Court Opinion

ID: 9897437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:33.225168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:46.603173
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Mar 29 2023, 9:08 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Amy O. Carson                                             Timothy R. Stoesz
Christopher P. Jeter                                      Stoesz & Stoesz
Jacob W. Zigenfus                                         Noblesville, Indiana
Massillamany Jeter & Carson LLP
Fishers, Indiana

Gillian Keiffner
Keiffner Law
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In Re: the Adoption of:                                   March 29, 2023
W.K., IV, and I.K.;                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-AD-2227
W.K.,
                                                          Appeal from the Hamilton
Appellant,                                                Superior Court
      v.
                                                          The Honorable William J. Hughes,
                                                          Judge
T.M.,
                                                          Trial Court Cause Nos.
Appellee.                                                 29D03-1904-AD-524
                                                          29D03-1904-AD-525

                                 Opinion by Judge Bailey
                           Judges Brown and Weissmann concur.

Bailey, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023                                 Page 1 of 17
      Case Summary
[1]   W.K. (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order granting custody of W.K., IV

      (“W.K.”) and I.K. (collectively, “Children”) to T.M. (“Stepfather”). We

      affirm.

      Issues
[2]   Father raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following

      two issues:

              I.       Whether Father suffered harm from the trial court’s denial
                       of his motion to dismiss the petitions for adoption
                       immediately following remand from this Court.

              II.      Whether the trial court’s findings and judgment are clearly
                       erroneous.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   Father and C.K. (“Mother”) were married in March of 2008. W.K. was born to

      them on December 9, 2008, and I.K. was born to them on April 14, 2010.

      Mother and Father were in the military and lived with Children in Japan. In

      May of 2013, Father and Mother separated, and Father moved to Texas.

      Mother and Children remained in Japan until July of 2013, at which time the

      three of them moved to California and lived with Children’s maternal

      grandparents.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023         Page 2 of 17
[4]   Mother filed for dissolution of marriage in California, and the dissolution was

      finalized in March of 2014. The dissolution order provided that the parents had

      joint legal custody of Children, Mother had physical custody of Children, and

      Father had parenting time with Children. Beginning in the summer of 2014,

      Children spent summers with Father in Texas. No child support order was

      issued at the time of the dissolution, but Father made some informal child

      support payments to Mother. Father was not “formally ordered to pay child

      support” until late in 2016. In re Adoption of W.K., 163 N.E.3d 370, 372 (Ind.

      Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[5]   Mother began dating Stepfather, a police officer in Indiana. In the fall of 2014,

      Mother and Children moved to Indiana to live with Stepfather. Mother and

      Stepfather married in December of 2016, and, beginning in approximately

      September of 2017, maternal grandparents moved in with Mother, Stepfather,

      and Children in Indiana. In February of 2019, A.M. was born to Mother and

      Stepfather. When Mother gave birth to A.M., it was discovered that Mother

      had stage four stomach cancer. Mother died on March 28, 2019. Maternal

      grandparents continued to live with Stepfather and Children.

[6]   On April 1, 2019, Father appeared at Children’s home in Indiana to “pick up

      the children” to take them to Texas. Appealed Order at 4. That same day,

      maternal grandmother filed for emergency guardianship of Children, and

      Stepfather filed adoption petitions and an “Emergency Petition for Immediate

      Temporary Custody” of Children. Appellant’s App. v. II at 60. On April 3,

      Father filed a petition to domesticate the California dissolution decree and a

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023      Page 3 of 17
      motion to dismiss the adoption petitions. On April 10, the trial court held

      emergency hearings on the pending petitions. The court granted Father’s

      petition to domesticate the California decree of dissolution. The court ordered

      temporary custody of Children to Stepfather for the remainder of the school

      year and then temporary custody to Father “until further Order of the Court.”

      Id. at 67. Grandmother’s guardianship petition was denied and dismissed. The

      trial court also appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”).

[7]   On July 26, 2019, Stepfather filed a “Petition for Emergency Hearing for

      Return of Child[ren] to Indiana” in which he alleged that Children’s school in

      Indiana started on August 6 but Father had refused to return Children to

      Indiana. Id. at 104. The court set the matter for an emergency hearing on

      August 2 and granted Father’s request to appear for the hearing telephonically.

