Court Opinion

ID: 9701155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:07:55.088125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:20.099014
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I agree that the September 30, 1988 disclosure order was interlocutory, and immediately appealable only by permissive appeal. I further agree with the majority’s conclusion that the October 25, 1988 discovery sanctions order is appealable, as well as with the majority’s statement that, "in determining the propriety of the lower court’s order of October 25,1988, we find that the merits of the September 30,1988 order inescapably requires our review.” Majority opinion, supra, at 555. However, unlike the majority, I find that the disclosure order was improper. Moreover, I find additionally that assuming, arguendo, that the disclosure order was proper, the sanction imposed for the violation of the disclosure order was still an abuse of discretion. I would vacate both orders. My reasons are as follows.
I. Hydraulic Forces and Well-Settled Principles
Associate Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., writing in dissent in Northern Securities v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 24 S.Ct. 436, 48 L.Ed. 679 (1903), set forth his famous dictum that:
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, *310and before which even well-settled principles of law will bend.
193 U.S. at 400-01, 24 S.Ct. at 468, 48 L.Ed. at 726.
The instant case involves the highly notorious murder of an eight year old girl, thirty nine years ago. After so much time, an aged suspect has been brought before the bar of our courts to answer a charge of murder. Under ordinary circumstances, one might be tempted to conclude out-of-hand that reasonable doubt must arise from the simple fact of the passage of so great a period of time; in the instant case, however, there is evidence of an alleged recent confession.
The majority, in all candor, has stated clearly that, “the age of the case is a significant overriding factor” in their analysis. (Majority Opinion, supra, at 302-303). I respect (and to some extent share) their concerns regarding the age of this case. Nonetheless, I am unwilling to allow those concerns to become a hydraulic force which bends the well-settled principles of law which control the disposition of this appeal.
Though murder prosecutions are subject to no statute of limitations (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5551), due process restrictions may preclude prosecution in certain circumstances. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 392 Pa. Super. 331, 339-340, 572 A.2d 1258, 1262-63 (1990); Commonwealth v. Akers, 392 Pa.Super. 170, 183-185, 572 A.2d 746, 752-53 (1990); Commonwealth v. Graizer, 391 Pa.Super. 202, 570 A.2d 1054 (1990). Knowing that appellant may address the “age of the case” issue directly, via a due process challenge to the charges, I am less inclined than I might be otherwise to permit the “age of the case” to exert hydraulic force upon my analysis of the well settled principles which control our review of the discovery sanctions/suppression order currently before this Court on appeal.*3111
II. Jurisdiction
I agree that the disclosure order was entered in accordance with the trial court’s determination that the identity of the officer’s confidential informant was discoverable under Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(B)(2)(d). As such, the order was immediately appealable only by special permissive allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Iannaccio, 505 Pa. 414, 480 A.2d 966 (1984), cert. denied 474 U.S. 830, 106 S.Ct. 96, 88 L.Ed.2d 78 (1984). Hence, quashal of the appeal taken from the trial court’s order of September 30, 1988 is required. I agree with that portion of the majority’s analysis.
I also agree with the majority that when the trial court imposes a discovery sanction under Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(E) which directs the suppression of evidence, the finality and appealability of such an order must be determined in accordance with the rationale in Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985) and Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). See Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 524, 544 A.2d 943 (1988); Commonwealth v. Moore, 378 Pa.Super. 379, 548 A.2d 1250 (1988); Darlington, et al., Pennsylvania Appellate Practice, § 341.12, at 147 & nn. 11 & 11.2 (1986 & 1989 Cum. Supp.) (“orders that handicap the prosecution in a manner similar to the handicap imposed by a suppression order may be appealable under the same theory”). The effect of such discovery sanctions is indistinguishable from a suppression order in this context.
In Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 Pa. 112, 511 A.2d 1327 (1986), our Supreme Court addressed the merits of a disclosure order upon appeal from civil contempt sanctions imposed for failing to comply with a disclosure order, notwithstanding the attorney’s failure to seek permissive interlocutory review of the disclosure order. I can see no reason to treat the Commonwealth differently here.
