Court Opinion

ID: 9748531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:05:01.20265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:36.709477
License: Public Domain

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, concurring. I write separately solely to express my view as to the quantum of proof necessary to support a finding of clear and convincing evidence that a juvenile should be tried as an adult under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(h) (Repl. 2002). It is imperative to note that, as a result of recent amendments to the juvenile code, the focus of concurrent jurisdiction between juvenile court and circuit court has shifted in favor of rehabilitation. There was a time when the criminal information for murder provided a sufficient basis for a trial court to deny a transfer. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991). In 1997, this court unequivocally retreated from holding that a criminal information is a sufficient quantum of proof under the clear-and-convincing standard to support a finding that a juvenile should be tried as an adult. See Thompson v. State, 330 Ark. 746, 958 S.W.2d 1(1997) (decision under prior law, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e) (Supp. 1997))(holding that the State must produce some evidence to substantiate the serious and violent nature of the charges contained in the information). More recently, we have stated that because capital murder is a crime of a serious and violent nature, evidence of the defendant’s involvement in a capital murder is a sufficient reason alone to affirm a circuit court’s decision not to transfer the case to the juvenile division. Sanford v. State, supra (decision under prior law, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e) (Supp. 1997)). At the time Sanford and Thompson were decided, section 9-27-318 listed only three statutory factors for the court to consider in a transfer hearing. In 1999, Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-27-318 was rewritten by the General Assembly. Under the 1999 version of the statute, the number of factors the court is required to consider increased from three to ten. Compare Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e) (Supp. 1997), with 9-27-318(g) (Repl. 2002); see also Beulah v. State, 344 Ark. 528, 42 S.W.3d 461 (2001). Of particular importance is the statute’s language directing the courts to consider “[w]hether there are facilities or programs available to the court which are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile prior to the expiration of the court’s jurisdiction.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(g)(7) (Repl. 2002). Indeed, also in 1999, the General Assembly provided for extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ). See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-501 et seq. (Repl. 2002). The structure of EJJ allows the State to petition the circuit court at any time to impose an adult sentence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-507 (Repl. 2002). In addition, EJJ allows the court to maintain jurisdiction over the individual as a juvenile until he or she reaches the age of twenty-one. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(29)(B) (Repl. 2002). Based on these major changes in the Arkansas Juvenile Code, it is clear to me that the General Assembly has expressed a view that the juvenile court system is appropriate even in cases where there is a charge of capital murder and evidence of violence. As such, I believe that some evidence to substantiate the serious and violent nature of the crime charged is not by itself a sufficient quantum of proof under the clear-and-convincing standard to support a finding that the juvenile should be tried as an adult. In my view, the blended sentencing options available through EJJ require the courts to look more favorably upon rehabilitation as an option.