Court Opinion

ID: 9381305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 17:03:28.276756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.583032
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/23 P. v. Miller CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                          F082858
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                            (Super. Ct. No. BF177511A)
                    v.

    RAYSHOUN GLENN MILLER,                                                              OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David R. Zulfa,
Judge.
         Spolin Law and Aaron Spolin for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Clara M.
Levers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
         Appellant Rayshoun Glenn Miller was convicted by jury of human trafficking
(Pen. Code,1 § 236.1, subd. (b); count 1); pimping (§ 266h, subd. (a); count 2); and
pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1); count 3). In a bifurcated court trial, the court found true

1        All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
an allegation that appellant had suffered a prior strike offense (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j);
1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)).
       As to count 1, appellant was sentenced to the upper term of 20 years, doubled to
40 years for the strike prior. As to counts 2 and 3, appellant was sentenced to the upper
term of six years, doubled to 12 years for each count, and the court stayed punishment as
to both counts pursuant to section 654.
       On appeal, appellant contends the court erred by declining to grant his request at
the beginning of his trial for a continuance to retain private counsel in place of his court-
appointed attorney. In supplemental briefing, he further contends he is entitled to
resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567).
Respondent concedes remand for resentencing is appropriate. We accept respondent’s
concession and remand for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
                                           FACTS
       Sierra testified that she moved to Fresno from Ohio in 2018 to live with her infant
son’s father and his family. When her son’s father was arrested and went to jail, his
family kicked Sierra out, and she became homeless. She was about 21 years old and did
not have a job or source of income. In February 2019, shortly after she was kicked out,
she met a woman named Marshai, who told her she and her son could stay with her.
       About 30 minutes after Sierra arrived at Marshai’s apartment with her son,
appellant arrived as well, and Marshai encouraged Sierra to talk to him. Appellant asked
Sierra what she wanted to do with her life and told her she could make money out of
town. He gave Sierra his phone number and instructed her to delete all her phone
contacts and social media accounts. Sierra gave all her money to appellant. Later that
day, Sierra and appellant took her son to appellant’s mother’s house and dropped him off
there, and appellant took Sierra to get her nails done.
       The next morning, Sierra, Marshai, and another woman went to a motel in
Bakersfield via an Uber paid for by appellant. Marshai paid for a motel room in cash.

                                              2.
Sierra was not sure what she would be doing, just that she could make money doing an
unspecified task. Sierra learned, however, she was there to prostitute herself. Sierra was
not ok with prostituting herself but had no way to leave, as she had no money.
       Once the three women had their room, a man came to the door and “picked” Sierra
out of the three women, and she had sex with him in exchange for money while Marshai
and the other woman waited in the bathroom. Sierra gave the money to Marshai, who in
turn sent the money to appellant. Men continued to come to the motel room, and it was
the “same thing over and over again.” Sierra did not keep any money from the acts of
prostitution. She, Marshai, and the other woman all engaged in acts of prostitution, and
she and the other woman both gave their money to Marshai. On one occasion, Sierra
transferred money directly to appellant. Sierra made about $500 per day and kept none of
it because she “wasn’t allowed to.” Marshai taught Sierra “everything that [she] was
supposed to do.”
       Sierra was at the motel engaging in prostitution for two weeks. Over the course of
those two weeks, she had between 10 and 20 “dates,” and performed sexual acts such as
sexual intercourse, oral sex, and “hand jobs.” Sierra never left the room; she ordered
food through UberEats, which was paid for by appellant. She had to ask appellant
permission to leave the room to get snacks. At one point, Marshai took her to the mall
and bought her clothes with cash. Sierra and the other women took half-naked selfies,
which were placed on a website with a description and phone number where men could
call and plan “dates.” Sierra did not want to engage in prostitution, but she had no way to
leave and she did not know if she would get to see her son if she left. On one occasion,
appellant showed up in Bakersfield because the women were not answering their phones
as they were asleep. He told them to get up because they were not supposed to be
sleeping and then left.
       After two weeks, Sierra, Marshai, and Sandy, another woman who was in a
different room at the motel when Sierra and Marshai arrived, went back to Fresno in an

