Court Opinion

ID: 9765524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:05:05.744647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:10.309002
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. The majority opinion improperly places venue of this cause of action in Randolph County. This case is not about an automobile accident. Instead, it concerns an assignment of a judgment and the management of the trust department of a Garland County bank, which has no other base of operation. Lip service is paid to the allegation of negligent entrustment. If, however, negligent entrustment occurred at all, it occurred in Garland County. Not even the automobile accident upon which the initial judgment was based occurred in Randolph County. Therefore, I see no basis whatsoever for establishing venue in that county. This is an ingenious method on the respondent’s part of getting the petitioner out of its native Garland County and into the friendly environment of Randolph County. It is interesting to note that the bank was not named in the original complaint. Had the bank been named at that time, we can be sure that at least the present motion would have been made earlier; If prohibition had been denied, the bank would at least have been able to come in and fight the case on its merits. Regardless of what an action is called, it should be viewed for what it really is. We had this principle in mind in deciding Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Arkansas v. Southall, 281 Ark. 141, 661 S.W.2d 383 (1983), where we stated: “When a complaint asserts both local and transitory causes of action the venue is determined by the principal purpose of the action.” To the same effect, see Atkins Pickle Co., Inc. v. Burrough-Uerling-Brasuell Consulting Engineers, Inc., 275 Ark. 135, 628 S.W.2d 9 (1982). The petitioner correctly asserts that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-60-104 (1987) requires that a cause of action against a corporation be brought “in the county in which it is situated or has its principal office or place of business, or in which its chief officer resides.” The petitioner bank was the guardian only of the estate of the incompetent. Perhaps another party was the guardian of the person. The only allegations in the complaint concerning acts of the bank were conclusory charges of “negligent entrustment” and the bank’s allowing the ward “to operate said automobile . . . without liability insurance. . . .” Surely there should be specific acts of negligence recited if this is a negligence case. Mere conclusions are never sufficient to state a cause of action. Although I have nothing against lawyers demonstrating initiative by fashioning novel theories for recovery, I do feel that such theories should be buttressed with specific allegations of facts which would support a judgment. It is contrary to the venue statutes and our prior decisions to allow this type of action to be maintained in Randolph County. Venue is apparently a matter of choice now. This decision will no doubt encourage the expansion of forum shopping. Hickman and Hays, JJ., joins this dissent.