Court Opinion

ID: 9635991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:11:43.581251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:39.872472
License: Public Domain

GEIGER, District Judge
(dissenting). On August 6, 1927, the parties entered into an agreement for the submission of a con*421troversy to six arbitrators, pursuant to tbe provisions of tbe Railway Labor Act approved May 20, 1926. Such agreement is set forth in full in the majority opinion and need not be repeated. The parties embodied in the agreement the stipulations required by the statute.
Pursuant thereto, the United States Board of Mediation appointed H. P. Burke and Paul A. Sinsheimer, the appellee Brotherhood appointed Samuel A. Boone and Albert Phillips, and the appellant railroads appointed R. V. Fletcher and John W. Higgins, as the Board.
What thereafter happened is disclosed in the appellants’ petition for impeachment which, upon reference to the record of the proceedings of the arbitration filed in the District Court, brought before that court, and now before this court, contains a narration of all action taken on December 5th and December 17th (the latter being filed December 20th) prepared by the arbitrators unanimously on the former, and by four of their number, on the latter date. For convenience of reference the contents of the two documents thus prepared will be here repeated.
In a document signed by all of the arbitrators under the date of December 5th (filed with the court December 7, 1927) and after reciting the organization of the Board, its hearings from September 29 to November 11, a recess to meet in Denver, Colorado, November 28, 1927, they proceed:
“The arbitrators having reconvened in Denver, as above provided, and there labored from day to day until this 5th day of December, 1927, and having carefully considered the entire evidence submitted to them, and the briefs and arguments of the representatives of the parties, now find:
“The principal demand of the Brotherhood submitted to this court by the terms of the arbitration board appearing on 3A of Yol.,*l the transcript herein, reads as follows:
“ ‘Except as otherwise provided herein, excepting rates of pay for firemen, helpers, hostlers and outside hostler helpers, shall be increased one dollar per day.’
“On this demand the arbitrators find themselves absolutely unable to agree. Arbitrators Boone and Phillips agree that road freight firemen may be increased 45 cents per day, and all other employés in the arbitration 40 cents per day, but can subscribe to nothing else. Arbitrators Fletcher and Higgins are unwilling to agree that any increase be granted road firemen. They are willing to agree that an increase of 7% per cent, be granted all other employés in the arbitration. They are unable to subscribe to any greater increase. Arbitrators Burke and Sinsheimer agree that an increase of 30 cents be granted rate passenger firemen and an increase of 35 cents to all other employés in the arbitration. They are unable to subscribe jointly to a greater increase and unable to subscribe to any lesser increase which would so nearly approximate the concession of Arbitrators Fletcher and Higgins as to hold out any hope of an agreement, although the chairman is willing to go to a lower figure and Arbitrator Sinsheimer to a higher.
“A majority of the Board having thus failed to reach an agreement on the main question, it is the unanimous opinion of the four partisan arbitrators that no award should be made on the minor questions.
“The undersigned members of said Board of Arbitration hereby certify to the correctness of the foregoing.”
This document is signed by all of the arbitrators. One of the arbitrators, Sinsheimer, appended thereto a “statement,” viz.:
“As a neutral arbitrator in these proceedings, I, of course, greatly regret that this Board has been unable to reach an agreement.
“As stated in the foregoing findings, my individual opinion would justify a greater wage increase than that suggested jointly by the neutral arbitrators. This of course in my opinion should range from 35 to 45 cents in the standard daily wage rates now in effect and should apply in appropriate proportions to all firemen, hostlers and hostler helpers in service on Western roads.”
The record discloses that on December 20, 1927, “came certain members of the Board of Arbitration by their attorney who filed in the clerk’s office of said court a certain award,” to wit:
“After the Board of Arbitration in this proceeding had discontinued its labors December 5th and filed statement of its inability to agree with the Board of Mediation, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the United States District Court and delivered copies thereof to the parties, President Robertson on December 9, 1927, acting on behalf of the Brotherhood, delivered to H. P. Burke a request that said Board reconvene and continue ‘its deliberations in an effort to make and file an award on or before December 20, 1927.’ On the same day similar requests were received by said Burke from Albert Phillips and S. A. Boone, Paul A. Sinsheimer, acting on the suggestion of the United States Board of Mediation, made the same request.
*422“December 10, 1927, said Burke was advised by the Chairman of the U. S. Board of Mediation as follows:
“ ‘We express the hope that the arbitrators may consistently act as Mr. Robertson, President, has suggested and that you as Chairman take steps to bring the arbitrators together for the purpose herein indicated.’ “December 12, 1927, said Burke sent the following wire to each of the other five arbitrators, and so reported to the United States Board of Mediation:
“ ‘Request received by me from Robertson for Brotherhood and from Sinsheimer, Boone and Phillips, arbitrators, to reconvene Board. Wire received by me from Chairman, Board of Mediation — Quote—We express the hope that the arbitrators may consistently act as Mr. Robertson has requested and that you as chairman take steps to bring arbitrators together. — End Quote. Complying so far as possible with foregoing I request arbitrators to meet at my chambers Denver, Dee. 16th at 10 a. m. to consider what action, if any, can be taken.’
“On the same date said Burke notified Chairman Jeffers by wire of the foregoing call, and said Jeffers answered protesting a reconvening of the Board.
“December 13, 1927, Sinsheimer requested said meeting be postponed to December 17th. Said Burke advised each of the other arbitrators thereof and signified his assent thereto. Answers were received from each of the arbitrators showing that the foregoing advices concerning a meeting in Denver had been received by them.”
“December 15, 1927, Higgins and Fletcher,' by wire, declined to attend any further meeting for any purpose and said Burke so notified said Board of Mediation.
“December 16, 1927, the Chairman of Board of Mediation wired said Burke as follows:
“‘We have received no word from any arbitrator indicating an intention of not serving further as such in firemen’s case Stop Based on advice from Department of Justice we suggest on the understanding that all arbitrators have been duly notified that the meeting called by you for the 17th of December 1927 be held Stop If all arbitrators are not present there should be at least a majority who should make an award strictly on the questions presented in the agreement to arbitrate as entered into by the parties in interest.’ _
“Under the conditions above outlined the Board reconvened with H. P. Burke, as Chairman, and arbitrators. Sinsheimer, Boone and Phillips present and acting, and thereupon considered and decided and awarded as follows:
“On the several demands submitted for decision under the contract of arbitration — Demand 1: ‘Except as otherwise provided» herein existing rates of pay for firemen, helpers, hostlers and outside hostler helpers shall be increased $1.00 per day.’
