Court Opinion

ID: 9563244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:38:05.848655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:46.976290
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The federal Constitution protects both a woman’s right to obtain an abortion during the early months of pregnancy and the right of every person to publicly and peacefully express an opinion on emotionally charged and controversial issues like abortion. When presented with a case like this one, in which these constitutional rights appear to collide, a court must take special care to ensure that both rights are effectively protected, so far as reasonably possible.
In this case, a medical clinic that was the subject of anti-abortion demonstrations asked a court for an injunction to protect itself and its clients. The trial court issued preliminary orders permitting only a small number of protesters on the sidewalk in front of the clinic. Eleven months later, it issued a permanent injunction prohibiting any protesters on that sidewalk, even though the clinic had not sought such a blanket prohibition. We granted review solely to consider the validity of the sidewalk exclusion. The majority concludes that the exclusion was proper. I cannot agree.
My disagreement is not with the majority’s descriptions of the pertinent law or the relevant interests at stake. Rather, I disagree with the majority’s account of the operative facts and the conclusion it reaches by applying the law to those facts. Relying on fragmentary and equivocal testimony, the majority derives from the trial court record a factual picture that is incomplete and misleading. As I will explain, the record supports the trial court’s decision to establish a buffer zone around the clinic, but not its absolute prohibition of speech within that zone.
I. Standard of Review
When it reviews an order restricting First Amendment rights, an appellate court must “ ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ ... to *884make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’ ” (Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 499 [80 L.Ed.2d 502, 515-516, 104 S.Ct. 1949], quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 284-286 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 708-710, 84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412]; see also In re Capital Cities/ABC Inc.’s to Sealed Transc. (3d Cir. 1990) 913 F.2d 89, 92 [when considering claimed First Amendment violations, reviewing courts “exercise substantially broader review” including “independent consideration of the [trial] court’s order and the factual findings inferred from the evidence before it”]; United States v. Smith (3d Cir. 1986) 787 F.2d 111, 113, fn. 1 [recognizing reviewing courts’ “special obligation” to independently examine the record in “the First Amendment context”].) The United States Supreme Court has explained the rationale for this heightened standard of review, in these words: “‘[I]t is of prime importance that no constitutional freedom, least of all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, be defeated by insubstantial findings of fact screening reality.’ ” (NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, 924 [73 L.Ed.2d 1215, 1243, 102 S.Ct. 3409], quoting Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co. (1941) 312 U.S. 287, 293 [85 L.Ed. 836, 841, 61 S.Ct. 552, 132 A.L.R. 1200].) I fear this is precisely what has happened in this court with this case.
The majority pays lip service to the independent judgment standard of review, but it does not give the trial evidence the careful scrutiny that the standard requires.
II. Facts and Proceedings
The following are the relevant facts disclosed by application of the independent judgment standard of review to the record before this court. I begin with a description of the physical characteristics of the protest site, followed by a summary of pertinent trial court proceedings and the evidence presented in support of the permanent injunction at issue.
A. Physical Characteristics of the Protest Site
The site of the demonstrations at issue in this case is a public sidewalk in front of a building on Broadway in the City of Vallejo. Inside the building is a medical clinic operated by Planned Parenthood. The record discloses that the clinic is set well back from the street and sidewalk, with its entrances at or near the back of the building.
More precisely, the record shows that the clinic occupies the back of a one-story building, with a tax service business occupying the front. The staff *885entrance to the clinic is in the back of the building; its public entrance is on the side of the building near the back corner. The lot on which the building is situated is approximately 100 feet wide and 184 feet deep; the building itself is 36 feet wide and 64 feet deep.
In front of the building, between the tax service and the public sidewalk, is a parking area that extends around one side and to the back of the building. The distance between building and sidewalk is 44 feet. Two driveways intersect the sidewalk, providing clients and staff of the tax service and clinic with access to Broadway, a busy four-lane avenue. Across Broadway from the tax service and the clinic is an office occupied by Birthright of Vallejo/Benicia, an organization that opposes abortion.
B. The Complaint and the Temporary Restraining Order
This case began on August 8, 1990, when Planned Parenthood filed its verified complaint for injunctive relief. The complaint named as defendants Citizens for Life and Christine Williams, its director.
