Court Opinion

ID: 9704166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:25:10.113599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:10.628660
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from division I of the majority opinion. Although the city’s good or bad faith in the investigation and prosecution of the condemnation may be relevant as a separate ground for damages, the issue whether the delay was unreasonable should be objectively determined as a separate matter. Such a view is supported by the authorities the majority relies on.
While this court in Skaff v. Sioux City, 168 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 1969), did make the statement the majority quotes, there is nothing in that decision indicating the trial court determined the delay in prosecution was unreasonable on the basis that the city acted in bad faith.
The trial court’s finding, quoted in Skaff, was this:
There was lack of good faith on the part of the city in instituting the action *592and there was no diligent prosecution thereof.
Id. at 792 (emphasis added). Trial court awarded damages “[b]y reason of the unreasonable delay of the city in the prosecution of the proceedings.” Id.
The Skaff court’s analysis quoted approvingly from a law review note, which described the difference between the cause of action for damages caused by a con-demnor’s bad faith in bringing or abandoning eminent domain proceedings, and a cause of action for damages for unreasonable delay:
A practice somewhat related to bad faith is the unreasonable protraction of condemnation proceedings or abandonment thereof after an extended period of time. Although a condemnor may have valid reasons for delay, the courts, upon a finding of unreasonableness, have required compensation for resulting damages.
Id. at 793 (quoting Note, The Condemnor’s Liability for Damages Arising Through Instituting, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 Utah L.Rev. 548, 553).
The Iowa court early recognized this distinction in Ford v. Board of Park Commissioners, 148 Iowa 1, 126 N.W. 1030 (1910). There this court held the condemnation “was not so long as that any one would be justified in holding it unreasonable,” id. at 6, 126 N.W. at 1032, but nonetheless noted that “[i]f plaintiffs are entitled to [damages], it is because of the fact that the members of the board were activated by bad faith.” Id. at 7, 126 N.W. at 1032.
That there may be a recovery based either on bad faith or on unreasonable delay is indicated in other authorities cited by the majority. Thus the quotation from Nichols is better understood if the emphasis as placed by the majority is moved in the following fashion:
[I]t is held, in the absence of bad faith or unreasonable delay upon the part of the party which instituted the proceedings that the owner is not constitutionally entitled to recover such expenses and losses.
6 J. Sackman, Nichols’ The Law of Eminent Domain § 26.45 (rev. 3d ed. 1985) (emphasis added). The same reemphasis clarifies the majority’s quotation from American Jurisprudence:
This [no-damage] rule is qualified, however, by the requirement of good faith on the part of the condemnor in instituting the action, and the diligent prosecution thereof ....
27 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 461, at 381 (1966) (emphasis added).
Other authorities further underscore this dual requirement:
Recovery of damages against the con-demnor for bad faith in bringing or abandoning condemnation proceedings is one of the judicially shaped exceptions that have eroded the general rule that just compensation does not include incidental damages....
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A practice somewhat akin to bad faith, and, in fact, often grouped together with bad faith as another reason for making an exception to the rule disallowing damages, is unreasonable delay in prosecuting the condemnation action or abandonment after an extended time period. Although the condemning authority may have valid reasons for delay, a judicial finding of unreasonableness requires recovery for resulting damages.
3 P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Condemnation Procedures and Techniques § 14.02[3] (a), (b) (1985); see State ex rel. Morrison v. Helm, 86 Ariz. 275, 282, 345 P.2d 202, 206-07 (1959), appeal dismissed, 362 U.S. 609, 80 S.Ct. 960, 4 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1960); Upper Third Street Development Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis.2d 595, 600-01, 99 N.W.2d 687, 690 (1959); Annot., 92 A.L. R.2d 355, 363 (1963).
The instruction the majority approves tells the jury the condemnor’s good faith would excuse an unreasonable delay. This concept finds no authoritative support. It blurs a long-standing distinction between separate causes of action for damages, one *593based on bad faith and the other on unreasonable delay. Plainly, the condemnor might be well-intentioned but still cause a delay that by all standards would be unreasonable.
I would reverse the judgment in the damage action, and remand for new trial.
SCHULTZ, J., joins this dissent.