Court Opinion

ID: 9380882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 17:02:19.936363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.241127
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                    DAVID NOVAK, Plaintiff/Appellant,

                                        v.

               RYAN B. NOVAK, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

                             No. 1 CA-CV 22-0325
                               FILED 3-21-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
           No. CV2021-051120, CV2021-051667, CV2021-094221
                   The Honorable Sara J. Agne, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

David Novak, Fountain Hills
Plaintiff/Appellant

Sternfels & White PLLC, Fountain Hills
By Frederick C. Horn, Shawn C. White
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
                        NOVAK v. NOVAK, et al.
                         Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1           David Novak ("Plaintiff") appeals from the superior court
ruling granting summary judgment to Ryan and Alexandra Novak
("Defendants"). For the following reasons, we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2           Plaintiff is Ryan Novak's father and is a resident of the Town
of Fountain Hills. In 2012, while visiting his father, Ryan Novak suggested
that they purchase a home together in Fountain Hills as an investment
property and a place for Plaintiff to live.

¶3             Plaintiff, who had real-estate experience, contacted a local
realtor to help them find and purchase the property. The parties eventually
decided to purchase a home, located at 15001 N. Stratford Circle ("the
Property"), for $320,000.

¶4             According to Plaintiff, the parties entered into an oral
agreement whereby Plaintiff would pay $20,000 of the $64,000 down
payment along with $5,000 in initial improvements. Plaintiff would also
pay $1,200 per month towards the mortgage and live in the Property as its
sole resident. When both parties agreed to sell the Property, Plaintiff would
be entitled to a return of his portion of the down payment and 50% of the
profit on the sale.

¶5           This alleged agreement was never put into writing. When the
time came to purchase the Property, the purchase contract listed
Defendants as purchasers. The mortgage on the Property also listed
Defendants as the sole borrowers. And Defendants took title to the
Property as community property with rights of survivorship.

¶6             In February 2021, Ryan Novak informed his father that he
intended to sell the home. At that time, he offered to pay Plaintiff back for
his portion of the down payment and give him 25-40% of the profit from
the sale. Plaintiff refused. Instead, he asked Ryan Novak to agree in writing
to a 50/50 split.

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                         NOVAK v. NOVAK, et al.
                          Decision of the Court

¶7           In July 2021, after the parties were unable to resolve their
dispute, Defendants evicted Plaintiff from the Property.         Plaintiff
subsequently filed three lawsuits concerning the Property, which the
superior court consolidated into this case.

¶8           In November 2021, Defendants moved for summary
judgment on all counts. Following oral argument, the superior court
granted the motion and awarded Defendants their attorney fees and costs.
Plaintiff timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

¶9             We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Andrews
v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12 (2003). In doing so, we view the evidence
and reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion." Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

¶10           This Court "prefer[s] to decide each case upon its merits rather
than to dismiss summarily on procedural grounds." Adams v. Valley Nat'l
Bank of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340, 342 (App. 1984). But we also "have a
responsibility to see that [litigants] conform to an acceptable, minimum
level of competency and performance," Evans v. Arthur, 139 Ariz. 362, 364
(1984), and "there is a limit to which judicial leniency can be stretched,"
Adams, 139 Ariz. at 342; see Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83, ¶ 24 (2017)
(noting that courts hold unrepresented litigants to the same standards as
attorneys).

¶11           Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure ("ARCAP") 13 sets
forth the requirements for an appellate brief. At a minimum, "[t]he brief
must present arguments that explain an appellant's 'contentions concerning
each issue presented for review' with supporting reasons, citations to legal
authorities, and appropriate references to the record." Ramos v. Nichols, 252
Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (quoting ARCAP 13(a)(7)). "If we ignore a
failure to comply with these elementary rules and tolerate unprofessional
standards, it will be the clients, the public, the bar, and the courts which
ultimately suffer." Id. at 523, ¶ 13 (cleaned up). Accordingly, when an
appellant "fail[s] to provide a bona fide and reasonably intelligent effort to
comply with Rule 13," the court may find that he has "waived any issues he
may have wished to submit for this court's review." Id. at 522, ¶ 9.

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                         NOVAK v. NOVAK, et al.
                          Decision of the Court

¶12            The opening brief fails to comply with ARCAP 13. Although
it presents several issues for review, it fails to provide supporting reasons,
citations to legal authorities, or references to the record. Instead, Plaintiff
relies on ad hominem attacks on the opposing parties, their counsel, and
the superior court judge, "choosing accusation and innuendo over reasoned
discussion and legal analysis" and "commit[ting an] unreasonable
infraction[] of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure . . . ." Ashton-Blair v.
Merrill, 187 Ariz. 315, 316 (App. 1996). Among other things, the opening
brief describes Ryan Novak as "a liar," "a thief," and "a fraud" and claims
Defendants' counsel is a "swindler" who "is infamous for lying to the Courts
to steal money for his clients." Alleging that the superior court judge "lied
about the evidence on record" in order to "assist[]" Defendants in "stealing"
his property, Plaintiff suggests the judge must have been either "stupid" or
"dishonest and [] paid off." Plaintiff further claims the judge was "corrupt,"
"incompetent," and a "moron" who "'ought to be shot' (figure of speech)."

¶13            "The rule of law depends largely upon civil discourse in the
peaceful resolution of legitimate disputes upon their legal merits." Ramos,
252 Ariz. at 524, ¶ 15. Plaintiff's abusive language and argument
throughout his briefs on appeal "constitutes an affront to the dignity of the
judicial process and the people of this state that rely on it in resolving their
disputes." Id.

¶14           Defendants have not requested sanctions in this case. While
we have authority to impose sanctions on parties who have used hostile
and abusive language in their briefs, id.; Ashton-Blair, 187 Ariz. at 316, we
do not impose sanctions lightly, Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 523, ¶ 12. In the absence
of a request by Defendants, we decline to award sanctions on our own
motion. Cf. ARCAP 25 (providing that an appellate court on its own may
sanction a party or attorney). Nevertheless, Plaintiff's reliance on hostile
and abusive language in place of legal reasoning does not constitute a
reasonable effort to comply with ARCAP 13.

¶15          Because Plaintiff has failed to make a bona fide and
reasonably intelligent effort to comply with ARCAP 13, he has waived all
appealable issues and effectively abandoned his appeal. Ramos, 252 Ariz.
at 523, ¶ 11. Accordingly, we must affirm the superior court's ruling
granting summary judgment. Id.

¶16          Defendants request attorney fees on appeal under A.R.S.
§ 12-341.01 and A.R.S. § 33-420. Because Defendants are the prevailing
parties on appeal, we grant their request for reasonable attorney fees upon
compliance with ARCAP 21. See Lacer v. Navajo County, 141 Ariz. 392, 394

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                        NOVAK v. NOVAK, et al.
                         Decision of the Court

(App. 1984) ("A party is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees under
A.R.S. § 12-341.01 if judgment in its favor is based upon the absence of the
contract sued upon by the adverse party.").

                             CONCLUSION

¶17          For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the decision of the
superior court and award Defendants their reasonable attorney fees on
appeal.

                         AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                         FILED: AA

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