Court Opinion

ID: 9964635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 16:00:41.681271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.248401
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1000     Document: 010111040621      Date Filed: 04/30/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                               Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        April 30, 2024

                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  BRANDON PRYOR,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                         No. 23-1000

  SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, d/b/a Denver
  Public Schools; SUPERINTENDENT
  ALEX MARRERO, in his individual and
  official capacities; DEPUTY
  SUPERINTENDENT ANTHONY
  SMITH, in his individual and official
  capacities,

        Defendants - Appellants.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of Colorado
                            (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-02886-JLK)
                        _________________________________

 Andrew D. Ringel (Jared R. Ellis and Katherine N. Hoffman with him on the briefs), of
 Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado for Defendants-Appellants.

 Andrew McNulty (Mari Newman with him on the brief), of Killmer, Lane & Newman,
 LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
                       _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

 CARSON, Circuit Judge.
                     _________________________________
Appellate Case: 23-1000     Document: 010111040621         Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 2

        The First Amendment protects those who petition the government for redress

 of grievances, even though such speech may offend government officials or damage

 their public reputation. Plaintiff Brandon Pryor passionately—and at times

 profanely—criticized actors within Defendant Denver School District No. 1

 (“District”) when he advocated for change within the District. In response,

 Defendants stripped him of his volunteer position and restricted his access to District

 facilities. Because the District likely acted in retaliation against Plaintiff’s First

 Amendment rights, we exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 and affirm the

 district court’s preliminary injunction.

                                              I.

        Plaintiff Brandon Pryor advocates for quality educational opportunities in Far

 Northeast Denver (“FNE Denver”). His advocacy takes many forms: he texts

 privately with District administration, speaks with officials in person, appears on

 local podcasts and news media, posts on social media, attends board meetings and

 work groups, and participates in public comment sessions. He has also served as a

 volunteer football coach in FNE Denver for many years. In 2019 he co-founded a

 school in FNE Denver: the Robert W. Smith STEAM Academy (“STEAM

 Academy”).

        In October 2022, the District served on Plaintiff a letter from Aaron

 Thompson, the District’s general counsel (“Thompson Letter”). The Thompson

 Letter alleged that Plaintiff had displayed “abusive, bullying, threatening, and

 intimidating conduct directed at [District] staff.” As support for its allegations, the

                                              2
Appellate Case: 23-1000    Document: 010111040621        Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 3

 Thompson Letter described interactions between Plaintiff and District staff

 throughout the previous two years. The Thompson Letter also quoted Plaintiff’s text

 messages, personal Facebook posts, and statements from phone calls and a local

 podcast.

       The Thompson Letter explained that Neisa Lynch, newly hired principal of

 Montbello High School in FNE Denver, had complained to the District that Plaintiff

 subjected her to harassment, defamation, and slander and that he had intimidated and

 threatened her and her husband.1 In her complaint, Lynch cited many of Plaintiff’s

 Facebook posts—including a post that specifically called for Lynch’s resignation or

 termination; a post in which Plaintiff stated that she (and others) “are a disgrace to

 the entire community”; and a post that included Lynch’s husband’s LinkedIn profile

 and stated: “What are the chances that Neisa Lynch and her husband Mike Lynch

 worked together to steal our kids [sic] game? . . . I’m sure they’ve talked about it

 all . . .” Lynch also complained that Plaintiff told community members not to enroll

 children at her school; called her derogatory names such as “plantation builder”;

 and—according to the Thompson Letter—“suggest[ed] her colleagues have endured

 hate speech, harassment, defamation, and slander by [Plaintiff] as well.”

       1
          Lynch was not the first District employee to complain about Plaintiff. Other
 District employees had complained that Plaintiff had become angry with them and
 had yelled and cursed in personal interactions. In response to these complaints, the
 District investigated and found that Plaintiff acted unprofessionally but did not
 violate District policies on harassment. The District ultimately did not enforce
 restrictions on Plaintiff based on these prior complaints.

                                             3
Appellate Case: 23-1000     Document: 010111040621          Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 4

        Each conversation, post, or interaction that the Thompson Letter listed related

 in some manner to Plaintiff objecting to or calling for changes in District operations.

