Court Opinion

ID: 9523205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:37:06.440024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:41.864501
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON LIMITED GRANT OF REHEARING JUSTICE O’MALLEY delivered the supplemental opinion of the court: In November 1998 the City of Chicago (City) and Cook County (County) filed suit against several firearm manufacturers, firearm distributors and firearm dealers (collectively, defendants) under theories of public nuisance and negligent entrustment. All defendants, including Sports Authority, responded with motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2 — 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 (West 2000)). In addition to its section 2 — 615 motion, Sports Authority filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 — 619 (735 ILCS 5/2 — 619 (West 2000)), claiming affirmative matter sufficient to defeat plaintiffs’ cause of action. The trial court’s September 15, 2000, order granted all defendants’ motions “pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2 — 615 and/or 2 — 619” with prejudice and made the order final and appealable pursuant to Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s ruling dismissing their complaint. On November 4, 2002, Justice William Cousins, Jr., delivered this court’s opinion reversing the trial court’s orders of dismissal. On November 25, 2002, Sports Authority filed a petition for limited rehearing claiming that while this court “extensively analyzed the merits of the defendants’ section 2 — 615 motions,” it failed to address the unique issues raised in its section 2 — 619 motion to dismiss. We granted Sports Authority’s petition for limited rehearing on November 27, 2002. Justice Cousins retired on December 1, 2002. We believe these issues should have been addressed in our original opinion. The issues were properly before this court since the trial court failed to give a specific basis for its ruling. This circumstance places before us every issue raised in the motion. See Williams v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 222 Ill. App. 3d 559, 565, 584 N.E.2d 257 (1991). Therefore, this supplemental opinion addresses only those issues raised in Sports Authority’s section 2 — 619 motion. I. WAIVER Initially, Sports Authority contends that plaintiffs have waived any arguments in response to its section 2 — 619 motion by not addressing the issues or rebutting the accompanying affidavits in their opening brief on appeal. We do not believe there has been a waiver, although it is true that plaintiffs did not specifically address the grant of Sports Authority’s section 2 — 619 motion in their opening brief. Rather, they combined their response to the grant of defendants’ section 2 — 615 and section 2 — 619 motions. To place this in context, in the court below, defendant-dealer Sports Authority filed a combined motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, predicated upon both sections 2 — 615 and 2 — 619 of the Code. Sports Authority’s section 2 — 619 motion alleged matters that, in its view, would defeat plaintiffs’ claims. The section 2 — 619 motion was supported by the affidavits of James O’Connor, “Vice President — Loss Prevention,” and Thomas Hodek, manager of the Burbank, Illinois, store. The affidavit of James O’Connor provided: the sales of handguns constituted less than 1% of the company’s overall sales; prior to filing the lawsuit, neither the City nor County contacted Sports Authority regarding the claims of illegal sales of firearms and, accordingly, the company believed its sales were lawful; in April 1999, Sports Authority announced that it would discontinue selling handguns; prior to filing the lawsuit, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) never advised Sports Authority that its sales created a public nuisance or that Sports Authority was negligently selling or entrusting the handguns in Cook County to persons who intended to use them improperly within the City or County; and to his knowledge, no store in the company has ever had its license to sell firearms revoked. The affidavit of Thomas Hodek declared: Sports Authority has certain procedures instituted for firearms sales; relative to a handgun sale noted in the complaint, the circumstances around that sale were reported to an ATF agent; there is no requirement that ATF be contacted regarding multiple sales; and relative to another handgun sale noted in the complaint, he believed that the guns were for the purchaser only. Plaintiffs filed with the trial court a combined response to defendants’ section 2 — 615 motions to dismiss and to Sports Authority’s section 2 — 619 motion to dismiss. In their response, plaintiffs maintain that: all of the defendant dealers, including Sports Authority, sell firearms to persons they know are Chicago residents, when they know or reasonably foresee that those firearms will be brought back into Chicago illegally; Sports Authority is allegedly in the small group of dealers disproportionately responsible for supplying firearms to criminals in Chicago; Sports Authority allegedly sold multiple firearms to an “admitted gunrunner” for a street gang; and Sports Authority sold three firearms to undercover police officers “who made it clear that they were engaged in a straw purchase of one of those firearms.” Plaintiffs further allege that Hodek’s affidavit: does not negate the import of the facts alleged in the complaint or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom; does not explain why it was “nonnegligent to sell firearms to one likely to use them unlawfully if the seller notifies a law enforcement agency of the transaction only after the firearms are out the door”; does not explain why Sports Authority failed to take action to refrain from making sales of firearms that are illegal to possess in Chicago to Chicago residents; and does not explain why his failure to observe “what was going on in plain view was nonnegligent.” Lastly, plaintiffs note that the complaint pleads that Sports Authority “is among the small minority of dealers that knowingly, or at least negligently, exploit the underground market for illegal firearms in Chicago.” On appeal, plaintiffs’ opening brief alleges: the “dealers engage in grossly irresponsible sales practice”; “defendant dealers sell firearms even when they should know that purchasers will use them unlawfully”; the tracing data “demonstrates exactly how each defendant has participated in distribution channels that supply grossly disproportionate numbers of guns to criminals in Chicago”; and the dealers sell firearms when they know or should know that the buyer intends to take a handgun into Chicago or is making an illegal “straw purchase or purchase of multiple weapons on behalf of others.”  