Court Opinion

ID: 9679076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:40:07.045452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:10.127573
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ROBERTS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for negligent homicide in the first degree, as denounced by Article 1231 of our former Penal Code. After finding the appellant guilty, the jury assessed punishment at confinement in jail for 180 days. See Article 1238 of the former Code.
Omitting the formal parts, the information alleged that on or about November 30, 1973, the appellant did then and there
“while in the performance of a lawful act, was handling a pistol and while doing so the Defendant, without an apparent intention to kill Burnette Clyde George, the deceased, but there being an apparent danger of causing the death of the deceased and other persons, caused the death of the deceased by causing his pistol to discharge thereby killing the deceased, and the death of the deceased was caused by the Defendant’s acts of negligence and carelessness in failing to exercise that degree of care and caution as a person of ordinary prudence would have done under like circumstances in that he:
“1. failed to use the care of an ordinarily prudent person in the operation of a deadly weapon;
“2. failed to aim the pistol away from the person of the deceased;
“3. failed to exercise proper control over a loaded pistol.”
The appellant was tried after January 1, 1974, the effective date of our new Penal Code.
On rehearing the appellant presents the same contentions urged in his original brief: that the trial court was without jurisdiction to try him after January 1, 1974, and that the State failed to prove the elements of the corpus delicti. We overrule these contentions; it follows that appellant’s motion for rehearing must be denied and the judgment affirmed.
The record reflects that appellant was sleeping on a mattress on the floor of the bedroom in an apartment in Houston. The *648deceased walked into the bedroom with at least two others at approximately 1:00 p. m. on the date alleged in the information. The appellant, who was lying on his stomach, had a .32 caliber pistol in his hand. When the deceased entered the bedroom, the appellant “raised up off the floor and the pistol accidently [sic] went off, just that fast, it happened just that fast.” According to two eyewitnesses the appellant then stated that he “was trying to uncock the pistol and the pistol went off.”
The deceased was taken to a hospital, where he died. There is no evidence that the appellant intentionally or knowingly pointed the pistol at the deceased.
Appellant first contends that the acts alleged in the information do not constitute an offense under the new Texas Penal Code.
Appellant relies upon subsection 6(b) of the Savings Provisions of the new Code, which provides:
“Conduct constituting an offense under existing law that is repealed by this Act and that does not constitute an offense under this Act may not be prosecuted after the effective date of this Act. If, on the effective date of this Act, a criminal action is pending for conduct that was an offense under the laws repealed by this Act and that does not constitute an offense under this Act, the action is dismissed on the effective date of this Act. However, a conviction existing on the effective date of this Act for conduct constituting an offense under laws repealed by this Act is valid and unaffected by this Act. For purposes of this section, ‘conviction’ means a finding of guilt in a court of competent jurisdiction, and it is of no consequence that the conviction is not final.”
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., Ch. 399, pp. 883, 996, Sec. 6(b).
The appellant argues that since Article 1231 of our former Code was repealed by the new Code and since the conduct alleged is no longer an offense, it follows that the appellant could not be prosecuted after January 1, 1974.
Article 1231 was in fact repealed by the enactment of the new Code. Acts 1973, supra, at pp. 991, 994, Sec. 3.
Moreover, appellant is correct in his assertion that if conduct condemned by the former Code is no longer an offense under the present Code, the trial court is required to dismiss the charging instrument as soon as the evidence shows that the conduct alleged is no longer an offense. Ex parte Davila, 530 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976) (on motion for rehearing).
The issue then is whether the conduct alleged and proved is an offense under the new Code. Subsection 6(b), supra; Rockwood v. State, 524 S.W.2d 292, 293 (Tex.Cr. App.1975).
Criminally negligent homicide is an offense under our present Code. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 19.07(a) provides:
“A person commits an offense if he causes the death of an individual by criminal negligence.”
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 6.03(d) defines criminal negligence as follows:
“A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.”
We conclude that the actions of appellant were sufficient to indicate that he ought to have been aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct might injure and kill the deceased, at whom the pistol was quite obviously pointed at the time it was fired. Clearly, the risk was of such a nature and degree that it constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care prescribed by Sec. 6.03(d).
*649Under our former Code, we would yet be faced with the question of whether the appellant’s acts were intentional or unintentional, since, as we said in Stiles v. State, 520 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex.Cr.App.1975):
“The difference between accidental homicide and negligent homicide is whether the act resulting in death was intentionally or unintentionally done. The focus is on the accused’s act, not on the result of his act. Accidental homicide is the result of an unintentional act while negligent homicide may only result from an intentional act. . . . (Emphasis in original.)
* * sfc ⅜ * *
“Another difference is that a jury finding of accidental homicide results in an acquittal, while a jury finding of negligent homicide results in the jury or the court assessing punishment within the range provided by law.”
After a careful consideration of Chapter Six of our new Penal Code, we have concluded that this precise distinction is no longer valid.
Section 6.03 of the new Code defines four culpable mental states. The highest of these is when “[a] person acts intentionally, or with intent.” V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 6.03(a). There are three lesser culpable mental states which are sufficient to establish criminal responsibility: when a person acts knowingly, or with knowledge; when he acts recklessly, or is reckless; and when he acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent. V.T.C.A., supra, Secs. 6.03(a), (b), (c).1
Thus, under this particular statutory scheme of our new Code, a person may act “unintentionally” — that is, without intent— and still commit a criminal offense, provided he acts with knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. This is in direct contrast to the holding of Stiles v. State, supra, and the cases on which it relies, which hold that a homicide which is the product of an unintentional act is no crime at all. It follows that the precise distinction drawn by Stiles —between intentional and unintentional acts — can no longer stand.
It is clear, however, that a homicide may still be accidental under our new Penal Code.
Section 6.01(a) of our new Code provides:
“A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession, in violation of a statute that provides that the conduct is an offense.” V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 6.01(a).”
By enacting this section the Legislature intended to assure that persons not be criminally punished for acts, omissions, and possessions not done voluntarily. Therefore, if a homicide is not the result of voluntary conduct, it cannot be criminally punished.
*650However, it is also clear that such a homicide must be accompanied by one of the four culpable mental states. See V.T. C.A., Penal Code, Secs. 19.01 — 19.07, and V.T.C.A., Sec. 6.03.
We conclude, therefore, that homicide is punishable only where the State proves both voluntary conduct and a culpable mental state. It follows that where criminal negligence has been proved — as it has in this case — the homicide may still not be subject to criminal penalties if the conduct which caused the homicide is not voluntary, and we so hold.2
We also hold that the appellant’s actions were sufficiently voluntary to establish the offense of criminally negligent homicide under Section 19.07 of our new Penal Code. Appellant’s first contention is overruled.
Appellant’s remaining contention is that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti in that there is no proof that the shot fired by appellant caused the death of the deceased, or that death in fact resulted. Two of the eyewitnesses to the shooting testified that they took the deceased to the hospital immediately after the shooting, and one of them stated that he thought that it was at the hospital that the deceased died rather than in the car. This testimony was sufficient to show both causation and the fact of death. See Hines v. State, 515 S.W.2d 670 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Taylor v. State, 489 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). .
This case is easily distinguishable from Jones v. State, 151 Tex.Cr.R. 114, 205 S.W.2d 603 (1947), relied upon by appellant. In Jones, the deceased walked away from the scene after being shot, and the State utterly failed to show that the shots fired caused his death. See Ware v. State, 480 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
This contention is overruled.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.

. Section 6.03 in its entirety is as follows:
“§ 6.03. Definitions of Culpable Mental States
“(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
“(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, -with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
“(c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.
“(d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.”

. To the extent that it perpetuates the former distinction between negligent and accidental homicide, Fazzino v. State, 531 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976) is overruled. However, we observe that the same result would have been reached in that case under the rationale enunciated today.