Court Opinion

ID: 9951650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 17:04:18.469166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:54.049812
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 P. v. Kamilchu CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C096908

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 18FE001319)

           v.

    EDWARD KAMILCHU,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Eduard Kamilchu was found guilty of arson and sentenced to the upper
term of eight years. On defendant’s original appeal, we remanded for the trial court to
resentence defendant under recently amended Penal Code1 section 1170. On remand, the
trial court again imposed the upper term based on two aggravating factors related to
defendant’s prior convictions. Defendant appeals again; now he contends the trial court’s

1        Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

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sentence violated amended section 1170 because it relied on facts not found true by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree and vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for
another resentencing hearing.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Defendant stayed at his ex-girlfriend’s house after she gave birth to their child
even though she had a restraining order against him. When law enforcement officers
attempted to arrest defendant, he barricaded himself upstairs and threw objects down the
stairs at officers, including a lit cannister of kerosene that exploded and caught the house
on fire. The jury found defendant guilty of arson. (People v. Kamilchu (Feb. 28, 2022,
C092636) [nonpub. opn.].)2
       At the original sentencing hearing the trial court found defendant violated his
probation and imposed the upper term of eight years. Defendant appealed and we
remanded for the trial court to “resentence defendant consistent with the changes effected
by Senate Bill No. 567” (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731) (Senate Bill 567).
(People v. Kamilchu, supra, C092636.)
       At the resentencing hearing the prosecutor introduced two exhibits. The first was
a set of certified documents relating to defendant’s 2017 conviction for domestic violence
in case No. 17MI000498. The second exhibit was a transcript of defendant’s testimony at
his trial where he conceded to having a driving under the influence conviction in 2010, a
prior misdemeanor restraining order violation, and a prior misdemeanor domestic
violence conviction in 2017.
       The trial court then found based on “the certified copy, plus . . . [d]efendant’s
admissions in court to those convictions, the [c]ourt would find that he suffered those
convictions and that it demonstrates a record of increasing seriousness.” The court

2      We granted defendant’s motion to incorporate the record from his previous appeal.

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explained it was “very important” that during trial it established the victim was “the same
person that was the subject of all of the drama that led to this conviction for arson in this
case. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] So sometimes maybe misdemeanors aren’t considered as records
of increasing seriousness, but in this case absolutely because it involves the same victim
as in the other case.” The court also found defendant was “clearly on probation at the
time of” the arson. Thus, the court concluded, “[B]ased on those three factors of his prior
convictions, his record of increasing seriousness, and unsatisfactory performance while
on probation, the [c]ourt finds that those aggravating factors are sufficient.”
       The trial court added, “[A]ny one of those aggravating factors is sufficient to
aggravate this case to where the [c]ourt would impose the upper term of eight years,
which this [c]ourt has previously imposed. [¶] I find that because of the circumstances
involved in this case and the unique circumstances in the case he was convicted on, as
well as the unique circumstances on the [2017 domestic violence case] with the same
victim being involved, that I would think that any one of these aggravating factors would
be sufficient in the [c]ourt’s view to impose the upper term on this case.” The court then
summarized the facts underlying defendant’s arson conviction and concluded, “So I think
in the interest of justice and to ensure public safety the only proper sentence in this case
is the upper term. The [c]ourt will impose the sentence on the arson of the upper term of
eight years.” The court also ordered the same credits and fee terms as ordered at the
original sentencing. Defense counsel then put on the record an objection to the court
using defendant’s prior trial testimony as an admission to his prior convictions.
       Defendant appeals.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
            The Trial Court Prejudicially Erred In Imposing The Upper Term
       Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b) so that, among other
things, aggravating circumstances now only justify the imposition of an upper-term

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sentence if “the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the
judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2), as added by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
The amended statute includes a third method of factfinding, which allows courts to
“consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified
record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(3).)
       Defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing the upper term at resentencing
because the trial court engaged in impermissible factfinding to support several of the
aggravating factors. The People concede the aggravating factors based on defendant’s
prior convictions did not meet the evidentiary requirements of section 1170. But they
argue reversal is not required because “there is no reasonable probability that the jury
would not have found that [defendant’s] crimes were increasing in seriousness and that
his prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory.” We conclude there was
reversible error.
       The trial court found two aggravating factors: (1) defendant was on probation at
the time of the crime, and (2) defendant’s prior convictions as an adult are numerous or
of increasing seriousness. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2) & (4).)3 There are
two issues with these findings. First, although a certified record of conviction supported
defendant’s 2017 conviction, the other two prior convictions were not supported by a

3       The trial court said it relied on “three factors,” with one being “his prior
convictions.” But there is no enumerated aggravating factor for just prior convictions.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421.) And it may violate the prohibition against dual use
of facts in sentencing to use his prior convictions for both its own factor and for the
increasing in seriousness factor. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(5); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.420(g).) Regardless, a review of the court’s entire analysis establishes it considered
defendant’s prior convictions in establishing these two aggravating factors, not as an
independent factor.

