Court Opinion

ID: 9675928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:10:01.162249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:00.971810
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Smith,
concurring in part and in part dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the injunctive relief sought by respondent, but I do not agree that the injunction *103heretofore granted should be dissolved. I respectfully present the following opinion.
This suit was filed by respondent against six common carrier truck companies and five individuals, who were managers of the defendant-truck companies. The suit was not against the petitioner or any other labor organization.
The respondent plead a cause of action against the trucking companies for damages and for an injunction, and, if the evidence sustained the pleadings, the state court had jurisdiction and the injunction granted was warranted. The intervention of petitioner over respondent’s objection or otherwise does not give the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. The Garner case and other cases of like holding do not control the decision in this case. Respondent alleged in part:
“On or about the 14th day of April, 1952, the corporate defendants and the individual defendants notified plaintiff, either through said individual defendant or through other employees or agents of said corporate defendants, that they, and each of them, would not thereafter deliver to plaintiff any merchandise which might be in the course of transportation over their lines and the lines of plaintiff. Each of such corporate defendants and individual defendants, through such individual defendants, or other agents or employees of such corporate defendants, stated the sole and only reason for such action was that the aforenamed labor union or other unions unknown to this plaintiff had told the said defendants that they should divert their freight from plaintiff to some other carrier. Thereafter, on the 15th day of April, 1952, a shipment of merchandise which had been received by plaintiff for transportation by plaintiff over plaintiff’s line, and for delivery by plaintiff to a connecting motor carrier at El Paso for transportation beyond El Paso, consisting of a total weight of 3,000 pounds, was tendered by plaintiff to defendant Texas-Arizona Motor Freight, Inc., for transportation over its lines to point of destination. Said shipment was tendered to said defendant in the regular course of business, and in accordance with the usual custom and practice as existing between the plaintiff and said defendant. Said defendant refused to accept such shipment wrongfully and without just cause, and its action in that respect was due to the Union’s demands upon it.”
The pleadings of the respondent are specific in alleging that *104the wrong complained of was brought about by statements made by the Union to the defendant-carriers. These carriers were employers and not employees.
The defendant-carriers filed sworn answers in which they denied that they were acting jointly and in concert with each other, and in furtherance1 of a conspiracy and restraint of trade; or that they were participating with any Union in a secondary boycott.
Intervenor-petitioner’s sworn answer, in part, alleged that it has advised several of the defendants of the fact that plaintiff has refused to deal with other affiliates of the Teamsters’ Union in the State of New Mexico and elsewhere, and that it is advised that said other Teamsters’ local unions, engaged in a labor dispute with plaintiff, are engaged in lawful picketing of plaintiff at Albuquerque, New Mexico, and intervenor would show that it has a right to advise defendants of such fact.
Some of the evidence which shows wrongful acts of coercion applied by the Union to defendant-carriers and a participation in a secondary boycott by the defendant-carriers against the respondent is as follows:
Mr. Fred A. Bone, Secretary-Treasurer of the Union, testified:
“Q. Now somebody on behalf of the Union did on the morning of Monday, April 14th, 1952, advise these truck lines who are defendants in this suit, that there was — that Whitfield was being picketed at Albuquerque, did they not?
“A. I couldn’t say, I didn’t.
“Q. Well you did say, didn’t you Mr. Bone, in this answer of your Union which is referred to here as Intervenor, that said ‘Intervenor would show that it has advised several of Defendants of the fact that Plaintiff has refused to deal with other affiliates of the Teamsters Union in the State of New Mexico and elsewhere and that it is advised that said other Teamsters’ Local Unions, engaged in a labor dispute with plaintiff, are engaged in lawful picketing of Plaintiff at Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Intervenor would show that it has a right to advise Defendants of such fact.’ You say you didn’t know about that?
“A. My assistant may have notified the carriers. I didn’t notify the carriers. I stated that I didn’t notify the carriers. .
*105“Q. You didn’t notify them. Well you know somebody representing the Union did do so?
“A. I presume that’s right.
“Q. Well do you presume it, or is it a fact?
“A. Well—
“Q. It’s right there and it is sworn to by you, isn’t that a fact?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Well do you presume that, or is that a fact?
“A. I presume my assistant does what I tell him.