                                            3.
Uber and stayed for a day or two. Appellant brought Sierra to see her son, and she got to
see him for two hours at Marshai’s apartment. Her son was sick and underweight. She
was upset and told Marshai, but nothing was done. Appellant took Sierra’s son back to
his mother’s house. Sierra let him because she did not know him well and did not know
what he would do to her. She wanted to spend the night with her son, but appellant told
her she could not. At one point, she went to Planned Parenthood with Marshai, appellant,
and Sandy to get checked for sexually transmitted diseases and to get condoms.
       While in Fresno, appellant “beat the shit out of” Sierra because she had been
arguing with Sandy. He choked her, slammed her to the couch, and backhanded her
across the face. Sierra was afraid appellant would kill her.
       Sierra also testified she had a romantic relationship with appellant, and that she
had sex with him, as well as with him and Marshai, at Marshai’s house.
       After the short stay in Fresno, Sierra returned to the motel in Bakersfield with
Marshai in an Uber paid for by appellant. When she returned to Bakersfield, it was “the
same thing over again.” Sierra was scared to leave, was scared of appellant, and was
afraid she would get back to Fresno and not know where her son was.
       Shortly after Sierra returned to Bakersfield, she decided to stop doing what she
was doing because she missed her son and felt like she had no freedom. She texted her
friend, and her friend called the police. The police arrived at her motel room while she
was with a “date” engaging in prostitution and arrested her. Police later were able to
recover Sierra’s son.
       Detective Frank McIntyre testified Sierra identified appellant as a “pimp” and
Marshai as a “bottom,” which McIntyre described as a woman who has had a long
established relationship with the pimp and serves as the “enforcer” or the person who
explains the rules to the prostitute and works alongside them to get the prostitute “up to
par with what the pimp wants from her.” Sierra informed McIntyre she was to text or call
appellant before every sexual transaction for approval of the monetary amounts she

                                             4.
would receive for each act, but had deleted the text messages because she was scared.
Sierra also told McIntyre that she had told appellant at one point that child protective
services and the police were looking for her, and appellant responded that child protective
services were not going to do anything, and “[y]ou’re not going anywhere.” Marshai also
told her the same thing.
       McIntyre further testified victims of human trafficking are often vulnerable, in
financial trouble, isolated, and/or prior victims of abuse. A pimp will use physical force
threats or violence or a romantic relationship to gain control over a human trafficking
victim. It is almost always the case for pimps to have sexual relationships with the
prostitutes. The pimp will be the only person that provides the victim with food, money,
or a place to stay. The pimps control the money prostitutes earn and it is common for
prostitutes to have to ask permission for certain things. Pimps will often isolate the
prostitute from family members and instruct them not to use social media. It is common
for pimps to mentally, emotionally, and physically abuse their prostitutes to keep them
from leaving.
       Sierra’s cell phone data revealed several attempts to get information on services
from churches and homeless shelters and searches for job applications beginning in late
January 2019. The data showed that in February 2019, Sierra began communicating with
Marshai and appellant, who was in her phone as “Ray Daddy.” The data revealed several
phone calls between Sierra and appellant, sometimes multiple calls per day, between
February 24, 2019 and March 6, 2019, as well as communications between other phone
numbers regarding price negotiations for sexual acts.
                                      DISCUSSION
I.     Denial of Appellant’s Request to Retain Private Counsel
       A.       Relevant Background
       Appellant was arraigned on the complaint on June 10, 2020, and was appointed
the public defender to represent him. The public defender represented appellant through

                                             5.
the preliminary hearing and arraignment on the information until September 25, 2020,
when the office declared a conflict, and appellant was referred to the Indigent Defense
Program (IDP) for appointment of new counsel. A trial date of October 5, 2020, had
been previously set.
       On October 2, 2020, IDP attorney Gregory Mitts was appointed to represent
appellant. The court vacated the October 5 trial date because Mitts was newly appointed
and had not received discovery. At a subsequent hearing, the court set a trial date of
November 30, 2020.
       On November 20, 2020, Mitts informed the court that appellant was anxious to
settle the case but that Mitts and the prosecutor were “still a bit apart.” The court
continued the trial date to December 7, 2020.
       On December 4, 2020, the parties confirmed the trial date. However, on
December 7, 2020, Mitts was quarantined due to COVID-19 and the trial was reset for
December 21, 2020.
       On December 21, 2020, both parties answered not ready for trial because of new
discovery. The trial date was continued to January 11, 2021, over appellant’s objection.
       On January 11, 2021, Sierra was present from Ohio and available to testify. The
prosecution answered ready, and Mitts answered not ready as he had just received more
discovery. The court found good cause to continue the trial to January 14, 2021.
       On January 14, 2021, the first day of trial, the court indicated that it had been
informed in chambers that appellant and his family “have been efforting [sic] to hire a
private attorney to represent” him. The court went on to explain the “problem that that
posed to the Court” was that the case had “been around for a while” and had been
assigned out to the trial court. The court explained for that reason, any new counsel
would have to be ready to proceed or show good cause as to why they should be allowed
to substitute in. The court further explained to appellant that he had “a right to have the
attorney of your choosing if you are paying for that attorney, [but] that is only one of

