconstitutional. Outdoor’s Br. at 13-17.9 Second, Outdoor maintains that the Board
abused its discretion, acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and committed an
error of law by affirming the zoning officer’s ruling that the Sign would flash when
in operation and, thus, was prohibited by the Zoning Ordinance. Id. at 40-47. Finally,
Outdoor similarly asserts that the Board abused its discretion, acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner, and committed an error of law by affirming the zoning
officer’s ruling that the Zoning Ordinance bars internally illuminated signs. Id. at
27-39.
    A. Substantive Validity of former Section 208-131 of the Zoning Ordinance
       We agree with Outdoor that the Board abused its discretion, to the extent it
concluded that former Section 208-131 is substantively valid in toto.
               Property owners have a constitutional right to enjoy their
               property. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; PA. CONST. art. I
               § 1. However, townships may place reasonable limits on
               the right of private property owners to do what they wish
               with their property by enacting zoning ordinances in
               accordance with [each] township’s police powers to
               protect the public health, safety, and welfare. Section 604
               of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10604; In re Realen Valley Forge
               Greenes Associates, . . . 838 A.2d 718, 727-[]29 ([Pa.]
               2003); Penn Street, L.P. v. East Lampeter [Twp.] Zoning
               Hearing [Bd.], 84 A.3d 1114, 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). A
               zoning ordinance is presumed to be constitutional unless
               the party challenging the ordinance demonstrates that the
               ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not substantially
               related to a township’s power to protect the public health,
               safety, and welfare. Village of Euclid . . . v. Ambler Realty
               Co., 272 U.S. 365 . . . (1926); BAC, Inc. v. [Bd.] of [Sup’rs]
               of Millcreek [Twp.], . . . 633 A.2d 144, 146-147
               ([Pa.]1993); Keinath v. [Twp.] of Edgmont, 964 A.2d 458,

       9
         Outdoor also claims that HR-329 is substantively invalid, but, as HR-329 is simply a local
ordinance that was passed by the Township’s Board of Supervisors, which was codified in a
slightly modified way as former Section 208-131, Outdoor’s arguments regarding HR-329 are
simultaneously duplicative and irrelevant.

                                                6
            462 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Fisher v. Viola, 789 A.2d 782,
            785 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). In examining whether the
            ordinance is a valid exercise of the police powers,
            reviewing courts employ a substantive due process
            analysis, balancing the public interest to be served by the
            ordinance against the confiscatory or exclusionary impact
            of the ordinance on individual property rights; however,
            where the validity is debatable, it is the legislature’s
            judgment that must control. Boundary Drive [Assocs.] v.
            Shrewsbury [Twp. Bd.] of [Sup’rs], . . . 491 A.2d 86, 90
            ([Pa.] 1985); Penn Street, 84 A.3d at 1134.
Delchester Devs., L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Twp. of London Grove, 161 A.3d
1081, 1091-92 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). “In other words, we must examine the
reasonableness of the restriction on land use in light of the deprivation of the
landowner’s freedom thereby incurred.” Penn Street, 84 A.3d at 1134.
      Former Section 208-131, the Zoning Ordinance provision challenged by
Outdoor, reads as follows:
            A. Freestanding advertising signs shall be permitted by
            conditional use in an overlay district consisting of the
            following parcels: 43-9M-160, [i.e., the Property,] 43-10-
            11, [i.e., 750 Bear Hill Road,] and 43-11E-80[, i.e., 21
            Lancaster Avenue]. Freestanding advertising signs are
            also subject to the general standards prescribed in
            [Section] 208-117 [of the Zoning Ordinance] and the
            regulations of [Section] 208-123. In the event of a conflict
            among [Section] 208-117, [Section] 208-123 and this
            [Section], the most restrictive regulation shall prevail. The
            applicant for conditional use approval for a freestanding
            advertising sign shall have the burden of proving
            compliance with all applicable criteria and regulations.
            Documents and plans necessary to establish compliance
            shall be submitted to the Township with the conditional
            use application.
            B. Signs shall not exceed 136 square feet in area and signs
            and their supporting structure shall not exceed 15 feet in
            height, except that signs existing on the parcels listed in
            Subsection A above on the effective date of this section
            that are larger and/or higher may continue as uses by right.

