Court Opinion

ID: 9464452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:33:44.389431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:38.264627
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge
(concurring and joining in opinion of Judge OAKES):
I concur in the judgment and join in the opinion of Judge Oakes, concurring in the result.
APPENDIX
Opinion of the Panel
Before SMITH, OAKES and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges.
OAKES, Circuit Judge:
Had this appeal been before us one year ago, it would have been relatively easy to resolve. Three Supreme Court decisions in the spring and summer of 1976, while perhaps intended to simplify the federal courts’ labors as to habeas corpus petitions brought by state prisoners, have instead complicated analysis in the instant case. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Robert L. Carter, Judge, dismissed appellant’s petition under 28 U.S. C.A. § 2254 on the ground that appellant had failed adequately to raise, for New York state law purposes, his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts. After some struggle to understand the implications of the recent High Court cases, we have concluded that we must reverse.

Facts

The facts are essentially undisputed. In September, 1966, appellant’s estranged wife died of multiple stab wounds sustained in her apartment in Spring Valley, New York. Before losing consciousness, she responded to a neighbor’s inquiry as to whether her husband had been the assailant by saying, “I don’t know, but he wore glasses,” as did *845appellant. Just 45 minutes later, appellant’s car was stopped ten miles from the scene of the stabbing for an offense entirely unconnected with the stabbing, failure to dim his headlights. For reasons that are obscure, the officer who stopped appellant, after taking his driver’s license and registration, arrested him in connection with the stabbing.
Appellant was subsequently charged with first-degree murder, convicted by a jury in Rockland County Court, and sentenced to a prison term of from 20 years to life. The evidence at his trial was entirely circumstantial, consisting primarily of threats he had made against his wife and a set of fingerprints and palmprints found on the apartment’s bathroom windowsill, through which the assailant apparently entered the dwelling. Some of the prints matched appellant’s prints, which were taken by the police a few hours after appellant’s arrest. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on which appellant was convicted, the New York Court of Appeals, expressing doubt whether the threats alone would have been sufficient, upheld the conviction because of “the almost conclusive force of the fingerprint evidence . . . [which] pointed ineluctably to the defendant’s guilt . ..” People v. Gates, 24 N.Y.2d 666, 669, 301 N.Y.S.2d 597, 600, 249 N.E.2d 450, 451-52 (1969).
Appellant’s trial counsel objected to the introduction of appellant’s prints, taken at the police station following his arrest. Counsel did so, however, on grounds that were regrettably ambiguous, and this ambiguity has led to the instant litigation. Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel had the following colloquy with the trial judge:
Defense Counsel: While there is no question, and we will stipulate, that [the prints] were taken of the defendant in this ease, we raise objection not to the fact that they are or are not his prints but to the introduction of those prints on the basis that this man’s constitutional rights both under the State and Federal
Constitutions have been violated by the taking of these prints and as such we object to them.
The Court: Your objection is then on constitutional grounds to the mere fact of the taking of the prints?
Counsel: Yes, sir.
The Court: As such?
Counsel: Right, sir.
The Court: I will overrule that objection.
Counsel: Exception.
The Court: And you will have a similar objection, without having to renew it, for the record to any further introduction of prints taken of the defendant by any other law enforcement officer.
Counsel: Fine) sir.
The Court: And with the same ruling.
It is not clear whether counsel was objecting on Fifth Amendment grounds, that being compelled to be fingerprinted was “to be a witness against himself,” compare Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed.2d 746 (1886) (compelling production of private papers may violate Fifth Amendment), and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) (Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause applies to states), with Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (compelling blood test, fingerprinting, photographing, etc., does not violate Fifth Amendment); or on Fourth Amendment grounds, that fingerprints obtained after an arrest made without probable cause were inadmissible, see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 723-24, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); or on both, see Boyd v. United States, supra, 116 U.S. at 633, 6 S.Ct. 524. The ambiguity is there even though the objection was made some six months after Schmerber, supra, which made it unavailing if on grounds of the Fifth, and over two years before Davis, which made it clearly availing on grounds of the Fourth.1
Appellant’s conviction was affirmed by both New York’s Appellate Division, 29 A.D.2d 843, 288 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1968) (mem.), *846and Court of Appeals, supra. The latter court, with the benefit of Davis v. Mississippi, supra, to which it referred, recognized that fingerprint evidence that is the fruit of an arrest without probable cause must be excluded,2 but held that appellant had *847failed to object to the print evidence on this ground. 24 N.Y.2d at 670, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 601, 249 N.E.2d at 452. The court’s opinion does not in any way allude to the objection quoted above; instead, it states that appellant failed “even to intimate that such an issue was in the case.” Id. Appellant then applied for a writ of error coram nobis, which was denied. 61 Misc.2d 250, 305 N.Y. S.2d 583 (Rockland County Ct. 1969). The Appellate Division affirmed, 36 A.D.2d 761, 319 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1971), and the Court of Appeals denied further leave to appeal. Neither of the opinions on coram nobis mentioned the objection quoted above; both assumed, without discussion, that no objection on the relevant ground had been made at trial.3
Appellant next petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for a writ of habeas corpus. The court was perplexed about the lack of reference to the above-quoted objection in the three state court opinions dealing with Gates’ conviction and confinement, and by letter asked counsel for clarification. Following receipt of counsel's responses, the court denied the petition, ruling that the state court opinions are “to be understood as holding that counsel’s objection . was not sufficiently specific to raise the fruit of an unlawful arrest argument.” No. 73 Civ. 3865 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1976), slip op. at 7.

