Court Opinion

ID: 2963614
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:01.623388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:29.572777
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2283

                                 THEODORE M. BARBOUR,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                            DYNAMICS RESEARCH CORPORATION,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                            Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                           ______________

                                 ____________________

            Norman Jackman  with whom  Martha M.  Wishart and  Jackman &  Roth
            ______________             __________________      _______________
        were on brief for appellant.
            Joan  Ackerstein  with  whom  Guy  P.  Tully and  Jackson,  Lewis,
            ________________              ______________      ________________
        Schnitzler & Krupman were on brief for appellee.
        ____________________

                                 ____________________

                                   August 15, 1995
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL,  Circuit  Judge.     Plaintiff  Theodore  M.
                      STAHL,  Circuit  Judge.
                              ______________

            Barbour   sued  his   former   employer,  Dynamics   Research

            Corporation  ("DRC"),  claiming   that  DRC  terminated   his

            employment to avoid paying disability benefits, in  violation

            of section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

            (ERISA), 29  U.S.C.     1140.   The  district  court  granted

            summary judgment for DRC, and we affirm.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
                                  FACTUAL BACKGROUND
                                  __________________

                      In  July  1985,   DRC,  an  Andover,  Massachusetts

            company, hired Barbour as a staff engineer.  Although Barbour

            was performing his  job satisfactorily, his  supervisor, Earl

            Zimmerman, began  to complain  to Barbour  in September  1987

            that  Barbour's breath  smelled  of  alcohol.    Barbour  and

            Zimmerman discussed Barbour's alcohol  problem, and Zimmerman

            suggested that Barbour apply for a medical leave of absence. 

                      For   employees   with    a   medically   certified

            disability, DRC provides company-funded short-term disability

            benefits.  The short-term disability plan provides a disabled

            employee  with up  to 75% of  his or  her salary.   After six

            months elapses,  an employee who is still  disabled must then

            apply for  long-term disability benefits, which  are provided

            through a funded insurance program.

                      DRC  employees  applying  for  short-term  benefits

            receive two documents.  The first, a Medical Leave of Absence

                                         -2-
                                          2

            Notice  (the "Disability  Notice")  describes the  employee's

            rights and responsibilities  under the  program and  requires

            certain information and  an employee signature.1   The second

            form,  a Physician's  Certification  of Disability  form (the

            "Certification  Form") is to  be completed by  the employee's

            physician  and  returned  to  DRC's  benefits  office.    The

            Disability Notice states that the employee 

                      must  submit   a  completed   Physician's
                      Certification  of Disability  form (or  a
                      comparable     note     on    physician's
                      letterhead).   This must  be received  in
                      the benefits office within 10 days of the
                      date your leave commences  or the date of
                      this notice, whichever is later.
              
            The  ten-day requirement also  appears in a  memorandum dated

            July  1, 1987,  from DRC's  benefits  administrator, Patricia

            Nickles,  to department  managers.   The memorandum  provides

            that

                      [t]he employee has 10 days from the first
                      day  out  to  submit  the signed  medical
                      leave   letter   and    written   medical
                      certification to the Benefits office.  If
                      this timeframe  is not met,  a time  card
                      will not be processed . . . .

                       On or around December 4, 1987, Barbour went to see

            DRC's vice president  of human resources, John  Wilkinson, to

            discuss  the process  of  applying for  short-term disability

            benefits.     During  his  meeting  with  Wilkinson,  Barbour

            received  an undated  Disability Notice  and  a Certification

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The record  does not indicate  when and if this  form was
            returned and neither party focuses on this document.

                                         -3-
                                          3

            Form.   Barbour claims that Wilkinson told him the Disability

            Notice  was undated in order to give  him more time to obtain

            certification.   On December 7, without any apparent employer

            permission, Barbour commenced his absence from work.  On this

            same  day,  Barbour  brought the  Certification  Form  to the

            office  of Dr. Kenneth Prescott,  a hematologist who had been

            treating  him for protracted  bleeding.  Dr.  Prescott was on

            vacation but his nurse informed Barbour that the doctor would

            return on  December 16  and would complete  the form  at that

            time.

                      On  December 10, Nickles sent a certified letter to

            Barbour, stating  that  unless  the  Certification  Form  was

            returned to  her office by  December 18 -- eleven  days after

            Barbour commenced his leave -- she would assume he had chosen

            voluntarily to  terminate his  employment.   This letter  was

            never  received by Barbour  as it was  incorrectly addressed.

            Although  Nickles  told  Barbour about  the  letter  during a

            December 15  phone conversation, Barbour  claims that Nickles

            did not specifically tell him  that he would be terminated if

            the certification was  not received by December  18.  Barbour

            states that  Nickles told  him that he  would be  receiving a

            form letter but that  he should not "get shook" and  that DRC

            "will work with you but keep in touch."

                      On December 16,  Dr. Prescott told Barbour  that he

            was unwilling  to  sign the  Certification Form  and that  it

                                         -4-
                                          4

            should be taken  to a general practitioner.   Because Barbour

            was  not under  the care  of a  general practitioner  at that

            time, he  experienced  difficulty in  obtaining an  immediate

            appointment.    Barbour  says that  he  attempted  to contact

            Wilkinson  on December  16 to  inform him  of the  delay, but

            claims that Wilkinson failed to return his phone calls.

                      On  December 22,  Wilkinson called  Barbour to  ask

            about the status of  the Certification Form.  After  learning

            that Barbour had yet to set up an appointment with  a general

            practitioner, Wilkinson  suggested that Barbour  continue his

            efforts  at obtaining certification  and told him  that "they

            would try  to jump the  hurdles."  In the  meantime, however,

            Nickles  and  Wilkinson  decided  to  begin  the  termination

            process  and on  December  22 mailed  a  certified letter  to

            Barbour  stating that his employment was being terminated for

            failure to comply with the ten-day deadline.  This letter too

            was mistakenly sent to the wrong address and was not received

            by Barbour until January 10, 1988.

                      On  December 30,  Barbour finally saw  Dr. Lawrence

            McCartin, a  general practitioner.   During the  appointment,

            Dr. McCartin told Barbour that he was suffering from a number

            of  alcohol-related  disabilities,   including  hypertension.

            Barbour asked  the doctor  to indicate  on the  Certification

            Form that his disability was caused by hypertension as he did

            not  want  alcoholism  documented  in  his  personnel   file.