                                         7
             C. No more than one freestanding advertising sign may be
             erected on a lot, either alone or with another principal use
             or uses, except that signs in excess of one existing on the
             parcels listed in Subsection A above on the effective date
             of this section may continue as uses by right.
             D. Signs may be externally lit: Lighting shall comply with
             the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America’s
             (“IESNA”) recommended practices and criteria contained
             in the [IESNA] Lighting Handbook, including but not
             limited to criteria for “full cutoff” fixtures. Fixtures shall
             be equipped with or be capable of being back-fitted with
             light-directing devices such as shields, visors or hoods
             when necessary to redirect offending light distribution. All
             fixtures shall be aimed to illuminate the advertising copy
             only. All lighting shall be aimed, located, designed, fitted
             and maintained so as not to present a hazard to drivers or
             pedestrians by impairing their ability to safely traverse and
             so as not to project or reflect light onto a neighboring use
             or property. If adjacent to residential zoning districts, the
             signs shall be lit only from dusk to 12:00 midnight. All
             lighting fixtures shall be equipped with devices which
             automatically extinguish the lighting at 12:00 midnight.
Former Zoning Ordinance § 208-131. Former Section 208-131 also includes the
following, relevant note:
             Editor’s Note: Effect on existing advertising signs. . . .
             HR-329 also provided that:
                   “A. Notwithstanding the provisions of [Section]
                   208-131 . . . , advertising signs on the parcels
                   identified above existing as of the effective date of
                   this ordinance may be continued and shall not be
                   deemed nonconforming as to use, dimension or
                   other requirement made effective by the enactment
                   of this ordinance.
                   B. For the purpose of regulation and enforcement,
                   the Code Enforcement Officer shall make and
                   maintain a list of all advertising signs on the parcels
                   identified above existing as of the effective date of
                   this [Zoning O]rdinance. The list shall be filed in

                                           8
                   the office of the Code Enforcement Office and used
                   to assure compliance with this ordinance.”
Id.
      Former Section 208-131 establishes uniform conditional use regulations
regarding the permissible size and height of freestanding advertising signs, as well
as regarding the number of such signs allowed on each parcel in the Overlay District.
While regulations of this nature are constitutionally permissible, what is not is the
carve-out former Section 208-131 created for preexisting signs in the Overlay
District, which legalized those signs and declared them to be, in their then-current
form, permissible by right. This carve-out cannot be deemed to have a substantial
relationship to the Township’s police power, as it was predicated not upon the
physical specifics of the preexisting signs, or upon whether those signs comported
with the Township’s general determinations regarding what sort of signs should be
allowed in the Overlay District; rather, former Section 208-131’s designation of
certain signs as allowed by right was based entirely upon whether those signs were
already in place at the time that former Section 208-131 was codified into the
Township’s Zoning Ordinance. This categorical distinction is arbitrary and, thus,
constitutionally impermissible.
      This, however, does not mean that former Section 208-131 must be deemed
substantively invalid as a whole.
             In general, a statute or ordinance may be partially valid
             and partially invalid, and if the provisions are distinct and
             not so interwoven as to be inseparable, the courts should
             sustain the valid portions. Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel
             [Co.], . . . 196 A.2d 664, 666, 667 ([Pa.] 1964). In
             determining the severability of a statute or ordinance, the
             legislative intent is of primary significance. Id. The
             legislating body must have intended that the act or
             ordinance be separable, and the statute or ordinance must
             be capable of separation in fact. Id. Thus, the valid portion

                                          9
             of the enactment must be independent and complete
             within itself. Id.
Pa. Indep. Waste Haulers Ass’n v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 872 A.2d 224, 228 n.16
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Furthermore,
             [t]he possible severability of provisions of the ordinance
             is always germane because the Statutory Construction Act
             of 1972, at 1 Pa. C.S. § 1925, provides:
                    “The provision of every statute shall be severable.
                    If any provision of any statute or the application
                    thereof to any person or circumstance is held
                    invalid, the remainder of the statute, and the
                    application of such provisions to other persons or
                    circumstances, shall not be affected thereby, unless
                    the Court finds that the valid provisions of the
                    statutes are so essentially and inseparably connected
                    with, and so depend upon, the void provision or
                    application, that it cannot be presumed the General
                    Assembly would have enacted the remaining valid
                    provisions without the void one; or unless the court
                    finds that the remaining valid provisions, standing
                    alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being
                    executed in accordance with the legislative intent.”
Greenwood Twp. v. KEFO, Inc., 416 A.2d 583, 586 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980); see id.
(“Rules of statutory construction are applicable to statutes and ordinances alike.”).
In this instance, there is no question that the Township’s Board of Supervisors
intended any offending portions of Section 208-131 to be severable from the rest.
Section V of HR-329 is titled “Severability” and reads as follows:
             If any sentence, clause, section or part of this Ordinance is
             for any reason found to be unconstitutional, illegal or
             invalid, such unconstitutionality, illegality or invalidity
             shall not affect or impair any of the remaining provisions,
             sentences, clauses, sections or parts hereof. It is hereby
             declared as the intent of the Board of Supervisors that this
             Ordinance would have been adopted absent said
             provisions, sentences, clauses, sections or parts.

