Court Opinion

ID: 9948958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:15:29.767658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.080614
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1075

                         REBECCA M. BROWN & others1

                                       vs.

                     JOHN J. DONOVAN, SR., & another.2

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       In this protracted litigation, the narrow issue currently

 before us is whether a Superior Court judge erred in confirming

 an arbitration award that sanctioned the defendant, John J.

 Donovan, Sr. ("Donovan"), by divesting him of his interest in a

 trust.    Donovan argues that the arbitrator refused to hear

 evidence, exceeded his powers, and demonstrated evident

 partiality, and that the award was procured by fraud.               We

 affirm.

       Background.     In 2003, three of Donovan's children ("the

 siblings") filed the underlying complaint against him and

 another sibling, John J. Donovan, Jr. ("John").             Thereafter, the

 1 James H. Donovan, Maureen Donovan Lantz, and Carolyn Donovan
 Rosenbaum.
 2 The estate of John J. Donovan, Jr.
parties agreed to submit their disputes to an arbitrator, and

the same arbitrator has heard the parties' disputes for over a

decade.   The Superior Court retained jurisdiction over the case

for the purpose of enforcing the agreement and related issues.

As the arbitrator summarized, the siblings "were always at odds

with their father," while John was often in the middle,

"sympathetic to the views of his siblings but also supportive of

his father and concerned for his welfare."   Thus, "John worked

with his siblings and his father to resolve disputes and was

instrumental in forging an agreement which resulted in the

creation of a trust for [Donovan] which John hoped would provide

his father with financial security for the remainder of his

life."

    After John died in 2015, Donovan claimed that a codicil to

John's will gave him authority to act on John's behalf.

Pursuant to that purported authority, Donovan filed a number of

self-benefiting documents with the registry of deeds that, among

other things, were designed to deprive John's widow and children

of their interests in various assets.   Donovan also claimed that

John wanted to make a posthumous confession that he and his

siblings had committed tax fraud, thereby corroborating

allegations made by Donovan that were previously discredited,

and that the codicil instructed Donovan to submit paperwork to

that effect with the Internal Revenue Service.   Upon discovering

                                 2
these filings, the siblings and John's estate submitted a demand

for arbitration and contended that Donovan forged the codicil.

In an award dated January 25, 2017, the arbitrator concluded

that the codicil was "false and fraudulent."   The arbitrator

contemplated divesting Donovan of his interest in the trust as a

sanction for his wrongdoing, did not do so "out of respect for

what [the arbitrator] believed John would have wanted," but

warned Donovan that there would "be no more second chances."     A

Superior Court judge confirmed the award, and Donovan did not

appeal from that order.

    Then, by letter to the arbitrator dated January 19, 2021,

Donovan asked for various forms of relief, including entry of an

order rescinding all prior orders entered in the arbitration

proceedings.   The letter reasserted Donovan's tax fraud

allegations and suggested that John had legitimate reasons for

instructing Donovan to report that fraud to the Internal Revenue

Service.   The arbitrator received documentary evidence from the

parties and agreed to hear Donovan's testimony, after which the

arbitrator would decide whether to hear any additional testimony

from other parties.   After hearing Donovan's testimony, the

arbitrator decided not to hear any additional testimony and

issued an award dated November 10, 2021, which concluded that

Donovan was fraudulently trying to charge his children with tax

fraud, and sanctioned Donovan by divesting him of his interest

                                 3
in the trust.   The arbitrator noted his prior reluctance to

impose that sanction but concluded that "[e]nough is enough."        A

Superior Court judge confirmed the award, which is the subject

of this appeal.

    Discussion.    "[A]n arbitration award is subject to a narrow

scope of review" (citation omitted).    Beacon Towers Condominium

Trust v. Alex, 473 Mass. 472, 474 (2016).    We "review an

arbitrator's award to determine only whether one of the

statutory grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting the

award has been met."   Katz, Nannis & Solomon, P.C. v. Levine,

473 Mass. 784, 793 (2016).   As pertinent here, the statutory

grounds for vacatur include that "the arbitrators . . . refused

to hear evidence material to the controversy . . . as to

prejudice substantially the rights of a party"; "the arbitrators

exceeded their powers"; "there was evident partiality by an

arbitrator"; and "the award was procured by corruption, fraud or

other undue means."    G. L. c. 251, § 12 (a).

