Court Opinion

ID: 9605116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:30:32.151722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:46.860018
License: Public Domain

KLEINSCHMIDT, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent because I believe that due process of law requires that transfer of a child from juvenile to adult court must be made upon an evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence as opposed to a mere preponderance of the evidence.
The decision to transfer a juvenile to the adult court is a critical one. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). To my mind it is no less important than a proceeding to terminate parental rights, which calls for a high degree of confidence in the correctness of the factual conclusions which support it. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). I would apply the three part test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) appropriate to this consideration as follows:
1. The private interest affected, the child’s presumed right to treatment within the juvenile system, is commanding.
2. The risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial. This case is a perfect illustration of the point. Even by a mere preponderance standard the trial judge’s determination was necessarily very close, if indeed not an abuse of discretion.4
3. The state’s countervailing interest is slight. The state has chosen to presume that children will be treated within the juvenile system and it has thereby conceded *112the important need to be factually correct in making exceptions to the norm. While the state may indeed have a very strong interest in determining which child shall be treated as a juvenile and which shall be treated as an adult, it can have little interest in having the determination made by the more casual standard.
The very fact that the trial judge’s discretion is so broad, and the factual criteria for transfer so vague, bolsters the need for an enhanced standard of proof. See In re Revocation of License of Irwin Jacob Polk, M.D., 90 N.J. 550, 449 A.2d 7 (1982).
The Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association’s Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards have adopted the clear and convincing test for referral of juveniles for adult prosecution. See B. Flicker, Standards for Juvenile Justice: A Summary and Analysis, § 5.4.2 (1977).
I would reverse. It is clear that the trial judge made his decision on the basis of probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe as dictated by 17A, A.R.S. Juv.Ct. Rules of Proc., Rule 14(b). The record will not support a transfer measured by a clear and convincing standard.

. I am aware that the victim was kicked in the back by one of his assailants and suffered what he described as a few gashes in his back which were apparently injuries of a temporary nature. It is not at all clear from the record that the defendant was the kicker and there is good reason, based on the victim’s testimony, to believe that he was not. It is clear that the defendant is the boy who actually took the victim’s radio. I condone nothing when I observe that as robberies go this was less serious than many. The defendant’s prior referrals, both of which occurred in 1981, were for painting graffiti on a parking lot and for a theft of beer. The proximity of the defendant’s eighteenth birthday is certainly the most serious impediment to his retention in the juvenile system but given the boy’s intelligence and potential and the recommendations of the professional staff for retention, I simply repeat that the question was close, even by the most relaxed standard.