The complaint alleged that defendants, beginning in March 1990, had intimidated and harassed workers and clients of Planned Parenthood by verbally assaulting people entering and leaving the parking lot, by physically obstructing the driveway, and by forcing or attempting to force anti-abortion literature on people and vehicles at or near the clinic. The complaint further alleged that defendants had “disrupted and attempted to disrupt” business at the clinic through nonamplified noise and by gaining or attempting to gain entrance to the parking lot, grounds, walkways, and offices.
In the complaint, Planned Parenthood asked the court to enjoin defendants from (1) trespassing on clinic property, (2) blocking the driveway, (3) harassing or threatening any person entering or leaving the clinic, (4) shouting words “likely to disturb the peace” of Planned Parenthood, its staff, or its clients, (5) bringing children to the picket line, (6) shouting or using amplification devices to disturb Planned Parenthood’s business, and (7) otherwise attempting to intimidate and harass Planned Parenthood’s staff and clients.
The complaint also specifically asked the trial court to restrict the number of picketers ‘to two on the public sidewalk.” Planned Parenthood supported this request with two declarations, one by its attorney and the other by Janine Schoenfeld, Planned Parenthood’s “escort coordinator.” In her declaration, Schoenfeld described the anti-abortion protest activities of members and supporters of Citizens for Life. She then set forth the scope and justification *886for the proposed limit on the number of picketers, in these words: “One picket could stand on one of the sidewalks, and one on the other side of the driveway in safety in order to get their message across. All people going into the clinic would have to pass their signs. Their viewpoint would be clear to passers-by on Broadway.”
On the same day (August 8, 1990), the trial court issued a temporary restraining order (hereafter TRO) that, among other things,1 allowed no more than two protesters on the sidewalk directly in front of the clinic. The TRO remained in effect until the trial court dissolved it on August 28, 1990.
C. The Hearing and the Preliminary Injunction
On September 12, 1990, the court held a hearing on Planned Parenthood’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The witnesses at the hearing were Janice Schoenfeld (the Planned Parenthood employee whose declaration had been submitted with the complaint) and Jeanette Hammer, an anti-abortion protester.
Schoenfeld testified that her job at the clinic included escorting women into the clinic from the parking lot on days that the clinic provided abortion services. Of particular relevance for our purposes, she testified that the protests organized by defendants began in March 1990, that she had never asked the police to arrest any protesters, that she had never made a citizen’s arrest of any of the protesters, and that the police had come to the site once and had then admonished the protesters to stay on the sidewalk and to leave alone any person who so requested.
Hammer testified that she had picketed the clinic and had volunteered her services as a counselor to women approaching or leaving the clinic. She also testified that she had undergone an abortion herself and that this experience had led her to the view that pregnant women need information to help them make the important decision of whether or not to have an abortion.
One week after the hearing, on September 19, 1990, the court issued a preliminary injunction. In relevant part, the preliminary injunction “[r]e-strict[ed] picketing and/or counseling to the public sidewalk in front of the building” but nonetheless provided that defendants could “maintain four (4) *887pickets and not more than two (2) shall be less than ten feet from any other picketer or counselor.” The preliminary injunction remained in force until August 1, 1991, when the trial court issued the permanent injunction.
D. The Trial and the Permanent Injunction
Planned Parenthood’s application for a permanent injunction was tried to the court on April 18, 1991. On that date, the preliminary injunction had already been in force for seven months. The trial lasted less than four hours and included the testimony of just three witnesses, all called by Planned Parenthood.
One of the witnesses was Janice Schoenfeld, the Planned Parenthood employee who had previously testified in support of the preliminary injunction. At the trial, she testified as follows: Before the issuance of the injunction, there had been eight picketers outside the clinic or in the clinic’s parking lot, and on one weekend day there had been nearly one hundred protesters on the sidewalk in front of the clinic. In August of 1990, a police officer had told her that a representative of defendant Citizens for Life had contacted the police to find out “the rules regarding picketing at the clinic.” With respect to events occurring after issuance of the preliminary injunction, the record shows the following exchange:
“Q. [by counsel for Planned Parenthood] Have you observed picket activity since the injunction?
“A. [by Schoenfeld] Yes, but they followed the injunction usually, except for picketers.
“[Counsel for Planned Parenthood]: Thank you. I have nothing further. Thank you.
“The Court: You say that they followed the injunction?
