Court Opinion

ID: 9495850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:11:39.065704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:13.763023
License: Public Domain

GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the well-written lead opinion, both as to the validity of the search warrant and the officers’ compliance with the knock-and-announce rule. My concurrence on the search-warrant issue, however, is a reluctant one, compelled by this court’s controlling precedent in United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970 (6th Cir.2000) (en banc). But for Allen, I would hold that Officer Mackall’s affidavit was legally insufficient to support the magistrate judge’s conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be found at Pinson’s residence. The affidavit simply documents that the confidential informant purchased a single rock of crack cocaine while at 2713 Torbett Street. It leaves out the key piece of information that the informant had observed large quantities of drugs, money, and weapons when he was in the residence. Without this additional information, I do not believe that the magistrate *569judge had a reasonable basis to conclude that the police would find contraband in the residence three days after the single rock of crack cocaine had been purchased by the informant. See Allen, 211 F.3d at 977 (Gilman, J., concurring); see also United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1378 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that the affidavit submitted for a warrant did not support the magistrate’s determination of probable cause where “the only claim of possible wrongdoing is the averment that, within three days prior to the affidavit date, the informant was on the suspect premises and, while there, he saw some quantity of marijuana ‘expressly for the purpose of unlawful distribution’ ”).
The fact that Officer Mackall had this additional information does not save the deficient affidavit. As well put by the lead opinion, “a probable cause determination can be based only upon the information the law enforcement officer communicates to the magistrate judge, and ... the omission of relevant information from an affidavit could lead to the suppression of evidence and the demise of a prosecution.” (Lead Op. at 565) See Weaver, 99 F.3d at 1378 (“In determining whether an affidavit is ‘bare bones,’ the reviewing court is concerned exclusively with the statements contained within the affidavit itself.”). I personally believe that the affidavit in the present case was insufficient to establish probable cause, but recognize that the majority in Allen found to the contrary based upon a substantially similar affidavit. Therefore, I reluctantly concur on this issue.
As to the knock-and-announce issue, I must say that this case is as “close to the line” as any I have seen. The lead opinion quite properly emphasizes that “[w]e need not decide whether a wait of five to ten seconds, standing alone, is adequate under the knock and announce rule” (Lead Op. at 568), and that, [mjore importantly, a number of events occurred prior to the first knock that should have alerted the occupants of 2713 Torbett Street that the police would be seeking entry to the premises.” (Lead Op. at 568) Without these prior events, I would have found that the police officers had violated the knock-and-announce rule. This case, therefore, should not be cited for the general proposition that five seconds is a sufficient time for police officers to wait before forcing their way into a residence.