The Applicability of Stone v. Powell

After the district court’s ruling below, the Supreme Court decided a case that bears directly on the cognizability of appellant’s petition. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), the Court held “that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Id. 428 U.S. at 494, 96 S.Ct. at 3052 (footnotes omitted). Appellant here seeks relief on precisely this ground; his claim of an absence of probable cause for his arrest is in essence a claim of unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-16, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973). There is little doubt, moreover that the Stone case was intended by the Supreme Court to apply retroactively to habeas petitions then pending in the federal courts. See 428 U.S. at 495 n. 38, 96 S.Ct. at 3052, n. 38; id. 428 U.S. at 482, 96 S.Ct. at 3070 (Brennan, J., dissenting); LaVallee v. Mungo, 428 U.S. 907, 96 S.Ct. 3215, 49 L.Ed.2d 1213 (1976) (per curiam) (vacation of judgment and remand to court of appeals for further consideration in light of Stone); Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 1976); Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500, 502 (10th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Poindexter v. Wolff, 540 F.2d 390, 391 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
Stone v. Powell forecloses habeas review, however, only when the petitioner had “an *848opportunity for full and fair litigation of [his] Fourth Amendment claim,” and appellant argues that he received no such opportunity here. The Court in Stone did not elaborate on the substance of the “opportunity” required,4 and its various formulations of the rule provide limited assistance, see 428 U.S. at 481, 96 S.Ct. at 3044, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (“ ‘a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question’ ”); 428 U.S. 480, 96 S.Ct. at 3045 (“the opportunity for full and fair consideration of [the] claim”); id. 428 U.S. at 465, 96 S.Ct. 3049 (rejection of claim by state courts); id. 428 U.S. 494 n. 37, 96 S.Ct. at 3052 n. 37 (“an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of [the] claim at trial and on direct review”). In a footnote to the summary of its holding, the Court did indicate that Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), is of some relevance to the question whether an adequate opportunity has been provided, see 428 U.S. at 494 n. 36, 96 S.Ct. at 3052 n. 36, although the “cf.” signal preceding the citation makes its exact meaning uncertain, see A Uniform System of Citation 7 (12th ed. 1976) (“Cf. [means] [c]ited authority supports a proposition different from that in text but sufficiently analogous to lend support. . . . ‘Cf.' should not be used without an explanatory parenthetical.”)
Townsend v. Sain, supra, which held that an evidentiary hearing was required to determine whether a confession underlying a state court conviction was obtained involuntarily through use of “truth serum,” spelled out six situations in which a state habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court because of the inadequacy of state fact-finding proceedings.5 Its citation by the Stone Court may thus have been a suggestion that these situations are ones in which “an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim” is absent. Two of the Townsend categories seem relevant here. The first involves the state court’s not making findings of fact and leaving the legal grounds for its conclusion uncertain. See 372 U.S. at 314, 83 S.Ct. 745. The state trial court here simply “overruled” appellant’s objection, with no statement of either factual or legal grounds, and none of the reviewing courts even mentioned the objection. While appellant may not have “tendered” the constitutional issues with precision, see id., we understand Townsend to place some obligation on state courts to articulate reasons for their decisions on federal constitutional questions.6 In the absence of such *849reasons, a habeas petitioner cannot be said to have received “even . . . the semblance of a full and fair hearing.” Id. at 313, 83 S.Ct. at 757.
A second Townsend category, perhaps more significant here, is one in which, “for any reason not attributable to the inexcusable neglect of petitioner, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. [391], 438 [83 S.Ct. 822, p. 848, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963)], evidence crucial to the adequate consideration of the constitutional claim was not developed at the state hearing . . ..” 372 U.S. at 317, 83 S.Ct. at 759. The evidence crucial to appellant’s claim was that relating to the circumstances surrounding his arrest, and it is clear that this evidence was not developed at all, see People v. Gates, supra, 24 N.Y.2d at 668 n. 2, 670, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 599 n. 2, 601, 249 N.E.2d at 451 n. 2, 452. A question of considerable importance, however, is whether appellant’s failure to specify the precise ground for his constitutional objection constitutes “inexcusable neglect” as the term was used in Townsend, supra. Fay v. Noia, it will be recalled, granted the federal district court a “[n]arrowly circumscribed” power to “deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of the state courts,” 372 U.S. at 438, 83 S.Ct. at 849, the term “inexcusable neglect” is not to be found in that case.

