Court Opinion

ID: 9400078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 15:00:49.61193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.041602
License: Public Domain

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                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-12727
                           ____________________

        THOMAS DALE FERGUSON,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF
        CORRECTIONS,
        ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,

                                                  Respondents-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cv-00138-CLS-JEO
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  20-12727

                             ____________________

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        WILSON, Circuit Judge:
                 Thomas Dale Ferguson is an Alabama prisoner serving a
        death sentence following his jury convictions on four counts of cap-
        ital murder. After pursuing a direct appeal and post-conviction re-
        lief in the Alabama state courts, Ferguson filed a federal habeas pe-
        tition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Ferguson appeals the district court’s
        denial of his federal habeas petition, arguing that the district court
        did not apply the proper standard for intellectual disability as re-
        quired by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and erred in finding
        Ferguson was not intellectually disabled. Ferguson also contends
        that the state court’s determination that Ferguson’s counsel was
        not ineffective during the pretrial and penalty phases was an unrea-
        sonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984).
        After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we af-
        firm.
                              I.     BACKGROUND
                                      A. Guilt Phase
               In 1997, an Alabama grand jury indicted Ferguson on four
        counts of capital murder in connection with the murder of Harold
        Pugh and his eleven-year-old son, Joey Pugh. Ferguson v. State, 814
        So. 2d 925, 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (Ferguson I). The murder of
        the Pughs constituted four capital counts because the killings were
        committed during a robbery in the first degree (two counts); the
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        20-12727               Opinion of the Court                         3

        killings involved the murder of two or more persons by one
        scheme or course of conduct; and Joey was less than fourteen years
        old at the time of his death. See Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(2), (10),
        (15) (1975).
                On July 26, 1997, Ferguson and his four codefendants—Mark
        Moore, Michael Craig Maxwell, Donald Risley, and Kino Gra-
        ham—robbed a bank in Mississippi. Ferguson I, 814 So. 2d at 934.
        Prior to robbing the bank, they went looking for a getaway vehicle
        at a local boat landing. Id. at 935. Ultimately, they decided to steal
        a truck belonging to Harold Pugh. Id. As Harold and Joey arrived
        at the boat landing, Maxwell ordered the Pughs back onto their
        boat. Id. After getting on the boat and heading downstream, Fer-
        guson shot Harold and Maxwell shot Joey. Id. at 937. The jury
        found Ferguson guilty on all four counts of capital murder. Id. at
        933.
                                 B. Sentencing
               During the sentencing phase, Ferguson called Dr. James
        Chudy, a clinical psychologist who had evaluated Ferguson for the
        sentencing phase. Dr. Chudy testified that Ferguson was not intel-
        lectually disabled but that Ferguson’s IQ was likely in the border-
        line range. Id. at 962. Further, Dr. Chudy testified that
              this borderline intelligence could possibly impair Fer-
              guson’s “reasoning in social situations”; that it could
              aﬀect his ability to “reason abstractly”; and that it
              could “diminish to a degree” his ability to appreciate
              the consequences of his actions. In addition, Dr.
              Chudy diagnosed Ferguson as having a “personality
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 20-12727

               disorder” with borderline features. Dr. Chudy stated
               that this disorder could result in mood swings that
               could aﬀect Ferguson’s relationships. Dr. Chudy also
               stated that Ferguson may have some “transient or
               brief ” psychotic periods where he is “out of touch
               with reality.” However, in his written report, Dr.
               Chudy stated that Ferguson’s claims of psychotic epi-
               sodes—i.e., hearing voices that told him to do things
               to other people and having hallucinations of people
               and objects moving—were “diﬃcult to substantiate”
               and that the accuracy of those claims “remains in
               question.” Dr. Chudy also stated in his report that
               there were “no signs of disturbance in [Ferguson’s]
               thinking”; that Ferguson was not psychotic; and that
               Ferguson’s thinking was merely “illogical.”

        Id. at 962–63.
               Ferguson also called his wife, Karen Ferguson. She testified
        that they were married in November 1992, that Ferguson had a job
        most of the time they were married, and that Ferguson was not
        violent. Karen also testified that Ferguson was mentally slow, and
        that she made all the decisions in their marriage, often telling Fer-
        guson what to do.
                On rebuttal, Alabama called Dr. Stephen Rosen, a clinical
        psychologist, who examined Ferguson before trial pursuant to a
        court order. Dr. Rosen testiﬁed that Ferguson was not intellectu-
        ally disabled despite his IQ score of 69, but Ferguson’s IQ was likely
        in the borderline range. Id. at 963. Further, Dr. Rosen testiﬁed that
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        20-12727              Opinion of the Court                        5

              Ferguson ﬁrst told him that he did not do it and then
              said that he was an unwilling participant; by the end
              of the evaluation, however, Ferguson was claiming
              that voices had told him to commit the crime. Dr.
              Rosen stated that during the evaluation Ferguson at-
              tempted to give him “the impression that he was
              more disturbed than in fact he was” by exaggerating
              and claiming symptoms he believed to be signs of a
              mental disorder—speciﬁcally, by claiming that he
              heard voices and saw “little green men [who] were
              laughing and telling him to do things.” Dr. Rosen,
              like Dr. Chudy, also diagnosed Ferguson as having a
              personality disorder and stated that the disorder could
              result in mood swings, antisocial traits, and perhaps
              some transient or temporary episodes where Fergu-
              son is “out of touch with reality.”
        Id.
               Alabama argued the existence of one aggravating circum-
        stance: the capital oﬀense (murders) was committed during a rob-
        bery. Ferguson argued the existence of ﬁve mitigating circum-
        stances, including his character. Ferguson presented evidence of
        his character—his school records, his relationship with his father
        (who was actually his stepfather), and his low IQ. After hearing all
        the testimony and considering the evidence, the jury
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                       20-12727

        recommended, 11 to 1, a sentence of life in prison without the pos-
        sibility of parole.1
                At sentencing, the trial judge found one statutory aggravat-
        ing circumstance: the murders were committed while Ferguson
        was engaged in a robbery. The trial judge found one statutory mit-
        igating circumstance: Ferguson had no signiﬁcant history of prior
        criminal activity. The trial judge did ﬁnd the following evidence to
        be mitigating: (1) Ferguson’s surrender and confession to authori-
        ties, and (2) the jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment. Yet
        when discussing the jury recommendation, the trial court found
        that Ferguson’s age at the time of the crime (24) was not a mitigat-
        ing circumstance.
              Ultimately, the trial court overruled the jury’s vote and sen-
        tenced Ferguson to death. The trial judge explained:
                The Court does ﬁnd that there is a reasonable basis
                for enhancing the jury’s recommendation of life im-
                prisonment without parole for the reasons stated
                herein, and this was a murder of a[n] adult man and
                his young son during a robbery, and [Ferguson] had
                the opportunity to reﬂect and withdraw from his ac-
                tions and chose not to do so; that [Ferguson’s]

        1 In a capital case, Alabama now requires that the jury’s sentencing verdict
        binds the trial court and is no longer a recommendation to be overridden by
        the judge. Ala. Code § 13A-5-47(a) (“Where the jury has returned a verdict of
        death, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. Where a sentence of
        death is not returned by the jury, the court shall sentence the defendant to life
        imprisonment without parole.”).
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        20-12727               Opinion of the Court                         7

               capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
               or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
               law was not substantially impaired.

