Court Opinion

ID: 9960487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 15:00:25.847056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:32.210724
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

RICHARD JAMES ABRESCH,                          DOCKET NUMBER
             Appellant,                         DC-1221-21-0639-W-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: April 15, 2024
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Richard James Abresch , FPO, APO/FPO Europe, pro se.

      Michael Steven Causey , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

      Tracy W. Lin , Arlington, Virginia, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed.       Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
clarify the IRA exhaustion requirement and to explicitly find that the appellant
exhausted his claims with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), we AFFIRM the
initial decision.

                                 BACKGROUND
      At all times relevant to this appeal, the appellant was an employee of the
agency’s Commander Navy Regional Maintenance Center in Norfolk, Virginia.
Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 5, Tab 10 at 18-19. On September 14, 2021,
he filed the instant IRA appeal alleging that he had been subjected to several
personnel actions in retaliation for his protected whistleblowing disclosures and
requesting a hearing on his appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 1-5. With his initial appeal, the
appellant provided a copy of a close-out letter from OSC dated July 21, 2021. Id.
at 8. The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order in which he apprised
the appellant of the applicable law and burden of proof requirements for an IRA
appeal and ordered him to submit evidence and argument establishing Board
jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 3 at 1-9. He also issued a supplemental order instructing
the agency to file a response addressing its defense that the doctrine of laches
bars the appellant’s claims. IAF, Tab 15 at 1-3.
                                                                                       3

         After the parties submitted their jurisdictional pleadings, IAF, Tabs 8-10,
18-19, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, IAF, Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 2. Specifically,
the administrative judge acknowledged the appellant’s allegations that he made
disclosures between 2011-2012 and the agency subjected him to a reassignment in
2013 and nonselections between 2019-2021. ID at 5-8. However, he observed
the appellant did not file his OSC complaint until 8 years after the alleged first
personnel action.      ID at 6.    Noting the significant length of the delay and
crediting the agency’s argument that it was prejudiced by the appellant’s delay in
seeking corrective action, the administrative judge concluded that the appellant’s
purported retaliatory reassignment in 2013 was barred by the equitable doctrine
of laches. ID at 7. The administrative judge also found that the appellant failed
to make a nonfrivolous allegation that his protected disclosures were a
contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take personnel actions against him.
ID at 8-11.
         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition
for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response in opposition to
the petition for review.      PFR File, Tab 5.      The appellant has filed a reply.
PFR File, Tab 8.

                   DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
         The appellant argues on review that the administrative judge erred in
concluding that his 2013 reassignment was barred by the doctrine of laches.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 10-13; ID at 7.         He also argues that he nonfrivolously
alleged that his protected disclosures were a contributing factor in the
personnel actions imposed by the agency in 2018, 2020, and 2021. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 14-19.      For the following reasons, we agree with the administrative
judge.
                                                                                 4

The administrative judge correctly determined that the appellant’s 2013
reassignment is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
      The equitable defense of laches bars an action when an unreasonable delay
in bringing the action has prejudiced the party against whom the action is taken.
Johnson v. U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 6 (2014). The Board has
acknowledged that laches may apply as a defense in an IRA appeal and may be
applied before reaching the merits of the appeal. Brown v. Department of the Air
Force, 88 M.S.P.R. 22, ¶¶ 3, 7-10 (2001). The party asserting laches must prove
both unreasonable delay and prejudice. Johnson, 121 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 6. Under
laches, the mere fact that time has elapsed from the date a cause of action first
accrued is not sufficient to bar suit; rather, the delay must be unreasonable and
unexcused. Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Two types of prejudice may stem from a delay in filing suit. Id. at 1378. The
first type, defense prejudice, concerns the Government’s ability to mount a
defense due to the loss of records, destruction of evidence, fading memories, or
unavailability of witnesses. Id. The second type, economic prejudice, centers on
consequences, primarily monetary, to the Government should the appellant
prevail. Id.
      The appellant argues on review, amongst other things, that the
administrative judge failed to consider the facts to determine the reasonableness
of his delay because the agency caused the delay when it “denied [him] the
knowledge of facts necessary to submit a nonfrivolous appeal in 2013.”
PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. In the initial decision, the administrative judge found the
appellant’s delay in challenging his 2013 reassignment unreasonable, reasoning
that the appellant failed to “file a complaint with OSC until after [he] had
informed [the appellant that] the Board likely lacked jurisdiction over his first
Board appeal challenging the non-selections because, inter alia, he had not filed
such a complaint.” ID at 6 (emphasis in original). We agree.
                                                                                  5