State Procedural Default

The district court concluded that appellant’s objection was not “sufficiently specific” for state law purposes and ruled that this state procedural ground precluded the granting of federal habeas relief. Slip op. at 7-9. This conclusion, that the state courts held the objection insufficiently specific, however, is doubtful. None of the three state opinions even mentioned the objection cited by appellant here; it was only from this silence that the district court drew the inference' that the objection was insufficiently specific. But it is at least equally plausible that the state courts were not aware of, or for some reason chose to ignore, appellant’s objection. Whatever the adequacy of the objection, it certainly “intimated” that the Fourth Amendment might be an issue, especially since the Fifth Amendment claim had already been foreclosed by Schmerber, supra, yet the New York Court of Appeals stated that appellant “fail[ed] . . . even to intimate that such an issue was in the case . 24 N.Y.2d at 670, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 601, 249 N.E.2d at 452. See also note 3 supra.
The Court of Appeals’ statement in the opinion on appellant’s direct appeal is especially difficult to fathom in view of its own earlier statement (in a case cited in that opinion) that merely “some effort in th[e] direction” of a Fourth Amendment objection is sufficient to preserve the question for appellate review. People v. Friola, 11 N.Y.2d 157, 159, 227 N.Y.S.2d 423, 424, 182 N.E.2d 100, 101 (1962). See also United States ex rel. Vanderhorst v. LaVallee, 417 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1969) (en banc) (citing New York authority for propositions that “ ‘no exception is necessary to preserve for appellate review a deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right’ ” and that “a constitutional issue may be raised for the first time on appeal in New York”), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 930, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1970). See also People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898 (1976) (no objection necessary to preserve constitutional claim), cert. granted, Patterson v. N. Y., 429 U.S. 813, 97 S.Ct. 52, 50 L.Ed.2d 72 (1976). Moreover, if the state courts were holding, as the court below believed, that the objection appellant did make was inadequate for state law purposes, the normal and proper course would have been for them to state that holding and supporting reasons. Cf. Arlinghaus v. Ritenour, (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), 543 F.2d 461, 464 (“A decisionmaker obliged to give reasons to support his decision may find they do not; ‘the opinion will not write.’ ”). Since they made no such statement, it remains inappropriate for a federal *850court to dismiss a habeas petition on the basis of pure speculation as to what the state courts might implicitly have been holding. See Townsend v. Sain, supra, 372 U.S. at 314-16, 83 S.Ct. 745. Nothing in Stone v. Powell affects this aspect of the federal courts’ obligations.
Even if the holding as to state law were explicit, moreover, it does not follow that this state procedural ground would give the district court power to deny federal habeas relief. Under Fay v. Noia, supra, such power exists only if the procedural default in the state courts amounted to a “deliberate bypass” of state procedures. 372 U.S. at 438, 83 S.Ct. 822. See also Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 290 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 886, 43 L.Ed.2d 196 (1975). Under that test, the federal habeas court must make an “independent determination” that the habeas petitioner — assisted by counsel but making the final decision himself — “understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts . . ..” 372 U.S. at 439, 83 S.Ct. at 849. See also id. at 433-37, 83 S.Ct. 822.7 No such determination was made by the district court here, nor is there any indication in the record that appellant knowingly waived his federal claims. On the contrary, his counsel was at least asserting some constitutional claim in respect to the evidence by his objection; doubtless appellant would have thought such an assertion procedurally sufficient. Given the vital importance of the fingerprint evidence to the State’s case, it would have been senseless for appellant to have waived any available objection to the admission of the evidence. No trial tactic by anyone could conceivably involve omission to make such an objection. This court has recently held that failure to object at all to a charge to the jury did not constitute deliberate bypass, when the petitioner’s trial strategy indicated that the lack of objection was inadvertent. Kibbe v. Henderson, 534 F.2d 493, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1976), petition for cert. granted, 429 U.S. 815, 97 S.Ct. 55, 50 L.Ed.2d 74 (1976). It follows a fortiori that, when a lack of objection would have been virtually fatal to the petitioner’s case, and when an objection was in fact made on constitutional grounds, the petitioner cannot be said, in the absence of clear evidence of a knowing waiver, to have deliberately bypassed the state courts.8
