Court Opinion

ID: 9536608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:03:21.347431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:50.849460
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting) :
As I understand the majority, their reasons for overruling State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167, since they give no others, are those set forth in the quotation from Commonwealth v. Sebastian (Ky.), 500 S.W.2d 417, 419 (1973), that “the more acceptable position, especially in view of the modern trend toward equalization of the rights and obligations of men and women, is that a wife’s voluntary consent to a search of a home makes admissible as evidence against a husband the fruits of a search.” No reason is stated in Commonwealth v. Sebastian why this position is more acceptable, other than a modern trend toward the equalization of rights of men and women. How the rights of men *439and women are thereby equalized is not explained. If the statement is intended to mean that it is more enlightened to allow a wife to invite the police into the home to search for evidence with which to prosecute her husband criminally, then, indeed, I dissent. I do not believe criminal justice requires that one spouse invite an invasion of the home by police officers without a warrant who then may indiscriminately search for evidence upon which to base a criminal charge against the other spouse.
The decision in Pina was bottomed on sound social policy. Marriage and the home are everywhere recognized as institutions to be encouraged and protected. They are the foundations upon which a stable society is built. So, in Arizona communications between spouses are privileged, Arizona Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Wagner, 75 Ariz. 82, 251 P.2d 897 (1952), and interspousal tort suits are not permitted, Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968). The rule in Pina prevents unnecessary and unjustified invasions of privacy before they occur.
The majority of this Court are critical of the statement in Pina as being “over-broad,” that “[ojbviously a third person cannot waive another’s basic constitutional rights against unlawful searches and seizures unless specifically authorized.” Under the United States Constitution, Amendment IV, if the search or seizure is unreasonable, then it is unconstitutional and unlawful. It is just as obvious today as it was twelve years ago that an unauthorized third person cannot waive another’s right to be secure from the unreasonable, and, hence, unlawful searches and seizures forbidden by the United States Constitution.
I do not agree with the majority when they say, “The United States Supreme Court has considered this problem in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).” Matlock is a case in which an unmarried man and woman jointly occupied a room in a house. The problem in this case was not considered in Matlock. The Court there stated: “Respondent and Gayle Graff were not married, * * *.” A holding by the United States Supreme Court that the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not protect against a warrantless search where two or more unmarried persons occupy a room jointly is not authority for the proposition that Arizona may not forbid an invasion of the marital residence based upon a social policy designed to protect and encourage the marriage status.
Finally, I am in disagreement with the order of the court in this case. Facts which the majority do not recite tend to indicate that there was ample opportunity for the police to obtain a search warrant. The petition before this Court states:
“On September 19, 1974, Lt. Carl Cansler of the Yuma City Police Department received word from Judge William Nabours of the Yuma County Superior Court, Division I, indicating he had information about a possible suspect to a recent burglary. Judge Nabours mentioned that pornographic literature and items were the subject of the burglary and that they could be found at the home of the defendant Lutz. Lt. Cansler contacted the police department, confirmed that there had been a burglary of the Venus Adult Theatre, and informed Judge Nabours. Lt. Cansler then passed on the information to Harry Wright of the Yuma Police Department. Accompanied by Deputy Hamilton, they proceeded to 574 10th Street, Yuma [the home of respondent Lutz].”
At least since Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958), probable cause to believe a building contains incriminating evidence is not alone sufficient to support a warrantless search. Since the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence was based on the holding in Pina, and since the majority are setting aside the state’s policy to protect the security of the home, I would order this case returned to the Superior Court to determine whether the Yuma Police had a reasonable opportunity to obtain a search warrant.