      Following the August 2 hearing, the court ordered Father to return Children to

      Indiana on or before August 5, with Children to remain in Stepfather’s

      “temporary custody until further order of the Court” and with Father to have

      parenting time with Children during fall school break. W.K., 163 N.E.3d at

      373.

[8]   Father did not return Children on August 5 as ordered; rather, he initiated an

      action in Texas to enforce the dissolution decree and attempted to enroll

      Children in school in Texas. Stepfather filed a report with the police in

      Indiana, and Father was charged with two counts of Level 6 felony interference

      with child custody. In September, Father was arrested in Texas, and Stepfather

      drove to Texas and brought Children back to Indiana. Stepfather subsequently

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023          Page 4 of 17
       requested that the charges against Father be dropped, and the charges were

       dismissed with prejudice.

[9]    On September 1, the GAL interviewed Children. Children reported to the

       GAL that Father “spanked” them repeatedly with his hand or a belt and that

       they were scared of Father. December 6, 2019, GAL report at 13.1 W.K.

       reported that Father hits the belt “on tables to scare them” sometimes. Id. at

       15. Children expressed their belief that Father was “angry all the time,” and

       W.K. reported remembering an incident when Father “thr[ew] a computer at

       Mother in the face and ma[de] her nose bleed.” Id. at 14. Children expressed

       fear “of what Father [would] do” if he discovered what Children told the GAL.

       Id. at 15. Children stated that they did not wish to live with Father. Children

       expressed happiness with Stepfather and a desire to live with Stepfather and

       visit Father during summers.

[10]   On September 27, 2019, Father filed a “Renewed Motion to Dismiss” the

       adoption petitions. Appellant’s App. v. II at 7. On December 17, 2019, and

       April 28, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Stepfather’s petition to adopt

       Children. Stepfather argued that Father’s consent to adoption was not

       necessary, and the trial court agreed. Father appealed, and a panel of this

       Court reversed the trial court order. This Court held that Father’s consent was

       1
         The December 2019 GAL report was not included in the record on this appeal but was accessed by this
       Court on Odyssey, the state court case management system. We note that the report is part of the record in
       this case. See Ind. Appellate Rule 27.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023                              Page 5 of 17
       required for the adoption of Children, in part because the evidence did not

       establish that Father was an “unfit” parent. W.K., 163 N.E.3d at 375-76.

[11]   Following remand and a change of trial court judge, on July 9, 2021, Father

       filed a “renewed motion” to dismiss the adoption petitions and a request for

       emergency custody of Children. Appellant’s App. v. II at 172. On July 29,

       Stepfather filed a petition for custody of Children, citing Indiana Code Section

       31-19-11-5. On August 2, the trial court conducted a hearing on Father’s

       motion to dismiss the adoption petitions and denied it as “premature” because

       neither party had “rested its case” on all the issues raised in the adoption

       petitions and contest of adoption.2 Id. at 186. Stepfather subsequently filed a

       motion to intervene as a party in the dissolution action, which the court denied

       as “unnecessary,” and a request for custody as a de facto custodian of Children.

       Id. at 218. Father filed a motion for summary judgment on the issues of

       adoption and custody as a de facto custodian.

[12]   On May 26, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the adoption petitions

       and all pending custody matters. The court heard testimony from Father,

       Stepfather, and the GAL, among others. GAL reports from September 2021,

       January 2022, and May 2022 were admitted into evidence. Each GAL report

       noted that Children wish to live with Stepfather, with parenting time to Father.

       2
         Father did not file a document entitled “Petition to Contest Adoptions” but the trial court found that
       Father’s “filing of September 27, 2019[,] titled Motion to Dismiss, while poorly titled, was sufficiently
       explicit to advise the parties that … [Father] was contesting the adoption.” Appellant’s App. v. II at 224.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023                                 Page 6 of 17
       The GAL reports also indicated that Father had ceased physical discipline of

       Children, and one report noted, “It appears Father has displayed some growth

       in how he parents the Children, and is less reliant on utilizing fear as a tactic

       with the Children.” Ex. at 112.

[13]   On August 30, 2022, the trial court issued its Final Order on custody, which

       included findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Regarding adoption, the trial

       court noted that, per this Court’s prior decision, Father’s consent was required

       for the adoption of Children. Because Father did not consent, the court denied

       Stepfather’s adoption petitions. Regarding custody, the trial court weighed the

       “best interests” of the children factors contained in Indiana Code Section 31-17-

       2-8 and the de facto custodian custody factors listed in Indiana Code Section

       31-17-2-8.5.3 The trial court granted sole legal custody and primary physical

       custody of Children to Stepfather and ordered parenting time for Father. This

       appeal ensued.

