Court Opinion

ID: 9460825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:01:05.419476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:47.853483
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge,
with whom WISDOM, GOLDBERG, GOD-BOLD and MORGAN, Circuit Judges, join (dissenting):
I dissent. The majority opinion engages in fact-finding at the appellate level and draws an inappropriate analogy with Terry v. Ohio1 to provide policy support for its views.
The majority reasons that Miranda2 is inapplicable because Agent Arwine did not interrogate Castellana when he inquired whether any weapons were nearby. The question did not constitute interrogation, we are told, because Ar-wine did not ask it “in an attempt to elicit evidence of a crime.” Assuming that the majority has hit upon a satisfactory definition of interrogation, I cannot agree with its reasoning; it presumes to find as a fact that Arwine asked about the guns for safety reasons. In the first place it is not the function of this court to find facts. Second, the “safety purposes” theory conflicts with the lower court’s finding that the agents did not feel physically threatened or endangered by Castellana. To say that a question is asked for safety purposes assumes that there is a perceived danger present. To justify intrusions on the basis of self-protection when there is no perceived danger is like excusing a killing as self-defense when the killer knew his victim was unarmed, peaceful and harmless. Such reasoning invites police misconduct.
Nor can the majority find comfort in Terry v. Ohio; the analogy will not withstand inspection. First, Terry is a search and seizure case; this case involves a different constitutional amendment and a different type of intrusion, compelled self-incrimination. Second, the Supreme Court specifically limited Terry’s holding to situations in which a police officer reasonably concludes “that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.” 329 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. In this case the lower court found there was “no evidence introduced at the hearing on the motions to suppress which indicates any reason to believe that the defendant posed any physical threat to the agents’ safety.” The majority did not vacate that finding as clearly erroneous. If the agents believed Castellana was harmless, I cannot understand what “circumstances” supposedly “validate” Arwine’s question. Terry’s holding is predicated on a perceived risk of harm; *328it mentions no other circumstances justifying intrusive safety precautions.
For these reasons I must conclude that the majority, without support from the case law3 or the record, has sanctioned an unjustified omission of Miranda’s safeguards.

. Terry v. Ohio, 1968, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

. The majority makes an enigmatic reference to Gustafson v. Florida, 1973, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 and United States v. Robinson, 1973, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427. With all deference I am compelled to point out that this court appears to be falling into a habit of making enigmatic references to those two cases when such references are neither necessary nor relevant to the outcome of the case before it. See United States v. Sori-ano, 497 F.2d 147 [5th Cir., 1974, p. 150]