Court Opinion

ID: 9737282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:20:42.313204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:57.817361
License: Public Domain

*202CHRISTIAN, J.
I dissent.
Apparently no prior California decision has considered the circumstances in which loading should be held to have commenced. I would adopt the test propounded by a learned writer: 1 ‘ The ‘ complete operation ’ doctrine contemplates that the loading commences when the items of cargo leave their original location on the way to the vehicle . . . and that unloading does not cease until the items of cargo have reached the final point of delivery toward which the transportation of the cargo by automobile was a part.” (Risjord, Loading and Unloading, 13 Vand. L. Rev., 903, 904; italics added.)
As the majority opinion points out, California is committed to the “complete operations” rule by several cases involving unloading. (Entz v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. (1966) 64 Cal.2d 379, 384 [50 Cal.Rptr. 190, 412 P.2d 382] ; Truck Ins. Exchange v. Webb (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 140, 145 [63 Cal.Rptr. 791].) Useful analogies to our ease may be drawn from cases dealing with the opposite end of the sequence: when unloading is to be held to have ended. No simple test can be found in these decisions, but the principle which seems to have guided them all is that when the term “loading and unloading” is used without elaboration or restriction in an insurance policy it is to be applied to each case in the manner most likely to conform with the reasonably implied intentions of the parties to the contract of insurance. Therefore, “ ‘the automobile need not be, in the legal sense, the proximate cause of the claim; the events giving rise to the claim must, however, arise out of and be related to its use.’ ” (American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co. (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 543, 550 [19 Cal.Rptr. 558] ; Home Indem. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 100 [69 Cal.Rptr. 504].) It seems to me that here the collapse of the pile of pipe did not “arise out of” the loading of the truck; the accident would as well have occurred if the retaining band had been cut preparatory to moving two or three lengths of pipe to some other place such as a stock bin inside the warehouse.
In Entz v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., supra, 64 Cal.2d 379, at p. 383, the Supreme Court held, in a case involving an injury which assertedly occurred in the course of unloading transit-mix cement, that unloading “has been completed when, following removal of the material from the vehicle, the deliveror has finished his handling of it, and it has been placed in the hands of the receiver at the designated reception point, even though it is necessary for the consignee, or someone on his *203behalf, to transport it thereafter to another point.” By analogy it seems to me reasonable to hold here that loading has not commenced when neither of the men had commenced moving the material from its “original location on the way to the vehicle.” (Risjord, op. cit., supra.) The accident occurred as the result of a merely preparatory step taken by Oppermann. Compare San Fernando Valley Crane Service, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co. (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 229 [40 Cal.Rptr. 165], another transit-mix cement case, in which unloading was held not to extend to the collapse of a bucket crane which was conveying cement from the insured vehicle to the spot on the construction site where the cement was to be used. This conclusion was held to be more likely to represent the intention of the parties in view of the fact that the cement could have been conveyed away from the truck by other means; it was considered “not reasonable to conclude that such parties intended an extension of coverage to an accident occurring after concrete has been placed in a receptacle furnished by or on behalf of the purchaser and while it is being mechanically conveyed to a location some distance above the ground.” (229 Cal.App.2d at p. 236.) By analogy here, it is unlikely that Oppermann and Allstate intended an extension of coverage to an accident which occurred before the workmen commenced moving the load to the truck. Such an extension would include risks which Oppermann would hardly think of in connection with the use of his truck, and which his insurance carrier would have great difficulty in evaluating for purposes of fixing a premium. (See also Truck Ins. Exchange v. Webb, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d 140, 145 [63 Cal.Rptr. 791].) Consistent with this view is American Auto. Ins. Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co. (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 630 [235 P.2d 645], where property damage resulting from negligent operation of facilities used in unloading the insured oil truck was held to be covered. In contrast to our facts, the negligent act there occurred during the actual course of unloading operations.
Finally, it seems to me that a test for the commencement of the loading process should be developed which can be applied with reasonable predictability. Otherwise parties are required to litigate, through the appellate stage, every case where an injury is in some manner related in time and place to the loading of an insured vehicle. For example, the present ease, in the view of the majority, turns upon a set of unusual facts which do not seem to relate to any guiding principle. I think *204the test suggested by Risjord, op. cit., supra, is preferable: it is predictable in its results, and it is likely to represent the unexpressed intentions of the parties.
I would reverse the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 3, 1968. Christian, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 30,1968.