Court Opinion

ID: 9385955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 21:02:33.054714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.961653
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/10/23 P. v. Sozahdah CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                     B319642

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. LA093308)
           v.

 SIDDIQA SOZAHDAH,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Terrance T. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Office of Qais Zafari and Qais Zafari for Defendant
and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Yun K. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                            _____________________________
      After Respondent the People dismissed Appellant Siddiqa
Sozahdah’s charge for grand theft under Penal Code section 487,
subdivision (a),1 Appellant filed a petition under section 851.8
requesting a finding that she was factually innocent and an order
destroying her arrest records. The trial court denied the petition.
We affirm.
                         BACKGROUND
      On October 13, 2020, Appellant was arrested for an
outstanding warrant after Gerard Boeke filed a police report for
grand theft under section 487, subdivision (a). Appellant and
Boeke were in a romantic relationship and lived together in late
2019. Appellant alleges that Boeke was abusive towards her
throughout their relationship. On or about January 2020,
Appellant decided to move out of Boeke’s residence. Appellant
hired movers to move items into a storage unit. During the move,
Boeke claimed that Appellant stole his property valued at
approximately $31,066.99.
      On November 15, 2021, the prosecution dismissed the case
because Boeke did not wish to proceed due to recurrent travel
expenses from Florida to Los Angeles for the preliminary
hearing.
      Appellant filed a motion to seal and destroy arrest records
pursuant to section 851.8. The motion argued that Appellant was
factually innocent because she did not knowingly take Boeke’s
property. Appellant claimed the movers she hired unknowingly
took some of Boeke’s property, and she did not realize until she
saw the items in her storage unit. Appellant claims she called
and notified Boeke of the mistake, and Boeke retrieved his

1     All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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belongings from the storage unit. Appellant argued that the
motion should be granted in the interest of justice because she
did not have a prior record, was a registered nurse “in the front
lines fighting the COVID Pandemic,” and because Boeke
domestically abused her.
       The People filed an opposition based on facts taken from
the police report and the People’s Disposition Report. The People
noted that on January 20, 2020, Boeke’s neighbor, John
Nilmeyer, saw Appellant load Nike shoe boxes and a large,
framed art piece into her car. Another neighbor, Eric Bailey, saw
Appellant moving large garbage bags with painted canvases
sticking out of them into her car. Bailey contacted Boeke because
he believed the paintings belonged to Boeke.
       Boeke then arrived at his home and noticed that eight
paintings, about 30 pairs of Nike shoes, and various electronics
were missing. Boeke confronted Appellant about the missing
items and recorded the confrontation. The video showed
Appellant repeatedly saying, “What’s yours is mine.” Appellant
said she would keep his property until she and Boeke met
without phones or recording devices. Appellant also claimed that
Boeke owed her money and that she “didn’t want it to be this
way.”
       About 10 days later, Appellant posted a photo of herself on
social media wearing a Raiders football team jacket. Boeke
provided the prosecution a photo of himself wearing the same
jacket before January 20, 2020.
       Based on the police report, video evidence, and
photographs, the trial court found that Appellant did not meet
her burden under section 851.8 and denied the motion to seal her
arrest.

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        Appellant timely appealed.
                             DISCUSSION
I.      The Trial Court Properly Denied Appellant’s Section
        851.8 Motion
        “There are three classes of persons who may petition the
court for a finding of factual innocence. (§ 851.8, subds.
(a), (c), (d) & (e).) ‘Those classes are (1) persons who have been
arrested but no accusatory pleading has yet been filed [subd. (a)];
(2) persons who have been arrested and an accusatory pleading
has been filed but no conviction has occurred [subds. (c) & (d)];
and (3) persons who are “acquitted of a charge and it appears to
the judge presiding at the trial . . . that the defendant was
factually innocent” [subd. (e)].’ ” (People v. Mazumder (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 732, 738 (Mazumder).) Because Appellant was
arrested and the People filed an accusatory pleading but
dismissed the charges before trial, Appellant is in class (2), and
section 851.8, subdivision (c), is the applicable provision here.
        Section 851.8, subdivision (c), provides: “In any case where
a person has been arrested, and an accusatory pleading has been
filed, but where no conviction has occurred, the defendant may,
at any time after dismissal of the action, petition the court that
dismissed the action for a finding that the defendant is factually
innocent of the charges for which the arrest was made.”
        Section 851.8, subdivision (b), which prescribes the
procedure for petitions under section 851.8, subdivision (c), states
in relevant part: “A finding of factual innocence and an order for
the sealing and destruction of records pursuant to this section
shall not be made unless the court finds that no reasonable cause
exists to believe that the arrestee committed the offense for
which the arrest was made. In any court hearing to determine

