Court Opinion

ID: 9741566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:58:05.738483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.821377
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I dissent from the portion of the majority’s disposition that determines that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of a permanency order despite the fact that the permanency issue was entertained, considered, and ordered during the dispositional hearing. There is no case law that indicates that matters determined and ordered at the close of a dispositional hearing are not appealable, even if they are nonfinal. The only aspect of the dispositional order that is arguably final is the determination of the status of the child as a ward of the court, and even that is subject to future resolution and disposition. To say that a permanency order issued as part of a dispositional order is nonfinal and therefore nonappealable is Orwellian; while all aspects of the dispositional order are nonfinal, permanency orders are a little more nonfinal. Using the logic of the majority, several alternative results are possible. An appellant in any juvenile matter would be required to file a Rule 306 or Rule 307 petition for leave to appeal any and all portions of a dispositional order other than the adjudication of wardship, since the other portions are nonfinal orders. The appellate court’s decision as to whether the issue raised is covered by Rule 306 or Rule 307 would determine whether the appellate court even has the ability to consider the issue and, if discretion is involved, the issue may not be resolved. For example, a nonpermanent injunction would be capable of review only under Rule 307, not Rule 303. If the injunction relates to custody, it may be subject to review under Rule 306. Under the logic of the majority, an appellate lawyer would have to analyze every aspect of a dispositional order to determine if it is nonfinal and if it is covered in some rule relating to the appealability of a nonfinal order. The majority posits “ ‘that a permanency goal does not finally determine a right or status of a party but instead looks at the anticipated future status of the child.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) 349 Ill. App. 3d at 936, quoting In re D.D.H., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 991. However, an examination of the dispositional order here reveals much “final determination” and very little of “anticipated future status.” The trial court found that the initial permanency goal was not appropriate and ordered DCFS to develop a permanency goal of guardianship. The court then set no date for a future permanency hearing and continued the case for 67 days for “closure of case.” The trial court left no question as to what the final goal of this case was to be. The majority mechanically applies a general rule of law without looking at the facts and achieves an illogical, unsound result. At what point would respondent be able to appeal the permanency order? After the case is closed? Such a response is absurd, for once the case is closed there would be no reason for the entry of a permanency order. The cases relied upon by the majority as authority involved a separation of powers issue relating to a statutory enactment that did not involve dispositional orders. See In re A.M., 324 Ill. App. 3d 144 (2001) (and cases cited therein). These authorities are facially distinguishable from the facts and procedural posture of this appeal. There is no legal authority to support the majority’s decision that the trial court’s permanency order is not appealable when it was entered as part of a dispositional order. To the contrary, and as the majority admits, the law is clear that a dispositional order is generally final and appealable. See 349 Ill. App. 3d at 935. In addition, the time to appeal from such an order is within 30 days of the entry of the order. See In re C.S., 294 Ill. App. 3d 780, 786-87 (1998); see also 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1); 134 Ill. 2d R. 660(b). Thus, according to the majority, a permanency order within a dispositional order is part of a dispositional order but is not a dispositional order. The permanency order is nonfinal and nonappealable as part of the dispositional order, but it is appealable as an interlocutory order under Rule 306(a)(5). The majority has created a new hybrid of an appealable order that is partly appealable and partly nonappealable; that is partly nonappealable as part of a final order and partly appealable as interlocutory; that is partly nonappealable as a matter of right and partly appealable with leave of court. Applying this logic across the board to all nonfinal aspects of dispositional orders would create an unreasonable burden on parties and courts to decipher what is appealable, by right, by leave of court, or not at all. In this case, in order for the respondent to appeal from the entire dispositional order, the majority would require that she file a notice of appeal as to paragraphs a-I, 1-7, and 12-13 of the dispositional order and a separate petition for leave to appeal as to paragraphs I, j, and 11. Such a complex interpretation of the order appealed is the least desirable interpretation, if not the least likely to be correct. Occam’s razor, “Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate,” or “plurality should not be posited without necessity,” as applied here, suggests that a simpler model is more likely to be correct than a complex one. William of Occam, ca. 1285-1349. Occam’s razor is also called the principle of parsimony. Today, it is interpreted to mean, “the simpler the explanation, the better.” I agree with the majority when it states that one should look to the substance of the order rather than its form. The perverse hypothetical cited by the majority, involving a nonpunitive contempt order, actually would make the “final” dispositional order nonfinal and nonappealable until punishment was meted out or the court indicated of record that no punishment was to be imposed. Then the dispositional order that included the contempt order would be final and appealable. See In re Marriage of Metz, 233 Ill. App. 3d 50, 56 (1992). The contempt/dispositional order would not, as the majority contends, be final and appealable prior to a determination of the nature and extent of punishments. A more illuminating analogy would involve a judgment as to fewer than all parties or claims under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Were the majority’s logic applied to such an order, the order would remain nonappealable, even after a final and appealable judgment was entered. Unless the appellant renewed the request for a Rule 304(a) certification and the trial court granted the request, the order would remain nonfinal and nonappealable. The majority’s interpretation is clearly incorrect as applied to Rule 304(a) orders, and it should be. There is no reason for further delay or discretion in entertaining an appeal under such circumstances. See Kral v. Fredhill Press Co., 304 Ill. App. 3d 988, 994 (1999) (“Once the trial court enters a final judgment disposing of all of the issues as to all of the parties, the previously entertained and otherwise final, but not appealable, [Rule 304(a)] order becomes both final and appealable”). Likewise, there is no reason for further delay or discretion with a permanency order that is part of a dispositional order. The incorrect analogy aside, the substance of a permanency order is of the type that a juvenile court enters in a dispositional hearing. A permanency order is called a permanency order because it is usually the result of a permanency hearing, but its substance is little different from many of the findings and determinations made at a dispositional hearing. I submit that it is the majority that is applying form over substance. The majority’s logic, when applied to other nonfinal aspects of dispositional orders, T /ill create havoc with appellate jurisdiction and review of dispositional orders. I would determine that we have jurisdiction to review the entire dispositional order, including the permanency order. The majority’s vision of jurisdiction is too cramped and myopic. As a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed, the failure to specify an order in a notice of appeal does not preclude this court’s review of that order “ ‘so long as the order that is specified directly relates bach to the judgment or order from which review is sought.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) In re F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d 55, 68 (2004), quoting Perry v. Minor, 319 Ill. App. 3d 703, 709 (2001). It is appropriate to retain our jurisdiction to review an unspecified judgment if that judgment is a step in the procedural progression leading to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal. F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 69. I consider this interpretation of jurisdiction to be simpler and more appropriate. Clearly, in this case, the permanency order should be reviewable as part of the dispositional order because, not only is it a step in the procedural progression leading to the dispositional order, it is part of the dispositional order. I would determine that the trial court was correct in making the determination as to permanency, based upon respondent’s statements indicating that she had no intention of complying with any of the other nonfinal aspects of the dispositional order. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the permanency order at this stage of the proceedings.