*312As the majority notes, it does not follow that a failure to seek permissive interlocutory appeal waives a challenge to the disclosure order on appeal from a final order imposing discovery sanctions for violation of the disclosure order. Permissive interlocutory appeals are just that—permissive. To imply waiver of a challenge to the merits of the disclosure order based upon the failure to seek permissive interlocutory appeal of the order, would be to create a self-contradictory mandatory, permissive interlocutory appeal. The majority has properly declined to do so here. Hence, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that review of the sanction order requires review of the disclosure order.
The Commonwealth has certified that this appeal is proper under Dugger and Bosurgi because the sanction order involved here suppressed crucial evidence of Redmond’s alleged recent confession, and thus substantially handicapped the prosecution. Consequently, I agree with the majority that the sanction order is properly before us for review.
III. Merits of the Disclosure Order
In October 1985, Officer Murphy interviewed a confidential informant regarding a wholly unrelated murder case. The informant mentioned the Althoff murder in which appellant herein was subsequently charged. The informant indicated that he/she was aware that one of the police’s suspects in that murder had been former Chief of Police “Whitey” Triplett.
The informant indicated that he/she had no personal knowledge of the possible culpability of Police Chief Triplett, and that his/her sole source of information was “common rumor” in the community. In his report, Officer Murphy conjectured that the rumor had probably arisen as the result of Police Chief Triplett’s general reputation for corruption (shaking down motorists for illegal and unreported traffic fines, and offering protection for hire to illegal gambling and prostitution operations, especially with regard to carnivals) and the fact that he had left town with a teenage girl he had been “counselling.” Officer Murphy's *313report further indicated that “review of the original case file prepared by [County] Detectives does not suggest that Triplett was involved in the murder of Althoff.” (General Investigation Report 10/10/87 at 4). (Emphasis added).
Notwithstanding these facts, the majority considers the identity of the confidential informant exculpatory and material. I do not. The majority grounds its conclusion on the premise that in a thirty-nine year old murder case the slenderest reed may be sufficient to sustain a reasonable doubt. True, perhaps. But here, there is no reed at all, only baseless conjecture.
The majority’s suggestion that, “Officer Murphy chose not to follow through on the information concerning Triplett, for reasons which are unclear,” (Majority’s Opinion, supra, at 302), is wholly unfounded. The uncontradicted evidence in this record establishes that Officer Murphy did follow-up on the informant’s tip but that it carried him no further than its genesis, i.e. unsubstantiated rumor.
The confidential informant stated that his/her information was all second hand hearsay based upon recollection of a rumor which circulated years earlier. The rumor had been investigated in 1963, and Officer Murphy reported that his review of the file relating to that investigation in 1987 indicated that Police Chief Triplett was not involved in the Althoff murder. In 1987, Officer Murphy concluded that a plausible but insubstantial basis for the rumor had been discovered and that further investigation of the confidential informant’s “tip” would be fruitless. Finally? by the time of Officer Murphy’s investigation in 1987, Police Chief Triplett was dead. What inaction would the majority have Officer Murphy explain? I can discern none.
For evidence to be exculpatory and material, I would find that it must at least be admissible or lead to admissible evidence. Here, there is only a hearsay report of the recollection of common rumor circulated years earlier.
Suppose the officer’s word to the informant (and the value of his word to all subsequent, prospective informants) *314were to be broken and the identity of this informant were disclosed. What then? There is not the least scintilla of evidence to support a conjecture that the informant could provide or lead to admissible exculpatory evidence. Indeed, there is clear indication that the informant could not.
Yet, the majority finds the officer’s refusal to disclose the informant’s identity to have involved the suppression of material and exculpatory evidence. I find this both unfounded in fact, and directly contrary to well settled law on this point.
Our Supreme Court has held that the defendant bears the burden to establish that disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant is “reasonable” and “in the interest of justice.” See Commonwealth v. Iannaccio, supra, 480 A.2d at 972 (where defendant could not meet burden, disclosure could not be required); Commonwealth v. Tolassi, 489 Pa. 41, 55, 413 A.2d 1003, 1009-10 (1980) (same); Commonwealth v. Herron, 475 Pa. 461, 466, 380 A.2d 1228, 1230 (1970) (defendant failed to meet his burden). This Court has repeatedly held that a vague assertion that disclosure might be helpful, or that it might lead to exculpatory evidence does not meet the defendant’s burden. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Bonasorte, 337 Pa.Super. 332, 356, 486 A.2d 1361, 1374 (1984); Commonwealth v. Fleck, 324 Pa. Super. 227, 235, 471 A.2d 547, 550 (1984); Commonwealth v. Davis, 318 Pa.Super. 507, 515, 465 A.2d 669, 672 (1983); Commonwealth v. Knox, 273 Pa.Super. 563, 568, 417 A.2d 1192, 1194 (1980); Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 266 Pa.Super. 442, 447-48, 405 A.2d 516, 519-20 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 238 Pa.Super. 22, 29, 364 A.2d 702, 706 (1975); Commonwealth v. Williams, 236 Pa.Super. 184, 190, 345 A.2d 267, 270 (1975); Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa.Super. 401, 407-08, 312 A.2d 434, 438 (1973). Our Supreme Court held precisely the same thing in Herron, supra, 380 A.2d at 1230.
