Court Opinion

ID: 9893165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 07:10:02.542538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:46.766227
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                     EL PASO, TEXAS

                                                   §               No. 08-23-00087-CV

 IN THE INTEREST OF                                §                  Appeal from the

 R.W.N.R.,                                         §            90th Judicial District Court

 a Child.                                          §            of Stephens County, Texas

                                                   §                  (TC# CV32590)

                                          OPINION

       In this original suit affecting the parent-child relationship, Appellant Hope Svoboda,

mother, appeals the trial court’s order appointing her and Appellee Tamara Beth Busby,

grandmother, joint managing conservators of R.W.N.R., Hope’s son, and awarding Tamara the

exclusive right to designate his primary residence. In this appeal, Hope argues that the trial court

abused its discretion in granting Tamara rights over Hope’s objection because the evidence is

legally and factually insufficient to overcome the constitutional and statutory fit-parent

presumptions. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

                                    STATEMENT OF FACTS

       R.W.N.R. was born in June 2012. Hope took care of him until September 2013. Hope

testified that almost a year following R.W.N.R.’s birth, after experiencing depression, anxiety, and

irritability, she was diagnosed with untreated or misdiagnosed post-partum depression. Around the
same time, Hope both lost her grandmother, who was her mother figure, and Hope’s husband filed

for divorce. 1

        Hope and Robert divorced at the end of 2013, but for reasons not relevant to this appeal,

the divorce decree was set aside. Believing she was divorced, Hope left R.W.N.R. in his father’s

care while she pursued other relationships. Up until Robert’s trial, Hope’s relationship with Robert

was “an on-again/off-again thing,” and Hope would live with Robert and R.W.N.R. intermittently

in their home. When Hope was home with R.W.N.R.’s father, she would take care of R.W.N.R.

Tamara lived next door to them and had daily contact with the child. In 2018, while Hope was

living with Robert and R.W.N.R., R.W.N.R. began counseling sessions with Jeanene Poston, a

licensed clinical social worker. 2 At the time, Robert “was facing some pretty serious legal charges,

and [R.W.N.R.] was struggling with adjustment and attachment issues.” Poston testified that the

problems stemmed from his difficulty adjusting amid his father’s legal troubles and his mother

being in and out of the home. Thereafter, R.W.N.R. was diagnosed with a generalized anxiety

disorder that manifests as food aversion—one of the only ways in which a child can exert any

control. From 2018 to 2019, Poston worked with Hope, Robert, and R.W.N.R. to treat the child’s

anxiety. Hope left for New Mexico in May of 2019, around the time of Robert’s trial, at the advice

of Robert’s attorney (according to Hope), which set R.W.N.R. back in his “abandonment schema

and part of his detachment disorder.”

1
  Hope testified that in October 2013, CPS put a safety plan in place, which Hope was released from the next month,
and there has not been any CPS intervention ever since.
2
  In terms of “working on developing relationships and helping Hope to reattach to and bond with her son,” Poston
testified that in 2018, she “thought [Hope] was making good progress and she was invested.”

                                                        2
           R.W.N.R.’s social worker continued to work with him as well as Tamara because

R.W.N.R. began to live with her once Robert was incarcerated. 3 Hope returned to Breckenridge

around August or September, after R.W.N.R.’s school started, but then moved to Wharton, Texas

to live with her aunt, Tina, with whom she currently resides. According to Hope, the members of

her “support group” live in Wharton, and she would not have support in Breckenridge because of

her strained relationship with Tamara. Hope petitioned for a divorce from Robert in January of

2020, and the case was consolidated with this suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR),

in which Hope indicated her expectation that she and Robert would enter into an agreement

regarding R.W.N.R.’s conservatorship, care, and support. Tamara intervened in the suit, seeking

managing conservatorship of R.W.N.R. On March 25, 2020, the court signed temporary orders

naming Hope and Tamara temporary joint managing conservators, giving Tamara exclusive rights

to determine the child’s residence, consent to care, and other decisions, while Hope had access to

R.W.N.R. supervised by his maternal aunt. Pursuant to the parties’ temporary orders, R.W.N.R.

stays with Hope in Wharton during her periods of possession.

           Hope is legally blind and unable to drive, so she relies on her aunts, uncles, and cousins,

all of whom resided at some point with Tina, to drive her to the location where Hope and Tamara

would exchange R.W.N.R. Tina and the other family members have all collectively participated

in child-rearing whenever R.W.N.R. has been with Hope in Wharton, although Hope is with

R.W.N.R. most of the time while R.W.N.R. is in Wharton. At trial in October 2022, testimony

from Hope and her family members reflected that Hope has bonded with R.W.N.R., whom she

disciplines appropriately during their time together, and that she cooks and cleans. Hope also

proffered pictures of R.W.N.R. looking happy with family members while in her care, baking

3
    Robert was sentenced to incarceration for a period that will surpass R.W.N.R.’s minor years.

                                                           3
cookies with Hope during Halloween, partaking in an Easter meal, completing school assignments,

attending the zoo with his friend, and posing in front of a submarine on which his grandfather

served. Hope further testified that her activities with R.W.N.R. have included going to the movies,

the zoo, museums, parks, and shopping, among other things. Additionally, Hope has tended to

R.W.N.R.’s medical and dental needs. Specifically, she took him to the hospital and stayed with

him there when he had appendicitis. And she took him to the dentist when he had a tooth abscess.

