Court Opinion

ID: 9411981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:07:24.454177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:22.467777
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/28/23 P. v. Christman CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B321145

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. TA154545)
           v.

 BRUCE ALLEN CHRISTMAN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.
      Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Michael C. Keller,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Appellant Bruce Allen Christman contends that his
convictions for assault with a firearm, assault with a
semiautomatic firearm, and unlawful possession of a firearm
must be reversed because the prosecution exercised peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory fashion during his jury trial.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that
appellant did not make a prima facie showing of discriminatory
intent. We accordingly affirm.
                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       On May 20, 2021, appellant and one of his two roommates,
J.D.,1 were involved in an argument during which J.D. was shot
in the leg. The three roommates gave varying accounts of the
incident at trial.
       According to J.D., appellant fired several shots in his
direction with a derringer handgun. J.D. responded by throwing
a garden shovel at appellant. Appellant then picked up a Glock
pistol and shot J.D. in the lower leg.
       The third roommate witnessed the incident. He testified
that appellant fired a “pellet gun” at J.D. twice. Appellant then
picked up a black Glock and fired about three shots at J.D.’s leg,
striking him. After J.D. was hit, he lunged at appellant with a
shovel.
       Appellant testified that he turned to look at J.D. after he
heard J.D. yelling at him and saw J.D. holding a black gun in his
right hand. Appellant reached over, grabbed J.D.’s right wrist or
hand, and pushed his arm down. The gun “went off” while it was
in J.D.’s hand. J.D. then dropped the gun; appellant picked it up

1     We refer to the victim using initials to protect his privacy.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)

                                 2
and put it in his pocket. Appellant also pocketed a small
derringer that was lying nearby before leaving the residence.
       A police officer testified that appellant had a Glock in his
pocket and a derringer in his sock when he was arrested later in
the day.
                     PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       An information filed on August 30, 2021 charged appellant
with one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen.
Code, § 245, subd. (b), count 1),2 one count of assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), count 2), and two counts of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), counts 3
and 4). The information alleged that appellant personally
inflicted great bodily injury on J.D. during the commission of
count 1 (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and personally used a firearm
during both counts 1 and 2 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). It further
alleged that appellant suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and a prior serious or violent
felony conviction (§§ 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7).
       On December 16, 2021, a jury found appellant guilty as
charged and found the personal use and great bodily injury
enhancements true. Appellant subsequently admitted his priors.
The court struck appellant’s strike and sentenced him to the high
term of nine years on count 1, plus consecutive terms of three
years for the great bodily injury enhancement and four years for
the personal use enhancement. It imposed and stayed sentence
on count 2 pursuant to section 654 and imposed consecutive
terms of eight months each on counts 3 and 4.
       Appellant timely appealed.

2     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

                                 3
                           DISCUSSION
       Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler3 motion during jury
selection. He argues that the prosecutor’s striking of Black
prospective jurors gave rise to an inference of discrimination, and
the trial court erred by finding no prima facie case had been
established. We disagree.
I.     Background
       The pool of approximately 704 prospective jurors in this
case was unevenly divided into two groups. Group A included 27
prospective jurors; and Group B included 43 to 45 prospective
jurors. One prospective juror in Group A was Black, and three
prospective jurors in Group B were Black. The racial makeup of
the remainder of the pool is not clear.
       A.    Juror 0468
       Juror No. 0468, a Black woman, was in Group A. Juror No.
0468 was single, lived in Compton, and worked as a licensed
vocational nurse. She had no prior jury experience and had never
been a victim of a crime. In response to a direct question from

3      Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson); People v.
Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, overruled in part by Johnson v.
California (2005) 545 U.S. 162 (Wheeler). Recently enacted Code
of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which significantly modifies the
Batson/Wheeler framework, is not relevant here because it
applies only to criminal trials in which jury selection began on or
after January 1, 2022. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subds. (i),
(k).) Jury selection in this case began on December 3, 2021.

4      The appellate record does not support appellant’s assertion
that “[t]here were more than 85 total prospective jurors.”