                                         -5-
                                          5

            Barbour  picked up  the completed  form  from Dr.  McCartin's

            office  on December 31 and delivered it  to DRC on January 4,

            1988,  the next business  day.  The  form was  stamped by Dr.

            McCartin and stated that Barbour was disabled  "indefinitely"

            beginning December 18, 1987, due to hypertension.

                      Upon  receipt  of   the  Certification  Form,   DRC

            proceeded to review  Barbour's disability claim.   On January

            7, Nickles  called Dr. McCartin's office and learned that Dr.

            McCartin  had  seen Barbour  only once,  on December  30, two

            weeks after Barbour s  disability allegedly began.   She also

            learned  that Barbour had missed a follow-up appointment with

            Dr. McCartin scheduled for January 7.  DRC claims that, based

            on these circumstances, along with  the fact that Barbour had

            not listed  alcoholism as the  cause of disability,  it chose

            not to accept the form as a valid certification of disability

            and did not reinstate Barbour.  Nickles, in informing Barbour

            of DRC's decision by letter on January 7, stated:

                      Unfortunately, I  [Nickles] am  unable to
                      consider   your   claim   for  disability
                      benefits.   As  you already know,  it was
                      your   responsibility   to   submit  this
                      documentation  by   December  18,   1987.
                      Since we  did not receive  your paperwork
                      by this deadline, you  were considered to
                      have    voluntarily    terminated    your
                      employment   with   DRC   retroactive  to
                      December 4, 1987. 

                      The  record indicates  that Barbour  was  the first

            employee   ever  terminated   for  failure   to  submit   the

            Certification  Form within  ten days  and that  Certification

                                         -6-
                                          6

            Forms of  other  employees were  received  by DRC  after  the

            deadline  had elapsed (between  three and twenty  days late).

            These employees  apparently  were not  terminated  or  denied

            disability benefits.   The  record also  suggests that  there

            were   other   instances  in   which   employees  turned   in

            insufficient  Certification Forms and it is not disputed that

            these  employees were  allowed to  supplement their  original

            forms, even though the ten-day period had expired. 

                      After Barbour was terminated, he  sought no medical

            treatment  for a  period of  nine  months.   In August  1988,

            Barbour  stopped  drinking  but continued  to  suffer  from a

            number of  alcohol-related illnesses.  On April  5, 1991, the

            Social  Security Administration  adjudicated Barbour  to have

            been  disabled since December  4, 1987, the  approximate date

            that his absence from work commenced.

                      In  June  1992, Barbour  commenced  this  action in

            Massachusetts  state court  under section  510  of ERISA,  29

            U.S.C.   1140,  alleging that DRC terminated him  in order to

            deprive him of disability benefits.  DRC subsequently removed

            the case to the United States District Court for the District

            of Massachusetts.   At the close  of discovery, both  parties

            moved for summary judgment.  The district court granted DRC's

            motion,  and Barbour thereafter filed a motion to reconsider.

            Upon  the district court s refusal to reconsider, this appeal

            ensued.

                                         -7-
                                          7

                                         -8-
                                          8

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

            A.  Summary Judgment Standard
            _____________________________

                      As always, we review a grant of summary judgment de
                                                                       __

            novo.   Like the  district court,  we view  the facts  in the
            ____

            light most  favorable to  the non-moving  party, drawing  all

            reasonable  inferences in  that  party's  favor.    Woods  v.
                                                                _____

            Friction Materials, Inc., 30  F.3d 255, 259 (1st Cir.  1994).
            ________________________

            Summary  judgment   is  appropriate   when  "the   pleadings,

            depositions,  answers to  interrogatories, and  admissions on

            file, together with  the affidavits, if any,  show that there

            is no  genuine issue  as to any  material fact  and that  the

            moving party  is entitled  to judgment as  a matter  of law."

            Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  56(c).   As  a  prerequisite  to  summary

            judgment,  a moving  party must  demonstrate  "an absence  of

            evidence  to support the  non-moving party's case."   Celotex
                                                                  _______

            Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).   Once the moving
            _____    _______

            party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment,

            the burden shifts to the  non-moving party, who "may not rest

            on mere allegations or denials  of his pleading, but must set

            forth  specific facts  showing there is  a genuine  issue for

            trial."  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,  477 U.S. 242,  256
                     ________    ___________________

            (1986).  

                      Even  in an ERISA case "where elusive concepts such

            as motive  or intent  are at issue,  summary judgment  may be

                                         -9-
                                          9

            appropriate  if   the  nonmoving  party  rests   merely  upon

            conclusory    allegations,    improbable    inferences,   and

            unsupported speculation."   Goldman  v. First  Nat'l Bank  of
                                        _______     _____________________

            Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116  (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Medina-
            ______                                                _______

            Munoz v. R.J.  Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5,  8 (1st Cir.
            _____    __________________________

            1990)).   Thus, Fed. R. Civ.  P. 56(c) "mandates the entry of

            summary judgment  . . . upon motion against a party who fails

            to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

            element  essential  to that  party's case,  and on  which the

            party will bear  the burden of proof at trial."  Celotex, 477
                                                             _______

            U.S. at 322.

            B.  Proving an ERISA section 510 Case
            _____________________________________

                      1. The Legal Framework
                      ______________________

                      Section 510 of ERISA provides in part:

                      It shall  be unlawful  for any  person to
                      discharge,    fine,    suspend,    expel,
                      discipline,  or  discriminate  against  a
                      participant or beneficiary for exercising
                      any  right to which  he is entitled under
                      the  provisions  of an  employee  benefit
                      plan . . . for the purpose of interfering
                                 ______________________________
                      with the attainment of any right to which
                      _________________________________________
                      such  participant  may   become  entitled
                      _________________________________________
                      under the plan . . . . 
                      _______________________

            29 U.S.C.   1140 (emphasis  supplied).  The ultimate  inquiry

            in a  section 510 case  is whether the employment  action was

            taken  with the  specific  intent  of  interfering  with  the

            employee's ERISA benefits.  Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990
                                        _____    ___________________

            F.2d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 1993); Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co.,
                                              _______    _______________

            953 F.2d 1405, 1417 (1st  Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded on
                                                  _______ ___ ________ __

                                         -10-
                                          10

            other grounds,  113 S. Ct 1701 (1993); McGann  v. H & H Music
            _____________                          ______     ___________

            Co.,  946 F.2d  401, 404  (5th  Cir. 1991).   This  "specific
            ___

            intent"  requirement derives from  the language of  the ERISA

            statute ("for the  purpose of interfering") and  is necessary

            "to separate  the firings  which have  an incidental,  albeit

            important,  effect on  an employee's  . .  . rights  from the

            actionable firings, in which the  effect of the firing on the

            employer's . . . obligation was a motivating factor."  Dister
                                                                   ______

            v.  Continental  Group, Inc.,  859 F.2d  1108, 1111  (2d Cir.
                ________________________

            1988).   Thus, no  ERISA cause of  action will lie  where the

            loss  of  benefits was  a  mere  consequence  of, but  not  a

            motivating factor behind,  a termination of employment.   Id.
                                                                      ___

            Without such a requirement,  every discharged employee  could

            have a potential claim against his or her employer.

