Court Opinion

ID: 9408772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 16:09:12.114177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:46.454809
License: Public Domain

J-A03016-23

                                   2023 PA Super 124

    ROBERT CAMPBELL                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JIAN TANG                                  :   No. 1006 EDA 2022

                Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 10, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
                       Civil Division at No(s): 2018-005782

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.:                                  FILED JULY 13, 2023

        Robert Campbell (“Campbell”) appeals from the judgment entered in

favor of Jian Tang (“Tang”). We affirm.

        The relevant factual and procedural history can be summarized as

follows. In May 2016, Campbell met Tang on Match.com, a dating website on

which Campbell represented his relationship status as “divorced.” Campbell

and Tang began dating and moved in together a few months later. In March

2017, Campbell proposed to Tang and presented her with a diamond

engagement ring along with a matching diamond pendant necklace and

matching diamond earrings.          Tang accepted Campbell’s proposal and took

possession of the ring, necklace, and earrings.

        The couple set a wedding date for May 12, 2018. Campbell requested

that Tang sign a prenuptial agreement, and she eventually retained counsel

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*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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to assist her with negotiations regarding the prenuptial agreement.

Approximately one week before the wedding date, Tang’s counsel discovered

that Campbell had never divorced his wife and was still legally married. As

Campbell was unable to legally marry Tang, she ended the engagement and

left the couple’s shared residence without returning the ring, necklace, and

earrings.

      In July 2018, Campbell sued Tang for replevin, unjust enrichment, and

conversion, seeking return of the ring, necklace, and earrings.          Tang

counterclaimed, asserting fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion.       The

matter proceeded to a non-jury bifurcated trial, during which Campbell

acknowledged that he falsely represented that he was divorced on his

Match.com profile, and admitted that he did not tell Tang that he was still

married because “it was a personal thing” and he “didn’t think it was that

important . . ..” N.T., 6/17/21, at 41, 53. Campbell explained that, although

his wife, Deborah, had initiated divorce proceedings years earlier, they

refrained from finalizing their divorce so that Deborah could continue to

receive his healthcare benefits and he could claim additional tax deductions.

See id. at 36. Campbell admitted that he did not tell Tang that he was still

married before he proposed to her. Id. at 57. Campbell further admitted that

at the time he proposed to Tang, and throughout the entirety of their

engagement, he was legally married to Deborah and could not apply for a

marriage license to marry Tang because he did not have a final divorce decree.

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See id. at 216. Tang testified that she did not find out that Campbell was still

married until her counsel discovered this fact approximately one week before

their planned wedding date. See N.T., 8/12/21, at 84. At the conclusion of

the non-jury trial, the court took the matter under submission and permitted

the filing of post-trial briefs. On December 22, 2021, the trial court entered

a decision in favor of Tang on all counts asserted in Campbell’s complaint, and

in favor of Campbell on all counts asserted in Tang’s counterclaim. Campbell

filed a post-trial motion for reconsideration and for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict. On February 22, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying

the motion. Campbell thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal.1 Tang did not

file a cross-appeal. Both Campbell and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

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1 Campbell purported to appeal from the trial court’s order denying his post-
trial motion. However, an order denying post-trial relief is a non-appealable,
interlocutory order. See Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Const.
Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 514 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (reiterating that an
appeal to this Court can only lie from a judgment entered subsequent to the
trial court’s disposition of any post-verdict motions, not from the order
denying post-trial motions); see also Pa.R.A.P. 301(a) (providing that no
order of court shall be appealable until it has been entered upon the
appropriate trial court docket). As the trial court had not entered judgment
in the case, this Court directed Campbell to file a praecipe for entry of
judgment. Campbell complied with this Court’s directive, and the trial court
thereafter entered judgment in the matter on June 10, 2022. Accordingly, we
deem Campbell’s appeal to be taken from the entry of judgment and have
corrected the caption accordingly. See Johnston the Florist, 657 A.2d at
513 (holding that “even though the appeal was filed prior to the entry of
judgment, it is clear that jurisdiction in appellate courts may be perfected after
an appeal notice has been filed upon the docketing of a final judgment”).

