Court Opinion

ID: 9576702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:27:11.177313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:45.526174
License: Public Domain

Justice EXUM
dissenting.
As the majority notes at the outset, there are two issues in this case: (1) whether the appropriation of funds by the Gaston County Commissioners to the Dyslexia School of North Carolina is in violation of the North Carolina Constitution, and (2) whether it is authorized by statute. The majority correctly concludes that this appropriation is consistent with Article V(2)(7) of the North Carolina Constitution. The problem, then, is whether there is statutory authorization for it.
On this point, I disagree with the majority. G.S. 153A-248(a) (2) does provide authority for this appropriation. That statute reads:
“(a) A county may appropriate revenues not otherwise limited as to use by law:
*97(2) To a sheltered workshop or other private, nonprofit, charitable organization offering work or training activities to the physically or mentally handicapped, and may otherwise assist such an organization.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority has essentially held that the Dyslexia School cannot fall within this statute because it is not like a sheltered workshop. In so doing it has unduly narrowed the scope of this provision. It has read its definition of “sheltered workshop” into the remaining language of the statute. Such a restrictive meaning should not be given wording which on its face is quite broad — “other private, nonprofit, charitable organization offering work or training activities to the physically or mentally handicapped.”
The Dyslexia School is a nonprofit organization. The children it serves suffer from a handicap that makes it difficult for them to cope in society. The handicap is either physical or mental or both. The school offers them training and instruction with the goal of enabling them to receive an adequate education. The school and its activities, therefore, fit precisely within the provisions of G.S. 153A-248(a)(2).
The majority makes much of a supposed difference between “rehabilitation” and “treatment.” This difference is one created largely by the highly selective definitions of these terms in the majority opinion. Even if it does exist, it is important only when the statutory provisions are given the narrow construction the majority attaches to them. The goals of a sheltered workshop and the Dyslexia School are essentially the same. Both work with persons with handicaps, seeking to help them cope in society despite their handicaps. Even if their methods differ, the statutory language is broad enough to encompass both.
Next the majority argues that because there are other statutes which address the problem of children with learning disabilities, the General Assembly did not intend for G.S. 153A-248(a)(2) to deal with it. The majority says that the legislature intended to attack this problem exclusively through programs administered by those agencies which administer the public schools, to wit, education expense grants to “exceptional children,” G.S. 115-315.7, et seq., and special education services for “children with special needs,” G.S. 115-363, et seq., particularly G.S. 115-366, 115-367, 115-377, 115-384.
*98The majority recognizes that serious, urgent needs arise “where the public school system cannot adequately provide educational opportunities for all of its learning disabled children.” This, precisely, is the problem which, the record shows, has arisen with dyslexic children in Gaston County. In addition to efforts of the public school administrators, the elected representatives of the people of that county desire to support what, the record reveals, is an effective attack on the problem of dyslexia.
The majority does not tell us why the General Assembly might not have intended to attack this problem both through programs under the auspices of the public school administrators and through boards of county commissioners via such provisions as G.S. 153A-248(a)(2). It relies on a maxim of statutory construction that where one statute deals specifically with a matter in issue and another only in general terms the specific statute controls and cites Utilities Commission v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 451, 232 S.E. 2d 184 (1977). The maxim relied on simply has no application here. Indeed, as it applies this maxim the majority reaches an incredibly strange result.
The fallacy of the majority’s argument, that because the General Assembly has authorized public school administrators to deal with learning disabilities it could not have meant for county commissioners also to do so, becomes apparent when the definitions of “exceptional children” entitled to education expense grants and “children with special needs” entitled to special education services are considered. An “exceptional child” is defined by G.S. 115-315.8 as:
“[T]he seriously emotionally disturbed, the severely learning disabled, the visually and/or hearing handicapped or impaired, the multiple handicapped, the mentally retarded, the crippled or other healthdmpaired child.” (Emphasis supplied.)
“Children with special needs” are defined by G.S. 115-366 as including:
“[A]ll children between the ages of five and 18 who because of permanent or temporary mental physical or emotional handicaps need special education, are unable to have all their needs met in a regular class without special education or related services, or are unable to be adequately educated in *99the public schools. It includes those who are mentally retarded, epileptic, learning disabled, cerebral palsied, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, autistic, multiply handicapped, pregnant, hearing -imp air e d, speech-impaired, blind or visually-impaired, genetically impaired, and gifted and talented.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Many “exceptional children” and “children with special needs” who are physically or mentally handicapped, mentally retarded, or orthopedically impaired, are eligible for help both at “sheltered workshops” and “other private, nonprofit, charitable organization^]” as those terms are used in G.S. 153A-248(a)(2) and defined by the majority. Such children are “rehabilitated” by these institutions even within the majority’s definition of this term. Such children could thus receive assistance under both G.S. 153A-248 and the statutes providing for “exceptional children” and “children with special needs.” According to the logic of the majority’s argument, however, county commissioners should not be able to appropriate money under G.S. 153A-248 to private organizations which serve these children because the General Assembly has provided for other means of helping them through “education expense grants” and “special education services” under auspices of public school administrators.
Obviously the General Assembly never intended such a result. It did not, in other words, intend to make the programs administered by public school administrators the exclusive tools by which this state can deal with the problem of its children who are physically or mentally handicapped, mentally retarded, or or-thopedically impaired. The legislature intended, I am convinced, to authorize not only public school administrators but also county commissioners to help these children, the latter by direct appropriation to such organizations as sheltered workshops and “other private, nonprofit, charitable organization^],” such as the Dyslexia School here, which help children who are disabled in all the various ways set out in all these statutes.
This is why the majority has applied the wrong maxim of statutory construction to this case. The proper maxim to be applied is that remedial statutes are to be liberally, not stintingly, construed. Puckett v. Sellars, 235 N.C. 264, 69 S.E. 2d 497 (1952); *100State v. Lovelace, 228 N.C. 186, 45 S.E. 2d 48 (1947). So construed G.S. 153A-248(a)(2) clearly authorizes the challenged appropriation.
Moreover, the majority has relied on an incomplete statement of the maxim it chooses to apply. The maxim, completely stated, is that a statute dealing specifically and in detail with a subject controls as against a more general statute dealing with the same subject only when the two statutes are necessarily inconsistent and both cannot be given effect. In Utilities Comm. v. Edmisten, Attorney General, supra, 291 N.C. 451, 232 S.E. 2d 184, relied on by the majority, the general statute, as interpreted by the Commission, and the specific statute, as ultimately interpreted by this Court, were necessarily inconsistent, and both could not be given effect. We held that under these circumstances, and assuming the Commission’s interpretation to be correct, the specific statute should nevertheless control. For this complete rendering of the maxim see N.C. Digest, Statutes, § 223.4 and cases therein annotated. Clearly G.S. 153A-248(a)(2) and those provisions of Chapter 115 relied on by the majority are not necessarily inconsistent. Both can, and should be, given effect.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and vote to reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.