Court Opinion

ID: 9575069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:11:12.2299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:54.387081
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KEENAN
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Jerar Nishanian and NGN Enterprises appeal from an order denying their request for an injunction. In their prayer for injunctive relief, they sought removal of four brick driveway columns, which were allegedly placed on a private road known as Akhtamar Drive by Asha and Virendra Sirohi. In this appeal, NGN and Nishanian contend that the trial court erred in failing to find that the brick columns constitute a continuing trespass on NGN’s land, as well as an interference with Nishanian’s easement rights to Akhtamar Drive.
The evidence before the trial court showed that NGN sold what is known as 10220 Akhtamar Drive to Asha and Virendra Sirohi. The deed described the property conveyed as:
All of Lot 4 of the subdivision designated as ‘Division of the Land of Richard Lyle’ as said subdivision appears duly dedicated, platted, and recorded in Deed Book 5056 at page 455 among the land records of Fairfax County, Virginia.
And being the same land acquired by NGN Enterprises, a Virginia General Partnership recorded in Deed Book 5057 at page 478 among the land records of Fairfax County, Virginia.
The deed reserved to NGN the right to grant or sell an easement which encompassed Akhtamar Drive and granted the Sirohis the use of the private road known as Akhtamar Drive in accordance with the ingress and egress easements granted within the deed. The deed further provides, “However, Akhtamar Drive itself *339is not being conveyed by this sale.” The record also shows that Nishanian was granted an ingress and egress easement encompassing Akhtamar Drive.
After a hearing on the merits, the trial court held that NGN and Nishanian had failed to show that the brick columns interfered with their “unhampered use of and rights to said easement road” and that they had failed to establish any basis for injunctive relief. This appeal followed.
NGN and Nishanian contend that the evidence before the trial court conclusively established NGN’s ownership of Akhtamar Drive. They note that it is undisputed that the brick columns which are the subject of this dispute are situated within the 50 foot-wide easement expressly reserved to NGN in its deed to the Sirohis. Further, they argue that since that deed granted the Sirohis an express easement over Akhtamar Drive for ingress and egress purposes only, the columns constitute a material encroachment on Nishanian’s easement rights, as well as a trespass upon NGN’s rights as fee-simple owner of Akhtamar Drive. In response, the Sirohis argue that the record shows that they own the land in question and, therefore, that the trial court properly denied NGN’s and Nishanian’s request for injunctive relief.1 We disagree with the Sirohis.
A continuing trespass may be enjoined by a court of equity. Mobley v. Saponi Corporation, 215 Va. 643, 645, 212 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1975). Similarly, injunctive relief may be awarded for the unlawful use of an easement. Robertson v. Bertha Min. Co., 128 Va. 93, 101, 104 S.E. 832, 834 (1920). The use of an easement must be restricted to the terms and purposes on which the grant was based. Id. at 104, 104 S.E. at 835.
These rules protect a land owner from the accrual of a prescriptive easement. A prescriptive easement may be established on real property upon a showing of adverse use under a claim of right, a use which is exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted and occurs with the knowledge of the land owner for at least twenty years. Martin v. Proctor, 227 Va. 61, 64-65, 313 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1984); Robertson v. Robertson, 214 Va. 76, 81, 197 S.E.2d 183, 188 (1973). Further, the right to a new and different use of an *340express easement may also be established by prescription. See Bertha Min. Co., 128 Va. at 102, 104 S.E. at 835.
The decision whether to grant injunctive relief is a matter submitted to the chancellor’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong. Blue Ridge Poultry v. Clark, 211 Va. 139, 144, 176 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1970).
We conclude that the trial court was plainly wrong in denying NGN an injunction for the removal of the brick columns. The deed from NGN to the Sirohis plainly refutes the Sirohis’s claim of ownership of Akhtamar Drive. The deed grants the Sirohis an easement for ingress and egress over Akhtamar Drive, and it specifically states that “Akhtamar Drive itself is not being conveyed by this sale.” The record also contains a house location survey dated October 23, 1989 which shows that the brick columns are completely located on Akhtamar Drive.
Additionally, we reject the Sirohis’s claim that NGN never owned Akhtamar Drive. “It is axiomatic that one who claims an interest in property is estopped to deny the title of his predecessors in interest.” Raney v. Four Thirty Seven Land Co., 233 Va. 513, 519, 357 S.E.2d 733, 735-36 (1987) (citation omitted). Thus, the Sirohis are estopped here from claiming that they own the disputed property by virtue of their deed from NGN, while at the same time claiming that NGN never owned the land in question. Id.
Finally, the Sirohis contend, in the alternative, that the reference to “Akhtamar Drive” in their deed from NGN pertains only to the 22 foot original dirt road existing on the property. Thus, they assert that since the brick columns are not located on that 22 foot-wide strip of land, they are not located on Akhtamar Drive. This argument, however, is directly refuted by the Lyle subdivision deed which shows Akhtamar Drive as being 34 feet wide. And, as stated above, the house location survey of October 23, 1989 places the brick columns within that 34 foot-wide strip. Therefore, the record directly refutes the Sirohis’s contention that the columns are not located on Akhtamar Drive.
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment and remand this cause for entry of an injunction directing the Sirohis to *341remove the brick columns which have been the subject of this dispute.2

Reversed and remanded.

 The trial court signed two conflicting statements of facts. One version recited that NGN is the owner of the disputed property, while the other stated that the Sirohis own the property.

 Because our ruling with regard to NGN’s claim is dispositive of this appeal, we do not address the merits of Nishanian’s claim.