Court Opinion

ID: 9524865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:57:55.834742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:08.685572
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent, and would hold that the trial court erred reversibly by allowing into evidence similar acts testimony concerning the Van Wormer and Hardy checks.
Evidence of other "bad acts” by a defendant is generally inadmissible as its probative value is often outweighed by the possibility that the trier of fact will forego an objective determination of the defendant’s guilt and infer guilt from the fact that he or she engaged in similar conduct in the past. People v Hammer, 98 Mich App 471, 473; 296 NW2d 283 (1980). There are, however, certain limited purposes for which such evidence may be admitted:
*825"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crime, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the crime charged.” MRE 404(b)).1
While such evidence is not admissible to directly infer that the defendant committed the crime charged because he or she has been engaged in wrongdoing in the past, it may have value in establishing a disputed element or other aspect of the offense mentioned in the court rule.
To be admissible for such a purpose the evidence must first qualify as a similar act. This involves the direct proof of three propositions which, if shown, leads to the permissible inference that it was the defendant who committed the crime, or that the acts which were undeniably committed by the defendant were criminal, rather than unintended, accidental, or otherwise innocent. Those three propositions are:
"1) that the manner in which the criminal act in question or some significant aspect of it was performed bore certain distinguishing, peculiar or special characteristics;
"2) that certain specific similar acts, performed contemporaneously with or prior to or subsequently to the act in question, bore the same distinguishing, peculiar or special characteristics;
"3) that the similar acts were performed by the defendant.” People v Major, 407 Mich 394, 398; 285 NW2d 660 (1979). (Footnote omitted.)
*826Furthermore, to qualify as "similar”, it is not enough that the act involves the same crime or violates the same statute under which a defendant is presently charged:
"The distinguishing, peculiar or special characteristics which are common to the acts and thus personalize them are said to be the defendant’s 'signature’ which identifies him as the perpetrator, or, if his identity is not contested, negates the suggestion that his behavior in performing the challenged act was unintended, accidental, a mistake, or otherwise innocent.” People v Major, supra, 398-399.
In the instant case, Julie Reif was allowed to testify, under the rubric of the similar acts rule, that defendant Brown asked her if she wanted to cash "some more” checks (the Van Wormer checks) shortly after she had cashed the checks for which defendant Brown was specifically on trial (the Kraxner checks). I do not believe that this other act was sufficiently "similar” to justify the admission of Reifs’ testimony. The only similarity between the crime charged and the other act is the fact that in each instance Brown is alleged to have asked Reif to cash a check for him which was drawn on the account of a third party. This similarity does not amount to a distinguishing, peculiar, or special characteristic that personalizes the act in such a manner as to place Brown’s "signature” on the transaction. Comparison may be made to the case of People v Oliphant, 399 Mich 472; 250 NW2d 443 (1976), where the defendant’s particular method of committing sexual assaults so as to make them appear consensual justified the admission of similar acts testimony to rebut the defendant’s claim that the sexual act with which he was charged was consensual. While the similar *827act in the instant case involves the same crime for which defendant was on trial, this alone is not enough. Major, supra, 398. There must be something special about the way in which that act is committed before admission is justified, and that factor is missing in the instant case.
Even if the testimony in the instant case qualified as similar acts testimony, its admission would still be error. Once it is established that the testimony to be offered is truly similar acts testimony, it must qualify for admission on two levels:
"1) It must be probative of one or more of the * * * purposes [specified in the court rule], and 2) one or more of those purposes must be material, that is, a proposition 'in issue’ in the case.” Major, supra, 400.
The majority concludes that Reifs testimony was probative of Brown’s scheme, plan, or system in doing an act. The mere fact that defendant has committed the crime charged in a similar manner on other occasions does not, however, establish a scheme, plan, or system. See People v Rustin, 406 Mich 527; 280 NW2d 448 (1979), People v Austin, 95 Mich App 662; 291 NW2d 160 (1980). While the testimony may have been probative on the question of defendant’s intent or identity, it was not material as neither intent nor identity were in issue at the time the evidence was admitted. Because similar acts testimony is always prejudicial to some degree, it should not be tolerated unless there is truly a need for it, and there is no need for it until one of the purposes mentioned in the court rule is actively placed in issue. Furthermore, Brown’s intent was never in issue since he denied all involvement in the crime charged. People v Rustin, supra, People v Austin, supra.
I am in agreement with the majority that the *828evidence concerning the Hardy checks was inadmissible against both Brown and Rangel. I do not agree, however, that this error, or the error involving the Van Wormer checks, should be considered harmless. The case against Rangel, and particularly the case against Brown, was not as strong as the majority suggests. Experts were not able to say definitely that the handwriting on the checks belonged to Rangel. Brown testified in his own behalf and denied any involvement. The only testimony directly linking the defendants to the crime charged came from Reif, an alleged accomplice whose testimony and credibility were ably impeached. Under these circumstances the similar acts testimony may have tipped the scales and I believe it is reasonable that without such testimony at least one juror may have voted to acquit. People v Austin, supra, 672. See People v Major, supra, 401.
I would reverse and remand for new trials as to both defendants.

 This rule went into effect shortly before defendants’ trial. It superseded MCL 768.27; MSA 28.1050, which had covered the subject in a similar manner.