Court Opinion

ID: 9621248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:54:18.598998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:03.103734
License: Public Domain

WOLLHEIM, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s use of the evidentiary presumption that an “[o]fficial duty has been regularly performed” in this case. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Defendant argues that the state failed to offer any evidence that she was the registered owner of the vehicle cited by photo radar. She asserts that, by neglecting that task, the state has not satisfied its burden of proof. The majority dismisses that contention by invoking the evidentiary presumption that an “[ojfficial duty has been regularly performed.” OEC 311(1)(j). I believe that defendant should also be afforded a presumption in this case. We should presume that defendant has not committed the infraction that she is charged with — at least until the state proves every element of its case — because of the presumption that “[tjhe law has been obeyed,” OEC 311(1)(x). In the resulting clash of presumptions, the question that results is this: shall the state’s presumption trump, shifting to defendant the burden of proving that an official duty was not performed, or shall defendant’s presumption prevail and force the state to prove that it was. OEC 310 instructs us on how to deal with that conflict: “If presumptions are conflicting, the presumption applies that is founded upon weightier considerations of policy and logic. If considerations of policy and logic are of equal weight, neither presumption applies.”
In this instance, the weightier policy consideration should be that which constrains the power of the state to make its case by a preponderance of the evidence, not a presumption thereof. Under OEC 310, the presumption relied on by the majority is in direct conflict with one of weightier consideration and should give way. It is a small thing to require, *444but one that is logical when juxtaposed with the resources1 the state may bring to bear against those suspected of breaking its laws, even the small ones.
I dissent.

 The fact that this case involves photo radar injects a certain “Buck Rogers” quality into the mix that fascinates me. From photo radar to computerized driver registration lists, the technology available today for law enforcement and adjudication is amazing. That said, it is disconcerting to note the following from the trial court’s dialogue with defendant’s attorney.
“Mr., this is not a game that’s gonna work, [counsel]. I am finding her guilty on the basis of the officer’s testimony and your decision to make no attempt to identify her one way or the other. You have identified yourself as the counsel of [defendant] and um . . . she clearly is the registered owner of the driver [sic] since she got the ticket and hired you, and I think that meets the burden of proof. I’m going to impose a $35 fine.” (Emphasis added.)
There are a plethora of tools at our disposal on which we may base our decisions. We are headed toward a judicial pickle, however, when we allow trial courts to find that, because a defendant got a ticket and retained a lawyer, the state’s burden of proving an important element of its case is automatically met.