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certified record of conviction. There is no provision in section 1170 permitting a
defendant’s prior testimony at trial to support an aggravating circumstance.
       Second, even if a certified record of conviction established all prior convictions,
the trial court relied on facts beyond the existence of the convictions. Courts typically
may determine whether past convictions are numerous or of increasing seriousness when
it requires “consideration of only the number, dates, and offenses of the prior convictions
alleged.” (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 819-820.) But courts cannot “engage
in factfinding about the specifics of the offenses or to make subjective value judgments as
to the relative seriousness of similar crimes.” (People v. Wiley (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
676, 687.)
       Here, the trial court acknowledged “misdemeanors aren’t considered as records of
increasing seriousness,” but what made this case different to the trial court was that the
current offense and the prior domestic violence case “involve[d] the same victim.” Even
if this is true, the significance of this fact and whether it indicates increasing seriousness
is a subjective value judgment, one not found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
       We also agree with defendant that these errors are not harmless. Appellate courts
disagree on the appropriate harmless error test for Senate Bill 567. (See People v. Lewis
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1131, review granted May 17, 2023, S279147.) The People
argue the proper test considers whether “there is a reasonable probability the court would
have imposed an upper-term sentence based upon the aggravating circumstances that
satisfy the statute.” (See People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1112 [“we must
consider whether it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser
sentence in the absence of the error”].) But even under this test we cannot conclude this
error was harmless.
       The trial court did state a single factor would be sufficient to justify the upper
term, and the trial court found defendant’s violation of probation was an aggravating
factor without any subjective value judgment. But the court explained that one factor

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was sufficient “because of the circumstances involved in this case and the unique
circumstances in the case he was convicted on,” including that they involved “the same
victim.” The court also summarized the facts of the case to support this finding.
       Accordingly, the trial court’s finding is reinforced with facts and value judgments
not found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury and we cannot confidently excise
these improper considerations without fatally undermining the finding’s integrity. We
therefore can only speculate on whether the trial court would have exercised its discretion
in the same way had it known it was unable to consider these facts to impose the upper
term. Accordingly, we must again remand the matter for a full resentencing.
                                               II
            The Trial Court Must Order A New Probation Report On Remand
       Defendant also argues the trial court erred in not ordering a new probation report
because it was a full resentencing two years after the original sentencing. We agree.
       The original sentencing hearing occurred on July 10, 2020. The presentence
report for this hearing noted defendant was not interviewed due to the COVID-19
pandemic, but the report found unusual circumstances rendered defendant eligible for
probation. At the hearing, defense counsel argued for a term other than the upper term
and noted defendant was a Marine and honorably discharged. A supplemental probation
report was not prepared for the resentencing at issue here.
       Under California Rules of Court, rule 4.411, “the court must refer the case to the
probation officer for . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [a] supplemental report if a significant period of
time has passed since the original report was prepared.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.411(a)(2).) The Advisory Committee Comment provides an example of “significant
time” as “after a remand by an appellate court.” (Advisory Com. com., 23 pt. 2 West’s
Ann. Cal. Rules of Court (2017 ed.) foll. rule 4.411, p. 94.) Further, “[c]ase law has
recognized that a probation report is not necessarily required if [the] defendant is
statutorily ineligible for probation.” (People v. Dobbins (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 176,

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180.) But a report may be appropriate if “needed to assist the court with other sentencing
issues.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.411(a)(1)(B).)
       A supplemental report was required here. Though statutorily ineligible, the
probation officer found defendant eligible for probation given unique circumstances.
And the resentencing hearing took place two years after the original sentencing hearing.
(See People v. Dobbins, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 181 [finding error in not ordering a
supplemental report with an eight-month period].) A supplemental report would also
have been particularly helpful to address the change in analysis under amended section
1170 and because defendant was not interviewed at all for the first probation report. It is
also possible mitigating factors now relevant may have been present that were not listed
in the original probation report, such as any trauma related to defendant’s military
service. (See § 1170.91.) The trial court consequently erred in not requesting a
supplemental probation report on the prior remand and must refer the case to probation
on this remand.
                                             III
          The Trial Court Must Recalculate Defendant’s Actual Custody Credits
       We also agree with defendant that the trial court must recalculate his actual
credits. Since we are vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding for a full
resentencing hearing, the trial court is directed to recalculate defendant’s custody credits
pursuant to section 2900.1. (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23-24 [§ 2900.1
applies when “an appellate remand results in modification of a felony sentence during the
term of imprisonment” but not after “a limited appellate remand for correction of
sentencing errors”].)

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                                      DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s sentence is vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for
resentencing consistent with current law. The trial court shall refer the case to the
probation officer for a supplemental presentence report and recalculate defendant’s
credits. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

                                                  /s/
                                                  ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
DUARTE, J.

/s/
ASHWORTH, J.*

*     Judge of the El Dorado County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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