Court Opinion

ID: 9797448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:21:06.662409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:55:37.307063
License: Public Domain

Judge TAUBMAN
dissenting.
Because I would decline to follow Horrell v. City of Aurora, 916 P.2d 8315 (Colo.App.1998) and because I find City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509 (Colo.1996) to be distinguishable, I respectfully dissent.
I. Statutory Interpretation
As the majority acknowledges, the supreme court has definitively held that the waiver provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA), § 24-10-101, et seq., C.R.S.1999, must be deferentially construed in favor of victims injured as a result of the negligence of a governmental entity. Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.8d 1082 (Colo.2000).
Thus, to the extent that the issue on the merits here presents a close question, the governing standard of review militates in favor of construing the GIA here so as to hold that defendant, Ute Water Conservancy District (Ute), is not immune from lability.
IL - Immunity
I agree with plaintiff's contention that Ute is not immune from liability under the GIA.
Section 24-10-106(1)(f), C.R.S.1999 provides that a public entity's sovereign immunity is waived in an action for injuries resulting from:
The operation and maintenance of any public water facility ... by such public entity.
With regard to liability in water meter pit cases, the supreme court in Gallegos set out two requirements for determining whether a public entity waives its immunity under § 24-10-106(1)(f£).
First, a reviewing court must determine whether the water meter pit is a public facility. City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, supra. To constitute a public facility, the water meter pit must be "for the benefit of the public." City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, supra, 916 P.2d at 511.
Second, a court must determine whether the public entity operates and maintains the water meter pit.
In determining the meaning of the GIA, we must presume that, in enacting it, the General Assembly intended a just and reasonable result. Burnworth v. Adams County, 826 P.2d 368 (Colo.App.1991)
With regard to the first requirement, I agree with Judge Jones' dissent in Horrell that a publicly owned water meter pit exists "for the benefit of the public." Unlike in Gallegos, the water meter pit here benefited the public because, although it served water only to the private property owned by Frank and Charlene Jones, it was owned, operated, and maintained by Ute for the benefit of the public, not just for the landowners.
In my view, all parts of a public water facility owned, operated, and maintained by a governmental entity must be considered to exist "for the benefit of the public." Otherwise, such facilities will argue successfully that significant components of the facilities are immune from liability. Thus, for example, a person injured by a negligently installed water pipe would be met with the argument that the water pipe existed for the benefit of a particular resident and, thus, was not part of a public water facility.
In my view, the water meter pit here, as the one in Horrell, is more closely analogous to the storm drain in Burnworth v. Adams County, supra. There, a division of this court concluded that a storm drain located on private property, but operated and maintained by the public entity, was a "sanitation facility" under § 24-10-106(1)(f), C.R.S.1999, and that, thus, the government had waived its immunity. The court in Gallegos distinguished the water meter pit there from the storm drain in Burnworth, stating that be*191cause the water meter pit was only for the benefit of the land on which it was located, and the storm drain benefited the general public, Burnworth was not persuasive. However, as noted above, I find such postulated distinetion as lacking a substantive basis.
Instead, I agree with Judge Jones' dissent in Horrell that a water meter pit owned, operated, and maintained by a governmental entity, as the one here, is analogous to the storm drain in Burnworth because it allows the county to maintain its water allocation to county residents and ensures that the landowners are properly charged for the water used. In addition, here, the water meter pit monitors water usage from public water pipes and is operated and maintained by the public entity. Therefore, in my view, the water meter pit is a public water facility under § 24-10-106(1)(f).
I disagree with the majority that the court in Gallegos looked only at whether the water meter pit provided a public benefit in determining whether it was a public water facility. To the contrary, a key factor in Gallegos was that the landowner owned, maintained, and operated it.
As the majority points out, the Gallegos court noted that ownership of the water meter pit is not dispositive. However, in my view, this observation by the Gallegos court should not be relied on to conclude that a water district is protected by governmental immunity regardless of who owns the water meter pit. Rather, the Gallegos court stated that "ownership is not dispositive" because "the GIA only requires that a governmental entity be engaged in the operation and maintenance of a public water facility in order for immunity to be waived." City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, supra, 916 P.2d at 512 (emphasis added).
The court also pointed out that "the legislature intended for governmental entities to be liable only when they both operate and maintain a public water facility." City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, supra, 916 P.2d at 512 (emphasis added). Thus, it held that, although the Denver Water Department operated the water meter pits in question there, it was not liable because the landowners maintained them.
Here, it is undisputed that Ute owns, maintains, and operates the pit in question. It does so for the benefit of the public, not just for the landowners. Accordingly, in my view, the water meter pit in question is a public water facility, and Ute waived its governmental immunity because it operates and maintains the water meter pit in question. See § 24-10-106(1)(f); City & County of Denver v. Gallegos, supra.
In addition, I believe the majority opinion leads to an unintended unreasonable result.
I recognize that the intent of the GIA was to limit governmental agencies' lability for tortious conduct and, as the majority opinion states, that the General Assembly in drafting the GIA acknowledged that in some instances it may be an inequitable doctrine. See § 24-10-102, C.R.8.1999. However, as the court in Burnworth recognized, if the General Assembly had intended to eliminate liability where governmental agencies operate and maintain "public water facilities," it would have done so specifically. Instead, the General Assembly did just the opposite and created a specific waiver of immunity in circumstances where governmental agencies operate and maintain "public water facilities." In my view, this includes a water meter pit located on private property, at least one, as here, operated and maintained by a public water facility.
Further, I do not believe that the General Assembly intended to deny a legal remedy to injured plaintiffs in litigation against both a governmental entity and private landowners.
In deBoer v. Jones, 996 P.2d 754 (Colo.App.2000), a division of this court, of which I was a member, held that plaintiff could not proceed against the landowners because the water meter pit was owned, operated, and maintained by Ute. However, the majority here concludes that plaintiff may not proceed against Ute because the very same water meter pit is operated for the benefit of the very same landowners. Consequently, the result here is inconsistent with the principle that the General Assembly intends to avoid unjust results. See Burnworth v. Adams County, supra.
*192The previous disposition in deBoer v. Jones, supra, together with the majority's opinion here, will send 'people running to the dictionary to gain a complete understanding of the phrase damnum absque injuria. That phrase, which means "harm for which there is no legal remedy," is well illustrated by the cireumstances presented here. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.