Court Opinion

ID: 9942598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 16:06:17.400383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:20.300340
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                        DARON LAVON HUSTON,
                             Appellant,

                                     v.

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,
                                Appellee.

                             No. 4D2023-2221

                            [February 21, 2024]

   Appeal of order denying rule 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for
the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Indian River County; Robert Meadows,
Judge; L.T. Case No. 311988CF001072A.

   Jeffrey H. Garland of Jeffrey H. Garland, P.A., Fort Pierce, for appellant.

  Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah Koenig,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

   Daron Huston appeals the denial of a Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. He alleges that
his life sentences for two sexual battery offenses are illegal based upon the
improper addition of victim injury points. We agree and reverse and
remand for resentencing.

    Huston’s offenses were committed in 1988. The law in effect at the time
permitted addition of victim injury points only once per victim per criminal
episode. See Gordon v. State, 575 So. 2d 736, 737 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991);
Fretwell v. State, 586 So. 2d 483, 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); see also Najar
v. State, 614 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). 1

  Huston received victim injury points for three offenses and argues there
were at most only two criminal episodes involving a single victim. Removal

1 As discussed in Lowe v. State, 742 So. 2d 350, 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), the

sentencing guidelines and rules of criminal procedure were later amended to
require penetration points for each offense.
of 40 penetration points for one sexual battery would reduce the top of his
permissible guidelines sentencing range from life to 40 years in prison.
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.988.

   Contrary to the State’s argument, this claim is not procedurally barred
because Huston’s prior rule 3.800(a) motion and appeal raised a different
scoresheet challenge.

    Regardless, collateral estoppel would not bar relitigation because the
failure to correct the illegal life sentences would be manifestly unjust.
State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 292 (Fla. 2003).

   The State also argues the motion was properly denied because
determination of whether there was one or more criminal episodes would
require an evidentiary hearing, citing Glasco v. State, 656 So. 2d 523 (Fla.
5th DCA 1995), and similar cases. But Glasco is distinguishable, and
these cases fail to show that this issue necessarily requires an evidentiary
hearing. Sentencing errors that depend upon the number of criminal
episodes and result in an illegal sentence may be raised in a rule 3.800(a)
motion if the number of episodes can be determined from the face of the
record. See Taylor v. State, 969 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007);
Perreault v. State, 853 So. 2d 604, 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“As appellant
in the instant case received a jury trial, it would likely be clear from the
evidence presented at trial whether the offenses took place during the
same criminal episode.”).

   Here, the State fails to show that there is any genuine factual dispute
about whether the offenses were committed in more than two episodes.
The record includes the victim’s trial testimony, which shows at most two
criminal episodes.

   Because the face of the record shows the life sentences are illegal, we
reverse and remand for resentencing with a corrected scoresheet. Because
appellant may have already served more than the maximum permissible
guidelines sentence with gain time, the trial court should hold a prompt
resentencing.

   Reversed and remanded.

GROSS, LEVINE and FORST, JJ., concur.

                           *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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