 In many posts, Plaintiff called for the resignation or termination of District officials;

 in others, he criticized District officials for operational missteps or decisions with

 which he disagreed. The text messages between Plaintiff and District staff included

 specific demands, sometimes coupled with derogatory statements directed at the

 staff. Some of Plaintiff’s statements, as quoted in the Thompson Letter, were cryptic,

 such as “Warning! Don’t poke a resting bear!” And a few statements contained

 expletives—such as the following: “Watch out for the Black folks trying to

 Whitesplain this bullshit” (in a Facebook comment related to a post criticizing Lynch

 for hiring decisions); and “Stay the fuck away from me” (in a phone conversation

 with the District’s Regional Instructional Superintendent after Plaintiff learned she

 had canceled a planning meeting for the school he founded).

        The Thompson Letter stated that Plaintiff violated various District policies and

 restricted Plaintiff’s access to District facilities and relationship with the District.

 Plaintiff appealed these restrictions. The District eventually removed some

 restrictions, allowing Plaintiff to attend District Board meetings and participate in

 public comment sessions in person. But the District maintained two categorical

 restrictions (“Restrictions”): (1) the District removed Plaintiff from his position as

 volunteer football coach; and (2) the District revoked Plaintiff’s privileged access to

 District facilities, including STEAM Academy, that he had previously enjoyed based

 on his status as a school founder.

                                              4
Appellate Case: 23-1000    Document: 010111040621        Date Filed: 04/30/2024      Page: 5

       While Plaintiff’s appeal to the District was pending, Plaintiff sued the District,

 Superintendent Alex Marrero, and Deputy Superintendent Anthony Smith alleging

 (among other claims) First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and

 1985. Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction related to his First Amendment

 retaliation claim, asking the district court to (1) enjoin Defendants from banning

 Plaintiff from District property or retaliating against him, his children, or STEAM

 Academy; and (2) restore Plaintiff’s ability to coach, his access as a school founder,

 and his ability to speak at public comment sessions. The district court granted a

 preliminary injunction in part. The district court enjoined Defendants from enforcing

 the Thompson Letter restrictions and from taking any other retaliatory action against

 Plaintiff, his family, or STEAM Academy for pursuing the lawsuit. Defendants

 appeal the preliminary injunction.

                                           II.

       We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s grant of a preliminary

 injunction. Chamber of Com. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 764 (10th Cir. 2010)

 (citing Pac. Frontier v. Pleasant Grove City, 414 F.3d 1221, 1230–31 (10th Cir.

 2005)). “A district court abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law or

 makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quoting Beltronics USA, Inc. v.

 Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009)). Thus, we

 review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings for

 clear error. Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003)

 (citing Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2002)).

                                            5
Appellate Case: 23-1000    Document: 010111040621        Date Filed: 04/30/2024       Page: 6

                                            III.

                                            A.

       A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy constituting drastic relief.

 Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, Colo., 916 F.3d 792, 797 (10th

 Cir. 2019) (quoting United States ex rel. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of

 Okla. v. Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 883 F.2d 886, 888 (10th Cir. 1989)). To

 obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must establish four factors: (1) the movant

 is substantially likely to succeed on the merits; (2) the movant will suffer irreparable

 injury if the court denies the injunction; (3) the movant’s harm without the injunction

 outweighs the other party’s harm with the injunction; and (4) the injunction is not

 adverse to the public interest. Id. (quoting Beltronics, 562 F.3d at 1070).

       We first examine Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits in his

 underlying lawsuit. Plaintiff claims Defendants—acting under color of law—

 retaliated against him for speech that the First Amendment protects, violating his

 constitutional rights. The elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim differ

 depending on whether the speaker is employed by the alleged retaliator. Klen v. City

 of Loveland, 661 F.3d 498, 508–09 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Van Deelen v. Johnson,

 497 F.3d 1151, 1155–56, 1158 (10th Cir. 2007)). Defendants concede that Plaintiff

 is not a District employee but argue his volunteer position requires us to use the

 employee test anyway. Plaintiff contends that his unpaid volunteer work does not

 elevate him to employee status. Without deciding Plaintiff’s status, we apply the

                                             6
Appellate Case: 23-1000      Document: 010111040621         Date Filed: 04/30/2024      Page: 7

 more stringent employee test as Defendants urge.2 We conclude Plaintiff is

 substantially likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.