“On this demand the Board decides that the rates of pay for firemen in road passenger service shall be increased 30 cents per day and the rates of pay of all other employes involved shall be increased 35 cents per day.
“Demand 2: ‘In Freight and Service on steam, electric, or other power weighing 250,-000 pounds and over, on drivers, and on Mallet engines, existing rates of pay shall be increased $1.25 per day.’
“This demand the Board denies, except to the extent granted in No. 1 above.
“Demand 3: ‘Gradations on locomotives, according to weights on drivers to be extended to 550,000 pounds and over in freight service with an additional increase of 25 cents per day to be applied for each 50,000 pounds above 250,000 pounds on drivers.’
“This demand the Board denies.
“Demand 4: ‘The weight on all other power driven wheels will be added to the weight on drivers of locomotives that are’ equipped with boosters and the weights produced by such increased weights shall fix the rates for the respective classes of service.’
“This demand the Board grants.
“Demand 5: ‘In all passenger service, the earnings from mileage, overtime or other rules applicable, for each day service is performed shall be not less than $6.25 for firemen.’
“This demand the Board grants to the extent of $5.55, otherwise denies.
“The undersigned members of said Board of Arbitration hereby certify to the correctness of the foregoing award.
“Dated at Denver, Colo., December 17th, 1927. H. P. Burke, Chairman.
“Paul A. Sinsheimer.
“Albert Phillips.
“S. A. Boone.
“Statement by the Chairman to be considered in connection with his signature to the foregoing award and in explanation thereof:
“On the meeting of the members of the Board of Arbitration, whose signatures are affixed to the foregoing award, at the Capitol Building in Denver, at 2:00 P. M. December 17, 1927, the first question for consideration *423was whether the said Board could legally reconvene for any purpose at that time and pri- or to its reconvening and reorganization as a board. I stated to Arbitrators Sinsheimer, Boone and Phillips that, in my opinion, no further legal meeting of said Board of Arbitrators could be held, but that on the opinion of the Deportment of Justice and the request of the Board of Mediation to the contrary, I was willing to participate therein in order that an award might if possible, under the circumstances, be rendered and filed in the United States District Court and its legality thereby determined by the only tribunal competent to authoritatively pass upon the question. H. P. Burke, Chairman.
“Statement by Arbitrators Phillips and Boone:
“We believe it appropriate to state in connection with the foregoing award that, in our careful and considered judgment the employees involved in this arbitration are entitled to increases in rates of pay, substantially larger than those awarded. Nevertheless we believe it our duty to join in an award which will give these men the benefit of at least a portion of the increased wages to which, in our judgment, they are entitled.
“Albert Phillips.
“S. A. Boone.
“Statement by Mr. Sinsheimer:
“I believe the award herein fails to accord the full measure of wage increase justified upon the record of the case. This increase, in my opinion, should range from 35 to 45 cents in the standard wage rates now in effect and should apply in appropriate proportions to all firemen, hostlers and hostler helpers in service on Western railroads.
“. I have joined in the award so that some measure of increase may be made effective, even though not in the full amount I hold to be justified.
“Paul A. Sinsheimer.”
The appellants, in their petition for impeachment of the award, in addition to averring the fact of disagreement of the arbitra^ tors, their separation or dispersion, in short, renunciation of their powers — which allegation alone might suffice to raise the question on demurrer, have incorporated, by reference and by further allegations, the foregoing documents prepared and filed, by the arbitrators. So that, while by direct allegation the ultimate, fact is presented, the evidentiary matters which are claimed to support the allegation, also brought before the court a tender of proofs whose quality has been discussed by the parties.
These questions arise:
(1) What does the pleading with its allegations and tender of proofs establish?
(2) If it establishes the ultimate fact asserted by appellants, viz., the final separation and abdication of powers by the arbitrators on December 5th, what is the effect of such ultimate fact in respect of the action taken by the arbitrators on December 17th as shown in the, document filed December 20th? In other words, is it legally competent and adequate to impeach the latter as an award?
Obviously, the first question deals wholly with the natural quality of the proofs in their tendency, their relevancy to establish a fact which became a fact, if at all, on December 5th. And it is not relevant in answering that question to point out that on December 17th or 20th a majority of the Board professed to make and file an “award”; for the basic question is, Does the action of December 5th, whether it be called a decision, an award, or something else, have the attributes ascribed to it by the appellants? What is its effect upon the later attempted exercise of power? To say that it was not final because on December 17th a majority still executed an “award,” merely begs the question. The attack on the later action precludes the idea that the action taken on that day serves the dual purpose of showing conclusively (a) its own efficacy as an award, and (b) the non-competency or the nonefficaey of what transpired on the 5th as an impeaching act. I am speaking of the narrow question respecting the relevancy of the action of December 17th as a claimed award, to the alleged finality of the action of the arbitrators on December 5th. Obviously, if the second question be so answered to exclude the action of December 5th as without competency or relevancy to prove anything, it makes no difference. But the point is, that the power to make an award on December 17th, being challenged by the action of the 5th, cannot sustain itself by proof of what was done in the attempted exercise of the challenged power. But this is also true, that the conduct of those whose power was challenged, whether it be their conduct on the 5th, during the interim, or on the 17th and 20th — certainly their written declarations, are basically relevant in determining the character of the action taken on the 5th, and the intentions of all participants on that and the ensuing days.
Proceeding therefore to a consideration of the tendered proofs, they consist of what was done on the 5th by the arbitrators themselves; of what transpired by way of communication between the arbitrators, the par*424ties, and others from the 5th to the 17th; and of what transpired on the 17th and 20th.
In view of contentions made by the appellees, it is believed that some extended analysis of these proofs, as part of the allegations of the petition, should be attempted. It may be prefaced with the observation that the law in question does not — except upon some implication or interpretation, endeavor to forbid final disagreements or deadlocks in arbitration, and likewise it does not, except by like implication or interpretation, endeavor to deal with the time when disagreements or deadlocks may become effective to terminate the authority of arbitrators. It is hard to conceive how the law can be interpreted as effectually prohibiting or preventing disagreements or deadlocks whenever they may occur. Likewise it may be granted that if a conclusion or deadlock, or a mutually recognized permanent disagreement is not an “award” — and I do not think it is — the statute is silent in dealing or attempting to deal with such an eventuality. It may be granted that the statute does not require the course of procedure, viz. the filing, the service with functionaries, and upon the parties, of any paper or document evidencing the fact of disagreement, no matter what its legal effect may be. But what the arbitrators none the less did is conceived to bear most persuasively upon their conception of the quality of the action which they took and intended to take in the circumstances disclosed.
