Court Opinion

ID: 9520569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:43:59.650414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:27.809378
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’MALLEY, specially concurring: The majority decides this appeal based on a permissive-mandatory distinction argument the State did not raise and defendant had no opportunity to answer. The majority dismisses this concern with the startlingly circular rationalization that “it is questionable whether defendant would have chosen to respond to the argument given that he chose not to file a reply brief in the first place.” 388 Ill. App. 3d at 717. Needless to say, I do not share the majority’s sentiment. I would instead decide the case based on harmless error — an issue the State raised and that defendant had the choice to argue. See VG Marina Management Corp. v. Wiener, 225 Ill. 2d 594 (2007) (denying leave to appeal but ordering that the appellate court, which had decided the case on an issue not raised in the briefs, vacate its judgment and order supplemental briefing as had been suggested by the appellate court dissent). To the majority’s accusation that I am “sidestep[ping]” the mandatory-presumption issue (388 Ill. App. 3d at 718), I can respond only that I, unlike the majority, would decide the case based on the arguments actually presented by the parties, and I directly address those arguments. The permissive-mandatory distinction is one of any number of issues the parties did not raise; I would hardly consider my declining to discuss those issues to be “sidestepping.” If anything, it is the majority, not I, who has stepped from the path laid out by the parties’ briefs. Defendant argues that the trial court’s use of the 1.18 conversion factor was error, but, in his brief, he argues that any conversion factor between 1.10 and 1.20 would have been appropriate. As the State notes in its brief, even a 1.20 factor — the factor most favorable to defendant within the range identified by defendant — would have yielded a whole blood alcohol result over the legal limit. Thus, no conversion factor that defendant could have presented would have exculpated him. Of course, even if any acceptable conversion factor would have resulted in conviction, the State was still required to present some evidence of a conversion factor, lest it fail to satisfy its burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Thoman, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1219-20 (where State presented no evidence of a conversion factor, the error could not be considered harmless on appeal). However, even assuming that the regulation at issue here contains an unconstitutional presumption, and even further assuming that the trial court impermissibly relied on the unconstitutional presumption, I would still hold that the State presented evidence of a conversion factor sufficient to trigger the harmless-error rule on appeal. Our supreme court has held that an unconstitutional evidentiary presumption may be considered harmless error on appeal where the evidence established the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt independently of the presumption. Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d at 315. Here, if we strip the regulation of any power to mandate an evidentiary presumption, it still stands as nonbinding evidence of a proper conversion factor, just as expert testimony or a regulation from another jurisdiction would. See Thoman, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1220 (equating judicial notice of the regulation with presentation of expert testimony by saying, “The State could have proved the whole blood alcohol concentration through expert testimony *** or through asking the trial court to take judicial notice of, and instruct the jury on, the appropriate conversion factor”). Although the supreme court in Wood-rum severed and struck down the portion of the statute creating the unconstitutional presumption in that case (a perhaps unavoidable result, since the offending language explicitly required that certain evidence “ ‘shall be prima facie evidence of ” an element of a crime (see Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d at 309, quoting 720 ILCS 5/10 — 5(b)(10) (West 1998))), defendant here urges only that the regulation cannot be afforded the power to create a mandatory evidentiary presumption. Even if I were to fully accept defendant’s argument on this point, I would still consider the regulation evidence of a conversion factor, independent of any impermissible presumption it might contain. In arguing that the regulation cannot serve as evidence, the majority emphasizes its view that Woodrum requires “independent trial evidence of a conversion factor beyond the regulation.” (Emphasis in original.) 388 Ill. App. 3d at 718. The majority rewrites Woodrum, which actually says that an impermissible presumption may be deemed harmless where the evidence established guilt “independently of the presumption.” (Emphasis added.) Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d at 315. Again, if the regulation were stripped of any presumption, it would nevertheless serve as evidence independent of any presumption. The majority’s only response to this point is its conclusory statement that “Woodrum does not support” my view. 388 Ill. App. 3d at 718. I think my view is consistent with the actual language of Woodrum. Based on the above discussion, I would hold that any error in failing to consider other conversion factors was harmless.