                                 4
the court, she stated that she would not change her vote to end
deliberations more quickly.
       During defense counsel’s voir dire of Group A, Juror No.
0468 raised her hand to indicate that she could follow the law as
provided by the court. Defense counsel did not directly engage
Juror No. 0468 in any additional colloquy or questioning.
       During the prosecutor’s voir dire of Group A, Juror No.
0468 agreed that a witness who made three different statements
about an event would be inconsistent. Later, the prosecutor
asked if anyone disagreed with “the idea that self-defense, the
use of force has to be proportional to what is being used on you.”
Another prospective juror, Juror No. 1943, said he disagreed and
made the following remarks:
       “Well, since 911, what happened on the plane it is - - it’s - -
you cannot, unfortunately, give in to your attacker. You must
stop your attacker completely, period. And I think 911 proved
that. Because no matter what you did or thought or how you felt
about it, they were going to down that plane with you in it and
everybody else. So the lesson to me is when you’re faced in a
situation like that, you must stop them. Save your life, but stop
them in the tracks. In other words, you’ve got to kill them. You
have to kill them. And that’s the lesson that I draw from 911.”
       After the prosecutor stated—and Juror No. 1943 agreed—
that “911 is a pretty rare circumstance,” Juror No. 1943 added,
“It doesn’t have to be. You know, I mean, we’re subject to attack.”
The prosecutor then asked Juror No. 1943 if he believed in “a
right to extreme self defense,” meaning “[y]ou have the right to
kill someone should you feel in danger.” Juror No. 1943 clarified
that he “wouldn’t go that far” where “somebody . . . is just going
to rob you.” He added, “It’s all proportional . . . . You’ve got to look

                                   5
at the situation. You’ve got to look at the factors. You know, how
much threat are they, you know, bringing against you? What is
their intent? You know, so like in a war situation, it’s kill or be
killed. In the terrorist situation, the same applies. But out here
in the civil world, you know, you’re not going to find that all the
time.”
       Shortly after these remarks, the prosecutor noted that
Juror No. 0468 was “giving me a look that makes me think you’ve
got something to say.” Juror No. 0468 said she did, and stated,
“He used the reference in the 911 situation. Why can’t you apply
the same thing? In a civil situation, as to what he was referring
with the 911, why couldn’t you subdue them?”
       The prosecutor asked, “Okay. So am I understanding that
you think if you feel threatened, you have the right to kill
someone?” Juror No. 0468 answered, “What I feel about that is if
you are in a situation and you feel that your life is either [sic]
coming to an end, I say fight for your life.” The prosecutor said,
“Uh-huh.” Juror No. 0468 then concluded, “It’s fight or flight.”
       The prosecutor then asked the rest of the prospective jurors
if anyone disagreed with Juror No. 0468. One person stated that
flight is a good option in some cases, but “if you don’t have the
option to run away, fighting seems fair.” Several others agreed;
one added, “I don’t believe you need to have some calculus going
on about what is proportional. You have a right to self-defense
within reason. And that would be more my question, was it
within reason.” The prosecutor said he agreed with that before
shifting the focus. Juror No. 0468 did not participate in this
discussion or make any further remarks. The prosecutor did not
ask her any additional questions.

                                 6
       After the prosecutor and defense counsel made their
challenges for cause, the court gave them an opportunity to
exercise their peremptory challenges on the Group A jurors. The
prosecutor used his first peremptory challenge to excuse Juror
No. 0468.
       B.     Juror No. 3841
       Juror No. 3841, a Black man, was in Group B. Group B
was not present during the voir dire of Group A.
       Juror No. 3841 was single, lived in Compton, and worked
as a warehouse clerk. He had no prior jury experience. He
initially stated that he had never been the victim of a crime, but
subsequently said that he had twice been the victim of a car
break-in. Juror No. 3841’s brother suffered a conviction related
to an unregistered firearm approximately 25 years earlier; Juror
No. 3841 said that would not affect his ability to be fair.
       During defense counsel’s voir dire, she directly asked Juror
No. 3841 if he could judge credibility. The following exchange
ensued:
       Juror No. 3841: No.
       Defense counsel: You can’t?
       Juror No. 3841: No.
       Defense counsel: Tell me why.
       Juror No. 3841: Well, it depends on what it is. I mean - -
       Defense counsel: I’m so sorry. I cannot hear you.
       Juror No. 3841: … It depends on what it - - because if I
don’t know him, I don’t know. I mean, I can’t.
       Defense counsel: I’ll give you the same hypothetical I gave
Juror. No. 8.
       Juror No. 3841: Yeah.

