Court Opinion

ID: 9826965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:01:12.616465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:47:52.614490
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11635     Document: 43-1       Date Filed: 08/31/2023   Page: 1 of 15

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 22-11635
                             Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        REGINALD ANDREW PAULK, SR.,
                                                         Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        L. BENSON,
        D/S ID#13736, Palm Beach County Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce,
        ZACHARY O’NEIL,
        Assistant State Attorney, 15th Judicial Circuit Palm Beach,
        NICHOLAS KALEEO,
        Assistant State Attorney, 15th Judicial Circuit Palm Beach,
        DANIEL O’HEARON,
        in individual capacity,
        BRIAN LEOFFLER,
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        2                        Opinion of the Court               22-11635

        in individual capacity, et al.,

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                              ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cv-80126-RAR
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Reginald Paulk, through counsel, appeals the district court’s
        dismissal of his pro se amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint under
        the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
        (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. On appeal, he argues that the district
        court erred in concluding that he failed to state a claim for wrongful
        arrest and that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
        his amended complaint without first giving him another
        opportunity to amend. After review, we affirm.
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        22-11635                  Opinion of the Court                               3

                                     I.      Background
               In January 2022, Paulk filed a pro se civil complaint against
        various defendants under § 1983 alleging a variety of claims.1 Upon
        review, the district court concluded the complaint constituted an
        impermissible shotgun pleading and explained that because Paulk
        was pro se he was entitled to an opportunity to amend the
        complaint. The district court explained that the amended
        complaint must comply with both the local rules and the Federal
        Rules of Civil Procedure, including that the complaint should
        include a short and plain statement of each claim and should
        separate out each cause of action or claim for relief. Thereafter,
        Paulk filed his pro se amended complaint.
               As relevant to this appeal, 2 Paulk’s complaint alleged that
        two individuals, Daniel O’Hearon and Brian Leoffler, had stolen
        Paulk’s personal property and boating equipment from Paulk’s
        boat, which was docked in a boat harbor in Florida. On August 24,
        2019, when Paulk and his family were at the boat harbor, they
        observed the stolen items on Leoffler’s boat “in plain view,” and a
        physical confrontation ensued between Paulk and the two men.
        Paulk successfully retrieved his property. According to Paulk,
        O’Hearon and Leoffler left the marina but then returned two more

        1 At the time Paulk filed the complaint, he was incarcerated on charges

        unrelated to this case.
        2 Paulk asserted various claims against numerous defendants.    However, he
        appeals only the dismissal of the wrongful arrest claim. Therefore, this
        opinion omits discussion of allegations and defendants unrelated to that claim.
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                         22-11635

        times and tried to confront Paulk again. Paulk and his family then
        left the marina. That same day, however, O’Hearon and Leoffler
        called the police and, according to Paulk, falsely reported that
        Paulk had assaulted them while armed. Specifically, O’Hearon
        reported that Paulk “threatened him with a hand gun [sic]” while
        Leoffler reported that Paulk threatened him “with a 6-foot long
        pitchfork.”
               Based on the allegedly false allegations, police arrested Paulk
        the next day when he and his family were preparing to board their
        boat. The state charged Paulk with three counts of aggravated
        assault (later reduced to simple assault) and one count of criminal
        mischief; a trial ensued and a jury found him not guilty on all
        counts. 3 According to Paulk’s amended complaint, the arresting
        officer, Deputy Benson, failed to adequately investigate the case,
        arrested him without explanation, and without taking his
        statement, and acted with a racially discriminatory motive in
        arresting him.4
               Prior to any appearance by the defendants, the district court
        dismissed the complaint sua sponte under the screening provisions
        of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In relevant part, the district court concluded
        that the substance of Paulk’s claims against Deputy Benson

        3 The district court took judicial notice of the state court records.

        4 Paulk is black and O’Hearon and Leoffler are white.       Paulk did not allege
        Deputy Benson’s race.
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        22-11635                 Opinion of the Court                              5

        constituted a wrongful arrest claim. 5 However, the district court
        then concluded that Paulk failed to state a claim on which relief
        could be granted because Deputy Benson was entitled to qualified
        immunity as she had arguable probable cause to arrest Paulk based
        on O’Hearon’s and Leoffler’s statements. The district court
        explained that, even if Paulk was correct that O’Hearon and
        Leoffler had lied to the police, that fact was irrelevant to the
        probable cause analysis because there was no suggestion that
        Deputy Benson knew that their statements were false.
        Accordingly, because Deputy Benson had arguable probable cause,
        the district court concluded that she was entitled to qualified
        immunity and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
              Paulk timely appealed to this Court, and he moved for leave
        to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel in this
        Court. A judge of this Court granted Paulk leave to proceed and
        appointed counsel to represent him on appeal.
                                     II.     Discussion
             Paulk argues that the district court (1) erred in dismissing his
        wrongful arrest claim for failure to state a claim, and (2) abused its

