Court Opinion

ID: 9352759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 18:11:01.384211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:59:47.640034
License: Public Domain

J-S43035-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ELIJAH GILBERT THOMPSON                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1466 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 5, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division
                       at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001901-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED JANUARY 9, 2023

        Appellant Elijah Gilbert Thompson appeals from the May 5, 2022 order

which notified Appellant that the court intended to dismiss his second Post

Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant’s PCRA counsel, Matthew J.

Deschler, Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and a

Turner/Finley2 brief. We conclude that the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to

enter this order; therefore, we quash.

        As we write for the parties, we need not set forth a detailed recitation

of the factual and procedural history. Briefly, Appellant entered a negotiated

guilty plea to resisting arrest and disorderly conduct on August 28, 2019. That

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1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of three

to twelve months’ incarceration. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.

       Appellant filed his first pro se PCRA petition on March 23, 2021. The

PCRA court appointed Brian Monahan, Esq. to represent Appellant. On June

17, 2021, Attorney Monahan filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter. Appellant

filed a pro se objection to Attorney Monahan’s Turner/Finley letter and a

second pro se PCRA petition3 on October 5, 2021.           The PCRA court then

appointed Robert Patterson, Esq. to replace Attorney Monahan as Appellant’s

counsel.

       On February 22, 2022,4 the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s first PCRA

petition without a hearing.         Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on

February 24, 2022, which this Court docketed at 853 EDA 2022.

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3  Appellant captioned his second PCRA petition as a “motion to amend” his
first pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court did not grant Appellant permission
to amend his first PCRA petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A). Therefore, the
PCRA court properly treated Appellant’s October 5, 2021 “motion to amend
petition” as a second pro se PCRA petition instead of as an amended first PCRA
petition. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4, 12 (Pa. 2012).

4 We note that although the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s first
PCRA petition was time-stamped and entered on the docket on February 16,
2022, the docket entries reflect that the PCRA court served Appellant with a
copy of this order on February 22, 2022. See Commonwealth v. Jerman,
762 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that “[i]n a criminal case, the
date of entry of an order is the date the clerk of courts enters the order on
the docket, furnishes a copy of the order to the parties, and records the time
and manner of notice on the docket” (citations omitted)); see also
Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c); Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d)(1).

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       Attorney Patterson filed a Turner/Finley brief and a supplemental brief

with the PCRA court on April 28, 2022. On May 5, 2022,5 the PCRA court

issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s second PCRA

petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal6 from the

Rule 907 notice on May 10, 2022.7 This Court docketed the instant appeal at

1466 EDA 2022.        Appellant filed a pro se court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement. The PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion concluding that this

appeal should be quashed as interlocutory. See PCRA Ct. Op., 7/8/22, at 7.

On July 21, 2021, the PCRA court appointed Attorney Deschler as PCRA

counsel.

____________________________________________

5 Although the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice was time-stamped and marked
on the docket on April 28, 2022, the docket entries reflect that the trial court
served Appellant’s counsel on May 5, 2022. See Jerman, 762 A.2d at 368;
Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c); Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d)(1). We have amended
the caption accordingly.

6 Although Appellant was represented by counsel when he filed his pro se
notice of appeal, the general prohibition against hybrid representation does
not apply to a timely pro se notice of appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 151 A.3d 621 (Pa. Super. 2016) (explaining that because a notice
of appeal protects constitutional rights, it is distinguishable from other filings
that require counsel, and this Court is required to docket a pro se notice of
appeal despite the appellant being represented by counsel).

7 Subsequently, in an order dated July 6, 2022, and entered on July 11, 2022,
the PCRA court purported to dismiss Appellant’s second PCRA petition.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal from that order, which this Court docketed
at 1859 EDA 2022. In a separate memorandum we also quash Appellant’s
appeal at 1859 EDA 2022.

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      On October 14, 2022, Attorney Deschler filed a Turner/Finley brief and

a petition to withdraw with this Court. On October 27, 2022, Appellant filed a

pro se response to Attorney Deschler’s Turner/Finley brief.

      Before we address Attorney Deschler’s petition to withdraw, we must

consider whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to enter the order being

appealed, which we may raise sua sponte. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Arcelay, 190 A.3d 609, 614 (Pa. Super. 2018). Our standard of review is de

novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id.

      “Any act taken by a court without proper jurisdiction is null and void.”

Commonwealth v. Harris, 230 A.3d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). This Court has recognized that “PCRA courts

are not jurisdictionally barred from considering multiple PCRA petitions

relating to the same judgment of sentence at the same time unless the PCRA

court’s order regarding a previously filed petition is on appeal and, therefore,

not yet final.” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 365 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (en banc) (footnote omitted).

      This Court has further explained that

      Pennsylvania law makes clear the trial court has no jurisdiction to
      consider a subsequent PCRA petition while an appeal from the
      denial of the petitioner’s prior PCRA petition in the same case is
      still pending on appeal. Commonwealth v. Lark, [746 A.2d 585,
      588 (Pa. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth
      v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)]. See also [Montgomery,
      181 A.3d at 364] (reaffirming that Lark precludes consideration
      of subsequent PCRA petition while appeal of prior PCRA petition is
      still pending).

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Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      Further, Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701 states, in relevant part, that

“[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken . . .

the trial court . . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P.

1701(a); see also Harris, 230 A.3d at 1126 (noting that under Rule 1701(a)

“the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction” (citations

omitted)).

      Here, the PCRA court concluded that this appeal should be quashed as

interlocutory because it was not taken from a final order. See PCRA Ct. Op.,

7/8/22, at 7. In the alternative, the PCRA court found that Appellant’s second

PCRA petition was untimely filed. See id. at 7-8. However, the PCRA court

did not address whether it had jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s second PCRA

petition after Appellant filed the appeal at 853 EDA 2022.

      Our review of the record indicates that Appellant’s appeal at 853 EDA

2022 was pending when the PCRA court issued its Rule 907 notice on May 5,

2022, which Appellant purports to challenge in the instant appeal. Therefore,

the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s second PCRA

petition, even though it had been filed before Appellant appealed the dismissal

of his first PCRA petition. See Montgomery, 181 A.3d at 364-65; Beatty,

207 A.3d at 961; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). Because the PCRA court lacked

jurisdiction to enter its May 5, 2022 order, that order is a legal nullity. See

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Harris, 230 A.3d at 1127. Accordingly, we quash this appeal.8

       Appeal quashed. Petition to withdraw as counsel dismissed as moot.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/9/2023

____________________________________________

8Based upon our disposition of this appeal, Attorney Deschler’s petition to
withdraw as counsel is dismissed as moot.

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