       Discussion and Decision
       Delay in Dismissing Adoption Petitions
[14]   Father maintains that the trial court erred when it denied his July 9, 2021,

       motion to dismiss the adoption petitions as being “premature” because neither

       3
         The trial court erroneously cited Indiana Code Section 31-14-13-8.5 rather than Indiana Code Section 31-
       17-2-8.5, but it applied the correct statute. Appealed Order at 16.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023                             Page 7 of 17
       party had “rested its case” on all the issues raised in the adoption petitions and

       the contest of adoption. Appellant’s App. v. II at 186. Although he

       acknowledges that the court dismissed the adoption petitions on August 30,

       2022, he asserts that the court committed reversible error by delaying its ruling

       until that time.

[15]   Indiana law requires that, “[w]henever a motion to contest an adoption is filed,

       the court shall, before entering a decree under IC 31-19-11, set the matter for a

       hearing to contest the adoption.” Ind. Code § 31-19-10-5. After “hearing

       evidence at the hearing,” the court “shall” dismiss the adoption petition if it

       finds that “a required consent has not been obtained.” I.C. § 31-19-10-

       6(2)(A)(ii).

[16]   Here, on December 17, 2019, and April 28, 2020, the trial court held a hearing

       on the issue of whether Father’s consent was required for Stepfather’s adoption

       of the children. The trial court concluded from that hearing that Father’s

       consent to the adoptions was not required. On appeal of that order, a panel of

       this Court reversed. Thus, at the time the trial court “[r]eopened” this case after

       it had received the Court of Appeals’ decision, it was clear that an evidentiary

       hearing on consent had been held and that Father’s consent was required but

       not given. Appellant’s App. v. II at 15. Therefore, under Indiana Code Section

       31-19-10-6(2)(A)(ii), the trial court was required to dismiss the adoption

       petitions. The trial court did so in its order of August 30, 2022.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023        Page 8 of 17
[17]   Father asserts that the trial court waited too long to dismiss the adoption

       petitions. However, he cites to no legal authority imposing a time limit for the

       dismissal, and we find none. Moreover, even assuming for the sake of

       argument only that the trial court erred by waiting until August of 2022 to

       dismiss the adoption petitions, Father has failed to show that he suffered any

       harm from that delay. See Ind. Trial R. 61 (providing no error in any ruling or

       order is grounds for reversal on appeal unless the error was “inconsistent with

       substantial justice” and “affect[ed] the substantial rights of the parties”).

[18]   Indiana law clearly requires that, after an adoption petition is dismissed, the

       trial court “shall determine the person who should have custody of the child.”

       I.C. § 31-19-11-5(a). It is also clear that Stepfather had “temporary custody [of

       Children] until further order of the court,” i.e., pending a final custody decision.

       August 2, 2019, order of the trial court.4 The latter order was still in effect at

       the time Father sought dismissal of the adoption petitions following remand

       from this Court. Thus, even if the trial court had immediately granted Father’s

       July 2021 request to dismiss the adoption petitions, Stepfather still would have

       had temporary custody of the children pending the final custody determination

       that was issued on August 30, 2022.

[19]   Father has failed to cite any legal authority for his assertion that the trial court

       should have immediately granted his motion on remand to dismiss the adoption

       4
         Neither party provided a copy of the August 2, 2019, court order in their appendices on appeal. However,
       the order was accessible via Odyssey.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023                             Page 9 of 17
       petitions, and he has failed to show any harm from the delay in dismissing

       those petitions.

       Custody Determination
[20]   Father appeals the custody determination. Our standard of review in custody

       matters is well-settled: custody “determinations are within the trial court’s

       discretion and will not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion.” Blasius v.

       Wilhoff, 863 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. In

       determining whether the court abused its discretion, “[w]e will consider the

       evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn

       in favor of the judgment, and we will not reweigh the evidence nor will we

       reassess the credibility of witnesses.” Matter of Guardianship of I.R., 77 N.E.3d

       810, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[21]   In addition, where there are findings of fact and conclusions thereon, as there

       are here,

               we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and
               then whether findings support the judgment. On appeal we shall
               not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous,
               and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
               to judge the credibility of the witnesses. A judgment is clearly
               erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings or
               the findings fail to support the judgment. A judgment is also
               clearly erroneous when the trial court applies the wrong legal
               standard to properly found facts.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023       Page 10 of 17
       K.I. ex rel J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009) (quotations and citations

       omitted).