“The Witness: They followed the injunction, yes since the injunction.”
Schoenfeld was never asked to explain her cryptic remark that the protesters had obeyed the injunction “except for the picketers.” The only elucidation was provided by the trial court’s follow-up question, in which Schoenfeld reaffirmed that “they” had “followed the injunction.” To the extent this equivocal remark might be construed as evidence that “picketers” had not “followed the injunction” (the majority does so construe it), it is the legal conclusion of a lay witness, unsupported by specific facts, and thus not *888competent evidence. (See Evid. Code, § 800; People v. De Santis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210]; Lombardo v. Santa Monica Young Men’s Christian Assn. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 529, 540 [215 Cal.Rptr. 224]; Pond v. Insurance Co. of North America (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 280, 289 [198 Cal.Rptr. 517].)
Another trial witness was Marsha Anderson, the clinic’s director. At one point in her testimony, she stated: “I called the police to issue the injunction a couple of times, to hand it out to people who were on the sidewalk and were about to break the rules, or breaking the rules.” Because the majority relies upon this statement as evidence that “police enforcement of the terms of the preliminary injunction had been necessary” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 866), this statement deserves careful examination.
In her testimony, Anderson never explained what specific acts by the protesters led her to conclude that they were “about to break the rules, or breaking the rules.” Thus her testimony suffers from the same defect as the testimony of Schoenfeld: it is the legal conclusion of a lay witness, unsupported by specific facts, and thus it is not competent evidence. (Evid. Code, § 800.) Apparently seeking to avoid this difficulty, the majority infers that these “rule” violations consisted of specific acts, such as writing down license plate numbers and handing literature through car windows in the parking lot, that Anderson had described earlier in her testimony. But the record will not permit this inference. Rather, the record shows that plaintiff’s counsel asked Anderson to describe incidents “that occurred during the period of picketing before the injunction” (italics added), and the record shows that Anderson’s descriptions of specific acts were in answer to this question. Anderson never stated that the protesters engaged in the same or similar conduct after issuance of the preliminary injunction, nor is there any evidence in the record to support a reasonable inference that such conduct occurred.
The third trial witness was defendant Christine Williams, the director of Citizens for Life. She testified that Planned Parenthood had called the police in August of 1990, but that since the injunction the picketing had been lawful.
On August 1, 1991—four months after the trial and eleven months after issuance of the preliminary injunction—the trial court issued a permanent injunction ordering that “[a]ll picketing, demonstrating or counseling at the Planned Parenthood building shall only take place along the public sidewalk across the street from the Planned Parenthood building.”
*889III. First Amendment Analysis
The First Amendment prohibits all government action abridging freedom of speech and assembly. (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.) The United States Supreme Court has described this constitutional guarantee, and its role in our political system, this way: “The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.” (Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15, 24 [29 L.Ed.2d 284, 293, 91 S.Ct. 1780].)
Because this case concerns an injunction that prohibits picketing and distributing literature on a public sidewalk, there can be no doubt that the First Amendment is implicated. Picketing and leafleting are expressive activities at the core of the First Amendment. (See, e.g., Boos v. Barry (1988) 485 U.S. 312, 318 [99 L.Ed.2d 333, 342-343, 108 S.Ct. 1157]; United States v. Grace (1983) 461 U.S. 171,176-177 [75 L.Ed.2d 736, 742-744,103 S.Ct. 1702].) And a public sidewalk is a quintessential public forum, a place traditionally used for exchanging ideas and expressing opinions. (Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 474, 480 [101 L.Ed.2d 420, 428-429, 108 S.Ct. 2495]; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund (1985) 473 U.S. 788, 802 [87 L.Ed.2d 567, 579-580, 105 S.Ct. 3439]; Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 482 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 841 P.2d 975].)
Yet, even in a public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech. To be reasonable, however, the restrictions must be (1) content neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication. (Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 791 [105 L.Ed.2d 661, 675, 109 S.Ct. 2746].)
A. Content Neutrality
The permanent injunction’s establishment of a protective buffer zone on the sidewalk in front of the clinic is, on its face, neutral as to content. It prohibits all speech in the buffer zone, not just speech carrying a certain message. But to satisfy the constitutional requirement of content neutrality, it is not enough that the restriction itself is neutral as to content. The justification for the restriction must take no account of the content of the *890restricted speech. (Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra, 491 U.S. 781, 791 [105 L.Ed.2d 661, 675] [“Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’ ”].)