Coming, therefore, to a consideration of what was done on the 5th, the document shows:
(1) The formal narrative of hearings down to the taking of a “recess” (on November 11th) to meet in executive session for the purpose of deliberation on November 28, 1927, at Denver.
(2) That having reconvened at Denver, there deliberated from day to day until the 5th day of December, 1927, during which time they had “carefully considered the entire evidence submitted to them and'the briefs and arguments of the representatives of the parties” they now find, viz.:
(3) That in respect of the “principal demand” of the appellees, they, the arbitrators, find themselves “absolutely unable” to agree. They proceed to state in detail the attitude of at least three groups among their number upon this demand; they for themselves and for all assert the unwillingness or the inability to subscribe by each of the groups to the position taken by either of the other two; they indicate individual willingness to make certain concessions but state inability to subscribe to greater or to lesser increases approximating concessions made by one or another group “as to hold out any hope of cm agreement.”
(4) That “a majority of the Board having failed to reach an agreement on the main question, the unanimous opinion of the four partisan arbitrators, is that no award be made on the minor questions.
(5) The members unanimously certified to the “correctness” of the document.
(6) One of the arbitrators appends to the document a statement made by him as a “neutral” arbitrator in which he “of course” regrets greatly that this Board has been unable to reach an agreement. He further states his individual opinion upon the merit of a portion of the controversy.
(7) The foregoing document was filed with the United States District Court as a part of the proceedings, took its place of record, was before the District Court and is here before us as a part of the record made by the arbitrators, and now tendered as a portion of the proof relied upon by the appellants to support its claim of impeachment. The petition further avers that this document was served upon (1) the parties and (2) the functionaries designated in the Railway Labor Act upon whom and with whom an “award” should be served or filed.
(8) As an incident of what is last above noted, and, as bearing upon the intended quality of the act of the arbitrators, the filing of the document of December- 5th was the culminating act of surrender by arbitraltors of the entire record of the proceedings with the district court; so that, for all that appears in the record before the court, when the action of December 17th was taken, the arbitrators then convening did not have before them a vestige of the record of their proceedings under the agreement. That had been surrendered to the court for some one and for some purpose. This is referred to merely as bearing upon the intended finality of the act of December 5th.
At this point, adverting to the discussion by counsel of this action of December 5th, it may be observed that whether this document be called a “decision” may involve more or less of a play on words. Excepting the possibility of contention over its effect respecting the “minor questions” upon which, so it is stated, “it is the unanimous opinion of the four partisan arbitrators that no award should be made,” it is obvious that the mere announcement of a disagreement, final or otherwise, cannot correctly be termed a “decision” of the merits of a controversy. A *425formal agreement to disagree, no matter how accurately and comprehensively stated, would be a decision to quit, but it could not be a decision of an issue. But in meeting the eight specifications of proof last above summarized, their clear prima facie effectiveness to disclose a situation of permanent disagreement consequent upon which there is a cessation of functioning, the attitude of the appellees is, to say the least, hardly responsive. In dealing with the appellant’s reference to this action as a “decision,” the appellee states:
“Counsel for appellants contend that the statement of December 5th was a ‘decision’ on the part of the members of the Board of Arbitration, to abandon their functions and that once having made such an unfortunate and discreditable ‘decision’ the arbitrators disqualified themselves from any further ability to perform the duties imposed upon them or to fulfill the obligations to the public and the parties which they had accepted. The first answer to this contention is that if the arbitrators had any such intention, in issuing a statement of December 5th, they did not express it. They made the statement that they were unable to agree upon a decision on that day. They did not say that they were convinced that they never would be able to agree. They did not say that they had decided to adjourn sine die. They did not say that they had decided to renounce their powers as arbitrators. They simply made a public statement to the effect that they were unable to agree on that date. If such a public statement had any legal effect, we are here concerned with the effect of a public statement by arbitrators that they are unable to decide a controversy.”
It is true that the arbitrators did not express their intention in the foregoing words. But it is hardly candid to ascribe to them an intended statement of mere inability to agree upon a decision “on that day." Likewise is it true that they did not say that they had decided to adjourn sine die; nor say that they had decided to renounce their powers as arbitrators. Equally true is it that they did not say that they were taking a recess or an interim adjournment. Equally true is it that they did say that they “find themselves absolutely unable to agree.” Equally true is it that, apparently as evidence to fortify the “absolute” character of their disagreement, they gave the detailed positions of the membership in respect of the main question and the unwillingness, the inability of the several members to recede from their respective positions, and the unwillingness to recede sufficiently “to hold out any hope of an agreement.” Therefore to now declare that they did not say that they adjourned sine die, or say that they would never be convinced is not at all responsive to the very purport of what they in fact said and did. The natural meaning of the words used, their ¿tended purport is the expression of finality of disagreement —hopelessness of deadlock.
Proceeding further with the tendered proofs — and these appear from the narrative of evidence which is reported ¿ connection with the action taken on December 17th — it is pertinent to inquire why the arbitrators made report to the court, to the parties and to the functionaries named, of their action of the 5th, if that action was intended by the arbitrators as lacking in finality, as having a reservation as upon recess or interim adjournment, to reconvene at a time certain or at all. It is fair to presume that they, first of all, would have acted consistently with such intention. On the contrary, the act of so filing and serving the parties and tribunals, indicates that without reservation — though probably mistakenly — they conceived the ne>eessity of making that sort of a report as their final act just as, had they made an awwrd, they were obliged to so report it as a final act. But as the very first step taken by any one after the filing of this statement of inability to agree and the “discontinued” labors (see document December 17th), the President of the appellee delivered to the Chairman of the Board a request that the Board reconvene its deliberations, etc. Three of the arbitrators, acting upon the suggestion of the United States Board of Mediation, made the same request. There is nothing to indicate that any of such requests were made or wére received or understood by any one except upon the hypothesis that the Board had quit. Such requests elicited no responses nor developed a suggestion of an attitude, in substance, that a “reconvention” was expeeted to take place in any event on or before the 20th. The Chairman, as a culmination of these importunities, yielded by requesting the arbitrators to meet “to consider what action, if any, can be taken.” But the other party to this arbitration “protested” the reconvening of the Board,, which, of course, presumably reflects that party’s conception of the finality of the act of the arbitrators. Two of the arbitrators declined to attend any further meeting for any purpose, and the Chairman was advised of their attitude. On December 16th the Board of Mediation wired the Chairman “suggesting that the meeting called for December 17th be *426held,” and, “if all arbitrators are not present there should be at least a majority who should make an award strictly on the questions presented in the agreement to arbitrate as entered into by the parties in interest.” The suggestion to hold the meeting is stated by the Board to be based “on advice from the Department of Justice.” • And under such conditions, the “board” reconvened with four members present.