                                 7
       Defense counsel: If the witness standing at this door says
this is what happened to me. Right? Standing right here. Then
the witness gets up on the witness box and goes no, no, no, this is
how it really happened. Is that consistent?
        Juror No. 3841: No.
       Defense counsel: Okay. So inconsistency, would you agree,
is a factor of whether that witness is credible or not?
       Juror No. 3841: I’m not sure I understand the - -
       Defense counsel: He gives two different version of what
happened.
       Juror No. 3841: So he wouldn’t be credible.
       Defense counsel: Would he be credible to you?
            Juror No. 3841: No.
       Defense counsel: Okay. I mean, if you’re a beating [sic]
man and someone says to you the Lakers are absolutely going to
beat on the Clippers, and then five minutes later he says the
Lakers are not going to beat the Clippers, he’s giving you two
different statements. Do you trust his word?
       Juror No. 3841: No.
       The exchange concluded due to a scheduled break in the
proceedings. When Group B returned to the courtroom, the court
addressed the group as a whole:
       “Ladies and gentlemen, before I turn it back to [defense
counsel], I just wanted to touch on something because she’s asked
this question a couple of times, and I’ve kind of noticed the
responses from a couple of jurors.
       “The question is can you judge credibility. And let me just
tell you, we judge credibility every day of our lives. All right. A
trail [sic] is no different. It’s in the context of this courtroom and
the proceeding. But the factors to judge credibility. We use them

                                  8
every day. I just want to give you a quick example so you
understand.”
       The court then provided an example of buying steak, and
evaluating the butcher’s recommendation of the most expensive
steak on display. The court continued, “You obviously looked at
what this person is saying. You consider the fact he’s selling you
steak. They want to earn a profit. Right? You’re considering all
these things. The motivation for him saying you want to get the
expensive steak or whatever. All these things [defense counsel]
is asking about, can you judge credibility. You do these things
every day of your life. You may bring up examples of your kids.
It can be in a relationship. It can be at work. So when she asks
can you judge credibility, you do it every single day.”
       Defense counsel resumed her colloquy with Juror No. 3841
immediately after the court’s remarks.
       Defense counsel: In your personal life and everything, can
you tell if someone is telling the truth?
       Juror No. 3841: No.
       Defense counsel: I didn’t hear you.
       Juror No. 3841: No.
       Defense counsel: No. Okay. Can you tell if someone is
telling a lie?
       Juror No. 3841: No. No, I can’t.
       Defense counsel: Okay. What are the factors that you would
consider if someone is not telling the truth? That you would
consider.
       Juror No. 3841: If they were telling the truth? Telling
truth?
       Defense counsel: Yes. What would you – give me a factor.

                                9
       Juror No. 3841: I don’t know. I wouldn’t know. Because if
you don’t know the person, you wouldn’t be able to – I would just
have to accept what they’re telling me.
       Defense counsel: So if a witness gets up on the stand and
they tell you how something happened one day, but then switches
the story the next day, would you be able to tell that person is –
       Juror No. 3841: Yeah. Well, yeah. That’s different.
       The prosecutor revisited this topic with Juror No. 3841
during his voir dire.
       Prosecutor: You said that you have some difficulty
determining credibility of witnesses. Can you tell me a little bit
more about that.
       Juror No. 3841: Credibility?
       Prosecutor: Let me put a finer point on that. Can you tell
when people are lying to? [sic]
       Juror No. 3841: No. If I don’t know them, I don’t know.
Say if somebody - - I have to take their word for it until I get
something to counter it. If somebody walk [sic] up and say, you
know, he’s whatever, and then I would have to make my
judgment through that.
       Prosecutor: Okay. So no one in this case presumably is
going to be someone that you know. But all of them are going to
testify and swear to tell the truth. And you’re going to have to
determine what happened. And you might run into two
conflicting stories, and you’re going to have to sort out which one
of these is true. Do you think you’re going to be able to do that?
       Juror No. 3841: Yeah.
       Prosecutor: Now, you said you had problems telling when
people are lying. What makes you think you can do this?

