Court Opinion

ID: 9776011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:16:28.511278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:32.806756
License: Public Domain

CADENA, Justice,
concurring.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion insofar as it holds, or gives the appearance of holding, that in a trespass to try title suit the issues of title or right to possession and damages are severable.1
Here, appellee seeks to recover damages and rents, which are “constituent elements of a cause of action in trespass to try title.” Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446, 186 S.W.2d 69 (1945). The cause of action in trespass to try title asserted by plaintiff in this case, then, is a unit composed of the elements of title and damages. The conclusion that damages is a constituent element of the cause of action in trespass to try title compels the inference that there is but one cause of action, and that damages is but a part of that single cause of action. The severance in this case is nothing more than an attempt to try, as separate cases, different elements of a single cause of action.
Nor do I agree that appellee’s announcement in oral argument before this Court of his waiver of the right to recover damages resulting from the unlawful withholding of possession by appellant, has any effect on the propriety of the severance. There is nothing in the papers on file in the trial court which even suggests that appellee has waived any claim asserted in his pleadings. A plaintiff who, in a tort action, obtains a “partial” summary judgment on the question of liability and then induces the trial court to sever the damage issue for trial in a separate proceeding cannot be said to have waived his right to recover damages.
However, I agree with the judgment of affirmance. The order of severance was entered on November 23, 1976. Appellant had notice of the filing of appellee’s motion to sever. He gave notice of appeal on November 29, 1976, and this instrument expressly refers to the order of severance of November 23. At no time did appellant object to the action of the court in ordering the severance, although it is clear that he had notice of the severance at a time when he could have moved that it be set aside. He cannot now “complain of a mere error in granting the same.” Pierce v. Reynolds, 160 Tex. 198, 329 S.W.2d 76, 78 (1959). The Supreme Court expressly held in Reynolds that a court has the power to sever one entire cause of action into two or more parts and render separate final judgments disposing of both parts. The Supreme Court there expressly disapproved of holdings to the effect that an order severing a single cause of action into two parts is wholly ineffective. The result is that the order of severance, albeit erroneous, made the judgment as to the title portion of the cause of action final and appealable.

. The question of severability of the two issues was noted, but not decided, in Zambrano v. Olivas, 477 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1972, no writ).