Plainly, it would be a melancholy reflection upon the intelligence of the arbitrators to attempt to reconcile all of this effort with the ever present purpose to continue the labors which had been “discontinued” on December 5th. As will be shortly seen, there is no explanation for these interim communications exeept the clear consciousness in the minds of the arbitrators, the parties, and the Board of Mediation respecting the intended final character of the action taken on December 5tH. Every act done, every declaration made, by any one, is aimed to further, not a reeonvention pursuant to any purpose reserved on the 5th, but to inducing the arbitrators to recede from the unanimous purpose disclosed in the document and their attendant acts of filing and serving it, intended by them and accepted by every one as evidencing the renunciation of their powers and functions. Not only does this appear clearly in the recitals of the document signed by four of the arbitrators on December 17th; but the “statement” appended by the chairman (it was stated on oral argument that he is a distinguished lawyer and jurist) to the document of December 17th “to be considered in connection with his signature to the foregoing award and in explanation thereof, removes even conjectural doubt. Why should the Chairman of a meeting which, as noted, convened to see what if any action could be taken, be confronted with the “first question,” viz. whether the said Board could legally reconvene for any purpose. Clearly, this question was raised by the four arbitrators as one for consideration “at that time and prior to its reconvening and keorganization a& a board.” The Chairman, so it is certified to the District Court, “stated to Arbitrators Sinsheimer, Boone and Phillips that in my opinion no further legal meeting of said Board of Arbitrators could be held.”
Why was the question raised? And why thus answered? Simply because, at the threshhold of any attempted meeting, the prior action was conceived to be a/ bar to further exercise of power.. And its significance rests further in the fact that on the 20th, when, if they could, they would, give the previous action a different characterization, they reaffirmed the characterization. As has been indicated, this is referred to, not because of its pertinency in determining the merit of the question respecting the legality of a meeting on the 17th. It is, however, conclusive evidence that on that day the arbitrators had before them the question which arose out of a fact, viz. the character of the action taken on December 5th. And it discloses without doubt the then conception of those who met, speaking through a chairman, that the action taken on December 5th was recognized as final, leaving as a legal question the very question before this court, viz. whether abandoned power could be resumed. The Chairman of the meeting could not more clearly have indicated his purpose of signing the document of December 17th and yet retain every syllable of his conviction respecting the fact and its quality, viz. the intended finality of the action of December 5th.
This discussion having as its object the answer to be given to the first question hereinbefore propounded, has proceeded in recognition of two phases of the case as disclosed by the petition of the appellants. As has been indicated, the first is that the petition plainly aims to charge as an ultimate fact the deadlock and the abandonment of their delegated powers; secondly, by allegation, and by reference to what is asserted to be the record in this arbitration matter, of what are hereinbefore dealt with as “proofs” tendered as supportive of the petitioner’s allegation of the ultimate fact. It is believed •with entire confidence that, the matter having come before the trial court, and now before this court upon a demurrer to the petition, the ultimate fact averred direetly and evidentiarily in that pleading, cannot be denied, but must be taken as a verity. I assume the rule to be that where a pleading plainly intends to aver what is conceived to be a material ultimate fact, even if liberality of interpretation is required to sustain it, that liberality should be extended. There seems, however, to be no reason for invoking the latter as a guide for interpretation of the pleading; for the briefs of both of the parties here proceed upon the concession that the appellants’ petition aims to, and does aver, in the dual manner indicated, the ultimate fact upon which they rely as a basis for impeaching the action of' December 17th.'
Therefore the District Court was, and this court is, bound, not only to accept the ultimate fact as petitioners and' appellants aver it, but, upon its acceptance to respect *427its necessary implications and the intendments disclosed in the declarations of the arbitrators. It is not to be whittled away nor disparaged by any considerations dealing with the broad policy of the statute, nor by conjectural possibilities of other evidence which, being offered, might bear pertinently upon the fact.
In my judgment there is no possible escape from the conclusion that on this record, on this demurrer or motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, the court must accept the unanimous action of the arbitrators on December 5th as the appellants characterize it, in substance, an abdication of power, a cessation of functioning having and intended to have, and intended by them to be understood by the parties and everyone else as having, final and self-executing attributes. By this latter is meant that if the act discloses an intention to surrender, renounce or dissolve power that is derived from the agreement, the act speaks for itself and is not conditioned upon acceptance by the parties or by any one else.
We come, then, to the second phase of the case which presents the question whether these proofs and the ultimate fact which must be accepted by the court, is or are adequate foundation for impeachment of the claimed “award.” The statute assigns as grounds for impeachment: .
(1) That the award plainly does not conform to the substantive requirements laid down by this act for such awards, or that the proceedings were not substantially in conformity with this act.
(2) That the award does not conform, nor confine itself, to the stipulations of the agreement to arbitrate.
(3) That a member of the Board of Arbitration rendering the award was guilty of fraud or corruption; or that a party to the arbitration practiced fraud or corruption, which fraud or corruption effected the result of the arbitration.
Confining ourselves for the present to the first of these specifications, it would appear self-evident that the continued residence of the power that was reposed in arbitrators down to and including the making of the claimed award is an inherent basic requirement of “substantial” conformity — either to the agreement or to a statute. It cannot be that Congress intended to declare that every action which has the appearance of an award should be conclusively held to be such; that it was intended to eliminate contention respecting a loss of power within the period for making an award. Yet this appears to be the position of the appellees which receives recognition in the majority option.
