Court Opinion

ID: 9742858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:21:43.30975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:20:40.674857
License: Public Domain

SHUMAKER, Judge
(concurring specially).
I respectfully concur and write separately to note a burgeoning confusion in the caselaw as to what is and what is not covered by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines (MSG).
For nearly all felonies in Minnesota, the MSG provide presumptive sentences that are deemed appropriate, given severity levels and criminal histories. If sentences are to be executed, the MSG provide for discretionary ranges of sentences above and below the presumptive sentences. The presumptive sentences and discretionary ranges are disclosed on a sentencing-guidelines grid.
The MSG are conditionally mandatory: “Thus, the judge shall pronounce a sentence within the applicable range unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a sentence outside the range on the grid.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines .II.D (emphasis added). Except in an advisory sense, the MSG do not apply to sentences that are not within the guidelines grid: “A sentence outside the applicable range on the grid is a departure from the sentencing guidelines and is not controlled by the guidelines, but rather, is an exercise of judicial discretion constrained by case law and appellate review.” Id. (emphasis added).
The constraint of the caselaw in Appren-di and Blakely is clear. The discretion to sentence higher than the term provided in a sentencing grid is not exercisable unless a jury determines the fact that supports a higher term, or unless a defendant waives the right to a jury determination.
What we should not lose sight of in our sentencing jurisprudence is that departures never have been controlled by the guidelines but rather always have existed in the realm of inherent judicial authority. And although the legislature has, in some statutes, provided for sentencing departures, it has never purported to exclusively control the realm of sentencing departures. As the supreme court recognized in Shattuck, the judiciary has the inherent authority to regulate the procedures for applying Blakely. State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 148 (Minn.2005). When the supreme court stated in Shattuck that it did not have the authority to “engraft sentencing-jury or bifurcated-trial requirements onto the Sentencing Guidelines,” it was simply recognizing that the MSG is a legislative creation and that the judiciary has no authority to alter legislation. Id. (emphasis added). But departures are not a legislative creation. It is clear that they operate outside the legislative creation known as the MSG, or at least did until the enactment of Minn.Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5 (Supp.2005).
I respectfully urge that State v. Maddox, No. A05-339 (Minn.App. May 30, 2006), fails to make the critical distinction between what is and what is not a legislative function regarding sentencing. Prior to the 2006 sentencing legislation, departures were expressly not within the domain of the legislatively created MSG but rather were clearly within the inherent powers of the judiciary. The instant departure is lodged squarely within judicial *738authority as constrained by Blakely. Thus, in my view, affirmance is compelled.