Hope indicated that over the last three years, her bonding with R.W.N.R. “has been interrupted

due to having to bring him back so many times. It would be easier to strengthen that bond if he

was with me all the time.” Hope indicated that at times, Tamara has restricted her communication

with R.W.N.R. to “every five days.” Hope also voiced her concern about Tamara as a caregiver

based on problems she had as a result of the way Tamara treated her when she was a child. Hope

further noted that Tamara is in bad health, which makes it hard for her to care for R.W.N.R. Tamara

testified that she has severe anemia, but has never “passed out.”

         Poston testified that on one occasion, following a summer-long stay with Hope, an

increasingly anxious R.W.N.R. complained about the food protocols at Hope’s home and

complained about Tina being overbearing. 4 Poston opined that Tamara “tries to be very consistent

in the home,” and it would be in R.W.N.R.’s best interest to live with Tamara versus Hope because

he feels comfortable with Tamara, and stability—that is, keeping him in the same community,

4
   Poston stated: “He was increasingly more anxious. His sleep was disturbed. He was tearful.” According to Poston,
R.W.N.R.’s anxiety was propelled by Tina serving him a plate of food for dinner and the family expecting him to sit
and eat with the family, “which is not part of the protocol”; the protocol at Tamara’s home allows the child to have
more control over what goes on his plate. The expectations around food consumption and the types of food R.W.N.R.
is given are different at the two homes. Poston testified that R.W.N.R. is very sensitive and nervous and indicated that
R.W.N.R. had grievances about Tina—the authoritarian in Hope’s home. And she further testified that R.W.N.R. is
actually with Hope most of the time when he is at her home, as Tina works. While both Poston and Hope spoke about
what R.W.N.R. told each of them, the court indicated that due to hearsay, “I’m not going to take either one of them as
part of evidence.”

                                                           4
school, church, etc., where he has bonds and attachments—is “extremely” important for someone

with anxiety. Poston also testified that if R.W.N.R. were to live with Hope, it would be helpful for

Hope to participate in his treatment, and Poston could send her notes to a counselor in Hope’s area.

Tamara testified about her close relationship with R.W.N.R. She indicated that she has been his

primary caregiver since 2019 and believes that Hope has not demonstrated that she is self-

sufficient and can adequately care for R.W.N.R. on her own. Poston testified that R.W.N.R.’s best

interest is served by awarding primary custody to Tamara because of the stability she has provided

him and her participation in counseling with him. She testified that Hope’s appointment as

managing conservator would lead to physical and emotional harm to R.W.N.R. First, Hope failed

to follow the proper protocol for feeding a child with food aversion, which Poston claimed might

lead to unnecessary weight loss. Second, a change in R.W.N.R.’s environment—particularly, his

school, his church, and his support system—might cause increased anxiety and, in turn, exacerbate

his food aversion. Because Hope has a past history of leaving the child, Poston concluded that the

child’s best interest is served by leaving him with Tamara, who has proven to be the only consistent

figure in his life.

        At trial, Hope requested sole managing conservatorship. Following trial, the court issued

findings of fact and conclusions of law, which included in relevant part:

        4. [R.W.N.R.] has lived solely with Tamara continually since May 1, 2019. Further,
        Tamara was caring for [R.W.N.R.]’s daily physical and psychological needs, and
        exercised guidance, governance, and direction similar to that typically exercised on
        a day-to-day basis by parents with their children, for most of [R.W.N.R.]’s life,
        even when Hope was in the home. Tamara has been the only consistent, and stable
        person in [R.W.N.R.]’s life.

        5. Hope has not shown the ability to provide for herself and the child, or that she
        has done so, at any point in the child’s life. In addition, Jeanene Poston, Clinical
        Social Work/Therapist, LCSW testified that it would significantly impair the
        child’s physical health or emotional development to be in Hope’s custody because

                                                 5
       of limitations Hope has. Hope has failed to even try to obtain a job, or home, during
       the entire time this suit has been pending.

       For these reasons, in the final order, the court named Hope and Tamara joint managing

conservators of R.W.N.R. and Robert possessory conservator with no specific rights. The order

gave Hope standard possession for conservators residing over 100 miles apart and carried through

many of the temporary orders. The exclusive right to determine the child’s residence remained

with Tamara, while the court removed the requirement that visits with Hope be supervised. Hope

appealed, contending that (1) she was entitled to the constitutional fit-parent presumption, and (2)

Tamara failed to meet her burden under the Texas Family Code to show that appointing Hope as

sole managing conservator would significantly impair R.W.N.R.’s physical health or emotional

development in order to overcome the statutory fit-parent presumption.