                                          10
R.R. at 206a. This language unmistakably evinces the Board of Supervisors’ clear,
unambiguous intent to render Section 208-131 severable in whole or in part.
Furthermore, the offending portions of Section 208-131, i.e., those declaring
preexisting signs within the Overlay District to be permissible by right without
regard to their quantity or physical particulars, have no effect upon the viability of
the remaining parts. Therefore, we conclude that the only substantively invalid
pieces of Section 208-131 are as follows: Subsection B and Subsection C, but only
insofar as those subsections state that preexisting signs in the Overlay District are
allowed by right; and Subsection A of the Editor’s Note, which states that those signs
should not be considered as nonconforming.
      The substantive invalidity of these subsections is ultimately of no help to
Outdoor. Indeed, the practical effect of our holding on this point is that the signs on
the properties located at 750 Bear Hill Road and 21 Lancaster Avenue, which exceed
the Zoning Ordinance’s size, height, and/or number restrictions, are simply
transformed into, or returned to their previous existence as, nonconforming uses.
             A lawful nonconforming use is a use that predates the
             enactment of a prohibitory zoning restriction. The right to
             continue a lawful nonconforming use is afforded the
             constitutional protections of due process. As such, a
             property owner’s right to continue a legal nonconforming
             use is an interest that runs with the land, so long as the use
             is not abandoned.
Sowich v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Brown Twp., 214 A.3d 775, 785 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2019) (internal citations omitted). As for the Sign, it fully complies with former
Section 208-131’s restrictions and, thus, has been made into an authorized, by right
use of the Property. See Decision, F.F. ¶77; id., Discussion at 20; id., C.L. ¶30. This
did not impinge upon Outdoor’s ability to keep the Sign in its preexisting state and,
as a result, legalized a nonconforming use in an entirely constitutional manner. See

                                          11
Pennridge Dev. Enterprises, Inc. v. Volovnik, 624 A.2d 674, 677 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)
(“[S]ince a nonconforming use is not entitled to greater rights that those afforded a
conforming use, [a landowner] cannot be disadvantaged by having its
nonconforming use converted to a permitted use.”); see id. at 676 (a municipality
acts in an unconstitutional manner if it enacts an ordinance that eliminates a
nonconforming use without also proving just compensation to the affected
landowner); accord Warner Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Tredyffrin Twp., 612 A.2d
578, 585 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). Accordingly, the remaining, substantively valid
provisions of former Section 208-131 still fully govern the Sign.
                               B. The Meaning of “Flash”
       Furthermore, this partial invalidation of former Section 208-131 does not
affect the propriety of the Board’s determination that the modified Sign would flash
while in operation and, thus, was prohibited by former Section 208-123 of the
Zoning Ordinance.10 “The interpretation of a statute or ordinance presents this Court
with a pure question of law, which is generally subject to plenary review.” Kohl v.
New Sewickley Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 108 A.3d 961, 968 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
              Like statutes, the primary objective of interpreting
              ordinances is to determine the intent of the legislative body
              that enacted the ordinance. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921; Bailey
              v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Phila., . . . 801 A.2d
              492 ([Pa.] 2002); Malt Beverages Distribs. Ass’n v. Pa.
              Liquor Control Bd., 918 A.2d 171 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) . . .
              . In pursuing that end, we are mindful that a statute’s plain
              language generally provides the best indication of
              legislative intent. Id. Thus, statutory construction begins
              with examination of the text itself. Id.
              In reading the plain language of a statute, “[w]ords and
              phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar

        The Township’s Board of Supervisors substantially revised and replaced former Section
       10

208-123 when it enacted Ordinance HR-437 on August 17, 2020.