[22]   As Father notes, in a custody dispute between a third party and a natural

       parent, there is a presumption that custody with the natural parent is in a child’s

       best interest. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind.

       2002). To overcome this presumption and place a child “in the custody of a

       person other than the natural parent, a trial court must be satisfied by clear and

       convincing evidence that the best interests of the child require such a

       placement.” Id. That is, the trial court “must be convinced placement with a

       person other than the natural parent represents a substantial and significant

       advantage to the child.” Id. The burden of proof is on the third party, and, if

       the third party meets that burden, “then custody of the child remains in the

       third party. Otherwise, custody must be modified in favor of the child’s natural

       parent.” K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 461.

[23]   In making the custody determination between a natural parent and a third

       party, the trial court may be guided by the “three step approach” outlined in

       Hendrickson v. Binkley, 316 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (abrogation on

       other grounds recognized by Riggs v. Riggs, 77 N.E.3d 792, 795 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2017), trans. denied):

               First, it is presumed it will be in the best interests of the child to
               be placed in the custody of the natural parent. Secondly, to rebut
               this presumption it must be shown by the attacking party that
               there is, (a) unfitness, (b) long acquiescence, or (c) voluntary
               relinquishment such that the affections of the child and third

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023          Page 11 of 17
                party have become so interwoven that to sever them would
                seriously mar and endanger the future happiness of the child.
                The third step is that upon a showing of one of these above three
                factors, then it will be in the best interests of the child to be
                placed with the third party.

       B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 286 (quoting Hendrickson).

[24]   Father asserts that the trial court erred because it did not base its custody

       determination on the standard articulated in Hendrickson, above. However, our

       Supreme Court has made it clear that the trial court is not limited to the

       Hendrickson three-step approach when making its determination. Id. at 288.

       Rather, in determining the best interest of the child, the trial court must also

       consider the relevant statutory custody factors. In this case, those factors can be

       found at Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-8 and include:5

                (1) The age and sex of the child.

                (2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.

                (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
                child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

       5
         Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-8 relates to initial custody determinations, and Indiana Code Section 31-17-
       2-21 relates to modification of custody determinations. As the trial court noted, our Supreme Court has held
       that “the distinctions between the statutory factors required to obtain initial custody and those required for a
       subsequent custody modification are not significant enough to justify substantially different approaches in
       resolving custody disputes. Instead[,] both require a determination of the child’s best interest, and both
       require consideration of certain relevant factors.” K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 460.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023                                 Page 12 of 17
        (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

                 (A) the child’s parent or parents;

                 (B) the child’s sibling; and

                 (C) any other person who may significantly affect the
                 child’s best interests.

        (5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:

                 (A) home;

                 (B) school; and

                 (C) community.

        (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

        (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
        parent.

        (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
        custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall
        consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this chapter.

        (9) A designation in a power of attorney of:

                 (A) the child’s parent; or

                 (B) a person found to be a de facto custodian of the child.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023          Page 13 of 17
[25]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in its findings applying

       the above statutory custody standard. The trial court noted that Children were

       thirteen and twelve years old, and both consistently expressed strong wishes to

       remain in the custody of Stepfather, with parenting time to Father. As to

       Children’s relationship with Father, the court noted the GAL testimony and

       report from December 6, 2019, in which the GAL stated Children were in fear

       of Father’s temper and uncomfortable with some of his behaviors such as

       drinking alcohol and hitting Children with a belt as punishment. However, the

       GAL’s more recent reports noted that Father had ceased using physical

       punishment on Children.

[26]   On the other hand, the court noted Children had strong, close relationships

       with Stepfather; their little sister, A.M.; and their maternal grandmother, all of

       whom lived with them in Indiana. Children had been living with Stepfather

       since they were four and three years old. During that time, Stepfather provided

       for Children financially and was a “constant presence in their lives[,] …

       encourage[ing] them in their school work and extracurricular activities.”

       Appealed Order at 11. Children are “able to talk to [Stepfather] and share their

       concerns and worries with him.” Id. In contrast, Children did not believe they

       could share their feelings with Father, including their fear of physical

       punishment and retaliation for reporting such punishment and their feelings

       about Mother and her death.

