Court Opinion

ID: 9848989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:31:51.133447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:56.114618
License: Public Domain

McHUGH, Justice,
dissenting in part, concurring in part:
Standing alone, the syllabus agreed upon by the Court’s majority is laudatory and it is supported by sound legal authorities. *618The text of the opinion, however, reveals that the majority pressed forward, adding requirements which could only be characterized as bizarre, and certainly not supported by any legal authority.
Appropriately enough, the majority opinion follows the holdings of Texas State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40, 50 (1983), and Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978). These cases all support the syllabus in this case. However, without any fanfare or any supporting legal authority, the majority’s economic whims arrive front and center, thus, effectively eroding the holding set forth in the syllabus. Under a fair reading of the Court’s opinion in this case, these whims of the majority become the standard by which the syllabus is to be applied. Clearly, application of this new standard represen'ts a departure from the holdings of Texas State Teachers, Hensley, and Nadeau.
Although any reasonable interpretation of the cases cited above and relied upon by the majority would require attorney fees to be awarded if the plaintiff “prevailed,” as that term is commonly understood by courts across the country, the majority in this case has added an absurd requirement. Now, a trial judge is required to ascertain at what point during litigation a “reasonable” offer to settle the case was made. Clearly, this is unduly burdensome and will cause lawyers and judges throughout our state to scratch their heads in amazement at the novel way the majority of the Court has chosen to resolve this case.
Perhaps the reason the majority’s approach is not supported by any legal authority is that the potential result in many cases will be lamentably inequitable and inconsistent with the legislative purpose of W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985]. What the majority fails to comprehend is that often, the relief sought and/or obtained in cases brought under W.Va. Code, 22A-3-25 [1985] does not revolve around monetary damages. This failure to comprehend is evident in the majority’s pronouncement that “a party who receives less from the jury than he was offered by his opponent has not necessarily ‘materially altered’ their relationship.” In this case, the only relief obtained was that the appellee was required to replace the appellant’s water supplies. It does not require a great deal of computation to see that in this case, the amount of compensation obtained by the appellants, specifically, zero, is less than the appellee’s offer. Consequently, under the majority’s approach, the trial court is permitted to find that the parties’ relationship was not “materially altered,” when in fact, it was.
Those who seek to protect their air, land, and water under the provisions of W.Va. Code, 22A-3-1, et seq. will be thwarted in their efforts under the majority’s opinion, which will act as a barrier to environmental justice in many ways, but most importantly, by rejecting the concept that, in most instances, those who seek these vindications lack sufficient funds to obtain legal counsel.
By enacting W. Va. Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985], the legislature sought to promote its policy that “it is essential to the economic and social well-being of the citizens of the state of West Virginia to strike a careful balance between the protection of the environment and the economical mining of coal needed to meet energy requirements.” W.Va.Code, 22A-3-2 [1985]. The statute at issue in this case, W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985], does not require a trial judge to ascertain at what point in the litigation a reasonable offer to settle was made before it may award attorney fees. By adding this ludicrous requirement, the Court’s majority has amended the statute so that litigants with legitimate causes of action will now be stifled in their efforts to seek remuneration by way of the provided legislative remedy.
Nor do the cases discussing the “prevailing party” standard require such a determi*619nation by the trial judge. For example, in Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Campbell Industries, 732 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was faced with a case involving the recoverability of attorney fees in an antitrust action under the federal Clayton Act.1 As the majority in this case has done, the court in Southwest Marine looked to the recoverability of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). In applying that standard to recovering attorney fees under the Clayton Act, the court stated:
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 a plaintiff may be awarded attorney’s fees if he is a ‘prevailing party.’ In American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.1981), we held that a plaintiff need not obtain formal relief to recover fees. Rather, for there to be a ‘prevailing party,’ there must simply be a causal relationship between the litigation brought and the practical outcome realized. Id. at 187; Pomerantz v. County of Los Angeles, 674 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir.1982). As a result of the action filed by plaintiff, the defendants decided to permit Southwest Marine to use the dock under an assignment from National Steel and Shipbuilding Co. Thus, whether or not plaintiff ultimately prevails on damages on remand, it has ‘prevailed’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 543 F.Supp. 126, 130 (E.D.Va.1982).
732 F.2d at 747 (emphasis supplied). See also Sciambra v. Graham News, 892 F.2d 411, 415-16 (5th Cir.1990) (“[I]t does not follow ... that an attorneys’ fees award is dependent on a compensatory damages award.” Rather, the statute which permits attorney fees “and the fact of damage analysis make the actual recovery of compensatory damages irrelevant to the recov-erability of attorneys’ fees.”)
The guidelines set forth in the text of the majority’s opinion will also make it more difficult for lawyers who represent those who seek to vindicate their environmental rights. For example, the trial court’s new duty to determine when a reasonable offer to settle was made will now factor into the lawyer’s judgment as to when he or she would advise acceptance or rejection of such an offer. Consequently, lawyers who represent plaintiffs in actions brought under this article will be hesitant to even discuss settlement options for fear that ultimately “prevailing” may really mean not receiving a fee when representing a client who is suffering from economic hardship, just because no compensatory damages were awarded. In other words, the majority would prefer that those only knock on the courthouse door who are wealthy enough to vindicate their environmental rights.
Provisions which award reasonable attorney fees are not uncommon in statutes whose ultimate purposes are to provide a remedy for an alleged wrongdoing. See, e.g., W.Va.Code, 22A-1A-20 [1985] (allowing costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees in the event a miner is discriminated against for seeking corrections of mine violations); and W.Va.Code, 5-11-13 [1983] (allowing reasonable attorney fees for complainants who prove discriminatory practices). These statutes all require “reasonableness” in awarding attorney fees.
However, the majority opinion in this case confuses the question of whether an award of attorney fees may even be recovered with the question of whether such fees are reasonable. By asserting that at some points during the parties’ dispute, recovery of attorney fees is reasonable, while at other points, such recovery is not reasonable, the majority opinion equates reasonable attorney fees with recoverable attorney fees. W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985] does not contemplate such a scheme.
Rather, once it has been determined that the plaintiff is a “prevailing” party, i.e., *620properly applying the Court’s syllabus in this case, then the trial court is to determine whether the attorney fees sought to be recovered by the plaintiff are reasonable.
[I]t has been recognized that there are several general factors, more or less constant in the cases, which may properly be considered in passing upon the amount to be allowed as a reasonable compensation to an attorney. These factors have been well summarized in Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professional Responsibility!;.]
1 Stuart M. Speiser, Attorneys’ Fees § 8:2 (1973).
The general factors contained in Disciplinary Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are also contained in Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which have been adopted by this Court. Rule 1.5 provides, in part:
(а) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(б) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
We have adopted similar guidelines where attorney fees are sought against a third party in syllabus point 4 of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 176 W.Va. 190, 342 S.E.2d 156 (1986).
None of these factors deal with settlement offers or at what point during litigation a “reasonable” offer to settle was made so as to allow an award of attorney fees.
Because these factors have long been key to determining reasonableness of attorney fees, the majority should have looked to these factors with which trial judges and lawyers possess more than just a passing familiarity.
Because I believe that the majority of the Court in this case wrongfully added a requirement not called for by W.Va.Code, 22A-3-25(f) [1985], and then conditioned recovery of attorney fees upon this requirement, I dissent. However, I concur with the statement contained in the syllabus, per se.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice MILLER joins in this opinion.

. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1978).