Court Opinion

ID: 9636748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:41:37.593421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:48.840886
License: Public Domain

HOLMES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
There was no unlawful search in either of these cases. In one, I think, there was no search at all, and in the other, appellant not only consented thereto but invited the officer to come up to his house and inspect his tax-paid liquor, assuring the officer that all liquor therein was tax-paid. Upon visiting appellant’s home in response to this invitation, the officer found all liquors in tax-paid containers, except one five-gallon keg on' which admittedly the taxes were not paid.
The .court fully and correctly instructed the jury upon the doctrine of reasonable doubt. After expressly charging that the burden was on the Government to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it went into detail upon the issue as to whether the appellant possessed the liquor for the purpose of selling it or of “pouring it out,” and stated that the jury had a right to consider all of the facts and circumstances in order to determine whether the liquor was possessed “for the purpose of pouring it out or for the purpose of drinking it.” There was nothing wrong with the charge, so far as I can see; and it was not necessary for the court, at the instance of counsel, to repeat in different language what had already been announced.
The argument of the district attorney, who was merely giving his theory of the case, should not be taken from its context and held to be ‘reversible error. Let it be remembered that the appellant’s defense on the merits was to the effect that the tax-paid liquor was kept for the purpose of sale, but that the five-gallon keg, on which admittedly no tax had been paid, was possessed for the purpose “of pouring it out.” The guilt of the appellant is clear upon this record; and, no reversible error appearing, I think the verdict and judgment of the district court should not be disturbed.