Court Opinion

ID: 9747250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:05:58.950317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:21.656117
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the result reached in the Majority Opinion regarding Father’s first and third issues. However, not only do I conclude that Father’s second issue has not been waived, but I also conclude that this Court must address this issue in order to completely dispose of the issues presented to this Court, in a matter being remanded for further proceedings.
Father alleges, in his second issue, that the trial court erred in refusing to permit counsel to question the parties two minor daughters. The Majority states that this issue was waived because Father failed to contest the trial court’s procedure at trial. I find this issue to be preserved for our review.
Counsel for Father, upon hearing the trial court’s planned procedure for interviewing the children, requested that counsel be permitted to question the children. The trial court refused and allowed no further discussion on this issue. While Father’s counsel did not ask the court for an exception to its ruling on this issue, the taking of an exception is no longer required in order to preserve an issue for review. See Pa. R.Civ.P. 227(a). After the trial court’s order, Father also raised this issue in his Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, as no post-trial motions are permitted in cases involving custody. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.10(b). Father and Mother have also completely briefed this issue for consideration on this appeal. I conclude that Father’s second issue was preserved for review. Thus, our decision should include a determination of this issue, despite the fact that the outcome of the case will remain unchanged.
Father contends that Rule 1915.11, of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, mandates that counsel for the parties must be permitted to question the children who are the *541subject of a custody action. That Rule states in pertinent part:
(b) The court may interrogate a child, whether or not the subject of the action, in open court or in chambers. The interrogation shall be conducted in the presence of the attorneys and if permitted by the court, the parties. The attorneys shall have the right to interrogate the child under the supervision of the court. The interrogation shall be part of the record.
Father relies on the statement by this Court in Gerald G. v. Theresa G., 284 Pa.Super. 498, 426 A.2d 157 (1981), as dispositive on this issue. In Gerald G., we vacated a custody order by the trial court due to deficiencies in the record which made it impossible for this Court to evaluate the case on appeal. Id. at 503, 426 A.2d at 160. There, the issue of whether counsel should be permitted to personally question a child, who is the subject of a custody dispute, was not before the Court. Rather, in dicta, we described the procedure to be generally followed when interviewing a child in a custody dispute, as guidance to the parties and the trial court in developing a complete record. Id. at 503, 426 A.2d at 161.
Father also relies on Sutliff v. Sutliff, 361 Pa.Super. 194, 522 A.2d 80 (1987), to support his contention that the order of the trial court should be reversed because his counsel did not personally question the children. In Sutliff, we again reversed a custody order due to the fact that there was an incomplete record for appellate review. The Sutliff trial court interviewed the child in question and dismissed the child from the witness stand notwithstanding the fact that counsel for the mother indicated that there were additional questions which should be asked of the child. Id. at 198, 522 A.2d at 82. In that case, we reversed the custody order because the trial court’s failure to entertain any questions from counsel resulted in an incomplete record for review in this Court. Id. at 198, 522 A.2d at 82..
In the present case, the trial court stated that it alone would question the children. However, the trial court also indicated that questions would be accepted from counsel and that the *542trial court itself would pose those questions to the children. The children were then questioned by the trial court, in the presence of counsel for both parties, on the issues raised in the custody dispute. After completing its questioning, the trial court asked counsel if they had any questions for the children. Counsel for Father clearly indicated that he had no further questions.
The plain language of Rule 1915.11 states that questioning of children who are the subject of a custody dispute, by counsel for the parties, will be under the supervision of the court. The trial court did not, as Father alleges, deny counsel the right to pose questions to the children but, rather, exercised supervision of the questioning by permitting the questions to be posed through the trial court during its examination of the children. At no time during the questioning, did counsel for Father object to the questions which the trial court asked of the children. Moreover, in this appeal, Father does not allege how this exercise of the court’s supervision over counsels’ questioning of the children prejudiced him. Father also fails to indicate what, if any, additional questions he would have posed to the children in order to further clarify the issues raised in this custody dispute.
In both Gerald G. and Sutliff, swpra, we reversed the order of the trial court because we were presented with an incomplete record for review on appeal. In the present case, Father does not contend, nor would I find, that review in this Court has been hindered by the trial court posing questions to the children rather than allowing adversarial questioning of the children by counsel. Rule 1915.11(b) permits the trial court to exercise its discretion to supervise the questioning of children during a custody hearing; Absent a gross abuse of that discretion, a reviewing court will not interfere in the procedure used by the trial court. Since Father fails to establish that he was prejudiced or that the record is incomplete, I would conclude that there was no gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in conducting its interrogation of the children. Because this case is being remanded, the trial *543court’s procedure with regard to questioning the parties’ minor daughters should be upheld.