Court Opinion

ID: 9821299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 07:59:05.971637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:50.026328
License: Public Domain

Hall, J.
(dissenting). I agree with much of the majority’s opinion, except for the conclusion that there is specific statutory authority for permitting the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders (hereinafter the Board) to consider youthful offender adjudications in making a recommendation regarding a sex offender’s risk level under the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA). Consequently, I respectfully dissent.
“ ‘[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact’ ” (Miller v Alabama, 567 US —, —, 132 S Ct 2455, 2467 [2012], quoting Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 US 104, 115 [1982]). It is a time of immaturity, irresponsibility, and recklessness (see Miller v Alabama, 567 US at —, 132 S Ct at 2465) and a “condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage” (Eddings v Oklahoma, 455 US at 115). Developments in psychological and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between adolescent and adult minds, for instance, in the parts of the brain related to behavior control (see Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 68 [2010]). A growing body of research in developmental psychology and neuroscience makes it increasingly clear that the adolescent brain is not yet fully formed in areas such as impulse control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance (see Miller v Alabama, 567 US at — n 5, 132 S Ct at 2464 n 5). In addition, the character of an adolescent is not as well formed as that of an adult; the adolescent’s traits are less fixed and, therefore, the adolescent’s actions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievable depravity *101(see Miller v Alabama, 567 US at —, 132 S Ct at 2464; Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 569 [2005]). “Only a relatively small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into adulthood” (Roper v Simmons, 543 US at 570, citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 [2003]).
Consistent with these realities, “[t]he youthful offender provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law emanate from a legislative desire not to stigmatize youths between the ages of 16 and 19 with criminal records triggered by hasty or thoughtless acts which, although crimes, may not have been the serious deeds of hardened criminals” (People v Drayton, 39 NY2d 580, 584 [1976]). To this end, courts have the discretion to designate an eligible convicted defendant as a youthful offender if “in the opinion of the court the interest of justice would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the onus of a criminal record” (CPL 720.20 [1] [a]).
Moreover, the Criminal Procedure Law specifically provides that “[a] youthful offender adjudication is not a judgment of conviction for a crime or any other offense” (CPL 720.35 [1]). Once a court determines that a person is a youthful offender, the court “must direct that the conviction be deemed vacated and replaced by a youthful offender finding” (CPL 720.20 [3]). As pointed out by the majority, such youthful offender treatment allows an individual to avoid the stigma and practical consequences that accompany a criminal conviction (see People v Cook, 37 NY2d 591, 595 [1975]).
With these principles in mind, I conclude that the Board exceeded its authority in adopting guidelines which include youthful offender adjudications in its definition of “crime [s]” for the purpose of determining a sex offender’s criminal history (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 6 [2006]). Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I do not find any specific statutory authority permitting the Board or a SORA court to consider youthful offender adjudications in determining a sex offender’s risk level designation.
In 2011, the Department of Correctional Services and the Division of Parole merged to form the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter DOCCS) (see L *1022011, ch 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A). The merger sought to streamline departmental functions, eliminate duplication of effort, achieve better outcomes for more offenders, and enhance public safety, while simultaneously reducing expenditures and saving taxpayer dollars (see Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Merger of Department of Correctional Services and Division of Parole, http://www.doccs.ny.gov/ FactSheets/DOCS-Parole-Merger.html [accessed Jan. 15, 2016]).
Consistent with this merger, in March 2011, the legislature amended Correction Law § 168-1 (1) so as to provide, inter alia, that all five members of the Board, who are appointed by the governor, shall be employees of DOCCS (see Correction Law § 168-1 [1]; L 2011, ch 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart B, § 19). Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, in my view, this provision does not provide specific statutory authorization for the consideration of youthful offender adjudications in SORA proceedings.
There is nothing in the language of Correction Law § 168-1 (1) that addresses youthful offender adjudications in the context of a SORA proceeding. While Correction Law § 168-1 (1) provides that members of the Board shall comprise employees of DOCCS, and although DOCCS employees have access to records pertaining to youthful offender adjudications (see CPL 720.35 [2]), that does not lead me to the conclusion that a youthful offender adjudication can be considered as a crime in determining a sex offender’s criminal history.
There is no indication that the legislature intended to specifically authorize the Board to utilize youthful offender adjudications in determining a sex offender’s criminal history when it amended Correction Law § 168-1 (1) in 2011. Indeed, there is nothing in the language of Correction Law § 168-1 (1), or in the legislative history of the 2011 amendments to that statute, which support such a conclusion. The previous version of the statute provided, among other things, that three members of the Board shall be employees of the Division of Parole and the remaining two members shall be from the Department of Correctional Services (see L 2011, ch 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart B, § 19). Therefore, it can be inferred that, in amending the statute in 2011, the legislature simply intended to effectuate the merger of the Department of Correctional Services and the Division of Parole into DOCCS.
I acknowledge that DOCCS has access to records pertaining to youthful offender adjudications (see CPL 720.35 [2]) and, in *103creating presentence reports, routinely refers to such adjudications in describing a defendant’s criminal history. Sentencing courts, consequently, are made aware of youthful offender adjudications in determining appropriate sentences. Here, however, the defendant has already served his sentence, yet the Board and the SORA court have considered the defendant’s youthful offender adjudication to be a “crime” in assessing his risk level pursuant to SORA. In this respect, the defendant has suffered the practical consequences of his 2001 criminal conviction, even though he received youthful offender treatment.
Because the defendant received youthful offender treatment, his 2001 conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree was vacated (see CPL 720.20 [3]). Pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Law, the defendant’s youthful offender adjudication does not constitute a judgment of conviction for a crime or any other offense (see CPL 720.35 [1]). Nonetheless, the majority’s decision has the effect of treating the defendant’s youthful offender adjudication as if it were a criminal conviction, contrary to the laudable purpose of the youthful offender statutes.
Since the defendant’s youthful offender adjudication does not constitute a conviction of a crime pursuant to CPL 720.35 (1), I conclude that it should not have been considered in determining his risk level pursuant to SORA, in the absence of specific statutory authority to the contrary. Consequently, it is my opinion that the defendant should not have been assessed 15 points under risk factor 9 and 10 points under risk factor 10. This would result in a total risk factor score of 90 points, making the defendant a level two sex offender.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent, and vote to reverse and designate the defendant a level two sex offender.
Chambers and Duffy, JJ., concur with Levanthal, J.P.; Hall, J., dissents, and votes to reverse the order appealed from, and designate the defendant a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.