The State argues, however, that the Fay deliberate bypass rule has been modified by two recent Supreme Court decisions, Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 48 L.Ed.2d 149 (1976). But nothing in either decision purports to affect Fay in any way, although the dissenting opinions suggest a sub silentio modification of Fay, see 425 U.S. at 521-528, 96 S.Ct. at 1702-1704 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 425 U.S. at 542-557, 96 S.Ct. at 1711-1719 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Stone v. Powell, supra, 428 U.S. at 516 n. 12, 96 S.Ct. at 3062 n. 12 (Brennan, J., dissenting); note 7 supra.
In Estelle the habeas petitioner did not object at trial to being tried in prison garb, and the Court ruled that, because he had not been compelled to stand trial so attired, his petition should not have been granted. While the exact ground of the Court’s deci*851sion is somewhat obscure, see 425 U.S. at 522, 96 S.Ct. at 1702 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the thrust of the majority opinion goes to “compulsion,” rather than to waiver. See.id. 425 U.S. at 502-504, 511, 96 S.Ct. at 1692-1693, 1696. Mr. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, did argue that a failure to object “at a time when a substantive right could have been protected” should be treated the same as a knowing waiver, id. 425 U.S. at 513, 96 S.Ct. at 1697, but his opinion makes apparent that he is referring to a situation in which counsel failed entirely to object, id., when fully aware of clear constitutional grounds on which he could have objected, id. & n. 1. By contrast, appellant’s counsel here did raise an objection, was probably not fully aware of the constitutional grounds available to him (because Davis v. Mississippi, supra, had not yet been decided), and, as discussed above, could not conceivably have made a “tactical choice” to decline to object on any ground remotely likely to succeed.
Francis v. Henderson, supra, rests upon a concern with placing habeas petitioners from state judgments on an equal footing with those from federal judgments with regard to challenges to the composition of grand juries. Following Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 93 S.Ct. 1577, 36 L.Ed.2d 216 (1973), the Court ruled that a state petitioner who failed to make a “timely challenge” to the grand jury’s composition could not challenge the composition in a federal habeas proceeding. 425 U.S. at 536-541, 96 S.Ct. at 1708-1711. The opinion states:
If, as Davis held, the federal courts must give effect to [specified grand jury-related] concerns in [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 proceedings, then surely considerations of comity and federalism require that they give no less effect to the same clear interests when asked to overturn state criminal convictions.
Id. 425 U.S. at 541, 95 S.Ct. at 1711. The Court did not go beyond this narrow rationale to the broader Fay v. Noia waiver question, despite the majority’s clear awareness, from the dissenting opinion, of the broader ground available. It would be inappropriate for us, as a lower court, to speculate about what Francis v. Henderson “really means” or about what the Supreme Court may do in the next case. Except as modified narrowly by Francis as to grand jury challenges, Fay v. Noia remains good law, and, as the Supreme Court has recently reminded us, “[o]ur institutional duty is to follow until changed the law as it now is .,” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 1036, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976).
We therefore conclude that appellant did not commit the sort of procedural default that would bar him from asserting a federal claim in this collateral proceeding. It follows under Townsend v. Sain, supra, that the state courts’ failure to develop evidence crucial to appellant’s claim deprived him of a state opportunity fully and fairly to litigate it. Because such an opportunity is a critical precondition to the application of Stone v. Powell, supra, that case does not operate here to prevent the district court from reaching the merits of appellant’s Fourth Amendment claim. Our analysis above also indicates that the district court erred in holding that New York procedural requirements barred federal consideration of appellant’s claim on a petition for habeas corpus.9
*852Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for a hearing on the merits of appellant’s claim.10

