Court Opinion

ID: 9715171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:56:42.946802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:32.203309
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE MORAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the judgment that allows the State to appeal a pretrial suppression order; however, I dissent from the procedure adopted in accomplishing this result. By today’s ruling, the State, in its sole discretion and as a matter of right, will be allowed to appeal any pretrial suppression order whenever the prosecutor certifies to the trial court that such order substantially impairs the State’s ability to further prosecute its case. In doing so, the court has intentionally and expressly refused to adopt any objective standard or define the term “substantial impairment.” Instead, the majority relies upon (1) the good-faith evaluation of the prosecutor and (2) the State’s need to allocate its heavily taxed resources as the only deterrent against possible abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor. Contrary to the beliefs and assumptions expressed in the opinion that only a minimal number of appeals by certification will be forthcoming, I foresee an upsurge in frivolous appeals being added to the voluminous case load presently pending in each district of the appellate court. To guard against the possibility of any abuse of discretion on the part of the State, I would propose that the prosecutor petition the appellate court for leave to appeal in the same manner employed under Rule 306 in civil cases. This procedure would require the State to divulge the reason or reasons as to why the suppression order substantially impairs its ability to proceed in prosecution of a case. Petitions under Rule 306 are promptly acted upon by the appellate court. In those instances where the State is unable to establish that the suppression order creates a substantial impairment, the petition would be denied and trial of the case thereby hastened.