                                             12
             and according to their common and approved usage.” 1 Pa.
             C.S. § 1903(a). Further, every statute shall be construed, if
             possible, to give effect to all its provisions so that no
             provision is “mere surplusage.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a).
             Where the words in an ordinance are free from all
             ambiguity, the letter of the ordinance may not be
             disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.
             C.S. § 1921.
             Thus, if we determine the ordinance provision at issue is
             unambiguous, we must apply it directly as written.
             Bowman v. Sunoco, Inc., . . . 65 A.3d 901 ([Pa.] 2013); see
             1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). However, if we deem the language
             of the ordinance ambiguous, we must then ascertain the
             legislative body’s intent by statutory analysis, wherein we
             may consider numerous relevant factors. Id. An ambiguity
             exists when language is subject to two or more reasonable
             interpretations and not merely because two conflicting
             interpretations may be suggested. Adams Outdoor Adver.,
             L.P. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Smithfield Twp., 909 A.2d
             469 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
Tri-Cnty. Landfill, Inc. v. Pine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 83 A.3d 488, 509-10 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2014). “With respect to zoning matters, undefined terms are given their
plain meaning, and any doubt is resolved in favor of the landowner and the least
restrictive use of the land.” Kohl, 108 A.3d at 968. Additionally,
             we note the . . . well-settled principle that a zoning hearing
             board’s interpretation of its own zoning ordinance is
             entitled to great weight and deference. Smith v. Zoning
             Hearing Bd., 734 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) . . . .
             Such deference is appropriate because a zoning hearing
             board, as the entity charged with administering a zoning
             ordinance, possesses knowledge and expertise in
             interpreting that ordinance. Id. at 58.
Risker v. Smith Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 886 A.2d 727, 731 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
“Similarly, ‘because [a township’s zoning officer] is charged with the administration
and execution of the [ordinance], his interpretation of the ordinance is entitled to
deference and should not be disregarded unless shown to be clearly erroneous.’”

                                          13
Kohl, 108 A.3d at 968 (quoting McIntyre v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Shohola Twp., 614 A.2d
335, 337 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)).
      Former Section 208-123.G of the Zoning Ordinance reads, in relevant part, as
follows: “No signs which flash . . . shall be permitted.” Former Zoning Ordinance §
208-123.G. As the Zoning Ordinance does not define “flash,” we consequently turn
to the dictionary for guidance. Like the Board, we note that Merriam-Webster
defines “flash” in relevant part, as:
             2
                    a: to cause the sudden appearance of (light)
             ....
                    c[:]
                           (1): to cause (light) to reflect
                           (2): to cause (something) to reflect light [,
                           e.g.,] flash a mirror
                           (3): to cause (a lamp) to flash
                    d: to convey by means of flashes of light
             3
                    a: to make known or cause to appear with great
                    speed[, e.g.,] flash a message on the screen[.]
Flash, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/flash (last
visited May 4, 2023); see Decision, Discussion at 18. Additionally, we recognize
that the Board made the following, relevant factual findings:
             46. The advertisements on the proposed sign will change
             every six . . . seconds. [Board Hearing, Tr.,] 5/29/19 at 38.
             47. The proposed sign will be capable of changing more
             rapidly than every six . . . seconds if the software lock is
             bypassed. [Id.] at 59.
             48. When the propose[d] sign switches from one
             advertisement to the next advertisement, the computer will
             send a signal to the [Sign’s] LED modules to change the
             entire sign face. [Id.] at 38-39, 41-42.

                                          14
              49. The transition from one advertisement to the next
              advertisement will be instantaneous. [Id.] at 51, 57, 85.
Decision, F.F. ¶¶46-49. Given these findings, and the generally understood meaning
of “flash,” we cannot conclude that the Board committed an error of law when it
determined that the modified Sign would flash when in operation and, thus, that it
was prohibited by former Section 208-123 of the Zoning Ordinance.
                                      III. Conclusion
       In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we reverse Common Pleas’
October 19, 2021 order in part and affirm it in part.11

                                              ____________________________
                                              ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

       11
          Due to our disposition of this appeal, we need not reach Outdoor’s remaining argument
challenging the Board’s conclusion that former Section 208-131 prohibits internally illuminated
signs.