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the factual innocence of a party, the initial burden of proof shall
rest with the petitioner to show that no reasonable cause exists to
believe that the arrestee committed the offense for which the
arrest was made. If the court finds that this showing of no
reasonable cause has been made by the petitioner, then the
burden of proof shall shift to the respondent to show that a
reasonable cause exists to believe that the petitioner committed
the offense for which the arrest was made.”
       “A petitioner’s burden to establish factual innocence has
been described as ‘ “incredibly high.” ’ ” (Mazumder, supra,
34 Cal.App.5th at p. 738; see People v. Esmaili (2013) 213
Cal.App.4th 1449, 1459 [“ ‘the record must exonerate, not merely
raise a substantial question as to guilt’ ”], italics omitted.)
“[S]ection 851.8 precludes the trial court from granting a petition
‘unless the court finds that no reasonable cause exists to believe’
the defendant committed the offense charged.” (People v. Adair
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 895, 904 (Adair).) “Reasonable cause is a well-
established legal standard, defined as that state of facts as would
lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and
conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the
person is guilty of a crime.” (Ibid., internal quotation marks
omitted.) “ ‘Establishing factual innocence . . . entails
establishing as a prima facie matter not necessarily just that the
[defendant] had a viable substantive defense to the crime
charged, but more fundamentally that there was no reasonable
cause to arrest him in the first place.’ ” (Id. at p. 905; see People
v. Forest (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1110.) To be entitled to
relief under section 851.8, “[t]he arrestee [or defendant] thus
must establish that facts exist which would lead no person of
ordinary care and prudence to believe or conscientiously

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entertain any honest and strong suspicion that the person
arrested [or acquitted] is guilty of the crimes charged.” (Adair, at
p. 904.)
       We review a trial court’s denial of a petition for factual
innocence under the de novo standard. (Adair, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at p. 908.) Although we “defer to the trial court’s factual findings
to the extent they are supported by substantial evidence, [we]
must independently examine the record to determine whether the
defendant has established ‘that no reasonable cause exists to
believe’ he . . . committed the offense charged.” (Id. at p. 897.)
       Appellant suggests that the trial court applied the wrong
legal standard because it stated that Appellant can be found
factually innocent “only if no cause exists to believe that [she]
committed the offense.” As discussed further below, even
applying the “no reasonable cause” standard set forth above,
Appellant fails to meet her burden.
       Appellant’s primary contention is that she could not be
guilty of grand theft because she did not take any of Boeke’s
“belongings knowingly.” To have the requisite intent for theft, a
defendant must either intend to deprive the owner permanently,
or to remove it from the owner’s possession for so extended a
period of a time that the owner would be deprived of a major
portion of the property’s value or enjoyment. (See People v. Avery
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57–58.)
       The record shows a plethora of evidence that would lead a
reasonable person of ordinary prudence to harbor a strong
suspicion that Appellant intended to deprive Boeke of his
property, either permanently or for an extended period of time so
as to deprive him of a major portion of his property’s value or
enjoyment. Nilmeyer, Boeke’s neighbor, saw Appellant load

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Nike shoe boxes and a large-framed art piece into her car.
Bailey, another neighbor, saw Appellant move large garbage bags
with painted canvases sticking out of them into her car. The
video evidence shows Appellant insinuating that she took Boeke’s
belongings intentionally. She states that Boeke owes her money
and she did not “want it to be this way.” She also states, “what’s
yours is mine,” implying that Boeke’s property is also hers to
take. Appellant further states in the video that she would meet
with Boeke without phones to resolve everything. The police
report notes, “it can be inferred that she has his belongings and is
keeping them until he agrees to meet with her under different
circumstances.” Ten days later, Appellant posted a photo on
social media wearing Boeke’s Raiders team jacket. Boeke
provided the police of a photo of himself wearing the same jacket
prior to the theft.
       Appellant cherry-picks a statement from the police report
that says, “[t]he videos do not depict a theft. It appears Susp-1 is
collecting her belongings.” However, the report goes on to say, “If
Susp-1 is responsible for the theft, it was done prior to these
videos.” As such, the lack of video evidence depicting the actual
theft is not dispositive given the other evidence in the record,
including photographs, witness accounts, and statements
Appellant made in the video implying she knew she was taking
Boeke’s property.
       In sum, having considered the totality of the evidence,
including the police report, video evidence, witness accounts, and
photographs, we cannot conclude there were facts “which would
lead no person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or
conscientiously entertain any honest and strong suspicion that

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[Appellant] is guilty of the crime[] charged.” (Adair, supra,
29 Cal.4th at pp. 904–905, 909.)

                         DISPOSITION
     The trial court’s order denying Appellant’s section 851.8
motion is affirmed.

                                           VIRAMONTES, J.
We Concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             WILEY, J.

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