Court Opinion

ID: 9605087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:29:59.654127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:44.040460
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s holding that the six-month speedy trial period includes a reasonable period after notification to the prosecution of defendant’s return to redocket the case and prepare for trial.
The majority’s reliance upon Kansas and Alaska authority is misplaced. In State v. Welch, 212 Kan. 180, 509 P.2d 1125 (1973), the court rested its ruling upon the permissible limits of the Kansas speedy trial statute, Kan.Stat.Ann., 22-3402 (1981), which is dissimilar to the Colorado statute, § 18-1-405, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). The language in Welch which was quoted in the majority opinion here was characterized as dictum by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Sherman, 217 Kan. 326, 536 P.2d 1373 (1975). As for the holding in Russell v. Anchorage, 626 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1981), it was limited to the situation in which, by virtue of the defendant’s inaction, no progress is made in the normal pretrial process before his disappearance. That factor is not present in this case.
The Colorado Supreme Court has been diligent in protecting a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial. See, e.g., People v. Moye, Colo., 635 P.2d 194 (1981); Marquez v. District Court, Colo., 613 P.2d 1302 (1980); Sweet v. Myers, Colo., 612 P.2d 75 (1980); Sanchez v. District Court, Colo., 612 P.2d 519 (1980); People v. Colantonio, 196 Colo. 242, 583 P.2d 919 (1978); People v. Gallegos, 192 Colo. 450, 560 P.2d 93 (1977); Harrington v. District Court, 192 Colo. 351, 559 P.2d 225 (1977); Saiz v. District Court, 189 Colo. 555, 542 P.2d 1293 (1975); People ex rel. Coca v. District Court, 187 Colo. 280, 530 P.2d 958 (1975). In Harrington, supra, the Court held that the language of § 18-1 — 405, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) “is mandatory and leaves no discretion for a court to fashion exceptions for the six-month rule apart from those delineated in the statute.” The speedy trial deadline cannot be extended even when the district court calendar does not permit trial within six months. Carr v. District Court, 190 Colo. 125, 543 P.2d 1253 (1975). Thus, in Colorado, the statutory guarantee of a speedy trial is not as flexible as the majority believes.
In my view § 18-l-405(6)(d), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) provides for an exclusion of time strictly limited to the period of actual unavailability of the defendant. However, the People are not prevented from obtaining additional time in which to prepare for trial after the defendant’s re-, turn. Section 18-l-405(6)(g), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) provides for the following *333exclusion of time from the speedy trial period:
“The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the consent of the defendant, if:

(II) The continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time in felony cases to prepare the state’s case and additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of the case and the court enters specific findings with respect to the justification.”
The majority reasons that, since the prosecution may obtain a continuance for a reason other than defendant’s escape, the speedy trial deadline may be extended automatically without a prosecution-requested continuance. I believe that the prosecution must request the continuance and convince the court that exceptional circumstances justify the continuance. In addition, the trial court must enter specific findings concerning the exceptional circumstances which justify the continuance. This statutory scheme offers significant additional protection to the defendant’s speedy trial guarantee, and cannot be bypassed by judicial permission for a reasonable period of delay beyond the date of the defendant’s return from escape. The General Assembly, if it chooses, may amend the statute to provide for an automatic extension of time. The judiciary may not. See Colo. Const., Art. Ill; People ex rel. VanMeveren v. District Court, 195 Colo. 34, 575 P.2d 4 (1978).