Court Opinion

ID: 9467592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:52:12.259522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:25.479968
License: Public Domain

CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Petitioner Hooper did not object at trial to the jury instructions allocating to him the burden of proving the affirmative defense of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Since he failed to comply with Rule 30 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires a contemporaneous objection in order to preserve the issue for appeal, his threshold task is to satisfy the “cause” and “prejudice” standards of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). See Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1980). The en banc decision of this court in Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1980) holds that, in situations such as this, the absence of any colorable reason for raising an objection will constitute “cause”, and “prejudice” is presumed when the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant when he has produced sufficient evidence to raise the defense of self-defense. As the majority notes, the evidence adduced by Hooper to corroborate his claim of self-defense was grossly inadequate. That failure to present sufficient evidence on the issue of self-defense precludes consideration of petitioner’s claim.
Even if Hooper were able to satisfy the Wainwright criteria, the substance of his due process claim is without merit. Petitioner claims that it was a denial of due process for the state to compel him to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The underpinning of this contention is the assertion that the defense of self-defense negates the element of malice. On the one hand, the state was forced to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was committed purposely and with malice in order to convict. On the other hand, petitioner claims that he was forced to rebut the element of malice by proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence in order to gain an acquittal on the theory of self-defense. Petitioner argues this constitutes impermissible burden shifting under Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). I would reject this claim on the merits and affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief based upon the reasoning of my opinion for the court in Carter v. Jago, 637 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980). The thrust of Carter is that due process of law does not preclude a state, once having proved the fundamental elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, from then placing the burden of proving an affirmative defense on the accused. In this setting, an instruction shifting the burden of proof does not remove from the prosecution the full burden resting upon it under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), but simply reflects a legislative evaluation of a party’s superior access to the proof.