Court Opinion

ID: 9571563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:40.378782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:35.261323
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I would affirm the armed robbery conviction, with modification; but, I would reverse the kidnapping conviction for the reason it is in violation of 21 O.S.1971, § 11, under the circumstances of these appeals. I believe further that the two charges should have been filed as separate counts in one information under the provisions of 22 O.S.1971, § 404, because they arose out of a single transaction. I offer the same objections to this decision that I offered in Kupiec v. State, Okl.Cr., 493 P.2d 444 (1972). I agree that the statute is permissive, as argued by my colleague; and I agree that the crimes of rape and *1309armed robbery are separate and distinct offenses, but under the circumstances of these appeals insofar as they arose out of a single transaction they should have been tried at one time as separate counts.
It is expected that this Court will provide some guidance in the proper administration of criminal justice, but so long as we continue to allow the stacking of offenses — as was done in these cases — we are failing to provide that expected guidance. Instead, we are permitting the district attorneys to tell the courts how they will prosecute offenses, regardless of the circumstances involved. As I stated in Ku-piec, supra, for the very same reason this Court is justified in consolidating these appeals into one decision, the district attorney should have been required to have consolidated them under separate counts in one information.
In most instances wherein the Public Defender lodges the appeal, as in these two appeals, the record is prepared at state expense. We are informed by the Court Administrator that those costs continue to mount. See this Court’s decision in Morgan v. Graham, Okl.Cr., 497 P.2d 464 (1972), footnote one, for a statement of costs paid by the state for transcripts of trials. Consequently, disregarding entirely the long standing legal authority for not permitting the prosecutors to carve out numerous charges from one set of circumstances, the economic facts seem to me to justify a reimposing of the requirements authorizing consolidation of offenses, when the same testimony will support both charges. See: Estep v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 103, 143 P. 64 (1914).
Therefore, I concur in that part of this decision which affirms the conviction for armed robbery; but, I respectfully dissent to that part of this decision which affirms the kidnapping conviction, as being in violation of the double jeopardy provisions of the Constitution.