                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
       We review a trial court’s order granting conservatorship to a nonparent under an abuse-of-

discretion standard. In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007). A trial court abuses its

discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably without reference to any guiding rules or principles.

Interest of M.T., No. 11-17-00340-CV, 2019 WL 1291246, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 21,

2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Under this standard of review, the fact that a trial court judge might

resolve a matter within her discretion differently than an appellate court judge does not

demonstrate abuse of discretion. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242

(Tex. 1985). Moreover, challenges to the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence do not

constitute separate grounds of error. Interest of G.L.H., 630 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2021, pet. denied). Instead, the reviewing court incorporates the sufficiency analysis into

its analysis of abuse of discretion by conducting a two-part inquiry: (1) Did the trial court have

                                                  6
sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion? (2) Did the trial court err in its exercise

of that discretion? In re A.J.E., 372 S.W.3d 696, 698–99 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.).

       The first part of this inquiry implicates the traditional sufficiency review. When we conduct

a legal sufficiency review, we determine whether the evidence would enable a reasonable fact-

finder to reach the decision under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827

(Tex. 2005). This means that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

order and indulge every reasonable inference that supports it. Id. at 822. We credit any evidence

that is favorable to the trial court’s decision and disregard any contrary evidence unless a

reasonable fact-finder could not do so. Id. at 827. A challenge to the legal sufficiency of the

evidence succeeds in four circumstances:

       (1)   the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact;

       (2)   the court is barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the
             only evidence offered to prove a vital fact;

       (3)   the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere
             scintilla; or

       (4)   the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact.

Bien v. Bien, 365 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.). If more than a scintilla of

evidence supports the trial court’s finding, the challenge to legal sufficiency fails. Tanner v.

Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 289 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2009).

       When we review a trial court’s decision for factual insufficiency, the question is whether

the court’s findings are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be

clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Rentech Steel, L.L.C. v. Teel, 299 S.W.3d 155, 160

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, pet. dism’d). Because we are not the fact-finder, we defer to the trial

court’s judgment on issues of credibility and refrain from substituting our judgment for that of the

                                                  7
trier of fact, even if we would reach a different answer upon review of the evidence. City of Keller,

168 S.W.3d at 816–17, 822.

                                             ANALYSIS

        In one issue on appeal, Hope argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting

Tamara rights over Hope’s objection because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

overcome the constitutional and statutory fit-parent presumptions. We analyze each presumption

separately, asking whether there is some probative evidence in the record to support the trial court’s

finding that the parental presumption was rebutted in this case and whether the court’s finding is

against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

        A. Constitutional Fit-Parent Presumption Under Troxel and In re C.J.C.

        Hope’s first point of error is that appointing Tamara as managing conservator violates her

due process rights under the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57 (2000) to make decisions regarding R.W.N.R. We agree.

        It is axiomatic that parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of

their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). From this rule of law, the Supreme

Court of the United States has deduced that a fit parent’s determination of their child’s best interest

is accorded “special weight” because it is presumed that a fit parent acts in the best interest of their

child. Id. at 69. The Court synonymized parental fitness with providing “adequate care.” Id. at 68.

In the Court’s words, “so long as the parent adequately cares for his or her child (i.e., is fit), there

will normally be no reason for the State to . . . question the [parent’s ability] to make the best

decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.” Id. at 68–69. Thus, in Troxel, where

the grandparents of a child whose mother was a fit parent asked the court for visitation rights, the

                                                   8
Court found that mother’s decision as to the frequency of such visitation should have been given

special weight since it was presumed that she was acting in her child’s best interest. Id. at 72.

       The Texas Supreme Court recognized the fit-parent presumption in In re C.J.C., 603

S.W.3d 804 (2020). There, the Texas Supreme Court reinforced the fit-parent presumption in the

context of a conservatorship dispute. Id. at 807. The Court held that when a nonparent requests

appointment as managing conservator in addition to or in lieu of a natural parent, the best interest

of the child—the primary consideration in conservatorship determinations—is “embedded with

the presumption that it is the fit parent . . . who makes the determination whether to allow that

request.” Id. at 820. “In re C.J.C. extended the fit parent presumption to apply to a parent who had

been named as the child’s managing conservator in a previous order in custody modification

proceedings involving private parties”; thus Hope, who in the temporary orders was named joint

managing conservator along with Tamara, is entitled to the fit-parent presumption. In re B.B., 632

S.W.3d 136, 140 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no. pet.).

       Since the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in In re C.J.C., courts have been unable to

articulate the degree or quantum of evidence required to overcome the fit-parent presumption. In

re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 823 (Lehrmann, J., concurring); Interest of A.V., No. 05-20-00966-CV,

2022 WL 2763355, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 15, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re

C.D.C., No. 05-20-00983-CV, 2021 WL 346428, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 2, 2021, no pet.)

