Court Opinion

ID: 9904027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:15:34.554536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:02.956698
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                   NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                   FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                   DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

D.B.,

            Appellant,

v.                                          Case No. 5D21-2676
                                            LT Case No. 20F-07613

AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES,

            Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed October 14, 2022

Administrative   Appeal     from     the
Department of Children and Families.

Matthew Armand Gripp, of Seminole
County Bar Association, Legal Aid,
Longwood, for Appellant.

Francis Albert Carbone ll, General
Counsel, and Carrie Beth McNamara and
Rosa Emilia Llaguno, Senior Attorneys, of
Agency for Persons with Disabilities,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.
      D.B. appeals the final order affirming the Agency for Persons with

Disabilities’ (“the Agency”) denial of eligibility for Home and Community-

Based Services (“HCBS”). We reverse.

      In June 2020, while 17 years old, D.B. applied to the Agency to obtain

an HCBS waiver, which is a Medicaid-funded package of supports and

services for persons with qualifying developmental disabilities. 1 D.B. applied

under the category of intellectual disability, and the Agency subsequently

issued a notice letter indicating that D.B. was eligible for the HCBS waiver

program. The notice placed D.B. on the waiting list and explained that

“[p]resently, the Agency does not have sufficient funds to serve all [Agency]

consumers on the waiver . . . . Placement on a waiting list does not ensure

future eligibility . . . . If funding becomes available, your eligibility status will

be reviewed and updated.”

      Shortly thereafter, Embrace Families, a community-based care

organization, requested that the Agency provide residential placement for

D.B. in anticipation of his eighteenth birthday, which caused the Agency to

“re-review” D.B.’s eligibility for the program. The Agency’s State Office

Psychologist, Dr. Martha Mason, conducted the re-review and determined

      1
       See Fla. Admin. Code R. 65G-4.014(8); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1396n(c).

                                         2
that D.B. was ineligible under the intellectual disability category. Thus, in

October 2020, the Agency sent D.B. a notice of ineligibility for the HCBS

waiver program, stating that he “had been determined to not have . . .

intellectual disability as defined in Section 393.063(24), Florida Statutes.”2

      2
          Section 393.063(24) provides

              (24) “Intellectual disability” means significantly
              subaverage general intellectual functioning existing
              concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior which
              manifests before the age of 18 and can reasonably
              be expected to continue indefinitely. For the
              purposes of this definition, the term:

              (a) “Adaptive behavior” means the effectiveness or
              degree with which an individual meets the standards
              of personal independence and social responsibility
              expected of his or her age, cultural group, and
              community.

              (b) “Significantly subaverage general intellectual
              functioning” means performance that is two or more
              standard deviations from the mean score on a
              standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of
              the agency.

§ 393.063(24), Fla. Stat. (2019). “[F]or most IQ tests, the mean is 100 and
the standard deviation is 15. Thus, ‘two or more standard deviations below
the mean’ generally translates to a full-scale score of approximately 70 points
or below.” O.H. v. Ag. for Pers. with Disab., 332 So. 3d 27, 37 (Fla. 3d DCA
2021) (Miller, J., dissenting).

                                         3
D.B. disagreed with the Agency’s determination and exercised his right to an

administrative hearing.

      Preliminarily, D.B. moved to determine the burden of proof, arguing

that the burden should be on the Agency, given that it reversed its original

eligibility determination. The hearing officer agreed and placed the burden

on the Agency to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that D.B. did not

qualify for the waiver program. Testimony at the hearing addressed, inter

alia, three psychological evaluations—conducted when D.B. was ages 8, 16,

and 17—reflecting his IQ test scores.3 The IQ scores were inconsistent

across the evaluations, and the witnesses disputed which scores and

subscores were most indicative of D.B.’s intellectual functioning.

      The hearing officer entered a lengthy final order rendering findings of

fact and conclusions of law. Despite noting that the burden of proof was on

the Agency, the order went on to conclude that “[t]he controlling laws above

      3
        The two intelligence tests utilized were the Weschler Intelligence
Scale for Children, Fourth Edition and the Weschler Adult Intelligence
Scales, Fourth Edition. Both tests typically provide a Full-Scale IQ score
(“FSIQ”) and a General Ability Index score (“GAI”). Under the governing
administrative rule, a single test or subtest should not be used alone to
determine eligibility, and if there is a substantial amount of variability between
IQ scores between tests or on different administrations of the same test,
closer scrutiny is required. Fla. Admin. Code R. 65G-4.017(3)(a). Still, a
single FSIQ score of 70 or below may be sufficient for eligibility. Id.

                                        4
require Petitioner to provide evidence that he has significant deficits in

adaptive functioning” and that D.B had failed to meet that burden.

