Court Opinion

ID: 9703521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:59:35.551269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:49.948441
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Judge,
dissenting with separate opinion.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion to remand the case to the trial court for correction of the clerical error in the plea agreement with regard to the missing HTV charge so as to accurately reflect the intent of the parties. Op. p. 478. While I agree with the majority to the extent that a mistake has been made, I am mindful that,
[a] plea agreement is a contract, an explicit agreement between the State and the defendant which is binding upon both parties when accepted by the trial court. Because a plea agreement is a contract, the principles of contract law can provide guidance in the consideration of plea agreements. The primary goal of contract interpretation is to give *481effect of the parties' intent. When the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, they are conclusive of that intent, and the court will not construe the contract or look to extrinsic evidence. Rather we will merely apply the contractual provisions.
Griffin v. State, 756 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), reh'g demied, trans. denied (emphasis added). Here, the written terms of the modified plea agreement filed on March 7, 2005, provide both in the caption and in clause 1 that "[ Wells] will plead guilty to the charge(s) of: [causing serious bodily injury when operating a vehicle while intoxicated] and the State will dismiss __ court to sentence." (Appellant's App. p. 29). Accordingly, the plea agreement that was accepted by the trial court unequivocally and unambiguously states that Wells is only pleading guilty to Count I. Even though the terms of the modified plea agreement are clear and thus conclusive of the parties' intent; nevertheless, the majority, at the urging of the State, looked beyond the face of the agreement and considered extrinsic evidence in reaching its conclusion.
Thus, in light of the evidence before me, I respectfully part ways with the majority by recommending to vacate Wells' sentence and remand with instructions that a new sentence be crafted within the parameters of the terms of the written modified plea agreement and the law.