                      In most cases, given that the employer controls the

            evidence  related to intent,  a plaintiff  will be  unable to

            adduce "smoking gun"  evidence that the employer  intended to

            interfere with his or her  benefits.  An employer is unlikely

            to  document such a  motive, and there  is rarely "eyewitness

            testimony  as to the  employer's mental processes."   Dister,
                                                                  ______

            859 F.2d at  1112 (quoting United States Postal  Serv. Bd. of
                                       __________________________________

            Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).  Therefore, a
            _________    ______

            plaintiff  usually  must rely  on circumstantial  evidence to

            prove his or her case.

                                         -11-
                                          11

                      Where a plaintiff must resort to such evidence, the

            burden-shifting  analysis   used  in  Title   VII  employment

            discrimination  cases is especially helpful.  It "enables the

            trial  judge  to sift  through  the  evidence in  an  orderly

            fashion to determine  the ultimate question in  the case--did

            the defendant discriminate against the plaintiff."  Dillon v.
                                                                ______

            Voles, 746  F.2d 998,  1003 (3d Cir.  1984).   Accordingly, a
            _____

            number  of  circuits  have   applied  the  McDonnell  Douglas
                                                       __________________

            framework to section  510 claims.   See,  e.g., Humphreys  v.
                                                ___   ____  _________

            Bellaire  Corp.,  966 F.2d  1037  (6th  Cir.  1992); Rath  v.
            _______________                                      ____

            Selection  Research, Inc.,  978 F.2d  1087  (8th Cir.  1992);
            _________________________

            Conkwright v.  Westinghouse Elec.  Corp., 933  F.2d 231  (4th
            __________     _________________________

            Cir. 1990); Dister, 859 F.2d  at 1108; Gavalik v. Continental
                        ______                     _______    ___________

            Can  Co., 812 F.2d  834 (3d Cir.  1987).   The district court
            ________

            appropriately employed the framework in this case, and we now

            do the same  in assessing the propriety of  the court's grant

            of defendant's motion for summary judgment.

                      a. Prima Facie Case
                         ________________

                      In  order to  establish a  prima  facie case  under

            section  510, a  plaintiff must  present  sufficient evidence

            from which the  employer's specific intent to  interfere with

            the plaintiff's benefits  can be inferred.   Dister, 859 F.2d
                                                         ______

            at 1114-15.  Thus, a plaintiff  must show that he or she  (1)

            is entitled to  ERISA's protection, (2) was qualified for the

            position,  and (3)  was  discharged under  circumstances that

                                         -12-
                                          12

            give rise  to an inference  of discrimination.  Id.  at 1115.
                                                            ___

            As in the Title VII  context, the plaintiff's burden of proof

            at this stage is de minimis.  Id. at 1114-15.
                             __ _______   ___

                      Applying this standard to the instant case, Barbour

            has  met his initial burden of  producing evidence to support

            each of the elements of his prima facie case.  First, Barbour

            is a  member of the  protected class under the  ERISA statute

            because he  had the  opportunity to attain  a right  under an

            employee benefit plan.  Second, Barbour has provided evidence

            that  he was  performing satisfactorily  in  his job.   DRC's

            performance  evaluations   indicate  that  Barbour   met  the

            characteristics of a "fully  qualified experienced employee."

            Finally,   Barbour  was   attempting  to   obtain  disability

            certification  when  the  employment  action  was  taken  and

            benefits, if granted,  would have been paid  from defendant's

            general funds.  As the  plaintiff's burden at the prima facie

            stage  is de minimis,  these circumstances are  sufficient to
                      __ _______

            give  rise  to an  inference that  DRC terminated  Barbour in

            order to interfere with his disability benefits.  See Dister,
                                                              ___ ______

            859  F.2d at 1114  (plaintiff's discharge four  months before

            certain pension benefits were due to vest, together with  the

            substantial cost savings  to the employer in  denying pension

            benefits, were sufficient  to raise an inference  of specific

            intent  at   the  prima   facie  stage);   Zappia  v.   Nynex
                                                       ______       _____

            Information, No. 90-11366-Y, 1993 WL 437676, at  *3 (D. Mass.
            ___________

                                         -13-
                                          13

            Oct.   22,  1993)   (employee's  discharge   while  receiving

            disability benefits gives rise to  a presumption of intent at

            the prima facie stage). 

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      b. Defendant's Non-Discriminatory Reason
                         _____________________________________

                      Once the plaintiff establishes a  prima facie case,

            a presumption arises  that the defendant acted  unlawfully in

            denying the plaintiff  ERISA benefits.  See  St. Mary's Honor
                                                    ___  ________________

            Ctr. v. Hicks,  113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) (Title VII).  In
            ____    _____

            Title  VII   cases,  "[t]his  presumption  `places  upon  the

            defendant the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the

            prima facie case--i.e., the burden of producing evidence that

            the adverse employment  actions were taken for  a legitimate,

            non-discriminatory reason.'"  Udo v. Tomes, No. 94-1931, slip
                                          ___    _____

            op. at 7  (1st Cir. Apr. 28, 1995) (quoting Hicks, 113 S. Ct.
                                                        _____

            at  2747).   In the  ERISA context,  this burden  remains the

            same.  Dister, 859  F.2d at 1115.   Thus, the defendant  must
                   ______

            establish a legitimate, "non-discriminatory" reason --  i.e.,

            one  unrelated  to  the   plaintiff's  entitlement  to  ERISA

            benefits -- for its actions toward the plaintiff.

