Court Opinion

ID: 9447067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:24:22.571958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:53.133795
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The court below sitting without jury, in my opinion, tried this case with unusual skill and care, setting forth in detail its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which, to my mind, are amply supported by the evidence. I think, therefore, that we should affirm its judgment.
The court below set about to discover, as was its duty, the intent of the parties to this contract. Since the parties had executed writings, it followed the standard set up by this Court as applicable in such cases:1
“It is the court’s duty, if it can, to determine the intent of the parties from the writing they executed, construed from the standpoint of the parties, circumstanced as they were, 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, § 227, § 229 and § 247 et seq.”
The court found also, as anyone would find, it seems to me, from examining the writings involved in this action, that the writings were “not sufficiently clear, definite, explicit and harmonious”2 to enable it to discover the intent of the parties “without resort to the aids conventionally employed to assist in arriving at the intention of the parties to a written instrument.”
The contract originally executed between the parties was indefinite in the quantity of limestone rock to be transported, the amount ranging between 100,000 and 125,000 cubic yards; the point where it was to be picked up was indefinite, as was the point at which it was to be unloaded. No time of delivery was specified, at least by any direct words. The majority evidently assumes that the time element was spelled out by the contract terms requiring Gateo to furnish for the undertaking “a minimum of two tugs and four barges.” That did not exempt Gateo from furnishing a larger number of tugs and barges. It is clear, moreover, that the size of the tugs and barges was not fixed. All of these provisions of the writing made it plain that the written language was not “clear, *549definite, explicit and harmonious.” The court was, therefore, at liberty, indeed was required, to resort to all of the aids normally looked to by courts for assistance in determining the meaning of words which are not clear and explicit.
The conclusion reached by the court below was amply justified, it seems to me, if it looked alone to the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the writing was executed and the setting in which the execution took place. That, every court ought to do in construing every contract. We expressed such a view many years ago in T. B. Walker Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co., 5 Cir., 1912, 200 F. 529, 531. Under facts quite similar to those here, we stated the rule thus:
“The questions presented by these contentions may not be entirely free from doubt if, in the consideration of the contract, we were confined to what appears in the writing. We are not so confined. We look, not only to the language employed, but to the subject-matter, the course of dealing between the parties, and all the relevant surrounding circumstances. The court is not shut out from the light which the parties enjoyed when the contract was made. In determining the meaning of the words used and the intention of the parties, we place ourselves in the situation of the parties, so as to view the circumstances as they viewed them. In that way we endeavor to get at the correct application of the language to the things described and at the real intention of the parties.” 3
With respect to the extremely important time element the court below made this finding based upon the tests and aids approved in the foregoing quotation and citations:
“Although the writing dated February 24, 1956 did not specify the period of time within which Gateo was to complete the transportation of the limestone rock, at the time the agreement was negotiated and executed, Gateo had been informed by plaintiff and knew that the rock to be transported was that required for the performance of plaintiff’s contract with the Florida State Turnpike Authority, that plaintiff had only 150 calendar days after February 20, 1956 to complete its contract with the Turnpike Authority, that all the rock would have to be transported to the Stuart unloading dock at least thirty days before the expiration of the performance period in order for plaintiff to complete on time its contract with the Turnpike Authority, and that plaintiff was gearing its operations to handle 2,000 cubic yards of rock per day. Gateo represented to plaintiff that it could and would transport the rock in the quantities and within the time required by plaintiff’s needs under plaintiff’s contract with the Turnpike Authority. The agreement of February 20, 1956, was intended and understood by both parties thereto to be a contract for the transportation by Gateo of the rock in the quantities and within the time known by both parties to be required under plaintiff’s contract with the Turnpike Authority.”
The trial court found also that Gatco’s performance caused numerous interruptions and delays in supplying the limestone rock; that it threatened to abandon all attempts to perform under its contract; that Dickerson obtained barges and other facilities which Gateo claimed it could not come by; that Gateo did not operate its equipment full time, but *550spasmodically; that Dickerson increased the unit payment for the rock and did everything possible to induce Gateo to perform what was clearly its obligation. The damages sustained by Dickerson were itemized by the court below, which sat through a very long trial, hearing many witnesses and considering many exhibits. Its findings were, in my opinion, clearly correct and not clearly erroneous. I dissent, therefore, from the opinion rendered by this Court reversing the action of the trial court.

. Major Appliance Co. v. Hupp Corp., 5 Cir., 1958, 254 F.2d 503, 505. And see Baker v. Nason, 5 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 483; Petroleum Financial Corp. v. Cockburn, 5 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 312; Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Farm Air Service Inc., 5 Cir., 1958, 255 F.2d 658.

. Major Appliance Co. v. Hupp Corp., supra, 254 F.2d at page 507.

. This general rule is well stated in 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 247, pp. 784-786, and the text is based in part on two Florida decisions, Heisler v. Marceau, 95 Fla. 135, 116 So. 447, and Holmes v. Kilgore, 89 Fla. 194, 103 So. 825. Cited also are a large number of cases from the Supreme Court of the United States and the Courts of Appeal of the several circuits, as well as cases from thirty-one states. And cf. also 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1159, pp. 1011 et seq.