“Q. Well don’t be mealy-mouthed about it. It’s a fact, isn’t it?
“MR. WELLS: What is a fact?
“Q. That somebody representing the Union in question, I originally asked him, notified these defendants on the morning of April the 14th, 1952, that they were picketing Whitfield at Albuquerque. ?
“A. Yes, they were notified.”
❖ * ❖
“Q. And you expected as a result of that notification that freight would be diverted — interlined freight would be diverted from Whitfield at El Paso, did you not?
“A. I couldn’t say that would be the reaction.
“Q. No, but you expected that, didn’t you?
“A. I might have expected it — some members do and some members don’t, so I expected the best part of it would be, yes.
“Q. You knew that the best part of the interline freight in El Paso would be diverted from Whitfield as a result of that notification?
“A. No, I didn’t know it.
“Q. You firmly expected it, though, didn’t you?
“A. I expected it.”
Mr. Bone’s assistant testified that he did so notify defendant-carriers.
The defendant’s situation is shown in the testimony of J. I. *106Young, the freight agent for defendant-carriers, Western Truck Lines, Ltd. and Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., who testified that in the interest of diplomatic relations with the Union on the part of his employers, he felt it unwise to tender freight to respondent, and that he asked permission of Mr. Thomas, an officer of petitioner-Union, to even accept freight from respondent since he felt that obtaining such permission was good politics with the Union; that petitioner-Union had collective bargaining contracts with the defendant-carriers. He further testified that had no such consent been obtained from the Union the employees of the two truck line-defendants for which he was agent would have refused to handle respondent’s freight received by such lines. He also testified that he considered the notice from the Union of the presence of a picket line in Albuquerque an implied threat not to do business with respondent, and that since petitioner-Union would look favorably upon his refusing to give freight to Whitfield, his refusal so the interline was based upon what he thought the Union wanted him to do.
Richard Harris, the dock foreman for respondent in El Paso, Texas, testified that Ike Young, (the same person as J. I. Young previously mentioned), in a telephone conversation with Mr. Harris on April 14, 1952, told him that he had been instructed by the Union to divert freight from respondent; that James W. Young, the rate clerk for Southern Express, on that same day in another telephone conversation also told him that the petitioner-Union had instructed Southern Express to divert freight from respondent, and that Vernon Johnson, the warehouse-foreman of Texas-Arizona Motor Freight, and a member of petitioner-Union, in a telephone conversation with the said Harris on April 15, 1952, told him that Texas-Arizona Motor Freight would neither receive nor tender freight to respondent. The testimony of Richard Harris, dock foreman for respondent; Fred Romero, a truck driver for Whitfield; Ike Young, Manager of the two defendant-truck lines; A. D. Hall and Fred Bone, Union business agents, supports the findings of the trial court of a secondary boycott, and a violation of the Texas AntiTrust laws by the defendant-trucking companies.
The trial court granted a perpetual injunction against the defendants, and made the following findings of fact in its judgment:
“The Court finds that plaintiff had no dispute with, or complaint from its employees, and that the Intervenor did not, at the time this suit was filed, or at the time of trial of this cause, claim to represent a majority of said employees, but that never*107theless members, agents, employees and representatives of the union combined to formulate and put into effect a plan to cause a secondary boycott to be instituted and carried on by defendants against plaintiff at El Paso, Texas, with respect to interline freight; that union by threats, express or implied, coerced the defendants into establishing and carrying on the said secondary boycott, defendant’s action in this respect being put into effect pursuant to signal given by the Intervenor and kept in effect from that time until the issuance of the temporary restraining order issued in this cause; and that Intervenor, its agents, employees, representatives and members, and defendants, did combine and engage in said secondary boycott, and pursuant thereto did divert from plaintiff interline freight at El Paso, Texas, which otherwise would have been delivered by defendants to Plaintiff; and that Defendant Texas-Arizona Freight, Inc., pursuant to said plan and combination, refused to accept interline freight from plaintiff; and that in connection with all of said acts of defendants and intervenor, their agents, representatives, members, and employees, there was a concert of action among them, and all of them. That said concert of action, plan, and combination, was instituted and caried on for the purpose of causing injury or damage to plaintiff by withholding patronage from plaintiff, and that it interfered with the free flow of commerce, and that it created or tended to create retsrictions in trade or commerce. That said facts show a violation of the anti-trust laws of the State of Texas, and of the provisions of Article 5154f of the Vernon’s Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, as amended, and said acts on the part of defendants and intervenor are illegal, and should be enjoined, and that said acts on the part of Intervenor and defendants, and each of them, will cause plaintiff irreparable injury, and that plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.”