[27]   Maternal grandmother was also a “constant presence in the children’s lives,”

       and Children described her as “an integral part of their lives.” Id. at 12. And

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023         Page 14 of 17
       the GAL described Children’s relationship with A.M. as “close, supportive, and

       loving.” Id. Both Children wished to live with A.M. and maternal

       grandmother at Stepfather’s home in Indiana.

[28]   The trial court also found that Children were very well adjusted to their home,

       school, and community in Westfield, Indiana. Children did well in school, had

       friends and “good social skills,” and engaged in extracurricular activities. Id.

       Children were also in “good mental” and physical health, despite their grief

       over their Mother’s death. Id. at 13. Stepfather also appeared to be “well

       adjusted.” Id.

[29]   The trial court found that it had “very little information to form an opinion of

       Father’s mental health or physical health,” but noted he was “described to the

       GAL by others as being angry, aggressive, and impulsive.” Id. at 14. The court

       also noted that Father “appears to have little regard for or understanding of the

       impact” of involving Children in the custody proceedings and “frequently

       discussed issues about the case with them.” Id. The court found that Father’s

       relationship with Mother involved domestic violence and Father’s second

       marriage was also described by his second wife as “violent.” Id. at 15.

[30]   Given the above evidence, the trial court found that the best interests of the

       children factors contained in the custody statute weighed in favor of granting

       custody to Stepfather and parenting time to Father. The court found,

               based on the evidence before it and the actions of the litigants,
               [Children] will significantly benefit from a closer relationship
               with those important to them, Sister, Stepfather, Maternal
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023          Page 15 of 17
                [Grandparents]…, Father, their friends, and fellow church
                members which is demonstrably more likely to be fostered by an
                award of custody to Stepfather. This is a significant advantage
                that cannot be duplicated in Father’s custody.

       Id. at 21.

[31]   The court held that the presumption in favor of Father “has been rebutted by

       the clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 19. In reaching that conclusion, the

       trial court noted:

                [a]fter watching Father and listening to him and reviewing all the
                evidence presented[,] this Court simply cannot find Father to be
                credible. He presents one conveniently rosey [sic] view of his
                circumstances and life in Texas that is not what is seen by the
                GAL at her visit, it is not supported by the statements of his own
                sons, it is not reflected in his actions in this cause of action, and it
                is not supported by his own collateral contacts who[,] instead of
                describing him as a good a[nd] loving father[,] describe him as
                violent and aggressive. On the other hand, the Court does find
                the Stepfather to be credible.

       Id. at 20.

[32]   Those findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial

       court’s judgment was supported by those findings.6 Father’s contentions to the

       6
         The trial court also found that Stepfather and Maternal Grandmother were de facto custodians of Children
       and applied the de facto custodian factors outlined in Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-8.5. However, the
       evidence does not support that finding. The court noted that Maternal Grandmother, “on occasion,” had
       cared for Children for “several months.” Appealed Order at 15-16. The court found that Stepfather had
       cared for Children “for a period of approximately 6 weeks prior to initiation of this action” and consistently

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023                               Page 16 of 17
       contrary are requests that we reweigh the evidence and judge witness

       credibility, which we may not do. See I.R., 77 N.E.3d at 813.

       Conclusion
[33]   Even assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in delaying dismissal

       of the adoption petitions, such error was harmless and not a basis for reversal.

       Further, the trial court’s relevant custody findings were supported by clear and

       convincing evidence, and those findings support the final custody

       determination.

[34]   Affirmed.

       Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       since the action. Id. at 16. However, a de facto custodian is defined, in relevant part, as “a person who has
       been the primary caregiver for, and financial support of, a child who has resided with the person for at least:
       … one (1) year if the child is at least three (3) years of age.” I.C. § 31-9-2-35.5. The one-year period does not
       include “[a]ny period after a child custody proceeding has been commenced[.]” Id. The evidence cited by
       the trial court does not support a finding that Maternal Grandmother or Stepfather were de facto custodians
       as they had not been the “primary caregiver” for children for at least one year, exclusive of the period
       following initiation of custody proceedings. However, we note that this error was harmless, as application of
       the relevant custody factors cited above support the trial court’s custody determination.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-AD-2227 | March 29, 2023                                 Page 17 of 17