Court Opinion

ID: 9865337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:32:10.232423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:29.395473
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Moore
dissenting.
In Houston v. Kirschwing, 117 Colo. 92, 184 P. (2d) 487, we pronounced the provisions of the ordinance under which plaintiffs in error were required to pay the license fees involved, to be “arbitrary, oppressive and discriminatory.” Prior to our said determination, however, and on the theory of the validity of the ordinance, plaintiffs in error were “summoned to appear in police *193court,” as stated in the court opinion, “for failure to secure a license from the City and County of Denver, authorizing them to conduct their business for the calendar year 1946.” For any such failure a severe penalty was visitable, as the court opinion emphasizes, “When the city demands payment of the license fee and manifests an intention to enforce collection by instituting an action in the police court,” as the opinion of the court recites, “duress is present,” as the court thoughtfully adds. “It is not essential,” says the court, that the parties “await the imposition of a fine or otherwise suffer penalties for the violation of the provisions of the ordinance,” nor did they do so. On the contrary, and proceeding at once, but “under protest,” they paid the exacted charge of $110.00 for the year 1946, and the action in police court was dismissed “without prejudice.” When time to pay a like exaction for the year 1947 had arrived, and our pronouncement on the validity of the ordinance was yet to be made, plaintiffs in error paid again. But since in the latter instance the check covering did not carry the words “under protest,” as had the check for the first payment under the invalid ordinance, the trial court ordered the city to refund the first payment and refused like disposition in relation to the second one.
The history of the controversy reveals that from the time of the passage of the ordinance we have declared to be void, there was active protest against it by many small coal dealers, including those here, and, although plaintiffs in error were not parties therein, a suit in challenge of its validity was immediately instituted in the district court. The city was a party thereto, and its officials were aware thereof and had active part in the litigation from its inception. How better, we venture to inquire, could those in interest have made protest against the inequitable and unjust ordinance? We think of none. Why the city authorities should wish to retain license *194fees collected on an invalid ordinance, particularly in the circumstances here, is not understandable.
We regard the disposition made below on the second payment as highly technical, manifestly unfair, and respectfully decline to have part in its affirmance.