               Ferguson appealed, and relevant to this appeal, he argued
        that the trial court erred in not ﬁnding as a nonstatutory mitigating
        circumstance that he was intellectually disabled. Ferguson I, 814 So.
        2d at 965. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) noted
        that “the trial court did refer to the evidence of Ferguson’s low in-
        telligence in several parts of its sentencing order.” Id. The ACCA
        found that the “trial court did not err in not ﬁnding, as a nonstatu-
        tory mitigating circumstance, that Ferguson was” intellectually dis-
        abled because there was no evidence in the record to support that
        ﬁnding. Id. Ultimately, the ACCA aﬃrmed Ferguson’s conviction
        and death sentence. Ferguson I, 814 So. 2d at 970.
               The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed Ferguson’s peti-
        tion and found that there was no error in the ACCA’s opinion. Ex
        parte Ferguson, 814 So. 2d 970, 975 (Ala. 2001). The United States
        Supreme Court denied Ferguson’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
        Ferguson v. Alabama, 535 U.S. 907 (2002).
                         C. State Post-Conviction Proceedings
               In March 2003, Ferguson petitioned for a writ of habeas cor-
        pus in state trial court, also called a Rule 32 petition in Alabama.
        Although Ferguson made several claims in his Rule 32 petition, this
        section only discusses the issues involved in this appeal. First, Fer-
        guson argued that he is intellectually disabled and thus constitu-
        tionally protected from being sentenced to death under Atkins v.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 20-12727

        Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). To support the ﬁrst prong of his Atkins
        claim, Ferguson pointed to his full-scale IQ score of 71 when he
        was in the sixth grade and his full-scale IQ score of 69 when he was
        awaiting trial. Ferguson then detailed how he established at trial
        that he had severe limitations in adaptive functioning, including be-
        ing placed in special educational programs at school.
                Then, Ferguson also asserted many ineﬀective assistance of
        counsel claims, both at the pretrial and sentencing phases. For the
        pretrial stage, Ferguson argued that his counsel was ineﬀective for
        failing to act in his interest by providing inadequate representation
        during his statement to the police. Speciﬁcally, Ferguson asserted
        that his trial counsel failed to adequately advise him of his rights
        and encouraged Ferguson to talk to the police even without a plea
        deal. Ferguson also argued that his trial counsel failed to conduct
        an adequate independent investigation. To support his argument,
        Ferguson stated that his trial counsel had minimal contact with his
        family, failed to investigate the other suspects, and did not gather
        evidence to support his mental health defense.
               For the sentencing phase, Ferguson argued that trial counsel
        was ineﬀective for failing to adequately investigate and present mit-
        igation evidence. Relevant to this appeal, Ferguson argued that his
        trial counsel failed to contact and interview people who had
        knowledge about the abuse Ferguson suﬀered at the hands of his
        stepfather. Ferguson detailed his family history and explained how
        his stepfather routinely abused Ferguson’s mother, Betty, and his
        half-brothers. Ferguson explained that witnesses would have
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        20-12727               Opinion of the Court                        9

        testiﬁed about how his stepfather beat Betty to the point that she
        attempted suicide, which led to her institutionalization. Ferguson
        argued that if his trial counsel had interviewed these witnesses,
        they would have been able to present a stronger, more sympathetic
        argument during the mitigation phase of sentencing.
               In October 2006, the state trial court denied Ferguson’s re-
        quest for an evidentiary hearing and summarily denied his Rule 32
        petition. In addressing Ferguson’s Atkins claim, the trial court dis-
        cussed Ferguson’s IQ scores and how he often gave up easily on
        those tests, which resulted in lower scores. The trial court also
        stated that the expert opinions both concluded that Ferguson was
        not intellectually disabled. Ultimately, the trial court concluded
        that Ferguson’s IQ was “best classiﬁed as borderline to low average
        intellectual functioning.”
                The trial court then moved on to discuss the evidence about
        whether Ferguson exhibited signiﬁcant or substantial deﬁcits in
        adaptive functioning. The trial court reviewed Ferguson’s work
        history, including a promotion, and then discussed Ferguson’s abil-
        ity to develop relationships, including his marriage and his actions
        during and after the crime. After considering all the evidence, the
        trial court found that Ferguson “demonstrated a high level of adap-
        tive functioning.” Thus, the trial court found that “Ferguson does
        not meet either the intelligence or adaptive functioning elements
        necessary to establish” intellectual disability, and thus he was not
        intellectually disabled.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  20-12727

                The trial court also found that Ferguson’s ineﬀective assis-
        tance claim that his counsel should have prevented him from mak-
        ing inculpatory statements to police lacked merit. Speciﬁcally, the
        trial court found that, based on the transcript of Ferguson’s confes-
        sion, Ferguson initially contacted the police to give his statement,
        and his lawyer advised Ferguson of his right to remain silent and of
        the possible consequences of speaking. Next, the trial court found
        Ferguson’s arguments that his counsel failed to conduct an ade-
        quate independent investigation to be insuﬃciently pleaded under
        Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(b).
                Turning to Ferguson’s penalty phase arguments, the trial
        court found that Ferguson could not demonstrate deficient perfor-
        mance or prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
        668 (1984). Specifically, the trial court explained that “[t]rial coun-
        sel’s investigation of Ferguson’s case and presentation of mitigating
        evidence was more than reasonable in light of the circumstances of
        the case. The reasonableness of trial counsel’s mitigation strategy
        is supported by the jury’s 11 to 1 recommendation of life without
        parole.” The trial court went through Ferguson’s allegations about
        his childhood abuse and how that information was already in the
        record through Dr. Chudy’s notes and Karen’s testimony. The trial
        court also explained that “[e]ven if the Court assumed that the al-
        legations in the petition are true and that counsel could have pre-
        sented additional witnesses to testify regarding Ferguson’s abuse as
        a child, . . . the evidence would be nothing more than cumulative
        to that already presented.” The trial court also agreed with the
        sentencing judge who determined that Ferguson’s “difficult
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        20-12727               Opinion of the Court                       11

        childhood” was not a mitigating factor. Specifically, the trial court
        noted that
              Ferguson was 24 years old at the time of the crime.
              He had been married for ﬁve years and was able to
              support himself and his wife while she attended nurs-
              ing school. Under the circumstances of this case, the
              petitioner’s allegations of child abuse and borderline
              intellect, even if true, would not mitigate his actions
              as an adult.