At the^risk of repetition, but for the purpose of confining the query to its proper limits, the appellee’s statement summarizing the scope of the provisions dealing with grounds for impeachment is given:
“Thus on examining the statutory grounds for impeaching an award, we find there are no allegations of any facts whatsoever, in the petition to impeach the award, which, if true (on this proceeding, all the facts averred are admitted) would afford a ground for impeaching the award. The plain fact is that the act expressly excludes, from any possible grounds for impeaching an award, charges against the arbitrators concerning their conduct during their deliberations. Therefore it makes no difference whether they made .oral or written statements; whether they walked the streets or met in a hotel or an office building; whether they read newspapers or books; whether they talked to this person or that; what letters they wrote or what business they transacted privately or as a board, saying (saving?) only that they were not guilty of fraud or corruption. It was the very purpose of the act to exclude from the consideration of the courts exactly such charges as are here presented as the basis for impeaching an award.” (Italics and parentheses supplied.)
It will be agreed that matters of conduct as are above vaguely stated, do not bring a case within impeaching range, They never have. They may arouse discussion of improprieties, which — save as they could be found fraudulent or corrupt — never were'and are not now ground for impeaching contracts, awards or decisions. The statute admittedly did not aim to enlarge, or to restrict, the category of “fraud” or of “corruption.”
But we are concerned here with the effect of a unanimous action by arbitrators which, by operation of law, is asserted to have ended their power and status — an action which neither as such nor in its legal effect is comprehended within the terms of the statute— and which, it may be added, was not and ordinarily is not comprehended within common law or statutory agreements to arbitrate. It is not so comprehended because in its very nature it deals with the legal effect of something which happened though not contemplated. We are not dealing with the mere status'of disagreement of arbitrators in and during continuity of deliberations. The statute in question does not contemplate, no more than did or do common law agreements, that arbitrators, whether the duration of their *428powers be fixed by definite specification of time, or for “reasonable time,” shall always initially agree. In other words, we are not dealing with the mere want of harmony during deliberations. But we are dealing with the action of arbitrators which, as has been indicated, is and was intended to have the quality of ending deliberations, of final renunciation of powers and of functioning. This brings us to a consideration of discussion by the parties, and, in the majority opinion — of the common law. It is elemental that in the United States there is no common law as a body of law distinctive from the common law of England. But, independently of any statute, state and federal courts from earliest time have applied the principles of the common law (except as modified by statutes) to the subject of arbitration. That is because it involves elements of contract, of delegated powers, and the like. And notwithstanding appellee’s insistence — accepted by the majority opinion— that the Labor Act prevents the renunciation of powers by arbitrators there seems to be a concession that at common law in certain classes of arbitrations, renunciation of powers or a final disagreement asserted as such was effective to dissolve either the agreement, or the power of arbitrators. The majority opinion states:
“The courts have quite generally held that, where no time limitation was inserted in the agreement of the parties, a final hearing at which the arbitrators were unable to agree upon an award followed by a separation of the arbitrators with an understanding that no further meetings should be held, terminated, at common law, the arbitration and the powers of the arbitrators. Parsons v. Ambos, 121 Ga. 98, 48 S. E. 696; Couch v. Harrison, 68 Ark. 580, 60 S. W. 957; Jefferson R. R. Co. v. Mounts, 7 Ind. 689; Baltes v. Bass Foundry & Machine Works, 129 Ind. 185, 28 N. E. 319; Bennetto v. City of Winnipeg, 18 Manitoba, 100; Twisleton v. Travers, 2 Kelb, 15; 4 Elliott on Contracts, § 2952; 5 C. J. 76.
“Counsel.differ sharply as to the effect of the insertion of a time limitation in the agreement to arbitrate. Appellee insists that, even at common law, the powers of the arbitrators terminated only by a lapse of the prescribed period of time or by the rendition of an award. Chace v. Dare, 2 Show, 164; Cappin v. Hurnard, 2 Saunders, 129, 133; Smailes v. Wright, 3 M. & S. 559; Bodge v. Hull, 59 Me. 325; Carpenter v. Wood, 1 Metc. (42 Mass.) 409; Daniel v. Daniel, 6 Dana (36 Ky.) 93 ”
Prima fade, of course, whether an arbitration agreement endows the arbitrators with power for a fixed, or for a reasonable, period of time, it is exercisable “within” either. But upon equally basic grounds, it is renouneeable within either — that is, arbitrators, no matter what they ought to do, may, in fact, renounce it, within either. And whether the duration is one or the other, whichever it may be, the act of renunciation, whenever it is committed by the arbitrators, has no relevancy to a possible earlier or later commission. All this is consistent with the further concession that arbitrators under either may disagree from start to finish. But it is difficult to see any difference between a final disagreement and renunciation by arbitrators who have consumed only one-half of a reasonable time, and those who have consumed only one-half of -a fixed period of time. The act of renunciation, that is the possibility of its happening, seems to me to be just as implicit under the one as under the other, and also under this or any other statute.
In my judgment there is and can be no “sharp” difference of opinion as to the effect of a time limitation, at common law, upon a final disagreement and renunciation of powers by arbitrators. The statements, in adjudicated eases, and by text-writers are unanimous to the effect that a final disagreement, a renunciation of further functioning, interpretable and intended as such by arbitrators, who at the time possess the full power over the controversy, ends the arbitration. Their power is gone. But it is equally clear from the authorities that where the last condition is not present, but the agreement is of a character which calls for an umpirage, questions then arise sueh as:
(1) At what period, under the terms of submission did the powers of the umpire commence?
(2) When the powers of the umpire commenced, did the powers of the disagreeing initial arbitrators cease?
There can be no doubt respecting the debate that arose and may still arise-^beeause of the doubtful terms of the submission agreement — upon each of these questions. The very provision for an umpire is predicated upon .disagreement; and some of the cases deal with the question whether by the terms of the submission the umpire could be appointed prior to disagreement, whether, if so appointed prior to disagreement, he could function at all, whether after disagreement the power to decide rested in him alone or whether by the terms of the submission the *429entire arbitration was then to proceed, e. g., with full power in three arbitrators, instead of two who had disagreed. Plainly, these cases deal with the conditioning of umpirage. But no ease has been cited which holds that when all arbitrators including an umpire, fail to reach an agreement, announce it with an intention of ending and actually ending their functioning, they may resume. Plainly an agreement which merely provides that two arbitrators, when they disagree, may call in an umpire is consistent with the theory that thereupon the three shall act. But equally clearly do some of the cases indicate that a contrary intention was manifested in the submission whereunder the umpire, upon disagreement, was to be the sole functionary. And plainly, disagreement between two, being a condition, or sine qua non of umpirage, even if final or renunciatory, cannot defeat the umpirage. And, as illustrative of the desire on the part of legislators to put an end to contentions thus arising, is the Wisconsin law:
“298.03. Umpire. Where a submission is made as prescribed in this chapter, an additional arbitrator or an umpire cannot be selected or appointed unless the submission expressly so provides. Where a submission, made either as prescribed in this chapter or otherwise, provides that two or more arbitrators therein designated may select or appoint a person as an additional arbitrator, or as an umpire, the selection or appointment must be in writing. An additional arbitrator or umpire must sit with the original arbitrators upon the hearing. If testimony has been taken before his selection or appointment, the matter must be reheard, unless a rehearing is waived in the submission or by the subsequent written consent of the parties or their attorneys.” (St. 1927.)
