Court Opinion

ID: 9421077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:56:53.340559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:28.501818
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Clark,
concurring.
I see no necessity for invalidating Louisiana’s law by dismissing these direct actions. In administering the Limited Liability Act the Court can easily avoid a clear conflict between it- and the direct action statute.
The Limited Liability Act admittedly was not designed for the benefit of insurance companies; nor does it deal with their liability. The purpose of the Congress in passing the Act in 1851 was to encourage investment in American ships by placing a limitation upon the personal liability of the shipowner in the event of an accident where there is no “privity or knowledge.” Thereafter this Court in The City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468 (1886), recognized the right of a shipowner to buy insurance coverage for damage to his hull in order to protect against the loss of his investment. The proceeds of such “hull insurance” were held, for purposes of a limitation proceeding, not a part of “the interest” of the owner in the vessel. The basis of the decision was that Congress intended the Act to protect the investment of shipowners, and if the latter were prevented from indemnify*424ing themselves from loss of their investment in the ship it would be contrary to the purpose of Congress as well as to the spirit of commercial jurisprudence. Here, the damage claims which may be sustained in the limitation proceeding will be chargeable against the Jane Smith and the owner may lose the damaged hull or its value unless he can recoup through the insurance which is involved in these direct actions and which he purchased for his protection. If the insurance proceeds are exhausted in the direct actions, the owner’s recoupment will be impossible. Though the holding in The City of Norwich does not control, I think that the reasoning of that case is pertinent; in other words, the owner of the ship has the same right to protect his investment in the ship by insurance against damage claims arising in its operation and which are chargeable to it1 as he has to protect his investment from damage to the ship itself. Unless the owner is afforded an opportunity to provide for such protection, the purpose of Congress to encourage investment in American ships will be just as much thwarted as it would have been had the owner’s right to buy insurance protection in The City of Norwich not been recognized.
To say that this view benefits the shipowner “at the expense of the families of the deceased seamen” is to ignore the realities of the case. Had the owner not purchased liability insurance the claimants could not, under any condition, recover more than the value of the damaged hull if there is no “privity or knowledge.” The owner’s liability insurance is the sole source of the claimants’ hope for a recovery beyond the value of the *425damaged hull. The owner’s motive in purchasing insurance certainly was not to protect his seamen or the public, but to protect himself against damage claims. And in so doing he has aided the widows and orphans of the deceased seamen by creating the possibility of an additional recovery against the insurance companies. Nor can the owner “profit” from the accident. The amount he may recover from the insurers under the liability policies could never exceed the amount he is obligated to pay to the claimants in the limitation proceedings. He “profits” only in the sense that he is permitted to receive the protection for which he paid.
This is not to say that the insurance companies in a direct action are liable to damage claimants. That would be a question of Louisiana law. Our only interest is to make certain that such actions do not interfere with the Federal Limitation proceeding. To do this we need only require that the limitation proceeding be concluded first and the owner’s liability settled under it. The petitioners could then discharge this liability, to the extent their policies covered it, by paying into the limitation proceeding the proper sum.2 The door would then be left open for prosecution of the direct actions against the insurance companies on the remaining coverage of the policies. Thus, whatever the insurers’ liability may be under Louisiana law in the subsequent direct actions, the owner’s purse cannot be touched.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s opinion states that the cases might be held for the limitation proceeding were it not that Congress intended that proceeding to be, in addition to a concursus of all claims against the owner *426and charterer, the exclusive forum for litigating all liability resulting from the accident. This is certainly not an unreasonable position. To be sure, some of the arguments for a concursus of claims against the owner or charterer would be applicable to claims against the insurer. But I do not think the arguments for such a holding are so persuasive, and the case for an opposite conclusion so feeble, that we should proceed at this juncture to invalidate a state law. It is also reasonable to read the Limited Liability Act as aimed at protecting only owners and charterers. The statute does not speak of suits against insurers. And when the Admiralty Rules were adopted we were concerned solely with the problems of the owner and charterer. For example, the limitation court is empowered to enjoin suits in other courts arising out of the accident only if the suits are against the owner, charterer or vessel; no mention was made of enjoining suits against any other party, e. g., insurance companies. See Rule 51. In sum, we must read between the lines in interpreting the Act regardless of how we hold. When the issue is so close, I would resolve it in favor of upholding rather than invalidating a state statute. We are not here confronted with a picture of lawsuits in twenty-odd states under twenty different state laws; if this be a valid argument against upholding the statute in another situation, it has no application in this case. The towboat Jane Smith, owned by a Louisiana resident, plied only Louisiana waters of the Atchafalaya River; the accident which befell the vessel occurred in Louisiana; all the parties save one resided in the state and both the limitation proceeding and the damage suits are pending in the same court before the same judge. Moreover, the damage claimants, perhaps secondary beneficiaries of the Limited Liability Act, are also the beneficiaries of a holding that the Limited Liability Act does *427not foreclose the possibility of direct actions by them subsequent to the limitation proceeding.
For these reasons, I would direct the District Court to first conclude the limitation proceeding, after which the liability, if any, of the petitioners on their policies in the direct actions could be determined.

 The business practice of purchasing marine protection and indemnity insurance, the type primarily involved here, to protect the shipowner against this contingency has long been recognized. See testimony of Ira A. Campbell for American Steamship Owners’ Association, at Hearings before House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H. R. 4550, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, 125, 131.

 Of course, if the ship is a total loss, and assuming no privity or knowledge, the owner’s liability would be nothing under the federal Act. All the insurance would then be available to claimants in the direct actions, if liability is present under Louisiana law.