Court Opinion

ID: 9850764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:45.220965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:43.024191
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur in the affirmance of Thomason’s conviction for murder, I cannot concur in the affirmance of the death penalty imposed by the trial court following a trial without a jury. Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that a proportionality analysis supports affirmance of the sentence.
We are required by OCGA § 17-10-35 to conduct a review of the sentence in all death penalty cases, and specifically to consider “[wjhether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3). Because we are the only Georgia appellate court to review death penalty cases (Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par.. Ill, Ga. Const. 1983) and because the issue is one of enormous gravity, this weighty responsibility must be approached with special care in every case. Exacerbating the risk of a faulty proportionality analysis is the doctrine of stare decisis: if we lower the standard in a single case, that case becomes precedent for easier and easier imposition of the most extreme punishment available in criminal jurisprudence.
Bearing those considerations in mind, I have reviewed this case in the context of other murder convictions in which the conduct of the defendant was similar to that of Thomason in this case. It is evident from the facts set out in the majority opinion that Thomason was surprised in a burglary of the victim’s home. Thus, there is evidence that the murder was committed in the course of a burglary and for the purpose of obtaining money and things of value. However, when considering this case in terms of proportionality, it is apparent that other defendants who have killed in the course of burglaries and other felonies, and whose crimes have thus met the same test for aggravating circumstances that Thomason’s crime met, have not been subjected to our society’s ultimate punishment: White v. State, 267 Ga. 523 (481 SE2d 804) (1997), defendant convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault (defendant and two others used assault rifles to rob and then shoot four men, two of whom died), sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment for each count of felony murder, and twenty years for each remaining count to be served concurrently; Sterling v. State, 267 Ga. 209 (477 SE2d 807) (1996), defendant convicted of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, kidnapping and burglary (defendant and *314accomplice forced their way into house of drug users and demanded money from victims who were then taken into the woods and shot, one fatally in the mouth and the other in the face), sentenced to life for the murder, a consecutive life term for aggravated assault, and two twenty-year concurrent terms for the kidnapping and burglary convictions; LeMay v. State, 265 Ga. 73 (453 SE2d 737) (1995), defendant found guilty of burglary, armed robbery, and murder (victim’s home ransacked, several handguns taken as well as money and jewelry, and victim stabbed), received two life sentences for malice murder and armed robbery, and a consecutive twenty-year sentence for armed robbery (State sought the death penalty); Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732 (462 SE2d 737) (1995), defendant convicted of malice murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping with bodily injury (defendant robbed jewelry store, shot owner in the head), sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the murder, and to consecutive life sentences for the armed robbery and kidnapping; Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 615 (449 SE2d 516) (1994), defendant found guilty of malice murder, armed robbery, and burglary (operator of a motel fatally stabbed one week after argument with defendant in which defendant threatened victim), sentenced to a life sentence for the murder, a consecutive life sentence for the armed robbery, and ten years for burglary; Brown v. State, 264 Ga. 803 (450 SE2d 821) (1994), defendant convicted of malice murder, felony murder, attempted robbery, possession of a firearm during commission of crime, armed robbery, aggravated assault (defendant shot and killed taxicab driver during robbery), sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, life for each count of armed robbery, twenty years for each count of aggravated assault, ten years for armed robbery convictions, five years for each conviction for possession of a firearm during commission of crime; Howard v. State, 262 Ga. 784 (426 SE2d 365) (1993), defendant convicted of felony murder, burglary, and armed robbery (victim shot when he returned unexpectedly while defendant and two other men were burglarizing victim’s house), sentenced to two consecutive life sentences for felony murder and armed robbery convictions; Mitchell v. State, 261 Ga. 347 (405 SE2d 38) (1991) (reversed on other grounds), defendant convicted of malice murder and sentenced to life in prison (victim shot in chest with shotgun because defendant upset over victim’s relationship with defendant’s former girl friend), received a fifteen-year sentence for burglary, as well as fifteen years for aggravated assault. The conduct of the defendants in these cases was at least as culpable as Thomason’s, yet they were punished by imprisonment. Thomason’s conduct should be punished with similar severity.
Although the majority opinion includes an appendix of cases offered to demonstrate that the penalty in this case was not dispro*315portionate to that imposed in others, the cited cases do not serve that purpose. While all murders are horrid, the fact that proportionality analyses are undertaken shows that some murders are to be considered more horrid than others, especially those in which the murder is planned, or there is cruelty and torture beyond the fact of killing, or there are multiple victims. Those horrors are not present in this case. The evidence in this case points unquestionably to the fact that Thomason was surprised in a burglary of the victim’s home, and suggests strongly that he killed the victim with the victim’s own gun, stolen in the burglary. It is thus apparent that Thomason did not go to the victim’s home for the purpose of committing a murder and that he did not engage in brutality and violence beyond that necessary to carry out his criminal purpose. By contrast, the cases cited in the majority opinion’s appendix reflect either a fixed purpose to commit murder or a greater degree of gratuitous violence: Mobley v. State, 265 Ga. 292 (455 SE2d 61) (1995), victim forced to kneel and shot execution style; Meders v. State, 261 Ga. 806 (411 SE2d 491) (1992), victim shot in the chest before a demand for money was made and while he was opening the cash register, then shot again in the head after falling on the floor; Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461 (360 SE2d 258) (1987), victim whose relationship with defendant had gone sour (defendant told a friend before the shooting that he was going to “blow her brains out”) shot three times, and her eleven-year-old niece shot in the head; Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616 (340 SE2d 891) (1986), victims both lying on the floor and shot in the back of the head, one victim at a distance of less than two feet; Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871 (295 SE2d 281) (1982), victim killed and another shot at by defendant leaving scene of burglary; Amadeo v. State, 243 Ga. 627 (255 SE2d 718) (1976), victim shot in chest after demand for money by defendant who had passed victim, then returned to single victim out for robbery; Bowden v. State, 239 Ga. 821 (238 SE2d 905) (1977), one victim beaten so severely with a pellet gun as to make her unrecognizable and her brain visible from a large open wound behind her ear, then stabbed in chest with large butcher knife after death (elderly victim, also severely beaten with the same pellet gun, later died); Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259 (227 SE2d 261) (1976), victim robbed, hit in the face and kicked, caught when he tried to escape, and shot by a pistol placed in his ear; Pulliam v. State, 236 Ga. 460 (224 SE2d 8) (1976), cab driver shot in the back of the head during planned robbery-murder; Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861 (213 SE2d 829) (1975), victim murdered and robbed by defendant after arson-murder plan with victim’s nephew failed. In all of these cases, there is some factor such as premeditation, gratuitous brutality, or multiple victims which sets the conduct of those defendants apart from Thomason’s.
*316Decided July 16, 1997 —
Reconsideration denied July 30, 1997.
Bret J. Pangborn, Edwin Marger, for appellant.
Tambra P Colston, District Attorney, Fred R. Simpson, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Susan V Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paige R. Whitaker, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
The cases set out above, considered in context with Thomason’s crime, persuade me that the imposition of the death penalty in this case is not proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. The majority’s affirmance of the sentence in this case lowers the standard to be applied to subsequent death penalty cases, and threatens to make routine the most serious penalty that can be imposed in this state. I must, therefore, dissent.