                In April 2008, the ACCA aﬃrmed the state trial court’s deci-
        sion. Ferguson v. State, 13 So. 3d 418, 445 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)
        (Ferguson II). In regard to Ferguson’s Atkins claim, the ACCA re-
        viewed the record of both Ferguson’s direct criminal appeal and
        post-conviction proceedings and then re-stated verbatim the trial
        court’s ﬁndings from Ferguson’s post-conviction proceedings. Id.
        at 433–36. Ultimately, the ACCA concluded that “the circuit court’s
        ﬁndings are more than supported by the record.” Id. at 435–36.
        The ACCA found that Ferguson was not intellectually disabled. Id.
        at 436.
                Next, the ACCA reviewed Ferguson’s ineﬀective assistance
        claims. First, as to Ferguson’s claim that his counsel was ineﬀective
        during Ferguson’s statements to the police, the ACCA found the
        trial court’s dismissal of that claim proper. The ACCA noted that
        the day after Ferguson’s arrest, he spoke with the police alongside
        his counsel, Tony Glenn. Id. at 437–38. The ACCA reprinted the
        following exchange between Glenn and Ferguson:
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                20-12727

              Mr. Glenn: Dale, you called me earlier today and you
              told me that you wanted to try and help yourself with
              the Colbert County Sheriﬀ’s Department and the FBI
              on these charges that are here pending today. You had
              information you thought would help them. You real-
              ize that I have gone over with you your rights and told
              you that you don’t have to talk, but it is your—but you
              have informed me that you choose to help at this
              point to try to help yourself; is that correct?

              Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.

              Mr. Glenn: Do you realize that there are no deals at
              this point?

              Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.

              Mr. Glenn: That what you are doing is voluntary and
              you are doing it to try to help yourself in further-
              ance—

              Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.

              Mr. Glenn: —of this; is that correct?

              Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.

              Mr. Glenn: And this is what you want to do?

              Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.

              Mr. Glenn: And do you realize that this is on the rec-
              ord, this tape that we are making here today can and
              will more than likely be used in court?
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        20-12727              Opinion of the Court                         13

              Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.

              Mr. Glenn: Okay. With that, do you want to go for-
              ward?

              Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.

        Id. at 438. Following this exchange, Ferguson ultimately confessed.
        See id.
                In reviewing the above exchange, the ACCA noted that Fer-
        guson himself suggested that he make the inculpatory statement
        to the police, not Ferguson’s counsel. Id. The ACCA adopted the
        trial court’s ﬁnding that Ferguson’s statements were voluntarily
        made and concluded that his attorney, Glenn, could not “be held
        ineﬀective for the informed and voluntary choices of [his] client.”
        Id. at 438–39.
                When pursuing his clam that his trial counsel failed to con-
        duct an adequate independent investigation, Ferguson argued that
        “[t]rial counsel’s performance was also objectively deficient, for
        many reasons and including the unavailability of sufficient funds
        for a thorough defense.” Id. at 439. Then, the ACCA addressed:
              In a footnote, he then purports not to waive any claim
              presented in his petition or apparent from the record.
              However, he does not set forth any facts or argument
              in support of his bare contention. Rather, he simply
              moves to his next ineﬀective-assistance allegation.
              Therefore, he has not complied with the require-
              ments set forth in Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., as to
              this allegation.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                20-12727

        Id.
               Last, as to Ferguson’s ineﬀective assistance claim, the ACCA
        again repeated the ﬁndings from the trial court and adopted them
        as part of the ACCA’s opinion ﬁnding that summary dismissal was
        proper. Id. at 439–43.
              In January 2009, the Supreme Court of Alabama denied Fer-
        guson’s petition for certiorari.
                             D. Federal § 2254 Proceedings
               In 2009, Ferguson ﬁled a federal habeas petition in the
        Northern District of Alabama. Relevant to this appeal, Ferguson
        challenged the state court’s failure to give him an Atkins hearing on
        his intellectual disability claim and the state court’s determination
        on his ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims. The district court
        denied Ferguson’s petition on all grounds.
                Ferguson then moved to amend the judgment because,
        among other reasons, courts cannot rely on “pre-Atkins evidence to
        determine if a petitioner qualiﬁes for relief under Atkins.” The dis-
        trict court granted Ferguson’s request and vacated the portion of
        its prior order regarding Ferguson’s Atkins claim.
               On August 27, 2019, the district court held an evidentiary
        hearing on Ferguson’s Atkins claim and heard from two experts.
        Ferguson retained Dr. Robert Shaﬀer to evaluate his “cognitive and
        intellectual functions, and his adaptive behavior” to determine
        whether Ferguson was intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for
        the death penalty. Alabama retained Dr. Glen King “to primarily
        determine the intellectual ability of ” Ferguson.
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        20-12727               Opinion of the Court                        15

                To prevail on his Atkins claim, Ferguson had to prove that he
        had signiﬁcantly subaverage intellectual functioning (IQ of 70 or
        below), substantial deﬁcits in adaptive behavior, and the manifesta-
        tion of those problems before Ferguson reached the age of 18. See
        Smith v. State, 213 So. 3d 239, 248 (Ala. 2007). At the hearing, the
        district court also heard about Ferguson’s prior IQ scores, received
        prior expert reports about Ferguson’s intellectual disability, and re-
        viewed Ferguson’s school reports, which included prior IQ testing.
        The next paragraphs lay out in chronological order the evidence
        Ferguson presented to the district court to support his Atkins claim.
               In November 1979, Ferguson obtained a full-scale IQ score
        of 77 on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (Binet). Before the
        1985–1986 school year, Ferguson was evaluated for special educa-
        tion services because of a “lack of academic progress, suspected
        learning disability, deﬁcient reading skills, and deﬁcient handwrit-
        ing skills.” Using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Re-
        vised (WISC-R), Ferguson achieved a verbal IQ score of 74, a per-
        formance IQ score of 71, and a full-scale IQ score of 71. The eval-
        uator noted that Ferguson “gave up easily on both verbal and non-
        verbal items,” and he “did not appear to be challenged by the more
        diﬃcult items on the test.” Using the results, the school found Fer-
        guson was eligible for special services as “educationally mentally
        handicapped.” Within the report, the evaluator explained that Fer-
        guson’s prior IQ score of 77 on the Binet was consistent with his
        current WISC-R score.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 20-12727