(mem. op.)). Troxel and subsequent Texas cases do instruct, however, that the fit-parent

presumption is not overcome if the nonparent shows that the parent has failed to adequately care

for the child. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (defining “fitness” as providing adequate care); In re

C.D.C., 2021 WL 346428, at *6 (“[T]he existence of the fit-parent presumption necessarily

requires that some evidence that a parent is not fit must be offered to rebut it.”); Interest of A.V.,

                                                  9
2022 WL 2763355, at *5 (“To prove Mother unfit here, Grandparents had the burden to prove that

Mother cannot adequately care for A.V.”). 5

         In making this determination, courts have understood that the relevant time period for

assessing parental fitness is the present. Interest of S.T., 508 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2015, no pet.). But evidence of a parent’s distant past conduct—for example, from two

or three years before trial—coupled with more recent transgressions can support a finding of

parental unfitness. See Danet v. Bhan, 436 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Tex. 2014) (holding there was some

evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding that mother was not fit to be appointed sole

managing conservator where she had a criminal record, used drugs, failed to provide a stable home,

and abandoned the child in the last two or three years, and she more recently failed to visit or

communicate with the child and engaged in illegal misconduct). While the “length of time required

to ameliorate a history of bad conduct” has not been delineated, it is a “purely contextual” question

that is “subject to the good judgment of the fact-finder at trial.” Id. at 797–98. Nonetheless, past

5
   Because the dissent views In re C.J.C. as distinguishable, it does not burden Tamara with having to overcome the
constitutional fit-parent presumption in this case on the basis of the § 102.003(a)(9) standing provision. The case upon
which the dissent relies, Interest of H.S., addresses standing, which itself does not include a requirement to overcome
a fit-parent presumption. Interest of H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 152, 154 (Tex. 2018) (reversing the court of appeals’
holding that “standing under § 102.003(a)(9) cannot be gained by a nonparent exercising care, control, and possession
over a child in the absence of evidence that the child’s parent is unfit or has abdicated his or her own care, control,
and possession over the child to the nonparent for the statutory period”). But the dissent’s reasoning, i.e., that
“[b]ecause the standing provision on which Tamara relies does not require her to additionally establish Hope’s lack
of fitness, I see no legal basis to apply it,” does not follow from Interest of H.S., as the court did not reach the merits
of the conservatorship determination in that case. Id. at 163. (finding that the grandparents fell into the narrow Family
Code class of nonparents who served in a parent-like role over a period of time and attained standing, but not
considering or expressing any opinion as to the merits of the grandparents’ claims that they should be awarded
managing conservatorship). While an individual who attains standing under the more stringent Texas standing statute
(as opposed to the “breathtakingly broad” statute in Troxel) may very well have more of an argument that the parent
is unfit under certain circumstances, we do not conflate the legal standards of standing versus merits. See Interest of
H.S. at 162 (“Nor does section 102.003 govern the merits of a SAPCR; again, the statute addresses only who may file
a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, not what a petitioner must show to obtain the relief she seeks.”); see also
In re B.A.B., No. 07-21-00259-CV, 2022 WL 1687122, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(recognizing same).

                                                           10
conduct alone is not sufficient to demonstrate parental unfitness. Interest of S.T., 508 S.W.3d at

492.

        Although the line between parental fitness and unfitness is thus far ill-defined, we find that

there is no evidence in the record that Hope is presently an unfit parent or has been an unfit parent

within the almost three years from the time she filed the SAPCR to the time of trial. Accordingly,

she is entitled to the fit-parent presumption. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the trial court

found “Hope has not shown the ability to provide for herself and the child[] or that she has done

so[] at any point in the child’s life,” and Tamara has assumed all parental responsibilities.

Additionally, the court found that Hope has failed to obtain a job or a home during the pendency

of this suit.

        While maintaining employment and a home has been cited by courts as some evidence of

parental fitness, as measured in the present time, these factors are not necessary markers thereof.

For example, in Interest of A.V., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that grandparents who cared for

their granddaughter for most of the child’s life and were asking for sole managing conservatorship

failed to show that mother was unfit and therefore not entitled to the parental presumption where

they argued that based on the mother’s history, neither mother’s employment nor her relationship

to her fiancé would last. 2022 WL 2763355, at *5. The court found that, in fact, the only evidence

presented on those issues established the opposite of unfitness: mother had a steady job with

substantial income, was engaged to be married, and was living in a home that she leased with her

fiancé. Id. The court noted that mother’s past actions in allowing the grandparents to care for her

daughter could not, standing alone, support a finding that mother was unfit at the time of trial. Id.

at *5. Nevertheless, even when mother had relied on the grandparents’ help in the past in obtaining

housing and other provisions during her periods of financial or emotional instability, the court

                                                 11
found that by doing so, mother ensured that her child was adequately cared for and thereby acted

in her child’s best interest. Id. at *6.

        The Dallas Court of Appeals illustrated two points applicable here. First, the question under

the constitutional fit-parent presumption is not whether a parent was, at some point in the distant

past, unable to adequately care for their child, but whether they are presently fit do so. Like the

child in Interest of A.V., R.W.N.R. has been fed, housed, and cared for exclusively by his

grandmother at times in the past. But just as the Dallas Court of Appeals cabined its analysis of

parental fitness to the mother’s circumstances at the time of trial, and not solely to her period of

instability in the past, we are resolved to look for evidence of present parental unfitness that would

support the trial court’s findings. And while evidence of parental unfitness might be found in

Hope’s more distant past, i.e., before the SAPCR filing, that past conduct alone cannot support the

trial court’s finding almost three years later that Hope cannot adequately care for R.W.N.R. today.