It is my view — supported by decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Texas, that respondent’s cause of action against the defendant-employers for injunction and damages resulting from the wrongful acts of the defendants could not have been presented to the National Labor Relations Board, and, if presented, would have been dismissed. To hold otherwise would leave no power to the State and the respondent without a forum. The Labor Management Relations Act, or the so-called Taft-Hartley Act, does not cover this case, as it did the Garner case.
The statute involved applies only where a union engages in, *108or induces or encourages the employees of an employer to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal to handle or transport goods or commodities when the Union had certain specified objects in view. The evidence clearly shows that the Union representatives did not approach the employees of the defendant-truck companies, but, on the contrary, all the evidence proves conclusively that the Union representatives coerced the employers — the six defendant-truck companies — into a concerted action, which resulted in the defendants’ failure to interline freight with respondent, as they had theretofore been doing. Such action of the defendants began on April 14, 1952, and continued until about April 21, 1952, the date the temporary restraining order was granted in this case.
The Union aplied a secondary boycott by coercing other carriers who were employers. The employees of respondent, Whitfield, were not involved in the picketing and had no pending grievance or complaint against respondent. No demands had been made upon the respondent “with respect to Union terms or matters.” The evidence shows that at the time of the action taken by the Union there were no “representations made by either the company’s employees or * * * by the Teamsters’ Union, to the effect that they represented a majority of the company’s employees.”A bout two years before the acts of the Union which gave rise to the present controversy, the National Labor Relations Board ordered a representation election. At that time, the Teamsters’ Union claimed to represent the company’s employees. The election was held and the Union lost by a vote of 87 to 6. No request was made thereafter by the Teamsters’ Union, or any of its locals, that an election be held. At the time of and prior to establishing the picket line at Whitfield’s place of business in Albuquerque, the intervenor-Union had not been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the bargaining agent for the company’s employees.
The only notice of any kind, prior to the picketing, was in the form of a letter, dated March 15, 1952. The letter bore no return address. The letter reads:
“It is the desire of the Representatives of the Teamsters Joint Council No. 71 to meet with Representatives of your Company to discuss issues of mutual interest to both parties.
“We would appreciate very much if you would notify us at your earliest possible convenience when it will be possible to arrange this meeting.
*109“If necessary, the Representatives of the Council can meet with you in Las Cruces.”
Mr. Hull, General Manager for Whitfield, testified: “The letter showed no return address whatsoever.” The Company did not reply to the letter. When asked whether Whitfield made any effort to reply to the letter, Mr. Hull stated, “No, because they didn’t indicate in the letter that they represented any of the employees, or anything of that nature.”
The evidence shows that the Union had lost in a fair election ; that after the defeat, it entered upon a course of conduct which indicated a desire to ignore the vote of the employees of Whitfield, the National Labor Relations Board, and the rights of Whitfield. The election conducted two years before by the National Labor Relations Board was extremely disappointing to the Union. The record reveals a course of action and conduct on the part of the Union which resulted in material damage to Whitfield. The Union, by coercing the defendant-truck lines, who were employers, and not employees, caused Whitfield to lose more than $4,000.00 in interline freight business both at Albuquerque, New Mexico and El Paso, Texas. In the Garner case, 346 U. S. 485, 98 L. Ed. 161, 74 Sup. Ct. 161, 164, the Court said in part: “The National Labor Relations Act, as we have pointed out (citing Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301, 313, 93 L. Ed. 691, 69 Sup. Ct. 584; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 773; 91 L. Ed. 1234, 67 Sup. Ct. 1026; Hill v. State of Florida ex rel Watson, 325 U. S. 538, 89 L. Ed. 1782, 65 Sup. Ct. 1373) leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.”