Additionally, the hearing officer found that D.B. had recorded an FSIQ score

of 76, which was not two standard deviations below the mean. The hearing

officer concluded that, based on D.B.’s FSIQ score, he did not manifest an

intellectual disability under the Florida Administrative Code. This appeal

followed.

      D.B. argues that (1) the final order was not supported by competent

substantial evidence due to inaccurate factual findings; and (2) the hearing

officer applied incorrect legal standards. D.B. raises a number of additional

arguments that we find were either not properly preserved for appeal or are

unnecessary to address in light of our disposition on other grounds. “We

review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo and we review the record to

determine whether competent substantial evidence supports the agency’s

decision. In doing so, ‘we give no deference to agency interpretations of

statutes or rules.’” O.H., 332 So. 3d at 29 (quoting G.R. v. Ag. for Pers. with

Disab., 315 So. 3d 107, 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)); see also Art. V, § 21, Fla.

Const.

      At the outset, we agree with D.B. that the hearing officer improperly

shifted the burden of proof to him. Although the hearing officer noted that the

                                      5
burden of proof was on the Agency, the conclusions of law indicate

otherwise. Specifically, the hearing officer found that D.B. was required to

provide evidence of significant deficits in his adaptive functioning and

concluded that he had failed to do so. This was error and contrary to the pre-

trial ruling placing the burden on the Agency.

      Additionally, there is one significant inaccuracy in the hearing officer’s

factual findings that compels us to reverse. The order stated that D.B.

“obtained a[n] FSIQ score of 76 at the age of 16 years old” and then

concluded, “Based on Petitioner’s FSIQ he did not manifest the intellectual

functioning based on the Florida Administrative Code.” (emphasis added).

Critically, however, the record contains no such FSIQ score; the score of 76

represented a verbal comprehension index subscore.4 Thus, the order

explicitly indicates that the hearing officer based her decision, at least in part,

upon a nonexistent FSIQ score.5 We find that the Agency has failed to

demonstrate that this misstatement of fact did not contribute to the hearing

officer’s conclusion that D.B. was ineligible. See J.J. v. Ag. for Pers. with

      4
          The only FSIQ score in the record was a score of 67.
      5
       The hearing officer also relied upon D.B.’s GAI score of 84 in light of
the testimony by the Agency’s expert that the GAI is a better metric for
measuring intellectual functioning when there is variability in IQ scores. We
express no opinion on the reliance on a GAI score over an FSIQ score for
purposes of eligibility determinations.

                                        6
Disab., 174 So. 3d 372, 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (applying harmless error

analysis to alleged error in administrative hearing).

      Finally, the hearing officer also erred by misstating the law with regard

to the validation of performance measures of adaptive functioning and, as a

result, found a number of psychiatric reports not credible under Florida

Administrative Code Rule 65G-4.017(3)(b). On remand, the hearing officer

should apply the express language of rule 65G-4.017(3)(b) to such evidence

when evaluating D.B.’s adaptive functioning. Regarding the validation

portion of that analysis, the hearing officer should also consider the recent

case of Fatigato v. Agency for Persons with Disabilities, 344 So. 3d 627 (Fla.

2d DCA 2022).

      Accordingly, we reverse the order on appeal and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is not our function to reweigh the

evidence in these cases and we do not do so here. Our reversal is based

entirely upon findings in the final order not supported by competent

substantial evidence and legal errors therein.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLIS and NARDELLA, JJ., concur.
COHEN, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

                                      7
                                            Case No. 5D21-2676
                                            LT Case No. 20F-07613

COHEN, J., concurring specially.

      I am in complete accord with the majority opinion. I write separately to

note that our record reveals a documented history of D.B.’s intellectual

deficiencies beginning at a very young age. D.B. was 17 years old when the

Agency sent him a notice of eligibility for the waiver program, yet soon

thereafter the Agency made a complete U-turn, despite virtually no change

in D.B.’s condition. On top of that, the hearing officer rejected, improperly, a

vast amount of evidence presented to rebut the Agency’s case and establish

the requisite eligibility criteria, instead relying almost entirely on the Agency’s

expert. 6 If we, as a society, are judged by how we treat our most vulnerable

members, then the Agency came up short in D.B.’s case.

      6
         One piece of evidence presented by the Agency was that D.B. had
passed an Algebra class while in high school. But the Agency did not call
any of the educators who had taught D.B. over the course of his educational
lifetime, in contrast to the evidence proffered by D.B. Testimony from one of
D.B.’s teachers, along with his educational records, renders the Agency’s
Algebra evidence suspect. In my view, the Agency’s case is reflective of a
system that passes children like D.B. down the line, despite their obvious
intellectual deficiencies.

                                        8