The fact that the informant “had no first hand knowledge of the case,” plainly weighs heavily (if not conclusively), against compelling disclosure. When the informant is an *315eyewitness to the crime at issue, a compelling case can be made for disclosure. Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 293 A.2d 33 (1972); Commonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, 233 A.2d 284 (1967). Conversely, when the informant is not an eyewitness, the basis for disclosure is diminished considerably. Commonwealth v. Herron, supra, 380 A.2d at 1231 (emphasizing that the informant was not an eyewitness); Commonwealth v. Culberson, 467 Pa. 424, 429-30, 358 A.2d 416, 418 (1976) (distinguishing Carter and Garvin because the informant was not an eyewitness); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 261 Pa.Super. 296, 300, 396 A.2d 406, 408 (1978) (emphasizing that informant was not an eyewitness, citing Culberson). It follows then, that when the informant is not only not an eyewitness, but had “no first hand knowledge of the case,” and merely had provided tips based solely on hearsay in the form of common rumor wholly unrelated to the defendant’s alleged participation in the crime charged, the case for disclosure is considerably weaker still.
Culberson is particularly relevant in this respect. In Culberson our Supreme Court held that disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity was not appropriate when the defendant failed to establish that the informant was an eyewitness, and when the information provided by the informant did not relate to the defendant. Such is precisely the case instantly, except that here it is conceded that the informant was not an eyewitness and had no first hand knowledge of the crime, which of course makes the case for denying disclosure here stronger still.
In sum, there is no evidence in this record of any likelihood whatsoever that the informant could or would in any way exculpate Redmond. Hence, an exercise of the trial court’s discretion to compel disclosure was a manifest abuse of discretion, as the necessary prerequisite for the exercise of that discretion had not been established. See Commonwealth v. Bonasorte, supra, 486 A.2d at 1374.
*316The disclosure order was contrary to well-established precedent. I would vacate the sanction order, and the underlying disclosure order as well.
IV. Inappropriateness of Suppression
The majority also concludes that the effective dismissal of the charges against Redmond was an appropriate discovery sanction which was within the Court’s discretion to impose. Majority Opinion, supra, at 304-309. I cannot agree.
The provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(E) are as follows:
Remedy
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit discovery or inspection, may grant a continuance, or may prohibit such party from introducing evidence not disclosed, other than testimony of the defendant, or. it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(Emphasis added). The sanction order did not merely “prohibit [the police officer] from introducing evidence not disclosed,” it suppressed any evidence of any kind from the officer, including evidence of Redmond’s alleged recent confession to the officer. If this sanction was authorized at all, then, it must come then under the residual authorization to “enter such order as it deems just under the circumstances.” As broad as the residual authorization may appear, our prior case law demonstrates that it does not include the authority exercised in this case.
It is true that when a party has failed to comply with a Pa.R.Crim.P. 305 discovery order, the trial court has broad discretion in choosing an appropriate remedy. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 364 Pa.Super. 521, 540-41, 528 A.2d 631, 641 (1987) (citing cases). “However, we have found termination of the prosecution to be ‘a penalty far too drastic’ for a prosecutor’s violation of discovery rules.” Commonwealth v. Gordon, supra, 528 A.2d at 641; Commonwealth v. Woodell, 344 Pa.Super. 487, 492, 496 A.2d 1210, 1213 *317(1985); Commonwealth v. Parente, 294 Pa.Super. 446, 452, 440 A.2d 549, 552 (1982) (appeal denied); Commonwealth v. Yost, 348 Pa.Super. 297, 502 A.2d 216 (1985). The Commonwealth asserts, the majority readily conceeds, and I agree, that the sanction order imposed here leads inexorably to just that result by suppressing evidence of Redmond’s alleged recent confession along with all other evidence from Officer Murphy.