                      DRC  claims that it  terminated Barbour for failing

            to  report  to work  or submit  any medical  certification of

            disability  within ten days of the commencement of his leave.

            Although Barbour disputes the veracity of this justification,

            it  is enough  to satisfy  DRC's  "relatively light"  burden.

            Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).   As the
            _______    _______

            Supreme  Court stated  in Hicks,  "the  determination that  a
                                      _____

            defendant  has met  its burden  of production  (and  has thus

            rebutted any legal presumption of intentional discrimination)

                                         -15-
                                          15

            can  involve no credibility  assessment.  For  the burden-of-

            production determination necessarily precedes the credibility
                                                 ________

            assessment  stage."    113  S.  Ct.  at  2748  (emphasis   in

            original).

                      c.  Barbour's  Evidence  of  Pretext  and  Specific
                          _______________________________________________

            Intent
            ______

                      Once   the  defendant   has  met   its  burden   of

            production,  the presumption  of  intent  established by  the

            plaintiff's  prima facie  case "drops  out  of the  picture."

            Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.   The burden of production  shifts
            _____

            back  to the  plaintiff, who  must prove  that the  defendant

            acted  with the  specific  intent  of  interfering  with  the

            plaintiff's  benefits.   Id.   Thus,  in order  to survive  a
                                     ___

            motion  for  summary  judgment, a  plaintiff  must  introduce

            evidence sufficient to  support two findings:   (1) that  the

            employer's articulated reason for its  employment actions was

            a pretext; and (2) that the true reason was to interfere with

            the plaintiff's  receipt of benefits.  See Udo, slip op. at 8
                                                   ___ ___

            (citing Smith v. Stratus Computer,  Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 16 (1st
                    _____    _______________________

            Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1958 (1995)).
                        _____ ______

                      Barbour   argues  that   Hicks  precludes   summary
                                               _____

            judgment  where there is sufficient evidence to conclude that

            the defendant's  proffered reasons  are a  pretext.   Barbour

            contends  that   under   Hicks,  where   the  plaintiff   has
                                     _____

            established  a  prima  facie  case  and  has shown  that  the

                                         -16-
                                          16

            employer's  reasons are not worthy of credence, no additional

            proof of intent is  required for the trier  of fact to  infer

            that the employer  intended to interfere with  the employee's

            benefits.  Barbour bases his argument on the passage in Hicks
                                                                    _____

            in  which the Court stated that "[t]he factfinder's disbelief

            of the reasons  put forward by the defendant (particularly if

            disbelief  is accompanied by  a suspicion of  mendacity) may,

            together with the elements  of the prima facie case,  suffice

            to show intentional  discrimination."  Hicks,  113 S. Ct.  at
                                                   _____

            2749.   Barbour's argument,  however, was  foreclosed by  our

            decision in Woods, in which we interpreted the quoted passage
                        _____

            from Hicks to make clear  
                 _____

                      that  the Supreme  Court envisioned  that
                      some cases exist where a prima facie case
                      and  the   disbelief  of   pretext  could
                      provide  a  strong  enough  inference  of
                      actual  discrimination   to  permit   the
                      factfinder  to  find for  the  plaintiff.
                      Conversely,  we  do  not think  that  the
                      Supreme Court  meant to  say that such  a
                      finding would always be permissible . . .
                      .  The  strength of the prima  facie case
                      and the  significance of  the disbelieved
                      pretext  will  vary  from  case  to  case
                      depending on the circumstances. 

            Woods,  30 F.3d  at 261  n.3.   Thus,  whether the  plaintiff

            relies solely on his prima facie case and evidence of pretext

            or has  additional evidence of  specific intent as  well, the

            plaintiff  must  always  adduce  evidence  sufficient  for  a
                             ______

            rational  jury to  conclude that  the  employer's action  was

            motivated  by an  intent to  interfere  with ERISA  benefits.

                                         -17-
                                          17

            Because  Barbour relies largely on the same evidence to prove

            both pretext  and specific intent,  we now assess the  sum of

            that  evidence and  explain why it  is insufficient  to carry

            Barbour's burden.

                      Barbour points to  several facts both  disputed and

            undisputed that he  claims could lead  a reasonable juror  to

            infer that DRC's motivation was to interfere with his receipt

            of  disability  benefits.    Barbour  contends  that  he  was

            deliberately led  into a situation  in which DRC could  use a

            non-existent rule  to terminate  him.  As  evidence of  this,

            Barbour  points  to  Wilkinson's  provision  of  an   undated

            Disability Notice  on December  4 in order  to give  him more

            time to  obtain certification,  Nickles's alleged failure  to

            state  specifically that  the Certification  Form  had to  be

            returned by  a particular date,2 and  Wilkinson's instruction

            to Barbour  on December 22  that he should continue  with his

            efforts to obtain certification despite his difficulties.  We

            fail to  see how  a rational jury  could conclude  from these

            facts  that DRC deliberately misled Barbour into believing he

            could  take  as  much  time   as  he  needed  to  submit  the

            Certification Form.  No reasonable employee would assume that

                                
            ____________________

            2.  DRC disputes this allegation and claims that Nickles told
            Barbour on two occasions that the  Certification Form was due
            in the benefits office by December 18.  Even Barbour concedes
            that  Nickles  told him  to  return  the  form "as  early  as
            possible."  Because  this is a  motion for summary  judgment,
            however, we will review the facts in the light most favorable
            to Barbour. 