        5 The district court also concluded that Paulk asserted an equal protection

        claim against Deputy Benson based on his allegations that Deputy Benson
        acted with a racially discriminatory motive. The district court denied the
        equal protection claim because Paulk “fail[ed] to allege that he was treated
        differently from any other ‘similarly situated’ person and instead improperly
        relie[d] upon ‘conclusory allegations or assertions of personal belief of
        disparate treatment or discriminatory intent.’” Paulk does not challenge the
        denial of this claim on appeal.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                    22-11635

        discretion in dismissing the amended complaint without first
        granting him another opportunity to amend on account of his pro
        se status.
                Before addressing the merits of Paulk’s claims, it is necessary
        to review the governing principles in this case. Under the PLRA,
        the district court is required to screen any “civil action in which a
        prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
        employee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “On review, the court shall
        identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
        of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails
        to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. . . .” Id.
        § 1915A(b). In conducting this review, the court must accept the
        allegations in the complaint as true and “construe them in the light
        most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Danglar v. Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.4th
        54, 55 n.1 (11th Cir. 2022). “If the complaint contains a claim that
        is facially subject to an affirmative defense, that claim may be
        dismissed” for failure to state a claim. LeFrere v. Quezada, 582 F.3d
        1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009). The same standards that apply to a
        dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) apply to
        dismissals under § 1915A. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276,
        1278–79 (11th Cir. 2001). “A district court’s decision to dismiss for
        failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is reviewed de
        novo[.]” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006).
        With these principles in mind, we turn to Paulk’s claims.
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        22-11635               Opinion of the Court                         7

           A. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Paulk’s
              wrongful arrest claim
               Paulk argues that the district court erred in concluding that
        his wrongful arrest allegations were insufficient to state a claim
        against Deputy Benson. He maintains that under Kingsland v. City
        of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), a wrongful arrest claim
        under the Fourth Amendment and § 1983 exists where, as here, an
        officer conducts an investigation in a biased fashion or ignores
        exculpatory information offered to her.
               “An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause
        violates the Constitution and can underpin a § 1983 claim . . . .” See
        Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010);
        see also Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir. 1990)
        (“Under the Fourth Amendment, . . . persons have the right not to
        be arrested without probable cause.”). The existence of actual
        probable cause, or arguable probable cause, however, “at the time
        of arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge
        to the arrest.” Gates v. Khokar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1297–98 (11th Cir.
        2018) (quotation omitted). “Whether an officer has probable or
        arguable probable cause . . . depends on the elements of the alleged
        crime and the operative fact pattern.” Id. at 1298 (quotation
        omitted).
               “To determine whether an officer had probable cause for an
        arrest, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then
        decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint
        of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11635

        cause.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56–57 (2018)
        (quotations omitted); see also Carter, 821 F.3d at 1319 (“We assess
        probable cased based on the totality of the circumstances.”
        (quotations omitted)). Of course, “[b]ecause probable cause deals
        with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances,
        it is a fluid concept that is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to
        a neat set of legal rules.” Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd, 941
        F.3d 504, 516 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted)). Indeed, it
        “requires only a probability or a substantial chance of criminal
        activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Wesby, 583 U.S.
        at 57 (quotations omitted). Far from an exacting standard,
        probable cause is “not a high bar.” Id.; see also Paez v. Mulvey, 915
        F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that probable cause
        “does not require anything close to conclusive proof or proof
        beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was in fact committed, or
        even a finding made by a preponderance of the evidence”).
               Arguable probable cause exists when a reasonable officer “in
        the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the
        defendant could have believed that probable cause existed to
        arrest.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298 (alteration adopted) (quotation
        omitted). “The concept of arguable probable cause therefore
        allows for the possibility that an officer might reasonably but
        mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present.” Id.
        (quotations omitted). “In determining whether arguable probable
        cause exists, [w]e apply an objective standard, asking whether the
        officer’s actions [were] objectively reasonable . . . regardless of the
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        22-11635                Opinion of the Court                          9

