Court Opinion

ID: 9723054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:01:22.404703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:44.261184
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
Staton, P.J.
I dissent from the majority opinion for these reasons: (1) there is no evidence of a binding insurance contract; (2) there is no evidence that Bulla was Donahue’s agent and the trial court did not find that an agency existed; and (3) the authority cited by the majority opinion can be easily distinguished from the facts in this case.
The binding contract appears to have been gleaned from the expression attributed to Bulla that “he was working on it.” This expression used by Bulla over the telephone to Gundlach has been interpreted by the majority as an application accepted and being processed. Actually, no application had been prepared or signed by Mrs. Donahue or Gundlach. The only assurance of possible coverage came from Gundlach, not Bulla. Mrs. Donahue stated that she had “... a doubt in my mind wondering...” whether she was covered at the time the information was mailed to Bulla. Before she left for California, Gundlach said “... not to worry, you are covered.” Bulla’s unrefuted testimony was that after the information was submitted, he would look at it “. . . and if the application was accepted it had to be signed.”1 Gundlach testified *132that Bulla never told her in so many words that “they are covered.” No meeting of the minds was ever achieved between Bulla and Donahue. This is not to say that perhaps some understanding had been reached between Gundlach and Donahue.
What is really meant by the expression “he was working on it”? This expression appears to have confused the trial court. The record disclosed the following testimony of Gundlach on direct examination:
“Q. When was the first time this ever came to your attention that Mr. Bulla had not followed this up?
“A. [Gundlach] When the Donahues told me they did not have the policy yet, so I called him, he said he was working on it, so I figured-
“Q. What did that mean to you?
MR. FEAGLER [Bulla’s attorney]: Again, I object on the same grounds. This is a self serving opinion.
THE COURT: Sustained.
“Q. Does that have any particular significance in the insurance trade other than--
“A. No, when I am working on something I am doing something.
MR. FEAGLER: I wish she would confine herself to the question.
“A. It means people work.”
When Bulla’s attorney attempted to clarify the testimony by pointing out that all Gundlach testified to was that Bulla “was working on it,” the trial court replied, “That is not the way the court recalls it. . . . [Q]n that particular phase of it he said there was coverage. . ..”
There may be some evidence that Gundlach was Donahue’s agent, but there is no evidence that Bulla was Donahue’s agent. *133Nor, did the trial court expressly find an agency relationship. Gundlach testified to the procedures that she followed when working with Bulla. She testified that she was not working for Bulla. She further testified that she was not his agent, and she could not bind him. Therefore, her actions, telling Donahue that she was covered, cannot be construed as within the scope of her authority as agent. Obviously, Donahue relied on Gundlach’s assessment of her coverage. It would be incorrect to say that Gundlach has inherent agency power. Storm v. Marsischke (1973), 159 Ind. App. 136, 304 N.E.2d 840.
In Hamacher v. Tumy (1960), 222 Ore. 341, 352 P.2d 493, which is relied upon by the majority opinion as authority to support the result reached, there had been prior insurance dealings between the parties. Donahue had had no previous insurance dealings with Bulla; the first time Donahue dealt with Bulla was three days after the accident. Burroughs v. Bunch (1948), _ Tex.Civ.App. _, 210 S.W.2d 211, and Gibbs v. Allstate Insurance Company (1965), _ Tex.Civ.App ___, 386 S.W.2d 606, were cited by the majority opinion as authority for the proposition that Bulla had a duty to inform Donahues that the insurance was not going to be written. In Burroughs, there was a specific promise2 to notify the insured if the policy could not be written. Gibbs simply relied on Burroughs. There was no specific promise made by Bulla to Gundlach or Donahue. If Mrs. Donahue was lulled into “... thinking that the information provided was sufficient...,” as concluded by the majority opinion, she was lulled by Gundlach’s direct representations and not by representations made by Bulla. Donahue’s recovery should have been from Gundlach and not Bulla.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
NOTE — Reported at 366 N.E.2d 233.

. I would disagree with the majority that there were sufficient facts submitted by Gundlach to Bulla to ascertain (even by inference) the limit and duration of the risk and the amount of the premium to be paid. Such facts are simply not in the record. Mrs. Donahue testified that she did not discuss all of the coverage with Gundlach, let alone the risk to be insured. The information taken from a previous policy by Gundlach was just that, information. Donahues had no way of knowing or reason to expect that Bulla would provide the same coverage. The unsettled state of the insurance agreement is obvious in that Mrs. Donahue questioned even the possibility of making monthly payments. If everything was crystal clear (as the majority would have us believe), why did Mrs. Donahue not assume the matter of monthly payments as well? Amount and manner of payment of consideration are material elements in an insurance contract. See Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wolfe (1968), 142 Ind. App. 206, 233 N.E.2d 690. Before negotiations may ripen into a contract, the negotiations must leave nothing open for future determination. Had Bulla named an exorbitant figure for the cost of the premium, Donahue would not have been bound to pay the figure for whatever number of years Bulla decided. Neither should Donahue or Gundlach be able to unilaterally bind Bulla. Accord Maryland Casualty Co. v. Clean-Rite Maintenance Co. (9th Cir. 1967), 380 F.2d 166, which distinguishes Hamacher v. Tumy (cited by the majority) in a situation very *132similar to the one at bar; the Federal Court held that the contract was unenforceable for lack of certainty in its terms.

. The Texas Supreme Court distinguished Burroughs on the same ground: no specific request by the insured. See McCall v. Marshall (1965), _Tex. _, 398 S.W.2d 106.