In Commonwealth v. Bonasorte, supra, this Court did affirm a suppression order arising from a police officer’s refusal to produce a confidential informant for an in camera interview. However, Bonasorte is materially distinguishable in two critical respects. First, the defendant’s disclosure burden was clearly met in Bonasorte by the fact that the informant was a primary source for information included in a search warrant probable cause affidavit, and the trial court found that the Commonwealth’s own evidence in the suppression hearing challenging the warrant raised serious doubts as to the existence of the alleged informant. Second, suppression was required in that case based upon the trial court’s determination that the probable cause affidavit was wilfully false, the search unconstitutional, and the fruits of the search tainted, and not as a discovery sanction for failure to disclose the identity of the informant. 486 A.2d at 1371-74; see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); Commonwealth v. Miller, 513 Pa. 118, 518 A.2d 1187 (1986); Commonwealth v. Hall, 451 Pa. 201, 302 A.2d 342 (1973).
Here, no search warrant was involved. Moreover, the informant’s tips in no way led to the crucial evidence suppressed by the sanction order. Rather, it was a mere fortuitous coincidence that the officer who knew the identity of the confidential informant was also the officer to whom Redmond allegedly confessed, and who developed other evidence unrelated to and, in fact, contrary to the informant’s tips. The informant’s identity and his/her “tip” *318were wholly unrelated to any of the inculpatory evidence suppressed by the sanction order.
V. Existence of More Appropriate Alternative Sanctions
Beyond these grounds for dissent, there is a more basic and, I think, more compelling ground upon which to dissent. The wrong people are being punished for the officer’s alleged contempt/non-compliance.
I do not find the officer to have been in error in this case. I find that he had every legal right to resist the improper disclosure order; and, perhaps even a moral duty to resist. Nonetheless, assuming, arguendo, that he was wrong, even obstinately and contemptuously wrong, I cannot agree that the charges against Redmond should therefore be dismissed. Rather, the burden of any sanctions for the alleged contempt/non-compliance should fall upon the officer, individually, rather than upon the Commonwealth and the interests of justice.
The majority blames the Commonwealth for the officer’s alleged contempt. The theory upon which this “constructive” contempt finding is based, is that even though the prosecutor did not know the identity of the informant, the prosecutor had “control” of the information. (Majority Opinion, supra, at 299).
How so? Could the prosecutor have exercised power over the officer which the trial court could not? Certainly not. The court had authority to compel the disclosure on pain of contempt. The prosecutor, on the other hand, could do no more than ask for compliance, which is, of course, an insufficient ground upon which to rest the prosecution’s presumed “control” over the information sought. The contempt, if any existed, was the officer’s alone, and not the Commonwealth’s.
In Commonwealth v. Carson, 510 Pa. 568, 510 A.2d 1233 (1986), our Supreme Court explained:
While a trial court must have authority to regulate attendance upon its schedule and concomitant authority to *319sanction a breach, the sanction must be visited upon the offender and not upon the interests of public justice. The failure of a party to observe the orders of a court may result in a loss to a party in a civil action, because there the loss falls upon private interests and those who invoke the power of a court must be obedient to its orders or lose its powers to serve their purposes. Criminal cases involve issues of public justice; issues that transcend the immediate parties. In criminal cases, sanctions may be imposed upon individuals, including counsel for either side; sanctions that vindicate the authority of the court to maintain its schedule and enforce its orders.
510 A.2d at 1234. (Emphasis added).
The reasoning in Carson requires that any sanction, if appropriate for the failure to comply with the disclosure order, be imposed upon the recalcitrant officer, and not upon the Commonwealth and the interests of public justice. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 381 Pa.Super. 23, 51-02, 552 A.2d 1075, 1089-90 (1988) (identical reasoning with regard to sanctions imposed on Commonwealth for a Commonwealth witness’ failure to appear at a sentencing hearing). There is no reason why the police officer’s alleged contempt, if any, should be made to inure to the benefit of the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Carson, supra, 510 A.2d at 1235 (Papadakos, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, supra, 552 A.2d at 1090. As this Court explained in Ferguson:
No Commonwealth employee is cloaked with an agency which would authorize wilful misconduct such as contempt of court; consequently, we see no reason why the sanction for contempt by a Commonwealth employee should be imposed upon the Commonwealth, rather than directly upon the employee. Cf. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8542(a)(2), 8550 (a local agency may not be held liable for the wilful misconduct of its employee, and an employ*320ee of a local agency enjoys no official immunity from liability for injuries arising from wilful misconduct).