                                              15
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tredyffrin Outdoor, LLC,            :
                  Appellant         :
                                    :
     v.                             : No. 1305 C.D. 2021
                                    :
Zoning Hearing Board of             :
Tredyffrin Township                 :

                                  ORDER

     AND NOW, this 5th day of May, 2023, it is hereby ORDERED:
           1.    The Court of Common Pleas of Chester County’s (Common
     Pleas) October 19, 2021 order is REVERSED IN PART, with regard to its
     affirmance of Appellee Zoning Hearing Board of Tredyffrin Township’s
     (Board) denial of Appellant       Tredyffrin Outdoor, LLC’s (Outdoor)
     substantive validity challenge to former Section 208-131 of Tredyffrin
     Township’s Zoning Ordinance, but only as to the portions of former
     Subsections 208-131.B and .C that state that preexisting signs in Tredyffrin
     Township’s Advertising Sign Overlay District are allowed by right, and as to
     former Subsection A of Section 208-131’s Editor’s Note;
           2.    Common Pleas’ October 19, 2021 order is AFFIRMED IN
     PART, as to its affirmance of the remaining parts of the Board’s substantive
     validity challenge denial and of the Board’s determination that Outdoor’s
     proposed modified advertising sign would flash and, thus, was barred by
     former Section 208-123 of the Zoning Ordinance.

                                       ____________________________
                                       ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tredyffrin Outdoor, LLC,                   :
                        Appellant          :
                                           :
              v.                           :       No. 1305 C.D. 2021
                                           :       Submitted: October 28, 2022
Zoning Hearing Board of                    :
Tredyffrin Township                        :

BEFORE:       HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
              HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
              HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT                                          FILED: May 5, 2023

              Respectfully, I dissent in part and concur in part.
              Tredyffrin Outdoor, LLC (Lessee) applied to Tredyffrin Township
(Township) for a permit to replace the face of its existing outdoor vinyl-wrapped
changeable copy sign1 with a digital changeable copy sign. At the hearing before
the Township’s Zoning Hearing Board (Zoning Board), Lessee presented the
testimony of Jesse White, a representative of the manufacturer of digital billboards,
to explain their construction and operation. White explained that a digital image of
the advertisement is transmitted to a computer inside the billboard, which translates
the data to a display on the billboard. Zoning Board Adjudication at 7, Finding of
Fact (F.F.) No. 42. The software allows Lessee to determine the schedule for an

1
  At the time of Lessee’s application, the Township’s Zoning Ordinance defined “changeable copy
sign” as “[a] sign on which message copy can be changed through use of attachable letters,
numerals or graphics or by switching of lamps. A changeable copy sign shall not be considered
to be an animated sign.” TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP ZONING ORDINANCE OF 1939 (Zoning
Ordinance), as amended, former §208-6(B)(5); Reproduced Record at 263a (R.R. __).
advertisement, including its run time. The software does not allow the display of an
animated image, and while it allows the operator to choose the run time, it must run
at least six seconds. Zoning Board Adjudication at 8, F.F. No. 47. The transition
from one image to another is “instantaneous” not gradual.             Zoning Board
Adjudication at 8, F.F. No. 49.
             The Zoning Board denied Lessee’s application for the stated reasons
that its proposed digital billboard will use internal illumination and will flash. The
Zoning Board construed the Zoning Ordinance in effect at the time Lessee submitted
its application to prohibit billboards that have either feature. The Zoning Board’s
construction violates well-established statutory construction principles.
             As to flashing signs, former Section 208-123(G) of the Zoning
Ordinance stated, in part, as follows:
             No mobile signs, bench signs, vehicle signs, permanent
             sidewalk, sandwich or A-frame signs, animated signs or other
             than time and temperature signs, or signs that emit smoke, vapor
             or noise shall be permitted. No signs which flash, move, rotate,
             oscillate or which outline the rooflines, doors, windows or wall
             edges by illuminated tubing or strings of lights for advertising
             purposes shall be permitted.

Former ZONING ORDINANCE §208-123(G) (emphasis added). The term “flash” is
not defined in the Zoning Ordinance. Accordingly, we “give undefined terms their
plain, ordinary meaning.” Adams Outdoor Advertising, LP v. Zoning Hearing Board
of Smithfield Township, 909 A.2d 469, 483 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
             Using the dictionary, the majority defines flash as “to cause the sudden
appearance of (light),” “to cause (light) to reflect,” “to convey by means of flashes
of light” or “to make known or cause to appear with great speed[, e.g.,] flash a
message on a screen[.]” Tredyffrin Outdoor, LLC v. Zoning Hearing Board of