                                              6.
several competing factors that the Court would have to consider.” The court asked
appellant to confirm that the private attorney “has not officially been retained and is not
making an appearance today,” to which appellant responded, “Yes. He’s getting retained
today.” The court told appellant that was “the problem” because “we’re already in jury
trial today.” Appellant explained it was “the first effort that we are making today because
yesterday was a holiday, so they discussed it, she would come in today and give him the
money and she—later this week.” The court went on to say that it would be moving
forward with trial with appellant’s appointed counsel, and in limine motions would be
addressed that day and jury selection would start the next day.
       Appellant then informed the court he felt there was a “conflict of interest.” The
court responded by asking appellant if he was “asking to have a hearing to see if another
court-appointed attorney should be appointed?” Appellant replied, “I just want my
attorney. That’s all I want, sir.” The court expressed concern because “[t]here are
witnesses that are available that are from out of state, there are attorneys that have set
aside the time, the Court has set aside resources to conduct this trial.” The court
indicated it did not believe appellant was attempting to manipulate the court and that it
appeared appellant’s request was “sincere” but it had to “balance that desire and that
request with where we are in the proceedings.”
       Appellant told the court he did not believe that new counsel was needed earlier
and began to explain why he currently felt counsel was not prepared for trial. The court
then stated it would be conducting a Marsden2 hearing, noting “while [appellant’s] not
using the terms of art that I normally expect, I do believe that that is, ultimately, what he
is requesting.”
       At the closed hearing that followed, the court gave appellant the opportunity to
explain why he did not want Mitts to represent him. Appellant stated that his mother and
two sisters—witnesses he thought were important to his case—had not been interviewed,

2      People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

                                              7.
and he had never met or been given contact information for the defense’s private
investigator. Appellant explained that his family had had trouble getting into contact
with Mitts. Appellant also expressed frustration that Mitts was not making enough of an
effort to settle the case. Appellant told the court he wished to plead in exchange for
concurrent time with his four-year sentence in another case. Appellant also told the court
there were two occasions where Mitts had told appellant he was coming to see him but
had failed to do so. Appellant further explained that his “speedy trial rights ha[d] been
violated” and that Mitts allowed the prosecutor to trail the case too many times.
Appellant stated that the victim “was originally on my side” and willing to make a video
to that effect, but Mitts never contacted her.
       In response, Mitts noted he did attempt to negotiate an offer with the district
attorney but she was “passionate about this case” and “not in much of a settling mood.”
Mitts stated there was an offer of 20 or 30 years, and he had asked appellant what he
would like to counteroffer. Mitts represented to the prosecutor that appellant’s position
was he would accept the same offer as Marshai, who was originally a codefendant, for a
year in county jail and a three-year probation period. The prosecutor declined to extend
the offer, and she and Mitts reached an “impasse.” Mitts also indicated he had had some
trouble getting a private investigator appointed but that one he was familiar with had been
working with the defense for about a week or so. As for witnesses, Mitts expressed that
the “witnesses in this matter could cut both ways” and that he had “worked diligently on
this case” and was still considering, as a matter of trial strategy, which witnesses to call.
Mitts also stated he had recently visited appellant. He explained that he had learned that
appellant had called his diligence and work ethic into question with some of his family
members and, at his visit with appellant, he asked him if he wanted to bring a Marsden
motion, indicating it would not “hurt [his] feelings.” Appellant told Mitts he wanted to
keep him, that he had the money to hire an attorney, but wanted to keep his present
counsel.

                                                 8.
       When appellant was given a final opportunity to speak he stated, “Now, I feel
like—since we, like—how I should say—put each other on blast, now I really feel
uncomfortable with, you know, him representing me because of the things that I just, you
know, said.” Appellant noted, “what I’m saying [was] the truth, and the things he [Mitts]
said also were the truth.” Appellant stated he wanted a fair trial and that he “would get a
fairer trial if I can get an attorney that I’m paying, that I know would really fight for me,
you know, because he’s paid.” Appellant also noted that his family had discovered Mitts
was on a six-month probation period due to lack of filing motions and that “plays a part
and scares” him and his family.
       In ruling, the court assured appellant it also wanted appellant to have a fair trial.
Regarding settlement negotiations, the court pointed out there was a “big gap” between
the offer appellant received at the beginning of the case and the four-year concurrent
sentence he wished for. The court noted that “cases like this are not ones that [the district
attorney’s office] tend to negotiate,” and there was nothing defense counsel could do
about that. The court explained “if we were at a different stage in these proceedings, the
desire for a privately retained attorney and the ability to bring a privately retained
attorney into court would be analyzed perhaps a bit differently.” The court concluded
that granting appellant’s request to bring in private counsel would “unreasonably disrupt
the criminal proceedings.” It would require the court to grant a continuance, leading to a
further delay of the case, which, per the court was “already getting aged” because of
continuances due to a number of circumstances, including COVID-19. The court noted
the prosecution had witnesses in the county available for testimony and that appellant’s
family’s efforts to retain private counsel “were started much later in the process than they
should have been.”
       At that point, appellant again expressed concern that there were witnesses that had
not been interviewed. In response, the court asked Mitts to confirm that he was ready on
the case, to which Mitts responded he was. The court asked Mitts if “either directly or