                                10
      Juror No. 3841: Like I said, I would have to hear what they
say and then take it from there. Like I said, I don’t know if
they’re lying or not until I hear what they say.
      Prosecutor: Okay. I understand you now. All right. So
you can’t judge someone just based on their appearance whether
they’re telling the truth?
      Juror No. 3841: Right.
      Prosecutor: So you would take all witnesses coming to the
stand on the exact same level.
      Juror No. 3841: Yeah.
      Prosecutor: All right. And you would listen to what they’re
saying. And then after that, would you be able to tell what they
said made sense?
      Juror No. 3841: Yeah.
      Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel sought to
excuse any Group B jurors for cause. The prosecutor used his
second peremptory challenge for Group B to excuse Juror No.
3841. After defense counsel accepted the panel, the prosecutor
used his next peremptory challenge to excuse Juror No. 8294, a
Black man who also said he had difficulty assessing credibility.5

5      The prosecutor engaged in a colloquy about credibility with
Juror No. 8294, who lived in Los Angeles with his parents and
brother and was unemployed but previously had worked at the
post office. Juror No. 8294, who happened to be seated next to
Juror No. 3841, said he could not tell when people are lying, he
had difficulty evaluating competing stories in his daily life, and
he did not think he would be able to evaluate evidence in the case
if he heard two conflicting stories. Although Juror No. 8294 was
subject to the Batson/Wheeler motion below, appellant does not
challenge the exercise of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge
against Juror No. 8294 on appeal.

                               11
       C.     Baston/Wheeler Motion
       After the prosecutor excused Juror No. 8294, defense
counsel made a Batson/Wheeler motion at sidebar. Defense
counsel stated that she did not “believe there’s an objective
reason as to why he’s been excused. . . . I believe the People now
have used two peremptories and two Black males have been
excused. And I believe in Group A, which have [sic] a Black
female, was excused also. So I waited all the way until this third
one.”
       The court observed that the prosecutor had exercised a
total of six peremptory challenges across both groups, and that
three of them had been used to strike Black jurors. It also
summarized the biographical information those jurors had
provided, which we summarized above.
       The court continued, “At present, I do not see any other
African-American jurors in seats 1 through 12, and I believe that
my recollection tells me there’s perhaps one male in the audience
who’s not yet called that remains in the audience. Okay. But
that’s it. So I want to be clear in how I state this. I’m not finding
a prima facie case at this time that [the prosecutor’s] exercise of
his peremptories is improperly based on race. But based on my
status [sic] of the law, now I need to you to state the reasons why
and make a record as such.”
       The prosecutor stated that he struck Juror No. 0468
because “she indicated she would be supportive of a self-defense
[sic] to a fairly extreme degree. When one juror went on about
responding in a lethal fashion to self-defense and then walking it
back to say but that’s qualified, her response was incredulous and
indicated she would be friendly to someone responding to regular
force with lethal force.”