                                         -18-
                                          18

            he or she had an unlimited time period in which to justify an
                             _________

            absence.  Here, the Disability Notice Barbour received stated

            very  clearly that  a certification of  disability had  to be

            provided no later than ten days from the date of the  form or

            the commencement  of the leave,  whichever was later.   Since

            the Disability  Notice was  undated, Barbour had  unequivocal

            notice that  his ten-day period  began to run on  December 7,

            when he  voluntarily commenced his leave.  That Wilkinson and

            Nickles  told  Barbour  to  continue with  his  certification

            efforts when  it was apparent  that he could not  comply with

            the deadline does  not in any way indicate  a deliberate plan

            to mislead;  to the contrary, it demonstrates  that they were

            still willing to  consider his claim.   Barbour's own account

            of his conversation  with Wilkinson on December  22 indicates

            that  Wilkinson essentially told  Barbour that DRC  would see

            what it could do although he made no promises.3

                                
            ____________________

            3.  With   respect    to   our   dissenting    brother,   his
            characterization of this conversation is  but one in a series
            of skewed presentations of the evidence that, taken together,
            he argues would  permit a rational jury to  conclude that DRC
            managers  conspired to "induce" Barbour to take medical leave
            and "lull" him  into believing there would be no consequences
            for failing to return the medical forms  on time.  First, the
            dissent  suggests that DRC had approved a "medical disability
            leave" when Barbour  voluntarily began his absence  from work
            on December 7.  Infra  at 24.  Although DRC  provided Barbour
                            _____
            with the proper forms, the record contains no support for the
            inference  that Barbour's absence  beginning on that  day was
            approved or  induced  by  DRC.   Our  brother  finds  further
            support  for his    conspiracy  theory in  the  fact that  on
            December 22, Barbour  was "told [by Wilkinson] to continue to
                                       ____                __ ________ __
            seek medical  certification."   Infra at  26.   Barbour's own
            ____ _______  _____________     _____
            notes, however, state  that Wilkinson actually told  him that

                                         -19-
                                          19

                                
            ____________________

            he should "keep going with the Dr. certificate and they would
                                                           ___ ____ _____
            try to jump hurdles," and that "we will see if we can salvage
            ___ __ ____ _______
            this  thing."  Wilkinson's  choice of words  belies Barbour's
            assertion that DRC  soft-pedaled the trouble he was  in.  The
            assertion  is further  belied by  Barbour's own notes  of his
            conversation  with  Nickles  on  December  15,  in  which  he
            recorded that Nickles told him that he should not "get shook"
            by  the  form letter  she  had  sent  him, and  by  Barbour's
            December 18 message for  Nickles in which he told her that he
            did not want  to terminate.   See  infra at 25.   Why  should
                                          ___  _____
            Barbour "get shook" at all by a form letter unless he knew it
            contained some kind of ominous  warning?  And, if Barbour had
            no idea that he was flirting with termination on December 18,
            __ ____
            why did he  leave a message for  Nickles stating that  he did
            "not  want  to  terminate"?   The  particular  inferences the
            dissent would permit  the jury to draw from  this (and other)
            evidence  --  that  DRC  lured  an  unwary  Barbour   into  a
            bureaucratic  trap  --  are  patently  unreasonable  on  this
            record.
                      Similarly  misleading is  the dissent's  suggestion
            that    DRC's  misaddressing  of the  December  10  letter to
            Barbour, and,  in the dissent's underlined language, the fact
            that Nickles  "did [not]  ask for  Barbour's correct  mailing
                           ___  ___   ___ ___  _________ _______  _______
            address" when she spoke to  him on December 15, were evidence
            _______
            of nefarious doings.   Infra at 24 n.1, 25.   The December 10
                                   _____
            letter was addressed to Barbour at "P.O. Box 215, 88 Rogers."
            He  had apparently stopped  using the postal  box; the street
            address, however, was  correct.  One cannot  rationally infer
                                                         __________
            from  this that  Nickles  intended  that  Barbour  would  not
                                      ________
            receive the letter; the fact that Nickles  put both addresses
                                                           ____
            on the envelopes  -- with at  least a reasonable  probability
            that the  postal service  would direct  the  envelope to  the
            correct address --  is mighty strong evidence  of mistake and
            not deliberation.  That  Nickles failed to ask  for Barbour's
            correct mailing address,  simply in light of the  fact that a
            letter sent a few day earlier had not arrived yet, is of even
            less evidentiary value; it proves absolutely nothing. 
                      To   cite   a  final   example  of   the  dissent's
            indefensible  inference-drawing,   we  are   at  a  loss   to
            understand what possible weight is added to Barbour's case by
            the  statements  of  Wilkinson's   secretary  to  Barbour  on
            December 31.   Infra  at 26.   The  dissent cites  this as  a
                           _____
            "vicarious admission," but of  what?  Even assuming  that the
            secretary's  statements concerned matters within the scope of
            her employment, what  permissible negative inference could  a
            rational jury  draw  from  the fact  that  DRC  "evinced  its
            readiness to receive the medical form" even after Barbour had
            been  formally terminated?    Whatever  inferential leap  our

                                         -20-
                                          20

                      Barbour  also argues that the fact that the penalty

            of  termination  for  failure  to  comply  with  the  ten-day

            deadline is  not stated in  any of DRC's written  policies is

            evidence  that  DRC  fabricated  the  "policy"  in  order  to

            interfere with  his benefits.   In support of  this argument,

            Barbour directs  us to  the undisputed fact  that he  was the

            first employee ever terminated by  DRC for failing to  comply

            with   the  deadline.      In   addition,  Barbour   presents

            Certification Forms of  other employees  submitted after  the

            deadline had elapsed and there is no evidence indicating that

            these employees were terminated or denied disability benefits

            for their late submissions. 

                      Even  viewing the facts in the light most favorable

            to Barbour,  we agree  with the district  court that  at most

            these facts show  that DRC may  have acted inconsistently  in

            its  application of the policy regarding employees who turned

            in their Certification  Forms late.  Such  evidence, standing

            alone,  is  insufficient  to  demonstrate  intent  unless the

            inconsistent application  is  linked  with  a  motivation  to

            deprive  the  employee  of  benefits.   See,  e.g.,  Fong  v.
                                                    ___   ____   ____

                                
            ____________________

            brother is making here escapes us.
                      Contrary to  the dissent's characterization  of our
            holding, we do not mean to imply that the total assemblage of
            evidence compels  a particular  conclusion;  rather, we  hold
                     _______
            that the conclusion  that Barbour would have a  rational jury
                                                            ________
            draw  -- namely, that DRC set Barbour up to apply for medical
            leave so that it could fire him, and then lied about it -- is
            impermissible based on this evidence. 

                                         -21-
                                          21

            American Airlines, Inc.,  626 F.2d 759, 762 (9th  Cir. 1980);
            _______________________

            Teumer  v. General  Motors Corp.,  840 F.  Supp. 538,  548-50
            ______     _____________________

            (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that in an action under section 510

            of  ERISA,  the  plaintiff  cannot  show  pretext  simply  by

            demonstrating that the defendant applied its recall policy in

            an inconsistent manner,  but must adduce facts that allow the

            court to infer that the  defendant had the specific intent of

            interfering with  plaintiff's benefits),  aff'd, 34  F.3d 542
                                                      _____

            (7th Cir. 1994).