        Second, neither the lack of home ownership nor a lack of employment serve as sufficient

evidence to overcome the presumption of parental fitness where the parent demonstrates that she

can adequately care for the child by other means—for example, by utilizing an existing support

system comprised of close relatives. As the court in Interest of A.V. recognized that a parent can

act in her child’s best interest while lacking in financial stability and relying on help from extended

family, we, too, are careful not to hold that not having a job or a home on one’s own, without more,

is legally sufficient evidence to support a finding of parental unfitness. 6 We have previously stated

that “[c]ustody disputes by their very nature are inherently fact-intensive.” In re De La Pena, 999

6
  Relatedly, as discussed in further detail below, the Texas Supreme Court has held that in analyzing whether the
parental presumption was rebutted under the Texas Family Code, evidence that a parent was unemployed at the time
of trial and was living in “crowded conditions” with other family members was not sufficient evidence of significant
impairment to the child’s physical health or emotional development. Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 165
(Tex. 1990).

                                                        12
S.W.2d 521, 529 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.). As such, best-interest determinations require

a contextual analysis of the evidence, for “[s]ometimes, evidence might be misleadingly suggestive

of parental unfitness when viewed in isolation or unexplained.” In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813,

836 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.). Thus, we look for any probative evidence in

the record that, when viewed in context, supports the trial court’s finding that Hope cannot

presently adequately care for R.W.N.R. And in so doing, we hold that there is legally and factually

insufficient evidence to support this conclusion.

       When viewed in the context of the relevant time frame for determining parental fitness,

i.e., the present, the record contains uncontroverted evidence that during her time of

unemployment, Hope has been going to school to obtain better employment prospects. She is

presently in a position to obtain a job with her current level of schooling. She provides R.W.N.R.

housing with the help of her aunt and receives support for other child-rearing responsibilities from

other members of her extended family. Hope manages her own financial accounts and pays rent to

her aunt. Even were she to live alone, she would, to some extent, continue to need assistance from

her extended family, as she is legally blind and not allowed to drive. Thus, she relies on her aunt,

uncle, and cousins to drive her to the parties’ exchange location and to other destinations. Her aunt

has agreed that Hope will have continued support if R.W.N.R. were to live with Hope.

       Additionally, since her appointment as joint managing conservator under the trial court’s

2020 temporary order, Hope has provided R.W.N.R. medical attention when he has been ill, has

cooked and cleaned for him, and has bonded with him over family meals and activities. In other

words, Hope is not homeless, has not abdicated her parental duties since being appointed joint

managing conservator of R.W.N.R., and has not otherwise neglected or endangered R.W.N.R. Cf.

In re B.B., 632 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (finding that the question of

                                                 13
father’s fitness was at issue, and there was legally sufficient evidence that supported the trial

court’s appointment of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services as temporary

managing conservator where father had been couch surfing to avoid homelessness, had a criminal

record and a history of domestic violence, and had only limited visits with the child in the last six

years). To echo the court in Interest of A.V., the fact that Hope has sought and obtained a support

system through extended family is not evidence of unfitness because in so doing, she ensured that

R.W.N.R. was adequately cared for and thus acted in his best interest. See Interest of A.V., 2022

WL 2763355, at *6 (stating the same about mother in that case). Accordingly, the trial court’s

findings—namely, that Hope has not proven that she is able to provide for herself or her child

because of her unemployment and failure to obtain a home—are contrary to the overwhelming

weight of the evidence. The evidence establishes the opposite: that Hope has adequately provided

for R.W.N.R. since her appointment as joint managing conservator in 2020.

       Importantly, Tamara has not alleged that Hope’s current home is unsafe or unstable. The

crux of her argument is that Hope has not cultivated a safe or stable environment for R.W.N.R. on

her own. Rather than demonstrate parental unfitness, this fact merely speaks to the reality of many

American families wherein single parents increasingly rely on people outside the nuclear family

“to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000). And

the need for such assistance rings especially true for parents whose disabilities pose unique

challenges to parenthood—as it has in this case, where Hope’s family has had to facilitate the

visitations between her and R.W.N.R due to Hope’s blindness. But “limitations” that are

precipitated by a parent’s disability are not evidence of parental unfitness, particularly where the

parent demonstrates that they can accommodate their needs to enable them to care for their

children. See In re L.D.F., 445 S.W.3d 823, 831 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (“[W]e

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recognize that a parent’s mental illness diagnosis alone does not necessarily demonstrate that a

child’s physical health or emotional development will be significantly impaired by parental

custody.”).