                                 12
       Regarding Juror No. 3841, the prosecutor explained that
during defense counsel’s voir dire, “he indicated that he had
difficulty judging credibility. He was slow to respond to the
hypothetical questions, indicating that he wasn’t understanding
quite what was going on. He said he couldn’t determine if people
were telling him the truth. If he doesn’t personally know the
person, he didn’t know they were lying, which made me think he
might be a poor juror in deliberations when asked to adjudicate
the credibility of witnesses.”
       As to Juror 8294, the prosecutor said, “I kicked him for very
similar reasons. He said he couldn’t tell if someone was telling
the truth. . . . He had difficulty evaluating the testimony, which
is why I exercised that peremptory challenge.”
       The court asked defense counsel if she would like to make a
record. She stated, “Just that in terms of the last two Black male
jurors, I don’t think they’re [sic] hesitancy in automatically
saying they can judge someone whether they’re lying or
truthfulness, I don’t think it makes them not believable. Other
jurors said the same thing. A peremptory should not be used for
that. . . . I work with [the prosecutor] a lot. I admire him. I’m
doing this merely in representing Mr. Christman. I don’t think
there’s uncertainty that they can judge credibility is enough of a
reason to kick them out just because of what they said because
there are other jurors who said the same thing. I think
specifically they’re African-Americans is a factor.”
       The court said it wanted to make a record as well. It stated,
“The court observed that the last two jurors that [the prosecutor]
kicked. Specifically the juror that was 3841, when [defense
counsel] asked him directly can you judge credibility, he said no.
And the only reason I bring this up is there was a female juror, I

                                13
believe formally [sic] seated in 8 . . . I think you [the prosecutor]
might have excused her.” The parties agreed that the prosecutor
had struck that juror, who was single, worked in sales and
marketing, and said she had been a victim of domestic violence.
The court said that defense counsel had asked that prospective
juror if she could judge credibility, and that she had responded
no. “That was her first answer. And then you went through
some voir dire. . . . Juror 3841, who was the first individual that
[the prosecutor] kicked, when you asked him can you judge
credibility, he said no. That’s why when we came back from the
break, I said can I talk to them real quick, [defense counsel],
about judging credibility. . . . That stood out to me because they
both seemed to indicate off the back [sic] ‘I can’t judge
credibility.’”
       The court continued, “And I have to say, despite the
questioning, I don’t know if for Juror No. 3841, the first
individual that [the prosecutor] excused, . . . if it was the
certainty [sic] of his answers or if he just didn’t understand sort
of the role of judging credibility. But I got the sense from [sic]
that maybe he didn’t understand judging credibility or what’s
involved. I have to be frank. I got the same sense from [Juror
No. 8294]. It was the court’s sense, upon questioning by both
sides, that that juror seemed to indicate a problem with the role
in judging credibility or difficulties for him doing that. That was
the sense that I got from these individuals. I just wanted that to
be part of the court’s observation. I think these are race neutral
reasons.”
       The court denied the motion, concluding “all taken, the
totality of the individuals’ answers, I’m not finding a Batson
violation.”

                                 14
II.    Governing Law
       “The law is clear and firmly established. “‘Both the federal
and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate’s use of peremptory
challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race.’”
[Citation.] “‘Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution and the right to trial by a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community
under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.’ ”
[Citation.] The law also recognizes “‘a rebuttable presumption
that a peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the
burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate impermissible
discrimination.” [Citation.] “A three-step procedure applies at
trial when a defendant alleges discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges. First, the defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the prosecution exercised a challenge based on
impermissible criteria. Second, if the trial court finds a prima
facie case, then the prosecution must offer nondiscriminatory
reasons for the challenge. Third, the trial court must determine
whether the prosecution's offered justification is credible and
whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, the defendant has
shown purposeful race discrimination. [Citation.] ‘The ultimate
burden of persuasion regarding [discriminatory] motivation rests
with, and never shifts from, the [defendant].””” [Citation.]”
(People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719,
759-760.)
        “[W]here (1) the trial court has determined that no prima
facie case of discrimination exists, (2) the trial court allows or
invites the prosecutor to state his or her reasons for excusing the
juror for the record, (3) the prosecutor provides
nondiscriminatory reasons, and (4) the trial court determines