                      Here, we do not believe that specific intent can be

            inferred from  the fact that  Barbour was the  first employee

            ever  terminated for  missing  the  ten-day  deadline.    The

            Disability  Notice  clearly  states  that  an  employee  must
                                                                     ____

            provide medical certification  within ten days; as  we stated

            above, no reasonable employee would assume that he or she had

            an  unlimited time  in  which  to provide  it.   The  summary

            judgment   record  indicates  that   DRC's  decision  not  to

            terminate other employees  who submitted Certification  Forms

            late were based on extenuating circumstances absent from this

            case.  For example, DRC  had previously extended the deadline

            when an  employee's physician  contacted DRC  and advised  it

            that he or  she would be unable  to complete the form  within

            the specified time  period.  Similarly, extensions  were also

            granted  where an  employee was  hospitalized  and unable  to

            complete the form in a timely manner.

                                         -22-
                                          22

                      In   this  case,  DRC  was  never  contacted  by  a

            physician regarding Barbour's  illness, and  Barbour was  not

            hospitalized.  Having received the Disability  Notice clearly

            notifying him of the ten-day deadline, Barbour then failed to

            obtain an  appointment with a  physician willing to  sign the

            form  until December  30.   While  the delay  in obtaining  a

            doctor's signature may not have  been entirely his fault,  it

            was Barbour's  choice to  begin his  absence  on December  7,
                _________

            without any assurance  that he would obtain  certification of

            disability  within ten  days.   By December  22, DRC  had not

            received  any certification  of  disability and  Barbour  had

            informed  Wilkinson that  no future doctor's  appointment had

            been arranged.   It was this circumstance that  caused DRC to

            mail  the December  22  termination letter  to  Barbour.   An

            employer  need not remain idle indefinitely while an employee

            is absent without  excuse.  While DRC may have  chosen not to

            discharge  other  employees  for  missing  the  certification

            deadline, Barbour's case does not present similar extenuating

            circumstances  and,  therefore,  specific  intent  cannot  be

            inferred  from DRC's  actions.   Cf. Stratus,  40 F.3d  at 17
                                             ___ _______

            (Title VII  plaintiff alleging disparate treatment  must show

            that he or she was treated differently from persons similarly

            situated in all relevant aspects).

                      In addition, DRC's actions when Barbour finally did

            submit  certification   make  Barbour's  claim   of  unlawful

                                         -23-
                                          23

            motivation even more implausible.   Despite Barbour's failure

            to  comply  with  express  company policy,  DRC  nevertheless

            reviewed Barbour's disability  claim on January 7.   Although

            the form  was submitted over  two weeks late,  Nickles called

            Dr.  McCartin to  inquire  about  the  listed  disability  of

            "hypertension."     Based  on   what  she  learned   in  that

            conversation,  DRC chose not  to accept  Barbour's form  as a

            valid   certification  of  disability.4    Even  if  DRC  was

            mistaken in its  evaluation of Barbour's disability,  as long

            as that determination was in  good faith and formed the basis

            of the decision it is permissible under section 510.  Zappia,
                                                                  ______

            1993 WL  437676 at  *3.  Barbour  has failed  to produce  any

            evidence of bad faith.

                      Barbour  next argues  that specific  intent can  be

            inferred from  the mere  fact that  DRC  knew he  was in  the

            process of applying for benefits at the  time of termination.

            It is undisputed that Barbour informed Wilkinson on or around

            December  4 that he  was considering applying  for disability

                                
            ____________________

            4.  In fact, DRC set forth five justifications for its
            decision to deny Barbour's disability claim: (1) Dr. McCartin
            did not see Barbour until December 30, two weeks after the
            disability allegedly began; (2) the condition listed on the
            form, "hypertension," was different than the alcohol problem
            or bleeding condition which was expected given Barbour's
            previous statements to DRC supervisors; (3)  Barbour appeared
            to have been "shopping around" for a physician after Dr.
            Prescott refused to complete the form; (4) the length of
            disability (undetermined) did not coincide with medical
            guidelines; and (5) Barbour failed to keep his follow-up
            appointment with Dr. McCartin scheduled for January 7. 

                                         -24-
                                          24

            leave.  It  is also undisputed that during  their discussion,

            Barbour  and Wilkinson  discussed  the  odor  of  alcohol  on

            Barbour's breath and  the possibility of an  alcohol problem.

            However, these facts add little  to Barbour's proof:  "[E]ven

            if [Barbour] could  establish that [DRC] knew  that [Barbour]

            definitely planned to apply for . . . disability benefits, he

            would still  be  required to  offer some  evidence that  this

            knowledge  somehow  influenced"   DRC's  employment  actions.

            Corcoran v. GAB Business Servs.,  Inc., 723 F. Supp. 966, 971
            ________    __________________________

            (S.D.N.Y. 1989).   As was  the case in Corcoran,  Barbour has
                                                   ________

            failed to produce  any evidence suggesting that  the prospect

            of paying disability benefits influenced DRC's decisions.  To

            the contrary,  we find  it significant that  the option  of a

            medical   leave  of  absence  was  first  suggested  by  DRC.

            Barbour's  supervisor,  Zimmerman,   approached  Barbour  and

            suggested that  he apply for  a medical leave to  address his

            alcohol  problem.   Prior to  their  discussion, Barbour  was

            unaware that he  would even qualify for  disability benefits.

            We think it is highly  unlikely that DRC would have suggested

            such an option  if it ultimately intended  to deprive Barbour

            of benefits:   DRC had no way  of knowing that  Barbour would

            fail to submit the proper documentation.

                      Barbour finally  suggests that  a factfinder  could

            infer unlawful intent if DRC imposed criteria on Barbour that

            were  harsher  than  that imposed  on  other  employees whose

                                         -25-
                                          25

            illnesses were  less likely  to lead  to permanent  long-term

            disability.  Even if such  an inference would be permissible,

            Barbour has produced  no evidence that  his illness was  more

            likely  to  lead  to  long-term disability.    In  fact,  the

            evidence  strongly  suggests  that  DRC  would  have  granted

            Barbour  disability  benefits  had  he submitted  appropriate

            documentation  of his alcohol  condition.  In  1987 and 1988,

            DRC  provided disability  benefits to  all seventy-six  other

            employees who applied for disability benefits.   Of these, at

            least  sixteen employees applied  for and received disability

            benefits for conditions related to the abuse of alcohol.

