Court Opinion

ID: 9387967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 15:07:51.587266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.515966
License: Public Domain

[J-76-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                  MIDDLE DISTRICT

 JOSE L. VELLON,                                :   No. 39 MAP 2022
                                                :
                      Appellant                 :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                :   Commonwealth Court dated
                                                :   September 10, 2021 at No. 117 CD
               v.                               :   2020 Affirming the Order of the
                                                :   Court of Common Pleas of York
                                                :   County, Civil Division, dated
 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                  :   December 30, 2019 at No. 2017-SU-
 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,                  :   003297
 BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING,                    :
                                                :   SUBMITTED: October 14, 2022
                      Appellee                  :

                                  CONCURRING OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY                                                 DECIDED: April 19, 2023
       I agree that the Commonwealth Court’s order should be reversed, but I reach that

conclusion based on an interpretation of Section 3806(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code which

differs modestly from that of the majority.

       The majority reasons it would be arbitrary for two similarly-situated defendants,

one of whom is sentenced for two DUI convictions on the same day, and the other of

whom is sentenced for two DUI convictions on different days, to have different license

suspensions. See Majority Op. at 16. As explained below, I agree with this precept, but

I differ with the conclusion that this means the phrase “two or more offenses,” as it

appears in 3806(b)(3), applies to multiple sentences imposed before the current

sentencing proceeding. See id. at 17 & n.9. In my view, that reading renders the provision

of no effect, which is contrary to our rules of interpretation. See 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1921(a),

1922(2); Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717, 734 (Pa. 2020).
      In relevant part, Section 3806 states:

      (a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (b), the term “prior
      offense” as used in this chapter shall mean any conviction for which
      judgment of sentence has been imposed, . . . before the sentencing on the
      present violation for any of the following:

             (1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under
             influence of alcohol or controlled substance); . . .

      (b) Timing.--

             (1) . . . the prior offense must have occurred: (i) within the
             past 10 years prior to the date of the offense for which the
             defendant is being sentenced; or (ii) on or after the date of the
             offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.

             (2) The court shall calculate the number of prior offenses, if
             any, at the time of sentencing.

             (3) If the defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses in
             the same day, the offenses shall be considered prior offenses
             within the meaning of this subsection.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3806.

      As can be seen, the general rule set forth in 3806(a) already covers the

circumstance where there were two sentences imposed on the same day in the past. It

indicates “the term ‘prior offense’ . . . shall mean any conviction for which judgment of

sentence has been imposed[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a) (emphasis added). The phrase,

“has been imposed,” refers to the past imposition of a sentence, and the word “any” is

universal. Thus, it refers to all convictions in the past for which sentence has already

been imposed, including multiple offenses for which a sentence was imposed on the

same day. This reading is bolstered because paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii) refer to the

current sentence as “the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced” (emphasis

added), and the present tense is also used in paragraph (b)(3), which describes a

                           [J-76-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2
situation where “the defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses in the same day”

(emphasis added).

       With that said, like the majority I find it unlikely the General Assembly intended for

the length of a license suspension to depend on the fortuity of whether the defendant is

sentenced for two convictions on the same day or on different days. As aptly developed

by the majority, it is hard to see how that distinction serves any valid governmental

purpose, see Majority Op. at 16, and such a construction is disfavored as it raises equal-

protection difficulties. See Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079, 1088 (Pa.

2003) (noting that, under the Equal Protection Clause, differential treatment must “bear a

reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose”); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3)

(reflecting a presumption that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the state

or federal charters).

       At the same time, the statutory text does appear to reflect a legislative directive

that, at a minimum, a person being sentenced simultaneously on two DUIs should not be

considered to have no priors for either of them. Accord Vellon v. PennDOT, 263 A.3d

679, 687 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021); see also Majority Op. at 17 (expressing the provision

precludes “a volume discount on multiple same day sentences”). Consequently, the most

logical result is that, where the driver is sentenced for two or more DUIs on the same day,

the first DUI is prior to the second and subsequent DUIs, but they are not prior to the first.

Further, the statutory text is so unclear as to defy any confident interpretation on its own

terms. See Commonwealth v. Haag, 981 A.2d 902, 906 (Pa. 2009) (observing Section

3806 “has resisted plain interpretation . . . in several Superior Court decisions”). This is

primarily because the word “prior,” a relative term, is given no temporal reference point,

and the offenses for which sentence is imposed on the same day are described in the

aggregate as “prior offenses” and not otherwise differentiated.

                             [J-76-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 3
       It is not unknown for a statute to contain words which are contrary to legislative

intent. Where such text is clear and unambiguous, we are generally not at liberty to

overlook the plain wording in deference to what the Legislature clearly meant to say. See

Burke ex rel. Burke v. Independence Blue Cross, 103 A.3d 1267, 1273-74 (Pa. 2014).

Here, however, the text is, in my view, insolubly ambiguous. Under these unusual

circumstances, I favor a construction according to what the Legislature appears to have

intended. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a) (“The object of all interpretation and construction of

statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”). In my

view, the Legislature appears, in this instance, to have intended for paragraph 3806(b)(3)

to apply to the present sentencing proceeding, and for the first offense to be “prior” to the

second and subsequent offenses, but not vice versa.

       Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the order of

the Commonwealth Court.

       Justice Dougherty joins this concurring opinion.

                            [J-76-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 4