Counsel for appellee seems to appreciate that the eases principally relied upon axe those “where the submission to arbitrate provided that if the arbitrators could not agree, a person named in the submission, or a person appointed by the arbitrators as umpire, should have authority to make an award."
Upon examination of the cases, those cited and others, it appears that they'deal with this very question of umpirage only. That obviously involves a consideration of the terms of the submission to ascertain whether the whole power, in case of disagreement of two, should thereafter reside in the three or in the umpire only. But, as indicated, they do not support the doctrine that if those in whom the whole power rests, renounce it any time, it may thereafter be resumed. It would be absurd, where the submission provided for an umpirage, that the two initially named could disagree and thereby prevent the umpirage which, by the terms of the submission was to come into being through disagreement. By the inherent force of these agreements, the whole power, if not executed by two in an agreement, is then devolved upon three, or one — the umpire only.
The Labor Act very clearly had as objectives, among other things, reiteration of, recession from, and additions to, common law principles. And as pointed out by appellants, it makes no mention whatever of certain well recognized principles. While the public concern or the public interest in arbitrations of controversies between carriers and employes may have prompted its passage, the law nevertheless deals with arbitration of controversies which arise out of matters of strictly private contract — wages and the like. Provisions for majority award, for fixed periods of time within which to make awards, for recommittal of awards for interpretation, for filling vacancies, for judicial proceedings to enforce, for grounds of impeachment, are not new in so far as they are declaratory of or derogatoiy to common law provisions; they appear in almost all legislative attempts to regulate arbitrations, private and public. In my judgment the law in question as a regulation, displaces the principles of the common law no more than did the Interstate Commerce Law (49 USCA §§ 1-22, 25-27; Comp. St. § 8563 et seq.):
“Can it be that the great multitude of interstate commercial transactions are freed from the brudens created by the common law, as so defined, and are subject to no rule except that to be found in the statutes of Congress? We are clearly of opinion that this cannot be so, and that the principles of the common law are operative upon all interstate commercial transactions except so far as they are modified by congressional enactment.” Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U. S. 92, 21 S. Ct. 561, 45 L. Ed. 765.
On behalf of the appellee it is urged that the matter is governed by an underlying or first principle — and if that be true with respect to common law arbitrations, it ought to be true under this statute. It is said that such principle relative to “termination of authority” where a time for making an award is fixed in the agreement to arbitrate, is “the accepted rule or law that the arbitrators have no authority to change the contract of the parties, or to vary the terms of the submission.”
*430It is further said: “The parties in the present ease agreed that they would abide any award made by a majority of the arbitrators on or before December 20, 1927. If the arbitrators had attempted to make an award after the expiration of the time limit, they would have been attempting to change the contract of the parties and to extend their own authority, whereas the contract and their authority are the creation of the parties over which the arbitrators have no control. Likewise if the arbitrators had attempted to shorten the time within which an award could be made, they would have been attempting to change the contract of the parties and to curtail their own authority.”
Here again it is conceived that there is a failure to recognize what is inherent in every situation, viz. the different methods by whieh power may. be lost as a consequence whereof its attempted further exercise is futile. It may be agreed that if arbitrators have 60 days’ time, fixed by agreement “within” which to make an award, they cannot agree to take or take 70, without the consent of the parties. It may be agreed that if they enter into an understanding that they will limit the duration of their hearings and deliberations to 30 days, such understanding is in defiance of the agreement. But suppose, in the latter case, they actually make an award in 25 days, the circumstance that they had tried to limit themselves to 30 becomes irrelevant. But suppose further that they effectuated their purpose to limit themselves to 30 days, at whieh time, being in disagreement and deadlock, they renounced further functioning and communicated that fact to the parties. If at the end of 55 days they had attempted to resume, we would have the question now before the court. And, as has been intimated, the same question could arise if the duration of their deliberations was for a “reasonable” period. The elemental rule, of course, deals, among other things, with the right of the arbitrators to change the contract by consideration of) e. g., enlarged or restricted subject-matter and the like. But it is not accurate to speak of a renunciation of power as a “change” or “alteration” of a contract. It is proper to characterize it as a defaulting act. I assume that no one who, as agent or otherwise, is invested with power can be said to “alter” or “change” the terms of his appointment, by renouncing it. Defaulting on a contract is not altering or changing it.
Now, the majority opinion seems content to avoid a determination respecting the effectiveness of an act of renunciation, either at common law or, as it is conceived, upon elemental principles, by finding in the Labor Act, not in express words, but, upon implication or interpretation, a warrant for the conclusion that the aetion of the arbitrators on December 5th is wholly without pertinency. As the opinion states it, “the power of the arbitrators to make the award did not cease until the expiration of the time fixed by the agreement of the parties.”
The majority opinion expresses the view that a comparison of the provisions of the act “with the holdings respecting common law arbitrations indicates that the entire subject of arbitrations was rewritten.” Of foremost significance is noted “that under the act the arbitrators, save the 'neutrals,’ may be directly interested in the award and not be disqualified.” This is characterized as a “radical, and apparently an unfortunate, departure from the common law.” Reference is made to the provision for affirmative vote of a majority of arbitrators, to the method of filling vacancies occasioned by death or the refusal of an arbitrator to act, for reconvening arbitrators to interpret terms of an award, etc.
Two paragraphs are regarded as “significant,” viz.:
(1) Dor fixing a period “from the date •of the appointment of the arbitrators * * * within which the said Board shall commence its hearings;” and
(2) That the agreement shall fix the period from the beginning of the hearings within which the said hoard shall make and file its aioard.
