Court Opinion

ID: 9765776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:18:59.116619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:15.580571
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, P.J.E.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 While the author of the majority Opinion has undertaken a careful analysis and provides a perceptive expression of rationale, I am compelled to a differing position. This Court, in Commonwealth v. Hampton, 718 A.2d 1250 (Pa.Super.1998), in an Opinion by our esteemed colleague Judge Justin M. Johnson, decreed that “every post-conviction litigant is entitled to ‘at least one meaningful opportunity to have issues reviewed, at least in the context of an ineffectiveness claim.” ’ Id. at 1252 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted), quoted in, Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 945 (Pa.Super.2003).
¶ 2 As set out by the Majority, appellant in this case filed a petition for relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, and thereby initiated the proceedings that culminated in the present appeal. Although counsel was appointed to assist appellant, that attorney ultimately filed in the trial court a “no merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa.Super. 390, 550 A.2d 213 (1988), and was granted permission to withdraw. Appellant then initiated this appeal in which, by necessity, he appears pro se. Appellant, in his brief, sets out two claims of alleged ineffectiveness of prior counsel and one claim that the trial court erred in allowing appointed counsel to withdraw. Although the Majority finds no merit to any of the issues raised by appellant, I am compelled to disagree.
¶ 3 As a PCRA petitioner, appellant is entitled to the assistance of counsel for his first PCRA petition, and any appeal therefrom. Commonwealth v. Smith, 572 Pa. 572, 584, 818 A.2d 494, 500-501 (2003); Commonwealth v. Porter, 556 Pa. 301, 314 n. 3, 728 A.2d 890, 896 n. 3 (1999), citing Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693 (1998); Commonwealth v. Quail, 729 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa.Super.1999). While that right to counsel is not absolute, appointed counsel has the duty “to diligently and competently represent the client until his or her appearance is withdrawn.” Commonwealth v. Librizzi, 810 A.2d 692, 693 (Pa.Super.2002) (emphasis supplied). The conditions governing the right of PCRA counsel to withdraw from representing his or her client are well defined:
[Cjounsel may withdraw at any stage of collateral proceedings if, in the exercise of his or her professional judgment, *1226counsel determines that the issues raised in those proceedings are merit-less and if the post-conviction court concurs with counsel’s assessment. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 435 Pa.Super. 211, 645 A.2d 274 (1994)....
* * * * * *
In [Commonwealth v.] Turner, our Supreme Court endorsed an independent review by the PCRA Court as an appropriate follow-up to counsel’s “no-merit” letter filed at that level. Commonwealth v. Mosteller, 430 Pa.Super. 57, 633 A.2d 615, 617 (1993).
The independent review necessary to secure a withdrawal request by counsel requires proof that:
PCRA counsel, in a “no-merit” letter, has detailed the nature and the extent of his review;
PCRA counsel, in the “no-merit” letter, lists each issue the petitioner wishes to have reviewed;
PCRA counsel must explain, in the “no-merit” letter, why petitioner’s issues are meritless;
The PCRA court must conduct its own independent review of the record; and
The PCRA court must agree with counsel that the petition is meritless.
633 A.2d at 617.... The PCRA Court’s decision is then subject to appellate scrutiny to assure that these constraints have been followed. Mosteller, 633 A.2d at 617.
Commonwealth v. Glover, 738 A.2d 460, 463-464 (Pa.Super.1999).
¶ 4 While counsel in this case did observe the formalities of submitting a Finley letter and of advising appellant of his post-Finley rights, I cannot agree that this Finley letter evinced a diligent and competent review of the record.
¶ 5 Moreover, I am unable to agree with the conclusion of appointed counsel, and the trial court, that there is no merit to the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Commonwealth’s reference to the police photographs and appellant’s multiple addresses. The record reveals that appellant was already well known to the witnesses who reported this shooting to the police, and there was no need for them to peruse police photographs in order to identify him. Importantly, the defense of appellant at trial was not misidentification, or even denial, but the absence of malice. Under these facts the use by the Commonwealth of the police photographs served no other purpose than to prejudicially signal to the jury that appellant was previously known to the homicide division of the Philadelphia Police Department. Such prejudicial information, while in some cases unavoidable, could have been kept from the jury in this case had trial counsel interposed a timely objection. At a minimum, appellant was entitled to have this matter further explored in a PCRA evidentiary hearing.
¶ 6 I, therefore, would reverse the order of the trial court, and remand this case for appointment of new counsel to assist appellant in the prosecution of this collateral attack.