Court Opinion

ID: 9848256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:15:28.093478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:09.913371
License: Public Domain

*258BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I do not find it necessary to engage in a debate which is largely centered around attempting to determine when solicitation leaves off and attempt takes over, or to distinguish between overt acts and slightly overt acts, or to find the line of demarcation between perpetration and preparation.
Not too long ago the Court wrestled with the Lindquist and Creech cases.1 Lindquist was a contract killer, and the details of that crime will be found well laid out in the dissent of Justice Shepard. The main difference which I perceive in comparing that case to this is that Phillip Weitz, who contracted for the death of his wife (through one Vetch) got the killer for which he bargained — Otto did not.
No one has satisfactorily demonstrated that element which is missing in this case which was present in the Lindquist-Weitz affair. Had Vetch, who played much the same part in the Weitz scenario as did the lounge owner in this, placed Weitz in touch with a police officer rather than with a Lindquist, then three members of the Court sua sponte2 would have held that Weitz could not have been convicted of anything.
Murder may be accomplished in many ways, and it may be attempted in many ways. Of a twenty volume work on the history of mankind, at least two volumes could be devoted to discussing the multitude of ingenious ways man has devised to kill his fellow man, and seventeen volumes could be written dealing in general with man’s inhumanity to man in doing so. The point I lead to is that a man may take it upon himself to effect the death of another person in several ways. He may undertake to commit the murder. (If he fails he is clearly guilty of attempted murder, and no one argues to the contrary.) Others, desiring the commission of a murder, however, may lack the fortitude to make a direct attack, or may deceive themselves into believing that there is less risk involved if someone else does the dastardly deed. Such persons accordingly may connive to bring about the murder through an agent. If the agent fails to accomplish the act, is it any less an attempt on the part of the principal? Such is the simple question before us.
Whether a person takes on for himself the task of trying to kill another person, or tries to bring about that killing through hiring another to perform the deed, is in actuality nothing but a matter of personal choice. While the principal is guilty of murder when the contract is performed, an attempt has been made when the bargain is struck. Such to me appears to be the essence of the Washington court’s holding in State v. Gay, 4 Wash.App. 834, 486 P.2d 341 (1971). Nor does there appear to be any sound reason for demanding that there be an exchange of consideration. In the civil area of the law mutual promises are sufficient, and I see no reason for not extending that rule of law to the criminal field. If criminals are going to contract out their services, and if there are persons who will retain those services, there is no reason why the criminal courts should decline to respect those contracts. Here, of course, Otto did pay a consideration, and there is no reason to dwell in depth on what might be the case if he had not. Such is better saved for a case where no consideration changes hands.
As far as solicitation is concerned, my understanding of the word is that it is a “seeking out.” Real estate agents solicit new listing agreements. Would-be sellers sometimes solicit real estate agents — both to sell property for them, and to assist in *259selling property. Out of such solicitations contracts are born, and agencies created. So with lawyers. A client in need of a good lawyer solicits an attorney to represent him. If the attorney agrees, a legal relationship is created. Solicitation either accomplishes its purpose, or it does not. If it does, and a contractual relationship is created, various kinds of agencies are created; I have briefly mentioned that of broker and that of attorney. There are others, and one of those is our concern today. Here a contract was entered into, the main element of which was that Fredrickson was retained by Otto to do away with Ailor. So far as Otto was concerned the machinery for bringing about Ailor’s death was as much set in motion as it would have been if done by means other than by use of Fredrickson.
Contracts, other than government offers of reward,3 involving a payment and/or a promise to pay for the killing of a person, are unlawful, and equally unenforceable. Nevertheless, a contract is a contract, and many an unenforceable civil contract has been fully performed. Many an unlawful contract to perpetrate a crime has also been performed. The contract is there, the deal has been made, and it is logically inescapable that when a man enters into a contract with another man to bring about the unlawful death of an intended victim, that man is then and there guilty of attempting to effect or bring about a murder.
I am unable to see that the principal is to be relieved of his criminal liability simply because his agent fails in the purpose of his agency either by fouling up, by dishonesty, or by turning out to be a police officer.
Where it has come to pass in this country that we have people who will accept a contract for a killing, it is only fair and just that, where others agree to purchase such services, those contracts should be accorded the intent contemplated by the contracting parties.
The judgment of conviction should be affirmed.

. State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 589 P.2d 101 (1979); State v. Creech, 99 Idaho 779, 589 P.2d 114 (1979).

. Neither the majority opinion authored by Justice McFadden, nor the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Bakes, extends the credit due the Court for here having sua sponte raised the dispositive issue, and the only issue upon which the Court is divided. In State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 619 P.2d 787 (1980), in suggesting that there were several serious constitutional errors, only one of which had been presented at trial, I had hoped to excite the Court’s sense of fundamental fairness, but even a citation to State v. Cariaga, 95 Idaho 900, 904, 523 P.2d 32, 36 (1974) (“[njeither can this Court ignore the issue because it has not been assigned as error in the original briefs”) failed to do so. That the Court is observed now returning to the doctrine of the latter mentioned case may be a good omen.

. I.C. § 67-802(8) specifically empowers the governor of Idaho to offer money for the apprehension of a fugitive. Apprehension, of course, means the arrest or seizing of the fugitive, but if the fugitive resists, and his death results therefrom, he has nonetheless been apprehended, and the person responsible has earned the promised compensation. Smith v. State, 38 Nev. 477, 151 P. 512 (1915). The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts:
“ ‘That during or about the month of January, 1911, “Harry Cambrón and three associates” were murdered in Washoe county, state of Nevada. That thereafter the Legislature of the state of Nevada authorized the offer of a reward for the “arrest and conviction of the person or persons guilty of the murder of Harry Cambrón and three associates,” such act having been approved on February 17, 1911. That thereafter, and on the 17th day of February, 1911, Tasker L. Oddie, Governor of the state of Nevada, did offer a reward of $1,000 in each case for the arrest and conviction of the person or persons guilty of the murder of “Harry Cambrón and three associates.” That “Harry Cambrón and three associates” were murdered by a band of Indians, which included “Indian Squaw Jennie,” “unknown” Indian boy,” “Shoshone Mike,” “Buck Disenda,” “Buck Kinnan,” “Buck Cupena,” and “unknown Indian squaw.” That A. E. Smith, Joe Reeder, George Holmes, Warren Fruit, Henry Hughes, Jack Ferguson, Bill Parsons, Otto Van Norman, and Ben Cambrón, plaintiffs herein, were members of a posse on the trail of the said Indians, and did, on or about the 26th day of February, 1911, kill the certain Indians above referred to in an attempt to arrest said Indians, who were then and there murderers of said “Harry Cambrón and three associates,” while said Indians refused to surrender, and were resisting arrest for the said murder of said “Harry Cambrón and three associates,” but that none of said assassins were arrested, tried, or convicted by any court.’ ” 151 P. at 512.
The Nevada court held:
“In the case at bar the arrest and conviction of the persons for whom the reward was offered was rendered impossible by reason of their being killed while resisting arrest. Their killing, in the manner detailed in the agreed statement of facts, was justifiable, and operated as a lawful excuse for noncompliance with the full conditions of the reward. It is our conclusion that there has been shown a substantial compliance with the conditions of the reward, and the respondents are entitled to recover.
“Judgment affirmed.” Id. 151 P. at 514.