               In 1988, pursuant to school policy, the school re-evaluated
        Ferguson, and he achieved a verbal IQ score of 87, performance IQ
        score of 88, and a full-scale IQ score of 87. As a result, the school
        moved Ferguson to normal classes, but he received special assis-
        tance such as receiving help with certain subjects, having more
        time to take a test, or having someone read the test to him.
                In December 1997, Dr. Rosen administered the Wechsler
        Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R), and Ferguson achieved
        a verbal IQ score of 76, a performance IQ score of 66, and a full-
        scale IQ score of 69. But Dr. Rosen noted that it was “quite appar-
        ent that [Ferguson] did not make a good eﬀort in this test, giving
        up readily on many items and seemingly not trying as hard as pos-
        sible.” At Ferguson’s criminal trial, Dr. Rosen expounded on Fer-
        guson’s lack of eﬀort by noting that Ferguson’s assessment revealed
        a “somewhat inconsistent pattern” where he would get the earlier,
        simpler questions wrong but would then get later, harder questions
        right. Dr. Rosen testiﬁed that he did not see any signs of intellec-
        tual disability, but that Ferguson’s intellectual abilities were below
        average—in the borderline intellectual functioning range with an
        IQ between 70 and 84. Dr. Rosen testiﬁed that if Ferguson had “re-
        ally tried [then] he would have scored probably in the middle 70’s
        for most of them, perhaps higher.”
               In June 1998, after conducting a psychological evaluation,
        Dr. Chudy did not provide a speciﬁc IQ score but noted that the
        Shipley Institute of Living Scale placed Ferguson in the borderline
        intellectual range at about the ﬁfth percentile. Dr. Chudy also
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        20-12727                  Opinion of the Court                              17

        testiﬁed that borderline intellectual functioning covers “the area be-
        tween low average intelligence and” intellectual disability.
               In preparation for the evidentiary hearing, between Septem-
        ber 2017 and March 2018, Dr. Shaﬀer met with Ferguson and inter-
        viewed Ferguson’s mother, Betty. Dr. Shaﬀer administered the
        Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV), and
        Ferguson received a full-scale IQ score of 77. But after applying the
        Flynn Eﬀect2 and the standard error of measurement (SEM), 3 Dr.
        Shaﬀer explained that Ferguson’s IQ fell between 69.4 and 78.4 with
        95% probability, or between 67.9 and 78.9 with a conﬁdence level
        of 99%. Dr. Shaﬀer determined that the totality of the test scores
        aligned with his opinion that Ferguson has signiﬁcant limitations in
        his ability to function intellectually, despite some tests not showing
        substantial impairments. As for adaptive functioning, Dr. Shaﬀer
        administered the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales Test

        2 The Flynn Effect refers to findings by Dr. James Flynn that average IQ scores
        have increased steadily by roughly .3 points every year since the IQ test was
        normed. Thus, when applying the Flynn Effect, the evaluator looks at when
        the test was normed (approximately mid-2007 for the Wechsler Fourth Edi-
        tion) and when the test was administered (September 2017), then determines
        the difference (here 10.2 years), and subsequently multiplies it by .3 (the an-
        nual increase) to get a set number (3.06), which is subtracted from the full-
        scale IQ score (77). So Ferguson’s September 2017 full-scale score of 77 would
        be reduced by 3.06 points to 73.94 if adjusted for the Flynn Effect.
        3 The SEM typically involves a range from five below to five above the set IQ.
        This provides a range for the IQ score, which likely gives a better estimate
        than a fixed number for the person’s IQ.
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                         20-12727

        (Vineland) 4 to Betty Ferguson because she could provide observa-
        tions of Ferguson at the age of 18. Considering Betty’s responses
        about Ferguson at the age of 18, Ferguson’s Vineland scores
        showed 67 in communication, 67 in daily living skills, and 68 in so-
        cialization, giving him a composite score of 63. This placed him in
        the ﬁrst percentile, meaning that 99 percent of comparable eight-
        een-year-olds had greater skills and abilities to perform daily rou-
        tines than Ferguson did at the age of 18. Dr. Shaﬀer concluded that
        those ﬁndings justiﬁed an intellectual disability diagnosis.
                In February 2018, Dr. King evaluated Ferguson and adminis-
        tered the WAIS-IV and the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test, Fifth
        Edition (SB-5). Ferguson received a score of 85 on the WAIS-IV and
        a score of 84 on the SB-5. Dr. King adjusted Ferguson’s score on
        the WAIS-IV using the SEM, providing a range of 81 to 89. Dr. King
        administered the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System where Fer-
        guson rated his own abilities on whether he could perform several
        tasks. Ferguson highly rated his ability to complete the identiﬁed
        tasks. Dr. King also administered the Independent Living Scales,
        which measures practical abilities of managing money, health and
        safety, social adjustment, and problem solving. Dr. King testiﬁed
        about Ferguson’s performance on the test and noted his belief that
        Ferguson did not have subaverage intellectual functioning and that

        4 The Vineland looks at three domains of adaptive behavior: communication
        skills, daily living skills, and social skills. Typically, the Vineland is adminis-
        tered to parents, caregivers, or teachers rather than the person whose IQ is at
        issue.
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        20-12727                  Opinion of the Court                               19

        there was no indication of poor adaptive functioning (only lower
        social adjustment which is expected from being on death row).
               After the evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Fer-
        guson’s request for relief, concluding that Ferguson failed to estab-
        lish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has an intellectual
        disability. The district court gathered and identiﬁed all of Fergu-
        son’s IQ scores, as detailed below: 5
         Test      IQ Test       Full Scale      Flynn Eﬀect          SEM Range
         Date       Given          Score         Adjustment
         1979       SB-3             77              75.2              70.2–80.2
         1985      WISC-R            71              67.7              62.7–72.7
         1988      WISC-R            87              82.2              77.2–87.2
         1997      WAIS-R            69              64.2              59.2–69.2
         2017      WAIS-IV           77              74.3              69.3–79.3
         2018      WAIS-IV           78             75.15             70.15–80.15
                    SB-5             84              79.6              74.6–84.6

        5 This chart comes from the district court’s order but does not contain the
        column listing when the IQ tests were normed, nor does it contain the corre-
        sponding footnotes. We have also adjusted the 2018 SB-5 score to correct an
        error recognized by the district court in a subsequent order—the court initially
        reduced the SB-5 score for “practice effect,” but later acknowledged that the
        practice-effect reduction applied only to the 2018 WAIS-IV score. Of note, the
        district court correctly identified the years the tests were normed but still
        made mathematical errors when calculating the Flynn Effect. See supra n. 2.
        Ferguson does not argue these errors nor do they make a difference in our
        ultimate decision. Thus, we use the calculation provided by the district court.
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                        20-12727