The Court also said that where the National Labor Relations Board is without express power to prevent the injurious conduct of which complaint is made, it has “declined to find an implied exclusion of state powers.” See International Union v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245, 254, 93 L. Ed. 651, 69 Sup. Ct. 516.
In Rabouin, dba Conway’s Express v. National Labor Relations Board, 195 F. 2d 906, Rabouin, a truck line operator, was engaged in arguments with the Teamsters’ Union, in the course of which they undertook to bring pressure on him by requesting other truck line operators not to accept his shipments. This was held not to violate Section 8 (b) (4) of the Labor Management Relations Act, the Court saying:
*110“Petitioner also sees in the union’s pressure on neutral employers to stop accepting his shipments a violation of the secondary boycott provisions. Sec. 8 (b) (A). Even if the demands carried with them an implicit threat to strike, we cannot agree that they tended to induce or encourage the employees to engage in a strike or concerted refusal forcing the employer to cease doing business with another. The embargo on Rabouin’s goods was the product solely of requests addressed to management or supervisory personnel. The former are clearly employers, and the latter have lately been so defined by the new Section 2 (2, 11), 29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 152 (2, 11). The union thus did not ‘encourage the employees.’ ”
In Douds, on behalf of National Labor Relations Board., v. Sheet Metal Workers, 101 Fed] Supl. 273, 970, 972 (on rehearing) there was involved a boycott of the products of FerroCo., who did not employ members of the Sheet Metal Union. An injunction was sought in the United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, by Douds as Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board. It was alleged that the Union had committed an unfair labor practice by establishing a boycott prohibited by Section 8, (b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act. The injunction was denied and the Court, among other things, said:
“Viewing the situation realistically, what the petitioner seeks to enjoin here is, of course, the boycott by the respondent of the goods manufactured by Ferro-Co. But the evidence shows that the boycott was accomplished by the respondent, not by inducing or encouraging the employees of Dierks to engage in a strike or concerted refusal to handle Ferro-Co’s products, but because of an agreement with the Heating Assaciation representing a group of employers. That agreement provided that the work of fabricating and installing radiator enclosures on jobs contracted by the Association members would be performed by members of the Sheet Metal Workers International. Whatever objections can be taken to such agreement as being contrary to law, it cannot be regarded as a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A), because the evidence fails to show that the respondent, in achieving its objective, induced or encouraged the employees of any employer to engage in an unfair labor practice as defined therein.”
A union is not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act where the evidence shows coercion by the union upon secondary employers *111and does not show any inducement or encouragement of the employees of such secondary employers. Sheet Metal Workers, etc., and Ferro-Co. Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1660; Local Union No. 50, etc. and Clyde M. Furr, 98 N.L.R.B. 128; Arkansas Express, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 255. In Arkansas Express, Inc., the Board said:
“The record clearly shows, and we find, that the Respondent, in aid of its primary dispute with Arkansas, brought pressure upon the other carrier-secondary employers-to boycott Arkansas completely. The terminal manager of Highway Express testified that, sometime between February 6 and February 20, the Respondent Union’s assistant business agent, James Harrison, told him that Highway Express could not call Arkansas for a pickup because there would be ‘nobody to check the freight’; and that if Highway Express made the call the men ‘might walk out’ with ‘the sanction of the Union’. * * * The principal issue raised by the motion, therefore, is whether the General Counsel has proved that the Respondent induced the employees of the other carriers to refuse to handle Arkansas freight in the course of their employment. * * * As its main defense, and in support of the motion, the Respondent insists that notwithstanding the clear evidence of secondary objective or inducement of secondary employers, the General Counsel has not shown any inducement by the Respondent of employees (other than those of Arkansas, the primary employer).”
The Board, in the above case, held that the evidence showed coercion by the Union upon the secondary employers and did not show any inducement or encouragement of the employees of such secondary employers and that the union for that reason was not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.
In the Garner case, the evidence showed that the National Labor Relations Board had express power to act. The facts brought the court to the conclusion: “This is not an instance of injurious conduct which the National Labor Relations Board is without express power to prevent and, which, therefore, either is ‘governable by the state or it is entitrely ungoverned’.”