Insofar as the justification for the buffer zone is ensuring ingress and egress to the clinic, it is content neutral. Regardless of their message, protesters may be enjoined from blocking driveways or otherwise physically obstructing the passage of automobiles and pedestrians going to or coming from the clinic. Also content neutral is the justification that excessive noise levels from sidewalk protesters could compromise the medical treatment and welfare of patients within the clinic. No matter what the message sought to be conveyed, excessively noisy speech can be enjoined when it interferes with sound medical practice.
But the majority may violate the content neutrality requirement when it suggests that the buffer zone may be justified as a means of preventing emotional or psychological distress to women seeking abortion or other pregnancy-related services at the clinic. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 873-874.) This emotional distress may in large measure be attributable to the content of the anti-abortion message, and not merely the manner in which the content is expressed. To the extent this is true, the offered justification is impermissible, for restrictions on speech may not be based on how the message affects those who receive it. (Texas v. Johnson (1989) 491 U.S. 397, 414 [105 L.Ed.2d 342, 360, 109 S.Ct. 2533] [“government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable”]; Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971) 402 U.S. 415, 419 [29 L.Ed.2d 1, 5, 91 S.Ct. 1575] [“claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the First Amendment”]; Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo (1994) 135 N.J. 126, 139 [638 A.2d 1260, 1266]; see also Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) § 12-3, p. 795, fn. 4.)
B. Alternative Channels of Communication
The permanent injunction confines all picketing to the opposite side of a busy, four-lane avenue. Persons entering or leaving the clinic may not notice the protesters standing across the roadway, and unless they make the effort to cross that roadway, they will be unable to converse with the protesters in a normal tone of voice or to peruse or accept their offered literature. At this distance from persons entering and leaving the clinic, the only speech left to the protesters is that conveyed by placards and shouted slogans.
*891Moreover, there is a substantial risk that the protesters’ message will be grossly misinterpreted by casual viewers. Because the protests must take place in front of the office of Birthright of Vallejo/Benicia, those passing by, including pregnant women contemplating abortion, may assume the protest is directed against that organization, which opposes abortions, rather than against the medical clinic, which provides them.
Under these circumstances, I conclude that the permanent injunction does not leave the protesters with ample alternative channels of communication.
C. Narrow Tailoring
The majority incorrectly concludes that the prohibition here is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. The government does, as the majority states (maj. opn., ante, p. 873), have a significant interest in safeguarding the health and safety of people seeking medical services (see, e.g., Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB (1978) 437 U.S. 483 [57 L.Ed.2d 370, 98 S.Ct. 2463] [enforcing National Labor Relations Board order requiring hospital to allow union distribution of literature and solicitation in hospital cafeteria visited by patients]), and also in protecting private property and ensuring public safety (see Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, supra, 135 N.J. 126, 146-147 [638 A.2d 1260, 1270]). But identifying significant government interests is only part of the constitutional requirement. A restriction on speech must be narrowly tailored to serve those interests.
The preliminary injunction allowing four picketers on the sidewalk was in effect for eleven months. Had the terms of the preliminary injunction been less than completely effective in protecting the health and safety of the clinic’s patients, Planned Parenthood would surely have presented detailed evidence of specific problems during this time. Indeed, as the plaintiff in the action (see Evid. Code, § 500), and as the party seeking to restrict speech (see Healy v. James (1972) 408 U.S. 169, 184-185 [33 L.Ed.2d 266, 281-282, 92 S.Ct. 2338]), Planned Parenthood was required to do so or have this crucial factual issue resolved against it. Yet the relevant evidence at trial, which I have summarized, includes no such testimony.
As this court has explained, a complete prohibition on picketing is permitted “where past picketing has become so irrevocably blended with acts of violence, physical intimidation or other unlawful conduct as to give rise to a justifiable belief that future picketing is likely to result in a continuance of the illegal acts.” (Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128 (1942) 19 Cal.2d 676, 683 [123 P.2d 20].) Conversely, when the picketing “has been in general lawful,” even though there may have “infrequent illegal acts not of a serious *892character,” then a total prohibition on picketing is not permitted and “only the unlawful conduct will be enjoined.” (Id. at p. 684.) Here, the evidence fails to establish that the protesters resorted to physical violence, nor does it establish repeated and serious violations of the preliminary injunction. I therefore conclude that the more severe restrictions of the permanent injunction, completely prohibiting speech on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic, were not reasonably necessary to protect the health and safety of the clinic’s patients.