        officer’s underlying intent or motivation.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
        1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002).
               Here, the gravamen of Paulk’s argument is that his
        allegations established that Deputy Benson lacked even arguable
        probable cause because she conducted an inadequate investigation
        before arresting him. He maintains that she relied solely on the
        allegedly false statements of O’Hearon and Leoffler and she acted
        unreasonably under Kingsland in not obtaining Paulk’s side of the
        story prior to arresting him. We disagree.
                We recognized in Kingsland that “officers are not required to
        perform error-free investigations or independently investigate
        every proffered claim of innocence.” 382 F.3d at 1229 n.10. The
        plaintiff in Kingsland, however, alleged that the officers not only
        “turned a blind eye to immediately available exculpatory
        information” but essentially fabricated evidence in an effort to
        “exonerate” one of their fellow officers. Id. Specifically, the
        evidence indicated that, upon responding to the scene of an auto
        accident, Kingsland indicated that she was injured, but officers
        ignored her; officers spoke to the other party involved in the
        accident (who happened to be a fellow police officer), but no officer
        took Kingsland’s statement or spoke to any witnesses on scene, yet
        in the arrest report, officers stated that Kingsland had run a red light
        and was at fault for the accident; officers claimed to smell a
        marijuana odor coming from Kingsland’s vehicle, but never
        searched the vehicle or called in a canine unit, despite Kingsland’s
        assertions that she did not do drugs and no drugs were ever
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                   22-11635

        produced; officers administered field sobriety tests on Kingsland,
        despite her continued protestations that she was injured, felt dizzy
        and sick, and needed to go to the hospital; and when she failed the
        field sobriety tests, officers arrested her and charged her with
        driving under the influence of alcohol, but when the Breathalyzer
        tests came back negative, another officer told the first officer to
        charge Kingsland with driving under the influence of cannabis (but
        a drug test later came back negative). Id. at 1223–27. Thus, we
        concluded that summary judgment in favor of the officers was
        inappropriate because “a reasonable jury could find that the
        [officers’] investigation was deficient in that the officers consciously
        and deliberately did not make an effort to uncover reasonably
        discoverable, material information.” Id. at 1230.
               We have cautioned that Kingsland did not “establish[] that
        every failure by an officer to discover ‘easily discoverable facts’
        violates the Fourth Amendment.” Washington v. Rivera, 939 F.3d
        1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2019). Rather, the significant point in
        Kingsland was the jarring fact that a jury could have found that the
        officers fabricated evidence against the plaintiff. Id.; see also Huebner
        v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing
        Kingsland and emphasizing that in Kingsland the arresting officers
        not only failed to follow up and ignored exculpatory evidence but
        affirmatively misrepresented their intentions and may well have
        manufactured evidence to justify the arrest).
               There are stark differences between this case and Kingsland.
        Here, taking as true Paulk’s allegations that O’Hearon and Leoffler
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        22-11635               Opinion of the Court                        11

        were lying, Paulk does not allege that Deputy Benson knew that
        they were lying or that Deputy Benson fabricated evidence against
        him. Rather, he merely faults Deputy Benson from arresting him
        without first obtaining his side of the story. But we have never held
        that in order to have probable cause, much less arguable probable
        cause, an officer must first interview a defendant before
        effectuating an arrest. To the contrary, it is entirely reasonable for
        an officer to rely on the statements of the purported victims when
        determining whether he has probable cause to arrest. See Lee, 284
        F.3d at 1195 (“Arguable probable cause does not require an
        arresting officer to prove every element of a crime or to obtain a
        confession before making an arrest, which would negate the
        concept of probable cause and transform arresting officers into
        prosecutors.”). To be clear, “[p]olice officers are not expected to
        be lawyers or prosecutors,” and they are not required to resolve
        conflicting stories before effectuating an arrest. Huebner, 935 F.3d
        at 1188 (explaining that an arresting officer is not “required to sift
        through conflicting evidence or resolve issues of credibility” before
        making an arrest).
               Given the totality of the circumstances in this case viewed
        in the light most favorable to Paulk, arguable probable cause
        existed to arrest Paulk for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
        Faced with O’Hearon and Leoffler’s statements, a reasonable
        officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same
        knowledge as Deputy Benson had reason to believe that Paulk was
        involved in a confrontation with O’Hearon and Leoffler and that
        he threatened them with a deadly weapon during the
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                      22-11635