          Under the employee test, a court considering a First Amendment retaliation

 claim must balance five factors:

          (1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee’s official
          duties; (2) whether the speech was on a matter of public concern;
          (3) whether the government’s interests, as employer, in promoting the
          efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff’s
          free speech interests; (4) whether the protected speech was a motivating
          factor in the adverse employment action; and (5) whether the defendant
          would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the
          protected conduct.

 Eisenhour v. Weber Cnty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting

 Dixon v. Kirkpatrick, 553 F.3d 1294, 1301–02 (10th Cir. 2009)). The first

 three factors present questions of law that we review de novo. Id. at 1228

 2
     Non-employee plaintiffs need only to prove three elements:

          (1) that the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity;
          (2) that the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury
          that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
          engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant’s adverse action was
          substantially motivated as a response to the plaintiff's exercise of
          constitutionally protected conduct.

 Klen, 661 F.3d at 508 (quoting Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir.
 2000)). Although the three elements of the non-employee test do not neatly
 correspond to elements of the employee test, the non-employee test is generally less
 stringent and protects a broader free speech interest. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S.
 228, 237 (2014) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)). For
 substantially the same reasons that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits using
 Defendants’ preferred test, he is also likely to succeed under the non-employee test.

                                               7
Appellate Case: 23-1000    Document: 010111040621        Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 8

 (quoting Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1302). The fourth and fifth factors present fact

 issues that we review for clear error. Id. (quoting Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1302).

       First, we consider whether the movant spoke pursuant to his official duties. Id.

 at 1227 (quoting Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1301–02). Generally, a governmental employer

 may control speech within the scope of an employee’s official duties. Rohrbough v.

 Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 748 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Brammer-

 Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007)). But

 this control may not extend to an employee’s speech when he participates in civic

 discourse as a citizen—outside his official work duties. Garcetti v. Ceballos,

 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006) (citing Pickering v. Bd. Of Ed., 91 U.S. 53, 569–70

 (1968)). The critical question is not whether the speech related to the official duties,

 but whether it was within the scope of the employee’s work tasks that the employer

 paid him to perform. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 241 (2014) (quoting Garcetti,

 547 U.S. at 421–22).

       Under our Court precedent, plaintiffs speak personally as citizens, outside their

 official duties, when speaking out against wrongdoing in a citizen forum with no job

 responsibility to report the wrongdoing, Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1204–05;

 when engaging in categories of activity for which they are not paid, Thomas v. City

 of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1325 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Green v. Bd. of Cnty.

 Comm’rs, 472 F.3d 794, 801 (10th Cir. 2007)); and when complaining to authorities

 about operational issues for which they bear no responsibility, Casey v. W. Las

 Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1332–33 (10th Cir. 2007).

                                            8
Appellate Case: 23-1000     Document: 010111040621        Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 9

        Based on these principles, we must determine whether Plaintiff spoke

 personally as a citizen or professionally as an employee. The district court found that

 Defendants presented no evidence on Plaintiff’s official responsibilities as a

 volunteer coach or school founder. We agree. Without record evidence of Plaintiff’s

 official responsibilities, we have no foundation for holding that Plaintiff’s speech in

 question was a part of his official responsibilities.

        Relevant evidence supports that Plaintiff did not speak as part of his official

 responsibilities. Plaintiff primarily spoke out against District operations, heavily

 criticizing the decisions of the District and its employees. Defendant Smith’s

 testimony and a letter from the District to Plaintiff both show that Plaintiff’s role as a

 founder did not give him authority or responsibility over the District’s operational

 issues. And Plaintiff voiced criticism through his personal Facebook page,

 independent news outlets, and at public comment sessions—all forums citizens often

 use for civic discourse. As in Brammer-Hoelter, these forums support that Plaintiff

 spoke while participating in civic discourse as a citizen. Thus, the first factor weighs

 in Plaintiff’s favor.

        Second, we consider whether Plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern or

 on a matter of purely personal interest. Eisenhour, 744 F.3d at 1227 (quoting Dixon,

 553 F.3d at 1301–02). In this context, the First Amendment may protect the former

 but not the latter. Id. at 1228 (citing Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 856–57

 (10th Cir. 1989)). We consider whether Plaintiff intended to expose a public

 official’s wrongdoing, corruption, or misdeeds. Id. (quoting Canaway v. Smith, 853

                                              9
Appellate Case: 23-1000     Document: 010111040621        Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 10

  F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir. 1988)). We examine the “content, form, and context” of

  Plaintiff’s speech. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983)).