       Lastly, while Tamara has undoubtedly served the role of a parent to R.W.N.R., she

recognizes that the child is bonded with his mother and wishes for him to have a good relationship

with Hope—negating concerns of parental unfitness. See In re B.A.B., No. 07-21-00259-CV, 2022

WL 1687122, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that the

evidence confirms grandparents’ belief that father was a fit parent because they wanted father to

be in the child’s life and to bond with the child). Whether R.W.N.R. is “better off” with Tamara

as a managing conservator is not for us to say, nor is it the controlling question. See In re C.J.C.,

603 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. 2020) (“The government may not ‘infringe on the fundamental right

of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a better decision

could be made.’” (quoting In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 333 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam))); see

also In re B.A.B., 2022 WL 1687122, at *5 (recognizing same). Because there is no evidence to

suggest that Hope is presently unfit, and because the evidence instead shows that Hope has

adequately cared for R.W.N.R. since 2020, we conclude Hope is entitled to the constitutional fit-

parent presumption: she is presumed to act in R.W.N.R.’s best interest, and her decisions regarding

conservatorship are accorded special weight. We therefore sustain Hope’s first point of error.

       B. Parental presumption under Texas Family Code § 153.131

       Additionally, Hope argues that Tamara did not meet the Texas Family Code § 153.131

requirement to overcome Hope’s statutory fit-parent presumption, i.e., to show that appointing

Hope as sole managing conservator would significantly impair R.W.N.R.’s physical health or

emotional development. We agree.

                                                 15
       The presumption that a child’s best interest is served when custody is awarded to a natural

parent is “deeply embedded in Texas law.” Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 166. Accordingly, the Texas

Family Code creates a parental preference, providing that a parent “shall be appointed sole

managing conservator or both parents shall be appointed as joint managing conservators of the

child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a). The statute also presumes that the best interest of the

child is served when both parents are appointed joint managing conservators. Id. § 153.131(b).

This presumption applies anytime a nonparent is seeking appointment as managing conservator.

Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). But this presumption

is rebuttable. We have recognized that a fit parent’s wishes are not absolute. In re B.B., 632 S.W.3d

at 139. Thus, even when a fit parent’s objection to a nonparent’s request for custody is given

special weight, a nonparent can overcome the presumption by proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that there is a history of family violence or that the appointment of a parent as a managing

conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a)–(b); Id. § 105.005; see also In re C.J.C, 603 S.W.3d at 821

(Lehrmann, J. concurring) (stating that § 153.131 of the Texas Family Code provides a standard

for resolving the question of when a trial court can award custody to a nonparent over the fit

parent’s objection). The trial court must make specific factual findings to support its conclusion

that the presumption has been rebutted; failing to do so constitutes error. Interest of A.V., 2022 WL

2763355, at *6.

       The burden of overcoming this presumption is a heavy one. In re A.D.A., No. 11-12-00002-

CV, 2012 WL 4955270, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 18, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). The

nonparent must point to specific and identifiable behavior, in the form of an act or omission by the

parent, that will cause the harm outlined in the statute. Id. at *3. For example, courts have found

                                                 16
that the presumption is rebutted when there is evidence of “physical abuse, severe neglect,

abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse, or very immoral behavior on the part of the parent.” Id. (citing

Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186, 197 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,

381 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. 2012)).

       The presumption is not rebutted where the evidence raises “a mere surmise or speculation

of possible harm.” May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ

denied). The Eastland Court of Appeals has found the presumption rebutted where a nonparent

presents evidence of actual harm to the child and where that harm is traceable to the parent’s

conduct and not to the child’s anxiety over a possible uprooting. See In re K.P.O., No. 11-98-

00269-CV, 2000 WL 34234982, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 3, 2000, no pet.) (not designated

for publication) (distinguishing other cases where the presumption was not rebutted because no

actual harm to the child was shown); In re A.D.A., 2012 WL 4955270, at *4 (finding that harm

deriving from uprooting the child is not harm traceable to the parent and is therefore not evidence

of significant impairment sufficient to rebut the parental presumption). A nonparent fails to

overcome the statutory parental preference by merely showing that they are a better custodian of

the child. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 167.

       Finally, as discussed above, a parent’s past conduct alone is not sufficient to prove a parent

unfit, but it may be relevant if used to infer a person’s future conduct and thereby gauge present

parental fitness. In re De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d at 528; In re K.P.O., 2000 WL 34234982, at *4.

While there is no fixed time period for how far back in time a parent’s conduct can be used to

inform courts of the parent’s present fitness, it is irrefragable that “if the parent is presently a

suitable person to have custody, the fact that there was a time in the past when the parent would

not have been a proper person to have such custody is not controlling.” In re K.R.B., No. 02-10-

                                                17
00021-CV, 2010 WL 3928727, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 7, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing May, 829 S.W.2d at 377).

       Proving “significant impairment” that rises above speculation of possible harm requires a

showing of specific behavior traceable to the parent’s unfitness, as measured in the present time,

and not solely to uprooting the child from his or her environment. In re A.D.A., 2012 WL 4955270,

at *4. In In re A.D.A., the trial court appointed the maternal aunt and father as joint managing

conservators and granted the aunt the exclusive right to determine the child’s primary residence.