    Donovan argues that the arbitrator "refused to hear

evidence" by not permitting Donovan to present any testimony

other than his own.    G. L. c. 251, § 12 (a) (4).   This argument

disregards the history of the case and the context of Donovan's

requests for relief.   The arbitrator, who had spent over a

decade arbitrating disputes between the parties, was exceedingly

familiar with the parties and the underlying issues.     Donavan's

                                 4
2021 letter asked the arbitrator to rescind all his prior orders

based on Donovan's previously discredited tax fraud allegations.

The arbitrator received Donovan's documentary evidence and heard

his testimony.    After considering that evidence, the arbitrator

concluded, based on his extensive experience with the case and

prior rejection of the same unsubstantiated allegations, that

Donovan had "brought before me another fraudulent application"

and there was no need to hear further evidence regarding those

allegations.     Rather than refusing to hear evidence, the

arbitrator exercised his discretion to place reasonable bounds

on the scope of the evidence presented.     See, e.g., Northland

Inv. Corp. v. Goodwin Proctor LLP, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 272, 273-

274 (2012).

     Donovan also argues that the arbitrator exceeded his powers

in divesting Donovan of his interest in the trust.     See G. L.

c. 251, § 12 (a) (3).     However, the parties entered into an

agreement that gave the arbitrator "discretion to award any

remedy including sanctions, damages, attorney[']s fees . . . for

any reason."   This language gave the arbitrator broad authority

to fashion an appropriate remedy for Donovan's wrongdoing and

did not limit the arbitrator to imposing "discrete payments to

compensate for specific expenses or wrongs," as Donovan argues.3

3 We note that Donovan faced criminal charges for fraud in
connection with the codicil. He argues that his tax fraud

                                   5
While Donovan also argues that the broad language, taken to its

extreme, permitted the arbitrator to divest Donovan of his

interest in the trust "just because he felt like it one day,"

that is not what occurred here.       The arbitrator did not make the

decision lightly, gave Donovan warning, and divested Donovan of

his interest in the trust only after he repeatedly engaged in

unconscionable conduct.   Accordingly, the arbitrator did not

"grant[] relief beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement,

. . . award[] relief beyond that to which the parties bound

themselves, or . . . award[] relief prohibited by law," and did

not exceed his powers (citations omitted).       Plymouth-Carver

Regional Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 407 Mass. 1006, 1007

(1990).

    Donovan's remaining arguments, that the arbitrator

demonstrated "evident partiality" and that the arbitration award

was procured by undue means require little discussion, as

Donovan has not established a factual basis for either argument.

See G. L. c. 251, § 12 (a) (1), (2).       As to evident partiality,

Donovan largely points to various strongly worded comments made

by the arbitrator that, among other things, found fault with

allegations were critical to his defense and that he was
impermissibly sanctioned for presenting that defense. This
argument fails as a matter of fact; the arbitrator sanctioned
Donovan for filing the petition in the arbitration proceedings,
not for making the same arguments in his criminal case.

                                  6
Donovan's experts and reproached Donovan for his wrongdoing.

The arbitrator made these comments based on his review of the

evidence, and they do not suggest that the arbitrator was biased

in reviewing that evidence or in deciding the merits of the

petition.   As to undue means, Donovan relies on his discredited

allegations of tax fraud, but those allegations, even if they

had not been discredited, would not establish that the instant

award was procured by undue means.4

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Vuono,

                                        Wolohojian & Toone, JJ.5),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    March 8, 2024.

4 Given our conclusion, we need not address Donovan's argument
that the case should be remanded with instructions that a new
arbitrator be appointed.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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