Court Opinion

ID: 9514681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:04.523418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.019532
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 66.] I respectfully dissent as to . issue four and would hold the trial court erred in denying the proposed jury instruction.
[¶ 67.] On the one hand, the majority opinion holds on issue five that prior acts evidence was admissible and relevant for proving specific intent on the part of Kennedy. On the other hand, on issue four, the majority endorses the trial court’s failure to give defendant’s proposed pattern jury instruction number 46-01, which would have clearly set forth the element of intent. I believe it is patently contradictory for the majority to allow prior acts in under the rationale of proving the element of intent, but then affirm the giving of instruction that does not require the jury to find intent as a necessary element of the claim. It is obvious plaintiff understood the use of prior acts to prove specific intent as he proposed it, but then successfully objected to an instruction that would have shown same. Argument by plaintiffs counsel at the hearing for the motion on prior bad acts was as follows:
So this is a case where what we have to prove at least in accordance with the Court’s proposed instructions here is that Myles Kennedy intentionally enticed the affections ... of Julie Veeder from Mike Veeder. And one of the ways we can show that is through a prior bad act. It is absolutely necessary evidence to our case.
[¶ 68.] The defendant’s proposed jury instruction stated in regard to the first element that plaintiff must prove “defendant intended from the outset to entice the affections of one spouse away from the other.” See ¶ 33. Such language specifically tracks this Court’s decisions emphasizing that an action for alienation of affections is an intentional tort. Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758, 763 (S.D.1989); Pankratz v. Miller, 401 N.W.2d 543, 549 (S.D.1987). In Pankratz, this Court, adopting rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Pedersen v. Jirsa, 267 Minn. 48,125 N.W.2d 38, 43 (1963), stated: “ ‘The gravamen of an action for alienation of affections is enticement. It is based on an intentional tort,21 not negligence. The acts which lead to the loss of affection must be wrongful and intentional, calculated to entice the affections of one spouse away from the other[.]’ ” 401 N.W.2d at 549 (emphasis added). While this Court has adopted intent as a required element, the majority is not requiring that it be included in the instructions to the jury. Moreover, not only has the majority affirmed an instruction absent intent, but the term, “wrongful conduct,” has not even been defined in these instructions. The majority excuses this omission by contending that the instructions, when construed together, “provide the jury with more than adequate guidance on the intent requirement that must be met[.]” See ¶ 39. The instruction approved by majority amounts to no more than sending the jury on an Easter egg hunt to find whether or not intent is a required element. When jury instructions mislead, conflict, or confuse the jury, it constitutes reversible error. Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 1996 SD 94, ¶ 19, 552 N.W.2d 801, 808; Wal-lahan v. Black Hills Elec. Coop., Inc., 523 N.W.2d 417, 423 (S.D.1994). By not including the required element of intent in the instructions, Kennedy was denied a fair trial by this jury.
[¶ 69.] The record reflects a spouse who repeatedly testified there were no affections to be alienated. While the majority places great emphasis on letters Julie Veeder had written expressing she missed her old life, if one looks at the record, these letters were written because of problems that arose in *624regards to child custody.22 This is not an uncommon event to see as a consequence of marriage dissolution.
[¶ 70.] When Julie requested Mike drop the lawsuit for the sake of their children, Mike responded: “[T]ell Myles to write me a check, and I might drop it.... [W]hen this is over he [Mike] was going to buy a Corvette and buy a license plate that said[,] ‘[T]hanks Myles’ on it.”. Based upon inadequate instructions given, it now appears Plaintiff will indeed be driving a Corvette for which he can thank Myles.
[¶ 71.] I would reverse and remand for proper instructions.

. This Court, in previous decisions defining intentional tort, required actual intent to cause the result to be shown. See Ham v. Continental Lumber Co., 506 N.W.2d 91, 96 (S.D.1993); Bra-zones V. Prothe, 489 N.W.2d 900, 907 (S.D.1992); Jensen v. Sport Bowl, Inc., 469 N.W.2d 370, 372 (S.D. 1991); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Products, 334 N.W.2d 874, 876 (S.D.1983).

. Julie testified:
It was Christmas. I had gotten a letter that — from Mike's attorney at that time that he was seeking custody of Brent to have him come back to Watertown. I came back at Christmas time and dropped the kids off. Christmas has always been something that I’ve always taken care of, and I didn't have that. I[saw] the kids for three hours on Christmas day and didn’t see them on Christmas Eve, and then I left Jill and Brent in Watertown for a week until school started, and I was loosing them.... I thought if this was the only way to have them I would do that.