Court Opinion

ID: 9721623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:03:46.714648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:27.739432
License: Public Domain

WIENER, J., Concurring.
A necessary predicate to the court’s holding in this case is that evidence of prior unprovoked assaults by the defendant occurring under similar circumstances is admissible to negate a claim of self-defense. We are guided by and rely on valid Supreme Court precedent in support of that proposition (Maj. opn., ante, p. 129) and I am in accord with that reliance. I take the unusual step of writing a separate concurrence to an opinion I have authored for the court (see, e.g., Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 595 [150 Cal.Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916]) in order to highlight what I believe to be an inherent doctrinal tension between the proposition on which we rely and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77 [201 Cal.Rptr. 567, 679 P.2d 1].
The notion that a defendant’s prior assaultive conduct is admissible to negate his claim of self-defense derives principally from the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330 [202 P.2d 53]. Wells was charged with an assault on a prison guard named Brown. He claimed he was defending himself from an attack by other guards when he accidently injured the victim. (Id., at p. 339.) The prosecution’s theory was that Wells was motivated by revenge in attacking Brown because the victim had previously reported Wells’ violation of certain prison regulations. In support of the theory, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of prior assaults committed by Wells against other prison guards. In particular, a prior assault by Wells on a guard named Jensen was relied on because Wells admitted striking Jensen in retaliation for Jensen’s conduct two months earlier in subduing Wells during a disturbance. (Id., at p. 341.)
The Supreme Court held that the evidence against Wells was properly admitted, explaining as follows: “The evidence of such other instances of misconduct was not admitted for the improper purpose of showing that defendant, because he had done many bad acts, was a bad person likely to *136do other bad acts, and, therefore, probably committed the crime charged. Rather, it was admitted in order that the jury, if they believed it, might draw the following proper series of inferences: Because defendant, at various times during the 10 years before and at a time about three months after commission of the offense charged, expressed, by words and acts, feelings of hostility toward various custodial officers, he probably felt hostility and bore malice toward the class of custodial officers. Therefore, he probably was hostile to Brown, a member of the class against which his animosity was directed. Therefore, defendant probably injured Brown with ‘malice aforethought’ rather than by accident while engaged in actions prompted by honest fear for his own (defendant’s) safety. More particularly, the ‘Jensen incident,’ similar in its circumstances to the present incident, permits the inference that since defendant had once availed himself of an opportunity to inflict physical vengence upon a guard who had participated in disciplining him, it was probable that when defendant injured another guard who had brought disciplinary charges against him he did so in a spirit of vengeance, not accidentally or because of honest fear.” (Id., at pp. 341-342, fn. omitted.)
The holding of Wells that evidence of prior similar unprovoked acts is admissible to negate a defendant’s claim of self-defense was referred to again some years later in People v. Sam (1969) 71 Cal.2d 194 [77 Cal.Rptr. 804, 454 P.2d 700]. Sam was charged with murder arising out of his participation in a fight with another patron in a bar. The victim died of injuries inflicted when Sam kicked him in the stomach. Sam asserted that the victim was the aggressor in the fight and claimed self-defense. The prosecution introduced evidence of two prior incidents in which Sam severely injured a friend and a mistress by kicking them. Although the Supreme Court reversed Sam’s conviction because it concluded evidence of the prior incidents had been improperly admitted, the court found potential merit in the Attorney General’s claim, not raised before the trial court, that the evidence was admissible to negate Sam’s self-defense claim. The court expressed its doubt that the probative value of the prior assaults with respect to negating self-defense would be sufficient to outweigh the prejudicial effect1 but it nonetheless allowed the prosecution to raise and argue the issue on retrial. (Id., at pp. 206-207.) Of particular significance is that the court reaffirmed the Wells principle by citing that case as an example of a situation in which the probative value of the prior act evidence in negating a self-defense claim was substantial. (Id., at p. 206, fn. 2.)
*137Applied to the facts of this case, Wells and Sam indicate that evidence of the Ashton incident, if it was caused by Simon’s jealous reaction, is admissible to negate his claim of self-defense. In that sense the Ashton incident is quite similar to the “Jensen incident” in Wells; both tend to impeach a defendant’s story that his attack was motivated by honest fear for his own safety; both do so by demonstrating that a prior attack on an objectively similar victim resulted from a malicious motive such as revenge or jealousy. Moreover, the types of unwarranted collateral prejudice identified by the court in Sam are not present on this record.
I am concerned, however, that the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tassell, supra, 36 Cal.3d 77, may undercut the Wells! Sam doctrine. Tassell was a rape and oral copulation case in which the defendant admitted the acts but claimed the victim consented. In order to rebut defendant’s claim, the prosecution introduced evidence of two prior acts of rape on arguably similarly situated victims.2 The court held that such evidence was inadmissible because the only fact it tended to prove was defendant’s disposition to commit similar crimes. (Id.., at p. 89.)
I have considerable difficulty conceptually distinguishing Wells and Sam on one hand and Tassell on the other. In both situations there is a factual dispute as to the manner in which the incident in question occurred. In the prototypical self-defense case, the defendant claims the victim was the aggressor. In the prototypical rape-consent case, the defendant claims the victim voluntarily participated in various sexual acts. Both such claims, if supported by the evidence, make conduct which would otherwise be criminal not so. In the Wells/Sam situation, the prior act evidence is introduced to suggest that if the defendant was the aggressor in prior similar situations, it is more likely he was the aggressor in the incident leading to the charged crime. In the Tassell situation, the prior act evidence is introduced to suggest that if the defendant forced himself on similar victims in the past, it is more likely he did so in the incident for which the defendant is now on trial.
Given the conceptual similarity of the self-defense and consent issues, one could argue that Tassell sub silentio overruled Wells and Sam. I have difficulty adopting this course, however, because Tassell repeatedly relies *138on Sam as a prime example of the correct analysis to be applied in prior act cases. (36 Cal.3d at pp. 86-87, 89, fn. 8.) I cannot believe the Supreme Court was merely referring to the result in Sam—exclusion of the evidence— without being aware of Sam’s express approval of the Wells principle.
The clear impact of Tassell is its rejection of a separate standard for the admissibility of prior acts in sex cases. Such a holding is unassailable. While it is only conjecture, I wonder whether the court’s concern with making this forceful pronouncement deflected it from considering the impact of conceptually similar precedents such as Wells and Sam. Whether this be the case, or whether I have overlooked a defensible distinction which will reconcile Wells and Sam with Tassell, I feel compelled to follow Wells and Sam pending further guidance from the Supreme Court.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 28, 1986, and respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 11, 1986.

With regard to unwarranted prejudice, the court noted that the prior incidents portrayed Sam as a drunkard living with a woman other than his wife who frequently fought even with persons close to him. (Id., at p. 206.)

While there were important differences between the circumstances of the three incidents (the two prior acts and the current charged crime) there .were also significant similarities which would appear to have logically justified the drawing of appropriate inferences regarding the lack of consent if such inferences were legally proper. (See generally People v. Harvey (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 90, 100-105 [208 Cal.Rptr. 910].) The Tassell court’s failure to discuss factual similarity or the lack of it suggests the court intended to hold that even assuming sufficient similarity between the prior acts and charged crime, such evidence is inadmissible to negate the defendant’s claim of consent.