Court Opinion

ID: 9735491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:18:50.717093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:59.220961
License: Public Domain

On rehearing. After the foregoing opinion was filed, the plaintiff moved for rehearing “on the question of exemption of [its] real estate in the Town of Meredith for the tax year 1958” and the motion was granted.
*15John H. Ramsey and Upton, Sanders & Upton (Mr. Richard F. Upton orally), opposed.
Donald R. Bryant for Society of Jesus of New Hampshire, as amicus curiae.
Duncan, J.
The arguments advanced by the plaintiff upon rehearing center upon the interpretation of subsection V of RSA 72:23 (supp) which was enacted in 1957. Laws 1957, c. 202, s. 2. It is suggested that in interpreting the word “used” in subsection V the court has ignored familiar principles of statutory construction which would lead to a conclusion opposite to that reached; and that the 1957 amendment was intended to be little more than a reorganization of existing provisions and a codification of judicial decisions interpreting them.
We cannot accede to this view. In the light of the legislative history reviewed by the parties on rehearing, it seems evident that there was no over-all purpose to widen the sweep of the exemption laws, but rather a purpose to remove provisions which had given rise to administrative difficulties, and with respect to educational institutions in particular to substitute something more closely approaching a rule of thumb.
As previously stated, adoption in 1957 of the additional test of “use” for the charitable purposes of the owner injected a criterion not found in the statute since 1913. St. Mary’s School v. Concord, 80 N. H. 436. It was however one which had played a considerable part under the statute in force from 1895 to 1913. See Carter v. Whitcomb, 74 N. H. 482, 485; Carter v. Eaton, 75 N. H. 560, 562; Laws 1913, c. 115.
In construing subsection V, the court is charged primarily with ascertaining the intention of the Legislature when it provided that real estate of charitable organizations, to qualify for exemption, must be “owned . . . occupied and used . . . for the purposes for which they are established.” In subsection IV the same requirement was imposed with respect to the property of educational institutions; and by definition there set out “lands and buildings not used and occupied directly” for the specified purposes (and not previously enumerated) were expressly excluded from exemption. We do not regard this as a repeal of “the old doctrine of 'direct use,’ ” as suggested by amicus curiae.
A determination of the legislative intent is to be made upon *16consideration of the act as a whole. Costoras v. Noel, 100 N. H. 81, 83. The conclusion that the word “used” was intended to convey the same meaning in subsection V which was clearly given to it in subsection IV is supported by the recognized principle that words used with plain meaning in one part of an act are to be given the same meaning in other parts of the act, unless a contrary intention is clearly shown. See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F. 2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945); Randall’s Case, 331 Mass. 383. This principle, rather than that urged upon the court by the plaintiff, is appropriately to be followed in giving effect to what the Legislature must be taken to have intended by the 1957 revision. In reaching this conclusion we express no view concerning the interpretation of subsection III of section 23, as amended, which is not here in issue.
The order upon rehearing is

Former result affirmed.

All concurred.