                                15
that the prosecutor’s nondiscriminatory reasons are genuine, an
appellate court should begin its analysis of the trial court’s denial
of the Batson/Wheeler motion with a review of the first-stage
ruling.” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 391 (Scott).)
        At the first stage, the defendant must set forth a prima
facie case of discrimination “by showing that the totality of the
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory
purpose.” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383.) The bar is
relatively low; “[i]t is satisfied simply by evidence sufficient to
permit us to draw an inference that discrimination may have
occurred.” (People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 773.) The
ultimate issue is not whether there is systematic exclusion of a
protected class, but rather whether a particular panelist has been
challenged on the basis of group bias. (Ibid.)
        Applying the substantial evidence standard of review, “[w]e
examine the entire record before the trial court to determine
whether it supports an inference of such group bias.” (People v.
Battle, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 772-773.) Facts particularly
relevant to this showing include “that a party has struck most or
all of the members of the identified group from the venire, that a
party has used a disproportionate number of strikes against the
group, that the party has failed to engage these jurors in more
than desultory voir dire, that the defendant is a member of the
identified group, and that the victim is a member of the group to
which the majority of jurors belong.” (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 384.) We also may consider nondiscriminatory reasons for the
challenge that are “apparent from and ‘clearly established’ in the
record.” (Ibid.) We “may not rely on a prosecutor’s statement of
reasons to support a trial court’s finding that the defendant failed
to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.” (Id. at p. 390.)

                                 16
III.   Analysis
       Appellant argues first that we “may ignore the first step of
the Batson inquiry and proceed directly to the third step.” We
disagree. We skip the first step of the inquiry where the court
does not make a prima facie finding or makes the finding only
after the prosecutor provides his or her reasons for striking the
juror. (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 76; Scott, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 387 fn. 1.) Here, the trial court unambiguously
found that defense counsel failed to make a prima facie showing
before asking the prosecutor to place his reasons for the strikes
on the record. This is the precise situation described in Scott,
and we accordingly follow the Supreme Court’s directive to begin
our analysis at the first stage. (See Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
391.)
       Appellant next contends there was sufficient evidence from
which the trial court could and should have drawn an inference of
discrimination at the prima facie stage. Specifically, he asserts
that the prosecutor challenged all three Black jurors and used a
disproportionate number of his peremptory challenges, three out
of six or 50 percent, to strike Black jurors, who constituted a
much smaller percentage of the venire.
       This argument turns the substantial evidence standard of
review on its head. The issue is not whether substantial evidence
would support a contrary finding, but whether substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding. We find that it does.
Viewed as a whole, the record in this case clearly establishes
nondiscriminatory reasons for excusing Juror No. 0468 and Juror
No. 3841 that dispel any inference of bias.
       Although both jurors were Black, and the prosecutor struck
all three Black jurors who had been through voir dire, those facts

                                17
alone are not dispositive. (See People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1184, 1212; People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 343.) We also
consider that appellant, who is Hispanic, was not a member of
the racial group at issue.6 (See Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th 384.)
Most important on this record is the prosecutor’s engagement of
both jurors in “more than desultory” voir dire relevant to key
issues in the case: witness credibility and self-defense. During
lengthy exchanges with both the prosecutor and defense counsel,
Juror 3841 repeatedly said he was unable to assess credibility or
discern whether people were lying or telling the truth. Adding to
remarks by another prospective juror, Juror No. 0468 indicated
that she took an expansive and purely subjective view of self-
defense: “if you are in a situation and you feel that your life is
either [sic] coming to an end, I say fight for your life.” These
statements strongly support the court’s conclusion that the
prosecutor did not exercise his peremptory challenges based on
impermissible criteria. Indeed, the court noted that the
prosecutor struck a non-Black juror who made similar comments
about her inability to assess credibility.
      The totality of the circumstances here supports the court’s
finding that appellant did not present a prima facie case of
discrimination. We accordingly do not reach the parties’
arguments concerning the third step of the Batson/Wheeler
inquiry.

6      The race of the victim may also be relevant, but J.D.’s race
is not apparent from the record. (See Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 384.)

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                      DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                   COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

MORI, J.

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