      Here, as set forth above, the appellant’s reassignment occurred 8 years
before the appellant filed his request for corrective action with OSC in July 2021.
IAF, Tab 1 at 4, 8, Tab 10 at 18. The Board and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit have regularly found shorter delays to be unreasonable and
applied laches to bar such claims. See Pepper v. United States, 794 F.2d 1571,
1573-74 (1986) (stating that a 6-year delay was inexcusable in concluding that the
claim was barred by laches); Brown, 88 M.S.P.R. 22, ¶¶ 3, 8-10 (2001) (finding a
6-year delay to be unreasonable and applying the doctrine of laches to bar an IRA
appeal).
      We find unavailing the appellant’s claims that laches should not apply
because the agency’s failure to provide him with the necessary information
reasonably delayed him in challenging his reassignment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11.
Specifically, the appellant claimed that the agency failed to inform him of any
issues or its attempt to remove him until July 2021 and he learned of the reason
for his reassignment in February 2022.      Id.   However, he averred below that
he perceived whistleblower animus after his 2013 reassignment but failed to
“submit a complaint on the initial incident, thinking the animus would pass.”
IAF, Tab 10 at 9. Thus, he could have raised the issue when he first suspected
but failed to do so. Therefore, as the administrative judge correctly concluded,
his 8-year delay is unreasonable because he “took no steps to pursue his rights in
2013 or anytime immediately thereafter.” ID at 6; see Johnson, 121 M.S.P.R.
101, ¶ 7 (finding an appellant’s delay unreasonable when he failed to diligently
investigate and pursue his rights in a timely manner).
      The appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s conclusion that his
unreasonable delay in seeking corrective action prejudiced the agency. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 12-13; ID at 5-7.         Specifically, he appears to argue that the
administrative judge erred in finding prejudice based solely on the “[deciding
official’s] claim[] [that] he has limited memory of his decision to reassign the
appellant and of allegations lodged against the appellant” and not considering that
                                                                                    6

the agency may have documents to supplement the deciding official’s limited
recollection.   PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-13.     We discern no basis to reverse this
finding.   The administrative judge credited the agency’s argument that it was
prejudiced by the appellant’s unreasonable delay when the appellant’s disclosure
and reassignment occurred 8-10 years prior and the deciding official submitted a
sworn declaration indicating that he is unable to recall many of the details and
circumstances of the appellant’s protected disclosures and his 2013 reassignment.
ID at 5-7; IAF, Tab 18 at 7-10. The record is also devoid of evidence that the
agency possesses documents to refresh the deciding official’s memory. 2
Notwithstanding, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s
delay in seeking corrective action would negatively impact the agency’s ability to
defend against his claim. As the administrative judge noted, the agency would
have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same
action in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosures and given the
deciding official’s limited recollection of the details surrounding the appellant’s
disclosures and reassignment, the agency would be disadvantaged to meet such a
high standard. ID at 7.
      The appellant also asserts on review that the agency’s argument that it
would be prejudiced due to the limited memory of the deciding official is
insufficient because other witnesses are available. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-13. To
support his assertion, the appellant cites Nuss v. Office of Personnel Management,
974 F.2d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1992), to seemingly argue that even if the agency
established that the deciding official’s lack of memory prejudiced its ability to
defend against the appellant’s claim, the agency is not actually prejudiced
because “there would be a number of witnesses available to assist the [deciding
official] to recall details” and he proved that other witnesses are available.

2
  The agency counsel asserted below that documents related to the appellant’s claim
created before 2019 were not retained. IAF, Tab 9 at 5 n.2. However, the statements of
a party’s representative in a pleading do not constitute evidence. Hendricks v.
Department of the Navy, 69 M.S.P.R. 163, 168 (1995).
                                                                                    7

PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-13.       The appellant’s reliance on Nuss is misplaced.
In Nuss, the court found that the unavailability of a personnel officer familiar
with the appellant’s position description did not prejudice the agency because
other witnesses testified or submitted affidavits attesting to his actual duties when
it was his actual duties, rather than his position description, that was relevant to
his claim. 974 F.2d at 13, 18-19. In this case, the deciding official is a witness
with knowledge of the facts relevant to the appellant’s claim and the agency’s
defense. However, the appellant’s proffered witnesses, like the personnel officer
in Nuss, both lack the knowledge relevant to the appellant’s claim that the
deciding official considered his protected disclosures in his 2013 reassignment.
IAF, Tab 10 at 15-17.
      Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency has
produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it would be unreasonably
prejudiced by the appellant’s significant unexplained delay in seeking corrective
action related to his 2013 reassignment. Accordingly, we find the appellant’s
2013 reassignment barred by the doctrine of laches.

The administrative judge correctly concluded that the Board lacks jurisdiction
over his nonselection and return rights claims.
      The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant exhausts his
administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that
he made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged
in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or
(D), and the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the
agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action.          Chambers v.
Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 14; see Hessami v. Merit
Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The Board’s
regulations define a nonfrivolous allegation as an assertion that, if proven, could
establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).    The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has found that, in the context of an IRA appeal, a
                                                                                    8

nonfrivolous allegation is an allegation of “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”    Hessami v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Once an appellant
establishes jurisdiction over his IRA appeal, he is entitled to a hearing on the
merits of his claim, which he must prove by preponderant evidence.          Rebstock
Consolidation v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 9
(2015).

