Court Opinion

ID: 9762323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:19:56.537525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:33.273059
License: Public Domain

Speziale, C. J.
(dissenting). I strongly disagree with the majority opinion because there is not the least bit of evidence—none whatsoever—in the record before us to allow the majority to conclude that the state has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper ex parte communication between the trial judge and a juror was harmless. My concern is not with the content of the communication as described by the trial judge in his statement on the record, rather my concern is with the total lack of any evidence on the record as to the communication between judge and juror. In the absence of such evidence, I do not believe that the state can show the communication to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I would remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary proceeding at which the state would have the opportunity to develop the evidence required to meet its burden.
In finding error on this point, the majority correctly indicates that an ex parte communication between a judge and juror is improper and that, because of the constitutional implications of such communication in a criminal trial, the burden is on the state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the communication was harmless. See Aillon v. *93State, 173 Conn. 334, 338, 377 A.2d 1087 (1977) (Aillon II); Aillon v. State, 168 Conn. 541, 545-47, 363 A.2d 49 (1975) (Aillon I). In this case the majority finds this burden as having been met by the judge’s statement on the record and by the defendant’s failure to dispute this statement or to move for an evidentiary proceeding. This conclusion, however, is not consistent with the law as established in Aillon I, supra, and Aillon II, supra.
When an improper ex parte communication between a judge and juror occurs, it is presumed, until rebutted by the state, that the defendant has been prejudiced. Aillon I, supra, 548. In this case “the record contains no . . . evidence whatsoever as to what was said by the judge and the juror during that improper private conversation.” (Emphasis added.) Aillon II, supra, 339. The judge’s statement on the record, of course, being unsworn and not subject to cross-examination is not evidence. The judge and the juror were the only ones who could testify as to what was said; however, neither the judge nor the juror testified. In the absence of such evidence, it cannot be reasonably and logically concluded that the state rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt the presumption of prejudice. Id., 340. Because of the presumption of prejudice it was incumbent upon the state, not the defendant, to seek an evidentiary hearing at which evidence could be developed to rebut the presumption. Aillon II, supra, 335, 339; Aillon I, supra, 548.
In the interests of fairness and justice, I would remand this case for further proceedings at which time the judge and juror in question could testify and, thereby, give the state an opportunity to develop a record which would be sufficient to allow *94ns to determine properly whether the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the present record is totally devoid of even an iota of evidence to support the majority’s reaching such a conclusion at this time, I must dissent.
In this opinion Peters, J., concurred.