Court Opinion

ID: 9860371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:19:48.985616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:37.599061
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REINHARD, dissenting: I respectfully differ from my colleagues’ analysis of both the issues involved in this appeal and am compelled to dissent. On a motion for discharge under section 103 — 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 — 5) the defendant has the burden of affirmatively establishing facts which show a violation of his rights under the section. (People v. Beyah (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 423,427, 367 N.E.2d 1334; People v. Cunningham (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 949, 951, 396 N.E.2d 876; People v. Behning (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 536, 539, 263 N.E.2d 607, appeal denied (1971), 45 Ill. 2d 591.) If a defendant in a motion for his discharge under the statute relies upon facts dehors the record, such facts must be preserved in the record; otherwise the court will not recognize such facts as existing. (People v. Tamborski (1953), 415 Ill. 466, 473, 114 N.E.2d 649.) As the defendant has the burden to affirmatively show that he comes within the terms of the statute, the State cannot be deemed to have waived this requirement even though it failed to precisely articulate this before the trial court. Thus, finding nothing in the record to show that the defendant was on bond or recognizance while the charge remained on SOL status in Cook County, the crucial question then becomes whether section 103 — 5 is applicable in SOL cases where the defendant is not on bond or recognizance. Section 103 — 5 expressly applies to persons either “in custody” or “on bail or recognizance.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 — 5; People v. Leannah (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 628, 629-30, 418 N.E.2d 1054.) The majority opinion cites People v. Baskin (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 141, 230 N.E.2d 208; People v. Sanders (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 457, 407 N.E.2d 951; and People v. Garcia (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 472, 382 N.E.2d 371, appeal denied (1979), 72 Ill. 2d 582, as precedent for its position that the speedy trial statute is not tolled by the striking of a charge with leave to reinstate. In my opinion, a closer examination of these authorities does not warrant such a conclusion. In Baskin the defendant was “on bond at all times subsequent to the filing of the complaint.” (38 Ill. 2d 141,145, 230 N.E.2d 208.) Sanders involved a nolle prosequi, not an SOL, and furthermore held that the speedy trial provisions did not apply once a charge was nolle prossed. Similarly, Garcia held that the time provisions of section 103 — 5 cease to run if defendant is discharged after a finding of no probable cause. A case which does support the majority viewpoint is People v. Bauer (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 537,388 N.E.2d 1013. However, the authority relied upon by the Bauer court was People v. Baskin, which I have already referred to above as inapposite to the facts here since the defendant in Baskin was on bond. There is nothing in the record which sets forth the current SOL procedure used in Cook County. SOL is not a statutorily authorized procedure but apparently is used in Cook County and some other jurisdictions as a procedural device to avoid having to nolle pros and then refile a new information or indictment; instead, the original charge may be reinstated upon the State’s motion. (See People v. Kidd (1934), 357 Ill. 133,191 N.E. 244; People v. Sanders (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 457, 467, 407 N.E.2d 951.) While such a procedure appears to be mainly an administrative method which avoids the necessity of filing an additional charge and the opening of a new case, a SOL also is significantly different from a nolle prosequi since a charge still continues to lie against the defendant, albeit in a dormant state. Yet even if a charge still is technically pending in the SOL procedure, the relevant provisions of section 103 — 5 plainly apply only to persons “in custody” or “on bond or recognizance.” Had the legislature intended section 103 — 5 to apply to cases where charges alone pend against a defendant, it could have expressly so provided. The evil intended to be prevented by the speedy trial provision is wrongful incarceration and restriction under bail or recognizance rather than wrongful accusation. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment below and reinstate the two dismissed counts. As my dissent from the majority opinion on this basis alone would require reversal, it is unnecessary for me to further lengthen this dissent by separately analyzing whether the charge brought in Cook County is the same as that brought in Kane County. It suffices to point out that from this record I cannot subscribe to the majority’s conclusion that the defendant has met his burden to show that he was charged in Kane County for the same offense on the same date for which he was charged in Cook County, nor do I concur in their analysis of the legal principles applicable in prosecution of theft by obtaining control over stolen property where such occurs in more than one county.