. Counsel had previously objected in open court to a question calling for the arresting officer’s description of appellant’s right hand as observed at the station in the fingerprinting *846process, also on vague “constitutional grounds,” an objection that could likewise have gone either to the Fourth or to the Fifth Amendment or to both. The objection was similarly overruled by the trial court.

. The New York Court of Appeals stated:
In the light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 [89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676] there can be no doubt that fingerprint evidence is “subject to the proscriptions of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments” and that such evidence is to be excluded if it be the product of an illegal arrest (394 U.S., at p. 724 [89 S.Ct. at p. 1396]).
People v. Gates, 24 N.Y.2d 666, 670, 301 N.Y. S.2d 597, 601, 249 N.E.2d 450, 452 (1969). The court’s statement is ambiguous as to whether it viewed Davis as establishing a new rule of law retroactively binding in appellant’s case — the fingerprinting and trial of appellant occurred prior to Davis — or whether it viewed Davis as merely clarifying established New York or federal constitutional law. The latter interpretation seems the most likely one in light of the Davis opinion:
[I]n Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081] (1961), we held that “ail evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.” (Italics supplied.) Fingerprint evidence is no exception to this comprehensive rule.
394 U.S. at 724, 89 S.Ct. at 1396.
Despite the Court of Appeals’ statement that Davis was applicable to appellant’s case, the Rockland County Court ruled, in appellant’s later coram nobis action, that Davis had “prospective effect only.” People v. Gates, 61 Misc.2d 250, 254, 305 N.Y.S.2d 583, 588 (1969), aff’d on other grounds, 36 A.D.2d 761, 319 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1971). This ruling is inconsistent not only with the implication of the Davis opinion and the holding of New York’s highest court, but also with Mills v. Wainwright, 415 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1969), applying Davis to fingerprinting following an illegal arrest occurring prior to the date Davis was decided, as well as other cases assuming Davis to be applicable retroactively, see, e. g., Hamrick v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 940, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Dessus v. Pennsylvania, 452 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853, 93 S.Ct. 184, 34 L.Ed.2d 96 (1972); United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705, 710-11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824, 92 S.Ct. 49, 30 L.Ed.2d 51 (1971); United States v. Seay, 432 F.2d 395, 400 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 949, 28 L.Ed.2d 223 (1971). Judge Carter below concluded:
Davis did not enunciate a new doctrine, but merely extended the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio. . . . The Davis decision . . . described an existing rule of law. Thus, there is no issue here of applying a new rule retroactively.
United States ex rel. Gates v. Henderson, No. 73 Civ. 3865 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1976), slip op. at 2 n. 2. On this appeal, the State has agreed with — and indeed emphasizes the correctness of — the district court’s conclusion. Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 20.