                                              9.
through an investigator, have you or even by an offer of proof by somebody that may
have identified these witnesses, do you have a belief as to what they would testify to if
they were to be called as witnesses,” to which Mitts responded that he did. The court
then asked Mitts, “And is that part of the consideration that you are contemplating and
determining whether it is appropriate to call them,” to which Mitts responded, “Correct.”
Mitts added that he would rather elicit the pertinent information from prosecution
witnesses since presenting defense witnesses “can be a two-edged sword,” so that he
needed to wait until the prosecution’s case-in-chief was completed to make his decision
about witnesses.
       The court subsequently found there was not good cause to relieve defense counsel
as appellant’s attorney.
       Following the prosecution’s case-in-chief, defense counsel stated on the record,
out of the presence of the jury, his reasons for not calling witnesses on behalf of the
defense. He stated:

              “The three potential witnesses that we had contemplated were
       Marshai; Mrs. Lee, [appellant’s] mother; and one of his sisters. Upon
       reading Marshai’s statement to the law enforcement in this case, it would
       have been far more harmful than helpful to the defense issues of
       [appellant’s] character would have come up, prior bad acts, subsequent bad
       acts. It was just fraught with peril for very little benefit, and he and I
       agreed—as a matter of fact, it was his idea not to call her.

              “The mother had very little corroborative to say. Her only testimony
       would have been about the child of Sierra. However, as the Court knows,
       witnesses can go far and wide and expose the witness to cross-examination
       that could be hurtful to [appellant]. Again, the profit/loss analysis
       determined that she not testify.

              “The other was a sister named LaSheri. There is some possibility
       that she had a prostitution conviction or arrest on her record. That wouldn’t
       have gone over very well in this case. And, again, her testimony would
       have been de minimus at best in favor of the defense.

                                             10.
               “So, jointly, [appellant] and I decided that we’re satisfied with the
       state of the evidence as it stands and we are not in a position to call any
       witnesses who would benefit us.”
       B.     Analysis
       Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his request to retain private
counsel rather than proceed with appointed counsel, Mitts. Appellant frames this as one
general claim of error, citing a plethora of authority in support, including Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, Marsden and its progeny, and People v. Courts (1985)
37 Cal.3d 784 (Courts) and its progeny, at times conflating what we view as separate
claims of error. Thus, we find it necessary to reframe appellant’s argument slightly. In
our view, the trial court reasonably interpreted appellant’s request as two somewhat
separate but interrelated requests—a continuance request to obtain private counsel and an
independent request to have Mitts relieved (a Marsden request)—and conducted the
Marsden hearing to consider both, as appellant’s request to obtain private counsel was
based on his claim Mitts was unprepared for trial and other dissatisfactions with Mitts’s
performance.3 Thus, in reviewing appellant’s claim, we consider both requests and
address them separately, recognizing, like the trial court, that they are interrelated, as
consideration of both relies on many of the same facts.
       First, we explain the court did not err by declining appellant’s request to relieve
Mitts, independent of his request to obtain private counsel. Next, we separately conclude
the court did not err by denying appellant’s request to continue the trial so that he could
retain private counsel, recognizing the reason for his request was his dissatisfaction with
Mitts’s performance. Finally, to the extent appellant is arguing Mitts provided ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial, we conclude this claim is not properly before us, as
appellant’s briefing failed to contain reasoned argument in support of such claim.

3    We disagree with respondent’s characterization that appellant’s request was not a
Marsden motion. We defer to the trial court’s characterization of the request.

                                              11.
              1.      The Court’s Denial of Appellant’s Implicit Marsden Motion
       In considering whether to grant or deny a defendant’s motion to obtain new
counsel on the basis that his appointed counsel is providing inadequate representation,
commonly referred to as a Marsden motion, the trial court “must permit the defendant to
explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate
performance.” (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604.) “A defendant is entitled to
relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing adequate
representation or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.” (Ibid.) A trial
court’s inquiry is sufficient to develop a record for review when the court gives the
defendant a “full opportunity to air all of his complaints, and counsel to respond to
them.” (Id. at p. 606.)
       We review a court’s denial for abuse of discretion. Denial is not an abuse of
discretion “unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace counsel would
substantially impair the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.” (People v. Smith,
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 604.)
       Here, the trial court clearly gave appellant a full opportunity to air his complaints
and for counsel to respond to them. As we will explain, the court’s finding that Mitts
could adequately represent appellant and thus his right to effective representation was not
infringed upon was not an abuse of discretion.
       Appellant’s first contention with Mitts was that his mother and sister had not been
interviewed. Mitts, however, after diligent questioning by the court, assured the court he
was aware of what they would testify to, and because they could potentially be harmful to
the case, he had decided to see if he could elicit the same information through cross-
examination of the prosecution’s witnesses. He represented he was prepared for trial.
Whether to call certain witnesses is a matter of tactical or strategic decision. A defendant
does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to