The majority offers various arguments against this conclusion, but none is persuasive.
Relying on a case upholding a limitation on noisy demonstrations (Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 106 [33 L.Ed.2d 222, 226, 92 S.Ct. 2294]), the majority appears to suggest that the total ban on picketing within the sidewalk buffer zone is necessary to protect the patients inside the clinic from disturbance. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 872.) But another portion of the permanent injunction, the legality of which is not before us, prohibits the picketers from “making any noise that can be heard inside the premises.” Because this other provision adequately protects the patients inside the clinic from disruption, and because there is no credible evidence that sidewalk protesters generated excessive noise during the life of the preliminary injunction, the ban on picketing in front of the clinic may not be justified as a noise prevention measure.
The majority relies heavily on Frisby v. Schultz, supra, 487 U.S. 474, as supporting a complete prohibition of picketing directed against “captive” listeners. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 872-873 & fn. 6.) In Frisby, the United States Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting picketing “ ‘before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual ....’” (487 U.S. at p. 477 [101 L.Ed.2d at pp. 426-427].) The court found there were ample alternative opportunities for the exercise of free speech, emphasized the unique nature of the home as a citadel of repose, and concluded that the picketing in that case was not directed at the public. (Id. at pp. 485-486 [101 L.Ed.2d at pp. 432-433].)
The reasoning of Frisby does not support the majority’s result here. This case involves picketing of a medical clinic, not a residence. The ample alternatives to picketing cited in Frisby—such as the ability of protesters to distribute literature door to door (487 U.S. at p. 484 [101 L.Ed.2d at pp. 431-432])—do not exist here because the anti-abortion protesters cannot effectively reach their intended audience—pregnant women contemplating *893abortion—by distributing literature door to door. Their message, moreover, is directed to the public. Finally, the problem of “captive” listeners, to the extent it may once have existed in this case, has been effectively eliminated. The injunction expressly prohibits activity physically obstructing passage to and from the clinic, and Planned Parenthood presented no evidence at trial that passage was in fact obstructed during the life of the preliminary injunction.
Next, the majority asserts that the blanket prohibition against picketing in front of the clinic is necessary to prevent emotional trauma to patients entering the clinic, trauma which in some cases could endanger the health of the patients. As I have previously discussed, any such justification must be based on the manner rather than the content of the expression. Certainly, a court has the authority and obligation to enjoin any mode of expression that amounts to harassment or intimidation and that poses a significant health risk. And, just as certainly, pregnant women seeking access to health services, including abortion, must be protected from serious emotional trauma caused by abusive forms of expression. But the record in this case contains no evidence that women entering Planned Parenthood’s clinic were subjected to any such harassment or intimidation during the 11-month life of the TRO and preliminary injunction. Thus, the emotional well-being of the clinic’s patients had already received effective protection without the permanent injunction’s total prohibition on speech within the buffer zone.
The majority accurately states that buffer zones around abortion clinics are “widely employed by state and federal courts in the context of antiabortion protests.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 877.) But the majority fails to acknowledge that these same courts have either allowed a limited number of protesters within the buffer zone (e.g., Northeast Women’s Center, Inc. v. McMonagle (3d Cir. 1991) 939 F.2d 57, 63-64 [six picketers permitted]; Fargo Women’s Health v. Lambs of Christ (N.D. 1992) 488 N.W.2d 401, 407-408 [two picketers permitted]), or they have drawn the boundaries of the buffer zone so narrowly that protesters standing outside can still communicate effectively with persons entering and leaving the clinic (e.g., Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue (W.D.N.Y. 1992) 799 F.Supp. 1417, 1434 [clear zone of only 15 feet from clinic entrances]; Planned Parenthood v. Holy Angels Catholic Church (N.D.Cal. 1991) 765 F.Supp. 617, 626 [clear zone of only 25 feet from clinic extrances]; Bering v. Share (1986) 106 Wn.2d 212, 231-233 [721 P.2d 918, 929-931] [picketing permitted on sidewalk next to, but not in front of, medical facility].)