        confrontation. Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298. Thus, a reasonable officer
        possessing this information could have believed that probable
        cause existed to arrest Paulk for aggravated assault under Florida
        law. 6 Id. Because the existence of arguable probable cause defeats
        Paulk’s wrongful arrest claim, id., the district court did not err in
        sua sponte dismissing the claim for failure to state a claim on which
        relief could be granted under § 1915A.
               B. Whether the district court abused its discretion in
                  dismissing the amended complaint without giving Paulk
                  an additional opportunity to amend
               Paulk argues that because he was pro se and he had
        attempted to correct the deficiencies in his initial complaint by
        filing the amended complaint, the district court should have
        afforded him an additional opportunity to amend the complaint
        before dismissing it. He maintains that had he received the

        6 In Florida, an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon has four elements:

               (1) the defendant intentionally and unlawfully threatened,
               either by word or act, to do violence to the victim, (2) at the
               time, the defendant appeared to have the ability to carry out
               the threat, (3) the act of the defendant created in the mind of
               the victim a well-founded fear that violence was about to take
               place, and (4) the assault was with a deadly weapon.
        Howard v. State, 245 So. 3d 962, 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); accord Fla. Stat.
        § 784.021(1)(a) (defining aggravated assault as simple assault with a deadly
        weapon without the intent to kill). “A deadly weapon is defined as an
        instrument that will likely cause death or great bodily harm when used in the
        ordinary and usual manner contemplated by its design.” Brown v. State, 86 So.
        3d 569, 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
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        22-11635                Opinion of the Court                         13

        opportunity to amend, it is possible that he could have included
        additional allegations that would have supported the existence of a
        wrongful arrest claim against Deputy Benson, such as “what
        Deputy Benson knew before the arrest, the lack of any interaction
        with him prior to arrest, the existence and reactions of other
        eyewitnesses present at the public place of the supposed assault,
        and the availability of still other witnesses at the scene of his arrest
        who might have provided details about the supposed assault.”
               “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
        pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
        construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)
        (quotations omitted). Generally, where a more carefully drafted
        complaint might state a claim, the district court abuses its
        discretion if it does not provide a pro se plaintiff at least one
        opportunity to amend before the court dismisses with prejudice.
        See Woldeab v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291–92
        (11th Cir. 2018); see also Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir.
        1991) (same), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am.
        Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 543 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc). This rule
        applies even when the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend the
        complaint in the district court. Bank, 92 F.2d at 1112. A district
        court need not grant leave to amend however, if the plaintiff clearly
        indicates that he does not want to amend or if amendment would
        be futile because a more carefully crafted complaint would still not
        be able to state a claim. See Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291.
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                    22-11635

               Here, as required, the district court afforded Paulk one
        opportunity to amend his complaint. Once Paulk filed his
        amended complaint, nothing compelled the district court to
        continue to offer Paulk opportunities to further amend his
        complaint. See Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358–59
        (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that where the plaintiff is provided fair
        notice of the specific defects in his complaint and a meaningful
        chance to fix it but fails to correct the defects, the district court does
        not abuse its discretion by subsequently dismissing with prejudice
        on shotgun pleading grounds). Paulk’s speculative assertion on
        appeal that, if given a second opportunity to amend, he “may” have
        been able to include additional allegations related to the wrongful
        arrest claim does not establish that the district court abused its
        discretion in dismissing the complaint without affording him a
        second opportunity to amend. Moreover, it is clear that any
        further amendment would have been futile. Even assuming that
        Paulk included additional allegations about eyewitnesses to the
        confrontation and Deputy Benson’s lack of interaction with Paulk
        prior to his arrest, as discussed above, Deputy Benson was not
        required to sift through the evidence or resolve conflicting
        accounts of the incident before arresting Paulk. See Huebner, 935
        F.3d at 1188; Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195. Rather, arguable probable cause
        existed to arrest Paulk based on the statements of O’Hearon and
        Leoffler.
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        22-11635              Opinion of the Court                    15

                                 III.   Conclusion
              For the above reasons, we affirm the district court.
              AFFIRMED.