Court Opinion

ID: 9785582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:13:35.987675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:30.171852
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring.
I agree generally with the separation of powers test stated by the majority, and with its application of that test to the narrow circumstances of this particular case. In light of the unique history and function of the Coastal Commission (Commission), I accept the majority’s conclusion that the current version of the California Coastal Act (Coastal Act; Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.)1 does not violate the separation of powers by providing that the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, and the Speaker of the Assembly shall each appoint one-third of the Commission’s voting members. I also concur that, technically, we may confine our analysis to the law as currently in effect, because this case concerns only the prospective validity of an injunction, and the “de facto officer” doctrine would protect the official acts of commissioners who held their offices, under color of authority, pursuant to the prior scheme.
As the majority suggests, the Commission is a modem, somewhat hybrid statutory creation. It has succeeded, on behalf of the state, to certain land use planning functions—executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial—that were traditionally the province of local government. Though formally lodged within the executive branch, the Commission has an independent mission. Neither the Commission nor its members directly assist the Governor, or any other constitutional executive officer, in carrying out that officer’s prescribed duties. Hence, legislative participation in appointing the Commission’s members does not “impinge[] upon a core zone of executive branch authority” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 47), or upon an “exclusively executive prerogative” (id., at p. 46), as prohibited by the separation of powers clause.
Moreover, safeguards contained in the current version of the Coastal Act ensure commissioners, once in office, a substantial measure of insulation from their appointing authorities. Hence, the law’s appointment provisions, as now in effect, “do not improperly compromise the ability of the . . . *60Commission[’s] [members] individually, or [of] the . . . Commission as a whole, to perform the Commission’s functions independently” of the legislative branch. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 48.)
The individual history, nature, and function of this agency make me especially reluctant to overturn the current statutory method of appointing its voting members. In particular, I am mindful that the Commission’s long tradition of membership by both state and local representatives, with substantial appointment power vested in both the executive and legislative branches of state government, originated with the voters of California.
As the majority recount, today’s Commission has its genesis in a 1972 initiative measure, Proposition 20, enacted by the voters at the November 7, 1972 General Election (hereafter Proposition 20). This measure created a statewide agency, the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission (1972 statewide commission)—the direct predecessor of the present Commission—as well as six regional commissions (1972 regional commissions) covering the affected coastal areas. (Former §§ 27200-27243, as enacted by Prop. 20.) Each of the 1972 regional commissions included an equal number of local officials and public members—the latter appointed, one-third each, by the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, and the Assembly Speaker. (Former §§ 27201, 27202, subd. (d), as enacted by Prop. 20.) The 1972 statewide commission itself had 12 voting members—six regional representatives, one appointed by each 1972 regional commission from among its own members, and six public members appointed, one-third each, by the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, and the Assembly Speaker. (Former §§ 27200, 27202, subd. (d), as enacted by Prop. 20.) The 1972 initiative law was repealed, by its own terms, as of January 1, 1977. (Former § 27650, as amended by Stats. 1974, ch. 897, § 2, p. 1900.)
The initiative’s successor legislation, the Coastal Act (§ 30000 et seq., as enacted by Stats. 1976, ch. 1330, § 1, p. 5951 et seq.), created the present statewide Commission, as well as six successor regional commissions that would terminate no later than January 1, 1981. (Former §§ 30300-30305, added by Stats. 1976, ch. 1330, § 1, pp. 5966-5969.) The voting membership of the statewide Commission, like that of its 1972 predecessor, included six regional representatives and six statewide public members—the latter appointed equally, as before, by the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, and the Assembly Speaker. (Former § 30301, subds. (d), (e), added by Stats. 1976, ch. 1330, § 1, p. 5966.)
In turn, the regional commissions were constituted, and their members were appointed, essentially as under the 1972 initiative scheme. So long as a regional commission remained in existence, its representative on the statewide Commission was selected by the regional commission itself, from *61among its own members, as under prior law. When a regional commission ceased to exist, its representative on the statewide Commission would be replaced by a city councilperson or county supervisor from that region, selected from a list of such officials nominated at the local level. The power to appoint this new representative from the list of nominees fell directly to the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, or the Assembly Speaker according to a specified rotation, so as to ensure that, once all the regional commissions ceased existence, each appointing authority would choose an equal number of regional representatives to the statewide Commission. (Former §§ 30301, subds. (d), (e), 30301.2, 30303, added by Stats. 1976, ch. 1330, § 1, pp. 5966-5969.)