                      In sum, we hold that Barbour has failed to  present

            evidence that would enable a reasonable jury to conclude that

            DRC's actions  were motivated by  a desire to  interfere with

            Barbour's benefits.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                      Because Barbour  has failed  to raise  an issue  of

            fact as to  whether DRC intended to interfere  with his ERISA

            benefits,  the   district  court  properly   granted  summary

            judgment in favor of DRC on Barbour's ERISA claim.

                      Affirmed.
                      _________

                                         -26-
                                          26

                                          Dissent follows.

                                         -27-
                                          27

                      CYR, Circuit  Judge (dissenting).  The  court aptly
                      CYR, Circuit  Judge (dissenting).
                           ______________

            acknowledges,   supra  at  p.   15,  that  an   inference  of
                            _____

            intentional  discrimination  is   "particularly"  appropriate

            where a "finding of pretext  is accompanied by a suspicion of

            mendacity,"  Hicks, 113  S.  Ct. at  2749, but  then abandons
                         _____

            basic summary judgment procedure en route to its holding that

            fair  findings  of  pretext and  suspicion  of  mendacity are

            precluded  on the  present record.    Allowed their  rightful

            role,  the  incumbent   requirements  that  all   credibility

            assessments  and fair inferences be indulged favorably to the

            party resisting  summary  judgment,  Woodman  v.  Haemonetics
                                                 _______      ___________

            Corp., 51 F.3d 1087,  1091 (1st Cir.  1995), do not admit  of
            _____

            the findings the court deems compelled.  
                                         _________

                      Conspicuously affected  by alcoholism  and in  poor

            health, Barbour had  used much of his sick  leave by December

            4, 1987.  On that day, his supervisor, Earl Zimmerman, called

            Barbour  aside and  asked whether  he  had considered  taking

            long-term  medical  disability   leave  ("medical  disability

            leave").  Upon learning that Barbour had never considered it,

            Zimmerman urged him to do so:  "It's a good deal, and I don't

            see why you shouldn't qualify for it.  I really would like to

            call John Wilkinson [DRC  vice-president for human resources]

            . . . and tell him you are on the way down to  see him and do

            that."  

                                         -28-
                                          28

                      On   Zimmerman's  advice,   Barbour  went   to  see

            Wilkinson, who handed him an undated medical disability leave
                                         _______

            form  to be returned  "within 10 days of  the date your leave

            commences or  the date of  this notice, whichever  is later."
                      __                                          _____

            (emphasis  added).   The  form itself  made  no mention  that

            failure to file on time  could result in termination, nor did

            Wilkinson ever mention  that it should be returned  by a date

            certain.

                      On December 7,  Barbour went on medical  disability

            leave.   Three  days later,  Patricia  Nickles, the  benefits

            administrator for DRC, mailed a certified letter warning that

            Barbour could be terminated if he did not return the enclosed

            medical certification  form (dated  December 10) by  December

            18.   As the letter was  misaddressed, Barbour never received

            it.5  

                      There  is  no  record evidence  that  DRC  had ever

            terminated or threatened to terminate an employee for failing

            to comply with  the ten-day filing provision.   Rather, on at

            least   ten   occasions  DRC   had   accepted  late   medical

            certification  forms.  Moreover,  this marked the  first time

                                
            ____________________

            5.  Although DRC had  the correct street address,  the letter
            had been addressed to a post office  box (as well as a street
            address) which  Barbour  had relinquished  sometime after  he
            moved in 1984. 

                                         -29-
                                          29

            that any DRC  employee had ever been threatened  with adverse

            action before the ten-day filing period had expired.6

                      On  December 15, Barbour  called to  advise Nickles

            that he  had been unable  to return the medical  form because

            his  physician   had  been   on  vacation.     During   their

            conversation,  Barbour  informed  Nickles that  he  had never

            received a certified letter dated December 10.   In response,

            Nickles simply  reassured Barbour  that a  "form letter  [had

            been] sent out.  Don't get shook.  We will work with  you but

            keep in touch."   She never mentioned that  failure to return

            the  completed form  within the  next three  days could,  let

            alone would, lead to Barbour's termination.  Moreover, though

            she knew  Barbour had never  received the December  10 letter
                                         ________

            warning  that termination could  result unless the  form were

            returned  by December 18,  Nickles neither mailed  nor handed

            Barbour another copy, nor did  she ask for Barbour's  correct
                                  ___ ___  ___ ___ ___ _________  _______

            mailing address.  
            _______ _______

                      On December 16,  Barbour's physician, a  specialist

            in hematology, advised him that the certification form should

            be completed  by a  general practitioner.   Although  Barbour

            left  telephone messages  with  John  Wilkinson's office,  so

            informing  him, the  calls  were never  returned.   Two  days

                                
            ____________________

            6.  On  one other  occasion,  in early  1988,  DRC warned  an
            employee  nineteen days after the ten-day period had elapsed.
                                    _____
            Thus,  the record supports a  fair inference that the ten-day
            provision was being applied inconsistently or  selectively at
            or about the time Barbour was terminated. 

                                         -30-
                                          30

            later,  on December 18    unbeknownst to Barbour the deadline
                                                                 ________

            for filing  the medical form     he left a  telephone message

            for Nickles:   "If you don't reach [me]  this morning, [I'll]

            get to you  this afternoon.  Having  trouble getting doctor's

            signature.  [Don't] want to terminate." (emphasis added).
                         _____  ____ __ _________

                      On December  21, after  conferring with  Wilkinson,
                                       _____  __________ ____  _________

            Nickles  telephoned  to   tell  Barbour  that  he   had  been

            terminated  for  failure  to  return  the  medical  forms  by

            December 18.   During their  telephone conversation,  Barbour

            volunteered his  correct mailing  address.   On December  22,

            Nickles  mailed Barbour  a  notice of  voluntary  termination
                                                   _________  ___________

            based on his  failure to return the required  medical form by

            December 18.   That same  day, in the belief  that Wilkinson,

            rather than  Nickles, had the  authority to act in  behalf of

            DRC, Barbour contacted  Wilkinson and was told to continue to
                                    _________         ____ __ ________ __

            seek medical certification.
            ____ _______ _____________

                      On December 30,  Barbour was examined by  a general

            practitioner, who diagnosed  hypertension.  At 9:45  a.m. the

            following day,  Barbour was  advised by  the doctor's  office

            that  the signed medical  certification form could  be picked

            up.   Barbour  immediately  informed  Wilkinson, through  his
                                        ________  _________

            secretary,  that the  form had  been signed.   The  record is

            silent as to whether  he told the  secretary that he did  not

            yet  have the form in hand.   The secretary told Barbour that

            was "fine" and Barbour should "bring [the]  form over today."
                 ____

                                         -31-
                                          31

            (emphasis  added).   Thus, as  late as  December 31,  DRC had

            evinced its readiness  to receive the medical form.   See id.
                                                                  ___ ___

            at 1094 (vicarious admissions by employee). 

