Court Opinion

ID: 999719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:29:50.975787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:03.060788
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 98-4722

MICHAEL MIGUEL COWLES,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News.
Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-98-9)

Submitted: June 15, 1999

Decided: September 13, 1999

Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and WILLIAMS,
Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Sydney K.L. West, HORNE, WEST & MCMURTRIE, P.C.,
Gloucester, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States
Attorney, Laura M. Everhart, Assistant United States Attorney, Nor-
folk, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Michael Miguel Cowles appeals from his conviction and sentence
for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
cocaine and cocaine base, and distribution and possession with intent
to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West
1981 & Supp. 1999), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994), respectively. On
appeal, Cowles first challenges the district court's denial of his
motion for a continuance. We find that the district court's denial did
not deprive Cowles either of a fair trial or his Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel and, thus, was not an abuse of dis-
cretion. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983); United States
v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1079 (4th Cir. 1993).

Next, Cowles claims that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. We have
reviewed the record and find that a rational trier of fact, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have
found Cowles guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Tresvant, 677
F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). We therefore sustain the verdict. See
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).

Cowles next challenges the district court's two-point enhancement
of his offense level pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(c), for his role as a
leader in the drug conspiracy. While the trial testimony is somewhat
unclear as to whether the drug dealers to whom Cowles distributed
crack cocaine actually were recruited by Cowles, a review of the
record as a whole reveals that Cowles clearly was a leader in the drug
distribution network. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1, com-
ment. (n.4) (1997). Accordingly, we cannot say that the district
court's enhancement of Cowles' offense level was clearly erroneous.
See United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1147 (4th Cir. 1996).

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Cowles also claims that the district court clearly erred in applying
a two-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), for pos-
session of a firearm during the offense of the conviction. We find that
the court's decision was a factual determination based solidly on trial
testimony and hence not clearly erroneous. See United States v.
Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 880 (4th Cir. 1992).

Finally, Cowles claims that the district court erred by failing to
make a downward departure from the applicable guideline range, pur-
suant to USSG § 5K2.0. Absent circumstances not present here, a
decision not to depart is not reviewable. See United States v. Hall,
977 F.2d 861, 863 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d
28, 31 (4th Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, we affirm Cowles' conviction and sentence. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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