                                              12.
an adequate and competent defense. (See People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142,
1162.) “Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by
themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ‘When a defendant chooses to be
represented by professional counsel, that counsel is “captain of the ship” and can make
all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant.’ ” (People v. Welch (1999)
20 Cal.4th 701, 728–729.) The trial court could reasonably conclude that Mitts’s failure
to interview certain witnesses did not interfere with appellant’s right to counsel.
       Appellant next contended Mitts had not adequately attempted to negotiate a plea
agreement with the prosecutor. The record indicates, however, that Mitts reasonably
attempted to negotiate settlement of the case. Appellant expressed he desired concurrent
time with a sentence he was serving in another case, and Mitts represented that he had
tried to negotiate for a similar offer, but the prosecutor declined. The record contains
support for Mitts’s representation that the prosecution would not agree to the sentence
appellant desired. The record indicates that on July 17, 2020, appellant rejected an offer
of the low term doubled to 16 years, and the prosecution rejected the counteroffer of
32 months. The record further indicates that on November 20, 2020, Mitts indicated he
and the prosecutor had had “brief conversations” with regard to settling the case because
appellant was “anxious to” do so, but that he and the prosecutor were “still a bit apart”
and he “d[id not] know how close we are going to get.” The court’s finding that Mitts
could not be faulted for failing to successfully negotiate a plea agreement was reasonable.
       With regard to appellant’s contention that Mitts had not visited him often enough,
the trial court was not compelled to relieve Mitts for that reason. The trial court
thoroughly inquired of Mitts his preparation for the case, and Mitts assured the court he
was ready for trial. When a court has satisfied itself that counsel is adequately prepared,
it may deny a Marsden motion even if he or she had not communicated fully with his or
her client. (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 580‒581.)

                                             13.
       Appellant also criticized Mitts for failing to create a video of the victim while she
was on appellant’s “side,” and allowing the district attorney to trail the case until she was
willing to testify. It is true the matter was continued a number of times over appellant’s
objection, for various reasons, but we cannot say the record indicates any incompetence
on Mitts’s behalf in requesting these continuances. Mitts requested continuances due to
being newly appointed, needing time to adequately prepare for trial to provide effective
assistance, and receiving new discovery that needed to be reviewed. At one point, after
announcing ready for trial, the trial date needed to be continued because Mitts had to be
quarantined due to COVID-19.
       Finally, with regard to Mitts’s previous disciplinary action, the court was not
unreasonable in not putting great weight on this. As respondent points out, a reviewing
court does not presume ineffective assistance of counsel based on previous or pending
disciplinary proceedings. (See People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 44.)
       In sum, the court could reasonably find that Mitts had not inadequately
represented appellant nor that they had become embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict
that would result in ineffective representation. Concluding the court did not abuse its
discretion by finding no good cause to relieve Mitts, we turn to the court’s denial of
appellant’s continuance request.

              2.     The Court’s Denial of Appellant’s Request for a Continuance to
                     Obtain Private Counsel
       “The right to the effective assistance of counsel ‘encompasses the right to retain
counsel of one’s own choosing.’ ” (Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 789.) Trial courts “are
required to ‘make all reasonable efforts to ensure that a defendant financially able to
retain an attorney of his own choosing can be represented by that attorney.’ ” (Id. at
p. 790.) The right to counsel of one’s choosing “ ‘can constitutionally be forced to yield
only when it will result in significant prejudice to the defendant himself or in a disruption
of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular

                                             14.
case.’ ” (Ibid.) “The right to such counsel ‘must be carefully weighed against other
values of substantial importance, such as that seeking to ensure orderly and expeditious
judicial administration, with a view toward an accommodation reasonable under the facts
of the particular case.’ ” (Ibid.)
       When a defendant is requesting a continuance to obtain counsel of his choosing,
“[a] continuance may be denied if the accused is ‘unjustifiably dilatory’ in obtaining
counsel, or ‘if he arbitrarily chooses to substitute counsel at the time of trial.’ ” (Courts,
supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 790‒791.) “[T]rial courts should accommodate such requests—
when they are linked to an assertion of the right to retained counsel—‘to the fullest extent
consistent with effective judicial administration.’ ” (Id. at p. 791.)
       We review for an abuse of discretion a court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for a
continuance to enable his retained counsel to prepare for trial. (Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d
at pp. 790‒791.) “[D]iscretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of
reason, all circumstances being considered.” (People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907,
920.) “In deciding whether the denial of a continuance was so arbitrary as to violate due
process, the reviewing court looks to the circumstances of each case, ‘particularly in the
reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request [was] denied.’ ” (Courts, at
p. 791.)
       Appellant contends the seminal case—Courts—is factually on point. We disagree.
In Courts, the defendant, charged with murder and use of a firearm, was appointed the
public defender to represent him. He was arraigned on July 19, and a trial date was set
for October 26. (Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 787.) In early September, appellant
approached private counsel, Russell Swartz, with the intention of obtaining his services
for trial. (Ibid.) At the time, the defendant could not afford Swartz’s services but told
him he wanted to try to raise the retainer, and the two met several times to discuss fee
arrangements and other aspects of the case. (Ibid.) On October 18, at a trial setting
conference, the public defender informed the court that the defendant wanted a

                                              15.
continuance in order to obtain private counsel. (Ibid.) The defendant informed the court
Swartz had been on vacation, and the defendant was unable to conclude financial
arrangements. (Id. at pp. 787‒788.) The court denied the request stating it was “too
late.” (Id. at p. 788.) The defendant continued to meet with Swartz and on October 21,
paid a retainer. (Ibid.) Both Swartz’s office and the public defender attempted to
calendar a date for substitution but were unsuccessful. (Ibid.) On October 26, the judge
who had conducted the pretrial proceedings was disqualified. (Ibid.) The public
defender renewed the motion for a continuance before the new judge, and Swartz testified
he was willing to represent the defendant but that a continuance was necessary. (Ibid.)
The court denied the request because the “retainer” in effect was “not a retainer” since it
was accepted on the ground there would be a continuance. (Ibid.) The court
subsequently reconsidered the motion, including a new declaration by the defendant
outlining the steps he took to retain Swartz, and denied it again without comment. (Id. at
pp. 788‒789.) Trial commenced, and the jury found the defendant guilty of involuntary
manslaughter and the gun allegation true. (Id. at p. 789.)
       The Supreme Court found the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
continuance noting the record “establishe[d] that [the defendant] engaged in a good faith,
diligent effort to obtain the substitution of counsel [nearly two months] before the
scheduled trial date.” (Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 791.) The Courts court reasoned
that as the defendant had established an attorney-client relationship with Swartz and was
not requesting a continuance to obtain private counsel, he was not “ ‘unjustifiably
dilatory’ in attempting to obtain the services of counsel of his own choosing.” (Ibid.)
The court explained that the defendant’s first request was timely yet “premature” as a
retainer had not been paid. It nonetheless concluded the trial court’s comment that it was
“ ‘too late’ ” was “not a correct reading of the law.” (Id. at p. 792.) The Courts court,
relying on the defendant’s subsequent steps to pay the retainer three days later, noted that
the defendant’s diligence in securing private counsel was genuine. (Id. at p. 794.) The

                                            16.
court concluded the defendant had taken “reasonable and timely steps to create a
relationship with private counsel.” (Ibid.) In contrast, the Courts court found “no
circumstances which warranted the limitation of [the defendant’s] right to counsel based
on considerations of judicial efficiency,” noting no evidence on the record that the court
or parties would be inconvenienced by a continuance, such as evidence of congestion of
the courts or hardship of witnesses or jurors. (Id. at pp. 794‒795.)
       The trial court here did not abuse its discretion by concluding Courts was
distinguishable and that appellant’s request constituted an “unreasonable disruption to our
criminal proceedings.” Here, in contrast to Courts, where “a lawyer-client relationship
had been established,” appellant had not yet retained private counsel at the time he made
his request. The trial court was thus faced with the “ ‘uncertainties and contingencies’ ”
of an accused who wanted a continuance to obtain private counsel. (Courts, supra,
37 Cal.3d at p. 791; People v. Butcher (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 63, 69 [reviewing court
found abuse of discretion where “[the] [a]ppellant was not requesting a continuance to
obtain private counsel and the court was not faced with the uncertainties and
contingencies of that circumstance [and the] [a]ppellant’s privately retained counsel was
before the court and willing to commit himself to a date one week hence.”].) Appellant
admitted to the trial court that his family would be making their “first effort” to pay the
retainer that day and offered no other information about his desired counsel’s availability
or when they would be prepared for trial. This contrasts with the well-developed record
of the attorney-client relationship that had been established in Courts. Further, unlike
Courts, where “the prosecutor failed to express any valid concern about an inconvenience
to witnesses which might have resulted if a continuance had been granted” (Courts, at
pp. 794‒795), in the present case, the prosecution had arranged for Sierra to travel from
out of state to testify. Sierra was available on January 11, and the matter had to be
continued three days because the defense had just received new discovery.