  Even if personal grievances partially motivate speech, the speech still involves

  matters of public concern when it reveals official wrongdoings because this interests

  the public. Trant v. Oklahoma, 754 F.3d 1158, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing

  Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1205).

        In each interaction or conversation in question, Plaintiff expressed that he

  intended to expose wrongdoing in the local school board and school administration.

  Plaintiff revealed specific information about local schools and officials, presented his

  grievances to the board and members of the administration, and made specific

  requests for change that would affect the entire community. This content, form, and

  context fits speech intended to petition the government for redress of grievances.

  Plaintiff’s personal passion on these issues does not lessen the community’s interest

  in potential malfeasance by local government officials. Accord id. at 1165 (citing

  Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1205). Thus, Plaintiff spoke on matters of public

  concern.

        Third, we consider whether the District’s interests as an employer in

  promoting efficiency outweigh Plaintiff’s free speech interests. Eisenhour, 744 F.3d

  at 1227 (quoting Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1301–02). The First Amendment protects an

  employee’s dissenting speech “unless the employer shows that some restriction is

  necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions or to insure effective

  performance by the employee.” Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Gardetto v.

                                             10
Appellate Case: 23-1000    Document: 010111040621        Date Filed: 04/30/2024   Page: 11

  Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 815 (10th Cir. 1996)). Expected public reaction that impacts

  external relationships does not constitute a detrimental impact and does not weigh in

  the District’s favor. See Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1566 (10th Cir. 1989).

  A governmental employer must justify the restrictions on an employee’s speech by

  showing that, based on the employer’s interest, its need for the restrictions outweighs

  the employee’s right to speak. See id. at 1565 (quoting Childers v. Indep. Sch. Dist.

  No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1341 (10th Cir. 1982)).

        We give great weight to an employee’s First Amendment rights when he

  speaks out to expose government corruption—especially when the employee has first

  complained directly to the governmental entity’s administration. See Lytle v. City of

  Haysville, 138 F.3d 857, 865 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d

  789, 797 (10th Cir. 1988)). In such cases, the governmental entity must carry an

  even higher burden of showing a stronger interest than we would otherwise require.

  Helget v. City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Curtis v. Okla. City

  Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1213 (10th Cir. 1998)). This is because a

  governmental entity’s interest in efficient operations should not only encompass a

  desire for a harmonious employee environment but should also extend to

  extinguishing corruption and misconduct. See Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1207

  (the employer’s efficiency is the controlling question); Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d

  1229, 1239 (10th Cir. 2003) (allegations of wrongdoing more greatly protected when

  raising serious issues that concern the taxpaying public).

                                            11
Appellate Case: 23-1000     Document: 010111040621         Date Filed: 04/30/2024       Page: 12

         Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s speech threatened their safety. But the

  district court found that Plaintiff’s speech did not endanger the District employees’

  safety or security—only their jobs. The record includes testimony by Defendants

  themselves that Plaintiff threatened the District staff’s jobs, reputation, careers, and

  legal liability—not their physical safety. Defendants contend Plaintiff wanted a

  physical fight and rely on Plaintiff’s text messages to Nicky Yollick, a community

  member, in which Plaintiff stated, “When I see you you are going to have a

  problem,” and, “Send address and I can come now” (“Yollick Messages”). But

  Plaintiff testified that his intent in the Yollick Messages was to meet for a

  conversation and that Plaintiff and Yollick had a shared history in advocacy related

  to District operations. Thus the district court did not clearly err in its finding.

         Meanwhile, Plaintiff spoke on matters of serious concern to the taxpaying

  public—school funding, cronyism, educational choice, and discrimination. And he

  repeatedly engaged directly with District officials in his attempts to effect change.

  So, Plaintiff’s interest in speaking is strong. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566, 571–73

  (protecting speech by school employees who attacked school funding, operations,

  athletic programs, and individual school officials). The impoliteness, passion, or

  profanity of his speech do not overcome his free speech interests. See ACLU v.

  Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Sable Commc’ns, Inc. v.

  FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)) (the First Amendment protects even indecent

  expression). And the offensive, vulgar manner of Plaintiff’s speech does not deprive

  him of constitutional protections—especially in the context of petitioning the

                                              12
Appellate Case: 23-1000     Document: 010111040621          Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 13

  government for redress for grievances. Klen, 661 F.3d at 509 (quoting Chaplinsky v.