              The district court reduced the 2018 WAIS-IV IQ score by 7
        points for practice eﬀect 6 because Dr. King re-administered the
        same test Dr. Shaﬀer administered ﬁve months earlier.
               Considering his evaluators also noted that Ferguson did not
        try on some of his IQ tests (speciﬁcally the ones where he scored
        below 70), the district court found that Ferguson did not suﬀer
        from “signiﬁcantly subaverage intellectual functioning.” As for
        adaptive behavior, the district court found that Ferguson failed to
        show “substantial present limitations” in adaptive functioning and
        that most of the evidence produced focused on the time before and
        during Ferguson’s trial. The district court did not address whether
        his IQ scores and deﬁcits in adaptive functioning manifested before
        Ferguson reached 18-years-old.
               Ferguson timely appealed the district court’s denial of ha-
        beas relief. First, Ferguson argues that the district court clearly
        erred in ﬁnding that he was not intellectually disabled. Second, Fer-
        guson argues that his trial counsel was ineﬀective at multiple stages
        of his case and thus the ACCA’s decision is an unreasonable appli-
        cation of Strickland. We will address each argument in turn.

        6 In citing a 2012 study, the district court explained that when “the WAIS-IV
        was re-administered at three or six months after the initial, baseline admin-
        istration of that test[, the study] found that their Full-Scale IQ score increased
        an average of 7 points.”
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        20-12727                   Opinion of the Court                               21

                   II.     INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY CLAIM
                Ferguson argues that the district court erred in two ways
        concerning his Atkins claim.7 First, Ferguson argues that the dis-
        trict court erred in requiring him to show that he presently suffered
        from substantial deficits in adaptive functioning at the time of his
        Atkins hearing, which occurred over twenty years after the crime.
        Second, regardless of the standard, Ferguson argues that the district
        court clearly erred in finding him not intellectually disabled.
               “A determination as to whether a person is [intellectually
        disabled] is a finding of fact.” Fults v. GDCP Warden, 764 F.3d 1311,
        1319 (11th Cir. 2014). “We review for clear error a district court’s
        finding that an individual is not intellectually disabled.” Ledford v.
        Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 632
        (11th Cir. 2016). “[A] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
        there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

        7 In its order granting Ferguson’s motion to alter or amend the judgment as
        to his Atkins claim, the district court, citing Burgess v. Commissioner, Alabama
        Department of Corrections, 723 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2013), agreed with Fer-
        guson’s argument that it was an unreasonable application of Atkins to consider
        potential mitigation information produced before the Atkins decision to deter-
        mine whether Ferguson is intellectually disabled. Not until oral argument
        when this court asked Alabama whether the district court erred in having an
        evidentiary hearing did Alabama contest the district court’s order setting and
        conducting an evidentiary hearing. But Alabama’s argument in response was
        conclusory at best. Here, we make no determination about whether the dis-
        trict court erred in holding an evidentiary hearing and reviewing Ferguson’s
        Atkins claim de novo, and we will only review the district court’s finding that
        Ferguson is not intellectually disabled.
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                  20-12727

        evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
        has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
        573 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
        395 (1948)).
               In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the execution of in-
        tellectually disabled people violates the Eighth Amendment, leav-
        ing to the individual states “the task of developing appropriate
        ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execu-
        tion of sentences.” 536 U.S. at 317. But the Supreme Court noted
        that “clinical deﬁnitions of [intellectual disability] require not only
        subaverage intellectual functioning, but also signiﬁcant limitations
        in adaptive skills” that manifested before the age of 18. Id. at 318.
               In Ex Parte Perkins, the Supreme Court of Alabama discussed
        the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins and how the broadest deﬁ-
        nition of intellectual disability requires the prisoner to prove: (1)
        signiﬁcantly subaverage intellectual functioning (IQ below 70), (2)
        signiﬁcant deﬁcits in adaptive functioning, and (3) that both issues
        manifested before the age of 18. 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002).
        Later in Smith, Alabama formally adopted the broadest deﬁnition
        and requires that “in order for an oﬀender to be considered [intel-
        lectually disabled] in the Atkins context, the oﬀender must cur-
        rently exhibit subaverage intellectual functioning, currently exhibit
        deﬁcits in adaptive behavior, and these problems must have mani-
        fested themselves before the age of 18.” 213 So. 3d at 248.
              Turning to Ferguson’s arguments, he contends that by re-
        quiring a showing of present deficits in adaptive functioning,
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        20-12727               Opinion of the Court                         23

        Alabama’s standard for determining intellectual disability conflicts
        with Atkins and is thus unconstitutional. Regardless of the validity
        of Alabama’s requirement that Ferguson must demonstrate sub-
        stantial present limitations in adaptive functioning, under Smith,
        Ferguson also has to show he possessed significantly subaverage
        intellectual functioning. Because the district court found Ferguson
        at no point had subaverage intellectual functioning, and because
        Ferguson has not shown the district court clearly erred in making
        that finding, we need not address whether requiring present signifi-
        cant deficits in adaptive functioning runs afoul of Atkins.
                We now turn to Ferguson’s argument about his intellectual
        functioning. Specifically, Ferguson argues that when considering
        all his IQ scores, including when adjusted for the Flynn Effect and
        after the SEM has been applied, he has significantly subaverage in-
        tellectual functioning. We disagree.
                After reviewing all the evidence, the district court found that
        when adjusted for the Flynn Effect, all but two of Ferguson’s IQ
        scores were above 70, the rough cutoff for intellectual disability.
        The two IQ scores below 70 were the 1985 IQ test (score of 67.7)
        and the 1997 IQ test (score of 64.2). The district court discounted
        those two scores based on evidence that Ferguson did not put forth
        his best effort on those tests. Because we have held that the trier
        of fact can discount IQ scores when there is evidence of malinger-
        ing, Clemons v. Comm’r, Alabama Department of Corrections, 967 F.3d
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        24                         Opinion of the Court                         20-12727

        1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 2020), 8 we cannot say that the district court’s
        factual finding about Ferguson’s IQ scores is clearly erroneous.
                Ferguson asserts that we should find the district court clearly
        erred in discounting the two sub-70 scores because the remaining
        tests, including the most recent ones, showed that Ferguson put in
        the appropriate effort. Ferguson’s argument misses the mark. Fer-
        guson wants us to require the district court to impute his legitimate
        effort expended on later tests to all of his tests. This would be an
        error—just like it would have been an error had the district court
        imputed the malingering accusations onto all of Ferguson’s IQ
        scores. Rather, the district court properly reviewed each IQ score
        and any notes from the corresponding evaluator to weigh whether
        to credit those scores. Both challenged tests included notations
        from the evaluators about Ferguson’s lack of effort, and the district
        court weighed those records, including Dr. Rosen’s credentials, to
        determine whether he could have reasonably arrived at his conclu-
        sion. See Clemons, 967 F.3d at 1248. We find that the district court
        took the correct approach, and the record supports its finding.