                                             17.
       Appellant contends “grave concerns of appointed counsel’s inadequate
representation should have been factored into the trial court’s decision.” (Unnecessary
capitalization omitted.) This contention is belied by the fact that the trial court conducted
a Marsden hearing, giving appellant ample opportunity to explain the alleged problems
with Mitts’s performance and engaging in a thorough inquiry of appellant and Mitts
regarding appellant’s allegations. As we have stated, the trial court appeared to consider
appellant’s request as both a continuance to obtain private counsel as well as a Marsden
motion and considered the alleged inadequacies in making its decisions on both. The
record indicates the court took appellant’s claims seriously and, had there been a showing
of ineffectiveness, would have considered either substituting other counsel or allowing
appellant more time to retain private counsel.
       In considering all the circumstances surrounding appellant’s request, we conclude
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request for a continuance to
retain private counsel.

              3.     Appellant’s Suggestion that Mitts Provided Ineffective
                     Assistance of Counsel
       Finally, to the extent appellant is arguing Mitts actually provided ineffective
assistance of counsel during trial, we reject this claim. Appellant focuses the vast
majority of his briefing on the trial court’s denial of his request to obtain private counsel,
as well as the court’s declining to relieve Mitts at the commencement of trial based on
appellant’s representations he was not adequately prepared for trial. At the end of his
opening brief, however, he lists several ways Mitts’s representation put appellant at a
“disadvantage”: “the failure of counsel to file a Pitchess[4] motion, in regard to the
possible influence of the most critical testimony of the victim witness (given that when
the investigating officer was interviewing this witness a second time, he had promised

4      Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

                                             18.
that if she corroborated, she could get her son back from Child Protective Services[;][5]
failure of counsel to effectively investigate the victim witness’s extraneous offense
involving an arrest for loitering in a public place with intent to commit prostitution,
which a relative of [appellant] had discovered[;][6] failure of counsel to state outside the

5       Mitts cross-examined Detective McIntyre extensively on this topic. It was
revealed that during an interview with Sierra, McIntyre said, “[W]e’re just going to ask
you to look through your phone to see if you have any messages from [Marshai] to kind
of corroborate what happened. That way, we can get your son back. And if she … tell us
what she’s doing, you know what I’m saying? As opposed to denying everything and
putting this on you.” Mitts questioned McIntyre about whether he told Sierra that if she
cooperated he would help her get her son back, and McIntyre denied that was the “way
that it was said.” McIntyre further denied, following more questioning from Mitts, that
he indicated to Sierra he had the “power” to get her son back. McIntyre explained:
“Well, did I tell her, ‘I have the power to give you your son back’? If that’s how it’s
interpreted, that’s not what I meant. That’s certainly not what she thought as well, given
our entire conversation. I told her that her child was under CPS custody. I never told her
that if you do, this I will give you your child back. I have no right to tell her that because
I don’t have that power.”
       Mitts questioned Sierra on this topic as well. He asked her, “did [the police] say
anything to the [e]ffect that, you know, ‘If you tell us the truth, maybe there’s something
we can do. If you lie to us, then we can’t help you with CPS’?” Sierra responded, “No.
They automatically told me that he was going to foster care because of the situation.”
Mitts asked Sierra, “Did it enter your mind that if you told the officers what they wanted
to hear, that you had a better chance of getting your child back from Child Protective
Services?” Sierra responded, “No.”
       When the prosecutor asked McIntyre on direct examination if he threatened Sierra
regarding the custody of her child, he answered, “Absolutely not. Our main goal at that
point was to recover the child safely.”
6      During Sierra’s testimony, Mitts sought to introduce evidence of Sierra’s
conviction for loitering in a public place with the intent to prostitute, the arrest for which
happened three weeks after the incident underlying the present case. As to the late
discovery of this conviction, Mitts explained: “[The prosecutor] and I went over the RAP
sheet and this wasn’t on the RAP sheet. I had … my investigator … run the RAP sheet.
He got the same thing that [the prosecutor] got, and it was only until one of defendant’s
relatives found it on the Fresno County Superior Court website that I became aware of
it.”
       The court ruled the evidence was admissible over the prosecutor’s objection. The
prosecutor raised the issue with Sierra on redirect examination and she explained she was
waiting for a ride and was not intending to engage in prostitution. Mitts questioned her

