Court Opinion

ID: 9388849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 19:01:06.162972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:23.312811
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 CHRISTOPHER L. WRIGHT,

                        Plaintiff,

                        v.                         Case No. 20-cv-306 (CRC)

 GINA RAIMONDO, Secretary,
 U.S. Department of Commerce,

                        Defendant.

                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Plaintiff Christopher Wright, a veteran employee of the Office of Sustainable Fisheries

within the United States Department of Commerce, filed this suit pro se against the Secretary of

Commerce in her official capacity. In what is left of Wright’s complaint after the Court granted

summary judgment to the Secretary on a host of claims that Wright had failed to exhaust or raise

within the statute of limitations, see Mem. Op., June 10, 2020 (ECF No. 10), Wright alleges that

he experienced discriminatory and retaliatory conduct, and was subjected to a hostile work

environment, at the hands of his superiors through a series of events in 2018. He brings claims

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

       Following discovery, the Secretary moved for summary judgment on December 22, 2022.

In light of Wright’s pro se status and consistent with D.C. Circuit precedent, on December 30,

2022, the Court issued a “Fox/Neal” Order advising Wright that “on a motion for summary

judgment, ‘any factual assertions in the movant’s affidavits will be accepted as being true unless

[the opposing party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the

assertion.’” See Order at 1, Dec. 22, 2022 (ECF No. 33) (cleaned up). The Court further

directed Wright to this Court’s Local Civil Rule 7(b) on conceded motions, cautioning him that
failure to respond to the Secretary’s motion could risk dismissal of his case and entry of

judgment for the Secretary. Id. at 2.

       Wright had not responded to the Secretary’s motion by February 8, 2023, well after the

deadline for doing so. The Court therefore issued that day an Order to Show Cause why the

motion should not be granted, giving Wright until February 22, 2023 to respond. Min. Order to

Show Cause, Feb. 8, 2023. He has not done so. In fact, Wright has not communicated with the

Court in almost six months, since the parties filed a joint status report on September 1, 2022

concerning the timing of Wright’s deposition. Joint Status Report, Sept. 1, 2022 (ECF No. 27).

       In Winston & Strawn v. McLean, the D.C. Circuit held that a district court may not,

consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), rely on this Court’s Local Rule 7(b) to

enter summary judgment against a nonmoving party who fails to respond to his opponent’s

motion in a timely fashion. 843 F.3d 503 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The Circuit explained that while an

untimely opposition could result in treating the movant’s asserted facts as undisputed, the court

may not “grant judgment ‘as conceded’ simply because a nonmoving party fails to respond.” Id.

at 507. Rather, the district court “must always engage in the analysis required by Rule 56 before

acting on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 506.

       The plaintiff in Winston & Strawn missed the opposition deadline by only two days.

Given Wright’s extended silence here, it likely would be within the Court’s discretion to dismiss

the case outright for failure of prosecution, wholly apart from Rule 7(b). In an abundance of

caution, however, the Court will nevertheless treat the Secretary’s Statement of Undisputed Facts

as uncontested, and briefly assess the merits of the Secretary’s entitlement to summary judgment

based on those facts.

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       In short, Wright’s claims are based on a series of alleged transgressions that took place in

2018. They consist of being excluded from office leadership meetings, being hassled about his

travel reimbursements, receiving tough counseling emails from his supervisor, having duties

added to his job responsibilities, and being told that he needs to figure out ways to better handle

his workload. Compl. ¶¶ 25–33; id. Ex. 3; Def.’s Statement of Facts ¶ 3. The government

insists that none of these perceived slights constitute an adverse action for purposes of Title VII

or the other statutes at issue. Mot. Summ. J. (“Mot.”) at 1, 5–6, 8–10, 14. The Court is not so

sure after the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Chambers v. District of Columbia, which relaxed

the standard for actionable adverse actions in Title VII discrimination cases. See 35 F.4th 870

(D.C. Cir. 2022). In any case, the government also argues, supported by its Statement of

Undisputed Facts, that Wright’s supervisors had legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-

retaliatory reasons to take each of the actions about which Wright complains. Mot. at 16–22.

The Court agrees. The Secretary is also correct that the series of workplace-related actions that

Wright describes do not come close to the level of severe and pervasive conduct necessary to

make out a Title VII hostile work environment claim. See Durant v. District of Columbia Gov’t,

875 F.3d 685, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

       The Court will, accordingly, grant summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. A

separate Order follows.

                                                              CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
                                                              United States District Judge

Date: April 21, 2023

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