        8 Although Clemons involved reviewing the petitioner’s Atkins claim through
        the lens of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, we see
        no reason why a district court, sitting as the trier of fact, should not be allowed
        to discount IQ scores when there is evidence of malingering.
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        20-12727                   Opinion of the Court                                25

                After the SEM is applied, only one other test has a range that
        falls below 70: the 2017 IQ test. 9 But, importantly, the SEM “is
        merely a factor to consider when assessing an individual’s intellec-
        tual functioning—one that may benefit or hurt that individual’s At-
        kins claim, depending on the content and quality of expert testi-
        mony presented.” Ledford, 818 F.3d at 640–41.
                We find that the district court committed no clear error in
        its consideration of those IQ scores and the SEM range associated
        with those scores. Ferguson’s 2017 IQ score of 77 would yield a
        SEM IQ range (after being adjusted for the Flynn Effect) of 69.3–
        79.3. 10 The other four scores considered by the district court
        ranged from just above 70 at the low end of the SEM range to 87.2
        at the high end. The experts disagreed as to whether Ferguson’s
        intellectual functioning may be higher or lower than his overall IQ
        score reflected. For example, the trial experts—one appointed by
        the court and one called by Ferguson—testified that Ferguson’s

        9 Although the 1985 and 1997 IQ scores would produce a range below 70, we
        need not address the SEM range for those tests because we found that the dis-
        trict court properly discredited those IQ scores based on malingering.
        10 The district court, as we explained earlier, discounted Ferguson’s IQ scores
        based on the Flynn Effect and (as to the 2018 WAIS-IV score) the practice ef-
        fect. For clarity, we repeat what we’ve said in other cases: while a factfinder
        may consider both effects in assessing an offender’s possible intellectual disa-
        bility (if there’s evidence to support them), it is not required to consider them.
        See Jenkins v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 963 F.3d 1248, 1276 (11th Cir. 2020);
        Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987, 1008 (11th Cir. 2019); Ledford, 818 F.3d at
        638–39.
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        26                       Opinion of the Court                    20-12727

        intellectual functioning was above the disabled range. Twenty
        years later, at the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Shaffer explained there
        was a 95% probability that Ferguson’s full scale IQ score was be-
        tween 69.4–78.4. As a result, Dr. Shaffer found that Ferguson had
        significantly subaverage intellectual functioning because his IQ
        could be less than 70. But Dr. King testified that, considering Fer-
        guson’s IQ scores and the SEM ranges, Ferguson’s IQ placed him
        at either the high end of the borderline range (70–84) or at the low
        end of the average range (85–115). In ultimately concluding that
        Ferguson had not shown significantly subaverage intellectual func-
        tioning, the district court credited Dr. King’s testimony over Dr.
        Shaffer, which is plausible in light of the record. See Ledford, 818
        F.3d at 641 (“So long as the district court’s findings regarding how
        the standard error of measurement informs its ultimate intellectual
        functioning determination are plausible in light of the record evi-
        dence viewed in its entirety, there will be no clear error.”).
                                     *      *       *
               Because the district court’s finding that Ferguson is not in-
        tellectually disabled is plausible in light of the entire record, it is not
        clearly erroneous. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573–74 (“If the district
        court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record
        viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even
        though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it
        would have weighed the evidence differently.”). We therefore af-
        firm the district court on this point.
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        20-12727                Opinion of the Court                         27

         III.   INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
                Ferguson argues that his trial counsel was ineﬀective during
        both the pretrial and sentencing stages of his case. The ACCA de-
        nied Ferguson’s ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims, so our re-
        view is subject to the Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act
        of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2554 (AEDPA). See Lynch v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
        Corr., 776 F.3d 1209, 1217 (11th Cir. 2015).
               Under AEDPA, a federal court can grant relief to a state pris-
        oner only if he shows that the state court’s determination of his
        claim resulted in a decision that was (1) “contrary to, or involved
        an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
        determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2)
        “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
        the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
        § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
               Here, Ferguson argues that the ACCA’s decision is an unrea-
        sonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984).
        Thus, we will only review whether the ACCA unreasonably ap-
        plied Strickland under § 2254(d)(1).
                A state habeas court’s decision is an “unreasonable applica-
        tion” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identiﬁes
        the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s]
        decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
        prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). “To
        satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to show that the
        state court’s ruling . . . was so lacking in justiﬁcation that there was
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        28                     Opinion of the Court                 20-12727

        an error well understood and comprehended in existing law be-
        yond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Woods v. Don-
        ald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
        omitted).
               To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
        criminal defendant must show: (1) that his lawyer rendered defi-
        cient performance, such that he “made errors so serious that coun-
        sel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth
        Amendment,” and (2) that those errors prejudiced the defense,
        such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
        unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
        been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. As the Supreme
        Court described it, a “reasonable probability is a probability suffi-
        cient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
               As to deficient performance, courts must “indulge a strong
        presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
        reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. “To overcome that
        presumption, a defendant must show that counsel failed to act rea-
        sonably considering all the circumstances.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
        U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (alteration adopted and internal quotation
        marks omitted). “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investi-
        gation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
        unchallengeable,” but, importantly, “strategic choices made after
        less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the ex-
        tent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations
        on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. “In other words,
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        20-12727               Opinion of the Court                      29

        counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
        reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unneces-
        sary.” Id. at 691.
                As noted above, to establish prejudice, the defendant “need
        not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not al-
        tered the outcome in the case”; he need only show a reasonable
        probability of a different outcome, which requires a showing “suf-
        ficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 693–94. A
        court deciding an ineffectiveness claim need not “address both
        components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient
        showing on one.” Id. at 697.
               Ferguson argues that his trial counsel erred at both the pre-
        sentencing phase and the penalty phase. We will address each
        phase, and Ferguson’s arguments under each, in turn.
                          A.         Pre-Sentencing Phase
               Ferguson argues that his trial counsel erred in two ways dur-
        ing the pre-sentencing phase. First, Ferguson’s trial counsel was
        ineffective for not acting in Ferguson’s best interest during Fergu-
        son’s statement to law enforcement. Second, Ferguson’s trial
        counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate pretrial
        investigation into Ferguson’s mental health evidence and possible
        intellectual disabilities for the guilt phase.
                                i.        Confession
               Ferguson argues that, for two reasons, his trial counsel was
        ineffective at the time he gave his statements to law enforcement,
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                20-12727