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       Campbell raises the following issue for our review: “The trial court erred

as a matter of law in the trial and decision to render a verdict in favor of [Tang]

against [Campbell].” Campbell’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and

internal quotation marks omitted).2

       When reviewing equitable decrees, our scope of review and standard of

review are deferential, but our deference has limits. This Court has explained:

             In equity matters, appellate review is based on a
       determination by the appellate court of such questions as whether
       (1) sufficient evidence supports the findings of the judge; (2) the
       factual inferences and legal conclusions based on those findings
       are correct; [and] (3) there has been an abuse of discretion or an
       error of law. Generally, in an appeal from a trial court sitting in
       equity, the standard of review is rigorous. The function of this
       Court on an appeal from an adjudication in equity is not to
       substitute its view for that of the lower tribunal; our task is rather
       to determine whether a judicial mind, on due consideration of all
       the evidence, as a whole, could reasonably have reached the
       conclusion of that tribunal.

Omicron Sys., Inc. v. Weiner, 860 A.2d 554, 557-58 (Pa. Super. 2004).3

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2We note with disapproval Campbell’s vague statement of questions involved,
which violates Pa.R.A.P. 2116. We point out that “[n]o question will be
considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly
suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). This Court may quash or dismiss an
appeal if the appellant fails to conform to the requirements set forth in the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. However,
while Campbell’s statement of the questions involved is overly broad, we
decline to find waiver because appellate review is not hampered, and we are
able to discern Campbell’s issues from the argument section of his brief.

3 As explained above, Campbell pleaded causes of action for replevin, unjust
enrichment, and conversion in his complaint. However, in his court-ordered
Rule 1925(b) concise statement, Campbell did not raise any claim regarding
the denial of relief under those causes of action, and instead asserted that he
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Pennsylvania courts have long ruled that an engagement ring or other

gift given in contemplation of marriage is a conditional gift which does not

vest in the donee until the contemplated marriage occurs and must be

returned to the donor if either party breaks the engagement. See Lindh v.

Surman, 742 A.2d 643, 644 (Pa. 1999) (requiring the donee to return the

engagement ring given to her by the donor after the donor broke the

engagement); see also Nicholson v. Johnston, 855 A.2d 97, 102 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (affirming the trial court’s directive that, after the engagement

was broken, the donee was required to return monies extended by the donor

to be used as a down payment for the purchase of a house to be inhabited by

the parties after their contemplated marriage). As our High Court explained:

              A gift given by a [donor] to a [donee] on condition that [the
       donee] embark on the sea of matrimony with [the donor] is no
       different from a gift based on the condition that the donee sail on
       any other sea. If, after receiving the provisional gift, the donee
       refuses to leave the harbor, -- if the anchor of contractual
       performance sticks in the sands of irresolution and procrastination
       -- the gift must be restored to the donor.

Lindh, 742 A.2d at 644 (quoting Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 136 A.2d 127,

130 (Pa. 1957)).

____________________________________________

is entitled to the return of the ring, necklace, and earrings pursuant to
established Pennsylvania case law regarding engagement gifts. See Concise
Statement, 3/31/22, at 2-4. Thus, any claim regarding the specific causes of
action pleaded in the complaint are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)
(providing that issues not included in the concise statement are waived); see
also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

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       Notwithstanding this well-established tenet of Pennsylvania legal

jurisprudence, we must determine whether the rule applies when the donor of

an engagement ring or other gift given in contemplation of marriage lacks the

capacity to contract to marry at the time of the proposal and all times during

the purported engagement. In other words, does the rule presuppose that

that the donor has the capacity to enter marriage at the time of the proposal

and all times during the purported engagement.