After all the regional commissions had terminated, the Coastal Act was amended to eliminate reference to them, and to confirm that the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, and the Assembly Speaker shall each appoint one-third of the statewide Commission’s 12 voting members. As has been true since the regional commissions ceased existence, this membership is equally divided between regional representatives chosen from lists of eligible local officials submitted by local nominating bodies, and statewide public members. (§ 30301, subds. (d), (e), as amended by Stats. 1991, ch. 285, § 5, p. 1796; § 30301.2, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1991, ch. 285, § 6, p. 1796.)
This evolution of the scheme for appointment of the Commission’s voting members, though complex, reflects a continuing adherence to the electorate’s original desire that the membership of the statewide agency charged with protecting California’s coastal resources should be carefully balanced between statewide and local interests, and that appointments to the agency should come from both the executive and legislative branches. Indeed, retention of this system under current law does not suggest a “power grab” instigated by the Legislature itself, but rather an acceptance of the electorate’s design, as set forth in the 1972 initiative. After the Commission has operated for some three decades under this scheme, we would be hard-pressed to find that all, or at least most, of its members have been appointed unconstitutionally.
That said, I reserve the right to examine, on a case-by-case basis, other statutory schemes for legislative participation in naming persons to hold positions in the executive branch, as such schemes may now or hereafter exist. My concurrence in today’s judgment is narrowly confined to the current Coastal Act. It does not constitute any concession on my part that the Legislature generally may arrogate such nominating authority to itself without running afoul of the separation of powers clause.
*62The Founders recognized the Legislature as “the branch most likely to encroach on the power[s] of the other branches.” (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 298 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 20 P.3d 533].) Legislators may often have a political incentive to enhance their own authority and influence at the expense of the executive branch and its officials. Such legislative schemes must be scrutinized with the utmost care to ensure that the constitutional functions and prerogatives of the executive are carefully preserved.
Finally, though it is not strictly necessary to address the issue, I note I would find that the Coastal Act was constitutionally flawed until amended in 2003. Prior to this amendment, the statute provided that all the Commission’s voting members, including those appointed by the Senate Rules Committee and the Assembly Speaker, would serve “for two years at the pleasure of their appointing power.” (Former § 30312, subd. (b), as enacted by Stats. 1976, ch. 1330, p. 5970, italics added.) Thus, under the former law, the appointing officials or bodies, including those from the Legislature, could remove their Commission appointees at will.
The pre-2003 version was in effect when this case came before the Third District Court of Appeal. That court struck down the scheme, concluding that the legislative power both to appoint and to remove a majority of the Commission’s members violated the separation of powers. As Presiding Justice Scotland stated in his opinion for the court: “[Former] [s]ection 30312 gives the Speaker of the Assembly and the Senate Committee on Rules virtually unfettered authority over the appointment of a majority of the Commission’s members, and wholly unfettered power to remove those members at the will of the Legislature. The presumed desire of those members to avoid being removed from their positions creates an improper subservience to the legislative branch of government. . . . Consequently, this statutory scheme gives the Legislature excessive control over the Commission in the exercise of powers, and in the execution of duties, that are executive in character.” (Italics added.) Spurred by the Court of Appeal’s decision, the Legislature promptly amended the law to the form now before us. (§ 30312, as amended by Stats. 2003, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. lx, § 1.)
Removal at pleasure was an implicit feature of the 1972 commissions established by Proposition 20. (See Brown v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 52 [123 Cal.Rptr. 377, 538 P.2d 1137] [1972 regional commissioners].) To the extent the removal power was thus part of the voters’ original design in 1972, it is due considerable deference. Nonetheless, I concur fully in Presiding Justice Scotland’s conclusion that the pre-2003 version of the Coastal Act overstepped constitutional bounds insofar as it included a legislative removal power. Quite clearly, if officials of the legislative branch have moment-by-moment control over the tenure of most of an executive agency’s voting *63members, the agency cannot perform its executive functions free of undue legislative influence. Accordingly, the removal provision contravened the second prong of the test applied by the majority (see discussion, ante), and thus violated the separation of powers.
Brown, J., concurred.

All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Public Resources Code.