        and that, as a result, he was prejudiced to an extent sufficient to
        warrant relief under Strickland.
               First, Ferguson argues that his trial counsel was deﬁcient for
        letting him speak with law enforcement shortly after his arrest. As
        discussed above and as the ACCA noted, Ferguson called his coun-
        sel, Glenn, to set up a time for Ferguson to give a statement to po-
        lice. Then Glenn explained that there was no deal on the table and
        that any statements made would be used against Ferguson. As the
        ACCA noted, Ferguson conveyed that he understood his rights and
        wanted to move forward with the statement.
               Ferguson has failed to show how the ACCA unreasonably
        applied Strickland. Ferguson attempts to argue that his attorney
        should have instructed him to remain silent absent a deal. But as
        the ACCA noted, Ferguson requested the meeting where Glenn ap-
        peared at the confession with Ferguson and explained Ferguson’s
        rights to him. Glenn then explained that there were no deals on
        the table and that Ferguson’s statements would likely be used in
        court—important information to help Ferguson decide whether to
        move forward with speaking to the police. As the ACCA noted,
        and conﬁrmed by the transcripts, Ferguson understood those rights
        and still made the decision to proceed after speaking with Glenn.
        Ferguson II, 13 So. 3d at 438.
              Ferguson argues that an attorney renders ineﬀective assis-
        tance when, without doing proper due diligence, counsel fails to
        properly advise their client of their right to remain silent or move
        to suppress an improper confession. Speciﬁcally, Ferguson points
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        20-12727                  Opinion of the Court                              31

        to two cases in which this court has found counsel to be ineﬀective
        for failing to suppress a confession. See Smith v. Wainwright, 777
        F.2d 609, 616–20 (11th Cir. 1985) (Smith I); Smith v. Duer, 911 F.2d
        494, 497–98 (11th Cir. 1990) (Smith II). But Ferguson’s reliance is
        misplaced. Both cases involved the same defendant making con-
        fessions without counsel present, and counsel subsequently failing
        to move to suppress the illegally coerced information. See Smith I,
        777 F.2d at 610, 618; Smith II, 911 F.2d at 495–96, 498. Here, Glenn
        was present during the confession and properly informed Ferguson
        of his rights. In fact, Ferguson contacted Glenn to make the volun-
        tary choice to speak with police, which was reaﬃrmed by Ferguson
        after hearing his rights. By informing Ferguson of his rights and
        the likelihood that his confession would be used against him, Glenn
        was suﬃciently “functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed [to Fergu-
        son] by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Thus,
        the ACCA’s determination that Glenn “cannot be held ineﬀective
        for the informed and voluntary choices” of his client is not an un-
        reasonable application of Strickland. Ferguson II, 13 So. 3d at 439.
                Second, Ferguson argues that his counsel was deﬁcient for
        failing to step in when law enforcement allegedly pressured him to
        change his story. But Ferguson did not fairly present this argument
        to the district court in his habeas petition.11 See Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t
        of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that an

        11 We note that Ferguson did raise this issue (although in a conclusory man-
        ner) in his state habeas petitions, despite the Commissioner’s arguments to the
        contrary.
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        32                      Opinion of the Court                20-12727

        argument that is not fairly presented to the district court will not
        be considered on appeal). In his counseled federal habeas petition,
        Ferguson never mentions the alleged pressure from law enforce-
        ment but mainly argues that Glenn “failed to counsel adequately
        and represent vigorously his client’s interest . . . during Mr. Fergu-
        son’s alleged ‘confession’ on August 12, 1997.” Ferguson’s attor-
        neys did not expressly designate the issue as a distinct claim for re-
        lief, nor did they speciﬁcally argue that the ACCA unreasonably ap-
        plied Strickland. Thus, we will not consider Ferguson’s argument
        on whether his counsel was deﬁcient for not intervening during
        Ferguson’s confession when police allegedly pressured him to
        change his story.
               Because Ferguson has failed to show that his counsel was de-
        ﬁcient in how he handled Ferguson’s confession, we need not ad-
        dress his prejudice argument. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (ex-
        plaining that a court considering an ineﬀectiveness claim need not
        “address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes
        an insuﬃcient showing on one”); see also Conner v. GDCP Warden,
        784 F.3d 752, 766–67 (11th Cir. 2015) (following Strickland and only
        addressing one prong because it disposed of the petitioner’s claim).
                          ii.      Adequate Investigation
               Ferguson next argues that his counsel was ineffective for fail-
        ing to conduct an adequate investigation into his mental health ev-
        idence and possible intellectual disabilities before trial. But as the
        Commissioner correctly argues, and the district court correctly
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        20-12727                    Opinion of the Court                                 33

        noted, Ferguson abandoned this claim during his state post-convic-
        tion proceedings and thus it is procedurally defaulted.
                Ferguson’s inadequate investigation claim was procedurally
        defaulted under Alabama’s procedural rules. The ACCA noted that
        Ferguson argued that “[t]rial counsel’s performance was also ob-
        jectively deficient, for many reasons and including the unavailabil-
        ity of sufficient funds for a thorough defense.” See Ferguson II, 13
        So. 3d at 439. But the ACCA explained that the conclusory state-
        ment without facts or argument did not comply “with the require-
        ments set forth in Rule 28(a)(10)” of the Alabama Rules of Appel-
        late Procedure. Id.
                “Claims presented in a Rule 32 petition but not pursued on
        appeal are deemed to be abandoned.” Hallford v. Culliver, 459 F.3d
        1193, 1199 n.4 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Boyd v. State,
        913 So. 2d 1113, 1145 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)). “[W]hen a petitioner
        has failed to present a claim to the state courts and under state pro-
        cedural rules the claim has become procedurally defaulted, the
        claim will be considered procedurally defaulted in federal court.”
        See Collier v. Jones, 910 F.2d 770, 772 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Fergu-
        son’s claim about an inadequate pretrial investigation is procedur-
        ally defaulted. 12

        12 Nestled inside the inadequate-pretrial-investigation section of Ferguson’s
        brief, he also argues that trial counsel: “failed to present a defense that included
        evidence regarding [Ferguson’s] disabilities”; “failed to introduce evidence re-
        garding [his] intoxication and drug use”; and “failed to . . . present testimony
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        34                          Opinion of the Court                         20-12727

