Court Opinion

ID: 9660039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:01:58.104076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:14.144848
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
For the first time on motion for rehearing and in the face of a plainly irreconcilable position on original submission, the appellee now urges that the evidence authorized the trial court to find, and that the trial court impliedly found, that the negligent acts which caused plaintiff’s damage were attributable to Jetton or Meador, and not to Harris; and that plaintiff thus established, in virtue of such finding, a cause of action against the resident defendants which would authorize the maintenance of venue in Jackson County against Harris — the existence of a cause of action against Harris béing immaterial as a venue fact since he was properly joined with the resident defendants.
Appellee’s position on original submission is-fairly reflected by the Conclusion to his supplemental brief, which is as follows:
Conclusion.
“In the case at bar. it has been. clearly established that the holes in the casing were not plugged by the welders, that gravel got into the well? through the holes in the casing, and that the well .was ruined as a result of the gravql-getting inside the casing. In other words, there is no question but that damage to the plaintiff had been established and that the damage was the proximate result of negligence on the part- of one or more of the welders. The policy .of the law is to permit a recovery by plaintiff against defendants in such a situation where it is impossible for the plaintiff to ascertain which defendant has caused the, injury, where the defendants, under the circumstances, were bound to have been acting jointly and in concert. Consequently, plaintiff has established a cause of action against *243Harris, E. W. Meador, Jr. and Lathy Jetton, and the liability of each is joint and several; we, therefore, have a cause of action established against E. W. Meador, Jr. and Lathy Jetton, both of whom were shown to be residents of Jackson County, and venue properly lies in that county as against Appellant Harris.” (Emphasis supplied.)
There was nothing more plain in appellee’s presentation of his case on original submission than that he took the position that the absence of facts at his command made it impossible that the identity of the actual wrongdoer be ascertained. Whether this was motivated by the desire for a joint and several judgment against all defendants i,s neither material nor for us to say. -However, in view of the fact that plaintiff cited and quoted from Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Nall, 178 Ky. 33, 198 S.W. 745, in his supplemental brief on original submission — a case which might have supported the contention he now makes for the first time on motion for rehearing — we were doubly careful to make sure that appellee did not even contend the record contained facts from which the trial court would be authorized to conclude that the party, or parties, responsible for the negligence complained of was cine, or both, of the active resident defendants.
In view of the foregoing, we think ap-pellee ought not to be permitted at this date to urge on us for the first time, and wholly contrary to his position on original submission the point which he now seeks to make. We, therefore, decline to consider it.
The occasion of our .writing on rehearing at all is to forestall our opinion being construed at a trial on the merits as foreclosing the possibility of Cleveland establishing a cause-of action either as against the resident defendants on the. one hand or the nonresident defendant on the other. The majority opinion in Louisville Gas &.Electric Co. v. Nall would indicate that were each of the welders to deny his own responsibility, the jury could accept the testimony of one or more as credible and discredit the testimony of the others, one or both, so as to fasten responsibility where in the opinion of the jury it properly belonged. The dissenting opinion holds the direct opposite. We express no opinion one way or the other on the point, or on any point of estoppel by prior conduct in the proceedings involving the plea of privilege which might arise at a trial on the merits.
The case of Blum Milling Company v. Moore-Seaver Grain Co., Tex.Com.App., 277 S.W. 78, urged on original submission and re-urged on motion for rehearing as supporting the legal position taken by ap-pellee as set out in the quoted Conclusion from his supplemental bri'ef, .-was carefully considered by us on original submission. Rightly understood and interpreted, we do not think it supports ap-pellee’s stated position.
Motion refused.
CODY, J., not sitting.