552 A.2d 1090.2
Here, the trial court readily could have imposed contempt sanctions (fine or imprisonment) to compel compliance with the disclosure order. Instead, the trial court imposed a discovery sanction prohibiting any and all evidence from the recalcitrant officer, entirely regardless of whether the evidence was related to the informant or the informant’s tip. This was far too high a price to exact for no real benefit— Redmond’s alleged recent confession was suppressed along with other evidence properly obtained, and the prosecution’s case substantially impaired, but the officer was not made to pay any personal price for the alleged non-compliance/ contempt.3
The majority suggests that Carson may be distinguished in that no prejudice to the defendant was shown in Carson. *321The language of Carson suggests no such distinction. Moreover, as noted above, I find no semblance of prejudice here. Still further, I find no reason why simply holding the officer in contempt to force the disclosure would not have vindicated fully the court’s authority, and prevented whatever prejudice was anticipated from non-disclosure, without the serious deleterious effects which the court’s sanction order necessarily imposes upon the interests of public justice.
VI. Improper Focus Regarding “Prejudice”
In upholding the discovery/suppression order, the majority appears to focus upon the prejudice they assume had arisen between the murder on April 25, 1951, and the non-compliance with the trial court’s disclosure order on September 30, 1988. While I find no prejudice established with respect to that time period (given the patent irrelevance of the identity of the confidential informant, or his/her hearsay evidence), I find that period wholly irrelevant to a determination of the appropriateness of the sanction order imposed.
Rather, the relevant time period was the time between the disclosure order on September 30, 1988 and the sanction order on October 28, 1988, the period of non-compliance. If no prejudice occurred between those dates, then there could be no justification for the trial court’s failure to even attempt to simply direct compliance by the officer, on pain of contempt. I find no evidence of prejudice even suggested as to that time period.
In sum, I find that the discovery sanction imposed was in no sense “just under the circumstances.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(E). I would vacate the order as a manifest abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, I dissent. While the appeal taken from the disclosure order of September 30, 1988 must be quashed, both the disclosure order and the *322sanction order should be vacated in the appeal from the sanction order of October 25, 1988.

. I in no way suggest favor or disfavor of a due process, remoteness claim in this case. That issue must be addressed first by the trial court, if appellant in fact decides to pursue such a claim.

. I note that I consider it a fundamental rule that sanctions should be borne by the party whose conduct triggers the sanction to the greatest extent possible. I have expressed this view previously in a variety of contexts. See e.g. In re J.S., 387 Pa.Super. 432, 449-53, 564 A.2d 468, 477-78 (1989) (Kelly, J., concurring and dissenting) (the remedy for failing to hold required civil commitment hearings should be an immediate hearing, with sanctions imposed directly on the parties responsible for the improper detention; release of the patient without regard ■ to the patient’s need for treatment or restraint serves no interests); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, supra, 552 A.2d at 1089-90 (per Kelly, J.) (financial sanctions for failure of a Commonwealth witness to appear at a sentencing hearing should be borne by the witness, rather than the taxpayers); Commonwealth v. Zeitlen, 366 Pa.Super. 78, 86-87, 530 A.2d 900, 904-05 (1987) (sanctions for counsel’s violation of briefing rules should be borne whenever possible by the counsel responsible, rather than a client who was powerless to prevent the violations). While it will not always be possible to impose direct sanctions, they should be preferred to indirect sanctions whenever practicable.

. Exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence exacts a high societal cost which is not always justified by the right to be vindicated. See New York v. Harris, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990); Commonwealth v. Slaton, 383 Pa.Super. 301, 341-42, 556 A.2d 1343, 1363-64 (1989) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Melson, 383 Pa.Super. 139, 172, 556 A.2d 836, 852-53 (1989) (Kelly, J., dissenting). This is particularly true when the right can be otherwise fully vindicated without suppression. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, supra; cf. Commonwealth v. Carson, supra.