Id. at *1. The child had a developmental disorder, which, according to a psychologist who testified

on behalf of the maternal aunt, might cause the child to react violently or to “shut down

completely” if he were uprooted from his home. Id. at *4. As for physical impairment, the

psychologist agreed that any prediction of physical problems the child could develop would be

speculative at best. Id. He testified that although removing a child from his home is a traumatic

experience, he would find it hard to believe that the child could not eventually acclimate or “regain

whatever he loses during that period [of transition].” Id. Additionally, both the aunt and the

psychologist agreed that anyone could learn to properly care for the child. Id. The aunt testified to

one occasion when the child urinated and defecated on himself before going to court and seeing

his father but stated that the child often has accidents whenever he is anxious or nervous. Id. The

thrust of her testimony was that the child would suffer from separation anxiety and nervousness

were he removed from her home. Id. In reversing the trial court’s appointment of the aunt as the

primary managing conservator, the court opined that the harm relayed by the aunt and the

psychologist was merely speculative and that there was no specific act or omission by the father

that would cause harm to the child. Id.

                                                 18
       In reaching its conclusion that the possibility of harm stemming from uprooting a child did

not rebut the presumption, the court relied on the Thirteenth Court of Appeals’ decision in Gray,

329 S.W.3d at 186. There, the child’s parents had been in and out of her life since the child’s birth,

and the grandmother’s home was the only stable and consistent home the child had ever known.

Id. at 188. Given the inconsistent parental presence, the child developed separation anxiety, and

the licensed clinical social worker hypothesized numerous risks to the child’s health that would

result from uprooting the child, including vomiting, bed-wetting, crying, screaming, poor

socialization and school performance, and increased clinginess. Id. at 190–91. In fact, the social

worker testified that the child had already been vomiting, possibly from her anxiety over visits

with her father. Id. at 191. Nonetheless, the court held that the grandmother did not rebut the

statutory parental presumption. Id. at 196–99. The only harm identified was from the uprooting

itself, and such harm was merely speculative, as evidence of the child’s sporadic vomiting was

only “probably” linked to anxiety, and other evidence was merely a possibility. Id. at 198.

       The evidence in this case similarly demonstrates mere speculation of possible harm not

attributable to Hope’s conduct since her appointment as joint managing conservator in 2020. The

trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law wherein it found that the statutory

presumption had been rebutted because of the “limitations Hope has.” Without elaborating on what

those “limitations” are, the court cited the testimony of the licensed clinical social worker, who

stated that Hope failed to follow the proper protocol for feeding a child with food aversion.

Specifically, instead of allowing the child to dictate his own portions at dinner, the child was pre-

served and made to eat a “good portion” of what was on his plate, lest he be given time-out and

made to sit at the base of the stairs. The social worker informed the court that given the child’s

diagnosis, punishment around food is improper, and if this behavior continued, the food aversion

                                                 19
could worsen. After pointing out a picture of the child that was received as an exhibit, the social

worker further testified that the child was already underweight, and exacerbating his anxiety by

uprooting the child could lead to further weight loss. In response, Hope stated that she did not

know about any protocol the child was following with Tamara in her home. She averred that had

she known about the food protocols, she would have implemented them. 7 Instead, Hope and her

family traditionally eat dinner together as a family, and R.W.N.R. is fed what Hope considers to

be organic and healthier food than what Tamara feeds R.W.N.R. at Tamara’s home.

        Assuming the social worker was qualified to make any statement about the child’s physical

health and weight, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Hope’s dinner regimen has

aggravated R.W.N.R.’s food aversion. The social worker’s testimony about the possibility of

future weight loss caused by anxiety-induced food aversion is speculative; there is no evidence

that the child has, in fact, lost weight because of anything that Hope has done or failed to do.

Moreover, the record is devoid of evidence that Hope’s current dinner regimen for R.W.N.R. has

caused him significant emotional impairment. Just as the facts of Gray and In re A.D.A revealed,

uprooting children from their environments may cause anxiety-related symptoms in young

children. Gray, 329 S.W.3d at 198; In re A.D.A., 2012 WL 4955270, at *4. But if those symptoms

are not traceable to the parent’s present unfitness—as measured by their recent conduct in the form

of a specific act or omission—then such evidence will not rebut the parental presumption. Gray,

329 S.W.3d at 198; In re A.D.A., 2012 WL 4955270, at *4. Here, R.W.N.R.’s food aversion

predates this SAPCR, and while a possible uprooting might cause further complications with the

child’s anxiety, there is no other evidence to suggest that Hope’s acts or omissions in the past three

7
 Poston testified that after Hope left, and once she no longer had unsupervised visits with R.W.N.R., Tamara took
over and Poston never reached out to Hope to speak with her or involve her in R.W.N.R.’s therapy.

                                                       20
years since her appointment as managing conservator have caused the child physical or emotional

harm.

