Court Opinion

ID: 9771173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:35:52.807257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:12.595071
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
A jury convicted appellant of attempted aggravated sexual assault and the trial judge assessed punishment at ten years confinement, probated. The Court of Appeals reversed. Wiltz v. State, 749 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988). On retrial, a jury again convicted appellant and appellant elected to have the trial judge assess punishment. However, a different judge presided at the retrial and that judge assessed appellant’s punishment at five years confinement. The Court of Appeals held the second sentence was more severe than the sentence assessed at the first trial and reversed. Wiltz v. State, 827 S.W.2d 372, 373 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992). We granted the State’s petition to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding a sentence of five years confinement was greater than a ten year prison sentence that was probated. The State contends the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with our decision in Lechuga v. State, 532 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
I.
On direct appeal, the State did not argue that the presumption of judicial vindietiveness in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), was inapplicable to the instant case. Rather the State conceded that Pearce applied and the Court of Appeals assumed that Pearce applied. However, for the following reasons, I am of the opinion that Pearce does not apply. Accordingly, I believe the majority errs in reaching the merits of the State’s ground for review.
II.
In Pearce the Supreme Court stated:
Due process of law then requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant’s exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725, 89 S.Ct. at 2080. The Court then held vindictiveness will be presumed whenever a more severe sentence is imposed upon retrial, unless “objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding” affirmatively appeared in the record. Id., 395 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081.
III.
Despite its broad language, Pearce has been narrowly applied. For example, there is no presumption of vindictiveness when a jury assesses the subsequent punishment. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973). And the presumption does not apply to the assessment of punishment at a trial de novo following an appeal from a lower court. Colten v. Ken*467tucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972).
In McCullough v. State, 720 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), we held the presumption applied where the same trial judge granted McCullough’s request for a new trial and assessed a punishment more severe than that originally assessed by the jury:
... the three important considerations of Pearce found inapplicable to jury resen-tencing in Chaffin are all present here: first, the trial judge obviously knew the sentence pronounced by the jury at the first trial, since she presided over the first trial. Second, the second sentence was in fact “meted out by the same judicial authority whose handling of the prior trial was sufficiently unacceptable to have required” a new trial. Finally, since the trial judge assessed punishment on retrial, the third element cited in Chaffin above is also present.
Id., 720 S.W.2d at 92.
However, the Supreme Court reversed our decision in Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986).
... The presumption of Pearce does not apply in situations where the possibility of vindictiveness is this speculative, particularly since the presumption may often “operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus ... block a legitimate response to criminal conduct.”
Id., 475 U.S. at 139, 106 S.Ct. at 979, quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2488, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982).
In Jackson v. State, 766 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), the trial judge assessed punishment at fifteen years. The trial judge then granted Jackson’s request for a new trial. A different judge presided at the retrial and the jury assessed punishment at twenty-five years. Jackson contended his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him to have the trial judge assess punishment because, under Pearce, the punishment could not have exceeded fifteen years and we agreed. Id., 766 S.W.2d at 510-11.
However, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded the ease for further consideration in fight of McCullough, supra. Texas v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 1114, 106 S.Ct. 1627, 90 L.Ed.2d 175 (1986). On remand we stated:
Simply put, if Pearce was not applicable to the facts of the ease it would not have been ineffective assistance of counsel for appellant’s counsel to have failed to inform appellant that Pearce did apply.
In fight of McCullough, was the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness really applicable to the facts of this case? Here the first trial judge granted appellant’s request for a new trial ... As in McCullough, this was hardly an act of vindictiveness. After the first trial judge left the state bench a new judge, with no connection with the case, was appointed to the court. Several months later appellant’s case, based on a new indictment, came to trial. Surely it cannot be said under the circumstances that the new or second trial judge had a “personal stake in the prior conviction.” Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. at 27, 93 S.Ct. at 1983. To presume vindictiveness from these facts would be speculative. If the new judge had been called upon to assess punishment, there would have been “different sentencers” and the Pearce presumption would not apply. The Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness finds no basis for application here.1
Jackson v. State, 766 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). We concluded Jackson had not been denied effective assistance of counsel. Id., 766 S.W.2d at 522.
IV.
Jackson established a general rule that a defendant is not entitled to the Pearce presumption when the defendant is sentenced by a different judge. Jackson, 766 S.W.2d at 521. This rule appears to be well-founded. In McCullough, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he [Pearce ] presumption [was] ... inapplicable because different sentencers assessed the varying sentences-” McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140, 106 S.Ct. at 979. Under such circumstances, the possibility of *468-476vindictiveness is too speculative to invoke the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness.2 Therefore, Pearce does not apply to the instant case because there is nothing in the record to suggest that the sentencing judge possessed a “personal stake in the prior conviction.” Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 27, 93 S.Ct. at 1983.
Since Pearce does not apply to the instant case, there is no need for the majority to determine which punishment was more severe. Consequently, the majority opinion, which resolves an issue not essential to the resolution of the instant case, is merely obi-ter dictum,3
With these comments, I concur only in the result.
MILLER and OVERSTREET, JJ., join this opinion.

. Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis herein is supplied by the author.

. As with every general rule, there will be exceptions. Just because the second sentence was assessed by a different judge will not necessarily insulate the sentence from the protections of Pearce. An appellate court must nevertheless review the record to guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process. McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138, 106 S.Ct. at 979. For example, in Bingham v. State, 523 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), we provided relief where the record established the sentencing judge was aware of the proceedings incident to the first sentence and there was a danger of retaliation against the defendant. Bingham, 523 S.W.2d at 950, (Roberts, J., concurring).

. The majority contends that this conclusion disrespects our Rules of Appellate procedure and unnecessarily voids balanced decisions of this Court such as Lechuga. Op. at 465 n. 2.
As a general rule our opinions should be limited to the issues presented by the parties because, in most cases, the parties present the issues necessary to resolve the case. However, there have been cases, where this Court has been compelled to reach issues necessary to resolve the case but not raised by the parties. Indeed, in Lechuga we resolved an issue in the interest of justice even though it had not been raised by appellant. Lechuga, 532 S.W.2d at 582. See also, Bobo v. State, 843 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (petition granted to determine viability of pre-text arrest doctrine under Texas Constitution but dismissed because pre-text doctrine not involved.); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (petition granted to consider continued viability of outstanding reasonable hypothesis analytical construct but Court required definition of reasonable doubt); and Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 199 n. 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (Court found point of error procedurally defaulted even though waiver not raised by the State.). By addressing the "more severe punishment issue,” the majority reaches an issue not necessaiy to the resolution of this case and, in addressing that issue, the majority implicitly overrules Jackson. I can only lament that the majority is unable to distinguish obiter dictum from "reasoned judicial restraint.”