Court Opinion

ID: 9720642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:38:08.180428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:20.264994
License: Public Domain

*1564WOODS (A. M.), P. J.
I dissent from the conclusion of the majority that the municipal court did not lose jurisdiction until the transfer fees set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 399 were paid.
When this action was commenced, the municipal court had full and complete jurisdiction. It was endowed by law with subject matter jurisdiction and obtained personal jurisdiction over the parties. There can be no valid dispute that once it allowed amendment of the complaint to allege a cause of action for deprivation of plaintiff’s civil rights pursuant to 42 United State Code section 1983, it no longer had jurisdiction over the subject matter. Code of Civil Procedure section 3961 specifically provides that under these circumstances the court “must suspend all further proceedings therein and transfer the action ... to a court having jurisdiction thereof . . . .” (Italics added.)
This statutory language is consistent with case law acknowledging the fundamental nature of such a jurisdictional defect (Barnick v. Longs Drug Store, Inc. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 377, 379 [250 Cal.Rptr. 10]), and cases holding that where subject matter jurisdiction is lacking the court in which the action was commenced has only very limited power. It must order the case transferred (§ 396); it can, under appropriate circumstances, vacate the order of transfer (Badella v. Miller (1955) 44 Cal.2d 81, 86 [279 P.2d 729]); and it can perform those acts necessary to implement the transfer including acceptance of the transfer fee or dismissal of the action in the event the transfer fee is not timely paid. (§ 399; London v. Morrison (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 876, 879 [222 P.2d 941].) This limited power has been termed by some courts to be a “lack of jurisdiction” or a limitation of jurisdiction. (See Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715].) Others have described it as a suspension of jurisdiction. (See Schwenke v. J & P Scott, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 71, 78 [252 Cal.Rptr. 91].) Regardless of the precise terminology used, it is clear that in the case before us, proceedings were suspended, pursuant to section 396, until the transfer was accomplished.
Despite this state of the law, the majority concludes, without citation to supporting authority, that there was no period of time in which jurisdiction was suspended in this case. The majority, which distinguishes Schwenke v. J & P Scott, Inc., supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 71, on its facts, would presumably follow Schwenke and reach a contrary result here, but for the fact that appellant is responsible for an avoidable period of delay in the transfer of the case. This factual distinction does not bear close scrutiny.2
*1565By this dissent we have called to the majority’s attention the appropriate remedy for such delay, which is a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 399. This the majority summarily rejects “because it simply is not a defendant’s responsibility to hoist a warning flag for plaintiff’s benefit.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1562.) This argument renders at least a portion of the statute meaningless,3 in violation of the rules of statutory construction. (People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 480 [82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580].)
Further, the language of section 399 affords no support for the majority’s conclusion. The majority’s assertion to the contrary is based upon a non sequitur. The majority reasons that since section 399 requires payment of transfer fees “before such transfer is made” it therefore follows that “the municipal court is not divested of jurisdiction until the section 399 transfer fees are paid.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1562.) In fact, section 399 specifically provides: “The cause of action shall not be further prosecuted in any court until such costs and fees are paid.” (Italics added.) In other words, jurisdiction is suspended until the transfer is made.
It follows that there is a period of time which must, pursuant to section 583.340, be excluded from the computation of the five-year period within which the case can be brought to trial. Section 583.340 provides in pertinent part: “In computing the time within which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article, there shall be excluded the time during which any of the following conditions existed: [If] (a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended.”4 (Italics added.)
Any attempt to modify section 583.340’s unequivocal language is unsound. The running of the five years is stayed for the period of time during which the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is suspended. This legal fact cannot be compromised by the conduct of the moving party.
*1566For these reasons, appellant is entitled to have the 117 days between the filing of the amended complaint, on August 28, 1987, and the acceptance of the transfer by the superior court, on December 28, 1987, deleted from the computation of the 5-year statute of limitations. The trial court’s decision to the contrary was an abuse of discretion and the majority’s affirmance is not legally sound.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 20, 1990.

 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

 It should be noted that appellant did not unnecessarily delay the entire period from the time of the order to the time of the transfer. Only 65 days of that time constituted unneces*1565sary delay. Section 399 provides that the earliest date upon which the transfer can occur, even assuming immediate payment of transfer fees, is “after expiration of the time within which a petition for writ of mandate could have been filed,” i.e., “within 20 days after service of a written notice of the order” granting transfer. (§ 400.) In this case appellant gave written notice by mail on September 23, 1989. Allowing five days for service by mail (§ 1013), the last day upon which respondents could have petitioned the court for extraordinary relief was October 18, 1987, and the first date upon which the case could have been transferred was October 19, 1987. The fees were paid on December 23, 1987. Thus, the total period of avoidable delay was 65 days.

 The relevant language is: “If such costs and fees are not paid within 30 days after service of notice of such order, . . . then within 30 days after notice of finality of the order of transfer, the court on a duly noticed motion by any party may dismiss the action without prejudice to the cause on the condition that no other action on the cause may be commenced in another court prior to satisfaction of the court’s order for costs and fees.” (§ 399.)

 That period is from the filing of the verified amended complaint to the date the transfer was completed. (See Schwenke v. J & P Scott, Inc., supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 78, and cases cited therein.)