Some question might possibly be raised about this conclusion in view of United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1974), holding Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) (border patrol searches), inapplicable retroactively. The Peltier Court emphasized, however, that an exclusionary rule holding will be given solely prospective effect only “if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that their conduct was in accordance with the law . . ..” 422 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 2317 (emphasis in original); see id. at 541, 95 S.Ct. 2313 (conduct of officers in Peltier had received “continuous judicial approval”). Peltier thus evidently does not affect the retroactivity of decisions that clarify or extend, rather than overrule or sharply change, existing law. United States v. Martinez, 526 F.2d 954, 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1976) (opinion on rehearing) (petition for rehearing en banc denied, 9-5); People v. Morales, 52 A.D.2d 818, 824, 383 N.Y.S.2d 608, 615 n.* (1976) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (issue not. reached by majority). But see United States v. Peltier, supra, 422 U.S. at 544-49 & n. 5, 95 S.Ct. 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Davis decision, by its own terms, was merely a clarifying decision. Moreover, the conduct in which the police engaged in Davis (and allegedly here), arrest without probable cause, had received repeated judicial condemnation, contrary to the situation in Peltier, since 1806, Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 447, 452, 2 L.Ed. 495 (1806) (Marshall, C. J.), and federal standards had been unquestionably applicable to arrests by state officers since 1963, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), over three years before appellant’s arrest. See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) (evidence taken from defendant at police station following arrest without probable cause should have been excluded at state trial). *847In view of these clear judicial statements, no New York police officer in 1966 could have “reasonably believed in good faith” that the arrest of appellant, if without probable cause, “was in accordance with the law.” United States v. Peltier, supra, 422 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 2318.

. The Rockland County Court said:
It is undisputed that the objections now sought to be raised by the defendant were not asserted by him at the time of trial . .. It was not until argument before the Court of Appeals on February 27, 1969, two years after defendant’s conviction, that he, for the first time, raised the issue of alleged violation of his Federal constitutional rights and which he now claims requires that his judgment of conviction be vacated.
61 Misc.2d at 252, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 585-86. However, the court went on to consider Davis v. Mississippi, supra, but concluded that Davis was not to be applied retroactively. See note 2 supra. The Appellate Division stated: “Appellant never raised his Fourth Amendment claim in the trial court ..” 36 A.D.2d at 761, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 570. It went on to hold that he had “forfeited [the] right [to raise the issue] by failing to raise the constitutional question in the trial court and then to test any adverse ruling on appeal from the judgment . . Id., 319 N.Y.S.2d at 571.

. In one of the two cases consolidated in Stone, the petitioner had received a suppression hearing in the state trial court on his claim of an unlawful search. See 428 U.S. at 473 & n. 3, 96 S.Ct. at 3041 & n. 3. In the other case, the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim hinged on whether a vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional. See id. 428 U.S. at 473, 96 S.Ct. at 3039. Since this contention was legal, not factual, in nature, a formal suppression hearing was apparently not held.