                                         MHL-2
Tredyffrin Township (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1305 C.D. 2021, filed May 5, 2023), slip op.
at           14          (quoting             Merriam-Webster,      https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/flash). “Flash” is such a “plain” and “ordinary” word that
to resort to the dictionary seems unnecessary. Nevertheless, using the guidance of
“sudden appearance of light,” one can say that lightning, often accompanied by
thunder, meets the definition of “flash.” Likewise, lightning bugs are said to “flash.”
Notably, in each case, the “flash” is preceded by some interval of darkness.
                  By contrast, Lessee’s proposed digital billboard will use continuous
light that changes color to effect a new static image.2 A change in copy does not
make a static copy image a “sign which flash[es].” Former ZONING ORDINANCE
§208-123(G). Notably, the Zoning Ordinance does not regulate the frequency of the
change for a “changeable copy sign.” Former ZONING ORDINANCE §208-6(B)(5);
R.R. 263a. Further, the Zoning Ordinance states that the “message copy can be
changed . . . by switching of lamps.” Id. Because the Zoning Ordinance authorizes
a change in copy to be effected by “lamps” and without any restriction on frequency,
the change itself cannot constitute a “flash.” Rather, it is the image itself that must
flash, just as lightning bugs flash.
                  In any case, Lessee’s application did not state that it intended to change
the digital image every six seconds, and the record does not establish the intended
frequency of change. White testified only that it could not physically change more
frequently than every six seconds. More importantly, the record establishes that the
digital image on the billboard is static and does not “flash.” Indeed, the image
transition cannot be perceived.

2
    In 1939, this technology did not exist.
                                                MHL-3
              The Zoning Board also found that former Section 208-131 of the
Zoning Ordinance prohibits any kind of internal illumination. It states as follows:
              Signs may be externally lit. Lighting shall comply with the
              Illuminating Engineering Society of North America’s
              (“IESNA”) recommended practices and criteria contained in the
              IESNA Lighting Handbook, including but not limited to criteria
              for “full cutoff” fixtures . . . . All fixtures shall be aimed to
              illuminate the advertising copy only. All lighting shall be aimed,
              located, designed, fitted and maintained so as not to present a
              hazard to drivers or pedestrians by impairing their ability to
              safely traverse and so as not to project or reflect light onto a
              neighboring use or property.

Former ZONING ORDINANCE §208-131(D) (emphasis added).3 The Zoning Board
construed this authorization for external lighting to constitute a prohibition of
internal illumination. The majority does not address this issue, characterizing it as
unnecessary because Lessee’s proposed digital sign will impermissibly “flash.”
              The Zoning Board’s strained construction of former Section 208-
131(D) cannot be sustained.
              First, it is inconsistent with the Zoning Ordinance provision authorizing
a billboard to change its copy by using “lamps.” Former ZONING ORDINANCE §208-
6(B)(5) (definition of “Signs, Changeable Copy”). A “lamp” can only be an internal
lighting source that will change the copy. Stated otherwise, former Section 208-
6(B)(5) implicitly authorizes internal illumination, at least for changeable copy
billboards.

3
  Section 208-131(M)(2) of the current Zoning Ordinance, adopted after the submission of
Lessee’s application, expressly prohibits internally illuminated and digital changeable-copy sign
billboards. ZONING ORDINANCE §208-131(M)(2). See also https://ecode360.com/7117586 (last
visited May 4, 2023).
                                            MHL-4
             Second, the Zoning Ordinance’s regulation of external lighting fixtures
does not implicitly state a prohibition of digital signs. It has been held that a zoning
ordinance provision that states: “[i]n each district, only such uses and uses accessory
and incidental thereto, as are hereinafter specified, will be permitted,” expresses a
prohibition of uses not listed. Silver v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 112 A.2d 84,
87 (Pa. 1955). However, no comparable provision appears in the Township’s
Zoning Ordinance. Simply, silence cannot be construed as a prohibition. In
construing a zoning ordinance that restricts
             the use of the property, the language shall be interpreted, where
             doubt exists as to the intended meaning of the language written
             and enacted by the governing body, in favor of the property
             owner and against any implied extension of the restriction.

Section 603.1 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31,
1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53
P.S. §10603.1 (emphasis added). Because there is doubt that former Section 208-
131(D) of the Zoning Ordinance prohibits internal illumination of billboards, the
Zoning Ordinance must be interpreted in favor of Lessee.
             Several states have prohibited outdoor advertising signs. See, e.g., Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, §1908 (West 1977). Unless and until Pennsylvania follows
this public policy initiative, outdoor advertising is a lawful use. Any restriction on
the use of property for digital billboards must be provided in clear terms, as has been
stated, without any doubt, in Section 208-131(M)(2) of the current Zoning
Ordinance.

                                       MHL-5
             I agree with the majority on the substantive validity challenge.
However, I would reverse the trial court on the other two issues.

                           ____________________________________________
                           MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

                                      MHL-6