      The appellant exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC.
      The Board may only consider those disclosures and personnel actions that
an appellant raised before OSC. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); Baldwin v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 8 (2010). The administrative judge appears
to have found implicitly that the appellant exhausted his administrative remedies
before OSC. ID at 2. Because the administrative judge did not make specific
findings as to which disclosures and personnel actions the appellant exhausted,
we do so here.
      The substantive requirements of exhaustion are met when an appellant has
provided OSC with sufficient basis to pursue an investigation.             Chambers,
2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10.      Generally, exhaustion can be demonstrated through the
appellant’s initial OSC complaint, evidence the original complaint was amended
(including but not limited to OSC’s determination letter and other letters from
OSC referencing any amended allegations), and the appellant’s written responses
to OSC referencing the amended allegations. Mason v. Department of Homeland
Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8 (2011). Alternatively, exhaustion may be proved
through other sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or declaration
attesting that the appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts in his
appeal. Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11.
      Here,   the   appellant   submitted   a   closure   letter   from   OSC   dated
July 21, 2021, which provided that “[he] disclosed financial fraud by the
Comptroller and mismanagement of the manpower and staffing of [his]
                                                                                   9

organization.”   IAF, Tab 1 at 8.      The letter also refers to the appellant’s
allegations that the agency took multiple actions against him, including
reassigning him, impeding his return rights, and not selecting him for multiple
positions, in retaliation for his disclosures. Id. at 8. In addition, the appellant
submitted a letter dated July 19, 2021, which he purports to be a response to OSC.
IAF, Tab 10 at 12. Therefore, we explicitly find that the appellant’s response to
OSC and OSC’s closure letter are sufficient to establish exhaustion.

      The administrative judge correctly concluded that the appellant
      failed to nonfrivolously allege that his protected disclosures were a
      contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take personnel actions
      against him in 2018, 2019, and 2021.
      On review, the appellant seemingly argues that his protected disclosures
were a contributing factor in the agency’s decisions to take personnel actions
against him because the agency officials involved in the personnel actions were
influenced to retaliate against him.    PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-20.      We are not
persuaded.
      To satisfy the contributing factor criterion at the jurisdictional stage,
an appellant need only raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact of, or content
of, the protected disclosure or activity was one factor that tended to affect the
personnel action in any way.      Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 14.         One way to
establish this criterion is the knowledge/timing test, under which an employee
may nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor
in a personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the
official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure or activity and that the
personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person
could conclude that the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the
personnel action. Id., ¶ 15; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). If an appellant fails to
satisfy the knowledge/timing test, the Board must consider other evidence, such
as that pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking
the personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was personally directed at the
                                                                               10

proposing or deciding official, and whether those individuals had a desire or
motive to retaliate against the appellant.
      The appellant’s alleged disclosures occurred in 2011-2012, which is at least
6 years before the agency allegedly impeded his return rights in 2018 and 7 years
before it failed to select him for positions in 2019 and 2021, respectively.
IAF, Tab 8 at 4-6. Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge that such a
gap in time is too remote to satisfy the knowledge/timing test. ID at 9-10; see
Salinas v. Department of the Army, 94 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 10 (2003) (finding that a
disclosure made 2 1/2 to 3 years before the relevant personnel actions was too
remote for a reasonable person to conclude the disclosure was a contributing
factor to the actions).
      Regarding the denial of his return rights, the record reflects that the
appellant’s disclosures were not personally directed at the agency officials that
he indicated were responsible for denying his rights.      IAF, Tab 8 at 4, 9.
The record is also devoid of evidence tending to show that the agency officials
involved in effecting his return rights had a strong motivate to retaliate against
him. Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to
nonfrivolously allege that his disclosures in 2011-2012 contributed to the
agency’s decisions concerning his return rights in 2018.
      The appellant’s disclosures also were not personally directed at the agency
officials that he indicated were involved in the agency’s nonselection decisions.
Id. at 5-6, 9-10. However, he indicated, below and on review, that two of the
agency officials involved in his nonselections had direct knowledge of his alleged
whistleblowing activity. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7; IAF, Tab 8 at 4-5. Nonetheless,
other than his own conclusory assertions, the appellant identifies no specific
evidence or argument that, if true, could show that the agency officials that were
aware of his disclosures had any motive to retaliate against him. Id. Therefore,
we find that the appellant failed to raise nonfrivolous allegations that he made
                                                                                     11

protected disclosures that were contributing factors in the denial of his return
rights or the agency’s nonselection decisions.
      Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
3
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      12

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                13

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     14

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 4   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

4
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           15

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.