. The six situations are:
1. Where the state court has not made adequate factual or legal findings to support its conclusion, 372 U.S. at 313-16, 83 S.Ct. 745.
2. Where the state factual determinations are “not fairly supported by the record,” id. at 316, 83 S.Ct. at 758.
3. Where “serious procedural errors” have been employed in the factfinding process, id.;
4. Where newly discovered evidence bearing upon the constitutionality of the detention is alleged in a habeas application, id. at 317, 83 S.Ct. 745.
5. Where “evidence crucial to the adequate consideration of the constitutional claim was not developed at the state hearing,” unless- there was “inexcusable” default under Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), 372 U.S. at 317, 83 S.Ct. at 759; and
6. Where — open-endedly—“the state court has not after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts,” id. at 318, 83 S.Ct. at 759.

. It could be argued that, among the functions served by a statement of reasons at a state court hearing, the statement may help litigants to clarify the grounds for their constitutional objections. For example, the trial judge here might have told appellant’s counsel, “I overrule your objection on the basis that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against testimonial compulsion does not extend to fingerprints.” Counsel might then have clarified his objection by indicating that his concern was a Fourth, *849not a Fifth, Amendment one, relating to the fruits of an unlawful arrest. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965) (trial judge can seek elaboration of objections to introduction of evidence).

. While the “deliberate bypass” language of Fay was reaffirmed as late as 1975 in Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 290 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 886, 43 L.Ed.2d 196 (1975), that language could conceivably be under reexamination by the Court. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (“ 'inexcusable procedural default’ ” in connection with a “trial-type right”); id. at 4616 n. 5 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 96 S.Ct. 1708, 48 L.Ed.2d 149 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see text at notes 8-9, infra.

. The State asserts in its brief that United States ex rel. Tarallo v. LaVallee, 433 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919, 91 S.Ct. 2235, 29 L.Ed.2d 697 (1971), is controlling here. We believe that case is distinguishable, however, because the petitioner there made no objection at all on constitutional grounds when the evidence allegedly seized illegally was originally introduced at trial, id. at 7, so that his later objection was untimely. Here there is no question that appellant seasonably objected “on constitutional grounds.” It is specificity, not timeliness, that is at issue here.

. The State argues that appellant failed to exhaust his state remedies, as he is required to do by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). A state prisoner must present to the state courts “the substance” of his federal claim, although he need not “cit[e] ‘book and verse on the federal constitution.’ ” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S.Ct. 509, 513, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971), quoting Daugharty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958); see, e. g., United States ex rel. Gibbs v. Zelker, 496 F.2d 991, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1974); Mayer v. Moeykens, 494 F.2d 855, 858-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 926, 94 S.Ct. 2633, 41 L.Ed.2d 229 (1974). Presentation to the state courts, however, has not been construed to mean presentation at every level of the state court system; it is sufficient for exhaustion purposes if a federal issue is first raised on a state appeal. See Picard v. Connor, supra, 404 U.S. at 273-74, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509 (by implication); United States ex rel Nelson v. Zelker, 465 F.2d 1121, 1124 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 *852U.S. 1045, 93 S.Ct. 544, 34 L.Ed.2d 497 (1972). In the instant case, regardless of the adequacy under Picard v. Connor, supra, of appellant’s trial-level constitutional objection, cf. United States ex rel. Gibbs v. Zelker, supra, 496 F.2d at 994 (“we would hardly insist that the [objection] ... be raised in the state court in the specific garb of a federal constitutional question . . .”), there is no question that the precise Fourth Amendment issue was presented to the New York Court of Appeals on direct review and to three levels of the state court system in connection with appellant’s coram nobis petition. It is clear that “the state courts [had] a fair chance [to] resolv[e] the constitutional problems of petitioner’s case.” Id.

. It is unfortunate that in the rhetoric of the dissenting opinion our dissenting brother did not see fit to discuss, let alone analyze, how the State here “provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim” within the express language of Stone v. Powell, see Point I supra. Perhaps the dissent’s fire is misdirected and it is the exclusionary rule and Davis v. Mississippi, supra, with which it is so upset, since they operate to exclude illegally obtained fingerprint evidence. As for setting free a “convicted first degree murderer” after ten years, we were unaware that there was a statute of limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights.