Court Opinion

ID: 9448024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:20:24.387478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:15.528035
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Circuit Judge
(Dissenting).
I think there is no difference between the majority’s attitude and mine on the facts involved in what is before us in these petitions. The majority has stated in its opinion, as quoted in my dissent, that petitioner is left with its unamended licenses and whatever rights in the development of the projects as may be comprehended thereunder, because the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 799, says so. The Federal Power Commission seems to be in entire agreement with that position also. Its attitude is further attested by a letter from the Solicitor for the Commission written to the clerk of this Court seeking (successfully) to have certain words in my dissent changed. In this letter, the Solicitor stated:
“What I tried to say was that the Commission here claimed no right to make these amendments without the licensee’s consent and had not attempted or purported to do so.”
There seems, therefore, to be no disagreement anywhere as to what was intended to be done by the Commission in these cases, and all connected with them seem to be of one mind as to what was done by the orders entered, which the petitioner sought to have reviewed.
By its petition for rehearing the petitioner quotes two paragraphs of the majority opinion:
“The Commission says that the actions taken by it in connection with the requested amendment of the Jordan Dam license and its proposed amendment of the two dam licenses are in legal contemplation two things: 1. They are orders of the Commission touching on certain matters dealing with desirability and economic and other factors which, unless attacked by the Power Company by motion for rehearing and, upon denial, by petition to vacate, will stand as final and binding. 2. They are proposed amendments of three existing licenses held by the Power Company which, if accepted, will therefore be controlling in the enjoyment of the licenses by the Power Company.
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“In view of the fact that the petitioner did not, in its motion for rehearing below or in its petition here. *563seek to set aside the orders of the Commission as orders but sought only a determination that it is not bound by the proposed amendments not accepted by it, there remains nothing for this Court to pass upon.”
The petition for rehearing further recites :
“However, petitioner is disturbed lest respondent may seek to argue that these two paragraphs of the Court’s opinion, when read together, support its contention, made for the first time on oral argument, that even though the orders are concededly ineffective as unilateral amendments to petitioner’s existing licenses, they nevertheless survive as ‘orders’ laying down certain binding determinations — i.e., ‘findings’ — which could be relied on by respondent to prevent petitioner from carrying out the terms of its existing licenses.”
It has appeared to me from the outset that this apprehension on the part of the petitioner was the sole basis for its petitions, and that the apprehension was justified by the letter, construing the orders, which had been written to petitioner by the Secretary of the Federal Power Commission, as quoted in my dissent.
It seems abundantly clear now that the meaning attributed, justifiably in my opinion, by the petitioner to the paragraph from the Secretary’s letter has been completely disavowed, and that the majority has stated that the statute itself preserves the rights possessed by petitioner in the existing licenses already owned by it. I am content to have this controversy put to rest with these assurances that the record confirms that the existing licenses remain unimpaired and unprejudiced by the orders which petitioner has by these proceedings sought to bring under review. I still think that our opinion and judgment should be to sustain the petitions for review to that extent and, therefore, I must dissent from the action of the Court in dismissing the petitions and in denying the petition for rehearing.