Court Opinion

ID: 9720443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:31:03.838293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:18.326997
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The majority has reached a result that would not be expected or intended from the language of the insurance policy. In fact, the policy language clearly states an exclusion from coverage that embraces this case.
Coverage E excludes personal liability to others for “bodily injury” expected or intended by the insured. The majority’s analysis transforms this exclusion language to “death” expected or intended by the insured. Of course, the tragic death of Matt was not expected or intended by anyone. But to assign this as the reason that exclusionary insurance coverage does not apply subverts the policy principles cited by the majority.
The policy construction should not turn on whether death was expected or intended. “Bodily injury” is defined in the policy itself to include “bodily harm” as well as death. Bodily harm obviously has a broader scope than just the ultimate harm of death. The construction by the majority so narrows the policy exclusion that it would virtually have no application.
In a death case little short of murder would be excluded. If the insured intended to kill but succeeded only in maiming the victim, coverage would apply because the injury was not specifically intended by the assailant. In a less extreme case, the exclusion would not prevent coverage if the assailant intended to break the victim’s arm but broke his leg instead. Such an interpretation totally changes the purpose of homeowners insurance covering accidents.
The policy exclusion does not depend on how severe or how tragic were the consequences of the act. The exclusion applies because the trial court found that harm was intended by the insured to another. The principles enunciated in Altena v. United Fire and Casualty Co., 422 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Iowa 1988), apply to deny coverage. An insurer is entitled to rely on them in gauging the risk of its insurance underwriting.
The majority distinguishes this case from Altena because the exclusion in the AMCO homeowners policy issued to the Hahts excluded damages for “bodily injury ... intended by the insured.” The majority adopts the view that the exclusion applies only when the insured has the specific intent to cause the type of injury suffered. This test would apply in all cases where the intentional injury exclusion clause in an insurance policy has language similar to the AMCO policy. In Altena, we expressly rejected that view in favor of the majority rule, noting our decision in McAndrews v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 349 N.W.2d 117 (Iowa 1984), in which we denied coverage to an insured who injured the victim in self defense under an exclusion for “bodily injury which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” We did not distinguish the policy language in McAndrews when we examined that decision in Altena. In fact, in Altena we relied extensively on cases that interpreted exclusion clauses with language identical or similar to the AMCO policy. See Altena, 422 N.W.2d at 488-89. We cited these decisions from other jurisdictions to support the majority rule that *847the intent to act and the intent to cause some kind of bodily injury are sufficient to deny insurance coverage. The language in the AMCO policy does not direct that we now adopt a different view.
In Pachucki v. Republic Insurance Co., 89 Wis.2d 703, 278 N.W.2d 898 (1979), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied coverage for the insured’s intentional acts under a policy exclusion for “bodily injury ... which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” The insured struck the victim, injuring his eye, with a “greening pin” which he had projected with a rubber band. The court found that the insured intended to strike the victim’s body with the pin and intended to inflict no greater harm than a “sting” to the victim. The Wisconsin court held that recovery must be barred under the intentional tort exclusionary sections of the applicable insurance policies because the insured intended to act and to inflict injury; it was immaterial that the resulting injury was different in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended. Id. at 904.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has examined similar exclusion language in Iowa Kemper Insurance Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.1978). In that case, the insured intentionally struck the victim with the buckle of his belt which he had wrapped around his hand. The blow caused the victim to suffer from a continuing epileptic condition. The homeowners insurance policy in the name of the insured’s father provided that there would be no coverage for “bodily injury ... caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured.” The Supreme Court of Minnesota determined that there would be no coverage. The court stated:
The “intent” required to exclude coverage is neither the “intent to act” nor the “intent to cause the specific injury complained of.” Rather, it is the “intent to cause bodily injury” even if the actual injury is more severe or of a different nature than the injury intended.
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The rule is well-established and well-reasoned, consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties to the insurance contract and the public policy against “licensing” intentional and unlawful harmful acts. In the instant case, the direct and inferential evidence permits only one conclusion: [the insured] intended to injure [the victim]. The district court’s conclusion to that effect was clearly correct; coverage was therefore properly excluded.
Id. at 887.
In Youngwirth v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., we set out principles applicable to intent of the parties in insurance contracts.
A second principle auxiliary to the determination of intent is that the language of insurance contracts must be given its common and ordinary meaning and must be construed as popularly understood. We have said: “... the words, terms, and provisions of insurance contracts, and particularly clauses limiting or excluding liability on the policy, must be given a practical, reasonable and fair interpretation.... Such words must be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning and not peculiar or technical meanings.”
258 Iowa 974, 978, 140 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1966); see also Stover v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 189 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa 1971); Hein v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 166 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Iowa 1969).
The majority has carved out of the policy an exception to the policy exclusion concerning eleven-year-olds injuring someone in a playground argument. Nothing in the policy remotely suggests the creation of this idea. While compassion for parties suffering tragic injuries has a rightful place in law it should not negate the clear meaning of language already fixed by our jurisprudence. An insurer is entitled to have some idea of what it is insuring.
Christopher Haht intended to hit and cause bodily injury to Matt Lottman. The fact that the injury was more severe than Christopher intended is not a consideration *848under the principles we adopted in Altena. Coverage should be denied.
McGIVERIN, C.J., and SCHULTZ, J., join this dissent.