                                             19.
presence of the jury his intent to call to the stand: Marshai Roberson, Mr. Miller’s
mother, Tabitha Lee, and Mr. Miller’s sister, LaSheri.[7]” Appellant also spends a
substantial amount of his briefing discussing the case of Brooks v. Yates (9th Cir. 2016)
818 F.3d 532, 533 (Brooks), where the appellant, who had been represented by Mitts,
appealed from the dismissal of a habeas petition as untimely. The Ninth Circuit found
the district court abused its discretion by concluding Mitts had not “abandoned” the
appellant for the purposes of applying equitable tolling. (Id. at p. 534.) The court noted
the record demonstrated that Mitts was “grossly negligent” in his representation of the
appellant by failing to respond to the court’s order to show cause why the petition should
not be dismissed as untimely, and failing to communicate with the appellant in general
regarding the order. (Id. at pp. 534‒535.)
       To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, appellant must establish
that (1) the performance of his trial counsel fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) prejudice occurred as a result. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569.) “When examining
an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical
decisions, and there is a presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. It is particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of
ineffective assistance. On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical
purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed
to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All other claims

on the case on recross-examination, and she revealed she pled no contest in exchange for
a conditional dismissal but the case was never dismissed. Sierra said she had “[n]o
explanation” as to why she was in a place where prostitution was prevalent only weeks
after the incident underlying the present case.
7      This is a misrepresentation of the record. At page 678 of the reporter’s transcript,
Mitts began his explanation of why he did not call certain witnesses directly after the
court noted, “The jury is not present. We are in open court, but without the jury present.”

                                             20.
of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.”
(People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
         To establish prejudice under Strickland, an appellant “ ‘must establish “prejudice
as a ‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or
omissions of counsel.” ’ ” (In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 1016.) “ ‘[I]t is not enough
“to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” ’
[Citation.] To show prejudice, [the] defendant must show a reasonable probability that
he would have received a more favorable result had counsel’s performance not been
deficient. [Citations.] ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.’ [Citations.] ‘The likelihood of a different result must be
substantial, not just conceivable.’ ” (People v. Rogers (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1353,
1367.)
         Here, appellant goes into little detail about how any of Mitts’s specific acts or
omissions constituted ineffective assistance and, more importantly, does not go into any
detail of how they resulted in Strickland prejudice. Appellant’s comparison to Brooks
and his conclusion that this court should find, like the Ninth Circuit did in Brooks, that
Mitts was “grossly negligent,” is not persuasive. Except for the fact that Mitts was the
attorney, Brooks shares few similarities to the present case. It was in a vastly different
procedural stance, considered a different issue, and, most importantly, Mitts’s
performance actually resulted in an adverse effect on the appellant—the dismissal of his
petition. As we have stated, appellant has not established, nor attempted to establish, a
reasonable probability he would have received a more favorable outcome had it not been
for Mitts’s alleged deficiencies.
         Without further discussion, we conclude appellant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is not properly before us and reject it. (See People v. Stanley (1995)
10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [“ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of

                                               21.
authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may
treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.’ ”].)
II.    Senate Bill 567
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, restricting a
trial court’s sentencing discretion, including its ability to impose the upper term for a
conviction. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Pursuant to Senate Bill 567, section 1170 now
precludes a trial court from imposing a sentence exceeding the middle term for any
offense with a sentencing triad, unless “there are circumstances in aggravation of the
crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) In other words, Senate Bill 567 provides for a
presumptive middle term absent the presence of circumstances in aggravation, the facts
underlying which have either been stipulated to by the defendant or proven beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (2); People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 459, 464.)
       Here, the court found the following circumstances in aggravation: (1) “the victim
was particularly vulnerable”; (2) appellant “induced others to participate in the
commission of the crime or occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other
participants in its commission”; (3) appellant “potentially” unlawfully prevented or
dissuaded witnesses from testifying; (4) “the manner in which the crime was carried out
indicates planning, sophistication, or professionalism”; (5) appellant “has engaged in
violent conduct which indicates a serious danger to society as evidenced by the current
case and prior convictions for [section] 246, and [section] 273.5(a)”; (6) appellant’s
“prior convictions as an adult and sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings
are numerous”; (7) appellant “has served two prior prison terms”; (8) appellant “was on
post-release community supervision when this crime occurred”; and (9) appellant’s “prior

                                              22.
perform on felony probation, parole, and post-release community supervision was
unsatisfactory in that he failed to comply with the terms and re-offended.”
       The parties agree, as do we, the amended version of section 1170, subdivision (b)
applies retroactively in this case as an ameliorative change in the law applicable to all
nonfinal convictions on appeal. (See People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032,
1039.) The parties further agree that remand for resentencing is required. Without
further discussion, we remand for resentencing.
                                       DISPOSITION
       Appellant’s convictions are affirmed. The matter is remanded for resentencing in
compliance with all applicable laws.

                                                           DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

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