                                         *       *        *
               Ferguson has not demonstrated, under AEDPA, that the
        ACCA’s denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim about
        his counsel’s actions before his confession was an unreasonable ap-
        plication of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Also, Ferguson’s
        argument about his counsel’s pretrial investigation for the guilt
        phase is procedurally defaulted. Thus, Ferguson has not met his
        burden to warrant habeas relief on his pre-sentencing stage claims
        of ineffective assistance of counsel.
                                    B.       Penalty Phase
               Last, Ferguson argues that his counsel was ineﬀective by fail-
        ing to investigate and present evidence of Ferguson’s stepfather’s
        abuse during the penalty phase. Speciﬁcally, Ferguson argues that
        the ACCA’s determination that Ferguson was not prejudiced be-
        cause of that deﬁcient performance was an unreasonable applica-
        tion of Strickland. 13 Here, we need not address whether Ferguson’s

        about [his] personality and tendencies.” But these are guilt-phase argu-
        ments—not pretrial investigation claims—and, thus, they are outside the cer-
        tificate of appealability. See McClain v. Hall, 552 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (“In an appeal brought by an unsuccessful habeas petitioner, appellate review
        is limited to the issues specified in the certificate of appealability.” (alterations
        adopted)). Even if they weren’t, as the district court explained, Ferguson’s
        guilt-phase arguments were procedurally defaulted because he did not raise
        them in the ACCA and he has not given us any reason to excuse the default.
        13 Ferguson also maintains that the district court correctly concluded that his
        counsel’s performance was deficient and that the ACCA’s determination to
        the opposite was an unreasonable application of Strickland.
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        20-12727               Opinion of the Court                        35

        counsel performance was deﬁcient because the ACCA’s determina-
        tion that Ferguson failed to establish prejudice was not an unrea-
        sonable application of Strickland.
              The ACCA adopted the trial court’s ﬁnding about prejudice,
        speciﬁcally noting:
               Finally, in light of the nature and circumstances of
               this crime—the robbery and murder of a father and
               his young son—and the speciﬁc ﬁndings made by the
               sentencing authority, there is no reasonable probabil-
               ity that the mitigating circumstances alleged in the pe-
               tition, even if true, would have altered the balance of
               aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. The
               sentencing authority was well aware of the mitigation
               evidence presented at trial.

        Ferguson II, 13 So. 3d at 442 (internal citation omitted).
                Under the prejudice prong, when the defendant challenges
        his death sentence, “the question is whether there is a reasonable
        probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an ap-
        pellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evi-
        dence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
        mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466
        U.S. at 695. In determining whether there is a reasonable probabil-
        ity of a diﬀerent result, a court must “consider ‘the totality of the
        available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the
        evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding’—and ‘reweigh it
        against the evidence in aggravation.’” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S.
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        36                     Opinion of the Court                20-12727

        30, 41 (2009) (per curiam) (alteration adopted) (quoting Williams,
        529 U.S. at 397–98).
                The ACCA found that Ferguson’s “trial counsel presented
        the vast majority of mitigation evidence that Ferguson alleges
        should have been presented.” Ferguson II, 13 So. 3d at 439. We
        agree with the ACCA that most of the new mitigation evidence
        was cumulative of the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances pre-
        sented during sentencing. See Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1298
        (11th Cir. 2010) (“[M]uch (although not all) of the ‘new’ testimony
        introduced at the post-conviction hearing would simply have am-
        plified the themes already raised at trial and incorporated into the
        sentencing judge’s decision to override the jury.”); Marquard v.
        Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 429 F.3d 1278, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005)
        (“There is no reason to believe that added details about Marquard’s
        troubled childhood and substance abuse—which the sentencing
        court clearly recognized in imposing a death sentence—would
        have had any effect on the sentence.”).
                While more mitigation witnesses could have presented
        more details or different examples of these unfortunate aspects of
        Ferguson’s life, these aspects were nonetheless known to the sen-
        tencing jury and judge. Thus, no significant prejudice can result
        from the exclusion of cumulative evidence, meaning Ferguson’s
        trial counsel’s failure to present cumulative evidence was not prej-
        udicial. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 200 (“There is no reasonable proba-
        bility that the additional evidence Pinholster presented in his state
        habeas proceedings would have changed the jury’s verdict. The
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        20-12727               Opinion of the Court                         37

        ‘new’ evidence largely duplicated the mitigation evidence at trial.”);
        see also Ledford, 818 F.3d at 649–50. Because there is not a “reason-
        able probability” that, but for the exclusion of cumulative evidence,
        the last remaining juror would have voted for life imprisonment or
        the judge would have decided not to override the jury, we cannot
        find that the ACCA’s determination that Ferguson failed to show
        prejudice was an unreasonable application of Strickland.
               Citing Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2008), Fergu-
        son argues that prejudice is evident in his case because, like Wil-
        liams, the trial judge overrode the jury’s recommendation for life
        imprisonment based on one statutory factor. Speciﬁcally, as Fergu-
        son points out, Williams stated “[t]he fact that the jury decisively
        voted against the death penalty, even without the powerful evi-
        dence adduced at postconviction, weighs heavily in favor of a ﬁnd-
        ing of prejudice.” 542 F.3d at 1343. The state responds by citing
        Lee v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, where we
        said that “the fact that the jury recommended life imprisonment
        counsels against a determination that [the petitioner] was preju-
        diced under Strickland.” 726 F.3d 1172, 1196 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing
        Parker v. Allen, 565 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2009)).
               Whatever tension there may be between Williams and Lee,
        we don’t have to resolve it here because, in order to show the ACCA
        unreasonably applied Strickland, Ferguson must “show that there is
        a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-
        rors,” the trial judge would not have overridden the jury’s recom-
        mendation of life imprisonment. See 466 U.S. at 694. Here, the
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        38                     Opinion of the Court                20-12727

        ACCA assumed all of Ferguson’s allegations from his Rule 32 peti-
        tion to be true, but even with that assumption, the ACCA found
        that there was no reasonable probability that it would have altered
        the balance of the aggravating and mitigating evidence. As the
        ACCA noted, the trial judge “was well aware of the mitigation ev-
        idence presented at trial” yet found that the circumstances of Fer-
        guson’s childhood did not amount to a mitigating factor given Fer-
        guson’s age, marriage, and employment. Ferguson II, 13 So. 3d at
        442. In light of the trial court’s determination, we cannot ﬁnd the
        ACCA unreasonably applied Strickland by concluding that Fergu-
        son did not provide enough evidence to undermine the ACCA’s
        conﬁdence in the trial judge’s decision to override the jury’s recom-
        mendation of life. Ferguson “cannot show that ‘no fairminded ju-
        rist’ would have done as the state habeas court did in denying his
        claim.” Sealey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338, 1359
        (11th Cir. 2020).
                              IV.    CONCLUSION
                After careful review, we find that the district court did not
        clearly err in finding that Ferguson was not intellectually disabled.
        We also find that the ACCA’s determination that Ferguson’s coun-
        sel was not ineffective was not an unreasonable application of
        Strickland. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ferguson’s
        habeas petition.
              AFFIRMED.