Court Opinion

ID: 9675227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:46:00.794408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:32.265801
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the manner in which the Court disposes of this case. I concur with the holding of the Court that under Article 46a the child-placing agency stands in loco parentis to the child and is clothed with the authority to give or withhold the consent necessary to the entry of a judgment for adoption. This consent was not obtained by Appellees. It is apparently the law that parental consent in similar cases is jurisdictional. Burran v. Fuller, *696248 S.W.2d 1015 (Tex.Civ.App.1952, reversed on other grounds) 151 Tex. 335, 250 S.W.2d 587 (1952); Woodall v. Schmudlach, 299 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Civ.App.1957, no writ); Pearce v. Harris, 134 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.Civ.App.1939, no writ); Platt v. Moore, 183 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.Civ.App.1944, writ ref’d. w. o. m.).
Consequently, under the holding of Catholic Charities of Diocese of Galveston v. Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d 111 (1960) it would be but a logical step to hold that consent of the child-placing agency is jurisdictional.
If the lack of consent of the adoption agency raises a jurisdictional problem there can be no legal basis, under the facts of this case to construe the adoption act to allow strangers (here the Appellees), after the death of the natural mother who has given her consent to the child-placing agency, to accomplish that which the Courts of this State would not permit the natural mother to do while living. The natural father would have no standing to seek adoption of a child born out of wedlock unless the child was legitimatized by a marriage of its parents according to Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.1965). Where a father would not be allowed to intervene in an adoption proceeding, certainly strangers to the cause of action should not be placed in a better position than the natural father or even the natural mother if she were yet alive. Consequently, in my opinion, the Appellants’ point that Appellees have no standing before the Court is valid. Holloway v. Currie, 388 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Civ.App.1965, no writ); 44 Tex.Jur.2d, Sec. 7, page 145.
Inasmuch as the trial court should have dismissed the case, I would hold that the case should be dismissed. Tex.R.Civ.P. 434.
In the prior opinion of the majority of the court, no disposition was made of appellants’ point complaining of error by the court in overruling the plea of privilege of the adoptive parents.
Upon consideration of that point we are of the opinion that the court properly overruled appellants’ plea of privilege. Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 46a, Section 1, specifies venue for adoption cases. See also Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 1995, Section 30, In Re Alls’ Adoption, 278 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.Civ.App.1955, no writ). Art. 46a, Section 1, provides, in part, that “if such child were placed for adoption by a child-placing institution”, suit for adoption may be filed in the county of the residence of the petitioner, or in. the county of the residence of the child, or in the county where the child-placing institution is situated.
The child-placing institution, Lutheran Social Service, Inc., is located in Travis County. Travis County is also the county of the residence of the child, since Lutheran Social Service, Inc. still retains custody of the child. See Peacock v. Bradshaw, 145 Tex. 68, 194 S.W.2d 551 (1946).
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Motion overruled.