  New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 571–72 (1942)).

         Defendants fail to show that their interest in enforcing the Restrictions

  outweighs Plaintiff’s interest in speaking. Moreover, Defendants’ failure to enforce

  restrictions after prior complaints, engage in conflict resolution or mediation, or

  make any other effort to protect its employees contradicts any assertion that they

  have a significant interest in enforcing the Restrictions. Defendants’ testimony that

  Plaintiff threatens their reputations suggests that Defendants’ interest lies in curbing

  an expected public reaction. This does not weigh in their favor because the District

  lacks a valid interest in avoiding embarrassment or irritation at the expense of

  community members’ free speech rights. See Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1566. Thus,

  Defendants do not carry their burden of justifying the Restrictions and the third factor

  weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.

         The fourth and fifth factors are questions of fact that turn on the non-movant’s

  intent. See Eisenhour, 744 F.3d at 1228 (quoting Dixon, 553 F.3d at 1302). Because

  we hold that the district court did not clearly err in its factual findings, we defer to its

  findings that the fourth and fifth factors support Plaintiff.

         In evaluating the fourth factor, the district court found little doubt that

  Plaintiff’s protected speech motivated the Restrictions. And in evaluating the fifth

  factor, the district court found that evidence “strongly suggests” Defendants lacked

  any reason to apply the Restrictions apart from Plaintiff’s protected speech, and

  Defendants failed to carry their burden to show otherwise. See Trant, 754 F.3d

                                              13
Appellate Case: 23-1000     Document: 010111040621         Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 14

  at 1167 (quoting Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir.

  1998)) (burden shifts to defendants to show they would have reached the same

  employment decision in the absence of the protected activity). The record supports

  these findings because (1) the Thompson Letter cited protected speech from

  Plaintiff’s Facebook posts when imposing the Restrictions and (2) Aaron Thompson,

  counsel for the District, testified that the Lynch complaint about the same Facebook

  posts served as the “catalyst” for the Restrictions.3 Thus, the district court did not

  clearly err.

         Because all five factors of the employee test weigh in Plaintiff’s favor,

  Plaintiff is substantially likely to succeed on the merits of his First Amendment

  retaliation claim. Thus, Plaintiff establishes the first prong of the test for a

  preliminary injunction.

         When a movant establishes the first prong of a preliminary injunction based on

  a First Amendment claim, the remaining prongs generally also weigh in his favor.

  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1145 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d

  sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, (2014) (quoting ACLU

  v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2012)). That is true here.

         3
          Defendants argue that the district court wrongly focused on the Lynch
  complaint and ignored other interactions between Plaintiff and the District. But
  under this prong, the district court needed to consider the District’s motivations for
  the Restrictions. Aaron Thompson’s testimony informed the district court that the
  Lynch complaint catalyzed the Restrictions. Moreover, the district court certainly
  considered the extensive history between Plaintiff and the District, as shown by its
  lengthy statement of the facts. The district court did not err in its focus.

                                              14
Appellate Case: 23-1000     Document: 010111040621         Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 15

         Under the second prong, Plaintiff must show irreparable injury if we deny the

  injunction. See Free the Nipple, 916 F.3d at 797 (quoting Beltronics, 562 F.3d

  at 1070). Defendants argue Plaintiff won’t suffer irreparable injury because the

  Restrictions do not prevent Plaintiff from speaking. But our precedent is clear that a

  First Amendment violation constitutes irreparable injury. Id. at 806. Defendants

  likely violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by retaliating against his speech,

  and under our precedent this constitutional violation establishes irreparable injury

  even if the Restrictions do not directly silence Plaintiff’s protected speech. And any

  potential loss of First Amendment freedoms—however small—also establishes

  irreparable injury. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (citing N.Y. Times Co.

  v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). Plaintiff shows that the Restrictions, by their

  retaliatory nature, have chilled his protected speech and deterred him from continuing

  to petition the government for redress of his grievances—again establishing

  irreparable injury.

         Under the third prong for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must show that the

  injury he faces without the injunction outweighs Defendants’ injury under the

  injunction. Free the Nipple, 916 F.3d at 797 (quoting Beltronics, 562 F.3d at 1070).

  A governmental interest in upholding a mandate that is likely unconstitutional does

  not outweigh a movant’s interest in protecting his constitutional rights. See Hobby

  Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1145 (quoting Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131–32 (10th Cir.