                      Barbour did  not pick up  the form on  December 31,

            due to car trouble.  When  he called DRC during the afternoon

            of  December 31  to explain  the delay,  no one  answered the

            telephone.    Due  to  the  New  Year  holiday,  the  medical

            certification  form was not received by Barbour until January

            4, 1988, the next  business day.  He delivered it  to DRC the

            same day.  Yet on January 7, after conferring with Wilkinson,
                                         _____ __________ ____ _________

            Nickles sent a certified letter to Barbour informing him that

            his  claim for  medical  benefits  would  not  be  considered
                                               _____  ___  __  __________

            because Barbour had failed to  comply with the ten-day filing

            provision.7   On January  10, 1988, Barbour  finally received

            the missent termination letter dated December 22, 1987.

                      A rational  factfinder reasonably could  infer from

            the foregoing evidence that  DRC not only induced Barbour  to

            take  medical disability  leave  but  that  it  utilized  its

            hitherto  dormant ten-day filing  provision as a  pretext for

                                
            ____________________

            7.  Notwithstanding its  categorical notification  to Barbour
            that  the   disability  benefits  application  would  not  be
            considered, DRC now contends on appeal that it was considered
            and rejected on the basis  of late submission and because the
                                                          ___ _______ ___
            disability claim  was based on  hypertension, not alcoholism.
            __________ _____  ___ _____ __  ____________  ___ __________
            Should  this  belated  representation   be  credited  by  the
            factfinder, it could  buttress the inference that  failure to
            file the form  within ten days  was not the  true motive  for
                                                         ____
            terminating Barbour.   In  these circumstances, Barbour  need
            demonstrate no  more at  summary judgment.   See  Woodman, 51
                                                         ___  _______
            F.3d at 1094. 

                                         -32-
                                          32

            terminating Barbour after  it had misled and lulled  him into

            believing that the ten-day provision would not be enforced as
                                                       ___

            a ground for termination, all in order to avoid liability for

            an ERISA-based medical disability claim.  See id. at 1094. 
                                                      ___ ___

                      First,  short  of  ignoring  the  summary  judgment

            prescripts that  all credibility  assessments and  reasonable

            inferences are to  favor Barbour, see id. at  1091, it cannot
                                              ___ ___

            be inferred that Barbour  was ever informed, until after  the
                                                         _____ _____  ___

            ten-day period had expired,  that his employment could  be   
            _______ ______ ___ _______

            let alone would be     terminated for tardiness in filing the
                                   __________

            medical certification form.  On  the other hand, the trier of

            fact   reasonably   could   infer   from  Barbour's   initial

            conversation with John  Wilkinson, at which time  Barbour was

            handed an undated medical  certification form, that Wilkinson

            implicitly assured him  that the ten-day provision  would not

            be enforced against him.   Such an inference is  strengthened

            by the  December 15 statement  Nickles made to  Barbour, that

            though a certified letter had been sent to Barbour, he should

            not "get shook.  We will work with you but keep in touch."  

                      Second, even after Barbour was notified that he had

            been  terminated, he  received decidedly  mixed signals  from

            DRC.    Although  Nickles  informed  him  that  he  had  been

            terminated, her superior    Wilkinson    as late  as December
                            ________

            31 held open  the prospect that DRC would  accept the medical

            form.  Not  until January 10, 1988, when  he finally received

                                         -33-
                                          33

            the misaddressed  December 22, 1987, termination  letter, and

            the January 7 letter informing  him that the disability claim

            application would not be considered, was Barbour unambiguous-

            ly informed of the consequences of failing to comply with the

            ten-day provision.  By then, of course, it was too late. 

                      Finally,  the  bald  statement in  the  December 22

            termination letter  that  DRC had  presumed     based on  his
                                               ________

            failure  to return  the  medical forms      that Barbour  had

            voluntarily  terminated his  employment, notwithstanding  his
            ___________  __________

            flat advice to the contrary on  December 18, see supra p.  4,
                                                         ___ _____

            and  his ongoing efforts  to obtain medical  certification at

            DRC's suggestion, imperatively bespeaks pretext and mendacity

            with sufficient  clarity to  demonstrate that the  inferences

            relied  on by  DRC, and  endorsed  by the  majority, are  not

            compelled.8  
            _________

                      Since   it  cannot   be  demonstrated       without

            indulging    impermissible    inferences    and   credibility

            assessments     that a rational factfinder would be compelled
                                                                _________

            to find that  DRC did not actively encourage  Barbour to take
            __ ____           ___ ___

            medical   disability    leave   before    obtaining   medical

            certification, then  lull him  into the  fateful belief  that

                                
            ____________________

            8.  The spirited argument advanced by the court in defense of
            the   inferences  it  deems  compelled,  see  supra  note  3,
                                                     ___  _____
            necessarily   presumes   that   the   employer's   undeniably
            ambivalent  conduct can  only  have  been  activated  by  the
            innocent intent and motives ascribed to it by the court    an
            exercise appropriately reserved for the factfinder.

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                                          34

            strict compliance  with its ambivalent ten-day  filing policy

            would  not be  enforced, id.  at 1094-95  (prima facie  case,
                                     ___               _____ _____

            combined  with showing of pretext and suspicion of mendacity,

            precludes   summary   judgment   on  issue   of   intentional

            discrimination);  see generally, Hicks,  113 S. Ct.  at 2749,
                              ___ _________  _____

            2749 n.4  & 2756  (where plaintiff  adduces enough  competent

            evidence  to support  inference of  discrimination, the  case

            must go to the trier of fact), I respectfully dissent.
                                           _ ____________ _______

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