The position of the union that the state courts are without jurisdiction and that the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal courts have preempted the field in all cases involving interstate commerce is wholly unsupported by the authorities. The fact in this case bring it squarely within the principle *112announced in the cases of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 93 L. Ed. 834, 69 Sup. Ct. 684 ; Best Motor Lines, Inc. v. Int. Bro., etc., 150 Texas 95, 237 S.W. 2d 589 and Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Weber, et al, 364 Mo. 573, 265 S.W. 2d 325. The trial court in the present case found a conspiracy on the part of the defendant-truck lines and the Union in restraint of trade and that such act was in violation of the Texas AntiTrust laws. This was one of the grounds for the issuance of the injunction. I see no valid reason to waiver in the least from the holding this Court made in the Best Motor Lines case, supra, wherein we said: “The Texas Anti-Trust Statutes are valid laws and all persons are subject thereto, and the courts have the power to enjoin acts and conduct in violation thereof. Labor unions are not excepted, even though there exists a labor dispute and the picketing is peaceful.”
The recent case of United Construction Workers, Affiliated with the United Mine Workers of America, et al v. Laburnum Construction Corporation 347 U. S. 656, 74 Sup. Ct. 833, 834, involved the question as to “whether the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, had given the National Labor Relations Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of a common-law tort action for damages as to preclude an appropriate state court from hearing and determining its issues where such conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice under that Act.” The Court held against the contention of the Union. In discussing the jurisdictional question, the Court said: “We accept the view of the National Labor Relations Board that respondent’s activities affect interstate commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act.” The contention of the petitioner-union was stated and the Court held as follows:
“Petitioners contend that the Act of 1947 has occupied the labor relations field so completely that no regulatory agency other than the National Labor Relations Board and no court may assert jurisdiction over unfair labor practices as defined by it, unless expressly authorized by Congress to do so. They claim that state courts accordingly are excluded not only from enjoining future unfair labor practices and thus colliding with the Board, as occurred in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 74 Sup. Ct. 161, but that state courts are excluded also from entertaining common-law tort actions for the recovery of damages caused by such conduct. The latter exclusion is the issue here. In the Garner case, Congress had provided a federal administrative remedy, supplemented by judicial procedure for its enforcement, with which the state injunctive procedure con*113flicted. Here Congress has neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct. For us to cut off the injured respondent from this right of recovery will deprive it of its property without recourse or compensation. To do so will, in effect, grant petitioners immunity from liability for their tortious conduct. We see no substantial reason for reaching such a result. The contrary view is consistent with the language of the Act and there is positive support for it in our decisions and in the legislative history of the Act.”
The National Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 did not expressly relieve labor organizations from legal liability for unlawful conduct. The United States Supreme Court concluded its opinion by saying:
“If Virginia is denied jurisdiction in this case, it will mean that where the federal preventive administrative procedures are impotent or inadequate, the offenders, by coercion of the type found here, may destroy property without liability for the damage done. If petitioners were unorganized private persons, conducting themselves as petitioners did here, Virginia would have had undoubted jurisdiction of this action against them. The fact that petitioners are labor organizations, with no contractual relationship with respondent or its employees, provides no reasonable basis for a different conclusion.”
In holding that the State of Virginia had jurisdiction of the involved controversy between the union and the respondent, the Court clearly construed its opinion in the Garner case.
The evidence is conclusive that the acts and conduct of the intervenor-union induced the defendant-carriers to cease delivering merchandise to petitioner for transportation over its lines and thereby caused petitioner to suffer damages. The acts caused the defendant-carriers to do that which they would not otherwise have done. Petitioner was not required to prove physical force on the part of intervenor. The intervener adopted a subtle method of approach and accomplished its purpose. The Union was restrained from coercing the employers. The intervenorunion is not in a legal position to complain of an injunction which restrains it from applying a secondary boycott by coercing employers. The defendant-carriers did not appeal and the order granting the injunction as to them has become final.
The injunction order expressly provided that “nothing contained herein shall be construed to enjoin the exercise by any *114person of the right of free speech, nor to inhibit the dessemination by lawful means of facts and information concerning any labor dispute.” The injunction does not prevent the intervenorUnion or the defendant-carriers from performing any lawful act.
The judgments of the Court of Civil Appeals and the trial court should be affirmed.
Opinion delivered December 15, 1954.
Rehearing overruled January 19, 1955.