Court Opinion

ID: 9646942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:17:33.309774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:43.985933
License: Public Domain

Blandin, J.,
dissenting: The basic question of fact here was whether the plaintiff was in the road or on the path. It may fairly be said the case depended on the answer to this question and the parties knew it as the record shows. Again and again under both direct and adroit cross-examination the plaintiff stated in the plainest and most unequivocal words that she was off the road and on the path as shown by the following extracts from the record: "Q. You have told us several times including Mr. Burns where you were when you stopped to tie your shoestring. A. Yes. Q. Will you tell us were you on the road or off the road? A. I was off the road, Q. And were you on the path or off the path? A. I was on *127the path. Q. Yes. And did you feel that that was a safe place for you to stop and tie your shoe? A. Yes. . . . Q. (By Mr. Cofran) : But you didn’t stop in the street to tie your shoestring? A. No. . . . Q. (By Mr. Cofran): All right, will you tell us again where did you stop to tie your shoe? ... A. I stopped on the path. Q. (By Mr. Cofran): Yes. Are you sure of that? A. Yes.” Again when in cross-examination counsel for the defendant asked a question which assumed the plaintiff was in the road, the plaintiff’s counsel said: “Mr. Cofran: She already testified, she testified she was off the pavement. Mr. Bums: Oh I understand that. . . . Mr. Cofran: Well I submit that is a hypothetical situation which hasn’t a basis for such a question. She testified she was off the road.” Later he repeated this assertion: “Mr. Cofran: I pray your Honor’s judgment. She hasn’t said that. . She said she went across the street and she knelt down off the black surface and tied her shoe.” Without further detailing this evidence sufficeth to say the record gives no indication that this plaintiff was in the least degree confused or uncertain as to where she was at the moment of the accident. Her testimony and the flat assertions of her counsel show her case was based on the proposition that she was not in the road but on the path. Had she given any impression of confusion or uncertainty it is fair to assume the Presiding Justice would have submitted the question as to her whereabouts to the jury, in effect as she requested and in accordance with our law. Feuerstein v. Grady, 86 N. H. 406, 409. Where testimony is plain, positive and no reasonable likelihood of mistake appears our courts have not hesitated to hold that a plaintiff of the same age as this one is bound even where the opportunity for error is greater than in the present case. Katsikas v. Railway, 90 N. H. 21, 25, 26.
It seems this is a situation where “It would be inconsistent with honesty and good faith for [her] to recover on a finding of conduct wholly different from that which [she] claimed in [her] testimony.” Bartis v. Warrington, 91 N. H. 415, 418, and cases cited. It appears to me the majority decision paves the way for practices in the future contrary to the sound principles of this decision.