Court Opinion

ID: 9495076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:53:50.115915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:47.833060
License: Public Domain

KEARSE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
To the extent that the majority’s decision means that plaintiff Hertzner may not pursue this appeal, I respectfully dissent. Although I too would deny the motion for reinstatement of the appeal, I would do so because in my view, under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (the “Rules”), the motion is superfluous because the appeal is already pending.
As the majority opinion sets forth, a final judgment against Hertzner was entered on February 28, 2000; on March 22, 2000, she filed a notice of appeal. However, on March 8, she had filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment pursuant to Rule 6.3 of the Local Rules of the district court. That motion, because it was filed within 10 days after the entry of judgment, is treated as a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment, see, e.g., United States ex rel. McAllan v. City of New York, 248 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir.2001), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 1301, 152 L.Ed.2d 212 (2002); Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Group Inc., 204 F.3d 397, 401 (2d Cir.2000), and, as such, made Hertzner’s notice of appeal ineffective prior to “the entry of the order disposing of the ... motion,” Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A); see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i) (notice of appeal ineffective during pendency of a timely motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), to alter or amend the judgment).
The Rules provide that “[i]f a party files a notice of appeal after the court announces or enters a judgment — but before it disposes of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A) — the notice becomes effective to *307appeal a judgment ... when the order disposing of the last such remaining motion is entered.” Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)© (emphasis added). The district court disposed of Hertzner’s reconsideration motion on November 29, 2000. Thus, as the majority opinion notes, ante at 304, her “notice of appeal ... became effective on November 29.”
When Hertzner’s notice of appeal became effective on November 29, in accordance with the express provision of Rule 4(a)(4)(B)©, her appeal was thereby pending. Because the November 29, 2000 reinstatement of the appeal occurred automatically by operation of that Rule, the May 2000 stipulation for a motion to reinstate the appeal called for a motion that was unnecessary. Indeed, I would say that, technically, a motion for the reinstatement of an already reinstated or pending appeal could not be granted. I would not allow the parties’ evidently insufficient familiarity with the Rules to override the Rules themselves. Thus, although Hertzner did eventually move to reinstate the appeal, I view that motion as simply superfluous. Neither the initial granting of that superfluous motion by our Staff Attorney’s Office nor the rescission of that grant affected the facts that Hertzner’s notice of appeal had automatically become effective in accordance with Rule 4(a)(4)(B)© as of November 29, and that the appeal was thereby pending.
I find it difficult to agree with the majority’s view that applying Rule 4(a)(4)(B)© as written, and considering an automatically reinstated appeal to be pending, poses any impediment to settlement or to this Court’s ability to clear its docket of appeals that have been filed prematurely. I also find it difficult to reconcile the present ruling with our decision in Compania Trasatlantica Espanola, S.A. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 950 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.1991). In that case, a premature notice of appeal was filed; no timely notice was ever filed; and there was no Rules provision for the automatic reinstatement of the appeal; yet we relieved the plaintiff of a prior stipulation withdrawing the premature appeal and setting a deadline for reinstatement of the appeal, which was missed, and we allowed the appeal to proceed. See id. at 106-07. It seems to me especially ironic, in light of the decision in Compañía Trasatlántico^ that in the present case, where the notice of appeal automatically became effective under the terms of Rule 4(a)(4)(B)©, the majority does not allow this appeal to proceed.
In sum, I regard the present appeal, which was automatically pending in this Court as of November 29, 2000, as still pending. Accordingly, I would deny the present motion for reinstatement on the ground that it is unnecessary, and I would permit the appeal to proceed.