Court Opinion

ID: 9948688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 18:01:00.748352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:45.575768
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1247     Document: 010111011614        Date Filed: 03/07/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                        PUBLISH                                 Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          March 7, 2024

                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                            No. 22-1247

  RICHARD RONQUILLO,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of Colorado
                           (D.C. No. 1:21-CR-00356-RM-1)
                        _________________________________

 Deborah Lynn Roden, Woodhouse Roden Ames & Brennan, Boulder, Colorado, for
 Defendant-Appellant Richard Ronquillo

 Jena Rose Neuscheler, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado (Cole
 Finegan, United States Attorney, with her on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee United
 States of America
                         _________________________________

 Before CARSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 CARSON, Circuit Judge.
                     _________________________________

       Courts have agonized over the parameters of curtilage since Justice Holmes

 first hinted at the idea nearly a century ago in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57,

 59 (1924). Once again, we find ourselves confronting this complex matter in a series
Appellate Case: 22-1247   Document: 010111011614        Date Filed: 03/07/2024     Page: 2

 of events that led officers to find Defendant Richard Ronquillo sleeping in a detached

 garage. Officers found methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin on his person.

 Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming that officers wrongly entered because

 the search warrant did not include the detached garage. The district court denied the

 motion and found the search warrant authorized the detached garage because it fell

 within the curtilage. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the

 district court.

                                         I.

        The Denver Police Department (DPD) received information from a

 confidential informant (CI) that an individual was selling methamphetamine at

 836 North Linley Court. While conducting surveillance the DPD observed various

 people enter the residence, stay for around five to ten minutes, and then leave. The

 DPD used its CI to conduct two separate controlled buys. Both times, the CI entered

 the residence and bought methamphetamine. Based on this information, the DPD

 obtained a search warrant for the place described as “836 North Linley Court, a

 single family structure with green siding and trim on the east side of North Linley

 Court with a black metal security door with the numbers ‘836’ to the right of the door

 in black.”

        The property at 836 North Linley Court contained two structures: the main

 residence and a detached garage. A brick and wrought iron fence lined the property’s

 front perimeter and a chain link fence extended from the sides of the detached garage

 and lined the property’s back perimeter. The detached garage stood about twenty-

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 five feet away from the residence with a walkway connecting the two structures. The

 detached garage had two boarded-up windows and a door facing the backyard and the

 residence. A sealed and inoperable garage door faced the alley.

        On October 24, 2018, the DPD Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team

 executed the warrant, securing the residence, the occupants, and the backyard. At the

 time of the raid, the SWAT team had no visibility into the detached garage because

 of the boarded-up windows. The SWAT team breached the detached garage to secure

 the interior. The SWAT team found Defendant sleeping on a bed and ordered him to

 exit. Defendant arose from the bed, shoved a plastic bag into his rear pocket, and

 exited the detached garage where the SWAT team detained Defendant. Officers

 performed two pat downs on Defendant and found cocaine, methamphetamine, and

 heroin. 1

        Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found on his person. The district

 court denied the motion and a jury convicted Defendant of possession with intent to

 distribute methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. The district court sentenced

 Defendant to 210 months’ imprisonment. Defendant now appeals the district court’s

 denial of his motion to suppress.

                                         II.

        “We look at the totality of the circumstances in reviewing the denial of the

 motion to suppress.” United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir.

        Defendant challenged the second pat down before the district court but
        1

 abandoned that challenge on appeal.
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 2005) (citing United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001)). “When

 reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most

 favorable to the government, accept the district court’s findings of fact unless clearly

 erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under

 the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Windom, 863 F.3d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir.

 2017) (quoting United States v. Mosley, 743 F.3d 1317, 1322 (10th Cir. 2014)).

                                          III.

       The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in

 their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

 shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment requires that

 warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things

 to be seized.” Id. “The particularity requirement ‘ensures that the search will be

 carefully tailored to its justifications.’” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1131–

 32 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)).

 “[P]ractical accuracy rather than technical precision controls the determination of

 whether a search warrant adequately describes the place to be searched.” United

 States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v.

 Hutchings, 127 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1997)).