These two provisions of the law are said to be “at least suggestive of an obligation upon the arbitrators to continue their efforts to reach an award until the time fixed in the agreement expires. Dor,” the opinion continues : •
“Having dealt specifically with the subject-matter (the specified time within which the arbitrators must make and file the award) does not the deduction necessarily follow therefrom that Congress intended to cover the particular phase of arbitration law with whieh we are dealing? 'Expressio unims est exclusio alterius.’ ”
And the opinion proceeds:
“True, it may be contended, and with force, that the specific provisions here under consideration do not expressly or necessarily exclude a voluntary termination of the arbitration before the expiration of the specific period. While it must be admitted that this is a possible contention, yet its acceptance *431would do violence to the purpose of the act.”
Emphasis is said to reside in the “mandatory” character of this time-limit provision and also in asserted congressional purpose to legislate “to settle matters of public interest” in arbitrations of this character.
At the outset, a specific declaration in the act for a “time limit” within which an award may be made, suggests nothing more and is a premise for no deduction other than that time limitation .was the objective. By no stretch can it comprehend as subject-matter failure or defaults “within” the time in their effectiveness to destroy power. The intention to prohibit indefinite duration of powers is not at all germane to the prohibition or prevention of such subject-matter; and this is true whether the duration is or is not fixed. It is conceived that this is the ground upon which it may be contended “with force” that these provisions neither expressly, necessarily, or even reasonably, exclude a “voluntary termination of the arbitration before the expiration of the specific period.” Now, while this is admitted to be a possible contention (though I think a contention that may be made “with force” is more than a possible contention) it is rejected by my associates because doing “violence to the purpose of the act.” But it must be remembered that this provision of the act does nothing more than to provide for agreements like those at common law, which “fixed” the period of duration of powers, and, as has been just stated, that, as subject-matter is not at all germane to a default, renunciation, or defiance, of this or any other provision of an agreement or a statute. As we shall see, the very interpretation and its effectiveness to allow the powers to continue requires far more than the mere “interpretation” of this provision to cure what eoneededly is implicit, even with the provision and its “interpretation” or implication, as a default or a renunciation of powers between arbitrators and parties.
I conceive the quoted maxim, “Expressio unius,” etc., to be not at all applicable; but if it is intended upon its application to reach the conclusion that it was the congressional purpose to prevent renunciation of power, it does not aid in answering the question before the court. If Congress intended a continuance of power, without right on the part of the arbitrators to renounce it, we still have before the court the stubborn fact that they here breached that obligation. Now the majority opinion following the suggestion of appellees finds in the statute alone the conclusion above noted, wherefore it is immaterial whether the common law is abrogated or altered or declared. The aim, however, is to reach a conclusion consistent with''the fact of renunciation; and the plain consequences of that fact are avoided upon what is conceived to be an entirely vague suggestion of “violence to the purpose of the act.” In the attempt to elaborate reasons or sentiments supportive of that method of reaching the conclusion, it is said:
“From the fact that the means and instrumentalities provided by this act are available only to carriers and their employes, it is fair to assume that Congress was endeavoring to avoid interruptions to commerce so injurious to the public. It is no doubt true that the settlement of a wage controversy in and of itself was much to be desired, for disputes result in strikes, which in turn ruin commerce. Congress, therefore, limited the scope of the act to the one particular industry, and, to certain limited disputes which experience had demonstrated were the most fruitful causes of complete industrial paralysis. To permit those chosen as arbitrators to lay down their burdens before a reasonable time for deliberation has elapsed, would be hardly consistent with the purpose of the legislation. The obligation of the arbitrators is to stay by their task until an award is made or until the lapse of time has terminated the arbitration.”
As above suggested, there can be no difficulty in ascribing to Congress the same motives to provide for arbitration and mediation as at common law, and to-day, independent of statute, prompt parties to resort thereto in settlement of controversies; and, from earliest times prompted courts to favor the pursuit of such a course. But when there is ascribed to parties or to a Legislature a purpose to charge arbitrators with the duty of trying to perform the obligation assumed, the possibility is always present that arbitrators may fail, may breach the obligation, may renounce it. So it is again said that by merely translating the broad objectives of Congress, no progress has been made in solving the problems that arise through failures inherent in every situation.
And the majority opinion professes to find further support for its conclusion “in the subsection which prompts interested parties to act as arbitrators. The normal or probable attitude of partisan arbitrators is illustrated by the record in the instant ease. An open-minded consideration of the questions at issue can hardly be expected where arbitrators are chosen to represent the contestants. It is somewhat of a misnomer to call them arbitrators. They are advocates. It *432could hardly he expected that such partisans would surrender one iota of their claims until the arrival of the psychological moment for concessions.” “It is not unlikely that the contentions of the partisan members persistently asserted would prove discouraging to the neutral arbitrators whose inclination and desire would be to terminate their labors before exhausting all efforts to reach an agreement.” (Italics supplied.)
These views,' it is confidently believed, may be met in their asserted support of the conclusion by a consideration of the result— already adverted to — by attempting to apply that conclusion in cases like the one before us. It would seem to follow, if the time-limit provision may be considered as mandatorily forbidding renunciation, that the obligation not to breach it must be therein found. The forbidden thing certainly must be considered, if done, as violatwe of something, or some right. If, further, the fact of breach, defiance or renunciation may be characterized as not only unfortunate, but “discreditable” if and when it occurs, it is going a long way to ascribe to Congress and to parties a purpose to treat such an eventuality as mere “brutem fulmen.” All will agree that a stipulation, either at common law or under the present statute, serves at least as a limitation of power, after the specified, period. An attempted exercise after the period is not, and could not be, a breach or defiance of the agreement; for the agreement and power are both at an end. But the view urged by the appellee and recognized by the majority opinion, must inherently involve this: That the exercise of the power within the period is not only authorized, but its residence must continue to the end of the period, the duty to exercise it by making an award must persist to the end of the period, wherefore it cannot be renounced; that renunciation in fact is wrongful. In other words, if the conclusion is pressed to the limit, it involves the paradox that the statute and the parties agreeing thereunder interdicted a default or renunciation but that arbitrators who none the less breached and defied the interdiction, did not defy the parties; and the latter are precluded from complaining, because, the act of the arbitrators was wrongful. It amounts in substance to an agreement that parties would abide, not only by performance, which was contemplated, but would abide by breach and-defiance, which was not contemplated. Or, that Congress intended that the parties should abide by either or both; that breach or defiance was intended and agreed to be respected as being as much in conformity with the statute as full performance may be; or that breaeh and defiance should not be deemed in nonconformity.