Most recently, in Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, supra, 135 N.J. 126 [638 A.2d 1260], the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the validity *894of an injunction that prohibited all picketing on a public sidewalk in front of an abortion and family planning clinic. The injunction followed a noisy demonstration by 120 to 140 anti-abortion protesters that had blocked not only the sidewalk, but also a portion of the street in front of the clinic, and that had caused half of the women scheduled to appear at the clinic to cancel their appointments.
Nonetheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the facts of the case “lend themselves to a more permissive restriction than the one the trial court imposed,” and that “rather than prohibiting all expressional activities on the sidewalk directly in front of the [clinic], the injunction should have allowed a limited, controlled form of expression near the entrance while restraining the troublesome mass of protestors to a location across the street.” (Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, supra, 135 N.J. 126, 152 [638 A.2d 1260, 1273].) Unlike the majority in this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized its obligation to balance the protected interests of both the demonstrators and the patients. In the court’s words, “The injunction should give consideration to the right of the protestors to make their presence known and to the role of sidewalk counselling in that process, while at the same time protecting against any harassment of the patients or others who wish to enter the clinic.” (Id. at p. 1273.)
Admittedly, the constitutional requirement of narrow tailoring does not mean that a time, place, and manner restriction on speech must be the “least restrictive” alternative. (Ward v. Rock Against Racism, supra, 491 U.S. 781, 798 [105 L.Ed.2d 661, 680].) But. it emphatically does mean that any such restriction may not burden “substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” (Id. at p. 799 [105 L.Ed.2d at p. 681]; see also, Carroll v. Princess Anne (1976) 393 U.S. 175, 183 [21 L.Ed.2d 325, 332-333, 89 S.Ct. 347] [stating that an order restricting peaceful picketing “must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order”].) Here, the issue posed by the sidewalk prohibition is not just “quibbling over a few feet,” as the majority would have us believe. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 879.) The difference between the preliminary injunction, allowing carefiilly restricted speech within the buffer zone, and the permanent injunction, exiling all protesters across a broad avenue, is substantial and must be fully justified. The record utterly fails to provide the required justification.
For these reasons, the permanent injunction’s sidewalk restriction, totally prohibiting speech within the buffer zone, does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of narrow tailoring.
*895IV. Conclusion
In this case, anti-abortion protesters sought to express their views in front of a medical clinic by picketing and distributing literature, protected First Amendment activities that cannot be enjoined merely because the antiabortion content of the message is offensive or even upsetting to the clinic’s staff and to women seeking abortion services. The abortion protesters sought to engage in these activities on a public sidewalk, a place that by long tradition has been recognized as an appropriate and constitutionally protected site for expression protected by the First Amendment. The clinic, for its part, has sought to prevent activities by the protesters that threaten the health of its patients or otherwise substantially interfere with its operations.
The trial court granted a preliminary injunction allowing only four protesters on the sidewalk, limiting the noise level of the protests, and barring obstructive behavior. The 11-month life of the preliminary injunction was ample to test its effectiveness in controlling abusive and obstructive conduct by the protesters. Had the protesters resorted to physical violence at any time, or had they committed serious and willful violations of the preliminary injunction, I would have no hesitation in affirming an order excluding them from the sidewalk buffer zone. As I said earlier, courts have the authority and the obligation to protect pregnant women seeking access to health services from serious emotional trauma caused by abusive methods of expression. But the record contains no evidence from which this court can conclude with any sort of confidence that the preliminary injunction was at all inadequate to protect the health and safety of the clinic’s patients.
The sensitive adjustment of competing rights and interests that the federal Constitution requires was achieved in this case by the preliminary injunction. There was no need, practically or legally, to banish the protesters to the opposite side of the street, thereby barring them from peacefully expressing their views on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic. Therefore, I must conclude that the permanent injunction’s sidewalk restriction is invalid under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari on October 31, 1994 (No. 94-334). The judgment was vacated and cause remanded on that date to the Supreme Court of California for further consideration.

The TRO also prohibited the protesters from blocking the entrances to the parking lot, verbally harassing or making noises likely to disturb the peace of the clients and staff of the clinic, bringing children to the property, recording license numbers, or photographing persons coming to and from the building. These aspects of the TRO, and similar provisions in the preliminary and permanent injunctions, are not at issue here.