       In this Commonwealth, marriage is regarded as a civil contract made

between parties with the capacity to contract. See Lampus v. Lampus, 660

A.2d 1308, 1311 (Pa. 1995).4 Both parties entering into a marriage must

have the legal capacity to marry, and if either party is already married, any

attempted subsequent marriage is absolutely void. See Watt Estate, 185

A.2d 781, 785-86 (Pa. 1962) (holding that, because the decedent did not

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4 Historically, Pennsylvania has recognized two types of marriage: ceremonial
and common law. See In re Estate of Carter, 159 A.3d 970, 974 (Pa. Super.
2017). However, the Pennsylvania legislature abolished the doctrine of
common law marriage effective January 1, 2005. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103.
Notwithstanding, section 1103 of the Marriage Law permits the legal
recognition of common law marriages contracted before January 1, 2005. See
id. While we recognize that some of the cases cited herein involve common
law marriages, our jurisprudence makes clear that the capacity to contract to
a marriage is an essential prerequisite to all marriages, whether ceremonial
or common law. See, e.g., Lampus, 660 A.2d at 1311 (holding that capacity
to marry is essential for a ceremonial marriage); Rosenberger Estate, 65
A.2d 377, 380 (Pa. 1949) (holding that capacity to marry is essential for a
common law marriage).

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obtain a valid divorce decree from his prior wife, he lacked the legal capacity

to remarry another and, hence, the subsequent marriage was deemed void);

see also Lampus, 660 A.2d at 1311 (holding that an individual whose

previous ceremonial marriage has not been dissolved is incapable of

contracting to marry another); Rosenberger Estate, 65 A.2d at 380 (holding

that, because the decedent was still married to his common law wife, he “was,

therefore, legally incapable of contracting another valid [common law]

marriage,” which was deemed a nullity); Sharpe v. Fed. Window & Office

Cleaning Co., 19 A.2d 509, 514 (Pa. Super. 1941) (holding that one who is

married cannot lawfully marry again unless the marriage has been dissolved

by absolute divorce or by death, and if a second marriage is entered into, it is

void ab initio).

      Campbell concedes that he was legally married to Deborah at the time

he proposed to Tang and throughout the entirety of their engagement. See

Campbell’s Brief at 6, 8, 11. However, Campbell maintains that his continued

marriage to Deborah was “a matter of economic viability so that [she] would

be able to maintain an affordable lifestyle.” Id. at 11. Campbell claims that

he presented evidence to the trial court that he made a “serious and good

faith effort . . . to complete his promise to marry . . . Tang,” including retaining

legal counsel and expending legal costs to prepare and revise pre-nuptial

agreements.        Id.   According to Campbell, Tang’s sincerity regarding the

marriage should be questioned because she failed to execute any of the

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prenuptial agreements that he presented for her to sign.            Campbell

additionally claims that Tang was aware of his marital status by May 9, 2018,

which was three days before their planned wedding date. See id. at 13-14.

       Campbell urges this Court to rely on a 1969 Duquesne University Law

Review article5 which considered a ruling made by a New York trial court in

Lowe v. Quinn, 301 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1st Dep’t 1969). In Lowe, the donor was

married to another woman when he proposed to the donee and presented her

with an engagement ring. The donee was aware that the donor was married.

Nevertheless, the donee accepted the engagement ring and thirty days later

she ended the engagement and refused to return the ring. The donor then

filed an action to recover the engagement ring. The trial court ruled that the

donee must return the ring. See id. On appeal, the intermediate appellate

court reversed and ruled that the contract to marry was completely void

because the donor was already married at the time of the proposal, and the

fact that he contemplated getting a divorce did not validate the agreement to

marry. See Lowe v. Quinn, 301 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (App. Div. 1969) (holding

that the married donor’s gift of the engagement ring was unconditional and

absolute).    On further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed,

concluding that, because the donor was married at the time of the proposal,

the engagement to marry was void as against public policy, and the donor was

____________________________________________

5 See 8 Duq. L. Rev. 185 (1969) (William C. Costopoulos, Domestic Relations
- Gifts in Contemplation of Marriage).

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not entitled to recover the engagement ring. See Lowe v. Quinn, 267 N.E.2d

251, 252 (N.Y. 1971).