        More important, according to the social worker, is the risk of emotional harm to R.W.N.R.

that might arise from uprooting the child from his currently stable environment. She stated that

while she “can’t tell the future,” a change in R.W.N.R.’s environment—particularly, the school

that he is well-adjusted to, the church he regularly attends with Tamara, and his consistent support

system—might exacerbate the child’s food aversion issue and cause a dip in school performance,

the latter of which has already happened. Thus, R.W.N.R.’s anxiety is best treated in a stable

environment, Poston testified, as one that Tamara has provided since 2019. In fact, Tamara argues,

and the court found, that the statutory presumption was rebutted because Tamara has been the only

consistent parental figure in R.W.N.R.’s life. While that may be true, the test in Texas is not the

fitness or degree of competence, or even excellence, of the nonparent custodian in terms of caring

for the child, but whether appointment of the natural parent as managing conservator will cause

significant impairment. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131. We will not find the presumption was

rebutted just because Tamara may be a better parent. See Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 166 (“‘[W]hile

there might be a lot of reasons appointment of a parent would not be in the best interest of the

child, only one suffices to rebut the parental preference.’” (quoting 89–1 State Bar Section

Report—Family Law 27 (J. Sampson ed. 1989))). Further, while Hope’s long-term history of

providing stability for R.W.N.R. contains bouts of her absence from his day-to-day life before she

filed the SAPCR in 2020, her past conduct alone is not determinative of parental unfitness. In re

De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.). There is no evidence in

the record that since Hope’s re-entry into R.W.N.R.’s life as managing conservator in 2020, she

has been an inconsistent presence or that she has faltered in executing her parental responsibilities.

                                                 21
See Interest of A.V., 2022 WL 2763355, at *5 (stating that mother’s “past actions, standing alone,

cannot support a find that [m]other was unfit at the time of trial”); cf. Gray, 329 S.W.3d at 188–

89, 196 (finding that a father who had very little, sporadic visitation with his daughter, who lived

in another state, and who did not keep in constant virtual communication with his child was still

entitled to the parental presumption).

       Even if R.W.N.R. would arguably suffer some emotional impairment from a change in

conservatorship, Tamara offered no evidence to suggest that such impairment would be

“significant,” as the statute requires. Courts have found that in a few cases, emotional impairment

can be inferred from uprooting a child from the only home or family they have known when doing

so would be akin to “psychological amputation.” Interest of Rodriguez, 940 S.W.2d 265, 273–74

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ). And that was the case for a child whose only family she

had ever known in her first two years of life was her foster family and whose biological father had

only visited her twice in those formative years. Id. at 271–74. But even in those cases, courts have

required a showing of how the harm to the child would be significant. In re J.C., 346 S.W.3d 189,

194 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). By contrast, Hope and R.W.N.R. have

already bonded, and there is no similar risk of emotional impairment akin to psychological

amputation. Like the aunt and psychologist in In re A.D.A., who agreed that anyone could learn to

care for the child’s special needs, here, the social worker acknowledged that R.W.N.R.’s can be

treated by any licensed clinician, and Hope agreed to continuing therapy and implementing a

proper regimen to treat R.W.N.R.’s anxiety. As such, the record discloses no evidence of

significant impairment that would result from Hope’s appointment as sole managing conservator.

       We hold that there is legally insufficient evidence in the record to show that granting Hope

sole managing conservatorship would significantly impair R.W.N.R.’s physical health or

                                                22
emotional development. As such, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in granting

Tamara joint managing conservatorship with the right to designate the child’s primary residence.

We sustain Hope’s second point of error.

                                                 CONCLUSION
          Because we hold that the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse the trial court’s order

appointing Tamara joint managing conservator with the exclusive right to determine R.W.N.R.’s

primary residence.

          We acknowledge that close to a year has passed since the trial court issued its order, and

this Court has “no ability to determine the present circumstances of . . . the parties, nor do we have

the luxury of sitting as a fact-finder.” Therefore we find it in the interest of justice to remand the

case for the trial court to make a determination regarding conservatorship of, possession of, and

access to R.W.N.R., to the extent Tamara continues to pursue the same. In doing so, however, the

trial court may consider only the circumstances since the time of trial. 8 Should the trial court

determine that Tamara remains unable to overcome the fit-parent presumptions, on remand the

trial court may consider whether and to what degree Tamara should have possession of or access

to R.W.N.R. in accordance with § 153.433 of the Texas Family Code. 9

                                                      LISA J. SOTO, Justice

October 25, 2023

8
  In Shook v. Gray, 381 S.W.3d 540, 542-43 (Tex. 2012), the Texas Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part the court of appeals’ decision in Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186, 199 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg
2010). Shook, 381 S.W.3d at 542-43 (affirming the court of appeals’ remand to the trial court but reversing it to the
extent it limited the remand to the trial court’s consideration of grandmother’s rights; though the grandmother “failed
to present evidence capable of overcoming the parental presumption, it does not follow that she will necessarily be
unable to overcome the parental presumption under the present circumstances”).
9
    TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 153.433 (addressing possession of or access to grandchild).

                                                         23
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
Palafox, J., dissenting

                                                 24