       Defendant argues that the warrant did not authorize the DPD’s search of the

 detached garage because the warrant and supporting affidavit contained no reference

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 to the detached structure. 2 But police may search a detached structure not directly

 referenced in a warrant if the curtilage contains the detached structure. See United

 States v. DePugh, 452 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.1971) (citing Steele v. United State

 No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)) (holding that the description is sufficient if it

 “enable[s] the officers to ascertain the place to be searched”). We have consistently

 held that a search warrant authorizing a search of a certain place includes any

 detached structures and vehicles located within its curtilage. For example, in United

 States v. Earls, we held that a search warrant authorized the search of a detached

 garage, shed, and office because the detached structures fell within the curtilage,

 even though the search warrant did not describe them. 3 42 F.3d 1321, 1327 (10th

 Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 458 (10th Cir. 1992)

 (upholding the search of a horse trailer in the curtilage of a residence even though the

 warrant did not specifically state it); United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459,

 1461 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding the search of vehicles in the curtilage of residence

       2
          The government conceded at the district court that the search warrant did not
 include the detached garage. But “[i]t is well-settled that a court is not bound by
 stipulations of the parties as to questions of law.” Koch v. U.S. Dep't of Interior,
 47 F.3d 1015, 1018 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell,
 803 F.2d 1473, 1477 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986)). Whether a detached structure was within
 the curtilage is a question of law. United States v. Cousins, 455 F.3d 1116, 1121 n.4
 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc footnote).
       3
          Defendant argues that Earls is distinguishable because the search warrant in
 Earls stated, “the premises” and the search warrant here stated, “the place.” We are
 not persuaded that this distinction makes a difference. In Earls, we reached our
 conclusion because the detached structures were within the curtilage, not because the
 search warrant stated, “the premises.” 42 F.3d 1321, 1327.
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 even though they were not specifically enumerated in the warrant). So we must

 determine whether the detached garage falls within the curtilage of the residence.

 We hold that it does.

       The curtilage and the home receive the same Fourth Amendment protections

 because “the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated

 with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” Oliver v. United

 States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630

 (1886)). We review the curtilage determination de novo. United States v. Cousins,

 455 F.3d 1116, 1121 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc footnote).

       To determine the curtilage of the residence, we consider four factors: (1) “the

 proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home;” (2) “whether the area is

 included within an enclosure surrounding the home;” (3) “the nature of the uses to

 which the area is put;” and (4) “the steps taken by the resident to protect the area

 from observation by people passing by.” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301

 (1987) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) (Powell, J.,

 dissenting)). The Dunn factors are useful analytical tools that bear upon our primary

 inquiry of “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it

 should be placed under the home's ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id.

       Proximity. The close proximity of the detached garage to the residence

 suggests that it falls within the curtilage of the residence. The detached garage was

 about twenty-five feet from the main residence, and a walkway through the backyard

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 connected the detached garage to the main residence. 4 See United States v. Diehl,

 276 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that the curtilage included a driveway

 eighty-two feet from the camp); United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1277 (2d Cir.)

 (holding that the curtilage included a cottage 375 feet from the main house), aff’d

 and amended, 91 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 1996).

       Enclosure. The fence enclosure supports that the curtilage includes the

 detached garage. A chain link fence surrounded the backyard and connected to the

 detached garage. The fence did not enclose the entire building of the detached

 garage, but the fence started and ended at the detached garage and the garage door

 was inoperable—creating a full enclosure and requiring anyone wishing to enter the

 detached garage to do so from inside the fence. Thus, the fence and the detached

 garage “serve[d] to demark a specific area of land immediately adjacent to the house

 that is readily identifiable as part and parcel of the house.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302;

 see also United States v. Swepston, 987 F.2d 1510, 1515 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding

 that an unfinished fence encircling both the house and the chicken shed supported

 that the curtilage included the chicken shed), abrogated on other grounds by Cousins,

 455 F.3d at 1121 n.4.

       Nature of the use of the area. The third factor requires us to examine “the

 nature of the uses to which the area is put.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. A “detached