If it be supposed that suggested analogies may be helpful in supporting or refuting the proposition advanced by appellees, the first requisite is to consider complete analogies. Therefore, trial by jury in court, with the inherent possibility of disagreement, is not helpful to the appellees but discloses the evident weakness, if we complete it, by importing the asserted “mandatory” stipulation and the claimed interpretation as to time “within” which a verdict should be returned. If a statute prescribed three days after submission within which a verdict be returned, would any one contend for an “inter.pretation” which required the Court in every ease to compel the jury to remain in session the whole period? That if the court should accept their prior .assurances of “absolute” inability to agree, the mistrial then declared would be “brutem fulmen,” as distinguished from the mistrial made necessary by the announcement at the end of three days? Or, let us take a court, consisting of two or more judges, constrained by statute to render a “decision” for or against parties within a prescribed period. It finds its members in “absolute” disagreement because no common ground can be reached by a majority (and that was the situation in this case on December 5th); whereupon in recognition of that situation — implicit in every arbitral situation —a defaulting ruling is made. The merit of the matter is not determined. But functioning ceases. The consequences — e. g., affirmance of the judgment, — comes not as a determination of the merit of the controversy —but inherently, out of default. And the controversy there, is without judicial, as here without arbitral, result; and merit is left undetermined. Suppose, further, that such a disposition were made a month prior to the expiration of the statutory period, can it be conceived that a reviewing court would intercede and by mandamus compel the lower tribunal to reinstate the case and to consume the full statutory time?
There is a basic difference between an arbitral functionary like a jury, which has the right if not the duty to report to another (a judge) whether deliberations have or will come to fruition, and a functionary like an arbitration board which is endowed contractually with power within a maximum time to award. In the latter, default, committed and intended as such — is just as implicit as in the first. No one can compel two or more persons to agree. But there is this differ*433ence, the defaulting act and its quality as final, is left wholly within the power of the arbitral tribunal; it alone commits and of necessity delivers it to the parties as a default — as evidencing termination of functioning. And if it be pointed out to the arbitrators that they were bound by statute, or by the agreement, to try to agree, their renunciation may be simply more aggravating. The fact is not altered. The limitation of time within which they may or should agree is likewise a limitation within which they may, and as here did, renounce.
Another analogy is suggested, hypothetically. Suppose, in the present case, the statute failed to specify fraud and corruption as a ground for impeachment. It may be safely assumed as elementary that, if present in any situation, fraud or corruption vitiate everything, including the exercise of power. It is hard to believe that if the statute were silent as suggested, any one would contend that an award, no matter how fraudulent or corrupt, was still in “conformity” with the statute and the agreement. Yet the contention would have just as sure grounds because the award, on its face, would not disclose the destruction of power. It could still be contended that the statute aimed to “rewrite” the whole law of arbitration; that by comprehending what appears on its face, it excluded everything else.
The result of the claimed interpretation respecting the effectiveness of the time limit provision is simply this: That the action of the arbitrators on December 5th, no matter how genuinely final'it was, and intended by them to be, and intended to be so understood and accepted by the parties as evidencing abdication and cessation of functioning, was and is nevertheless, in a legal sense ostensible only. Further, that without the arbitrators knowing or intending it, but really intending the contrary, the law reserved, not merely to the unanimous, but to any majority of the membership, the right and the power to renounce a renunciation. In other words, the action and the will of the arbitrators therein though renouncing a duty which they had agreed to perform, is of no then concern to the parties who had charged them with the duty. The law reserved to the arbitrators, or a majority, the right to recant. That right is interpreted or implied into the statute, but the equal right of parties to complain of a violation of an interdiction, is denied.
It is suggested that this interpretation, in the ease before us, might have developed as a sequel to the action of December 5th, a further disagreement and renunciation between and by the four arbitrators who met on the 17th. Whereupon they could again have gone through the ceremonial of the 5 th, and if sufficient time remained, two of them might have attempted to induce the two who refused to attend on the 17th to reconvene on the 18th. This, of course, is extreme, but it is within the elear possibilities of the interpretation claimed for the statute.
If this case has the importance which parties ascribe to it, the discussion of this principal question should not conclude without a reference to a thought or a sentiment delicately suggested by the appellee, but rather broadly and unequivocally adopted in the majority opinion. It does not seem possible that Congress intended that this legislative provision for arbitration should have the effect of introducing a theory wholly repugnant to the fundamentals of “arbitration” as known from earliest times. Arbitrators, it is' true, are not judges, constrained to proceed in strict conformity with the principles of law respecting evidence, damages, or the like. But no court has ever said that because of the manner of their selection, those deriving their appointments from parties are the alter ego, the advocates, the partisans, of their nominators. The provision of the Labor Act removing the disqualification because of bias or interest — characterized as “radical and unfortunate” — again raises the question respecting the legislative intent as to scope of common law derogation. I reject the thought that it was intended to do anything more than to remove the disqualification. If it is unfortunate, it is so because of the difficulty attending discharge of impartial duty by one who may have an interest or a concurring obligation. But it is not conceived to be within the province of courts to go beyond and say that Congress intended an “arbitrator” so hampered to be an “advocate” or partisan; that the obligation of impartiality, of good conscience, of respect to the interest of the parties (not his principal) and the public are not the first, the prime, in fact the only requisite of his functioning.
I am mindful that the arbitrators in this case apparently had the conception that four of their number, two on a side, were “partisan,” two “neutral” — they so characterized the three groups. It is not for this court to inquire whether in functioning, these six arbitrators in fact took up the duly of advocates. But if the right of advocacy exists, the duty to exercise it likewise exists. And if the law contemplates that where six arbitrators are chosen, two partisans by each side, who function as such, of course the implica*434tion is that the parties appointing them may-exact to the utmost the discharge of zeal, partisanship, finesse, or the like, incident to advocacy — but presumably absent in arbitrament. Not only this, but the so-called “psychology” referred to, need not be the psychology of impartiality, fairness or of conscience, except, optionally. I ain unwilling to accept such a view of this law, nor in any event its relevancy to the interpretation of the provision relied upon to answer the question before the court. The view respecting “advocacy,” if adopted, and, if loyalty in advoeaey is to be expected, and exacted, can result in nothing more than a disparagement of the law as an arbitration law. It will be the means of promoting failures.
I am of the opinion that the demurrer and motion to dismiss should have been overruled, and that the order of the District Court should be reversed.