  2012)). For the same reasons we held that the District’s interests do not outweigh

  Plaintiff’s free speech interests, we also hold that the injury to Plaintiff’s free speech

                                              15
Appellate Case: 23-1000     Document: 010111040621         Date Filed: 04/30/2024    Page: 16

  interests exceeds the District’s legitimate injuries under the injunction if the District

  is not enjoined from continued retaliation.

        Finally, under the fourth prong for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must

  show that the requested injunction is not adverse to the public interest. Free the

  Nipple, 916 F.3d at 797 (quoting Beltronics, 562 F.3d at 1070). “It is always in the

  public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Hobby

  Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1145 (quoting Awad, 670 F.3d at 1132). Thus, this injunction is

  not adverse to the public interest.

        Because all four prongs for a preliminary injunction favor Plaintiff, the district

  court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.

                                              B.

        Defendants argue that the preliminary injunction the district court ordered is a

  disfavored mandatory injunction because it mandates action and disturbs the pre-

  litigation status quo. Defendants failed to make this argument at the district court

  even though Plaintiffs’ application for injunctive relief specifically requested the

  parts of the order that Defendants now claim is mandatory. Defendants also failed to

  request plain-error review. Without deciding whether we must apply waiver, we

  reject Defendants’ argument because it lacks merit.

        An injunction is mandatory when it requires defendants to do something they

  were not doing during the most recent peaceable status quo—that is, the last

  uncontested period preceding the injunction. See Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v.

  Echostar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing SCFC ILC,

                                              16
Appellate Case: 23-1000    Document: 010111040621        Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 17

  Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1099 (10th Cir. 1991), holding modified by O

  Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973 (10th Cir.

  2004)). To obtain a mandatory injunction, the moving party must make a stronger

  showing than otherwise that two factors—likelihood of success on the merits and

  balance of harms—weigh in his favor. Free the Nipple, 916 F.3d at 797 (quoting

  Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 724 (10th Cir. 2016)).

        Defendants contend Plaintiff faces this heavier burden. But the injunction

  does not disturb the last peaceable status quo.

        The Restrictions banned Plaintiff from coaching football or accessing District

  facilities other than in his capacity as a parent and a member of the public. Plaintiff

  contested the Restrictions. So the last peaceable status quo existed before the

  Restrictions—when Plaintiff coached football and maintained special access to

  District facilities. The preliminary injunction restores the most recent peaceable

  status quo because it merely prevents the District from enforcing the Restrictions and

  prohibits additional unconstitutional actions. It does not mandate additional actions.

  Thus, it is not a mandatory injunction, and the heavier burden does not apply.

                                             C.

        An order granting an injunction must “describe in reasonable detail . . . the act

  or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(c). We require that

  injunctions be “reasonably specific” to notify the defendant of what is prohibited.

  Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1243 (10th Cir. 2001)

  (quoting Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 668 (10th Cir. 1990)). This

                                             17
Appellate Case: 23-1000        Document: 010111040621     Date Filed: 04/30/2024   Page: 18

  Court can modify an injunction that lacks specificity when such modification is “just

  under the circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2106.

        Defendants argue that the preliminary injunction fails to specify sufficiently

  what acts are prohibited. They object that the district court did not outline

  appropriate restrictions on Plaintiff’s speech. As a result, Defendants claim they

  must guess whether their future actions will violate the injunction. Yet Defendants

  specify no action on which they seek clarification or any restriction they want to

  enforce against Plaintiff.

        Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the preliminary injunction

  lacks sufficient specificity. We will not speculate about actions Defendants would

  take but for fear of violating the preliminary injunction. Defendants may seek future

  interpretation, modification, or clarification from the district court. See Dombrowski

  v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 492 (1965) (citing Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Emps. Dep’t,

  AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961); Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S.

  556 (1942); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932)) (“. . . district courts

  retain power to modify injunctions in light of changed circumstances.”); Pimentel &

  Sons Guitar Makers, Inc. v. Pimentel, 477 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2007) (district

  courts can interpret or clarify existing injunction).

                                              18
Appellate Case: 23-1000    Document: 010111040621         Date Filed: 04/30/2024    Page: 19

                                            IV.

        We conclude that the district court did not commit an error of law or make

  clearly erroneous factual findings. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion

  in granting Plaintiff the preliminary injunction.

        AFFIRMED.

                                             19