In our view, while not specifically identifying the issues raised by Sports Authority in its opening brief, plaintiffs have not waived the issues. They sufficiently addressed the dismissal based on section 2 — 619 by realleging that the defendant dealers, including Sports Authority, contributed disproportionately to the illegal conduct occurring in Chicago and the County, causing a public nuisance. Moreover, even if the issues had been waived, in order to reach a just result and to maintain a sound and uniform body of precedent, a reviewing court may sometimes override the considerations of waiver. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d 475, 480, 584 N.E.2d 116 (1991). II. SPORTS AUTHORITY’S SECTION 2 — 619 MOTION Sports Authority asserts that even if the plaintiffs have not waived their section 2 — 619 challenges, they failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in granting that motion.  Section 2 — 619 states, in pertinent part: “(a) Defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion for dismissal of the action or for other appropriate relief upon any of the following grounds ***: * >;« * (9) That the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 619(a)(9) (West 2000). Generally, a section 2 — 619 motion affords a means to dispose of issues of law or easily proved issues of fact. Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 115, 619 N.E.2d 732 (1993), quoting Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2 — 619, Historical & Practice Notes, at 662 (Smith-Hurd 1983). A section 2 — 619(a)(9) motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action much in the same way that a section 2 — 615 motion to dismiss admits a complaint’s well-pleaded facts. Kedzie, 156 Ill. 2d at 115. Under section 2 — 619, a motion to dismiss should be granted if, after construing the pleadings and the supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the trial court finds that no set of facts can be proved upon which relief could be granted. Owens v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 316 Ill. App. 3d 340, 344, 736 N.E.2d 145 (2000). An appeal from a dismissal based on section 2 — 619 is given de novo review. Kedzie, 156 Ill. 2d at 116.  In filing its motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 — 619, Sports Authority maintains that the claim against it is barred by “affirmative matters” avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim. See 735 ILCS 5/2 — 619(a)(9) (West 2000). The phrase “affirmative matter” in support of a section 2 — 619 motion to dismiss encompasses any defense other than a negation of the essential allegations of the plaintiffs cause of action. Kedzie, 156 Ill. 2d at 115. By submitting adequate affidavits supporting the asserted defense, the defendant satisfies the initial burden of going forward on the motion. Kedzie, 156 111. 2d at 116. If it cannot be determined with reasonable certainty that the alleged defense exists, the motion should not be allowed. Consumer Electric Co. v. Cobelcomex, Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d 699, 703, 501 N.E.2d 156 (1986). “Conclusions of law or conclusions of fact which are unsupported by specific factual allegations are not admitted.” SBL Associates v. Village of Elk Grove, 247 Ill. App. 3d 25, 29, 617 N.E.2d 178 (1993).  Relative to Sports Authority’s contention contained in the affidavit supporting its section 2 — 619 motion that it would discontinue selling handguns, an assertion that “handguns” would no longer be sold does not speak to the sale of other types of firearms, as alleged in the complaint. Moreover, the mere voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct cannot moot a case, unless it is absolutely clear the wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. Fryzel v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 173 Ill. App. 3d 788, 794, 527 N.E.2d 1025 (1988). The burden is on the defendant to make this showing. Cohan v. Citicorp, 266 Ill. App. 3d 626, 629, 639 N.E.2d 1302 (1993). In our view, Sports Authority has failed to carry its burden. With regard to the allegations that gun sales constituted only 1% of its overall sales, this is simply a factual matter that does not defeat plaintiffs’ cause of action against Sports Authority but, rather, constitutes evidence that a jury may consider in assessing culpability or degrees of fault, if any. See Watkins v. Schmitt, 172 Ill. 2d 193, 210, 665 N.E.2d 1379 (1996). Relative to the affiants’ other contentions, in our view, these are factual assertions submitted in contradiction to the complaint. Evidentiary material in support of a section 2 — 619 motion may not be submitted for the purpose of contradicting well-pleaded facts in the complaint. Provenzale v. Forister, 318 Ill. App. 3d 869, 879, 743 N.E.2d 676 (2001); Anderson v. Anchor Organization for Health Maintenance, 274 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1012, 654 N.E.2d 675 (1995). When a defendant satisfies the initial burden of going forward on the section 2 — 619(a)(9) motion to dismiss, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must establish by affidavit or other proof that the affirmative defense asserted either is “unfounded or requires the resolution of an essential element of material fact before it is proven.” Kedzie, 156 Ill. 2d at 116. In the instant case, we cannot say that Sports Authority has met the initial burden of demonstrating a defense that would defeat plaintiffs’ claim. Having reviewed the motion and affidavits submitted in support of Sports Authority’s section 2 — 619 motion for dismissal, we hold that the “affirmative matters” provided in the affidavits are factual matters that do not negate the facts alleged in the second amended complaint or the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts. In our view, Sports Authority was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under section 2 — 619 and the trial court erred in its dismissal of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint on that basis. In all other respects, we adhere to our original opinion. Reversed and remanded. McNULTY and TULLY, JJ., concur.