       4
         We have held that a driveway entrance “several hundred feet” from the house
 was not part of the curtilage, a dramatic difference from the twenty-five feet here.
 Rieck v. Jensen, 651 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2011).
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 garage . . . [is] the type of building[] which [is] ordinarily a part of residential

 property” as the activity of storing a vehicle in a detached garage is intimately tied to

 home life. Earls, 42 F.3d at 1327; Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1575 (2018)

 (holding that the curtilage included a driveway and “a parking patio or carport into

 which an officer can see from the street is no less entitled to protection from trespass

 and a warrantless search than a fully enclosed garage”). Here, the overhead garage

 door was sealed, inoperable, and prevented the storage of a vehicle. Even with this

 information, the officers had no objective data indicating the use of the garage. But

 intimate activities of the home occurred in this detached garage. 5 Defendant used the

 detached garage as a living quarter. The detached garage had clothes, mouthwash,

 multiple chairs, a mirror, lamps, and drinks. Officers also found Defendant sleeping

 in a bed. Defendant used the detached garage as a bedroom, and the activities that

 occur in a bedroom are the type of private intimate activities that occur in the home.

        5
          Justice Scalia opined that the officer’s objective data about the use of the
 property lacked significance. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J. concurring). The
 officer’s perception is “no more relevant to whether the barn was curtilage than to
 whether the house was a house.” Id; see also United States v. Cousins, 455 F.3d
 1116, 1122–23 (10th Cir. 2006) (reviewing the actual use of the side yard and not
 officers knowledge to determine whether it’s within the curtilage); United States v.
 Diehl, 276 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that officers’ objective evidence of
 intimate use is not required); Harris v. O'Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 240 (2d Cir. 2014)
 (considering the actual use); United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1278 (2d Cir.
 1996) (considering both the actual use of the area and the officer’s objective
 knowledge and holding that the test is the actual intimate and private use made of the
 property); United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (looking to
 both the actual use of storing bulk food, wine, Christmas decoration and the officer’s
 knowledge of marijuana smell); United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 917 (9th Cir.
 2001) (using both officer’s knowledge and how the homeowner actually made use of
 the property).
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       Shielding from public view. The public could not observe the interior of the

 detached garage, which weighs in favor of the notion that the detached garage existed

 within the curtilage. The detached garage had two windows and one door, all of

 which faced the main residence and not the public alley. The sealed inoperable

 overhead garage door was the only entrance facing the public alley. The two boarded

 up windows protected the interior from public observation. After reviewing the

 Dunn factors, we conclude that the curtilage included the detached garage. Thus, the

 search warrant authorized the search of the detached garage. 6

                                         IV.

       Defendant also argues that officers unreasonably detained him because his

 detention occurred outside the immediate vicinity of the premise to be searched. We

 disagree. “Detentions incident to the execution of a search warrant are reasonable

 under the Fourth Amendment because the limited intrusion on personal liberty is

 outweighed by the special law enforcement interests at stake.” Bailey v. United

       6
          Arguably, Defendant used the detached garage as a separate residence. But
 here, the property line and address encompassed the detached garage, and the same
 fence around the main residence connected to the detached garage. Nothing the
 officers observed, including the sealed and inoperable garage door, placed them on
 notice that Defendant used the detached garage as a separate residence until after
 officers breached it. See United States v. Smith, 531 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir.
 2008) (holding that the warrant included the garage apartment because officers were
 not on notice about the separate residence); Harman v. Pollock, 446 F.3d 1069, 1080
 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that officers had no reason to believe that detached garage
 was a separate residence even though garage had separate address and mailbox,
 certain vehicles parked on property were not used by residents of main house, and
 Operation Order described simultaneous raids on “residence # 1” and “residence
 # 2”).
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  States, 568 U.S. 186, 202 (2013). Officers have three law enforcement interests in

  detaining an occupant during the execution of a search warrant: officer safety,

  facilitating the completion of the search, and preventing flight. Michigan v.

  Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981). But the detention must occur within the

  “immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched.” Bailey, 568 U.S. at 201. The

  search warrant authorized the search of the detached garage, and thus the immediate

  vicinity included the detached garage, and anyone inside it, such as Defendant.

  Defendant’s detention was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

        AFFIRMED.

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