       The Duquesne University Law Review article, which was written without

the benefit of the New York Court of Appeals decision, posited that, if the same

case should arise in Pennsylvania, a court should deem the donor’s marital

status at the time of the proposal as irrelevant and immaterial and permit

recovery of the engagement ring by the donor in the event that the

engagement is broken.         Campbell suggests that we should not follow the

reasoning of the New York intermediate appellate court in Lowe. Instead,

Campbell urges this Court to adopt the rationale espoused by the trial court

in Lowe, as advocated by the author of the Duquesne University Law Review

article.6   Campbell thus contends that this Court should deem his marital

status as immaterial and irrelevant, and apply established Pennsylvania law

regarding engagement gifts to require Tang to return the ring, necklace, and

earrings to him.7

____________________________________________

6 Initially, we observe that this Court is not bound by commentary set forth in
law review articles. Nor is this Court bound to follow a trial court opinion, let
alone one from another jurisdiction which has been reversed on appeal.
Finally, we point out that Lowe is factually distinguishable from the instant
matter, as the donee in Lowe was, at all times, aware that the donor was
married.

7 Campbell also argues that the Heart Balm Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 1902,
precludes Tang’s recovery in her counterclaims. However, the trial court
found in favor of Campbell on all of Tang’s counterclaims, and she did not
appeal that ruling. Thus, her counterclaims are not at issue in this appeal.

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      The trial court considered Campbell’s issue and concluded that it lacked

merit. The court reasoned:

              The crucial distinction between well-settled Pennsylvania
      law and this current matter is the impediment of [Campbell’s]
      existing marriage at the time that the engagement occurred. This
      still existing legal marriage is a fact that did not exist in the relied-
      on Pennsylvania case law involving the return of engagement
      gifts. . . .

            Here, the existence of [Campbell’s] marriage was still legally
      recognized because a final divorce decree was intentionally left
      unsigned. . . . [Campbell] did not take the steps necessary to
      remove this impediment at any time, despite his knowledge that
      he could not actually get a marriage license until he had a finalized
      divorce decree. Throughout the duration of the relationship, at
      the time of the engagement, or during the entirety of the
      engagement, [Campbell] was never able to become married to
      [Tang].

            The lack of a finalized divorce decree was a legal
      impediment to the contract to marry from its inception, therefore
      making the intended contract to marry void. Since the contract to
      marry was incapable of ever being fulfilled, the Pennsylvania law
      put forth by [Campbell] is inapplicable to this case . . ..
      [T]herefore[,] any gifts provided by [Campbell] to [Tang] would
      be gratuitous in nature and are not considered as gifts in
      contemplation of marriage.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/27/22, at 8-9.

      Based on our review, we conclude that the findings of the trial court are

supported by competent evidence and the trial court committed no error in

any application of the law. Here, there is no dispute that Campbell was legally

married to Deborah when he proposed to Tang and presented her with the

ring, necklace, and earrings. There is also no dispute that, due to his existing

marriage to Deborah, Campbell lacked to capacity to marry Tang at the time

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of the proposal and at all times during their engagement. See Lampus, 660

A.2d at 1311; see also Rosenberger, 65 A.2d at 380; Sharpe, 19 A.2d at

514.

       In   light   of   our   established   jurisprudence   regarding   Campbell’s

impediment to marry Tang, it follows that he also lacked the capacity to

propose an agreement to marry her. While no Pennsylvania appellate court

has considered this precise issue, we believe that such a determination is a

logical extension of existing Pennsylvania case law regarding the incapacity of

an individual to contract to marry another when his or her prior marriage has

not been dissolved by an absolute divorce or by the death of his or her spouse.

Accordingly, we hold that an individual whose previous marriage has not been

dissolved by absolute divorce or by death is incapable of proposing a contract

to marry another, and if such a proposal is made by the married individual,

the purported engagement is void ab initio, and any gift given in

contemplation of the purported engagement constitutes an unconditional gift.

       Having concluded that Campbell’s marriage proposal to Tang, which was

made while he was legally married to Deborah, was void ab initio, Campbell’s

gifts of the ring, necklace, and earrings were not conditioned on the act of

marriage and therefore constitute unconditional gifts that Tang is not required

to return. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of Tang.

       Judgment affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/13/2023

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