Court Opinion

ID: 9535414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:49:18.636066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:14.877728
License: Public Domain

*239WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I do so despite an awareness that the result achieved by the majority is consistent with an earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Young, 262 Pa.Super. 253, 396 A.2d 741 (1978) (Hester, J., dissenting). I dissent because, in my judgment, we are placing too rigid and too stringent an interpretation on the requirement found in Pa.R.Crim.P. 1409 that a probation violation hearing be held “as speedily as possible.”
Lavaughn Smith, appellant, was convicted of robbery in 1971 and placed on probation for five years, commencing April 10, 1971. On August 5, 1976, he was convicted of a theft which had occurred on March 15, 1976. He was sentenced for this new offense on November 12, 1976. On March 15, 1977, a probation violation hearing was held, probation was revoked, and a sentence of imprisonment imposed for not less than six months nor more than twelve months. This hearing took place 7V2 months after appellant’s conviction and four months after sentence for the new offense had been imposed.
The failure to hold an earlier probation violation hearing was explained by a busy court schedule. Appellant’s evidence failed to show that any actual prejudice had been caused by the delay. His conviction of the new offense did not occur until after the initial probation period had expired; and he was serving a sentence of imprisonment for the new offense at the time of his probation violation hearing. Therefore, it is difficult to perceive in what manner appellant was really prejudiced because the probation violation hearing did not take place until after the expiration of the original probationary period.
Probation is an effective rehabilitative tool. It deters future criminal activity, but only if the probationer understands that a new offense will result in its revocation and the imposition of a sentence of incarceration. To the extent that unnecessarily rigid time limitations render revocation uncertain, the effectiveness of probation is diluted. Therefore, I would not interpret Rule 1409 as imposing time *240restrictions upon probation violation hearings which are more stringent than those required by the due process clause of the United States Constitution. See: Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S.Ct. 204, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976).
The circumstances in the instant case lead me to conclude that the delay in holding the final probation violation hearing was not unreasonable. Therefore, I would affirm the action of the trial court.